THE
SEVEN GREAT MONARCHIES
Jeº-º-º-º-º-º---------, - .
OF THE * A • { ( (.
...~~~~~~~...~~~
ANCIENT EASTERN WORLD:
OR,
THE HISTORY, GEOGRAPHY, AND ANTIQUITIES OF CHALDAA, ASSYRIA,
BABYLON, MEDIA, PERSIA, PARTHIA, AND SASSANIAN, .
OR, NEW PERSIAN EMPIRE.
BY
GEORGE RAWLINSON, M.A.,
CAMDEN PROFESSOR OF ANCIENT HISTORY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD,
IN THREE VOLUMES.–VOLUME III.
Čáif) flaps amū 3|Iustrations.
NEW YORK :
JOHN B. ALDEN, PUBLISHER,
1885.
Đ5
Ø2.
. Q27
| 985
V, 2.
TROW"3
PRIntna AND sookeinding company,
YORKs
contRNTs of vol. III. -
CHAPTER I.
PAGE
Geography of Parthia Proper. Character of the Region. Climate. Character
of the surrounding countries............. & © e º e s = e º & e º is ºw s, ºr * * * * *gw- e s sº e see e s tº e.e-e, e.e.-e ‘s.ege
-CHAPTER II. *.
Early notices of the Parthians. Their Ethnic character and connections.
Their position under the Persian Monarchs, from Cyrus the Great to Darius
III. (Codomannus)............. , e s is e e º a s e e, & tº € e º e s tº s e s s & e e º e s e e s e s e º is a tº e s a s e s tº º e
& CHAPTER III.
Condition of Western Asia...underºti złº - - - - dº — ? — — — — $ i Revolts of Bactria, and
Parthia. Conflicting accounts of the establishment of the Parthian Kingdom.
First War with Syria............* ***** a “e-ºriº & ºn ess s et si e º e e s a e s & s e s e s = e º e s a * * * * * g e e s a e 16
CHAPTER IV. , , t *
Consolidation of the Tarthian Kingdom. Death of Tiridates and accession of
Arsaces III. Attack on Media. War of Artabanus (Arsaces HII) with Am-
tiochus the Great. Period of inaction. Great development of Bactrian
power. Reigns of Priapatius (Arsaces IV.) and Phraates I. (Arsaces V.)....... 29
CHAPTER W. --
Reign of Mithridates I. Position of Bactria and Syria at his accession. His
first War with Bactria. His great Expedition against the Eastern Syrian pro-
, vinces, and its results. His second war with Bactria, terminating in its con-
quest. Extent of his Empire. Attempt of Demetrius Nicator to recover the .*
lost Provinces fails. Captivity of Demetrius. Death of Mithridates...........
CHAPTER WI.
System of government established by Mithridates I. Constitution of the Par-
thians. Government of the Provinces. Laws and institutions. Character of
Mithridates I............................................. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ... . . . . 4?
iy CONTENTS OF VOL. III.
CHAPTER VII.
PAGE
Reign of Phraates II. Expedition of Antiochus Sidetes against Parthia. Re-
lease of Demetrius. Defeat and death of Sidetes. War of Phraates with the
Northern Nomads. His death and character
CHAPTER VIII.
Accession of Artibanus II. Position of Parthia, Growing pressure upon her,
and general advance towards the south of the Saka or Scyths. Causes and
extent of the movement. Character and principal tribes of the Saka.
Scythic War of Altabanus. His death. . . . . . . . . ....... * * * * > e s = e º e º e s e º e s sº e s e º ºs 62
CHAPTER IX.
Accession of Mithridates II. Termination of the Scythic Wars. Commencement
of the struggle with Armenia. Previous history of Armenia. Result of the
first Armenian War. First contact of Home with Parthia. Attitude of Rome
towards the East at this time. Second Armenian War. Death of Mithridates. 69
CHAPTER X.
Dark period of Parthian History. Doubtful Succession of the Monarchs.
Accession of Sanatroeces, ab. B. c. 76. Position of Parthia during the Mithri-
datic Wars. Accession of Phraates III. His Relations with Pompey. His
death. Civil War between his two sons, Mithridates and Orodes. Death of
Mithridates. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 77
CHAPTER XI,
Accession of Orodes I. Expedition of Crassus. His fate. Retaliatory inroad
of the Parthians into Syria under Pacorus, the son of Orodes. Defeat of
Pacorus by Cassius. His recall. End of first War with Rome........... ... .. 84
CHAPTER XII.
Relations of Orodes with Pompey, and with Brutus and Cassius. Second War
with Rome. Great Parthian expedition against Syria, Palestine, and Asia.
Minor. Defeat of Saxa. Occupation of Antioch and Jerusalem, Parthians
driven out of Syria by Ventidius. Death of Pacorus. Death of Orodes....... 102
| & CHAPTER XIII.
Reign of Phraates IV. His cruelties. Flight of Monaeses to Antony. Antony's
great Parthian Expedition, or Invasion of Media Atropaténé. Its Complete
Failure. Subsequent Alliance of the Median King with Antony. War be-
tween Parthia and Media. Rebellion raised against Phraates by Tiridates.
Phraates expelled. He recovers his Throne with the help of the Scythians.
His dealings with Augustus. His death and character.............. * * * * * * * * * * * 111
CHAPTER XIV.
Shorts Reigns of Phraataces, Orodes II., and Wonones I. Accession of Arta-
banus III. His relations with Germanicus and Tiberius. His war with
Pharasmanes of Iberia. His first Expulsion from his Kingdom, and return
to it. His Peace with Rome. Internal Troubles of the Parthian Kingdom.
Second Expulsion and Return of Artabanus. His death
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * & © tº sº º º
CONTENTS OF WOL. III. V
CHAPTER XV.
• , PAGE
Doubts as to the successor of Artabanus III. First short reign of Gotarzes.
He is expelled and Vardanes made King. Reign of Vardanes. His War with
Izates. His Death. Second reign of Gotarzes. His Contest with his Nephew,
Meherdates. His Death. Short and inglorious reign of Vonones II
* * * * * * * * * * *
CHAPTER XVI.
Reign of Volagases I. His first attempt on Armenia fails. His quarrel with
Izates. Invasion of Parthia Proper by the Dahae and Sacae. Second Attack
of Volagases on Armenia. Tiridates established as KingN First Expedition of
Corbulo. Half submission of Volagases. Revolt of Vardanes. Second Expe-
dition of Corbulo. Armenia, given to Tigranes. Revolt of Hyrcania. Third
Attack of Volagases on Armenia. Defeat of Paetus, and re-establishment of
Tiridates. Last Expedition of Corbulo, and arrangement of Terms of Peace.
Tiridates at Rome. Probable time of the Death of Volagases............. , ... 149
CHAPTER XVII.
Results of the establishment of Tiridates in Armenia. Long Period of Peace
between Parthia and Rome. Obscurity of Parthian History at this time.
Relations of Volagases I. with Vespasian. Invasion of Western Asia by the
Alani. Death of Volagases I. and Character of his Reign. Accession and
Long Reign of Pacorus. Relations of Pacorus with Decebalus of Dacia. In-
ternal Condition of Parthia during his Reign. Death of Pacorus and Acces-
sion of Chosroës. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........ * * * * * * * * * * * = 164
CHAPTER XVIII.
Reign of Chosroës. General condition of Oriental Affairs gives a handle to
Trajan. Trajan's Schemes of Conquest. Embassy of Chosroës to Trajan
fails. Great Expedition of Trajan. Campaign of A.D. 115. Campaign of A.D.
116. Death of Trajan, and relinquishment of his Parthian Conquests by Had-
rian. Interview of Chosroës with Hadrian. Its Consequences. Death of
Chosroës and Accession of Volagases II.............................. ......... 170
CHAPTER XIX.
Reign of Volagases II. Invasion of the Alani. Communications between
Volagases and Antoninus Pius. Death of Volagases II. and Accession of
Volagases III, Aggressive War of Volagases III, on Rome. Campaign of
A.D. 162. Verus sent to the East. Sequel of the War. Losses suffered by
CHAPTER xx.
Accession of Volagases IV. His Alliance sought by Pescennius Niger. Part
taken by Parthia in the Contest between Niger and Severus. Mesopotamia
revolts from Rome. First Eastern Expedition of Severus. Its results.
Second Flxpedition. Successes of Severus. His failure at Hatra. General
Results of the War. Death of Volagases IV. . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * * * * * * = . 190
vi .CONTENTS OF WOL. III.
CHAPTER xxi.
- * ~ * PAGE
Struggle between the two Sons of Volagases IV., Volagases V. and Artabanus.
Continued Sovereignty of both Princes. Ambition of Caracallus. His Pro-
ceedings in the East. His Resolve to quarrel with Parthia. First Proposal
made by him to Artabanus. Perplexity of Artabanus. Caracahus invades
Parthia. His Successes, and Death. Macrinus, defeated by Artabanus, con-
sents to Terms of Peace. Revolt of the Persians under Artaxerxes. Pro-
longed Struggle. Death of Artabanus, and Downfall of the Parthian Empire. 199
CHAFTER xXII.
On the Architecture and Ornamental Art of the Parthians...... * * * > * * * * * * * * * * * * * 212
.* CHAPTER XXIII.
Customs of the Parthians—in Religion ; in War; in their Embassies and Deal-
ings with Foreign Nations ; at the Court; in Private Life. Extent of the re-
finement to which they reached. Their gradmal Decline in Taste and Knowl-
HISTORY OF THE SASSANIAN OR NEW PERSIAN EMPIRE.
CHAPTER, I,
Condition of the Persians' under the Successors of Alexander. Under the
Arsacidae. Favor shown them by the latter. Allowed to have Kings of their
own. Their Religion at first held in Honor. Power of their Priests. Gradual
Change of Policy on the part of the Parthian Monarchs, and final Oppression
of the Magi. Causes which produced the Insurrection of Artaxerxes.......... 241
CHAPTER II.
Situation and Size of Persia. General Character of the Country and Climate.
Chief Products. Characteristics of the Persian People, Physical and Moral.
Differences observable in the Race at different Periods........................ 250
CHAPTER III.
Reign of Artaxerxes I. Stories told of him. Most probable Account of his
Descent, Rank, and Parentage. His Contest with Artabanus. First War
with Chosroës of Armenia. Contést with Alexander Severus. Second War
with Chosroës and Conquest of Armenia. Religious Reforms. 'Internal Ad-
ministration'and Gövernment. Art." Coinage. Inscriptions....... * * * * * * * * * * * 257
CHAPTER IV. ,
Death of Artaxerxes I. and Accession of Sapor I. War of Sapor with Manizen.
His first War with Rome. Invasion of Mesopotamia, A.D. 241. Occupation of
Antioch. Expedition of Gordian to the East. Recovery by Rome of her lost
Territory. Peace made between Rome and Persia. Obscure Interval. Second
War with Rome. Mesopotamia again invaded, A.D. 258, Valerian takes the
Command in the East. Struggle between him and Sapor. Defeat and Cap-
ture of Waleſian A.D. 260. Sapor invests Miriades with the Purple. He takes
Syria and So uthern Cappadocia, but is shortly afterwards attacked by Odena-
*
* CONTENTS QF VOL. III. Vii
PAGº. "
thus. Successes of Odenathus. Treatment of Valerian. Further Successes
of Odenathus. Period of Tranquility. Great Works of Sapor. His Sculptures.
His Dyke. His Inscriptions. His Coins. His Religion. Religious Condition
of the East in his Time: Rise into Notice of Manes. His Rejection by Sapor.
Sapor's Death. His Character........... • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * tº e º ºs e º sº e 279
CHAPTER V.
Short Reign of Hormisdas I. His dealings with Manes. Accession of Warahran
I. He puts Manes to Death. Persecutes the Manichaeans and the Christians.
His Relations with Zenobia. He is threatened by Aurelian. His Death. Reign
of Varahran II. His Tyrannical Conduct. His Conquest of Seistan, and War
with India. His War with the Roman Emperors Carus and Diocletian. His
Loss of Armenia. His Death. Short Reign of Varahram III.................. 293
* * CHAPTER VI.
Civil War of Narses and his Brother Hormisdas. Narses victorious. He attacks "
and expels Tiridates. War declared against him by Diocletian, First Cam-
paign of Galerius, A.D. 297. Second Campaign, A. D. 298, Defeat suffered by
Narses. Negotiations. Conditions of Peace. Abdication and Death of
Narses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... 301
CHAPTER VII. |
Reign of Hormisdas II. His Disposition, General Character of his Reign. His
Taste for Building. His new Court of Justice. His Marriage with a Princess
of Cabul. Story of his Son Hormisdas. Death of Hormisdas II., and Imprison-
ment of his son Hormisdas. Interregnum. Crown assigned to Sapor II. be-
fore his birth. Long Reign of Sapor. First Period of his Reign, from A.D. 309
to A.D. 337. Persia plundered by the Arabs and the Turks. Victories of
Sapor over the Arabs. Persecution of the Christians. Escape of Hormisdas,
Feelings and Conduct of Sapor............... * * * * * * * * * * * * * g & 9 * * s & s is a s a s s & e s e s a 813
CHAPTER VIII. *
Position of Affairs on the Death of Constantine. First War of Sapor with Rome,
A.D. 337–350, First Siege of Nisibis. Obscure Interval. Troubles in Armenia,
and Recovery of Armenia by the Persians. Sapor's Second Siege of Nisibis.
Its Failure. Great Battle of Singara. Sapor's son made Prisoner and mur-
dered in Cold Blood. Third Siege of Nisibis. Sapor called away by an Inva-
Sion of the Massagette. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .............................. 320
- CHAPTER IX.
Revolt of Armenia and Acceptance by Arsaces of the Position of a Roman
Feudatory. Character and Issue of Sapor's Eastern Wars. His Negotiations
with Constantius. His Extreme Demands, Circumstances under which he
determines to renew the War. , His Preparations. Desertion to him of
Antoninus. Great Invasion of Sapor. Siege of Amida, Sapor's Severities.
Siege and Capture of Singara; of Bezabde. Attack on Virta fails. Aggres- .
sive Movement of Constantius. He attacks Bezabde, but fails. Campaign of
A.D. 361. Death of Constantius. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........................... 328
CHAPTER X.
Julian becomes Emperor of Rome. His Resolution to invade Persia. His
Views and Motives. His Proceedings. Proposals of Sapor rejected. Other
Embassies. Relations of Julian with Armenia. Strength of his Army. His
Invasion of Mesopotamia. His Line of March. Siege of Perisabor; of
Maogamalcha. Battle of the Tigris. Further Progress of Julian checked by
viii COWTENTS OF WOL. III.
PAGE
his inability to invest Ctesiphon. His Retreat. His Death. Retreat con-
tinued by Jovian. Sapor offers Terms of Peace. Peace made by Jovian. Its
Conditions. Reflections on the Peace and on the Termination of the Second
Period of Struggle between Rome and Persia........... * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * - - - -
CHAPTER XI,
Attitude of Armenia during the War between Sapor and Julian. Sapor's
Treachery towards Arsaces. Sapor conquers Armenia. He attacks Iberia,
deposes Sauromaces, and sets up a new King. Resistance and Capture of
Artogerassa. Difficulties of Sapor. Division of Iberia between the Roman
and Persian Pretenders. Renewal of Hostilities between Rome and Persia.
Peace made with Valens. Death of Sapor. His Coins.......... * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 370
CHAPTER XII.
Short Reigns of Artaxerxes II, and Sapor III. Obscurity of their History.
Their Relations with Armenia. Monument of Sapor III. at Takht-i-Bostan.
Coins of Artaxerxes II. and Sapor III. Reign of Varahran IV. His Signets.
His Dealings with Armenia. His Death............ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 378
CHAPTER XIII.
Accession of Isdigerd I. Peaceful Character of his Reign. His alleged Guard-
ianship of Theodosius II. His Leaning towards Christianity, and consequent
Unpopularity with his Subjects. His Change of View and Persecution of the
Christians. His Relations with Armenia. His Coins. His Personal Char-
acter. His Death... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . & e º 'º e s tº e s e e s e is a º e &
CHAPTER XIV,
Internal Troubles on the Death of Isdigerd I. Accession of Varahran W. His
Persecution of the Christians. His War with Rome. His Relations with Ar-
menia from A.D. 422 to A.D. 428. His Wars with Scythic Tribes on his Eastern
Frontier. His Strange Death. His Coins. His Character....................
g CHAPTER XV.
Reign of Isdigerd II. His War with Rome. His Nine Years' War with the
Ephthalites. His Policy towards Armenia. His Second Ephthalite. War,
His Character. His Coins.................................................. * - - -
f } CHAPTER XVI.
Right of Succession disputed between the two Sons of Isdigerd II., Perozes (or,
Firuz) and Hormisdas. Civil War for two years. Success of Perozes, through
aid given him by the Ephthalites. Great Famine. Perozes declares War
against the Ephthalites, and makes an Expedition into their Country. His
Ill Success. Conditions of Peace granted him. Armenian Revolt and War.
Perozes, after some years, resumes the Ephthalite War. His Attack fails, and
he is slain in Battle. Summary of his Character. Coins of Hormisdas III.
and Perozes. Vase of Perozes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ......................
CHAPTER XVII.
Accession of Balas or Palash. His Relationship to Perozes. Peace made with
the Ephthalites. Pacification of Armenia, and General Edict of Toleration.
Revolt of Zareh, Son of Perozes, and Suppression of the Revolt with the help
of the Armenians. Flight of Kobad to the Ephthalites. Further Changes in
Armenia. Vahan made Governor. Death of Balas; his Character. Coins
ascribed to him...................... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * - - - - - - - - - © s e º e g g g e g s sº e e
385
403
421
* CONTENTS, - & ix
CHAPTER XVIII.
PAGE
First Reign of Kobad. His Favorites, Sufrai and Sapor. His Khazar War.
Rise, Teaching, and Influence of Mazdak. His Claim to Miraculous Powers.
Robad adopts the new Religion, and attempts to impose it on the Armenians.
Revolt of Armenia under Vahan, successful. Köbad yields. General Rebellion
in Persia, and Deposition of Kobad. Escape of Mazdak. Short Reign of
Zamasp. His Coins......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................................. 426
CHAPTER XIX.
Second Reign of Kobad. His Change of Attitude towards the Followers of Maz-
duk. His Cause of Quarrel with Rome, First Roman War of Robad. Peace
made A.D. 505. Rome fortifies Daras and Theodosiopolis. Complaint made
by Persia. Negotiations of Kobad with Justin: Proposed Adoption of Chosroës
by the Latter. Internal Troubles in Persia. Second Roman War of Kobad,
A.D. 524–531. Death of Kobad. His Character. His Coins.................... 432
- CHAPTER XX.
Accession of Chosroës I. (Anushirwan.) Conspiracy to Dethrone him crushed.
General Severity of his Government. He concludes Peace with Rome, A.D.
533. Terms of the Peace. Causes which led to its Rupture. First Roman
War of Chosroës, A.D. 540-544. Second Roman War, A.D. 549–557. Eastern
Wars. Conquest of Arabia Felix. Supposed Campaign in India. War with
the Turks. Revolt of Persarmenia. Third Roman War, A.D. 572–579. Death
of Chosroës . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
- CHAPTER XXI. * •
Administration of Persia under Chosroës I. Fourfold Division of the Empire.
Careful Surveillance of those entrusted with Power. Severe Punishment of
Abuse of Trust. New System of Taxation introduced. Correction of Abuse
connected with the Military Service. Encouragement of Aghculture and
Marriage. Relief of Poverty. Care for Travellers. Encouragement of Learn-
ing. , Practice of Toleration within Certain Limits. Domestic Life of Chosroës.
His Wives. Revolt and Death of his Son, Nushizad. Coins of Chosroës. Es-
timate of his Character... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tº e º ºs e = e º 'º e s... • * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 483
CHAPTER XXII.
Accession of Hormisdas IV. His good Government in the Earlier Portion of his
Reign. Invasion of Persia by the Romans under Maurice. Defeats of Adar-
man and Tamchosro. Campaign of Johannes. Campaigns of Philippicus and
Heraclius. Tyranny of Hormisdas. He is attacked by the Arabs, Khazars,
and Turks. Bahran defeats the Turks. His Attack on Lazica. He suffers a -
Defeat. Disgrace of Bahram. Dethronement of Hormisdas IV. and Elevation
of Chosroës II. Character of Hormisdas. Coins of Hormisdas...... * e º a e s e e g 495
CHAPTER. , XXIII.
Accession of Chosroës II. (Eberwiz.) Bahram rejects his Terms. Contest be-
tween Cluostoës and Bahram. Flight of Chosroës. Short Reign of Bahram
(Varahram VI.). Campaign of A.D. 501. Recovery of the Throne by Chosoës.
Coins of Bahram. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................... 504
CHAPTER XXIV.
Second Reign of Chosroës II. (Eberwiz.) His Rule at first Unpopular. His
Treatment of his Uncles. Bindoës and Bostam. His Vindictive Proceedings
against. Bahram. His supposed Leaning towards Christianity. Hiš'wives,
Shirin and Kurdiyeh. His Early Wars. His Relations with the Emperor
Maurice. His Attitude towards Phocas. Great War of Chosroës with Phocas,
A.D. 603–610, War continued with Heraclius. Immense Successes of Chos-
roës, A.D. 611-620. Aggressive taken by Heraclius, A.D. 622. His Campaigns
*
CONTENTS,
- PAGE
in Persian Territory ap. 622–628. Murder of Chosroës. His Character. His
Coins...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ,- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 514
CHAPTER XXV. *
Accession of Siroës, or Kobad II. His fletter to Heraclius. Peace made with
Rome. Terms of the Peace. General Popularity of the New Reign. Dissat-
isfaction of Shahr-Barz. Kobad, by the advice of the Persian Lords, murders
his Brothers. His Sisters reproach him with their Death. He falls into low
spirits and dies. Pestilence in his Reign. His coins. Accession of Artax-
erxes III. Revolt of Shahr-Barz. Reign of Shaar-Barz. His Murder. Reign
of Purandocht. Rapid Succession of Pretenders. Accession of Isdigerd III. 535
CHAPTER XXVI.
Death of Mohammed and Collapse of Mohammedanism. Recovery under Abu-
bekr. Conquest of the Kingdom of Hira. Conquest of Obolla. Invasion of
Mesopotamia. Battle of the Bridge—the Arabs suffer a Reverse. Battle of
El Boweib—Mihram defeated by El Mothanna. Fresh Effort made by Persia—
Battle of Cadesia—Defeat of the Persians. Pause in the War. March of Sa'ad
on Ctesiphon. Flight of Isdigerd. Capture of Ctesiphon. Battle of Jalula.
Conquest of Susiana and Invasion of Persia Proper. Recall of Sa'ad. Isdigerd
assembles an Army at Nehawend. Battle of Nehawend. Flight of Isdigerd.
Conquest of the various Persian Provinces. Isdigerd murdered. Character
of Isdigerd. Coins of Isdigerd.............................. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 543
CHAPTER XXVII.
* Architecture of the Sassanians. Its Origin. Its Peculierities. Oblong Square
Plan. Arched Entrance Halls. Domes resting on Pendentives. Suites of
Apartments. Ornamentation: Exterior, by Pilasters, Cornices, String-courses,
and Shallow Arched Recesses, with Pilasters between them: Interior, by Pil-
lars supporting Transverse Ribs, or by Doorways and False Windows, like the
Persopolitan. Specimen Palaces at Serbistan, at Firzebad, at Ctesiphon, at
,Mashita. Elaborat Decoration at the last-named Palace. Decoration Else-
where. Arch of Takht-i-Bostan. Sassanian Statuary. Sassanian Bas-reliefs.
Estimate of their Artistic Value. Question of the Employment by the Sassa-
nians of Byzantine Artists. General Summary. . . . . ........................... 560
- CHAPTÉR xxvill.
Religion of the later Persians, Duelism of the Extremest Kind. Ideas enter-
tained with Respect to Ormazd and Ahriman. Representations of them. Or-
mazd the Special Guardian of the Kings. Lésser Deities subject to Ormazd:
Mithra, Serosh, Vayu, Airyanam, Vitraha, etc. Thé Six Amshashpands: Bah-
man, Ardibehesht, Shāhravar, Isfand-armat, Khordad, and VAmerdat. Re-
ligion, how far Idolatrous. Worship of Anaitis. Chief Evil Spirits subject to
Ahriman: Akomano, Indra, Çaurva, Naomhaitya, Taric, and Zaric. Position
of Man between the Two Worlds of Good and Evil. His Duties: Worship, Ag-
riculture, Purity. Nature of the Worship. Hymns, Invocations, the Homa
Ceremony, Sacrifice. Agriculture a part of Religion. Purity required: I,
Moral; 2, Legal. Nature of each, Man's Future Prospects. Position of the
Magi under the Sassanians; their Organization, Dress, etc. The Fire-temples
and Altars. The Barsom. The Khrafgthraghna. Magnificence of the Sassa-
nian Court; the Throne-room, the Seraglio, the Attendants, the Ministers.
Multitude of Palaces. Dress of the Monarch: 1, in Peace; 2, in War. Favor-
ite Pastimes of the Kings. Hunting. Maintenance of Paradises. Stag and
Boar-hunts. Music. Hawking. Games. Character of the Persian Warfare
under the Sassanians. Sassanian Chariots. The Elephant Corps. The Cav-
alry. The Archers. The Ordinary Infantry. Officers. Standards. Tactics.
Private Life of the Later Persians. Agricultural Employment of the Men.
Non-seclusion of the Women. General Freed6m from Oppression of all Classes
except the highest. ................... ...". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............... 578
\ * ~
\ f
- ^
-- *
l
A.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS-VOL. III. -
- - - - - z *
Ruins of Great Palace at Hatra....... tº e s - -, - - - - - - - - - • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * .....To face title.
Map of Parthia Proper........... • . . . . . . . . . . . . --.- : - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - . To face page 1
“ Parthian Empire at its greatest extent......................To face page 49
“ Sassanian Empire...................::::..................... To facé page 256
Ruins of Great Palace of Chosroës I. at Ctesiphon.............. ....To face page 240
- & PLATE t
1. Coin of Diodotus I............. .............................................. 1
2. Coin of Phraates I. ..... & e s = º is sº s e º & e º e ....................'................. 1
8. Obverse of a Coin of Phraates I.......................... * * * * * * * * * * * e º e º e º a º e 1
4. Coins of Mithridates I............................ A e s = e º e s = & e e s a e a e º e s s a s e e s a s 1
5. Coins of Mithridates I., Arsaces I., and Artabanus I......................... 1 -
6. "Coin of Labienus...... .................'....... * * * * * * * * * * * * * e º 'º e º 'º e s a e e s sº a 2 .
7. Coin of Phraataces and Mousa............ tº e g º gº e º ºs e e º ºs e º ºs e º e s tº e & e º e & e º e s s tº e º e s 2
8. Coin of Vonones I.............................. • * * * * * * B & & eº e º & tº e & e º e º ſº ſº e º Gº & e º e ... 2
9. Coin of Artabanus III. ............... e s ∈ e º ºs e º e g º e º e º 'º tº ſº e dº e º ºs e e g º g g º e & e º e s tº a º a 2 * ,
10. Coin of Vardanes I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................................. 2 <!
11. Coin of Vardanes, Iſ...................................... e = * g g g g g g g tº tº sº de e ºs e º s º 3
13. Coin of Pacorus II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .-----------------........... 8 's
13. Coins of Volagases II. and Mithridates IV................ tº a dº e s is gº e º e º sº ë e ∈ E & e 8 **
14. Coin of Volagases II. ............................. d = e s s = e s = e s s e s e e s e = e e • . . . ... 8
15. Parthian sculpture of a female head (after Ross)........ * * * * * * * * * * * * g a s is e e s e 4
16. Parthian sculpture, cornice and quasi-capital (after Ross)................... 4
17. Plan of Hatra (after Ross)...................................... & e º ºs º e º e º e º ºs e 4
18. Plan of Palace-Temple at Hatra (after Fergusson and Ross)................ 4 ~
19. Parthian sculpture, frieze over doorway (after Ross)......................... 5
20. Restoration of Palace-Temple at Hatra (after Ainsworth)................... 5
21. Parthian capitals (after Loftus)....... tº e º 'º & e º ºs e º e º 'º e º 'º e º e e • * g e º e º e s e e s e e .... 5
22. Parthian diapering (ditto).... ".......... ................ • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 5
23. Parthian ornamented coffin (ditto) ................. * = & © e º º e ∈ e & 4 & e g º e s e º & . ... 6
24. Parthian statuette (ditto), ........... e e e s tº 6 e º ºs tº e º ºs e º ºs • a e e s e s a 4 s e s s e e s e º e s e e s e e 6
25. Parthian vases, jugs, and lamps (ditto)......... • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - - - - - - - - - - - 6
26. Bas-relief of Gotarzes (after Coste)................... e e g g º ºs e e & & e e s tº e º e º º s . ... 7
27. Parthian bas-relief (ditto)............... .................. 4 s m = a e e s = e s a e s = e º a 8
28. Bas-relief of Magus, probably Parthian, (ditto).............................. 9
39. Bas-relief of hunter and bear, probably Parthian (ditto)............ . . . . . . . . . 10
80. Parthian kings from coins............... • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * e tº sº a s is sº e s ∈ s .... 10 T
81. Ancient Persians, from a bas-relief at Persepolis (after Ker. Porter)... ...... 11
82. Earlier coins of Artaxerxes I............... tº a e º- a tº e g tº a e º e s tº & e as tº gº e º e s s a e g a s a e e 11
x t

xii LIST OF ILL USTRATIONS- VOL. III.
* IPLATE
33. Artaxerxes I. giving the crown to his son, Sapor (after Ker Porter)..........
34. Sapor I. presenting Cyriades to the Romans as their Emperor (after
Flandin). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
35. Valerian doing homage to Cyriades (after Flandin)................. ........ 14
36. Later coins of Artaxerxes I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
37. Coins of Sapor I . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
38. Head of Sapor I., from a gem (after Mordtmann)............................ 15
39. Coin of Hormisdas I............. & s e a e e º e º º º ºs e < * * * * * * * * * * * * e = e º º ºs e is e s ∈ e º e º sº e < e is 15
40. Coin of Varahran I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
41. Coin of Varahram II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
42. Varahran II. addressing his nobles (after Ker Porter)................. . . . . . .
43. Varahran II. receiving the submission of the Segestani (after Flandin)..... 17
44. Coin of Varahran III. . . . . . . . . - * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
45. Head of Narses, from a bas-relief (after Flandin)............................ 18
46. Coins of Narses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . & e e º e º e º e º s s e a e 18
47. Head of Hormisdas II., from a gem (after Mordtmann)...................... 18,
48. Coin of Hormisdas II. (after Thomas)........................................ 18
49. Coins of Sapor II. . . . . . . . . . . . ** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 19
50. Coin of Artaxerxes II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
51. Coins of Sapor III. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................... 20
52. Portrait of Varahran IV., from a seal (after Thomas)....................... 20 -
53. Later seal of Varahran IV, (after Thomas). . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................... 20
54. Coin of Varahran IV. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................................. 20
55. Bas-relief representing Sapor II, and Sapor III. (after Ker Porter).......... 20
56. Coin of Isdigerd I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * e s = e º a 21
57. Coin of Varahran V. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...................................... 21
58. Coin of Isdigerd II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................... e = * * * * * * * * * * . * * * * * * * * 21
59. Doubtful coin of Hormisdas III.............................................. 21
60. Coin of Perozes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..................* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 21
61. Coin of Balas........................ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
62. Coin of Zamasp........................................ tº e º e s ∈ E * * * * * * * * * * * * s e e 22
63. Coin of Kobad I.......................................................... . . . . . 22
64. Coin of Chosroës I................................. e e e º e º q is a s a & & # * * * * * * * * * * * * * 22
65. Another coin of Chosroës I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ................... 22 ,
66. Coin of Hormisdas IV.......................................... tº e º gº e º sº e e s = e º e 23
7. Preregnal coin of Varahram VI. (after Thomas)..................* * * * * * * * * * * * * 23
68. Late coin of Varahran VI...................................... * * * * * * g e s = e e s s 23
69. Coins of Chosroës II. (Parwiz).......................... * * * * * * * * * * * ... . . . . . . 28, 24
70. Coin of Kobad. II. (Siroës)... . . . . . . . . . . . . • * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 24
71. Coin of Artaxerxes III. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .................................. 24
72. Coin of Isdigerd III. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . & s s : * * * * * * * * * * * * g g g g a e g º ºs e e s = e s a s 24
73. Ground-plan of palace at Serbistan (after Flandin).......................... 25
74. Front view of Serbistan Palace, restored (after Flandin).................... 25
75. Ground-plan of palace at Firuzabad (after Flandin)......................... • 2
76. Section of domed chamber (after Flandin). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
77. External ornamentation of palace at Firuzabad (after Flandin)............. 27
78. Ground-plan and elevation of Takht-i-Khosru (after Flandin)........... . . . . . 28
79. General view of Mashita Palace (from a photograph)................. ...... 28
80. Ground-plan of palace at Mashita (after Tristram) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
81. Inner gateway of Mashita Palace (from a photograph)...................... 29
82. Ornamentation of palace at Mashita (from a plot, graph).................. 30
83. Archivolte of arch at Takht-i-Bostan (after Flandin)......................... 31
84. Flowered panel at the side of arch (after Flandin)........................... 31
85, Sassanian capitals (after Flandin)............................................ 32
86. Sassanian capitals (after Flandin)............................................ 33
87. General view of arch at Takht-i-Bostan (after Flandin).............. . . . . . . . . 34
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS-VOL. III.
88. Sassanian angel or Victory (after Flandin).................... ............ ... •
89. Bas-relief of Ormazd giving the crown to Artaxerxes I. (after Ker Porter)... 35
35
90. Statue of Sapor I. (after Texier). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............................
91. Head-dress of an unknown king (after Texier).............................. . 36
92. Bas-relief representing the victory of Sapor I. over Valerian (after Texier). 37
93. Bas-relief of Sapor I. representing tribute-bearers (after Flandin)........... 38
94. Bas-relief of Varahram IV. representing a battle-scene (after Texier)........ 39
95. Bas-relief of uncertain date representing a battle-scene (after Flandin)..... 40
96. Bas-relief of Chosroës I. representing him as receiving tribute from the
Romans (after Flandin). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . s e e e º e s = • * * * * * * * 41
07. Bas-relief of Chosroës II. under arch at Takht-i-Bostan (after Flandin)...... 42
98. Bas-relief of stag-hunt, at same place (after Flandin)............. e e s = e s e e is a e 43
90. Bas-relief of boar-hunt, at same place (after Flandin). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
100. Bas-relief representing the embroidery of the royal robes (after Flandin)... 45
101. Bas-relief representing Chosroës II. on horseback, accompanied by a
parasol-bearer (after Flandin). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .......... 46
102. Saddle-mule of Chosroës I., from a bas-relief (after Texier).................. 46
103. Sassanian chariot, from a bas-relief (after Texier).............. * < e < e < e º s . . . . 46
104. Persian guardsman, from a bas-relief (after Flandin)................... . . . . . 46
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&
. A HISTORY OF PARTHIA.
A
CHAPTER I.
Geography of Parthia Proper. Character of the Region,
Climate. Character of the Surrounding Countries.
THE broad tract of desert which, eastward of the Caspian
Sea, extends from the Moughojar hills to the Indian Ocean, a
distance of above 1500 miles, is interrupted about midway by
a strip of territory possessing features of much beauty and
attraction. This strip, narrow compared to the desert on
either side of it, is yet, looked at by itself, a region of no incon-
siderable dimensions, extending, as it does from east to west,”
a distance of 320, and from north to south of nearly 200 miles.
The mountain chain, which running southward of the Cas-
pian, skirts the great plateau of Iran, or Persia, on the north,
broadens out, after it passes the South-eastern corner of the
sea, into a valuable and productive mountain-region. Four or
five distinct ranges” here run parallel to one another, having
between them latitudinal valleys, with glens transverse to
their courses. The sides of the valleys are often well wooded;"
the flat ground at the foot of the hills is fertile; water abounds;
and the streams gradually collect into rivers of a considerable
S126.
The fertile territory in this quarter is further increased by the
extension of cultivation to a considerable distance from the base
of the most southern of the ranges, in the direction of the Great
Iranic desert. The mountains send down a number of small
streams towards the south; and the water of these, judiciously
husbanded by means of reservoirs and kanats, is capable of
spreading fertility over a broad belt at the foot of the hills;”
which, left to nature, would be almost as barren as the desert
itself, into which it would, in fact, be absorbed.
It was undoubtedly in the region which has been thus briefly
2 THE SIXTH MOWARCHF. ſch, i.
described that the ancient home of the Parthians lay. In
this neighborhood alone are found the geographic names
which the most ancient writers who mention the Parthians
connect with them." Here evidently the Parthians were set-
tled" at the time when Alexander the Great overran the East,
and first made the Greeks thoroughly familiar with the Par-
thian name and territory. Here, lastly, in the time of the
highest Parthian splendor and prosperity, did a province of .
the Empire retain the name of Parthyéné, or Parthia Proper;"
and here, also, in their palmiest days, did the Parthian kings
continue to have a capital and a residence.”
Parthia Proper, however, was at Ino time coextensive with
the region described. A portion of that region formed the
district called Hyrcania; and it is not altogether easy to deter-
mine what were the limits between the two. The evidence
goes, on the whole, to show that, while Hyrcania lay towards
the west and north, the Parthian country was that towards
the south and east,” the valleys of the Ettrek and Gurghan
constituting the main portions of the former, while the tracts
east and south of those valleys, as far as the sixty-first degree
of E. longitude, constituted the latter.
If the limits of Parthia Proper be thus defined, it will have
nearly corresponded to the modern Persian province of Khora-
san. It will have extended from about Damaghan (long.
54° 10') upon the west,” to the Heri-rud upon the east, and
have comprised the modern districts of Damaghan, Shah-rud,
Sebzawar, Nishapur, Meshed, Shebri-No, and Tersheez. Its
length from east to west will have been about 300 miles, and
its average width about 100 or 120. It will have contained an
area of about 33,000 square miles, being thus about equal in
size to Ireland, Bavaria, or St. Domingo.
The character of the district has been already stated in
general terms; but some further particulars may now be
added. It consists, in the first place, of a mountain and a
plain region—the mountain region lying towards the north
and the plain region towards the south. The mountain region
is composed of three main ranges, the Daman-i-Koh, or Hills
of the Kurds,” upon the north, skirting the great desert of
Rharesm, the Alatagh and Meerabee mountains in the centre;
and the Jaghetai or Djuvein range, upon the south, which
may be regarded as continued in the hills above Tersheez and
Khaff. The three ranges are parallel, running east and west,
but with an inclination, more or less strong, to the north of
CH. I.] RIVERS OF PARTHIA. 3
west and the south of east. The northern and central ranges
are connected by a water-shed, which runs nearly east and
west, a little to the south of Kooshan, and separates the head
streams of the Ettrek from those of the Meshed river. The
central and southern ranges are connected by a more decided
mountain line, a transverse ridge which runs nearly north and
south, dividing between the waters that flow westward into
the Gurghan, and those which form the river of Nishapur.
This conformation of the mountains leaves between the ranges
three principal valleys, the valley of Meshed towards the
south-east, between the Kurdish range and the Alatagh and
Meerabee; that of Miyanabad towards the west, between the
Alatagh and the Jaghetai; and that of Nishapur towards the
south, between the eastern end of the Jaghetai and the western
flank of the Meerabee. As the valleys are three in number,
so likewise are the rivers, which are known respectively as the
Tejend, or river of Meshed, the river of Nishapur, and the
river of Miyanabad.” &
The Tejend, which is the principal stream of the three, rises
from several Sources in the hills south of Kooshan, and flows
with a south-easterly course down the valley of Meshed, re-
ceiving numerous tributaries from both sides,” until it reaches
that city, when it bends eastward, and, finding a way through
the Kurdish range, joins the course of the Heri-rud, about
long. 61° 10'. Here its direction is completely changed. Turn-
ing at an angle, which is slightly acute, it proceeds to flow to
the west of north, along the northern base of the Kurdish
range, from which it receives numerous small streams, till it
ends finally in a large swamp or marsh, in lat. 39°, long. 57°,
nearly.” The entire length of the stream, including only main
windings, is about 475 miles. In its later course, however, it
is often almost dry, the greater portion of the water being
consumed in irrigation in the neighborhood of Meshed.
The river of Nishapur is formed by numerous small streams,
which descend from the mountains that on three sides inclose
that city. Its water is at times wholly consumed in the culti-
vation of the plain; but the natural course may be traced,
running in a southerly and south-westerly direction, until it.
debouches from the hills in the vicinity of Tersheez. .
The Miyanabad stream is believed to be a tributary of the
Gurghan. It rises from several sources in the transverse
ºrange joining the Alatagh to the Jaghetai, the streams from
which all flow westward in narrow valleys, uniting about
*.
4 THE SIXTH ‘MONA RCHY. . [CH. I.
long. 57° 35'. The course of the river from this point to Pi-
perne has not been traced, but it is believed to run in a general
westerly direction along the Southern base of the Alatagh, and
to form a junction with the Gurghan a little below the ruins
of the same name. Its length to this point is probably about
200 miles. $.
The elevation of the mountain chains is not great. No very
remarkable peaks occur in them; and it may be doubted
whether they anywhere attain a height of above 6000 feet.
They are for the most part barren and rugged, very scantily
supplied with timber,” and only in places capable of furnish-
ing a tolerable pasturage to flocks and herds. The valleys, on
the other hand, are rich and fertile in the extreme; that of
Meshed, which extends a distance of above a hundred miles
from north-west to South-east, and is from twenty to thirty
miles broad, has almost everywhere a good and deep soil,” is
abundantly supplied with water, and yields a plentiful return
even to the simplest and most primitive cultivation. The
plain about Nishapur, which is in length from eighty to ninety
miles, and in width from forty to sixty, boasts a still greater
fertility.” -
The flat country along the southern base of the mountains.
which ancient writers regard as Parthia, par eaccellence,” is a
strip of territory about 300 miles long, varying in width ae
cording to the labor and the skill applied by its inhabitants to
the perfecting of a system of irrigation. At present the
kanats, or underground water-courses, are seldom carried to a
distance of more than a mile or two from the foot of the hills;
but it is thought that anciently the cultivation was extended
considerably further. Ruined cities dispersed throughout the
tract” sufficiently indicate its capabilities, and in a few places
where much attention is paid to agriculture the results are
such as to imply that the soil is more than ordinarily produc-
tive.” The salt desert lies, however, in most places within ten
or fifteen miles of the hills; and beyond this distance it is
obviously impossible that the “Atak” or “Skirt” should at any
time have begn inhabited.”
It is evident that the entire tract above described must have
been at all times a valuable and much coveted region. Com-
pared with the arid and inhospitable deserts which adjoin it
upon the north and South, Khorasan, the ancient Parthia and
Hyrcania, is a terrestrial Paradise. Parthia, though scantily
wooded,” still produces in places the pine, the walnut, the
f
*
CH. I.]: BORDER DISTRIOTS.–CHOFASMIA. 5
sycamore, the ash, the poplar, the willow, the vine, the mul-
berry, the apricot, and numerous other fruit trees.” Saffron,
asafoetida, and the gum ammoniac plant, are indigenous in
parts of it.” Much of the soil is suited for the cultivation of
wheat, barley, and cotton.” The ordinary return upon wheat
and barley is reckoned at ten for one.” Game abounds in
the mountains, and fish in the underground water-courses.”
Among the mineral treasures of the region may be enumerated
copper, lead, iron, salt,” and one of the most exquisite of gems,
the turquoise.” This gem does not appear to be mentioned by
ancient writers; but it is so easily obtainable that we can
scarcely suppose it was not known from very ancient times.
The severity of the climate of Parthia is strongly stated by
Justin.” According to modern travellers, the winters, though
protracted, are not very inclement, the thermometer rarely
sinking below ten or eleven degrees of Fahrenheit during the
nights,” and during the daytime rising, even in December and
January,” to 40° or 50°. The cold weather, however, which
commences about October, continues till nearly the end of
March, when storms of sleet and hail are common.” Much
snow falls in the earlier portion of the winter, and the valleys
are scarcely clear of it till March. On the mountains it re-
mains much longer, and forms the chief source of supply to
the rivers during the spring and the early summer time. In
summer the heat is considerable, more especially in the region
known as the “Atak;” and here, too, the unwholesome wind,
which blows from the southern desert, is felt from time to
time as a terrible scourge.” But in the upland country the
heat is at no time very intense, and the natives boast that they
are not compelled by it to sleep on their house-tops during
more than one month in the year.” - ~
The countries by which Parthia Proper was bounded were
the following: Chorasmia, Margiana, Aria, Sarangia, Sagartia,
and Hyrcania. - #
Chorasmia lay upon the north, consisting of the low tract
between the most northerly of the Parthian mountain chains
and the old course of the Oxus. This region, which is for the
most part an arid and inhospitable desert,” can at no time have
maintained more than a sparse and scanty population. The
Turkomantribes which at the present day roam over the waste,
feeding their flocks and herds alternately on the banks of the
Oxus and the Tejend, or finding a bare subsistence for them
about the ponds and pools left by the winter rains, represent, it
6 | THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. I.
is probable, with sufficient faithfulness, the ancient inhabitants,
who, whatever their race, must always have been nomads, and
can never have exceeded a few hundred thousands.” On this
side Parthia must always have been tolerably safe from at-
tacks, unless the Cis-Oxianian tribes were reinforced, as they
Sometimes were, by hordes from beyond the river. &
On the north-east was Margiana, sometimes regarded as a
country by itself, sometimes reckoned a mere district of Bac-
tria.” This was the tract of fertile land upon the Murg-ab, or
ancient Margus river, which is known among moderns as the
district of Merv. The Murg-ab is a stream flowing from the
range of the Paropamisus, in a direction which is a little east
of north; it debouches from the mountains in about lat. 36°25',
and thence makes its way through the desert. Before it
reaches Merv, it is eighty yards wide and five feet deep,” thus
carrying a vast body of water. By a judicious use of dykes
and canals, this fertilizing fluid was in ancient times carried to
a distance of more than twenty-five miles from the natural
course of the river; and by these means an Oasis was created
with a circumference of above 170, and consequently a diame-
ter of above fifty miles.” This tract, inclosed on every side by
deserts, was among the most fertile of all known regions; it
was especially famous for its vines, which grew to such a size
that a single man could not encircle their stems with his two
arms, and bore clusters that were a yard long.” Margiana
possessed, however, as a separate country, little military
strength, and it was only as a portion of Some larger and more
populous territory that it could become formidable to the Par-
thians. +
South of Margiana, and adjoining upon Parthia toward the
east, was Aria, the tract which lies about the modern Herat.
This was for the most part a mountain region, very similar in
its general character to the mountainous portion of Parthia,”
but of much smaller dimensions.” Its people were fairly war-
like; but the Parthian population was probably double or triple
their number, and Parthia consequently had but little to fear
in this quarter.
Upon the South-east Parthia was bordered by Sarangia, the
country of the Sarangae, or Drangae. This appears to have
been the district South of the Herat valley, reaching thence as
far as the Hamoon, or Sea of Seistan. It is a country of hills
and downs, “ watered by a number of somewhat scanty
streams, which flow south-westward from the Paropamisus to
CEI. II.] HYRCANIA. . 7
the Hamoon. Its population can never have been great, and
they were at no time aggressive or enterprising, so that on this
side also the Parthians were secure, and had to deal with no
formidable neighbor. - -
Sagartia succeeded to Sarangia towards the west, and bordered
Parthia along almost the whole of its southern frontier. Ex-
cepting in the vicinity of Tebbes and Toun" (lat. 34°, long. 56°
to 58°), this district is an absolute desert, the haunt of the ga-
Zelle and the wild ass,” dry, Saline, and totally devoid of vege-
tation. The wild nomads, who wandered over its wastes, ob-
taining a scanty subsistence by means of the lasso,” were few
in number,” scattered, and probably divided by feuds, South-
ern Parthia might occasionally suffer from their raids; but
they were far too weak to constitute a serious danger to the
mountain Country. -
Lastly, towards the west and the north-west, Parthia was
bordered by Hyrcania, a region geographically in the closest
connection with it, very similarin general character, but richer,
warmer, and altogether more desirable. Hyrcania was, as al-
ready observed,” the western and north-western portion of
that broad mountain region which has been described as inter-
vening between the eastern shores of the Caspian and the river
Arius, or Heri-rud. It consisted mainly of the two rich valleys
of the Gurghan and Ettrek, with the mountain chains inclos-
ing or dividing them. Here on the slopes of the hills grow the
oak, the beech, the elm, the alder, the wild cherry; here luxu-
riant vines spring from the soil on every side, raising them-
selves aloft by the aid of their stronger sisters, and hanging in
wild festoons from tree to tree; beneath their shade the ground
is covered with flowers of various kinds, primroses, violets,
lilies, hyacinths, and others of unknown species; while in the
flat land at the bottom of the valleys are meadows of the soft-
est and the tenderest grass, capable of affording to numerous
flocks and herds an excellent and unfailing pasture." Abun-
dant game finds shelter in the forests,” while towards the
mouths of the rivers, where the ground is for the most part
marshy, large herds of wild boars are frequent; a single herd
sometimes containing hundreds.” Altogether Hyrcania was a
most productive and desirable country, capable of sustaining a
derise population, and well deserving Strabo's description of it
as “highly favored of Heaven.” “ The area of the country
was, however, small;" probably not much exceeding one half
.*
8. f THE SIXTH MONAIRCEI.Y. ICH II.
that of Parthia Proper; and thus the people were not sufficiently.
numerous to cause the Parthians much apprehension.
The situation and character of Parthia thus, on the whole,
favored her becoming an imperial power. She had abundant,
resources within herself; she had a territory apt for the pro-
duction of a hardy race of men; and she had no neighbors of
sufficient strength to keep her down, when she once developed
the desire to become dominant. Surprise has been expressed
at her rise.” But it is perhaps more astonishing that she
passed so many centuries in obscurity before she became an
important state, than that she raised herself at last to the first
position among the Oriental nations. Her ambition and her
material strength were plants of slow growth; it took several
hundreds of years for them to attain maturity: when, how-
ever, this point was reached, the circumstances of her geo-
graphical position stood her in good stead, and enabled her
rapidly to extend her way over the greater portion of Western
Asia.
CHAPTER II.
Early notices of the Parthians. Their Ethnic character and
connections. Their position under the Persian Monarchs,
from Cyrus the Great to Darius III. (Codoman mus.)
IIáp6quw yewos Xicu6tków.—Arrian, Fr. 1.
THE Parthians do not appear in history until a comparatively
recent period. Their name occurs nowhere in the Old Testa-
ment Scriptures. They obtain no mention in the Zendavesta.
The Assyrian Inscriptions are wholly silent concerning them.
It is not until the time of Darius Hystaspis that we have trust-
worthy evidence of their existence as a distinct people.” In
the inscriptions of this king we find their country included
under the name of Parthva or Parthwa among the provinces
of the Persian Empire, joined in two places with Sarangia,
Aria, Chorasmia, Bactria, and Sogdiana,” and in a third with
these same countries and Sagartia.” We find, moreover, an
account of a rebellion in which the Parthians took part. In
the troubles which broke out upon the death of the Pseudo-
cH. H.] EARLY NOTICES OF THE PARTHIANS. 9
Smerdis, B.C. 521, Parthia revolted, in conjunction (as it would
seem) with Hyrcania, espousing the cause of that Median pre-
tender, who, declaring himself a descendant of the old Median
monarchs, set himself up as a rival to Darius. Hytāspes, the
father of Darius, held at this time the Parthian satrapy. In
two battles within the limits of his province he defeated the
rebels, who must have brought into the field a considerable
force, since in one of the two engagements, they lost in killed
and prisoners between 10,000 and 11,000 men. After their
second defeat the Parthians made their submission, and once
more acknowledged Darius for their sovereign."
With these earliest Oriental notices of the Parthians agree
entirely such passages as contain any mention of them in the
more ancient literature of the Greeks. Hecataeus of Miletus,
who was contemporary with Darius Hystaspis, made the
Parthians adjoin upon the Chorasmians in the account which
he gave of the geography of Asia." Herodotus spoke of them
as a people subject to the Persians in the reign of Darius, and
assigned them to the sixteenth satrapy, which comprised also
the Arians, the Sogdians, and the Chorasmians." He said that
they took part in the expedition of Xerxes against Greece (B.C.
480), serving in the army on foot under the same commander
as the Chorasmians, and equipped like them with bows and
arrows, and with spears of no great length." In another pas-
sage he mentioned their being compelled to pay the Persian
water tax, and spoke of the great need which they had of
water for the irrigation of their millet and sesamé crops.”
It is evident that these notices agree with the Persian ac-
counts, both as to the locality of the Parthians and as to the
fact of their subjection to the Persian government. They fur-
ther agree in assigning to the Parthians a respectable military
character, yet one of no very special eminency. On the eth-
nology of the nation, and the circumstances under which the
S
country became an integral part of the Persian dominions, -
they throw no light. We have still to seek an answer to the
questions, “Who were the Parthians?” and “How did they
become Persian subjects?”
Who were the Parthians ? It is not until the Parthians have
emerged from obscurity and become a great people that an-
bient authors trouble themselves with inquiries as to their
êthnic character and remote antecedents. Of the first writers
who take the subject into their consideration, some are con-
tent to say that the Parthians were a race of Scyths, who at a
*.
10 - THE SIXTH MoMARCHY [CH. II.
remote date had separated from the rest of the nation, and had
occupied the southern portion of the Chorasmian desert,
whence they had gradually made themselves masters of the
mountain region adjoining it." Others added to this that the
Scythic tribe to which they belonged was called the Dahae; that
their own proper name was Parni, or Aparni; and that they
had migrated originally from the country to the north of the
Palus Maeotis, where they had left the great mass of their fel-
low tribesmen.” Subsequently, in the time of the Antonines, the
theory was started that the Parthians were Scyths, whom
Sesostris, on his return from his Scythian expedition, brought
into Asia and settled in the mountain-tract lying east of the
Caspian.”
It can scarcely be thought that these notices have very much
historical value. Moderns are generally agreed that the
‘ Scythian conquests of Sesostris are an invention of the Egyptian
priests, which they palmed on Herodotus * and Diodorus.”
Could they be regarded as having really taken place, still the
march back from Scythia to Egypt round the north and east
of the Caspian Sea would be in the highest degree improbable.
. The Šettlement of the Parthians in Parthia by the returning
conqueror is, in fact, a mere duplicate of the tale commonly told
of his having settled the Colchians in Colchis,” and is equally
worthless. The earlier authors, moreover, know nothing of
the story, which first appears in the second century after our
era, and as time goes on becomes more circumstantial.”
Even the special connection of the Parthians with the Dahae,
and their migration from the shores of the Palus Maeotis,
may be doubted. Strabo admits it to be uncertain whether
there were any Dahae at all about the Maeotis ; * and, if there
were, it would be open to question whether they were of the
same race with the Dahae of the Caspian.” As the settlement
of the Parthians in the country called after their name dated
from a time anterior to Darius Hystaspis, and the Greeks cer-
tainly did not set on foot any inquiries into their origin till at
least two centuries later,” it would be unlikely that the Parthi-
ans could give them a true account. The real groundwork of the
stories told seems to have been twofold. First, there was a
strong conviction on the part of those who came in contact
with the Parthians that they were Scyths; and secondly, it
was believed that their name meant “exile.”” Hence it was
necessary to suppose that they had migrated into their country
from some portion of the tract known as Scythia to the Greeks,
CH. II.] THE PARTHIANS, SOYTHS. - , 11
and it was natural to invent stories as to the particular cir-
cumstances of the migration. - .
The residuum of the truth, or at any rate the important con-
viction of the ancient writers, which remains after their
stories are sifted, is the Scythic character of the Parthian peo-
ple. On this point, Strabo, Justin, and Arrian are agreed.
The manners of the Parthians had, they tell us, much that
was Scythic in them.” Their language was half Scythic,
half Median.* They armed themselves in the Scythic fash-
ion.” They were, in fact, Scyths in descent, in habits, in
character. -
But what are we to understand by this 7 May we assume at
once that they were a Turanian people, in race, habits, and
language akin to the various tribes of Turkomans who are at
present dominant over the entire region between the Oxus and
the Parthian mountain-tract, and within that tract have many
settlements 2 May we assume that they stood in an attitude
of natural hostility to the Arian nations by which they were
surrounded, and that their revolt was the assertion of inde-
pendence by a down-trodden people after centuries of subjec-
tion to the yoke of a stranger ? Did TURAN, in their persons,
rise against IRAN after perhaps a thousand years of oppression,
and renew the struggle for predominance in regions where the
war had been waged before, and where it still continues to be
waged at the present day ?
Such conclusions cannot safely be drawn from the mere fact
that the Scythic character of the Parthians is asserted in the
strongest terms by the ancient writers. The term “Scythic.”
is not, strictly speaking, ethnical. It designates a life rather a
descent, habits rather than blood. It is applied by the Greeks
and Romans to Indo-European and Turanian races indiffer-
ently,” provided that they are nomads, dwelling in ‘tents or
carts, living on the produce of their flocks and herds, uncivi-
lized, and, perhaps it may be added, accustomed to pass their
lives on horseback. We cannot, therefore, assume that a na-
tion is Turanian simply because it is pronounced “Scythic.”
Still, as in fact the bulk of those races which have remained
content with the nomadic condition, and which from the ear-
liest times to the present day have led the life above described
in the broad Steppes of Europe and Asia, appear to have been
of the Turian type, a presumption is raised in favor of a
people being Turanian by decided and concordant statements
that it is Scythic. The presumption may of course be re-
12, THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. II.
moved by evidence to the contrary ; but, until such evidence
is produced it has weight, and constitutes an argument, the
force of which is considerable. -- -
In the present instance the presumption raised is met by no
argument of any great weight; while on the other hand it
receives important confirmation from Several different quar-
ters. It is said, indeed, that as all, or almost all, the other
nations of these parts were confessedly Arians (e.g. the
Bactrians, the Sogdians, the Chorasmians, the Margians, the
Arians of Herat, the Sagartians, the Sarangians, and the
Hyrcanians), it would be strange if the Parthians belonged to
a wholly different ethnic family.” But, in the first place, the
existence of isolated nationalities, detached fragments of some
greater ethnic mass, embodied amid alien matérial, is a fact
familiar to ethnologists;” and, further, it is not at all certain
that there were not other Turanian races in these parts, as,
for instance, the Thamanaeans. Again, it is said that the
Parthians show their Arian extraction by their names; but
this argument may be turned against those who adduce it.
It is true that among the Parthian names a considerable
number are not only Arian, but distinctly Persian—e.g., Mith-
ridates, Tiridates, Artabanus, Orobazus, Rhodaspes—but the
bulk of the names have an entirely different character. There
is nothing Arian in such appellations as Amminapes, Bacasis,
Pacorus, Vonones, Sinnaces, Abdus, Abdageses, Gotarzes,
Vologeses, Mnasciras, Sanatroeces; nor anything markedly
Arian in Priapatius,” Himerus, Orodes, Apraetaeus, Ornos-
pades, Parrhaces, Vasaces, Monesis, Exedares. If the Par-
thians were Arians, what account is to be given of these
words? That they employed a certain number of Persian names
is sufficiently explained by their subjection during more than
two centuries to the Persian rule. We are also distinctly told
that they affected Persian habits, and desired to be looked
upon as Persians.” The Arian names borne by Parthians no
more show them to be Arians in race than the Norman names
adopted so widely by the Welsh show them to be Northmen.
On the other hand, the non-Arian names in the former case
are like the non-Norman names in the latter, and equally indi-
Cate a second source of nomenclature, in which should be con-
tained the key to the true ethnology of the people.
The non-Arian character of the Parthians is signified, if not
proved, by the absence of their name from the Zendavesta.
The Zendavesta enumerates among Arian nations the Bac-
CH. II.] TURANIAN CAST OF THE NAMES. 13
trians, the Sogdians, the Margians, the Hyrcanians, the Arians
of Herat, and the Chorasmians, or ALL the important nations
of these parts eaccept the Parthians. The Parthian country it
mentions under the name of Nisaya “ or Nisaea, implying
apparently that the Parthians were not yet settled in it. The
only ready way of reconciling the geography of the Zenda-
vesta with that of later ages is to suppose the Parthians a
'non-Arian nation who intruded themselves among the early
Arian settlements, coming probably from the north, the great
home of the Turanians. ~. -
Some positive arguments in favor of the Turanian origin of
the Parthians may be based upon their names. The Parthians
affect, in their names, the termination -ac or -ak, as, for
instance, in Arsac-es, Sinnac-es, Parrhaces, Vesaces, Sana-
traeces, Phraataces, etc.—a termination which characterizes
the primitive Babylonian, the Basque, and most of the Tura-
nian tongues. The termination -geses, found in such names as
Volo-geses, Abda-geses, and the like, may be compared with
the -ghiz of Yenghiz. The Turanian root annap, “God,” is
perhaps traceable in Amm-inap-es. If the Parthian “Chos-
röes” represents the Persian “Kurush” or Cyrus, the corrup-
tion which the word has undergone is such as to suggest a
Tatar articulation. ~.
The remains of the Parthian language, which we possess,
beyond their names, are too scanty and too little to be de-
pended on to afford us any real assistance in settling the .
question of their ethnic character. Besides the words surena,
“Commander-in-chief,” and karta or kerta, “city,” “fort,”
there is scarcely one of which we can be assured that it was
really understood by the Parthians in the sense assigned to
it.” Of these two, the latter, which is undoubtedly Arian,
may have been adopted from the Persians:” the former is
non-Arian, but has no known Turanian congeners. *
If, however, the consideration of the Parthian language does
not help us to determine their race, a consideration of their
manners and customs strengthens much the presumption that
they were Turanians. Like the Turkoman and Tatar tribes
generally, they passed almost their whole lives on horseback,
conversing, transacting business, buying and selling, even .
eating on their horses.” They practised polygamy, secluded
their women from the sight of men, punished unfaithfulness
with extreme severity, delighted in hunting, and rarely rate
any flesh but that which they obtained in this way, were
A .
14 THE SIXTH MONARCIIY. - [CH. II.
moderate eaters” but great drinkers,” did not speak much,
but yet were very unquiet, being constantly engaged in stir-
ring up trouble either at home or abroad.* A small portion
of the nation alone was free; the remainder were the slaves
of the privileged few." Nomadic habits continued to prevail
among a portion of those who remained in their primitive
seats, even in the time of their greatest national prosperity;”
and a coarse, rude, and semi-barbarous character attached
always even to the most advanced part of the nation, to the
king, the court, and the nobles generally, a character which,
despite a certain varnish of civilization, was constantly show-
ing itself in their dealings with each other and with foreign
nations. “The Parthian monarchs,” as Gibbon justly ob-
serves,” “like the Mogul (Mongol) sovereigns of Hindostan,
delighted in the pastoral life of their Scythian ancestors, and
the imperial camp was frequently pitched in the plain of
Ctesiphon, on the eastern bank of the Tigris.” Niebuhr seems
even to doubt whether the Parthians dwelt in cities at all.”
He represents them as maintaining from first to last their
nomadic habits, and regards the insurrection by which their
empire was brought to an end as a rising of the inhabitants of
towns—the Tadjiks” of those times—against the Ilyats or
wanderers, who had oppressed them for centuries. This is, no
doubt, an over-statement; but it has a foundation in fact,
since wandering habits and even tent-life were affected by the
Parthians during the most flourishing period of their empire.
On the whole, the Turanian character of the Parthians,
though not absolutely proved, appears to be in the highest
degree probable. If it be accepted, we must regard them as in
race closely allied to the vast hordes which from a remote
antiquity have roamed over the steppe region of upper Asia,
from time to time bursting upon the south, and harassing or
subjugating the comparatively unwarlike inhabitants of the
warmer countries. We must view them as the congeners of
the Huns, Bulgarians, and Comans of the ancient world; of
the Kalmucks, Ouigurs, Usbegs, Eleuts, etc., of the present
day. Perhaps their nearest representatives will be, if we look
to their primitive condition at the founding of their empire,
the modern Turkomans, who occupy nearly the same districts;
if we regard them in the period of their great prosperity, the
Osmanli Turks. Like the Turks, they combined great mili-
tary prowess and vigor with a capacity for organization and
government not very usual among Asiatics. Like them, they
* {
CH. II.] PARTILIANS CONQUERED BY CYRUS. 15
remained at heart barbarians, though they put on an external
appearance of civilization and refinement. Like them, they
never to any extent amalgamated with the conquered races,
but continued for centuries an exclusive dominant race,
encamped in the countries which they had overrun.
The circumstances under which the Parthians became
subjects of the Persian empire may readily be conjectured,
but cannot be laid down positively. According to Diodorus,
who probably followed Ctesias, they passed from the do-
minion of the Assyrians to that of the Medes, and from depend-
ence upon the Medes to a similar position under the Persians.”
But the balance of evidence is against these views. It is, on
the whole, most probable that neither the Assyrian nor the
Median empire extended so far eastward as the country of the
Parthians.” The Parthians probably maintained their inde-
pendence from the time of their settlement in the district
called after their name until the sudden arrival in their
country of the great Persian conqueror, Cyrus. This prince,
as Herodotus tells us, subdued the whole of Western Asia,
proceeding from nation to nation, and subjugating one people
after another. The order of his conquests is not traceable;
but it is clear that after his conquest of the Lydian empire
(about B.C. 554) he proceeded eastward, with the special
object of subduing Bactria.” To reach Bactria, he would have
to pass through, or close by, Parthia. Since, as Herodotus
says,” “he conquered the whole way, as he went,” we may
fairly conclude that on his road to Bactria he subjugated the
Parthians. It was thus, almost certainly, that they lost their
independence and became Persian subjects. Competent
enough to maintain themselves against the comparatively
small tribes in their near neighborhood, the Chorasmians,
Hyrcanians, Arians of Herat, Bactrians, and Sagartians, it
was not possible for them to make an effectual resistance to a
monarch who brought against them the entire force of a .
mighty empire. Cyrus had, it is probable, little difficulty in
obtaining their submission. It is possible that they resisted;
but perhaps it is more probable that their course on this occa-
sion was similar to that which they pursued when the Macedo-
nian conqueror swept across these same regions. The Parthi-
ans at that period submitted without striking a blow. “ There
is no reason to believe that they caused any greater trouble
to Cyrus.
When the Persian empire was organized by Darius Hystas-
a
\ 3. f
16 . . . THE SIXTH MONARCHY. EcH. III.
pis into satrapies, Parthia was at first united in the same
government with Chorasmia, Sogdiana, and Aria.” Subse-
quently, however, when Satrapies were made more numerous,
it was detached from these extensive countries and made to
form a distinct government, with the mere addition of the
comparatively small district of Hyrcania.” It formed, ap-
parently, one of the most tractable and submissive of the
Persian provinces. Except on the single occasion already
noticed,” when it took part in a revolt that extended to nearly
one-half the empire,” it gave its rulers no trouble; no second
attempt was made to shake off the alien yoke, which may
indeed have galled, but which was felt to be inevitable. In
the final struggle of Persia against Alexander, the Parthians
were faithful to their masters. They fought on the Persian
side at Arbela; * and though they submitted to Alexander
Somewhat tamely when he invaded their country, yet, as
Darius was then dead, and no successor had declared himself,
they cannot be taxed with desertion. Probably they felt
little interest in the event of the struggle. Habit and circum-
stance caused them to send their contingent to Arbela at the
call of the Great King; but when the Persian cause was
evidently lost, they felt it needless to make further sacrifices.
Having no hope of establishing their independence, they
thought it unnecessary to prolong the contest. They might
not gain, but they could Scarcely lose, by a change of masters.
CHAPTER III.
*
Condition of Western Asia under the earlier Seleucidae. Re-
volts of Bactria and Parthia. Conflicting accounts of the
establishment of the Parthian Kingdom. First War with
Syria. -
Tº e8vos Makečávov &méarma'av, kai kað’ favroës ºpéav, kai émi waya Suvápºews #Aaaav.–
Arrian, Fr. 1.
THE attempt of Alexander the Great to unite the whole civ-
ilized world in a single vast empire might perhaps have been a
success if the mind which conceived the end, and which had to
a considerable extent elaborated the means, had been spared
to watch over its own work, and conduct it past the perilous
:
\
CH. III.] PARTIIIA UNDER THE GREEKS. 17
period of infancy and adolescence. But the premature decease
of the great Macedonian in the thirty-third year of his age,
when his plans of fusion and amalgamation were only just
beginning to develop themselves, and the unfortunate fact that
among his “Successors” there was not one who inherited
either his grandeur of conception or his powers of execution,
caused his Scheme at Once to collapse; and the effort to unite
and consolidate led only to division and disintegration. In lieu
of Europe being fused with Asia, Asia itself was split up. For
nearly a thousand years, from the formation of the great As-
syrian empire to the death of Darius Codomannus, Western
Asia, from the Mediterranean to Affghanistan, or even to
India, had been united under one head, had acknowledged
one sovereign. Assyria, Media, Persia, had successively held
the position of dominant power; and the last of the three had
given union, and consequently peace, to a wider stretch of
country and a vaster diversity of peoples than either of her
predecessors. Under the mild yoke of the Achaemenian princes
had been held together for two centuries, not only all the
nations of Western Asia, from the Indian and Thibetan deserts
to the AEgean and the Mediterranean, but a great part of Africa
also, that is to say, Egypt, north-eastern Libya, and the Greek
settlements of Cyrene and Barca. The practical effect of the
conquests of Alexander was to break up this unity, to intro-
duce in the place of a single consolidated empire a multitude
of separate and contending kingdoms. The result was thus
the direct opposite of the great conqueror's design, and forms
a remarkable instance of the contradiction which so often sub-
sists between the propositions of man and the dispositions of
an overruling Providence. f
The struggle for power which broke out almost immediately
after his death among the successors of Alexander may be re-
garded as having been brought to a close by the battle of Ipsus.
The period of fermentation was then concluded, and something
like a settled condition of things brought about. A quadri-
partite division of Alexander's dominions was recognized,
Macedonia, Egypt, Asia Minor, and Syria (or south-western
Asia) becoming thenceforth distinct political entities. Asia
Minor, the kingdom of Lysimachus, had indeed less of unity
than the other three states. It was already disintegrated, the
kingdoms of Bithynia, Pontus, and Cappadocia, subsisting side
by side with that of Lysimachus, which was thus limited to
western and South-western Asia Minor. After the death of
- - - * * * *
a
18 . THE SIXTH MoMARCHY. [CH. III.
Tysimachus, further changes occurred; but the state of Per-
gamus, which sprang up this time, may be regarded as the
continuation of Lysimachus's kingdom, and as constituting
from the time of Eumenes I. (B.C. 263) a fourth power in the
various political movements and combinations of the Graeco-
Oriental world. ^
Of the four powers thus established, the most important,
and that with which we are here especially concerned, was
the kingdom of Syria (as it was called), or that ruled for 247
years by the Seleucidae. Seleucus Nicator, the founder of this
kingdom, was one of Alexander's officers, but served without
much distinction through the various compaigns by which the
conquest of the East was effected." At the first distribution
of provinces (B.C. 323) among Alexander's generals after his
death, he received no share;” and it was not until B.o. 320,
when upon the death of Perdiccas a fresh distribution was
made at Triparadisus, that his merits were recognized, and he
was given the satrapy of Babylon.” In this position he ac-
quired a character for mildness and liberality, and made him-
self generally beloved, both by his soldiers and by those who
were under his government." In the struggle between Anti-
gonus and Eumenes (B.C. 317–316), he embraced the side of
the former, and did him some good service; but this, instead
of evoking gratitude, appears to have only roused in Antigonus
a spirit of jealousy. The ambitious aspirant after universal
dominion, seeing in the popular satrap a possible, and far from
a contemptible, rival, thought it politic to sweep him out of
his way; and the career of Seleucus would have been cut
short had he not perceived his peril in time, and by a precipi-.
tate flight secured his safety. Accompanied by a body of no
more than fifty horsemen, he took the road for Egypt, es-
caped the pursuit of a detachment sent to overtake him, and
threw himself on the protection of Ptolemy.
This event, untoward in appearance, proved the turning-
point in Seleucus's fortunes. It threw him into irreconcilable
hostility with Antigonus, while it brought him forward before
the eyes of men as one whom Antigonus feared. It gave him
an opportunity of showing his military talents in the West,
and of obtaining favor with Ptolemy, and with all those by
whom Antigonus was dreaded. When the great struggle
came between the confederate monarchs and the aspirant
after universal dominion, it placed him on the side of the allies.
Having recovered Babylon (B.C. 312), Seleucus led the flower
-- –
CH. III.] ExTENT OF HIS EMPIRE 19
of the eastern provinces to the field of Ipsus (B.C. 301), and
contributed largely to the victory, thus winning himself a
position among the foremost potentates of the day. By the
terms of the agreement made after Ipsus, Seleucus was recog-
nized as monarch 6f all the Greek conquests in Asia, with the
sole exceptions of Lower Syria and Asia Minor." -
The monarchy thus established extended from the Holy-
Land and the Mediterranean on the west, to the Indus valley &
and the Bolor mountain-chain upon the east, and from the Cas-
pian and Jaxartes towards the north, to the Persian Gulfand In-
dian Ocean towards the South. It comprised Upper Syria, Meso-
potamia, parts of Cappadocia and Phrygia, Armenia," Assyria,
Media, Babylonia, Susiana, Persia, Carmania, Sagartia, Hyr-
cania, Parthia, Bactria, Sogdiana, Aria, Zarangia, Arachosia,
Sacastana, Gedrosia, and probably some part of India." Its
entire area could not have been much less than 1,200,000 square
miles. Of these, some 300,000 or 400,000 may have been desert;
but the remainder was generally fertile, and comprised within
its limits some of the very most productive regions in the
whole world. The Mesopotamian lowland, the Orontes valley,
the tract between the Caspian and the mountains, the regions
about Merv and Balkh, were among the richest in Asia, and
produced grain and fruits in incredible abundance. The rich
pastures of Media and Armenia furnished excellent horses.
Bactria gave an inexhaustible supply of camels. Elephants
in large numbers were readily procurable from India." Gold,
- silver, copper, iron, lead, tin, were furnished by several of the
provinces, and precious stones of various kinds abounded.”
Moreover, for above ten centuries, the precious metals and the
most valuable kinds of merchandise had flowed from every
quarter into the region; and though the Macedonians may
have carried off, or wasted, a considerable quantity of both,
yet the accumulations of ages withstood the drain, and the
hoarded wealth which had come down from Assyrian, Babylo-
nian, and Median times was to be found in the days of Seleucus
chiefly within the limits of his Empire.
The situation which nature pointed out as most suitable for
the capital of a kingdom having the extension that has been
here indicated was some portion of the Mesopotamian valley,
which was at once central and fertile. The empire of Seleucus
might have been conveniently ruled from the site of the ancient
Nineveh, or from either of the two still existing and still flour-.
ishing cities of Susã and Babylon. The impetus given to com-
- i
20 " TIE sixTH IronARCHY ſch. iii.
merce by the circumstances of the time" rendered a site near
the sea preferable to one so remote as that of Nineveh, and the
same consideration made a position on the Tigris or Euphrates
more advantageous than one upon a Smaller river. So far, all
pointed to Babylon as the natural and best metropolis; and it
was further in favor of that place that its merits had strick the
- Great Conqueror, who had designed to make it the capital of
his own still vaster Empire.” Accordingly Babylon was Se-,
leucus's first choice; and there his Court was held for some
years previously to his march against Antigonus. But either
certain disadvantages were found to attach to Babylon as a
residence, or the mere love of variety and change caused him
very shortly to repent of his selection, and to transfer his capi-
tal to another site. He founded, and built with great rapidity,
the city of Seleucia upon the Tigris”, at the distance of about
forty miles from Babylon, and had transferred thither the seat
f
of government even before B.C. 301. Thus far, however, no
fault had been committed. The second capital was at least as
conveniently placed as the first, and would have served equally.
well as a centre from which to govern the Empire. But after
Ipsus a further change was made—a change that was injudi-
cious in the extreme. Either setting undue store by his newly-
acquired western provinces, or over-anxious to keep close
watch on his powerful neighbors in those parts, Lysimachus
and Ptolemy, Seleucus once more transferred the seat of em-
pire, exchanging this time the valley of the Tigris for that of
the Orontes, and the central position of Lower Mesopotamia for
almost the extreme western point of his vast territories. An-
tioch arose in extraordinary beauty and magnificence during
the first few years that succeeded Ipsus, and Seleucus in a
short time made it his ordinary residence.” The change
weakened the ties which bound the Empire together, offended
the bulk of the Asiatics, who saw their monarch withdraw
from them into a remote region, and particularly loosened the
grasp of the government on those more eastern districts which
were at once furthest from the new metropolis and least as-
similated to the Hellenic character. Among the causes which
led to the disintegration of the Seleucid kingdom, there is none
that deserves so well to be considered the main cause as this.
It was calculated at once to produce the desire to revolt, and
to render the reduction of revolted provinces difficult, if not
impossible. -
... The evil day, however, might have been indefinitely delayed
|
\
\ !, - \ . —:
on m. WARS of SELEvous AND HIS SUCCESSORs. 21
had the Seleucid princes either established and maintained
through their Empire a vigorous and effective administration,
or abstained from entangling themselves in wars with their
Theighbors in the West, the Ptolemies and the princes of Asia
Minor. 8. - . . .
But the organization of the Empire was unsatisfactory. In-
stead of pursuing the system inaugurated by Alexander and
seeking to weld the heterogeneous elements of which his king-
dom was composed into a homogeneous whole, instead of at
Once conciliating and elevating the Asiatics by uniting them
with the Macedonians and the Greeks, by promoting intermar-
riage and social intercourse between the two classes of his sub-
jects, educating the Asiatics in Greek ideas and Greek schools,
opening his court to them, promoting them to high employ- .
ments, making them feel that they were as much valued and
as well cared for as the people of the conquering race, “the first
Seleucus, and after him his successors, fell back upon the old
simpler, ruder system, the system pursued before Alexander's
time by the Persians, and before them perhaps by the Medes--
"the system most \ongenial to human laziness and human pride
—that of governing a nation of slaves by means of a class of
victorious aliens. Seleucus divided his empire into satrapies,
seventy-two in number. He bestowed the office of satrap on
none but Macedonians and Greeks. The standing army, by
|
which he maintained his authority, was indeed composed in
the main of Asiatics, disciplined after the Greek model; but it
was officered entirely by men of Greek or Macedonian parent-
age. Nothing was done to keep up the self-respect of Asiatics,
or to soften the unpleasantness that must always attach to be-
ing governed by foreigners. Even the superintendence over
, the satraps seems to have been insufficient. According to
'some writers, it was a gross outrage offered by a satrap to an
Asiatic subject that stirred up the Parthians to their revolt.”
“The story may not be true; but its currency shows of what
conduct towards those under their government the satraps of
the Seleucidae were thought, by such as lived near the
time, to have been capable. . - -
It would, perhaps, have been difficult for the Seleucid
princes, even had they desired it, to pursue a policy of abso-
lute abstention in the wars of their western neighbors. So
long as they were resolute to maintain their footing on the
right bank of the Euphrates, in Phrygia, Cappadocia, and up-
per Syria, they were of necessity mixed up with the quarrels
•r
A
22 THE SIXTH MoMARCHY. [CH. III.
of the west. Could they have been content to withdraw with-
in the Euphrates, they might have remained for the most part
clear of such entanglements; but even then there would have
been occasions when they must have taken the field in self-
defence. As it was, however, the idea of abstention seems
never to have occurred to them. It was the fond dream of
each “Successor” of Alexander that in his person might, per-
haps, be one day united all the territories of the great Con-
queror. Seleucus would have felt that he sacrificed his most
cherished hopes if he had allowed the west to go its own way,
and had contented himself with consolidating a great power in *
the regions east of the Euphrates. & + -
And the policy of the founder of the house was followed by
his successors. The three Seleucid sovereigns who reigned
prior to the Parthian revolt were, one and all, engaged in fre-
quent, if not continual, wars with the monarchs of Egypt and
Asia Minor. The first Seleucus, by his claim to the sovereignty
of Lower Syria, established a ground of constant contention
with the Ptolemies;" and though he did not prosecute the
claim to the extent of actual hostility, yet in the reign of his
son, Antiochus I., called Soter, the Smothered quarrel broke
out. Soter formented the discontent of Cyrene with its subjec-
tion to Egypt,” and made at least one expedition against
Ptolemy Philadelphus in person (B.C. 264). His efforts did not
meet with much success; but they were renewed by his son,
Antiochus II., surnamed “the God” (Geog), who warred with
Philadelphus from B.C. 260 to B.C. 250, contending with him
chiefly in Asia Minor.” These wars were complicated with
others. The first Antiochus aimed at adding the kingdom of
JBithynia to his dominions, and attacked successively the
|Bythynian monarchs, Zipoetas” and Nicomedes I. (B.C. 280–
278).” This aggression brought him into collision with the
Gauls, whom Nicomedes called to his aid, and with whom
Antiochus had several struggles, some successful and some dis-
astrous.” He also attacked Eumenes of Pergamus (B.C. 263),
but was defeated in a pitched battle near Sardis.” The second
Antiochus was not engaged in so great a multiplicity of con-
tests; but we hear of his taking a part in the internal affairs of
Miletus,” and expelling a certain Timachus, who had made
himself tyrant of that city. There is also some ground for
thinking that he had a standing quarrel with the king of Media
Atropatene.” Altogetherit is evident that from B.C. 280 to B.C.
250 the Seleucid princes were incessantly occupied with wars
...”
\
\
ch. II.] CIIARACTER OF ANTIOCHUS. 23
in the west, in Asia Minor and in Syria Proper, wars which so
constantly engaged them that they had neither time nor atten-
tion to spare for the affairs of the far east. So long as the
Bactrian and Parthian satraps paid their tributes, and supplied
the requisite quotas of troops for service in the western wars,
the Antiochi were content. The satraps were left to manage
affairs at their own discretion; and it is not surprising that
the absence of a controlling hand led to various complications
and disorders. - .* -
Moreover, the personal character of the second Antiochus
must be taken into account. The vanity and impiety, which
could accept the name of “Theus” for a service that fifty other
Greeks had rendered to oppressed towns without regarding
themselves as having done anything very remarkable,” would
alone indicate a weak and contemptible morale, and might
justify us, did we know no more, in regarding the calamities
of his reign as the fruit of his own unfitness to rule an empire.
But there is sufficient evidence that he had other, and worse,
vices. He was noted, even among Asiatic Sovereigns, for.
luxury and debauchery; he neglected all state affairs in the
pursuit of pleasure; his wives and male favorites were allowed
to rule his kingdom at their will; and their most flagrant
crimes were neither restrained nor punished.” Such a charac-
ter could have inspired neither respect nor fear. The satraps,
to whom the conduct of their sovereign could not but become ,
known, would be partly encouraged to follow the bad example,
partly provoked by it to shake themselves free of so hateful.
and yet contemptible a master.
It was, probably, about the year B.C. 256, the fifth of the sec-
ond Antiochus, when that prince, hard pressed by Philadelphus
in the west, was also, perhaps, engaged in a war with the king
of Atropatene in the north, that the standard of revolt was,
first actually raised in the eastern provinces, and Sa Syrian
Satrap ventured to declare himself an independent sovereign.
This was Diodotus,” satrap of Bactria a Greek, as his name
shows. Suddenly assuming the state and style of king he
issued coins stamped with his own name, and established him-
Self without difficulty as sovereign over the large and flourish-
ing province of Bactria,” or the tract of fertile land about the
upper and middle Oxus. This district had from a remote an-
tiquity been one with special pretensions. The country was
fertile, and much of it strong; the people were hardy and
valiant;” they were generally treated with exceptional favor
, t
24 THE SIXTIT MONAIRGIII. ſon, nº
|
by the Persian monarchs;” and they seem to have had tradi-
itions which assigned them a pre-eminence among the Arian
tribes at some indefinitely distant period.” We may presume
" that they would gladly support the bold enterprise of their
new monarch; they would feel their vanity flattered by the
establishment of an independent Bactria, even though it were
"under Greek kings; and they would energetically second him
in an enterprise which gratified their pride, while it held out
to them hopes of a career of conquest, with its concomitants
of plunder and glory. The settled quiet which they had en-
joyed under the Achaemenide and the Seleucidae was probably
not much to their taste; and they would gladly exchange So.
tame and dull a life for the pleasures of independence and the
chances of empire.
It would seem that Antiochus, sunk in luxury at his capi-
tal, could not bring himself to make even an effort to check .
the spirit of rebellion, and recover his revolted subjects. Bac-
tria was allowed to establish itself as an independent mon-
archy, without having to undergo the ordeal of a bloody strug-
gle. Antiochus neither marched against Diodotus in person,
nor sent a general to contend with him. The authority of Di-
odotus was confirmed and riveted on his subjects by an undis-
turbed reign of eighteen years before a Syrian army even
showed itself in his neighborhood.
The precedent of successful revolt thus set could not well be
barren of consequences. If one province might throw off the
yoke of its feudal lord with impunity, why might not others?
Accordingly, within a few years the example set by Bactria
was followed in the neighboring country of Parthia, but with
certain very important differences. In Bactria the Greek
satrap took the lead, and the Bactrian kingdom was, at any
Tate at its commencement, as thoroughly Greek as that of the
Seleucidae. But in Parthia Greek rule was from the first cast
aside. The natives rebelled against their masters. An Asiatic
race of a rude and uncivilized type, coarse and Sawage, but
brave and freedom-loving, rose up against the polished but ef-
feminate Greeks who held them in subjection, and claimed:and
established their independence. The Parthian kingdom was
thoroughly anti-Hellenic.” It appealed to patriotic feelings,
and to the hate universally felt towards the stranger. It set
itself to undo the work of Alexander, to cast out the Euro-
peans, to recover to the Asiatics the possession of Asia. It
was naturally almost as hostile to Bactria as to Syria, although
ch, mºj REVOLT OF PARTHIA UNDER ARSACES I. 25
danger from a common enemy might cause it sometimes to
make a temporary alliance with that kingdom. It had, no
doubt, the general sympathy of the populations in the adjacent
countries, and represented to them the cause of freedom and
autonomy. • . - - . . .
The exact circumstances, under which the Parthian revolt -
took place are involved in much obscurity. According to one
account the leader of the revolt, Arsaces, was a Bactrian, to
whom the success of Diodotus was disagreeable, and who
therefore quitted the newly-founded kingdom, and betook
himself to Parthia, where he induced the natives to revolt and
to accept him for their monarch.” Another account, which is
attractive from the minute details into which it enters, is the
following:—“Arsaces and Tiridates were brothers, descendants
of Phriapites, the son of Arsaces. Pherecles, who had been
made satrap of their country by Antiochus Theus, offered a
gross insult to one of them, whereupon, as they could not
brook the indignity, they took five men into counsel, and with
their aid slew the insolent one. They thén induced their nation
to revolt from the Macedonians, and set up a government of
their own, which attained to great power.”* A third version
says that the Arsaces, whom all represent as the first king, was
in reality a Scythian, who at the head of a body of Parnian
Dahae, nomads inhabiting the valley of the Attrek (Ochus), in-
'vaded Parthia, soon after the establishment of Bactrian inde-
*
pendence, and succeeded in making himself master of it.* .
With this account, which Strabo seems to prefer, agrees toler-
ably well that of Justin, who says * that “Arsaces, having
been long accustomed to live by robbery and rapine, attacked
the Parthians with a predatory band, killed their satrap, An-
dragoras, and seized the supreme authority.” As there was in
all probability a close ethnic connection between the Dahae
and the Parthians,” it would be likely enough that the latter
might accept for a king a chieftain of the former who had
boldly entered their country, challenged the Greek satrap to
an encounter, and by defeating and killing him freed them—
at any rate for the time—from the Greek yoke. An oppressed
people gladly adopts as chief the head of an allied tribe if he
has shown skill and daring, and offers to protect them from
their oppressors. -
The revolt of Arsaces has been placed by some as early as the
year B.C. 256.” The Bactrian revolt is assigned by most histo-
rians to that year;” and the Parthian, according to some," was
#
26 THE SIXTH MoMARCHY [CH., III.
contemporary. The best authorities, however, give a short in-
terval between the two insurrections;” and, on the whole,
there is perhaps reason to regard the Parthian independence as
dating from about. B.C. 250.” This year was the eleventh of
Antiochus Theus, and fell into the time when he was still en-
gaged in his war with Ptolemy Philadelphus. It might have
been expected that when he concluded a peace with the Egypt
tian monarch in B.C. 249, he would have turned his arms at
once towards the east, and have attempted at any rate the re-
covery of his lost dominions. But, as already stated,” his per-
sonal character was weak, and he preferred the pleasures of
repose at Antioch to the hardships of a campaign in the Cas-
pian region. So far as we hear, he took no steps to re-establish
his authority; and Arsaces, like Diodotus, was left undisturbed
to consolidate his power at his leisure.
: Arsaces lived, however, but a short time after obtaining the
crown. His authority was disputed within the limits of Par-
thia itself; and he had to engage in hostilities with a portion
of his own subjects. “ We may suspect that the malcontents
were chiefly, if not solely, those of Greek race, who may have
been tolerably numerous, and whose strength would lie in the
towns. Hecatompylos, the chief city of Parthia, was among
the colonies founded by Alexander;" and its inhabitants would
naturally be disinclined to acquiesce in the rule of a “barba-
rian.” Within little more than two years of his coronation,
Arsaces, who had never been able to give his kingdom peace,
was killed in battle by a spear-thrust in the side;” and was
succeeded (B.C. 247) by his brother, having left, it is probable,
no Sons, or none of mature age.
Tiridates, the successor of Arsaces, took upon his accession
his brother's name, and is known in history as Arsaces II.
The practice thus begun passed into a custom,” each Parthian
monarch from henceforth bearing as king the name of Arsaces
in addition to his own real appellation, whatever that might
be. In the native remains the assumed name almost super-
sedes the other;” but, fortunately, the Greek and Roman
writers who treat of Parthian affairs, have preserved the dis-
tinctive appellations, and thus saved the Parthian history
from inextricable confusion. It is not easy to see from what
quarter this practice was adopted;” perhaps we should regard
it as one previously existing among the Dahan Scyths.
If the Parthian monarchy owed its origin to Arsaces I., it
owed its consolidation, and settled establishment to Arsaces
ch. Im.] TIRIDATES THREATENED BY PTOLEMY III. 27
II., or Tiridates. This prince, who had the good fortune to
reign for above thirty years," and who is confused by many
writers” with the actual founder of the monarchy, having re-
ceived Parthia from his brother, in the weak and unsettled
condition above described, left it a united and powerful king-
dom, enlarged in its boundaries, strengthened in its defences,
in alliance with its nearest and most formidable neighbor, and
triumphant over the great power of Syria, which had hoped to
bring it once more into subjection. He ascended the throne,
it is probable, early in B.C. 247, and had scarcely been monarch
a couple of years when he witnessed one of those vast but
transient revolutions to which Asia is subject, but which are
of rare occurrence in Europe. Ptolemy Euergetes, the son of
Philadelphus, having succeeded to his father's kingdom in the
same year with Tiridates, marched (in B.C. 245) a huge expedi-
tion into Asia, defeated Seleucus II. (Callinicus) in Syria, took
Antioch, and then, having crossed the Euphrates, proceeded
to bring the greater part of Western Asia under his sway.
Mesopotamia, Assyria, Babylonia, Susiana, Persia, Media, sub-
mitted to him. He went in person as far as Babylon, and,
according to his own account,” was acknowledged as master
by all the Eastern provinces to the very borders of Bactria.
The Parthian and Bactrian kingdoms cannot but have trem-
bled for their newly won independence. Here was a young
warrior who, in a single campaign, had marched the distance
of a thousand miles, from the banks of the Nile to those of the
Lower Euphrates, without so much as receiving a check, and
who was threatening to repeat the career of Alexander. What-
resistance could the little Parthian state hope to offer to such
an enemy? It must have rejoiced Tiridates to hear that while
the new conqueror was gathering somewhat too hastily the
fruits of victory, collecting and despatching to Egypt the most
valuable works of art that he could find in the cities which he
had taken, and levying heavy contributions on the submitted
countries, a revolt had broken out in his own land, to quell
which he was compelled to retire suddenly and to relinquish
the greater part of his acquisitions. Thus the threatened con-
quest proved a mere inroad, and instead of a power of greater
strength replacing Syria in these regions, Syria practically re-
tained her hold of them, but with enfeebled grasp, her strength
crippled, her prestige lost, and her honor tarnished. Ptolemy
had, it is probable, not retired very long, when, encouraged #
by what he had seen of Syria's weakness, Tiridates took the - x
28 d THE SIXTH MoMARCHY ſon. In
aggressive, and invading the neighboring district of Hyrcania,
succeeded in detaching it from the Syrian state, and adding it
to his own territory.” This was throwing out a challenge
which the Syrian monarch, Callinicus, could scarcely decline
-to meet, unless he was prepared to lose, one by one, all the
'outlying provinces of his empire. -
Accordingly in B.C. 237, having patched up a peace with his
brother, Antiochus Hierax, the Syrian monarch made an ex-
pedition against Parthia. Not feeling, however, altogether
ſconfident of success if he trusted wholly to his own unaided
efforts, he prudently entered into an alliance with Diodotus
the Bactrian king, “and the two agreed to combine their forces
against Tiridates. Hereupon that monarch, impressed with a
deep sense of the impending danger, quitted Parthia, and, pro-
ceeding northwards, took refuge with the Aspasiacae,” a Scyth-
ſian tribe which dwelt between the Oxus and the Jaxartes.**
The Aspasiacae probably lent him troops; at any rate, he did
not remain long in retirement, but, hearing that the Bactrian
king, whom he especially feared, was dead, he contrived to
detach his son and successor from the Syrian alliance, and to
draw him over to his own side. Having made this important
stroke, he met Callinicus in battle, and completely defeated
...his army.”
This victory was with reason regarded by the Parthians as a
- sort of second beginning of their independence.” Hitherto
, their kingdom had existed precariously, and as it were by suf-
ferance. It could not but be that the power from which they
Had revolted would one day seek to reclaim its lost territory;
and, until the new monarchy had measured its strength against
that of its former mistress, none could feel secure that it would
be able to maintain its existence. The victory gained by Tiri-
dates over Callinicus put an end to these doubts. It proved
to the world at large, and also to the Parthians themselves,
that they had nothing to fear—that they were strong enough
to preserve their freedom. Considering the enormous dispro-
portion between the military strength and resources of the
narrow Parthian State and the vast Syrian Empire—consider-
ing that the one comprised about fifty thousand and the other
above a million of Square miles;” that the one had inherited
the wealth of ages and the other was probably as poor as any
province in Asia; that the one possessed the Macedonian arms,
training, and tactics, while the other knew only the rude war-
fare of the Steppes—the result of the struggle cannot but be re-
2. }
*
f .*
cH. Iv.] PARTHIAN KINGDOM CONSOLIDATED. 29
garded as Surprising. Still it was not without precedent, and
it has not been without repetition. It adds another to the
many instances where a small but brave people, bent on re-
, sisting foreign domination, have, when standing on their de-
fence, in their own territory, proved more than a match for
the utmost force that a foe of overwhelming strength could
bring against them. It reminds us of Marathon, of Bannock-
burn, of Morgarten. We may not sympathize wholly with the
victors, for Greek civilization, even of the type introduced by
Alexander into Asia, was ill replaced by Tatar coarseness and
barbarism; but we cannot refuse our admiration to the spec-
tacle of a handful of gallant men determinedly resisting in the
fastness of their native land a host of aliens, and triumphing
over their would-be oppressors. s
The Parthians themselves, deeply impressed with the im-
portance of the contest, preserved the memory of it by a sol-
emn festival on the anniversary of their victory, which they
still celebrated in the time of Trogus.” " - *
CHAPTER IV.
Consolidation of the Parthian Kingdom. Death of Tiridates
and accession of Arsaces III. Attack on Media. War of
Artabanus (Arsaces III.) with Antiochus the Great. Period
of inaction. Great development of Bactrian power. Reigns
of Priapatius (Arsaces IV.) and Phraates I. (Arsaces W.)
- f
Katº &pxãs dadevils àv kai airbs (Sc. Apačkms) kai oi 8tašešáuevot kelvov.—Strab. .
xi. 9, § 2, -
SELEUCUS might perhaps not have accepted his defeat as
final had he been altogether free to choose whether he would
continue the Parthian war or no. The resources of his Empire
were So vast, his command of men and money so unbounded,
that he could easily have replaced one army by another, and
so have prolonged the struggle. But renewed troubles had
'broken out in the western portion of his dominions,” where his
brother, Antiochus Hierax, was still in arms against his au-
thority. Seleucus felt it necessary to turn his attention to this
quarter, and having Once retired from the Parthian contest, he
never afterwards renewed it.” Tiridates was left unmolested,
30 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. Iv.
to act as he thought fit, and either to attempt further con-
quests, or to devote himself to securing those which he had
effected. He chose the latter course, and during the remainder
of his reign—a space of above twenty years—he employed him-
self wholly in strengthening and adorning his small kingdom.
Having built a number of forts in various strong positions, and
placed garrisons in them, he carefully selected a site for a new
city, which he probably intended to make his capital. The
spot chosen combined the advantages of being at once delight-
ful and easily defensible. It was surrounded with precipitous
rocks, which enclosed a plain of extraordinary fertility. Abun-
dant wood and copious streams of water were in the neighbor-
hood. The soil was so rich that it scarcely required cultiva-
tion, and the woods were so full of game as to afford endless
amusement to hunters.” To the town which he built in this
locality Tiridates gave the name of Dara, a word which the
Greeks and Romans elongated into Dareium.* Unfortunately,
modern travellers have not yet succeeded in identifying the
site, which should, however, lie towards the East," perhaps in
the vicinity of Meshed. -
We may presume that Tiridates, when he built this remark-
able city, intended to make it the seat of government. Hecat-
ompylos, as a Greek town, had the same disadvantages, which
were considered in later times to render Seleucia unfit for the
residence of the Parthian Court and monarch. Dara, like
Ctesiphon, was to be wholly Parthian. Its strong situation
would render it easy of defence; its vicinity to forests abound-
ing in game would give it special charms in the eyes of persons
so much devoted, as the Parthian princes were, to the chase.
But the intention of Tiridates, if we have truly defined it,
failed of taking permanent effect. He may himself have fixed
his abode at Dara, but his successors did not inherit his pre-
dilections; and Hecatompylos remained, after his reign, as be-
fore it, the head-quarters of the government, and the recog-
nized metropolis of Parthia Proper." -
After passing in peace and prosperity the last twenty years
of his reign, Tiridates died in a good old age, leaving his crown
to a son, whose special name is a little uncertain, but who is
called by most moderns' Artabanus I.
Artabanus, having ascended the Parthian throne about B.C.
214, and being anxious to distinguish himself, took advantage
of the war raging between Antiochus III., the second son of
Seleucus Callinicus, and Achaeus, one of his rebel satraps, to
ch, rv.] REIGN of ARTABANUS I 31
advance into Media, and to add to his dominions the entire -
tract between Hyrcania and the Zagros mountains. Of the
manner in which he effected his conquests we have no account;
but they seem to have been the fruit of a single campaign,
which must have been conducted with great vigor and military
skill. The Parthian prince appears to have occupied Ecbatana,"
the ancient capital of the Median Empire, and to have thence
threatened the Mesopotamian countries. Upon receiving in-
telligence of his invasion, Antiochus levied a vast army,” and
set out towards the East, with a determination to subjugate
all the revolted provinces, and to recover the limits of the old
Empire of Nicator. Passing the Zagros chain, probably by
way of Behistun and Kermanshaw,” he easily retook Ecbatana,
which was an open town,” and undefended by the Parthians,
and proceeded to prepare for a further advance eastward. The
The route from Ecbatana to the Caspian Gates crosses, of ne-
cessity, unless a considerable circuit be taken, some large tracts
of barren ground, inlets or bays of the Great Salt Desert of
Iran. Artabanus cherished the hope that here the difficulties
# -
of the way would effectually bar his enemy's progress, more
especially as his troops were so numerous, and as water was
scanty throughout the whole region. The streams which flow
from Zagros towards the East are few and scanty; they mostly
fail in summer, which, even in Asia, is the campaigning sea-
son; and those who cross the desert at this time must depend
on the wells wherewith the more western part of the region is
supplied by means of kamats or underground conduits,” which
are sometimes carried many miles from the foot of the moun-
tains. The position of the wells, which were few in number,
was known only to the natives;” and Artabanus hoped that
the Syrian monarch would be afraid to place the lives of his .
soldiers in such doubtful keeping. When, however, he found
that Antiochus was not to be deterred by any fears of this
kind, but was bent on crossing the desert, he had recourse to
the barbaric expedients of filling in, or poisoning, the wells
along the line of route which the Syrian prince was likely to
follow.” But these steps seem to have been taken too late.
Antiochus, advancing suddenly, caught Some of the Parthian
troops at their barbarous work, and dispersed them without
difficulty.” He then rapidly effected the transit, and, pressing
forward, was soon in the enemy's country, where he occupied
the chief city, Hecatompylos.” -
Up to this point the Parthian monarch had declined an en-
* }
32 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CEI. IV.
gagement. No information has come down to us as to hig
motives; but they may be readily enough conjectured. To
draw an enemy far away from his resources, while retiring
upon one's own ; to entangle a numerous host among narrow
passes and defiles ; to decline battle when he offers it, and then
to set upon him unawares, has always been the practice of weak
mountain races when attacked by a more numerous foe. It is
often good policy in such a case even to yield the capital with-
out a blow, and to retreat into a more difficult situation. The
assailant must follow whithersoever his foe retires, or quit the
country, leaving him unsubdued. Antiochus, aware of this
necessity, and rendered confident of success by the evacuation
of a situation so strong, and so suitable for the Parthian tac-
tics as Hecatompylos,” after giving his army a short rest at
the captured capital, set out in pursuit of Artabanus, who had
withdrawn his forces towards Hyrcania. To reach the rich
Hyrcanian valleys, he was forced to cross the main chain of
the Elburz, which here attains an elevation of 7000 or 8000 feet.
The route which his army had to follow was the channel of a
winter-torrent,” obstructed with stones and trunks of trees,
partly by nature, partly by the efforts of the inhabitants.
The long and difficult ascent was disputed by the enemy the
whole way, and something Iike a pitched battle was fought at
, the top; but Antiochus persevered, and, though his army must
have suffered severely, descended into Hyrcanian and cap-
tured several of the towns.” Here our main authority, Poly-
bius, suddenly deserts us, and we can give no further account
of the war beyond its general result—Artabanus and the
Parthians remained unsubdued after a struggle which seems
to have lasted some years; Artabanus himself displayed
great valor;” and at length the Syrian monarch thought
it best to conclude a peace with him, in which he acknowl-
edged the Parthian independence. It is probable that
he exacted in return a pledge that the Parthian monarch should
, lend him his assistance in the expedition which he was bent
‘ on conducting against Bactria; * but there is no actual proof
that the conditions of peace contained this clause. We are left
in doubt whether Artabanus stood aloof in the war which
Antiochus waged with Euthydemus of Bactria immediately
after the close of his Parthian campaigns, or whether he lent
his aid to the attempt made to crush his neighbor. Perhaps,
on the whole, it is most probable that, nominally, he was Anti-
Wol, lll. Plate 1.
Fig. 2.
Phraates I. (Obverse.)
Coin of Phraatcs I.
Fig. 3.
Coin of Mithridates I. (Native) Coin of Mithridates I. (Greek.)
Fig. 4
Arsaces I. Artabanus I.




Plate ||.. Vol. Ill.
Coin of Labienus,
Fig 2.
COIN OF PHRAATACES AND MOUSA.
COIN OF WONONES I.
Fig. 4. Fig. 5.
CoIN OF ARTABANUs III. COIN OF WARDANES I.




cII. Iv.] BIANK PERIOD IN PARTHIAN HISTORY. 33
ochus's ally in the war, but that, practically, he gave him little
help, having no wish to see Syria aggrandized. . .
At any rate, whether Euthydemus had to meet the attack.o
Syria only, or of Syria and Parthia in combination, the result
was, that Bactria, like Parthia, proved strong enough to main-
tain her ground, and that the Syrian King, after a while, grew
tired of the struggle, and consented to terms of accommodation.”
. The Bactrian monarchy, like the Parthian, came out of the
contest unscathed—indeed we may go further, and say that
the position of the two kingdoms was improved by the attacks
made upon them. If a prince possessing the personal qualities
that distinguished the third Antiochus, and justified the title
of “Great” which he derived from his oriental expedition”—
if such a prince, enjoying profound peace at home, and direct-
ing the whole force of his empire against them, could not suc-
ceed in reducing to subjection the revolted provinces of the
northeast, but, whatever military advantages he might gain,
founº conquest impossible, and returned home, having ac-
knowledged as independent kings those whom he went out to
chastise as rebellious satraps, it was evident that the kingdoms
might look upon themselves as firmly established, or, at least,
as secure from the danger of re-absorption into the Syrian
State. The repulse of Callinicus was a probable indication of
the fate of all future efforts on the part of Syria to reduce
Parthia ; the conditions of peace granted by Antiochus to both
countries, after a series of military successes, constituted al-
most a proof that the yoke of Syria would never be re-imposed
on either the Parthian or the Bactrian nation.
With the departure of Antiochus from the East, about B.C.
206, we enter upon a period when Parthian history is, for a
quarter of a century, almost a blank. Nothing more is known
of Arsaces III. after Antiochus retired ; and nothing at all is
known of his successor, Priapatius, beyond his name and the
length of his reign, which lasted for fifteen years ” (from about
B.C. 196 to 181). The reigns of these princes coincide with
those of Euthydemus and his son, Demetrius, in Bactria ; and
perhaps the most probable solution of the problem of Parthian
inactivity at this time is to be found in the great development
of Bactrian power which now took place, and the influence
which the two neighboring kingdoms naturally exercised upon
each other. When Parthia was strong and aggressive, Bactria
was, for the most part, quiet; and when Bactria shows signs
34 THE SIXTH MONARCHY, [CH. Iv.
of vigorous and active life, Parthia languishes and retires into
the shade. z
The Bactrian Kingdom, founded (as we have seen *) a little
before the Parthian, sought from the first its aggrandizement
in the East rather than in the West. The Empire of Alexan-
der had included all the countries between the Caspian Sea and
the Sutlej; and these tracts, which constitute the modern
Rhorasan, Afghanistan, and Punjaub, had all been to a cer-
tain extent Hellenized by means of Greek settlements” and
Greek government. But Alexander was no sooner dead than
a tendency displayed itself in these regions, and particularly in
the more eastern ones, towards a relapse into barbarism, or, if
this expression be too strong, * at any rate towards a rejec-
tion of Hellenism. During the early wars of the “Successors”
the natives of the Punjaub generally seized the opportunity to
revolt ; the governors placed over the various districts by
Alexander were murdered; and the tribes everywhere deglared
themselves free. Among the leaders of the revolt was a cer-
tain Chandragupta (or Sandracottus), who contrived to turn
the circumstances of the time to his own special advantage, and
built up a considerable kingdom in the far East out of the
fragments which had detached themselves from what was
still called the Macedonian Empire.” When Seleucus Nicator,
about B.C. 305, conducted an expedition across the Indus, he
found this monarch established in the tract between the Indus
and the Ganges,” ruling over extensive dominions and at the
head of a vast force.” It is uncertain whether the two rivals
engaged in hostilities or no.” At any rate, a peace was soon
made; and Seleucus, in return for five hundred elephants,
ceded to Sandracottus certain lands on the west bank of the
Indus, which had hitherto been regarded as Macedonian.”
These probably consisted of the low grounds between the
Indus and the foot of the mountains—the districts of Peshawur,
Bunnoo, Murwut, Shikarpoor, and Kurrachee—which are now
in British occupation. Thus Hellenism in these parts receded
more and more, the Sanskritic Indians recovering by degrees
the power and independence of which they had been deprived
by Alexander. -
This state of things could not have been pleasing to the
Greek princes of Bactria, who must have felt that the reaction
towards barbarism in these parts tended to isolate them, and
that there was a danger of their being crushed between the
Parthians on the one hand and the perpetually advancing In-
cH. Iv.] AGGIEESSIVE ATTITUDE OF PHRAATFS I. 35
dians on the other. When Antiochus the Great, after
concluding his treaty with Euthydemus, marched eastward,
the Bactrian monarch probably indulged in hopes that the In-
dians would receive a check, and that the Greek frontier
would be again carried to the Indus, if not to the Sutlej. But, if
so, he was disappointed. Antiochus, instead of making war
upon the Indians, contented himself with renewing the old
alliance of the Seleucidae with the Mawr.ja princes,” and obtain-
ing a number of elephants from Sophagesenus, the grandson of
Sandracottus.” It is even possible that he went further, and
made cessions of territory in return for this last gift,” which
brought the Indian frontier still nearer than before to that of
Bactria. At any rate, the result of the Indian expedition of
Antiochus seems to have been unsatisfactory to Euthydemus,
who shortly afterwards commenced what are called “Indian
Wars” ” on his south-eastern frontier, employing in them
chiefly the arms of his son, Demetrius. During the latter years
of Euthydemus and the earlier ones of Demetrius, the Bactrian
rule was rapidly extended over the greater portion of the mod-
ern Afghanistan; * nor did it even stop there. The arms of
Demetrius were carried across the Indus into the Punjaub re-
gion; * and the city of Euthymedeia upon the Hydaspes re-
mained to later times an evidence of the extent of his con-
Quests.” From B.C. 206 to about B.C. 185 was the most flour-
ishing period of the Bactrian monarchy, which expanded
during that space from a small kingdom into a considerable
empire.”
The power and successes of the Bactrian princes at this time
account Sufficiently for the fact that the contemporary Parthian
monarchs stood upon their guard, and undertook no great ex-
peditions. Arsaces III., who continued on the throne for about
ten or twelve years after his peace with Antiochus, and Pria-
patius, or Arsaces IV., his son, who succeeded him, and had a
reign of fifteen years, were content, as already observed,” to
watch over their own State, husbanding its resources, and liv-
ing at peace with all their neighbors. It was not till Phraates
I. (Arsaces V.), the son of Priapatius, had mounted the throne,
B.C. 181, that this policy was departed from, and Parthia,
which had remained tranquil for a quarter of a century, once
more aroused herself, and assumed an attitude of aggression.
The quarter to which Phraates I. directed his arms was the
country of the Mardians, a poor but warlike people,” who ap-
pear to have occupied a portion of the Elburz range, probably
36 THE SIXTH MOWARCHY. [CH. Iv.
that immediately south of Mazanderan and Asterabad.* The
reduction of these fierce mountaineers is likely to have occu-
pied him for some years, since their country was exceedingly
strong and difficult.“ Though the Mardi were (nominally, at
any rate) subjects of the Seleucidae, we do not hear of any as-
sistance being rendered them, or, indeed, of any remonstrance
being made against the unprovoked aggression of the Parthian
monarch. The reign of Phraates I. in Parthia coincides with
that of Seleucus IV. (Philopator) in Syria; and we may account
for the inactivity of this prince, iſ, part by his personal charac-
ter, which was weak and pacific,” in part by the exhaustion of
Syria at the time, in consequence of his father's great war with
Rome (B.C. 197–190), and of the heavy contribution which was
imposed upon him at the close of it. Syria may scarcely have
yet recovered sufficient strength to enter upon a new struggle,
especially one with a distant and powerful enemy. The mate-
rial interests of the Empire may also have seemed to be but little
touched by the war, since the Mardi were too poor to furnish
much tribute; and it is possible, if not even probable, that
their subjection to Syria had long been rather formal than
real.” Seleucus therefore allowed the Mardians to be reduced,
conceiving, probably, that their transfer to the dominion of
the Arsacidae neither increased the Parthian power nor dimin-
ished his own.
But the nation which submits to be robbed of a province,
however unproductive and valueless, must look to having the `
process repeated at intervals, until it bestirs itself and offers
resistance. There is reason to believe that Phraates had no
Sooner conquered the Mardians than he cast his eyes on an ad-
jacent district, and resolved to add it to his territories. This
was the tract lying immediately to the West of the Caspian
Gates, which was always reckoned to Media, forming, how-
ever, a distinct district, know as Media Rhagiana.” It was a
region of much natural fertility, being watered by numerous
streams from the Elburz range, and possessing a soil of re-
markable productiveness.” Its breadth was not great, since it
consisted of a mere strip between the mountains and the Salt
Desert which occupies the whole centre of the Iranic table.
land; but it extended in length at least a hundred and fifty
miles, from the Caspian Gates to the vicinity of Kasvin. Its
Capital city, from a remote antiquity, was Rhages,” situated
near the eastern extremity of the strip, probably at the spot
now called Kaleh Erij," about twenty-three miles from the
\
cH. Iv.] HIS IN VASION OF MEDIA RHAGIAN4. 37
“Gates.” On this region it is clear that Phraates cast a covét-,
ous eye. How much of it he actually occupied is doubtful;
but it is at least certain that he effected a lodgment in its east-
ern extremity," which must have put the whole region in
jeopardy. Nature has set a remarkable barrier between the
more eastern and the more western portions of Occidental Asia,
about midway in the tract which lies due south of the Caspian
Sea. The Elburz range in this part is one of so tremendous a
character, and northward abuts so closely on the Caspian, that
all communication between the east and the west necessarily
passes to the south of it. In this quarter the Great Desert of-
fering an insuperable obstacle to transit, the line of communi-
cation has to cling to the flanks of the mountain chain, the
narrow strip between the mountains and the desert–rarely ten
miles in width—being alone traversable. But about long. 52°
20' this strip itself fails. A rocky spur runs due south from
the Elburz into the desert for a distance of some twenty or
thirty miles, breaking the line of communication, and seeming
at first sight to obstruct it completely.” This, however, is not
the case absolutely. The spur itself is penetrable by two
passes, one where it joins the Elburz, which is the more diffi-
cult of the two, and another, further to the south, which is
easier.” The latter now known as the Girdwºi Sudurrah,
pass, constitutes the famous “Pylae Caspiae.” Through this pass
alone can armies proceed from Armenia, Media, and Persia.
eastward, or from Turkestan, Khorasan, and Afghanistan into
the more western parts of Asia. The position is therefore one
of primary importance. It was to guard it that Rhages was
built so near the eastern end of its territory. So long as it re-
mained in the possession of Syria, Parthian agression was
checked. Rhagiana, the rest of Media, and the other provinces
were safe, or nearly so. On the other hand, the loss of it to
Parthia laid the eastern provinces open to her, and was at once
almost equivalent to the loss of all Rhagiana, which had no
other natural protection. Now we find that Phraates sur-
mounted the “Gates,” and effected a lodgment in the plain
country beyond them. He removed a portion of the conquered
Mardians from their mountain homes to the city of Charax,
which was on the western side of the Gates,“ probably on
the site now occupied by the ruins known as Uewanikif.”
Their location in this strong post "was a menace to the neigh-
boring town of Rhages, which can Scarcely have maintained
itself long against an enemy encamped at its doors. We are
38 THE SIXTH MONARCHIV. 3 [CH. v.
not informed, however, of any results which followed on the
occupation of Charax during the lifetime of Phraates. His
reign lasted only seven years—from B.C. 181 to B.C. 174—and it
is thus probable that he died before there was time for his sec-
ond important conquest to have any further consequences.
Phraates had sufficient warning of his coming decease to
make preparations with respect to a successor. Though he had
several sons, some of whom were (we must suppose) of sufficient
age to have ascended the throne,” he left his crown to his
brother, Mithridates. He felt, probably, that the State re-
Quired the direction of a firm hand, that war might at any
time break out with either Syria or Bactria; while, if the ca-
reer of conquest on which he had made Parthia enter were to
be pursued, he could trust his brother better than any of his
sons to conduct aggressive expeditions with combined vigor and
prudence. We shall see, as the history proceeds, how Mith-
ridates justified his choice. Phraates would also appear to
have borne his brother especial affection, since he takes the
name of “Philadelphus” (brother-loving) upon his coins.” It
must have been a satisfaction to him that he was able by his
last act at once to consult for the good of his country, and to
gratify a sentiment on which it is evident that he prided him-
self.
CHAPTER V.
Reign of Mithridates T. Position of Bactria and Syria at his
accession. His first war with Bactria. His great Earpedi-
tion against the Easter," Syrian provinces, and its results.
His second war with Bactria, terminating in its conquest.
Eactenſ of his Empire. Attempt of Demetrius Nicator to
f recover the lost Provinces fails. Captivity of Demetriws.
Death of Mithridates. -
|
“Mithridati, insignis virtutis viro, reliquit imperium (Phra hates).”
- Justin, xli. 5,
THE reign of Mithridates I. is the most important in the Par-
thian history. [Pl. 1. Fig. 3..] Receiving from his brother
Phraates a kingdom of but narrow dimensions, confined (as it
would seem) between the city of Charax on the one side, and
the river Arius, or Heri-rud, on the other, he transformed it,
CH. V.] OO WDITION OF BA CTRIA, - 39
within the space of thirty-seven years (which was the time that
his reign lasted), into a great and flourishing Empire. It is not
too much to say that, but for him, Parthia might have re-
mained a mere petty State on the outskirts of the Syrian king-
dom, and, instead of becoming a rival to Rome, might have
sunk shortly into obscurity and insignificance. $
As commonly happens in the grand changes which constitute
the turning-points of history, the way for Mithridates's vast
successes was prepared by a long train of antecedent circum-
stances. To show how the rise of the Parthians to greatness
in the middle of the second century before our era was rendered
possible, we must turn aside once more from our proper sub-
ject and cast a glance at the condition of the two kingdoms be-
tween which Parthia stood, at the time when Mithridates as-
cended the throne.
The Bactrian monarchs in their ambitious struggles to possess
themselves of the tracts south of the Paropamisus,” and ex-
tending from the Heri-rud to the Sutlej and the mouths of the
Indus, overstrained the strength of their State, and by shifting
the centre of its power injured irretrievably its principle of
cohesion. As early as the reign of Demetrius” a tendency to
disruption showed itself, Eucratidas having held the supreme
power for many years in Bactria itself, while Demetrius exer-
cised authority on the southern side of the mountains.” It is
true that at the death of Demetrius this tendency was to a cer-,
tain extent checked, since Eucratidas was then able to extend
his sway over almost the whole of the Bactrian territory.” But
the old evil recurred shortly, though in a less pronounced
form. Eucratidas, without being actually supplanted in the
north by a rival, found that he could devote to that portion of
the Empire but a small part of his attention. The southern
countries and the prospect of Southern and eastern conquests
engrossed him. While he carriod on successful wars with the
Arachotians, the Drangians, and the Indians of the Punjaub
region, his hold on the more northern countries was relaxed,
and they began to slip from his grasp." Incursions of the
nomad Scyths from the Steppes carried fire and sword over
portions of these provinces, some of which were even, it is
probable, seized and occupied by the invaders."
Such was, it would seem, the condition of Bactria under
Eucratidas, the contemporary of Mithridates. In Syria, Anti-
Ochus Epiphanes had succeeded his brother Seleucus IV.
(Philopator) about a year before Mithridates ascended the
$
40 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. v.
Parthian throne." He was a prince of courage and energy;
but his hands were fully occupied with wars in Egypt, Pales-
tine, and Armenia, and the distant East could attract but a
small share of his thought or attention. The claim put
forward by Egypt to the possession of Coele-Syria and Pales-
time, promised to Ptolemy V. (it was affirmed) as a dowry
with Cleopatra, the daughter of Antiochus the Great, led to
hostilities in the south-west which lasted continuously for four
years (B.C. 171 to B.C. 168), and were complicated during two
of them with troubles in Judaea, rashly provoked by the
Syrian monarch, who, unaware of the stubborn temper of the
Jews, goaded them into insurrection.* The war with Egypt
came to an end in B.C. 168; it brought Syria, no advantage,
since Rome interposed, and required the restitution of all
conquests. The war with the Jews had no such rapid termin-
ation. Antiochus, having not only plundered and desecrated
the Temple, but having set himself to eradicate utterly the
Jewish religion, and completely Hellenize the people, was met
with the most determined resistance on the part of a moiety
of the nation. A patriotic party rose up under devoted
leaders,” who asserted, and in the end secured, the independ-
ence of their country. Not alone during the remaining years
of Epiphanes, but for half a century after his death, through-
out seven reigns, the struggle continued; Judaea, taking
advantage of every trouble and difficulty in Syria to detach
herself more and more completely from her oppressor; being
a continual thorn in her side, a constant Source of weakness,
preventing more than anything else the recovery of her power.
The triumph which Epiphanes obtained in the distant Ar-
menia (B.C. 166–5), where he defeated and captured the king,
Artaxias,” was a poor set-off against the foe which he had
created to himself at his doors through his cruelty and intoler-
all Cé.
In another quarter, too, the Syrian power received a severe
shake through the injudicious violence of Epiphanes. The
Oriental temples had, in some instances, escaped the rapacity
of Alexander's generals and “Successors; ” their treasuries
remained unviolated, and contained large hoards of the
precious metals. Epiphanes, having exhausted his own ex-
chequer by his wars and his lavish gifts, saw in these un-
plundered stores a means of replenishing it, and made a
journey into his south-eastern provinces for the purpose. The
natives of Elymais, however, resisted his attempt, and proved
&
CH. v.] CONDITION OF SYRIA, 41
strong enough to defeat it;” the baffled monarch retired to
Tabae, where he shortly afterward fell sick and died. In the
popular belief his death was a judgment upon him for his
attempted Sacrilege; * and in the exultation caused by the
event the bands which joined these provinces to the Empire
must undoubtedly have been loosened.
Nor did the removal of Epiphanes (B.C. 164) improve the
condition of affairs in Syria. The throne fell to his son, Anti-
ochus Eupator, a boy of nine, according to Appian,” or,
according to another authority,” of twelve years of age. The
regent, Lysias, exercised the chief power, and was soon
engaged in a war with the Jews,” whom the death of Epiph-
anes had encouraged to fresh efforts. The authority of
Lysias was further disputed by a certain Philip, whom Epiph-
anes, shortly before his death, had made tutor to the young
king.” The claims of this tutor to the regent's office being
supported by a considerable portion of the army, a civil war
arose between him and Lysias, which raged for the greater
part of two years (B.C. 163–2), terminating in the defeat and
death of Philip. But Syrian affairs did not even then settle
down into tranquillity. A prince of the Seleucid house, Deme-
trius by name, the son of Seleucus IV., and consequently the
first cousin of Eupator, was at this time detained in Rome as
a hostage, having been sent there during his father's lifetime
as a security for his fidelity. Demetrius, with some reason,
regarded his claim to the Syrian throne as better than that of
his cousin, the son of the younger brother, and being in the
full vigor of early youth,” he determined to assert his preten-
sions in Syria, and to make a bold stroke for the crown.
Having failed to obtain the Senate's consent to his quitting
Italy, he took his departure secretly,” crossed the Mediterra-
nean in a Carthaginian vessel, and, landing in Asia, succeeded
within a few months in establishing himself as Syrian
monarch.
From this review it sufficiently appears that the condition
of things, both in Syria and Bactria, was favorable to any
aspirations which the power that lay between them might
entertain after dominion and self-aggrandizement. The Sy-
rian and Bactrian kings, at the time of Mithridates's accession,
were, both of them, men of talent and energy; but the Syrian
monarch was soon involved in difficulties at home, while the
Bactrian had his attention attracted to prospects of advantage
in a remote quarter. Mithridates might, perhaps, have at-
42 THE SIXTH MoMARCITY. [CH. v.
tacked the territory of either with an equal chance of victory;
and as his predecessor had set him the example of successful
warfare on his western frontier, we might have expected his
first efforts to have been in this direction, against the depend-
encies of Syria. But circumstances which we cannot exactly
trace determined his choice differently. While Eucratidas
was entangled in his Indian wars, Mithridates invaded the
Bactrian territory where it adjoined Parthia, and added to his
Empire, after a short struggle, two provinces, called respect-
ively Turiña and that of Aspionus.” It is conjectured that
these provinces lay towards the north and the north-west, the
one being that of the Turanians proper, and the other that of the
Aspasiacae,” who dwelt between the Jaxartes and the Oxus.”
But there is scarcely sufficient ground for forming even a
conjecture on the subject, since speculation has nothing but
the names themselves to rest upon.”
Successful in this quarter, Mithridates, a few years later,
having waited until the Syrian throne was occupied by the
boy Eupator, and the two claimants of the regency, Lysias
and Philip, were contending in arms for the supreme power,
made suddenly an expedition towards the west, falling upon
Media, which, though claimed by the Syrian kings as a prov-
ince of their Empire, was perhaps at this time almost, if not
quite, independent.” The Medes offered a vigorous resistance
to his attack; and, in the war which followed, each side had
in turn the advantage;” but eventually the Parthian prince
proved victorious, and the great and valuable province of
Media Magna was added to the dominons of the Arsacidae. A
certain Bacasis was appointed to govern it, whether as satrap
or as tributary monarch is not apparent;” while the Parthian
king, recalled towards home by a revolt, proceeded to crush
rebellion before resuming his career of conquest.
The revolt which now occupied for a time the attention of
Mithridates was that of Hyrcania.” The Hyrcanians were
Arians in race; they were brave and high-spirited,” and under
the Persian monarchs had enjoyed some exceptional privi-
leges” which placed them above the great mass of the con-
quered nations. It was natural that they should dislike the
yoke of a Turanian people; and it was wise of them to make
their effort to obtain their freedom before Parthia grew into
a power against which revolt would be utterly hopeless.
Hyrcania might now expect to be joined by the Medes, and
even the Mardi, who were Arians like themselves,” and could
cII. v.] MEDIA AND SUSIANA CONQUERED. 43
not yet have forgotten the pleasures of independence. But
though the effort does not seem to have been ill-timed, it was
unsuccessful. No aid was given to the rebels, so far as we
hear, by any of their neighbors. Mithridates's prompt return
nipped the insurrection in the bud; Hyrcania at once sub-
mitted, and became for centuries the obedient vassal of her
powerful neighbor.
The conquest of Media had brought the Parthians into con-
tact with the rich, country of Susiana or Elymais; and it was
not long before Mithridates, having crushed the Hyrcanian
revolt, again advanced westward, and invaded this important
province. Elymais appears to have a had a king of its own,”
who must either have been a vassal of the Seleucidae, or have
acquired an independent position by revolt after the death of
Epiphanes. In the war which followed between this monarch
and Mithridates, the Elymaeans proved wholly unsuccessful,
and Mithridates rapidly overran the country and added it to
his dominions. After this he appears to have received the sub-
mission of the Persians on the one hand and the Babylonians
on the other,” and to have rested on his laurels for some
years,” having extended the Parthian sway from the Hindoo
Koosh to the Euphrates.
The chronological data which have come down to us for this
period are too scanty to allow of any exact statement of the
number of years occupied by Mithridates in effecting these
conquests. All that can be said is that he appears to have
commenced them about B.C. 163 and to have concluded
them some time before B.C. 140, when he was in his turn
attacked by the Syrians. Probably they had been all effected
by the year B.C. 150; since there is reason to believe that about
that time” Mithridates found his power sufficiently estab-
lished in the west to allow of his once more turning his atten-
tion eastward, and renewing his aggressions upon the Bactrian
kingdom, which had passed from the rule of Eucratidas under
that of his son and successor, Heliocles.**
Heliocles, who was allowed by his father a quasi-royal posi-
tion,” obtained the full possession of the Bactrian throne by
the crime of parricide. It is conjectured that he regarded
with disapproval his father's tame submission to Parthian
ascendency, and desired the recovery of the provinces which
Eucratidas had been content to cede for the sake of peace.”
We are told that he justified his crime on the ground that his
father was a public enemy;” which is best explained by sup-
w
44 THE SIXTH MONARCIIY. ſch. v.
posing that he considered him the friend of Bactria's great
enemy, Parthia. If this be the true account of the circum-
stances under which he became king, his accession would have
been a species of challenge to the Parthian monarch, whose
ally he had assassinated. Mithridates accordingly marched
against him with all speed, and, easily defeating his troops,
took possession of the greater part of his dominion.” Elated
by this success, he is said to have pressed eastward, to have
invaded India, and overrun the country as far as the river
Hydaspes,” but, if it be true that his arms penetrated so far,
it is, at any rate, certain that he did not here effect any con-
quest. Greek monarchs" of the Bactrian series continued
masters of Cabul and Western India till about B.C. 126; no
Parthian coins are found in this region; nor do the best authori-
ties claim for Mithridates any dominion beyond the mountains
which enclose on the west the valley of the Indus.
By his war with Heliocles the empire of Mithridates reached
its greatest extension. It comprised now, besides Parthia
Proper, Bactria, Aria, Drangiana, Arachosia, Margiana, Hyr-
cania, the country of the Mardi, Media Magna, Susiana, Persia
and Babylonia. Very probably its limits were still wider.
The power which possessed Parthia, Hyrcania, and Bactria,
would rule almost of necessity over the whole tract between
the Elburz range and the Oxus, if not even over the region be-
tween the Oxus and the Jaxartes; that which held the Caspian
mountains and eastern Media could not fail to have influence
over the tribes of the Iranic desert; while Assyria Proper
would naturally follow the fortunes of Babylonia and Susi-
ana.” Still the extent of territory thus indicated rests only
on conjecture. If we confine ourselves to what is known by
positive evidence, we can only say that the Parthian Kingdom
of this period contained, at least, twelve provinces above
enumerated. It thus stretched from east to west a distance of
fifteen hundred miles between the Suleiman mountains and
the Euphrates, varying in width from three or four hundred
miles—or even more—towards the west and east, to a narrow
strip of less than a hundred miles toward the centre. It prob-
ably comprised an area of about 450,000 square miles; which
is somewhat less than that of the modern Persia.
Unlike the modern Persia, however, the territory consisted
almost entirely of productive regions. The excellent quality
of the soil in Parthia Proper, Hyrcania, and Margiana, has
been already noticed.” Bactria, the next province to Margiana
CH. V.] TROUBLES IN SYRIA. 45
towards the east, was less uniformly fertile; but still it con-
tained a considerable proportion of good land along the course
of the Oxus and its tributaries, which was cultivated in vine-
yards and cornfields, or else pastured large herds of cattle.” The
Mardian mountain territory was well wooded;” and the plain
between the mountains and the Caspian was rich in the ex-
treme. ** Media, where it adjoined on the desert, was compar-
atively sterile; but still even here an elaborate system of arti-
ficial irrigation brought a belt of land under culture.” Further
west, in the Zagros chain, Media comprised Some excellent
pasture lands,” together with numerous valleys as productive
as any in Asia.” Elymais was, in part, of the same character
with the mountainous portion of Media, while beyond the
mountain it sank down into a rich alluvium, Inot much inferior
to the Babylonian.” Babylonia itself was confessedly the
most fertile country in Asia. It produced wheat, barley, mil-
let, sesame, vetches, dates, and fruits of all kinds." The re-
turn of the wheat crop was from fifty to a hundred-and-fifty-
fold;" while that of the barley crop was three hundred-fold.”
The dates were of unusual size and superior flavor;” and the
palm, which abounded throughout the region, furnished an
inexhaustible supply both of fruit and timber. “
The great increase of power which Mithridates had obtained
by his conquests could not be a matter of indifference to the
Syrian monarchs. Their domestic troubles—the contentions
between Philip and Lysias, between Lysias and Demetrius
Soter, Soter and Alexander Balas, Balas and Demetrius II.,
Demetrius II. and Tryphon, had so engrossed them for the
space of twenty years (from B. c. 162 to B.C. 142) that they had
felt it impossible, or hopeless, to attempt any expedition to-
wards the East, for the protection or recovery of their prov-
inces. Mithridates had been allowed to pursue his career of
conquest unopposed, so far as the Syrians were concerned,
and to establish his sway from the Hindoo Koosh to the Eu-
phrates. But a time at last came when home dangers were
less pressing, and a prospect of engaging the terrible Parthians
with Success seemed to present itself. The second Demetrius
had not, indeed, wholly overcome his domestic enemy, Try-
phon; but he had so far brought him into difficulties as to
believe that he might safely be left to be dealt with by his
wife, Cleopatra, and by his captains." At the Salme time the
condition of affairs in the East seemed to invite his interfer-
ence. Mithridates ruled his new conquests with Some strict-
46 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. v.
ness,” suspecting, probably, their fidelity, and determined
that he would not by any remissness allow them to escape
from his grasp. The native inhabitants could scarcely be
much attached to the Syro-Macedonians, who had certainly
not treated them very tenderly;” but a possession of 170 years'
duration confers prestige in the East, and a strange yoke may
have galled more than one to whose pressure they had become
accustomed. Moreover, all the provinces which Parthia took
from Syria contained Greek towns, and their inhabitants
might at all times be depended on to side with their country-
men against the Asiatics. At the present conjuncture, too,
the number of the malcontents was swelled by the addition of
the recently subdued Bactrians, who hated the Parthian yoke,
and longed earnestly for a chance of recovering their freedom.
Thus when Demetrius II., anxious to escape the reproach of
inertness,” determined to make an expedition against the
great Parthian monarch, he found himself welcomed as a de-
liverer by a considerable number of his enemy's subjects,
whom the harshness, or the novelty, of the Parthian rule had
offended.” The malcontents joined his standard as he ad-
vanced; and supported, as he thus was, by Persian, Elymaen,
and Bactrian contingents, he engaged and defeated the Par-
thians in several battles." Upon this, Mithridates, finding
himself inferior in strength, had recourse to stratagem, and
having put Demetrius off his guard by proposals of peace,"
attacked him, defeated him, and took him prisoner.” The in-
vading army appears to have been destroyed.” The captive
monarch was, in the first instance, conveyed about to the sev-
eral nations which had revolted, and paraded before each in
turn, as a proof to them of their folly in lending him aid, “but
afterwards he was treated in a manner befitting his rank and
the high character of his captor." Assigned a residence in
Hyrcania, he was maintained in princely state, and was even
promised by Mithridates the hand of his daughter, Rhodo-
guné." The Parthian monarch, it is probable, had the design
of conquering Syria, and thought it possible that he might
find it of advantage to have a Syrian prince in his camp, well
disposed towards him, connected by marriage, and thus fitted
for the position of tributary monarch. But the schemes of
Mithridates proved abortive. His career had now reached its
close. Attacked by illness" not very long after his capture of
Demetrius, his strength proved insufficient to bear up against
the malady, and he died after a glorious reign of about thirty-
eight years, B.C. 136.
cH. vi.] PARTHIAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, 47
CHAPTER VI.
System of government established by Mithridates I. Constitu-
tion of the Parthians. Government of the Provinces.
Laws and Institutions. Character of Mithridates I.
“Rex, magno et regio animo.”—Justin, xxxviii. 9, § 3.
THE Parthian institutions possessed great simplicity; and it
is probable that they took a shape in the reign of Arsaces I., or,
at any rate, of Tiridates, which was not greatly altered after-
wards. Permanency is the law of Oriental governments; and
in a monarchy which lasted less than five hundred years, it is
not likely that many changes occurred. The Parthian institu-
tions are referred to Mithridates I., rather than to Tiridates,
because in the reign of Mithridates Parthia entered upon a new
phase of her existence—became an empire instead of a mere
monarchy; and the sovereign of the time could not but have
reviewed the circumstances of his State, and have determined
either to adopt the previous institutions of his country, or to
reject them. Mithridates I. had attained a position which en-
titled and enabled him to settle the Parthian constitution as he
thought best; and, if he maintained an earlier arrangement,
which is uncertain, he must have done so of his own free will,
simply because he preferred the existing Parthian institutions
to any other. Thus the institutions may be regarded as start-
ing from him, Since he approved them, and made them those
of the Parthian EMPIRE.
Like most sovereignties which have arisen out of an associa-
tion of chiefs banding themselves together for warlike purposes
under a single head, the Parthian monarchy was limited.
The king was permanently advised by two councils, consisting
of persons not of his own nomination, whom rights, conferred
by birth or office, entitled to their seats. One of these was a
family conclave (concilium domesticwm), or assembly of the
full-grown males of the Royal House; the other was a Senate
comprising both the spiritual and the temporal chiefs of the
nation, the Sophi, or “Wise Men,” and the Magi, or “Priests.”
Together these two bodies constituted the Megistanes, the
48 TEIE SIXTH MOMA ſº CEIY. [CH. VI.
“Nobles” or “Great Men”—the privileged class which to a
considerable extent checked and controlled the monarch. The
monarchy was elective, but only in the house of the Arsacidae;
and the concurrent vote of both councils was necessary in the
appointment of a new king. Practically, the ordinary law of
hereditary descent appears to have been followed, unless in the
case where a king left no son of sufficient age to exercise the
royal office. Under such circumstances, the Megistanes
usually nominated the late king's next brother to succeed him,”
or, if he had left behind him no brother, went back to an
uncle.” When the line of succession had once been changed, the
right of the elder branch was lost, and did not revive unless
the branch preferred died out or possessed no member qualified
to rule. When a king had been duly nominated by the two
councils, the right of placing the diadem upon his head be-
longed to the Surena,” the “Field-Marshal,” or “Commander
in Chief of the Parthian armies.” The Megistanes further
claimed and sometimes exercised the right of deposing a mon-
arch whose conduct displeased them; but an attempt to exer-
cise this privilege was sure to be followed by a civil war, no
monarch accepting his deposition without a struggle; and
force, not right, practically determining whether he should
remain king or no.
After a king was once elected and firmly fixed upon the
throne, his power appears to have been nearly despotic. At any
rate he could put to death without trial whomsoever he chose;
and adult members of the Royal House, who provoked the
reigning monarch's jealousy, were constantly so treated.”
probably it would have been more dangerous to arouse the
fears of the “Sophi’’ and “Magi.” The latter especially were
a powerful body, consisting of an organized hierarchy, which
had come down from ancient times, and was feared and vene-
rated by all classes of the people." Their numbers at the close
of the Empire, counting adult males only, are reckoned at .
eighty thousand;" they possessed considerable tracts of fertile
land," and were the sole inhabitants of many large towns or
villages, which they were permitted to govern as they pleased.”
The arbitrary power of the monarchs must, in practice, have
been largely checked by the privileges of this numerous priestly
Caste, of which it would seem that in later times they became
jealous, thereby preparing the way for their own downfall.”
The dominion of the Parthians over the conquered provinces
was maintained by reverting to the system which had pre-
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CH. v1.] THE GREER TOWNS. 49
vailed generally through the East before the accession of the Per-
sians to power, and establishing in the various countries either
viceroys, holding office for life, or sometimes dependent dy-
nasties of kings.” In either case, the rulers, so long as they
paid tribute regularly to the Parthian monarchs and aided
them in their wars, were allowed to govern the people beneath
their sway at their pleasure. Among monarchs, in the higher
sense of the term, may be enumerated the kings of Persia,”
Elymais,” Adiabéné,” Osrhoëné,” and of Armenia and Media
Atropaténé, when they formed, as they sometimes did, por-
tions of the Parthian Empire. The viceroys, who governed
the other provinces, bore the title of Vitaaroº (6ióraxes), and
were fourteen or fifteen in number.” The remark has been
made by the historian Gibbon" that the system thus estab-
lished “exhibited under other names a lively image of the
feudal system which has since prevailed in Europe.” The
comparison is of some value, but, like most historical parallels,
it is inexact, the points of difference between the Parthian and
the feudal system being probably more numerous than those
of resemblance, but the points of resemblance being very main
points, not fewer in number, and striking.
It was with special reference to the system thus established
that the Parthian monarchs took the title of “ King of Kings”
(6&61Ae J5 gadºlágov), so frequent upon their coins,” which
seems sometimes to have been exchanged for what was
regarded as an equivalent phrase,” “Satrap of Satraps”
(6cºrpºrms rejv Garrow ſtoov). This title seems to appear first on
the coins of Mithridates I.
In the Parthian system there was one anomaly of a very
curious character. The Greek towns, which were scattered
in large numbers throughout the Empire,” enjoyed a munici-
pal government of their own, and in some cases were almost
independent communities, the Parthian kings exercising over
them little or no control. The great city of Seleucia on the
Tigris was the most important of all these: its population was
estimated in the first century after Christ at six hundred
thousand souls;” it had strong walls,” and was surrounded
by a most fertile territory.” It had its own senate, or muni-
cipal council, of three hundred members, elected by the people
to rule them from among the wealthiest and best educated of
the citizens.” Under ordinary circumstances it enjoyed the
blessing of complete self-government, and was entirely free
from Parthian interference, paying no doubt its tribute, but
5() THE SIXTH MOVARCH Y. [CH. VI.
otherwise holding the position of a “free city.” It was only
in the case of internal dissensions that these advantages were
lost, and the Parthian soldiery, invited within the walls, ar-
ranged the quarrels of parties, and settled the constitution of
the State at its pleasure. Privileges of a similar character,
though, probably, less extensive, belonged (it would seem) to
most of the other Greek cities of the Empire. The Parthian
monarchs thought it polite to favor them; and their practice
justified the title of “Phil-Hellene,” which they were fond of
assuming upon their coins. On the whole, the policy may
have been wise, but it diminished the unity of the Empire;
and there were times when serious danger arose from it. The
Syro-Macedonian monarchs could always count with certainty
on having powerful friends in Parthia, whatever portion of it
they invaded; and even the Romans, though their ethnic con-
nection with the cities was not so close, were sometimes
indebted to them for very important assistance.”
We are told that Mithridates I., after effecting his conquests,
made a collection of the best laws which he found to prevail
among the various subject peoples, and imposed them upon
the Parthian nation.” This statement is, no doubt, an exag-
geration; but we may attribute, with some reason, to Mith-
ridates the introduction at this time of various practices and
usages, whereby the Parthian Court was assimilated to those
of the earlier Great Monarchies of Asia, and became in the
eyes of foreigners the successor and representative of the old
Assyrian and Persian Kingdoms. The assumption of new
titles and of a new state—the organization of the Court on a
new plan—the bestowal of a new character on the subordinate
officers of the Empire, were suitable to the new phase of its
life on which the monarchy had now entered, and may with
the highest probability, if not with absolute certainty, be as-
signed to this period.
It has been already noticed that Mithridates appears to have
been the first Parthian sovereign who took the title of “King
of Kings.” The title had been a favorite one with the old
ASSyrian and Persian monarchs,” but was not adopted either
by the Seleucidae or by the Greek kings of Bactria.” Its re-
vival implied a distinct pretension to that mastery of Western
Asia which had belonged of old to the Assyrians and Persians,
and which was, in later times, formally claimed by Arta-
Xerxes,” the Son of Sassan, the founder of the New Persian
Kingdom. Previous Parthian monarchs had been content to
CH. VI.] TITLES AAWD STATE OF THE RING.. " 51
call themselves “the King,” or “the Great King”—Mithridates
is “the King of Kings, the great and illustrious Arsaces.”
At the same time Mithridates appears to have assumed the
tiara, or tall stiff crown, which, with certain modifications
in its shape, had been the mark of sovereignty, both under the
Assyrians and under the Persians. Previously the royal head-
dress had been either a mere cap of a Scythic type, but lower
than the Scyths commonly wore it;” or the ordinary diadem,
which was a band round the head terminating in two long
ribbons or ends, that hung down behind the head on the back.
According to Herodian, the diadem, in the later times, was .
double;” but the coins of Parthia do not exhibit this pecu-
liarity. [Pl. 1, Fig. 4.]
Ammianus says” that among the titles assumed by the
Parthian monarchs was that of “Brother of the Sun and
Moon.” It appears that something of a divine character was
regarded as attaching to the race. In the civil contentions,
which occur so frequently throughout the later history, com-
batants abstained from lifting their hands knowingly against
an Arsacid, to kill or wound one being looked upon as sacri-
lege.” The name of 69605 was occasionally assumed, as it was
in Syria; and more frequently kings took the epithet of
08 ord roop, which implied the divinity of their father.” After
his death a monarch seems generally to have been the object
of a qualified worship; statues were erected to him in the
temples, where (apparently) they were associated with the
images of the great luminaries.”
Of the Parthian Court and its customs we have no account
that is either complete or trustworthy. Some particulars,
however, may be gathered of it on which we may place re-
liance. The best authorities are agreed that it was not station-
ary, but migrated at different times of the year to different
cities of the Empire, in this resembling the Court of the
Achaemenians. It is not quite clear, however, which were the
cities thus honored. Ctesiphon was undoubtedly one of them.
All writers agree that it was the chief city of the Empire, and
the Ordinary Seat of the government.” Here, according to
Strabo, the kings passed the winter months, delighting in the
excellence of the air.” The town was situated on the left bank
of the Tigris, opposite to Seleucia, twelve or thirteen miles
below the modern Baghdad. Pliny says” that it was built by
the Parthians in Order to reduce Seleucia to insignificance, and
that when it failed of its purpose they built another city,
52 THE SIXTH MON.1 RCHY. [CH. Vl
Vologesocerta, in the same neighborhood with the same ob-
ject; but the account of Strabo is more probable—viz., that it
grew up gradually out of the wish of the Parthian kings to
spare Seleucia the unpleasantness of having the rude soldiery,
which followed the Court from place to place, quartered upon
them.” The remainder of the year, Strabo tells us, was spent
by the Parthian kings either at the Median city of Ecbatana,
which is the modern Hamadan, or in the province of Hyrca-
nia." In Hyrcania, the palace, according to him, was at
Tapé;” and between this place and Ecbatana he no doubt re-
garded the monarchs as spending the time which was not
passed at Ctesiphon. Athenaeus, however, declares that Rhages
was the spring residence of the Parthian kings;” and it seems
not unlikely that this famous city, which Isidore, writing in
Parthian times, calls “the greatest in Media,” was among the
Occasional residences of the Court. I’arthia itself was, it
would seem, deserted;" but still a city of that region preserved
in one respect a royal character, being the place where all the
earlier kings were interred."
The pomp and grandeur of the Parthian Inonarchs are de-
scribed only in the vaguest terms by the classical writers.
No author of repute appears to have visited the Parthian
Court. We may perhaps best obtain a true notion of the
splendor of the sovereign from the accounts which have
reached us of his relations and officers, who can have reflected
only faintly the magnificence of the sovereign. Plutarch tells
us that the general whom Orodes deputed to conduct the war
against Crassus came into the field accompanied by two
hundred litters wherein were contained his concubines, and by
a thousand camels which carried his baggage.” His dress was
fashioned after that of the Medes; he wore his hair parted in
the middle and had his face painted with cosmetics.” A body
of ten thousand horse, composed entirely of his clients and
slaves, followed him in battle.” We may conclude from this
picture, and from the general tenor of the classical notices,
that the Arsacidae revived and maintained very much such a
Court as that of the old Achaemenian princes, falling probably
somewhat below their model in politeness and refinement, but
equalling it in luxury, in extravagant expenditure, and in
display. -
Such seems to have been the general character of those
practices and institutions which distinguish the Parthians
from the foundation of their Empire by Mithridates. Some of
CII. VII.] REIGN OF PHIPAATES II. 53
them, it is probable, he rather adopted than invented; but
there is no good reason for doubting that of many he was the
originator. He appears to have been one of those rare indi-
viduals to whom it has been given to unite the powers which
form the conqueror with those which constitute the suc-
cessful Organizer of a State. Brave and enterprising in war,
prompt to seize an occasion and to turn it to the best advan-
tage, not even averse to severities where they seemed to be
required, he yet felt no acrimony towards those who had
resisted his arms, but was ready to befriend them so soon as
their resistance ceased. Mild, clement, philanthropic," he
conciliated those whom he subdued almost more easily than
he subdued them, and by the efforts of a few years succeeded
in welding together a dominion which lasted without suffer-
ing serious mutilation for nearly four centuries. Though not
dignified with the epithet of “Great,” he was beyond all
question the greatest of the Parthian monarchs. Later times
did him more justice than his contemporaries, and, when the
names of almost all the other kings had sunk into oblivion,
retained his in honor, and placed it on a par with that of the
original founder of Parthian independence.”
CHAPTER VII.
Reign of Phraates II. Eacpedition of Antiochus Sidetes against
Parthia. Release of Demetrius. Defeat and Death of
Sidetes. War of Phraates with the Northern Nomads.
FIis death, and character.
“Post necem Mithridates, Parthorum regis, Phrahates filius ejus
rex constituitur.”—Justin, xlii. 1, § 1.
MITHRIDATES was succeeded by his son, Phraates, the second
monarch of the name, and the seventh Arsaces. This prince,
entertaining, like his father, the design of invading Syria, and
expecting to find some advantage from having in his camp
the rightful occupant of the Syrian throne,' treated the captive
Demetrius with even greater kindness than his father had
done, not only maintaining him handsomely, but even giving
him his sister Rhodoguné, in marriage.” Demetrius, however,
was not to be reconciled to his captivity by any such blandish-
54 - THE SIXTH MONARCHY, [cII. vſ.
ments, and employed his thoughts chiefly in devising plans by
which he might escape. By the help of a friend he twice
managed to evade the vigilance of his guards, and to make his
way from Hyrcania towards the frontiers of his own kingdom;
but each time he was pursued and caught without effecting
his purpose.” The Parthian monarch was no doubt vexed at
his pertinacity, and on the second occasion thought it prudent
to feign, if he did not even really feel, offence: he banished his
ungrateful brother-in-law from his presence,” but otherwise
visited his crime with no severer penalty than ridicule, Choos-
ing to see in his attempts to change the place of his abode no
serious design, but only the wayward conduct of a child, he
sent him a present of some golden dice, implying thereby that
it was only for lack of amusement he had grown discontented
with his Hyrcanian residence.”
Antiochus Sidetes, the brother of Demetrius, had been gen-
erally accepted by the Syrians as their monarch, at the time
when the news reached them of that prince's defeat and cap-
ture by Mithridates. He was an active and enterprising sov-
ereign, though fond of luxury and display. For some years
(B.C. 140–137) the pretensions of Tryphon to the throne gave
him full occupation;" but, having finally established his au-
thority after a short war, and punished the pretender with
death, he found himself, in B.C. 137, at liberty to turn his
arms against foreign enemies. He would probably have at
once attacked Parthia, but for the attitude of a nearer neigh-
bor, which he regarded as menacing, and as requiring his im-
mediate attention. Demetrius, before his departure for the
East, had rewarded the Jews for Services rendered him in his
war with Tryphon by an open acknowledgment of their inde-
pendence.” Sidetes, though indebted to the Jewish High Priest,
Simon, for offers of aid against the same adversary,” could not
bring himself to pay the price for it which Demetrius had
thought reasonable—an independent Palestine appeared to him
a danger close to his doors, and one that imperilled the very
existence of the Syrian State. Accordingly, he had no sooner
put down Tryphon than he resolved to pick a quarrel with the
Jews, and to force them to resume their old position of vassal-
age to Syria.” His general, Cendebæus, invaded their country,
but was defeated near Azotus.” Antiochus had to take tho
field in person.” During two years, John Hyrcanus, who had
succeeded his father, Simon (B.C. 135), baffled all his efforts;
but at last, in B.C. 133, he was forced to submit, to acknowl-
cII. VII.] IIIS WAR WITII ANTIOcIlus SID ET/E.S. 55
w
edge the authority of Syria, to dismantle Jerusalem, and to
resume the payment of tribute. Sidetes then considered the
time come for a Parthian expedition, and, having made great
preparations, he set out for the East in the spring of B.C. 129.
It is impossible to accept Without considerable reserve the
accounts that have come down to us of the force which Antio-
chus collected. According to Justin,” it consisted of no more
than 80,000 fighting men, to which was attached the incredible
number of 300,000 camp-followers, the majority being com-
posed of cooks, bakers, and actors. As in other extreme cases
the camp-followers do but equal or a little exceed the number
of men fit for service,” this estimate, which makes them nearly
four times as numerous, is entitled to but little credit. The
late writer, Orosius,” corrects the error here indicated ; but
his account seems to err in rating the supernumeraries too low.
According to him, the armed force amounted to 300,000, while
the camp-followers, including grooms, sutlers, courtesans, and
actors, were no more than a third of the number. From the
two accounts, taken together, we are perhaps entitled to con-
clude that the entire host did not fall much short of 400,000
men. This estimate receives confirmation from an independent
statement made by Diodorus, with respect to the number who
fell in the campaign—a statement of which we shall have to
speak later.”
The army of Phraates, according to two accounts of it”
(which, however, seem to represent a single original authority),
numbered no more than 120,000. An attempt which he made
to enlist in his service a body of Scythian mercenaries failed,
the Scyths being willing to lend their aid, but arriving too late
to be of any use.” At the same time a defection of the subject
princes” deprived the Parthian monarch of contingents which
usually swelled his numbers, and threw him upon the support
of his own countrymen, chiefly or solely. Under these cir-
cumstances it is more surprising that he was able to collect
120,000 men than that he did not bring into the field a larger
number. -
The Syrian troops, magnificently appointed” and supported
by a body of Jews under John Hyrcanus,” advanced upon
Babylon, receiving on their way the adhesion of many of the
Parthian tributaries, who professed themselves, disgusted by
the arrogance and pride of their masters.” Phraates, on his
part, advanced to meet his enemies, and in person or by his
generals engaged Antiochus in three battles, but without suc-
5(; THE SIXTH MONARCII Y. |CH. VII.
cess. Antiochus was three times a conqueror. In a battle
fought upon the river Lycus (Zab) in further Assyria he de-
feated the Parthian general, Indates, and raised a trophy in
honor of his victory.” The exact scene of the other com-
bats is unknown, but they were probably in the same neigh-
borhood. The result of them was the conquest of Babylonia,
and the general revolt of the remaining Parthian provinces,”
which followed the common practice of deserting a falling
house, and drew off or declared for the enemy.
Under these circumstances Phraates, considering that the
time was come when it was necessary for him to submit or to
create a diversion by raising troubles in the enemy's territory,
released Demetrius from his confinement, and sent him, Sup-
ported by a body of Parthian troops, to reclaim his kingdom.”
He thought it probable that Antiochus, when the intelligence
reached him, would retrace his steps, and return from Babylon
to his own capital. At any rate his efforts would be distracted;
he would be able to draw fewer reinforcements from home; and
he would be less inclined to proceed to any great distance from
his own country.
Antiochus, however, was either uninformed of the impend-
ing danger or did not regard it as very pressing. The winter
was approaching; and, instead of withdrawing his troops from
the occupied provinces and marching them back into Syria,
he resolved to keep them where they were, merely dividing
them, on account of their numbers, among the various cities
which he had taken, and making them go into winter quar-
ters.” It was, no doubt, his intention to remain quiet during
the two or three winter months, after which he would have
resumed the war, and have endeavored to penetrate through
Media into Parthia Proper, where he might expect his adver-
sary to make his last stand.
But Phraates saw that the position of affairs was favorable
for striking a blow before the spring came. The dispersion of
his enemy's troops deprived him of all advantage from the
superiority of their numbers. The circumstance of their being
quartered in towns newly reduced, and unaccustomed to the
rudeness and rapacity of soldiers and camp-followers, made it
almost certain that complications would arise, and that it
would not be long before in some places the Parthians, so late-
ly declared to be oppressors, would be hailed as liberators.
Moreover, the Parthians were, probably, better able than their
adversaries to endure the hardships and severities of a cam-
CH. VII.] A TTEJIP?' A T' WEGO TIATION FAILS. 57
paign in the cold season.” Parthia is a cold country, and the
winters, both of the great plateau of Iran and of all the moun-
tain tracts adjoining it, are severe. The climate of Syria is far
milder. Moreover, the troops of Antiochus had, we are in-
formed, been enervated by an excessive indulgence on the part
of their leader during the marches and halts of the preceding
summer.” Their appetites had been pampered; their habits
had become unmanly; their general tone was relaxed; and
they were likely to deteriorate still more in the wealthy and
luxurious cities where they were bidden to pass the winter.
These various circumstances raised the spirits of Phraates,
and made him hold himself in readiness to resume hostilities
at a moment's notice. Nor was it long before the complications
which he had foreseen began to occur. The insolence of the
soldiers” quartered upon them exasperated the inhabitants of
the Mesopotamian towns, and caused them to look back with
regret to the time when they were Parthian subjects. The
requisitions made on them for stores of all kinds was a further
grievance.” After a while they opened communications with
Phraates, and offered to return to their allegiance if he would
assist them against their oppressors. Phraates gladly listened
to these overtures. At his instigation a plot was formed like
that which has given so terrible a significance to the phrase
“Sicilian vespers.” It was agreed that on an appointed day all
the cities should break out in revolt: the natives should take
arms, rise against the soldiers quartered upon them, and kill
all, Or as many as possible. Phraates promised to be at hand
with his army, to prevent the scattered detachments from
giving help to each other. It was calculated that in this way
the invaders might be cut off almost to a man without the
trouble of even fighting a battle.
But, before he proceeded to extremities, the Parthian prince
determined to give his adversary a chance of escaping the fate
prepared for him by timely concessions. The winter was not
over; but the snow was beginning to melt through the increas-
ing warmth of the sun's rays," and the day appointed for the
general rising was probably drawing near. Phraates felt that
no time was to be lost. Accordingly, he sent ambassadors to
Antiochus to propose peace, and to inquire on what conditions
it would be granted him. The reply of Antiochus, according
to Diodotus, was as follows: “If Phraates would release his
prisoner, Demetrius, from captivity, and deliver him up with-
out ransom,” at the same time restoring all the provinces
5S THE SIXTH MO NARCHIV. [CH. VII.
which had been taken from Syria, and consenting to pay a
tribute for Parthia itself, peace might be had; but not other-
wise.” To such terms it was, of course, impossible that
Phraates should listen; and his ambassadors, therefore, re-
turned without further parley.
Soon afterwards the day appointed for the outbreak arrived.
Apparently, no suspicion had been excited. The Syrian troops
were everywhere quietly enjoying themselves in their winter
quarters, when, suddenly and without warning, they found
themselves attacked by the natives.” Taken at disadvantage,
it was impossible for them to make a successful resistance;
and it would seem that the great bulk of them were massacred
in their quarters. Antiochus, and the detachment stationed
with him, alone, so far as we hear, escaped into the open field
and contended for their lives in just warfare.” It had been
the intention of the Syrian monarch, when he took the field,
to hasten to the protection of the troops quartered nearest to
him; but he no Sooner commenced his march than he found
himself confronted by Phraates, who was at the head of his
entire army, having, no doubt, anticipated Antiochus's design
and resolved to frustrate it. The Parthian prince was anxious
to engage at once, as his force far outnumbered that command-
ed by his adversary; but the latter might have declined the
battle, if he had so willed, and have, at any rate, greatly pro-
tracted the struggle. He had a mountain region—Mount
Zagros, probably—within a short distance of him, and might
have fallen back upon it, so placing the Parthian horse at
great disadvantage; but he was still at an age when caution is
apt to be considered cowardice, and temerity to pass for true
courage. Despite the advice of one of his captains, he de-
termined to accept the battle which the enemy offered, and
not to fly before a foe whom he had three times defeated.”
But the determination of the commander was ill seconded by
his army. Though Antiochus fought strenuously,” he was de-
feated, since his troops were without heart and offered but a
poor resistance.” Antiochus himself perished, either slain by
the enemy or by his own hand.” His son, Seleucus, a boy of
tender age,” and his niece, a daughter of Demetrius,” who had
accompanied him in his expedition, were captured. His troops
Were either cut to pieces or made prisoners. The entire num-
ber of those slain in the battle, and in the previous massacre,
was reckoned at 300,000.”
Such was the issue of this great expedition. It was the last
CII. VII.] PHRAATES AFTER HIS VICTORY. 59 .
which any Seleucid monarch conducted into these countries—
the final attempt made by Syria to repossess herself of her lost
Eastern provinces. Henceforth Parthia was no further
troubled by the power that had hitherto been her most dan-
gerous enemy, but was allowed to enjoy without molestation
from Syria the conquests which she had effected. Syria, in
fact, had from this time a difficulty in preserving her own ex-
istence. The immediate result of the destruction of Antiochus
and his host was the revolt of Judaea,” which henceforth
maintained its independence uninterruptedly. The dominions
of the Seleucidae were reduced to Cilicia and Syria Proper,” or
the tract west of the Euphrates, between Amanus and Pales-
tine. Internally, the state was agitated by constant commo-
tions from the claims of various pretenders to the sovereignty:
externally, it was kept in continual alarm by the Egyptians,
Arabians, or Romans. During the sixty years” which elapsed
between the return of Demetrius to his kingdom and the con-
version of Syria into a Roman province, she ceased wholly to
be formidable to her neighbors. Her flourishing period was
gone by, and a rapid decline set in, from which there was no
recovery. It is surprising that the Romans did not step in
earlier and terminate a rule which was but a little removed
from anarchy. Rome, however, had other work on her hands;
and the Syrian kingdom continued to exist till B.C. 65, though
in a feeble and moribund condition.
But Phraates could not, without prophetic foresight, have
counted on such utter prostration following as the result of a
single—albeit a terrible—blow. Accordingly, we find him still
exhibiting a dread of the Seleucid power even after his great
victory. He had released Demetrius too late to obtain any
benefit from the hostile feeling which that prince probably en-
tertained towards his brother. Had he not released him too
soon for his own safety? Was it not to be feared that the Syr-
ians might rally under one who was their natural leader, might
rapidly recover their strength, and renew the struggle for the
mastery of Western Asia? The first thought of the dissatisfied
monarch was to hinder the execution of his own project. De-
metrius was on his way to Syria, but had not yet arrived
there, or, at any rate, his arrival had not been as yet reported.
Was it not possible to intercept him? The Parthian king has-
tily Sent out a body of horse, with orders to pursue the Syrian
prince at their best speed, and endeavor to capture him before
he passed the frontier.” If they succeeded, they were to bring
60 THE SIXTH MoMARCHY. [CH. VII.
him back to their master, who would probably have then com-
mitted his prisoner to close custody. The pursuit, however,
failed. Demetrius had anticipated, or at least feared, a change
of purpose, and, having prosecuted his journey with the great-
est diligence, had reached his own territory before the emissa-
ries of Phraates could overtake him.”
It is uncertain whether policy or inclination dictated the
step which Phraates soon afterwards took of allaying himself
by marriage with the Seleucidae. He had formally given his
sister, Rhodoguné, as a wife to Demetrius,” and the marriage
had been fruitful, Rhodoguné having borne Demetrius several
children.” The two houses of the Seleucidae and Arsacidae
were thus already allied to some extent. Phraates resolved to
strengthen the bond. The unmarried daughter of Demetrius
whom he had captured after his victory over Antiochus took
his fancy; and he determined to make her his wife.” At the
same time he adopted other measures calculated to conciliate
the Seleucid prince. He treated his captive, Seleucus, the son
of Antiochus, with the greatest respect.” To the corpse of An-
tiochus he paid royal honors;” and, having placed it in a silver
coffin, he transmitted it to the Syrians for sepulture.”
Still, if we may believe Justin,” he entertained the design of
carrying his arms across the Euphrates and invading Syria, in
order.to avenge the attack of Antiochus upon his territories.
But events occurred which forced him to relinquish this enter-
prise. The Scythians, whom he had called to his aid under the
pressure of the Syrian invasion, and who had arrived too late
to take part in the war, demanded the pay which they had been
promised, and suggested that their arms should be employed
against some other enemy.” Phraates was unwilling either to
requite services not rendered, or to rush needlessly into a fresh
war merely to gratify the avarice of his auxiliaries. He
therefore peremptorily refused to comply with either sugges-
tion. Upon this, the Scythians determined to take their pay-
ment into their own hands, and began to ravage Parthia and to
carry off a rich booty. Phraates, who had removed the head-
quarters of his government to Babylonia, felt it necessary to
entrust affairs there to an officer, and to take the field in per-
son against this new enemy, which was certainly not less for-
midable than the Syrians. He selected for his representative
at the seat of Empire a certain Himerus * (or Evemerus)," a
youth with whom he had a disgraceful connection, and having
established him as a sort of viceroy," marched away to the north-
©
ch, viºl DEATH OF PHRAATES. 61
east, and proceeded to encounter the Scythians in that remote
region. Besides his native troops, he took with him a number of
Greeks, whom he had made prisoners in his war with Antiochus."
Their fidelity could not but be doubtful; probably, however, he
thought that at a distance from Syria they would not dare to fail
him, and that with an enemy so barbarous as the Scythians they
would have no temptation to fraternize. But the event proved
him mistaken. The Greeks were sullen at their captivity, and
exasperated by some cruel treatment which they had received
when first captured. They bided their time; and when, in a
battle with the Scythians, they saw the Parthian soldiery hard
pressed and in danger of defeat, they decided matters by going
over in a body to the enemy. The Parthian army was com-
pletely routed and destroyed, and Phraates himself was among
the slain.” We are not told what became of the victorious
Greeks; but it is to be presumed that, like the Ten Thousand,
they fought their way across Asia, and rejoined their own
Countrymen. -
Thus died Phraates I., after a reign of about eight or nine
years.” Though not possessing the talents of his father, he was
a brave and warlike prince, active, enterprising, fertile in re-
Sources, and bent on maintaining against all assailants the
honor and integrity of the Empire. In natural temperament
he was probably at once soft" and cruel." But, when policy
required it, he could throw his softness aside and show himself
a hardy and intrepid warrior.” Similarly, he could control
his natural harshness, and act upon occasion with clemency
and leniency.” He was not, perhaps, without a grim humor,
which led him to threaten more than he intended, in order to
see how men would comport themselves when greatly alarmed."
There is some evidence that he aimed at saying good things;
though it must be confessed that the wit is not of a high
order.” Altogether he has more character than most Oriental
monarchs; and the monotony of Arsacid biography is agree-
ably interrupted by the idiosyncrasy which his words and con-
duct indicate.
62 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. VIII.
CHAPTER VIII.
Accession of Artabanus II. Position of Parthia. Growing
pressure upon her, and general advance towards the south,
of the Saka or Scyths. Causes &nd eactert of the move-
ment. Character and principal tribes of the Saka. Scythic
war of Artabanus. His death.
“Imperium Asiae [Scythae] ter quaesivere.”—Justin, ii, 3, § 1.
The successor of Phraates was his uncle, Artabanus,' a son
of Priapatius. It is probable that the late king had either left
no son, or none of sufficient age to be a fit occupant of the
throne at a season of difficulty. The “Megistanes,” therefore,
elected Artabanus in his nephew's place,” a man of mature
age,” and, probably, of some experience in war. The situation
of Parthia, despite her recent triumph over the Syro-Macedo-
nians, was critical; and it was of the greatest importance that
the sceptre should be committed to one who would bring to the
discharge of his office those qualities of wisdom, promptness,
and vigor, which a crisis demands.
The difficulty of the situation was two-fold. In the first
place, there was an immediate danger to be escaped. The
combined Greeks and Scythians, who had defeated the Par-
thian army and slain the monarch, might have been ex-
pected to push their advantage to the utmost, and seek to
establish themselves as conquerors in the country which lay
apparently at their mercy. At any rate, the siege and
sack of some of the chief towns was a probable contingency,
if permanent occupation of the territory did not suit the
views of the confederates. The now monarch had to rid Par-
thia of her invaders at as little cost as possible, before he
could allow himself to turn his attention to any other mat-
ter whatsoever. Nor did this, under the circumstances, ap-
pear to be an easy task. The flower of the Parthian troops
had been destroyed in the late battle, and it was not easy to
replace them by another native army. The subject-nations
were at no time to be depended upon when Parthia was re-
duced to straits, and at the present conjecture some of the
most important were in a condition bordering upon rebellion.
CH. VIII.] DANGEI: OF PARTIIIA FROM TIIE SCYTHS. 63
Himerus, the viceroy left by Phraates in Babylonia, had first
driven the Babylonians and Seleucians to desperation by his
tyranny," and then plunged into a war with the people of
Měsené," which must have made it difficult for him to send
Altabanus any contingent. Fortunately for the Parthians, the
folly or moderation of their enemies rendered any great effort
on their part unnecessary. The Greeks, content with having
revenged themselves, gave the new monarch no trouble at all:
the Scythians were satisfied with plundering and wasting the
open country, after which they returned quietly to their
homes." Artabanus found himself quit of the immediate dan-
ger which had threatened him almost without exertion of his
own, and could now bend his thoughts to the position of his
country generally, and the proper policy to pursue under the
circumstances.
For there was a second and more formidable danger im-
pending over the State—a danger not casual and temporary
like the one just escaped, but arising out of a condition of
things in neigboring regions which had come about slowly,
and which promised to be permanent. To give the reader the
means of estimating this danger aright, it will be necessary to
take a somewhat wide view of the state of affairs on the
northern and north-eastern frontiers of Parthia for some time
previously to the accession of Artabanus, to trace out the
causes which were at work, producing innportant changes in
these regions, and to indicate the results which threatened,
and those which were accomplished. The opportunity will
also serve for giving such an account of the chief races which
here bordered the empire as wifi show the nature of the peri
to which Parthia was exposed at this period.
In the wide plains of Northern Asia, extending from the
Arctic Ocean to the Thian Chan mountains and the Jaxartes,
there had been nurtured from a remote antiquity a nomadic
population, at no time very numerous in proportion to the
area over which it was spread, but liable on occasions to accu-
mulate, owing to a combination of circumstances. in this or
that portion of the region occupied, and at such times causing
trouble to its neighbors. From about the close of the third
century B.C. symptoms of st:ch an accumulation had begun to
display themselves in the tract immediately north of the
Jaxartes, and the inhabitants of the countries south of that
river had suffered from a succession of raids and inroads,
which were not regarded as dangerous, but which gave Con-
*
64 THE SIXTEI MONARCHY.) [CH. VIII.
stant annoyance. Crossing the great desert of Kharesm by
forced marches, some of the hordes invaded the green valleys
of Hyrcania and Parthia, and carried desolation over those
fair and flourishing districts." About the same time other
tribes entered the Bactrian territory and caused alarm to the
Greek kingdom recently established in that province.” It ap-
pears that the Parthian monarchs, unable to save their
country from incursions, consented to pay a sort of black-mail
to their invaders, by allowing them the use of their pasture
grounds at certain fixed times—probably during some months
of each year." The Bactrian princes had to pay a heavier
penalty. Province after province of their kingdom was swal-
ſowed up by the northern hordes," who gradually occupied
Sogdiana, or the tract between the lower Jaxartes and the
lower Oxus, whence they proceeded to make inroads into
Bactria itself. The rich land on the Polytimetus, or Ak Su,
the river of Samarkand, and even the highlands between the
upper Jaxartes and upper Oxus, were permanently occupied
by the invaders; and if the Bactrians had not compensated
themselves for their losses by acquisitions of territory in
Afghanistan and India, they would soon have had no king-
dom left. The hordes were always increasing in strength
through the influx of fresh immigrants, and in lieu of Bactria
a power now stood arrayed on the north-eastern frontier of
the Parthians, which was reasonably regarded with the most
serious alarm and suspicion.
The origin of the state of things here described is to be
sought, according to the best authorities, in certain movements
which took place about B.C. 200," in a remote region of inner
Asia. At that time a Turanian people called the Yue-chi were
expelled from their territory on the west of Chen-si by the
Hiong-nu, whom some identified with the Huns. “The Yue-
chi Separated into two bands; the smaller descended south-
wards into Thibet; the larger passed westwards, and after a
hard struggle dispossessed a people called “Su” of the plains
west of the river of Ili. These latter advanced to Ferghana
and the Jaxartes; and the Yue-chi not long afterwards re-
treating from the U-siun, another nomadic race, passed the
“Su” on the north and occupied the tracts between the Oxus
and the Caspian. The Su were thus in the vicinity of the
Bactrian Greeks; the Yue-chi in the neighborbood of the Par-
thians.” On the particulars of this account, which comes
from the Chinese historians, we cannot perhaps altogether de-
Wo!, III. Plate lll.
COIN OF WARDANIES II, Coin of Pacorus II.
Fig. 3.
Early Coin of Volagases, II. Coin of Mithridates IV.
Fig. 4
Volagases II.



Plate IV
Fig. 1.
*...
3.3%
*
sº . * *%,
* ºff,2% H
- t , E
- sº º '*',
"I'm.I. tº * *:
wnwºº **
*\l … tºwº .#
syºnº-g
§ ,wsº
2
^*::
~ *
'aº. 7 ouTv
Fig. 2.
Plan of Hatra (after Ross).
Traces ºf water
Fig. 3 Plan of Palace-Temple at Hatra (after Fergusson and Ross),
- * -
23>GXSPXGXSGGKS3E3EG
Fig. 4.
Cornice and quasi-capital, Hatra (after Ross).





















on vini conqūESTs MADE BY THE SCITHS. 65
pend; but there is no reason to doubt the main fact, attested
by a writer who visited the Yue-chi in B.C. 139," that they had
migrated about the period mentioned from the interior of Asia,
and had established themselves sixty years later in the Cas-
pian region. Such a movement would necessarily have thrown
the entire previous population of those parts into commotion,
and would probably have precipitated them upon their neigh-
bors. It accounts satisfactorily for the pressure of the north-
ern hordes at this period on the Parthians, Bactrians, and
even the Indians; and it completely explains the crisis in Par-
thian history, which we have now reached, and the neces-
sity which lay upon the nation of meeting and, if possible,
overcoming, an entirely new danger.
In fact, one of those occasions of peril had arisen, to which
in ancient times the civilized world was always liable from an
outburst of northern barbarism. Whether the peril has alto-
gether passed away or not. we need not here inquire; but cer-
tainly in the old world there was always a chance that civili-
zation, art, refinement, luxury, might suddenly and almost
without warning be swept away by an overwhelming influx of
savage hordes from the unpolished North. From the reign
of Cyaxares, when the evil first snowed itself,” the danger was
patent to all wise and far-seeing governors both in Europe and
Asia, and was from time to time guarded against. The expe-
ditions of Cyrus against the Massagetae, of Darius Hystaspis
against the European Scyths, of Alexander against the Getae,
of Trajan and Probus across the Danube, were designed to
check and intimidate the northern nations, to break their
power, and diminish the likelihood of their taking the offen-
sive. It was now more than four centuries since in this part
of Asia any such effort had been made;” and the northern
barbarians might naturally have ceased to fear the arms and
discipline of the South. Moreover the circumstances of the
time scarcely left them a choice. Pressed on continually
more and more by the newly-arrived Su and Yue-chi, the old
inhabitants of the Transoxianian regions were under the
necessity of seeking new settlements, and could only attempt
to find them in the quarter towards which they were driven
by the new-comers. Strengthened, probably, by daring spirits
from among their conquerors themselves" they crossed the
rivers and the deserts by which they had been hitherto con-
fined, and advancing against the Parthians, Bactrians, and
Arians, threatened to carry all before them. We have seen
z
66 THE SIXTH MONAIRCRIX. ſch. viii.
how successful they were against the Bactrians.” In Ariana,
they passed the mountains, and, proceeding Southwards, occu-
pied the tract below the great lake wherein the Helmend ter-
minates, which took from them the name of Sacastané” (“land
of the Saka,” or Scyths)—a name still to be traced in the
modern “Seistan.” Further to the east they effected a lodg-
ment in Kabul, and another in the the southern portion of
the Indus valley, which for a time bore the name of Indo-
Scythia.” They even crossed the Indus and attempted to
penetrate into the interior of India, but here they were met
and repulsed by a native monarch, about the year B.C. 56.”
The people engaged in this great movement are called, in a
general way, by the classical writers, Sacae, or Scythae—i.e.
Scyths. They consisted of a number of tribes, similar for the
most part in language, habits, and mode of life, and allied
more or less closely to the other nomadic races of Central
and Northern Asia. Of these tribes the principal were the
Massagetae (“great Jits, or Jats”), who occupied the country
on both sides of the lower course of the Oxus;” the Dahae,
who bordered the Caspian above Hyrcania, and extended
thence to the latitude of Herat;” the Tochari,” who settled in
the mountains between the upper Jaxartes and the upper
Oxus, where they gave name to the tract known as Tokhar-
estan; the Asii, or Asiani, who were closely connected with
the Tochari;” and the Sakarauli (Saracucae?), who are found
connected with both the Tochari and the Asiani.” Some of
these tribes contained within them further sub-divisions; e.g.
the Dahae, who comprised the Parni (or Aparni), the Pissuri,
and the Xanthii;” and the Massagetae, who included among
them Chorasmii, Attasii, and others.”
The general character of the barbarism in which these vari-
ous races were involved may be best learnt from the descrip-
tion given of one of them, the Massagetae, with but few differ-
ences, by Herodotus” and Strabo.” According to this descrip-
tion, the Massagetae were nomads, who moved about in wagons
or carts, accompanied by their flocks and herds, on whose milk
they chiefly sustained themselves. Each man had only one
wife, but all the wives were held in common They were good
riders and excellent archers, but fought both on horseback and
on foot, and used, besides their bows" and arrows, lances,
knives, and battle-axes. They had little or no iron, but made
their spear and arrow-heads, and their other weapons, of
bronze. They had also bronze breast-plates; but otherwise the
cH. VIII.] CHARACTER OF THE SCYTHIC BARBARISM. 67
metal with which they'adorned and protected their own per-
Sons, and the heads of their horses, was gold. To a certain ex-
tent they were cannibals.” It was their custom not to let the
aged among them die a natural death, but, when life seemed
approaching its natural term, to offer them up in sacrifice, and
then boil the flesh and feast on it. This mode of ending life
was regarded as the best and most honorable; such as died of
disease were not eaten but buried, and their friends bewailed
their misfortune.
It may be added to this that we have sufficient reason to be-
lieve that the Massagetae and the other nomads of these parts
regarded the use of poisoned arrows as legitimate in warfare,
and employed the venom of Serpents, and the corrupted blood
of man, to make the wounds which they inflicted more
deadly.” -.
Thus, what was threatened was not merely the conquest of
one race by another cognate to it, like that of the Medes by the
Persians, or of the Greeks by Rome, but the obliteration of
such art, civilization, and refinement as Western Asia had at-
tained to in course of ages by the successive efforts of Baby-
lonians, Assyrians, Medes, Persians, and Greeks—the spread
over some of the fairest regions of the earth of a low type of
savagery—a type which in religion went no further than the
worship of the sun;” in art knew but the easier forms of met-
allurgy and the construction of carts; in manners and customs,
included cannibalism, the use of poisoned weapons, and a rela-
tion between the sexes destructive alike of all delicacy and of
all family affection. The Parthians were, no doubt, rude and
coarse in their character as compared with the Persians; but
they had been civilized to a certain extent by three centuries
of subjection to the Persians and the Greco-Macedonians before
they rose to power; they affected Persian manners; they pat-
ronized Greek art, they appreciated the advantages of having
in their midst a number of Greek states. Had the Massagetae
and their kindred tribes of Sakas, Tochari, Dahae, Yue-chi, and
Su, which now menaced the Parthian power, succeeded in
sweeping it away, the general declension of all which is lovely
or excellent in human life would have been marked. Scythi-
cism would have overspread Western Asia. No doubt the con-
querors would have learned something from those whom they
subjected; but it cannot be supposed that they would have
learned much. The change would have been like that which
passed over the Empire of the West, when Goths, Vandals,
68 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. ſch. viii.
Burgundians, Alans, Heruli, depopulated its fairest provinces
and laid its civilization in the dust. The East would have been
barbarized; the gains of centuries would have been lost; the
work of Cyrus, Darius, Alexander, and other great benefactors
of Asiatic humanity, have been undone; Western Asia would
have sunk back into a condition not very much above that
from which it was raised two thousand years earlier by the
primitive Chaldaeans and the Assyrians.
Artabanus II., the Parthian monarch who succeeded
phraates II., appears to have appreciated aright the perils of
his position. He was not content, when the particular body of
barbarians which had defeated and slain his predecessor, hav-
ing ravaged Parthia Proper, returned home, to fold his arms
and wait until he was again attacked. According to the brief,
but expressive words of Justin,” he assumed the aggressive,
and invaded the country of the Tochari, one of the most power-
ful of the Scythic tribes, which was now settled in a portion of
the region that had, till lately, belonged to the Bactrian king-
dom.” Artabanus evidently felt that what was needed was to .
roll back the flood of invasion which had advanced so near to
the sacred home of his nation; that the barbarians required to
be taught a lesson; that they must at least be made to under-
stand that Parthia was to be respected; or that, if this could
not be done, the fate of the Empire was sealed. He therefore,
with a gallantry and boldness that we cannot sufficiently ad-
mire—a boldness that seemed like rashness, but was in reality
prudence—without calculating too closely the immediate
chances of battle, led his troops against one of the most forward
of the advancing tribes. But fortune, unhappily, was adverse.
How the battle was progressing we are not told; but it ap-
pears that in the thick of an engagement Artabanus received
a wound in the fore-arm, from the effects of which he died al-
most immediately.” The death of the leader decides in the East,
almost to a certainty, the issue of a contest. We cannot doubt
that the Parthians, having lost their monarch, were repulsed;
that the expedition failed; and that the situation of affairs
became once more at least as threatening as it had been be-
fore Artabanus made his attempt. Two Parthian monarchs had
now fallen within the space of a few years in combat with the
aggressive Scyths—two Parthian armies had suffered defeat.
Was this to be always so? If it was, then Parthia had only to
make up her mind to fall, and, like the great Roman, to let it
be her care that she should fall grandly and with dignity.
CH. IX.] ACCESSION OF MITIII:ID.1 TES II. --- 69
CHAPTER IX.
Accession of Mithridates II. Termination of the Scythic Wars.
Commencement of the struggle with Armenia. Previous
history of Armenia. Result of the first Armenian War.
Pirst contact of Rome with Parthia. Attitude of Rome
towards the East at this time. Second Armenian War.
Death of Mithridates. .
“Mithridati res gestae Magni cognomen dedere.”—Justin, xlii. 2, § 3.
ON the death of Artabanus II., about B.C. 124, his son, Mith-
ridates II., was proclaimed king. Of this monarch, whose
achievements (according to Justin') procured him the epithet
of “the Great,” the accounts which have come down to us are
extremely scanty and unsatisfactory. Justin, who is our prin-
cipal informant on the subject of the early Parthian history,
has unfortunately confounded him with the third monarch of
the name,” who ascended the throne more than sixty years
later, and has left us only the slightest and most meagre out-
line of his actions. The other classical writers, only to a very
small extent, supplement Justin's narrative; and the result is
that of a reign which was one of the most important in the
early Parthian series, the historical inquirer at the present
day can form but a most incomplete conception.
It appears, however, from the account of Justin, and from
such other notices as have reached us of the condition of
things at this time in the regions lying east of the Caspian,
that Mithridates was entirely successful where his father and
his cousin had signally failed. He gained a number of victo-
ries over the Scythic hordes;” and effectually checked their
direct progress towards the south, throwing them thereby
upon the east and the south-east. Danger to Parthia from the
Scyths seems after his reign to have passed away. They
found a vent for their superabundant population in Seistan,
Afghanistan, and India, and ceased to have any hopes of
making an impression on the Arsacid kingdom. Mithridates,
it is probable, even took territory from them. The acquisition
of parts of Bactria by the Parthians from the Scyths, which is
attested by Strabo,' belongs, in all likelihood, to his reign; and
70 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. Ix,
the extension of the Parthian dominion to Seistan" may well
date from the same period. Justin tells us that he added
many nations to the Parthian Empire." The statements made
of the extent of Parthia on the side of Syria in the time of
Mithridates the First render it impossible for us to discover
these nations in the west: we are, therefore, compelled to re-
gard them as consisting of races on the eastern frontier, who
could at this period only be outlying tribes of the recent
Scythic immigration.
The victories of Mithridates in the East encouraged him to
turn his arms in the opposite direction, and to make an attack
on the important country of Armenia, which bordered his
north-western frontier. Armenia was at the time under the
government of a certain Ortoadistus," who seems to have been
the predecessor, and was perhaps the father, of the great Ti-
granes.” Ortoadistus ruled the tract called by the Romans
“Armenia Magna,” which extended from the Euphrates on
the west to the mouth of the Araxes on the east, and from the
valley of the Kur northwards to Mount Niphates and the head
streams of the Tigris towards the south. The people over
which he ruled was one of the oldest in Asia and had on many
occasions shown itself impatient of a conqueror. Justin, on
reaching this point in his work, observes that he could not feel
himself justified if, when his subject brought before him so
mighty a kingdom, he did not enter at some length on its pre-
vious history.” The modern historian would be even less ex-
CuSable than Justin if he omitted such a review, since, while
he has less right to assume a knowledge of early Armenian
history on the part of his readers, he has greater means of
gratifying their curiosity, owing to the recent discovery of
Sources of information unknown to the ancients.
Armenia first comes before us in Genesis, where it is men-
tioned as the country on whose mountains the ark rested.”
A recollection of it was thenceforth retained in the semi-mythic
traditions of the Babylonians.” According to some,” the
Egyptian monarchs of the eighteenth and nineteenth dynasties
Carried their arms into its remote valleys, and exacted tribute
from the petty chiefs who then ruled there. At any rate, it is
certain that from about the ninth century B.C. it was well
lºnown to the Assyrians, who were engaged from that time
still about B.C. 640 in almost constant wars with its inhabit-
ants.” At this period three principal races inhabited the coun-
try—the Nairi, who were spread from the mountains west of
CH. IX.] EARLY HISTORY OF AIRMENIA. . . 71
Lake Van along both sides of the Tigris to Bir on the Eu-
phrates, and even further; the Urarda (Alarodii, or people of
Ararat), who dwelt north and east of the Naſri, on the upper
Euphrates, about the lake of Van, and probably on the Araxes;
and the Minni, whose country lay south-east of the Urarda, in
the Urumiyeh basin and the adjoining parts of Zagros. Of
these three races, the Urarda were the most powerful, and it
was with them that the Assyrians waged their most bloody
wars. The capital city of the Urarda was Van, on the eastern
shores of the lake; and here it was that their kings set up the
most remarkable of their inscriptions. Six monarchs, who
apparently all belong to One dynasty, left inscriptions in this
locality commemorative of their military expeditions or of
their offerings to the gods.” The later names of the series
can be identified with those of kings who contended with
Assyrian monarchs belonging to the last, or Sargonid dy-
nasty;” and hence we are entitled approximately to fix the
series to the Seventh and eightb centuries before our era. The
|Urarda must at this time have exercised a dominion over al-
most the whole of the region to which the name of Armenia.
commonly attaches.” They were worthy antagonists of the
Assyrians, and, though Occasionally worsted in fight, main-
tained their independence, at any rate, till the time of Asshur-
bani-pal (about B.C. 640), when the last king of the Van series,
whose name is read as Bilat-duri, succumbed to the Assyrian
power, and consented to pay a tribute for his dominions.”
There is reason to believe that between the time when we
obtain this view of the primitive Armenian peoples and that
at which we next have any exact knowledge of the condition
of the country—the time of the Persian monarchy—a great
revolution had taken place in the region. The Nairi, Urarda,
and Minni were Turanian, or, at any rate, non-Arian, races.”
Their congeners in Western Asia were the early Babylonians
and the Susianians, not the Medes, the Persians, or the Phryg-
ians. But by the time of Herodotus the Arian character of
the Armenians had become established. Their close connec-
tion with the Phrygians was recognized.” They had changed
their national appellation; for while in the Assyrian period
the terms Naīri and Urarda had preponderated, under the
Persians they had come to be called Armenians and their
country Armenia.” The personal names of individuals in the
country, both men and women, had acquired a decidedly Arian
cast.” Everything seems to indicate that a strange people
72 THE SIXTH MO WARCHY. [CII. Ix.
had immigrated into the land, bringing with them a new lan-
guage, new manners and customs, and a new religious
system.” From what quarter they had come, whether from
Phrygia as Herodotus and Stephen” believed, or, as we should
gather from their language and religion, from Media, is per-
haps doubtful; but it seems certain that from one quarter or
another Armenia had been Arianized; the old Turanian
character had passed away from it; immigrants had flocked
in, and a new people had been formed—the real Armenian of
later times, and indeed of the present day—by the admixture
of ruling Arian tribes with a primitive Turanian population,
the descendants of the old inhabitants.
The new race, thus formed, though perhaps not less brave
and warlike than the old, was less bent on maintaining its
independence. Moses of Choréné, the Armenian historian,
admits that from the time of the Median preponderance in
Western Asia the Armenians held under them a subject
position.* That such was their position under the Persians is
abundantly evident; * and, so far as appears, there was only
one occasion during the entire Achaemenian period (B.C. 559 to
B.C. 331) when they exhibited any impatience of the Persian
yoke, or made any attempt to free themselves from it. In the
early portion of the reign of Darius Hystaspis they took part
in a revolt raised by a Mede called Phraortes, and were not
reduced to obedience without some difficulty.” But from
henceforth their fidelity to the Achaemenian Kings was un-
broken; they paid their tribute (apparently) without reluc-
tance,” and furnished contingents of troops to the Persian
armies when called upon.” After Arbela they submitted
without a struggle to Alexander;” and when in the division
of his dominions, which followed upon the battle of Ipsus,
they fell naturally to Seleucus, they acquiesced in the arrange-
ment.” It was not until Antiochus the Great Suffered his
great defeat at the hands of the Romans (B.C. 190) that
Armenia bestirred itself, and, after probably four and a half
centuries of subjection, became once more an independent
power. Even then the movement seems to have originated
rather in the ambition of a chief than in a desire for liberty
on the part of the people. Artaxias had been governor of the
Greater Armenia under Antiochus,” and seized the opportu-
nity afforded by the battle of Magnesia to change his title of
Satrap into that of sovereign. No war followed. Antiochus
was too much weakened by his reverses to make any attempt
\
CH. XI.] ARMENIA ATTACKED BY MITHRIDATES II. 73
to reduce Artaxias or recover Armenia; and the nation ob-
tained autonomy without having to undergo the usual ordeal
of a bloody struggle. When at the expiration of five-and-
twenty years Epiphanes, the son of Antiochus the Great,
determined on an effort to reconquer the lost province, no
very stubborn resistance was offered to him. Artaxias was
defeated and made prisoner in the very first year of the war
(B.C. 165), and Armenia seems to have passed again under the
sway of the Seleucidae.” .
It would seem that matters remained in this state for the
space of about fifteen or sixteen years. When, however,
Mithridates I. (Arsaces VI.), about B.C. 150, had overrun the
eastern provinces of Syria, and made himself master in
succession of Media, Elymais, and Babylonia, the revolution-
ary movement excited by his successes reached Armenia, and
the standard of independence was once more raised in that
country. According to the Armenian historians,” an Arsacid
prince, Wagharshag or Valarsaces, was established as sover-
eign by the influence of the Parthian monarch, but was
allowed to rule independently. A reign of twenty-two years
is assigned to this prince, whose kingdom is declared to have
reached from the Caucasus to Nisibis, and from the Caspian
to the Mediterranean.” He was succeeded by his son, Arshag
(Arsaces), who reigned thirteen years, and was, like his father,
active and warlike, contending chiefly with the people of
Pontus.” At his death the crown descended to his son,
Ardashes," who is probably the Ortoadistus of Justin.”
Such were the antecedents of Armenia when Mithridates
II., having given an effectual check to the progress of the
Scythians in the east, determined to direct his arms towards
the west, and to attack the dominions of his relative, the
third of the Armenian Arsacidae. Of the circumstances of
this war, and its results, we have scarcely any knowledge.
Justin, who alone distinctly mentions it, gives us no details.
A notice, however, in Strabo, which mnst refer to about this
time, is thought to indicate with sufficient clearness the result
of the struggle, which seems to have been unfavorable to the
Armenians. Strabo says that Tigranes, before his accession
to the throne, was for a time a hostage among the Parthians.”
As hostages are only given by the vanquished party, we may
assume that Ortoadistus (Ardashes) found himself unable to
offer an effectual resistance to the Parthian king, and con-
scºnted after a while to a disadvantageous peace, for his
observance of which hostages were required by the victor.
74 THE SIXTH MONARCH Y. [CII. IX. .
It cannot have been more than a few years after the termi-
nation of this war, which must have taken place towards the
close of the second, or soon after the beginning of the first cen-
tury,” that Parthia was for the first time brought into contact
with Rome.
The Great Republic, which after her complete victory over
Antiochus III., B.C. 190, had declined to take possession of a
single foot of ground in Asia, regarding the general state of af-
fairs as not then ripe for an advance of Terminus in that quar-
ter, had now for some time seen reason to alter its policy, and
to aim at adding to its European an extensive Asiatic dominion.
Macedonia and Greece having been absorbed, and Carthage de-
stroyed (B.C. 148–146), the conditions of the political problem
seemed to be so far changed as to render a further advance to-
wards the east a safe measure; and accordingly, when it was
seen that the line of the kings of Pergamus was coming to an
end, the Senate set on foot intrigues which had for their object
the devolution upon Rome of the Sovereignty belonging to
those monarchs. By clever management the third Attalus was
induced, in repayment of his father's obligations to the Ro-
ºnmans," to bequeath his entire dominions as a legacy to the Re-
public. In vain did his illegitimate half-brother, Aristonicus,
dispute the validity of So extraordinary a testament; the
Romans, aided by Mithridates IV., then monarch of Pontus,
easily triumphed over such resistance as this unfortunate
prince could offer,” and having ceded to their ally the portion
of Phrygia which had belonged to the Pergamene kingdom,”
entered on the possession of the remainder. Having thus be-
come an Asiatic power, the Great Republic was of necessity
mixed up henceforth with the various movements and strug-
gles which agitated Western Asia, and was naturally led to
strengthen its position among the Asiatic kingdoms by such
alliances as seemed at each conjuncture best fitted for its in-
terests.
Hitherto no occasion had arisen for any direct dealings
between Rome and Parthia. Their respective territories were
still separated by considerable tracts, which were in the occu-
pation of the Syrians, the Cappadocians, and the Armenians.
Their interests had neither clashed, nor as yet sufficiently
united them to give rise to any diplomatic intercourse. But
the progress of the two Empires in opposite directions was
continually bringing them nearer to each other; and events had
CH. IX.] PARTHIA ATTACKED BY TIGRA.NES. 75
now reached a point at which the Empires began to have (or
seem to have) such a community of interests as led naturally
to an exchange of communications. A great power had been
recently developed in these parts. In the rapid way so com-
mon in the East, Mithridates V., of Pontus, the son and succes-
sor of Rome's ally, had, between B.C. 112 and B.C. 93, built up
an Empire of vast extent, numerous population, and almost in-
exhaustible resources. He had established his authority over
Armenia Minor, Colchis, the entire east coast of the Black Sea,
the Chersonesus Taurica, or kingdom of the Bosporus, and
even over the whole tract lying west of the CherSonese as far
as the mouth of the Tyras, or Dniester.” Nor had these gains
contented him. He had obtained half of Paphlagonia by an
iniquitous compact with Nicomedes, King of Bithynia; he had
occupied Galatia; and he was engaged in attempts to bring
Cappadocia under his inflüence. In this last-named project he
was assisted by the Armenians, with whose king, Tigranes, he
had (about B.C. 96) formed a close alliance, at the same time
giving him his daughter, Cleopatra, in marriage.” Rome,
though she had not yet determined on war with Mithridates,
was resolved to thwart his Cappadocian projects, and in B.C.
92 sent Sulla into Asia with orders to put down the puppet
whom Mithridates and Tigranes were establishing, and to re-
place upon the Cappadocian throne a certain Ariobarzanes,
whom they had driven from his kingdom.” In the execution
of this commission, Sulla was brought into hostile collision
with the Armenians, whom he defeated with great slaughter,
and drove from Cappadocia together with their puppet king.”
Thus, not only did the growing power of Mithridates of Pontus,
by inspiring Rome and Parthia with a common fear, tend to
draw them together, but the course of events had actually given
them a common enemy in Tigranes of Armenia, who was
equally obnoxious to both.
For Tigranes, who, during the time that he was a hostage in
Parthia, had contracted engagements towards the Parthian
monarch which involved a cession of territory, and who in con-
sequence of his promises had been aided by the Parthians in
seating himself on his father's throne" though he made the ces-
Sion required of him in the first instance had soon afterwards
repented of his good faith, had gone to war with his benefac-
tors, recovered the ceded territory, and laid waste a consider-
able tract of country lying within the admitted limits of the
Parthian kingdom.” These proceedings had, of course, alien-
76 THE SIXTH MONAROH"Y. [CH. IX.
ated Mithridates II. ; and we may with much probability as-
cribe to them the step, which he now took, of sending an ambas-
sador to Sulla. Orobazus, the individual selected, was charged
to propose an alliance offensive and defensive between the two
countries." Sulla received the overture favorably, but proba-
bly considered that it transcended his powers to conclude a
treaty; and thus nothing more was effected by the embassy
than the establishment of a good understanding between the
two States.”
Soon after this Tigranes appears to have renewed his attacks
upon Parthia," which in the interval between B.C. 92 and B.C.
83 he greatly humbled,” depriving it of the whole of Upper
Mesopotamia, at this time called Gordyéné, and under rule of
one of the Parthian tributary kings.” Of the details of this
war we have no account; and it is even uncertain whether it
fell within the reign of Mithridates II. or no. The unfortunate
mistake of Justin,” whereby he confounded this monarch with
Mithridates III., has thrown this portion of the Parthian his-
tory into confusion, and has made even the successor of Mith-
ridates II. uncertain.
Mithridates II. probably died about B.C. 89, after a reign
which must have exceeded thirty-five years. His great
successes against the Scythians in the earlier portion of his
reign were to some extent counterbalanced by his losses to Ti-
granes in his old age; but on the whole he must be regarded as
one of the more vigorous and successful of the Parthian mon-
archs, and as combining courage with prudence. It is to his
credit that he saw the advantage of establishing friendly rela-
tions with Rome at a time when an ordinary Oriental monarch
might have despised the distant Republic, and have thought it
beneath his dignity to make overtures to so strange and anom-
alous a power. Whether he definitely foresaw the part which
Rome was about to play in the East, we may doubt; but at any
rate he must have had a prevision that the part would not be
trifling or insignificant Of the private character of Mithri-
dates we have no sufficient materials to judge. If it be true
that he put his envoy, Orobazus, to death on acount of his
having allowed Sulla to assume a position at their conference
derogatory to the dignity of the Parthian State,” we must
pronounce him a harsh Imaster; but the tale, which rests wholly
on the weak authority of the gossip-loving Plutarch, is perhaps
Scarcely to be accepted.
ch, x] GAP IN THE LIST OF PARTHIAN KINGS, 77
CHAPTER X.
Dark period of Parthian History. Doubtful succession of the
Monarchs. Accession of Sanatraeces, ab. B.C. 76. Posi-
tion of Parthia during the Mithridatic Wars. Accession
of Phraates III. His relations with Pompey. His death.
Civil War between his two sons, Mithridates and Orodes.
Death of Mithridates.
“Varia complurium regum in Parthis successione imperium accepit Orodes.”
Trog. Pomp. Epit. lib. xlii.
THE successor of Mithridates II. is unknown. It has been
argued, indeed, that the reigns of the known monarchs of this
period would not be unduly long if we regarded them as
strictly consecutive, and placed no blank between the death of
Mithridates II. and the accession of the next Arsaces whose
name has come down to us." SanatrOdoeces, it has been said,
may have been, and may, therefore, well be regarded as, the
successor of Mithridates. But the words of the epitomizer of .
Trogus, placed at the head of this chapter, forbid the accept-
ance of this theory. The epitomizer would not have spoken
of “many kings” as intervening between Mithridates II. and
Orodes, if the number had been only three. The expressionim-
plies, at least, four or five monarchs; and thus we have no choice
but to suppose that the succession of the kings is here imper-
fect,” and that at least one or two reigns were interposed between
those of the second Mithridates and of the monarch known as
Sanatroeces, Sinatroces, or Sintricus, -
A casual notice of a Parthian monarch in a late writer may
supply the gap, either wholly or in part. Lucian speaks of a
certain Mnasciras as a Parthian king, who died at the advanced
age of ninety-six.” As there is no other place in the Parthian
history at which the succession is doubtful, and as no such
name as Mnascris occurs elsewhere in the list, it seems neces.
sary, unless we reject Lucian's authority altogether, to insert
this monarch here. We cannot say, however, how long he
reigned, or ascribe to him any particular actions; nor can we
say definitely what king he either succeeded or preceded. It
is possible that his reign covered the entire interval between
78 THE SIXTH MONARCHIY. - [CH. x.
Mithridates II. and Sanatroeces; it is possible, on the other
hand, that he had successors and predecessors, whose names
have altogether perished.
The expression used by the epitomizer of Trogus," and a few
words dropped by Plutarch," render it probable that about this
time there were contentions between various members of the
Arsacid family which issued in actual civil war. Such con-
tentions are a marked feature of the later history; and, ac-
cording to Plutarch, they commenced at this period. We may
suspect, from the great age of two of the monarchs chosen,"
that the Arsacid stock was now very limited in number, that
it offered no candidates for the throne whose claims were in-
disputable, and that consequently at each vacancy there was
a division of opinion among the “Megistanes,” which led to
the claimants making appeal, if the election went against them,
to the arbitrament of arms.
The dark time of Parthian history is terminated by the ac-
cession—probably in B.C. 76"—of the king above mentioned as
known by the three names of Sanatroeces, Sinatroces, and
Sintricus." The form, Sanatroeces, which appears upon the
, Parthian coins, is on that account to be preferred. The king
so called had reached when elected the advanced age of eighty."
It may be suspected that he was a son of the sixth Arsaces "
(Mithridates I.), and consequently a brother of Phraates II.
He had, perhaps, been made prisoner by that Scythians in the
course of the disastrous war waged by that monarch, and had
been retained in captivity for above fifty years. At any rate,
he appears to have been indebted to the Scythians in some
measure for the crown which he acquired so tardily, his en-
joyment of it having been secured by the help of a contingent
of troops furnished to him by the Scythian tribe of the
Sacauracae.”
The position of the Empire at the time of his accession was
one of considerable difficulty. Parthia, during the period of
her civil contentions, had lost much ground in the west, having
been deprived by Tigranes of at least two important provinces.”
At the same time she had been witness of the tremendous
struggle between Rome and Pontus which commenced in B.C.
88, was still continuing, and still far from decided, when
Sanatroeces came to the throne. An octogenarian monarch
was unfit to engage in strife, and if Sanatroeces, notwithstand-
ing this drawback, had been ambitious of military distinction, it
would have been difficult for him to determine into which scale
cH. x.] CONTEMPOIARY POWER OF TIGIRANES. 79
the interests of his country required that he should cast the
weight of his sword. On the one hand, Parthia had evi-
dently much to fear from the military force and the covetous
disposition of Tigranes, king of Armenia, the son-in-law of
Mithridates, and at this time his chosen alley. Tigranes had
hitherto been continually increasing in strength. By the de-
feat of Artanes,” king of Sophéné, or Armenia Minor, he had
made himself master of Armenia in its widest extent; by his
wars with Parthia herself he had acquired Gordyéné, or
Northern Mesopotamia, and Adiabéné, or the entire rich tract
east of the middle Tigris (including Assyria Proper and Arbe-
litis, as far, at any rate, as the course of the lower Zab;” by
means which are not stated he had brought under subjection
the king of the important country of Media Artropaténé, inde-
pendent since the time of Alexander.” Invited into Syria,
about B.C. 83, by the wretched inhabitants, wearied with the
perpetual civil wars between the princes of the house of the
Seleucidae, he had found no difficulty in establishing himself
as king over Cilicia, Syria, and most of Phoenicia.” About B.C.
80 he had determined on building himself a new capital in the
province of Gordyéné”, a capital of a vast size,” provided with,
all the luxuries required by an Oriental court,” and fortified
with walls which recalled the glories of the ancient cities of
the Assyrians.” The position of this huge town on the very
borders of the Parthian kingdom, in a province which had till
very recently been Parthian, could be no otherwise understood
that as a standing menace to Parthia itself, the proclamation
of an intention to extend the Armenian dominion southwards,
and to absorb at any rate all the rich and fertile country between
Gordyéné and the sea. Thus threatened by Armenia,” it was
impossible for Sanatroeces cordially to embrace the side of
Mithridates,” with which Armenia and its king were so
closely allied; it was impossible for him even to wish that the
two allies should be free to work their will on the Asiatic con-
timent unchecked by the power which alone had for the last
twelve years obstructed their ambitious projects.
On the other hand, there was already among the Asiatic
princes generally a deep distrust of Rome *—a fear that in the
new people, which had crept so quietly into Asia, was to be
found a power more permanently formidable than the Macedo-
nians, a power which would make up for want of brilliancy
and dash by a dogged perseverance in its aims, and a stealthy,
crafty policy, sure in the end to achieve great and striking re-
80 TEHE SIXTH MONAIROLIY. ſch. x.
sults. The acceptance of the kingdom of Attalus had not, per-
haps, alarmed any one; but the Seizure of Phrygia during the
minority of Mithridates, without so much as a pretext,” and
the practice, soon afterwards established, of Setting up pup-
pet kings,” bound to do the bidding of their Roman allies, had
raised suspicions; the ease with which Mithridates notwith-
standing his great power and long preparation, had been van-
quished in the first war (B.C.88–84) had aroused fears; and
Sanatroeces could not but misdoubt the advisability of lending
aid to the Romans, and so helping them to obtain a still firmer
hold on Western Asia. Accordingly we find that when the final
war broke out, in B.C. 74, his inclination was, in the first instance,
to stand wholly aloof, and when that became impossible, then
to temporize. To the application for assistance made by Mith-
ridates in B.C. 72 a direct negative was returned: * and it was
not until, in B.C. 69, the war had approached his own frontier,
and both parties made the most earnest appeals to him for aid,
that he departed from the line of pure abstention, and had re-
course to the expedient of amusing both sides with promises,
while he helped neither.” According to Plutarch, this line of
procedure offended Lucullus, and had nearly induced him to
defer the final struggle with Mithridates and Tigranes, and
turn his arms against Parthia.” But the prolonged resistance
Of Nisibis, and the successes of Mithridates in Pontus, diverted
the danger; and the war rolling northwards, Parthia was not
yet driven to take a side, but was enabled to maintain her
neutral position for some years longer.
Meanwhile the aged Sanatroeces died,” and was succeeded
by his son, Phraates III. This prince followed at first his
father's example, and abstained from mixing himself up in
the Mithridatic war; but in B.C. 66, being courted by both
sides, and promised the restoration of the provinces lost to
Tigranes,” he made alliance with Pompey, and undertook,
while the latter pressed the war against Mithridates, to find
Occupation for the Armenian monarch in his own land. This
engagement he executed with fidelity. It had happened that
the eldest living son of Tigranes, a prince bearing the same
name as his father, having raised a rebellion in Armenia and
been defeated, had taken refuge in Parthia with Phraates.”
Phraates determined to take advantage of this circumstance.
The young Tigranes was supported by a party among his
countrymen who wished to see a youthful monarch upon the
throne; and Phraates therefore considered that he would best
Plate. V.
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Fig. 4. -
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Plate VI . Fig. 2. Vol. III.
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Parthian statuette (after Loftus).
Fig. 4.
Parthian vases, jugs, and lamps (after Loftus).




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on X. DIALING; or PHRAATES III. WITH POMPEY. 81
discharge his obligations to the Romans by fomenting this
family quarrel, and lending a moderate support to the younger
Tigranes against his father. He marched an army into Ar-
menia in the interest of the young prince, overran the open
country, and advanced on Artaxata, the capital. Tigranes,
the king, fled at his approach, and betook himself to the
neighboring mountains. Artaxata was invested; but as the
siege promised to be long, the Parthian monarch after a time
withdrew, leaving the pretender with as many troops as he
thought necessary to press the Siege to a successful issue. The
result, however, disappointed his expectations. Scarcely was
Phraates gone, when the old king fell upon his son, defeated
him, and drove him beyond bis borders.” He was forced,
however, soon afterwards, to submit to Pompey,” who, while
the civil war was raging in Armenia, had defeated Mithridates
and driven him to take refuge in the Tauric Chersonese.
Phraates, now, naturally expected the due reward of his
services, according to the stipulations of his agreement with
Pompey. But that general was either dissatisfied with the
mode in which the Parthian had discharged his obligations, or
disinclined to strengthen the power which he saw to be the
only one in these parts capable of disputing with Rome the
headship of Asia. He could scarcely prevent, and he does not
seem to have tried to prevent, the recovery of Adiabéné by
the Parthians; but the nearer province of Gordyéné to which
they had an equal claim, he would by no means consent to
their occupying. At first he destined it for the younger Ti-
granes.” When the prince offended him, he made it over to
Ariobarzanes, the Cappadocian monarch.” That arrangement
not taking effect, and the tract being disputed between Phraates
and the elder Tigranes, he sent his legate, Afranius, to drive
the Parthians out of the country, and delivered it over into
the hands of the Armenians.” At the same time he insulted
the Parthian monarch by refusing him his generally recognized
title of “King of Kings.” He thus entirely alienated his late
ally, who remonstrated against the injustice with which he was
treated,” and was only deterred from declaring war by the
wholesome fear which he entertained of the Roman arms.-
Pompey, on his side, no doubt took the question into con-
sideration whether or no he should declare the Parthian
prince a Roman enemy, and proceed to direct against him the
available forces of the Empire. He had purposely made him
hostile, and compelled him to take steps which might have
82 , THE SIXTH MONARCHY. , ' [cii. x.
! i
furnished a plausible casus belli. But, on the whole, he found
that he was not prepared to venture on the encounter. The
war had not been formally committed to him; and if he did
not prosper in it, he dreaded the accusations of his enemies at
IRome. He had seen, moreover, with his own eyes, that the
IParthians were an enemy far from despicable, and his knowl-
edge of campaigning told him that success against them, was
not certain. He feared to risk the loss of all the glory which
he had obtained by grasping greedily at more, and preferred
enjoying the fruits of the good luck which had hitherto at-
tended him to tempting fortune on a new field.” He therefore
determined that he would not allow himself to be provoked
into hostilities by the reproaches, the dictatorial words, or
even the daring acts of the Parthian King. When Phraates
demanded his lost provinces he replied, that the question of
borders was one which lay, not between Parthia and Rome,
but between Parthia and Armenia.” When he laid it down
that the Euphrates properly bounded the Roman territory,
and charged Pompey not to cross it, the latter said he would
keep to the just bounds, whatever they were.” When Ti-
granes complained that after having been received into the
Roman alliance he was still attacked by the Parthian armies,
the reply of Pompey was that he was willing to appoint ar-
bitrators who should decide all the disputes between the two
nations.” The moderation and caution of these answers
proved contagious. The monarchs addressed resolved to com-
pose their differences, or at any rate to defer the settlement of
them to a more convenient time. They accepted Pompey's
proposal of an arbitration; and in a short time an arrangement
was effected by which relations of amity were re-established
between the two countries.**
It would seem that not very long after the conclusion of
this peace and the retirement of Pompey from Asia (B.C. 62),
Phraates lost his life. He was assassinated by his two sons,
Mithridates and Orodes;* for what cause we are not told.
Mithridates, the elder of the two, succeeded him (about B.C.
60); and, as all fear of the Romans had now passed away in
consequence of their apparently peaceful attitude, he returned
soon after his accession to the policy of his namesake, Mithri-
dates II., and resumed the struggle with Armenia from which
his father had desisted.* The object of the war was probably
the recovery of the lost province of Gordyöné, which, having
been delivered to the elder Tigranes by Pompey, had remained
CII. X.] IIIS CIVIL WAR WITH OBODES. 83
in the occupation of the Armenians. Mithridates seems to
have Succeeded in his enterprise. When we next obtain a dis-
tinct view of the boundary line which divides Parthia from
her neighbors towards the north and the north-west, which is
within five years of the probable date of Mithridates's accession,
we find Gordyéné once more a Parthian province.” As the
later years of this intermediate lustre are a time of civil strife,
during which territorial gains can scarcely have been made,
we are compelled to refer the conquest to about B.C. 59–57.
But in this case it must have been due to Mithridates III.,
whose reign is fixed with much probability to the years B.C.
60-56.
The credit which Mithridates had acquired by his conduct of
the Armenian war he lost soon afterwards by the severity of
his home administration. There is reason to believe that he
drove his brother, Orodes, into banishment.” At any rate, he
ruled so harshly and cruelly that within a few years of his ac-
cession the Parthian nobles deposed him,” and, recalling Orodes
from his place of exile, set him up as king in his brother's
room. Mithridates was, it would seem, at first allowed to
govern Media as a subject monarch; but after a while his
brother grew jealous of him, and deprived him of this dignity.”
Unwilling to acquiesce in his disgrace, Mithridates fied to the
Romans, and being favorably received by Gabinius, then pro-
consul of Syria, endeavored to obtain his aid against his coun-
trymen. Gabinius, who was at once weak and ambitious, lent
a ready ear to his entreaties, and was upon the point of con-
ducting an expedition into Parthia, when he received a still
more tempting invitation from another quarter." Ptolemy
Auletes, expelled from Egypt by his rebellious subjects, asked
his aid, and having recommendations from Pompey, and a fair
sum of ready money to disburse, found little difficulty in per-
suading the Syrian proconsul to relinquish his Parthian plans
and march the force at his disposal into Egypt. Mithridates,
upon this, withdrew from Syria, and re-entering the Parthian
territory, commenced a civil war against his brother, finding
numerous partisans, especially in the region about Babylon.”
It may be suspected that Seleucia, the second city in the Em-
pire, embraced his cause.” Babylon, into which he had thrown
himself, sustained a long siege on his behalf, and only yielded
when compelled by famine.” Mithridates might again have
become a fugitive; but he was weary of the disappointments
and hardships which are the ordinary lot of a pretender, and
*
84 THE SIXTEI MONARCHY. [CII. XI.
preferred to cast himself on the mercy and affection of his
brother. Accordingly he surrendered himself unconditionally
to Orodes; but this prince, professing to place the claims of
patriotism above those of relationship, “caused the traitor who
had sought aid from Rome to be instantly executed. Thus
perished Mithridates III. after a reign which cannot have ex-
ceeded five years, in the winter of B.C. 56, or the early spring
of B.C. 55. Orodes, on his death, was accepted as king by the
whole nation.
CHAPTER XI.
Accession of Orodes I. Eacpedition of Crassus. His fate.
Retaliatory inroad of the Parthians into Syria under
Pacorus, the Son of Orodes. Defeat of Pacorus by Cassius.
His recall. End of the first War with Rome.
“Parthi . . . a Romanis, bellis per maximos duces florentissimis temporibus laces-
siti, soli ex omnibus gentibus non pares solum, sed etiam victores fuere.”
Justin, xli. 1, § 7.
THE complete triumph of Orodes over Mithridates, and his
full establishment in his kingdom, cannot be placed earlier
than B.C. 56, and most probably fell in B.C. 55. In this latter
year Crassus obtained the consulship at Rome, and, being ap-
pointed at the same time to the command of the East,” made
no secret of his intention to march the Roman legions across
the Euphrates, and engage in hostilities with the great Parthian
kingdom.” According to Some writers, his views extended
even further. He spoke of the wars which Lucullus had waged
against Tigranes and Pompey against Mithridates of Pontus as
mere child's play, and announced his intention of carrying the
Roman arms to Bactria, India, and the Eastern Ocean.* The
Parthian king was thus warned betimes of the impending dan-
ger, and enabled to make all Such preparations against it as he
deemed necessary. More than a year elapsed between the as-
signment to Crassus of Syria as his province, and his first
overt act of hostility against Orodes.
It cannot be doubted that this breathing-time was well spent
by the Parthian monarch. Besides forming his general plan
of campaign at his leisure, and collecting, arming, and exer-
f
CH. XI.] EXPEDITION OF CRASSUS. " 85
cising his native forces, he was enabled to gain over certain
chiefs upon his borders, who had hitherto held a semi-depend-
ent position, and might have been expected to welcome the
Romans. One of these, Abgarus," prince of Osrhoëné, or the
tract east of the Euphrates about the city of Edessa, had been
received into the Roman alliance by Pompey, but, with the
fickleness common among Orientals, he now readily changed
sides, and undertook to play a double part for the advantage
of the Parthians." Another, Alchaudonius, an Arab sheikh of
these parts, had made his submission to Rome even earlier;"
but having become convinced that Parthia was the stronger
power of the two, he also went over to Orodes.” The impor-
tance of these adhesions would depend greatly on the line of
march which Crassus might determine to follow in making
his attack. Three plans were open to him. He might either
throw himself on the support of Artavasdes, the Armenian
monarch, who had recently succeeded his father Tigranes, and
entering Armenia, take the safe but circuitous route through
the mountains into Adiabéné, and so by the left bank of the
Tigris to Ctesiphon; or he might, like the younger Cyrus, fol-
low the course of the Euphrates to the latitude of Seleucia, and
then cross the narrow tract of plain which there separates the
two rivers; or, finally, he might attempt the shortest but most
dangerous line across the Belik and Khabour, and directly
through the Mesopotamian desert. If the Armenian route
were preferred, neither Abgarus nor Alchaudonius would be
able to do the Parthians much service; but if Crassus resolved
on following either of the others, their alliance could not ºut
be most valuable.
Crassus, however, on reaching his province, seemed in Yao
haste to make a decision. He must have arrived in Syria tol-
erably early in the spring;” but his operations during the first
year of his proconsulship were unimportant. He seems at
once to have made up his mind to attempt nothing more than
a reconnaissance. Crossing the Euphrates at Zeugma, the
modern Bir or Bireh-jik, he proceeded to ravage the open
country, and to receive the submission of the Greek cities,
which were numerous throughout the region between the
Tuphrates and the Belik." The country was defended by the
Parthian satrap with a small force; but this was easily de-
feated, the satrap himself receiving a wound.” One Greek city
only, Zenodotium, offered resistance to the invader; its in-
habitants, having requested and received a Roman garrison of
86 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. xI.
one hundred men, rose upon them and put them barbarously
to the sword; whereupon Crassus besieged and took the place,
gave it up to his army to plunder, and sold the entire popula-
tion for slaves.” He then, as winter drew near, determined
to withdraw into Syria, leaving garrisons in the various
towns. The entire force left behind is estimated at eight
thousand men.”
It is probable that Orodes had expected a more determined
attack, and had retained his army near his capital until it
should become evident by which route the enemy would ad-
vance against him. Acting on an inner circle, he could readily
have interposed his forces, on whichever line the assailants
threw themselves. But the tardy proceedings of his antagonist
made his caution superfluous. The first campaign was over,
and there had scarcely been a collision between the troops of
the two nations. Parthia had been insulted by a wanton at-
tack, and had lost some disaffected cities; but no attempt had
been made to fulfil the grand boasts with which the war had
been undertaken.
It may be suspected that the Parthian monarch began now
to despise his enemy. He would compare him with Lucullus
and Pompey, and understand that a Roman army, like any
other, was formidable, or the reverse, according as it was ably
or feebly commanded. He would know that Crassus was a
sexagenarian, and may have heard that he had never yet
shown himself a captain or even a soldier. Perhaps he almost
doubted whether the proconsul had any real intention of press-
ing the contest to a decision, and might not rather be expected,
when he had enriched himself and his troops with Mesopota-
mian plunder, to withdraw his garrisons across the Euphrates.
Crassus was at this time showing the worst side of his char-
acter in Syria, despoiling temples of their treasures,” and ac-
cepting money in lieu of contingents of troops from the
dynasts of Syria and Palestine.” Orodes, under these circum-
stances, sent an embassy to him, which was well calculated to
stir to action the most sluggish and poor-spirited of com-
manders. “If the war,” said his envoys, “was really waged
by Rome, it must be fought out to the bitter end. But if, as
they had good reason to believe," Crassus, against the wish of
his country, had attacked Parthia and seized her territory for
his own private gain, Arsaces would be moderate. He would
have pity on the advanced years of the proconsul, and would
give the Romans back those men of theirs, who were not so
t gº •
ch. xi.] SEgOND INVASION OF CRASSUS, B.C. 53. S7
much keeping watch in Mesopotamia as having watch kept on
them.” Crassus, stung with the taunt, exclaimed, “He would
return the ambassadors an answer at Seleucia.” Wagises, the
chief ambassador, prepared for some such exhibition of feeling,
and, glad to heap taunt on taunt, replied, striking the palm of
one hand with the fingers of the other: “Hairs will grow here,
Crassus, before you see Seleucia.”
Still further to quicken the action of the Romans, before the
winter was well over, the offensive was taken against their ad-
herents in Mesopotamia. The towns which held Roman garri-
sons were attacked by the Parthians in force; and, though we
do not hear of any being captured, all of them were menaced,
and all suffered considerably.” 3.
If Crassus needed to be stimulated, these stimulants were
effective; and he entered on his second campaign with a full
determination to compel the Parthian monarch to an en-
gagemert, and, if possible, to dictate peace to him at his capi-
tal. He had not, however, in his second campaign, the same
freedom with regard to his movements that he had enjoyed
the year previous. The occupation of Western Mesopotamia
cramped his choice. It had, in fact, compelled him before
quitting Syria to decline, definitely and decidedly, the over-
tures of Artavasdes, who strongly urged on him to advance by
way of Armenia, and promised him in that case an important
addition to his forces.” Crassus felt himself compelled to sup-
port his garrisons, and therefore to make Mesopotamia, and
not Armenia, the basis of his operations, He crossed the
Euphrates a second time at the same point as before,” with
an army composed of 35,000 heavy infantry, 4,000 light infan-
try, and 4,000 horse.” There was still open to him a certain
choice of routes. The one preferred by his chief officers was
the line of the Euphrates, known as that which the Ten Thou-
sand had pursued in an expedition that would have been suc-
cessful but for the death of its commander. Along this line
water would be plentiful; forage and other supplies might be
counted on to a certain extent; and the advancing army, rest-
ing on the river, could not be surrounded.” Another, but one
that does not appear to have been suggested till too late,” was
that which Alexander had taken against Darius;* the line
along the foot of the Mons Masius, by Edessa, and Nisibis, to
Nineveh. Here too waters and supplies would have been
readily procurable, and by clinging to the skirts of the hills
the Roman infantry would have set the Parthian cavalry at
88 TIIE SIXTH MONAIRC III. [CH. XI.
defiance. Between these two extreme courses to the right and
to the left were numerous slighily divergent lines across the
Mesopotamian plain, all shorter than either of the two above-
mentioned, and none offering any great advantage over the
remainder.
It is uncertain what choice the proconsul would have made,
had the decision been left simply to his own judgment. Proba-
bly the Romans had a most dim and indistinct conception of
the geographical character of the Mesopotamian region, and
were ignorant of its great difficulties. They remained also, it
must be remembered, up to this time, absolutely unacquainted
with the Parthian tactics and accustomed as they were to
triumph over every enemy against whom they fought, it
would scarcely occur to them that in an open field they could
suffer defeat. They were ready, like Alexander, to encounter
any number of Asiatics, 2nd only asked to be led against the
foe as quickly as possilie. When, therefore, Abgarus, the
Osrhoëne prince, soon aft'.r Crassus had crossed the Euphrates,
rode into his camp, and f eclared that the Parthians did not in-
tend to make a stand, b. It were quitting Mesopotamia and fly-
ing with their treasure to the remote regions of Hyrcania and
Scythia, leaving only a rear guard under a couple of generals
to cover the retreat,” it is not surprising that the resolution
was taken to give ui, the circuitous route of the Euphrates,
and to march dirºſy across Mesopotamia in the hope of
Crushing the cover .ng detachment, and coming upon the fly-
ing multitude encºmbered with baggage, which would furnish
a rich spoil to the victors. In after times it was said that C.
Cassius Longán as and some other officers were opposed to this
movement,” 2 ind foresaw its danger; but it must be questioned
whether the whole army did not readily obey its leader's order,
and commence without any forebodings its march, through
Upper Mesopotamia. That region has not really the character
which the apologists for Roman disaster in later times gave to
it. It is a region of swelling hills, and somewhat dry gravelly
plains. It possesses several streams and rivers, besides
$lumerous springs.” At intervals of a few miles it was studded
with cities and villages;* nor did the desert really begin until
the Khabour was crossed. The army of Crassus had traversed
it throughout its whole extent during the summer of the pre-
ceding year, and must have been well acquainted with both
its advantages and drawbacks.
But it is time that we should consider what preparations the
ch. xi.] HIS ADVERSARY, THE PARTIIIAN SUREWAS. 89
Parthian monarch had made against the threatened attack.
He had, as already stated, come to terms with his outlying
vassals, the prince of Osrhoëné, and the sheikh of the Scenite
Arabs, and had engaged especially the services of the former
against his assailant. He had furthur, on considering the
various possibilities of the campaign, come to the conclusion
that it would be best to divide his forces, and, while himself
attacking Artavasdes inthe mountain fastnesses of his own
country, to commit the task of meeting and coping with the
Romans to a general of approved talents.” It was of the
greatest importance to prevent the Armenians from effecting a
junction with the Romans, and strengthening them in that
arm in which they were especially deficient, the cavalry.
Perhaps nothing short of an invasion of his country by the
Parthian king in person would have prevented Artavasdes
from detaching a portion of his troops to act in Mesopotamia.
And no doubt it is also true that Orodes had great confidence
in his general, whom he may even have felt to be a better
commander than himself. Surenas, as we must call him, since
his name has not been preserved to us,” was in all respects a
person of the highest consideration. He was the second man
in the kingdom for birth, wealth, and reputation. In courage
and ability he excelled all his countrymen; and he had the
physical advantages of commanding height and great personal
beauty. When he went to battle, he was accompanied by a
train of a thousand camels, which carried his baggage; and
the concubines in attendance on him required for their con-
veyance two hundred chariots. A thousand horseman clad in
mail, and a still greater number of light-armed, formed his
bodyguard. At the coronation of a Parthian monarch, it was
his hereditary right to place the diadem on the brow of the
new sovereign. When Orodes was driven into banishment it
was he who brought him back to Parthia in triumph. When
Seleucia revolted, it was he who at the assault first mounted
the breachand, striking terror into the defenders, took the city.
Though less than thirty years of age at the time when he was
appointed commander, he was believed to possess, besides these
various qualifications, consummate prudence and sagacity.”
The force which Orodes committed to his brave and skilful
lieutenant consisted entirely of horse. This was not the ordi-
nary character of a Parthian army, which often comprised
four or five times as many infantry as cavalry. It was, per-
haps, rather fortunate accident than profound calculation that
w
90 THE SIXTII MONARCIIY. [CHI. xI.
caused the sole employment against the Tºomans of this arm.”
The foot soldiers were needed for the rough warfare of the
Armenian mountains; the horse would, it was known, act
with fair effect in the comparatively open and level Mesopo-
tamia. As the king wanted the footmen he took them, and
left to his general the troops which were not required for his
own operations.
The Parthian horse, like the Persian,” was of two kinds,
standing in strong contrast the one to the other. The bulk of
their cavalry was of the lightest and most agile description.
Fleet and active coursers, with scarcely any caparison but a
headstall and a single rein, were mounted by riders clad only
in a tunic and trousers,” and armed with nothing but a strong
bow and a quiver full of arrows. A training begun in early
boyhood made the rider almost one with his steed; and he
could use his weapons with equal ease and effect whether his
horse was stationary or at full gallop, and whether he was ad-
vancing towards or hurriedly retreating from his enemy.*
His supply of missiles was almost inexhaustible, for when he
found his quiver empty, he had only to retire a short distance
and replenish his stock from magazines, borne on the backs of
camels, in the rear.” It was his ordinary plan to keep con-
stantly in motion when in the presence of an enemy, to gallop
backwards and forwards, or round and round his square or
column, never charging it, but at a moderate interval plying
it with his keen and barbed shafts;” which were driven by a
practised hand from a bow of unusual strength. Clouds of
this light cavalry enveloped the advancing or the retreating
foe, and inflicted grievous damage without, for the most part,
suffering anything in return.
But this was not the whole. In addition to these light
troops, a Parthian army comprised always a body of heavy
cavalry,” armed on an entirely different system. The strong
horses selected for this service were clad almost wholly in
mail. Their head, neck, chest, even their sides and flanks,
were protected by scale-armor of brass or iron, sewn, probably,
upon leather.” Their riders had cuirasses and cuisses of the
same materials, and helmets of burnished iron.” For an offen-
sive weapon they carried a long and strong spear or pike."
They formed a serried line in battle, bearing down with great
weight on the enemy whom they charged, and standing firm
as an iron wall against the charges that were made upon
them. A cavalry answering to this in Some respects had been
cII. XI.] T ADVANCE OF CRASSUS. - 9i
employed by the later Persian monarchs,” and was in use also
among the Armenians at this period; but the Parthian pike
was apparently more formidable than the corresponding weap-
ons of those nations, and the light spear carried at this time
by the cavalry of a Roman army was no match for it.
The force entrusted to Surenas comprised troops of both
these classes. No estimate is given us of their number, but it
was probably considerable.” At any rate it was sufficient to
induce him to make a movement in advance—to cross the
Sinjar range and the river Khabour, and take up his position
in the country between that stream and the Belik—instead of
merely seeking to cover the Capital. The presence of the
traitor Abgarus in the camp of Crassus was now of the utmost
importance to the Parthian commander. Abgarus, fully
trusted, and at the head of a body of light horse, admirably
adapted for outpost service, was allowed, upon his own re-
quest, to scour the country in front of the advancing Romans,
and had thus the means of communicating freely with the
Parthian chief. He kept Surenas informed of all the move-
ments and intentions of Crassus, “while at the same time he
suggested to Crassus such a line of route as suited the views
and designs of his adversary. Our chief authority for the de-
tails of the expedition tells us” that he led the Roman troops
through an arid and trackless desert, across plains without
tree, or shrub, or even grass, where the Soil was composed of
a light shifting sand, which the wind raised into a succession
of hillocks that resembled the waves of an interminable Sea.
The soldiers, he says, fainted with the heat and with the
drought, while the audacious Osrhoëne scoffed at their com-
plaints and reproaches, asking them whether they expected to
find the border-tract between Arabia and Assyria a country of
cool streams and shady groves, of baths, and hostelries, like
their own delicious Campania. But our knowledge of the
geographical character of the region through which the march
lay makes it impossible for us to accept this account as true.”
The country between the Euphrates and the Belik, as already
observed, is one of alternate hill and plain, neither destitute of
trees nor ill-provided with water. The march through it could
have presented no great difficulties. All that Abgarus could
do to serve the Parthian cause was, first, to induce Crassus to
trust himself to the open country, without clinging either to a
river or to the mountains, and, Secondly, to bring him, after
a hasty march, and in the full heat of the day, into the pres-
92 THE SIXTH MONARCH Y. [CH. xI,
ence of the enemy. Both these things he contrived to effect,
and Surenas was, no doubt, So far beholden to him. But the
notion that he enticed the Roman army into a trackless desert,
and gave it over, when it was perishing through weariness,
hunger, and thirst, into the hands of its enraged enemy,” is
in contradiction with the topographical facts, and is not even
maintained consistently by the classical writers.”
It was probably on the third or fourth day after he had
quitted the Euphrates” that Crassus found himself approach-
ing his enemy. After a hasty and hot march” he had ap-
proached the banks of the Belik, when his scouts brought him
word that they had fallen in with the Parthian army, which
was advancing in force and Seemingly full of confidence.
Abgarus had recently quitted him on the plea of doing him
some undefined Service, but really to range himself on the side
of his real friends, the Parthians.” His officers now advised
Crassus to encamp upon the river, and defer an engagement
till the morrow; but he had no fears; his son, Publius, who
had lately joined him with a body of Gallic horse sent by
Julius Caesar, was anxious for the fray; and accordingly the
Boman commander gave the Order to his troops to take some
refreshment as they stood, and then to push forward rapidly.”
Surenas, on his side, had taken up a position on wooded and
hilly ground, which concealed his numbers,” and had even,
we are told, made his troops cover their arms with cloths and
skins,” that the glitter might not betray them. But, as the
Romans drew near, all concealment was cast aside; the signal
for battle was given; the clang of the kettledrums arose on
every side; the squadrons came forward in their brilliant
array; and it seemed at first as if the heavy cavalry was
about to charge the Roman host,” which was formed in a
hollow square with the light-armed in the middle, and with
supporters of horse along the whole line, as well as upon the
flanks.” But, if this intention was ever entertained, it was
altered almost as soon as formed, and the better plan was
adopted of halting at a convenient distance and assailing the
legionaries with flight after flight of arrows, delivered without
a pause and with extraordinary force. The Roman en-
deavored to meet this attack by throwing forward his own
skirmishers; but they were quite unable to cope with the
numbers and the superior weapons of the enemy, who forced
them almost immediately to retreat, and take refuge behind
the line of the heavy-armed.” These were then once more
*
cH. XI.] BATTLE OF TIIE BELIK. 93
exposed to the deadly missiles, which pierced alike through
shield and breast-plate and greaves, and inflicted the most
fearful wounds. More than once the legionaries dashed for-
ward, and sought to close with their assailants, but in vain.
The Parthian squadrons retired as the Roman infantry ad-
vanced, maintaining the distance which they thought best
between themselves and their foe, whom they plied with their
shafts as incessantly while they fell back as when they rode
forward. For a while the Romans entertained the hope that
the missiles would at last be all spent;” but when they found
that each archer constantly obtained a fresh supply from the .
rear, this expectation deserted them. It became evident to
Crassus that some new movement must be attempted; and, as
a last resource, he commanded his son, Publius, whom the
Parthians were threatening to outflank, to take such troops
as he thought proper, and charge. The gallant youth was
only too glad to receive the Order. Selecting his Gallic cav-
alry, who numbered 1000, and adding to them 500 other horse-
men, 500 archers, and about 4000 legionaries,” he advanced at
speed against the nearest Squadrons of the enemy. The
Parthians pretended to be afraid, and beat a hasty retreat.
Publius followed with all the impetuosity of youth, and was
soon out of the sight of his friends, pressing the flying foe,
whom he believed to be panic-stricken. But when they had
drawn him on sufficiently, they suddenly made a stand,
brought their heavy cavalry up against his line, and com-
pletely enveloped him and his detachment with their light-
armed. Publius made a desperate resistance. His Gauls
seized the Parthian pikes with their hands and dragged the
encumbered horsemen to the ground; or dismounting, slipped
beneath the horses of their opponents, and stabbing them in
the belly, brought steed and rider down upon themselves.
His legionaries occupied a slight hillock, and endeavored to
make a wall of their shields, but the Parthian archers closed
around them, and slew them almost to a man. Of the whole
detachment, nearly six thousand strong, no more than 500
were taken prisoners," and scarcely one escaped. The young
Crassus might, possibly, had he chosen to make the attempt,
have forced his way through the enemy to Ichnae, a Greek
town not far distant;" but he preferred to share the fate of
his men. Rather than fall into the hands of the enemy, he
caused his shield-bearer to dispatch him; and his example
was followed by his principal officers. The victors struck off
f . *
94 THE SIXTH MONARCHY, [CH. XI.
his head, and elevating it on a pike, returned to resume their
attack on the main body of the Roman army. S *
. The main body, much relieved by the diminution of the pres-
sure upon them, had waited patiently for Publius to return in
triumph, regarding the battle as well-nigh over and success as
certain. After a time the prolonged absence of the young
captain aroused suspicions, which grew into alarms when mes-
sengers arrived telling of his extreme danger.” Crassus,
almost beside himself with anxiety, had given the word to ad-
vance, and the army had moved forward a short distance,
when the shouts of the returning enemy were heard, and the
head of the unfortunate officer was seen displayed aloft, while
the Parthian squadrons, closing in once more, renewed the
assault on their remaining foes with increased vigor. The
mailed horsemen approached close to the legionaries and thrust
at them with the long pikes,” while the light-armed, galloping
across the Roman front, discharged their unerring arrows over
the heads of their own men. The Romans could neither suc-
cessfully defend themselves nor effectively retaliate. Still
time brought some relief. Bowstrings broke, spears were
blunted or splintered, arrows began to fail, thews and sinews
to relax;" and when night closed in both parties were almost
equally glad of the cessation of arms which the darkness ren-
dered compulsory. * -
It was the custom of the Parthians, as of the Persians," to
bivouac at a considerable distance from an enemy. Accor-
dingly, at nightfall they drew off, having first shouted to the
Romans that they would grant the general one night in which
to bewail his Son; on the morrow they would come and take
him prisoner, unless he preferred the better course of surren-
dering himself to the mercy of Arsaces." A short breathing-
space was thus allowed the Romans, who took advantage of it to
retire towards Carrhae, leaving behind them the greater part of
their wounded, to the number of 4,000. A small body of horse
reached Carrhae about midnight, and gave the commandant
such information as led him to put his men under arms and
issue forth to the succor of the proconsul. The Parthians,
though the cries of the wounded made them well aware of the
Roman retreat, adhered to their system of avoiding night com-
bats, and attempted no pursuit till morning." Even then they
allowed themselves to be delayed by comparatively trivial
matters—the capture of the Roman camp, the massacre of the
wounded, and the slaughter of the numerous stragglers scattered
\
cH. xI.] FLIGHT OF CRASSUS FROM CARRILE. 95
along the line of march—and made no haste to overtake the
retreating army. The bulk of the troops were thus enabled to
effect their retreat in Safety to Carrhae, where, having the pro-
tection of walls, they were, at any rate for a time secure. \
It might have been expected that the Romans would here
have made a stand. The siege of a fortified place by cavalry
is ridiculous, if we understand by siege anything more than a
very incomplete blockade. And the Parthians were notori-'
ously inefficient against walls." There was a chance, moreover,
that Artavasdes might have been more successful than his ally,
and, having repulsed the Parthian monarch, might march his
troops to the relief of the Romans. But the soldiers were
thoroughly dispirited, and would not listen to these sugges-
tions.” Provisions no doubt ran short, since, as there had
been no expectation of a disaster, no preparations had been
made for standing a siege. The Greek inhabitants of the place
could not be trusted to exhibit fidelity to a falling cause.
Moreover, Armenia was near; and the Parthian system of ab-
staining from action during the night seemed to render escape
tolerably easy. It was resolved, therefore, instead of clinging
to the protection of the walls, to issue forth once more, and to
endeavor by a rapid night march to reach the Armenian hills.
The various officers seem to have been allowed to arrange mat-
ters for themselves. Cassius took his way towards the
Euphrates, and succeeded in escaping with 500 horse. Octa-
vius, with a division which is estimated at 5,000 men, reached
the outskirts of the the hills at a place called Sinnaca,” and found
himself in comparative security. Crassus, misled by his guides,
made but poor progress during the night; he had, however, ar-
rived within little more than a mile of Octavius before the
enemy, who would not stir till daybreak, overtook him.
Bressed upon by their advancing squandrons, he, with his
small band of 2,000 legionaries and a few horsemen, occupied.
a low hillock connected by a ridge of rising ground with the
position of Sinnaca. Here the Parthian host beset him; and
he would infallibly have been slain or captured at once, had
not Octavius, deserting his place of safety, descended to the
aid of his commander. The united 7,000 held their own against
the enemy, having the advantage of the ground, and having
perhaps by the experience of Some days learnt the weak points
of Parthian warfare. ---
Surenas was anxious, above all things, to secure the person
of the Roman commander. In the East an excessive impor-
96 THE SIXTHI MOYARCII Y. [CH. XI.
tance is attached to this proof of success; and there were reasons
which made Crassus particularly obnoxious to his antagonists.
He was believed to have originated, and not merely conducted,
the war, incited thereto by simple greed of gold.” He had re-
fused with the utmost haughtiness all discussion of terms, and
had insulted the majesty of the Parthians by the declaration
that he would treat nowhere but at their capital. If he escaped,
he would be bound at some future time to repeat his attempt;
if he were made prisoner, his fate would be a terrible warning to
others. But now, as evening approached, it seemed to the
Parthian that the prize which he so much desired was about
to elude his grasp. The highlands of Armenia would be
gained by the fugitives during the night, and further pursuit
of them would be hopeless. It remained that he should effect
by craft what he could no longer hope to gain by the employ-
ment of force; and to this point all his efforts were now di-
rected. He drew off his troops and left the Romans without
further molestation. He allowed some of his prisoners to es-
cape and rejoin their friends, having first contrived that they
should overhear a conversation among his men, of which the
theme was the Parthian clemency, and the wish of Orodes to
come to terms with the Romans. He then, having allowed time
for the report of his pacific intentions to spread, rode with a
few chiefs towards the Roman camp, carrying his bow unstrung
and his right hand stretched out in token of amity. “Let the
Roman General,” he said, “come forward with an equal num-
ber of attendants, and confer with me in the open space be-
tween the armies on terms of peace.” The aged proconsul was
disinclined to trust these overtures; but his men clamored
and threatened, upon which he yielded, and went down into
the plain, accompanied by Octavius and a few others. Here
he was received with apparent honor, and terms were arranged;
but Surenas required that they should at once be reduced to
writing, “since,” he said, with pointed allusion to the bad
faith of Pompey, “you Romans are not very apt to remember
your engagements.” A movement being requisite for the
drawing up of the formal instruments, Crassus and his officers
were induced to mount upon horses furnished by the Parthians,
who had no sooner seated the proconsul on his steed, than he
proceeded to hurry him forward, with the evident intention of
carrying him off to their camp.” The Roman officers took the
alarm and resisted. Octavius snatched a sword from a Par-
thian and killed one of the grooms who was hurrying Crassus
Plate V||;
Wol
fºur
'(01500 puu uſpuſīJ 101Ju) saziwļob Jo Joſſoſ-suq
! /
ſ ºſ
»， ſi







Voſ. Ill.
|.
Plate Vll
Parthian bas-relief (after Flandin and Coste).

CH. XI.] CA USES OF IIIS FA II, URE. 97
away. A blow from behind stretched him on the ground life-
less. A general mêlée followed, and in the confusion Crassus
was killed, whether by one of his own side and with his own
consent, or by the hand of a Parthian is uncertain.” The army,
learning the fate of their general, with but few exceptions, sur-
rendered. Such as sought to escape under cover of the ap-
proaching night were hunted down by the Bedouins who
served under the Parthian standard, and killed almost to a
man. Of the entire army which had crossed the Euphrates,
consisting of above 40,000 men, not more than one fourth re-
turned. One half of the whole number perished.” Nearly
10,000 prisoners were settled by the victors in the fertile oasis
of Margiana,” near the northern frontier of the empire, where
they intermarried with native wives,” and became submissive
Parthian subjects."
Such was the result of this great expedition, the first at-
tempt of the grasping and ambitious Romans, not so much to
conquer Parthia, as to strike terror into the heart of her peo-
ple, and to degrade them to the condition of obsequious de-
pendants on the will and pleasure of the “world's lords.””
The expedition failed so utterly, not from any want of bravery
on the part of the Soldiers employed in it, nor from any abso-
lute superiority of the Parthian over the Roman tactics, but
partly from the incompetence of the commander, partly from
the inexperience of the Romans, up to this date, in the nature
of the Parthian warfare and in the best manner of meeting it.
To attack an enemy whose main arm is the cavalry with a
body of foot-Soldiers, supported by an insignificant number of
horse, must be at all times rash and dangerous. To direct
such an attack on the more open part of the country, where cav-
alry could operate freely, was wantonly to aggravate the peril.
After the first disaster, to quit the protection of walls, when it
had been obtained, was a piece of reckless folly. Had Crassus
taken care to obtain the support of some of the desert tribes,”
if Armenia could not help him, and had he then advanced
either by the way of the Mons Masius and the Tigris, or along
the line of the Euphrates, the issue of his attack might have
been different. He might have fought his way to Seleucia and
Ctesiphon, as did Trajan, Avidius Cassius, and Septimius Sev-
erus, and might have taken and plundered those cities. He
would no doubt have experienced difficulties in his retreat;
but he might have come off no worse than Trajan, whose Par-
thian expedition has been generally regarded as rather aug-
p 3
; :
: i ,
g s
98 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. xI.
|
menting than detracting from his reputation. But an ignorant
and inexperienced commander, Venturing on a trial of arms
with an enemy of whom he knew little or nothing, in their
own country, without support or allies, and then neglecting
every precaution suggested by his officers, allowing himself to
be deceived by a pretended friend, and marching straight into
a net prepared for him, naturally suffered defeat. The credit .
of the Roman arms does not greatly suffer by the disaster, nor
is that of the Parthians greatly enhanced. The latter showed,
as they had shown in their wars against the Syro-Macedonians,
that there somewhat loose and irregular array was capable of
acting with effect against the solid masses and well-ordered
movements of disciplined troops. They acquired by their use
of the bow a fame like that which the English archers ob-
tained for the employment of the same weapon at Crecy and
Agincourt. They forced the arrogant Romans to respect them,
and to allow that there was at least one nation in the world
which could meet them on equal terms and not be worsted in
the encounter.” They henceforth obtained recognition from
Graeco-Roman writers—albeit a grudging and covert recogni-
tion—as the Śecond Power in the world, the admitted rival of
Rome,” the only real counterpoise upon the earth to the power
which ruled from the Euphrates to the Atlantic Ocean.
While the general of King Orodes was thus successful
against the Romans in Mesopotamia, the king himself had in
Armenia obtained advantages of almost equal value, though
of a different kind. Instead of contending with Artavasdes,
he had come to terms with him, and had concluded a close
alliance, which he had sought to confirm and secure by unit-
ing his son, Pacorus, in marriage with a sister of the Arme-
nian monarch.” A series of festivities was being held to cele-
brate this auspicious event, when news came of Surenas's
triumph, and of the fate of Crassus. According to the barbar-
ous customs of the East, the head and hand of the slain pro-
consul accompanied the intelligence. We are told that at the
moment of the messenger's arrival the two sovereigns, with
their attendants, were amusing themselves with a dramatic
entertainment. Both monarchs had a good knowledge of the
Greek literature and language, in which Artavasdes had him-
self composed historical works and tragedies. The actors were
representing the famous scene in the “Bacchae” of Euripides,”
where Agavé and the Bacchanals come upon the stage with
the mutilated remains of the murdered Pentheus, when the
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cH. xi.] CRASSUSS HEAD CARRIED TO ORODES. 99
head of Crassus was thrown in among them. Instantly the
player who personated Agavé seized the bloody trophy, and
placing it on his thyrsus instead of the one he was carrying,
paraded it before the delighted spectators, while he chanted
the well-known lines:*
- - From the mountain to the hall
New-cut tendril, see, we bring—
Blessed prey !
The horrible spectacle was one well suited to please an Eastern
audience: it was followed by a proceeding of equal barbarity
and still more thoroughly Oriental.” The Parthians, in deris-
ion of the motive which was supposed to have led Crassus to
make his attack, had a quantity of gold melted and poured it
into his mouth.*
Meanwhile Surenas was amusing his victorious troops, and
seeking to annoy the disaffected Seleucians, by the perform-
ance of a farcical ceremony. He spread the report that Cras-
sus was not killed but captured; and, Selecting from among the
prisoners the Roman most like him in appearance, he dressed
the man in woman's clothes, mounted him upon a horse, and
requiring him to answer to the names of “Crassus” and “Im-
perator,” conducted him in triumph to the Grecian city. Be-
fore him went, mounted on camels, a band, arrayed as trum-
peters and lictors, the lictors' rods having purses suspended
to them, and the axes in their midst being crowned with the
bleeding heads of Romans. In the rear followed a train of
Seleucian music-girls, who sang songs derisive of the effemi-
nacy and cowardice of the proconsul. After this pretended
parade of his prisoner through the streets of the town, Surenas
called a meeting of the Seleucian Senate, and indignantly de-
nounced to them the indecency of the literature which he had
found in the Roman tents. The charge, it is said, was true;”
but the Seleucians were not greatly impressed by the moral
lesson read to them, when they remarked the train of concu-
bines that had accompanied Surenas himself in the field, and
thought of the loose crowd of dancers, singers, and prostitutes,
that was commonly to be seen in the rear of a Parthian army.
The political consequences of the great triumph which the
Parthians had achieved were less than might have been anti-
cipated. Mesopotamia was, of course, recovered to its extrem-
est limit, the Euphrates; Armenia was lost to the Roman
alliance, and thrown for the time into complete dependence
e ºf
* *
*
100 THE SIXTH MONARCHY, [CH. xi.
upon Parthia. The whole East was, to some extent, excited;
and the Jews, always impatient of a foreign yoke, and recently
aggrieved by the unprovoked spoiliation of their Temple by
Crassus, flew to arms.” But no general movement of the
Oriental races took place. It might have been expected that
the Syrians, Phoenicians, Cilicians, Cappadocians, Phrygians,
and other Asiatic peoples whose proclivities were altogether
Oriental, would have seized the opportunity of rising against
their Western lords and driving the Romans back upon
Europe. It might have been thought that Parthia at least
would have assumed the offensive in force, and have made a
determined effort to rid herself of neighbors who had proved
so troublesome. But though the conjuncture of circumstances
was most favorable, the man was wanting. Had Mithridates
or Tigranes been living, or had Surenas been king of Parthia,
instead of a mere general, advantage would probably have
been taken of the occasion, and Rome might have suffered
seriously. But Orodes seems to have been neither ambitious
as a prince nor skilful as a commander; he lacked at any rate
the keen and all-embracing glance which could sweep the
political horizon and, comprehending the exact character of the
situation, see at the same time how to make the most of it.
He allowed the opportunity to slip by without putting forth
his strength or making any considerable effort; and the occa-
sion once lost never returned.
In Parthia itself one immediate result of the expedition
seems to have been the ruin of Surenas. His services to his
sovereign had exceeded the measure which it is safe in the
East for a subject to render to the crown. The jealousy of his
royal master was aroused, and he had to pay the penalty of
over-much success with his life.” Parthia was thus left with-
out a general of approved merit, for Sillaces, the second in
command during the war with Crassus,” had in no way dis-
tinguished himself through the campaign. This condition of
things may account for the feebleness of the efforts made in
B.C. 52 to retaliate on the Romans the damage done by their
invasion. A few weak bands only passed the Euphrates, and
began the work of plunder and ravage, in which they were
speedily disturbed by Cassius, who easily drove them back
over the river.” The next year, however, a more determined
attempt was made. Orodes sent his son, Pacorus, the young
bridegroom, to win his spurs in Syria, at the head of a consid-
erable force, and supported by the experience and authority of
i; ſº. h
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*
ch. xi.] INVASION OF SYRIA AND CILICIA. 101
an officer of ripe age, named OSaces.” The army crossed the
Euphrates unresisted, for Cassius, the governor, had with him
only the broken remains of Crassus's army, consisting of about
two legions, and, deeming himself too weak to meet the enemy
in the open field, was content to defend the towns. The
open country was consequently overrun; and a thrill of
mingled alarm and excitement passed through all the Roman
provinces in Asia.” The provinces were at the time most in-
adequately supplied with Roman troops,” through the desire
of Caesar and Pompey to maintain large armies about their own
persons. The natives were for the most part disaffected and
inclined to hail the Parthians as brethren and deliverers.”
Excepting Deiotarus of Galatia, and Ariobarzanes of Cappa-
docia, Rome had, as Cicero (then proconsul of Cilicia) plain-
tively declared," not a friend on the Asiatic continent. And
Cappadocia was miserably weak," and open to attack on the
side of Armenia. Had Orodes and Artavasdes acted in con-
cert, and had the latter, while Orodes sent his armies into
Syria, poured the Armenian forces into Cappadocia and then
into Cilicia (as it was expected that he would do)," there would
have been the greatest danger to the Roman possessions, As
it was, the excitement in Asia Minor was extreme. Cicero
marched into Cappadocia with the bulk of the Roman troops,
and summoned to his aid Deiotarus with his Galatians,” at the
same time writing to the Roman Senate to implore reinforce-
ments.” Cassius shut himself up in Antioch,” and allowed
the Parthian cavalry to pass him by, and even to proceed be-
yond the bounds of Syria into Cilicia.” But the Parthians
seem scarcely to have understood the situation of their adver-
saries, or to have been aware of their own advantages. In-
stead of spreading themselves wide, raising the natives, and
leaving them to blockade the towns, while with their as yet
unconquered squandrons they defied the enemy in the open
country, we find them engaging in the siege and blockade of
cities, for which they were wholly unfit, and confining them-
selves almost entirely to the narrow valley of the Orontes.”
TJnder these circumstances we are not surprised to learn that
Cassius, having first beat them back from Antioch,” contrived
to lead them into an ambush on the banks of the river, and se-
verely handled their troops, even killing the general Osaces.”
The Parthians withdrew from the neighborhood of the Syrian
capital after this defeat, which must have taken place about
the end of September, and Soon afterwards went into winter
102 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. XII.
\
quarters in Cyrrhestica,” or the part of Syria immediately
east of Amanus. Here they remained during the winter
months under Pacorus, and it was expected that the war would
break out again with fresh fury in the Spring;” but Bibulus,
the new proconsul of Syria, conscious of his military deficien-
cies, contrived to sow dissensions among the Parthians them-
selves, and to turn the thoughts of Pacorus in another direc-
tion. He suggested to Ornodapantes, a Parthian noble, with
whom he had managed to open a correspondence, that Pacorus
would be a more worthy occupant of the Parthian throne than
his father, and that he would consult well for his own interests
if he were to proclaim the young prince, and lead the army of
Syria against Orodes.” These intrigues seem to have first
caused the war to languish, and then produced the recall of the
expedition. Orodes summoned Pacorus to return to Parthia
before the plot contrived between him and the Romans was
ripe for execution; and Pacorus felt that no course was open
to him but to obey.” The Parthian legions recrossed the Eu-
phrates in July, B.C. 50; and the First Roman War, which had
lasted a little more than four years, terminated without any
real recovery by the Romans of the laurels that they had lost
at Carrhae.
CHAPTER XII.
Relations of Orodes with Pompey, and with Brutus and
Cassius. Second War with Rome. Great Porthºom. Eac-
pedition digainst Syria, Palestine, and Asia Minor. De-
jeat of Saaca. Occupation of Antioch and Jerusalem.
Parthians driven out of Syria by Ventidius. Death of
Pacorus. Death of Orodes.
* Jam bis Monaeses et Pacori manus
Non auspicatos contudit impetus
Nostros. et adjecisse praedam
Torquibus exiguis renidet.”—Hor. Od. iii. 6, 10-18.
THE civil troubles that had seemed to threaten Parthia from
the ambition of the youthful Pacorus passed away without
any explosion. The son showed his obedience by returning
home submissively when he might have flown to arms; and
the father accepted the act of obedience as a sufficient indica-
ch. xII.] I’ELATIONS OF ORODES WITH POMPEY. 103
tion that no rebellion had been seriously meant. We find
Pacorus not only allowed to live, but again entrusted a few
years later with high office by the Parthian monarch; and on
this occasion we find him showing no signs of disaffection or
discontent.
Nine years, however, elapsed between the recall of the
young prince and his reappointment to the Supreme com-
mand against the Romans. Of the internal condition of
Parthia during this interval we have no account. Appar-
ently, Orodes ruled quietly and peaceably, contenting him-
self with the glory which he had gained, and not anxious to
tempt fortune by engaging in any fresh enterprise. It was
no doubt a satisfaction to him to see the arms of the Romans,
instead of being directed upon Asia, employed in intestine
strife; and we can well understand that he might even deem
it for his interest to foment and encourage the quarrels which,
at any rate for the time, secured his own empire from attack.
It appears that communications took place in the year B.C. 49
or 48 between him and Pompey, a request for alliance being
made by the latter, and an answer being sent by Orodes, con-
taining the terms upon which he would consent to give Pom-
pey effective aid in the war.” If the Roman leader would
deliver into his hands the province of Syria and make it wholly
over to the Parthians, Orodes would conclude an alliance with
him and send help; but not otherwise. It is to the credit of
Pompey that he rejected these terms, and declined to secure
his own private gain by depriving his country of a province.
Notwithstanding the failure of these negotiations and the im-
prisonment of his envoy Hirrus,” when a few months later,
having lost the battle of Pharsalia, the unhappy Roman was
in need of a refuge from his great enemy, he is said to have
proposed throwing himself on the friendship, or mercy, of
Orodes." He had hopes, perhaps, of enlisting the Parthian
battalions in his cause, and of recovering power by means of
this foreign aid. But his friends combated his design, and
persuaded him that the risk, both to himself and to his wife,
Cornelia, was too great to be compatible with prudence.
Pompey yielded to their representations; and Orodes escaped
the difficulty of having to elect between repulsing a suppliant,
'and provoking the hostility of the most powerful chieftain and
the greatest general of the age.
Caesar quitted the East in B. C. 47 without entering into any
communication with Orodes. He had plenty of work upon
104 TIIE SIXTHI MONARCIIY. [CH. XII.
his hands; and whatever designs he may have even then
entertained of punishing the Parthian inroad into Syria, or
avenging the defeat of Carrhae," he was wise enough to
keep his projects to himself and to leave Asia without ex-
asperating by threats or hostile movements the Power on
which the peace of the East principally depended. It was not
until he had brought the African and Spanish wars to an end
that he allowed his intention of leading an expedition against
Parthia to be openly talked about. In B.C. 34, four years
after Pharsalia, having put down all his domestic enemies,
and arranged matters, as he thought, satisfactorily at Rome,
he let a decree be passed formally assigning to him “the Par-
thian War,” and sent the legions across the Adriatic on their
way to Asia. What plan of campaign he may have contem-
plated is uncertain;" but there cannot be a doubt that an ex-
pedition under his auspices would have been a most serious
danger to Parthia, and might have terminated in her sub-
jection. The military talents of the Great Dictator were of
the most splendid description; his powers of organization and
consolidation enormous; his prudence and caution equal to
his ambition and his courage. Once launched on a career of
conquest in the East, it is impossible to say whither he might
not have carried the Roman eagles, or what countries he might
not have added to the Empire. But Parthia was saved from
the imminent peril without any effort of her own. The daggers,
of “the Liberators” struck down on the 15th of March, B.C. 44,
the only man whom she had seriously to fear; and with the
removal of Julius passed away even from Roman thought for
many a year" the design which he had entertained, and which
he alone could have accomplished.
In the civil war that followed on the murder of Julius the
Parthians are declared to have actually taken a part. It ap-
pears that—about B.C. 46—a small body of Parthian horse-
archers had been sent to the assistance of a certain Bassus,” a
Roman who amid the troubles of the times was seeking to
obtain for himself something like an independent principality
in Syria. The soldiers of Bassus, after a while (B.C. 43), went
over in a body to Cassius, who was in the East collecting
troops for his great struggle with Antony and Octavian; and
thus a handful of Parthians came into his power.” Of this
circumstance he determined to take advantage, in order to
obtain, if possible, a considerable body of troops from Orodes.
He presented each of the Parthian soldiers with a sum of
| -
cH. xII.] SECOND PARTIIIAN ATTACK ON ROME. 105
money, and dismissed them all to their homes, at the same
time seizing the opportunity to Send Some of his own officers,
as ambassadors, to Orodes, with a request for substantial aid.”
On receiving this application the Parthian monarch appears to
have come to the conclusion that it was to his interest to
comply with it. Whether he made conditions, or no, is un-
certain; but he seems to have sent a pretty numerous body
of horse to the support of the “Liberators” against their an-
tagonists.” Perhaps he trusted to obtain from the gratitude
of Cassius what he had failed to extort from the fears of
Pompey. Or, perhaps, he was only anxious to prolong the
period of civil disturbance in the Roman State, which secured
his own territory from attack, and might ultimately give him
an opportunity of helping himself to some portion of the
Roman dominions in Asia. -
The opportunity seemed to him to have arrived in B.C. 40.
Philippi had been fought and lost. The “Liberators” were
crushed. The struggle between the Republicans and the Mon-
archists had come to an end. But, instead of being united,
the Roman world was more than ever divided; and the chance
of making an actual territorial gain at the expense of the
tryant power appeared fairer than it had ever been before.
Three rivals now held divided sway in the Roman State;” each
of them jealous of the other two, and anxious for his own ag-
grandizement. The two chief pretenders to the first place
were bitterly hostile; and while the one was detained in Italy
by insurrection against his authority, the other was plunged
in luxury and dissipation, enjoying the first delights of a
lawless passion, at the Egyptian capital. The nations of the
East were, moreover, alienated by the recent exactions of the
profligate Triumvir,” who, to reward his parasites and favor-
ites, had laid upon them a burden that they were scarcely
able to bear. Further, the Parthians enjoyed at this time the
advantage of having a Roman officer of good position in their
service,” whose knowledge of the Roman tactics, and influence
in Roman provinces, might be expected to turn to their ad-
vantage. Under these circumstances, when the spring of the
year arrived, Antony being still in Egypt, and Octavian (as
far as was known) Occupied in the siege of Perusia,” the
Parthian hordes, under Labienus and Pacorus, burst upon
Syria in greater force than on any previous occasion. Over-
running with their numerous cavalry the country between
the Euphrates and Antioch, and thence the valley of the
106 THE SIXTH MOWARCHY [CH. XII.
Orontes, they had (as usual) some difficulty with the towns.
From Apamaca, placed (like Durham) on a rocky peninsula
almost surrounded by the river,” they were at first repulsed;”
but, having shortly afterwards defeated Decidius Saxa, the
governor of Syria, in the open field, they received the sub-
mission of Apamaea and Antioch, which latter city Saxa aban-
doned at their approach, flying precipitately into Cilicia.”
Encouraged by these successes, Labienus and Pacorus agreed
to divide their troops, and to engage simultaneously in two
great expeditions. Pacorus undertook to carry the Parthian
standard throughout the entire extent of Syria, Phoenicia, and
Palestine, while Labienus determined to invade Asia Minor,
and to see if he could not wrest some of its more fertile regions
from the Romans. Both expeditions were crowned with suc-
cess. Pacorus reduced all Syria, and all Phoenicia, except the
single city of Tyre, which he was unable to capture for want
of a naval force.” He then advanced into Palestine, which he
found in its normal condition of intestine commotion.” Hyr-
canus and Antigonus, two princes of the Asmonaean house,
were rivals for the Jewish crown; and the latter, whom Hyr-
canus had expelled, was content to make common cause with
the invader, and to be indebted to a rude foreigner for the
possession of the kingdom whereto he aspired. He offered
Pacorus a thousand talents, and five hundred Jewish women,
if he would espouse his cause and seat him upon his uncle's
throne.” The offer was readily embraced, and by the irresti-
ble help of the Parthians a revolution was effected at Jerusa-
lem. Hyrcanus was deposed and mutilated. A new priest-
King was set up in the person of Antigonus, the last Asmo-
naean prince, who held the capital for three years—B.C. 40–37
—as a Parthian satrap, the creature and dependant of the
great monarchy on the further side of the Euphrates. Mean-
while in Asia Minor Labienus carried all before him. Deci-
dius Saxa, having once more (in Cilicia) ventured upon a
battle, was not only defeated, but slain.” Pamphylia, Lycia,
and Caria were overrun. Stratonicea was besieged; Mylasa
and Alabanda were taken.” According to some writers the
Parthians even pillaged Lydia and Ionia, and were in possess-
ion of Asia to the shores of the Hellespont.” It may be said
that for a full year Western Asia changed masters; the rule
and authority of Rome disappeared; and the Parthians were
recognized as the dominant power.
But the fortune of war now began to turn. In the autumn
CH. XII.] VICTORIES OF VENTIDIUS. 107
of B.C. 39 Antony, having set out from Italy to resume his
command in the East, despatched his lieutenant, Publius
Ventidius, into Asia, with orders to act against Labienus and
the triumphant Parthians.” Ventidius landed unexpectedly
on the coast of Asia Minor, and So alarmed Labienus, who had
no Parthian troops with him, that the latter fell back hur-
riedly towards Cilicia, evacuating all the more western pro-
vinces, and at the same time sending urgent messages to
Pacorus to implore succor. Pacorus sent a body of horse to his
aid; but these troops, instead of putting themselves under his
command, acted independently, and, in a rash attempt to Sur
prise the Roman camp, were defeated by Ventidius, whereupon
they fled hastily into Cilicia, leaving Labienus to his fate.”
The self-styled “Imperator,” ” upon this, deserted his men,
and sought safety in flight; but his retreat was soon discov-
ered, and he was pursued, captured, and put to death.”
The Parthians, meanwhile, alarmed at the turn which affairs
had taken, left Antigonus to maintain their interests in Pales-
tine, and concentrated themselves in Northern Syria and
Commagéné, where they awaited the advance of the Romans.
A strong detachment, under Pharnapates, was appointed to
guard the Syrian Gates, or narrow pass over Mount Amanus,
leading from Cilicia into Syria.” Here Ventidius gained ano-
ther victory. He had sent forward an officer named Pompae-
dius Silo with some cavalry to endeavor to seize this post, and
Pompaedius had found himself compelled to an engagement
with Pharmapates, in which he was on the point of suffering
defeat, when Ventidius himself, who had probably feared for
his subordinate's safety, appeared on the scene, and turned the
scale in favor of the Romans. The detachment under Pharna-
pates was overpowered, and Pharmapates himself was among
the slain.” When news of this defeat reached Pacorus, he re-
solved to retreat, and withdrew his troops across the
Euphrates. This movement he appears to have executed with-
out being molested by Ventidius, who thus recovered Syria to
the Romans towards the close of B.C. 39, or early in B.C. 38.
But Pacorus was far from intending to relinquish the con-
test. He had made himself popular among the Syrians by his
mild and just administration,” and knew that they preferred
his government to that of the Romans. He had many allies
among the petty princes and dynasts,” who occupied a semi-
independent position on the borders of the Parthian and Roman
empires. Antigonus, whom he had established as king of the
108 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. xII.
Jews, still maintained himself in Judaea against the efforts of
Herod,” to whom Augustus and Antony had assigned the throne.
Pacorus therefore arranged during the remainder of the win-
terfor a fresh invasion of Syria in the spring, and, taking the
field earlier than his adversary expected, made ready to recross
the Euphrates. We are told that if he had crossed at the usual
point, he would have found the Romans unprepared, the
legions being still in their winter quarters, some north and
some south of the range of Taurus.” Ventidius, however,
contrived by a stratagem to induce him to effect the passage at
a different point, considerably lower down the stream, and in
this way to waste some valuable time, which he himself em-
ployed in collecting his scattered forces. Thus, when the Par-
thians appeared on the right bank of the Euphrates, the Roman
general was prepared to engage them, and was not even loath
to decide the fate of the war by a single battle. He had taken
care to provide himself with a strong force of slingers, and had
entrenched himself in a position on high ground at some dis-
tance from the river.” The Parthians, finding their passage of
the Euphrates unopposed, and, when they fell in with the
enemy, seeing him entrenched, as though resolved to act only
on the defensive, became overbold; they thought the force op-
posed to them must be weak or cowardly, and might yield its
position without a blow, if briskly attacked. Accordingly, as
on a former occasion,” they charged up the hill on which the
Roman camp was placed, hoping to take it by sheer audacity.
But the troops inside were held ready, and at the proper mo-
ment issued forth; the assailants found themselves in their
turn assailed, and, fighting at a disadvantage on the slope, were
soon driven down the declivity. The battle was renewed in
plain below, where the mailed horse of the Parthians made a
brave resistance; but the slingers galled them severely, and
in the midst of the struggle it happened that by ill-fortune
Pacorus was slain. The result followed which is almost in-
variable with an Oriental army: having lost their leader, the
soldiers everywhere gave way; flight became universal, and the
Romans gained a complete victory.” The Parthian army fled
in two directions. Part made for the bridge of boats by which
it had crossed the Euphrates, but was intercepted by the
Romans and destroyed. Part turned northwards into Com-
magéné, and there took refuge with the king, Antiochus, who
refused to surrender them to the demand of Ventidius, and no
doubt allowed them to return to their own country.
cH. xIL] ROMANS AND PARTHIANS COMPARED. 109
Thus ended the great Parthian invasion of Syria, and with it
ended the prospect of any further spread of the Arsacid do-
minion towards the west. When the two great powers, Rome
and Parthia, first came into collision—when the first blow
struck by the latter, the destruction of the army of Crassus,
was followed up by the advance of their clouds of horse into
Syria, Palestine, and Asia Minor—when Apamaea, Antioch,
and Jerusalem fell into their hands, when Decidius Saxa was.
defeated and slain, Cilicia, Pamphylia, Caria, Lydia, and Ionia
occupied—it seemed as if Rome had found, not so much an
equal as a superior; it looked as if the power heretofore pre-
dominant would be compelled to contract her frontier, and as
if Parthia would advance hers to the Egean or the Mediterra-
nean. The history of the contest between the East and the
West, between Asia and Europe, is a history of reactions. At
one time one of the continents, at another time the other, is in
the ascendant. The time appeared to have come when the
Asiatics were once more to recover their own, and to beat back
the European aggressor to his proper shores and islands. The
triumphs achieved by the Seljukian Turks between the
eleventh and the fifteenth centuries would in that case have
been anticipated by above a thousand years through the efforts
of a kindred, and not dissimilar people.” But it turned out .
that the effort made was premature. While the Parthian war-
fare was admirably adapted for the national defence on the
broad plains of inner Asia, it was ill suited for conquest, and,
comparatively speaking, ineffective in more contracted and
difficult regions. The Parthian military system had not the
elasticity of the Roman—it did not in the same way adapt it-
self to circumstances, or admit of the addition of new arms, or
the indefinite expansion of an old one. However loose and
seemingly flexible, it was rigid in its uniformity; it never al-
tered; it remained under the thirtieth Arsaces such as it had
been under the first, improved in details, perhaps, but essen-
tially the same system. The Romans, on the contrary, were
ever modifying their system, ever learning new combinations
or new manoeuvres or new modes of warfare from their enemies.
They met the Parthian tactics of loose array, continuous dis-
tant missiles, and almost exclusive employment of cavalry, with
an increase in the number of their own horse, a larger employ-
ment of auxiliary irregulars, and a greater use of the sling.” At
the same time they learnt to takefull advantage of the Parthian
inefficiency against walls, and to practice against them the
arts of pretended retreat and ambush. The result was, that
110 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. * [CH. xII.
Parthia found she could make no impression upon the domin-
ions of Rome, and, having become persuaded of this by the
experience of a decade of years, thenceforth laid aside for ever
the idea of attempting Western conquests. She took up, in
fact, from this time, a new attitude, Hitherto she had been
consistently aggressive. She had labored constantly to extend
herself at the expense successively of the Bactrians, the Scy-
thians, the Syro-Macedonians, and the Armenians. She had
proceeded from one aggression to another, leaving only short
intervals between her wars, and had always been looking out
for some fresh enemy. Henceforth she became, comparatively
speaking, pacific. She was content for the most part, to main-
tain her limits. She sought no new foe. Her contest with
Rome degenerated into a struggle for influence over the king-
dom of Armenia; and her hopes were limited to the reduction
of that kingdom into a subject position.
The death of Pacorus is said to have caused Orodes intense
grief.” For many days he would neither eat nor speak; then
his sorrow took another turn. He imagined that his son had
returned; he thought continually that he heard or saw him;
he could do nothing but repeat his name. Every now and then,
however, he awoke to a sense of the actual fact, and mourned
the death of his favorite with tears. After a while this ex-
treme grief wore itself out, and the aged king began to direct
his attention once more to public affairs. He grew anxious
about the succession.” Of the thirty sons who still remained
to him there was not one who had made himself a name, or was
in any way distinguished above the remainder. In the absence
of any personal ground of preference, Orodes—who seems to
have regarded himself as possessing a right to nominate the son
who should succeed him—thought the claims of primogeniture
deserved to be considered, and selected as his successor, Phraa-
tes, the eldest of the thirty.” Not content with nominating
him, or perhaps doubtful whether the nomination would be ac-
cepted by the Megistanes, he proceeded further to abdicate in
his favor, whereupon Phraates became king. The transaction
proved a most unhappy one. Phraates, jealous of some of his
brothers, who were the sons of a princess married to Orodes,”
whereas his own mother was only a concubine, removed them
by assassination, and when the ex-monarch ventured to express
disapproval of the act added the crime of parricide to fratri-
cide by putting to death his aged father.” Thus perished
Orodes, after a reign of eighteen years—the most memorable
in the Parthian annals. .
t
CH. XIII.] REIGN OF PIIRAATES IV. 111
CHAPTER XIII.
Reign of Phraates IV. His cruelties. Flight of Monoeses to
Antony. Antony's great Parthian. Eacpedition, or Invasion
of Media Atropatémé. Its Complete Failure. Subsequent
Alliance of the Median King with Antony. War between
Parthia and Media. Rebellion raised against Phraates by
Tiridates. Phraates eacpelled. He recovers his Throne
with the help of the Scythians. His dealings with Augus-
tus. His death, and Character.
“Redditum Cyri solio Phraatem
Dissidens plebi numero beatorum
Fximit Virtus.”—Hor. Od. ii. 2, 16–18.
THE shedding of blood is like “the letting out of water.”
When it once begins, none can say where it will stop. The ab-
solute monarch who, for his own fancied security, commences
a system of executions, is led on step by step to wholesale atro-
cities from which he would have shrunk with horror at the
outset. Phraates had removed brothers whose superior advan-
tages of birth made them formidable rivals. He had punished
with death a father who ventured to blame his act, and to for-
get that by abdication he had sunk himself to the position of a
subject. Could he have stopped here, it might have seemed
that his severities proceeded not so much from cruelty of dis-
position as from political necessity; and historians, always
tender in the judgments which they pass on kings under such
circumstances, would probably have condoned or justified his
conduct. But the taste for bloodshed grows with the indul-
gence of it. In a short time the young king had killed all his
remaining brothers,” although their birth was no better than
his own, and there was no valid ground for his fearing them;
and soon afterwards, not content with the murder of his cyn
relations, he began to vent his fury upon the Parthian nobles.
Many of these suffered death;” and such a panic seized the
order that numbers quitted the country, and dispersed in dif-
ferent directions, content to remain in exile until the danger
which threatened them should have passed by. There were
others, however, who were not so patient. A body of chiefs
had fled to Antony, among whom was a certain Monaeses, a
112 TIIE SIXTII MONAIROH Y. [CH. XIII.
nobleman of the highest rank,” who seems to have distinguished
himself previously in the Syrian wars." This person repre-
sented to Antony that Phraates had by his tyrannical and
bloody conduct made himself hateful to his subjects, and that
a revolution could easily be effected. If the Romans would
support him, he offered to invade Parthia; and he made no
doubt of wresting the greater portion of it from the hands of
the tyrant, and of being himself accepted as king. In that case
he would consent to hold his crown of the Romans, who might
depend upon his fidelity and gratitude. Antony is said to
have listened to these overtures, and to have been induced by
them to turn his thoughts to an invasion of the Parthian king.
dom.” He began to collect troops and to obtain allies with this
object. He entered into negotiations with Artavasdes, the Ar-
menian king," who seems at this time to have been more afraid
of Rome than of Parthia, and engaged him to take a part in his
projected campaign. He spoke of employing Monaeses in a
separate expedition. Under these circumstances Phraates be-
came alarmed. He sent a message to Monaeses with promises
of pardon and favor, which that chief thought worthy of ac-
ceptance. Hereupon Monaeses represented to Antony that by
a peaceful return he might perhaps do him as much service as
by having recourse to arms; and though Antony was not per-
Suaded, he thought it prudent to profess himself well satisfied,
and to allow Monaeses to quit him. His relations with Parthia,
he said, might perhaps be placed on a proper footing without a
war, and he was quite willing to try negotiation. His ambas-
sadors should accompany Monaeses. They would be instructed
to demand nothing of Phraates but the restoration of the
Roman standards taken from Crassus, and the liberation of
such of the captive soldiers as were still living."
But Antony had really determined on war. It may be
doubted whether it had required the overtures of Monaeses to
put a Parthian expedition into his thoughts. He must have
been either more or less than a man if the successes of his
lieutenants had not stirred in his mindsome feeling of jealousy,
and some desire to throw their victories into the shade by a
grand and noble achievement. Especially the glory of Venti-
dius, who had been allowed the much-coveted honor of a
triumph at Rome on account of his defeats of the Parthians in
Cilicia and Syria," must have moved him to emulation, and
have caused him to cast about for some means of exalting his
own military reputation above that of his subordinates. For
\
cII. xIII | PARTIII.1N EXPEDITION OF ANTONY. 113
this purpose nothing, he must have known, would be so ef-
fectual as a real Parthian success, the inflicting on this hated
and dreaded foe of an unmistakable humiliation, the dictating
to them terms of peace on their own soil after some crushing
and overwhelming disaster. And, after the victories of Venti-
dius, this did not appear to be so very difficult. The prestige
of the Parthian name was gone. Roman soldiers could be
trusted to meet them without alarm, and to contend with them
without undue excitement or flurry. The weakness, as well
as the strength, of their military system had come to be
known; and expedients had been devised by which its strong
points were met and counterbalanced.” At the head of six-
teen legions,” Antony might well think that he could invade
Parthia successfully, and not only avoid the fate of Crassus,
but gather laurels which might serve him in good stead in his
contest with his great political rival.
Nor can the Roman general be taxed with undue precipita-
tion or with attacking in insufficient force. He had begun, as
already noticed, with securing the co-operation of the Arme-
nian king, Artavasdes, who promised him a contingent of
7000 foot and 6000 horse. His Roman infantry is estimated
at 60,000; besides which he had 10,000 Gallic and Iberian horse,
and 30,000 light armed and cavalry of the Asiatic allies.” His
own army thus amounted to 100,000 men; and, with the
Armenian contingent, his Cntire force would have been 113,000.
It seems that it was his original intention to cross the
Euphrates into Mesopotamia, and thus to advance almost in
the footsteps of Crassus:” but when he reached the banks of
the river (about midsummer B.C. 37) he found such prepara-
tions made to resist him that he abandoned his first design,
and, turning northwards, entered Armenia, determined to
take advantage of his alliance with Artavasdes, and to attack
Parthia with Armenia as the basis of his operations. Arta-
vasdes gladly received him, and persuaded him, instead of
penetrating into Parthia itself, to direct his arms against the
territory of a Parthian subject-ally,” the king of Media Atro-
paténé, whose territories adjoined Armenia on the southeast.
Artavasdes pointed out that the Median monarch was absent
from his own country, having joined his troops to those which
Phraates had collected for the defence of Parthia. His terri-
tory therefore would be open to ravage, and even Praaspa, his
capital, might prove an easy prey. The prospect excited An-
tony, who at once divided his troops, and having given orders
Af
114 - THE SIXTH HONARCHY ſch. xm,
to Oppius Statianus to follow him leisurely with the more un-
wieldy part of the army, the baggage-train, and the siege
batteries, proceeded himself by forced marches to Praaspa
with all the calvary and the infantry of the better class.”
This town was situated at the distance of nearly three hun-
dred miles from the Armenian frontier;” but the way to it
lay through well-cultivated plains, where food and water
were abundant. Antony performed the march without diffi-
culty and at once invested the place. The walls were
strong, and the defenders numerous, so that he made little
impression; and when the Median king returned, accom-
panied by his Parthian suzerain, to the defence of his coun-
try, the capital seemed in so little danger that it was re-
solved to direct the first attack on Statianus, who had not yet
joined his chief. A most successful Onslaught was made on
this officer, who was surprised, defeated, and slain.” Ten
thousand Romans fell in the battle,” and all the baggage-
wagons and engines of war were taken. A still worse result
of the defeat was the desertion of Artavasdes, who, regarding
the case of the Romans as desperate, drew off his troops, and
left Antony to his own resources.”
The Roman general now found himself in great difficulties.
He had exhausted the immediate neighborhood of Praaspa,
and was obliged to send his foraging-parties on distant expedi-
tions, where, being beyond the reach of his protection, they
were attacked and cut to pieces by the enemy.” He had lost
his siege-train, and found it impossible to construct another.
Such works as he attempted suffered through the sallies of the
besieged; and in some of these his soldiers behaved so ill that
he was forced to punish their cowardice by decimation.” His
supplies failed, and he had to feed his troops on barley instead
of wheat. Meantime the autumnal equinox was approaching,
and the weather was becoming cold. The Medes and Par-
thians, under their respective monarchs, hung about him, im-
peded his movements, and cut off his stragglers, but carefully
avoided engaging him in a pitched battle. If he could have
forced the city to a surrender, he would have been in compara-
tive safety, for he might have gone into winter quarters there
and have renewed the war in the ensuing spring. But all his
assaults, with whatever desperation they were made, failed;
and it became necessary to relinquish the siege and retire into
Armenia before the rigors of winter should set in. He could,
however, with difficulty bring himself to make a confession of
—s— – -
CH. XIII.] ANTONY IS FORCED TO RETIRE., x - 115,
failure, and flattered himself for a while that the Parthians
would consent to purchase his retirement by the surrender of
the Crassian Captives and standards. Having lost some valu-
able time in negotiations, at which the Parthians laughed,” at
length, when the equinox was passed, he broke up from before
Praaspa, and commenced the work of retreat. There were
two roads” by which he might reach the Araxes at the usual
point of passage, One lay towards the left, through a plain
and open country,” probably that through which he had
come; the other, which was shorter, but more difficult, lay to
the right, leading across a mountain-tract, but one fairly sup-
plied with water, and in which there were inhabited villages.
Antony was advised that the Parthians had occupied the easier
route,” expecting that he would follow it, and intended to
overwhelm him with their cavalry in the plains. He there-
fore took the road to the right through a rugged and inclement
country—probably that between Tahkt-i-Suleiman and Tabriz”
—and, guided by a Mardian who knew the region well, pro-
ceeded to make his way back to the Araxes. His decision
took the Parthians by surprise, and for two days he was un-
molested. But by the third day they had thrown themselves
across his path; and thenceforward, for nineteen consecutive
days, they disputed with Antony every inch of his retreat,
and inflicted on him the most serious damage. The sufferings
of the Roman army during this time, says a modern historian
of Rome,” were unparalleled in their military annals. The
intense cold, the blinding snow and driving sleet, the want
Sometimes of provisions, sometimes of water, the use of poison-
ous herbs, and the harassing attacks of the enemy's cavalry
and bowmen, which could only be repelled by maintaining the
dense array of the phalanx or the tortoise, reduced the retreat-
ing army by one-third of its numbers. At length, after a
march of 300 Roman, or 277 British, miles, they reached the
river Araxes, probably at the Julfa ferry, and, crossing it,
found themselves in Armenia. But the calamities of the
return were not yet ended. Though it was arranged with
Artavasdes that the bulk of the army should winter in
Armenia,” yet, before the various detachments could reach
their quarters in different parts of the country, eight thousand
more had perished through the effects of past sufferings or the
severity of the weather.” Altogether, out of the hundred
thousand men whom Antony led into Media Atropaténé, less
than seventy thousand” remained to commence the campaign
\
$
116 THE SIXTH MONARCIIy.
4 \
*= g
[CH, XIII.
which was threatened for the ensuing year. Well may the
unfortunate commander have exclaimed as he compared his
own heavy losses with the light ones of Xenophon and his
Greeks in these same regions, “Oh, those Ten Thousand!
those Ten Thousand ſ” ” ... -
On the withdrawal of Antony into Armenia a quarrel broke
out between Phraates and his Median vassal. The latter re-
garded himself as wronged in the division made of the Roman
spoils,” and expressed himself with so much freedom on the
subject as to offend his suzerain. He then-began to fear that
he had gone too far, and that Phraates would punish him by
depriving him of his sovereignty. Accordingly, he was anxious
to obtain a powerful alliance, and on turning over in his mind
all feasible political combinations it seems to have occurred to
him that his late enemy, Antony, might be disposed to take
him under his protection. He doubtless knew that Artavasdes
of Armenia had offended the Roman leader by deserting him
in the hour of his greatest peril, and felt that, if Antony was
intending to revenge himself on the traitor, he would be glad
to have a friend on the Armenian border. He therefore sent
an ambassador of rank” to Alexandria, where Antony was
passing the winter, and boldly proposed the alliance. Antony
readily accepted it; he was intensely angered by the conduct
of the Armenian monarch, and determined on punishing his
defection; he viewed the Median alliance as of the utmost im-
portance in connection with the design, which he still enter-
tained, of invading Parthia itself;” and he saw in the powerful
descendant of Atropates a prince whom it would be well worth
his while to bind to his cause indissolubly. He therefore em-
braced the overtures made to him with joy, and even rewarded
the messenger who had brought them with a principality.”
After sundry efforts to entice Artavasdes into his power, which
occupied him during most of B.C. 35, in the spring of B.C. 34 he
suddenly appeared in Armenia. His army, which had re-
|
mained there from the previous campaign, held all the more
important positions, and, as he professed the most friendly
feelings towards Artavasdes, even proposing an alliance be-
tween their families,” that prince, after some hesitation, at
length ventured into his presence. He was immediately seized
and put in chains.” Armenia was rapidly overrun. Artaxias,
whom the Armenians made king in the room of his father,
was defeated and forced to take refuge with the Parthians.
Antony then arranged a marriage between the daughter of the
^
* { 1
CH. XIII.] - ANTONY PUNISHES ARMENIA. , , 117
Median monarch” and his own son by Cleopatra, Alexander,
and, leaving garrisons in Armenia, carried off Artavasdes and
a rich booty into Egypt. &
Phraates, during these transactions, stood wholly upon the
defensive. It may not have been unpleasing to him to see
Artavasdes punished. It must have gratified him to observe
how Antony was injuring his own cause by exasperating the ,
Armenians, and teaching them to hate Rome even more than
they hated Parthia.” But while Antony's troops held both
Syria and Armenia, and the alliance between Media Atropaténé
and Rome continued, he could not venture to take any ag-
gressive step or do aught but protect his own frontier. He
was obliged even to look on with patience, when, early in B.C.
33, Antony appeared once more in these parts,” and advanc-
ing to the Araxes, had a conference with the Median monarch,
whereat their alliance was confirmed, troops exchanged, part
of Armenia made over to the Median king, and Jotapa, his
daughter, given as a bride to the young Alexander, whom
Antony designed to make satrap of the East.” But no sooner
had Antony withdrawn into Asia Minor in preparation for his
contest with Octavian than Phraates took the Offensive. In
combination with Artaxias, the new Armenian king, he at-
tacked Antony's ally; but the latter repulsed him by the help
of his Roman troops. Soon afterwards, however, Antony re-
called these troops without restoring to the Median king his
own contingent; upon which the two confederates renewed
their attack, and were successful. The Median prince was de-
feated and taken prisoner.” Artaxias recovered Armenia and
massacred all the Roman garrisons which he found in it.”
Both countries became once more wholly independent of
Rome, and it is probable that Media returned to its old al-
legiance. -
But the successes of Phraates abroad produced ill conse-
quences at home. Elated by his victories, and regarding his
position in Parthia as thereby secured, he resumed the series
of cruelties towards his subjects which the Roman war had in-
terrupted, and pushed them so far that an insurrection broke
out against his authority (B.C. 33), and he was compelled to
quit the country.” The revolt was headed by a certain Tiri-
dates, who, upon its success, was made king by the insurgents.
f’hraates fled into Scythia, and persuaded the Scythians to em-
brace his cause. These nomads, nothing loth, took up arms,
and without any great difficulty restored Phraates to the
*.
f
118 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. A [CH. XIII.
throne from which his people had expelled him. Tiridates
fled at their approach, and, having contrived to carry off in
his flight the youngest son of Phraates, presented himself be-
fore Octavian, who was in Syria at the time on his return
from Egypt (B.C. 30), “surrendered the young prince into his
hands, and requested his aid against the tyrant.” Octavian
accepted the valuable hostage, but with his usual caution, de-
clined to pledge himself to furnish any help to the pretender;
he might remain, he said, in Syria, if he so wished, and while
he continued under Roman protection, a suitable provision
should be made for his support, but, he must not expect armed
resistance against the Parthian monarch. To that monarch,
when some years afterwards (B.C. 23) he demanded the sur-
render of his subject and the restoration of his young son,
Octavian answered” that he could not give Tiridates up to
him, but he would restore him his son without a ransom. He
should expect, however, that in return for this kindness the
Parthian king would on his part deliver to the Romans the
standards taken from Crassus and Antony, together with all
who survived of the Roman captives. It does not appear that
Phraates was much moved by the Emperor's generosity. He
gladly received his son; but he took no steps towards the resto-
ration of those proofs of Parthian victory which the Romans
were so anxious to recover. It was not until B.C. 20, when
Octavian (now become Augustus) visited the East, and war
seemed the probable alternative if he continued obstinate, that
the Parthian monarch brought himself to relinquish the tro-
phies which were as much prized by the victors as the van-
quished.” In extenuation of his act we must remember that
he was unpopular with his subjects, and that Augustus could
at any moment have produced a pretender, who had once oc-
cupied, and with Roman help might easily have mounted for
a second time, the throne of the Arsacidae. *.
The remaining years of Phraates—and he reigned for nearly
twenty years after restoring the standards—are almost un-
broken by any event of importance. The result of the twenty
years' struggle between Rome and Parthia had been to impress
either nation with a wholesome dread of the other. Both had
triumphed on their own ground; both had failed when they
ventured on sending expeditions into the enemy's territory.
Each now stood on its guard, watching the movements of its
adversary across the Euphrates. Both had become pacific.
It is a well-known fact that Augustus left it as a principle of
– ,— – = - - *
* ... * - *
ch. xIII.] PHRAATES SINDS HIS SONS TO I:OME. " '119
f w
policy to his successors that the Roman Empire had reached
its proper limits, and could not with advantage be extended
further.” This principle, followed with the utmost strictness
by Tiberius, was accepted as a rule by all the earlier Caesars,
and only regarded as admitting of rare and slight exceptions.
Trajan was the first who, a hundred and thirty years after
the accession of Augustus, made light of it and set it at de-
fiance. With him re-awoke the spirit of conquest, the aspira-
tion after universal dominion. But in the meantime there
was peace—peace indeed not absolutely unbroken, for border
wars occurred, and Rome was tempted sometimes to interfere
by arms in the internal quarrels of her neighbor”—but a gen-
eral state of peace and amity prevailed—neither state made
any grand attack on the other's dominions—no change occurred
in the frontier, no great battle tested the relative strength of
the two peoples. Such rivalry as remained was exhibited less
in arms than in diplomacy and showed itself mainly in en-
deavors on either side to obtain a predominant influence in
Armenia. There alone during the century and a half that in-
tervened between Antony and Trajan did the interests of Rome
and Parthia come into collision, and in connection with this
kingdom alone did any struggle between the two countries
continue.
Phraates, after yielding to Augustus in the matter of the
standards and prisoners, appears for many years to have
studiously cultivated his good graces. In the interval between
B.C. 11 and B.C. 7," distrustful of his subjects, and fearful of
their removing him in order to place one of his sons upon the
Parthian throne, he resolved to send these possible rivals out
of the country; and on this occasion he paid Augustus the
compliment of selecting Rome for his children's residence.”
The youths were four in number, Vonones, Seraspadanes,
Rhodaspes, and Phraates;” two of them were married and
had children; they resided at Rome during the remainder of
their father's lifetime, and were treated as became their rank,
being supported at the public charge and in a magnificent
manner.” The Roman writers speak of these as “hostages”
given by Phraates to the Roman Emperor;” but this was
certainly not the intention of the Parthian monarch; nor
could the idea well be entertained by the Romans at the time
of their residence.
These amicable relations between the two sovereigns would
probably have continued undisturbed till the death of one or
t *.
120 THE SIXTH MONAIRCEHY. [CH. XIII.
# &
the other, had not a revolution occured in Armenia, which
tempted the Parthian king beyond his powers of resistance.
On the death of Artaxias (B.C. 20), Augustus, who was then
in the East, had sent Tiberius into Armenia to arrange matters,
and Tiberius had placed upon the throne a brother of Artaxias,
named Tigranes.” Tigranes died in B.C. 6, and the Armenians,
without waiting to know the will of the Roman Emperor, con-
ferred the royal title on his sons, for whose succession he had
before his death paved the way by associating them with him
in the government." Enraged at this assumption of inde-
pendence, Augustus sent an expedition into Armenia (B.C. 5),
deposed the sons of Tigranes, and established on the throne a
certain Artavasdes, whose birth and parentage are not known
to us.” But the Armenians were not now inclined to submit
to foreign dictation; they rose in revolt against Artavasdes
(ab. B.C. 2), defeated his Roman supporters, and expelled him
from the kingdom.” Another Tigranes was made king;” and,
as it was pretty certain that the Romans would interfere with
this new display of the spirit of independence, the Parthians
were called in to resist the Roman oppressors. Armenia, was,
in fact, too weak to stand alone, and was obliged to lean upon
one or other of the two great empires upon her borders. Her
people had no clear political foresight, and allowed them-
selves to veer and fluctuate between the two influences ac-
cording as the feelings of the hour dictated. Rome had now
angered them beyond their very limited powers of endurance,
and they flew to Parthia for help, just as on other occasions
we shall find them flying to Rome. Phraates could not bring
himself to reject the Armenian overtures. Ever since the
time of the second Mithridates it had been a settled maxim of
Parthian policy to make Armenia dependent; and, even at the
cost of a rupture with Rome, it seemed to Phraates that he
must respond to the appeal made to him. The rupture might
not come. Augustus was now aged, and might submit to the
affront without resenting it. He had lately lost the services
of his best general, Tiberius, who, indignant at slights put
upon him, had gone into retirement at Rhodes. He had no
One that he could employ but his grandsons, youths who had
not yet fleshed their maiden swords. Phraates probably
hoped that Augustus would draw back before the terrors of a
Parthian war under such circumstances, and would allow
without remonstrance the passing of Armenia into the position
of a subject-ally of Parthia. -
|
*
\
sº
cH. XIII.]. DEATH OF PHRAATI’s IV. 121
But if these were his thoughts, he had miscalculated. Au-
gustus, from the time that he heard of the Armenian troubles,
and of the support given to them by Parthia, Seems never to
have wavered in his determination to vindicate the claims of
Rome to paramount influence in Armenia, and to have only
hesitated as to the person whose services he should employ in
the business. He would have been glad to employ Tiberius;
but that morose prince had deserted him and, declining pub-
lic life, had betaken himself to Rhodes, where he was living in
a self-chosen retirement. Caius, the eldest of his grandsons,
was, in B.C. 2, only eighteen years of age; and, though the
thoughts of Augustus at once turned in this direction, the ex-
treme youth of the prince caused him to hesitate somewhat;
and the consequence was that Caius did not start for the East
till late in B.C. 1. Meanwhile a change had occured in Parthia.
Phraates, who had filled the throne for above thirty-five years,
ceased to exist,"and was succeeded by a young son, Phraataces,
who reigned in conjunction with the queen-mother, Thermusa,
Or Musa.”
The circumstances which brought about this change were the
following. 'Phraates IV. had married, late in life, an Italian
slave-girl, sent him as a present by Augustus; and she had
borne him a son for whom she was naturally anxious to secure
the succession. According to some, it was under her influence
that the monarch had sent his four elder boys to Rome, there
to receive their education.” At any rate, in the absence of
these youths, Phraataces, the child of the slave-girl, became
the chief support of Phraates in the administration of affairs,
and obtained a position in Parthia which led him to regard
himself as entitled to the throne so soon as it should become .
vacant. Doubtful, however, of his father's goodwill, or fear-
ful of the rival claims of his brothers, if he waited till the
throne was vacated in the natural course of events, Phraataces
resolved to anticipate the hand of time, and, in conjunction
with his mother, administered poison to the old monarch,”
from the effects of which he died. A just Nemesis for once
showed itself in that portion of human affairs which passes be-
fore our eyes. Phraates IV., the parricide and fratricide,
was, after a reign of thirty-five years, himself assassinated (B.
C. 2) by a wife whom he loved only too fondly and a son
whom he esteemed and trusted.
Phraates cannot but be regarded as one of the ablest of the
Parthian monarchs. His conduct of the campaign against
122 THE SIXTH MONARCHY." [CH. xIII.
Antony—one of the best soldiers that Rome ever produced—
was admirable, and showed him a master of guerilla warfare.
His success in maintaining himself upon the throne for five
and thirty years, in spite of rivals, and notwithstanding the
character which he obtained for cruelty, implies, in such a
state as Parthia, considerable powers of management. His
dealings with Augustus indicate much suppleness and dex-
terity. If he did not in the course of his long reign advance the
Parthian frontier, at any rate he was not obliged to retract it.
Apparently, he ceded nothing to the Scyths as the price of
their assistance. He maintained the Parthian supremacy over
Northern Media. He lost no inch of territory to the Romans.
It was undoubtedly a prudent step on his part to soothe the
irritated vanity of Rome by a surrender of useless trophies,
and scarcely more useful prisoners; and, we may doubt if this
concession was not as effective as the dread of the Parthian
arms in producing that peace between the two countries which
continued unbroken for above ninety years from the campaign
of Antony," and without serious interruption for yet another
half century.” If Phraates felt, as he might well feel after the
campaigns of Pacorus, that on the whole Rome was a more
powerful state than Parthia, and that consequently Parthia
had nothing to gain but much to lose in the contest with her
western neighbor, he did well to allow no sentiment of foolish
pride to stand in the way of a concession that made a pro-
longed peace between the two countries possible. It is some-
times more honorable to yield to a demand than to meet it
with defiance; and the prince who removed a cause of war
arising out of mere national vanity, while at the same time he
maintained in all essential points the interests and dignity of
his kingdom, deserved well of his subjects, and merits the ap-
proval of the historian. As a man, Phraates has left behind
him a bad name: he was cruel, selfish, and ungrateful, a
fratricide and a parricide; but as a king he is worthy of
respect, and, in certain points, of admiration.
* | - z
CH. XIV.] ACCESSION OF PHRAATACES. 123
- *
CHAPTER XIV.
Short reigns of Phraataces, Orodes II., and Vonones I. Ac-
cession of Artabanus III. His relations with Germanicus
and Tiberius. His War with Pharasmanes of Iberia. His
Pirst Ea:pulsion from his Kingdom, and return to it. His
peace with Rome. Internal troubles of the Parthian King-
dom. Second Ea:pulsion and return of Artabanus. His
Death.
“Mota Orientis regna, provinciaque Romanae, initio apud Parthos orto.” --
Tacit. Ann. ii. 1.
THE accession of Phraataces made no difference in the atti-
tude of Parthia towards Armenia. The young prince was as
anxious as his father had been to maintain the Parthian claims
to that country, and at first perhaps as inclined to believe that
Augustus would not dispute them. Immediately upon his
accession he sept ambassadors to Rome announcing the fact,
apologizing for the circumstances under which it had taken
place, and proposing a renewal of the peace which had sub-
sisted between Augustus and his father." Apparently, he said
nothing about Armenia, but preferred a demand for the sur-
render of his four brothers, whom no doubt he designed to
destroy. The answer of Augustus was severe in the extreme.
Addressing Phraataces by his bare name, without adding the
title of king, he required him to lay aside the royal appella-
tion, which he had arrogantly and without any warrant as-
Sumed, and at the same time to withdraw his forces from
Armenia.” On the surrender of the Parthian princes he kept
silence, ignoring a demand which he had no intention of ac-
cording. It was clearly his design to set up one of the elder
brothers as a rival claimant to Phraataces, or at any rate to
alarm him with the notion that, unless he made concessions,
this policy would be adopted. But Phraataces was not to be
frightened by a mere message. He responded to Augustus
after his own fashion, dispatching to him a letter wherein he
took to himself the favorite Parthian title of “king of kings,”
and addressed the Roman Emperor simply as “Caesar.”* The
attitude of defiance would no doubt have been maintained, had
Augustus confined himself to menaces; when, however, it
f * *
*
‘124 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. LCH. XIV.
§
appeared that active measures would be taken, when Augus-
tus, in B.C. 1, Sent his grandson, Caius, to the East with
orders to re-establish the IRoman influence in Armenia even at
the cost of a Parthian war, and that prince showed himself in
Syria with all the magnificent surroundings of the Imperial
dignity, the Parthian monarch became alarmed. He had an
interview with Caius in the spring of A.D. 1, upon an island in
the Euphrates;" where the terms of an arrangement between
the two Empires were discussed and settled. The armies of
the two chiefs were drawn up on the opposite banks of the
river, facing one another; and the chiefs themselves, accom-
panied by an equal number of attendants, proceeded to delib-
erate in the sight of both hosts. Satisfactory pledges having
been given by the Parthian monarch, the prince and king in
turn entertained each other on the borders of their respective
dominions;" and Caius returned into Syria, having obtained
an engagement from the Parthians to abstain from any further
interference with Armenian affairs." The engagement appears
to have been honorably kept; for when, shortly afterward,
fresh complications occurred, and Caius in endeavoring to
Settle them received his death-wound before the walls of an
Armenian tower," we do not hear of Parthia as in any way
involved in the unfortunate occurrence. The Romans and
their partisans in the country were left to settle the Armenian
succession as they pleased; and Parthia kept herself wholly
aloof from the matters transacted upon her borders.
One Cause—perhaps the main cause—of this abstinence, and
of the engagement to abstain entered into by Phraataces, was
doubtless the unsettled state of things in Parthia itself.” The
circumstances under which that prince had made himself king,
though not unparalleled in the Parthian annals, were such as
naturally tended towards civil strife, and as were apt to pro-
duce in Parthia internal difficulties, if not disorders or com-
motions. Phraataces soon found that he would have a hard
task to establish his rule. The nobles objected to him, not
Only for the murder of his father, but his descent from an
Italian concubine, and the incestuous commerce which he was
Supposed to maintain with her." They had perhaps grounds
for this last charge. At any rate Phraataces provoked sus-
picion by the singular favors and honors which he granted to
a woman whose Origin was mean and extraction foreign. Not
content with private marks of esteem and love, he departed
from the practice of all former Parthian sovereigns” in placing
*.
N.
*
* *.
^.
CH. XIV.] , DEATH OF PHRAATACES. 125
her effigy upon his coins; and he accompanied this act with
fulsome and absurd titles. Musa was styled, not merely
“Queen,” but “Heavenly Goddess,” ” as if the realities of
slave origin and concubinage could be covered by the fiction of
an apotheosis. It is not surprising that the proud Parthian
nobles were offended by these proceedings, and determined to
rid themselves of a monarch whom they at once hated and
despised. Within a few years of his obtaining the throne an
insurrection broke out against his authority; and after a brief
struggle he was deprived of his crown and put to death.” The
nobles then elected an Arsacid, named Orodes, whose residence
at the time and relationship to the former monarchs are un-
certain. It seems probable” that, like most princes of the
blood royal, he had taken refuge in a foreign country from the
suspicions and dangers that beset all possible pretenders to the
royal dignity in Parthia, and was living in retirement, unex-
pectant of any such offer, when a deputation of Parthian
nobles arrived and brought him the intelligence of his election.
It might have been expected that, obtaining the crown under
these circumstances, he would have ruled well; but, according
to Josephus (who is here, unfortunately, our sole authority),
he very soon displayed so much violence and cruelty of dispo-
Sition that his rule was felt to be intolerable; and the Par-
thians, again breaking into insurrection, rid themselves of him,
killing him either at a banquet or on a hunting excursion.”
This done, they sent to Rome, and requested Augustus to
allow Vonones, the eldest son of Phraates IV., to return to
Parthia in order that he might receive his father's kingdom.”
The Emperor complied readily enough, since he regarded his
own dignity as advanced by the transaction; and the Par-
thians at first welcomed the object of their choice with rejoic-
ings. But after a little time their sentiments altered. The
young prince, bred up in Rome, and accustomed to the refine-
ments of Western civilization, neglected the occupations which
seemed to his subjects alone worthy of a monarch's regard,
absented himself from the hunting-field, took small pleasure
in riding, when he passed through the streets indulged in the
foreign luxury of a litter, shrank with disgust from the rude
and coarse feastings which formed a portion of the national
manners. He had, moreover, brought with him from the
place of his exile a number of Greek companions, whom the
Pärthians despised and ridiculed; and the favors bestowed on
these foreign interlopers were seen with jealousy and rage. It
. \
126 THE SIXTH MONAIRCEIY. [CH. xrv.
was in vain that he endeavored to conciliate his offended sub-
jects by the openness of his manners and the facility with
which he allowed access to his person. In their prejudiced
eyes virtues and graces unknown to the nation hitherto were
not merits but defects,” and rather increased than diminished
their aversion. Having conceived a dislike for the monarch
personally, they began to look back with dissatisfaction on
their own act in sending for him. “Parthia,” they said,
“had indeed degenerated from her former self to have re-
quested a king to be sent her who belonged to another world
and had had a hostile civilization ingrained into him. All the
glory gained by destroying Crassus and repulsing Antony was
utterly lost and gone, if the country was to be ruled by Caesar's
bond-slave, and the throne of the Arsacidae to be treated like
a Roman province. It would have been bad enough to have
had a prince imposed on them by the will of a superior, if they
had been conquered; it was worse, in all respects worse, to
suffer such an insult, when they had not even had war made
, on them.” Under the influence of such feelings as these, the
Parthians, after tolerating Vonones for a few years, rose
against him (ab. A.D. 16), and summoned Artabanus, an Arsa-
cid who had grown to manhood among the Dahae of the Cas-
pian region, but was at this time king of Media Atropaténé, to
rule over them.”
It was seldom that a crown was declined in the ancient
world; and Artabanus, on receiving the overture, at once ex-
pressed his willingness to accept the proffered dignity. He in-
vaded Parthia at the head of an army consisting of his own
subjects, and engaged Vonones, to whom in his difficulties the
bulk of the Parthian people had rallied. The engagement re-
sulted in the defeat of the Median monarch,” who returned to
his own country, and, having collected a larger army, made a
second invasion. This time he was successful. Vonones fled
on horseback to Seleucia with a small body of followers; while
his defeated army, following in his track, was pressed upon by
the victorious Mede, and suffered great losses. Artabanus, hav-
ing entered Ctesiphon in triumph, was immediately proclaimed
king.” Vonones, escaping from Seleucia, took refuge among
the Armenians; and, as it happened that just at this time the
Armenian throne was vacant, not only was an asylum granted
him, but he was made king of the country.” It was impossible
that Artabanus should tamely submit to an arrangement which
would have placed his deadly enemy in a position to cause him
Af
*
ch, xiv.] - REIGN OF ARTABANUS III. 127
constant annoyance. He, therefore, at once remonstrated, both
in Armenia and at Rome. As Rome now claimed the investi-
ture of the Armenian monarchs, he sent an embassy to Tiberius,
and threatened war if Vonones were acknowledged; while at
the Same time he applied to Armenia and required the surrender
of the refugee. An important section of the Armenian nation
was inclined to grant his demand:* Tiberius, who would will-
ingly have supported Vonones, drew back before the Parthian
threats;* Vonones found himself in imminent danger, and,
under the circumstances, determined on quitting Armenia and
betaking himself to the protection of the Roman governor of
Syria. This was Creticus Silanus, who received him gladly,
gave him a guard, and allowed him the state and title of king.”
Meanwhile Artabanus laid claim to Armenia, and suggested as
a candidate for the throne one of his own sons, Orodes.”
Under these circumstances, the Roman Emperor, Tiberius,
who had recently succeeded Augustus, resolved to despatch to
the East a personage of importance, who should command the
respect and attention of the Oriental powers by his dignity, and
impose upon them by the pomp and splendor with which he
was surrounded. He selected for this office Germanicus, his
nephew, the eldest son of his deceased brother, Drusus, a prince
of much promise, amiable in his disposition, courteous and affa-
ble in his manners, a good soldier, and a man generally popu-
lar. The more to strike the minds of the Orientals, he gave
Germanicus no usual title or province, but invested him with
an extraordinary command over all the Roman dominions to
the east of the Hellespont,” thus rendering him a sort of mon-
arch of Roman Asia. Full powers were granted him for mak-
ing peace or war, for levying troops, annexing provinces, ap-
pointing subject kings, and performing other sovereign acts,
without referring back to Rome for instructions. A train of
unusual magnificence accompanied him to his charge, calcu-
lated to impress the Orientals with the conviction that this was
no common negotiator. Germanicus arrived in Asia early in
A.D. 18, and applied himself at once to his task. Entering Ar-
menia at the head of his troops, he proceeded to the capital,
Artaxata,” and, having ascertained the wishes of the Arme-
nians themselves, determined on his course of conduct. To
have insisted on the restoration of Vonones would have been
grievously to offend the Armenians who had expelled him, and
at the same time to provoke the Parthians, who could not have
tolerated a pretender in a position of power upon their borders;
|
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128 THE SIXTHI MONARCEIY. [CH. xiv.
.*
K. , . . -- N.
to have allowed the pretensions of the Parthian monarch, and
accepted the candidature of his son, Orodes, would have lowered
Rome in the opinion of all the surrounding nations, and been
equivalent to an abdication of all influence in the affairs of
Western Asia. Germanicus avoided either extreme, and found
happily a middle course. It happened that there was a foreign
' prince settled in Armenia, who having grown up there had as-
similated himself in all respects to the Armenian ideas and
habits, and had thereby won golden opinions from both the
nobles and the people. This was Zeno, the Son of Polemo, once
king of the curtailed Pontus, and afterwards of the Lesser Ar-
menia,” an outlying Roman dependency. The Armenians
themselves suggested that Zeno should be their monarch; and
Germanicus saw a way out of his difficulties in the suggestion.
At the seat of government, Artaxata, in the presence of a vast
multitude of the people, with the consent and approval of the
principal nobles, he placed with his own hand the diadem on
the brow of the favored prince, and saluted him as king under
the new name of “Artaxias.”” He then returned into Syria,
where he was shortly afterwards visited by ambassadors from
the Parthian monarch.” Artabanus reminded him of the peace
concluded between Rome and Parthia in the reign of Augustus,
and assumed that the circumstances of his own appointment to
the throne had in no way interfered with it. He would be
glad, he said, to renew with Germanicus the interchange of
friendly assurances which had passed between his predecessor,
Phraataces, and Caius; and to accommodate the Roman
general, he would willingly come to meet him as far as the Eu-
phrates; meanwhile, until the meeting could take place, he
must request that Vonones should be removed to a greater dis-
tance from the Parthian frontier, and that he should not be al-
lowed to continue the correspondence in which he was engaged
with many of the Parthian nobles for the purpose of raising:
fresh troubles. Germanicus replied politely, but indefinitely,
to the proposal of an interview, which he may have thought
unnecessary, and open to misconstruction. To the request for
the removal of Vonones he consented.” Vonones was trans-
ferred from Syria to the neighboring province of Cilicia; and
the city of Pompeiopolis, built by the great Pompey on the
site of the ancient Soli, was assigned to him as his residence.
With this arrangement the Parthian monarch appears to have
been contented. Vonones on the other hand was so dissatisfied
with the change that in the course of the next year (A.D. 19) he
. Vol. III. Plate IX.
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cII. xiv.] ARTA BANUS QUARRELS WITH ROME. 129
endeavored to make his escape; his flight was, however, dis-,
covered, and, pursuit being made, he was overtaken and slain
on the banks of the Pyramus.” Thus perished ingloriously one
of the least blamable and most unfortunate of the Parthian
princes. A
After the death of Germanicus, in A.D. 19, the details of the
Parthian history are for some years unknown to us. It ap-
pears that during this interval Artabanus [Pl. II. Fig. 5.] was
engaged in wars with several of the nations upon his borders,”
and met with so much success that he came after a while to
desire, rather than fear, a rupture with Rome. He knew that
Tiberius was now an old man,” and that he was disinclined to
engage in distant wars; he was aware that Germanicus was
dead; and he was probably not much afraid of L. Vitellius, the
governor of Syria, who had been recently deputed by Tiberius
to administer that province.” Accordingly in A.D. 34, the Ar-
menian throne being once more vacant by the death of Artaxias
(Zeno), he suddenly seized the country, and appointed his eldest
son, whom Dio and Tacitus call simply Arsaces,” to be king.
At the same time he sent ambassadors to require the restora-
tion of the treasure which Vonones had carried off from Par-
thia and had left behind him in Syria or Cilicia. To this plain
and definite demand were added certain vague threats, or
boasts, to the effect that he was the rightful master of all the
territory that had belonged of old to Macedonia or Persia, and •
that it was his intention to resume possession of the provinces,
whereto, as the representative of Cyrus and Alexander, he was
entitled.” He is said to have even commenced operations
against Cappadocia,” which was an actual portion of the
Roman Empire, when he found that Tiberius, so far from re-
senting the seizure of Armenia, had sent instructions to Vitel-
lius, that he was to cultivate peaceful relations with Parthia.”
Apparently he thought that a good opportunity had arisen for
picking a quarrel with his Western neighbor, and was deter-
mined to take advantage of it. The aged despot, hidden in his
retreat of Capreae, seemed to him a pure object of contempt;
and he entertained the confident hope of defeating his armies
and annexing portions of his territory,
But Tiberius was under no circumstances a man to be
wholly despised. Simultaneously with the Parthian demands
and threats intelligence reached him that the subjects of
Artabanus were greatly dissatisfied with his rule, and that it
would be easy by fomenting the discontent to bring about a
\
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w
130 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. " [CH. xIV.
revolution.” Some of the nobles even went in person to Rome
(A.D. 35), and suggested that if Phraates, One of the surviv-
ing sons of Phraates IV., were to appear under Roman
protection upon the banks of the Euphrates, an insurrection
would immediately break out. Artabanus, they said, among
his other cruelties had put to death almost all the adult
males of the Arsacid family; a successful revolution could
not be hoped for without an Arsacid leader; if Tiberius,
however, would deliver to them the prince for whom they
asked, this difficulty would be removed, and there was then
every reason to expect a happy issue to the rebellion. The
Emperor was not hard to persuade; he no doubt argued that,
whatever became of the attempt and those engaged in it, one
result at least was certain—Artabanus would find plenty of
work to occupy him at home, and would desist from his
foreign aggressions. He therefore let Phraates take his de-
parture and proceed to Syria, glad to meet the danger which
had threatened him by craft and policy rather than by force
of arms.”
Artabanus soon became aware of the intrigue. He found
that the chief conspirators in Parthia were a certain Sinnaces,
a nobleman distinguished alike for his high birth and his
great riches, and a eunuch named Abdus, who held a position
about the court, and was otherwise a personage of importancé.
It would have been easy to seize these two men, and execute
them; but Artabanus was uncertain how far the conspiracy
extended, and thought it most prudent to defer bringing
matters to a crisis. He therefore dissembled, and was content
to cause a delay, first by administering to Abdus a slow
poison, and then by engaging Sinnaces so constantly in affairs
of state that he had little or no time to devote to plotting.
Successful thus far by his own cunning and dexterity, he was
further helped by a stroke of good fortune, on which he could
not have calculated. Phraates, who thought that after forty
years of residence in Rome it was necessary to fit himself for
the position of Parthian king by resuming the long-disused
habits of his nation, was carried off, after a short residence in
Syria, by a disease which he was supposed to have contracted
through the change in his mode of life.” His death must for
the time have paralyzed the conspirators, and have greatly
relieved Artabanus. It was perhaps now, under the stimulus
of a sudden change from feelings of extreme alarm to fancied
Security, that he wrote the famous letter to Tiberius, in which
$
F -
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! **
CH. xiv.] TIBERIUS SUPPORTS PRETENDERS. 131
A
he reproached him for his cruelty, cowardice, and luxurious-
ness of living, and recommended him to satisfy the just
desires of the subjects who hated him by an immediate
Suicide.” - { - .
This letter, if genuine, must be pronounced under any cir-
cumstances a folly; and if really sent at this time, it may have
had tragical consequences. It is remarkable that Tiberius, on
learning the death of Phraates, instead of relaxing, intensified
his efforts. Not only did he at once send out to Syria another
pretender, Tiridates, a nephew of the deceased prince,” in
order to replace him, but he made endeavors, such as we do
not hear of before, to engage other nations in the struggle;”
and further, he enlarged the commission of Vitellius, giving
him a general superintendence over the affairs of the -East.
Thus Artabanus found himself in greater peril than ever, and
if he had really indulged in the silly effusion ascribed to him
was rightly punished. Pharasmanes, king of Iberia, a portion
of the modern Georgia, incited by Tiberius, took the field (A.D.
35), and proclaimed his intention of placing his brother, Mith-
ridates, on the Armenian throne.” Having by corruption
succeeded in bringing about the murder of Arsaces by his
attendants," he marched into Armenia, and became master of
the capital without meeting any resistance. Artabanus, upon
this, sent his son Orodes to maintain the Parthian cause in the
disputed province; but he proved no match for the Iberian,
who was superior in numbers, in the variety of his troops, and
in familiarity with the localities. Pharasmanes had obtained
the assistance of his neighbors, the Albanians, and, opening
the passes of the Caucasus, had admitted through them a
number of the Scythic or Sarmatian hordes," who were
always ready, when their swords were hired, to take a part in
the quarrels of the south. Orodes was unable to procure
either mercenaries or allies,” and had to contend unassisted
against the three enemies who had joined their forces to
oppose him. For some time he prudently declined an engage-
ment; but it was difficult to restrain the ardor of his troops,
whom the enemy exasperated by their reproaches.” After a
while he was compelled to accept the battle which Pharas-
manes incessantly offered. His force consisted entirely of
cavalry, while Pharasmanes had besides his horse a powerful
body of infantry. The battle was nevertheless stoutly con-
tested; and the victory might have been doubtful, had it not
happened that in a hand-to-hand combat between the two
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132 THE SIXTH MOWARCHY. [CH. XIV,
commanders Orodes was struck to the ground by his antago-
nist, and thought by most of his own men to be killed." As
, usual under such circumstances in the East, a rout followed.
If we may believe Josephus,” “many tens of thousands” were
slain. Armenia was wholly lost; and Artabanus found him-
self left with diminished resources and tarnished fame to meet
the intrigues of his domestic enemies.
Still, he would not succumb without an effort. In the
spring of A.D. 36, having levied the whole force of the Em-
pire, he took the field and marched northwards, determined,
if possible, to revenge himself on the Iberians and recover his
lost province.” But his first efforts were unsuccessful; and
before he could renew them Vitellius put himself at the head
of his legions, and marching towards the Euphrates threatened
Mesopotamia with invasion. Placed thus between two fires,
the Parthian monarch felt that he had no choice but to with-
draw from Armenia and return to the defence of his own
proper territories, which in his absence must have lain tempt-
ingly open to an enemy. His return caused Vitellius to change
his tactics. Instead of measuring his strength against that
which still remained to Artabanus, he resumed the weapon of
intrigue so dear to his master, and proceeded by a lavish ex-
penditure of money” to excite disaffection once more among
the Parthian nobles. This time conspiracy was successful.
The military disasters of the last two years had alienated from
Artabanus the affections of those whom his previous cruelties
had failed to disgust or alarm; and he found himself without
any armed force whereon he could rely, beyond a small body
of foreign guards which he maintained about his person. It
seemed to him that his only safety was in flight; and ac-
cordingly he quitted his capital and removed himself hastily
into Hyrcania, which was in the immediate vicinity of the
Scythian Dahae, among whom he had been brought up. Here
the natives were friendly to him, and he lived a retired life,
waiting (as he said) until the Parthians, who could judge an
absent prince with equity, though they could not long continue
faithful to a present one, should repent of their behavior to
him.* e
Upon learning the flight of Artabanus, Vitellius advanced to
the banks of the Euphrates, and introduced Tiridates into his
kingdom.” Fortunate omens were said to have accompanied
- the passage of the river; and these were followed by adhesions
of greaterimportance. Ornospades, Satrap of Mesopotamia, was
A
ch. xiv.] TIRIDATES II. BECOMES KING. , 133
the first to join the standard of the pretender with a large
body of horse. He was followed by the conspirator Sinnaces,
his father Abdageses, the keeper of the king's treasures, and
other personages of high position. The Greek cities in Meso-
potamia readily opened their gates to a monarch long domiciled
at Rome, from whom they expected a politeness and refine-
ment that would harmonize better with their feelings than the
manners of the late king, bred up among the uncivilized Scyths.
Parthian towns, like Halus and Artemita,” followed their ex-
ample. Seleucia, the second city in the Empire, received the
new monarch with an obsequiousness that bordered on adula-
tion.” Not content with paying him all customary royal
honors, they appended to their acclamations disparaging re-
marks upon his predecessor, whom they affected to regard as
the issue of an adulterous intrigue, and as no true Arsacid.
Tiridates was pleased to reward the unseemly flattery of these
degenerate Greeks by a new arrangement of their constitution.
Hitherto they had lived under the government of a Senate of
Three Hundred members, the wisest and wealthiest of the
citizens, a certain control being, however, secured to the
people. Artabanus had recently modified the constitution in
an aristocratic sense; and therefore Tiridates pursued the con-
trary course, and established an umbridled democracy in the
place of a mixed government. He then entered Ctesiphon, the
capital, and after waiting Some days for certain noblemen, who
had expressed a wish to attend his coronation but continually
put off their coming, he was crowned in the ordinary manner
by the Surena of the time being, in the sight and amid the ac-
clamations of a vast multitude. -
The pretender now regarded his work as completed, and
forbore any further efforts. The example of the Western
provinces would, he assumed, be followed by the Eastern, and
the monarch approved by Mesopotamia, Babylonia, and the
capital would carry, as a matter of course, the rest of the
nation. Policy required that the general acquiescence should
not have been taken for granted. Tiridates should have made
a military progress through the East, no less than the West,”
and have sought out his rival in the distant Hyrcania, and
slain him, or driven him beyond the borders. Instead of thus
occupying himself, he was content to besiege a stronghold
where Artabanus had left his treasure and his harem. This,
conduct was imprudent; and the imprudence cost him his
crown. That fickle temper which Artabanus had noted in
Af
*.
k-
134 - , THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. xIV. -
4.
his countrymen began to work so soon as the new king was
well installed in his office; the coveted post of chief vizier
could but be assigned to One, and the selection of the fortunate
individual was the disappointment of a host of expectants;
, nobles absent from the coronation, whether by choice or
necessity, began to be afraid that their absence would cost
them dear, when Tiridates had time to reflect upon it and to
listen, to their detractors. The thoughts of the malcontents
turned towards their dethroned monarch; and emissaries were
despatched to seek him out, and put before him the project of
a restoration. He was found in Hyrcania, in a miserable
dress, and plight, living on the produce of his bow. At first he
suspected the messengers, believing that their intention was to
seize him and deliver him up to Tiridates; but it was not long
ere they persuaded him that, whether their affection for him-
self were true or feigned, their enmity to Tiridates was real.”
They had indeed no worse charges to bring against this prince
than his youth, and the softness of his Roman breeding; but
they were evidently in earnest, and had committed themselves
too deeply to make it possible for them to retract. Artabanus,
therefore, accepted their offers, and having obtained the ser-
vices of a body of Dahae and other Scyths,” proceeded west-
ward, retaining the miserable garb and plight in which he had
been found, in order to draw men to his side by pity; and
making all haste, in Order that his enemies might have less
opportunity to prepare obstructions and his friends less time
to change their minds. He reached the neighborhood of
Ctesiphon while Tiridates was still doubting what he should
do, distracted between the counsels of some who recommended
an immediate engagement with the rebels before they recov-
ered from the fatigues of their long march or grew accustomed
to act together, and of others who advised a retreat into Meso-
potamia, reliance upon the Armenians and other tribes of the
north," and a union with the Roman troops, which Vitellius,
on the first news of what had happened, had thrown across the
Euphrates. The more timid counsel had the support of Ab-
dageses, whom Tiridates had made his vizier, and therefore
naturally prevailed, the prince himself being moreover of an
unwarlike temper. It had, in appearance, much to recommend
it; and if its execution had been in the hands of Occidentals
might have succeeded. But, in the East, the first movement
in retreat is taken as a confession of weakness and almost as
an act of despair: an Order to retire is regarded as a direction
*\s y -, H - - - - —x.
ch. xiv.] ARTABANU'S RECOVERS THE THRONE. 135
to fly. No sooner was the Tigris crossed and the march
through Mesopotamia began, than the host of Tiridates melted
away like an iceberg in the Gulf Stream. The tribes of the
Desert set the example of flight;" and in a little time almost
the whole army had dispersed, drawing off either to the camp
of the enemy or to their homes. Tiridates reached the Eu-
phrates with a mere handful of followers, and crossing into
Syria found himself once more Safe under the protection of
the Romans.
The flight of Tiridates gave Parthia back into the hands of
its former ruler. Artabanus reoccupied the throne, apparently
without having to fight a battle.” He seems, however, not to
have felt himself strong enough either to resume his designs
upon Armenia, or to retaliate in any way upon the Romans
for their support of Tiridates. Mithridates, the Iberian, was
left in quiet possession of the Armenian kingdom, and Vitellius
found himself unmolested on the Euphrates. Tiberius, how-
ever, was anxious that the war with Parthia should be formally
terminated, and, having failed in his attempts to fill the Par-
thian throne with a Roman nominee, was ready to acknowl-
edge Artabanus, and eager to enter into a treaty with him.
He instructed Vitellius to this effect;” and that officer (late in
A.D. 36 or early in A.D. 37), having invited Artabanus to an in-
terview on the Euphrates," persuaded him to terms which
were regarded by the Romans as highly honorable to them-
selves, though Artabanus probably did not feel them to be de-
grading to Parthia. Peace and amity were re-established be-
tween the two nations. Rome, it may be assumed, undertook
to withhold her countenance from all pretenders to the Par-
thian throne, and Parthia withdrew her claims upon Armenia.
Artabanus was persuaded to send his son, Darius, with some
other Parthians of rank, to Rome, and was thus regarded by
the Romans as having given hostages for his good behavior.”
He was also induced to throw a few grains of frankincense on
the Sacrificial fire which burnt in front of the Roman standards
and the Imperial images, an act which was accepted at Rome
as one of submission and homage." The terms and circum-
stances of the peace did not become known in Italy till Tibe-
rius had been succeeded by Caligula (March, A.D. 37).” When
known, they gave great satisfaction, and were regarded as
glorious alike to the negotiator, Vitellius, and to the prince
whom he represented. The false report was spread that the
Parthian monarch had granted to the new Caesar what his
*
Af
$g
&
136 THE SIXTEI MONAROHF. [CH. XIV.
contempt and hatred would have caused him to refuse to Ti-
berius; and the inclination of the Romans towards their young
sovereign was intensified by the ascription to him of a diplo-
matic triumph which belonged of right to his predecessor.
Contemporaneously with the troubles which have been above
described, but reaching down, it would seem, a few years be-
yond them, were other disturbances of a peculiar character in
one of the Western provinces of the Empire. The Jewish ele-
ment in the population of Western Asia had been one of im-
portance from a date anterior to the rise, not only of the Par-
thian, but even of the Persian Empire. Dispersed colonies of
Jews were to be found in Babylonia, Armenia, Media, Susiana,
Mesopotamia, and probably in other Parthian provinces.”
These colonies dated from the time of Nebuchadnezzar's cap-
tivity, and exhibited everywhere the remarkable tendency of
the Jewish race to an increase disproportionate to that of the
population among which they are settled. The Jewish ele-
ment became perpetually larger and more important in Baby-
lonia and Mesopotamia, in spite of the draughts which were
made upon it by Seleucus and other Syrian princes.” Under
the Parthians, it would seem that the Mesopotamian Jews en-
joyed generally the same sort of toleration, and the same per-
mission to exercise a species of self-government, which Jews
and Christians enjoy now in many parts of Turkey. ' They
formed a recognized community, had some cities which were
entirely their own, possessed a common treasury, and from
time to time sent up to Jerusalem the offerings of the people
under the protection of a convoy of 30,000 or 40,000 men.” The
Parthian kings treated them well, and no doubt valued them
as a counterpoise to the disaffected Greeks and Syrians of this
part of their Empire. They had no grievance of which to
complain, and it might have been thought very unlikely that
any troubles would arise in connection with them; but cir-
cumstances seemingly trivial threw the whole community
into commotion, and led on to disasters of a very lamentable
character.
Two young Jews, Asinai and Anilai, brothers, natives of
Nearda, the city in which the treasury of the community was
established, upon suffering some ill-treatment at the hands of
the manufacturer who employed them, gave up their trade,
and, withdrawing to a marshy district between two arms of the
Euphrates, made up their minds to live by robbery.” A band
of needy youths soon gathered about them, and they became
i
^
CH. XIV.] ASINAT AND ANILAI. . . 137
the terror of the entire neighborhood. They exacted a black-,
mail from the peaceable population of shepherds and others
who lived near them, made occasional plundering raids to a
distance, and required an acknowledgment (bakhshish) from
travellers. Their doings having become notorious, the satrap
of Babylonia marched against them with an army, intending
to surprise them on the Sabbath, when it was supposed that
they would not fight; but his approach was discovered, it was
determined to disregard the obligation of Sabbatical rest, and
the satrap was himself surprised and completely defeated.
Artabanus, having heard of the disaster, made overtures to the
brothers, and, after receiving a visit from them at his court,
assigned to Asinai, the elder of the two, the entire government
of the Babylonian satrapy. The experiment appeared at first
to have completely succeeded. Asinai governed the province
with prudence and zeal, and for fifteen years” no complaint
was made against his administration. But at the end of this
time the lawless temper, held in restraint for so long, reasserted
itself, not, indeed, in Asinai, but in his brother. Anilai fell in
love with the wife of a Parthian magnate, commander (appar-
ently) of the Parthian troops stationed in Babylonia, and, seeing
no other way of obtaining his wishes, made war upon the chief-
tain and killed him. He then married the object of his affec-
tions, and might perhaps have been content; but the Jews
under Asinai's government remonstrated against the idolatries
which the Parthian woman had introduced into a Jewish
household, and prevailed on Asinai to require that she should
be divorced. His compliance with their wishes proved fatal to
him, for the woman, fearing the consequences, contrived to
poison Asinai; and the authority which he had wielded passed
into the hands of Anilai, without (so far as we hear) any fresh
appointment from the Parthian monarch. Anilai had, it ap-
pears, no instincts but those of a freebooter, and he was no
sooner settled in the government than he proceeded to indulge
them by attacking the territory of a neighboring satrap, Mith-
ridates, who was not only a Parthian of high rank, but had
married one of the daughters of Artabanus. Mithridates flew
to arms to defend his province; but Anilai fell upon his encamp-,
ment in the night, completely routed his troops, and took
Mithridates himself prisoner. Having subjected him to a
gross indignity,” he was nevertheless afraid to put him to
death, lest the Parthian king should avenge the slaughter of
his relative on the Jews of Babylon. Mithridates was conse-
138 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. xIV.
quently released, and returned to his wife, who was so indig-
nant at the insult whereto he had been subjected that she left
him no peace till he collected a second army and resumed the
war. Analai was no ways daunted. Quitting his stronghold
in the marshes, he led his troops a distance of ten miles through
a hot and dry plain to meet the enemy, thus unnecessarily ex-
hausting them, and exposing them to the attack of their ene-
mies under the most unfavorable circumstances. He was of
course defeated with loss; but he himself escaped and revenged
himself by carrying fire and sword over the lands of the Baby-
lonians, who had hitherto lived peaceably under his protection.
The Babylonians sent to Nearda and demanded his surrender;
but the Jews of Nearda, even if they had had the will, had no
power to comply. A pretence was then made of arranging
matters by negotiation; but the Babylonians, having in this
way obtained a knowledge of the position which Anilai and his
troops occupied, fell upon them in the night, when they were
all either drunk or asleep, and at One stroke exterminated the
whole band.
Thus far no great calamity had occurred. Two Jewish rob-
ber-chiefs had been elevated into the position of Parthian Sa-
traps; and the result had been, first, fifteen years of peace, and
then a short civil war, ending in the destruction of the surviv-
ing chief and the annihilation of the band of marauders. But
the lamentable consequences of the commotion were now to
show themselves. The native Babylonians had always looked
with dislike on the Jewish colony, and occasions of actual
collision between the two bodies had not been wholly wa t-
ing.” The circumstances of the existing time seemed to fur-
nish a good excuse for an outbreak; and scarcely were Anilai
and his followers destroyed, when the Jews of Babylon were
set upon by their native fellow-citizens. Unable to make an
effectual resistance, they resolved to retire from the place, and,
at the immense loss which such a migration necessarily costs,
they quitted Babylon and transferred themselves in great num-
bers to Seleucia. Here they lived quietly for five years (about
A.D. 34–39), but in the Sixth year (A.D. 40) fresh troubles broke
out. The remnant of the Jews at Babylon were assailed, either
by their old enemies or by a pestilence,” and took refuge at
Seleucia with their brethren. It happened that at Seleucia
there was a feud of long standing between the Syrian popula-
tion and the Greeks. The Jews naturally joined the Syrians,
who were a kindred race, and the two together brought the
F- . — -- —t – - – .
A"
ca. xiv.] REFLECTIONS ON THE TROUBLES. 139
- }
Greeks under; whereupon these last contrived to come toterms
with the Syrians, and persuaded them to join in an attack on
the late allies.- Against the combined Greeks and Syrians the
Jews were powerless, and in the massacre which ensued they
lost above 50,000 men. The remnant withdrew to Ctesiphon;
but even there the malice of their enemies pursued them, and
the persecution was only brought to an end by their quitting
the metropolitan cities altogether, and withdrawing to the
provincial towns of which they were the sole occupants.”
The narrative of these events derives its interest, not so
much from any sympathy that we can feel with any of the ac-
tors in it as from the light which it throws upon the character
of the Parthian rule, and the condition of the countries under
Parthian government. In the details given we seem once
more to trace a near resemblance between the Parthian system
and that of the Turks; we seem to see thrown back into the
mirror of the past an image of those terrible conflicts and dis-
orders which have passed before our own eyes in Syria and the
Lebanon while under acknowledged Turkish sovereignty.
The picture has the same features of antipathies of race unsof-
tened by time and contact, of perpetual feud bursting out into
occasional conflict, of undying religious animosities, of strange
combinations, of fearful massacres, and of a government look-
ingtamely on, and allowing things for the most part to take their
course. We see how utterly the Parthian system failed to
blend together or amalgamate the conquered peoples; and not .
only so, but how impotent it was even to effect the first object
of a government, the securing of peace and tranquillity within
its borders. If indeed it were necessary to believe that the
picture brought before us represented truthfully the normal
condition of the people and countries with which it is con-
cerned, we should be forced to conclude that Parthian govern-
ment was merely another name for anarchy, and that it was
only good fortune that preserved the empire from falling to
pieces at this early date, within two centuries of its establish-
ment, But there is reason to believe that the reign of Arta-
banus III. represents, not the normal, but an exceptional state
of things—a state of things which could only arise in Parthia
when the powers of government were relaxed in consequence
of rebellion and civil war.” We must remember that Arta-
banus was actually twice driven from his kingdom, and that
during the greater part of his reign he lived in perpetual fear
of revolt and insurrection. It is not improbable that the cul-
A
140 s THE SIXTH MOVARCH Y. ſch. xiv.
minating atrocities of the struggle above described synchro-
nized with the second expulsion of the Parthian monarch,” and
are thus not so much a sign of the ordinary weakness of the
Parthian rule as of the terrible strength of the forces which
that rule for the most part kept under control.
The causes which led to the second expulsion of Artabanus"
are not distinctly stated, but they were probably not very differ-
ent from those that brought about the first. Artabanus was
undoubtedly a harsh ruler; and those who fell under his dis-
pleasure, naturally fearing his Severity, and seeing no way of
meeting it but by a revolution, were driven to adopt extreme
measures. Something like a general combination of the nobles
against him seems to have taken place about the year A.D. 40;
and it appears that he, on becoming aware of it, determined to
quit the capital and throw himself on the protection of one of
the tributary monarchs. This was Izates, the sovereign of
Adiabéné, or the tract between the Zab rivers, who is said to
have been a convert to Judaism.” On the flight of Artabanus
to Izates it would seem that the Megistanes formally deposed
him, and elected in his place a certain Kinnam, or Kinnamus,
an Arsacid who had been brought up by the king. Izates,
... when he interfered on behalf of the deposed monarch, was met
by the objection that the newly-elected prince had rights which
- could not be set aside. The difficulty appeared insuperable;
ar
but it was overcome by the voluntary act of Kinnamus, who
wrote to Artabanus and offered to retire in his favor. Here-
upon Artabanus returned and remounted his throne, Kinnamus
carrying his magnanimity so far as to strip the diadem from
his own brow and replace it on the head of the old monarch.
A condition of the restoration was a complete amnesty for all
political offences, which was not only promised by Artabanus,
but likewise guaranteed by Izates. .
It was very shortly after his second restoration to the
throne that Artabanus died. One further calamity must, how-
ever, be noticed as having fallen within the limits of his
reign. The great city of Seleucia, the second in the Empire,
shortly after it had experienced the troubles above narrated,”
revolted absolutely from the Parthian power, and declared it-
self independent. No account has reached us of the circum-
stances which caused this revolt; but it was indicative of a
feeling that Parthia was beginning to decline, and that the dis-
integration of the Empire was a thing that might be expected.
The Seleucians had at no time been contented with their position
#
g #
cH. xv.] SUCCESSOR OF ARTABANUS III. DOUBTFUL. 141
as Parthian subjects. Whether they supposed that they could
stand alone, or whether they looked to enjoying under Roman
protection a greater degree of independence than had been
allowed them by the Parthians, is uncertain. They revolted.
however, in A. D. 40, and declared themselves a self-governing
community. It does not appear that the Romans lent them
any assistance, or broke for their sake the peace established
with Parthia in A. D. 37. The Seleucians had to depend upon,
themselves alone, and to maintain their rebellion by means of
their own resources. No doubt Artabanus proceeded at once
to attack them, but his arms made no impression. They were
successful in defending their independence during his reign,
and for some time afterwards, although compelled in the end
to Succumb and resume a subject position under their own
masters. Artabanus seems to have died in August or Septem-
ber A.D. 42,” the year after the death of Caligula. His checkered
reign had covered a space which cannot have fallen much
short of thirty years.
CHAPTER XV.
Doubts as to the successor of Artabanus III. First short reign.
of Gotarzes. He is eacpelled and Vardanes made king.
Reign of Vardanes. His war with Izates. His Death.
Second reign of Gotarzes. His Contest with his Nephew,
Meherdates. His Death. Short and inglorious reign of
Vonones II. - --
“Turbatae Parthorum res, inter ambiguos, quis in regnum acciperetur.” -
Tacit. Ann. xi. 10.
THERE is considerable doubt as to the immediate successor
of Artabanus. According to Josephus' he left his kingdom to
his son, Bardanes or Vardanes, and this prince entered without
difficulty and at once upon the enjoyment of his sovereignty. .
According to Tacitus,” the person who obtained the throne
directly upon the death of Artabanus was his son, Gotarzes, ...'
who was generally accepted for king, and might have reigned
without having his title disputed, had he not given indications
of a harsh and cruel temper. Among other atrocities whereof ,
}
142 , THE SIXTH YONARCHIV. [CH. xv.
he was guilty was the murder of his brother, Artabanus,”
whom he put to death, together with his wife and Son, appar-
ently upon mere suspicion. This bloody initiation of his reign
spread alarm among the nobles, who thereupon determined to
exert their constitutional privilege of deposing an obnoxious
monarch and supplying his place with a new one. Their
choice fell upon Vardanes, brother of Gotarzes, who was resid-
ing in a distant province, 350 miles from the Court. [Pl. II.
Fig. 5.] Having entered into communications with this prince,
they easily induced him to quit his retirement, and to take up
arms against the tyrant. Vardanes was ambitious, bold and
prompt: he had no sooner received the invitation of the Megis-
tanes than he set out, and, having accomplished his journey to
the Court in the space of two days," found Gotarzes wholly
unprepared to offer resistance. Thus Vardanes became king
without fighting a battle. Gotarzes fled, and escaped into the
country of the Dahae, which lay east of the Caspian Sea, and
north of the Parthian province of Hyrcania. Here he was
allowed to reign for some time unmolested by his brother, and
to form plans and make preparations for the recovery of his
lost power.
The statements of Tacitus are so circumstantial, and his
authority as an historian is so great, that we can scarcely
hesitate to accept the history as he delivers it, rather than as
it is related by the Jewish writer. It is, however, remarkable
that the Series of Parthian coins presents an appearance of
accordance rather with the latter than the former, since it
affords no trace of the supposed first reign of Gotarzes in A.D.
42, while it shows Vardanes to have held the throne from
Sept. A.D. 42 to at least A.D. 46." Still this does not absolutely
contradict Tacitus. It only proves that the first reign of
Gotarzes was comprised within a few weeks, and that before
two months had passed from the death of Artabanus, the
kingdom was established in the hands of Vardanes. That
prince, after the flight of his brother, applied himself for some
time to the reduction of the Seleucians," whose continued inde-
pendence in the midst of a Parthian province he regarded as a
disgrace to the Empire. His efforts to take the town failed,
however, of success. Being abundantly provisioned and
strongly fortified, it was well able to stand a siege; and the
high spirit of its inhabitants made them determined to resist
to the uttermost. While they still held out, Vardanes was
called away to the East, where his brother had been gathering
. A
CH. XV.] REIGN OF WARDANäs I. 143
strength, and was once more advancing his pretensions. The
Hyrcanians, as well as the Dahae, had embraced his cause, and
Parthia was threatened with dismemberment. Vardanés, hav-
ing Collected his troops, Occupied a position in the plain region
of Bactria," and there prepared to give battle to his brother,
who was likewise at the head of a considerable army. Before,
however, an engagement took place, Gotarzes discovered that
there was a design among the nobles on either side to rid them-
Selves of both the brothers, and to set up a wholly new king.
Apprehensive of the consequences, he communicated his dis-
covery to Vardanes; and the result was that the two brothers
made up their differences and agreed upon terms of peace.
Gotarzes yielded his claim to the crown, and was assigned a
residence in Hyrcania, which was, probably, made over to his
government. Vardanes then returned to the west, and, resum-
ing the siege of Seleucia, compelled the rebel city to a sur-
render in the seventh year after it had revolted (A.D. 46.)”
Successful thus far, and regarding his quarrel with his
brother as finally arranged, Vardanes proceeded to contem-
plate a military expedition of the highest importance. The
time, he thought, was favorable for reviving the Parthian
claim to Armenia,” and disputing once more with Rome the
possession of a paramount influence over that country. The
Roman government of the dependency, since Artabanus for-
mally relinquished it to them, had been far from proving
satisfactory. Mithridates, their protégé,” had displeased them,
and had been summoned to Rome by Caligula,” who kept him
there a prisoner until his death.” Armenia, left without a
king, had asserted her independence; and when, after an
absence of several years, Mithridates was authorized by
Claudius to return to his kingdom, the natives resisted him in
arms, and were only brought under his rule by the combined
help of the Romans and the Iberians. Forced upon a reluctant
people by foreign arms, Mithridates felt himself insecure, and
this feeling made him rule his subjects with imprudent
Severity.” Under these circumstances it seemed to Vardanes
that it would not be very difficult to recover Armenia, and
thus gain a signal triumph over the Romans.
But to engage in so great a matter with a good prospect of
Success it was necessary that the war should be approved,
not only by himsself, but by his principal feudatories.” The
most important of these was now Izates, king of Adiabéné and
Gordyéné,” who in the last reign had restored Artabanus to -
\
† - * . A
4.
f •
144 - THE SIXTH MoMARCHY, [CH. xv.
his lost throne.” Vardanes, before committing himself by any
overt act, appears to have taken this prince into his counsels,
and to have requested his opinion on affronting the Romans by
an interference with Armenian affairs. Izates strenuously
opposed the project. He had a personal interest in the matter,
since he had sent five of his boys to Rome, to receive there a
polite education, and he had also a profound respect for the
Roman power and military system. He endeavored, both by
persuasion and reasoning, to induce Vardanes to abandon his
design. His arguments may have been cogent, but they were
not thought by Vardanes to have much force, and the result of
the conference was that the Great King declared war against
his feudatory.” -
The war had, apparently, but just begun, when fresh trou-
bles broke out in the north-east. Gotarzes had never ceased to
regret his renunciation of his claims, and was now, on the in-
vitation of the Parthian nobility, prepared to came forward
again and contest the kingdom with his brother. Vardanes
had to relinquish his attempt to coerce Izates, and to hasten to
* Hyrcania in order to engage the troops which Gotarzes had col-
,'
lected in that distant region. These he met and defeated more
than once in the country between the Caspian and Herat;”
but the success of his military operations failed to strengthen
his hold upon the affections of his subjects. Like the gener-
ality of the Parthian princes, he showed himself harsh and
cruel in the hour of victory, and in conquering an opposition
roused an opposition that was fiercer and more formidable.
A conspiracy was formed against him shortly after his return
from Hyrcania, and he was assassinated while indulging in
the national amusement of the chase.”
The murder of Vardanes was immediately followed by the
restoration of Gotarzes to the throne. There may have been
some who doubted his fitness for the regal office,” and inclined
to keep the throne vacant till they could send to Rome and ob-
tain from thence one of the younger and more civilized Par-
thian princes. But, we may be sure that the general desire was
not for a Romanized sovereign, but for a truly national king,
one born and bred in the country. Gotarzes was proclaimed
by common consent, and without any interval, after the death
of Vardanes, and ascended the Parthian throne before the end
of the year A.D. 46.” It is not likely that his rule would have
been resisted had he conducted himself well; but the cruelty
of his temper, which had already once cost him his crown,
&
º
i
ANCIENT prºrsi ANs (from a bas-relief at Persepolis).

Vol. Ill.
Plata X|}.
fºrðavs “Nos sih o L-NAworio a HI， ĐNIAIÐ · I saxſizixw Lwiw

—,
CH. xv.] GOTARZES AND MEHERDATES. 145
‘s.
ſ - \
again displayed itself after his restoration, and to this defect
was added a slothful indulgence yet more distasteful to his
subjects.” Some military expeditions which he undertook,
moreover, failed of success, and the crime of defeat caused the
cup of his offences to brim over. The discontented portion of
his people, who were a strong party, sent envoys to the Roman
Emperor, Claudius (A.D. 49), and begged that he would surren-
der to them Meherdates, the grandson of Phraates IV. and son
of Vonones, who still remained at Rome in a position between
that of a guest and a hostage. “They were not ignorant,”
they said, “of the treaty which bound the Romans to Parthia,
nor did they ask Claudius to infringe it. Their desire was not
to throw off the authority of the Arsacidae, but only to ex-
change one Arsacid for another. - The rule of Gotarzes had be-
came intolerable, alike to the nobility and the common people.
He had murdered all his male relatives, or at least all that
were within his reach—first his brothers, then his near kins-
men, finally even those whose relationship was remote; nor
had he stopped there; he had proceeded to put to death their
young children and their pregnant wives. He was sluggish in
his habits, unfortunate in his wars, and had betaken himself.
to cruelty, that men might not despise him for his want of
manliness. The friendship between Rome and Parthia was a
public matter; it bound the Romans to help the nation allied
to them—a nation which, though equal to them in strength,
was content on account of its respect for Rome to yield her
precedence. Parthian princes were allowed to be hostages in
foreign lands for the very reason that then it was always possi4
ble, if their own monarch displeased them, for the people to
obtain a king from abroad, brought up under milder in-
fluences.”” -
This harangue was made before the Emperor Claudius and
the assembled Senate, Meherdates himself being also present.
Claudius responded to it favorably. “He would follow the
example of the Divine Augustus, and allow the Parthians to
take from Rome the monarch whom they requested. That
prince, bred up in the city, had always been remarkable for
his moderation. He would (it was to be hoped) regard himself
in his new position, not as a master of slaves, but as a ruler of
citizens. He would find that clemency and justice were the
more appreciated by a barbarous nation, the less they had had
experience of them Meherdates might accompany the Par-
thian envoys; and a Roman of rank, Caius Cassius, the prefect
*
\
146 THE SIXTH MONARCHY, [CH. xv.
of Syria, should be instructed to receive them on their arrival
in Asia, and to see them safely across the Euphrates.”
The young prince accordingly set out, and reached the city
of Zeugma in safety. Here he was joined, not only by a
number of the Parthian nobles, but also by the reigning king
of Osrhoëné, who bore the usual name of Abgarus.” The
Parthians were anxious that he should advance at his best
speed and by the shortest route on Ctesiphon, and the Roman
governor, Cassius, strongly advised the same course; but
Meherdates fell under the influence of the Osrhoëné monarch,
who is thought by Tacitus to have been a false friend, and to
have determined from the first to do his best for Gotarzes.
Abgarus induced Meherdates to proceed from Zeugma to his
own capital, Edessa, and there detained him for several days
by means of a series of festivities. He then persuaded him,
though the winter was approaching, to enter Armenia, and to
proceed against his antagonist by the circuitous route of the
Upper Tigris, instead of the more direct one through Meso-
potamia. In this way much valuable time was lost. The
rough mountain-routes and Snows of Armenia harassed and
fatigued the pretender's troops, while Gotarzes was given an
interval during which to collect a tolerably large body of
soldiers. Still, the delay was not very great. Meherdates
marched probably by Diarbekr, Til, and Jezireh, or in other
words, followed the course of the Tigris, which he crossed in
the neigborhood of Mosul, after taking the small town which
represented the ancient Nineveh. His line of march had now
brought him into Adiabéné; and it seemed a good omen for
the success of his cause that Izates, the powerful monarch of
that tract, declared in his favor, and brought a body of troops
to his assistance.” Gotarzes was in the neighborhood, but
was distrustful of his strength, and desirous of collecting a
larger force before committing himself to the hazard of an en-
gagement. He had taken up a strong position with the river
Corma in his front,” and, remaining on the defensive, con-
tented himself with trying by his emissaries the fidelity of his
rival's troops and allies. The plan succeeded. After a little
time, the army of Meherdates began to melt away. Izates of
Adiabéné and Abgarus of Edessa drew off their contingents,
and left the pretender to depend wholly on his Parthian sup-
porters. Even their fidelity was doubtful, and might have
given way on further trial; Meherdates therefore resolved,
before being wholly deserted, to try the chance of a battle.
N.
CH. XV. I ROCR SCULPTURE OF GOTARZES. 147
His adversary was now as willing to engage as himself, since
he felt that he was no longer outnumbered. The rivals met,
and a fierce and bloody action was fought between the two
armies, no important advantage being for a long time gained
by either. At length Carrhenes, the chief general on the side
of Meherdates, having routed the troops opposed to him and
pursued them too hotly, was intercepted by the enemy on his
return and either killed or made prisoner. This event proved
decisive. The loss of their leader caused the army of Meher-
dates to fly; and he himself, being induced to intrust his
safety to a certain Parrhaces, a dependent of his father's, was
betrayed by this miscreant, loaded with chains, and given up
to his rival. Gotarzes now proved less unmerciful than might
have been expected from his general character. Instead of
punishing Meherdates with death, he thought it sufficient to
insult him with the names of “foreigner” and “Roman,” and
to render it impossible that he should be again put forward as
monarch by subjecting him to mutilation.” The Roman
historian supposes that this was done to cast a slur upon
Rome;” but it was a natural measure of precaution under the
circumstances, and had probably no more recondite motive
than compassion for the youth and inexperience of the pre-
tender. -
Gotarzes, having triumphed over his rival, appears to have
resolved on commemorating his victory in a novel manner.
Instead of striking a new coin, like Vonones,” he determined
to place his achievement on record by making it the subject
of a rock-tablet, which he caused to be engraved on the sacred
mountain of Baghistan, adorned already with sculptures and
inscriptions by the greatest of the Achaemenian monarchs.
The bas-relief and its inscription have been much damaged,
both by the waste of ages and the rude hand of man; but
enough remains to show that the conqueror was represented
as pursuing his enemies in the field, on horseback, while a
winged Victory, flying in the air, was on the point of placing
a diadem on his head." In the Greek legend which accom-
panied the sculpture he was termed “Satrap of Satraps”—an
equivalent of the ordinary title “King of Kings”; and his con-
quered rival was mentioned under the name of Mithrates, a cor-
rupt form of the more common or Mithridates or Meherdates.”
Very shortly after his victory Gotarzes died. His last year
Seems to have been A.D. 51.* According to Tacitus, he died a
natural death, from the effects of disease;” but, according to
-— - s—z- - —= - —r-
•r i Af *
148 , THE SIXTH - MONAIROH Y. [CH. XV.
Josephus, he was the victim of a conspiracy.” The authority
of Tacitus, here as elsewhere generally, is to be preferred; and
we may regard Gotarzes as ending peacefully his unquiet
reign, which had begun in A.D. 42, immediately after the death
of his father, had been interrupted for four years—from A.D.
42 to A.D. 46—and had then been renewed and lasted from A.D.
46 to A.D. 51. Gotarzes was not a prince of any remarkable
talents, or of a character differing in any important respects
from the ordinary Parthian type. He was perhaps even more
cruel than the bulk of the Arsacidae, though his treatment of
Meherdates showed that he could be lenient upon occasion.
He was more prudent than daring, more politic than brave,
more bent on maintaining his own position than on advancing
the power or dignity of his country. Parthia owed little or
nothing to him. The internal organization of the country
must have suffered from his long wars with his brother and
his nephew; its external reputation was not increased by one
whose foreign expeditions were uniformly unfortunate.
The successor of Gotarzes was a certain Vonones. His rela-
tionship to previous monarchs is doubtful—and may be sus-
pected to have been remote.” Gotarzes had murdered or
mutilated all the Arsacidae on whom he could lay his hands;
and the Parthians had to send to Media” upon his disease in
order to obtain a sovereign of the required blood. The coins
of Vonones II. are scarce, and have a peculiar rudeness. The
only date” found upon them is one equivalent to A.D. 51–52;
and it would seem that his entire reign was comprised within
the space of a few months. Tacitus tells us that his rule was
brief and inglorious, marked by no important events, either
prosperous or adverse. He was succeeded by his son, Vola-
gases I., who appears to have ascended the throne before the
year A.D. 51 had expired.”
... — i. - ; Y.
.* * N
CH. xv.1.] ACCESSION OF WOLAGASES I. 149.
CHAPTER XVI.
Reign of Volagases I. His first attempt on Armenia fails.
His quarrel with Izates. Invasion of Parthia Proper by
the Dahae and Sacae. Second attack of Volagases on Ar-
menia. Tiridates established as King. First eacpedition
of Corbulo. Half submission of Volagases. Revolt of
TVardanes. Second eacpedition of Corbulo. Armenia given
to Tigranes. Revolt of Hyrcania. Third attack of Vola-
gases on Armenia. Defeat of Poetus, and re-establishment
of Tiridates. Last eacpedition of Corbulo, and arrange-
ment of Terms of Peace. Tiridates at Rome. Probable
time of the Death of Volagases. ~
“Genti Parthorum Vologeses imperitabat, materna origine expellice Graeca.”
Tac. Ann. xii. 44.
VoNONES the Second left behind him three sons, Volagases,
Tiridates, and Pacorus. It is doubtful which of them was the
eldest, but, on the whole, most probable that that position be-
longed to Pacorus. We are told that Volagases obtained the
crown by his brothers' yielding up their claim to him,” from
/
which we must draw the conclusion that both of them were
his elders. These circumstances of his accession will account
for much of his subsequent conduct. It happened that he was
able at once to bestow a principality upon Pacorus,” to whom
he felt specially indebted; but in order adequately to reward
his other benefactor, he found it necessary to conquer a prov-
ince and then make its government over to him. Hence his
frequent attacks upon Armenia, and his numerous wars with
Rome for its possession, which led ultimately to an arrange- .
ment by which the quiet enjoyment of the Armenian throne
was secured to Tiridates.
The circumstances under which Volagases made his first
attack upon Armenia were the following. Pharasmanes of .
Iberia,” whose brother, Mithridates, the Romans had (in A.D.
47) replaced upon the Armenian throne, had a son named
Rhadamistus, whose lust of power was so great that to pre-
vent his making an attempt on his own crown Pharasmanes
found it necessary to divert his thoughts to another quarter."
f
t - \
# *
150 THE SIXTH HONARCHIV. , [CH. XVI.
Armenia, he suggested, lay near, and was a prize worth win-
ning; Rhadamistus had only to ingratiate himself with the
people, and then craftily remove his uncle, and he would
probably step with ease into the vacant place. The son took
the advice of his father, and in a little time succeeded in get-
ting Mithridates into his power, when he ruthlessly put him
to death, together with his wife and children." Rhadamistus
then, supported by his father, obtained the object of his ambi-
tion, and became king. It was known, however, that a con-
siderable number of the Armenians were adverse to a rule
which had been brought about by treachery and murder; and
it was suspected that, if an attack were made upon him, he
would not be supported with much zeal by his subjects. This
was the condition of things when Volagases ascended the Par-
thian throne, and found himself in want of a principality with
which he might reward the services of Tiridates, his brother.
It at once occurred to him that a happy chance presented him
with an excellent opportunity of acquiring Armenia, and he
accordingly proceeded, in the very year of his accession, to
make an expedition against it." At first he carried all before
him. The Iberian supporters of Rhadamistus fled without
risking a battle; his Armenian subjects resisted weakly; Ar-
taxata and Tigranocerta opened their gates; and the country
generally submitted. Tiridates enjoyed his kingdom for a few
months; but a terrible pestilence, brought about by a severe
winter and a want of proper provisions, decimated the Par-
thian force left in garrison; and Volagases found himself
obliged, after a short occupation, to relinquish his conquest.
Rhadamistus returned, and, although the Armenians opposed
him in arms, contrived to re-establish himself. The Parthians
did not renew their efforts, and for three years—from A.D. 51
to A.D. 54–Rhadamistus was left in quiet possession of the
Armenian kingdom."
It appears to have been in this interval that the arms of
Volagases were directed against one of his great feudatories,
Izates. As in Europe during the prevalence of the feudal sys-
tem, so under the Parthian government, it was always possible
that the sovereign might be forced to contend with one of the
princes who owed him fealty. Volagases seems to have
thought that the position of the Adiabenian monarch was be-
coming too independent, and that it was necessary to recall
him, by a sharp mandate, to his proper position of subordinate
and tributary. Accordingly, he sent him a demand that he
$.
*
CH. XVI.] IIIS WAR WITH IZATES. 151
should surrender the special privileges which had been con-
ferred upon him by Artabanus III., and resume the ordinary,
status of a Parthian feudatory. Izates, who feared that if he
yielded he would find that this demand was only a prelude to
others more intolerable, replied by a positive refusal, and im-
mediately prepared to resist an invasion. He sent his wives
and children to the strongest fortress within his dominions, col-
lected all the grain that his subjects possessed into fortified
places, and laid waste the whole of the open country, so that
it should afford no sustenance to an invading army. He then
took up a position on the lower Zab, or Căprius, and stood
prepared to resist an attack upon his territory. Volagases
advanced to the opposite bank of the river, and was preparing
to invade Adiabéné, when news reached him of an important
attack upon his eastern provinces. A horde of barbarians,
consisting of Dahae and other Scythians, had poured into Par-
thia. Proper, knowing that he was engaged elsewhere, and
threatened to carry fire and sword through the entire prov-,
ince. The Parthian monarch considered that it was his first
duty to meet these aggressors; and leaving Izates unchastised,
he marched away to the north-east to repel the external
enemy.”
Volagases, after defeating this foe, would no doubt have re-
turned to Adiabéné, and resumed the war with Izates, but in
his absence that prince died." Monobazus, his brother, who
inherited his crown, could have no claim to the privileges
which had been conferred for personal services upon Izates;
and consequently there was no necessity for the war to be re-
newed. The bones of Izates were conveyed to the holy soil of
Palestine and buried in the vicinity of Jerusalem. Monobazus
was accepted by Volagases as his brother's successor without
any apparent reluctance, and proved a faithful tributary, on
whom his suzerain could place complete dependence.
The quarrel with Izates, and the war with the Dahae and
Sacae, may have occupied the years A.D. 52 and 53. At any
rate it was not till A.D. 54, his fourth year, that Volagases re-
Sumed his designs against Armenia.” Rhadamistus, though
he had more than once had to fly the country, was found in
p0SSession as king, and for Some time he opposed the progress
of the Parthian arms; but, before the year was out, despairing
of success, he again fled, and left Volagases to arrange the af-
fairs of Armenia at his pleasure. Tiridates was at once estab-
lished as king, and Armenia brought into the position of a
Jº
*
| -
152 ' THE SIXTH MO WARCHIV. ſch. xvi.
regular Parthian dependency. The claims of Rome were ig-
nored. Volagases was probably aware that the Imperial throne
was occupied by a mere youth, not eighteen years old, one
destitute of all warlike tastes, a lover of music and of the arts,
who might be expected to submit to the loss of a remote prov-
ince without much difficulty. He therefore acted as if Rome
had no rights in this part of Asia, established his brother at
Artaxata, and did not so much as send an embassy to Nero to
excuse or explain his acts. These proceedings caused much
uneasiness in Italy. If Nero himself cannot be regarded as
likely to have felt very keenly the blow struck at the prestige
of the Empire, yet there were those among his advisers who
could well understand and appreciate the situation. The
ministers of the young prince resolved that efforts on the
- largest scale should be made. Orders were at once issued for
recruiting the Oriental legions, and moving them nearer to
Armenia; preparations were set on foot for bridging the Eu-
phrates; Antiochus of Commagéné, and Herod Agrippa II.,
were required to collect troops and hold themselves in readiness
to invade Parthia; the Roman provinces bordering upon Ar-
menia were placed under new governors;” above all, Corbulo,
regarded as the best general of the time, was summoned from
Germany, and assigned the provinces of Cappadocia and Gala-
tia, together with the general superintendence of the war “for
retaining possession of Armenia.”” At the same time instruc-
tions were sent out to Ummidius, proconsul of Syria, requiring
him to co-operate with Corbulo; and arrangements were made
to obviate the clashing of authority which was to be feared be-
...tween two equal commanders. In the spring of A.D. 55 the
Roman armies were ready to take the field, and a struggle
seemed impending which would recall the times of Antony and
Phraates.
But, at the moment when expectation was at its height, and
the clang of arms appeared about to resound throughout
Western Asia, suddenly a disposition for peace manifested it-
self. Both Corbulo and Ummidius sent embassies to Volagases,
exhorting him to make concessions, and apparently giving him
to understand that something less was required of him than
the restoration of Armenia to the Romans.” Volagases listened
favorably to the overtures, and agreed to put into the hands of
the Roman commanders the most distinguished members of the
royal family as hostages. At the same time he withdrew his
troops from Armenia;” which the Romans, however, did not
CH. XVI.] REBELLION OF WARDANES II. 153
occupy, and which continued, as it would seem, to be governed
by Tiridates. The motive of the Parthian king in acting as he
did is obvious. A revolt against his authority had broken out
in Parthia, headed by his son, Vardanes; and, until this inter-"
nal trouble should be suppressed, he could not engage with ad-
vantage in a foreign war.” [Pl. III. Fig. 1.] The reasons
which actuated the Roman generals are far more obscure. It ,
is difficult to understand their Omission to press upon Volagases
in his difficulties, or their readiness to accept the persons of a
few hostages, however high their rank, as an equivalent for the
Roman claim to a province. Perhaps the jealousy which sub-
sequently showed itself in regard to the custody of the
hostages” may have previously existed between the two com-
manders, and they may have each consented to a peace disad-
vantageous to Rome through fear of the other's obtaining the
chief laurels if war were entered on. ,”
The struggle for power between Volagases and his son War-
danes seems to have lasted for three years"—from A.D. 55 to
A.D. 58. Its details are unknown to us; but Volagases must
have been successful; and we may assume that the pretender,
of whom we hear no more, was put to death. No sooner was
the contest terminated than Volagases, feeling that he was now
free to act, took a high tone in his communications with Cor-
bulo and Ummidius, and declared that not only must his
brother, Tiridates, be left in the undisturbed possession of Ar-
menia, but it must be distinctly understood that he held it as a
Parthian, and not as a Roman, feudatory.” At the same time
Tiridates began to exercise his authority over the Armenians
with severity, and especially to persecute those whom he sus-
pected of inclining towards the Romans.” Corbulo appears to
have felt that it was necessary to atone for his three years of
inaction by at length prosecuting the war in earnest. He
tightened the discipline of the legions, while he recruited them.
to their full strength,” made fresh friends among the hardy
races of the neighborhood,” renewed the Roman alliance with
Pharasmanes of Iberia, urged. Antiochus of Commagéné to
cross the Armenian frontier, and taking the field himself,
carried fire and sword Over a large portion of the Armenian
territory. Volagases sent a contingent of troops to the assist-
ance of his feudatory, but was unable to proceed to his relief in
person, owing to the occurrence of a revolt in Hyrcania,”
which broke out, fortunately for the Romans, in the very year
that the rebellion of Vardanes was Suppressed. Under these
*
A
*
154 i THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [cH. xvi.
circumstances it is not surprising that Tiridates had recourse toº
treachery,” or that on his treachery failing he continually lost
ground, and was at last compelled to evacuate the country and
yield the possession of it to the Romans. It is more remarka-
ble that he prolonged his resistance into the third year than
that he was unable to continue the struggle to a later date. He
lost his capital, Artaxata, in A.D. 58, and Tigranocerta, the
second city of Armenia, in A.D. 60. After this he made one
further effort from the side of Media,” but the attempt was un-
availing; and on suffering a fresh defeat he withdrew alto-
gether from the struggle, whereupon Armenia reverted to the
Romans. They entrusted the government to a certain Tigranes,
a grandson of Archelaiis, king of Cappadocia, but at the same
time greatly diminished the extent of the kingdom by granting
portions of it to neighboring princes. Pharasmanes of Iberia,
Połemo of Pontus, Aristobulus of the Lesser Armenia, and An-
tiochus of Commagéné, received an augmentation of their terri-
tories at the expense of the rebel state, which had shown itself
incapable of appreciating the blessings of Roman rule and had
manifested a decided preference for the Parthians.”
But the fate of Armenia, and the position which she was to
hold in respect of the two great rivals, Rome and Parthia, were
not yet decided. Hitherto Volagases, engaged in a contest
with the Hyrcanians and with other neighboring nations,
whereto the flames of war had spread,” had found himself
unable to take any personal part in the struggle in which his
brother and vassal had been engaged in the west. Now mat-
ters in Hyrcania admitted of arrangment, and he was at lib-
erty to give his main attention to Armenian affairs. His pres-
ence in the West had become absolutely necessary. Not only
was Armenia, lost to him, but it had been made a centre from
which his other provinces in this quarter might be attacked
and harassed. Tigranes, proud of his newly-won crown, and
anxious to show himself worthy of it, made constant incursions
into Adiabéné, ravaging and harrying the fertile country far
and wide.” Monobazus, unable to resist him in the field, was
beginning to contemplate the transfer of his allegiance to Rome,
as the only means of escaping from the evils of a perpetual
border war.” Tiridates, discontented with the position
whereto he found himself reduced, and angry that his brother
had not given him more effective support, was loud in his com-
plaints, and openly taxed Volagases with an inertness that
bordered on cowardice.” Public opinion was inclined to accept
w -
cii. xvi.] TIIIRD EXPEDITION OF WOLAGASES. 155
- f *
and approve the charge; and in Parthia public opinion could
not be safely contemned. Volagases found it necessary to win
back his subjects' good-will by calling a council of the nobility,
and making them a formal address:” “Parthians,” he said,
“when I obtained the first place among you by my brothers
ceding their claims, I endeavored to substitute for the old sys-
tem of fraternal hatred and contention a new one of domestic
affection and agreement; my brother Pacorus received Media
from my hands at once; Tiridates, whom you see now before
you, I inducted shortly afterwards into the sovereignty of
Armenia, a dignity reckoned the third in the Parthian king- |
dom. Thus I put my family matters on a peaceful and satisfac-
tory footing. But these arrangements are now disturbed by the
Romans, who have never hitherto broken their treaties with
us to their profit, and who will now find that they have done ,
so to their ruin. I will not deny that hitherto I have preferred "
to maintain my right to the territories, which have come to me
from my ancestors, by fair dealing rather than by shedding of
blood—by negotiation rather than by arms; if, however, I
have erred in this and have been weak to delay so long, I will
now correct my fault by showing the more zeal. You at any.
rate have lost nothing by my abstinence; your strength is in-
tact, your glory undinninished; you have added, moreover, to
your reputation for valor the credit of moderation—a virtue
which not even the highest among men can afford to despise,
and which the Gods view with special favor.” Having con-
cluded his speech, he placed a diadem on the brow of Tiridates,
proclaiming by this significant act his determination to restore
him to the Armenian throne. At the same time he ordered
Monaeses, a Parthian general, and Monobazus, the Adiabenian
monarch, to take the field and enter Armenia, while he him-
self with the main strength of the empire advanced towards
the Euphrates and theatened Syria with invasion.”
The results of the campaign which followed (A.D. 62) scarcely
answered to this magnificent opening. Monaeses indeed, in
conjunction with Monobazus, invaded Armenia, and, advanc-
ing to Tigranocerta, besieged Tigranes in that city,” which, ,
upon the destruction of Artaxata by Corbulo, “ had become the
seat of government. Volagases himself proceeded as far as
Nisibis,” whence he could threaten at the same time Armenia
and Syria. The Parthian arms proved, however, powerless to
effect any serious impression upon Tigranocerta; and Vola-
gases, being met at Nisibis by envoys from Corbulo, who
A
* - *
156 THE SIXTH MoMARCHY. ' [ch. xvi.
!
threatened an invasion of Parthia in retaliation of the Parthian
attack upon Armenia, consented to an arrangement. A plague
of locusts had spread itself Over Upper Mesopotamia, and the
- consequent scarcity of forage completely paralyzed a force
which consisted almost entirely of cavalry.” Volagases was
glad under the circumstances to delay the conflict which had
seemed impending, and readily agreed that his troops should
suspend the siege of Tigranocerta and withdraw from Armenia
on condition that the Roman should at the same time evacuate
the province.” He would send, he said, ambassadors to Rome
who should arrange with Nero the footing upon which Armenia
was to be placed. Meanwhile, until the embassy returned, there
should be peace—the Armenians should be left to themselves—
neither Rome nor Parthia should maintain a soldier within the
limits of the province, and any collision between the armies of
the two countries should be avoided.
A pause, apparently of some months' duration, followed.
Towards the close of autumn, however, a new general came upon
the scene; and a new factor was introduced into the political
and military combinations of the period. L. Caesennius Paetus,
a favorite of the Roman Emperor, but a man of no capacity,
was appointed by Nero to take the main direction of affairs in
Armenia, while Corbulo confined himself to the care of Syria,
his special province. Corbulo had requested a coadjutor,”
probably not so much from an opinion that the war would be
better conducted by two commanders than by one, as from
fear of provoking the jealousy of Nero, if he continued any
longer to administer the whole of the East. On the arrival of
Paetus, who brought one legion with him, an equitable division
of the Roman forces was made between the generals. Each
had three legions; and while Corbulo retained the Syrian aux-
iliaries, those of Pontus, Galatia, and Cappadocia were attached
to the army of Paetus. But no friendly feeling united the
leaders. Corbulo was jealous of the rival whom he knew to
have been sent out as a check upon him rather than as a help;
and Paetus was inclined to despise the slow and temporizing
policy of the elder chief. The war, according to his views, re-
quired to be carried on with more dash and vigor than had
hitherto appeared in its conduct—cities should be stormed, he
Said–the whole country plundered—severe examples made of
the guilty. The object of the war also should be changed—in-
stead of setting up shadowy kings, his own aim would be to
reduce Armenia into the form of a province.”
CH. XVI.] ' CAMPAIGN AGAINST PAETUS. 157
The truce established in the early summer, when Volagases
sent his envoys to Nero, expired in the autumn, on their re-
turn without a definite reply;” and the Roman commanders
at once took the Offensive and entered upon an autumn cam-
paign, the second within the space of a year. Corbulo crossed
the Euphrates in the face of a large Parthian army, which he
forced to retire from the eastern bank of the river by means
of military engines worked from ships anchored in mid-stream.
He then advanced and occupied a strong position in the hills
at a little distance from the river, where he caused his legions
to construct an entrenched camp.” Paetus, on his part, en-
tered Armenia from Cappadocia with two legions, and, passing
the Taurus range, ravaged a large extent of country; winter,
however, approaching, and the enemy nowhere appearing in
force, he led back his troops across the mountains, and, re-
garding the campaign as finished, wrote a despatch to Nero
boasting of his successes, sent one of his three legions to winter
in Pontus, and placed the other two in quarters between the
Taurus and the Euphrates, at the same time granting furloughs
to as many of the soldiers as chose to apply for them. A
large number took advantage of his liberality, preferring no
doubt the pleasures and amusements of the Syrian and Cap-
padocian cities to the hardships of a winter in the Armenian
highlands. While matters were in this position Paetus sud-
denly heard that Volagases was advancing against him. As
once before at an important crisis,” so now with the prospect
of Armenia as the prize of victory, the Parthians defied the
severities of winter and commenced a compaign when their
enemy regarded the Season for war as over. In this crisis
Paetus exhibited an entire unfitness for command. First, he
resolved to remain on the defensive in his camp; then, affect-
ing to despise the protection of ramparts and ditches, he gave
the order to advance and meet the enemy; finally, after losing
a few Scouts whom he had sent forward, he hastily retreated
and resumed his old position, but at the same time unwisely
detached three thousand of his best foot to block the pass of
Taurus, through which Volagases was advancing.” After
Some hesitation he was induced to make Corbulo acquainted
with his position; but the message which he sent merely stated
that he was expecting to be attacked. “ Corbulo was in no
hurry to proceed to his relief, preferring to appear upon the
scene at the last moment, when he would be hailed as a
Savior.
T T T T - – - — — — — — — —
-- *
158 THE SIXTH MoMARCHY. ' [ch. xvi.
Volagases, meanwhile, continued his march. The small force .
left by Paetus to block his progress was easily overpowered,
and for the most part destroyed.* The castle of Arsamosata.”
where Paetus had placed his wife and child, and the fortified
camp of the legions, were besieged." The Romans were chal-
lenged to a battle, but dared not show themselves outside their
entrenchments. Having no confidence in their leader, the
legionaries despaired and began openly to talk of a surrender.
As the danger drew nearer, fresh messengers had been des-
patched to Corbulo, and he had been implored to come at his
best speed in order to save the poor remnant of a defeated
army.* That commander was on his march, by way of Com-
magéné and Cappadocia; it could not be very long before he
would arrive; and the supplies in the camp of Paetus were
sufficient to have enabled him to hold out for weeks and
, months.” But an unworthy terror had seized both Paetus and
his soldiers. Instead of holding out to the last, the alarmed
chief proposed negotiations, and the result was that he con-
sented to capitulate. His troops were to be allowed to quit
their entrenchments and withdraw from the country, but were
to surrender their strongholds and their stores. Armenia was
to be completely evacuated by the Romans; and a truce was to
be observed and Armenia not again invaded, until a fresh em-
bassy, which Volagases proposed to send to Rome, returned.
Moreover, a bridge was to be made by the Romans over the
Arsanias, a tributary of the Euphrates, which, as it was of no
immediate service to the Parthians, could only be intended as
a monument of the Roman defeat." Paetus assented to these
terms, and they were carried out; not, however, without some
further ignominy to the Romans. The Parthians entered the
Roman entrenchments before the legionaries had left them,
and laid their hands on anything which they recognized as
Armenian spoil. They even seized the soldiers' clothes and
arms, which were relinquished to them without a struggle,
lest resistance should provoke an outbreak.” Paetus, once
more at liberty, proceeded with unseemly haste to the Eu-
phrates, deserting his wounded and his stragglers,” whom he
left to the tender mercies of the Armenians. At the Euphrates
he effected a junction with Corbulo, who was but three days'
march distant when Paetus so gracefully capitulated. -
The chiefs, when they met, exchanged no cordial greeting.
Corbulo complained that he had been induced to make a use-
less journey, and to weary his troops to no purpose, since
w
%
CII. XVI.] WAI: COMMITTED TO ComEULO. ' 159
without any aid from him the legions might have escaped
from their difficulties by simply waiting until the Parthians
had exhausted their stores, when they must have retired. .
Paetus, anxious to obliterate the memory of his failure, pro-
posed that the combined armies should at once enter Armenia
and overrun it, since Volagases and his Parthians had with-
drawn. Corbulo replied coldly—that “he had no such orders
from the Emperor. He had quitted his province to rescue
the threatened legions from their peril; now that the peril
was past, he must return to Syria, since it was quite tuncertain
what the enemy might next attempt. It would be hard work
for his infantry, tired with the long marches it had made, to
keep pace with the Parthian cavalry, which was fresh and
would pass rapidly through the plains. The generals upon
this parted. Paetus wintered in Cappadocia; Corbulo returned
into Syria, where a demand reached him from Volagases that
he would evacuate Mesopotamia. He agreed to do so on the
condition that Armenia should be evacuated by the Parthians.”
To this Volagases consented; since he had re-established Tiri-
dates as king, and the Armenians might be trusted, if left to
themselves, to prefer Parthian to Roman ascendancy.
There was now, again, a pause in the war for some months.
The envoys sent by Volagases after the capitulation of Paetus
reached Rome at the commencement of spring” (A.D. 63), and
were there at once admitted to an audience. They proposed
peace on the terms that Tiridates should be recognized as king
of Armenia, but that he should go either to Rome, or to the
head-quarters of the Roman legions in the East, in order to re-
ceive investiture, either from the Emperor or his representa-
tive. It was with some difficulty that Nero was brought to
believe in the success of Volagases, so entirely had he trusted
the despatches of Paetus, which represented the Romans as
triumphant.” When the state of affairs was fully understood
from the letters of Corbulo and the accounts given by a Roman
officer who had accompanied the Parthian envoys, there was
no doubt or hesitation as to the course which should be pur-
sued. The Parthian proposals must be rejected. Rome must
not make peace immediately upon a disaster, or until she had
retrieved her reputation and shown her power by again taking
the offensive. Paetus was at once recalled, and the whole di-
rection of the war given to Corbulo, who was intrusted with a
wide-spreading and extraordinary authority." The Parthian
envoys were dismissed, but with gifts, which seemed to show
§ -
N - * .
160 THE SIXTH MOWARCHIV. [CH. xvi. $
that it was not so much their proposals as the circumstances
, under which they had been made that were unpalatable.”
Another legion was sent to the East; and the Semi-independent
princes and dynasts were exhorted to support Corbulo with
zeal. That commander used his extraordinary powers to draw
together, not so much a very large force, as one that could be
thoroughly trusted;” and, collecting his troops at Melitëné
(Malatiyeh), made his arrangements for a fresh invasion.
Penetrating into Armenia by the road formerly followed by
Lucullus, Corbulo, with three legions, and probably the usual
proportion of allies—an army of about 30,000 men—advanced
against the combined Armenians and Parthians under Tiri-
dates and Volagases, freely offering battle, and at the same
time taking vengeance, as he proceeded, on the Armenian
nobles who had been especially active in opposing Tigranes,
the late Roman puppet-king." His march led him near the
spot where the capitulation of Paetus had occurred in the pre-
s ceding winter; and it was while he was in this neighborhood
that envoys from the enemy met him with proposals for an
accommodation. Corbulo, who had never shown himself
anxious to push matters to an extremity, readily accepted the
Overtures. The site of the camp of Paetus was chosen for the
- place of meeting; and there, accompanied by twenty horsemen
each, Tiridates and the Roman general held an interview."
The terms proposed and agreed upon were the same that Nero
had rejected; and thus the Parthians could not but be satisfied,
since they obtained all for which they had asked. Corbulo,
on the other hand, was content to have made the arrangement
on Armenian soil, while he was at the head of an intact and
unblemished army, and held possession of an Armenian dis-
trict; so that the terms could not seem to have been extorted
by fear, but rather to have been allowed as equitable. He
also secured the immediate performance of a ceremony at
which Tiridates divested himself of the regal ensigns and
placed them at the foot of the statue of Nero; and he took se-
curity for the performance of the promise that Tiridates
should go to Rome and receive his crown from the hands of
Nero, by requiring and obtaining one of his daughters as a
hostage. In return, he readily undertook that Tiridates should
be treated with all proper honor during his stay at Rome, and
On his journeys to and from Italy, assuring Volagases, who
was anxious on these points, that Rome regarded only the sub-
stance, and made no account of the mere show and trappings
of power.” **.
a
y
ch. xvi.] PEACE BETWEEN PARTHIA AND ROME. 161
The arrangement thus made was honestly executed. After
a delay of about two years,”for which it is difficult to account,
Tiridates set out upon his journey. He was accompanied by
his wife, by a number of noble youths, among whom were sons
of Volagases and of Monobazus, and by an escort of three
thousand Parthian cavalry.” The long cavalcade passed, like
a magnificent triumphal procession, through two thirds of the
Empire, and was everywhere warmly welcomed and sumptu-
ously entertained. Each city which lay upon its route was
decorated to receive it; and the loud acclaims of the multitudes
expressed their satisfaction at the novel spectacle. The riders
made the whole journey, except the passage of the Hellespont,
by land, proceeding through Thrace and Illyricum to the head
of the Adriatic,” and then descending the peninsula. Their
entertainment was furnished at the expense of the state, and
is said to have cost the treasury 800,000 sesterces (about 6250l.)
a day:" this outlay was continued for nine months, and must
have amounted in the aggregate to above a million and a half
of our money. The first interview of the Parthian prince with
his nominal sovereign was at Naples, where Nero happened to
be staying. According to the ordinary etiquette of the Roman
court, Tiridates was requested to lay aside his sword before
approaching the Emperor; but this he declined to do; and the
difficulty seemed serious until a compromise was suggested,
and he was allowed to approach wearing his weapon, after it
had first been carefully fastened to the scabbard by nails. He
then drew near, bent one knee to the ground, interlaced his
hands, and made obeisance, at the same time saluting the Em-
peror as his “lord.”
The ceremony of the investiture was performed afterwards
at Rome. On the night preceding, the whole city was illumi-
nated and decorated with garlands; the Forum, as morning
approached, was filled with “the people,” arranged in their
several tribes, clothed in white robes and bearing boughs of
laurel; the Praetorians, in their splendid arms, were drawn up
in two lines from the further extremity of the Forum to the
Rostra, to maintain the avenue of approach clear; all the roofs
of the buildings on every side were thronged with crowds of
spectators; at break of day Nero arrived in the attire appro-
priated to triumphs, accompanied by the members of the
Senate and his body-guard, and took his seat on the Rostra,
in a curule chair. Tiridates and his suite were then introduced
between the two long lines of soldiers; and the prince, advanc-
/
\
162 - THE SIXTH MONARCHY, [CH. xv.1,
ing to the Rostra, made an oration, which (as reported by Dio)
was of a sufficiently abject character." Nero responded proudly;
and then the Armenian prince, ascending the ROstra by a way
constructed for the purpose, and sitting at the feet of the
Roman Emperor, received from his hand, after his speech
had been interpreted to the assembled Romans, the coveted
diadem, the symbol of Oriental sovereignty.”
. After a stay of Some weeks, or possibly months, at Rome,
during which he was entertained by Nero with extreme mag-
nificence, Tiridates returned, across the Adriatic and through
Greece and Asia Minor," to his own land. The circumstances
of his journey and his reception involved a concession to Rome
of all that could be desired in the way of formal and verbal
acknowledgment. The substantial advantage, however, re-
mained with the Parthians. The Romans, both in the East and
at the capital, were flattered by a show of submission; but the
Orientals must have concluded that the long struggle had
ºterminated in an acknowledgment by Rome of Parthia as
the stronger power. Ever since the time of Lucullus, Armenia
had been the object of contention between the two states, both
of which had sought, as occasion served, to place upon the
throne its own nominees. Recently the rival powers had at
One and the same time brought forward rival claimants; and
the very tangible issue had been raised, Was Tigranes or
Tiridates to be king? When the claims of Tigranes were finally,
with the consent of Rome, set aside, and those of Tiridates al-
lowed, the real point in dispute was yielded by the Romans. A
Parthian, the actual brother of the reigning Parthian king, was
permitted to rule the country which Rome had long deemed her
own. It could not be doubted that he would rule it in accord-
ance with Parthian interests. His Roman investiture was a
form which he had been forced to go through; what effect
could it have on him in the future, except to create a feeling of
soreness? The arms of Volagases had beeen the real force
which had placed him upon the throne; and to those arms he
must have looked to support him in case of an emer-
gency. Thus Armenia was in point of fact relinquished to
Parthia at the very time when it was nominally replaced
under the sovereignty of the Romans.”
There is much doubt as to the time at which Volagases I.
ceased to reign. The classical writers give no indication of the
death of any Parthian king between the year A.D. 51, when
they record the demise of Vonones II., and about the year A.D.
Vol. Ill. Plate X||l.
#
*
;
f

|i.
Vol.
Plate XIV
*(SEIGIvni IJN \Io) sacīYIſIxO OJ. a bywoh Đs Ioq NYIMISI’IYA

y ! - wº- •,
cH. xvi.] LENGTH OF THIE REIGN OF WOZ.4GASIS. 163
90, when they speak of a certain Pacorus as occupying the
throne.” Moreover, during this interval, whenever they have
occasion to mention the reigning Parthian monarch, they al-
ways give him the name of Volagases.” Hence it has been
customary among writers on Parthian history to assign to .
Volagases I. the entire period between A.D. 51 and A.D. 90—a
space of thirty-nine years.” Recently, however, the study of
the Parthian coins has shown absolutely that Pacorus
began to reign at least as early as A.D. 78,” while it has raised
a suspicion that the space between A.D. 51 and A.D. 78 was
shared between two kings,” one of whom reigned from A.D. 51
to about A.D. 62, and the other from about A.D. 62 to A.D. 78.
It has been proposed to call these kings respectively Volagases I.
and Artabanus IV.” or Volagases I. and Volagases II.,” and
Parthian history has been written on this basis;” but it is con-
fessed that the entire absence of any intimation by the clas-
sical writers that there was any, change of monarch in this
space, or that the Volagases of whom they speak as a contem-
porary of Vespasian was any other than the adversary of
Corbulo, is a very great difficulty in the way of this view
being accepted; and it is suggested that the two kings which
the coins indicate may have been contemporary monarchs
reigning in different parts of Parthia.” To such a theory
there can be no objection. The Parthian coins distinctly show
the existence under the later Arsacidae of numerous pretenders,
or rivals to the true monarch, of whom we have no other
trace. In the time of Volagases I. there was (we know), a
revolt in Hyrcania,” which was certainly not suppressed as late
as A.D. 75. The king who has been called Artabanus IV. or
Volagases II. may have maintained himself in this region,
while Volagases I. continued to rule in the Western provinces
and to be the only monarch known to the Romans and the
Jews. If this be the true account of the matter, we may regard
Volagases I, as having most probably reigned from A.D. 51 to
about A.D. 78—a space of twenty-Seven years.
*…
ar.
f
'164 TEIAE SIXTII MONARCHI’. [CH. xv.11.
CHAPTER XVII.
Results of the Establishment of Tiridates in Armenia. , Long
period of Peace between Parthia and Rome. Obscurity of
Parthian History at this time. Relations of Volagases I.
with Vespasian. Invasion of Western Asia by Alani.
Death of Volagases I. and Character of his Reign. Acces-
sion and Long Reign of Pacorus. Relations of Pacorus
• with Decebalus of Dacia. Internal Condition of Parthia
during his Reign. Death of Pacorus and Accession of
Chosroës. *
“Longa concordia quietus Oriens. . . tantum adversus Parthos minae.”
Tacit. Hist. ii. 6.
THE establishment of Tiridates as king of Armenia, with the
joint consent of Volagases and Nero, inaugurated a period of
peace between the two Empires of Rome and Parthia, which
exceeded half a century." This result was no doubt a fortunate
one for the inhabitants of Western Asia; but it places the
modern historian of the Parthians at a disadvantage. Hitherto
the classical writers, in relating the wars of the Syro-Macedo-
nians and the Romans, have furnished materials for Parthian
history, which, if not as complete as we might wish, have been
at any rate fairly copious and satisfactory. Now, for the space
of half a century, we are left without anything like a consecu-
tive narrative, and are thrown upon scattered and isolated
notices, which can form only a most incomplete and disjointed
narrative. The reign of Volagases I. appears to have continued
for about twelve years after the visit of Tiridates to Rome;”
and no more than three or four events are known as having
fallen into this interval. Our knowledge of the reign of Pacorus
is yet more scanty. But as the business of the workman is
simply to make the best use that he can of his materials, such
a sketch of this dark period as the notices which have come
down to us allow will now be attempted.
When the troubles which followed upon the death of Nero
shook the Roman world, and after the violent ends of Galba
and Otho, the governor of Judaea, Vespasian, resolved to be-
come a candidate for the imperial power (A.D. 69), Volagases
> \
w *. - x -- = — — — — -- –
à W *
CH. xvi.I.] TROUBLES IN COMMAGENE. 165
was at onceinformed by envoys of the event, and was exhorted.
to maintain towards the new monarch the same peaceful atti-
tude which he had now for seven years observed towards his
predecessors.” Volagases not only complied with the request,
but sent ambassadors in return to Vespasian, while he was still
at Alexandria (A.D. 70), and offered to put at his disposal a. body,
of forty thousand Parthian cavalry.” The circumstances of his
position allowed Vespasian to decline this magnificent proposal,
and to escape the odium which would have attached to the
employment of foreign troops against his countrymen. His
generals in Italy had by this time carried all before them; and
he was able, after thanking the Parthian monarch, to inform
him that peace was restored to the Roman world, and that he
had therefore no need of auxiliaries." In the same friendly
spirit in which he had made this offer, Volagases, in the next
year (A.D. 71), Sent envoys to Titus at Zeugma, who presented
to him the Parthian king's congratulations on his victorious
conclusion of the Jewish war, and begged his acceptance of a
crown of gold. The polite attention was courteously received;
and before allowing them to return to their master the young
prince hospitably entertained the Parthian messengers at a
banquet."
Soon after this, circumstances occurred in the border state of
Commagéné which threatened a rupture of the friendly rela-
tions that had bitherto Subsisted between Volagases and Wes-
pasian." Caesennius Paetus, proconsul of Syria, the unsuc-
cessful general in the late Armenian war, informed Vespasian,
early in A.D. 72, that he had discovered a plot, by which Com-
magéné, one of the Roman subject kingdoms, was to be de-
tached from the Roman alliance, and made over to the Par-
thians. Antiochus, the aged monarch, and his son Epiphanes
were, according to Paetus, both concerned in the treason; and
the arrangement with the Parthians was, he said, actually con-
cluded. It would be well to nip the evil in the bud. If the
transfer of territory once took place, a most Serious disturbance
of the Roman power would follow. Commagéné lay west of
the Euphrates; and its capital city, Samosata (the modern
Sumeisat), commanded one of the points where the great river
was most easily crossed; so that, if the Parthians held it, they
would have a ready access at all times to the Roman provinces
of Cappadocia, Cilicia, and Syria, with a perfectly safe retreat.
These arguments had weight with Vespasian, who seems to
have had entire confidence in Paetus, and induced him to give
- - *
166 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. XVII.
the proconsul full liberty to act as he thought best. Thus em-
powered, Paetus at once invaded Commagéné in force, and
meeting at first with no resistance (for the Commagénians were
either innocent or unprepared), succeeded in Occupying Samo-
sata by a coup de main. The aged king wished to yield every-
thing without a blow; but his two sons, Epiphanes and Cal-
linicus, were not to be restrained. They took arms, and, at the
head of such a force as they could hastily muster, met Paetus
in the field, and fought a battle with him which lasted the
whole day, and ended without advantage to either side. But
the decision of Antiochus was not to be shaken; he refused to
countenance his sons’ resistance, and, quitting Commagéné,
passed with his wife and daughters into the Roman province
of Cilicia, where he took up his abode at Tarsus. The spirit of
the Commagénians, could not hold out against this defection;
the force collected began to disperse; and the young princes
found themselves forced to fly, and to seek a rofuge in Parthia,
which they reached with only ten horsemen.” Volagases re-
ceived them with the courtesy and hospitality due to their royal
rank; but as he had given them no help in the struggle, so now
he made no effort to reinstate them. Ali the exertion to which
he could be brought was to write a letter on their behalf to Ves-
pasian,” in which he probably declared them guiltless of the
charges that had been brought against them by Paetus. Ves-
pasian, at any rate, seems to have become convinced of their
innocence; for though he allowed Commagéné to remain a
Roman province, he permitted the two princes with their father
to reside at Rome, assigned the ex-monarch an ample reve-
nue, and gave the family an honorable status.
It was probably not more than two or three years after the
events above narrated,” that Volagases found himself in cir-
cumstances which impelled him to send a petition to the Ro-
man Emperor for help. The Alani, a Scythian people, who
had once dwelt near the Tanais" and the Lake Maeotis, or Sea
of Azof, but who must now have lived further to the East, had
determined on a great predatory invasion of the countries west
of the Caspian Gates, and having made alliance with the
Hyrcanians, who were in possession of that important pass,”
had poured into Media through it, driven King Pacorus to the
mountains, and overrun the whole of the open country.
From hence they had passed on into Armenia, defeated Tiri-
dates, in a battle, and almost succeeded in capturing him by
means of a lasso.” Volagases, whose subject-kings were thus
*
*
cH. xvii.] DEATH AND CHARACTER OF WOLAGASES. 167
rudely treated, and who might naturally expect his own pro-
per territories to be next attacked, sent in this emergency
a request to Vespasian for aid. He asked moreover that the
forces put at his disposal should be placed under the command
of either Titus or Domitian,” probably not so much from any
value that he set on their military talents as from a convic-
tion that if a member of the Imperial family was sent, the
force which accompanied him would be considerable. We are
told that the question, whether help be given or no, was seri-
ously discussed at Rome, and that Domitian was exceedingly
anxious that the troops should go, and begged that he might
be their commander. But Vespasian was disinclined for any
expenditure of which he did not recognize the necessity, and
disliked all perilous adventure. His own refusal of extraneous
support, when offered by his rival, rendered it impossible for
him to reject Volagases's request without incurring the charge
of ingratitude. The Parthians were therefore left to their own
resources; and the result seems to have been that the inva-
ders, after ravaging and harrying Media and Armenia at
their pleasure, carried off a vast number of prisoners and an
enormous booty into their own country.” Soon after this,
Volagases must have died. The coins of his successor" com-
mence in June, A.D. 78, and thus he cannot have outlived by
more than three years the irruption of the Alani. If he died,
as is most probable, in the Spring of A.D. 78, his reign would
have covered the space of twenty-seven years. It was an
eventful one for Parthia. It brought the second period of
struggle with the Romans to an end" by compromise which
gave to Rome the shadow and to Parthia the substance of vic-
tory. And it saw the first completed disintegration of the
Empire in the successful revolt of Hyrcania—an event of evil
portent. Volagases was undoubtedly a monarch of consider-
able ability. He conducted with combined prudence and firm-
ness the several campaigns against Corbulo; he proved him-
Self far superior to Paetus; exposed to attacks in various quar-
ters from many different enemies, he repulsed all foreign in-
Vaders and, as against them, maintained intact the ancient
dominions of the Arsacidae. He practically added Arminia to
the Empire. Everywhere success attended him, except against
a domestic foe. Hyrcania seceded during his reign, and it
may be doubted whether Parthia, ever afterwards recovered it.
An example was thus set of successful Arian revolt against the
hitherto irresistible Turanians, which may have tended in no
*.
- - - -)
168 TEIE SIXTH MONAROLIY. [CH. XVII.
slight degree to produce the insurrection which eventually
subverted the Parthian Empire.
The successor of Volagases I. was Pacorus, whom most
writers on Parthian history have regarded as his son.” There
is, however, no evidence of this relationship; and the chief
reason for regarding Pacorus as belonging even to the same
branch of the Arsacidae with Volagases I. is his youth at his
accession, indicated by the beardless head upon his early coins,
which is no doubt in favor of his having been a near re-
lation of the preceding king. Pl. III., Fig 1. The Parthian
coins show that his reign continued at least till A.D. 93; it may
have lasted considerably longer, for the earliest date on any
coin of Chosroës is AEr. Seleuc. 421, or A.D. 110. The accession
of Chosroës has been conjecturally assigned to A.D. 108, which
would allow to Pacorus the long reign of thirty years. Of this
interval it can only be said that, so far as our knowledge goes,
it was almost wholly uneventful. We know absolutely noth-
ing of this Pacorus except that he gave encouragement to a
person who pretended to be Nero; that he enlarged and beau-
tified Ctesiphon;” that he held friendly communications with
Decebalus, the great Dacian chief, who was successively the
adversary of Domitian and Trajan; and that he sold the
Sovereignty of Osrhoëné at a high price to the Edessene prince
who was cotemporary with him. The Pseudo-Nero in question
appears to have taken refuge with the Parthians in the year
A.D. 89, and to have been demanded as an impostor by Domi-
tian.” Pacorus was at first inclined to protect and to even assist
him, but after a while was induced to give him up, probably by
a threat of hostilities. The communication with the Dacian
chief was most likely earlier. The Dacians, in one of those in-
cursions into Moesia which they made during the first years of
Domitian, took captive a certain Callidromus,” a Greek, if we
may judge by his name, slave to a Roman of some rank,
named Liberius Maximus. This prisoner Decebalus (we are
told) sent as a present to Pacorus, in whose service and favor
he remained for a number of years. This circumstance, insig-
nificant enough in itself, acquires an interest from the indica-
tion which it gives of intercommunication between the enemies
of Rome, even when they were separated by vast spaces, and
might have been thought to have been wholly ignorant of each
Other's existence. Decebalus can scarcely have been drawn to
Pacorus by any other attraction than that which always sub-
sists between enemies of any great dominant power. He must
- - . . . .
.* #
*
CH. XVII.] * REIGN OF PACORUS II. 169
have looked to the Parthian monarch as a friend who might
make a diversion on his behalf upon occasion; and that mon-
arch, by accepting his gift, must be considered to have shown
a willingness to accept this kind of relation. e
The sale of the Osrhoëné territory to Abgarus by Pacorus”
was not a fact of much consequence. It may indicate an ex-
haustion of his treasury, resulting from the expenditure of
vast sums on the enlargement and adornment of the capital,
but otherwise it has no bearing on the general condition of the
Empire. Perhaps the Parthian feudatories generally paid a
price for their investiture. If they did not, and the case of
Abgarus was peculiar, still it does not appear that his pur-
chase at all altered his position as a Parthian subject. It was
not until they transferred their allegiance to Rome that the
Osrhoëné princes struck coins, or otherwise assumed the status
of kings. Up to the time of M. Aurelius they continued just
as much subject to Parthia as before, and were far from ac-
quiring a position of independence.
There is reason to believe that the reign of Pacorus was a
good deal disturbed by internal contentions. We hear of an
Artabanus” as king of Parthia in A.D. 79; and the Parthian
coins of about this period present us with two very marked
types of head, both of them quite unlike that of Pacorus,”
which must be those of monarchs who either contended with
Pacorus for the crown, or ruled contemporaneously with him
over other portions of the Parthian Empire. [Pl. III., Fig. 2.]
Again, towards the close of Pacorus's reign, and early in that
of his recognized successor, Chosroës, a monarch called Mith-
ridates is shown by the coins to have borne sway for at least
six years—from A.D. 107 to 113. This monarch commenced
the practice of placing a Semitic legend upon his coins,” which
would seem to imply that he ruled in the western rather than
the eastern provinces. The probability appears, on the whole,
to be that the disintegration which has been already noticed as
having commenced under Volagases I. was upon the increase.
Three or four monarchs were ruling together in different por-
tions of the Parthian world, each claiming to be the true Ar-
saces, and using the full titles of Parthian sovereignty upon
his coins. The Romans knew but little of these divisions and
contentions,” their dealings being only with the Arsacid who
reigned at Ctesiphon and bore sway over Mesopotamia and
Adiabéné. ,
Pacorus must have died about A.D. 108, or a little later.
- —r— - - I
*
170 THE SIXTH MOWARCHIV. ſch. xviii.
He left behind him two sons, Exedares and Parthamasiris,”
but neither of these two princes was allowed to succeed him.
The Parthian Megistanes assigned the crown to Chosroës, the
brother of their late monarch, perhaps regarding Exedares and
IParthamasiris as too young to administer the government of
Parthia satisfactorily. If they knew, as perhaps they did,”
that the long period of peace with Rome was coming to an
end, and that they might expect shortly to be once more at-
tacked by their old enemy, they might well desire to have
upon the throne a prince of ripe years and approved judg-
ment. A raw youth would certainly have been unfit to cope
with the age, the experience, and the military genius of
Trajan.
CHAPTER XVIII.
Reign of Chosroës. General condition of Oriental Affairs
gives a handle to Trajan. Trajan's Schemes of Conquest.
Embassy of Chosroës to Trajan fails. Great Eacpedition of
Trajan. Campaign of A.D. 115. Campaign of A.I). 116.
Death of Trajan, and relinquishment of his Parthian
Conquests by Hadriam. Interview of Chosroës with
Hadrian. Its Consequences. Death of Chosroës and
Accession of Volagases II.
“Ad ortum solis, cunctae gentes quae inter Indum et Euphratem amnes inclytos
sunt, concussae bello.”—Aurel. Vict. Hist. § 13.
THE general state of Oriental affairs at the accession of
Chosroës seems to have been the following. Upon the demise
of Tiridates (about A.D. 100)' Pacorus had established upon the
Armenian throne one of his Sons, named Exedares, or Axidares,
and this prince had thenceforth reigned as king of Armenia
without making any application to Rome for investiture, or
acknowledging in any way the right of the Romans to interfere
with the Armenian succession.” Trajan, sufficiently occupied
in the West,” had borne this insult. When, however, in A.D.
114, the subjugation of Dacia was completed, and the Roman
Emperor found his hands free, he resolved to turn his arms
towards Asia, and to make the Armenian difficulty a pretext
for a great military expedition, designed to establish unmis-
- *
—w-
* i
CH, xvi II.] PLANS OF TRAJAN. 171
takably the supremacy of Rome throughout the East. The
condition of the East at once called for the attention of Rome,
and was eminently favorable for the extension of her influence
at this period. Disintegrating forces were everywhere at
work, tending to produce a confusion and anarchy which
invited the interposition of a great power, and rendered resist-
ance to such a power difficult. Christianity, which was daily
spreading itself more and more widely, acted as a dissolvent
upon the previously-existing forms of society, loosening the
old ties, dividing man from man by an irreconcilable division,
and not giving much indication as yet of its power to combine
and unite. Judaism, embittered by persecution, had from a
nationality become a conspiracy; and the disaffected adherents
of the Mosaic system, dispersed through all the countries of
the East, formed an explosive element in the population which
involved the constant danger of a catastrophe.” The Parthian
political system was also, as already remarked, giving Symp-
toms of breaking up. Those bonds which for two centuries
and a half had sufficed to hold together a heterogeneous king-
dom extending from the Euphrates to the Indus, and from the
Oxus to the Southern Ocean, were beginning to grow weak,
and the Parthian Empire appeared to be falling to pieces.
There seemed to be at once a call and an opportunity for a
fresh arrangement of the East, for the introduction of a uni-
fying power, such as Rome recognized in her own administra-
tive system, which should compel the crumbling atoms of the
Oriental world once more into cohesion.
To this call Trajan responded. His vast ambition had been
whetted, rather than Satiated, by the conquest of a barbarous
nation, and a single, not very valuable, province. In the East
he might hope to add to the Roman State half a dozen countries
of world-wide repute, the seats of ancient empires, the old
homes of Asiatic civilization, countries associated with the
immortal names of Sennacherib and Sardanapalus, Cyrus,
Darius, and Alexander. The career of Alexander had an
attraction for him, which he was fain to confess;" and he
pleased himself by imitating, though he could not hope at his
age to equal it. His Eastern expedition was conceived very
much in the same spirit as that of Crassus; " but he possessed
the military ability in which the Triumvir was deficient, and
the enemy whom he had to attack was grown less formidable.
Trajan commenced his Eastern expedition in A.D. 114, seven
years after the close of the Dacian War. He was met at
A
— — — — — — — - , * → ge
- f
172 THIE SIXTH MONAIRCEIY. [CH. XVIII.
Athens in the autumn of that year by envoys from Chosroës,
who brought him presents, and made representations which,
it was hoped, would induce him to consent to peace." Chosroës
stated that he had deposed his nephew, Exedares, the Armenian
prince whose conduct had been offensive to Rome; and pro-
posed that, as the Armenian throne was thereby vacant, it
should be filled by the appointment of Parthamasiris, Exedares's
brother. This prince would be willing, he said, to receive
investiture at the hands of Rome; and he requested that Trajan
would transmit to him the symbol of sovereignty. The
accommodation suggested would have re-established the re-
lations of the two countries towards Armenia on the basis on
which they had been placed by the agreement between
Volagases and Nero. It would have saved the credit of Rome,
while it secured to Parthia the substantial advantage of re-
taining Armenia under her authority and protection. Trajan
might well have consented to it, had his sole object been to
reclaim the rights or to vindicate the honor of his country.
But he had distinctly made up his mind to aim, not at the re-
establishment of any former condition of things, but at the
placing of matters in the East on an entirely new footing.”
Eſe therefore gave the ambassadors of Chosroës a cold reception,
declined the gifts offered him, and replied to the proposals of
accommodation that the friendship of kings was to be meas-
ured by deeds rather than by words—he would therefore say
nothing, but when he reached Syria would act in a becoming
manner.” The envoys of the Parthian monarch were obliged
to return with this unsatisfactory answer; and Chosroës had
to wait and see what interpretation it would receive from the
course of events.
During the later months of autumn, Trajan advanced from
Athens to Antioch." At that luxurious capital, he mustered
his forces and prepared for the campaign of the ensuing year.
Abgarus, the Osrhoëne prince who had lately purchased his
sovereignty from Pacorus,” sent an embassy to him in the
course of the winter, with presents and an offer of friendship.”
Parthamasiris also entered into communications with him, first
assuming the royal title, and then, when his letter received no
answer, dropping it, and addressing the Roman Emperor as a
mere private person.” Upon this act of self-humiliation, nego-
tiations were commenced. Parthamasiris was encouraged to
present himself at the Roman camp, and was given to under-
stand that he would there receive from Trajan, as Tiridates had
- - - - —w- – - - -- —k -
*
ch. xviri..] TRAJAN ENTRAPS PARTHAMASIRIS. 173
received from Nero, the emblem of sovereignty and permission
to rule Armenia. The military preparations were, however,
continued. Vigorous measures were taken to restore the dis-
cipline of the Syrian legions, which had suffered through the
long tranquillity of the East and the enervating influence of the
climate.” With the spring Trajan commenced his march.
Ascending the Euphrates, to Samosata, and receiving as he ad-
vanced the submission of various semi-independent dynasts
and princes, he took possession of Satala and Elegeia, Armeni-
an cities on or near the Euphrates, and establishing himself at
the last-named place, waited for the arrival of Parthamasiris.
That prince shortly rode into the Roman camp, attended by a
small retinue; and a meeting was arranged, at which the Par-
thian, in the sight of the whole Roman army, took the diadem
from his brows and laid it at the feet of the Roman Emperor,
expecting to have it at once restored to him. But Trajan had
determined otherwise. He made no movement; and the army,
prepared no doubt for the occasion, shouted with all their
might, saluting him anew as Imperator, and congratulating
him on his “bloodless victory.” ” Parthamasiris felt that he
had fallen into a trap, and would gladly have turned and fled;
but he found himself surrounded by the Roman troops and
virtually a prisoner. Upon this he demanded a private audi-
ence, and was conducted to the Emperor's tent, where he made
proposals which were coldly rejected, and he was given to
understand that he must regard his crown as forfeited. It was
further required of him that, to prevent false rumors, he
should present himself a second time at the Emperor's tribunal,
prefer his requests openly, and hear the Imperial decision.
The Parthian consented. With a boldness worthy of his high
descent, he affirmed that he had neither been defeated nor
made prisoner, but had come of his own free will to hold a con-
ference with the Roman chief, in the full expectation of receiv-
ing from him, as Tiridates had received from Nero, the crown
of Armenia, confident, moreover, that in any case he would
suffer no wrong, but be allowed to depart in safety. Trajan
answered that he did not intend to give the crown of Armenia
to any one—the country belonged to the Romans, and should
have a Roman governor. As for Parthamasiris, he was free
to go whithersoever he pleased, and his Parthian attendants
might accompany him. The Armenians, however, must re-
main. They were Roman subjects, and owed no allegiance
to Parthia.”
/ .*
\ y
*
174' THE SIXTH MONARCHY, [CH. xvii.I.
The tale thus told, with no appearance of shame, by the
Roman historian, Dio Cassius, is sufficiently disgraceful to
Trajan, but it does not reveal to us the entire baseness of his
conduct. We learn from other writers,” two of them contem-
porary with the events, that the pompous dismissal of Partha-
masiris, with leave to go wherever he chose, was a mere pre-
tence. Trajan had come to the conclusion, if not before the
interview, at any rate in the course of it, that the youth was
dangerous, and could not be allowed to live. He therefore
sent troops to arrest him as he rode off from the camp, and
when he offered resistance caused him to be set upon and slain.
This conduct he afterwards strove to justify by accusing the
young prince of having violated the agreement made at the in-
terview;” but even the debased moral sense of his age was re-
volted by this act, and declared the grounds whereon he ex-
cused it insufficient. Good faith and honor had been sacrificed
(it was said) to expediency—the reputation of Rome had been
tarnished—it would have been better, even if Parthamasiris
were guilty, to have let him escape, than to have punished him
at the cost of a public scandal.” So strongly was the disgrace
felt that some (it seems) endeavored to exonerate Trajan from
the responsibility of having contrived the deed, and to throw
the blame of it on Exedares, the ex-king of Armenia and
brother of Parthamasiris. But Trajan had not sunk so low as
to shift his fault on another. He declared openly that the act
was his own, and that Exedares had had no part in it.”
The death of Parthamasiris was followed by the complete
submisson of Armenia.” Chosroës made no attempt to avenge
the murder of his nephew, or to contest with Trajan the pos-
session of the long-disputed territory. A little doubt seems for
a short time to have been entertained by the Romans as to its
disposal. The right of Exedares to be reinstated in his former
kingdom” was declared by some to be clear; and it was prob-
ably urged that the injuries which he had suffered at the hands
of Chosroës would make him a sure Roman ally. But these ar-
guments had no weight with Trajan. He had resolved upon his
course. An end should be put, at once and forever, to the
perpetual intrigues and troubles inseparable from such rela-
tions as had hitherto subsisted between Rome and the Arme-
nian kingdom. The Greater and the Lesser Armenia should be
annexed to the Empire, and should form a single Roman
province.” This settled, attention was turned to the neigh-
boring countries. Alliance was made with Anchialus, king
— = r &
t
CH. xviii.] ARMENIA AND MESOPOTAMIA CONQUERED. 175
\ A
of the Heniochi and Macheloni, and presents were sent to
him in return for those which his envoys had brought io Tra-
jan.” A new king was given to the Albanians. Friendly re-
lations were established with the chiefs of the Iberi, Sauro-
matae, Colchi, and even with the tribes settled on the Cimme-
rian Bosphorus.* The nations of these parts were taught that
Rome was the power which the inhabitants even of the remote
East and North had most to fear; and a wholesome awe was
instilled into them which would, it was hoped, conduce to
the general tranquillity of the Empire. - .
But the objects thus accomplished, considerable as they
were, did not seem to the indefatigable Emperor sufficient for
one year. Having settled the affairs of the North-east, and
left garrisons in the chief Armenian strongholds,” Trajan
marched southwards to Edessa, the capital of the province of
GSrhoëné, and there received the humble submission of Ab-
garus, who had hitherto wavered between the two contending
powers.” Manisares, a satrap of these parts, who had a quar-
rel of his own with Chosroës, also embraced his cause,” while
other chiefs wavered in their allegiance to Parthia, but feared
to trust the invader. Hostilities were commenced by attacks
in two directions—Southward against the tract known as An-
themusia, between the Euphrates and the Khabour;” and east-
ward against Batnae, Nisibis, and the mountain region known
as Gordyéné, or the Mons Masius.” Success attended both
these movements; and, before winter set in, the Romans had.'
made themselves masters of the whole of Upper Mesopotamia,
and had even pushed southwards as far as Singara,” a town on
the skirts of the modern Sinjar mountain-range. Mesopotamia
was at once, like Armenia, “reduced into the form of a Roman
province.” - Medals were issued representing the conqueror .
with these subject countries at his foot;” and the obsequious
Senate conferred the title of “Parthicus” upon the Imperator,”
who had thus robbed the Parthians of two provinces.
According to some, the headquarters of Trajan during the
ensuing winter were at Nisibis or Edessa,” but the nexus of
the narrative in Dio seems rather to require, and the other
ancient notices to allow, the belief that he returned to Syria
and wintered at Antioch,” leaving his generals in possession of
the conquered regions, with orders to make every preparation
for the campaign of the next year. Among other instructions
which they received was the command to build a large fleet at
Nisibis, where good timber was abundant," and to prepare for
#
J
*
{
176 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. xv.111.
its transport to the Tigris, at the point where that stream quits
the mountains and enters on the open country.” Meanwhile,
in the month of December,” the magnificent Syrian capital,
where Trajan had his headquarters, was visited by a calamity
of a most appalling character. An earthquake, of a violence
and duration unexampled in ancient times, destroyed the
greater part of its edifices, and buried in their ruins vast multi-
tudes of the inhabitants and of the strangers that had flocked
into the town in consequence of the Imperial presence. Many
Romans of the highest rank perished, and among them M.
Virgilianus Pedo, one of the consuls for the year. The Emperor
himself was in danger, and only escaped by creeping through
a window of the house in which he resided; nor was his person
quite unscathed. Some falling fragments struck him; but for-
tunately the injuries that he received were slight, and had no
permanent consequence. The bulk of the surviving inhabitants,
finding themselves houseless, or afraid to enter their houses if
they still stood, bivouacked during the height of the winter in
the open air, in the Circus, and elsewhere about the city. The
terror which legitimately followed from the actual perils was
heightened by imaginary fears. It was thought that the Mons
Casius, which towers above Antioch to the south-west, was
about to be shattered by the violence of the shocks, and to pre-
cipitate itself upon the ruined town.”
Nor were the horrors of the catastrophe confined to Antioch.
The earthquake was one of a series which carried destruction
and devastation through the greater part of the East. In the
Roman province of Asia, four cities were completely destroyed
—Eleia, Myrina, Pitané, and Cymé. In Greece two towns were
reduced to ruins, namely, Opus in Tocris, and Oritus. In
Galatia three cities, unnamed, suffered the same fate.” It
seemed as if Providence had determined that the new glories
which Rome was gaining by the triumphs of her arms should
be obscured by calamities of a kind that no human power could
avert or control, and that despite the efforts of Trajan to make
his reign a time of success and splendor, it should go down to
posterity as one of gloom, suffering, and disaster.
Trajan, however, did not allow himself to be diverted from
the objects that he had set before him by such trifling matters
as the sufferings of a certain number of provincial towns.
With the approach of spring (A.D. 116) he was up and doing.”
His officers had obeyed his orders, and a fleet had been built
- at Nisibis during the winter amply sufficient for the purpose
*
- *
sº
\ .
CH. XVIII.] CAMPAIGN OF A.D. 116, * 177
for which it was wanted. The ships were so constructed that
they could be easily taken to pieces and put together again,
Trajan had them conveyed on wagons to the Tigris at Jezireh,”
and there proceeded to make preparations for passing the river
and attacking Adiabéné. By embarking on board Some of his
ships companies of heavy-armed and archers, who protected
his working parties, and at the same time threatening with
other ships to cross at many different points, he was able,
though with much difficulty, to bridge the stream in the face
of a powerful body of the enemy, and to land his troops safely
on the opposite bank. This done, his work was more than half
accomplished. Chosroës remained aloof from the war, either
husbanding his resources, or perhaps occupied by civil feuds,”
and left the defence of his outlying provinces to their respective
governors. Mebarsapes, the Adiabenian monarch, had set his
hopes on keeping the invader out of his kingdom by defending,
the line of the Tigris, and when that was forced he seems to
have despaired, and to have made no further effort. His towns
and strongholds were taken one after another, without their
offering any Serious resistance. Nineveh, Arbela, and Gauga-
mala fell into the enemy's hands. Adenystrae, a place of great.
strength, was captured by a small knot of Roman prisoners,
who, when they found their friends near, rose upon the garri-
son, killed the commandant, and opened the gates to their
countrymen.” In a short time the whole tract between the
Tigris and the Zagros mountains was overrun; resistance
ceased; and the invader was able to proceed to further con-
quests. *
It might have been expected that an advance would have at
Once been directed on Ctesiphon, the Parthian capital; but
Trajan, for some reason which is not made clear to us, deter-
mined otherwise. He repassed the Tigris into Mesopotamia,
took Hatra" (now el-Hadhr), at that time one of the most con-
siderable places in those parts, and then, crossing to the Eu-
phrates, descended its course to Hit" and Babylon. No re-
sistance was offered him, and he became master of the mighty
Babylon without a blow. Seleucia seems also to have sub-
mitted;" and it remained only to attack and take the capital
in order to have complete possession of the entire region
Watered by the two great rivers. For this purpose a fleet
Was again necessary, and, as the ships used on the upper
Tigris had, it would seem, been abandoned,” Trajan conveyed
a flotilla, which had descended the Euphrates, across Meso-
sº
178 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. xvii.I.
potamia on rollers, and launching it upon the Tigris, proceeded
to the attack of the great metropolis.” Here again the resist-
ance that he encountered was trivial. Like Babylon and Se-
leucia, Ctesiphon at once opened its gates. The monarch had
departed with his family and his chief treasures," and had
placed a vast space between himself and his antagonist. He
was prepared to contend with his Roman foe, not in battle
array, but by means of distance, natural obstacles, and guerilla
warfare. He had evidently determined neither to risk a battle
nor stand a siege. As Trajan advanced, he retreated, seeming
to yield all, but no doubt intending, if it should be necessary,
to turn to bay at last, and in the meantime diligently foment-
ing that spirit of discontent and disaffection which was shortly
to render the further advance of the Imperial troops impos-
sible. r
But, for the moment, all appeared to go well with the in-
vaders. The surrender of Ctesiphon brought with it the sub-
mission of the whole region on the lower courses of the great
rivers, and gave the conqueror access to the waters of a new
sea. Trajan may be excused if he overrated his successes, re-
garded himself as another Alexander, and deemed that the
great monarchy, so long the rival of Rome, was now at last
swept away, and that the entire East was on the point of being
absorbed into the Roman Empire. The capture by his lieuten-
ants of the golden throne of the Parthian kings may well have
seemed to him emblematic of this change; and the flight of
Chosroës into the remote and barbarous regions of the far East
may have helped to lull his adversary into a feeling of com-
plete security. Such a feeling is implied in the pleasure voy-
age of the conqueror down the Tigris to the Persian Gulf, in
his embarkation on the waters of the Southern Sea, in the in-
quiries which he instituted with respect to Indian affairs, and
in the regret to which he gave utterance, that his advanced
years prevented him from making India the term of his
labors.” No shadow of his coming troubles seems to have
flitted before the eyes of the Emperor during the weeks that
he was thus occupied—weeks which he passed in self-com-
placent contemplation of the past and dreams of an impossible
future. .
Suddenly, tidings of a most alarming kind dispelled his
pleasing visions, and roused him to renewed exertions. Re-
volt, he found, had broken out everywhere in his rear. At
Seleucia, at Hatra, at Nisibis, at Edessa,” the natives had
CH, xvii.I.] TRAJAN REPULSED FROM HATRA. 179
flown to arms; his entire line of retreat was beset by foes, and
he ran a risk of having his return cut off, and of perishing in
the land which he had invaded. Trajan had hastily to retrace
his steps, and to Send his generals in all directions to check the
spread of insurrection. Seleucia was recovered by Erucius
Clarus and Julius Alexander, who punished its rebellion by .
delivering it to the flames. Lucius Quietus retook Nisibis,
and plundered and burnt Edessa. Maximus, on the contrary,
was defeated and slain by the rebels,” who completely de-
stroyed the Roman army under his orders.” Trajan, perceiv-
ing how slight his hold was upon the conquered populations,
felt compelled to change his policy, and, as the only mode of
pacifying, even temporarily, the growing discontent, instead
of making Lower Mesopotamia into a Roman province, as he
had made Armenia, Upper Mesopotamia, and Adiabéné (or
Assyria), he proceeded with much pomp and display to set
up a native king. The prince selected was a certain Partha-
maspates, a member of the royal family of the Arsacidae, who
had previously sided with Rome against the reigning mon-
arch." In a plain near Ctesiphon, where he had had his tri-
bunal erected, Trajan, after a speech wherein he extolled the
greatness of his own exploits, presented to the assembled
Romans and natives this youth as King of Parthia, and with
his own hand placed the diadem upon his brow."
Under cover of the popularity acquired by this act the aged
Emperor now commenced his retreat. The line of the Tigris
was no doubt open to him, and along this he might have
marched in peace to Upper Mesopotamia or Armenia; but
either he preferred the direct route to Syria by way of Hatra
and Singara, or the insult offered to the Roman name by the
independent attitude which the people of the former place still
maintained induced him to diverge from the general line of his
course, and to enter the desert in order to chastise their pre-
Sumption. Hatra was a small town, but strongly fortified.
The inhabitants at this time belonged” to that Arabian immi-
gration which was always more and more encroaching upon
Mesopotamia. They were Parthian subjects, but appear to
have had their own native kings.” On the approach of Tra-
jan, nothing daunted, they closed their gates, and prepared
themselves for resistance. Though he battered down a por-
tion of the wall, they repulsed all the attempts of his soldiers
to enter through the breach, and when he himself came near to
reconnoitre, they drove him off with their arrows. His troops
zº
180 THE SixTH MoyARCHY. [CH. XVIII.
suffered from the heat, from the want of provisions and fodder,
from the swarms of flies which disputed with them every mor.
sel of their food and every drop of their drink, and finally
from violent hail and thunderstorms. Trajan was forced to
withdraw after a time without effecting anything, and to own
himself baffled and defeated by the garrison of a petty for-
# treSS.”
The year, A.D. 116, seems to have closed with this memo-
rable failure. In the following spring, Chosroës, learning the
retreat of the Romans, returned to Ctesiphon, expelled Par-
thamaspates, who retired into Roman territory, and re-estab-
lished his authority in Susiana and Southern Mesopotamia."
The Romans, however, still held Assyria (Adiabéné) and Upper
Mesopotamia, as well as Armenia, and had the strength of
the Empire been exerted to maintain these possessions, they
might have continued in all probability to be Roman provinces,
despite any efforts that Parthia could have made to recover
them. But in August, A.D. 117, Trajan died; and his succes-
sor, Hadrian, was deeply impressed with the opinion that
Trajan's conquests had been impolitic, and that it was unsafe
for Rome to attempt under the circumstances of the time any
extension of the Eastern frontier. The first act of Hadrian
was to relinquish the three provinces which Trajan's Parthian
war had added to the Empire, and to withdraw the legions
within the Euphrates." Assyria and Mesopotamia were at
once re-occupied by the Parthians. Armenia appears to have
been made over by Hadrian to Parthamaspates,” and to have
thus returned to its former condition of a semi-independent
kingdom, leaning alternately on Rome and Parthia. It has
been asserted that Osrhoëné was placed likewise upon the
same footing;” but the numismatic evidence adduced in favor
of this view is weak;" and upon the whole it appears most
probable that, like the other Mesopotamian countries, Os-
rhoëné again fell under the dominion of the Arsacidae. Rome
therefore gained nothing by the great exertions which she had
made," unless it were a partial recovery of her lost influence
in Armenia, and a knowledge of the growing weakness of her
Eastern rival—a knowledge which, though it produced no im-
mediate fruit, was of importance, and was borne in mind
when, after another half-century of peace, the relations of the
two empires became once more unsatisfactory.
The voluntary withdrawal of Hadrian from Assyria and
Mesopotamia placed him on amicable terms with Parthia dur-
ch. xviii. HADRIAN GIVES UP TRAJAN's cowoul:STS 181
ing the whole of his reign. Chosroës and his successor could
not but feel themselves under obligations to the monarch who,
without being forced to it by a defeat, had restored to Parthia
the most valuable of her provinces. On one occasion alone do
we hear of any, even threatened, interruption of the friendly
relations subsisting between the two powers; and then the
misunderstanding, whatever it may have been, was easily rec-
tified and peace maintained. Hadrian, in A.D. 122, had an
interview with Chosroës on his eastern frontier, and by per-
sonal explanations and assurances averted, we are told,” an
impending outbreak. Not long afterwards (A.D. 130, probably)
he returned to Chosroës the daughter who had been captured
by Trajan, and at the same time promised the restoration of
the golden throne," on which the Parthians appear to have set
a special value.
It must have been soon after he received back his daughter
that Chosroës died. His latest coins bear a date equivalent to
A.D. 128;” and the Roman historians give Volagases II. as
king of Parthia in A.D. 133.” It has been generally supposed
that this prince was Chosroës' son, and succeeded him in the
natural course;” but the evidence of the Parthian coins is
strong against these suppositions. According to them, Vola-
gases had been a pretender to the Parthian throne as early as
A.D. 78, and had struck coins both in that year and the follow-
ing one, about the date of the accession of Pacorus. His at-
tempt had, however, at that time failed, and for forty-one
years he kept his pretensions in abeyance; but about A.D.
119 or 120 he appears to have again come forward, and to have
disputed the crown with Chosroës, or reigned contemporane-
ously with him over some portion of the Parthian kingdom,
till about A.D. 130, when—probably on the death of Chosroës—
he was acknowledged as sole king by the entire nation. Such
is the evidence of the coins, which in this case are very pecu-
liar, and bear the name of Volagases from first to last.” It
seems to follow from them that Chosroës was succeeded, not
by a son, but by a rival, an old claimant of the crown, who
cannot have been much younger than Chosroës himself.
182 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. XIX.
y
CELAPTER XIX.
ſ
Reign of Volagases II. Invasion of the Alani. Communica-
tions between Volagases and Antoninus Pius. Death of Vola-
gases II. and Accession of Volagases III. Aggressive War
of Volagases III. on Rome. Campaign of A.D. 162. Verus
sent to the East. Sequel of the War. Losses suffered by
Parthia. Death of Volagases III.
*
“Parthicum bellum, quod Volagessus . . . indixit.”
*. Jul. Capit. M. Antonin. $8.
VoIAGASES II. appears to have occupied the Parthian throne,
after the death of Chosroës, for the space of nineteen years.
His reign has a general character of tranquillity, which agrees
well with the advanced period of life at which, according to
the coins, he first became actual king of Parthia." It was dis-
turbed by only one actual outbreak of hostilities, an occasion
upon which Volagases stood upon the defensive; and on one
other occasion was for a brief period threatened with disturb-
ance. Otherwise it seems to have been wholly peaceful. So
far as appears, no pretenders troubled it. The coins show, for
the years between A.D. 130 and A.D. 149, the head of but one
monarch, a head of a marked type, which is impossible to be
mistaken.” [Pl. III., Fig. 4.]
The occasion upon which actual hostilities disturbed the re-
pose of Volagases was in A.D. 133, when, by the intrigues of
Pharasmanes, king of the Iberians, a great horde of Alani from
the tract beyond the Caucasus was induced to pour itself
through the passes of that mountain chain upon the territories
of both the Parthians and the Romans.” Pharasmanes had
previously shown contempt for the power of Pome by refusing
to pay court to Hadrian, when, in A.D. 130, he invited the mon-
archs of Western Asia generally to a conference." He had also,
it would seem, been insulted by Hadrian, who, when Pharas-
manes sent him a number of cloaks made of cloth-of-gold, em-
ployed them in the adornment of three hundred convicts con-
demned to furnish sport to the Romans in the amphitheatre."
What quarrel he had with the Parthians we are not told; but
it is related that at his instigation the Savage Alani, introduced
*
$ - - –
CH. XIX.] INROAD OF THE ALANI. 183
within the mountain barrier, poured at one and the same time
into Media Atropaténé, which was a dependency of Parthia;
into Armenia, which was under Parthamaspates; and into the
Roman province of Cappadocia. - Volagases sent an embassy to
Rome complaining of the conduct of Pharasmanes," who ap-
pears to have been regarded as ruling under Roman protection;
and that prince was summoned to Rome in order to answer for
his conduct. But the Alanian inroad had to be dealt with at
once. The Roman governor of Cappadocia, who was Arrian,
the historian of Alexander, by a mere display of force drove
the barbarians from his province. Volagases showed a tamer
spirit; he was content to follow an example, often set in the
East, and already in one instance imitated by Rome," but never
adopted by any nation as a settled policy without fatal conse-
quences, and to buy at a high price the retreat of the invaders.
It was to have been expected that Rome would have punished
severely the guilt of Pharasmanes in exposing the Empire and
its allies to horrors such as always accompany the inroads of a
barbarous people. But though the Iberian monarch was com-
pelled to travel to Rome and make his appearance before the
Emperor's tribunal," yet Hadrian, so far from punishing him,
was induced to load him with benefits and honors. He per-
mitted him to sacrifice in the Capitol, placed his equestrian
statue in the temple of Bellona, and granted him an augmenta-
tion of territory." Volagases can scarcely have been pleased at
these results of his complaints; he bore them, however, with-
out murmuring, and, when (in A.D. 138) Hadrian died and was
succeeded by his adopted son, T. Aurelius, better known as
Antoninus Pius, Volagases sent to Rome an embassy of con-
gratulation, and presented the new monarch with a crown of
gold.”
It was probably at this same time that he ventured to make
an unpleasant demand. Hadrian had promised that the golden
throne which Trajan had captured in his expedition, and by
which the Parthians set so much store, should be surrendered to
them; ” but this promise he had failed to perform. Volagases
appears to have thought that his successor might be more
facile, and accordingly instructed his envoys to re-open the
Subject, to remind Antoninus of the pledged faith of his adopted
father, and to make a formal request for the delivery of the
valued relic.” Antoninus, however, proved as obdurate as
Hadrian. He was not to be persuaded by any argument to
give back the trophy; and the envoys had to return with the
º
184 THE SIXTH MONARCHY: [CH. xix.
\
report that their representations upon the point had been in
vain, and had wholly failed to move the new Emperor.
The history of Volagases II. ends with this transaction. No
events are assignable to the last ten years of his reign, which
was probably a season of profound repose, in the East as it was
in the West—a period having (as our greatest historian observes
of it) “the rare advantage of furnishing very few materials for
history,” which is, indeed (as he says), “little more than the
register of the crimes, follies, and misfortunes of mankind.””
The influence of Rome extended beyond his borders. As in
modern times it has become a proverb that when a particular
European nation is satisfied the peace of the world is assured,
so in the days whereof we are treating it would seem that
Rome had only to desire repose, for the surrounding nations to
find themselves tranquil. The inference appears to be that
not only were the wars which occurred between Rome and her
neighbors for the most part stirred up by herself, but that even
the civil commotions which disturbed States upon her borders
had very generally their origin in Roman intrigues, which,
skilfully concealed from view, nevertheless directed the course
of affairs in surrounding States, and roused in them, when
Rome thought her interests required it, civil differences, disor-
ders, and contentions.
The successor of Volagases II. was Volagases III., who was
most probably his Son, although of this there is no direct evi-
dence. The Parthian coins show “that Volagases III. ascended
the throne in A.D. 148 or 149, and reigned till A.D. 190 or 191—
a space of forty-two years. We may assume that he was a
tolerably young man at his accession, though the effigy upon
his earliest coins is well bearded, and that he was somewhat
tired of the long inactivity which had characterized the period
of his father's rule. He seems very early to have meditated a
war with Rome,” and to have taken certain steps which be-
trayed his intentions; but, upon their coming to the knowledge
of Antoninus, and that prince writing to him on the subject,
Volagases altered his plans," and resolved to wait, at any rate,
until a change of Emperor at Rome should give him a chance
of taking the enemy at a disadvantage. Thus it was not till
A.D. 161—twelve years after his accession—that his original de-
sign was carried out, and the flames of war were once more
lighted in the East to the ruin and desolation of the fairest por-
tion of Western Asia. *
The good Antoninus was succeeded in the spring of A.D. 161
CH. XIX.] VOLAGASES III.- INVADES SYRIA. 185.
by his adopted son, Marcus Aurelius, who at once associated
with him in the government the other adopted Son of Antoni-
nus, Lucius Verus. Upon this, thinking that the opportunity
for which he had been so long waiting had at last arrived, Vo-
lagases marched his troops suddenly into Armenia, expelled
Soaemus, the king protected by the Romans,” and established
in his place a certain Tigranes, a Scion of the old royal stock,
whom the Armenians regarded as their rightful monarch.”
News of this bold stroke soon reached the governors of the
adjacent Roman provinces, and Severianus, praefect of Cap-
padocia, a Gaul by birth, incited by the predictions of a pseudo-
prophet of those parts, named Alexander,” proceeded at the
head of a legion into the adjoining kingdom, in the hope of
crushing the nascent.inSurrection and punishing at Önce the
Armenian rebels and their Parthian supporters. Scarcely,
however, had he crossed the Euphrates, when he found him-
self confronted by an overwhelming force, commanded by a
Parthian called Chosroës,” and was compelled to throw himself
into the city of Elegeia, where he was immediately surrounded
and besieged.” Various tales were told of his conduct under
these circumstances, and of the fate which overtook him:” the
most probable account being that after holding out for three
days he and his troops were assailed on all sides, and, after a
brave resistance, were shot down almost to a man. The Par-
thians then crossed the Euphrates, and carried fire and sword
through Syria.” Attidius Cornelianus, the proconsul, having
ventured to oppose them, was repulsed.* Vague thoughts of
flying to arms and shaking off the Roman yoke possessed the
minds of the Syrians,” and threatened to lead to some overt
act. The Parthians passed through Syria into Palestine, and
almost the whole East seemed to lie open to their incursions.
When these facts were reported at Rome, it was resolved to
send Lucius Verus to the East. He was of an age to undergo
the hardships of campaigning, and therefore better fitted than
Marcus Aurelius to undertake the conduct of a great war. But,
as his military talent was distrusted, it was considered neces-
sary to place at his disposal a number of the best Roman gen-
erals of the time, whose services he might use while he claimed
as his own their successes. Statius Priscus, Avidius Cassius,
and Martius Verus, were the most important of these officers;
and it was by them, and not by Verus himself, that the military
operations were, in fact, conducted.
It was not till late in the year A.D. 162 that Verus, having
*
{
186 THE SIXTH MOWARCHY. ſcH. xix.
with reluctance torn himself from Italy,” appeared, with his
lieutenants, upon the scene in Syria, and, after vainly offering
them terms of peace,” commenced hostilities against the trium-
phant Parthians. The young Emperor did not adventure his
own person in the field, but stationed himself at Antioch,”
where he could enjoy the pleasures and amusements of a luxu-
rious capital, while he committed to his lieutenants the task;
of recovering Syria and Armenia, and of chastising the in-
vaders. Avidius Cassius, to whom the Syrian legions were
entrusted, had a hard task to bring them into proper discipline
after their long period of inaction,” but succeeded after a while
by the use of almost unexampled severities. Attacked by Vo-
lagases within the limits of his province, he made a successful
defence,” and in a short time was able to take the offensive, to
defeat Volagases in a great battle near Europus,” and (A.D. 163)
to drive the Parthians across the Euphrates. The Armenian
war was at the same time being pressed by Statius Priscus, who
advanced without a check from the frontier to the capital, Ar-
taxata, which he took and (as it seems) destroyed.” He then
built a new city, which he strongly garrisoned with Roman
troops, and sent intelligence of his successes to Rome, whither
Soaemus, the expelled monarch, had betaken himself. Soaemus
was upon this replaced on the Armenian throne, the task of
settling him in the government being deputed to a certain
Thucydides, by whose efforts, together with those of Martius
Verus, all opposition to the restored monarch was suppressed,
and the entire country tranquillized.”
Rome had thus in the space of two years recovered her losses,
and shown Parthia that she was still well able to maintain the
position in Western Asia which she had acquired by the vic-
tories of Trajan. But such a measure of success did not con-
tent the ambitious generals into whose hands the incompetence
of Verus had thrown the real direction of the war. Military
distinction at this time offered to a Roman a path to the very
highest honors, each successful general becoming at once by
force of his position a candidate for the Imperial dignity. Of
the various able officers employed under Verus, the most dis-
tinguished and the most ambitious was Cassius—a chief who
ultimately raised the standard of revolt against Aurelius, and
lost his life in consequence.” Cassius, after he had succeeded
in clearing Syria of the invaders, was made by Aurelius a
sort of generalissimo:” and being thus free to act as he chose,
determined to carry the war into the enemy's country, and to
t
ch. XIX.] , DESTRUCTIVE PESTILENCE. N87
l
try if he could not rival, or outdo, the exploits of Trajan fifty
years previously. Though we have no continuous narrative of,
his expedition, we may trace its course with tolerable accuracy’.
in the various fragmentary writings which bear upon the his-
tory of the time—from Zeugma, when he crossed the Euphra-
tes into Mesopotamia,” to Nicephorium,” near the junction
of the Belik with the Euphrates; and thence down the course -
of the stream to Sura” (Sippara?) and Babylon.” At Sura a
battle was fought, in which the Romans were victorious; and
then the final efforts were made, which covered Cassius with
glory. The great city of Seleucia, upon the Tigris, which had
a population of 400,000 Souls, was besieged, taken, and burnt,
to punish an alleged treason of the inhabitants.” Ctesiphon,
upon the opposite side of the stream, was occupied, and the
summer palace of Volagases there situated was levelled with
the ground.” The various temples were plundered; secret
places, where it was thought treasure might be hid, were ex-
amined, and a rich booty was carried off by the invaders. The
Parthians, worsted in every encounter, ceased to resist; and all
the conquests made by Trajan were recovered. Nor was this
all. The Roman general, after conquering the Mesopotamian
plain, advanced into the Zagros mountains, and occupied, at
any rate, a portion of Media, thereby entitling his Imperial
masters to add to the titles of “Armeniacus,” and “Parthicus,”
which they had already assumed, the further and wholly novel
title of “Medious.” ”
But Rome was not to escape the Nemesis which is wont to
pursue the over-fortunate. During the stay of the army in
Babylonia a disease was contracted of a strange and terrible
character, whereto the superstitious fears of the soldiers as-
signed a supernatural origin. The pestilence, they said, had,
crept forth from a subterranean cell in the temple of Comaean
Apollo at Seleucia,” which those who were plundering the
town rashly opened in the hope of its containing treasure, but
which held nothing except this fearful scourge, placed there in
primeval times by the spells of the Chaldeans. Such a belief,
however fanciful, was calculated to increase the destructive,
power of the malady, and so to multiply its victims. Vast
numbers of the soldiers perished, we are told, from its effects
during the march homeward; their sufferings being further
aggravated by the failure of supplies, which was such that
many died of famine. “ The stricken army, upon entering the
Roman territory, communicated the infection to the innabi-
t
;188 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. XIX.
tants, and the return of Verus and his troops to Rome was a
march of Death through the provinces. The pestilence raged
with special force throughout Italy, and spread as far as the
Rhine and the Atlantic Ocean.” According to one writer”
more than one half of the entire population, and almost the
whole Roman army, was carried off by it.
But though Rome suffered in consequence of the war, its gen-
eral result was undoubtedly disadvantageous to the Parthians.
The expedition of Cassius was the first invasion of Parthia in
which Rome had been altogether triumphant. Trajan's cam-
paign had brought about the submission of Armenia to the
Romans; but it did not permanently deprive Parthia of any
portion of her actual territory. And the successes of the Em-
peror in his advance were almost balanced by the disasters
which accompanied his retreat—disasters so serious as to cause
a general belief that Hadrian's concessions Sprang more from
prudence than from generosity. The war of Verus produced
the actual cession to Rome of a Parthian province, which con-
tinued thenceforth for centuries to be an integral portion of
the Roman Empire.” Western Mesopotamia, or the tract be-
tween the Euphrates and the Khabour, passed under the domin-
ion of Rome at this time; and, though not reduced to the con-
dition of a province, was none the less lost to Parthia, and ab-
sorbed by Rome into her territory. Parthia, moreover, was
penetrated by the Roman arms more deeply at this time than
she had ever been previously, and was made to feel, as she had
never felt before, that in contending with Rome she was fight-
ing a losing battle. It added to the disgrace of her defeats,
and to her own sense of their decisive character, that they
were inflicted by a mere general, a man of no very great emi-
nence, and one who was far from possessing the free command
of those immense resources which Rome had at her disposal.
Parthia bad now, in fact, entered upon the third stage of
Her decline. The first was reached when she ceased to be an
aggressive and was content to become a stationary power;”
the Second set in when she began to lose territory by the revolt
of her own subjects:" the third—which commences at this
point—is marked by her inability to protect herself from the
attacks of a foreign assailant. The causes of her decline were
various. Luxury had no doubt done its ordinary work upon
the conquerors of rich and highly-civilized regions, softening
down their original ferocity, and rendering them at once less
.robust in frame and less bold and venturesome in character.
CH. XIX.] M.4 IPKED DECLINE OF PARTHI.1. 189
The natural law of exhaustion, which sooner or later affects
all races of any distinction, may also not improbably have
come into play, rendering the Parthians of the age of Verus
very degenerate descendants of those who displayed such
brilliant qualities when they contended with Crassus and Mark
Antony. Loyalty towards the monarch, and the absolute de-
votion of every energy to his service, which characterized the
earlier times, dwindled and disappeared as the succession be-
came more and more disputed, and the kings less worthy of
their subjects’ admiration. The strength needed against for-
eign enemies was, moreover, frequently expended in civil
broils; the spirit of patriotism declined; and tameness under
insult and indignity took the place of that fierce pride and
fiery self-assertion which had once characterized the people.
The war with Rome terminated in the year A.D. 165. Vola-
gases survived its close for at least twenty-five years; but he
did not venture at any time to renew the struggle, or to make
any effort for the recovery of his lost territory. Once only does
he appear to have contemplated an outbreak. When, about
the year A.D. 174 or 175, Aurelius being occupied in the west
with repelling the attacks of the wild tribes upon the Danube,
Avidius Cassius assumed the purple in Syria," and a civil war
seemed to be imminent, Volagases appears to have shown an
intention of Once more taking arms and trying his fortune. A
Parthian war was at this time expected to break out by the
Romans.” But the crisis passed without an actual explosion.
The promptness of Aurelius, who, on hearing the news, at once
quitted the Danube and marched into Syria, together with the
rapid collapse of the Cassian revolt, rendered it imprudent
for Volagases to persist in his project. He therefore laid aside
all thought of renewing hostilities with Rome; and, on the ar-
rival of Aurelius in Syria, sent ambassadors to him with
friendly assurances, who were received favorably by the philo-
sophic Emperor.” |
Four years after this Marcus Aurelius died,” and was suc-
ceeded in the purple by his youthful son, Lucius Aurelius Com-
modus. It might have been expected that the accession of this
weak and inexperienced prince would have induced Volagases
to resume his warlike projects, and attempt the recovery of
Mesopotamia. But the Scanty history of the time which has
come down to us" shows no trace of his having entertained any
such design. . He had probably reached the age at which repose.
becomes a distinct object of desire, and is infinitely preferred.
A
*
&
190 THE SIXTII MONARCHIV. [CH. xx.
to active exertion. At any rate, it is clear that he made no
effort. The reign of Commodus was from first to last un-
troubled by Oriental disturbance. Volgases III. was for ten
years contemporary with this mean and unwarlike prince; but
Rome was allowed to retain her Parthian conquests unmolest.
ed. At length, in A.D. 190 or 191, Volagases died," and the des.
tinies of Parthia passed into the hands of a new monarch.
/
• . . CHAPTER XX. Ae
Accession of Volagases IV. His Alliance sought by Pescen-
nius Niger. Part taken by Parthia in the Contest between
Niger and Severus. Mesopotamia revolts from Rome.
First Eastern Expedition of Severus. Its Results. Sec-
ond Easpedition. Successes of Severus. His Failure at
Hatra. General Results of the War. Death of Volagases
IV.
Merå 8ë raßra 5 ×eg?pos éka-rparsijev kará ràv IIáp6av . . . ºpxe ô’ attàv OtoAóyavaros.-
Dio Cass. lxxv. 9.
#
ON the death of Volagases III., in A.D. 190 or 191, the Parthian
crown fell to another prince of the same name, who was prob-
ably the eldest son of the late monarch." This prince was
scarcely settled upon the throne when the whole of Western
Asia was violently disturbed by the commotions which shook
the Roman Empire after the murder of Commodus. The
virtuous Pertinax was allowed to reign but three months (A.D.
193, January–March). His successor was scarcely proclaimed
when in three different quarters the legionaries rose in arms,
and, saluting their commanders as “Emperors,” invested them
with the purple. Clodius Albinus, in Britain; Severus, in
Pannonia; and Pescennius Niger, in Syria, at one and the
same time claimed the place which the wretched Julianus had
bought, and prepared themselves to maintain their rights
against all who should impugn them. It seems that, on the
first proclamation of Niger, and before it had become evident
that he would have to establish his authority by force of arms,
either the Parthian monarch, or at any rate princes who were
among his dependants,” sent to congratulate the new Emperor
.*
ch. xx.] VOLAGASES IV. LENDS AID TO WIGER. 191
on his accession and to offer him contingents of troops, if he
required them. These spontaneous proposals were at the first
politely declined, since Niger expected to find himself accepted
joyfully as sovereign, and did not look to have to engage in
war. When, however, the news reached him that he had
formidable competitors, and that Severus, acknowledged Em-
peror at Rome, was about to set out for the East, at the head
of vast forces, he saw that it would be necessary for him, if he
were to make head against his powerful rival, to draw together
troops from all quarters. Accordingly, towards the close of
A.D. 193, he sent envoys to the princes beyond the Euphrates,
and especially to the kings of Parthia, Armenia, and Hatra,
entreating them to send their troops at once to his aid." Vo-
lagases, under these circumstances, appears to have hesitated.
He sent an answer that he would issue orders to his satraps for
the collection of a force, but made no haste to redeem his pro-
mise, and in fact refrained from despatching any body of dis-
tinctly Parthian troops to the assistance of Niger in the im-
pending struggle. - --
While, however, thus abstaining from direct interference in
the contest between the two Roman pretenders, Volagases
appears to have allowed one of his dependent monarchs to mix
himself up in the quarrel. Hatra, at this time the capital of an
Arabian community,” and the chief city of central Mesopotamia
(or the tract between the Sinjar and the Babylonian alluvium),
was a dependency of Parthia, and though, like so many other
Parthian dependencies, it possessed its native kings," cannot
have been in a position to engage in a great war without per-
mission from the Court of Ctesiphon. When, therefore, we
find that Barsemius, the King of Hatra, not only received the
envoys of Niger favorably, but actually sent to his aid a body
of archers," we must understand that Volagases sanctioned the
measure. Probably he thought it prudent to secure the friend-
ship of the pretender whom he expected to be successful, but
Sought to effect this in the way that would compromise him
least if the result of the struggle should be other than he looked
for. The sending of his own troops to the camp of Niger would
have committed him irretrievably; but the actions of a vassal
monarch might with some plausibility be disclaimed.
As the struggle between the two pretenders progressed in the
early months of A.D. 194, the nations beyond the Euphrates
grew bolder, and allowed themselves to indulge their natural
feelings of hostility towards the Romans. The newly subjected
g
– – *
z-
192 THE SIXTH HONARCIIY. S [CH. xx.
Mesopotamians flew to arms, massacred most of the Roman
detachments stationed about their country, and laid siege to
Nisibis," which since the cession Rome had made her head-quar-
ters. The natives of the region were assisted by their kindred
races across the Tigris, particularly by the people of Adiabéné,”
who, like the Arabs of Hatra, were Parthian vassals. Severus
had no Sooner overcome his rival and slain him, than he
hastened eastward with the object of relieving the troops shut
up in Nisibis, and of chastising the rebels and their abettors.
It was in vain that the Mesopotamians sought to disarm his
resentment by declaring that they had taken up arms in his
cause, and had been only anxious to distress and injure the
partisans of his antagonist. Though they sent ambassadors
to him with presents, and offered to make restitution of the
Roman spoil still in their hands, and of the Roman prisoners, it
was observed that they said nothing about restoring the strong-
holds which they had taken, or resuming the position of Roman
tributaries. On the contrary, they required that all Roman
soldiers still in their country should be withdrawn from it, and
that their independence should henceforth be respected.” As
Severus was not inclined to surrender Roman territory without
a contest, war was at once declared. His immediate adversa-
ries were of no great account, being, as they were, the petty
kings of Osrhoëné, Adiabéné, and Hatra; but behind them
loomed the massive form of the Parthian State, which was
attacked through them, and could not be indifferent to their
fortunes.
In the spring of A.D. 195, Severus, at the head of his troops,
crossed the Euphrates in person, and taking up his own
quarters at Nisibis, which the Mesopotamians had been un-
able to capture, proceeded to employ his generals in the re-
duction of the rebels and the castigation of their aiders and
abettors. Though his men suffered considerably from the
scarcity and badness of the water," yet he seems to have
found no great difficulty in reducing Mesopotamia once more
into subjection. Having brought it completely under, and
formally made Nisibis the capital, at the same time raising it
to the dignified position of a Roman colony,” he caused his
troops to cross the Tigris into Adiabéné, and, though the in-
habitants offered a stout resistance, succeeded in making him-
self master of the country.” The Parthian monarch seems to
have made no effort to prevent the occupation of this province.
He stood probably on the defensive, expecting to be attacked,
COIN
OF WARA III:AN. I.
HEAD OF SAPOR I.
(from a gem).
Fig. 7.
COIN OF SAPOR I.
COIN OF WARAHRAN II.


Plate. XVI
i
Wol ||l,

A
.* wº
ch. xx.] SECOND EASTERN EXPEDITION OF SEVERUS. 1937
in or near his capital. But Severus could not afford to remain
in these remote regions. He had still a rival in the West in
the person of Clodius Albinus, who might be expected to
descend upon Italy, if it were left exposed to his attacks much
longer. He therefore quitted the East early in A.D. 196, and
returned to Rome with all speed, leaving Parthia very insuf-
ficiently chastised, and his new conquests very incompletely
settled. *
Scarcely was he gone when the war broke out with greater
violence than ever. Volagases took the offensive, recovered
Adiabéné, and crossing the Tigris into Mesopotamia, swept the
Romans from the open country. Nisibis alone, which two
years before had defied all the efforts of the Mesopotamians, *
held out against him, and even this stronghold was within a
little of being taken.” According to one writer,” the trium-
phant Parthians even crossed the Euphrates, and once more
spread themselves over the fertile plains of Syria. Severus
was forced in A.D. 197 to make a second Eastern expedition, to
recover his lost glory and justify the titles which he had taken. , ,
On his first arrival in Syria, he contented himself with ex-
pelling the Parthians from the province, nor was it till late in
the year,” that, having first made ample preparation, he
crossed the Euphrates into Mesopotamia.
The success of any expedition against Parthia depended
greatly on the dispositions of the semi-dependent princes, who
possessed territories bordering upon those of the two great em-
pires. Among these the most important were at this time the
kings of Armenia and Osrhoëné. Armenia had at the period of
Niger's attempt been solicited by his emissaries; but its mon-
arch had then refused to take any part in the civil conflict.”
Subsequently, however, ſhe in some way offended Severus,
who, when he reached the East, regarded Armenia as a hos-
tile State requiring instant Subjugation.” It seems to have
been in the summer of A.D. 197, soon after his first arrival in ,
Syria, that Severus despatched a force against the Armenian -
prince, who was named (like the Parthian monarch of the
time) Volagases. That prince mustered his troops and met
the invaders at the frontier of his kingdom. A battle seemed
imminent; but ere the fortune of war was tried the Armenian f
made an application for a truce, which was granted by the Ro- .
man leaders. A breathing-space being thus gained, Volagases
sent ambassadors with presents and hostages to the Roman
emperor in Syria, professed to be animated by friendly feelings
- - .*
*
- A
194 - THE SIXTH MOWARCH Y. [CH. xx.
towards Rome, and entreated Severus to allow him terms of
peace. Severus permitted himself to be persuaded; a formal
treaty was made, and the Armenian prince even received an
enlargement of his previous territory at the hands of his molli-
fied suzerain.”
The Osrhoënian monarch, who bore the usual name of Ab-
garus, made a more complete and absolute submission. He
came in person into the emperor's camp, accompanied by a
numerous body of archers, and bringing with him his sons as
hostages.” Severus must have hailed with especial satisfac-
tion the adhesion of this chieftain, which secured him the un-
disturbed possession of Western Mesopotamia as far as the
junction of the Khabour with the Euphrates. It was his de-
sign to proceed himself by the Euphrates route,” while he sent
detachments under other leaders to ravage Eastern Mesopo-
tamia and Adiabéné,” which had evidently been re-occupied
by the Parthians. To secure his army from want, he deter-
mined, like Trajan,” to build a fleet of ships in Upper Mesopo-
tamia, where suitable timber abounded, and to march his
army down the left bank of the Euphrates into Babylonia,
while his transports, laden with stores, descended the course
of the river.” In this way he reached the neighborhood of
Ctesiphon without suffering any loss, and easily captured the
two great cities of Babylon and Seleucia, which on his ap-
proach were evacuated by their garrisons. He then proceeded
to the attack of Ctesiphon itself, passing his ships probably
through one of the canals which united the Tigris with the
Euphrates, or else (like Trajan) conveying them on rollers
across the neck of land which separates the two rivers.
Volagases had taken up his own position at Ctesiphon, bent
on defending his capital. It is possible that the approach of
Severus by the line of march which he pursued was unex-
pected,” and that the sudden presence of the Romans before
the walls of Ctesiphon came upon the Parthian monarch as a
surprise. He seems, at any rate, to have made but a poor re-
sistance. It may be gathered, indeed, from one author” that
he met the invaders in the open field, and fought a battle in
defence of Ctesiphon before allowing himself to be shut up
within its walls. But after the city was once invested it ap-
pears to have been quickly taken. We hear of no such resist-
ance as that which was soon afterwards offered by Hatra.
The soldiers of Severus succeeded in storming Ctesiphon on
the first assault; the Parthian monarch betook himself to
, , . . .
* } …”
CH. XX.] OTESIPHON TAKEN BY THE ROMA.N.S. 195
W
- \
flight, accompanied by a few horsemen;” and the seat of em-
pire thus fell easily—a second time within the space of eighty-
two years—into the hands of a foreign invader. The treat-
ment of the city was such as we might expect from the ordi-
nary character of Roman warfare. A general massacre of the
male population was made. The Soldiers were allowed to plun-
der both the public and the private buildings at their pleasure.
The precious metals accumulated in the royal treasury were
seized, and the chief ornaments of the palace were taken and
carried off. Nor did blood and plunder content the victors.
After slaughtering the adult males they made prize of the wo-
men and children, who were torn from their homes without
compunction and led into captivity, to the number of a hun-
dred thousand.” ;
Notwithstanding the precautions which he had taken, Seve-
rus appears to have become straitened for supplies about the
time that he captured Ctesiphon. His soldiers were compelled
for some days to exist on roots, which produced a dangerous
dysentery.” He found himself unable to pursue Volagases,”
and recognized the necessity of retreating before disaster over-
took him. He could not, however, return by the route of the
Euphrates, since his army had upon its advance completely
exhausted the resources of the Euphrates region.” The line of
the Tigris was therefore preferred for the retreat; and while
the ships with difficulty made their way up the course of the
stream, the army pursued its march upon the banks, without,
So far as appears, any molestation. It happened, however,
that the route selected led Severus near to the small state of
Hatra, which had given him special offence by supporting the
cause of his rival, Niger; and it seemed to him of importance
that the inhabitants should receive condign punishment for
this act of audacity. He may also have hoped to eclipse the
fame of Trajan by the capture of a town which had success-
fully resisted that hero.” He therefore stopped his march in
Order to lay siege to the place, which he attacked with military
engines, and with all the other offensive means known at the
time to the Romans. His first attempt was, however, easily
repulsed.* The walls of the town were strong, its defenders
brave and full of enterprise. They burnt the siege-machines
brought against them, and committed great havoc among the
Soldiers. Under these circumstances disorders broke out
among the besiegers; mutinous words were heard; and the
emperor thought himself compelled to have recourse to
•
*
i “A
196 THE SIXTH MONARCHIV. ſch. xx.
severe measures of repression. Having put to death two of
his chief officers,” and then found it necessary to deny that he
had given orders for the execution of one of them, he broke up
from before the place and removed his camp to a distance.
He had not, however, as yet relinquished the hope of bring-
ing his enterprise to a successful issue. In the security of his
distant camp he constructed fresh engines in increased num-
bers, collected an abundant supply of provisions, and made
every preparation for renewing the siege with effect at no re-
mote period.* The treasures stored up in the city were re-
ported to be great, especially those which the piety of succes-
sive generations had accumulated in the Temple of the Sun.”
This rich booty appealed forcibly to the cupidity of the em-
peror, while his honor seemed to require that he should not
suffer a comparatively petty town to defy his arms with im-
punity. He, therefore, after a short absence retraced his
steps, and appeared a second time before Hatra with a stronger
siege-train and a better appointed army than before. But the
Hatreni met his attack with a resolution equal to his own.
They were excellent archers; they possessed a powerful force
of cavalry; they knew their walls to be strong; and they were
masters of a peculiar kind of fire, which was calculated to ter-
rify and alarm, if not greatly to injure, an enemy unacquainted
with its qualities.” Severus once more lost almost all his ma-
chines; the Hatrene cavalry severely handled his foragers; his
men for a long time made but little impression upon the walls,
while they suffered grievously from the enemy's slingers” and
archers, from his warlike engines, and especially, we are told,
from the fiery darts which were rained upon them incessantly.”
However, after enduring these various calamities for a length
of time, the perseverance of the Romans was rewarded by the
formation of a practicable breach in the outer wall; and the
soldiers demanded to be led to the assault, confident in their
power to force an entrance and carry the place.” But the
emperor resisted their inclination. He did not wish that the
city should be stormed, since in that case it must have been
given up to indiscriminate pillage, and the treasures which he
coveted would have become the prey of the soldiery. The
Hatreni, he thought, would make their submission, if he only
gave them a little time, now that they must see further resist-
ance to be hopeless. He waited therefore a day, expecting an
offer of surrender. But the Hatreni made no sign, and in the
night restored their wall where it had been broken down.
$
CH. XX.] INACTION OF VoIAGASES - 197,
- \
Severus then made up his mind to sacrifice the treasures on
which his heart had been set, and, albeit with reluctance, gave
the word for the assault. But now the legionaries refused.
They had been forbidden to attack when success was certain
and the danger trivial—they were now required to imperil
their lives while the result could not but be doubtful. Perhaps
they divined the emperor's motive in withholding them from
the assault, and resented it; at any rate they openly declined
to execute his orders. After a vain attempt to force an en-
trance by means of his Asiatic allies, Severus desisted from
his undertaking. The summer was far advanced;" the heat
was great; disease had broken out among his troops; above
all, they had become demoralized, and their obedience could
no longer be depended on.” Severus broke up from before
Hatra a second time, after having besieged it for twenty
days,” and returned—by what route we are not told—into
Syria.
Nothing is more surprising in the history of this campaign
than the inaction and apparent apathy of the Parthians. Vo-
lagases, after quitting his capital, seems to have made no effort
at all to hamper or harass his adversary. The prolonged re-
sistance of Hatra, the sufferings of the Romans, their increas-
ing difficulties with respect to provisions, the injurious effect
of the summer heats upon their unacclimatized constitutions,
would have been irresistible temptations to a prince of any
Spirit or energy, inducing him to advance as the Romans re-
tired, to hang upon their rear, to Čut off their supplies, and to
render their retreat difficult, if not disastrous. Volagases ap-
}
pears to have remained wholly inert and passive. His conduct
is only explicable by the consideration of the rapid decline
which Parthia was now undergoing, of the general decay of
patriotic spirit, and the sea of difficulties into which a mon-
arch was plunged who had to retreat before an invader.
The expedition of Severus was on the whole glorious for
Rome, and disastrous for Parthia, though the glory of the
victor was tarnished at the close by his failure before Hatra.
It cost Parthia a second province. The Roman emperor not
only recovered his previous position in Mesopotamia, but over-
stepping the Tigris, established the Roman dominion firmly in
the fertile tract between that stream and the Zagros mountain-
range. The title of “Adiabenicus” became no empty boast.
Adiabéné, or the tract between the Zab rivers—probably in-
cluding at this time the entire low region at the foot of Zagros
\ x.
*
b. *
* ~.
f f
• 198 ..THE SIXTH MONARCHY. * [CH. xx.’
.*. |
. . from the eastern Khabour on the north to the Adhem towards
*
*
.*
the south—passed under the dominion of Rome, the monarch
of the country, hitherto a Parthian vassal, becoming her tribu-
tary.” Thus the imperial standards were planted permanently
at a distance less than a degree from the Parthian capital,
which, with the great cities of Seleucia and Babylon in its
neighborhood, was exposed to be captured almost at any mo-
ment by a sudden and rapid inroad.
Volagases survived his defeat by Severus about ten or eleven
years. For this space Parthian history is once more a blank,
our authorities containing no notice that directly touches Par-
thia during the period in question. The stay of Severus in the
East" during the years A.D. 200 and 201, would seem to indi-
cate that the condition of the Oriental provinces was unsettled
and required the presence of the Imperator. But we hear of
no effort made by Parthia at this time to recover her losses—
of no further collision between her troops and those of Rome;.
s and we may assume therefore that peace was preserved, and
Ithat the Parthian monarch acquiesced, however unwillingly,
in the curtailment of his territory. Probably internal, no less
, than external, difficulties pressed upon him. The diminution
of Parthian prestige which had been brought about by the suc-
cessive victories of Trajan, Avidius Cassius, and Severus must
have loosened the ties which bound to Parthia the several vas-
sal kingdoms. Her suzerainty had been accepted as that of
the Asiatic nation most competent to make head against Eu-
ropean intruders, and securé the native races in continued in-
dependence of a wholly alien power.” It may well have ap-
peared at this time to the various vassal states that the Par-
thian vigor had become effete, that the qualities which had
advanced the race to the leadership of Western Asia were
gone, and that unless some new power could be raised up to
act energetically against Rome, the West would obtain com-
plete dominion over the East, and Asia be absorbed into Eu-
rope. Thoughts of this kind, fermenting among the subject
populations, would produce a general debility, a want both of
power and of inclination to make any combined effort, a desire
to wait until an opportunity of acting with effect should offer.
Hence probably the deadness and apathy which characterize
this period, and which seem at first sight so astonishing. Dis-
trust of their actual leader paralyzed the nations of Western
Asia, and they did not as yet see their way clearly towards
placing themselves under any other guidance.
**
*
w zS - - - §. - * Af | *
J. $. * - § 3? $ # , \
h -- Y * -
ch. xxi.] VOLAGASES V. AND ARTABANUS PV. 199
- * z *.
Volagases IV. reigned till A.D. 208-9, dying thus about two
years before his great adversary, who expired” at York,
February 4, A.D. 211. \ f \
CHAPTER XXI.
Struggle between the two Sons of Volagases IV., Volagases V.
and Artabanus. Continued Sovereignty of both Princes.
Ambition of Caracallus. His Proceedings in the East.
His Resolve to quarrel with Parthia. First Proposal
made by him to Artabanws. Perpleacity of Artabanus.
Caracallus invades Parthia. His Successes, and Death.
Macrinus, defedted by Artabanus, consents to Terms of
Peace. Revolt of the Persians wºnder Artaaceraces. Pro-
longed Struggle. Death of Artabanus, and Downfall of
the Parthian Empire. tº.
y
TeXevratos yé yovey & "Aprä8avos.—Dio Cass. lxxx, 8.
& y
ON the death of Volagases IV., the Parthian crown was
disputed between his two sons, Artabanus and Volagases.
According to the classical writers, the contest resulted in
favor of the former, whom they regard as undisputed sov-
ereign of the Parthians, at any rate from the year A.D. 216.”
It appears, however, from the Parthian coins, that both the
brothers claimed and exercised sovereignty during the entire
term of seventeen or eighteen years which intervened between
the death of Volagases IV. and the revolt of the Persians.”
Artabanus must beyond all doubt have acquired the sole rule
in the western portions of the empire, since (from A.D. 216 to
A.D. 226) he was the only monarch known to the Romans.
But Volagases may at the same time have been recognized in
the more eastern provinces, and may have maintained himself
in power in those remote regions without interfering with his
brother's dominion in the West. Still this division of the
empire must naturally have tended to weaken it; and the
position of Volagases has to be taken into account in esti-
mating the difficulties under which the last monarch of the
Arsacid series found himself placed—difficulties to which,
after a struggle, he was at last forced to succumb, Domestic
\
*
*.
s N
\ * f
... • f is
200 * THE SIXTH MONARCHY. . . [CH. xxi.
dissension, wars with a powerful neighbor (Rome), and in-
ternal disaffection and rebellion formed a combination,
against which the last Parthian monarch, albeit a man of
considerable energy, strove in vain. But he strove bravely;
and the closing scenes of the empire, in which he bore the
chief part, are not unworthy of its best and palmiest days.
An actual civil war appears to have raged between the two
brothers for Some years. Caracallus, who in A.D. 211 suc-
ceeded his father, Severus, as Emperor of Rome, congratulated
the Senate in A.D. 212 on the strife still going on in Parthia,
which could not fail (he said) to inflict serious injury on that
hostile state.” The balance of advantage seems at first to have
inclined towards Volagases, whom Caracallus acknowledged
as monarch of Parthia“ in the year A.D. 215. But soon after
this the fortune of war must have turned; for subsequently
to the year A.D. 215, we hear nothing more of Volagases, but
find Caracallus negotiating with Artabanus instead, and treat-
ing with him as undisputed monarch of the entire Parthian
empire." That this was not his real position, appears from the
coins; but the classical evidence may be accepted as showing
that from the year A.D. 216, Volagases ceased to have much
power, sinking from the rank of a rival monarch into that of
a mere pretender, who may have caused some trouble to the
established sovereign, but did not inspire serious alarm.
Artabanus, having succeeded in reducing his brother to this
condition, and obtained a general acknowledgment of his
claims, found himself almost immediately in circumstances of
much difficulty. From the moment of his accession, Cara-
callus had exhibited an inordinate ambition; and this ambition
had early taken the shape of a special desire for the glory of
Oriental conquests. The weak and dissolute son of Severus
fancied himself, and called himself, a second Alexander;" and
thus he was in honor bound to imitate that hero's marvellous
exploits. The extension of the Roman territory towards the
East became very soon his great object, and he shrank from
no steps, however base and dishonorable, which promised to
conduce towards the accomplishment of his wishes. As early
as A.D. 212 he summoned Abgarus, the tributary king of
Osrhoëné, into his presence, and when he unsuspectingly com-
plied, seized him, threw him into prison, and declaring his
territories forfeited, reduced them into the form of a Roman
province." Successful in this bold proceeding, he attempted.
to deal with Armenia in the same way; but, though the
* º,
# 4. • \
cH. XXI.] , EWVOYS TO ARTABANU.S. 201
* ! l
monarch fell foolishly into the trap set for him, the nation was
not so easily managed. The Armenians flew to arms on
learning the imprisonment of their king and royal family;”
and when, three year afterwards (A.D. 215), Caracallus sent a
Roman army under Theocritus, one of his favorites, to chastise
them, they inflicted a severe defeat on their assailant.” But
the desire of Caracallus to effect Oriental conquests was in-
creased, rather than diminished, by this occurrence. He had
sought a quarrel with Parthia as early as A.D. 214, when he
demanded of Volagases the Surrender of two refugees of dis-
tinction.” The rupture, which he courted, was deferred by
the discreditable compliance of the Great King with his
requisition.”
Volagases surrendered the two unfortunates; and the Roman
Emperor was compelled to declare himself satisfied with the
concession. But a year had not elapsed before he had devised
a new plan of attack and proceeded to put it in execution.
Volagases V. was about this time compelled to yield the
western capital to his brother; and Artabanus IV. became the
representative of Parthian power in the eyes of the Romans.
Caracallus in the summer of A.D. 215, having transferred his
residence from Nicomedia to Antioch, sent ambassadors from
the last-named place to Artabanus, who were to present the
Parthian monarch with presents of unusual magnificence,”
and to make him an unheard-of proposition. “The Roman
Emperor,” said the despatch with which they were intrusted,
“could not fitly wed the daughter of a subject or accept the
position of son-in-law to a private person. No one could be a
suitable wife to him who was not a princess. He therefore
asked the Parthian monarch for the hand of his daughter.
Rome and Parthia divided between them the sovereignty of
the world; united, as they would be by this marriage, no
longer recognizing any boundary as separating them, they
would constitute a power that could not but be irresistible It
would be easy for them to reduce under their sway all the bar-
barous races on the skirts of their empires, and to hold them
in subjection by a flexible system of administration and gov-
ernment. The Roman infantry was the best in the world, and
in steady hand-to-hand fighting must be allowed to be un-
rivalled. The Parthians surpassed all nations in the number
of their cavalry and in the excellency of their archers. If
these advantages, instead of being separated, were combined,
and the various elements on which success in war depends
*
f
*.
*
*
* Y -
202' - THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. xxi.
were thus brought into harmonious union, there could be no
difficulty in establishing and maintaining a universal mon-
archy. Were that done, the Parthian spices and rare stuffs,
as also the Roman metals and manufactures, would no longer
need to be imported secretly and in small quantities by mer-
chants, but, as the two countries would form together but one
nation and one state, there would be a free interchange among
all the citizens of their various products and commodities.””
The recital of this despatch threw the Parthian monarch
into extreme perplexity. He did not believe that the propo-
sals made to him were serious, or intended to have an honor-
able issue. The project broached appeared to him altogether
extravagant, and such as no one in his senses could entertain
for a moment. Yet he was anxious not to offend the master
of two-and-thirty legions, “nor even to give him a pretext for
a rupture of amicable relations. Accordingly he temporized,
contenting himself with setting forth Some objections to the
request of Caracallus, and asking to be excused compliance
with it.” “Such a union, as Caracallus proposed, could
scarcely,” he said, “prove a happy one. The wife and hus-
band, differing in language, habits, and mode of life, could not
but become estranged from one another. There was no lack
of patricians at Rome, possessing daughters with whom the
emperor might wed as suitably as the Parthian kings did with
the females of their own royal house. It was not fit that either
family should sully its blood by mixture with the other.”
There is some doubt whether Caracallus construed this re-
sponse as an absolute refusal, and thereupon undertook his
expedition, or whether he regarded it as inviting further nego-
tiation, and sent a second embassy, whose arguments and per-
Suasions induced Artabanus to consent to the proposed alli-
ance. The contemporary historian, Dio, states positively that
Artabanus refused to give his daughter to the Roman monarch,
, and that Caracallus undertook his expedition to avenge this
insult;" but Herodian, another contemporary, declares exactly
the reverse. According to him, the Roman Emperor, on re-
ceiving the reply of Artabanus, sent a new embassy to urge
his Suit, and to protest with oaths that he was in earnest and
had the most friendly intentions. Artabanus upon this yielded,
addressed Caracallus as his son-in-law, and invited him to
Come and fetch home his bride.” Herodian describes with
much minuteness, and with a good'deal of picturesque effect,
the stately march of the Imperial prince through the Parthian
*
º #
# * i.
3.
cº, wril TREACHERous ATTACK OF CARACALLUS. 203
* /
territory, the magnificent welcome which he received, and the
peaceful meeting of the two kings in the plain before Ctesi-
phon, which was suddenly interrupted by the meditated trea-
son of the crafty Roman. Taken at disadvantage, the Parthian
monarch with difficulty escaped, while his soldiers and other
subjects, incapable of making any resistance, were slaughtered
like sheep by their assailants, who then plundered and ravaged
the Parthian territory at their will, and returned laden with
spoil into Mesopotamia. In general, Dio is a more trustworthy
authority than Herodian, and most moderns have therefore
preferred his version of the story.” But it may be ques-
tioned whether in this particular case the truth has not been
best preserved by the historian on whom under ordinary cir-
cumstances we place less dependence. If so disgraceful an
outrage as that described by Herodian was, indeed, committed
by the head of the Roman State on a foreign potentate, Dio,
as a great State official, would naturally be anxious to gloss it
over. There are, moreover, internal difficulties in his narra-
tive;” and on more than one point of importance he contra-
dicts not only Herodian, but also Spartianus.” It is therefore
not improbable that Herodian has given with most truth the
general outline of the expedition of Caracallus, though, with
that love of effect which characterizes him, he may have un-
duly embellished the narrative.
The advance of Caracallus was, if Spartianus is to be believed,
through Babylonia.” The return may have been (as Dio seems
to indicate that it was”) by the way of the Tigris, through
Adiabéné and Upper Mesopotamia. It was doubtless on the
return that Caracallus committed a second and wholly wanton
outrage upon the feelings of his adversary, by violating the
Sanctity of the Parthian royal Sepulchres, and dispersing their
contents to the four winds. These tombs were situated at
Arbela, in Adiabéné, a place which seems to have been always
regarded as in some sort a City of the Dead.” The useless in-
sult and impiety were worthy of one who, like Caracallus, was
“equally devoid of judgment and humanity,” and who has
been pronounced by the most unimpassioned of historians to
have been “the common enemy of mankind.”* A severereck-
Oning was afterwards exacted for the indignity, which was
felt by the Parthians with all the keenness wherewith Orientals
are wont to regard any infringement of the Sanctity of the
grave. ~~ -
Caracallus appears to have passed the winter at Edessa,
\
A
*
*.
\ —r— - -
* \s *
§ g **
204' . . . THE SIXTH HONARCITY. , , Ich. xxi.
amusing himself with hunting and charioteering after the
fatigues of his campaign.” In the Spring he threatened another
advance into Parthian territory, and threw the Medes and
Parthians into great alarm.” He had not, however, the oppor-
tunity of renewing his attack. On April 8, A.D. 217; having
quitted Edessa with a small retinue for the purpose of visiting
a famous temple of the Moon-God near Carrhae, he was sur-
prised and murdered on the way by Julius Martialis, one of his
guards.” His successor, Macrinus, though a Praetorian prefect,
was no soldier, and would willingly have retired at once from
the war. But the passions of the Parthians had been roused.
Artabanus possessed the energy and spirit which most of the
recent monarchs had lacked; and though defeated when taken
at disadvantage, and unable for some months to obtain any re-
venge, had employed the winter in the collection of a vast
army, and was determined to exact a heavy retribution for the
treacherous massacre of Ctesiphon and the wanton impiety of
Arbela. He had already taken the field and conducted his
troops to the neighborhood of the Roman frontier when Cara-
callus lost his life. Macrinus was scarcely acknowledged em-
peror when he found that the Parthians were close at hand,
that the frontier was crossed, and that unless a treaty could be
concluded he must risk a battle.*
Under these circumstances the unwarlike emperor hurriedly
sent ambassadors to the Parthian camp, with an offer to restore
all the prisoners made in the late campaign as the price of
peace. Artabanus unhesitatingly rejected the overture, but at
the same time informed his adversary of the terms on which
he was willing to treat. Macrinus, he said, must not only re-
store the prisoners, but must also consent to rebuild all the
towns and castles which Caracallus had laid in ruins, must
make compensation for the injury done to the tombs of the
kings, and further must cede Mesopotamia to the Parthians.”
It was impossible for a Roman Emperor to consent to such de-
mands without first trying the fortune of war, and Macrinus
, accordingly made up his mind to fight a battle. The Parthian
prince had by this time advanced as far as Nisibis, and it was
in the neighborhood of that city that the great struggle took
place. - - . . . . .
The battle of Nisibis, which terminated the long contest be.
tween Rome and Parthia, was the fiercest and best-contested
which was ever fought between the rival powers. It lasted for
the space of three days.” The army of Artabanus was numer
*
— — . f
\, * .#
} - f .
CH. XXI.] GREAT BATTLE OF WISIBIS. 205
t } - # W
ous and well-appointed: like almost every Parthian force, it .
was strong in cavalry and archers; and it had moreover a
novel addition of considerable importance, consisting of a corps
of picked soldiers, clad in complete armor, and carrying long,
spears or lances, who were mounted on camels.” The Roman
legionaries were supported by numerous light-armed troops,
and a powerful body of Mauritanian cavalry.” According to
Dio, the first engagement was brought on accidentally by a
contest which arose among the Soldiers for the possession of a
watering-place.” Herodian tells us that it commenced with a
fierce assault of the Parthian cavalry, who charged the Romans
with loud shouts, and poured into their ranks flight after flight
of arrows. A long struggle followed. The Romans suffered
greatly from the bows of the horse-archers, and from the lances
of the corps mounted on camels; and though, when they could
reach their enemy, they had always the superiority in close
combat, yet after a while their losses from the cavalry and
camels forced them to retreat. As they retired they strewed
the ground with spiked balls and other contrivances for injur-
ing the feet of animals; and this stratagem was so far success-
ful that the pursuers soon found themselves in difficulties, and
the armies respectively retired, without any decisive result, to
their camps. -
The next day there was again a combat from morning to
night, of which we have no description, but which equally ter-
minated without any clear advantage to either side.” The
fight was then renewed for the third time on the third day,
with the difference that the Parthians now directed all their
efforts towards surrounding the enemy, and thus capturing
their entire force.” As they greatly outnumbered the Romans,
these last found themselves compelled to extend their line un-
duly, in order to meet the Parthian tactics; and the weakness
of the extended line seems to have given the Parthians an op-
portunity of throwing it into confusion, and thus causing the
Roman defeat.” Macrinus took to flight among the first; and
his hasty retreat discouraged his troops," who soon afterwards
acknowledged themselves beaten, and retired within the lines
of their camp. Both armies had suffered severely. Herodian
describes the heaps of dead as piled to such a height that the
manoeuvres of the troops were impeded by them, and at last the
two contending hosts could scarcely see one another! Both
armies, therefore, desired peace.” The soldiers of Macrinus,
who had never had much confidence in their leader, were de-
*.
f
*.
z
,”,
4.
f -R – – — — —
206 THE SIXTH MoMARCHY. [CH. xxi.
-*.
. moralized by ill success, and showed themselves inclined to
throw off the restraints of discipline. Those of Artabanus, a '
militia rather than a standing force, were unaccustomed to
sustained efforts; and having been now for some months in the
field, had grown weary, and wished to return home. Macrinus
under these circumstances re-opened negotiations with his ad-
versary. He was prepared to concede something more than he
a had proposed originally, and he had reason to believe that the
f -
Parthian monarch, having found the Romans resistance so
stubborn, would be content to insist on less. The event justi-
fied his expectations. Artabanus relinquished his demand for
the cession of Mesopotamia, and accepted a pecuniary compen-
sation for his wrongs. Besides restoring the captives and the
, booty carried off by Caracallus in his raid, Macrinus had to pay
a sum exceeding a million and a half of our money. Rome
thus concluded her transactions with Parthia, after nearly three
centuries of struggle, by ignominiously purchasing a peace.”
It might have been expected that the glory of this achieve-
ment would have brought the troubles of Artabanus to a close;
and if they did not cause the pretender who still disputed his
possession of the throne to submit, would at any rate have put
an end to any disaffection on the part of the subject nations
that the previous ill-success of Parthia in her Roman wars
might have provoked. But in the histories of nations and em-
pires we constantly find that noble and gallant efforts to re-
'trieve disaster and prevent the ruin consequent upon it come
too late. When matters have gathered to a head, when steps
that commit important persons have been taken, when classes
or races have been encouraged to cherish hopes, when plans
have been formed and advanced to a certain point, the course
of action that has been contemplated and arranged for cannot
suddenly be given up. The cause of discontent is removed, but
the effects remain. Affections have been alienated, and the
alienation still continues. A certain additional resentment is
even felt at the tardy repentance, or revival, which seems to
cheat the discontented of that general sympathy whereof with-
out it they would have been secure. In default of their original
grievance, it is easy for them to discover minor ones, to exag-
gerate these into importance, and to find in them a sufficien
Teason for persistence in the intended course. Hence revolu
tions often take place just when the necessity for them seems
to be past, and kingdoms perish at a time when they have be:
gun to show themselves deserving of a longer term of life.
- A g f
CH. XXI.] GRIEVANCES QF THE PERSIA.N.S. 207
It is impossible at the present day to form any trustworthy
estimate of the real value of those grounds of complaint
which the Persians, in common doubtless with other subject
races, thought that they had against the Parthian rule. We
can well understand that the Supremacy of any dominant
race is irksome to the aliens who have to submit to it; but
such information as we possess fails to show us either any-
thing seriously oppressive in the general system of the Par-
thian government, or any special grievance whereof the Per-,
sians had to complain. The Parthians were tolerant; they
did not interfere with the religious prejudices of their subjects,
or attempt to enforce uniformity of creed or worship. Their
military system did not press over-heavily on the subject
peoples, nor is there any reason to believe that the scale of
their taxation was excessive. Such tyranny as is charged
upon certain Parthian monarchs is not of a kind that would
have been sensibly felt by the conquered nations, for it was
exercised upon none who were not Parthians. If we endeavor
to form a distinct notion of the grievances under which the
/
Persians suffered, they seem to have amounted to no more s
than this: 1. That high offices, whether military or civil, were,
for the most part confined to those of Parthian blood, and not
thrown open to Parthian subjects generally; 2. That the
priests of the Persian religion were not held in any special
honor," but placed merely on a par with the religious min-
isters of the other subject races; 3. That no advantage in any
respect was allowed to the Persians over the rest of the con-
quered peoples, notwithstanding that they had for so many
years exercised Supremacy over Western Asia, and given to
the list of Asiatic worthies such names as those of Cyrus and
Darius Hystaspis. It must, however, be confessed that the
account which has come down to us of the times in question
is exceedingly meagre and incomplete; that we cannot say
whether the Persians had not also other grounds of complaint
besides those that are known to us; and, more especially, that
we have no means of determining what the actual pressure of
the grievances complained of was, or whether it did not reach
to that degree of severity which moderns mostly hold to
justify disaffection and rebellion. On the whole, perhaps,
our conclusion must be, that the best justification of the out-
break is to be found in its success. The Parthians had no
right to their position but such as arose out of the law of the
stronger— w
/ .
f
208 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. . . . [CH. xxi.
* The ancient rule, the good old plan, *
That those shall take who have the power,
And those shall keep who can—
f
when the time came that they had lost this pre-eminence,
superiority in strength having passed from them to a nation
hitherto counted among their subjects, it was natural and
right that the seat of authority should shift with the shift in
the balance of power, and that the leadership of the Persians
should be once more recognized.
If the motives which actuated the nation of the Persians in
rising against their masters are thus obscure and difficult to
be estimated, still less can we form any decided judgment
upon those which caused their leader, Artaxerxes, to attempt
his perilous enterprise. Could we trust implicitly the state-
ment of Agathias, that Artaxerxes was himself a Magus,
initiated in the deepest mysteries of the Order,” we should
have grounds for considering that religious Zéal was, at any
rate, a leading motive of his conduct. It is certain that
among the principal changes consequent upon his success was
a religious revolution—the substitution for Parthian tolerance
of all faiths and worships, of a rigidly enforced uniformity in
religion, the establishment of the Magi in power, and the
bloody persecution of all such as declined obedience to the
precepts of Zoroaster.” But the conjecture has been made,
and cannot be refuted, that the proceedings of Artaxerxes in
this matter should be ascribed to policy rather than to
bigotry,” and in that case we could not regard him as origi-
' ' nally inspired by a religious sentiment. Perhaps it is best to
suppose that, like most founders of empires, he was mainly
prompted by ambition: that he saw in the distracted state of
Parthia and in the awakening of hope among the subject races,
an occasion of which he determined to avail himself as far as
he could, and that he was gradually led on to enlarge his
views and to effect the great revolution, which he brought
about, by the force of circumstances, the wishes of others, and
the occurrence of opportunities which at first he neither fore-
saw nor desired. * {
It has been observed,” that Parthia was, during the whole
reign of Artaxerxes, distracted by the claims of a pretender,
Volagases V. According to Moses of Choréné, two branches
of the Arsacid family, both of them settled in Bactria, were at
feud with the reigning prince; and these offended relatives
carried their enmity to such a length as to consider sub-
Vol.
"INVISA bºş a H.J. Ho NoISSLINĘ ms cīEL ĐNLAITORI-‘II NVAIHVAVA
Plate XVII,
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Plate XVI ||.










, - - - - * — — — — ** # \\ *
cm xxi.) THEIR REVOLT UNDER ARTAXERXES. 209
mission to a foreigner a less evil than subjection to the de facto
head of their house.” The success of Artabanus in the war.
against Rome had no effect upon his domestic foes; and
Artaxerxes undoubtedly knew that, if he raised the standard
of revolt, he might count. On a certain amount of Support from
discontented Arsacids and their followers. But his main re-
liance must have been on the Persians. The Persians had, in
the original arrangements of the Parthian empire, been
treated with a certain amount of favor. They had been al-
lowed to retain their native monarchs," a concession which
naturally involved the continuance of the nation's laws,
customs, and traditions. Their religion had not been perse-
cuted, and had even in the early times attracted a considerable
amount of Court favor." But it would seem that latterly the
privileges of the nation had been diminished, while their preju-
dices were wantonly shocked. The Magi had ceased to be re-
garded as of much account,” and, if they still formed nomi-
nally a portion of the king's council, can have had little
influence on the conduct of affairs by the government. Such a ! .
custom as that of burning the dead, which seems to have
been the rule in the later Parthian times,” could never have
maintained its ground, if the opinion of the Magi, or their co-
religionists, had been considered of much account. , . .
Encouraged by the dissensions prevailing in the Parthian
royal house, strong in the knowledge of his fellow-country-
men's discontent, and perhaps thinking that the losses which
Artabanus had sustained in his three days' battle against the
Romans under Macrinus had seriously weakened his military
strength, Artaxerxes, tributary king of Persia under Parthia,"
about A.D. 220,” or a little later, took up arms against his
master, and in a little time succeeded in establishing the in-
dependence of Persia Proper, or the modern province of
Fars.” Artabanus is said to have taken no steps at first to
crush the rebellion, or to re-establish his authority over his
revolted vassal.” Thus the Persian monarch, finding himself
unmolested, was free to enlarge his plans, and having origi-
nally, as is probable, designed only the liberation of his own
people, began to contemplate conquests. Turning his arms
eastwards against Carmania (Kerman), he easily reduced that
Scantily-peopled tract under his dominion, after which he
made war towards the north, and added to his kingdom some
of the outlying regions of Media. Artabanus now at length
resolved to bestir himself, and collecting his forces, took the
*
* \
210 THE SIXTH MONAIRCRIX. * [CH. xxx. .
field in person. Invading Persia Proper, he engaged in a
desperate struggle with his rival. Three great battles were
fought between the contending powers." In the last, which
took place in the plain of Hormuz," between Bebahan and
Shuster, on the course of the Jerahi river, Artabanus was,
after a desperate conflict, completely defeated," and not only
defeated but slain (A.D. 226). W Af
The victory of Hormuz did not, however, absolutely decide
the contest, or determine at once that the Parthian empire
should fall, and the new Persian kingdam succeed into its
place. Artabanus had left sons;” and there were not wanting
those among the feudatories of the empire, and even among
the neighboring potentates, who were well inclined to embrace
their cause. A certain Artavasdes seems to have claimed the
throne, and to have been accepted as king, at least by a por-
tion of the Parthians, in the year following the death of Ar-
tabanus (A.D. 227), when he certainly issued coins.” The
Armenian monarch, who had been set on his throne by Arta-
banus, and was uncle to the young princes,” was especially
anxious to maintain the Arsacids in power; he gave them a
refuge in Armenia," collected an army on their behalf, and
engaging Artaxerxes, is even said to have defeated him in a
battle.” But his efforts, and those of Artavasdes, were un-
availing. The arms of Artaxerxes in the end everywhere
prevailed. After a struggle, which cannot have lasted more
than a few years, the provinces of the old Parthian empire
submitted; the last Arsacid prince fell into the hands of the
Persian king;” and the founder of the new dynasty sought
to give legitimacy to his rule by taking to wife an Arsacid
princess.”
Thus perished the great Parthian monarchy after an ex-
istence of nearly five centuries. Its end must be attributed
in the main to internal decay, working itself out especially in
two directions. The Arsacid race, with which the idea of the
empire was bound up," instead of clinging together with that
close “union” which is “strength,” allowed itself to be torn
to pieces by dissensions, to waste its force in quarrels, and to
be made a handle of by every foreign invader, or domestic
rebel, who chose to use its name in order to cloak his own
selfish projects. The race itself does not seem to have become
exhausted. Its chiefs, the successive occupants of the throne,
never sank into mere weaklings or fainéants, never shut
themselves up in their Seraglios, or ceased to take a leading
| -
cII. xxi.] END OF THE PARTHIAN MONARCHY - 211
part, alike in civil broils, and in struggles with foreign rivals.
But the hold which the race had on the population, native and
foreign, was gradually weakened by the feuds which raged
within it, by the profusion with which the sacred blood was
shed by those in whose veins it ran, and the difficulty of
knowing which living member of it was its true head, and so
ontitled to the allegiance of those who wished to be faithful
Parthian subjects. Further, the vigor of the Parthian soldiery
must have gradually declined, and their superiority over the
mass of the nations under their dominion have diminished.
We found reasons for believing that, as early as A.D. 58,
Hyrcania succeeded in throwing off the Parthian yoke,” and
thus setting an example of successful rebellion to the subject
peoples. The example may have been followed in cases of ,
which we hear nothing; for the condition of the more remote
portions of the empire was for the most part unknown to the
Romans. When Persia, about A.D. 220, revolted from Arta-
banus, it was no doubt with a conviction that the Parthians
were no longer the terrible warriors who under Mithridates I.
had driven all the armies of the East before them like chaff,
or who under Orodes and Phraates IV. had gained signal
victories over the Romans. It is true that Artabanus had
contended not unsuccessfully with Macrinus. But the prestige
of Parthia was far from being re-established by the result of
his three days' battle. Rome retained as her own, notwith-
standing his success, the old Parthian province of Mesopotamia,
and was thus, even in the moment of her weakness, acknow-
ledged by Parthia to be the stronger. The Persians are not
likely to have been braver or more warlike at the time of their
revolt from Artabanus than in the days when they were sub-
jected by Mithridates. Any alteration, therefore, in the rela-
tive strength of the two peoples must be ascribed to Parthian
decline, since it cannot have been owing to Persian advance
and improvement. To conclude, we may perhaps allow some-
thing to the personal qualities of Artaxerxes, who appears to
have possessed all the merits of the typical Oriental conqueror.
Artabanus was among the most able of the later Parthian
monarchs; but his antagonist was more than this, possessing
true military genius. It is quite possible that, if the leaders
On the two sides had changed places, the victory might have
rested, not with the Persians, but with the Parthians.
212 THE SIXTH MONARCIIY. [CII, XXII.
Af
CHAPTER XXII.
On the Architecture and Ornamental Art of the Parthians.
THE modern historian of Architecture observes,” when he
reaches the period with which we have had to deal in this
volume, that, with the advent of Alexander, Oriental archi-
tecture disappears, and that its history is an absolute blank
from the downfall of the Achaemenians in B.C. 331 to the rise
of the Sassanians, about A.D. 226. The statement made in-
volves a certain amount of exaggeration; but still it expresses,
roughly and strongly, a curious and important fact. The Par-
thians were not, in any full or pregnant sense of the word,
builders. They did not aim at leaving a material mark upon
the world by means of edifices or other great works. They
lacked the spirit which had impelled successively the Assy-
rians, the Babylonians, and the Persians to cover Western
Asia with architectural monuments, proofs at once of the
wealth, and the grand ideas, of those who raised them. Par-
thia, compared to these pretentious empires, was retiring and
modest. The monarchs, however rich they may have been,
affected something of primitive rudeness and simplicity in
their habits and style of life, their dwellings and temples,
their palaces and tombs. It is difficult indeed to draw the
line in every case between pure Parthian work and Sassanian;
but on the whole there is, no doubt, reason to believe that the
architectural remains in Mesopotamia and Persia, which be-
long to the period between Alexander and the Arab conquest,
are mainly the work of the Sassanian or New Persian king-
dom, and that comparatively few of them can be ascribed
with confidence to a time anterior to A.D. 227. Still a certain
number, which have about them indications of greater an-
tiquity than the rest, or which belong to sites famous in Par-
thian rather than in Persian times, may reasonably be re-
garded as in all probability structures of the Arsacid period;
and from these we may gather at least the leading character-
istics of the Parthian architecture, its aims and resources, its
style and general effect, while from other remains—scanty
indeed, and often mutilated—we may obtain a tolerable notion
of their sculpture and other ornamental art.
- — — — — . . * f $f
w * * , \ *
ch. xxi.1] WALL OF HATRA. - ' 213
•; \ g
|
The most imposing remains which seem certainly assignable . . "
to the Parthian period are those of Hatra, or El-Hadhr, visited
by Mr. Layard in 1846, and described at length by Mr. Ross in
the ninth volume of the “Journal of the Royal Geographi-
cal Society,” ”,as well as by Mr. Fergusson, in his “History of
Architecture.” Hatra became known as a place of import-
ance in the early part of the second century after Christ.” It,
successfully resisted Trajan in A.D. 116, and Severus in A.D.
198." It is then described as a large and populous city, de-
fended by strong and extensive walls," and containing within
A
it a temple of the Sun, celebrated for the great value of its . .
offerings." It enjoyed its own kings at this time,” who were
regarded as of Arabian stock, and were among the more impor-
tant of the Parthian tributary monarchs. By the year A.D.
363 Hatra had gone to ruin, and is then described as “long
since deserted.” Its flourishing period thus belongs to the
space between A.D. 100 and A.D. 300; and its remains, to which
Mr. Fergusson assigns the date A.D. 250, must be regarded as
probably at least a century earlier, and consequently as indi-
cating the character of the architecture which prevailed under
the later Parthians, and which, if Sassanian improvements
had not obliterated them, we should have found upon the site
of Ctesiphon. -
The city of Hatra” was enclosed by a circular wall of great
thickness,” built of large square-cut stones, and strengthened
at intervals of about 170 yards by square towers or bastions. ,
[Pl. IV. Fig. 1.] Its circumference considerably exceeded three
miles. Outside the wall was a broad and very deep ditch,
and on the further side of the ditch was an earthen rampart
of considerable height and thickness. Two detached forts,
situated on eminences, commanded the approaches to the .
place, one-towards the east, and the other towards the north.
The wall was pierced by four gateways, of which the principal
Ono faced the east.” *
The circular space within the walls was divided into two
portions by a water-course” passing across it from north to
south, and running somewhat east of the centre, which thus
divided the circle into two unequal parts. The eastern por-
tion was left comparatively clear of buildings, and seems to
have been used mainly as a burial-ground; in the western
were the public edifices and the more important houses of the
inhabitants. Of the former by far the most remarkable was
one which stood nearly in the centre of the city, and which
*
*
^
*
, 214 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. xxII.
* - , .* *
has been called by some a palace, by others a temple, but
which may best be regarded as combining both uses.” [Pl.
IV. Fig. 2..] This building stood within a walled enclosure of
an oblong square shape, about 800 feet long by 700 broad.”
The wail surrounding it was strengthened with bastions, like
the wall around the city. The enclosure comprised two courts,
an inner and an outer. The outer court, which lay towards
the east, and was first entered, was entirely clear of buildings,
while the inner court contained two considerable edifices. Of
these the less important was one which stretched from north
to south across the entire inclosure, and abutted upon the
outer court; this was confused in plan, and consisted chiefly
of a number of small apartments, which have been regarded
as guard-rooms.” The other was a building of greater preten-
sions. It was composed mainly of seven vaulted halls, all of
them parallel one to another, and all facing eastward, three
being of superior and four of inferior size. The smaller halls
(Nos. I., III., IV., and VI., on the plan) were about thirty
feet long by twenty wide, and had a height of thirty feet;"
the larger ones measured ninety feet in length,” and were
from thirty-five to forty feet broad,” with a height of sixty
feet.* All were upon the same plan. They had semicircular
vaulted roofs, no windows, and received their light from the
archway at the east end, which was either left entirely open,
or perhaps closed with curtains.
Externally, the eastern façade of the building, which was
evidently its main front, had for Ornament, besides the row of
seven arches, a series of pillars, or rather pilasters, from
, which the arches sprang, Some Sculptures on the stones com-
posing the arches, and one or two emblematic figures in the
spaces left between the pilasters. The sculptures on the
stones of the arches consisted either of human heads, or of
representations of a female form, apparently floating in air.”
[Pl. IV. Fig. 3..] An emblematic Sculpture between the fourth
and fifth arch represented a griffin with twisted tail, raised
about 5 feet above the ground. The entire length of the
façade was about 300 feet. º
The interior of the smaller halls had no ornament; but the
larger ones were decorated somewhat elaborately. Here the
side walls were broken by three squared pilasters, rising to
the commencement of the vaulting, and terminated by a quasi-
capital of ornamental work, consisting of a series of ovals,
each oval containing in its centre a round ball of dark stone.
— — — — — A
d
CH. XXII.] ‘PALACE-TEMPLE OF HATRA.
*.
*
|Underneath these quasi-capitals, at the distance of from two
to three feet, ran a cornice, which crossed the pilasters, and
extended the whole length of the apartment, consisting of
flowers and half-ovals, each Oval containing a half-ball of the
same dark stone as the capitals. [Pl. IV. Fig. 4.] Finally, on
the pilasters, immediately below the cornice, were sculptured
commonly either two or three human heads,” the length of
each head being about two feet, and the faces representing
diverse types of humanity, Some old and some young, some
male and some female, Some apparently realistic, some ideal-
ized and more or less grotesque in their accompaniments. The
drawing of the heads is said to have been full of spirit, and
their general effect is pronounced life-like and striking.
The seven halls, which have been described, were divided
into two groups, of three and four respectively, by a low fence,
which ran from east to west across the inner court, from the
partition wall separating the third and fourth halls to the
buildings which divided the inner court from the outer. It is
probable that this division separated the male and female
apartments. The female ornamentation” of the large hall
(No. II.) belonging to the Southern group is perhaps an indica-
tion of the sex of its inmates; and another sign that these
were the female quarters is to be found in the direct commu-
nication existing between this portion of the building and “the
Temple” (No. VIII.), which could not be reached from the
male apartments except by a long circuit round the building.
The “Temple” itself was an apartment of a square shape,
each side being about forty feet. It was completely sur-
rounded by a vaulted passage, into which light came from two
windows at its south-west and north-west corners. The Tem-
ple was entered by a single doorway, the position of which
was directly opposite an opening leading into the passage from
Hall No. II. Above this doorway was a magnificent frieze,
the character of which is thought to indicate the religious pur-
pose of the structure. [Pl. V. Fig. 1.] The interior of the
Temple was without ornamentation, vaulted, and except, for
the feeble light which entered by the single doorway, dark.
On the west side a portal led into the passage from the oute
all’. -
Besides these main apartments, the edifice which we are
describing contained a certain number of small rooms, lying
behind the halls, and entered by doorways opening from them.
One or two such rooms are found behind each of the smaller
215
f
f .* -
| * * {
216 THE SIXTH MONARCHY.' [CH. XXII.
*
halls; and another of somewhat larger dimensions lay behind
the great hall (numbered VII. in the plan), forming the extreme
north-western corner of the building. These rooms were
vaulted and had no windows, receiving their only light from
the small doorways by which they were entered.
It is believed that the entire edifice, or at any rate the
greater portion of it, had an upper story. Traces of such a
structure appear over the halls numbered I and VI. ; and it is
thought that the story extended over the entire range of halls.
One traveller,” on conjectural grounds, even assigns to the
building an elevation of three stories, and ventures to restore
the second and third in the mode represented in the woodcut. ,
[Pl. W. Fig. 2..] According to this author the upper portion of
the edifice resembled in many respects the great palace of the
Sassanian monarchs, of which Splendid remains still exist on
the site of Ctesiphon, where they are known as the Takht-i-
Rhuzroo, or Palace of Chosroës. That palace was, however,
on a very different plan from the Hatra One, comprising as it
did one hall only, but of a size vastly superior to any of those
at Hatra, and two wings, one on either side of the hall, made
up of dwelling and sleeping apartments.”
The few windows which exist at Hatra are oblong square in
shape,” as in general are the doorways connecting one apart-
ment with another. In one case there is an arched doorway,
or niche, which has been blocked up. There are no passages
except the one which surrounds “the Temple,” the apartments
generally leading directly one into another. In some cases
the lintel of a doorway is formed of a single stone, and orna-
mented with very delicate carving.” The doorways are for
the most part towards the corners of apartments; that of the
Temple, however, is in the centre of its eastern wall.
The general style of the buildings at Hatra has been said to be
“Roman or Byzantine;” and it has even been supposed that
“in the style of the ornaments and sculptured figures may be
traced the corrupt taste and feeble outline of the artists of
Constantinople.”” But there is abundant reason to believe
that the Hatra Palace was built nearly two centuries before
Constantinople came into existence; and, although the large
use of the round arch in vaulting may be due to the spread of
Roman architectural ideas, yet there are no grounds for sup-
posing that any but native artists, Parthian subjects, were
employed in the work, or that it is other than a fair specimen
of what was achieved by the Parthian builders during, the
- - - g — — — — — 4. e V,
ch. xxii.] IRESERVOIRS AND TOMBS AT IIATRA. \ ,217
later period of the empire. The palace of Volagases III. at
Ctesiphon, which Avidius Cassius destroyed in his invasion,”
was most likely of the same general character—a combination
of lofty halls suitable for ceremonies and audiences with small
and dark sleeping or living rooms, opening out of them, the
whole placed in the middle of a paved court, and the male
apartments carefully divided from those of the women.
The remains at Hatra are further remarkable for a consider-
able number of reservoirs and tombs. The open space between
the town proper and the eastern wall and gate is dotted with
edifices of a square shape, standing apart from one another,
which are reasonably regarded as Sepulchres.” These are
built in a solid way, of hewn stone, and consist either of one
or two chambers. They vary in size from twenty feet square
to forty, and are generally of about the same height. Some
are perfectly plain, but the exteriors of others are ornamented
with pilasters. The reservoirs occur in the paved court which
surrounds the main building; they have narrow apertures, but
expand below the aperture into the shape of a bell, and are
carefully constructed of well-cut stones closely fitted together.
The material used at Hatra is uniformly abrownish gray lime-
stone; and the cutting is so clean and smooth that it is doubted
whether the stones have needed any cement. If cement has
been employed, at any rate it cannot now be seen, the stones
everywhere appearing to touch one another. f *
There are several buildings remaining in Persia, the date of
which cannot be much later than that of the Hatra edifice;” .
but, as it is on the whole more probable that they belong to .
the Sassanian than to the Parthian period, no account of them
will be given here. It will be sufficient to observe that their
architecture grows naturally out of that which was in use at
|Hatra, and that thus we are entitled to ascribe to Parthian
times and to subjects of the Parthian Empire that impulse to
Oriental architecture which awoke it to renewed life after a
sleep of ages, and which in a short time produced such impos-,
ing results as the Takht-i-Khuzroo at Ctesiphon, the ruins of
Shapur, and the triumphal arch at Takht-i-Bostan.
The decorative and fictile art of the Parthians has received
no inconsiderable amount of illustration from remains discow-
ered, in the years 1850-1852, in Babylonia. In combination
with a series of Parthian coins were found by Mr. Loftus, on
the site of the ancient Erech (now Warka), a number of objects
in clay, plaster, and metal,” enabling us to form a fair idea of
*
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the mode in which purely Parthian edifices were decorated
during the best times of the empire, and of the style that
then prevailed in respect of personal ornaments, domestic
utensils, and other objects capable, more or less, of aesthetic
handling. The remains discovered comprised numerous archi-
tectural fragments in plaster and brick; a large number of or-
namental coffins; several statuettes in terra-cotta; jars, jugs,
vases, and lamps in earthenware; some small glass bottles;
and various personal decorations, such as beads, rings, and ear-
rings.
The architectural fragments consisted of capitals of pillars
[Pl, W. Fig. 3], portions of cornices, and specimens of a sort of
diapering which seems to have been applied to screens or thin
partitions. The capitals were somewhat heavy in design, and
at first sight struck the spectator as barbarous; but they ex-
hibited a good deal of ingenious boldness, an absence of con-
ventionality, and an occasional quaintness of design not
unworthy of a Gothic decorator. One especially, which com-
bines the upper portion of a human figure, wearing the puffed-
out hair or wig, which the Parthians affected, with an elegant
leaf rising from the neck of the capital, and curving gracefully
under the abacus, has decided merit, and is “suggestive of the
later Byzantine style.”* The cornices occasionally reminded
the discoverer of the remarkable frieze at El-Hadhr,” and were
characterized by the same freedom and boldness of invention
as the capitals. But the most curious remains were the frag-
ments of a sort of screen work, pieces of plaster covered with
geometric designs upon both sides, the patterns on the two
sides differing. [Pl. W. Fig. 4.] These designs, though unlike
in many respects the arabesques of the Mohammedans, yet
seemed on the whole to be their precursors, the “geometric
curves and tracery” appearing to “shadow forth the beauty
and richness of a style which afterwards followed the tide of
Mohammedan conquest to the remotest corners of the known
world.” 8°
The ornamental coffins were of a coarse glazed earthenware,
bluish-green in hue, and belonged to the kind which has been
called “slipper-shaped.”* [Pl. VI. Fig. 1.] They varied in
length from three feet to six, and had a large aperture at their
upper end, by means of which the body was placed in them,
and a flat lid to close this aperture, ornamented like the coffin,
and fixed in its place by a fine lime cement. A second aperture
at the lower extremity of the coffin allowed for the escape of
*
x z *
\ s
# . * 3 * *4 * * #
218 . . THE SIXTH MoMARCHF: [CH. xxii.
|
f
A *
ch. xxii.1 PARTIILAN VASES AND LAMPS. 219
the gases disengaged during decomposition. The ornamenta-
tion of the coffins varied, but consisted generally of small
figures of men, about six or seven inches in length, the most
usual figure being a warrior with his arms akimbo and his legs
astride, wearing on his head a coiffure, like that which is seen
on the Parthian coins, and having a sword hanging from the
belt. [Pl. VI. Fig. 2.] - s
Of the statuettes in terra-cotta, one of the most curious rep-
resented a Parthian warrior, recumbent, and apparently about
to drink out of a cup held in the left hand.” [Pl. VI. Fig. 3..]
The figure was clad in a long coat of mail, with greaves on the
legs and a helmet upon the head. Others represented females;
these had lofty head-dresses, which sometimes rose into two
peaks or horns, recalling the costume of English ladies in the
time of Henry IV. These figures were veiled and carefully
draped about the upper part of the person, but showed the face,
and had the legs bare from the knee downwards.”
The jars, jugs, vases, and lamps greatly resembled those of
the Assyrian and Babylonian periods, but were on the wholes
more elegant and artistic. The forms appended will give a
tolerable idea of the general character of these vessels. [Pl. VI.
Fig. 4.] They were of various sizes, and appear to have been
placed in the tombs, partly as the offerings of friends and well- .
wishers, partly with the more superstitious object of actuallys
supplying the deceased with the drink and light needful for
him on his passage from earth to the realms of the dead.”
The glass bottles were, perhaps, lachrymatories.” They had
no peculiar characteristics, but were almost exactly similar to
objects of the same kind belonging to the times of the Assyrian
and Babylonian Empires.” They exhibited the same lovely
prismatic colors, which have been so admired in the glass of
those kingdoms, an effect of decomposition, which, elsewhere
generally disfiguring, in the case of this material enhances the
Original beauty of the object tenfold by clothing it in hues of
the utmost brilliance and delicacy.”
The personal decorations consisted chiefly of armlets, bangles,
beads, rings, and ear-rings.” They were in gold, silver, copper,
and brass. Some of the Smaller gold ornaments, such as ear-
rings, and small plates or beads for necklaces and fillets, were
“of a tasteful and elegant design.” “ The finger-rings were
coarser, while the toe-rings, armlets, and bangles, were for the
most part exceedingly rude and barbarous. Head-dresses in
gold, tall and pointed, are said to have been found occasionally;
*
&
*
--
f
f
*
* A.
f $
220 " TILE SIXTII MONARCIIY. [CH., xxii.
but the museums of Europe have not yet been able to secure
any, as they are usually melted down by the finders. Broad
ribbons of gold, which may have depended like strings from a
cap, are commoner, and were seen by Mr. Loftus. Altogether,
the ornaments indicated a strong love of personal display, and
the possession of considerable wealth, but no general diffusion
of a correct taste, nor any very advanced skill in design or
metallurgy.
Of purely aesthetic art—art, that is, into which the idea of
the useful does not enter at all—the Parthians appear Scarcely
to have had an idea. During the five centuries of their sway,
they seem to have set up no more than Some half-dozen bas-re-
liefs. There is, indeed, only one such work which can be posi-
tively identified as belonging to the Parthian period by the in-
scription which accompanies it.” The other presumedly Par-
thian reliefs are adjudged to the people by art critics merely
from their style and their locality, occurring as they do within
the limits of the Parthian kingdom, and lacking the character-
istics which attach to the art of those who preceded and of
those who followed the Parthians in these countries.
The one certainly Parthian bas-relief is that which still
exists on the great rock of Behistun, at the foot of the moun-
tain, raised but slightly above the plain.” It seems to have
contained a Series of tall figures, looking towards the right, and
apparently engaged in a march or procession, while above and
between them were smaller figures on horseback, armed with
lances, and galloping in the same direction. One of these was
attended by a figure of Fame or Victory, flying in the air, and
about to place a diadem around his brow. The present con-
dition of the Sculpture is extremely bad. Atmospheric in-
fluences have worn away the larger figures to such an extent
that they are discerned with difficulty; and a recent Governor
of Kirmanshah has barbarously inserted into the middle of the
relief an arched niche, in which he has placed a worthless
Arabic inscription. It is with difficulty that we form any
judgment of the original artistic merit of a work which pre-
\
sents itself to us in such a worn and mutilated form; but, on
the whole, we are perhaps justified in pronouncing that it must
at its best have been one of inferior quality, even when com-
pared only with the similar productions of Asiatics. The
general character is rather that of the Sassanian than of the
Assyrian or Persian period. The human figures have a heavy
clumsiness about them that is unpleasant to contemplate; the
*
*
ſ **, A
& d *
* {
a' - * * * - 3 *
f / *
- ?
...sº * º
CH. XXII d BASRELIEFS. * . 221
horses are rudely outlined, and are too small for the men; the
figure of Fame is out of all proportion to the hero whom she
crowns, and the diadem which she places on his head is ridicu- -
lous, being nearly as large as herself! On the other hand,
there is spirit in the attitudes of both men and horses; the
Fame floats well in air; and the relief is free from that coarse.
grotesqueness which offends us in the productions of the Sas-
sanian artists. *. t
Another bas-relief, probably, but not quite certainly Par-
thian, exists in the gorge of Sir-pul-i-Zohab, and has been
recently published in the great work of M. Flandin.” (Pl.
VIII.) The inscription on this monument, though it has not #
yet been deciphered,” appears to be written in the alphabet .
found upon the Parthian coins. The monument seems to rep-
resent a Parthian king, mounted on horseback, and receiving
a chaplet at the hand of a subject. The king wears a cap
bound round with the diadem, the long ends of which depend
over his shoulder. He is clothed in a close-fitting tunic and
loose trowsers, which hang down. Upon his boots, and wears
also a short cloak fastened under the chin, and reaching : ".
nearly to the knee. The horse which he bestrides is small, but
strongly made; the tail is long, and the mane seems to be
plaited. Thus far the representation, though somewhat heavy
and clumsy, is not ill-drawn; but the remaining figure—that
of the Parthian subject—is wholly without merit. The back
of the man is turned, but the legs are in profile; one arm is
ridiculously short, and the head is placed too near the left
shoulder. It would seem that the artist, while he took pains
with the representation of the monarch, did not care how ill he
rendered the subordinate figure, which he left in the unsatis-
factory condition that may be seen in the preceding woodcut.
A set of reliefs,” discovered by the Baron de Bode in the
year 1841, are also thought by the best judges to be Parthian.
The most important of them represents a personage of conse- '
uence, apparently a Magus, who seems to be in the act of
consecrating a sacred cippus, round which have been placed
wreaths or chaplets. (Pl. IX.) Fifteen spectators are present,
arranged in two rows, one above the other, all except the first
of them standing. The first sits upon a rude chair or stool.
The figures generally are in an advanced stage of decay; but that
of the Magus is tolerably well preserved, and probably indi-
cates with sufficient accuracy the costume and appearance of
the great hierarchs under the Parthians. The conical cap de-
/ §
l *
- * * tº
“i
º
t-
222 THE SIXTH MONAROHY. [ch. xxii.
-scribed by Strabo" is very conspicuous. Below this the hair
is worn in the puffed-out fashion of the later Parthian period.
The upper lip is ornamented by moustaches, and the chin
covered by a straight beard. The figure is dressed in a long
sleeved tunic, over which is worn a cloak, fastened at the
neck by a round brooch, and descending a little below the
knees. The legs are encased in a longer and shorter pair of
trowsers, the former plain, the latter striped perpendicularly.
* Round the neck is worn a collar or necklace; and on the right
/
arm are three armlets and three bracelets. The conical cap
appears to be striped or fluted.
On the same rock, but in no very evident connection with
the main representation, is a second relief, in which a Parthian
cavalier, armed with a bow and arrows, and a spear, contends
with a wild animal, seemingly a bear." (Pi. X. Fig. 1.) A
long flowing robe here takes the place of the more ordinary
tunic and trowsers. On the head is worn a rounded cap or
tiara. The hair has the usual puffed-out appearance. The
bow is carried in the left hand, and the quiver hangs from the
saddle behind the rider,” while with his right hand he thrusts
his spear into the beast's neck. The execution of the whole
tablet seems to have been rude; but it has suffered so much
from time and weather, that no very decided judgment can be
passed upon it. .
Another still ruder representation occurs also on another face
of the same rock. This consists of a female figure reclining
upon a couch, and guarded by three male attendants, one at
the head of the couch unarmed, and the remaining two at its
foot, seated, and armed with spears. The female has puffed-
out hair, and carries in her right hand, which is outstretched, a
wreath or chaplet. One of the Spearmen has a curious rayed
head-dress; and the other has a short streamer attached to the
head of his spear. Below the main tablet are three rudely
carved standing figures, representing probably other attend-
ants. t
This set of reliefs may perhaps be best regarded as forming a
single series, the Parthian king being represented as engaged
in hunting the bear, while the queen awaits his return upon
her couch, and the chief Magus attached to the court makes
prayer for the monarch's safety.
Such are the chief remains of Parthian aesthetic art. They
convey an idea of decline below the standard reached by the
Persians of the Achaemenian times, which was itself a decline
t &
*
— — — º { - - * , Aº’
t .* *
g # *
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*
*
* * * $ * -
ch, swin.) RELIGION of THE PARTHIANS - 223
from the earlier art of the Assyrians. Had they been the
efforts of a race devoid of models, they might fairly have been
regarded as not altogether without promise. But, considered
as the work of a nation which possessed the Achaemenian
sculptures, and which had moreover, to a certain extent,
access to Greek examples,” they must be pronounced clumsy,
coarse, and wanting in all the higher qualities of Fine Art. It
is no wonder that they are scanty and exceptional. The nation
which could produce nothing better must have felt that its
vocation was not towards the artistic, and that its powers had
better be employed in other directions, e.g. in conquest and in
organization. It would seem that the Parthians perceived this,
and therefore devoted slight attention to the Fine Arts, pre-
ferring to occupy themselves mainly with those pursuits in,
which they excelled; viz. war, hunting, and government.
CHAPTER XXIII.
Customs of the Parthians—in Religion ; in War; in their Em-
bassies and Dealings with Foreign Nations; at the Court;
tn Private Life. Eactent of the Refinement to which they
reached. Their gradual Decline in Taste and Knowledge.
"E67 exovira troXi wºv to Bápgapov kai To 2xv6tkov, TrAéov pleurot rô xpijo uplov ºrpès hyeptovíav
kai tºw év rots troXépious karépôwouv.–Strab. xi. 9, § 2. 2.
*
VERY little is known as to the religion of the Parthians. It
Seems probable that during the Persian period they submitted
to the Zoroastrian system,” which was generally maintained
by the Achaemenian kings, acquiescing, like the great bulk of
the conquered nations, in the religious views of their conquer-
Ors; but as this was not their own religion, we may conclude :
that they were at no time very zealous followers of the Bactrian,
prophet,” and that as age succeeded age they became continually
more lukewarm in their feelings, and more lax in their reli-
gious practice. The essence of Zoroastrian belief was dualism
—recognition of Ormazd as the great Principle of Good, and of
Ahriman as the Principle of Evil. We need not doubt that, in
Word, the Parthians from first to last admitted this antagonism,
and professed a belief in Ormazd as the Supreme god, and a
A
- g |
224 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. XXIII.
dread of Ahriman and his ministers. But practically, their
religious aspirations rested, not on these dim abstractions, but
on beings whose existence they could better realize, and whom
they could feel to be less remote from themselves. The actual
devotion of the Parthians was offered to the Sun and Moon, to
deities who were supposed to preside over the royal house, and
to ancestral idols which each family possessed, and conveyed
with it from place to place with every change of habitation.
The Sun was saluted at his rising,” was worshipped in temples,
under the name of Mithra, with sacrifices and offerings;" had
statues erected in his honor, and was usually associated with
the lesser luminary." The deities of the royal house were
probably either genii, ministers of Ormazd, to whom was com-
mitted the special protection of the monarchs and their fami-
lies, like the bagáha vithāyā of the Persians," or else the ances-
tors of the reigning monarch, to whom a qualified divinity
seems to have been assigned in the later times of the empire."
The Parthians kings usually swore by these deities on solemn
Occasions;” and other members of the royal family made use of
the same oath." The main worship, however, of the great mass
of the people, even when they were of the royal stock, was
concentrated upon ancestral images," which had a place sacred
to them in each house, and received the constant adoration of
the household.
In the early times of the empire the Magi were held in high
repute, and most of the peculiar tenets and rites of the Magian
religion were professed and followed by the Parthians. Ele-
mental worship was practised. Fire was, no doubt, held
sacred, and there was an especial reverence for rivers.” Dead
bodies were not burned, but were exposed to be devoured by
birds and beasts of prey, after which the dry bones were col-
lected and placed in tombs.” The Magiformed a large portion
of the great national council, which elected and, if need were,
deposed the kings.” But in course of time much laxity was
introduced. The Arsacid monarchs of Armenia allowed the
Sacred Fire of Ormazd, which ought to have been kept con-
tinually burning, to go out;” and we can scarcely suppose but
that the Parthian Arsacidae shared their negligence. Respect
for the element of fire so entirely passed away, that we hear of
the later Parthians burning their dead.” The Magi fell into
disrepute, and, if not expelled from their place in the council,
at any rate found themselves despised and deprived of in-
fluence." The later Parthian religion can have been little more
\ g - *
Plate XIX.
Fig. 1.
COIN OF ARTAXERXES II. COIN OF WARA III:AN IV.
LATER SEAL
- OF WARAHIRAN IV.
Fig. 5.
CONIS OF SAPOR III.
FoºtRAIt of varAHRAN Iv. (from a seal).



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CH. XXIII.] PAIRTILIAN TOI.ERANCE. S 225, -
than a worship of the Sun and Moon, and of the teraphim, or
sacred images, which were the most precious possession of each,
household. - # f
While thus lax and changeful in thoir own religious practice, * *
the Parthians were, naturally, tolerant of a variety of creeds *
among their subjects. Fire altars were maintained, and Zo- *-
roastrian zeal was allowed to flourish in the dependent king- * -
dom of Persia." In the Greek cities the Olympian gods were .
permitted to receive the veneration of thousands,” while in *
Babylon, Nearda, and Nisibis the Jews enjoyed the free exer-
cise of their comparatively pure and elevated religion.” No
restrictions seem to have been placed on proselytism, and .
Judaism certainly boasted many converts from the heathen in ſh
Adiabéné, Charax Spasini, and elsewhere.” Christianity also - 1
penetrated the Parthian provinces to a considerable extent, -
and in one Parthian country, at any rate, seems to have be- k.
come the state religion. The kings of Osrhoëné are thought to *g
have been Christians from the time of the Antonines,” if not $
from that of our Lord;” and a flourishing church was certainly g
established at Edessa before the end of the second century.”
The Parthian Jews who were witnesses of the miraculous S. A
events which signalized the day of Pentecost” may have, in
Some cases, taken with them the new religion to the land where
they had their residence; or the Apostle, St. Thomas, may (as f
Eusebius declares”) have carried the Gospel into the regions . A
beyond the Euphrates, and have planted the Christian Church' " ;
in the countries out of which the Jewish Church sprang. Be- .
sides the flourishing community of Edessa, which was pre-
dominantly, if not wholly, Christian from the middle of the
Second century, many converts were, we are told, to be found
among the inhabitants of Persia, Media, Parthia Proper, and
even Bactria.” The infusion, however, was not sufficient to
leaven to any Serious extent the corrupt mass of heathenism
into which it was projected; and we cannot say that the gene-
ral character of the Parthian empire, or of the manners and r &
customs of its subjects, was importantly affected by the new
religion, though it had an extraordinary influence over indi-
viduals. &
The Parthians were essentially a warlike people; and the
chief interest which attaches to them is connected with their
military vigor and ability. It is worth while to consider at
some length the peculiarities of that military system which
proved itself Superior to the organization of tho Macedonians, &-f
*
e
* - ~ *.
226 THE SIXTH MONARCH Y. [CH. xxi.II.
and able to maintain for nearly three hundred years a doubt-
ful contest with the otherwise irresistible Romans.
We are told that the Parthians had no standing army.”
When war was proclaimed and the monarch needed a force,
he made his immediate vassals acquainted with the fact, and
requested each of them to marshal their troops, and bring them
to a fixed rendezvous by a certain day.” The troops thus sum-
moned were of two kinds, Parthian and foreign. The gover-
nors of the provinces, whether tributary kings or satraps, called
out the military strength of their respective districts, saw to
their arming and provisioning, and, marching each at the head
of his contingent, brought a foreign auxiliary force to the as-
sistance of the Great King.” But the back-bone of the army,
its main strength, the portion on which alone much reliance
was placed, consisted of Parthians. Each Parthian noble was
bound to call out his slaves and his retainers, to arm and equip
them at his own expense, and bring them to the rendezvous by
the time named.” The number of troops furnished by each
noble varied according to his position and his means; we hear
in one instance of their amounting to as many as 10,000,” while
in another recorded case” the average number which each
furnished was no more than 125. The various contingents had
their own baggage-trains, consisting ordinarily of camels, in
the proportion (as it would seem) of one to every ten fighting-
men.”
A Parthian army consisted usually of both horse and foot,
but in proportions unusual elsewhere. The foot soldiers were
comparatively few in number, and were regarded as of small
account.* Every effort was made to increase the amount and
improve the equipment of the horsemen, who bore the brunt of
every fight, and from whose exertions alone victory was hoped.
Sometimes armies consisted of horsemen only,” or rather of
horsemen followed by a baggage train composed of camels and
chariots.
The horse were of two kinds, heavy and light. The heavy
- horsemen ('card pparzerot) wore coats of mail, reaching to their
knees, composed of raw hide covered with scales of iron or
steel,” very bright,” and capable of resisting a strong blow.”
They had on their heads burnished helmets of Margian steel,
whose glitter dazzled the spectator.” Their legs seem not to
have been greaved, but encased in a loose trouser, which hung
about the ankles and embarrassed the feet, if by any chance
the horseman was forced to dismount.” They carried no
t - r \
.# *
ci. xxiii.] customs of THE PARTHIANS IN WAR. 227 .
shield,” being sufficiently defended by their coats of mail.
Their offensive arms were a long spear (adv.ros), which was of .
great strength and thickness,” and a bow and arrows of un-
usual size.” They likewise carried in their girdle a short
sword “ or knife (udºxalpa), which might be used in close com-
bat. Their horses were, like themselves, protected by a defence
of scale armor,” which was either of steel or bronze.”
The light horse was armed with the same sort of bows and
arrows as the heavy, but carried no spear and wore no armor.
It was carefully trained to the management of the horse and
the bow,” and was unequalled in the rapidity and dexterity of
its movements. The archer delivered his arrows with as much
precision and force in retreat as in advance, and was almost
more feared when he retired than when he charged his foe.”
Besides his arrows, the light horseman seems to have carried a .
sword,” and he no doubt wore also the customary knife in his
belt. A.
We are told by one writer” that it was a practice of the Par-
thians to bring into battle a number of led horses, and that the
riders from time to time exchanged their tired steeds for fresh
ones, thus obtaining a great advantage over enemies who had
no such practice. But the accounts which we have of Parthian
engagements make no reference to this usage, which we can
therefore scarcely suppose to have been adopted to any large
extent. It may be doubted, also, if the practice could ever be
one of much value, since the difficulty of managing led horses
amid the tumult of a battle would probably more than counter-
balance the advantage derivable from relays of fresh steeds.
During the later period of the monarchy, the Parthians, who
had always employed camels largely in the conveyance of
stores and baggage,” are said to have introduced a camel corps
into the army itself, and to have derived considerable advan-
tage from the new arm.” The camels could bear the weight of
the mailed warrior and of their own armor better than horses,
and their riders were at once more safe in their elevated posi-
tion and more capable of dealing effective blows upon the
enemy. As a set-off, however, against these advantages, the
Spongy feet of the camel were found to be more readily injured
by the tribulus, or caltrop, than the harder feet of the horse,
and the corps was thus more easily disabled than an equal force
of cavalry, if it could be tempted to pass over ground on which
Caltrops had been previously scattered.”
The Parthian tactics were of a simple kind, and differed little
g
ſ
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*
t ** =
‘ 228 THE SIXTEI MONARCH Y. [CH. XXIII.
- | º -
from those of other nations in the same region, which have de-
pended mainly on their cavalry. To surround their foe, to in-
volve him in difficulties, to cut off his supplies and his strag-
glers, and ultimately to bring him into a position where he
might be overwhelmed by missiles, was the aim of all Parthian
commanders of any military capacity. Their warfare was
suited for defence rather than for attack, unless against con-
temptible enemies.” They were bad hands at sieges,” and sol-
dom ventured to engage in them, though they would do so if
circumstances required it." They wearied of long campaigns,
and if they did not find victory tolerably easy, were apt to retire
and allow their foe to escape," or baffle him by withdrawing
their forces into a distant and inaccessible region. After their
early victories over Crassus and Antony, they never succeeded
in preventing the steady advance of a Roman army into their
territory, or in repulsing a determined attack upon their capi-
tal. Still they generally had their revenge after a short time.
It was easy for the Romans to overrun Mesopotamia, but it
was not so easy for them to hold it; and it was scarcely possi-
ble for them to retire from it after an occupation without dis-
aster. The clouds of Parthian horse hung upon their retreat-
ing columns, straitened them for provisions, galled them with
missiles, and destroyed those who could not keep up with
the main body. The towns upon the line of their retreat re-
volted and shut their gates, defying even such commanders as
Soverus and Trajan. Of the six great expeditions of Rome
against Parthia, one only, that of Avidius Cassius, was entirely
successful. In every other case either the failure of the ex-
pedition was complete, or the glory of the advance was tarnished
by disaster and suffering during the retreat. -
The results of invading Parthia would have been even more
calamitous to an assailant but for one weak point in the mili-
tary system of the Parthians. They were excessively unwill-
ing to venture near an enemy at night, and as a general rule
abstained from all military movements during the hours of
darkness.” As evening approached, they drew off to a con-
siderable distance from their foe, and left him unmolested to
retreat in any direction that he pleased. The reason of this
probably was, not merely that they did not fortify their
camps;” but that, depending wholly on their horses, and be-
ing forced to hobble or tether them at night, they could not
readily get into fighting order on a sudden during darkness.
Once or twice in the course of their history, we find them de-
oil. zzm.] PARTIILAN USI of CHARIOTS 229
parting from their policy of extreme precaution, and recom-
mencing the pursuit of a flying foe before dawn; but it is
noted as an unusual occurrence.”
It was also a general principle of Parthian warfare to abstain
from campaigning during the winter." So much depended
upon the tension of their bow-strings, which any dampness re-
laxed, that their rule was to make all their expeditions in the
dry time of their year, which lasted from early in the spring .
until late in the autumn. The rule was, however, transgressed
upon occasions. Phraates II. made his attack upon Antiochus
Sidetes, while the snow was still upon the ground;” and Wola-
gases I. fell upon Paetus after the latter had sent his troops
into winter quarters." The Parthians could bear cold no less
than heat; though it was perhaps rather in the endurance of
the latter than of the former that they surpassed the Romans.
The sun's rays were never too hot for them;" and they did
not need water frequently or in large quantities. The Romans
believed that they increased their ability of bearing thirst by
means of certain drugs which they consumed;" but it may be
questioned whether they really employed any other remedies
than habit and resolution.
We find no use of chariots among the Parthians, except for
the conveyance of the females, who accompanied the nobles
upon their expeditions. The wives and concubines of the
chiefs followed the camp in great numbers;" and women of a
less reputable class, singers, dancers, and musicians, swelled
the ranks of the supernumeraries." Many of these were
Greeks from Seleucia and other Macedonian towns.” The com-
missariat and transport departments are said to have been
badly organized;” but some thousands of baggage camels al-
ways accompanied an army,” carrying stores and provisions.
Of these a considerable portion were laden with arrows," of
which the supply was in this way rendered inexhaustible.
The use of the elephant in war was still more rare in Parthia
than that of the chariot. While the Seleucid kings employed
the animal to a large extent,” and its use was also probably
known to the Greek princes of Bactria,” the Arsacidae appear
to have almost entirely neglected it. On one occasion alone
do we find their employment of it mentioned,” and then we
hear of only a single animal, which is ridden by the monarch.
Probably the unwieldy creature was regarded by the Parthians
as too heavy and clumsy for the light and rapid movements of
their armies, and was thus disused during the period of their
- |
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230 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [CH. XXIII,
supremacy, though again employed, after Parthia had fallen,
by the Sassanidae.” -
The Parthians entered into battle with much noise and shout-
ing.” They made no use of trumpets or horns, but employed
instead the kettledrum, which resounded from all parts of the
field when, they made their onset.” Their attack was furious.
The mailed horsemen charged at speed, and often drove their
spears through the bodies of two enemies at a blow.” The
light horse and the foot, when any was present, delivered their
arrows with precision and with extraordinary force. But
if the assailants were met with a stout resistance, the first
vigor of the attack was rarely long maintained. The Parthian
warriors grew quickly weary of an equal contest, and, if they
could not force their enemy to give way, soon changed their
tactics. Pretending panic, dispersing, and beatinga hasty re-
treat, they endeavored to induce their foe to pursue hurriedly
and in disorder, being ready at any moment to turn and take
advantage of the least appearance of confusion. If these tac-
tics failed, as they commonly did after they came to be known,
the simulated flight was generally converted into a real one;
further conflict was avoided, or at any rate deferred to another
Occasion.” |
When the Parthians wished to parley with an enemy, they
unstrung their bows,” and advancing with the right hand out-
stretched,” asked for a conference. They are accused by the
Romans of sometimes using treachery on such occasions, but,
except in the single case of Crassus, the charge of bad faith
cannot be sustained against them. On Solemn occasions, when
the intention was to discuss grounds of complaint or to bring a
war to an end by the arrangement of terms of peace, a formal
meeting was arranged between their representatives and those
of their enemy, generally on neutral ground, as on an island
in the Euphrates, or on a bridge constructed across it.” Here
the chiefs of the respective nations met, accompanied by an
equal number of guards, while the remainder of their forces
occupied the opposite banks of the river. Matters were dis-
cussed in friendly fashion, the Greek language being commonly
employed as the vehicle of communication;” after which fes-
- tivities usually took place, the two chiefs mutually entertain-
ing each other, or accepting in common the hospitalities of a
third party.” The terms of peace agreed upon were reduced
to writing;” hands were grasped as a sign that faith was
pledged;" and oaths having been interchanged,” the confer-
& e • { y
f - --- * -- w
*.
CH. XXIII.] EMBASSIES AND IIOSTAGES. 231
ence broke up, and the chiefs returned to their respective resi-
dences. S.
Desides negotiating by means of conferences, the Parthian
monarchs often Sent out to neighboring states, and in return
received from them formal embassies. The ambassadors in
every case conveyed, as a matter of course, gifts to the prince
to whom they were accredited,” which might consist of articles
of value, or of persons. Augustus included an Italian slave-
girl” among the presents which he transmitted to Phraates
IV. ; and Artabanus III. Sent a Jewish giant to Tiberius.” The
object of an embassy was sometimes simply to congratulate;
but more often the ambassadors were instructed to convey
certain demands, or proposals, from their own prince to the
head of the other nation, whereto his assent was required, or
requested. These proposals were commonly formulated in a
letter from the one prince to the other,” which it was the chief
duty of the ambassadors to convey safely. Free powers to
conclude a treaty at their discretion were rarely, or never, en-
trusted to them. Their task was merely to deliver the royal
letter, to explain its terms, if they were ambiguous, and to carry
back to their own monarch the reply of the foreign sovereign.
The sanctity of the ambassadorial character was invariably re-
spected by the Parthians, who are never even taxed with a
violation of it. t *
As a security for the performance of engagements, or for the
permanent maintenance of a friendly attitude, it was usual in
the East during the Parthian period to require, and give, hos-
tages. The princes who occupied the position of Parthian feu-
datories gave hostages to their suzerain, who were frequently
their near relations, as sons or brothers.” And a practice grew
up of the Parthian monarchs themselves depositing their own
Sons or brothers with the Roman Emperor, at first perhaps.
merely for their own security,” but afterwards as pledges for
their good behavior.” Such hostages lived at the expense of
the Roman court, and were usually treated with distinction.
In the event of a rupture between their country and Rome,
they had little to fear. Rome found her advantage in employ-
ing them as rivals to a monarch with whom she had quarrelled,
and did not think it necessary to punish them for his treachery,
Or inconstancy.
The magnificence of the Parthian court is celebrated in gen-
eral terms by various writers, but not very many particulars
have come down to us respecting it. We know that it was
* * & * & \
Ae t *
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232 THE SIXTEI MONARCHIY. [CH. XXIII.
migratory, moving from one of the chief cities of the empire to
another at different seasons of the year," and that owing to
the vast number of the persons composing it, there was a diffi-
culty sometimes in providing for their subsistence upon the
road.” The court comprised the usual extensive harem of an
Oriental prince, consisting of a single recognized queen, and a
multitude of secondary wives or concubines. The legitimate
wife of the prince was commonly a native, and in most cases
was selected from the royal race of the Arsacidae;” but some-
times she was the daughter of a dependent monarch,” and she
might even be a slave raised by royal favor from that humble
position.” The concubines were frequently Greeks.” Both
wives and concubines remained ordinarily in close seclusion,
and we have little mention of them in the Parthian annals.
But in one instance, at any rate, a queen, brought up in the
notions of the West, succeeded in setting Oriental etiquette at
defiance, took the direction of affairs out of the hands of her
husband, and subsequently ruled the empire in conjunction
with her son.” Generally, however, the Parthian kings were
remarkably free from the weakness of subservience to women,
and managed their kingdom with a firm hand, without allow-
ing either wives or ministers to obtain any undue ascendency
over them. In particular, we may note that they never, so far
as appears, fell under the baleful influence of eunuchs, who,
from first to last, play a very subordinate part in the Parthian
history.” "
The dress of the monarch was commonly the loose Median
robe, which had been adopted from the Medes by the Persians.
This flowed down to the feet in numerous folds, enveloping and
concealing the entire figure." Trousers and a tunic were
probably worn beneath it, the latter of linen, the former of
silk or wool. As head-dress, the king wore either the mere
diadem, which was a band or ribbon, passed once or oftener
round the head, and terminating in two long ends which fell
down behind,” or else a more pretentious cap, which in the
earlier times was a sort of Scythian pointed helmet,” and in
the later a rounded tiara, sometimes adorned with pearls or
gems.” His neck appears to have been generally encircled
with two or three collars or necklaces, and he frequently wore
ear-rings in his ears. The beard was almost always cultivated,
and, with the hair, was worn variously. Generally both hair
and beard were carefully curled; but sometimes they depended
in long Straight locks. Mostly the beard was pointed, but oc-
§
—x— —
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j
y y
CH. XXIII.] DRESS OF THE MONARCH. ' 233
casionally it was worn square. In later times a fashion arose
of puffing out the hair at either side extravagantly, so as to
give it the appearance of a large bushy wig." * *
In war the monarch seems to have exchanged his Median
robe for a short cloak, reaching half way down the thigh.”
EIis head was protécted by a helmet, and he carried the
national arm of offence, the bow. He usually took the field
on horseback, but was sometimes mounted on an elephant,”
trained to encounter the shock of battle. Gold and silver
were abundantly used in the trappings of his steed and in his
arms. He generally took the command, and mingled freely in
the fight, though he might sometimes shrink without re-
proach from adventuring his own person.” His guards
fought about him; and he was accompanied by attendants,
whose duty it was to assist him in mounting on horseback
and dismonnting.” .
The status of the queen was not much below that of her
royal consort. She wore a tiara far more elaborate than his,
and, like him, exhibited the diadem. Her neck was encircled
with several necklaces.” As the title of Theos, “God,” was
often assumed by her husband, so she was allowed the title of
“Goddess” (698c), or “Heavenly Goddess” (698a owgavia).
Separate apartments were of course assigned to the queen, .
and to the royal concubines in the various palaces. These
were buildings on a magnificent scale, and adorned with the
utmost richness. Philostratus, who wrote in Parthian times,”
thus describes the royal palace at Babylon. “The palace is
roofed with brass, and a bright light flashes from it. It has ,
chambers for the women, and chambers for the men, and
porticos, partly glittering with silver, partly with cloth-of-
gold embroideries, partly with solid slabs of gold, let into the
walls, like pictures. The subjects of the embroideries are
taken from the Greek mythology, and include representations
of Andromeda, of Amymoné, and of Orpheus, who is frequently
repeated . . . . Datis is moreover represented, destroying .
Naxos with his fleet, and Artaphernes besieging Eretria, and
Xerxes gaining his famous victories. You behold the occu-
pation of Athens, and the battle of Thermopylae, and other
points still more characteristic of the great Persian war,
rivers drunk up and disappearing from the face of the earth,
and a bridge stretched across the sea, and a canal cut through
Athos. ... One chamber for the men has a roof fashioned into
a vault like the heaven, composed entirely of Sapphires, which
*
... — ——r- # * 3 *
* f ~ T
- * * ; *
\
234, . THE SIXTH MoMARCHY ſch. xxiii.
are the bluest of stones, and resemble the sky in color. Gold-
en images of the gods whom they worship, are set up about
the vault, and show like stars in the firmament. 'This is the
chamber in which the king delivers his judgments. Four
golden magic-wheels hang from its roof, and threaten the
monarch with the Divine Nemesis, if he "exalts himself above
the condition of man. These wheels are called ‘the tongues
of the gods,” and are set in their places by the Magi who
frequent the palace.”” -
The state and pomp which surrounded the monarch seem
scarcely to have fallen short of the Achaemenian standard.
Regarded as in some sort divine during his life, and always an
object of national worship after his death, the “Brother of
the Sun and Moon”” occupied a position far above that of the
most exalted of his subjects. Tributary monarchs were
shocked, when, in times of misfortune, the “Great King”
stooped to solicit their aid, and appeared before them in the
character of a suppliant, shorn of his customary splendor.”
Nobles coveted the dignity of “ King's Friend,” and were con-
tent to submit to blows and buffets at the caprice of their
royal master, before whom they prostrated themselves in ado-
ration after each castigation.” The Parthian monarch dined
in solitary grandeur, extended on his own special couch, and
eating from his own special table, which was placed at a
greater elevation than those of his guests.” His “friend.”
' sat on the ground at his feet, and was fed like a dog by scraps
from his master's board. Guards, ministers, and attendants
of various kinds surrounded him, and were ready at the
slightest sign to do his bidding. Throughout the country he
had numerous “Eyes” and “Ears” ”—officers who watched
his interests and sent him word of whatever touched his
Safety. The bed on which the monarch slept was of gold, and
subjects were forbidden to take their repose on couches of this
rich material.” No stranger could obtain access to him
unless introduced by the proper officer; and it was expected
that all who asked an audience would be prepared with some
present of high value.” For the gifts received the monarch
made a suitable return, allowing those whom he especially
favored to choose the presents that they preferred.”
The power and dignity of the Parthian nobles was greater
than that usually enjoyed by any subjects of an Oriental king.
Rank in Parthia being hereditary and not simply official, the
“megistanes” were no mere creatures of the monarch, but a
f
}
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WT \ ^
f i .*.
cH. xxHI.] POWER OF THE MEGISTANES. 235
class which stood upon its own indefeasible rights. As they
had the privilege of electing to the throne upon a vacancy, and
even that of deposing a duly elected monarch,” the king could
not but stand in wholesome awe of them, and feel compelled to
treat them with considerable respect and deference. Moreover,
they were not without a material force calculated to give pow-
erful support to their constitutional privileges. Each stood at
the head of a body of retainers accustomed to bear arms and to
serve in the wars of the Empire. Together these bodies consti-
tuted the strength of the army; and though the royal body-
guard might perhaps have been capable of dealing successfully
with each group of retainers separately, yet such an esprit de
corps was sure to animate the nobles generally, that they would
make common cause in case one of their number were attacked,
and would support him against the crown with the zeal in-
spired by self-interest. Thus the Parthian nobility were far
more powerful and independent than any similar class under
the Achaemenian, Sassanian, Modern Persian, or Turkish sov-
ereigns. They exercised a real control over the monarch, and
had a voice in the direction of the Empire. Like the great
feudal vassals of the Middle Ages, they from time to time quar-
relled with their liege lord, and disturbed the tranquillity of the
kingdom by prolonged and dangerous civil wars; but these
contentions served to keep alive a vigor, a life, and a spirit of
sturdy independence very unusual in the East, and gave a
stubborn strength to the Parthian monarchy, in which Oriental
governments have for the most part been wanting.
There were probably several grades of rank among the nobles.
The highest dignity in the kingdom, next to the Crown, was
that of Surena, or “Field-Marshal;” and this position was heredi-
tary in a particular family,” which can have stood but a little
below the royal house in wealth and consequence. The head
of this noble house is stated to have at one time brought into
the field as many as 10,000 retainers and slaves, of whom a
thousand were heavy-armed.” It was his right to place the
diadem on the king's brow at his coronation. The other nobles
lived for the most part on their domains, but took the field at
the head of their retainers in case of war, and in peace some-
times served the offices of satrap, vizier, or royal councillor.
The wealth of the class was great;” its members were inclined
to be turbulent, and, like the barons of the European kingdoms,
acted as a constant check and counterpoise to the royal dignity.
Next to war, the favorite employment of the king and of the
* * A
236 , TIIE SIXTEI MONAIRCEIY. ſch. xxiii.
nobles was hunting.” The lion continued in the wild state an
occupant of the Mesopotamian river-banks and marshes;” and
in other parts of the empire bears, leopards, and even tigers
abounded.” Thus the higher kinds of sport were readily ob-
tainable. The ordinary practice, however, of the monarch and
his courtiers seems to have fallen short of the true Sportsman's
ideal. Instead of seeking the more dangerous kinds of wild
beasts in their native haunts, and engaging with them under
the conditions designed by nature, the Parthians were generally
content with a poorer and tamer method. They kept lions,
leopards, and bears in enclosed parks, or “paradises,” and
found pleasure in the pursuit and slaughter of these denatural-
ized and half-domesticated animals.” The employment may
still, even under these circumstances, have contained an ele:
ment of danger which rendered it exciting; but it was a poor
substitute for the true sport which the “mighty Hunter before
the Lord” ” had first practised in these regions.
The ordinary dress of the Parthian noble was a long loose
robe reaching to the feet,” under which he wore a vest and
trousers.” Bright and varied colors were affected, and some-
times dresses were interwoven or embroidered with gold.” In
seasons of festivity garlands of fresh flowers were worn upon
the head.” A long knife or dagger was carried at all times,”
which might be used either as an implement or as a weapon.
In the earlier period of the empire the Papthian was noted as
a spare liver;” but, as time went on, he aped the vices of more
civilized peoples, and became an indiscriminate eater” and a
hard drinker.” Game formed a main portion of his diet;”
but he occasionally indulged in pork,” and probably in other
sorts of butcher's meat. He ate leavened bread with his meat,
and various kinds of vegetables.” The bread, which was par-
ticularly light and porous, Seems to have been imported some-
times by the Romans, who knew it as parvis aquaticus or pants
Parthicus.” Dates were also consumed largely by the Par-
thians, “ and in some parts of the country grew to an extraor-
dinary size. A kind of wine was made from them; and this
seems to have been the intoxicating drink in which the nation
generally indulged too freely.” That made from the dates of
Babylon was the most highly esteemed, and was reserved for
the use of the king and the higher order of satraps.”
Of the Parthian feasts, music was commonly an accompani-
ment. The flute, the pipe, the drum, and the instrument called
8ambuca, appear to have been known to them; ” and they un-
i t
ch. xxin] DEGREE OF PARTIIIAN REFINEMENT 237.
derstood how to combine these instrument, in concerted har-
mony. They are said to have closed their feasts with dancing
—an amusement of which they were inordinately fond *—but
this was probably the case only with the lower class of people.
Dancing in the East, if not associated with religion, is viewed
as degrading, and, except as a religious exercise, is not indulged
in by respectable persons. .
The separation of the sexes was very decided in Parthia.
The women took their meals, and passed the greater portion of
their life, apart from the men.” Veils were commonly worn,
as in modern Mohammedan countries; and it was regarded as .
essential to female delicacy that women, whether married or
single, should converse freely with no males but either their
near relations or eunuchs. Adultery was punished with great
severity;” but divorce was not difficult, and women of rank
released themselves from the nuptial bond on light grounds of
complaint, without much trouble.” Polygamy was the estab-
lished law; and every Parthian was entitled, besides his chief
wife, to maintain as many concubines as he thought desirable.”
Some of the nobles supported an excessive number:* but the
expenses of the seraglio prevented the generality from taking
much advantage of the indulgence which the law permitted.
The degree of refinement and civilization which the Parthians
reached is difficult to determine with accuracy. In mimetic
art their remains certainly do not show much taste or sense of
beauty.” There is some ground to believe that their architec-
ture had merit; but the existing monuments can scarcely be
taken as representations of pure Parthian work, and may have
owed their excellence (in some measure, at any rate) to foreign
influence. Still, the following particulars, for which there is
good evidence, seem to imply that the nation had risen in re-
ality far above that “barbarism” which it was the fashion of
the Greek and Roman writers to ascribe to it. In the first
place, the Parthians had a considerable knowledge of foreign
languages. Plutarch tells us that Orodes, the opponent of
Crassus, was acquainted with the Greek language and litera-
ture, and could enjoy the representation of a play of Euri-
pides.” The general possession of such knowledge, at any
rate by the kings and the upper classes, seems to be implied by
the use of the Greek letters and language in the legends upon
Coins and in inscriptions. Other languages were also to some
extent cultivated. The later kings almost invariably placed a .
Semitic legend upon their coins; and there is one instance of a
g
238 THE SIXTH - MONARCH Y. [CH. xxLIr,
- * } \ ,
, Parthian prince adopting an Aryan legend of the type known as
Bactrian." Josephus, moreover, regarded the Parthians as
familiar with Hebrew, or Syro-Chaldaic, and wrote his history
of the Jewish War in his own native tongue, before he put out
his Greek version, for the benefit especially, of the Parthians,
among whom he declares that he had many readers.” -
Though the Parthians had, so far as we can tell, no native
literature, yet writing was familiar to them, and was widely
used in matters of business. Not only were negotiations car-
ried on with foreign powers by means of despatches,” but the
affairs of the empire generally were conducted by writing. A
custom-house system was established along the frontier, and
all commodities liable to duty that entered the country were
registered in a book” at the time of entry by the custom-house
officer. In the great cities where the Court passed a portion of
the year, account was kept of the arrival of strangers, whose
names and descriptions were placed upon record by the keep-
ers of the gates.” The orders of the Crown were signified in
writing to the satraps;” and they doubtless corresponded with
- the Court in the same way. In the earlier times the writing
material commonly used was linen; but shortly before the time
of Pliny, the Parthians began to make paper from the papyrus,
v which grew in the neighborhood of Babylon, though they still
employed in preference the old material.”
There was a considerable trade between Parthia and Rome,
carried on by means of a class of merchants.” Parthia im-
ported from Rome various metals, and numerous manufactured
articles of a high class. Her principal exports were textile
fabrics and spices.” The textile fabrics seem to have been
produced chiefly in Babylonia, and to have consisted of silks,
carpets, and coverlets.” The silks were largely used by the
Boman ladies.” The coverlets, which were patterned with
various colors, fetched enormous prices, and were regarded as
fit adornments of the Imperial palace.” Among the spices
exported, the most celebrated were bdellium, and the juncus
odoratus or Odoriferous bulrush.”
The Parthians had many liberal usages which imply a fairly
advanced civilization. Their tolerance of varieties in religion
has been already mentioned.” Even in political matters they
seem to have been free from the narrowness which generally
characterizes barbarous nations. They behaved well to pris-
oners,” admitted foreigners freely to offices of high trust,”
', gave an asylum to refugees, and treated them with respect and
#
— — — . - — — — - * - - *.
.*- * • ‘
** * *—º g z
- § * .
ch. xxmi.] THE PARTHIANS LIKE THE TURKS. 239
\ | ^.
kindness,” were scrupulous observers of their pledged word,”
and eminently faithful to their treaty obligations.” On the
other hand, it must be admitted that they had some customs
which indicate a tinge of barbarism. They used torture for
the extraction of answers from reluctant persons,” employed
the scourge to punish trifling offences,” and, in certain cases,
condescended to mutilate the bodies of their dead enemies.”
Their addiction to intemperance is also a barbaric trait. They
were, no doubt, on the whole, less civilized than either the -
Greeks or Romans; but the difference does not seem to have
been so great as represented by the classical writers.
Speaking broadly, the position that they occupied was some-
what similar to that which the Turks hold in the system of
modern Europe. They had a military strength which caused
them to be feared and respected, a vigor of administration”
which was felt to imply many sterling qualities. A certain
coarseness and rudeness attached to them which they found it
impossible to shake off; and this drawback was exaggerated . .
by their rivals into an indication of irreclaimable barbarity.
Except in respect of their military prowess, it may be doubtful '
if justice is done them by any classical writer. They were not
merely the sole rival which dared to stand up against Rome in
the interval between B.C. 65 and A.D. 226, but they were a rival
falling in many respects very little below the great power
whose glories have thrown them so much into the shade. They
maintained from first to last a freedom unknown to later
Rome; they excelled the Romans in toleration and in liberal
treatment of foreigners, they equalled them in manufactures
and in material prosperity, and they fell but little short of them
in the extent and productiveness of their dominions. They
were the second power in the world for nearly three centuries,
and formed a counterpoise to Rome which greatly checked
Roman decline, and, by forcing the Empire to exert itself, pre-
Vented Stagnation and corruption. -
It must, however, be confessed, that the tendency of the
Parthians was to degenerate. Although the final blow was
struck in an unexpected quarter, and perhaps surprised the
Victors as much as the vanquished, still it is apparent that
for a considerable space before the revolt of Artaxerxes the
Parthian Empire had shown signs of failing strength, and had
tended rapidly towards decay and ruin. The constant quarrels .
among the Arsacidae and the incipient disintegration of the
Empire have been noticed.” It may be added here that a '
g
*
#
*
\
240 THE SIXTH MONARCHY. [ch. xxiii.
s
growing barbarism, a decline in art and letters, is observable in
, the Parthian remains, such as have usually been found to
accompany the decrepitude of a nation. The coinage has from
first to last a somewhat rude character, which indicates that
it is native, and not the production of Greek artists.” But
on the earlier coins the type, though not indicative of high art,
is respectable, and the legends are, with few exceptions,”
perfectly correct and classical. Barbarism first creeps in
about the reign of Gotarzes,” A.D. 42–51. It increases as
time goes on, until, from about A.D. 133, the Greek legend upon
the coins becomes indistinct and finally unintelligible, the
letters being strewn about the surface of the coin, like dead
soldiers over a field of battle. It is clear that the later
directors of the mint were completely ignorant of Greek, and
merely attempted to reproduce on the coin some semblance of
a language which neither they nor their countrymen under-
stood. Such a condition of a coinage is almost without paral-
lel, and indicates a want of truth and honesty in the conduct
of affairs which implies deep-seated corruption. The Parthians
must have lost the knowledge of Greek about A.D. 130, yet still
a pretence of using the language was kept up. On the tetra-
drachms—comparatively rare coins—no important mistake
was committed; but on the more usual drachm, from the time
of Gotarzes, the most absurd errors were introduced, and
thenceforth perpetuated.” The old inscription was, in a
certain sense, imitated, but every word of it ceased to be
legible: the old figures disappeared in an indistinct haze, and—
if we except the head and name of the king (written now in a
Semitic character)—the whole emblazonment of, the coin be-
came unmeaning. A degeneracy less marked, but still suf-
ficiently clear to the numismatic critic, is observable in the
heads of the kings, which, in the earlier times, if a little coarse,
are striking and characteristic; while in the later they sink to a
conventional type, rudely and poorly rendered, and so uniform
that the power of distinguishing one sovereign from another
rests no longer upon feature, but upon mere differences in the
arrangement of hair, or beard, or head-dress. -
-

HISTORY OF THE SASSANIAN OR NEW
PERSIAN EMPIRE.
CHAPTER I.
Condition of the Persians under the Successors of Alearander—
wnder the Arsacidae. Favor shown them by the latter—
allowed to have Kings of their own. Their Religion at first
held in honor. Power of their Priests. Gradual Change of
Policy on the part of the Parthian Monarchs, and final Op-
pression of the Magi. Causes which produced the Insur-
rection of Artaateraces.
“The Parthians had been barbarians; they had ruled over a nation far more civi-
lized than themselves, and had oppressed them and their religion.”
NIEBUHR, Lectures on Roman History, vol. iii. p. 276.
WHEN the great Empire of the Persians, founded by Cyrus,
collapsed under the attack of Alexander the Great, the domi-
nant race of Western Asia did not feel itself at the first reduced
to an intolerable condition. It was the benevolent design of
Alexander to fuse into one the two leading peoples of Europe
and Asia, and to establish himself at the head of a Perso-
Hellenic State, the capital of which was to have been Babylon."
Had this idea been carried out, the Persians would, it is evi-
dent, have lost but little by their subjugation. Placed on a
par with the Greeks, united with them in marriage bonds,”
and equally favored by their common ruler, they could scarcely
have uttered a murmur, or have been seriously discontented
with their position. But when the successors of the great
Macedonian, unable to rise to the height of his grand concep-
tion, took lower ground, and, giving up the idea of a fusion,
fell back upon the ordinary status, and proceeded to enact the
ordinary rôle, of conquerors, the feelings of the late lords of
Asia, the countrymen of Cyrus and Darius, must have under-
}
*
242 THE SEVENTH AIONARCHY. ſch, i.
gone a complete change. It had been the intention of Alexan-
der to conciliate and elevate the leading Asiatics by uniting
them with the Macedonians and the Greeks, by promoting
social intercourse between the two classes of his subjects and
encouraging them to intermarry, by opening his court to
Asiatics, by educating then in Greek ideas and in Greek
schools, by promoting them to high employments, and making
them feel that they were as much valued and as well cared for
as the people of the conquering race: it was the plan of the
Seleucidae to govern wholly by means of European officials,
Greek or Macedonian, and to regard and treat the entire mass
of their Asiatic subjects as mere slaves.” Alexander had placed
Persian Satraps over most of the provinces, attaching to them
Greek or Macedonian commandants as checks." Seleucus
divided his empire into seventy-two satrapies; but among his
satraps not one was an Asiatic—all were either Macedonians
or Greeks. Asiatics, indeed, formed the bulk of his standing
army, and so far were admitted to employment; they might
also, no doubt, be tax-gatherers, couriers, scribes, constables,
and officials of that mean stamp; but they were as carefully
excluded from all honorable and lucrative offices as the natives
of Hindustan under the rule of the East India Company. The
standing army of the Seleucidae was wholly officered, just as
was that of our own Sepoys, by Europeans; Europeans thronged
the court, and filled every important post under the govern-
ment. There cannot be a doubt that such a high-spirited and
indeed arrogant people as the Persians must have fretted and
chafed under this treatment, and have detested the nation and
dynasty which had thrust them down from their pre-eminence
and converted them from masters into slaves. It would
scarcely much tend to mitigate the painfulness of their feelings
that they could not but confess their conquerors to be a civi.
lized people—as civilized, perhaps more civilized than them-
selves—since the civilization was of a type and character which
did not please them or command their approval. There is an
essential antagonism between European and Asiatic ideas and
modes of thought, such as seemingly to preclude the possibility
of Asiatics appreciating a European civilization. The Persians
must have felt towards the Greco-Macedonians much as the
Mohammedans of India feel towards ourselves—they may have
feared and even respected them—but they must have very bit-
terly hated them. .
Nor was the rule of the Seleucidae such as to overcome by its
‘ch. I.] RULE OF THE SELEUCID.E. s , 243
justice or its wisdom the original antipathy of the dispossessed
lords of Asia towards those by whom they had been ousted.
The satrapial system, which these monarchs lazily adopted
from their predecessors, the Achaemenians, is one always open
to great abuses, and needs the strictest superintendence and
supervision. There is no reason to believe that any sufficient
watch was kept over their satraps by the Seleucid kings, or
even any system of checks established, such as the Achaeme-
nidae had, at least in theory, set up and maintained." The
Greco-Macedonian governors of provinces seem to have been
left to themselves almost entirely, and to have been only con-
trolled in the exercise of their authority by their own notions
of what was right or expedient. Under these circumstances,
abuses were sure to creep in; and it is not improbable that
gross outrages were sometimes perpetrated by those in power
—outrages calculated to make the blood of a nation boil, and
to produce a keen longing for vengeance. We have no direct
evidence that the Persians of the time did actually suffer from
such a misuse of satrapial authority; but it is unlikely that
they entirely escaped the miseries which are incidental to the
system in question. Public opinion ascribed the grossest acts
of tyranny and oppression to some of the Seleucid satraps;"
probably the Persians were not exempt from the common lot
of the subject races. - -
Moreover, the Seleucid monarchs themselves were occasion-
ally guilty of acts of tyranny, which must have intensified the
dislike wherewith they were regarded by their Asiatic sub-
jects. The reckless conduct of Antiochus Epiphanes towards
the Jews is well known; but it is not perhaps generally recog-
nized that intolerance and impious cupidity formed a portion
of the system on which he governed. There seems, however,
to be good reason to believe that, having exhausted his treas-
ury by his wars and his extravagances, Epiphanes formed a
general design of recruiting it by means of the plunder of his
subjects. The temples of the Asiatics had hitherto been for
the most part respected by their European conquerors," and
large stores of the precious metals were accumulated in them.
Epiphanes saw in these hoards the means of relieving his own
necessities, and determined to seize and confiscate them. Be-
sides plundering the Temple of Jehovah at Jerusalem, he made
a journey into the southeastern portion of his empire, about
B.C. 165, for the express purpose of conducting in person the
Collection of the Sacred treasures. It was while he was engaged
s &
~ 244 THE SEVENTH MONARCHIV. - [CH. I.
in this unpopular work that a spirit of disaffection showed
itself; the East took arms no less than the West; and in Persia,
or upon its borders, the avaricious monarch was forced to retire
before the opposition which his ill-judged measures had pro-
voked, and to allow one of the doomed temples to escape him.”
When he soon afterwards sickened and died, the natives of
this part of Asia saw in his death a judgment upon him for his
attempted sacrilege.”
It was within twenty years of this unfortunate attempt that
the dominion of the Seleucidae over Persia and the adjacent
countries came to an end. The Parthian Empire had for
nearly a century been gradually growing in power and extend-
ing itself at the expense of the Syro-Macedonian; and, about
B.C. 163, an emergetic prince, Mithridates I., commenced a
series of conquests towards the West, which terminated (about
B.C. 150) in the transference from the Syro-Macedonian to the
Parthian rule of Media Magna, Susiana, Persia, Babylonia, and
Assyria Proper. It would seem that the Persians offered no
resistance to the progress of the new conqueror.” The Seleu-
cidae had not tried to conciliate their attachment, and it was
impossible that they should dislike the rupture of ties which
had only galled hitherto. Perhaps their feeling, in prospect
of the change, was one, of simple indifference. Perhaps it
was not without some stir of satisfaction and complacency that
they saw the pride of the hated Europeans abased, and a racc,
which, however much it might differ from their own, was at
least Asiatic, installed in power. The Parthia system, more-
over, was one which allowed greater liberty to the subject
races than the Macedonian, as it had been understood and
carried out by the Seleucidae; and so far some real gain was to
be expected from the change. Religious motives must also
have conspired to make the Persians sympathize with the new
power, rather than with that which for centuries had despised
their faith and had recently insulted it. -
, The treatment of the Persians by their Parthian lords seems,
on the whole, to have been marked by moderation. Mithri-
dates indeed, the original conqueror, is accused of having alien-
ated his new subjects by the harshness of his rule;” and in the
struggle which occurred between him and the Seleucid king,
T)emetrius II., Persians, as well as Elymasans and Bactrians,
are said to have fought on the side of the Syro-Macedonian.”
But this is the only occasion in Parthian history, between the
submission of Persia and the great revolt under Artaxerxes,
\ > - ! } Y .
$
*
cE, 1.] PARTHIAN TREATMENT OF THE PERSIANS. 245
where there is any appearance of the Persians regarding their
masters with hostile feelings. In general they show them-
selves submissive and contented with their position, which
was certainly, on the whole, a less irksome one than they had
occupied under the Seleucidae. -
It was a principle of the Parthian governmental system to
allow the Subject peoples, to a large extent, to govern them-
selves. These peoples generally, and notably the Persians,
were ruled by native kings,” who succeeded to the throne by
hereditary right, had the full power of life and death,” and
ruled very much as they pleased, so long as they paid regularly
the tribute imposed upon them by the “King of Kings,” and
sent him a respectable contingent when he was about to en-
gage in a military expedition.” Such a system implies that
the conquered peoples have the enjoyment of their own laws
and institutions, are exempt from troublesome interference,
and possess a sort of semi-independence. Oriental nations,
having once assumed this position, are usually contented with
it, and rarely make any effort to better themselves. It would
seem that, thus far at any rate, the Persians could not com-
plain of the Parthian rule, but must have been fairly satisfie
with their conditton. .
Again, the Greco-Macedonians had tolerated, but they
had not viewed with much respect, the religion which they
had found established in Persia. Alexander, indeed, with the
enlightened curiosity which characterised him, had made in-
quiries concerning the tenets of the Magi, and endeavored to
collect in one the writings of Zoroaster.” But the later mon-
archs, and still more their subjects, had held the system in
contempt, and, as we have seen, Epiphanes had openly in-
sulted the religious feelings of his Asiatic subjects. The
Parthians, on the other hand, began at any rate with a treat-
ment of the Persian religion which was respectful and gratify-
ing. Though perhaps at no time very sincere Zoroastrians,
they had conformed to the State religion under the Achaeme-
nian kings; and when the period came that they had themselves
to establish a system of government, they gave to the Magian
hierarchy a distinct and important place in their governmental
machinery. The council, which advised the monarch, and
which helped to elect and (if need were) depose him, was
composed of two elements—the Sophi, Orwise men, who were
civilians; and the Magi, or priests of the Zoroastrian religion.”
The Magi had thus an important political status in Parthia.
*,
--
Tºy w * af
246 THE SEVENTH iroMARCHY. . [ci. I.
during the early period of the Empire; but they seem gradually
to have declined in favor, and ultimately to have fallen into
disrepute.” The Zoroastrian creed was, little by little, super-
seded among the Parthians by a complex idolatry, which, be-
ginning with an image-worship of the Sun and Moon, proceeded
to an association with those deities of the deceased kings of the
nation, and finally added to both a worship of ancestral idols,
which formed the most cherished possession of each family,
and practically monopolized the religious sentiment.” All the
old Zoroastrian practices were by degrees laid aside. In Arme-
nia, the Arsacid monarchs allowed the sacred fire of Ormazd to
become extinguished;” and in their own territories the Par-
thian Arsacidae introduced the practice, hateful to Zoroastrians,
of burning the dead.* The ultimate religion of these monarchs
seems in fact to have been a syncretism wherein Sabaism, Con-
fucianism, Greco-Macedonian notions, and an inveterate primi-
tive idolatry” were mixed together. It is not impossible that
the very names of Ormazd and Ahriman had ceased to be
known at the Parthian Court, or were regarded as those of ex-
ploded deities, whose dominion over men's minds had passed
a Wą W.
On the other hand, in Persia itself, and to some extent
doubtless among the neighboring countries, Zoroastrianism
, (or what went by the name) had a firm hold on the religious
sentiments of the multitude, who viewed with disfavor the
tolerant and eclectic spirit which animated the Court' of
Ctesiphon. The perpetual fire, kindled, as it was, from
heaven, was carefully tended and preserved on the fire-altars
of the Persian holy places;” the Magian hierarchy was held in
the highest repute, the kings themselves (as it would seem)
not disdaining to be Magi;” the ideas—even perhaps the
forms"—of Ormazd and Ahriman were familiar to all; image-
worship was abborred;" the sacred writings in the Zend or
most ancient Iranian language were diligently preserved and
multiplied; a pompous ritual was kept up; the old national
religion, the religion of the Achaemenians, of the glorious
period of Persian ascendency in Asia, was with the utmost
strictness maintained, probably the more zealously as it fell
more and more into disfavor with the Parthians.
The consequence of this divergence of religious opinion be-
tween the Persians and their feudal lords must undoubtedly
have been a certain amount of alienation and discontent. The
Persian Magi must have been especially dissatisfied with the
4 *
CH. I.] THEIR GRADUAL DEGENERACY. 2.47
position of their brethren at Court; and they would doubtless
use their influence to arouse the indignation of their country-
men generally. But it is scarcely probable that this cause
alone would have produced any striking result. Religious
sympathy rarely leads men to engage in important wars, un-
less it has the support of other concurrent motives. To ac-
count for the revolt of the Persians against their Parthian
lords under Artaxerxes, something more is needed than the
consideration of the religious differences which separated the
two peoples.
First, then, it should be borne in mind that the Parthian
rule must have been from the beginning distasteful to the Per-
sians, owing to the rude and coarse character of the people.
At the moment of Mithridates's successes, the Persians might
experience a sentiment of Satisfaction” that the European
invader was at last thrust back, and that Asia had re-asserted
herself; but a very little experience of Parthian rule was suf-
ficient to call forth different feelings. There can be no doubt
that the Parthians, whether they were actually Turanians or
no,” were, in comparison with the Persians, unpolished and
uncivilized. They showed their own sense of this inferiority
by an affectation of Persian manners.” But this affectation
was not very successful. It is evident that in art, in archi-
tecture, in manners, in habits of life, the Parthian race
reached only a low standard; they stood to their Hellenic and
Iranian subjects in much the same relation that the Turks of
the present day stand to the modern Greeks; they made
themselves respected by their strength and their talent for
organization; but in all that adorns and beautifies life they
were deficient.” The Persians must, during the whole time of
their subjection to Parthia, have been sensible of a feeling of
shame at the want of refinement and of a high type of civiliza-
tion in their masters.
Again, the later sovereigns of the Arsacid dynasty were for
the most part of weak and contemptible character. From the
time of Volagases I. to that of Artabanus IV., the last king,
the military reputation of Parthia had declined. Foreign
enemies ravaged the territories of Parthian vassal kings, and
retired when they chose, unpunished.” Provinces revolted
and established their independence.” Rome was entreated to
lend assistance to her distressed, and afflicted rival, and met
the entreaties with a refusal.” In the wars which still from
time to time were waged between the two empires Parthia
* | x
248 THE SEVENTH MON_ARCHIY. [CH. I.
2
was almost uniformly worsted. Three times her capital was
occupied,” and once her monarch's Summer palace was
burned.* Province after province had to be ceded to Rome.*
The golden throne which symbolized her glory and magnifi-
cence was carried off.” Meanwhile feuds raged between the
different branches of the Arsacid family; civil wars were fre-
quent; two or three monarchs at a time claimed the throne,
or actually ruled in different portions of the Empire.” It is
not surprising that under these circumstances the bonds were
loosened between Parthia and her vassal kingdoms, or that
the Persian tributary monarchs began to despise their suze-
rains, and to contemplate without alarm the prospect of a re-
bellion which should place them in an independent position.
While the general weakness of the Arsacid monarchs was
thus a cause naturally leading to a renunciation of their allegi-
ance on the part of the Persians, a special influence upon the
decision taken by Artaxerxes is probably to be assigned to
one, in particular, of the results of that weakness. When
provinces long subject to Parthian rule revolted, and revolted
successfully, as seems to have been the case with Hyrcania,
and partially with Bactria," Persia could scarcely for very
shame continue submissive. Of all the races subject to Par-
thia, the Persians were the one which had held the most bril-
liant position in the past, and which retained the liveliest re-
membrance of its ancient glories. This is evidenced not only
by the grand claims which Artaxerxes put forward in his
early negotiations with the Romans,” but by the whole course
of Persian literature, which has fundamentally an historic
character, and exhibits the people as attached, almost more
than any other Oriental nation, to the memory of its great
men and of their noble achievements." The countrymen of
Cyrus, of Darius, of Xerxes, of Ochus, of the conquerors of
Media, Bactria, Babylon, Syria, Asia Minor, Egypt, of the in-
waders of Scythia and Greece, aware that they had once borne
sway over the whole region between Tunis and the Indian
Desert, between the Caucasus and the Cataracts, when they
saw a petty mountain clan, like the Hyrcanians, establish and
maintain their independence despite the efforts of Parthia to
coerce them, could not very well remain quiet. If so weak
and small a race could defy the power of the Arsacid mon-
archs, much more might the far more numerous and at least
equally courageous Persians expect to succeed, if they made
resolute attempt to recover their freedom. . . . . . . . ~~
{
- r * s z
“, z
*
ch, 1.] CAUSES OF ARTAXERXES INSURRECTION. 249
It is probable that'Artaxerxes, in his capacity of vassal,
served personally in the army with which the Parthian mon-
arch Artabanus carried on the struggle against Rome, and
thus acquired the power of estimating correctly the military
strength still possessed by the Arsacidae, and of measuring it
against that which he knew to belong to his nation. It is not
unlikely that he formed his plans during the earlier period of
Artabanus's reign, when that monarch allowed bimself to be
imposed upon by Caracallus, and suffered calamities and in-
dignities in consequence of his folly.” When the Parthian
monarch atoned for his indiscretion and wiped out the mem-
ory of his disgraces by the brilliant victory of Nisibis and the
glorious peace which he made with Macrinus, Artaxerxes may
have found that he had gone too far to recede; or, undazzled
by the splendor of these successes, he may still have judged
that he might with prudence persevere in his enterprise. Ar-
tabanus had suffered great losses in his two campaigns against
Rome, and especially in the three days' battle of Nisibis. He
was at variance with several princes of his family, one of
whom certainly maintained himself during his whole reign
with the State and title of “King of Parthia.” Though he
had fought well at Nisibis, he had not given any indications of
remarkable military talent. Artaxerxes, having taken the
measure of his antagonist during the course of the Roman war,
having estimated his resources and formed a decided opinion
on the relative strength of Persia and Parthia, deliberately
resolved, a few years after the Roman war had come to an
end,” to revolt and accept the consequences. He was no
doubt convinced that his nation would throw itself enthusias-
tically into the struggle, and he believed that he could con-
duct it to a successful issue. He felt himself the champion of
a depressed, if not an oppressed,” nationality, and had faith
in his power to raise it into a lofty position. Iran, at any rate,
should no longer, he resolved, submit patiently to be the slave
of Turan; the keen, intelligent, art-loving Aryan people should
no longer bear submissively the yoke of the rude, coarse,
clumsy Scyths. An effort after freedom should be made. He
had little doubt of the result. The Persians, by the strength
of their own right arms and the blessing of Ahuramazda, the
“All-bounteous,” would triumph over their impious masters,
and become once more a great and independent people. At
the worst, if he had miscalculated, there would be the alter-
native of a glorious death upon the battle-field in one of the
noblest of all causes, the assortion of a nation's freedom.”
f
* s — - -
* ar
250 - , THE SEVENTH AIONARCHY, ICH. II,
CHAPTER II. -
Situation and Size of Persia. General Character of the Coun,
try and Climate. Chief Products. Characteristics of the
Persian People, physical and moral. Differences observ-
able in the Race at different periods.
"H IIeports eart roºm uév čv til trapaxtº . . . troxi & ueigov čv rà wearoyaig.—Strabo,
* - STRABO, xv. 3, § 1.
PERSIA PROPER was a tract of country lying on the Gulf to
which it has given name, and extending about 450 miles from
north-west to south-east, with an average breadth of about
250 miles. Its entire area may be estimated at about a hun-
dred thousand square miles. It was thus larger than Great
Britain, about the size of Italy, and rather less than half the
size of France." The boundaries were, on the west, Elymais
or Susiana (which, however, was sometimes reckoned a part
of Persia);” on the north, Media; on the east, Carmania;' and
on the south, the sea. It is nearly represented in modern
times by the two Persian provinces of Farsistan and Laristan,
the former of which retains, but slightly changed, the ancient
appellation. The Hindyan or Tab (ancient Oroatis) seems
towards its mouth to have formed the western limit.* East-
ward, Persia extended to about the site of the mordern Bunder
Rongo." Inland, the northern boundary ran probably a little
south of the thirty-second parallel, from long. 50° to 55°. The
line dividing Persia Proper from Carmania (now Kerman) was
somewhat uncertain.
The character of the tract is extremely diversified. Ancient
writers divided the country into three strongly contrasted
regions. The first, or coast tract, was (they said) a sandy
desert, producing nothing but a few dates, owing to the inten-
sity of the heat. Above this was a fertile region, grassy, with
well-watered meadows and numerous vineyards, enjoying a
delicious climate, producing almost every fruit but the olive,
containing pleasant parks or “paradises,” watered by a
number of limpid streams and clear lakes, well wooded in
places, affording an excellent pasture for horses and for all
sorts of cattle, abounding in water-fowl and game of every
&
w
cH. II.] DESCRIPTION OF PERSIA. PROPEI2. 251.
kind, and altogether a most delightful abode. Beyond this
fertile region, towards the north, was a rugged mountain
tract, cold and mostly covered with snow, of which they did
not profess to know much." N.
In this description there is no doubt a certain amount of
truth; but it is mixed probably with a good deal of exaggera-
*
tion. There is no reason to believe that the climate or charac-'
ter of the country has undergone any important alteration
between the time of Nearchus or Strabo and the present day.
At present it is certain that the tract in question answers but
very incompletely to the description which those writers give
of it. Three regions may indeed be distinguished, though the
natives seem now to speak of only two ;' but none of them ,
corresponds at all exactly to the accounts of the Greeks. The
coast tract is represented with the nearest approach to correct-
ness. This is, in fact, a region of arid plain, often impregna-
ted with salt, ill-watered, with a poor soil, consisting either
of sand or clay, and productive of little besides dates and a
few other fruits.” A modern historian" says of it that “it
bears a greater resemblance in soil and climate to Arabia than
to the rest of Persia.” It is very hot and unhealthy, and can
at no time have Supported more than a sparse and scanty
population. Above this, towards the north, is the best and
most fertile portion of the territory. A mountain tract,” the
continuation of Zagros, succeeds to the flat and sandy coast
region, occupying the greater portion of Persia Proper. It is
about two hundred miles in width, and consists of an alterna-
tion of mountain, plain, and narrow valley, curiously inter-
mixed, and hitherto mapped very imperfectly.” In places
this district answers fully to the description of Nearchus,
being, “richly fertile, picturesque, and romantic almost
beyond imagination, with lovely wooded dells, green mountain
sides, and broad plains, suited for the production of almost
any crops.”” But it is only to the smaller moiety of the
region that such a character attaches; more than half the
mountain tract is sterile and barren;” the supply of water is
almost everywhere scanty; the rivers are few, and have not
much volume; many of them, after short courses, end in the
Sand, or in small salt lakes, from which the superfluous water
is evaporated. Much of the country is absolutely without
Streams, and would be uninhabitable were it not for the kanats
or kareezes”—subterranean channels made by art for the con-
Veyance of spring water to be used in irrigation. The most
&
4
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f
\
A
\
252 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. . [CH. II.
desolate portion of the mountain tract is towards the north
and north-east, where it adjoins upon the third region, which
is the worst of the three. This is a portion of the high table-
land of Iran, the great desert which stretches from the eastern
skirts of Zagros to the Hamoon, the Helmend, and the river of
Subzawur. It is a dry and hard plain, intersected at intervals
by ranges of rocky hills,” with a climate extremely hot in
summer and extremely cold in winter, incapable of cultiva-
, tion, excepting so far as water can be conveyed by kamats,
which is, of course, only a short distance. The fox, the
jackal, the antelope, and the wild ass possess this sterile and
desolate tract, where “all is dry and cheerless,” and verdure
is almost unknown.
Perhaps the two most peculiar districts of Persia are the
lake basins of Neyriz and Deriah-i-Nemek. The rivers given
off from the northern side of the great mountain chain
, between the twenty-ninth and thirty-first parallels, being un-
able to penetrate the mountains, flow eastward towards the
desert; and their waters gradually collect into two streams,
which end in two lakes, the Deriah-i-Nemek and that of Ney-
riz, or Lake Bakhtigan.” The basin of Lake Neyriz lies
towards the north. Here the famous “Bendamir,” and the
Pulwar or Kur-ab, flowing respectively from the north-east
and the north, unite in one near the ruins of the ancient
Persepolis, and, after fertilizing the plain of Merdasht," run
eastward down a rich vale for a distance of some forty miles
into the salt lake which swallows them up. This lake, when
full, has a length of fifty or sixty miles, with a breadth of
from three to six.” In summer, however, it is often quite
dry,” the water of the Bendamir being expended in irrigation
before reaching its natural terminus. The valley and plain of
the Bendamir, and its tributaries, are among the most fertile
portions of Persia, as well as among those of most historic
interest.” *
The basin of the Deriah-i-Nemek is smaller than that of the
Neyriz, but it is even more productive. Numerous brooks and
streams, rising not far from Shiraz, run on all sides into the
Nemek lake, which has a length of about fifteen and a breadth
of three or three and a half miles.” Among the streams is the
celebrated brook of Hafiz, the Rocknabad, which still retains
“its singular transparency and softness to the taste.” “ Other
rills and fountains of extreme clearness abound,” and a verdure
is the result, very unusual in Persia. The vines grown in the
CH. II.] * PRODUCTS. - e , 253
basin produce the famous Shiraz wine, the only good wine
which is manufactured in the East. The orchards are magnifi-
cent. In the autumn “the earth is covered with the gathered
harvest, flowers, and fruits; melons, peaches, pears, nectarines,
cherries, grapes, pomegranates; all is a garden, abundant in
sweets and refreshment.”” *
But, notwithstanding the exceptional fertility of the Shiraz .
plain and of a few other places, Persia Proper seems to have
been rightly characterized in ancient times as “a scant land
and a rugged.” “” Its area was less than a fifth of the area of
modern Persia; and of this space nearly one half was uninhab-
itable, consisting either of barren stony mountain or of Scorch-
ing sandy plain, ill supplied with water and often impregnated
with salt. Its products, consequently, can have been at no
time either very abundant or very varied. Anciently, the low
coast tract seems to have been cultivated to a small extent in
corn,” and to have produced good dates and a few other
fruits.” The mountain region was, as we have seen,” cel-
ebrated for its excellent pastures, for its abundant fruits, and
especially for its grapes. Within the mountains, on the high
plateau, assafoetida (Silphium) was found,” and probably some
other medicinal herbs.” Corn, Ino doubt, could be grown
largely in the plains and valleys of the mountain tract, as well
as on the plateau, so far as the kamats carried the water.
There must have been, on the whole, a deficiency of timber,
though the palms of the low tract, and the Oaks, planes, chenars
or Sycamores, poplars, and willows” of the mountain regions
sufficed for the wants of the natives. Not much fuel was re-
quired, and stone was the general material used for building.
Among the fruits for which Persia was famous are especially
noted the peach,” the walnut, and the citron.” The walnut
bore among the Romans the appellation of “royal.”
Persia, like Media, was a good nursery for horses.” Fine
grazing grounds existed in many parts of the mountain region,
and for horses of the Arab breed even the Deshtistan was not
unsuited.” Camels were reared in some places,” and sheep
and goats were numerous.” Horned cattle were probably not
So abundant, as the character of the country is not favorable
for them.* Game existed in large quantities,” the lakes
abounding with water-fowl,” such as ducks, teal, heron,
Snipe, etc.; and the wooded portions of the mountain tract
giving shelter to the stag, the wild goat, the wild boar, the
hare, the pheasant, and the heathcock. “ Fish were also plen-
* - y *
254 THE SEVENTII MONARCHY. ... [CH. II.
\ W g
tiful. Whales visited the Persian Gulf, and were sometimes
stranded upon the shores, where their carcases furnished a
mine of wealth to the inhabitants.” Dolphins abounded, as
well as many smaller kinds; and shell-fish, particularly oys-
ters, could always be obtained without difficulty.” The rivers,
too, were capable of furnishing fresh-water fish in good quan-
tity,” though we cannot say if this source of supply was util-
ized in antiquity.
The mineral treasures of Persia were fairly numerous.
Good salt was yielded by the lakes of the middle region, and
was also obtainable upon the plateau. Bitumen and naphtha
were produced by sources in the low country.” The mountains
contained most of the important metals and a certain number
of valuable gems.” The pearls of the Gulf acquired early a
great reputation, and a regular fishery was established for
them before the time of Alexander." -
But the most celebrated of all the products of Persia were its
men. The “scant and rugged country” gave birth, as Cyrus
the Great is said to have observed,” to a race brave, hardy,
and enduring, calculated not only to hold its own against ag-
gressors, but to extend its sway and exercise dominion over
the Western Asiatics generally. The Aryan family is the one
which, of all the races of mankind, is the most self-asserting,
and has the greatest strength, physical, moral, and intellectual.
The Iranian branch of it, whereto the Persians belonged, is not
perhaps so gifted as some others; but it has qualities which
place it above most of those by which Western Asia was an-
ciently peopled. In the primitive times, from Cyrus the Great
to Darius Hystaspis, the Persians seem to have been rude
mountaineers, probably not very unlike the modern Kurds
and Lurs, who inhabit portions of the same chain which forms
the heart of the Persian country. Their physiognomy was
handsome.* A high straight forehead, a long slightly aquiline
nose, a short and curved upper lip, a well-rounded chin, char-
acterized the Persian. The expression of his face was grave
and noble. He had abundant hair, which he wore very arti-
ficially arranged. Above and round the brow it was made to
stand away from the face in short crisp curls; on the top of
the head it was worn smooth; at the back of the head it was
again trained into curls, which followed each other in several
rows from the level of the forehead to the nape of the neck.
The moustache was always cultivated, and curved in a gentle
sweep. A beard and whiskers were worn, the former some-
\ f
*
| s A
{ - . N.
CH. II.] CHLAIR-LCTERISTICS OF THE PERSIANS. 255.
times long and pendent, like the Assyrian, but more often clus-
tering around the chin in short close curls. The figure was
well-formed, but somewhat stout; the carriage was dignified
and simple. [Pl. XI., Fig. 1.]
Simplicity of manners prevailed during this period. At the
court there was some luxury; but the bulk of the nation, living
in their mountain territory, and attached to agriculture and
hunting, maintained the habits of their ancestors, and were a
somewhat rude though not a coarse people. The dress com- .
monly worn was a close-fitting shirt or tunic of leather,” de-
Scending to the knee, and with sleeves that reached down to
the wrist. Round the tunic was worn a belt or sash, which
was tied in front. The head was protected by a loose felt
cap," and the feet by a sort of high shoe or low boot. The
Ordinary diet was bread and cress-seed,” while the sole bever-
age was water." In the higher ranks, of course, a different
style of living prevailed; the elegant and flowing “Median
robe’” was worn;" flesh of various kinds was eaten;” much
wine was consumed;” and meals were extended to a great
length;" The Persians, however, maintained during this period
a general hardihood and bravery which made them the most
dreaded adversaries of the Greeks,” and enabled them to main-
tain an unquestioned dominion over the other native races of
Western Asia.
As time went on, and their monarchs became less warlike,
and wealth accumulated, and national spirit decayed, the Per-
sian character by degrees deteriorated, and sank, even under
the Achaemenian kings, to a level not much superior to that of
the ordinary Asiatic. The Persian antagonists of Alexander
were pretty nearly upon a par with the races which in Hindu-
stan have yielded to the British power; they occasionally
fought with gallantry,” but they were deficient in resolution,
in endurance, in all the elements of solid strength; and they
were quite unable to stand their ground against the vigor and .
dash of the Macedonians and the Greeks. Whether physically
they were very different from the soldiers of Cyrus may be
doubted, but morally they had fallen far below the -ancient
standard; their self-respect their love of country, their attach-
ment to their monarch had diminished; no one showed any
great devotion to the cause for which he fought; after two de-
feats" the empire wholly collapsed; and the Persians submitted,
apparently without much reluctance, to the Helleno-Macedonian
yoke. * - |
*
*
*/
# *
256 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [ch. II.
Five centuries and a half of servitude could not much im-
prove or elevate the character of the people. Their fall from
power, their loss of wealth and of dominion did indeed advan-
tage them in one way: it but an end to that continually ad-
vancing sloth and luxury which had Sapped the virtue of the
nation, depriving it of energy, endurance, and almost every
manly excellence. It dashed the Persians back upon the ground
whence they had sprung, and whence, Antaeus-like, they pro-
ceeded to derive fresh vigor and vital force. In their “Scant
and rugged” fatherland, the people of Cyrus once more recov-
ered to a great extent their ancient prowess and hardihood—
their habits became simplified, their old patriotism revived,
their self-respect grew greater. But while adversity thus in
some respects proved its “sweet uses” upon them, there were
other respects in which submission to the yoke of the Greeks,
and still more to that of the Parthians, seems to have altered
them for the worse rather than for the better. There is a coarse-
ness and rudeness about the Sassanian Persians which we do
not observe in Achaemenian times. The physique of the na-
tion is not indeed much altered. Nearly the same countenance
meets us in the Sculptures of Artaxerxes, the son of Babek, of
Sapor, and of their successors,” with which we are familiar
from the bas-reliefs of Darius Hystapis and Xerxes. There is
the same straight forehead, the same aquiline nose, the same
well-shaped mouth, the same abundant hair. The form is,
however, coarser and clumsier; the expression is less refined;
and the general effect produced is that the people have, even
physically, deteriorated. The mental and aesthetic standard
seems still more to have sunk. There is no evidence that the
Persians of Sassanian times possessed the governmental and
administrative ability of Darius Hystapis or Artaxerxes Ochus.
Their art, though remarkable, considering the almost entire
disappearance of art from Western Asia under the Parthians,"
is, compared with that of Achaemenian times, rude and gro-
tesque. In architecture, indeed, they are not without merit,
though even here the extent to which they were indebted to
the Parthians, which cannot be exactly determined, must lessen
Our estimation of them; but their mimetic art, while not want-
ing in Spirit, is remarkably coarse and unrefined. As a later
chapter will be devoted to this subject, no more need be said
upon it here. It is sufficient for our present purpose to note
that the impression which we obtain from the monumental re-
mains of the Sassanian Persians accords with what is to be
Vol. Ill. Plate XXI,
COIN OF ISDIGERD. I. COIN OF ISDIGERD II
COIN OF WARAHRAN V.
COIN OF HORMISDAS III.
(doubtful).
COIN OF BALAS
COIN OF PEROZES.



|||.
Vol.
53
><
QD
----
G.
Cl-
COIN OF ZAMASP.
COIN OF KOBAD.
COIN OF CHOSROES I.
COIN OF CHOSROES. I.




# y * * - <= - — , — - -
or. III.] STORIES TOLD OF ARTAXERXES I. 257
- ~!
gathered of them from the accounts of the Romans and the
Greeks. The great Asiatic revolution of the year A.D. 226
marks a revival of the Iranic nationality from the depressed
state into which it had sunk for more than five hundred years;
but the revival is not full or complete. The Persians of the
Sassanian kingdom are not equal to those of the time between
Cyrus the Great and Darius Codomannus; they have ruder
manners, a grosser taste, less capacity for government and
organization; they have, in fact, been coarsened by centuries
of Tartar rule; they are vigorous, active, energetic, proud, brave;
but in civilization and refinement they do not rank much above
their Parthian predecessors. Western Asia gained, perhaps,
something, but it did not gain much, from the substitution of
the Persians for the Parthians as the dominant power. The
change is the least marked among the revolutions which the
East underwent between the accession of Cyrus and the con-
quests of Timour. But it is a change, on the whole, for the bet- .
ter. It is accompanied by a revival of art, by improvements in . , ,
architecture; it inaugurates a religious revolution which has
advantages. Above all, it saves the East from stagnation. It
is one among many of those salutary shocks which, in the
political as in the natural world, are needed from time to time
to stimulate action and prevent torpor and apathy.
CHAPTER III.
Reign of Artaateraces I. Stories told of him. Most probable ac-
count of his Descent, Ronk, and Parentage. His Contest
with Artabanus. First War with Chosroës of Armenia.
Contest with Alexander Severus. Second War with Chosroës
and conquest of Armenia. Religious Reforms. Internal
Administration and Government. Art. Coinage. In-
scriptions.
(“Ov sc. "Apta 8 ) "Aptašépêms & (vas, IIéparats thv &pxhv čvekrioraro. Tá re yewrviöv,
ta éðvm Bópflapa xeupooréuevos, flačios fióm kai tā ‘Poplatov dipxm étreflowſAevarev.–HERo-
DIAN. vi. 2, ad flºw.
AROUND the cradle of an Oriental sovereign who founds a
dynasty there cluster commonly a number of traditions, which
have, more or less, a mythical character. The tales told of
Cyrus the Great, which even Herodotus set aside as incredible,”
&#
ºf
258 * , THE SEVENTH MoMARCHF, , [CH. III. .
* have their parallels in narratives that were current within
one or two centuries” with respect to the founder of the Second
Persian Empire, which would not have disgraced the mytholo-
gers of Achaemenian times. Artaxerxes, according to some,”
was the son of a common Soldier who had an illicit connection
with the wife of a Persian cobbler" and astrologer, a certain
Babek or Papak, an inhabitant of the Cadusian country" and a
man of the lowest class." Papak, knowing by his art that the
soldier's son would attain a lofty position, voluntarily ceded
his rights as husband to the favorite of fortune, and bred up as
his own the issue of this illegitimate commerce, who, when he
attained to manhood, justified Papak's foresight by successful-
ly revolting from Artabanus and establishing the new Persian
rhomarchy. Others' said that the founder of the new kingdom
was a Parthian satrap, the Son of a noble, and that, having
long meditated revolt, he took the final plunge in consequence
of a prophecy uttered by Artabanus, who was well skilled in
magical arts, and saw in the stars that the Parthian empire
was threatened with destruction. Artabanus, on a certain oc-
cosion, when he communicated this prophetic knowledge to his
wife, was overheard by one of her attendants, a noble damsel
named Artaducta, already affianced to Artaxerxes and a sharer
in his Secret counsels. At her instigation he hastened his
plans, raised the standard of revolt, and upon the successful
issue of his enterprise made her his queen. Miraculous cir-
cumstances were freely interwoven with these narratives,” and
a result was produced which staggered the faith even of such a
writer as Moses of Choréné, who, desiring to confine himself
to what was strictly true and certain, could find no more to
say of Artaxerxes's birth and origin than that he was the son of
a certain Sasan, and a native of Istakr, or Persepolis.
Even, however, the two facts thus selected as beyond criti-
cism by Moses are far from being entitled to implicit credence.
Artaxerxes, the Son of Sasan according to Agathangelus and
Moses,” is the same as Papak (or Babek) in his own" and his
son's inscriptions. The Persian writers generally take the
Same view, and declare that Sasan was a remoter ancestor of
Artaxerxes, the acknowledged founder of the family, and not
Artaxerxes' father.” In the extant records of the new Persian
Kingdom, the coins and the inscriptions, neither Sasan nor the
gentilitial term derived from it, Sasanidae, has any place; and
though it would perhaps be rash to question on this account
the employment of the term Sasanidae by the dynasty,” yet
*
Twº VT W # * sº
* ; f*
CH. III.] HIS PARENTAGE AND BIRTHPLACE. -, - 259
- - - r
we may regard it as really “certain” that the father of Arta-
xerxes was named, not Sasan, but Papak; and that, if the term
Sasanian was in reality a patronymic, it was derived, like the
term “Achaemenian,” “from some remote progenitor” whom
the royal family of the new empire believed to have been their
founder. w
The native country of Artaxerxes is also variously stated by
the authorities. Agathangelus calls him an Assyrian,” and
makes the Assyrians play an important part in his rebellion.”
Agathias says that he was born in the Cadusian country,” or
the low tract south-west of the Caspian, which belonged to
Media rather than to Assyria or Persia. Dio Cassius” and
Herodian,” the contemporaries of Artaxerxes, call him a Per- ,
sian; and there can be no reasonable doubt that they are cor-
rect in So doing. Agathangelus allows the predominantly Per-
sian character of his revolt, and Agathias is apparently un-
aware that the Cadusian country was no part of Persia. The
statement that he was a native of Persepolis (Istakr)is first found
in Moses of Choréné.” It may be true, but it is uncertain; for
it may have grown out of the earlier statement of Agathange-
lus, that he held the government of the province of Istakr.”
We can only affirm with confidence that the founder of the
new Persian monarchy was a genuine Persian, without attempt-
ing to determine positively what Persian city or province had
the honor of producing him.”
A more interesting question, and one which will be found
perhaps to admit of a more definite answer, is that of the rank
and station in which Artaxerxes was born. We have seen.”
that Agathias (writing ab. A.D. 580) called him the suppositi-
tious son of a cobbler. Others” spoke of him as the child of a
shepherd; while some said that his father was “an inferior
officer in the service of the government.”* But on the other
hand, in the inscriptions which Artaxerxes himself set up in
the neighborhood of Persepolis,” he gives his father, Papak,
the title of “King.” Agathangelus calls him a “noble” ” and
“Satrap of Persepolitan government;”* while Herodian seems
to speak of him as “king of the Persians,” before his victories
Over Artabanus.” On the whole, it is perhaps most probable
that, like Cyrus, he was the hereditary monarch of the subject
kingdom of Persia, which had always its own princes under
the Parthians,” and that thus he naturally and without effort
took the leadership of the revolt when circumstances induced
his nation to rebel and seek to establish its independence. The
A
*s
p * , , , , ,
260 . . THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. III.
stories told of his humble origin, which are contradictory and
improbable, are to be paralleled with those which made Cyrus
the son of a Persian of moderate rank,” and the foster-child
of a herdsman.” There is always in the East a tendency to-
wards romance and exaggeration; and when a great monarch
emerges from a comparatively humble position, the humility
and obscurity of his first condition are intensified, to make the
contrast more striking between his original low estate and
his ultimate splendor and dignity.
The circumstances of the struggle between Artaxerxes and
Artabanus are briefly sketched by Dio Cassius * and Agath-
angelus,” while they are related more at large by the Persian
writers.” It is probable that the contest occupied a space of
four or five years. At first, we are told,” Artabanus neglected
to arouse himself, and took no steps towards crushing the re-
bellion, which was limited to an assertion of the independence
of Persia Proper, or the province of Fars. After a time the
revolted vassal, finding himself unmolested, was induced to
raise his thoughts higher, and commenced a career of conquest.
Turning his arms eastward, he attacked Kerman (Carmania),
and easily succeeded in reducing that scantily-peopled tract
under his dominion.” He then proceeded to menace the north,
and, making war in that quarter, overran and attached to his
kingdom some of the outlying provinces of Media. Roused by
these aggressions, the Parthian monarch at length took the
field, collected an army consisting in part of Parthians, in part
of the Persians who continued faithful to him,” against his
vassal, and, invading Persia, soon brought his adversary to a
battle. A long and bloody contest followed, both sides suffer-
ing great losses; but victory finally declared itself in favor of
Artaxerxes, through the desertion to him, during the engage-
ment, of a portion of his enemy's forces.” A second conflict
ensued within a short period, in which the insurgents were
even more completely successful; the carnage on the side of
the Parthians was great, the loss of the Persians small; and
the great king fled precipitately from the field. Still the re-
sources of Parthia were equal to a third trial of arms. After a
brief pause, Artabanus made a final effort to reduce his re-
volted vassal; and a last engagement took place in the plain of
|Hormuz," which was a portion of the Jerahi valley, in the
beautiful country between Bebahan and Shuster. Here, after
a desperate conflict, the Parthian monarch suffered a third and
signal defeat; his army was scattered; and he himself lost his
J.- *
A
# N * _a .
j . º.º. " , * . . . **
ch. III.] ‘ ‘HIS CONTEST WITH ARTABANUS. 261
life in the combat. According to some, his death was the re-
sult of a hand-to-hand conflict with his great antagonist,” who,
pretending to fly, drew him on, and then pierced his heart .
with an arrow. .
The victory of Hormuz gave to Artaxerxes the dominion of
the East; but it did not secure him this result at once, or with-
out further struggle. Artabanus had left sons;” and both in
Bactria and Armenia there were powerful branches of the
Arsacid family,” which could not see unmoved the downfall
of their kindred in Parthia. Chosroës, the Armenian mon-
arch, was a prince of considerable ability, and is said to have
been set upon his throne by Artabanus, whose brother he was,
according to some writers.” At any rate he was an Arsacid;
and he felt keenly the diminution of his own influence involved
in the transfer to an alien race of the sovereignty wielded for
five centuries by the descendants of the first Arsaces. He had
set his forces in motion, while the contest between Artabanus
and Artaxerxes was still in progress, in the hope of affording
substantial help to his relative.” But the march of events was
too rapid for him; and, ere he could strike a blow, he found
that the time for effectual action had gone by, that Artabanus
was no more, and that the dominion of Artaxerxes was estab-
lished over most of the countries which had previously formed
portions of the Parthian Empire. Still, he resolved to continue
the struggle; he was on friendly terms with Rome,” and
might count on an imperial contingent; he had some hope that
the Bactrian Arsacidae would join him; " at the worst, he re-
garded his own power as firmly fixed and as sufficient to enable
him to maintain an equal contest with the new monarchy.
Accordingly he took the Parthian Arsacids under his protec-
tion, and gave them a refuge in the Armenian territory.” At
the same time he negotiated with both Balkh and Rome, made
arrangements with the barbarians upon his northern frontier
to lend him aid,” and, having collected a large army, invaded
the new kingdom on the north-west," and gained certain not
unimportant successes. According to the Armenian historians,
Artaxerxes lost Assyria and the adjacent regions; Bactria
wavered; and, after the struggle had continued for a year or
two, the founder of the second Persian empire was obliged to
fly ignominiously to India." But this entire narrative seems
to be deeply tinged with the vitiating stain of intense national
vanity, a fault which markedly characterizes the Armenian
writers, and renders them, when unconfirmed by other author-
z
44- \. * ** w 3 *
262 THE SEVENTH MONAI:CHY tº [ch. III.
‘ities, almost worthless. The general course of events, and the
position which Artaxerxes takes in his dealings with Rome
(A.D. 229–230), sufficiently indicate that any reverses which
he sustained at this time in his struggle with Chosroës and the
unsubmitted Arsacidae” must have been trivial, and that they
certainly had no greater result than to establish the independ-
ence of Armenia, which, by dint of leaning upon Rome,” was
able to maintain itself against the Persian monarch and to
check the advance of the Persians in North-Western Asia.
Artaxerxes, however, resisted in this quarter, and unable to
overcome the resistance, which he may have regarded as
deriving its effectiveness (in part at least) from the support lent
it by Tome, determined (ab. A.D. 229) to challenge the empire to
an encounter. Aware that Artabanus, his late rival, against
whom he had measured himself, and whose power he had
completely overthrown, had been successful in his war with
Macrinus, had gained the great battle of Nisibis, and forced
the Imperial State to purchase an ignominious peace by a pay-
ment equal to nearly two millions of our money,” he may
naturally have thought that a facile triumph was open to his
arms in this direction. Alexander Severus, the occupant of
the imperial throne, was a young man of a weak character,
controlled in a great measure by his mother, Julia Mamaea,
and as yet quite undistinguished as a general. The Roman
forces in the East were known to be licentious and insubordi-
nate;” corrupted by the softness of the climate and the
Seductions of Oriental manners, they disregarded the restraints
of discipline, indulged in the vices which at once enervate the
frame and lower the moral character, had scant respect for
their leaders, and seemed a defence which it would be easy to
Overpower and sweep away. Artaxerxes, like other founders
of great empires, entertained lofty views of his abilities and
his destinies; the monarchy which he had built up in the space
of Some five or six years was far from contenting him; well
read in the ancient history of his nation, he sighed after the
glorious days of Cyrus the Great and Darius Hystaspis, when
all Western Asia from the shores of the AEgean to the Indian
desert, and portions of Europe and Africa, had acknowledged
the Sway of the Persian king. The territories which these
princes had ruled he regarded as his own by right of inherit,
ange; and we are told that he not only entertained, but boldly
published, these views." His emissaries everywhere declared
that their master claimed the dominion of Asia as far as the
f
—w- — – *— — — —- sº.- - - - - T - * *
* * # * -
CH, III.] NEGOTIATIONS WITH ROME. g 263
* \
AEgean Sea and the Propontis. It was his duty and his
mission to recover to the Persians their pristine empire. What
Cyrus had conquered, what the Persian kings had held from
‘ that time until the defeat of Codomannus by Alexander, was
his by indefeasible right, and he was about to take possession
of it.
Nor were these brave words a mere brutum fulmen. Simul-
taneously with the putting forth of such lofty pretensions the
troops of the Persian monarch crossed the Tigris and spread
themselves over the entire Roman province of Mesopotamia,” "
which was rapidly overrun and offered scarcely any resistance.
Severus learned at the same moment the demands of his
adversary and the loss of one of his best provinces. He heard
that his strong posts upon the Euphrates, the old defences of "
the empire in this quarter, were being attacked,” and that
Syria daily expected the passage of the invaders. The crisis
was one requiring prompt action; but the weak and inexperi-
enced youth was content to meet it with diplomacy, and,
instead of sending an army to the East, despatched ambassa-
dors to his rival with a letter. “Artaxerxes,” he said, “ought
to confine himself to his own territories and not seek to
revolutionize Asia; it was unsafe, on the strength of mere
unsubstantial hopes, to commence a great war. Every one
should be content with keeping what belonged to him.
Artaxerxes would find war with Rome a very different thing
from the contests in which he had been hitherto engaged with
barbarous races like his own. He should call to mind the
successes of Augustus and Trajan, and the trophies carried off,
from the East by Lucius Verus and by Septimius Severus.”
The counsels of moderation have rarely much effect in
restraining princely ambition. Artaxerxes replied by an
embassy in which he ostentatiously displayed the wealth and
magnificence of Persia;" but, so far from making any deduc-
tion from his original demands, he now distinctly formulated
them, and required their immediate acceptance. “Artaxerxes, .
the Great King,” he said, “ordered" the Romans and their
ruler to take their departure forthwith from Syria and the rest
of Western Asia, and to allow the Persians to exercise domin-
ion over Ionia and Caria and the other countries within the
AEgean and the Euxine, since these countries belonged to
Persia by right of inheritance.”" . A Roman emperor had
Scláom received such a message; and Alexander, mild and
gentle as he was by nature, seems to have had his equanimity .
f
• ? f
264 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY, - [CH. III,
disturbed by the insolence of the mandate. Disregarding the
sacredness of the ambassadorial, character, he stripped the
envoys of their splendid apparel, treated them as prisoners of
war, and settled them as agricultural colonists in Phrygia. If
we may believe Herodian, he even took credit to himself for
sparing their lives, which he regarded as justly forfeit to the
offended majesty of the empire.
Meantime the angry prince, convinced at last against his
will that negotiations with such an enemy were futile, col-
t
lected an army and began his march towards the East. Tak-
ing troops from the various provinces through which he
passed,” he conducted to Antioch, in the autumn of A.D.
231,” a considerable force, which was there augmented by the
legions of the East and by troops drawn from Egypt" and
other quarters. Artaxerxes, on his part, was not idle. Ac-
cording to Severus himself," the army brought into the field
by the Persian monarch consisted of one hundred and twenty
thousand mailed horsemen, of eighteen hundred scythed
chariots, and of seven hundred trained elephants, bearing on
their backs towers filled with archers; and though this pre-
tended host has been truly characterized as one “the like of
which is not to be found in Eastern history, and has searcely
been imagined in Eastern romance,” "yet, allowing much for
exaggeration, we may still safely conclude that great exer-
tions had been made on the Persian side, that their forces con-
sisted of the three arms mentioned, and that the numbers of
each were large beyond ordinary precedent. The two adver-
Saries were thus not ill-matched; each brought the flower of
his troops to the conflict; each commanded the army, on
which his dependence was placed, in person; each looked to
obtain from the contest not only an increase of military glory,
but substantial fruits of victory in the shape of plunder or
territory. - .
It might have been expected that the Persian monarch, after
the high tone which he had taken, would have maintained an
aggressive attitude, have crossed the Euphrates, and spread
the hordes at his disposal over Syria, Cappadocia, and Asia
Minor. But it seems to be certain that he did not do so, and
that the initiative was taken by the other side. Probably the
Persian arms, as inefficient in sieges as the Parthian," were
unable to overcome the resistance offered by the Roman forts
upon the great river; and Artaxerxes was too good a general
to throw his forces into the heart of an enemy's country with-
z %
ci. III.] PLANS of ALEXANDER SEVERUS 265
out having first secured a safe retreat. The Euphrates was
therefore crossed by his adversary” in the spring of A.D. 232;
the Roman province of Mesopotamia was easily recovered;"
and arrangements were made by which it was hoped to deal
the new monarchy a heavy blow, if not actually to crush
and conquer it." *
Alexander divided his troops into three bodies. One division
was to act towards the north, to take advantage of the friendly
disposition of Chosroës, king of Armenia, and, traversing his
strong mountain territory, to direct its attack upon Media,
into which Armenia gave a ready entrance. Another was to
take a southern line,” and to threaten Persia Proper from the
marshy tract about the junction of the Euphrates with the .
Tigris, a portion of the Babylonian territory. The third and
main division, which was to be commanded by the emperor in
person, was to act on a line intermediate between the other
two, which would conduct it to the very heart of the enemy's
territory, and at the same time allow of its giving effective
support to either of the two other divisions if they should need
it. &
The plan of operations appears to have been judiciously con-
structed, and should perhaps be ascribed rather to the, friends
whom the youthful emperor consulted” than to his own un-
assisted wisdom. But the best designed plans may be frus-
trated by unskilfulness or timidity in the execution; and it
was here, if we may trust the author who alone gives us any
detailed account of the campaign,” that the weakness of Alex-
ander's character showed itself. The northern army success-
fully traversed Armenia, and, invading Media, proved itself in
numerous small actions superior to the Persian force opposed
to it, and was able to plunder and ravage the entire country at
its pleasure. The Southern division crossed Mesopotamia in
safety, and threatened to invade Persia Proper.” Had Alex-
ander with the third and main division kept faith with the two
secondary armies, had he marched briskly and combined his
movements with theirs, the triumph of the Roman arms
would have been assured. But, either from personal timidity
or from an amiable regard for the anxieties of his mother
Mamaea, he hung back while his right and left wings made
their advance, and so allowed the enemy to concentrate their
efforts on these two isolated bodies. The army in Media,
favored by the rugged character of the country, was able to
maintain its ground without much difficulty; but that which
-* g.
.
— — — — — — — — – }
! . *
, I - ~
266 * THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. * [CII. III.
had advanced by the line of the Euphrates and Tigris, and
which was still marching through the boundless plains of
the great alluvium, found itself suddenly beset by a countless
host, commanded by Artaxerxes in person, and, though it
struggled gallantly, was overwhelmed and utterly destroyed
by the arrows of the terrible Persian bowmen. Herodian
says, no doubt with Some exaggeration, that this was the
greatest calamity which had ever befallen the Romans.” It
certainly cannot compare with Cannae, with the disaster of
Varus, or even with the similar defeat of Crassus in a not very
distant region. But it was (if rightly represented by Hero-
dian) a terrible blow. It absolutely determined the campaign.
A Caesar or a Trajan might have retrieved such a loss. An
Alexander Severus was not likely even to make an attempt
to do so. Already weakened in body by the heat of the
climate and the unwonted fatigues of war," he was utterly
prostrated in spirit by the intelligence when it reached him.
The signal was at once given for retreat. Orders were sent to
the corps d'armée which occupied Media to evacuate its con-
quests and to retire forthwith upon the Euphrates. These
orders were executed, but with difficulty. Winter had already
set in throughout the high regions; and in its retreat the
army of Media suffered great losses through the inclemency
of the climate, so that those who reached Syria were but a
small proportion of the original force. Alexander himself,
and the army which he led, experienced less difficulty; but
disease dogged the steps of this division, and when its columns
reached Antioch it was found to be greatly reduced in num-
bers by sickness, though it had never confronted an enemy.
The three armies of Severus suffered not indeed equally, but
still in every case considerably, from three distinct causes—
sickness, severe weather, and marked inferiority to the
enemy.” The last-named cause had annihilated the southern
division; the northern had succumbed to climate; the main
army, led by Severus himself, was (comparatively speaking)
intact, but even this had been decimated by sickness, and was
not in a condition to carry on the war with vigor. The result
of the campaign had thus been altogether favorable to the
Persians,” but yet it had convinced Artaxerxes that Rome
was more powerful than he had thought. It had shown him
that in imagining the time had arrived when they might be
easily driven out of Asia, he had made a mistake. The im-
perial power had proved itself strong enough to penetrate
f -- J - ! } ---. §
;
*. *
cil. III.] RESULTS OF THE ROMAN WAR. 267
- - - * *
deeply within his territory, to ravage some of his best prov-
inces, and to threaten his capital.” The grand ideas, with
which he had entered upon the contest had consequently to be
abandoned; and it had to be recognized that the struggle with
Rome was one in which the two parties were very evenly
matched, one in which it was not to be supposed that either
side would very Soon obtain any decided preponderance.
Under these circumstances the grand ideas were quietly
dropped; the army which had been gathered together to en-
force them was allowed to disperse, and was not required
within any given time to reassemble ; it is not unlikely that
(as Niebuhr conjectures”) a peace was made, though whether,
s
Rome ceded any of her territory” by its terms is exceedingly .
doubtful. Probably the general principle of the arrangement
was a return to the status quo ante bellum, or, in other words,
the acceptance by either side, as the true territorial limits ,
between Rome and Persia, of those boundaries which had been
previously held to divide the imperial possessions from the
dominions of the Arsacidae. -
The issue of the struggle was no doubt disappointing to
Artaxerxes; but if, on the one hand, it dispelled some illusions '
and proved to him that the Roman State, though verging to
its decline, nevertheless still possessed a vigor and a life which
he had been far from anticipating, on the other hand it left
him free to concentrate his efforts on the reduction of Armenia,
which was really of more importance to him, from Armenia.
being the great stronghold of the Arsacid power, than the
nominal attachment to the empire of half-a-dozen Roman
provinces. So long as Arsacidae maintained themselves in a
position of independence and substantial power so near the
Persian borders, and in a country of such extent and such
vast natural strength as Armenia, there could not but be a
dánger of reaction, of the nations again reverting to the yoke
whereto they had by long use become accustomed, and of the
star of the Sasanidae paling before that of the former masters
of Asia. It was essential to the consolidation of the new Per-
sian Empire that Armenia should be subjugated, or at any
rate that Arsacidae should cease to govern it; and the fact that
the peace which appears to have been made between Rome
and Persia, A.D. 232, set Artaxerxes at liberty to direct all his .
endeavors to the establishment of such relations between his
own state and Armenia as he deemed required by public policy
and necessary for the Security of his own power, must be re-
º
A.
A
— — —, —i - - * w: * *
f *
268 • THE SEVENTH MOWARCHY, [CH. III.
^. f #
garded as one of paramount importance, and as probably one
of the causes mainly agtuating him in the negotiations and in-
clining him to consent to peace on any fair and equitable terms.
Consequently, the immediate result of hostilities ceasing be-
tween Persia and Rome was their renewal between Persia and
Armenia. The war had indeed, in one sense, never ceased;
^ for Chosroës had been an ally of the Romans during the cam-
paign of Severus,” and had no doubt played a part in the in-
vasion and devastation of Media, which have been described
above.” But, the Romans having withdrawn, he was left
wholly dependent on his own resources; and the entire strength
of Persia was now doubtless brought into the field against him.
Still he defended himself with such success, and caused Arta-
xerxes so much alarm, that after a time that monarch began to
despair of ever conquering his adversary by fair means, and
cast about for Some other mode of accomplishing his purpose.
Summoning an assembly of all the vassal kings, the governors,
and the commandants throughout the empire, he besought
T them to find some cure for the existing distress, at the same
time promising a rich reward to the man who should contrive
an effectual remedy. The second place in the kingdom should
be his; he should have dominion over one half of the Arians;”
nay, he should share the Persian throne with Artaxerxes him-
self, and hold a rank and dignity only slightly inferior. We
are told that these offers prevailed with a noble of the empire,
named Anak,” a man who had Arsacid blood in his veins, and
belonged to that one of the three branches of the old royal
stock which had long been settled at Bactria (Balkh), and that
he was induced thereby to come forward and undertake the
assassination of Chosroës, who was his near relative and would
not be likely to suspect him of an ill intent. Artaxerxes
warmly encouraged him in his design, and in a little time it
was successfully carried out. Anak, with his wife, his chil-
dren, his brother, and a train of attendants, pretended to take
refuge in Armenia from the threatened vengeance of his sov-
ereign, who caused his troops to pursue him, as a rebel and
deserter, to the very borders of Armenia. Unsuspicious of
any evil design, Chosroës received the exiles with favor, dis-
cussed with them his plans for the subjugation of Persia, and,
. having sheltered them during the whole of the autumn and
winter, proposed to them in the spring that they should ac-
company him and take part in the year's campaign.” Anak,
forced by this proposal to precipitate his designs, contrived a
t *
^
ch. III.] "ARMENIA SUBJUGATED. . 269
meeting between himself, his brother, and Chosroes, without
attendants, on the pretext of discussing plans of attack, and,
having thus got the Armenian monarch at a disadvantage,
drew sword upon him, together with his brother, and easily
put him to death. The crime which he had undertaken was
thus accomplished; but he did not live to receive the reward
promised him for it. Armenia rose in arms on learning the
foul deed wrought upon its king; the bridges and the few
practicable outlets by which the capital could be quitted were
occupied by armed men; and the murderers, driven to despe-
ration, lost their lives in an attempt to make their escape by
swimming the river Araxes.” Thus Artaxerxes obtained his
object without having to pay the price that he had agreed
upon; his dreaded rival was removed; Armenia lay at his
mercy; and he had not to weaken his power at home by shar-
ing it with an Arsacid partner. -
The Persian monarch allowed the Armenians no time to
recover from the blow which he had treacherously dealt them.
His armies at once entered their territory” and carried every-
thing before them. Chosroës seems to have had no son of
sufficient age to succeed him, and the defence of the country.
fell upon the satraps, or governors of the several provinces.
These chiefs implored the aid of the Roman emperor,” and re-
ceived a contingent; but neither were their own exertions nor
was the valor of their allies of any avail. Artaxerxes easily
defeated the confederate army, and forced the satraps to take
refuge in Roman territory. Armenia submitted to his arms,
and became an integral portion of his empire.” It probably
did not greatly trouble him that Artavasdes, one of the satraps,
succeeded in carrying off one of the sons of Chosroës, a boy
named Tiridates, whom he conveyed to Rome, and placed un-
der the protection of the reigning emperor.” -
Such were the chief military successes of Artaxerxes. The
greatest of our historians, Gibbon, ventures indeed to assign.
to him, in addition, “some easy victories over the wild Scyth-
ians and the effeminate Indians.” But there is no good
authority for this statement; and on the whole it is unlikely
that he came into contact with either nation. His coins are
not found in Afghanistan;” and it may be doubted whether
he ever made any eastern expedition. His reign was not long;
and it was sufficiently occupied by the Roman and Armenian
wars, and by the greatest of all his works, the reformation of
religion. - -
t e - * A
* * |
270. TIIE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CII. III.
.The religious aspect of the insurrection which transferred
the headship of Western Asia from the Parthians to the
Persians, from Artabanus to Artaxerxes, has been already
noticed;” but we have now to trace, so far as we can, the
steps by which the religious revolution was accomplished, and
the faith of Zoroaster, or what was believed to be such, estab.
lished as the religion of the State throughout the new empire.
Artaxerxes, himself (if we may believe Agathias”) a Magus,
was resolved from the first that, if his efforts to shake off the
Parthian yoke succeeded, he would use his best endeavors to
overthrow the Parthian idolatry and install in its stead the
ancestral religion of the Persians. This religion consisted of a
combination of Dualism with a qualified creature-worship, and
a special reverence for the elements, earth, air, water, and
fire. Zoroastrianism, in the earliest form which is historically
known to us,” postulated two independent and contending
principles—a principle of good, Ahura-Mazda, and a principle
of evil, Angro-Mainyus. These beings, who were coeternal
and coequal, were engaged in a perpetual struggle for su-
premacy; and the world was the battle-field wherein the strife
was carried on. Each had called into existence numerous
inferior beings, through whose agency they waged their
interminable conflict. Ahura-Mazda (Oromazdes, Ormazd)
had created thousands of angelic beings to perform his will
and fight on his side against the Evil One; and Angro-Main-
yus (Arimanius, Ahriman) had equally on his part called into
being thousands of malignant Spirits to be his emissaries in the
world, to do his work, and fight his battles. The greater of
the powers called into being by Ahura-Mazda were proper
objects of the worship of man,” though, of course, his main
worship was to be given to Ahura-Mazda. Angro-Mainyus
was not, to be worshipped, but to be hated and feared. With
this dualistic belief had been combined, at a time not much
later than that of Darius Hystaspis, an entirely separate.
system,” the worship of the elements. Fire, air, earth, and
water were regarded as essentially holy, and to pollute any of
them was a crime. Fire was especially to be held in honor;
and it became an essential part of the Persian religion to main-
tain perpetually upon the fire-altars the sacred flame, supposed
to have been originally kindled from heaven, and to see that
it never went out.” Together with this elemental worship
was introduced into the religion a profound regard for an
order of priests called Magians, who interposed themselves
| ,
*
* º
.#
on. III.] AIRTAXERXES RESTORES ZOROASTRIANISM. 271 . "
between the deity and the worshipper,” and claimed to
possess prophetic powers.” Thigº Magian order was a priest-
caste, and exercised vast influence, being internally organized
into a hierarchy containing many ranks, and claiming a
sanctity far above that of the best laymen. . -
Artaxerxes found the Magian order depressed by the syste-
matic action of the later Parthian princes,” who had practi-
cally fallen away from the Zoroastrian faith and become mere
idolaters. He found the fire-altars in ruins, the sacred flame
extinguished,” the most essential of the Magian ceremonies
and practices disregarded.” Everywhere, except perhaps in
his own province of Persia Proper, he found idolatry estab-
lished. Temples of the sum abounded, where images of Mithra
were the object of worship,” and the Mithraic cult was
carried out with a variety of imposing ceremonies. Similar
temples to the moon existed in many places; and the images
of the Arsacidae were associated with those of the sun and
moon gods in the sanctuaries dedicated to them." The pre-
cepts of Zoroaster were forgotten. The sacred compositions
which bore that Sage's name, and had been handed down from
a remote antiquity, were still indeed preserved, if not in a
written form," yet in the memory of the faithful few who
clung to the old creed; but they had ceased to be regarded as
binding upon their consciences by the great mass of the
Western Asiatics. Western Asia was a Seething-pot, in which
were mixed up a score of contradictory creeds, old and new,
rational and irrational, Sabaism, Magism, Zoroastrianism,
Grecian polytheism, teraphim-worship, Judaism, Chaldee
mysticism, Christianity. Artaxerxes conceived it to be his
mission to evoke order out of this confusion, to establish in
lieu of this extreme diversity an absolute uniformity of re-
ligion. - *
The steps which he took to effect his purpose seem to have
been the following. He put down idolatry by a general
destruction of the images, which he overthrew and broke to
pieces.” He raised the Magian hierarchy to a position of
honor and dignity such as they had scarcely enjoyed even
under the later Achaemenian princes,” securing them in a con-
dition of pecuniary independence by assignments of lands,"
and also by allowing their title to claim from the faithful the
tithe of all their possessions.” He caused the sacred fire to be
rekindled on the altars where it was extinguished,” and
assigned to certain bodies of priests the charge of maintaining
_*
*
* * , *.
{
272 . . THE SEVEWTH MOWARCH Y. ' [CH. III.
the fire in each locality. He then proceeded to collect the sup-
posed precepts of Zoroaster into a volume, in order to estab-
lish a standard of orthodoxy whereto he might require all to .
conform. He found the Zoroastrians themselves divided into
a number of sects.” Among these he established uniformity
by means of a “general council,” which was attended by Magi
from all parts of the empire, and which settled what was to be
regarded as the true Zoroastrian faith. According to the Ori-
ental writers, this was effected in the following way: Forty
thousand, or, according to others, eighty thousand Magi hav-
ing assembled, they were successively reduced by their own
... act to four thousand, to four hundred, to forty, and finally to
seven, the most highly respected for their piety and learning.
Of these seven there was one, a young but holy priest, whom
the universal consent of his brethren recognized as pre-emi-
nent. His name was Ardä-Viraf. “Having passed through
the strictest ablutions, and drunk a powerful opiate, he was
covered with a white linen and laid to sleep. Watched by
seven of the nobles, including the king, he slept for seven days
and nights; and, On his reawaking, the whole nation listened
with believing wonder to his exposition of the faith of Ormazd,
which was carefully written down by an attendant scribe for
the benefit of posterity.””
The result, however brought about, which must always re-
main doubtful, was the authoritative issue of a volume which
-a
w
the learned of Europe have now possessed for some quarter of
a century,” and which has recently been made accessible to
the general reader by the labors of Spiegel.” This work, the
Zendavesta, while it may contain fragments of a very ancient
literature,” took its present shape in the time of Artaxerxes,
and was probably then first collected from the mouths of the
Zoroastrian priests and published by Ardä-Viraf. Certain ad-
ditions may since have been made to it; but we are assured
, that “their number is small,” and that we “have no reason to
doubt that the text of the Avesta, in the days of Ardä-Viraf,
was on the whole exactly the same as at present.” The re-
ligious system of the new Persian monarchy is thus com-
pletely known to us, and will be described minutely in a later
chapter. At present we have to consider, not what the exact
tenets of the Zoroastrians were, but only the mode in which
Artaxerxes imposed them upon his subjects.
The next step, after settling the true text of the sacred vol-
ume, was to agree upon its interpretation. The language of
–
Plate, XX|||.
Wol, Ill.
COIN OF HORNIISDAS IV.
* EARLY COIN OF WARAHRAN VI.
LATE COIN OF WARAHRAN VI.
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RARE COIN OF CHOSRoßs II.
Plate XXIV.
coin of BIRoís or KOBAD II.
COIN OF ARTAXERXES III.
CoIN OF ISD1GERD III.




ch. In ADMINISTRATION OF ARTAXERXES 273
the Avesta, though pure Persian,” was of So archaic a type
that none but the most learned of the Magi understood it;
to the common people, even to the ordinary priest, it was
a dead letter. Artaxerxes seems to have recognized the
necessity of accompanying the Zend text with a translation
and a commentary in the language of his own time, the
Pehlevi or Huzvaresh. Such a translation and commentary
exist; and though in part belonging to later Sassanian times,
they reach back probably in their earlier portions to the era of
Artaxerxes, who may fairly be credited with the desire to make
the sacred book “ understanded of the people.”
Further, it was necessary, in order to secure permanent uni-
formity of belief, to give to the Magian priesthood, the keepers
and interpreters of the sacred book, very extensive powers.
The Magian hierarchy was therefore associated with the mon-
arch in the government and administration of the State. It
was declared that the altar and the throne were inseparable,
and must always sustain each other.” The Magi were made
to form the great council of the nation.” While they lent
their support to the crown, the crown upheld them against all
impugners, and enforced by pains and penalities their deci-
sions. Persecution was adopted and asserted as a principle of
action without any disguise. By an edict of Artaxerxes, all
places of worship were closed except the temples of the fire-
worshippers.” If no violent outbreak of fanaticism followed,
it was because the various Sectaries and Schismatics succumbed
to the decree without resistance. Christian, and Jew, and
Greek, and Parthian, and Arab allowed their sanctuaries to be
closed without striking a blow to prevent it; and the non-
Zoroastrians of the empire, the votaries of foreign religions,
were shortly reckoned at the insignificant number of 80,000. ”
Of the internal administration and government of his ex-
tensive empire by Artaxerxes, but little is known.” That lit-
tle seems, however, to show that while in general type and
character it conformed to the usual Oriential model, in its
practical working it was such as to obtain the approval of the
bulk of his subjects. Artaxerxes governed his provinces
either through native kings, or else through Persian Satraps.”
At the same time, like the Achaemenian monarchs, he kept the
armed force under his own control by the appointment of
“generals” or “commandants” distinct from the satraps.”
Discarding the Parthian plan of intrusting the military de-
fence of the empire and the preservation of domestic order to a.
z
*
274 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. III.'
} §
mere militia, he maintained on a war footing a considerable
force, regularly paid and drilled. “There can be no power,”
he remarked, “without an army, no army without money, no
money without agriculture, and no agriculture without jus-
tice.” To administer strict justice was therefore among his
chief endeavors. Daily reports were made to him of all that
passed not only in his capital, but in every province of his vast
empire; and his knowledge extended even to the private
actions of his subjects.” It was his earnest desire that all
well-deposed persons should feel an absolute assurance of
security with respect to their lives, their property, and their
honor.” At the same time he punished crimes with severity,
and even visited upon entire families the transgression of one
of their members. It is said to have been one of his maxims,
that “kings should never use the sword where the cane would
answer;” ” but, if the Armenian historians are to be trusted,
in practice he certainly did not err on the side of clemeny.”
Artaxerxes was, of course, an absolute monarch, having the
entire power of life or death, and entitled, if he chose, to decide
all matters at his own mere will and pleasure. But, in prac-
tice, he, like most Oriental despots, was wont to summon and
take the advice of counsellors. It is perhaps doubtful whether
any regular “Council of State” existed under him. Such an
institution had prevailed under the Parthians, where the mon-
archs were elected and might be deposed by the Megistanes;”
but there is no evidence that Artaxerxes continued it, or did
more than call on each occasion for the advice of such persons
among his subjects as he thought most capable. In matters
affecting his relations towards foreign powers he consulted
with the subject kings, the satraps, and the generals; * in re-
ligious affairs he no doubt took counsel with the chief Magi.”
The general principles which guided his conduct both in re-
ligious and other matters may perhaps be best gathered from
the words of that “testament,” or “dying speech,” which he
is said to have addressed to his son Sapor. “Never forget,”
*
he said, “that, as a king, you are at once the protector of re-
ligion and of your country. Consider the altar and the throne
as inseparable; they must always sustain each other. A sover-
eign without religion is a tyrant; and a people who have none
may be deemed the most monstrous of all societies. Religion
may exist without a state; but a state cannot exist without
religion; and it is by holy laws that a political association can
alone be bound. You should be to your people an example of
c: nº HIS “TESTAMENT." 275
piety and of virtue, but without pride or ostentation. . . . . . .
Remember, my son, that it is the prosperity or adversity of the
ruler which forms the happiness or misery of his subjects, and
that the fate of the nation depends on the conduct of the in-
dividual who fills the throne. The world is exposed to constant
vicissitudes; learn, therefore, to meet the frowns of fortune
with courage and fortitude, and to receive her smiles with
moderation and wisdom. To sum up all—may your admin-
istration be such as to bring, at a future day, the blessings of
those whom God has confided to our parental care upon both
your memory and mine!” ” -
There is reason to believe that Artaxerxes, some short time
before his death, invested Sapor with the emblems of sover-
eignty, and either associated him in the empire, or, wholly
ceded to him his own place. The Arabian writer, Magoudi,
declares that, sated with glory and with power, he withdrew
altogether from the government, and, making over the ad-
ministration of affairs to his favorite son, devoted himself to
religious contemplation.” Tabari knows nothing of the reli-
{
gious motive, but relates that towards the close of his life Ar-
taxerxes “made Sapor regent, appointed him formally to be
his successor, and with his own hands placed the crown on his
head.” ” [Pl. XII.] These notices would, by themselves, have
been of small importance; but force is lent to them by the facts
that Artaxerxes is found to have placed the effigy of Sapor on
his later coins,” and that in one of his bas-reliefs he seems to
be represented as investing Sapor with the diadem.” This
tablet, which is at Takht-i-Bostan, has been variously ex-
plained,” and, as it is unaccompanied by any inscription, no
certain account can be given of it; but, on the whole the opin-
ion of those most competent to judge seems to be that the in-
tention of the artist was to represent Artaxerxes (who wears
the cap and inflated ball) as handing the diadem to Sapor—
distinguished by the mural crown of his own tablets and
coins"—while Ormazd, marked by his customary baton, and
further indicated by a halo of glory around his head, looks on,
Sanctioning and approving the transaction. A prostrate figure
under the feet of the two Sassanian kings represents either
Artabanus or the extinct Parthian monarchy, probably the
former; while the sunflower upon which Ormazd stands, to-
gether with the rays that stream from his head, denote an in-
t
tention to present him under a Mithraitic aspect, suggestive ,
to the beholder of a real latent identity between the two great
objects of Persian worship.
a
— — — — — w – T f t * * :
276 THE SEVENTH Moyancay. ſon. Im.
The coins of Artaxerxes present five different types.” [Pl.
XI., Fig. 1.] In the earliest his effigy appears on the obverse,'
front-faced, with the simple legend ARTaBSHaTR (Artaxerxes),
or sometimes with the longer one, BaGI ARTaBSHaTR MalkA,
“Divine Artaxerxes, King;” while the reverse bears the profile
of his father, Papak, looking to the left, with the legend BaGI
PAPaKI MalEA, “Divine Papak, King;” or BaRI BaGI PAPaKI
. MaIKA, “Son of Divine Papak, King.” Both heads wear the
ordinary Parthian diadem and tiara; and the head of Arta-
xerxes much resembles that of Volagases V., one of the later
Parthian kings.” The coins of the next period have a head
on one side only. This is in profile, looking to the right, and
bears a highly ornamental tiara, exactly like that of Mithri-
dates I. of Parthia,” the great conqueror. It is usually accom-
panied by the legend MaZDISN BaGI ARTa HSHaTR MalkA (or
MaDKAN. MaIKA) - AIRAN, i.e. “The Ormazd-worshipping Divine
Artaxerxes, King of Iran,” or “King of the Kings of Iran.”
The reverse of these coins bears a fire-altar, with the legend
ARTaFISHaTR NUVAZI, a phrase of doubtful import.” In the
third period, while the reverse remains unchanged, on the ob-
verse the Parthian costume is entirely given up; and the king
takes, instead of the Parthian tiara, a low cap surmounted by
the inflated ball, which thenceforth becomes the almost uni-
versal badge of a Sassanian monarch. The legend is now
longer, being commonly MazBISN. BaGI ARTa HSHaTR MalKAN
MalKA AIRAN MINUCHiTRI MiNYaZDAN, or “The Ormazd-worship-
ping Divine Artaxerxes, King of the Kings of Iran, heaven-
descended of (the race of) the Gods.” The fourth period is
marked by the assumption of the mural crown,” which in the
sculptures of Artaxerxes is given only to Ormazd, but which
was afterwards adopted by Sapor I. and many later kings,”
in combination with the ball, as their usual head-dress. The
legend on these coins remains as in the third period, and the
reverse is likewise unchanged. Finally, there are a few coins
i of Artaxerxes, belonging to the very close of his reign, where
he is represented with the tiara of the third period, looking to
the right; while in front of him, and looking towards him, is
another profile, that of a boy, in whom numismatists recognize
his eldest son and successor, Sapor.” [Pl. XV., Fig. 1].
v It is remarkable that with the accession of Artaxerxes there
is at once a revival of art. Art had sunk under the Parthians,
despite their Grecian leanings, to the lowest ebb which it had
known in Western Asia since the accession of ASShur-izir-pal
— — — . ,- r - – , \
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.*
- \ . . . .
CH. III.] IBASIS OF THE COINAGE. 277
a' A - ,w
to the throne of Assyria (B.C. 886). Parthian attempts at art
were few and far between, and when made were unhappy, not
to say ridiculous.” The coins of Artaxerxes, compared with
those of the later Parthian monarchs, show at once a renais-
sance.” The head is well cut; the features have individuality
and expression; the epigraph is sufficiently legible. Still more
is his sculpture calculated to surprise us. Artaxerxes repre-
sents himself as receiving the Persian diadem from the hands
of Ormazd; both he and the god are mounted upon chargers of
a stout breed, which are spiritedly portrayed; Artabanus lies
prostrate under the feet of the king's steed, while under those
of the deity's we observe the form of Ahriman, also prostrate,
f
|
and indeed seemingly dead.” Though the tablet has not .
really any great artistic merit, it is far better than anything
that remains to us of the Parthians; it has energy and vigor;
the physiognomies are carefully rendered; and the only fla-
grant fault is a certain over-robustness in the figures, which
has an effect that is not altogether pleasing. Still, we cannot
but see in the new Persian art—even at its very beginning—a
movement towards life after a long period of stagnation; an
evidence of that general stir of mind which the downfall of
Tartar oppression rendered possible; a token that Aryan intel-
ligence was beginning to recover and reassert itself in all the
various fields in which it had formerly won its triumphs.”
The coinage of Artaxerxes, and of the other Sassanian mon-
archs, is based, in part upon Roman, in part upon Parthian,
models. The Roman aureus furnishes the type which is repro-
duced in the Sassanian gold coins,” while the silver coins fol-
low the standard long established in Western Asia, first under
the Seleucid, and then under the Arsacid princes. This stand-
ard is based upon the Attic drachm, which was adopted by
Alexander as the basis of his monetary system. The curious
occurrence of a completely different standard for gold and sil-
ver in Persia during this period is accounted for by the cir-
cumstances of the time at which the coinage took its rise.
The Arsacidae had employed no gold coins,” but had been
content with a silver currency; any gold coin that may have
been in use among their subjects for purposes of trade during
the continuance of their empire must have been foreign money
—Roman, Bactrian, or Indian;” but the quantity had proba-
bly for the most part been very small. But, about ten years
before the accession of Artaxerxes there had been a sudden
influx into Western Asia of Roman gold, in consequence of the
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278 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. ſch. m.
terms of the treaty concluded between Artabanus and Macri.
nus (A.D. 217), whereby Rome undertook to pay to Parthia an
indemnity of above a million and a half of our money.” It is
probable that the payment was mostly made in awrei. Arta-
xerxes thus found current in the countries, which he overran
and formed into an empire, two coinages—a gold and a silver
—coming from different Sources and possessing no common
measure. It was simpler and easier to retain what existed,
and what had sufficiently adjusted itself through the working
of commercial needs, than to invent something new; and
hence the anomalous character of the New Persian monetary
system. -
The remarkable bas-relief of Artaxerxes described above.”
and figured below in the chapter on the Art of the Sassanians,
z
is accompanied by a bilingual inscription,” or perhaps we
should say by two bilingual inscriptions, which possess much
antiquarian and some historic interest. The longer of the two
runs as follows:– “Pathkar zani mazdism bagi Artahshatr,
malkan malka Airan, minuchitri min Yöztan, bari bagi Pap-
aki malka;” while the Greek version of it is—
TOYToroñPoconoMMACAAcNoy
6GOYAPTA::AF)Y#ACHAeLucBACIAEA)N
APIANtonFKreNoyceetonylox
eeOYTIATIAKGYBAC:Aetºlc.
The shorter inscription runs—“Pathkar zon? Ahuramazda
' bagi, the Greek being
TorroTonPoctorionAIoceeoy.
The inscriptions are interesting, first, as proving the continued
use of the Greek character and language by a dynasty that
was intensely national and that wished to drive the Greeks
out of Asia. Secondly, they are interesting as showing the
character of the native language, and letters, employed by the
Persians, when they came suddenly into notice as the ruling
people of Western Asia. Thirdly, they have an historic inter-
est in what they tell us of the relationship of Artaxerxes to
Babek (Papak), of the rank of Babek, and of the religious
sympathies of the Sassanians. In this last respect they do in-
deed, in themselves, little but confirm the evidence of the coins
$ —r—
* *
* * *.
CH. IV.] REIGN OF SAPOR I. 279
\ #
\\
and the general voice of antiquity on the subject. Coupled,
however, with the reliefs to which they are appended, they do
more. They prove to us that the Persians of the earliest Sas-
sanian times were not averse to exhibiting the great person-
ages of their theology in Sculptured forms; nay, they reveal
to us the actual forms then considered appropriate to Ahura-
Mazda (Ormazd) and Angro-Mainyus (Ahriman); for we can
scarcely be mistaken in regarding the prostrate figure under
the hoofs of Ahura-Mazda's steed as the antagonist Spirit of
Evil.” Finally, the inscriptions show that, from the com-
mencement of their sovereignty, the Sassanian princes claimed
for themselves a qualified divinity, assuming the title of BAG,”
or ALHA,” “god,” and taking, in the Greek version of their
legends, the correspondent epithet of 6 EO2. . *
CHAPTER IV.
*
Death of Artaaceraces I. and Accession of Sapor I. War of
Sapor with Manizen. His first War with Rome. Invasion
of Mesopotamia, A.D. 241. Occupation of Antioch. Eacpe-
dition of Gordian to the East. Recovery by Rome of her
lost Territory. Peace made between Rome and Persia.
Obscure Interval. Second War with Rome. Mesopotamia
again invaded, A.D. 258. Valerian takes the Command in
the East. Struggle between him and Sapor. Defeat and
Capture of Valerian, A.D. 260. Sapor invests Miriades with
the Purple. He takes Syria and Southern Cappadocia, but
ts shortly afterwards attacked by Odenathus. Successes of
Odenathus. Treatment of Valerian. Further successes of
Odenathus. Period of Tranquillity. Great Works of
Sapor. His Sculptures. His Dyke. His Inscriptions.
His Coins. . His Religion. Religious Condition of the East
fin his Time. Rise into Notice of Mani. His Rejection by
Sapor. Sapor's Death. His Character.
Awabé * * * * * t 3 g * y * * * * * *
tabéxetat rô kpáros Xatrúpms ékelvos é Évayéotaros, kai Šteflio trpos ré, évi rpuékovra rows
Af
trávtas Švavrous, traetata éga tows Pouaiovs Avuatváuevos.-AGATHIAs, iv. p. 134, B.
ARTAXERXES appears to have died in A.D. 240.” He was suc-
Ceeded by his son, Shahpuhri,” or Sapor, the first Sassanian
prince of that name. According to the Persian historians, the
* ,
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280 'THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. "
• *.
[CH. Iv.
mother of Sapor was a daughter of the last Parthian king, Ar-
tabanus,” whom Artaxerxes had taken to wife after his con-
quest of her father. But the facts known of Sapor throw doubt
on this story,” which has too many parallels in Oriental romance
to claim implicit credence." Nothing authentic has come down
to us respecting Sapor during his father's lifetime;" but from
w
the moment that he mounted the throne, we find him engaged
in a series of wars, which show him to have been of a most
active and energetic character. Armenia, which Artaxerxes
had subjected, attempted (it would seem) to regain its independ-
ence at the commencement of the new reign; but Sapor easily
crushed the nascent insurrection," and the Armenians made no
further effort to free themselves till several years after his
death. Contemporaneously with this revolt in the mountain
region of the north, a danger showed itself in the plain country
of the south, where Manizen,” king of Hatra, or El Hadhr, not
only declared himself independent, but assumed dominion over
the entire tract between the Euphrates and the Tigris, the
Jezireh of the Arabian geographers. The strength of Hatra
was great, as had been proved by Trajan and Severus;" its
thick walls and valiant inhabitants would probably have defied
every attempt of the Persian prince to make himself master of
it by force. He therefore condescended to stratagem. Mani-
Zen had a daughter who cherished ambitious views. On ob-
taining a promise from Sapor that if she gave Hatra into his
power he would make her his queen, this unnatural child
turned against her father, betrayed him into Sapor's hands, and
thus brought the war to an end. Sapor recovered his lost ter-
ritory; but he did not fulfil his bargain. Instead of marrying
the traitress, he handed her over to an executioner, to receive
the death that she had deserved, though scarcely at his hands."
Encouraged by his success in these two lesser contests,
Sapor resolved (apparently in A.D. 241") to resume the bold
projects of his father, and engage in a great war with Rome.
The confusion and troubles which afflicted the Roman Empire
at this time were such as might well give him hopes of obtain-
ing a decided advantage. Alexander, his father's adversary,
had been murdered in A.D. 235 by Maximin,” who from the
condition of a Thracian peasant had risen into the higher ranks
of the army. The upstart had ruled like the savage that he
was; and, after three years of misery, the whole Roman world
had risen against him. Two emperors had been proclaimed in
Africa;” on their fall, two others had been elected by the Sen-
\ *
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3. * y
CH. IV.] S.A POR IN VADES SYRIA. * 281
ate,” a third, a mere boy,” had been added at the demand of
the Roman populace. All the pretenders except the last had
met with violent deaths; and, after the shocks of a year un-
paralleled since A.D. 69, the administration of the greatest king-
dom in the world was in the hands of a youth of fifteen. Sa-
por, no doubt, thought he saw in this condition of things an
opportunity that he ought not to miss, and rapidly matured his
plans lest the favorable moment should pass away. +
Crossing the middle Tigris into Mesopotamia, the bands of
Sapor first attacked the important city of Nisibis. Nisibis, at
this time a Roman colony,” was strongly situated on the out-
skirts of the mountain range which traverses Northern Meso-
potamia between the 37th and 38th parallels. The place was
well fortified and well defended; it offered a prolonged resist-
ance; but at last the walls were breached, and it was forced to
yield itself.” The advance was then made along the southern
flank of the mountains, by Carrhae (Harran) and Edessa to the
Euphrates, which was probably reached in the neighborhood
of Birehjik. The hordes then poured into Syria, and, spread-
ing themselves over that fertile region, surprised and took the
metropolis of the Roman East, the rich and luxurious city of
Antioch.” But meantime the Romans had shown a spirit
which had not been expected from them, Gordian, young as
he was, had quitted Rome and marched through Moesia and
Thrace into Asia,” accompanied by a formidable army, and by
at least one good general. Timesitheus,” whose daughter Gor-
dian had recently married, though his life had hitherto been
that of a civilian,” exhibited, on his elevation to the dignity of
Praetorian prefect, considerable military ability. The army,
nominally commanded by Gordian, really acted under his
orders. With it Timesitheus attacked and beat the bands of
Sapor in a number of engagements,” recovered Antioch, crossed .
the Euphrates, retook Carrhae, defeated the Persian monarch
in a pitched battle near Resaina” (Ras-el-Ain), recovered Nisi-
bis, and once more planted the Roman standards on the banks
of the Tigris. Sapor hastily evacuated most of his conquests,”
and retired first across the Euphrates and then across the more
eastern river; while the Romans advanced as he retreated,
placed garrisons in the various Mesopotamian towns, and even
threatened the great city of Ctesiphon.” Gordian was confident
that his general would gain further triumphs, and wrote to the
Senate to that effect; but either disease or the arts of a rival
cut short the career of the victor,” and from the time of his
! ſt
*
$.”
282 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. Iv.
death, the Romans ceased to be successful. The legions had, it
would seem, invaded Southern Mesopotamia” when the Prae-
torian prefect who had succeeded Timesitheus brought them
intentionally into difficulties by his mismanagement of the
commissariat;” and at last retreat was determined on. The
young emperor was approaching the Khabour, and had almost
reached his own frontier, when the discontent of the army, fo-
mented by the prefect, Philip, came to a head. Gordian was
murdered at a place called Zaitha, about twenty miles south of
Circesium, and was buried where he fell, the Soldiers raising a
tumulus in his honor. His successor, Philip, was glad to make
peace on any tolerable terms with the Persians; he felt himself
insecure upon his throne, and was anxious to obtain the Sen-
ate's sanction of his usurpation. He therefore quitted the East
in A.D. 244, having concluded a treaty with Sapor, by which
Armenia seems to have been left to the Persians, while Meso-
potamia returned to its old condition of a Roman province.”
The peace made between Philip and Sapor was followed by
an interval of fourteen years,” during which Scarcely anything
is known of the condition of Persia. We may suspect that
troubles in the north-east of his empire occupied Sapor during
this period, for at the end of it we find Bactria, which was
certainly subject to Persia during the earlier years of the
monarchy,” occupying an independent position, and even as-
suming an attitude of hostility towards the Persian monarch.”
Bactria had, from a remote antiquity, claims to pre-eminence'
among the Aryan nations.” She was more than once inclined
to revolt from the Achaemenidae;” and during the later Par-
thian period she had enjoyed a sort of semi-independence.” It
would seem that she now succeeded in detaching herself alto-
gether from her Southern neighbor, and becoming a distinct
and separate power. To strengthen her position she entered
into relations with Rome, which gladly welcomed any ad-
hesions to her cause in this remote region.
Sapor's second war with Rome was, like his first, provoked
by himself. After concluding his peace with Philip, he had
seen the Roman world governed successively by six weak em-
perors,” of whom four had died violent deaths, while at the
same time there had been a continued series of attacks upon
the northern frontiers of the empire by Alemanni, Goths, and
Franks, who had ravaged at their will a number of the finest
provinces, and threatened the absolute destruction of the great
monarchy of the West.” It was natural that the chief king-
\
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* i-
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* #
ch. Iv.] SECOND WAR OF SAPOR WITH ROME. . .283
dom of Western Asia should note these events, and should seek
to promote its own interests by taking advantage of the cir-
cumstances of the time. Sapor, in A.D. 258, determined on a
fresh invasion of the Roman provinces, and, once more enter-
ing Mesopotamia, carried all before him, became master of
Nisibis, Carrhae, and Edessa, and, crossing the Euphrates, sur-
prised Antioch, which was wrapped in the enjoyment of
theatrical and other representations, and only knew its fate on
the exclamation of a couple of actors “that the Persians were
in possession of the town.” ” The aged emperor, Valerian,
hastened to the protection of his more eastern territories, and
at first gained some successes, retaking Antioch, and making
that city his headquarters during his stay in the East.” But,
§
after this, the tide turned. Valerian entrusted the whole con- .
duct of the war to Macrianus, his Praetorian prefect, whose
talents he admired, and of whose fidelity he did not entertain
a suspicion." Macrianus, however, aspired to the empire, and
intentionally brought Valerian into difficulties,” in the hope
of disgracing or removing him. His tactics were successful.
The Roman army in Mesopotamia was betrayed into a situation
whence escape was impossible, and where its capitulation was
only a question of time. A bold attempt made to force a way
through the enemy's lines failed utterly,” after which famine
and pestilence began to do their work. In vain did the aged
emperor send envoys to propose a peace, and offer to purchase
escape by the payment of an immense sum in gold.” Sapor,
confident of victory, refused the overture, and, waiting
patiently till his adversary was at the last gasp, invited him to
a conference, and then treacherously seized his person.“ The
army surrendered or dispersed.” Macrianus, the Praetorian
prefect, shortly assumed the title of emperor, and marched
against Gallienus, the son and colleague of Valerian, who had
been left to direct affairs in the West. But another rival '
started up in the East. Sapor conceived the idea of complicat- '
ing the Roman affairs by himself putting forward a pretender;
and an obscure citizen of Antioch, a certain Miriades or Cyri-
ades," a refugee in his camp, was invested with the purple, and
assumed the title of Caesar.” [Pl. XIII.]
The blow struck at Edessa laid the whole of Roman Asia
Open to attack, and the Persian monarch was not slow to seize
the occasion. His troops crossed the Euphrates in force, and,
marching on Antioch, once more captured that unfortunate
town, from which the more prudent citizens had withdrawn,
f
, 2.
— — ,— & ar * *, vº
284 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. Iv.
* * A t *
but where the bulk of the people, not displeased at the turn of
affairs, remained and welcomed the conqueror.” Miriades was
installed in power, while Sapor himself, at the head of his irre-
sistible squadrons, pressed forward, bursting “like a mountain
torrent” into Cilicia and thence into Cappadocia. Tarsus, the
birthplace of St. Paul, at once a famous seat of learning and a
great emporium of commerce, fell; Cilicia Campestris was
overrun; and the passes of Taurus, deserted or weakly de-
fended by the Romans, came into Sapor's hands. Penetrating
through them and entering the champaign country beyond,
his bands soon formed the siege of Caesarea Mazaca, the great-
est city of these parts, estimated at this time to have contained
a population of four hundred thousand souls. Demosthenes,
the governor of Caesarea, defended it bravely, and, had force
only been used against him, might have prevailed; but Sapor
found friends within the walls, and by their help made himself
master of the place, while its bold defender was obliged to con-
tent himself with escaping by cutting his way through the
victorious host." All Asia Minor now seemed open to the con-
queror; and it is difficult to understand why he did not at any
rate attempt a permanent occupation of the territory which he
had so easily overrun. But it seems certain that he entertained
no such idea." Devastation and plunder, revenge and gain,
not permanent conquest, were his objects; and hence his course
was everywhere marked by ruin and carnage, by smoking
towns, ravaged fields, and heaps of slain. His cruelties have
no doubt been exaggerated; but when we hear that he filled
the ravines and valleys of Cappadocia with dead bodies, and
so led his cavalry across them;” that he depopulated Antioch,
killing or carrying off into slavery almost the whole popula-
tion; that he suffered his prisoners in many cases to perish of
*~,
hunger, and that he drove them to water once a day like
beasts,” we may be sure that the guise in which he showed
himself to the Romans was that of a merciless scourge—an
avenger bent on spreading the terror of his name—not of one
who really sought to enlarge the limits of his empire.
During the whole course of this plundering expedition, until
the retreat began, we bear but of one check that the bands of
Sapor received. It had been determined to attack Emesa (now
Hems), one of the most important of the Syrian towns, where
the temple of Venus was known to contain a vast treasure.
The invaders approached, scarcely expecting to be resisted; but
the high priest of the temple, having collected a large body of
—rs. — — — — —- - T, T * > ºr *
$ *
*
*
peasants, appeared, in his Sacerdotal robes, at the head of a
fanatic multitude armed with slings, and succeeded in beating
off the assailants.” Emesa, its temple, and its treasure, escaped
the rapacity of the Persians; and an example of resistance was
set, which was not perhaps without important consequences.
For it seems certain that the return of Sapor across the Eu-
phrates was not effected without considerable loss and difficul-,
ty. On his advance into Syria he had received an embassy from
a certain Odenathus, a Syrian or Arab chief, who occupied a
position of semi-independence at Palmyra, which, through the
advantages of its situation, had lately become a flourishing
commercial town. Odenathus Sent a long train of camels laden
with gifts, consisting in part of rare and precious merchandise,
to the Persian monarch, begging him to accept them, and claim- “
ing his favorable regard on the ground that he had hitherto re-
frained from all acts of hostility against the Persians. It ap-
pears that Sapor took offence at the tone of the communication,
which was not sufficiently humble to please him. Tearing the
letter to fragments and trampling it beneath his feet, he ex-
claimed—“Who is this Odenathus, and of what country, that
he ventures thus to address his lord 2 . Let him now, if he
would lighten his punishment, come here and fall prostrate be-
fore me with his hands tied behind his back. Should he refuse, .
let him be well assured that I will destroy himself, his race, and
his land.” At the same time he ordered his servants to cast
the costly presents of the Palmyrene prince into the Eu-
phrates.” - * ~,
This arrogant and offensive behavior naturally turned the
willing friend into an enemy." Odenathus, finding himself
forced into a hostile position, took arms and watched his op-
portunity. So long as Sapor continued to advance, he kept
aloof. As soon, however, as the retreat commenced, and the
Persian army, encumbered with its spoil and captives, pro-
ceeded to make its way back slowly and painfully to the Eu-
phrates, Odenathus, who had collected a large force, in part
from the Syrian villages," in part from the wild tribes of Ara-
bia,” made his appearance in the field. His light and agile horse-
men hovered about the Persian host, cut off their stragglers,
made prize of much of their spoil, and even captured a portion of
the seraglio of the Great King.” The harassed troops were glad
when they had placed the Euphrates between themselves and
their pursuer, and congratulated each other on their escape.”
So much had they suffered, and so little did they feel equal to
ch, wit SAPor ATTACKED BY ODENATIUS. 285
t
— — — — . -
- #
286 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. . . [CH. Iv.
* f
' further conflicts, that on their march through Mesopotamia
they consented to purchase the neutrality of the people of Edessa
by making over to them all the coined money that they had
carried off in their Syrian raid.” After this it would seem that
the retreat was unmolested, and Sapor succeeded in conveying
the greater part of his army, together with his illustrious pris-
oner, to his own country. .
With regard to the treatment that Valerian received at the
hands of his conqueror, it is difficult to form a decided opinion.
The writers nearest to the time speak vaguely and moderately,
merely telling us that he grew old in his captivity,” and was
kept in the condition of a slave.". It is reserved for authors of
the next generation" to inform us that he was exposed to the
Tconstant gaze of the multitude, fettered, but clad in the im-
perial purple;" and that Sapor, whenever he mounted on horse-
back, placed his foot upon his prisoner's neck." Some add
that, when the unhappy captive died, about the year A.D. 265
or 266, his body was flayed, and the skin inflated and hung up
to view in one of the most frequented temples of Persia, where
it was seen by Roman envoys on their visits to the Great King's
Court.”
It is impossible to deny that Oriental barbarism may con-
ceivably have gone to these lengths; and it is in favor of the
truth of the details that Roman vanity would naturally have
been opposed to their invention. But, on the other hand, we
have to remember that in the East the person of a king is
generally regarded as sacred, and that self-interest restrains
the conquering monarch from dishonoring one of his own class.
We have also to give due weight to the fact that the earlier
authorities are silent with respect to any such atrocities, and
that they are first related half a century after the time when
they are said to have occurred. Under these circumstances
the scepticism of Gibbon with respect to them” is perhaps more
worthy of commendation than the ready faith of a recent
French Writer.”
It may be added that Oriental monarchs, when they are
cruel, do not show themselves ashamed of their cruelties, but
usually relate them openly in their inscriptions, or represent
them in their bas-reliefs.” The remains ascribed on good
grounds to Sapor do not, however, contain anything confirma-
tory of the stories which we are considering. Valerian is rep-
resented on them in a humble attitude,” but not fettered,” and
never in the posture of extreme degradation commonly associ.
—s— g - - 3r * * i
º - |
ch, rv.] ‘ ODENATHUS ATTACKS CTESIPHON. . 287
ated with his name. He bends his knee, as no doubt he would
be required to do, on being brought into the Great King's
presence; but otherwise he does not appear to be subjected to
any indignity. It seems thus to be on the whole most proba-
ble that the Roman emperor was not more severely treated than
the generalty of captive princes, and that Sapor has been un-
justly taxed with abusing the rights of conquest.”
The hostile feeling of Odenathus against Sapor did not cease
with the retreat of the latter across the Euphrates. The
Palmyrene prince was bent on taking advantage of the gen-
eral confusion of the times to carve out for himself a consider-
able kingdom, of which Palmyra should be the capital. Syria
and Palestine on the one hand, Mesopotamia on the other, were
the provinces that lay most conveniently near to him, and “.
that he especially coveted. But Mesopotamia had remained in
the possession of the Persians as the prize of their victory over
Valerian, and could only be obtained by wresting it from the
hands into which it had fallen. Odenathus did not shrink
from this contest. It is had been with some reason conjec-
tured” that Sapor must have been at this time occupied with
troubles which had broken out on the eastern side of his em-
pire. At any rate, it appears that Odenathus, after a short
contest with Macrianus and his son, Quietus,” turned his arms
once more, about A.D. 263, against the Persians, crossed the
Euphrates into Mesopotamia, took Carrhae and Nisibis, de-
feated Sapor and some of his sons in a battle," and drove the
entire Persian host in confusion to the gates of Ctesiphon. He
even ventured to form the siege of that city;” but it was not
long before effectual relief arrived; from all the provinces
flocked in contingents for the defence of the Western capital;
several engagements were fought, in some of which Odenathus
was defeated;” and at last he found himself involved in diffi- *
culties through his ignorance of the localities,” and so thought
it best to retire. Apparently his retreat was undisturbed; he
succeeded in carrying off his booty and his prisoners, among
whom were several satraps,” and he retained possession of
Mesopotamia, which continued to form a part of the Palmy-
rene kingdom until the capture of Zenobia by Aurelian (A.D.
273).
The successes of Odenathus in A.D. 263 were followed by a
period of comparative tranquillity. That ambitious prince,
Seems to have been content with ruling from the Tigris to the
Mediterranean, and with the titles of “Augustus,” which he
#
\
*
| *: T T T – – – ºr – – A –r – —
*g
sº a -- *
288 THE SEVENTH MOMARCHY. [CH. Iv.
received from the Roman emperor, Gallienus,” and “king of
kings,” which he assumed upon his coins.” . He did not press
further upon Sapor; nor did the Roman emperor make any
serious attempt to recover his father's person or revenge his
defeat upon the Persians. An expedition which he sent out to
the East, professedly with this object, in the year A.D. 267,
failed utterly, its commander, Heraclianus, being completely
defeated by Zenobia, the widow and successor of Odenathus.”
Odenathus himself was murdered by a kinsman three or four
years after his great successes; and, though Zenobia ruled his
kingdom almost with a man's vigor,” the removal of his
powerful adversary must have been felt as a relief by the
Persian monarch. It is evident, too, that from the time of
the accession of Zenobia, the relations between Rome and
Palmyra had become unfriendly;” the old empire grew jealous
of the new kingdom which had sprung up upon its borders;
and the effect of this jealousy, while it lasted, was to secure
Persia from any attack on the part of either. *
It appears that Sapor, relieved from any further necessity
of defending his empire in arms, employed the remaining years
of his life in the construction of great works, and especially
s in the erection and ornamentation of a new capital. The ruins
//
*
of Shahpur, which still exist near Kazerun, in the province of
Fars,” commemorate the name, and afford some indication of
the grandeur, of the second Persian monarch. Besides re-
mains of buildings, they comprise a number of bas-reliefs and
rock inscriptions, some of which were beyond a doubt set up
by Sapor I.” In one of the most remarkable the Persian mon-
arch is represented on horseback, wearing the crown usual
upon his coins, and holding by the hand a tunicked figure,
probably Miriades, whom he is presenting to the captured
Romans as their Sovereign. Foremost to do him homage is
the kneeling figure of a chieftain, probably Valerian, behind
, whom are arranged in a double line seventeen persons, repre-
}
senting appasently the different corps of the Roman army.
} [Pl. XIV.] All these persons are on foot, while in contrast
with them are arranged behind Saporten guards on horseback,
who represent his irresistible cavalry.” Another bas-relief at
the same place” gives us a general view of the triumph of
Sapor on his return to Persia with his illustrious prisoner.
Here fifty-seven guards are ranged behind him, while in front
are thirty-three tribute-bearers, having with them an elephant
and a chariot. In the centre is a group of seven figures, com-
Vol Ill. Plate. XXV.
:
---
-
~
-
i
GROUND PLAN of THE SERBISTAN PALACE (after Flandin).
N.B.-The dimensions are given in English yards.
A A A Porches. C C Pillared Halls.
B B Domed Halls. ID Court.
FRONT WIEw of SE3b1stAN PALACE, RESTORED (after Flandin).
–


Plate XXVI.
Z
%iº
GROUND PLAN. of THE PALACE AT FIRUzABAD (after Flandin).
N.B.-The dimensions are in English yards.
Vol.

r • & 2, v
CH. IV.1 ° IIIS INSCRIPTIONS. . - 2S9
prising Sapor, , who is on horseback in his usual costume;
Valerian, who is under the horse's feet; Miriades, who stands
by Sapor's side; three principal tribute-bearers in front of the
main figure; and a Victory which floats in the sky. .
Anothér important work, assigned by tradition to Sapor I.,
is the great dyke at Shuster. This is a dam across the river
Earun, formed of cut stones, cemented by lime, and fastened
together by clamps of iron; it is twenty feet broad, and no less
than twelve hundred feet in length. The whole is a solid mass
excepting in the centre, where two small arches have been con-
structed for the purpose of allowing a part of the stream to
flow in its natural bed. The greater portion of the water is
directed eastward into a canal cut for it; and the town of
Shuster is thus defended on both sides by a water barrier,
whereby the position becomes one of great strength.” Tradi-
tion says that Sapor used his power over Valerian to obtain
Roman engineers for this work;” and the great dam is still
known as the Bund-i-Kaisar,” or “dam of Caesar,” to the in-
habitants of the neighboring country.
Besides his works at Shahpur and Shuster, Sapor set up
memorials of himself at Haji-abad, Nakhsh-i-Rajab, and Nakhsh-
i-Rustam, near Persepolis, at Darabgerd in South-eastern
Persia, and elsewhere; most of which still exist and have been
described by various travellers.” At Nakhsh-i-Rustam Vale-
rian is seen making his submission in one tablet,” while an-
other exhibits the glories of Sapor's court.” The sculptures are
in some instances accompanied by inscriptions. One of these
is, like those of Artaxerxes, bilingual, Greek and Persian. ,
The Greek inscription runs as follows: g
Ton PocoſionToy TomacAACNoyeeOY
cAntoPOYBActaetocBActaetowARIANtoN
KAIANAPLANtonekrenoyceetoxylox
MACAAcNoyeeOYAPTAEAPOYBActaetºo
BAciaewNAPIANtvNekreNOYcestºs
ekronoyeeoyrianAKOYBAClaetºc
Its Persian transcript is read thus: “Pathkar (?) zant maz-
dism bag Shahpuhri, malkan malka Airam ve Amiran minu-
chitri min yaztan, bari mazdish bag Artahshetr malkan malka
N
Y
— — — - - - T t;
\
290 . . THE SEVENTH MOWAIRCH Y. [CH. Iv.
Airan, minuchitri min yaztan, napi bag Papaki malka.”
In the main, Sapor, it will be seen, follows the phrases of his
father Artaxerxes; but he claims a wider dominion. Arta-
xerxes is content to rule over Ariana (or Iran) only; his son
calls himself lord both of the Arians and the non-Arians, or of
Iran and Turan. We may conclude from this as probable that
he held some Scythic tribes under his sway, probably in
Segestan, or Seistan, the country south and east of the Hamoon,
zº
or lake in which the Helmend is swallowed up. Scythians had
been settled in these parts, and in portions of Afghanistan and
India, since the great invasion of the Yue-chi,” about B.C. 200;
and it is not unlikely that Some of them may have passed
under the Persian rule during the reign of Sapor, but we have
no particulars of these conquests. - -
Sapor's coins resemble those of Artaxerxes in general type,”
but may be distinguished from them, first, by the head-dress,
which is either a cap terminating in the head of an eagle, or
else a mural crown surmounted by an inflated ball; and,
secondly, by the emblem on the reverse, which is almost
always a fire-altar between two supporters.” [Pl. XV., Fig. 2.]
The ordinary legend on the coins is “Mazdism bag Shahpuhri,
malkan malka Airan, minuchitri minyazdan,” on the obverse;
and on the reverse “Shahpuhri muvazi.””
-It appears from these legends, and from the inscription above
given, that Sapor was, like his father, a zealous Zoroastrian.
His faith was exposed to considerable trial. Never was there
a time of greater religious ferment in the East, or a crisis which
more shook men's belief in ancestral creeds. The absurd
idolatry which had generally prevailed through Western Asia
for two thousand years—a nature-worship which gave the
sanction of religion to the gratification of men's lowest pro-
pensities—was shaken to its foundation; and everywhere men
were striving after Something higher, nobler, and truer than
had satisfied previous generations for twenty centuries. The
Sudden revivification of Zoroastrianism, after it had been de-
pressed and almost forgotten for five hundred years, was one
result of this stir of men's minds. Another result was the
rapid progress of Christianity, which in the course of the third
century overspread large portions of the East, rooting itself
with great firmness in Armenia, and obtaining a hold to some
extent on Babylonia, Bactria, and perhaps even on India.”
Judaism, also, which had long had a footing in Mesopotamia,
and which after the time of Hadrian may be regarded as hav-
. *
* *
CH. IV.] RELIGIOUS STIR-RISE OF MANES. 291 ,
ing its headquarters at Babylon–Judaism itself, usually so
immovable, at this time showed signs of life and change, taking
something like a new form in the schools wherein was com-
piled the vast and strange work known as “the Babylonian
Talmud.””
Amid the strife and jar of so many conflicting systems, each
having a root in the past, and each able to appeal with more
or less of force to noble examples of virtue and constancy
among its professors in the present, we cannot be surprised that
in some minds the idea grew up that, while all the systems pos-
sessed some truth, no one of them was perfect or indeed much
superior to its fellows. Eclectic or syncretic views are always
congenial to some intellects; and in times when religious
thought is deeply stirred, and antagonistic creeds are brought
into direct collision, the amiable feeling of a desire for peace
comes in to strengthen the inclination for reconciling opponents
by means of a fusion, and producing harmony by a happy
combination of discords. It was in Persia, and in the reign of
Sapor, that one of the most remarkable of these well-meaning’
attempts at fusion and reconciliation that the whole of history
can show was made, and with results which ought to be a lasting
warning to the apostles of comprehension. A certain Mani (or
Manes, as the ecclesiastical writers call him *), born in Persia
about A.D. 240, “grew to manhood under Sapor, exposed to the
various religious influences of which we have spoken. With a
mind free from prejudice and open to conviction, he studied
the various systems of belief which he found established in
Western Asia—the Cabalism of the Babylonian Jews, the
Dualism of the Magi, the mysterious doctrines of the Chris-
tians, and even .the Buddhism of India.” At first he inclined
§
to Christianity, and is said to have been admitted to priest's
Orders and to have ministered to a congregation; ” but after a
time he thought that he saw his way to the formation of a new
Creed, which should combine all that was best in the religious
Systems which he was acquainted with, and omit what was
Superfluous or objectionable. He adopted the Dualism of the
Zoroastrians, the metempsychosis of India, the angelism and
demonism of the Talmud, and the Trinitarianism of the Gospel
of Christ. Christ himself he identified with Mithra, and gave
Him his dwelling in the Sun. He assumed to be the Paraclete
promised by Christ, who should guide men into all truth, and
claimed that his “Ertang,” a sacred book illustrated by pic-
tures of his own painting, should supersede the New Testa-
*
* ty
sº
*
~) * ! ~ * -
292 * THE SEVENTH MONARCH Z. [CH. Iv.
ment.” Such pretensions were not likely to be tolerated by
the Christian community; and Manes had not put them for-
ward very long when he was expelled from the church" and
forced to carry his teaching elsewhere. Under these circum-
stances he is said to have addressed himself to Sapor, who was
at first inclined to show.him some favor;” but when he found
out what the doctrines of the new teacher actually were, his
feelings underwent a change, and Manes, proscribed, or at any
rate threatened with penalties, had to retire into a foreign
country.” .
The Zoroastrian faith was thus maintained in its purity by
the Persian monarch, who did not allow himself to be imposed
upon by the specious eloquence of the new teacher, but ulti-
$ mately rejected the strange amalgamation that was offered to
his acceptance. It is scarcely to be regretted that he so deter-
mined. Though the morality of the Manichees was pure,” and
though their religion is regarded by some as a sort of Chris.
tianity, there were but few points in which it was an improve-
ment on Zoroastrianism. Its Dualism was pronounced and de-
cided; its Trinitarianism was questionable; its teaching with
respect to Christ destroyed the doctrines of the incarnation and
atonement; its “Ertang" was a poor substitute for Holy Scrip-
ture. Even its morality, being deeply penetrated with asceti-
cism, was of a wrong type and inferior to that preached by
Zoroaster. Had the creed of Manes been accepted by the Per-
sian monarch, the progress of real Christianity in the East
—would, it is probable, have been impeded rather than forwarded
—the general currency of the debased amalgam would have
checked the introduction of the pure metal. * -
It must have been shortly after his rejection of the teaching
of Manes that Sapor died, having reigned thirty-one years, from
A.D. 240 to A.D. 271. He was undoubtedly one of the most re-
markable princes of the Sassanian series. In military talent,
indeed, he may not have equalled his father; for though he de-
feated Valerian, he had to confess himself inferior to Odena-
thus. But in general governmental ability he is among the
foremost of the Neo-Persian monarchs, and may compare fa-
vorably with almost any prince of the series. He baffled Odena-
thus, when he was not able to defeat him, by placing himself
behind walls, and by bringing into play those advantages which
naturally belonged to the position of a monarch attacked in his
own country.” He maintained, if he did not permanently
advance, the power of Persia in the west; while in the east it is
-- \
*
- - - - - - x- * *
* * * g
*.
ch, W.] REIGN OF HoRMISpAs I. t 293
probable that he considerably extended the bounds of his do. *
minion.” In the internal administration of his empire he
united works of usefulness” with the construction of memorials .
which had only a sentimental and aesthetic value. He was a
liberal patron of art, and is thought not to have confined his
patronage to the encouragement of native talent.” On the
subject of religion he did not suffer himself to be permanently
led away by the enthusiasm of a young and bold freethinker.s
He decided to maintain the religious system that had descended
to him from his ancestors, and turned a deaf ear to persuasions
that would have led him to revolutionize the religious opinion -
of the East without placing it upon a Satisfactory footing. The
Orientals add to these commendable features of character, that .
he was a man of remarkable beauty,” of great personal cour-
age, and of a noble and princely liberality. According to them,
“he only desired wealth that he might use it for good and great
purposes.” - -
CHAPTER V.
Short Reign of Hormisdas I. His dealings with Manes.
Accession of Varahran I. He puts Manes to Death.
Persecutes the Mamichoeans and the Christians. His Re-
lations with Zenobia. He is threatened by Awrelian. His
Death. Reign of Varahran II. His Tyrannical Conduct.
His Conquest of Seistan, and War with India. His war
with the Roman Emperors Carus and Diocletian. His
Loss of Armenia. His Death. Short Reign of Varahram
III.
Teóvnkóros toū Xatrºpov, "Oppataróórms, 6 Toºrov rais, rºv Baoruxeiav trapaxapabávew.
AGATH. iv. p. 134, C. -
THE first and second kings of the Neo-Persian Empire were . .
men of mark and renown. Their successors for several
generations were, comparatively speaking, feeble and insig-
nificant. The first burst of vigor and freshness which
commonly attends the advent to power of a new race in the
East, or the recovery of its former position by an old one, had
passed away, and was succeeded, as so often happens, by
reaction and exhaustion, the monarchs becoming luxurious
v.
*
. \
*
294 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. v.
and inert, while the people willingly acquiesced in a policy of
which the principle was “Rest and be thankful.” It helped to
, keep matters in this quiescent state, that the kings who ruled
during this period had, in almost every instance, short reigns,
four monarchs coming to the throne and dying within the .
space of a little more than twenty-one years." The first of
these four was Hormisdates, Hormisdas, or Hormuz,” the son
of Sapor, who succeeded his father in A.D. 271. His reign
lasted no more than a year and ten days,” and was dis-
tinguished by only a single event of any importance. Mani,
who had fled from Sapor, ventured to return to Persia on the
accession of his Son," and was received with respect and favor.
Whether Hormisdas was inclined to accept his religious
'teaching or no, we are not told; but at any rate he treated him
kindly, allowed him to propagate his doctrines, and even
assigned him as his residence a castle named Arabion. From
this place Mani proceeded to spread his views among the
Christians of Mesopotamia, and in a short time succeeded in
founding the sect which, under the name of Manichaeans or
Manichees, gave so much trouble to the Church for several
centuries. Hormisdas, who, according to some," founded the
city of Ram-Hormuz in Eastern Persia, died in A.D.272, and
was succeeded by his Son or brother," Vararanes or Varahran."
He left no inscriptions, and it is doubted whether we possess
any of his coins.”
Varahran I., whose reign lasted three years only," from A.D.
272 to 275, is declared by the native historians to have been a
mild and amiable prince;" but the little that is positively
known of him does not bear out this testimony. It seems
certain that he put Mani to death, and probable that he en-
ticed him to leave the shelter of his castle by artifice,” thus
showing himself not only harsh but treacherous towards the
unfortunate heresiarch. If it be true that he caused him to be
flayed alive,” we can Scarcely exonerate him from the charge
of actual cruelty, unless indeed we regard the punishment as
an ordinary mode of execution in Persia.” Perhaps, however,
in this case, as in other similar ones, there is no sufficient
evidence that the process of flaying took place until the culprit
was dead,” the real object of the excoriation being, not the
infliction of pain, but the preservation of a memorial which
could be used as a warning and a terror to others. The skin
of Mani, stuffed with straw, was no doubt suspended for some
time after his execution over One of the gates of the great city
ºx
* • I f *. - t
CH. v.] TWARS OF WARAHRAW I. . 295
of Shahpur;” and it is possible that this fact may have been
the sole ground of the belief (which, it is to be remembered,
was not universal") that he actually suffered death by flaying.
The death of the leader was followed by the persecution of .
his disciples. Mani had organized a hierarchy, consisting of
twelve apostles, seventy-two bishops, and a numerous priest-
hood;" and his sect was widely established at the time of his
execution. Varahran handed over these unfortunates, or at
any rate such of them as he was able to seize, to the tender
mercies of the Magians, who put to death great numbers of
Manichaeans. Many Christians at the same time perished,
either because they were confounded with the followers of
Mani, or because the spirit of persecution, once let loose, could ...
not be restrained, but passed on from victims of one class to
those of another, the Magian priesthood seizing the opportu-
nity of devoting all heretics to a common destruction.
Thus unhappy in his domestic administration, Varahran was
not much more fortunate in his wars. Zenobia, the queen of
the East, held for some time to the policy of her illustrious
husband, maintaining a position inimical alike to Rome and
Persia from the death of Odenathus in A.D. 267 to Aurelian's
expedition against her in A.D. 272. When, however, in this
year, Aurelian marched to attack her with the full forces of
the empire, she recognized the necessity of calling to her aid
other troops besides her own. It was at this time that she
made overtures to the Persians, which were favorably re-
ceived; * and, in the year A.D. 273, Persian troops are men-
tioned among those with whom Aurelian contended in the
vicinity of Palmyra." But the succors sent were inconsid-
erable, and were easily overpowered by the arts or arms of
the emperor. The young king had not the courage to throw
himself boldly into the war. He allowed Zenobia to be defeated
and reduced to extremities without making anything like an
earnest or determined effort to save her. He continued her
ally, indeed, to the end, and probably offered her an asylum at
his court, if she were compelled to quit her capital; but even
this poor boon he was prevented from conferring by the capt-
ure of the unfortunate princess just as she reached the banks
of the Euphrates.” *
In the aid which he lent Zenobia, Varahran, while he had
done too little to affect in any degree the issue of the struggle, ,
had done quite enough to provoke Rome and draw down upon
him the vengeance of the Empire. It seems that he quite re-
. * r x-rº ºr – — — —
sºv -*. * 2 * * : * : .
$ § ***
296 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY: " .. [ch. v.
alized the position in which circumstances had placed him.
|Feeling that he had thrown out a challenge to Rome, and yet
2 shrinking from the impending conflict, he sent an embassy to
> the conqueror, deprecating his anger and seeking to propitiate
him by rare and costly gifts. Among these were a purple robe.”
from Cashmere, or some other remote province of India, of so
brilliant a hue that the ordinary purple of the imperial robes
could not compare with it, and a chariot like to those in which
the Persian monarch was himself wont to be carried.” Aure-
* lian accepted these gifts; and it would seem to follow that he
* condoned Varahran's conduct, and granted him terms of peace.
Hence, in the triumph which Aurelian celebrated at Rome in
fhe year A.D. 274, no Persian captives appeared in the proces-
sion, but Persian envoys” were exhibited instead, who bore
with them the presents wherewith their master had appeased
the anger of the emperor. 4
A full year, however, had not elapsed from the time of the
triumph when the master of the Roman world thought fit to
change his policy, and, suddenly declaring war against the
Persians,” commenced his march towards the East. We are
not told that he discovered, or even sought to discover, any
fresh ground of complaint. His talents were best suited for
employment in the field, and he regarded it as expedient to
-- “exercise the restless temper of the legions in some foreign
war.”” Thus it was desirable to find or make an enemy; and
the Persians presented themselves as the foe which could be
attacked most conveniently. There was no doubt a general
desire to efface the memory of Valerian's disaster by some
considerable success; and war with Persia was therefore likely
to be popular at once with the Senate, with the army, and with
the mixed multitude which was dignified with the title of
“the Roman people.” - g
Aurelian, therefore, set out for Persia at the head of a nu-
# merous, but still a manageable, force.” He proceeded through
Illyricum and Macedonia towards Byzantium, and had almost
reached the straits, when a conspiracy, fomented by one of his
Secretaries, cut short his career, and saved the Persian empire
from invasion. Aurelian was hurdered in the spring of A.D.
3. 275, at Coenophrurium, a small station between Heraclea (Pe-
rinthus) and Byzantium.” The adversary with whom he had
hoped to contend, Varahran, cannot have survived him long,
since he died (of disease as it would seem) in the course of the
year, leaving his crown to a young Son who bore the same
º
* =
* ſ #
- \
CH. W.] ' ' REIGN OF VARAHRaw II.
- \ *
name with himself, and is known in history as Varahran the
Second.”
4.
-*
a
t º &
297 .
*
Varahran II. is said to have ruled at first tyrannically,” and, }
to have greatly disgusted all his principal nobles, who went so
far as to form a conspiracy against him, aud intended to put *.
him to death. The chief of the Magians, however, interposed,
and, having effectually alarmed the king, brought him to ac-
knowledge himself wrong and to promise an entire change of y
conduct.” The nobles upon this returned to their allegiance;
and Varahran, during the remainder of his reign, is said to
have been distinguished for wisdom and moderation, and to
have rendered himself popular with every class of his subjects.
It appears that this prince was not without military ambi-, J
tion. He engaged in a war with the Segestani” (or Sacastani), .
the inhabitants of Segestan or Seistan, a people of Scythic ori- , f
gin,” and after a time reduced them to subjection” [Pl. XVII].
He then became involved in a quarrel with some of the natives,
of Afghanistan, who were at this time regarded as “Indians.” "
A long and desultory contest followed without definite result,
which was not concluded by the year A.D. 283, when he found
himself suddenly engaged in hostilities on the opposite side of
the empire.*
Rome, in the latter part of the third century, had experienced ** ^
one of those reactions which mark her later history, and which
alone enabled her to complete her predestined term of twelve ''
centuries. Between the years A.D. 274 and 282, under Aurelian,
Tacitus, Probus, and Carus, she showed herself once more very
*
decidedly the first military power in the world, drove back the
barbarians on all sides, and even ventured to indulge in an ag-
gressive policy. Aurelian, as we have seen, was on the point
of invading Persia when a domestic conspiracy brought his
reign and life to an end. Tacitus, his successor, scarcely ob-
tained such a firm hold upon the throne as to feel that he could,
with any prudence provoke a war. But Probus, the next em-
peror, revived the project of a Persian expedition,” and would
probably have led the Roman armies into-Mesopotamia, had A
Inot his career been cut short by the revolt of the legions in
Illyria (A.D. 282). Carus, who had been his praetorian prefect,
and who became emperor at his death, adhered steadily to his
policy. It was the first act of his reign to march the forces of
the empire to the extreme east, and to commence in earnest
the war which had so long been threatened. Led by the Em-
peror in person, the legions once more crossed the Euphrates.
•
^*~,
*
# -
•r
...”
- 298 THE SEVENTH MOWARCH Y. ſch. v.
#
Mesopotamia was rapidly overrun, since the Persians (we are
told) were at variance among themselves, and a civil war was
raging.” The bulk of their forces, moreover, were engaged on
the opposite side of the empire in a struggle with the Indians,”
probably those of Afghanistan. Under these circumstances,
no effectual resistance was possible; and, if we may believe the
Roman writers, not only was the Roman province of Mesopo-
tamia recovered, but the entire tract between the rivers as far
south as the latitude of Bagdad was ravaged, and even the
two great cities of Seleucia and Ctesiphon were taken without
the slightest difficulty.” Persia Proper seemed to lie open to
the invader, and Carus was preparing to penetrate still further
to the east, when again an opportune death checked the pro-
gress of the Roman arms, and perhaps saved the Persian mon-
archy from destruction. Carus had announced his intention
of continuing his march; some discontent had shown itself; and
an oracle had been quoted which declared that a Roman em-
peror would never proceed victoriously beyond Ctesiphon.
Carus was not convinced, but he fell sick, and his projects were
delayed; he was still in his camp near Ctesiphon, when a ter-
rible thunderstorm broke over the ground occupied by the
Roman army. A weird darkness was spread around, amid
which flash followed flash at brief intervals, and peal upon peal
terrified the superstitious soldiery. Suddenly, after the most
violent clap of all, the cry arose that the Emperor was dead.*
Some said that his tent had been struck by lightning, and that
his death was owing to this cause; others believed that he had
simply happened to succumb to his malady at the exact mo-
ment of the last thunder-clap; a third theory was that his at-
tendants had taken advantage of the general confusion to assas-
sinate him, and that he merely added another to the long list
of Roman emperors murdered by those who hoped to profit by
their removal. It is not likely that the problem of what really
caused the death of Carus will ever be solved.” That he died
very late in A.D. 283, or within the first fortnight of A.D. 284,
is certain;” and it is no less certain that his death was most
'fortunate for Persia, since it brought the war to an end when
it had reached a point at which any further reverses would
have been disastrous, and gave the Persians a breathing-space
during which they might, at least partially, recover from their
prostration.
. Upon the death of Carus, the Romans at once determined on
retreat. It was generally believed that the imperial tent had
- *
CH. V.] ' RE VOI, T OF AIRMENIA. 299
been struck by lightning; and it was concluded that the de-
cision of the gods against the further advance of the invading
army had been thereby unmistakably declared.” The army
considered that it had done enough, and was anxious to return
home; the feeble successor of Carus, his son Numerian, if he
possessed the will, was at any rate without the power to resist
the wishes of the troops; and the result was that the legions
quitted the East without further fighting,” and without secur-
ing, by the conclusion of formal terms of peace, any permanent
advantage from their victories.
A pause of two years now occurred, during which Varahran
had the opportunity of strengthening his position while Rome
was occupied by civil wars and distracted between the claims.
of pretenders. “ No great use seems, however, to have been
made of this interval. When, in A.D. 286, the celebrated Dio-
cletian determined to resume the war with Persia, and, em-
bracing the cause of Tiridates, son of Chosroës, directed his
efforts to the establishment of that prince, as a Roman feudatory,
on his father's throne, Varahran found himself once more over-
matched, and could offer no effectual resistance. Armenia
had now been a province of Persia for the space of twenty-six
(or perhaps forty-six) years;" but it had in no degree been con-
ciliated or united with the rest of the empire. The people had
been distrusted and oppressed; the nobles had been deprived
of employment; a heavy tribute had been laid on the land; and
a religious revolution had been violently effected.” It is not
surprising that when Tiridates, supported by a Roman corps
d'armée,” appeared upon the frontiers, the whole population
received him with transports of loyalty and joy. All the
nobles flocked to his standard, and at once acknowledged him
for their king.” The people everywhere welcomed him with
acclamations. A native prince of the Arsacid dynasty united
the Suffrages of all; and the nation threw itself with enthusi-
astic zeal into a struggle which was viewed as a war of inde-
pendence. It was forgotten that Tiridates was in fact only a
puppet in the hand of the Roman emperor, and that, whatever
the result of the contest, Armenia would remain at its close, as
she had been at its commencement, a dependant upon a foreign
power.
The success of Tiridates at the first was such as might have
been expected from the forces arrayed in his favor. He de-
feated two Persian armies in the open field, drove out the gar-
risons which held the more important of the fortified towns,
f
*
*
800 - THE SEVENTH HONARCHY [cf. v.
and became undisputed master of Armenia.” He even crossed
the border which separated Armenia from Persia, and gained
signal victories on admitted Persian ground." According to
the native writers, his personal exploits were extraordinary; he
defeated singly a corps of giants, and routed on foot a large
detachment mounted on elephants!" The narrative is here,
no doubt, tinged with exaggeration; but the general result is
correctly stated. Tiridates, within a year of his invasion, was
complete master of the entire Armenian highland, and was in
, a position to carry his arms beyond his own frontiers.
Such seems to have been the position of things, when
Varahran II. suddenly died, after a reign of seventeen years,”
A.D. 292. He is generally said to have left behind him two
sons,” Varahran and Narsehi, or Narses, of whom the elder,
Varahran, was proclaimed king. This prince was of an amia-
ble temper, but apparently of a weakly constitution. He was
with difficulty persuaded to accept the throne,” and anticipated
from the first an early demise." No events are assigned to
his short reign, which (according to the best authorities) did
not exceed the length of four months." It is evident that he
must have been powerless to offer any effectual opposition to
Tiridates, whose forces continued to ravage, year after year, the
north-western provinces of the Persian empire." Had Tiri-
dates been a prince of real military talent, it could scarcely
have been difficult for him to obtain still greater advantages.
But he was content with annual raids, which left the substantial
power of Persia untouched. He allowed the occasion of the
throne's being occupied by a weak and invalid prince to slip
by. The consequences of this negligence will appear in the
next chapter. Persia, permitted to escape serious attack in
her time of weakness, was able shortly to take the offensive and
- to make the Armenian prince regret his indolence or want of
ambition. The son of Chosroës became a second time a fugi-
tive; and once more the Romans were called in to settle the
affairs of the East. We have now to trace the circumstances
of this struggle, and to show how Rome under able leaders
succeeded in revenging the defeat and captivity of Valerian,
and in inflicting, in her turn, a grievous humiliation upon her
adversary.
* f
CH. VI.] / ACCESSION OF WARSES. 301
g t f ! &
CHAPTER VI.
- M. :
Civil War of Narses and his Brother Hormisdas. Narses
victorious. He attacks and eaſpels Tiridates, . War de-
clared against him by Diocletian. First Campaign of
Galerius, A.D. 297. Second Campaign, A.D. 298. Defeat
suffered by Narses. Negotiations. Conditions of Peace.
Abdication and Death of Narses. #
Napa is 880gos évaypéderal Bagtaeda at IIeporów &rö 'Apraśćpčov.—ZonoRAs, xii. 31.
IT appears that on the death of Varahran III., probably * *
without issue, there was a contention for the crown between
two brothers,” Narses and Hormisdas.” We are not informed
which of them was the elder, nor on what grounds they re-
spectively rested their claims; but it seems that Narses was
from the first preferred by the Persians, and that his rival re-
lied mainly for success on the arms of foreign barbarians.
Worsted in encounters wherein none but Persians fought on
either side, Hormisdas summoned to his aid the hordes of the
north"—Gelli from the shores of the Caspian, Scyths from the
Oxus or the regions beyond, and Russians, now first men-
tioned by a classical writer. But the perilous attempt to settle
a domestic struggle by the Swords of foreigners was not des-
tined on this occasion to prosper. Hormisdas failed in his
endeavor to obtain the throne; and, as we hear no more of
him, we may regard it as probable that he was defeated and
slain. At any rate Narses was, within a year or two of his
accession, so firmly settled in his kingdom that he was able to
turn his thoughts to the external affairs of the empire, and to .
engage in a great war. All danger from internal disorder
must have been pretty certainly removed before Narses could
veuture to affront, as he did, the strongest of existing military
powers. [Pl. XVIII.] * •
Narses ascended the throne in A.D. 292 or 293. It was at
least as early as A.D. 296 that he challenged Rome to an en- &
arms had established in Armenia." Tiridates had, it is evi-
dent, done much to provoke the attack by his constant raids
into Persian territory," which were sometimes carried even to
the south of Ctesiphon." He was probably surprised by the
counter by attacking in force the vassal monarch whom her tº
*.
*
f
g
:*
.*
\
re , - •
302 THE SEVENTH . MONAIRCEIY. [CH. VI.
e-
sudden march and vigorous assault of an enemy whom he had
learned to despise; and, feeling himself unable to organize an
effectual resistance, he had recourse to flight, gave up Armenia
to the Persians," and for a second time placed himself under
the protection of the Roman emperor. The monarch who held
this proud position was still Diocletian, the greatest emperor
that had occupied the Roman throne since Trajan, and the
prince to whom Tiridates was indebted for his restoration to
his kingdom. It was impossible that Diocletian should submit
to the affront put upon him without an earnest effort to .
avenge it. His own power rested, in a great measure, on his
military prestige; and the unpunished insolence of a foreign
|King would have seriously endangered an authority not very
firmly established. The position of Diocletian compelled him
to declare war against Narses" in the year A.D. 296, and to ad-
dress himself to a struggle of which he is not likely to have
misconceived the importance. It might have been expected
that he would have undertaken the conduct of the war in per-
son; but the internal condition of the empire was far from
satisfactory, and the chief of the State seems to have felt that
he could not conveniently quit his dominions to engage in war
beyond his borders. He therefore committed the task of re-
instating Tiridates and punishing Narses to his favorite and
son-in-law, Galerius,” while he himself took up a position with-
in the limits of the empire,” which at once enabled him to
overawe his domestic adversaries and to support and coun-
tenance his lieutenant.
The first attempts of Galerius were unfortunate. Summoned
suddenly from the Danube to the Euphrates, and placed at the
head of an army composed chiefly of the levies of Asia, ill-dis-
ciplined, and unacquainted with their commander, he had to
meet an adversary of whom he knew little or nothing, in a
region the character of which was adverse to his own troops
and favorable to those of the enemy. Narses had invaded the
Roman province of Mesopotamia, had penetrated to the Kha-
bour, and was threatening to cross the Euphrates into Syria.”
Galerius had no choice but to encounter him on the ground
which he had chosen. Now, though Western Mesopotamia is
ill-described as “a smooth and barren surface of sandy desert,
without a hillock, without a tree, and without a spring of
fresh water,” it is undoubtedly an open country, possessing
numerous plains, where, in a battle, the advantage of numbers
is likely to be felt, and where there is abundant room for the
g
CH. VI.] HIS VICTORY OVER GALERIUS. . . . .303
evolutions of cavalry. The Persians, like their predecessors
the Parthians, were especially strong in horse; and the host
which Narses had brought into the field greatly outnumbered
the troops which Diocletian had placed at the disposal of
Galerius. Yet Galerius took the offensive. Fighting under
the eye of a Somewhat stern master, he was scarcely free to
choose his plan of campaign. Diocletian expected him to drive
the Persians from Mesopotamia,” and he was therefore bound
to make the attempt. He accordingly sought out his adversary
in this region, and engaged him in three great battles.” The
first and second appear to have been indecisive; but in the
third the Roman general suffered a complete defeat.” The
catastrophe of Crassus was repeated almost upon the same bat- ..
tle-field, and probably almost by the same means.” But,
personally, Galerius was more fortunate than his predecessor.
He escaped from the carnage, and, recrossing the Euphrates;
rejoined his father-in-law in Syria. A conjecture, not al-
together destitute of probability,” makes Tiridates share both
the calamity and the good fortune of the Roman Caesar. Like
Galerius, he escaped from the battle-field, and reached the
banks of the Euphrates. But his horse, which had received a
wound, could not be trusted to pass the river. In this emer-
gency the Armenian prince dismounted, and, armed as he was,
plunged into the stream. The river was both wide and deep;
the current was rapid; but the hardy adventurer, inured to
danger and accustomed to every athletic exercise, swam across
and reached the opposite bank in Safety.” f
Thus, while the rank and file perished ignominiously, the
two personages of most importance on the Roman side were
Saved. Galerius hastened towards Antioch, to rejoin his col-
league and sovereign. The latter came out to meet him, but,
instead of congratulating him on his escape, assumed the air
of an offended master, and, declining to speak to him or to stop
his chariot, forced the Caesar to follow him on foot for nearly
a mile before he would condescend to receive his explanations
and apologies for defeat.” The disgrace was keenly felt, and
was ultimately revenged upon the prince who had contrived
it. But, at the time, its main effect doubtless was to awake in
the young Caesar the strongest desire of retrieving his honor,
and wiping out the memory of his great reverse by a yet more
Signal victory. Galerius did not cease through the winter of
A.D. 297 to importune his father-in-law for an opportunity of
redeeming the past and recovering his lost laurels. - *. -
\ *
304 * THE SEVENTH MONARCII), ' [CH. vi.
The emperor, having sufficiently indulged his resentment,
acceded to the wishes of his favorite. Galerius was continued
in his command. A new army was collected during the win-
ter, to replace that which had been lost; and the greatest care
was taken that its material should be of good quality, and that
it should be employed where it had the best chance of success.
The veterans of Illyria and Moesia constituted the flower of the
force now enrolled;” and it was further strengthened by the
addition of a body of Gothic auxiliaries.”. It was determined,
moreover, that the attack should this time be made on the side
of Armenia, where it was felt that the Romans would have the
doſſible advantage of a friendly country, and of one far more
favorable for the movements of infantry than for those of an
army whose strength lay in its horse.” The number of the
troops employed was still small. Galerius entered Armenia
at the head of only 25,000 men;” but they were a picked force,
and they might be augmented, almost to any extent, by the
national militia of the Armenians. He was now, moreover, as
cautious as he had previously been rash; he advanced slowly,
, feeling his way; he even personally made reconnaissances,
accompanied by only one or two horsemen, and, under the
shelter of a flag of truce, explored the position of his adver-
sary.** Narses found himself overmatched alike in art and in
force. He allowed himself to be surprised in his camp by his
active enemy,” and suffered a defeat by which he more than lost
all the fruits of his former victory. Most of his army was
destroyed; he himself received a wound,” and with difficulty
escaped by a hasty flight. Galerius pursued, and, though he
did not succeed in taking the monarch himself, made prize of
his wives, his sisters, and a number of his children,” besides
capturing his military chest. He also took many of the most
illustrious Persians prisoners,” How far he followed his flying
adversary is uncertain;” but it is scarcely probable that he
proceeded much southward of the Armenian frontier. He had
to reinstate Tiridates in his dominions, to recover Eastern
Mesopotamia, and to lay his laurels at the feet of his colleague
and master. It seems probable that having driven Narses from
Armenia, and left Tiridates there to administer the govern-
ment, he hastened to rejoin Diocletian before attempting any
further conquests. - --
The Persian monarch, on his side, having recovered from his
wound,” which could have been but sight, set himself to col-
lect another army, but at the same time sent an ambassador to
g
t
*
cII. vi.] , PERSIAN EMBASSY TO GALERIUS. 305
to the camp of Galerius, requesting to know the terms o
which Rome would consent to make peace. A writer of good
authority” has left us an account of the interview which fol-
lowed between the envoy of the Persian monarch and the
victorious Roman. Apharban (So was the envoy named) :
opened the negotiations with the following speech”:
“The whole human race knows,” he said, “that the Roman
and Persian kingdoms resemble two great luminaries, and that,
like a man's two eyes, they ought mutally to adorn and
illustrate each other, and not in the extremity of their wrath
to seek rather each other's destruction. So to act is not to act
manfully, but is indicative rather of levity and weakness; for
it is to suppose that our inferiors can never be of any service to
us, and that therefore we had better get rid of them. Narses, "
moreover, ought not to be accounted a weaker prince than
other Persian kings; thou hast indeed conquered him, but then
thou surpassest all other monarchs; and thus Narses has of
course been worsted by thee, though he is no whit inferior in
merit to the best of his ancestors. The orders which my master
has given me are to entrust all the rights of Persia to the
clemency of Rome; and I therefore do not even bring with me
any conditions of peace, since it is for the emperor to deter-
mine everything. I have only to pray, on my master's behalf,
for the restoration of his wives and male children; if he re-
ceives them at your hands, he will be forever beholden to you,
and will be better pleased than if he recoverd them by force of
arms. Even now my master cannot sufficiently thank you for
the kind treatment which he hears you have vouchsafed them,
in that you have offered them no insult, but have behaved to-
wards them as though on the point of giving them back to
their kith and kin. He sees herein that you bear in mind the
changes of fortune and the instability of all human affairs.”
At this point Galerius, who had listened with impatience to
the long harangue, burst in with a movement of anger that
shook his whole frame—“What? Do the Persians dare to re-
mind us of the vicissitudes of fortune, as though we could for-
get how they behave when victory inclines to them? Is it
not their wont to push their advantage to the uttermost and
preSS as heavily as may be on the unfortunate? How charm-
ingly they showed the moderation that becomes a victor in
Valerian's time! They vanquished him by fraud; they kept
him a prisoner to advanced old age; they let him die in dis-
honor; and then when he was dead they stripped off his skin,
ar
2x - ><= — — — — —
§ *
! - 306 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. ſcă. vi.
and with diabolical ingenuity made of a perishable human
body an imperishable monument of our shame.” Verily, if we
follow this envoy's advice, and look to the changes of human
affairs, we shall not be moved to clemency, but to anger, when
we consider the past conduct of the Persians. If pity be shown
them, if their requests be granted, it will not be for what they
have urged, but because it is a principle of action with us—a
a principle handed down to us from our ancestors—‘to spare
the humble and chastise the proud.’” Apharban, therefore,
was dismissed with no definite answer to his question, what
terms of peace Rome would require; but he was told to assure
his master that Rome's clemency equalled her valor, and that
.it would not be long before he would receive a Roman envoy
authorized to signify the Imperial pleasure, and to conclude a
treaty with him.
Having held this interview with Apharban, Galeriushastened
to meet and consult his colleague.” Diocletian had remained
in Syria, at the head of an army of observation,” while Galerius
penetrated into Armenia and engaged the forces of Persia.
When he heard of his son-in-law's great victory he crossed the
Euphrates, and advancing through Western Mesopotamia,
from which the Persians probably retired, took up his residence
at Nisibis,” now the chief town of these parts. It is perhaps
true that his object was “to moderate, by his presence and
counsels, the pride of Galerius.” That prince was bold to
rashness, and nourished an excessive ambition. He is said to
have at this time entertained a design of grasping at the con-
quest of the East, and to have even proposed to himself to re-
duce the Persian Empire into the form of a Roman province.”
But the views of Diocletian were humbler and more prudent.
He held to the opinion of Augustus and Hadrian, that Rome
did not need any enlargement of her territory, and that the
absorption of the East was especially undesirable. When he
and his son-in-law met and interchanged ideas at Nisibis, the
views of the elder ruler naturally prevailed; and it was resolved
to offer to the Persians tolerable terms of peace. A civilian of
importance,” Sicorius Probus, was selected for the delicate
office of envoy, and was serºt, with a train of attendants, into
Media, where Narses had fixed his headquarters. We are told
that the Persian monarch received him with all honor, but,
under pretence of allowing him to rest and refresh himself after
his long journey, deferred his audience from day to day; while
he employed the time thus gained in collecting from various
f
CH. VI.j ROME CONSENTS TO PEACE. | 307
quarters such a number of detachments and garrisons as might
constitute a respectable army. He had no intention of renew-
ing the war, but he knew the weight which military prepara-
tion ever lends to the representations of diplomacy. Accord-
ingly it was not until he had brought under the notice of Sico-
rius a force of no inconsiderable size that he at last admitted
him to an interview. The Roman ambassador was introduced
into an inner chamber of the royal palace in Media," where he
found only the king and three others—Apharban, the envoy
gent to Galerius, Archapetes, the captain of the guard, and
Barsaborsus, the governor of a province on the Armenian fron-
tier.” He was asked to unfold the particulars of his messsage,
and say what were the terms on which Rome would make
peace. Sicorius complied. The emperors, he said, required
five things: —(i.) The cession to Rome of five provinces beyond
the river Tigris, which are given by one writer” as Intilene,
Sophene, Arzanene, Carduene, and Zabdicene; by another” as
Arzanene, Moxoene, Zabdicene, Rehimene, and Corduene; (ii.)
the recognition of the Tigris, as the general boundary between
the two empires; (iii.) the extension of Armenia to the fortress
of Zintha, in Media; (iv.) the relinquishment by Persia to Rome
of her protectorate over Iberia, including the right of giving
investiture to the Iberian kings; and (v.) the recognition of
Nisibis as the place at which alone commercial dealings could
take place between the two nations. *
It would seem that the Persians were surprised at the moder-
ation of these demands. Their exact value and force will re-
quire Some discussion; but at any rate it is clear that, under
the circumstances, they were not felt to be excessive. Narses
did not dispute any of them except the last; and it seems to
have been rather because he did not wish it to be said that he
had yielded everything, than because the condition was really
very onerous, that he made objection in this instance.” Sico-
rius was fortunately at liberty to yield the point. He at once
withdrew the fifth article of the treaty, and, the other four be-
ing accepted, a formal peace was concluded between the two
nations. +.
To understand the real character of the peace now made, and
to appreciate properly the relations thereby established between
Rome and Persia, it will be necessary to examine at some
length the several conditions of the treaty, and to see exactly
What was imported by each of them. There is scarcely one
Out of the whole number that carries its meaning plainly upon
*
308 THE SEWENTH MONARCIIP. [CH. VI.
its face; and on the more important very various interpretations
have been put, so that a discussion and settlement of some
rather intricate points is here necessary.
(i.) There is a considerable difference of opinion as to the five
provinces ceded to Rome by the first article of the treaty, as to
their position and extent, and consequently as to their impor-
tance. By some they are put on the right,” by others on the
left, bank of the Tigris; while of those who assign them this
latter position some place them in a cluster about the sources
of the river,” while others extend them very much further to
the southward." Of the five provinces three only can be cer-
tainly named, since the authorities differ as to the two others.”
• These three are Arzanene, Cordyene, and Zabdicene, which
occur in that order in Patricius. If we can determine the posi-
tion of these three, that of the others will follow, at least within
certain limits. -
Now Arzanene was certainly on the left bank of the Tigris.
It adjoined Armenia,” and is reasonably identified with the
modern district of Kherzan, which lies between Lake Van and
the Tigris, to the west of the Bitlis river." All the notices of
Arzanene" suit this locality; and the name “Kherzan” may be
regarded as representing the ancient appellation.”
Zabdicene was a little south and a little east of this position.
It was the tract about a town known as Bezabda (perhaps a
corruption of Beit-Zabda), which had been anciently called
Phoenica.” This town is almost certainly represented by the
modern Fynyk," on the left bank of the Tigris, a little above
Jezireh. The province whereof it was the capital may perhaps
have adjoined Arzanene, reaching as far north as the Bitlis
TTVer.
If these two tracts are rightly placed, Cordyene must also be
sought on the left bank of the Tigris. The word is no doubt
the ancient representative of the modern Kurdistan, and
means a country in which Kurds dwelt. Now Kurds seem to
have been at one time the chief inhabitants of the Mons Masius,
- the modern Jebel Karajah Dagh and Jebel Tur, which was
thence called Cordyene, Gordyene, or the Gordiaean mountain
chain.” But there was another and a more important Cor-
dyene on the opposite side of the river. The tract to this day
known as Kurdistan, the high mountain region south and
south-east of Take Van between Persia and Mesopotamia, was
in the possession. of Kurds from before the time of Xenophon,
and was known as the country of the Carduchi, as Cardyene,
e
cm. v.] POSITION OF THE CEDIED PROVINCES 309
and as Cordyene.” This tract, which was contiguous to Ar-
zamene and Zabdicene, if we have rightly placed those regions,
must almost certainly have been the Cordyene of the treaty,
which, if it corresponded at all nearly in extent with the modern
Rurdistan, must have been by far the largest and most impor-
tant of the five provinces.
The two remaining tracts, whatever their names," must un-
doubtedly have lain on the same side of the Tigris with these
three. As they are otherwise unknown to us (for Sophene,
which had long been Roman, cannot have been one of them),
it is impossible that they should have been of much importance.
No doubt they helped to round off the Roman dominion in this
quarter; but the great value of the entire cession lay in the ac-
quisition of the large and fruitful” province of Cordyene, in-,
habited by a brave and hardy population, and afterwards the
seat of fifteen fortresses” which brought the Roman dominion
to the very edge of Adiabene, made them masters of the passes
into Media, and laid the whole of Southern Mesopotamia open
to their incursions. It is probable that the hold of Persia on
the territory had never been strong; and in relinquishing it she
may have imagined that she gave up no very great advantage;
but in the hands of Rome Kurdistan became a standing menace
to the Persian power, and we shall find that on the first oppor-
tunity the false step now taken was retrieved, Cordyene with
its adjoining districts was pertinaciously demanded of the Ro-
mans," was grudgingly surrendered, and was then firmly re-
attached to the Sassanian dominions.
(ii.) The Tigris is said by Patricius and Festus” to have been
made the boundary of the two empires. Gibbon here boldly
substitutes the Western Khabour and maintains that “the Ro-
man frontier traversed, but never followed, the course of the
Tigris.” He appears not to be able to understand how the
Tigris could be the frontier, when five provinces across the
Tigris were Roman. But the intention of the article probably
was, first, to mark the complete cession to Rome of Eastern
as well as Western Mesopotamia, and, secondly, to establish
the Tigris as the line separating the empires below the point
down to which the Romans held both banks. Cordyene may
not have touch the Tigris at all, or may have touched it only
about the 37th parallel. From this point southwards, as far as
Mosul, or Nimrud, or possibly Kileh Sherghat, the Tigris was
probably now recognized as the dividing line between the em-
pires. By the letter of the treaty the wilole Euphrates valley
310 | THE SEVENTH MoMARCITY. [CH. VI.
might indeed have been claimed by Rome; but practically she
did not push her occupation of Mesopotamia below Circesium.
The real frontier from this point was the Mesopotamian desert,
which extends from Kerkesiyeh to Nimrud, a distance of 150
miles. Above this it was the Tigris, as far probably as Fesha-
poor; after which it followed the line, whatever it was, which
divided Cordyene from Assyria and Media.
(iii.) The extension of Armenia to the fortress of Zintha, in
Media, seems to have imported much more than would at first
sight appear from the words. Gibbon interprets it as imply-
ing the cession of all Media Atropatene,” which certainly ap-
pears a little later to be in the possession of the Armenian
monarch, Tiridates." A large addition to the Armenian terri-
tory out of the Median is doubtless intended; but it is quite
impossible to determine definitely the extent or exact charac-
ter of the cession."
(iv.) The fourth article of the treaty is sufficiently intelli-
gible. So long as Armenia had been a fief of the Persian em-
pire, it naturally belonged to Persia to exercise influence over
the neighboring Iberia, which corresponded closely to the modern
Georgia, intervening between Armenia and the Caucasus.
Now, when Armenia had become a dependency of Rome, the
protectorate hitherto exercised by the Sassanian princes passed
naturally to the Caesars; and with the protectorate was bound
up the right of granting investiture to the kingdom, whereby
the protecting power was Secured against the establishment on
the throne of an unfriendly person. Iberia was not herself a
state of much strength; but her power of opening or shutting
the passes of the Caucasus gave her considerable importance,
since by the admission of the Tatar hordes, which were always
ready to pour in from the plains of the North, she could sud-
denly change the whole face of affairs in North-Western Asia,
and inflict a terrible revenge on any enemy that had provoked
her. It is true that she might also bring suffering on her
friends, or even on herself, for the hordes, once admitted, were
apt to make little distinction between friend and foe; but
prudential considerations did not always prevail over the
promptings of passion, and there had been occasions when, in
spite of them, the gates had been thrown open and the bar-
barians invited to enter." It was well for Rome to have it in
her power to check this peril. Her own strength and the
tranquillity of her eastern provinces were confirmed and secured
by the right which she (practically) obtained of nominating the
Iberian monarchs,
cH. vi.] IMPORTANCE OF THE ROMAN GAINS. 311
(v.) The fifth article of the treaty, having been rejected by
Narses and then withdrawn by Sicorius, need not detain us
long. By limiting the commercial intercourse of the two
nations to a single city, and that a city within their own
dominions, the Romans would have obtained enormous com-
mercial advantages. While their own merchants remained
quietly at home, the foreign merchants would have had the
trouble and expense of bringing their commodities to market a
distance of sixty miles from the Persian frontier and of above
a hundred from any considerable town;" they would of course
have been liable to market dues, which would have fallen
wholly into Roman hands; and they would further have been
chargeable with any duty, protective or even prohibitive, which
Rome chose to impose. It is not surprising that Narses here
made a stand, and insisted on commerce being left to flow in
the broader channels which it had formed for itself in the
course of ages.”
Rome thus terminated her first period of struggle with the
newly revived monarchy of Persia by a great victory and a great
diplomatic Success. If Narses regarded the terms—and by his
conduct he would seem to have done so—as moderate under the
circumstances,” our conclusion must be that the disaster which
he had suffered was extreme, and that he knew the strength of
Persia to be, for the time, exhausted. Forced to relinquish his
suzerainty over Armenia and Iberia, he saw those countries
not merely wrested from himself, but placed under the pro-
tectorate, and so made to minister to the strength, of his rival.
Nor was this all. Rome had gradually been advancing across
Mesopotamia and working her way from the Euphrates to the
Tigris. Narses had to acknowledge, in so many words, that the
Tigris, and not the Euphrates, was to be regarded as her true .
boundary, and that nothing consequently was to be considered
as Persian beyond the more eastern of the two rivers. Even
this concession was not the last or the worst. Narses had
finally to submit to see his empire dismembered, a portion of
Media attached to Armenia, and five provinces, never hitherto
in dispute, torn from Persia and added to the dominion of
Rome. He had to allow Rome to establish herself in force on
the left bank of the Tigris, and so to lay open to her assaults a
great portion of his northern besides all his western frontier.
He had to see her brought to the very edge of the Iranic pla-
teau, and within a fortnight's march of Persia Proper. The
ambition to rival his ancestor Sapor, if really entertained," was
*
-
- *
312 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. ſch. vi.
severely punished; and the defeated prince must have felt that
he had been most ill-advised in making the venture. .
Narses did not long continue on the throne after the con-
clusion of this disgraceful, though, it may be, necessary, treaty.
It was made in A.D. 297. He abdicated in A.D. 301. It may
have been disgust at his ill-success, it may have been mere
weariness of absolute power, which caused him to descend from
his high position and retire into private life." He was so for-
tunate as to have a son of full age in whose favor he could re-
, sign, so that there was no difficulty about the succession.
His ministers seem to have thought it necessary to offer some
opposition to his project;” but their resistance was feeble, per-
haps because they hoped that a young prince would be more
entirely guided by their counsels. Narses was allowed to com-
plete his act of self-renunciation, and, after crowning his son
Hormisdas with his own hand, to spend the remainder of his
days in retirement. According to the native writers, his main
object was to contemplate death and prepare himself for it.
In his youth he had evinced some levity of character, and had
been noted for his devotion to games and to the chase;” in his
middle age he laid aside these pursuits, and, applying himself
actively to business, was a good administrator, as well as a
brave soldier. But at last it seemed to him that the only life
worth living was the contemplative, and that the happiness of
the hunter and the statesman must yield to that of the philoso-
pher. It is doubtful how long he survived his resignation of
the throne,” but tolerably certain that he did not outlive his
son and successor, who reigned less than eight years. ,
*
z'
, ch. VII.] REIGN OF HORMISDAS II. 313
*
CHAPTER VII.
Reign of Hormisdas II. His Disposition. General Charac-
ter of his Reign. His Taste for Building. His new Court
of Justice. His Marriage with a Princess of Cabul.
Story of his Son Hormisdas. Death of Hormisdas II.,
and Imprisonment of his Son Hormisdas. Interregnum.
Crown assigned to Sapor II. before his Birth. Long
Reign of Sapor. First Period of his Reign, from A.D.
309 to A.D. 337. Persia plundered by the Arabs and the
Turks. Victories of Sapor over the Arabs. Persecution,
of the Christians. Escape of Hormisdas. Feelings and .
Conduct of Sapor.
“Regnum in Persas obtinuit Hormoz, Narsis filius.”—EUTych, vol. i. p. 396.
HoRMISDAS II., who became king on the abdication of his
father, Narses, had, like his father, a short reign. He ascend-
ed the throne A.D. 301; he died A.D. 309, not quite eight years
later." To this period historians assign scarcely any events.
The personal appearance of Hormisdas, if we may judge by a
gem, was pleasing; [Pl. XVIII., Fig. 4.] he is said, however, to
have been of a harsh temper by nature, but to have controlled
his evil inclinations after he became king, and in fact to have
then neglected nothing that could contribute to the welfare of
his subjects.” He engaged in no wars; and his reign was thus
one of those quiet and uneventful intervals which, furnishing
no materials for history, indicate thereby the happiness of a
nation.” We are told that he had a strong taste for building,”
and could never see a crumbling edifice without instantly set-
ting to work to restore it. Ruined towns and villages, so com-
mon throughout the East in all ages, ceased to be seen in
Persia while he filled the throne. An army of masons always
followed him in his frequent journeys throughout his empire,
and repaired dilapidated homesteads and cottages with as much
care and diligence as edifices of a public character. According
to some writers he founded several entirely new towns in
Khuzistan or Susiana," while, according to others," he built the
important city of Hormuz, or (as it is sometimes called) Ram-
Aormuz, in the province of Kerman, which is still a flourishing
314 , THE SEVENTH MoMARCIIY. [CH. VII.
place. Other authorities" ascribe this city, however, to the
first Hormisdas, the Son of Sapor I. and grandson of Artaxer-
XeS.
Among the means devised by Hormisdas II. for bettering
the condition of his people the most remarkable was his es-
tablishment of a new Court of Justice. In the East the op-
pression of the weak by the powerful is the most inveterate
and universal of all evils, and the one that well-intentioned
monarchs have to be most careful in checking and repressing.
Hormisdas, in his anxiety to root out this evil, is said to have
set up a court expressly for the hearing of causes where com-
plaint was made by the poor of wrongs done to them by the
rich.” The duty of the judges was at once to punish the op-
- pressors, and to see that ample reparation was made to those
whom they had wronged. To increase the authority of the
court, and to Secure the impartiality of its sentences, the
monarch made a point of often presiding over it himself, of
hearing the causes, and pronouncing the judgments in person.
The most powerful nobles were thus made to feel that, if
they offended, they would be likely to receive adequate pun-
ishment; and the weakest and poorest of the people were
encouraged to come forward and make complaint if they had
suffered injury.
Among his other wives, Hormisdas, we are told, married a
daughter of the king of Cabul.” It was natural that, after the
conquest of Seistan" by Varahran II., about A.D. 280, the
Persian monarchs should establish relations with the chief-
tains ruling in Afghanistan. That country seems, from the
first to the fourth century of our era, to have been under the
government of princes of Scythian descent and of considerable
wealth and power.” Kadphises, Kanerki, Kenorano, Ooerki,
Baraoro, had the main seat of their empire in the region about
Cabul and Jellalabad; but from this centre they exercised an
extensive sway, which at times probably reached Candahar on
the one hand, and the Punjab region on the other. Their large
gold coinage proves them to have been monarchs of great
wealth, while their use of the Greek letters and language in-
dicates a certain amount of civilization. The marriage of
Hormisdas with a princess of Cabul implies that the hostile
relations existing under Varahran II. had been superseded by
friendly ones.” Persian aggression had ceased to be feared.
The reigning Indo-Scythic monarch felt no reluctance to give
his daughter in marriage to his Western neighbor, and sent
z
CH, VII.] EIIS RELATIONS WITH CABUL. 315
her to his court (we are told) with a wardrobe and ornaments
of the utmost magnificence and costliness.”
Hormisdas II. appears to have had a Son, of the same name
with himself, who attained to manhood while his father was
still reigning.” This prince, who was generally regarded, and
who, of course, viewed himself, as the heir-apparent, was no
favorite with the Persian nobles, whom he had perhaps of.
fended by an inclination towards the literature and civiliza-
tion of the Greeks.” It must have been upon previous con-
Sultation and agreeement that the entire body of the chief
men resolved to vent their spite by insulting the prince in
the most open and public way at the table of his father. The
king was keeping his birthday, which was always, in Persia,
the greatest festival of the year,” and so the most public occa-
sion possible. All the nobles of the realm were invited to the
banquet ; and all came and took their several places. The
prince was absent at the first, but shortly arrived, bringing
with him, as the excuse for his late appearance, a quantity of
game, the produce of the morning's chase. Such an entrance
must have created some disturbance and have drawn general
attention; but the nobles, who were bound by etiquette to rise
from their seats, remained firmly fixed in them, and took not
the slightest notice of the prince's arrival.” This behavior was
an indignity which naturally aroused his resentment. In the
heat of the moment he exclaimed aloud that “those who had
insulted him should one day suffer for it—their fate should be
the fate of Marsyas.” At first the threat was not understood;
but one chieftain, more learned than his fellows, explained to
the rest that, according to the Greek myth, Marsyas was flayed
alive. Now, flaying alive was a punishment not unknown to
the Persian law;” and the nobles, fearing that the prince really
entertained the intention which he had expressed, became
thoroughly alienated from him, and made up their minds that
they would not allow him to reign. During his father's life-
time, they could, of course, do nothing; but they laid up the
dread threat in their memory, and patiently waited for the
moment when the throne would become vacant, and their
enemy would assert his right to it.
Apparently, their patience was not very severely taxed.
Hormisdas II. died within a few years; and Prince Hormisdas,
as the only son whom he had left behind him,” thought to suc- .
ceed as a matter of course. But the nobles rose in insurrection,
seized his person, and threw him into a dungeon, intending
f
316 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. VII.
that he should remain there for the rest of his life. They them-
selves took the direction of affairs, and finding that, though
King Hormisdas had left behind him no other son, yet one of
his wives was pregnant, they proclaimed the unborn infant
king, and even with the utmost ceremony proceeded to crown
, the embryo by suspending the royal diadem over the womb of
the mother.” A real interregnum must have followed; but it
did not extend beyond a few months. The pregnant widow of
Hormisdas fortunately gave birth to a boy, and the difficulties
of the succession were thereby ended. All classes acquiesced
in the rule of the infant monarch, who received the name of
Sapor—whether simply to mark the fact that he was believed
to be the late king's son,” or in the hope that he would rival
the glories of the first Sapor, is uncertain.
The reign of Sapor II. is estimated variously, at 69, 70, 71,
and 72 years;” but the balance of authority is in favor of sev-
enty. He was born in the course of the year A.D. 309, and he
seems to have died in the year after the Roman emperor
Valens,” or A.D. 379. He thus reigned nearly three-quarters of
a century, being contemporary with the Roman emperors,
Galerius, Constantine, Constantius and Constans, Julian, Jo-
vian, Valentinian I., Valens, Gratian, and Valentinian II.
This long reign is best divided into periods. The first period
of it extended from A.D. 309 to A.D. 337, or a space of twenty-
eight years. This was the time anterior to Sapor's wars with
the Romans. It included the sixteen years of his minority”
and a space of twelve years during which he waged successful
wars with the Arabs. The minority of Sapor was a period of
severe trial to Persia. On every side the bordering nations en-
deavored to take advantage of the weakness incident to the
rule of a minor, and attacked and ravaged the empire at their
pleasure.” The Arabs were especially aggressive, and made
continual raids into Babylonia, Khuzistan, and the adjoining
regions, which desolated these provinces and carried the hor-
rors of war into the very heart of the empire. The tribes of
Beni-Ayar and Abdul-Kais, which dwelt on the southern shores
of the Persian Gulf, took the lead, in these incursions; and
though not attempting any permanent conquests, inflicted ter-
rible sufferings on the inhabitants of the tracts which they in-
vaded. At the same time a Mesopotamian chieftain, called
Tayer or Thair,” made an attack upon Ctesiphon, took the city
by storm, and captured a sister or aunt of the Persian monarch.
The nobles, who, during Sapor's minority, guided the helm of
z
CH, VII.] -MINORITY of SAPOR II. 317
the State, were quite incompetent to make head against these
numerous enemies. For sixteen years the marauding bands
had the advantage, and Persia found herself continually weak-
er, more impoverished, and less able to recover herself. The
young prince is said to have shown extraordinary discretion
and intelligence.” He diligently trained himself in all manly ex-
ercises, and prepared both his mind and body for the important
duties of his station. But his tender years forbade him as yet
taking the field; and it is not unlikely that his ministers pro-
longed the period of his tutelage in order to retain, to the latest
possible moment, the power whereto they had become accus-
tomed. At any rate, it was not till he was sixteen, a later age
than Oriental ideas require,” that Sapor's minority ceased—
that he asserted his manhood, and, placing himself at the head ,
of his army, took the entire direction of affairs, civil and mili-
tary, into his own hands.”
From this moment the fortunes of Persia began to rise. Con-
tent at first to meet and chastise the marauding bands on his
own territory, Sapor, after a time, grew bolder, and ventured
to take the offensive. Having collected a fleet of considerable
size,” he placed his troops on board, and conveyed them to the
city of El-Katif, an important place on the south coast of the
Persian Gulf, where he disembarked and proceeded to carry
fire and sword through the adjacent region. Either on this oc-
casion, or more probably in a long series of expeditions, he rav-
aged the whole district of the Hejer, gaining numerous victories
over the tribes of the Temanites, the Beni-Waiel, the Abdul-
Rais, and others, which had taken a leading part in the inva-
sion of Persia. His military genius and his valor were every-
where conspicuous; but unfortunately these excellent qualities
were unaccompanied by the humanity which has been the
crowning virtue of many a conqueror. Sapor, exasperated by
the sufferings of his countrymen during so many years, thought
that he could not too severely punish those who had inflicted
them. He put to the sword the greater part of every tribe that
he conquered; and, when his soldiers were weary of slaying,
he made them pierce the shoulders of their prisoners, and in-
Sert in the wound a string or thong by which to drag them into
captivity.” The barbarity of the age and nation approved
these atrocities; and the monarch who had commanded them
was, in consequence, saluted as Dhowlacta, or “Lord of the
Shoulders,” by an admiring people.” *
Cruelties almost as great, but of a different character, were
- \
f
318 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ſch. vii.
at the same time sanctioned by Sapor in regard to one class of
his own subjects—viz., those who had made profession of
Christianity. The Zoroastrian zeal of this king was great,
and he regarded it as incumbent on him to check the advance
which Christianity was now making in his territories. He is-
sued severe edicts against the Christians soon after attaining
his majority;” and when they sought the protection of the
Roman emperor, he punished their disloyalty by imposing
upon them a fresh tax, the weight of which was oppressive.
When Symeon, Archbishop of Seleucia, complained of this ad-
ditional burden in an offensive manner, Sapor retaliated by
closing the Christian churches, confiscating the ecclesiastical
property, and putting the complainant to death. Accounts of
, these severities reached Constantine, the Roman emperor, who
had recently embraced the new religion (which, in spite of
constant persecution, had gradually overspread the empire),
and had assumed the character of a sort of general protector
of the Christians throughout the world.” He remonstrated
with Sapor, but to no purpose.” Sapor had formed the reso-
lution to renew the contest terminated so unfavorably forty
years earlier by his grandfather. He made the emperor's in-
terference with Persian affairs, and encouragement of his
Christian subjects in their perversity, a ground of complaint,
and began to threaten hostilities.” Some negotiations, which
are not very clearly narrated,” followed. Both sides, appar-
ently, had determined on war, but both wished to gain time.
It is uncertain what would have been the Fesult had Constan-
time lived. But the death of that monarch in the early sum-
mer of A.D. 337, on his way to the eastern frontier, dispelled
the last chance of peace by relieving Sapor from the whole-
some fear which had hitherto restrained his ambition. The
military fame of Constantine was great, and naturally inspired
respect; his power was firmly fixed, and he was without com-
petitor or rival. By his removal the whole face of affairs was
changed; and Sapor, who had almost brought himself to ven-
ture on a rupture with Rome during Constantine's life, no
longer hesitated on receiving news of his death, but at once
commenced hostilities.** t y
. It is probable that among the motives which determined the
somewhat wavering conduct of Sapor at this juncture” was a
reasonable fear of the internal troubles which it seemed to be
in the power of the Romans to excite among the Persians, if
from friends they became enemies. Having tested his own
}
cH. vii.] HIS GROUNDS OF QUARREL WITH ROME. 319
military capacity in his Arab wars, and formed an army on
whose courage, endurance, and attachment he could rely, he
was not afraid of measuring his strength with that of Rome in
the open field; but he may well have dreaded the arts which
the Imperial State was in the habit of employing," to supple.
ment her military shortcomings, in wars with her neighbors.
There was now at the court of Constantinople a Persian refu.
gee of such rank and importance that Constantine had, as it
were, a pretender ready made to his hand, and could reckon
on creating dissension among the Persians whenever he
pleased, by simply proclaiming himself this person's ally and
patron. Prince Hormisdas, the elder brother of Sapor, and
rightful king of Persia, had, after a long imprisonment,” con-
trived, by the help of his wife, to escape from his dungeon,”
and had fled to the court of Constantine as early as A.D. 323.
He had been received by the emperor with every mark of
honor and distinction, had been given a maintenance suited
to his rank, and had enjoyed other favors.” Sapor must have
felt himself deeply aggrieved by the undue attention paid to
his rival; and though he pretended to make light of the mat-
ter, and eyen generously sent Hormisdas the wife to whom his
escape was due, “he cannot but have been uneasy at the pos-
session, by the Roman emperor, of his brother's person. In
weighing the reasons for and against war he cannot but have
assigned considerable importance to this circumstance. It did
not ultimately prevent him from challenging Rome to the
combat; but it may help to account for the hesitation, the
delay, and the fluctuations of purpose, which we remark in his
conduct during the four or five years” which immediately pre-
ceded the death of Constantine.
320 , ! TLIE SEVENTII MONARCHY. {CH, VIII.
CHAPTER VIII.
Position of Affairs on the Death of Constantine. First War
of Sapor with Rome, A. D. 337–350. First Siege of Nisibis.
Obscure Interval. Troubles in Armenia, and Recovery of
Armenia by the Persians. Sapor's Second Siege of Nisibis.
Its Failure. Great Battle of Singara. Sapor's Son made
Prisoner and murdered in cold blood. Third Siege of
Nisibis. Sapor called away by an Invasion of the Mas-
* Sagetoe. .*
“Constantius adversus Persas et Saporem, qui Mesopotamiam vastaverant, novem
praeliis parum prospere decertavit.”—Orosius, Hist. vii. 29.
THE death of Constantine was followed by the division of the
Roman world among his sons. The vast empire with which
Sapor had almost made up his mind to contend was partitioned
out into three moderate-sized kingdoms.” In place of the late
brave and experienced emperor, a raw youth,” who had given
no signs of superior ability, had the government of the Roman
provinces of the East, of Thrace, Asia Minor, Syria, Mesopo-
tamia, and Egypt. Master of one third of the empire only,
and of the least warlike portion,” Constantius was a foe whom
the Persian monarch might well despise, and whom he might
expect to defeat without much difficulty. Moreover, there
was much in the circumstances of the time that seemed to
promise success to the Persian arms in a struggle with Rome.
The removal of Constantine had been followed by an outburst
of licentiousness and violence among the Roman soldiery in
the capital;" and throughout the East the army had cast off
the restraints of discipline, and given indications of a turbu-
lent and seditious spirit." The condition of Armenia was also
such as to encourage Sapor in his ambitious projects. Tiri-
dates, though a persecutor of the Christians in the early part
of his reign, had been converted by Gregory the Illuminator,"
and had then enforced Christianity on his subjects by fire and
sword. A sanguinary conflict had followed. A large portion
of the Armenians, firmly attached to the old national idolatry,
had resisted determinedly." Nobles, priests, and people had
fought desperately in defence of their temples, images, and
Vol.
|||. t. Plate XXVI l.
º
|
º
|
º
| º º
A PERSIAN GUARDSMAN (from the bas-reliefs)
w


























Vol || Plate XXVI ||
ſiſſiſſiſſiſſſſſſſſſſ
|ſſiſſiſſiſſiſſiſſiſſi
\ºſſſſſſſſ
#
JELEVATION AND GROUND PLAN of THE PALACE AT CTESIPHoN (after
Flandin). Scale, 1 inch to 100 feet.
GENERAL VIEw of Mashita Palace (from a Photograph).




on viii., SAPOI, II, ATTACKS coys.TANTIUS 321
altars; and, though the persistent will of the king overbore all
opposition, yet the result was the formation of a discontented
faction, which rose up from time to time against its rulers, and
was constantly tempted to ally itself with any foreign power
from which it could hope the re-establishment of the old relig-
ion. Armenia had also, after the death of Tiridates (in A.D.
314), fallen under the government of weak princes.” Persia.
had recovered from it the portion of Media Atropatene ceded
by the treaty between Galerius and Narses." Sapor, thereforé,
had nothing to fear on this side; and he might reasonably ex-
pect to find friends among the Armenians themselves, should
the general position of his affairs allow him to make an effort
to extend Persian influence once more over the Armenian
highland. - -
The bands of Sapor crossed the Roman frontier soon after, if
not even before,” the death of Constantine; and after an inter-
val of forty years the two great powers of the world were once
more engaged in a bloody conflict. Constantius, having paid
the last honors to his father's remains,” hastened to the eastern
frontier, where he found the Roman army weak in numbers,
badly armed and badly provided, ill-disposed towards himself,
and almost ready to mutiny.” It was necessary, before any-
thing could be done to resist the advance of Sapor, that the in-
subordination of the troops should be checked, their wants sup-
plied, and their good-will conciliated. Constantius applied him-
self to effect these changes.” Meanwhile Sapor set the Arabs
and Armenians in motion, inducing the Pagan party among
the latter to rise in insurrection, deliver their king, Tiranus,
into his power,” and make incursions into the Roman territory,
while the latter infested with their armed bands the provinces
of Mesopotamia and Syria.” He himself was content, during
the first year of the war, A.D. 337, with moderate successes, and
appeared to the Romans to avoid rather than seek a pitched
battle.” Constantius was able, under these circumstances, not
only to maintain his ground, but to gain certain advantages.
He restored the direction of affairs in Armenia to the Roman
party,” detached some of the Mesopotamian Arabs from the side
of his adversary, and attached them to his own,” and even
built forts in the Persian territory on the further side of the
Tigris." But the gains made were slight; and in the ensuing
year (A.D. 338) Sapor took the field in greater force than before,
and addressed himself to an important enterprise. He aimed,
it is evident, from the first, at the recovery of Mesopotamia,
^
322 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. VIII.
and at thrusting back the Romans from the Tigris to the Eu-
phrates. He found it easy to overrun the open country, to
ravage the crops, drive off the cattle, and burn the villages and
homesteads. But the region could not be regarded as conquered,
it could not be permanently held, unless the strongly fortified
posts which commanded it, and which were in the hands of
Rome, could be captured.” Of all these the most important
was Nisibis. This ancient town, known to the Assyrians as
Nazibina,” was, at any rate from the time of Lucullus,” the
most important city of Mesopotamia. It was situated at the
distance of about sixty miles from the Tigris, at the edge of the
Mons Masius, in a broad and fertile plain, watered by one of
the affluents” of the river Khabour, or Aborrhas. The Romans,
after their occupation of Mesopotamia, had raised it to the rank
of a colony;” and its defences, which were of great strength,
had always been maintained by the emperors in a state of effi-
ciency. Sapor regarded it as the key of the Roman position in
the tract between the rivers,” and, as early as A.D. 338, sought
to make himself master of it.”
The first siege of Nisibis by Sapor lasted, we are told, sixty-
three days.” Few particulars of it have come down to us.
Sapor had attacked the city, apparently, in the absence of con-
, stantius,” who had been called off to Pannonia to hold a confer-
ence with his brothers. It was defended, not only by its gar-
rison and inhabitants, but by the prayers and exhortations of
its bishop,” St. James, who, if he did not work miracles for
the deliverance of his countrymen, at any rate sustained and
animated their resistance. The result was that the bands of
Sapor were repelled with loss, and he was forced, after wasting
two months before the walls, to raise the siege and own himself
baffled.” .
After this, for some years the Persian war with Rome lan-
guished. It is difficult to extract from the brief statements of
epitomizers,” and the loose invectives or panegyrics of orators,”
the real circumstances of the struggle; but apparently the gen-
eral condition of things was this. The Persians were constantly
victorious in the open field; Constantius was again and again
defeated;” but no permanent gain' was effected by these suc-
cesses. A weakness inherited by the Persians from the Par-
thians”—an inability to conduct sieges to a prosperous issue—
showed itself; and their failures against the fortified posts
which Rome had taken care to establish in the disputed regions
were continual. Up to the close of A.D. 340 Sapor had made
cH. viir.] SETTLEMENT OF AIRMENIA. 323
no important gain, had struck no decisive blow, but stood nearly
in the same position which he had occupied at the commence-
ment of the conflict. ~
But the year A.D. 341 saw a change. Sapor, after obtaining
possession of the person of Tiranus, had sought to make himself
master of Armenia, and had even attempted to set up one of
his own relatives as king.” But the indomitable spirit of the
inhabitants, and their firm attachment to their Arsacid princes,
caused his attempts to fail of any good result, and tended on
the whole to throw Armenia into the arms of Rome. Sapor,
after a while, became convinced of the folly of his proceedings,
and resolved on the adoption of a wholly new policy. He would
relinquish the idea of conquering, and would endeavor instead
to conciliate the Armenians, in the hope of obtaining from their
gratitude what he had been unable to extort from their fears.
Tiranus was still living; and Sapor, we are told, offered to re-
place him upon the Armenian throne;” but, as he had been
blinded by his captors, and as Oriental notions did not allow a
person thus mutilated to exercise royal power,” Tiranus de-
clined the offer made him, and suggested the substitution of his
son, Arsaces, who was, like himself, a prisoner in Persia. Sa-
por readily consented; and the young prince, released from
captivity, returned to his country, and was installed as king
by the Persians,” with the good-will of the natives, who were
Satisfied so long as they could feel that they had at their head
a monarch of the ancient stock. The arrangement, of course,
placed Armenia on the Persian side, and gave Sapor for many
years a powerful ally in his struggle with Rome.”
Thus Sapor had, by the year A.D. 341, made a very consider-
able gain. He had placed a friendly sovereign on the Arme-
nian throne, had bound him to his cause by oaths, and had
thereby established bis influence, not only over Armenia itself,
but over the whole tract which lay between Armenia and the
Caucasus. But he was far from content with these successes.
It was still his great object to drive the Romans from Mesopo-
tamia; and with that object in view it continued to be his
first wish to obtain possession of Nisibis. Accordingly, having
Settled Armenian affairs to his liking, he made, in A.D. 346, a
Second attack on the great city of Northern Mesopotamia,
again investing it with a large body of troops, and this time
pressing the siege during the space of nearly three months.”
Again, however, the strength of the walls and the endurance
of the garrison baffled him. Sapor was once more obliged to
_ – – -
\
324 TILE SEVENTH MONAIROHY. [CH. VIII.
withdraw from before the place, having suffered greater loss
than those whom he had assailed, and forfeited much of the
prestige which he had acquired by his many victories.
It was, perhaps, on account of the repulse from Nisibis, and
in the hope of recovering his lost laurels, that Sapor, in the
next year but one, A.D. 348, made an unusual efiort. Calling
out the entire military force of the empire, and augmenting it
by large bodies of allies and mercenaries,” the Persian king,
towards the middle of summer, crossed the Tigris by three
bridges,” and with a numerous and well-appointed army in-
vaded Central Mesopotamia, probably from Adiabene, or the
region near and a little south of Nineveh. Constantius, with
the Roman army, was posted on and about the Sinjar range
of hills, in the vicinity of the town of Singara, which is repre-
sented by the modern village of Sinjar.” The Roman emperor
did not venture to dispute the passage of the river, or to meet
his adversary in the broad plain which intervenes between the
Tigris and the mountain range, but clung to the skirts of the
hills, and commanded his troops to remain wholly on the de-
fensive.” Sapor was thus enabled to choose his position, to
establish a fortified camp at a convenient distance from the
enemy, and to occupy the hills in its vicinity—some portion of
the Sinjar range—with his archers. It is uncertain whether,
in making these dispositions, he was merely providing for his
own safety, or whether he was laying a trap into which he
hoped to entice the Roman army.* Perhaps his mind was
wide enough to embrace both contingencies. At any rate,
having thus established a point d'appui in his rear, he ad-
vanced boldly and challenged the legions to an encounter.
The challenge was at once accepted, and the battle commenced
about midday;” but now the Persians, having just crossed
swords with the enemy, almost immediately began to give
ground, and retreating hastily drew their adversaries along,
across the thirsty plain, to the vicinity of their fortified camp,
where a strong body of horse and the flower of the Persian
- archers were posted. The horse charged, but the legionaries
easily defeated them,” and elated with their success burst into
the camp, despite the warnings of their leader, who strove
vainly to check their ardor and to induce them to put off the
completion of their victory till the next day.” A small de-
tachment found within the ramparts was put to the Sword;
and the soldiers scattered themselves among the tents, some
in quest of booty, others only anxious for some means of
#
on vin] THIRD SIEGE of NISIBIs. 325
quenching their raging thirst.” Meantime the sun had gone
down, and the shades of night fell rapidly. Regarding the
battle as over, and the victory as assured, the Romans gave
themselves up to sleep or feasting. But now Sapor saw his
opportunity—the opportunity for which he had perhaps
planned and waited. His light troops on the adjacent hills
commanded the camp, and, advancing on every side, sur-
rounded it. They were fresh and eager for the fray; they
fought in the security afforded by the darkness; while the
fires of the camp showed them their enemies, worn out with
fatigue, sleepy, or drunken." The result, as might have been
expected, was a terrible carnage." The Persians overwhelmed
the legionaries with showers of darts and arrows; flight,
under the circumstances, was impossible; and the Roman.
soldiers mostly perished where they stood. They took, how-
ever, ere they died, an atrocious revenge. Sapor's son had
been made prisoner in the course of the day; in their despera-
tion the legionaries turned their fury against this innocent
youth; they beat him with whips, wounded him with the
points of their weapons, and finally rushed upon him and
killed him with a hundred blows.” r
The battle of Singara, though thus disastrous to the Romans,
had not any great effect in determining the course or issue of
the war. Sapor did not take advantage of his victory to at-
tack the rest of the Roman forces in Mesopotamia, or even to
attempt the siege of any large town.” Perhaps he had really
suffered large losses in the earlier part of the day;” perhaps he
was too much affected by the miserable death of his son to
care, till time had dulled the edge of his grief, for military
glory.” At any rate, we hear of his undertaking no further
enterprise till the second year after the battle," A.D. 350, when
he made his third and most desperate attempt to capture Nisi-
bis. --
The rise of a civil war in the West, and the departure of
Constantius for Europe with the flower of his troops early in
the year," no doubt encouraged the Persian monarch to make
one more effort against the place which had twice repulsed him
with ignominy.” He collected a numerous native army, and
strengthened it by the addition of a body of Indian allies,”
who brought a large troop of elephants into the field." With
this force he crossed the Tigris in the early summer, and,
after taking several fortified posts, march northwards and in-
vested Nisibis. The Roman commander in the place was the
*
}
326 THE SEFENTH MONARCHY. [CH. VIII.
Count Lucilianus, afterwards the father-in-law of Jovian, a man
of resource and determination. He is Said to have taken the
best advantage of every favorable turn of fortune in the course
of the siege, and to have prolonged the resistance by various
'subtle stratagems.” But the real animating spirit of the de-
fence was once more the bishop, St. James, who roused the
enthusiasm of the inhabitants to the highest pitch by his ex-
'hortations, guided them by his counsels, and was thought to
work miracles for them by his prayers.” Sapor tried at first
the ordinary methods of attack; he battered the walls with
his rams, and Sapped them with mines. But finding that by
these means he made no satisfactory progress, he had recourse
shortly to wholly novel proceedings. The river Mygdonius
(now the Jerujer), swollen by the melting of the snows in the
Mons Masius, had overflowed its banks and covered with an
inundation the plain in which Nisibis stands. Sapor saw that
the forces of nature might be employed to advance his ends,
and so embanked the lower part of the plain that the water
could not run off, but formed a deep lake round the town,
gradually creeping up the walls till it had almost reached the
battlements.”. Having thus created an artificial sea, the en-
ergetic monarch rapidly collected, or constructed," a fleet of
vessels, and, placing his military engines on board, launched
the ships upon the waters, and so attacked the walls of the
city at great advantage. But the defenders resisted stoutly,
setting the engines on fire with torches, and either lifting the
ships from the water by means of cranes, or else shattering
them with the huge stones which they could discharge from
their balistae." Still, therefore, no impression was made; but
at last an unforeseen circumstance brought the besieged into
the greatest peril, and almost gave Nisibis into the enemy's
hands. The inundation, confined by the mounds of the Per-
sians, which prevented it from running off, pressed with con-
tinually increasing force against the defences of the city, till
at last the wall, in one part, proved too weak to withstand the
- tremendous weight which boreupon it, and gave way suddenly
for the space of a hundred and fifty feet." What further
damage was done to the town we know not; but a breach was
opened through which the Persians at once made ready to
pour into the place, regarding it as impossible that so huge a
gap should be either repaired or effectually defended. Sapor
took up his position on an artificial eminence, while his troops
rushed to the assault." First of all marched the heavy cav-
9
CH. VIII.] THIRD SIEGE OF NISIBIS. 327
t
alry, accompanied by the horse-archers; next came the ele.
phants, bearing iron towers upon their backs, and in each
tower a number of bowmen; intermixed with the elephants
were a certain amount of heavy-armed foot.” It was a
strange column with which to attack a breach; and its compo-
sition does not say much for Persian siege tactics, which were,
always poor and ineffective," and which now, as usually, re-
sulted in failure. The horses became quickly entangled in the
ooze and mud which the waters had left behind them as they
subsided; the elephants were even less able to overcome these
difficulties, and as Soon as they received a wound sank down
—never to rise again—in the swamp." Sapor hastily gave
orders for the assailing column to retreat and seek the friendly
shelter of the Persian camp, while he essayed to maintain his .
advantage in a different way. His light archers were ordered
to the front, and, being formed into divisions which were to
act as reliefs, received orders to prevent the restoration of the
ruined wall by directing an incessant storm of arrows into the
gap made by the waters. But the firmness and activity of the
garrison and inhabitants defeated this well-imagined proceed-
ing. While the heavy-armed troops stood in the gap receiving
the flights of arrows and defending themselves as they best
could, the unarmed multitude raised a new wall in their rear,
which, by the morning of the next day, was six feet in height.”
This last proof of his enemies' resolution and resource seems to
have finally convinced Sapor of the hopelessness of his enter-
prise. Though he still continued the siege for a while, he made
no other grand attack, and at length drew off his forces, hav-
ing lost twenty thousand men before the walls,” and wasted a
hundred days, or more than three months.”
Perhaps he would not have departed so soon, but would
have turned the siege into a blockade, and endeavored to starve
the garrison into Submission, had not alarming tidings reached
him from his north-eastern frontier. Then, as now, the low
flat Sandy region east of the Caspian was in the possession of
nomadic hordes, whose whole life was spent in war and plun-
der. The Oxus might be nominally the boundary of the em-
pire in this quarter; but the nomads were really dominant over
the entire desert to the foot of the Hyrcanian and Parthian
hills.” Petty plundering forays into the fertile region south
and east of the desert were no doubt constant, and were not
greatly regarded; but from time to time some tribe or chieftain
bolder than the rest made a deeper inroad and a more sustained
*
- - - - *
*
- 328 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. IX,
attack than usual, spreading consternation around, and terrify.
ing the court for its safety. Such an attack seems to have oc-
curred towards the autumn of A.D. 350. The invading horde is
said to have consisted of Massagatae;” but we can hardly be
mistaken in regarding them as, in the main, Of Tatar, or Tur-
koman blood, akin to the Usbegs and other Turanian tribes
which still inhabit the sandy steppe. Sapor considered the cri-
sis such as to require his own presence; and thus, while civil
war summoned one of the two rivals from Mesopotamia to the
far West, where he had to contend with the self-styled emper-
ors, Magnentius and Vetranio, the other was called away to
the extreme East to repel a Tatar invasion. A tacit truce was
thus established between the great belligerents"—a truce which
lasted for seven or eight years. The unfortunate Mesopota-
mians, harassed by constant war for above twenty years, had
now a breathing-space during which to recover from the ruin
and desolation that had overwhelmed them. Rome and Per-
sia for a time suspended their conflict. Rivalry, indeed, did
not cease; but it was transferred from the battlefield to the
cabinet, and the Roman emperor sought and found in diplo-
matic triumphs a compensation for the ill-success which had
attended his efforts in the field. -
CHAPTER IX.
Revolt of Armenia and Acceptance by Arsaces of the Position
of a Roman Feudatory. Character and Issue of Sapor's
Eastern Wars. His negotiations with Constantius. His
Eactreme Demands. Circumstances under which he deter.
mines to renew the War. His Preparations. Desertion to
him of Antoninus. Great Invasion of Sapor. Siege of
Amida. Sapor's Severities. Siege and Capture of Sin.
gara; of Bezabde. Attack on Virta fails. Aggressive
Movement of Constantius. He attacks Bezabde, but fails,
Campaign of A.D. 361. Death of Constantius.
Evenerat . . . quasi fatali constellatione . . . ut Constantium dimicantem cum
Persis fortuna Semper sequeretur affliction.—Amm. Marc. xx. 9, ad fin.
IT seems to have been soon after the close of Sapor's first
War with Constantius that events took place in Armenia which
- * ,
ch, Ix.] EASTERY WARS OF SAPOR II. 329
once more replaced that country under Roman influence. Ar-
saces, the son of Tiranus, had been, as we have seen,” estab-
lished as monarch, by Sapor, in the year A.D. 341, under the
notion that, in return for the favor shown him, he would ad-
minister Armenia in the Persian interest. But gratitude is an
unsafe basis for the friendships of monarchs. Arsaces, after a
time, began to chafe against the obligations under which Sapor
had laid him, and to wish, by taking independent action, to
show himself a real king, and not a mere feudatory. He was
also, perhaps, tired of aiding Sapor in his Roman war, and may
have found that he suffered more than he gained by having
Rome for an enemy. At any rate, in the interval” between
A.D. 351 and 359, probably while Sapor was engaged in the far
East," Arsaces sent envoys to Constantinople with a request to.
Constantius that he would give him in marriage a member of
the Imperial house.” Constantius was charmed with the appli-
cation made to him, and at Once accepted the proposal. . He
Selected for the proffered honor a certain Olympias, the daugh-
ter of Ablabius, a Praetorian prefect, and lately the betrothed
bride of his own brother, Constans; and sent her to Armenia,"
where Arsaces welcomed her, and made her (as it would seem)
his chief wife, provoking thereby the jealousy and aversion of
his previous Sultana, a native Armenian, named Pharandzem."
The engagement thus entered into led On, naturally, to the con-
clusion of a formal alliance between Rome and Armenia—an
alliance which Sapor made fruitless efforts to disturb," and
which continued unimpaired down to the time (A.D. 359) when
hostilities once more broke out between Rome and Persia.
Of Sapor's Eastern wars we have no detailed account. They
seem to have occupied him from A.D. 350 to A.D. 357, and to
have been, on the whole, successful. They were certainly ter-
minated by a peace in the last-named year"—a peace of which
it must have been a condition that his late enemies should lend
him aid in the struggle which he was about to renew with
Rome. Who these enemies exactly were, and what exact re-
gion they inhabited, is doubtful. They comprised certainly the
Chionites and Gelani, probably the Euseni and the Vertae.”
The Chionites are thought to have been Hiongnu or Huns;”
and the Euseni are probably the U-siun, who, as early as B.C.
200, are found among the nomadic hordes pressing towards the
Oxus.” The Vertae are wholly unknown. The Gelani should,
by their name, be the inhabitants of Ghilan, or the coast tract
South-west of the Caspian; but this locality Seems too remote
* & t -
330 THE SEVENTH MONARCHF. [CH, Ix.
from the probable seats of the Chionites and Euseni to be the
one intended. The general scene of the wars was undoubtedly
east of the Caspian, either in the Oxus region, or still further
eastward, on the confines of India and Scythia.” The result of
the wars, though not a conquest, was an extension of Persian
influence and power. Troublesome enemies were converted
into friends and allies. The loss of a predominating influence
over Armenia was thus compensated, or more than compen-
sated, within a few years, by a gain of a similar kind in an-
other quarter.
While Sapor was thus engaged in the far East, he received
letters from the officer whom he had left in charge of his
... western frontier,” informing him that the Romans were anxious
to exchange the precarious truce which Mesopotamia had been
allowed to enjoy during the last five or six years for a more
settled and formal peace. Two great Roman officials, Cas-
sianus, duke of Mesopotamia, and Musonianus, Praetorian pre-
fect, understanding that Sapor was entangled in a bloody and
difficult war at the eastern extremity of his empire, and know-
ing that Constantius was fully occupied with the troubles
caused by the inroads of the barbarians into the more western
of the Roman provinces, had thought that the time was favor-
able for terminating the provisional state of affairs in the
Mesopotamian region by an actual treaty.” They had accord-
ingly opened negotiations with Tamsapor, satrap of Adiabene,
and suggested to him that he should sound his master on the
subject of making peace with Rome. Tamsapor appears to
have misunderstood the character of these overtures, or to
have misrepresented them to Sapor; in his despatch he made
Constantius himself the mover in the matter, and spoke of him
as humbly supplicating the great king to grant him condi-
tions.” It happened that the message reached Sapor just as he
had come to terms with his eastern enemies, and had succeeded
in inducing them to become his allies. He was naturally elated
at his success, and regarded the Roman overture as a simple
-, acknowledgment of weakness. Accordingly he answered in
the most haughty style. His letter, which was conveyed to
the Roman emperor at Sirmium by an ambassador named
Narses,” was conceived in the following terms:"
“Sapor, king of kings, brother of the Sun and moon, and
companion of the stars, sends salutation to his brother, Con-
stantius Caesar. It glads me to see that thou art at last re-
turned to the right way, and art ready to do what is just and
A
g
ch, Ix.] LETTER OF SAPOR TO CONSTANTIUS. 331
fair, having learned by experience that inordinate greed is oft-
times punished by defeat and disaster. As then the voice of
truth ought to speak with all openness, and the more illustrious
of mankind should make their words mirror their thoughts, I
will briefly declare to thee what I propose, not forgetting that
I have often Said the Same things before. Your own authors
are witness that the entire tract within the river Strymon and
the borders of Macedon was once held by my ancestors; if I
required you to restore all this, it would not ill become me (ex-
cuse the boast), inasmuch as I excel in virtue and in the splen-
dor of my achievements the whole line of our ancient monarchs.
But as moderation delights me, and has always been the rule
of my conduct—wherefore from my youth up I have had no
occasion to repent of any action—I will be content to receive "
Mesopotamia and Armenia, which was fraudulently extorted
from my grandfather. We Persians have never admitted the
principle, which you proclaim with such effrontery, that success
in war is always glorious, whether it be the fruit of courage or
trickery. In conclusion, if you will take the advice of one who
speaks for your good, Sacrifice a small tract of territory, one
always in dispute and causing continual bloodshed, in order
that you may rule the remainder Securely. Physicians, re-
Imember, often cut and burn, and even amputate portions of
the body, that the patient may have the healthy use of what is
left to him; and there are animals which, understanding why
the hunters chase them, deprive themselves of the thing coveted,
to live thenceforth without fear. I warn you, that, if my am-
bassador returns in vain, I will take the field against you, so
Soon as the winter is past, with all my forces, confiding in my
good fortune and in the fairness of the conditions which I have
now offered.”
It must have been a severe blow to Imperial pride to receive
such a letter: and the sense of insult can scarcely have been
much mitigated by the fact that the missive was enveloped in
a silken covering,” or by the circumstance that the bearer,
Narses, endeavored by his conciliating manners to atone for his
master's rudeness.” Constantius replied, however, in a digni-
fied and calm tone.” “The Roman emperor,” he said, “victo-
rious by land and, Sea, Saluted his brother, King Sapor. His
lieutenant in Mesopotamia had meant well in opening a nego-
tiation with a Persian governor; but he had acted without
Orders, and could not bind his master. Nevertheless, he (Con-
Stantius) would not disclaim what had been done, since he did
332 . TIME SEVENTH MONARCHF. [CH. IX.
not object to a peace, provided it were fair and honorable. But
to ask the master of the whole Roman world to surrender ter-
ritories which he had successfully defended when he ruled only
over the provinces of the East was plainly indecent and ab-
surd. He must add that the employment of threats was futile,
and too common an artifice; more especially as the Persians
themselves must know that Rome always defended herself
when attacked, and that, if occasionally she was vanquished
in a battle, yet she never failed to have the advantage in the
event of every war.” Three envoys were entrusted with the
delivery of this reply”—Prosper, a count of the empire; Spec-
tatus, a tribune and notary; and Eustathius, an orator and
. philosopher, a pupil of the celebrated Neo-Platonist, Jam-
blichus,” and a friend of St. Basil.” Constantius was most
anxious for peace, as a dangerous war threatened with the
Alemanni, one of the most powerful tribes of Germany.” He
seems to have hoped that, if the unadorned language of the
two statesmen failed to move Sapor, he might be won over by
the persuasive eloquence of the professor of rhetoric.
But Sapor was bent on war. He had concluded arrange-
ments with the natives so long his adversaries in the East, by
which they had pledged themselves to join his standard with
all their forces in the ensuing spring.” He was well aware of
the position of Constantius in the West, of the internal cor-
ruption of his court, and of the perils constantly threatening
him from external enemies. A Roman official of importance,
bearing the once honored name of Antoninus, had recently
taken refuge with him from the claims of pretended creditors,
and had been received into high favor on account of the infor-
mation which he was able to communicate with respect to the
disposition of the Roman forces and the condition of their
magazines.” This individual, ennobled by the royal authority,
and given a place at the royal table, gained great influence
over his new master, whom he stimulated by alternately re-
proaching him with his backwardness in the past, and putting
- before him the prospect of easy triumphs over Rome in the fu-
ture. He pointed out that the emperor, with the bulk of his
troops and treasures, was detained in the regions adjoining the
Danube, and that the East was left almost undefended; he
magnified the services which he was himself competent to ren-
der;” he exhorted Sapor to bestir himself, and to put confidence
in his good fortune. He recommended that the old plan of
sitting down before walled towns should be given up, and that
\\
CH. IX.] GREAT INVASION of SAPOR. | 333
the Persian monarch, leaving the strongholds of Mesopotamia
in his rear, should press forward to the Euphrates,” pour his
troops across it, and overrun the rich province of Syria, which
he would find unguarded, and which had not been invaded by
an enemy for nearly a century. The views of Antoninus were
adopted; but, in practice, they were overruled by the exigen-
cies of the situation. A Roman army occupied Mesopotamia,
and advanced to the banks of the Tigris. When the Persians
in full force crossed the river, accompanied by Chionite and
Albanian allies,” they found a considerable body of troops pre-
pared to resist them. Their opponents did not, indeed offer
battle, but they laid waste the country as the Persians took
possession of it; they destroyed the forage, evacuated the in-.
defensible towns” (which fell, of course, into the enemy's
hands), and fortified the line of the Euphrates with castles,
military engines, and palisades.” Still the programme of An-
toninus would probably have been carried out, had not the
swell of the Euphrates exceeded the average, and rendered it
impossible for the Persian troops to ford the river at the usual
point of passage into Syria. On discovering this obstacle, An-
toninus suggested that, by a march to the north-east through
a fertile country, the Upper Euphrates might be reached, and ,
easily crossed, before its waters had attained any considerable
volume. Sapor agreed to adopt this suggestion. He marched
from Zeugma across the Mons Masius towards the Upper Eu-
phrates, defeated the Romans in an important battle near
Amida,” took, by a sudden assault, two castles which defended
the town,” and then somewhat hastily resolved that he would
attack the place, which he did not imagine capable of making
much resistance. - -
Amida, now Diarbekr, was situated on the right bank of the
Upper Tigris, in a fertile plain, and was washed along the whole
of its western side by a semi-circular bend of the river.” It
had been a place of considerable importance from a very an-
cient date,” and had recently been much strengthened by Con-
stantius, who had made it an arsenal for military engines, and
had repaired its towers and walls.” The town contained within
it a copious fountain of water, which was liable, however, to
acquire a disagreeable odor in the summer time. Seven le-
gions, of the moderate strength to which legions had been re-
duced by Constantine,” defended it; and the garrison included
also a body of horse-archers, composed chiefly or entirely of
noble foreigners.” Sapor hoped in the first instance to terrify
334 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. [CH. Ix.
it into submission by his mere appearance, and boldly rode up
to the gates with a small body of his followers, expecting that
they would be opened to him. But the defenders were more
courageous than he had imagined. They received him with a
shower of darts and arrows that were directed specially
against his person, which was conspicuous from its ornaments;
and they aimed their weapons so well that one of them passed
through a portion of his dress and was nearly wounding him.”
Persuaded by his followers, Sapor upon this withdrew, and
committed the further prosecution of the attack to Grumbates,
the king of the Chionites, who assaulted the walls on the next
day with a body of picked troops, but was repulsed with great
loss, his only son, a youth of great promise, being killed at his
side by a dart from a balista." The death of this prince spread
dismay through the camp, and was followed by a general
mourning; but it now became a point of honor to take the
town which had so injured one of the great king's royal allies;
and Grumbates was promised that Amida should become the
funeral pile of his lost darling.”
The town was now regularly invested. Each nation was as-
signed its place. The Chionites, burning with the desire to
avenge their late defeat, were on the east; the Vertae on the
south; the Albanians, warriors from the Caspian region, on the
north: the Segestans,” who were reckoned the bravest soldiers
of all, and who brought into the field a large body of elephants,
held the west. A continuous line of Persians, five ranks deep,
surrounded the entire city, and supported the auxiliary detach-
ments. Tha entire besieging army was estimated at a hundred
thousand men;” the besieged, including the unarmed multitude,
were under 30,000." After the pause of an entire day, the first
general attack was made. Grumbates gave the signal for the
assault by hurling a bloody spear into the space before the
walls, after the fashion of a Roman fetialis.” A cloud of darts
and arrows from every side followed the flight of this weapon,
and did severe damage to the besieged, who were at the same
time galled with discharges from Roman military engines,
taken by the Persians in Some capture of Singara, and now em-
ployed against their former owners." Still a vigorous resist-
ance continued to be made, and the besiegers, in their exposed
positions, suffered even more than the garrison; so that after
two days the attempt to carry the city by general assault was
abandoned, and the slow process of a regular siege was adopted.
Trenches were opened at the usual distance from the walls,
---
CH. IX.] . . SIEGE OF AMIDA. . . - 335
along which the troops advanced under the cover of hurdles
towards the ditch, which they proceeded to fill up in places.
Mounds were then thrown up against the walls; and movable
towers were constructed and brought into play, guarded exter-
nally with iron, and each mounting a balista.” It was impos-
sible long to withstand these various weapons of attack. The
hopes of the besieged lay, primarily, in their receiving relief
from without by the advance of an army capable of engaging
their assailants and harassing them or driving them off; sec-
ondarily, in successful Sallies, by means of which they might
destroy the enemy's works and induce him to retire from be-
fore the place. r
There existed, in the neighborhood of Amida, the elements of
a relieving army, under the command of the new prefect of the
East, Sabinianus. Had this officer possessed an energetic and
enterprising character, he might, without much difficulty, have
collected a force of light and active Soldiers, which might have
hung upon the rear of the Persians, intercepted their convoys,
cut off their stragglers, and have even made an occasional dash
upon their lines. Such was the course of conduct recommend-
ed by Ursicinus, the second in command, whom Sabinianus had
recently superseded; but the latter was jealous of his subordi-
nate, and had orders from the Byzantine court to keep him un-
employed.” He was himself old and rich, alike disinclined to
and unfit for military enterprise;" he therefore absolutely re-
jected the advice of Ursicinus, and determined on making no
effort. He had positive orders, he said, from the court to keep
on the defensive and not endanger his troops by engaging them
in hazardous adventures. Amida must protect itself, or at any
rate not look to him for succor. Ursicinus chafed terribly, it
it said, against this decision,” but was forced to submit to it.
His messengers conveyed the dispiriting intelligence to the de-
voted city, which learned thereby that it must rely wholly
upon its own exertions.
Nothing now remained but to organize sallies on a large scale
and attack the besieger's works. Such attempts were made
from time to time with some success; and on one occasion two
Gaulish legions, banished to the East for their adherence to
the cause of Magnentius, penetrated, by night, into the heart
of the besieging camp, and brought the person of the monarch
into danger. This peril was, however, escaped; the legions
were repulsed with the loss of a sixth of their number;" and
nothing was gained by the audacious enterprise beyond a truce
w
}
336 THE SEWENTH MONARCHY. . [CH. IX.
of three days, during which each side mourned its dead, and
sought to repair its losses.
The fate of the doomed city drew on. Pestilence was added
to the calamities which the besieged had to endure.” Desertion
and treachery were arrayed against them. One of the natives
of Amida, going over to the Persians, informed them that on
the southern side of the city a neglected staircase led up from
the margin of the Tigris through underground corridors to one of
the principal bastions; and under his guidance Seventy archers
of the Persian guard, picked men, ascended the dark passage at
dead of night, occupied the tower, and when morning broke dis-
played from it a scarlet flag, as a sign to their countrymen that
a portion of the wall was taken. The Persians were upon the
alert, and an instant assault was made. But the garrison, by
extraordinary efforts, succeeded in recapturing the tower be-
fore any support reached its occupants; and then, directing
their artillery and missiles against the assailing columns, in-
flicted on them tremendous losses, and soon compelled them to
return hastily to the shelter of their camp. The Vertae, who
maintained the siege on the south side of the city, were the
chief sufferers in this abortive attempt.”
'Sapor had now spent seventy days before the place, and had
made no perceptible impression. Autumn was already far ad-
vanced,” and the season for military operations would soon be
over. It was necessary, therefore, either to take the city
speedily or to give up the siege and retire. Under these circum-
stances Sapor resolved on a last effort. He had constructed
towers of such a height that they overtopped the wall, and
poured their discharges on the defenders from a superior
elevation. He had brought his mounds in places to a level
with the ramparts, and had compelled the garrison to raise
countermounds within the walls for their protection. He now
determined on pressing the assault day after day, until he
either carried the town or found all his resources exhausted.
His artillery, his foot, and his elephants were all employed in
turn or together; he allowed the garrison no rest." Not con-
tent with directing the operations, he himself took part in the
Supreme struggle, exposing his own person freely to the enemy's
weapons, and losing many of his attendants." After the con-
test had lasted three continuous days from morn to night, for-
tune at last favored him. One of the inner mounds, raised by
the besieged behind their wall, suddenly gave way, involving
its defenders in its fall, and at the same time filling up the
&
Wol. Ill.
Fig. 1.
*...* an º' -- ** * * * *
-
- ---
GrousD-PLAN of PAI.Ace AT MAshita (after Tristram.
A A, 'Sculptured façade. B B n B, Pillared entrances.
c. Well or fºſtratafa.,
D, Tower with staircase. E. E. E. E. Main building of Palace.
Plate XXIX.
INNER GATEWAY of MAs HITA PALACE (from a Photograph).
- - grap


Plate. XXX,
ELABorati, ORNAMENTATION of PAIACE AT MAshit A.

t
cII. IX.] . FALL OF AMIDA. . 337
entire space between the wall and the mound raised outside
by the Persians. A way into the town was thus laid open,”
and the besiegers instantly occupied it. It was in vain that
the flower of the garrison threw itself across the path of the
entering columns—nothing could withstand the ardor of the
Persian troops. In a little time all resistance was at an end;
those who could quitted the city and fled—the remainder,
whatever their sex, age, Or calling, whether armed or un-
armed, were slaughtered like sheep by the conquerors.”
Thus fell Amida after a siege of seventy-three days." Sapor,
who on other occasions showed himself not deficient in clem-
ency," was exasperated by the prolonged resistance and the
losses which he had sustained in the course of it. Thirty .
thousand of his best soldiers had fallen;" the son of his chiefly
ally had perished;" he himself had been brought into im-
minent danger. Such audacity on the part of a petty town
seemed no doubt to him to deserve a severe retribution. The
place was therefore given over to the infuriated soldiery, who
were allowed to slay and plunder at their pleasure. Of the
captives taken, all belonging to the five provinces across the
Tigris, claimed as his own by Sapor, though ceded to Rome by
his grandfather, were massacred in cold blood. The Count
AElian, and the commanders of the legions who had conducted
the gallant defence, were barbarously crucified. Many other
Romans of high rank were subjected to the indignity of being
manacled, and were dragged into Persia as slaves rather than
as prisoners.”
The campaign of A.D. 359 terminated with this dearly bought
victory. The season was too far advanced for any fresh enter-
prise of importance; and Sapor was probably glad to give his
army a rest after the toils and perils of the last three months,
Accordingly he retired across the Tigris, without leaving (so
far as appears) any garrisons in Mesopotamia, and began pre-
parations for the campaign of A.D. 360. Stores of all kinds
were accumulated during the winter; and, when the spring
Came, the indefatigable monarch once more invaded the
enemy's country, pouring into Mesopotamia an army even
more numerous and better appointed than that which he had
led against Amida in the preceding year." His first object
now was to capture Singara, a town of Some consequence,
which was, however, defended by only two Roman legions and
a certain number of native soldiers. After a vain attempt to
persuade the garrison to a Surrender, the attack was made in
338 t THE SEWENTEI MONARCHY. [CH. Ix.
the usual way, chiefly by scaling parties with ladders, and by
battering parties which shook the walls with the ram. The
defenders kept the Scalers at bay by a constant discharge of
stones and darts from their artillery, arrows from their bows,
and leaden bullets" from their slings. They met the assaults
of the ram by attempts to fire the wooden covering which pro-
tected it and those who worked it. For some days these
efforts sufficed; but after a while the besiegers found a weak
point in the defences of the place—a tower so recently built
that the mortar in which the stones were laid was still moist,
and which consequently crumbled rapidly before the blows of
a strong and heavy battering-ram, and in a short time fell to
, the ground. The Persians poured in through the gap, and
were at once masters of the entire town, which ceased to re-
sist after the catastrophe. This easy victory allowed Sapor to
exhibit the better side of his character; he forbade the further
shedding of blood, and Ordered that as many as possible of the
garrisons and citizens should be taken alive. Reviving a
favorite policy of Oriental rulers from very remote times," he
transported these captives to the extreme eastern parts of his
empire,” where they might be of the greatest service to him in
defending his frontier against the Scythians and Indians.
It is not really surprising, though the historian of the war.
regards it as needing explanation," that no attempt was made
to relieve Singara by the Romans. The siege was short; the
place was considered strong; the nearest point held by a
powerful Roman force was Nisibis, which was at least sixty
miles distant from Singara. The neighborhood of Singara was,
moreover, ill supplied with water; and a relieving army would
probably have soon found itself in difficulties. Singara, on the
verge of the desert, was always perilously situated. Rome
valued it as an outpost from which her enemy might be
watched, and which might advertise her of a sudden danger,
but could not venture to undertake its defence in case of an
attack in force, and was prepared to hear of its capture with
- equanimity. -
From Singara Sapor directed his march almost due north-
wards, and, leaving Nisibis unassailed upon his left, proceeded
to attack the strong fort known indifferently as Phoenica or
Bezabde.” This was a position on the east bank of the Tigris,
near the point where that river quits the mountains and de-
bouches upon the plain;" though not on the site,” it may be
considered the representative of the modern Jezireh, which
* ~
CH. IX.] ' ' … FALL OF BEZABDE. * 339
commands the passes from the low country into the Kurdish
mountains. Bezabde was the chief city of the province, called
, after it Zabdicene, one of the five ceded by Narses and greatly
coveted by his grandson. It was much valued by Rome, was
fortified in places with a double wall, and was guarded by
three legions and a large body of Kurdish archers.” Sapor,
having reconnoitred the place, and, with his usual hardi-
hood, exposed himself to danger in doing so, sent a flag of truce
to demand a surrender, joining with the messengers some
prisoners of high rank taken at Singara, lest the enemy should
open fire upon his envoys. The device was successful; but the
garrison proved stanch, and determined on resisting to the
last. Once more all the known resources of attack and de-
fence were brought into play; and after a long siege, of which ..
the most important incident was an attempt made by the
bishop of the place to induce Sapor to withdraw,” the wall was
at last breached, the city taken, and its defenders indiscrimi-
nately massacred. Regarding the position as one of first-rate
importance, Sapor, who had destroyed Singara, carefully re- .
paired the defences of Bezabde, provisioned it abundantly, and,
garrisoned it with some of his best troops. He was well aware
that the Romans would feel keenly the loss of so important a
post, and expected that it would not be long before they made
an effort to recover possession of it. - *
The winter was now approaching, but the Persian monarch
still kept the field. The capture of Bezabde was followed by
that of many other less important strongholds,” which offered
little resistance. At last, towards the close of the year, an at-
tack was made upon a place called Virta, said to have been a
fortress of great strength, and by some moderns” identified
with Tekrit, an important city upon the Tigris betweeen Mosul
and Bagdad. Here the career of the conqueror was at last
arrested. Persuasion and force proved alike unavailing to in-
duce or compel a surrender; and, after wasting the small re-
mainder of the year, and Suffering considerable loss, the Per-
sian monarch reluctantly gave up the siege, and returned to
his own country.”
Meanwhile the movements of the Roman emperor had been
Slow and uncertain. Distracted between a jealous fear of his
Cousin Julian's proceedings in the West, and a desire of check-,
ing the advance of his rival Sapor in the East, he had left
Constantinople in the early spring,” but had journeyed leisurely
through Cappadocia and Armenia Minor to Samosata, whence,
~”
*
340 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. Ich. x.
after crossing the Euphrates, he had proceeded to Edessa,
and there fixed himself.” While in Cappadocia he had sum-
moned to his presence Arsaces, the tributary king of Armenia,
had reminded him of his engagements, and had endeavored to
quicken his gratitude by bestowing on him liberal presents.”
At Edessa he employed himself during the whole of the sum-
mer in collecting troops and stores; nor was it till the autum-
... nal equinox was past” that he took the field, and, after weep-
ing over the smoking ruins of Amida, marched to Bezabde,
and, when the defenders rejected his overtures of peace,
formed the siege of the place. Sapor was, we must suppose,
now engaged before Virta, and it is probable that he thought
Bezabde strong enough to defend itself. At any rate, he made
no effort to afford it any relief; and the Roman emperor was
allowed to employ all the resources at his disposal in reiterated
assaults upon the walls. The defence, however, proved
stronger than the attack. Time after time the bold sallies of
the besieged destroyed the Roman works. At last the rainy
season set in, and the low ground outside the town became a
glutinous and adhesive marsh.” It was no longer possible to
continue the siege; and the disappointed emperor reluctantly
drew off his troops, recrossed the Euphrates, and retired into
winter quarters at Antioch.
The successes of Sapor in the campaigns of A.D. 359 and 360,
his captures of Amida, Singara, and Bezabde, together with
the unfortunate issue of the expedition made by Constantius
against the last-named place, had a tendency to shake the
fidelity of the Roman vassal-kings, Arsaces” of Armenia, and
Meribanes of Iberia. Constantius, therefore, during the win-
ter of A.D. 360–1, which he passed at Antioch, sent emissaries
to the courts of these monarchs, and endeavored to secure their
fidelity by loading them with costly presents.” His policy
seems to have been so far successful that no revolt of these
kingdoms took place; they did not as yet desert the Romans
or make their submission to Sapor. Their monarchs seem to
have simply watched events, prepared to declare themselves
distinctly on the winning side so soon as fortune should incline
unmistakably to one or the other combatant. Meanwhile they
maintained the fiction of a nominal dependence upon Rome.*
It might have been expected that the year A.D. 361 would
have been a turning-point in the war, and that, if Rome did
- not by a great effort assert herself and recover her prestige,
the advance of Persia would have been marked and rapid. But,
\
f
CH. IX.] IWACTION OF SAPOIR IN A.D. 361. 341
the actual course of events was far different. Hesitation and
diffidence characterize the movements of both parties to the
contest, and the year is signalized by no important enterprise
on the part of either monarch. Constantius reoccupied
Edessa,” and had (we are told)” some thoughts of renewing
the siege of Bezabde; actually, however, he did not advance
further, but contented himself with sending a part of his army
to watch Sapor, giving them strict orders not to risk an en-
gagement.” Sapor, on his side, began the year with demon-
strations which were taken to mean that he was about to pass
the Euphrates;” but in reality he never even brought his
troops across the Tigris, or once set foot in Mesopotamia.
After wasting weeks or months in a futile display of his armed
strength upon the eastern bank of the river, and violently.
alarming the Officers sent by Constantius to observe his move-
ments,” he suddenly, towards autumn, withdrew his troops,
having attempted nothing, and quietly returned to his capitall
It is by no means difficult to understand the motives which
actuated Constantius. He was, month after month, receiving
intelligence from the West of steps taken by Julian which
amounted to open rebellion, and challenged him to engage in
civil war.” So long as Sapor threatened invasion he did not
like to quit Mesopotamia, lest he might appear to have sacri-
ficed the interests of his country to his own private quarrels;
but he must have been anxious to return to the seat of empire
from the first moment that intelligence reached him of Julian's
assumption of the imperial name and dignity; and when
Sapor's retreat was announced he naturally made all haste to
reach his capital. Meanwhile the desire of keeping his army
intact caused him to refrain from any movement which in-
volved the slightest risk of bringing on a battle, and, in fact, ,
reduced him to inaction. So much is readily intelligible. But
what at this time withheld Sapor, when he had so grand an
opportunity of making an impression upon Rome—what par-
alyzed his arm when it might have struck with such effect—it
is far from easy to understand, though perhaps not impossible
to conjecture. The historian of the war ascribes his absti-
nence to a religious motive, telling us that the auguries were
not favorable for the Persians crossing the Tigris.” But
there is no other evidence that the Persians of this period were
the slaves of any such superstition as that noted by Ammianus,
nor any probability that a monarch of Sapor's force of char-
acter would have suffered his military policy to be affected by
f ł s *
, 342 THE SEVENTH MoMAROIIY. ſoil. ix.
f A
omens. We must therefore ascribe the conduct of the Persian
king to some cause not recorded by the historian—same failure
of health, or some peril from internal or external enemies
, which called him away from the scene of his recent exploits,
just at the time when his continued presence there was most
important. Once before in his lifetime, an invasion of his
eastern provinces had required his immediate presence, and
allowed his adversary to quit Mesopotamia and march against
Magnentius.” It is not improbable that a fresh attack of the
same or some other barbarians now again happened oppor-
tunely for the Romans, calling Sapor away, and thus enabling
Constantius to turn his back upon the East, and set out for
Europe in order to meet Julian.
• The meeting, however, was not destined to take place. On
bis way from Antioch to Constantinople the unfortunate Con-
stantius, anxious and perhaps over-fatigued, fell sick at Mop-
sucrene, in Cilicia, and died there, after a short illness,” to-
wards the close of A.D. 361. Julian the Apostate succeeded
peacefully to the empire whereto he was about to assert his
right by force of arms; and Sapor found that the war which
he had provoked with Rome, in reliance upon his adversary's
weakness and incapacity, had to be carried on with a prince of
far greater natural powers and of much superior military
training. -
^+ } * *
• { z -
. CII, X- JUL1.1/N SUCCEEDS CONSTANTIUS. 343
CHAPTER X.
Julian becomes Emperor of Rome. His Resolution to invade
Persia. His Views and Motives. His Proceedings. Pro-
posals of Sapor rejected. Other Embassies. Relations of
Julian with Armenia. Strength of his Army. His inva-
Sion of Mesopotamia. His Line of March. Siege of Peri-
sabor; of Maogamalcha. Battle of the Tigris. Further
Progress of Julian checked by his Inability to invest Ctesi-
phon. His Retreat. His Death. Retreat continued by
Jovian. Sapor offers Terms of Peace. Peace made by
Jovian. Its Conditions. Reflections on the Peace and on
the Termination of the Second Period of Struggle between
Rome and Persia.
2,
“Julianus, redacta ad unum se orbis Romani curatione, gloriae nimis cupidus, in
Persas proficiscitur.”—Aurel. Vict. Epit. § 43.
THE prince on whom the government of the Roman empire,
and consequently the direction of the Persian war, devolved
by the death of Constantius, was in the flower of his age,"
proud, self-confident, and full of energy. He had been en-
gaged for a period of four years” in a struggle with the rude
and warlike tribes of Germany, had freed the whole country’
west of the Rhine from the presence of those terrible warriors,
and had even carried fire and Sword far into the wild and
Savage districts on the right bank of the river, and compelled
the Alemanni and other powerful German tribes to make their
submission to the majesty of Rome. Personally brave, by
temperament restless, and inspired with an ardent desire to
rival or eclipse the glorious deeds of those heroes of former
times who had made themselves a name in history; he viewed
the disturbed condition of the East at the time of his accession
not as a trouble, not as a drawback upon the delights of em-
pire, but as a happy circumstance, a fortunate opportunity
for distinguishing himself by some great achievement. Of all
the Greeks, Alexander appeared to him the most illustrious;"
of all his predecessors on the imperial thone, Trajan and Mar-
CuS Aurelius were those whom he most wished to emulate.*
But all these princes had either led or sent” expeditions into
g
º * $ ^
344 THE SEVENTH MONAï:CHY. [CH. x.
*
the far East, and had aimed at uniting in one the fairest prov-
inces of Europe and Asia. Julian appears, from the first mo-
ment that he found himself peaceably established upon the
throne," to have resolved on undertaking in person a great ex-
pedition against Sapor, with the object of avenging upon
Persia the ravages and defeats of the last sixty years, or at
any rate of obtaining such successes as might justify his as-
suming the title of “Persicus.”” Whether he really enter-
tained any hope of rivalling Alexander, or supposed it possible
that he should effect “the final conquest of Persia,”* may be
doubted. Acquainted, as he must have been,” with the entire
course of Roman warfare in these parts from the attack of
Crassus to the last defeat of his own immediate predecessor,
he can scarcely have regarded the subjugation of Persia as an
easy matter, or have expected to do much more than strike
terror into the “barbarians” of the East, or perhaps obtain
from them the cession of another province. The sensible
officer, who, after accompanying him in his expedition, wrote
the history of the campaign, regarded his actuating motives as
, the delight that he took in war, and the desire of a new title.”
Confident in his own military talent, in his training, and in his
power to inspire enthusiasm in an army, he no doubt looked to
reap laurels sufficient to justify him in making his attack; but
the wild schemes ascribed to him, the conquest of the Sas-
sanian kingdom, and the subjugation of Hyrcania and India,”
are figments (probably) of the imagination of his historians.
Julian entered Constantinople on the 11th of December, A.D.
361; he quitted it towards the end of May,” A.D. 362, after re-
siding there less than six months. During this period, not-
withstanding the various important matters in which he was
engaged, the purifying of the court, the depression of the Chris-
tians, the restoration and revivification of Paganism, he found
- time to form plans and make preparations for his intended
eastern expedition, in which he was anxious to engage as soon
as possible. Having designated for the war such troops as
could be spared from the West, he committed them and their
officers to the charge of two generals, carefully chosen, Victor,
a Roman of distinction, and the Persian refugee, Prince Hor-
misdas,” who conducted the legions without difficulty to
Antioch. There Julian himself arrived in June or July,” after
having made a stately progress through Asia Minor; and it
would seem that he would at once have marched against the
enemy, had not his counsellors strongly urged the necessity of
* *
ſ
* - - 4. * } &
cH. x.] PROPOSALS MADE BY SAPOR. 345
*
a short delay," during which the European troops might be
rested, and adequate preparations made for the intended inva-
sion. It was especially necessary to provide stores and ships,”
since the new emperor had resolved not to content himself
with an ordinary campaign upon the frontier, but rather to
imitate the examples of Trajan and Severus, who had carried
the Roman eagles to the extreme south of Mesopotamia.”
Ships, accordingly, were collected, and probably built,” during
the winter of A.D. 362–3; provisions were laid in; warlike stores,
military engines, and the like accumulated; while the impa-
tient monarch, galled by the wit and raillery of the gay Antio-
chemes,” chafed at his compelled inaction, and longed to ex-
change the war of words in which he was engaged with his
subjects for the ruder contests of arms wherewith use had
made him more familiar.
It must have been during the emperor's stay at Antioch
that he received an embassy from the court of Persia, com-
missioned to Sound his inclinations with regard to the conclu-
sion of a peace. Sapor had seen, with some disquiet, the
sceptre of the Roman world assumed by an enterprising and
courageous youth, inured to warfare and ambitious of military
glory. He was probably very well informed as to the general
condition of the Roman State” and the personal character of
its administrator; and the tidings which he received concern-
ing the intentions and preparations of the new prince were
such as caused him. Some apprehension, if not actual alarm.
Under these circumstance she sent an embassy with over-
tures, the exact nature of which is not known, but which, it
is probable, took for their basis the existing territorial limits
of the two countries. At least, we hear of no offer of Sur-
render or submission on Sapor's part; and we can scarcely
suppose that, had such offers been made, the Roman writers
would have passed them over in silence. It is not surprising
that Julian Jent no favorable ear to the envoys, if these were
their instructions; but it would have been better for his repu-
tation had he replied to them with less of haughtiness and
rudeness. According to one authority,” he tore up before
their faces the autograph letter of their master; while, accord-
ing to another,”, he responded, with a contemptuous smile,
that “there was no occasion for an exchange of thought be-
tween him and the Persian king by messengers, since he in-
tended very shortly to treat with him in person.” Having
received this rebuff, the envoys of Sapor took their departure,
f
346 ** THE SE WENTH MONARCHY. ... [CH. x.
and conveyed to their sovereign the intelligence that he must
prepare himself to resist a serious invasion.
About the same time various offers of assistance reached
the Roman emperor from the independent or semi-independent
princes and chieftains of the regions adjacent to Mesopotamia.”
Such overtures were sure to be made by the heads of the plun-
dering desert tribes to any powerful invader, since it would be:
hoped that a share in the booty might be obtained without
much participation in the danger. We are told that Julian
promptly rejected these offers, grandly saying that it was for
Rome rather to give aid to her allies than to receive assistance
from them.” It appears, however, that at least two excep-
... tions were made to the general principle thus magniloquently
asserted. Julian had taken into his service, ere he quitted
Europe, a strong body of Gothic auxiliaries;” and, while at
Antioch, he sent to the Saracens, reminding them of their
promise to lend him troops, and calling upon them to fulfil
it.” If the advance on Persia was to be made by the line of
the Euphrates, an alliance with these agile sons of the desert
was of first-rate importance, since the assistance which they
could render as friends was considerable, and the injury which
they could inflict as enemies was almost beyond calculation.
It is among the faults of Julian in this campaign that he did
not set more store by the Saracen alliance, and make greater
efforts to maintain it; we shall find that after a while he
allowed the brave nomads to become disaffected, and to ex-
change their friendship with him for hostility.” Had he taken
more care to attach them cordially to the side of Rome, it is
quite possible that his expedition might have had a prosperous
1SSU16. # - •
There was another ally, whose services Julian regarded him-
Self as entitled not to request, but to command. Arsaces, king
of Armenia, though placed on his throne by Sapor, had (as we
have seen) transferred his allegiance to Constantius, and volun-
tarily taken up the position of a Roman feudatory.” Constan-
tius had of late suspected his fidelity; but Arsaces had not as
yet, by any overt act, justified these suspicions, and Julian
Seems to have regarded him as an assured friend; and ally.
Early in A.D. 363 he addressed a letter to the Armenian mon-
arch, requiring him to levy a considerable force, and hold him-
Self in readiness to execute such orders as he would receive
within a short time.” The style, address, and purport of this
/, letter were equally distasteful to Arsaces, whose pride was out-
^
-- {
# -
ch. x.] JULIAN MARCIIES THROUGH MESOPOTAMIA. 347
raged, and whose indolence was disturbed, by the call thus
suddenly made upon him. His own desire was probably to re- .
main neutral; he felt no interest in the standing quarrel be-
tween his two powerful neighbors; he was under obligations to
both of them; and it was for his advantage that they should.
remain evenly balanced. We cannot ascribe to him any earnest .
religious feeling;” but, as one who kept up the profession of
Christianity, he could not but regard with aversion the Apos-
tate, who had given no obscure intimation of his intention to
use his power to the utmost in Order to sweep the Christian
religion from the face of the earth. The disinclination of their
monarch to observe the designs of Julian was shared, or rather
surpassed, by his people, the more educated portion of whom
were strongly attached to the new faith and worship.” If the
great historian of Armenia is right in stating that Julian at
this time offered an open insult to the Armenian religion,” we
must pronounce him strangely imprudent. The alliance of
Armenia was always of the utmost importance to Rome in any
attack upon the East. Julian seems to have gone out of his
way to create offence in this quarter,” where his interests re-
quired that he should exercise all his powers of conciliation.
The forces which the emperor regarded as at his disposal, and
with which he expected to take the field, were the following.
His own troops amounted to 83,000 or (according to another
account) to 95,000 men.” They consisted chiefly of Roman
legionaries, horse and foot, but included a strong body of Gothic
auxiliaries. Armenia was expected to furnish a considerable
force, probably not less than 20,000 men;” and the light horse
of the Saracens would, it was thought, be tolerably numerous.
Altogether, an army of above a hundred thousand men was .
about to be launched on the devoted Persia, which was believed
unlikely to offer any effectual, if even any serious, resistance.
The impatience of Julian scarcely allowed him to await the
conclusion of the winter. With the first breath of spring he
put his forces in motion,” and, quitting Antioch, marched with
all Speed to the Euphrates. Passing Litarbi, and then Hierap-
olis, he crossed the river by a bridge of boats in the vicinity of
that place, and proceeded by Batnae to the important city of
Carrhae,” once the home of Abraham.” Here he halted for a
few days and finally fixed his plans. It was by this time well
known to the Romans that there were two, and two only, con-
Venient roads whereby Southern Mesopotamia was to be
reached, one along the line of the Mons, Masius, to the Tigris,
348 THE SEVENTII MONAROIIY." [CH. x.
and then along the banks of that stream, the other down the
valley of the Euphrates to the great alluvial plain on the lower
course of the rivers. Julian had, perhaps, hitherto doubted
which line he should follow in person.” The first had been pre-
ferred by Alexander and by Trajan, the second by the younger
Cyrus, by Avidius Cassius, and by Severus. Both lines were
fairly practicable; but that of the Tigris was circuitous, and its
free employment was only possible under the condition of Ar-
menia being certainly friendly. If Julian had cause to Suspect,
as it is probable that he had, the fidelity of the Armenians, he
may have felt that there was one line only which he could with
prudence pursue. He might send a subsidiary force by the
doubtful route which could advance to his aid if matters went
favorably, or remain on the defensive if they assumed a threat-
ening aspect; but his own grand attack must be by the other.
Accordingly he divided his forces. Committing a body of
troops, which is variously estimated at from 18,000 to 30,000,"
into the hands of Procopius, a connection of his own, and Se-
bastian, Duke of Egypt, with orders that they should proceed
by way of the Mons Masius to Armenia, and, uniting themselves
with the forces of Arsaces, invade Northern Media, ravage it,
and then join him before Ctesiphon by the line of the Tigris,”
He reserved for himself and for his main army the shorter and
more open route down the valley of the Euphrates. Ileaving
Carrhae on the 26th of March, after about a week's stay; he
marched southward, at the head of 65,000 men, by Davana and
along the course of the Belik, to Callinicus or Nicephorium,
ſnear the junction of the Belik with the Euphrates. Here the
Saracen chiefs came and made their submission, and were gra-
ciously received by the emperor, to whom they presented a
crown of gold.” At the same time the fleet made its appear-
ance, numbering at least 1100 vessels,” of which fifty were
ships of war, fifty prepared to serve as pontoons, and the re-
maining thousand transports laden with provisions, weapons,
and military engines.
From Callinicus the emperor marched along the course of
the Euphrates to Circusium, or Circesium, “at the junction of
the Khabour with the Euphrates, arriving at this place early
in April.” Thus far he had been marching through his own
dominions, and had had no hostility to dread. Being now
about to enter the enemy's country, he made arrangements for
the march which seem to have been extremely judicious. The
Cavalry was placed under the command of Arinthaeus and
CH. x.] s & surrëNDER OF ANATHAN. 349
Prince Hormisdas, and was stationed at the extreme left, with
orders to advance on a line parallel with the general course of
the river. Some picked legions under the command of Nevitta
formed the right wing, and, resting on the Euphrates, main- "
tained communication with the fleet. Julian, with the main
part of his troops, occupied the space intermediate between
these two extremes, marching in a loose column which from
front to rear covered a distance of above nine miles. A fly-
ing corps of fifteen hundred men acted as an avant-guard
under Count Lucilianus, and explored the country in advance,
feeling on all sides for the enemy. . The rear was covered by
a detachment under Secundinus, Duke of Osrhoëne, Dagalai-
phus, and Victor.”
Having made his dispositions, and crossed the broad stream
of the Khabour, on the 7th of April, by a bridge of boats, which
he immediately broke up," Julian continued his advance
along the course of the Euphrates, supported by his fleet,
which was not allowed either to Outstrip or to lag behind the
army.” The first halt was at Zaitha,” famous as the scene of
the murder of Gordian, whose tomb was in its vicinity."
Here Julian encouraged his soldiers by an eloquent speech,” in
which he recounted the past successes of the Roman arms,
and promised them an easy victory over their present adver-
sary. He then, in a two days' march, reached. Dura,” a
ruined city, destitute of inhabitants, on the banks of the
river; from which a march of four days more brought him
to Anathan,” the modern Anah, a strong fortress on an island
in the mid-stream, which was held by a Persian garrison. An
attempt to surprise the place by a night attack having failed,
Julian had recourse to persuasion, and by the representations
of Prince Hormisdas induced its defenders to surrender the
fort and place themselves at his mercy.” It was, perhaps, to
gall the Antiochenes with an indication of his victorious
progress that he sent his prisoners under escort into Syria,
and settled them in the territory of Chalcis, at no great dis-
tance from the city of his aversion. Unwilling further to
weaken his army by detaching a garrison to hold his conquest,
he committed Anathan to the flames before proceeding further
down the river. * *
About eight miles below Anathan, another island and ano-
ther fortress were held by the enemy. Thilutha is described
as stronger than Anathan, and indeed as almost impregna-
ble." Julian felt that he could not attack it with any hope
+
*
- - A. --- p * >
2. ... * " . . § . . *
350 TIIE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ' [CH. x.
of success, and therefore once more submitted to use persua.
sion. But the garrison, feeling themselves secure, rejected
his overtures; they would wait, they said, and see which
party was superior in the approaching conflict, and would
then attach themselves to the victors. Meanwhile, if unmo-
\lested by the invader, they would not interfere with his
advance, but would maintain a neutral attitude. Julian had
to determine whether he would act in the spirit of an Alexan-
der," and, rejecting with disdain all compromise, compel by
force of arms an entire submission, or whether he would take
lower ground, accept the offer made to him, and be content to
leave in his rear a certain number of unconquered fortresses.
. He decided that prudence required him to take the latter
course, and left Thilutha unassailed. It is not surprising that,
having admitted the assumption of a neutral position by one
town, he was forced to extend the permission to others,” and
so to allow the Euphrates route to remain, practically, in the
hands of the Persians. -
A five days' march from Thilutha brought the army to a
point opposite Diacira, or Hit,” a town of ancient repute,"
and one which happened to be well provided with stores and
provisions. Though the place lay on the right bank of the
river, it was still exposed to attack, as the fleet could convey
, any number of troops from one shore to the other. Being
considered untenable, it was deserted by the male inhabitants,
who, however, left some of their women behind them. We
obtain an unpleasant idea of the state of discipline which the
philosophic emperor allowed to prevail, when we find that his
soldiers, “without remorse and without punishment, massa-
cred these defenceless persons.” “ The historian of the war
S records this act without any appearance of shame, as if it
were a usual occurrence, and no more important than the
burning of the plundered city which followed.” -
From Hit the army pursued its march, through Sitha and
Megia,” to Zaragardia or OZogardana, where the memory of
Trajan's expedition still lingered, a certain pedestal or pulpit
of stone being known to the natives as “Trajan's tribunal.”
Up to this time nothing had been seen or heard of any Per-
• sian opposing army;" One man only on the Roman side, so
far as we hear, had been killed." No systematic method of
checking the advance had been adopted; the corn was every-
where found Štanding; forage was plentiful; and there were
magazines of grain in the towns. No difficulties had delayed
\
2.
* * + \
cH. X.] THE ROMANS ENTER BABYLONIA. 351
‘A * -
the invaders but such as Nature had interposed to thwart
them, as when a violent storm on one occasion shattered the
tents, and on another a sudden swell of the Euphrates
wrecked some of the corn transports, and interrupted the
right wing's line of march." But this pleasant condition of
things was not to continue. At Hit the rolling Assyrian plain
had come to an end, and the invading army had entered upon
the low alluvium of Babylonia," a region of great fertility, ,
intersected by numerous canals, which in some places were
carried the entire distance from the one river to the other.”
The change in the character of the Country encouraged the
Persians to make a change in their tactics. Hitherto they
had been absolutely passive; now at last they showed them-
selves, and commenced the active system of perpetual harass-
ing warfare in which they were adepts. A Surena, or general
of the first rank," appeared in the field, at the head of a
strong body of Persian horse, and accompanied by a sheikh of
the Saracenic Arabs,” known as Malik (or “King”) Rodosaces.
Retreating as Julian advanced, but continually delaying his
progress, hanging on the skirts of his army, cutting off his
stragglers, and threatening every unsupported detachment,
this active force changed all the conditions of the march,
rendering it slow and painful, and sometimes stopping it
altogether. We are told that on one occasion Prince Hormis-
das narrowly escaped falling into the Surena's hands.” On
another, the Persian force, having allowed the Roman van-
guard to proceed unmolested, suddenly showed itself on the
southern bank of one of the great canals connecting the
Euphrates with the Tigris, and forbade the passage of Julian's
main army.” It was only after a day and a night's delay
that the emperor, by detaching troops under Victor to make
a long circuit, cross the canal far to the east, recall Lucilianus
with the vanguard, and then attack the Surena's troops in the
rear, was able to overcome the resistance in his front, and ,
carry his army across the cutting. e
Having in this way effected the passage, Julian continued
his march along the Euphrates, and in a short time came to the
city of Perisabor” (Firuz Shapur), the most important that he
had yet reached, and reckoned not much inferior to Ctesi-
phon.” As the inhabitants steadily refused all accommoda-
tion, and insulted Hormisdas, who was sent to treat with them,
by the reproach that he was a deserter and a traitor, the em-
peror determined to form the siege of the place and see if he
*.
* .
s
f
#
º y
352 THE SE WENTII MONARCHIY. [CH. x.
could not compel it to a surrender. Situated between the Eu-
phrates and one of the numerous canals derived from it, and
further protected by a trench drawn across from the canal to
the river, Perisabor occupied a sort of island, while at the same
time it was completely surrounded with a double wall. . The
citadel, which lay towards the north, and overhung the Eu-
phrates, was especially strong; and the garrison was brave,
numerous, and full of confidence. The walls, however, com-
posed in part of brick laid in bitumen, were not of much
strength;” and the Roman. Soldiers found little difficulty in
shattering with the ram one of the corner towers, and so mak-
ing an entrance into the place. But the real struggle now
began. The brave defenders retreated into the citadal, which
was of imposing height, and from this vantage-ground galled
the Romans in the town with an incessant shower of arrows,
darts, and stones. The Ordinary catapults and balistae of the
Romans were no match for such a storm descending from such
a height; and it was plainly necessary, if the place was to be
taken, to have recourse to some other device. Julian, there-
fore, who was never sparing of his own person, took the reso-
lution, on the second day of the siege, of attempting to burst
open one of the gates. Accompanied by a small band, who
formed a roof over his head with their shields, and by a few
Sappers with their tools, he approached the gate-tower, and
made his men commence their operations. The doors, how-
ever, were found to be protected with iron, and the fastenings
to be so strong that no immediate impression could be made;
while the alarmed garrison, concentrating its attention on the
threatened spot, kept up a furious discharge of missiles on
their daring assailants. Prudence counselled retreat from the
dangerous position which had been taken up; and the emperor,
though he felt acutely the shame of having failed," retired.
But his mind, fertile in resource, soon formed a new plan.
He remembered that Demetrius Poliorcetes had acquired his
surname by the invention and use of the “Helepolis,” a mova-
'ble tower of vast height, which placed the assailants on a level
with the defenders even of the loftiest ramparts. He at once
ordered the construction of such a machine; and, the ability
of his engineers being equal to the task, it rapidly grew before
his eyes. The garrison saw its growth with feelings very
opposite to those of their assailant; they felt that they could
not resist the new creation, and anticipated its employment by
a Surrender.” Julian agreed to spare their lives, and allowed
*
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CH. X.] MARCH ALONG THE NAIII:-MALCHA. 353.
them to withdraw and join their countrymen, each man taking
with him a spare garment and a certain sum of money. The
other stores contained within the walls fell to the conquerors,
who found them to comprise a vast quantity of corn, arms,
and other valuables. Julian distributed among his troops
whatever was likely to be serviceable; the remainder, of which
he could make no use, was either burned or thrown into the
Euphrates.
The latitude of Ctesiphon was now nearly reached, but Julian
still continued to descend the Euphrates, while the Persian
cavalry made Occasional dashes upon his extended line, and
sometimes caused him a Sensible loss.” At length he came to
the point where the Nahr-Malcha, or “Royal river,” the chief
of the canals connecting the Euphrates with the Tigris, branched
off from the more western stream, and ran nearly due east to
the vicinity of the capital. The canal was navigable by his
ships, and he therefore at this point quitted the Euphrates, and
directed his march eastward along the course of the cutting,
following in the footsteps of Severus, and no doubt expecting,
like him, to capture easily the great metropolitan city. But
his advance across the neck of land which here separates the
Tigris from the Euphrates" was painful and difficult, since the
enemy laid the country under water, and at every favorable
point disputed his progress. Julian, however, still pressed
forward, and advanced, though slowly. By felling the palms
which grew abundantly in this region, and forming with them
raſts supported by inflated skins; he was able to pass the inun-
dated district, and to approach within about eleven miles of
Ctesiphon. Here his further march was obstructed by a
fortress, built (as it would seem) to defend the capital, and
fortified with especial care. Ammianus calls this place Maoga-
malcha,” while Zosimus gives it the name of Besuchis;" but
both agree that it was a large town, commanded by a strong
citadel, and held by a brave and numerous garrison. Julian
*
g
might perhaps have left it unassailed, as he had left already
several towns upon his line of march; but a daring attempt
made against himself by a portion of the garrison caused him
to feel his honor concerned in taking the place; and the result
was that he once more arrested his steps, and, sitting down
before the walls, commenced a formal siege. All the usual
arts of attack and defence were employed on either side for
several days, the chief novel feature in the warfare being the
use by the besieged of blazing balls of bitumen,” which they
, \
— — — — — — — … - -
354 THE SEVENTH . MONARCIIF. [CH. x.
*
, shot from their lofty towers against the besiegers' works and
persons. Julian, however, met this novelty by a device on his
side which was uncommon; he continued openly to assault the
walls and gates with his battering rams, but he secretly gave
orders that the chief efforts of his men should be directed to
the formation of a mine,” which should be carried under both
the walls that defended the place, and enable him to introduce
suddenly a body of troops into the very heart of the city. His
orders were successfully executed; and while a general attack
upon the defences occupied the attention of the besieged, three
corps* introduced through the mine suddenly showed them-
selves in the town itself, and rendered further resistance hope-
less. Maogamalcha, which a little before had boasted of being
s impregnable, and had laughed to scorn the vain efforts of the
.*
|
emperor,” suddenly found itself taken by assault and under-
going the extremities of sack and pillage. Julian made no
efforts to prevent a general massacre,” and the entire popula-
tion, without distinction of age or sex, seems to have been put
to the sword.” The commandant of the fortress, though he
was at first spared, suffered death shortly after on a frivolous
charge.” Even a miserable remnant, which had concealed
itself in caves and cellars, was hunted out, smoke and fire being
used to force the fugitives from their hiding-places, or else
'cause them to perish in the darksome dens by suffocation.”
. Thus there was no extremity of Savage warfare which was not
used, the fourth century anticipating some of the horrors which
have most disgraced the nineteenth.”
Nothing now but the river Tigris intervened between Julian
and the great city of Ctesiphon, which was plainly the special
object of the expedition. Ctesiphon, indeed, was not to Persia
what it had been to Parthia; but still it might fairly be looked
upon as a prize of considerable importance. Of Parthia it had
been the main, in later times perhaps the sole, capital; to Per-
sia it was a secondary rather than a primary city, the ordinary
residence of the court being Istakr, or Persepolis. Still the
Persian kings seem occasionally to have resided at Ctesiphon;
and among the secondary cities of the empire it undoubtedly
held a high rank. In the neighborhood were various royal
hunting-seats, surrounded by shady gardens, and adorned with
- paintings or bas-reliefs;” while near them were parks or “para-
dises,” containing the game kept for the prince's sport, which
included lions, wild boars, and bears of remarkable fierce-
ness.” As Julian advanced, these pleasaunces fell, one after
CH. X.] . JULIAN REACHES COCHE. . 355
another, into his hands, and were delivered over to the rude
soldiery, who trampled the flowers and shrubs under foot,
destroyed the wild beasts, and burned the residences. No
serious resistance was as yet made by any Persian force to the
progress of the Romans, who pressed steadily forward, occasion-
ally losing a few men or a few baggage animals,” but drawing
daily nearer to the great city, and on their way spreading ruin
and desolation over a most fertile district, from which they
drew abundant supplies as they passed through it, while they
left it behind them blackened, wasted, and almost without in-
habitant. The Persians seem to have had orders not to make,
as yet, any firm stand. One of the sons of Sapor was now at
their head, but no change of tactics occurred. As Julian drew
near, this prince indeed quitted the shelter of Ctesiphon, and
made a reconnaissance in force; but when he fell in with the
Roman advanced guard under Victor, and saw its strength,
he declined an engagement, and retired without coming to
blows.”
Julian had now reached the western suburb of Ctesiphon,
which had lost its old name of Seleucia and was known as
Coché." The capture of this place would, perhaps, not have
been difficult; but, as the broad and deep stream of the Tigris
flowed between it and the main town, little would have been
gained by the occupation. Julian felt that, to attack Ctesiphon
with success, he must, like Trajan and Severus, transport his
army to the left bank of the Tigris, and deliver his assault
upon the defences that lay beyond that river. For the safe
transport of his army he trusted to his fleet, which he had there-
fore caused to enter the Nahr-Malcha, and to accompany his
troops thus far. But at Coché he found that the Nahr-Maleha,
instead of joining the Tigris, as he had expected, above Cte-
siphon, ran into it at some distance below." To have pursued
this line with both fleet and army would have carried him, too
far into the enemy's country, have endangered his communi- .
cations, and especially have cut him off from the Armenian
army under Procopius and Sebastian, with which he was at
this time looking to effect a junction. To have sent the fleet
into the Tigris below Coché, while the army occupied the right
bank of the river above it, would, in the first place, have sep-
arated the two, and would further have been useless, un-
less the fleet could force its way against the strong current
through the whole length of the hostile city. In this difficulty
Julian's book-knowledge was found of service. He had studied
&
356 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY [CH. x.
g | -
A
with care the campaigns of his predecessors in these regions,
and recollected that one of them” at any rate had made a cut-
, ting from the Nahr-Malcha, by which he had brought his fleet
into the Tigris above. Ctesiphon. If this work could be dis-
covered, it might, he thought, in all probability be restored.
Some of the country people were therefore seized, and, inquiry
being made of them, the line of the canal was pointed out, and
the place shown at which it had been derived from the Nahr-
Malcha. Here the Persians had erected a strong dam, with
sluices, by means of which a portion of the water could occa-
sionally be turned into the Roman cutting.” Julian had the
cutting cleared out, and the dam torn down; whereupon the
main portion of the stream rushed at once into the old channel,
which rapidly filled, and was found to be navigable by the
Roman vessels. The fleet was thus brought into the Tigris'
above Coché; and the army advancing with it encamped upon
the right bank of the river.
The Persians now for the first time appeared in force.” As
Julian drew near the great stream, he perceived that his pas-
Sage of it would not be unopposed. Along the left bank,
which was at this point naturally higher than the right, and
which was further crowned by a wall built originally to fence
in one of the royal parks,” could be seen the dense masses of
the enemy's horse and foot, stretching away to right and left,
the former encased in glittering armor,” the latter protected
by huge wattled shields.” Behind these troops were dis-
cernible the vast forms of elephants, looking (says the his-
torian) like moving mountains,” and regarded by the legion-
aries with extreme dread. Julian felt that he could not ask
his army to cross the stream openly in the face of a foe thus
advantageously posted. He therefore waited the approach of
night. When darkness had closed in, he made his dispositions;
divided his fleet into portions; embarked a number of his
troops; and, despite the dissuasions of his officers,” gave the
signal for the passage to commence. Five ships, each of them
conveying eighty soldiers, led the way, and reached the op-
posite shore without accident. Here, however, the enemy
received them with a sharp fire of burning darts, and the two
foremost were soon in flames.” At the ominous sight the
rest of the fleet wavered, and might have refused to proceed
further, had not Julian, with admirable presence of mind, ex-
claimed aloud—“Our men have crossed and are masters of the
bank—that fire is the signal which I bade them make if they
Af i
^.
- - - - + *
|
*- #
cH. X.] PASSAGE OF THE TIGRIS. 357
were victorious.” Thus encouraged, the crews plied their oars
with vigor, and impelled the remaining vessels rapidly across
the stream. At the same time, some of the Soldiers who had
not been put on board, impatient to assist their comrades,
plunged into the stream, and swam across supported by their
shields.” Though a stout resistance was offered by the Per-
sians, it was found impossible to withstand the impetuosity of
the Roman attack. Not only were the half-burned vessels
saved, the flames extinguished, and the men on board rescued
from their perilous position, but everywhere the Roman troops
made good their landing, fought their way up the bank against
a storm of missile weapons, and drew up in good order upon
its summit. A pause probably now occurred, as the armies
could not see each other in the darkness; but, at dawn of
day," Julian, having made a fresh arrangement of his troops,
led them against the dense array of the enemy, and engaged
in a hand-to-hand combat, which lasted from morning to mid-
day, when it was terminated by the flight of the Persians.
Their leaders, Tigranes, Narseus, and the Surena,” are said”
to have been the first to quit the field and take refuge within
the defences of Ctesiphon. The example thus set was univer-
sally followed; and the entire Persian army, abandoning its
camp and baggage, rushed in the wildest confusion across the
plain to the nearest of the city gates, closely pursued by its
active foe up to the very foot of the walls. The Roman writers
assert that Ctesiphon might have been entered and taken, had
not the general, Victor, who was wounded by a dart from a
catapult, recalled his men as they were about to rush in
through the open gateway.” It is perhaps doubtful whether
success would really have crowned such audacity. At any rate
the opportunity passed—the runaways entered the town—the
gate closed upon them; and Ctesiphon was Safe unless it were
reduced by the operations of a regular siege.
But the fruits of the victory were still considerable. The
entire Persian army collected hitherto for the defence of
Ctesiphon had been defeated by one-third of the Roman force
under Julian.” The vanquished had left 2,500 men dead upon
the field, while the victors had lost no more than seventy-
five.” A rich spoil had fallen into the hands of the Romans,
who found in the abandoned camp couches and tables of mas-
sive silver, and on the bodies of the slain, both men and
horses, a profusion of gold and silver ornaments, besides trap-
pings and apparel of great magnificence.” A welcome supply
&
*
*
- t V - *.
358 , TIIE SEVENTH MONAIRCIIY. [CH. R.
of provisions was also furnished by the lands and houses in
the neighborhood of Ctesiphon; and the troops passed from a
state of privation to one of extreme abundance, so that it was
feared lest they might suffer from excess.”
Affairs had now reached a point when it was hecessary to
form a definite resolution as to what should be the further aim
and course of the expedition. Hitherto all had indicated an
intention on the part of Julian to occupy Ctesiphon, and
thence dictate a peace. His long march, his toilsome canal-
cutting, his orders to his second army,” his crossing of the
Tigris, his engagement with the Persians in the plain before
Ctesiphon, were the natural steps conducting to such a result,
and are explicable on one hypothesis and one hypothesis only.
He must up to this time have designed to make himself master
of the great city, which had been the goal of So many previous
invasions, and had always fallen whenever Rome attacked it.
But, having overcome all the obstacles in his path, and having
it in his power at once to commence the siege, a sudden doubt
appears to have assailed him as to the practicability of the
undertaking. It can Scarcely be supposed that the city was
really stronger now than it had been under the Parthians;”
much less can it be argued that Julian's army was insufficient
for the investment of such a place. It was probably the most
powerful army with which the Romans had as yet invaded
Southern Mesopotamia; and it was amply provided with all
the appurtenances of war. If Julian did not venture to at-
tempt what Trajan and Avidius Cassius and Septimius Severus
had achieved without difficulty, it must have been because the
circumstances under which he would have had to make the
attack were different from those under which they had ven-
tured and succeeded. And the difference—a most momentous
One—was this. They besieged and captured the place after
defeating the greatest force that Parthia could bring into the
field against them. Julian found himself in front of Ctesiphon
before he had crossed swords with the Persian king, or so
much as set eyes on the grand army which Sapor was known
to have collected. To have sat down before Ctesiphon under
such circumstances would have been to expose himself to great
peril; while he was intent upon the siege, he might at any
time have been attacked by a relieving army under the Great
King, have been placed between two fires, and compelled to
engage at extreme disadvantage.” It was a consideration of
this danger that impelled the Council of war, whereto he sub-
e - v. * I -
A a.
on x.] JULIAN DETERMINES ON RETREAT. 359
mitted the question, to pronounce the siege of Ctesiphon too
hazardous an operation, and to dissuade the emperor from
attempting it. a
But, if the city were not to be besieged, what course could -
with any prudence be adopted? It would have been madness
to leave Ctesiphon unassailed, and to press forward against
Susa and Persepolis. It would have been futile to remain en-
camped before the walls without commencing a siege. The
heats of summer had arrived,” and the malaria of autumn was
not far off. The stores brought by the fleet were exhausted;”
and there was a great risk in the army's depending wholly for
its subsistence on the supplies that it might be able to obtain
from the enemy's country. Julian and his advisers must have
seen at a glance that if the Romans were not to attack Ctesi-
phon, they must retreat. And accordingly retreat seems to
have been at once determined on. As a first step, the whole -
fleet, except some dozen vessels,” was burned, since twelve
was a sufficient number to serve as pontoons, and it was not
worth the army's while to encumber itself with the remainder.
They could only have been tracked up the strong stream of
the Tigris by devoting to the work some 20,000 men;” thus
greatly weakening the strength of the armed force, and at the
same time hampering its movements. Julian, in sacrificing
his ships, suffered simply a pecuniary loss—they could not
possibly have been of any further service to him in the cam-
palgn.
Retreat being resolved upon, it only remained to determine
what route should be followed, and on what portion of the
Roman territory the march should be directed. The soldiers
clamored for a return by the way whereby they had come;” ,
but many valid objections to this course presented themselves
to their commanders. The country along the line of the Eu-
phrates had been exhausted of its stores by the troops in their
advance; the forage had been consumed, the towns and vil-
lages desolated. There would be neither food nor shelter for
the men along this route; the season was also unsuitable for
it, since the Euphrates was in full flood, and the moist atmos-
phere would be sure to breed swarms of flies and mosquitoes.
Julian saw that by far the best line of retreat was along the
Tigris, which had higher banks than the Euphrates, which was
no longer in flood,” and which ran through a tract that was
highly productive and that had for many years not been
visited by an enemy. The army, therefore, was ordered to * * *
\
*,
ł./
§
— — — —- - w .*
y
A
360 . THE SEVENTH MOWARCHY. . . [CH. x.
commence its retreat through the country lying on the left
bank of the Tigris, and to spread itself over the fertile region,
in the hope of obtaining annple supplies. The march was un-
derstood to be directed on Cordyene (Kurdistan), a province
now in the possession of Rome, a rich tract, and not more than
about 250 miles distant from Ctesiphon.”
Before, however, the retreat commenced, while Julian and
his victorious army were still encamped in sight of Ctesiphon,
the Persian king, according to Some writers,” sent an em-
bassy proposing terms of peace. Julian's successes are repre-
sented as having driven Sapor to despair—“the pride of his
royalty was humbled in the dust; he took his repasts on the
ground; and the grief and anxiety of his mind were expressed
by the disorder of his hair.”” He would, it is suggested,
have been willing “to purchase, with one half of his kingdom,
the safety of the remainder, and would have gladly subscribed
himself, in a treaty of peace, the faithful and dependent ally
of the Roman conqueror.”” Such are the pleasing fictions
wherewith the rhetorician of Antioch, faithful to the memory
of his friend and master, consoled himself and his readers
after Julian's death. It is difficult to decide whether there
underlies them any Substratum of truth. Neither Ammianus
nor Zosimus makes the slightest allusion to any negotiations
at all at this period; and it is thus open to doubt whether the
entire story told by Libanius is not the product of his imagina-
tion. But at any rate it is quite impossible that the Persian
king can have made any abject offers of submission, or have
been in a state of mind at all akin to despair. His great army,
collected from all quarters,” was intact; he had not yet con-
descended to take the field in person; he had lost no important
town, and his adversary had tacitly confessed his inability to
form the siege of a city which was far from being the greatest
in the empire. If Sapor, therefore, really made at this time
, overtures of peace, it must have been either with the intention
of amusing Julian, and increasing his difficulties by delaying
his retreat, or because he thought that Julian's consciousness
of his difficulties would induce him to offer terms which he
might accept.
The retreat commenced on June 16.” Scarcely were the
troops set in motion, when an ominous cloud of dust appeared
On the Southern horizon, which grew larger as the day ad-
'vanced; and, though some suggested that the appearance was
produced by a herd of wild asses, and others ventured the con-
f
* - .—x= —r— y
wº
t
j * 4 f
cH. X.] JULIAN IV DIFFICULTIES. § 361
jecture that it was caused by the approach of a body of Julian's
Saracenic allies, the emperor himself was not deceived, but,
understanding that the Persians had set out in pursuit, he
called in his stragglers, massed his troops, and pitched his
camp in a strong position.” Day-dawn showed that he had
judged aright, for the earliest rays of the sun were reflected
from the polished breastplates and cuirasses of the Persians,
who had drawn up at no great distance during the night.” A
combat followed in which the Persian and Saracenic horse at-
tacked the Romans vigorously, and especially threatened the
baggage, but were repulsed by the firmness and valor of the
Roman foot. Julian was able to continue his retreat after a
while, but found himself surrounded by enemies, some of
whom, keeping in advance of his troops, or hanging upon his
flanks, destroyed the corn and forage that his men so much
needed; while others, pressing upon his rear, retarded his
march, and caused him from time to time no inconsiderable .
losses.” The retreat under these circumstances was slow;
the army had to be rested and recruited when it fell in with
any accumulation of provisions; and the average progress
made seems to have been not much more than ten miles a
day.” This tardy advance allowed the more slow-moving
portion of the Persian army to close in upon the retiring Ro-
mans; and Julian soon found himself closely followed by
dense masses of the enemy's troops, by the heavy cavalry clad
in steel panoplies, and armed with long spears, by large bodies
of archers, and even by a powerful corps of elephants.” This
grand army was under the command of a general whom the
Roman writers call Meranes,” and of two sons of Sapor. It
pressed heavily upon the Roman rearguard; and Julian, after
a little while, found it necessary to stop his march, confront
his pursuers, and offer them battle. The offer was accepted,
and an engagement took place in a tract called Maranga.”
The enemy advanced in two lines—the first composed of the
mailed horsemen and the archers intermixed, the second of
the elephants. Julian prepared his army to receive the attack
by disposing it in the form of a cresent, with the centre drawn
back considerably; but as the Persians advanced into the hol-
low space, he suddenly led his troops forward at speed, allow-
ing the archers scarcely time to discharge their arrows before
he engaged them and the horse in close combat. A long and
bloody struggle followed; but the Persians were unaccustomed
to hand-to-hand fighting and disliked it; they gradually gave
§
.* * . ſ
362 - THE SEVENTH MOMARCHY, [ch. x.
- ground, and at last broke up and fled, covering their retreat,
however, with the clouds of arrows which they knew well how
to discharge as they retired. The weight of their arms, and
the fiery heat of the summer Sun, prevented the Romans
from carrying the pursuit very far. Julian recalled them
quickly to the protection of the camp, and suspended his march
for some days” while the wounded had their hurts attended
to.
The Persian troops, having suffered heavily in the battle,
made no attempt to storm the Roman camp. They were con-
tent to spread themselves on all sides, to destroy or carry off
all the forage and provisions, and to make the country,
through which the Roman army must retire, a desert. Julian's
forces were already suffering severely from scarcity of food;
and the general want was but very slightly relieved by a dis-
tribution of the stores set apart for the officers and for the
members of the imperial household. Under these circum-
stances it is not surprising that Julian's firmness deserted him,
and that he began to give way to melancholy forebodings, and
to see visions and Omens which portended disaster and death.
In the silence of his tent, as he studied a favorite philosopber
during the dead of night, he thought he saw the Genius of the
State, with veiled head and cornucopia, stealing away through
the hangings slowly and sadly.” Soon afterwards, when he
had just gone forth into the open air to perform averting sacri-
fices, the fall of a shooting star seemed to him a direct threat
from Mars, with whom he had recently quarrelled.” The
Soothsayers were consulted, and counselled abstinence from all
military movement; but the exigencies of the situation caused
their advice to be for once contemned. It was only by change
of place that there was any chance of obtaining supplies of
\ food; and ultimate extrication from the perils that surrounded
the army depended on a steady persistence in retreat.
At dawn of day,” therefore, on the memorable 26th of June,
A.D. 363, the tents were struck, and the Roman army continued
its march across the wasted plain, having the Tigris at some
little distance on its left, and some low hills upon its right.”
The enemy did not anywhere appear; and the troops advanced
for a time without encountering opposition. But, as they drew
near the skirts of the hills, not far from Samarah, suddenly an
attack was made upon them. The rearguard found itself vio-
lently assailed; and when Julian hastened to its relief, news
came that the van was also engaged with the enemy, and was
j
- - § —-3– *
\
j
* - { -
ch. x.] BATTLE OF SAMARAH. '.363
already in difficulties. The active commander now hurried
towards the front, and had accomplished half the distance,
when the main Persian attack was delivered upon his right
centre,” and to his dismay he found himself entangled, amid
the masses of heavy horse and elephants, which had thrown
his columns into confusion. The suddenness of the enemy's
appearance had prevented him from donning his complete
armor; and as he fought without a breastplate, and with the
aid of his light-armed troops restored the day, falling on the
foe from behind and striking the backs and houghs of the
horses and elephants, the javelin of a horseman, after grazing
the flesh of his arm, fixed, itself in his right side, penetrating
through the ribs to the liver.” Julian, grasping the head of
the weapon, attempted to draw it forth, but in vain—the sharp
steel cut his fingers, and the pain and loss of blood caused him
to fall fainting from his steed. His guards, who had closed
around him, carefully raised him up, and conveyed him to the
camp, where the surgeons at once declared the wound mortal.
The sad news, spread rapidly among the soldiery, and nerved
them to desperate efforts—if they must lose their general, he
should, they determined, be avenged. “Striking their shields
with their spears,” they everywhere rushed upon the enemy
with incredible ardor, careless whether they lived or died, and
only seeking to inflict the greatest possible loss on those op-
posed to them. But the Persians, who had regarded the day
as theirs, resisted strenuously, and maintained the fight with
obstinacy till evening closed in and darkness put a stop to the
engagement. The losses were large on both sides; the Roman
right wing had suffered greatly; its commander, Anatolius,
master of the offices, was among the slain, and the prefect Sal-
lust was with difficulty saved by an attendant.” The Per-
sians, too, lost their generals Meranes and Nohodares; and with
them no fewer than fifty satraps and great nobles are said to
have perished.” The rank and file no doubt suffered in pro-
portion; and the Romans were perhaps justified in claiming
that the balance of advantage upon the day rested with them.
But such advantage as they could reasonably assert was far
more than counterbalanced by the loss of their commander, .
who died in his tent towards midnight on the day of the
battle.” Whatever we may think of the general character of
Julian, or of the degree of his intellectual capacity, there can
be no question as to his excellence as a soldier, or his ability as
a Commander in the field. If the expedition which he had led
364 THE SEVENTH MONARCIIY. [CH. x.
into Persia was to some extent rash—if his preparations for it
had been insufficient, and his conduct of it not wholly faultless
—if consequently he had brought the army of the East into a
--
situation of great peril and difficulty—yet candor requires us
to acknowledge that of all the men collected in the Roman
camp he was the fittest to have extricated the army from its
embarrassments, and have conducted it, without serious disas-
ter or loss of honor, into a position of safety. No one, like Ju-
lian, possessed the confidence of the troops; no one so com-
bined experience in command with the personal activity and
vigor that was needed under the circumstances. When the
leaders met to consult about the appointment of a successor to
the dead prince, it was at once apparent how irreparable was
their loss. The prefect Sallust, whose superior rank and
length of service pointed him out for promotion to the vacant
post, excused himself on account of his age and infirmities.”
The generals of the second grade—Arinthaeus, Victor, Nevitta,
Dagalaiphus—had each their party among the soldiers, but
were unacceptable to the army generally. None could claim
any superior merit which might clearly place him above the
rest; and a discord that might have led to open strife seemed
impending, when a casual voice pronounced the name of Jovian,
and, Some applause following the suggestion, the rival generals
acquiesced in the choice; and this hitherto insignificant officer
was suddenly invested with the purple and saluted as “Augus-
tus” and “Emperor.”” Had there been any one really fit to
take the command, such an appointment could not have been
made; but, in the evident dearth of warlike genius, it was
thought best that one whose rank was civil rather than mili-
tary” should be preferred, for the avoidance of jealousies and
contentions. A deserter carried the news to Sapor, who was
not now very far distant, and described the new emperor to him
as effeminate and slothful.” A fresh impulse was given to the
pursuit by the intelligence thus conveyed; the army engaged
in disputing the Roman retreat was reinforced by a strong
body of cavalry; and Sapor himself pressed forward with all
haste, resolved to hurl his main force on the rear of the re-
treating columns.”
It was with reluctance that Jovian, on the day of his eleva-
tion to the supreme power (June 27, A.D. 363), quitted the
protection of the camp,” and proceeded to conduct his army
over the open plain, where the Persians were now collected in
great force, prepared to dispute the ground with him inch by
*
ch. x.] DIFFICULTIES OF THE ROMAN RETREAT. 365
º f •
inch. Their horse and elephants again fell upon the right wing
of the Romans, where the Jovians and Herculians were now
posted, and, throwing those renowned corps” into disorder,
pressed on, driving them across the plain in headlong flight and
slaying vast numbers of them. The corps would probably
have been annihilated, had they not in their fight reached a
hill occupied by the baggage train, which gallantly came to
their aid, and, attacking the horse and elephants from higher
ground, gained a signal success.” The elephants, wounded
by the javelins hurled down upon them from above, and mad-
dened with the pain, turned upon their own side, and, roaring
frightfully,” carried confusion among the ranks of the horse,
which broke up and fled. Many of the frantic animals were
killed by their own riders or by the Persians on whom they
were trampling, while others succumbed to the blows dealt
them by the enemy. There was a frightful carnage, ending in
the repulse of the Persians and the resumption of the Roman
march. Shortly before night fell, Jovian and his army reached
Samarah,” then a fort of no great size upon the Tigris,” and,
encamping in its vicinity, passed the hours of rest unmolested.
The retreat now continued for four days along the left bank
of the Tigris,” the progress made each day being small,” since
the enemy incessantly obstructed the march, pressing on the
columns as they retired, but when they stopped drawing off,
and declining an engagement at close quarters. On one occa-
sion they even attacked the Roman camp, and, after insulting
the legions with their cries, forced their way through the prae-
torian gate, and had nearly penetrated to the royal tent, when
they were met and defeated by the legionaries.” The Sara-
cenic Arabs were especially troublesome. Offended by the re-
fusal of Julian to continue their subsidies,” they had trans-
ferred their services wholly to the other side, and pursued the
Romans with a hostility that was sharpened by indignation and
resentment. It was with difficulty that the Roman army, at
the close of the fourth day, reached Dura, a small place upon
the Tigris, about eighteen miles north of Samarah.” Here a
new idea seized the soldiers. As the Persian forces were
massed chiefly on the left bank of the Tigris, and might find it
difficult to transfer themselves to the other side, it seemed to
the legionaries that they would escape half their difficulties if
they could themselves cross the river, and place it between
them and their foes. They had also a notion that on the west
side of the stream the Roman frontier was not far distant, but
*
• * N
366 THE SEVENTH MOWAI:CHF. [CH. x.
might be reached by forced marches in a few days.” They
therefore begged Jovian to allow them to swim the stream. It
was in vain that he and his officers opposed the project; muti-
nous cries arose; and, to avoid worse evils, he was compelled
to consent that five hundred Gauls and Sarmatians, known to
be expert swimmers, should make the attempt. It succeeded
beyond his hopes. The corps crossed at night, surprised the
Persians who held the opposite bank, and established them-
selves in a safe position before the dawn of day. By this bold
exploit the passage of the other troops, many of whom could
not swim, was rendered feasible, and Jovian proceeded to col-
lect timber, brushwood, and skins for the formation of large
rafts on which he might transport the rest of his army.”
. These movements were seen with no small disquietude by the
Persian king. The army which he had regarded as almost a
certain prey seemed about to escape him. He knew that his
troops could not pass the Tigris by swimming; he had, it is
probable, brought with him no boats, and the country about
Dura could not supply many; to follow the Romans, if they
crossed the stream, he must construct a bridge, and the con-
struction of a bridge was, to such unskilful engineers as the
Persians, a work of time. Before it was finished the legions
might be beyond his reach, and so the campaign would end,
and he would have gained no advantage from it. Under these
circumstances he determined to open negotiations with the
Romans, and to see if he could not extract from their fears
some important concessions. They were still in a position of
great peril, since they could not expect to embark and cross
the stream without suffering tremendous loss from the enemy
before whom they would be flying. And it was uncertain what
perils they might not encounter beyond the river in traversing
the two hundred miles that still separated them from Roman
territory.” The Saracenic allies of Persia were in force on the
further side of the stream;” and a portion of Sapor's army
might be conveyed across in time to hang on the rear of the le-
gions and add largely to their difficulties. At any rate, it was
worth while to make overtures and see what answer would be
returned. If the idea of negotiating were entertained at all,
something would be gained; for each additional day of suffer-
ing and privation diminished the Roman strength, and brought
nearer the moment of absolute and complete exhaustion.
Moreover, a bridge might be at once cºmmenced at some little
distance,” and might be pushed forward, so that, if the nego-
— — — —
{ * S. •ºr
on 21 THE TERMS or PEACE . , 367
tiations failed, there should be no great delay in following the
Romans across the river."
Such were probably the considerations” which led Sapor to
send as envoys to the Roman camp at Dura the Surena and
another great noble, who announced that they came to offer
terms of peace.” The great king, they said, having respect
to the mutability of human affairs, was desirous of dealing
mercifully with the Romans, and would allow the escape of the
remnant which was left of their army, if the Caesar and his
advisers accepted the conditions that he required.” These
conditions would be explained to any envoys whom Jovian
might empower to discuss them with the Persian plenipoten-
tiaries. The Roman emperor and his council gladly caught at
the offer; and two officers of high rank, the general Arinthaeus
and the prefect Sallust, were at once appointed to confer with
Sapor's envoys, and ascertain the terms on which peace would
be granted. They proved to be such as Roman pride felt to be
almost intolerable; and great efforts were made to induce
Sapor to be content with less. The negotiations lasted for four
days;” but the Persian monarch was inexorable; each day di-
minished his adversary's strength and bettered his own posi-
tion; there was no reason why he should make any concession
at all; and he seems, in fact, to have yielded nothing of his
original demands, except points of such exceedingly slight mo-
ment that to insist on them would have been folly.”
The following were the terms of peace to which Jovian con-
sented. First, the five provinces east of the Tigris, which had
been ceded to Rome by Narses, the grandfather of Sapor, after
his defeat by Galerius,” were to be given back to Persia, with
their fortifications, their inhabitants, and all that they con-
tained of value. The Romans in the territory were, however,
to be allowed to withdraw and join their countrymen. Sec-
Ondly, three places in Eastern Mesopotamia, Nisibis, Singara,
and a fort called “the Camp of the Moors,” were to be surren-
dered, but with the condition that not only the Romans, but
the inhabitants generally, might retire ere the Persians took
possession, and carry with them such of their effects as were
movable." The surrender of these places necessarily involved
that of the country which they commanded, and can scarcely
imply less than the withdrawal of Rome from any claim to do-
minion over the region between the Tigris and the Khabour.”
Thirdly, all connection between Armenia and Rome was to be
broken off; Arsaces was to be left to his own resources; and in
\ * - + * * r ar
- & \ * * { *.
368 THE SEWENTH MONARCHY. [CH. x.
any quarrel between him and Persia Rome was precluded from
lending him aid. On these conditions a peace was concluded
for thirty years;” oaths to observe it faithfully were inter-
changed; and hostages were given and received on either side,
to be retained until the stipulations of the treaty were executed.
The Roman historian who exclaims that it would have been
better to have fought ten battles than to have conceded a single
one of these shameful terms,” commands the sympathy of
every reader, who cannot fail to recognize in his utterance the
natural feeling of a patriot. And it is possible that Julian, had
he lived, would have rejected So inglorious a peace, and have
preferred to run all risks rather than sign it. But in that case
there is every reason to believe that the army would have been
absolutely destroyed, and a few stragglers only have returned
to tell the tale of disaster.” The alternative which Ammianus
suggests—that Jovian, instead of negotiating, should have
pushed on to Cordyene, which he might have reached in four
days—is absurd;” for Cordyene was at least a hundred and
fifty miles distant from Dura, and, at the rate of retreat which
Jovian had found possible (four and a half miles a day), would
have been reached in three days over a month! The judgment
of Eutropius, who, like Ammianus, shared in the expedition, is
probably correct—that the peace, though disgraceful, was
necessary.” Unless Jovian was prepared to risk not only his
own life, but the lives of all his soldiers, it was essential that
he should come to terms; and the best terms that he could ob-
tain were those which he has been blamed for accepting.
It is creditable to both parties that the peace, once made,
was faithfully observed, all its stipulations being honestly and
speedily executed. The Romans were allowed to pass the
river without molestation from Sapor's army,” and, though
they suffered somewhat from the Saracens when landing on
the other side,” were unpursued in their retreat,” and were
perhaps even, at first, supplied to some extent with pro-
visions.” Afterwards, no doubt, they endured for some days
great privations; but a convoy with stores was allowed to
advance from Roman Mesopotamia into Persian territory,”
which met the famished soldiers at a Persian military post,
called Ur or Adur,” and relieved their most pressing necessi-
ties. On the Roman side, the ceded provinces and towns
were quietly surrendered; offers on the part of the inhabitants
to hold their own against the Persians without Roman aid
were refused;” the Roman troops were withdrawn from the

*
- ſ g f fº * *
- f | • { a * -
cII. x.] , GENERAL RESULTS OF THE WAR. , 369
fortresses; and the Armenians were told that they must
henceforth rely upon themselves, and not look to Rome for "
help or protection. Thus Jovian, though strongly urged to
follow ancient precedent,” and refuse to fulfil the engage-
ments contracted under the pressure of imminent peril, stood
firm, and honorably performed all the conditions of the treaty.
The second period of struggle between Rome and Persia had
thus a termination exactly the reverse of the first. Rome
ended the first period by a great victory and a great diplomatic
success.” At the close of the second she had to relinquish all
her gains, and to draw back even behind the line which she
occupied when hostilities first broke out. Nisibis, the great
stronghold of Eastern Mesopotamia, had been in her posses-
sion ever since the time of Verus.” Repeatedly attacked by
Parthia and Persia, it had never fallen; but once, after which
it had been soon recovered; and now for many years it had
come to be regarded as the bulwark of the Roman power in
the East, and as carrying with it the dominion of Western
Asia.” A fatal blow was dealt to Roman prestige when a
city held for near two hundred years, and one honored with .
the name of “colony,” was wrested from the empire and
occupied by the most powerful of its adversaries. Not only
Amida and Carrhae, but Antioch itself, trembled at a loss
which was felt to lay open the whole eastern frontier to
attack,” and which seemed ominous of further retrogression.
Although the fear generally felt proved to be groundless, and
the Roman possessions in the East were not, for 200 years,
further curtailed by the Persians, yet Roman influence in
Western Asia from this time steadily declined, and Persia
came to be regarded as the first power in these regions. Much
credit is due to Sapor II. for his entire conduct of the war
with Constantius, Julian, and Jovian. He knew when to
attack and when to remain upon the defensive, when to press
on the enemy and when to hold himself in reserve and let
the enemy follow his own devices. He rightly conceived
from the first the importance of Nisibis, and resolutely per-
sisted in his determination to acquire possession of it, until at
last he succeeded. When, in B.C. 337, he challenged Rome to -
a trial of strength, he might have seemed rash and presumptu-
Ous. But the event justified him. In a war which lasted
twenty-seven years, he fought numerous pitched battles with
the Romans, and was never once defeated. He proved him-
Self greatly superior as a general to Constantius and Jovian,
* |
*..
* ... " & 7, $ #. sº. J. . . * $ # ,
*
}. *
, 370 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. . . . [ch. xi.
... } *
and not unequal to Julian. By a combination of courage,
perseverance, and promptness, he brought the entire contest
to a favorable issue, and restored Persia, in A.D. 363, to a
higher position than that from which she had descended two
generations earlier. If he had done nothing more than has
, already come under our notice, he would still have amply
deserved that epithet of “Great" which, by the general con-
sent of historians, has been assigned to him. He was un-
doubtedly among the greatest of the Sassanian monarchs, and
may properly be placed above all his predecessors, and above
all but one” of those who succeeded him.
f
.#
*
* ..ºf
CHAPTER XI.
Attitude of Armenia during the War between Sapor and
Julian. Sapor's Treachery towards Arsaces. Sapor con-
- quers Armenia. He attacks Iberia, deposes Sauromaces,
, , and sets wip a new King. Resistance and Capture of Arto-
- - gerassa. Difficulties of Sapor. Division of Iberia between
# 4 the Roman and Persian Pretenders. Renewal of Hostili-
ties between Rome and Persia. Peace made with Valens.
g Death of Sapor. His Coins.
*Rex Persidis, longaevus ille Sapor, post imperatoris Juliani excessum et
pudendae pacis icta foedera . . . injectabat Armeniae manum.”—Amm. Marc.
xxvii. 12. -
THE successful issue of Sapor's war with Julian and Jovian
resulted in no small degree from the attitude which was
assumed by Armenia soon after Julian commenced his inva-
* sion. We have seen that the emperor, when he set out upon
his expedition, regarded Armenia as an ally, and in forming
his plans placed considerable dependence on the contingent
which he expected from Arsaces, the Armenian monarch." It
was his intention to attack Ctesiphon with two separate
- armies, acting upon two converging lines. While he himself
advanced with his main force by way of the Euphrates valley
- and the Nahr-Malcha, he had arranged that his two generals,
Procopius and Sebastian, should unite their troops with those
of the Armenian king, and, after ravaging a fertile district of
Media, make their way towards the great city, through
$ t
ch. xi.] SAPOR'S PROCEEDINGS AGAINST ARSACES. 371
Assyria and Adiabene,” along the left bank of the Tigris. It
was a bitter disappointment to him when, on nearing Ctesi-
phon, he could see no signs and hear no tidings of the northern
army, from which he had looked for effectual aid at this crisis
of the campaign.” We have now to consider how this failure
came about, what circumstances induced that hesitation and
delay on the part of Sebastian and Procopius which had at
any rate a large share in frustrating Julian's plans and causing
the ill-success of his expedition. .
It appears that the Roman generals, in pursuance of the
orders given them, marched across Northern Mesopotamia to
the Armenian borders, and were there joined by an Armenian
contingent which Arsaces sent to their assistance.” The allies
marched together into Media, and carried fire and sword
through the fruitful district known as Chiliacomus, or “the
district of the Thousand Villages.”" They might easily have
advanced further; but the Armenians suddenly and without
warning drew off and fell back towards their own country.
According to Moses of Choréné, their general, Zuraeus, was
actuated by a religious motive; it seemed to him monstrous
that Armenia, a Christian country, should embrace the cause
of an apostate, and he was prepared to risk offending his own
sovereign rather than lend help to one whom he regarded as
the enemy of his faith." The Roman generals, thus deserted
by their allies, differed as to the proper course to pursue.
While one was still desirous of descending the course of the
Tigris, and making at least an attempt to effect a junction
y
\
.*
with Julian, the other forbade his soldiers to join in the
march, and insisted on falling back and re-entering Mesopo-
tamia." As usual in such cases, the difference of opinion re-
Sulted in a policy of inaction. The attempt to join Julian was
given up; and the second army, from which he had hoped so
much, played no further part in the campaign of A.D. 363. ,
We are told” that Julian heard of the defection of the Arme-
nians while he was still on his way to Ctesiphon, and immedi-
ately sent a letter to Arsaces, complaining of his general's con-
duct, and threatening to exact a heavy retribution on his re-
turn from the Persian war, if the offence of Zuraeus were not
visited at once with condign punishment. Arsaces was great-
ly alarmed at the message; and, though he made no effort to
Supply the shortcomings of his officer by leading or sending
fresh troops to Julian's assistance, yet he hastened to acquit -
himself of complicity in the misconduct of Zuraeus by execut- .
f
ºf
\
* X § Af * A
372 TIIE SEVENTH MoMARCIIY. [CH. Kr,
ing him, together with his whole family.” Having thus, as he
supposed, Secured himself against Julian's anger, he took no
further steps, but indulged his love of ease and his distaste for
the Roman alliance by remaining wholly passive during the
rest of the year.
But though the attitude taken by Armenia was thus, on the
whole, favorable to the Persians,and undoubtedly contributed
to Sapor's success, he was himself so far from satisfied with
the conduct of Arsaces that he resolved at once to invade
his country and endeavor to strip him of his crown. As Rome
had by the recent treaty relinquished her protectorate over
Armenia, and bound herself not to interfere in any quarrel be-
tween the Armenians and the Persians, an opportunity was
afforded for bringing Armenia into subjection which an ambi-
tious monarch like Sapor was not likely to let slip. He had
only to consider whether he would employ art or violence, or
whether he would rather prefer a judicious admixture of the
two. Adopting the last-named course as the most prudent, he
proceeded to intrigue with a portion of the Armenian satraps,
while he made armed incursions on the territories of others,
and so harassed the country that after a while the satraps
generally went over to his side, and represented to Arsaces
that no course was open to him but to make his submission,
Eſaving brought matters to this point, Sapor had only further
to persuade Arsaces to surrender himself, in order to obtain
the province which he coveted, almost without striking a blow.
He therefore addressed Arsaces a letter which, according to
the only writer who professes to give its terms,” was expressed
as follows: --
“Sapor, the offspring of Ormazd, comrade of the sun, king of
kings, sends greeting to his dear brother, Arsaces, king of
Armenia, whom he holds in affectionate remembrance. It has
come to our knowledge that thou hast approved thyself our
faithful friend, since not only didst thou decline to invade Per-
sia with Caesar, but when he took a contingent from thee thou
didst send messengers and withdraw it.” Moreover, we have
not forgotten how thou actedst at the first, when thou didst
prevent him from passing through thy territories, as he wished.
Our soldiers, indeed, who quitted their post, sought to cast on
thee the blame due to their own cowardice. But we have not
listened to them: their leader we punished with death, and to
~ ; thy realm, I swear by Mithra, we have done no hurt. Arrange
matters then so that thou mayest come to us with all speed.
--- r i f s H=w — + º-,- -
~. * $ ! }
CH. XI.] ARSACES: SEIZED AND BLINDED. 373
and consult with us concerning our common advantage. Then
thou canst return home.” $
Arsaces, on receiving this missive, whatever suspicions he
may have felt, saw no course open to him but to accept the in-
vitation. He accordingly quitted Armenia and made his way
to the court of Sapor, where he was immediately seized and
|blinded.” He was then fettered with chains of silver, accord- *
ing to a common practice of the Persians with prisoners of dis- }
tinction,” and was placed in strict confinement in a place called
“the Castle of Oblivion.” “ -- *
But the removal of their head did not at once produce the ".
submission of the people. A national party declared itself un-
der Pharandzem, the wife, and Bab (or Para), the son of , ,
Arsaces, who threw themselves into the strong fortress of,
Artogerassa (Ardakers), and there offered to Sapor a de- . ,
termined resistance.” Sapor committed the siege of this place
to two renegade Armenians, Cylaces and Artabannes, while at
the same time he proceeded to extend his influence beyond the *-
limits of Armenia into the neighboring country of Iberia, * ,
which was closely connected with Armenia, and for the most .
part followed its fortunes. tº
Iberia was at this time under the government of a king bear- i.,
ing the name of Sauromaces, who had received his investiture ,
from Rome, and was consequently likely to uphold Roman
interests. Sapor invaded Iberia, drove Sauromaces from his
kingdom, and set up a new monarch in the person of a certain 4.
Aspacures, on whose brow he placed the coveted diadem.” ' ,
He then withdrew to his own country, leaving the complete r
subjection of Armenia to be accomplished by his officers, -
Cylaces and Artabannes, Or, as the Armenian historians call *
them, Zig and Garen.”
Cylaces and Artabannes commenced the siege of Artogerassa,
and for a time pressed it with vigor, while they strongly urged
the garrison to make their submission. But, having entered
within the walls to negotiate, they were won over by the oppo-
site side, and joined in planning a treachorous attack on the
besieging force, which was surprised at night and compelled to
retire. Para took advantage of their retreat to quit the town
and throw himself on the protection of Valens, the Roman
emperor, who permitted him to reside in regal state at Neocae-
Sarea. Shortly afterwards, however, by the advice of Cylaces
and Artabannes, he returned into Armenia, and was accepted
by the patriotic party as their king, Rome secretly countenanc-
}
*
– —, * : s *
*
374 * THE SEVENTH MONARCIIY. . [CH. xI.
ing his proceedings.” Under these circumstances the Persian
monarch once more took the field, and, entering Armenia at
the head of a large army, drove Para, with his counsellors
Cylaces and Artabannes, to the mountains, renewed the siege
of Artogerassa, and forced it to submit, captured the queen
Pharandzem, together with the treasure of Arsaces,” and
finally induced Para to come to terms, and to send him the
heads of the two arch-traitors. The resistance of Armenia
would probably now have ceased, had Rome been content to
see her old enemy so aggrandized, or felt her hands absolutely
tied by the terms of the treaty of Dura.
But the success of Sapor thus far only brought him into
greater difficulties. The Armenians and Iberians, who desired
above all things liberty and independence, were always especi-
ally hostile to the power from which they felt that they had for
the time being most to fear. As Christian nations, they had
also at this period an additional ground of sympathy with
Rome, and of aversion from the Persians, who were at once
heathens and intolerant.” The patriotic party in both coun-
'tries was thus violently opposed to the establishment of Sapor's
‘authority over them, and cared little for the artifices by which
he sought to make it appear that they still enjoyed freedom
, and autonomy. Above all, Rome, being ruled by monarchs”
who had had no hand in making the disgraceful peace of A.D.
363, and who had no strong feeling of honor or religious obliga-
tion in the matter of treaties with barbarians, was preparing
herself to fly in the face of her engagements, and, regarding
her own interest as her highest law, to interfere effectually in
order to check the progress of Persia in North-Western Asia.
Rome's first open interference was in Ibera. Iberia had per-
haps not been expressly named in the treaty, and support
might consequently be given to the expelled Sauromaces with-
out any clear infraction of its conditions. The duke Terentius
was ordered, therefore, towards the close of A.D. 370, to enter
Tberia with twelve legions and replace upon his throne the old
Roman feudatory.” Accordingly he invaded the country from
Lazica, which bordered it upon the north, and found no diffi-
culty in conquering it as far as the river Cyrus. On the Cyrus,
however, he was met by Aspacures, the king of Sapor's choice,
who made proposals for an accommodation. Representing
himself as really well-inclined to Rome, and only prevented
from declaring himself by the fact that Sapor held his son as a
hostage, he asked Terentius' consent to a division of Iberia be-
e- - - -
ºf a T- - —z—
*
*
j * * * * it f
ch. xi.] WAR BETWEEN SAPOR AND WALENS. 375
tween himself and his rival, the tract north of the Cyrus being
assigned to the Roman claimant, and that South of the river
remaining under his own government. Terentius, to escape
further trouble, consented to the arrangement; and the double
kingdom was established. The northern and western portions
of Iberia were made over to Sauromaces; the southern and
eastern continued to be ruled by Aspacures. -
When the Persian king received intelligence of these trans-
actions he was greatly excited.” To him it appeared clear that
by the spirit, if not by the letter, of the treaty of Dura, Rome
had relinquished Iberia equally with Armenia;” and he com-
plained bitterly of the division which had been made of the
Iberian territory, not only without his consent, but without
his knowledge. He was no doubt aware that Rome had riot
really confined her interference to the region with which she had
some excuse for intermeddling, but had already secretly in-
tervened in Armenia, and was intending further intervention.
The count Arinthaeus had been sent with an army to the Arme-
nian frontier about the same time that Terentius had invaded
Iberia, and had received positive instructions to help the
Armenians if Sapor molested them. It was in vain that the
Persian monarch appealed to the terms of the treaty of Dura—
Rome dismissed his ambassadors with contempt, and made no
change in her line of procedure. Upon this Sapor saw that
war was unavoidable; and accordingly he wasted no more
time in embassies, but employed himself during the winter,
which had now begun, in collecting as large a force as he could,
in part from his allies, in part from his own subjects, resolving
to take the field in the spring, and to do his best to punish
Rome for her faithlessness.” t
Rome on her part made ready to resist the invasion which
She knew to be impending. A powerful army was sent to
guard the East under count Trajan, and Vadomair, ex-king of .
the Alemanni;” but so much regard for the terms of the re-
cent treaty was still felt, or pretended, that the generals re-
ceived orders to be careful not to commence hostilities, but to
wait till an attack was made on them. They were not kept
long in expectation. As soon as winter was over, Sapor cross-
ed the frontier (A.D. 371) with a large force of native cavalry
and archers, supported by numerous auxiliaries,” and attacked
the Romans near a place called Vagabanta. The Roman com-
mander gave his troops the order to retire; and accordingly
they fell back under a shower of Persian arrows, until, several
#
A
s — .. a — - - *
*
*
.
*
376 TEIE SEVENTH HONAIRCII Y. ſch. xi.
having been wounded, they felt that they could with a good
face declare that the rupture of the peace was the act of the
Persians. The retreat was then exchanged for an advance,
and after a brief engagement the Romans were victorious, and
inflicted a severe loss upon their adversaries.” But the suc-
cess was not followed by results of any importance. Neither
side seems to have been anxious for another general encounter;
&
and the season for hostilities was occupied by a sort of guerilla
warfare, in which the advantage rested alternately with the
Persians and the Romans.” At length, when the summer was
ended, the commanders on either side entered into negotia-
tions; and a truce was made which allowed Sapor to retire to
Ctesiphon, and the Roman emperor, who was now personally
directing the war, to go into winter quarters at Antioch.”
After this the war languished for two or three years.” Va-
lens was wholly deficient in military genius, and was quite con-
tent if he could maintain a certain amount of Roman influence
in Armenia and Iberia, while at the same time he protected
the Roman frontier against Persian invasion. Sapor was ad-
vanced in years, and might naturally desire repose, having
been almost constantly engaged in military expeditions since
he reached the age of sixteen. Negotiations seem to have
alternated with hostilities* during the interval between A.D.
371 and 376; but they resulted in nothing, until, in this last-
named year, a peace was made,” which gave tranquillity to
the East during the remainder of the reign of Sapor. -
The terms upon which this peace was concluded are obscure.
It is perhaps most probable that the two contracting powers
agreed to abstain from further interference with Iberia and
Armenia, and to leave those countries to follow their own in-
clinations. Armenia, seems by the native accounts to have
gravitated towards Rome under these circumstances,” and
Iberia is likely to have followed her example. The tie of
Christianity attached these countries to the great power of the
West; and, except under compulsion, they were not likely at
this time to tolerate the yoke of Persia for a day. When
Jovian withdrew the Roman protection from them, they were
forced for a while to submit to the power which they disliked;
but no sooner did his successors reverse his policy, and show
themselves ready to uphold the Armenians and Iberians against
Persia, than they naturally reverted to the Roman side, and
formed an important Support to the empire against its Eastern
rival. . j -
f
*
ch. xi.] * coſNs of SAPOR II. 377
The death of Sapor followed the peace of A.D. 376 within a
few years. He died” A.D. 379 or 380, after having reigned
Seventy years. It is curious that, although possessing the
crown for So long a term, and enjoying a more brilliant reign
than any preceding monarch, he neither left behind him any
inscriptions, nor any sculptured memorials. The only material
evidences that we possess of his reign are his coins, which are ,
exceedingly numerous. According to Mordtmann,” they may ,
be divided into three classes, corresponding to three periods in
his life. The earliest have on the reverse the fire-altar, with
two priests, or guards, looking towards the altar, and with the
flame rising from the altar in the usual way. The head on the
obverse is archaic in type, and very much resembles that of
Sapor I. The crown has attached to it, in many cases, that ,
“cheek-piece” which is otherwise confined to the first three-
monarchs of the line. These coins are the best from an artistic
point of view; they greatly resemble those of the first Sapor,
but are distinguishable from them, first, by the guards looking
towards the altar instead of away from it; and, secondly, by a
greater profusion of pearls about the king's person. The coins
of the second period lack the “cheek-piece,” and have on the
reverse the fire-altar without supporters; they are inferior as
works of art to those of the first period, but much superior
to those of the third. These last, which exhibit a marked
degeneracy,” are especially distinguished by having a human
head in the middle of the 'flames that rise from the altar.
Otherwise they much resemble in their emblems the early,
coins, only differing from them in being artistically inferior. .
The ordinary legends upon the coins are in no respect remark-
able; * but occasionally we find the monarch taking the new
and expressive epithet of Toham, “the Strong.”.” [Pl. XIX.,
Fig. 1.] .
See
º
W
378 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. ſch. xm,
CHAPTER XII.
Short Reigns of Artaateraces II. and Sapor III. Obscurity
of their History. Their Relations with Armenia. Monu-
ment of Sapor III. at Takht-i-Bostan. Coins of Arta-
aceraces II. and Sapor III. Reign of Varahram IV. His
Sigmets. His Dealings with Armenia. His Death.
'Apraśnp Érm 8' Xaßop, vios 'Apraśńp, Tm é Oiapapávns érm it.
Syncellus, Chronographia, p. 360, C.
THE glorious reign of Sapor II., which carried the New Per-
sian Empire to the highest point whereto it had yet attained,
is followed by a time which offers to that remarkable reign a
most complete contrast. Sapor had occupied the Persian
throne for a space approaching nearly to three-quarters of a
century; the reigns of his next three successors amounted to
no more than twenty years in the aggregate." Sapor had been
engaged in perpetual wars, had spread the terror of the Per-
sian arms on all sides, and ruled more gloriously than any of
his predecessors. The kings who followed him were pacific
and unenterprising; they were almost unknown to their
neighbors,” and are among the least distinguished of the Sas-
sanian monarchs. More especially does this character attach
to the two immediate successors of Sapor II., viz. Artaxerxes
II. and Sapor III. They reigned respectively four and five
years;” and their annals during this period are almost a blank.
Artaxerxes II., who is called by some the brother of Sapor II.,
was more probably his son.” He succeeded his father in A.D.
379, and died at Ctesiphon" in A.D. 383. He left a character
for kindness and amiability behind him, and is known to the
Persians as Nikowkar," or “the Beneficent,” and to the Arabs
as Al Djemil,” “the Virtuous.” According to the “Modjmel-
al-Tewarikh,” he took no taxes from his subjects during the
four years of his reign, and thereby secured to himself their
affection and gratitude. He seems to have received overtures
from the Armenians soon after his accession," and for a time
to have been acknowledged by the turbulent mountaineers as
their Sovereign. After the murder of Bab, or Para, the Ro-
– mans had set up, as king over Armenia, a certain Varaztad
$
* * * t - .
ch. xii.] FRESH TROUBLES IN ARMENIA. 379
(Pharasdates), a member of the Arsacid family, but no near
relation of the recent monarchs, assigning at the same time the
real direction of affairs to an Armenian noble named Mou-
shegh, who belonged to the illustrious family of the Mamigo-
nians.” Moushegh ruled Armenia with vigor, but was sus-
pected of maintaining over-friendly relations with the Roman
emperor, Valens, and of designing to undermine and supplant
his master. Varaztad, after a while, having been worked on
by his counsellors, grew suspicious of him, and caused him to
be executed at a banquet." This treachery roused the indigna-
tion of Moushegh's brother Manuel, who raised a rebellion
against Varaztad, defeated him in open fight, and drove him
from his kingdom.” Manuel then brought forward the prin-
cess Zermanducht, widow of the late king Para, together with
her two young Sons, Arsaces and Valarsaces, and, surrounding
all three with royal pomp, gave to the two princes the name of
king, while he took care to retain in his own hands the real
government of the country. Under these circumstances he
naturally dreaded the hostility of the Roman emperor, who
was not likely to see with patience a monarch, whom he had
set upon the throne, deprived of his kingdom by a subject. To
maintain the position which he had assumed, it was necessary
that he should contract some important alliance; and the alli-
ance always open to Armenia when she had quarrelled with
Rome was with the Persians. It seems to have been soon
after Artaxerxes II. Succeeded his father, that Manuel sent an
embassy to him, with letters and rich gifts, offering, in return
for his protection, to acknowledge him as lord-paramount of .
Armenia, and promising him unshakable fidelity.” The offer
was, of course, received with extreme satisfaction; and terms
were speedily arranged. Armenia was to pay a fixed tribute,
to receive a garrison of ten thousand Persians and to provide
adequately for their support, to allow a Persian satrap to
divide with Manuel the actual government of the country, and
to furnish him with all that was necessary for his court and
table. On the other hand, Arsaces and Valarsaces, together
(apparently) with their mother, Zermanducht, were to be al-
lowed the royal title and honors;. Armenia was to be protected
in case of invasion; and Manuel was to be maintained in his
office of Sparapet or generalissimo of the Armenian forces.”
We cannot say with ceitainty how long this arrangement re-
mained undisturbed; most probably, however, it did not con-
tinue in force more than a few years.” It was most likely
– – **
880 TIME SEVENTH MONARCH Y. ſch. xii.
* . while Artaxerxes still ruled Persia, that the rupture described
by Faustus occurred.” A certain Meroujan, an Armenian
noble, jealous of the power and prosperity of Manuel, per-
suaded him that the Persian commandant in Armenia was
about to seize his person, and either to send him a prisoner to
Artaxerxes, or else to put him to death. Manuel, who was so
credulous as to believe the information, thought it necessary
... for his own safety to anticipate the designs of his enemies, and,
*.
*
falling upon the ten thousand Persians with the whole of the
Armenian army, succeeded in putting them all to the sword,
except their commander, whom he allowed to escape." War
followed between Persia and Armenia with varied success, but
on the whole Manuel had the advantage; he repulsed several
Persian invasions, and maintained the independence and in-
tegrity of Armenia till his death, without calling in the aid of
Rome.” When, however, Manuel died, about A.D. 383, Arme-
nian affairs fell into confusion; the Romans were summoned
to give help to One party, the Persians to render assistance to
the other; * Armenia became once more the battle-ground
between the two great powers, and it seemed as if the old con-
test, fraught with so many calamities, was to be at once
renewed. But the circumstances of the time were such that
neither Rome nor Persia now desired to reopen the contest.
Persia, was in the hands of weak and unwarlike sovereigns,
and was perhaps already threatened by Scythic hordes upon
the east.” Rome was in the agonies of a struggle with the
ever-increasing power of the Goths; and though, in the course of
the years A.D. 379–382, the Great Theodosius had established
peace in the tract under his rule, and delivered the central
provinces of Macedonia and Thrace from the intolerable
ravages of the barbaric invaders,” yet the deliverance had
been effected at the cost of introducing large bodies of Goths
into the heart of the empire,” while still along the northern
frontier lay a threatening cloud, from which devastation and
ruin might at any time burst forth and overspread the pro-
vinces upon the Lower Danube. Thus both the Roman em-
peror and the Persian king were well disposed towards peace.
An arrangement was consequently made, and in A.D. 384, five
years after he had ascended the throne, Theodosius gave
audience in Constantinople” to envoys from the court of
Persepolis, and concluded with them a treaty whereby matters
in Armenia were placed on a footing which fairly satisfied
both sides, and the tranquillity of the East was assured.* The
f
&
cit. XII.] ARMENIA DIVIDED BY ROME AND PERSIA. 3S1
high contracting powers agreed that Armenia should be parti-
tioned between them. After detaching from the kingdom
various outlying districts, which could be 'conveniently ab-
sorbed into their own territories, they divided the rest of the
country into two unequal portions. The Smaller of these,
which comprised the more western districts, was placed
under the protection of Rome, and was committed by Theo- "
dosius to the Arsaces who had been made king by Manuel,
the son of the unfortunate Bab, or Para, and the grandson of
the Arsaces contemporary with Julian. The larger portion,
which consisted of the regions lying towards the east, passed
under the suzerainty of Persia, and was confided by Sapor III.,
who had succeeded Artaxerxes II., to an Arsacid, named
Chosroës, a Christian, who was given the title of king, and re-
ceived in marriage at the same time one of Sapor's sisters.
Such were the terms on which Rome and Persia brought their
contention respecting Armenia to a conclusion. Friendly
relations were in this way established between the two crowns,
which continued undisturbed for the long space of thirty-six
years (A.D. 384–420).” . s
Sapor III. appears to have succeeded his brother Artaxerxes
– H---- —
in A.D. 383, the year before the conclusion of the treaty. It is
uncertain whether Artaxerxes vacated the throne by death, or ,
was deposed in consequence of cruelties whereof he was guilty
towards the priests and nobles. Tabari and Magoudi, who re-
late his deposition,” are authors on whom much reliance can-
not be placed;’ and the cruelties reported accord but ill
with the epithets of “the Beneficent” and “the Virtuous,”
assigned to this monarch by others.” Perhaps it is most
probable that he held the throne till his death, according to the
statements of Agathias and Eutychius.” Of Sapor III., his
brother and successor, two facts only are recorded—his con-
clusion of the treaty with the Romans in B.C. 384, and his war
with the Arabs of the tribe of Yad,” which must have followed
shortly afterwards. It must have been in consequence of his
contest with the latter, whom he attacked in their own coun-
try, that he received from his countrymen the appellation of
“the Warlike,” ” an appellation better deserved by either of
the other monarchs who had borne the same name. .
Sapor III. left behind him a sculptured memorial, which is
still to be seen in the vicinity of Kermanshah. [Pl. XX.]
It consists of two very similar figures, looking towards each
other, and standing in an arched frame. On either side of the
f
Af
\
- - - - - f
382 THE SEVENTH MOWARCHY. [CH. XII.
figures are inscriptions in the Old Pehlevi character, whereby
we are enabled to identify the individuals represented with the
second and the third Sapor.” The inscriptions run thus:—
“Pathkelizani mazdism shahia Shahpuhri, malkan malka Ailan
ve Amilan, minuchitli min yazdan, bari mazdism shahia Awhºr-
mazai, malkan malka Ailan ve Anilan, minuchitli min yazdan,
napi shahia Narshehi malkan malka;” * and “Pathkeli maz-
dism shahia Shahpuhri, malkan malka Ailan ve Amilan, minu-
chitli min yazdan, bari maždism shahia Shahpuhri, malkan
malka Ailan ve Anilan, minuchitli min yazdan, map? shahia
Auhrmazdi, malkan malka.” They are, it will be seen, iden-
tical in form, with the exception that the names in the right-
... hand inscription are “Sapor, Hormisdas, Narses,” while those
in the left-hand one are “Sapor, Sapor, Hormisdas.” It has
been supposed” that the right-hand figure was erected by
Sapor II., and the other afterwards added by Sapor III. ; but
the unity of the whole sculpture, and its inclusion under a
single arch, seem to indicate that it was set up by a single sov-
ereign, and was the fruit of a single conception. If this be so,
we must necessarily ascribe it to the later of the two monarchs
commemorated, i.e. to Sapor III., who must be supposed to
have possessed more than usual filial piety, since the com-
memoration of their predecessors upon the throne is very
rare among the Sassanians.
The taste of the monument is questionable. An elaborate
finish of all the details of the costume compensates but ill for
a clumsiness of contour and a want of contrast and variety,
which indicate a low condition of art, and compare unfavorably
with the earlier performances of the Neo-Persian sculptors. It
may be doubted whether, among all the reliefs of the Sassani-
ans, there is one which is so entirely devoid of artistic merit as
this coarse and dull production.
- The coins of Sapor III. and his predecessor, Artaxerxes II.,
have little about them that is remarkable. Those of Artaxerxes
bear a head which is surmounted with the usual inflated ball,
and has the diadem, but is without a crown—a deficiency in
which some See an indication that the prince thus represented
was regent rather than monarch of Persia.” [Pl. XIX. Fig. 2.]
The legends upon the coins are, however, in the usual style of
, royal epigraphs, running commonly”—“Ma2dism bag Artah-
shetri malkan malka Airam ve Aniram,” or “the Ormazd-wor-
Shipping divine Artaxerxes, king of the kings of Iran and
Turan.” They are easily distinguishable from those of Arta-
g <!
*
cII, XII.] COINS OF ARTAXERXES II. AND SAPOR II. , 383 .
\
xerxes I., both by the profile, which is far less marked, and by
the fire-altar on the reverse, which has always two supporters,
looking towards the altar. The coins of Sapor III. present some
unusualtypes. [Pl. XIX. Fig. 6..] On some of them the king has
his hair bound with a simple diadem, without crown or cap of
any kind.” On others he wears a cap of avery peculiar character,
which has been compared to a biretta,” but is really altogether
sui generis. The cap is surmounted by the ordinary inflated
ball, is ornamented with jewels, and is bound round at bottom
with the usual diadem.” The legend upon the obverse of Sa-
por’s coins is of the customary character; but the reverse
bears usually, besides the name of the king, the word atur, .
which has been supposed to stand for Aturia or Assyria;” this
explanation, however, is very doubtful.” * *
The coins of both kings exhibit marks of decline, especially
on the reverse, where the drawing of the figures that support
the altar is very inferior to that which we observe on the coins
of the kings from Sapor I. to Sapor II. The characters on both
obverse and reverse are also carelessly rendered, and can only
with much difficulty be deciphered. \ f *
Sapor III, died A.D. 388, after reigning a little more than five
years.". He was a man of simple tastes,” and is said to have
been fond of exchanging the magnificence and dreary etiquette , ,
of the court for the freedom and ease of a life under tents. On
an occasion when he was thus enjoying himself, it happened
that one of those violent hurricanes, to which Persia is subject,
arose, and, falling in full force on the royal encampment, blew
down the tent wherein he was sitting. It happened unfortu-
nately that the main tent-pole struck him, as it fell, in a vital
part, and Sapor died from the blow.” Such at least was the
account given by those who had accompanied him, and gener-
ally believed by his subjects. There were not, however, want-
ing persons to whisper that the story was untrue—that the real
cause of the catastrophe which had overtaken the unhappy
monarch was a conspiracy of his nobles, or his guards, who
had overthrown his tent purposely, and murdered him ere he
could escape from them.
The successor of Sapor III. was Varahran IV., whom some
authorities call his brother and others his son.* This prince is
known to the oriental writers as “Varahran Kerman-shah,” or
“Varahran, king of Carmania.” Agathiastells us“that during
the lifetime of his father he was established as governor over
Kerman or Carmania, and thus obtained the appellation which
#
#
384 THE'SEVENTH MONARCHY, [ch. xii.
t
pertinaciously adhered to him. A curious relic of antiquity,
fortunately preserved to modern times amid so much that has
been lost, confirms this statement. It is the Seal of Varahran
before he ascended the Persian throne, and contains, besides his
portrait, beautifully cut, an inscription, which is read as fol-
lows:”—“Varahran Kerman malka, bari mazdism bag Shahpuh-
ri malkan malka Airan ve Aniran, minuchitri min jazdan,”
or “Varahran, king of Kerman, Son of the Ormazd-worshipping
divine Sapor, king of the kings of Iran and Turan, heaven-de-
scended of the race of the gods.” [Pl. XIX. Fig. 5.] Another
seal, belonging to him probably after he had become monarch
of Persia, contains his full-length portrait,” and exhibits him
as trampling under foot a prostrate figure, supposed to repre-
sent a Roman,” by which it would appear that he claimed to
have gained victories or advantages over Rome. [Pl. XIX. Figs.
- 3 and 4.] It is not altogether easy to understand how this
could have been. Not only do the Roman writers mention no
war between the Romans and Persians at this time, but they
expressly declare that the East remained in profound repose
during the entire reign of Varahran, and that Rome and Persia
continued to be friends.” The difficulty may, however, be per-
haps explained by a consideration of the condition of affairs in
Armenia at this time; for in Armenia Rome and Persia had
still conflicting interests, and, without having recourse to arms,
triumphs might be obtained in this quarter by the one over the
other.
On the division of Armenia between Arsaces and Chosroës,
a really good understanding had been established, which had
lasted for about six years. Arsaces had died two years after
he became a Roman feudatory;" and, at his death, Rome had
absorbed his territories into her empire, and placed the new
province under the government of a count.” No objection to
the arrangement had been made by Persia, and the whole of
Armenia had remained for four years tranquil and without
disturbance. But, about A.D. 390, Chosroës became dis-
satisfied with his position, and entered into relations with
J Rome which greatly displeased the Armenian monarch,”
Chosroës obtained from Theodosius his own appointment to
the Armenian countship, and thus succeeded in uniting both
Roman and Persian Armenia under his government. Elated
with this success, he proceeded further to venture on admin-
istrative acts which trenched, according to Persian views, on
the rights of the lord paramount.” Finally, when Varahran
*
Vol III, Plate, XXX|||
tºº
tºur rise) = Nº.
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wº !ſ 11:1 K- |
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ºf Rſ.`
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SassaniaN CAPITAL (after Flandin)
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- r 1 * * * , ,
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Plate XXXIV.
E---E -
-------
Ancy of Chosrois II. At Takht-i-Bostº (after Flandin).
-
- - - - - -
; : ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ; ;
t t - r º
- :
• *...* : . . . . ."
- " - - " - t


ch. xiii.) ACCESSION OF ISDIGERD I. 385
addressed to him a remonstrance, he replied in insulting terms,
and, renouncing his authority, placed the whole Armenian
kingdom under the suzerainty and protection of Rome.”
War between the two great powers Imust now have seemed
imminent, and could indeed only have been avoided by great
moderation and Self-restraint on the one-side or the other.
Under these circumstances it was Rome that drew back.
Theodosius declined to receive the Submission which Chosroës
tendered, and refused to lift a finger in his defence. The
unfortunate prince was forced to give himself up to Varahan,
who consigned him to the Castle of Oblivion, and placed his
brother, Varahran-Sapor, upon the Armenian throne.” These
events seem to have fallen into the year A.D. 391, the
third year of Varahran,” who may well have felt proud of
them, and have thought that they formed a triumph over
Rome which deserved to be commemorated.
The character of Varahran IV. is represented variously by .
the native authorities. According to some of them, his
temper was mild, and his conduct irreproachable.” Others
say that he was a hard man, and so neglected the duties of
his station that he would not even read the petitions or com-
plaints which were addressed to him." It would seem that
there must have been some ground for these latter representa-
tions, since it is generally agreed” that the cause of his death
was a revolt of his troops, who surrounded him and shot at
him with arrows. One shaft, better directed than the rest,
struck him in a vital part, and he fell and instantly expired."
Thus perished, in A.D. 399, the third son of the Great Sapor,
after a reign of eleven years.
CHAPTER XIII.
Accession of Isdigerd I. Peaceful Character of his Reign. His
Alleged Guardianship of Theodosius II. His leaning to-
wards Christianity, and consequent Unpopularity with his
Subjects. His Change of vičw and Persecution of the
Christians. His relations with Armenia. II:3 Coins.
IHis Personal Character. His Degth.
Eſri Tourous 'Io 8tyépôms . . . thv IIeporukhv hyeſtoviav trapaxapºgévet, à troAVs trapā ‘Papaiots
Kai TreptățAmtos.-Agathias, iv. 26; p. 136, C.
VARAHRAN. IV. was succeeded (A.D. 399) by his son,
Izdikerti,” or Isdigerd I.,” whom the soldiers, though they
\
— — — — — — — - / T - 'y
* t
386 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. XIII.
} •
had murdered his father,” permitted to ascend the throne
without difficulty. He is Said, at his accession, to have borne
a good character for prudence and moderation,” a character
which he sought to confirm by the utterance on various oc-
casions of high-sounding moral sentiments." The general
"tenor of his reign was peaceful;" and we may conclude there-
fore that he was of an unwarlike temper, since the circum-
stances of the time were such as would naturally have induced
a prince of any military capacity to resume hostilities against
the Romans. After the arrangement made with Rome by
Sapor III. in A. D. 384, a terrible Series of calamities had be-
fallen the empire." Invasions of Ostrogoths and Franks sig-
malized the years A. D. 386 and 388; in A. D. 387 the revolt of
Maximus seriously endangered the western moiety of the
Roman state; in the same year occurred an outburst of
sedition at Antioch, which was followed shortly by the more
dangerous sedition, and the terrible massacre of Thessalonica;
Argobastes and Eugenius headed a rebellion in A.D. 392;
Gildo the Moor detached Africa from the empire in A.D.
386, and maintained a separate dominion on the southern
shores of the Mediterranean for twelve years, from A.D.
386 to 398; in A.D. 395 the Gothic warriors within and
without the Roman frontier took arms, and under the re-
doubtable Alaric threatened at Once the East and the West,
ravaged Greece, captured Corinth, Argos, and Sparta, and
from the coasts of the Adriatic already marked for their prey
the smiling fields of Italy. The rulers of the East and West,
Arcadius and Honorius, were alike weak and unenterprising;
and further, they were not even on good terms, nor was either
likely to trouble himself very greatly about attacks upon the
territories of the other. Isdigerd might have crossed the
Euphrates, and overrun or conquered the Asiatic provinces of
the Eastern Empire, without causing Honorious a pang, or in-
ducing him to stir from Milan. It is true that Western Rome
possessed at this time the rare treasure of a capable general;
but Stilicho was looked upon with fear and aversion by the
emperor of the East," and was moreover fully occupied with
the defence of his own master's territories. Had Isdigerd, on
ascending the throne in A.D. 399, unsheathed the Sword and
resumed the bold designs of his grandfather, Sapor II., he
could scarcely have met with any serious or prolonged resis-
tance. He would have found the East governed practically by
, the eunuch Eutropius, a plunderer and oppressor, universally
&
;
:
f
tº .
... .
& K.
e;
- - —za- - 8t- x r
t k t , t
º
* Y-
ch. xiii.] goNDITION OF ROME AT THIS PERIOD 387 / . .
hated and feared; he would have had opposed to him, nothing
but distracted counsels and disorganized forces; Asia Minor
was in possession of the Ostrogoths, who, under the leadership
of Tribigild, were ravaging and destroying far and wide;" the
armies of the State were commanded by Gainas, the Goth, and ' '
Leo, the wool-comber, of whom the one was incompetent, and
the other unfaithful;" there was nothing, apparently, that
could have prevented him from overrunning Roman Armenia,
Mesopotamia, and Syria, or even from extending his ravages,
or his dominion, to the shores of the AEgean. But the opportu-
nity was either not seen, or was not regarded as having any
attractions. Isdigerd remained tranquil and at rest within the
walls of his capital. Assuming as his special title the charac-
teristic epithet" of “Ramashtras,” “the most quiet,” or “the
most firm,” he justified his assumption of it by a complete
abstinence from all military expeditions. V - ? .
When Isdigerd had reigned peaceably for the space of nine
years, he is said to have received a compliment of an unusual
character. Arcadius, the emperor of the East, finding his end
approaching, and anxious to secure a protector for his son
Theodosius, a boy of tender age, instead of committing him to
the charge of his uncle Honorius, or selecting a guardian for
him from among his own subjects, by a formal testamentary
act, we are told,” placed his child under the protection of the
Persian monarch. He accompanied the appointment by a sol-
emn appeal to the magnanimity of Isdigerd, whom he exhorted
at Some length to defend with all his force, and guide with his
best wisdom, the young king and his kingdom.” According to
one writer,” he further appended to this trust a valuable legacy
—no less than a thousand pounds weight of pure gold, which
he begged his Persian brother to accept as a token of his good-
will. When Arcadius died, and the testament was opened,
information of its contents was sent to Isdigerd, who at once
accepted the charge assigned to him, and addressed a letter
to the Senate of Constantinople,” in which he declared his de-
termination to punish any attempt against his ward with the
extremest severity. Unable to watch over his charge in per-
Son, he selected for his guide and instructor a learned eunuch
of his court, by name Antiochus, and sent him to Constantino-
ple," where for several years he was the young prince's con- -
stant companion. Even after his death or expulsion,” which
took place in consequence of the intrigues of Pulcheria, Theo-
dosius's elder sister, the Persian monarch continued faithful to
!
-
* **
*
*
^
- Z. 2. *
388 . THE SETVENTH MONAROFIX. [CII. XII:. .
his engagements. During the whole of his reign he not only
rémained at peace with the Romans, but avoided every act
that they could have regarded as in the least degree un-
friendly.”
Such is the narrative which has come down to us on the au-
thority of historians, the earliest of whom wrote a century and
a half after Arcadius's death.” Modern criticism has, in gen-
\ eral, rejected the entire story, on this account, regarding the
silence of the earlier writers as outweighing the positive state-
ments of the later ones.” It should, however, be borne in
mind, first that the earlier writers are few in number,” and
, that their histories are very meagre and Scanty; secondly, that
the fact, if act it were, was one not very palatable to Chris-
tians; and thirdly, that, as the results, so far as Rome was
concerned, were negative, the event might not have seemed
to be one of much importance, or that required notice. The
character of Procopius, with whom the story originates, should
also be taken into consideration, and the special credit allowed
him by Agathias for careful and diligent research.” It may
be added, that one of the main points of the narrative—the
position of Antiochus at Constantinople during the early years
of Theodosius—is corroborated by the testimony of a contem-
porary, the bishop Synesius,” who speaks of a man of this
name, recently in the Service of a Persian,” as all-powerful
with the Eastern emperor. It has been supposed by one
writer” that the whole story grew out of this fact; but the
basis scarcely seems to be sufficient; and it is perhaps most
probable that Arcadius did really by his will commend his son
to the kind consideration of the Persian monarch, and that
, that monarch in consequence sent him an adviser, though the
formal character of the testamentary act, and the power and
position of Antiochus at the court of Constantinople, may have
been overstated. Theodosius no doubt owed his quiet posses-
sion of the throne rather to the good disposition towards him
of his own subjects than to the protection of a foreigner; and
Isdigerd refrained from all attack on the territories of the
young prince, rather by reason of his own pacific temper than
in consequence of the will of Arcadius.
The friendly relations established, under whatever circum-
stances, between Isdigerd and the Roman empire of the East
seemed to have inclined the Persian monarch, during a portion
of his reign, to take the Christians into his favor, and even to
have induced him to contemplate seeking admission into the
- & * ºr
* 4.
*
cH. xIII.] ISDIGERD’S PERSECUTIONS. 389'
Church by the door of baptism.” Antiochus, his representa-
tive at the Court of Arcadius, openly wrote in favor of the
persecuted sect;” and the encouragement received from this
high quarter rapidly increased the number of professing Chris-
tians in the Persian territories.” The sectaries, though op-
pressed, had long been allowed to have their bishops; and Is-
digerd is said to have listened with approval to the teaching
of two of them, Marutha, bishop of Mesopotamia, and Abdağs,
bishop of Ctesiphon.” Convinced of the truth of Christianity,
but unhappily an alien from its Spirit, he commenced a perse-
cution of the Magians and their most powerful adherents,”
which caused him to be held in detestation by his subjects,
and has helped to attach to his name the epithets of “Al-
Khasha,” “the Harsh,” and “Al-Athim,” “the Wicked.” But
the persecution did not continue long. The excessive zeal of
Abdańs after a while provoked a reaction; and Isdigerd, de-
serting the cause which he had for a time espoused, threw
himself (with all the zeal of one who, after nearly embrac-
ing truth, relapses into error) into the arms of the opposite
party. Abdańs had ventured to burn down the great Fire-
Temple of Ctesiphon, and had then refused to rebuild it.” Is-
digerd authorized the Magian hierarchy to retaliate by a gen-
eral destruction of the Christian churches throughout the Per-
sian dominions, and by the arrest and punishment of all those
who acknowledged themselves to believe the Gospel.” A fear-
ful slaughter of the Christians in Persia followed during five
years;” Some, eager for the earthly glory and the heavenly re-
wards of martyrdom, were forward to proclaim themselves
members of the obnoxious Sect; others, less courageous or less
inclined to self-assertion, sought rather to conceal their creed;
but these latter were carefully sought out, both in the towns
and in the country districts,” and when convicted were relent-
lessly put to death. Nor was mere death regarded as enough.
The victims were subjected, besides, to cruel sufferings of vari-
ous kinds,” and the greater number of them expired under
torture.” Thus Isdigerd alternately oppressed the two relig-
ious professions, to one or other of which belonged the great
mass of his subjects; and, having in this way given both
parties reason to hate him, earned and acquired a unanimity
of execration which has but seldom been the lot of persecuting
monarchs.
At the same time that Isdigerd allowed this violent persecu-
tion of the Christians in his own kingdom of Persia, he also
*
w
;
+
-* g
e - *-
390 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. . ſch. xiii.
sanctioned an attempt to extirpate Christianity in the de-
* - pendent country of Armenia. Varahran-Sapor, the successor
of Chosroës, had ruled the territory quietly and peaceably for
twenty-one years.” He died A.D. 412, leaving behind him a
single son, Artases, who was at his father's death aged no
more than ten years.” Under these circumstances, Isaac, the
Metropolitan of Armenia, proceeded to the court of Ctesiphon,
and petitioned Isdigerd to replace on the Armenian throne the
prince who had been deposed twenty-one years earlier, and
who was still a prisoner on parole" in the “Castle of Oblivion”
—viz. Chosroës. Isdigerd acceded to the request; and Chos-
roës was released from confinement and restored to the throne
from which he had been expelled by Varahran IV. in A.D.
391. He, however, survived his elevation only a year. Upon
\ . his decease, A.D. 413, Isdigerd selected for the viceroyship, not
an Arsacid, not even an Armenian, but his own son, Sapor,
whom he forced upon the reluctant provincials, compelling
them to acknowledge him as monarch (A.D. 413–414). Sapor
was instructed to ingratiate himself with the Armenian no-
bles, by inviting them to visit him, by feasting them, making
them presents, holding friendly converse with them, hunting
with them; and was bidden to use such influence as he might
obtain to convert the chiefs from Christianity to Zoroastrian-
ism. The young prince appears to have done his best; but
the Armenians were obstinate, resisted his blandishments, and
remained Christians in spite of all his efforts. He reigned”
from A.D. 414 to 418, at the end of which time, learning that
his father had fallen into ill health, he quitted Armenia and
returned to the Persian court, in order to press his claims to
the succession. Isdigerd died Soon afterwards* (A.D. 419 or
420); and Sapor made an attempt to seize the throne; but
there was another pretender whose partisans had more
.* strength, and the viceroy of Armenia was treacherously as-
Sassinated in the palace of his father.” Armenia remained
for three years in a state of anarchy; and it was not till Wa-
rahran V. had been for some time established upon the Persian
throne that Artases was made viceroy, under the name of
Artasiris or Artaxerxes.**
The coins of Isdigerd I. are not remarkable as works of art;
but they possess some features of interest. They are numerous,
and appear to have been issued from various mints,” but all
bear a head of the same type. [Pl. XXI., Fig. 1.] It is that
of a middle-aged man, with a short beard and hair gathered
*
**
cii. xiii.] . HIS CHARACTEIR. 391
behind the head in a cluster of curls. The distinguishing mark
is the head-dress, which has the usual inflated ball above a
fragment of the old mural crown, and further bears a crescen;
in front. The reverse has the usual fire-altar with supporters,
and is for the most part very rudely executed.” The ordinary
legend is, on the obverse, Mazdism bag ramashtras Izdikerti,
malkan malka Airan, or “the Ormazd-worshipping divine
most peaceful Isdigerd, king of the kings of Iran;” and On
the reverse, Ramashtras Izdikerti, “the most peaceful Isdi-
gerd.” In some cases, there is a second name, associated with
that of the monarch, on the reverse, a name which reads
either “Ardashatri” (Artaxerxes)” or, “Varahran.”* It has
been conjectured that, where the name of “Artaxerxes” oc-
curs, the reference is to the founder of the empire;” while it
is admitted that the ‘‘Varahran” intended is almost certainly
Isdigerd's son and successor," Varahran V., the “Bahram-
Gur” of the modern Persians. Perhaps a more reasonable ac-
count of the matter would be that Isdigerd had originally a
son Artaxerxes, whom he intended to make his successor, but
that this son died or offended him, and that then he gave his
place to Varahran. -
The character of Isdigerd is variously represented. Accord-
ing to the Oriental writers, he had by nature an excellent dis-
position, and at the time of his accession was generally re-
garded as eminently sage, prudent, and virtuous; but his
conduct after he became king disappointed all the hopes that
had been entertained of him. He was violent, cruel, and pleas-
ure-seeking; he broke all laws human and divine; he plun-
dered the rich, ill-used the poor, despised learning, left those
who did him a service unrewarded, suspected everybody.”
He wandered continually about his vast empire, not to benefit
his subjects, but to make them all suffer equally.” In curious
contrast with these accounts is the picture drawn of him by
the Western authors, who celebrate his magnanimity and his
virtue, “his peaceful temper, his faithful guardianship of Theo-
dosius, and even his exemplary piety.” A modern writer"
has suggested that he was in fact a wise and tolerant prince,
whose very mildness and indulgence offended the bigots of his
own country, and caused them to represent his character in
the most odious light, and do their utmost to blacken his
memory. But this can scarcely be accepted as the true ex-
planation of the discrepancy. It appears from the ecclesiasti-
Cal historians" that, whatever other good qualities Isdigerd
Af
§ * —H *
* Asºº
* • y t &
392 THE SEVENTEI MONARCEIY. ſch. xmi.
may have possessed, tolerance at any rate was not among his
virtues. Induced at one time by Christian bishops almost to
embrace Christianity, he violently persecuted the professors
of the old Persian religion. Alarmed at a later period by the
excessive zeal of his Christian preceptors, and probably fearful
of provoking rebellion among his Zoroastrian Subjects, he
turned around upon his late friends, and treated them with
a cruelty even exceeding that previously exhibited towards
their adversaries. It was probably this twofold persecution
that, offending both professions, attached to Isdigerd in his
own country the character of a harsh and bad monarch. For-
eigners, who did not suffer from his caprices or his violence,
might deem him magnanimous and a model of virtue. His
own subjects with reason detested his rule, and branded his
memory with the well-deserved epithet of Al-Athim, “the
Wicked.”
A curious tale is told as to the death of Isdigerd. He was
still in the full vigor of manhood when one day a horse of rare
beauty, without bridle or caparison, came of its own accord
and stopped before the gate of his palace. The news was told
to the king, who gave orders that the strange steed should be
saddled and bridled, and prepared to mount it. But the animal
reared and kicked, and would not allow any one to come near,
till the king himself approached, when the creature totally
changed its mood, appeared gentle and docile, stood perfectly
still, and allowed both saddle and bridle to be put on. The
crupper, however, needed some arrangement, and Isdigerd in
full confidence proceeded to complete his task, when suddenly
the horse lashed out with one of his hind legs, and dealt the
unfortunate prince a blow which killed him on the spot. The
animal then set off at speed, disembarrassed itself of its ac-
coutrements, and galloping away was never seen any more.”
The modern historian of Persia compresses the tale into a
single phrase,” and tells us that “Isdigerd died from the kick
of a horse:” but the Persians of the time regarded the occur-
rence as an answer to their prayers, and saw in the wild steed
an angel sent by God."
* g |
{ },
f W
ºr swl vaſtalliam W. Becomes KING, . , 393
*
CHAPTER XIV.
Internal Troubles on the Death of Isdigerd I. Accession of
Varahram V. His Persecution of the Christians. His
War with Rome. His Relations with Armenia from A.D.
422 to A.D. 428. His Wars with the Scythic Tribes on
his Eastern Frontier. His Strange Death. His , Coins.
JHis Character.
'Ere. 'Iaşiyépôms vooria as éé àv0pétrov jºbāvuato, Érix9ev és 'Pouatov riv yiv Oiapapávms à
IIeporóv Baorºews otpatº peyāA®.—Procop. De Bell. Pers. i. 2.
IT would seem that at the death of Isdigerd there was some
difficulty as to the succession. Varahran, whom he had des-
ignated as his heir, 'appears to have been absent from the capi-
tal at the time; while another Son, Sapor, who had held the
Armenian throne from A.D. 414 to 418, was present at the seat
of government, and bent on pushing his claims.” Varahran, if
we may believe the Oriental writers, who are here unanimous,”
had been educated among the Arab tribes dependent on Persia,
who now occupied the greater portion of Mesopotamia. His
training had made him an Arab rather than a Persian; and he
was believed to have inherited the violence, the pride, and the
cruelty of his father.” His countrymen were thererore re-
solved that they would not allow him to be king. Neither
were they inclined to admit the claims of Sapor, whose
government of Armenia had not been particularly success-
ful," and whose recent desertion of his proper post for the
advancement of his own private interests was a crime against
his country which deserved punishment rather than reward.
Armenia had actually revolted as Soon as he quitted it, had
driven out the Persian garrison," and was a prey to rapine and
disorder. We cannot be surprised that, under these circum-
stances, Sapor's machinations and hopes were abruptly termi-
nated, soon after his father's demise, by his own murder. The
nobles and chief Magi took affairs into their own hands." In-
stead of sending for Varahran, or awaiting his arrival, they
Selected for king a descendant of Artaxerxes I. only remotely
related to Isdigerd—a prince of the name of Chosroës—and
formally placed him upon the throne. But Varahran was not
willing to cede his rights. Having persuaded the Arabs to
A
— - Y - – - – –
s f
- g
394 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. , [CH, xIV.
/ A *
embrace his cause, he marched upon Ctesiphon at the head of
a large force, and by some means or other, most probably by
the terror of his arms," prevailed upon Chosroës, the nobles,
and the Magi, to Submit to him. The people readily acquiesced
in the change of masters; Chosroës descended into a private
station, and Varahran, son of Isdigerd, became king. -
Varahran seems to have ascended the throne in A.D. 420.”
He at once threw himself into the hands of the priestly party,
and, resuming the persecution of the Christians which his
father had carried on during his later years, showed himself,
to one moiety of his subjects at any rate, as bloody and cruel
as the late monarch.” Tortures of various descriptions were
employed;" and so grievous was the pressure put upon the
followers of Christ that in a short time large numbers of the
persecuted sect quitted the country, and placed themselves
under the protection of the Romans. Varahran had to con-
sider whether he would quietly allow the escape of these
criminals, or would seek to enforce his will upon them at the
risk of a rupture with Rome. He preferred the bolder line of
conduct. His ambassadors were instructed to require the sur-
render of the refugees at the court of Constantinople;” and
when Theodosius, to his honor, indignantly rejected the
demand, they had orders to protest against the emperor's
decision, and to threaten him with their master's vengeance.
It happened that at the time there were some other out-
standing disputes, which caused the relations of the two em-
pires to be less amicable than was to be desired. The Persians
had recently begun to work their gold mines, and had hired
experienced persons from the Romans, whose services they
found so valuable that when the period of the hiring was ex-
pired they would not suffer the miners to quit Persia and
return to their homes. They are also said to have ill-used the
Roman merchants who traded in the Persian territories, and
to have actually robbed them of their merchandise.”
These causes of complaint were not, however, it would
seem, brought forward by the Romans, who contented them-
selves with simply refusing the demand for the extradition of
the Christian fugitives, and refrained from making any
counter-claims. But their moderation was not appreciated;
and the Persian monarch, on learning that Rome would not
restore the refugees, declared the peace to be at an end, and
immediately made preparations for war. The Romans had,
however, anticipated his decision, and took the field in force
o
f
CH. XIV.1 WAR RENEWED WITH ROME 395
^*.
before the Persians were ready. The command was entrusted
to a general bearing the strange name of Ardaburius,” who
marched his troops through Armenia into the fertile province
of Arzanene,” and there defeated Narses,” the leader whom
Varahran had sent against him. Proceeding to plunder
Arzanene, Ardaburius Suddenly heard that his adversary was
about to enter the Roman province of Mesopotamia, which
was denuded of troops, and seemed to invite attack. Hastily
concluding his raid, he passed from Arzanene into the threat-
ened district, and was in time to prevent the invasion intended
by Narses, who, when he found his designs forestalled, threw
himself into the fortress of Nisibis, and there stood on the
defensive. Ardaburius did not feel himself strong enough to
invest the town; and for some time the two adversaries re-
mained inactive, each watching the other. It was during this
interval that (if we may credit Socrates) the Persian general
sent a challenge to the Toman, inviting him to fix time and
place for a trial of strength between the two armies. Arda-
burius prudently declined the overture, remarking that the
Romans were not accustomed to fight battles when their
enemies wished, but when it suited themselves. Soon after-
wards he found himself able to illustrate his meaning by his
actions. Having carefully abstained from attacking Nisibis
while his strength seemed to him insufficient, he suddenly,
upon receiving large reinforcements from Theodosius, changed
his tactics, and, invading Persian Mesopotamia, marched upon
the stronghold held by Narses, and formally commenced its
Slege.
Hitherto Varahran, confident in his troops or his good
fortune, had left the entire conduct of the military operations
to his general; but the danger of Nisibis—that dearly won and
highly prized possession"—seriously alarmed him, and made
him resolve to take the field in person with all his forces. En-
listing on his side the services of his friends the Arabs, under
their great sheikh, Al-Amundarus (Moundsir),” and collecting
together a strong body of elephants,” he advanced to the re-
lief of the beleaguered town. Ardaburius drew off on his ap-
proach, burned his Seige artillery, and retired from before the
place. Nisibis was preserved; but soon afterwards a disaster
is said to have befallen the Arabs, who, believing themselves
about to be attacked by the Roman force, were seized with a
Sudden panic, and, rushing in headlong flight to the Eu-
phrates (!) threw themselves into its waters, encumbered with
|
}
f
^s.
3.
}
9
*
*
g g
396 ' TIIE, SEVENTH MONARCHY. . [CH. xiv.
their clothes and arms, and there perished to the number of a
nundred thousand.”
The remaining circumstances of the war are not related by
our authorities in chronological Sequence. But as it is certain
that the war lasted only two years,” and as the events above
narrated certainly belong to the earlier portion of it, and
seem sufficient for one campaign, we may perhaps be justified
in assigning to the Second year, A.D. 421, the other details
recorded—viz., the siege of Theodosiopolis, the combat be-
tween Areobindus and Ardazanes, the Second victory of Arda-
burius, and the destruction of the remnant of the Arabs by
Vitianus. -
Theodosiopolis was a city built by the reigning emperor,
Theodosius II., in the Roman portion of Armenia, near the
sources of the Euphrates.” It was defended by strong walls,
lofty towers, and a deep ditch.” Hidden channels conducted
an unfailing supply of water into the heart of the place, and
the public granaries were large and generally well stocked
with provisions.” This town, recently built for the defence of
the Roman Armenia, was (it would seem) attacked in A.D. 421
by Varahran in person.” He besieged it for above thirty
days, and employed against it all the means of capture which
were known to the military art of the period. But the de-
fence was ably conducted by the bishop of the city, a certain
Eunomius, who was resolved that, if he could prevent it, an
infidel and persecuting monarch should never lord it over his
see. Eunomius not merely animated the defenders, but took
part personally in the defence, and even on one occasion dis-
charged a stone from a balista with his own hand, and killed
a prince who had not confined himself to his military duties,
but had insulted the faith of the besieged. The death of this
officer is said to have induced Varahran to retire, and not
further molest Theodosiopolis.” - ---
While the fortified towns on either side thus maintained
themselves against the attacks made on them, Theodosius, we
are told,” gave an independent command to the patrician
Procopius, and sent him at the head of a body of troops to Op-
pose Varahran. The armies met, and were on the point of
engaging when the Persian monarch made a proposition to
decide the war, not by a general battle, but by a single combat.
Procopius assented; and a warrior was selected on either side,
the Persians choosing for their champion a certain Ardazanes,
and the Romans “Areobindus the Goth,” count of the
f
*
t
cm xiv.] VARAHRAN MAKES PEACE WITH ROME. 397
“ Foederati.” In the conflict which followed the Persian
charged his adversary with his spear, but the nimble Goth
avoided the thrust by leaning to one side, after which he en-
tangled Ardazanes in a net, and then despatched him with his
sword.” The result was accepted by Varahran as decisive of
the war, and he desisted from any further hostilities. Areo-
bindus” received the thanks of the emperor for his victory,
and twelve years later was rewarded with the consulship.
But meanwhile, in other portions of the wide field over which
the war was raging, Rome had obtained additional successes.
Ardaburius, who probably still commanded in Mesopotamia,
had drawn the Persian force opposed to him into an ambus-
cade, and had destroyed it, together with its seven generals.”.
Witianus, an officer of whom nothing more is known, had ex-
terminated the remnant of the Arabs not drowned in the
Euphrates.” The war had gone everywhere against the Per-
sians; and it is not improbable that Varahran, before the close
of A.D. 421, proposed terms of peace.”
Peace, however, was not exactly made till the next year.
Early in A.D. 422, a Roman envoy, by name Maximus, appeared
in the camp of Varahran,” and, when taken into the presence
of the great king, stated that he was empowered by the Ro-
man generals to enter into negotiations, but had had no com-
Imunication with the Roman emperor, who dwelt so far off that
he had not heard of the war, and was so powerful that, if he
knew of it, he would regard it as a matter of small account.
It is not likely that Varahran was much impressed by these
falsehoods; but he was tired of the war; he had found that
Rome could hold her own, and that he was not likely to gain
anything by prolonging it; and he was in difficulties as to
provisions,” whereof his supply had run short. He was there-
fore well inclined to entertain Maximus's proposals favorably.
The corps of the “Immortals,” however, which was in his
Camp, took a different view, and entreated to be allowed an
Opportunity of attacking the Romans unawares, while they
believed negotiations to be going on, considering that under
Such circumstances they would be certain of victory. Varah-
ran, according to the Roman writer who is here our sole
authority,” consented. The Immortals made their attack, and
the Romans were at first in some danger; but the unexpected
arrival of a reinforcement saved them, and the Immortals
Were" defeated and cut off to a man. After this, Varahran
made peace with Rome through the instrumentality of Maxi-
- &
* 4 & sº
* \
398 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. ſcH. xIV.
mus,” consenting, it would seem, not merely that Rome should
harbor the Persian Christians, if she pleased, but also that all
persecution of Christians should henceforth cease throughout
his own empire.” .
The formal conclusion of peace was accompanied, and per-
haps helped forward, by the well-judging charity of an ad-
mirable prelate. Acacius, bishop of Amida, pitying the con-
dition of the Persian prisoners whom the Romans had captured
during their raid into Arzanene, and were dragging off into
slavery, interposed to save them; and, employing for the pur-
pose all the gold and silver plate that he could find in the
churches of his diocese, ransomed as many as Seven thousand
captives, supplied their immediate wants with the utmost ten-
derness, and sent them to Varahran,” who can Scarcely have
failed to be impressed by an act. So unusual in ancient times.
Our sceptical historian remarks, with more apparent sincerity
than usual, that this act was calculated “to inform the Per-
sian king of the true spirit of the religion which he perse.
cuted,” and that the name of the doer might well “have
dignified the saintly calendar.” These remarks are just;
and it is certainly to be regretted that, among the many un-
known or doubtful names of canonized Christians to which
the Church has given her Sanction, there is no mention made
of Acacius of Amida.
Varahran was perhaps the more disposed to conclude his
war with Rome from the troubled condition of his own portion
of Armenia, which imperatively required his attention. Since
the withdrawal from that region of his brother Sapor" in A.D.
418 or 419, the country had had no king. It had fallen into a
state of complete anarchy and wretchedness; no taxes were
collected; the roads were not safe; the strong robbed and op-
pressed the weak at their pleasure.” Isaac, the Armenian
patriarch, and the other bishops, had quitted their sees and
taken refuge in Roman Armenia,” where they were received
favorably by the prefect of the East, Anatolius, who no doubt
hoped by their aid to win over to his master the Persian divis-
ion of the country. Varahran's attack on Theodosiopolis had
been a counter movement, and had been designed to make the
Romans tremble for their own possessions, and throw them
back on the defensive. But the attack had failed; and on its
failure the complete loss of Armenia probably seemed immi-
nent. Varahrantherefore hastened to make peace with Rome,
and, having so done, proceeded to give his attention to Arme-
.*
ch. xiv.] PERSAIRMENIA ABSORBED INTO PERSIA. 399
nia, with the view of placing matters there on a satisfactory
footing. Convinced that he could not retain Armenia unless
with the good-will of the nobles,” and believing them to be
deeply attached to the royal stock of the Arsacids, he brought
forward a prince of that noble house, named Artases, a son of
Varahran-Sapor, and, investing him with the ensigns of royalty,
made him take the illustrious name of Artaxerxes, and de-
livered into his hands the entire government of the country.
These proceedings are assigned to the year A.D. 422, “the year
of the peace with Rome, and must have followed very shortly
after the signature of the treaty. -
It might have been expected that this arrangement would
have satisfied the nobles of Armenia, and have given that un-
happy country a prolonged period of repose. But the personal
character of Artaxerxes was, unfortunately, bad; the Arme-
nian nobles were, perhaps, capricious; and after a trial of six
years it was resolved that the rule of the Arsacid monarch
could not be endured, and that Varahran should be requested
to make Armenia a province of his empire, and to place it
under the government of a Persian Satrap.” The movement
was resisted with all his force by Isaac, the patriarch, who ad.
mitted the profligacy of Artaxerxes and deplored it, but held
that the rôle of a Christian, however lax he might be, was to
be preferred to that of a heathen, however virtuous.” The
nobles, however, were determined; and the opposition of Isaac
had no other result than to involve him in the fall of his sov-
ereign. Appeal was made to the Persian king;” and Varahran,
in Solemn state, heard the charges made against Artaxerxes
by his subjects, and listened to his reply to them. At the end.
he gave his decision. Artaxerxes was pronounced to have
forfeited his crown, and was deposed; his property was confis-
cated, and his person committed to safe custody. The mon-
archy was declared to be at an end; and Persarmenia was de-
livered into the hands of a Persian governor.” The patriarch
Isaac was at the same time degraded from his office and de-
tained in Persia as a prisoner. It was not till some years later
that he was released, allowed to return into Armenia, and to
resume, under certain restrictions, his episcopal functions.”
The remaining circumstances of the reign of Varahran V.
come to us wholly through the Oriental writers, amid whose
exaggerations and fables it is very difficult to discern the
truth. There can, however, be little doubt that it was during
the reign of this prince that those terrible struggles commenced
$
\
4()() THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. . [CH. xiv.
between the Persians and their neighbors upon the north-east
which continued, from the early part of the fifth till the mid-
dle of the sixth century, to endanger the very existence of the
empire. Various names are given to the people with whom
Persia waged her wars during this period. They are called
Turks," Huns,” sometimes even Chinese,” but these terms
seem to be used in a vague way, as “Scythian” was by the
ancients; and the special ethnic designation of the people
appears to be quite a different name from any of them. It is
a name the Persian form of which is Haithal or Ha'athéleh,”
the Armenian Hephthagh," and the Greek “Ephthalites,” or
r sometimes “Nephthalites.” “ Different conjectures have been
, formed as to its origin: but none of them can be regarded as
more than an ingenious theory.” All that we know of the
Ephthalites is that they were established in force, during the
fifth and sixth centuries of our era, in the regions east of the
f
Caspian, especially in those beyond the Oxus river, and that
they were generally regarded as belonging to the Scythic or
Finno-Turkic population, which, at any rate from B.C. 200,
had become powerful in that region. They were called
“White Huns” by some of the Greeks;” but it is admitted
that they were quite distinct from the Huns who invaded
Europe under Attila;” and it may be doubted whether the
term “Hun’ is more appropriate to them than that of Turk or
even of Chinese. The description of their physical character
and habits left us by Procopius, who wrote when they were at
"the height of their power, is decidedly adverse to the view that
they were really Huns. They were a light-complexioned race,
whereas the Huns were decidedly swart;" they were not ill-
looking, whereas the Huns were hideous; they were an agri-
cultural people, while the Huns were nomads; they had good
laws, and were tolerably well civilized, but the Huns were
savages. It is probable that they belonged to the Thibetic or
Turkish stock, which has always been in advance of the Fin-
nic, and has shown a greater aptitude for political organiza-
tion and Social progress. -
We are told that the war of Varahran V. with this people
commenced with an invasion of his kingdom by their Khacan,
, or Kahn," who crossed the Oxus with an army of 25,000 (or,
Jaccording to others, of 250,000) men," and carried fire and
sword into some of the most fertile provinces of Persia. The
rich oasis, known as Meru or Merv, the ancient Margiana, is
especially mentioned as overrun by his troops,” which are said
* f t
Sºiſſºrs
-- | 3)2
\ º º Ž
\
STATUE of SAPor I. At SHAPUR (REstored).
Plate XXXV

Plate
XXXVI Vol. ||
i
HEAD-DRESs of AN UNKNowN KING (after Texier).

- *
g
ch. xv.] CoMMENGEMENT OF EPHTHALITE WARs. 401 .
ſ/ *.
by some to have crossed the Elburz range into Khorassan and
to have proceeded westward as far as Rei, or Rhages.” When .
news of the invasion reached the Persian court, the alarm felt \
was great; Varahran was pressed to assemble his forces at
once and encounter the unknown enemy; he, however, pro-
fessed complete indifference, said that the Almighty would pre-
serve the empire, and that, for his own part, he was going to
hunt in Azerbijan," or Media Atropatene. During his absence
the government could be conducted by Narses, his brother.
All Persia was now thrown into consternation; Varahran was
believed to have lost his senses; and it was thought that the
only prudent course was to despatch an embassy to the Khacan,
and make an arrangement with him by which Persia should
acknowledge his suzerainty and consent to pay him a tribute." ,
Ambassadors accordingly were sent; and the invaders, satisfied
with the offer of submission, remained in the position which
they had taken up, waiting for the tribute, and keeping slack
guard, since they considered that they had nothing to fear.
Varahran, however, was all the while preparing to fall upon
them unawares. He had started for Azerbijan with a small
body of picked warriors;" he had drawn some further strength
from Armenia;" he proceeded along the mountain line
through Taberistan, Hyrcania, and Nissa (Nishapur),” march-
ing only by night, and carefully masking his movements. In
this way he reached the neighborhood of Merv unobserved. He
then planned and executed a night attack on the invading army
which was completely successful. Attacking his adversaries
suddenly and in the dark— alarming them, moreover, with
strange noises,” and at the same time assaulting them with the
utmost vigor—he put to flight the entire Tatar army. The
Rhan himself was killed;" and the flying host was pursued to
e
the banks of the Oxus. The whole of the camp equipage fell
into the hands of the victors; and Khâtoun, the wife of the
great Khan, was taken.” The plunder was of enormous value,
and comprised the royal crown with its rich setting of pearls.”
After this success, Varahran, to complete his victory, sent
One of his generals across the Oxus at the head of a large force,
and falling upon the Tatars in their own country defeated
them a second time with great slaughter.” The enemy then
prayed for peace, which was granted them by the victorious
Varahran, who at the same time erected a column to mark the
boundary of his empire in this quarter,” and, appointing his
brother Narses governor of Khorassan, ordered him to fix his
w * f
K ..f f
402 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ſch. xiv.
residence at Balkh, and to prevent the Tatars from making
incursions across the Oxus." It appears that these precautions
were successful, for we hear nothing of any further hostilities
in this quarter during the remainder of Varahran's reign.
The adventures of Varahran in India, and the enlargement
of his dominions in that direction by the act of the Indian king,
who is said so have voluntarily ceded to him Mekran and Scinde
in return for his services against the Emperor of China,” can-
not be regarded as historical. Scarcely more so is the story
that Persia had no musicians in his day, for which reason he
applied to the Indian monarch, and obtained from him twelve
thousand performers, who became the ancestors of the Lurs.”
After a reign which is variously estimated at nineteen,
twenty, twenty-one, and twenty-three years,” Varahran died
by a death which would have been thought incredible, had not
a repetition of the disaster, on the traditional site, been wit-
nessed by an English traveller in comparatively recent times.
The Persian writers state that Varahran was engaged in the
hunt of the wildass, when his horse came suddenly upon a deep
pool, or spring of water, and either plunged into it or threw
his rider into it, with the result that Varahran sank and never
reappeared.” The supposed scene of the incident is a valley
between Ispahan and Shiraz. Here, in 1810, an English soldier
lost his life through bathing in the Spring traditionally declared
to be that which proved fatal to Varahran.” The coincidence
has caused the general acceptance of a tale which would prob-
ably have been otherwise regarded as altogether romantic and
mythical. - .
The coins of Varahran V. are chiefly remarkable for their
rude and coarse workmanship and for the number of the mints
from which they were issued. The mint-marks include Ctesi-
phon, Ecbatana, Isaphan, Arbela, Ledan, Nehavend, Assyria,
Chuzistan, Media, and Kerman, or Carmania.” The ordinary
legend is, upon the obverse, Mazdism bag Varahran malka, or
Mazdism bag Varahram rasti malka, and on the reverse, “War-
ahran,” together with a mint-mark. The head-dress has the
mural crown in front and behind, but interposes between these
two detached fragments a crescent and a circle, emblems, no
doubt, of the sun and moon gods. The reverse shows the usual
fire-altar, with guards, or attendants, watching it. The king's
head appears in the flame upon the altar. (Pl. xxi. Fig. 2).
According to the Oriental writers, Varahran V. was one of
the best of the Sassanian princes. He carefully administered
º
- - • * º
& f" |
º f
CH. xv.] ACCESSION OF ISDIGERD II. 403
f
justice among his numerous subjects, remitted arrears of tax-
aftion, gave pensions to men of Science and letters, encouraged
agriculture, and was extremely liberal in the relief of poverty
and distress.” His faults were, that he was over-generous and
over-fond of amusements, especially of the chase. The nick-
name of “Bahram-Gur,” by which he is known to the Orientals,
marks this last-named predilection, transferring to him, as it
does, the name of the animal which was the especial object of
his pursuit.” But he was almost equally fond of dancing and
of games.” Still it does not appear that his inclination for
amusements rendered him neglectful of public affairs, or at all
interfered with his administration of the State. Persia is said
to have been in a most flourishing condition during his reign.”
He may not have gained all the successes that are ascribed to:
him; but he was undoubtedly an active prince, brave, ener-
getic, and clear-sighted. He judiciously brought the Roman
war to a close when a new and formidable enemy appeared on
his north-eastern frontier; he wisely got rid of the Armenian
difficulty, which had been a stumbling block in the way of his
predecessors for two hundred years; he inflicted a check on the
aggressive Tatars, which indisposed them to renew hostilities
with Persia for a quarter of a century. It would seem that he
did not much appreciate art;" but he encouraged learning, and
did his best to advance science.” ~
CHAPTER XV.
Reign of Isdigerd II. His War with Rome. His Nine Years'
War with the Ephthalites. His Policy towards Armenia.
His Second Ephthalite War. His Character. His Coins.
Obapapávns . . . trapašíðoort riv Baorºetav Iarévyépôm 6arépºp rig oikeiq travči.—Agathias,
* iv. 27; p. 137, C.
THE successor of Varahan V. was his son, Isdigerd the
Second, who ascended the Persian throne without opposition
in the year A.D. 440.’ His first act was to declare war against
Rome. The Roman forces were, it would seem, concentrated
in the vicinity of Nisibis;” and Isdigerd may have feared that
they would make an attack upon the place. He therefore
anticipated them, and invaded the empire with an army com-
– , – – º – g g
*
404 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. ICH. xv.
posed in part of his own subjects, but in part also of troops
\
from the surrounding nations. Saracens, Tzani, Isaurians,
and Huns (Ephthalites?) served under his standard; * and a
sudden incursion was made into the Roman territory, for
which the imperial officers were wholly unprepared. A con-
siderable impression would probably have been produced, had
not the weather proved exceedingly unpropitious. Storms of
; rain and hail hindered the advance of the Persian troops, and
allowed the Roman generals a breathing space, during which
they collected an army." But the Emperor Theodosius was
anxious that the flames of war should not be relighted in this
quarter; and his instructions to the prefect of the East, the
Count Anatolius," were Such as speedily led to the conclusion,
first of a truce for a year, and then of a lasting treaty. Ana-
tolius repaired as ambassador to the Persian camp, on foot
and alone, so as to place himself completely in Isdigerd's
power—an act which so impressed the latter that (we are told)
he at once agreed to make peace on the terms which Anato-
lius suggested." The exact nature of these terms is not re-
corded; but they contained at least one unusual condition.
The Romans and Persians agreed that neither party should
construct any new fortified post in the vicinity of the other's
territory—a loose phrase which was likely to be variously
interpreted, and might easily lead to serious complications.
It is difficult to understand this sudden conclusion of peace
- by a young prince, evidently anxious to reap laurels, who in
the first year of his reign had, at the head of a large army,
invaded the dominions of a neighbor. The Roman account,
that he invaded, that he was practically unopposed, and that
then, out of politeness towards the prefect of the East, he
voluntarily retired within his own frontier, “having done
nothing disagreeable,”’ is as improbable a narrative as we
often meet with, even in the pages of the Byzantine historians.
Something has evidently been kept back. If Isdigerd re-
turned, as Procopius declares, without effecting anything, he
must have been recalled by the occurrence of troubles in some
other part of his empire.” But it is, perhaps, as likely that he
retired, simply because he had effected the object with which
he engaged in the war. It was a constant practice of the
Romans to advance their frontier by building strong towns
on or near a debatable border, which attracted to them the
submission of the neighboring district. The recent building of
Theodosiopolis' in the eastern part of Roman Armenia had
*A f
*
ca. ºv.] . . . HIs Royā Y WAR, i. 405
been an instance of this practice. It was perhaps being pur-
sued elsewhere along the Persian border, and the invasion of
Isdigerd may have been intended to check it. If so, the
proviso of the treaty recorded by Procopius would have
afforded him the Security which he required, and have ren-
dered it unnecessary for him to continue the war any longer.
His arms shortly afterwards found employment in another
quarter. The Tatars of the Transoxianian regions were once
more troublesome; and in order to check or prevent the
incursions which they were always ready to make, if they
were unmolested, Isdigerd undertook a long war on his north-
eastern frontier, which he conducted with a resolution and
perseverance not very common in the East. Leaving his
vizier, Mihr-Narses, to represent him at the seat of govern-
ment, he transferred his own residence to Nishapur,” in the
mountain region between the Persian and Kharesmian deserts,
and from that convenient post of observation directed the
military operations against his active enemies, making a
campaign against them regularly every year from A.D. 443 to
451. In the year last mentioned he crossed the Oxus, and,
attacking the Ephthalites in their own territory, obtained a
complete success, driving the monarch from the cultivated
portion of the country, and forcing him to take refuge in the
desert.” So complete was his victory that he seems to have
been satisfied with the result, and, regarding the war as
terminated, to have thought the time was come for taking in
hand an arduous task, long contemplated, but not hitherto
actually attempted. -
This was no less a matter than the forcible conversion of
Armenia to the faith of Zoroaster. It has been already
noted" that the religious differences which—from the time
when the Armenians, anticipating Constantine, adopted as,
the religion of their state and nation the Christian faith (ab.
A.D. 300)—separated the Armenians from the Persians, were a
cause of weakness to the latter, more especially in their
contests with Rome. Armenia was always, naturally, upon
the Roman side, since a religious sympathy united it with the
the court of Constantinople, and an exactly opposite feeling
tended to detach it from the court of Ctesiphon. The aliena-
tion would have been, comparatively speaking, unimportant,
after the division of Armenia between the two powers, had
that division been regarded by either party as final, or as
precluding the formation of designs upon the territory which
*
*
406 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. '[CH. xv.
each had agreed should be held by the other. But there
nover yet had been a time when such designs had ceased to be
entertained; and in the war which Isdigerd had waged with
Theodosius at the beginning of his reign, Roman intrigues in
Persarmenia had forced him to send an army into that coun-
try.” The Persians felt, and felt with reason, that so long as
Armenia remained Christian and Persia held to the faith of
Zoroaster, the relations of the two countries could never be
really friendly; Persia would always have a traitor in her
own camp; and in any time of difficulty—especially in any
difficulty with Rome—might look to see this portion of her
territory go over to the enemy. We cannot be surprised if
Persian statesmen were anxious to terminate so unsatisfactory
a state of things, and cast about for a means whereby Arme-
nia might be won over, and made a real friend instead of a
coneealed enemy.
The means which suggested itself to Isdigerd as the simplest
and most natural was, as above observed, the conversion of
the Armenians to the Zoroastrian religion. In the early part
of his reign he entertained a hope of effecting his purpose by
persuasion, and sent his vizier, Mihr-Narses, into the country,
with orders to use all possible peaceful means—gifts, blandish-
ments, promises, threats, removal of malignant chiefs—to
induce Armenia to consent to a change of religion.” Mihr-
Narses did his best, but failed signally. He carried off the
chiefs of the Christian party, not only from Armenia, but
from Iberia and Albania, telling them that Isdigerd required
their services against the Tatars, and forced them with their
followers to take part in the Eastern war.” He committed
Armenia to the care of the Margrave, Vasag, a native prince
who was well inclined to the Persian cause, and gave him
instructions to bring about the change of religion by a policy
of conciliation. But the Armenians were obstinate. Neither
threats, nor promises, nor persuasions had any effect. It was
in vain that a manifesto was issued, painting the religion of
Zoroaster in the brightest colors, and requiring all persons to
Conform to it. It was to no purpose that arrests were made,
and punishments threatened. The Armenians declined to
yield either to argument or to menace; and no progress at all
, , was made in the direction of the desired conversion.
In the year A.D. 450, the patriarch Joseph, by the general
desire of the Armenians, held a great assembly, at which it
$º- was carried by acclamation that the Armenians were Chris-
...”
CH. XV.] ARMENIAN WAR OF RELIGION. . . .407
tians, and would continue such, whatever it might cost them.
If it was hoped by this to induce Isdigerd to lay aside his
proselytizing Schemes, the hope was a delusion. Isdigerd
retaliated by Summoning to his presence the principal chiefs,
viz., Vasag, the Margrave; " the Sparapet, or commander-in-
chief, Vartan, the Mamigonian; Vazten, prince of Iberia;
Watché, king of Albania, etc.; and having got them into his
power, threatened them with immediate death, unless they at
once renounced Christianity and made profession of Zoroastri-
anism. The chiefs, not having the spirit of martyrs, un-
happily yielded, and declared themselves converts; where-
upon Isdigerd Sent them back to their respective countries,
with orders to force everywhere on their fellow-countrymen a
similar change of religion. * -
Upon this, the Armenians and Iberians broke out in open
revolt. Vartan, the Mamigonian, repenting of his weakness,
abjured his new creed, resumed the profession of Christianity,
and made his peace with Joseph, the patriarch.” He then
called the people to arms, and in a short time collected a force
of a hundred thousand men. Three armies were formed, to act
separately under different generals. One watched Azerbijan,
or Media Atropatene, whence it was expected that their main
attack would be made by the Persians; another, under Var-
tan, proceeded to the relief of Albania, where proceedings
were going on similar to those which had driven Armenia.
into rebellion; the third, under Vasag, occupied a central
position in Armenia, and was intended to move wherever
danger should threaten.” An attempt was at the same time
made to induce the Roman emperor, Marcian, to espouse the
cause of the rebels, and Send troops to their assistance; but
this attempt was unsuccessful. Marcian had but recently
ascended the throne,” and was, perhaps, Scarcely fixed in his
Seat. He was advanced in years, and naturally unenterpris-
ing. Moreover, the position of affairs in Western Europe
was such that Marcian might expect at any moment to be
attacked by an overwhelming force of northern barbarians,
cruel, warlike, and unsparing. Attila was in A.D. 451 at the
height of his power; he had not yet been worsted at Cha-
lons;” and the terrible Huns, whom he led, might in a few
months destroy the Western, and be ready to fall upon the
Eastern empire. Armenia, consequently, was left to her own
resources, and had to combat the Persians single-handed.
Even so, she might probably have succeeded, have maintained,
— — —
*N.
* , * s z f / " *
408 - THE SEVENTH MOWARCHY. . . .[CH. xv.
her Christianity, or even recovered her independence, had her
people been of one mind, and had no defection from the
national cause manifested itself. But Vasag, the Marzpan,
had always been half-hearted in the quarrel; and, now that
the crisis was come, he determined on going wholly over to
the Persians. He was able to carry with him the army which
he commanded; and thus Armenia was divided against itself:
and the chance of victory was well-nigh lost before the
struggle had begun. When the Persians took the field they
found half Armenia ranged upon their side; and, though a
long and bloody contest followed, the end was certain from
the beginning. After much desultory warfare, a great battle
was fought in the sixteenth year of Isdigerd (A.D. 455 or 456)
between the Christian Armenians on the one side, and the
Persians, with their Armenian abettors, on the other. The
Persians were victorious; Vartan, and his brother, Hemaîag,
were among the slain; and the patriotic party found that no
further resistance was possible.” The patriarch, Joseph, and
the other bishops, were seized, carried off to Persia, and
martyred. Zoroastrianism was enforced upon the Armenian
nation. All accepted it, except a few, who either took refuge
in the dominions of Rome, or fled to the mountain fastnesses
of Kurdistan.”
The resistance of Armenia was scarcely overborne, when
war once more broke out in the East, and Isdigerd was forced
to turn his attention to the defence of his frontier against the
aggressive Ephthalites, who, after remaining quiet for three
or four years, had again flown to arms, had crossed the Oxus,
and invaded Khorassan in force.” On his first advance the
Persian monarch was so far successful that the invading
hordes seems to have retired, and left Persia to itself; but
when Isdigerd, having resolved to retaliate, led his own forces
into the Ephthalite country, they took heart, resisted him,
and, having tempted him into an ambuscade, succeeded in
inflicting upon him a severe defeat. Isdigerd was forced to
retire hastily within his own borders, and to leave the honors
of victory to his assailants, whose triumph must have en-
couraged them to continue year after year their destructive
inroads into the north-eastern provinces of the empire.
It was not long after the defeat which he suffered in this
quarter that Isdigerd's reign came to an end. He died A.D.
457, after having held the throne for seventeen or (according
to some) for nineteen years.” He was a prince of con-
*
*: f *-
cII. xv.] coſys of ISDIGERD II. , 409
siderable ability, determination, and courage. That his sub-
jects called him “the Clement” is at first sight surprising,
since clemency is certainly not the virtue that any modern
writer would think of associating with his name. But
we may assume from the application of the term that, where
religious considerations did not come into play, he was
fair and equitable, mild-tempered, and disinclined to harsh
punishments. Unfortunately, experience tells us that natural
mildness is no Security against the acceptance of a bigot's
creed; and, when a policy of persecution has once been
adopted, a Trajan or a Valerian will be as unsparing as a
Maximin or a Galerius. Isdigerd was a bitter and successful
persecutor of Christianity, which he-for a time at any rate—
stamped out, both from his own proper dominions, and from
the newly-acquired province of Armenia. He would have pre-
ferred less violent means; but, when they failed, he felt no
scruples in employing the extremest and severest coercion. He
was determined on uniformity; and uniformity he secured,
but at the cost of crushing a people, and so alienating them as
to make it certain that they would, on the first convenient
occasion, throw off the Persian yoke altogether. - -
The coins of Isdigerd II, nearly resemble those of his father,
Varahran V., differing only in the legend, and in the fact that
the mural crown of Isdigerd is complete.” The legend is re-
markably short, being either Masdism kadi Yezdikerti, or -
merely Kadi Yezdikerti—i.e. “the Ormazd-worshipping great
Isdigerd;” or “Isdigerd the Great.” The coins are not very
numerous, and have three mint-marks only, which are inter-
preted to mean “Khuzistan,” “Ctesiphon,” and “Nehavend.”
[Pl. XXI., Fig. 3..] ^ .
410 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xvi.
\ ***
| CHAPTER XVI.
Right of Succession disputed between the two Sons of Is-
digerd II., Perozes (or Firuz) and Hormisdas. Civil War
jor two years. Success of Perozes, through aid given him.
by the Ephthalites. Great Famine. Perozes declares
War against the Ephthalites, and makes an Earpedition
into their Country. His ill success. Conditions of Peace
granted him. Armenian Revolt and War. Perozes, after
some years, resumes the Ephthalite War. His attack
fails, and he is slain in battle. Summary of his Charac-
ter. Coins of Hormisdas III. and Perozes. Vase of
Perozes.
*Yazdejerdo e medio sublato, de regno contenderunt duo ipsius filii, Phiruz et
Hormoz, aliis a partibus Firuzi, aliis ab Hormozi stantibus.”—Eutych. voi. i.
p. 100.
ON the death of Isdigerd II. (A.D. 457) the throne was seized
by his younger Son,' Hormisdas, who appears to have owed
his elevation, in a great measure, to the partiality of his father.
That monarch, preferring his younger son above his elder, had
made the latter governor of the distant Seistan, and had thus
removed him far from the court, while he retained Hormisdas
about his own person.” The advantage thus secured to Hor-
misdas enabled him when his father died to make himself
king; and Perozes was forced, we are told, to fly the country,
and place himself under the protection of the Ephthalite mon-
arch, who ruled in the valley of the Oxus, over Bactria, Toka-
ristan, Badakshan, and other neighboring districts.” This
king, who bore the name of Khush-newāz," received him
favorably, and though at first, out of fear for the power of Per-
sia, he declined to lend him troops, was induced after a while
to adopt a bolder policy. Hormisdas, despite his epithet of
Ferzan, “the Wise,” was soon at variance with his subjects,
many of whom gathered about Perozes at the court which he
was allowed to maintain in Taleqan, one of the Ephthalite
cities. Supported by this body of refugees, and by an Ephtha-
lite contingent," Perozes ventured to advance against his
brother. His army, which was commanded by a certain
\
| •”
- & —r
* *
cH. XVI.] HORMISDAS III. SUCCEEDED BY PEROZES. 411
Raham, or Ram, a noble of the Mihran family, attacked the
forces of Hormisdas, defeated them, and made Hormisdas
Himself a prisoner." The troops of the defeated monarch, con-
vinced by the logic of success, deserted their late leader's
cause, and went over in a body to the conqueror. Perozes,
after somewhat more than two years of exile, was acknowl-
edged as king by the whole Persian people, and, quitting
Taleqan, established himself at Ctesiphon, or Al Modain,
which had now become the main seat of government. It is
uncertain what became of Hormisdas. According to the
Armenian writers,” Raham, after defeating him, caused him to
be put to death; but the native historian, Mirkhond, declares
that, on the contrary, Perozes forgave him for having disputed
the succession, and amiably spared his life.” - -
The civil war between the two brothers, short as it was, ha
lasted long enough to cost Persia a province. Watché, king of
Aghouank (Albania)” took advantage of the time of disturb-
ance to throw off his allegiance, and succeeded in making him-
self independent.” It was the first object of Perozes, after
establishing himself upon the throne, to recover this valuable
territory. He therefore made war upon Watché, thought that
prince was the son of his sister, and with the help of his
Ephthalite allies, and of a body of Alans whom he took into
his service, defeated the rebellious Albanians and completely
subjugated the revolted country.”
A time of prosperity now ensued. Perozes ruled with mode-
ration and justice.” He dismissed his Ephthalite allies with
presents that amply contented them,” and lived for five years
in great peace and honor. But in the seventh year,” from the
death of his father, the prosperity of Persia was suddenly and
grievously interrupted by a terrible drought, a calamity where-
to Asia has in all ages been subject, and which often produces
the most frightful consequences. The crops fail; the earth be-
comes parched and burnt up; smiling districts are change into
Wildernesses; fountains and brooks cease to flow; then the
wells have no water; finally even the great rivers are reduced
to threads, and contain only the scantiest supply of the life-
giving fluid in their channels. Famine under these circum-
stances of necessity sets in; the poor die by hundreds; even
the rich have a difficulty in sustaining life by means of food
imported from a distance. We are told” that the drought in
the reign of Perozes was such that at last there was not a drop
of water either in the Tigris or the Oxus; all the sources and
4.
- -
- t
§ {
412 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ſon. xvi.
fountains, all the streams and brooks failed; vegetation alto-
gether ceased; the beasts of the field and the fowls of the air
perished; nowhere through the whole empire was a bird to be
seen; the wild animals, even the reptiles, disappeared alto-
gether. The dreadful calamity lasted for seven years,” and
under ordinary circumstances the bulk of the population would
have been swept off; but such were the wisdom and the bene-
ficence of the Persian monarch, that during the entire duration
of the Scourge not a single person, or, according to another
account, but one person,” perished of hunger. Perozes began
by issuing general orders that the rich should come to the re-
lief of their poorer brethren; he required the governors of
towns, and the head-men of villages, to see that food was sup-
plied to those in need, and threatened that for each poor man
in a town or village who died of want he would put a rich man
to death. At the end of two years, finding that the drought
continued, he declined to take any revenue from his subjects,
remitting taxes of all kinds, whether they were money imposts
or contributions in kind. In the fourth year, not content with
these measures, he went further: opened the treasury doors
and made distributions of money from his own stores to those
in need. At the same time he imported corn from Greece,
from India, from the valley of the Oxus, and from Abyssinia,
obtaining by these means such ample supplies that he was able
to furnish an adequate sustenance to all his subjects.” The re-
sult was that not only did the famine cause no mortality
among the poorer classes, but no one was even driven to quit
the country in order to escape the pressure of the calamity.
Such is the account which is given by the Oriental authors
of the terrible famine which they ascribe to the early part of
the reign of Perozes. It is difficult, however, to suppose that
the matter has not been very much exaggerated, since we find
, that, as early as A.D. 464–5, when the famine should have been
at its height, Perozes had entered"upon a great war and was
hotly engaged in it, his ambassadors at the same time being
sent to the Greek court, not to ask supplies of food, but to re-
quest a subsidy on account of his military operations.” The
enemy which had provoked his hostility was the powerful
nation of the Ephthalites, by whose aid he had so recently
obtained the Persian crown. According to a contemporary
Greek authority, more worthy of trust than most writers of
his age and nation,” the origin of the war was a refusal on the
part of the Ephthalites to make certain customary payments
- —ar- N
t
on rvºj EPHTHALITE EXPEDITION of PEROZES. 413
which the Persians viewed in the light of a tribute.” Perozes
determined to enforce his just rights, and marched his troops
against the defaulters with this object. But in his first opera-
tions he was unsuccessful, and after a time he thought it best
to conclude the war, and content himself with taking a secret
revenge upon his enemy, by means of an occult insult. He
proposed to Khush-newāz to conclude a treaty of peace, and to
strengthen the compact by adding to it a matrimonial alliance.
|Khush-newäz should take to wife one of his daughters, and thus
unite the interests of the two reigning families. The proposal
was accepted by the Ephthalite monarch; and he readily
espoused the young lady who was sent to his court apparelled
as became a daughter of Persia. In a little time, however, he
found that he had been tricked: Perozes had not sent him his
daughter, but one of his female slaves;” and the royal race of
the Ephthalite kings had been disgraced by a matrimonial
union with a person of Servile condition. Khush-newāz was
justly indignant; but dissembled his feelings, and resolved to
repay guile with guile. He wrote to Perozes that it was his
intention to make war upon a neighboring tribe, and that he
wanted officers of experience to conduct the military opera-
tions. The Persian monarch, suspecting nothing, complied
with the request, and sent three hundred of his chief officers
to Khush-newāz, who immediately seized them, put some to
death, and, mutilating the remainder, commanded them to re-
turn to their sovereign, and inform him that the king of the
Ephthalites now felt that he had sufficiently avenged the trick
of which he had been the victim.” On receiving this message
Perozes renewed the war, advanced towards the Ephthalite
country, and fixed his head-quarters in Hyrcania, at the city
of Gurgan,” He was accompanied by a Greek of the name of
Eusebius,” an ambassador from the Emperor Zeno, who took
back to Constantinople the following account of the cam-
palgn. *
When Perozes, having invaded the Ephthalite territory, fell
in with the army of the enemy, the latterpretended to be seizéd
with a panic, and at once took to flight. The retreat was di-
rected upon a portion of the mountain region, where a broad
and good road led into a spacious plain, surrounded on all sides
by wooded hills, steep and in places precipitous. Here the mass
of the Ephthalite troops was cunningly concealed amid the
foliage of the woods, while a small number, remaining visible,
led the Persians into the cul-de-sac, the whole army unsuspect-
*
sº
414 TIIE SE WENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xvr.
ingly entering, and only learning their danger when they saw
the road whereby they had entered blocked up by the troops
from the hills. The officers then apprehended the true state of
the case, and perceived that they had been cleverly entrapped;
but none of them, it would seem, dared to inform the monarch
that he had been deceived by a stratagem. Application was
made to Eusebius, whose ambassadorial character would pro-
tect him from an outbreak, and he was requested to let Perozes
know how he was situated, and exhort him to endeavor to ex-
tricate himself by counsel rather than by a desperate act.
Eusebius upon this employed the Oriental method of apologue,
relating to Perozes how a lion in pursuit of a goat got himself
into difficulties, from which all his strength could not enable
him to make his escape. Perozes apprehended his meaning,
understood the situation, and, desisting from the pursuit, pre-
pared to give battle where he stood. But the Ephthalite mon-
arch had no wish to push matters to extremities. Instead of
falling on the Persians from every side, he sent an embassy to
Perozes and offered to release him from his perilous situation,
and allow him to return with all his troops to Persia, if he
would swear a perpetual peace with the Ephthalites and do
homage to himself as his lord and master, by prostration.
Perozes felt that he had no choice but to accept these terms,
hard as he might think them. Instructed by the Magi, he
made the required prostration at the moment of sunrise, with
his face turned to the east, and thought thus to escape the
humiliation of abasing himself before a mortal by the mental
reservation that the intention of his act was to adore the great
Persian divinity. He then swore to the peace, and was allowed
to return with his army intact into Persia.”
It seems to have been soon after the conclusion of his dis-
graceful treaty” that serious troubles once more broke out in
Armenia. Perozes, following out the policy of his father,
Isdigerd,” incessantly persecuted the Christians of his north-
ern provinces, especially those of Armenia, Georgia, and Al-
bania.” So severe were his measures that vast numbers of the
Armenians quitted their country, and, placing themselves under
the protection of the Greek Emperor, became his subjects, and
entered into his service.* Armenia was governed by Persian
officials, and by apostate natives who treated their Christian
fellow-countrymen with extreme rudeness, insolence, and in-
justice. Their efforts were especially directed against the few
noble families who still clung to the faith of Christ, and had
ch. xvi.] FRESII TROUBLES IN ARMENIA. . . 415
not chosen to expatriate themselves. Among these the most
important was that of the Mamigonians, long celebrated in Ar-
menian history,” and at this time reckoned chief among the
nobility. The renegades sought to discredit this family with
the Persians; and Vahan, son of Hemaîag, its head, found
himself compelled to visit, once and again, the court of Persia,
in order to meet the charges of his enemies and counteract the
effect of their calumnies. Successful in vindicating himself,
and received into high favor by Perozes, he allowed the sun-
shine of prosperity to extort from him what he had guarded
firmly against all the blasts of persecution—to please his sov-
ereign, he formally abjured the Christian faith, and professed
himself a disciple of Zoroaster.” The triumph of the anti-
Christian party seemed now secured; but exactly at this point
a reaction set in. Vahan became a prey to remorse, returned
secretly to his old creed.” and longed for an opportunity of
wiping out the shame of his apostasy by perilling his life for
the Christian cause. The opportunity was not long in pre-
senting itself. In A.D. 481 Perozes suffered a defeat at the hand
of the barbarous Koushans, who held at this time the low
Caspian tract extending from Asterabad to Derbend. Iberia at
once revolted, slew its Zoroastrian king, Vazken, and placed a
Christian, Vakhtang, upon the throne. The Persian governor
of Armenia, having received Orders to quell the Iberian rebel-
lion, marched with all the troops that he could muster into the
northern province, and left the Armenians free to follow their
own devices. A rising immediately took place. Vahan at first
endeavored to check the movement, being doubtful of the
power of Armenia to cope with Persia, and feeling sure that
the aid of the Greek emperor could not be counted on. But the
the popular enthusiasm overleaped all resistance; everywhere
the Christian party rushed to arms, and swore to free itself;
the Persians with their adherents fled the country; Artaxata,
the capital, was besieged and taken; the Christians were com-
pletely victorious, and, having made themselves masters of all
Persarmenia, proceeded to establish a national government,
placing at their head as king, Sahag, the Bagratide, and ap-
pointing Vahan, the Mamigonian, to be Sparapet, or “Com-
Imander-in-Chief.” ” .
Intelligence of these events recalled the Persian governor,
Ader-Veshnasp, from Iberia. Returning into his province at
the head of an army of no great size, composed of Atropa-
tenians, Medes, and Cadusians, he was encountered by Vasag,
— v- — _ – – - – – A r
#
416 • THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. . . [ch. xvi.
a brother of Vahan, on the river Araxes, with a small force,
and was completely defeated and slain...”
Thus ended the campaign of A.D. 481. In A.D. 482 tho
Persians made a vigorous attempt to recover their lost ground
by sending two armies, one under Ader-Nerseh against Ar-
menia, and the other under Mihran” into Iberia. Vahan met
the army of Ader-Nerseh in the plain of Ardaz, engaged it,
and defeated it after a sharp struggle, in which the king,
Sahag, particularly distinguished himself. Mihran was op-
pösed by Vakhtang, the Iberian king, who, however, soon
found himself overmatched, and was forced to apply to Ar-
menia for assistance. The Armenians came to his aid in full
force; but their generosity was ill rewarded. Vakhtang plot-
ted to make his peace with Persia by treacherously betraying
his allies into their enemies' hands; and the Armenians, forced
to fight at tremendous disadvantage, suffered a severe defeat.
Sahag, the king, and Vasag, one of the brothers of Vahan,
were slain; Vahan himself escaped, but at the head of only a
few followers, with whom he fled to the highland district of
Daik, on the borders of Rome and Iberia. Here he was
“hunted upon the mountains” by Mihran, and would probably
have been forced to succumb before the year was out, had not
the Persian general suddenly received a summons from his
sovereign, who needed his aid against the Koushans of the
low Caspian region. Mihran, compelled to obey this call, had
to evacuate Armenia, and Vahan in a few weeks recovered
possession of the whole country.*
, The year A.D. 483 now arrived, and another desperate at-
tempt was made to crush the Armenian revolt. Early in the
spring a Persian army invaded Armenia, under a general
called Hazaravougd. Vahan allowed himself to be surprised,
to be shut up in the city of Dovin, and to be there besieged.
After a while he made his escape, and renewed the guerilla
warfare in which he was an adept; but the Persians recovered
most of the country, and he was himself, on more than one
occasion, driven across the border and obliged to seek refuge
in Roman Armenia, whither his adversary had no right to
follow him. Even here, however, he was not safe. Hazara-
vougd, at the risk of a rupture with Rome, pursued his flying
foe across the frontier:” and Vahan was for some time in the
... greatest danger. But the Persian system of constantly chang-
ing the commands of their chief officers saved him. Hazara-
vougd received orders from the court to deliver up Armenia
Plate XXXVI
TRIUMPH oF SAPOR I. ovfr. VALERIAN,


Vol.
Plate XXXVIII.
‘I hoàys o L º Laaſiſ I, ĐNIÐNINIH
s'ha No13：10）

A*
cH. xvi.] SECOWD EPHTHALITE WAR OF PEROZES. 417
to a newly appointed governor, named Sapor,” and to direct
his own efforts to the recovery of Iberia, which was still in
insurrection. In this latter enterprise he was successful;
Iberia submitted to him; and Vakhtang fled to Colchis. But
in Armenia the substitution of Sapor for Hazaravougd led to
disaster. After a vain attempt to procure the assassination of
Vahan by two of his officers, whose wives were Roman pris-
oners, Sapor moved against him with a strong body of troops;”
but the brave Mamigonian, falling upon his assailant unawares,
defeated him with great loss, and dispersed his army.” A
second battle was fought with a similar result; and the Per-
sian force, being demoralized, had to retreat; while Vahan,
taking the offensive, established himself in Dovin, and once
more rallied to his side the great mass of the nation.” Affairs
were in this state, when suddenly there arrived from the east
intelligence of the most supreme importance, which produced
a pause in the Armenian conflict and led to the placing of
Armenian affairs on a new footing. /
Perozes had, from the conclusion of his treaty with the
Ephthalite monarch (ab. A.D. 470), been tormented with the
feeling that he had suffered degradation and disgrace.” He
had, perhaps, plunged into the Armenian and other wars” in the
hope of drowning the recollection of his shame, in his own
mind as well as in the minds of others. But fortune had not
greatly smiled on him in these struggles; and any credit that
he obtained from them was quite insufficient to produce for "
getfulness of his great disaster. Hence, as time went on, he
became more and more anxious to wipe out the memory of the
past by a great and signal victory over his conquerors. He
therefore after some years" determined to renew the war. It
was in vain that the chief Mobed opposed himself to this in-
tention;" it was in vain that his other counsellors sought to
dissuade him, that his general, Bahram, declared against the
infraction of the treaty,” and that the soldiers showed them-
selves reluctant to fight. Perozes had resolved, and was not
to be turned from his resolution. He collected from all parts
of the empire a veteran force,” amounting, it is said,” to
100,000 men, and 500 elephants, placed the direction of affairs
at the court in the hands of Balas (Palash), his son or brother,”
and then marched upon the north-eastern frontier, with the
determination to attack and defeat the Ephthalites or perish
in the attempt. According to some Oriental writers” he en-
deavored to escape the charge of having falsified his engage-
*.
~,
*
f - *
418 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. [CH. xvi.
ments by a curious subterfuge. The exact terms of his oath
to Khush-newāz, the Ephthalite king, had been that he would
never march his forces past a certain pillar which that mon-
arch had erected to mark the boundary line between the Per-
sian and Ephthalite dominions. Perozes persuaded himself
that he would sufficiently observe his engagement if he kept
its letter; and accordingly he lowered the pillar, and placed it
impon, a number of cars, which were attached together and
drawn by a train of fifty elephants, in front of his army.
Thus, however deeply he invaded the Ephthalite country, he
never “passed beyond” the pillar which he had sworn not to
pass. In his own judgment he kept his vow, but not in that
of his natural advisers. It is satisfactory to find that the
Zoroastrian priesthood, speaking by the mouth of the chief
Mobed, disclaimed and exposed the fallacy of this wretched
casuistry.” &
, The Ephthalite monarch, on learning the intention of Perozes,
prepared to meet his attack by stratagem. He had taken up
his position in the plain near Balkh, and had there established
his camp, resolved to await the coming of the enemy. During
the interval he proceeded to dig a deep and broad trench" in
front of his whole position, leaving only a space of some twenty
or thirty yards, midway in the work, untouched. Having ex-
cavated the trench, he caused it to be filled with water," and
covered carefully with boughs of trees, reeds, and earth, so as
to be undistinguishable from the general surface of the plain
on which he was encamped. On the arrival of the Persians in
his front, he first of all held a parley with Perozes, in which,
after reproaching him with his ingratitude and breach of faith,
he concluded by offering to renew the peace. Perozes scorn-
fully refused; whereupon the Ephthalite prince hung on the
point of a lance the broken treaty," and, parading it in front
of the Persian troops, exhorted them to avoid the vengeance
which was sure to fall on the perjured by deserting their
doomed monarch. Upon this, half the army, we are told,”
retired; and Khush-newäz proceeded to effect the destruction
of the remainder by means of the plan which he had so care-
fully prepared beforehand. He sent a portion of his troops
across the ditch, with orders to challenge the Persians to an
engagement, and, when the fight began, to fly hastily, and,
returning within the ditch by the sound passage, unite them-
selves with the main army. The entire Persian host, as he
expected, pursued the fugitives, and coming unawares upon
— — — — — — . - , , , , ~ , ../
•-ºx
ch. xvi. DEATH OF PEROZES-HIS_CHARACTER, 419
the concealed trench plunged into it, was inextricably entan-
gled, and easily destroyed. Perozes himself, several of his
sons,” and most of his army perished. Firuz-docht, his
daughter, the chief Mobed, and great numbers of the rank
and file were made. prisoners. A vast booty was taken.”
Khush-newāz did not tarnish the glory of his victory by any
cruelties; he treated the captives tenderly, and caused search
to be made for the body of Perozes, which was found and
honorably interred. - *
Thus perished Perozes, after a reign of (probably) twenty-six
years." He was undoubtedly a brave prince, and entitled to
the epithet of Al Merdaneh, “the Courageous,” which he re-
ceived from his subjects.” But his bravery, unfortunately,
verged upon rashness,” and was unaccompanied (so far as ap-
pears) by any other military quality. Perozes had neither the
sagacity to form a good plan of campaign, nor the ability to
conduct a battle. In all the wars wherein he was personally
engaged he was unsuccessful, and the only triumphs which
gilded his arms were gained by his generals. In his civil
administration, on the contrary, he obtained a character for
humanity and justice;” and, if the Oriental accounts of his
proceedings during the great famine” are to be regarded as
trustworthy, we must admit that his wisdom and benevolence
were such as are not commonly found in those who bear rule
in the East. His conduct towards Khush-newāz has generally
been regarded as the great blot upon his good fame;" and it is
certainly impossible to justify the paltry casuistry by which
he endeavored to reconcile his actions with his words at the
time of his second invasion. But his persistent hostility to-
wards the Ephthalites is far from inexcusable, and its motive
may have been patriotic rather than personal. He probably
felt that the Ephthalite power was among those from which
Persia had most to fear, and that it would have been weak in
him to allow gratitude for a favor conferred upon himself to
tie his hands in a matter where the interests of his country
were vitally concerned. The Ephthalites continued for nearly
a century more to be among the most dangerous of her neigh-
bors to Persia; and it was only by frequent attacks upon them
in their own homes that Persia could reasonably hope to ward,
off their ravages from her territory.
It is doubtful whether we possess any coins of Hormisdas
III., the brother and predecessor of Perozes. Those which are
assigned to him by Mordtmann" bear a name which has no re-
*
t yº * *
- f
420 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xvi.
'semblance to his; and those bearing the name of Ram, which
Mr. Taylor considers to be coins of Hormisdas," cannot have
been issued under his authority, since Ram was the guardian
and general, not of Hormisdas, but of his brother.” Perhaps
the remarkable specimen figured by M. Longpérier in his valu-
able work,” which shows a bull's head in place of the usual in-
flated ball, may really belong to this prince. The legend upon
it is read without any doubt as Auhrimazd, or “Hormisdas;”
and in general character it is certainly Sassanian,” and of
about this period. [Pl. XXI., Fig. 5.]
The coins of Perozes are undoubted, and are very numerous,
They are distinguished generally by the addition to the ordi-
nary crown of two wings, one in front of the crown, and the
other behind it,” and bear the legend, Kadi Piruzi,” or Maz-
disn Kadi Piruzi, i.e., “King Perozes,” or “the Ormazd-wor-
shipping king Perozes.” The earring of the monarch is a triple
pendant.” On the reverse, besides the usual fire-altar and sup-
porters, we see on either side of the altar-flame a star and a
crescent. The legend here is M–probably for malka, “king”
—or else Kadi, together with a mint-mark. The mints named
are numerous, comprising (according to Mordtmann)” Perse-
polis, Ispahan, Rhages, Nehavend, Darabgherd, Zadracarta,
Nissa, Behistun, Chuzistan, Media, Kerman, and Azerbijan;
or (according to Mr. Thomas)” Persepolis, Rasht, Nehavend,
Darabgherd, Baiza, Modain, Merv, Shiz, Iran, Kerman, Yezd,
and fifteen others. The general character of tho coinage is
rude and coarse, the reverse of the coins showing especial
signs of degradation. [Pl. XXI., Fig. 6.]
Besides his coins, one otherºmemorial of the reign of Perozes
has escaped the ravages of time. This is a cup or vase, of an-
tique and elegant form, engraved with a hunting-scene, which
has been thus described by a recent writer: “This cup, which
comes from Russia, has a diameter of thirty-one centimètres,
and is shaped like a ewer without handles. At the bottom
there stands out in relief the figure of a monarch on horseback,
pursuing at full speed various wild animals; before him fly a
wild boar and wild sow, together with their young, an ibex, an
antelope, and a buffalo. Two other boars, an ibex, a buffalo,
and an antelope are strewn on the ground, pierced with arrows
The king has an aquiline nose, an eye which is very
wide open, a short beard, horizontal moustaches of considerable
length, the hair gathered behind the head in quite a small knot,
and the ear ornamented with a double pendant, pear-shaped;
f - t
*
* *
*
on Xvir.] Tº ACCESSION OF BALAS. 421
f
the head of the monarch supports a crown, which is mural at
the side and back, while it bears a crescent in front; two wings
surmounting a globe within a crescent form the upper part of
the head-dress. . . . On his right the king carries a short dag.
ger and a quiver full of arrows, on his left a sword. . . . Firuz,
who has the finger-guard of an archer on his right hand, is
represented in the act of bending a large bow made of horn.””
There would seem to be no doubt that the work thus described
is rightly assigned to Perozes. .
CHAPTER XVII.
Accession of Balas or Palash. His Relationship to Perozes.
Peace made with the Ephthalites. Pacification of Armenia.
and General Edict of Toleration. Revolt of Zareh, Son of
Perozes, and Suppression of the Revolt with the help of the
Armenians. Flight of Kobad to the Ephthalites. Further .
Changes in Armenia. Vahan made Governor. Death of
Balas; his Character. Coins ascribed to him.
BáAas . . . ini thv 3px?v čvaBās, ow8év ri baivetat &évadhiymrov 8páoras troAéutov čveka kai
trapatáčedov.–Agathias, iv. 27; p. 137, D.
PEROZES was succeeded by a prince whom the Greeks call
Balas, the Arabs and later Persians Palash, but whose real
name appears to have been Valākhesh' or Volagases. Different
accounts are given of his relationship to his predecessor, the
native writers unanimously representing him as the son of
Perozes and brother of Kobad,” while the Greeks” and the con-
temporary Armenians' declare with one voice that he was
Kobad's uncle and Perozes's brother. It seems on the whole
most probable that the Greeks and Armenians are right;" and
We may suppose that Perozes, having no son whom he could
trust to take his place" when he quitted his capital in order to
take the management of the Ephthalite war, put the regency:
and the guardianship of his children into the hands of his
brother, Valākhesh, who thus, not unnaturally, became king
When it was found that Perozes had fallen.
The first efforts of the new monarch were of necessity di-
rected towards an arrangement with the Ephthalites, whose
signal victory over Perozes had laid the north-eastern frontier
*
, 422 THE SEVENTH MONAIROHY. . . [CH. xv.11.
* -
of Persia open to their attack. Balas, we are told,” employed
on this service the arms and arts of an officer named Sukhra or
Sufrai, who was at the time governor of Seistan. Sukhra col-
lected an imposing force, and conducted it to the Ephthalite
border, where he alarmed Khush-newāz by a display of his
own skill with the bow." He then entered into negotiations
and obtained the release of Firuz-docht, of the Grand Mobed,
and of the other important prisoners, together with the restora-
tion of a large portion of the captured booty, but was probably
oompelled to accept on the part of his sovereign some humilia-
ting conditions. Procopius informs ns that, in consequence of
the defeat of Perozes, Persia became subject to the Ephthalites
and paid them tribute for two years;” and this is so probable
a result, and one so likely to have been concealed by the native
writers, that his authority must be regarded as outweighing
the silence of Mirkhond and Tabari. Balas, we must suppose,
consented to become an Ephthalite tributary, rather than re-
new the war which had proved fatal to his brother. If he ac-
cepted this position, we can well understand that Khush-newāz
would grant him the small concessions of which the Persian
writers boast; while otherwise the restoration of the booty and
the prisoners without a battle is quite inconceivable.
Secure, so long as he fulfilled his engagements, from any mo-
lestation in this quarter, Balas was able to turn his attention
to the north-western portion of his dominions, and address him-
self to the difficult task of pacifying Armenia, and bringing to
an end the troubles which had now for several years afflicted
, that unhappy province. His first step was to nominate as
Marzpan, or governor, of Armenia, a Persian who bore the
name of Nikhor, a man eminent for justice and moderation."
Nikhor, instead of attacking Vahan, who held almost the whole
of the country, since the Persian troops had been withdrawn
on the news of the death of Perozes,” proposed to the Arme-
nian prince that they should discuss amicably the terms upon
which his nation would be content to end the war and resume
its old position of dependence upon Persia. Vahan expressed
Jhis willingness to terminate the struggle by an arrangement,
and Suggested the following as the terms on which he and his
adherents would be willing to lay down their arms: *
(1) The existing fire-altars should be destroyed, and no others
should be erected in Armenia. -
(2) The Armenians should be allowed the full and free exer-
cise of the Christian religion, and no Armenians should be in
" -
- i.* - 1.
- !,
cm xvii.] PACIFICATION of ARVENIA. , 493
future tempted or bribed to declare themselves disciples of Zo-
roaster. - - - -
(3) If converts were nevertheless made from Christianity to
Zoroastrianism, places should not be given to them.
(4) The Persian king should in person, and not by deputy,
administer the affairs of Armenia.” Nikhor expressed himself
favorable to the acceptance of these terms; and, after an ex-
change of hostages, Vahan visited his camp and made arrange-
ments with him for the Solemn ratification of peace on the
aforesaid conditions. An edict of toleration was issued, and it
was formally declared that “every one should be at liberty to
adhere to his own religion, and that no one should be driven to
apostatize.” Upon these terms peace was concluded between
Vahan and Nikhor,” and it was only necessary that the Persian
monarch should ratify the terms for them to become formally
binding. - -
While matters were in this state, and the consent of Balas to
the terms agreed upon had not yet been positively signified, an
important revolution took place at the court of Persia. Zareh, .
a son of Perozes, preferred a claim to the crown, and was sup-
ported in his attempt by a considerable section of the people.”
A civil war followed; and among the officers employed to sup-
press it was Nikhor, the governor of Armenia. On his appoint-
ment he suggested to Vahan that it would lend great force to
the Armenian claims if under the existing circumstances the
Armenians would furnish effective aid to Balas, and so enable
him to suppress the rebellion. Vahan saw the importance of
the conjuncture, and immediately sent to Nikhor's aid a pow-
erful body of cavalry under the command of his own nephew,
Gregory. Zareh was defeated, mainly in consequence of the
great valor and excellent conduct of the Armenian contingent.
He fled to the mountains, but was pursued, and was very
shortly afterwards made prisoner and slain.” -
Soon after this, Kobad, son of Perozes, regarding the crown
as rightfully his, put forward a claim to it, but, meeting with
no success, was compelled to quit Persia and throw himself
upon the kind protection of the Ephthalites,” who were always
glad to count among their refugees a Persian pretender. The
Ephthalites, however, made no immediate stir—it would seem
that So long as Balas paid his tribute they were content, and
felt no inclination to disturb what seemed to them a satisfac-
tory arrangement. - -
The death of Zareh and the flight of Kobad left Balas at
t *
* ° W
494 THE SEVENTII MONARCHY. , [CH. xvn,
liberty to resume the work which their rebellions had inter-
rupted—the complete pacification of Armenia. Knowing how
much depended upon Vahan, he summoned him to his court, .
received him with the highest honors, listened attentively to
his representations, and finally agreed to the terms which
Vahan had formulated.” At the same time he replaced Nikhor
, by a governor named Antegan, a worthy successor, “mild,
prudent, and equitable;”” and, to show his confidence in the
Mamigonian prince, appointed him to the high office of Com-
mander-in-Chief, or “Sparapet.” This arrangement did not,
however, last long. Antegan, after ruling Armenia for a few
"months, represented to his royal master that it would be the
wisest course to entrust Vahan with the government,” that the
same head which had conceived the terms of the pacification
might watch over and ensure their execution. Antegan's re-
commendation approved itself to the Persian monarch, who
proceeded to recall his self-denying councillor, and to install
Vahan in the vacant office. The post of Sparapet was assigned
...to Vart, Vahan's brother. Christianity was then formally re-
established as the State religion of Armenia; the fire-altars
were destroyed; the churches reclaimed and purified; the hie-
rarchy restored to its former position and powers. A reconver-
Sion of almost the whole nation to the Christian faith was the
immediate result; the apostate Armenians recanted their errors,
and abjured Zoroastrianism; Armenia, and with it Iberia, were
pacified;” and the two provinces which had been so long a
cause of weakness to Persia grew rapidly into main sources of
her strength and prosperity.
The new arrangement had not been long completed when
Balas died (A.D. 487). It is agreed on all hands that he held the
throne for no more than four years,” and generally allowed
that he died peaceably by a natural death.” He was a wise
and just prince,” mild in his temper,” averse to military enter-
prises,” and inclined to expect better results from pacific ar-
rangements than from wars and expeditions. His internal ad-
ministration of the empire gave general satisfaction to his
subjects; he protected and relieved the poor, extended cultiva-
tion, and punished governors who allowed any men in their
province to fall into indigence.” His prudence and modera-
tion are especially conspicuous in his arrangement of the Ar-
menian difficulty, whereby he healed a chronic sore that had
long drained the resources of his country. His submission to
pay tribute to the Ephthalites may be thought to indicate a
—s. - *
GH. XVII.] . . COINS OF B.A.L.A.S. - 425
want of courage or of patriotism; but there are timeswhen the
purchase of a peace is a necessity; and it is not clear that Balas
was minded to bear the obligation imposed on him a moment
longer than was necessary. The writers who record the fact .
that Persia submitted for a time to pay a tribute limit the in-
terval during which the obligation held to a couple of years.”
It would seem, therefore, that Balas, who reigned four years,
must, a year at least before his demise, have shaken off the
Ephthalite yoke and ceased to make any acknowledgment of
dependence. Probably it was owing to the new attitude as-
Sumed by him that the Ephthalites, after refusing to give
Robad any material support for the space of three years,
adopted a new policy in the year of Balas's death (A.D. 487), and
lent the pretender a force” with which he was about to attack
his uncle when news reached him that attack was needless,
since Balas was dead and his own claim to the succession un-
disputed. Balas nominated no successor upon his death-bed,
thus giving in his last moments an additional proof of that
moderation and love of peace which had characterized his
relgn.
Coins, which possess several points of interest, are assigned
to Balas by the best authorities.” They bear on the obverse
the head of the king with the usual mural crown surmounted
by a crescent and inflated ball. The beard is short and curled.
The hair falls behind the head, also in curls. The earring,
wherewith the ear is ornamented, has a double pendent.
Flames issue from the left shoulder, an exceptional peculiarity
in the Sassanian series, but one which is found also among the
Indo-Scythian kings with whom Balas was so closely connected.
The full legend upon the coins appears to be Hur Kadi Valak-
ôshi, “Volagases, the Fire King.” The reverse exhibits the
usual fire-altar, but with the king's head in the flames, and
with the star and crescent on either side, as introduced by Pe-
rozes. It bears commonly the legend, Valakāshi, with a mint-
mark. The mints employed are those of Iran, Kerman, Ispa-
han, Nisa, Ledan, Shiz, Zadracarta, and one or two others.
[Plate XXI., Fig. 4].
426 - THE SETVEWTH MONARCEIP. ſch. xviii.
CHAPTER XVIII.
First reign of Kobad. His Favorites, Sufraft and Sapor. His
- Khazar War. Rise, Teaching, and influence of Mazdak.
His Claim to Miraculous Powers. Kobad adopts the new
Religion, and attempts to impose it on the Armenians. Re-
volt of Armenia wºnder Vahan, successful. Kobad yields.
General Rebellion in Persia, and Deposition of Kobad. ES-
cape of Mazdak. Short Reign of Zamasp. His Coins.
Ka8áôms 8& 6 roo IIepášov Úorraras viós, ris Baoru Aetas Špačápºevos, Širi to Buatórepov til &pxm
éxpāto kai kouvâs rās yuvaikas Švouofférmaev exeiv.–Cedrenus, p. 356, B, C.
- |
WHEN Kobad fled to the Ephthalites on the failure of his at-
tempt to seize the crown, he was received, we are told,” with
open arms; but no material aid was given to him for the space
of three years. However, in the fourth year of his exile, a
change came over the Ephthalite policy, and he returned to his
capital at the head of an army, with which Khush-newāz had
furnished him. The change is reasonably connected with the
withholding of his tribute by Balas;’ and it is difficult to sup-
pose that Kobad, when he accepted Ephthalite aid, did not
- pledge himself to resume the subordinate position which his
uncle had been content to hold for two years. It seems certain
that he was accompanied to his capital by an Ephthalite con-
tingent,” which he richly rewarded before dismissing it. Owing
his throne to the aid thus afforded him, he can scarcely have
} refused to make the expected acknowledgment. Distinct evi-
dence on the point is wanting; but there can be little doubt that
for some years Kobad held the Persian throne on the condition
& of paying tribute to Khush-newāz, and recognizing him as his
lord paramount. - .
i During the early portion of his first reign, which extended
from A.D. 487 to 498, we are told that he entrusted the entire
A administration of affairs to Sukhra, or Sufraj,” who had been
the chief minister of his uncle. Sufraí's son, Zer-Mihr, had
faithfully adhered to him throughout the whole period of his
exile," and Kobad did not regard it as a crime that the father
had opposed his ambition, and thrown the weight of his au-
thority into the scale against him. He recognized fidelity as a
t
^
A
*
ſ -
on XVIII.] KOBAD's WAR WITH THE KHAZARS - 427
f * \
quality that deserved reward, and was sufficiently magnani-
mous to forgive an opposition that had sprung from a virtuous
motive, and, moreover, had not succeeded. Sufraí accordingly
governed Persia for Some years; the army obeyed him, and the
civil administration was completely in his hands. Under these
circumstances it is not surprising that Kobad after a while grew
jealous of his Subordinate, and was anxious to strip him of the
quasi-regal authority which he exercised and assert his own
right to direct affairs. But, alone, he felt unequal to such a .
task. He therefore called in the assistance of an officer who
bore the name of Sapor, and had a command in the district of
Rhages." Sapor undertook to rid his sovereign of the incubus
whereof he complained, and, with the tacit sanction of the
monarch, he contrived to fasten a quarrel on Sufraî which he
pushed to such an extremity that, at the end of it, he dragged
the minister from the royal apartment to a prison, had him
heavily ironed, and in a few days caused him to be put to death.
Sapor, upon this, took the place previously occupied by Sufrai;
he was recognized at once as Prime Minister, and Sipehbed, or
commander-in-chief of the troops." Kobad, content to have
vindicated his royal power by the removal of Sufraí, conceded
to the second favorite as much as he had allowed to the first,
and once more suffered the management of affairs to pass
wholly into the hands of a subject.
The only war in which Persia seems to have been engaged
during the first reign of Kobad was one with the Khazars.
This important people, now heard of for the first time in Per-
sian history, appears to have occupied, in the reign of Kobad,
the steppe country between the Wolga and the Don,” whence
they made raids through the passes of the Caucasus into the
fertile provinces of Iberia, Albania, and Armenia. Whether
they were Turks, as is generally believed," or Circassians, as
has been ingeniously argued by a living writer," is doubtful;
but we cannot be mistaken in regarding them as at this time a
race of fierce and terrible barbarians, nomadic in their habits,
ruthless in their wars, cruel and uncivilized in their customs, a
fearful curse to the regions which they overrun and desolated.
We shall meet with them again, more than once, in the later -
history, and shall have to trace to their hostility some of the
Worst disasters that befel the Persian arms. On this occasion
it is remarkable that they were repulsed with apparent ease.
Kobad marched against their Khan in person, at the head of a
hundred thousand men, defeated him in a battle, destroyed the
*
&
- - t A
428 TITE SEVENTH MoWARCHY. [CH. xvn1.
greater portion of his army, and returned to his capital with an
enormous booty.” To check their incursions, he is said to have
built on the Armenian frontier a town called Amid,” by which
we are probably to understand, not the ancient Amida (or
Diarbekr), but a second city of the name, further to the east
and also further to the north, on the border line which sepa-
rated Armenia from Iberia. .
The triumphant return of Kobad from his Khazar war might
have seemed likely to Secure him a long and prosperous reign;
but at the moment when fortune appeared most to smile upon
him, an insidious evil, which had been gradually but secretly
sapping the vitals of his empire, made itself apparent, and,
drawing the monarch within the sphere of its influence, in-
volved him speedily in difficulties which led to the loss of his
crown. Mazdak, a native of Persepolis,” or, according to
others, of Nishapur, in Khorassan,” and an Archimagus, or
High Priest of the Zoroastrian religion, announced himself,
early in the reign of Kobad, as a reformer of Zoroastrianism,
and began to make proselytes to the new doctrines which he
declared himself commissioned to unfold. All men, he said, were,
by God's providence, born equal—none brought into the world
any property, or any natural right to possess more than
another. Property and marriage were mere human inventions,
contrary to the will of God, which required an equal division
of the good things of this world among all, and forbade the ap-
propriation of particular women by individual men. In com-
munities based upon property and marriage, men might law-
fully vindicate their natural rights by taking their fair share of
the good things wrongfully appropriated by their fellows
Adultery, incest, theft, were not really crimes, but necessary.
steps towards re-establishing the laws of nature in such sociº
eties.” To these communistic views, which seem to have been
the original speculations of his own mind, the Magian reformer
added tenets borrowed from the Brahmins or from some other
Oriental ascetics, such as the Sacredness of animal life, the
necessity of abstaining from animal food, other than milk,
cheese, or eggs, the propriety of simplicity in apparel, and the
need of abstemiousness and devotion.” He thus presented
the spectacle of an enthusiast who preached a doctrine of laxity
and Self-indulgence, not from any base or selfish motive, but
simply from a conviction of its truth.” We learn without sur-
prise that the doctrines of the new teacher were embraced with
ardor by large classes among the Persians, by the young of all
- - f
- 3 § }
*
CH. XVIII.] MAZDAR cowVERTS KOBAD. 429'
ranks, by the lovers of pleasure, by the great bulk of the lower .
orders.” But it naturally moves our wonder that among the
proselytes to the new religion was the king. Kobad, who had.
nothing to gain from embracing a creed which levelled him
with his subjects, and was scarcely compatible with the con-
tinuance of monarchical rule, must have been sincere in his
profession; and we inquire with interest, what were the cir-
cumstances which enabled Mazdak to attach to his cause soim-
portant and so unlikely a convert. - -
The explanation wherewith we are furnished by our authori-
ties is, that Mazdak claimed to authenticate his mission by the
possession and exhibition of miraculous powers. In order to im-
pose on the weak mind of Kobad he arranged and carried into
act an elaborate and clever imposture.” He excavated a cave
below the fire-altar, on which he was in the habit of offering,
and contrived to pass a tube from the cavern to the upper sur-
face of the altar, where the sacred flame was maintained per-
petually. Having then placed a confederate in the cavern, he
invited the attendance of Kobad, and in his presence appeared
to hold converse with the fire itself, which the Persians viewed
as the symbol and embodiment of divinity. The king accepted
the miracle as an absolute proof of the divine authority, of the
new teacher, and became thenceforth his zealous adherent and
follower. -
It may be readily imagined that the conversion of the mon-
arch to such a creed was, under a despotic government, the
prelude to disorders, which Soon became intolerable. Not con-
tent with establishing community of property and of women
among themselves, the sectaries claimed the right to plunder
the rich at their pleasure, and to carry off for the gratification
of their own passions the inmates of the most illustrious
harems.” In vain did the Mobeds declare that the new re-
ligion was false, was monstrous, ought not to be tolerated for
an hour. The followers of Mazdak had the support of the
monarch, and this protection secured them complete impunity.
Each day they grew bolder and more numerous. Persia be- .
Came too narrow a field for their ambition, and they insisted
On spreading their doctrines into the neighboring countries.
We find traces of the acceptance of their views in the distant
West;” and the historians of Armenia relate that in that un-
happy country they so pressed their religion upon the people
that an insurrection broke out,” and Persia was in danger of
Osing, by intolerance, one of her most valued dependencies,
430 • THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY: , [Ch. xvii.
Vahan, the Mamigonian, who had been superseded in his office
by a fresh Marzpan, bent on forcing the Armenians to adopt
the new creed, once more put himself forward as his country's
champion, took arms in defence of the Christian faith, and
endeavored to induce the Greek emperor, Anastasius, to accept
the sovereignty of Persarmenia, together with the duty of pro-
tecting it against its late masters. Fear of the consequences,
if he provoked the hostility of Persia, caused Anastasius to
hesitate; and things might have gone hardly with the un-
fortunate Armenians,” had not affairs in Persia itself come
about this time to a crisis. - .
The Mobeds and the principal nobles had in vain protested
against the spread of the new religion and the patronage lent
it by the Court. At length appeal was made to the chief
Mobed, and he was requested to devise a remedy for the exist-
ing evils, which were generally felt to have passed the limits
of endurance. The chief Mobed decided that, under the circum-
stances of the time, no remedy could be effectual but the depo-
sition of the head of the State, through whose culpable con-
nivance the disorders had attained their height.” His decision
was received with general acquiescence. The Persian nobles
agreed with absolute unanimity to depose Kobad, and to place
upon the throne another member of the royal house. Their
choice fell upon Zamasp,” a brother of Kobad, who was noted
for his love of justice and for the mildness of his disposition.”
The necessary arrangements having been made, they broke
out into universal insurrection, arrested Kobad, and committed
him to safe custody in the “Castle of Oblivion,” proclaimed
Zamasp, and crowned him king with all the usual formalities.
An attempt was then made to deal the new religion a fatal
blow by the seizure and execution of the heresiarch, Mazdak.
But here the counter-revolution failed. Mazdak was seized in-
deed and imprisoned; but his followers rose at once, broke open
his prison doors, and set him at liberty. The government felt
itself too weak to insist on its intended policy of coercion.
Mazdak was allowed to live in retirement unmolested, and to
increase the number of his disciples. -
The reign of Zamasp appears to have lasted from A.D. 498 to
A.D. 501, or between two and three years.” He was urged by the
army to put Kobad to death,” but hesitated to adopt so extreme
a course, and preferred retaining his rival as a prisoner. The
“Castle of Oblivion” was regarded as a place of safe custody;
but the ex-king contrived in a short time to put a cheat on his
ch. xviii.] coſNS OF ZAMASP ( 431
guards” and effect his escape from confinement. Like other
claimants of the Persian throne,” he at once took refuge with
the Ephthalites, and sought to persuade the Great Khan to em-
brace his cause and place an army at his disposal. The Khan
showed himself more than ordinarily complaisant. He can
scarcely have sympathized with the religious leanings of his
suppliant; but he remembered that he had placed him upon
the throne, and had found him a faithful feudatory and a quiet
neighbor. He therefore received him with every mark of
honor, betrothed him to one of his own daughters,” and lent
him an army of 30,000 men.” With this force Kobad returned
to Persia, and offered battle to Zamasp, Zamasp declined the
conflict. He had not succeeded in making himself popular
with his subjects, and knew that a large party desired the re-
turn of his brother.” It is probable that he did not greatly
desire a throne. At any rate, when his brother reached the
neighborhood of the capital, at the head of the 30,000 Eph-
thalites and of a strong body of Persian adherents, Zamasp
determined upon submission. He vacated the throne in favor
of Kobad, without risking the chance of a battle, and descended
voluntarily into a private station.” Different stories are told
of his treatment by the restored monarch. According to Pro- ' '
copius,” he was blinded after a cruel method long established
among the Persians; . but Mirkhond declares that he was
pardoned, and even received from his brother marked signs of
affection and favor.”
The coins of Zamasp have the usual inflated ball and mural
Crown, but with a crescent in place of the front limb of the
crown.” The ends of the diadem appear over the two shoul-
ders. On either side of the head there is a star, and over
either shoulder a crescent. Outside the encircling ring, or
“pearl border,” we see, almost for the first time,” three stars
with Crescents. The reverse bears the usual fire-altar, with a
Star and crescent on either side of the flame. The legend is
extremely brief, being either Zamasp or Bag Zamasp, , i.e.
“Zamaspes,” or “the divine Zamaspes.” [Pl. XXII., Fig. 1.] .
A
*.
432 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ſch. xix.
/
CHAPTER XIX.
Second Reign of Kobad. His Change of Attitude towards the
Followers of Mazdak. His Cause of Quarrel with Rome.
, First Roman War of Kobad. Peace made A.D. 505. Rome
fortifies Daras and Theodosiopolis. Complaint made by
Persia. Negotiations of Kobad with Justin : Proposed
Adoption of Chosroës by the Latter. Internal Troubles
in Persia. Second Roman War of Kobad, A.D. 524–531.
Death of Kobad. His Character. His coins.
Kafláðms & IIepóšov, túv IIeporuków Trpayuárov kpario as, troAAoi's pièv karū ‘Paptaiov woxé-
wovs 6tiveyke, troXAá Šē kará Bapflápov rov trpoaroukouvrov čormale rpátrata, kai Xpévov
où8éva trapºke tapaxa is te kai kuvöúvous éykaAlvöovºevos.-Agathias, iv. 27; p. 138, B.
THE second reign of Kobad covered a period of thirty years,'
extending from A.D. 501 to A.D. 531.” He was contemporary,
during this space, with the Roman emperors Anastasius, Jus-
tin, and Justinian, with Theodoric, king of Italy, with Cassio-
dorus, Symmachus, Boëthius, Procopius, and Belisarius. The
Oriental writers tell us but little of this portion of his history.
Their silence, however, is fortunately compensated by the un-
usual copiousness of the Byzantines, who deliver, at consider-
able length, the entire series of transactions in which Kobad
was engaged with the Constantinopolitan emperors, and fur-
nish some interesting notices of other matters which occupied
him. Procopius especially, the eminent rhetorician and secre-
tary of Belisarius, who was born about the time of Kobad's
restoration to the Persian throne,” and became secretary to the
great general four years before Kobad's death,” is ample in his
details of the chief occurrences, and deserves a confidence
which the Byzantines can rarely claim, from being at once a
contemporary and a man of remarkable intelligence. “His
facts,” as Gibbon well observes," “are collected from the per-
sonal experience and free conversation of a soldier, a states-
man, and a traveller; his style continually aspires, and often
attains, to the merit of strength and elegance; his reflections,
more especially in the speeches, which he too frequently in-
serts, contain a rich fund of political knowledge; and the his-
‘torian, excited by the generous ambition of pleasing and in-
|
— — — — — — — — — — — - ~~ f
i
ca. xix.] SEcoRD REIGN of KoRAD. . 433
structing posterity, appears to disdain the prejudices of the
people and the flattery of courts.” - A.
The first question which Kobad had to decide, when, by the
voluntary cession of his brother, Zamasp, he remounted his
throne, was the attitude which he should assume towards Maz-
dak and his followers. By openly favoring the new religion
and encouraging the disorders of its votaries, he had so dis-
gusted the more powerful classes of his subjects that he had
lost his crown and been forced to become a fugitive in a foreign
country. He was not prepared to affront this danger a second
time. Still, his attachment to the new doctrine was not shaken;
he held the views propounded to be true, and was not ashamed
to confess himself an unwavering adherent of the communistic
prophet." He contrived, however, to reconcile his belief with .
his interests by separating the individual from the king. As
a man, he held the views of Mazdak; but, as a king, he let it
be known that he did not intend to maintain or support the
sectaries in any extreme or violent measures. The result was
that the new doctrine languished; Mazdak escaped persecu-
tion and continued to propagate his views; but, practically,
the progress of the new opinions was checked; they had ceased
to command royal advocacy, and had consequently ceased to
endanger the State; they still fermented among the masses,
and might cause trouble in the future; but for the present they
were the harmless speculations of a certain number of enthu-
siasts who did not venture any more to carry their theories
into practice.
Kobad had not enjoyed the throne for more than a year be-
fore his relations with the great empire on his western frontier
became troubled, and, after some futile negotiations, hostilities
Once more broke out. It appears that among the terms of the
peace concluded in A.D. 442 between Isdigerd II. and the
younger Theodosius," the Romans had undertaken to pay an-
nually a certain sum of money as a contribution towards the
expenses of a fortified post which the two powers undertook
to maintain in the pass of Derbend," between the last spurs of
the Caucasus and the Caspian. This fortress, known as Juroi-
pach or Biraparach,” commanded the usual passage by which
the hordes of the north were accustomed to issue from their
vast arid steppes upon the rich and populous regions of the
South for the purpose of plundering raids, if not of actual con-
quests. Their incursions threatened almost equally Roman
and Persian territory,” and it was felt that the two nations
.*
!
g
434 , | THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. [CH. xix.
were alike interested in preventing them. The original agree-
ment was that both parties should contribute equally, alike to
the building and to the maintaining of the fortress; but the
Romans were so occupied in other wars that the entire burden
actually fell upon the Persians. These latter, as was natural,
made from time to time demands upon the Romans for the
payment of their share of the expenses;” but it seems that
these efforts were ineffectual, and the debt accumulated. It
was under these circumstances that Kobad, finding himself in
want of money to reward adequately his Ephthalite allies,”
sent an embassy to Anastasius, the Roman emperor, with a
peremptory demand for a remittance. The reply of Anastasius
was a refusal. According to one authority” he declined abso-
lutely to make any payment; according to another,” he ex-
pressed his willingness to lend his Persian brother a sum of
money on receiving the customary acknowledgment, but re-
fused an advance on any other terms. Such a response was a
simple repudiation of obligations voluntarily contracted, and
could scarcely fail to rouse the indignation of the Persian mon-
arch. If he learned further that the real cause of the refusal
was a desire to embroil Persia, with the Ephthalites, and to ad-
vance the interests of Rome by leading her enemies to waste
each other's strength in an internecine conflict,” he may have
admired the cunning of his rival, but can scarcely have felt
the more amicably disposed towards him.
The natural result followed. Kobad at once declared war.
, The two empires had now been uninterruptedly at peace for
sixty, and, with the exception of a single campaign (that of
A.D. 441), for eighty years. They had ceased to feel that
respect for each other's arms and valor which experience
gives, and which is the best preservative against wanton hos-
tilities. Kobad was confident in his strength, since he was
able to bring into the field, besides the entire force of Persia, a
large Ephthalite contingent, and also a number of Arabs.
Anastasius, perhaps, scarcely thought that Persia would go
to war on account of a pecuniary claim which she had allowed
to be disregarded for above half a century. The resolve of
Kobad evidently took him by surprise; but he had gone too
far to recede. The Roman pride would not allow him to yield
to a display of force what he had refused when demanded
peacefully; and he was thus compelled to maintain by arms
the position which he had assumed without anticipating its
consequences. . - -
* - º g *
\ * * - **, -
ch. xix.] HE BESIEGES AMIDA. S. 435
The war began by a sudden inroad of the host of Persia into
Roman Armenia," where Theodosiopolis was still the chief
stronghold and the main support of the Roman power.” Un-
prepared for resistance, this city was surrendered after a short
siege by its commandant, Constantine, after which the greater
part of Armenia was overrun and ravaged.” From Armenia
kobad conducted his army into Northern Mesopotamia, and
formed the siege of Amida about the commencement of the
winter.” The great strength of Amida has been already
noticed in this volume.” Kobad found it ungarrisoned, and
only protected by a small force, cantoned in its neighborhood,
under the philosopher, Alypius.” But the resolution of the
townsmen, and particularly of the monks, was great; and a
most strenuous resistance met all his efforts to take the place.
At first his hope was to effect a breach in the defences by
means of the ram; but the besieged employed the customary
means of destroying his engines, and, where these failed, the
strength and thickness of the walls was found to be such that
no serious impression could be made on them by the Persian
battering train. It was necessary to have recourse to some
other device; and Kobad proceeded to erect a mound in the
immediate neighborhood of the wall, with a view of dominat-
ing the town, driving the defenders from the battlements, and
then taking the place by escalade. He raised an immense
work; but it was undermined by the enemy, and at last fell in
with a terrible crash, involving hundreds in its ruin.” It is
said that after this failure Kobad despaired of success, and de-
termined to draw off his army; but the taunts and insults of
the besieged, or confidence in the prophecies of the Magi, who
saw an omen of victory in the grossest of all the insults, caused
him to change his intention and still continue the siege. His
perseverance was soon afterwards rewarded. A soldier dis-
covered in the wall the outlet of a drain or sewer imperfectly
blocked up with rubble, and, removing this during the night,
found himself able to pass through the wall into the town.
He communicated his discovery to Kobad, who took his meas-
ures accordingly. Sending, the next night, a few picked men
through the drain, to seize the nearest tower, which happened
to be slackly guarded by some sleepy monks, who the day be-
fore had been keeping festival,” he brought the bulk of his
troops with scaling ladders to the adjoining portion of the wall,
and by his presence, exhortations, and threats,” compelled
them to force their way into the place. The inhabitants re-
t
Af ł s \ .
A.
,”
*
* /
g 436 THE SEVENTEI MONARCHY. [CH. xix.
# -
sisted strenuously, but were overpowered by numbers, and
the carnage in the streets was great. At last an aged priest,
shocked at the indiscriminate massacre, made bold to address
the monarch himself and tell him that it was no kingly act to
slaughter captives. “Why, then, did you elect to fight?” said
the angry prince. “It was God's doing,” replied the priest,
astutely; “He willed that thou shouldest owe thy conquest of
Amida, not to our weakness, but to thy own valor.” The flat-
tery pleased Kobad, and induced him to stop the effusion of
blood;* but the sack was allowed to continue; the whole town
was pillaged;” and the bulk of the inhabitants were carried off
as slaves.” . .
The siege of Amida lasted eighty days,” and the year A.D.
503 had commenced before it was over.” Anastasius, on learn-
ing the danger of his frontier town, immediately despatched
to its aid a considerable force, which he placed under four
commanders”—Areobindus, the grandson of the Gothic officer
of the same name who distinguished himself in the Persian
war of Theodosius;” Celer, captain of the imperial guard;
Patricius, the Phrygian; and Hypatius, one of his own
nephews. The army, collectively, is said to have been more
, numerous than any that Rome had ever brought into the field
against the Persians;” but it was weakened by the divided
command, and it was moreover broken up into detachments
which acted independently of each other. Its advent also was
tardy. Not only did it arrive too late to save Amida, but it in
no way interfered with the after-movements of Kobad, who,
leaving a small garrison to maintain his new conquest, carried
off the whole of his rich booty to his city of Nisibis, and placed
the bulk of his troops in a good position upon his own fron-
tier.” When Areobindus, at the head of the first division,
reached Amida and heard that the Persians had fallen back,
he declined the comparatively inglorious work of a siege, and
pressed forward, anxious to carry the war into Persian terri-
tory. He seems actually to have crossed the border and in-
vaded the district of Arzanene,” when news reached him that
kobad was marching upon him with all his troops, whereupon
he instantly fled, and threw himself into Constantia, leaving
his camp and stores to be taken by the enemy. Meanwhile
another division of the Roman army, under Patricius and
Hypatius, had followed in the steps of Areobindus, and meet-
ing with the advance-guard of Kobad, which consisted of
eight hundred Ephthalites, had destroyedit almost to a man.”
*
ch. xix.] THE IMPHTHALITES INVADE PERSIA. . . 437
Ignorant, however, of the near presence of the main Persian
army, this body of troops allowed itself soon afterwards to be
surprised on the banks of a stream, while some of the men
were bathing and others were taking their breakfast, and was
completely cut to pieces by Kobad, scarcely any but the gene-
rals escaping.” -
Thus far success had been wholly on the side of the Persians;
and if circumstances had permitted Kobad to remain at the
seat of war and continue to direct the operations of his troops
in person, there is every to reason to believe that he would
have gained still greater advantages. The Roman generals
were incompetent; they were at variance among themselves;
and they were unable to control the troops under their com-
mand. The soldiers were insubordinate, without confidence
in their officers, and inclined to grumble at such an unwonted
hardship as a campaign prolonged into the winter.” Thus all
the conditions of the war were in favor of Persia. But un-
fortunately for Kobad, it happened that, at the moment when
his prospects were the fairest,” a danger in another quarter.
demanded his presence, and required him to leave the conduct
of the Roman war to others. An Ephthalite invasion called
him to the defence of his north-eastern frontier before the year
A.D. 503 was over,” and from this time the operations in Meso-
potamia were directed, not by the king in person, but by his
generals. A change is at once apparent. In A.D. 504 Celer
invaded Arzanene, destroyed a number of forts, and ravaged
the whole province with fire and sword.” Thence marching
southward, he threated Nisibis, which is said to have been
within a little of yielding itself.” Towards winter Patricius
and Hypatius took heart, and, collecting an army, commenced
the siege of Amida, which they attempted to storm on several
occasions, but without success.” After a while they turned
the siege into a blockade, entrapped the commander of the
Persian garrison, Glones, by a stratagem,” and reduced the
defenders of the place to such distress that it would have been
impossible to hold out much longer. It seems to have been
when matters were at this point” that an ambassador of high
rank” arrived from Kobad, empowered to conclude a peace,
and instructed to declare his master's willingness to surrender
all his conquests, including Amida, On the payiment of a con-
siderable sum of money. The Roman generals, regarding
Amida as impregnable, and not aware of the exhaustion of its
Stores, gladly consented. They handed over to the Persians a
f
— 2–
4.38 THE SETWENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xix,
*
thousand pounds' weight of gold, and received in exchange the
captured city and territory.” A treaty was signed by which
the contracting powers undertook to remain at peace and re-
spect each other's dominions for the space of seven years.”
No definite arrangement seems to have been made with res-
pect to the yearly payment on account of the fortress, Birapa.
rach, the demand for which had occasioned the war. This
claim remained in abeyance, to be pressed or neglected, as
Persia, might consider her interests to require.
The Ephthalite war, which compelled Kobad to make peace
with Anastasius, appears to have occupied him uninterruptedly
for ten years.” During its continuance Rome took advantage
of her rival's difficulties to continue the system (introduced
under the younger Theodosius") of augmenting her own power,
and crippling that of Persia, by establishing strongly fortified
posts upon her border in the immediate vicinity of Persian
territory. Not content with restoring Theodosiopolis and
greatly strengthening it defences,” Anastasius erected an en-
tirely new fortress at Daras,” on the southern skirts of the
Mons Masius, within twelve miles of Nisibis, at the edge of the
great Mesopotamian plain. This, place was not a mere fort,
but a city; it contained churches, baths, porticoes, large gran-
aries, and extensive cisterns.” It constituted a standing men-
ace to Persial:” and its erection was in direct violation of the
treaty made by Theodosius with Isdigerd II.," which was re-
garded as still in force by both nations.
We cannot be surprised that Kobad, when his Ephthalite
war was over, made formal complaint at Constantinople (ab.
A.D. 517) of the infraction of the treaty.” Anastasius was un-
able to deny the charge. He endeavored at first to meet it by
a mixture of bluster with professions of friendship; but when
this method did not appear effectual he had recourse to an ar.
gument whereof the Persians on most occasions acknowledged
the force. By the expenditure of a large sum of money he
either corrupted the ambassadors of Kobad, or made them
honestly doubt whether the sum paid would not satisfy their
master. ** *
In A.D. 518 Anastasius died, and the imperial authority was
assumed by the Captain of the Guard, the “Dacian peasant,” "
Justin. With him Kobad very shortly entered into negotia-
tions. He had not, it is clear, accepted the pecuniary sacrifico
of Anastasius as a complete satisfaction. He felt that he had
many grounds of quarrel with the Romans. There was the old
.*
\
-- |
¥
cm xix.] STRANGE PROPOSAL MADE By KOBAD. .439.
matter of the annual payment due on account of the fortress
of Biraparach; there was the recent strengthening of Theo-
dosiopolis, and building of Daras; there was moreover an in-
terference of Rome at this time in the region about the Cau-
casus which was very galling to Persia and was naturally re-
sented by her monarch. One of the first proceedings of Justin
after he ascended the throne was to send an embassy with rich
gifts to the court of a certain Hunnic chief of these parts, called
Ziligdes or Zilgibis,” and to conclude a treaty with him by
which the Hun bound himself to assist the Romans against the z
Persians. Soon afterwards a Lazic prince, named Tzath,
whose country was a Persian dependency, instead of seeking
inauguration from Kobad, proceeded on the death of his
father” to the court of Constantinople, and expressed his wish
to become a Christian, and to hold his crown as one of Rome's
vassal monarchs. Justin gave this person a warm welcome,
had him baptized, married him to a Roman lady of rank, and
sent him back to Lazica adorned with a diadem and robes that,
sufficiently indicated his dependent position." The friendly rela-
tions established between Rome and Persiaby the treaty of A.D.
505 were, under these circumstances, greatly disturbed, and on
both sides it would seem that war was expected to break out."
Dut neither Justin nor Kobad was desirous of a rupture. Both
were advanced in years,” and both had domestic troubles to oc-,
cupy them. Kobad was at this time especiallyanxious about the
succession. He had four sons,” Kaūses, Zames, Phthasuarsas,
and Chosroës, of whom Kačses was the eldest. This prince,
however, did not please him. His affections were fixed on his
fourth son, Chosroës, and he had no object more at heart than .
to secure the crown for this favorite child. The Roman writers.
tell us“ that instead of resenting the proceedings of Justin in
the years A.D. 520–522, Kobad made the strange proposal to him
about this time that he should adopt Chosroës, in order that
that prince might have the aid of the Romans against his coun-
trymen, if his right of succession should be disputed. . It is, no
doubt, difficult to believe that such a proposition should have
been made; but the circumstantial manner in which Procopius,
writing not forty years after, relates the matter, renders it
almost impossible for us to reject the story as a pure fabrica-
tion. There must have been some foundation for it. In the
negotiations between Justin and TKobad during the early years
of the former, the idea of Rome pledging herself to acknowledge.
Chosroës as his father's successor must have been brought
*
*
4
A
— — . *
& w * _ !
440 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. , [CH. XIX.
~ forward. The proposal, whatever its exact terms, led however
f
to no result. Rome declined to do as Kobad desired;" and
thus another ground of estrangement was added to those which
had previously made the renewal of the Roman war a mere
question of time.
It is probable that the rupture would have occurred earlier
than it did had not Persia about the year A.D. 523 become once
more the scene of religious discord and conspiracy. The fol-
lowers of Mazdak had been hitherto protected by Kobad, and
had lived in peace and multiplied throughout all the provinces
of the empire.” Content with the toleration which they
enjoyed, they had for above twenty years created no disturb-
ance, and their name had almost disappeared from the records
of history. But as time went on they began to feel that their
position was insecure." Their happiness, their very safety,
depended upon a single life; and as Kobad advanced in years
they grew to dread more and more the prospect which his death
would open. Among his sons there was but one who had em-
braced their doctrine; and this prince, Phthasuarsas, had but
little chance of being chosen to be his father's successor.
Raúses enjoyed the claim of natural right; Chosroës was his
father's favorite; Zames had the respect and good wishes of the
great mass of the people;” Phthasuarsas was disliked by the
Magi,” and, if the choice lay with them, was certain to be
passed over. The sectaries therefore determined not to wait
the natural course of events, but to shape them to their own
purposes. They promised Phthasuarsas to obtain by their
prayers his father's abdication and his own appointment to
succeed him, and asked him to pledge himself to establish their
religion, as that of the State when he became king. The prince
consented; and the Mazdakites proceeded to arrange their
plans, when, unfortunately for them, Kobad discovered, or
suspected, that a scheme was on foot to deprive him of his
crown. Whether the designs of the sectaries were really trea-
sonable or not is uncertain; but whatever they were, an Orien-
tal monarch was not likely to view them with favor. In the
East it is an offence even to speculate on the death of the king;
and Kobad saw in the intrigue which had been set on foot a
criminal and dangerous conspiracy. He determined at once to
crush the movement. Inviting the Mazdakites to a solemn as-
sembly, at which he was to confer the royal dignity on Phtha-
Suarsas, he caused his army to surround the unarmed multitude
and massacre the entire number.”
$ - * # |
ch. xix.] INTERNAL, TROUBLES IN PERSIA. 441
Relieved from this peril, Kobad would at once have declared
war against Justin, and have marched an army into Roman
territory, had not troubles broken out in Iberia, which made it
necessary for him to stand On the defensive.” Adopting the
intolerant policy so frequently pursued, and generally with
such ill results, by the Persian kings, Kobad had commanded
Gurgenes, the Iberian monarch, to renounce Christianity and
profess the Zoroastrian religion. Especially he had required
that the Iberian custom of burying the dead should be relin-
quished, and that the Persian practice of exposing corpses to
be devoured by dogs and birds of prey” should supersede the
Christian rite of Sepulture. Gurgenes was too deeply attached
to his faith to entertain these propositions for a moment. He
at once shook off the Persian yoke, and, declaring himself a
vassal of Rome, obtained a promise from Justin that he would
never desert the Iberian cause. Rome, however, was not pre-
pared to send her own armies into this distant and inhospitable.
region; her hope was to obtain aid from the Tatars of the
Crimea,” and to play off these barbarians against the forces
where with Kobad might be expected shortly to vindicate his
authority. An attempt to engage the Crimeans generally in
this service was made, but it was not successful. A small
force was enrolled and sent to the assistance of Gurgenes. But
now the Persians took the field in strength. A large army was
sent into Iberia by Kobad, under a general named Boës. Gur-
genes saw resistance to be impossible. He therefore fled the
country, and threw himself into Lazica, where the difficult
nature of the ground, the favor of the natives, and the assist-
ance of the Romans enabled him to maintain himself. Iberia,
however, was lost, and passed once more under the Per-
sians, who even penetrated into Lazic territory and occupied
some forts which commanded the passes between Lazica and
Iberia.” &
Rome, on her part, endeavored to retaliate (A.D. 526) by in-
vading Persarmenia and Mesopotamia. The campaign is re-
markable as that in which the greatest general of the age, the
renowned and unfortunate Belisarius, first held a command
and thus commenced the work of learning by experience the
duties of a military leader. Hitherto a mere guardsman, and ' . .
still quite a youth,” trammelled moreover by association with
a Colleague, he did not on this occasion reap any laurels. A
Persian force under two generals, Narses and Aratius, defended
Persarmenia, and, engaging the Romans under Sittas and
*
- - - - - #
f - **
*
442 THE SEVENTEI MOYARCIIY. [CII. xix.
Belisarius, succeeded in defeating them. At the same time,
Licelarius, a Thracian in the Roman service, made an incursion
into the tract about Nisibis, grew alarmed without cause and
beat a speedy retreat. Hereupon Justin recalled him as in-
competent, and the further conduct of the war in Mesopotamia
was entrusted to Belisarius, who took up his headquarters at
I)aras. .”
The year A.D. 527 seems to have been one in which nothing
of importance was attempted on either side. At Constanti-
nople the Emperor Justin had fallen into ill health, and, after
associating his nephew Justinian on the 1st of April, had de-
parted this life on the 1st of August.” . About the same time"
Kobad found his strength insuffieient for active warfare, and
put the command of his armies into the hands of his sons.
The struggle continued in Lazica, but with no decisive result. 78
At Daras, Belisarius, apparently, stood on the defensive. It
was not till A.D. 528 had set in that he resumed operations in
the open field, and prepared once more to measure his strength
against that of Persia. - -
Belisarius was stirred from his repose by an order from
court. Desirous of carrying further the policy of gaining
ground by means of fortified posts,” Justinian, who had re-
cently restored and strengthened the frontier city of Martyr-
opolis,” on the Nymphius, sent instructions to Belisarius,
early in A.D. 528, to the effect that he was to build a new fort
at a place called Mindon, on the Persian border a little to the
left of Nisibis.” The work was commenced, but the Persians
would not allow it to proceed. An army which numbered
30,000 men, commanded by Xerxes,” son of Kobad, and
Perozes, the Mihran,” attacked the Roman workmen; and
when Belisarius, reinforced by fresh troops from Syria and
Phoenicia, ventured an engagement, he was completely de-
feated and forced to seek safety in flight. The attempted
fortification was, upon this, razed to the ground; and the
Mihran returned, with numerous prisoners of importance, into
Persia. **
It is creditable to Justinian that he did not allow the ill-
success of his lieutenant to lead to his recall or disgrace. On
the dontrary, he chose exactly the time of his greatest depres-
sion to give him the title of “General of the East.” Belisa-
rius upon this assembled at Daras an imposing force, com-
posed of Romans and allies, the latter being chiefly Massageta°.
The entire number amounted to 25,000 men;” and with this
§
f *
º & * *
h •
ca. Xix.] THE PERSIANS ATTACK DARAS 443
army he would probably have assumed the offensive, had not
the Persian general of the last campaign, Perozes the Mihran,"
again appeared in the field, at the head of 40,000 Persians”
and declared his intention of besieging and taking Daras.
With the insolence of an Oriental he sent a message to Belisa-
rius, requiring him to have his bath prepared for the morrow,
as after taking the town he would need that kind of refresh-
ment.” Belisarius contented himself, in reply, with drawing
out his troops in front of Daras in a position carefully pre-
pared beforehand, where both his centre and his flanks would
be protected by a deep ditch, outside of which there would be
room to act for his cavalry. Perozes, having reconnoitred the
position, hesitated to attack it without a greater advantage of
numbers, and sent hastily to Nisibis for 10,000 more soldiers,
while he allowed the day to pass without anything more
serious than a demonstration of his Calvary against the Roman
left, and some insignificant single combats.”
The next morning his reinforcement arrived;” and after
some exchange of messages with Belisarius,” which led to no
result, he commenced active operations. Placing his infantry
in the centre, and his horse upon either wing, as the Romans
had likewise done, and arranging his infantry so that one half
should from time to time relieve the other,” he assaulted the
Roman line with a storm of darts and arrows. The Romans
replied with their missile weapons; but the Persians had the
advantage of numbers; they were protected by huge wattled
shields; and they were more accustomed to this style of war-
fare than their adversaries. Still the Romans held out; but it
was a relief to them when the missile weapons were exhausted
On both sides, and a closer fight began along the whole line
with swords and spears. After a while the Roman left was in
difficulties. Here the Cadiseni (Cadusians?) under Pituazes
routed their opponents, and were pursuing them hastily when
the Massagetic horse, commanded by Sunicas and Aigan, and
three hundred Heruli under a chief called Pharas, charged
them on their right flank, and at once threw them into dis-
Order. Three thousand fell, and the rest were driven back
upon their main body, which still continued to fight bravely.
The Romans did not push their advantage, but were satisfied
to reoccupy the ground from which they had been driven.”
Scarcely was the battle re-established in this quarter when
the Romans found themselves in still greater difficulties upon
their right. Here Perozes had determined to deliver his main
/ f i
,”
f
* A
444 | THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. [CH. XIX.
attack. The corps of Immortals, which he had kept in re-
serve, and such troops as he could spare from his centre, were
secretly massed upon his own left,” and charged the Roman
right with such fury that it was broken and began a hasty
retreat. The Persians pursued in a long column, and were
carrying all before them, when once more an impetuous flank.
charge of the barbarian cavalry, which now formed an im-
portant element in the Roman armies, changed the face of
affairs, and indeed decided the fortune of the day. The Per-
sian column was actually cut in two by the Massagetic horse;
those who had advanced the furthest were completely sepa-
rated from their friends, and were at once surrounded and
slain. Among them was the standard-bearer of Baresmanes,
who commanded the Persian left. The fall of this man in-
creased the general confusion. In vain did the Persian
column, checked in its advance, attempt an orderly retreat.
The Romans assaulted it in front and on both flanks, and a
terrible carnage ensued. The crowning disaster was the death
of Baresmanes, who was slain by Sunicas, the Massa-Goth;
whereupon the whole Persian army broke and fled without
offering any further resistance. Here fell 5000, including
numbers of the “Immortals.” The slaughter would have been
still greater, had not Belisarius and his lieutenant, Hermo-
genes, with wise caution restrained the Roman troops and re-
Called them quickly from the pursuit of the enemy, content
with the success which they had achieved. It was so long
Since a Roman army had defeated a Persian one in the open
field that the victory had an extraordinary value, and it
would have been foolish to risk a reverse in the attempt to
give it greater completeness.”
While these events took place in Mesopotamia, the Persian
arms were also unsuccessful in the Armenian highlands,
whither Kobad had sent a second army to act offensively
against Rome, under the conduct of a certain Mermeröes.
The Roman commanders in this region were Sittas, the former
colleague of Belisarius,” and Dorotheas, a general of experi-
ence. Their troops did not amount to more than half the
number of the enemy,” yet they contrived to inflict on the
Persians two defeats, one in their own territory, the other in
Roman Armenia. The superiority thus exhibited by the
Romans encouraged desertions to their side; and in Some in-
stances the deserters were able to carry over with them to
their new friends small portions of Persian territory.”
&
|
ch. xix.) PROJECT OF ALA MANDARUS, 445
\ -
In the year A.D. 531, after a vain attempt at negotiating
terms of peace with Rome,” the Persians made an effort to
recover their laurels by carrying the war into a new quarter
and effecting a new combination. Alamandarus, sheikh of
the Saracenic Arabs, had long been a bitter enemy of the
Romans, and from his safe retreat in the desert had been ac-
customed for fifty years to ravage, almost at his will, the
eastern provinces of the empire.” Two years previously he
had carried fire and sword through the regions of upper Syria,
had burned the suburbs of Chalcis,” and threatened the
Roman capital of the East, the rich and luxurious Antioch.
He owed, it would seem, some sort of allegiance to Persia,”
although practically he was independent, and made his expe-
ditions when and where he pleased. However, in A.D. 531,
he put himself at the disposal of Persia, proposed a joint
expedition, and suggested a new plan of campaign. “Mesopo-
tamia and Osrhoëné,” he said, “on which the Persians were
accustomed to make their attacks, could better resist them
than almost any other part of the Roman territory, In these
provinces were the strongest of the Roman cities, fortified ac-
cording to the latest rules of art, and plentifully supplied with
every appliance of defensive warfare. There, too, were the
best and bravest of the Roman troops, and an army more
numerous than Rome had ever employed against Persia
before. It would be most perilous to risk an encounter on this
ground. Let Persia, however, invade the country beyond the
Euphrates, and she would find but few obstacles. In that
region there were no strong fortresses, nor was there any army
worth mention. Antioch itself, the richest and most populous
city of the Roman East, was without a garrison, and, if it were
suddenly assaulted, could probably be taken. The incursion
might be made, Antioch sacked, and the booty carried off into
Persian territory before the Romans in Mesopotamia received
intelligence of what was happening.” Kobad listened with
approval, and determined to adopt the bold course suggested
to him. He levied a force of 15,000 cavalry,” and, placing it
under the command of a general named Azarethes,” desired
him to take Alamandarus for his guide and make a joint expe-
dition with him across the Euphrates. It was understood that
the great object of the expedition was the capture of Antioch.
The allied army crossed the Euphrates below Circesium,”
and ascended the right bank of the river till they neared the
latitude of Antioch, when they struck westward and reached
446 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY ſch. xix.
Gabbula” (the modern Jabul), on the north shore of the salt
lake now known as the Sabakhah.” Here they learned to
their surprise that the movement, which they had intended to
be wholly unknown to the Romans, had come to the ears of
Belisarius,” who had at once quitted Daras, and proceeded by
forced marches to the defence of Syria, into which he had
thrown himself with an army of 20,000 men,” Romans,
Isaurians, Lycaonians,” and Arabs. His troops were already
interposed between the Persians and their longed-for prey,
Belisarius having fixed his headquarters at Chalcis,” half a
degree to the west of Gabbula, and twenty-five miles nearer
to Antioch. Thus balked of their purpose, and despairing
of any greater success than they had already achieved, the
allies became anxious to return to Persia with the plunder of
the Syrian towns and villages which they had sacked on their
advance. Belisarius was quite content that they should carry
off their spoil, and would have considered it a sufficient victory
to have frustrated the expedition without striking a blow.”
But his army was otherwise minded; they were eager for
battle, and hoped doubtless to strip the flying foe of his rich
booty.' Belisarius was at last forced, against his better judg-
ment, to indulge their desires and allow an engagement, which
was fought on the banks of the Euphrates, nearly opposite
Callinicus.” Here the conduct of the Roman troops in action
corresponded but ill to the anxiety for a conflict. The infantry
indeed stood firm, notwithstanding that they fought fasting;”
but the Saracenic Arabs, of whom a portion were on the
Roman side, and the Isaurian and Lycaonian horse, who had
'been among the most eager for the fray, offered scarcely any
resistance; and, the right wing of the Romans being left ex-
posed by their flight, Belisarius was compelled to make his
troops turn their faces to the enemy and their backs to tho
Euphrates, and in this position, where defeat would have been
ruin, to meet and resist all the assaults of the foe until the
shades of evening fell, and he was able to transport his troops
in boats across the river. The honors of victory rested with
the Persians, but they had gained no substantial advantage;
and when Azarethes returned to his master he was not unjustly
reproached with having sacrificed many lives for no appreci-
able result.” The raid into Syria had failed of its chief object;
and Belisarius, though defeated, had returned, with the main
strength of his army intact, into Mesopotamia.
The battle of Callinicus was fought on Easter Eve, April 19.
- t * **
*
CH. xix.] DEATH OF KOBA D-IIIS CHARACTER. 447
Azarethes probably reached Ctesiphon and made his report to
Robad towards the end of the month. Dissatisfied with what
Azarethes had achieved, and feeling that the season was not
too far advanced for a Second campaign, Kobad despatched an
army under three chiefs, into Mesopotamia, where Sittas was
now the principal commander on the Roman side, as Belisarius
had been hastily summoned to Byzantium in order to be em-
ployed against the Vandals in Africa. This force found no
one to resist in the open field, and was therefore able to invade
Sophéné and lay siege to the Roman fortress of Martyropolis.”
Martyropolis was ill provisioned, and its walls were out of
repair. The Persians must soon have taken it, had not Sittas
contrived to spread reports of a diversion which the Huns
were about to make as Roman allies. Fear of being caught
between two fires paralyzed the Persian commanders; and
before events undeceived them, news arrived in the camp that
Robad was dead, and that a new prince sat upon the throne.
Under these circumstances, Chanaranges, the chief of the Per-
sian commanders, yielded to representations made by Sittas,
that peace would now probably be made between the contend-
ing powers, and withdrew his army into Persian territory.”
Robad had, in fact, been seized with paralysis on the 8th of
September,” and after an illness which lasted only five days,
had expired. Before dying, he had communicated to his chief
minister, Mebodes, his earnest desire that Chosroës should suc-
ceed him upon the throne, and, acting under the advice of
Mebodes, had formally left the crown to him by a will duly
executed,” He is said by a contemporary to have been eighty-
two years old at his death,” an age very seldom attained by
an Oriental monarch. His long life was more than usually
eventful, and he cannot be denied the praise of activity, persè-
Verance, fertility of resource, and general military capacity.
But he was cruel and fickle; he disgraced his ministers and his
generals on insufficient grounds; he allowed himself, from con-
siderations of policy, to smother his religious convictions; and
he risked subjecting Persia to the horrors of a civil war, in
order to gratify a favoritism which, however justified by the
event, seems to have rested on no worthy motive. Chosroës
Was preferred on account of his beauty, and because he was
the Son of Kobad's best-loved wife,” rather than for any good
qualities; and inherited the kingdom, not so much because he
had shown any capacity to govern as because he was his far
ther's darling. -
*
g - * * ,
448 THE SEVENTH MoMARCIIy. IoH, xx.
The coins of Kobad are, as might be expected from the length
of his reign, very numerous. In their general appearance
they resemble those of Zamasp, but do not exhibit quite so
many stars and crescents. The legend on the obverse is either
“Kavat" or “Kavāt,” afzwi,” i.e. “Kobad,” or “May Kobad
be increased.”” The reverse shows the regnal year, which
ranges from eleven to forty-three,” together with a mint-mark.
The mint-marks, which are nearly forty in number, comprise
almost all those of Perozes, together with about thirteen
others.” [Pl. XXII. Fig. 2.]
CHAPTER XX.
Accession of Chosroës I. (Anushirwan). Conspiracy to de-
* throne him crushed. General Severity of his Government.
FIe concludes Peace with Rome, A. D. 533. Terms of the
Peace. Causes which led to its Rupture. First Roman
TWar of Chosroës, A.D. 540–544. Second Roman War, A.D.
549–557. Eastern Wars. Conquest of Arabia Feliac. Sup-
posed Campaign in India. War with the Turks. Revolt
of Persarmenia. Third Roman War, A.D. 572–579. Death
of Chosroës. .
º
Teówmkóros rod KáBašov, Xoopóms à trévv 5 kað’ huàs 8taôéxeral Tºv trarpºšav ćpx?iv, kai
trétrpaxe traetorra öga kai uéytota-Agathias, iv. 29; p. 140, A.
THE accession of Chosroës was not altogether undisputed.
Kaūses, the eldest of the sons of Kobad, regarding himself as en-
titled to the crown by right of birth, assumed the insignia of
royalty on the death of his father, and claimed to be acknowl-
edged as monarch.” But Mebodes, the Grand Vizier, interposed
with the assertion of a constitutional axiom, that no one had the
right of taking the Persian crown until it was assigned to him
by the assembly of the nobles.” Kačses, who thought he might
count on the goodwill of the nobles, acquiesced; and the assem-
bly being convened, his claims were submitted to it. Here-
upon Mebodes brought forward the formal testament of Kobad,
which he had hitherto concealed, and, submitting it to the
nobles, exhorted them to accept as king the brave prince desig-
nated by a brave and successful father. His eloquence and
authority prevailed; the claims of Kaūses and of at least one
w
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*
** *
CH, XX 1 AccESSION OF CHOSRoºs I, , , , 449
other son of Kobad” were set aside; and, in accordance with
his father's will, Chosroës was proclaimed lawful monarch of
Persia. - * =
But a party among the nobles were dissatisfied with the de-
cision to which the majority had come. They dreaded the
restlessness,” and probably feared the cruelty, of Chosroës.
It might have been expected that they would have espoused
the cause of the disappointed Kačses, which had a solid basis
of legality to rest upon; but, apparently, the personal charae-
ter of Kačses was unsatisfactory, or at any rate, there was
another prince whose qualities conciliated more regard and
aroused more enthusiasm. Zames, the second son of Kobad,
had distinguished himself repeatedly in the field," and was the
idol of a considerable section of the nation, who had long de-
sired that he should govern them. Unfortunately, however,
he possessed a disqualification fatal in the eyes of Orientals;
he had, by disease or mischance, lost one of his eyes, and this
physical blemish made it impossible that he should occupy the
Persian throne." Under these circumstances an ingenious plan
was hit upon. In order to combine respect for law and usage
with the practical advantage of being governed by the man of
their choice, the discontented nobles conceived the idea of con-
ferring the crown on a son of Zames, a boy named after his
grandfather Kobad, on whose behalf Zames would naturally
be regent.” Zames readily came into the plot; several of his
brothers, and, what is most strange, Chosroës' maternal uncle,
the Aspebed, supported him; the conspiracy seemed nearly
sure of success, when by some accident it was discovered, and
the occupant of the throne took prompt and effectual measures
to crush it. Zames, Kağses, and all the other sons of Kobad
were seized by order of Chosroës, and, together with their en-
tire male offspring, were condemned to death.” The Aspebed,
and the other nobles found to have been accessory to the con-
spiracy, were, at the same time, executed. One prince alone,
the intended puppet-king, Kobad, escaped, through the com-
passion of the Persian who had charge of him, and, after pass-
ing many years in concealment, became a refugee at the Court
of Constantinople, where he was kindly treated by Jus-
tinian.”
When Chosroës had by these means secured himself against
the claims of pretenders, he proceeded to employ equal severity
in repressing the disorders, punishing the crimes, and compel-
ling the abject submission of his subjects. The heresiarch Maz-
º
J
f
,”
f
t
*
450 - THE SEVENTH MONARCH Y. ſon, ºx,
dak, who had escaped the persecution instituted in his later
years by Kobad, and the sect of the Mazdakites, which, despite
that persecution, was still strong and vigorous, were the first to
experience the oppressive weight of his resentment; and the
corpses of a hundred thousand martyrs blackening upon gib-
bets proved the determination of the new monarch to make
his will law, whatever the consequences.” In a similar spirit
the hesitation of Mebodes to obey instantaneously an order
sent bim by the king was punished capitally, and with circum-
stances of peculiar harshness,” by the stern prince, who did
not allow gratitude for old benefits to affect the judgments
which he passed on recent offences. Nor did signal services in
the field avail to save Chanaranges, the nobleman who pre-
served the young Kobad, from his master's vengeance. The
conqueror of twelve nations, betrayed by an unworthy son,
was treacherously entrapped and put to death on account of a
single humane act which had in no way harmed or endangered
the jealous monarch.”
The fame of Chosroës rests especially on his military exploits
and successes. On first ascending the throne he seems, how-
ever, to have distrusted his capacity for war; and it was with
much readiness that he accepted the overtures for peace made
by Justinian, who was anxious to bring the Eastern war to a
close, in order that he might employ the talents of Belisarius
in the reduction of Africa and Italy. A truce was made be-
tween Persia and Rome” early in A.D. 532; and the truce was
followed after a short interval by a treaty—known as “the
endless peace ""—whereby Rome and Persia made up their
differences and arranged to be friends on the following condi-
tions: (1) Rome was to pay over to Persia the sum of eleven
thousand pounds of gold, or about half a million of our money,
as her contribution towards the maintenance of the Caucasian
defences, the actual defence being undertaken by Persia; (2)
•
Daras was to remain a fortified post, but was not to be made
the Roman head-quarters in Mesopotamia, which were to be
fixed at Constantia; (3) the district of Pharangium and the
castle of Bolon, which Rome had recently taken from Persia,
were to be restored, and Persia on her part was to surrender
the forts which she had captured in Lazica; (4) Rome and
Persia were to be eternal friends and allies, and were to aid
each other whenever required with supplies of men and mon-
ey.” Thus was terminated the thirty years' war, which, com-
mencing in A.D. 502 by the attack of Kobad on Annastasius,”
…”
... 6
! N-1- – * *
CH. XX.] PEACE MADE WITH ROME. 451
was brought to a close in A.D. 532, and ratified by Justinian in
the year following.” ---
When Chosroës consented to substitute close relations of
amity with Rome for the hereditary enmity which had been
the normal policy of his house, he probably expected that no
very striking or remarkable results would follow. He supposed
that the barbarian neighbors of the empire on the north and on
the west would give her arms sufficient employment, and that
the balance of power in Eastern Europe and Western Asia
would remain much as before. But in these expectations he
was disappointed. Justinian no Sooner found his eastern fron-
tier secure than he directed the whole force of the empire upon
his enemies in the regions of the west, and in the course of
half a dozen years (A. D. 533–539), by the aid of his great gener-
al, Belisarius, he destroyed the kingdom of the Vandals in the
region about Carthage and Tunis,” subdued the Moors,” and
brought to its last gasp the power of the Ostrogoths in Italy.”
The territorial extent of his kingdom was nearly doubled by .
these victories; his resources were vastly increased; the pres-
tige of his arms was enormously raised; veteran armies had
been formed which despised danger, and only desired to be led
against fresh enemies; and officers had been trained capable
of conducting operations of every kind, and confident, under
all circumstances, of success. It must have been with feelings
of dissatisfaction and alarm not easily to be dissembled that
the Great King heard of his brother's long series of victories
and conquests,” each step in which constituted a fresh danger
to Persia by aggrandizing the power whom she had chiefly to
fear. At first his annoyance found a vent in insolent demands
for a share of the Roman spoils, which Justinian thought it
prudent to humor;” but, as time went on, and the tide of vic-
tory flowed more and more strongly in one direction, he became
less and less able to contain himself, and more and more deter-
mined to renounce his treaty with Rome and renew the old
struggle for supremacy. His own inclination, a sufficiently
strong motive in itself, was seconded and intensified by appli-
cations made to him from without on the part of those who
had especial reasons for dreading the advance of Rome, and
for expecting to be among her next victims. Witiges, the Ös-
trogoth king of Italy, and Bassaces, an Armenian chief, were
the most important of these applicants. Embassies from these
opposite quarters * reached Chosroës in the same year, A D.
539, and urged him for his own security to declare war agains;
f
\
t
* f :
452 THE SEVENTII MONARCHY. [CH. xx.
Justinian before it was too late. “Justinian,” the ambassadors
said, “aimed at universal empire. His aspirations had for a
while been kept in check by Persia, and by Persia alone, the sole
powerin the world that he feared. Since the ‘endless peace’ was
made, he had felt himself free to give full vent to his ambitious
greed, had commenced a course of aggression upon all the other
conterminous nations, and had spread war and Confusion on all
sides. He had destroyed the kingdom of the Vandals in Africa,
, conquered the Moors, deceived the Goths of Italy by professions
of friendship, and then fallen upon them with all his forces, vio-
lated the rights of Armenia and driven it to rebellion, enslaved
the Tzani and the Lazi, seized the Greek city of Bosporus, and
the ‘Isle of Palms’ on the shores of the Red Sea, solicited the alli-
ance of barbarous Huns and Ethiopians, striven to sow discord
between the Persian monarch and his vassals,” and in every
part of the world shown himself equally grasping and restless.
What would be the consequence if Persia continued to hold
aloof? Simply that all the other nations would in turn be de-
stroyed, and she would find herself face to face with their de-
stroyer, and would enjoy the poor satisfaction of being de-
voured last. But did she fear to be reproached with break-
ing the treaty and forfeiting her pledged word? Rome had
already broken it by her intrigues with the Huns, the Ethiopi-
ans, and the Saracens; and Persia would therefore be free from
reproach if she treated the peace as no longer existing. The
treaty-breaker is not he who first draws the sword, but he who
sets the example of seeking the other's hurt. Or did Persia
fear the result of declaring war? Such fear was unreasonable,
for Rome had neither troops nor generals to oppose to a sud-
den Persian attack. Sittas was dead;” Belisarius and the best
of the Roman forces were in Italy. If Justinian recalled
Belisarius, it was not certain that he would obey; and, in the
worst case, it would be in favor of Persia that the Goths of
Italy, and the Armenians who for centuries had been subjects
of Rome, were now ready to make common cause with her.”
Thus urged, the Persian king determined on openly declaring
war and making an attack in force on the eastern provinces
of the empire. * *
The scene of contest in the wars between Rome and Persia
had been usually either Mesopotamia or Armenia. On rare oc-
casions only had the traditional policy been departed from,
and attempts made to penetrate into the richer parts of the
Roman East, and to inflict serious injury on the empire by
CH. XX.] CHOSROES INVADES SYRIA. . 453
carrying fire and sword into peaceful and settled provinces.
Robad, however, had in his later years ventured to introduce
a new system, and had sent troops across the Euphrates into
Syria” in the hope of ravaging that fertile region and captur-
ing its wealthy metropolis, Antioch. This example Chosroës
now dotermined to follow. Crossing the great stream in the
lower portion of its course, he led his troops up its right bank,
past Circesium, Zenobia,” and Callinicus, to Surón,” a Roman
town on the west side of the river. As this small place ven-
tured to resist him, Chosroës, bent upon terrifying the other
towns into submission, resolved to take a signal revenge.
Though the garrison, after losing their commandant, made
overtures for a surrender, he insisted on entering forcibly at .
one of the gates, and then, upon the strength of this violent
entrance, proceeded to treat the city as one taken by storm,
pillaged the houses, massacred a large portion of the inhabi-
tants, enslaved the others, and in conclusion set the place on
fire and burned it to the ground.” It was perhaps in a fit of
remorse, though possibly only under the influence of greed,”
that shortly afterwards he allowed the neighboring bishop of
Sergiopolis to ransom these unfortunate captives, twelve thou-
sand in number, for the modest sum of two hundred pounds
of gold.
From Surón the invading army advanced to Hierapolis,” with-
out encountering the enemy, who did not dare to make any resist-
ance in the open field, but sought the protection of walls and
strongholds. The defences of Hierapolis were in tolerable or-
der; its garrison was fairly strong; and the Great King there-
fore prudently resolved to allow the citizens to ransom them-
selves and their city at a moderate price. Two thousand
pounds of silver was the amount fixed upon; and this sum was
paid without any complaint by the Hierapolites. Plunder, not
conquest, was already distinctly set before the invader's mind
as his aim; and it is said that he even offered at this period to
evacuate the Roman territory altogether upon receiving a
thousand pounds of gold.” But the Romans were not yet
brought so low as to purchase a peace; it was thought that
Antioch and the other important towns might successfully
defy the Persian arms, and hoped that Justinian would soon
Send into the field an army strong enough to cope with that
of his adversary. The terms, therefore, which Chosroës offered
by the mouth of Megas, bishop of Berhoea, were rejected; the
Antiochenes were exhorted to remain firm; Ephraim, the bishop,
|
\
- - *
- ºf * - —A *
* , $ &
454 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY , ſon. XX.
was denounced to the authorities for counselling submission;
and it was determined to make no pacific arrangement, but to
allow Chosroës to do his worst.” The Persian, on his side, was
not slack or remiss. No sooner had he received the ransom of
Hierapolis than he advanced upon Berhoea (now Aleppo),
which he reached in four days.” Observing that the defences
were weak, he here demanded twice the ransom that he had
accepted from the Hierapolites, and was only induced to fore-
go the claim by the tears and entreaties of the good bishop,
who convinced him at length that the Berhoeans could not pay
so large a sum, and induced him to accept the half of it. A
few more days' march brought him from Aleppo to the out-
skirts of Antioch; and after an interval of nearly three cen-
turies” the “Queen of the East,” the richest and most magnifi-
cent of Oriental cities, was once more invested by Persian
troops and threatened by a Sassanian monarch.
A great calamity had fallen upon Antioch only fourteen
years previously. The entire town had been ruined by a suc-
cession of terrible earthquakes, which commenced in October,
A.D. 525, and terminated in August of the ensuing year.” All
for a time was havoc and disorder. A landslip had covered a
portion of the city, " and in the remainder almost every house
was overthrown. But the liberality of Justinian,” the spirit
of the inhabitants, and the efforts of the governor,” had effaced
these disasters; and the city, when the Persians appeared be-
fore it, was in most respects grander and more magnificent
than ever. The defences were, hewever, it would seem, im-
perfect. The citadel especially, which was on the high ground
south of the city, had been constructed with small attention to
the rules of engineering art, and was dominated by a height at
a little distance, which ought to have been included within the
walls.” Nor was this deficiency compensated by any strength
in the garrison, or any weight of authority or talent among
those with whom rested the command. Justinian had origi-
nally sent his nephew, Germanus, to conduct the defence of
the Syrian capital,” while Buzes, an officer who had gained
some repute in the Armenian war,” was entrusted with the
general protection of the East until Belisarius should arrive
_from Italy;” but Germanus, after a brief stay, withdrew from
Antioch into Cilicia, “ and Buzes disappeared without any one
, knowing whither he had betaken himself.” Antioch was left
almost without a garrison; and had not Theoctistus and Molat-
zes, two officers who commanded in the Lebanon, come to the
A \
W t |
* S. - |
* .*. &
- ** - - - -
** * f $ P
A * *
CH. XX.] . FALL OF ANTIOCH s 455
rescue and brought with them a body of six thousand disci-
plined troops," it is scarcely possible that any resistance
should have been made. As it was, the resistance was brief
and ineffectual. Chosroës at once discerned the weak point in
the defences, and, having given a general order to the less
trusty of his troops to make attacks upon the lower town in
various places, himself with the flower of the army undertook
the assault upon the citadel. Here the commanding position
So unaccountably left outside the walls enabled the Persians
to engage the defenders almost on a level, and their superior.
skill in the use of missile weapons soon brought the garrison
into difficulties. The assailants, however, might perhaps still
have been repulsed, had not an unlucky accident supervened,
which, creating a panic, put it in the power of the Persians by
a bold movement to enter the place. The Romans, cramped
for room upon the walls, had extemporized some wooden
stages between the towers, which they hung outside by means
of ropes. It happened that, in the crush and tumult, one of
these stages gave way; the ropes broke, and the beams fell
with a crash to the earth, carrying with them a number of the
defenders. The noise made by the fall was great, and produced
a general impression that the wall itself had been broken down;
the towers and battlements were at once deserted; the Roman
soldiers rushed to the gates and began to quit the town; while
the Persians took advantage of the panic to advance their scal-
ing ladders, to mount the walls, and to make themselves mas-
ters of the citadel." Thus Antioch was taken. The prudence
of Chosroës was shown in his quietly allowing the armed force
to withdraw; his resolve to trample down all resistance ap-
peared in his slaughter of the Antiochene youth, who with a
noble recklessness continued the conflict after the soldiers had
fled; his wish to inspire terror far and wide made him deliver
the entire city, with few exceptions, to the flames;” while his
avarice caused him to plunder the churches, and to claim as his
own the works of art, the marbles, bronzes, tablets, and pic-
tures, with which the Queen of the Roman East was at this
time abundantly provided. But, while thus gratifying his
most powerful passions, he did not lose sight of the opportunity
to conclude an advantageous peace. Justinian's ambassadors
had long been pressing him to come to terms with their master.
He now consented to declare the conditions on which he was
ready to make peace and withdraw his army. Rome must pay
him, as an indemnity for the cost of the war, the sum of five
! ~ - \ f
456 THE SEVENTH MONARCIIY. [CH. xx.
‘ thousand pounds of gold, and must also contract to make a
further payment of five hundred pounds of gold annually, not
as a tribute, but as a fair contribution towards the expense of
maintaining the Caspian Gates and keeping out the Huns.” If
hostages were given him, he would consent to abstain from
further acts of hostility while Justinian was consulted on these
proposals, and would even begin at once to withdraw his army.
The ambassadors readily agreed to these terms, and it was un-
derstood that a truce would be observed until Justinian's
answer should be delivered to Chosroës. *.
But the Great King, in thus formulating the terms on which
he would be content to make peace, did not intend to tie
his own hands, or to allow the Syrian cities before which he
had not yet appeared to be quit of him without the payment of
ransom. After visiting Seleucia, the port of Antioch at the
mouth of the Orontes, bathing in the blue waters of the Medi-
terranean, and offering sacrifice to the (setting?) sun upon the
shore," he announced his intention of proceeding to Apameia,
a city on the middle Orontes, which was celebrated for its
wealth, and particularly for its possession of a fragment of the
“true cross,” enshrined in a case which the pious zeal of the
faithful had enriched with gold and jewels of extraordinary
value.” Received peacefully into the city by the submissive
inhabitants, instead of fixing their ransom at a definite sum,
he demanded and obtained all the valuables of the sacred
treasury,” including the precious relic which the Apamaeans
regarded as the most important of their possessions. As, how-
ever, it was the case, and not its contents, that he coveted,
while he carried off the former, he readily restored the latter to
the prayers of the bishop and inhabitants.”
From Apameia Chosroës returned to Antioch, and after
witnessing the games of the amphitheatre and securing victory
to the green champion because Justinian preferred the blue,"
he set out at last on his return to Persia, taking care to visit,
upon his way to the Euphrates, the city of Chalcis,” the only
important place in Northern Syria that had hitherto escaped
him. The Chalcidians were required not only to ransom them-
selves by a sum of money, but to give up to Chosroës the
Roman soldiers who garrisoned their town. By a perjury that
may well be forgiven them, they avoided the more important
concession, but they had to satisfy the avarice of the conqueror
by the payment of two hundred pounds of gold. The Persian
host then continued its march, and reaching the Euphrates at
\ • *
*
# #
.*
*
CH. XX.] RETURN MARCII of CHOSROES. 457
Obbane, in the neighborhood of Barbalissus," crossed by a
bridge of boats in three days. The object of Chosroës in thus
changing his return line of march was to continue in Roman
Mesopotamia the course which he had adopted in Syria since
the conclusion of the truce—i.e. to increase his spoil by making
each important city ransom itself. Edessa,” Constantina,”
and Daras were successively visited, and purchased their safety
by a contribution. According to Procopius,” the proceedings
before Daras were exceptional. Although Chosroës, before he
quitted Edessa, had received a communication from Justinian
accepting the terms arranged with the Roman envoys at
Antioch," yet, when he reached Daras, he at once resolved
upon its siege. The city was defended by two walls, an outer
one of moderate strength, and an inner one sixty feet high,
with towers at intervals, whose height was a hundred feet.
Chosroës, having invested the place, endeavored to penetrate
| * wº
within the defences by means of a mine; but, his design having
been betrayed, the Romans met him with a countermine, and
completely foiled his enterprise. Unwilling to spend any more
time on the siege, the Persian monarch upon this desisted
from his attempt, and accepted the contribution of a thousand ,
pounds of silver as a sufficient redemption for the great for-
tress.”
Such is the account of the matter given to us by Procopius,
who is our only extant authority for the details of this war.
But the account is violently improbable. It represents Chos-
roës as openly flying in the face of a treaty the moment that
he had concluded it, and as departing in a single instance from
the general tenor of his proceedings in all other cases. In
view of the great improbability of such a course of action, it is
perhaps allowable to suppose that Procopius has been for once
carried away by partisanship, and that the real difference be-
tween the case of Daras and the other towns consisted in this,
that Daras alone refused to pay its ransom, and Chosroës had,
in consequence, to resort to hostilities in order to enforce it.
Still, no doubt, the whole conduct of Chosroës in enforcing
ransoms from the towns after the conclusion of the truce was
Open to Serious question, and Justinian was quite justified in
treating his proceedings as a violation of his recent engage-
ments. It is not unlikely that, even without any such excuse,
he would shortly have renewed the struggle, since the return
of Belisarius in triumph from the Italian war had placed at his
Service for employment in the East a general from whose
*
— — — — — — — — — — — - W - w
* } * *
458 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. [CH. xx,
i *-
abilities much was naturally expected. As it was, Justinian
was able, on receiving intelligence of the fines levied on
Apameia, Chalcis, Edessa, Constantina, and Daras, and of the
hostile acts committed against the last-named place, with great
show of reason and justice, to renounce the recently concluded
peace, and to throw on the ill faith of Chosroës the blame of
the rupture.” \. --
The Persian prince seems to have paid but little heed to the
denunciation. He passed the winter in building and beautify-
ing a Persian Antioch” in the neighborhood of Ctesiphon,
assigning it as a residence to his Syrian captives, for whose use
he constructed public baths and a spacious hippodrome, where
the entertainments familiar to them from their youth were re-
produced by Syrian artists." The new city was exempt from
the jurisdiction of Persian satraps, and was made directly de-
pendent upon the king, who supplied it with corn gratuitously,
and allowed it to become an inviolable asylum for all such
Greek slaves as should take shelter in it, and be acknowledged
as their kinsmen by any of the inhabitants. A model of Greek
civilization was thus brought into close contact with the Per-
sian court, which could amuse itself with the contrasts, if it
did not learn much from the comparison, of European and
Asiatic manners and modes of thought.
The campaign of A.D. 540 was followed by one of a very dif-
ferent character in A.D. 541. An unexpected offer suddenly
made to the Persian king drew him from his capital, together
with the bulk of his troops, to one of the remotest portions of
the Persian territory, and allowed the Romans, instead of
standing on their defence, to assume an aggressive in Mesopo-
tamia, and even to retaliate the invasion which the year before
Chosroës had conducted into the heart of their empire. The
hostile operations of A.D. 541 had thus two distinct and far-
distant scenes; in the one set the Persians, in the other the
Bomans, took the offensive; the two wars, for such they in
reality were, scarcely affected one, another; and it will there-
fore be convenient to keep the accounts of them distinct and
separate. To commence with. -
I. The LAZIC WAR.—Lazica had been a dependency of Rom
from the time when Tzath, upon his conversion to Christianity,
professed himself the vassal of Justin,” and received the in-
signia of royalty from his new patron (A.D. 522). The terms of
the connection had been at the first honorable to the weaker
nation, which paid no tribute, admitted no Roman garrison,
º - w - _`,
c. *x.] ACCEPTS PROTECTORATE of LAZICA. 459
and was troubled by no Roman governor.” As time went on, ,
however, the Romans gradually encroached upon the rights of
their dependants; they seized and fortified a strong post, called
Petra, upon the coast," appointed a commandant who claimed
an authority as great as that of the Lazic king, and established
a commercial monopoly which pressed with great severity
upon the poorer classes of the Lazi." Under these circum-
stances the nation determined on revolt; and in the winter of
A.D. 540–1 Lazic ambassadors visited the court of Persia, ex-
posed the grievances of their countrymen, and besought Chos-
roës to accept their submission, and extend to them the pro-
tection of his government.” The province was distant, and
possessed few attractions; whatever the tales told of its
ancient wealth, or glories, or trade,” in the time of Chosroës
it was poor and unproductive, dependent on its neighbors
for some of the necessaries and all the conveniences of life,”
and capable of exporting nothing but timber, slaves, and
skins.” It might have been expected, under such circum-
stances, that the burden of the protectorate would have been
refused; but there was an advantage, apparent or real, in the
position of the country, discovered by the Sagacity of Chos-
roës or suggested to him by the interested zeal of the envoys,”
which made its possession seem to the Persian king a matter
of the highest importance, and induced him to accept the offer
made him without a moment's delay. Lazica, the ancient
Colchis and the modern Mingrelia and Imeritia, bordered
upon the Black Sea, which the Persian dominions did not as
yet touch. Once in posession of this tract, Chosroës conceived
that he might launch a fleet upon the Euxine, command its
commerce, threaten or ravage its shores, and even sail against
Constantinople and besiege the Roman emperor in his capital.
The Persian king therefore acceded to the request of the
envoys, and, pretending to be called into Iberia by a threat-
ened invasion of the Huns,” led a large army to the Lazic
border, was conducted into the heart of the country by the
envoys, received the submission of Gubazes, the king, and
then, pressing on to the coast, formed the siege of Petra,
where the Roman forces were collected.” Petra offered a
Stout resistance, and repulsed more than one Persian assault;
but it was impossible for the small garrison to cope with the
numbers, the engineering skill, and the ardor of the assail-
ants. After the loss of their commandant, Johannes, and the
fall of one of the principal towers, the soldiers capitulated;
y
_ – – - T. - f
460 , , TIIE SEVENTH MONARCLIY. Icil. XX.
Petra was made over to the Persians, who restored and
strengthened its defences, and Lazica became for the time a
Persian province.
II. THE WAR IN MESOPOTAMIA.—Belisarius, on reaching the
eastern frontier, fixed his head-quarters at Daras,” and, find
ing that the Persians had no intention of invading Syria or
Roman Mesopotamia, resolved to lead his troops into the
enemy's territory. As his forces were weak in numbers, ill-
armed, and ill-supplied, he could Scarcely hope to accomplish
any great enterprise; but it was important to recover the
Roman prestige after the occurrences of the preceding year,
and to show that Rome was willing to encounter in the open
field any force that the Persians could bring against her. He
therefore crossed the frontier and advanced in the direction of
Nisibis,” less with the intention of attacking the town than of
distinctly offering battle to the troops collected within it.
His scheme succeeded; a small force, which he threw out in
advance, drew the enemy from the walls; and their pursuit of
this detachment brought them into contact with the main
army of Belisarius, which repulsed them and sent them flying
into the town.” Having thus established his superiority in
the field, the Roman general, though he could not attack Nisibis
with any prospect of success, was able to adopt other offensive
measures. He advanced in person a day's march beyond
Nisibis, and captured the fort of Sisauranón.” Eight hun-
dred Persian cavalry of the first class were made prisoners,
and sent by Belisarius to Byzantium, where they were de-
spatched by Justinian to Italy, where they served against the
Goths. Arethas, the chief of the Saracens who fought on the
side of Rome, was sent still further in advance. The orders
given him were to cross the Tigris into Assyria, and begin to
ravage it, but to return within a short time to the camp, and
bring a report of the strength of the Persians beyond the river.
If the report was favorable, Belisarius intended to quit Mes-
opotamia, and take the whole Roman force with him into
Assyria. His plans, however, were frustrated by the selfish
Arab, who, wishing to obtain the whole Assyrian spoil for him-
self, dismissed his Roman troops, proceeded to plunder the rich
province on his own account, and sent Belisarius no intelli-
gence of what he was so doing. After waiting at Sisauranón
till the heats of summer had decimated his army, the Roman
general was compelled to retreat by the discontent of the sol-
diery and the representations of his principal officers. He with:
24
* \ # - *.
- f
CII, XX.] RETREAT OF CHOSROES. 461
drew his forces within the Roman frontier without molesta-
tion from the enemy, and was shortly afterwards summoned
to Constantinople to confer on the state of affairs with the
emperor." - -
The military operations of the next year (A.D. 542) were
comparatively unimportant. Chosroës collected a large army,
and, repeating the movement of A.D. 540, made his appearance
in Commagene early in the year,” intending to press forward
through Syria into Palestine,” and hoping to make himself
master of the sacred treasures which he knew to be accumu-
lated in the Holy City of Jerusalem. He found the provincial
commanders, Buzes and Justus, despondent and unenterpris-
ing, disclined to meet him in the field, and content to remain
shut up within the walls of Hierapolis. Had these been his
only opponents the campaign would probably have proved a '
success; but, at the first news of his invasion, Justinian de-
spatched Belisarius to the East for the second time, and this
able general, by his arts or by his reputation, succeeded in
arresting the steps of Chosroés and frustrating his expedition.
Belisarius took up his head-quarters at Europus, on the
Euphrates, a little to the South of Zeugma, and, spreading
his troops on both banks of the river, appeared both to
protect the Roman province and to threaten the return of
the enemy. Chosroës having sent an emissary to the Roman
camp under the pretence of negotiating, but really to act
the part of a spy,” was so impressed (if we may believe
Procopius) by the accounts which he received of the ability.
of the general and the warlike qualities of his soldiers, that
he gave up the idea of advancing further, and was content to
retire through Roman Mesopotamia into his own territories.
He is said even to have made a convention that he would
commit no hostile act as he passed through the Roman prov-
ince; but if so, he did not keep the engagement. The city of
Callinicus lay in his way; its defences were undergoing repairs,
and there was actually a gap in one place where the old wall
had been pulled down and the new one had not yet been built.
The Persian king could not resist the temptation of seizing
this easy prey; he entered the undefended town, enslaved all
whom he found in it, and then razed the place to the ground.”
Such is the account which the Byzantine historian gives of
the third campaign of Chosroës against the Romans, and of
the motive and manner of his retreat. Without taxing him
with falsehood, we may suspect that, for the glorification of
w
.* w
*
462. THE SEVENTH MONAI:CHF. ſch. xx.
- wº
his favorite hero, he has kept back a portion of the truth.
The retreat of Chosroës may be ascribed with much probabil-
ity to the advance of anotner danger, more formidable than
Belisarius, which exactly at this time made its appearance in
the country whereto he was hastening. It was in the summer
of A.D. 542 that THE PLAGUE broke out at Pelusium,” and
spread from that centre rapidly into the rest of Egypt and
- also into Palestine. Chosroës may well have hesitated to
confront this terrible. foe. He did not ultimately eacape it;
but he might hope to do so, and it would clearly have been
the height of imprudence to have carried out his intention of
invading Palestine when the plague was known to be raging
there. - -
The fourth year of the Roman war (A.D. 543) opened with a
movement of the Persian troops toward the Armenian fron-
tier,” consequent upon the desertion of the Persian cause by
the Roman Armenians in the course of the winter.” Chos-
roës in person once more led the attack, and proceeded as far
as Azerbijan; but, the pestilence breaking out in his army, he
hastily retreated,” after Some futile attempts at negotiation
with the Roman officers. opposed to him, Belisarius had this
year been sent to Italy, and the Roman army of the East,
amounting to thirty thousand men,” was commanded by as
, many as fifteen generals, almost of equal rank, among whom
there was little concert Or agreement. Induced to take the
offensive by the retirement of the Persian king, these in-
capable officers invaded Persarmenia with all their troops,
and proceeded to plunder its rich plains and fertile valleys.
Encountering suddenly and unexpectedly the Persian general
Nabedes, who, with a small force, was strongly posted at a
village called Anglon,” they were compelled to engage at
disadvantage; their troops, entangled in difficult ground,
found themselves attacked in their rear by an ambush;
Narses, the bravest of them, fell; and, a general panic seizing
the entire multitude, they fled in the extremest disorder,
casting away their arms, and pressing their horses till they
sank and expired.” The Persians pursued, but with caution,
and the carnage was not so great as might have been ex-
pected; but vast numbers of the disarmed fugitives were over-
taken and made prisoners by the enemy; and the arms,
animals, and camp equipment which fell into the hands of
the Persians amply compensated all previous losses, and left
Persarmenia the richer for the inroad.
2 / . - \ —I- ,-
ca. xx] CAMPAIGNs of A.D. 543 AND 544 463
The ravages of the pestilence having ceased, Chosroës, in the
following year (A.D. 544), again marched westward in person,
and laid siege to the city of Edessa.” It would seem that he
had now resolved not to be content with plundering raids, but
to attempt at any rate the permanent conquest of some portion
of the Roman territory. Edessa and Daras were the two towns
on which the Roman possession of Western Mesopotamia at
this time mainly depended. As the passing of Nisibis, in A.D.
363, from Roman into Persian hands,” had given to Persia a
Secure hold on the eastern portion of the country between the
rivers, so the occupation of Edessa and Daras could it have
been effected, would have carried with it dominion over the
more western regions. The Roman frontier would in this way
have been thrown back to the Euphrates. Chosroës must be
understood as aiming at this grand result in the siege which he
so pertinaciously pressed, and which Edessa, so gallantly re-
sisted, during the Summer of A.D. 544. The elaborate account
which Procopius gives of the siege” may be due to a sense of
its importance. Chosroës tried, not force only, but every art
known to the engineering Science of the period; he repeated
his assaults day after day; he allowed the defenders no repose;
yet he was compelled at last to own himself baffled by the
valor of the Small Roman garrison and the spirit of the native
inhabitants, to burn his works, and to return home. The five
hundred pounds of gold” which he extorted at last from
Martinus, the commandant of the place, may have been a salve
to his wounded pride; but it was a poor set-off against the loss
of men, of stores, and of prestige, which he had incurred by
his enterprise.
It was, perhaps, his repulse from the walls of Edessa that in-
duced Chosroës, in A.D. 545, Seriously to entertain the proposals ,
for an arrangement which were made to him by the ambassa-
dors of Justinian. Throughout the war their had been contin-
ual negotiations; but hitherto the Persian king had trifled with
his antagonist, and had amused himself with discussing terms
of accommodation without any serious purpose. Now at last,
after five years of incessant hostilities, in which he had gained
much glory but little profit, he seems to have desired a breath-
ing-space. Justinian's envoys visited him at Ctesiphon,” and
Set forth their master's desire to conclude a regular peace.
Chosroës professed to think that the way for a final arrange-
ment would be best prepared by the conclusion, in the first in-
stance, of a truce. He proposed, in lieu of a peace, a cessation
\
* | \ *
464 . . . THE SEVENTH MoMARCITY. g
,”
[CH. XX.
of hostilities for five years, during the course of which the
causes of quarrel between the two nations might be considered,
and a good understanding established. It shows the weakness
of the Empire, that Justinian not only accepted this proposal,
but was content to pay for the boon granted him. Chosroës
received as the price of the five years' truce the Services of a
Greek physician and two thousand pounds of gold.”
The five years' truce seems to have been observed with better
faith by the Persian than by the Roman monarch. Alamun-
darus indeed, though a Persian vassal, regarded himself as en-
titled, despite the truce, to pursue his quarrel with his natural
enemy, Arethas,” who acknowledged the suzerainty of Rome;
but Chosroës is not even accused of instigating his proceedings;
and the war between the vassals was carried on without drag-
ging either of the two lords-paramount into its vortex. Thus
far, then, neither side had any cause of complaint against the
other. If we were bound to accept the Roman story of a pro-
ject formed by Chosroës for the surprise and seizure of Daras,”
we should have to admit that circumstances rather than his
own will saved the Persian monarch from the guilt of being the
first to break the agreement. But the tale told by Procopius
is improbable;" and the Roman belief of it can have rested at
best only upon suspicion. Chosroës, it is allowed, committed no
hostile act; and it may well be doubted whether he really en-
tertained the design ascribed to him. At any rate, the design
was not executed, nor even attempted; and the peace was thus
not broken on his part. It was reserved for Rome in the fourth
year of the truce (A.D. 549) expressly to break its provisions by
accepting the Lazi into alliance and sending them a body of
eight thousand men to help them against the Persians.”
Very soon after their submission to Persia, the Lazi had re-
pented of their rash and hasty action. They found that they
had gained nothing, while in some respects they had lost, by
their change of masters. The general system of the Persian
administration was as arbitrary and oppressive as the Roman.
If the commercial monopoly, whereof they so bitterly com-
plained, had been swept away, commerce itself had gone with
it, and they could neither find a market for their own products,
nor obtain the commodities which they required.” The Per-
sian manners and customs introduced into their country, if not
imposed upon themselves, were detestable to the Lazi, who were
zealous and devout Christians, and possessed by the spirit of
intolerance.” Chosroës, after holding the territory for a fow
NA
t
-- – - –, I
ch. xx. ROME BREAKS THE TRUCE–LAZIG WAR. 465
years, became convinced that Persia could not retain it unless .
the disaffected population were removed and replaced by faith-
ful subjects. He designed therefore, we are told, to deport the
entire Lazic nation, and to plant the territory with colonies of
Persians and others, on whose fidelity he could place full reli-
ance.” As a preliminary step, he suggested to his lieutenant
in Lazica that he should contrive the assassination of Gubazes,
the Lazic king, in whom he saw an obstacle to his project.
Phabrizus, however, failed in his attempt to execute this com-
mission;" and his failure naturally produced the immediate
revolt of the province, which threw itself once more into the
arms of Rome, and, despite the existing treaty with the Per-
sians, was taken by Justinian under his protection.
The Lazic war, which commenced in consequence of this act
of Justinian's, continued almost without intermission for nine
years—from A.D. 549 to 557. Its details are related at great
length by Procopius and Agathias,” who view the struggle as
one which vitally concerned the interests of their country.
According to them, Chosroës was bent upon holding Lazica in
order to construct at the mouth of the Phasis a great naval
station and arsenal, from which his fleets might issue to com-
mand the commerce or ravage the shores of the Black Sea.”
There is no doubt that the country was eminently fitted for
such a purpose. The soil is for the most part richly fertile;”.
the hills are everywhere covered with forests of noble trees;”
the Rion (Phasis) is deep and broad towards its mouth;” and
there are other streams also which are navigable.” If Chos-
roës entertained the intentions ascribed to him, and had even
begun the collection of timber for ship-building” at Petra on
the Euxine as early as A.D. 549, we cannot be surprised at the
attitude assumed by Rome, or at her persistent efforts to re-
cover possession of the Lazic territory.
The war was opened by an attack upon the great centre of
the Persian power, Petra. This place, which was strongly
situated on a craggy rock projecting into the sea, had been
carefully fortified by Justinian” before Lazica passed into the
possession of Chosroës, and had since received important addi-
tions to its defences at the hands of the Persians.” It was
sufficiently provisioned,” and was defended by a body of fif-
teen hundred men.” Dagisthaus, the Roman commander,
besieged it with his entire force of eight thousand men, and
Succeeded by his constant attacks in reducing the garrison to
little more than a fourth of its original number. Baffled in
- - y - *
& “s -
- - * i
, P. $ , A
466 THE SEVENTIT MONARCHY. [CH. xx.
f
one attempt to effect a breach by means of a mine, he had con-
trived to construct another, and might have withdrawn his
props, destroyed the wall, and entered the place, had he not
conceived the idea of bargaining with the emperor for a speci-
fic reward in case he effected the capture.” Whilst he waited
for his messenger to bring a reply, the Persian general, Mer-
meroës, forced the passes from Iberia into Lazica, and de-
scended the valley of the Phasis with an army of 30,000 men.”
Dagisthaus in alarm withdrew, and Petra was relieved and
revictualled. The walls were repaired hastily with sand-
bags,” and the further defence was entrusted to a fresh garri-
son of 3000 picked soldiers.” Mermeroës then, finding it diffi-
cult to obtain supplies for his large army, retired into Persar-
menia, leaving only five thousand Persians in the country be-
*
sides the garrison of Petra. This Small force was Soon after-
wards surprised by the combined Romans and Lazi, who com-
pletely defeated it, destroying or making prisoners almost the
entire number.”
In the ensuing year, A.D. 550, the Persians took the field un-
der a fresh general, Chorianes,” who brought with him a con-
siderable army, composed of Persians and Alans. The allied
Romans and Lazi, under Dagisthaus and Gubazes, gave battle
to this new foe on the banks of the Hippis (the Tschenikal?);
and though the Lazi, who had insisted on taking the lead and
fighting separately, were at the first encounter routed by the
Persian horse, yet in the end Roman discipline and stubborn-
ness triumphed. Their solid line of footmen, bristling with
spears, offered an impervious barrier to the cavalry of the
enemy, which did not dare to charge, but had recourse to vol-
leys of missiles. The Romans responded with the same; and
the battle raged for a while on something like even terms, the
superior rapidity of the Asiatics being counterbalanced by the
better protection which their shields gave to the Europeans,
until at last, by a stroke of fortune, Rome obtained the victory.
A chance arrow killed Chorianes, and his army instantly fled.
There was a short struggle at the Persian camp; but the
Romans and Lazi captured it. Most of the Persians were here
put to the Sword; the few who escaped quitted Lazica and re-
turned to their own country.” -
Soon afterwards Dagisthaeus was superseded by Bessas,”
and the siege of Petra was recommenced. The strength of
the place had been considerably increased since the former
attack upon it. A new wall of great height and solidity had
w
- –I-y —- -
i * * - * ...
ch. xx.] THE Royax's capture PETRA, 467
been built upon a framework of wood in the place which Da
gisthaeus had so nearly bréached; the Roman mines had been ,
filled up with gravel;” arms, offensive and defensive, had
been collected in extraordinary abundance; a stock of flour
and of salted meat had been laid in sufficient to support the . .
garrison of 3000 men for five years; and a store of vinegar, -’s
and of the pulse from which it was made, had likewise been
accumulated.” The Roman general began by attempting to
repeat the device of his predecessor, attacking the defences in
the same place and by the same means; but, just as his mine
was completed, the new wall with its framework of wood sank
quietly into the excavation, without suffering any disturb-
ance of its parts, while enough of it still remained above the
surface to offer an effectual bar to the assailants.” It seemed
hopeless to recommence the mine in this place, and elsewhere
the nature of the ground made mining impossible; some other . . "
mode of attack had therefore to be adopted, or the siege must
have been abandoned. Rome generally took towns by the
battering-ram; but the engines in use were of such heavy con-
struction that they could not be dragged up an ascent like that
upon which Petra stood. Bessas was in extreme perplexity,
when some Hunnic allies, who happened to be in his camp,
suggested a mode of constructing a ram, as effective as the
ordinary one, which should nevertheless be so light that it
could be carried on the shoulders of forty men.” Three such
machines were quickly made; and under their blows the wall
would soon have given way, had not the defenders employed
against them the terrible agency of fire, showering upon them . .
from the walls lighted casks of sulphur, bitumen, and naphtha. . . .
which last was known to the Greeks of Colchis as “Medea's *
oil.”” Uncertain of succeeding in this attack, the Roman -
general gallantly led a scaling party to another portion of the
walls, and, mounting at the head of his men, attempted to
make good his footing on the battlements.” Thrown headlong
to the ground, but undeterred by his fall, he was about to re-
peat his attempt, when he found it needless. Almost simul- #
taneously his troops had in two other places penetrated into
the town. One band had obtained an entrance by scaling the
rocks in a place supposed to be inaccessible;” a second owed
its success to a combination of accidents. First, it had hap-
pened that a gap had shown itself in the piece of the wall
which sank into the Roman mine, and a violent struggle had ...”
ensued between the assailants and defenders at this place.”
A
v,
*.
468 - THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. , ' ' [ch. xx.
Then, while this fight was going on, the fire which the Per-
sians were using against the Roman battering-rams had been
by a shift of wind blown back upon themselves, and the
wooden structure from which they fought had been ignited,
and in a short time entirely consumed, together with its in-
mates.” At sight of the conflagration, the Persians who
stood.in the gap had lost heart, and had allowed the Roman
troops to force their way through it into Petra. Thus fell the
great Lazic fortress, after a resistance which is among the
most memorable in history. Of the three thousand defenders,
seven hundred had been killed in the siege; one thousand and
seventy were destroyed in the last assault. Only seven hun-
dred and thirty were made prisoners; and of these no fewer
than seven hundred and twelve were found to be wounded.
The remaining five hundred threw themselves into the citadel,
and there resisted to the last extremity, refusing all terms of
capitulation, and maintaining themselves against an over-
whelming force, until at last by Sword and fire they perished
to a man.” - -
The siege of Petra was prolonged far into the winter, and
the year A.D. 551 had begun ere the resistance ceased.” Could
the gallant defenders have maintained themselves for a few
more weeks, they might not improbably have triumphed.
Mermeroës, the Persian commander of two years previously,”
took the field with the commencement of spring, and, at the
head of a large body of cavalry, supported by eight ele-
phants,” began his march to the coast, hoping to relieve the
beleaguered garrison. Unfortunately he was too late. On his
march he heard of the capture of Petra, and of its complete
destruction by Bessas,” who feared lest the Persians should
again occupy the dangerous post. Mermeroës had no difficulty
in establishing Persian rule' through almost the whole of
Lazica. The Romans did not dare to meet him in the field.”
Archaeopolis, indeed, repulsed his attack;” but no other im-
portant place in the entire country remained subject to the
Empire. Gubazes and his followers had to hide themselves in
the recesses of the mountains.” Quartering his troops chiefly
on the upper Phasis, about Kutaïs” and its neighborhood,
Mermeroës strengthened his hold on the country by building
forts or receiving their submission, and even extended the
Persian dominion beyond Lazica into Scymnia and Suania.”
Still Rome, with her usual tenacity, maintained a hold upon
certain tracts; and Gubazes, faithful to his allies even in the
{
• \ \
CH. XX.] ATTEMPT AT NEGOTIATIONS. '469
& * } -
extremity of their depression, maintained a guerilla war, and
hoped that some day fortune would cease to frown on him.”
Meanwhile, at Byzantium, fresh negotiations were in pro-
gress, and hopes were entertained of an arrangement by which
all the differences between the two great powers would be sat-
isfactorily adjusted. Isdigunas again represented his master
at the Byzantine court, and conducted the diplomatic contest
with skill and ability. Taxing Justinian with more than one
infraction of the truce” concluded in A.D. 545, he demanded
the payment of a lump sum of two thousand six hundred
pounds of gold,” and expressed the willingness of Chosroës to
conclude on these terms a fresh truce for five years, to take
effect from the delivery of the money. With regard to the ,
extent of country whereto the truce should apply, he agreed
to an express limitation of its range—the settled provinces of
both empires should be protected by it, but Lazica and the
country of the Saracens should be excluded from its opera-
tion.” Justinian consented to these terms, despite the oppo-,
sition of many of his subjects, who thought that Rome de-
graded herself by her repeated payments of money to Persia,
and accepted a position little better than that of a Persian
tributary.” & -
Thus the peace of A.D. 551 did nothing towards ending the
Lazic war, which, after languishing through the whole of A.D.
552, burst out again with renewed vigor in the spring of A.D.
553. Mermeroës in that year advanced from Kutais against
Telephis,” a strong fort in the possession of Rome, expelled
the commandant, Martinus, by a stratagem, pressed forward .
against the combined Roman forces, which fled before him
from Ollaria,” and finally drove them to the coast and cooped
them up in “the Island,” ” a small tract near the mouth
of the Phasis between that stream and the Docönus. On his
return he was able to reinforce a garrison which he had es-
tablished at Onoguris in the immediate neighborhood of Arch-
abopolis, as a means of annoying and weakening that impor-
tant station.” He may naturally have hoped in one or two
more campaigns to have driven the last Roman out of the
country and to have attached Lazica permanently to the em-
pire of the great king.
Unluckily, however, for Persia, the fatigues which the gal-
lant veteran had undergone in the campaign of A.D. 553 proved
more than his aged frame could endure, and he had scarcely
reached Kutais when he was seized with a fatal malady, to
*
y – « º st - " *. *, * §
470 , -}. • THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. [CH. xx,
which he succumbed in the course of the winter.” Chosroës
2 appointed as his successor a certain Nachoragan, who is said to
º, have been a general of repute,” but who proved himself quite
unequal to the position which he was called upon to fill, and in
the course of two years ruined the Persian cause in Lazica.
The failure was the more signal from the fact that exactly at
, , the time of his appointment circumstances occurred which
seriously shook the Roman influence over the Lazi, and opened
a prospect to Persia transcending aught that she could reason-
ably have hoped. This was nothing less than a most serious
quarrel between Gubazes, the Lazic king, and some of the prin-
cipal Roman commanders—a quarrel which involved conse-
quences fatal to both parties. Gubazes, disgusted with the
* negligence or incapacity of the Roman chiefs, had made com-
plaint of them to Justinian;" they had retaliated by accusing
' him of meditating desertion, and had obtained the emperor's
consent to his arrest, and to the use of violence if he offered re-
sistance.” Armed with this mandate, they contrived in a
little time to fasten a quarrel upon him; and, when he declined
to do as they required, they drew their swords upon him and
slew him.” The Lazic nation was, naturally enough, alienated
by this outrage, and manifested an inclination to throw itself
absolutely into the arms of Persia.” The Romans, dispirited
at the attitude of their allies, and at variance among themselves,
f could for some months after Gubazes' death have offered but
little resistance to an enterprising enemy. So demoralized
were they that an army of 50,000 is said to have fled in dismay
when attacked by a force of Persians less than a twelfth of
their number,” and to have allowed their camp to be captured
and plundered. During this critical time Nachoragan remained
inactive in Iberia, and contented himself with sending messen-
. . gers into Lazica to announce his near approach and to animate
and encourage his party.” The result was such as might have
/ been expected. The Lazi, finding that Persia made no effort
to take advantage of their abstention, and that Rome despite
of it maintained possession of the greater portion of their coun-
try, came to the conclusion that it would be unwise to desert
their natural allies on account of a single outrage, however
monstrous, and agreed to renew their close alliance with Rome
on condition that the murderers of Gubazes should be punished,
and his brother, Tzathes, appointed king in his place.” Jus-
tinian readily gave his consent;” and the year A.D. 555 saw the
quarrel ended, and the Lazi once more heartily in accord with
their Roman protectors. - 4
*
*
* & º a …” .# * gº.
. c. xxi ATTEnter on phasis 4 " " .
It was when affairs were in this state, and he had exactly
missed his opportunity, that Nachoragan took the field, and,
advancing from Iberia into the region about Kutais with an
army amounting to 60,000 men,” made preparations for carry-
ing on the war with vigor. He was opposed by Martinus, Jus-
tin, and Babas, the two former of whom with the bulk of the
Roman forces occupied the region on the lower Phasis, known
as “the Island,” while Babas held the more central position of
Archaeopolis.” Nachoragan, after losing about 2,000 of his
best troops in the vicinity of this last-named place,” resolved
to challenge the Romans to a decisive eneounter by attacking
the important post of Phasis at the mouth of the river. With
some skill he succeeded in passing the Roman camp. On the
island, and in establishing himself in the plain directly south
of Phasis before the Roman generals guessed his purpose.” .
They, however, were able by a quick movement to throw them- .
selves into the town, and the struggle became one between
fairly balanced forces, and was conducted with great obstinacy.
The town was defended on the South by an outer palisade, a
broad ditch protected by sharp stakes and full of water, and an
inner bulwark of considerable height but constructed wholly of
wood." The Phasis guarded it on the north; and here a
Roman fleet was stationed which lent its aid to the defenders
at the two extremities of their line. The yards of the ships
were manned with Soldiers, and boats were hung from them
containing slingers, archers, and even workers of catapults,
who delivered their weapons from an elevation exceeding that
of the towers.” But Nachoragan had the advantage of num-
bers; his men soon succeeded in filling up part of the ditch;”
and the wooden bulwark could scarcely have long resisted his
attacks, if the contest had continued to be wholly one of brute
strength. But the Roman commander, Martinus, finding him-
self inferior in force, brought finesse and stratagem to his aid.
Pretending to receive intelligence of the sudden arrival of a
fresh Roman army from Byzantium, he contrived that the re-
port should reach Nachoragan and thereby cause him to divide
his troops, and send half of them to meet the supposed rein-
forcements.” Then, when the Persian general nevertheless re;
newed his assault, Martinus sent seeretly 5,000 men under
Justin to a short distanee from Phasis;” and this detachment, ſ:
appearing suddenly when the contest was going on at the wall,
was naturally taken for the newly arrived army, and caused a
general panic. The Persians, one and all, took to flight; a gen-
*.
471, tº
%
- - 3. $º. |
472 - 1 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY, , ſch. xx."
eral sally was made by the Romans in Phasis; a rout and a
carnage followed, which completely disheartened the Persian
f
, leader, and led him to give up his enterprise.” Having lost
nearly one-fourth of his army,” Nachoragan drew off to Kutaïs,
and shortly afterwards, leaving the command of the Persians
in Lazica to Vaphrizes, retired to winter quarters in Iberia.”
The failure of Nachoragan, following closely upon the decision
of the Lazi to maintain their alliance with Rome in spite of the
murder of Gubazes, seems to have convinced the Persian mon-
arch that, in endeavoring to annex Lazica, he had engaged in
a hopeless enterprise, and that it would be the most prudent
and judicious course to yield to the inevitable, and gradually
withdraw from a position which was untenable. Having meted
out to Nachoragan the punishment usually assigned to unsuc-
cessful commanders in Persia,” he sent an ambassador to By-
zantium” in the Spring of A.D. 556, and commenced negotia-
tions which he intended to be serious. Diplomacy seems to
have been as averse in the days of Chosroës as in our own to an
undignified rapidity of proceeding. Hence, though there could
be little to debate where both parties were substantially at one,
the negotiations begun in May A.D. 556 were not concluded till
after the commencement of the following year.” A complete
suspension of hostilities was then agreed upon, to extend to
Lazica no less than to the other dominions of the two mon-
archs.” In Lazica each party was to keep what it possessed,
territory, cities, and castles.” As this joint occupation was
scarcely suitable for a permanent arrangement, it was provided
that the two belligerents should, during the continuance of the
, truce, proceed to settle the terms on which a lasting peace
might be established.” . i -
. An interval of five years elapsed before the happy result, for
which both parties had expressed themselves anxious, was ac-
complished.” It is uncertain how Chosroës was occupied dur-
ing this period; but there are some grounds for believing that
he was engaged in the series of Oriental wars” whereof we
shall have to speak presently. Success appears to have crowned
his arms wherever he directed them; but he remained undaz-
zled by his victories, and still retained the spirit of moderation
which had led him in A.D. 557 to conclude the general truce.
He was even prepared, after five years of consideration, to go
further in the line of pacific policy on which he had then en-
tered, and, in order to secure the continuance of his good rela-
tions with Rome, was willing to relinquish all claim to the
*
f \,
- - *
* , & , ºr
CH., xx.] . PEACE MADE WITH ROME. 473
sovereignty of Lazica. Under these circumstances, ambassa-
dors of the highest rank, representing the two powers, met on
the frontier between Daras and Nisibis, proclaimed the power
and explained the motives of their respective sovereigns, and
after a lengthy conference formulated a treaty of peace. The
terms, which are given at length by a writer of the succeeding
generation,” may be briefly expressed as follows:” (1) the
Persians were to withdraw from Lazica, to give up all claim to
it, and to hand over its possession to the Romans; (2) they
were in return to receive from Rome an annual sum of 30,000
pieces of gold, the amount due for the first seven years being
paid in advance;” (3) the Christians in Persia were guaranteed
the full and free exercise of their religion, but were forbidden
to make converts from the disciples of Zoroaster; (4) commer-
cial intercourse was to be allowed between the two empires, but
the merchants were restricted to the use of certain roads and .
certain emporia; (5) diplomatic intercourse was to be wholly
free, and the goods of ambassadors were to be exempt from
duty; (6) Daras was to continue a fortified town, but no new
fortresses were to be built upon the frontier by either nation, , ,
and Daras itself was not to be made the headquarters of the
Prefect of the East, or to be held by an unnecessarily large gar-
rison; (7) all disputes arising between the two nations were to
be determined by courts of arbitration; (8) the allies of the two
nations were to be included in the treaty, and to participate in
its benefits and obligations; (9) Persia was to undertake the
sole charge of maintaining the Caspian Gates against the Huns
and Alans; (10) the peace was made for a period of fifty years.
It has been held that by this treaty Justinian consented to
become a tributary of the Persian Empire;” and undoubtedly
it was possible for Oriental vanity to represent the arrange-
ment made in this light.” But the million and a half, which
Rome undertook to pay in the course of the next fifty years,.
might well be viewed by the Romans as an outlay for which
they received an ample return in the cession to them of the
Persian part of Lazica, and in the termination of their obliga-
tion to contribute towards the maintenance of the Caspian
Gates. If there was any real danger of those results following
from the Persian occupation of Lazica which both nations
anticipated,” the sum must be considered to have been one of
the best investments ever made by a State. Even if we be-
lieve the dangers apprehended to have been visionary, yet it
cannot be viewed as an exorbitant price to have paid for a
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474 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY ſch. xx.
considerable tract of fertile country, a number of strong for-
tresses, and the redemption of an obligation which could not
with honor be disowned. - g
To Chosroës the advantage secured by the treaty was similar
to that which Rome had obtained” by the peace of A.D. 532.
Being no longer under any necessity of employing his forces
against the Romans in the north-west, he found himself free to
act with greatly increased effect against his enemies in the
east and in the south. Already, in the interval between the
conclusion of the general truce and of the fifty years' peace,
he had, as it seems, invaded the territories of the Ephthalites,”
and, with the help of the Great Khan of the Turks, inflicted
upon this people, so long one of Persia's most formidable ene-
mies, a severe defeat. According to Tabari, he actually slew
the Ephthalite monarch, ravaged his territory, and pillaged
his treasures.” About the same time he had also had a war
with the Khazars, had overrun their country, wasted it with
fire and sword, and massacred thousands of the inhabitants.”
He now entertained designs against Arabia and perhaps India,
countries on which he could not hope to make an impression
without earnest and concentrated effort. It was doubtless
with the view of extending his influence into these quarters
that the Persian monarch evacuated Lazica, and bound his
country to maintain peace with Rome for the next half-
century. -
The position of affairs in Arabia was at the time abnormal
and interesting. For the most part that vast but sterile region
has been the home of almost countless tribes, living independ-
ently of one another, each under its own sheikh or chief, in
wild and unrestrained freedom.” Native princes have seldom
obtained any widely extended dominion over the scattered
population; and foreign powers have still more rarely exer-
cised authority for any considerable period over the freedom-
loving descendants of Ishmael. But towards the beginning of
the sixth century of our era, the Abyssinians of Axum, a
Christian people, “raised” far “above the ordinary level of
African barbarism” by their religion and by their constant
intercourse with Rome, succeeded in attaching to their em-
pire a large portion of the Happy Arabia, and ruled it at first
, from their African capital, but afterwards by means of a
viceroy, whose dependence on the Negus of Abyssinia was
little more than nominal. Abraha, an Abyssinian of high
rank,” being deputed by the Negus to re-establish the au-
^ j
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*
Y
t J
2’ *s. J. : " ,
on XXI condition of ARABIA. 475
| -
thority of Abyssinia over the Yemen when it was shaken by
a great revolt, made himself master of the country, assumed
the crown, established Abyssinians in all the chief cities, built
numerous churches, especially one of great beauty at Sana,”
and at his death left the kingdom to his eldest son, Yaksourm.”
An important Christian state was thus established in the Great
Peninsula; and it was natural that Justinian should see with
satisfaction, and Chosroës with Some alarm, the growth of a
power in this quarter which was sure to side with Rome and
against Persia, if their rivalry should extend into these parts.
Justinian had hailed with pleasure the original Abyssinian
conquest, and had entered into amicable relations with both
the Axumites and their colonists in the Yemen.” Chosroës
now resolved upon a counter movement. He would employ
the quiet secured to him by the peace of A.D. 562 in a great at-
tack upon the Abyssinian power in Arabia. He would drive
the audacious Africans from the soil of Asia, and would earn
the eternal gratitude of the numerous tribes of the desert. He
would extend Persian influence to the shores of the Arabian
Gulf, and so confront the Romans along the whole line of their
eastern boundary. He would destroy the point d'appui which ,
Rome had acquired in South-western Asia, and So at once -
diminish her power and augment the strength and glory of
Persia. * *
The interference of Chosroës in the affairs of a country so
distant as Western Arabia involved considerable difficulties;
but his expedition was facilitated by an application which he
received from a native of the district in question. Saif, the
son of Dsu-Yezm, descended from the race of the old Homerite
kings whom the Abyssinians had conquered, grew up at the
court of Abraha in the belief that that prince, who had married
his mother, was not his step-father, but his father.” Unde-
ceived by an insult which Masrouq, the true son of Abraha
and succesor of Yaksoum, offered him,” Saif became a refugee
at the court of Chosroës, and importuned the Great King to
embrace his quarrel and reinstate him on the throne of his
fathers. He represented the Homerite population of Yemen
as groaning under the yoke of their oppressors and only
waiting for an opportunity to rise in revolt and shake it off.
A few thousand Persian troops, enough to form the nucleus of
an army, would suffice; they might be sent by Sea to the port
of Aden, near the mouth of the Arabian Gulf, where the
Homerites would join them in large numbers; the combined
rº,
§
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476 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. , [CH. xx.
forces might then engage in combat with the Abyssinians, and
destroy them or drive them from the land. Chosroës took the
advice tendered him, so far at any rate as to make his expedi-
, , , tion by sea. His ships were assembled in the Persian Gulf; a
certain number of Persian troops” were embarked on board
them; and the flotilla proceeded, under the conduct of Saif,
first to the mouth of the Gulf, and then along the southern
coast of Arabia to Aden.” Encouraged by their presence, the
Homerites rose against their foreign oppressors; a war followed,
of which the particulars have been disfigured by romance;”
but the result is undoubted—the Abyssinian strangers were
driven from the soil of Arabia; the native race recovered its
supremacy; and Saif, the descendant of the old Homerite
kings, was established, as the vassal or viceroy of Chosroës,
on the throne of his ancestors.” This arrangement, however,
was not lasting. Saif, after a short reign, was murdered by
his body-guard;” and Chosroës then conferred the govern-
ment of Yemen upon a Persian officer, who seems to have
borne the usual title of Marzpan,” and to have been in no
way distinguished above other rulers of provinces. Thus the
Homerites in the end gained nothing by their revolt but a
change of masters. They may, however, have regarded the
change as one worth making, since it gave them the mild sway
of a tolerant heatben in lieu of the persecuting rule of Christian
/ bigots.
According to some writers,” Chosroës also, in his later
years, sent an expedition by Sea against some portion of Hin-
dustan, and received a cession of territory from an Indian
monarch. But the country of the monarch is too remote for
belief, and the ceded provinces seem to have belonged to Per-
sia previously.” It is therefore, perhaps, most probable that
friendly intercourse has been exaggerated into conquest, and
the reception of presents from an Indian potentate” meta-
morphosed into the gain of territory. Some authorities do not
assign to Chosroës any Indian dominion;” and it is at least
doubtful whether he made any expedition in this directián.
A war, however, appears certainly to have occupied Chos-
roës about this period on his north-eastern frontier. The
Turks had recently been advancing in strength and drawing
nearer to the confines of Persia. They had extended their
dominion over the great Ephthalite kingdom, partly by force
*
of arms,” partly through the treachery of Katulphus, an
Ephthalite chieftain;” they had received the submission of
* |
* -e- * * * l i.
\ - - V - * *.
ch. xx.] EMBASSY FROM DIZABUL THE TURK. 477
^
the Sogdians, and probably of other tribes of the Transoxianian
region, previously held in subjection by the Ephthalites; and
they aspired to be acknowledged as a great power, the second,
if not the first, in this part of Asia. It was perhaps rather
with the view of picking a quarrel than in the hope of any
valuable pacific result, that, about the close of A.D. 567, Diza-,
bul, the Turkish Khan, sent ambassadors to Chosroës” with
proposals for the establishment of free commercial intercourse
between the Turks and Persians, and even for the conclusion
of a treaty of friendship and alliance between the two nations.
Chosroës suspected the motive for the overture, but was afraid
openly to reject it. He desired to discourage intercourse be-
tween his own nation and the Turks, but could devise no
better mode of effecting his purpose than by burning the
Turkish merchandise offered to him after he had bought it,
and by poisoning the ambassadors and giving out that they
had fallen victims to the climate. His conduct exasperated
the Turkish Khan, and created a deep and bitter hostility be-
tween the Turks and Persians.” It was at once resolved to .
send an embassy to Constantinople and offer to the Greek
emperor the friendship which Chosroës had scorned. The em-
bassy reached the Byzantine court early in A.D. 568, and was
graciously received by Justin, the nephew of Justinian, who
had succeeded his uncle on the imperial throne between three
and four years previously. A treaty of alliance was made
between the two nations; and a Roman embassy, empowered
to ratify it, visited the Turkish court in the Altai mountains* ,
during the course of the next year (A.D. 569), and drew closer
the bonds of friendship between the high contracting powers.
But meanwhile Dizabul, confident in his own strength, had
determined on an expedition into Persia. The Roman ambas-
Sador, Zemarchus, accompanied him on a portion of his
march,” and witnessed his insulting treatment of a Persian
envoy, sent by Chosroës to meet him and deprecate his attack.
Beyond this point exact information fails us; but we may sus-
pect that this is the expedition commemorated by Mirk-
hond,” wherein the Great Khan, having invaded the Persian
territory in force, made himself master of Shash, Ferghana,
Samarkand, Bokhara, Kesh, and Nesf, but, hearing that Hor-
misdas, son of Chosroës, was advancing against him at the
head of a numerous army, Suddenly fled, evacuating all the
country that he had occupied, and retiring to the most distant
portion of Turkestan. At any rate the expedition cannot have
§
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478 THE SEVENTH Monarchy. ICH. xx.
had any great success; for shortly afterwards (A.D. 571) we
find Turkish ambassadors once more visiting the Byzantine
court,” and entreating Justin to renounce the fifty years'
peace and unite with them in a grand attack upon the com-
mon enemy, which, if assaulted simultaneously on either side,
might (they argued) be almost certainly crushed. Justin gave
the ambassadors no definite reply, but renewed the alliance
with Dizabul, and took seriously into consideration the ques-
tion whether he should not yield to the representations made
to him, and renew the war which Justinian had terminated
nine years previously. .
. There were many circumstances which urged him towards
a rupture. The payments to be made under the fifty years'
peace had in his eyes the appearance of a tribute rendered by
Rome to Persia, which was, he thought, an intolerable dis-
grace.” A subsidy, not very dissimilar, which Justinian had
allowed the Saracenic Arabs under Persian rule, he had al-
ready discontinued;” and hostilities had, in consequence, al-
ready commenced between the Persian and the Roman Sara-
cens.” The successes of Chosroës in Western Arabia had at
once provoked his jealousy, and secured to Rome, in that quar-
ter, an important ally in the great Christian kingdom of Abys-
sinia. The Turks of Central Asia had sought his friendship
and offered to combine their attacks with his, if he would
consent to go to war.” Moreover, there was once more dis-
content and even rebellion in Armenia, where the proselytiz-
ing zeal of the Persian governors had again driven the natives
to take up arms and raise the standard of independence.”
*
Above all, the Great King, who had warred with such success
for twenty years against his uncle, was now in advanced
age,” and seemed to have given signs of feebleness, inasmuch
as in his recent expeditions he had individually taken no part,
but had entrusted the command of his troops to others.” Un-
der these circumstances, Justin, in the year A.D. 572, deter-
mined to renounce the peace made ten years earlier with the
Persians, and to recommence the old struggle. Accordingly
he at once dismissed the Persian envoy, Sebocthes, with con-
tempt, refused wholly to make the stipulated payment, pro-
claimed his intention of receiving the Armenian insurgents
under his protection, and bade Chosroës lay a finger on them
at his peril.” He then appointed Marcian to the prefecture
of the East,” and gave him the conduct of the war which was
now inevitable. • -- ~~
+
- 2 ×
& * * * #
ch. xx.] RENEWAL OF THE WAR WITH ROME. 479
No sooner did the Persian monarch find his kingdom seri-
ously menaced than, despite his advanced age, he immediately,
took the field in person. Giving the command of a flying
column of 6000 men to Adarman,” a skilful general, he
marched himself against the Romans, who under Marcian”
had defeated a Persian force, and were besieging Nisibis,”
forced them to raise the siege, and, pressing forward as they
retired, compelled them to seek shelter within the walls of
Daras,” which he proceeded to invest with his main army.
Meanwhile Adarman, at the head of the troops entrusted to
him, crossed the Euphrates near Circesium, and, having en-
tered Syria, carried fire and sword far and wide over that fer-, .
tile province.” Repulsed from Antioch, where, however, he
burnt the suburbs of the town, he invaded Coelesyria, took and
destroyed Apamea, and then, recrossing the great river, re-
joined Chosroës before Daras. The renowned fortress made a
brave defence. For about five months it resisted,” without ob-
taining any relief, the entire force of Chosroës, who is said” to
have besieged it with 40,000 horse and 100,000 foot. At last,
on the approach of winter, it could no longer hold out; en-
closed within lines of circumvallation, and deprived of water
by the diversion of its streams into new channels,” it found -
itself reduced to extremity, and forced to submit towards the
close of A.D. 573. Thus the great Roman fortress in these parts.
was lost in the first year of the renewed war; and Justin,
alarmed at his own temerity, and recognizing his weakness,
felt it necessary to retire from the conduct of affairs, and de-
liver the reins of empire to stronger hands. He chose as his
coadjutor and successor the Count Tiberiuš, a Thracian by
birth, who had long stood high in his confidence; and this
prince, in conjunction with the Empress Sophia, now took the .
direction of the War.” -
The first need was to obtain a breathing-space. The Persian,
king having given an opening for negotiations,” advantage
was taken of it by the joint rulers” to send an envoy, fur-
nished with an autograph letter from the empress, and well
provided with the best persuasives of peace, who was to sug-
gest an armistice for a year, during which a satisfactory ar-
rangement of the whole quarrel might be agreed upon. Tibe-
rius thought that within this space he might collect an army
sufficiently powerful to re-establish the superiority of the
Roman arms in the east; Chosroës believed himself strong
enough to defeat any force that Rome could now bring into
f
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. 480 ' ' THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xx.
- . . *
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the field.” A truce for a year was therefore concluded, at
the cost to Rome of 45,000 aurei;” and immense efforts were
at once made by Tiberius to levy troops from his more distant
provinces, or hire them from the lands beyond his borders.
An army of 150,000 men was, it is said, collected from the
banks of the Danube and the Rhine, from Scythia, Pannonia,
Moesia, Illyricum, and Isauria;” a general of repute, Justin-
ian, the son of Germanus, was selected to command them;
, and the whole force was concentrated upon the eastern
frontier;” but, after all these preparations, the Caesar's heart
failed him, and, instead of offering battle to the enemy, Tibe-
rius sent a second embassy to the Persian head-quarters, early
in A.D. 575, and besought an extension of the truce.” The
Romans desired a short term of peace only, but wished for a
general suspension of hostilities between the nations; the Per-
sians advocated a longer interval, but insisted that the truce
should not extend to Armenia.” The dispute continued till
the armistice for a year had run out;” and the Persians had
resumed hostilities and threatened. Constantina” before the
Romans would give way. At length it was agreed that there
should be peace for three years, but that Armenia should be
exempt from its operation.” Rome was to pay to Persia,
during the continuance of the truce, the sum of 30,000 aurei
annually.” *
No Sooner was the peace concluded than Chosroës put him-
Self at the head of his army, and, entering Armenia Proper,
proceeded to crush the revolt, and to re-establish the Persian
authority throughout the entire region.” No resistance was
offered to him; and he was able, before the close of the year,
to carry his arms into the Roman territory of Armenia Minor,
and even to threaten Cappadocia. Here Justinian opposed his
progress; and in a partial engagement, Kurs (or Cursus), a
leader of Scythians in the Roman service, obtained an advan-
tage over the Persian rear-guard, captured the camp and the
, baggage, but did not succeed in doing any serious damage.”
Chosroës soon afterwards revenged himself by surprising and
destroying a Roman camp during the night; he then took and
burnt the city of Melitene (Malatiyeh); after which, as winter
was approaching, he retired across the Euphrates, and re-
turned into his own country. Hereupon Justinian seems to
have invaded Persian Armenia, and to have enriched his
troops with its plunder; according to some writers, he even
penetrated as far as the Caspian Sea, and embarked upon its,
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Chosrºofs II. AND “EMBLEMAT1c FIGUREs UNDER ARCH At Takht-i-Bostan,




































































* - r - * } .
ch. xx.] PERSIANS VICTORIOUS IN AIRMENIA.] .. 481
waters;* he continued on Persian soil during the whole of the
winter, and it was not till the spring came that he re-entered
Roman territory (A.D. 576).” . * . .
The campaign of A.D. 576 is somewhat obscure. The Romans '
seem to have gained certain advantages in Northern Armenia.
and Iberia,” while Chosroës on his part carried the war once
more into Armenia Minor, and laid siege to Theodosiopolis,
which, however, he was unable to take.” Negotiations were
upon this resumed, and had progressed favorably to a certain
point, when news arrived of a great disaster to the Roman
arms in Armenia, which changed the face of affairs and caused
the Persian negotiators to break up the conference. Tam-
chosro, a Persian general, had completely defeated the Roman
army under Justinian.” Armenia had returned to its alle-
giance. There seemed every reason to believe that more was
to be gained by arms than by diplomacy, and that, when the
three years peace had run out, the Great King might renew
the general war with a prospect of obtaining important suc-
CeSSèS. . - - . . . . -
There are no military events which can be referred to the
year A.D. 577. The Romans and Persians amused each other
with alternate embassies during its course, and with negotia-
tions that were not intended to have any result.” The two
monarchs made vast preparations; and with the spring of A.D.
578 hostilities recommenced. Chosroës is accused of having
anticipated the expiration of the truce by a period of forty
days;” but it is more probable that he and the Romans.
estimated the date of its expiration differently. However
this was, it is certain that his generals, Mebodes and Sapoés,
took the field in early spring with 20,000 horse,” and entering
the Roman Armenia laid waste the country, at the same time
threatening Constantina and Theodosiopolis.” Simultaneously
Tamchosro,” quitting Persarmenia, marched westward and
plundered the country about Amida (Diarbekr). The Roman S
commander Maurice, who had succeeded Justinian, possessed
considerable military ability. On this occasion, instead of fol-
lowing the ordinary plan of simply standing on the defensive
and endeavoring to repulse the invaders, he took the bolder
course of making a counter movement. Entering Persarmenia,
which he found denuded of troops, he carried all before him,
destroying the forts, and plundering the countryſº Though
the summer heats brought on him an attack of fever, he con-
tinued without pause his destructive march; invaded and oc-
* - * * t " . - r {
a’ - 3.
* 482 TIME SEVENTII MONARCHY. ten ºx.
, cupied Arzanene, with its stronghold, Aphumón, carried off
+ the population to the number of 10,090, and, pressing forwards
from Arzanene into Eastern Mesopotamia, took Singara, and
carried fire and sword over the entire region as far as the Ti-
gris. He even ventured to throw a body of skirmishers across
• , the river into Cordyéné (Kurdistan); and these ravagers, who
! were commanded by Kurs, the Scythian, spread devastation over
a district where no Roman soldier had set foot since its cession
by Jovian.” Agathias tells us that Chosroës was at the time
enjoying his summer villeggiatura in the ICurdish hills, and
saw from his residence the smoke of the hamlets which the
Roman troops had fired.” He hastily fled from the danger,
... and shut himself up within the walls of Ctesiphon, where he
was soon afterwards seized with the illness which brought his
life to a close.
Meanwhile Kurs, unconscious probably of the prize that had
been so near his grasp, recrossed the Tigris with his booty and
rejoined Maurice, who on the approach of winter withdrew into
Roman territory, evacuating all his conquests excepting Arza-
nene.” . The dull time of winter was, as usual, spent in nego-
, tiations; and it was thought that a peace might have been
concluded had Chosroës lived.* Tiberius was anxious to re-
cover Daras, and was willing to withdraw the Roman forces
wholly from Persarmenia and Iberia, and to surrender Arza-
nene and Aphumón, if Daras were restored to him.” He would
probably have been content even to pay in addition a sum of
...t. money.” Chosroës might perhaps have accepted these terms;
but while the envoys empowered to propose them were on
their way to his court, early” in the year A.D. 579, the aged
monarch died in his palace at Ctesiphon after a reign of forty-
*
eight years.”
l ~.
* -- * ---
e’ A 4
ch. xxi.] ADMINISTRATION OF CHOSROES 1. 483
CHAPTER XXI.' - v
Administration of Persia wnder Chosroës I. Fourfold Divi-
sion of the Empire. Careful Surveillance of those en-
trusted with Power. Severe Punishment of Abuse of
Trust. New System of Taxation introduced. Correction
of Abuse connected with the Military Service. Encourage-
ment of Agriculture and Marriage. Relief of Poverty.
Care for Travellers. Encouragement of Learning. Prac-
tice of Toleration within certain Limits. Domestic Life
of Chosroës. His Wives. Revolt and Death of his Son,
Nushizad. Coins of Chosroës. Estimate of his Character.
"Eytoye rou &vöpa weigova 6einu riov &AAtov Bapbápov.–Agathias, ii. 28.
A GENERAL consensus of the Oriental writers marks the reign §
of the first Chosroës as a period not only of great military
activity, but also of - improved domestic administration.
Chosroës found the empire in a disordered and ill-regulated
condition, taxation arranged on a bad system, the people op-
pressed by unjust and tyrannical governors, the military ser-
vice a prey to the most Scandalous abuses, religious fanaticism
rampant, class at variance with class, extortion and wrong
winked at, crime unpunished, agriculture languishing, and the
masses throughout almost the whole of the country sullen and
discontented. It was his resolve from the first” to carry out.
a series of reforms—to secure the administration of even-
handed justice, to put the finances on a better footing, to en-
courage agriculture, to relieve the poor and the distressed, to
root out the abuses that destroyed the efficiency of the army,
and to excise the gangrene of fanaticism which was eating into
the heart of the nation. How he effected the last named object
by his wholesale destruction of the followers of Mazdak has
been already related;” but it appeared unadvisable to interrupt
the military history of the reign by combining with it any ac-
Count of the numerous other reforms which he accomplished.
It remains therefore to consider them in this place, since they
are certainly not the least remarkable among the many achieve-
ments of this great monarch. - |
Persia, until the time of Anushirwan, had been divided into
• *
24
-
~
is, THE SET/EWTII MONARCH Z. [CH. XXI.
a multitude of provinces, the satraps or governors of which
held their office directly under the crown. It was difficult for
the monarch to exercise a sufficient Superintendence Over so
large a number of rulers, many of them remote from the
court, and all united by a common interest. Chosroës con-
ceived the plan of forming four great governments, and entrust-
.ing them to four persons in whom he had confidence, whose
duty it should be to watch the conduct of the provincial satraps
to control them, direct them, or report their misconduct to
the crown. The four great governments were those of the
east, the north, the south, and the west. The east comprised
Khorassam, Seistan, and Kirman; the north, Armenia, Azer-
bijan, Ghilan, Koum, and Isfahan; the south, Fars and Ahwaz;
the west, Irak, or Babylonia, Assyria, and Mesopotamia."
It was not the intention of the monarch, however, to put a
blind trust in his instruments. He made personal progresses
through his empire from time to time, visiting each province
in turn and inquiring into the condition of the inhabitants."
He employed continually an army of inspectors and spies, who
reported to him from all quarters the sufferings or complaints
of the oppressed, and the neglects or misdoings of those in
authority." On the occurrence of any specially suspicious cir-
Cumstance, he appointed extraordinary commisssions of in-
quiry, which, armed with all the power of the crown, pro-
ceeded to the suspected quarter, took evidence, and made a
careful report of whatever wrongs or malpractices they dis-
covered." *. •
When guilt was brought home to incriminated persons or
parties, the punishment with which they were visited was
swift and signal. We have seen how harsh were the sentences
passed by Chosroës upon those whose offences attacked his
own person or dignity.” An equal severity appears in his
judgments, where there was no question of his own wrongs, but
only of the interests of his subjects.” On one occasion he is
said to have executed no fewer than eighty, collectors of taxes
On the report of a commission charging them with extortion.”
Among the principal reforms which Chosroës is said to have
- 'introduced was his fresh arrangement of the taxation. Hitherto
all lands had paid to the State a certain proportion of their
produce, a proportion which varied, according to the estimated
richness of the soil, from a tenth to one-half.” The effect was
to discourage all improved cultivation, since it was quite possi-
ble that the whole profit of any increased outlay might be
^.
r- —I -
, -- , - -
#.
ch. xxi.] ESTABLISHMENT OF A LAND-TAx. ' 485
absorbed by the State, and also to cramp and check the liberty
of the cultivators in various ways, since the produce could nºt
be touched until the revenue official made his appearance and
carried off the share of the crop which he had a right to take.”
Chosroës resolved to substitute a land-tax for the proportionate
payments in kind, and thus at once to set the cultivator at
liberty with respect to harvesting his crops and to allow him -
the entire advantage of any agumented production which
might be secured by better methods of farming his land. His
tax consisted in part of a money payment, in part of a pay-
ment in kind; but both payments were fixed and invariable,
each measure of ground being rated in the king's books at one
dirhem and One measure of the produce.” Uncultivated land,
and land lying fallow at the time, were exempt;” and thus the
scheme involved, not one survey alone, but a recurring (annual)
survey,” and an annual registration of all cultivators, with the
quantity of land under cultivation held by each, and the nature
of the crop or crops to be grown by them. The system was
one of much complication, and may have pressed somewhat
hardly upon the poorer and less productive soils; but it was an
f
immense improvement upon the previously existing practice,
which had all the disadvantages of the modern tithe system, ag-
gravated by the high rates exacted” and by the certainty that,
in any disputed case, the subject would have had a poor chance
of establishing his right against the crown. It is not surprising
that the caliphs, when they conquered Persia, maintained un-
altered the land system of Chosroës” which they found estab-
lished, regarding it as, if not perfect, at any rate not readily
admitting of much improvement. t
Besides the tax upon arable lands, of which we have hitherto
Spoken, Chosroës introduced into into Persia various other
imposts. The fruit trees were everywhere counted, and a small
payment required for each.” The personality of the citizens
was valued, and a graduated property-tax established, which,
however, in the case of the most opulent, did not exceed the
moderate sum of forty-eight dirhems” (about twenty-seven
shillings). A poll-tax was required of Jews and Christians,”
whereof we do not know the amount. From all these burdens .
liberal exemptions were made on account of age and sex; no
female paid anything;” and males above fifty years of age or
under twenty were also free of charge. Due notice was given
to each individual of the sum for which he was liable, by the
publication in each province, town, and village, of a tax-table,
g
*
*
<
*r- * -- A”
486. THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. * [CH. xxi.
, in which each citizen or alien could see against his name the
amount about to be claimed of him, with the ground upon
which it was regarded as due.” Payment had to made by
instalments, three times each year, at the end of every four
months.” * **. -
In order to prevent the unfair extortion, which in the
ancient world was always, with reason or without, charged
upon collectors of revenue, Chosroës, by the advice of the
Grand Mobed, authorized the Magian priests everywhere to
exercise a supervision over the receivers of taxes, and to
hinder them from exacting more than their due.” The priests
were only too happy to discharge this popular function; and
extortion must have become rare under a system which com-
prised so efficient a safeguard.
Another change ascribed to Chosroës is a reform of the ad-
ministration of the army. Under the system previously ex-
isting, Chosroës found that the resources of the state were
lavishly wasted, and the result was a military force inefficient
and badly accoutred. No security was taken that the soldiers
possessed their proper equipments or could discharge the duties
appropriate to their several grades. Persons came before the
paymaster, claiming the wages of a cavalry soldier, who
possessed no horse, and had never learned to ride. Some, who
called themselves soldiers, had no knowledge of the use of any
weapon at all; others claimed for higher grades of the service
than those whereto they really belonged; those who drew the
pay of cuirassiers were destitute of a coat of mail; those who
professed themselves archers were utterly incompetent to
draw the bow. The established rates of pay varied between
a hundred dirhems a year and four thousand, and persons en-
titled to the lowest rate often received an amount not much
short of the highest.” The evil was not only that the treasury
was robbed by unfair claims and unfounded pretences, but
that artifice and false seeming were encouraged, while at the
same time the army was brought into such a condition that
no dependence could be placed upon it. If the number who
actually served corresponded to that upon the rolls, which is
uncertain,” at any rate all the superior arms of the service
fell below their nominal strength, and the lower grades were
crowded with men who were only soldiers in name.
As a remedy against these evils, Chosroës appointed a single
paymaster-general, and insisted on his carefully inspecting
and reviewing each body of troops before he allowed it to draw
- *
• * * .*
| - º . Kva
#
ch. xxi.] BABEK AND CHOSROES. 487
its pay.” Each man was to appear before him fully equipped
and to show his proficiency with his weapon or weapons;
horse soldiers were to bring their horses, and to exhibit their
mastery over the animals by putting them through their paces,
mounting and dismounting, and performing the other usual
exercises. If any clumsiness were noted, or any deficiency in
the equipment, the pay was to be withheld until the defect
observed had been made good. Special care was to be taken
that no one drew the pay of a class superior to that whereto
he really belonged—of an archer, for instance, when he was in
truth a common soldier, or of a trooper when he served not in
the horse, but in the foot. -
A curious anecdote is related in connection with these
military reforms. When Babek, the new paymaster, was
about to hold his first review, he issued an order that all per-
Sons belonging to the army then present in the capital should
appear before him on a certain day. The troops came; but
Babek dismissed them on the ground that a certain person
whose presence was indispensable had not made his appear-
ance. Another day was appointed, with the same result, ex-
cept that Babek on this occasion plainly intimated that it was
the king whom he expected to attend. Upon this Chosroës,
when a third summons was issued, took care to be present,
and came fully equipped, as he thought, for battle. But the
critical eye of the reviewing officer detected an omission,
which he refused to overlook—the king had neglected to bring
with him two extra bow-strings. Chosroës was required to go
back to his palace and remedy the defect, after which he
was allowed to pass muster, and then summoned to receive
his pay. Babek affected to consider seriously what the pay of
the commander-in-chief ought to be, and decided that it ought
to exceed that of any other person in the army. He then, in
the sight of all, presented the king with four thousand and one
dirhems, which Chosroës received and carried home.” Thus
two important principles were thought to be established—that
no defect of equipment whatsoever should be overlooked in
any officer, however high his rank, and that none should draw
from the treasury a larger amount of pay than 4,000 dirhems
(112l, of our money). e
The encouragement of agriculture was an essential element
in the system of Zoroaster;” and Chosroës, in devoting his at-
tention to it, was at once performing a religious duty and
increasing the resources of the state. It was his earnest
•
,
y
{
\
f * - - #
488 . THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xxi.
desire to bring into cultivation all the soil which was capable
of it; and with this object he not only issued edicts command-
ing the reclamation of waste lands, but advanced from the
treasury the price of the necessary seed-corn, implements, and
, ‘beasts to all poor persons willing to carry out his Orders.”
Other poor persons, especially the infirm and those disabled by
bodily defect, were relieved from his privy purse; mendicancy
was forbidden, and idleness made an offence.” The lands for-
feited by the followers of Mazdak were distributed to neces-
, Sitous cultivators.” The water system was carefully attended
to; river and torrent courses were cleared of obstructions and
straightened;” the Superfluous water of the rainy season was
stored, and meted out with a wise economy to those who tilled
the soil, in the spring and Summer.”
The prosperity of a country depends in part upon the
laborious industry of the inhabitants, in part upon their num-
bers. Chosroës regarded Persia as insufficiently peopled, and
made efforts to increase the population by encouraging and
indeed compelling marriage.* All marriageable females were
required to provide themselves with husbands; if they neg-
lected this duty, the government interfered, and united them
to unmarried men of their own class. The pill was gilt to
these latter by the advance of a sufficient dowry from the pub-
lic treasury, and by the prospect that, if children resulted from
the union, their education and establishment in life would be
undertaken by the state. Another method of increasing the
population, adopted by Chosroës to a certain extent, was the
settlement within his own territories of the captives whom he
carried off from foreign countries in the course of his military
èxpeditions. The most notorious instance of this policy was
the Greek settlement, known as Rumia (Rome), established by
Chosroës after his capture of Antioch (A.D. 540), in the near
vicinity of Ctesiphon.” • -
Oriental monarchs, in many respects civilized and enlight-
ened, have often shown a narrow and unworthy jealousy of
'foreigners. Chosroës had a mind which soared above this
petty prejudice. He encouraged the visits of all foreigners,
excepting only the barbarous Turks,” readily received them
at his court, and carefully provided for their safety. Not
only were the roads and bridges kept in the most perfect
order throughout his territories,” so as to facilitate locomo-
tion, but on the frontiers and along the chief lines of route
guard-houses were built and garrisons maintained for the
*
*
. st - TA - ? *.
|
}
ch. xxi.] EWCOURAGEMENT OF LEARNING. 489
f
\
express purpose of securing the safety of travellers.” The ,
result was that the court of Chosroës was visited by numbers
of Europeans, who were hospitably treated, and invited, or
even pressed, to prolong their visits. •
To the proofs of wisdom and enlightenment here enumerated
Chosroës added another, which is more surprising than any
of them. He studied philosophy, and was a patron of Science
and learning. Very early in his reign he gave a refuge at his
court to a body of seven Greek sages whom a persecuting
edict, issued by Justinian, had induced to quit their country
and take up their abode on Persian soil.” Among the refu-
gees was the erudite Damascius, whose work De Principiis is
well known, and has recently been found to exhibit an inti-
mate acquaintance with some of the most obscure of the
Oriental religions.” Another of the exiles was the eclectic
philosopher Simplicius, “the most acute and judicious of the
interpreters of Aristotle.” “ Chosroës gave the band of phi-
losophers a hospitable reception, entertained them at his
table, and was unwilling that they should leave his court.”
They found him acquainted with the writings of Aristotle and
Plato, whose works he had caused to be translated into the
Persian tongue. “ If he was not able to enter very deeply into
the dialectical and metaphysical subtleties which characterize
alike the Platonic Dialogues and the Aristotelian treatises, at
any rate he was ready to discuss with them such questions as
\
*
the origin of the world, its destructibility or indestructibility,
and the derivation of all things from one First Cause or from
more.” Later in his reign, another Greek, a sophist named
Uranius, acquired his especial favor,” became his instructor
in the learning of his country, and was presented by him with
a large sum of money. Further, Chosroës maintained at his
court, for the space of a year, the Greek physician, Tribunus,
and offered him any reward that he pleased at his departure.”
He also instituted at Gondi-Sapor, in the vicinity of Súsa, a
sort of medical School, which became by degrees a university,
wherein philosophy, rhetoric, and poetry were also studied.”
Nor was it Greek learning alone which attracted his notice
and his patronage. Under his fostering care the history and
jurisprudence of his native Persia were made special objects
of study; the laws and maxims of the first Artaxerxes, the
founder of the monarchy, were called forth from the obscurity
which had rested on them for ages, were republished and de-
clared to be authoritative;" while at the same time the annals
wº
*
.
— — . -- ~~ A v * - • * *
* { y * *
490 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. ſch. xxi.
of the monarchy were collected and arranged, and a “Shah-
, nameh,” or “Book of the Kings,” composed, which it is proba-
ble formed the basis of the great work of Firdausi.” Even
the distant land of Hindustan was explored in the search after
varied knowledge, and contributed to the learning and civili-
zation of the time the fables of Bidpai" and the game of
chess.”
Though a fierce persecutor of the deluded followers of
Mazdak,” Chosroës admitted and practised, to Some extent,
the principles of toleration. On becoming king, he laid it
down as a rule of his government that the actions of men
alone, and not their thoughts, were subject to his authority.“
. He was therefore bound not to persecute opinion; and we may
suppose that in his proceedings against the Mazdakites he
intended to punish their crimes rather than their tenets.
Towards the Christians, who abounded in his empire,” he
certainly showed himself, upon the whole, mild and moderate.
He married a Christian wife, and allowed her to retain her
religion.” When one of his sons became a Christian, the only
punishment which he inflicted on him was to confine him to
the palace." He augumented the number of the Christians in
his dominions by the colonies which he brought in from
abroad. He allowed to his Christian subjects the free exercise
, , of their religion, permitted them to build churches, elect
bishops, and conduct services at their pleasure, and even
suffered them to..bury their dead,” though such pollution of
the earth was accounted sacrilegious by the Zoroastrians. No
unworthy compliances with the established cult were required
of them. Proselytism, however, was not allowed; and all
Christian sects were perhaps not viewed with equal favor,
Chosroës, at any rate, is accused of persecuting the Catholics
and the Monophysites, and compelling them to join the Nesto-
rians, who formed the predominant sect in his dominions.”
Conformity, however, in things outward, is compatible with
a wide diversity of opinion; and Chosroës, while he disliked
: differences of practice, seems certainly to have encouraged, at
least in his earlier years, a freedom of discussion in religious
matters which must have tended to shake the hereditary faith
of his subjects.” He also gave on one occasion a very re-
markable indication of liberal and tolerant views. When he
made his first peace with Rome,” the article on which he
insisted the most was one whereby the free profession of their
known opinions and tenets in their own country was secured
* ; i Y. L T -r —- – – , — —, , – —
• . a' - # * #
ch. xxi.] TOLERATION. 491
to the seven Grecian sages who had found at his court, in
their hour of need, a refuge from persecution.” t
In his domestic relations Chosroës was unfortunate. With
his chief wife, indeed, the daughter of the great Khan of the
Turks, he seems to have lived always on excellent terms; and
it was his love for her which induced him to select the son
whom she had borne him for his successor on the throne.
But the wife who stood next in his favor displeased him by
her persistent refusal to renounce the religion of Christ and
adopt that of her husband in its stead; * and the quarrel
between them must have been aggravated by the conduct of
their child, Nushizad, who, when he came to years of dis-
cretion, deliberately preferred the faith of his mother to that
of his father and of the nation.” With this choice Chosroës
was naturally offended; but he restrained his anger within
moderate limits, and was content to punish the young prince
by forbidding him to quit the precincts of the palace.” Un-
happy results followed. Nushizad in his confinement heard a
rumor that his father, who had started for the Syrian war,
was struck with sickness, was not likely to recover, was dead.
It seemed to him a golden opportunity, of which he would be
foolish not to make the most. He accordingly quitted his
prison, spread the report of his father's death, seized the state
treasure, and scatterrd it with a liberal hand among the troops
left in the capital, summoned the Christians throughout the
empire to his aid, assumed the title and state of king, was
acknowledged by the whole of the southern province, and
thought himself strong enough to take the offensive and at-
tempt the subjugation of Irak." Here, however, he was met
by Phabrizus" (Firuz?), one of his father's generals, who com-
pletely defeated his army in a pitched battle. According to
one account, Nushizad fell in the thick of the fight, mortally
Woulided by a chance arrow.” According to another, he was
made prisoner, and carried to Chosroës, who, instead of punish-
ing him with death, destroyed his hopes of reigning by inflict-
ing on him a cruel disfigurement.” º
The coins of Chosroës are verg numerous, and offer one or
two novel and curious types. The most remarkable have on
the obverse the head of the king, presenting the full face, and
Surmounted by a mural crown with a low cap.” The beard is
close, and the hair arranged in masses on either side. There
are two stars above the crown, and two crescents, one over
either shoulder, with a star and crescent on the dress in front
f
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492 Y. THE SEVENTH MoWARCIIY. . . [ch. xxi.
of each shoulder. The kings wears a necklace, from which
hang three pendants. On the reverse these coins have a full-
length figure of the king, standing to the front, with his two
hands resting on the hilt of his straight Sword, and its point
placed between his feet. The crown worn resembles that on
the obverse; and there is a star and crescent on either side of
the head. The legend on the obverse is Khusludi afzum,
“May Chosroës increase;” the reverse has, on the left Khus.
ludi, with the regnal year; on the right, a longer legend which
has not yet been satisfactorily interpreted.” [Pl. XXII., Fig.
3.] -
, ' The more ordinary type on the coins of Chosroës I. is one
differing but little from those of his father, Kobad, and his son,
Hormazd IV. The obverse has the king's head in profile, and
the reverse the usual fire-altar and supporters. The distin-
guishing mark of these coinsis, in addition to the legend, that
they have three simple crescents in the margin of the obverse,
instead of three crescents with stars. [Pl. XXII., Fig. 4.]
A relic of Chosroës has come down to us, which is of great
beauty. This is a cup composed of a number of small disks of
colored glass, united by a gold setting, and having at the bot-
tom a crystal, engraved with a figure of the monarch. As late
as 1638 it was believed that the disks of glass were jacynths,
garnets, and emeralds, while the stone which forms the base was
thought to be a white Sapphire. The original owner of so rare
a drinking-vessel could (it was supposed) only be Solomon;”
and the figure at the bottom was accordingly supposed to re-
present the Jewish king. Archaeologists are now agreed that
the engraving on the gem, which exactly resembles the figure
upon the peculiar coins above described, represents Chosroës
Anushirwan, and is of his age.” There is no sufficient reason
to doubt but that the cup itself is one out of which he was
accustomed to drink.
It is the great glory of Arushirwan that the title which his
Subjects gave him “was “the JUST.” According to European,
and especially to modern ideas, this praise would seem to have
undeserved; and thus the great historian of the Byzantine
period has not scrupled to declare that in his external policy
Chosroës was actuated by mere ambition, and that “in his
domestic administration he deserved the appellation of a
tyrant.”" . Undoubtedly the punishments which he inflicted
were for the most part severe; but they were not capricious,
, nor uniform, nor without reference to the character of the
g
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ch. xxi.) , CELARACTER OF CHOSROES I. 493 .
\ * * *
offence. Plotting against his crown or his person, when the
conspirators were of full age, treasonable correspondence with
the enemy, violation of the Sanctity of the harem, and the
proselytism which was strictly forbidden by the laws, he
punished with death." But, when the rebel was a mere youth,
he was content to inflict a disfigurement;" whence the offence
was less, he could imprison,” or confine to a particular spot,”
or simply banish the culprit from his presence.” Instances
on record of his clemency to offenders,” and others which
show that, when his own interests were at stake, he steadily
refused to make use of his unlimited power for the oppression
/
of individuals.” It is unlikely that Anushirwan was distin-,
guished as “the Just” without a reason; and we may safely
conclude from his acknowledged title that his subjects found.
his rule more fair and equitable than that of any previous
monarch. &
That the administration of Chosroës was wise, and that Per-
sia prospered under his government, is generally admitted.
His vigilance, his activity, his care for the poor, his efforts to
prevent or check oppression, are notorious, and cannot be
gainsaid. Nor can it be doubted that he was brave, hardy,
temperate, prudent, and liberal. Whether he possessed the
softer virtues, compassion, kindliness, a tender and loving
heart, is perhaps open to question. He seems, however, to
have been a good husband and a good father, not easily
offended, and not over-severe whence offence was given him.”
His early severities * against his brothers and their followers
may be regarded as caused by the advice of others, and per-
haps as justified by state policy. In his later life, when he was
his own master, he was content to chastise rebellion more
mildly. - --
Intellectually, there is no reason to believe that Chosroës rose
very high above the ordinary Oriental level. The Persians, .
and even many Greeks, in his own day, exalted him above
measure, as capable of apprehending the most subtle arguments
aud the deepest problems of philosophy; * but the estimate of
Agathias" is probably more just, and this reduces him to a
standard about which there is nothing surprising. It is to his
credit that although engaged in almost perpetual wars, and
burdened moreover with the administration of a mighty em-
pire, he had a mind large enough to entertain the consideration
also of intellectual problems, and to enjoy and take part in
their discussion; but it could scarcely be expected that, with
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2 494 * * The sereyra woxarchy. * , ſch. xxi.
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his numerous other employments, he should really Sound to
their utmost depths the profundities of Greek thought, or
understand the speculative difficulties which separated the
4. various schools one from another. No doubt his knowledge
was superficial, and there may have been Ostentation in the
parade which he made of it;” but we must not deny him the
~& praise of a quick, active intellect, and a width of view rarely
found in an Oriental.
It was not, however, in the field of speculative thought, but in
that of practical effort, that Chosroës chiefly distinguished
himself and gained his choicest laurels. The excellence of his
domestic administration has been already noticed. But, great
as he was in peace, he was greater in war. Engaged for nearly
+& fifty years in almost uninterrupted contests, he triumphed in
every quarter, and scarcely experieneed a reverse. Victorious
~ over the Romans, the Abyssinians, the Ephthalites, and the
Turks, he extended the limits of his empire on all sides, pacified
the discontented Armenia, crushed internal revolt, frustrated
the most threatening combinations, and established Persia in a
position which she had scarcely occupied since the days of
Darius Hystaspis. Personally engaged in above a score of
fights, by the admission of his enemies he was never defeated
but once; * and there are circumstances which make it pro-
bable that this single check was of slight importance.” The
one real failure that can be laid to his charge was in another
quarter, and involved no military, but only a political blunder.
In recoiling from the difficulties of the Lazic war,” Chosroës
had not to deplore any disgrace to his arms, but simply to
acknowledge that he had misunderstood the temper of the
Tazic people. In depreciation of his military talents it may be
said that he was never opposed to any great general. With
Belisarius it would certainly seem that he never actually
crossed swords; but Justinian and Maurice (afterwards em-
peror), to whom he was opposed in his later years, were no
contemptible antagonists. It may further be remarked that
, the collapse of Persia in her struggle with Rome" as soon as
Chosroës was in his grave is a tolerably decisive indication
that she owed her long career of victory under his guidance to
his possession of uncommon military ability.
*~
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CH. XXII.] 2’ ACCESSION OF HORMISDAS IV.
t * - ar • ?
§
CHAPTER XXII.
Accession of Hormisdas IV. His good Government in the
Earlier Portion of his Reign. Invasion of Persia by the
Romans wholer Mawrice. Defeats of Adarman and Tam-
chosro. Campaign of Johannes. Campaigns of Philippicus
and Heraclius. Tyranny of Hormisdas. He is attacked
by the Arabs, Khazars, and Turks. Bahram defeats the
Turks. His Attack on Lazica. He suffers a Defeat. Dis-
grace of Bahrain. Dethronement of Hormisdas IV. and .
Elevation of Chosroës II. Character of Hormisdas. Coins
of Hormisdas. $
Xoapóms kareg’tpéparo Bíov, Štá8oxov ‘Opuia Sav row vićv, &vöpa rixaxerórmri riv warpgav
trepnkovrukóra rāv rpómov &voa vörmta #v yāp Biatós re kai row traetovos épaarns àkópe-
aros.-Theophylact. Simocatt. iii. 16. -
AT the death of Chosroës the crown was assumed without
dispute or difficulty by his son, Hormazd, who is known to the
Greek and Latin writers, as Hormisdas IV. Hormazd was the
eldest, or perhaps the only, son borne to Chosroës by the
Turkish princess, Fakim,” who, from the time of her marriage, .
had held the place of Sultana, or principal wife. His illustrious
descent on both sides, added to the express appointment of his
father, caused him to be universally accepted as king; and we
do not hear that even his half-brothers, several of whom were
older than himself,” put forward any claims in opposition to
his, or caused him any anxiety or trouble. He commenced his
reign amid the universal plaudits and acclamations of his sub-
jects, whom he delighted by declaring that he would follow in
all things the steps of his father, whose wisdom so much ex-
ceeded his own, would pursue his policy, maintain his officers
in power, and endeavor in all respects to govern as he had
governed.” When the mobeds attempted to persuade him to
confine his favor to Zoroastrians and persecute such of his sub-
jects as were Jews or Christians he rejected their advice with
the remark" that, as in an extensive territory there were sure
to be varieties of soil, so it was fitting that a great empire
should embrace men of various opinions and manners. In his
progresses from one part of his empire to another he allowed of .
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496 ) THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. [CH: XXII.
no injury being done to the lands or gardens along the route,
and punished severely all who infringed his orders." Accord-
ing to some," his good dispositions lasted only during the time
that he enjoyed the counsel and support of Abu-Zurd-mihir,
one of the best advisers of his father; but when this venerated
sage was compelled by the infirmities of age to quit his court
he fell under other influences, and Soon degenerated into the
cruel tyrant which, according to all the authorities," he showed
himself in his later years. .
Meanwhile, however, he was engaged in important wars,
particularly with the Roman emperors Tiberius and Maurice,
who, now that the great Chosroës was dead, pressed upon Per-
sia with augmented force, in the confident hope of recovering
their lost laurels. On the first intelligence of the great king's
death, Tiberius had endeavored to negotiate a peace with his
successor, and had offered to relinquish all claim on Armenia,
and to exchange Arzanene with its strong fortress, Aphumón,
for Daras; but Hormisdas had absolutely rejected his pro-
posals, declared that he would surrender nothing, and declined
to make peace on any other terms than the resumption by
Rome of her old system of paying an annual subsidy.” The
war consequently continued; and Maurice, who still held the
command, proceeded, in the summer of A.D. 579, to take the
offensive and invade the Persian territory. He sent a force
across the Tigris under Romanus, Theodoric, and Martin, which
ravaged Kurdistan, and perhaps penetrated into Media," no-
where encountering any large body of the enemy, but carrying
all before them and destroying the harvest at their pleasure.
In the next year, A.D. 580, he formed a more ambitious project.
Having gained over, as he thought, Alamundarus, the leader
of the Saracens dependent on Persia, and collected a fleet to
carry his stores, he marched from Circesium down the course of
the Euphrates, intending to carry the war into Southern Meso-
potamia,” and perhaps hoping to capture Ctesiphon. He ex-
pected to take the Persians unawares, and may not unnaturally
have looked to gain an important success; but, unhappily for
his plans, Alamundarus proved treacherous. The Persian king
was informed of his enemy's march, and steps were at once
taken to render it abortive. - Adarman was sent, at the head of
a large army, into Roman Mesopotamia, where he threatened
the important city of Callinicus in Maurice's rear. That general
dared advance no further. On the contrary, he felt constrained
to fall back, to give up his Scheme, burn his fleet, and return
f *
,
ch, ºxn] PERSIA INVADED BY MAURICE . 497
f
hastily within the Roman frontier. On his arrival, he en-
gaged Adarman near the city which he was attacking, defeated
him, and drove him back into Persia.”
In the ensuing Spring, after another vain attempt at negoti-
ation,” the offensive was taken by the Persians, who, early in
A.D. 581, crossed the frontier under Tam-chosro, and attacked
the Roman city of Constantia, or Constantina.” Maurice
hastened to its relief; and a great battle was fought in the im-
mediate vicinity of the city, wherein the Persians were com-
pletely defeated, and their commander lost his life.” Further
advantages might have been gained; but the prospect of the
succession drew Maurice to Constantinople, where Tiberius,
stricken with a mortal disease, received him with open arms,
gave his daughter and the state into his care, and, dying soon
after, left him the legacy of the empire, which he administered
with success for above twenty years.”
On quitting the East, Maurice devolved his command upon
an officer who bore the very common name of Johannes, but
was distinguished further by the epithet of Mustacon, on ac-
count of his abundant moustache.” This seems to have been
a bad appointment. Mustacon was unequal to the position. .
He gave the Persians battle at the conjunction of the Nymphius
with the Tigris, but was defeated with considerable loss, partly
through the misconduct of one of his captains. He then laid
siege to Arbas,” a strong fort on the Persian side of the -
Nymphius, while the main body of the Persians were attack-
ing Aphumón in the neighboring district of Arzanene. The
garrison of Arbas made signals of distress, which speedily
brought the Persian army to their aid; a second battle was ,
fought at Arbas, and Mustacon was again defeated, and forced
to retire across the Nymphius into Roman territory.” His in-
capacity was now rendered so clearly evident that Maurice ,
recalled him, and gave the command of the army of the East,
to a new general, Philippicus, his brother-in-law.” .*
The first and second campaigns of Philippicus, in the years
A.D. 584 and 585, were of the most commonplace character.
He avoided any general engagement, and contended himself
with plundering inroads into the Persian territory on either
side of the Upper Tigris, occasionally suffering considerably
from want of water and provisions.” The Persians on their
part undertook no operations of importance until late in A.D. ^
585, when Philippicus had fallen sick. They then made at-
tempts upon Monocartum and Martyropolis, which were un-
i
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498' THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. ſch. xxm.
successful, resulting only in the burning of a church and a
monastery near the latter town.” Neither side seemed capable
of making any serious impression upon the other; and early
the next year negotiations were resumed,” which, however,
resulted in nothing. `---
• In his third campaign Philippicus adopted a bolder line of
proceeding. Commencing by an invasion of Eastern Mesopo-
tamia, he met and defeated the Persians in a great battle near
Solachon,” having first roused the enthusiasm of his troops by
carrying along their ranks a miraculous picture of our Lord,”
which no human hand had painted. Hanging on the rear of the
fugitives, he pursued them to Daras, which declined to receive
within its walls an army that had so disgraced itself.” The
Persian commander withdrew his troops further inland; and
Thilippicus, believing that he had now no enemy to fear, pro-
ceeded to invade Arzanene, to besiege the stronghold of Chlo-
marón,” and at the same time to throw forward troops into the
more eastern parts of the country. He expected them to be un-
opposed; but the Persian general, having rallied his force and
augmented it by fresh recruits, had returned towards the fron-
tier, and, hearing of the danger of Arzanene, had flown to its
defence. Philippicus was taken by surprise, compelled to raise
the siege of Chlomarón, and to fall back in disorder. The Per-
sians pressed on his retreat, crossed the Nymphius after him,
and did not desist from the pursuit until the imperial general
threw himself with his shattered army into the strong fortress
of Amida.” Disgusted and discredited by his ill-success,
Philippicus gave over the active prosecution of the war to
. Heraclius, and, remaining at head-quarters, contented himself
with a general supervision. -
Heraclius, on receiving his appointment, is said to have at
once assumed the offensive, and to have led an army, consist-
ing chiefly or entirely of infantry,” into Persian territory,
which devastated the country on both sides of the Tigris, and
rejoined Philippicus, without having suffered any disaster,
before the winter. Philippicus was encouraged by the success
of his lieutenant to continue him in command for another year;
but, through prudence or jealousy, he was induced to intrust
a portion only of the troops to his care, while he assigned to
others the supreme authority over no less than one third of the
Roman army. The result was, as might have been expected,
inglorious for Rome. During A.D. 587 the two divisions acted
separately in different quarters; and, at the end of the year,
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CH. XXII.] CAMPAIGNS OF HERACLIUS. 499
neither could boast of any greater success than the reduction,
in each case, of a single fortress.” Philippicus, however, seems
to have been Satisfied; and at the approach of winter he with-
drew from the East altogether, leaving Heraclius as his repre-
sentative, and returned to Constantinople.
During the earlier portion of the year A.D. 588 the mutinous
temper of the Roman army rendered it impossible that any
military operations should be undertaken.” Encouraged by
the disorganization of their enemies, the Persians crossed the
frontier, and threatened Constantina, which was however
saved by Germanus.” Later in the year, the mutinous spirit
having been quelled, a counter-expedition was made by the
Romans into Arzanene. Here the Persian general, Maruzas,
met them, and drove them from the province; but, following
up his success too ardently, he received a complete defeat near
Martyropolis, and lost his life in the battle. His head was
cut off by the civilized conquerors, and sent as a trophy to
Maurice.* .
The campaign of A.D. 589 was opened by a brilliant stroke
on the part of the Persians, who, through the treachery of a
certain Sittas, a petty officer in the Roman army, made them-
selves masters of Martyropolis.” It was in vain that Philip-
picus twice besieged the place; he was unable to make any
impression upon it, and after a time desisted from the attempt.
On the second occasion the garrison was strongly reinforced
by the Persians under Mebodes and Aphraates, who, after de-
feating Philippicus in a pitched battle, threw a large body of
troops into the town. Philippicus was upon this deprived of
his office, and replaced by Comentiolus, with Heraclius as sec-
Ond in command.” The new leaders, instead of engaging in
the tedious work of a siege, determined on re-establishing the
Roman prestige by a bold counter-attack. They invaded the
Persian territory in force, ravaged the country about Nisibis,
and brought Aphraates to a pitched battle at Sisarbanón, near
that city. Victory seemed at first to incline to the Persians;
Comentiolus was defeated and fled; but Heraclius restored the
battle, and ended by defeating the whole Persian army, and
driving it from the field, with the loss of its commander, who
was slain in the thick of the fight.” The next day the Persian
Camp was taken, and a rich booty fell into the hands of the
conquerors,” besides a number of standards. The remnant of
the defeated army found a refuge within the walls of Nisibis.
Later in the year Comentiolus recovered to some extent his
500 THE SETVENTH MONARCH Y. [CH. xxi.I.
tarnished laurels by the siege and capture of Arbas,” whose
strong situation in the immediate vicinity of Martyropolis ren-
dered the position of the Persian garrison in that city insecure,
if not absolutely untenable.
| Such was the condition of affairs in the western provinces of
, the Persian Empire, when a sudden danger arose in the east,
which had strange and most important consequences. Accord-
ing to the Oriental writers, Hormisdas had from a just mon-
arch gradually become a tyrant; under the plea of protecting
the poor had grievously oppressed the rich; through jealousy
or fear had put to death no fewer than thirteen thousand of
the upper classes,” and had thus completely alienated all the
more powerful part of the nation. Aware of his unpopularity,
the surrounding tribes and peoples commenced a series of ag-
gressions, plundered the frontier provinces, defeated the de-
tachments sent against them under commanders who were
disaffected, and everywhere brought the empire into the
greatest danger. The Arabs” crossed the Euphrates and
spread themselves over Mesopotamia; the Khazars invaded
Armenia and Azerbijan; rumor said that the Greek emperor
had taken the field and was advancing on the side of Syria, at
the head of 80,000 men;" above all, it was quite certain that
the Great Khan of the Turks had put his hordes in motion, had
passed the Oxus with a countless host," occupied Balkh and
Herat, and was threatening to penetrate into the very heart of
Persia. The perilous character of the crisis is perhaps exag-
gerated;” but there can be little doubt that the advance of the
Turks constituted a real danger. Hormisdas, however, did not
even now quit the capital, or adventure his own person. He
selected from among his generals a certain Varahran or Bah-
ram, “a leader of great courage and experience, who had dis-
tinguished himself in the wars of Anushirwan,“ and, placing
all the resources of the empire at his disposal, assigned to him
the entire conduct of the Turkish struggle. Bahram is said to
have contented himself with a small force of picked men,”
veterans between forty and fifty years of age,” to have
marched with them upon Balkh, contended with the Great
Khan in several partial engagements,” and at last entirely de-
feated him in a great battle, wherein the Khan lost his life.”
This victory was soon followed by another over the Khan's
son, who was made prisoner and sent to Hormisdas.” An
enormous booty was at the same time despatched to the
court;" and Bahram himself was about to return, when he
cB. XXII.] HoRMISDAS INSULTS BAHRAM. 501
received his master's orders to carry his arms into another
quarter. te
It is supposed by some that, while the Turkish hordes were
menacing Persia upon the north-east, a Roman army, intended
to act in concert with them," was sent by Maurice into Al-
bania, which proceeded to threaten the common enemy in the
north-west. But the Byzantine writers know of no alliance at
this time between the Romans and Turks; nor do they tell of
any offensive movement undertaken by Rome in aid of the
Turkish invasion, or even simultaneously with it. According
to them, the war in this quarter, which certainly broke out in
A.D. 589, was provoked by Hormisdas himself, who, imme-
diately after his Turkish victories, sent Bahram with an army
to invade Colchis and Suania,” or in other words to resume the
Lazic war, from which Anushirwan had desisted” twenty-seven
years previously. Bahram found the province unguarded, and
was able to ravage it at his will; but a Roman force soon gath-
ered to its defence, and after some manoeuvres a pitched battle
was fought on the Araxes, in which the Persian general suf-
fered a defeat." The military results of the check were insig-
nificant; but it led to an internal revolution. Hormisdas had
grown jealous of his too successful lieutenant, and was glad of
an opportunity to insult him.” No sooner did he hear of Bah-
ram's defeat than he sent off a messenger to the camp upon
the Araxes, who deprived the general of his command, and
presented to him, on the part of his master, a distaff, some
cotton, and a complete set of women's garments." Stung to
madness by the undeserved insult, Bahram retorted with a
letter, wherein he addressed Hormisdas, not as the son, but as
the daughter of Chosroës." Shortly afterwards, upon the ar-
rival of a second messenger from the court, with orders to
bring the recalcitrant commander home in chains, Bahram
openly revolted, caused the envoy to be trampled upon by an
elephant,” and either by simply putting before the soldiers his
Services and his wrongs,” or by misrepresenting to them the
intentions of Hormisdas towards themselves, induced his wholo
army with one accord to embrace his cause.
The news of the great general's revolt was received with accla-
mations by the provinces. The army of Mesopotamia, collected
at Nisibis, made common cause with that of Albania; and the
united force, advancing on the capital by way of Assyria, took
up a position upon the Upper Zab river." Hormisdas sent a
general, Pherochanes, to meet and engage the rebels; but the
ſº
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502 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. XXII.
emissaries of Bahram seduced his troops from their allegiance:
Pherochanes was murdered;" and the insurgent army, aug.
mented by the force sent to oppose it, drew daily nearer to
Ctesiphon Meanwhile Hormisdas, distracted between hate
and fear, suspecting every one, trusting no one, confined him-
self within the wails of the capital, where he continued to ex-
ercise the severities which had lost him the affections of his
subjects. According to some, he suspected his son, Chosroës,
of collusion with the enemy, and drove him into banishment,”
imprisoning at the same time his own brothers in-law, Bindoés
and Bostam," who would be likely, he thought, to give their
support to their nephew. These violent measures precipitated
the evils which he feared; a general revolt broke out in the
palace; Bostam and Bindoés, released from prison, put them-
selvos at the head of the malcontents, and, rushing into the
presence-chamber, dragged the tyrant from his throne, strip-
ped him of the diadem, and committed him to the dungeon
from which they had themselves escaped. The Byzantine his-
toriang believed “ that, after this, Hormisdas was permitted to
plead his cause before an assembly of Persian nobles, to glorify
his own reign. vituperate his eldest Son, Chosroës, and express
his willingness to abdicatein favor of another son, who had never
offended him. They supposed that this ill-judged oration had
sealed the fate of the youth recommended and of his mother,
who were cut to pieces before the fallen monarch's eyes, while
at the same time the rage of the assembly was vented in part
upon Hormisdas himself, who was blinded, to make his re-
storation impossible. But a judicious critic will doubt the
likelihood of rebels, committed as were Bindoës and Bostam,
consenting to allow such an appeal as is described by Theo-
phylact; and a perusal of the speeches assigned to the occasion
will certainly not diminish his scepticism." The probability
would seem to be that Hormisdas was blinded as soon as com-
mitted to prison, and that shortly afterwards he suffered the
general fate of deposed sovereigns, being assassinated in his
place of confinement." - -
The deposition of Hormisdas was followed almost immedia-
tely by the proclamation of his eldest son, Chosroës, the prince
known in history as “Eberwiz” or “Parviz,” the last great
, Persian monarch. The rebels at Ctesiphon had perhaps acted
from first to last with his cognizance: at any rate, they cal-
culated on his pardoning proceedings which had given him
actual possession of a throne whereto, without their aid, he
cE.'ssil.] COINs of HolºſsDAs IV. 503
might never have succeeded. They accordingly declared him
king of Persia without binding him by conditions, and without
negotiating with Dahrum, who was still in arms and at no
great distance.
Before passing to the consideration of the eventful reign with
which we shall now have to occupy Ourselves, a glance at the
personal character of the deceased monarch will perhaps be
expected by the reader. Hormuzd is pronounced by the con-
current voice of the Greeks and the Orientals one of the worst
princes that ever ruled over Persia." The fair promise of his
early years was quickly clouded over; and during the greater
portion of his reign he was a jealous and capricious tyrant, in-
fluenced by unworthy favorites, and stimulated to ever-in-
creasing severities by his fears. Eminence of whatsoever kind
roused his suspicions; and among his victims were included,
besides the noble and the great, a large number of philosophers
and men of science.” His treatment of Bahram was at once a
folly and a crime—an act of black ingratitude, and a rash step,
whereof he had not counted the consequences. To his other
vices he added those of indolence and effeminacy. From the
time that he became king nothing could drag him from the
soft life of the palace; in no single instance did he take the
field, either against his country's enemies or his own. Miser-
able as was his end, we can scarcely deem him worthy of our
pity, since there never lived a man whose misfortunes were
more truly brought on him by his own conduct.
The coins of Hormisdas IV. are in no respect remarkable.
The head seems modelled on that of Chosroës, his father, but is
younger. The field of the coin within the border is somewhat
unduly crowded with stars and crescents. Stars and crescents
also occur outside the border, replacing the simple crescents of
Chosroës," and reproducing the combined stars and crescents
of Zamasp." The legend on the obverse is Awhºramazdi af2'ud,
or sometimes Auhramazi afzwn;” on the reverse are com-
Imonly found, besides the usual fire-altar and supporters, a
regnal year and a mint-mark. The regnal years range from
/

One to thirteen;” the number of the mint-marks is about /
thirty.” [Pl. XXIII., Fig. 1.]
/
|
:
|
504 THE SEVENTH MONARCII). [CH, XXIII.
CHAPTER - XXIII. .
Accession of Chosroës II. (Eberwiz). Bahram rejects his
Terms. Contest between Chosroës and Bahram. Flight
of Chosroës. Short Reign of Bahram (Varahram VI.).
Campaign of A.D. 591. Recovery of the Throne by Chos-
roës. Coins of Bahram. -
‘Eyka9lotóow ſoi IIéporat] flaauxéa. Xoopómu . . . ka0 oil 8ápagos étriarpateiſet uetá ràv
- &pºp airów.—Evagr. Hist. Eccles. vi. 17.
THE position of Chosroës II. On his accession was one of great
difficulty. Whether actually guilty of parricide or not," he was
at any rate suspected by the greater part of his subjects of
complicity in his father's murder. A rebel, who was the
greatest Persian general of the time, at the head of a veteran
army, stood arrayed against his authority. He had no estab-
lished character to fall back upon, no merits to plead, nothing
in fact to urge on his behalf but that he was the eldest son of
his father, the legitimate representative of the ancient line of
the Sassanidae. A revolution had placed him on the throne in a
hasty and irregular manner; nor is it clear that he had ventured
On the usual formality of asking the consent of the general
assembly of the nobles to his coronation.” Thus perils sur-
rounded him on every side; but the most pressing danger of
all, that which required to be immediately met and confronted,
was the threatening attitude of Bahram, who had advanced
from Adiabéné to Holwan,” and occupied a strong position not
a hundred and fifty miles from the capital. Unless Bahram
could be conciliated or defeated, the young king could not hope
to maintain himself in power, or feel that he had any firm
grasp of the sceptre. .
Under these circumstances he took the resolution to try first
the method of conciliation. There seemed to be a fair opening
for Such a course. It was not he, but his father, who had given
the offence which drove Bahram into rebellion, and almost
forced him to vindicate his manhood by challenging his de-
tractor to a trial of strength. Bahram could have no personal
ground of quarrel with him. Indeed that general had at the
first, if we may believe the Oriental writers,” proclaimed Chos-
cH. xxirſ. CHOSROES II. TREATS WITH BAHRAM. 505
roës as king, and given out that he took up arms in order to
place him upon the throne. It was thought, moreover, that
the rebel might feel himself sufficiently avenged by the death
of his enemy, and might be favorably disposed towards those
who had first blinded Hormisdas and then despatched him by
the bowstring." Chosroës therefore composed a letter in which
he invited Bahram to his court, and offered him the second
place in the kingdom, if he would come in and make his sub-
mission. The message was accompanied by rich presents, and
by an offer that if the terms proposed were accepted they
should be confirmed by oath."
The reply of Bahram was as follows: “Bahram, friend of
the gods, conqueror, illustrious, enemy of tyrants, satrap of
satraps, general of the Persian host, wise, apt for command,
god-fearing, without reproach, noble, fortunate, successful, ven-
erable, thrifty, provident, gentle, humane, to Chosroës the Son
of Hormisdas (Sonds greeting). I have received the letter
which you wrote with such little wisdom, but have rejected
the presents which you sent with such excessive boldness. It
had been better that you should have abstained from sending
either, more especially considering the irregularity of your
appointment, and the fact that the noble and respectable took
no part in the vote, which was carried by the disorderly and
low-born. If then it is your wish to escape your father's fate,
strip off the diadem which you have assumed and deposit it in
some holy place, quit the palace, and restore to their prisons the
criminals whom you have set at liberty,’ and whom you had
no right to release until they had undergone trial for their
crimes. When you have done all this, come hither, and I will
give you the government of a province. Be well advised, and
so farewell. Else, be sure you will perish like your father.”
So insolent a missive might well have provoked the young
prince to some hasty act or some unworthy show of temper.
It is to the credit of Chosroës that he restrained himself, and
even made another attempt to terminate the quarrel by a rec-
onciliation. While striving to outdo Bahram in the grandeur
of his titles,” he still addressed him as his friend. He compli-
mented him on his courage, and felicitated him on his excel-
lent health. “There were certain expressions,” he said, “in the
letter that he had received, which he was sure did not speak
his friend's real feelings. The amanuensis had evidently drunk
more wine than he ought, and, being half asleep when he
wrote, had put down things that were foolish and indeed mon-
*
2.
*
506 TIIE, SEVENTH MONARCIIP. [CII. xxi.II.
strous. But he was not disturbed by them. He must decline,
however, to send back to their prisons those whom he had re-
leased, since favors granted by royalty could not with pro-
priety be withdrawn; and he must protest that in the cere-
mony of his coronation all due formalities had been observed.
As for stripping himself of his diadem, he was so far from
contemplating it that he looked forward rather to extending
his dominion over new worlds. As Bahram had invited him,
he would certainly pay him a visit; but he would be obliged to
come as a king, and if his persuasions did not produce submis-
sion he would have to compel it by force of arms. He hoped
that Bahram would be wise in time, and would consent to be
his friend and helper.”
This second overture produced no reply; and it became tol-
erably evident that the quarrel could only be decided by the
arbitrament of battle. Chosroës accordingly put himself at
the head of such troops as he could collect,” and marched
against his antagonist, whom he found encamped on the Hol-
wan River." The place was favorable for an engagement; but
Chosroës had no confidence in his soldiers. He sought a pop-
sonal interview with Bahram, and renewed his offers of par-
don and favor; but the conference only led to mutual recrimi-
nations,” and at its close both sides appealed to arms. During
six days the two armies merely skirmished, since Chosroës
bent all his efforts towards avoiding a general engagement;
but on the seventh day Bahram surprised him by an attack
after night had fallen,” threw his troops into confusion, and
then, by a skilful appeal to their feelings, induced them to
desert their leader and come over to his side. Chosroës was
forced to fly. He fell back on Ctesiphon;” but despairing of
making a successful defence, with the few troops that remairod
faithful to him, against the overwhelming force which Bahram
had at his disposal, he resolved to evacuate the capital, to quit
Persia, and to throw himself on the generosity of some one of
his neighbors. It is said that his choice was long undeter-
mined between the Turks, the Arabs, the Khazars of the Cau-
casian region, and the Romans.” According to some writers,
after leaving Ctesiphon, with his wives and children, his two
uncles, and an escort of thirty men,” he laid his reins on his
horse's neck, and left it to the instinct of the animal to deter-
mine in what direction he should flee." The sagacious beast
took the way to the Euphrates; and Chosroës, finding him-
Self on its banks, crossed the river, and, following up its
> rt vºy * —r —— -as-
"t, * º f
.* - - ,
cH. xxii.I.] MAURICE PROTECTS CHOSROES. 507
course," reached with much difficulty the well-known Roman
station of Circesium." He was not unmolested in his retreat.
Bahram no Sooner heard of his flight than he sent off a body
of 4000 horse, with Orders to pursue and capture the fugitive.”
They would have succeeded, had not Bindoës devoted himself
on behalf of his nephew, and, by tricking the officer in com-
mand,” enabled Chosroës to place such a distance between
himself and his pursuers that the chase had to be given up,
and the detachment to return, with no more valuable capture
than Bindoes, to Ctesiphon. - - -
Chosroës was received with all honor by Probus, the gov-
ernor of Circesium,” who the next day communicated intelli-
gence of what had happened to Comentiolus, Prefect of the
East, then resident at Hierapolis. At the same time he sent
to Comentiolus a letter which Chosroës had addressed to Mau-
rice, imploring his aid against his enemies. Comentiolus ap-
proved what had been done, despatched a courier to bear the
royal missive to Constantinople, and shortly afterwards, by
the direction of the court, invited the illustrious refugee to
remove to Hierapolis,” and there take up his abode, till his
cause should be determined by the emperor. Meanwhile, at
Constantinople, after the letter of Chosroës had been read, a
serious debate arose as to what was fittest to be done.” While
some urged with much show of reason that it was for the in-
terest of the empire that the civil war, should be prolonged,
that Persia should be allowed to waste her strength and ex-
haust her resources in the contest, at the end of which it would
be easy to conquer her, there were others whose views were
less selfish or more far-sighted. The prospect of uniting the
Last and West into a single monarchy, which had been brought
to the test of experiment by Alexander and had failed, did not
present itself in a very tempting light to these minds. They
doubted the ability of the declining empire to sway at once
the sceptre of Europe and of Asia. They feared that if the
appeal of Chosroës were rejected, the East would simply fall
into anarchy, and the way would perhaps be prepared for
Some new power to rise up, more formidable than the kingdom
of the Sassanidae. The inclination of Maurice, who liked to
think himself magnanimous,” coincided with the views of
these persons: their counsels were accepted; and the reply
was made to Chosroës that the Roman emperor accepted him
as his guest and son,” undertook his quarrel, and would aid
him with all the forces of the empire to recover his throne. At
>
\
§ - g -- §
*
... • *. - -
a
…”
bj08 THE SEVENTET MOWAROLIY. [CH. XXIII.
the same time Maurice sent him some magnificent presents,”
and releasing the Persian prisoners in confinement at Constan-
tinople,” bade them accompany the envoys of Chosroës and
resume the service of their master. Soon afterwards more
substantial tokens of the Imperial friendship made their ap-
pearance. An army of 70,000 men” arrived under Narses; and
a subsidy was advanced by the Imperial treasury, amounting
(according to one writer)” to about two millions sterling.
But this valuable support to his cause was no free gift of a
generous friend; On the contrary, it had to be purchased by
great sacrifices. Chosroës had perhaps at first hoped that aid
would be given him gratuitously, and had even regarded the
cession of a single city as one that he might avoid making.”
But he learnt by degrees that nothing was to be got from
Rome without paying for it; and it was only by ceding Persar-
menia and Eastern Mesopotamia, with its strong towns of
Martyropolis and Daras,” that he obtained the men and money
that were requisite.
Meanwhile Bahram, having occupied Ctesiphon, had pro-
claimed himself king,” and sent out messengers on all sides to
acquaint the provinces with the change of rulers. The news
was received without enthusiasm, but with a general acquies-
cence; and, had Maurice rejected the application of Chosroës,
it is probable that the usurper might have enjoyed a long and
quiet reign. As soon, however, as it came to be known that
the Greek emperor had espoused the cause of his rival, Bahram
found himself in difficulties: conspiracy arose in his own court,
and had to be suppressed by executions;” murmurs were heard
in some of the more distant provinces; Armenia openly re-
volted and declared for Chosroës;” and it soon appeared that
in places the fidelity of the Persian troops was doubtful. This
was especially the case in Mesopotamia,” which would have to
bear the brunt of the attack when the Romans advanced.
Bahram therefore thought it necessary, though it was now the
depth of winter, to strengthen his hold on the wavering prov-
ince, and sent out two detachments, under commanders upon
whom he could rely, to occupy respectively Anatho and Nisi-
bis, the two strongholds of greatest importance in the suspected
region. Mir-aduris succeeded in entering and occupying Ana-
tho.” Zadesprates was less fortunate; before he reached the
neighborhood of Nisibis, the garrison which held that place
had deserted the cause of the usurper and given in its adhe-
sion to Chosroës; and, when he approached to reconnoitre, he
t = - \, , ,
CH. xxIII.] BAHRAM IN DIFFICULTIES, \ 509.
was made the victim of a stratagem and killed by an officer
named Rosas.” Mir-aduris did not long survive him; the
troops which he had introduced into Anatho caught the con-
tagion of revolt, rose up against him, slew him, and sent his
head to Chosroës.”
The spring was now approaching,” and the time for mili-
tary operations on a grand scale drew near. Chosroës, be-
sides his supporters in Mesopotamia, Roman and Persian, had
a Second army in Azerbijan, raised by his uncles Bindoës and
Bostam,” which was strengthened by an Armenian contin-
gent.” The plan of Campaign involved the co-operation of
these two forces. With this object Chosroës proceeded early
in the Spring, from Hierapolis to Constantina,” from Constan-
tina to Daras,” and thence by way of Ammodion” to the
Tigris, across which he sent a detachment, probably in the
neighborhood of Mosul. This force fell in with Bryzacius,
who commanded in these parts for Bahram, and surprising
him in the first watch of the night, defeated his army and
took Bryzacius himself prisoner. The sequel, which Theophy-
lact appears to relate from the information of an eye-witness,
furnishes a remarkable evidence of the barbarity of the times.
Those who captured Bryzacius cut off his nose and his ears,
and in this condition sent him to Chosroës. The Persian
prince was overjoyed at the success, which no doubt he ac-
cepted as a good omen; he at Once led his whole army across
the river, and having encamped for the night at a place
called Dinabadón, entertained the chief Persian and Roman
nobles at a banquet. When the festivity was at its height,
the unfortunate prisoner was brought in loaded with fetters,
and was made sport of by the guests for a time, after which,
at a signal from the king, the guards plunged their swords
into his body, and despatched him in the sight of the feasters.
Having amused his guests with this delectable interlude, the
amiable monarch concluded the whole, by anointing them with
perfumed ointment, crowning them with flowers, and bid-
ding them drink to the success of the war. “The guests,”
Says Theophylact, “returned to their tents, delighted with
the completeness of their entertainment, and told their friends
how handsomely they had been treated, but the crown of all
(they said) was the episode of Bryzacius.”
Chosroës next day advanced across the Greater Zab, and,
after marching four days, reached Alexandriana," a position
probably not far from Arbela, after which, in two days more,

- 4. * *
W $
510 THE SEWEWTH MONARCIIY. [CH. XXIII,
A
he arrived at Chnaethas," which was a district upon the Zab
Asfal, or Lesser Zab River. Here he found himself in the im-
mediate vicinity of Bahram, who had taken up his position
on the Lesser Zab, with the intention probably of blocking
the route up its valley,” by which he expected that the Ar-
menian army would endeavor to effect a junction with the
army of Chosroës. Here the two forces watched each other
for some days, and various manoeuvres were executed, which
it is impossible to follow, since Theophylact, our only author-
ity, is not a good military historian. The result, however, is
certain. Bahram was out-manoeuvred by Chosroës and his
Roman allies; the fords of the Zab were seized; and after five
days of marching and countermarching, the longed-for junc-
tion took place.” Chosroës had the Satisfaction of embracing
his uncles Bindoës and Bostam, and of Securing such a rein-
forcement as gave him a great Superiority in numbers over
his antagonist." - -
About the same time he received intelligence of another
most important success. Before quitting Daras, he had de-
spatched Mebodes, at the head of a small body of Romans,”
to create a diversion on the Mesopotomian side of the Tigris by
a demonstration from Singara against Seleucia and Ctesiphon.
He can hardly have expected to do more than distract his
enemy and perhaps make him divide his forces. Bahram,
however, was either indifferent as to the fate of the capital, or
determined not to weaken the small army, which was all that
he could muster, and on which his whole dependence was
placed. He left Seleucia and Ctesiphon to their fate. Mebodes
and his small force marched southward without meeting an
enemy, obtained possession of Seleucia without a blow after the
withdrawal of the garrison, received the unconditional sur-
render of Ctesiphon, made themselves Imasters of the royal
palace, and treasures, proclaimed Chosroës king, and sent to
him in his camp the most precious emblems of the Persian
Sovereignty.” Thus, before engaging with his antagonist,
Chosroës recovered his capital and found his authority once
more recognized in the seat of government.
The great contest had, however, to be decided, not by the
loss and gain of cities, nor by the fickle mood of a populace,
but by trial of arms in the open field. Bahram was not of a
temper ,to surrender his sovereignty unless compelled by
defeat. He was one of the greatest generals of the age,” and,
though compelled to fight under every disadvantage, greatly
*
*
CH. XXIII.] coyTEST OF BAHRAM AND CHOSROES. ( 511
outnumbered by the enemy, and with troops that were to a
large extent disaffected, he was bent on resisting to the ut-
most, and doing his best to maintain his own rights. He
seems to have fought two pitched battles with the combined
Tomans and Persians,” and not to have succumbed until
treachery and desertion disheartened him and ruined his
caused The first battle was in the plain country of Adiabéné,
at the foot of the Zagros range. Here the opposing armies were
drawn out in the open field, each divided into a centre and
two wings. In the army of Chosroës the Romans were in the
middle, on the right the Persians, and the Armenians on the ’
left. Narses, together with Chosroës, held the central position:
Bahram was directly opposed to them. When the conflict
began the Romans charged with such fierceness that Bahram's
centre at Once gave way; he was obliged to retreat to the foot
of the hills, and take up a position on their slope. Here the
Romans refused to attack him; and Chrsroës very impru-
dently ordered the Persians who fought on his side to advance
up the ascent. They were repulsed, and thrown into complete
confusion; and the battle would infallibly have been lost, had
not Narses come to their aid, and with his steady and solid
battalions protected their retreat and restored the fight. Yet
the day terminated with a feeling on both sides that Bahram
had on the whole had the advantage in the engagement; the
king de facto congratulated himself; the king de jure had to
bear the insulting pity of his allies, and the reproaches of his
own countrymen for Occasioning them such a disaster.” }
But though Bahram might feel that the glory of the day was
his, he was not elated by his success, nor rendered blind to the
difficulties of his position. Fighting with his back to the
mountains, he was liable, if he suffered defeat, to be entangled
in their defiles and lose his entire force. Moreover, now that
Ctesiphon was no longer his, he had neither resources nor
point d'appui in the low country, and by falling back he would
at Once be approaching nearer to the main source of his own
supplies, which was the country about Rei,” south of the
Caspian, and drawing his enemies to a greater distance from
the sources of theirs. He may even have thought there was a
chance of his being unpursued if he retired, since the Romans
might not like to venture into the mountain region, and Chos-
roës might be impatient to make a triumphal entry into his
Capital. Accordingly, the use which Bahram made of his
victory was quietly to evacuate his camp, to leave the low
A
512 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ſch. xxiii.
plain region, rapidly pass the mountains, and take up his
quarters in the fertile upland beyond them, the district where
the Lesser Zab rises, south of Lake Urumiyeh. ;
If he had hoped that his enemies would not pursue him,
Bahram was disappointed. Chosroës himself, and the whole
of the mixed army which supported his cause, soon followed
on his footsteps, and pressing forward to Canzaca,” or Shiz,”
near which he had pitched his camp, offered him battle for the
second time. Bahram declined the offer, and retreated to a
position on the Balarathus, where, however, after a short time,
he was forced to come to an engagement. He had received, it
would seem, a reinforcement of elephants from the provinces
bordering on India,” and hoped for some advantage from the
employment of this new arm. He had perhaps augmented his
forces," though it must be doubted whether he really on this
occasion outnumbered his antagonist. At any rate, the time
seemed to have come when he must abide the issue of his ap-
peal to arms, and Secure or lose his crown by a supreme effort.
Once more the armies were drawn up in three distinct bodies;"
and once more the leaders held the established central position.”
The engagement began along the whole line, and continued for
a while without marked result. Bahram then strengthened his
left, and, transferring himself to this part of the field, made an
impression on the Roman right. But Narses brought up sup-
ports to their aid, and checked the retreat, which had already
begun, and which might soon have become general. Hereupon
Bahram suddenly fell upon the Roman centre and endeavored
to break it and drive it from the field; but Narses was again a
match for him, and met his assault without flinching, after
which, charging in his turn, he threw the Persian centre into
confusion. Seeing this, the wings also broke, and a general
flight began,” whereupon 6000 of Bahram's troops deserted,
and, drawing aside, allowed themselves to be captured.” The
retreat then became a rout. Bahram himself fled with 4,000
men," His camp, with all its rich furniture, and his wives
and children, were taken." The elephant corps still held out
and fought valiantly; but it was surrounded and forced to sur-
render.” The battle was utterly lost; and the unfortunate
chief, feeling that all hope was gone, gave the reins to his
horse and fled for his life. Chosroës sent ten thousand men in
pursuit,” under Bostam, his uncle; and this detachment over-
took the fugitives, but was repulsed” and returned. Bahram
Continued his flight, and passing through Rei and Damaghan,"
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CH. XXIII.] COINS OF BAHRAM. 513
reached the Oxus and placed himself under the protection of
the Turks. Chosroës, having dismissed his Roman allies, re-
entered Ctesiphon after a year's absence, and for the secon
time took his place upon the throne of his ancestors. A
The coins of Bahram possess a peculiar interest. While
there is no numismatic evidence which confirms the statement
that he struck money in the name of the younger Chosroës,
there are extant three types of his coins, two of which appear
to belong to the time before he seated himself upon the throne,
while one—the last—belongs to the period of his actual sove-
reignty.” In his pre-regnal coins, he copied the devices of the
last sovereign of his name who had ruled over Persia.” He
adopted the mural crown in a decided form, omitted the stars
and crescents, and placed his own head amid the flames of the
fire-altar. His legends were either Varahran Chub, “Bahram
of the mace,” or Varahran, malkan malka, mazdism, bagi,
ramashtri, “Bahram, king of kings, Ormazd-worshipping,
divine, peaceful.” [Pl. XXIII., Fig. 2.] *
The later coins follow closely the type of his predecessor,
Hormisdas IV., differing only in the legend, which is, on the
obverse, Varahram afzwn, or “Varahran (may he be) greater;”
and on the reverse the regnal year, with a mint-mark. The
regnal year is uniformly “one;” the mint-marks are Zadra-
carta, Iran, and Nihach, an unknown locality. [Pl. XXIII.,
Fig 3..] -
f* - • +
514 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. ſch. xxiv.
CHAPTER XXIV.
Second Reign of Chosroës II. (Eberwiz). His Rule at first
Unpopular. His Treatment of his Uncles, Bindoës and
Bostam. His vindictive Proceedings against Bahram.
His supposed Leaning towards Christianity. His Wives,
Shirin and Kwrdīyeh. His early Wars. His Relations
with the Emperor Maurice. His Attitude towards Phocas.
Great War of Chosroës with Phocas, A.D. 603–610, War
continued with Heraclius. Immense Successes of Chosroës,
A.D. 611-620. Aggressive taken by Heraclius A.D. 622. His
Campaigns in Persian Territory A.D. 622–628. Murder of
Chosroës. His Character. His Coins.
“Regnum ergö "occupavit Cesra, filius Hormozi, qui Aperwif cognominatus est,
annos triginta novem.”—Eutychius, Annales, vol. ii. p. 207.
THE second reign of Chosroës II., who is commonly known
as Chosroës Eberwiz or Parwiz," lasted little short of thirty-
seven years"—from the summer of A.D. 591 to the February of
A.D. 628. Externally considered, it is the most remarkable
reign in the entire Sassanian Series, embracing as it does the
extremes of elevation and depression. Never at any other
time did the Neo-Persian kingdom extend itself so far, or so
distinguish itself by militº &y achievements, as in the twenty
years intervening between A.D. 602 and A.D. 622. Seldom was
it brought so low as in the years immediately anterior and
immediately subsequent to this space, in the earlier and in
the later portions of the reign whose central period was so
- glorious.
Victorious by the help of Rome, Chosroës began his second
reign amid the scarcely disguised hostility of his subjects. So
greatly did he mistrust their sentiments towards him that he
begged and obtained of Maurice the support of a Roman body-
'guard,” to whom he committed the custody of his person. To
the odium always attaching in the minds of a spirited people
to the ruler whose yoke is imposed upon them by a foreign
power, he added further the stain of a crime which is happily
rare at all times, and of which (according to the general belief
of his subjects) no Persian monarch had ever previously been
* f r —y- Af
* * § A
~4 *. •4
cii. xxiv.] DEATHS or BINDOES AND BosTAM. 515
guilty. It was in vain that he protested his innocence: the
popular belief held him an accomplice in his father's murder,
and branded the young prince with the horrible name of
“parricide.” *
It was no doubt mainly in the hope of purging himself from
*
!
***,
this imputation that, after putting to death the subordinate
instruments" by whom his father's life had been actually
taken, he went on to institute proceedings against the chief
contrivers of the outrage—the two uncles who had ordered,
and probably witnessed, the execution. So long as the suc-
coss of his arms was doubtful, he had been happy to avail
himself of their support, and to employ their talents in the
struggle against his enemies. At one moment in his flight he
had owed his life to the self-devotion of Bindoës;" and both the
brothers had merited well of him by the efforts which they
had made to bring Armenia over to his cause, and to levy a
powerful army for him in that region." But to clear his own
character it was necessary that he should forget the ties both
of blood and gratitude, that he should sink the kinsman in the
sovereign, and the debtor in the stern avenger of blood. Ac-
cordingly, he seized Bindoës, who resided at the court, and
had him drowned in the Tigris." To Bostam, whom he had
appointed governor of Rei and Khorassan,” he sent an order of
recall, and would undoubtedly have executed him, had he
obeyed; but Bostam, suspecting his intentions, deemed it the
wisest course to revolt,” and proclaim himself independent
monarch of the north country. Here he established himself
in authority for some time, and is even said to have enlarged
his territory at the expense of some of the border chieftains;”
but the vengeance of his nephew pursued him unrelentingly,
and ere long accomplished his destruction. According to the
best authority,” the instrument employed was Bostam's wife,
the sister of Bahram, whom Chosroës induced to murder her
husband by a promise to make her the partner of his bed.
intrigues not very dissimilar in their character had been
previously employed to remove Bahram, whom the Persian
monarch had not ceased to fear, notwithstanding that he was
a fugitive and an exile. The Khan of the Turks had received
him with honor on the occasion of his flight, and, accord-
ing to some authors,” had given him his daughter in marriage.
Chosroës lived in dread of the day when the great general
might reappear in Persia, at the head of the Turkish bordes,
and challenge hiºn to renew the lately-terminated contest.”
516 THE SEVENTH MONAIROHY - - [CH. xxiv.
He therefore sent an envoy into Turkestan, well supplied with
... rich gifts, whose instructions were to procure by some means
' or other the death of Bahram. Having sounded the Khan upon
the business and met with a rebuff, the envoy addressed him-
self to the Khatün, the Khan's wife, and by liberal presents in-
duced her to come into his views. A slave was easily found
who undertook to carry out his mistress's wishes, and Bahram
was despatched the same day by means of a poisoned dagger.”
It is painful to find that one thus ungrateful to his friends
and relentless to his enemies made, to a certain extent, profes-
sion of Christianity. Little as his heart can have been pene-
trated by its spirit, Chosroës seems certainly, in the earlier
part of his reign, to have given occasion for the suspicion,
which his subjects are said to have entertained,” that he de-
signed to change his religion, and confess himself a convert to
the creed of the Greeks. During the period of his exile, he was,
it would seem, impressed by what he saw and heard of the
Christian worship and faith; he learnt to feel or profess a high
veneration for the Virgin;" and he adopted the practice, com-
mon at the time, of addressing his prayers and vows to the
Saints and martyrs, who were practically the principal objects
of the Oriental Christians' devotions. Sergius, a martyr, held
in high repute by the Christians of Osrhoëné and Mesopotamia,
was adopted by the superstitious prince as a sort of patron
Saint; and it became his habit, in circumstances of difficulty,
to vow some gift or other to the shrine of St. Sergius at Sergi-
opolis," in case of the event corresponding to his wishes. Two
occasions are recorded where, on sending his gift, he accompa-
nied it with a letter explaining the circumstances of his vow
and its fulfilment; and even the letters themselves have come
down to us,” but in a Greek version. In one, Chosroës as-
cribes the Success of his arms on a particular occasion to the
influence of his self-chosen patron; in the other, he credits him
with having procured by his prayers the pregnancy of Sira
(Shirin), the most beautiful and best beloved of his wives.” It
appears that Sira was a Christian, and that in marrying her
Chosroës had contravened the laws of his country, which for-
bade the king to have a Christian wife.” Her influence over
him was considerable,” and she is said to have been allowed to
build numerous churches and monasteries in and about Ctesi-
phon.” When she died, Chosroës called in the aid of sculpture
to perpetuate her image, and sent her statue to the Roman Em-
peror, to the Turkish Khan, and to various other potentates.”
f
i -
ch. xxiv.] CHOSROESS IPELATIONS. WITII MAURICE. 517
# |
Chosroës is said to have maintained an enormous seraglio;”
but of these Secondary wives, none is known to us even by
name, except Kurdiyeh, the sister of Bahram and widow of
Bostam, whom she murdered at Chosroës's suggestion.”
During the earlier portion of his reign Chosroës seems to
have been engaged in but few wars, and those of no great im-
portance. According to the Armenian writers,” he formed a
design of depopulating that part of Armenia which he had not
ceded to the Romans, by making a general levy of all the males,
and marching them off to the East, to fight against the Ephtha-
lites; but the design did not prosper, since the Armenians car-
ried all before them, and under their native leader, Smbat, the
Bagratunian, conquered Hyrcania and Tabaristan, defeated re-
peatedly the Koushans and the Ephthalites, and even engaged
with success the Great Khan of the Turks, who came to the
support of his vassals at the head of an army consisting of
300,000 men. By the valor and conduct of Smbat, the Persian
dominion was re-established in the north-eastern mountain re-
gion, from Mount Demavend to the Hindu Kush; the Koushans,
Turks, and Ephthalites were held in check; and the tide of
barbarism, which had threatened to submerge the empire on
this side, was effectually resisted and rolled back. -
With Rome Chosroës maintained for eleven years the mos
friendly and cordial relations. Whatever humiliation he may
have felt when he accepted the terms on which alone Maurice
was willing to render him aid, having once agreed to them, he
stified all regrets, made no attempt to evade his obligations,”
abstained from every endeavor to undo by intrigue what he
had done, unwillingly indeed, but yet with his eyes open.
Once only during the eleven years did a momentary cloud
arise between him and his benefactor. In the year A.D. 600
some of the Saracenic tribes dependent on Rome made an in-
cursion across the Euphrates into Persian territory, ravaged it
far and wide, and returned with their booty into the desert.”
Chosroës was justly offended, and might fairly have consid-
ered that a casus belli had arisen; but he allowed himself to be
pacified by the representations of Maurice's envoy, George, and
consented not to break the peace on account of so small a mat-
ter. George claimed the concession as a tribute to his own
amiable qualities; but it is probable that the Persian monarch
acted rather on the grounds of general policy than from any
personal predilection.
Two years later the virtuous but perhaps over-rigid Maurice
t
A, *
518 . THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. ſch. xxiv.
was deposed and murdered by the centurion, Phocas, who, on
the strength of his popularity with the army, boldly usurped
the throne.” Chosroës heard with indignation of the execution
of his ally and friend, of the insults offered to his remains,”
and of the assassination of his numerous sons,” and of his
brother.” One son, he heard, had been sent off by Maurice to
implore aid from the Persians;” he had been overtaken and
put to death by the emissaries of the usurper;“ but rumor, al-
ways busy where royal personages are concerned, asserted
that he lived, that he had escaped his pursuers, and had
reached Ctesiphon. Chosroës was too much interested in the
acceptance of the rumor to deny it; he gave out that Theodo-
sius was at his court, and notified that it was his intention to
assert his right to the succession.” When, five months after
his coronation, Phocas Sent an envoy to announce his occupa-
tion of the throne, and Selected the actual murderer of Maurice
to fill the post, Chosroës determined on an open rupture. He
seized Lilius, the envoy, threw him into prison," announced
his intention of avenging his deceased benefactor, and openly
declared war against Rome.
The war burst out the next year (A.D. 603). On the Roman
side there was disagreement, and even civil war; for Narses,
who had held high command in the East ever since he restored
, Chosroës to the throne of his ancestors, on hearing of the
death of Maurice, took up arms against Phocas, and, throwing
himself into Edessa, defied the forces of the usurper.” Ger-
manus, who commanded at Daras, was a general of small
capacity, and found himself quite unable to make head, either
against Narses in Edessa, or against Chosroës, who led his
troops in person into Mesopotamia. Defeated by Chosroës in
a battle near Daras, in which he received a mortal wound,
Germanus withdrew to Constantia, where he died eleven days
afterwards.” A certain Leontius, a eunuch, took his place,
but was equally unsuccessful. Chosroës defeated him at
Arxamūs, and took a great portion of his army prisoners;”
whereupon he was recalled by Phocas, and a third leader,
Domentziolus, a nephew of the emperor, was appointed to
the command. Against him the Persian monarch thought it
enough to employ generals.” The war now languished for a
short space; but in A.D. 605 Chosroës came up in person against
Taras, the great Roman stronghold in these parts, and be-
sieged it for the Space of nine months,” at the end of which
time it surrendered.” The loss was a severe blow to the
*
cII, XXIV.] IIE MARIES WAR ON PEI.O.O.A.S. 619
Roman prestige, and was followed in the next year by a long
series of calamities. Chosroës took Tur-abdin, Hesen-Cephas,
Mardin, Capher-tuta, and Amida.” Two years afterwards,
A.D. 607, he captured Harran (Carrhae”), Ras-el-ain (Resaina”),
and Edessa, the capital of Osrhoëné, after which he pressed
forward to the Euphrates, crossed with his army into Syria,
and fell with fury on the Roman cities west of the river.
Mabog or Hierapolis, Kenneserin, and Berhoea (now Aleppo),
were invested and taken "" in the course of one or at most two
campaigns; while at the same time (A.D. 609) a second Per-
sian army, under a general whose name is unknown, after op-
erating in Armenia, and taking Satala and Theodosiopolis,” in-
vaded Cappadocia and threatened the great city of Caesarea
Mazaca, which was the chief Roman stronghold in these parts.
Bands of marauders wasted the open country, carrying terror
through the fertile districts of Phyrgia and Galatia, which had
known nothing of the horrors of war for centuries, and were
rich with the accumulated products of industry. According
to Theophanes,” Some of the ravages even penetrated as far as
Chalcedon, on the opposite side of the straits from Constanti-
nople; but this is probably the anticipation of an event be-
longing to a later time.” No movements of importance are as-
signed to A.D. 610; but in the May of the next year the Per-
sians once more crossed the Euphrates, completely defeated
and destroyed the Roman army which protected Syria, and
sacked the two great cities of Apameia and Antioch.”
Meantime a change had occurred at Constantinople. The
double revolt of Heraclius, prefect of Egypt, and Gregory, his
lieutenant, had brought the reign of the brutal and incapable
Phocas to an end, and placed upon the imperial throne a
youth of promise, innocent of the blood of Maurice, and well
inclined to avenge it.” Chosroës had to consider whether he
should adhere to his original statement, that he took up arms
to punish the murderer of his friend and benefactor, and
Consequently desist from further hostilities now that Phocas
was dead, or whether, throwing consistency to the winds, he
should continue to prosecute the war, notwithstanding the
change of rulers, and endeavor to push to the utmost the advan-
tage which he had already obtained. He resolved on this latter
alternative. It was while the young Heraclius was still inse-
Cure in his seat that he sent his armies into Syria, defeated
the Roman troops, and took Antioch and Apameia. Follow-
ing up blow with blow, he the next year (A.D. 612) invaded
} -
*
fi20 THE SEVENTH MON.4 RCIIY Ich. xxiv.
Cappadocia a second time and captured Caesarea Mazaca.”
Two years later (A.D. 614) he sent his general Shahr-Barz,
into the region east of the Antilibanus, and took the ancient
and famous city of Damascus." From Damascus, in the en-
suing year, Shahr-Barz advanced against Palestine,” and,
summoning the Jews to his aid, proclaimed a Holy War
against the Christian misbelievers, whom he threatened to en-
slave or exterminate. Twenty-six thousand of these fanatics
flocked to his standard; and having occupied the Jordan
region and Galileee, Shahr-Barz in A.D. 615 invested Jeru-
salem, and after a siege of eighteen days” forced his way into
the town, and gave it over to plunder and rapine. The cruel
hostility of the Jews had free vent. The churches of Helena,
of Constantine, of the Holy Sepulchre, of the Resurrection,
and many others, were burnt or ruined;" the greater part of
the city was destroyed; the sacred treasuries were plundered;
the relics scattered or carried off; and a massacre of the in-
habitants, in which the Jews took the chief part, raged
throughout the whole city for some days. As many as
seventeen thousand or, according to another account, ninety
thousand, were slain." Thirty-five thousand were made
prisoners.” Among them was the aged Patriarch, Zacharius,
who was carried captive into Persia, where he remained till
his death.” -
The Cross found by Helena, and believed to be “the True
Cross,” was at the same time transported to Ctesiphon, where
it was preserved with care and duly venerated by the Chris-
tian wife of Chosroes.” .
A still more important success followed. In A.D. 616 Shahr-
Barz proceeded from Palestine into Egypt, which had enjoyed
a respite from foreign war since the time of Julius Caesar,
surprised Pelusium, the key of the country, and, pressing for-
ward across the Delta, easily made himself master of the rich
and prosperous Alexandria.” John the Merciful, who was
the Patriarch, and Nicétas the Patrician, who was the
governor, had quitted the city before his arrival, and had fled
to Cyprus.” Hence scarcely any resistance was made. The
fall of Alexandria was followed at once by the complete sub-
mission of the rest of Egypt.” Bands of Persians advanced
up the Nile valley to the very confines of Ethiopia, and
established the authority of Chosroës over the whole country
—a country in which no Persian had set foot since it was
wrested by Alexander of Macedon from Darius Codomannus.
2
*
y
ch. xxiv.] GREAT SUCCESSES OF CHOSROES. Ö21
While this remärkable conquest was made in the South-
west, in the north-west another Persian army under another
general, Saina or Shahēn,” starting from Cappadocia, marched
through Asia Minor to the shores of the Thracian Bosphorus,
and laid siege to the strong city of Chalcedon, which lay upon
the strait, just opposite Constantinople. Chalcedon made a
vigorous resistance; and Heraclius, anxious to save it, had an
interview with Shahēn, and at his suggestion sent three of his
highest nobles as ambassadors to Chosroës," with a humble re-
quest for peace. The overture was ineffectual. Chosroës im-
prisoned the ambassadors and entreated them cruelly;"
threatened Shahēn with death for not bringing Heraclius in
chains to the foot of his throne;" and declared in reply that he
would grant no terms of peace—the empire was his, and Her-
aclius must descend from his throne.” Soon afterwards (A.D.
617) Chalcedon, which was besieged through the winter, fell;”
and the Persians established themselves in this important
stronghold, within a mile of Constantinople.” Three years
afterwards, Ancyra (Angora), which had hitherto resisted the
Persian arms, was taken;” and Rhodes, though inaccessible to
an enemy who was without a naval force, submitted.”
Thus the whole of the Roman possessions in Asia and Eastern
Africa were lost in the space of fifteen years.” The empire of
Persia was extended from the Tigris and Euphrates to the
Egean and the Nile, attaining once more almost the same
dimensions that it had reached under the first and had kept
until the third Darius. It is difficult to say how far their
newly acquired provinces were really subdued, organized, and
governed from Ctesiphon, how far they were merely overrun,
plundered, and then left to themselves. On the one hand, we
have indications of the existence of terrible disorders and of
something approaching to anarchy in parts of the conquered
territory during the time that it was held by the Persians; on
the other, we seem to see an intention to retain, to govern,
and even to beautify it. Eutychius relates” that, on the witn-
drawal of the Romans from Syria, the Jews resident in Tyre,
who numbered four thousand, plotted with their co-religionists
of Jerusalem, Cyprus, Damascus, and Galilee, a general mas-
Sacre of the Tyrian Christians on a certain day. The plot was
discovered; and the Jews of Tyre were arrested and im-
prisoned by their fellow-citizens, who put the city in a state of
defence; and when the foreign Jews, to the number of 26,000,
came at the appointed time, repulsed them from the walls,
*
- f -
522 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. . [ch. xxiv.
and defeated them with great slaughter. This story suggests
the idea of a complete and general disorganization. But on
the other hand we hear of an augmentation of the revenue”
under Chosroës II., which seems to imply the establishment in
the regions conquered of a settled government; and the palace
at Mashita, discovered by a recent traveller," is a striking
proof that no temporary occupation was contemplated, but
that Chosroës regarded his conquests as permanent acquisi-
tions, and meant to hold them and even visit them occasionally.
Heraclius was now well-nigh driven to despair. The loss of
Egypt reduced Constantinople to want,” and its noisy popu-
lace clamored for food. The Avars overran Thrace, and con-
tinually approached nearer to the capital.” The glitter of the
Persian arms was to be seen at any moment, if he looked from
his palace windows across the Bosphorus. No prospect of as-
<sistance or relief appeared from any quarter. The empire was
“reduced to the walls of Constantinople, with the remnant of
Greece, Italy, and Africa, and some maritime cities, from Tyre
to Trebizond, of the Asiatic Coast.”” It is not surprising that
under the circumstances the despondent monarch determined
on flight, and secretly made arrangements for transporting
himself and his treasures to the distant Carthage,” where he
might hope at least to find himself in safety. His ships, laden
with their precious freight, had put to sea, and he was about
to follow them, when his intention became known or was sus-
pected; the people rose; and the Patriarch, espousing their
side, forced the reluctant prince to accompany him to the
church of St. Sophia, and there make oath that, come what
might, he would not separate his fortunes from those of the
imperial city.”
Baffled in his design to escape from his difficulties by flight,
Heraclius took a desperate resolution. He would leave Con-
stantinople to its fate, trust its safety to the protection afforded
by its walls and by the strait which separated it from Asia,”
embark with such troops as he could collect, and ‘carry the
war into the enemy's country. The one advantage which he had
over his adversary was his possession of an ample navy, and con-
sequent command of the sea and power to strike his blows unex-
pectedly in different quarters. On making known his inten-
tion, it was not opposed, either by the people or by the Patri-
arch.” He was allowed to coin the treasures of the various
churches into money, “to collect stores, enroll troops, and, on
the Easter Monday" of A.D.622, to set forth on his expedition.
ch. xxiv.] BOLD RESOLUTION OF HERACLIUS, 523
His fleet was steered southward, and, though forced to contend
with adverse gales,” made a speedy and successful voyage
through the Propontis, the Hellespont, the Egean, and the
Cilician Strait, to the Gulf of Issus,” in the angle between
Asia Minor and Syria. Thé position was well chosen, as one
where attack was difficult, where numbers would give little ad-
vantage, and where consequently a small but resolute force
might easily maintain itself against a greatly superior enemy.
At the same time it was a post from which an advance might
conveniently be made in several directions, and which menaced
almost equally Asia Minor, Syria, and Armenia. Moreover, the
level tract between the mountains and the sea was broad
enough for the manoeuvres of such an army as Heraclius com-
manded, and allowed him to train his soldiers by exercises and
sham fights to a familiarity with the sights and Sounds and
movements of a battle.” He conjectured, rightly enough, that
he would not long be left unmolested by the enemy. Shahr-
Barz, the conqueror of Jerusalem and Egypt, was very soon
sent against him;” and, after various movements, which it is
impossible to follow, a battle was fought between the two
armies in the mountain country towards the Armenian fron-
tier, in which the hero of a hundred fights was defeated,” and
the Romans, for the first time since the death of Maurice, ob-
tained a victory. After this, on the approach of winter,
Heraclius, accompanied probably by a portion of his army, re-
turned by sea to Constantinople.”
The next year the attack was made in a different quarter.
Having concluded alliances with the Khan of the Khazars and
Some other chiefs of inferior power,” Heraclius in the month
of March embarked with 5000 men,” and proceeded from Con-
stantinople by way of the Black Sea first to Trebizond,” and
then to Mingrelia or Lazica.” There he obtained contingents
from his allies, which, added to the forces collected from
Trebizond and the other maritime towns, may perhaps have
raised his troops to the number of 120,000, at which we find
them estimated." With this army, he crossed the Araxes,”
and invaded Armenia. Chosroës, on receiving the intelli-
gence, proceeded into Azerbijan with 40,000 men, and occu-
pied the strong city of Canzaca,” the site of which is probably
marked by the ruins known as Takht-i-Suleiman.” At the
Same time he ordered two other armies, which he had sent on.
in advance, one of them commanded by Shahr-Barz, the other
-
by Shahēn, to effect a junction and oppose themselves to the
.*
z
524 THE SH, VENTH MOWAROH Y. ſch. xxiv.
further progress of the emperor.” The two generals were,
however, tardy in their movements," or at any rate were
outstripped by the activity of Heraclius, who, pressing for-
‘ward from Armenia into Azerbijan, directed his march upon
Canzaca, hoping to bring the Great King to a battle. His
advance-guard of Saracens did actually surprise the picquets
of Chosroës;” but the king himself hastily evacuated the
Median stronghold, and retreated southwards through Arde-
1an towards the Zagros mountains, thus avoiding the engage-
ment which was desired by his antagonist. The army, on
witnessing the flight of their monarch, broke up - and dis-
persed.” Heraclius pressed upon the flying host and slew all
whom he caught, but did not suffer himself to be diverted
... from his main object, which was to overtake Chosroës. His
pursuit, however, was unsuccessful. Chosroës availed himself
of the rough and difficult country which lies between Azerbi-
jan and the Mesopotamian lowland, and by moving from
place to place contrive to baffle his enemy.” Winter arrived,
and Heraclius had to determine whether he would continue
his quest at the risk of having to pass the cold season in the
enemy's country, far from all his resources, or relinquish it
and retreat to a safe position. Finding his soldiers divided in
their wishes, he trusted the decision to chance, and opening
the Gospel at random settled the doubt by applying the first
passage that met his eye to its solution. The passage sug-
gested retreat; and Heraclius, retracing his steps, recrossed
the Araxes, and wintered in Albania.” -
The return of Heraclius was not unmolested. He had ex-
cited the fanaticism of the Persians by destroying, wherever
he went, the temples of the Magians,” and extinguishing the
Sacred fire, which it was a part of their religion to keep con-
tinually burning. He had also everywhere delivered the
cities and villages to the flames, and carried off many thou-
Sands of the population. The exasperated enemy conse-
quently hung upon his rear, impeded his march, and no doubt
caused him considerable loss, though, when it came to fight-
ing, Heraclius always gained the victory." He reached
Albania without Sustaining any serious disaster, and even
brought with him 50,000 captives; but motives of pity, or of
Self-interest, caused him soon afterwards to set these prisoners
free.” It would have been difficult to feed and house them
through the long and severe winter, and disgraceful to sell or
massacre them.
ch. xxiv. VICTORIES OF HERAOLIUS IN PERSIA. 525
In the year A.D. 624 Chosroës took the offensive, and, before
Heraclius had quitted his winter quarters, sent a general, at
the head of a force of picked troops, into Albania,” with the
view of detaining him in that remote province during the sea-
son of military Operations. But Sarablagas feared his adver-
sary too much to be able very effectually to check his move-
ments; he was content to guard the passes, and hold the high
ground, without hazarding an engagement. Heraclius con-
trived after a time to avoid him, and penetrated into Persia
through a series of plains, probably those along the course and
about the mouth of the Araxes. It was now his wish to push
rapidly southward; but the auxiliaries on whom he greatly de-
pended” were unwilling; and, while he doubted what course
to take. three Persian armies, under commanders of note,”
closed in upon him, and threatened his small force with de-
struction. Heraclius feigned a disordered flight, and drew on-
him an attack from two out of the three chiefs, which he easily
repelled. Then he fell upon the third, Shahēn, and completely
defeated him. A way seemed to be thus opened for him into
the heart of Persia, and he once more set off to seek Chosroës;
but now his allies began to desert his standard, and return to
their homes;” the defeated Persians rallied and impeded his
march; he was obliged to content himself with a third victory,
at a place which Theophanes calls Salban,” where he surprised
Shahr-Barz in the dead of the night, massacred his troops, his
wives, his officers, and the mass of the population, which fought
from the fiat roofs of the houses, took the general's arms and
equipage, and was within a little of capturing Shahr-barz him-
self.” The remnant of the Persian army fled in disorder, and
was hunted down by Heraclius, who pursued the fugitives un-
ceasingly till the cold Season approached, and he had to retire
into cantonments. The half-burnt Salban afforded a welcome
shelter to his troops during the snows and storms of an Arme-
nian winter.” . -
Early in the ensuing spring the indefatigable emperor again
Set his troops in motion, and, passing the lofty range” which
Separates the basin of Lake Van from the streams that flow
into the upper Tigris, struck that river, or rather its large
affluent, the Bitlis Chai,” in seven days from Salban, crossed
into Arzanene, and proceeding westward recovered Martyr-
opolis and Amida,” which had now been in the possession of
the Persians for twenty years.” At Amida he made a halt, and
wrote to inform the Senate of Constantinople of his position
*
526 THE SEWEWTH MON. I’CII Y. [CH. xxIV.
, and his victories, intelligence which they must have received
gladly after having lost sight of him for above a twelvemonth.
But he was not allowed to remain long undisturbed. Before
the end of March Shahr-Barz had again taken the field in force,
had occupied the usual passage of the Euphrates, and threat-
ened the line of retreat which Heraclius had looked upon as
open to him. Unable to cross the Euphrates by the bridge,
which Shahr-barz had broken,” the emperor descended the
stream till he found a ford, when he transported his army to
the other bank, and hastened by way of Samosata and Germa-
nicaea” into Cilicia. Here he was once more in his own terri-
tory, with the sea close at hand, ready to bring him supplies or
afford him a Safe retreat, in a position with whose advantages
he was familiar,” where broad plains gave an opportunity for
skilful maneuvers, and deep rapid rivers rendered defence
easy. Heraclius took up a position on the right bank of the
Sarus (Syhun), in the immediate vicinity of the fortified bridge
by which alone the stream could be crossed.” Shahr-Barz
followed, and ranged his troops along the left bank, placing
the archers in the front line, while he made preparations to
draw the enemy from the defence of the bridge into the plain
on the other side. He was so far successful that the Roman
occupation of the bridge was endangered; but Heraclius, by his
personal valor and by almost superhuman exertions,” restored
the day; with his own hand he struck down a Persian of gigan-
tic stature and flung him from the bridge into the river; then
pushing on with a few companions, he charged the Persian host
in the plain, receiving undaunted a shower of blows, while he
dealt destruction on all sides.” The fight was prolonged until
the evening and even then was undecided; but Shahr-Barz had
convinced himself that he could not renew the combat with any
prospect of victory. He therefore retreated during the night,
and withdrew from Cilicia.” Heraclius, finding himself free
to march where he pleased, crossed the Taurus, and proceeded
to Sebaste (Sivas), upon the Halys, where he wintered in the
heart of Cappadocia, about half-way between the two seas. AC-
cording to Theophanes,” the Persian monarch was so much
enraged at this bold and adventurous march, and at the suc-
cess which had attended it, that, by way of revenging himself
on Heraclius, he seized the treasures of all the Christian churches
in his dominions, and compelled the orthodox believers to em-
brace the Nestorian heresy. s
The twenty-fourth year of the war had now arrived, and it
|
*
*s
L.
ch. xxiv.] ALLIANCE OF CHOSFOR'S WITH THE AWARS 527
was difficult to say on which side lay the balance of advantage. .
If Chosroës still maintained his hold on Syria, Egypt, and Asia
Minor as far as Chalcedon, if his troops still flaunted their ban-
ners within sight of Constantinople, yet on the other hand he
had seen his hereditary dominions deeply penetrated by the
armies of his adversary; he had had his best generals defeated,
his cities and palaces burnt, his favorite provinces wasted;
Heraclius had proved himself a most formidable opponent; and
unless some vital blow could be dealt him at home, there was
no forecasting the damage that he might not inflict on Persia
by a fresh invasion. Chosroës therefore made a desperate at-
tempt to bring the war to a close by an effort, the success of
which would have changed the history of the world. Having
enrolled as soldiers, besides Persians, a vast number of foreign-
ers and slaves,” and having concluded a close alliance with the
Khan of the Avars, he formed two great armies,” one of which
was intended to watch Heraclius in Asia Minor, while the other
co-operated with the Avars and forced Constantinople to sur-
render. The army destined to contend with the emperor was
placed under the command of Shahēn; that which was to bear
a part in the siege of Constantinople was committed to Shahr-
Barz. It is remarkable that Heraclius, though quite aware of
his adversary's plans, instead of seeking to baffle them, made
such arrangements as facilitated the attempt to put them into
execution. He divided his own troops into three bodies, one
only of which he sent to aid in the defence of his capital.”
The second body he left with his brother Theodore, whom he
regarded as a sufficient match for Shahēn. With the third di-
vision he proceeded eastward to the remote province of Lazica,”
and there engaged in operations which could but very slightly
affect the general course of the war. The Khazars were once
more called in as allies; and their Khan, Ziebel, who coveted
the plunder of Tiflis, held an interview with the emperor in the
sight of the Persians who guarded that town, adored his ma-
jesty, and received from his hands the diadem that adorned
his own brow.” Richly entertained, and presented with all
the plate used in the banquet, with a royal robe, and a pair of
pearl earrings, promised moreover the daughter of the em-
peror(whose portrait he was shown) in marriage, the barbarian
chief, dazzled and flattered, readily concluded an alliance, and
asSociated his arms with those of the Romans.” A joint at-
tack was made upon Tiflis,” and the town was reduced to ex-
tremities; when Sarablagas, with a thousand men, contrived
52s THIS SEVENTH MONARCIIY. [CII. xxiv.
to throw himself into it, and the allies, disheartened thereby,
raised the siege and retired.
Meanwhile, in Asia Minor, Theodore engaged the army of
Shahēn; and, a violent hailstorm raging at the time, which
drove into the enemy's face, while the Romans were, compara-
tively speaking, sheltered from its force, he succeeded in de-
feating his antagonist with great slaughter. Choroës was in-
furiated; and the displeasure of his sovereign weighed so
heavily upon the mind of Shahēn that he shortly afterwards
sickened and died. The barbarous monarch gave orders that
his corpse should be embalmed and sent to the court, in order
that he might gratify his spleen by treating it with the grossest
indignity.” -
At Constantinople the Persian cause was equally unsuccess-
ful. Shahr-Barz, from Chalcedon, entered into negotiations
with the Khan of the Avars, and found but little difficulty in
persuading him to make an attempt upon the imperial city.
Erom their seats beyond the Danube a host of barbarians—
Avars, Slaves, Gepidae, Bulgarians,” and others—advanced
through the passes of Haemus into the plains of Thrace, de-
stroying and ravaging. The population fled before them and
sought the protection of the city walls, which had been carefully
strengthened in expectation of the attack, and were in good
order.” The hordes forced the outer works; but all their ef-
forts, though made both by land and Sea, were unavailing
against the main defences; their attempt to sap the wall failed;
their artillery was met and crushed by engines of greater
power;” a fleet of Slavonian canoes, which endeavored to force
an entrance by the Golden Horn,” was destroyed or driven
ashore;” the towers with which they sought to overtop the
walls were burnt;" and, after ten days of constantly repeated
assaults,” the barbarian leader became convinced that he had
undertaken an impossible enterprise, and, having burnt his
engines and his siege works,” he retired. The result might
have been different had the Persians, who were experienced in
the attack of walled places, been able to co-operate with him;
but the narrow channel which flowed between Chalcedon and
the Golden Horn proved an insurmountable barrier; the Per-
sians had no ships, and the canoes of the Slavonians were quite
unable to contend with the powerful galleys of the Byzantines,
so that the transport of a body of Persian troops from Asia to
Europe by their aid proved impracticable.” Shahr-Barz had
the annoyance of witnessing the efforts and defeat of his allies,
ch. xxiv.] HERACLIUS MARCHES UPON DASTAGHERD. 529
without having it in his power to take any active steps towards
assisting the One or hindering the other.
The war now approached its termination; for the last hope”
of the Persians had failed; and Heraclius, with his mind set at
rest as regarded his capital, was free to strike at any part of
Persia that he pleased, and, having the prestige of victory and
the assistance of the Khazars, was likely to carry all before
him. It is not clear” how he employed himself during the
spring and summer of A.D. 627; but in the September of that
year he started from Lazica” with a large Roman army and a
contingent of 40,000 Khazar horse,” resolved to surprise his
adversary by a winter campaign, and hoping to take him at a
disadvantage. Passing rapidly through Armenia and Azer-
bijan without meeting an enemy that dared to dispute his
advance, suffering no loss except from the guerilla warfare of
some bold spirits among the mountaineers of those regions,”
he resolved, notwithstanding the defection of the Khazars,”
who declined to accompany him further south than Azerbijan,
that he would cross the Zagros mountains into Assyria, and
make a dash at the royal cities of the Mesopotamian region,
thus retaliating upon Chosroës for the Avar attack upon Con-
stantinople of the preceding year, undertaken at his instiga-
tion. Chosroës himself had for the last twenty-four years
fixed his court at Dastagherd” in the plain country, about
seventy miles to the north of Ctesiphon.” It seemed to Her-
aclius that this position might perhaps be reached, and an
effective blow struck against the Persian power. He hastened,
therefore, to cross the mountains; and the 9th of October saw
him at Chnaethas,” in the low country, not far from Arbela,
where he refreshed his army by a week's rest. He might now
easily have advanced along the great post-road which con-
nected Arbela with Dastagherd and Ctesiphon; but he had
probably by this time received information of the movements
of the Persians, and was aware that by so doing he would
place himself between two fires, and run the chance of being
intercepted in his retreat. For Chosroës, having collected a
large force, had sent it, under Rhazates, a new general, into
Azerbijan;” and this force, having reached Canzaca, found
itself in the rear of Heraclius, between him and Lazica.
Heraclius appears not to have thought it safe to leave this
enemy behind him, and therefore he idled away above a
month in the Zab region, waiting for Rhazates to make his
appearance. That general had strict orders from the Great
Af
2.
*.
¥
- - —r- - f
* * / *-
*
p30 , THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. [CH. xxiv.
King to fight the Romans wherever he found them, whatever
might be the consequence;” and he therefore followed, as
quickly as he could, upon Heraclius's footsteps, and early in
December came up with him in the neighborhood of Nineveh.
Both parties were anxious for an immediate engagement,
Rhazates to carry out his master's Orders, Heraclius because
he had heard that his adversary would soon receive a rein-
forcement. The battle took place on the 12th of December,”
in the open plain to the north of Nineveh." It was contested
from early dawn to the eleventh hour of the day, and was
finally decided, more by the accident that Rhazates and the
other Persian commanders were slain, than by any defeat of
the soldiers. Heraclius is said to have distinguished himself
personally during the fight by many valiant exploits;” but he
does not appear to have exhibited any remarkable strategy on
the occasion. The Persians lost their generals, their chariots,
and as many as twenty-eight standards;” but they were not
routed, nor driven from the field. They merely drew off to
the distance of two bowshots,” and there stood firm till after
nightfall. During the night they fell back further upon their
fortified camp, collected their baggage, and retired to a strong
position at the foot of the mountains. Here they were joined
by the reinforcement which Chosroës had sent to their aid;"
and thus strengthened they ventured to approach Heraclius
once more, to hang on his rear, and impede his movements.
He, after his victory, had resumed his march southward, had
occupied Nineveh, recrossed the Great Zab, advanced rapidly
through Adiabéné to the Lesser Zab, seized its bridges by a
forced march of forty-eight (Roman) miles, and conveyed his
army safely to its left bank, where he pitched his camp at a
place called Yesdem,” and once more allowed his soldiers a
brief repose for the purpose of keeping Christmas. Chosroës
had by this time heard of the defeat and death of Rhazates,
and was in a state of extreme alarm. Hastily recalling Shahr-
Barz from Chalcedon,” and ordering the troops lately com-
manded by Rhazates to outstrip the Romans, if possible, and
interpose themselves between Heraclius and Dastagherd,” he
took up a strong position near that place with his own army
and a number of elephants, and expressed an intention of
there awaiting his antagonist. A broad and deep river, or
rather canal, known as the Baras-roth or Barazrud,” pro-)
tected his front; while at some distance further in advance
was the Torna, probably another canal,” where he expected
* *
*
CH. xxiv.] FLIGHT OF CHOSROES. * → 531
that the army of Rhazates would make a stand. But that -
force, demoralized by its recent defeat, fell back from the line
of the Torna, without even destroying the bridge over it;">
and Chosroës, finding the foe advancing on him, lost heart,
and secretly fled from Dastagherd to Ctesiphon,” whence he
crossed the Tigris to Guedeseer or Seleucia, with his treasure
and the best-loved of his wives and children.” The army.
lately under Rhazates rallied upon the line of the Nahr-wan"
canal, three miles from Ctesiphon; and here it was largely
reinforced, though with a mere worthless mob of slaves and ,
domestics.” It made however a formidable show, supported
by its elephants, which numbered two hundred; it had a deep
and wide cutting in its front; and, this time, it had taken care
to destroy all the bridges by which the cutting might have ,
been crossed. Heraclius, having plundered the rich palace of
Dastagherd,” together with several less splendid royal resi-
dences, and having on the 10th of January encamped within
twelve miles of the Nahr-wan,” and learnt from the com-
mander of the Armenian contingent, whom he sent forward
to reconnoitre, that the canal was impassable, came to the
conclusion that his expedition had reached its extreme limit,
and that prudence required him to commence his retreat.
The season had been, it would geem, exceptionally mild,” and
the passes of the mountains were still open; but it was to
be expected that in a few weeks they would be closed by the
Snow, which always falls heavily during some portion of
the winter. Heraclius, therefore, like Julian,” having come
within sight of Ctesiphon, shrank from the idea of besieging it,
and, content with the punishment that he had inflicted on his
enemy by wasting and devastation, desisted from his expedi-
tion, and retraced his steps. In his retreat he was more for-
tunate than his great predecessor. The defeat which he had
inflicted on the main army of the Persians paralyzed their
energies, and it would seem that his return march was un-
molested. He reached Siazurus (Shehrizur) early in Feb-
ruary,” Barzan (Berozeh) probably on the 1st of March,” and
On the 11th of March Canzaca,” where he remained during the
rest of the winter.
Chosroës had escaped a great danger, but he had incurred a
terrible disgrace. He had fled before his adversary without
Venturing to give him battle. He had seen palace after palace
destroyed, and had lost the magnificent residence where he had
held his court for the last four-and-twenty years. The Romans
- - – - —r— W
532 THE SEVENTH MoMARCH.P. [CH. XXIV.
C \.
had recovered 300 standards,” trophies gained in the numerous
, victories of his early years. They had shown themselves able
to penetrate into the heart of his empire, and to retire without
suffering any loss. Still, had he possessed a moderate amount
of prudence, Chosroës might even now have surmounted the
perils of his position, and have terminated his reign in tran-
i quillity, if not in glory. Heraclius was anxious for peace,”
and willing to grant it on reasonable conditions. He did not
aim at conquests, and would have been contented at any time
with the restoration of Egypt, Syria, and Asia Minor. The
Bersians generally were weary of the war, and would have
hailed with joy almost any terms of accommodation.” But
Chosroës was obstinate; he did not know how to bear the
frowns of fortune; the disasters of the late campaign, instead
of bending his spirit, had simply exasperated him, and he
vented upon his own subjects the ill-humor which the successes
of his enemies had provoked. Lending a too ready ear to a
whispered slander, he ordered the execution of Shahr-Barz, and
thus mortally offended that generai, to whom the despatch was
communicated by the Romans.” He imprisoned the officers
who had been defeated by, or had fled before Heraclius.” Sev-
eral other tyrannical acts are alleged against him;” and it is
said” that he was contemplating the setting aside of his legiti-
mate successor, Siroës, in favor of a younger son, Merdasas,
his offspring by his favorite wife, the Christian Shirin,” when
a rebellion broke out against his authority. Gurdanaspa,”
who was in command of the Persian troops at Ctesiphon, and
twenty-two nobles of importance,” including two sons of
Shahr-Barz,” embraced the cause of Siroës, and seizing Chos-
roës, who meditated flight,” committed him to “the House of
Darkness,” a strong place where he kept his money.” Here
he was confined for four days, his jailers allowing him daily a
morsel of bread and a small quantity of water; when he com-
plained of hunger, they told him, by his son's orders, that he
was welcome to satisfy his appetite by feasting upon his treas-
ures. The officers whom he had confined were allowed free
access to his prison, where they insulted him and spat upon
him. Merdasas, the son whom he preferred, and several of his
other children, were brought into his presence and put to death
before his eyes. After suffering in this way for four days he
was at last, on the fifth day from his arrest (February 28), put
to death in some cruel fashion, perhaps, like St. Sebastian, by
being transfixed with arrows.” Thus perished miserably the
|
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- F — —w- s—
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ch. xxiv.] CHARAgTER OF CHOSRoßs II. . , 533
second Chosroës, after having reigned thirty-seven years”
(A.D. 591-628), a just but tardy Nemesis overtaking the parri-
cide. g
The Oriental writers represent the second Chosroës as a
monarch whose character was orginally admirable, but
whose good disposition was gradually corrupted by the pos- $
session of sovereign power. “Parviz,” says Mirkhond,” -
“holds a distinguished rank among the kings of Persia
through the majesty and firmness of his government, the wis-
dom of his views, and his intrepidity in carrying them out, the
size of his army, the amount of his treasure, the flourishing
condition of the provinces during his reign, the security of the
highways, the prompt and exact obedience which he enforced,
and his unalterable adherence to the plans which he once |
formed.” It is impossible that these praises can have been
altogether undeserved; and we are bound to assign to this .
monarch, on the authority of the Orientals, a vigor of admin-
istration, a strength of will, and a capacity for governing, not -
very commonly possessed by princes born in the purple. To #
these merits we may add a certain grandeur of soul, and power ,
of appreciating the beautiful and the magnificent, which, * *
though not uncommon in the East, did not characterize many
of the Sassanian sovereigns. The architectural remains of
Chosroës, which will be noticed in a future chapter, the de-
scriptions which have come down to us of his palaces at *
Dastagherd” and Canzaca,” the accounts which we have of -
his treasures,” his court,” his seraglio,” even his seals,” ,"
transcend all that is known of any other monarch of his line. . .
The employment of Byzantine sculptors and architects, which
his works are thought to indicate, implies an appreciation of
artistic excellence very rare among Orientals. But against
these merits must be set a number of most serious moral de-
fects, which may have been aggravated as time went on, but
of which we see something more than the germ, even while he
was still a youth. The murder of his father was perhaps a
state necessity, and he may not have commanded it, or have
been accessory to it before the fact:” but his ingratitude to-
wards his uncles, whom he deliberately put to death, is wholly
unpardonable, and shows him to have been cruel, selfish, and
utterly without natural affection, even in the earlier portion of
his reign. In war he exhibited neither courage nor conduct;
all his main military successes were due to his generals; and
in his later years he seems never voluntarily to have exposed
.*-
+
— — — — — -- - - * ,
&
^, ... <
534 f - THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. . [CH. xxiv.
himself to danger. In suspecting his generals, and ill-using
them while living, he only followed the traditions of his
house;” but the insults offered to the dead body of Shahēn.
whose only fault was that he had suffered a defeat, were un-
usual and outrageous. The accounts given of his seraglio im-
ply either gross Sénsualism or extreme Ostentation; perhaps
we may be justified in inclining to the more lenient view, if we
take into consideration the faithful attachment which he ex-
hibited towards Shirin.” The cruelties which disgraced his
later years are wholly without excuse; but in the act which
deprived him of his throne, and brought him to a miserable
end—his preference of Merdasas as his successor—he exhibited
no worse fault than an amiable weakness, a partiality towards
, the son of a wife who possessed, and seems to have deserved,”
N
his affection.
The coins of the second Chosroës are numerous in the ex-
* * treme,” and present several peculiarities. The ordinary type
has, on the obverse, the king's head in profile, covered by a
tiara, of which the chief ornament is a crescent and star be-
tween two outstretched wings. The head is surrounded by a
double pearl bordering, outside of which, in the margin, are
three crescents and stars. The legend is Khusrwi af2wd, with
a monogram of doubtful meaning.” The reverse shows the
usual fire altar and supporters, in a rude form, enclosed by a
triple pearl bordering. In the margin, outside the bordering,
are four crescents and stars. The legend is merely the regnal
year and a mint-mark. Thirty-four mint-marks” have been
ascribed to Chosroës II. [Pl. XXIII., Fig. 4.]
s A rarer and more curious type of coin,” belonging to this
monarch, presents on the obverse the front face of the king,
surmounted by a mural crown, having the star and crescent
between outstretched wings at top. The legend is Khusruï
malkan malka — afzud. “Chosroës, king of kings—increase
(be his).” The reverse has a head like that of a woman, also
fronting the spectator, and wearing a band enriched with pearls
across the forehead, above which the hair gradually converges
to a point. [Pl. XXIV., Fig. 1.] A head very similar to this is
found on Indo-Sassanian coins.” Otherwise we might have
supposed that the uxorious monarch had wished to circulate
among his subjects the portrait of his beloved Shirin.
/.
* * * - — — - -
* ~ Y. * \
ch. xxv.1, ACCESSION OF KOBAD II:
*
* CHAPTER XXV.
Accession of Siroës, or Kobad II. His Letter to Heraclius.
- Peace made with Rome. Terms of the Peace. General
Popularity of the new Reign. Dissatisfaction of Shahr- .
- Barz. Kobad, by the advice of the Persian Lords, murders
his Brothers. His Sisters reproach him with their Death.
He falls into low spirits and dies. Pestilence in his Reign.
His coins. Accession of Artaxerxes III. Revolt of Shahr- ,
Barz. Reign of Shahr-Barz. His Murder. Reign of
Purandocht. Rapid Succession of Pretenders. Accession
of Isdigerd III. -
“Kobades, regno praefectus, justitiam prae se tulit, et injuriam qua oppressa
fuerat amovit.”—Eutychius, Annales, vol., ii. p. 252.
SIRoßs, or Kobad the Second, as he is more properly termed,”
was proclaimed king on the 25th of February,” A.D. 628, four
days before the murder of his father. According to the Orien-
tal writers,” he was very unwilling to put his father to death,
and only gave a reluctant consent to his execution on the rep-
resentations of his nobles that it was a state of necessity. His
first care, after this urgent matter had been settled, was to
make overtures of peace to Heraclius, who, having Safely
crossed the Zagros mountains,” was wintering at Canzaca.
The letter which he addressed to the Roman Emperor on the
occasion is partially extant; but the formal and official tone
which it breathes renders it a somewhat disappointing docu-
ment. Kobad begins by addressing Heraclius as his brother,
and giving him the epithet of “most clement,” “thus assuming
his pacific disposition. He then declares, that, having been
elevated to the throne by the especial favor of God, he has re-
solved to do his utmost to benefit and serve the entire human
race. He has therefore commenced his reign by throwing open
the prison doors, and restoring liberty to all who were detained
in custody." With the same object in view, he is desirous of
living in peace and friendship with the Roman emperor and
state as well as with all other neighboring nations and kings.
ASSuming that his accession will be pleasing to the emperor,
he has sent Phaeak, one of his privy councillors, to express the
~5
t
— — — — — — - 7 tº-
— — — — . * * !'
l
{j}6 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xxv.
{ \ ---
love and friendship that he feels towards his brother, and learn
the terms upon which peace will be granted him." The reply
of Heraclius is lost; but we are able to gather from a short
summary which has been preserved,” as well as from the sub-
sequent course of events, that it was complimentary and fa-
vorable; that it expressed the willingness of the emperor to
bring the war to a close, and suggested terms of accommoda-
tion that were moderate and equitable. The exact formulation
of the treaty seems to have been left to Eustathius, who, after
Heraclius had entertained Phaeak royally for nearly a week,”
accompanied the ambassador on his return to the Persian
Court. .
The general principle upon which peace was concluded was
evidently the status quo ante bellum. Persia was to surrender
Egypt, Palestine, Syria, Asia Minor, Western Mesopotamia,
and any other conquests that she might have made from Rome,
to recall her troops from them,” and to give them back into the
possession of the Romans. She was also to surrender all the
captives whom she had carried off from the conquered coun-
tries;” and, above all, she was to give back to the Romans the
precious relic which had been taken from Jerusalem,” and
which was believed on all hands to be the veritable cross
whereon Jesus Christ suffered death. As Rome had merely
, made inroads, but not conquests, she did not possess any terri-
tory to surrender; but she doubtless set her Persian prisoners
free, and she made arrangements for the safe conduct and hon-
orable treatment of the Persians, who evacuated Syria, Egypt,
and Asia Minor, on their way to the frontier.” The evacuation
was at once commenced; and the wood of the cross, which had
been carefully preserved by the Persian queen, Shirin,” was
restored. In the next year,” Heraclius made a grand pilgrim-
age to Jerusalem, and replaced the holy relic in the shrine from
which it had been taken.
It is said that princes are always popular on their coronation
day. Kobad was certainly no exception to the general rule.”
His subjects rejoiced at the termination of a war which had
always been a serious drain on the population, and which lat-
terly had brought ruin and desolation upon the hearths and
homes of thousands. The general emptying of the prisons was
an act that cannot be called statesmanlike; but it had a spe-
cious appearance of liberality, and was probably viewed with
favor by the mass of the people. A still more popular measure
must have been the complete remission of taxes with which
* , * *
*. - * i - { *
CII. xxv.] A TTITUDE OF SHAHR-BARZ. A 537
Kobad inaugurated his reign”—a remission which, according
to one authority, was to have continued for three years, had
the generous prince lived. So long. In addition to these some-
what questionable proceedings, Kobad adopted also a more
legitimate mode of securing the regard of his subjects by a -
careful administration of justice,” and a mild treatment of
those who had been the victims of his father's severities. He
restored to their former rank the persons whom Chosroës had
degraded or imprisoned, and compensated them for their in-
juries by a liberal donation of money.”
Thus far all seemed to promise well for the new reign, which,
though it had commenced under unfavorable auspices, bid fair
to be tranquil and prosperous. In one quarter only was there
any indication of coming troubles.” Shahr-Barz, the great
general, whose life Chosroës had attempted shortly before his
own death,” appears to have been dissatisfied with the terms
on which Kobad had concluded peace with Rome; and there
is even reason to believe that he contrived to impede and delay
the full execution of the treaty.” He held under Kobad the
government of the western provinces.” and was at the head
of an army which numbered sixty thousand men.” Kobad
treated him with marked favor; but still he occupied a posi-
tion almost beyond that of a subject, and one which could not
fail to render him an object of fear and suspicion. For the
present, however, though he may have nurtured ambitious
thoughts, he made no movement, but bided his time, remain-
ing quietly in his province, and cultivating friendly relations
with the Roman emperor.”
Kobad had not been seated on the throne many months when . .
he consented to a deed by which his character for justice and
clemency was seriously compromised, if not wholly lost. This
was the general massacre of all the other sons of Chosroës II.,
his own brothers or half-brothers—a numerous body, amount-
ing to forty according to the highest estimate, and to fifteen
according to the lowest.” We are not told of any circum-
stances of peril to justify the deed, or even account for it.
There have been Oriental dynasties, where such a wholesale
murder upon the accession of a sovereign has been a portion of
the established system of government, and others where the
milder but little less revolting expedient has obtained of blind-
ing all the brothers of the reigning prince; but neither prac-
tice was in vogue among the Sassanians; and we look vainly
for the reason which caused an act of the kind to be resorted
\
|
— , — — . Y w
At-f * , 2 { 4. . . A
*
* * *
B38 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY: . [cH. xxv.
t - f
, to at this conjuncture. Mirkhond” says that Firuz, the chief
minister of Kobad, advised the deed; but even he assigns no
motive for the massacre, unless a motive is implied in the
statement that the brothers of Kobad were “all of them dis-
tinguished by their talents and their merit.” Politically speak-
ing, the measure might have been harmless, had Kobad en-
joyed a long reign, and left behind him a number of sons.
But as it was, the rash act, by almost extinguishing the race
of Sassan, produced troubles which greatly helped to bring the
empire into a condition of hopeless exhaustion and weakness.
While thus destroying all his brothers, Kobad allowed his
sisters to live. . Of these there were two, still unmarried, who
resided in the palace, and had free access to the monarch.
, - Their names were Purandocht and Azermidocht, Purandocht
being the elder. Bitterly grieved at the loss of their kindred,
these two princesses rushed into the royal presence, and re-
* proached the king with words that cut him to the soul. “Thy
ambition of ruling,” they said,” “has induced thee to kill thy
father and thy brothers. Thou hast accomplished thy purpose
- within the space of three or four months. Thou hast hoped
thereby to preserve thy power forever. Even, however, if
- thou shouldst live long, thou must die at last. May God de-
prive thee of the enjoyment of this royalty l’” His sisters'
words sank deep into the king's mind. He acknowledged
their justice, burst into tears, and flung his crown on the
ground.” After this he fell into a profound melancholy,
ceased to care for the exercise of power, and in a short time
died. His death is ascribed by the Orientals to his mental
sufferings; but the statement of a Christian bishop throws
some doubt on this romantic story. Eutychius, Patriarch of
Alexandria, tells us that, before Kobad had reigned many
months, the plague broke out in his country. Vast numbers of
his subjects died of it; and among the victims was the king
himself,” who perished after a reign which is variously esti-
mated at six, seven, eight, and eighteen months.” &
There seems to be no doubt that a terrible pestilence did
• afflict Persia at this period. The Arabian writers are here in
agreement with Eutychius of Alexandria,” and declare that the
malady was of the most aggravated character, carrying off
one half, or at any rate one third, of the inhabitants of the
provinces which were affected, and diminishing the population
of Persia by several hundreds of thousands.” Scourges of this
kind are of no rare occurrence in the East; and the return of a
*
f Q
.4
~ . " – —- —r- —
CH. xxv.] - - ARTA XERXES III. * , 539
!,
mixed multitude to Persia, under circumstances involving &
privation, from the cities of Asia Minor, Syria, and Palestine, ‘
was well Calculated to engender such a calamity. g
The reign of Kobad II. appears from his coins to have lasted
above a year.” He ascended the throne in February, A.D. 628;
he probably died about July,” A.D. 629. The coins which are
attributed to him resemble in their principal features those of ~
Chosroës II. and Artaxerxes III., but are without wings, and
have the legend Kavat-Firuz. The bordering of pearls is A
single on both obverse and reverse, but the king wears a double
pearl necklace. The eye is large, and the hair more carefully
marked than had been usual since the time of Sapor II. [Pl. ,
XXIV., Figs, 2 and 3]. - *
At the death of Kobad the crown fell to his son, Artaxerxes .
III., a child of seven,” or (according to others) of one year
only. The nobles who proclaimed him took care to place him ' ' '
under the direction of a governor or regent, and appointed to "
the office a certain Mihr-Hasis, who had been the chief pur-
veyor of Kobad.” Mihr-Hasis is said to have ruled with jus-
tice and discretion; but he was not able to prevent the occur-
rence of those troubles and disorders which in the East almost
invariably accompany the sovereignty of a minor, and render
the task of a regent a hard one. Shahr-Barz, who had scarcely
condescended to comport himself as a subject under Kobad,
saw in the accession of a boy, and in the near extinction of the
race of Sassan, an opportunity of gratifying his ambition, and
at the same time of avenging the wrong which had been done
him by Chosroës. Before committing himself, however, to
the perils of rebellion, he negotiated with Heraclius, and se- #
cured his alliance and support by the promise of certain ad- ºr
vantages. The friends met at Heraclea” on the Propontis.
Shahr-Barz undertook to complete the evacuation of Egypt, ,
Syria, and Asia Minor, which he had delayed hitherto, and
promised, if he were successful in his enterprise, to pay Hera-
clius a large sum of money as compensation for the injuries
inflicted on Rome during the recent war.” Heraclius con-
ferred on Nicetas, the son of Shahr-Barz, the title of “Patri- .
can,” consented to a marriage between Shahr-Barz's daughter,
Niké, and his own son, Theodosius, and accepted Gregoria, the
daughter of Nicetas, and grand-daughter of Shahr-Barz, as a *
wife for Constantine, the heir to the empire.” He also, it is
probable, supplied Shahr-Barz with a body of troops,” to assist "
|
him in his struggle with Artaxerxes and Mihr-Hasis.
j
.*
— — — — - 4.
- §
* * \ ,
y i
\
, 540 THE SEVENTII MONARCIIY, \ , ſch. xxv.
f
. Of the details of Sharhr-Barz's expedition we know nothing.
He is said to have marched on Ctesiphon with an army of
sixty thousand men;” to have taken the city, put to death
Artaxerxes, Mihr-Hasis, and a number of the nobles,” and
then seized the throne. We are not told what resistance was
made by the monarch in possession, or how it was overcome,
or even whether there was a battle. It would seem certain,
however, that the contest was brief. The young king was of
course powerless; Mihr-Hasis, though well-meaning, must
have been weak; Shahr-Barz had all the rude strength of the
animal whose name he bore,” and had no scruples about using
his strength to the utmost. The murder of a child of two, or
at the most of eight, who could have done no ill, and was legiti-
mately in possession of the throne, must be pronounced a brutal
act, and one which sadly tarnishes the fair fame, previously
unsullied, of one of Persia's greatest generals.
It was easy to obtain the crown, under the circumstances of
the time; but it was not so easy to keep what had been wrong-
\
fully gained. Shahr-Barz enjoyed the royal authority less
than two months.” During this period he completed the
evacuation of the Roman provinces occupied by Chosroës II.,
restored perhaps some portions of the true cross which had
been kept back by Kobad,” and sent an expeditionary force
against the Khazars who had invaded Armenia, which was
completely destroyed by the fierce barbarians.” He is said by
the Armenians” to have married Purandocht, the eldest
f
daughter of Chosroës, for the purpose of strengthening his hold
On the crown; but this attempt to conciliate his subjects, if it
was really made, proved unsuccessful. Ere he had been king
for two months, his troops mutinied, drew their swords upon
him, and killed him in the open court before the palace.”
Having so done, they tied a cord to his feet and dragged his
Corpse through the streets of Ctesiphon, making proclamation
everywhere as follows: “Whoever, not being of the blood-
\
*.
royal, seats himself upon the Persian throne, shall share the
fate of Shahr-Barz.” They then elevated to the royal dignity
the princess Purandocht," the first female who had ever sat
in the seat of Cyrus. -
. The rule of a woman was ill calculated to restrain the turbu-
lent Persian nobles. Two instances had now proved that a
mere noble might ascend the throne of the son of Babek; and
a fatal fascination was exercised on the grandees of the king-
dom by the examples of Bahram-Chobin" and Shahr-Barz.
- - | ^.
*
g t
*** , * * Y.
ch. xxv.] ACCESSION OF ISDIGERD III. 541
Pretenders sprang up in all quarters, generally asserting some
connection, nearer or more remote, with the royal house, but
relying on the arms of their partisans, and still more on the
weakness of the government. It is uncertain whether Puran-
docht died a natural death;” her sister, Azermidocht, who
reigned soon after her, was certainly murdered.” The crown
passed rapidly from one noble to another, and in the course of
the four or five years which immediately succeeded the death
of Chosroës II. it was worn by nine or ten different persons.
Of these the greater number reigned but a few days or a few
months; no actions are ascribed to them; and it seems unnec-
essary to weary the reader with their obscure names, or with
the still more obscure question concerning the order of their
succession.” It may be suspected that in some cases, two or
more were contemporary, exercising royal functions in differ-
ent portions of the empire at the same time. Of none does the
history or the fate possess any interest; and the modern his-
torical student may well be content with the general knowl-
edge that for four years and a half after the death of Chosroës
II. the government was in the highest degree unsettled; an-
archy everywhere prevailed; the distracted kingdom was torn
in pieces by the struggles of pretenders; and “every province,
and almost each city of Persia, was the scene of independ-
ence, of discord, and of bloodshed.” "
At length, in June,” A.D. 632, an end was put to the internal
commotions by the election of a young prince, believed to
be of the true blood of Sassan, in whose rule the whole
nation acquiesced without much difficulty." Yezdigerd (or
Isdigerd) the Third was the Son of Shahriar” and the grandson
of Chosroës II.” He had been early banished from the Court,”
and had been brought up in obscurity, his royal birth being
perhaps concealed, since if known it might have caused his
destruction." The place of his residence was Istakr,” the
ancient capital of Persia, but at this time a city of no great
importance. Here he had lived unnoticed to the age of fifteen,”
when his royal rank having somehow been discovered, and no
other scion of the stock of Chosroës being known to exist, he
was drawn forth from his retirement and invested with the
Sovereignty. . t
But the appointment of a sovereign in whose rule all could
acquiesce came too late. While Rome and Persia, engaged in
deadly struggle, had no thought for anything but how most to
injure each other, a power began to grow up in an adjacent
ſ ,”
*
*
f
–, 2–2 -2, - - - -2 - . . t r *
A. - 2 A. * ~ *
Af $
542 THE SE WENTEI MONARCH Z. [CH. xxv.
country, which had for long ages been despised and thought
incapable of doing any harm to its neighbors. Mohammed,
half impostor, half enthusiast, enunciated a doctrine, and by
degrees worked out a religion, which proved capable of unit-
ing in one the scattered tribes of the Arabian desert, while at
the same time it inspired them with a confidence, a contempt
for death, and a fanatic valor, that rendered them irresistible
by the surrounding nations. Mohammed's career as prophet
began while Heraclius and Chosroës II. were flying at each
other's throats;” by the year of the death of Chosroës (A.D.
628) he had acquired a strength greater than that of any other
Arab chief;" two years later he challenged Rome to the com-
bat by sending a hostile expedition into Syria;" and before his
, death (A.D. 632) he was able to take the field at the head of
30,000 men." During the time of internal trouble in Persia
he procured the submission of the Persian governor of the
Yemen;" as well as that of Al Mondar," or Alamundarus,
King of Bahrein, on the west coast of the Persian Gulf.”
Isdigerd, upon his accession, found himself menaced by a
power which had already stretched out one arm towards the
lower Euphrates, while with the other it was seeking to grasp
Syria and Palestine. The danger was imminent; the means
of meeting it insufficient, for Persia was exhausted by foreign
war and internal contention; the monarch himself was but ill
able to cope with the Arab chiefs, being youthful and inexpe-
rienced: we shall find, however, that he made a strenuous re-
sistance. Though continually defeated, he prolonged the fight
for nearly a score of years, and only succumbed finally when,
to the hostility of open foes, was added the treachery of pre-
tended friends and allies.” -
J. * * - A •
| *
ch. xxvi. POWER OF ABU-BEKR. & 543’
\ . . S 3
* * , 4- & 4
*
* }
CHAPTER XXVI.
Death of Mohammed and Collapse of Mohammedanism. Re-
covery under Abu-bekr. Conquest of the Kingdom of Hira.
Conquest of Obolla. Invasion of Mesopotamia. Battle of
the Bridge—the Arabs suffer a Reverse. Battle of El Bow-
eib—Mihran defeated by El Mothamna. Fresh. Effort made
by Persia—Battle of Cadesia – Defeat of the Persians.
Pause in the War. March of Sa'ad on Ctesiphon. Flight
of Isdigerd. Capture of Ctesiphon. Battle of Jalula.
Conquest of Susiana and invasion of Persia Proper. Re-
call of Sa'ad. Isdigerd assembles an Army at Nehawend. ,
Battle of Nehawend. Flight of Isdigerd. Conquest of the *
various Persian Provinces. Isdigerd murdered. Char- tº
acter of Isdigerd. Coins of Isdigerd. “;
..º - 3 #
“Yazdejird, Persarum rex . . . Rostamum misit oppugnatum Saadum . . . neque } |
unquam bellorum et dissentionum expers fuit, donec Occideretur. Regnavit au-
tem annos viginti.”—Eutychius, Annales, vol. ii. pp. 295-6. §
* k $
Pºff
\
THE power which Mohammed had so rapidly built up fell to
pieces at his decease. Isdigerd can scarcely have been well
Settled upon this throne when the welcome tidings must have
reached him that the Prophet was dead, that the Arabs gen-
erally were in revolt, that Al Mondar had renounced Islamism,
and resumed a position of independence." For the time Mo-
hammedanism was struck down. It remained to be seen
whether the movement had derived its strength solely from
the genius of the Prophet, or whether minds of inferior calibre
would suffice to renew and sustain the impulse which had pro-
ceeded from him, and which under him had proved of such
wonderful force and efficacy. ! .
The companions of Mohammed lost no time in appointing
his successor. Their choice fell upon Abu-bekr, his friend and *
father-in-law, who was a person of an energetic character, º, .
brave, chaste, and temperate. Abu-bekr proved himself quite
equal to the difficulties of the situation. Being unfit for war
himself, as he was above sixty years of age,” he employed able
generals, and within a few months of his accession struck such
a series of blows that rebellion collapsed everywhere,” and in ,->
y
\
... — — — — — — — T - !, *
* t * * r
* ?
k g * - f d t t
544 THE SEVENTH MONARCIIY. . [CH. xxvi.
|
...A f d }
, a short time the whole Arab nation, except the tribe of Gassan,
acknowledged themselves his subjects. Among the rivals
against whom he measured himself, the most important was
Moseilama. Moseilama, who affected the prophetic character,"
had a numerous following, and was able to fight a pitched
*battle with the forces of Abu-bekr, which numbered 40,000
men." At the first encounter he even succeeded in repulsing
this considerable army, which lost 1200 warriors; but in a
second engagement the Mohammedans were victorious—
Moseilama was slain—and Kaled, “the Sword of God,” carried
back to Medina the news of his own triumph, and the spoils of
the defeated enemy. Soon after the fall of Moseilama, the
tribes still in rebellion submitted themselves, and the first of
the Caliphs found himself at liberty to enter upon schemes of
" foreign conquest. -
Distracted between the temptations offered to his arms by
the East and by the West, Abu-bekr in his first year (A.D. 633)
sent expeditions in both directions, against Syria, and against
Hira, where Iyas, the Persian feudatory, who had succeeded
Noman, son of Al Mondar," held his court, on the western
branch of the Euphrates. For this latter expedition the
commander selected was the irresistible Kaled, who marched a
body of 2000 men" across the desert to the branch stream,”
which he reached in about latitude 30°. Assisted by Al
, Mothanna, chief of the Beni Sheiban, who had been a subject
of 'Iyas, but had revolted and placed himself under the protec-
tion of Abu-bekr,” Kaled rapidly reduced the kingdom of Hira,
took successively Banikiya, Barasuma, and El Lis," descended
the river to the capital,” and there fought an important battle
with the combined Persian and Arab forces, the first trial of
arms between the followers of Mohammed and ‘those of
Zoroaster. The Persian force consisted entirely of horse, and
was commanded by a general whom the Arab writers call
Asadsubeh.” Their number is not mentioned, but was
|probably small. Charged furiously by Al Mothanna, they
immediately broke and fled; Hira was left with no other pro-
tection than its walls; and Iyas, yielding to necessity, made
his Submission to the conqueror, and consented to pay a tribute
of 290,000 dirhems.”
The splendid success of his pioneer induced Abu-bekr to sup-
port the war in this quarter with vigor. Reinforcements
joined Kaled from every side, and in a short time he found
himself at the head of an army of 18,000 men.“ With this
Vol. III, Plate XLV.
f
.
r
-n.
º
º
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-, iſi Cºl
- º), fºſſº º,
Gºº º'- -
º § *5 fº
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...]
RoRED FIGURE, showING SASSANIAN EMBROIDERY.
















Plate XLVI
Vol.
ExtERNAL ORNAMENTATIox of
PALAck At FintzABAD,
|||

ch. xxvil SUCCESSES OF KALED. 545
force he proceeded southwards, bent on reducing the entire
tract between the desert and the Eastern or real Euphrates.
The most important city of the southern region was at the time
Obolla, which was situated on a canal or backwater derived
from the Euphrates, not far from the modern Busrah.” It was
the great emporium for the Indian trade, and was known as
the limes Indorum,” or “frontier city towards India.” The
Persian governor was a certain Hormuz or Hormisdas, who held
the post with a body of 20,000 men." Kaled fought his second
great battle with this antagonist, and was once more com-
pletely victorious, killing Hormuz, according to the Arabian
accounts, with his own hands.” Obolla surrendered; a vast
booty was taken; and, after liberally rewarding his soldiers,
Raled sent the fifth part of the spoils, together with a captured
elephant, to Abu-bekr at Medina. The strange animal aston-
ished the simple natives, who asked one another wonderingly,”
“Is this indeed one of God's works, or did human art make,
it?” -
The victories of Kaled Over Asad'subeh and Hormuz were
followed by a number of other successes,” the entire result be-
ing that the whole of the fertile region on the right bank of the
Euphrates, from Hit to the Persian Gulf, was for the time re-
duced, made a portion of Abu-bekr's dominions, and parcelled
out among Mohammedan governors.” Persia was deprived of
the protection which a dependent Arab kingdom to the west of
the river had hitherto afforded her, and was brought into di-
rect contact with the great Mohammedan monarchy along al-,
most the whole of her western frontier. Henceforth she was
open to attack on this side for a distance of above four hundred
miles, with no better barrier than a couple of rivers interposed
between her enemy and her capital. *
Soon after his conquest of the kingdom of Hira, Kaled was
recalled from the Euphrates to the Syrian war,” and was em-
ployed in the siege of Dalmascus,” while Persia enjoyed a .
breathing-space. Advantage was taken of this interval to stir
up disaffection in the newly-conquered province. Rustam, ap-
pointed to the command against the Arabs by Isdigerd,” sent
emissaries to the various towns of the Sawād,” urging them to
rise in revolt and promising to support such a movement with
a Persian army.” The situation was critical; and if the Mo-
hammedans had been less tenacious, Or the Persians more
skilfully handled, the whole of the Sawād might have been re-
scovered. But Rustam allowed his troops to be defeated in de-
f
*
J - 2 * ** J.
* f
¥ f - A
, 546 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xxvi.
tail. Al Mothanna and Abu Obediah, in three separate engage-
ments, at Namárik, Sakatiya, and Barusma,” overcame the
Bersian leaders, Jaban, Narses, and Jalenus, and drove their
shattered armies back on the Tigris. The Mohammedan au-
thority was completely re-established in the tract between the
desert and the Euphrates; it was even extended across the Eu-
phrates into the tract watered by the Shat-el-Hie; and it soon'
became a question whether Persia would be able to hold the
Mesopotamian region, or whether the irrepressible Arabs would
not very shortly wrest it from her grasp. But at this point in
the history the Arabs experienced a severe reverse. On learn-
ing the defeat of his lieutenants, Rustam sent an army to
- watch the enemy, under the command of Bahman-Dsul-
hadjib,” or “Bahman the beetle-browed,” which encamped
upon the Western Euphrates at Kossen-natek, not far from the
site of Kufa. At the same time, to raise the courage of the
soldiers, he entrusted to this leader the sacred standard of,
Persia, the famous durufsh-kawani, or leathern apron of the
blacksmith Kawah,” which was richly adorned with silk and
gems, and is said to have measured eighteen feet long by
twelve feet broad.” Bahman had with him, according to the
Persian tradition, 30,000 men and thirty elephants;” the Arabs
under Abu Obediah numbered no more than 9000, or at the
most 10,000.” Bahman is reported” to have given his adver-
sary the alternative of passing the Euphrates or allowing the
Persians to cross it. Abu Obediah preferred the bolder course,
and, in spite of the dissuasions of his chief officers, threw a
bridge of boats across the stream, and so conveyed his troops
to the left bank. Here he found the Persian horse-archers
covered with their scale armor,” and drawn up in a solid line
behind their elephants. Galled severely by the successive
flights of arrows, the Arab cavalry sought to come to close
, quarters: but their horses, terrified by the unwonted sight of
the huge animals, and further alarmed by the tinkling of the
bells hung round their necks,” refused to advance. It was
found necessary to dismount, and assail the Persian line on
foot. A considerable impression had been made, and it was
thought that the Persians would take to flight,” when Abu
Obediah, in attacking the most conspicuous of the elephants,
was seized by the infuriated animal and trampled under his
\feet.” Inspirited by this success, the Persians rushed upon
their enemies, who, disheartened by the loss of their comman-
der, began a retrograde movement, falling back upon their
*
* - — ,
-x 2 - ...— .
. *. — 1 , . " *. *.
CH. xxvi.] * BATTLE OF THE BRIDGE. 547 s
*
newly-made bridge. This, however, was found to have been
broken, either by the enemy,” or by a rash Arab who thought,
by making retreat impossible, to give his own side the courage
of despair. Before the damage done could be repaired, the re-
treating host suffered severely. The Persians pressed closely
upon them, slew many, and drove others into the stream,
where they were drowned. Out of the 9000 or 10,000 who
originally passed the river, only 5000 returned, and of these
2000 at Once dispersed to their homes.” Besides Abu Obediah,
the veteran Salit was slain;" and Al Mothanna, who succeeded
to the command on Abu Obediah's death, was severely
wounded.” The last remnant of the defeated army might
easily have been destroyed, had not a dissension arisen among
the Persians, which induced Bahman to return to Ctesiphon.
The Arabs, upon this repulse, retired to El Lis; * and Al
Mothanna sent to Omar for reinforcements, which speedily ,
arrived under the command of Jarir, Son of Abdallah.” . Al
Mothanna was preparing to resume the offensive when the
Persians anticipated him. A body of picked troops, led by ,
Mihran,“ a general of reputation, Crossed the Euphrates, and
made a dash at Hira. Hastily collecting his men, who were
widely dispersed, Al Mothanna gave the assailants battle on
the canal El Boweib, in the near vicinity of the threatened
town, and though the Persians fought with desperation from
noon to sunset, succeeded in defeating them and in killing
their commander.” The beaten army recrossed the Euphra-
tes, and returned to Ctesiphon without suffering further
losses, since the Arabs were content to have baffled their
attack, and did not pursue them many miles from the field of,
battle.* All Mesopotamia, however, was by this defeat laid
open to the invaders, whose ravages soon extended , to the
Tigris and the near vicinity of the capital.”
The year A.D. 636 now arrived, and the Persians resolved
upon an extraordinary effort. An army of 120,000 men was
enrolled,” and Rustam, reckoned the best general of the day, ,
was placed at its head.” The Euphrates was once more
crossed, the Sawād entered, its inhabitants invited to revolt,”
and the Arab force, which had been concentrated at Cadesia
(Kadisiyeh), where it rested upon a fortified town, was sought
out and challenged to the combat. The Caliph Omar had by
great efforts contrived to raise his troops in the Sawād to the
number of 30,000," and had entrusted the command of them
to Sa'ad, the Son of Wakas, since Al Mothanna had died of his
\
,”
-* –
|
*
* }
* /
3 - ?, —x- a g –3–– ... " 4
... " | 2 | \ fy * - # *
*
* f * - W
Ö48 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH(xxvi.
wound.” Sa'ad stood wholly on the defensive. His camp
was pitched outside the walls of Cadesia, in a position pro-
tected on either side by a canal,” or branch stream, derived
from the Euphrates, and flowing to the South-east out of the
Sea of Nedjef. He himself, prevented by boils from sitting on
his horse, looked down on his troops, and sent them directions
from the Cadesian citadel." Rustam, in order to come to
blows, was obliged to fill up the more eastern of the branch
streams (El Atik), with reeds and earth,” and in this way to
cross the channel. The Arabs made no attempt to hinder the
operation; and the Persian general, having brought his vast
army directly opposite to the enemy, proceeded to array his
troops as he thought most expedient. Dividing his army into
a centre and two wings, he took himself the position of honor
in the mid line" with nineteen elephants and three fifths of
his forces," while he gave the command of the right wing to
Jalenus, and of the left to Bendsuwän; * each of whom we
may suppose to have had 24,000 troops and seven elephants.
The Arabs, on their side, made no such division. Kaled, son
of Orfuta, was the sole leader in the fight, though Sa'ad from
his watch-tower observed the battle and gave his orders. The
engagement began at mid-day and continued till sunset. At
the signal of Allah akbar, “God is great,” shouted by Sa'ad
from his tower, the Arabs rushed to the attack. Their cavalry
charged; but the Persians advanced against them their line
of elephants, repeating with excellent effect the tactics of the
famous “Battle of the Bridge.”” The Arab horse fled; the
foot alone remained firm; victory seemed inclining to the
Persians, who were especially successful on either wing;"
Toleicha, with his “lions”" failed to re-establish the balance;
and all would have been lost, had not Assem, at the command
of Sa'ad, sent a body of archers and other footmen to close
with the elephants, gall them with missiles, cut their girths,
and so precipitate their riders to the ground. Relieved from
this danger, the Arab horse succeeded in repulsing the Per-
sians, who as evening approached retired in good order to
their camp. The chief loss on this, the “day of concussion,”
was suffered by the Arabs, who admit that they had 500
killed,” and must have had a proportional number of
wounded.
On the morning of the second day the site of the battle was
somewhat changed, the Persians having retired a little during
the night.* Reinforcements from Syria kept reaching the
* - * { -*. y
y
cII.-XXVI.] DAY OF SUCCours. ' ' ' . 549
Arab camp through most of the day;" and hence it is known
to the Arab writers as the “day of succors.”" The engagé-
ment seems for SQIme time not to have been general, the Arabs '
waiting for more troops to reach them, while the Persians
abstained because they had not yet repaired the furniture cf
their elephants." Thus the morning passed in light skir- .
mishes and single combats between the champions of either
host, who went out singly before the lines and challenged .
each other to the encounter.” The result of the duels was
adverse to the Persians, who lost in the course of them two of ,
their best generals, Bendsuwän and Bahman-DSulhadjib.”
After a time the Arabs, regarding themselves as sufficiently
reinforced, attacked the Persians along their whole line,
partly with horse, and partly with camels, dressed up to
resemble elephants.” The effect on the Persian cavalry was
the same as had on the preceding day been produced by the
real elephants on the horse of the Arabs; it was driven off the
field and dispersed, suffering considerable losses. But the .
infantry stood firm, and after a while the cavalry rallied;
Rustam, who had been in danger of suffering capture, was
saved;" and night closing in, defeat was avoided, though the
advantage of the day rested clearly with the Arabs. The
Persians had lost 10,000 in killed and wounded, the Arabs n
more than 2000.” v
In the night which followed “the day of succors” great
efforts were made by the Persians to re-equip their elephants,
and when morning dawned they were enabled once more to
bring the unwieldy beasts into line. But the Arabs and their
horses had now grown more familiar with the strange ani-
mals; they no longer shrank from meeting them; and some
Persian deserters gave the useful information that, in order to
disable the brutes it was only necessary to wound them on the
proboscis or in the eye. Thus instructed, the Arabs made the
elephants the main object of their attack, and, having
wounded the two which were accustomed to lead the rest,
caused the whole body on a sudden to take to flight, cross the
canal El Atik, and proceed at full speed to Ctesiphon. The
armies then came to close quarters; and the foot and horse
contended through the day with swords and spears, neither
side being able to make any serious impression upon the
other.” As night closed in, however, the Persians once more
fell back, crossing the canal El Atik,” and so placing that
barrier between themselves and their adversaries.
*
f
J
** *
*
* * d f #- - $ *
4” § . N f ~x. f
& t \ * ºn
550 . . . THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY's ſon. Xxvi.
, Their object in this manoeuvre was probably to obtain the
rest which they must have greatly needed. The Persians
were altogether of a frame less robust, and of a constitution
*.
less hardy, than the Arabs. Their army at Kadisiyeh was,
| e
moreover, composed to a large extent of raw recruits; and
three consecutive days of severe fighting must have sorely
tried its endurance. The Persian generals hoped, it would
seem, by crossing the Atik to refresh their troops with a quiet
night before renewing the combat on the morrow. But the
indefatigable Arabs, perhaps guessing their intention, deter-
mined to frustrate it, and prevented the tired host from
enjoying a moment's respite. The “day of embittered war,”
as it was called,” was followed by the “night of snarling”—a
time of horrid noise and tumult, during which the discordant
cries of the troops on either side were thought to resemble the
yells and barks of dogs and jackals. Two of the bravest of
, the Arabs, Toleicha and Amr, crossed the Atik with small
bodies of troops, and under cover of the darkness entered the
Persian camp, slew numbers, and caused the greatest con-
fusion." By degrees a general engagement was brought on,
which continued into the succeeding day, so that the “night
of snarling” can scarcely be separated” from the “day of
cormorants” ”—the last of the four days' Kadisiyeh fight.
It would seem that the Persians must on the fourth day have
had for a time the advantage, since we find them once more
fighting upon the old ground, in the tract between the two
canals, with the Atik in their rear.” About noon, however, a
wind arose from the west, bringing with it clouds of sand,
which were blown into the faces and eyes of the Persians,
while the Arabs, having their backs to the storm, suffered but
little from its fury. Under these circumstances the Moslems
made fresh efforts, and after a while a part of the Persian army
was forced to give ground. Hormuzan, Satrap of Susiana, and
Tiruzan, the general who afterwards commanded at Ne-
havend," fell back. The line of battle was dislocated; the per-,
son of the commander became exposed to danger; and about
the same time a sudden violent gust tore away the awning
that shaded his seat,” and blew it into the Atik, which was not
far off. Rustam sought a refuge from the violence of the storm
among his baggage mules, and was probably meditating flight,
when the Arabs were upon him. Hillal, son of Alkama, intent
upon plunder, began to cut the cords of the baggage and strew
it upon the ground. A bag falling severely injured Rustam,”
\ ~ .
N.
f
J - - - – – — — — -
º
ch. xxvi.) COMPLETE DEFEAT OF THE PERSIA.N.S. 551
- ºf N -
who threw himself into the Atik and attempted to swim
across. Hillal, however, rushed after him, drew him to shore,
and slew him; after which he mounted the vacant throne, and
shouted as loudly as he could,” “By the lord of the Kaaba, I
have killed Rustam.” The words created a general panic.
Everywhere the Persian courage fell; the most part despaired
wholly, and at Once took to flight; a few cohorts alone stood
firm and were cut to pieces;” the greater number of the men
rushed hastily to the Atik; some swam the stream others
crossed where it had been filled up; but as many as 30,000
perished in the waves.” Ten thousand had fallen on the field
of battle" in the course of the preceding night and day, while
of the Mohammedans as many as 6000 had been slain. Thus
the last day of the Kadisiyeh fight was stoutly contested; and
the Persian defeat was occasioned by no deficiency of courage,
but by the Occurrence of a sand-storm and by the almost acci-
dental death of the commander. Among the Persian losses in
the battle that of the national standard,” the dwrufsh-kawani,
was reckoned the most serious.
The retreat of the defeated army was conducted by Jalenus.
Sa'ad, anxious to complete his victory, sent three bodies of troops
across the Atik, to press upon the flying foe. One of these,
commanded by Sohra, came up with the Persian rear-guard
under Jalenus at Harrar, and slaughtered it, together with its
leader.” The other two seem to have returned without effect-
ing much. The bulk of the fugitives traversed Mesopotamia
in safety, and found a shelter behind the walls of Ctesiphon.
By the defeat of Kadisiyeh all hope of recovering the ter-
ritory on the right bank of the Euphrates was lost; but Persia
did not as yet despair of maintaining her independence. It was
evident, indeed, that the permanent maintenance of the capital
was henceforth precarious; and a wise forethought would have
suggested the removal of the Court from so exposed a situation
and its transference to some other position, either to Istakr,
the ancient metropolis of Persia Proper, or to Hamadan, the
capital city of Media. But probably it was considered that to
retire voluntarily from the Tigris would be a confession of
weakness, as fatal to the stability of the empire as to be driven
back by the Arabs; and perhaps it may have been hoped that
the restless nomads would be content with their existing con-
quests, or that they might receive a check at the hands of
Rome which would put a stop to their aggressions elsewhere.
It is remarkable that, during the pause of a year and a half
&
•º
f
*.
\. * }. t - , - . . * { " * ź. 45
552 . . . THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY ſch. xxvi.
which intervened between the battle of Radisiyeh and the re-
sumption of hostilities by the Arabs, nothing seems to have
been done by Persia in the way of preparation against her ter-
rible assailants. -
In the year A.D. 637 the Arabs again took the offensive.
They had employed the intervening year and a half in the
foundation of Busrah and Kufa,” and in the general Consolida-
tion of their sway on the right bank of the Euphrates.” They
were now prepared for a further movement. The conduct of
the war was once more entrusted to Sa'ad. Having collected
an army of 20,000 men,” this general proceeded from Kufa to
Anbar” (or Perisabor), where he crossed the Euphrates, and
entered on the Mesopotamian region. Isdigerd, learning that
he had put his forces in motion, and was bent upon attacking
Ctesiphon, called a council of war, and asked its advice as to
the best course to be pursued under the circumstances.” It
was generally agreed that the capital must be evacuated, and
a stronger situation in the more mountainous part of the coun-
try occupied; but Isdigerd was so unwilling to remove that he
waited till the Arabian general, with a force now raised to
, 60,000, had reached Sābāt," which was only a day's march
from the capital, before he could be induced to commence his
*
*
retreat. He then abandoned the town hastily, without carry-
'ing off more than a small portion of the treasures which his
ancestors had during four centuries accumulated at the main
seat of their power, and retired to Holwan, a strong place in
the Zagros mountain-range.” Sa'ad, on learning his move-
ment, sent a body of troops in pursuit, which came up with
the rear-guard of the Persians, and cut it in pieces, but effected
nothing really important. TSdigerd made good his retreat, and
in a short time concentrated at Holwan an army of above
100,000 men.” Sa'ad, instead of pushing forward and engaging
this force, was irresistibly attracted by the reputed wealth of
the Great Ctesiphon, and, marching thither, entered the unre-
sisting city," with his troops, in the sixteenth year of the
Eſegira, the four hundred and eleventh from the foundation of
the Sassanian kingdom by Artaxerxes, son of Babek.
Ctesiphon was, undoubtedly, a rich prize. Its palaces and
its gardens, its opulent houses and its pleasant fields, its foun-
tains and its flowers, are celebrated by the Arabian writers,
who are never weary of rehearsing the beauty of its site, the
elegance of the buildings, the magnificence and luxury of their
furniture, or the amount of the treasures which were contained
.# • -- — s = -
f * * * * *
f * ..ºf ſº
on. xxvi.] THE ARABS TAKE GTESIPHON. 553
in them.” The royal palace, now known as the Takht-i-
Ehosru,” especially provoked their admiration. It was built
of polished stone, and had in front of it a portico of twelve
marble pillars, each 150 feet high. The length of the edifice
was 450 feet, its breadth 180, its height 150. In the centre
was the hall of audience, a noble apartment, 115 feet long and
85 high,” with a magnificent vaulted roof, bedecked with
golden stars, so arranged as to represent the motions of the §
planets among the twelve signs of the Zodiac," where the mon-
arch was accustomed to sit on a golden throne, hearing causes
and dispensing justice to his subjects. The treasury and the
various apartments were full of gold and silver, of costly robes
and precious stones, of jewelled arms and dainty carpets. The
glass vases of the Spice magazine contained an abundance of
musk, camphor,” amber, gums, drugs, and delicious per-
fumes. In one apartment was found a carpet of white brocade,
450 feet long and 90 broad, with a border worked in precious -
stones of various hues, to represent a garden of all kinds of
beautiful flowers. The leaves were formed of emeralds, the
blossoms and buds of pearls, rubies, Sapphires, and other gems
of immense value. Among the objects found in the treasury
were a horse made entirely of gold, bearing a silver saddle set
with a countless multitude of jewels, and a camel made of
silver, accompanied by a foal of which the material was gold.
A coffer belonging to Isdigerd was captured at the bridge over
the Nahrwān canal as it guardians were endeavoring to carry
it off. Among its contents were a robe of state embroidered
with rubies and pearls, several garments made of tissue of
gold, the crown and seal of Chosroës (Anushirwan?), and ten
pieces of silk brocade. The armory of Chosroës also fell into
the conqueror's hands. It contained his helmet, breastplate,
greaves, and arm-pieces, all of solid gold adorned with pearis,
six “cuirasses of Solomon,” and ten costly scimitars. The
works of art, and a fifth part of the entire booty, were set
apart for the Caliph Omar, and sent by trusty messengers to
Medina; the value of the remainder was so enormous” that
when Sa'ad divided it among his 60,000 soldiers the share of
each amounted to 12,000 dirhems (312l.). #
It is said “that Sa'ad, after capturing Ctesiphon, was anxious
to set out in pursuit of Isdigerd, but was restrained by de-
spatches received from Omar, which commanded him to remain
at the Persian capital, and to employ his brother Hashem, and,
the experienced general, El Kakāa, in the further prosecution
—w * -
tº # * * * ~, - “. * : * º *
f
* -
* \
554 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. ſon, ºxvi.
of the war. Hashem was, therefore, sent with 12,000 men,
against the fugitive monarch, whose forces, said to have ex-
ceeded 100,000 men, and commanded by a Mihran, were drawn
up at Jalula, not far from Holwan.” The disparity of num-
bers forced Hashem to condescend to maneuvering; and it was
\
W
six months before he ventured on a general engagement with
his antagonist. Again the Mohammedans proved victorious;
and this time the carnage was excessive; 100,000 Persians are
Said to have lain dead on the battle-field; the commander was
himself among the slain. Jalula at once surrendered; and
fresh treasures were obtained. Among other precious articles,
a figure of a camel, with its rider, in solid gold, was found in
One of the tents.” Altogether the booty is reckoned at about
four millions of our money—the share of each soldier engaged
being 10,000 dirhems,” or about 260l. Sterling.
Isdigerd, on learning the result of the battle of Jalula, quitted
Holwan, and retired to Rei, a large town near the Caspian
sea,” at a short distance from the modern Teheran, thus
placing the entire Zagros range between himself and his
irresistible foes. A general named Khosru-Sum was left behind
- with a large body of troops, and was bidden to defend Holwan
to the last extremity. Instead of remaining, however, within
the walls of the stronghold, Khosru-sum rashly led his force to
meet that of El Kakáa, who defeated him at Kasr-i-Shirin."
and entirely dispersed his army. Holwan, being left without
protection, surrendered; the conquest of Shirwan, Mah-sabadan,
and Tekrit followed;” and by the close of the year A.D. 637 the
banner of the Prophet waved over the whole tract west of
Zagros, from Nineveh almost to Susa, or from the Kurnib to
the Kuran river.
Another short pause in the Arabian aggressions upon Persia
now occurred; but in the year A.D. 639 their attacks were re-
sumed, and the Persians had to submit to further losses.
Otba, governor of Busrah, sent an expedition across the Shat-
el-Arab into Susiana,” and, supported by the Arab population
of the province, which deserted the Persian side, engaged Hor-
muzan, the satrap, in two battles, defeated him, and forced
him to cede a portion of his territory, including the important
city of Ahwaz.” Soon afterwards, Ala, governor of Bahrein,
conducted in person an expedition into Persia Proper, crossing
the Gulf in the rude vessels of the time, and attacking Shehrek,
the Persian satrap, who acknowledged the authority of Isdi-
gerd. Here, the Arabs were for once unsuccessful. Shehrek
w W. * - -
* * } < * , * * *- *
.# i &
CH. xxvi.] INVASION OF SUSIANA. 555
collected a force which Ala was afraid to encounter; the Arab -
chief retreated to the coast, but found his fleet engulfed by
the waves; and it was only with great difficulty that he made
his escape by land from the country which he had ventured to
invade. He owed his escape to Otba, who sent troops from
Busrah to his aid, defeated Shehrek, and rescued his fellow
governor from the peril which threatened him.” -
In the next year (A.D. 640) Hormuzan, incited by Isdigerd,
made a desperate attempt to recover the territory which he
had been compelled to cede. Assisted by Shehrek, governor of
Persia Proper, he attacked the Arabs unawares, but was
speedily met, driven from Ram-Hormuz to Shuster, and there
besieged for the space of six months. As many as eighty
engagements are said to have taken place before the walls,”
with no decided advantage to either side. At length Al-Berä,
son of Mālik, one of the companions of the Prophet, and be-
lieved by many to possess the prophetic spirit, announced that
victory was about to incline to the Moslems, but that he him- 7
self would be slain. A chance arrow having fulfilled won half
of the prediction, the Arabs felt an assurance that the other
half would follow, and fought with such fanatic ardor that
their expectations were soonfulfilled. The town was won; but
Hormuzan retired into the citadel, and there successfully
maintained himself, till Abu-Sabra, the Mohammedan general,
consented to spare his life, and send him to Medina, where his
fate should be determined by the Caliph. Hormuzan, on ob-
taining an audience, pretended thirst and asked for a cup of
water, which was given him: he then looked suspiciously
around, as if he expected to be stabbed while drinking. “Tear
nothing,” said Omar; “your life is safe till you have drunk the
water.” The crafty Persian flung the cup to the ground, and
Omar felt that he had been outwitted, but that he must keep
his word. Hormuzan became an Arab pensionary, and shortly
afterwards embraced Islamism.” His territories were occu-
pied by the Moslems, whose dominions were thereby extended
from the Kuran to the Tab river.
The Arab conquests on the side of Persia had hitherto been
effected and maintained by the presiding genius of one of the
ablest of the Mohammedan commanders, the victor of Kadi-
Siyeh, Sa'ad Ibn Abi Wakas. From Kufa, where he built him-
Self a magnificent palace, which Omar however caused to be
destroyed,” this great general and skilful administrator direct-
ed the movements of armies, arranged the divisions of pro-
*
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• * * A
556 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xxvi.
vinces, apportioned the sums to be paid to the revenue, dealt
out justice, and generally superintended affairs throughout the
entire region conquered by the Arabs to the east of the desert.
A man in such a position necessarily made himself enemies;
and complaints were frequently carried to Omar of his lieu-
tenant's pride, luxury, and injustice.” What foundation
there may have been for these charges is uncertain; but it
seems that Omar was persuaded, towards the close of A.D. 640,
or very early in A.D. 641, that they were of sufficient weight to
make it necessary that they should be investigated. He
accordingly recalled Sa'ad from his government to Medina, and
replaced him at Kufa by Ammār Ibn Yāser.”
The news of this change was carried to Isdigerd at Rei, and
caused him to conceive hopes of recovering his lost territory.
The event shows that he attributed too much to the personal
ability of his great antagonist; but the mistake was not un-
natural; and it was a noble impulse which led him to seize the
first promising occasion, in order to renew the struggle and
make a last desperate effort to save his empire and repulse the
barbarous nomads. The facts are not as the Arabian historians
represent them. There was no intention on the part of the
Mohammedans to be content with the conquests which they
made, or to remain within the boundary line of the mountains
that separate the Mesopotamian region from the high plateau
of Iran.” Mohammedanism had an insatiable ambition, and
was certain to spread itself in all directions until its forces
were expended, or a bound was set to it by resistance which it
could not overcome. Isdigerd, by remaining quiet, might per-
haps have prolonged the precarious existence of Persia for
half a dozen years, though even this is uncertain, and it is per-
haps as probable that the tide of conquest would have flowed
eastward in A.D. 641 or 642, even had he attempted nothing.
What alone we can be sure of his, that no acquiescence on his
part, no abstention from warlike enterprise, no submission
, short of the acceptance of Islamism, would have availed to
Save his country for more than a very brief space from the
tramp of the hordes that were bent on enriching themselves
with the plunder of the whole civilized world, and imposing on
all the nations of the earth their dominion and their religion.
. From the citadel of Rei, Isdigerd, in A.D. 641, sounded the
call to battle with no uncertain note. His envoys spread
themselves through Media, Azerbijan, Khorassan, Gurgan,
Tabaristan, Merv, Bactria, Seistan, Kerman, and Farsistan.”
* r ºf * - • –
> * * - * ;
•
f { x 4- - -
*
CH. XXVI.] BATTLE of NEHAVEND. 557
(or Persia Proper), demanding contingents of troops, and ap-
pointing, as the place of rendezvous, the small town of Nehav-
end, which is in the mountain region, about fifty miles south of
Hamadan. The call was responded to with zeal; and in a short
time there was gathered together at the place named an army
of 150,000 men.” Firuzan, one of the nobles who had com-
manded at Kadisiyeh,” was made general-in-chief. The design
was entertained of descending on Holwan, and thence upon the
lowland region, of re-taking Ctesiphon, crossing the great
rivers, and destroying the rising cities of Kufa and Busrah.”
But the Arabs were upon the alert, and anticipated the in-
tended invasion. Noman, son of Mokarrin, who commanded
at Ahwaz, was hastily commissioned by Omar to collect the
Arab troops stationed in Irak, Khuzistan, and the Sawād, to
put himself at their head, and to prevent the outbreak by
marching at once on Nehavend. He succeeded in uniting
under his standard about 30,000 soldiers,” and with this mode-
rate force entered the mountain tract, passed Holwan and
Merj, and encamped at Tur, where he expected the attack of
the enemy.” But Firuzan had now resolved to maintain the
defensive. He had entrenched himself strongly in front of
Nehavend and was bent on wearing out the patience of the
Arabs by a prolonged resistance. Noman, finding himself un-
molested, advanced from Tur to the immediate neighborhood
of Nehavend, and endeavored to provoke his adversary to give
battle, but without effect. For two months the two hosts faced
each other without fighting. At last, the stores of the Arabs,
as well as their patience, began to fail; and it was necessary to
employ some device, or to give up the war altogether. Here-
upon, Noman, by the advice of two of his captains, had re-
course to a stratagem. He spread a report that Omar was
dead, and breaking up from from his camp began a hasty re-
treat. The plan succeeded. Firuzan quitted his entrench-
ments, and led his army on the traces of the flying foe. It was
two days before he reached them, and on the third day the bat-
tle began. Noman, having addressed his soldiers and made
arrangements concerning the command in case of his own
death, mounted a milk-white steed,” and gave the signal for
the fight by thrice shouting the famous tekbir, or battle-cry,
“Allah akbar.” The Arabs charged with fury, and for a
while, amid the clouds of dust which rose beneath their feet,
nothing was heard but the clash of steel.” At length the Per-
sians gave way; but, as Noman advanced his standard and led
f
\
2.
* {- —w-–
A. i. * * • . * .x & 3
558 . THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xxvi.
the pursuit, a volley of arrows from the flying foe checked his
, movement, and at the same time terminated his career. A
shaft had struck him in a vital part, and he fell at thermoment
of victory. For his men, maddened by the loss of their com-
mander, pressed on more furiously than before; the Persians
were unable to rally; and a promiscuous flight began. Then
followed a dreadful slaughter. The numbers of the Persians
must have impeded their retreat; and in the defiles of the
mountains a rapid flight was impossible. Firuzan himself,
who, instead of falling back on Nehavend, took the road lead-
ing north to Hamadan, was overtaken by El Kakāa in a narrow
pass, and put to the sword. More than 100,000 Persians are
said to have perished.” The victors, pressing onwards, easily
took Nehavend. Hamadan Surrendered to them shortly after-
Wards.” - *
The defeat of Nehavend terminated the Sassanian power.”
Isdigerd indeed, escaping from Rei, and flying continually
'from place to place, prolonged an inglorious existence for the
space of ten more years—from A.D. 641 to A.D. 651; but he had
no longer a kingdom. Persia fell to pieces on the occasion of
“the victory of victories,” and made no other united effort
against the Arabs. Province after province was occupied by
the fierce invaders;” and, at length, in A.D. 651, their arms
penetrated to Merv, where the last Scion of the house of Babek
had for some years found a refuge. It is said that during this
interval he had made efforts to engage the Khan of the Turks
and the Emperor of the Chinese to embrace his cause;” but, if
this were so, it was without success. Though they may have
lent him some encouragement, no real effort was made by
either potentate on his behalf. Isdigerd, at Merv, during his
later years, experienced the usual fate of Sovereigns who have
lost their kingdoms. He was alternately flattered and coerced
by pretended friends among his own people—induced to cherish
vain hopes, and driven to despair, by the fluctuating counsels
of the monarchs of neighboring nations. At last he was mur-
dered by a subject for the sake of his clothes, when he was
flying from a combined attack of treacherous subjects and
offended foreigners.”
It is difficult to form a decided opinion as to the character of
Isdigerd III. He was but fifteen years of age at his accession,
twenty-four at the time of the battle of Nehavend, and thirty-
four at his decease, A.D. 651. It is in his favor that “history
lays no crimes to his charge;”” for this can be said of very few
~s
- N.
( . *~ ` -
,-,-,-,-,-, , , , ,
-- « , \ } * - ) * \ ,
* . \ -* f
ch. xxvi.] CHARACTER OF ISDIGERD III–COINS. 559"
\
Sassanian sovereigns. It is also to his credit that he persevered
so long in struggling against his fate, and in endeavoring to
maintain, or restore, the independence of his nation. But, on
the other hand, it must be confessed that there is little to be
admired in the measures which he took to meet the perils of
the time, and that personally he appears to have been weak and
of luxurious habits. During the whole of his long struggle
with the Arabs he seems never once to have placed himself at
the head of his troops, much less to have crossed Swords with
the enemy. He intrusted the defence of Persia to generals,
and did not even seek to inspire his soldiers with enthusiasm
by his own presence in their camp. Always Occupying some
secure fortress far in the rear of his army, he fled from each as
the enemy made a step in advance, quitting Ctesiphon for Hol-
wan, Holwan for Rei, and Rei for Merv, never venturing upon
a stand, never making an appeal to the loyalty which was
amongst the best qualities of the Persians, and which would
have caused them to fight with desperation in defence of a
present king. Carrying with him in all his wanderings the
miserable pageant of an Oriental court, he suffered his move-
ments to be hampered and his resources crippled by a throng. .
of 4000 useless retainers,” whom he could not bring himself to
dismiss. Instead of donning the armor which befitted one who
was struggling for his crown, he wore to the last the silken
robes, the jewelled belt, the rings and bracelets that were only
suited for the quiet inmate of a palace, and by this incongruous
and misplaced splendor he provoked, and, perhaps we may Say,
deserved his fate. A monarch who loses his crown for the most
part awakens interest and sympathy; but no historian has a
word of commiseration for the last of the Sassanidae, who is
reproached with feebleness, cowardice, and effeminacy.” It
must certainly be allowed that he was no hero; but considering
his extreme youth when his perils began, the efforts which he
made to meet them, and the impossibility of an effective
resistance in the effete and exhausted condition of the Persian
nation, history is scarcely justified in passing upon the unfortu-
nate prince a severe judgment. - . .
The coins assigned to Isdigerd III. are neither numerous nor
very remarkable.” The head is in general very similar to that
of Artaxerxes III. The pearl bordering around it is single, and
in the margin are the usual stars and crescents of the later
Sassanian kings. The margin, however, shows also in some
instances a peculiar device behind the crown, and also a legend,
* z, * * 3. - , FT - # Ts
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* P. \ " .. ) \
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*. * *
560 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY.S. [CH. XXVII.
A - g =
which has been read, but very doubtfully,” as “Ormazd.” The
Ring's name is given as Iskart or Iskarti. Among the regnal
years marked on the reverse have been found the numbers
“nineteen” and “twenty.” Among the mint-marks are Azer-
bijan, Abiverd, and Merv. [Pl. XXIV., Fig. 4.]
CHAPTER XXVII.
Architecture of the Sassanians. Its Origin. Its Peculiarities.
Oblong Square Plan. Arched Entrance Halls. Domes rést-
ing on Pendentives. Suites of Apartments. Ormamenta-
tion : Eacterior, by Pilasters, Cornices, String-courses, and
shallow arched Recesses, with Pilasters between them, ; In-
& terior, by Pillars supporting Transverse Ribs, or by Door-
ways and False Windows, like the Persopolitan. Specimen
Palaces at Serbistan, at Firuzbad, at Ctesiphon, at Mashita.
ar IZlaborate Decoration at the last-named Palace. Decoration
a’ Elsewhere. Arch of Takht-i-Bostan. Sassanian Statuary.
Sassanian Bas-reliefs. Estimate of their Artistic Value.
Question of the Employment by the Sassamians of Byzan-
time Artists. General Summary.
“With the accession of the Sassanians, Persia regained much of that power and
stability to which she had been so long a stranger. . . . The improvement in the
fine arts at home indicates returning prosperity, and a degree of security unknown
since the fall of the Achaemenidae.”—Fergusson, History of Architecture, vol. i.
pp. 381–2, 2d edition.
WHEN Persia under the Sassanian princes shook off the bar-
barous yoke to which she had submitted for the space of almost
five centuries, she found architecture and the other fine arts at
almost the lowest possible ebb throughout the greater part of
Western Asia." The ruins of the Achaemenian edifices, which
were still to be seen at Pasargada, Persopolis, and elsewhere,”
bore witness to the grandeur of idea, and magnificence of con-
struction, which had once formed part of the heritage of the
Persian nation; but the intervening period was one during
which the arts had well-nigh wholly disappeared from the
Western Asiatic world; and when the early sovereigns of the
house of Sassan felt the desire, common with powerful mon-
archs, to exhibit their greatness in their buildings, they found
#
%
g - * - * * - t”. - f -
ch. xxvii.j GENERAL FEATURES OF THE PALACES. 561.
themselves at the first without artists to design, without arti-.
Sans to construct, and almost without models to copy. The
Parthians, who had ruled over Persia for nearly four hundred
years,' had preferred country to city life, tents to buildings,
and had not themselves erected a single edifice of any preten-
sion during the entire period of their dominion.” Nor had the
nations subjected to their sway, for the most part, exhibited
any constructive genius, or been successful in supplying the
artistic deficiencies of their rulers. In one place alone was
there an exception to this general paralysis of the artistic
powers. At Hatra, in the middle Mesopotamian region, an
Arab dynasty, which held under the Parthian kings, had
thought its dignity to require that it should be lodged in a pal-
ace,” and had resuscitated a native architecture in Mesopotamia,
after centuries of complete neglect. When the Sassanians
looked about for a foundation on which they might work, and
out of which they might form a style suitable to their needs
and worthy of their power and Opulence, they found what they
sought in the Hatra edifice, which was within the limits of
their kingdom, and at no great distance from one of the cities
where they held their Court. .
The early palaces of the Sassanians have ceased to exist.
Artaxerxes, the Son of Babek, Sapor the first, and their imme-
mediate successors, undoubtedly erected residences for them-
selves exceeding in size and richness the buildings which had
contented the Parthians, as well as those in which their own
ancestors, the tributary kings of Persia under Parthia, had
passed their lives. But these residences have almost wholly
disappeared." The most ancient of the Sassanian buildings
which admit of being measured and described are assigned'
to the century between A.D. 350 and 450; and we are thus
unable to trace the exact steps by which the Sassanian style
was gradually elaborated. We come upon it when it is be-
yond the stage of infancy, when it has acquired a marked and
decided character, when it no longer hesitates or falters, but
knows what it wants, and goes straight to its ends. Its main
features are simple, and are uniform from first to last, the
later buildings being merely enlargements of the earlier," by an
addition to the number or to the size of the apartments. The
principal peculiarities of the style are, first, that the plan of
the entire building is an oblong Square, without adjuncts or
projections; secondly, that the main entrance is into a lofty
Vaulted porch or hall by an archway of the entire width of the
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$ * • * ' * * *
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562 . THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. [CH. xxvii.
# ... " * i \
. . # |
apartment; thirdly, that beside these oblong halls, the build-
ing contains square apartments, vaulted with domes, which
are circular at their base, and elliptical in their section, and
A.
which rest on pendentives of an unusual character; fourthly,
that the apartments are numerous and en swite, opening one
into another, without the intervention of passages; and fifthly,
that the palace comprises, as a matter of course, a court,
placed towards the rear of the building, with apartments
opening into it.
The oblong square is variously proportioned. The depth
may be a little more than the breadth,” or it may be nearly
twice as much.” In either case, the front occupies one of the
shorter sides, or ends of the edifice. The outer wall is some-
times pierced by one entrance only;” but, more commonly,
entrances are multiplied beyond the limit commonly observed
in modern buildings.” The great entrance is in the exact
centre of the front. This entrance, as already noticed, is com-
monly by a lofty arch which (if we set aside the domes) is of
almost the full height of the building, and constitutes one of
its most striking, and to Europeans most extraordinary,
features. From the outer air, we look, as it were, straight
into the heart of the edifice, in one instance” to the depth of
115 feet, a distance equal to the length of Henry VII.'s Chapel
at Westminster. The effect is very strange when first seen
by the inexperienced traveller; but similar entrances are com-
mon in the mosques of Armenia and Persia, and in the palaces
of the latter country. In the mosques “lofty and deeply-
recessed portals,” “unrivalled for grandeur and appropriate-
ness,” “ are rather the rule than the exception; and, in the
palaces, “Throne-rooms” are commonly mere deep recesses
of this character, vaulted or supported by pillars, and open at
one end to the full width and height of the apartment.” The
height of the arch varies in Sassanian buildings from about
fifty to eighty-five feet; it is generally plain, and without
ornament; but in one case we meet with a foiling of Small
arches round the great one," which has an effect that is not
unpleasing.
The domed apartments are squares of from twenty-five to
forty feet, or a little more. The domes are circular at their
base; but a section of them would exhibit a half ellipse, with its
longest and shortest diameters proportioned as three to two."
The height to which they rise from the ground is not much
above seventy feet.” A single building will have two or three
g
#. - #
CH. XXVII.] DOMES-ORNAMENTATION. 563
f
domes, either of the same size, or occasionally of different
dimensions. It is a peculiarity of their construction that they
rest, not on drums, but on pendentives of a curious character.
A series of Semi-circular arches is thrown across the angles of
the apartment, each projecting further into it than the pre-
ceding, and in this way the corners are got rid of, and the
square converted into the circular shape.” A cornice ran
round the apartment, either above or below the pendentives,
or sometimes both above and below.” The domes were pierced
by a number of small holes, which admitted some light, and
the upper part of the walls between the pendentives was
also pierced by windows.
There are no passages or corridors in the Sassanian palaces. .
The rooms for the most part open one into the other. Where
this is not the case, they give upon a common meeting-ground,
which is either an open court, or a large vaulted apartment.
The openings are in general doorways of moderate size, but
sometimes they are arches of the full width of the subordinate
room or apartment. As many as seventeen or eighteen rooms
have been found in a palace.”
There is no appearance in any Sassanian edifice of a real
second story. The famous Takht-i-Khosru presents exter-
nally the semblance of such an arrangement; but this seems
to have been a mere feature of the external ornamentation,
and to have had nothing to do with the interior.”
The exterior ornamentation of the Sassanian buildings was
by pilasters, by arched recesses, by cornices, and sometimes .
by string-courses.” An ornamentation at once simple and
elegant is that of the lateral faces of the palace at Firuzabad,
where long reed-like pilasters are carried from the ground to
the cornice, while between them are a series of tall narrow
doubly recessed arches.* Far less satisfactory is the much
more elaborate design adopted at Ctesiphon,” where six series
of blind arches of different kinds are superimposed the one on
the other, with string-courses between them, and with pilasters, l
placed singly or in pairs, separating the arches into groups,
and not regularly superimposed, as pillars, whether real or
Seeming, ought to be. s *
The interior ornamentation was probably, in a great measure,
by stucco, painting, and perhaps gilding.” All this, however,
if it existed, has disappeared; and the interiors now present a
bare and naked appearance, which is only slightly relieved by
the occasional occurrence of windows, of ornamental door-
\
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Af
* J - * ,
564 -THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH xxvir.
ways, and of niches, which recall well-known features at
Persepolis. In some instances, however, the arrangement of
the larger rooms was improved by means of short pillars,
placed at some distance from the walls, and supporting a sort
of transverse rib, which broke the uniformity of the roof.”
The pillars were connected with the side walls by low arches.
Such are the main peculiarities of Sassanian palace architec-
ture. The general effect of the great halls is grand, though
scarcely beautiful; and, in the best specimens,” the entire
palace has an air of simple severity which is striking and
dignified. The internal arrangements do not appear to be
very convenient. Too much is sacrificed to regularity; and
the opening of each room into its neighbor must, one would
think, have been unsatisfactory. Still, the edifices are re-
garded as “indicating considerable originality and power,”
though they “point to a state of society when attention to
security hardly allowed the architect the free exercise of the
more delicate ornaments of his art.” --
From this general account of the main features of the
architecture it is proposed now to proceed to a more particular
description of the principal extant Sassanian buildings—the
palaces at Serbistan, Firuzabad, Ctesiphon, and Mashita.
The palace at Serbistan is the smallest, and probably the
earliest of the four. It has been assigned conjecturally to the
middle of the fourth century,” or the reign of Sapor II. The
ground plan is an oblong but little removed from a square, the
length being 42 French mêtres, and the breadth nearly 37
mêtres.” [Pl. XXV., Fig. 1.] The building faces west, and is
entered by three archways, between which are groups of three
semi-circular pilasters, while beyond the two outer arches
towards the angles of the building is a single similar pilaster.
Within the archways are halls or porches of different depths,
the central one of the three being the shallowest. [Pl. XXV.,
Fig. 2..] This opens by an arched doorway into a square
chamber, the largest in the edifice. It is domed, and has a
diameter of about 42 feet or, including recesses, of above 57
feet. The interior height of the dome from the floor is 65 feet.
Beyond the domed chamber is a court, which measures 45 feet
by 40, and has rooms of various sizes opening into it. One of
these is domed; and others are for the most part vaulted.
The great domed chamber opens towards the north, on a deep
porch or hall, which was entered from without by the usual
arched portal. On the South it communicates with a pillared
g
cH. xxvii.] : THE PALACE AT FIRUZABA.D. 565
hall, above 60 feet long by 30 broad. There is another some-
what similar hall on the north side of the building, in width
about equal, but in length not quite 50feet. In both halls the
pillars are short, not exceeding six feet. They support piers,
which run up perpendicularly for a considerable height, and
then become ribs of the vaulting. ^.
The Firuzabad palace has a length of above 390 and a width.
of above 180 feet.” Its supposed date” is A.D. 450, or the reign
of Isdigerd I. As usual the ground plan is an oblong square.
[Pl. XXVI.] It is remarkable that the entire building had but
a single entrance.” This was by a noble arch, above 50 feet in
height, which faced north, and gave admission into a vaulted
hall, nearly 90 feet long by 43 wide, having at either side two
lesser halls of a similar character, opening into it by somewhat
low semi-circular arches, of nearly the full width of the apart.
ments. Beyond these rooms, and communicating with them by
narrow, but elegant doorways, were three domed chambers pre-
cisely similar, occupying together the full width of the build-
ing, each about 43 feet square, and crowned by elliptical domes
rising to the height of nearly 70 feet. [Pl. XXVII., Fig. 1.]
The ornamentation of these chambers was by their doorways,
and by false windows, on the Persepolitan model. The domed
chambers opened into some small apartments, beyond which
was a large court, about 90 feet square, surrounded by vaulted
rooms of various sizes, which for the most part communicated
directly with it. False windows, or recesses, relieved the in-
terior of these apartments, but were of a less elaborate char-
acter than those of the domed chambers. Externally the whole
building was chastely and tastefully ornamented by the tall
narrow arches and reed-like pilasters already mentioned.”
[Pl. XXVII., Fig. 2..] Its character, however, was upon the
whole “simple and severe;” nor can we quarrel with the
judgment which pronounces it “more like a gigantic bastile
than the palace of a gay, pavilion-loving people like the
Persians.”8° .
It is difficult to form any very decided opinion upon the
architectural merits of the third and grandest of the Sassanian
palaces, the well known “Takht-i-Khosru,” or palace of ChoS-
roës Anushirwan, at Ctesiphon.” What remains of this mas-
sive erection is a mere fragment,” which, to judge from the
other extant Sassanian ruins, cannot have formed so much as
one fourth part of the original edifice. [Pl. XXVIII., Fig. 1.]
Nothing has come down to our day but a single vaulted hall
- —x- - $
%
566 , THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. ſch. xxvii.
on the grandest scale, 72 feet wide, 85 high, and 115 deep, to-
gether with the mere outer wall of what no doubt constituted
the main façade of the building. The apartments, which, ac-
cording to all analogy, must have existed at the two sides, and
in the rear, of the great hall, Some of which should have been
vaulted, have wholly perished. Imagination may supply them
from the Firuzabad, or the Mashita palace; but not a trace,
even of their foundations, is extant; and the details, conse-
quently, are uncertain, though the general plan can scarcely
be doubted. At each side of the great hall were probably two
lateral ones, communicating with each other, and capable of
being entered either from the hall or from the outer air.” Be-
yond the great hall was probably a domed chamber, equalling
it in width, and opening upon a court, round which were a
number of moderate-sized apartments. The entire building
was no doubt an oblong square, of which the shorter sides
seem to have measured 370 feet." It had at least three, and
may not improbably have had a larger number of entrances,
since it belongs to tranquil times and a secure locality.
The ornamentation of the existing façade of the palace, is by
doorways, doubly-arched recesses, pilasters, and string-courses.
These last divide the building, externally, into an appearance
of three or four distinct stories. The first and second stories
are broken into portions by pilasters, which in the first or
basement stories are in pairs, but in the second stand singly.
It is remarkable that the pilasters of the second story are not
arranged with any regard to those of the first, and are conse-
quently in many cases not superimposed upon the lower pi-
lasters. In the third and fourth stories there are no pilasters,
the arched recesses being here continued without any inter-
ruption. Over the great arch of the central hall, a foiling of
Seventeen small semicircular arches constitutes a pleasing and
unusual feature.
The Mashita palace, which was almost certainly built be-
tween A.D. 614 and A.D. 627, while on a smaller scale than that
of Ctesiphon, was far more richly ornamented. [Pl. XXVIII.,
Fig. 2..] This construction of Chosroës II. (Parwiz) consisted
of two distinct buildings (separated by a court-yard, in which
was a fountain), extending each of them about 180 feet along
the front, with a depth respectively of 140 and 150 feet.* The
main building, which lay to the north, was entered from the
Court-yard by three archways, semicircular and standing side
by side, separated only by columns of hard, white stone, of a
CH. xxvii.] ORNAMENTATION OF MASHITA PALACE. 567
quality approaching to marble. These columns were sur- -
mounted by debased Corinthian capitals, of a type introduced
by Justinian,“ and supported arches which were very richly
fluted, and which are said to have been “not unlike our own
late Norman work.”* [Pl. XXIX., Fig. 2..] The archways
gave entrance into an oblong court or hall, about 80 feet long,
by sixty feet wide, on which opened by a wide doorway the
main room of the building. This was a triapsal hall, built of
brick, and surmounted by a massive domed roof of the same
material, which rested on pendentives like those employed at
Serbistan and at Firuzabad.* The diameter of the hall was a
little short of 60 feet. On either side of the triapsal hall, and
in its rear, and again on either side of the court or hall on
which it opened, were rooms of a smaller size, generally open-
ing into each other, and arranged symmetrically, each side
being the exact counterpart of the other. The number of these
smaller apartments was twenty-five. [Pl. XXIX., Fig. 1.]
The other building, which lies towards the south, and is sep-
arated from the one just described by the whole length of the
Court-yard, a distance of nearly 200 feet, appears to have been
for the most part of an inferior character. It comprised one
large hall, or inner court, but otherwise contained only small
apartments, which, it is thought, may have been “intended as
guard-rooms for the soldiers.”* Although, however, in most
respects So unpretending, this edifice was adorned externally
with a richness and magnificence unparalleled in the other re-
mains of Sassanian times, and scarcely exceeded in the archi-
tecture of any age or nation. Forming, as it did, the only
entrance by which the palace could be approached,” and pos-
Sessing the only front which was presented to the gaze of the
outer world, its ornamentation was clearly an object of Chos-
g
roës' special care, who seems to have lavished upon it all the
known resources of art. The outer wall was built of finely-
dressed hard stone;” and on this excellent material the sculp-
tors of the time—whether Persian or Byzantine, it is impossi-
ble to determine—proceeded to carve in the most elaborate
Way, first a bold pattern of zigzags and rosettes, and then,
Over the entire surface, a most delicate tracery of foliage, ani-
mals, and fruits. The effect of the zigzags is to divide the
wall into a number of triangular compartments, each of which
is treated separately, covered with a decoration peculiar to it-
Self, a fretwork of the richest kind, in which animal and vege-
table forms are most happily intermingled. In one a vase of
— — — — —F-
Y.
-"
568 THE SEVENTH MONARCH Y. [CH. XXVII.
an elegant shape stands midway in the triangle at its base;
two doves are seated on it, back to back; from between them
rises a vine, which spreads its luxuriant branches over the en-
tire compartment, covering it with its graceful curves and
abundant fruitage; on either side of the vase a lion and a wild
boar confront the doves with a friendly air; while everywhere
amid the leaves and grapes we see the forms of birds, half re-
vealed, half hidden by the foliage. Among the birds, pea-
cocks, parrots, and partridges have been recognized; among
the beasts, besides lions and wild boars, buffaloes, panthers,
lynxes, and gazelles. In another panel a winged lion, the
“lineal descendant of those found at Nineveh and Persepo-
lis,” “ reflects the mythological symbolism of Assyria, and
shows how tenacious was its hold on the West-Asian mind.
Nor is the human form wholly wanting. In one place we per-
ceive a man's head, in close juxtaposition with man's insepara-
ble companion, the dog; in another, the entire figure of a man,
who carries a basket of fruit.” .
Besides the compartments within the zigzags, the zigzags
themselves and the rosettes are ornamented with a patterning
of large leaves, while the moulding below the zigzags and the
' cornice, or string-course, above them are covered with con-
ventional designs, the interstices between them being filled in
- with very beautiful adaptations of lesser vegetable forms.”
Altogether, the ornamentation of this magnificent façade
may be pronounced almost unrivalled for beauty and appropri-
ateness; and the entire palace may well be called “a marvel-
lous example of the sumptuousness and selfishness of ancient
princes,” “ who expended on the gratification of their own
taste and love of display the riches which would have been
better employed in the defence of their kingdoms, or in the re-
lief of their poorer subjects. -
The exquisite ornamentation of the Mashita palace exceeds
anything which is found elsewhere in the Sassanian buildings,
but it is not wholly different in kind from that of other remains
of their architecture in Media and Persia Proper. The archi-
volte which adorns the arch of Takht-i-Bostan” [Pl. XXXI.,
Fig. 1.] possesses almost equal delicacy with the patterned cor-
mice or string-course of the Mashita building; and its flowered
panels may compare for beauty with the Mashita triangular
compartments. [Pl. XXXI., Fig. 2..] Sassanian capitals are
also in many instances of lovely design, sometimes delicately
diapered (A, B), sometimes worked with a pattern of conven-
* \
ch. xxvii.] of HER SASSANIAN ORNAMENTATION. 569
tional leaves and flowers (C) [Pl. XXXII.], occasionally ex-,
hibiting the human form (D, E), or a flowery patterning, like
that of the Takht-i-Bostan (F, G). [Pl. XXXIII.] In the more
elaborate specimens,” the four faces—for the capitals are
square—present designs completely different; in other in-
stances, two of the four faces are alike, but on the other two .
the design is varied.* The shafts of Sassanian columns, so far
as we can judge, appear to have been fluted."
A work not exactly architectural, yet possessing architectural
features—the well-known arch of Chosroës II. above alluded ,
to—seems to deserve description before we pass to another
branch of our subject. [Pl. XXXIV., Fig. 1.] This is an arch-
way or grotto cut in the rock at Takht-i-Bostan, near Kerman-
shah, which is extremely curious and interesting. On the
brink of a pool of clear water, the sloping face of the rock has
been cut into, and a recess formed, presenting at its further end
a perpendicular face. This face, which is about 34 feet broad,
by 31 feet high, and which is ornamented at the top by some
rather rude gradines, has been penetrated by an arch, cut into
the solid stone to the depth of above 20 feet, and elaborately ,
ornamented, both within and without. Externally, the arch.
is in the first place surmounted by the archivolte already
spoken of, and then, in the Spandrels on either side are intro-
duced flying figures of angels or Victories, holding chaplets in
one hand and cups or vases in the other, which are little infe-
rior to the best Roman art." [Pl. XXXIV., Fig. 2..] Between
the figures is a crescent, perhaps originally enclosing a ball," -
and thus presenting to the spectator, at the culminating point
of the whole sculpture, the familiar emblems of two of the na-
tional divinities. Below the spandrels and archivolte, on either
side of the arched entrance, are the flowered panels above-men- -
tioned, alike in most respects, but varying in some of their de-
tails. Within the recess, its two sides, and its further end,
are decorated with bas-reliefs, those on the sides representing
Chosroës engaged in the chase of the wild boar and the stag,” ;
while those at the end, which are in two lines, one over the
other, show the monarch, above, in his robes of state, receiving
wreaths from ideal beings; below, in his war costume, mounted
upon his favorite charger, Sheb-Diz,” with his spear poised in ,
his hand, awaiting the approach of the enemy. The modern
critic regards" this figure as “original and interesting.” We
shall have occasion to recur to it when we treat of the “Man-
ners and Customs” of the Neo-Persian people.
#
— — — — . I-
!
*
/
570 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. Icm xxvii.
The glyptic art of the Sassanian is seen chiefly in their bas-
reliefs; but one figure “in the round” has come down to us
from their times, which seems to deserve particular description.
This is a colossal statue of Sapor I., hewn (it would seem)
out of the natural rock,” which still exists, though overthrown
and mutilated, in a natural grotto near the ruined city of Sha-
pur. [Pl. XXXV.] The original height of the figure, accord-
ing to M. Texier,” was 6 mêtres 7 centimètres, or between 19
and 20 feet. It was well proportioned, and carefully wrought,
representing the monarch in peaceful attire, but with a long
Sword at his left side, wearing the mural crown which charac-
terizes him on the bas-reliefs,” and dressed in a tunic and
trowsers of a light and flexible material, apparently either silk
or muslin. The hair, beard, and mustachios, were neatly ar-
ranged and well rendered." The attitude of the figure was
natural and good. One hand, the right, rested upon the hip;
the other touched, but without grasping it, the hilt of the long
straight sword. If we may trust the representation of M.
Texier's artist, the folds of the drapery were represented with
much skill and delicacy; but the hands and feet of the figure,
especially the latter, were somewhat roughly rendered.”
The bas-reliefs of the Sassanians are extremely numerous,”
and though generally rude, and Sometimes even grotesque,"
are not without a certain amount of merit. Some of the earlier
and coarser specimens have been already given in this volume;
and one more of the same class is here appended [Pl. XXXVI.,
Fig. 1.] but we have now to notice some other and better ex-
amples, which seem to indicate that the Persians of this period
attained a considerable proficiency in this branch of the glyp-
tic art. The reliefs belonging to the time of Sapor I. are gen-
erally poor in conception and ill-executed; but in one instance,
unless the modern artist has greatly flattered his original,” a
work of this time is not devoid of some artistic excellence.
This is a representation of the triumph of Sapor over Valerian,
comprising only four figures—Sapor, an attendant, and two
Romans—of which the three principal are boldly drawn, in at-
titudes natural, yet effective, and in good proportion. [Pl.
XXXVII.] The horse on which Sapor rides is of the usual
clumsy description, reminding us of those which draw our
brewers' wains; and the exaggerated hair, floating ribbons and
uncouth head-dress of the monarch give an outré and ridicu-
lous air to the chief figure; but, if we deduct these defects,
which are common to almost all the Sassanian artists, the rep-
4.
t +
ch. xxvii. BASIRELIEES OF SAPOR I. - 571
\
resentation becomes pleasing and dignified. Sapor sits his
horse well, and thinks not of himself, but of what he is doing.
Cyriadeś, who is somewhat too short, receives the diadem from
his benefactor with a calm satisfaction.” But the best figure
is that of the captive emperor, who kneels on one knee, and,
with outstretched arms, implores the mercy of the conqueror.
The whole representation is colossal, the figures being at least
three times the size of life; the execution seems to have been
good; but the work has been considerably injured by the ef-
fects of time.
Another bas-relief of the age of Sapor I. is on too large a
scale, and too complicated, to be represented here;” but a de-
scription may be given of it, and a specimen subjoined, from
which the reader may judge of its character. On a surface of
rock at Shapur, carefully smoothed and prepared for sculpture,
the second Sassanian monarch appears in the centre of the tab-
let, mounted on horseback, and in his usual costume, with a
dead Roman under his horse's feet, and holding another (Cyri-
ades?), by the hand. In front of him, a third Roman, the rep-
resentative of the defeated nation, makes submission; and then
follow thirteen tribute-bearers, bringing rings of gold, shawls,
bowls, and the like, and conducting also a horse and an elephant.
Behind the monarch, on the same line, are thirteen mounted
guardsmen. Directly above, and directly below the central
group, the tablet is blank; but on either side the subject is con-
tinued, above in two lines, and below in one, the guardsmen
towards the left amounting in all to fifty-six, and the tribute-
bearers on the right to thirty-five. The whole tablet comprises
ninety-five human and sixty-three animal figures, besides a
Victory floating in the sky. The illustration [Pl. XXXVIII.]
is a representation of the extreme right-hand portion of the
Second line. * > || -
After the time of Sapor I. there is a manifest decline in Sas-
sanian art. The reliefs of Varahran II. and Varahran III., of
Narses and Sapor III., fall considerably below those of Sapor,
Son of Artaxerxes.” It is not till we arrive at the time of Va-
rahran IV. (A.D. 388–399) that we once more have works which
possess real artistic merit. Indications have already appeared ,
in an earlier chapter” of this monarch's encouragement of art-
ists, and of a kind of art really meriting the name. We saw
that his gems were exquisitely cut, and embodied designs of
first-rate excellence. It has now to be observed further, that
among the bas-reliefs of the greatest merit which belong to
*.
*
$ , “. ,”
572 / THE SE VENTH MONARC HY. [CH, xxvii.
Sassanian times, one at least must be ascribed to him; and
that, this being so, there is considerable probability that two
others of the same class belong also to his reign. The one which
must undoubtedly be his, and which tends to fix the date of
the other two, exists at Nakhsh-i-Rustam, near Persepolis, and
has frequently been copied by travellers.” It represents a
mounted warrior, with the peculiar head-dress” of Varahram
IV., charging another at full speed, striking him with his
spear, and bearing both horse and rider to the ground. [Pl.
XXXIX.] A standard-bearer marches a little behind; and a
dead warrior lies underneath Varahran's horse, which is clear-
ing the obstacle in his bound. The Spirit of the entire compo-
sition is admirable; and though the stone is in a state of ad-
vanced decay, travellers never fail to admire the vigor of the
design and the life and movement which characterize it.”
The other similar reliefs to which reference has been made
exist, respectively, at Nakhsh-i-Rustam and at Firuzabad. The
Nakhsh-i-Rustam tablet" is almost a duplicate of the one above
described and represented, differing from it mainly in the Omis-
sion of the prostrate figure, in the forms of the head-dresses
borne by the two cavaliers, and in the shape of the standard.
It is also in better preservation than the other, and presents
some additional details. The head-dress of the Sassanian war-
rior is very remarkable, being quite unlike any other known
example. It consists of a cap, which spreads as it rises, and
breaks into three points, terminating in large striped balls."
[Pl. XXVI., Fig. 2..] His adversary wears a helmet crowned
, with a similar ball. The standard, which is in the form of a
capital T, displays also five balls of the same sort, three rising
from the cross-bar, and the other two hanging from it. Were
it not for the head-dress of the principal figure, this sculpture
might be confidently assigned to the monarch who set up the
neighboring one. As it is, the point must be regarded as unde-
cided, and the exact date of the relief as doubtful. It is,
however, unlikely to be either much earlier, or much later, than
the time of Varahran IV.
The third specimen of a Sassanian battle-scene exists at
Firuzabad, in Persia Proper, and has been carefully rendered
by M. Flandin.” It is in exceedingly bad condition, but ap-
pears to have comprised the figures of either five or six horse-
men, of whom the two principal are a warrior whose helmet
terminates in the head of a bird, and one who wears a crown,
above which rises a cap, surmounted by a ball. [Pl. XL.] The
– , – -- /
y -
CH. xxvii.] LATER SASSANIAN BAS-RELIEFS. 573
former of these, who is undoubtedly a Sassanian prince,”
pierces with his spear the right side of the latter, who is rep-
resented in the act of falling to the ground. His horse tumbles
at the same time, though why he does so is not quite clear, 2.
since he has not been touched by the other charger. His atti
tude is extravagantly absurd, his hind feet being on a leve
with the head of his rider. Still more absurd seems to have
been the attitude of a horse at the extreme right, which turns
in falling, and exposes to the spectator the inside of the near
thigh and the belly. But, notwithstanding these drawbacks,
the representation has great merit. The figures live and
breathe—that of the dying king expresses horror and helpless-
ness, that of his pursuer determined purpose and manly
strength. Even the very horses are alive, and manifestly re-
joice in the strife. The entire work is full of movement, of
variety, and of artistic spirit. - - ^
If we have regard to the highest qualities of glyptic art, Sas-
sanian sculpture must be said here to culminate. There is a
miserable falling off, when about a hundred and fifty years.
later the Great Chosroës (Anushirwan) represents himself at
Shapur,” seated on his throne, and fronting to the spectator,
with guards and attendants on one side, and soldiers bringing
in prisoners, human heads, and booty, on the other. [Pl.

XLI.] The style here recalls that of the tamer reliefs set up º
by the first Sapor,” but is less pleasing. Some of the prisoners
appear to be well drawn; but the central figure, that of the
monarch, is grotesque; the human heads are ghastly; and the
soldiers and attendants have little merit. The animal forms *
are better—that of the elephant especially, though as compared
with the men it is strangely out of proportion.
* With Chosroës II. (Eberwiz or Parviz), the grandson of
Anushir Wän, who ascended the throne only twelve years after
the death of his grandfather, and reigned, from A.D. 591 to A.D.
628, a reaction Set in. We have seen the Splendor and good
taste of his Mashita palace, the BEty of some or his coins,”
and the general excellence of his ornańentation.” It remains
to notice the character of his reliefs, found at present in one ſ
locality only, viz., at Takht-i-Bostan, where they constitute the At
main decorations of the great triumphal arch of this monarch. ^
[Pl. XLII.] .. *
These reliefs consist of two classes of works, colossal
, figures and hunting-pieces. The colossal figures, of which wº
some accolińThås been already given, and which are repre-
* *
*
§74 g THE SEVENTII MONARCHY. [CH. XXVII.
sented in Pl. XLI., have but little merit. They are curious on
account of their careful elaboration, and furnish important in-
formation with respect to SaSSanian dress and armature, but
they are poor in design, being heavy, awkward, and ungainly.
Nothing can well be less, beautiful than the three overstout
personages, who stand with their heads nearly or quite touch-
ing the crown of the arch, at its further extremity, carefully
drawn in detail, but in outline little short of hideous. The
least bad is that to the left, whose drapery is tolerably well
arranged, and whose face, judging by what remains of it, was
not unpleasing. Of the other two it is impossible to say a
word in commendation. - .
. The mounted cavalier below them—Chosroës himself on his
black” war horse, Sheb-Diz—is somewhat better. The pose of
horse and horseman has dignity; the general proportions are
fairly correct, though (as usual) the horse is of a breed that
recalls the modern dray-horse rather than the charger. The
figure, being near the ground, has suffered much mutilation,
probably at the hands of Moslem fanatics; the off hind leg of
the horse is gone; his nose and mouth have disappeared; and
the horseman has lost his right foot and a portion of his lower
clothing. But nevertheless, the general effect is not altogether
destroyed. Modern travellers admire the repose and dignity
of the composition, its combination of simplicity with detail,
and the delicacy and finish of some portions.” It may be
added that the relief of the figure is high; the off legs of the
horse were wholly detached; and the remainder of both horse
and rider was nearly, though not quite, disengaged from the
rock behind them. \
The hunting-pieces, which ornament the interior of the
arched recess on either side, are far superior to the colossal
figures, and merit an exact description. On the right, the per-
pendicular space below the spring of the arch contains the
representation of a stag hunt, in which the monarch and about
a dozen other mounted horsemen take part, assisted by some
ten Or twelve footmen, and by a detachment mounted on ele-
phants. [Pl. XLIII.] The elephants, which are nine in num-
ber, occupy the extreme right of the tablet, and seem to be
employed in driving the deer into certain prepared enclosures.
Each of the beasts is guided by three riders, sitting along their
backs, of whom the central one alone has the support of a sad-
dle or howdah. The enclosures into which the elephants drive
the game are three in number; they are surrounded by nets;
*
cH. xxvii.] HUNTING-PIECES OF CHOSROES II. 575 -
A >
and from the central one alone is there an exit. Through this
exit, which is guarded by two footmen, the game passes into
the central field, or main space of the sculpture, where the
king awaits them. He is mounted on his steed, with his bow
passed over his head, his sword at his side, and an attendant
holding the royal parasol over him. It is not quite clear
whether he himself does more than witness the chase. The
game is in the main pursued and brought to the ground by
horsemen without royal insignia,” and is then passed over into
a further compartment—the extreme one towards the left,
where it is properly arranged and placed upon camels for con-
veyance to the royal palace. During the whole proceeding a
band of twenty-six musicians, Some of whom occupy an ele-
vated platform, delights with a “concord of sweet sounds” the
assembled sportsmen.” - -
On the opposite, or left-hand, side of the recess, is represented
a boar-hunt. [Pl. XLIV.] Here again, elephants, twelve in
number, drive the game into an enclosure without exit. Within
this space nearly a hundred boars and pigs may be counted.
The ground being marshy, the monarch occupies a boat in the
centre, and from this transfixes the game with his arrows.
No one else takes part in the sport, unless it be the riders on a
troop of five elephants, represented in the lower middle por-T
tion of the tablet. When the pigs fall, they are carried into a
second enclosure, that on the right, where they are upturned,
disembowelled, and placed across the backs of elephants, which
convey them to the abode of the monarch. Once more, the
scene is enlivened by music. Two bands of harpers occupy
boats on either side of that which carries the king, while an-
other harper sits with him in the boat from which he delivers
his arrows. In the water about the boats are seen reeds,
ducks, and numerous fishes. The oars by which the boats are
propelled have a singular resemblance to those which are rep- . .
resented in some of the earliest Assyrian sculptures.” Two
other features must also be noticed. Near the top of the tablet,
towards the left, five figures standing in a boat seem to be
clapping their hands in order to drive the pigs towards the
monarch; while in the right centre of the picture there is an-
other boat, more highly ornamented than the rest, in which
we seem to have a second representation of the king, differing
from the first only in the fact that his arrow has flown, and
that he is in the act of taking another arrow from an attend-
ant. In this second representation the king's head is sur-
g
^.
\
– , – −4.
i *
* * gº *.
576 THE SH WENTH MIONARCH Y. [CH. XXVII.
rounded by a nimbus or “glory.” Altogether there are in this'
tablet more than seventy-five human and nearly 150 animal
forms. In the other, the human forms are about seventy, and
the animal ones about a hundred.
The merit of the two reliefs above described, which would
require to be engraved on a large scale, in order that justice
should be done to them,” consists in the spirit and truth of the
animal forms, elephants, camels, stags, boars, horses, and in
the life and movement of the whole picture. The rush of the
pigs, the bounds of the Stags and hinds, the heavy march of
the elephants, the ungainly movements of the camels, are well
portrayed; and in one instance, the foreshortening of a horse,
advancing diagonally, is respectably rendered." In general,
Sassanian sculpture, like most delineative art in its infancy,
affects merely the profile; but here, and in the overturned
horse already described,” and again in the Victories which or-
' nament the spandrels of the arch of Chosroës, the mere profile
is departed from with good effect, and a power is shown of
drawing human and animal figures in front or at an angle.
What is wanting in the entire Sassanian series is idealism, or
the notion of elevating the representation in any respects
above the object represented; the highest aim of the artist is
to be true to nature; in this truthfulness is his triumph; but
as he often falls short of his models, his whole result, even at
the best, is unsatisfactory and disappointing.
Such must almost necessarily be the sentence of art critics,
who judge the productions of this age and nation according to
the abstract rules, or the accepted standards, of artistic effort.
But if circumstances of time and country are taken into ac-
count, if comparison is limited to earlier and later attempts in
the same region, or even in neighboring ones, a very much
more favorable judgment will be passed. The Sassanian re-
liefs need not on the whole shrink from a comparison with
those of the Achaemenian Persians. If they are ruder and
more grotesque, they are also more spirited and more varied;
and thus, though they fall, short in some respects, still they
must be pronounced superior to the Achaemenian in some of
the most important artistic qualities. Nor do they fall greatly
behind the earlier, and in many respects admirable, art of the
Assyrians. They are less numerous and cover a less variety
of subjects; they have less delicacy; but they have equal or
greater fire. In the judgment of a traveller not given to ex-
travagant praise, they are, in some cases at any rate, “exe-
ch. xxvii.J SASSANIAN ART, NATIVE OR FOREIGN; 577
cuted in the most masterly style.” “I never saw,” observes
Sir R. Ker Porter, “the elephant, the stag, or the boar por-
trayed with greater truth and spirit. The attempts at detailed
human form are,” he adds, “far inferior.”” Af
Before, however, we assign to the Sassanian monarchs, and
to the people whom they governed, the merit of having pro-
duced results so worthy of admiration, it becomes necessary to
inquire whether there is reason to believe that other than
native artists were employed in their production. It has been
very confidently stated that Chosroës the Second “brought
Roman artists” to Takht-i-BOstan,” and by their aid eclipsed
the glories of his great predecessors, Artaxerxes, son of Babek,
and the two Sapors. Byzantine forms are declared to have
been reproduced in the moldings of the Great Arch, and in
the Victories.” The lovely tracery of the Mashita Palace is
regarded as in the main the WOFF: OFGFEERs 5RTSyrians.”
No doubt it is quite possible that there may be somSTFúth in
these allegations; but we must not forget, or let it be forgot-
ten, that they rest on conjecture and are without historical
foundation. The works of the first Chosroës at Ctesiphon, ac-
cording to a respectable Greek writer,” were produced for him
by foreign artists, sent to his court by Justinian. But no such
statement is made with respect to his grandson. On the con-
trary, it is declared by the native writers” that a certain
Ferhad, a Persian, was the chief designer of them; and mod-
ern critics admit that his hand may perhaps be traced, not
only at Takht-i-Bostan, but at the Mashita Palace also.” If
then the merit of the J&sign is conceded to a native artist, we
need not too curiously inquire the nationality of the workmen
employed by him. |
At the worst, should it be thought that Byzantine influence
appears so plainly in the later Sassanian works, that Rome
rather than Persia must be credited with the buildings and
sculptures of both the first and the second Chosroës, still it
will have to be allowed that the earlier palaces—those at Ser-
bistan and Firuzabad—and the spirited battle-Scenes above de-
Scribed,” are wholly native; since they present no trace of any
foreign element. But, it is in these battle-scenes, as already
noticed,” that the delineative art of the Sassanians culmi-
nates; and it may further be questioned whether the Firuza-
bad palace is not the finest specimen of their architecture,
severe though it be in the character of its ornamentation; so
that, even should we surrender the whole of the later works
- - *
*
578 THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. [CH. xxvi II.
enough will still remain to show that the Sassanians, and the
* Persians of their day, had merit as artists and builders, a
merit the more creditable to them inasmuch as for five cen-
turies they had had no opportunity of cultivating their
powers, having been crushed by the domination of a race
singularly devoid of artistic aspirations. Even with regard to
the works for which they may have been indebted to for-
eigners, it is to be remembered that, unless the monarchs had
appreciated high art, and admired it, they would not have
hired, at great expense, the services of these aliens. For my
own part, I see no reason to doubt that the Sassanian remains
of every period are predominantly, if not exclusively, native,
not excepting those of the first Chosroës, for I mistrust the
statement of Theophylact.” - -
• *, * s -
CHAPTER XXVIII.
ON THE RELIGION, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, ETC., OF THE LATER
PERSIANS. *
Religion of the later Persians, Dualism of the eactremest kind.
Ideas entertained with respect to Ormazd and Ahriman.
Representations of them. Ormazd the special Guardian
of the Kings. Lesser Deities subject to Ormazd: Mithra,
Serosh, Vayu, Airyanam, Vitraha, etc. The sia: Amshash-
pands: Bahman, Ardibehesht, Shahravar, Isfand-armat,
Khordad, and Amerdat. Religion, how far idolatrows.
Worship of Anaitis. Chief Evil Spirits subject to Ahri-
man: Akomano, Indra, Çaurva, Naomhaitya, Taric, and
2aric. Position of Man between the two Worlds of Good
and Evil. His Duties: Worship, Agriculture, Purity.
Nature of the Worship. Hymns, Invocations, the Homa
Ceremony, Sacrifice. Agriculture a part of Religion.
Purity required : 1, Moral; 2, Legal. Nature of each.
Man's future Prospects. Position of the Magi whder the
Sassanians; their Organization, Dress, etc. The Fire-
temples and Altars. The Barsom. The Khrafathraghna.
Magnificence of the Sassanian Court; the Throme-room, the
Seraglio, the Attendants, the Ministers. Multitude of Pal-
aces. Dress of the Monarch : 1, in Peace; 2, in War.
g
*
ch. xxviii.] SASSANIAN MANNERS AND CUSTOMS. 579
Favorite Pastimes of the Kings. Hunting. Maintenance
of Paradisés. Stag and Boar-hunts. Music. Hawking.
Games. Character of the Persian Warfare under the
Sassanians. Sassanian Chariots. The Elephant Corps.
The Cavalry. The Archers. The ordinary Infantry.
Officers. Standards. Tactics. Private Life of the later
Persians. Agricultural Employment of the Men. Non-
seclusion of the Women. General Freedom from Oppres-
sion of all Classes eaccept the highest.
IIéparas oióa vöuotal rota Śe Xpeoplevows.--Herod. i. 131.
THE general character of the Persian religion, as revived by
the founder of the Sassanian dynasty, has been described in a
former chapter;' but it is felt that the present work would be
incomplete if it failed to furnish the reader with a tolerably
full account of So interesting a matter; more especially, since
the religious question lay at the root of the original rebellion
and revolution which raised the Sassanidae to power, and was
to a considerable extent the basis and foundation of their au-
thority. An access of religious fervor gave the Persians of the
third century after Christ the strength which enabled them to
throw off the yoke of their Parthian lords and recover the
sceptre of Western Asia. A strong—almost fanatical—relig-
ious spirit animated the greater number of the Sassanian mon-
archs. When the end of the kingdom came, the old faith was
still flourishing; and, though its star paled before that of Mo-
hammedanism, the faith itself survived, and still survives at
the present day.”
It has been observed that Dualism constituted the most
noticeable feature of the religion.” It may now be added that
the Dualism professed was of the most extreme and pronounced
kind. Ormazd and Ahriman, the principles of Good and Evil,
were expressly declared to be “twins.”* They had “in the
beginning come together to create Life and Death,” and to
settle “how the world was to be.”" There was no priority of
existence of the one over the other, and no decided superiority.
The two, being coeval, had contended from all eternity, and
would, it was almost certain, continue to contend to all eter-
nity, neither being able to vanquish the other. Thus an eternal
struggle was postulated between good and evil; and the issue
was doubtful, neither side possessing any clear and manifest
advantage.
4. *
5S0 . TH}} SEWENTH MONARCHIV. [CH. XXVIII.
The two principles were Persons. Ormazd was “the creator
of life, the earthly and the spiritual,” he who “made the
celestial bodies, earth, water, and trees.” He was “good,”
{ { holy, 17 g “pure, }} 10 { % true, }} 11 { { the Holy God, ?? 12 { % the
Holiest,” ” “the Essence of Truth,” “ “the father of all
truth,” ” “the being best of all,” ” “the master of purity.” "
He was supremely “happy,” ” being possessed of every bless-
ing, “health, wealth, virtue, wisdom, immortality.”" From
him came every good gift enjoyed by man; on the pious and
the righteous he bestowed, not only earthly advantages, but
precious spiritual gifts, truth, devotion, “the good mind,”
and everlasting happiness; * and, as he rewarded the good, so
he also punished the bad,” though this was an aspect in which
he was but seldom represented.
While Ormazd, thus far, would seem to be a presentation of
the Supreme Being in a form not greatly different from that
wherein it has pleased him to reveal Himself to mankind
through the Jewish and Christian scriptures, there are cartain
points of deficiency in the representation, which are rightly
viewed as placing the Persian very considerably below the
Jewish and Christian idea.” Besides the limitation on the
power and freedom of Ormazd implied in the eternal co-ex-
istence with him of another and a hostile principle, he is also
limited by the independent existence of space, time, and light,
which appear in the Zendavesta as “self-created,” or “without
beginning,”* and must therefore be regarded as “condition-
ing” the Supreme Being, who has to work, as best he may,
under circumstances not caused by himself. Again, Ormazd
is not a purely spiritual being. He is conceived of as possess-
ing a sort of physical nature. The “light,” which is one of his
properties, seems to be a material radiance.” He can be spoken
of as possessing health.” The whole conception of him, though
not grossly material, is far from being wholly immaterial.
His nature is complex, not simple.” He may not have a body,
in the ordinary sense of the word; * but he is entangled with
material accidents, and is far from answering to the pure
spirit, “without body, parts, or passions,” which forms the
Christian conception of the Deity. *
Ahriman, the Evil Principle, is of course far more powerful
and terrible than the Christian and Jewish Satan. He is un-
caused, co-eternal with Ormazd, engaged in a perpetual war-
fare with him. Whatever good thing Ormazd creates, Ahri-
man corrupts and ruins it. Moral and physical evils are
.*
– 1
*
cII. xxvii.I.] ORMAZD AND AHRIMAW, REPRESENTED. - 581
alike at his disposal. He blasts the earth with barrenness, or
makes it produce thorns, thistles, and poisonous plants; his
are the earthquake, the storm, the plague of hail, the thunder-
bolt; he causes disease and death, Sweeps off a nation's flocks
and herds by murrain, or depopulates a continent by pesti-
lence; ferocious wild beasts, Serpents, toads, mice, hornets,
mosquitoes, are his creation; he invented and introduced into
the world the sins of witchcraft, murder, unbelief, cannibalism,
sodomy; he excites wars and tumults, stirs up the bad against
the good, and labors by every possible expedient to make vice
triumph over virtue. Ormazd can exercise no control over
him; the utmost that he can do is to keep a perpetual watch
on his rival, and seek to baffle and defeat him. This he is not
always able to do. Despite his best endeavors, Ahriman is not
unfrequently victorious.**
In the purer times of the Zoroastrian-religion it would seem
that neither Ormazd nor Ahriman was represented by sculp-
tured forms.” A symbolism alone was permitted, which none
could Tmistake for a real attempt to portray these august,
beings.” But by the date of the Sassanian revival, the orig-
inal Spirit of ########.
tion; and it was no ſonger ſhought impious, or perilous, to
exhibit the heads of the Pantheon, in the forms regarded as
appropriate to them, upon public monuments. e great
Artaxerxes, probably Soon after his accession, set up a memo-
rial of his exploits, in which he represented himself as receiv-
ing the insignia of royalty from Ormazd. Thimself, while Ahri-
man;" tīātā ājū ŞGemingly, though Of course not really,
dead, lay at the feet Of The Steed on which Ormazd was
mounted.” In the form of Ormazd—there is nothing very re-
markable; he is attiréd like the king, has a long beard and
ºfflº, baton,
which olds erect in a Slanting position. The figure of
Ahriman possesses more interest. iñº face wears an expression
of pain and SüffèFing; but the features are calm, and in no
way disturbed. They are regular, and at least as handsome
as those of Artaxerxes and his divine patron. He wears a
band or diadem across the brow, above which we see a low
cap or crown. From this escape the heads and necks of a
number of Vipers or Snakes, fit emblems of the poisonous an
“death-dealing" * Evil One. *
Some further representations of Ormazd occur in the Sassa-
nian sculptures; but Ahriman seems not to be portrayed else-
2–-
—z-
*
f



– R. a" 9 - - /
582 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xxviiI.
where. Ormazd appears on foot in a relief of the Great Arta-
Xerxes wº only, those of himself and
higºne patron.” He is aſsorterbe seen in a sculpture which
belongs probably to Sapor L. and represents that monarch in
the act of receiving the diadem from Artaxerxes, his father.”
In the former of these two tablets the type exhibited in the
bas-relief just described is followed without any variation; in
the latter, the type is considerably modified. Ormazd still
carries his huge baton, and is attired in royal fashion; but
otherwise his appearance is altogether new and singular. His
head bears no crown, but is surrounded by a halo of streaming
rays; he has not much beard, but his hair, bushy and abun-
dant, flows down on his two shoulders; he faces the spectator,
and holds his baton in both his hands; finally, he stands upon
a blossom, which is thought to be that of a sun-flower. Per-
haps the conjecture is allowable that here we have Ormazd ex-
hibited to us in a solar character,” with the attributes of
Mithra, from whom, in the olden time, he was carefully dis-
tinguished. -
Ormazd. Seems to have been regarded by the kings as their
special guardian and protector. No other deity (unless in one
instance”) is brought into close proximity with them; no
other obtains mention in their inscriptions; from no other do
they allow that they receive the blessing of offspring.” What-
ever the religion of the common people, that of the kings
would seem to have been, in the main, the worship of this
od, whom they perhaps sometimes confused with Mithra, or
âssociated with Anaïtis, but whom they never neglected, or
failed openly to acknowledge.”
Under the great Qrmazd. were a number of Subordinate
deities, the principal of whom were Mithra and Serosh,
Mithra, the Sun-God, had been from a very early date an object
of adoration in Persia, only second to Ormazd.” The Achae.
menian kings “joined him occasionally with Ormazd in their
invocations. In processions his chariot, drawn by milk-white
horses, followed closely on that of Ormazd.” He was often
associated with Ormazd, as if an equal,” though a real equality
, was probably not intended. . He was “great,” “pure,” “im-
perishable,” “the beneficent protector of all creatures,” “
and “the beneficent preserver of all creatures.” “... He had a
thousand ears and ten thousand eyes.” His worship was pro-
bably more widely extended than that of Ormazd himself,
and was connected in general with a material representation.
ch. xxviii.) SEROSH AND THE AMSIIASIIPANDS 583
In the early times this was a simple disk, or circle; * but from
the reign of Artaxerxes Mnemon, a human image seems to
have been substituted. er was offered to Mithra three
times a day,” at dawn, at noon, and at sunset; and it was
usual to worship him with sacrifice. The horse appears to
have been the victim which he was supposed to prefer.”
Sraosha, or Serosh, was an angel of great power and dignity.
He was the special messenger of Ormazd, and the head of his
celestial army. He was “tall, well-formed, beautiful, swift,
victorious, happy, sincere, true, the master of truth.” It
was his office to deliver revelations, to show men the paths
of happiness, and to bring them the blessings which Ormazd.
had assigned to each. He invented the music for the five most
ancient Gathas, discovered the barsom or divining-rod, and
first taught its use to mankind. From his palace on the high-
est summit of the Elburz range, he watched the proceedings
of the evil genii, and guarded the world from their attempts.
The Iranians were his special care; but he lost no opportunity
of injuring the Powers of Darkness, and lessening their do-
minion by teaching everywhere the true religion. In the other
world it was his business to conduct the souls of the faithful
through the dangers of the middle passage, and to bring them
before the golden throne of Ormazd."
Among minor angelic powers were Vayu, “the wind,” “who
is found also in the Vedic system; Airyanam, a god presiding
over marriages;” Vitrahã, a good genius;* Tistrya,” the Dog
Star, etc. The number of the minor deities was not, however,
great; nor do they seem, as in so many other polytheistic re-
ligions, to have advanced in course of time from a subordinate
to a leading position. From first to last they are of small
account; and it seems, therefore, unnecessary to detain the
reader by an elaborate description of them.
From the mass, however, of the lower deities or genii must
be distinguished (besides Mithra and Serosh) the six Amesha
Spentas, or Amshashpands, who formed the council of Or-
mazd, and in a certain sense reflected his glory. These were
Wohu-mano or Bahman, Ashavahista or Ardibehesht, Khsha-
thra-vairya or Shahravar, Spenta-Armaiti or Isfandarmat,
Haurvatat or Khordād, and Ameretat or Amerdāt.* Vohu-
mano, “the Good Mind,” originally a mere attribute of Or-
mazd, came to be considered a distinct being, created by him
to be his attendant and his councillor. He was, as it were, the
Grand Vizier of the Almighty King, the chief of the heavenly
**
* t
b84 THE SEWEWTH MONARCHY, [CH. XXVIII,
conclave. Ormazd entrusted to him especially the care of
animal life; and thus, as presiding over cattle, he is the patron
deity of the agriculturist." Asha-vahista, “the best truth,”
or “the best purity,” is the Light of the universe, subtle, per-
vading, omnipresent. He maintains the splendor of the vari-
ous luminaries, and presides over the element of fire.” Khsha-
thra-vairya, “wealth,” has the goods of this world at his dis-
posal, and specially presides over metals, the conventional
signs of wealth; he is sometimes identified with the metal
which he dispenses.” Spenta-Armaiti, “Holy Armaiti,” is at
once the genius of the Earth, and the goddess of piety. She
has the charge of “the good creation,” watches over it, and
labors to convert the desolate and unproductive portions of it
into fruitful fields and gardens.” Together with Vohu-mano,
she protects the agriculturist," blessing his land with increase,
as Vohu-mano does his cattle. She is called “the daughter of
Ormazd,” and is regarded as the agent through whom Or-
mazd created the earth.” Moreover, “she tells men the ever-
lasting laws, which no one may abolish,” or, in other words,
imparts to them the eternal principles of morality. She is
sometimes represented as standing next to Ormazd in the
mythology, as in the profession of faith required of converts
to Zoroastrianism." The two remaining Amshashpands,
Haurvatat and Ameretat, “Health” and “Immortality,” have
the charge of the vegetable creation; Haurvatat causes the
flow of water, so necessary to the support of vegetable life in
countries where little rain falls; Ameretat protects orchards
and gardcns, and enables trees to bring their fruits to per-
fection.
Another deity, practically perhaps as much worshipped as
Ormazd and Mithra, was Anaïtis or Anahit. Anaïtis was
Originally an Assyrian nian," not a Zoppastrian
goddess; but her worship spread to the Persians at a date
anterior to Herodotus," and became in a short time exceed-
ingly popular. It was in connection with this worship that
idolatry seems first to have crept in, Artaxerxes Mnemon (ab.
B.C. 400) having introduced images of Anaïtis into Persia, and
set them up at Susa, the capital, at Persepolis, Ecbatana,
Bactra, Babylon, Damascus, and Sardis.” Anaïtis was the
Babylonian Venus; and her rites at Babylon were undoubtedly
of a revolting character." It is to be feared that they were
introduced in all their grossness into Persia, all that this was
the cause of Anahit's great popularity. Her cult “was pro-

#
t
CH. xxvii.I.] {
EVII, GENII. r 585
vided with priests and hieroduli, and connected with mys-
teries, feasts, and unchaste ways.”” ,”
The Persian system was further tainted with idolatry in
respect of the worship of Mithra," and possibly of Wohu-mano
(Bahman), and of Amerdat;” but on the whole, and es-
pecially as compared with other Oriental cults, the religion,
even of the later Zoroastrians, must be regarded as retaining a
non-materialistic and anti-idolatrous character, which elevated
it above other neighboring religions, above Brahminism on the
one hand and Syro-Chaldaean nature-worship on the other,
In the kingdom of Darkness, the principal powers, besides
Ahriman, were Ako-mano, Indra, Qaurva, Naomhaitya, Taric,
and Zaric.” These six together formed the Council of the
Evil One, as the six Amshashpands formed the council of
Ormazd. Ako-mano, “the bad mind,” or (literally) “the
naught mind,”” was set over against Vohu-mano, “the good
mind,” and was Ahriman's Grand Vizier. His special sphere
was the mind of man, where he suggested evil thoughts, and
prompted to bad words and wicked deeds. Indra, identical
with the Vedic deity, but made a demon by the Zoroastrians,
presided over storm and tempest, and governed the issues of
war and battle. Qaurva and Naonhaitya were also Vedic
deities turned into devils.” It is difficult to assign them any
distinct sphere. Taric and Zaric, “Darkness” and “Poison,”
had no doubt occupations corresponding with their names. .
Besides these chief demons, a countless host of evil genii (divs)
and fairies (pairikas) awaited the orders and executed the be-
hests of Abriman. - -
Placed between the two contending worlds of good and evil,
man's position was one of extreme danger and difficulty.
Originally set upon the earth by Ormazd in order to maintain
the good creation, he was liable to the continual temptations
and seductions of the divs or devas, who were “wicked, bad,
false, untrue, the originators of mischief, most baneful, de-
^
structive, the basest of all things.”” A single act of sin gave
them a hold upon him, and each subsequent act increased
their power, until ultimately he became their mere tool and
slave.” It was however possible to resist temptation, to cling
to the side of right, to defy and overcome the devas. Man
might maintain his uprightness, walk in the path of duty, and
by the help of the asuras, or “good spirits,” attain to a blissful
paradise.
To arrive at this result, man had carefully to observe three
*.
, , *
586 - THE SE WENTEI MOWARCEIY- ' [CH. xxviii.
principal duties. These were worship, agriculture, and purity.
Worship consisted in the acknowledgment of the One True
God, Ormazd, and of his Holy Angels, the Amesha Spentas or
Amshashpands, in the frequent offering of prayers, praises,
and thanksgivings, in the rescitation of set hymns, the per-
formance of a certain ceremony called the Homa, and in the
occasional sacrifice of animals. The set hymns form a large
portion of the Zendavesta, where they occur in the shape of
Gāthās,” or Yashts,” Sometimes possessing considerable
beauty.” They are sometimes general, addressed to Ormazd
and the Amesha Spentas in Common, Sometimes special, con-
taining the praises of a particular deity. The Homa ceremony
consisted in the extraction of the juice of the Homa plant by
the priests during the recitation of prayers, the formal pre-
sentation of the liquor extracted to the Sacrificial fire, the con-
sumption of a small portion of it by one of the officiating
priests, and the division of the remainder among the worship-
pers. As the juice was drunk immediately after extraction
and before fermentation had set in, it was not intoxicating.
The ceremony seems to have been regarded, in part, as having
a mystic force, Securing the favor of heaven; in part, as exert-
ing a beneficial effect upon the body of the worshipper through
the curative power inherent in the Homa plant.” The ani.
mals which might be Sacrificed were the horse, the ox, the
sheep, and the goat, the horse being the favorite victim. A
priest always performed the sacrifice,” slaying the animal, and
showing the flesh to the sacred fire by way of consecration,
after which it was eaten at a solemn feast by the priest and
people. -
It is one of the chief peculiarities of Zoroastrianism that it
regarded agriculture as a religious duty. Man had been
placed upon the earth especially “to maintain the good
creation,” and resist the endeavors of Ahriman to injure, and
if possible, ruin it. This could only be done by careful tilling
of the soil, eradication of thorns and weeds, and reclamation
of the tracts over which Ahriman had spread the curse of
barrenness. To cultivate the soil was thus incumbent upon
all men; the whole community was required to be agricultural;
and either as proprietor, as farmer, or as laboring man, each
Zoroastrian was bound to “further the works of life” by ad-
vancing tillage.”
The purity which was required of the Zoroastrian was of two
kinds, moral and legal. Moral purity comprised all that Chris-
CH. XXVIII.] POSITION OF THE MAGI. - 587
† .
tianity includes under it—truth, justice, chastity, and general
sinlessness. It was coextensive with the whole sphere of hu-
man activity, embracing not only words and acts, but even
the secret thoughts of the heart.” Legal purity was to be ob-
tained only by the observance of a multitude of trifling cere-
monies and the abstinence from ten thousand acts in their na-
ture wholly indifferent.* Especially, everything was to be
avoided which could be thought to pollute the four elements—
all of them Sacred to the Zoroastrian of Sassanian times—fire,
water, earth, and air.”
Man's struggle after holiness and purity was sustained in the
Zoroastrian system by the confident hope of a futurity of hap-
piness. It was taught” that the soul of man was immortal,
and would continue to possess for ever a separate conscious
existence. Immediately after death the spirits of both good
and bad had to proceed along an appointed path to “the bridge
of the gatherer” (chinvat peretu). This was a narrow road
conducting to heaven or paradise, over which the Souls of the
pious alone could pass, while the wicked fell from it into the
gulf below, where they found themselves in the place of pun-
ishment. The steps of the good were guided and supported by
the angel Serosh—the “happy, well-formed, swift, tall Serosh’’
—who conducted them across the difficult passage into the
heavenly region. There Bahman, rising from his throne,
greeted them on their entrance with the salutation, “Happy
thou who art come here to us from the mortality to the im-
mortality ſ” Then they proceeded joyfully onward to the
presence of Ormazd, to the immortal saints, to the golden
throne, to paradise. As for the wicked, when they fell into
the gulf, they found themselves in Outer darkness, in the king-
dom of Ahriman, where they were forced to remain and to
feed on poisoned banquets.
The priests of the Zoroastrians, from a time not long subse-
quent to Darius Hystaspis,” were the Magi. This tribe, or
Caste, originally perhaps external to Zoroastrianism, had come
to be recognized as a true priestly order; and was intrusted
by the Sassanian princes with the whole control and direction
of the religion of the state.” Its chief was a personage holding
a rank but very little inferior to the king. He bore the title of
Tempet,” “Head of the Religion,” or Movpetan Movpet,” “Head
of the Chief Magi.” In times of difficulty and danger he was
Sometimes called upon to conduct a revolution;” and in the
Ordinary course of things he was always reckoned among the
t
ë. * -
588 THE SEVENTEI MONAIRCEIY. [CH. XXVIII.
monarch's chief counsellors.” Next in rank to him were a
number of Movpets, or “Chief Magi,” called also destoors or
“rulers,” who scarcely perhaps constituted an Order, but still
held an exalted position.” Under these were, finally, a large
body of ordinary Magi, dispersed throughout the empire, but
especially congregated in the chief towns.
The Magi officiated in a peculiar dress. This consisted of
a tall peaked cap of felt or some similar material, having
deep lappets at the side, which concealed the jaw and even the
lips, and a long white robe, or cloak, descending to the ankles.”
They assembled often in large numbers, and marched in stately
processions, impressing the multitude by a grand and Striking
ceremonial. Besides the offerings which were lavished upon
them by the faithful, they possessed considerable endowments
in land,” which furnished them with an assured subsistence.
They were allowed by Chosroës the First a certain adminis-
trative power in civil matters; the collection of the revenue
was to take place under their supervision; they were empow-
ered to interfere in cases of oppression, and protect the subject
against the tax-gatherer.” - s
The Zoroastrian worship was intimately connected with fire-
temples" and fire-altars. A fire-temple was maintained in
every important city throughout the empire; and in these a
Sacred flame, believed to have been lighted from heaven, was
kept up perpetually, by the care of the priests, and was spoken of
as “unextinguishable.”" Fire-altars probably also existed, in-
dependently of temples; and an erection of this kind maintained
from first to last an honorable position on the Sassanian coins,
being the main impress upon the reverse.” It was represented
with the flame rising from it, and sometimes with a head in
the flame;" its stem was ornamented with garlands or fillets;
and on either side, as protectors or as worshippers, were repre-
Sented two figures, sometimes watching the flame, sometimes
turned from it, guarding it apparently from external ene-
mies.**
Besides the Sacerdotal, the Magi claimed to exercise the
prophetical office. From a very early date they had made them-
Selves conspicuous as omen-readers and dream-expounders;”
but, not content with such occasional exhibitions of prophetic
power, they ultimately reduced divination to a system, and,
by the help of the barsom or bundle of divining rods, under-
took to return a true answer on all points connected with the
future, upon which they might be consulted.” Credulity, is
* º # ,
*
ch. xxviii.] THE BARSOM-THE KHRAFWTHRAGHNA. 589
never wanting among Orientals; and the power of the priest. '
hood was no doubt greatly increased by a pretension which
was easily made, readily believed, and not generally discredited
by failures, however numerous. . ---
The Magian priest was commonly seen with the barsom in
his hand; but occasionally he exchanged that instrument for
another, known as the khrafgth raghna.” It was among the
duties of the pious Zoroastrian, and more especially of those
who were entrusted with the priestly office, to wage perpetual
war with Ahriman, and to destroy his works whenever oppor-
tunity offered. Now among these, constituting a portion of
“the bad creation,” were all such animals as frogs, toads.
snakes, newts, mice, lizards, flies, and the like. The Magi
took every opportunity of killing such creatures; * and the
khrafgth raghna was an implement which they invented for the
sake of carrying out this pious purpose. .
The court of the Sassanian kings, especially in the later
period of the empire, was arranged upon a Scale of almost un-
exampled grandeur and magnificence. The robes worn by the
Great King were beautifully embroidered, and covered with
gems and pearls, which in some representations may be
counted by hundreds." [Pl. XLV.] The royal crown, which
could not be worn, but was hung from the ceiling by a gold
chain exactly over the head of the king when he took his seat
in his throne-room, is said to have been adorned with a
thousand pearls, each as large as an egg.” The throne itself
was of gold, and was supported on four feet, each formed of a
single enormous ruby.” The great throne-room was orna-
mented with enormous columns of silver, between which were
hangings of rich silk or brocade.” The vaulted roof presented
to the eye representations of the heavenly bodies, the sun, the
moon, and the stars;” while globes, probably of crystal, or of
burnished metal, hung suspended from it” at various heights,
lighting up the dark space as with a thousand lustres.
The state observed at the court resembled that of the most
formal and stately of the Oriental monarchies. The courtiers
were organized in seven ranks. Foremost came the Ministers
of the crown; next the Mobeds, or chief Magi; after them, the
hirbeds, or judges; then the Sipehbeds, or commanders-in chief,
of whom there were commonly four; last of all the singers,
musicians, and men of science, arranged in three orders. The
king sat apart even from the highest nobles, who, unless sum-
moned, might not approach nearer than thirty feet from him.
!
590 | THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY ſch. xxvii.
A low curtain separated him from them, which was under the
charge of an officer, who drew it for those only with whom the
king had expressed a desire to converse.”
An important part of the palace was the seraglio. The poly.
gamy practised by the Sassanian princes was on the largest
scale that has ever been heard of, Chosroës II. having main-
tained, we are told, three thousand concubines.” The modest
, requirements of so many Secondary wives necessitated the
lodging and sustenance of twelve thousand additional females,”
chiefly slaves, whose office was to attend on these royal favor.
ites, attire them, and obey their behests. Eunuchs are not
mentioned as employed to any large extent; but in the
sculptures of the early princes they seem to be represented as
holding offices of importance,” and the analogy of Oriental
courts does not allow us to doubt that the Seraglio was, to some
extent at any rate, under their superintendence. Each Sas-
sanian monarch had one Sultana or principal wife, who was
generally a princess by birth, but might legally be of any
origin. In one or two instances the monarch sets the effigy of
his principal wife upon his coins;” but this is unusual, and
when, towards the close of the empire, females were allowed
to ascend the throne, it is thought that they refrained from
parading themselves in this way, and stamped their coins
with the head of a male.” A.
In attendance upon the monarch were usually his parasol-
bearer, his fan-bearer, who appears to have been a eunuch,”
the Semekapan,” or “Lord Chamberlain,” the Maypet, or
“Chief Butler,” the Andertzapet, or “Master of the Wardrobe,”
the Akhorapet, or “Master of the Horse,” the Taharhapet or
“Chief Cupbearer,” the Shahpan, or “Chief Falconer,” and’
the Krhogpet, or “Master of the Workmen.” Except the para-
sol-bearer and fan-bearer, these officials all presided over de-
partments, and had under them a numerous body of subordi-
nates. If the royal stables contained even 8000 horses, which
one monarch is said to have kept for his own riding,” the
grooms and stable-boys must have been counted by hundreds;
and an equal or greater number of attendants must have been
required for the camels and elephants, which are estimated *
respectively at 1200 and 12,000. The “workmen” were also
probably a corps of considerable size, continually engaged in
repairs or in temporary or permanent erections. ,
. Other great officials, corresponding more nearly to the “Min-
isters” of a modern Sovereign, were the W20Wrkhramanatar,”
N
CH. XXVIII.] coSTUME OF THE KING. 591
N
or “Grand Keeper of the Royal Orders,” who held the post now
known as that of Grand Vizier; the Dprapet Ariats, or “Chief
of the Scribes of Iran,” a sort of Chancellor; the Hazarapet
dran Ariats, or “Chiliarch of the Gate of Iran,” a principal
Minister; the Hamarakar, a “Chief Cashier” or “Paymaster;”
and the Khohrdean dpir, or “Secretary of Council,” a sort of
Privy Council clerk or registrar. The native names of these
officers are known to us chiefly through the Armenian writers
of the fifth and seventh centuries.”
The Sassanian court, though generally held at Ctesiphon,
migrated to other cities, if the king so pleased, and is found
established, at one time in the old Persian capital, Persepolis,”
at another in the comparatively modern city of Dastagherd.”
The monarchs maintained from first to last numerous palaces,
which they visited at their pleasure and made their residence
for a longer or a shorter period. Four such palaces have been
already described;” and there is reason to believe that many
others existed in various parts of the empire. There was cer-
tainly one of great magnificence at Canzaca;” and several are
mentioned as occupied by Heraclius in the country between
the Lower Zab and Ctesiphon.” Chosroës II. undoubtedly ,
built one near Takht-i-BOstan; and Sapor the First must have
had one at Shapur, where he set up the greater portion of his
monuments. The discovery of the Mashita palace, in a position
so little inviting as the land of Moab, seems to imply a very
general establishment of royal residences in the remote prov-
inces of the empire. t
The costume of the later Persians is known to us chiefly from
the representations of the kings, on whose figures alone have
the native artists bestowed much attention. In peace, the
monarch seems to have worn a sort of pelisse or long coat, par-
tially open in front, and with close-fitting sleeves reaching to
the wrist,” under which he had a pair of loose trousers de-
scending to the feet and sometimes even covering * them. A
belt or girdle encircled his waist. His feet were encased in
patterned shoes,” tied with long flowing ribbons. Over his
pelisse he wore occasionally a long Cape or short cloak, which
was fastened with a brooch or strings across the breast and
flowed over the back and shoulders.” The material compos-
ing the cloak was in general exceedingly light and flimsy. The
head-dress commonly worn seems to have been a round cap,
which was perhaps ornamented with jewels.” The vest and
trousers were also in some cases richly jewelled.” Every
\
-
2 4
B92 THE SEVENTEI MOWARCH Y. [CH. xxvii.I
— —z—
King wore ear-rings,” with one, two, or three pendants. A
collar or necklace was also commonly worn round the neck;
and this had sometimes two or more pendants in front. Occa-
sionally the beard was brought to a point and had a jewel
hanging from it.” The hair seems always to have been worn
long; it was elaborately curled, and hung down on either
shoulder in numerous ringlets. When the monarch rode out
in state, an attendant held the royal parasol over him.”
In war * the monarch encased the upper part of his person
in a coat of mail, composed of scales or links. Over this he
wore three belts; the first, which crossed the breast diagonally,
was probably attached to his shield, which might be hung from
it; the second supported his sword; and the third his quiver,
and perhaps his bow-case.” A stiff, embroidered trouser of
great fulness protected the leg, while the head was guarded by
a helmet, and a vizor of chain mail hid all the face but the
eyes. The head and fore-quarters of the royal charger were
also covered with armor, which descended below the animal's
knees in front, but was not carried back behind the rider.
The monarch's shield was round, and carried on the left arm;
his main offensive weapon was a heavy spear, which he bran-
dished in his right hand. - -
One of the favorite pastimes of the kings was hunting. The
Sassanian remains show us the royal sportsmen engaged in the
pursuit of the stag, the wild boar, the ibex, the antelope, and
the buffalo.” To this catalogue of their beasts of chase the
classical writers add the lion, the tiger, the wild ass, and the
bear. Tions, tigers, bears, and wild asses were, it appears, col-
lected for the purpose of sport, and kept in royal parks or para-
dises” until a hunt was determined on. The monarchs then
engaged in the sport in person, either singly or in conjunction
with a royal ambassador,” or perhaps of a favorite minister,
or a few friends.” The lion was engaged hand to hand with
sword or spear; the more dangerous tiger was attacked from a
distance with arrows.” Stags and wild boars were sufficiently
abundant to make the keeping of them in paradises unneces-
sary. When the king desired to hunt them, it was only requi-
site to beat a certain extent of country in order to make sure
of finding the game. This appears to have been done generally
by elephants, which entered the marshes or the woodlands, and,
spreading themselves wide, drove the animals before them
towards an enclosed space, surrounded by a net or a fence, where
the king was stationed with his friends and attendants. If the
CH. xxviri..] MUSIC. FIA WKING. / 593
g
tract was a marsh, the monarch Occupied a boat, from which
he quietly took aim at the beasts that came within shot.
Otherwise he pursued the game on horseback,” and transfixed
it while riding at full speed. In either case he seems to have
joined to the pleasures of the chase the delights of music.
Bands of harpers and other musicians were placed near him
within the enclosure, and he could listen to their strains while
he took his pastime.” .
The musical instruments which appear distinctly on the
Sassanian Sculptures are the harp, the horn, the drum, and the
flute or pipe. The harp is triangular, and has seven strings;
it is held in the lap, and played apparently by both hands.
The drum is of Small size. The horns and pipes are too rudely
represented for their exact character to be apparent. Con-
certed pieces seem to have been sometimes played by harpers
only, of whom as many as ten or twelve joined in the execu-
tion. Mixed bands were more numerous. In one instance”
the number of performers amounts to twenty-six, of whom
seven play the harp, an equal number the flute or pipe, three
the horn, one the drum, while eight are too slightly rendered
for their instruments to be recognized. A portion of the
muscians occupy an elevated Orchestra, to which there is ac-
cess by a flight of Steps. tº
There is reason to believe that the Sassanian monarchs took a
pleasure also in the pastime of hawking. It has been already
noticed that among the officers of the court was a “Head Fal- >
coner,” who must have presided over this species of sport.”
Hawking was of great antiquity in the East,” and appears to
have been handed down uninterruptedly from remote timesto
the present day. We may reasonably conjecture that the os-
triches and pheasants, if not the peacocks also, kept in the roy-
al preserves,” were intended to be used in this pastime, the
hawks being flown at them if other game proved to be scarce.
The monarchs also occasionally amuſsed themselves in their
leisure hours by games. The introduction of chess from India.
by the great Chosroës (Anushirwan) has already been noticed;”
and some authorities state that the same monarch brought into
use also a species of tric-trac or draughts.” Unfortunately we
have no materials for determining the exact form of the game
in either case, the Sassanian remains containing no represen-
tation of such trivial matters. *
In the character of their warfare, the Persians of the Sassa-
nian period did not greatly differ from the same people under
\
*
Y
594. THE SE7ENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xxvii.I.
the Achaemenian kings. The principal changes which time
had brought about were an almost entire disuse of the war
chariot,” [Pl. XLVI. Fig.,3.] and the advance of the elephant
corps into a very prominent and important position. Four
, main arms of the Service were recognized, each standing on a
different level: viz. the elephants, the horse, the archers, and
the ordinary footmen. The elephant corps held the first posi-
tion.” It was recruited from India, but was at no time very
numerous. Great store was set by it; and in some of the
earlier battles against the Arabs the victory was regarded as
gained mainly by this arm of the service.” It acted with best
effect in an open and level district; but the value put upon it
was such that, however rough, mountainous, and woody the
country into which the Persian arms penetrated, the elephant
always accompanied the march of the Persian troops, and care
was taken to make roads by which it could travel.” The
elephant corps was under a special chief, known as the Zend-
kapet, or “Commander of the Indians,” either because the
beasts came from that country, or because they were managed
by natives of Hindustan.
The Persian cavalry in the Sassanian period seems to have
been almost entirely of the heavy kind. [Pl. XLVI., Fig. 4.]
We hear nothing during these centuries of those clouds of
light horse which, under the earlier Persian and under the
Parthian monarchy, hung about invading or retreating
armies, countless in their numbers, agile in their move-
ments, a terrible annoyance at the best of times, and a fearful
peril under certain circumstances. The Persian troops which
pursued Julian were composed of heavily armed cavalry, foot
archers, and elephants;" and the only light horse of which we
have any mention during the disastrous retreat of his army
are the Saracenic allies of Sapor.” In these auxiliaries, and
in the Cadusians from the Caspian region, the Persians had
always, when they wished it, a cavalry excellently suited for
light service; but their own horse during the Sassanian period
seems to have been entirely of the heavy kind, armed and
equipped, that is, very much as Chosroës II. is seen to be at
Takht-i-Bostan.” The horses themselves were heavily ar-
mored about their head, neck, and chest; the rider wore a
coat of mail which completely covered his body as far as the
hips, and a strong helmet, with a vizor, which left no part of
the face exposed but the eyes. He carried a small round shield
On his left arm, and had for weapons a heavy spear, a sword,
**.
ch. xxviii.] THE CAVALRY-THE ARCHERS. 595 (
and a bow and arrows. He did not fear a collision with the
best Roman troops. The Sassanian horse often charged the
infantry of the legions with success, and drove it headlong
from the field of battle. In time of peace, the royal guards
were more simply accoutred. [See Pl. XLVI.] .
The archers formed the élite of the Persian infantry.” They
were trained to deliver their arrows with extreme rapidity, and
with an aim that was almost unerring. The huge wattled
shields, adopted by the Achaemenian Persians from the As-
syrians, still remained in use;” and from behind a row of
these, rested upon the ground and forming a sort of loop-holed
wall, the Sassanian bowmen shot their weapons with great
effect; nor was it until their store of arrows was exhausted
that the Romans, ordinarily, felt themselves upon even terms .
with their enemy. Sometimes the archers, instead of thus
fighting in line, were intermixed with the heavy horse,” with
which it was not difficult for them to keep pace. They galled
the foe with their constant discharges from between the ranks
of the horsemen, remaining themselves in comparative se-
curity, as the legions rarely ventured to charge the Persian
mailed cavalry. If they were forced to retreat, they still shot
backwards as they fled;” and it was a proverbial saying with
the Romans that they were then especially formidable.”
The ordinary footmen seem to have been armed with swords
and spears, perhaps also with darts. They were generally
stationed behind the archers,” who, however, retired through
their ranks when close fighting began. They had little de-
fensive armor; but still seem to have fought with spirit and
tenacity, being a fair match for the legionaries under ordinary
circumstances, and superior to most other adversaries. .
It is uncertain how the various arms of the service were
organized internally. We do not hear of any divisions cor-
responding to the Roman legions or to modern regiments; yet
it is difficult to suppose that there were not some such bodies.”
Perhaps each satrap” of a province commanded the troops
raised within his government, taking the actual lead of the
cavalry or the infantry at his discretion. The Crown doubt-
less appointed the commanders-in-chief—the Sparapets, Spaha-
pets, or Sipehbeds,” as well as the other generals (arzbeds),
the head of the commissariat (hambarapet or hambarakapet),
and the commander of the elephants (2endkapet). The satraps
may have acted as colonels of regiments under the arzbeds,
‘t-
w - —x-
º
596 THE SEVENTH MoyARCIIY. [CH. xxvi II.
and may probably have had the nomination of the subordinate
(regimental) officers. ,
The great national standard was the famous “leathern
apron of the blacksmith,” originally unadorned, but ulti-
mately covered with jewels, which has been described in a
former chapter." This precious palladium was, however, but
rarely used, its place being supplied for the most part by
standards of a more ordinary character. These appear by the
monuments” to have been of two kinds. Both consisted pri-
marily of a pole and a cross-bar; but in the one kind the cross-
bar sustained a single ring with a bar athwart it, while below
depended two woolly tassels; in the other, three striated balls
rose from the cross-bar, while below the place of the tassels
was taken by two similar balls. It is difficult to say what
these emblems symbolized,” or why they were varied. In
both the representations where they appear the standards ac-
company cavalry, so that they cannot reasonably be assigned
to different arms of the service. That the number of standards
carried into battle was considerable may be gathered from the
fact that on One occasion, when the defeat sustained was not
very complete, a Persian army left in the enemy's hands as
many as twenty-eight of them.”
During the Sassanian period there was nothing very remark-
able in the Persian tactics. The size of armies generally va-
ried from 30,000 to 60,000 men,” though sometimes" 100,000,
and on One occasion” as many as 140,000, are said to have
been assembled. The bulk of the troops were footmen, the
proportion of the horse probably never equalling one third of a
mixed army.” Plundering expeditions were sometimes under-
taken by bodies of horse alone;” but serious invasions were
seldom or never attempted unless by a force complete in all
arms; comprising, that is, horse, foot, elephants, and artillery.
To attack the Romans to any purpose, it was always necessary
to engage in the siege of towns; and although, in the earlier
period of the Sassanian monarchy, a certain weakness and in-
; efficiency in respect of sieges manifested itself,” yet ultimate-
ly the difficulty was overcome, and the Persian expeditionary
armies, well provided with siege trains, compelled the Roman
fortresses to surrender within a reasonable time. It is remark-
able that in the later period so many fortresses were taken
with apparently so little difficulty—Daras, Mardin, Amida,
Carrhae, Edessa, Hierapolis, Berhaea, Theodosiopolis, Antioch,
Damascus, Jerusalem, Alexandria, Caesaraea Mazaca, Chalce-
*
cH. xxvi II.] PRIVATE LIFE OF THE PEOPLE. 597
don; the siege of none lasting more than a few months, or
costing the assailants very dear. The method used in sieges
was to open trenches at a certain distance from the walls, and
to advance along them under cover of hurdles to the ditch, and
fill it up with earth and fascines.” Escalade might then be
attempted; or movable towers, armed with rams or balistoe,
might be brought up close to the walls,” and the defences bat-
tered till a breach was effected. Sometimes mounds were
raised against the walls” to a certain height, so that their
upper portion, which was their weakest part, might be at-
tacked, and either demolished or escaladed. If towns resisted
prolonged attacks of this kind, the siege was turned into a .
blockade,” lines of circumvallation being drawn round the
place, water cut off, and provisions prevented from entering.
TJnless a strong relieving army appeared in the field, and
drove off the assailants, this plan was tolerably sure to be
successful. - • , . . .
Not much is known of the private life of the later Persians.
Besides the great nobles and court officials, the strength of the
nation consisted in its dikhans or landed proprietors, who for
the most part lived on their estates, seeing after the cultivation
of the soil, and employing thereon the free labor of the peas-
ants. It was from these classes chiefly that the standing army
was recruited, and that great levies might always be made in
time of need. Simple habits appear to have prevailed among
them; polygamy, though lawful, was not greatly in use;” the
maxims of Zoroaster, which commanded industry, purity, and
piety, were fairly observed. Women seem not to have been
kept in seclusion,” or at any rate not in such seclusion as had
been the custom under the Parthians, and as again became
usual under the Arabs. The general condition of the popula-
tion was satisfactory. Most of the Sassanian monarchs seem
to have been desirous of governing well; and the system in-
augurated by Anushirwan,” and maintained by his successors,
secured the subjects of the Great King from oppression, so far
as was possible without representative government. Provincial
rulers were well watched and well checked; tax-gatherers were
prevented from exacting more than their due by a wholesale
dread that their conduct would be reported and punished;
great pains were taken that justice should be honestly admin-
istered; and in all cases where an individual felt aggrieved at
a sentence an appeal lay to the king. On Such occasions the
cause was re-tried in open court, at the gate, or in the great
598 ' THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. xxviir,
square; the king, the Magi, and the great lords hearing it,
while the people were also present.” The entire result seems
to have been that, so far as was possible under a despotism,
oppression was prevented, and the ordinary citizen had rarely
any ground for serious complaint.
But it was otherwise with the highest class of all. The near
relations of the monarch, the great officers of the court, the
generals who commanded armies, were exposed without de-
fence to the monarch's caprice, and held their lives and liber-
ties at his pleasure.” At a mere word or sign from him they
were arrested, committed to prison, tortured, blinded, or put
to death, no trial being thought necessary where the king
chose to pronounce sentence. The intrinsic evils of despotism
thus showed themselves even under the comparatively mild
government of the Sassanians;” but the class exposed to them
was a small one, and enjoyed permanent advantages, which
may have been felt as some conpensation to it for its occasional
sufferings. - 4.
ROYAL HOUSE OF THE SASSANLANS.
(1) ARTAXERXES I.
(2) SAPOR I.
(3) HoRºisoas I. (7) sº (?)
(4) VARAHRAN I. (8) HoRMISDAs II.
(5) VARAHRAN II. Hormisdas (9) SAPort II.
(banished).
(6) WARAHRAN III.
(12) VARAHRAN IV. ()
(13) ISDIGERD. I.
(14) van HRAN v.
(15) ISDIGERD II.
(11) SAPort III. (10) ARTAxERXES II.
sapor (Viceroy of Armenia).
) Punaspoort
(daughter).
(16) HoRºisdas III. (17) PERozEs. (18) Baias.
(19) rº I. Zareh (killed). (2) Zawase. .
Kačses. Zames. Phthasuarsas. (2) Chosross I.
Kobad. , A--------,
(22) HoRMISDAs IV. Nushizad.
(23) Capshoks II.
t -
(27) AzermIDoCHT Merdasas (24) KobAD II. Shahriar (Saliarus).
(daughter). (ki i
(25) ARTAxERXES III.
(28) ISDIGERD III.
;
§
NOTES TO THE SIXTH MONARCHY.
PREFACE.
1 Gibbon (Decline and Fall, vol. i. ch.
iii. sub fin.
3 The ancient writers are liberal in
their admissions of this fact. (See Jus-
tin, xli. 1, § 7; Dio Cass. xl. 14; Strab. xi.
, § 2; Plin. H. N. 25; and Herodian,
iv. 18.) It is surprising that moderns
have so generally overlooked these pas-
Sages.
3 History and Coimage of the Parthi-
ans, published at Cork in 1852.
CHAPTER I.
1 The limit, eastward, of the region
here described is the course of the Heri-
rud, which pierces the mountain chain
in long. 61° E. nearly.
2 The chief of these are known as the
Daman-i-Koh, the Ala Tagh, and the
Jaghetai or Djuvein mountains. *
8 See Fraser's Khorasam, pp. 433, 434,
598, &c.
4 Ibid. pp. 380, 405, 406, &c.
5 Herodotus unites the Parthians with
the Chorasmians (Kharesm), the Sog-
dians, and the Arians (Heratees), and
again with the Hyrcanians (Gurgham),
the Sarangians, and the Thamanaeans
(Herod. iii. 93, 117). In the Inscriptions
of Darius, Parthia is connected with Sa-
rangia, Aria, Sagartia (the Iranic desert),
and Hyrcania. (See the author's Herod-
otus, vol. iv. p. 162, 2nd edition.)
6 Arrian, Earp. Alea’. iii. 25.
7 Isid. Char. Mans. Parth. § 12. Com-
pare Plin. H. N. vi. 25.
8 Hecatompylos. (See Polyb, x. 25;
Strab. ix. 9, § 1; Diod. Sic. xvii. 57.)
9 See especially Arrian, Earp. Alear. iii.
fºliº. H. N., l. s. c.; and Isid. Char.
10–12.
10 According to Strabo (l. s.c.), the
western boundary of Parthia was at the
Caspian Gates, or more than a hundred
miles further west than Damaghan; but
the region immediately east of the Gates
is more commonly assigned either to
Pſyrcania or to Media.
11 Shah Abbas the First transplanted
about 15,010 Kurds from the Turkish
frontier to Khorasan, and settled them
in the mountain region, that they might
#. it against the Usbegs and other
atar tribes The descendants of these
colonists still ‘...; most of the range
between the Meshed valley and the
Kharesmian desert. |
12 Fraser, Khorasan, p. 554.
18 One of the chief of these conveys
to the Tejend the waters of the Tchesh-
ma. Gilass, a small lake beautifully clear,
on the western side of the valley, about
twenty-five miles above Meshed.
14 Vambéry, Travels in Central Asia,
alſ). ;
*P In this respect the mountains of
ancient Parthia present a strong con-
trast to those of the nº Hyrca-
nia. The banks of the Gurghan and
Ettrek are richly wooded (Fraser, pp.
599–602; Arrian, Earp. Alea’. iii. 23); while
the mountains of eastern Khorasan are
almost destitute of trees. (Fraser, pp.
407. 470, &c.) -
16 Even where the surface was gravel,
Mr. Fraser noticed “a richer stratum be-
neath” (p. 550).
17 Kinneir, Persian Empire, pp. 185,
186; Fraser, Khorasan, pp. 405, 406.
18 Plin. H. N. vi. 25.
19 As Bostam (Fraser, p. 336), Khyza-
bad (Ibid., p. 359), and others. (Ibid. pp.
373. 374, 380, &c.)
20 Kinneir, p. 185; Fraser, pp. 343, 379,
C.
21 The name “Atak” is given to the
skirts of the mountains both north and
south of Parthia. It is the Turanian
correspondent of the Arian daman
which has the same application and
- (Fraser, p. 245.)
22 See above, note 15. Yet Strabo says
(xi. 9. § 1) that it was “thickly wooded"
(Saareia).
28 Fraser, pp. 401, 405,432, 433,436, &c.;
Kinneir, p. 175.
24 Kinneir, p. 185; Fraser, Appendix,
p. 25.
25 Fraser, pp. 819, 379, &c.
26 So Fraser, p. 335. Macdonald Kin-
neir, with unwonted extravagance,
speaks of the return from dry grain be-
ing a hundred, and from rice four hun-
dred fold ! (Persian Empire, p. 178.)
27 Fraser, pp. 388 and 406.
8 Kinneir, p. 184; Fraser, pp. 367, 371,
413, 421, &c.
29 On the turquoise mines of Nisha-
pur, see Fraser, ch. xvi. pp. 407-417. .
80 See the passage quoted at the head
of the chapter. * ..
81 Fraser, Appendix, p. 134.
82 Ibid. pp. 303, 343, and 581.
33 Ibid. pp. 436,552, and 554.
** Kinmeir, p. 170. -
*
.*
f


*
- by the Sagartians.
'602
28 Fraser, p. 557.
86 Vambéry calls it “that immense aw.
ul desert where the traveller may wan-
er about for weeks and weeks without
nding a drop of sweet water, or the
helter of a single tree” (Travels, p. 302).
[ouravieff says: “This country exhibits
he image of death, or rather of the
esolation left behind by a great convul-
|
rupeds are found in it; no verdure nor
vegetation cheers the sight, except here
and there at long intervals some spots
on which there grow a few stunted
shrubs.” (See De Hell's Travels in the
Steppes of the Caspian Sea, p. 326, E.T.)
87 M. Vatmbéry reckons the entire
Turkoman population south of the Oxus
from the Caspian to Balkh at 196.500
tents, or 982,500 souls. (Travels, p. 809.)
Chorasmia was not more than about
one-half of this region.
38 In the Behistun Inscription Darius
evidently includes Margiana (Margush)
in Bactria (col. iii. par. 3, 4). Strabo,
however (xi. 10, § 2), Ptolemy (vi. 11),
and Isidore (Mans. Parth. § 14) make it
a separate country. . . .
: 89. See the Map to Vambéry's Travels.
. 40 Strab. xi. 10. § 2. There seems no
reason to doubt this statement, though
Mr. Fraser supposes that the irrigation
could never have been carried to a much
greater distance than twelve or fourteen
miles. (Khorasan, App. p. 56.)
41 Strab. 1. s. c. -
** See Ferrier, Caravan Journeys, pp.
139,165; Fraser, Khorasam, App. pp. 30–
32; Wambéry, pp. 257-270.
48. Strabo gives Aria a length of 2,000
stades (230 miles), and a breadth of 300
stades (35 miles). This would make its
area about 8,000 square miles, or less
than one-third of the area of Parthia.
(see text, p. 2). - .
;: Ferrier, Caravan Journeys, pp. 273,
6 4. -
* Fraser, p. 246, and App. p. 24.
46 Vambéry, p. 288.
47 Herod. vii. 85. If the Sagartians
used the lasso in war, we may be sure
that, like the inhabitants of the Pampas,
they employed it also in peace, to cap-
ture the animals which they hunted.
48 Eight thousand is the largest num-
ber which we find brought into the field
(Herod. l. S. C.)
49 See text, p. 2. . -
50 See the graphic descriptions of Mr.
THE SIXTH MONARCHY.
on of nature. Neither birds nor quad-
[CH. II.

Fraser §ºn, pp. 599, 600, 608, &c.)
f
x
31 Ibid. p.
52 Wambéry, p. 72.
, 68 Xóóðpa eißaiutov (Strab. xi. 7, § 2).
According to this writer, a single vine in
Hyrcania produced a metretes (nine gal-
lons) of wine, a single fig-tree produced
sixty medimni (ninety bushels) of figs,
and corn did not require to be sown, but
sprang from the casual droppings of the
last year's crop.
hen Hyrcania is called by Strabo
“large” (troAXii), he intends to compare
it, not with Parthia, but with the small
districts occupied by separate tribes
along the south coast of the Caspian Sea
(Strabo. xi. 7, § 1, 2). A comparison of
it with Parthia is difficult, owing to the
uncertainty of their respective bounda-
ries; but if we regard the line of demar-
cation as running along the mountains
south of the Gurghan, thence passing to
the Alatagh, and proceeding along the
water-shed south of Kooshan to the
Eurdish range about Mohammedabad,
the proportions of the two will be as
stated in the text.
55 See Justin, xli. 1. “Hi et Assyrio-
rum et Medorum temporibus inter Ori-
entis populos obscurissimi fuere. Pos-
imperium Orientis a
Persas translatum est, veluti
vulgus sine nomine, praeda victorum
fuere. Postremo Macedonibus, triumph-
ato Oriente, servierunt: wit cwivis mirwºm
wideathtr ad tantam eos felicitatem pro-
vectos, ut imperent gentibus, sub qua-
rum imperio veluti servile vulgus fuere.”
CHAPTER II.
1 Diodorus enumerates the Parthians
among the nations conquered by Ninus
(ii. 2, § 3), and also says that in the time
of Cyaxares they revolted from the
Medes and placed themselves under
Scythian protection. But no value can
be set upon these stories, which he
adopted from the untrustworthy Cte-
Slaſs
2 See Behist. Ins. col. i. par. 6, and
Nakhsh-i-Rustam Ins. par, 3. .
8 See the great inscription of Darius
at Persepolis, par. 2, § 3. -
* Behist. Ins. col. ii. par. 16, and col.
iii. par. 1. * .
5 Fr. 173.
6 Herod. iii. 93. .
7 Ibid. vii. 66. Compare chap. 64.
8 Ibid. iii. 117.
* As Trogus Pompeius, who is followed
by Justin (xli. 1). º
10 Strab. xi. 9, § 3. Compare xi. 8, § 2.
11 Arrian, Fr. 1. -
12 See Herod. ii. 103.
18. Diod. ic. Si. 55, § 4.
14 Herod. ii. 104; Diod. Sic. l. s. c.
* John of Malala knows the number
of the colonists (15,000), that they were
all youths, and all warriors (p.26; ed.
Niebuhr).
1° Strab, xi. 9, § 3. Oil Trávv8' tºp-oxo-yet-rat
Aáas sivai rivas row intrép ris Mauáriëos
Xxv6öv, - -
17 Dahae or Dai are found in a great
variety of places, as in Persia Proper
(Herod. i. 125), in Samaria (Ezr. iv. 9), in
Thrace (Thuc. ii. 96), in the tract east of
the Caspian (Strab. ix. 8, § 2), &c. It is
not probable that they were all really
the same people. h y
18 The Greeks did not come into con-
tact with the Parthians till B.C. 331.
Probably they did not care much to in-
gºre into , their origin till after B.c.
ºt
**
|
CH. III.] -
19 Justin, xli. 1; Eustath. ad Dionys.
IPer. 1. 1047. ... --
20 Strab. xi. 9, § 2. Tà é6m rà éxovira
troAt prºv to Báp6apov kai ro 2kvěuków. Com-
pare Plin. H. N. vi. 25. -
21 Justin, xli. 2. “Sermo his inter
Scythicum, Medicumque medius, et ex
utrisque mixtus.” -
22 I id, “Armorum patrius ac Scythi-
CuS II.10S. - - r
23 Strabo calls the Massagetae Scyths
(xi. 8, §2). Pliny not only includes under
the name all the tribes between Arme-
nia and Northern India (H. N. vi. 25), but
regards it as having originally extended
to the Sarmatians and the Germans (ib.
iv. 81). According to Strabo, some of
the older Greek geographers called all
the nations of the north either Scythians
or Celto-Scythians (xi. 6, § 2)
24 See the article on Parthia in Dr.
Smith's Dictionary of Greek and Roman
Geography.
25 The Etruscans in Italy, the Galatians
in Asia, Minor, the Basques in Spain, are
cases in point. It would be easy to ad-
duce others
* Priapatius has indeed been explain-
ed as equivalent to the Zendic Frijapai-
tis, “lover of his father” (Lassen, In-
dische Alterthwmskvinde, vol. ii. p. 285,
note 3). But the etymology is uncer-
tain.
27 Julian, Or. de Constant. gest. ii. p.
*śsee Ritter's Erdkwnde, vol. viii. p.
29 Justin says that the word “Parthi "
meant “exiles” in the Scythic speech
(xli. 1), but this derivation assumes the
proper original form of the name to be
Parada (Sanskrit pardes, = “ of , an-
other country”), whereas the earliest
and probably most correct form , is
Parthwa. (Compare Greek IIapóvãvm
and IIapóvatow.) Lassen translates the
word “Parthi " by “those who march
over the borders” (Ind. Alt. l. S. c.), but
gives explanation of his etymology. Am-
mianus tells us that a commander of the
cavalry was called vitaara by the Par-
thians; but Hesychius alters both the
word and the meaning, making the
former Biorraš, and the latter “king.”
80 The Persian form seems to have
been garda, as in Parsagarda (Plin. H.
N. vi. 26). which became corrupted into
Pasargada. The Parthian is, like the
Armenian, certa, as in VologeSOcerta.
(ib. l. s c.).
31 Justin, xli. 3. “Equis omni tem-
pore vectantur: illis bella, illis convivia.
illis publica ac privata negotia obeunt.”
Compare Vambéry's account of the
modern Ushegs (Travels in Central Asia,
p. 845 and plate opposite).
33 Ibid. “In cibum parci.”
88 Plin, H. N. xiv. 22.
84 Justin, 1. s. c. “Semper aut in ex-
termosaut in domesticos motus inquieti;
natura, taciti.” .
*Ibid. xli. 2. Compare the case of
THE, SIXTH MONARCHY.
2nd
603
the Mongols, where the “Golden Horde”
alone was free. - -
86 Plin. H. N. vi. 25. º
*7 Decline and Fall, vol. i. p. 341.
(Smith's edition.) - *
* Lectures on Roman History, vol. iii.
p. 276; E.
8° On the modern Tadjiks, the settled
Iranian population of Bokhara and Ko-
kand, see Wambéry's Travels, pp. 367,
381, &c.
40 Diod. Sic. ii. 2, § 3; 84, § 1 and § 6.
* See Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii. pp.
234 and 428; 2nd ed.
42 Herod. i. 153.
48. Herod. i. 177. Tà uºv vuv rário Tijs
'Acrims"Aprayos &váarrara étroise rà 8é àvo
airms airós Köpos, tra v. č6 vos kara-
or r p s h 6 pi e vos kai o is 8 & 1 trap i e is. . .
** Arrian, Earp. Al. iii. 25; Q. Curt.
Hºl.i.; , -
** Strab. xi. 9, § 1. XuveréAew Merå rºw
Ypkavaov kará rà IIepartkä.
47. See text, p. 8. - . :
* Behist. Ins. col. ii. par. 2. Compare
An fººt Monarchies, vol. iii. pp. 411–413;
eCº. •,
49 Arrian, iii. 8; Q. Curt. iv. 12. *
CHAPTER III. *
1 Seleucus is rarely mentioned by Ar-
rian. His name occurs only in v. 13, 16;
vii. 4 and 26. g *.
* See Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, vol.
vii. pp. 139,140; Grote, Hist, of Greece,
vol. viii. p. 517. -
* Thirlwall, vol. vii. p. 245.
4 Ibid. p. 308.
.* Thirlwall, vol. vii. p. 401; Grote, vol.
viii. p. 576. * , t
° Bishop Thirlwall notes that Armenia,
shortly before the battle of Ipsus, was
independent under Ardoates," a native
king (vol. vii. p. 402, and compare Diod.
Sic. xxxi. 19, § 5), and suggests that after
Ipsus Seleucus was too much engaged
with other affairs to bring Armenia un-
er. But either Seleucus or one of his
early successors must have reconquered
Armenia. for it did not permanently es-
tablish its independence till B. c. , 190.
(Strab. xi. 14, § 5.
7 Its limits eastward are somewhat
doubtful. Seleucus appears to have
ceded a portion, at any rate, of his In-
dian possessions to Sandracottus before
Ipsus. (Thirlwall, vol. vii. p. 395.) -
8 Sandracottus presented Seleucus with
500 of these animals (Strab. xv. 2, g
They were largely used both by him and
by his successors in their wars -
9 See, for details of the localities, An-
cient Monarchies, vol. iii. pp. 158—162, 2nd
edit. -
10 Thirlwall, Hist. of Greece, vol. vii
*} -
11 This is rather indicated by the pains
which he took to improve Babylon (Arr.
Erp. Al. vii. 17, 19, 21) than distinctly
declared by any important authorities.
It bas been recognized as tolerably cer-
* * ! { . . .
$º.
.THE SIXTH MONARCHY,
: 604
tain by modern writers. (See Dr.
Pict. of Biography, vol. i. p. 122, &c.
12 Strab. xvi. 1, § 5; Plin. H. N. vi. 26.
. 18 Strab. xvi. 2, § 4.
14. On the views and intentions of Alex-
ander, see the excellent remarks of
Bishop Th;gºl (History of Greece, vol.
• gº º 25).
- 15 See text, p. 25.
, , , 16 Diod. Sic. xxi. 5.
17 Pausan. i. 7, § 3.
18 On this war, see Niebuhr, Lectures
on Auct. History, vol. iii. p. 286, E. T.
** Memnon, De rebus Heracl. xx. 3.
20 Ibid. xvi.
- 21 Antiochus I. obtained his name of
Soter (Saviour) from a victory over the
Gauls (Appian, Syriaca, p. 130, C.) He
was slain in a battle against the same
enemy (Phylarch. ap. Plin. H. N. viii
42; AElian, H. Am vi. 44). -
22 Strab. xiii. 4, § 2.
28. Appian. Syr. p. 130, D. -
24 Strab. xi. 9, § 2.
25 The title was conferred by the Mile-
sians on the expulsion of Timarchus.
(See above, note 21.)
26 See Niebuhr's Leçtures, vol. iii. pp.
286, 287; and compare Athen. Deipino-
soph. ii. p. 45; x. p. 438;, Hieronym. a.d.
I)an. xi. &c.
- 27 Justin gives the name as Theodotus
(Justin. xli. 4); but Diodotus, which is
the form used by Strabo (xi. 9, § 3), ap-
pears upon the Bactrian coins [Pl. 1, Fig.
, 1] (Lassen, Indische Altherthumsk. vol.
ii. p. 284; Num. Chr. New Series, vol.
viii. p. 278).
28 Justin’s “thousand Bactrian cities”
£xii. 1) are no doubt an exaggeration,
but they indicate a truth—that the coun-
try was populous and flourishing.
* The Bactrians were among the na-
tions selected by Mardonius to continue
the struggle with the Greeks when the
bulk of Xerxes' army returned home
(Herod. viii. 113). They fought well at
Arbela (Arr. Eacp. Al. iii. 13; Q. Curt. iv.
15, § 18), and offered a strenuous resist-
ance to Alexander (Arr. iv. 1–22).
80 Bactria was made generally a sort
of royal appanage. It was conferred by
Cyrus on his second son, Smerdi
JEacc. Pers. § 8). In the reign of Xerxes
it was first held by his brother, Masistes
(Herod. ix. 113), and afterwards by an-
gºer brother, Hystaspes (Diod. Sic. xi.
) -
* See Ancient Monarchies, vol. iii. p.
2n e .
82.It is true that the Parthians used the
Greek language on their coins and for
inscriptions. and also that some of their
kings took the title of puxe?Amv. Still I
believe the statement in the text to be a
correct one. It applies especially to the
early kingdom—from B c. 250 to B c. 127.
88 Strabo (xi. 9. § 3) mentions this view,
but implies his own dissent from it.
34 Arr. Fr. 1. Compare Syncell. p. 284,
B, and Zosimus, i. 18. The latter says:
'Apačkms & IIapóvatos, Štá ràw sis rêv čāsā-
Smith's
&
Parthian. But S
*r-
*
[CH. III.
Öov Tripušárqv $8pw &yavārrioras, méAegow
trpos rov 'Avrióxov oratpdarmv &pápºevos, airi-
aw éðwke rois IIapóvaiots ex8axodou Maké-
8ovas, eis éavroijs raw öpxhv treptorºo'at,
*5 Strab. xi. 9, § 2. . -
** Justin, xli. 4. *-
37. See text, p. 10.
* Frölich, Annales Regum Syriae, p.
26; Heeren, Manual of Ancient History,
p. 299, E. T. Mr. P. Smith (Ancient His:
tory, vol. ii. p. 92), and Mr. Lindsay
(History and Coinage of the Parthians,
p. 4), taking the later part of the same
Qlympic year, make the Bactrian king-
dom to have been founded in B. c. 255.
ajor Cunningham has recently ar-
gued for the low date of B.C. 246 (Num.
Chron. New Series, vol. vii. pp. 261–
265); by which the Bactrian revolt is
made to fall four years later than the
trabo, whom he con-
fesses to be the main authority, is clear
that Bactria set the example of revolt,
which Parthia followed (Geograph. xi. 9,
§ 2 and § 3). ...~ -
º See Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 216,
Il. I.
*Justin says, after speaking of the
Parthian revolt: “Eodem tempore, etiam
Theodotus, mille urbium Bactrianarum
praefectus, deficit" (xli. 4).
* Strabo says: II pio to v učv rāv Bax-
Tpt avimv dréorma avoi tretruo revuevo. . . .
§ tre t r" "Aporákms . . &mix6ev ºri Thy
IIapóvatav kai éxpármorev airms This au-
thority is followed by Droysen (Ge-
Schichte des. Hellemismats, vol. ii. § 381),
Lassen (I'm dische Alterthwmskwºnde, vol.
ii. p. 284), Mr. P. Smith (Ancient History,
vol. ii. pp. 91.92), and most moderns.
** Justin places it in the consulship of
L. Manlius Vulso and M. Atilius Regulus,
which was B c. 256. But M. Atilius is
probably an error for C. Atilius, who
was consul with. L. Manlius Vulso in B.C.
250. Eusebius distinctly places the re-
volt of the Parthians in this year (Chron.
Can. ii. p. 852); and Moses of Chorene
exactly agrees, when he assigns it to the
eleventh year of Antiochus Theus.
(Hist. Armen. ii. 1, ad fin.), Compare
Samuel Amiens. Sum. Temp. i. 7, § 13.
43 See text, p. 23.
44 Strab, xi. 9, § 2. Kar' āpxãs Mev ov
àgéevils à étaroxegów trphs rois à papegévras
Thu xàopav. *
45 Q. Curt. vi. 2.
* Suidas advoc. "Aporákms. Syncellus
indicates that his death was violent (vol.
i. p. 540).
* See Justin, xli. 5; Strab. xv. 1, § 36;
Mos, Chor. ii. 1; Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6, &c.
**All the Parthian coins bear the name
of Arsaces. A few comparatively have
the special name of the monarch in ad-
dition. (See Clinton. F. R. vol. ii. p. 252;
Lindsay, History of the Parthians, pp.
134–163, and plates 1–10.) In the public
documents also it would seem that the
Special designation of the monarch was
omitted (Dio Cass. lxvi. 11). .
** The practice is not that of the Pto-
CH. IV.]
lemies, who bere the name of Ptolemy
as a family appellation, and took some
further designation for distinction's
Sàkè.
50 Syncellus (p. 284, B) says 37 years;
but the synchronisms in the Parthian
history scarcely allow so much.
* As by Justin, Ammianus (I. s. c.),
and others.
* See the inscription of Adule (Böckh,
ii. p. 509).
Corp. Inscr. Gr. vol. iii.
** Justin, xli. 4. . (On the situation and
Fº character of Hyrcania, see ch.
i. p. 12.) , .
4 Ibid.
*Strab. xi. 8, § 8, 'Aparākms row KaxAi-
vikov bevyov XéXevkov eig rows 'Aarwaarud cas
*xºpmae. Major Cunningham places the
flight of Tiridates in B. c. 246, the first
§. of Callinicus (Num. Chron. New
eries, vol. ix. p. 33); but there seems to
be no reason for supposing that that
monarch threatened the eastern prov-
inces until B. c. 237, his tenth year, nor
any §§ that Tiridates would de-
sert his hº until the Syrian mon-
arch actually made his expedition.
* Qn the character, and geographical
position of the Aspasiacae, see Polyb. x.
47. Thi
is writer assigns them the whole
region between the Oxus and the Tanais;
but such an extension of their country.
can only have rested on conjecture.
What Polybius knew was that they
dwelt north of the Oxus, which they
were in the habit of crossing to make
raids into Hyrcania.
** Justin, l. s. c.: “Sed cito, morte
Theodoti metu liberatus, cum filio ejus
—et inso Theodoto–foedus ac pacem
fecit; nec multo post cum Seleuco rege,
ad defectores persequendos veniente,
congressus victor fuit.” - Jun-
ningham concludes, on the strength of a
fragment of Posidonius (ap. Athen.
Deipn. iv, p. 153, A), that Seleucus was
not only defeated by Tiridates, but made
}.”; (Num. Chrom. vol. ix. p. 34).
ut this would make Posidonius ex-
ressly contradict Justin, who says that
§. after his defeat was recalled
to his own kingdom by fresh troubles.
(See note 1 on the next º Others,
as Waillaut, Clinton, and Wilson,
have concluded from the fragment of
Posidonius that Callinicus must have
subsequently made a second expedition
against the Parthians, and have then
been made prisoner—an expedition of
which the Posidonian fragment is the
only trace. But it has been well pointed
out by Mr. Bunbury that that fragment
belongs to the history, not of Seleucus
Callinicus, but of Seleucus, the eldest
son of Antiochus Sidetes, who was taken
prisoner by Phraates II. in , B.C. 129
(Dict. of Greek and Roman #º",
vol. iii. p. 774). The sixteenth book of
I’osidonius, which contained the pas-
sage, treated of this period, and the
passage itself, which speaks of a Syrian.
expedition against Media, is inappro-
THE SIXTH MONARCHY.
s t
* * 24-4.
605
priate to the time of Tiridates. The ob
jection taken to Mr. Bunbury's view,
that Seleucus is called “king” in the
passage, has no force. The word Bøgvasos
is constantly applied to princes by the
Greek writers; and, moreover, Seleucus,
the eldest surviving son of Callinicus
(Euseb. Chron. Cun. i. 40, § 19), would ,
have been de jure “king” on his father's
eath. -
* “Velutinitium libertatis.” (Justin,
xii. 4, ad fin.) -
69 See text, pp. 2 and 19. The con-
§: of Hyrcania may have raised the
arthian territory from 33,000 to 50,000
Square miles. - -
*0 Justin, no doubt, reports the actual
words of Trogus when he says (l. s. c.),
$ 8§: diem Parthi exinde solemnem,
velut initium libertatis, observant.”
CHAPTER IV. A
1 Justin, xli. 5. “Revocato Seleuco
novis motibus in Asiam.”
* See note 57, Chapter III.
*Justin, l. s. c. “Dato laxamento, reg-
num Parthicum format, militem legit,
castella munit, civitates firmat; urbemi
Quoque nomine Daram in monte Zapa-
Ortenon condit; cujus loci ea conditio
est, ut neque munitius quidquam esse,
neque amoenius possit. Ita enim et;
praeruptis rupibus undique cingitur, ut
tutela loci nullis defensoribus egeat; et
Soli circumjacentistanta ubertas est, ut
propriis opibus expleatur. Jam fontium.
ac Sylvarum ea copia est, utet aquarum
abundantia irrigetur, et venationum vo-
luptatibus exornetur.” s
* See Plin. H. N. vi. 16. The double
resemblance of . Apavortene (Zapavor-
tene in one MS.) to Zapaortenon, and
of Dareium to Dara, is enough to show
that Pliny, and Justin are speaking of
the same, locality. The description of
Dareium in Pliny as “fertilitatis inclutae
locus” is a confirmation, if one were
needed. f
* This empl t depends especially -
on the identification of Justin's Zapaor-
tenon with the Apavarctica of Isidore
of Charax (Mans. Parth. § {3), which
lay between Parthyene and Margiana.
* See Polyb. x. 28, § 7; Plin. H. N. vi.
15; Strab. xi. 9, § 1. .
7 See Vaillant. Hist. Arsacid. p. 16;
Heeren, Manwal, p. 300. E. T.; Plate.ini
Smith's Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Biog-
raphy, vol. i. p. 354; Lindsay, History
and Coimage of the Parthians, p. 4; &c.
Mr. Clinton questions the existence of
any such king (F. R. vol. ii. p. 241. note
*); but the name is given in the Epitome
of Trogus Pompeius, and the actions are
those wrongly assigned by Mr. Clinton
to Tiridates.
* This is implied in the account of Po- .
lybius, especially in the fact recorded,
that Antiochus, in reoccupying the
place, plundered it (Polyb. x. 27, § 13). . .
* Justin (xli. 5) makes the number of
his troops 100,000 foot and 20,000 horse,.
606
f
THE SIXTH
which is not at all an extravagant esti-
Imate
10 This is the easiest pass from Meso-
potamia into Media, and the one which
is open the earliest.
11 Aretxworros. Polyb, x. 27, § 6.
12 “Yiróvouot. Polyb. x. 28, § 2. On the
extensive use of kamats in Persia, See
Gls.
14 Polyb x. 28, § 5. Compare the con-
duct of the European Scyths at the time
of the invasion of their country by Da-
rius (Herod. iv. 120).
15 Polyb. x. 28, § 6.
16 Ibid. § 7.
17 Ibid. x. 29, § 1.
18 Auá xapáöpas xetuáñāov. (Tb. x. 80,
§ 2.) The situation of the Parthian and
Hyrcanian towns is, unfortunately, still
so uncertain that it is impossible to fol-
low the march of Antiochus upon the
map. Hecatompylos probably lay be-
tween the Jaghetai and the Alatagh;
and it was this latter chain which An-
tiochus had to cross in order to enter
Hyrcania. Polybius calls it Mount La-
llS.
** As Tambraca and Syrinx.
20 Justin, xli 5: “Adversus Antiochum
Seleuci filium mira virtute pugnavit,”
21 The expression used by Justin—“ad
postremum in societatem ejus (sc. An-
tiochi) adsumptus est "-seems to imply
something more than a mere peace.
22 Polyb. xi. 34, § 9, 10. The terms were
the , following: — Euthydemus supplied
Antiochus with provisions for his army,
and surrendered to him all his elephants.
Antiochus allowed Euthydemus to re-
tain his government, and recognized his
title of “king.” . A marriage was ar-
ranged between Demetrius, the eldest
son of Euthydemus, and a daughter of
Antiochus, probably not of marriage-
able age. Finally, an alliance, offensive
and defensive (ovupraxia), was concluded
between the two powers. These favor-
able terms were granted to the Bactrian
monarch, chiefly on account of his rep-
resentations that a strong Bactria was
needed in order to keep in check the
northern nomads, who were continually
threatening an irruption, which, if it once
took place, would barbarize the whole
country. This is the first we hear of an
aggressive attitude being assumed by
the Scythic hordes across the Jaxartes.
* Appian, Syrigc., p. 86 A... 'Avrioxos
. . . orga}\tov šs Mm6tav re kai IIapóvãvny,
rai étepa €61m &quotapleva èrt ºrpo avrov,
kai troAAá 8págas, kai máyas 'Avrioxos étrº-
&Améets. Compare Polyb. xi. 34, § 16.
24 Justin, xii. 5.
25 See text, p. 25. .
* On the Greek cities founded by Alex-
ander in Bactria, see Strabo, xi. 11, § 4;
in Sogdiana, see Arrian, Earp. Al. iv. 3,
ad fin.: in the Paropamisus, ib. iv. 22;
on the Indus and its tributaries, Strab.
xv. 2, § 9; Arrian, v.19; vi. 15, 21, &c.
MOZVARCHY. [CH. Iv.
27 That the Hindoo civilization of the
time was not altogether contemptible is
shown by Lassen in the second book of
his Indische Alterthwmskunde (vol. ii.
pp. 1-111 -
28 See especially the account of Justin,
xv. 4, § 12–19. “Transitum deinde in In-
dia fecit, quae post mortem Alexandri,
veluti cervicibus jugo servitutis excusso,
praefectos ejus occiderat. Auctor liber-
tatis Sandrocottus fuerat; sed titulum
libertatis post victoriam in servitutem
verterat; siquidem occupato regno,
populum, quem ab externa dominatione
vindicaverat, ipse servitio premebat.”
** Palibothra, on the Ganges, is made
the head of the kingdom of Sandracot-
tus by Strabo, who follows the eye-wit-
ness, Megasthenes (xv. 1, § 36). Plutarch
(Vit. Alea’. § 62) extends the Praesian In-
dians, over whom he ruled, to the “Altars
of Alexander.” which were on the Hy-
phasis, or Sutlej (Diod. Sic. xvii. 95, § 1).
Seleucus must have come into contact
with Sandracottus in the Punjaub re-
glon.
80 Strabo (l. s. c.) gives as the amount
of his force 400,000; Plutarch (l. s. c.),
600,000
81 Appian mentions hostilities (röv 'Iv-
§ov Trepča as étro A & M m are v 'Avôpokórºp 8a–
auxet rôw trepi attoo "Ivööv. Syriac. p. 123,
B); but Strabo (xv. 2, § 9) and Justin (xv.
1, § 21) speak merely of an alliance.
82 Strabo, l. s. c. Plutarch (Vit. Alea’.
$62) mentions the elephants, but not the
cession of territory.
88 On this dynastic appellation, see
hº Indische Alterthumskwmde, vol.

. p. 190.
84 Polyb. x. 34, § 11. Lassen has shown
that Sophagesemus (Subhagasena) was
probably a title of Jaloka, the son of
Asoka, and grandson of Chandragupta
(Sandracottus).
85 So Wilson (Ariana Antiqua, p 229);
but I do not find any statement of the
fact by any ancient writer.
36 Strab. xi. 11, § 1.
*7 Demetrius is called by Justin “King
of the Indians” (xli. 6, - is rea-
sonably regarded as the founder of the
city called Demetrias in Arachosia (Isid.
8.I.". ). His Indian conquests are
attested by Strabo (l. s. c.)
88 This has been questioned by Wilson
(Ar. Amt. p. 230); but Lassen (Ind. Alt.
vol. ii. p. 300) regards, the evidence as,
on the whole, conclusive,
89 Ptol, Geograph. vii. 1: p. 171.
40 The coins of Euthydemus are found
over a wide space, and show his empire
to have included the provinces of Sog-
diana, Bactria, Margiana, Aria, the Pa-
ropamisus, Drangiana, and Arachosia.
* See text, p. 33.
42 Justin says, “Phraates Mardos, vali-
dam gentem, bello domuit" (xli. 5).
Arrian notes that at the time of Alex-
ander they were “poor”, (trévºres), but
“brave in their #;" (uáxtuot &mi Tà
trevig. Eacp. Al. iii. 24).
l
I

|
CH. v.]
THE SIXTH MONARCHY.
607
f CHAPTER V.
1 See text, ch. iv. p. 35.
2 Bactria appears to have been from.
the first less centralized than Parthia.
Strabo's expression that “those who
were intrusted with its government **
(ot trenuo revučvot) caused it to revolt, is
remarkable, and implies a plurality of
princes. The early coins are in accord-
ance. Those of Diodotus II. show us
two other contemporary princes, Anti-
machus and Agathocles, who at one
time held their principalities under him,
and at another time were independent.
(See Num. Chron, New Series, vol. viii.
Pl. 8, Nos. 5–7: Pl. 9, Nos. 1-8.) ajor
Cunningham believes that about B.C.
230–225 there were four contemporary
princes of what is commonly known as
the Bactrian, series. . (Ibid. vol. ix. p.
128.) According to him, the union of
the Greek power in the countries east of
Parthia was first effected by Euthyde-
Imus, ab. B.C. 225.
* Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, pp. 229,
, &c. Lassen agrees, though a little
doubtfully (Indische Alterthumskunde,
vol. ii. pp. 304, 305).
* According to Major Cunningham, the
Indian provinces remained in the pos-
session of the family of Demetrius, fall-
ing to his son (?), Lysias, who had for
successors Antialcidas, Amyntas, and
Hermaeus. (Num. Chron. New Series,
#) ix. p. 150. Compare vol. viii. p.
74. .
48 The position of the Mardians has
been much disputed. I am induced to
assign them, this locality at this time
from a consideration of Arriam (l, s. c.)
compared with Strabo (xi. 8, § 1 and § 8).
44 Arrian, 1. s. c. : Curt. Hist. Alea’.
vi. 5. The latter writer says: “Interiora,
regionis ejus haud same a dire sine mag-
na, vexatione [Alexandri) exercitus pos
terat. Juga montium, praealtae sylvae,
rupesque inviae sepiunt.”
45 Niebuhr, Lectures on Ancient His-
tory, vol. iii. p. 445, E. T.
46 The Mardians were a robber tribe,
whose allegiance to Persia had sat very
lightly on them. They submitted to
Alexander, but probably reverted soon
after to their old condition.
47 Isid. Char. Mans. Parth. § 7. Com-
pare Strab. xi. 18, § 7; Diod. Sic. xix.
44, § 5; Ptol. Geogr. vi. 2.
* See the descriptions of Fraser (Kho-
rasam, pp. 287, 288), and Kinneir (Per-
sian Empire, p. 119).
49 Rhages appears in the Zendavesta
under the form of Ragha. It is men-
tioned in the Behistun inscription (col,
ii. par. 13), and in the Books of Tobit
(i. TA: vi, 9) and Judith (i. 5).
50 See-Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii. p.
273; 2nd ed. $ *
5i Isid. Char. Mans. Parth. § 7, "Evrew-
9ew "Paytavi, Mmöia, Čv h . . . ‘Páya kai
Xápaś, §v, ueyiqrm rôv karū thv Mºmčiav fi
‘Páya. Eis Sé riv_Xápaxa ºrporos Baauxei's
q'padºrms rows Mapôows ºrctorey.
52 Fraser, Khorasam, p. 291.
63 Ancient Monarchies, !. S. C. he
more northern pass is called the Girdwºvi
Siyalwlc. It is perhaps the “Pylae Cas-
piae” of Pliny (H. N. vi e
54 See above, note 51. Mr. Lindsay
(History of the Parthians, p. 7) has
strangely confounded the Median Cha-
rax with Charax Spasini, at the mouth
of the Tigris, and has imagined that
Phraates I. extended his dominion to
the Persian e
55 So Droysen, Geschichte des Hellen-
ismus, vol. ii. p. 716. Isidore's descrip-
tion (€attv in trö 'ro 5 s à kaAsitat Káa-
Trvos) would lead one to place it some-
what nearer the “Gates.”
* The word “Charax” properly means
“palisade,” and applied to a town indi-
cates that it was guarded by a palisaded
earthwork. On the strength of such
palisaded places under the Parthians,
see Polyb. x Tádpot yap Forav
tput rai, trađtos uéy, oux éAatrov, exovgot
Tpuākovta irmxöv, Bá60s 6é Trevrekaičeka' étri
§§ Tots xeiàeavv čkáarms X a p a k & H at a
8varAá čtréketro, kai rexévratov ºrporeixtapla.
Suvarov. .
*7 Unless this had been the case, Jus-
tin would scarcely have dwelt so much
upon the meritorious character of
Phraates’ action (Hist. Phil. xli. 5, ad
º,
*See Lindsay's Parthians, p. 136. The
ſº is from a coin of this monarch.
[Pl. 1, Fig. 2.]
6 Justin. xli. 6.
• Strab. xi. 8, § 2. Md.Atarra öğ yväptºot
yeyóvaav Tów vouděov of Tovs"EAAmvas &de-
Aówevow thv Baxtpuaviv. Strabo does not
fix the date, but it can scarcely have
been either earlier or later than the
reign of Eucratidas. (Compare Wilson,
Ariana Antiqua, p. 236.)
7 The accession of Epiphanes is fixed
to B.C. 175 by the best chronologers.
(See Clinton, F. H. vol. iii. pp. 317-322.)
Mºates probably became king in
B.C. 17.
8 See 1 Maccab. i. 21–64; and compare
Joseph. Amt. Jud. xii. 5, 6; Diod. Sic.
xxxiv. 1, § 3, 4.
0 1 Mac. ii.—Wi.
as" Appian, Syriac. p. 131, B.; Liv. xli.
11 Polyb. xxxi. 11; 1 Mac. vi. 1–4. Ap-
pian makes him succeed in plundering
the Temple (Syriac. p. 131, C.), but he is
to be corrected from Polybius.
12 Polyb. l. s. c. The Jews naturally
regarded their own wrongs as the cause
of their oppressor's untimely end. (1
Mac. vi. 13.
18 Syriac. p. 117, B. z
14 Porphyr, ap. Euseb. Chron. Can.
i. 40, § 15. -
15 1 Mac. vi. 17-62. -
16 Ibid. vi. 15, 55, 63.
17 He was in his twenty-third year.
(See Polyb. xxxi. 12, § 5.)
18 The circumstances of this secret de-
parture are given in detail by Polybius,
608
who was a friend of Demetrius and privy
to his escape. (See Polyb. xxxi. 19–23.)
19 Strab. xi. 11, § 2. Mithridates is not
named by Strabo, but must have been
the conqueror, as the contemporary of
Eucratidas.
Lassen. Indische Alterthumskunde,
vol. ii. p. 294.
• 21 See note 56, Chapter III.
22 The names furnish but an uncertain
ground. Lassen seems to assume the
identity of Thurida with Turan, which is
no doubt possible, but still very doubt-
ful, the word Turan not otherwise oc-
curring till the time of the Sassanians.
Aspionus is not very close to Aspasiacae.
Professor H. H. Wilson placed Aspionus
at Andkhuy, and Turifia in the Hazareh
Mountains, to the south of Maymene.
; his Map, Ariana Antiqua, opp, p.
1
28 The quasi-independence of Media is
implied in the account of Justin, who
represents the war simply as one be-
tween the Medes and the Parthians (xli.
* , 24 Justin, 1. s. c. “Cum varius utri-
usque populi casus fuisset, ad postre-
imum victoria penes Parthos fuit.”
28 Justin’s words (** Mithridates Mediae
Bacasin praepomit’) point rather to an
appointment as satrap; but the Ordinary
system of the Parthians was to govern
by means of tributary monarchs.
28 Justin, 1. s. c.
27 Q. Curt. Hist. Alea’. vi. 4, § 15.
28 Xen. Cyrop. iv. 2, § 8.
29 See the author’s Herodotus, vol. i.
p. 345, 2nd edit.
30 Justin, l. s. c. “Bellum cum Ely-
maeorum rege gessit [Mithridates].”
81 If the Persians and Babylonians had
been reduced by force of arms, Justin
, would probably have mentioned their
reduction in Blº. Xli. e.h. 6 As it is, we
must regard the submission of Baby-
lonians as implied in that chapter, and
that of the Persians in Bk. xxxvi. ch.
82 The reduction of the Babylonians is
assigned by Orosius (v. 5) to the time of
the contest between Đemetrius and Alex-
ander Balas, B.C. 153–151. But the au-
thority is not very goods and it is prob-
' able that they submitted earlier.
The reduction of the Bactrians by
Mithridates is implied in the statements,
of Justin, that they were among the
... people who welcomed the expedition of
emetrius, having experienced the cru-
elty of the Parthians (xxxvi. 1). The
exact time of the invasion and the Bac-
trian monarch who resisted it, are un-
certain.
34. This relation of Heliocles to Eucra-
tidas is proved by a coin, which shows
him to have been associated with that
monarch, agreeably to the statement of
Justin. (See Wilson, Ar. Amt., p. 264;
Lassen. Ind. Alt. ii. p. 313.). Major Cun-
ningham's idea, that the effigies on the
obverse of this coin represent the father
*
THE SIXTH MONARCHY.
cruelty (‘
*
[CH. v.
and mother'of Eucratidas, seems to me
** Justin, I. s. c. It may have been in
the same spirit that Heliocles took the
epithet of Aikatos, which appears upon
his coins.
$8 Justin, xli. 6. .
** Orosius, v. 5. Compare Diod. Sic.
xxxiii. 20. These conquests are some-
what doubtful, since Justin seems lo
have known nothing of them.
49 See Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, pp.
268–300.
** Moses of Chorene makes Assyria
subject to Mithridates, whom he calls
{ % he great Arsaces” (Hist. Armen. ii. 4,
** See text, pp. 4, 6, and 7.
48 Q. Curt. Hist. Alea’. vii. 4, § 26:
“Bactriana terra multiplex et varia
natura est. Alibi multa arbor, et vitis
largos mitesque fructus alit: solum
pingue crebrifontes rigant; quae mitiona.
sunt frumento conseruntur: caetera ar-
mentorum pabulo cedunt.”
id. vi. 5.
45 Ibid. vi. 4.
46 Polyb. x. 28, § 3.
47 Especially the district called Nisaea,
where the Nisaean horses were bred.
(Arrian, Earp. Al. vii. 13; Diod. Sic. xvii.
110, § 6; Am. Marc. xxiii. 6.) .
48 See Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii. pp.
289. 290, 2nd ed.
4° Strab. xv. 3, § 11.
59 Herod. i. 193; Berosus, Fr. 1, § 2.
51 Theophrast. Hist. Plant. viii. 7;
Plin. H. N. xviii. 17. -
52 Strab. xvi. 1, § 14.
58. Theophrast. Hist. Plant. ii. 2.
** Herod. I. s. c.; Strab. 1. s. c.; Amm.
Marc. xxiv. 3; Zosim. iii. p. 173.
** The troubles of the reign of Deme–
trius are given with much fulness in the
• first book of Maccabees, ch. xi.—xiii
he provinces complained of his
propter Arsacidae regis Par-
thorum crudelitatem.”—Justin, xxxvi.
1, $3).
57 See text, p. 40. w
58 Justin, xxxvi. 1, §2: “ad abolendam
Segnitiae maculam.”
5° “Quod veteri Macedonum imperio
admoti, novi populi superbian indigne
ferebant.” (Justin, xxxvi. 1, § 3.
80 “Cúm et Persarum, et Elymaeorum,
et Bactrianorum auxiliis juvaretur, mul-
tis probliis Parthos, fudit.” (Ib. § 4.
Compare xxxviii. 9, § 2.) -
* “ Ad postremum tamen pacis simu-
latione deceptus capitur" (Ib. xxxvi. 1,
5.) “Repente insidiis circumventus.”
Ib. xxxviii. 9, § 2).
** Justin, 1. s. c.; Appian, Syriac. p.
132, A.; Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 15; Ores. v. 4.
* “Amisso exercitu” (Justin, xxxviii.
9, 2). Comp. 1 Mac. xiv. 3.
94. Justin. xxxvi. 1, § 5: “Traductus
per ora civitatium, populis, qui descive-
rant, in ludibrium favoris Oslenditur.”
j
*
cH. VI.]
THE SIXTH MONARCHIV.
609
phrase is exchanged for Boarvaeijovros Ba-
gºt Ağtºy. *
19 The phrase “Satrap, of Satraps”
occurs only in one inscription, that of
Gotarzes at Behistun, and has been
thought to throw some doubt on the
identification of the. Gotarzes who set it
up with the twenty-first Arsaces. But
the doubt is scarcely reasonable; and it
does not seem unlikely that under the
Parthian system the distinct force of
the word “satrap” would be lost, and
it would come to be regarded as a title
equivalent to king.
20 Appian enumerates twenty-five be-
sides those that Seleucus Nicator built
and named after himself or his relations,
which he estimates at thirty-five more.
(Syriaca, pp. 124, 125.) Isidor of Charax
finds, upon a single line of route, sixteen
(Mans. Parth. § 1–19). On the general
subject, see Grote, History of Greece,
vol. viii. p. 474, ed. of 1862.
2, Plin. H. N. vi. 26.
** “Civitas potens, septamuris.” (Tac.
Amºn. vi. 42.)
* “Ager totius Orientis fertilissi-
mus.” (Plin. 1. s. c.)
* “Trecenti, opibus aut sapientia de-
lecti, ut Senatus.” (Tacit. l. s. c.
25 See what Dio says of the Greek and

Macedonian colonies in Mesopotamia at
*Ibid. 1. s. c.: “Missus deinde in Hyr-
caniam, benigne et juxta cultum pris-
tinae fortunae etur.” Compare
xxxviii. 9, § 3. “Cui Arsacides Partho-
rum rex, magmo et regio animo, misso
in Hyrcaniam non culturm tantum re-
gium praestitit, sed et filiam in matri-
monium dedit,” &c.
* App. Syriac, 1. s. c.
*7 Adversa valetudine correptus ”
(Justin, xli. 6, § 9).
CHAPTER VI.
1 Posidonius ap. Strab. xi. 9, § 3. Tºv
IIapóvatov auvéðptóv $ngly siva, IIogetöð-
vvos Sutrów, rö pºev ovyyevæv, to 8& aroqāov
Kai piùytov, Šć &v àpidotv Tovs flaq i\sis ka0t-
arrao 6aw.
2 There are five instances of brothers
succeeding—viz., those of Mithridates I.,
Orodes I., Gotarzes, Chosroës, and Arta-
nus III. One of these, however, that
of Mithridates I., is ascribed to the will
of the previous monarch.
* As in the case of Artabanus I., the
Successor of Phraates II. -
*Tacit. Ann. vi. 42; Appian, Parth. p.
141, A. According to this latter writer,
the right was hereditary in the family
to which the Surena, who opposed Cras-
sus belonged.
5 s IV., on his accession, put
to death his twenty-nine brothers.
*The high position of the Magi under
the Parthian kings is strongly marked
by their place in the Great Council. (See
above, note 1.)
ibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. i. p.
333 (Smith's edition).
8 Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6; p. 405.
*Ibid. p. 406.
* Agathias, ii. 25. To ugyuköv böAov
éyxparès éé exeivov [roß 'Aprašápov] yé yovs
kai dyāptoxov, Öv Hºčv #öm kai trpárepov, oùtra,
Śē és rooro rºuns re kai trañómorias ºpplévov,
d'AA' à motov Útrö révév réAet éorriv i kai tre-
puopaoréat. -
11 Pliny correctly calls the Parthian
provinces “kingdoms.” (“Regna Par-
thorum octodecim Sunt omnia,” H. N.
vi. 25.) The Greek writers most com-
monly call them “satrapies,” but incor-
13 Strab. xv. 3, § 24. -
13 Ibid. xvi. 1, § 19. This monarch ap-
pears to have had special privileges.
** Joseph. Amt. Jud. xxi. 2; Oros. vii.
6; Dio Cass. lxviii. 19.
1 * Dio Cass. xi. 20; Ixviii. 18. -
1° Ammianus makes the vitaacoe eigh-
teen in number, but includes among
them the “kings” of Persia, Susiana, &c.
He explains the term as signifying
“Masters of the Horse and Royal Sa-
traps;” but Hesychius says more briefly,
and probably more correctly. Biara: 6
Bctoruxei's trapó IIéparats (i.e. IIdépôots).
17 Decline and Fall, vol. i. p. 339,
Smith's edition.
18 See Lindsay, History of the Par-
thians, p. 218. In one instance the
the time of the invasion of Crassus (xl.
{} Compare Appian, Parthica, p. 136,
26 Diod. Sic. xxxiii. 20.
27 See text. p. 49.
* See, Tiglath-Pileser Inscription, p.
20; Behist. Ins. col. i. par. 1; Persep.
Ins, passim.
39 The Seleucidae from first to last re-
tain the modest BAXIAEQX. The Graeco-
Bactrian kings use the same style at
first, but afterwards change it for BA-
XIAEQX METALOY. (See Wilson, Ariana
Antiqtta. pp. 237–241.) Tigranes of Ar-
menia, like the later Parthian monarchs,
claims to be BaartMeijs Baoru Métov. -
30 Herodian, vi. 6.
* On the ordinary Scythic cap, see the
tºº. Herodotus, vol. iii. p. 3, and vol.
1V. p. b3. . - *
32 Herodian, vi. 6.
88 Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6: “Ad id tem-
pus reges ejusdem gentis pertumidi ap-
E. se_patiuntur Solis fratres atquie
unae.” The same title is borne by the
modern Shahs of Persia. :
** Ibid. “In qualibet civili, concerta-
tione, quae assidue apud eos eveniunt,
velut sacrilegium quisque cavet ne dex.
tera. Sua, Arsacidem arma gestantern
feriat vel privatum.”
* According to Mr. Lindsay, Priapa-
tius was the first “Theopator” (History
of the Parthians, p. 213). Others make
the first to have been Phraates II.. the
son and successor of Mithridates (Clin-
ton, Fasti Romani, vol. ii. p. 252). The
first king who took the epithet of 9ebs is
thought to be Phraates III. (Ibid.)
* See Mos. Chor. Hist, Armen. ii. 74.
i.
610
t
“Fanorum religiones praecipue instau-
ravit. . . . Statuas autem, quas Valar-
saces majoribus suis statuerat, Solisque
et Lunae simulachra, quae ille . . . Ar-
taxata, deportaverat, ea Artasires COn-
fregit.
87 Pliny calls it “caput regnorum ”
(H. N. º Tacitus, “sedes imperii’”
(Ann. vi. 26); Dio Cassius describes it as
ºróAts v i Baori Aeva [oi IIdºp60t] exovart
(Hist. Rom. xl. 45); Ammianus (xxiii. 6,
p. 402), as “Persidis specimen sum-
mum.” -
38 Eið0aortv čvraß6a rod Xeuptavos Ståyetv
oi Baoruxels ö tä rê e i die pov (xvi. 1, § 16).
39 -
*
H
. N. vi. 26; $ 122
40 Strab. 1. s. c. Tairmv čtrotojvro xel-
pudětov oi rav IIapóvaíov 8aataeis, betóów.e-
vot rôv Xexevkéov, iva win karaorraðuetſouvro
intro roi, XKvěukoi, puſXov kai orparvorukov.
41 Strab. 1. s. c. Compare xi. 13, § 1.
42 Ibid. xi. 7, § 2.
** Deipnosoph. xii. 8; p. 514.
44 Mans. Parth. § 7.
• ** An occasional flying visit may have
been, paid to º where the
old palace of the early kings was main-
tained at least to the time of Strabo (xi.
9, § 1); but the province was not rich
enough to furnish food for the vast num-
bers of the later Court. (Ibid.)
4° Isid. Char. Mans. Parth. § 12. In
later times Arbela appears to have be-
come the royal burying-place (D. Cass.
xxviii. 1).
47 Plutarch, Vit. Crass. § 21. Comp.
Appian, Parthica, p. 141. A.
48 Plut. Vit. Crass. $24.
49 Ibid. § 21.
50 Diod. Sic. xxxiii. 20. -
* See Agathias, who, writing under
the Byzantine emperors, ab. A.D. 56
580, thus sums up the Parthian period :
t - * - * re. - -
IIapóvatou, É6vos karūkoov kai inktorra év rº
Trpi rod bycuaorétarov, TrapéAvgav rºs &px?s
rows Makeóóvas. Kai eita éxeivot rôv 68wov
arºv Aiyūrtov hyoovro, "Aporákov učv trpó-
Tepov rºs &moatáoretos épéapiévov, ſos kai
"Aporakiöas rows pºet' autov ovoudgeoréat,
Mt. 6p v 8 & rou Sē où woxA® iſ a repov ć s
Au 6 y a r u k A €os ro II a. o. 6 v a two v 5 vo-
At a € $ e ve y k &v to s. (Hist. ii. 25, ad fin.)
. . . . CHAPTER VII.
1 Justin, xxxviii. 9, § 10.
* Appian, Syriac, p. 132, A. Justin,
however, makes the marriage take
place ... in the reign of Mithridates
(xxxviii. 9, § 3). ..
* Justin, $ 4–8. -
* “Ut invisus a conspectu submove-
tur” (Ibid.).
* “Talis aureis ad exprobrationem
puerilis levitatis donatur” (Ibid.).
6 ac. xv. 10–25; Appian, Syriac. p.
1 Mac. xv. 28.36.
10 Ibid. xvi. 8–10. .
* Euseb. Chron. Can. i. 40, § 18; Jo-
seph. Ant. Jud. xiii. 8, § 2. -
*
THE SIXTH MONARCHY.
[CH. VII.
*Justin, xxxviii. 10, $2. . . .
18 See Herod. vii. 186; Tacit. Hist. iii.
33, &c. - -
14 Orosius wrote about A.D. 420. His
chronology is exceedingly confused, but
he occasionally preserves in his details
important facts, which he has obtained
from earlier writers. The passage here

referred to is in Book V. ch. 1
15 See text, p. 58.
1° Porphyr. T ap. Euseb. Chron. Can.
40, § 18; Mos. Chor. Hist, Armen. ii. 2.
17 Justin, xlii. 1, § 2.
18 Ibid. xxxviii. 10, § 5.
1° According to Justin, the common
soldiers had their military boots fastened
with gold (compare Val. Max. ix. 1), and
their cooking utensils were of silver.
29 Joseph. Amt. Jud. xiii. 8. The pres-
ence of Hyrcanus is confirmed by Nico-
las of Damascus (Fr. 74). -
21 “Cum execratione superbiae Par-
thica” (Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 5).
22 Nic. Dam. Fr. 74.
28 Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 6. -
** Porphyr. ap. Euseb. Chron. Can.
1. S. c.; Appian, Syriac, p. 132, B; Justin
xxxviii. 10, § 7.
25 Justin, $8.
* Dio (xl. 46) speaks of the Parthians
as disinclined to make war in winter,
because a damp air relaxed their bow-
strings. But physically, they were as
capable of enduring the winter cold as
the summer heats. -
27 According to Posidonius, Antiochus
in this expedition “feasted daily vast
crowds of his men, and allowed his
guests not only to consume as much as
they would, but even to carry away with
them from the banquet, birds, beasts,
and fish that had not been touched, to
the extent of a wagon-load each ban-
uet; in addition to which he presented
them with homey-cakes and garlands
scented with myrrh and frankincense
tied with golden strings six feet long”
(Fr. 17).
28 See Justin, xxxviii. 10, $8; and com-
pare Diodorus (xxxv. 17, § 2), where
Athenaeus, one of the generals of Anti-
ochus, is said to have distinguished him-
self by behaving worse than others to-
wards those on whom he was quartered,
and to have suffered for it afterwards.
29 Justin, l, s. c.
80 This seems the only way of recon-
ciling Diodorus (xxxv.15) with Porphyry
(ap. Euseb. 1. s. c.) and Moses of Chorene
(ii. 2). The last two distinctly state that
the battle in which Antiochus fell was
fought in the winter. Diodorus, on the
other hand, speaks of the spring warmth
as having begun to melt the snow, when
hraates sent his embassy.
81 It would appear from this that De-
metrius was either not yet released, or
not known to be at large by his brother.
Probably the order to release him was
sent to Hyrcania at the beginning of the
winter; but it may well be that it could
not be executed immediately. The se-
i


T f ºw
#
f
cH. viii.]
f : -
*
THE SIXTH MoMARCHY.
*
*** *
60 Indications of this are his relations
with Himerus (see text, p. 60), and the
rapidity with which he fell in love with
Demetrius' daughter (Justin, xxxviii.
10, § 10)
*1 The natural cruelty of Phraates is
shown, 1, in his treatment of his Greek
captives (“exercitum Graecorum su-
perbe crudelitergue tractaverat,”) Jus-
tin, xlii. 1, § 4; 2, in his feelings towards
the people of Seleucia (āAAorpios trphs
>eXevkets Staketu.evos kai u v m a v k a k to v,
Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 19); and perhaps, 3, in
his appointment of Himerus, whose se-
verities he must have countenanced or
at least permitted. -
** Note especially his winter campaign
against Antiochus (see text, p. 58).
** As in his treatment of Demetrius
after his two escapes, in his conduct to-
wards Seleucus, Antiochus’ son, and (in
a less degree) in his treatment of An-
tiochus' body. * * -
* This is the impression raised by the
story which Diodorus tells about the
Seleucenses. “The Seleucenses,” he
says, “understanding that Arsaces was
angry with them, sent ambassadors to
deprecate his wrath, and bade them be
sure to bring back an answer from the
king. So Arsaces took the ambassadors
to the place where Pitthides, a man
whose eyes had been put out, was wont
to sit; and said–Tell the men of Seleu-
cia that they all deserve the fate of
Pitthides!'”. As it does not appear that
Phraates took any steps to carry out his
threat, it can scarcely have been serious.
611 .
verity of the weather makes travelling
very difficult on the high plateau during
December and January; and it would
have been especially hard to cross the
Zagros range during this season. De-
metrius may not have reached Syria, till
February, and Antiochus may, there-
fore, not have known that he was at
liberty.
82 Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 8. “Die statuta,
omnes apud se divisum exercitum per
insidias, ne invicem ferre auxilia pos-
sent, aggrediumtur.” -
88 Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 9; Diod. Slc.
xxxiv. 16.
S4 Diod. Sic. l. S. c.
35 'Aveóéxero Tºv ráðv Bappépav čdoôov
st p & a T wo s, says Diodorus. “Fortius,
3. exercitus ejus, dimicavit,” says
ustin
36 “Metu Suorum desertus occiditur”
(Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 10). Athenaeus,
the general who had advised retreat, was
the first to fly, (Diod. Sic. l. s. c.)
87 Justin, Porphyry, Josephus, and
Orosius say that he was slain; Appian
(Syriac. p. 132, B) and AElian (Hist. Am.
x. 34) declare that he killed himself. . .
º Porphyr. ap. Euseb. Chron. Can.
Xi. lö.
39 Justin, 1. s. c.
40 Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 17, § 1.
41 Joseph. Ant. Jud. xiii. 9.
42 Cilicia was lost B.C. 102. The towns
on the coast, Tyre, Sidon, Seleucia, &c.,
about the same time assumed indepen-
dence.
48 The eacact time was sixty-three
years,from the spring of B.C. 128 to B.C.65.
44 Justin, xxxviii. 10, § 11. *
45 Justin, 1. s. c.
46 See text, p. 53.
47 Justin, xxxviii. 9, § 8.
48 Ibid. xxxviii. 1 10.
49 Porphyr., ap. Euseb. Chron. Can. i.
40, § 18, “Seleucum Arsaces captivum
abduxit, regioque more custodiendum
curavit.”
50 Justin, 1. s. c. “Exsequias regio
more fecit.”
51 Ibid. xxxix. 1, § 6.
52 Ibid. xlii. 1, § 1. The statement is
confirmed by Diodorus (xxxiv. 18), who
says that Phraates expected to make
himself master of Syria, with ease (éAtri-
gov Götaps airms kvpueta euv). -
58. Justin, xlii. 1, § 2.
*4 Ibid. § 3; Posidon. Fr. 21.
55 Diod. Sic. xxxiv. 21.
** Himerus is called “king of the Par-
thians '' by Diodorus — an expression
which requires explanation rather than
correction. Posidonius speaks of him
as vöv rup a v v 7) a a v r a Bašuxtovíov (Fr.
21). According to Justin (xiii. 2, § 8), he
was Phraates’ vicarius.
** Justin, xlii. 1, § 4.
58 Ibid. § 5.
* The accession of Phraates II. is
fixed by various considerations to about
the year B.o. 136. is death must have
taken place in B. c. 128 or B. c. 127.
* Besides the above story, there is an
anecdote of Phraates told by Posidonius,
which deserves to be noticed. “When
Antiochus, who made war upon Ar-
saces,” he says, “was dead, and the
latter was occupying himself about his
funeral, he exclaimed, ‘Oh, Antiochus,
thy rashness and thy intemperance were
thy ruin; in thy mighty cups thou
thoughtest to swallow down the king-
dom of the Arsacidae!’” (Posid. Fr. 20.)
CHAPTER VIII.
* Justin, xlii. 2, § 1.
* Justin's phrase (“In hujus locum
Artabanus, patruus ejus, rex substitui-
twr”) implies their election, which, be-
sides, we know to have been the regular
course of procedure. (See text, p. 48.)
* As Priapatius died in or about B.C.
181, Artabanus could not in B.C. 127 be
less than 54 years of age. - -
4 The tyranny of this governor is wit-
nessed to in a general way by Justin
(xiii. 1, § 3), and Posidonius (Fr. 21).
Some particulars of it are given by
Diodorus. “Evenerus,” he says, “the
Parthian king, was a Hyrcanian by race,
aud exceeded in cruelty all other tyrants
on record. There was no form of pun-
ishment which he omitted to use. On
accusations of a trivial character he
condemned many of the Babylonians to
slavery, and sent them with their fami-
*
*
t «
* f
/ /
lies into Media to be publicly sold. He
burnt the market-place of Babylon, and
several of the temples, destroying at the
same time the finest portion of the city.”
5 Trog. Pomp. Prolog. lib. xlii. “Ut
raefectus Parthis a Phraate Mesenis
É. intulit.” Meséné was the tract
between Babylonia and the sea; it had
gº not yet been made subject to
arthia. -
* Justin, xlii. 2, § 1. “Scythae autem
contenti victoria, depopulata Parthia,
in patriam revertuntur.”
7 Strab. xi. 8, § 8.
8 That the pressure of the nomadic
hordes on Bactria began as early as the
reign of Euthydemus (B.C. 220–200), ap-
pears from his representations to An-
tiochus (Polyb. xi. 34, § 5).
* Strab. 1. s. c. Oi Śē ovvé9evro popovs’
bópos 6' ºiv ro èrurpéreuv rakrois rvat Xpó-
vous riv x&pav karatpéxetv kai pepéq6at
Asiav. I understand this as a pasture
right similar to that claimed by the
Samnites in Campania (Arnold, Hist. of
Rome, vol. ii. p. 108), only enjoyed at a
different time of the year.
10 Strab. xi. 8, § 2 and $4; Trog. Pomp.
Prol, lib. xli. -
11 This is the date given. (See Wilson,
Ariana Amt. p. 303) It does not pre-
- tend to exactness; and we may perhaps
conclude from the words of Euthyde-
mus (see above, note 8), which were
spoken B.C. 205, the movement
commenced seven or eight years earlier.
12 Wilson, I. S. c.
18 The Chinese authority for the his-
tory of this migration is a certain Chang-
kian, who was sent on a mission from
China to the Yuechi in B.C. 139, and re-
turned to his native country in B. c. 126.
14 The great Scythian invasion in the
reign of Cyaxares (ab. B. c. 630) is a well-
attested fact of history. (See Herod. i.
* 103–5; iv. 1; Strab. i. 8, § 21; xi. 8, § 4;
Euseb. Chron. Can. ii. p. 227; Oros. i. 19;
Syncell. p. 214, C; &c.) It is the first in-
vasion of the kind that can be regarded
as certain. Justin's story of a Scythic
conquest of Asia in the time of Sesos-
tris (ii. 3, § 15; cf. Strab. xv. 1, § 6) being
probably apocryphal.
15 The attack made by Cyrus on the
Massagetae belongs to the year B. c. 559.
1° The Chinese regard the conquests
, as made by the Su and the Yue-chi. In
migratory movements, the expelled
people are constantly led by individuals
of the race that has expelled them.
/
18 This .* is first found in Isidore
of Charax, who belongs probably to the
Augustan age.
1° Wilson, Ariana Antigua, pp. 302,
805. 347, &c.
* 30 Ibid. p 302.
21 Strab. xi. 8, § 8.
22 Ibid. § 2,
* See Trog, Pomp. Prol.lib. xlii.; Jus-
tin, xlii. 2, § 2; Strab. 1. s. c.; Dionys.
* Perieg. 752. .
*
THE SIXTH MoMARCHY.
been poisoned.
an *.
--- *
| -
Sch. Ix.

24 Trogus said that the Asiani at one
time furnished kings to the Tochari.
(Prol. lib. xlii. ad fin.)
*Strab. 1. s.c.; Trog. Pomp. Prol. lib.
I.
26 Strab. H. S. C.
27 Ibid. xi. 8, § 8.
28 Herod. i. 215, 216.
29 Strab. xi. 8, § 6. -
80 That the Massagetae were not the
a
only cannibals among the nomadic
hordes of these parts, appears from
Pliny, who notes the same feature in
the Tochari (“Tochari . . . humanis
corporibus vescuntur.” H. N. vi. 17).
31 See Plin. ... xi. 53.
82 Herod. i. 216. Oedov woovov #Atov
º: Strabo repeats the statement
S. C.
83 “Bello Tocharis illato” (Hist, Phil.
xlii. 2, § 2).
84 See text, p. 64.
85 “In brachio vulneratus, statin de-
cedit.” (Justin, 1. s. c.) e invºmediate
death consequent upon a wound in the
fore-arm raises a painful suspicion that
the weapon which dealt the wound had
(See above, note 31.)
CHAPTER IX. •
1 See the passage quoted at the hea
of the chapter. Compare Trog. Pomp.
Prol, lib. xlii.
* Justin, xlii. 4, § 1. That Trogus did
not make the mistake appears from the
Prologue to boo ii., where we are
told that he placed several kings be-
tween Mithridates II. and Orodes.
* “Cum Scythis prospere aliquoties
dimicavit, ultorque injuriae parentum
fuit.” (Justin. xiii. 2, § 5.)
4 Strab. xi. 9, § 'ApsiAovro Tºs Bax-
Tptavns wepos [ot IIápévaiot] 8 t a q à w e-
vo u roi s > k iſ 6 a. s.
5 Isid. Char. Mans. Parth. § 18.
* “Multos populos Parthico regno ad-
digiº.º.;
4.)
ustin, xlii. 2. § 6. Some of the MSS.
have “Arthoadisti,” others “Artadisti.”
It may be suspected that the true read-
ing is “Artavasdis.”
8 Appian makes Tigranes the son of a
Tigranes (Syn'. p. 118, D); but his au-
thority is not very great. Moses of Cho-
rene calls his father Ardashes.
* Justin, xlii. 2, §§ 7, 8,
10 Gen. viii. 4. The geographical term
used is Ararat, to hºst, which is ety-
mologically quite distinct from Armenia,
but which designates the same country.
11 See Beros. Fr. 7, § 6.
12 Lenormant. Manuel d'Histoire An-
tigue de l'Orient, vol. i. pp. 379. 385, &c.
The conclusion is based on the etymo-
logical identity of a word read as Lema-
new or Femanen with Armina (Old
Pers.) or Armenia. The etymology is,
of course, quite possible; but it is against
the identification that the word Armina
seems not to have been known in the
country till the times of the Medo-Per-
&IlS. .
w g
f *
CH. IX.]
1*See Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii. pp.
101, 112, 150, 210, &c. (2nd edit.)
14 For an account of these inscrip-
tions, see Layard, Nineveh, and Babylon,
p. 394–403. They have been published
§ Schulz.
15 Arghistis contended with Sargon,
ab. B.C. 720–700, and the second Bilat-
Duri (Milidduris of Layard) with Asshur-
bani-pal, ab. B.C. 640.
16 They style themselves “kings of the
Nairi,” and relate their successful expe-
ditions into the Minni country. Their
inscriptions at Malatiyeh, Palu, and in
the Miyandab, south of Lake Urumiyeh,
indicate the extent of their sway.
17 Amcient Monarchies, vol. ii. p. 210,
2nd edit. .
18 Sir H. Rawlinson in the
Herodotus, vol. iv. p. 206, 2nd e
19 Herod. vii, 73.
20 See the Beh. Ins, col. i. par. 6; col.
ii. par. 7, &c. The term 'Appévuot seems
to have been first introduced into Greece
by Hecataeus (Fr. 105).
* In the Behistun Inscription we have
three Armenian names, Dadarshish,
Arakha, and Handita. Of these Dadar-
shish is manifestly Arian, being a redu-
plicated form from darsh, “to dare.”
Arakha has the root Air (= ariya, “no-
ble”) with the Scythic termination alch
suffixed to it. Handita has the same
participial ending as Khshathrita (Xa-
thritis), Arshita (Arsites), and the like,
but its etymology is otherwise obscure.
To these undoubted Armenian names
we may add from Moses of Choréné
Tigranes, Tigrania, Eryandus (= Ary-
andes), and Zaria; and from Xenophon,
Sabaris (= Sybares). Of these, Tigranës,
Aryandes, and Sybares are well-known
Persian names; Tigrania is a feminine
form of Tigranes (compare Roxané);
Zaria is from zara, “gold.” and would
mean “golden-haired.” Compare the
Greek Chrysé and Chrysis.
22 The later Armenian religion was
like the Persian (Strab. xi. 14, 5).
The religion of the Urarda was entirely
different. -
28 Steph. Byz. ad voc. 'Applevia.
24 Hist. Armen... i. 21.
25 Behist. Ins. col. i. par. 6; Herod. iii.
93; Xen. Am... iv. 3, § 4; 4, § 4; Arrian,
Eacp. Alea’. iii. 8.
36 Beh. Inscr. col. ii. par. 2–13.
27 Strab. xi. 14, § 9. ‘O orarpárms rºs
Applevias tº IIéparm kar’ tos 8tarpºvpious trº-
Aovs rois Mv8pakivous éneutrév.
38 Herod. vii. 73; Arrian, l. s. c.
29 Arrian, iii. 16. -
80 Strab. xi. 14, § 15.
81 Ibid. "Hxpov obrow, ſ'Aprašías re kai
Zapio.8pus] roo Baataetos étrutpéquavros.
** Appian, Syriacct, p. 3 *-**
83 See Mos. Chor. Hist. Arm. ii. 3.
author’s
dit.
$1.
87 Ardashes is made by Moses the
THE SIXTH MOWARCHY,
613
father and predecessor of Tigranes, and
is given a reign of twenty-five years.
(Cornpare ii. 10, § 1, with ii. 13, § 1.) This
would bring his accession to B.C. 121,
and would make the expedition of Mith-
ridates II. (ab. B. c. 100) certainly fall
in his time. g
* Strab. xi. 14, § 15. Kat' àpxás wey.
tºpipevge trapá Hápbots. Compare Jus-
tin, xxxviii. 3, § 1. .
* As Tigranes lived to B.C. 55, and was
eighty-five at his death (Lucian, Maer.

§ 15), he must, have been born B.C 140;
in which case he can scarcely have been
given as a hostage till B.C. 120. His ac-
º to the throne is generally placed
*The chief use which Rome made of
her victory at Magnesia, was to augment
the territory, of her ally, Eumenes of
Pergamus, whose dominions she more
than doubled on the occasion. (See
Niebuhr. Lectures on Ancient History,
vol. iii. p. 403, E. T.
.* Justin, xxxvi. 4, §§6–9; Vell. Paterc.


ii. 4, &c.
43 Justin, xxxvii. 1, § 2,
48 Memnon, Fr. 30; Justin, xxxvii. 3;
Strab. vii. 4, § 3, &c.
44 Appian, Mithridat. p. 180, C. Plut.
Lucull. § 14; Justin, xxxviii. 3, § 2; Mem-
non, Fr. 43, *
45 Plut. Sull. § 5; Liv. Epit. lxx. .
** Plut. J. S. c. IIAetovas 'Appleviov trpo-
Bom6oovtas &mokretvas, Tápévov pisv čáñAa-
orev, 'Aptogapgåvmv 6' &tréðelºs Baglaea. -
*7 Strab. xi. 14, § 15; Justin, xxxviii. 3,
§ 1. -
48 Strab. 1. s. c. The district ravaged
was that about Nineveh and Arbela
(étrépôma's riv re trepi Nivov kai Tav repi
"Appmåa). There is a difficulty in fixing
the time of these events, and I have
been guided by probability in placing
them at this exact period. • -
49 Plutarch speaks of the Parthians as
ovuuiaxias kai ºbtaias 8souévows. Livy's
epitomizer says: “Parthorum legati, a
rege Arsace missi, venerunt ad Sullam,
ut amicitiam populi Romani peterent.”
Veileius puts the embassy nine years
later (i. 24, § 3), when Sulla was in Asia
for the second time; but the combined
authority of Livy and Plutarch out-
weighs his. -
50 We find no mention in any author
of a treaty being made at this time.
That friendly relations were regarded as
established is implied in the expression
of Livy’s epitomizer, under B.C. 66, “Cn.
Pompeius cum rege Parthorum Phraate
amicitiam renovavit.” (Ep. c.
* See Plut. Lucull. § 14. Twypávns,
§xov Štívauw fi IIápéovs repukówré rijs
'Aorias.
* Ibid. § 21. Thy IIdp0ov, dos &AAos
ovësis, Sºuauvv ét a tre i v to or ev. -
58 Cf. Strab. xi. 14, § 15, with Plut,
Luchull. § 21. & -
54 See text, p. 69.
* As related by Plutarch, Sull. § 5. . . .
614
CHAPTER X. -
1 Clinton, Fasti Romani, vol. ii. p. 245,
Iº.
dates II. and Orodes are three only—
viz., Sanatroeces, Phraates III., and Mi-
thridates III. The succession of these
three and of Orodes to Mithridates III.
is certain. Thus the only possible gap
is between Mithridates II, and Sana-
troeces. *
* Lucian, Macrob. § 15.
4 “Varia Complurium regum succes-
8ione.” A varied succession implies ir-
regularity, which is naturally accom-
panied by disturbance.
5 Plut. Lucull. § 36. Tās IIóp6tov Švyā-
pleads tº tr' é º f v A to v kai Trpoo`oikov tro-
A é º w w ow8 "Apprevious tºpigovtas Špijoué-
vms &uiſveoréat. -
& Sanatroeces and Mnasciras, who were
respectively eighty and about ninety at
their accession.
7 So Phlegon (Fr. 12), who is more
definite in his statement than Mr. Clin-
ton, represents (F. R. vol. ii. p. 245).
Dio (Hist, Rom. xxxv. 3; xxxvi. 28) and
Appian (Mithridat. p. 242, E.) are less
exact, but on the whole confirm Phlegon.
8 Sanatroeces (XANATPOIKHX) is the
form found upon the coins; Sinatroces
is that of the best MSS. of Lucian; Sin-
tricus occurs in Appian (l. s. c.) Phle-
gon gives Sinatruces (>uvarpoºkms). -
* Or, strictly speaking, seventy-nine
(byöomkoorrow étos yeyovºs. Lucian, T. s. c.)
10 The suspicion arises from the fact
that, like Phraates II., he takes the epi-
thet of 6eotrétop upon his coins, which
implies the divinity of his father. It is
doubtful if any Parthian monarch be-
sides Mithridates I. had yet been deified.
The age of Sanatroeces is suitable. As
he was seventy-nine in B.C. 76, he must
have been born B. c. 155, or about twenty
years before Mithridates I. died.
, 11 Lucian, 1. s. c. The “Sacauracae”
are not otherwise known, unless we re-
gard them as identical with the Saca-
rauli (see text, p. 66).
12 Gordyêné and Adiabéné. (See Plut.
Lucull. § 21 and § 26.) It is uncertain
whether Media, Atropaténé, which had
also been conquered by Tigranes (Strab.
xi. 14, § 15; Plut. Lucull. § 26). had up to
this time ever formed a portion of the
Parthian dominions. Most probably it
had not. -
13 Strab. xi. 14, § 15.
14 Plutarch. Lucull. § 26; Strab. 1. s. c.
15 Yırmicóous écrxe ſcal row 'Atpouarnvov
rai Töv Topóvatov. Strab. 1. s. c.
pare Plut. Lucull. §§26 and 27.
16 Appian, Syr. p. 133; Plut. Lucull.
§ 14; Justin, xi. 1; Eutrop. vi. 8.
17 The exact position of Tigranocerta
is unknown, but it was probably not far
from the modern Mardin. (See Strab.
xvi. 1, § 23; Tac. Ann. xv. 5.) -
18 According to Strabo, twelve Greek
cities were §º. to furnish Ti-
granocerta with inhabitants (xi. 14, § 15).
Com-
THE SIXTH MONARCHY.
Oté 1.
2 The known kings between Mithri-'
[CH. x.
According to Appian, 300,000 §:
cians were transplanted thither (Mithrid.
. 216, C). Plutarch speaks of the popu-
ation as having been drawn from Cili-
Cia., Cappadocia, Gordyéné, Assyria, and
Adiabéné (Lucull. § 26).
19 See Appian, Mithrid. p. 229, A.
Kai Baguxeta kai trapačeiorows kará to Tpoć-
otetov Štroiet Makpois, kai kvvmyéata troAAä.
kai Airwas.
* Appian says the walls were seventy-
five feet high (ib. p. 228, E.). The height
of those seen by Xenophon in Assyria
was 100 or 150 feet. (Amab. iii. 4, §§ 7–11.)
* A threat was also implied in the as-
sumption by Tigranes of the title “King
of kings” (Plut. Lucull. §§ 14 and 21),
hitherto only borne by the Parthian
monarchs.
** One of the predecessors of Sana-
troeces had, it would seem, allied him-
self with Mithridates about B.C. 88 (Ap-
pian, Mithr, p. 180, C.; Memnon, Fr. 30,
§ 3); but Parthia does not appear to
have ever lent him any aid.
28 The existence of these feelings is in-
dicated, 1, by the speech which Trogus
put into the mouth of Mithridates (Jus-
tin, xxxviii. 4–7); and, 2, by the alleged
letter of Mithridates to the Parthian
king. (Sallust, Hist. Rom. ix. Fr. 12.)
24 ºstin, xxxviii. 5, § 3; Memnon, Fr.

* As Ariobarzanes in Cappadocia, and
the third Nicomedes in Bithynia.
26 Memnon, Fr. 43, § 2.
27 Appian, Mithr. p. 230, D.; Dio. Cass.
xxxv. 1, and 3; Memnon, Fr. 58, § 2.
This last writer calls the Parthian mon-
arch, by mistake, Phradates (i.e. Phra-
ates). It is evident from Dio Cass. xxxv.
3, compared with xxxvi. 28, that it was
Sanatroeces, and not his son, Phraates,
who amused Lucullus and Mithridates
with promises.
28 Plut. Lucull. § 30.
* Appian, p. 242, E; Dio Cass. xxxvi.
3. --→ •
80 Dio Cass. 1. s. c. ‘O IIoutrijios rºw
ºuxtav tº ºpačTm étri to is at to is trpo-
ovvertóero. This can only mean that
Pompey and Mithridates offered the
same terms. What these were is best
learnt from Memnon, Fr. 58, § 2 (8terpear-
Beijero trapaxtopeiv air's rhv Mearototapitav
kai Tinv 'Aöuagmwav kai toos MeyāAous AuXà-

VG.S J.
ºAppian, p. 242, E; Dio Cass. xxxvi.
i
*ijio Cass. 1. s. c.
* Dio Cass. xxxvi. 35; App. Mithr. p.
243, B
* Appian, Mithr. p. 243, C.
:ººp.”
* Plut. Pomp. § 36; Dio Cass. xxxvii.
5, C.
87 Plut. Pomp. § 38; Dio Cass. xxxvii.6.
** 1Xio Cass. 1. s. c. trépillas Tpéorgets
trávra öga #8tkm to éirekáAew ot—and again,
trpéo Bews re at 6ts trpès airov &méo reuxe trai
Toxxâ pºv Tow Twypåvov karmyópmare, troAA&
8è kai és toūs "Popiaious intreaſiumvey. This
#
CH. XI.]
THE SIXTH MO NARCHY,
kotº'ou trpès Twypávnv kai IIoparmiou ºrphs
Mv8ptôātmy, 6xpt Baktpitov kai 'Ivööv kai.
rms ééo 6aadorans diviyev Šavröv rais éAirãort.
Compare App. Parth. p. 135, C.
5 The name is given variously, as Ab-
garus, Acbarus, and Avgarus (Aiyapos);
but the first form is the only one used
upon the coins of Edessa. Otherwise
the form Acbarus might seem prefera-
ble, as the representative of the Arabic
Akbar. All the princes of Edessa seem
to have been called either Abgarus or ;
Mannus
ºiºass.xi.20; App. Parth. p. 140, A.
ad fin.
7 Dio Cass, xxxv. 2,
8 Ibid. xi. 20. º
* Crassus left Rome in the year of his
consulship B. c. 55, later than Nov. 15
(Cic. Ep. ad Att. iv. 13). He took ship
from Brundusium before the storms of
winter were over (Plut. Crass. § 17), pro-
ceeded to Asia Minor, and marched rap-
idly through Galatia (hiretyero Suá Taxa-
615
\
ºbs, ib.) into Syria, where he must have

writer evidently feels the injustice with
which Phraates was treated.
30 See the account which Dio gives of
Pompey's motives (xxxvii. 7).
40 pija as ūtrāp Öpitov ruvav Tiju Stadopæv
aúró, trpès row Twypdvm eivat. (Dio Cass.
xxxvii. 7, D
41 Both Dio (xxxvii. 6, A.) and Plutarch
(Pomp. § 33, ad fin.) record Phraates’
demand, but the latter alone gives
Pompey's reply—5pg xpigeo-bat rig Sukata.
42 Plut. Pomp. § 39; Dio Cass. xxxvii.
'#'Dio Cass. xxxvii. 7. E5 #Trio ravro
&pidétepov, says Dio, öru 6trórepos &v airów
Toj čtépov kpatija-eue, raw re Trpayuárov Tots
“Peoplaíous trpookóilieu (leg. trpokólieu), kai
aúrðs sixeuptătepos ordial yewigerat. "Ekei-
vot uév Šà 6tā Taüta katmāAdymarav.
44 Ibid. Xxxix. 56.
45 Justin, xlii. 4, § 1. The fact that
both Mithridates II, and III. were en-
gaged in Armenian wars seems to have
been among the reasons of Justin's con-
fusing them.
46 This was clearly the case at the
time of the invasion of Crassus, when
the Parthians were masters of the whole
of Mesopotamia as far as the Euphrates.
47 Plutarch tells us that the Parthian
general who defeated Crassus had pre-
viously brought back Orodes from ban-
isliment (Vit, Crass. $ 21). Appian fol-
lows him (Parth. p. 141. A).
48 Justin, i. s. c. “Propter crudelita-
tem a senatu Parthico regno pellitur.”
49 Dio Cass. Xxxix. 56. 16ptôātmy rov
děeadov čk Tijs Mm6tas, is ºpxev, &#é8ańe.
1 50 App. Syriac. p. 120, A.; Parthic. p.
51 Justin, xiii. 4, § 2.
52 That Seleucia had been in rebellion
against Orodes before B. c. 54, and ha
been recovered for him by the general
whom he employed against Crassus, is
related by Plutarch (Crass. § 21). It is
reasonable to connect this rebellion with
the civil war between the brothers.
Mommsen, however, does so too posi-
tively. (Röm. Geschichte, vol. iii. p. 323.)
58 Justin incorrectly says, “Babylo-
niam, quo Mithridates confugerat, diu
obsidet, et fame coactos in deditionem
oppidanos compellit.” (!. s. c.) But it is
evident that the town, Babylon (“Baby-
lonem”) is intended.
54 “Plus hostem quam fratrem cogi-
tans.” (Justin, xlii. 4, § 4.)
CHAPTER XI,
1 Gabinius, to whom Mithridates fled
was not proconsul of Syria till B.g. 56,
and Mithridates therefore cannot have
applied to him till that year. As the
civil war followed on this application,
and the siege of Babylon is expressly
said to have occupied a long time (Jus-
tin). Mithridates can scarcely have sub-
mitted until B.C. 55.
2 Liv. Epit, cv.; Dio Cass. xxxix. 33.
3 Plut. Crºss. *
* Ibid. “Qs travövåv &trodavay rà Aov-
arrived as early as April or May.
Mommsen, however, overstates the case,
when he makes him reach Syria, “at the
yely beginning of 700” (bereits Anfang
700).
10 Dio Cass. xl. 13. Compare Isid. Char.
Mans. Parth. § 1. The chief of these
cities were Apameia, Anthemusias or
Charax Sidae, Ichnae, and Nicephorium.
** Dio Cass. xi. 12. This engagement
took place near Ichnae, which was on
the Belik, about seventeen miles north
of Rakkah (Nicephorium).
12 Plut. Crass. § 17; Dio Cass. xl. 13.
18 Seven thousand foot and a thousand
horse. (Plut. i. s. c.) -
14. It is certain that Crassus plundered
the ancient shrine of Atargatis, or Der-
ceto at Hierapolis (Plut. Crass. § 17;
App. Parth. p. 137,
Josephus (Amt. Jud. xiv. 7, § 1), he also
made a journey to Jerusalem for the ex-
ress purpose of plundering the Jewish
emple. (Compare Orosius, vi. 13.)
* 'Emvypádov Kai Siwots kai évvaarstats
otpatworów kataAóyous, eit’ &viets àpyúptov
8v8óvras. (Piut. Crass. 1. s. c.) -
16 The intention of Crassus to attack
the Parthians was well known at Rome,
and was opposed by a powerful party.
$º ...; Crass. § 16; Cic. Ep, ad Div.
- C *
W. 85: &C.
17 Plut. Crass. § 18; Dio Cass. xl. 16.
18 Dean Merivale speaks of some of
the Roman detachments in Mesopota-
mia as “compelled to abandon their
posts” (Romon Empire, vol. ii. p. 11);
but I find no such statement in the au-
thorities. Dio says that a Parthian army
was sent against the places that had
been taken and those that had fallen
away (l. s. c.); Plutarch adds that at-
tacks and combats took place, and that
some of the soldiers in garrison, escap-
ing from the beleaguered towns, brought.
Crassus an exaggerated account of the
difficulties of Parthian warfare (l. S. c.).
1° Artavasdes offered a contingent of
B). According to ,

616
30,000 foot and 16,000 horse, of whom
10,000 should be heavily armed. Crassus
replied “that his march would lie
through Mesopotamia, as he had left
there anamy good soldiers.” (Plut. 1. s. c.)
20 This point, as already stated, was
probably the modern Bir, or Bireh-jik,
which best answers on the whole to the
Roman “Zeugma.” (See the note of C.
Müller on Isid. Char. Mans. Parth. § 1.)
It is not to be confounded with Rum-
kaleh (twenty-six miles higher up, the
river), nor with Thapsacus (160 miles
ower down), where. Alexander crossed.
io (xi. 17) has misled Dean Merivale.
(R. E. vol. ii. page 13, note.)
21 Plut. Crass. § 20. The seven legions
of this writer may be estimated roughly
at 35,000 footmen. Florus (iii. 11) raises
the number of legions to eleven, and
Appian (Bell. Civ. iii. 18) makes the en-
tire force amount to 100,000 men.
22' quíAaka roi, ºn kukko6 ºvat row
troraptov axóvtas. (Plut. Crass. 1. S. c.) -
28 Ibid. § 22. Artavasdes is said to
have suggested this route.
24 Arrian. Exp. Ale:C. iii. 7.
25 Plut. Crass. § 21.
28 Ibid. § 20 and § 22.
27 See Chesney, Euphrates Earpedition,
vol. i. pp. 46–49; Niebuhr, Voyage em.
Arabie, pp. 320-334; Pocock, Description
of the East, vol. ii. pp. 158–163.
28 On the line of route between Zeugma
and Nicephorium, which must have
nearly coincided with the march of
Crassus, Isidore places three cities, one
village, and four fortified posts. (Mans.
Parth. § 1.)
29 Plut. Crass. 21; Dio Cass. xl. 16.
80 It has been already observed that
Surenas, or Surena, was properly an
official title. (See text, p. 48.) Ui-
tarch, however, Dio, and the Pseudo-
Appian use it as a proper name. -
.81. This account is taken from Plutarch
(Crass. § 21).
82 Mommsen regards the employinent
of cavalry only against Crassus as a
“brilliant idea,” (genialen Gedanken) of
the Parthian commander (Geschichte,
vol. iii. p. 328).
83 See Ancient Monarchies, vol. iii. pp.
178–179, 2nd edit,
** On the ordinary Scythic equipment
of a light horseman, see the author's
Herodotus, vol. iii. p. 34, 2nd edit. There
is no reason to suppose that the Parthian
was different.
2.85 Plut. Crass., § 24, ad fin.; Virg.
Georg. iii. 31; Hor. Od. i. 19. 11; ii. 13, 16;
Justin, xli. 2; Tac. An. vi. 35, &c.
84 Plut. Crass. § 25.
87 Plutarch speaks of the “barbed
oints” (hykworrowplevas diktöas) of the
arthian arrows. (i. s. c.)
88 The Greeks called these horsemen
karaqipëkrovs. “protected, covered un.”
They are best described by Heliodorus
(AEthiop. ix. pp. 431–433).
* See Justin, xli. 2. § 10. “Munimen-
tum ipsis equisque lorica plumatae sunt,
THE SIXTH MoMARCHY.
* f
[CH. xi,
Huao utrumque toto corpore tegunt.”
ompare Wing. ƺn. xi. 770. -
* Plut. Crass. § 24. Kpéveau roi, Map-
Yavoi avoipov arix}ovros & kai ruptAaj-
Tes.
** The contus (kóvros) of the Greeks
and Romans.
** See Ancient Monarchies, vol. iii. p.
178. 2nd edit.
48They are called “a vast number”
(traſbos troAſ, Plut. Crass. § 23), and “an
immense body” (copia? immanes, Vell.
Pat. ii. 46). The Parthians brought 50,-
000 horse into the field against Antony
(Justin, xli. 2, § 6). -
44 Dio Cass. xl. 21.
45 Plut. Crass. § 22.
**The arguments of Dean Merivale
are conclusive (Roman Empire, vol. ii.
pp. 18, 19); but he somewhat mars their
effect, by suggesting that Plutarch may
have confounded the Belik with the
Khabour, and that the battle may have
really been fought on the latter stream.
The general tradition that the scene of
the fight was near Carrhae, and the spe-
cial mention of Ichnae as also in the
neighborhood (Plut. Crass. § 25), make
it certain that the scene is rightly placed
on the Belik, since both those cities
were On that river.
See Mommsen, Röm. Geschichte,
vol. iii. p. 327. This writer shows no
knowledge of the real character of the
country.
48 Dio has no mention of sands or
deserts. On the contrary, he makes the
Scene of the battle hilly ground, partly
covered with trees (xl. 21).
49 The direct distance from Zeugma to
the probable scene of the engagement
(half-way between Carrhae and Ichnae)
is less than eighty miles. The army,
however, did not take this line, but
marched at first along the left bank of
the Euphrates. From the nearest bend
uphrates to the scene of action
is less than fifty miles.
50 Plut. Crass. § 23; Dio Cass. xl. 23.
51 Plut. Crass. p. 22, ad fin. This ac-
count is more probable than that of Dio,
that he remained with the Romans till
after the death of the young Crassus,
and then fell upon their rear while the
Parthians attacked in front. (Dio Cass.

x:1 º,
52 Plut. Crass. § 23.
58 Dio Cass. xi. 21. ‘H re xºpa &vºua-
Aós mºv kai 8évôpa elxev.
54 Plut. Crass. 1. S. c. e
55 So Plut (Crass. § 24). But it may
be doubted if the intention really existed.
69 Plut. Crass. § 23.
57 Jbid. § 24. -
58 Ibid. § 25. Compare Lucan, Phars.
viii. 386-387.
50 “Tight cohorts” (Plutarch) would
be abolit, this number.
60 Dio says that not a single prisoner
was taken on the first day (xl. 24); but
Plutarch allows the capture of 500 .
(Crass. § 25, ad fin.).
\
* >
CH. XI.]
61 On the position of Ichnae, see Is.
Char. Mans. Parth. § 1; and compare
Mons. C. Müller's note ad loc.
62 Plut. Crass. $26.
63 Plut. Crass. § 27; Dio Cass. xl. 22.
64 Dio Cass. xl. 24. Oi re kovºroi rôv
Bappépubv oi pièv ćtreatpáðigav, oi 88 €kAáq-
ômºrav, kai ai vevpai . . . .éññá *
85 On the Persian practice, see Ancient
Monarchies, vol. iii. p. 191, 2nd edit.
Fear of a night attack, and the difficulty
of unfastening and caparisoning their
horses in a hurry, were at the root of
the custom.
86 Plut. Ch'ass. 1. s. c.
07 So Plutarch (§ 28). Ot IIápôow, vukrös
pºv ata:86plevot raw & Tóðpaavu, o b k & 8 to -
o v. Dean Merivale has, I think, mis-
understood a Somewhat obscure passage
in the preceding section—where the re-
treating army is said to have thought
the enemy was upon them (tº s : "r ºf e-
pop, Ś v to v Tów troXeuiwu)—and has made
the Parthians start in pursuit, but soon
give up the attempt, because “their
horses, after a long day’s service, were
unable to keep pace with the headlong
rush of desperate men.” This is not
very probable, and it is certainly not
contained in the authorities.
8 See Lucan, Pharsalia, viii. 377–379:
&{ Nºries illis, non ulla est machina.
eill.
Haud fossas implere valent; Par-
thogue sequente
Murus erit, quodcunque potest ob-
stare sagittae.”
Compare Tacit. Ann. xv. 4.
69 Plut. Crass, $ 29.
70 Ido not understand why Dr. Momm-
sen speaks of Sinnaca as a “fort” (Fes-
tung, vol. iii. p. 330). Plutarch seems to
regard it as a mere hill) note the ex-
pression & AA o v Adºbov, Ütokeiuevov tois
2uvvákows); and Strabo only calls it a
“ place” (xopiow, xvi. 1, § 23)
7, See text, p. 86.
72 Mommsen seems to doubt whether
the Parthians really intended any
treachery (Geschichte, vol. iii. p. 330).
But the Romans can scarcely have been
mistaken upon the point. Such treachery
has been constant in the East from the
time of the Ten Thousand to the Aff-
ghan war of 1841.
73 Plutarch makes him killed by a
Parthian named Pomaxathres, but con-
ſesses that the exact truth was not
known (Crass. § 31). Dio gives both ac-
counts (xl. 27).
** Plut. Crass. § 31, ad fin.
75 Plin. H. N. vi. 16.
7° See the well-known passage of
Horace (Od. iii. 5, 5):—
“Milesne Crassi conjuge barbara,” &c.
.” The Roman captives served as sol-
giers in the Parthian armies (Well. Pat.
ii. 82: Florus, iv. 10).
THE SIXTH MONARCHY.
quoted, Strab
25
617
78 “Romanos rerum dominos” (Virg.
AErv. i. 282).

2)
* As Julian did (Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5).
80 See Justin, xli. 1, § 7:—“Parthi, a
Romanis trillis bellis, per maximos du-
ces florentissimis temporibus lacessiti,
soli ea omnibus genvtibus now pares so-
lum, verwm etian victores fuere.” And
Dio (x!. 14):—TeXevròvres 83, Širi roarojiro
Kai Tàs 66&ns kai rās 8vváueos éxiàpma'av,
Öorre Kai Tois "Pogaiots róre &vrviroñejujarat,
& a i ö e i po & e i & v 7 tra Ao t w ou igs-
or 0 a t.
* Compare besides the passages above
, xi. 9, i. Plin. H. N. v.
; and Herodian, iv. 18.
82 Plut. Crass. § 33.
* Eurip. Bacch. 1109-1200 (ed. Dindorf).
84 Ibid. 1170–1172 :--
bépouev čá 6peos
éAtka veótogov čtri uéâa.0pa,
tav 6%pav.
* Compare the proceedings of Tomy-
ris with the head of Cyrus, as related in
Herodotus, i. 214; and for more exact
parallels see Appian, Mithridat. p. 184,
C; and Mich. Palaeol. ii. 24.
86 So Florus (iii. 11, § 11) and Dio (xl.
27). Plutarch omits the circumstance;
but I think, with Dean Merivale, that
there is no reason why we should disbe-
lieve it. oman Empire, vol. ii. p. 26.)
B7 Plut. Crass. § 32. Oirot rajrá ye ka-
Taihevarépcevos. -
88 Josephus, Amt. Jud. xiv. 7, § 3.
* Plut. Crass, $ 33.
99 Plut. Crass. $21. Compare Dio Cass.
xi. 12: Oros. vi. 13.
91 Dio Cass. xi. 28.
- Compare Cic. Ep. ad Att. v.
18, 20; ad Div. xv. 1; &c.
** See, on this point, the interesting
despatch of Cicero to the Roman Senate
(Ep. ad. Div. xv. 1).
4 See the complaints of Cicero in the
despatch above referred to; and no
that Cicero himself had for his large
province not two complete legions (Ep.
ad Div. iii. 6). -
95 Dio Cass. xi. 28, ad fin. Tav Šiutov
rfi re Popwatov Šeatrorség &x90, €vov, kai
trpös abroijs (i.e. rows IIápéows), āre kai yet-
Tovas kai ouvrī0sus ordiatv čvras, &mokxuvév-
ºrtuy.
96 Cie. Ep. ad Div. xv. 1.
97 “Cappadocia est inanis.” (Cic. I.
C
98 Cic. Ep. ad Div. xv. 3; ad Att. v. 20.
99 Ep. ad Div. xv. 4.
100 Ibid. xv. 1. “IHoc autem tempore
res sese ita habet, ut, misi exercitum
tantum quantum ad maximum bellum
mittere voletis, nature in has proviºcias
miseritis, summum periculum sit, Ile
amittendae sint onnes has provinciae.”
º Dio Cass. xl. 29; Cic. Ep. ad Att.
W. 20.
102 Cicero tells us that his cavalry de-
feated a Parthian detachment within
the limits of Cilicia (Ep. ad Div. xv. 4).
108 Dio Cass. xl. 29.
2.
i
• 104 Ibid. Káororios
kpoiſora
ºro.
106 ibid. Compare Cic. Ep. ad Att. v.
0.
taxupiðs. atroës &me-
. 21; vi. 1.
v. 21: “Maximum
bellum irripendiet.” Compare ad Att.
vi. 1 (p. 91a); ad Div. ii. 10. .
108 Dio Cass. xl. 30.
109 Justin, xlii. 4, § 5. The time of the
recall is misplaced by Justin, but the
fact may be accepted on his authority.
CHAPTER XII.
1 See text, p. 105. It appears from
several coins of Orodes, which bear the
legend BASIAEQX BAXIAEQN APXA-
R q>IAEAAHNOX KAI APXAKOY
IIAKOPOY, that Pacorus was associated
by his father in the government during
the later years of his reign. Hence he
is correctly called “king” by Livy (Epit.
cxxviii.), Justin (xiii. 4, § 10), and Taci-
tus (Hist. v. 9). See upon these coins
Lindsay, History and Coinage of the
Parthians, pp. 147, 148, and compare
Pl, 3. Nos. 49 and 50.
* Dio Cass. xli. 55. Compare Justin,
xlii. 4, § 6 (which, however, is an over-
statement) and Caes. Bell. Civ. iii. 82.
io Cass. xlii. 2.
4 Plut. Pomp. § 76; Appian, Bell. Civ.
ii. p. 480, A.; Well. Pat. ii. 53. Dio ques-
tions the truth of the report. (I. s. c.)
5 design is attributed to him at
this time by Dio, or rather by Antony,
as reported by Dio (xliv, 46).
* Dio Cass. xliii. 51.
7 Suetonius represents him as intend-
ing to enter Parthia by way of the
Lesser Armenia, and to proceed cau-
tiously to try the strength of the Par-
thians before engaging them in battle
(Jul. § 44). Plutarch says that he meant,
after conquering the Parthians, to pro-
ceed by the Caspian and the Caucasus
into Scythia, from Scythia, to assail the
ermans, and when he had overrun
Germany, to return into Italy by way of
Gaul (Jul. § 58).
8 No attempt was made seriously to
curtail the Parthian power, much less
to conquer the Parthian State, until the
time of Trajan (A.D. 115), a hundred and
sixty years later. Antony's invasion
was a mere ostentatious raid without
serious object.
9 Dio Cass. xlvii. 27.
10 Appian, Bell. Civ. iv. pp. 623, 624.
*1 Appian, Bell. Civ. iv. p. 625, D, E.
12 The authorities are not altogether
agreed on this point. Dio says (xlviii.
24) that Orodes temporized, and neither
refused the overtures of Cassius mor ac-
Jeepted them. Justin distinctly
states that the Parthians helped Brutus
and Cassius (xlii. 4, § 7) and Appian
mentions them thrice among the troops
who fought at Philippi (Bell. Civ. p. 640,
}.
’13 Octavian, Antony, and Lepidus.
There was also a fourth, Sext. Pompeius,
THE SIXTH MONARCHY.
[CH. XII.
who forced himself into partnership
with the other three a little later.’
14 Appian. Bell. Civ. v. p. 574.
15 Q. Labienus, the son of Titus, Cae-
sar's legate in Gaul, had been sent as
envoy to Orodes by Brutus and Cassius
(Dio Cass. xlviii. 24), and was at the
Parthian Court when news of the defeat
at Philippi arrived. Dreading the “pro-
scription” of the victors, he determined
to continue with the Parthians, and to
put his services at their disposal.
16 Perusia was taken in January, B.C.
40; but the news of its capture would
not reach Ctesiphon for some months.
17 Strab. xvi. 2, § 10.
18 Dio Cass. xlviii. 25 (§ 108).
19 Dio Cass. xlviii. §§ 108–110.
*9 Ibid. xlviii. 26 (§ 111). Compare Ap-
pian, Bell. Civ. v. § 701, B. .
*1 Joseph. Anut. Jud. xiv. 13; Bell. Jud.
i. 13.
22 Joseph. Bell. Jud. i. 13, § 1. g
28 Dio Cass. xlviii. 25, ad fin.
24 Ibid. xlviii. 26. Compare Strab. xiv.
2, § 24.
25 Plut. Anton. § 30; Appian, Parth.
p. 156, A.
28 Dio Cass. xlviii. 39; Plut. Anton,
33.
27 Dio Cass. xlviii, 40.
28 Labienus styled himself “Impera-
tor Parthicus” (Strab. 1. s. c.; Dio Cass,
xlviii. 26, ad fin.); and even put this
Hºus title upon his coins. [Pl. II.
19. 1.
* Dio, Cass. xlviii. 40, ad fin.; Plut.
Amfon. § 33.
30 For the position of this pass, see
Strabo, xv. 2, § 8.
81 Dio Cass. xlviii. 41; Plut. l. s. c.;
Strab. l. s. c. .
82 Dio, Cass. xlix. 20. Töv IIákopov
ôpiola tois pºdºxuota Tav Trätrote Baouxevaav-
tov kai ér Šukatoa iſvn kai étri trpaëtmt. [oi
Xıſpouji Trephydºrov.
88 As Antiochus, king of Commagéné;
Lysanias, tetrarch of Ituraea: Małęhus,
sheikh of the Nabataean Arabs; Chav-
naeus, Antigonus, and others. (Dio
Cass. xlviii. 41; xlix. 19, 32, &c.)
i. Jºeph Amt. Jud. xiv. 15; Bell. Jud.
e g º 1 j.
85 Dio Cass. xlix, 19.
86 Ibid. 20.
87 See text. p. 93.
38 In describing this battle, I have fol-
lowed Dio's account (xlix. 20), rather
than Justin's (xlii. 4) as at once more
graphic and more probable.
99 See text, p. 14
40 Compare on this point Dio Cass.
xix. 20, and 26, with Plut. Autom. § 41.
Note especially the statement of Dio:—
ot a bevöövitat. ToàAoi te àvres, kai º a k po -
T ép a t to v Tó { w v i év tes, travra kai Tov
katádhpaktov toxupéos éAvu.aivovto—and the
fact implied in 1°lutarch that the slingers
used leaden bullets (woxv58sis) instead
of stones.’
S
** Justin. xlii. 4, §§ 12–13. Compare
Dio Cass. xlix. 23.
i
>
4
CH. XIII.]
42 Justin, xlii. 4, § 14. /
43 Dio Cass. xlix. 23.
44 Orodes had married a daughter of
Antiochus, king of Commagéné (Dio
Cass. 1. S. C.) - -
45 According to Plutarch (Crass. § 33)
Phraates first attempted his father's de-
struction by means of poison, but the
poison failing to take effect, he then
smothered him with his pillow.
CHAPTER XIII.
1 To reconcile Dio (xlix. 23) with Jus-
tin (xlii. 4, § 14), it is necessary to sup-
pose that the grandsons of Antiochus
were murdered first, the sons of Orodes
by his concubines afterwards.
2 Dio Cass. 1. s. c.
8 Plut. Anton. $ 37. "Avihp &rtºpavns kai
8vvarós.
4 Hor. Od. iii. 6, 9.
5 Dio Cass. xlix. 24.
6 Ibid. C. 25
* Dio Cass. xlix. 24, ad fin.
8The “Fasti triumphales” give under
the year A.U.C. 715 (= B.C., 38) the entry
“P. VENTIDIWS PRO COS, EXTAVRO
MONTE ET PARTHEIS.”
9 See text, p. 109.
10 So Florus (iv. 10) and Justin (xlii. 5,
§§ Livy says eighteen (Epit. cxxx.);
elleius (ii. 82, § 1), thirteen.
| 1 se numbers are taken from Plu-
tarch (Anton. § 37), whose account is the
most circumstantial, and (on the whole)
the one most to be depended upon.
12 Dio Cass. xlix. 25.
18 Media Atropatépé was sometimes
subject to Parthia, sometimes indepen-
dent. That at this time it was depen-
dent appears from the whole narrative
of the war in Plutarch and Dio.
14 Dio Cass. 1. s. c.
15 See text, p. 115. On the identity of
Dio's Praaspa (the Vera of Strabo, xi.
13, § 3) with the modern Takht-i-Sulei-
man, see a paper by Sir H. Rawlinson
in §ºrºſia Journal, vol. x. pp.
113–117.
16 Plut. Anton. § 38, ad fin. ; Dio Cass.
17 So Plutarch (l, s. c.). The “two le-
gions”, of Livy (“duabus legionibus
amissis,” Epit. cxxx.) seem to refer to
this battle. Compare Vell. Pat. ii. 82,
2.
18 Plut. Anton. § 39.
19 Dio Cass. xlix. 26,
20 Plut. Anton. § 39, ad fin.; Dio Cass,
xlix. 97.
31 Dio Cass. xlix. 27; Plut. Anton, $40,
32 Plut. Anton: $41.
28 If Praasda was, as is probable, the
modern Takht-i-Suleiman, this would be
the route along the course of the Jaghetu
and the eastern shores of Lake Urumi-
yeh, which is the road an army would nat-
urally follow. (See Geograph, Journ.
vol., x. p. 115.
* Phit. l. s. c. Compare Dio Cass.
xlix. $28.
25 Sir H. Rawlinson has shown that
THE SIXTH MOWARCHF.
A ,
619
this route corresponds in every particu-
lar to that described by Plutarch.
(Geograph. Journ. vol. x. pp. 115–117.)
* Merivale, Roman Empire, vol. ii. p.
37 Dio Cass, xlix. 31.
38 Plut. Anton. § 51.
* Florus says that not more than one-
third of the legionaries escaped (iv. 10);
Welleius, that one-fourth of the soldiers
and one-third of the attendants perished
(ii 82). Plutarch estimates the loss in
Media at 24,000 men (Anton. § 50); but
it is doubtful whether he means to in-
clude in this the 10,000 destroyed with
Statianus. If not, he would regard the
army as reduced on its return to Ar-
menia from 100,000 to 66,000.
80 Plut. Anton. $.45, ad fin. . p9ewpople-
vov Šē troAAav, kai tāov. IIóp6øv ovk &quorra-
piévov troXAákus divaſp6éyéao 6at rov 'Avro-
vtov iotopobartv, "Q fºuptow.
* Dio Cass. xlix. 33. Plut. Anton. $52.
82 Polemo, who is called “ lºing of
Pontus” (Dio Cass. xlix. 23)—that is, of
the portion which had not been , ab-
sorbed into the Roman Empire. On the
history of this Polemo, see Clinton, F.
. vol. iii. p. 428, note m.
83 Plut. Anton. § 52.
84 Dio, Cass. xlix. 33. Tºg IIoMéuovº
wºogov ris knpukeias thv uukporépav 'Apple-
víav Šoovat. h
85 Ibid. xlix, 39.
86 These are said to have been at first
of silver (Dio Cass. xlix. 39, fin.), and
afterwards of gold (ib. 40; Vell. Paterc.
ii. 82).
87 This king had the same name as the
Armenian monarch—viz., Artavasdes.
He has, therefore, to prevent confu-
sion, not been named in the text.
88 Compare "l'arif. Ann. ii. 3: “Arme-
nia inter Parthtºrum et Romanas ope
infida ob Scelws Antonii.”
89 Dio Cass. xlix, 44.
40 See Plut. Anton. § 54; Dio Cass.
xlix. 41. w
41 Dio Cass. xlix. 44. -
42 Dio Cass. ii. 16. .
** Justin. xlii. 5, § 4. It was probably
now that Phraates, fearing that his se-
raglio would fall into the hands of Tiri-
dates, murdered all his concubines.
(Isid. Char. M. P. § 1.) * .
** Tiridates cannot have reigned in
Parthia more than about three years
(from B.o. 33 to 30); but he continued to
claim the title of king and to issue coins
till, at any rate, B.C. 26. Coins which
seem rightly assigned to him in the
British Museum Collection (arranged by
the late Mr. De Salis) bear the dates
ETIX, and STIX, or B.C. 27 and 26. The
earliest coin of a similar type which is
dated, bears the letters OOX, or B.C. 33.
45 Justin makes these events take
place later. when Augustus was in Spain
(B.c. 27–24); but it seems impossible that
the circumstantial account of Dio (li.18)
can be a mere fiction.
46 Dio Cass, liii. 33. &
*
2-
2-
— — — — --
620
47 The standards were surrendered to
Tiberius (Suet. Tib. § 9), who was com-
missioned by Augustus to receive them.
Their recovery is celebrated in jubilant
chorus by the Roman writers. (Suet.
Qctar. § 21: Liv. Epit. cxxxix.; Veil.
Pat. ii. 91: Florus, iv. 12, § 63; Justin,
xlii. 5, § 11; Eutrop. vii. 5: Oros. vi. 21,
ad fin. ; Hor. Od. iv. 15, 6–8: Ovid. Trist.
ii. 227, 228, &c.)
48 See Tacit. Ann. i. 11, ad fin. ; Dio
Cass, Iv. 33, &c,
49 As when she assisted Meherdates
against Gotarzes (see text, p. 145).
50 This date is fixed by the mention in
Strabo (xvi. 1, § 28) of Titius as the gov-
ernor of Syria at the time when the
youths were sent to Rome. M. Titius
º! Syria as legate from B.C. 11 to
B.C., 7.
51 Strab. xvi. 1, § 28; Tac. Ann. ii. 1;
Well. Pat. ii. 94; Justin, xlii. 5, § 12.
52 Strabo, l. s c. The names of two of
these youths appear in an inscription
found at Rome and published by Gruter
(Corp. Inscr. p. cclxxviii. 2), part of
which runs thus:
SERASPADANES . PHRAATIS
ARSACIS REGVM . REGIS . F
FARTHVS
RHODASPES . PHRAATIS
ARSACIS REGVM . REGIS . F
PARTHVS
53 Strab. 1. s. c. Töv Plēv obv raičov Gorov
Trepčevo.uv čv Pépin &mplooriq Baa vätkös Tnue-
Aoûvrat. -
54 Among the Latin writers, the idea
commences with Welleius, the flatterer
of Tiberius (ii. 94, ad fin.). From him
it passes to Suetonius (Octov. $21), Jus-
tin (l. s. c.), Eutropius (vii. 5), Orosius
vi. 21, ad fin.), &c. We find it, however,
even previously to Welleius, in Strabo.
The good sense of Tacitus prevents him
frºmaccepting the vie
w.
nn. ii. 3; Suet. Tib. § 9; Dio
Cass. liv. 9, . By a strange mistake, Vel-
leius calls the king whom Tiberius set
up Artavasdes (ii. 94).
56 Tac. Ann. l. S. c.
57 Ibid. Coins of the year B.C. 5 (A.U.C.
749) have the legend
ARMENIA RECEPTA.
58 Dio Cass. lv. 9.
59 This Tigranesis, I believe, mentioned
only in a fragment of Dio (lv. 11), the
exact place of which is uncertain.
90 It has been usual to regard Phraates
Manual, p. 303, E. T.; Plate in Smith's
Biographical Dictionary, vol. i. p. 857;
Lindsay, History and Coinage, P} 48,
49); or even till A.D. 15 (Clinton's Fasti
Romani, vol. ii. p. 246). But the dates
on the coins of Phraataces prove that
he was king in B.C. 2, and there is no
reason to think that he was associated
by his father. The difficulty on the
point has been in part owing to Dio's
calling the son “Phraates” (lv. 11) as
well as the father.
IV. as having ºgº º A.D. 4 (Heeren, ,
0: *
*1 Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 2, § 4) gives
*.
TEIE SIXTH MONARGEIY. ''
\
{CH. xiv.
*
the name as Thermusa; but it appears
as “Musa” (MOYXA) invariably upon the
COInS.
92 Joseph. Amt. Jud. 1. s. c.
** Pacorus, the eldest son of Orodes,
was of age to receive a military com-
mand in B. c. 51, and must therefore have
been born as early as B.C. 69 or 70.
Phraates, the second son, is likely to
have been but a few years younger. He
would therefore be sixty-five or sixty-six
1I] B.C. 33.
*4 From the year of the campaign of
Antony (B.C. 36) to the commencement
of the war between Vologeses I. and
Nero (A.D. 58) was a period of ninety-four
earS.
*Till the attack of Trajan. A.D. 114,
fifty-two years after the end of the war
wit
CHAPTER XIV.
1 Dio Cass. lv. 11. It has been usual to
regard this passage of Dio (recovered
from the Earcerpt, de Legationibus) as
belonging to the reign of Phraates IV.,
and not of Phraataces; but I have no
doubt that it refers to the latter. The
hrase rows &öexpovs &mi eipſivm &matriov is
by itself decisive. There were no broth-
ers of Phraates at Rome whom he could
demand. Neither could Augustus have
called in question the royal title of
Phraates, with whom he had kept up
diplomatic intercourse as unquestioned
King of Parthia for nearly thirty years.
The misconception has arisen from the
name. But it should be remembered
that the form Phraataces is a mere
diminutive of Phraates, and that it is
found only in Josephus, whose Parthian
names are not always to be depended
upon. (See note 61, Chapter XIII.)
* Dio Cass, lv. 11, Tó Te 6vopca rö 8aort-
Atköv karabéarðaw, kai rās 'Apprevias &mdarrº-
vat trpoorétaše.
* Ibid. "O IIápéos oux borov oi katérrm-
§ev, &AAó kai dutéypalevoi ră te àAAa tºtrep-
ºpověs, kai avtov pièv Baa'l Néa Baquxetov
éketvov Šē Kaia apa piévov avopºdaras.
4 Vell. Pat. ii. 101. This interview is
placed by some in A.D. 2 (Clinton, F. H.
vol. iii. p. 262: Merivale, Roman Empire,
vol. iv. pp. 285, 286); but it seems un-
likely that Caius would have delayed so
long the main purpose of his Eastern
expedition. In the Tauchnitz edition
of Velleius, the date A.D. 1 is given for it.
5 Velleius, who gives these details, was
himself present at the meeting, and evi-
dently regards it as an event of first-
rate importance. “Quod spectaculum,”
he says, “stantis ex diverso, hinc Ro-
mani. illinc Parthorum exercitus, cum
duo inter se eminentissima imperiorum
et hominum coirent capita, perquam
clarum et memorabile, sub initia stipen-
diorum meorum, tribuno militum mihi
visere contigit.” That Phraataces, and
not Phraates, was the Parthian mon-
arch present appears from the MS. read-
ing of the preceding sentence, which
CH. XIV.]
runs thus: “Cum rege Parthorum, emi-
mentissimo juvene, in insula quam am-
nis Euphrates ambiebat, aquato utri-
usque partis numero, coiit.” Recent
editors have altered “eminentissimo
juvene” into “eminentissimus juvenis.”
6 Dio Cass. lv. 11. ‘O 8é Öh ‘ppoſitims kº-
TmAAáym émi tº tims 'Appevias ātroatival.
7 Well. Pat. ii. 102; Suet. Octav. § 65;
Tacit. Ann. i. 3; Zonaras, p. 539, D. -
* Dio (l, s. c.) notes this, assigning two
reasons for the withdrawal of the Par-
thian claims to Armenia, the presence
of Caius in Syria, and the Parthian
king's expectation of disturbances
among his subjects (rù oikeia raparróweva
piget attoo biretótraore).
9 Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 2, § 4.
10 It is perhaps doubtful whether
Phraates IV. had not done the same
during his later years, as Mionnet (Mé-
dailles, supplément. tom. viii. pp. 441–
443) and Mr. Lindsay (History and Coin-
age, p. 149) imagine. On the whole,
however, I incline to the belief that the
Musa coins belong wholly to Phraataces.
11 The coins of Phraataces have on
the one side his head, which is being
crowned by two Victories; on the other
the head of Musa, with : the legend
MOYXHX BAXIAIXXHX (9EAX, OY PA-
NIAX. [Pl. II. Fig. 2.) They bear the
three dates IT, AIT, and EIT, or B.c. 2,
B.C. 1, and A.D. 4. (See for the last-men-
tioned dates, Numismatic Chronicle,
New Series, No. xliii. p. 218.) .
12 Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 2, § 4.
13 This seems to follow from the ex-
pression used by Josephus, oi yewvatórarov
IIáp6.au . . . 'Op.68my extixovy ºr p e o Be iſ -
S .
14 Joseph. 1. s. c. The violent deaths
of at least two kings between Phraates
IV. and Artabanus III. are attested by
Tacitus (Ann. ii. 2), who says: “Post
finem Phraatis et sequentium regum ob
internas coedes,” &c.
15 Tacit. Ann. l. s. c.; Joseph. 1. s. c.;
Suet. Tib. § 16. e
16 “Ignotae Parthis virtutes nova, vi-
tia.” (Tacit. 1. s. c.)
17 Tacit. Ann. ii. 3. “Apud Dahas
adultus.” Joseph. Ant., Jud. 1. s. c.
Apré8avov Mimäetas Baarvaeuſovra, yewos
Aparaktötöv.
18 Vonones commemorated his victory
in the Roman fashion by striking coins
which bore upon the one side his head,
with the legend BAXIAEYX ONQNHX;
and on the other a Victory, with the le-
gend BAXIAEYX ON ONHX NEIKHXAX
APTABANON. [Pl. II. Fig. 3.]
** Joseph. 1. S. c.
20 Tacit. Ann. ii. 4.
*1 Oi trepi Naqdirqv Svyatoi rôv 'Appreviou
'Apragávº rpoo ribévrat. (Joseph. 1. s.c.)
* Josephus expresses this broadly.
'O.T.Réptos attº &metre, ºrphs . où
IIápéoù r & s & Te v A & s. Tacitus implies
it when he says: “Si nostra, vi defende-
retur, bellum adversus Parthos Sumen-
umerat.” . . -
~ \
THE SIXTH MONARCHY. 621
\ 1–
38 Tacit. Ann. ii. 4, ad fin.
** Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 2, § 4, ad
fin. It is supposed by some that Jose-
phus in this passage refers to the estab-
lishment of Arsaces, another son of Ar-
tabanus, on the throne of Armenia,
nearly, twenty years afterwards. But
the close connection of the clause with
one in which he speaks of Vonones as
guarded in Syria, limits the date to A.D.
16–18. That Artabanus had a son, Oro-
des, distinct from Arsaces, king of Ar-
menia. appears from Tacit. Ann. vi. 33.
* “Permissae Germanico provincia”,
quae mari dividuntur.” Tac. Ann. ii. 43.
26 Ibid. ii. 56.
27 See note 32, Chapter XIII. ? §
*8 Tacitus says (l. s. c.) that the name
was taken from that of the city Artax-
ata, which is absurd; for Artaxata is
Artaaria-sata, “Artaxias's city” (com-
are Samosata, and see Strab. xi. 14,
Fº and itself took its name from the
first Artaxias. Dean Merivale observes
that the word “signified greatness or
sovereignty” (vol. v. p. 192); which is
true, but not of much importance, since
the derivation would scarcely occur to
either Zeno or his subjects. What was
needed was that the new king should
exchange his Greek name for a native
One, Chose Artaxias as that of two
previous monarchs who had distin-
guished themselves.
29 Tacit. Anºn., ii. 58.
80 Germanicus was believed to be ac-
tuated on this occasion in part by his
hostility to the governor of Syria, Piso,
and his wife, Plancina, whom Vonones
had courted. But it may be doubted
whether he allowed motives of this kind
to influence him. .
81 Tacit. Anºn. ii. 68.
82 Tacit. Anºt. vi. 31. ‘.
88 Tiberius was seventy-five in A.D. 84.
84 Vitellius, who was made consul at
the beginning of A.D. 84, appears (like
Germanicus) to have at once set out for
his province. (See Joseph. Amt. Jud.
xviii. 4, § 2, and compare Burton, Hist.
of First Three Centuries, vol. i. p.125.
85 It is almost certain that this prince
must have had some real personal name
besides the family title of Arsaces. (See
Strab. xv. 1, § 36.) .
86 Tacit. Amºn. vi. 31. t -
87 Dio Cass. lviii. 26.
88 Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 4, § 4, IIéu-
-aret 88 kai Tubéptos os ObéréAAtov ypcºmplara,
reaeiſov autov ºrpºororevv ºbtaiav trpos 'Aprä-
flavov row IIápôov Baarvača: čháBet yºp air-
rov čx6pos tow, kai. 'Appleviav trapsaragué-
vos, win Štri tračov kolkovpyń.
89 Tacit. Ann. l. s. c.
40 “Destinata retinens, consiliis et astu
res externas moliri; arma procul ha-
bere.” Tacit. Anºm. vi. 32.
* Tacit. l. s.c.; Dio Cass. lviii. 26. . . .
42 Sueton. Tib. § 66:—“Quin et Arta.
bani, Parthorum regis, laceratus est .
literis, parricidia et caedes et ignaviana
et luxuriana objicientis, monenſisque at
2


#
.*
622 TEIE SIXTH
voluntaria morte maximo justissimoque
civium odio quam primum satisfaceret.”
48. Dean Merivale calls Tiridates “the
son of Phraates” (Rom. Empire, vol. v.
p. 416); but, if this had been so, Tacitus
would most certainly have mentioned
it. Tacitus calls him “sanguinis ejus-
dem” (of the same family), and speaks
of the elder Phraates (Phraates IV.) as
his grandfather (Ann. vi. 37), but leaves
us to , guess which son of this king was
his father. I suspect it was either Rho-
daspes or Seraspadanes.
44 Tacit. Ann. vi. 32; Joseph. Amt.
Jud. xviii. 4, § 4. .
45 Tiberius had suggested this candi-
date. (Tacit. Ann. l. S. c.) .
46 Ibid. vi. 33.
47 Tacitus calls them Sarmatians (Amm.
vi. 33); Josephus, Scyths (Ant. Jud.
xviii. 4, § 4). Both writers absurdly
bring them through “the Caspian
Gates”; but it is clear that the Mozdok
pass of the Caucasus is meant.
48 The Sarmatians were ready to have
sold their services to both sides; but the
Iberians guarded the main pass through
the Caucasus; and the Derbend pass,
between the mountains and the Caspian,
was (according to Tacitus) impassable
during the summer time, being then
flooded by the sea. (Ann. l. S. C.)
49 Ibid. vi. 34.
50 Tacit. Amm. vi. 35.
51 Ant. Jud. l. s. c.
62 Tacit. Amºn, vi. 36.
* IIopatrú Xpmudrov eis re ovyyevets kai
ºpi\ovs rows ékéivov. (Joseph. Amt. Jud.
1. s. c.) Tacitus omits this feature.
54 “Interim posse Parthos, absentium
aequos, praesentibus mobiles, ad poemi-
tentiam mutari.” Tac. Amm. vi. 36, ad
º,. .
5*Ibid. vi. 37. The Roman general al-
most immediately retired.
56 Tacit. Anºn. vi. 41. Artemita, was in
Sittacéné, not far from Ctesiphon (Strab.
# 1, § 7). The site of Halus is un-
O
Wºl.
57 Tacit. Amºn. vi. 42.
58 Tacit. Amºn. vi. 43.
* “Sensit vetus regnandi, falsos in
amore, odia non fingere.” (Tacit. Anºv.
vi. 44.)
60 Tacitus says “Scyths” only (“auxi-
lia Scytharum”); Josephus, “Dahae and
Sacae'' (orportiav Aatov re kai Xaków). The
early connection of Artabanus with the
Dahae (Tac. Ann. ii. 3), makes it proba-
MoMARCHY. ICH. XIV.
ble that he would obtain aid from them:
91 Tacitus says “the Armenians and
Elymaeans” (vi. 44); but the latter la
exºti, in the opposite quarter to Ar-
menia, and seem to be wrongly men-
tioned.
62 “Principio a gente Arabum facto.”
(Tacit. Ann. 1. s. c.) The Arabians of
the Mesopotamian Desert are probably
intended.
, ** Josephus says: Iſoaspaña as rows &v-
6earnróra: káreoxe ruv &px|v (Ant. Jud.
xviii. 4, § 4, Žiž .); but the fuller nar-
rative of Tacitus shows that there was
no actual fighting.
** Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii., 4, § 5.
** Josephus describes this interview
at some length. he Euphrates was
bridged in the usual way, by a bridge of
boats, and the two chiefs met, each ac-
companied by a guard, midway on the
bridge. After the conditions of peace
had been settled, Herod Antipas, who
was present as a Roman ally, enter-
tained the Parthian king and Roman
governor at a banquet, held in a mag-
nificent tent erected midway between
the two shores.
* The term “hostage” is used by Jo-
sephus (l. s. c.), Suetonius (Calig. $ 19),
and Dio (lix. 27). One would be glad to
know whether the Parthians themselves
regarded the transaction in the same
light as the Romans appear to have
One.
97 Sueton. Calig. § 14; Dio Cass. l. s. c.
*8. This seems to me the best mode of
reconciling Joseph. Amt. Jud. xviii. 4,
§ 5 with Dio Cass, lix. 27 and Sueton.
Calig. l. s. c.; Vitell. § 2.
69 Compare Acts ii. 9; Joseph. Ant.
Jud. xvi. 6, § 1; xviii. 9, § 1; Philo. Leg.
ad Caium. p. 1032; Mos. Chor. Hist, Ar-
men. ii. 3, 7, &c. ... -
70 On the transfer of Jews from Baby.
lonia, to Antioch, see Joseph. Ant. Jud.
xii. 8, § 1; contr. Ap. ii. 4.
71 Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 9, § 1.
7? This narrative rests wholly upon the
authority of Josephus. Its internal
probability, its thoroughly Oriental col-
oring, and its general harmony with
what we otherwise know of Parthia at
this time, have led to its acceptance by
Milman and other writers not inclined
to credulity.
78 Probably from about A.D. 19 to 34.
** Mithridates was stripped naked and
Set upon an ass, and in this guise was
conveyed from the battle-field to the
camp of the victors. (Joseph. A. J. xviii.
* 5 v -
75 Joseph. Amt. Jud. xviii. 9, § 8. ‘Aei
dos étri troXi Suáðopov ka9earākea av, kai Öro-
Tépots trapayávouro 9aññeiv irpárepov &AAi-
m ar row to .
7° The words of Josephus (tº €krºp grew
$90pé, év BašvXavi čyévero airãov) are am-
biguous. Dean Milman understood them
to intend a pestilence. (History of the
Jews, vol. ii. p. 189, 12mo edit.)
7 Joseph. Amt. Jud. xviii. 9, § 9.
78 See text, pp. 14 and 109.
** Strabo (xi. 9, § 2) praises the Par-
thian rule as salutary and vigorous
(xpiatplow trpès hyeſtoviav). There can be
no doubt that the nation showed some-
thing of that aptitude for command and
government which distinguishes the
Turks.
*The Jewish troubles precede in Jo-
sephus his account of the death of Ca-
ligula, so that apparently they fall into
the year A.D. 40. The death of Artaba-
nus, which followed closely upon his
#
CH. XV.]
second eypºlº and restoration (Jo-
seph. A. J. xx. 3, § 4), is shown by the
series of Parthian coins to have hap-
pened in A.D. 42. -
81 This portion of the history depends
wholly on the authority of Josephus,
who is not perhaps to be implicitly
(See Amt. Jud. xx. 3, § 1–3.)
83 The reduction of Seleucia appears
from Tacitus to have fallen into the
year A.D. 46. This was, he says (xi. 9),
the seventh year after it revolted. The
revolt must therefore have taken place
in A.D. 40. That it fell in the reign of
Artabanus appears from Tacit. Ann. xi.
84 This date is earlier than that gen-
erally assigned, which is A.D. 44 (Heeren,
Manual, p. 303, E. T.; Lewis, History
of the Parthian Empire, p. 231; Vail-
lant, Arsac. Imperium, p. 220). ut it is
rendered certain by the coins, which
have for the last year of Artabanus the
date TNT Awiov (= Aug. A.D. 42), and for
the first of Vardanes TNT Tapirvat.
(= September of the same year).
CHAPTER XV.
1 Amt. Jud. xx. 3, § 4. Thu BaoruMetav
tº trauði Ovapôāvū karaximtöv.
2 Ann. xi. 8. The true meaning of
Tacitus in the passage has been ques-
tioned (see Walther's Tacitws, note ad
loc.); but, for my own part, I cannot
feel a doubt that he regards Gotarzes as
king before Vardanes.
8 Some suppose the Artabanus in-
tended to be Artabanus III., the pre-
ceding king; but he was the father, not
the brother, of Gotarzes. (See Joseph.
Amt. Jud. 1. s. c., where Vardanes is
called the son of Artabanus III. and
Gotarzes the brother of Vardanes.)
4 The possibility of this feat has been
questioned, and it has been proposed to
alter the text of Tacitus from “biduo
tria M. passuum” to “triduo duo M.
passuum” (see Walther's Tacitus, vol.
ii. p. 18). But the feat of Vardanes does
not come up to that of Tiberius, who
travelled in one night and day 200 Ro-
man (or 184 British) miles to visit his
sick brother, Drusus (Plin. H. N. vii. 20).
5 Coins of a uniform type, differing
altogether from those of Gotarzes, and
reasonably ascribed to Vardanes, bear
the dates TNT, ANT, ENT, SNT and ZNT,
or A.D. 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46. •
8 Tacit. Ann. xi. 8.
7 “Bactrianos apud campos.” Tacit.
S. C.
8 Tacit. Ann. xi. 9.
* Compare Tac. Ann. xi. 10 with Jo-
seph. Amt. Jud. xx. 3, § 4. The intended
“Roman War” . of the latter writer is
the projected “Armenian expedition”
of the former.
10 See text, p. 131. -
** Dio Cass. lx. 8; Tac.. Ann. xi. 8.
** Dio Cass. l. s. c.; Senec. De Tran-
guill, § 11. .
THE SIXTH MONARCHF.
18 “Cuncta in Mithridatem fluxere,
atrociorem gwam novo regno conduce.
ret' (Tacit. Ann. xi. 9).
14 A Parthian king could, no doubt,
command the services of nis feudato-
ries; but it depended very much upon
themselves what forces they should
bring into the field. To obtain any real
success, the hearty co-operation of the
feudatories was necessary.
1° Artabanus rewarded Izates by add-
ing this tract to his dominions. (Joseph.
A. J. XX. 3, § 3.)
16 See text, p. 140.
17 Joseph. Ant. Jud. xx. 3, § 4. II6Aepov
trpès "Igdºmy katiyyev.Aév. Compare the
remark of Tacitus—“Exin validissimas
proºfecturas invasit'' (Ann. xi. e -
* I cannot follow this campaign in de-
tail, as the rivers “Erinde” and * Sinde,”
mentioned by Tacitus, are unknown to
the geographers.
*Tacit. Ann. xi. 10. Josephus gives
no details, but says simply &vapoda.
divºrov.
20 So Tacitus (I. s. c.). “Nece Barda-
nis turbatae Parthorum res, inter am-
biguos, quis in regnum acciperetur.
Multi ad Gotarzem inclinabant; quidam
ad Meherdatem, prolem Phraatis.” But
it may be doubted whether Meherdates
was thought of until Gotarzes had ren-
dered himself obnoxious to his subjects.
21 Coins of Vardanes bear the date
ZNT, or A.D. 45–46. A coin of Gotarzes
is dated ZNT, IIavénov, or July, A.D. 46.
22 Tacit. Ann. xi. 10 : “Gotarzes . . .
per soevitian ac, lwa wºm, adegit Parthos
mittere ad Principem Romanum occul-
tas preces.” . Compare the expression
“socors domi,” in Ann. xii. 10.
28 This speech is given by Tacitus with
his usual brevity (Ann. xii. 10). e adds
that the envoys said more to the same
effect. -
24 Ibid. xii. 11.
25 See text, pp. 85, 88, 93.
26 Tacit. Ann. xii. 13.
27 The notices of Tacitus do not enable
us to follow with any exactness the
movements of Gotarzes; but I think
there cannot be a doubt that he was pro-
tecting Ctesiphon, and that the scene of
his manoeuvres and of the final engage-
ment was the tract south of Nineveh,
between the Tigris and the Zagros moun-
tain range. the reading “Arbela.”
be allowed to stand in Ann. xii. 13, we
may limit the scene of action a little
more, and say that it lay between Arbil
and Baghdad. Sambulos, the moun-
tain which Gotarzes at first occupied, is
robably the modern Mount Sunbulah,
etween the plains of Ghilan and Deira,
in lat. 34° 25', long. 46° 10' nearly. This
is a “very remarkable range, far ex-
ceeding in height all others at the foot
of Zagros” (Journal of Geograph. So-
ciety, xol. ix. p. 41). n the summit is
“a fine table-land, wooded with dwarf
oak,” while the sides are in most places
bounded by “naked and precipitous
*
624
Acrags like those of Behistun” (ibid. p.
42). But the second position of Go-
tarzes, behind the river Corma, cannot
be, identified, since there are scarcely
-sufficient grounds for regarding that
stream as the Kara-Su, or river of Kir-
manshah. i - . &
28 In the East, mutilation of any kind
is regarded as incapacitating a man
from the exercise of sovereignty. , Hence
the Persian kings were in the habit, un-
/ til recently, of blinding all their brothers
upon their accession. . . . . .
29 Tacit. Ann. xii. 14. ** Ostentui cle-
mentiae suae, et in mosqehomestamento.”
30 See note 18, Chapter XIV. .
, , 81 Flandin, Woyage em. Perse, p. 8. “On
y reconnait, néammoins les, silhouettes
de plusieurs personnages dehaute taille,
surmontés d'autres plus petits, parmi
lesquels se distinguent un cavalier armé
d’une lance, et une espèce de gloire ou
, de renommée couronnant un autre gue-
grier a cheval.” - .
32 Some account of this inscription
has been given by Sir R. K. Porter
-(Travels, vol. ii. p. 151), by Sir H. Raw-
linson (Geograph. Journal, vol. ix. p.
115), and by MM. Flandin and Coste
(Poyage en Perse, Planches anciennes,
pl. 119). The best account is that of the
second-named traveller, who transcribed
the inscription as follows: AA9ASATHX.
MI®PATH>II.EII . . . TOTAPZHC >A-
"TPAEIHXTQNXATPAIRON . . .
. He also
read in a corner-of the tablet the words
TOTAPXHC. TEODIOOPOX. It has been
argued that the inscription cannot have
-been set up by King Gotarzes, on ac-
count of the title “Satrap of Satraps”;
but this argument is not convincing. See
note 19, Chapter VI.) The combination
of the names Gotarzes and Meherdates
:(Mithrates) with the locality, certainly
near the scene of the battle, and the
winged Victory, common on Parthian
coins at exactly this time, is a far more
weighty one in favor of the inscription
being rightly assigned to the monarch.
3. A coin of Gotarzes bears the date
BAET, or A.D. 50-51. One of Vonones II.
has TET, or A.D. 51–52. -
*: Dein Gotarzes morboobiit" (Ann.
xii. 14).
85 Joseph. Ant., Jud. xx. 8, § 4. Mer’
of aroxy xpóvov čá & Tru Bo v A is rexevrä-
divºrd.
80 Philostratus is quoted as calling him
“the younger brother of Artabanus
TII.” (Lindsay, History and Coimage,
p. 70.) But the authority of Philostra-
tus on a point of this kind is worthless.
. . $7 Tacit. Anºn. T. s. c.
. 88 The date in question is TET, which -
corresponds to the last three months of
A.D. 51 and the first nine of A.D. 52.
- ** This appears from Tacitus (Anºn.
zii. 44 and 50). }
i CHAPTER XVI. . . .
*Tacit. Ann. xii. 44., “Concessu fra:
trum regnum adeptus.” The names of .
* * *
THE SIXTH MoMARCHY.
r - |
[CH. XVI,
b
z
the two brothers are given by Josephus
:(Ant. Jud. xx. 2, § 4), and Dio Cassius
(lxiii. 5). , The former tells us that Pa-
corus was older than Tiridates. --
2 The government bestowed on Pa-
corus was that of Media; whether Me-
dia Magna or Atropaténé is uncertain.
* See text, p. 131.
4 Tacit. Ann. l. s. c.
* Ibid. xii. 47. Mithridates and his
wife, who was the sister of Rhadamis-
tus, were first smothered. The children
were then killed for lamenting their
parents. *
* Tacit. Ann. xii. 50. The first inva-
ision of Volagases falls into the latter
#. of A.D. 51, which was the year that
he became king, according to the coins.
ºmpare Tacit. Ann. xii. 50, 5i, with
Bl

8 As Wolagases was descended from a
brauch of the Arsacidae, quite distinct
from that whereto Artabanus had be-
longed, there was not the “ingratitude”
in this demand which some writers have
Seen in it. - * - |
9 #:Ph. Amt. Jud. xx. 4, § 2.
10 Ibid. § 3.
11 Tacit. Ann. xiii. 6.
** The Lesser Armenia, was assigned
to Aristobulus, a son of Herod, king of
:Chalcis, and a first cousin of Agrippa II.
Sophéné, the more southern portion of
the Greater Armenia, was entrusted to
a certain Sohemus. (Tac, Ann. xiii. 7.)
* It is characteristic of Roman vanity,
which could not bear to admit a loss,
that Corbulo's appointment was said to
be not “reciperandae,” but “retinendoe
Armeniae.” (Tacit. Ann. xiii. 8.
**Tacitus (Ann. xiii. 9) does not clear-
ly express this; but it seems to follow
from his silence as to any recovery of
Armenia in A.D. 55, joined to his admis-
sion that Tiridates possessed the coun-
try in A.D. 58 (ibid. xiii. 34, 37).
1*Tac. Amn. xiii. 7. .
**Ibid. Tacitus is confirmed by the
coins, which show that Vardanes was
proclaimed at least as early as A.D. 55. .
17 Tac. Anºn... xiii. 9.
18.The coins ascribed to Wardanes II.
bear the dates ZET. HET, and 95T, or
A.D. 55, 56, and 57-58.
- 19 Tacit. Ann. xiii. 34. It would seem
that when the hostages were given in
A.D. 55, ambassadors were sent to Rome
to endeavor to effect some arrangement.
It was long before any answer was
vouchsafed them (Dio Cass. lxii. 20).
When a reply came, it appears to have
been to the effect that Tiridates must
either relinquish Armenia, or consent to
-receive it at the hands of the Romans
and hold it as a Roman fief. .
20 Tacit, Ann. xiii. 87.
21 Ibid. ch. 35.
* “Tunc primum illecti Isichi, gens

haud alias Socia Romanis.” (Ibid. ch.
87.) -
* Tacit. Ann. l. s. c. Compare xiv.
25 and xv. 1. - .
-
A
*
* *
4 ^.
CH. XVI.]
24 Tacit. Ann. xiii. 38–40.
25 lbid. xiv. 26.
26 Tacitus says of the Armenians,
“Ambigua fide utraque arma invita-
bant, situ terrai'um, similitudine morum
Parthis propiores, connubiisque per-
mixti ac libertate ignota, illwc magis ad
servitiwm inclinabant.” (Ann. xiii. 34.)
27 We know, unfortunately, nothing of
these wars but the mere fact of their oc-
currence. Some have supposed them
to have been stirred up and assisted by
Rome (Merivale, Roman Einſpire, vol.
vii. p. 23); but there is no evidence of
this. On one occasion, a Hyrcanian em-
bassy made its way to Rome, and So-
licited aid from Nero (Tac. Ann. xiv. 25),
but apparently without any result. On
their return to the East, these envoys
were protected by Corbulo, who sent
them home the circuitous route of
the Indian Ocean and the Indus (?).
28 Tacit. Ann. xv. 1; Dio Cass. lxii. 20.
29 This seems to be implied in the re-
flection ascribed to Monobazus by Taci-
tuS c.), “Levius servitium apud
Romanos deditis quam captis.”
80 The Latin ignavia (the term used by
Tiridates in Tacitus) unites these two
notions.
31 See Tâcit. Ann. xv. 2. It has been
thought best not to overload this history
with the speeches which Greek and Ro:
man writers put into the mouths of
their historical characters on all possi-
ble occasions. In the present instance
an exception is made on account of the
suitability of the sentiments to the oc.
CaSiOn. -
32 Tacit. Ann. xv. 2.
83 Ibid. Ch. 4.
* Seetext, p. 154,
85 Tacit. Ann. xv. 5.
86 “Imbecillum equitem pabuli inopia:
nam exorta vis locustarum ambederat
quicq uid herbidum aut frondosum.”
(Tac. l. s. c.). On the ravages commit-
ted by these insects in Mesopotamia and
the adjacent regions, see Ancient Mon-
archies, vol. ii. pp. 299, 493, 2nd edit.
87 Tacitus does not expressly mention
this condition, but implies it in Ann. xv.
6. (“Cur enim exercitum Romanum a
Tigranocertis deductum ? . Cur deserta
per otium quae bello defenderant 7”)
88 Tac. Ann. xv. 3. -
89 This is clearly the meaning of the
threat—“Se tributa et leges, et pro um-
bra regis Romanum jus victis impositu-
rum.” It was not likely to conciliate
the Armenians.
40 Tac. Amun. xv. 7.
41 Ibid. ch. 9. -
42 See text, pp. 56–58.
48 Tacit. Anºn. xv. 10. The infan
had the support of some troops of Pan-
nonian horse, which fled, however, on
the ºº:: of Volagases.
*** Hostem instare.” (Tacit. l. s. c.)
45 Ibid. xv. 11.
** Arsamosata must not be confounded
with Samosata, now Sumeisat. Samo-
THE SIXTH MoMARCHY. .
-**
º
*** \,
625
-
sata was situated on the Euphrates
(Stråb. xvi. 2, § 3), from which Arsamo-
sata was at least forty (
distant (Tac. Ann. xv. 16).
47 Tac. Annu. xv. 13.
* “Veniret propere: signa et aquilas,
et nomen reliquum infelicis exercitus
tueretur.” (Ibid. ch. 11.)
49 Ibid, ch. 16.
50 Dio Cass. lxii. 21.
Amºn. xv. 15.
51 Tac. Ann. xv. 15."
52 Ibid. ch. 16. -
* Dio Cass. lxii. 22; Tac. Ann. xv. 17.
54 Tac. Ann. xv. 24. .
55 Ibid. Ch. 25.
*Tagitus compares the powers now
granted to Corbulo with those which
were entrusted to Pompey by the Ga-
binian law. (See on this Merivale, Ro-
man Empire, vol. i. p. 66.) . . .
57 Dio attributes to Nero at this time
the proposal of , exactly those condi-
tions of peace which he rejected (Dio
Cass. lxii. 22). He is to be corrected
from Tacitus (Ann. xv. 25).
58 See Tac. Ann. xv. 26, where there is
mention of his obtaining picked cohorts
from Egypt and Illyricum. -
Ibid. ch. 27. -
61 Ibid. Chs. 29–31. -
62. The arrangement was made in the
Summer of A.D. 63. Tiridates did not
make his appearance at Rome till the
spring of A.D. 66. (See Clinton, F. R.,
vol. i. p. 48.)
63 Dio Cass. Ixiii. 1, 2.
*4 This is the meaning of Dio (lxiii. 7),
where itrèp row 'Idvvov has been generally
translated “across the Adriatic,” in-
stead of “above” or “round the head
of the Adriatic,” which is the true mean-
man) miles
Compare Tac.
w
Ing.
65 Sueton. Neron. § 80. Dio agrees,
(lxiii. 2).
66 Dio Cass. 1. S. c. -
*7 According to this author, Tiridates
said—“Master, am a descendant of
Arsaces, a brother of the kings Volaga-
sus and Pacorus; but I am thy slave. I
have come hither to thee, who art my
God, to worship thee, as I would Mith-
ras; and from henceforth my fate will
be whatever thou makest it. For thou
art my Fate and my Fortune.” (Dio
Cass. lxiii. 5.) - -
68 Dio Cass, l. s. c.; Sueton. Ner. § 13.
69 Dio Cass. lxiii. 7. -
70 Writers on Roman history have not
always seen this. But Dean Merivale
well observes, in concluding his notice
of the events—“While , Tiridates did
homage for his kingdom to Nero, he
was suffered to place himself really wºn-
der the protection of Vologesus” (Roman
Fmpire, vol. vii. p. 26). - •.
us is mentioned as king of
Parthia by Martial in an epigram written
under Domitian, probably towards the
close of his reign. which was from A.D.
81 to A.D. 96. (Mart. Epig. ix, 86, 3.)
Af
+
*
626
Clinton dates the epigram A.D. 94 or 95
(F. R. vol. i. p. 79).
72 See Sueton. Ner. § 57; Vesp. § 6;
Domit. § 2; Tag. Hist, iv. 51; Dio Cass.
lxvi.1; Joseph. Bell. Jud. vii. 5, § 2,
and 't,
78 Waillant, Arsacid. Imper. pp. 249–
292; Heeren, Manual of Ancient. Histo-
ry, p. 303, E.T.: Plate in Smith's Dic-
tionary of Greek, and Roman Biogra-
phy, vol. i. pp. 358, 359.
74. A coin of Pacorus, bearing his name,
has the date @IIT Aatoriov, or June, A.D.
78.
75 The coins which run from AET (A.D.
52) to HIIT (A.D. 76) are thought to pre-
sent two distinct types of face, one of
which is found always before A.D. 62,
and the other always after that date.
This seems to be the opinion of the best
numismatologists, as M.M. Long perier
and De Bartholomei, Mr. Lindsay, and
the late Mr. De Salis. For my own part,
I confess I am unable to detect any
clear difference.
Tº Lindsay, History and Coinage, p. 87.
77 In the British Museum Collection,
arranged by the late Mr. De Salis, these
names are adopted.
78 By Mr. Lindsay (History and Coin-
age, pp. 71-101).
79 Lindsay, History and Coinage, p. 87.
80 See text, pp. 153, 154, The revolt
appears to have broken out in A.D. 58
(Tac. Ann. xiii. 37). We hear of it as
continuing in A.D. 60 (ibid. xiv. 25), and
again in A.D. 62 (ibid. xv. 1). From this
time we have no distinct mention of it
until A.D. 75, when it appears from Jo-
sephus (Bell. Jud, vii. 7, $4) that the re-
volt had succeeded, and that a king
ruled in Hyrcania who was completely
independent.
CHAPTER XVII.
1 The peace dates from the year A.D.
62, when the arrangement was made
with Corbulo (see text, B. 159, 160). It
was not infringed until the great expe-
dition of Trajan in A.D. 115.
- 2 See text, p. 161. -
8 Tacit. Hist. ii. 82. -
4 Sueton. Vesp. § 6; Tac. Hist. iv. 51.
5 Tacit. Hist. i. s. c.
* Joseph. Bell. Jud. vii. 5, § 2.
7 Ibid. vii. 7, § 1. -
8 Joseph. Bell. Jud. vii. 7, § 2.
* This may possibly have been the let-
ter to which Dio Cassius alludes (lxvi.
11), wherein Volagases addressed the
Roman emperor thus:–“Arsaces, King
of Kings, to Flavius Vespasianus, sends
greeting”; whereto Vespasian was con-
tent to reply with very palpable irony,
“Flavius Vespasianus to Arsaces, King
of Kings, sends greeting.” It is, how-
ever, on the whole more likely that the
letter with this heading was provoked
by the refusal of Vespasian to help the
Parthian monarch against the Alani. -
I *
A.D. 75.
in The Alani are first mentioned by
*
&
f -
THE SIXTH MONARCH).
t
[CH. xv.11.
Dionysius the Geographer (B.C. 30–10),
who joins them with the Daci and the
Tauri (Perieg. 305, 306), and #: places
hem between the latter and the Aga-
thyrsi (308, 309). A similar position (in
the south of Russia in Europe, the mod-
ern Ukraine) is assigned to them by
Pliny (H. N.iv., 12, § 25) and Josephus
Bell. Jud. vii. 7, § 4). Seneca (Thyest.
629) places them further west, upon the
Ister. Ptolemy has two bodies of Alani,
one in the position above described, the
other in Scythia, within the Imaus, north
and pººl. east of the Caspian (Geo-
graph. ii. 14, iii. 5, vi. 14). It must have
een from these last, the successors,
and, according to some (Amm. Marc.
xxxi. 2), the descendants of the ancient
Massagetae, that the Alani came who at-
tacked Pacorus and Tiridates. Their
alliance with the Hyrcanians shows that
they rounded the south-east corner of
the Caspian, and their passage through
the Gates into Media, and Armenia.
equally indicates that they invaded
those countries from the East. The
; of the Alani has been much
disputed. Some regard them as Medes,
Some as Teutons, others as Turks or
Fins. It is in favor of their Finnish
origin that Alani and Rhox-alani are
significant in Finnish, Alani (alain)
meaning “men,” and Rhox-alani (rºtots-
alain) “red-haired men.” A special
connection is traced between the Alani
and the Os or Osethi of the Caucasus.
12 This implies a development of Hyr-
canian power not otherwise recorded,
but in itself not improbable. The
“Gates” were beyond the limits of Hyr-
cania Proper, but closely adjoined upon
it, and would be likely to fall into the
hands of the power which held the ad-
jacent mountain-tract.
18 Joseph. B. J. vii. 7, § 2. On the use
of the lasso by Asiatics, see Herod. vii.
85; Pausan. i. 21, § 8; Suidas, ad voc.
Xeupé, &c.
14 Sueton. Domit. § 2. Compare Dio
Cass. lxvi. 15.
15 Joseph. 1. s. c.
16 The earliest known coin of Pacorus
bears date @HT, Aatoriou. It has the
legend [II]akópo . . . Šukatov [ć] truqavov[s
(buxe]AAmvo[s].
17. The first period of struggle, in
which either state sought to conquer
territory from the other, lasted from
B.C. 55 to 36, and was succeeded by sev-
enty years of peace—from B.C. 35 to A.D.
35. The second, for supremacy over
Armenia, commenced A.D. 35, and ter-
minated A.D. 63 by Rome's acceptance
of Tiridates. This was followed by a
p. which lasted fifty-three years—
rom A.D., 63 to A.D. 115.
19 Vaillant, Arsac. Imp. p. 296; Plate
in Smith's Biogr. Dict., vol. i.B} 359;
Lewis, History of the Parthian Empire,
p. 318. Lindsay (History and Coinage,
t
p. 101) suggests that he was not the son
of Volagases I. but his grandson.
Af
• -\
f
CH. XVIII.]
19 Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6. “Ctesiphon,
quam . . ... rex Pacorus, incolarum viri-
bus amplificatam et moenibus, Graeco
indito nomine, Persidis effecit specimen
summum.” - .
20 Sueton. Neron. § 57. “Denique, curm
post viginti annos, adolescente me, ex-
fitisset conditionis incertae, qui se Nero-
nem esse jactaret, tam favorabile nomen
ejus apud Parthos fuit, ut vehementer
adjutus, et vix redditus sit.” . The
“twenty years” of this passage, dating
from the death of Nero, A.D. 69, fix the
appearance of this Pseudo-Nero to A.D.
89, the ninth year of Domitian.
21 Plin. Ep. x. 16. “Callidromum
. ... captum a Susago in Moesia, &c.
22 Suidas ad voc ovnrū. .
28 Zonaras, p. 578. B. The date is fixed
by the mention immediately afterwards
of the great eruption of Vesuvius in the
reign of Titus, which belongs to A.D. 79.
One of these, of whom there is a
coin in the Brit. Mus, dated BOT, or A.D.
8 . 81, is thought by some to be the Ar-
tabanus of Zonaras. The other, whose
head is entirely different, has been iden-
tified with the Volagases who succeeded
Chosroës.
as this legend (LS18 hyyh3)
is read as $5.2%) n-Tºhno or Mitra-
drit malcha, i.e. “Ring Mithridates.”
(See Numism. Chron. vol. xi. Pl. vii. No.
4.) Legends in the same character are
frequent on the coins of the later Par-
thian kings. -
26 We have, however, an indication of
them in Dio Cassius, who, speaking of
the slight resistance offered to Trajan
in his advance upon Babylon, says,
“There were few to hinder liim, since
the power of Parthia had been brought
low through the civil wars, and there
were still unsubdued rebellions” (lxviii.
9;º - -
Żó).
27 Dio Cass. lxviii. 17.
28 Pacorus had had occasion before
his death to make various complaints to
Trajan (Suidas ad voc. ÉtrikAmula). This
would imply that Rome had already
taken an aggressive attitude, and was
preparing the way for a rupture.
CHAPTER XVIII.
1 The date here is uncertain; and it is
even not quite clear whether Exedares
was placed on the Armenian throne' by
Pacorus or Chosroës. It seems, how-
ever, scarcely likely that Tiridates
should have lived much beyond A.D. 100,
or that Chosroës, if he had established
Exedares, should have so readily de-
posed him. : -
2 Dio Cass, lxviii. 17. --
8The Dacian War occupied Trajan
from A.D. 101 to A.D. 106. The year A.D.
107 was spent in securing possession of
the Dacian territory. (Clinton, F. R.,
vol. i. pp. 88–94.) , , -
* Some good remarks on these sub-
THE SIXTH MoMARCHY.
jects will be found in Dean Merivale's
Roman Empire. vol. viii. pp. 134–153.
io (Jass. lxviii. 29. * a'
* See text. p. 84, .
7 Dio Cass 1xviii. 17/ -
8 Dio calls the Armenian matter a
mere pretext, and Trajan's love of glory
the real cause of the war (lxviii. 17).
* IIdivta rā ºrpoo`mixovira motmorev (ibid. 1.
S. C.)
10 Clinton, F. R., vol. i. p. 98.
11 See text, p. 168.
12 Dio Cass. lxviii. 18.
18 Ibid. Ch. 19,
14 Fronto, Princip. Hist, in his Opera
in edita, vol. ii. p. 340. -
** Nikmv čvauplow towoulagov (Dio Cass.
lxviii. 19).
16 Dio Cass. lxviii. 20.
17 Eutrop. Breviar. viii. 3; Fronto,
Princip. Hist. vol. ii. p. 349 : Arrian. Fr.
16. Fronto and Arrian were contem-
porary with Trajan.
18”Orº trpatos trapaflavov rá šuykeiueva
érvXe tims àikms. (Arrian, 1. s. c.)
19 See Fronto, l. s. c.
29 See the fragment of Arrian given
by Suidas, ad voc. yuāorts, which consists
of words that Arrian must have put in-
to the mouth of Trajan:—IIepi IIapóapta-
aipov ºs, oùxī 'Aétéápov eival, 3AA’ avroſ,
thv yväguv' 6tt trparos, k.T.A. (See above,
note 18.) 1 *
21 Dio Cass. lxviii. 21. -
** Arrian, ap. Suid, ad voc. &ndiXoyos.
**.Eutrop. Breviar. viii. 2; Hist. Mis-
cell. x. 8, p. 206 (ed. Eyssenhardt, Bero-
lin. 1868).
24 Dio Cass. lxviii. 19.
* Eutrop. 1. s. c.; Hist. Misc. l. s. c.;
Plin. Ep. x. 13–15. . - -
26 Dio Cass. lxviii. 21. -
37 Dio Cass. . c.) Compare ch. 18.
(l. S
28 Ibid. Ch. 22. -
29 Suidas ad voc. jºbnymorourat.
80 The captures of Nisibis and Batnae
are mentioned by Dio (lxviii. 23). The
general reduction of the Cardueni
(Kurds), or inhabitants of Gordyéné, is
attested by Eutropius (l. s. c.) and the
PIistoria, Miscella (l. s. c.)
31 Dio Cass. lxviii. 22.
82 See a representation in Vaillant's
Hist. Arsac. p. 312, and compare Eckhel,
Doct. Num. vol. vi. p. 438.
88 Dio Cass. lxviii. 23.
34 So, Dean Merivale (Rom. Empire.
vol. viii. p. 162), following Francke. I
differ with reluctance and hesitation :
but, on the whole, Dio, as reported by
Xiphilinus, seems to me our safest guide
for the general course of the events of
this period.
8° Dio distinctly places the earthquake
at Antioch and Trajan's escape from its
perils at the close of the carmpaign of
A.D. 115, which he terminates with the
captures of Nisibis and Batnae (Xiphil.
Epit. Dion. p. 249). Malala also assigns
the earthquake to this winter, C 5
(xi. p. 359). I do not understand the
argument of Clinton, that the death of
*-
Ar
*
*
f
* *A
.628
; Pêdo (the consul of A.D. 115) in the earth-
quake proves it to have occurred in the
§; winter (F. R. vol. i. p. 100).
hether,the earthquake was in Janu-
ary, A.D.'115, or in December of that
year, it would equally fall within Pedo's
consulate.
36 Dio Cass. lxviii. 26. Compare Taylor
in Geograph. Journal, vol. XXXV. p. 56.
37 Kará rà Kápôvvov apos. (Dio Cass. l.
s. c.) The Cardunian mountain of Dio is
the Mons Masius of Strabo, which runs
parallel with the course of the Upper
Tigris from Diarbekr to Tilleh, and
meets the river at Jezireh.
. 88 Joh. Malal. 1. s. c
89 Dio Cass. lxviii. 24, 25.
40 Hist. Misc. x. 5; Oros. vii. 12; Eu-
seb. Chron. Can. ii. pp. 380, 381.
s 41 Dio Cass. lxviii. 26. - -
42 See above, note 37.
43 These are alluded to by Dio at the
close of ch. 26. A passage in John of
* Malala (Chron. xi. p. 273) sets them forth
more at large. His account of them.
however, cannot be accepted, since it
contradicts Dio and Victor.
, 44 Dio Cass. lxviii. 22. This fragment is
misplaced in Fabricius's generally excel-
lent edition of Dio (Hamburg, 1752). It
belongs to the period covered by ch. 26.
. .45 The capture of Hatra is implied in
the mention of its revolt (Dio Cass.
Ixviii. 31).
46 Ibid. ch. 27. The only bitumen-pits
in Babylonia are at Hit (the 'Is of Hero-
dotus, i. 179). . . r
-47 Dean Merivale supposes Seleucus to
have held out after the fall of Ctesiphon
(Rom. Empire, vol. vii. p. 163), and Says
its reduction was left to Trajan’s gen-
erals. To me this seems unlikely, and I
find no authority for the statement.' "
48 Few writers notice the employment
by Trajan of two fleets, one on each river;
and not one attempts to account for the
transfer of the Euphrates fleet to the Ti-
gris when there was already a flotilla
upon the latter stream. Fabricius'alone
notices the difficulty (note on § 172).
should imagine that, the artificial dams
and natural reefs which cross the bed of
I
THE SIXTH MONARCHY.
* *
* A
[CH. XIX.
the point (l. s. c.), notwithstanding the
general untrustworthiness of his narra-
tive, -- Af
56 Dio Cass. lxviii. 30. t
57 lbid. lxviii. 31. Merå tajra é º T mºv
'A p a B i a v #A9e kai rots 'Atpmºtois étrexel-
pmare. (Compare likxv. 11, 12; Herodian,
iii. 28, &c.
58 Herodian. iii. 1.
59 Dio Cass. 1. s. c. -
*0 Ibid. lxviii. 33. Trajan was about to
make another expedition into Southern
Mesopotamia, when his last illness pre-
vented him.
61 Eutrop. Breviar. viii. 3; Hist, Mis-
ell. x. 7.
92 A.l. Spart. Hadrian. § 5. Spartian
by mistake calls him Partamo-siris. .
* See Vaillant, Hist, Arsac, p. 319.
** There is, I believe, only a single
coin which is thought to support the
view that Osrhoëné became a kingdom
dependent on the Romans at the acces-
sion of Hadrian. This is described by
Eckhel (Doct. Num, vol. iii. p. 512) and
Mionnet (Description de Médºr illes, vol.
v, p. 618), who both view it with suspi-
C10]1.
* Dio Cass, lxviii. 33. Otto ºvoi 'Pw-
watov, ris re. 'Appevias kai, ris Meororora-
pºtas rms traetovos tow Te IIdip6.av kpatijo av-
*
& C

Tes, tº it n w ś iſ 6 v na a v kai n &t n v
é k t w ś iſ ve v or a v. -
** AEl. Spart. Hadrian, § 12, ad fin.
67 Ibid. § 13. . .
the Tigris between Mosul and Tekrit (Laº:
yard, Nin. and Babylon, p. 466) rendered
the descent of the vessels in the later
months of summer impracticable. That
the vessels were of a large size appears
from Arrian, Fr. 19. * . . . "
49 Dio Cass. lxviii. 28.
50 This appears from the capture of
his daughter and his golden throne: .
which were taken by the Romans who
went in pursuit of him; at Susa. (See
Spartian. Hadr. § 13; Capit. Ant. Pi. $9,
c.)
* I Dio Cass. lxviii. 28 and 29.
52 Ibid. Chs. 30 and 31. - -
68 Ibid. Ch. 30. -
54 Fronto, Princip. Hist, p. 338. “Lega-
tus cum exercitu cºesus.” -
55 This is so probable, that we § 8|Ce
cept the evidence of John of Malala on
68 A coin, of Chosroës in the Brit, Mu-
seum bears the date @AY. which corre-
sponds to A.D. 127–8. A coin ascribed to
olagases II. by Mr. Lindsay, with the
date HMY (A.D. 136-7), has a head exact-
ly like that of Chosroës upon it. (See
Lindsay, Pl. ix. No. 77.) - -
* Dio Cass. lxix. 15; Xiphil. Ep. Dion.
xv. % 264). .#
70 Vaillant, Hist, Arsac. p. 323; Eckhel,
octr. Num, vol. iii. p. 53; ; Lewis, Hist,
of the Parthian Empire, p. 332; Lindsay,
History and Coinage, p. 116; Plate in
Smith's Dict. of Greek and Roman Bi-
ography, vol. i. p. 359.
- 71. The usual legend on a tetra-
drachm of Volagases II. is BAXIAE0X.
BAXLAEQN APXAKOY . O AATAXOY AI-
KAIOY EIIIqb ANOYX I, IAEAAHNOX.
His drachms bear almost universally
the , inscription Jly] X]^y}]], Or
& Dº YºY, Volgasu Mulcha, “King
Volagases.”
CHAPTER XIX.
* If we allow Volagases to have been
even twenty years of age when he first
came forward as a claimant of the Par-
thian crown (A.D. 77-8), he must have
been seventy-two at the death of Chos-
roës in A.D. 130, -
* Volagases II, wears a tiara, orna-
mented at the edge with hooks or feath-
ers. His nose is prominent, his eye
large, his hair curled, his beard pointed
and wavy. º wº
\
*
CH. XX.] .
& Dio Cass. lxix. 15; Zonaras, p. 590, C.
4 AE1. Spart. Hadrian. § 13. -
5 Ibid., § 17, ad fin. - . . t . . .
6 Dio Cass. l. s. c. . . -
7 In the case of the Dacians. (Dio Gºss.
lxviii. 6; Plin. Haneg. 11, 12.)
8 Dio Cass. lxix. 15.
9 Ibi -
10 This appears from a coin, struck in
the first year of Antoninus, having on
the obverse the head of the Emperor,
and on the reverse a female figure, hold-
ing a bow and quiver with the left haud,
and presenting a crown with the right,
with the inscription PARTHIA.
11 Æl. Spart, Hadrian. § 13. .
12 Jul. Capit. Anton. Pi. § 9.
18 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. i. p.
205; Smith's ed.
14 See Lindsay, History and Coinage,
pp. 186, 187. -
15 Jul. Capit. Anton. Phil. § 8, “Par-
thicum bellum, paratum sub Pio, Marci
et Veri tempore indixit Volagessus.”
16 Ibid. Anton. Pi. § 9. “Parthorum
regem ab Armeniorum expugnatione so-
lis litteris reppulit [Pius].” -
17 See ap. Phot. Bibliothec.
Cod. xciv. p. 241; Dio Cass, ap. Suid.
voc. Mápruos: Fronto, Epist. ad Verwmv,
ii. 1 (p. 127, ed. Naber). -
18 Mos. Choren. Hist. Armen. ii. 61.
19. Lucian. Aleax. Pseudo-Mant. § 27.
20 Ibid. .. Quomodo Hist, sit conscri-
bend. § 21. - . -
21 Dio Cass. lxxi. 2.,
22 According to some, he starved him-
self (Lucian, 1. s. c.); according to others
he cut his throat with a piece of glass
(ibid. § 27). The true account of his
death is given by Dio. (l. s. c. OvoRé-
yavaros . . . atpatórešov 6xov ‘Pwuaiköv
airois hyepióort karstóševare kai Stépéeupe.)
28 Dio Cass. lxxi. 2; Oros. vii. 15.
24 Jul. Capit. Anton. Phil. § 8.
25 Ibid. Ver. Imperat. § 6. “Syris
defectionem cogitantibus.”
26 Ibid. l. S. c
27 fronto, Princip. Plist. p. 208, ed.
8,061”. -
* Dio Cass. lxi. 2; Jul. Capit. Ver.
Im. * . -
29 Vulc. Gall. Avid. Cass. §§ 5, 6. Com-
pare Fronto, Princip. Hist pp. 205-208;
where. however, the credit of establish-
ing a proper discipline is assigned by
the poſite courtier to Verus. * -
80 Dio Cass. 1. s. c. "Emudvta röv OtoAó-
yata'ovyevvaiws intrépielve.
* Lucian. Quomodo historia sit con-
8crib. § 20 and § 28.
** Jul. Capit. Amt. Phil. § 9; Suidas ad
voc. Bipos. . . .
88 Suidas, l. s. c. Comp. Jamblich. ap.
Phot. Bibl. xciv. p. 241. . . . .
84 Vulc. Gall. Avid. Cass. § 7; Dio Cass.
lxxi. 22–27. * .
** Dio Cass. lxxi. 3; Vulc. Gall. Avid.
Cass, $6.
* Dio Cass. Fr. ap. Suidam, sub voc.
Zejyua.
* Fronto, Epist. ii. 1, p. 121. •
f
THE SIXTH MoMARCHY.
f
t
. ºnel, Doct. Numv. vo
sus pestilentiae fuit, ut
\ -
629
/
." 38 Lucian.
omodo, &c., § 29.’ ' ' '
', 39 Jul. Cap. - *
er. Imp. § 7. . . . .
40 Dio Cass. lxxi. 2; Jul. Capit. Ver.
Imp. § 8; Eutrop. Brev. viii. 5: Oros. vii.
15; Amm. Marc xxiii. 6. Capitolinus
disbelieves the charge made against the
Seleucians. -
41 Dio Cass. l. S. c.
42 Jul. Capit. Ver. {ºp. § 7. Compare
. vii. pp. 51 and
** See Ammian. Marc. xxiii. 6, § 24.
Compare Jul. Capit. Ver. Imp. § 8.
44 lio Cass. lxxi. 2.; . - -
45 Amm. Marc. l. s. c. -,
* Eutrop. Brev. viii. 6:—“Tantus ca- .
. . . . per Italia.In
provinciasque maxima hominum pars,
militum omnes fere copiae languore de-
fecerint.” Compare Oros. vii. 15. •.
47 This is seen most clearly in the se-
lies of Mesopotamian coins, especially
those of Carrhae and Edessa, which bear
on the obverse the head of a Roman
Emperor from the time of Aurelius and
erus. (See Mionnet, Description de
Méd. Ant. tom. v. pp. 593-625. ... "
.48 See text, p. 110.
49 See text, p. 167. . . .
50 Jul. Cap. Avid. Cass. § 7; Dio Cass.:
ixxi. 22. -
*1 Jul. Capit. Ant. Phil. § 22. “Im-
minebat et Parthicum bellum et Britan-
Curri * . . '
52 Jul. Capit. Ant. Phil. § 26, ad init.
The “Persian ambassadors” of this past
sage are undoubtedly envoys from Vola-
gases. - - - - M
** A.D. 180. (See Clinton, F. R. vol. i.
a Cº. - -
54 Our authorities for the time of Com-
modus are three only: Dio in the Epi-
tome of Xiphilinus, Herodian (book i.),
and Lain pridius in the Historiae Augus-
toe Scriptores. These writers are almost
silent as to the condition of the 'East at
the period. , - . . . . .
** The latest coins of Volagases III.'
bear the date Bºp, which corresponds to
the latter part of A.D. 190 and the earlier
of A.D. 191. . . . .
CHAPTER XX.
1 Reimar and others have supposed
that Volagases, the adversary of Seve-
rus, was the son of a Sanatroeces, of
Sanatruces, on the strength of a frag-
ment of Dio Cassius. (lxxv. 9, ad fin.).
But it is more probable that the frag-
ment refers to a different Volagases, an:
Armenian prince, contemporary with
the Parthian Volagases IV. ... •
erodian. ii. 31. " The expressions'
used are somewhat vague—ot re étréxeuva
TiyptSos kai Eööpárov garpára, kai Baat-
Aets &méareAAo;', R.T.A. - I
8 Herodian. iii. 1. - . .
* Arab tribes from a very early period
held portions of Mesopotamia. Xeno-
hon calls the tract between the Kha-'
our , and the Babylonian alluvium
*Arabia.” (Anab. i. 5, § 1). Strabo as-
630
signs the same region to “Scenite Arabs”
(xvi. 1, § 26). Arabs appear in Upper
Mesopotamia about the time of Pompey
(Dio Cass. xxxv.2). Osrhoëné is reck-
oned as Arabian by Plutarch (Crass. §
21), and Appian (Parth. p. 140, A). Hatra,
or Atra (now el-Hadhr), is first men-
tioned in the wars of Trajan, and is al-
ways said to be Arabian. (See Dio Cass.
lxviii. 31; lzxv. 10–12; Herodian. iii. 28;
C. -
5 Herodian. iii. 1 and 27.
6 Ibid. iii. 1.
7 Dio Cass. lxxv. 1.
8 Ibid, Oi wet, 'Oorpomyoi kai o i 'A 8 v -
a 6 m voi &roor&vres kai Niaruguv troAtop-
koúvres, K.T.A.
9 Ibi
10 Dio tells a story, which has a some-
what apocryphal air, to illustrate the
sufferings of the army. An especially
dry summer had, he tells us, caused the
springs generally to fail, and the troops
on their way through the desert were
SO º: with drought, and so choked
with dust, that they could no longer
converse, but could barely articulate
“Water, water.” At length they reach-
ed a well, but the water was so foul that
at first none would drink it. Seeing
this, Severus caused a goblet to be filled
for himself, and in the sight of the
troops swallowed the whole at a draught.
The men then consented to drink and
were refreshed. (Dio Cass. lxxv. 2.)
11 Dio says, vaguely that Severus
“gave dignity” to Nisibis (lxxv. 3, §§to-
pua. Th Nooribew Souſs). The nature of the
dignity appears from the coins, which
give Nisibis the titles of KOAONIA and
MHTPOIIOAIX. . (See Mionnet, Descrip-
tion, dºc., tom. v. pp. 625-628.)
** Dio Cass. 1. s. c. Compare Spartian.
Sev. Imp. § 9. In commemoration of
these successes Severus took the epi-
thets of Arabicus and Adiabenicus,
which are frequent in his inscriptions
and on his coins. (See Clinton, F. R.
vol. i. p. 196. * ,
, 13 See Dio Cass. lxxv, 9.
14 Spartianus. See his “Life of Seve-
rus,” $ 15, where we are told that Seve-
rus, as soon as he arrived in Syria,
** Parthos swimmovit.” -
*** A.state igitur jam exeunte ingres-
sus,” &c. (Spartian. Sev. Imp. § 16, ad
init -
16 Herodian. iii. 1.
** Compare on this subject Herodian,
iii. 27 with Lio Cass. lxxv. 9. . .
18 This is to be gathered from the ex-
pression of Dio (lxxv. 9, ad fin. uépos. Te
rims’Applevias &mi tā eipivn'xaptorato), which
must denote the cession to Volagases of
some part of the Roman Armenia (Ar-
menia, Minor).
10 Herodian. iii. 27, ad fin.
20 Dio Cass. lxxv. 9,
21 This seems to be the only way of
reconciling Dio (lxxv. 9) with Herodian
(iii. 28, ad init.) -
22 See text, p. 176.
, THE SIXTH MOWARCHY. *
t
[CH. XX.
• 23 Dio Cass. l. s. c. .
** Herodian’s narrative is absurd as it
stands; but there may be some truth in
his statement that the Romans found
the Parthians unprepared (Trpoo Trearávres
of 'Poplatov &trapaakevãotous tois Bapëápots,
iii. 30).
* Spartianus (Sev. Imp. § 16.
phontem pulso rege pervenit ’’).
** Herodian. 1... s. c. Dio implies the
flight of Volagases, when he says ou uév-
To oute rov Oboxáyatorov ěmečiałew [6 Xe-
Bnpos]. - - .
27. Compare Dio Cass. lxxv. 9 with FIe-
rodian. iii. 30; and see also Spartian.
Sev. Imp. § 16: “Oppidum cepit, et re-
gem fugavit, et plurianos interemit.” "
38 Spartian. Sev. Imp. § 16. -
29 Ibid. “ ius ire non potuit.”
Dio, however, expresses surprise that no
pursuit was attempted.
80 Dio Cass. lxxv. 9.
$1 See text, p. 179.
82 Dio Cass. lxxv. 10. It is uncertain
whether Herodian means to describe the
first or second attack. e mentions
One siege only, and places it before that
of Ctesiphon (iii. 28, 29); but the narra-
tive of Dio, which is at once more, mi-
nute, and internally more probable,
seems preferable.
* One of these was Laetus, who a lit-
tle earlier had saved Nisibis (see above,
note 13). Severus (according to Dio)
grew jealous of him, because the sol-
diers declared that they would follows
no other leader. Marius Maximus, how-
ever, assigned his death to a different
cause, and placed it earlier. (See Spar-
tian. Sev. Imp. § 15.) .
4 Dio Cass lxxv. 11. l
85 Ibid. lxxv. 12. The ruins of this
temple still exist at El Hadhr.
8° The combustible material used is
said to have been naphtha. the flame of
which was thought to be almost inextin-
guishable. (Dio Cass. Fr. 175, § 2; lxxv.
11. Compare Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6, p.
*Herodian. iii. 28.
* Dio Cass. lxxv. 11, ad fin,
id, ch. 12
** Ctesi-


49 Spartian tells us (Sev. Imp. § 16)
that Ctesiphon was taken at the begin-
ning of winter (“hiemali prope tem;
re”). Herodian places the siege of
gºtra at the time of the great heats (iii.
2
). . - -
** Dio says that one of the officers of
Severus offered to take Hatra if 550 Eu-
ropean troops were placed at his dis-
posal. The reply of Severus. was.
“Whence am I to get such a number of
Soldiers ?”
42 Dio Cass. lxxv. 13.
4° Spartian. Sev. Imp. § 18:-“Adia-
benos in tributarios coegit.” This au-
thority is superior to that of Aurelius
Victor, who says—“Adiabena quoque,
ni terrarum macies despectaretur, in .
tributarios concessisset. (De Coes. § º
* See Clinton, F. R. vol. i. pp. 204–208.

CH. XXI.]
45 See text;
. O. 24.
46 Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 218.
CHAPTER XXI. g
1 The negotiations between Caracallus
and Artabanus, which Herodian de-
scribes (iv. 18–20), must have taken
lace in the course of this year. (See
É. F. R. vol. i. p. 224.) -
2 See Lindsay, History and Coinage,
pp. 113. 114.
8 Dio Cass. lxxvii. 12.
4 Ibid., lxxvii. 19 and 21. The IIápôos
of the latter chapter must, it would
seem, be the Oùoxáyaupog of the former.
* Herodian. I. S. c. Dio Cass. lxxviii. 1.
• Dio Cass. lxxvii. 22; Herodian. iv.
13 ; Spanheim, De Usu Numism. Diss.
X}l.
7 Dio Cass. lxxvii. 12. (Compare Gib-
bon, vol. i. p. 343 : Smith's edition.) -
8 Dio Cass. l. s. c.
9 Ibid. lxxvii. 21.
10 These were a certain Tiridates, who
seems to have been an Armenian prince,
and a Cynic philosopher, named Anti-
ochus (Dio Cass. lxxvii. 19).
11 Ibid. lxxvii. 21.
12 Herodian. iv. 18:-IIéutreu 88 mpea-
Betav kai 6 as p a "r à a m s iſ Ams, r s tro A v -
t e A o 0 s k a i r 6 x v m s to tri Ams.
18 Herºdian, iv. 18.
14 See Dio Cass. lv. 23, 24.
1 * Tà w8w rpara rotatºra èrtorréAAww, tra -
p m r e i r o. (Herodian. iv. 19.)
16 Dio Cass. lxviii. 1.
17 Herodian. iv. 20. The full passage
in Herodian is as follows:–” But when
Antoninus urged his request, and added
fresh gifts and oaths in confirmation
of his serious meaning and real friendli-
ness, the Barbarian yielded, and pro-
mised to give him his daughter, and
addressed him as his future son-in-law.
Now, when this was noised abroad, the
Parthians made ready to receive the
Roman monarch, and were transported
with joy at the prospect of an eternal
peace. Antoninus thereupon crossed
the rivers without hindrance, and enter-
ed Parthia, just as if it were his own
land. Everywhere along his route the
people greeted him with sacrifices,
and dressing their altars with garlands,
offered upon them all manner of spices
and incense; whereat he made pretence
of being vastly pleased. As his journey
now approached its close, and he drew
near to the Parthian Court. Artabanus,
instead of awaiting his arrivai, went
out and met him in the spacious plain
before the city. with intent to entertain
his daughter's bridegroom and his own
Son-in-law. Meanwhile the whole mul-
titude of the barbarians, crowned with
freshly gathered flowers, and clad in
fºrº worked with gold and various-
y dyed, were keeping holiday, , and
dancing gracefully to the sound of the
flute, the pipe, and the drum, an amuse-
ment wherein they take great delight
• THE SIXTH MONARCHY,
after they have indulged freely in wine.
Now, after all the Fº had come to-
gether, they got off their horses, hung
their quivers and their bows, and gave
themselves wholly to libations and re- .
vels. The concourse of barbarians was
very great, and they stood arranged in
no order, since they did not apprehend
any danger, but were all endeavoring to
catch a sight of the bridegroom. Sud-
denly Antoninus gives his men the
signal to fall on, and massacre the bar-
arians. These, amazed at the attack,
and finding themselves struck and
wounded, forthwith took to flight. Arta-
banus was hurried away by his guards.
and put on a horse, whereby he escaped
with a few followers. The rest of the
barbarians were cut to pieces, since
they could not reach their horses,
which, when they dismounted, they
had allowed to graze freely over the
plain; nor were they able to make use
of their legs, since these were entangled
in the long flowing garments which de-
scended to their heels, Many too had
come without quivers or bows, as they
were not wanted at a wedding. Anto.
minus, when he had made a vast slaugh-
ter, and taken a multitude of prisoners,
and a rich booty, moved off without
#º any resistance. He allowed
his soldiers to burn all the cities and
villages, and to carry away as plunder
whatever they chose.” No doubt this
passage contains a good deal of rhetoric;
but it describes a scene which we can
scarcely suppose to be imaginary.
18 Ramsay in Smith's Biog, Dict, vol.
i. p. 608; ampagny, Les Césars dw
8me. Siècle, vol. i. p. 385, &c.
** There is something supicious in the
extreme brevity of io's narrative
(lxxviii. 1), and in his statement that he
has nothing important to tell of the war
beyond the fact that when two soldiers
Were quarrelling over a wine-skin,
Caracallus ordered them to cut it in two
with their swords, and they obeyed him.
His account of the war in this place
does not harmonize with his statement
in ch. 26, that Artabanus was violently
angry at the treatment which he had re-
ceived and determined to resent it.
Again, the price which he allows tha
Macrinus paid for peace (ch. 27), is
altogether exorbitant unless it was
agreed to as compensation for some ex-
traordinary outrage.
20 Dio says that there was no engage- *
ment at all between the Parthians and
the Romans (lxxviii. 1). Spartianus
speaks of a battle in; which Caracallus
defeated the Satraps of Artabanus (Ant.
Caracall. § 6). Dio makes the countries
invaded Adiabéné and Media. Spar-
tianus indicates, a more southern local-
ity by saying that the invading army
assed through Babylonia. (“per Baby-
onios,” 1. s. c.) -
* Spartianus says “per-Cadwsios et
*.
\
As
&
*
*
632 /
Babylonios” (Ant. Caracall. § 6); but
this is impossible, since the Cadusii lay
upon the Caspian. . -
22 Dio Cass. lxxviii. 1. The mention of
Arbela indicates this route. ,
. 28 Assyrian and Persian monarchs con-
stantly conveyed to Arbela great crimi-
nals to be executed there. (See th
Journal of As. Society for 1865, p. 195,
note 17.) Rabbinical tradition placed
•e the tomb of Seth. (Schindler’s
Pentaglott, col. 144.) * * :
, 24 See Gibbon, vol. i. p. 272 (Smith's
edition). Both the phrases quoted are
used by this writer.
25 Hérodian. iv. 21; Spartian. Amt.
Car, $6. . . . . . . . . .
26 Dio Cass. lxxviii. 3. .
27 Ibid. lxxviii. 5; Herodian. . iv. 24;
Spart. l. s. c.; Eutrop. Brev. viii. 11.
28 Herodian. iv. 27; Dio Cass. lxxviii.
29 Dio Cass, lxxviii. 26. -
80 I follow here the narrative of Hero
dian (iv. 30), since the passage of . Dio
which contained an account of the
struggle is too much mutilated to be in-
telligible.
Si Herodian. iv. 28.
83 Ibid. iv. 30 (p. 172).
88 Dio Cass. lxxviii. 26.
84 Herodian. iv. 30 (p. 173).
85 So Herodian, 1. s. c. - -
86 Herodian makes the third day's bat-
tle terminate, like those of the two pre-
ceding days, without decisive result; but
Dio evidently regarded the Romans as
vanquished.
87 See the fragment of Dio, which (as
restored by Fabricius) reads thus:-rfi
rod Makpivov buyff &6vumarãprevol httà0m-
of ºv. - -
38 See, Dio Cass. lxxviii. 27.
89 The ignominy was cloaked under the
transparentfiction that the payment was
by way of presents to the Parthian mom-
arch and his lords (Dio Cass. 1. s. c.).
40 Agathias; ii. 26.
41 Agathias, ii. 25. "Hv 8é ye otros Ti,
Mayukh Károxos tepovgyiq, kai airrovpyos riov
&trońdmrov. ' &
42 See Malcolm's History of Persia,
vol. i. pp. 94, 95. Compare Gibbon. De-
cline and Fall, vol. i. pp. 322, 323, Smith's
edition. .
48 Malcolm, p. 95.
** See text, pp. 199, 200. -
45 Mos. Choren. Hist, Amen. ii. 68.
46 Strab. xv. 3, $4. - ,
47. See text, p. 48. - - -
48 Agathias, ii. 25. . . . .
49 Herodian, iv. 30, p. 174. . . •
50 Herodian (vi. 6) says:–'Apraśépêms à
II e p or ò v 8 a. or w A e i s , wers, rb Hap6vaíovs.
Ka8exeiv kai riis rară rºw divaroxyv dipx?s
trapaxiorat, 'Apréflavov row ºrpótepov kaxoiſ-
plewow row uéyav Baoru Méa kai Švari 6taôjuaort
xpºpulevov dºrékreuve. Dio, it is true. seems
to have called him merely “a certain
Persian” ('Apraśépêms ris IIépons); and
later writers indulged in various tales as
to his low birth. (Agathias, ii. 27; Gib-
THE STXTEI MONARCH)'.
*. • *
;
[CH. XXI.:

bon, Decline and Fall, vol. i. p. 331;
Malcolm, JHist of Persia, vol. i. pp.
89, 90.) But these stories are probabl
myths. which clustered about the foun-
der of the second Persian kingdom as so
many similar ones did about the founder
of the first, Cyrus. (Herod. i. 107-128.)
On the abundance of such myths in con-
nection with the person of Artaxerxes,
see Moses of Chorene (Hist. Arm. ii. 67),
who speaks of “the dream of desire, and
the judgment, and the fire that sprang
from Sassan, the imprisoned flock and
the white eye, the predictions of the.
soothsayers, and all that follows them—
Artaxerxes' incest, and his murders, 1.he
wild eloquence of the Magian dansel ow-
ing to the calf, &c.; the she-goat, which,
protected by the Eagle, suckled the boy;
the information of the Crow, and the
Lion's remiss, defence, the service ren-
dered by the Wolf, and the strange trial
of strength, and all the other silly fables
which are related in the books, but which
I do not intend to repeat.”
51. The exact date of the rebellion of
Artaxerxes is unknown. Roman writers
only tell us that he conquered Artabanus
and began to threaten Rome in A.D. 226,
The coins confirm this. but add nothing.
Abulpharagius, the Arabian writer. says
that Artaxerxes founded the New Per-
sian kingdom in the third year of Alex-
ander Severus, or A. n. 224 (p. 80).
* Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. i. p.
r f .
91.
53 Ibid. -
54 I)io. Cass. lxxx. 3. .
** So Malcolm, following Persian au-
thorities. (History of Persia, l. s. c.)
* Dio Cass. l. s. c.; Herodion. vi. 6, 7;
Agathias, ii. 25, &c. . - $
57 Dio Cass, I. S. c.
* A coin of Artavasdes has been fig-
ured and described by Mr. Taylor in the
Numismatic Chronicle for 1871, p. 226,
and pl. ii. No. 7. The same coin is fig.
ured also, but ve poorly, in Lindsay
(History and Coimage, pl. iv. No. 95), and
is there assigned wrongly to Volagases
V. The legeud upon it can be read as
Yººn-YR (Artabazu) or Artavasdes.
Some coins of this king bear the date
©Aq}, or A.D. 227. r -
59 Procopius de AEdific. Justinian. iii.
1. The native historians give this prince
the name of Chosroes, but do not ac-
knowledge his close relationship to Ar-
* (See Mos. Chor. Hist. Arm. ii.
64-7
60 Dio Cass, l. S. c. On the efforts
which were made by the Armenian king
to help Artabanus, see Mos. Chor. H. A.
ii. 68,70
6i hio
dian, vi.
62 Mos.' Chor. H. A. ii. 70.
* Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. i.
p. 96. note. #
3 ** See text, p. 130.
* See text, p. 168.
'Cass, ut supra. Compare Hero-
15,
—==
cH. XXII.] THE SIXTH MONARCHY. 633
* , CHAPTER XXII. f 21 The “female form floating in air”
1 Fergusson, History of Architecture,
vol. ii. p. 422. . -
* See Art. xxii. pp. 467–470.
3 Vol. ii. pp. 423–425.
4 See Arriam. Fr. 15: "Atpat, máxts ple-
rašū Evºpérov kai Tiypnros. Compare Dio
Cass. lxviii. 31; likxv. 10; Herodian. iii.
1 and 28; Arrian, Fr. 6.
5 Amm. Marc. xxv. 8. “Hatram . . .
oppidum, quod diruendum adorti tem-
poribus variis Trajanus et Severus, prin-
cipes bellicosi, cum exercitibus paene
deleti sunt.” See above, pp. 179 and 197.
6 Herodian. iii. 28.
7 Dio Cass. lxxv. 12.
* Herodian, iii. 1 and 27. .
* Amm. Marc. l. s. c. “Hatram . . .
vetus oppidum in media solitudine posi-
tum, olimgwe desertwm.”
10 In this description I follow especi-
ally the account given by Mr.
graph, Journal, l. S. c.) On some points
I am further indebted to Mr. Ainsworth
(Geographical Journal, vol. xi. pp. 13 et
seq; Researches in Mesopotamia, vol. ii.
pp. 165 et segg.), and orio thers to Mr.
Fergusson (History of Architecture, vol.
ii. 423–425
- 30). .
11 The width was a little more than ten
eet.
12 Mr. Ross's plan shows one#º
only—viz., the eastern one. r. Ains-
worth, however, states that there were
four. The plan which the latter travel-
ler sent with his memoir to the Royal
Geographical Society was, unfortu-
nately, not published. -
18 Mr. Ross represents the watercourse
as straight, but Mr. Ainsworth says it is
tortuous. (Researches, vol. ii. p. 167.)
14 In the East the Temple was com-
monly, or at any rate frequently, an ad-
junct of the palace. Two temples form-
ed part of the old Assyrian palace at Ca-
lah or Nimrud. (See Ancient Monarchies,
vol. i. pp. 319–320, 2nd edition.) A tem-
ple was included within Sargon's palace
at Khorsabad (ibid. p. 296). Mr. Fergus-
son regards the grand buildings at Per-
sepolis as “Palace-Temples.”
15 These measurements were furnish-
ed to Mr Fergusson by Mr. Layard.
(Hist, of Architecture, vol. ii. pp. 423–4.
Mr. Ross regarded the enclosure as “a
square of 300 good paces” (query, yards?)
; the Geograph. Journal, vol. ix. p.
16 Ainsworth, Researches, &c., vol. ii.
p. 166. At the southern extremity of the
row of small chambers was a hall of
Some size.
17 So Mr. Ross (Geograph. Journal, l.
S. c.) But from the drawing it would
seem that the estimate is insufficient.
18 Mr. Ross says “32 long paces,” by
which he seems to mean “steps.” Mr.
Ainsworth says “31 yards.”
19 “Twelve long paces” (Ross). “Four-
teen yards” (Ainsworth).
30 Mr. Ross and Mr. Ainsworth agree in
this estimate.
was confined to the hall marked No. II.
on the plan [see Pl. IV. Fig. 2]... The
stones of the other arches bore heads
both male and female, some with “very
curious curling bagwigs.” (Compare the
bushy wigs on many of the Parthian
Coins.)- . . .
22 In the Hall marked No. II. on the
plan [see Pl. IV. Fig 2), the heads were
uniformly three, as in Plate W. Fig. 1.
In Hall No. V. each pillar bore two,
heads. Hall No. VII. seems to have
had no pillars. The north side is in ruins:
the south is ornamented with a row of
eight human-headed bulls, standing out
from the walls as far as their shoulders
at a distance from the ground of about
ten feet. (Ross in Geographical Journal,
vol. ix. p.409.) -
28 See above, note 21. • ,
24 Ainsworth, Researches, vol. ii. p.
165, Mr. Ross believed that he found
traces of a staircase leading to the upper
rooms at the Soutlern end of the build-
.# (Geograph. Jowrmal, vol. ix. p.
& M.J.
*see the ground plan in Mr. Fergus-
son's History of Architecture, vol. ii. p.
ºss in Geograph. Journal, vol. ix.
p. 408. -
27 See Plate W. Fig. 1. .
.* Layard, Nineveh and Babylon, p.
à l'.
29 See text, p. 187. *. -
30 Ross in Geograph. Journal, vol. ix.
p. 370, Mr. Ainsworth regards some of
these buildings as dwelling houses, and
thinks that only upon a very cursory
inspection could they have been con-
sidered in all cases tombs (Researches,
vol. ii. p. 171). He does not, however,
question the sepulchral character of the
greater number. .
31 As º those at Serbistan and
Firuzabad, described by Mr. Fergusson
in his History of Architecture, vol. ii.
pp. 428–430.
82 See Loftus, Chaldoea and Swsiana,
pp. 202—214.
º Loftus, Chaldaea and Susiana, p.

34 Ibid. p. 225. (See Pl, W. Fig. 1.)
**Ibid. p. 227. Mr. Loftus argues that
the peculiarities of Saracenic architec-
ture, its richly wrought tracing and geo-
metric ornamentation, originated with
the Parthians, were disused by the Sas-
sanians, and after the Mohammedan
conquest were revived by the Arabs,
(Chaldoea and Susiana, p. 228.)
Së . , see Loftus, pp.
203–206; Layard, Nineveh, and Babylon,
p, 558; Rawlinson, Herodotus, vol. i. p.
272, 2nd edition. t
37 Loftus, p. 213. f
38 Ibid., p. 214.
** Similar, ideas existed among the
early Babylonians (Ancient Monarch: .
tes, vol. i. pp. 86–89, 2nd edition), and had
probably been passed on to the mixed
*
.*
' mal is intended for a bear
r i
634
race which inhabited the same tract of
country under the Parthians.
40 As Mr. Loftus Supposed (Chaldoea.
and Susiana, p. 211).
41 See Ancient Momarchies, vol. i. p.
389; vol. ii. p. 570, 2nd edit. . .
42 Compare the note of Sir D. Brews-
ter at the end of Mr. Layard's Ninteveh.
and Babylon, } 674–676.
- ; Loftus, Chaldoea and Susiana, p.
21
44 Ibid.
45 On this inscription. see text, p. 147.
46 This monument was seen by Sir H.
Rawlinson in 1838. and described in the
Journal of the Geographical Society,
vol. ix. p. 115. It was carefully copied
by M. Coste and inserted in the great
work of M. Flandin (Voyage en Perse,
Planches Anciennes. No. 119). The ac-
companying [Pl. VII.] is taken from this
engraving.
"...andin, |Woyage en Perse, tom. iv.
p 48 If the tºº were copied by a
erson versed in the character, it is
probable that there would be little diffi-
culty in deciphering it. But the differ-
ences between several of the Parthian
letters are so slight that it is extremely
hard for a person unskilled in the char-
acter to make a correct transcript. Still
the word “satrap” seems to be tracea-
ble at the commencement of the left-
hand inscription. -
49 These reliefs were communicated
by the Baron to M. Flandin, and will be
found represented in the Voyage en
Perse, tom. iv., plates 224 and 226. They
exist on an isolated mass of black rock,
near lenghi-Saoulek in the Bakhtyari
mountains (Voyage, tom. i. pp. 184, 185).
50 Strab. xv. 3, § 15.
*1 M. Flandin doubts whether the ani-
or a lion
(Voyage, p. 185); but his representation
fairly resembles the former, while it
pºents no likeness to the latter ani-
Iſlä,1.
* Compare a representation of a Par-
thian warrior in M. Flandin's work (pl.
225); and see also the coin of Labienus,
which represents him equipped in Par-
thian fashion (see Pl. II. Fig. 1.)
* The sculptures at Persepolis,
Nakhsh-i-Rustam. Behistun, &c., must
always have been exposed to view, and
would have sufficed to form a better
taste than that which is actually found
among the Parthians had they possessed
fair aesthetic capacity. That, besides
these, they possessed Greek models ap-
pears from the emblems upon their
COlnS.
CHAPTER XXIII.
1. By “the Zoroastrian system” must
be here understood, not the original
teaching of Zoroaster as exhibited to us
in the more ancient portions of the Zen-
davesta (see the author’s Amcient Mon-
archies, vol. ii. pp. 322–344), but the
*
THE SIXTH MONARCHY.
[CH. XXIII.
mixed religion produced by the contact
of Zoroastrianism with Magism, which
was adopted by the Achaemenian mon-
archs from Xerxes downwards. (Ibid.
pp. 344–354.)
*2 Amun. Marc. xxiii. 6, p. 405, ed. Gro-
In OV.
8 Herodia.n. iv. 30.
"HAvov, tos é60s attois.
4 The worship at Hatra (see text, p.
196) is probably a fair specimen of the
Parthian cult of the Sun at other places.
The Hatreme worship may have had an
Arabian tinge, but, on the whole, it is
probable that it conformed itself to that
of the dominant people.
5 Mos. Chor. Hist. Arm. ii. 74.
6 Percep. Inscr. H. ll. 14, 22, 24.
7 See Mos. Choren. l. s. c.
B Joseph. Amt. Jud. xviii. 9, § 3.
9 Ibid. § 6.
10 We have an account of this worship
only in Josephus (Ant. Jud. xviii. 9, § 5);
he, however, appears to be perfectly fa-
miliar with it. He calls the images dºu-
8ptſpara rav 6eſov and arefláaptata, and the
worship offered to them 9epareiav or 0pm-
grket
1 1
2 , *
Aatraorépuevot roy
clºs
Justin, xli. 3.
12 Ibid.
18 Strab. xi. 9, § 3.
14 Mos. Choren. Hist. Arm. l. s. c.
15 Herodia.n. iv. 30.
16 Agathias. ii. 26.
17 See text, p. 209.
18 Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6, p. 403; Jul. Ca-
pit. Vit. Ver. Imp. § 8.
1° Joseph. Amt, Jud. xviii. 9, § 1, et seq.
20 Ibid.
21 See Bayer, Hist. Edess. e numis il-
lustrata, iii. p. 173. and Asseman, Biblio-
theca Orientalis, vol. i. p. 423.
22 On the supposed letter of Abgarus,
king of Edessa, to our Lord, and the re-
ply to it, his cure by Thaddaeus, and the
conversion of his subjects, see Euseb.
Hist. Ec. i. 13. and compare Lardner,
Credibility, vol. vi. p. 596, and Burton,
Eccles. Hist. of First Three Centuries,
vol. i. pp. 328, 329.
28 A council was held in Edessa on the
proper time for keeping Easter in the
year A.D. . (Burton, vol. ii. p. 216.)
The Syriac (Peshito) version of the
Scriptures was proba made for the
Edessene Christians before the end of
the first century (ib vol. i. p. 328; Mi-
chºeſ. Introduction, vii. § 8).
, ll. $9.
25 Hist, Eccles. iii. 1. Rufinus, who
wrote in the fourth century, says that
St. Thomas was buried at Edessa.
(Hist. Eccl. ii. 5. Compare Socrat. iv.
18 and Sozom. vi. 18.)
* Bardesanes ap. Euseb. Proep. Ev.
vi. 10. ardesanes was a native o
Edessa, and wrote a little after the mid-
dle of the second century. -
27 Herodian. iii. 1.
28 Ibid. ‘O IIapóvatos émigrexe?v čºm
Tots orarpátraws Śiśvapºuv &6pougeuv' otºro yap
etw8ev, Örmvika av Šembi, oſtparöv ovXAéyeuv,
cH. XXIII.]
rig ºn ºxetv uvoróo bopov's kai ovveotös atpa-
Titº’t the 01/.
29 These auxiliary forces are not often
mentioned by the Greek and Latin
writers. Still occasionally we catch a
glimpse of them. (See Joseph. xviii. 9,
§ 2; xx. 3, § 4, &c.)
30 Justin, xli. 2.
31 Plutarch, Crass. § 21. Etxe & rois
orijutravras itrare is [6 ×oupſ vas], 6,...od trexé-
ras Te Kai Soukous, uvpiov oux àtroöéovtas.
** Justin (l. s. c.) estimates the nobles
in the Parthian army which fought
against Antony at 400, the army itself at
b0,000. This would give to each noble an
average of 125 followers.
This, at any rate, was the propor-
tion in the case mentioned in note 31,
where the 10,000 slaves and retainers of
Surenas were accompanied by a thou-
sand baggage-camels. (Plut. l. s. c.;
Appiº Parth. p. 141.
º Plut. Ch'ass. § 19 ; Appian, Parth. p.
* As that employed against Crassus.
(See text, p. 89.) -
36 ſº dipoğüporous kai orw8mpoºs.
•epak as
Plut. Crass. § 25. Compare Justin, xli
2, ſtal fin
37 Plut. Crass. § 34.
38 Ibid. §§ 18, 25.
89 Ibid. § 34. I(pāvm rod Mapylavoj artôň-
pov artiagovtos bái, kai Tupuxaputrés.
40 Herodian. iv. 30, p. 173. The repre-
sentation of a mailed warrior thus at-
tired at Takht-i-Bostan (Ker Porter, vol.
ii. Pl. 62), though of the Sassanian pe-
riod, lends force to the statement of He-
rodian.
41 Dio Cass. Xl. 15. Compare Justin,
xli. 2, ad filt.
42 Plut. Ant. § 45; Crass. § 27: Dio
Cass. xl. 22: Appian. Parth. p. 148; He-
rodian. iv. 30.
48 App. Parth. p. 144. The size and
stºk of the bow which they used en-
abled the Parthians to deliver their ar-
rows at a speed which was very unusual,
and which made them most formidable
archers. (See Plut. Crass. $$ 18 and 24.)
The arrow was not seen till it struck,
and it pierced easily through all cus-
tomary armor.
44 The knife, which was worn in pri-
vate life (Joseph. Amt. Jud: xviii. 2, § 4),
was certainly not laid aside in war. It
was frequently employed to cut off the
head of a dead enemy. (Plut. Crass.
§§ 25 and 34.)
45 Justin, l. s. c.
46 Plut. Crass. § 24, ad init.
47 Justin, l. s. c. “Hos pari ac liberos
'suos cura habent, et equitare et sagit-
tare magna industria docent.”
48 Plut. Crass. § 24. cud fin. : Justin. xli.
2; Virg, Georg. iii. 31: Hor. Od. i. 19, 11:
ii. 13, 16; Tacit. Amm. vi. 35.
49 Dio Cass. xl. 24.
50 Dio Cass. H. S. c.
ºut. Crass. $ 21: Appian, Parthica,
1
** Herodian. iv. 28, 30.
THE SIXTH MoMARCHY. /
58 Ibid., p. 172.
54 Dio Cass. xl. 15, ad fin.
** Justin, xli. 2: — "Obsessas expug-
nare urbes mesciunt.” Compare Dio
Cass. xl. 29 ('A&varot wroxtopic?orai Tu şoav)
and Tacit. Ann. xv. 4 (“ Partho ad ex-
sequendas obsidiones nulla cominus au-
daeia”).
5* They were ready to have besieged
Crassus in Carrhae, if he had shut him-
self up in it (Plut. Crass. $28). They ac-
tually besieged Antioch in B.C. 52, and
Apamaea in B. c. 40. See text, pp. 101
and 106.)
57 See Plut. Anton. § 49. Their per-
sistency against Macrinus is noticed as
something strange and unusual (Hero-
dian. iv. 30; pp. 173, 174).
58 Plut. Crass. $29:—Nuktoplaxsºv oi rā-
rptov airois éorruv. Compare Anton. § 47.
5° So Dio (xl. 24). But the real grounds
of their usage, a usage common to them
with the Persians, are better seen from
what Xenoplyon says of the latter.
Anab. iii. 4, §34. Compare Ancient Mon-
archies, vol. iv. p. 138.)
6 a p & To
kow. (Plut. Amt. § 47.)
*1 Dio Cass. xl. 15; Plut. Anton. $ 40.
62 See text, p. 57. -
** See text, p, 157.
*4 Tov hAtov p^oya&éarratov Švra övéxov-
rººft guvnéeug. (Dio Cass. i. s.c.)
t }
** Plutarch says that the general em-
Rºy: against Crassus was accompanied
y 200 chariots containing his concu-
bines (Crass. § 21)
07 Ibid. § 32. Kat' oupāv rºs báAayyos
eis Trópwas kai kpótaxa kat HaAmoirs kai trav-
vuxièas &kołóatous werd. Yuvatków rexévraj-
cºlº.
* Ibid. Xexevkváðss éraipal Movoroupyot.
* Dio Cass. xi. 15, ad fin. -
70 Plut. Crass. § 21. If the general em-
ployed against Crassus had a thousand
baggage camels for his own slaves and
retainers, the entire army may be pre-
sumned to have been accompanied by
see: thousands.
* § 11; xxxi. 8, § 11;
Strab. xv. 1, § 36: Plut. Aleat. § 62.
78 The elephant occurs on the coins of
the Bactrian kings (Mionnet, Supplé-
ment, tom. viii. pp. 482, 485). One Inon-
arch, Demetrius, wears a head-dress
made out of the head of an elephant
(ibid. p. 473).
74 Tacit. A mºn, xv. 15. -
75 See Amm. Marc. xxv. 3, 6, &c.; and
compare Malcolm, History of Persia,
vol. i. p. 170; Ockley. History of the Sa-
racens, p. 143: Ker Porter, Travels, vol.
ii. Pl. 63 and 64.
7& Plut. Crass. § 26; Herodian. iv. 30.
77 Justin. xli. 2; Plut. Crass. § 23, sub
fin...: Appian, Parth. p. 143.
78 Plut. ('rags $27.
79 Compare Dio Cass. xl. 15: Plut, Amt.
§§ 29, 42, 45; Herodian. iv. 30. Justin's
summary expresses a fair judgment:—
e i to 6 Ös étu vukrös éðtwo-
*
636
“Pugnant procurrentibus equis. aut
terga dantibus; sacpe etiam fugam sim-
ulant, ut incautiones adversum vulnera
insequentes habeant. . . . Nec pugnare
diu possunt: caeterum intolerandi fo-
rent, si quantus his impetus est, vistanta
et perseverantia esset” (xl. 2).
80 Plut. Crass. § 30; Anton. §§ 46 and
-s 81 Plutarch, l. S. c. .
82 Well. Paterc. ii. 101; Joseph. Ant.
Jud. xviii. 4, § 5.
88 On the Parthian knowledge of
Greek, see Plut. Crass. § 33. . I gather
from Dio and Herodian that Greek was
the language used in the diplomatic in-
tercourse of the Parthians and Ro-
In all S.
84 See the passages cited in note 82.
85 Plut. Cross. § 31. Aety 63 ypg}raoréat
rås avv6%kas. Compare Herodian. iv. 1
and 30. -
89 Hence such phrases as “renovari
deactras” (Tac. Amm. ii. 58), and the like.
87 Herodian. iv. 30.
88 Joseph. Amt. Jud. xviii. 2, § 4; 4,
$ 5: Tacit. Ann. xv. 25; Herodian. iv. 18.
, p. 121.
• Žitºid. xviii. 4, § 5.
°l On these letters, see Tacit. Ann. xv.
24; Dio Cass. lv. 11; Sueton. Tiber. § 66;
Herodian. iv. 18, 19, 30, &c.
** Joseph. Amt. Jud. xx. 2, § 3.
98 Ibid. xviii. 2, § 4; Tacit. Ann. ii. 1;
Strab. xvi. 1, -
94 Joseph. xviii. 4, § 5.
*5 See text, p. 5.
9° Strab. xi. 9, § 1.
97 Herodian. iv. 19.
98 Strab. xi. 13, § 1.
THE SIXTH MONARCHY, -
99 Joseph. Ant. Jud. xvii. 2, § 4.
100 Plut. Crass. § 32, ad fin.
. 101 See text, p. 124.
109 Philostratus is, so far as I know,
the only writer who mentions the em-
ployment of eunuchs by the Parthians.
According to him, eunuchs occupied
that position in the royal harem which
is usual in the East (Vit. Apoll. i. 37),
and held sometimes the office of satrap
in the provinces (ib. i. 21).
: 108 See Justin, ºxli. 2. The obverse of
Parthian coins frequently exhibits the
monarch thus apparelled. [Pl. X. Fig. 2.]
- 194 Compare the engravings on Pl. II.
105 See Pl. I. Fig. 4.
10° See Pl. I. Fig. 4 and III. Fig. 4.
107 See Pl. II. Fig. 4. .
108 On the obverse of the early Par-
thian coins the monarch is usually rep-
reinted in this attire. [Pl. X. Fig. 3..]
. 22
110 Plut. Anton. § 44.
111 AvagoNets. See Plut. Crass. § 31.
113 See Pl. II. Fig. 2.
118 Philostratus was born about A.D.
172, and lived to about A.D. 244, or a
little later. He was thus contemporary
with the Parthian kings Volagases III.,
Volagases IV. Volagases V. and Arta-
anus, the last monarch. His life of
Apollonius of Tyana, which contains ,
f
[CH. XXIII.
*
the description given in the text, as well
as other curious information about Par-
thia, is no doubt an historical romance;
but its local coloring seems intended to
be correct, and is probably not far from
the truth. -
114 Philostr., Vit. Apoll. Tyan. i. 25.
115 Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6: p. 397. -
11° See the narrative in Josephus (Ant.
* xx. 8, §§ 1, 2); and compare text, p.
140.
, 117 Posidon. ap. Athen. Deipm. iv. 13;
p. 152, F.
118 Ibid. p. 153. A. . . -
11° Philostrat. Vit. Apoll. Tyan. i. 21
and 28. -
140 Joseph. Ant. Jud. xx. 3, § 3.
12, Philostrat. Vit. Ap. Tyan. i. 28.
122 Ibid. i. 34.
125 See text, p. 48. -
124 Plut. Crass. § 21. K a rā y á v os
pºv otiv čá ápx?s éxértnro Baqtāet yºvokévº
IIáp3ow étruiru66val to Suáðmula trparov.
125 TI-Yi
. I. S. C.
1* This appears especially in the case
of the officer employed against Crassus,
who was attended in the field by 200
litters containing his wives and con-
cubines. In a less degree. it appears
also in the case of the Mithridates at-
tacked by Anilai. (See text. p. 137.)
137. See Philostr. Vit. Ap. Tijan. i. 22
and 38; Joseph. Ant. Jud. xviii. 2, § 4;
Justin. xli. 5; Suet. Caii Vit. § 5.
128 Philostr. i. 22.
12° The tiger has always been a native
of Hyrcania and the low tract south of
the Caspian. Bears have always inhab-
ited Mount Zagros, while leopards
abound in Mesopotamia.
180 Philostr. i. 38. Oripta Begaoravia'ſ eva
kai trapá ràv böauv rav Šavròv Šešov atopiéva.
181 Gen. x. 9. }
stin. xli. ii. “Vestis perlucida et
.” Cf. Herodian iv. 20.
188 Lucian. De conscrib, hist. § 19. `
184 Fierodian. 1. s. c. r
185 Ibid. -
13° Joseph, Ant. Jud. xviii. 2, § 4. Ma-
xatpodopetv č60s attaa iv.
137 Justin, xli. 8, ad fin. “In cibo
parcus.
158 Pliny, H. N. xi. 53. .
189, Ibid. xiv. 22. . According to Pliny,
the Parthians of his time (A.D. 50–70) ate
and drank so immoderately as to ren-
der their breath unpleasent. To remedy
this defect, the nobles were in the habit
of munching the pips of citrons (H. N.
xi. 53; xii. 3).
140 Justin' says—“Carne non nisi ve-
natibus quaesita vescuntur" (l. s. c.); but
we must correct him as to the later
period of the Empire from Philostratus
(Vit. Ap. Tyam. i. 21).
hilostr. 1. s. c.
144 Philostr. 1. S. C.
145 Compare Plin. H. N. xiv. 16 with
Philostr., Vit. Ap. Tyam. i. 21; p. 27.
146 Philostr. 1. s. c. . . . . . . . . .
*
- **.
a
CH. XXIII.]
.” Herodian. iv. 20; Athen. Deipn.
- THE SIXTH MONARCHY.
637
f
178 Joseph. Amt. Jud. xviii. 9, § 3. Oi,
yāp & bevºraºré ris Šešºv Ur airroš Šáaeos
yevouéums. - -
174 The opposite statement of Justin
(“Fides dictis promissisque nulla nisi
uatenus expedit,” xli. 3, ad fin.), and
the sneer of Horace (“Parthis men-
dacior,’’ Ep. I. ii. 112) are contradicted
by the whole tenor of Parthian history,
and must be considered as merely par-
allel to the charges of Punic perfidy,”
alleged by Livy and others
• {
175 Philostr. Wit. Ap. Tyan. i. 21.
º Posid. ap. Athen. Deipn. iv. 13; p.
* 4
xIV. 5.
148 Philostr. 1. S. c.
149 Justin, xli. 3. “Feminis non con-
vivia tantum virorum, verum etiam con-
spectum interdicunt.”
150 Justin, l. S. c. “Nec ulla delicta.
adulterio gravius vindicant.”
151 See the story told by Josephus,
Ant, Jud. xviii. 9, § 6.
153 Justin, xii. 3, ad init.
. . . singuli plures habent.”
158 Plut. Crass, $ 21. .
155 Piut. Grºs.'s 32. :
*** See Num. Clurgm. vi. p. 104; Lind-
say, History and Coinage, &c., p. 208;
and, for the Bactrian writing, compare
Wilson, -11°iſtrict 4ntiqua, plates.
157 Bell. Jud. Proem. § 1 and § 2.
158 See text, p. 231.
iñº Philostr. Vit. Ap. Tyan, i. 20.
160 Ibid. i. 27, ad fin. "Hpero Suouá re
aúToº, kai 6 tº €irirmöstſov, kai à Tu bottºv;
Kai & Toypapáuevos Tººra ès ypguitaretov,
orroxiv re attoo kai eiðos, ékéivov pºv rept-
pleivat ke?\etjeu. -
161 Herodian. iii. 1. ‘O 8& IIapóvaios
& Tr to t e A e i v šq m rots oratpátraws. Hero-
dian uses étra réAAety in the sense of éirio-
roMás tréuſſetv, constantly. Compare iv.
18. , triaréAAet rig Bagrixel IIapóvatov :
Tà 53 yp a pi u a t a €Aeyev. iv. 21. Šptor-
TéAAst Til, avykXirº. v. 1.
re &muco "Poplatov kai Ti; avykäärö . . .
& 1, a y v we 6 e i or m s 88 ris rotatºrms étruatoxins.
103 Plin. H. N. xiii. 11, ad fin.
168 Herodian. iv. 18. At patrópov.
164 Ibid. -
105 Compare Plin. H. N. viii. 48; xi. 22,
23; and Athen. Deipºv. v. p. 197. Strabo's
stateinent that Borsippa was in his day
“a great staple of the linen trade”
(Auvovyetov pleya, xvi. i. § 7) is also an in-
dication that manufactures flourished
under the Parthiaus. • .
166 Plin. H. N. xi. 23. The use of silk
in Parthia is noted as early as B.o. 54,
when the flags attached to their stand-
aris are said to have been made of it
(Florus, iii. 11).
187 Plin. H. N. viii. 48.
165 lbid. xii. 9; xxi. 18.
1 tº See text, p. 225.
170 Euseb. Cliron. Can. i. 40, § 18, ad fin.
171 Note, as instances, the employ-
ment of Iſabienus in high command (see
text, p. 105) and the satrapial dignity of
the Jews, Asinai and Anilai (Joseph.
217tt. Jwd. xviii. 9, §§ 4–7).
172 Dio Cass. xlviii. 24; Joseph. Bell.
Jud. vii. 7, § 2.
** Uxores
êmio TéAAew tº
~ y L =
177 Plut. Crass. § 31. -
178 Compare the remarks of Strabo-
attvos 6' 6 Bios attov kai rā €6 m rò exovira.
troAi pºev to 64p;3apov kai ro Xxv6tköv, ºr A 6 -
ow we v to t t b x p ijo up ow trp os ye-
pi o v i a v. xi 9, § 2. .
17° See text, pp. 210, 211. -
1*0 Eckhel thought that the entire
series of tetradrachms, was Greek and
uot Parthian, being the issue of the
semi-independent Greek towns in the
Parthian dominions (Doctr. Nwm. Vet.
vol. iii. pp. 549, 550). M. Lenormant, in
his work on the early Parthian coins,
went further, and maintained (p. 3) that
all the good coins were of Greek work-
manship, and only the barbarous ones
native. But the best authorities seem
now convinced that (excepting a few
tetradrachms of Mithridates I, , see Pl.
I. Fig. 3.) the coins are all, in the
strictest sense, Parthian.
181 E.g. AIIIPAINOYX appears for
EIIIqba NOYX on a coin ascribed to Mith-
ridates I. (Lindsay, p. 166); IIAIKOPY
for IIAKOPOY on coins of Orodes I. (ib.
p. 170). &c.
182. The famous legend of Gotarzes,
which should have run (as is supposed)
TQTEPZHX BAXIAEYX BAXIAEQN AP-
XAKHX YIOX KEKAHMENOX. APTABA-
NOY appears under the form of TOTE-
PEHX BAXIAE . . . BAXIAEQN APXA-
KOY YOX KEKAAYXNOX. APTABANOY
(Lindsay, p. 153).
188 Among these, one of the most re-
markable is the corruption of the family
title APXAKOY (Arsaces) into a form
which is either actually or nearly APIA-
NOY a geographical or ethnic appella-
tive. Other errors merely orthographic,
are the substitution of X for Ik in AI-
KAIOY, which, from the time of l’hra-
ates IV., is almost uniformly written
AIXAIOY; of X for N ill pH.AEAAHNOX,
which is often written b1AEAAHXOX,
and the like. *
NOTES TO THE SEVENTH MONARCHY.
ER. I. t
1 See, on this point, Bishop Thirlwall's
excellent remarks, Hist, of Greece, vol.
vii. pp. 121–124, which are ºleº
met by Mr. Grote, Hist. of Greece, vol.
o xii. pp. 352–366.
• 2 Arrian, Earp. Al. vii. 4.
* Compare the Author's Siacth Mon-
- archy, p. 21.
4 Arrian, iii. 16, 22, 23; vi. 27, 29, &c.
* See Xen. Cyrop. viii. 6. §§ 3–16; and
compare the Author's Herodotus, vol.
ii. pp. 462–3, 2nd ed., and his Ancient
Moivurchies, vol. iii. p. 424, 2nd ed.
rrian, Fr. 1; Zosim. i. 18; Syncell. p.
284, B. Compare the Author's Siacth
Monarchy, p. 25.
7 Some were no doubt plundered un-
der Alexander, and others by his early
successors (Arrian, vi. 29, 30; Polyb. x.
27, § 12; &c.). But many remained un-
touched.
8 See Polyb. xxxi. 11; 1 Macab. vi. 1-4;
Appian, Syr. p. 101, C.
9 Polyb. 1. s. c.
10 Compare the Author's Siacth Mon-
archy, p. 43.
11 Justin, xxxvi. 1, § 3.
13 Ibid. § 4, and xxxviii. 9, § 2,
13 Strabo, xv. 3, §§ 3 and 24.
14 Ibid. § 17. Baari Aetſov'ral imb raw &rö
yevows' 6 6' direv6ów &morpºmbeis kepaxïv kai
Bpaxiova pinterau.
*Tabari, Chronique. tom. ii. p. 5.
** Having obtained the writings, Alex-
ander is said to have burned them; but
the whole character of his policy makes
i this incredible.
17 Strabo. xi. 9, § 3.
18 Agathias. ii 26.
ºjee the Author's Siarth Monarchy,
p. 224. -
20 Moses of Chorēnē tells us that, when
- Artaxerxes conquered menia, he
t found the sacred fire extinguished, and
º it to be relrindled (Hist. Armen.
Il -
2. Herodian. iv. 30.
22 Compare the domestic image-wor-
ship, witnessed to by Josephus (Ant.
Jud. xviii. 9, § 5), with the teraphim-
worship of the ancient Syrians (Gen.
xxxi. 19-35).
. . 28 The coins of the Sassanians exhibit
from the first the fire-altar upon their
reverse. (Pl. XI. Fig. 1. and Pl. XV. Figs
a, Ilúl 'ſ.
24 Agathias, ii. 26; Niceplorus, Hist.
Jºccl. i. 6; p. 55, B.
25 These forms appear on the earliest
Sassanian bas-reliefs, and would scarce-
THE SEVENTH MONARCEIX.
*
[CH, II.
y
.*
ly have been thus used unless previous-
ly familiar to the people.
26 Mos. Chor, l. s. c.
27 See text, p. 244.
28 See, on this point, the Author's
Sixth Moriarchy, pp. 11-14.
29 Julian, Orat. ii. p. 63. -
80 See the Author's Siarth Monarchy,
pp. 222, 223 and 238–240,
81 See the Author's Siacth Monarchy,

pp. 166, 167. j
32 Ibid. pp. 163 and 167. &
$3 Ibid. p. 167.
84 By Trajan A.D. 116; by Avidius Cas-
sius A.D. 165; and by Sept. Severus A.D.
85 Dio Cassius, lxxi. 2.
86 See the Author's Sia:th Monarchy,
pp. 188 and 197. w
37 Ibid. p. 178.
38 Ibid. pp. 162–3, 169-70, 181, 199, 200.
30 See Mos. Chor. Hist. Armen. ii. 65
and 68.
ºerodian. vi. 6 and 11. See below,
* The generally historical character
of Firdusi's Shah-nameh, or “Book of
the Kings,” is well known. The best
critics admit that Firdusi wrote from
materials belonging to Sassanian times
(Max Müller in Bunsen's Philosophy of
History, vol. iii. p. & - .
49 See the Author's Siacth Monarchy,
pp. 202, 203.
48 Ibid. pp. 199, 200.
44 The Roman war terminated A.D. 217.
The first revolt of Artaxerxes probably
occurred ab. A.D. 220.
** Agathangelus, the Armenian histo-
rian, makes Artaxerxes tax Artabanus
and the Parthians generally with cruelty
and oppression (ii. § 5); but he gives no
instances of either. -
46 Alvura-mazda is “the much giving
Spirit.” Mazda, “ much-giving.” was
often used as a name by itself, instead
of the longer Ahura-mazda.
7 Agathangelus makes Artaxerxes
say ‘Opuigwu.ev trpos trapátaštv' ºpeirtov
'yāp 6avečv sivat Soijäou &earðrov diótkoúv-
tos (i. 5, ad fin.)
CHAPTER II.
1 The area of France was estimated in
1868 at 213,324 square miles. It is now
not much over 200,000 sq miles. That
of Great Britain is about 90.000 sq. miles;
that of Italy, without the islands, under
100.000 w
? Strabo says: Xxeóby Séru Kai º Xovais
uépos yeyevnTav rºs IIeportóos—” Susiana
f
, Arr. Hist. Ind. xi. 2–4.
- * *
CH. II.]
has almost become a part of Persia”
*x º ºx -
xv. 3, § 2). -
* Carmania was in ancient times reck-
oned a part of Persia (Herod. i. 125);
but the later classical writers (Strabo,
Arrian) and the Persian authorities for
the Sassanian period make it a distinct
country.
* Arrian, Hist. Ind. xl. 1.
5 Ibid. xxxviii. 1.
* See Strab. xv. 3, § 1, and Nearch. ap.
he latter writer
says: Thy đê IIeporiča yºv rpuxº vevejuna 6au
Taov dopéov A6-yos katéxet. To pièv abrms
Trpos tim Epwépá 6axdoran oixedwevov &n-
pºèës re sivat Kai äkaptov bºro kaiju aros. Tö
8' émi. Thöe tos trpos &pktov re kai Sopémv dive-
mov távrov kaxios kexpaoréat row opéov kai
rºw xºpmv trotºčeá re sival kai Asıgövas
iöpmAoûs kai äutrexov trońAny bipsw, kai
§arot &AAot kaptrol tramv čAaims trapačetorovoi.
re travrotocort reëmaévau, kai rotapatar, ka9a-
poigt övappéea flat kai Avuvmov, kai Šputatu
Ökóorotoruv Gudi troraptoijs re'kai Aip was €orti
Tà #6ea, tºrnova'i re &ya.6% weival, kai rotortv
&AAotoruv Urošuyiotou vēueo 6aw, kai Üxc36ed.
Te troAAaxºn kai troAv6mpov' rúv Ts trpáorto
§rt ém' àpkrov távrov xeup epimu koi viderø-
tº Cºl.
7 The natives speak of a ghermsir or
“warm district,” and a serdsir or “cold
region” (Kinneir's Persian Empire, pp.
44, 200; º Travels, p. 221; Geo-
graph, Journal, vol. xxvii. p. 184). The
“warm region” is known also as the
Deshtistan, or “low country.”
8 See Pottinger, Travels, p. 54; Fraser,
Rhorasam, p. 71; Kinneir, pp. 54, 70, 81,
01. -
Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. i.
10 It is curious that Strabo should
characterize the middle region as “flat”
(trečuvii). His authority, Nearchus, did
not make this mistake.
1* Contributions towards a map of
Persia Proper have been made by Mr.
Abbott, General Monteith, the Baron de
Bode, and others (see Geograph. Jour-
mal, vols. xiii., xxv. and xxvii.); but
much still remains to be done, especially
towards the east and south-east. -
12 See the Author's Ancient Mon-
archies, vol. iii. p. 87, 2nd ed.
18 See Kinneir, Persian Empire, pp.
195–200; Ker Porter, Travels, vol. i. pp.
459, 472; Morier, First Journey, Pr; 92,
147, 148; Geograph. Jowrmal, vol. xxv.
pp. 29–78, vol. xxvii. pp. 149–184.
14 Fraser, Khorasam, p. 79;
First Journey, p. 150.
15 Ker Porter, vol. i. pp. 455–463.
18 Ker Porter, vol. i. p. 462. '
17 Called also Lake Kheir. The name
Bakhtigan, which maintains its place in
our maps, is said to be at present un-
known to the natives (Abbott, in Geo-
graph. Jowrmal, vol. xxv. R. 71).
18 Moore, Lalla Rookh, “Veiled Proph-
et,” p. 77; “Fire-Worshippers,” p. 232;
Ç.
19 Ker Porter, Travels, vol. i. p. 683.
Morier,
THE SEVENTH MONAROH}.
HF .*
639
20 Abbott, in Geograph. Journal, vol.
2–75
21 Kinneir, Persian Empire, p. 60.
** The ancient capital, Pasargadae, was
situated in the valley of the Pulwar (or
Cyrus), a tributary of the Bendamir.
Persepolis, which superseded Pasar-
gadge, was at the opening of the Pulwar
into the Bendamir valley. Remains of
Cyrus, Darius, Xerxes, and other Achae-
menian kings abound in these two vales.
28 Ouseley, Travels, vol. ii. pp. 69, 70;
- T
g
Abbott, in Geograph. Journal, vol. xxvii
. 151.
p 24 Ker Porter, vol. i. p. 686.
25 Ibid. pp. 689, 693, 697, &c.
28 Ibid. p. 709. -
27 Herod. ix. 122. Compare Plat. Leg.
iii. p. 695, A.;_Arr. Eacp. Alex, v. 4.
28 Arrian, Hist. Ind. xxxvii. 2, xxxviii.
28 Ibid. xxxviii. 6; Strab. xv. 3, § 1.
30 See text, p. 251. *
31 Plin. ... xix. 3.
83 Ibid. xxiv. 17, xxvii. 13.
* See Ancient Monarchies, vol. iii. p.
84 Plin. xv. 13 and 14. The word
“peach” is corrupted from the Latin
ersica. (Compare Germ. . . Pfirsche,
uss, persºkie, and French péche.)
36 Plin. H. N. ×ii. 3.
86 Ibid xv. 22.
** Arrian. Hist. Ind. xl. 4. Compare
Herod. i. 136: Nic. Damasc. Fr. 66; Strab.
xv. 3, § 18. The statement of Xenophon,
that anciently a horse was a rarity in
Persia. Proper (Cyrop. i. 3. § 3), is one of
the many to be found in the work known
as the Cyropodia, on which no depend-
ence can be placed. -
* Kinneir. Persian Empire, p. 41; Fra-
ser, Khorasam, p. 72.
* Strab. xv. 3, § 1: ºrpès Taºs éaxariats
etoruv oi kapımāofloorkot. ; : -,
40 Arrian, Hist. Ind. xxxvii. 10; He-
rod. i. 126, -
*1 Horned cattle are, however, men-
tioned among the domestic animals of
Persia. Proper, both by Herodotus (l. s.c.)
and Nicolas of Damascus (Fr. 66). t
** Arrian, Hist. Ind. xl. 4: Xúpmy mo-
Atjømpov. .
43.4mcient Monarchies, vol. iii. p. 142.
44 Ibid. pp. 141–2.
** Nearch. ap. Arr. Hist, Ind. xxxix. 4.
46 Ibid. xxxix. 5.
& Ouseley, Travels, vol. i. pp. 261, 446,
C.
48 Plin. H. N. vi. 23. - -
*As the iritis, a species of rock-crys-
tal. (Plin. H. N. xxxvii. 9, sub fin.); the
at{zoë, a white stone which had a pleas-
ant odor (ib. xxxvii. 10); the mithraac, a
em of many hues (ibid.); the nippa-
réné, which resembled ivory (ibid.); and
the thelycardios or mºtle, which was in
'special favor among the natives of the
country (ibid.). - -
50 Arrian, Hist, Ind. xxxviii. 3. The
account of pearl-fishing given by Isidore
(see Müller's Geographi Minores, vol. i.
140, note i8
--
.*
640
the Persian practice, with which,
native of Charax Spasini, on the Persian
Gulf, he is likely to have been familiar.
The pearls were obtained wholly by
means of divers.
51 Herod. ix. 122.
52 Dr. Prichard says of the Persian
physiognomy, as represented in the an-
cient sculptures: “The outline of the
countenance is not strictly Grecian, for
it is peculiar; but it is noble and digni-
fied; and if the expression is not full of
life and genius, it is intellectual and in-
(licative of reflection. The shape of the
head is entirely Indo-European, and has
nothing that recalls the Tartar or Mon-
golian.” (Natural History of Man, p.
73 .
pp. 254, 255) is probably a description of
ich, as a
53 Herod. i. 71. -
54 Ibid. vii. 61: trepi rior kedańffort etxov
TriAous ātrayéas.
55 Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, §§ 8 and 11.
56 Herod. i. 71; Xen. Cyrop. i. 2, § 8;
Strab. xv. 3, § 18. -
57 Herod. i. 135; Xen. Cyrop. viii. 1, $40.
58 Herod. i. 133; Heraclid. Cuman.ap.
Athen. Deipm. iv. p. 145, F.
50 Herod, 1. s. c.; Xen. Cyrop. viii. 8,
10.
§ 60 Xen. Cyrop. viii. 8, § 9.
61 Herod. vi. 112, ix. 62, 71.
62 As at the Granicus (Arrian, Earp.
. Aleac. i. 15).
68 Those of Issus and Arbela. The en-
gagement at the Granicus was, corn-
paratively speaking, unimportant,
64 See Pl. . Figs. 1 and 2, and com-
pare them with the Achaemenian counte-
nances on Pi. XI. Fig. 1.
65 See the Author's Siacth Monarchy,
pp. 212–223. -
CHAPTER III.
1 Herod. i. 95 and 214.
2 Agathangelus, the earliest of those
Armenian historians whose works have
come down to us, was the Secretary of
Tiridates the Great (of Armenia), and
lived consequently in the earlier half of
the fourth century, or about a hundred
years later than Artaxerxes. Moses of
Choréné wrote a century later (ab. A.D.
440). Agathias is still later; he did not
write till about A.D. 580.
8 Agathias, ii. p. 65.
a Gibbon calis' Babek a “tanner” (De-
. THE SEVENTH MOWARCHY.
*
[CH. III.
cline and Fall, ch. viii. vol. i. p. 331), and
e Sacy a “currier” (corroyeur: Mé-
moire swirles Inscriptions de Nakhsh-i-
Rustam. p. 33, note 49) But Agathias,
their authority, has orkuto'rôpos,
5 So Agathias, ii. p. 65, C.
* IIavrátraoru ºwev čo muffratos. (Agathias,
1. s. c.)
, , , Agathangelus, i. 9. -
8 See Moses of Choréné (Hist. Armen.
ii. 67), who declines to repeat these fa-
bles, remarking: “Alienum est fabulas
commemorare, de somnio cupidinis, cle
judicio, et igne ab Sasame orto, degrege
concluso, atque oculi albugine, et divi-
norum sew Chodiorum praedictione, cae-
terisque quae sequuntur, nempe de stu-
prosa Artasiris mente, et caede, de ve-
sana magi filiae ob vitulum eloquentia.
&c.” Compare the story of #eftwad
and the worm. related in the Modjmel-
#º (Journal Asiatique for
1841
... p. *
* Agathangelus, i. § 3; Mos. Chor. Hist.
Armen. ii. 54, 66, &c.
10 De Sacy, Mémoire, &c., p. 30; Thom-
as, in As. Society's Journal, New Series,
vol. iii. p. 269; Spiegel, Grammatik der
Pivºvaresch-Sprache, p. 172; Haug, Old
Pahlavi-Pazand Glossary, p. 5. The in-
scription of Artaxerxes is confirmed by
those of his son, Sapor, who calls Papak
(Babek) his grandfather (De Sacy, p. 31;
Thomas, in Jowrmal of the Asiatic Soci-
ety, New Series, vol. iii. pp. 301, 314;
Haug, Glossary, p. 46). There are also
coins of Artaxerxes which have his head
the obverse, with the legend Ar-
tahshetr, and on the other side the head
of his father, with the legend Mazdāism,
bag Papak. “the Ormazd-worshipping
divine Papak.” e Mordtmann's arti-
cle in the Zeitschrift der dewtschen mor-
genländischen Gesellschaft, vol. viii. p.
9; compare Thomas in Num. Chron.
for 1872, p. 48.)
11 See Malcolm. Hist, of Persia, i. p.
89; Thomas in Num. Chrom..., New Se-
ries, No. xlv. p. 47. The variety, how-
ever, of the Persian accounts is almost
infinite. The Lebtarikh makes Arta-
xerxes the son of Sasan, and calls Babek
his maternal grandfather (D'Herbelot,
Bibl. Orient. tom. i. % 375). The Ta'rikh-
Kozideh and Bina-Kiti agree on the
latter point, but make Sasan the other
(paternal) grandfather (ibid.). The
Zeenºtt-al-Tuarikh has two Sasans, one
of whom is the father and the other the
grandfather of Babek, Magoudi gives
two genealogies of Artaxerxes, each
containing three Sasans, and one of
them two, the other three Babeks (Prai-
ries d'Or, tom. ii. p. 151):—
Lohrasp * Lohrasp
guar Gustasp
Isfendiar Isfendiar
Bahman Bahman
- Sassan Sassan
Dara, Mehrémas
Behawend Babelx
Sassan Sasan
Babek Babek ~
sººn Sassan
Bakk (Shah) Batºk
Ardeir Ardéshir
CH. III.]
w
1? The term seems to have been first
used by the Armenian writers, who re-
garded Artaxerxes as the son of Sasan,
(See Agathang. i. § 3, (tal fitt.) Adopted
from them by the Byzantines, it passed
into the languages of modern Europe.
18 This term (Hakhdūmanishiya) was
actually used by the kings of the Great
Persian Empire from Cyrus to Artax-
erxes Mnemon, as appears from their
inscriptions. (See Sir H. Rawlinson's
Cuneiform. ſº vol. i. pp. 270,
271, 279, 820, 342. &c.; and Loftus, Chal-
doea and Swsiana, p. 372.) It appears
from the Behistun monument that Da-
rius Hystapis connected the name with
a certain Achaemenes (Halchdimanish),
whom he regarded as his ancestor in
the fifth degree. (Compare Herod. i.
125; iii. 75; vii. 11.)
14 Patkanian (Jowrm. Asiatique for
1866, p. 128) notes that, according to na-
tive Persian accounts, the first Sassan
was a son of Artaxerxes Longimanus.
The Sassanian kings undoubtedly claim-
ed to descend from the Achaemenidae;
but it is very unlikely that they could
really trace their descent, nor has Sasan
, the form of an old Persian name.
** "Ek rms trarpías rās 'Aaraupias (i. § 3).
16 See §§ 5 and 8.
17 Sasan, according to Agathias, was
travelling through the Cadusian coun-
try (êvã ris Kačovoratov xúpas) when he
fell in with Babek who lived there (ii.
, p. 65).
p 18 Dio Cass. lxxx. 3.
19 Herodian, vi. 9.
20 Hist, Armen. ii. 66. The statement
is repeated by Eutychius (vol. i. p. 367):
“Anno imperii (Commodi) decimo ex-
orti Persaa Babelem, Amidum, et Per-
siam occuparunt, duce nempe Ardashi-
ro, filio Babeci filii Sasani. Estochrista.”
21 Ośros & "Aprao upas rms raw > t a x p 1 -
r & v rarpiðos oratpārms intrºpxev (i. 9).
22 Tabari says he was a native of a
city called Tirouzé, which was in the
government of lstakr. (Chronique, ii.
p. 67.)
23 See text, p. 258.
24 See D'Herbelot, Bibliothèque Ori-
entale, tom. i. p. 375, ad voc. ARDsch, R-
BABEGAN. -
25 Malcolm, History of Persia. vol. i.
, 89. Tabari calls him “ Governor of
Mabeira." (Chronique, tom. ii. p.
68.)
26. These inscriptions were first copied
by Carsten Niebuhr, the father of the
historian of Rome, and are given in his
Voyages, tom. ii. p. xxvii. They may
be found also in Chardin, Voyages em.
Perse, tom, ii. pl. lxxiii.; 1)e Sacy, Mé-
moire, pl. i.; Ker Porter, Travels, vol. i.
pl. 23; and Flandin. Voyage e11 Perse,
tom. iv. pl. 180. Papak is called malka,
in the Persian, and 8aa laevs in the Greek
.version.
** Taiw weywortdivuv 1 is 'Apragupas (i. 3).
28 See nute 21. .
... ** Herodian. vi. 2.
TEIE SEVENTH MONARCHY.
641
30 Strabo, xv. 3, § 24; Isid. Char. § 34.
81 Herod. i. 107. In an inscription of
Cyrus he calls his father Cannbyses “the
powerful king” (khshayathiya vazarka).
3 Ibid. i. 110–118. •
88 Dio Cass. lxxx. 3.
** Agathangelus, i. §§ 8-9. The three
battles are witnessed to by both writers.
**The Persian accounts will be found
condensed in Malcolmri, Hist. of Persia,
i:# pp. 90–92. Their authority is but
slight. - - - .
$9 Malcolm, p. 91. .
87 Ibid. 1. s. c.; Tabari, ii. p. 70. Thom-
as (Num. Chrom. No. xlv., New Series,
p. 54) assigns the earliest coins of Ar-
taxerxes to the period when he was
King of Fars only, or perhaps of Fars
and Kerman. .
* So Agathangelus: Ötraigero 'Apraßá-
vms pietà Ilápóov, & x to v K a i o tº k & A t-
ov's II Šp of a s, ºn kekowovnkótas Tī Tāv
Öpoºwow Bovāń (i. § 8).
89 Ibid. 1. S. c. -
* Dio Cassius (lxxx. 3) and Agathan->
gelus (l. s. c.) alike note the three en-
gagements, but give no indications of
locality. We are indebted to the Per-
sian writers for the mention of the
“plain of Hormuz.” (See Malcolm.
History of Persia, vol. i. p. 91.) They
are not, however, all agreed upon the
point, for the Modjmel-al-Tewarikh,
laces the battle at Nehata'end near Ec-
atana. (See the Jowrmal Asiatigue for
1841, p. 501.) .
41 Metaphrastus, quoted by M. Lang-
lois in his edition of Agathangelus, pub-
lished in the Iſragm. Hist. Gr. of Mons.
C. Miller, vol. v., pars 2nda. p. 113:
Modjmel-cul-Tewarikh, l. s. c.; Tabari, ii.
. 73
42 DiO Cass. I. S. c.
48 Agathang. Pref. § 2; Hist. Regn. Ti-
* idat. i. § 9; Mos. Choren. Hist. Armen.
ii. 65–69. -
** Agathang. Hist. i., § 9 (Greek ver-
sion); Procop. De AEdif. Justinian, iii. 1.
** Mos. Chor. ii. 68; Agathang. 1. s. c.
**Mos. Chor. ii. 69. Compare Hero-
dian. vi. 5.
47 Mos. Chor. 1. S. c.
48 Dio Cass. 1. S. c.
49 According to Agathangelus (ii. § 1),
Chosroës called in the aid of the Alba-
nians. , the Iberians, the Lepones, the
Silvani, the Caspians, and the Huns ( !).
# was also helped by the Saravens (ii.
\
50 Agathang. ii. § 2; Mos. Chor. ii. 60.
91 So Moses (Hist, Arm. ii. 70, ad fin.).
Agathangelus, however, the earlier
writer, makes no such extreme asser-
tion. According to him Artaxerxes
maintained the struggle. but with con-
stunt ili success, for twelve years (Hist.
ii. §§ 2 and 3). Patkanian believes Chos-
roës to have ravaged the Persian terri-
tory ris fºr as Ctesiphon; to have there
quarrelled, with his allies, who quitted
him; and after this to have had no great
success, thºugh he continued the war
642
\
for ten years, from A.D. 227 to A.D. 237
(Journal Asiatique, 1866, pp. 142–8).
52 We might doubt whether any re-
verses at all were sustained, were it not
for the statement of Dio: étri rºw 'Apple-
viav Aaore, kävtat,0a Tpós re rav Štruxoptov
Kai Trpos Mijöwov ruvøv tav re too 'Apragóvov
tratēgov tra at a as, dos pév tuvés Aéyovavy,
ébvyev, dis 6' repot, diveXtàpma's trpos trapa-
orkevnv Šuvápiegos pºet.govos (1xxx. 3).
5.3 MOS. Chor. ii. 58–59.
54 See the Author's Siacth Monarchy,
p. 206.
5* They had recently murdered their
eneral, Flavius Heracleon (Dio Cass.
xxx. 4).
56 Herodian, vi. 2; Dio Cass. lxxx. 3.
57 Herodian, l. s. c. Compare Lam-
pridius (Vit. Al. Sev, $56): “Terras in-
teramnanas ab impura illa belua recepi-
nus.” -
58 Herodian. I. S. c.
59 Four hundred youths, selected from
the tallest and most beautiful of the
Persians, dressed in rich apparel, and
with golden ornaments. mounted more-
over on fine steeds, and armed with
bows, carried the message of the Per-
sian monarch to Rome (Herodian, vi. 4).
60 K e Ae iſ e º uéyas Baoru Aeës 'Apraśépêms
& big ragba, ‘Poſtaiovs Te kai row apxovra
airav >upias re &Traorms 'Aarias re ris Euptó-
arm divruketuévns. (Ibid.)
* Eivat yap avºró IIeparav Trpoyovukå kTú-
para. (Ibid. -
62 Especially from Illyria, where some
of the best Roman troops were always
stationed to defend the frontier of the
anube.
68 There is some little doubt as to the
exact chronology. I follow Clinton (F'.
R. vol. i. pp. 244-246). De Champagny
makes Severus arrive in Antioch two
years later—A.D. 233 (Les Césars du troi-
sième Siècle, tom. ii. p. 115).
** Herodian, vi. 4, sub fin.
*5 See the speech of Severus in the
Senate on his return from the East, re-
gººd by Lampridius (Vit, Aleax. Sev.
5 -
86 So Gibbon (Decline and Fall, ch.
viii. vol. i. p. ). e numbers of the
chariots and of the elephants are espe-
cially improbable. Though in the more
ancient period of Oriental history we
find instances of kings possessing 1,200
(Shishak, Benhadad), 1,400 (Solomon).
and even 2,000 chariots (Ahab, accord-
ing to the Black Obelisk), yet in later
times only very moderate numbers were
brought into the field. Xenophon reck-
ons the chariots of an Oriental army at
300 (Cyrop. vi. 1, § 28); and the actual
number employed at Arbela was only
200 (Arrian, Earp. Al. iii. 11; Q. Curt. iv.
12; Diod. Sic. xvii. 53). The Arsacid
monarchs do not seem to have used
chariots at all in warfare (Siacth Mon-
archy, p. 229). Nothing can well be
more unlikely , than that Artaxerxes
should, within six years of his establish-
Iment as “great king,” have collected a
THE SEVENTEI MONARCHY.
[SH. III.
force of 1,800 war chariots. On the im:
probability of the “seven hundred ele-
hants,” see the excellent note of Gib-
n
Orl,
67 On the Parthian incapacity, see the
Author's Siacth Monarchy, note 54, Chap-
ter xxiii. The early Persians had shown
no such weakness (Ancient Monarchies,
vol. iv. p. 130); but the warfare of the
later Persians far more resembles that
of the Parthians than the more scientific
method of their own ancestors.
** Herodian, vi. 5. Compare Lampri-
dius, $55.
** “Terras interamnanas . . . recepi-
mus.” (Sever, ap. Lamprid. § 56.) . The
series of Mesopotamian coins shows
this boast to have been true. (See Mi-
onnet, Médailles, tom. v. pp. 593-637;
Supplément, tom. viii. pp. 391-416.)
70 Whatever judgment we form of the
result of the campaign, it seeins to me
uncritical to set aside the minute details
of Herodian with respect to Alexander’s
plans and intentions. The fact that
Lampridius is completely silent with re-
spect to all the details of the war ('' in-
digue aucun des détails de la guerre,”
De Champagny. ii. p. 122) is almost con-
clusive against the veracity of his story.
71 The present text of Herodian has
** north” for “south” here: but the con-
text clearly shows that either he or one
of his copyists has made a mistake
72 > xenºplevos arov 'rois pixous éveuple ro
otpatvorukov ets tºets fºotpas. (Herodian,
WI. :).
79 The relative credibility of Herodian
and Lampridius in their respective ac-
counts of Alexander's Persian campaign
has long formed a subject of dispute
with historical critics. Among impor-
tant names on either side are Gibbon
and Niebuhr for Herodian; Eckhel, Pro-
fessor Ramsay, and De Champagny for
his impugner. The main points in favor
of Herodian are, first, his being a con-
temporary; secondly, his general mod-
eration and good sense; and, thirdly,
the minuteness and circumstantiality of
his account, whicly stands in strong con-
trast with the vague boasts of Alexan-
der himself and his biographer. It is
sought to discredit Herodian by imput-
ing to him a prejudice against Alexan-
der; but, on the whole, his account of
that prince is not an unflattering por.
trait. Again, it is said (De Champagny,
ii. p. 121) to be inconceivable that, if
Herodian’s account of the campaign.
had been true. the general result of the
contest should have been so absolutel
without injury to Rome as he himself
admits it to have been. Certainly there
is a difficulty here; but it is not insu-
perable. Wé, with our Western motions,
should have expected Artaxerxes to
have followed up his successes in A.D.
232 by a great invasion of the Roman
territory in A.D. 233. ut we find him
absolutely passive. This appears strange
until we reflect that an Eastern army
CH. III.]
THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. 643
after the expedition of Alexander just
as before . *
82 Herodian. vi. 5; Mos. Chor. ii. 69.
Moses, it is urue, calls the Roman empe-
ror, who was the ally of Chosroës, Philip
(!); but it is evident that he has been
misled by a false view of Roman chro-
nolo
gy.
83 See text, p. 265.
** Mos. Chor, ii. 71: “Ut dimidiam par-
tem. Ariorum in sua ditione teneret.” .
**'Avak in the Greek text of Agathan-
gelus, Anag, in the Armenian (§ 13);
Anacus in Whiston's version of Moses of
Choréné (ii. 71); Anak in Sépéos (iii. 1).
* Agathang $14.
* Ev rols, otévois, TepukukAtógavres [ot
agtpºrat] tows ºvyč6as €v wéorge töv yedºv-
pov čv6ew kai év6ev, trorapoppuxious removii-
kaariv. (Ibid. § 15.)
$3 Ibid. c. iii. § 16.
* Mos. Chor. ii. 73. Agathangelus is
silent on this point.
*9 Agathang. I. s. c.; Mos. Chor. ii. 74.
* Tacitus, according to Moses (ii. 73);
but really, it is probable, the third Gor.
dian.
sº Decline and Fall, ch. viii, (vol. i. p.
*Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, p. 383.
This writer notes that the assertion of
Gibbon is “somewhat unwarrantable.”
94 See text, pp. 245, 246.
95 Agath. ii. p. 64.
** A critical analysis of the Zendavests,
into its earlier and later portions seems
to show that Dualism was a develop-
ment Out of an earlier Monotheism. (See
the Author's Ancient Monarchies, vol.
iii. pp. 104–107.) But we only know the
Persian religion historically from the
time of Darius Hystaspis, when Dualism
was certainly a part of it.
*7 Especially Mithra, the sun-god,
whose worship mav be traced back to
the earliest Iranic times. .
* See the Author's Ancient Monarch-
ies, vol. iii. pp. 122
-128.
** Strabo, xv. 3, §§ 14 and 15; Dio Chry-
h. p. 449, A.; Amm.
after a victory demands a time for rest
and enjoyment: that it has almost of
necessity to be disbanded, and can on!
be collected again after a considerable
interval. Eastern kings, moreover, are
often lazy or capricious. Orodes did
not follow up his victory over Crassus
by any serious attack on the Roman
territory until two years had passed
(Siacth Monarchy, pp. 100,101). And a sim-
ilar neglect of favorable opportunities
is observable throughout Oriental his-
tory. It may be added that there is at
least one expression in Lampridius
which betrays the truth that he endeav-
ors to conceal. The universal cry of the
Romans who accompanied Alexander's
triumphal procession from the Capitol
to the Palace was, Lampridius tells us
(§ 57), this—“ Rome is so red, since Alex-
ander is safe.” Safety is only a subject
of congratulation after imminent dan-
e!”
74 There is some difficulty in under-
standing Herodian here, since his geo-
graphical ideas are confused (Gibbon,
ch. viii. note 51). He speaks of the sec-
ond army as threatening both Parthia,
and Persia. The real Parthia, between
the Caspian and Bactria, cannot, it
seems to me, be intended. I suspect
that he means by Parthia, the tract
about Ctesiphon. recently the head-
quarters of Parthian power.
75 Me yi arr m airm orvudopä . . . ‘Paptai-
ovs étreaxe, 8vvápletos uéyèarms &taſh9apetgºms,
vºum kai Étéum uměeuta's Tøv &pxatov diro-
§ (v. 5, stub fin.)
70 Herodian, vi. 6, sub init.
77 Lampridius thus sums up the ac-
count of Herodian and his followers:—
* Amisisse illum (sc. Alexandrum) exer-
citum dicunt fame, frigore, ac morbo”
(§ 57); but Herodian says nothing about
famine. His words are: rav Tptiow plovpav
Toi, arparoš, (ov čvevue, to traetorov dro-
BaAávri Stadhápots ovuòopais, vöorº, Toàéuº,
kpºet. Lampridius seems to have read
Aiuq, for troAéu.9.
78. The Persians had, however, lost a
large number of their best troops. The
Romans of the southern army had fought
ell, and their defeat had cost their
enemy dear. (See Herodian, vi. 6, swb
7%.
79 Persepolis seems to have now be-
come the main Persian capital, under
the native name of Istakr or Stakr.
(Agathang. i., § 9, sub fin.) It was
threatened when the southern army of
Severus was expected to invade Persia.
Proper (see text, p. 265).
89 Lectures on Ancient History, vol.
iii. p. 278.
Śl “Rome must on that occasion have
lost many parts of her Eastern posses-
sions '' (Niebuhr, 1. s. c.) The numis-
matic evidence is in favor of there hav-
ing been nu loss. The effigy of the Ro-
man emperor continues upon the coins
of the Mesopotamian cities and states
sost. Orat. Boryst
Marc. xxiii. 6; Agathias, ii. 25,
100 Herod. i. 132; Strab. xv. 3, § 13;
Amm. Marc. l. s. c. The early priests
of the Zoroastrians were called kavi,
“seers,” karapan. “ sacrificers,” or
*Sikhs, “wise men” (Haug, Essays on
the Sacred Language, Writings, and
Religion of the Parsees, pp. 245–247);
IlêVer *; A term which some iden-
tify with Magus (magat or maghava) oc-
curs twice, but twice only, in the Zenda-
vesta. (See Westergaard, Introduction,
to Zendavesta, p. 17.)
101 Dino, Fr. 8: Schol. ad. Nicandr.
ſºlº Cic. De Div. i. 23, 41; Val.
i. (5
102 Agathias, ii. p. 65.
103 MOS. Chor. ii. 74
104 Herodian, iv. 30. .
is.” Mos. Chor. I. S. c.; Dio Cass. lxxv.
644
THE SETWEWTH MoMARCHY.
given in the text.
[CH. III.
vol. ii. p. 254), whom I venture to follow,
though I have not found ancient au.
thority for the statement.
1” Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. i. p.
338; Milman, vol. ii. p. 252.
124 Hyde, De Religione Persarum, c.
124 The account which Magoudi gives
of the Court and governmental system
of Artaxerxes (Prairies d'Or, tom. ii.
p. 153–157) is curious and interesting,
Éi can scarcely be regarded as authen-
tie. Magoudi did not write till about
A.D. 950; and the picture which he draws
represents probably the later rather
than the earlier period of the Sassanian
kingdom. -
125 Gibbon declares, but incorrectly,
that “the prudent. Artaxerxes, suffering
no person except himself to assume the
title of king, abolished every interme-
diary power between the throne and the
people” (Decline and Fall, vol. i. p. 340).
Agathangelus tells us that he called a
council of “all the kings, the rulers. and
the generals” ($ 12): and we see from
Moses that he was willing to have grant-
ed the kingly, title to Anak (Hist. Ar-
men. ii. 71). The very retention of the
title “King of kings,” so frequent on
the coins and in the inscriptions, indi-
cates a state of things exactly the op-
posite of that described by Gibbon.
Note further the mention of the subject
‘’ king of the Cadusians,” by Jul. Capito-
linus (Valer. § 5).
12% Agathang. 1. s. c. : trpoakaAeordplevos
travtas rows Bagweis, koi rotrépxas, kai arpa-

yolys.
127 So Malcolm (Hist. of Persia, vol. i.
p. 94). Gibbon paraphrases thus: “The
authority of the prince must be defend
ed by a military force; that force can
Only be maintained by taxes: all taxes
must, at last, fall upon agriculture; and
agriculture can never flourish except
..under the protection of justice and
ºation" (Decline and Fall, vol. i.
p. 346).
128 Malcolm, Hist. of Persia, vol. i. p.
i20 Malcolm, Hist, of Persia, vol. i. p.
96. There is a remarkable consensus of
authors on the point of Artaxerxes' love
of justice. ...Agathangelus, the Arme-
‘nian historian, says: épaori Aevore travra.
Trpartov Štrueukös, suvouiq xaupov kai troAv-
Teig ówkavorótm (§ 9). Eutychius, the
Latin writer, notes of him: “Quanta
fieri potuit, cum justitia inter homines
versatus est” (vol. i. p. 373). The Per-
sian historians make the assertions
(See Mohl's extracts
from the Modjmel-al-Tewarikh, in the
Journal Asiatique for 1841, p.
º
106 Mos. Chor. 1. S. c.
107 “Whether,” says Professor Max
Müller, “on the revival of the Persian
religion and literature. 500 years after
Alexander, the works of Zoroaster were
collected and restored from extant MSS.
or front oral tradition, must remain un-
certain; and the disturbed state of the
phonetic system would rather lead us to
'suppose a long-continued influence of
oral tradition.” (Bunsen's Philosophy
of History, vol. iii. pp. 116–7.)
108 Mos. Chor. 1. s. c. : “Statuas . .
Solisque et Lunae simulachra, Artasires
confregit.”
10° Agathias, l. s. c.
110 Arnm. Marc. xxiii. 6: p. 373. The
“Magian lands” mentioned in this pas-
'sage may have been in the possession of
the caste under the Parthians; but at
any rate Artaxerxes must have sanc-
'tioned the arrangement.
2 111 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. i. p.
1 12 MOS. Chor. ii. 74. -
118 Seventy, according to the Oriental
writers (see ( jibbon, vol. i. p. 332) : but
this round number, a multiple of seven,
is suspicious.
114 Milman, History of Christianity,
vol. ii. p. 251. (Compare the dissertation
of Bredow, prefixed to Syncellus, vol.
ii., in the Corpus Hist. Byzant. of B. G.
Niebuhr, Bonn. 1820.)
1 - 11° Anquetil Duperron, who, towards
the close of the last century, professed
to translate the Zendavesta into French,
was incompetent to the task. and gave
a wrong impression of the true charac-
ter of the volume. Burnouf first edited
with correctness a portion of the text,
which has since been published in its
entirety by Westergaard (1852–1854) and
Spiegel (1851–1858).
116 See his Translation of the Avesta,
Berlin, 1861. . . . -
17 On this point the reader may con-
Sult Haug's Essays on the Sacred Lam-
gºgge, déc., of the Parsees, Bombay,
118 Max Müller, in Bunsen's Philosophy
of History, vol. iii p. 116. .
119 The Aryan character of the Zend
was first proved by leask, and is now ad-
mitted by all scholars. Zend and Sans-
krit were two ancient sister forms of
speech. From Zend came, first. Achae-
menian Persian, or the language of the
Persian cuneiform , inscriptions: then
Pehlevi or Huzwaresh. Persian in its soul
(Max Müller. p. 119), but to a large extent
-Semitic in its vocabulary: next. Parsi,
which is Huzvaresh purified from its
Semitic ingredients: and finally, the lan-
guage of Firdusi. which continues to be
spoken at the present day.
120 See the account given hy. Malcolm,
from Persian sources, of the dying speech
of Artaxerxes (History of Persia, vol. i.
p: 95). Compare Magoudi, Prairies
d'Or, vol. ii. 162.
** So Milman (Hist. of Christianity,
p. 502.)
130 D'Herbeiot. Bibliothèque Orientalé,
tom. i. p. 380.
181 See Mos, Chor. ii. 70 and 75. *
'. See the Author's Siacth Momarchy,
p. 48.
188. Agathang. § 12.
*** This is probably what Dean Milman
g *
CH. III.]
meant when he said that “the Magian
hierarchy formed the great council of
the state” (History of Christianvity, vol.
ii. p. 254.) It is implied in the terins of
the “testament,” as given in the text.
135 See Malcolm, Hist. of Persia, vol.
i. pp. 95–96, who in this follows Firdusi.
Fird usi wrote, according to Malcolm,
from trustworthy Pehlevi materials.
Milman regards the record as authentic
(History, of Christianity, vol. ii. p. 253).
188 Magoudi, Prairies d'Or, vol. ii. pp.
159, 16ſ).
137 Tabari, Chronique, vol. ii. p. 74.
138 See Pl. XV. Fig. 1. .
199 See Flandin. Voyage en Perse, tom.
i.pl. 14; Ker Porter, Truvels, vol. ii. pl.
66.
140 Sir R. Ker Porter regarded the two
main figures as Artaxerxes and Ormazd,
the prostrate figure as a symbol of the
fallen Arsacidae, and the radiated per-
sonage as either Zoroaster (!) or “a per-
sonification of the Mithratic religion”
(Travels, vol. ii. p. 193). Flandin also
thought the radiated figure to be Zo-
roaster (Voyage en Perse, tom. i. p. 442).
r. Thomas takes the view of the mat-
ter which is followell in the text. (Jour-
aval of As. Society, New Series, vol. iii.
p. 257, note 3.} s
141 See Pl. XV. Figs. 2 and 7; and com-
pare Ker Porter. vol. i. pls. 21 and 28;
Flandin. vol. i. pl.s. 31 and 33: vol. ii. pls.
49 and 53; vol. iv. pl. 185: Texier, pl. 129.
142 See Mordtmann, in the Zeitschrift
der # * ~l rivo 9 2 *; -- ~ * * * ~ * 'f
schaft (vol. viii. pp. 29–34; and vol. xix.
. 415–6, 477–8); and Thomas, in the
wnismatic Chronicle for 1872 (No. xlv.
pp. 48–55).
148 Thomas, Num. Chron. 1872, p. 54.
144 Mr. Thomas regards these coins as
the third in order (ibid.); but Mordt-
mann is, I think, right in giving them
the second place (Zeitschrift, vol. viii.
pp. 31–33).
146 Mr. Thomas renders the phrase by
“Ardeshir’s fire-altar,” comparing junt-
vn2i with the Pelhlevi inaus, which has
this meaning (Num. Chron. 1872, p. 51).
ordtmann thinks this translation in-
possible, and suggests “Artaxerxes the
chauter” (der .4 mrufende). (See the
Zeitschrift, vol. viii. p. 32.) De Sacy
originally read tezdami for mºuvrtzi , but
this reading is now generally regarded
as mistaken.
149 See Longpérier, Médailles des Sas-
sat it jdes, pl. 2. Nos. 4 and 5.
147 As Sapor II., Varahran IV., Izdegird
I., and others.
148 Thomas, in Nunn. Chron, for 1872,
p. 55. and pl. 2, No. 12; Mortitmann, in
º 2eitschrift, vol. viii. p. 34. and pl. 10,
(). (j,
149 See the Author's Sixth Monarchy,
. 212–223.
150 Longpérier, Médailles des Sassa-
wides, p. 2.
**! For a representation of this Nakhsh-
*
TIIE SEWENTEI MONARCIIY.
645
i-Rustam tablet, see the Chapter on the
Art of the Sassatians.
** Besides the bas-relief described (p.
277), Artaxerxes has left either three or
four others. One, also at Nakhsh-i-
Rustam, represents Ormazd, giving Ar-
taxerxes the diadem, on foot (Ker Por-
ter, vol. i. pl. 27. No. 2; Flandin, Voyage
en Perse, pl. 193). Another, at Firuza-
bad, is similar, but shows us Artaxerxes
accompanied by four attendants (Flan-
im, pl. 44). A third, at Takht-i-Bostan,
exhibits Artaxerxes handing the diadem
to his son, Sapor (Ker Porter, pl. 66;
Flandin, pl. 14). The fourth. at Salmos,
to the west of Lake Urumiyeh, which
may have been the work of Sapor, rep-
resents Artaxerxes and Sapor on horse-
back, receiving the submission of the
Armenians (Ker Porter, vol. ii. pl. 82).
1** Longpérier, Médailles de Sassa-
mides. Preface, p. iv. and also p. 14. The
awrews of Macrinus weighs from 135 to
136 grains; the gold coins of the early
Sassanians weigh exactly 136 grains.
154 Ibid. p. 14.
15° Bactrian gold coins are rare, but .
have been found (Wilson, 4riar, a Am-
tiquit, pp. 218, 223); Indian are common
(ibid. pp. 347–380)
15° Dio Cassius, lxxviii. 27. Compare
the Author's Siactii Momarchy, p. 206.
157 See text, p. 277. . .
158 This inscription, which was first
copied with any accuracy by Carsten
iebuhr, will be found in his Voyages,
tom. ii. pl. 27. It is also represented in
the work of Ker Porter. vol. i. pl. 22,
opp. p. 548. Though bilingual only, it
is triliteral; the Persian transcript being
given, with only slight differences, in the
two sets of characters, which have been
recently distinguished as “Chaldaeo-
Pehlevi" and “Sassanian Pehlevi"
(Taylor, in Jowrmal of Asiatic Society,
vol. xii. pp. 264–206). The latter and
simpler character was successfully de-
ciphered by M. De Sacy. who was thus
enab ed to translate the inscription
(Mémoire sur les Inscriptions de Nak-
schi-Rouston, pp. 76 et seqq.). The other
character has been satisfactorily read
by Mr. Thomas, and, more recently, by
Dr. Martin Haug.
159 Ker Porter's drawing shows us that
this figure was represented with snakes
at the front of the helmet. The con-
nection of the serpent or snake with
Ahriman is a well-known feature of the
Zoroastrian religion (Vendidad. i.
xviii. 1–6; Herod. i. 140; &c.). º
180 Briga is the term used for “god.”
throughout the Achaemenian inscrip-
tions. It is there applied both to Or-
mazd and the inferior deities. That the
bag or bagi of the early Sassanians rep-
resents this word is generally agreed
upon. .
101 ALHA is used as an equivalent term
for BAGI in the Chaldaeo-Pehlevi tran-
script of this and other inscriptions of
3;
t
646 THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. [CH. Iv.
.*
the early Sassanian kings. It clearly
represents the Jewish El, or Elohim, and
the Arabic Allah.
. CHAPTER IV.
1 The Modjmel - al - Tewarikh agrees
with Agathias (iv. 24; p. 259, A) and Eu-
tychius (vol. i. p. 375) in giving Artaxerx-
es a reign of fourteen years only. (See
the Jowrnal Asiatique for 1841, p. 502;
and compare Magoudi, torn. ii. p. 159.)
When the Armenian writers give him
forty, forty-five, or even fifty years (Pat-
anian, in the Jowrmal Asiatique for
1866, §. 145), they perhaps include the
time during which he was tributary king
of Persia. (See Tabari, Chrownque, ii. p.
75: “Ardeschir régina quatorze ans après
la mort d’Ardewan: puis il mourut, après
avoir régné en tout quarante-quatre
8, Il S.
2 This is the form of the name on the
coins of Sapor, and in his inscriptions.
The word means ‘’ prince” — literally
“king's son”— from Shah (contracted
form of khshayathiya, “ king”) and
puhr (=Achaetnellian putra), ... “son.”
See Mos. Choren. Hist. Armen. ii. 74.)
3 Malcolm. History of Persia, vol. i. p.
96, note; D'Herbelot, Bibliothèque Ori-
entale, tom. i. pp. 378-9. Some writers
are content to make her an Arsacid
princess (Tabari, ii. p. 76).
4 As Artaxerxes only reigned fourteen
years after his last victory over Arta-
banus, if he then married that king's
daughter, and Sapor was their son, he
(Sapor) could not have been more than
thirteen at his father's death. But the
wars in which he is at once engaged do
not suit this age.
* Compare the stories that Cambyses
was the son of Nitetis, a daughter of
Amasis (Herod. iii. 2); that Cyrus was a
son of Mandané, daughter of Astyages
(ib. i. 108); and that Alexander the Great
was the son of Darius Codomannus, the
last Achaemenian monarch (Malcolm,
vol. i. p. 70). -
6 The tale that his mother was con-
demned to death, but spared by the
chief vizier because she was with child,
and that her offspring was brought up
secretly by the minister, who after a
time revealed the Imatter to Artaxerxes
(Tabari, ii. pp. 75–79; Malcolm, i. 96, note:
D'Herbelot, 1. s. c.). deserves no cre-
dence. Its details are contradictory.
7 Malcolm, vol. i. p. 97, note
8 Tabari calls this king Sâtiroun, and
places the siege of Hatra after the cap-
ture of Valerian (Chronique, ii. pp. 80–
82). Såtiroun is also given as the name
of the Hatra monareh by Magoudi (tom.
iv, pp. 81–82). -
*See the Author's Seacth Momarchy,
pp. 179 and 196.
10 Malcolm, i. pp. 96-7. Magoudi (iv.
p. 84) and Tabari make Sapor marry
this princess; but say that shortly after-
wards he put her to death (Chronique,
ii. p. 84).
11 Gordian’s journey to the East is
placed by Clinton in this year (F. R. i.
p. 256). Sapor's aggressions certainly
preceded this journey. They must have
occurred in the earlier months of A.D.
241, or the later ones of A. D. 240.
12 See Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. i.
pp. 307-8; De Champagny, Césars du 3me
Siècle, tom. ii. pp. 134–136.
18 The two Gordians, father and son,
who were shortly afterwards put down
§ Capelianus (Gibbon, vol. i. pp. 213–
)
** Maximus and Balbinus (ibid. p. 219).
** M. Antonius Gordianus, a grandson
of the elder and a nephew of the youn-
ger Gordian. He was only thirteen years
of age when he was proclaimed, in A.D.
238 (Herodian, viii. 8).
1 6 ſhe coins (Mionnet, Médailles,
tom. v. pp. 625-628; and Supplément,
tom. viii. pp. 415, 416). -
17 According to Persian authorities,
the wall fell down in answer to the
prayers of the besiegers (Malcolm, vol.
i. p º Compale Tabari, Chronique, ii.

• { -
18 Hist. August. Gordiani, § 27.
19 Ibid. § 26.
30 The name is given as Misitheus in
the Historia Awgusta (which is followed
by Gibbon and others), as Timesicles by
Zosimus (i. 17). ut inscriptions show
that the true form was Tinnesitheus
(Eckhel, Doctr. Num. Vet. vii. p. 319;
De Champagny, Césars du 3me Siècle,
tom. ii. p. 204, note).
21 See the inscription (No. 5530 in the
collection of Henzen) sunnmarized by De
Champagny, I. S. c. ~.
* “Frequentibus praeliis pugnavit et
vicit” (Hist. Aug. Gord. § 26).
** Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5: “Apud Resai-
nam fuso fugatoque Persarum rege.”
24 Hist. Aug. Górd. § 27.
** In the letter which he wrote to the
senate from Mesopotamia, Gordian said:
“Nisibin usque pervenimus, et, si di fa-
verint, Ctesiphonta usque veniemus.”
(Hist. Aug. 1. s. c. g
2% Hist. Anug. Gord. § 28.
27 John of Antioch makes the Roman
army penetrate to the “mouths of the
Tigris'' (ets Tā Toi Ttypmtos arów va, Fr.
147); but this is very improbable. An
advance into Southern Mesopotamia is,
however, distinctiy implied in the posi-
tion of Gordian's tomb, which was some
way soutli of the Khabour (Amm. Marc.
xxiii. 5).
28 Hist. August. Gord. § 29.
* De Champagny represents the peace
made as altogether favorable to Rome
(tom. ii. p. 216), and speaks of Armenia.
as having become Roman in consquence.
But this was certainly not so. Armenia.
did not cease to be Persian till the third
year of Diocletian, A.D. 286 (Mos. Chor.
ii. 79). Sonne ancient, writers called the
peace “very disgraceful to Rome.” (Zo-
sim. iii. 32: eipijvmv aiaziorrmv); but Nie-
buhr's conclusion seems to be just, viz.

*
cH. Iv.]
that “Philip concluded a peace with the
Persians, which was as honourable to the
Romans as circumstances would allow”
(Lectures on Anc. Hist., vol. iii. p. 284,
E
. T.).
30 From A.D. 244 to A.D. 258.
31 Mos. Chor. ii. 69, 7.1, &c.
32 See the statement in the Historia
Augusta that the Bactrians, among
otliers, declined to receive the over-
tures made to them by Sapor after his
defeat of Valerian, and placed their ser-
vices at the disposal of the Romans
(Jul. Capit. Valer. § 7).
83 See the Author's Ancient Monarch-
ies, vol. iv. p. 369.
34 Ibid, vol. iv. p. 487; Herod. ix. 113.
35 See text, p. 248. -
36 Philip, Decius, Gallus, AEmilianus,
Valerian, and Gallienus, whom he asso-
ciated. Of these the first four perished
within the space of five years (A.D. 249–
254).
37 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. i. pp.
298–326; Niebuhr, Lectures on Amcient
History, vol. iii. pp. 290–294, E. T.
88 Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5. Some place
this capture later, as Gibbon (vol. i. p.
328) and Clinton (F. R. vol. i. p. 288); but
it seems to me that the capture of the
city by a sudden surprise (as related by
Ammianus) is to be listinguished from
the capture of which the inhabitants
had due notice (mentioned by the anony-
mous author of the Tà pietà. Atwova, Fr.
Hist. Gr. vol. iv. p. 102), and that the
former preceded the other. The fact
that Animianus refers the surprise to
the reign of Gallienus is not conclusive
against this view, since Gallienus was
associated in the empire as early as A.D.
sº Zosim. i. 33-34. A coin of Valerian,
assigned to this year, has the legend
“WICT. PARTHICA” (Clinton, F. R. i.
. 382).
p. See the letter of Walerian to the
Senate, written from Mesopotamia, and
preserved in the Historia Awgusta, Mac-
rian. $ 12: – “Ego, Patres Conscripti,
belium Persicum gerens, Macriano to-
tam rempublicam credidi quidem a
parte militari. Ille nobis fidelis, ille
mihi devotus, &c.”
41 Hist. August. Valerian. $3: “Wictus
est a Sapore rege Persarum, dum ductu
cujusdam sui ducis, cui surninam Omni-
um bellicarum rerum agendarum com-
miserat, seu fraude seu adversa fortuna,
in ea esset loca deductus, ubi nec vigor
nec disciplina militaris, quin caperetur,
quidquam valere potuit.” I do not know
why the recent editors, Jordan and Eys-
senhardt, reject this passage (ed. of
1864, p. 70). -
42 Eutrop. ix. 7.
48 Petrus Patric. Fr. 9: Zosim. i. 36.
44 Zosim. l. s. c. Zonaras (xii. 23) has
a different account. According to him,
Valerian was simply captured as he
$ried to escape.
** Gibbon speaks of the whole army
THE SEVENTH MOWARCHY.
laying down its arms (vol. i. p. 328); but
the position of Macrianus at the head of
a considerable force, expressly said to
be the remnant of the lost army, itn-
plies the escape of a certain number
(Hisé Avg. Gallien. § 1).
** The Miriades (Mariades) of Malala
(xii. p. 295) can scarcely be a different
person from the Cyriades of the Histo-
ºria Augustu, Triginta Tyranni. § 2.
Whether he was brought forward is a
pretender before the death of Valerian
or after is perhaps doubtful (De Cham-
pagny, Césars du 3me Siècle, tom. ii. p.
436). But on the whole Gibbon's near its
* events has the greatest proba-
111ty. .
** The setting up of Miriades as em-
peror is thought to be represented on
more than one of Sapor's bas-reliefs. A
tablet on a large scale at Darabgerd
(Flandin, pl. 33) seems to exhibit the
Persian king on horseback, with Vale-
rian prostrate beneath his charger's
feet, in the act of designating Miriades
as monarch to the assembled Romans;
Sapor's guards stand behind him with.
their hands upon their sword-hilts, while
ill front of him the Roman soldiers ac-
cept their new ruler with acclamations.
He himself raises his right arm as he
takes an oath of fidelity to his suzerain.
* See the fragment of the anonymous
continuator of Dio's Roman History, in
the Fr. Hist, Gr. vol. iv. p. 192. • .
* The simile is used by Niebuhr (Lec-
twres, vol. iii. p. 294, E. T.)
* Zonaras, xii. 23; p. 630.
* See Zosim. i. 27 ad fin., and the
comment of Gibbon (vol. i. pp. 329, 330).
* Agathias, iv. 24; p. 259, B.
58 Zonar. 1. S. C. R
º ohann. Malal. Chronographia, xii.
p. 296.
* See the fragments of Peter Patri-
cius in the Fragmenta. Hist. Graec. of C.
Müller, vol. iv. p. 187, Fr. 10.
* Hist. August. Valer. § 7; Gallien. §
10: Odenat. § 15; Agath. 1. s. c.; &c
57 Sext. Rufus, c. 23.
nym. Chrom. anno &
58 Odenathus is called “Prince of the
Saracens” by Procopius (Bell. Pers. ii.
5), and John of Malala (xii. p. 297).
* Hist. August, Valerian, $ 7. (Com-
pare, however, the life of Odenathus,
where the capture of the concubines is
referred to a later date.) +
60 Pet. Patrio, Fr. 11.
61 Pet. Patric. Fr. 11.
** Historia Augusta, Valer. § 7: “Va-
leriano apud Persas consenescente.”
Maerian. § 12: “Infelicissimo, quod se-
nex apud Persas consenuit.”
**Ibid. Gallien. § 1: “Erat ingens om-
nibus moeror, quod imperator Romanus
in Perside serviliter tenerefn".”
*4 The stories of the extreme ill treat-
ment of Valerian start with Jactantius,
or the author of the treatise, De Morte
Persecutorum, whoever he may be.
This author wrote between A.D. 312 and
• * * ~ * *
Compare Hiero-
f
Oros. vii. 22.
f
648
315 (Smith's Dict of Biography, ad voc. .
Caecilius), or above fifty years after the
capture of Valerian. He asserts posi-
tively (c. s.) the use of Valerian, as a
footstool by Sapor, and the hanging of
his skin in a temple, where it was often
seen by Roman ambassadors. Lactan-
tius is followed by Eusebius of Caesarea,
excepting with regard to the employ-
ment of Valerian as a footstool; and
then the tales are repeated by Aurelius
Victor (De Coesaribus, c. 33) by his epi-
tornator (Epit. c. 32), by Orosius (viii.22),
and by Petrus Patricius (Fr. 13). On the
whole it seems to me that the preserva-
...tion of the skin is probably true (Euseb.
Vit, Constant. iv. 11; Orat. Constant.
xxiv. 2; Lactant. De M. P. c. 5); but
that the employment of the captive em-
peror as a stool from which Sapor
mounted his horse is a rhetorical inven-
, tion of Lactantius, fifty years after the
time, from whom alone later writers re-
ceived it. -
65 Euseb. Oratt. Comstant. xxiv. 2.
* Lactant. l. s. c.; Victor, Epit. 32:
97 Lactant. l. s. c.; Euseb. 1. s. c.;
Agath. iv. p. 133, A. .
88 Decline and Fall, vol. i. p. 331.
60 De Champagny, Césars, &c. tom. ii.
. 437. .
p 70 See the bas-reliefs of Sargon (Botta,
y Monument de Niwive, pls. 83, 118, 120)
and Asshur-bani-pal (Layard, Monw-
ments of Nineveh, 2nd series, pl.s. 45 and
47); and compare the Behistun Inscrip-
tion (col. ii. par. 13 and 14; col. iii. par. 8)
and, the Sassanian relief described by
Malcolm (Hist, of Persia. vol. i. p. 254).
71 See Flandin, ple. 33, 49, 53, &c.;
Texier, pl. 129, &c. -
72 It has been said that there is one ex-
$º (Thomas in .4s Soc. Journal,
vol. iii. N. S. p. 304). But the figure re-
ferred to represents, I believe, Miriades.
See P}. º )
( * A , *
78 Tabari is the only Oriental writer
'who reports that Valerian was used
cruelly; but his statement that Sapor
cut off his prisoner's nose and then set
him at liberty (Chronique, tom. ii. p. 80)
can scarcely be thought worthy of
Credlt. . . . . .
74 Niebuhr, Lectures on Ancient His-
tory, vol. iii. p. 295. -
** Hist. August. Gallien. § 3; Quietus,
**Ibid. Odenath. § 15. Compare the
letter of Aurelian preserved in this valu-
able compilation (Zenob. § 30).
77 Ibid. Gallien. § 10:... “Ad Ctesiphon-
tem. Parthoruſn multitudimen obsedit.”
Zosim. i. p. 89: IIáparas rots oiketous évamé-
Syncellus makes him succee
in talking the city (Krmatºpævra troAvopkig
trapaorrma &uevos): but this is an exagge-
Fº (See his Chronographia. pp.
{ . - * .
78 Hist. August. Gallien. § 10: “Fue-
runſ longa et variº praelia.”
9
Ib. “Locorum difficultatibus in
THE SEVENTH, MONAIROHY.
[CH. Iv.
sº solo imperator optimus labora-
8. 3 *
*Of these he sent some to Gallienus,
whom that weak monarch led in tri-
ph 8 & ©
81 “Odenathum, participato imperio,
Augustum vocavit’’(Hist. Aug. Gallien.
§ 12).
** See De Champagny, Césars, &c.
tom. iii. p. 45.
88 Hist. Awg. Gallien. § 13. .
84 “Zenobia Palmyrenis et orientali-
bus plerisque viriliter imperante,” ibid.
(Compare the letter of Aurelian to the
-Senate, preserved in the Hist, August.,
Triginta Tyranni, Zenob. § 30.) -
**See above, note 83; and compare
Hist. Aug. Claud. § 4.
86 Malcolm, Hist. Persia, vol. i. p.
98; Texier, Description de l'Arménie, de
la Perse, &c. pp. 205–208; pls. 146 to 151;
Flandin, Voyage en Perse, tom. ii. pp.
248–381, ple, 45–54,
87 The sculptures at §hº are
£º Sapor the First's. They may
e identified by the resemblance of the
chief figure to the head upon Sapor's
coins, and to the figure declared by an
inscription to be Sapor at Nakhsh-i-Ra-
jab (Ker Porter, pl. 28).
**See Malcolm, vol. i. opp. p. 255; Tex-
ier, pl. 146; Flandin. pl. 49.
* Texier, pl. 147; Flandin, pl. 53.
* See, the Journal of the Geographi-
cal Society, vol. ix. § 73-4; vol. xvi.
#P.# 8. Loftus, Chaldoea and Susiana,

* Tabari, Chronique, tom. ii. p. 80.
** Loftus, p. 299, Compare Geograph;
Journal, vol. ix. p. 75; vol. xvi. p. 28.
** Niebuhr, C., Voyages, tom. ii. p. 129;
Ker Porter, Travels, vol. i. pp. 540–575;
Malcolm, Hist, of Persia, vol. i. p, 254;
Flandin, Voyage en Perse, tom. ii. pp
97–135, &c.; Texier, Description de l'Ar-
ménie. &c. tom. ii. pp. 226-231. &c.
1. Ker Porter, vol. i. pl. 21; Texier, pl.
95 Texier, pl. 139.
** See, Thomas in Journal of As, So-
ciety, iii. N. S. p. 801; and compare De
Sacy, Inscriptions de Nakschi-Rowstam,
pp. 31 and 105; Spiegel, Grammatik, p.
169. The inscription may be thus ren-
dered:—“This is the representation of
the Ormazd-worshipping divine Sapor,
king of kings Arian and non-Arian,
heaven-descended, of the race of the
gods, son of the Ormazd-worshipping
divine Artaxerxes, king of the kings of
Aria, heaven-descended, of the race of
the gods, grandson of the divine Papak,
the king.” See Haug on the Haji-abad
Inscription, which commences in ex-
actly the same way. (Old Pallavi-Pa-
zand Glossary, pp. 48–51.)
*7. Compare the Author's Siarth. Mon-
archy, p. 64. -
°8 See Longpérier, Médailles des Sas-
sanides, pl. 8 and P , 13–18.
** A few coins of Sapor I. have, on the
reverse, a fire-altar without supporters,
.# y *.
CH. v.]
|
like the coins of his father. [Pl. XV. Fig.
iſ . - - W .
100 For the meaning of these legends,
See text, p. 276.
101 See Bohlen, Das alte Indien, vol. i.
pp. 369, et seq. ... -
102 Milman, History of the Jews, vol.
11. O. 469, -
* Routh, Reliquide. Sacroe, vol. iv.
pp. 147, 153, &c.; Augustin, De Nat.
Boni, p. 515; Contr. Faust, passim; Epi-
phan. Adv. Haeres. lxvi. 2
104 Burton, Eccles. Hist. of First Three
Centuries, vol. ii. p. 408. -
105 Epiphan. Adv. Hoeres. lxvi. §§ 1–3.
Compare Milman, History of Christi-
anity, vol. ii. pp. 259, 260, 26.1, &c.
106 Burton, p. 409; Milman, p. 263.
107 Milman, pp. 259-271.
108 Burton, p. 410. -
109 According to the interpretation of
one writer, Sapor has left a record
which sufficiently indicates his adoption
at one time in his life of a species of
mongrel Christianity. Mr. Thomas finds
the name of JESUS in the Haji-abad in-
scription, accompanied by the epithet
“the Lord,” and the statement that He
“mercifully brought joy to the people
of the world.” (See his explanation of
the inscription in the Journal of the
Royal Asiatic Society, vol. iii., New
Series, pp. 33S-9.) Another interpreter,
however, with at least equal claims to
attention, Dr. Martin Haug, finds no
reference at all to Jesus or to religion
in the record, which describes, accord-
ing to him, Sapor's shooting of an arrow
from the Haji-abad cave at a target
placed without it, and his failure to hit
the mark, thenee proceeding to give a
mystical account of the failure, which
is ascribed to the existence of an invisi-
ble target at the spot where the arrow
fell. (Old Pahlavi-Petzand Glossary, pp.
45-65.) It seems to result from the ex-
treme difference between the interpre-
tations of these two scholars, that the
language of the early Sassanian inscrip-
tions is as yet too itnperfectly known to
allow of any conclusions being drawn
from them, excepting where they are
accompanied by a Greek transcript.
Magoudi says that, on the first preaching
of Manes, Sapor “abjured the doctrine
of the Magi to embrace that of the new
teacher,” but that he afterwards re-
turned to the worship of his ancestors
(tom. ii. p. 164).
110 Burton, 1. s. c.; Milman, p. 263.
111 Augustin. Contr. Fortwavat, ad init.;
Contr. Faust. v. 1.
112 See text, p. 287.
118 See text, p. 290. -
114 Besides the works of usefulness al-
ready mentioned (p. 289), Sapor is said
to have constructed the great bridge of
Dizful, which has 22 arches, and is 450
paces long. (See M. Mohl's translation
of the Modjmel-al-Tewarikh in the Jour-
mal Asiatique for 1841, p. 511.)
*** Longpérier thinks that the hand of
THE "SEVENTH MONARCHY.
649
Greek artists is to be recognized in the
heads and emblems upon early Sassa-
nian' coins (Médailles des Sassanides, p.
5). - -
116 Tabari, Chronique, tom. ii. p. 81;
Magoudi, Prairies d’Or, tom. ii. p. 160,
tom. iv. p. 83; Mirkhond, Histoire des
. Sassanides, pp. 285-7. The portrait on
the gem given [Pl. XV. Fig. 5) tends to
confirm the testimony.
º Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. i.
p. 99. - -
- CHAPTER V.
* See Agathias, iv. p. 134; Eutychius,
‘vol. i. pp. 384, 387, 395.
* The full form is Hormisdates or Or-
misdates, “given by Ormazd.” This is
first contracted into Hormisdas, and
then by the later Persians into Hormuz.
The form of the mame on the coins of
Hormisdas II, is Auhrmazdi. . .
* Agath. 1. s.c. Compare Tabari, ii. p.
89: Magoudi, ii. p. 166.
* So Milman (History of Christianity,
vol. ii. p. 272); but Malcolm places his
return to Persia, under Varahrān I. (Hist.
of Persia, vol. i. p. 101). So Mirkhond,
Histoire des Sassawides, p. 295.
* Magoudi, tom. . ii. p. 166: Malcolm,
Hist, of Persia, vol. i. p. 100: Mirkhoud,
Histoire des Sassanides, p. 293.
* Magoudi tells us (tom. ii. p. 238) that,
according to Abu Obeidah, Varahran
was the son of Sapor and brother of
Hormisdas; but all other authorities, so
far as I know, make him the son of Hor-
misdas. . - -
7 The orthography of the name upon
the coins is Varāhran (Longpérier, Mé-
- This the Greeks express-
ed by Oiapóvms, or Obapapdºwns. The later
Persians corrupted the name into Bah-
rain.' t the Achaemenian, Persians
had some similar contracted form of the
word appears from the name Pharant-
dates, or Pherendates. . (See Sir H. Raw-
linson's remarks on this name in the
Author's Herodotus, vol. iii. p. 452, 2nd

d.)
8 Mr. Thomas does not allow that any
of the extant coins belong to Hormisdas
the First (see Num. Chron. for 1872, p.
105). Mordtmann (Zeitschrift, vol. viii.
pp. 37–9; vol. xix. pp. 423, 478) regards
as his the coins having the lion-crested
cap with a flower rising from the sum-
mit. These coins, however, must, from
the Indian emblems on some of them
(Thomas. 1. s. c.), helong to Hormisdas
II. As the portraits on these coins and
on those with the eagle cap are wholly
different, I suspect that the latter ma
be coins of the first Hormisdas. . [Pl.
. . Fig. 3.]. e gem regarded by
Mordtmann as bearing the name and
head of the first Hormisdas (Zeitschrift,
vol. xviii. p. 7; pl. i., fig. 5) must be as-
signed to the second prince of the name,
from the resemblance of the head to the
portraits on the lion coins.
* Agath. iv. p. 134, D: Tptoriv recru Baori-
#

Z

650 .
Aeſoras. So Magoudi (ii. p. 167). Eutych.
vol. i. p. 384: ‘Tres annos cum tribus
mensibus regnavit.” -
10 Malcolm, History of Persia, l. s. c.;
Tabari, tom. ii. p. 89; Mirkhond, Histoire
des Sassanides, l. S. c.
11 So Milman (Hist. of Christianity,
vol. ii. p. 272). Compare Magoudi, tom.
11. TO. 10'ſ.
lº Milman, 1. s. c.; Mirkhond, p. 296;
Suidas ad voc. &c.
13 Besides Valerian (who, according to
some, was flayed alive) and Manes, we
hear of a certain Nachoragan being
flayed alive by Chosroës (Agath. iv. p.
32, D). Some of the ecclesiastical
writers call flaying alive “the Persian
punishment” (Theodoret, Adv. Hoereses,
i. 26; Cyrill. Catech. vii.). It is also
mentioned as a Persian custom by
Faustus (Bibl. Hist. iv. 21). -
14 In early times the Achaemenian Per-
sians flayed men after killing them (He-
rod. v. 25, cród Éas &méðelpe). The same
was the practice of the European Scyth-
ians (ibid. iv. 64). It may be suspected
that the flaying process which is repre-
sented in the Assyrian sculptures was
performed on dead bodies (Ancient Mon-
archies, vol. i. p. 244, 2nd edition). Mal-
colm cautiously says of Mani: “Mani
and almost all his disciples were put to
death by order of Baharam; and the
skin of the impostor was hung up;”
which does not imply º: alive (see
10] .
. Hist. of Persia, vol. i. p.
\
;
15 Malcolm. l. s. c.; Mirkhond, l. s. c.;
Tabari, tonn. ii. p. 90. -
1 6 n says: “Manes was put to
eath, either by crucifiacion, or by exco-
ation” (Lectures on the First Three
'emtwries. vol. ii. p. 410), which shows
hat two accounts were known to him.
jutychius gives a different account
from either of these. According to him,
Varahran “cut Manes asunder” (” Ma-
nem prehensum medium divisit Bah-
rann.” vol. i. p. 301).
17 Milman, vol. ii. p. 273.
18 Vopisc. Vit. Aureliam. (in the His-
toria Augusta), $ 27. .
19 Ibid. § 28, .
20 “Zenobia, cum fugeret camelis quos
dromadas vocitant, atque ad Persºns iter
fººt. equitibusest capta.” (Vopisc.
. S. C. -
21 “Hoc munus [sc. pallium breve pur-
pureum lanestre, ad quod cum matronae
atoue ipse Aurelianus jungerent purpu-
ras suas. cineris specie decolorari vide-
bantur caeterae divini comparatione ful-
góris] rex Persarum ab lndis interiori-
bus sumptum Aureliano dedisse perhi- s
betur, scribens, ‘Sume purpuram, qua-
lis apud nos est.’ ” (Vopisc. Aurel. §
22 Ibid. § 33: “Currus regii tres fue-
runt . . . . unus Odenati argento, auro,
gemmis opercisus atque distinctus; alter,
quem Teac Persarwm Aurelictivo do no de-
dit.” De Champagny has represented
this as a chariot which the Persian king
THE SE WEWTH MONARCHY. *
rel. Vict. Coes. xxxviii.
[CH. v.
Siècle, tom. iii.
23 Vopisc
had given to Odenathus (Césars dw. 3mo
p. 119).
C. .
-- “Persis . . . . bellum in-
dixit [Aurelianus].”
25 See Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol.
i. F. 382. -
* “Parato magno potius quam ingenti
exercitu.” (Vopisc. º;', 35.)
27 “Mansionem quae est inter Heracli.
am et Byzantium.” (Vopise. § 36.) For
the exact situation. See Itiner, Antomim.
(p. 153, ed. Parthey et Pinder), where we
find that it was 18 Roman miles from
Heraclea (Perinthus), and 47 from By-
zantiu
Iºl.
28 Agath. iv. p. 134, C; Eutych. i. p.
387; Mirkhond, p. 297: Tabari, ii. p. 90.
29 Malcolm, Hist, of Persia, vol. i. p.
102; Mirkhond, Histoire des Sussamides,
pp. 297-8. Magoudi says that he aban-
doned himself to pleasure and idleness,
passed his time in hunting and other
amusements, gave the management of
the enmpire to unworthy favorites, and
allowed hundreds of towns and villages
to fall into ruin (tom. ii. pp. 168–173). It
is perhaps a sign of his soft and pleas-
ure-loving temperament that he alone
of the Sassanian kings places the effigy
of his wife upon his coins. This em:
placement implies association in the
kingdom. [Pl. XV. Fig. 4.
30 Is the bas-relief at Nakhsh-i-Rustam,
represented by Ker Porter (vol. i. pl. 24),
intended to commemorate this scene 3
It “consists of a king” (wearing the
peculiar headdress of Varahran 11.)
“standing in a niche or rostrum. as if
delivering a harangue” (ibid. vol. i. p.
[See Pl. XVI.]
31 Agath. iv. p. 135. A.
32 Saca-stan is “ the country of the
Saka” (Sacae or Scyths). It received the
name probably at the time of the great
invasion of the Yue-Chi. (See the Au .
thor's Sia:th Monarchy, p. 65.) -
38 The subjection of the Segestani is
perhaps the subject of the bas-relief rep-
resented by Flandin (pl. 51), where the
monarch wears the peeuliar headdress
of Varahram II.
84 The bulk of the Persian forces were
“detained on the frontiers of It dia.”
when Carus crossed the Euphrates (Gib-
bon, vol. ii. p. 55).
35 Probus, in A.D. 279, dismissed a Per-
sian embassy with threats (Vopisc.
fºot. § 17). Soon afterwards, however,
e “made peace with the Persians”
(ibid. § 18). But a little before his death,
in A.D. 282, we hear of his meditating a
Persian expedition (ibid. § 20).
38 Vopisc. Car. § 8.
37 Gibbon; i. s. c.
88 Vopisc. l. s. c.; Eutrop. ix. 18; Au-
Compare Mos.
Chor. Hist, Arm. ii. 76.
30 See the letter of the secretary. Ju-
lius Calpurnius, preserved by Vojiscus
(l, s. c.), and translated by Gibbon (De
cline and Fall, vol. ii. pp. 55–6). f
* *
cH. VI.]
40 Gibbon seems to believe that Carus
was killed by lightning (vol. ii. p. 56).
Niebuhr wavers between lightning and
assassination (Lectures, vol. iii. p. 805,
E. T.). De Champagny, says that the
whole matter is shrouded in impenetra-
ble mystery (Césars dw 3me Siècle, tom.
iii. p. 186). -
4f See Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 324; and
compare De Champagny, tom. iii. p. 186,
note 1.
42 It was an old Roman superstition
that “places or persons struck with
lightning were singularly devoted to the
wrath of heaven” (Gibbon, vol. i. p. 413).
There was also a special belief that
“when the praetorium was struck, it
foreboded the destruction of the army
itself” (Niebuhr, Lectures, vol. iii. p.
305, E
o, tú. 1 . ).
48 When Numerian is credited with
Persian victories (Nemes. Cyneget, 71-2),
it is on the notion that, having been as-
sociated by Carus, he had part in the
successes of A.D. 283. That Numerian
retreated upon the death of his father
without tempting fortune any further,
is clear from Aur. Vict. Coes. xxxviii.,
and Vopiscus, Numer. § 11.
44 During this interval Numerian was
killed, Diocletian invested with the pur-
ple, Carinus defeated and, slain, and
Maximian associated. (Gibbon, vol. ii.
pp. 60–66,
45 Moses of Chorēnē makes the sub-
jection of Armenia to Persia, last twen-
ty-six years (Hist. Arm., ii. 74, swb fin.).
But if he is right in making Artaxerxes
the king who reduced Armenia, and in
stating that Tiridates regained the
throne in the third year of Diocletian
(ii. 19), the duration of the Subjection
must have been, at least, forty-six years,
since Artaxerxes died in A.D. 241, and
the third of Diocletian was A.D.
4.6 MOS. Chor. ii. 77.
47 Moses omits this feature of the
struggle, but Agathangelus supplies it.
(Agathang. Hist. Regn, Tiridat. c. iii. §
21: § 8aarvaeijs row Tripmåårºv, . . . orptirev-
ua sis Boij6etav ćyxeupta'as, &mé\varev eis Tav
iötav xúpav.
48 Mos, Chor. ii. 79. ,
49 Agathang. iii. $21; Mos. Chor. 1. s. c.
50 Especially in Assyria. (Agathang.
iv. $55: riv erapyiavºis Agavpias Širáraše
ðetworátats ramyats. Mos. Chor. ii. 79, ad
71,
*1 So Moses. Agathangelus, while
praising highly the warlike qualities of
Tiridates (l. s. c.), avoids these improb-
able details.
52 Agathias. iv. p. 134, D; Eutych, vol.
i. p. 387. Mirkhond agrees (Histoire des
Sasanides, p. 299), but notes that his
authorities varied. Malcolm says that
some of the native writers allow him
only thirteen years (History of Persia,
vol. i. p. 103, note)...Tabari gives him no
more than four! (Chronique, ii. p. 90).
53 Tabari says (1. s. c.) that Varahran
II. had no son, but was succeeded by his
THE SEVENTH MONARCHY.
f
brother Narses. Narses himself says
that he was the son of Sapor and grand-
son of Artaxerxes. . It is thought that he
may have omitted his immediate ances-
tors as persons of Small account (Thom-
as in Num, Chron. for 1872, p. 113); but
such omission is very unusual.
** Mirkhoud, p. 300. A bas-relief at
Nakhsh-i-Rustam seems to represent
him as receiving the crown from his
mother. (Ker Porter, pl. 19.
* The inaugural addiess of Varahran
III. is reported as follows: “I ascend
this throne by right, as the issue of
your kings; but the sole end which I
propose to myself in ruling is to obtain
for the people who shall be subject to
me a happy and quiet life. I place all
my trust in the goodness of God, through
whose help all things may end happily.
If God preserves my life, I will conduct
myself towards you in such a way that
all who hear me spoken of will load me
with blessings. If, on the contrary, the
angel of death comes and carries me
away, I hope that God will not forsake
you or suffer you to perish.” (Mir-
khond, Hist. des Sassanides. 1. s. c.)
* Agathias, 1. s. c.; Eutych. vol. i. p.
395. So also Firdusi in the Shah-nameh.
Some Oriental writers, however, gave
him a reign of nine years. (Mirkhond,
1. s. c.)
*7 Agathang. iv. §§ 55 and 57.
CHAPTER VI.
* The relationship of Narses to his
redecessor is exceedingly, doubtful.
e himself declares in an inscription
that he was the son of Sapor and the
grandson of Artaxerxes (see note 53,
Chapter V.); and his statement is con-
firmed by the Arabian writer, Abu Obef-
dah (Magoudi, tom. ii. p. 238), and by
the Armenian historian, Sépêos. (See
the Jowrmal Asiatique for 1866, p. 149.)
abari, however, makes him the son of
Varahran I. (Chronique, tom. ii. p. 90.)
So Magoudi (tom. ii. p. 174). Agathias
avoids the question of relationship.
Mirkhond (p. 301) and the Persian
writers generally say that he was the
son of Varahran For my own part,
I should incline to accept his own state.
ment, and to suppose that; Varahran
III. having died without issue, the crown
reverted to his great-great-uncle, a man
of years and experience, who, however,
was not allowed to enjoy the throne
without a struggle with another prince
of the royal house, a certain Hormisdas.
* This passage of history rests entirely
on a single sentence in a Latin writer of
uncertain date, the author of the “Pane-
gyric” º: by Gibbon (Decline and
P'all, vol. ii. p. 81, note 61).
* “Ipsos Persas ipsumque regem ad-
Scitis Saccis. et Russis, et Gellis, petit
• * )
frater Ormies.” (Paneg. Vet. ii. 17.
The Gelli are well identified by Gibbon
with the inhabitants of Ghilan, the Gelae
of earlier writers. The Saccae (Sacae)
651
*..
652
are undoubtedly Scyths. They may
have dwelt on the Oxus, or possibly in
Affghanistan. The Russi should, by
their name, be “Russians;” but it must
be admitted that we have otherwise no
mention of them by the classical writers
till the ninth century A.D. If, howr
ever, they are intended in Ezek. xxxviii.
2, 3, xxxix. 1 (as Gesenius and Dean
Stanley argue), they may be meant also
in the present passage.
4 See Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 340, where
it is proved that the first campaign of
Galerius was as early as A.D. 297. If so,
the movements which provoked it must
have fallen, at the latest, in A.D. 296.
5 See text, p. 300.
6 Mos. Chor. ii. 79, ad fin. : “Etiam
ultra, Ctesiphontem incursiones fecit.”
7 Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5. Compare the
treatise De Morte Persecutorum, $9.
3 8 Aurel. Wict. Coesar. § 39; Zonar. xii.
1. -
* Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5; Zonar. l. s. c.;
Eutrop. ix. 24; &c.
10 First at Alexandria (Aurel. Vict.
1. s. c.); then at Antioch (Lactant. De
Morte Persec. l. s. c.).
11 Lactant. De Morte Persecutor. § 9;
Aurel. Victor, De Coesnºribus, $39. Zo:
naras makes him actually invade Syria
(roi, Náparov Toivvy roſtov ráte rhv >vpiav
Amigoplávov, xii. 31).
12 See Gibbon. Decline and Fall, ch.
xiii. (vol. ii. p. 82). On the real charac-
ter of the region see the Author's Sixth
Monarchy, pp. 91, 92. -
18 Victor expresses the commission of
Galerius as follows: “Provincia credita,
Maximiano Caesari, uti relict is finibus
in Mesopotamiam, progrederetwa', ad ar-
cendos Persarum impetus.” (I. s. c.)
14 Oros. vii. 25: “Cum duobus jam
praeliis adversus Narseum conflixisset,
tertio inter Callinicum et Carras con-
gressus et victus, amissis copiis, ad Dio-
cletianum refugit.”
15 Aurel. Vict. Coes. $39; Zonar. J. s.c.;
Eutrop. ix. 24; Julian, Paneg. Constant.
p. 18, A.
10 Gibbon's description of the battle
(l. s. c.) is wholly imaginary, no classical
writer having left us any account of it.
He transfers to the conflict between Ga-
Jerius and Narses all that Plutarch and
T}io relate of Crassus and Surenas. This
is scarcely an allowable mode of writing
.” In transferring to this occasion an
anecdote related of Tiridates by Moses
of Choréné, and attached by him to a
defeat of Carus by the Persians, which
never, took place, our great historian
does not perhaps transcend the limits of
a sound historical criticism.
18 Mos. Chor, ii. 76. . . . . .
1° Eutrop. 1. s. c.; Amm. Marc. xiv. 11.
The “mile almost " of Ammianus be-
comes “several miles” in Eutropius,
Festus (§ 25), and Orosius (vii. 25); and
“several leagues”, in Tillemont (Hist.
des Empereurs, iv. p. 37),
. THE SEVENTH IIONARCIIY.
ſch. VI.
20 Oros. 1. s. c.: “Per Illyricum et
Moesiam undique copias contraxit.”
*1 Jornandes, De Gothorwm rebus ges
tis, c. 21. - .
22 Aurel. Victor. Coes. § 39: “Per Ar
menjam in hostes contendit, quae Sola,
seu facilior, vincendi via est.”
23 Festus, $25.
24 Synes. Reg. p. 19, A. Compare Fes-
tus. 1. s. c., and Eutropius, ix. 25.
25 Festus, . c. , Compare Amm.
Marc. xxii. 4: “Sub Maximiano Caesare
vallo regis Persarum direpto.”
* Zonaras, xii. 31.
37 Ibid. Compare Eutrop. ix. 25; Oros.
vii. 25.
*... Captivos quamplurimos Persarum
nºbilium abduxit.” (Oros. 1. s. c.)
º onaras makes him pursue Narses
“Into the inner parts of Persia” (uéxpt
Tns évôorépas IIeportöos); and Eutropius
speaks of Narses as betaking himself to
the remotest solitudes of his kingdom
ix. 25), t it e questioned
whether the defeated monarch ever fled
further than Media, where we find him
when an ambassador is sent to him by
Diocletian (Pet. Patric. Fr. 14).
30 Zonaras, l. S. c.
81 Petrus Patricius. Although thisau-
thor did not write till towards the close
of the sixth century, he is generally al-


lowed by historical critics to be among
the best authorities even for the events
of three centuries previously. (See Gib-
bon, Decline and Fall, ch. xiii. vol. ii. p.
84, note 74; § Müller, Fr. Hist, Gr, vol.
iv. pp. 181-4; Niebuhr, Preface to the
Bonn edition of the Excerpta de Lega-
tionibus.
)
82 I have been content to translate Pa-
tricius. Gibbon, by recasting the entire
oration and changing the position of all
its parts, produces a fine result; but I
have not felt at liberty to work up the
ancient materials after-his fashion.
88 Note the absence here of any allu-
sion to fetters, or to the employment of
Valerian by his captor as a horseblock;
and remark that the flaying is distinctly
made subsequent to his decease.
34 Gibbon (l. s.c.) has incorrectly plac-
ed the embassy of Apharhan after the
meeting of Galerius with Diocletian at
Nisibis, and has made both monarchs
present at the interview. De Cham-
pagny has seen the true order of the
events (Césars du 3me Siècle, tom. iii.
tº ). *
* Eutrop. ix. 25; Julian, Orat. i. p. 18,
* Pet. Patric. Fr. 14.
88 Aurel. Vict, l. S. c.: “Adeo victor
[Galerius erat], ut, ni Valerius, cujus
nutu omnia, gerebantur, incertum qua
causa, abnuisset, Romani fasces in pro-
Vinciam novann ferrentur.”
** Patricius (l, s.c.) calls him &vrtypadéa
ris plviums, a sort of “Secretary of
State.” *
** "Ev rots ºvěotépal rôv Baarvaeiov. (Pet.
d
cH. VI.]
Patric. I s. c.) The palace' seems to ||
have been on the river.Asprudis, which
cannot be indentified. -
41 Patricius calls him “governor of
Symium.” Gibbon identifies Symium
with Synia, a tract east of Mount Ararat
(Arment. Geograph. § 74). -
42 Patricius, l. s. c. +
43 Antimianus Marcellinus, xxv. 7. Gib-;
bon has strangely intermixed the state-
ments of the two writers, ascribing the
mention of Intilene to mianus, and
that of Rehimene to Patricius (vol. ii. p.
37, note 79), which is the reverse of the
truth, * * *.
44 Pet. Patric. Fr. 14. r
45 This was the view of Valesius (ad
Amm. Marc. xxv. 7), of Tillemont (His-
‘oire des Emperewº's, tom. iv. p. 40), and
of must writers anterior to Gibbon. It
was argued that the provinces were
called “Transtigritanae.”, because they
were so to the Persians! -
46 De Champagny places them all
“west of Lake Van and south of Arme-
nia.” (Césars du 3m Siècle, tom. iii. p.
305, note.) -
47 As Gibbon, vol. ii. p. 87; Niebuhr,
Lectures on Roman. History. vol. iii. p.
311. E. 'T.; and Mr. James in Smith's
Dict, of Geography, ad voc. CORDYENIE.
48 See notes 42 and 43.
49 Menander Protect. Fr. 55, p. 257.
50 See Layard's Nineveh, and Babylon,
p. 39, and compare the map of Armenia,
Assyria, and Kurdistan at the end of
the book. .
51. The most º are Eutrop. vi.
7: Procop. De Bell. Pers. i. 8; De AEdific.
iii. 2; ' Menarid. Protect. Fr. 55, 57, and
60; Johann. Epiphan, Fr. 1, § 3; : Armen.
Geogr. § 68.
52 It is remarkable that the appella-
tion has changed so little in the course
of ceilturies. The Assyrian monarchs
call the country Kirznm.
** Amm. Marc. xx. 7.
*4 Layard, Nineveh and Babylon, p.53.
** Strab. xi. 12, § 4, xvi. 1, § 24; Plu-
tarch, Lucull. 26; &c.
* Xen. Anub. iv. i., §§ 2–3; Strab. xvi.
1. § 8; Arrian, Ecp. Alex. iii. 7; Plin. H.
N. vi. 15; Ptol. v. 13. .
57 The “Sophene” of Patricius may
safely be set aside, since it had long
been Roman. His “Intilené '' some
would change into Ingilene, a district
mentioned as “lying beyond Mesopota-
mia” by E ** (De Hoeres. lx. vol.
i. p. 505, ; ales.). The “Rehinene”
of Ammianus is confirmed by Zosimus,
who mentions “Remenians” among the
tribes ceded by Jovian (iii. 31). The
“Moxoene” of Ammianus does not
elsewhere occur. s it the modern
“ district of Mokus” (Layard, Nim, and
ab. p. 417, note)? Zosimus has in its
place “Zalene,” a name of which I can
make nothing. -
* Corduenae, wberis regionis et
traº,” (Amm. Marc. xxv. 7.) .
*Ibid. Compare Zosim. iii. 31. . .
IICS-
THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY,
653
* Amm. Marc. 1. s. c.: “Petebat rex
obstinatius stia dudum a Mlaximiiano
- ta. - -
erepta. -
. 91 Pace facta, Mesopotamia est resti-
tuta: et super ripam .Tigridis limes est
confirmatus, ut (“ with the further cou-
: dition... that ”) quinque gentium trans
Tigridem constitutarum ditionem asse-
|
queremur.” . . (Festus
, $ 14.)
** Decline and Fall, ch. xiii. (vol. ii. p.:
87. note 77); ' ' ' ' ' ' ' -
sº Decline and Fall, ch. xiii. (vol. ii. p.
64 Mos. Chor. ii. 84. -
* We can ouly say with De Cham-
pagny: “L’Arménie, vassale de Rome,
fut agrandie” (Césars, tom... iii. p. 305),
and that the augmentation was on the
siule of Media. - +
* Tacit. Antºn. vi. 33: “Iberi, locorum
potentes, Caspia via Sarrnatam in Ar-
niemios raptiin effundunt.” Compare
Dio Cass. lxix. 15. *.
• ‘7 Nineveh, which was now once more
a place of importance (see Tac. Annu. xii.
.*
13: Amm. Marc. xviii. T, ad invit.; Lay-
ard, Nin. and Bab. pp. 590–1), and which
was nearer Nisibis than any other Per-
sian town of consequence, lay at the dis-
tance of nearly 120 iniles. Arbela was
nearly 60 miles further off. -
..68 On the trade between Rome and
Parthia, see Herodian, iv. 18; and com-
pare the Author's Siacth Moncurchy, p.
233. It is probable that the exchange
of Persian for Parthian rule had made
but little difference in the course or.
character of the tra.
69 See text, p. 307.
70 Lacant. De Morte Persec. § 9: “Con-
citatus domesticis exemplis avi sui Sa-
poris, ad occupandum Orienten magnis
copiis [Narses] inhiabat.”
71 The abdication of Narses rests
wholly upon the authority of the Ori-
ental writers. (See Mirkhond, Histoire
des Sassanides, p. 302; Malcolm, History
of Persia, vol. i. p. 104.) It is accepted,
however, as a fact by most moderns.
See Malcolm, I. s. c.; Plate in Sumith's
Dict, of †ºol. iii. p. 717, &c.) -
** Mirkhond, I. s. c. .
78 He is said to have been surnamed
Nakhdjirkan, or “Hunter of wild beasts”
(Mirkhond, p. 303). lt is remarkable
that the headdress which distinguishes
him on his coins is adorned with horns,
either of the ibex or the stag. [Pl. XVIII.
Fig. 2..] This ornamentation is quite
peculiar to him; and it adds a weight to
the other statements of the native
writers as to his predilections.
74 Dr. Plate says he died in the year
that he abdicated; but I know mo all-
thority for this. That he did not outlive
A.D. 309, the year of his son's death
seems to follow from the difficulty ther,
felt about the succession. Perhaps it is
most probable that he died in A.D. 306,
since the Armenians regard him as king
up to this date. (See Patkaniari in the
Journal Asiatique for 1866, p. 150.)
&
CHAPTER VII.
1 See Clinton, F. R. vol. ii. p. 260. Aga-
thias declares that both Narses and Hor-
misdas reigned eacactly seven years and
five months (p. 135, A.). So Magoudi, ii.
174
. I j4.
2 Mirkhond, Histoire des Sassanides,
pp. 303-4. Compare Tabari, ii. p. 90,
ščibbon, decline and fail, chiii (vol.
i. P. 215).
Mirkhond, p. 304; D'Herbelot, Biblio-
thèque Orientale, tom iii. p. 221. ,
5 D'Herbelot, l. s. c.
6 D'Herbelot quotes the Lebtarikh and
the Tarikh-Cozideh to this effect.
7 Mirkhond, p. 293; Malcolm, Hist. of
Persia, vol. i. p. 100.
8 D'Herbelot, l. s. c. . .
9 Mirkhond, p. 304: Wilson, Ariana.
Antiqua, p. 385, note 5. -
10 See text, p. 297.
11 See Wilson, Ariana Antiqua, pp.
347–381.
12 The coins of Hormisdas II. not un-
frequently show signs of Indian influ-
€11Cé. n the reverses of some we see
the Indian deity Siva and his Bull
(Thomas in Num, Chron. vol. xv. p. 180;
New Series, No. 45, p. 115), as in the
coins of Kadphises (Wilson, Ariana.
Antiqua, pp. 350-7). On others we ob-
serve an Indian altar (Nunn. Chron, vol.
xv. p. 180, fig. 10).
13 Mirkhond, Histoire des Sassamides,
, 304.
p 14 The relationship of the “Prince
Hormisdas,” who took refuge at the
court of Constantine in the year A D. 323,
to Hormisdas II. rests on the authority
of Zosimus, from whom all the details
here given are derived. (See Zosim.
Hist, Nov. ii. 27.) The account given by
Zonaras (xiii. 5) is different.
15 The latter part of the story in Zosi-
mus implies that he had this inclination.
How offensive such tastes might be to
the Asiatics, we see from the history of
Vonones in Tacitus (Antt. ii. 2),
16 Herod. i. 133. . . Compare ix. 110.
17 Compare Mordecai's treatment of
Haman (Esther iii. 2, v. 9). -
18 See text, p. 294.
19 Some writers give him another son,
the Artaxerxes who succeeded Sapor II.
But it is impossible to accept this view.
See text, ch. xii.
20 Agathias, iv., p. 135; Mirkhond, pp.
305–6; Tabari, tom. ii. p. 91 : Malcolm,
History of Persia, vol. i. p. 106. Gibbon
suggests that Agathias obtained the his-
tory, from the Persian Chronicles (De-
cline and Fall, ch. xviii. vol. ii. p. 367,
note 54).
21 Sapor (Shah-puhr) means “King's
son.” as has been already, noted (see
note 2, Chapter IV.).
22 Abulpharagius in one place has six-
ty-nine years (p. 85). in another (p. 90)
seventy. Agathius (p. 135, D) and Theo-
hanes (p. 7) have seventy. Sir John
alcolm, following Oriental authorities,
gives seventy-one (Hist, of Persia, vol.
THE SEVENTH MONARCHY.
[CH. VII.
i. p. 110.). Eutychius (vol. i. p. 472), Mir-
hond (Hist, des Sassanides, p. 306), Ta-
bari (Chronique, tom. ii. p. 101), and
Magoudi (tom. ii. p. 175) say seventy-
two.
28 Abul pharagius
, p. 90.
24 Mirkhond makes Sapor begin to ex-
ercise some of the offices of government
at eight years (p. 807), but admits that
he did not undertake the direction of
military expeditions till he was sixteen
(ibid.). So Tabari (tom. ii. p. 93).
25 Mirkhond, l. s. c.; Tabari, vol. ii.
pp. 91–2; Malcolm, vol. i. p. 106.
28 D'Herbelot, Bibliothèque Orientale,
tom. v. p. 143; Gibbon, Decline and Fall
ch. xviii. (vol. ii. p. 367) ese writers
make Thair a king of Yemen or Arabia
proper; but Sir J. Malcolm says he was
a mere sheikh of some of the tribes of
Mesopotamia (vol. i. p. 107, note). . . .
27 Mirkhond, p. 307; Tabari, tom. ii. pp.
28 Fourteen is generally regarded as
the age of manhood in the East (Layard,
Mim. and Babylon. p. 205); and minori-
ties usually come to an end at this age.
(See Malcolm, Hist. of Persia, vol. i. pp.
499, 506, &c.)
29 Mirkhond, l. s. c.; Tabari, p. 93; Ma-
goudi, p. 176.
30 Mirkhond. p. 308: Tabari, p. 94.
31 This is Mirkhond's account. Other
authorities say that he dislocated (Mal-
colm, vol. i. p. 107; Magoudi, vol. ii. p.
177) or broke (D'Herbelot, Bibl. Orient.
tom. v. p. 141) the shoulders of his prison-
ers, to disqualify them for military ser-
Vice.
32 Gibbon, following an apocryphal
tale related by D'Herbelot, but not adop-
ted by him, gives the name as Dhow-
lacnaf, and translates it “Protector of
the Nation” (vol. ii. p. 367). The best au-
thorities are, however, all agreed that
the real epithet was Dhowlactaf, not
Dhould craf. (See D'Herbelot, 1. s. c.;
Mirkhond, p. 308; Tabari, tom. ii. p. 91;
Malcolm, vol. i. p. 107, note; Magoudi,
tom. ii. p. 175.
83 Sozomen, Hist. Eccles. ii. 9, 10.
84 Tillemont, Hist, des Emperento's,
tom. iv. p. 255: “Constantin se regar-
dait comme le protecteur général de
tous les serviteurs de Jésus-Christ.”
35 Eusebius (Vit. Constant. Magn. iv.
9 et seqq.) and Theodoret (i. 25) give the
terms of a letter written by Constantine
to Sapor at this time in favor of the
Christians. It is a verbose production,
and possesses but little interest. e
greater part is an account of his own
religious principles and feelings. The
concluding portion, which alone touches
the case of the Persian Christians, runs
as follows: “You can imagine then how
delighted I am to hear that Persia, too,
in some of its best regions, is adorned
and illustrated by this class of men, on
whose behalf I write to you—I mean the
Christians—a thing most agreeable to
my wishes. All prosperity then be

CH. VIII.]
ours, and all prosperity be theirs--may
}. flourish alike I Thus will you make
God the Father, the Lord of all, propi-
tious and friendly towards you. These
persons then, seeing that you are so
great, I commend to you—I put them
into your hand, seeing that you are so
conspicuous for your piety. Love them
with that love which befits your known
benevolence. For thus you will confer
both on us and on yourself an immeas-
urable benefit.” -
38 Libanius, Orat. iii. pp. 118, 120; Au-
rel. Vict. De Coesaribus, $41.
37 Compare Liban. 1. s. c. with Festus
(§ 26) and Euseb. Vit. Constant. iv. 8.
38 Some writers make the hostilities
commence in the lifetime of Constan-
time. (See Eutrop. x. 8: Chronic. Pasch.
. 286, C.) But Ammianus, who is al-
most a contemporary, assigns the out-
break to the reign of Constantius (xxv.
4).
's, Sapor is said to have sent a friendly
embassy to Constantine in A.D. 333 (Eu-
Seb. Wit. Comst. iv. 8: Liban. Or, iii. p.
118). In A.D. 337 he suddenly threatened
war, and demanded the restoration of
the five provinces ceded by Narses (Li-
ban. Or. iii. p. 120). Having received a
refusal, he sent another embassy, about
Easter, to express his desire for peace
(Euseb. iv. 57).
40 See the Author's Siacth Monarchy,
pp. 130, 132, 145, &c.
41 If Prince Hormisdas was a son of
Hormisdas II. and thrown into prison at
his death (see text, p. 315), he must have
passed fourteen years in confinement
before he inade his escape.
42 Zosim. ii. 27.
43 Ibid. ii. 27, ad fin.; and iii. 13, ad fin.
44 Suidas ad voc. Maporúas.
45 From A.D. 333 to A.D. 337.
CHAPTER VIII.
1. At first the partition, was into five
THE SEVENTH MONAIROHF.
655
kingdoms; but the dominions of Dal-.
matius and Hannibalianus were soon
absorbed into those of the sons of Con-
stantine.
2 Constantius was not quite twenty at
the death of his father'. e was born
in August, A.D. 317. Constantine died
May 22, A.D. 337.
8The natives of the voluptuous East
were never a match for those of the
hardy West. Roman legions recruited
in Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt were al-
ways poor soldiers.
4 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, ch. xviii.
(vol. ii. pp. 98–100).
* Ibid. p. 103.
Mos. Chor. Hist. Armen. ii. 77; Aga-
thangelus, $$ 110–132.
7 See Milnian, Hist. of Christianity,
vol. ii. p. 258, and the authorities there
8 Chosroës II., who was placed on the
throne by Rome in A.D. 816, and Tiranus,
; son, who succeeded Chosroës in A.D.
*This distinctly appears from Faustus,
iii. 20. The cession seems to have been
made by Chosroës II. (Mos. Chor. iii. 8).
19 See note 38, Chapter VII.; and com-
pare Liban. Orat. iii. p. 117, B.
* Liban. Orat, iii. p. 121, B.
** Julian. Orat. i. pp. 33 and 36.
**Ibid. pp. 36–38. Among other im-
provements introduced by Constantius
at this time was the equipment of a por-
tion of the Roman cavalry after the
fashion, of the Persian cataphracti, or
mailed horsemen. - A.
*Ibid. pp. 33 and 37. Compare St.
ºl. additions to Le Beau, Bas-En-
pire, vol. i. pp. 406 et seqq.
15 Julian. }.} i. p. ºld
** There must be some foundation
for the statements of Libanius and Ju-
lian, that Sapor at first avoided a con-
flict, even though they are contained in
panegyrics. . (See Liban. p. 122, A: , Tois
Öpiots devotiket tois IIeporukois, étru6vuðv
aiwáčat Thy đeđavº kai à têv 0\pubv Šešáue-
vos ovk fiv; 3 AA’ oi rov tróAeuov etodyovres
év buyfi rôv tróAekov Šlébepov, K.T.A. Ju-
lian. Orat, i. p. 39: Töv roAguíov obôsis
ŚróAumaev Čºvat Tixtópg tropôoupévm: rév-
to 68 rap' huàs #ysto Tākeivalv čyašá' rºv
prèº ováš eis xeipas iéval roxſºvrov.)
** Julian Orat. i. p. 37.
18 Ibid. p. 38. ... . -
19 Ibid. p. 39. -
**This is well urged by Gibbon (De-
cline and Fall, vol. ii. p. 372).
21 e Assyrian Canon, passim;
and compare Ancient Monarchies, vol.
1. p. 258.
* Plutarch, Lucull. § 32.
*This river, now called the Jerujer,
anciently the Mygdonius (river of Go,
Zan 3), joins the main stream of the Kha.
bøur in lat. 36° 20', near the volcanic
hill of Koukab. (Layard, Nin. and Bab.
pp 309, 322, &c.)
*As appears from the coins of Nisibis
(Mionnet, Description des Médailles,
tom. v. pp. 625–8).
*This is evident from the persistency
of his attacks. Ammianus says (xxv.
8): “Constabat orbem Eoum in ditio-
nem potuisse transire Persidis, nisi hac
civitas (sc. Nisibis) habili situ et magni-
tudine moeninm restitisset.” -
* On the date of the first siege of Ni-
sibis, see Tillemont, Hist, des Empe-
rewris, tom. iv. p. 668; Clinton, F. R. vol.
•i. p. 396, -
27 Chron. Pasch. p. 287, B; Theopha-
nes, p. 28, D.
* So Tillemont, tom. iv. p. 319. -
* Theodoret, ii. 30. The miracles as-
cribed by this writer to St. James are
justly ridiculed by Gibbon (vol. ii. p.
872, note 65). *
* Chron. Pasch. 1. s. c.; Hieronym.
Chron, anno 2354.
* Eutropius, Festus, Zosimus, Zona-
s
º
ras.
**The first and second speeches of
Julian and the third of Libanius helong
to the latter class; the Epistle of Julian
656
TEIE SEVENTH MONARCIHY.
piis ingenti strage confossis.” -
pare Hieronym, anno 2364; and Liban.
[cH. VIII.
the Persians fell upon them. I follow
probability, when I describe them as
“sleepy or drunken.” -
5i See Amm. Marc. xviii. 5: “Apud
Singaram . . . acerrime nocturna con-
certatione pugnatum est, nostrorum co-
- is.” Com-

Orat. iii. p. 132, C. Even Julian admits
that the battle was commonly regarded
as the greatest victory gained by the
Persians during the war (Orat. i. p. 41).
52 Liban 133. D: 'Ereiðov [of IIép-
gat] rov too Baauxéas traiča, rov rºs. &pxms
8tdöoxov, Ščoypnuévov, Kai uaariyovuevov,
kai kevronºuevov, kai utkpov is a Tepov kara-
komtépcevow. Tillemont has seen that this
treatment could not have been possible
till the troops were lalf-maddened with
despair and fury. (Histoire des Empe-
rewrs. tom. iv. p. 347.)
*8. So much we may accept from the
boasts of Julian (Orat. i. p. 45) and Liba-
nius (Orat. iii. p. 133, A), corroborated
as they are by the testimony of Ammi-
anus, who says (I. S. c.) that the Persians
made no use of their victory at Singara;
but it is impossible to believe the state-
ment of Libanius, that the whole Per-
sian army fled in disorder from Singara
and hastily recrossed the Tigris (p. 133,
54 Julian maintains that both sides
suffered equally in the battle (p. 41).
* Compare the grief of Orodes on the
iºn of Pacorus (Sia:th Monarchy, p.
110).
** Jerome's statement that Amidla, and
Bezabde were taken by Sapor shortly
after the battle of Singara arises appar-
ently from some confusion between the
events of the year A.D. 349 and those of
A.D. 359.
s: Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. ii. p.
{
.*
to the Athenian Senate and People, and
the tenth oration of Libanius belong
(so far as Constantius is concerned) to
the former. The later writings of these
two authors to a great extent invalidate
the earlier.
88 Nine times, according to Festus
(§ 27): frequently, according to Eutro-
ius (x. 10); whenever he engaged the
ersians, according to Ammianus (xx.
11, ad fin.) and Socrates (Hist. Eccles.
. 25).
ºjee the Author's Siacth Monarchy,
85 Mos. Chor. Hist. Armen. iii. 10;
Faustus, iii. 21. he Persian prince
seems to have been named Narses.
Moses calls him Sapor's brother; but
this is very improbable. - - -
86 Faustus, l. S. c.
- 27 Hence the practice of blinding their
near relatives upon their accession.
which the Shahs of Persia regularly
pursued till within the present century.
88 Faustus, iv. 1.
89 On the friendly relations which sub-
sisted at this time between Persia and
Armenia, see Faustus, iv. 16.
40 Jerome says: “Sapor tribus mensi-
bus obsedit Nisibin;” but Theophanes
gives the exact duration of the siege as
seventy-eight days (p. 31 D). $
41 Iliban. Orat. iii. p. 129, A, B.
42 Ibid. p. 130, A
43 On the position of Sinjar and the
character of the surrounding country,
see Layard (Nin. and Bab. pp. 246-249).
44 Liban. p. 129, D. This writer pre-
tends that it was not through fear of
meeting the enemy in the open that
Constantius held back, but because he
wanted to draw his adversary on and
prevent him from recrossing the Tigris
without fighting. Perhaps it is most
probable that the passage of the river
took Constantius by surprise, that he
was too weak to prevent it, and was
obliged to remain on the defensive until
his troops could be concentrated. .
* Libanius represents the entire ar-
rangement as a plan carefully laid
(Orat. iii. p. 130. C): Julian, on the con-
trary, regards the flight of the Persians
as a real panic, and their victory at the
camp as a mere piece of good fortune
(Orat. i. pp. 42–44).
** Liban. Orat. iii. p. 131, A. .
* Ibid. p. 131, D, and p. 132, A. Each
legionary, we are told, stepped aside
out of the way of the horseman who
bore down upon him, and then struck
him, as he passed, with a club.
** Julian. Orat. i. pp. 42–3; Liban. p.
30, D. -
4° Liban. p. 132, B; Julian, p. 44. The
latter writer appears to ascribe the Ro-
'man disaster mainly to the troops ex-
Osing themselves as they drank at the
ersian cisterns (Adikkows $8aros évôov
évrvxdvres, rhv kaxNiarmv vixmy Stéq6etpav).
2.90 The Roman writers touch lightly
the condition of the Roman troops when
58 Julian. Orat. i. p. 48.
59 Ilºid. ii. p. 115.
60 Ibid. p. 116.
61 Zosimus, iii. 8. -
82 Theodoret, ii. 30.
** Julian. Orat. ii. p. 115: ‘O IIapóvatov
Baoruxei's . . . Tuteuxigov riv tróNew xtºna-
oriv, elta ets ratta čexóplevos rêv Mvyöövtov,
Aiuvmv čtredaivero to rept tº date Xaptov,
Kai đa Trep viharov čv autº $vvetxe rºw tróAtv,
pukpov intrepezoiſorov kai Ütrepyaivopuévov raw
éréAšewov. Compare Orat. i. p. 49.
64 Compare Trajan's construction of a
fleet in this same region in the winter of
A.D. 115–116. (Siarth Monarchy, p. 176.),
** Julian, 1. s. c. ibbon appears to
have understood Julian to state that the
balistoe discharging these huge stones
(stones weighing more than five hun-
dred-weight) were carried by the ships
(Decline and Fall, vol. ii. p. 108). ll
Julian's meaning is clearly that stated
above in the text.
* A similar danger not unfrequently
threatens Baghdad from the sweiſ of the
Euphrates, which is brought to its walls
through the Saklawiyeh canal. Mr.
-
CH. IX.]
Loftus gives a graphic account of the
risk run in May 1849 (Chaldaea and Susi-
wna, pp. 7-8).
97 Julian, p. 116. l
08 Ibid. p. 120.
69 See text, p. 327. The weakness
here spoken of did not extend to the
ancient Persians, who were fairly suc-
cessful in their sieges (Ancient Mont-
archies, vol. iv. p. 130).
70 mianus tells us that, either now
or at some other time in the siege, the
l’ersians suffered much by the elephants
turning against their own side and
trampling the footmen under their feet
(xxv. 1).
71 Julian, p. 122.
72 Zonaras, xiii.
78 Chron. Pasch. p. 290, A. Julian ex-
aggerates when he says the time wasted
was “four months” (Orat. i. p. 51)
sº See Wilson, Ariana Arviigwa, p.
3.
75 Zonaras, xiii. 7. The original ethnic
character of the Massageta2 is perhaps
doubtful. They may have been degene-
rated Arians; but in their habits they
are, even from the first, scarcely to be
distinguished from the Tatar or Tura-
nian hordes. - By Sapor's time they had
probably intermixed largely with Ta-
tal'S. -
76 Julian. Orat. i. p. 51; Orat. ii. p. 123:
(āyst ırpès haas sipºvnv čk routov, kai otºre
āpkov oãre avvónkov dééngev. 3 yaré &
oikov uévov, K.T.A.)
CHAPTER IX.
1 See text, p. 323.
2 The alliance of Arsaces with Rome
is misdated both by Faustus and by
Moses of Choréné. The former places
it in the reign of Valens, A.D. 364–370
(Bibliothèque, iv. 5), the latter in that of
Valentinian I., A.D. 364–375 (Hist. Arment.
iii. 21). But it is clear from Ammianus
(xx. 11), whose authority exceeds that
of all the Armenian historians united,
that the alliance was made with Con-
stantius. It could not have been earlier
than A.D. 351, since Constans did not die
till A.D 350; and it could not have been
later than A.D. 359, since it is spoken of
as existing in that year (Amm. Marc.
xvii. 14).
8 That is between A.D. 850 and 357.
4 Faustus, iv. 15. .
Amm. Marc. xx. 11; Athanas. Ep. ad
Solitar, p. 856; Mos. Čhor. iii. 31.
& Pharandzem was the daughter of a
certain Antor, prince of Siunia, and was
first married to Gnel or Knei, a nephew
of Arsaces, whom he put to death. Her
jealousy impelled her to contrive the
murder of Olympias, who is said to have
been killed by poison introduced into
the sacred elements at the Eucharist.
º Faustus, l. s. c.; Mos. Chor. iii. 23,
º Amm. Marc. xx. 11: “Audiebat. sae-
pius eum tentatum a rege Persarum fal-
w THE SEVENTEI MONARCHY.
657
laciis, et minis, et dolis.” Compare
Faustus, iv. 16, 20 *
8 Amm. Marc. xvii. 5, § 1 : “Rex Per-
sarum, in confiniis agens adhue genti-
um extinarum, jamgue cum Chiomitis
et Gelamis, omnium acerrimis bellatori-
bus, pignore icto societatis,” &c. -
* The Chionites are mentioned repeat-
edly (Amm. Marc. xvi. 9; xvii. 5; xviii.
6; xix. 1, 2, &c.): the Wertae twice (xix.
2 and 5); the Euseni, and Gelani once
each (xvi. 9, and xvii. 5). It is not dis-
tinctly said that the Euseni or Wertae
had fought against Sapor.
19 Wilson, Ariana Antwawa, p. 386. *
11 Ibid. p. 303. Compare the Author's
Siarth Monarchy, p. 64. -
1* So Gibbon (Decline and Fall, vol. ii.
p. 408, note_58).
18 Amm. Marc. xvii. 5,
14 Ibid. xvi. 8,
**Ibid.: “Tamsapor . .... refert ad re-
gem, quod acerrimis bellis Constantius
implicatus pacem postulat precativarn.”
Compare xvii. 5.
16 Pet. Patric, Fr. 17. Ammianus calls
the ambassador Narseus. The Persian
name was Narsehi.
17 See Amm. Marc. xvii. 5. -
18 Themistius, Orat. iv. in laudem Com-
stantii, p. 57, B.
19 Pet, Patric. l. S. C.
20 Amm. Marc, 1. S. c. I have some-
what abbreviated the reply of Constan-
tius, but have endeavored to preserve
all the points which are of any impor-
ºf Amm. Marc. xvii. 5, sub fin.
23 Eunap. Vit. Jamblich. p. 23.
2* Basil. Ep. i. (Opera, vol. iii. pp. 69,
7.
0
24 See the history of the war in Am-
mianus (xvii. 6–10) and Gibbon (Decline
and Fall, vol. ii. pp. 412–418). *
25 Amm. Marc. xvii. 5, and xviii. 4.
26 Ibid. xviii. 5.
*7 “Ipse quoque in multis ac necessa-
riis operam suam fidenter promittens.”
Amm. Marc., xviii. 5, ad fin.)
28 Ibid. Xviii. 6.
28 Ibid. Ammianus himself witnessed
the passage of the river.
80 Carrhae alone is expressly men-
tioned.
31 Amm, Marc. xviii. 7.
32 Amm. Marc. xviii. 8,
83 Ibid. xviii. 10,
.* “A latere australi, geniculato Tigri-
dis meatu subluitur” (ibid. xviii. 9). The
plan given by the elder Niebuhr in his
Voyage en Arabie (tom. ii. pl. xlviii.)
shows this bend very clearly. The mod-
ern town, however, is not washed by the
rivel". . • , -
* It is often mentioned in the Assy-
rian inscriptions. (Ancient Monarchies,
vol. ii. pp. 345, 371, &c.) Its prefect ap-
pears as eponym in the Assyrian Canon
frequently.
36 Amm. Marc. I. S. c. . .
87 The legion of Constantine contained
from 1,000 to 1,500 men. Seven legions
658
\
would therefore give a force of fro
8,000 to 9,000. *
38 Amn: Marc. xviii. 9, sub fin.
* “Parte indumenti, tragulae ictu di-.
| scissa” (ib. xix. 1). I do not know why
Gibbon speaks of the dart as “ ſº
against the royal tiara” (Decline an
..Fall, vol. ii. p. 407).
40 Amm. Marc. xix. 1.
41 Ibid. xix. 2: “Agitata summa con-
siliorum placuerat, busto urbis subver-
sac expiare perempti juvenis manes.”
42 inhabitants of Seistan, probably of
Scythic origin. (See text, p. 297.)
43 Annm. Marc. xix. 6.
44 Ibid. xix. 2. sub fin. The legionaries
- were about 8,000 or 9,000 (see above,
note 37); the other soldiers and the un-
arrned multitude were reckoned at 20,000.
45 The comparison is made by Ammia-
nus: “ Ubi Grumbates hastam infectam
sanguine ritu patrio nostrique more con-
jecerat fetialis.” (xix. 2.) +
46 Ibid. }. . It is not clear whe
this capture took place; but it can
scarcely have been in this year, since
Rome holds Singara in A.D. 360. .
. Marc. xix. 5, ad imit.
48. Ibid. xix. 3.
49 Ibid. xviii. 5. ‘;
50 “Wisebatur ut leo magnitudine cor-
poris et torvitate terribilis, inclusos inter
retia catulos periculo ereptum ire non
audens, unguibus ademptis et dentibus.”
(A mm. Marc. xix. 3, ad fin, )
, 51 Four hundred were killed out of
probably about 2,500. (Ibid. xix. 6.)
52 Ibid. xix. 4
** Amm Marc. xix. 5, ad fin.
54. Ibid. xix. 9, ad imit. . e
* “Nulla quies certaminibus data.”
(Ibid. xix. 7.)
56'Ibid. swb fin.
*” Gibbon says “a large breach was
made by the battering-ram ” (Decline
and Fall, vol. ii. p. 409); but he has ap-
parently confused the capture of Sin-
gara, related by Ammianus (xx. 6). with
that of Amida, which is expressly as-
cribed to the spontaneous crumbling of
a mound in blº. xix. ch. viii. (“diu labo-
rata moles illa nostrorum, velut terrae
quodam tremore quassata, procubuit”).
ecorum ritu armati et imbelles
sine sexus discrimine trucidabantur.”
(Amm. Marc. 1. s. c.) . -
59 Ibid. xix 9, subtfin.
99 As when, on the capture of one of
the fortified posts outside Amida, he
..sent the wife of Craugasius unharmed
to her husband. and at the same time
ordered a number of Christian virgins,
found among the captives, to be protect-
ed from insult and allowed the free ex-
eroise, of their religion. . (Ibid. xix. 10,
as Amm. Marc.ºx. 9, sub init. , ,
* Gibbon conjectures that Sapor's al-
lies now-deserted him (l. s. c.), and says
•. j tº - -- - * , - .
THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY.
*
*
[CH. IX.
“the spirit as well as the strength of the
army with which he took the field was
no longer equal to the unbounded views
of his ambition;” but Ammianus tells
us that he crossed the Tigris in A.D. 360
** armis multiplicatis et viribus” (xx. 6,
ad invit.).
65 “ Glandes.” (See Amm. Marc. xx.
* See Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii. pp.
397,410, 423, 528; vol. iii. pp. 406. 497; vol.
iv. pp, 440, 448, &c. The practice was
common to the Assyrians, the Babylo-
nians, and the Achaemenian Persians.
*7 “Ad regiones Persidis ultimas sunt
asportati.” (Amm. Marc. 1. s. c.) The
regions “furthest” from Mesopotamia
would be those of the extreme East,
98 See the remarks of Ammianus at
thºse of blº. xx. ch. 6.
Amm. Marc, Xx. 7. Compare ch. 11.
70 See text, p. 308.
7. Some geographers identify Bezabde
with Jezireh (Dict. of Gk. and Roman
Geography, sub voc. BEzABDA); but the
name Fynyk is almost certain evidence
of the real site. Fynyk is about ten
miles from Jezireh to the north-west.
72 Amm. Marc. xx. 7.
78 “Christianae legis antistes exire se
velle gestibus ostentabat et nutu, &c.”
Ammianus afterwards calls him “epis-
copum,” and says that his intercession
brought on him an unjust suspicion of
collusion with the enemy. (I. s. c.)
74 “Interceptis aliis castellis viliori-
bus.” (Amm. Marc. xx. 7, sub fin.)
** As D'Anville (Géographie Ancienne,
tom. ii. p. 201). Gibbon (Decline and
Fall, vol. ii. p. 410, note 61), and Mr. E.
B. James (Duct. of Głc. and R. Geogra-
hy, ad voc. BIRTHA). It is difficult,
owever, to suppose that a position so
low down the Tigris as Tekrit was held
y the Romans. I am almost inclined
to suspect that the Virta of Ammianus
is Bir on the Euphrates (lat. 37° 5', long.
38° 5'), and that, when he speaks of it as
situated in the remotest part of Meso-
potamia, he means the part most re-
mote from Persia.
7°. Amm. Marc. xx. 7, ad fin.
77 Ibid. xx. 8. -
78 We find him at Caesarea, Mazaca,
about the middle of the year (ib. xx. 9),
then at Melitina (Malativeh), Lacotina,
and Samosata (ib. xx. 11); finally at
Edessa (ibid.).
79 Ibid. xx. 11, ad imit.
80 “Post equinoctium egreditur au-
tumnale.” (Ibid.) .
81 “Assiduis imbribus ita immaduerat
solum, ut luti ºglutinosa mollities per
eas regiones pinguissimi caºspitis omnia
perturbaret.” (Amm - e
82 According to Moses of Choréné, Ti-
ranus was still king at the time of the
invasion of Julian (Hist, Armen. iii. 15)
and Arsaces (Ardshag) did not succeed
him till after the death of Jovian (iii.
17). But Ammianus calls the king con-
CH. X.]
temporary with the later years of Con-
stantius, Arsaces (xx. 11; i. 6). So
also Sozomen (Hist. Eccles. vi. 1).
88 Amm, Marc. xxi. 6.
84 Faustus makes Arsaces lend aid to
Sapor in one of his attacks on Nisibis
(iv. 20), and declares that he completely
defeated a large Roman army in the
immediate vicinity of the place. But
the entire silence of Ammianus renders
his narrative incredible.
85 Amm. Marc. xxi. 7, ad fin.
86 Ibid. xxi. 13.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid. xxi. 7, ad imit.
89 Ibid. xxi. 13.
90 See Gibbon (Decline and Fall, vol.
iii. pp. 102–118).
91 Amm. Marc. xxi. 13: “Tardante
trans Tigridem rege dum moveri permit-
terent sacra;'' and again, further on in
the same chapter: “Nuntiatur regem ad
ropria, revertisse, auspiciis dirimenti-
us.” It must be admitted that the Per-
sians were believers in a sort of divina-
tion—that by means of the barsom, or
divining-rod (Ancient Monarchies, vol.
iii. pp. 130–1); but on no other occasion
do we find it even said that their military
operations were dependent on “aus-
CeS.
92 See text, p. 328.
98 Amm. Marc. xxi. 15: Aurel. Vict.
Epit. § 42. Some writers substitute
Mopsuestia for Mopsucrene (Mos. Chor.
iii. 12; Johann. Mal. ii. p. 14; Patkanian
in the Journal Asiatique for 1866, p. 151).
CHAPTER X.
1 Julian was born in the latter half of
the year A.D. 331, and was therefore un-
der thirty at his accession in A.D. 360.
(See. Tillemont, Hist, des Empereurs,
§ p. 198; and Clinton, F. R. vol. i.
2 From A.D. 356 to 359. (Gibbon, De-
cline and Fall, vol. ii. pp. 414–421.)
8 See his Caesares, passim. But com
pare the Orat. ad Themist., where the
palm is assigned to Socrates over Alex-
ander (Op. p. 264).
* This appears from the position as-
signed to these two emperors in the
** Caesars.”
* The expedition of L. Verus (A.D. 162–
164) was sent out by M. Aurelius. (See
the Author's Sia:th Monarchy, p. 185.)
Ammianus tells us that soon after his
arrival at Constantinople, on being ask-
ed to lead an expedition against the
Goths, Julian replied “ hostes quarere
se meliores '' (xxii. 7)—an expression
which clearly points at the Persians.
Ammianus says “Parthicus” (xxii.
12). But Julian himself would scarcely
have made this confusion.
* See Gibbon, Decline and Foll, vol.
iii. p. 181.
* Compare the Coesares, p. 324, C,
where Alexander is made to observe
that the Romans, in a war of 300 years,
\ \
THE SEVENTH MONAROHY.
* . --
659
*t
had not subdued the single province of
Mesopotamia. -
.” Ammianus says: “Urebatur bellan-
di gemino desiderio: primö, quod impa-
tiens otii lituos somniabat et proclia:
dein, quod ... . . . ornamentis illustrium
gloriarum inserere Parthici cognomen-
tum ardebat” (xxii. 12). -
sº Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p.
12 Tillemont, Hist, des Emperewºrs,
tom. iv. p. 213. “After May 12” (Clin-
ton, F. R. vol. i. p. 448).
18 See Zosimus, iii. 11; and, on the
subject of Prince Hormisdas, compare
text, p. 319. -
14 Gibbon places his arrival in August
(Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 181); but
Tillemont, argues strongly in favor of
July (Hist, des Emperewrs, tom. iv. p.
297, note vi. upon the reign of Julian).
Clinton shows that he was certainly at
Antioch before August 1 (F. R. vol. i.
p. 448). He concludes, as most probable,
that he arrived at Antioch “about Mid-
summer.”
15 Amm. Marc. xxii. 12.
16 Zosim. iii. 12, ad imit., and 13.
17 See the Author's Sixth Monarchy,
pp. 177–179 and 194–197.
18 Both Trajan and Severus had had to
build ships. (Dio Cass. lxviii. 26; lxxv.
9.) It seems scarcely possible that Ju-
lian should have collected the number
that he did (at least 1,100) without build-
ing. (See Zosim. iii. 13; and Amm. Marc.
xxiii. 8, ad fin.)
1 m. Marc. xxii. 14: Zosim. iii. 11;
Libanius, Orat. x. p. * *-* *
20 The employment of spies by the
Persians is often noticed by the Orien-
tal historians (Tabari, tom. ii. p. 96; Mir-
khond, p. 311). The tale that Sapor dis-
guised himself and visited Constanti-
nople in person (Tabari, ii. p. 99; Ma-
goudi, ii. p. 181) is, of course, not true;
but we may well believe that his emis-
saries went as far as that city.
21 Libanius, Orat. viii. p. 245, A. f
22 Socrat. Hist. Eccles. iii. 19, ad fin.
28 Amm Marc. xxii. 2, ad imit.
24 Ibid.: “Principe respondente, Ne-
quaquam decere adventiciis adjumentis
rem vindicari Romanam, cujus opibus
foveri conveniat amicos et Socios. si
auxilium eos adegerit necessitas implo-
rare.” .*
25 Ibid. xxiii. 2: Zosim. iii. 25. Tabari
calls these auxiliaries Khazars (vol. ii.
pp. 95–97).
26 Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5, ad imit. ; Ju-
lian, Ep. ad Liban. p. 401, D.
27 See text, p. 365.
28 See text, p. 329. .
29 Amm. Marc. xxiii. 2: “Solum Arsa-
cem monuerat. Armeniae regem, ut col-
lectis copiis validis jubenda opperiretur,
quo tendere, quid deberet urgere, pro-
pere cogniturus.” -
80 According to the Armenian histo-
rians, Arsaces was cruel and profligate.
He put to death, without reason, his re-
*
, tablished an asylum
660 "
- *
!ations and satraps, persecuted the ec-
clesiastics who reproved him, and es-
for criminals.
(Mos. Chor. iii. 20–32; Faustus, iv. 13—50.)
31 Faustus, iii. 13. -
82 Mos. Chor. iii. 13. Moses says that
Julian required the Armenian monarch
to hang up in the chancel of the metro-
olitan church a portrait, which he sent
THE SEVENTH MONARCHY.
#
x 30,000 (1
41
im, of himself, containing also “repre-
sentations of devils”—i.e. of the heathen
gods. It was pointed out by the Arme-
nian patriarch that this was an insult to
! Christianity (iii. 14).
38 The letter ascribed to Julian on this
occasion (Fabric. Bibliothec. Groec. vol.
vii. p. 86) may not be genuine, although
it is accepted by St. Martin (Notes on
Le Beaw, vol. iii. p. 37). But, even apart
from this, the insolent tone of Julian to-
wards the Armenian king is sufficiently
apparent.
34 Zosimus is the only writer who gives
an estimate of the whole force, which
he makes to consist of—
65,000 taken with him by Julian,
18,000 detached to act-under Pro-
*-*- Copius.
Total 83,000 *
Sozomen raises the number of the forces
under Procopius to “about 20,000” (Hist,
JEccles. vi. 1), and Ammianus to 30,000
(xxiii. 3). Libamius says 20,000 (Orat. x.
. 312), John of Malala, 16,000 (p. 328).
we add the 30,000 of Ammianus to the
65,000 who accompanied Julian, we
et
a total of 95,000, which is Gibbon's esti-
º (Decline and Fall, vol. iii. pp. 189,
0).
35 Armenia, furnished 7.000 foot and
gº horse to Antony (Plut. Anton. §
# *-
might have been increased to 16,000
(ibid. § 50). -
3° Julian left Antioch on March 5, A.D.
863. (See Ammianus, xxiii. 2: “Tertio
Nomas Martias profectus.”)
87 Amm. Marc. xxiii. 2, 3. Zosimus
makes him visit Edessa from Batma (iii.
12); but the expression used by Ammi-
anus (“venit cursu propero Carrhas”)
contradicts this.
38 The identity of Carrhae with the
Haran of Genesis is allowed by almost
all critics.
39 Ammianus says that he had care-
fully provisioned the line of the Tigris
in order to make the Persians think that
it was the line which he intended to fol-
§ low (xxiii. 3); but it is perhaps as prob-
able that he wished to be able to pursue
the Tigris line if circumstances proved
favorable.
40 Zosimus says 18,000 (iii. 12); Sozo-
men (vi. 1) and Labanius (Orat. Funebr.
p. 312, A) say 20,000; Ammianus says
. S. C.).
See Amm. Marc. I. s. c. Zosimus
, regards the force as jeft merely for the
protection of Roman Mesopotamia.
42 Amm.
lm. Marc. l. s. c. -
* This is the estimate of Ammianus.
It was calculated that the horse.
[CH. x.,
f
Zosimus makes the number consider-
ably exceed 1,150 (iii. 13).
44 Circesium is the ordinary form, and
is that given by Zosimus; but Ammia-
nus has “Circusium” (xxiii. 5); and so
the Nubian Geography.
45 “Principio mensis Aprilis,” (Amm.
Marc. l. S. C.)
46 Amm. Marc. xxiv. 1. Compare Zo-
sim. iii. 14.
47 Amm. Marc. xxiii. 5: “Pontem avel-
li jussit, ne cui militum ab agnminibus
pro priis revertendi fiducia remaneret.”
48 “Classis, licet per flumen ferebatur
assiduis flexibus tortuosum. nec residere,
nec praecurrere sinebatur.” Ibid. xxvi.
* Called Zautha by Zosimus (iii. 14),
pºp; * Asicha of Isidore (Mans.
Cº?”???.. -
P - -
50 Zosimus places the tomb at Dura,
two days' march from Zaitha (Amm.
Marc. xxiv. 1); but Ammianus, who ac-
companied the army, can scarcely have
been mistaken in the fact that the tomb
was at any rate distinctly visible from
Zaitha.
51 Gibbon supposes the speech to have
been made as soon as the Khabour was
crossed (Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p.
191); but Ammianus makes Zaitha, the
scene of it. In the course of it Julian
used the expression: “Gordianus, cujus
monumentum nunc vidinus” (Amm.
Marc. xxiii. 5).
52 “Emenso itinere bidui civitatem
venimus Duram” (ib. xxiv. 1).
53 “Dierum quatuor itinere levi per-
acto.” (Ibid.) Anathan was known to
the Assyrians as Anat, to the Greeks of
Augustus’s time as Anatho. (see Isid.
Char. Mans. Parth. § 1). It i perhaps
the “Hena” of Isaiah (xxxvii. 13).
4 Amm. Marc. xxiv. 1; Zosim, iii. 14,
ad fin.
55 Amm, Marc. l. S. c.
56 Ibid. xxiv. 2, ad in it.; Zosim. iii. 15:
ºpotſpuov 6xuptotatov.
o
57 See Arrian, Earp. Alea’. iv. 21, 26, 29,
C.
58 Ammianus mentions only one other,
Achaïachala; but Zosimus speaks of
érepo ºppoupta (l. S. C.).
59 This site is certainly identified by
the mention of bitumen springs in its
neighborhood (Zosim. iii. 15;
Maic. xxiv. 2). There are no bitumen
springs in this part of Mesopotamia ex-
cept those of Hit. .
60 Hit is thought to be mentioned un-
der the name of Ist in a hieroglyphical
inscription set up by Thothmes III.
about B.C. 1450. It is probably the Ahava
of Ezra (viii. 15, 21).
6 e words used are Gibbon's (De-
cline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 193). The fact
is recorded both by Zosimus and Am-
In 18, IlliS.
62 “Qua” (i.e. Diacira) “incensa, cae-
sisque mulieribus paucis quae, repertae
§: ºna occupavimus” (Amm.
v. 2).
GH. X.]
* These places are only mentioned by
Zosimus (iii. 15).
64 Gibbon implies the contrary of this,
when he says in the most general way,
“Dwring the march the Surenas, or Per.
sian general, and Malik Rodosaces in-
cessantly hovered round the army;
every straggler was intercepted; every
detachment was attacked,” &c. (De-
cline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 194.) But
Zosimus strongly notes the absence of
any Persian army up to this point:
6avadoras 6' 6 Baori Aeijs 6tu roaratºrmv rod
ortparoß Staëpapıdvros 68öv ow8eis ék IIep-
orów oite A6xos éé švéðpas, oùre ék rod trpo-
favois &m fivrmoré tº troAéuvov, K.T.A. (l. s.c.)
65 See Amm. Marc. xxiv. 1, ad fin.
66 Ibid. Compare Liban. Orat. Funebr.
p. 313, D.
67 Gibbon, following Herodotus (i. 192),
calls this tract Assyria (Decline and
Fall, vol. iii. pp. 194-199); but, strictly
speaking, it is only the upper, rolling,
slightly elevated plain to whic
name belongs. The alluvial plain is
properly Babylonia.
88 Amm. Marc. xxiv. 2; Zosim. iii. 16,
ad imit.
* It has been argued by some that
Surena is not a name of office, but a
Persian family appellation. (St. Martin,
Notes on Le Beaw, vol. iii. p. 79; Patka-
nian in the Jowrmal Asiatique for 1866,
, 130. here was certainly a family
called Suren-Pahlav at the close of the
Parthian and beginning of the Neo-Per-
sian period (Mos. Chor. ii. 65, 67). But
we find the word swrena in the classical
writers before the time when the Suren-
Pahlav family is said to have originated.
(See the historians of Crassus, passim.)
70 Gibbon calls him “the renowned
emir of the tribe of Gassan” (vol. iii. p.
194). But it is questionable whether
this tribe had settlements on the Eu-
phrates. Moreover, the tribe name in
mmianus is not Gassan, but Assam.
~ 71 Zosimus, iii. 15; Amm. Marc. xxiv. 2.
72 Zosim. iii. 16.
78 So Ammianus (l. s. c. Zosimus
(iii. 17) gives the name as Beersabóra.
(Bnparagopa). Libanius says it was
named after the reigning monarch (roß
Töre Baarvaetſovros étrévvuos. Cùù.
nebr. p. 315, A).
** Zosim. iii. 18: tróAetos prey&Ams kai
Tøv év 'Aaroupiq pierå Krmorvºbóvra weyāorms.
7* Ammianus speaks of this method of
Construction as especially strong (“ quo
82dificii genere nihil esse tutius con-
stat ''). But the speedy fall of the cor-
ner tower should have taught him bet-
ter. Bitumen, though useful in keep-
ing out damp, is not really a good ce-
ent.
7° “Evasit . . . verecundo rubore suf-
fusus.” (Amm. Marc. l. s. c.)
” So Ammianus. Zosimus speaks of
the terrible engine having been brought
into operation (iii. 18, pp. 149–150).
7° Zosimus, iii.19; Amm. Marc. xxiv.
w
THE SEVENTH MONARCHIV. *
h that
661
79 The distancé across is not more
than about 15 miles a little below Baby-
lon; in the latitude of Ctesiphon it is
about 20 miles.
Amm. Marc. xxiv. 4.
81 Zosim. iii. 20; p. 153. -
*Ibid. p. 154: Q &v Tó poupię roadp-
koúuevot . . . daºháAtºp 8%xovs Tervpwpie-
vows hkóvrvgov.
89 Liban. Orat. Funebr. p. 317, D;
... 317, D;
5 m. Marc. xxiv. 4; Zosim. iii. 21; p.
**The Mattiarii, the Laccinarii, and
the Victores. (Zosim, iii. 22; p. 156.)
* Liban. p. 317, B; Zosim. l. s. c.
* The Sophist of Antioch endeavors
to defend his hero from the charge of
cruelty by taxing the soldiers with dis-
obedience to their general's orders (Or.
Funebr. p. 318, C); but the narratives of
Ammianus and Zosimus contradict him.
87. “Sine sexus discrimine vel aetatis,
quidguid impetus reperit, potestas ira-
torum absumpsit.” (Amm. Marc. 1. s. c.)
Tovs év xepariv &vīpovv, oùre yuvaukav oire
traičov &vexówevow (Zosim. iii. 22; p. 157).
88 Nabdates was accused of having de-
fended Maogamalcha, to the last, after
having promised to surrender it. He
had also called Hormisdas a traitor.
For these crimes (?) he was burned alive!
(Amm. Marc. xxiv. 5.)
89 Ibid. xxiv. 4, sub fin.
90 The similar measures adopted by
Marshal Bugeaud against the Arabs of
Algeria, some thirty years ago were gen-
erally reprobated.
91 mianus speaks of “pictures”
(“diversorium opacum et amoenum,
gentiles picturas per , omnes aºdium
partes ostendens,” xxiv. 5). But the
wall decoration of the Sassanians was
ordinarily effected by bas-reliefs.
9% “Ursos (ut sunt Persici) ultra om-
nem rabiem saevientes.” (Amm. Marc.
xxiv. 5, sub init.)
98 Zosim. xxiii. 24; Amm. Marc. I. s. c.
94 Amm. Marc. xxiv. 4, ad fin.
95 So Ammianus (xxiv. 5). Zosimus
calls the suburb Zochase (iii. 23). Origi-
nally Coché and Seleucia, had been dis-
tinct towns (Arrian, Fr. 8); but it would
seem that they had, by this time, grown
into one.
96 Libanius gives the best account of
Julian's difficulty with respect to his
fleet and his mode of meeting it. (Orat.
Funebr. p. 319, D, and p. 320, A, B.) Gib-
bon has, I think, rightly apprehended
his meaning.
97 Gibbon supposes Trajan to be meant
(Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 202); and
So Zosimus (iii. 24). Ammianus mentions
both Trajan and Severus (xxiv. 6, ad
imit.); but it seems clear from Dio that
the former monarch at any rate con-
veyed his ships from the Euphrates to
the Tigris, by means of rollers, across
the land. (Dio Cass. xviii. 28.)
98 The “catarractae” of Ammianus
(“avulsis catarractis undarum magnitu-l
dine classis secura. . . . in alveum ejecta

,'
G62
est Tigridis” I. s. c.), are clearly sluices,
which can only have had this object.
09 The troops under Rodosaces and
the Surena (see text, p. 351) had been a
mere detachment, consisting entirely of
horse, and had been intended inerely to
harass the Romans, not to engage them.
100 Zosimus, iii. 25: Tºv čvtwºrépas àx6mw
6ewpoivres vibnaorépav, kai äua 9p : y : 6 v
rt va or v M. ºr a p a re t w oku e vow , et's epv-
pia pºev trapačeia ou Baoru.Alkot, thv 3pxhw
qjkočopamuevow.
101 “Turma sic confertae, ut laminis
corporum flexus splendore
$ 3
coaptati
praestringerent occursantes obtutus.
(Amm. Marc. xxiv. 6.
102 “Contectiscutis oblongis et curvis,
quae texta vimine et coriis crudis ges-
tantes densius se commovebant.” (Ibid.)
103 “Gradientium collium specie.”
(Ibid. 1. s. c.) Compare Libanius, p. 320,
B: Karelyov Tijv 5x6mv . . . Peyā6eguy &Ae-
©divraov, ois to ov špyov Štú ataxiſww éA6eiv
Kai baaay'yos.
104Ammianus says they all opposed
him (“duces concordi precatw, fieri pro-
hibere tentabant”). Libanius speaks of
one in particular as remonstrating (p.
321, A: tºp” & 3 #v ràs Svváuetos to tračov,
&vtéAeye).
105 Compare Zosim. iii. 25 with Amm.
Marc. xxiv. 6.
109 Ammianus alone (l. s. c.) mentions
this fact, which he compares with the
swimming of the Rhone by Sertorius.
107 Ammianus makes the battle begin
with the dawn and last all the day.
Zosimus says it lasted from midnight
te midday. We may best reconcile the
two by supposing that the passage of
the Tigris and the landing were at mid-
night—that then there was a pause—
that the battle recommenced at dawn—
that at midday the Persians were beaten
and took to flight—and that then the
pursuit lasted almost to nightfall.
108 The names are uncertain, Instead
of Tigranes and Narseus, Zosimus has
Pigraxes and Anareus. Some MSS. of
Ammianus have Pigranes,
109 Zosim. ii. 25: Tºs buyºs hymoſapwevov
rôv atparmyöv.
110 Amm. Marc. xxiv. 6; Rufus, $ 28;
Libanius, Or. Funebr. p. 322, A.
111 The fleet was formed in three divi-
sions, and only one had crossed. The
rest of the army passed the river on the
day after the battle and the day follow-
ing (Zosim. iii. 26).
112 These are the numbers of Zosimus
(iii. 25, sub fin.). Ammianus agrees as to
the Persians, but makes the Roman loss
only seventy (l. s. c.). , Libanius raises
the loss on the Persian side to 6,000
Orat. Funebr. p. 322, A). .
118 Zosim. I. s. c.
114 Eunapius, p.68, ed. Niebuhr.
115 See text, p. 348. - -
116 Ammianus speaks of Ctesiphon as
“situ ipso inexpugnabilis” (xxiv. 7, ad
imit.); but it occupied a piece of alluvial
plain, and had been taken three times
*
TEIE SEVENTH MOWARCHIV.
[CH. x.
- by the Romans.
Gibbon says: “It is
not easy for us to conceive by what arts
of fortification a city thrice besieged
and taken by the predecessors of Julian
could be rendered impregnable against
an army of 60, Romans '' (Decline
and Fall, vol. iii. p. 205). I should doubt
if any Special pains had been taken by
the Persians to strengthen the de-
fences.
117 That it was the fear of attack from
Sapor's army which caused the retreat
of Julian is confessed by Ammianus.
(“Itum est in sententian quorundam,
facinus audax et importuntum noscen-
tium id agredi, quod et civitas situ inso
inexpugnabilis defendebatur, et cum me-
twenvda multitudine protimus reac affore
credebatwa',” 1. s. c.
118. It was already the month of June
(Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 456).
11° Libanius confesses the want o
provisions (Orat. Funebr. p. 320, C).
Ammianus does not distinctly mention
it; but his narrative shows that, from
the time of the passage of the Tigris,
Julian's army depended mainly on the
food which it took from the enemy.
(Amm. Marc. xxiv. 7.)
120 Twenty-two, according to Zosimus
(iii. 26); but Ammianus twice gives the
number as twelve. *
121 Annm. Marc. xxiv. 7.
122 Ibid., xxiv. 8.
125 Gibbon overstates the case when
he says “The Tigris overflows in March,
the Euphrates in July ’’ (Decline and
Fall, vol iii. p. 208, note 84). The Tigris
flood does indeed begin in March, but it
is greatest in May: and the river only
returns to its natural level about the
middle of June. The Euphrates is in
full flood from the middle of June to the
middle of July, but begins to swell be-
fore the end of March, (See the
Author's Ancient Monarchies, vol. i. p.
12.)
124 This is allowing Cordyene to have
extended Southwards as far as the
point where the Greater Zab issues
from the mountains.
125 Libanius, Orat. Funebr. p. 301, A,
B; p. 322, D; Socrates, Hist. Eccles, iii.
21.
ºibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. iii.
127 Ibid.
128 Tabari * it was gathered from
all parts of Irak, Persia, and Khorassan
(Chronique, vol. ii. p. 97). Gibbon tells
us that “the satraps, as far as the con-
fines of India and Scythia, had been
ordered to assemble their troops” (vol.
lil. p.
139 Amm. Marc. xxiv. 8. Some writers,
as Tillemont (Hist, des Emperewºrs, tom.
iv. p. 543) and Gibbon (Decline and Fall,
vol. iii. p. 206), interpose at this point an
expedition on the part of Julian into the
interior provinces of Persia, with the ob-
ject of meeting Sapor and forcing him
to an engagement, which they consider
9
CH. X.]
to have been frustrated by the treach-
ery of his guides. No doubt there are
in Libanius, Gregory of Nazianzen, and
Sozomen, statements on which such a
view may be based—and we cannot but
suppose some foundation for the story
of the treacherous guides—but the plain
narratives of Ammianus and Zosimus,
and considerations of time, preclude the
possibility of anything important hav-
ing been undertaken between the battle
of the Tigris and the commencement of
the retreat. Some raids into the rich
country on either side of the Diyaleh,
with the object of obtaining provisions,
seem to have been all that Julian really
attempted in this short interval.
180 Amm. Marc. l. S. c.
181 Ibid. xxv. 1.
132 Zosimus, iii. 26–7;
. s. c ; Greg. Naz. p. 154, B.
188 The distance from Ctesiphon to
Samarah, a little south of which Julian
died, is, by the shortest route upon the
eastern side of the Tigris, about 100
& The route followed was proba-
bly somewhat longer; and the march
appears to have occupied exactly ten
&LVS.
Amm. Marc.
isº Amm. Marc. xxv. 1.
155 Ibid. Some suppose Merames not to
be a name, but (like Surena) a title. See
Dr. W. Smith’s note in his edition of
Gibbon's Decline and Fall, vol. iii. p.
210, and gºmpare Procop. De Bell. Pers.
136 Poin ad tractum Maranga nomi-
natum Omnis venisset exercitus.”
(Amm. Marc. 1. s. c.) Zosimus changes
the “tract called Maranga, ’’ into a
“village called Marönsa” (iii. 28).
187 “Triduo indutiis destinato, dum
suo quisque vulneri medetur vel proxi-
mi.” (Amm. Marc. xxv. 2, ad imit.)
138 Ibid.
189 Amm. Marc. xxiv. 6, ad fin. On
account of unpropitious onlens Julian
had sworn that he would never sacrifice
to Mars again.
240 “Exorto jam die.” (Ibid. xxv.2,
ad fin.)
141 Ammianus calls them “lofty hills”
(“celsos colles”); but there are none
such in the vicinity of Samarah.
14% Ammianus is confused on this
point, in one place making it the right,
in another the left wing that suffered
(xxv. 3: “sinistro cornu inclinato . . .
exercitus cornu dextero defatigato”). I
conceive that the entire attack was
made from a line of low hills, perhaps
the embankment of an old canal, on Ju-
lian's right, and that it was therefore on
this side that his army suffered its main
losses.
14° Libanius. Orat. Funebr. pp. 303–4;
Amm. Marc. xxv. 3. It is curious what
different accounts are given of Julian's
Wound. Zosimus says, tramrtetau şi bel
(iii. 29); Aurelius Victor, “conto percu-
titur” (Epit. 43). Libanius in one place
THE SEVENTH MONARCHY.
w
663
declares that the blow was not dealt by
one of the enemy, but by a Christian of
Julian's army (Orat. Funebr. p. 324).
But this is a manifest calumny.
144 Amm. Marc. l. s. c.: “ Hastas ad
scuta concrepans, miles ad vindictam.
. . . involabat.”
f
145 Zosim. iii. 29–30; Amm. Marc. xxv.
146 Amm. Marc. l. S. c.
147 Méxpt vukrös Means &pkioras āré9avev.
(Zos. iii. 29.)
148 Amm. Marc. xxv, 5.
149 Ibid. J. s. c. Zosimus gives no de-
tails, but simply says that the council
§ common consent elected Jovian (iii.
) - -
150 Jovian was “first of the domes-
tics,” or Comptroller of the Royal
Household. His military rank was per-
haps that of tribune. (See Zonaras,
Xiii. p. 29: 'Ioğuavös eis rºw airapkiav ºrpo-
kékpºrat, t 6 re x t A tap x à v. )
151. “Inertem et mollem.” (Amm.
Marc, 1. s. c. swb fin.)
152 Ibid.
158 Amm. Marc. xxv. 6, ad imit.
154. The “Jovians” and “Herculians”
had been instituted by Diocletian, and
received their names from the titles
“Jovius” and “Herculius” assumed by
that emperor and his son-in-law, Gale-,
I’ll lS. g
155 Zosimus (iii. 30) is here fuller and
more exact than Ammianus. His nar-
rative has all the appearance of truth.
156 Met& Bpuxmópod. (Zosim. i. s. c.).
157 Amm. Marc. xxv. 6: “Prope con-
finia noctis, cum ad castellum Swmere
nomine citis passibus tenderemus.”
Zosimus seems to intend the same place
by his Xojaa to bpowptov, which, however,
he makes the Romans pass early in the
ay.
108 Samarah became a flourishing and
important city under the Caliphs of the
Abasside dynasty. The 8th Caliph of
this line, Al-Motassem-Billah, made it
his capital. It is now once more re-
duced to insignificance.
15° Zosimus, iii. 30:
trpoex86vres.
190 As Dura (Dur) is but eighteen miles
above Samarah, the average progress
per day must have been under five
imiles, Ammianus gives the last day’s
march as thirty stades, or little more
than three miles (xxv.
161 Amm. Marc. l. S. c.
162 Julian had subsidized them for a
time, but, finding that his supply of cash
was becoming exhausted, stopped the
customary payment. The Saracens
complained, whereupon he replied that
he had no more gold, but plenty of steel,
t their service.
168 There can be no doubt of the iden-
tity of Dura (Aoûpa) with the modern
Dur, a small place on the Tigris between
Tekrit and Samarah. (Rich, Kurdistan.
vol. ii. ch. xviii.; Layard, Nineveh and
‘Huépas reororepas
•
** *
664
Babylon, p. 469.) It was a town of some
importance in the wars of the succes-
sors of Alexander (Polyb, v.48 and 52).
164 Amm. Marc. xxv. 6: “Tarna, Cir-
cumlata, fines haud procul limitum esse
nostrorum
3 *
fºibid." Rafts of this description had
been used on the Mesopotamian rivers
from very early times.
They are repre-
sented frequently in the Assyrian sculp-
tures. (See Layard, Monuments of Nim-
eveh, Second Series, pl. 13; Nineveh and
Babylon, p. 231, &c.)
166 The distance from Dur to Sinjar
(Singara), the nearest Roman post, is, as
the crow flies, about 175-miles. Slight
deflections from the straight line, ne-
cessitated by the position of the wells
upon the route, would raise the distance
to 200 miles. -
167 Amm. Marc. xxv. 8, ad imit.
188 This is not stated by the authori-
ties; but, after the peace was made, we
r a bridge which the Persians
were accused of constructing in order
to pursue Jovian and break the terms of
the treaty. (See Amm. Marc. xxv, 8.
As Sapor, if wicked enough, can scarce-
ly have been foolish enough, to con-
template breaking the very advantage-
ous treaty which he had just concluded,
I suspect that the bridge was begun
while the negotiations were in progress,
to be used if they failed.
169 I have given the considerations
which, it seems to me, must have weigh-
ed with Sapor. Ammianus represents
him as impelled to desire peace: 1, by
the losses that he had sustained; 2, by
fear of what the Roman army might do
if driven to desperation; and 3, by a
general dread of the Roman power and
a special fear of the army of Mesopota-
mia under Procopius. He admits, how-
ever, that the successful passage of the
river by the 500 Gauls and Sarmatians
was the circumstance which principally
moved him: “Super omnia hebetarunt
ejus anxiam mentem . . . quingentiviri
transgressitumidum flumen incolumes,”
C. (Am * * *
170 Ibid. 1. s. c.; Zosim. iii. 31.
17* * Humanorum respectu reliquias
exercitus redire sinere clementissimum
regem, quae jubet si impleverit cum pri-
matibus Caesar.” (Amm. Marc. l. s. c.)
172 Ibid. 1. S. C. -
178 The only concessions made were
the permission of withdrawal given to
all the inhabitants of Nisibis and Sin-
gara, and the allowance of a similar
right to Roman citizens located in any
part of the ceded territories.
174 See text, pp. 308, 309.
17* This is not distinctly stated as a
condition, but appears from what is re-
lated of the actual evacuation (Amm.
Marc. xxv. 9).
17° Orosius sees this, and therefore
says: “Nisibin oppidum, et partem sw-
{º Mesopotamide, Persis concessit”
vii. 31}.
| THE SEVENTH HONARCHY.
[CH. x.
17 Amm. Marc. xxv. 7, ad fin.; Zo-
sin;. iii. 31. •
1° S “Cum pugnari decies expediret; me
Inorum quidduam dederetur.” (Amm.
à l'C.. XXV. Y.
179 This point is well argued by Tille-
mont (Hist, des Emperewrs, tom. iv. p.
583). It is slurred over by Gibbon, who
blames Jovian, but leaves it doubtful
what he would have had him do (De-
cline and Fall, vol. iii. p. 219).
180 Gibbon admits as much in a note
(note 110), but in his text reproduces the
absurdity of Ammianus.
181 Eutrop. Breviar. x. 17, § 9: “Pa-
cem fecit necessariam quidem, sed ig-
nobilem.” Compare Orosius, vii. 31:
“Foedus, etsi parum putaret dignum,
satis tamen necessarium, pepigit.”
182 Ammianus gºieş describes
the passage (xxv. 8). Its difficulties
showed that, had the Persians been hos-
tile. it would have been impossible.
*Ammianus says “a Saracenis vel
Persis caedebantur;” but it is not clear
that there were really any Persians on
the right bank of the river.
184 Zosim. iii. 33: Amm. Marc. l. S. c.
185 Gibbon denies this (p. 221, note 116);
but it seems to me that the statements
of Rufinus (ii. 1; p. 177) and Theodoret
(iv. 2; p. 661, B) have some weight.
Amm. Marc., xxv. 8. The impor-
tant words “Persicum castellum” have
not generally been noticed. A reader
of Gibbon would suppose “the castle
of Ur” to be a Roman post.
187 The MSS. vary between “ad Ur
nomine Persicum venere castellum” and
“Adur nomine Persicum v. cast.” Am-
mianus commonly omits “ad '' after
** Venio.”
288 Amm. Marc. xxv. 9; Zosim. iii. 33,
sub fin.
189 The reproach addressed by the
Parthian chief to Crassus, “You Ro-
mans are not very apt to remember
your engagements” (Plut. Crass. § 31),
was well deserved, and is echoed by the
general voice of history. It is sadden-
ing to find a modern writer and an Eng-
lishman approving the ordinary Ro-
man practice, and suggesting that Jo-
vian ought to have “redeemed his pu-
sillanimous behavior by a splendid act
of patriotic perfidy” (Gibbon, Decline
and Fall, vol. iii. p. 223).
190 See text, p. 311.
191 Zosimus maintains (iii. 32) that
Rome never gave up Nisibis from the
time of its capture by Lucullus (B.C. 68).
And it may be true that she never re-
linquished it by treaty. But Nisibis and
Mesopotamia generally were Parthian
until the great expedition of Avidius
Cassius (A.D. 165).
192 “Constabat, Orbem Eoun in ditio-
nem potuisse transire Persidis, nisi hasc
civitas habili situ et moenium magnitu-
dine restitisset.” (Amm. Marc. xxv. 8.)
198 Zosim. iii. 34, sub init.; Johann,
Ant. Fr. 181.

f
\ } i t
sh. XII.]
194 Chosroës Anushirwan, who reigned
from A.D. 531 to A.D. 579.
CHAPTER XI.
1 See text, p. 348.
2 Zosim. iv. 4.
8 Amm. Marc. xxiv. 7, ad fin.
4 Mos. Chor. ist. Armen. iii. 15;
mm. Marc. xxv. 7.
* This was part of Julian's original
plan. (See Amm. Marc. xxiii. 3.) That
it was executed appears from the same
writer (xxv. 7).
6 Mos. Chor. iii. 15.
7 Liban. Orat. Funebr. p. 301, D. The
passage is obscure, but appears to refer
to the troops under Procopius and Se-
bastian.
8 Mos, Chor, I. S. c.
Ibid
g
10 Mos. Chor. iii. 17. Moses makes
the letter to be addressed to Tiranus;
but he ceased to reign A.D. 341.
11 Some think that this is the true
account of the matter—that Arsaces
ordered his general to withdraw the
troops, but, that he might not be com-
romised, made him pretend to act on
is own authority. .
12 Amm. Marc. xxvii. 12. The seizure
is also recorded by the Armenian histo-
rians, Faustus (iv. 54) and Moses (iii.
34); and also by Procopius (Bell. Pers.
i. 5).
18 “Winctum catenis argenteis, quod
apud eos honoratisvanum suppliciorum
aestimatur esse solatium.” (Amm.
Marc. l. S. c. oses, however, gives
him fetters of iron (iii. 35).
* Mos. Chor. iii. 85; Faustus, iv. 54;
1. 5, p. 39.
Chor. 1. s. c.; Amm. Marc.
xxvii. 12; Faustus, iv. 55.
. 19 Amm. Marc. xxvii. 12.
17 Faustus, iv. 55.
18 “Per Terentium ducem Para re-
ducitur in Armeniam.” (Amm. Marc.
l. S. c. Compare Faustus, v. 1.)
19 Amm. Marc. xxvii. 12; Faustus, iv.
55: Mos. Chor. iii. 35.
20 See text, p. 318.
21 Valentinian and Valens. Jovian had
died in A.D. 364, after a reign of little
more than eight months. Valentinian
had been elected his successor, and had
associated his brother Valens in the
empire. To Valens had been assigned
the government of the eastern prov-
inces. . -
22 Amm. Marc. xxvii. 12:
maces, pulsus . . . Hiberia regno, cum
duodecim legionibus et Terentio remitti-
* Sauro-
tur.
** “His percitus Sapor, patise indigna,
clamans,” &c. (Ibid. 1. s.c.) .
24 Sapor seems to have considered
that, in a certain sense, Iberia was in-
cluded in Armenia. en Rome re-
placed Sauromaces upon the Iberian
throne, he complained that “the Arme-
nias were assisted against the text of
THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY.
665
\
the treaty.” Rome, no
doubt, contested this interpretation.
** Amm. Marc. xxii. 12, ad finv.
26 Ibid. xxix. 1.
27 Ibid. t
28 See Amm. Marc. xxx. 2: “Sapor
vero, post suorum pristinam cladem.”
29 “Tentatis aliquoties levibus praeliis,
varioque finitis eventu.” (Ibid. xxix.
(Ibid. 1. s. c.)
g
30 Ibid. Compare Zosim. iv. 13.
31 Into this interval fell the death of
Para, whom the Persians entrapped and
ºered (Amm. Mare. xxx. 1; Faustus,’
v. 32) -
82 Amm, Marc. xxx. 2,
38 Zosim. iv. 21, sub imit. Compare
Amm. Marc. xxxi. 7.
84 Mos. Chor. iii. 40: Faustus, v. 34.
35 Clinton places his death in A.D. 379
(F. R. vol. i. p. 356); but Patkanian
(Journal Asiatique for 1866, p. 234) and
Thomas (Num. Chron. for 1872, p. 45)
prefer the date A.D. 380. --
38 Zeitschrift d. deutsches morgenländ.
Gesellschaft, vol. viii. pp. 46–7.
37 ongpérier agrees with Mordt-
mann on this point. (See his Médailles
des Sassanides, p. 42.
38 y are commonly either “Mazd-
ism bag Shapuhri malkan malka,” or
“Mazdism, bag Shapwhvi malkan malka,
Airam ve Amiran.”
39 Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift, vol.
viii. p. 47. Toham is the Sassanian equi-
valent of the Zend takhºna, “strong,”
which is found also in Achaemenian
Persian. !
CHAPTER XII.
* See the passage of Syncellus at the
head of the chapter. Agathias agrees
(iv. 26), as do Tabari (Chronique, vol. ii.
pp. 102–3), Magoudi (Prairies d'Or, vol.
ii. pp. 189-190), and the Modjmel-al-Te-
warikh. (See the Journal Asiatique for
1841, p. 513.) :
2 Faustus does not mention any Per-
sian king by name after Sapor II. The
oman writers do not seem even to
know the name of the prince who sent
the embassy of A.D. 384. See Oros. vii.
34; Pacat. Paneg. xxii. § 4; Socrat. H. E.

* All the authorities assign four years
to Artaxerxes II., except the Modjmel-
al-Tewarikh, which gives “four or five,
or twelve” (Jowrm. Asiat, for 1841, p. 513).
Some of the Armenian writers give Sa-
por III, no more than two years (Patka-
nian in the Jowrm. Asiat. for 1866, p. 157).
4 Artaxerxes is made to be Sapor’s
brother by Agathias (iv. 26), Mirkhond
(Hist. des Sassanides, p. 318), Tabari
(Chronique, ii. p. 102), Magoudi, (Prai-
ries d'Or, ii. p. 189), and the Modjmel-al-
Tewarikh (p. 513). The Armenian writers
alone make him Sapor's son. (See Mos.
Chor. iii. 51, and compare Patkanian in
Journ. As, for 1866, p. 155.) The history
of the mode in which Sapor II. became
*
666 #
king (see text, p. 816), and the great
length of his reign, make
robable that he was succeeded by a
Add to this that the coins of
Artaxerxes II. bear the head of a young-
1118,11. *
: ſºmetal Tewarikh, 1. S. C. Z
ICl.
7 Mirkhond, Hist. des Sassanides, p.
317, note. Malcolm has, by mistake,
transferred these qualities to his suc-
cessor (Hist. of Persia, vol. i. p. 112).
The Armenian synchronisms are ex-
ceedingly doubtful; but, on the whole,
it seems to me that the expulsion of
Varaztad by Manuel must have hap-
pened about five years after the death
of Para. If that event occurred, as Am-
mianus (xxx. 1) places it, in A.D. 374, the
revolution effected by Manuel (Faustus,
v. 37) must belong to the year A.D. 379,
z
which is the year of Artaxerxes' acces-
sion, probably.
Faustus, v. 34.
10 Ibid. c. 35.
11 Ibid. c. 37.
12 Faustus, c. 38.
13 Ibid. H. S. c.
14 The death of Para (A.D. 374) and the
conclusion of the treaty with Rome (A.D.
384) are two fixed dates known positive-
ly from the Roman writers. Into the
ten years between these events must
fall the entire reign of Varaztad (four
years according, to Moses of Choréné,
iii. 40), the revolt of Manuel, the joint
reign of Arsaces and Valarsaces (one
year, Mos. Chor. iii. 41), and the sole
reign of Arsaces from his brother's
death to the fºliº of Armenia (five
years, Mos. Chor. iii. 46).
** I.e. between A.D. 379 and A.D. 383.
16 Faustus, v. 38. -
17 Ibid. v. 39–43.
18 Ibid. vi. 1. Compare Mos. Chor. iii.
19 Faustus, v. 37. The “Koushans” of
this passage are probably Scyths or Ta-
tars of the Oxianian or Transoxianian
country. (See M. Vivien St. Martin's
essay, entitled Les Huns Blancs ow. Eph-
thalites, pp. 48–52.)
20 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. iii.
pp. 346–350.
31 Ibid. pp. 352–5.
22 See the Chronicles of Idatius and
Marcellinus, and compare Chron. Pasch.
p. 304, D; Socrat. H. E. v. 12; Oros. vii.
84; and Pacat. Paneg. xxii. 3–5.
- ** The terms of the treaty are given
unusual accord by Moses (iiiſt42) and
Faustus (vi. 1). The latter writer is
somewhat the fuller and more exact of
he two. Procopius (De AEd. Justinian.
iii. 1) has quite a different account of
the matter; but, as he writes a century
and a half after Faustus, we cannot ac-
cept his narrative against that of the
earlier writer.
* Orosius, writing in A.D. 417, says:
“Ictum tune foedus est, quo universus
Oriens usque ad nunc tranquillissime
*
TIIE, SEVENTII MONARCHY.
* *
+
[CH. XII.
{
fruitur.” (i. s. c.) The peace lasted
only three years longer. (See Clinton,
F. R. vol. i. p. 596.) -
25 Tabari, Chronique, ii. p. 102; Ma-
goudi, Prairies d'Or, ii. p. 189.
26 See text, p. 378.
27 Agath. iv. 26, ad imit.; Eutych. vol.
i. p. 399: “Regnavit post ipsum in Per-
sas filius ipsius Ardshir Saporis filius
annos quatuor; dein mortuus est.”
28 Magoudi, vol. ii. p. 189. .
ºrkload, Bistoire des Sassamides,
p 80 De Sacy read Varahram for Shah-
whºri in the third line of the right-hand
inscription, and concluded that the
Hºhº. figure was that of Varahran
IV. (Mémoire, p. 263). , Many writers
have copied this mistake. (Malcolm,
FHist. of Persia, vol. i. p. 258; Clinton,
. R. vol. ii. p. 260, note 12; Patkanian
in the Jowrmal Asiatique for 1866, p. 159,
note 1.) A
81 See Thomas in the Journal of the R.
Asiatic Society, New Series, vol. iii. p.
343. he meaning is—‘’ This is the im-
age of the Ormazd-worshipping kingly
Sapor, king of the kings of Iran and Tu-
ran, heaven-descended of the race of the
gods, son of the Ormazd-worshipping
kingly Hormisdas, king of the kings of
Iran and Turan, heaven-descended of
the race of the gods, grandson of the
kingly Narses, king of kings.” The other
inscription is identical except in the
names, and the omission of the second
word, zani, “this.” w
82 So Thomas in the number of the
Jowrmal of the R. Asiatic Society, quot-
ed above (p. 346). Ker Porter ascribed
the erection of the monument to Varah-
ran IV. (Thravels, vol. ii. p. 190). But
the only basis of this is the local tradi-
tion, a very insecure foundation.
38 Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift, vol.
viii. p. 51.
34 Ibid. pp. 51–2.
85 Longpérier, Médailles des Sassa-
mides, pl. 7, fig. 4. *
.8% Mordtmann, Zeitschrift, vol. viii. p.

37 Longpérier, pl. 7, fig. 5; Mordtmann,
52–7.
38 Mordtmann, p. 53. The old Persian
name for Assyria was Athura, whence
robably the Aturia ("Aroupté) of the
reeks (Strab. xvi. 1, § 2; Steph. Byz, ad
voc. Nivos; .).
89 The term atur, or at wri, is found
occasionally in combination with de-
cided mint-marks, denoting places, as
Baba, “The Porte,”, i.e. Ctesiphon
(Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift, Nos. 108
and 134); Kir, for Kirman (ibid. No. 114);
and As, which is probably for Aspadan
or Ispahan (Nos. 101, 110, and 144). And
these places are not in Assyria.
40 Five years, according to Agathias
(iv. 26) and Mirkhond (p. 319); four years
and five months. according to Eutychius
(vol. i. p. 472), Tabari (vol. ii. p. 102), and
Magoudi (vol. ii. p. 189). .
---
CH. XIII.]
41 Mirkhond (p. 320): “Schapour était
un roi d'une simplicité extrême.”
42 So Magoudi (l. s. c.). Tabari assigns
his death to a revolt of his troops; Mir-
khond to accident, or to a conspiracy
among his chief officers (p. 319).
48 Varahran is made the son of Sapor
III. by Agathias (l. s. c.), the son of Sa-
por II. and brother of Sapor III. by Ta-
bari and Mirkhond Eutychius and Ma-
goudi leave the point doubtful. Patka-
nian (Journal Asiatique for 1866, p. 158),
following Armenian authorities, men-
tions both views, but inclines to believe
him Sapor III.'s brother.
** Agathias, iv. 26; p. 136, C. Compare
Tabari, vol. ii. p. 103; Mirkhond, p. 320;
and the Modjmel-al-Tewarikh (Jowrm.
As. 1841. p. 513). Varahran, we are told,
gave his name of Kerman-shah to a town
, which he built in Media, and which still
bears the appellation (Malcolm, Hist, of
Persia, vol. i. p. 113; Ker Porter, Trav-
els, vol. ii. p. 190).
45 Thomas in Journal of R. As. Socie-
ty, New Series, vol. iii. p. 350.
* This seal is without inscription. but
is identified by the headdress, which is
the same as that upon Varahran's coins.
[Pl. XIX. Fig. 4.
47 Thomas in R.S.A8. Soc. J. º 352.
48 Oros. vii. 34. Compare Mos. Cho-
rén. Hist. Arm. iii. 51: " Pax fuit inter
Veramum (qui Cermanus appellatus est)
et Arcadium.”
49 Mos. Chor. iii. 46.
50 Ibid.; and compare Procop. De AEd.
Justinian. iii. 1; p. 53, B: Tö Aottröv 6
"Papaitov Baoukei's 3pxovra rots 'Apprevious
dei ka9íorm, buttvá rots kai Örmvika &v
aúró, BovXouévº ein: kó u m ré re rms 'Apple-
včas €káAouv kai eis épiè rov &pxovta toû-
Toy.
51 Mos. Chor. iii. 49. This writer calls
the Roman emperor of the time Arca-
dius, and the Persian monarch Sapor;
but, if he is right in assigning to Chos-
roës a reign of five years only (iii. 50),
they must have been, as represented in
the text. Theodosius the "Great and
Varahram IV.
**The Armenian patriarch, Aspuraces
(Asbourag), having died, Chosroës ap-
pointed his successor without consult-
ing Varahran. -
58 Mos. Chor. iii. 50.
54 Ibid.
** If the “five years” of Chosroës are
counted from the division of Armenia,
A.D. 384, his revolt and deposition would
fall into the year A.D. 389, the year after
the accession of Varahran. But it is
more probable that they date from the
commencement of his sole reign, which
was two years later, A.D. 386.
º Mirkhond, Hist, des Sassanides, p.
*7 Modjmel-al-Tewarikh, as translated
by M. Mohl in the Journal Asiatique
for 1841, p. 518. -
*
THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY.
*Tabari, Vol. ii. p. 108; Mirkhond,
667
1. s. c.; Malcolm, Hist, of Persia, vol. i.
p. 113. •
*. CHAPTER XIII.
1 The name upon his coins is read as
*n->-1)*. The Greek writers call him
“Isdigerdes,” the Armenian “Yazgerd.”
Eutychius (vol. i. p. 548; vol. ii. p. 79)
uses the form “Yasdejerd.”
3 Mordtmann interpolates after Wa-
rahran IV. a monarch whom he calls
“Isdigerd I.,” to whom he assigns a
reign of a year over a portion of Persia.
(Zeitschrift, vol. viii. p. 63). This prince
he makes succeeded by his son, Isdigerd
II., who is the “Isdigerd I.” of all other
writers. I cannot find any sufficient
reason for this interpolation.
mismatic evidence does, perhaps, show
that an Isdigerd, distinct from the three
known Persian monarchs, once reigned
in Seistan; but there is nothing to fix
the time of this reign.) *
3 That Varahran IV. was the father of
Isdigerd is asserted by Eutychius (vol. i.
. 548), Tabari (ii. p. 103), Abu Obeidah
quoted by Magoudi, vol. ii. p. 238), Sé-
êos (p. 20), and others. àre de
arbe makes him the brother of Isdi-
gerd (p. 33). Agathias (iv. 26) is ambig-
uous. Mirkhond (p. 321) and Tabari
(l. s c.) mention both views.
* Mirkhond, I. s. c.; Tabari, I. s. c.
* Several of these are given by Mir-
khond (pp. 321-2). . If authentic, they
would be remarkable as indicating a
consciousness that there lay in his diš-
position the germs of evil, which the
flºº of supreme power would be
ikely to develop.
* Eipjvm &#6699 xpºpuevos 8wayéyovev čw
"Pudulatous rov travra xpóvov (Procop. De
Bell. Pers. i. 2). Oiśāva ºrºtrore karð ‘Peo-
paitov hparo tróXeploy . . . &AAä Meuévnicev
éoraei eiſwovs re àv kai eipmuaios (Agath. iv.
26; p. • Ji-y A *
7 See Tillemont, Hist. des Empereurs,
tom. v. pp. 104–6, 21–221; Gibbon, De-
cline and Fall, vol. iii. pp. 351-402; vol.
iv. pp. 23–31.
8 §. vol. iv. pp. 29, 57, &c.; Tille-
mont, tom. v. p. 193. -
9 Gibbon, voſ. iv. pp. 140–6. The death
of Eutropius occurred in the same year
with the accession of Isdigerd (Clinton,
F. R. vol. i. pp. 542–6). It probably fell
10 Gibbon, vol. iv. pp. 144-6.
11 Ibid. p. 145.
12 See Mordtmann. in the Zeitschrift,
vol. viii. pp. 64–7. The title “Ramash-
tras” is wholly new when Isdigerd takes
it. Mordtmann regards it as a super-
lative form, equivalent to “Quietissi-
us.”
13 Procop. De Bell. Pers. i. 2; Agath.
iv. 26; p. 136, C, D; Theophan. Chrono-
late in the year.
graph. p. 69, A, B.
* IIoAAă ăv rais Swabikas &méokle, 9so-
§ogiq riv_flag Xetav orðévet re kai, trpovotº
Tráorm avv8taaaaaa-6at. (Procop. l. S. C.)
*


* 668
! is Cedrenus, p. 334, C. ,
16 Theophan. p. 69, B.
17 Theophan. p. 69, B. Compare Ce-
drenus, p. 335, A. --
18 The phrase;used by Theophanes and
Cedrenus (éxºrošav yeyovey) is ambiguous.
(See Theophan. p. 70, D; Cedrenus, p.
6, C.) -
19 Agath. 1. s. c.: Où8éva trømore roºs
.*Powaiots #paro tróAeuou, o v 8 & & A A o ru
tº a r" at T to v & x a p u & 6p a o e.
20 Procopius wrote about A.D. 553;
Agathias after A.D. 578; Theophanes
after A.D. 812
21 Tiñemont, Hist. des Emperewºrs,
tom. #} 1, and note; Gibbon, Decline
and Fall, vol. iv. p. 159; Smith's Dict.
. of Głc. and Rom. Biography, vol. iii. p.
1068, &c -
22 They consist of Philostorgius (B.C.
425), Socrates (ab. A.D. 440), Sozomen (ab.
A.D. 445), Theodoret (ab. A.D. 450), and
Prosper (ab. A.D. 460); all of whom are
ecclesiastical writers, rather than writ-
ers of civil history. Zosimus is so brief in
his notices of the Eastern Empire, that
his silence as to the will of Arcadius
cannot be regarded as of much conse-
quence.
> ** Agathias speaks of him as (6s. TrAe-
iorra wepla8mkóra, kai tra o a v, dos eitreiv,
i or rop i a v & vo. A € $ di pa e v ov.
34 Synes. Ep. 110.
35 The Persian to whose suite Anti-
ochus had belonged is called Narses.
(Synes. 1. s. c.) This was the name of
the favorite minister of Isdigerd (Taba-
ri, vol. ii. p. 104).
26 Tillemont, 1. s. c.
* Theophan. p. 71, A: Ets &kpov 9soore-
Bös yeyovey, Öate épteaxe orxečov Battigeo-
6at, Compare Socrat. H. E. vii. 8.
* Theophan. p. 69, C; Cedrenus, p.
THE SEVENTH MONAIRCEIY.
[CH. XIV.
41 “In castello Olivionis libera custo-
dia tenebatur.”—Ibid. 1. s. c. (Whiston's
translation).
42 Mos. Chor. iii. 56, ad imit,
48 Clinton places the death of Isdigerd
in A.D. 420 (F. R. vol. i. p. 596; vol. ii. p.
261); Mordtmann in the same year (Zeit-
schrift, vol. viii. p. 64); Thomas in A.D.
417 (Num. Chron. No. xlvii., New Series,
p. 45).
44 MOS. Chor. iii. 56.
45 Ibid. iii. 58, ad fin.
40 Mordtmann gives as mint-marks of
Isdigerd I. (his Isdigerd II.) Assyria,
Ctesiphon, Ispahan, and Herat (Zeit-
scharift, vol. viii. pp. 65–7).
47 See Longpérier, Médailles des Sas-
sanides, pl. vii., Nos. 2 and 3 (wrongl
ascribed to Artaxerxes II.); Mordtmann,
in the Zeitschrift, vol. viii. pl.vii., No. 17.
48 Mordtmann, Zeitschrift, vol. viii. p.
{4, No. 132; vol. xii. p. 11, No. 25.
40 Ibid, vol. viii. p. 67, No. 139.
50 Mordtmann, Zeitschrift, vol. viii. p.


8
Hist. of Persia, vol. i. p. 113
. . * 'ETAatüv6m év DIeportöv 6 xptarvavuorpiós.
(Theoph. 1. s. c.)
30 Ibid. p. 71, A.
** Ibid.: Totºs Máyovs des &raretovas ākā-
Aagev. Compare Socrat. Hist. Eccl. vii.
8: IIeptopyns yewóuevos Ó Baoru Asús rö ràv
&yov yevos &mečekároo’e.
**Tabari, vol. ii. p. 104; Magoudi, vol.
ii. p. 190; Mirkhond, p. 321; Malcolm,
** Theophan. p. 71, B; Theodoret, v. 39.
* Cyrill. Monach. in the Amalecta,
Groeca, p. 20; Theophan, 1. s. c.; Cedre-
Ill IS, º 336, C; Theodoret, v. 38.
35 Theophan. 1. s. c.
, “Qi Máyou karū tróAets kai x&pas imple-
Aós éðioevov Toijs Aav6ávovtas. (Theoph.
1. S. C.), Bovāduevow ot Máyou Trévras 9mpej-
orat rows Xptorreavows. (Cyrill. Monach.
. S. C.)
87 These are described. with much de-
tail, by Theodoret (H. E. v. 39); but the
modern reader will be glad to be spared
all particulars.
88 IIAsia-row kai év abraſs rais Baorévois
&vmpéðmorav. (
** Mos. Chor. iii. 55, ad in it.
* Mos. Chor. iii. 55, ad init.
65.
51 Ibid. p. 67,
52 Mirkhond. Histoire des Sassanides,
# 321–2; Tabari, Chronique, vol. ii. p.
103. --
53 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 104.
54 Procop. De Bell. Pers. i. 2: "Ia8tyép-
Öms, 6 IIepatov Baoru Mei's . . . Šv kai Trpióre-
pov čtri tpétrov pi e y a Ao ‘ppo a tº v m 6tagó-
intos és ra. Maxworta, & perii v ćtrečeišaro
6avuatós Te kai A6 you détav.
* Theophan. Chronograph. p. 71, A:
"Ia-Suyépôms . . . sis àxpov 6 e o a e 8 in s ye-
'yoveri.
1 * Malcolm, Hist, of Persia, vol. i. pp.
#7 Socrat. H. E. vii. 8; Cedrenus, #:
836, C; Theophan. 1, s.c.; Cyrill. Monach.
Vit. Euthym. in the Amalecta Groeca,
p. 20.
º Tabari, vol. ii. p. 104; Mirkhond, p.
* Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. i.
60 Tabari, l, s. c.
CHAPTER XIV.
1 See text, p. 391.
2 Mos. Chor. iii. 56.
8 Tabari, vol. ii. #. 105–112; Magoudi,
vol. ii. p. 191; Mirkhond, pp. 323–8; Modi-
mel-al-Tewarikh (in Journ. Asiatique
for 1841, p. 515).
4 Tabari, p. 113.
f , Chor. iii. 55. He had failed
either to conciliate or overawe the great
Armenian chiefs,
6 Ibid. iii. 56.
7 Tabari, 1. s. c.; Mirkhond, p. 329.
*In this part of the history fable has
replaced fact. According to Tabari and
others, Varahran made no use of his
Arab troops, but effected his purpose by
persuading the nobles and challeng-
ing Chosroësto a trial of a strange char-
acter. ... “Let the Persian crown,” he
said, “be placed between two hungry
lions, chained one on either side of it,
CH. XIV.]
and let that one of us who dares to ap-
proach the lions and take the crown be
acknowledged as king.” The proposal
pleased the nobles and Magi; and what
Varahran had suggested was done.
Chosroës was asked if he would make
the attempt first, but declined. Varah-
ran then took a club, and, approach-
ing the lions, jumped on the back of one,
seated himself, and, when the other was
about to spring on him, with two blows
dashed out the brains of both ! He then
took the crown, and was acknowleded
king, Chosroës being the first to swear
allegiance. (See Tabari, vol.ii. pp.117–
8: Magoudi, vol. ii. p. 515; Mirkhôndºpp.
330–1; &c.) We may perhaps conclude
with safety from the Persian accounts
that there was no actual civil war, but
that Varahran established himself with-
out having to fight
9 The date of A.D. 417, whlch Patka-
nian (Journ. As, 1866, p. 161) and Thomas
(Num. Chron. 1872, p. 45) obtain from the
Armenian writers, is less probable. It
contradicts Abulpharagius (p. 91). Aga-
thias (iv. 26), Theophanes (p. 73, D) and
others. See Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p.
6.
I () Sºra. H.E. vii. 18; Theodoret, H.
... W. 39.
11 Socrates speaks of Tuapias kai
a rp é 3 A as II ep a v × & s , , § 1 a. p 6 pov's .
Theodoret is painfully diffuse on the
subject.
12 Socrat. H. E. l. S. c.
13 Socrat. H. E. l. s. c.
14 This is the first that is heard of Ar-
daburius. He was of Alanian descent,
and was afterwards employed to put
down the pretender, Johannes (Socr. vii.
24: º ap. Phot. Bibliothec. p.
197; Philostorg. H. E. xii. 13), whom he
made prisoner (A.D. 425). In A.D. 427 he
was consul.
15 The form used by Socrates is Aza-
zene; but Theophanes has “Arzane''
(p. 74, A), whence we may conclude that
the district intended was that called Ar-
Zanene by Ammianus (xxv. 7), whic
has been already identified with the
modern Kherzan. (See text, p. 308.)
1° The name is given as Arses (Arsaeus)
by Theophanes (i. s. c.), but as Narses
(Narsaeus) by Socrates. Tabari says
that Narses was a brother of Varahran
(Chronique, vol. ii. pp. 119 and 125).
17 See text, pp. 367–369.
18 Moundsir was at the head of the
Mesopotamian or Saracenic Arabs at
this time, according to the Oriental
writers (Tahari, vol. ii. pp. 110–116; Mir-
khond, p. 328, who gives the name as
Mondar, a form easily traceable in Al-
Amvw.ndarus). -
19 Socrat. H. E. vii. 18, sub fin.
20 This tale is related both by Socrates
(I. S. c.) and by Theophanes (p. 74, B).
It must have had some foundation;
but no doubt the loss is greatly exag-
gerated.
THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. *
669

21 See the Chronicle of Marcellinus, p.
19; and compare Theophanes (pp. 74–5),
who, however, makes the war last three
years, and Socrat. H. E. vii. 18–20.
22 MOS. Chor. iii. 59.
23 The authority of Moses as to the
strength of Theodosiopolis (Hist. Arm.
1. s. c.) is preferable to that of Procopius,
who wrote a century later. Procopius
makes the place one of small account in
the time of Theodosius (De AEd. Justi-
nian. iii. 5).
24 MOs. Chor. iii. 59.
25 Theodoret, H. E. v. 37.
26 Ibid.
37 Johann, Malal, xiv. p. 25, A.
28 These details are given by Johan-
Malal. only; but the combat is mention-
ed also by Socrates (H. E. vii. 18, ad
ºl,
*Socrat. 1. s. c.; Marcellin. Chromi-
CO71, p. 23.
80 Socrat, I. s. c.
31 Ibid. -
32 John of Malala, makes Warahran
propose peace immediately after the
single combat. Theodoret makes peace
follow from the repulse suffered at
Theodosiopolis. -
83 Socrat. vii. 20. *
34 Socrat. vii. 20.
85 Socrates. The destruction of the
** Immortals “” is
Theophanes (p. 74, B), but vaguely and
without any details. -
86 The actual negotiator was, accord-
ing to Socrates, Maximus only. Others
mention, as concerned in the negotia-
tions, Helion, Anatolius, and Procopius.
(See Theophan. }. 75, B; Cedren, p. 341,
P; Sidon. Apollin. Paneg. Anthem. l.
{ },
37 Theophan. 1. s.c.; Socrat, H. E. vii.
*Socrat. 1. s. c.
89 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. iv. p.
167,
40 See text, p. 390. -
41 Mos. Chor. iii. 56: “Piebat ut regio
nostra, propter tumultuosa atque turbu-
lentissima tempora, per tres annos ab
rectore vacua fuerit, et misere spoliata,
adeo ut vectigalia regia deficerent, et
plebis itinera intercluderentur, omnis-
omnium rerum ordo perturbare-
.” (Whiston’s translation.)
42 Ibid. iii. 57. -
48 Mos. Chor. iii. 58: “Rex Persarum
Veramus, sine satrapis Armeniis regio-
nem eam se tenere non posse intelligens,
de pace egerat.”
44 See St. Martin, Mémoires sur l'Ar-
ménie, vol. i. p. 410; Notes to Le Beau's
Bas-Empire, vol. vi. p. 32. :
45 Mos, Chor. iii. 63.
** The reply of Isaac to the nobles is
not ill rendered by Gibbon: “Our king
is too much addicted to licentious pleas-
ures; but he has been purified in the
holy waters of baptism. He is a lover of
Women; but he does not adore the fire
mentioned also by .
w
*
lites (Les Huns Blancs ont
670
or the elements. He may deserve the
reproach of lewdness; but he is an un-
doubled Catholic, and his faith is pure
though his manners are flagitious. I
will never consent to abandon my sheep
to the rage of devouring wolves; and
you will soon repentFº rash exchange
of the infirmities of a believer for the
specious virtues of a heathen.” (De-
cline and Fall, vol. iv. p. 169.)
. 47 Mos. Chor. iii. 64.
48 Ibid. The name of the first gov-
ernor, according to Moses, was Vimiher-
a,DOr.
49 Ibid. iii. 65. -
50 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 119; Magoudi, vol.
ii. p. 190; Mirkhond, p. 335; Modjmel-al-
Tewarikh, p. 516.
51 Procop. De Bell. Pers. i. 3; Cosmas
Indicopleust. in Montfaucon's Collectio
nova, Patrwn, tom. ii. pp. 337–9; Abul-
phºag. Chromicon, tom. ii. p. 77; Elisée,
*śīrkhond calls the invader “the
Khacan of China” (p. 334), though he
flºº of e army as composed of
lurks
, 53 Mirkhond, p. 343; Te-
warikh, p. 517; Tabari,
54 Mos. Chor. Geogr. I
take this form from M.
tin, to whose little work on
Paris, 1849) I own myself
Whiston's translation gives
Hephthal [ii}.
55 Both readings occur in the MSS. of
Procopius, (See the note of Dindorf in
the edition of Niebuhr, p. 15.) €O-
phanes has Ned,0axirat only (Chrono-
graph. pp. 105-6). Neq6a Airai is also the
form used by Agathias (iv. 27). Menan-
der Protector has 'Eq6a Airat (Frs. 9 and
&S
56 M. Vivien St. Martin seeks to iden-
tify the Ephthalites with the Yue-chi,
one form of whose name he believes to
have been Yi-fa, or Ye-tha (Les Hums
lancs, 37-69. Others, e.g., De-
uignes, have seen in the word Ephtha-
ite a root Tié-lé, which they regard as
equivalent to Turk.
7. As Procopius (l. s. c.), Theophanes
(p. 105. C), and Cosmas (l. s. c.).
58 Procop. 1. s. c. . -
** Jornandes, De Gothorum rebus ges-
tis, $ 35.
60 “Kham” is the modern contracted
form of the word which is found in the
middle ages as Khagan, or Chagam, and
in the Persian and Arabic writers as
• Khakam or Khacan. Its original root is
probably the Khak,which meant “King”
in ancient Susianian, in Ethiopic (Tir-
hakah), and in Egyptian (Hyk-sos).
61 The moderate estimate of 25,
found in Mirkhond (p. 334) and in the
Rozwt-wl-Suffº (Malcolm, vol. i. p. 117).
Tabari (vol. ii. p. 119) and the Zeen.wt-
Tewarikh have 250,000.
t ** Mirkhond, pp. 334 and 836.
THEN SEVENTH MONARCII).
[CII. XIV.”
68 Ibid. p. 334. Compare Magoudi, vol.
- - c
ii. p. 190.
64 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 119; Modjmel-al-
Tewarikh, p. 516; Mirkhond, p. 334.
65 Tabari, I. s. c.; Mirkhond, p. 335.
68 Tabari makes the number only 300
(vol. ii. p. 119); but Mirkhond gives the
more probable figure of 7,000 (p. 336).
67 Mirkhond, p. 335.
68 Ibid. p. 336. -
* The moise was made, we are told, by
filling the dried skins of oxen with peb-
bles, and attaching them to the necks
of the horses, which, as they charged,
made the stones rattle (Mirkhond, i.s.c.;
Malêolm, vol. i. p. 118). Some authors
make Varahran catch a number of wild
beasts and let them loose upon the Ta-
tars (Modjmel-al-Tewarikh, p. 517).
*agoudi, vol. ii. p. 190; Mirkhond,
. 337
71 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 121.
72 According to Tabari (p. 120), the
crown was ornamented with several
, thousands of pearls. Compare the pearl
ornamentation of the Sassanian crowns
upon the coins, especially those of Sa-
por II.
7 3 º 1. s. c.; Modjmel-al-Tewa-
rikh, p. 517. The latter work expressly
calls this an invasion of the country of
Heyathelah (i.e. of the Ephthalites).
74 Modjmel-al-Tewarikh, p. 517: Taba-
ri, vol. ii. p. 120; Mirkhond, p. 337.
75 Tabari, 1. s. c.
7° Ibid. vol. ii. pp. 124–5. Compare
Magoudi, vol. ii. p. 191; Modjmel-al-T'e-
warikh, p. 516; Mirkhond, pp. 337-340.
77 Modjmel-al-Tewarikh. § 515,
78 Eutychius (vol. i. p. 80) º eigh-
teen years and eleven months; the
Modjmel-al-Tewarikh mentions nineteen
years, but prefers twenty-three (p. 514);
Agathias (iv. 27) Theophanes (p. 71, D),
and Abulpharagius (p. 91) say twenty;
Patkanian (Jottrn. #º for 1866, p.
161) prefers twenty-one: Magoudi (vol.
ii. p. 190) and Tabari (vol. ii. p. 126) agree
with the Modjmel-al-Tewarikh in giving
the number as twenty-three.
79 Tabari, p. 126;. Mirkhond, p. 341.
80 Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. i.
p. 121, note.
81 Mordtmann, in the Zeitschrift, vol.
viii. pp. 68–70.
82 Modjmel-al-Tewarikh, p. 515; Taba-
ri, vol. ii. p. 118; Mirkhond, pp. 332–3;
Maçoudi, vol. ii. p. 190.
88 The wild ass is called by the Per-
sians guy or gowr. Eutychius, in speak-
ing of Varahran V., writes the word
jawr (vol. ii. pp. 80 and 83).
84 Mirkhond, p. 334.
86 Ibid. p. 333; Tabari, p. 118.
86 The sculptures which Ker Porter as:
§ to this prince (Travels, vol. i. pp.
53 º have nothing that really con-
nects them with him. In none of them
is the head-dress of the king that which
apº on the coins of Warahran W.
- 7 Mirkhond, p. 832. -




*
CH. XVI.]
CHAPTER xv.
1 See Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 546.
Mordtmann puts his accession in A.D.
444 (Zeitschrift, vol. viii. p. 70); Patka-
mian (Journ. Asiatique, 1866, p. 167) in
A.D. 438. But a comparison of Marcelli-
nus (p. 25) with Moses of Chorēnē (iii. 67,
ad imit.) shows Clinton to be right.
2 Mos. Chor. l. s. c.
8 Marcellinus, Chrom. l. S. c.
4 Theodoret, H. E. v. 37. The invasion
is wrongly assigned by this writer to the
reign of Varahran V., which was just
€ll CléCl.
5 Procop. De Bell. Pers. i. 2. Anatolius
is also mentioned as concluding the
peace by Marcellinus (i. s. c.).
6 Procop. 1. s.c. : , Thy etprivnv Švvexºpm-
orev obras & Trep "AvaróAtos trpos autoi,
expºſé". . . . .
\ 7 'Eópage Šē ow8èv àxapt. (Procop, l. s. c.
8 So Tillemont suspects (Hist. des Env-
pereurs, tom. vi. pp. 39–40)
9 See text. p. 396.
\ 10 Patkanian in the Journal Asiatigate
for 1866, pp. 164–6.
Wii Patkanian in the Journal Asiatique
for 1866, p. 164.
12 See text, p. 376. --
13 The entrance of the army is noted
by Moses of Choréné (Hist. Armen. iii.
68). We can scarcely be mistaken in re-
garding its entrance as required on ac-
count of Roman intrigues.
14 St. Martin, Recherches swº’ l'Armé-
nie, tom. i. p. 322.
13 Ibid. p. 323.
16 The Armenian term is Marzpan,
“Protector of the Border,” with which
Patkanian well compares “Margrave”
(Jonurr. Asiatique, 1866, p. 114).
17 St. Martin, Recherches, p. 324.
18 Ibid. p. 326.
19 Marcian became emperor in Au-
ust, A.D. 450. The application to him
or aid was made, according to St. Mar-
tin, towards the end of A.D. 450, or early
lil A. D. 48) l.
20 The battle of Chalons was fought in
the autumn of A.D. 451 (Clinton, F. R.
- j42). On the power of Attila at
Gibbon (Decline and Fall,
vol. iv. pp. 231-6).
21 St. Martin. Recherches sur l'Armé-
nie, vol. i. p. 327. -
22 Ibid.
28 Patkanian, in the Journal Asia-
tique for 1866, p. 165,
* Tabari (vol. ii. p. 127) says he reign-
ed eighteen years; Magoudi (vol. ii. p.
395) nineteen; Agathias (iv. 27) seven-
teen. The statement of Agathias is pre-
ferred by Clinton (F. R. vol. i. p. 546);
that of Magoudi by Patkanian (p. 167)
and Thomas (Num. Chron. New Series,
No. xlv. p. 45). All moderns agree that
he died A.D. 457.
25 So Tabari, 1. s. c.
20 See Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift,
vol. viii. pp. 70–1. Longpérier has mis-
takenly assigned to Isdigerd I. two coins
THE SEVENTH MONARCHY,
671
(Pl. viii. Nos. 8 and 4) which really be.
long to Isdigerd II.
27 Mordtmann, 1. s. c.

CHAPTER XVI.
1 The Armenian historians make Hor-
misdas the elder, and Perozes the
younger son (Patkanian in the Journal
Asiatigue for 1866, p. 169); but Tabari
(Chronique, vol. ii. p. 127), Mirkhond (p.
342), and the Persian writers generally,
declare the reverse to have been the
case. They give details which support
their view. .
* Tabari, 1. s. c. Mirkhond says that
Isdigerd regarded Hormisdas as better
qualified to govern than Perozes, since
he bad more sweetness, modesty, and
intelligence, whereas, in favor of Perozes
were only his age and his advantages of
person (pp. 342–3).
8 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 137
“The Greeks shortened the name into
gº as (Kouyxas). See Priscus Panites,
r". 33
* So explained by Mirkhond (p. 344).
* Amounting, according to Mirkhond,
to no fewer than 30,000 men (ibid.).
7 Patkanian in the Journal Asiatique
for 1866, p. 168. .
* Elisée, p. 153; Moyse de Kaghank, i.
10. These writers are supported by
Tabari, who says briefly, “Firouz coni-
battit son frère Hormouz, et le two " (p.
8). -
9 Mirkhond, p. 344. -
10 On the identity of Aghouank with
Albania, see St. Martin's Recherches sur
§ºwie, toin. i. p. 214, and tom. ii. pp.
9.
11 Patkanian, p. 168.
12. Ibid. p. 170.
18 Mirkhond, p. 345; Tabari, p. 128.
14 Mirkhond, p. 344; Tabari, I. s. c.
1* So Tabari. The statement is con-
firmed by the remarkable fact that his
coins, which are abundant up to his
seventh year, then fail entirely for five
years, after which they reappear and
are once more plentiful. (See Thomas
in Numismatic Chronicle for 1873, vol.
xiii., No. 51, p. -
16 Tabari, Chronique, ii. p. 130.
17 Ibid. Compare Mirkhond, p. 345.
18 Tabari says in one place that no one
died of want during the famine (ii. p.
130); but in another. admits that one
died (ib. p. 129). So Mirkhond, p. 346.
19 See Tabari, ii. pp. 129, 130.
20 Priscus Panites, Fr. 31.
21 On the superiority of Priscus to the
general run of Byzantine historians, see
the remarks of Niebuhr in his collection
of the Byzantine historians (Bonn, 1829):
“I,onge optimus omnium sequioris avi
historicorum [Priscus); ingenio, fide,
sapientia, nulli vel optimorum postha-
bendus: elegans quoque et sermone
satis puro usus, laudem atque gloriam
Guum apud coacvos tum inter postero
merito adeptus est: cui etiam a Walesio
et Gibbono, summis viris, laudari con-
A
**
-
A
672
tigit.” Compare §ºith's Dict. of Bio-
526
f
Faphy, vol. iii. p. 526.
9 #s. Panites, Fr. 39.
23 Compare with this trick the some-
what similar one said to have been play-
ed off by Amasis upon Cambyses (He-
rod. iii. 1).
24 Priscus Panites, Fr. 33. -
25 Called §º by Priscus (l. s.c.) and
Procopius (Bell. Pers. i. 4). The old
Persian Varkana and the Greek Hyr-
cania are variants of the same word.
Some ruins of Gurgán still exist in the
valley of the Gurgån river (lat. 37° 20',
long. 55° 15') not far from Asterabad.
26 So Procopius, Bell. Pers. i. 3. Priscus
makes the patrician Constantius am-
ssador from Zeno to Perozes about
this period (Frs. 31, 32, and 33): proba-
bly Eusebius succeeded him. !
, 27 Such is the account given by Proco-
pius (l. s. c.). The Persian writers, Taba-
ri (vol. ii. pp. 132–136) and Mirkhond (pp.
348, 349), substitute a story in which the
old myth of Zopyrus (Herod. iii. 154–158)
is reproduced with little alteration from
the traditions of a thousand years ear-
lier. According to this tale, Perozes was
guided to his destruction in the desert
of Merv by an Ephthalite chief, who mu-
tilated himself in order to deceive the
Persians and secure the success of his
own sovereign.
28 The first Ephthalite war of Perozes
cannot have terminated earlier than
A.D. 469, since in A.D. 468 we hear of the
Persians as still having the advantage
in the struggle (Priscus, Fr. 41). The
troubles in Armenia, which led to the
revolt in A.D. 481 (Lazare Parbe, Vie de
Wahan le Mamigomien, p. 10), must have
commenced several years previously—
probably about A.D. 475.
29 See text, pp. 406–408.
80 Patkanian in the Jowrmal Asiatique
for 1866, p. 173.
31 Lazare Parbe, Vie de Vahan, p. 6.
The exodus had begun even earlier, in
32 See Faustus, iv. 2, 11, 15, &c.; Zenob.
de Glag, p. 337; Mos. Chor. ii. 81, 85; St.
#º, º: Sº?” § rménie, #.
ii. p. 23, Ompare above, pp. *
306, &c. p p
33 Lazare Parbe, p. 8.
34 Lazare Parbe, p. 9.
35 Ibid. pp. 10–14. -
38 Lazare Parbe, pp. 15 and 16.
37 Compare the “Merames” of Ammi-
anus (xxv. 1); and on the supposed force
of the word, see note 135, Chapter X.
38 Lazare Parbe, pp. 18–28.
30 Ibid. p. 31.
40Ibid. p. 32.
41 This expression must be understood
relatively. Nothing is more remarkable
in Lazare Parbe's account of this war
than the smallness of the numbers which
he represents as engaged on either side.
Persian armies rarely exceed 5,000 men.
Armenian are still smaller, and are gen-
THE SEVENTH MONARCHY.
his reign, before B.C. 464 (Priscus. Fr. 31). .
[CH. XVI.
erally counted by hundreds!
42 Lazare Parbe, p. 33. Af
43 Ibid. p. 35.
44 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 137; Mirkhond, pp.
349-350; Malcolm, History of Persia, vol.
i. p. 129,
P. Wars of Perozes with the Sagaruri,
Acatiri, and others, are indicated b
Priscus Panites (Fr. 37). A great war
with the Koushans is witnessed to by
Lazare Parbe (p. 10).
46 Xpévº ov troAA9 iſ a repov (Procop. Bell.
Pers. i. 4). The first war seems to have
terminated about A.D. 470, the second to
ve commenced in A.D. 481. (See La-
zare Parbe, 1. s. c.) -
47 Tabari, 1. s. c.
48 Patkanian, from the Armenian au-
thorities, Journal Asiatique, 1866, p. 171.
49 “Une armée aguerrie.” (Mirkhond
in De Sacy's translation, p. 350.)
50 Tabari, p. 138.
51 On the true relation of Balas to Pe-
rozes, see text, p. 331. \
53 As Tabari, p. 139.
58 Ibid. .
*4 Taçºpov 8a0etàv re kai sãpovs travās
éxovarav. (Procop. B - -
. P. i. 4.) Tabari
says it was fifteen feet deep and thirty
wide (vol. ii. p. 139). |
55 So Tabari (l. S. e.). Neither Proco-
pius nor Mirkhond mentions this cir-
Cumstance.
56 Mirkhond, p. 350; Tabari, ii. p. 141,
Procopius states, instead of this, that
the salt by which Perozes had sworn,
was suspended from the extreme point
of the royal standard.
57 Tabari, 1. s. c.
58. Thirty, according to Procopius, i. 4
p. 19).
59 A. magnificent pearl which Perozes
wore as an earring, and an amulet which
he carried as a bracelet, are particularly
mentioned (Procop. i. 4, pp. 21-24; Ta-
bari, ii. p. 142).
60 Tabari (l. s. c.) makes the exact
length of his reign twenty-six years and
five months. Mirkhond says twenty-six
years (p. 351): Eutychius (vol. i. p. 100;
vol. ii. p. 127), twenty-seven; Magoudi
(vol. ii. p. 195) twenty-nine; Agathias
(iv. 27) twenty-four. The “twenty-four
years” of Agathias have perhaps come
from a writer who assigned the first two
years after the death of Isdigerd II. to
Hormisdas. The true chronology ap-
pears to be the following:—Isdigerd II.
died early in A.D. 457. Both Perozes and
Hormisdas claimed the throne anti reck-
oned themselves kings from this time.
Hormisdas succumbed in A.D. 459. Pe-
rozes was killed late in A.D. 483, twenty-
six years and five months after the
death of his father, twenty-four years
after the death (or dethronement) of
Hormisdas.
31 Mirkhond, p. 351; Malcolm, History
of Persia. vol. i. p. 130.
62 Compare Agathias (I.s.c.):-ºvilprox-
pºrtias uév a yaw kai buxoméAepos — and
again tràéov #v aurº too Bovaevouévov to
6pagüvov. -

CH. xviii.]
Nº.
63 Tabari, ii. p. 128; Mirkhond, p. 345.
64 See text, pp. 411–412.
66 Malcolm, vol. i. pp. 129–130; Gibbon,
vol. v. p. 85.
88 Zeitschrift, vol. viii. p. 71; vol. xii.
p. 12. The name on these coins is read
as Chodad-Varda, Chodar-Varda, or
Chatar-Varda. , t
67 Nwm. Chron, for 1873, No. 51 (New
Series), pp. 225–7.
68 See text, p. 411. Mr. Thomas speaks
of Ram (or Raham) as “the paternally
nominated guardian and administrator”
of Hormisdas (p. 226). But the authors
whom he quotes, Elisée and Moyse de
Kaghank, state exactly the reverse—
that he governed for Perozes, defeated
Hormisdas, and put him to death.
99 Médailles des Sassanides, pl. ix. fig.
70 Mordtmann denies this (Zeitschrift,
vol. viii. p. 71), but, as it appears to me,
without sufficient reason. -
71 These wings, which were now first
introduced, became the distinguishing
feature of the later coinage from Chos-
roës II, downwards, and passed to the
Arabs. Some coins of Perozes are with-
out the wings (see Mordtnann in the
eitschrift, vol. viii. No. 172; Longpé-
ier, Médailles, pl. ix. fig. 2).
ordtmann, Zeitschrift, vol. viii. pp.
e meaning of kadi,
. Chron. for
873, pp. 229–230. -
78 Longpérier, Médailles, p. 62.
74 Zeitschrift, vol. viii. pp. 73–78; vol.
xii. p. 12.
75 Nwin. Chron. for 1873, p. 223. The
abbreviated form of most of the mint-
marks renders their attribution more Or
less doubtful; hence much of the diver-
sity in the lists (see text, p. 420). The
eneral tendency to extend more and
ore widely the principle of local mints,
s' time went on, is, llowever, quite be-
ond dispute.
76 See the Annales de l’Institut Arché-
logique for 1843, vol. xv. p. 105.
CHAPTER XVII.
1 This is M. Longpérier's reading of
e legend upon the coin which he
ascribes to Balas (Médailles, p. 65). M.
artholomaei substantially agrees with
- Mordtmann differs (Zeitschrift,
1. viii. p. 71). It is generally allowed,
owever, that the name, whatever its
lative form, represented the old Par-
iam Wolgasu or Volagases:
2 Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 138, 142, 144; Mir-
Iſhond, p. 351. § Magoudi, vol. ii. p.
: )
* Agathias, iv. 27: p. 137, D; Theophan.
hromograph, p. 106, A.
4 Patkanian in the Journal Asiatique
or 1866, p. 177.
5 Compare Malcolm, History of Per-
sia, vol. i. p. 131, mote; Patkanian (l. S. c.),
C.
| "The Greeks make him father of a
THE SEVENTH MONARCHY.
352 &
673
whom he took with him to the Ephtha-
lite war (Procop. B. P. i. 4; p. 11, A), and
who perished there (ibid. p. 12, C); but
the existence of these persons is un-
known to the native historians.
...Tabari, vol. ii. p. 142; Mirkhond, p.
{)
8 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 143.
9 Procop. Bell. Pers. i. 4, ad fin. Com-
pare Theophanes, Chromograph. p. 106,
A: Cedrenus, p. 355, D.
10 Lazare Parbe, p. 38.
11 Sapor and Hazaravougd had been
both required to march with all their
forces to Ctesiphon (ib. p. 36).
12 See Lazare Parbe, 38–39.
18 Patkanian (Journal Asiatique, 1866,
p. 176). .
14 Lazare Parbe, p. 39.
15 The revolt of Zareh, and his rela-
tionship to Perozes, rest wholly on the
testimony of the Armenian writers, who,
however, can hardly have been mis-
taken in the matter. (See Lazare
Parbe, p. 42; and compare Patkanian,
wit supra, p. 175.)
16 Patkanian, p. 176. ,
17 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 145; Mirkhond, p.
5
18 See text, pp. 422–423.
19 Lazare Parbe, p. 44.
20 Lazare Parbe, p. 45.
21 Ibid. p. 46. -
22 Agathias, iv. 27, p. 138, A.; Eutych.
ii. p. 127; Syncellus, p. 360, D; Tabari,
vol. ii. p. 144; Mirkhond, p.352; Magoudi,
vol. ii. p. 195; Lazare Parbe, p. 46; Pats
kanian, p. 176, &c. The four years were
probably not complete, Balas ascending
the thröme in A.D. 484, and dying before
the termination of A.D. 487.
23 There is not the same universal
i." here. Tabari (p. 144), Mir-
ond (p. 352), Eutychius (I. S. C.), and
k
Agathias (l. s. c.), speak of Balasas dying
a natural death. Lazare Parbe makes
him dethroned by his subjects as too
peaceful (p. 46). Procopius (B. P. i. 5
and 6) and others (Theophan. p. 106, A.;
Cedremus, p. 356, C) confound Balas with
Zamaspes, and say that he was de-
throned and blinded by Kobad. t
24 Mirkhond, p. 351; Tabari, ii. p. 144.
25 Agathias, iv. 27: IIpºos Tois Tpórows
Kai hºrvos.
26 Agathias, iv. 27. See the passage
prefixed to this chapter.
27 Tabari, 1. s. c.; Mirkhond, p. 352.
28 See above, note 9,
29 As Tabari (ii. p. 146) and Mirkhond
(l. s. c.) relate. -
80 Longpérier, Médailles des Sassa-
mides, p. 65, and pl. ix. fig. 5; Thomas,
Nwn. Chron. 1873, pp. 228-9. •
CHAPTER XVIII.
*Tabari, vol. ii. p. 146; Mirkhond, p.
2 See text, p. 425.
* Tabari, 1. s. c - |
numerous family of grown-up Sons,
*
* Sufrai is the form used by the Per-
i






















—w-
674
THE SEVENTII MONARCHY.
* W
[CH. XVIII.
vol. viii. p. 78). Magoudi (vol. ii. p. 195),
Mirkhond (p. 355), and Tabari (vol. ii. p.
149), have Djamasp; Eutychius, cor-
ruptly, Ramasph (vol. ii. p. 176). -
* So Agathias: trpºormtés re kai Sukato-
orbvms àptorro èxeuv Sokolovra (l. s. c.) Taba-
ri, however, liotes that he did not ad-
minister justice satisfactorily (p. 151).
Procop. Bell. Pers. i. 5; p. 15, B;
Agathias, I. S. c.
38 Zamasp is assigned two years only
by Magoudi (vol. ii. p. 196), by Procopius,
who, however, calls him Blases (B. P. i.
7), and by most of the Armenian writers
(Patkanian in the Journal Asiatique
for 1866, p. 178); but four years by Aga-
thias (p. 139, A), Theophanes (p. 117, C),
Syncellus (I. S. C.), and some of the Ar-
menians. The coins have a notice of
the third regnal year (Mordtmann in the
Zeitschrift, vol.xii, p. 13).
29 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 150. Procopius
tells us that when the fate of Kobad was .
being debated, an officer named Gusa-
nastades drew out the knife with which
he was accustomed to cut his nails, and,
showing it to the assembled chiefs, ex-
claimed—“You see how small this knife
is; yet it is big enough to accomplish
deed which a little while hence no
twenty thousand armed men will b
able to manage.” (Bell. Pers. i. 5; p. 1
B). His meaning was understood, b
the advice implied was not adopted.
30 The story is told with certain vari
tions; but all the accounts agree in a
tributing the escape of the king to the
assistance lent him by his wife. Ac-
cording to some, she changed clothes
with him, and took his place in the
prison (Procop. Bell. Pers. i. 6; p. 18,
B); according to others, she carried him.
out of the prison concealed in a bundle
of bedclothes and coverlets (Mirkhond,
p. 356: Tabari, vol. ii. p. 151).
31 See text, p. 410. Other instance
will occur in the later history. 18
p. 18. B
2
7


\
sians, Sukhra that employed by the
Arabs (Mirkhond, p. 353).
*Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 145–6; Mirkhond,
p. 352. : f
* Tabari, p. 147. .*
7 Tabari, p. 148.
8 See Frähn, De Chasaris, Eccerpta ea:
Hist. Arab.; and compare St._Martin’s
. Notes to the Bas-Empire of Le Beau,
tom. xi. p. 115; Theophanes, Chrono-
graph. p. 298. B; Zeuss, Die Deutschen
'wºnd die Nachbarstämme, . 721–742;
Neumann, Die, Völker des siidlichen
Russlands, p. 99; &c. -
9 Theoph. Chron. p. 263, C: rois Toup-
kovs &To rās égas, oùs Xagápovs ovouégov-
ortv. Prichard, Physical History of Man-
kind, vol. iv. p. 322; Smith's Notes on
Gibbon’s Decline and Fall, vol. v. p.
407. &c. ... *
i0 See a }. by Mr. H. H. Howorth
in the Ethnological Jowrmal for 1870,
vol. ii. pp. 182–192.
11 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 148.
12 Ibid.
13 So Mirkhond (p. 353), who is follow-
ºy Malcolm (Hist. of Persia, vol. i. p.
1 tº
14 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 148; Modjmel-al-
Tewarikh, quoted by St. Martin in his
notes to Le Beau, vol. vii. p. 322.
15 For the teaching of Mazdak. See
Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 148–9; Mirkhond, pp.
353-4; Agathias, iv. 27; p. 138, B; Pr
cop. Bell. Pers. i. 5: Theophan. Chrono-
graph. p. 106, A.; Cedrenus, Hist. Com-
pend. p. 356, C. Among modern writers
who have treated of the subject are
Gibbon (Decline and Fall, vol. v. pp.
181-2), Malcolm (Hist. of Persia, vol. i.
. 132), and St. Martin (Notes to "Le
eau, vol. vii. pp. 322–338).
1° See especially Mirkhond, p. 354.
17 Compare the case of Eudoxus, the
predecessor of Epicurus, as reported by
Aristotle (Eth. Nic. x. 2, § 1). \ .
18 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 149: “Cette doc-
trine plut aux jeunes gens, aux dé-
bauchés et à la populace.”
* Mirkhond, p. 354.
sº Tabari, vol. ii. p. 149; Mirkhond, p.
21 See St. Martin's Notes to Le Beau's
. Bas-Empire, vol. vii. p. 338; and com-
pare Gesenius, De Inscript. Phoenico-
Groeca in Cyrenaica, nºwper reperta,
Halle, 1825.
22 St. Martin, Recherches sur l'Armé-
nie, vol. i. pp. 328–9; Lazare Parbe, Vie
de Vaham, p. 47.
* As it was, Kobad retraced his steps
in Armenia, recalled the proselytizing
Marzpan, and reinstated Vahan in the
office. . (Lazare Parbe, p. 48.)
24 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 149.
* Agathias (iv. 28; p. 138, C) calls him
4. and so Thºrº (Chro-
nograph. p. 117, C; p. 119, B). But Syn-
s cellus has the more correct Zamaspes
(p. 360, D). Zamasp is the form upon
the coins (Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift,
32 Procop. Bell. Pers. i. 6;
Agathias, iv. 28; p. 138, D.
33 Mirkhond, p.356; Tabari, vol. ii. º
34 Tabari, I. s. c. .
30 Agathias. iv. 28; p. 139, A: 5 Zami-
arms éköv diréortm rod 64kou kai plebeivil
MaxNov ćyvo-rav Baoru Meiav.
36 Bell. Pers. i. 6; p. 19, B. -
37 Histoire des Sassanides, p. 35':
“Kobad pardonna å son frère et dissipa.
toutes ses craintes en lui prodiguant lºs
marques de sa tendresse” (De Sacy's
translation). ,
98 See Longpérier, Médailles des Sai-
sanides, pp. 70–71; Mordtmann in t
Zeitschrift, vol. viii. p. 78;, xii. p. 13.
39 Coins of Kobad, dated in his eleventh
year, which have this device (Num.
Chrom. for 1873, p. 231), are perhaps ear-
lier than those of Zamasp, who, how-
ever, ascended the throne this same
year (A.D. 498). The device was con.
tinued on most of the later coins, and
was adopted by the Arabs. &
CH. XIX.]
...’
CHAPTER XIX.
THE SEVENTH MONARCHY. 675
{ ſ
times the monks were accused of treach-
erously surrendering their trust (Theo-
phan. Chronograph. p. 125, A.; Marcel-
lin. Chronic. p. 48); but Procopius im-
putes to them no worse crime than
IternlsSneSS.
**According to Procopius, he drew
his scimetar, and threatened with in-
stant death every soldier who hesitated
to mount the scaling ladders.
35 Procop. p. 22, C. r 1
* Theophan. Chronograph, p. 125, A:
"Eora tims tróAetos yeyováres, Amigoja’u traorav
&gi ka9apova, kai traoûrov Aaugävovart tro-
U19. -
Of these Kobad


27 Procop. l. s. c.
afterwards released a large number.
(ibid. p. 22, D).
*Ibid. p. 22, B. Theophanes calls the
time “three months,” which is speaking
roundly. Marcellinus speaks of the
city as taken “in the fifth month,”
which is clearly incorrect.
29 See Clinton, -
80 Procop. B. P. i. 8; , A. Celer
who arrivéd on the scene the iatest of
the four, is omitted from the list of com-
manders by Some writers. (Johann,
Lydus, De Magist. iii. 53; Marcellin.
Chron. p. 48; Johann. Malal. xvi. p. 114,
31 See text, pp. 396–7.
** Procop. B. P. i. 8; p. 23, C: Xrpá-
Tevua Totoutó ‘baoruv oute ºrpárepov obre
to repov štri IIéparas ‘Poplatovs Évarºval.
** Theophan. Chrontograph. p. 125, B;
Procop. B. P. p. 23, D.
84 The phrase used by Procopius is
éatfiatorečejo avto èv xopiº 'A p & a u ę v we v
(p. 24, A). I 8w8pect that Arzanene is
here intended.
Procop. B. P. p. 24, B.
36 Ibid. p. 24, D.
37 Procop. B. P. i. 9; p. 25, B.
* Theophanes tells us that, after cap-
turing Amida,
ing expeditions which ravaged all Meso-

1 So Agathias, in direct terms (iv. 28).
Eutychius (vol. ii. pp. 131, 176), Magoudi
(vol. ii. p. 195), Mirkhond (p. 358), and
Tabari (vol. ii. p. 151) make his two
reigns, together with that of Zamasp,
cover forty-three years. This number
involves a second reign of twenty-nine
or thirty years, since the first reign of
Kobad lasted eleven years, and that of
Zamasp between two and three years.
2 See Clinton, F. R. vol. i. pp. 716 and
752.
8 See Smith's Dict. of Gk. and Rom.
Biography, vol. iii. p. 539.
4 Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 745; Dict. of
Gk. and Rom. Biogr. 1. s. c.
5 Decline and Fall, vol. v. p. 40.
• Tabari, vol. ii. p. 151.
7 The main authority for the state-
ments in the text is Johannes Lydus.
(De Magistrat. iii. 51–53), an earlier and
even more painstaking writer than Pro-
copius. He lived from A.D. 491 to about
A.D. 553, Procopius from about A.D. 5
to A.D. 560. He is confirmed in the mat-
ter ºriscus Panites, who wrote about
B -
.C., 4 (U.
8 So Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. v.
p. 87. It is perhaps not quite clear
whether the Derbend pass or that of
Mozdok is intended by Lydus.
9 Juroipach is the form used by Pris-
cus (Frs. 31 and 37); Biraparach that
given by Lydus (iii. 52). The initial ele-
ment is plainly the Bir or Vera, which
was the common Persian word for
“castle,” and which probably passed
from Persian into Hebrew, becoming
birah(Hºn).
19 At is a 64AAovres rá re Trpos Eºpov
IIéparats ré Te trpès Bopéav "Populatous avij-
kovra éðijovu. (Lydus, I. S. C.)
the demand made on Leo in
A.D. 464 (Priscus, Fr. 31), repeated in A. D.
466 (Fr. 37). One }. seems to have
been made by Theodosius II. (Cf. Ly-
dus, De Magistrat. iii. 53, where I con-
ceive that we ought to read plukpot for
ketºovos.)
12 The statement of Procopius to this
effect (Bell. Pers. i. 7, ad invit.) is quite
compatible with the account given by
Lydús, and explains why the demand
Was p. just at this time.
** Procopius, l. s. c.
14 Theophanes, Chronograph. p. 124, C.
** These grounds are stated by Pro-
copius as determining the conduct of
Anastasius.
, 10 Procop. B. P. i. 7; p. 20, A.; Theo-
phan. º; . S. C.
17 On the foundation and strength of
heodosiopolis, see text, p. 896.
18 Procop. B. P. l. s. c
19 Ibid
20Vol. i. p. 175. f
* Theophan. p. 124, D.
22 Procop. Bell. Pers. i. 7; p.
* Procop. B. P. p. 21, D.
21, B.
In later
potamia as far as Syrin (Chronograph.
p. 126, B). Edessa was threatened (Pro-
cop. B. P. ii. 13; p. 120, B); Constantia
submitted (ibid.).
39 Procop, B. P. i. 8; p. 24, D. Theo-
phanes speaks the invaders as
“Cadusians and others” (Chron, p. 127,
B). But Procopius calls them “Huns,”
which is his ordinary name for the
Ephthalites.
40 Theophan. Chron. p. 127, A.; Pro-
$ºp. P. P. p. 25, A.; Marcellin. Chron. p.
41 Theophan. 1. s. c.
42 Procop. B. P. p. 25, B.
43 The capture of Glones is related at
length by Procopius (B. P. i. 9; pp. 25–6);
alluded to by Theophanes (Chron. p. 126,
44 From Procopius alone we should
have concluded that the Surrender of
Amida and the conclusion of the seven
years' peace were two separate transac-
tions. (See the Bell. Pers. i 27.)
. 1. 9; 9. 21.)
IBut Theophanes distinctly regards the
Kobad sent out plunder- *
(xvii. p. 47,
Tzath receive his crown from Kobad and
676
two matters as parts of a single arrange-
ment (Chron. p. 127, B, C); and proba-
bility is on his side.
45 Procopius gives “Aspebedes” as the
name of the ambassador. But Aspebe-
des is clearly the modern Espebad, a
title of office, corresponding to the Ar-
menian Sparapet (or Spahapet), “ com-
mander-in-chief.” (See Patkanian in
the Journal Asiatique for 1866, p. 114.)
The ambassador's sister was married
to Kobad, and was the mother of Chos.
roës. *
. 30, A.)
25, C.
47 Ibid. p. 27. D.
* See the expression of Procopius
(l. s. c.); Too ºrpès Oüvvows troAeptov M. mic v -
vo tº évo v , and compare p. 29, B, D,
whence it appears that Kobad com-
plained of the conduct of the Romans
as soon as his war with the Huns was
ended, and that almost immediately
afterwards. Anastasius died. .
, 49 See text, pp. 396 and 404.
50 Procop. B. P. i. 10; p. 29, C.
51 Ibid. p. 29, A.; Johann. Malal. xvi. p.
41, C; Johann. Lydus, De Magistrat. iii.
47, ad fin.; Theophan, p. 129, A.
** Johann. Malal. 1. S. c.; Evagrius,
FI. E. iii. 37.
58 Procopius well says of Daras and
Theodosiopolis, émwreuxiopiata Tji girów
(S. c. tav IIeportov) x&pg yéyovew &uſbø.
(B. P. i. 10, ad fin.)
54 See text, p. 404.
$8 Zilgibis is the form used by J. Mala-
las (Chronogr. xvii. p. 48, C, D); Ziligde
that found in Theóphanes (Chron, p
43, A).
59 So the contemporary, J. Malalas
C, D). Theophanes makes
then desert to the Romans (p. 144, B).
The Paschal Chronicle follows J. Mala-
las (vol. i. p. 332,
60 The figure of Jtistin was embroider-
ed upon Tzath's robes. His diadem was
of Roman fashion. (See J. Malal. p. 47,
º! Theophan. p. 143, A.
.” Justin was sixty-eight at his acces-
sion (A.D. 518), and would consequently
be seventy-two in A.D. 522. If Kobad
was eighty-two at his death in A.D. 531,
as John of Malala declares (xviii. p. 211,
D), he would be seventy-three in A.D.
522. I suspect that he was really older,
since he is called an old man in A.D. 502
by J. Lydus (De Magistrat. iii. 53).
* So the Roman writers (Procop. R. P.
i. 11; p. 30, A.; compared with Theo-
han, Chron. p. 145, C). Tabari gives
im ten sons (Chronique, vol. ii. p. 148).
, ** Procop. B. P. i. 11; pp. 30–32; Theo-
phan. Chron. p. 143, C. f.
** The ground of the refusal is said to
have been, that, as Justin had no natu-
ral son, a son by adoption might have
#
, THE SEVENTH MONARCHY.
/
[CH. XIX.

claimed to be his heir, and therefore to
inherit from him the Roman Empire l
* See text, p. -
*7 The only ancient writer who gives
this history at length, Theophanes, calls
the sectaries “Manichees;” but there
can be little doubt that the Mazdakites
are intended. (See Dr. Plate's article on
the SASSANIDAE in Smith's Dict. of Głc.
and Rom. Biography, vol. iii. p. 719.)
68 Procop. B. P. i. 11; p. 30, A.
* As a Mazdakite (Theophan. Chron.
p. 145, C).
79 John of Malala places the destruc-
tion of the Mazdakites (Manichees)
somewhat later, º in A.D. 529.
(See his Chromographia, xviii. É. 61, C.)
71 Procop. B. P. i. 12; p. 33, B.
72 See Herod. i. 140; Strab. xv. 3, § 20:
Agathias, ii. p. 60. Compare Vemdiddd,
Farg. v. to Farg. viii.
78 These people are called “Huns” by
the Byzantines (Procop. B. P. i. 12; p.
33, D; Joh. Malal. xviii. p. 56, A), who,
however, use the term too vaguely for
us to be sure that real Huns are in-
tended.
74 Procop. B. P. p. 34, C.
75 Procop. B. P. p. 34, D.
78 Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 746.
º Joh. Malal. Chronograph. xviii.
p. 60, B.
78 To the Lazic war of this period seem
to belong the notices in Johann. Malal.
xviii. p. 153, C; Chron. Paschale, vol. i.
. 335, and Theophanes, p. 149, A. The
oman generals quarrelled among them-
selves, and finally the Roman troops
were withdrawn from the country.
79 See text, º: 438. *
80 Joh. Malal. xviii. p. 54, B.
81 Procop. B. P. i. 13; p. 35, B. For
º º of Martyropolis, see ibid. i.
1: p. 62, C. .
8% John of Malala supplies here many
facts not noted by Procopius, but quite
consistent with his narrative (Chrono-
graph. xviii. p. 60, B, C).
88 Johann. Malal. xviii. p. 60, C; Pro-
cop. B. P. i. 13; p. 35, C, D.
84 Procop. B. P. p. 35, D.
85 Ibid
86 Ibid. p. 37, A.
87. The name Perozes is given by Pro-
copius only (B. P. p. 36, C). The title
Mihran is given, as if a proper name, by
§§ of Malala (Chronograph. xviii. p.
0, C).
88 Procop. B. P. p. 37, A.
89 Ibid. p. 36, C.
90 See the narrative of Procopius (B.
P. pp. 37–8).
91 Procop. i. 14, ad imit.
92 The following were the letters which
passed between the two leaders, if we
may trust Procopius. Belisarius wrote:
“It is admitted by all those who have
even the smallest share of wisdom, that
§. is a good which excels all others.
herefore, if a man be a disturber of
peace, he will cause evil not only to
neighboring nations, but also to his own.

CH. XIX.]
kith and kin. And he truly is the best
general who proves himself capable of
bringing peace out of war. t thou,
when Rome and Persia, were on the best
of terms, didst force upon us a war for
which there was no reason, since our re-
spective kings were peaceably disposed
towards each other, and ambassadors
had come and were at no great distance,
empowered to reconcile our differences
—aimbassadors, I say, who will even now
arrange terms of peace between us, if
no insurmountable impediment arise
from this invasion. I pray thee, with-
draw thy force instantly into Persian
territory, and be not an obstacle to the
prosperity of thy country, lest perad-
venture thy countrymen shall cast on
thee the blame of what they may here-
after suffer.” Perozes replied: “I
would have done that which is requested
of me, convinced by what thou hadst
written, if I had not bethought myself
that the letter came from Romans, who
are always ready to promise, but little
inclined to perform their promises, even
when they have sworn to them. It is
on account of the deceits which you
have practised upon us that we have
been compelled to take up arms; there-
fore, my Roman friends, you may be
sure that you will have to meet the Per-
sians in battle. Our resolution is taken
either to compel you to do us justice, or
else to hold our present position till
death or old age disable us.” Belisarius
made the following rejoinder:—“It is
wrong, most excellent Mirrhanes, to in-
ulge in vain boasting, and wrong,
moreover, to tax one's neighbors with
crimes to which they are strangers. We
Said with truth that Rufinus was near at
namd, and had brought with him terms
of peace—you yourself will not be able
to deny this much longer. If, however,
you are bent on fighting, we shall meet
you confidently in the belief that God is
on our side. We have conciliated His-
favor by the fairness of our proceedings,
while your arrogance and rejection of
the conditions of peace which we offered
must have Offended Him. To mark the
justice of our cause, we shall attach to
our standards, ere we engage, the docu-
ments which we have exchanged re-
cently.” Perozes answered to this:—
“We, too, believe that we have not be-
gun this war without the sanction of our
own gods; under their protection we
shall attack you; and we trust that their
aid will enable us to take Daras to-mor-
. Have my bath and my breakfast
in readiness for me within the walls.”
(See Procop. B. P. i. 14; pp. 38–9.)
98 Procop. p. 40, D.
94 Procop. B. P. p. 41, B, C, D.
**Ibid. p. 42, A
** “Ikavöv aurois kate paivero thv vixmy
dkpatóvã Staatöoragóat u a k po w y áp
6 vow "Payuatov Tij ºd Xm ékéivm Tà huépg
;" IIéporat. (Procop. B. #! i. 14,
??,
THE SEVENTH
\ '
MONARCHY. '
97 See text, p. 441.
98 The Persians are estimated at 30,000,
the Romans at less than half that num-
ber (Procop. i. 15; p. 43, D).
99 A fort, named Bôlon, not far from
Theodosiopolis, and a district called
Pharangium, which lay between Persar-
menia and Tzania, and had gold mines
in it, are the gains mentioned (ibid. p.
44, C; p. 45, D).
100 Ibid. pp. 46–7. Kobad required
that either Daras should be evacuated
and destroyed. or that the trouble and
expense of defending the pass of Der-
bend should be shared between the two
nations.
101 Procop. B. P. i. 17; p. 50, D, and p.
51, A.; Johann Malal. xviii. p. 69, B
Theophan. vol. i. p. 151, D.
102 Theophanes says “Chalcedon’’
(l. s. c.), but probably means “Chalcis,”
since there was no “Chalcedon’’ in

Syria. -
103 Procop. B. P. p. 50, A: p. 51, B.
104 Procop. B. P. i. 18, ad in it.
105 So Procopius (l. s.
Malala calls him. Exarat
-
º
c.). John of
(xviii. p. 69,
106 John of Malala speaks of the Per-
sian army as passing Suá. Tod Kupkmortov,
which in classical Greek would mean
“through Circesium;” but his language
is so impure that we may understand
him to mean “passing by it,” on the
other side of the Euphrates. So the
Latin translator renders the passage
“Circesium praetergressus.”
107 Procop. B. P. p. 52, C; Johann.
Mal. 1. S. c. It is curious that Proco-
pius speaks of the country invaded as
Commageme. Commagene was pro-
perly the small tract at the extreme N.E.
of Syria, having Samosata for its capi-
tal, and not extending further south
than lat. 37°. The tract invaded
Azarethes was evidently Chalybonitis,
all the towns that are mentioned (Hie-
rapolis, Batnae, Barbalissus, Gabbula,
&c.) lying in that region. The line of .
the Persian march is given best by J.
Malalas, who names successively Cir-
cesium. Callinicus, and Gabbula, and
laces Roman troops in Hierapolis and
arbalissus.
108 See the Author's Ancient Mon-
archies, vol. ii. p. 466; 2nd edition.
109 It appears from John of Malala
that the expeditionary force was seen
as it passed Callinicus, and that intelli-
gence was at once conveyed to Belisa-
rius at Daras.
110 Procop. B. P. p. 52, B.
111 Ibid. p. 55, C.
112 So Procopius (p. 52, C), whose
authority on such a point must be pre-
ferred to that of J. Malalas. The latter
places Belisarius at Barbalissus, thirty
miles east of Gabbula.
11
p. p. 53, A.
* Ibid. Compare Jo. Malal. xviii. p.
70, C.
115 The battle was fought upon Eas-
\
-
678 -
ter Eve, when the Christians of the sixth
century fasted till after nightfall (Pro-
cop. p. 53, B). -
fic Procop. p. 56, D., *
117 Ibid. p. 62, C. Compare Jo. Malal.
xviii. p. 73, A, B.
118 Procop. p. 64, B. a
119 Jo. Malal. xviii. p. 73. C.
120 Procop. p. 63, B; Mirkhond, p. 359.
12, Jo. Malal. 1. s. c.
122 Procop. i. 11; p. 30, A.; Mirkhond,
p. 352.
123 See Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift,
s vol. viii. pp. 78–S3; vol. xii. pp. 13–19;
and Thomas in the Numismatic Chron-
icle for 1873, pp. 230-232. Both authori-
ties agree as to the meaning of afzwi or
afzw. (See Zeitschr., viii. p. 79; Num.
Chron. p. 231, note 21.
124 Kobad, it is evident, counted to his
reign the two years during which Za-
masp was king, as well as those during
which he actually reigned. His two
reigns (11 +30) comprised really but
forty-one years. Forty-three, however,
is the number usually assigned to him.
(See Tabari, vol. ii. p. 151; Mirkhond, p.
358; Jo. Malal. xviii. p. 73, D; Eutych.
vol. ii. p. 176.)
* 125 Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift, vol.
viii. pp. 78–83; Thomas in Nwºm. Chron.
for 1873, p. 232.
g
CHAPTER XX.
1 Procop. B. P. i. 21; p. 63, C. g
2 Ibid. Tºpdorkov ov6évol xpºvat airtópwarov
is Thu Bao'exeiav iévat, dAAó lºbº IIeportov
Tov Aoyiutov.
3 Zames (see p. 440). It is uncertain
what had become of Phthasuarsas.
4 Procop. B. P. i. 23; p. 66, B. Xoopóms
6 Ra66.60 w &raktós re #5 rºw Štávouav kai
vetotépov trpayuárov & To tros épaortiis.
& Ibid. p. 30, A.
6 Ibid. ‘Erepôq6a Aplov &AAm ruvi A68m
éxöuevov ot, 6epºts IIéporaws Baoru.Aéa ka0ia-
Tao'6aw. Compare Herod. iii. 73.
7 Procop. i. 23; p. 66, C.
8 Procop. p. 66, D.
9 Ibid. pp. 67-8.
ºrkhona, pp. 62–3; Tabari, vol. ii.
11 Mebodes was “commanded to re-
pair to the iron tripod which stood be-
, fore the gate of the palace. where it was
death to relieve or approach the victim,
and languished there several days be-
fore his sentence was pronounced by
the son of Kobad.” (See Gibbon, De-
cline and Fall, vol. v. p. 183; and com-
pare Procop. i. 23; p. 68, D.)
12 Procop. p. 68, B.
13 J. Malal. xviii. p. 213, ad init.
14 Thu dimepavrov kašovkievnv etprivnv.
(Procop. B. P. i. 22; p. 65, D. Compare
ii. 3; p. 94, B, D; B. Goth. iv. 14; p. 607,
is For the terms of the peace, compare
J. Malal. xviii. p. 219 with Procop. B. P.
i. 22; pp. 65–6.
16 See text, p. 434.
*
THE SEVENTII MONAIROIIF.
. LCH. XX.
17 Marcellin. Chron. p. 64.
18 See Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol.
v. pp. 101–114.
19 Ibid. pp. 121–123.
20 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. v. pp.
2–154.
21 See Procop. B. P. i. 26, ad init.; ii.
1, 2, &c.
42 Ibid. i. 26; p. 79, C, D. Chosroës
cloaked his insolence under a mask of
facetiousness; but it can scarcely have
been the less offensive on that account.
23 Ibid. ii. 2; pp. 89–90; ii. 3; pp. 93-4.
24. The allusion here was to certain
transactions between Justinian and Ala-
mundarus, the sheikh of the Saracells
dependent on Persia, wilo, at the insti-
gation of Chosroës, had commenced hos-
tilities against one of the Roman vassal-
kings, about A.D. 538 (Procop. B. P. ii. 1).
25 He had been killed by the rebels in
Armenia. (Procop. B. P. ii 2, C.)
26 See text, p. 445.
27 Zenobia was in the Arabian desert,
to the west of the Euphrates; the other
towns mentioned were on the opposite,
or Rorman, side.
28 Gibbon turns Surón into Dura; but
Dura was on the Tigris. Surón appears
as a Roman town on the Euphrates, not
only in Procop. B. P. ii. 5, but also in i.
; p. 53, B, and in Agathias, Proefat. p.
* ---
* Procop. B. P. ii. 5; pp. 98-9.
30 Eirs, buMav6ptomiq el-e quxoxpmuariq
éxópºevos (ibid. p. 99. C).
31 Ibid. ii. 6; p. 102, B.
32 Procop. B. P. ii. 6; p. 102, C.
* Ibid. p. 103, D.
84 Ibid., ii. 7; p. 102, D.
, p. 283.
86 J. Malal. xvii. p. 143; Procop. B. P.
ii. 14; p. 122. C; Theophan. Chromograph.
p. 147, C: Evagrius, H. E. iv. 5, 6; Mar-
cellin. Chron. p. 61.
37 J. Lydus, De Magistrat. iii. 54. This
feature has not been contmonly noticed.
- 88 Theophan. p. 151, D. Justin had
also subscribed largely to the restora-
tion (ibid. p. 148, A, B
8° J. Lydus. I. s. c.
40 Procop. B. P. ii. 6; p. 101, B. The
defect was observed by Germanus on
his arrival, and plans were proposed by
him for remedying it; but it was thought
imprudent to call attention to the weak
point, and so nothing was done.
41 Ibid. p. 101, A.
42 Ibid. ii. 3; p. 92, C, D.
48 Ibid. ii. 6; p. 100, B.
44 Ibid. 7; p. 103, D.
45 Boiſºns . . . &miov ºxero kaðirov trorè
•yºs étºyxavev obre rus Töv čv ‘IepatróAst ‘Peo-
platov oute à têv troAguiaow ortparös Ma.6eiv
(Procop. B. P. ii. 6; p. 101, A.)
id. ii. 8; p. 105, C.
47 Procop. B. P. ii. 8; pp. 106–108.
48The cathedral was spared on the
ground that the riches found in it might
be considered its ransom. The church
of St. Julian and some neighboring
houses were left standing as forming
CH. XX.]
the residence of Justinian's ambassa-
dors (ibid. ii. 10; p. 111, B).
49 Ibid. p. 112, D.
50.JProcop. B. P. ii. 11; p. 113, A. So,
fourteen centuries earlier. the great As-
shun'-izir-pa), on first reaching the Medi-
terranean. “ erected altars and offered
sacrifices to the gods of Assyria.” (An-
cient Monarchies, vol. ii. p. 89, 2nd ed.)
51 . B. P. ii. 11; p. , A, B.
Gibbon gives the impression that the
sacred relic itself was adorned with gold
and gems (Decline and Fall, vol. v. p.
190); but Procopius distinctly states that
the adornment was confined to the case
(Orikmu) containing it. *
52 This is probably the meaning of
Procopius (B. P. ii. 11; p. 115, A), since
he makes Chosroës propose the terms to
the bishop; but otherwise he might be
understood as speaking of all the valua-.
bles within the town.
53 Tº -
. Q. l l ;), U.
** On the factions of the amphithea-
tre, which, beginning at Constantinople,
spread to the provincial capitals, see
Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol e
48–55. The presidency of Chosroës, in
the Antiochian hippodrome is related
by, ºopui. (B. #. #: p. 115, C, D).
3 * * *
60 Ibid. p. 119, C. .
61 Procop. B. P. ii. 13; p. 121, D.
62 Ibid. -
68 Here the Oriental accounts are in
entire accord with the Greek. Mirkhond
(p. 366) and Tabari (ii. p. 160) relate at
length the construction of this new An-
tioch in the vicinity of Al Modain, add-
ing that the name given to it was Rumia
(Rome), and that it was an exact copy
of the town upon the Orontes.
64 Procop. B. P. ii. 14; p. 122, A, B.
65 See text, p. 439.
66 Procop. B. P. ii. 15; p. 123, D.
87 Ibid. }. 124, B.
68 The Lazi imported salt. corn. and
other necessaries from abroad (ib. p.
123, D); the Roman governor under Jus-
tinian, John Tzibus, required that these
commodities should be purchased from
none but himself (ib. p. 124, C).
, 69 Procop. B. P. ii. 15; pp. 124–6.
70 The Argonautic myth implies the
early importance of Colchis, either as a
gold-producing, or possibly merely as a
gold-exporting country. The story of
the Egyptian colony settled there by
Sesostris (Herod, ii. 103–5) is one on
which it would be uncritical to place
much reliance But there is satisfactory
evidence of the trading importance of
Colchis from the fourth to the first cen-
tury B.C. in the later classical writers.
(See Strab. Geograph. xi. 2, § 17; Pa-
trocł, Fr. 7: and 1°lin. H. N. vi. 17.)
** See above, note 68.
THE SEVENTII MONARCHP.
679
72 Procop. B. P. ii. 15; p. 123, D, and
ii. 17; p. 138, B.
78 So Procopius (B. P. ii. 15; p. 125, D).
Gibbon supposes the idea to have origi-
nated with Chosroës (Decline and SFall,
vol. v. p. 200). That the Romans took
the same view of the importance of
Lazica as Chosroës appears from Aga-
thias (Hist. ii. 18; p. 56, A).
74 Procop. B. P. ii. 15, ad fin.
76 Ibid. ii. 17; pp. 128–9.
76 Ibid. ii. 16; p. 126. D.
77 Ibid. ii. 18, ad in it.
78 Procop. B. P. ii, 18; pp. 131–2.
imit.
80 Procop. B. P. ii. 19, ad fin.
** "Apta hot &pxopievº Xoopóms b Kafláčov
rö Tpirov atparts weyāXq2 &s yīny Tºv Popwat-
tov čoré8axAe. (Ibid. ii. 20, ad in it.) And
a little later: émiei Še és Thu Koulaymvov
xtópav 6 Xoopóms à pixero. Commagene
was now the name given to Upper Syria.
generally. (See note 107, Chapter XIX.)
82 Theophan. Chronograph. p. 186, A.;
Cedrenus. Hist. Compend, p. 372, B.
83 Procop. B. P. ii. 21, ad imit.
84 Procop. B. P. ii. 21, sub fin.
Bº See Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 778.
86 Procop. B. P. ii. 24, ad init.
87 Ibid. ii. 21, ad fin.
88 Ibid. ii. 24; p. 148, C.
89 Ibid. p. 149, A. -
90 Gibbon speaks of “the camp of
Dubis” (Decline and Fall, vol. v. p.
193); but Anglon was 120 stades (four-
teen miles) from Dubis (Procop. ii. 25;
*
91 Procop. p. 151, C. :
** Procop. B. P. ii. 26; p. 152, A.
93. See text, p. 367.
94 Procop. B. P. ii. 26–7.
Dcop. B. P. p. 159, B.
*Ibid. ii. 28; p. 159, D.
97 Ibid. p. 160, A. Compare Marcellin.
Chron. p. 74.
98 Procop. B. P. ii. 28; pp. 160–1.
99 Ibid. pp. 161–2,
100 The tale is, that Chosroës profess-
ing to send an ambassador to Justinian,
who was to pass through Daras, gave
him a train of 500 picked soldiers, with
Orders that these men should fire the
houses in which they slept, and then, in
the confusion that was sure to follow,
should open the gates and admit a large
Persian force, e Romans, suspecting
the design, refused to receive more than
twenty of the 500 into the town. It is
evident that here the basis of fact is the
arrival of a Persian ambassador at the
gates of Daras with a train of unusual
size. . The rest is mere Roman (or rather
Greek) suspicion,
10, Ibid. ii. 29; p. 163, D.
109 Procop. B. P. ii. 29; p. 161, B. Salt,
wine, and corn are especially mentioned
among the commodities required. Yet "
at §: Mingrelia, though wretchedly
cultivated, produces maize, millet, and
barley in abundance (Haxthausen,
Transcaucasia, p. 19); the trees are
680
everywhere festooned with vines, which
grow naturally (ib. p. 18); and “yield a
very tolerable wine” (p. 31); while salt
is one of the main products of the neigh-
boring Georgia (ib. p. 81).
108 Procop. 1. s. c.
104 Ibid. p. 160, C, and p. 161, C.
105 Ibid. ii. 29; p. 163, C, D. . .
106 Procop. B. P. ii. 29, 30; B. Goth. iv.
8–16: Agath. ii. 18–22; iii. 2–28; iv. 1-23.
107 Agath. ii. 18; p. 56. A: Procop.
B. P. ii. 15; p. 125, D; ii. 28; p. 161, A.;
B. Goth. iv. 7; p. 582, B.
108 Haxthausen, p. 22, note: “The
soil is incredibly rich and prolific.”
109 “During the whole day our road
lay through forests, and what noble
forests! In the southern acclivities of
the Caucasus, the tree-vegetation of the
north is found together with that of the
south; and I have rarely seen finer
beeches, oaks, elms, fir-trees, inter-
spersed with planes, chestnuts, walnuts,
ives, laurels, and cherry-trees, the na-
tive habitat of which last may be said
to be Mingrelia.” (Ibid. p. 17.)
110 Procop. B. P. ii. 29; B. G. iv. 2.
111 As, especially the Khopi, which
forms the port of Redout-Kaleh (Hax-
thausen, p. 16).
112 Procop. B. P. p. 363, A
113 Procop. B. P. ii. 17; p. 128, C.
114 Procop. B. Goth. iv. 12; p. 599, B.
Among the most remarkable of these
was a conduit, with three channels
placed one whder the other, which con-
tinued to supply the town with water
after the upper and middle courses had
been obstructed.
115 Procop. B. P. ii. 29; p. 164, A. Gib-
bon (Decline and Fall, vol. v. p. 201)
confuses the original victualling of Pe-
tra with its revictualling (see text, p.
467). The great supplies found when
the Romans took the place (Procop. B.
G. p. 599, A) must be ascribed to the re-
victualling.
118 Procop. B. P. p. 165, D.
117 Ibid. ii. 29; p. 166, B.
118 Ibid. ii. 30; p. 166, D.
, A.
120 Ibid. p. 169, B. -
12, Procop. B. P. ii. 30; pp. 169–170.
122 Procop. B. Goth. iv. 1.
123 Ibid. iv. 8. -
124 Procop. B. G. iv. 9, ad init.
125 Ibid. iv. 11; p. 593, B.
**Ibid. iv. 12; p. 599, A.
137 Ibid. iv. 11; p. 592, C. -
128 The chief difference in the con-
struction seems to have been, that,
whereas the ordinary engines were
formed of solid beams, in the new ones
the beams were replaced by a number
of light rods tied together. (Procop.
..G. iv. 11; p. 593, D.)
128 Ibid. p. 594, C.
130 Ibid. p. 595, A.
*** These were Armenian mountain-
eers (ibid. p. 596, B).
183 Ibid., p. 596, A.
183 Ibid. p. 596, C, D.
;
THE SEVENTH MOWARCHIV.
[CH. xx.
184 Procop. B. G. iv. 12; pp. 597-8.
135 Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 792,
13° See text, p. 466.
* Procop. B.G. iv. 13; p. 601, A. The
and industry in making the wild and
mountainous Lazica practicable, not
only for cavalry, but for the ponderous
elephant.
138 ‘O Béaro as rov IIérpas trepifloxov čs
éögſbos kaðetaev, (Ibid. p. 599, D.)
18°Ibid. p. 602, D. Compare iv. 16; p.s
1, C.
149 Procop. B. G. iv. 14; Agath. Hist.
ii. 19, ad invit.
141 Procop. B. G. p. 611, D.
14* The modern Kutaïs is undoubtedly
the ancient Cotyaeum, Cutatisium, or
Cotaisis of Procopius and Agathias.
The similarity of name is supported by
the descriptions given of the locality.
(See Procop. B. G. iv. 14; p. 607, A.;
Agath. ii. 19, p. 56, B; and compare
Haxthausen, Transcaucasio, p. 28.)
149 The position of Scymnia is uncer-
tain. Suania appears to have lain N. E.
of Lazica, on the flanks of the Caucasus.
The inhabitants of this region still call
themselves Suans. (Max Müller, Lam-
guages of the Seat of War, } 114.)
144 Procop. B. G. iv. 16, sub fin.
146 Ibid. iv. 11; p. 591, D. . . Procopius
specifies one of these alleged infractions
only, viz. the encouragement given to
Arethas to attack Alamundarus; but he
admits that Isdigunas made other
charges.
146 Ibid. iv. 15, sub in it. This was at
the rate of 400 pounds for each year of
peace, and included a year and a half of
negotiations.
147 Compare Procop. 1.s.c. with Agath.
ii. 18. The latter writer, says: 'OAiyip
épºrpoa 6ev čkexeuptav Štretroimvro ['Paoplatov
kai IIéparat], it’ ºff wevrot oil TeXevotármy
&yetv etprivnv, où8é Öare travrobu rôv květí.
vov Tetraßg 6au, &AA’ 6aſov u dvov &vå riv čo,
kai rā tīs 'Applevias Špua Karépº yewet éor.
Treto 6au, Guºbi Śē rav Koxxića yºv rov tróAe-
mov Švadépévv.
148 Procop. B. G. iv. 15: P; 608–9.
14° Agathias, ii. 19: p. 56, D.
150 Ibid. ii. 20: * * * *
151 Ibid. ii. 21; p. 59, A.
152 Ibid. ii. 22: p. 60, A.
158 Agath. ii. 22; p. 60, B.
** "Avôpa riov ordóðpa Aoyiutov kai byou a-
orrorártov. (Ibid. iii. 2; p. 73, C.)
155 lbid. p. 73, D.
180 Ibid. iii. 6; p. 78, B,
191 Ibid. iii. 14; p. 89, C.
162 Ibid. iii. 15; pp. 90–1.
º Agath, iii. 15, ad init.; 17; p. 92, C,
184 Ibid. iii. 18; p. 94, C.
165 Ibid. t
160 Tbid. iii. 20.
187 Ibid. iii. 21; p. 96, D.
108 Ibid. p. 97, A, B. - *
CH. XX.]
169 Agath. iii. 23, ad imit.
170 Ibid. iii. 24.
171 Agathias makes Justin lead these
troops out of the city of his own accord,
and without any military purpose; but
it seems almost certain that what he
ascribes to accident was the result of
design. -
172 Agath. iii. 25–27.
173 Two thousand near Archaeopolis
(see text, p. 471), ten thousand in the bat-
tle before Phasis (Agath. iii. 27, ad fin.),
and two thousand more on the day fol-
174 Ibid. iii. 28, ad fin.
17* Agath. iv. 23. , Agathias seems to
suppose that Nachoragan was flayed
alive; but he does not actually assert
it; and we have already shown (see
text, p. 294) that it was the flaying
of criminals after death, which was cus-
tomary in Persia.
176 J. Malal. xviii. p. 81, A.; Theophan.
Chromograph. vol. i. p. 195, B.
177 See Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 808.
178 Agath. iv. 30; p. 141, D.
179 Ibid. p. 142, A.
180 Ibid. Compare Menand. Protect.
Fr. 11, ad imit.
181 See Clinton, F. R. vol. i. pp. 812–3.
182 According to Menander (Fr. 11, pp.
209-210), the ambassador of Chosroës
spoke of him in the negotiations of A.D.
562 as having already reduced to sub-
jection ten nations, and crushed the
power of the Ephthalites. These wars
could scarcely have been carried on
simultaneously with the war with Rome.
183 Menander wrote under the Empe-
ror Maurice, who reigned from A.D. 582
to A.D. 602.
184 See Menand. Prot. Fr. 11; pp. 208
and 21.2–3.
185 There was a further provision that,
at the end of the seven years, a Secon
ayment in advance should be made,
§ only for three years. Afterwards
the payments were to be annual (ibid. p.
188 Gibbon says: “The smallness of
the sum revealed the disgrace of a tri-
bute in its naked deformity” (Decline
and Fall, vol. v. p. 205); and again he
speaks of “the annual tribute which was
poorly disguised by the name of pen-
sion” (ib. p. 364).
187 Tabari speaks of Rome as paying
tribute to Chosroës (Chronique, vol. ii.
p. 161). So also Abu-Hanifah Deinavari,
quoted by Mirkhond (p. 367).
188 See text, pp. 459 and 465.
189 See text, p. 450.
190 That the Ephthalite war preceded
A.D. 562 appears from Menand. Prot. Fr.
11; p. 210. It is not likely to have been
}. while the war with Rome con-
Illiè01.
191 Tabari, Chronique, vol. ii. p. 162.
192 Ibid. p. 161. e
193 The remarkable fulfilment of the
rophecy in Gen. xvi. 12 is certainly not
invalidated by the occasional dominion
THE SEVENTII MONARCHY. f
681
of foreigners in Arabia during the space
of 4,000 years. (See the remarks of
Dean Milman in Smith's Gibbon, vol. v.
p. 364, note a.)
194 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. v. p.
195 Gibbon calls Abraha, “the slave of
a Roman merchant of Adulis” (Decline
and Fall, vol. v. p. 208); but the Orien-
tal writers unanimously represent him
as an Abyssinian of high rank. (See
Johannsen, Hist, Yemance, p. 94.) Ta-
bari makes him a member of the royal
family (Chronique,”vol. ii. p. 184).
196 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 188.
197 Ibid. p. 202. Yaksoum was suc-
ceeded by his younger brother, *ś
198 Procop. B. P. i. 19, 20; Jo. Malal.
Chronograph. xviii. pp. 57, 67, 68.
199 Tabari, Chronique, vol. ii. p. 203.
200 Ibid. p. 208. Masrouq cursed Saif
and his father. Saif knew by this that
e could not be the son of the same
father with Masrouq, and forced his
mother to tell him the truth.
201 Only eight hundred, according to
Tabari (vol. ii. p. 210); but this is im-
probable... Ibn-Kutaiba, as quoted by
Ibn-Khallikan (Biogr. Dict., vol. iii. p.
672, E. T.), made the number of men
sent by Chosroës with Saif 7,500.
202 Tabari, p. 211.
203 Tabari makes the Persians 600, the
Homerites 5,000. Masrouq sends 10,000
men against them, who are defeated,
He them leads against them an army of
100,000, who are equally unsuccessful.
He himself is killed by the commander
of the Persian contingent. The success
of the Persians is attributed to their use
of the bow, an arm previously unknown
in Yemen
204 St. Martin, Notes to Le Beaw, vol.
x. p. 78; Tabari, Chronique, vol. ii. p. 215.
205 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 218.
206 Tabari (l. s c.) makes Wahraz suc-
ceed Saif, and gives him “a son called
Merzeban.” No one can fail to recog-
nize in this pretended mame the favorite
Persian title.
207 Tabari, p. 221; Mirkhond, p. 372.
208 Serendib (Ceylon) is said to have
been the residence of the monarch. The
É. ceded are declared to have
een those which were previously ceded
to Bahramgur !. (Tabari, vol. ii. p. 221.)
209 On the Indian embassy, see Mir-
khond, p. 375; Magoudi, vol. ii. p. 202;
Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. v. p. 206.
210 In the division of his empire ascrib-
ed to Chosroës, the most eastern of his
provinces appear to have been Ora-
san, Seistan, and Kirman (Mirkhond, p.
364). Gibbon adds to these “Cabul and
Zablestan” (l. s. c.), but without much
rea,SOI). -
211 Menand. Protect. Fr. 18; p. 226.
212 Ibid. p. 225: , 'O Kátovados é 'Ed,0a-
Airms . . . Švá ràv čk roi, kav’ abrov Baouxé-
os yeyevnuevnv Buaiav ºut $ºv Tú yuvauki Trpoº-
#: º 6p16% vXov Tots Towpkows. Compare
1. 10. *.
*~
z
682
*
213 Ibid. Fr. 18: Theophan. Chrono-
raph. p. 207, \); Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p.
•x
3i: "Evgev totyapotºv h 8voruéveta àpšaro
IIeporâv re kai Towpkov. (Menand. Prot.
. S. C.
215 So Clinton understands the words
of Menander (Fr. 20: év 6pew ruvi Aeyoſºvº
"Exºray, os ºv ettrow xpvaroov Špos "EAAmv
divip). - - -
of the name points in this direction.
Otherwise the name itself might seem
to point to the modern Ak Tagh (or Ak
Tai). the “White Mountains” directly
north of Samarkand. With this location
would, I think, agree best the return
march of the ambassadors as described
in Fr. 21. {
21 6 Menand. Protect. Fr. 20.
217 Histoire des Sassanides, p. 365.
218 Menand. Protect. Fr. 32;Theophy-
lact. Sim. iii. 9.
219 Theophan. Chromograph. p. 208, A:
“O 'Iowa rivos éAvorev rºw eipmumv, pdorkov
étroveiðvorrow elvat popoxoyeio 6aw intro Tøv
IIeparav rows ‘Peoplatovs. Compare Theo-
phylact. Sim. iii. 9, sub fin.
220 Menand. Prot. Fr. 15.
221 Ibid. Fr. 17, ad fin.
222 The weight of the various causes of
war is differently estimated by different
writers. Menander considers the invita-
tion of the Turks to have been the chief
cause (Fr. 32). Theophylact puts in the
foreground the Arabian expedition and
the injuries of the Abyssinians or Ho-
merites (iii. 9). So Theophanes (Chro-
ºnograph. p. 206, D). Evagrius, Johannes
Biclar., and other's give the preference
to the state of affairs in Armenia. (See
Evagr. Hist. Eccl., v. 7.
228 St. Martin, Mémoires sur l'Arménie,
vol. ii. p. 331; Menand. Protect. Fr. 35 a.
Evagr. H. E. v. 7. The leader of the
insurrection was Vartan, the Mamigo-
nian, the son of Vart. (See text, p. 424.)
224 Eighty years old, according to
Gibbon (Decline and Fall, vol. v. p. 365);
but I do not know his authority. Me-
nander Protector uses the inexact
hrase, eis éazorov yºpas &m Maktos (Fr. 36).
#. had been on the throne above forty
THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY.
And certainly the explanation "
[CH. xx.

years.
225 The Arabian expedition to Saīf;
the Turkish war to his eldest son, Hor-
misdas. (See text, pp.476, 477.) .
296 Menand. Protect. Fr. 36: 'Edºm 88,
dos et trapaéein 64k.tvNov čva, kuvm.9morerau,
kai tos és Tºv IIeportov čAdorov.
227 Evagr. H. ... 8; Theophylact.
Simocatt. t
Theophan, Byz. § 4. . The other Theo-
phanes (Chronograph. p. 208, A) and
Zonaras (vol. ii. p. 71, C) wrongly call
him Martinus. *
tºo. Epiph. § 4; Theophylact. Sim.
Ili. U.
22° The Romans were delighted with
any gleam of success, and the battle of
Sargathon is celebrated by the whole
chorus of Byzantine writers. The Ro-
mans claimed to have killed 1,200 of the
. H. H. V
iii. 10; Joh. Epiphan. § 3;.
enemy, while their own loss was seven I
(Theophan. Byz. § 4.)
280 The siege was commenced by Mar-
cian; but, as it made no progress, he
was shortly superseded by Acacius (Jo.
Lpiph. § 4; Theophylact. Sim. iii. 11).
2.91 Evagr. H. E. v. 9. A portion of the
Roman army seems to have thrown it-
self into Mardin (Mépôms or Mápóes). (See
Jo. Epiph. § 5; Theophylact. iii. 11.),
282 Jo. Epiph. § 4; Evagr. H. E. v. 9,
10: Theophylact, l. s. c.
288 Evagr. H. E. v. 10: réutrov, kai trpós
* º: Theophylact says “six months.”
S. C
284 Theophan. Byz. § 4.
235 Theophylact. Sim. iii. 11. Compare
Evagr. H. E. v. 10, and Jo. Epiph. 3.
where, however, the text is mutilated.
Theophanes of Byzantium (l. s. c.) as-
cribes the loss of Daras to the Romans
being at variance among themselves. T
l 28° Evagr. H. E. v. 11; Theophylact,
. S. C. : &C.
287 By sending an embassy immediate-
ly upon the capture of Daras (Menand.
Protect. Fr. 37).
288 It is not quite clear whether the
embassy of Zacharias preceded or fol-
lowed the nomination of Tiberius as
Caesar. If Clinton is right in sayin
that the nomination was not made unti
the December of A.D. 574 (F. R. vol. i. p.
834), there must have been an interval
during which the Empress Sophia had
the sole direction of affairs. Tiberius,
however, was her counsellor (Menand.
Prot. Fr. 37, sub fin.).
289 See Memand. Prot. Fr. 40, The date
is a year later; but the sentiments by
which Chosroës was actuated were prob-
ably the same in A.D. 574 as in the year
following.
240 We learn this fact from Menander
only (Fr. 38). *
24l Evagr. H. E. v. 14.
242 That Justinian and his army reach-
ed the eastern frontier early in A.D. 575,
before the one year's truce had expired,
is evident from John of Epiphania and
Theophylact. The reader of Gibbon
would suppose that they did not arrive
till three years later.
º: Menand. Prot. Fr. 39; Evagr. H. E.
1
244 See Menander, Frs. 39 and 40.
*** Jo. Epiph. § 5, sub fin.: Toi, katpot,
Tºs és º: 'yeyevnuévns divakoxms repauw-
8èvros. Compare Theophylact. Sim. iii.
12: p. 78, C,
*** Jo. Epiph. l. s.c.; Memand. Prot,
- Frs. 40 and 50. -
247 Evagr. H. E. v. 12; Theophylact.
Sim. l. s. c.
248 Again we are indebted to Menander
for this confession (Fr. 40). The other
Byzantine writers carefully conceal the
fact that Rome had on each occasion to
pay for peace. Gibbon omits to notice it.
249 Memand. Prot. Fr. 41; Evagr. H. E.
v. 14.
* The account of Evagrius (l. s.c.) is
&
~,
*
*
CH. xxI.]
moderate and probable. Theophylact
(iii. 14) and Theophalues (p. 212, B, C
have greatly exaggerated the impor-
tance of the victory. All three writers
absurdly state that, in consequence of
his danger on this occasion, Chosroës
issued an edict that no Persian king
should henceforth go out to battle!
251 Theophylact, iii. 15; Theophan., p.
212, C. Evagrius does not indulge in this
flourish. *
252 Evagr. H. E. v. 14, sub fin.
263 See Menand. Prot. Frs. 41 and 42.
254 That Chosroës carried on this siege
in person is distinctly declared by Mè.
mander (Fr. 41). -
255 Theophylact, iii. 15; p. 83, C; Me-
nand. Prot. Fr. 47; Evagr. H. E. v. 19,
ad in it.
256 Menand. Prot. Frs. 47 and 50.
257 Ibid. Fr. 50. Compare Theophy-
lact, iii. 15: p. 83, D.
258 Twelve thousand of the twenty
were native Persians; the rest consisted
of Saracens and Iberians. (Menand.
Prot. 1. s. c.)
259 Theophylact, 1. s. c.
260 Menand. Prot. Fr. 52; Theophylact,
l -
ur knowledge of this campaign is
derived almost wholly from Theophy-
lact, (iii. 15, 16), whose account seems
worthy of acceptance. Some confirma-
tion is furnished by Menander (Fr. 55; p.
257) and Agathias (iv. 29). -
262 See text, p. 367.
263 Agathias, iv. 29. It is curious that
by none of the later writers is this
statement repeated.
284 Theophylact, iii. 16.
265 Menand. Prot. Fr. 55, ad imit.
266 Ibid. Fr. 54.
207 That such a payment had been
contemplated by both parties appears
from Fr. 47 (p. 251). - 4
268°Hpos àpxople vov º p. 84,
# In March (Clinton, R. vol. i. p.
2)
269 So Agathias (l. s. c.), Mirkhond (p.
887), and Tabari (vol. ii. p. 24). The
eacact duration of his reign was forty-
seven years and six months (Eutych.
vol. ii. pp. 179, 188), from Sept. A.D. 581
to March A.D. 579, -
CHAPTER XXI.
1 See especially Tabari, vol. ii. pp. 160,
222-232; Mirkhond, pp. 362–4; Magoudi,
Prairies d'Or, tom. ii. pp. 204–5; an
*man. Bibliotheca, tom. iii. pp. 404–
10.
2 Mirkhond makes him express his
intentions in his very first speech to his
nobles (p. 362).
• * See text, p. 450, , ,
4 Mirkhond, p. 364.
1 s Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. v. p.
• Mirkhond (p. 381) mentions this
among his principles of government.
It was an old practice of Persian mon-
J.
THE SEVENTH MoMARCHF.
683.
*
tºº, (See Ancient Monarchies, vol. iii .
p. 213. .
7 See Mirkhond, pp. 381–2.
* See text, pp. 449, 450.
* Menand. Prot. Fr. 46; Mirkhond, pp.
363. 379; Tabari, p. 226; &c.
10 Mirkhond, p. 382.
11 Mirkhond, p. 372. Tabari makes the
ºftest rate of taxation one-fifth (ii. p.
)
&
3.
12 See the story told of Kobad by Ta-
bari (ii. pp. 152, 153), where the cultivator
says: “We have not the free disposal of
our property, since the king is part
owner of it, and we do not dare to put
our hand to the harvest till some one
has come on the king's part to cut what.
belongs to him.” -
13 Tabari, ii. p. 223. The dirhem is es-
timated by M. Barbier de Meynard at
from 65 to 70 centimes. (See his notice
of Ibn Khordadbah in the Journal Asia-
tique for 1865, quoted in the Numismat-
ic Chronicle for 1873, p. 248.)
14 Tabari, p. 222.
15 Ibid. p. 226. -
16 On lands where the cultivator was
the owner, half the produce might be
paid, as it was by the helot to his Spar-
tan master. (See the Author's Herodo-
tws, vol. iii. p. 279). But where the cul-
tivator had also to pay a rent, such a
tax would have been cruelly oppressive.
Perhaps Tabari is right in making the
highest rate paid to the state one-fifth.
(See above, note 11.)
17 Tabari, ii. p. 226. .*
18 Ibid. p. 223. Magoudi gives the fol-
lowing as the rate of payment: “Four
palms of Fars, 1 dirhem: six common
palms, the same; six olives, the same;
each vine, 8 dirhems.” (Prairies d'Or,
ii. p. 204.) . -
19 Tabari, 1. s
20 Mirkhond,
p. 372; Tabari,
21 This appears not to have been the
case under the former system; for the
cultivator whose wrongs called forth
the compassion of Kobad was a woman
(Tabari, ii. p. 153).
23 Tabari, ii. p. 224.
23 Ibid. p. 225.
. C.
Histoire des Sassanides,
I. S. c.
ii. p. 227.
* Charging the treasury with the pay-
ment of a larger number of troops than
actually maintained is one of the com-
monest modes of cheating the govern-
ment in the East. It is not, however,
noted among the abuses observed by
Chosroës,
27 Tabari, ii. p. 229.
28 Tabari, ii. pp. 229–230; Mirkhond, p.
29 See the Author’s Ancient Monarch:
ies, vol. ii. pp. 337–8. .
30 Tabari, ii. p. 160.
$1 Ibid.
$2 Mirkhond, p. 363; Tabari, 1. s. c.
83 Mirkhond, p. 364. -
*
*
&
684
, 34 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. v. p.
35 Tabari, ii. p. 160.
30 See text, p. 458. According to Asse-
man (Bibl. On". vol. ii. p. 410), large num-
bers of Syrian Christians were carried
off by Chosroës from the neighborhood
of Edessa and settled in various parts
of Persia.
87 A desire expressed by the Sogdians
to establish a trade in silk with the Per-
sians was opposed by Chosroës on the
ground that it would lead to intercourse
between his subjects and the Turks on
whom the Sogdians depended
& li
intercourse he ºshi undesirable (Me-
nand. Prot. Fr. 18).
38 Mirkhond, p. 364. -
30 Ibid. p. 363. On the postal system
existing at this time in Persia, see Me-
nand. Protect. Fr. 11: º 212.
40 Agathias, ii. 30. The names of the
seven were Damascius of Syria, Simpli-
cius of Cilicia, Eulamius of Phrygia,
Priscianus of Lydia, Hermeias and Dio-
genes of Phoenicia, and Isidorus of Gaza.
41 See the Essay of Sir H. Rawlinson
“On the Religion of the Babylonians
and Assyrians,” contained in the Au-
thor's Herodotus, vol. i. p. 484, &c.
42 Mathiae, Manatal of Gk. and Roman
Literature, p. 201, E.
43 Agath. ii. 30, 31.
44 Ibid. ii. 28. The translations made
by the Arabian conquerors of Spain are
parallel, and lend a certain support to
the statements of Agathias. Still it may
be doubted whether the Persian trans-
lation extended to all the works of both
philosophers. Plato's Timaeus, Phaedo,
Gorgias, and Parmenides are, however,
expressly mentioned among the treatises
read by Chosroës in a Persian dress.
45 See Agathias, ii. 29, ad fin.: 5uvka-
Aeorépcevos toūs Máyous, Šs Aéyovs attø ka8t-
ortato yewéaetós te kai bijoeas trépt, kai et
Tööe ro trav &rexsiſtmrov ša raw, kai trórepov
Miav ráv &ndivrov dipx?v vopluateov. The
reference is to a conference between the
Magi and Uranius; but we may fairly
conclude that similar discussions took
lace between the Magi and the Seven
ageS.
46 Ibid. ii. 29, 32.
47 Procop. De Bell. Goth. iv. 10; p.
48 Asseman, Bibl. Or, vol. iv. pp. 745–7.
49 Tabari, ii. p. 160.
50 So Gibbon (Decline and Fall, vol. v.
p. 185, note 49). Others suppose that the
original “Book of Kings” was composed
by order of Yezdegird III. (See Atkin-
son’s Firdausi, published by the Orien-
tal Translation Fund, Preface, p. xi.; and
compare Bunsen, Philosophy of History,
vol. iii. p. 120.) -
51 On the fables of Bidpai or Pilpay,
see Gibbon. l. s. c., with the note of
Dean Milman.
52 Mirkhond, p. 376: Magoudi, vol. ii.
p. 203. D'Herbelot speaks of the intro-
duction of another game, which he calls
THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY. .
[CH. xxi.
a kind of draughts or trictra.c. : (Biblio-
thèque Orientale, vol. iv. p. 486.)
*8. See text, pp. 449, 450.
54 Mirkhond, p. 360. -
55 See Menand. Prot. Fr. 36; and com.
pare Asseman, Bibl. On". vol. i. p. 205;
vol. ii. p. 410; &c.
56 Mirkhond, p. 367. Was this wife
the Euphemia, whom, according to Pro-
copius (B. P. ii. 5), he carried off from
Surón and married? ſ
57 Ibid. p. 368.
58 Menand. Prot. Fr. 11; p. 213. It
must be admitted, however, that this
toleration was not the free act of Chos-
roës, but a concession which he made in
a treaty. -
59 Renaudot ap. Asseman, Bibl. Or.
vol. i. #. 205. Asseman himself believes
that Renaudot is mistaken, and that
Chosroës really favored the orthodox
(ibid. vol. iii. p. 407). -
80 Agathias, ii. 29, ad fin. Compare
his discussion of Christian doctrines
with the Nestorian primate, Mar-abas,
as related by Barhebraeus (Asseman,
B. O. vol. iii. pp. 408–9).
* See Clinton, F. R. vol. i. p. 755.
62 Agath. ii. 31.
** Mirkhond, pp. 367–8.
84 Ibid., p. 368. -
*So Mirkhond, l. s. c. Procopius
(Bell. Goth. iv. 10) says that Chosroës
exiled Nushizad (whom he calls Anoto-
Zad) to a place called Belapaton in Va-
zaine (Ahwaz or Khuzistan). . .
86 Such is Mirkhond's account. That -
of Procopius is not very different, ex-
cept that he omits all mention of the
Christianity of Nushizad. and of his
special appeal to the Christians of the
empire.
97 See text, p. 465. The Persian writers
Call this general Ram-Bourzin. -
68 Mº ond, p. 371; D'Herbelot, vol.

* Procop. B. Goth. iv. 10; p. 590, D. .
79 Coins of this type have been figured
y Ker Porter (Travels, vol. ii. Pl. lviii.
No. 10); by Longpérier (Médailles des
assamides, Pl. x. No. 4); and by Bar-
holomaei (Collection, ed. Dorn, Pl. xxiv.
o. 45). The engraving [see Pl. XXII.
"ig. 3) taken from Longpérier.
71 Mr. Thomas declines the task of
ºrpreting (Num. Chron, for 1873, p.
) -
l

iy

N
72 See the account of Dom Germain
Millet quoted by M. Longpérier in the
Annales de l'Institut Archéologique for
1843, vol. xv. p. 100. -
** See Numismatic Chronicle for 1873,
pp. 234–5.
14 See Mirkhond, p. 387; Tabari, ii. p.
233; D'Herbelot, Bibl. Or. vol. iv. p. 489.
* Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. v. p.

78 see Procop, B. P. i. 23; Menand.
Prot. Fr. 46; Mirkhond, p. 379; Asseman,
Bibl. On". vol. iii. p. 409.
1. Procop. B. Goth. iv. 10, swb fin.
78 Asseman, Bibl. Or. vol. iii. p. 406.
**
CH. XXII.]
80
81 On one occasion, Chosroës, being
displeased with one of his attendants,
banished him from the court, The man
absented himself, but on a certain day,
when, all subjects had the right of ap-
pearing before the king, he returned to
the palace, and, resuming his old duties,
waited on the guests at the royal table.
While thus employed, he took an op-
portunity of . Secreting a plate of solid
gold about his person, after which, quit-
ting the guest-chamber, he disappeared
altogether, Chosroës, who had seen the
whole transaction, took no notice, and,
when the plate was missed, merely said:
“The man who took it will not bring it
back, and the man who saw him will not
tell.” . A year later, the attendant ap-
peared once more on the same day;
whereupon the king called him aside
and said: “Is the first plate all gone
that you have come again to get an-
other ?”. The culprit owned his guilt
and implored forgiveness, which he ob-
tained. Chosroës not only pardoned
im, but took him back into his service.
(Mirkhond, pp. 382–3.) -
82 Chosroës was told that one of his
subjects surpassed him in wealth; and
he replied that he saw no harm in the
circumstance (Mirkhond, p. 384). He
wished to clear a space before his pal-
ace; but an old lady who owned one of
... the houses which occupied the ground
would not part with her property. Chos-
roës cleared the rest of the space, and
allowed her house to stand (ibid. p. 383).
83 Mirkhond, pp. 368-370.
84 See text, p. 449, 450.
85 Agathias, ii. 28.
86 Ibid. ii. 32, ad fin.
87 Compare Gibbon, Decline and Fall,
vol. v. p. 185: “The studies of Chosroës
were ostentatious and superficial.”
88 The only defeat celebrated by the
Byzantine authors is that near Melitëné
in A.D. 575. (See text, p. 480.)
8° Evagrius, who is the writer nearest
to the time, regards the check as slight,
and as compensated for soon afterwards
by a victory (Hist. Eccl. v. 14).
30 See text, pp. 472, 473.
°i See text, pp. 497–499.
79 Mirkhond, p. 368. º
Ibid. p. 382.
* CHAPTER, XXII.
... 1 º name is given by Magoudi (vol.
ll. D. -
2 Mirkhond, p. 388.
8 Ibid.
*Tabari, ii. p. 248.
6 Ibid. p. 247,
* Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. i. p.
151; Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. v. p.
367. Neither in Tabari, Mirkhond, nor
Magoudi is there any mention of Abu-
zurd-mihir in connection with Hormis-
8.S. .
* See Tabari, ii. pp. 273–4: Mirkhond,
p. 888; Magoudi, ii. p. 211; Theophylact.
THE SEVENTH MONARCHY,
; 685
Simocatt. iii. 16; D'Herbelot, Bibl. Or.
vol. iii. p. 222; &c.
8 Menand. Protect. Fr. 55.
* Theophylact. Simocatt. iii. 17.
10 Ibi Ató Tris épìuov to Aourov rºs
'Apaščas eis Thy B a 3 v A a v i a v
'yńv &qukéo 6aw.
11 Theophylact. Simocatt. iii. 17, ad
fin. This is probably the victory of
Maurice over Adarman; whereof Eva-
grius speaks somewhat vaguely in his
Hist. Eccles, v. 20.
12 See the prolix account given by Me-
nander Protector, Fr.
18, ad
º,

mºrečyero
*
18 Theophylact. Simocatt. iii.
imit.; Menander Prot. Fr. 60, ad fin.
14 Evagr. H. E. v. 20; Theophylact.
Simocatt. l. S. c. *
15 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. v. p.
5.
16 Theophyl, Sim. i. 9: Töv 'Iočvvmv,
ºtrep Štrøvuplov to rims intrepòas xexiſvns ka-
* Compare Theophan. Chrono-
graph. p. 214, B, Iodivvmy rov Movo Tákova.
17. Theophyl. Sim. i. 12, ad imit.
18 Theophylact. Sim. i. 12.
19 Ibid. i. 13, ad in it,
20 Ibid. ad fin.
21 Ibid. i. 14.
22 Ibid. i. 15. *
23 Ibid. ii. 3, sub fin. .
24. Theophan. Chronograph. p. 216, A.;
Theophylact. Sim. ii. 8. r
25 Theophylact. Sim. ii. 5.
26 Ibid. c. 7.
27 Ibid. c. 9, swb fin. .
28 ‘O 6’ ‘HpakNetos to 6 m. A v r u kö v 8ta-
Táčgs, K. T. A. (Theophyl. Sim. ii. 10, ad

imit.
29 Theophyl. Sim. ii. 18.
sº Ibid. 's1–2.
82 Ibid. iii. 5, -
83 Theophylact. Simocatt. iii. 5. Com-
pare Evagr. H. E. vi. 14.
*Theophan. p. 221, A; Theophylact.
... }ll. 0.
85 Theophylact. Sim. I. s. c. Mebodes
had been previously killed in the battle
with Philippicus, near Martyropolis.
Eiðm xpijaea, Tuđpas Te IIepaukås, kai
rås AtôokońAmirovs gºvas, Šs ot gopyapºrat
Toºs Bapgapous Aapwºrptivovaru. (Theophy-
lact. Sim. l. s. c.) .*
87 Evagr. H. E. vi. 15. Theophylact.
Sim. iv. 2, ad invit.
38 Mirkhond, p. 388; Tabari, ii. p. 248;
Magoudi, ii. p. 211.
89 The tribes of Kahtan and Mädd, ac-
cording to Magoudi (ii. p. 212), com-
manded by El-Abbas the one-eyed, and
. (Compare Mirkhond, p.
389, and Tabari, ii. p. 249.)
40 So Mirkhond (l. s. c.) and Magoudi
(l. s.c.). Tabari (l. s. c.) raised the num-
ber to 100,000. From the Byzantine
writers it would seem that there was no
truth in this rumor.
41 Three hundred thousand men, ac-
cording to Tabari (p. 248); 400,000, ac-
cording to Magoudi (l. s. c.).; either 300,"
000 or 400,000, according to Mirkhond. .
.*
686
42 The Romans seem certainly to have
made no great effort at this period; and
the Khazar attack is doubtful. Neither
the Armenians nor the Byzantines notice
it. . Gibbon exaggerates the peril, still
more by imagining a correspondence
between the Turkish and Roman Courts,
and an intention on the part of the two
armies to effect a junction (Decline and
JFall, vol. v. pp. 368–370). Neither the
Oriental nor the Byzantine writers know
of any such concert or correspondence.
48 Varahran is the form upon the
coins (Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift,
viii. pp. 110-1), Bahram that used by the
Orientals, both Persians and Arabs.
*
Theophylact has Bapán and sometimes
Bapáp.ms. *.
. 44 Theophylact. Sim. iii. 18; Tabari, ii.
v p. 252,
* 45 The “twelve thousand ” of Mir-
khond (p. 394), Tabari (p. 256), and Ma-
goudi (p. 213) seems very improbably
A small; but their statement that quality
rather than number was considered,
may be accepted.
48 Mirkhond, 1. s.c.
47 Ibid.
.48 Tabari, ii. p. 262; Magoudi, ii. p. 213.
49 Tabari, ii. pp. 264–5; Mirkhond, p.
394; Magoudi, ii. p. 213.
50 According to some writers, the
booty was eonveyed on the backs of
250,000 camels! (Mirkhond, l. S. c.)
51 Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. v. p.
368; Dict. of Głc. and Rom. Biography,
- s. v. MAURICIUs, vol. ii. p. 976.
52 Theophylact. Sim. iii. 6; Theophan.
Chronograph. p. 221, B.
58 See text, p. 472.
54 Theophylact. Sim. iii. 7, sub fin.
* Tabari, ii. p. 266; Mirkhond, p. 395.
The Oriental writers, by omitting all
• notice of Bahram's defeat on the Arax-
es, render the sequence of events very
, improbable. Theophylact, most fortu-
nately, supplies the facts which are
needed to make their accounts intelligi-
Y ble. (See the passage above cited.)
* * Theophylact mentions the depriva-
tion and the female garments (iii. 8).
Tabari (l. s. c.) and Mirkhond (l. s. c)
testify to the distaff. Gibbon from his
own imagination adds a spinning-wheel
. . . (Decline and Fall, vol. v. p. 370).
57 Theophylact (l. s. c); Theophan.
Chronograph. p. 222, A.
58 Theophylact. Sim. iii. 8, sub fin.
59 So the Orientals (Tabari, ii. pp. 266–
7; Mirkhond, p. 395). The Byzantines
say that Bahram pretended to have re-
ceived intelligence that Hormisdas was
about to diminish the soldiers' pay, and
to punish them for having allowed
themselves to be defeated on the Araxes
(Theophylact. Sim, iii. 18, ad fin.; Theo-
phan. Chromograph. p. 222, B.)
90 Theophylact. Sim. iv. 2.
- 61 Ibid. iv. 3.
62 The tale that Bahram, in order to
sow jealousy between Hormisdas and
*
*
*
THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY.
A.
* →
[CH. XXIII.


his son Chosroës, issued coins with the
image and superscription of the latter,
that Hormisdas in consequence suspect-
ed Chosroës, and that to escape death
the young prince had to betake himself
to banishment, being told only by the
Oriental writers, and unsupported by
any known facts, scarcely deserves our
acceptance. There are no coins of Chos-
roës II. unlike the rest, or E.;
any appearance of having been issue
under abnormal circumstances. On the
other hand, there are coins of Bahram,
issued in his own name, which may well
be those that he put into circulation be-
fore he became king. (See Thomas in
Numismatic Chronicle for 1873, vol. li.
pp. 236-240.) -
63 Mirkhond makes both the brothers
suffer imprisonment (p. 395). ... So Ma.
goudi (ii. p. 215) and Tabari (ii. p. 269).
Theophylact (iv. 3) and Theophanes §
222, D) represent Bindoës as the only
sufferer.
64 See Theophylact. Sim. iv. 3–6; Theo-
phan. Chrom, p. 223, A, B.
65 Dean Milman well observes, in the
notes appended to Smith's Gibbon (vol.
v. p. 371), that the orations in Theophy-
lact “read rather like those of a Grecian
sophist than of an Eastern assembly.”
86 The assassination is ascribed to
Bindoës and Bostam by the Orientals
(Tabari, ii. p. 279; Mirkhond. p. 396; Ma-
#. ii. p. 219), to Chosroës II. by the
yzantine writers (Theophylact. Sim. iv.
7; Theophan 23, C).
07 SeeTheophylact. Sim. iii. 16; Evagr.
H. E. vi. 16; Theophan. Chronograph.
, 222, B; Tabari, ii. p. 273; Mirkhond, p.-
388; Magoudi, ii. p. 211.
68 Mirkhond, l. s. c.
60 See Pi. XXII. Fig. 4.
70 See Pl. XXII. §§ 1.
71 That is to say, “Hormisdas, increase
(be his),” or “Hormisdas, (may he be)
greater.” -
72 Thomas in the Numismatic Chromi-
cle for 1873, p. 236
p e -
73 Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift, vol.
viii. pp. 100–110; vol. xii. pp. 27–32.
CHAPTER XXIII.
#" the doubt, see note 66, Chapter
* That he had not done so I gather
from the statement of Bahram (see text,
p. 505), that “the noble and respectable
took no part in the vote, which was car-
ried by the disorderly and low-born”
(write Tøv etyevæv kai &#voxóyov orvu phºtov
'yevowevuov Tois & Takrotépous kai čvary eved ré-
ows div6ptºtrous). Gibbon seems to sup-
pose that this is a nere rhetorical flour-
ish (Declame and Fall, vol. v. p. 872).
8 Tabari, ii. p. 276.
* Ibid. p. 268; Magoudi, ii. p. 214.
5 Mirkhond, p. 396; Tabari, ii. p. 279.
The beating to death with clubs seems
to be a clumsy invention of the Byzan-
tine writers (Theophylact. Sim. iv. 7;
Theopham. p. 223, C).
* Theophylact. Sim. l. s. c.


CH. XXIII.]
7 Chosroës had emptied the prisons, in
order to produce an impression that,
unlike his father, he was of a mild and
clement disposition.
8 Chosroës styled himself “king of
kings, lord of lords, master of masters,
prince of peace, saviour of mankind, in
the sight of gods a virtuous and immor-
tal man, in the sight of men a most
manifest god, surpassingly glorious, a
conqueror, rising with the sun and fur-
mishing to the night her eyes (the stars?),
of illustrious ancestry, a king averse to
war, beneficent, hirer of the genii, and
custodian of the Persian kingdom.”
(Theophylact. Sim. iv. 8). The thor-
oughly Oriental character of this exor-
dium seems to indicate that the letter is
genuine.
° Theophylact. Sim. iv. 9.
10 Compare Tabari, ii. p. 276, with Ma-
$º: §: p. 215 and Theophylact, Sim.
11 Tabari (pp. 266-7) gives the details.
Theophylact (iv. 9) speaks more gener-
ally, but quite to the same effect (troAAtov
ôyov &vºropéuevouevov atro Trpiórms &o
péxpus écrirepas €truatoans).
12 Theophylact. Sim, p. 103, A.
18 Tabari. ii. p. 278; Mirkhond, p. 396;
Theophylact, Sim. iv. 10. -
14 The Turks, the Caucasus, and the
Romans are mentioned by Theophylact
(l. s. c.), the Arabs by Tabari (l. s. c.).
The Khazars were the great power of
the Caucasian region.
15 So Theophylact (p. 104, A). Tabari
gives the number as ten (ii. p. 27
16 Theophylact. Sim. p. 103, C; Theo-
phan, p. 223, D.
17 He is said to have passed Aboreo
and . Anotho (Theophylact, p. 103, D),
The latter is evidently Anatho or Anat.
Is the former Perisabor?
18 To reach Circesium, he must have
recrossed the Euphrates. This, how-
ever, is not mentioned. S
19 Tabari, ii. p. 280. Compare Mir-
khond (p. 396) &nd Theophylact (iv. 12,
sub imit.)
30 Mirkhond, p. 897; Tabari, ii. p. 281.
21 Theophylact. Sim. iv. 10; Theophan.
. S. C. - -
22 The Orientals carry Chosroës to
Edessa (Magoudi, ii. p. 219) or Antioch
(Tabari, ii. p. 289). and then to Constan-
tinople (Mirkhond, p. 398: Tabari, ii. p.
291). But the Greeks, who must know
best, declare that he proceeded no fur-
ther than Hierapolis (Theophylact. Sim.
iv. 12 and 14; Evagr. H. E. vi. 19; Theo-
phan. p. 224, A).
** Tabari, ii. p. 290; Magoudi, ii. p. 193.
The reasonings actually used may be
best gathered from the replies to them
contained in the second letter of Chos-
roës (Theophylact. Sim. iv. 13).
*4 The “magnanimity” of Maurice is
put forward by the Byzantine writers as
specially evidenced by his conduct to-
wards Chosroës (Theophylact. Sim. p.
THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY.
} $
687

107, C; p. 111, A.; Evagr. H. E. vi. 17). .
Moderns will scarcely seein it more than
an intelligent appreciation of Roman in-
terests.
25 Evagr. 1. s. c. , Chosroës had ap-
pealed to him as his “father.” (Theo-
phylact. Sim. iv.
v. 11, sub fin.).
26 Mirkhond (p. 398) and Magoudi (ii. p. ,
220) enumerate them. vagrius con-
tents himself with a general statement,
but adds that the empress sent at the
same time presents for Chosroës' wives,
and the º children presents for
Chosroës' children.
27 Theophylact. Sim. iv. 14. -
28 Tabari, ii. p. 291. Magoudi makes
the number 100,000 (ii. p. 220). Mirkhond
mentions both reports without deciding
between them (p. 399). The Byzantimes
give no estimate of the number.
29 Magoudi, 1. s. c. -
80 On reaching Hierapolis, Chosroës
was at Onee asked to order the surren-
der of Martyropolis. He pretended to
do so, but secretly gave directions that
it should be defended to the last ex-
tremity (Theophylact. Sim. iv. 12, 13).
81 Ibid. iv. 13; p. 110. B. It has been
thought by some that Nisibis also was
ceded (Smith in Notes to Gibbon, vol. v.
p. 395). But the authority of the Arme-
nian writers is scarcely sufficient to es-
tablish such a fact against the silence
of the Byzantines, who would scarcely
have failed to notice so important a
galn.
** Theophylact. Sim. iv. 12; Magoudi,
ii. p. 219. - -
88 Tabari, ii. pp. 283–4; Theophylact.
Sim. iv. 14.
34 St. Martin. Notes to Le Bas, vol. x.
; 312; Patkanian in the Journal Asia-
ique for 1866, p. 193.
85 Theophylact. Sim. iv. 15; p. 113, A.
86 Ibid. v. 1.
87 Ibid. *
88 Ibid, V, 2
39 The date of Zadesprates' death is
fixed to February A.D. 591 by the letter
of Chosroës preserved in Evagrius,
which mentions that the head of Zade-
sprates was brought in on the 9th of
that month (Evagr. H. E. vi. 21.
40 Bindo&s had fled to Azerbijan from
Ctesiphon, having been set free by the
conspirators whose attempt failed (see
above, note 33). He had been joined by
20,000 Persians from the capital (Tabari,
ii. p. 285; compare Theophylact. Sim.
iv. 15, ad imit.). ostam was sent into
Azerbijan by Chosroës. (Ibid. iv. 12, ad
fin.)
... 41 Theophylact. Sim. v. 9; p. 131, C;
Patkanian, 1. s. c.
42 Theophylact. iv.15.
43 Ibid. v. 3.
44 Ibid. v. 4.
45 Theophylact. v. 5, ad fin.
4° So Theophylact (v. 7, sub fin.).
Theophanes calls the place Alexandrina
(Chronograph. p. 224,
*
a.
688
Theophylact. v. 8, ad imit.
See Ancient Monarchies, vol. i. p.
nd edition.
ſheophylact. Sim. v. 9.
According to Theophylact (l. s. c.)
the forces of Chosroës amounted to 60,-
000, those of Bahram to 40,000. The
number on the side of Chosroës is less
than we should have expected; but
§ strong Roman garrisons had
een left in Martyropolis and Daras, and
more troops may have accompanied
1Mebodes than is stated.
51 Two thousand, according to Theo-
phylact (v. 4); but the number is im-
probably small. .
52 Ibid. v. 7.
53 See text, º 500.
**The last battle only is mentioned
by Magoudi (ii., p. 222), Tabari (ii. pp.
294-6) and the Oriental writers generally,
including the Armenians. Theophanes
(p. 224) confuses the circumstances of
the two engagements. Theophylact
alone distinctly gives both (v. 9–11).
55 Theophylact. Sim. v. 9, '??..
* According to Tabari (ii. 252) Bahram
was born at Rei, of a noble family. He
was Marzpan of Rei when chosen gener-
al against the Turks (ibid. and compare
Magoudi, ii. p. 213), Rei was the place
B
5
:
:
:
d
5
:
whence he issued his coins (Tabari, ii.
*
p. 268), and whence he marched against
Chosroës.
57 Theophylact, Sim. v. 10, sub in it.
Canzaca is probably the modern Takht-
i-Suleiman, which is strongly situated
near the sources of the Jaghetu.
58 See Tabari (ii. p. 292). On the iden-
tity of Shiz with Canzaca, and of both
with Takht-i-Suleiman, see a paper by
Sir H. Rawlinson in the Journal of the
Geographical Society, vol. x. art. i.
59 Theophylact. Sim. p. 133, D. No
elephants are mentioned previously.
9 Bahram's army at this time is reck-
oned by Tabari at 100,000—the combined
Romans, Persians, and Armenians at
90,000 (ii. pp. 291–2).
* Theophylact. Sim. v. 10: rptori A6xots
—Tº 7putra; 6d. Aayyu.
62 From the earliest times the Persian
commander in-chief had always occu-
pied a central position in the line of bat-
tle. (See Ancient Monarchies, vol. iii.
p. 186, 2nd edition.)
** Theophan. p. 224. C. “O Naporºs Thy
wearmv Tóv Bappépav ŠtěAvore paixayya rowſ-
Tov Šč yewoptévow kai at Aoutral roß Bapāp.
haëévmorav böAayyss, kai yiveral roß rvpév-
§. PeyāAm buyi. Compare Theophylact.
}In ºr , .
3. Theo hylact. 1. s. c.; Theophan. p.
224. D p p p
ºfabari, ii. p. 296.
* Theophylact. Sim. v. 11, ad init.
67 Ibid -
THE SEVENTH MONARCHY,
g *
* [CH. XXIV.


* Eight hundred. according to Tabari
(l, s.c.); but the ten thousand of Theo-
phylact (p. 134, B) is more probable.
* So Tabari (l, s. c.). Theophylact
says nothing of the repulse.
f
º
70 Tabari, ii. p. 297. .
71 See Thomas in the Numismatic
Chronicle for 1873, pp. 236–9.
72 Varahran W. See Pl, XXI. Fig. 2.
78 This is the rendering of Mr. Thom-
as, and is somewhat uncertain. Chubin,
which, according to the Orientals, was
the actual epithet of this monarch, is
said to mean “dry wood;” and they
commonly say that it was applied to
him on account of a certain dryness in
his appearance. (See Malcolm, History
of Persia, vol. i. p. 120, who translates it
by “the stick-like,” and compare D'Her-
belot, Bibl. Or. vol. iii. p. 46, ad voc.
GIoubin.) . <,
CHAPTER XXIV.
1 Various explanations are given of
this title. ... Mirkhond (p. 401) explains it
as either “º king,” or else “vic-
torious.” Gibbon says “the epithet of
Panºviz alludes to the charms” of Chos-
roës (Decline and Fall, vol. v. p. 376).
* See Clinton, F. R. vol. ii. pp. 153 and
169. Writers who regard Chosroës as
having one reign only, which they date
from his father's death (September, A.D.
590), give him commonly thirty-eight
years. See Mirkhond, p. 407; Tabari,
vol. ii. p. 304; Eutychius, Annales, vol.
ii. p. 252; Clinton, F. R. vol. ii. p. 261;
&c.) The exact time was thirty-seven
years and five months.
3 Theophylact. Sim. v. 11, ad fin. and
v. 13, ad init.; Theophan. Chronograph.
p. 225. The number of the guards, ac-
gºing to Theophanes, was one thou-
n
* Theophylact. Sim. v. 15, sub imit.
* See text, p. 507.
* See note 40, Chapter XXIII.
7 Theophylact, I. s. c. The deaths of
Bindoes and Bostam at the hands of
Chosroës are witnessed to by the Orien-
tal writers generally (Tabari, vol. ii. pp.
303, 332; Magoudi, vol. ii. p. 223; Mir-
khond, p. 401); but the manner of the
death of Bindo&s rests on the Sole au-
thority of Theophylact.
8 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 301.
9Ibid. p. 332.
10 The Armenian writers say that Bos-
tam, whom they call Ustam, conquered
two Koushan kings, Shog and Pariók,
and made himself very powerful. (Pat-
kanian in the Journal Asiatigwe for
1866, p. 195.)
11 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 303. The Arme-
nians ascribe the assassination to Pa-
riók. (Patkanian, 1. s. c.)
12 Milman in Smith's Gibbon, vol. v.
p. 374, note a. .
18 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 302.
14 Ibid. pp. 302–3. Mirkhond agrees,
but enters into fewer jails (p. 400).
... 2
15 Tabari, vol. ii. p -
16 Theophylact relates that when Pro-
bus, Bishop of Chalcedon, was sent by
Maurice as ambassador to Ctesiphon,
Chosroës requested to be allowed a sight
of the portrait of the Virgin, which he
g
CH. xxiv.]
knew to be in the ambassador's posses-
sion. His request being granted, h
adored the picture, and said that he had
seen the original in a vision, and had
been promised by her the glories of
Alexander the Great. (Theophylact.
im. v. 15.)
17 The city called Razappa by the As-
syrians and Reseph or Rasaphé by the
later Syrians, received the honorable
appellation of Sergiopolis in the course
of the fifth or sixth century, from the
fact that its principal church was dedi-
cated to St. Sergius.
18 See Evagr. H. E. vi. 21, and Theo-
phylact. Sim. v. 13, 14.
19 As the reader may perhaps desire a
specimen of Chosroës' style, the open-
ing passage of the second letter is here
subjoined:– “Chosroës, king of kings,
to the great martyr Sergius. I, Chos-
roës, king of kings, Son of Hormisdas,
have sent this alms-dish (?) and these
other gifts, not for men to admire them,
nor to the intent that by my words
should be made known the greatness of
thy all-venerable name, but that, the
otruth of that which has been done
should be º and the many
mercies and favors which I have re-
ceived of thee. For I hold it as a piece
of good fortune that my name should
be inscribed upon thy vessels. When I
was at Beramae, I besought thee, O
saint, that thou wouldst come to my aid,
and cause Sira to conceive in her womb.”
20 'O huérepos woulos & Sevav ºutv oil trapé-
eu Xplairlaväv éx-vv yauletiv. (Theophy-
št. Sim. v. 14; p. 137, C.)
21 See Tabari, vol. ii. p. 330.
** Patkanian in Jowrm. Asiatigue for
1866, p. 194.
23 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 304. The stories of
the loves of Shirin and Ferbad, in which
the Persian poets indulge, are scarcely.
to be accounted as history. Tabari has
one allusion to them (l. S. c.).
24 Ibid. p. 335; Mirkhond, p. 404.
25 See text, p. 515.
26 Patkanian in the Journal Asiatique
for 1866, p. 194.
27 Theophylact. Sim, v. 15.
28 Ibid. viii. 1, ad imit.
29 ºbon, Decline and Fall, vol.
d
v. pp. 353–o.
30"The body of the dead Maurice was
cast into the sea by order of Phocas.
(Theophylact. Sim. viii. 12, ad imit.) His
ead was cut off, and exposed in a pub-
lic place in Constantinople.
81 Five sons of Maurice were murdered
before his eyes. One was a mere infant.
(Theophylact. Sim. viii. 11; Theophan.
9; p. 243, C, D.)
32 Theophylact. Sim. viii. 13, ad imit.
88 Ibid. viii. 9.
84 Ibid. viii. 13.
8b. Theophan. p. 244, C. The Orientals
seem to have been persuaded that Theo-
dosius actually escaped, and took refuge
with Chosroës. (See Patkanian in the
Jowrmal Asiatique for 1866, p. 197; Ta-
THE SE VENTH MONARCHIY.
*
689
bari, Chronique, vol. ii. p. 306.) Mir-
, however, is aware that Theodo-
sius was killed with his father (Histoire
des Sassanides, p. 401).
36 Theophylact. Sim. viii. 15, -
87. Theophan. Chromograph. p. 245, A.
Narses afterwards retreated from Edes-
sa, to Hierapolis (ib. p. 245, C), whence,
trusting to the promises of Domentzio-
lus, he proceeded to Constantinople,
where Phocas burned him to death (rupi
kolºr Ekotº) grew ). -
38 Ibid. p. 245, B. .
89 Chosroës beheaded a considerable
number of his prisoners, probably (as
Gibbon supposes) because he regarded
them as implicated in the murder of
allºl Cé. ;
49 Theophan. p. 245, D.
** Bar-hebraeus ap. Asseman, Bibl. Or.
vol. iii. p. 442. t
** The fall of Daras is mentioned, not
by Bar-hebraeus only, but by Theophanes
(Chromograph. p. 246, C), Cedrenus (p.
406, A), and the Armenian writers gen-
erally. (See Patkanian in the Journal
Asiatique for 1866, pp. 197 and 211.)
43 Bar-hebraeus, vol. iii. p. 412,
44 Patkanian, p. 211.
45 Ibid. p. 198.
46 Bar-helbraeus, 1. s. c. *
47 Patkanian, p. 198.
48 Chronograph. p. 248, B. *
49 See text, p. 521.
50 Theophan, Chronograph. p. 250, D.
Tº 6é Maiº ºwmvi éotpétevarav oi IIéparat
#
catá Xuptas, kai TapéAaBovrmy. "Atrápºevav,
A -
k, T = A.
* Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. v. pp.
** Theophan. Chronograph. p. 251, A;
Bar-hebraeus ap. Asseman, Bibl. Or.
vol. iii. p. 413. The Armenians place the
* somewhat earlier (Patkanian,
* Theophan. Chronograph. p. 251, D;
Bar-hebraeus, 1. s. c. :
54 The details of the war in Palestine
are given most fully by Eutychius (An-
males, vol. ii. pp. 212–3). He is confirm-
ed, generally, by Bar-hebraeus (l. s.c.)
and Theophanes (Chromograph. p. 252,
A).
** Patkanian, from Armenian sources
(Journal Asiatique for 1866, p. 200). .
* Eutych. Annales, vol. ii. pp. 212 and
. . Compare the Paschal Chronicle,
vol. i. p. , B. .
*7 Theophanes, says 90,000 (p. 252, A);
but this is improbable. £atkanian's Af.
menian authorities give the number as
17,000 (Journ. As. 1866, i. s. c.). The
Paschal Chronicle says “many thou-
sands of clergy, monks, and nuns’’
(l. s. c.); Eutychius “an innumerable
multitude” (Ann. völ. ii. p. 212).
* Patkanian, 1. s. c. X
* Eutych. Ann. vol. ii. p. 215. -
*Ibid. Eutychius supposes her to be
Maria, the daughter of Maurice; and so
the Orientals generally. But the mar-
riage of Chosroës with this princess
\
*


*
\
…”
seems to be a fable. Shirin is no doubt
the wife intended.
61 Theophan. Chronograph. p. 252, B;
iceph. De Rebus post Mauricium ges-
tis, p. 7, C; Eutych. Anav. vol. ii. p. 219;
Mirkhond, p. 402; Bar-hebraeus, l. s. c.
62 Eutychius, l. s.
C.
68 IIapéAaflov oi IIéparat rav Atyvirtov,
kai . . . ; êos Aiólomías. (Theophan.
Chromograph. 1. s. c.) So too Bar-he-
braeus, l. s. c. I do not know on what
authority Gibbon says that the Persian
arms were carried westward to the
neighborhood of Tripoli, and that the
Greek cities of the Cyrenaica received at
this time their death-blow. (Decline
and Fall, vol. v. p. 893.)
64 Shahēn is the form used by the Ar-
menian writers (Patkanian in Journ.
Asiatique, 1866, p. 212). The Paschal
Chronicle has Salén (p. 886, B). Saina is
in Bar-hebraeus (Asseman; Bibl.
Or. vol. iii. p. 413). Nicephorus has in-
correctly “Saitus” (De Rebus post Maw-
ricium. p. 2, C).
65 These were Olympius, the praetorian
prefect, Leontius, governor of Constan-
tinople, and Anastasius, priest in charge
of St. Sophia's. (Nicephorus, p. 8, D;
Chron. Pasch. -l. s. c.) The letter which
they carried to Chosroës is preserved in
this last-named compilation. It is writ-
ten in the name of the Greek people.
* Nicephorus, p. 9, A.
67 Ibid.
*8. So the Armenians (Patkanian, p.
201). Theophanes says that Chosroës'
answer was: “I will never grant you
peace till you, deny, the Crucified One,
whom you call God, and worship the
sun” (p. 252, D).
\ ^* Theophan. p. 252, C.
70 On the width of the canal of Con-
stantinople, see the Author's Herodotus,
vol. iii. p. 65, 2nd edition.
71 Theophan. p. 253, C; Bar-hebraeus,
. S. C.
72 Bar-hebraeus, l. s. c.
78 The conquests of Chosroës com-
menced in A.D. 605 (see text, p. 518). An-
cyra and Rhodes seem to have been
taken in A.D. 620. -
74 Eutych. Annales, vol. ii. pp. 220–3.
, 7°See a paper M. Barbier de Mey-
nard in the Journal Asiatique for 1865,
25
p. 303.
76 Canon Tristram. See his Land of
Moab, pp. 197 et seq. . An account of the
palace will be given in the Chapter on
Sassanian Art and Architecture.
77 Nicephorus, p. 9, B. Famine brought
its usual companion, pestilence.
78 Nicephorus, p. 10.
...” Gibbon, Decline and Fall, vol. v. p.
80 Nicephorus, p. 9, B.
81 Ibid. The treasure-ships were caught
in a tempest. Some sank; others were
cast upon the Syrian shore, and the spoil,
being conveyed to Chosroës, formed the
treasure called Badawerd, or “wind-
*
TEIJſ, SEVENTH MOAVAIRO II Y.
* -
loH. xxiv.
fall,” which was among the series of
his palace (Tabari, vol. ii. p. 805).
**The importance of this barrier was
evidenced not only on this occasion,

when for ten years the heights of Chal-
cedon were occupied by a Persian host,
but even more remarkably in later
times, when for centuries it proved an
impediment which the Turks could not
*świan ci h. p. 254. A
Theophan. Chronograph. e
84 Ibid. p graph. p. 254,
85 Georg. Pisid. De Earped. Pers. Acro-
as. i. 132–5. This writer accompanied
the expedition.
86 Ibid. i. 170–252.
87 The locality of the expedition is
mainly fixed by the statement of George
(Acroas. ii. 10) that the fleet sailed to
Pyloe. “Non enim est dubitandum,” as
Quercius observes (Annotationes in
Georgivm Pisid. p. 100), “quas Noster
nominat Pylas, eas esse quae in historiis
celeberrimae Sunt, et Armenia? (?) et
Ciliciae vel Syriae Pylae vocantur.” Theo-
phanes simply follows George.
"...iege. Pisid. ii. 44–176; Theophan.
4
89 Theophan. p. 255, B.
90 Ibid., p. 256, A, B;
Acroas. iii. 210-275.
91 Theophan. p. 256, C. Gibbon says
that after the battle “ Heraclius boldly
ascended the heights of Mount Taurus,
directed his march through the plains
of Cappadocia, and established his
troops for the winter in safe and plenti-
ful quarters on the banks of the river
Halys” (Decline and Fall, vol. v. p. 401).
He seems to quote George of Pisidia as
his authority; but that writer says
nothing of any movement made by the
army after the battle. Neither does
Theophanes.
92 Eutych. Annales, vol. ii. p. 231.
The Khazar alliance is mentioned by
the Armenian writers (Patkanian in
Journ. Asiatique for 1866, p. 213). Nice-
phorus puts it forward very strongly
(De Rebus post Mavricintm?, p. 11, C), but
calls the Khazars Turks. -
98 Eutych. Annales, l. s. c.
94 Ibid, .
95 Moyse de Khaghank, quoted by Pat-
kanian, p. 204; Rºhorus, p. 11, B. "
96 Patkanian, p. 201.
97 Patkanian, p. 204. . *
** Theophan. Chronograph. p. 257, D;
Cedrenus, p. 412.
* See the excellent article of Sir H.
Rawlinson in the Journal of the Royal
Geographical Society, vol. x. art. ii.
100 Theophan. p. 257, A, B.
101 Nicephorus says that Heraclius in:
tercepted the despatch which Chosroës
had addressed to Shahr-Barz, recalling
him to his aid, and altered the words of
it, thus deceiving the Persian general,
who, imagining that he was not wanted
by Chosroës, proceeded on to Chalcedon
(De Rebus post Mauricium, p. 12, B, C).
Georg. Pisid.
*
- \
CH. XXIV.]
102 Theophan, p. 258. A.
103 Ibid.
104 °Ev raiſraws rais 8vorxaptats rôtrov čk
róirov 6 Xpapóms hueubev kai à ‘HpákAetos
rojtov Štúkav troAA&s tróAeus énópénarev kai
tôpas. (Theophan. p. 258, B.) It is evi-
3. that Chosroës did not fly straight
to Dastagherd, but kept to the mountain
country, continually shifting his quar-
ters.
105 Theophan. 1. s. c.; Patkanian, p.
<nſt;
ŽUK).
106 Nicephorus, De Rebus post Mauri-
cintrº, }. 12, A.
107 Theophan. p. 258, C.
108 Ibid.
109 Theophan. p. 258, D. º
Moyse de Kaghank, as reported by Pat-
lºanian, Jowrmal Asiatigue, 1866, p. 205.
119 The Lazi, Abasgi, and Iberians are
specially mentioned (Theophan. p. 259,
111 Shahr-Barz, Shahén, and Shahrap-
hakan (or Sarablagas).
1 12 §§ 260, B.
113 Salban is identified by Sir H. Raw-
linson with the modern city of Van,
situated on the lake of the same name
(Journal of Geograph. Soc. vol. x. p. 90).
* Sal.” he observes, “is evidently the
Kurdish Shdil or Shar, signifying a city,
and Ban is the same word which is
written Buana by Ptolemy, and Iban
by Cedrenus; the title of Salban being,
thus, literally the city of Van.”
114. Theophan. p. 261, A.
115 Ibid. p. 261, B. . -
116 Mr. Layard found snow on the
mountain-range between Van and Mu-
l; us in the month of August (Nineveh.
cºnd Babylon, p. 418),
117 This is the conjecture of Sir H.
Rawlinson (Jowrival of Geograph. Socie-
ty, vol. x. p. 91).
118 Theophan. p. 261, D.
119 See text, p. 519.
130 Theophan. p. 262, A.
121 Germa-nicaea is not often heard of;
but its position is clearly marked by the
Itinerary of Antomime, which shows it
to have lain about sixty miles west of Sa-
mosata, in the district known as Com-
magene (pp. 81–3).
122 See text, pp. 522–523.
128 Theophan. p. 262, B.
124 Ibid." p. 262, D, & youvegögsvos ūrép
div6potrow.
125 Ibid. p. 263, A. Shahr-Barz is said
to have remarked on his conduct to one
of his officers:– “O Cosmas, dost thou
see the emperor, how boldly he engages
in the battle, against what a multitude
he contends alone, and how, like an an-
vil, he cares not for the blows showered
upon him?” -
**Theophan, p. 263, A.
137 Ibid. p. 263, B.
128 Xtpatetſoras $évous re kai troAiras kai
otkéras. (Theophan. 1. s. c.) This levy
of slaves and foreigners is a striking
indication of the exhaustion of Persia.
129 Gibbon says “the new levies were
THE SEVENTH MONARCHY,
691
divided into three formidable bodies”
(Decline and Fall, vol. v. p. 405); but he
#. to me to have misunderstood
Theophanes.
180 Georgius Pisid. Bell. Avaricum, l.
280; Theophan. Chronograph. p. 263, C.
131 Theopham. l. s. c.
.* Nicephorus, De Rebus post Mauri-

cium, p. 11, D. .
188 Nicephorus, De Rebus #. Mauri-
icum, p. 12, A. Compare Theophan. p.
184 This fact, and those which follow,
are derived from the Armenian writers.
(See Patkanian’s digest of Armenian
history in the Journal Asiatigue for
1866, # 206.
*** Theophan, p.263, D.
188 Georgius Pisid. Bell. Avar. l. 197;
Theophan. p. 263, C. According to the
Paschal Chronicle, the vanguard of the
invaders numbered 30,000 men (p. 392,
B). The entire force is reckoned by
George the Pisidian at 80,000 (Bell. Avar.
• 219). -
137 Georg. Pisid. Bell. Avar. Il. 269-273
and 293-7. .
188 Chron. Paschale, p. 393, D.
18° Oi 'ABápeus . . . .ets orrāqºm yxvitro, ºne
roß "Iatrpov tranbos dimeupov kai &pw8woß
Kpettrov čvéykavres rib v. ko A trov to J
k ép a ros émixiptograv (Theophan. Chro-
nography p. 264, C).
149 Chron. Pasch. p. 396, C. r
14, Ibid. p. 394, A.
143 Theophan. 1, s. c.
148 Chrow. Pasch. p. 396, D.
144 Ibid. p. 396, A, B.
145 Some of the Oriental authorities
(Elmacin, Hist. Saracen. pp. 13–16; Mir-,
khond, Histoire des Sassanides, p. 402)
place him in Mesopotamia at this pe-
riod; but it seems very improbable that,
in that case, he would have made his at-
tack from Lazica in the autumn.
*** Theophan. p. 264, D.
147 Ibid. p. 264, B.
148 Ibid. p. 265, A. -
* Ibid.: Ov Še Towprot, rovyetºva
§ptovres kai rās ovvexei's tručpouâs rôv IIep-
gov, whitrodépot res aroykortºv rq, Baa'l Aet,
ipšavro kar' baiyov i oppéeuv, kai mávres
diq'évres abrov, Ütréorrpe.Jav. -
150 Ibid. p. 268, A. The motive of his
removal from Ctesiphon is said to have
been a prophecy that when he should
next enter Ctesiphon he would perish
(Theophan. p. 269, A).
151 On the position of Dastagherd, see
the remarks of Sir H. Rawlinson in the
Jowrmal of the Geograph. Society, vol.
x, pp. 95–6; and compare Kinneir, Per-
sian Empire, p. 306.
1*Theophanes, according to his pres-
ent text, says Chamaëtha, or Chamaetha
(p. 265, B); but this is probably to be
corrected from Theophylact of Simo-
catta, who puts Chnaethas in about the
same locality (Hist, v. 8; see text, p. 510).
158 Theophan. p. 265, A. B. Nicepho-
rus calls him. Rhuzates (De Rebus post
Mauricium, p. 13, C); the Armenian
*:


692 e
*-
wiiters Rhôdja Weh (Patkanian in the
'Jottrn. Asiatigwe, 1866, p. 207).
154. Theophan. p. 265, D. The Arme-
nians say that Rhazates, having repre-
sented to Chosroës the certainty of de-
feat, was told in answer that he could
at any rate fight and die. “My God,”
he exclaimed, “judge between me and
my pitiless king!” But he obeyed,
fought, and fell (Patkanian, l. s.c.).
155 Theophan. p. 266, A.
15° This appears from the subsequent
occupation of Nineveh by Heraclius.
... 157 Theophan. p. 266, A, B. Gibbon
makes Heraclius kill Rhazates himself
(Decline and Fall, vol. v. p.409); but I
do not so understand .*.*.*. Ni-
cephorus certainly assigns him a share
of the honor (De Rebus post Mauricium,
p. 13, D); but even he gives the main
credit to a guardsman.
158 Theophan, p. 266, B.
159 Ibid. p. 266, C.
160 Ibid. p. 267, A.
101 Theophan. p. 267, A. Compare
Chron. Pasch. p. 899, C. -
182 Theophan. p. 266, D,
168 Ibid. p. 267, B.
164 On the Barazrud, see the remarks
of Sir H. Rawlinson in the Journal o
the Geograph. Society, vol. x. p. 95. It
was derived from the Diyaleh below the
Hammerin Hills at a point where, in
former times, was the great passage of
the river, - -
it 5 Sir H. Rawlinson identifies the
Torna, with the Ka-tun', the Arabic name
for the more northern part of the great
Nahr-yan canal (Geograph. Journ, vol.
x. p. 93).
188theophan. p. 267, C. 1 f
167 He is said to have quitted Dasta-
gherd by boring a hole through the town
wall, where it formed the boundary of
the palace garden (Theophan. p. 268, D).
168 Shirin, her two sons, Merdasas and
Saliarus, and three wives who are said
to have been also his daughters (ibid. p.
269, B: p. 270, D). -
169 Thai, the ‘‘ River Alba” of Theo-
phanes represents the Nahr-wan canal
is sufficiently clear: 1, from the letter
of Heraclius in the Paschal Chronicle,
where the form given is Nap3&v (p. 4
- $
A); and 2, from Magoudi (vol. ii. p. 227),
where the invading army is said to have
penetrated to Nahrewān. f
170 Theophan. p. 270, A.
171 Among the treasures of the palace
are enumerated aloes, raw silk (plåraśa).
pepper, muslins, sugar. ginger, silk
dresses, carpets, embroidered covelets,
and bullion. Most of these things were
burnt as being too heavy to carry off.
In the paradise attached to the palace
were found lions and tigers, kept for the
£. of being hunted, ostriches, ga-
zelles, wild asses, peacocks, and pheas-
ants. Heraclius kept thie Feast of the
Flpiphany in the palace, and then com-
pletely destroyed it (Theophan. p. 268, C).
172 Theophan. p. 270, B.
THE SEVENTH MONARCIIY.
ov Asyóuevov Bapg&v.
[CH. xxiv.
178 Sir H. Rawlinson says:—"In the
year of the Emperor's visit the winter
seems to have set in remarkably late”
(Journal of Geograph. Society, vol. x. p.
174 See text, p 357 et seqq. Af
175. Theophali. p. 270, C.
17° Heraclius left Silehrizur on Februt-
ary 24 (Chron. Pasch. p. 400, C). The
distance from Shehrizur to Berozeh or
Banneh) is usually reekoned at four
days' march (Geograph. Journal, vol. x.

p. 98); but Heraelius appears to have
occupied five days in traversing the dis-
tance, for it was March when he reached
Berozeh. (Tº Maptiq, ºnvi éA6öv eis xopt-
Theophan. 1. s. c.)
Chron. Pasch, p. 401, U, D.
178 They were found in the palace at
Dastagherd (Theophan. p. 268, -
178 Ibid. p. 270, Å.
189 Theophan. p. 270, A.
18, Ibid. p. 269, C, D.
** Mirkhond, p. 407; Tabari, vol. ii. p.
18° He is said to have put many of the
imprisoned officers to death (Tabari.
I. s. c.), to have imprisoned his sons and
forbidden them to marry (ibid.), to have
mutilated Merdanshah, governor of Za-
bulistan (ibid. p. 331), &c. Compare also
Mºś vol. ii. pp. 225–6,
184 Theophan. p. 270, C.
18° Gibbon speaks of Siroës as “glory-
ing in the rank and merit of his mother,
Sira” (Shirin); but this contradicts Theo-
llames, and obtains no support from the
riental writers. Tabari makes Siroës
the son of Maria, daughter of the Em-
peror Maurice (vol. ii. p. 332), whom he
distinguishes from Shirin (pp. 304, 328,
&c.), Mirkhond says that Siroës, after
the death of his fathèr. fell in love with
Shirin, and seems certainly not to re-
gard her as his mother (p. 406).
186 This is the form of the name found
in the Jetter of Heraclius (Chrom. Pasch.
& 398, D). Theophanes changes it into
undabunas (p. 270, C, D)
187 Theophan. p. 271, B.
188 Theophan. 1. s. c.
tº Chron. Pasch. 1. s. c.; Theophan.
p. 271, D.
190 Eicrºvovorty abrov eis Töv olxov roß
oxórows, ov autos tºxtipwaev čk véov kºria as
ets &mdésaſty Xpmºtov. (Theophan. 1 s.c.)
191 Heraclius says (Pºtsch. Chrom. p.
399. A) that Siroës destroyed his father
by a most cruel d-ath (trukporárq 9avárºp).
Theophames teſis us (p. 272, A) that he
had him killed by arrows (ékéAevorev 6
Xtpons rootov ráčots &veXeiv).
192 Cliosroës II. is S generally given
thirty-eight years (Tabari, vol. ii. p. 332;
Mirkhond, p.407: , Eutychius, vol. ii., p.
252; Magoudi, vol. ii. p. 232): st
number is reached by reckoning to him
the reign of Bahram Chobin (Varahran
iš Histoire des Sassanides, p. 401.
*** Theophanes, p. 268, B, C, "Compare
text, p. 533.
g
*
CH. XXV.]
195 The most remarkable feature of
the palace at Canzaca, was a domed
building, the ceiling of which was orna-
mented with representations of the sun,
moon, and stars, while below was an
image of the monarch, seated, and at-
tended by messengers bearing wands of
office. A machinery was attached, by
which rain and thunder could be imitat.
eſſ ſºarenue, p. 412; Tzetzes, Chiliad,
iii. 66).
106 The treasures found by the Ro-
mans in the palace of Dastagherd have
been already enumerated (see above,
note 171). The Orientals say that the
palace was supported on forty thousand
columns of silver, adorned by thirty
thousand rich hangings upon the walls,
and further ornamented by a thousand
globes suspended from the roof (D'Her-
belot. Bibl. Orientale, tom. iii. p. 480),
Among other treasures possessed by
Parviz, Tabari notices a throne of gold,
called Takdis, supported on feet which
were rubies, a napkin which would not
burn, and a crown enriched with a thou-
sand pearls, each as big as an egg
(Chronique, vol. ii. pp. 304–5).
197 According to Tabari, Chosroës II,
naintained for the use of his court 1,000
elephants, 12,000 white camels, 50,000
horses, mules, and asses, of which 8,000
were kept for his own riding, and 12,000
fetnale domestics, of whom a considera-
ble number were slaves (ibid. p. 305).
Magoudi (vol. ii. pp. 230-2) gives him
50,000 horses and 1,100 elephants, whiter
than snow, some of theim eleven cubits
high, and all accustomed to kneel at the
sight of the king; Mirkhond raises the
number of the elephants to 1,200, mak-
ing the camels 12,000, and the horses
50.000 tp. 404). .
1°8 The number of his concubines was
3,000 according to some writers (Gibbon,
Decline and Fall, vol. v. p. 395), 12,000
according to others (Mirkhond p. 404;
Tabari, vol. ii. p. 305).
1* Magoudi says (vol. ii. pp. 228-9) that
Parviz (Eberwiz) had nine seals of office.
The first was a diamond ring with a
ruby centre, bearing the portrait, maine
and titles of the monarch. It was used
for despatches and diplomas. The sec-
ond, also a ring, was a cornelian, set in
gold, with ſº “ Khorassan Khw-
reh,” which was used for the State ar-
chives. The third was an onyx ring
with the l-gend “Celerity,” used for
letters sent by post. The fourth, a gold
ring with a pink ruby, had the legend
* Riches are the source of prosperity.”
It was impressed upon lette s of grace.
e fifth seal, a red ruby, bore the le-
end " Khureh vat Khorrem’’ or “Splen-
dor and Prosperity,” and was impressed
upon the chests wherein treasure was
stored. The sixth, made of Chinese
iron, bore the emblem of an eagle, and
was used to seal letters addressed to
foreign kings. The seventh was a bézo-
Drd, bearing on it a fly.
THE SEVENTH MoMARCHY.
N
lt was impress-
693
ed on meats, medicines, and perfumes
reserved for the king's use. The eighth,
a pearl (!), bore the emblem of a pig's
head, and was placed on persons cón-
demned to death, and on death-warrants.
The ninth was an iron ring, which the
king took with him to the bath. • *
200 See text, p. 502.
201 See text, pp. 472, 501, &c. 2
20* The Byzantines agree with the Ori-
entals in making Chosroës faithful to
Shirin to the last. (Tabari. vol. ii. pp.
329, 389, &c.; Magoudi, vol. ii. p. 23::
Theophanes, p. 270, C, D.) Tabari even
represents him as having had no coin-
merce with any other woman (p. 335).
298. According to Mirkhond (p. 406),
Shirin was sought in marriage by Siroës
after his father's death. She made it a
condition of her consenting, that she
should be allowed first to visit the tomb
of Chosroës. Having obtained permis-
Sion, she entered the building and poi-
soned herself. w ~
204 See Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift
der deutschen morgenländischen Gesell-
º: ºl. viii. pp. 111–140; and vol. xi.
33–4 . -
20* Mordtmann conjectures that the
monogram represents the name of God,
and contects it with the rest of the le-
gend, regarding the meaning of the
whole as “May God increase Chosroës!”
(Zeitschrift, vol. xii. p. 33.)
* Ibid. vol. viii. p. 111 et seqq.; vol. xii.
p. 33 et seqq. * -
297 This coin has been represented by
Mordtmanti (No. 723), by Longpérier
(Médailles des, Sassanides, pl. xi. No. 3),
and others. The illustration [see Plate
i. Fig. 1] is taken from Longpérier's
WOl’k. -
208 See Thomas in Numismatic Chron-
tele fou 1873, p. 242. .
CHAPTER XXV.
1 Kobad (Kavat) is the form found in
the superscription of the letter written
by the king himself to Heraclius (Pasch.
Chron. p. 402, B). It likewise appears,
together with Firuz, upon the king'
coins. Heraclius himself (Pasch. Chrone.
p. 401, C), Eutychius (Annales, vol. ii. p.
252), Magoudi (Prairies d'Or, vol. ii. p.
282), Mirkhond (Histoire des Sassanides,
p. 407), and the Armenian writers (Pat-
kanian in Journal Asiatique for 1866,
pp. 215–7) have both names. abari
(vol. ii. pp. 827–347) uses the name Siroës
(Shirouí) only. 3.
2 Pasch. Chron. p. 298, D. -
3. ºnari, vol. ii. pp. 333–345; Mirkhond,
p. 408.
* See text, p. 531.
* Tº hºleptorátºp Baoruxel "Papaiov. Pasch.
Chron. p. 402, B.
* Compare Tabari, vol. ii. p. 346, and
Theophan. p. 271, D. ; :
7 The mutilation of ICobad's letter in
the Vatican M.S. renders the sense of
this last passage somewhat doubtful. '
* Nicephorus gives the following as
|S .
694
the main purport of Heraclius’ reply:-
** Heraclius wrote back to Siroës, calling
him his son, and saying that it had
never been his wish to deprive any king
of his royal state, not even Chosroës;
whom, if he had been completely victo-
rious, he would have replaced upon the
throne, notwithstanding all the harm
that he had done both to the Romans
and the Persians. But Heaven had decid-
ed otherwise, and to prevent further dis-
aster, had punished Chosroës as he de-
served, and opened to himself and
Siroës the way of reconciliation.” (De
letter of Heraclius to the Senate in the
Paschal Chronicle, É. 401, C, D.)
10 The recall of the troops is proved
by Theophanes (p. 272, C), who assigns
it to the first year of Siroës. The recall
implies the surrender.
11 Theophan. p. 272, B.
~12 Nicephorus, p. 14, C; Theophan.
. S. C.
18 The safe conduct of the Persians
was entrusted to Theodore, brother of
Heraclius (Theophan. p. 272, C).
14 So Gibbon in a note (Decline and
Fall, vol. v. p. 414); but I do not know
his authority. .
15 Theophan. p. 273, B, C; Cedrenus,
p. 420, A.
16 See Eutychius, Annales, vol. ii. p.
252; Tabari, vol. ii. p. 346; Mirkhond, p.
409: Moyse de Kaghank, ii. 12; &c.
17 Tabari, l. s. c.; Eutych. Ann. l. s. c.
18 Moyse de Kaghank, l. s. c.
19 Miſſiºnona, p. 409; £utych. 1. s.c.
20 Tabari, 1. s. c.
21 See text, p. 582. -
** Sépéðs, the Armenian historian,
distinctly asserts that Shahr-Varaz
(Shahr-Barz) refused to evacuate the
Roman territory at the command of
Kobad. (See Patkanian in Journ. Asia-
tique for 1866, p. 216.) The narrative of
Nicephorus (De Rebus post Mauricium,
p. 15) implies that the evacuation was
not complete till Shahr-Barz became
king of Persia.
28 Shahr-Barz is called by Eutychius
“praefectus limitum occidentalium”
(Annales, vol. ii. p. 252). -
24 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 347.
* Nicephorus, De Rebus post Mauri-
cium. p. 15, A, B.
2° Mirkhond makes the number fifteen
(p. 400), Tabari sixteen (vol. ii. p. 346),
the Modjmel-al-Tewarikh, seventeen,
Eutychius eighteen (Annales, vol. ii. p.
253), Thomas of Maraga (ap. Asseman,
Bibl. Or. vol. iii. p. 92) twenty-four, the
Armenian writers forty (Patkanian in
Journ. Asiatique for 1866, p.215). Thom-
as of Maraga ascribes the massacre to a
Christian, named Samatas, who acted
without the knowledge of Kobad.
37. Histoire des Sassanides, p. 409.
28 See Tabari, vol. ii. p. 847.
29 Mirkhond, I. s. c.
* Eutychius, Annales, vol. ii. p. 252.
THE SEVENTH MONAIROH Y.
* [CH. xxv.
*1 Sépéós, the Armenian writer, says
that Kobad II. reigned six months (Pat-
kanian in J. Asiatique for 1866, p. 216);
Tabari makes him reign “ seven months
in all ” (l. s.c.); Eutychius (l. s. c.) eight
months; so also Mirklıond (l. s. c.); Ma-
goudi alone gives him, in accordance
with his coins, a reign exceeding a year.
He makes Kobad reign eighteen months
(Prairies d'Or, vol. ii. p. 233). .
82 Eutychius, I. s. c.
** Magoudi, vol. ii. p. 232.
84 Thomas in Numismatic Chronicle
for 1873, p. 250; Mordtmann in the Zeit-
schrift, vol. viii. p. 141. - ~
**The eighteen months of Magoudi
would not be complete until August 23;
but they were probably incomplete.
86 So Tabari (vol. ii. p. 347). Magoudi
(vol. ii. p. 233), and Mirklıond (p. 409). Ta-
bari notes that some accounts said he
was only one year old. t
37 Tabari, 1. s. c. On the high dignity
of purveyors in Oriental courts, see 1
Kings, iv. 7–19. ... • ‘
38. See Patkanian in the Journ. Asia-
tigwe for 1866, p. 219. -
39 Nicephorus, De Rebus post Mauri-
civtm, p. 15, A.
40 Nicephorus, De Rebus post Mawri-
civin, p. 15, B. -
41 So the Armenians. (Patkanian, 1.s.c.)
42 Tabari, 1. s. c.
48 Ibid. Compare Mirkhond, p. 410.
44 Bar-hebraeus explains the name
Shahr-Barz as equivalent to hair baro,
“wild boar.” Mirkhond seems to ap-
prove the derivation (Histoire des Scts-
sanides. p. 410). •
45 Mirkhond (p. 411) and Tabari (vol.
ii. p. 348) give Shahr-Barz a reign of
forty days; Magoudi (vol. ii. p. 233) and
Theophanes (p. 278, D) of two months.
Some authors only allowed him twenty
flºº, (Mirkhond, l. s. c.; Magoudi,
. S. C. -
46 By this supposition we may best
reconcile Theophanes (p. 272, B) with
Nicephorus (p. 15, A. ad fin.).
47 Moyse de Kaghank, ii. 16.
** Patkanian in Journ. Asiatique for
1866, p. 222. g .
40 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 848. Compare Mir-
khond. p. 411.
50 Tabari, J. s.c., Mirkhond, 1. s. c. Ma-
goudi (vol. ii. p. 283) makes Chosroës,
son of Kobad, succeed Shahr-Barz. and
reign three months. Next to this Chos-
roës he places Bourān (i.e. Purandocht).
* See text, pp. 506–513.
**The shortness of her reign—seven
months, according to Theophanes. 'É.
273, D), sixteen months, according to
Tabari (vol. ii. p. 350) and Mirkhond (p.
412), eighteen months, according to Ma-
goudi (vol. ii i. 233)—raises the suspicion
of a violent death: of which, however,
there is no direct evidence.
** Mirkhond, p. 415; Tabari, vol. ii. p.
352: Eutychius, Annales, vol. ii. p. 255.
*4 Tabari gives the order as follows:–
Kobad Artaxerxes III., Shahr-Barz, I’u-


CH. xxvr.]
randocht, Kushensadeh, Azermidocht,
Chosroës III., Khordatl-Chosroës, Firuz,
d Ferukhzad-Chosroës (vol. ii.
836-353); Magoudi as Kobad. Artaxerxes
III., Shahr-Barz, Chosroës III., Bouran
(Purandocht), Firuz-Koshenshideh, Azer-
midocht, and Ferhad Khusru (vol. ii. pp.
233-4); Eutychius as Kobad, Artaxerxes
III., Jorham (=Shahr-Barz). Chosroës
III., Murla, Hoshnashtadah, Arzman-
docht, and Pharachorad-Choshra (An-
males, vol. ii. pp. 252-255). Mirkholid
agrees in the maill with Tabari, but
omits Khordad-Chosroës and Firuz (pp.
08-415) .
, 55 These are the words of Gibbon (De-
cline and Fall, vol. v. p. 412), who has
in his mind the following passage of Eu-
tychius:—“Erant autem affectus ipso-
rum diversi, coetus divisi, et se mutuo
bellis lacessentes, uniuscujusque terrae
tractus, urbis, autoppidi per totum reg-
num incolis vicinis suis bellum inferen-
tibus; manseruntdue hoc statu urbes,
videlicet, rebus dissolutis, populo diviso,
regno corrupto, hominibusque inter se
dissentientibus octo (?) annos.” (An-
males, vol. ii. p. 256.)
56 See Clinton, Fasti Romani, vol. ii.
. 172.
p 57 The Armenian writers speak of an
opposition to Isdigerd in the early part
of his reign (Patkanian in the Journal
Asiatique for 1866, p. 227); but neither
the Arabs nor the Persians mention any.
58 Shahriar is clearly the “Saliarus”
of Theophanes, who accompanied Chos-
roës, when he fled from Ctesiphon to
Seleucia (see note 168, Chapter XXIV.).
59 This seems to be the true account.
It is given by Tabari (vol. ii. p. 328), Mir-
khond (p. 416), and Magoudi (vol. ii. p.
234). Eutychius (vol. ii. p. 256), and El-
macin (ap. Pagiwmv, vol. ii. p. 799) make
Isdigerd ill. the son of Chosroës II.
60 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 330.
61 Kobad II. would probably have put
him to death, had he known of his ex-
istence. Chosroës II. threatened his
life on account of a prophecy (Tabari,
t
p. 320). - -
62 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 353; Mirkhond, p.
68 Eutychius, Annales, vol. ii. p. 256;
Tabari (l. s. c.) makes him sixteen.
64 Mohammed made his first converts
about A.D. 614-617, when Chosroës was
aining his greatest successes. (See
'º, History of the Saracens, pp.
14–16.) -
85 “Mohammed.” says Ockley, “was
now (A.D. 627) so well confirmed in his
power that he took upon himself the au-
thority of a king” (p. 45). . It seems to
have been in A.D. 628 that he addressed
letters to Heraclius, Chosroës, and
others, announcing himself as “the
apostle of God,” and calling upon them
to embrace his religion. Chosroës tore
the letter in pieces; whereupon Mo-
hammed remarked, “He has torn up
, at the commencement o
TIII: SEVENTH MoMARCHY. w 64,5
; own kingdom” (Tabari, vol. ii. p.
} }.
96 Ockley, p. 52: Gibbon, Decline aqua.
Fall, vol. vi. pp. 257-8, -
67 “Mahomet displayed his banner at
the head of te
twenty thousand foot ” (Gibbon, p. 258).
Dr. Smith remarks that “thirty thou-
sand is the lowest number assigned;”
but he adds that “a large part deserted
the march”
(p. 259, note a).
98 Badsan, or Badham. (See Ockley,
p. 50. ,
*Ibid. p. 51. Ockley says that Al
Mondar “ afterwards routed the Per-
sians and made a great slaughter of
them.”
70 Ibid. p. 90. The term Bahrein, which
is now applied only to the island cele-
brated for its pearlfishery (lat. 26°, long.
50° 35'), was formerly given to that por-
tion of the mainland which lies directly
west of the upper part of the Persian
Gulf. A remnant of this use will be
found in Carsten Niebuhr (Description,
de l'Arabie, p. 293, and compare the
map, opp. p. 268).
71 See text, p. 558.
CHAPTER XXVI. . -
1 See Ockley, History of the Sara cens,
p. 84–90. It is surprising that Gibbon
omits all notice of this time of revolt
and disturbance. “After the simple in-
auguration of Abubeker,” he says, “he
was obeyed in Media, Mecca, and the
provinces of Arabia; the Hashemites
alone declined the oath of fidelity” (De-
cline and Fall, vol. vi. pp. 270–1). This
is the reverse of the fact. (See Tabari,
ed; Kosegarten, vol. i. pp. 1–50; Magoudi,
vol. iv. pp. 180–3.)
3 Abu-bekr was sixty-three at his de-
cease (Ockley, p. 141), and consequently
above sixty at his accession, since he
reigned only a little more than two
years (Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen,
vol. i. p. 46 and p. 53). . . . . .
8 See Tabari, vol. i. pp. 53-251 (ed. Kose-
garten). • ,
4 He had affected to treat Mohammed
as an equal, and had addressed a letter
to him as follows:--‘‘ From Moseilama,
the Apostle of God, to Mohammed, the
Apostle of God.” Mohammed sent a
reply with the address:– “From Mo-
hammed, the Apostle of God, to Mosei-
lama, the liar " : (See note in Bohn's
edition of Ockley, p. 88.)
5 So Ockley (p. 88), who takes the
number from Elmacin. *
. . " Tabari gives a long account of the
circumstances under which Iyas had
been placed at the head of the Arab
tribes suhject to Persia in the place of
Noman, the last of the great Al Mondar
line (vol. ii. #. 309–19, ed. Zotenberg).
7 Tabari (ed. Kosegarten). vol. ii. p. 11.
8 The stream in question left the Eu-
phrates at Hit, and skirting the Arabian
n thousand horse and,
g

696.
desert, fell into the Persian Gulf oppo-
site the island of Bubian. It was known
to the Arabs as Kerek Sa'īdeh, or the
canal of Saideh, and was believed to
have been the work of Nebuchadnezzar.
(See Ancient Monarchies, vol. iii. p. 57,
2nd edition.) -
8 Tabari (ed. Zotenberg), vol. iii. p.
19.
THE SEVENTH MoMARCIIY.,
t
*
*
LCH. xxvi,
between the Euphrates and the Desert, '
from Hit to the Persiall Gulf. It is di-
vided by Tabari into Sawād of Hira, the
northern, and Sawād of Obolla, the
southern province (vol. ii. p. 57
26 Tabari (ed. Kosegarten),
27 Ibid. pp. 188–9.
28 Ibid. p. 195. For the explanation of
*
the term, see Zotenberg's Tabari, vol. ,
7). -
vol. ii. p.,
10 Ibid. pp. 320–1. Sir H. Rawlinson
identifies El Lis with the modern El
Rudder, which is on the line of the Kerek
Sa'īdeha about long. 48° 41' east from
Greenwich. Banikiya and Barasuma
seem also to have been on the same cut.
ting (Tabari, ed. Kosegarten, vol. ii. p.
7). They lay, probably, north of El Lis.
Mi The site of Hira is tolerably certain.
It lay on the sea of Nedjif, south-east of
Meshed-Aki, and almost due south of
Kufa, in lat. 31° 50', long. 44° 20' nearly.
(See the Map in Mr. Loftus's Chaldoea
and Susitrºna, #Pg. p. 436.
12 Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. ii. pp.
, 33, &c.
is Ibid. p. 5; but another account (p.
87) reduces the amount to 190,000 dir-
hems.
i4 ** 11.
15 Sir H. Rawlinson places. Obolla
“twelve miles above Busrah,” between
that city and the place where the Shat-
el-Arab divides into two streams (Geo-
graph. Jowrmal. vol. xxvii. p. 188). He
conjectures its identity with the ancient
Tereſlon or Diridotis.
- 16 Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. ii. p. 9.
17 So the Persian translator of Tainari
(ed. Zotenberg. vol. iii. p. 3:8). But in
the Arabic no number appears to be
mentioned.
18 Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. ii. p.
13. The perpetual single combats of
Kaled, in all of which he is victorious,
severely try the credulity of the modern
reader of Tabari.
19 Ibid. p. 15. .
20 Ibid. pp. 19–74. The most impor-
tant of these was the capture of Perisa-
bor or Anbar, a city on the Euphrates,
nearly in the same parallel with Bagh-
dad. - .
21 Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. ii. p.
57. Ten distinct governors are men-
tioned. - º
22 Ibid., p. 77; Ockley, History of Sara-
cens, p. 3'ſ.
23 Ockley, pp. 103–138; Irving, Succes-
sors of Mahomet, pp. 19–42; Tabari, vol.
ii. pp. 159–169. -
24 Tabari makes Rustam at this period
the general of Puran (or Puran-docht),
the daughter of Chosroës II. (vol. ii. pp.
179–181): . but inexorable chronology
shows this to be impossible. As the
“ era. Yezdigerd" was undoubtedly June
16, A.D. 632 (Gibbon, Decline and Fall,
vol. vi. p. 292, note 19), all the Arab
attacks on Persia must have been in his
reign.
*The name. Sawād is given by the
Arab writers to the whole fertile tract
iii. p. 376. .
29 Malcolm, History of Persia, vol. i.
17
80 "Fabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. ii. p.
193; Magoudi, vol. iv. p. 200.
81 So the Persian translator of Tabari
(ed. Zotenberg), vol. iii. p. 374. who did
not find the numbers in the Arabic
original.
82. In one place Tabari estimates the
Arabs under Abu Obeidah at from 6,000
to 10,000 (ed. Kosegarten, vol. ii. p. 198):
in another (vol. ii. p. 199) he makes them
9,000.
as Ibid. p. 193. . &
** “Equos cataphractis tectos” (ibid.
p. 197). On the character of the pro-
tection, see text, Chapter XXVI
35 “Ut vero Perste cum elephantis ac
tintinnabwlis in Moslemos irruerunt,
eorum turmas disjecerunt, neque re-
sistebant equi, nisi consternati.” (Ibid.
. S. G.
80 Tabari (p. 193). Six thousand Per-
sians had fallen, he says.
37 lbid, p. 197
38 So Washington Irving (Successors
of Mahonet, p. 118), I know not on what
authority. Tabari (p. 19.3) makes the
breaker of the bridge an Arab of the
tribe called Beni-Thakif.
89 Tabari, p. 199
40 Ibid.
41 He received a spear-thrust through
his corslet, which drove some of the
rings of the chain-armor into his breast.
42 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 201.
48 Ibid. p. 205. º
bari, vol. ii. p. 205. On the prob-
ability that Milutan, wherever it occurs,
is really a title, and not a name, see not
ſ: Chapter X., and note 37, Chapter
45 ‘Fabari, vol. ii. p. 215. According to
reports which Tabari had heard, the
Persians slain in this battle were near
upon, 100,000 (ibid. p. 217).
1. Ockley, History of the Saracers, p.
§
47 Tabari. vol. ii. pp. 229–235. The
Arabs are said to have penetrated at
this time to the close neighborhood of
Baghdad (ibid. p. 231).
48 Ibid. p. 291. (Compare vol. iii. pp.
1, 5, 26, &c.) Ebn Isbak, however, who
is quoted by Tabari (vol. iii. p. 66), made
the number only 60,000. With this esti-
mate Magoudi agrees (vol. iv. p. 208).
40 Tabari, vºl. ii. p. 28%. ,
51 Ibid. p. 255. - , -
** Sa'ad was sent to supersede Al Mo.
e
cII. xxvi.]
thanna; but the latter died while Sa'ad
was still upon his lnarch (ib. p. 253).
63 Ibid. vol. iii. p. 26.
*4 Ibid. pp. 22 and 33.
55 Ibid., p. 21. -
50 On the Persian preference for this
position, see Xen. Auſtb. i. 8; $ 21–23;
Arrian. Earp. Alez. ii. 8, ad fiv.; iii. 11.
57. A fighting elephant was attached to
each 4,000 men. (Tabari. vol. iii. p. 26.)
Rustam had in his centre eighteen fight-
ing elephants, besides one on which he
rode himself (ib. p. 21). These eighteen
imply the presence of 72,000 unen.
B8Ibid. p. 22.
59 See text, p. 546,
60 Tabari, vol. iii. p. 31.
61 Toleicha, led the Asadites (whose
, name is said to llave meant “lions”)
into battle. See Tabari, vol. iii. p. 30.
62 See Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen,
vol. i. p. 67. -
63 Tabari, vol. iii. p. 31.
64 So the Persian Tabari (vol. iii. p.
390); but perhaps from a mistaken ren-
dering of the words “Armath” and
“Agwath.”
65 Tabari, vol. iii. p. 34. The entire
number sent from Syria was 6,000. Of
these 5,300 arrived during the second
day’s fight.
x 66 Ruz-el-Agwath. See Price, Moham-
medan. History, vol. i. p. 112.
67 Tabari, p. 35.
68 Ibid. pp. 34 and 37-8.
... " Ibid., p. 34. Compare Magoudi, vol.
IV. p. 21%. ,
70 Tabari, p. 36.
71 Ibid. p. 38.
72 Ibid. p. 41. Magoudi makes the loss
3. the side of the Arabs 2,500 (vol. iv. p.
9)
73 Tabari, vol. iii. pp. 43–48.
74 Ibid., p. 48.
75 Weil, Geschichte der Chalifen, vol.
i. B. * |Price, Mohammedan. History,
p. 114.
76 Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. iii. p.
in Ibid. p
78 Price,
i. p. 114.
sº. Tabari (ed. Kosegarten), vol. iii. pp.
O-
TLIE SEVENTH MONARCHI’.
, 55.
Mohammedam. History, vol.
\ * *
697
30 See text, p. 557.
81 Like Xerxes at Salamis (Herod. viii.
69), Rustam surveyed the battle from a
throne, set for him in a convenient sit-
uation (Tabari, vol. iii. p. 55; Magoudi,
vol. iv. p. 221).
82 Tabari niakes the bag break some
of Rustam's vertebrae (vol. iii. p. 56), af-
ter which he runs to the Atik, plunges
in, and begins to swim / It is needless
to say that this is quite impossible. Ma:
$. says that the bag fell on him and
roke some of his ribs (vol. iv. p. 222).
88 Magoudi, 1. s. c.; Tabari, i. s. c.
84 Tabari, vol. iii. p. 61.
85 Ibid. p. 56. -
Bº Magoudi, vol. iv. p. 224.
87 See text, p. 546. The soldier who
took the standard sold it for 30,000 dir-
hems (780l.). Its real value was 1,200,000-
dirhems, or more than 30,000l. -
88 Tabari, vol. iii. p. 57. *
89 Ibid. pp. 85-7.
90 lbid. p. 80.
*1 Tabari (ed. Zotenberg), vol. iii. p.
414. The Arabic Tabari of Kosegarten
here fails me; and I have to rely almost
entirely on the Persian translator, who
is said, frequently to misrepresent his
original. His numbers are particularly
untrustworthy. -
02 ibid
93 Ibid. p. 415. -
**lbid. Compare Kosegarten's Taba.
ri, vol. iii. p. 71. -
99 Holwan was not “at the foot of the
Median hills,” as Gibbon (Decline aud
fall, vol. vi. p. 294) and Washington Ir-
ving (Successors of Miahomet, p.
sert. . It was situated at Sir-pul-i-Zohab,
far within the mountain-region, not far
from the sources of the Holwan river, in
lat. 34° 30', long. 45° 57 nearly. £),
few miles' distance are the celebrated
“Gates of Zagros,” a narrow defile,
guarded by a wall in which is a gateway.
Numerous Sassanian traditions cling to
this locality. (See Geograph. Jowººm. vol.
ix. pp. 32–35.
96. The Persian translator of Tabari
makes the number 200,000 (vol. iii. p.
420); but this is, I think, incredible.
97 Gibbon says “the capital was taken
by assault ’’ (l. s. c.), which is the re-
verse of the truth. See Tabari (vol. iii.
p. 415, ed. Zotenberg); and compare
Ockley, History of the Saracens, p. 215,
and Irving, Successors of Mahomet, p.
98 The subjoined particulars are taken
chiefly from Tabari (ed. Zotenberg), vol.
iii. ch. xlix. pp. 415–7. -
99 Or, more correctly, “Ták-i-kesra.”
But I have followed the form commonly
used by our older travelers.
- , XXVII. Fig. 2. ' ſº
101 D'Herbelot, Bibliothèque Orientale,
vol. iii. p. 480.
102 The Arabs are said to have mis-
taken this for salt, and to have mixed it
with their bread (Gibbon, Decline and/
Fall, vol. vi. p. 295; Irving, Successors
of Mahomet, p. 129). -
108 Estimating the dirhem, with M.
Barbier de Meynard (Journal Asiatighte,
1865, p. 253), as worth from 65 to 7
French centimes, I find the entire booty,
exclusive of the works of art, to have
been worth from 23,400,000l., to 25,200,-
& our money. ajor Price, by
substituting dinars for dirhems on the
authority (as it would seem) of the Ha-
beib-asseir, raises the value to the in-
credible sum of 800,000,000l. (Mohamme-
dam. History, vol. i. p. 122). -
104 Tabari (ed. Zotenberg), vol. iii. p.
105 Ibid. *.
10° Price, Mohammedan. History, p. 125,
107 Tabari, vol. iii. p. 418.
*
& 2


z
y
*
698
108 Ibid. p. 410. Rei is generally ident
tified with Rhages, one of the most an-
cient and important of the cities of Me-
dia. (See Ancient Monarchies, vol. ii.
. 272, 2nd edition.). But, while it is
quite possible that the name travelled
westward, it would seen to be certain
that the original Rhages was very much
nearer than Rei to the Caspian Gates.
(See Arrian, Earp. Alear. iii. 20.)
* Tabári, l, s. c. asr-i-Shirin re-
tains its name. It is a village about
twenty miles west of Holwall, on the
road leading from Baghdad to Hama-
dan. (Geographical Journal, vol. ix. p.
33; Rich, Kurdistan, vol. ii. p. 264). The
word signifies “the palace of Shirin;”
and the place is supposed to have been
one where Chosroës II. built a residence
for his favorite wife. -
110 Tabari, vol. iii. pp. 420–2. Accord-
ing to this author the Roman territory
included at this time both Mosul (Nine-
veh) and Tekrit. oman general,
Antag' (Antiochus 3), defended Tekrit
with 20,000 men. It is just possible that,
on the collapse of the Persian power,
Rome attempted to obtain a share of
the §:
111 Tabari, vol. iii. ch. lviii. pp. 447–9.
112 Ibid. pp. 447–452. -
118 Ibid. pp. 452–454.
;" Tabari (ed. Zotenberg), vol. iii. p.
115 Ibid. p. 461.
116 See Washington Irving's Success-
ors of Mahomet, p. 132. Compare Ta-
bari, vol. iii. pp. 423–4. . .
117 Tabari, p. 467 and pp. 472-4.
118 Ibid. ompare Price, Mohamme-
dam. History, vol. i. p. 128.
119 The intention had perhaps been
expressed after the battle of Jalula (Ta-
bari, p. 419); but it had never really been
entertained. Istakr, which was beyond
the mountain-line, had been assailed in
A.D. 689 (ibid. p. 452). . .
120 Tabari (ed. Zotenberg), vol. iii. pp.
467–8.
. p -
122 See text, p. 550.
*** Tabari, i. s. c.; Price, vol. i. p. 129.
124 Tabari, vol. iii. p. 471. -
125 Ibid. p. 472.
128 Price, vol. i. p. 133.
127 Tabari. vol. iii. p. 477.
#28 Ibid. p 478.
139 Ibid. p. 479.
180 “The battle of Nehavend,” says
Malcolm, “decided the fate of Persia;
which, from its date, fell under the do-
minion of the Arabian caliphs” (History
of Persia, vol. i. p. 177). This seems to
me the true view. It is well expressed
by Mr. Vaux, who says. “The sack of
Madain (Ctesiphon) and the carnage of
Nehavend followed, and the empire of
% he Sassanidae, and with it the religion of
t
sº
g
THE SEVENTH MONAIRCLII.
|OII. XXVII.
sia for 415 years.” (Persia from the
ICarliest Period to the Arab Congwest, p.
177.)
131 The battle of Nehavend is called by
the Arabs the “Fattah-hul-Futtåh,” or
“Victory of Victories.” (See Price, Mo-
hammedan. History, vol. i. p. 134.)
19%. The order of conquest seems to
have been the following:-Media, North-
ern Persia, Rhagiana, Azerbijan, Gur-
§ Tabaristan, and Khorassan in A.D.
42; Southern Persia, Kerman, Seistan,
Mekran, and Kurdistan in A.D. 643; Mcrv,
Balkh, Herat, and Kharezm in A.D. 650
or 652. (See Tabari, vol. iii. pp. 480–577.
138 Tabari, vol. iii. pp. 503–4. -
*** Malcolm, Hist, of Persia, vol. i. pp.
177–8; Price. Mohammedan. History, vol.
i. p. 162; Irving, Successors of Mahomet,
p. 152. The circumstances of the death
of ºr. are, however, extremely
doubtful...(See Tabari, vol. iii. pp. 510–1
and pp. 570–1.) -
185 lirving, l. S. c.
18° Tabari, vol. iii. 504. They included,
according to this author, slaves of the
palace. cooks, valets, grooms, secreta-.
ries, wives, concubines, female attend-
ants, children, and old men.
187 Malcolm, p. 178; Price, p. 124; Ir-
ving, pp. 152–3; Vaux, Persia from the
Earliest Period, p. 177.
*** See Mordtmann in the Zeitschrift,
vol. viii. p. 143; vol. xii. p. 44; IllèlS
#. jumismatic Chronicle for 1873, pp. .
isºthomas in Num. Chron. 1873, p.
3.
CHAPTER XXVII.
* See Fergusson, History of Architec-
ture, vol. i. pp. 377–380, 2nd edition.
* Compare Flandin, Voyage en Perse,
Fº vol. ii.; Texier. Description de
'Arménie, la Perse, et la Mésopotamie,
vol. ii. planches 91–119: and the Author's
Ancient Monarchies, vol. iii. pp. 273–317,
2nd edition.
* From B. c. 150 to A.D. 226. (See the
#hor's Siarth Monarchy, p. 43 and p.
10.
ºr. Fergusson says broadly, “the
Parthians have left no material traces
of their existence” (Hist, of Architec-
twºre, vol. ii. p. 422, 1st edition). This is
true, so far as buildings are concerned.
* For an account of this building, see
the Author's Sia:th Monarchy, pp. 213–
216; and compare Fergusson, History of
flºitecture, vol. i. pp. 378-380, 2nd edi-
JOll.
* A ruin at Shapur, seen and described
by M. Flandin (Voyage en Perse, vol. ii.
p. 280–1), may be a portion of one of
these early palaces. It was built of
hewn stone; its plan was square; and
its ornamentation recalled the Perse-
politan edifices, but was extremely rude.
(Ibid. planches, vol. i. pl. 47.) I should
incline to attribute its construction t
Sapor I. * *
*
•
CH. xxv.11.]
f g
7 Fergusson, History of Architecture,
vol. i. pp. 382–6.
8 It is, perhaps, doubtful how far this
can be stated positively of the Takht-i-
Khosru, or palace of Chosroës I. at
Ctesiphon. The existing building is a
mere fragment (Fergusson, vol. i. p. 385),
which different persons will probably be
inclined to complete differently.
9 As in the Serbistan palace, which is
42 mêtres by 37. (See Flandin, Voyage
en Perse, planches, vol. i. pl. 28; and
compare Fergusson, History of Archi-
tecture, vol. i. p. 383, *
10 The Sassanian palace at Firuzabad
has a length of 103, and a breadth of 55
mêtres (Flandin, pl. 89). -
11 This is the case at Firuzabad and at
Mashita.
12 The Serbistan palace has thirteen
entrances to the same number of rooms.
The fragment at Ctesiphon has four en-
trances.
. 18. At the Takht-i-Khosru,
14 Fergusson, History of Architecture,
vol. ii. p. 487, 1st edition. Compare
Texier, Description de l'Arménie, vol. i.
plg. 5, 43, 76.
15 Fergusson, vol. ii. p. 443, 1st edition.
1 * At the Takht-i-Khosru. (See Pl.
XXVIII. Fig. 1.)
17 See Flandin, vol. i. pl. 40.
18.This is the height at Firuzabad. If
the Ctesiphon palace, as originally built,
had domes, their height probably ex-
ceeded a hundred feet.
19 See Fergusson, vol. i. p.
edition; and compare Pl. X
20 t the Serbistan palace.
Flandin, pl. 29, “Coupe sur la ligne
A. B.")
21 This is the number at Firuzahad.
The Mashita palace seems to have had
forty-four rooms.
29 Fergusson, History of Architecture,
vol. i. p. 385.
28 As at the Takht-i-Khosru (Fergus-
son. Hist, of Architecture, vol. i. p. 386,
2nd edition), and to some extent at Ma-
shita (Tristram, Land of Moab, opp. p.
371). r. Fergusson has made the
string-course a marked feature of his
restoration of the Mashita palace (Fron-
tispiece to Land of Moab, and Hist. of
Architecture, vol. i. P. 392, 2nd edition).
24 See Plate XXVII. . -
25 See Plate XXVIII.
26 Fergusson, Hist, of Architecture,
wol. i. p. 386; Land of Moab. p. 384;
Flandin, Voyage en Perse, vol. ii. p. 347.
27 Flandin, Voyage en Perse; Planches
Anciennes, vol. i. pl. 29.
• 28 As especially in the Firuzabad pal-
ace, described in text, p. 565.
** Fergusson, Hist, of Architecture,
vol. i. p. 382. -
so Fergusson, p. 386, note 2. '
81 All the measurements and details
of this description are taken from the
great work of Messrs. Flandin and Coste
—the “Voyage en Perse"—which Mr.
Fergusson rightly calls “the great and
THE SEVENTH MONARCHY.
amined by M.
best authority on Sassanian art.” (See
his contribution to Canon Tristram's
Land of Moab, p. 374, note.) Plates 28
and 29 of the “Voyage” present us with
all necessary particulars.
** Here again the description is drawn
from the Voyage. See Planches Anci-
ennes, pis. 38–42. Mr. Fergusson has
abridged the account of Flandin care-
fully and well in his History of Archi-
tecture, vol. i. pp. 383–5.
** Fergusson, vol. i. p. 386, note 2.
** The same peculiarity belongs to the
Mashita palace in its complete state.
The object of having only one entrance
would seem to be greater security.
**See text, p. 563. The entire descrip-
tion of this building is drawn from the
elaborate plans, elevations, and sec-
tions of M. Flandin (Voyage en Perse,
Planches, vol. i. ple. 39 to 42).
36 Fºon, istory of Architecture,

.vol. i. p. 384.
87 Tradition seems to have been right
for once in attaching this edifice to th
first Chosroës. His erection of it is
mentioned by Theophylact of Simocat-
ta, who says that Greek materials and
Greek workmen were employed in its
construction (Hist. v. 6).
* See, Fergusson, Hist. of Architec-
ture, vol. i. p. 385.
* The doorways still remain. See Pl.
XXVIII. Fig. 1.) -
* This is the length of the present
façade. It does not, however, corre-
spond with either of the two measure-
tuents given by Tabari as those of the
length and breadth of the building.
(See text, p. 566.)
** This description is taken mainly
from Mr. Tristram's account of the pal-
ace in his Land of Monb (London, 18; º
but some points are added from Mr. Fer-
gusson's account in his History of Arch-
tteoture, vol. i. pp. 387–392, 2nd edition.
** Fergusson, Hist, of Architecture,
vol. i. p. 388.
** Tristram, Land of Moab, p. 202.
** See text, pp. 562, 563. .
45 Tristram, l. s. c.
** An external wall, strengthened with
semicircular bastions, and without gate-
ways, was carried round the entire en-
closure of the palace, and prevented in-
gress or egress anywhere except by the
great ɺ: in front. (See the ground-
plan, Pi. XXIX. Fig. 1. . . . *
47 Tristram, pp. 202, 204. -
48 Fergusson, Hist. of Architecture,
vol. i. p. 390. -
49 Tristram, p. 200. -
50 Ibid. pp. 200–201.
5, Ibid. p. 197, -
5* This arch has been thoroughly ex-
landin, and is eachaw8-
tively represented in his great work
(Voyage en Perse, Planches, vol. i. plg. 2
to 12), from which the present Author's
description is whollv taken. For a rep-
resentation of the arch on a small scale,
see Pl. XXXIV. Fig. 1
7(3(,
\
53 See Flandhn, ple, 17 bis and 27 bis.”
, 54 Ibid. pl.s. 17 and 27. , ,
55 See Pl. XXXII. C., and compare
SFlandin, vol. i. ple. 6 and 8. . . .
56 Mr. Fergusson considers that these
figures “are evident copies of those
à, orming the triumphal arches of the
Romans” (Hist. of Architecture, vol. i.
p. 394), and appears to think that they
must have been the work of Byzantine
artists; but the correctness of this latter
opinion may be doubted.
7 As does the crescent on the head of
Chosroës. (Flandin, pl. 9; see Pl. X].I.)
58 See Pls. XLVII and XLIV. : and for
a description see text, pp. 574-576.
59 Tabari, Chromiqtte, vol. ii. p. 804;
Magoudi, vol. ii. } 215. .
60 Fergusson, Hist. of Architecture,
. S. C. -
61 So M. Flandin though
Voyage en Perse, vol. ii. pp.
(See his
7–8.)
63 Description de l'Arménie, de lºt
t,
27
Perse, &c., vol. ii. p. 283 M. Flandin'
imagined that the original height was
between seven and eight mêtres,
83 See Pis. XII. and XIV.
64 “Les cheveux,” says M. Texier,
“sont traités avec un fini qui rappelle
les sculptures de Persepolis” (Descrip-
tion. vol. ii. p. 234). -
65 It is curious that, in M. Flandin’s
representation of the statue in its pres-
ent condition, the right hand and the
two feet have the appearance of being
delicately carved. The left hand is not
seen. (Voyage en Perse, Planches, vol.
i. pl. 54
- 30 Eighteen are represented by , M.
Flandin in the first volume of his plates;
thirteen by M. Texier. Others are add-
ed by Sir R. Ker Porter.
. See especially Flandin, Planches,
VOI. 1. Oi. 5U.
68 I cannot but suspect that M. Texier's
engravings are occasionally improve-
ments on the originals . But I have no
proof that my suspicions are well
founded. . -
THE SEVENTII MONARCHY,
[CH. xxvii.
Pl. XIX. Figs. 8 and 4. The peculiarity
consists in the two wings, one on either
side of the inflated ball. Two wings do
not 'otherwise occur until the time of
Perozes, with whom the crescent, which
does not appear on the Nakhsh-i-Rustam
bas-relief, is a distinguishing feature. .
7 5 er Porter, vol. i. p. 537; Flan-
din, Voyage en Perse, vol. ii. p. 101; Tex-
ier. Description, vol. ii. p. 228, Ker, Por-
ter says: “ The next bas-relief . . . rep-
resents a combat between two horsement
and has been designed with great fire,
and executed in a style very superior to
the preceding one. The proportions of
the figures are good; and everything
proclaims it to have been the work of a
different hand.” -
7° For this tablet, see Texier, vol. ii. pl.
131, and Ker Porter, vol. i. pl. 22,
77 See the description of M. Texier:-
* Le cavalier vainqueur . . . a une coif-
fure des plus singulières; 'c'est un bon-
net surmonté de trois pointes, lesquelles
sont terminées par trois ules can-
melées.” (Description, 1. s. c. a .
º See the Voyage en Perse, Planches,
vol. 1. pl. 43.
79 This is shown by the streaming rib-
bons, by the balls flying from the ãº.
ders, and the sum and moon emblem ºf
on the caparison of the horse and the
quiver. -
80 I am not aware that the sculpture
in question, which is figured by Flandin
(Voyage, Planches, vol. i. pl. 50) and
Texier (Description. vol. ii. pl. 151), has
ever been assigned to Chosroës I; but,
as he is the only Sassanian monarch who
represents himself upon his coins as
facing to the spectator, and leaning both
hands upon his straight sword, with its
point between his feet (see Pi. XXII.), I
make no doubt that the relief is his.
81 Especially the one figured by Texier
in pl. 147 of his second volume.
82 See Pls, XXIII. and XXIV.
88 See Pls, XXXI.-XXXIV.
** The name Sheb-Diz signifies “Color
of Night” (Tabari. vol. ii. p 304).
gºlandia. Voyage en Perse, vol. i. pp.

*
69 It is thus that I interpret the bas-
relief; but I am bound to add that M.
Texier himself sees in the figure in ques-
tion “a captive general who presents to
por his manacled arms” (Description,
vol. ii. p. 226). It is evident from his en-
graving that the relief is defective in
this part.
70 Full representations will be found
in Flandin (Voyage, Planches, vol. i. pl.
53) and Texier (Description, vol. ii. pl.
#. They differ curiously in some de-
£il
S.
71 See Pls. XVI., XVII., and XVIII.
Compare Flandin, . Voyage en Perse,
Planches, vol. i. pls. , 13, 51, and 52;
Texier, Description, vol. ii. ple. 133, 184,
140, and 148 (numbered by mistake 130).
72 See text, p. 384.
78 As by Ker Porter (Travels, vol. i. pl.
20); by Flandin (Voyage. Planches, vol.
iv.), and by Texier (vol. ii. pl. 132).
74 See the gem and the coin figured on
8° Yet I suspect that all the three
horsemen, who are on a larger scale
than the others, do in fact represent the
king—the first, towards the top. its lie
begins the day; the second. towards the
middle, as he engages in the hunt; the
third, near the bottom. as he rides home,
after having enjoyed the sport.
87 The musicians occupy the upper
portion of the central compartment on
either side of the monarch.
88 Compare Pl. CXXXV.
8° The best representation of the boar
hunt is that given by Ker Porter (vol. ii.
pl. 68), which is at once exact and spirit-
ed. His stag-hunt (pl. 64) has less merit.
90 See Pl. XLVI.
* See text, p. 573.
** Travels, vol. ii. p. 178.
* See especially the first Fargard of
the Vendidad, translated by Haug, in
Bunsen’s Philosophy of History, vol. iii.
pp -
there were any such in his day (i. 131).
No representations other than symboli-
cal are found in the Achaemenian sculp-
30 Ormazd was symbolized by the
winged circle, of which sometimes an
incomplete human form was a part.
Ahriman was perhaps symbolized by
the monstrous figures common on the
gems and at Persepolis.
31 See Pl. XXXV.
'82 This epithet of Ahriman is common
in the Zen ºesia. See Venudidad, Farg.
i. § 3, 5, 6, &c. -
3 See Ker Porter, Travels, vol. i. pl.
27; Flandin, Voyage en Perse, pl. 193;
º Description de l'Arménie, &c.
}}. 141. .
l 34 See Pl. XII. .
35 See text, p. 275.
86 In the arch at Takht-i-Bostan. Chos-
roës II. represents himself as receiving
the diadem from two deities, one male
and one female. The male deity is
pººl. {}rmazd; the female one ima.
he either Armaiti or Anallit. (See Pl.
XLII.) ... •
37 Hormisdates (=* given by Ormazd'')
is not an uncommon name for a Sassa-
nian monarch to give to his son; but no
other name constructed in this manner
is tused. There is no Mithridates in the
Sassanian royal line. .
In every extant inscription the king
gives himself the epithet of mazdism or
“ Ormazd-worshipping.”
8° Cyrus is made to swear by Mithra,
in the Cyropaedia of Xenophon (viii. 3, §
53). He had for treasurer a Mithredatin
(Mithridates), whose name signifies
“given by Mithra.” (See Ezra. i. 8
40 As Mnemon (Loftus, Chaldoert, and
Susiana, p. 372) and Ochus (Beh. Ins.
vol. i. p. 842). -
41 Xen. Cyrop. viii. 3, § 12.
42 As in the following passages—
* Conne to our help, Mithra and Ahura
(= Ormazd), ye great ones” (Avesta, iii.
2): “Mithra, and Ahura, the two great,
imperishable, pure ones, we praise’’ (ib.
iii. 12): “Wherefore may these corne to,
our aid, Mithra, and Ahura, the great
ones, yea, Mithra, and Ahura, the great
ones” (ib. iii. 97).
43 Mihir Yasht, 54.
44 Ibiti.
45 - vesta, iii. 79.
46 The disk, or circle, represents Mith-
ra, on the tourbs of the Achaemenian
kings. (See the Author's Ancient Mon-
archies, vol. iii. pp. 320 and 352.) It is
sometimes, but rarely, used by the Saš- .
sanians, who in general substitute for it
a six-rayed star. (See the later coins,
possin.) -
47 Berosus ap. Clem. Alex, Profrept.
§ 5. The noble figure, marked by its
t
.488–90. •
29 Herodotus expressly denies that
cH. xxviii.] * THE SEVENTH MONAROLIY.
98 Thomas in Numismatic Chrom.. for
1873, p. 243. f
94 Fergusson. Hist, of Architecture,
vol. i. p. 394, ºnd edition. -
95 Ibid. p. 390. ---
96 Theophylact. Simocatt. v. 6; p. 128,
97 See Tabari, vol. ii. p. 304.
98 So Mr. Fergusson (History of Archi-
tecture, vol. i. pp. 390-1). -
99 See Pl XXIX, and XL.
100 See Pl. XL. . -
101 There was scarcely any time when
Justinian and Chosroës I. were on such
terms as to render the transaction
spoken of at all probable. The “end-
less peace” was followed almost imme-
diately by covert hostility, issuing short-
ly in Irenewed warfare. The peace of
A.D. 562 did not indicate any real friend-
liness on the part of the contracting
powers; and, moreover, soon after its
conclusion Justinian died. Theophylact,
it must be remembered, did not write
till the reign of Heraclius, half a centu-
ry after the death of Justinian.
CHAPTER XXVIII.
1 See text, pp. 270, 271.
2 Zoroastrianism is the religion of the
Parsees (Persians), who, declining to sub-
mit to the religion of Mohammed, quitted
their country, and sought a refuge in
Western India, where they still remain,
chiefly in Bombay and Guzerat. -
8 See text, p. 270.
4 Gatha ahunavaiti, iii. 3, in Haug's
Gathas, vol. i. p. 7. º agrees in
the translation *A*st. vol. ii. p. 150).
5 Haug's Gathas, vol. ii. p. 9.
9 Haug's Essays, p. 257.
7 Yagna, xxxi. 7; li. 7.
8 Ibid. xii. 1.
9Ibid. xliii. 4, 5.
J.9 Hibid. Xxxv.
id. xlvi. 2.
. xliii. 5.
. xlv. 5.
. xxxv. 3.
19 Haug, Essays, p. 257.
20 Yagna, xxxiv. 1; xlvii. 1, 2, &c.
21 Ibid. xliii. 4. 5.
22 See the remarks of Dr. Pusey in his
Lectures on Daniel, pp. 580–1, 3rd edi-
tion.
28 See Spiegel's Avesta, vol. ii. p. 218,
Exxix
nº vol.-iii. p. x
24 See Yagnu, Xii. 1; and compare
Haug's Essays, p. 143, note. -
25
ee above, note 19, - -
26 Ormazd has a fravashi, which is dis-
tinct from himself, and yet a part of
himself (Yagna, xxvi. 3; Vendidad, xix.
, &c.). He has also a soul, and, in a
certain sense, a body. (See Yºgma, i. 2;
sº Avesta, vol. ii. p. 23.)
37 Even this, however, is disputed.
(See Pusey’s Daniel, p. 580, note 3.)
* K
*

702
wearing a Persian or Phrygian cap,
stabbing the bull in the classical Mith-
raic emblem (Lajard, Culte de Mithra,
pl. lxxv., lxxviii., lxxx... lxxxii., lxxxiii.,
3.c.), probably carries out the Oriental
1Cleå.
s: Spiegel, Tradit. Schrift. d. Pars. p.
; )
49 Xen. ºft viii. 3, § 24; Ov. Fast. i.
355; Yagna, xliv. 18.
50 See the Author's Ancient Monarch-
ies, vol. iii. pp. 99. 112, and 116.
51 Haug's Essays, p. 232. $
52 Ibid. p. 231.
... p. 193.
54 Spiegel, Avesta, iii. 72.
** Haug, Essays, p. 263. Compare
Windiscuinam, Zoroastrische Studien,
• Q}}.
P. Yagma, xxxiii. 3.
57 FIaug, p. 261. -
58 Spiegel, Avesta, vol. iii. p. x.
59 Yagna, xxxi. 9,
60 lbid. xxxi. 10.
61 Ibid. xliv, 11.
92 Haug, Essays, pp. 11, 186, &c.
* Yagna, Xliii. 6. Compare Soph.
CEal. Tyr. 837-844: — vöpiou iſ pitroëes, div
'Caupºros tratºp welvos, ovčé viv 8vatā (biſals
&véptov Štukrey, obôè piùv wrote A66 a karakow-
Aldo’et.
94 Yagna, xii. 1–9.
** Ancient Monarchies, vol. i. p. 138;
vol. ii. p. 24, 2nd edition.
66 Herod. i. 131
67 BeroSuS ap. Clem. Alex. Protrept.
§ 5. The erection of the statue at Susa.
was commemorated by Mnemon in an
inscription. (Loftus, Chaldaea and Sw-
sianct, p. 372.) ; -
68 See ºl. i. 199; Strab. xvi. i. § 20;
Baruch, wi
|THE SEVENTH MO.Y.1120EIY.
[ch. xxviiI,
. 43. }
69 Windischmann, Ueber die Persische
Anahita oder Amaitis, p. 19.
70 See text, p. 582. .
71 An idolatrous worship of Bahman
("Quavos), and Amerdat ("Avaðaros) was
established in Western Asia, in Strabo's
age (Strab. xi. 8, § 4, and xv. 3, § 15); but
it is uncertain whether these corrup-
tions continued into Sassanian times.
2 Haug, Essays, p. 230; Windisch-
mann, Zoroastrische Studien, p.
78 Haug, pp. 142 and 258.
74 Çaurva is identified (Haug, Essays,
p. 230) with the Indian Shiva, who has
the epithet, Sarva in one of the later
Vedas (Yajar-Veda, xvi. . 28). Naon-
haitya represents the Aswins, whose
collective name in the Vedas is Nasatyas.
Taric and Zaric are peculiar to the Ira-
nian system.
75 Yagna, xii. 4.
76 Ibid. xxx. 6.
77 The Gāthās have been collected and
ublished by Haug, in two volumes
Leipsic, 1858–60). They are metrical,
, and are º: to form the earliest
portion of the Zendavesta. .
78 Several of the Yashts are translated
by Haug, in his Essaus on the Religion
of the Parsees, Bombay, 1862. '
7° The following is a specimen: –“We
- (Ormazd) the
pure, the master of purity. We wor-
ship the Amesha Spentas, the possessors
of good, the givers of good. e W-Or-
ship the whole creation of the true spirit,
both the spiritual and the terrestrial, all
that supports the welfare of the good
creation. and the spread of the good and
true religion. -
“We praise all good thoughts, all
goods words, all good deeds, which are
or shall be; and we likewise keep clean
and pure all that is good.
“O. Ahura-mazda, thou true, happy
being ! We strive to think, to speak, and
to do only such things as may be best
fitted to promote the two lives (i.e. the
life of the body and the life of the soul).
“We beseech the spirit of earth for
the sake of these our best works” (i.e.
our labors in agriculture), “to grant us
beautiful and fertile fields, to the be-
liever as well as to the unbeliever, to
him who has riches as well as to him
who has no possessions.” (Yagna, xxxv.
1-4.)
80 See the Author's Ancient Monarch-
ies, vol. ii. p. 338. 2nd edition.
** Herod. i. 132: Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6.
82 Yagna, xxxiii. 3.
88 See above, note 64; and compare
Yaçna, xii. 8; xxxii. 5; xxxiii. 2; xlvii.
1; xlix. 4; &c.
84 See especially the Vendidad, Farg.
8–11, and 16, 17.
86 Herod. i. 139; Strab. xv. 3; $ 15 and
16; Agathias, ii. p. 60.
** Vendidad, Farg. 19, § 30–32; Haug,
Essays. p. 156.
87 The Magi can scarcely have been
the priests of the Persians when Darius
Hystaspis proclaimed a general massa-
cre of them, and established the annual
Magophonia (Herod. iii. 79); but when
Herodotus wrote, about seventy years
later, they had attained the position (ib.
i. 132). See the Author's “Essay on the
Religion of the Ancient Persians,” in the
first volume of his #. (pp. 346–
350, 2nd edition), and compare Wester-
gaard, “Preface” to the Zemdavesta, p.
iſ .
88 See text, pp. 271, 272. *
* Patkanian, in the Journal Asiatique
for 1866, p. 115.
90 Ibid. Mov-pet or Mog-pet, “Mago-
rum caput,” becomes in the later l'er-
sian Mobed.
91 See text, p. 430.
92 See text. pp. 297, 417, 418, 486, &c.
98 Hyde compares them to the “Bish-
ops” of the Christian Church (De relig.
Pers, c. 80, p. 372).
94 Strabo. xv. 3, 15; Diog. Laert.
Prooem, $6. The pointed cap and cloak
were still worn in Parthian times.
95 Amm. Marc. xxiii. 6; p. 378. g
* See text. p. 486. {
97 The statement of Herodotus that,
the Persians had no temples (i. 181, ad
(See.
CII, xxv III.]
init.) is not-even true of his own age, as
appears from the Bellistun inscription,
where Darius states that he rebuilt the
“temples” (ayadaná) which Gomates
the Magician had destroyed (Beh. Ins.
col. i. par. 14, § 5). In Sassanian times
their fire-temples are frequently men-
tioned. (See text, p. 524; and compare
Nicephorus, De Rebus post Mawricium,
p. 12, A.; Hyde, De relig. Pers. c. 29, p
359; Creuzer, Symbol. i. pp. 651, 719, 2nd
edition; Patkanian, in Journ. Asiatique,
1866, p. 112; &c.)
98 IIjo &apegrov by Aérrovartv ot Máyot
(Strab. xv. 3, § 15).
** See the representations on coins,
• *
Pis, xi., §v, xix.ºri.
100 As in the coins given (see Pis. XXI.—
101 These guardians became ultimate-
ly so debased as scarcely to present the
appearance of human figures. They are
however maintained. together with the
fire-altar, to the very close of the em-
ire. (See the coin of Isdigerd III., Pl.
..)
102 Herod. i. 107, 108, 120; vii. 19, 37;
Cic. de Div. i. 23.41, &c. That the Magi
of Sassanian times undertook to ex-
pound omens, appears from the story
% Kobad's siege of Amida (see text, p.
435).
108 Dino, Fr. 8; Schol. Nic. Ther. 613;
Vendidad, Farg. xviii. 1–6. g
104 Vendidad, l. s. c.
105 See Herod. i. 140,
10° See especially the central figure in
the archway at Takht-i-Bostan, which
represents. Chosroës II. in his robes of
state. (Flandin, Voyage em. Perse, pl.
9
..)
107 Tabari, Chronique, vol. ii. p. 305.
This is, of course, an exaggeration.
108 Ibid. p. 304.
109 D'Herbelot. Bibl. Orient. vol. iii. p.
0.
110 Cedrenus, p. 412.
111 D'Herbelof, 1. s. c. -
112 See Magoudi, vol. ii. pp. 156–9.
118 So Gibbon, following certain Orien-
tal authorities (decline and Fall, vol. v.
. 395). Other writers (as Mirkhond and
Tabari) raise the number to 12,000. (See
note 198, Chapter XXIV.) *
114 Tabari, vol. ii. p. 305.
115 see Pis. Xiii. xiv., XVI., and
irºšée Pl. XV.; and compare Pl.
XXIII
117 See Longpérier, Medailles des Sas-
sanides, pl.xii., coins of Pouran- (docht)
and Azermi- (döcht). It is however very
doubtful whether we have any coins of
these queens.
118 See Pl. XXXV.
***This and the following names are
taken from Patkanian's summary of
Sassanian history in the Journal Asia-
tique for 1866, pp. 114-116. --
120 Chosroës II. (Parwiz) is assigned
this number" by Tabari (vol. ii. p. 305),
who reckons the entire royal stud at 50,-
THE S/E VENTII MONARCHIV.
703
000! . a cipher should be struck
off both numbers. *
** Mirkhond, Histoire des Sassanides,
p. 404. Compare Tabari (l. s. c.) and Ma-
goudi (vol. ii. pp. 230–2). -
1** Here again I am indebted to Pat-
kanian for the native names of the offi-
cers. (See above, note 119.) In modern
Persia the corresponding officer is called
the Buzurk-Fermander.
*** As Elisaeus and Lazare Parbe, who
wrote between A.D. 400 and 500, and Sé-
Hºs. who wrote between A.D. 600 and
t -
134. This was the chief seat of the court
in the earlier times—from the founda-
tion of the empire, at any rate, till the
time of Julian. (See text, p. 354.
125 See text, p. 520.
*** Those of Serbistan and Firuzabad
in Persia Proper, of Ctesiphon in Irak,
and of Mashita in the land of Moab.
(See Pls. XXVII.-XXXI.)
127 See note 195, Chapter XXIV.
...” Theophan. Chronograph. pp. 268–
t U. -
12P See Pi. XII.
130 See especially Pl. XXXV.
** The patterning appears in the fig-
ure representing Chosroës II, under the
arch at Takht-i-Bostan, and in the statue
of Sapor I. In this latter case the pat-
term is a cross. (V.) .
r
(See Pi. XXXV
32 See the figures of Sapor I. (Pls.
XIII. and XIV.); and compare that of
Artaxerxes I. (Pl. XXXV.).
*** The round cap, with its ornamen-
tation of jewels or pearls, may be best
seen in the gem portraits of Sapor I. (Pl.
.), and Hormisdas II. (Pl. XVIII.). It
seems to be still worn in the time of
Chosroës II. (Pl. XLVI.), but is lower,
only just covering the head.
184See especially the figure of Chos-
roës II. under the arch. g
***Ear-rings are, I believe, universal
upon the coins; but in the sculptures
they are not unfrequently omitted (See
the head of Narses, Pl, XVIII.)
130 See the coins (Pls. XII., XV., XVIII.


C.).
187 See the bas-relief of the stag-hunt
(Pl. XLIII.).
188 The following description is taken
almost wholly from the figure repre-
senting Chosroës II. on his war-horse,
Sheb-Diz, in the lower ºpºnt ot
the great relief at Takht-i-Bostan. An
excellent representation of this figure is
given by Flandin (Voyage em. Perse,
Planches Anciennes, vol. i. pl. 10). -
189 The bow-case is not seen; but it
may have hung on the left side; or an
attendant may have handed the king
his bow when he required it.
140 The chase of the stag and wild-
boar is represented at Takht-i-Bostan
(see Pls. XLIII. and XLIV.); that of the
wild hoar, the ibex, the antelope, and
the huffalo, is seen in the precious vase
of Firuz (see text, p. 420).
141 Lions, tigers, and wild asses were
*
*.
"704
found by Heraclius in the paradise at-
tached to the Dastagherd palace, where
there were also a number of antelopes
(Theophan. Chronograph. p. 268. C).
Julian found, in paradises near Ctesi-
phon, lions, bears, and wild boars (see
text. p. 354). -
142 When Stilicho visited the Persian
court, he was entertained in this man-
ner, and acquired great credit., if we
may believe 8.a. for his skill in the
chase. (See the poem De lawdibws Sti-
lichonis, i. li. 64–6.)
143 Seven horsemen accompany the
monarch in the great stag-hunt of Chos-
roës II. (Pl. XLIII.). They are probably
participators in the sport.
144 This difference is marked in the
lines of Claudian,
Quis Stilichone prior ferro penetrare
€O?les
Comminus, aut longe virgatas figere
tigres? ,
(De law.d Stilich. i. 64–5). “.
145 The Sassanian, like the Jewish
kings (1 K. i. 33), sometimes condescend-
ed to ride mules. The saddle-mule of
Chosroës I. is represented in a bas-relief.
(Pl. XLVI. Fig. 2.)
146 See the two hunting bas-reliefs
(Pls. XLIII. and XLIV.).
147 See the representation of the stag-
hunt (Pl. XLIII.).
148. The word Shahpam is somewhat
doubtfully rendered as “Head Falco-
ner” by Patkanian (Journal Asiatique,
1866, p. 115); but I am inclined to think
that he is right. The modern Persians
call their favorite falcon the Shaheem,
and another variety the Shah-bazd (La-
yard, Nineveh and Babylon, pp. 480–1).
149 Mr. Layard says that he observed
a falconer with a hawk on his wrist
among the sculptures of Khorsabad
(ibid. p. 483, note), which belong to the
eighth century B.C. -
150 Theophan. Chronograph. p. 268, C,
15. See text, p. 490. .
152 D'Herbelót, Bibliothèque Orientale,
vol. iv.# 486.
198 I find only two occasions during the
Sassanian, period where chariots are
rrientioned in connection with the armed
orce. One is the famous occasion of
the invasion of Alexander Severus (see
text, p. 264), where, according to him,
f,800 scythed chariots were brought into
the field against him: 'The other is to-
wards the close of the empire. when,
after the battle of Nineveh, some cha-
riots are said to have been taken by
Heraclius (see text, p. 530). There is no
mention of their actual employment in
any battle. and only one representation
of a chariot on the sculptures. (See
Pl. XLVI.) . ---
1°4 See text, pp. 264, 300, 327, 361, 365,
C.
iº See text, pp. 546 and 548.
THE SEVENTIf MONARCHY.
[CH. xxvii.I.
15° On the employment of elephants
in the Tazio: war, see note 137, Chapter
. Elephanis are frequent upon the
seulptures. (See PIs. XLIII. and XIIV.)
157 Patkaijian in the Journal Asiatique
for 1866, p. 114.
168 See text, p. 361.
150 Ibid. pp. 361, 365, and 368. -
160 See the representation of Chosroës
II. º #Li) and compare Julian, Orat.
ii. p. 116. *
131 The pay of an archer considerably
exceeded that of an ordinary foot sol-
dier (see text, p. 487). *— +
183 See text, pp. 356 and 443.
163 See text, p. 361.
164 See text, R}, 262 and 558.
165 Compare Virg Georg. iii. 31: Hor.
Od. i. 19, 11 : ii. 13. 17: Justin. xli. 2; Tac.
ſº 35; Claudian, De lattd. Stilich.
. (58. &c.
f
186 See text, pp. 443. 526, &c.
167 The olily distinct corps of which we
hear is that of “the Innmortals.” which
was a divisiºn of the cavalry numberin
10,000, and therefore not j
(See text, pp. 396 and 444; and compare
Herod. vii. 83.)
168 The satraps collected the forces of
their respective provinces under the
Achaemenians (Herod. vii. 26). and led
them into battle. The same system
probably prevailed under the Sassa-
liians.
189 On these and the following names
of office, see Patkanian in the Journal
Asiatique for 1866, pp. 114–5.
170 See text, p. 546.
171 see Ker Forter. Travels, vol. i. pls.
20 and 22; Texier, Description de l'Ar-
menie, &c., vol. ii. plis. 131 and 132.
172 The single ring may be an emblem
of the sun; but the five striated balls
defy conjecture. They are certainly
not the five planets. -
178 See text, p. 530.
174 See text, pp. 442, 443, 466, 471, 523,
C.
175 See text, pp. 334,417, and 427; and
note 60, Chapter XXIII.
170. At the great siege of Taras by
Chosroës I. (see text, p. 479), Rustam's
army at Cadesia numbered 120,000 (ibid.
p. 547). The army brought by Artaxer-
xes I. against Alexander Severus (ibid.
p. 264) is not taken into account here,
since the only estimate which we have
of its numbei is quite untrustworthy. .
177 Out of the 140,000 brought into the
field by Chosroës I. only 40,000 were
horse.
178 See text, p. 445.
17° Ibid. pp. 322 and 327.
180 Ibid. pp. 334–5. *
18, Ibid. pp. 335, 336, 888, &c.
183 Ibid. pp. 335, 336,435, &c,
188 It was in this way that Daras was
taken (see text. p. 479).
194 Hyde goes so far as to say that a
second wife was not taken excepting
* t \
CH. XXVIII.]
with the consent of the first wife, and
in the case of her barrenness (De relig.
veterwm Persarum, c. 34, p. 413).
185 Indications of the non-seclusion of
women are, the occurrence of female
heads on the Sassanian coins (see Pl.
XV.); the reigns of two female sover-
eigns (see text. pp. 540–541); the mention
of women as cultivators and taxpayers
(see note 21, Chapter .); and again
as owners of houses (see note 82, Chap-
ter XXI.); &c.
186 See text, pp. 484-486.
text, p
Compare
. p. 314.
187 Patkanian, in the Journal Asia-
THE SEVENTH MONARCII). w
tique for 1866, p. 113. Compare Elisée,
pp. 102, 107, and Lazare Parbe, pp. 80
and 140. .
*See text, pp. 294, 427, 431.440, 449,
450, 472, 491, 501, 515, 532, and 537.
** If we compare the Sassanian pe-
riod with the Achaemenian, we shall
find that a considerable improvement
had taken place in respect of the num-
ber and the severity of punishments.
No such barbarities are related of any
Sassanian monarch as were common
under the kings of the older line. (See
the Author's Ancient Monarchies, vol.
iii. pp. 244-7, 2nd edition.)

G ENERAL IND EX. -
\ . . *
Alexander victorious at Issus...... ... ii., 539
Alexandria taken by Chosroës II ..... iii, 520
Alluvial deposits on Persian Gulf.... i, 3
Alphabetic characters of the Medes... ii, 76
Altaku, Egyptians defeated at........ , 449
Alyattes takes Smyrna......... tº e º 'º e º 'º ii, 101
Amasis sends Nitetis to Cambyres... ii., 448
Ambris deposed by Sargon..... # * * * * * , 442
Amnestris, wife of Xerxes I... . . . . . . . . , 501
Amida .#. by Philippicus...... , 498
— Romans defeated near... . . . . . . . . ... iii, 333
conquests — Surrender to Rome by Robad..... iii, 437
driven — taken by Chosroës II............ * * * * 519
— taken by Heraclius.....‘. . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 525
— taken by Kobad ........ • * * * * * * * * * * , 435
— taken by Sapor II. ................. ... iii, 337
threatened by TamchoSro. . . . . . . . . . , 481
Amidi taken by Assyrians............ U0
oo river. Šee Oxus.
Añº, the Sacaean king............ , 441
– holds Caria ............... * s • * * * * * * * , 508
Amran, mound of Babylon......... ... ii, 179
Amyitis, wife of Nebuchadnezzar...ii, 93, 23.
Amyntas submits to Hystaspis....... ii., 479
Amyrtaeus defeats the Persians...... , 50.3
Ana, the Chaldaean deity.......... ... . . i. 74
Anaſtis, the Babylonian Venus....... y
Anakassassinates Chosroes........... , 269
Anastasius and Kobad make a peace iii, 4.8
— builds Daras fortress. . . . . . . . . tº s º e º sº , 438
— Death of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • * * , 438
— refuses money to Kobad . 1ji, 434
— sends four generals to the East , 436
Anata, the Chaldaean deity........ ... i. 75
Anathan surrenders to Julian.. ... iii,
Anatho occupied by Mir aduris.
Anatolius enters Persian camp
Anchialus, Building of........ 4
— Roman alliance with....... ... iii, 174
Ancyra taken by Chosroës II.......... iii, 521
Anecdote of a Persian pºte: ... iii, 487
Anglon, Romans defeated at......... , 462
Angora. See Ancyra.
Angro-Mainyus. See Ahriman.
i, 81, 353 || Anilai, the robber-chief ............. ... iii, 136
iii, 583 Animals in Assyrian sculpture....... , 247
- - of Assyria .................... ....... 1, 146
— of Babylonian empire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 158
- of Media............................. , 29
— Of Persia Proper................... . ii,
iii, 547 || – Antalcidas, Peace of, concluded ... ii., 524
iii, 554 || — Second embassy of ............. .... ii., 52G
344 || Antegan made governor of Armenia iii, 424
Antioch, Founding of, on the Orontes iii, 20
- Earthquake at.............. . . . . . . . . . iii, 176
– Captured b DOT 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 281
— recovered by Timesitheus.......... , 281
— saved by Belisarius. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 445
— again taken by Sapor I............. , 283
2 | – Earthquakes of. D. C. 525. . . . . . . . . . . iii, 454
iji, 175 | – taken by Chosroë3 J. . . . . . . . . . . . • * * * * * * * *
iii, 282 — taken by Chosroës II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 519
ntiochus Lidetes, Accession of....... iii, 54
Antoninus Pius succeeds Hadrian.... iii, 183
ii, 533 || Antoninus, the Roman official........ iii. 832
ii, 545 Anu, the Assyrian deity.......... ... . . . i. 346
iſ, 335 | Anunit, the oriental sun-goddess...i, 81, 353
Anushirwan, the Just. See Chosroës I.
Apamea destroyed by Adarman..... , jii, 479
— its fragment of “true cross ". . . . . . iii, 456
— sacked by Chosroës II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . jii, 519
— taken by Chosroës I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii., 456
f
_º




708 tº
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
crucified.......
Assyrians....
* * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * *
• a s e º 'º e º & 8 & 9
* * * * * * * * * *
• * * * * * * * *
& © & s :
s e º 'º e º 'º e º e º & & & e º – c. *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * *
• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * s 6 & 8 v 8 º' g º $ 8 &
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
i
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * g e
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * *
and Per;
Slans
— religi, n., Earliest phase of
Ariaramnes captures a few Scythians
Ariaspes takes his own infe...... . . . . .
Ariobarzanes, Revolt of...............
Aristagoras takes Sardis...............
A
A
Arithmetic of Chaldaea. . . . . . . . . . . . . . * *
Armenia becomes a Persian province
— becomines a Roman province
— declares for Chosrogs II. . . . . . . . . . . .
— Eastern, describe
— forced into Zot oastrianism. . . . . . . .
— formidable to the Medes
©S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
* * * * * * * * * * * * * *
— Nikhor made governor of..........
— pacified by Balas
Alexan qºseveru: º
— plundered by Alexander severus.
— rabels against is digerd I
– relinquished to Parthia. . . . . . . . . . . . .
iii.
t
GENERAL INDEX.
Armenia. Sapor II
WOll
* c < * * * * * * * * * *
s & 4 c + æ e º - a s
* * * * * *
• * * * * * * * * * * * * s s
& e g c e g g º s m º º
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
a g º e s ∈ 8 & s º & 8 º' tº º 8 tº gº tº * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
e a s s - s s is e º s is
Artaxerxt:S
Persians....... - -
iii,
, 126
and slain ifi, 21
accede . . . . º
#, 2%
iil, , 53
..], 236
iii. 14)
:60
j
j},
i),
, 199
2













- SEVEN GREAT MON.4FCHIES.
Artaxerxes III, glain by Shahr-Barz... ii
– succeeds Kobad II.
\rtaxerxes of Armenia deposed......
Artaxias succeeds Artavasdes........
rteman, the site of Adrapan.........
Artogerassa taken by Sapor II
Arts and Sciences Of y Jo
\rxamús, Leontius defeated at ii
Aryandes, governor of Egypt, executed i
Mryenis marries Astyages.............
\rzamene ceded to the Romans.......
— invaded by Celer....................
A.
i., §§
j, 45
©. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
— taken by -:::::::::::::::::
Asia Minor, a
nvade ARShur-bani-pal........
— overrun
— Persian
tº s e a s - - - -
Cyrene.
- - - - - - * * * * * * * * * ii,
argon º
terrestrial paradise.... i
35; iii, 2
god of Assyria......
city of Assyria......
or Sardanapalus.. i.
- - - - - - - - - e º 'º - - - - - - - -
=
• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * - - -
• * * * - - - - - -
a e e e s - - - - - - - * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
- - - - - - - - - - - - - a t < * - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - -
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * ~ * - - - - - - e º 'º e e
* - - - - - - - - - - - e.
* * * * * - - - - - - -
- - - - - - - - - - e.
• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
and festivals
on the Tigris.
Articles of
*** * * * * * * * * - - - - - - - - - e. e. e. e. e.
– Tº
– royal attendants....................
– royal names, Meaning of...........
— ruins located
– Sacred symbols......................
— sacrifices (ºf worship........... .
— sculptures
• * * * * * * * * * * - - - - - - - - - - e s s
- * * * * *-* * * * - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
S • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
— Siego-tºactics
• *** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
— spirit in war.........................





g # *.
710 GENERAL INDEX. i
and statuettes.,.... Babylon, Pigments used in............ ii, 201
- spears - gº by Sennacherib..... ...... , 459
* - Pottery of............................ ii, 203
- -- revolts under Susub................. , 458
- - º of..... . . . . ................. ii, 224
--- — revolts against Xerxes I............ ii, 487
--- – Ruins of, located..... .............. , 14
- - Science in............................ ii, 205
- – Size of, uncertain.................... ii, 17
- — taken by Cyrus the great. ii, 257, 443
— wat — taken by Darius Hystaspi ... ii., 461
-- — taken by Intaphres... ... ii., 464
--- — taken by Sennacherib . i., 447
*** — taken by Sep. Severu ... iii, 194
*- — taken by Trajan......... ... iii, 177
- — Textile fabrics of.. ... li, 204
-- Tiglath-Pileser II. a ... i, 429
--- — True greatness of . . . . . . . . . ... if, 259
- — Walls and gates of 172, 176
- — War tactics. . . . . . . . ... ii, 215
- — Wise men of . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... il, 217
- Babylonia, the fourth monarchy..... , 122
— Agriculture in....................... , 218
— conquered by Antiochus Lidetes. . iii, 56
– Date Culture of.... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 220
- — Domestic animals of......... . . . . . . . , 160
- — extent of the empire . . . . . . . . . . '• * * * * , 122
— Fertility of . . . . . . ................... , 22i)
- Geography of........................ , 124
– Products of.......................... iii., 45
— Shallmanezer II., invades. . . . . . . . . . . , 409
— Subdued by Sargon ................. , 441
— under ASSyrian rule..... .......... 236
Baº empire, Boundaries of... ii, 149
- Character of......................... , 258
- Founding of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 238
- its animals... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 158
– its pirds.............................. , 139
- its cities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 147
- its gems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 157
- its lakes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 143
-- its productions...................... , 154
– its rivers.............................. , 134
- Overthrown.......................... , 257
power.... i Babylonian alliance with Lydia...... , 252
Persepolis — arts and Sciences.................... , 188
Persia i — captivity of the Jews .............. , 244
~ CC!!!ent. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 196
- civilization .......................... , 259
— commercial enterprise . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 166
- costume... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... • * * * * * * * , 211
— cruelties mentioned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 168
— ethnology................ * * * * * * * * * * * * * , 162
— gods named.......................... , 226
– images of worship.................. , 174
- immorality........................... , 167
-- lºings tortured....................... , 168
– luxury of living..................... , 167
– manners and customs.............. , 211
– military dress.......... ......... ... ii, 214
– military power...................... , 167
– musical instruments................ 222
– names, Meaning Of.................. , 262
– palace described.................... iii. 233
—— power broken by Sargon. . . . . . . . . . . , 441
– religious practices................... , 169
— – satrap—his revenue... ............. , 41.)
* — 8 38 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- — skill in cutting gems............... . .
- – symbolism in worship..............
- – Talmud, the........... . . . . . . 8 & &
--- — tribute to Persia... . . . . . . . . . .
- — Venus worshiped in Persia... ...
- – wheat crops............ . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
- — women disgraced......
- - WOTSD1.0 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
- Babylonians defeat Anilai,
- - 3. Lt. y Sal'gon. . . . . . . . . . .
- — defeated by Shammuz-Vul II
--- Bactra conquered by Cyrus...
- — in time of Sapor I...
- Ractrian revolt, The... . . . . . . . . . . . . s &
*-* Bactrians defeated by Artaxerxes I..
--- Badaca taken by Sennacherib.........
#













SEVEN GREAT MONARCHIES.
s g
Bagistan, a city of Media............. ii, 9, 15
Bagóas assassinates Arses............. ii, 53
— exalted by Ochus...; -
— insulted by Hormisdas IV...... f, 50
— refuses to treat with his king . . . . . iii, 506
— slain by a poisoned dagger......... iii. 515
— See Varahran.
Balas, Death of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
— pacifies Armenia - -
— succeeds Peroze
Balkans crossed by Darius H
Balkh ºff. by the Turk
— See also Bactria.
Banquets of Assyrians
— Of Babylonians......................
— of the Medes, Luxury of............
— of the Persians.
in, the
Or river
* * * * * * * *
• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
a • * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
& © tº º º $ a
captives
of Persia.....
* * * * * * * * * * * * *
a 4 & 8 g a s 8 º' 8 tº a
7
• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * s a i, 257
the name: ii, 265
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - , 77, 35
367; ii, 166, 222, 298
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - ii, 173
by Hazael. . . . i., 410
* * * * ... ii, 268
, 99
, 81
... iii., 468
iii., 466
* ~ * s = e < * * * *
Bezabde resists Constantius. . . . . . ‘.... iii
- taken by Sapor II. ..................
Biblical testimony On Chaldaea.......
Bidpai, Fables of.......................
Bil, the Chaldaean deity.............. i, uti, 347
Bindoës and Bostam join Chosroës. , i.
– drowned in the Tigris. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
– imprisoned by Hormisdas IV.
Birds of Assyria...
— of Babylonia.
— Of Chaldaea.
— of dia. ..........
Of S
- plºS OI. Kerkuk - - 146
Black-Obelisk king invades Babylonia ii, 232
Blinding, an oriental practice........ iii, 537
J3]ocks ğ Stone, Moving of............ , 239
$ 8 The,” as a punishment........ ii, 364
Boats of the Assyrians................. , 315
Bokhara taken by the Turks.......... iii., 477
Bolon restored to Persia.............. iii., 450
Borsippa, InScription about.......... ii, 261
- Location of.......................... ii, 185
— Ruins of, located.................... , 14
— surrenders to the Persians......... ii, 257
Bostam assassinated by his wife..... iii, 515
Boundaries of the Persian empire.... ii, 266
ROwariyeh mound, Size of... . . . . . . . . . . , 102
Bows and quivers of Assyria.......... i, 264
Brick-making in Assyria.............. , 231
- in Babylon............. ............. ii, 201
– in Chaldaea................. ......... , 49
Brick-masonry of Babylon. . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 119
Bricks, Enameled, of Assyria......... , 22.
— of Babylonians described....... ii, 158, 196
— preferred by Assyrians............. , 29
Bridge of Xerxes I. destroyed........ ii, 497
Bridges in Babylon.................... ii, 173
– of the Persians...................... ii, 336
Bronze castings of Babylon........... ii, 203
- Work of Assyrians.................. , 225
Bryzacius Slain at a banquet......... , 509
Buffaloes domesticated in Babylonia ii, 161
Building-stone in Persia............... ii, 313
- of Assyria............................ , 2.19
Bull-hunting in Assyria............... , 298
Burbur or Akkad, Tribe of............ , 37
Burial a sacrilege in Persia............ iii, 490
— places of Chaldaea................... , 57
— prohibited in Persia. . . . . . . . . . i, 63; iii, 441
Burzes disappears from Antioch. . . . iii, 454
Cadesia invested by Persians......... iii, 547
Cadusians, a nomad tribe............. , -19
- Campaign against.................. , 525
— Submit to the Medes................ , 109
Caesarea Mazaca, taken by Chosroës II iii, 520
— taken b or I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . : ,
— Palace Öf Esar-haddon a
— rises into grandeur.................
Callas defeated by Mentor...........
Callias, Peace of, concluded. . . . . . . . . .
Callidromus, a Greek, captured...... i
Callinicus, Battle of -
— rà.2é Osroës I
Callinicus flies to Parthia
Calmness a trait of the Babylonians.
Calneh, of Moses, located... . . . . . . . . . .
Caltrops used by Darius Codomannus
– used by the Parthians... . iii, 20
Cambyses, Character Of.... * * *
— or Atradates, of Persia,
– punishes the Egyptian rebels.
y Sap il, 284
Calah, the second §Of ºyria. ..i, 132, |
, 474
$ 8 & e º 'º - tº 8 e a e g g g & w w º




























712
–
*
GENERAL INDEX.
9 & 4 s e g g º 'º e º ºs
s • * * * * * * *
s
s
— takes Petra
Chosroë3 II., Arch of.................. iii,
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
s & e º e º e º 'º e º gº & 4 & © e º s º
* * * * * * * * * * = e s a sº a
s & 9 º' a 3 e º sº e º 'º e º a m = e º s º
* e º s v 4, a e s : * * * * *
* * * * * * * * s e a * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
tº s a s s a s & ©
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
** * * * * * * * * * * * * *
• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
e e º 'º e º e º e g º ºs e < * *
* * * * * * * * * g º e o 'º e º 'º º e º e s tº • * *


$ --
...” - SEVEN GREAT MONARCHIES. 713
Chosroës in prison. iii, 532
— defeats Bahram................. .... iii, 513
— defeats ii
— defeats Leontius..................... iii, 518
, 5
8
–
T Miłl ºil lllkºll-lèº e s a s a s e s , , s , s , , = 2 * * * s s , a iii, 290
* * s e e s a e s = e º s > * * * * * * * * * ... iii, 225
--- Armenia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 424
persecuted by Sapor II.,.. iii, 318
— persecut 3d in Persia............... iii., 389
— to be protected in Persia. . . . . . . . . . . iii., 473
— treated mildly in Persia........... iii., 4:
Chronology of Assyria................. i, 37
— of B abylon, Table of................ ii, 237
— of Chaldaea........................ i, 98, 113
- Studied in Assyria.................. i, 238
Cicero marches into Cappadocia iii, 101
Cilicia invaded by Sapor l., iii, 284
— Queen of, Imeets Cyrus. ii, 514
— ravaged by Esar-hadûon.. i., 468
— subdued by Sennacherib i, 459
Cimmerians enter Asia Minor ii, 100
- expelled from Asia....... ... ii, 101,
Cimon dies at Citium....... * * * * * * * * * * * ii, 504
Circesium reached by Chosroës II ... iii, 5U7
Cissia. See Susiana.
Cities and towns of Assyria.......... 1, 131
— of ancient Chaldaea.......... ... 1, 15 || –
— of Assyria, located ...... 131, 134 || –
— of Babylonian empire ii, 147 || –
— of Media, mentioned i, -
~ of Persian empire......... , 293 || –
Citium, Siege of, raised ......... ii, 504 || –
Citron-trees of ASSyria................ j, --
Civilization of Assyrians......... .... i, 505 || –
Ciedmbrotus, Death of................ li. 498 || –
Climate of Assyria..................... i, 139 —
~ of Babylonian empire.............. il, 131 || –
~ of Chaldaea.......................... j, 18 —
— of Media............... . . . . . . : . . . . . . . , 22 || –
— of Persia. Proper. . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 298; iii, 250 || –
Cloaks made of gold-cloth............ , 182
Coats of mail of Assyrians............ 1, 250
Cogué, the suburb of Ctesiphon... ... iii, 35.5
Godomannus. See Darius III.
Coffins of the Chaldaeans......... ... * * * * *
Coin legends of Persia................. iii, 276
-- testimony of jº: * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * iii, 377
Coinage of Darius Hystaspis......... ii, 473
ns of Balas of Persia............... iii, 425
- of Chosroës I......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii., 491
– of Chosroës II. ...................... ii, 534
– of Hormisdas IV.................... ill, 503
- of Isdigerd I.............. . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 390
- of Isdigercl III....................... iii., 559
— of Robad I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 448
- of Koball Iſ.......................... iii, 530














714
Ctesias, his duplicating of kings..... #. * 85
— his long chronology
82
ii, 172
— on the size of iº. * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
Ctesiphon, a court city of Parthia.... iii, 51
— its Fire-temple burned............. iii,
– occupied by Cassius................. iii, 187
— Plundered by Sep. Severus........ iii, 194
— taken by Cariis.... ................. iii, 298
— taken by Sa'ad...................... iii, 553
— taken by Sept. Severus............. iii, 194
— taken by Tayer...................... iii, 316
— taken by jan. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 178
Cunaxa, Persians defeated at..... ii, 5}
Cuneiform writing of Chaldaea j, 43
Cup use Chosroës I........ iii, 492
Cushite origin of Chaldaeans i, 8
Customs of Babylonians.. ii, 211
— Of the Scythians.......... 1, 49
Cyaxares I. attac
— captures Nineveh
Conquests of.
eath of ... . . . . . . . . .
— defeated by Madyes
- invades Assyria......
S Nineveh. . . . .
tor
Cylinder inscription of
Pileser I........................... , 392
Cymbals of the Assyrians............. i, 308
Cyprian revolt under Evagoras . . . . . . ii, 524
Cyß. erects an effigy Of Sargon .... i., 442
– Island of, described. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 28
— reduced by Idricus. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 530
Cyrenaica, as a Persian province..... s
Cyropolis on the Jaxartes............. ii, 412
Cyrus II., the Great, accedes. . . . . . . . . . , 433
If at the Median court....... ii, 111,432
- Character of......................... , 446
— crosses the Tigris;
— conquers Boctria
- Death of.............................
— defeats Nabonadius 2
— overthrows 1
— takes Babylon. ... ............... il, 257, 443
— takes Sardis...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 253, 437
– Tomb of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 402, 405
Cyrus, the prince, saved from death. ji, 512.
Cyrus the Younger, Rebellion of..... , 513
- Character of......................... , 519
— falls at Cunaxa, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 518
Cythera seized by Persian fleet....... , 524
Dacia subdued by Traian............. iii, 170
#; of the Assyrians.............. , 268
Dagisthaeus abandons Petra.......... iii., 466
- superseded by Bessas.............. iii., 466
Dahae invade Parthia............ ..... iii, 151
Damascus—itsT. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ii, 128
— reduced by Tiglath-Pileser II. ..... , 429
— Shalmanezer II. attacks...... . . . . . . , 409
-- taken by the Persians . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 520
— taken by Tiglath-Pileser II......... , 430
Damascius welcomed in Persia...... iii, 489
Damaspia, wife of Artaxerxes I...... , 506
Dancing at Parthian feasts............ , 237
ara Or Dareium nded. . . . . . . . . . . . . , 30
Daras, Belisarius victorious near.. , 444
– besieged and rans • * * * * * * * * * * * , 457
- Fortress of, built.................... , 438
– taken by Chosroës I................. , 479
— taken by Chosroës II. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 518
— to remain a fortified £º: a & a s = e º 'º 8 º' 4
Darics coined by Darius Hystaspis... ii., 47
Darius Hystaspis, Accession of....... , 45
– Character of......................... , 485
- Coinage of........................... , 473
— conquers the Getae.................. , 478
– conquer's Thrace....... . . . . . . . . . . . . , 47
- Death of..................... . . . . . . . . y
- executes governors. . . . . . .......... , 465
— founds a government..... * * * * * * * * * , 466
— massacres Magian priests.......... , 458
- Palace of.............. . . . . . . . . . ... ii., 388
— quells revolts.................. * , 460
— quells the Ionian revolt , 483
w GENERAL INDEX.
Darius Hystaspis reduces Sagartia. .
— Scythian expedition of
— Second period of
– takes Babylon.......................
— takes Miletus........................
Darius Nothus, Accession of..........
— character of
– execute8 Arsites ....................
Darius III. (Codomannus) accedes....
- #. at Issus...... * - - - - - - - - - - - - -
• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
• * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
— 8ends embassies to
- Sets Out from Babylon..............
– vanquished at Arbela......
Dastagherd, Persian court at
Date culture of Babylonia .
Date-palm of Chaldaea........
Dates used for making liquor.
Datis defeated at Marathon....
Dav-Kina. th -
nting in ARSyria..
— Of the sun stops a battle
Deities of Assyria, Table of , 358
— of the Assyrians. . . . . . . . . . 1, 346
— of the Chaldaeans........ . . i., 72
– of Zoroastrianism.................... iii, 583
Deity in Zoroastrianism............... iii, 580
Deluge, Chaldaean tradition........... , 94
TXemavend, Peak of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 2
| Demetrius II. taken prisoner......... iii., 46
– released by Phraates II. . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 5.3
Democedes, Voyage and escape of... ii., 476
Demosthenes defends U aesarea. Ma-
Zaca . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 284
Derbend Pass, Fortification of........ iii., 43.3
Deriah-i-Nemek lake................... il, 26.)
Deserts of Persia. Proper.............. , 273
Diacira. See Hit.
T)iadem of Persian kings.............. ii, 339
Diarbekr. See Amida,
Dice-playing in Persia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 352
Dio better authority than Herodian. iii, 203
Diocletian and Narses make a treaty iii, 307
— appears in Armenia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 29%)
— humiliates Galerius................. iii, 3 º'
– makes War on Narses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 302
Divination of the Magians...... • . . . . . ii, 63
Divisions of Persia under Chosroës I. iii, 484
Diyaleh river described. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 7, 124
Dizabul retires before Hormisdas.... iii, 477
— sends embassy to Chosroës I....... iii., 47".
— the Turk invades Persia............ ii, 477
Dogs of Media. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 33
Domentziolus succeeds Leontius..... iii, 518
Donnestic animais as captives... . . . . . . i, 280
– animals of ASSyria.................. i, 150
— animals Of Babylonia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 160
— animals of Chaldaea................ i, 27
— animals of Persia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 304
Dorians submit to Persian rule. . . . . . ii, 440
Drangiana assists Cyrus.............. ii, 442
Dream of Nebuchadnezzar. . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 249
Dress, a luxury of the Medes......... ii., §
— See COStume. -
Dualism in Zoroastrianism....ii, 421; iii, 5.9
- Origin of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i, 5.
Dur taken by Assyrians..... . . . . . . . . . . 1,430
Dura reached in retreat............... iii, 365
— Treaty made at.......... . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 36;
— War after Treaty Of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii. 35
‘Earthenware of Babylon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . i, 203
Earthquake at Antioch............... iii, 176
Earthquakes at Antioch. . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 4
Eastern conquests of Cyrus , ......... ii, 441
Fating and drinking in Persia. . . . . . . . ii, 356
Iºberwiz. See Chosroës II. . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 502
Ecbatana, Northern, or Gaza. . . . . . . . . f1, 13
— taken by Darius Hystaspis......... ii, 462
Ecbatanas, The two, of Media. . . . . . . . ii, 9
IEclipse of 753 B.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .





















SEVEN GREAT MONARCHIES.
Chosroës I....... iii, 463
Quietus ... iii, 179
at. . i, 225
&
i
4
4
9
i
i
i
s
4
6
9
* * * * * * * * * * *
* * * * *
* * * * *
321
* * * * * 427
76
482
453
438
- 474
410
s
--- 405
- 475
-- 436
- 517
*T* tº Riº Illèſ l tº Jº. Sº Ullººl Wil J. W. a s = e s = < e < e s s a s s a e 408
- 400
* I lºººl # º Jº Jº. Jillº Jº-K-Jº Jölli e s s s a s = e s s a s a s 423
a * * * * * * * * * * * * 514
• * * * * * * * * * * * 467
Tº ºf ºld Alyºl. Lyll J. & W.) l e s s e s s a e s a e s s a e s a s , s a 473
- $º. * * * * * * * * * * * * * * s : * * * s 471
- Death of............................. 47
- invades Arabia..................... 469
- invades Armenia.................... 468
— invades Bikan. . . . . . . . . . . . * * * * * * * * * * * 471
- Palace of.............. .............. 47
- penetrates Arabia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 470
8 * * * * * * * * *
* * * * * * * * * * * *
=
iii, 490
g e s s e º e º & s • iii, 271
iii, 588
. iii, 565
e ‘sº gº º & 6 & 8 sº e º E & i, 69
- ii, 160
- ii, 307
- SC&I’C8 111 ſºlédia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 31
Fishing device of storks............... ii, 159
- in Assyria......................... . . i, 304
Flood seasons of Mesopotamia........ i, 9
— Tradition of, in Chaldaea........... 1, 95
Flowers at Assyrian feasts............ i, 335
— Of Media named.............. ii, 28
Food of the Assyrians i, 332
— of the Babylonians ii, 221
— or the Chaldaea i, 68
— of the Persians......... ii, 357
Foot-soldiers of Assyria...... i, 253
l'ourth Monarchy. See Babylon. ,
Frankincense used in Assyria........ i, 823
Fruit-trees of Media. . . . . . . . * e º e s e e s = e & , 26
Fruits of Assyria......... t . . . * * * * * * * * i, 144, 332
— of Babylonia. ....................... ii, 155
- of Chaldaea.......................... i, 24
- of Persia Proper.................... ii, 302
Furniture of Persian court. . . . . . . . . . ii, 345
--- e ASSyrians................... i, 235,336
Gabinius marches to #º & 8 + 8 8 & 8 & & sº a iii, 83
Galerius defeated by the Persians... iii., §
- restores Tiridates............... .... iii, 304























716
Galleys
— Of the
Gambalu
— tribe
GENERAL INDEX.
**
Jerusalem...
described.......
Sennacherib...
1ii, 555
iii, 301
* * * * *......... iii, 315
*

-*,
SEVEN GREAT MONARCHIES. 717
Hormisdas Prince escapes to Rome, iii, 31% intaphres takes Babylon...
Hormisdas I, succeeded by Varahran I iii, 294 || Intemperance in Assyria...
— succeeds Sapor I..... & 8 s tº ..... iii, 293 || - in Earthia. - -
Hormisd ., death o . iii, 315 Intoxication, a
— Marriage of.......... . iii, 314 Ionian Révoſt reviewed .
— succeeds Narses. . iii, 312| Iphicrates and Pharnabazus att
Hormisdas III, defeated by Perozes. iii, 410 | Egypt ...................... ........ if, 525.
Hormisdas IV; becomes a tyrant..... iii, 500 Iran, Great plateau of..... .. ... ii, 2.3
– blinded and itnprisoned............. iii, 502 || Iranic character of the Medes. ... ii., 36.
– drives out the Turks.............. ... iii, 417 – chairagter of the Persians. ., ii,315.
— insults Bahram...... tº 4 & 4 * * * * * • * * * * * * iii. 501 ||— legends, Character of...... ii,.53, 59
— succeeds Chosroës I................ iii, 495 || - phases of ireligion.............. . . . . . ii. 6)
Horses as offerings of sacrifice......, ii, 56 || Eron unknown in Chaldaea i, '6
— inferior in Babylonia — in boulders in Persia.................. ii., 312
— of ASSyria. . . . . . . . . . . -- - - Irrigating channels........ i,325; ii, 27; iii, 25i
— of Assyrian chariots... Irrigation in Assyria................. i, 142, 325
— of Media................ 3 - in Media ... .............. . . . . . . . . ii,
– of Persia Proper.................... ii, 805, - neeessary iti Mesopotainia......... 1, 22
— protected gº."ºrm ºre ... ii., §23 Isdigerd...I., Death of.................... iii. 393
— reared in Persia. .................. ... iii, 253 || -- guardian to son of Arcadius....... iii,387
— sacrificed ill Persia................. i., 422 || – persecutes Christians............... iii, 389
Hoshea, of Israel taken by Shalmanezer i, 434 || – succeeds Varahram I............. ... iii, 385
Hostages in the East................... iii, 231 | Isdigerd II., Death of ................. iii,
Houses of the Assyrians..... . ....... i., § 5 || – aftempts to convert Armenia...... iii., 40;
Human sacrificial altars, ............. ii, 174 — defeated by Ephthalites...... . . . . . . iii., 408
Humbanigas defeated by Sargon..... i., 434 || – expels the Tatars. .............. ... iii. 405
Hunnic allies suggest a new ram.... iii, 467 || – makes peace with Bome........... iii., 414
Huns, Peculiarities of the........... . iii., 4tº) – succeeds. Varahran W. . . . .; : * * * * * * * * * iii, 403
Hunting, a Sassanian Sport........... iii, 592 | Isdigerd III, escapes from Rei........ iii. 553
— habits of Parthians................. iii, 238 — murdered by a subject ... iii.
— in Média........., sº e º s e a s tº e º e s e. e. e. , 9 s e sh ii, 44 || — resists the Arabians.......... • * * * * * * -
– in Persia.................• * * * * * * * * * * * *t ii, 352 — retreats from Sa'ad.......... -
- lions in Assyria..................... i, 295 — succeeds Azermidocht.............. iii, 54
Hur or Ur, the early capital........... 1, 12 | Isdigunas treats with Justinian.......
Hurki, the Chaldaean deity............ i, 80 | Isfahan, the site of Aspadam +
Huruk or Erech iu Chakdaea.......... i, 104 Ishtar, the oriental Venus.
Hyrcania, adjoining Parthia........... iii, ... I | Islamism. See Mohammedanism. * *
— Revolt in............... .* * * * * * * * * * * * * * iii, 153 | Ismi-dagón, king of Chaldaea......... i,108
Elyrcanians conquered by Cyrus..... ii., 441 ISpabara restored to his throne....... i, 443
- Country of the...................... ii, 280 Israel, First captivity of
— defeated by Darius. #; .... ii., 463 | Issus, Persians defeated at....
Hyrcanus deposed at Jerusalem..... iii, 106 | Istakr, Palace at.......................
Iberia divided between claimants... iii, 375 | – See also Persepolis
— rises º Isdigerd II............ , 407 || Iva, the oriental deity
— secured by Kobad................... iii., 441 Ivories of Assyrian art
– surrendered to Rome............... iii, 307 || Ivory, an Assyrian im
Iberian king dethroned by Sapor II, iii, 373 || Izates buried in Palest
Idolatries adopted by Persians....... ii, 428 || – receives Artaba
Idolatrous images of Babylon......... ii, 174 || Izirtu taken by ASSh
Idolatry, in Assyria................... ... , i., §61 || Jabbok river locat
– in Sassanian religion............... fii. Jaghetu river in Med
— overthrown by Cyrus...... * = E = e e g º me ii, 444 || Jarmak river locateg
– Persians averse to..................... ii, 422 || Jars, Burial, of Chald
Idols, Assyrian, Composition of...... , 362 Jaxartes river described
[drieus reduces Cyprus................ ii, Jehoiakim, king of J
Idumaea located..................... ... ii, 182 || Jerahi river located................
#º: persecuted by Mohammedans it, 308 || Jerusalem sacked by Chosroës II. -
II, the Chaldaean deity............ ..... i., §3 – taken by Nebuchadnezzar. if 244
Ilgi succeeds Urukh in Chaldaea. ... , i, 104 || Jet—origin of its name.......* * * * ii, #
Image-worship in Parthia... ... iii, 224 Jewelry worn by Assyrian king s
Images carried captive... ... i. 277 Jewish appearance of Assyrians i, 153
— of Babylonian worship ii, 227 | – Captivity, First... i, 4%
Immorality in Babylon... ............ ii. 167 || – Captivity, Second 1, 443
Immortality in Zoroastrianism...ii, 56; iii, 587 | – Captivity, Third..... : ii, 244
“Immortals” cut to pieces....... ... iii, 397 | – giant sent to Tiberias...... e iii, 231.
Implements of labor in Assyria...... i., 338 - temple—its building stopped ... ii., 458
Imports of the Assyrians...... e ... i., 321 Jews never revolted against persiaii, 47,425
— of the Babylonians..... ii, 210 || Jezdigerd. See Isdigerd. -
Inarus crucified in Persia ii. 504 || Johanines defeated and recalled...... iii, 437
- slays Archaemenes. ... . , , ii, 503 || John the Merciful flies to C ... iii, 520
Indates defeated by the Syrians. . . . . iii, 56 Joppa taken by Sennacherib...... i., 448
Indian dominion of Persia doubted, iii, 476 || Jordan river described......
Indus river as a Persian stream...... ii, 288 - Valley described I23
- tract conquered by Persia........ , ii., 475 Joseph, patriarch, martyre
- Valley of the........................ ii, 218 Josiah defeated by Neco..
Infantry of the Sassanians...... tº 3 s gº tº ſº iii, 595 || -- mortally wounded.................. ii, 24t
- service of Assyria................... , 252 Jotapa married to Alexander ...... ... iii, 117
Inscription of Nebuchadnezzar....... ii, 260 | Jovian makes treaty with Sapor..... iii,
- of Tiglath-Pileser I...... .* * * * * ....... ...i, 882 |- proclaimed emperor... : ............ iii, 3
Inscriptions of a bas-relief............ iii, 278 || Judaism, changes occur in............. . til, 291
Insects of Babylonia................... ii. 160 || Judea invaded by Sennacherib..... 1,449, 452
~, of Media ......... e s e º s e < * * * * * ......., ii, 82 Judith, as a literary authority ....... ii. 123
- of Persia Proper........ ........... ii., 304 || Jumjuma mound of Babylon. . . . . ... ii., 179
intaglios.on Assyrian stones........ . . . i. 230 Julian addresses his army at Zaitha tii; 849
- *~.























718 GENERAL INDEX. /
Julian avoids taking Ctesiphon.....
— becomes emperor...................
- burns Anathan......................
- burns Diacira ...................
— defeats *:::::. at Merangea......
e
– his military force................... iii,
- attl
— marries a Persian slave............
- receives Perozes......................
Eidaris or tiara of Persian kings.....
Kileh-Sherghat, Ruins of............ i.
Kings of Assyria, Tables of -
Kis, ASSyrian victory near............
Kizil-Uzeu river in Media.......... . . .
— called to defend his frontier......
- Censures Azarethes......... ... -
- claims Persiall throne..............
- Death of.......::::::. * - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
#- declares war with Rome...;.......
– demands a Roman payment.......
iii., 447
, 434
iii., 434
6 || Litany,
I., • . . . . . . . . . . . . . 426
to
- - - - -
-
• * * * * * ~ * - - -
* * * * * - - - -
Liquor
Or
Locust plagues in
- of Media........................ - - - - -
- of Persia Proper....................
Locusts, Two kinds of, in PerSla.....
Longimanus. See Artaxerxes I.
Lubarna submits to Assyrians...... ... 1,400
s
Lucialianus defend Nisibis......... ... iii, 326















i, 393 || Maurice murdered by Phocas........ iii, 518
tº 9 & 3 s , liº || -- takes ara ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 482
, 39 || Maximin succeeds Severus........... , 280
I, 249 || Maximus appears in Persian camp... iii, 397
, 505 || — defeated and slain.................. iii, 179
, 507 || Mazares reduces Sardis to submission ii., 438
, 437 || Mazdak feeds a fire-altar by fraud... iii, 429
, 252 | Mazdakites massacred by Chosroës I iii, 450
, 103 || — massacred by Kobad. . . . . . . iii, 440
, 479 || Meaning of Assyrian names. . i, 508
. ii., 98 || Mebarsapes yields to Trajan .... iii, 177
ii, 507 || Mebodies and Sapotēs enter Arm iii., 481
& 8 & 3 & 8 e º 'º - 8 & , 306 || – executed by Chosroës I.............. iii
, 268 || — secures Ctesiphon for Chosroës II. iii, 510
, 479 || – takes Seleucia................... i, 510
ii, 201
i, 239
. - iii., 467
victorius at Issus....... ii., 539 Medes attack Nineveh j, 491
the Roman army. ; !
3. t
7
8
3
—12}.
116
1
• * * * * * * * * * * * * *.*.*.* * * * * : *-* **-*…*-* *-*.*.*.*.*.*.* *** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * , 36
iii, 272 | – Hunting, a sport Of................. , 43
• * * * * i, 458 || – invaded by Scythians........i, 495; ii, 8.
486 || – Magna joined to Parthia............ iii., 4:
70 || – jº, in. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 4
g g º & 8 & 4, 8 & © & 9 389 || – reduced by Sargon.................. i, 44
e e s e < * * * * : * * * * * * * * * * * * * ii, 60 | – Religi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii,
ii, 202 || - Zoology of........................... ; :
Median alliance against Armenia.... iii, 1
— and Persian names................. , t
279 | — alphabetic characters.............. y
415 || – apple or citron.......... ....... p
g s v e º 'º e º 'º º & 8 e < * * * * 473 || — archers—their skill. . . . . . . . . . . . . , 4
s & © w w tº 8 + 8 + 8 & e º e º e 8 472 | — barbarity in conquest......... y &
* * * * * 48 || — battlements in seven colors , 1
& e º 'º a º 145 || -- cities mentioned. ................... ii,
211 || — cities without walls................ ; 4
13 | – climate and productions. . . . . . . . . ii, 22,
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * 292 | — costume--its richness............... ii., 4
294 | — gourt sple T8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 1
235 | — dynasty of Berosus................. , 8
280 | – cquipment in war.................. ; :
880 | – fictitious kings...................... º
854 || – fondness of ornament..... ...... ii, 42, 1
• a s e e º sº e e s s e e s a e e 361 – irrigating system, .................. ii,
* * * * * * * * * * * * * 485 | – luxury at banquets................. ii., 4
478 || — military prowess.................... *
e e g º & 35 | – mineral resources................... ii,
* * * * * * * * 498 — monarchy overthrown............. ii., 1
484 || – palace at Ecbatana,................. y
499 || — physiognomy...... tº e 8 & 8 tº v s tº 8 s e º 'º e s m & * *
463 | — profusion of flowers................ 3.
s g º ºs e e 6 || – revolt against Darius Hystaspis... ii., 4
65 || -- type of Women...................... * ** { .
* < 8 ſº e º 'º e g º 'º º 358 II ºf warfare....... ........ iſ, 4
s tº $ 8 º' tº e º e º 'º' 4 - Writing materials................... ii,
461 || Medians revolt against Darius Nothus ij, 510
204 || Medical School founded by Persia... iii, 489
489 || Medo-Persian empire founded........ , 114
499 || Megabazus conquers Thrace.......... , 479
447 — goes to Sardis..................... * * * 480
tº ſº e g º e º e º sº e 499 || Megabyzus recovers Babylon to Persia ii., 487
e g º 'º º e s & e < e º 8 442 | — relieves Memphis.................... if, 504
525 | – revolts in Syria..................... ii, 505
499 || Meherdates leaves Rome for Parthia fil, 143
s & & tº $ tº e g º $ 8 & 566 || Melitene burnt by Persians iii,
203 || Memphis surrenders to Cambyses ii, 449
58 || — taken by Esar-haddon. . . . . . . , 472
445 || Memnon, the odian, Death s
s ſº * * * * * * * * g c e º e º 'º tº 66 – the Rhodian, sent, to the He , 534
Assyrians.. 398 || Menagerie park in Assyria...... , 401
Emperor. 4 Menahem and Pul, the Assyria . 1, 424
- - 496 || Mentor honored for victo ii, 532
- 497 || Merames killed near Samarah iii, 363
*- 508 || – pursues Julian’s army....... ... ... iii, 861
* 481 | Mercury or Nebo of the orientals....i,91, 357
f

























720 GENERAL INDEX.
Mugheir, Temple of.................... i, 52
Mules used in Babylonia.............. ii, 160
Mulita, the Oriental deity............. i, 77, 350
Murgab. See Pasargadae.
Music in Parthian leasts.............. iii, 236
— of the Babylollians......... ... & & 8 a 6 & © a ii, 221
Musical instruments of Assyria.... .. 3.
— instruments of Persia..... . . . . . . . . . . iii, 593
Musicians of the Assyrians............ , 311
Muskai or Moschians subdued........ , 383
Musrim Kurdistan conquered......... , 385
Mustacon defeated and recalled...... iii, 497
#. I-Nebo, Accession or.......... , 380
Mycalé, Persians defeated at......... i
My litta, the Assyrian deity............ , 350
Mythology of Assyrians............... 844
- aldaea........................... 72
- of Zoroastranism............... ii, 53, 58,423
*- — studie Assyria. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i, 238
- Nabedes defeats the lºomans......... iii., 462
--- Naboº defeated by Cyrus the
--- — In king of Babylon.............. ºi
-- — strengthens Babyloll........... .... , 253
- — Surrenders to Cyrus.......... ii, 257
Nabonassar, king of Babylon... ii, 233
Nabopolassar, as a peace-make ... ii, 240
— betrays Assyria........... . . . i, 499
- Death of..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 241
Nachoragan fails to take Pha iii., 47:
— punished for failure .. iii., 472
— succeeds Mermeroës . 47
, 469
, 471
, 398
, 384
ii, 40;
ii, 262
... i, 518
... ii, 230
... ii, 69
Nana or Ishtar, the Oriental Venus...i, 90,356
Naram-Sin, king of Chaldaea.......... , 118
Narses abdicates Persian throne..... , 312
— ascends the throne................. , 3U1
— concludes a treaty with Diocletian iii, 307
— defeated by Ardaburius............ , 395
— defeats Belisarius ........ ......... , 441
— defeats Galerius.................... , B 3
— made governor of khorassan..... , 401
- Occupies Edessa..................... , 518
— retires into Nisibis................ ... iii, 395
— sent to the East by Maurice ....... , 508
— subdues Armenia. , ................ , 802
aval service of Persians............. , 833
Navigation of the Assyrians.......... , 313
avy of Xerxes I... . . . . . . . . ............ ii, 488
Nazi-bugas deposed and killed....... , 111
ebbi-Yunus, Mound of.............. i, 162,476
Nebo, the oriental Mercury.......... i, 91, §57
Nebo-bel-sumi joins the Elamites .... i, 481
— takes his own life'.................. , 483
Nebo-zirzi-sidi defeated by Es ar-
haddon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 469
Nebuchadnezzar, Accession of ....... , 242
— Character of.......* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ... ii, 247
- Death of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 249
— defeats Neco...... & e s e e º a sº a # * * * ii, 106, 241
- Dream of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 249
— Inscription of...... * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * , ii, 260
– invades Egypt....................... , 245
- Palace of............................ ... ii, 178
— Reign Of.......... - - - - - - - - - - - # tº e º a se e º a , 231
— takes Jerusalem............ - - - - - - - - , 244
— takes º & e º 8 & ſº tº * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * , 244
— Wo uilt by . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Neco defeats Josiah................. 1, 106, 240
Nectanebo defeats the l’ersians...... 29
— overthrown by Ochus............. ii., §
Nehavend taken by Arabs..........., iii., §§
Nergal, the oriental Mars......... ....i, 89, 33.
Neriglissar, Palace of.................. , 250
— succeeds Evil-Merodach........... , ii, 250







SEVEN GREAT MONARCHIES. * 721
Nero entertains Tiridates. . . . ......... iii, 161
- impersonated by an impostor..... iii, 1
Neyriz Lake in Persia. . i, 269; # * §
* ; :)
Nićétas flies to Cyprus... 20
|Niñer, Ruins of, located...... . i, 14
Niké marries son of Heraclius........ iii. 53
O overnor of Armenia.. iii, 423
Nile, Persian interest in the.. e {ººts
Nimrod, Successors of....
Nimrud. See Calah
rn
Nina-pala-zira, of Assyria,
Nineveh tºy located.
Qstrogoths possess Asia Minor
fiooded by the Tigris................
— overthrown by the M g
– Persian generals killed near....... iii, 53)
— Population of...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 164
— Siege and Capture of..............: , 93
— Size of, estimated.............. 1, 161; ii, 171
— taken y Cyaxares I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 93,239
– Walls of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 164 || –
Nisaea, a subdivision of Media........ ii, 8 || –
Nisaean horses of Media. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 34
Nisibis again taken by Sapor L........ iii, -
— approached by Belisarills........... iii., 460 || –
— Battle of, Romans defeated....... iii, 204 || –
— deserts cause Of Bahrain........... iii, 508 || –
— in a state of Siege................... iii, 192 || –
— recovered by Timesithens. . . . . . . . . -
– surrendered to Persia by treaty... iii, 368 || –
— taken by Lucius Quietus........... , 179 || –
— taken by Odenathus................ iii, 287 —
— taken by Sapor I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 281 || –
— the third Siege......... . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 326 —
— threatened by Celer . . . . . . . . . . :* * * * * * iii., 437 || –
thrice repels Sapor II. ...... iii, 822,823, 327 || –
Nisroch, the ASSyrian deity........... p --
Nitetis Šent as wife to Cambyses..... ii., 448 || –
ohodares, the Persian, killed....... iii,
Nomad races threaten Parthia....... ii, 66
Norman takes Nehavend............... , 558 || –
Notes to Assyrian monarchy......... , 531 || –
— t 828. Il Di Ollar Chly . . . . . . . . . . . . i, 515
Numerals of Persian language........ ii, 371
Numerian becomes emperor . . . . . . . . . iii, 299
Numi conquered by Assyrians....... , 397
Numismatics, Sassanian........ . . . . . . iii, 27
Nur-Vul, king of Chaldaea. . . . . . . . . . . . . , 110
Nushizad seizes the Persian crown... iii, 491
Obbane, Persians pass Euphrates at. iii, 457
Obelisk of black marble. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i, 412
— of white Stone, Assyrian. . . . . . . . . . . , 4U5
obéiisks or Assyria............. , 169
Obolla taken by Kaled................ iii, 544
Oc murders Sogdianus...... * * g. g
— See Artaxerxes II
Octavian receives Tiridates.......... iii, 118
Odenathus assassinated............... y
— harasses the Persian army......... iii, 285
— passes the Euphrates............... iii, 287
Odors of Persian perfumery.......... fi, 343
Officers of Persian courts. . . . . . . . . . . . . ]],
Qlympias, sent as wife to Arsaces.... iii, 329
Opis, the town, described............. ii, 147
Oriental plane-tree of Media.......... ii, 26
Ormazd, the Zoroastrian deity. . . . . . . ---
ii, 420; iii, 223, 270, 581 || –
Orodes and Pompey correspond...... iii, 105 || –
- assassinated by his son............ iii, 110 || –
— laments his son Pacorus... ....... iii, 110 || –
- the Parthian general............... iii., 52 —
- Successful in Armenia.............. iii, -
Orodes I., made king of Parthia...... iii, 83 || –
Orodes i. Accession of............... iii, 125 || –
Oroetes, governor of Sardis, executed il, 465 || –
Orontes bribed by Persian gold...... ii, 527 || –
Orontes, Mount in Media....... ... ii, 9 || –
Orontes river described........- i, 138 || –
Qsaces, the general, killed..... iii, 101 || –
Otanes succeeds Megabazus.. e
— the Persian noblo. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . il, 459










*
*
Onia.
Peoples transplanted by conquerors.
722 - GENERAL INDEX,
Parthian milit System. iii, 225
— nobles—their dignity. iii, 2.
— princes in Rome.... iii, 119
— procession to Rome. iii, 161
— respect for embassie g
— religious belief........ iii, 223
— toleration in 1'eligion ... iii, 238
- trade and exports......... ........ i, 2.
**
— destroys 800 Ephthalites . . . . . . . . . . iii., 436
Pausanias assassinates Philip of
aCedon. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 533
Peace of Antalcidas concluded....... ii, 524
– of Callias concluded................ ii, 51.5
Pearls of the Persian Gulf............ , 322
– valued in Persia..................... , 356
Pedo, M. Virgilianus, ed. . . . . . . . . . . iii, 176
Pekah subdued by Assyrians......... i., 430
Pelopidas, embassador to Susa. . . . . . . , 526
Pelusium, Death of Assyrian soldiers at i, 454
— Plague breaks out at............... i., 462
— m by Chosroës II............... , 520
People of Babylonia................... ii, 162
i, 448; ii, 245
Perfumery of the Persians............
$ºn 8 I
Perinthus repulses Philip of Macedon ii. 532
ulian iii, 352
Perisabor taken by Julian. . . . . . . . . . . 3
Perozes decla, 8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i, 412
— defeated by Belisarius.............. iii., 444
— defeated by Koushans..... . . . . . . . . . 415
— does º to the Ephthalites... iii, 414
— flies to the Ephthalites............. , 410
– perishes in a ditch.................. iii., 419
— persecutes the Christian........... iii., 414
— reattacks the Ephthalites.......... iii., 417
– recovers Albania.................... , 412
Persarmenia invaded by Belisarius... iii, 441
— Romans driven from............... , 462
Persecution adopted in Persia. . . . . . . . iii, 273
— of Christians by Sapor II. . . . . . . . . . . iii, 318
Pºiº Great palace of........... ... ii., 382
— Pillared Halls at.................... , 394
– the second capital................... , 27
Persia, the Fifth Monarchy......... ii, 266–550
- Architecture in.......”........... , 379
— Capital cities of.............. . . . . . . . , 270
— Chief districts of.................... , 271
– described............................ ii, 267
— divided into four provinces....... iii, 484
– Eating and drinking in............. , 356
— extent of the empire................ , 266
– First king of-Achaemenes. ....... ii., 431
- Lakes of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 269,291
— Secure against India................ , 296
— “Seven Princes” of................. , 85
- Ten tribes of......................... , 855
— Zoroastrianism in.................. ii, 420
Persia, jº mate of... . . . . . . . . . . , 298
— infested with scorpions............ , 304
— its animals e s a sº º e 8 º' tº a , ii, 302
– its birds. . . , 802
- its fruits.................. . . . . . . . . . . . , 302
– its insects....... , 304
its locusts.............
Service..
trade....





*
As
SEVEN GREAT MONARCHIES.
Persian Empire, Decay of
— Divisions of................
—its animals. . . . . . . . . . . e e
— its bird
— its gems. . . . . . . . . . . . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ii, 314
— its minerals ....... & º $ & & © e ∈ E * * * * * * * * * i. 3
— it's Yvºnſ! V! at
– its reptiles
— Neighbors of........................
— overthrown at Arbela, fi,
— Rivers Of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 286, 290
— Six great rivers of.................. ii, 286
— New. See Sassanian.
Persians borrowed certain vices..... , 362
— burned Greek temples.............. , 424
— capture Babylon. . . . . . . . . . . .......... i, 257
— conclude Peace of Antalcidas..... , 524
— defeated at Issus. ................... , 539
— camp and pavilion lost at Issus.... ii, 541
— defeated in Lazica.................. iii., 466
— defeated at Marathon.............. , 485
— defeated at Mycalá.................. ii, 50
— defeated at Plataea.................. s
— defeated at Salamis................. , 497
— defeated by Inarus.................. g
— Ethnology Of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 315
— gave quarter to enemies............ , 33
— not Scientific........................ , 419
--- and New, compared........... iii, 255
— pillage Sardis. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 437
— routed on the Granicus............. , 53
— tolerant to Jews..................... , 4
— Warluke character Of............ ii, 818, 32
Pestilence in army of Cassius........ iii, 187
Petra besieged by Dagisthaeus........ iii., 466
— in Lazica, taken b S&S. . . . . . . . . . 1,
— in Lazica taken by Chosroës I..... iii., 459
— taken by ASShur-bani-pal.......... i., 484
etroleum foundin. C 888. . . . . . . . i, 25, 146
Phaeak sent to Heraclius ............. ... iii, 535
Pharandzem taken prisoner by Sa- iii. 873
* * * * * * * ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 87
por
Pharºnes, the Iberian takes the
eld. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
, 131
Pharnabazus quarrels with Iphicrates ii., 526.
Pharmaces of Cappadocia............. ii,
Phasis lost by the Persians........... i, 471
Pherochanes, the general, murdered ili, 511
hilip of Macedon assassinated, .... . ii, 5.
– repulsed from Perinthus........... , 53.
hilip succeeds Gordian as emperor iii, 282
Philippicus replaced by Comentiolus iii, 499
— victorious at Solachon ....... & e = * = & 9
Philistines subdued by Tiglath- 430
e
Philolo -
— of Med Q
- rodes [........ ... iii, 11)
Phraates, the prince, dies in Syria... iii, 130
Phraortes defeated by Assyrians..... i. 49i
Phthasuarsas favored by Mazdakites iii., 440
Physical characteristics of Chaldaeans i, 35
i
4
9
723 .
Physiognomy of Medians ... ii, 37
— of the Persi * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * e ii, #16
• * * * * * * * * * * ... it ºf
i
º
I
~ ravages Persia, under Eobad....... iii. 538
Planets,Colors assigned to, in Babylon ii, 191
Platoea, Persians defeated at . . . . . . . . . ii, 500
Plateau, Persian, Nations of the..... ii, 275
Platform of the Persepolis Palace... 383
*lowing in Babylonia................. , 220
Polycrates of Samos, put to death... ii., 464
Polygamy, a law of Pärthia........... iii, 237
- in Media............................. ii, 44
- in Persia. ........................... , 358
Polytheism in Assyria................. , 342
- in Chaldaea........................... , 70
Pompey hesitates to attack Parthia. iii, 81
Population of Persia Proper.......... ii, 360
Post-houses of Darius Hystaspis...... ii, 473
Pottery of the Assyrians.............. , 231
– of the Babylonians ................. ii, 203
– of the Chaldaeans................... , 60
Precious stones imported by Assyrians i, 322
- of Babylonian empire.............. , 157
Media. , 35
- of Persia.......................... ii, 306, 314
Prexaspes exonerates himself........ ii, 452
Pride of the Babylonians.............. , 168
Priests, Dress of, in Babylon.......... , 214
– of Babylon........................... , 218
inces Sent as hostages.............. , 432
Probus receives Chosroës II. . . . . . . . . . iii, 507
— Sicorius as man envoy.......... iii, 306
Procopius as an authority....... . . . . . iii, 432
- Commands under"Julian...... . . . . . iii, 348
– sent against Varahran............. iii, 396
Productions Of Assyria.............. i, 143, 325
– of Babylonia................. ....... ii, 154
— of Chaldaea..... tº 9 s & E & © tº $ & 8 & e º 'º a ºn 4 & 6 º' , 22
- of Media...... ...................... 26
- of Persia Proper.................... , 301 .
Propylaea at Persepolis................ , 393
Provinces of Persian empire.......... , 267
— of Western Persia................... , 281
Provincial cities of Babylon.......... , 147
Psamatik I. takes Ashdod............. , 105
Psammenitus executed by Persians. ii., 451
– vanquished by Cambyses..... .... ii, 449
Psammetichus liberates Egypt....... , 483
— succeeded by Neco.................. , 240
Ptolemy Euergetes, invasion into Asia iii, 27
Ptolemy's Canon, Weakness of....... , 264
Pul, the Scriptural Assyrian....i, 423; ii, 233
Pulcheria, Intrigues of............... ... iii, 387
Punishments in Persia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 364
Punjab region acquired by Persia... ii., 475
°urandocht becomes Queen of Persia, iii, 540
– Sister of Kobad II.............. . . . . 538
Purna-puriyas, King of Chaldaea...i, fii. 377
Pylae §: See Caspian Gates.
lici
Pylae Ciliciae, passed by Cyrus the ...' .
WOULD ger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ii, 514
Quarter given by Persians............ ii, 332
— seldom granted by Assyrians. i, 272
Quartz found in Media........... , 29
ueen, Assyrian, Costume of i, 288
en-Mother at Persian court i, 348
ueen Purandocht of Persia... iii, 540
ueens of Persia, Power of.... ... ii., 346
ueens, their status, in Parthia...... iii, 233
ulvers and bows of Assyria.......... i, 264
ummukh defeated by Assyrians.... i., 383
a, the Chaldaean deity................ i, 73
Races in Persian territory..........ii, 274,282
Rafts of the ASSyrians......... tº e º 'º e e s s i, 314
Raga, in Media. See Rhages. -
Rams of the Persian navy............ ii, 335
Rapikh, Battle of....................... i, 438





Aº *
^ - 724 GENERAL INDEX.
f \
l, 458 || Sacrifices of Assyrian worship..... . . .1, 363
, 513 | – of ZoroastriaulSill.................. ii, 56
3 Sagahassus taken by Alexander ..... ii, 538
• +vvº º vºw ~ * ***.*.*.*** **, *.*.*.*.* ~~~ + = * * * * * * * ii, 492 || Sagartła, adjacent to Parthia ........ iii, 7
e e s ∈ s m e º a s fi , 558 Sagartiari rebel crucified. . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 463
• * * * * * * * * * * * , 341 || S - , a nomadic race, .......... ii, 21
• ?: e < e º ºs e º e s a s , 224 || - of Persia.............................. ii, 274
, 70 Saif killed by his body-guard......... iii., 476
$ ii, 45 | Saint James, of Nisibis . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 322, 326 .
gº º 8 e s tº º iii, 223 §. river located .................... ii, 137
ii, 420 | Salamis, Battle of......... ............ p
* - Of the S8.8Sanian S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 579 || – besieged by Piribazus.............. 3.
* * * * * * * * * * s & wº ºf saiban. Persians defeated at........ iii., §
* * * * * * * * s Salt abundant in Persia............... ii,
ii, 160 – and saline º: in Media......... iii. 29
, 81 | Samarah, Battle near.................. iii, 362
ii, 303 || Samaria reduced by Shalmanezer IV. i., 433
, 308 — reduced by Tiglath-Pileser II...... , 430
- taken by Sargon..................... 1, 436
.e. ºr *** **** * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * s • e < ii, 57 | Samaritan's stop building of Temple. ii., 456
k 1 | Samarkand taken by Dizabul........ iii., 477
e is sº gº tº e & ii, 470 | Sammuramit. See Semiramis.
tº it 8 & a s 8 tº 1,430 | Samos revolts against Persia. ...,... ii, 505
iii, 150 | San, the Chaldaean deity..............
ii, 9, 14 | Sana, Church built at.................. iii., 475
Sanatroeces, Death of.................. s’
the octogena" i8n, accedes......... iii, -78
sanā drifts of Chaidaea
Sandu -
i
. i, 28
ASSyria....... y y
harasses . — his memorial sculptures i, 289
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * iii., §51 || – insults the offering from , 286
... fij, 329 — quells Armenian revolt............ iii, 280
s & sº sº a tº e s = º º iii, 325 — reattacks the Romans iii, 283
6 * * * * * ii, 447 | – r jº a new Creed, iii, 292
ii, 117 | — seizes Valerian. . . . . . iii, 283
& TT * **** **** {rº V.M. lºº& W.A. W.J LM Sºs s a s , , º, e s s s e s s s e s , iii, 228 — takes Caesarea Mazaca. iii, 284
East. ... . iii, 262 | — takes Nisibis. . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 281
ersians lil, 466 sº II. attacks Rome.. ... iii, 318
$: ' - Đègill ASiatiº COIlCºllèSt. . . . . . . . . . . . . fii, 74 || -- Birth of... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 316
J * s : * * sº sº sº gº ºn tº e º 'º - sº e g tº iii, 115 — captures Artogerassa... ... iii, 373
* – Cut to pieces at Singara. . . . . . . . . . . iii, 325 | -- Death of........ ............... ... iii, 377
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * iii, 288 || – defeats Romans at Singara........ iii, 325
tºr Ilear AnniC18. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 333 — dethrones Sauromaces............. iii, 373
--- Praaspa................... iii, 114 | – fails to take Virta................... iii, 339
– massacred in Mesopotamia......... iii, — his barbarity to enemies iii, 317
— retreat under Alexander Severus. iii, 266 | – his great invasion................... iii, 333
ſ — retreat under Julian................ iii, 861 | — imprisons Arsaces.................. iii, 378
– under Bessas take Petra............ iii., 468 — invades Iberia....................... iii., 373
— under Crassus defeated by Par- — loses his son. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iit, 325
º: thians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 97 || – makes Arsaces king................. iii, 323
#. — victorious at Sura.......... * & 8 & 9 & 8 w iii, 187 — makes treaty with Jovian......... iii, 367
. * Rome and Parthia compared......... iii, 230 | – persecute8 the Christians.......... , 318
§ — concludes the “Eadless Peace”... iii, 450 | – raises sieges of Nisibis...... iii,322,823, 327
k Roofing of Assyrian Palaces.......... 1, 193 ) — reaches his majority...........'.... iii, 317
Ropes made of date-palm fiber. . . . y: . i, 23 — replies to Tam-Sapor, .............. iii, 33)
* Rosas kills Zadesprates............:‘... iii, 508 — takes Amida........ * * * * * * * * * $ 8 & 9 s ſº º º ili, 337
Roses of every shade in Media. . . . . . . . ii, 28 || – takes Bezabde fortress..... tº e º 'º e < * * iii, 339
* Roxana hewn in pieges.............. ... ii. 510 | – takes Singara........................ iii, 338
Royal costume in Babylon....... ..... ii, 213 | Sapor III., Accession of................ iii., 381
— house of the Sassanians....... *.... iii, 599 || – Death of.............................. , 38:
— River constructed. ............... ... ii, 246 || Sapor, Prince, killed in the palace... iii, 390
Rumia peopled by captives........... iii., 4 Sapphires in a palace roof............ iii, 233
Rustan appointed to command...... iii, 545 | Saitablagus avoids Heraclius.......... iii., 525
— attacks Cadesia..................... iii. 547 | – enters Tiflis............... ......... iii., 527
— GroSSé8 #ates a & & B e º 'º a g g g g º & & e º g fii, 548 Saracus, Accession of.................. 1,497
– slain by Hillal....................... iii., 551 | — burns himself in his palace........ 1,500
Sa'ad appointed to command......... iii, 548 — palace of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ............. ii,
- takes Ctesiphon..................... iii, 553 Sarangia, adjoining Parthia.......... iii., §
— takes Holwan................ * * * * * * * iii, 554 | Sarcophagi at Persepolis. . . . . . ....... ii, 406
Sabages slain at Issus.......... . . . . ... ii, 541 Sardanapalus. See Asshur-band-pal. --
Sabakhah lake described ............. ii. 143 Sardīs, the Lydian capital............. ii, 98
- | Sacae invade Parthia.................... iii, 151 | — Governor of, executed............. 11,485
Sacang conquered by Cyrus. . . . . . . . . . . ; 440 | — revolts against Cyruš. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 438
Sacasérie, an Armenian province.... 1,496 I — taken by Aristagorus............... ii., 482
*




















— — — — — — — / *
SEVEN GREAT MONARCHIES. 725
Sardis taken by Cimmerians. . . . . . . . . . ii, 101 | Sassanians, Plague among the........ iii., 538
— taken by Cyrus the Great........ ii, 253,437 — pursue Julian....................... iii, 361
Sarepta yields to Sennacherib........ l, 448 || – ravage Asia Minor.................. i
Sargon uttacks º* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * ii, 235 | — raze a new fortress................. j
— builds Khorsabad palace.........i, 184,444 || – Religion of the...................... iii, 579
— carries Jews captive................ l, 448 || – retire into Ctesiphon............... ii, 357
— conquers Babylon .................. ii. 236 — Subdue Egypt. . . . . . . . . ............. iii, 520
— Death of . . . . . . . . . tº 8 tº º e s tº e º a 3 s 2 e i, 445; ii, 236 || – suggest a single combat....... jii, 396
— defeats Merodach-Baladan......... , 436 || -- take Daras. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 518
— defeats Yahu-bid.................... , 437 || – threatened by Arabs.............. iii, 544
— deposes S . . . . ... i., 442 — threatened by the nomads ... iii,
— Embassy of Upir to , 442 | – Victorious at IHormuz........... iii, 210, 260
— his invasion of Medi ii. 83 || – See also Persians.
— invades Susiana , 436 | Sasanidae—origin of name. ...... iii, 258
— Pal of.... . . . . ,184 || Satala taken by the Persians. iii, 519
— reduces Ethiopi , 440 | Satra pial cities of Persia: ............. i, 294
— reduces Me , 443 Sail-Mugina appointed viceroy... i., 477
— restores Ispabar , 443 || – burned alive..... * * * * * * * * * * * * * * -
– subdues. A , 441 — rebels against Assy
— subdues Babylo , 44% | Sauromaces dethrone
— 811 es. Thamudite , 439 almander river reached
— takes Ashdod. . . . . . . , 440 Scepter of the Persian ki
— usurps_ASSyrian
Sarus bridge defend
I
throne
ed by Heraclius. iii, §§ ºr patronized by Chosroës
Saspeires, Country of the . . . . . . . . . . ... , 282 Sciences and arts of Babylon
Sassanian or new Persian Empire iii, 241-599 || Scientific learning in Babylon
- architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 560 | SCOrpions of Media. . . . . . . . . . . . . - -
— armies, Size of ...................... iii. 596 || – plentiful in Persia.......... * *
— army trapped by Ardaburius...... iii, 397 || Sculptural art in Babylon .......... -
– bas-reliefs. . . . . . . . . . ................. iii, 570 || Sculpture of Assyrians
— captives ransomed.................. 1ii, 338 || Sculptured animals of Assyria
— cavalry sent to Italy................ iii., 460 — memorial of Sapor III
– coin legends. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 276 sº of Asshur-izir-pal i, 404,
— complaint of Parthia............... iii, 207 || – of the Medes......................... ii, 44
— costumes. . . . . * = e g º 8 & 9 º' g º e º sº e º 'º e e º 'º e & iii, 591 || -- of Vul-lush III. . . . .................... 1, 431
— dominion in Lazica................. ii, 468 Scymnia, Persian döminion in iii., 468
— envoys imprisoned.................. iii, 246 Scythian Chiefs massacred i, 90
— hatred of eans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 242 | – conquests of Sesostris a myth iii, 10
— jealousy of Abyssinia.............. iii, 475 || - ethnology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 66
— ſting kicked by a horse. ............ iii, 392 || — expedition of Darius Hystaspis... ii., 477
— king killed by a tent-pole.......... iii, 383 || -- inroads, Features of................ , 492
– kings, Table of..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 590 Scythians as Persian neighbors ii, 295
— land and tax system............ . . . . . iii, 485 | – expelled from Media ............... , 91
– military reforms ................... iii, 487 — invade Media,.......... ....... i, 494; ii, 89
— monarchy bounded ..... .......... iii, 250 — reinstate Phraates IV.............. ii, 117
— monarchy overthrown............. ii!, 557 || -- Religion of the...................... , 494
– musical instruments............... iii., 533 — repulsed by Mithridates II iii, 69
- national standard,.............. .... iii, 596 – threaten Egypt...................... , 496
- numismatics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 276 || -- weaken Assyria..................... , 496
– palaces described................... iii, 564 Scythopolis, a town of Syria , 496
– practice of non-burial.............. iii., 441 Scyths, Characteristics of the , 493
- race traits. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 2 4 | Sea of Antioch located. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 146
- reasons for the revolt.............. iii, 248 || – of Tiberias described............... , 145
- revolt against Parthia.............. iii, 208 || Seal cyliuders of Chaldaea........ , 61
– royal chronology............. ..... iii, 599 || Seals. Chaldaean writing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 47
– royal household. .................... iii, 59.) | Sebocthes, Persian envoy, dismissed. iii. 478
– rule of Chosroës I................... iii., 483 | Second-Monavchy. See Assyria.
– revival of art........................ iii, 276 | Secydianus reigns six month ii, 556
- Siege tactics......................... iii. 597 Segestani subdued by the Persians... iii, 297
– slave sent, as a bride. . . . . ~4 e < * * * s = e a e iii, 413 | Seleucia, Building of.... ............. , 20
– throne seized by Shahr-Barz. . . . ... iii, 540 — burned by Cassius.................. iii, 187
- War Costillme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 592 || — burned by Trajan...... ............ ii, 179
~ War tactics..... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 594 | – declares its independence iii, 140
Sassanians attacked by barbarians... iii, 328 — occupied by Mebódes............... iii, 510
* - Capture Hatra....................... iii, 280 — taken by Carus...................... iii, 298
– changed their generals............. iii., 416 || — taken by Sept. Severus............. iii, 194
- Compared to Old Persians......... iii, 256 | Seleucid satraps tyrannical iii. 243
- conclude the “Endless Peace”.... iii, 450 | Seleucus Nigator flies to Egypt iii, 18
- Contented under Parthia. . . . . . . . . . . iii, 245 | Semiramis, Cavalry Service Of i, 249
- Cross the E Fº e8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii., 445 || -- Mythical character.................. i, 421
- defeat Galerfus...................... iii. 303 Semitic character of ASSyrians i, 152
- defeated at Rei...................... iii, 558 — character of Chaldaeans....... i, 28
- defeated at Salban.................. iii., 525 | — theory examined.................... i, 29
- defeated at Sisarbanón............. iii, 499 words, Vocabulary Of.............. i, 174
— discover chess in Hindustan....... iii, 490 Sennacherib, Accession of....... i, 445
- fall to take Nisibis............... iii, 323, 327 | – Architecture of...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i., 462
- harass Julian................ . . . . . . . . iłł, 351 || – builds Tarsus...... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i., 459
- invade Syria under Sapor I........ iii, 281 | — carries Jews captive................ i., 450
- invest Cădesia....................... iii, 547 | – Death in the camp of............... i., 454
- offer terms at Dura.................. iii., 367 || – Death of... . . . . . . . . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * i., 455
- Qverthrow of the ................... iii. 5*8 — defeats Tºgyptians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i., 449
— pill age Jerusalem................... iii., 520 ! — defeats Susub. . . . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * i, 451, 439



N
726 -
— invests Lăchish.......
GENERAL INDEX.
* * * s & e º e º a g º 4 & 5
— subdues Zagros tribes............i,
– succeeded by Esar–haddon.........
n
1IIll U18.
Semiramis—her effigy at Bagistan.... ii, 15
Seraglios of the Persian kings......... ii., 346
Serbistan palace described. .... ... iii, 564
Sergiopolis, Bishop of, ransoms cap- iii., 453
lves . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.
Sergius, St., and Chosroës II .... . . . iii, 516
Serpent-charming in the East........ ii, 309
“Seven Princes” of Persia. . . . . . . . . . . ii,
— Spheres in Babylon..... . . . . . . . . . . ii, 191
Seventh Monarchy. e Parthia.
Severianus besieged in Elegeia. . . . . . . iii, 185
Severus, Alexander,crosses Euphrates iii, 265
— defeated by Persians............... iii, 266
- empel'Or. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . §
— plunders Armenia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Severus, ; besieges Hatra.
- captures Ctesiphon
– murdered by Maximin.............
– crosses Euphrates................... iii, 192
- Death of........ .................... iii, 199
— fiefeats and slays Niger............ iii, 192
– ºrants a truce to Armenia......... ini, 193
– raises siege of Hatra..... .......... iii, 197
— takes Babylon ................ ..... iii, 194
— takes Seleucia on Tigris. . . . . . . . . . . iii, 19
Shab-nameh or “Book of the Kings.” iii, 490
Shahēn defeated by Heraclius. ...... iii, 525
— defeated by Theodore.............. iii, 528
— dies of disappointment.... ........ iii, 528
~ marches through Asia, Minor...... iii., 521
Shahpuhri. See Sapor I.
Shahpur, Ruins of........ ............ iii, 288
Simahr-Barz attacks Byzantines....... iii, 528
— assassinated by his troops......... iii, 54()
— defeated by Heraclius. . . . . . . . . . iii, 523, 525
— defeated by Khazars............... , fidt)
— negotiates with Heraclius......... , 539
— recalled from Chalcedon. . . . . . . . . . . , 530
,---- retreats from Cilicia..... .......... , 536
— Slays Artaxerxes III................ , 540
— takes Dam 8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 520
Shalmanezer I., of Assyria............ , 378
Shaimanezer II., Accession of... . . . . . , 407
- ºns º::::::::::::: , 408
- Death of.............................. , 414
- his empire........................... , 414
– Palace of............................. , 411
- vanquishes Hazael.................. , 411
Shalmanezer III., Reign of. .......... , 423
Shalmanezer IV., Accession of..... ... i, 432
– reduces Phoenicia................... 433
Shamas, the oriental sun-god........ i, 82, 851
Shamuz-Vul I., Reign of............... , 895
hamuz-Vuiii., Accession of..... ~... i., 414
— inivades Babylonia.................. , 417
Shebil canal at Babylon............... ii, 187
of Persia Proper............... ii, 30
Shephélah described................... 11, 131
erghis, or sirocco wind ii, 15.
Shields of the Assyrians............... i, 261
Shops constructed for the Tigris..... iii, 177
– of the Persian navy................ ii,
Shiraz wine of Persia ... ............... iii, 253
Shirin, wife of Chosroës II............ iii, 534
Shoes of ASSyrian kings............... , 285
Shoulders of prisoners pierced....... iii, 317
Shuhite rebellion crushed . . . . . . . . . . . . , 399
Shuster, Great dyke at . . . . . . . . ‘. . . . . . . iii, 289
Sicachotes, Smerdis killed at......... ii, 458
Sicorius Probus, the Roman envoy... iii, 307
Siddim, Chaldaean victory in......... , 106
Sidka, king of Ascalon, transported. i., 448
Sidon, Citizens of, massacred......... ii, 530
— t y Esar-haddon.............. , 468
-- yields to Sennacherib............ . . 1, 447
Sidonians burn themselves and fami.
es
Siege tactics of Assyrian
— tactics of Sassanians....
Signets of Chaldaean kings.
Silk, an ASSyrian product..........
Silphium, Cerenaic, or assafoetida,
Simplicius welcomed in Persia. ..
Sin series of Chaldaean kings..
Sin, the oriental moon-god...
Sinatroces. See Sanatroeces.
§: or Indus Yºley
| Sippara reservoir built... . . . . ......... ii, 246
Sirā, the Christian wife of Chosroës. iii, 516
Sirocco winds of the East......... .... ii, 15
Siroës rebels against Chosroës II. . . . . iii, 532
iroës. See Kobad II.................. iii, 585
Sisygambis, the infant prince........ ii, 543
Sisarbamón, Persians defeated at.... iii, 499
Sisauranön taken by Belisarius, ..... iii., 460
Sittas betrays Martyropolis. . . . . . . . . . iii, 499
— deceives Chanaranges.............. iii., 447
i ii, 4
~ defeats the Pºrsians in Armenia.. iii, 444
Six Hundred, Charge of, at Cunaxa.. ii., 520
Sixth Monarchy. See Parthia
8
Skulls as drinking-cup8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 493
Slingers of the Assyrians.............. , 256
Smbat defeats Ephthalites. . . . . . . . . 517
Smerdis assassinated by Darius...... , 458
— the impostor, burns temples....... , 456
Snmyrna ta. Alyattes............ , 101
Snakes abundant in Media............ , 31
Soaemus expelled from Armenia. . . . . iii, 185
— restored to Armenian throne. . . . . . iii, 186
Sogdianus reigns six months......... , 506
Sołachon, Persiall; defeated at....... iii, 498
Solomon, Empire of. .................. , 501
Soma ceremony in Persia. . . . . . . ii, 56; iii, 586
— worship in Media ................... , 5
Sophéné invaded by Persians... ..... iii, 447
Sophia, Empress, and Count Tiberius iii, 479
Sparethra, queen of the Sacae......... , 441
Sparta and Persia, make a treaty..... , 518
– refuses an apology to Persia....... , 523
pear e Assyrians.......... ; º;
Statianus defeated and slain......... iii, 114
Statira, Fº by Parysatis........ , 528
— faithful to Artaxerxes Mnemon... ii., 528
— saved from execution... . . . . . . . . . . . . , 511
Statues of ASSyrians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
Sterility of Media explained........ ... ii., §
Stilicho, the general, feared.......... iii, 886
Stool-bearer of the royal chariot..... ii, $42
Strongholds of Assyrian enemies..... , 273
Suicide of King Urza. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 442
Sukhra employed against Ephthalites jij, 4:3
– minister for Robad. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 426
Sun-dials used in Babylon . . . . . . . .
Sun-god of the orientals... . . . . . . . . . . . i, 82,
Sunflower upon a Persian bas-relief. iii, 275
Superstition of the Magi............... 3.








t
— palace, Seraglio O s a 4-y - .
Susiana becomes Assyrian province. i., 483 || Thamudites subdued by Sargon......
of. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 152 | Thapsacus reached by Cyrus the f
by Sennacherib.......... 1, 457, 458 -
— or Elam locate
a,
Susianian SupremaC j
war of Asshur-bani-pal...... ...... j
Susub-carried to Nineveh............. * * *
— desecrates temple of Bel...........
— escapes from Nineveh..............
— overrun by Parthian
— Productions of . . . . . . .
— Desert describe
– revolt of Megabyzu
— worshiped by Scythians............
Syennesis, proposes a peace . . . . . . . e
ssyrian worship -
lonian worship. . . . . . . g
eon, the archbishop, slain . i
te of ......... -
d by Chosroës I . i
— invaded by Parthians . i
— invaded by Sapor I.... ... i
• l
— ravaged by Adarman.. . i
— submits to Shalmanezer II -
— Three strongholds of...... . i
Syrian º of Ashur-izir-pal... i
— invasions of Sennacherib. . . . . . . . i, *
8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
— track of Oriental armies....... ... ... 1
— war of Tiglath-Pileser II. . . . . . . . . . .
Syrians massacred by Parthians..... iii, 58
Taº, of Assyrian kings............. i, 372, 513
8, e s e e s e º e s a s = 3 s e s is a 1
Tactics of Assyrian
rsian armie
Tamna taken by Semnacherib.........
Tarbisa, Ruins of
tured by Sapor I
Tatar invasion of Persia.
Ten Thousand Greeks, Retreat of
Tennes executed by Ochus......... . . .
nst Darius Hystaspis.. ii.
Ilk.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
s º
£ubge. . . . . . . . . . . l.
lets and obelisks of Assyria. . . . . .
— collected by Asshur-bani-pal.......
Chaldaean
Tabriz marble of Med
Tuchos, king of Egy
turns to E t
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
-pal , 40
y Antiochus Epiphanes H i. 5
SEVEN GREAT MONARCHIES.
armies............ --
8. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -
hia Compared... i
e OI. . . . . . . . . . . . . -
Tamchosro defeated and slain........ i Tin, an
tlS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i Tiranus,
Tammarit, king of Elam, sent to Nine- Tirhakah
innachariñ . * * * * * * * . . –
Tamsapor negotiates with Sapor II.. ii #
Tarsus built by Sénnacherib........W. i., §
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * iii, 284
* * * * * * * * * * * , 328, 401
iii, 4
ji
727
Surenas killed by Orodes.............. iii, 100 | Teraphim or sacredimages in Parthia iii, 225 * *
Surón pillaged by Chosroës I......... iii, 453 | Terentlvis enters Iberia.................. iii, 375
arius Hystaspis retires to..... ii, 480 | Terituchmes slain for rebellion...... ti, 510
— Great antiquity of............. . . . . . , 105 || Terra-cotta, work in Assyria... ...... , 232
t. . . . . . . . . . * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *, ii, 404 || Texile fabrics of Babylon............. ii, 204
f the... . . . . . . . . . — fabrics of Chaldaea.................. g
i,
4
§
*
diadem....






i
––2– >,
GENERAL INDEX. t t
Submits
- - - - - ii, 38
- - - - - iii, $90,393
* * * * * * * * * * * iii., §
•% e s - a w w = * & 8 s s a s a s a 6 s 3 m e º s º a iii, 402
&
Warahran W., Death of........ ... iii, 402
— persecutes the Christians.. ... iii, 394
— routes the Tatar invaders.. ... iii, 401
Varaztad executes Moushegh........ ii. 379
-- made king or Armenia. r iii, 378
Vardanes assassinated................ s ºf “I as
– succeeds Gotarzes.................. iii,
Vartan, the Maintigonian, slain....... iii., 407
Wasag defeats Adèr-Veshnasp........ iii., 416
— the Marzpan, deserts Armeniu..... iii,
Vases of the Chaldaeans............... i, 61
Watché rebels from Persia...... . . . . . . iii., 412
Vayu, god of the wind.......... ii, 49; iii 583
Vegetable products of Chaldaea..... . i,
Vegetables described by Berosus..... ii, 154
- of ABSyria .... .................... i, 144
~ of Persia Proper ................... ii, 301
Vehicles of the Assyrians.... ......... i, 339
Vendidaſ!, Translation from the . . . . . il, 119
Verºus, or Ishtar of the orientals....i, 90, 356
Veracity among the Persians... .... ii., 319
Verus, Lucius, £ent to the East....... iii, 185
Vespasian ueclines the aid of Parthia iii, 165
− declines to aid Volagases.......... iii, 167
Vetražlio, tile lumperial pretender.... iii, 3
Vices borrowcut by l’ersians.......... ii, 362
Virta fortress regists Sapor II....... iii, 339
Vitellius marches for the Euphrates. iii, 132
Vitianus externlinates the Arabs.... iii
Vizier of Assyrian courts ... . . . . . . . . . . 1,
Vocabulary of Semitic words. . . . . . . . . i, 174
Volagases I, Accession of............. iii, 149
~ and Vardanes contend for power. iii, 153
– calls a council....................... iii, 155
– his character........................ iii, 167
– invades Armenia.................... iii, 150
— Offers aid to Vespasian............. iii, 165
— quarrels with Izates................ iii, 1
— defeats Paetus....................... iii, 158
Volagases II, Accession of..... . . . . . . . iii, 182
Volagases III., Accession of........... , 184
— defeated near Europus............. , 186
- expels Soaemus...................... , 185
– Death of". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 190
Wolagases IV., becomes king , 190
— De Of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , 199
— expels the Romans....... , 193
— succeeded by his sons . , 199
Volagases V. and Artubanus accede... iii, 199
Vonones I., Accession of... . . . . . . . . . . , 125
-- retires to Armenia............. ... iii, 126
War implements of Persia. . . . . . . . . . . . ii, 821
— ships of the Persians................ ii, 333
— tactics of ASSyrians................ , 269
— tactics of Babylon.................. ii, 215
Wark ound, Size of................. , 102
~ ruin of Čhaidaea........... i, 13,
Warlike character of Persia........ ii, 318, 320
-- Spirit of ASSyrians........ . . . . . . . ... i, 155
— usages of Assyrians................. , 241
Water-System of Persia. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 488
Weapons of Median warfare.......... ii, 41
— of the Chaldaeans.................... , 63
Whales of the Indian Sea............. ii., §03
Wheat culture in Chaldaea............ , -23
— raising in Babylonia........ . . . . . . . . . y
W —the sirocco of the East. . . . . . . ii, 153
Wine-drinking at banquets. . . . . . . . . . . , 43
Winged circle as a symbol...... 1, 844; ii,
— human-headed bulls.......... . . . . . . , 423
Wige Men or Sophi of Parthia........ iii, 47
– men of Chaldaea................ . . . . . , 217
Women as captives—how treated.... i. 280
— Costume of Babylonian... . . . . . . . . . ii, 223
— of Babylon disgraced.i, 367; ii, 166, 222, 228
-











|
SEVEN GREAT MONARCHIES.
Women of Assyria, Dress of.......... j, 8.0
.** eClla . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 3 i
~ of Persian royalty. . ............... .ii, 346
-— of the Parthian Court. . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii, 232
— required to marry in Persia. . . . . . . iii., 488
— secluded by Assyrians...... & 9 8 tº e º & .i, 287
— secluded in Persia........ ... ii, 349; iii, 537
— Status of, in Parthia................ iii, 237
Wood-carving as an amusement..... ii, 353
Woolen fabrics of Babylon............ , 204
Worship of Mithra..ii, 421,427; iii, 124, 271, 585
— of the Babylonians....... * * * * * * * * * * * ii, 225
— of the Persians.... .. & g º e º 'º º sº * * * * * * * * ii, 422
— See also Religion.
Writing among the ASSyrians........ 1, 169
– Hieratic, of Chaldaea................ , 43
— in Media.......... * * * * * * * * ............ ii, 78
— materials of the Medes.............., ii, 77
— of the Persians.......... * * * * * * * * * ii, 365, 373
Xathrites, the pretender, crucified... 463
Xanthus burned by its people , 440
— taken by Ale #1'. . . . . . . . . . . , 538
Xerxes I., Accession of , 485
— Army of, estimated....... y
— as a builder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
— assassinated.....
— assaults Thermopyl
— banquets along the march.
– bridges the Hellespont..
-
C
h
al
r
fl
G
l'
{*
t
l:
e
§,
t
Š
1
l?
t
U
3.
– murdered at a festival
Xerxes, Palace §: l’ersepolis. . - ii, 886,
Xerxes, son of Ko ad defeats Belisa-
}'lllS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • - - - - - - - iii, 442
Xisuthrus, the Chaldaean Noah. . . . . . . ... i., §
Yad, War with tribes Of............... iii, 381
Yahu-bid taken and slain........ : - - - - ... • #37
Yaksouna becomes killg............... iii., 475
Yaman captured in Egypt...... . . . . . . ...i., 440
Yemen restored to the Homerites.... iii, 475
– subdued by Abraha.s.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii., 474
— Upper and LQWer, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.7, 123
Zabdicene ceded to the Romans..... iii, 303
Zacharius carried into Persia........ iii, 520
729
Zadesprates slain by Rosas..........) iii, 509
Zagros, -its location and character... ii, 1
- range of mountains................. , 136
— tribes reduced by Sargon, ......... , 442
- tribes subdued by Sennacherib.... , i, 447
Zaitha reached by Julian............ . iii, 349
Zamasp abdicates the throne......... , 431
— crowned as king......* * * * * * * * * * * . . . . iii, 430
Zames and his brothers slain......... 449
Zaragardia and Trajan’s tribunal.... iii, 350
Zareh claims Persian crown.......... , 423
Zarina, Queen of the Scythians....... , 91
Zedekiah, Inade king of Judah....... ii, 243
end 1 -- ill Meglia, . ii, 67
- Writings preserved. ................ , 246
Zendavesta averse to idolatry........ ii., 423
- its origin.......... .......... tº s s sº * * ... iii, 272
— mentions Rhag ii. 14
—- silent on the Pa.
Zenderud river in Media. . . . . tº € $ 4 & 8 º'
Zeno crowned as Artaxias
18, El
— defeats the Romans......
Zenodotium resists Crassu
Zermandu
r!'
Ziebel joins the Romans..
Ziggurats or temple towers... i, 199
#; Embassy to the Hun. iii., 439
Zir-banit, the Chaldaean deity i, 89
Zoology of Assyria....... i, 146
-- of Babylonian empire.............. ii, 158
– of Chaldaea.......................... i, 25
- ia. . . . . . . . ................ ... ... ii, 29
- Proper........ ........... ii, 302
Zapyrus, the satrap, slain............. ii, 487
Zoroaster, Birthplace of............... ii, 67
Tº the Median king..................... i, 105
Zoroastrian dualism........... ii, 421; iii, 579
~ hel'Oes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... ii. 5;
— inn posture in altar-fires . . . . . . . . . . . . iii.4%
– mythology...................... i, 53, 58, 423
— temples rebuilt by Darius. . . . . . . . . . ii., 459
Zoroastrianism defined............... iii, 270
– described................. y
— forced on Armenia 1, 408
– Immortality in...'.............. ii, 5
— in Media.
— in Parthia....................
— in Persia..... # * * * * * * * * * * * * * s is e a e s a s sº e y
— restored in Parthia..... * * * * * * * * * * ... iii, 208
— Translation from the Sendidad... ii. 119
– under Sapor I............. ......... 3.
– See also Ahriman and Ahura-Mazda.
Zur-Sin, king of Chaldaea.............. 3.
Zuraeus, the general, executed....... iii. 871
Zurka or Jabbok river located....... ii, 142
Y
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