Ruebler
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON, D. C.
United States office a
»«
REPORT
of the
DIRECTOR
of
RUBBER PROGRAMS
to the
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
»«
November 3, 1945
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U. S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C., price 5 cents.
27 43
FOR VICTORY
BUY
UNITED
STATES
WAR
BONDS
AND
STAMPS
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
WASHINGTON 25, D, C.
November 3, 1945
HD
9161
,452
155 2
1965
Buti
Dear Mr. Krug:
IN REPLY REFER TO:
I am submitting herewith my report as Director of
Rubber Programs.
The report speaks for itself. However, in transmitting
it to you, I wish to take occasion to speak of the splendid work
of the men in the Rubber Bureau and of the fine cooperation
rendered to this office and to the Bureau by the rubber industry.
The sudden occurrence or VJ-Day threw into the laps of
the Rubber Bureau a tremendous number of problems that required
prompt and vigorous action. This action was taken by the men in
the Bureau with speed and intelligence. The result was a shift
from all-out wartime production to production of peacetime pro-
ducts with a minimum of loss of time and tonnage.
The problems of meshing the rising supply of natural
rubber with America's full-grown synthetic rubber industry are
tremendous. The same intelligent and vigorous effort on the part
of the Rubber Bureau and the same thorough-going cooperation from
the rubber industry are required if this meshing is to be done
without clashing of the gears.
In conclusion, Mr. Tisdale and I want to take this
occasion to tell you how much we appreciated the opportunity of
working with you and with the staff of the War Production Board.

Sincerely yours,
Ks Werbow
R. S. Wilson
Director
Rubber Programs.
Mr. J. A. Krug
Chairman
War Production Board
Washington, D. C.
See page 8 for Index
WAR PRODUCTION BOARD
Report of the Director of Rubber Programs
I. INTRODUCTION
Unconditional surrender of Japan to
the Armed Forces of the United Nations
in August drastically altered many of
the major problems and most of the ob-
jectives of the rubber manufacturing in-
dustry. Therefore, this report deals
with the objectives and problems pre-
sented while this country was still at war
with Japan and the many changes in-
volved in rapid reconversion to peacetime
production, whereby this country will be
supplied as quickly as possible with the
thousands of articles containing rubber
on which our present-day civilian econ-
omy is based.
In view of the fact that the War Pro-
duction Board, having accomplished its
mission, is to be succeeded by another
Government agency-the Civilian Pro-
duction Administration-it seems proper
to include in this report not only the sit-
uations that have been dealt with during
the past four months, but to incorporate
a series of comprehensive charts and a
table that will make available in one
place statistics which deal with natural
rubber consumption and price, synthetic
rubbers, reclaimed rubber and tire pro-
duction.
II. JULY 1 TO AUGUST 14; VJ-DAY
A. Cutback in December Military Truck
Tire Program: Following VE-Day, the
level of military truck tire requirements
was reduced on several occasions. The
Rubber Bureau had been adjusting to
the level of essential military and civilian
requirements. As each adjustment was
made, it was studied in relation to the
existing and currently authorized new
capacity of the industry.
It became apparent that the additional
capacity for production of truck tires
provided by the December Military Truck
Tire Program was not needed in its en-
tirety. While serious shortages in
meeting current requirements still ex-
isted, particularly in the large-size truck
tires, it was clear that, by the time the
new plants and expansion would be com-
pleted and in production, capacity would
far exceed the latest projected require-
ment level.
A comprehensive study was under-
taken, comparing truck tire requirements
with existing and potential capacity. It
was determined that a reasonable cush-
ion of capacity should be provided over
the average level of requirements in order
to allow for contingencies. This study
indicated that, if the new plants under
construction and those other expansion
projects requiring the longest time to
complete and get into full production
were eliminated, retaining only those ex-
pansion projects that would be completed
and in production by the early part of
1946, a cushion of 12 per cent of average
requirements would be provided. If all
expansions were to be carried to com-
pletion, the capacity would be 37 per cent
in excess of average requirements. Be-
fore final recommendations were made
as to which projects should remain in the
Program, a very careful check was made
of the status of each project. In addi-
tion to estimated completion dates, the
cost per pound of the scheduled produc-
tion from each expansion project was
considered and, based upon these two
factors, recommendation was made that
certain projects should remain in the
Program.
On July 18, 1945, the detailed recom-
mendation for reduction in the Decem-
ber Military Truck Tire Program was dis-
cussed with representative officials of the
War Production Board and the claimant
agencies interested in tires. A decision
was reached to reduce the program in
the amount of 86 million dollars of the
initially authorized cost. This change,
together with cancellations previously
effected prior to July amounting to 24
million dollars of the initial cost, reduced
the December Military Truck Tire Pro-
gram to an initial cost of 22 million
dollars from the original 132 million
dollars. Estimates made at the time
indicated that the net saving of Govern-
ment funds might approximate 55 mil-
lion dollars.
After these cancellations had been ef-
fected, there still remained on a tonnage
basis an increase of approximately 32
per cent in total truck tire capacity above
the industry's declared capacity as of
November 1944.
The following table presents the sta-
tistical picture on a quarterly tonnage
basis:
INDUSTRY TRUCK TIRE CAPACITY-QUARTERLY
(BASED ON 75 WORK DAYS)
[Unit-Pounds]
Industry,
declared
November
1944
Maximum,
all
expansions
336, 000, 000 537, 000, 000
Remainder, Net change.
after July 18 after July 18
cancellations cancellations
445, 000, 000
+32%
Complete cancellation of this Program
after VJ-Day reduced the projected 445
million pound capacity. However, ca-
pacity will remain in excess of that de-
clared in November 1944, because a cer-
tain proportion of the expansion will be
completed by industry at its own ex-
pense.
B. Conversion of Truck-Tire Capacity to
A-3-b Tires (9.00 thru 11.00 cross sec-
tion): During the discussion and the de-
cision to cut back the December Military
Truck Tire Program, it was clearly shown
that insufficient unit capacity existed to
attain the projected requirement level for
A-3-b tires, while for other groups of
tires, the capacity exceeded require-
ments. After the program had been re-
duced, the Rubber Bureau requested the
industry to adjust its existing capacity
from smaller tires to A-3-b tires. In
addition, the companies, still having ex-
pansion projects remaining after the cut-
back, were requested to make the neces-
sary adjustments, so that A-3-b unit pro-
duction would be possible at the expense
of smaller truck tire sizes. This adjust-
ment program was set up just prior to
VJ-Day and, had it been put into effect,
the industry would have had balanced
capacity for the production of the vari-
ous types of tires against the pre-VJ-Day
level for 1946 requirements.
C. Expediting of Remaining Projects:
After the major cutbacks in the truck
tire program were effected, it was possi-
ble to readjust the delivery schedules for
various types of rubber-processing ma-
chinery and equipment, so that the po-
tential completion dates for the expan-
sion projects remaining in the program
were considerably advanced. The Rub-
ber Bureau continued a close follow-up
of the progress of the remaining projects
and continually expedited delivery of
needed equipment.
D. Partial Cutback of Rayon Expansion
Program and Reduction in the Level of
Carbon Black Program: The reduced
requirement level for tires, which re-
sulted in the cutback of the tire ex-
pansion program also meant that the
rubber industry did not need as much
rayon tire cord or as much carbon
black as had been previously forecast.
Therefore, it was possible for the Textiles
Bureau to cancel certain rayon expansion
projects that had been previously au-
thorized, and for the Chemicals Bureau
to do likewise for certain planned carbon
black expansions.
E. Work on Balancing Components and
Manpower Continued to VJ-Day: While
the reduced level of tire requirements
alleviated in a large measure some of
the critical situations that had previ-
ously developed with respect to compo-
nents, careful review was continued on
the current production level of rayon and
cotton tire cord, carbon black, chafer
fabrics, rosin and other important com.
ponents.
GPO-CPA 17432-—p. 3
:
During this period, neither tire nor
component materials production ap-
proached capacity, because of manpower
shortages and work stoppages.
The War Production Board, in cooper-
ation with the War Manpower Commis-
sion, continued its efforts to recruit ad-
ditional manpower for the tire plants,
tire cord mills, reclaimed rubber plants
and other plants producing rubber prod-
ucts. In addition, an effort was main-
tained to obtain deferment of important
workers in industry and to maintain men
from the Enlisted Reserve Corps in the
tire plants.
III. AFTER VJ-DAY
on
Industry:
A. Impact of VJ-Day
Generally speaking, VJ-Day found the
rubber industry capable of converting
quickly from the production of military
products to peacetime items. There was
no need for basic reconversion of equip-
ment and machinery. However, some
disruptions occurred, particularly in the
plants of the smaller companies due to
the sudden termination of military or-
ders. On VJ-Day control still existed on
the use of various synthetic rubbers and
reclaimed rubber. However, appeals
were granted immediately, permitting
companies, whose military orders had
been canceled, to begin production of ci-
vilian items made with reclaim or syn-
thetic rubber, except tube-grade butyl.
B. Demobilization of Controls on VJ-
Day: During the first few weeks immedi-
ately following VJ-Day, it was possible,
because of cutbacks in military procure-
ment, to effect the following changes in
wartime rubber controls:
(1) The quantitative restrictions on
the production of A-5 and A-6 truck
tires, farm-implement tires, passenger
tires, small truck and passenger tubes
and camelback were immediately re-
voked. This step meant the industry was
permitted to produce unlimited quanti-
ties of these items.
(2) Complete revocation of all restric-
tions on the use of reclaimed rubber and
the following synthetic rubbers: GR-S,
Neoprene (GR-M) and N-Types. This
change meant that the industry could
produce any kind of product from re-
claimed and these synthetic rubbers.
Usage control was maintained on natu-
ral rubber, natural rubber latex, chlori-
nated natural rubber and butyl (GR-I).
(3) The supply compared to require-
ments for farm-implement and tractor
tires, as well as industrial tires made it
possible to notify the Office of Price Ad-
ministration that rationing of these tires
could be discontinued. Also, because of
substantial cutbacks in orders for mili-
tary rubber footwear, it was possible to
recommend lifting of rationing of civilian
rubber footwear.
(4) Appendix IV to Rubber Order
R-1-the Tire Allotment Plan, which for
nearly two years was the mechanism for
distribution of truck tires for original
equipment. military replacement and
civilian replacement, was revoked.
(5) Rubber Order R-1 was completely
revised as of September 27, 1945. This
confirmed the actions indicated above
and also revoked various other controls,
such as production restrictions on golf
balls, regrooving of tires, regulations on
scrap rubber except segregation of tire
parts, etc. This revision eliminated sev-
eral reporting forms and simplified those
to be continued. Butyl was permitted in
the production of all tubes 6.50 cross-
section and larger. Rayon tire cord was
permitted in all tires with the exception
of passenger, motorcycle and bicycle.
The tire production pattern, which re-
quired manufacturers to use their inter-
changeable facilities and available mate-
rials to produce first the larger and more
critical size tires, was also revoked, per-
mitting the industry to adjust its pro-
ductive facilities to meet the civilian de-
mand for the various types and sizes of
tires.
C. Cancellation of Remaining Expansion
Program: Immediately following VJ-
Day, the Rubber Bureau withdrew its
sponsorship of all uncompleted federally-
financed projects for the production of
tires, soles and heels, and other rubber
products. The recommendation was
made, however, that all Reconstruction
Finance Corporation plants and facilities
producing tires should be continued in
operation at least until such time as tire
rationing could be lifted. The Bureau
also recommended completion of feder-
ally-financed facilities for washing of
natural rubber. To date work has not
been started on the washing projects,
since a review is being made as to the
amounts of unwashed rubber that may
be received and which will require wash-
ing in this country during 1946.
The requirements for rayon tire cord
and carbon black, needed to support the
peacetime production schedule, were de-
termined and presented to the Textiles
and Chemicals Bureaus respectively.
These lower requirements for these two
basic components permitted the Textiles
Bureau and the Chemicals Bureau to
withdraw sponsorship from all federally-
financed projects for the production of
high-tenacity rayon.
IV. PEACETIME PRODUCTION
OBJECTIVES
A. Tires and Tubes: On August 23,
1945 the Rubber Bureau completed its
estimate of tire production on a civi-
lian basis for the fourth quarter 1945
and for the year 1946-Basis VIII. In
making this forecast, the Rubber Bu-
reau used a study of civilian replacement
requirements that had been prepared
during April, 1945 by experts from the
rubber industry under auspices of the
Rubber Manufacturers Association. This
forecast contemplated fulfilling all de-
ferred replacement needs for passenger
and truck tires, as defined in the Rubber
Manufacturers Association Report, as
well as a substantial amount of the esti-
mated inventory deficit by the end of
1946. Original equipment tire require-
ments were obtained upon the best ad-
vice of the Automotive Division, War Pro-
duction Board and reasonable quantities
were estimated for export and military
procurement. Based upon this estimated
tire production schedule, forward esti-
mates were made of the requirements
for component materials, including nat-
ural and synthetic rubbers, reclaimed
rubber, rayon and cotton tire cord, car-
bon black, etc.
The tire manufacturing industry was
requested to submit on September 1, 1945,
their estimates of 1946 production, by
quarter, for purposes of confirming the
estimated Basis VIII production sched-
ule. These industry estimates for truck
tires, when totaled, were 9% lower on a
tonnage basis for the year 1946 than
Basis VIII. Because of the close ap-
proximation of the estimates of the Rub-
ber Bureau and that of the industry,
Basis VIII has been considered as the
official schedule for purposes of compo-
nent material estimates.
Because actual tire production to date
has been lower than the Basis VIII fore-
cast for the same period and because it
now seems indicated that 1946 produc-
tion will not be as high as anticipated
in Basis VIII, revised estimates have been
developed for year 1946.
ESTIMATED PRODUCTION 1946 U. S. A.
Tires
Truck and bus.
Passenger and motorcycle
Tractor and implement.
Airplane..
Industrial..
Bicycle..
Basis VIII

Original
8-23-45
Revised
10-25-45
15, 381,000
66, 000, 000
3,275,000
211,000
1,952, 000
8,000,000
13, 770,000
66,060, 000
3,803,000
182,000
2, 102, 000
9, 114, 000
These revised 1946 estimates, with the
exception of passenger tires, more closely
approximate the industry estimates sub-
mitted on September 1, 1945.
At the present time, truck tires and
passenger tires are still rationed. Truck
and bus tires are rationed in two size
categories: namely, large truck tires of
8.25 cross-section and larger and small
truck tires of 7.50 cross-section and
smaller. The War Production Board and
its successor agency, the Civilian Pro-
duction Administration, being the supply
agency for the production of tires, must
determine when production of these vari-
ous categories is sufficient to eliminate
rationing safely. The staff of the Rubber
Bureau has met on several occasions with
representatives of the Office of Price Ad-
ministration to discuss this subject.
Current production is climbing, but has
not yet reached the levels previously
anticipated. Until production becomes
greater, a definite date for ending of
rationing cannot be established.
There are certain remaining controls
on the production of tires and tubes that
will be maintained during the immediate
future. Rubber Order R-1 now prohibits
the production of white side-wall pas-
senger tires and also makes it illegal to
produce more than one grade of truck
or passenger tire. The grade now per-
mitted is the so-called "100 level". The
basic reason for these two controls is to
obtain maximum production by permit-
ting only one specification product to be
made. These controls will be revoked
immediately upon ending of rationing.
A pending amendment to Rubber Or-
der R-1 permits the use of rayon tire
GPO-CPA 17432—p. 4
cord in the manufacture of passenger
tires of 6.50 and larger cross-section.
At the present time, butyl may be used
only in the manufacture of tubes having
a cross-section of 6.50 or larger. Butyl
is a highly desirable synthetic for the
production of inner tubes. It is possible
that this material may replace natural
rubber for tubes after all controls are
lifted.
The amounts of natural rubber that
are permitted in the manufacture of
tires and tubes is controlled by Rubber
Order R-1. These controls will be main-
tained and will be relaxed systematically
and progressively pursuant to the recon-
version policy described below.
It is indicated that most other com-
ponent materials, other than those de-
scribed above, are in ample supply to
meet the projected tire and tube pro-
duction schedule for the year 1946. The
only possible difficulties that can be fore-
seen are the small amounts of cotton
broad woven textiles required by the
tire industry and the relatively small
amount of rosin used in compounding.
•
B. Other Rubber Products: Generally
speaking, there is ample capacity within
the industry for the production of
all types of rubber products. Many
items, manufacturing of which has been
prohibited throughout the war, now
become important to our peacetime econ-
omy. It is also true that many of these
items have not been successfully made
with synthetic rubber and that, there-
fore, it is necessary to consider the use
of natural rubber in these as well as in
those that have been made throughout
the war. Many controls, having been
removed on plastics, textiles, etc., the
rubber industry is faced with the loss of
position, if not allowed proper raw ma-
terial to produce serviceable items. This
situation will be given consideration as
more rubber becomes available.
The only remaining controls on pro-
duction of rubber items, other than tires
and tubes, are confined to the amounts of
natural rubber and butyl that may be
consumed.
The most serious component shortage
in this field of general rubber products
that threatens orderly reconversion is
cotton broad woven fabrics, controlled
by WPB Order M-317-a. Production of
rubber mechanical goods, footwear,
coated materials and other items is be-
ing curtailed and, in some instances,
threatened by the shortages of cotton
textiles. The present controls estab-
lished in Order M-317-a give preference
to customers producing bags, to satisfy
certain export requirements and to man-
ufacturers of low-priced clothing.
rubber industry has recommended that
the controls established in this order be
revoked, permitting equal treatment for
all consumers of these cotton fabrics.
The Rubber Division of the Civilian
Production Administration is preparing
factual information on this subject for
presentation to the Administrator.
The
The rubber manufacturing industry,
synthetic rubber industry, reclaimed
rubber industry are relatively small users
of rosin (10-12 per cent). It is recom-
mended that distribution controls over
this material be maintained to protect
this small requirement until such time
as production of rosin has been increased
to somewhat near the prewar levels.
V. RECONVERSION TO NATURAL
RUBBER
The policy of the Rubber Bureau and
its predecessor agencies in converting
from the use of natural to synthetic
rubber during the war was based on re-
taining natural rubber in those products,
where for quality reasons, synthetic rub-
ber could not be substituted. Converse-
ly, synthetic rubber was used first and
in the greatest quantities, in those prod-
ucts where the end product quality was
adequate when made of synthetic. In
reconverting from the use of synthetic
to natural rubber, the same basic policy
will be followed in reverse. As more
natural rubber becomes available, it will
be permitted first in those products
where for quality reasons it is required.
For example, in the field of tires, greater
improvement in tire performance can be
obtained by using relatively more natural
rubber in truck tires than in passenger
tires.
Because of the importance of the use
of natural rubber for quality reasons in
the production of large truck tires and
airplane tires during the war, the tire
industry on a wartime basis was consum-
ing approximately 90 per cent of all
natural rubber permitted. Historically,
the consumption of natural rubber for
production of tires has been 70-72 per
cent of the total amounts consumed.
Using the historical pattern of natural
rubber consumption which is surpris-
ingly stable, the Rubber Bureau has
calculated the percentage of natural
rubber that properly applies to each seg-
ment of the rubber industry, such as
tires and tubes, mechanical goods, wire
and cable, footwear, soles and heels, drug
sundries, etc. Each segment of the rub-
ber industry will share in the additional
supply of natural rubber in the propor-
tion its particular segment bears to the
total.
Within each industry segment, the ad-
ditional rubber will be permitted in those
products, where it is most needed for
quality reasons. In this connection, the
Rubber Bureau has the advice of ap-
proximately seventeen technical consult-
ing committees, representing the various
industry segments. In consultation with
these committees, a preference pattern is
being established within each segment
indicating the products in which the in-
dustry recommends natural rubber
should first be used. Importance of
these technical consulting committees
cannot be over-emphasized and it is
absolutely essential that they be main-
tained and permitted to perform the
same functions that they have over the
past three years.
This method of reconverting to the
use of natural rubber will cover the
major-consuming products, but obvi-
ously, will not reach all the many and
varied products that might be made with
natural rubber. As the process of re-
conversion continues, the industry will
progressively use larger percentages of
natural rubber. An appeal policy will be
established whereby manufacturers of
miscellaneous items which do not fall
within the major program, will be per-
mitted to consume rubber in the same
relative proportion to their pre-war use
as the major-consuming products.
The Technical Staff of the Rubber
Bureau is preparing a pattern for re-
conversion based upon the above policy,
which will lay out the steps that can be
progressively taken as soon as additional
natural rubber becomes available per
month. This pattern will be put into
effect immediately upon official advice
as to rubber availability.
With regards to rubber availability, it
is important that a clear-cut channel be
established for orderly flow of informa-
tion, so that advance planning on the
use of rubber can be put into effect im-
mediately as rubber actually becomes
available. The Rubber Development
Corporation of the Reconstruction Fi-
nance Corporation has been established
as the sole purchasing agent for the
United States and through its agents,
will know when rubber is actually in
transit to this country. The Rubber
Committee of the Combined Raw Ma-
terials Board will be advised of such ship-
ments and will determine rubber alloca-
tion as between .countries. The alloca-
tion decisions of this Committee will be
the official source of information upon
which the Rubber Division of the Civilian
Production Administration will act in
amending its controls.
VI. CONTINUING RUBBER ORGANI-
ZATION
The Director of Rubber Programs has
reported to the Chairman of the War
Production Board. With the abolition
of the War Production Board on Novem-
ber 3, 1945, this office will be discon-
tinued. However, Robert S. Wilson will
remain as Advisor to W. L. Batt, Chair-
man of the Interagency Policy Commit-
tee on Rubber. George M. Tisdale, who
has been Assistant Director of Rubber
Programs, will also remain as Advisor
to Mr. Batt and will be Chairman of the
Combined Raw Materials Board Rubber
Committee, responsible for allocation of
natural rubber to all consuming coun-
tries.
On VJ-Day, August 14, 1945, the Rub-
ber Bureau had 203 employees, 34 of
whom were on loan from the industry.
Because of the cancellation of the various
expansion programs, the revocation of
the Tire Allotment Plan and other rub-
ber controls, and the revocation of the
overall War Production Board controls,
such as the Controlled Materials Plan
and certain priority procedures, the Rub-
ber Bureau staff on September 30, 1945
was reduced to 108 persons, 26 of whom
were on loan from the industry.
On November 3, 1945, when the Ci-
vilian Production Administration re-
places the War Production Board, a Rub-
ber Division will be created in the Bureau
of Reconversion Operations. The staff
of the Rubber Division of the Civilian
Production Administration will total 78
persons, 17 of whom will be on loan from
the industry. There will be three main
organizational units in the Rubber Di-
vision. The Technical Operations
Branch will be responsible for admin-
GPO-CPA 17432—p. 5

istering the Rubber Order R-1 controls
as they pertain to the use of natural rub-
ber. This Branch will be staffed with
technical experts from the industry, who
will work with the various consulting
technical committees in recommending
the pattern of reconversion to the use of
natural rubber. A Production Staff will
be responsible for maintaining informa-
tion on production of tires and other rub-
ber products, and assisting the industry
in overcoming any bottlenecks to orderly
reconversion. This group will be respon-
sible also for determination of monthly
quotas for tire rationing. The Rubber
Supply and Statistics Branch will be re-
sponsible for the allocation of natural
rubber and will also collect and assemble
all statistics regarding natural rubber
consumption and tire production.
W. J. Sears, who has been directing the
activities of the Rubber Bureau since
April 1, 1945, as its Deputy Director, will
become Director of the Rubber Division.
E. D. Kelly, who has been Assistant Di-
rector of the Rubber Bureau in Charge
of Staff Operations, will become Deputy
Director of the Rubber Division. George
L. Allison will be Assistant Director for
Technical Operations, Carl Gibson As-
sistant Director for Production and Her-
bert M. James will be Chief of the Rubber
Supply and Statistics Branch.
During the life of the Rubber Bureau
of the War Production Board, the rubber
industry has responded magnificiently in
furnishing personnel to assist in the
Government program, has cooperated
wholeheartedly in furnishing informa-
tion and supporting the Rubber Bureau
in its operation. As retiring Director of
Rubber Programs, I can assure you and
the Administrator of the Civilian Pro-
duction Administration that the rubber
industry will continue its splendid record
of cooperation and will continue to sup-
port the Rubber Division in achieving the
objectives of the Civilian Production Ad-
ministration.
VII. SUMMARY OF IMPACT OF WAR
ON RUBBER INDUSTRY AND ITS
RESPONSE
All segments of the rubber manufac-
turing industry deserve the thanks of a
grateful nation for a truly tremendous
and complex effort during World War II.
The combined technical, scientific and
engineering ability within the industry
rose to the occasion, helping to develop
the absolutely necessary synthetic rub-
ber program. Cooperation with similar
technicians of the petroleum, chemical
and construction industries made pos-
sible a vital new material. In addition,
the chemists and physicists of the rubber
VIII CHARTS AND TABLE
industry took this new raw material and
developed methods by which synthetic
rubbers could be made into useful end-
products. Production management of
the rubber companies were faced with the
largest demands ever encountered. Rub-
ber manufacturing facilities were ex-
panded. As these came into production,
new manpower had to be found and
trained. The cooperation of labor-its
long hours of work, its no-strike pledge
and in late 1944, seven-day week in the
tire and tube industry, were factors that
made all-time high production possible.
Success or failure to supply the maximum
number of necessary rubber products to
win the war quickly was dependent basi-
cally on the achievements of labor and
industry. The fact that our armies have
been victorious in Africa, Europe and the
Pacific was brought about at least in part
by the tremendous efforts of the rubber
manufacturing industry. Although it
was necessary to limit the use of almost
all rubber products on the homefront and
to see that such products as were manu-
factured went to the most essential uses,
the civilian transportation of this coun-
try did not break down. There were sev-
eral pretty close calls, but on each occa-
sion the rubber manufacturing industry
put forth greater effort, so that there was
no serious delay due to a shortage of rub-
ber products.
THOUSANDS OF
LONG TOWS
UNITED STATES
1000
BALANCE OF WORLD
800
600
400
200
EXHIBIT A
WORLD NATURAL RUBBER
CONSUMPTION
YEARLY
THOUSANDS O
LONG TONS
CENTS
PER-LB
1000
100
800
80
60
400
40
200
20
EXHIBIT B
NATURAL RUBBER PRICES
RIBBED SMOKED SHEETS
N.Y. SPOT PRICE
О
1910 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
EST
1913 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50
100
80
40
20
GPO-CPA 17432-p. 6
MOUSA ROS
„ONG TONS
40
NATURAL,
EXHIBIT C
RUBBER CONSUMPTION IN THE U.S.A.
MONTHLY
RECLAIM
20
THOUSANDS
LONG TORS
PER CENT
100
80
60
SYNTHETIC
60
RECLAIM
1 NATURAL
SYNTHETIC –,
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
20
о
40
20
EXHIBIT E
U.S.A. PRODUCTION
EXHIBIT D
PERCENT SYNTHETIC RUBBER CONSUMPTION
OF
G
TOTAL NATURAL & SYNTHETIC U.S.A.


:
1942
1943
1944
1945
Truck & Bus
Tires
Passenger
Car Tires
Tractor & Impl.
Tires
Airplane
Tires
Camelback
Pounds
Year
1939
7,680,000
49,933,000
1,100,000 *
33,000
54,411,000 *
1940
8,221,000
50,965,000
1941
11,148,000
50,392,000
1,500,000 *
2,100,000 *
75,000
49,488,000 *
170,000
75,920,000+
1942
13,033,000
2,461,000
1943
12,927,000
7,628,000
430,000 *
914,000
625,000 106,082,000 *
*
1,033,000 236,715,000 *
1944
14,713,000
18,793,000
2,105,000
1945 Est.
16,600,000
28,200,000
2,600,000
1,417,000 353,744,000
800,000 321,000,000
1946 Est.
13,760,000
66,000,000
3,800,000
182,000 263,000,000
* Shipments
PER CENT
2-7416
80
60
40
20

GPO-CPA 17432--r 7

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
3 9015 03810 9057
THOUSANDS
LONG TONS
800
600
EXHIBIT F
U.S.A. NATURAL AND SYNTHETIC RUBBER CONSUMPTION
MILITARY VS CIVILIAN
YEARLY ESTIMATE
THOUSANDS
LONG TONS
BOO
600
CIVILIAN
400
400
200
MILITARY S
(INCLUDES LEND LEASE)
200
IX. CONCLUSION
O
1941
Now that our arms are victorious over
our enemies, the rubber manufacturing
industry is faced with new responsibili-
ties. Tires, tubes and thousands of other
rubber products must be produced to sup-
ply a nation that has been starved of
rubber goods. There is a tremendous
pent-up demand for products made of
rubber for civilian transportation, indus-
trial use and household consumption.
These demands will keep even the great-
ly expanded facilities of the rubber man-
ufacturing industry busy for many
months to come.
A summary review of rubber during
the war period will show:
(1) Ninety per cent of our natural
rubber supply was cut off in February,
1942.
(2) We had on hand or afloat at that
time approximately 650,000 tons of nat-
ural rubber.
(3) This stockpile, conserved by strin-
gent measures, gave us two years in
which to develop a substitute for natural
rubber.
1942
1943
1944
(4) In those two years an entirely new
source of supply of rubber was created-
the American synthetic rubber indus-
try-capable of producing 1,200,000 tons
of synthetic rubber annually.
(5) In 1941, America's rubber prod-
ucts were made of 99% natural rubber
and 1% synthetic rubber; in 1945, Amer-
ica's rubber products were made of 15%.
natural rubber and 85% synthetic.
(6) In the third year after the loss of
Singapore, our total rubber consumption
(natural and synthetic) rose to a peak
higher than any previous year in our his-
tory.
(7) While the synthetic rubber poly-
mer is not in all respects the equal of
natural rubber as yet, it did the job and
did it well.
(8) Broadly speaking, no vehicle, mili-
tary or essential civilian, stood still for
lack of tires and no military operation
was delayed because rubber equipment
was lacking.
These simple, unembellished facts tell
more strikingly than pages of comment
and statistics how America rose to over-
10
1945
come the most frightening industrial
aspect of the sudden Japanese attack.
Great credit must be given to the Rub-
ber Survey Committee (Messrs. Baruch,
Conant and Compton) for having
stressed the essentiality of rubber and
for having pointed the way by which
this nation could achieve the develop-
ment of an adequate supply of rubber.
Today, we are faced with the problem
of meshing our new synthetic rubber
industry with new supplies of Far East
plantation rubber which will be avail-
able in the months ahead. This is one
of the momentous problems that con-
fronts the nation. Development of the
groundwork for deciding these problems
is in the good hands of the Interagency
Policy Committee on Rubber established
by the Office of War Mobilization and
Reconversion.
R. S. WILSON,
Director, Rubber Programs.
GEORGE M. TISDALE,
Assistant Director, Rubber Programs.
NOVEMBER 3, 1945.
INDEX
Page
Page
I. INTRODUCTION
II. JULY 1 TO AUGUST 14; VJ-DAY.
A. Cutback in December Military Truck Tire
Program...
3
3
3
V. RECONVERSION TO NATURAL RUBBER
VI. CONTINUING RUBBER ORGANIZATION.
VII. SUMMARY OF IMPACT OF WAR ON RUBBER
INDUSTRY AND ITS RESPONSE.
5
5
6
B. Conversion of Truck-Tire Capacity to A-3-b
Tires (9.00 through 11.00 cross section)..
VIII. CHARTS AND TABLE....
6
C. Expediting of Remaining Projects.-
33
Exhibit A-World Natural Rubber Consump-
tion...
6
D. Partial Cutback of Rayon Expansion Pro-
gram and Reduction in the Level of Carbon
Black Program....
Exhibit B-Natural Rubber Prices Ribbed
Smoked Sheets...
6
3
E. Work on Balancing Components and Man-
power Continued to VJ-Day-
Exhibit C-Rubber Consumption in the U. S. A.
Exhibit D-Percent Synthetic Rubber Con-
7
3
III. AFTER VJ-DAY.
4
sumption of Total Natural & Synthetic-
U. S. A....
7
A. Impact of VJ-Day on Industry..
4
Exhibit E-U. S. A. Production...
7
B. Demobilization of Controls on VJ-Day-
C. Cancellation of Remaining Expansion Pro-
gram..
4
Exhibit F-U. S. A. Natural and Synthetic
Rubber Consumption Military vs. Civilian..
8
4
IX. CONCLUSION..
8
IV. PEACETIME PRODUCTION OBJECTIVES.
A Tires and Tubes..
B. Other Rubber Products..
4
4
5
GPO-CPA 17432-p. 8