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BOOKS BY GENERAL F. W. GREENE
PUBLISHED BY CELARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
TEIE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION IN TELE
UNITED STATES. 12mo . te e © fict $0.75
TELE REVOLUTIONARY WAR AND THE MILITARY
POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES. With Maps.
8vo . tº & º e * tº o © fict $2.50
THE MISSISSIPPI. With Maps. (Campaigns of the
Civil War.) 12mo . . . . . . net $1.00
THE PRESENT
MILITARY SITUATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
THE PRESENT
MILITARY SITUATION IN THE
UNITED STATES
BY
FRANCIS WINTON GREENE
GRADUATE OF WEST POINT; MAJo㺠GENERAL U. S. W.
NEW YORK
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
I9IS
CopyRIGHT, 1915, By
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
Published February, 1915

PREFACE
THE following pages are, substantially, a
reprint of an address recently delivered in
Portland, Maine, at the request of the Eco-
nomic Club of that city.
I hope that they may, in some small degree,
help to persuade the civilians, the voters, the
“plain people” of Lincoln, the lovers of peace
and all its infinite benefits, to give calm but
thoughtful consideration to this question of
adequate national defense. It is eminently
worthy of their consideration.
FRANCIS W. GREENE.
BUFFALO, February I, I915.
2.75373
THE PRESENT
MILITARY SITUATION IN THE
JNITED STATES
THE PRESENT MILITARY SITUATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
I feel somewhat diffident in speaking in such
distinguished company, and I should hesitate
to appear with them,” but for the fact that all
my life I have studied—and at times written
upon—the important subject which is under
discussion to-night; and, I may frankly say,
have never accomplished anything by any-
thing I have ever written upon it. I am not
alone in that. The most distinguished soldiers
we have ever had—General Sherman in par-
ticular—have written to the same effect, but
without producing the slightest impression
upon the minds of their countrymen. In 1876,
more than a generation ago, General Sherman
was chairman of a commission appointed by
* The other speakers were Lieutenant-General Nelson A.
Miles, U. S. Army, and Professor John Graham Brooks, of
Harvard; one of them the only survivor of the leading gen-
erals in the Civil War and of the great Indian-fighters of 1865–
1896, and the other, one of the most profound economic
students of the day. -
3
4 MILITARY SITUATION
Act of Congress to study and report upon this
Same question that we are discussing to-night,
viz.: the question of our national defense and
the formulation of a military policy suited
to our special requirements. Nobody now
knows that this commission was appointed;
the fact has long since been forgotten. I
know about it because I was for a time the
Secretary of the commission. General Sher-
man was then in command of the army, a
soldier of world-wide reputation. His vivid
memoirs had already been published: his
duties as commanding general of the army
(the constitutional Commander-in-Chief, who
at that time was also a great general, Grant,
and the Secretary of War being present) were
not such as to deprive him of the leisure
necessary for this important work; and, as
we all know, he wielded the pen not so much
of a ready writer as of a vigorous soldier,
and he expressed his thoughts clearly, in-
cisively. And General Sherman threw himself
into the task as chairman of this commission
with his usual enthusiasm. He thought that
IN THE UNITED STATES 5
perhaps he might be instrumental in formu-
lating a definite military policy for this coun-
try, and he welcomed the chance of doing this,
which he hoped would be the capstone of
his military career. He searched our mil-
itary archives from the time of Washington
to the time of Grant. He pored over the end-
less and tiresome documents in those mass-
ive quartos entitled “American State Pa-
pers,”” and particularly the seven volumes on
“Military Affairs,” March 3, 1789, to March
1, 1838, the existence of which is now known
only to the historical specialist of more than
ordinary curiosity. He examined all the un-
published records of the Mexican War. He
was himself the creator of a great part of the
most valuable records of the Civil War, then
just beginning to be published. ' He worked
ten and twelve hours a day at this, with the
same ardor that he displayed in his pursuit
* “American State Papers. Military Affairs.” Vols. III
to VII (1823 to 1838) and vols. XII and XIII (1789 to 1825),
selected and edited, under the authority of Congress, by
the secretary of the Senate and the clerk of the House of
Representatives. Large quartos, about 1,000 pages and
3,000,ooo words in each volume.
6 MILITARY SITUATION
of the wily Joe Johnston from Chattanooga
to Atlanta. From all these voluminous data
of millions of words he prepared a history of
the army and of our military policy—or lack
of policy—concise, accurate. The curious, if
so minded, may find it in the musty records
of the Forty-fourth Congress, as a Senate
Executive Document. Not content with
his own researches and opinions, he sum-
moned the principal soldiers of the Civil War
(it was only eleven years after Appomattox
and most of them were still living) to testify
before the commission and to put in writing
their matured views as to what ought to
be the military policy of the United States,
and the proper Organization of our military
strength and enormous but undeveloped mil-
itary resources in order to carry this policy
into effect. Hancock, Schofield, McDowell,
McClellan, Terry, Pope, Ord, Humphreys,
Meigs, Townsend, and Garfield responded in
short but comprehensive papers.
After nearly seven months of this labor
the documents were transmitted to Congress,
IN THE UNITED STATES 7
with a definite, explicit recommendation as to
the legislation necessary to give us a definite
military policy. - -
What happened? The documents were
printed, part of the tons of documents which
come out of the Government Printing Office
during every session of Congress. No more.
There was a brief debate, no action, and the
subject was dropped. Two years later a
“Joint Committee on the Reorganization of
the Army” was appointed, with General Burn-
side, then a Senator from Rhode Island, as
chairman and General M. C. Butler, then a
Senator from South Carolina, as one of its
members. The survivors of the Civil War
who had held high command were again
summoned to give their testimony, eminent
civilians were called upon to give their views,
again a document was printed (Forty-fifth
Congress, 3rd Session, Senate Report No. 555,
pp. 512), and again, after a brief debate, the
subject was dropped. It was not seriously
taken up again for thirty years.
Why was this? Because in the brief de-
8 MILITARY SITUATION
bates above referred to it was stated—and
then, as always, Congress represented with
substantial accuracy the opinion of the ma-
jority of the voters—that this country would
never again be engaged in war; and there-
fore, in the midst of such pressing questions
as the building of the Western railroads, the
resumption of specie payments, the silver
question, and the tariff, there was no time
to think about the needs of the army. There
was no “military situation in the United
States” worth thinking about.
From this dream of perpetual peace we
were rudely awakened by the war in 1898, in
which the loss of life and the expenditure of
money were so comparatively small, but of
which the consequences to us have been so
momentous. Still, our people continued to
think that the chances of war were quite
remote; and the subject of military prepara-
tion a matter of small importance, compared
with the regulation of public-service corpora-
tions, the control of monopoly, the improve-
ment of our banking system, and the other
IN THE UNITED STATES 9
great questions pressing hard for considera-
tion upon a very busy people. The events
of the last six months, however, have at last
opened the eyes of our people to the fact
that, while we are comparatively immune
from the dangers of war which beset the
peoples of Europe, yet we are by no means
completely immune. They begin to realize
that the “present military situation” is a
subject which deserves their consideration, that
it is of equal importance—perhaps greater
importance—than the federal reserve banking
law, the income tax, the Sherman law, the
tariff, the extension of our commerce, and
the rebuilding of our merchant marine; and
therefore it is a subject worthy of calm, Se-
rious deliberation.
There is no need of excitement about it, no
cause for hysteria. We do not need and will
not have in this country an army of 700,000
men, as some ill-balanced enthusiasts demand;
we are not compelled to, and we will not,
enter the battleship race of England and Ger-
many. England must run this race—or die.
10 MILITARY SITUATION
We are not so situated, and it would be su-
preme folly for us to waste our resources or our
thoughts in any such contest. But we do
need to give such thought to this matter as is
necessary, in order to compel our representa-
tives in Congress so to organize our latent
but enormous military strength that no na-
tion shall ever undertake to disturb our se-
curity, or attempt to prevent us from working
out our great destiny in the pursuits of peace.
One other question I should like to refer
to here. Does preparation for war result in
preserving peace or in inviting war? Many
men of eminence, presidents of universities,
leaders of public opinion, have recently as-
serted that the great conflict which is now
devastating Europe has forever disposed of
the fallacy that preparation for war helps to
preserve peace. In my humble opinion this
is a hasty, ill-considered judgment and—if I
may say so without offense to these univer-
sity presidents who are not only my personal
friends, but are men justly entitled to lead
public opinion and for whom, in common with
IN THE UNITED STATES 11
thousands of others, I have very great admi-
ration—it is a shallow judgment, due to the
mental perturbation naturally arising from
contemplation of this most appalling of all
catastrophes. The sober truth is that if
preparations for war are made with a view
to attack and for purposes of conquest, then
unquestionably such preparations do lead to
counter-preparations on the part of the na-
tion against which the attack is planned; they
lead to a race in armaments, ever increasing
in magnitude, constantly draining the re-
sources of the people, creating a military
caste like that of Germany, which steadily
grows more insolent and insulting in all its
references to its intended adversary; and at
the same time creating in the minds of the
taxpayer and the man of business the feeling
that the cost of armament is greater than
the probable cost of war, and that it were
better that the war should come and be done
with it, and the air cleared, as by a thunder-
storm, so that they can resume their ordi-
nary avocations without this dreadful night-
12 MILITARY SITUATION
mare hanging over them; and finally the
cataclysm, such as we are now witnessing,
does inevitably result. If, on the other hand,
these preparations are made, not with any
purpose of conquest, but solely to enable a
nation to pursue its peaceful development
without risk of interference from envious
rivals or competitors; and if such preparations
are so carefully but economically made (as is
easily possible in our case) that even the
most powerful nation will think it best, on
the whole, not to try military conclusions
with us, then I assert without fear of suc-
cessful contradiction that such preparation
does not invite war but does, on the con-
trary, tend to prevent war; and it does cer- .
tainly do everything that human foresight
can suggest to prevent that horrible calamity.
And I should not make this assertion with
such vehemence were it not that it has the
support of George Washington; who over
and over again, on every suitable occasion
during the sixteen years between the close of
the Revolution and his death in 1799, argued,
IN THE UNITED STATES 13
with his unrivalled wisdom and with all the
force of his strong nature, in the effort to con-
vince his countrymen of the soundness of the
views which I have, so imperfectly as com-
pared with him, attempted to express.
Gentlemen, in these days, some people, in
Massachusetts and elsewhere, have expressed
the opinion that Washington was not only a
poor soldier but an indifferent statesman; that
he was a man of good character but in pub-
lic affairs was not much more than a re-
spectable figure-head; that such military rep-
utation as he gained was due simply to the
fatuous mistakes of his adversaries; and that
his political reputation was due to a skilful
use of the thoughts of the great statesmen of
the period—the two Adamses, Franklin, Jef-
ferson, and Hamilton.
I do not share these views. As to his mil-
itary reputation and whether it was deserved
or not I have dealt elsewhere, at some length.*
I believe that he was one of the great soldiers
of history, and that if he had died within a
55
* “The Revolutionary War.” Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1911.
14 MILITARY SITUATION
year after the battle of Yorktown, and his
military services had not been overshadowed
by his transcendent political services, this
Opinion would be concurred in with substan-
tial unanimity. And I believe, also, as it was
generally believed throughout the whole pe-
riod of the nineteenth century, that he was
the greatest statesman of all time; that his was
the master mind; and that the two Adamses
and Franklin and Jefferson and Hamilton
and Madison were only his subordinate coad-
jutors in devising and Organizing this gov-
ernment of which we are so proud, and which
for five generations we have held up to the
world as a model of good government and
as the hope of mankind struggling to free
itself from the despotism of the past.
I beseech you, therefore, with all the ear-
nestness that I can command, to study what
Washington said and wrote concerning the
desirability and the necessity of preparing
for war in time of peace. What he said on
this subject forms no inconsiderable part of
his voluminous writings, which were collected
IN THE UNITED STATES 15
and printed in 12 volumes by Sparks in 1837,
and later in 14 volumes by Worthington C.
Ford in 1893. His views On this subject,
like the principles of strategy, are eternal.
They have not been changed by steam or
electricity or the marvellous industrial de-
velopment of the nineteenth century and
the early part of this twentieth century in
which we are privileged to live. They are
fixed and immutable, far more so than the
fabled laws of the Medes and Persians, as to
the nature of which no one has any accurate
knowledge. Our situation in this year 1915
is as different from our situation at the close
of the eighteenth century as it is possible for
the human mind to imagine; but the writings
of Washington on this question of national
defense are just as wise, just as pertinent, just
as applicable to-day as they were when they
were uttered a century and a quarter ago. I
beg of you to go to your public library, get
the volumes of Sparks and Ford, and read
them with careful attention.
There is no great danger in the present
16 MILITARY SITUATION
situation, no danger whatever provided we
utilize in a judicious manner a small portion
of the enormous resources at our disposal.
These resources have hitherto not been so
utilized. All that I can hope to do this
evening" is to convince you of this fact.
Once you and other voters are convinced of
it, there is no doubt that, with the ordinary
common sense which has always character-
ized this government of ours “by the people,”
the proper solution of the question will be
found. Naturally, the subject appeals more
closely in the first instance to the people who
live on the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans,
across which must come our enemies if we
are ever to be attacked. But, if the idea
takes possession of the people on the Seacoasts
that this is a matter worth thinking about,
the thought will quite rapidly penetrate to
the interior, and the people of Chicago and
Saint Louis and Kansas City and Denver
will be quite as much interested as the peo-
ple of New York and Boston and Portland.
The inhabitants of the interior cities will re-
IN THE UNITED STATES 17
alize that while they are far beyond the
twenty-mile range of the most powerful guns
now afloat, yet they are by no means beyond
the range of the financial and industrial dis-
aster which will surely overtake them if a
landing should be effected in the vicinity of
New York or Boston or San Francisco, and
either of those cities should be subjected to
an indemnity levied according to the methods
now in vogue.
Any discussion of our “present military
situation” necessarily raises the question
whether there is any military situation, and
if so, why. That means, in plain English, Is
there any such danger of our being attacked
either on the Atlantic coast or on the Pacific
coast, or on the three thousand miles of Ca-
nadian boundary line, that ordinary caution
and prudence, such caution and prudence as
we exercise to prevent a remote but possible
disaster in our private business, make it in-
18 MILITARY SITUATION
Cumbent upon us as plain, sensible people to
take measures, first, to prevent such an at-
tack, if it be in our power to prevent it; and
Secondly, to repel the attack, if we cannot
prevent it, and to repel it in such manner
that the nation which undertakes it will
never attempt it a second time?
There are some of my friends who say to
me it is not wise to discuss such matters; it
is injudicious to throw lighted matches where
there is so much loose powder lying about;
by talking about these things we shall bring
about the very result we are seeking to avoid.
Such is not my view. I do not believe that
the Ostrich has ever saved its neck by hiding
its head in the sand. This question of na-
tional defense against remote but still possi-
ble dangers is a question that must be met
manfully, calmly, prayerfully, if you like; and
there is no harm in talking about it, no sense
in attempting to disguise it.
Now, the only guide for the future is a
study of the past; and, before taking up the
subject of our present relations and possible
IN THE UNITED STATES 19
future relations with the most powerful na-
tions of Europe and of Asia, I should like to
call your attention for a moment to the un-
stable nature of political alliances and interna-
tional friendships. They are as shifting as the
sands of the desert. At the present time our
relations with Great Britain are of the most
friendly and cordial nature. It seems now
unthinkable that the two greatest nations
which speak the English language should ever
be brought into conflict. Yet what has been
the history of English alliances? From 1757
to 1763 England was engaged with France
in a struggle for the control of the North
American continent and of the destiny of
India. Under the lead of Chatham—to my
mind the most far-sighted, the most concilia-
tory, and in every way the greatest of English
statesmen—“the people of Massachusetts II
am quoting from Trevelyan's most fascinat-
ing history] taxed themselves to the amount
of two pounds in every three of their year's
income for the defense of the British Empire.
Massachusetts—so close-fisted against
20 MILITARY SITUATION
any attempt to take her money without ask-
ing her own consent—gave Pitt £140,000 in 20
months, and loaded herself with debt when the
yield from current taxation showed symptoms
of dwindling.” What is now the State of
Maine was then a part of Massachusetts.
Do you realize that your ancestors raised 30,-
000 men to fight in common with the men
whom Chatham sent over from England and
who decided on the Plains of Abraham the
destiny of this continent—that it was to be
English and not French 2
Peace was proclaimed in 1763. French sov-
ereignty was forever lost on this continent as
well as in India, and the success in America
was very largely due to the whole-hearted
support of the colonies, and particularly those
of New England. Only 12 years later the
men of Massachusetts shot down the King's
soldiers, to the number of 73 killed and 174
wounded, between Concord and Boston; be-
cause the royal Governor of Massachusetts
had used the King's soldiers in an attempt to
enforce an Act of Parliament which taxed them
IN THE UNITED STATES 21
without their consent. The war begun at Lex-
ington lasted eight and a half years, the most
bitter, as it was certainly the most disastrous,
war in which England ever engaged. The
French were then America’s all-important al-
lies. That war settled the question for all
time, not only whether the colonists should be
taxed without representation, but whether
they should be taxed by the British Parlia-
ment at all. -
The Seven Years' War, however (1757–63),
did not settle the score between England and
France. This was revived by the French
Revolution, and for 23 years, from 1792 to
1815, Great Britain fought a life-and-death
struggle against Napoleon. This did finally
settle the differences between France and Eng-
land, and not long after Napoleon's down-
fall these two nations began to be drawn
together in commerce and friendship; in 1854
they were full-fledged allies in a war against
Russia. England had by now become con-
vinced that her most dangerous rival was not
France, but Russia, and that if Russia should
22 MILITARY SITUATION
possess Constantinople, she would have a
position of vantage on the flank of the route
to India, and would use it to England's injury.
To prevent this, England, which had brought
on the war, laid down the cardinal principle
in the Treaty of Paris, in 1856, that it was
necessary that the (unspeakable) Turk should
remain in Constantinople and control the
straits of the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles.
England induced all the seven nations which
signed the treaty, viz., France, Prussia, Russia,
Austria, Sardinia, and Sweden, as well as
herself, to agree that they would “respect
the independence and territorial integrity of
the Ottoman Empire.” By a separate con-
vention, England induced France and Austria
to guarantee this integrity and independence,
and to consider any infraction of the Treaty
of Paris a casus belli.
From 1856 until some time after Bismarck
formed the Triple Alliance with Austria and
Italy, in 1883—that is to say, for the period of
nearly a generation—this principle of the in-
tegrity of the Ottoman Empire, as a means
IN THE UNITED STATES 23
of preventing access of Russia to the Mediter-
ranean, was the foundation and corner-stone
of British diplomacy. But after the Triple
Alliance had been formed, France, for self-
protection, came to an understanding with
Russia; and as the German commerce began
to spread to all quarters of the globe; as the
German industrial development began to in-
crease by leaps and bounds; as goods “made
in Germany” began to undersell British-made
goods, not only in the distant markets but also
in the British Isles themselves; as Germany
began to send insulting messages during the
Boer War, during the Algerian and Moroccan
developments, and began to publish books in
which England was spoken of as a decadent
race, a land-robber, possessed of an empire
which it had not the courage and ability to
defend, England began to see that Germany
and not Russia was her most dangerous rival.
Her policy then shifted and she, too, came
to an understanding with Russia. To-day
she is fighting for her very life, with Russia as
her most powerful ally; and it seems prob-
24 MILITARY SITUATION
able that as a recompense she will at the
close of the war acquiesce in the delivery
of Constantinople, and the control of the
Bosphorus and the Dardanelles, to Russia.
To recapitulate, in the eighteenth century
England and her American colonies fought
shoulder to shoulder against France. A few
years later France and the American colonies
fought shoulder to shoulder against England.
In the beginning of the nineteenth century
England and Germany fought against France,
and later England and France fought against
Russia. In the twentieth century England,
France, and Russia are fighting against Ger-
many—in the most colossal of all wars.
Why is it that nations thus shift their al-
liances? The answer is, because nations ever
have been, are now, and ever will be guided
in their dealings with other nations by self-
interest and self-interest alone. I am not
now speaking my own opinions only; I am
again quoting those of George Washington.
We Americans have always been governed in
our international dealings by Self-interest and
IN THE UNITED STATES 25
self-interest alone. The first conspicuous in-
stance of it occurred in November, 1778. A
committee of Congress, in conjunction with
the Marquis de LaFayette, and in correspond-
ence with Doctor Franklin at Paris, had drawn
up a plan for an attack on Canada, which
was to be effected by the combined operations
of the United States and France. It was a
most delicate situation. We were under enor-
mous obligations to France, and Washington
had a peculiarly strong affection for LaFay-
ette, whom, in the absence of a son of his
own, he regarded almost as his own son.
The plan for the invasion of Canada had
been made without consulting Washington.
When he heard of it he saw that, as Canada
was then denuded of British troops, the ex-
pedition would in all probability succeed, and
LaFayette would gain great renown; but he
saw with equal clearness that if an army
under LaFayette's command and composed
largely of French troops should cross the fron-
tier, descend the Saint Lawrence, meet a
French fleet at Quebec and capture that city,
26 MILITARY SITUATION
then French sovereignty would be restored
on the American continent. Washington in-
stantly wrote to the president of Congress
One of those letters, of which there are so
many in the twelve volumes of Sparks, the
wisdom of which seems almost superhuman,
in which he showed that if French troops en-
tered the city of Quebec, they would prob-
ably never leave there. This letter put a
quietus on the proposed expedition to Can-
ada. In the letter occurs this sentence, sel-
dom quoted, but to my mind one of the most
profound sayings of Washington, as true and
as pertinent in this twentieth century as when
it was written 136 years ago: “It is a maxim,
founded on the universal experience of mankind,
that no nation is to be trusted farther than it is
bound by its interests; and no prudent states-
man or politician will venture to depart from
7t.” -
Now, can we be sure, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that the interests of Great Britain and
of the United States will always continue to
be—as they undoubtedly are now, or were
IN THE UNITED STATES 27
until a few days ago—such that the existing
friendship and even affection shall continue?
Not long ago a cloud came on the horizon.
Two ships, the Dacia and the Wilhelmina,
recently belonging to Germany but now fly-
ing the flag of the United States, sailed for
Europe engaged in what we consider to be
lawful commerce. They sailed, if the reports
in the public press are correct, with the knowl-
edge and approval of Our government. And
yet Great Britain courteously, but no less
firmly and positively, informed our govern-
ment prior to the date of sailing that it was
her intention to seize these ships by force as
they approached the coast of Europe. The
ships are now on the Ocean, and I do not
know how the incident will terminate, but I
need hardly say that if Great Britain should
seize two ships flying the American flag, a
situation of no little delicacy would arise. I
shall say no more of this because under ex-
isting circumstances the less said the better;
but I think you ought to consider whether
in case Great Britain and the United States
28 MILITARY SITUATION
lock horns on any such question which each
party considers vital to its interests, and if
neither side yields, then the friendship of a
hundred years, of which we have recently
talked so much and of which we are justly
proud, might vanish Overnight.
We all hope and pray that our relations
of peace and friendly competition with Great
Britain may always continue; but we are not
justified in building our plans on hopes. If
England comes triumphant Out of this war,
she will not allow her subjects to be killed,
and their property to be wrecked, in Mexico,
and let it go with a flippant remark that her
subjects went there to make money and they
took the risks. | That is not the way that
England has treated her people, as they have
spread to the four quarters of the globe. She
will more probably say to us: “You restore
Order in Mexico, or we will.” And if Eng-
land goes to Mexico to restore Order, she may
not retire, as we did from Cuba. So that we
will either have to eat our Monroe Doctrine
or intervene in Mexico for an indefinite pe-
IN THE UNITED STATES 29
riod. Nor is this the only cloud that may
come between our good friends in England
and ourselves. If England comes out of this
war victorious, she will be more than ever
mistress of the seas; she will, with redoubled
energy, seek to extend her commerce on every
continent in order to recover the loss and
damage of the war. We also are seeking to
extend our commerce and to sell our manu-
factured goods in every quarter of the globe.
Therein, according to the judgment of our
wisest men of affairs, lies the future prosper-
ity of this country. Is there no chance that
the two great nations may clash in this com-
petition? Thanks to the skill of Hamilton
Fish and William M. Evarts, loyally sup-
ported by President Grant, in 1871, we arbi-
trated the Alabama claims with entire satis-
faction to both sides; later, in 1907, thanks
to the genius and forensic ability of Elihu
Root, we arbitrated the fishery disputes, which
had more than once brought us to the verge
of war during the hundred years that they
had remained unsettled. But the skill of Jef-
30 MILITARY SITUATION
ferson, Madison, and Monroe, all ardent ad-
vocates of peace and of the futility of prep-
aration for war, were insufficient to keep us
from going to war with England in 1812 over
the question of the impressment of our sea-
men. So that, looking at the history of Eng-
land for the last 160 years, I think we are
not justified in believing that the present
happy relations between the two great Eng-
lish-speaking peoples are SO certain to con-
tinue that it is not necessary to give any
thought to what we should do in the un-
happy contingency that they might be broken.
It was Cromwell who said: “Put your trust
in God but mind to keep your powder dry.”
That was a homely but sound maxim of your
ancestors. We no longer have to keep our
powder dry, because we keep it in a metallic
case, but we do have to take equally prudent
precautions.
Next, is there no risk that Germany may
Some day attack us? If she should come out
victorious from this war—which seems hardly
possible, and yet she has already accomplished
IN THE UNITED STATES 31
marvels of impossibility—Germany would
probably not ask us to restore Order in Mexico,
but would calmly announce that she intended

to restore order there herself and did not
need Qyr assistance in the matter. - As ancil-
lary to this undertaking she would promptly
buy from Denmark the island of Saint
Thomas, which has the finest harbor in the
West Indies. For 45 years, since the first
term of General Grant’s administration, we
have steadily refused to purchase it for our-
selves and as steadily refused to allow any
one else to buy it; although Denmark has
been ready and anxious at every moment
in that long period to sell. The adjacent
island of Santa Cruz, which she owns, would
be thrown in without extra expense, for both
islands are of no use to Denmark, and the
profits on their administration at the end of
every year are written in red figures. Ger-
many has hitherto respected our wish that
these islands should not be acquired by any
European nation; but, if she is victorious in
this war, it needs no prophet to say that this
32 MILITARY SITUATION
wish of ours may no longer be respected. If
Germany is defeated in this war, her wishes
as to Mexico and the West Indian islands and
the Panama Canal will have to be postponed;
but let us not base any plans on the theory
that Germany can be so crushed that she
will never again undertake offensive military
operations. The advocates of peace express
the bloodthirsty wish that this may be ac-
complished; that the war may continue until
Germany is not only brought to her knees,
but so devastated, maimed, and crippled that
not for a hundred years can she again go to
war; and they justify their wish by saying
that only so can universal peace be ushered in
and the United States of Europe established,
with an International Supreme Court sitting
constantly at The Hague to hear and decide
their differences and an International Army
to enforce its decrees. But, my friends, do
not be deceived: that is not “in the womb of
time”; it cannot be done. When the war is
over Germany will still be the second naval
power in the world, stronger than ourselves
IN THE UNITED STATES 33
in battleships, and possessed of an ocean-
going commerce with a tonnage nearly five
times as great as our own. In little more
than one generation, from 1872 to 1914, Ger-
many has built up her merchant marine from
989,000 tons to 4,900,000 tons, an increase of
fivefold. Germany possesses the only three
ships in the world having a tonnage each
exceeding 50,000 tons. The combined ton-
nage of the Hamburg-American, North Ger-
man Lloyd, and Hamburg South American
lines is 2,311,000. The combined tonnage of
the Cunard, White Star, British India, and
Peninsular and Oriental lines is only 1,960,-
000 tons. By far the greater part of the
German tonnage has been created within the
space of a single generation. The Germans
manufacture ships of the very highest quality
at about 60 per cent of what they cost us;
they operate these ships at an expense of
about 80 per cent of what we have to pay.
So long as the scale of wages continues what
it now is, and probably will continue to be, in
this country, there is no ground to expect
34 MILITARY SITUATION
that we can ever rival Germany in the ocean-
carrying trade. Even if during the present
war England should succeed in practically
destroying all of the existing German ships,
neither England nor any other nation can
destroy German efficiency, German stout-
heartedness, German brains, and German in-
dustrial skill. If her whole commercial fleet
is wiped out, it will only be a few years be-
fore German ships will again be seen on every
One of the seven seas. In support of this
we have only to consider how rapidly France
recovered from the appalling disasters of 1870
and the crushing financial burdens which
were then laid upon her by her victorious
opponent. We have only to consider the
state of absolute desolation in which the
South found itself in 1865, and the pros-
perity which it had already regained less than
10 years later.
Now, what are the German ideas about the
possibility of Germany's picking a quarrel
with us and sending troops across the sea to
Settle it? Let me read you something from
IN THE UNITED STATES 35
a very interesting little book* published in
Germany some years ago, the publication of
which, so it is said, was suppressed at the
outbreak of this war; but a translation was
recently made from copies which escaped
hither, and it has been published in New
York within the last few months. Its author
is or was a member of the German General
Staff and the title of his book is “Operations
Upon the Sea.” This is his opinion as to the
possibility of operations against the United
States. He says (p. 92):
“As a matter of fact, Germany is the only
great power which is in a position to conquer
the United States. England could, of course,
carry out a successful attack upon the sea,
but she would not be prepared to protect her
Canadian provinces, with which the Amer-
icans could compensate themselves for a total
or crushing defeat on the sea. None of the
other great powers can provide the necessary
transport fleet to attempt an invasion.”
* “Operations Upon the Sea. A Study.” By Freiherr von
fºdelsheim, in the service of the German General Staff in
Igor. Translated from the German. New York: The Out-
door Press, 1914.
36 MILITARY SITUATION
And again (p. 86):
“With that country, in particular, political
friction, manifest in commercial aims, has not
been lacking in recent years, and has, until
now, been removed chiefly through acquies-
cence on our part. However, as this sub-
mission has its limit, the question arises as
to what means we can develop to carry out
our purpose with force in order to combat
the encroachment of the United States upon
our interests.” Our main factor here is our
* Many people have expressed astonishment that the Ger-
man Government allowed the publication of Bernhardi’s
book, which so accurately forecasted the events of last Au-
gust, and similarly as to this book of von Edelsheim. The
latter deals solely with a military problem, whereas Bern-
hardi's “Next War” deals with many other than strictly
military subjects; but as to military projects von Edels-
heim’s book is to sea operations what von Bernhardi’s book
is to land operations. The officers of our army and navy
are forbidden to discuss such topics in public, either in speech
or writing. How in the world did Germany allow such
books to be published?
The answer is found in the difference in the environment.
In Germany several thousand military books are published
every year; in English-speaking countries several scores
at the most. German officers are encouraged to discuss
military topics, and they do not hesitate to face the facts
and call a spade a spade. Moreover, it is probable that the
German Chancellor was often in need of Socialist votes to
pass his appropriation bills for the army and navy, and that
IN THE UNITED STATES 37
fleet. Our battle fleet has every prospect of
victoriously defeating the forces of the United
States, widely dispersed over the two Oceans.
It is certain that after the defeat of the United
States fleet, the great extension of unprotected
coast-line and [of the] powerful resources of
that country would compel them to make
peace.”
His little book is an elaboration of his ideas
of how the operations should be conducted,
in order, as he says, “to carry out our purpose
with force”; and of an exhortation to the
members of the General Staff and his other
comrades in arms not to neglect this overseas
problem in the study of the many problems
it was necessary for them to be instructed as to the “en-
croachments” of other nations, and to be convinced by mil-
itary experts that they would get their money’s worth if
they voted for the expenditure. Finally, a possible psycho-
logical explanation: When Bismarck represented Prussia
in the Diet at Frankfort, he conceived the idea that his col-
leagues who represented the other states in the North Ger-
man Confederation conducted their negotiations by lying
and deceit. Thereafter he invariably told the truth, and
thereby outwitted them. The story is given by Busch, who
was to Bismarck as Boswell to Johnson. Possibly Bismarck's
disciples—not only the authors, but the Chancellors—acted on
the same principle.
38 MILITARY SITUATION
with which they are charged, but to make
their plans and to work out in time of peace
all necessary preparations, so that when the
transatlantic war begins it can be prosecuted
with as much celerity as, let me say, the mo-
bilization of August, 1914, and the advance
through Belgium to the vicinity of Paris. I
have no doubt that Freiherr von Edelsheim’s
advice has been carefully followed, that the
project for a war with the United States, in
successive units of, say, 240,000 men each,
has all been made, docketed, and put away in
the appropriate pigeonhole, in the office of the
German General Staff at Berlin, until it shall be
called for. I confess to an intense curiosity
(which is not likely to be satisfied) to see this
document. In the absence of that I shall
later on give you a summary of so much of
Baron von Edelsheim's plans as he has dis-
closed in his most interesting little book.
I dismiss all consideration of a “war” with
Mexico. Circumstances may make it neces-
sary for us to do some arduous, expensive,
and difficult police work in that turbulent
IN THE UNITED STATES 39
country. If we have to do it, it will be as
easily within our means as was the settle-
ment of our dispute with Spain in 1898; and
the result of pacifying and establishing stable
government in that land of marvellous re-
sources which has been distracted by revolu-
tions throughout the hundred years since it
declared its independence of Spain, will be
worth far more than what it costs; but it
would not be war in the sense of what we are
now discussing.
On the Pacific, however, there is a remote
possibility of war—in my humble judgment,
far more remote than the contingency of war
on the Atlantic coast, and it will not happen
except as a result of our own insolence, our
own disregard of our treaties, or our own in-
ability to compel the sovereign States which
form the portion of Our Union bordering on
the Pacific Ocean to legislate in conformity
to the treaties which the Federal Government
has made. I reach this opinion, viz., that
the possibility of war with Japan is in the
highest degree remote, for various reasons.
40 MILITARY SITUATION
In the first place, Japan owes her entrance
into the family of nations to us. All her
statesmen, on all proper Occasions, express
their gratitude for this, and their belief that
this gratitude and its resulting friendship will
be perpetual. Some people doubt the sincer-
ity of this, but I do not. In the second
place, the Elder Statesmen who control the
affairs of Japan are among the wisest of the
men who guide the destinies of nations. They
have no delusions. They are more con-
cerned with actualities than with rhetoric;
more interested in studying facts than in
making phrases. They realize that while
possibly in the beginning of the struggle they
might have an advantage over us, the end
of it would be disastrous to them. It would
Set them back where they were when Perry
opened their doors by the treaty of March
31, 1854. They are not willing that the
enormous strides which they have made in
shipping and foreign commerce and inland
industry during the last twenty years, since
they discharged with courteous thanks most
IN THE UNITED STATES 41
if not all of their foreign teachers, shall be
jeopardized. They appreciate that as to us
their resources and wealth are as dimes to
dollars.” But, on the other hand, no prouder
race exists on the face of the earth, no nation
which has more venerable traditions of which
it justly has the right to be proud. Their
courtesy and tact in dealing with foreign na-
tions lose nothing by comparison with those
of the French, whose language is the language
of diplomacy. Now, the Japanese people,
whose influence in their government daily
grows, as the influence of their statesmen by
comparison relatively diminishes, understand
that in our government the Constitution says
that treaties made in pursuance thereof,
and duly ratified by a two-thirds majority
of the Senate, are the supreme law of the
land; the people of Japan, as self-govern-
ment increases, and as they study more
and more the workings of other governments,
cannot comprehend how, when a State, a
* National wealth of the United States, $1 soooooooooo;
national wealth of Japan, $12,000,000,000, or 8 per cent.—
World Almanac, I915.
42 MILITARY SITUATION
portion of the United States, enacts legisla-
tion in contravention of such a treaty, all
that the President of the United States, can
do about it is to send his Secretary of State
out to make a speech to that legislature and
entreat it not to enact such legislation; and
still further, they cannot appreciate how a -
Secretary of State sent on such an errand
should return with his errand a complete fail-
ure. Nor do they think that it is their busi-
ness to try to understand such relations be-
tween a State and the United States of which
it is a part. They simply stand on their
treaty, as they have a right to; and they
have stood there now for several years, with
an exhibition of self-control, of dignity, and
of confidence in the righteousness of their
claim and an unshaken belief that we will
make our word good, which may well be com-
mended to our careful consideration. The
half-educated politicians of California, when
they think of the Japanese as “heathen,”
should open their Bibles, turn to II Corin-
thians 3:6, and ponder carefully what Paul,
IN THE UNITED STATES 43
the greatest of all Christian teachers, when
writing “to obviate the charge of vainglory,”
said: “The letter killeth, but the spirit giveth
life.” The California legislators have tried
to “beat” the treaty. Perhaps they have
succeeded. If so, let them not imagine that
Japan will let it go at that. Their statesmen
insist, and they are within their rights, legal,
equitable, and moral, in So insisting, that
they shall be treated as we treat other great
nations; and they have the ability, when all
diplomatic methods have been exhausted, to
compel us so to treat them. For it seems
hardly conceivable, when the people of this
country fully understand this proposition—
as Elihu Root and James Brown Scott and
Hamilton Holt understand it—that 95,000,-
000 people will allow themselves to be dragged
into a senseless and wrongful war at the
behest of 5,000,000 people, who seem to be
hopelessly wrong on this question.
The only question which can make trouble
between us and Japan is the question of how
long her endurance will last, how long her
44 MILITARY SITUATION
self-control will continue. If war comes with
Japan, it will be “made in America.”
I do not mean by this that the attack will
be made by us. If as a result of our supreme
folly in dealing with Japan as we do not deal
with other nations the Japanese shall be
goaded into war with us regardless of its
ultimate consequences to them, the first blow
would probably be struck by Japan before
any declaration of war; it would be dealt
with a Swiftness and a certainty of which our
people have no conception, and according to
a definite plan carefully prepared in advance.
Three days will see their battleships in the
Philippines, and ten days” in the Hawaiian
Islands, unless our battleships meet and des-
troy theirs on the way. Their ships would
not attack Manila because the fortifications
of Corregidor are impregnable. But there
are no fortifications on Lingayen Bay on
the north, Balayan Bay on the south, or
Lamon Bay on the east. A landing at either
* The distance from the Japanese naval station on the
Island Sea to Lingayen Gulf is 1,400 nautical miles, and to
Honolulu, 3,500 nautical miles.
IN THE UNITED STATES 45
of these points presents no difficulties, and
once landed it is but a few days' march to
the rear of Manila. The roads are excellent,
as good as those of New York or Massachu-
setts. I know about them because they have
been built by my son, who is the Director of
Public Works, and he has sent me many
photographs of them (with the automobiles
flying along just within the speed limit as
they do with us) and of the graceful bridges
of reinforced concrete which span the streams.
Our flag will not come down on Corregidor,
but Manila, Cebu, Iloilo, and the other prin-
cipal cities would all be in possession of the
enemy within 30 days after the declaration
of war, if there was one, or the sailing of the
Japanese battleships through Shimonoseki
Straits, if there was none—unless we had a
mobile army large enough to defeat the in-
vading army; as a matter of fact, we have,
according to the report of the Secretary of
War, 9,600 men in the Philippines, and as a
matter of opinion, if the Japanese ever attack
us there they will do it with 100,000 men.
46 MILITARY SITUATION
They have ample tonnage of ships to carry
that number.
Similarly, there are excellent fortifications in
some of the harbors of the Hawaiian Islands;
but, also, there are landing-places where there
are no fortifications and from which the cities
can be attacked in the rear. Honolulu is
much nearer to San Francisco (2,089 nautical
miles) than to Kobe or Yokohama, so that
perhaps we might reinforce our garrison of
8,200 men (provided we have a mobile army)
before the enemy could arrive. But in any
event there will be a great naval battle and
probably a great land battle before the fate of
the Hawaiian Islands would be settled.
So that, perhaps, when these facts become
known to our people as clearly as they are
now known to the Japanese people, we may
think that it becomes us to treat the Japa-
nese with the same politeness that they treat
us and that we show to other nations.
I shall say nothing about Alaska, with its
thousands of miles of unprotected coast-line,
its enormously valuable coal-mines, and its
IN THE UNITED STATES 47
great National Railway, the construction of
which is about to be undertaken. We have,
according to the report of the Secretary of
War, exactly 862 men in Alaska. There are
no fortifications on its coast. Nor shall I
say anything about the 1,200 miles of coast-
line of the 3 great Pacific States of Wash-
ington, Oregon, and California. The princi-
pal harbors are protected by strong, modern,
up-to-date fortifications; but unless we have
a mobile army superior to that of a possible
invader these fortifications will not prevent
a landing between harbors and the capture
of one or more of the great cities by an attack
from the rear. If by their ill-considered and
short-sighted legislation the people of these 3
States force their countrymen into an unnec-
essary war with Japan they will be the chief
sufferers. I shall not go into the details of
these matters, which affect us more closely
than anything that can happen at Manila or
Honolulu. I have already said enough, I
think, to show that it behooves us to treat
Japan on the basis of the most-favored nation.
48 MILITARY SITUATION
That is the solemn obligation of our treaty.
We are railing at others for breaking their
treaties. Are we observing our own? If not,
then this proud and sensitive race, under re-
peated provocations, may possibly work them-
selves into a frame of mind in which they will
prefer national death to national dishonor;
and in the dying they may deal us a wound
more deep than we now imagine.
And now having stated, I fear at too great
length, the possibilities, more or less remote,
of attack from the only three nations whose
attack would be serious, I want to say a few
words about the immutability of man, or at
least the approach to immutability involved
in the fact that his nature changes with such
fabulous slowness. And I speak of this be-
cause man's nature is of fundamental impor-
tance in considering whether there will be
more wars in the near future or whether, as
IN THE UNITED STATES 49
a result of the present unprecedented conflict,
universal peace is a possibility worthy of prac-
tical consideration. Doubtless man's nature
does slowly change, but only on the scale
used by the Psalmist when he said that “a
thousand years in the sight of the Lord are
but as yesterday when it is passed, and as a
watch in the night.” We hear much of
“progress” in these days; but the human
body has not improved in size nor in form
since the days of Phidias; the human mind
is certainly not more acute nor more pro-
found than it was in the days of Aristotle;
the human heart is much the same as it was
in the days of Solomon and David, three
thousand years ago; it has the same pas-
sions, noble and ignoble, the same lofty as-
pirations, the same frailties and backslidings.
Man is now and ever has been, and I believe
long will be, a fighting animal. There is
great talk nowadays of arbitration, and un-
doubtedly there are many differences which
can be and have been wisely arbitrated; and,
equally without doubt, there are many quar-
50 MILITARY SITUATION
rels between nations which cannot be arbi-
trated. If the suggested United States of
Europe can be established, I do not see how,
man's nature being what it is, civil war
can with certainty be prevented. The greatest
United States which the world has ever known,
the model on which the United States of
Europe must be patterned, if it is ever to be,
had been in successful and even splendid opera-
tion for 72 years; it had its Supreme Court
with well-defined powers and administered by
jurists of unsurpassed abilities; its Constitu-
tion required it to guarantee to every State a
republican form of government; it maintained
an army and a militia in order to fulfil its con-
stitutional obligation to suppress rebellion,
and to repress internal disorder in cases where
the individual States were unable to perform
this primary function of all government. And
yet in these United States, whose government
was rightfully claimed to be the last word in ad-
ministration, the highest product of the human
mind in that noblest of all arts, the art of gov-
ernment, a Civil War broke out which proved
IN THE UNITED STATES 51
to be the greatest conflict of modern times
prior to the war now raging in Europe, and
which continued until at the end of four ter-
rible years one party to the controversy was,
as a government, absolutely annihilated. If
that happened in “the best government on
earth,” administered by a race whose knowl-
edge and experience of Self-government goes
back through the centuries of the Declara-
tion of Independence, British Parliament, and
Magna Charta to the Witenagemot which the
Angles brought from the Rhine to Britain in
the fifth century, how can a new and loosely
formed confederation, composed of peoples
who speak five different languages, who range
the whole gamut of civilization from the high-
est art and literature to the lowest depth of
ignorance and backwardness, whose laws are
drawn from entirely different roots of thought,
and whose religions, among those of them
who still have any religious belief at all, have
nothing in common except a very diversified
belief in Jesus Christ—how can such a loosely
formed confederation expect to be immune
52 MILITARY SITUATION
from civil war? The suggestion is made that
the nations shall disarm, except for an inter-
national army which shall enforce the decrees
of the court at The Hague. The futility of
this is evident. In 1861 both the North and
South were disarmed. Before the end of the
year a million and a half were fighting in the
ranks. -
No, gentlemen, it does not look as if this
scheme of the United States of Europe had
been thoroughly thought out. I fear it will
not work; that it is an “iridescent dream.”
As to the ability and competence of man
to decide such fundamental differences as
have brought on this greatest of all conflicts:
I, for one, do not undertake to pass judgment
upon the motives of the nations now at war,
nor to attempt to decide which of them is
right and which of them is wrong in their con-
tentions. I do not believe that it is within
the scope of finite intelligence to decide such
a deep-rooted controversy. But I do be-
lieve that it is within the scope of Infinite
Intelligence to pass upon the merits of the
IN THE UNITED STATES 53
dispute, and to decide it aright. There are
some people old-fashioned and simple-minded
enough—I am one of them—to believe that
there is a God of Battles, who uses war as
an agency to accomplish his beneficent pur-
poses, and to settle disputes which man, un-
aided, cannot settle. Where would we have
been in a court of arbitration, if there had
been One, in 1775, when we shot down the
King's soldiers? And in 1776, when we de-
clared our independence? Parliament had
the right to tax us without representation, if
it was foolish enough to do so. But courts
of arbitration, like other courts, must deal
with rights, as they exist in law or equity;
) such courts cannot take into consideration
any “higher law,” or any aspirations for free-
dom. If we had appealed to a court of arbi-
tration at that time, we should have been
non-suited, and summarily thrown out of
court. What carried us into war was sym-
pathy with Patrick Henry's declaration:
“Give me liberty or give me death !” Courts
of arbitration do not take cognizance of any

54 MILITARY SITUATION
such appeals. If our quarrel with our kins-
folk in Great Britain had been arbitrated,
we should surely have lost, and we would
to-day be British colonies like Canada and
Australia. Does any one seriously claim that
that would be better than our present status,
or that the struggle of the eight long years
of the Revolution was not worth all that it
cost in blood and treasure?
Similarly, in 1861, if there had been a
Hague Court and the North and the South
had gone there to plead their differences, the
North would have said: We are opposed to
the extension of slavery; and the South would
have answered: That issue has already been
Settled in the Dred Scott case by the Supreme
Court of the United States. The North
would have said: We are in favor of the main-
tenance of the Union and of compelling States
to remain in the Union against their will; the
South would have replied: Read your Con-
stitution; show us any article in it which
authorizes you to compel us to stay in the
Union when we want to go out; as wit-
IN THE UNITED STATES 55
nesses, we cite Madison, who was so largely
instrumental in drawing up the Constitution,
and Jefferson, who took so prominent a part
in putting it into operation; does any one
know better than they what the Constitution
means? And what did they say about it in
1798?
Does any rational man believe that the
North would have won its case in such an
arbitration? The question answers itself.
But in the terrible war which followed, the
North did win its case; and the South is now
as enthusiastic as the North in acquiescing
in the decision made by the dread arbitra-
ment of war.
Again, in 1898 the Congress of the United
States passed, without a dissenting voice, a
joint resolution reading as follows: “The Gov-
ernment of the United States does hereby
demand, that the Government of Spain at
once relinquish its authority and government
in the Island of Cuba and withdraw its land
and naval forces from Cuba and Cuban wa-
ters.” Suppose we had sent our most em-
56 MILITARY SITUATION
inent jurists to The Hague and had asked
for a decree that the international police
force be sent to Cuba to enforce this demand,
what would the great lawyers of England,
France, Germany, Russia, and other coun-
tries, sitting in the beautiful Palace of Peace,
have said to our plea 2 They must of neces-
sity have decided that our plea was prepos-
terous. In that case Cuba, Porto Rico, and
the Philippines would have continued under
Spanish misgovernment, and the colonial
system of Spain would still be tottering in
its decrepitude. Does any one believe that
that would have been a better solution than
the solution which was brought about by
war, under which the peoples in these islands
are now well advanced on the high road of
self-government, prosperity, and happiness?
And as for the losses in battle during those
brief but all-important one hundred days,
they were no greater than the number killed
and injured on our own railroads during the
same period.
Turn again to 1846. If ever there was a
IN THE UNITED STATES 57
war conceived in sin and born in iniquity, it
was the war with Mexico. If we had tried
to arbitrate this, we would not have had a
leg to stand on; and yet through the work-
ings of an inscrutable and Divine Providence,
this wicked war resulted in bringing good
government throughout a territory of almost
untold wealth, about 1,000,000 square miles
in extent, now inhabited by nearly 10,000,000
of contented people; whereas but for the
war this vast territory would now be in a
state of anarchy and chaos, similar to that
which exists to-day in the contiguous states
of Chihuahua and Sonora.
Finally, it is possible, though by no means
certain, and, in fact, quite doubtful, that if we
had arbitrated our quarrel with Great Britain
in 1812 we might have won our case; but
it was not our grievances against Great Britain
—the impressment of our seamen, the occu-
pation of our western posts, and the inter-
ference with our commerce through paper
blockades and preposterous “Orders-in-Coun-
cil”—just as these grievances undoubtedly
58 MILITARY SITUATION
were, which drove us into war. It was the
fiery speech of young Henry Clay on his
accession to the Senate at the age of 34,
by which he swept Madison, an ardent ad-
vocate of peace, and the whole country off
their feet, by stating that we had a right to
demand that Great Britain should relinquish
her sovereignty over any and all parts of this
continent; that our citizen soldiers would
cross the frontier at Niagara and Plattsburg,
march down the Saint Lawrence to Quebec,
brushing aside the Canadians and the few
soldiers which in the agony of her conflict
with Napoleon Great Britain could then send
to Canada, and at Quebec we would dictate
a peace which would forever dispose of any
pretensions of Great Britain to exercise au-
thority on this continent. Henry Clay proved
a bad prophet; and, in the treaty which he
himself signed at Ghent 100 years ago last
month, not only did Great Britain retain
her sovereignty in Canada, which she still
maintains, but not one of the things for
which we went to war was so much as men-
IN THE UNITED STATES 59
tioned in the treaty. Nevertheless, Great
Britain did at an early day evacuate our
posts, and she never again attempted to im-
press our seamen or to issue “Orders-in-Coun-
cil” designed to destroy our foreign com-
merce. The result of the War of 1812 was
to give us commercial freedom, as the Revo-
lution had given us political freedom.
In addition to the questions of arbitration,
and of man's nature as affecting the prob-
ability of war, I desire for a moment to call
your attention to the relative advantages for
its inhabitants of a great and powerful na-
tion as compared with a small nation which
cannot indulge in the extravagance of great
armamentS.
A very able book was written a few years
ago by Norman Angell called, “The Great
Illusion.” Thousands of copies of it have
been sold, it has been translated into several
foreign languages, and must have had, as
60 MILITARY SITUATION
it deserved, several million readers. It was
written from the economic standpoint, and
was intended to prove that war does not termi-
nate the dispute; that private property still
exists in a conquered province; that the pay-
ment of the huge indemnity by France to
Germany was of benefit to France rather
than to Germany, because Germany spent
the money in wasteful extravagance which
brought on a financial panic, whereas France
by enforced economy and her traditional
thrift soon got the money back in payment for
the products of her industry; that not many
years later France was able to loan huge
sums to Germany and in the Moroccan crisis
she called her German loans and forced Ger-
many to settle that question in accordance
with her views. In support of his theory,
which many men of the first rank in finance
and business have pronounced unanswerable,
he quoted the prices of national Securities
and cited the fact, which at that time was
indisputable, that the bonds of the smaller
countries like Switzerland and Denmark and
IN THE UNITED STATES 61
Sweden which were not wasting their re-
Sources in ruinous armaments commanded a
far higher price in the markets of the world
than those of Germany, France, or England.
He argued that the might and power of these
nations created an illusion; and, in particular,
he cited the case of Belgium, whose bonds then
sold at a higher price than those of any other
nation in Europe. He referred to this hive of
industry, whose people lived contentedly with-
out a great army and with practically no
navy, the neutrality of their state and the
stability of their government guaranteed by
§& Jºhe three great nations, and he proved to his
ſº. own satisfaction, and that of thousands of
J2 vººreaders, that the condition of the Belgian,
whose government did not aspire to rule one-
sixth or one-fourth of the people of the world
and did not have to maintain the great na-
vies and armies which are necessary to such
a position, was far happier in every way than
that of the groaning taxpayer in the larger
countries.
His whole argument rested on the corner-
62 MILITARY SITUATION
stone of the inviolability of treaties, and alas!
when in August the neutrality treaties be-
came mere scraps of paper and were thrown
to the wind in what were supposed to be the
exigencies of a great power, at the beginning
of its campaign, his whole thesis fell to the
ground like a house of cards. There are no
quotations now on Belgian bonds, except such
as are guaranteed by England; and private
property in Belgium has almost ceased to exist,
burned up and battered down by a mighty
COnqueror. . - -
Following the fashion of the day, Mr. An-
gell invented a phrase in order to attract at-
tention to his thoughts: “The Great Illu-
sion.” The sad fact is that Mr. Angell was
himself the victim of an illusion, to wit: that
treaties are sacred and inviolable. Few wars
have been fought that did not involve the
violation of antecedent treaties.
I trust that I have given you some ground
to doubt whether this much-vaunted arbitra-
tion is the cure-all that its friends claim;
IN THE UNITED STATES 63
whether the fortune of being part of a small
neutralized state is as good as it was thought
to be; and—man's nature being substan-
tially what it has been for at least 3,000
years, and what it will long continue to be
—whether war is, or soon will be, a thing
of the past. We have, therefore, a “military
situation” in these United States, to wit:
It is conceivable that we may be attacked by
one, or possibly by two, of three great powers.
In case through their fault or through ours
—and we are not always or inevitably free
from fault in our dealings with other nations
—a conflict should arise, how would they go
about it, and what would or should we do
to repel the attack and successfully maintain
Our side of the controversy %
The issue, in the first instance, would de-
pend upon the control of the sea. Great
Britain now maintains a navy of size and
force equal to that of any other two nations
combined, Germany and the United States
included. In my judgment this condition
will continue during the longest life of the
64 MILITARY SITUATION
youngest of children now born. When Eng-
land ceases to maintain such a navy her name
will no longer be England, but some synonym
for Venice, Spain, or Holland, each of which
in turn was at one time mistress of the seas.
We are no longer the second naval power, but
the third; and if the views of the arbitration-
ists prevail, we shall soon be the fourth or
fifth. In any event, we cannot expect to
have a larger navy than Germany. If, in
some controversy about the Panama Canal
or our foreign commerce, the self-interest of
Great Britain and the self-interest of Germany
should coincide, and should be adverse to the
self-interest of the United States, then these
two nations would unite to coerce us; they
would again be allies as they were under
Chatham and under his great son, the younger
Pitt. In that event we should be opposed by
a naval force more than three times as great
as our own, and should be hopelessly out-
classed. The allies would have no trouble
in crossing the ocean and selecting such a
point for landing as the General Staffs of the
IN THE UNITED STATES 65
two countries should decide to be most fa-
vorable to their plans. If Great Britain
alone should be our antagonist in a conflict
which the resources of diplomacy and arbitra-
tion could not prevent, there would be prac-
tically the same result, for I cannot conceive
that we shall ever have a navy as large as
Great Britain must have. If Germany alone
should attack us, we might be inferior at
sea; in any event the best we could hope for
would be to fight the German navy on equal
terms. We might be defeated in such an
engagement; and, if we were victorious, we
would be so crippled that the control of the
sea would not be in Our hands, even if it was
not in the hands of the Germans.
Until this war no German battleship had,
So far as I know, been engaged in battle. The
German navy has no splendid traditions such
as the British navy has in Trafalgar, the Nile,
Copenhagen, and Saint Vincent's, no names
of great naval commanders on the pages of
its history like those of Nelson, Jervis, Howe,
Collingwood, Keppel, and Rodney. But in
66 MILITARY SITUATION
this, Germany’s first naval war, she has set
a new record in the feats of submarines and
cruisers; and in the battles of the south Pa-
cific, the South Atlantic, and the North Sea
she has shown that she is no mean antagonist
for England. The natives of the Baltic and
North Sea provinces have sailed the seas for
centuries; they are good Seamen in every
sense of the word. The great commercial
ships of Germany are navigated with a skill,
and commanded with a discipline, not excelled
by any other nation in the world. If any one
thinks that the Germans cannot fight on the
Sea as well as they do on the land, he makes a
great mistake.
I assume, therefore, that if the Germans
ever attempt to cross the Atlantic with an
army, they will succeed. Will they be able
to land? First, let me correct, or endeavor
to Correct, a popular error in regard to the
function performed by the modern fortifica-
tions which, thanks to the sound judgment
and wise advice of Samuel J. Tilden, now
protect all our great cities. They have been
IN THE UNITED STATES 67
built at a cost of nearly $160,000,000, and have
been more than 20 years in the building.
They do adequately serve their purpose of
protecting these great cities—your own among
them—from attack by Sea. Without them,
the battleships of any foreign nation could
approach the harbor of Portland or any other
harbor, send their torpedo-boats ahead to
sweep the channels clear of mines, as the Coast
Survey vessels now sweep the harbors to find
submerged rocks, and forthwith capture the
city without any loss to themselves. These
fortifications being in existence, armed with
the most modern cannon, and manned by a
sufficient number of skilled gunners, this thing
cannot be done. But from Portland to Ports-
mouth there is a stretch of about 50 miles in
which there are no fortifications; from Ports-
mouth to Boston, a similar stretch; from Bos-
ton around to Newport, a still longer piece of
unfortified coast; from Montauk Point to
Coney Island and from Sandy Hook to Cape
May, similar stretches of sandy beach, each
more than 100 miles in length, in which there
68 MILITARY SITUATION
are no fortifications, and no possibility of put-
ting on these long Sand Strips any guns of
size to match those of battleships. The near-
est city in the United States to the mouth of
the Kiel Canal is your own city of Portland.
Suppose that the German General Staff should
decide that, all things considered, Portland
would be the best place to attack in the first
instance with a view to establishing a naval
base in your fine and capacious harbor. They
would not come to Portland direct, but would
go, say, to Kennebunkport, where last Sum-
mer I have seen the sea as calm as the Great
Lakes; land there, quickly seize the rail-
roads at Kennebunk, West Kennebunk, and
Sanford so as to prevent any United States
troops from coming from Boston, and then
march down the fine automobile road—less
than a 2 days' march—attack Portland from
the rear, capture it, and seize your prin-
cipal citizens as hostages for the payment
of a large indemnity; as was recently done
in Brussels and other Belgian cities. Would
not that be an interesting “military situa-
IN THE UNITED STATES 69
tion”? Some people may think that it would
be difficult to land from the open ocean on
an open beach. Listen to what our friend
von Edelsheim has to say on that subject
(p. 62): “Military history shows that an at-
tempt to prevent a really bold landing is
never successful.” When I first read this
dictum I was disposed to question its ac-
curacy, but in looking back at the list of
overseas expeditions during the last 140 years
I can find no case which disproves his state-
ment. In the days of sailing-ships, Howe
landed on Long Island in 1776, Napoleon
landed in Egypt in 1778, and Scott landed
at Vera Cruz in 1847. In the days of steam,
the English, French, and Sardinians landed
in the Crimea in 1854, the troops of the
United States landed on Cuba, Porto Rico,
and the Philippines in 1898, the allies landed
at Taku in 1900; and there have been various
minor landings during the last 140 years.
I do not believe that von Edelsheim's dogma
can be successfully disputed.
Let me at once, however, allay your ap-
70 MILITARY SITUATION
prehensions by saying that I do not believe
that the German General Staff would select
Portland as their point of attack. I believe
that they would instantly strike at the vitals
of our trade, commerce, industrial and finan-
cial system—that is, at New York. Pending
an inspection of the overseas project—which,
as I have previously said, is doubtless quietly
reposing, docketed and indexed, in its proper
pigeonhole in the office of the General Staff
in Berlin—I venture to suggest that this is
the plan which would probably be adopted:
viz., a fleet of transports composed of ships
not less than 10,000 nor more than 50,000
tons in size, with speed of not less than 18
knots, properly escorted by battleships and
scout cruisers, and carrying about 15 divi-
sions—say, 240,000 infantry, with the proper
complement of artillery, cavalry, and engi-
neers—and having on the decks of these
ships an ample supply of aeroplanes, would
sail from Bremerhaven, Cuxhaven, Hamburg,
Glückstadt, Emden, and Kiel, and in about
10 days—longer, perhaps, if there was a great
IN THE UNITED STATES 71
naval battle on the way—would arrive off the
Long Island coast somewhere between Mon-
tauk Point and Coney Island, and probably
quite near those beautiful houses where some
of my dearest friends live at Southampton.
The ground would be reconnoitred by the
aeroplanes, and then the torpedo-boats, the
scout cruisers, and in the background the
battleships, would close in toward the shore
and with their guns protect the landing.
Once landed, the march would begin for Long
Island City; and unless we had a mobile army
of at least equal strength, equally trained,
and commanded by equally skilful officers,
this march would not take more than 4
days. Arrived in the boroughs of Queens and
Brooklyn, it is possible that our people would
destroy those splendid bridges crossing the
East River, which have been constructed at
an expense of $89,400,000, and which are the
admiration of engineers the world over.”
* Brooklyn Bridge, $22,4oo,ooo; Manhattan Bridge, $26,-
ooo,Coo; Williamsburg Bridge, $23,100,ooo; Queensboro
Bridge, $17,900,000.-World Almanac, 1914.
72 MILITARY SITUATION
If the bridges should be destroyed, the pas-
sage over to Manhattan would be delayed, but
not stopped. There are no forts between
Staten Island and Fort Schuyler (where the
East River joins Long Island Sound), a dis-
tance of more than 20 miles, nor is it
possible to have any forts in this, the most
densely populated spot on the face of the
globe. The passage of the East River would
present no great difficulties; and, once in Man-
hattan, discreet officers would at once be sent
to find John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie,
J. P. Morgan, George F. Baker, Jacob H.
Schiff, Frank A. Vanderlip, W. K. Vander-
bilt, Henry C. Frick, Vincent Astor, and
Harry Payne Whitney; or, if these men were
no longer living, they would seek those who, at
the time of the invasion, would occupy the
commanding position in the world of affairs
which these gentlemen now fill. These ten men
would be taken in military automobiles to the
headquarters of the commanding general and
there placed in close confinement until they
signed a bond, conditioned upon the payment,
IN THE UNITED STATES 73
either by the city of New York or by the
United States, or by both, of an indemnity
of not less than $5,000,000,000; say, about
twice the cost of our Civil War, exclusive of
pensions. Would they sign it? Most assur-
edly they would. They are all astute men
of affairs, and it would be bad business for
them to do anything else. The indemnity of
$5,000,000,000 compared with the resources
of the United States at the present time
would not be excessive, as compared with the
indemnity of $1,000,000,000 which France
was compelled to pay in 1871.* And yet,
to the last day of his life, Bismarck re-
gretted that he had not made Thiers sign
for more.
You all know the story of dear old Blücher,
that hot-headed but simple-minded old man
(he was then 73 years old) who helped
Wellington to win the battle of Waterloo.
After Napoleon had been sent to Saint Hel-
* According to Mulhall, the national wealth of France in
1870 was $34,652,000,ooo. The World Almanac for 1915
gives the national wealth of the United States at $150,000,-
OOO,OOO.
74 MILITARY SITUATION
ena, Blücher came to England as the guest
of the nation, and in accordance with the
usual custom he was given the freedom of
the City of London in a gold box and invited
to a dinner at the Mansion House. He rode
in the carriage with Wellington along the old
established route from Westminster, past Traf-
algar Square, where the Nelson column and
Landseer's splendid lions were not yet in place,
but where the pathetic statue of Charles I had
already been erected—a statue as pathetic
as the fate of poor Charles himself—then on
through the Strand, past Somerset House,
the Temple and the Inns of Court, with all
their wealth of historical associations, to
Temple Bar—where not even the Sovereign
of England might pass without the consent
of the Lord Mayor—on through Fleet Street,
redolent with the memories of John-
son, up Ludgate Hill and past Saint Paul's,
whose splendid dome and massive founda-
tions were as impressive then as now; around
Saint Paul’s churchyard, through Cheapside
and the Poultry to Mansion House Square.
IN THE UNITED STATES 75
As they rode along through the applauding
multitudes which lined the streets, doubtless
Wellington—although there was not much of
the sentimental in his make-up—pointed out
to Blücher the historical memories and the
associations of these ancient thoroughfares.
All this made no impression upon Blücher;
but when he arrived in sight of the Bank of
England, the Stock Exchange, and the Man-
sion House, he was filled with awe at the vi-
sions of such wealth; his face lighted up as
he turned to Wellington and exclaimed: “Was
fir Plunder!”—What a place for loot!” And
yet the entire value of all London from the
Abbey to the Bank, in 1815, was less than
the value of the property, real and personal,
fixed and incorporeal, within half a mile of
the United States subtreasury on Manhattan
Island. .
* It is so many years since I first heard this story that I
cannot remember its origin. I do not vouch for its accuracy,
but I have heard it so many times, told by men who had
passed much of their life in London, and it so accords with
Blücher’s well-known character and early life, that I can-
not but believe that it has some foundation in fact. At all
events e ben trovato. - -
76 MILITARY SITUATION
Yes, you can be very sure that the ten hos-
tages would sign the bond.*
I fancy I hear some one say under his
breath: What a fantastic picture as baseless
as the fabric of a dream. No! if we are not
adequately prepared for defense it is no more
fantastic than the fate of Belgium, no more
baseless than the destruction of Louvain.
Let us consider for a moment what actually
happened to Belgium. German mobiliza-
tion began on August 1, German troops en-
tered Belgium On August 3, Liège was cap-
tured on August 7, the Germans entered
Brussels on August 20, they crossed the
French frontier on August 23, Louvain was
destroyed on August 26, and on September
1 the German army, having swept across Bel-
gium, was within 25 miles of Paris. In just
* I cannot help wondering—and I hope I may say it without
giving offense to Mr. Carnegie, for whom I have profound
regard and who, unlike Sidney Smith's friend, needs no sur-
gical operation to get a joke into his head—whether the canny
Scot, should he be alive at the time of the invasion and be
one of the ten, as he took his pen in hand to affix his sig-
nature to the bond, would still hold fast to the doctrine which
he has enunciated in a recent interview, that “War never set-
tles anything.” - -
IN THE UNITED STATES 77
31 days, therefore, out of a state of profound
peace, Belgium had been practically des-
troyed. How did this catastrophe happen?
Simply because Belgium is only about one-
tenth of Germany in size and resources; and
her allies were not sufficiently prepared to
come to her relief in time to save her from
destruction. You will say that this could
not happen to us, because of our immense
resources and because of the Ocean which
Separates us from the nations of Europe. As
to the first, there is no easier mark than a
rich nation unprepared for defense. As to
the Second, the ocean was a great barrier in
the days of Sailing-ships, but its value as a
bulwark of defense has greatly diminished
with the advent of steam and electricity.
The German troops were across the Belgian
frontier in 2 days; the German transports
could not reach Long Island in less than 10
or 12 days. That is the only difference.
The mobilization on the Belgian frontier
took only 48 hours; the mobilization in the
Baltic and North Sea harbors would take no
78 MILITARY SITUATION
longer. Our interesting friend, von Edels-
heim, has figured it all out in a general way
and doubtless his comrades of the General
Staff have elaborated it in greater detail.
Let me again read you a few extracts from
his book. On page 34, speaking of the Ger-
man harbors, he says: “Bremerhaven is by
far the best. In every respect it would take
first place for embarkation, because of its
extensive wharves. From this point 2 or
more divisions could be shipped daily without
difficulty. Cuxhaven is not so well situated,
but its connection with Hamburg is impor-
tant. If it were brought up to full develop-
ment it could take care of 2 divisions a
day, which Hamburg could well supply.
Glückstadt is an especially important base
because most of our live-stock exporting busi-
ness is carried on there. It is recommended
that a short double-track railroad be built
from Elmshorn to Glückstadt, making a con-
nection with the reserve-corps frontier. In
Glückstadt 1 infantry division and part of
a cavalry division can be shipped [daily].”
IN THE UNITED STATES 79
In another part of his book he states the
well-known fact that a German infantry
division numbers 16,000 men. You will see,
therefore, that he has figured it out that 6
divisions, 96,000 men, can be embarked in
One day, or 240,000 men in two and a half
days. I do not believe that our General
Staff in Washington or any other military
experts who are familiar with the German
army will dispute the accuracy of his compu-
tation. In another part of his book (p. 55)
he has given at length his reasons for be-
lieving that 10 infantry divisions and 1
cavalry division can be despatched in 4
days. The number of ships and tonnage
space for artillery and cavalry horses are
all set forth. For instance (p. 50): “Three
ships would accommodate 2 cavalry bri-
gades.” There would be no lack of ships.
The fleet of the Hamburg line alone measures
1,168,000 tons, and of the North German
Lloyd 795,000 tons. And if these are not
enough, the harbors of Amsterdam, Rotter-
dam, Antwerp, and Copenhagen are close at
80 MILITARY SITUATION
hand; and the events of last August do not
warrant us in believing that any question of
neutrality would prevent the seizure, if need
be, of the shipping that crowds their docks.
Euphemistically von Edelsheim uses the fol-
lowing language (p. 37):
“The problem of ship control would at
best fall to the loading commission, which
should be settled upon as an established au-
thority to make a comprehensive survey and
appraise the German steamers for military
transporting. This commission should also
list the foreign-owned steamers which might be
available in the harbors for use in emergencies.
Through close commercial relations this control
can be extended to neighboring foreign ports
(Amsterdam, Rotterdam, Copenhagen), to the
end that we might charter several large foreign
Steamers.”* -
If the neutral owners did not wish to char-
ter their steamers, the Kaiser's dreadnoughts
would be close at hand to persuade them.
But, as a matter of fact, this would not be
* The italics are mine.
IN THE UNITED STATES 81
necessary, for Germany has an ample number
of ships of her own available at any time to
embark 240,000 infantry, with the correspond-
ing numbers of artillery, cavalry, and engi-
neers, and their necessary munitions, stores,
and provisions. Edelsheim again has it all
figured out (p. 47):
“The troop transport capacity of a ship
has heretofore been calculated by the ship's
tonnage, that is, 60 per cent of the ship's ca-
pacity is net ton loading-space. The neces-
sary space for us, for a long Sea voyage, is
set at 2 tons for each man, and 6 to
7 tons for each horse. The English and
Russian estimates are about the same. But
the English transports to Cape Town accom-
modated a larger number of troops than was
thought possible, and the American trans-
ports to Cuba were increased by one-third.”
On this basis the 15 divisions, num-
bering 240,000 infantry, would require 480,-
000 net tons, or 800,000 tons of ship's capac-
ity, and the accompanying artillery, cavalry,
stores, and provisions would take as much
82 MILITARY SITUATION
more; Or, in all, ships of a gross capacity of
1,600,000 tons. This is less than the ton-
nage of the Hamburg-American and North
German Lloyd lines; but, in addition to these
two lines, the tonnage of the other lines under
the German flag is nearly three times as
great, the total of German tonnage as given
in the statistical books for 1914 being 4,892,-
410. I can personally testify that his esti-
mate of 1 man for every 2 tons net is
substantially correct; for in 1898 I com-
manded the second expedition to the Philip-
pines, which consisted of the 10th Pennsyl-
vania, 1st Nebraska, and 1st Colorado, Vol-
unteers, the 18th and 23d Infantry of the
regular army, 2 batteries of field-artillery from
Utah, and half a company of regular en-
gineers, numbering in all about 4,800 men.
We had four transports—improvised from
mail-steamers plying on the Pacific—the larg—
est of which had a gross tonnage of 5,000 and
the smallest 1,500. The total tonnage was
about 12,500. Sixty per cent of this is 7,500
tons. With 4,800 men on board we were
IN THE UNITED STATES 83
stowed at the rate of about 1 man for each
1% net tons; and we were not uncomfortably
crowded as we slowly steamed across the Pa-
cific in echelon formation at 8 cable-lengths,
our speed governed by the speed of the slowest
ship, which was only 9 knots, so that we were
32 days covering the 7,000 or more nautical
miles from San Francisco to Manila Bay. If
we, in our state of almost total unpreparedness
in 1898, could raise a volunteer army, impro-
vise transports from ships which were not (as
are those of Germany) built with special ref-
erence to the transport of troops and liable
under their subsidy agreements to be taken
instantly when needed as transports, cross a
continent of 3,000 miles by rail, traverse
7,000 nautical miles of ocean, and make a
successful landing, under the protection of
the navy's guns, within a short distance of
the Spanish forts and trenches—all within
the space of 82 days from the declaration
of war; and within 27 days thereafter, under
the protection of 146 guns on Dewey's Squad-
ron, assault and capture an army, which
84 MILITARY SITUATION
though small in numbers was larger than that
of the assailants, and with it the capital of
the Spanish dominions in the Far East,
thereby terminating forever the Spanish co-
lonial system in the Orient which had existed
for more than 300 years—if, I say, we, al-
most ludicrously unready for war in 1898,
could do this, is it to be supposed that Ger-
many, with her plans studied out long in ad-
vance, with her enormous tonnage of fast
ships, her troops in instant readiness, with
no continent to cross and an ocean of barely
3,000 miles instead of 7,000 separating her
from her opponent—is it to be supposed, I
say, that Germany could not bring 240,000
infantry with the corresponding numbers of
artillery and cavalry to our shores in from
12 to 15 days? No soldier who has studied
the question will deny that Germany can do
this; and, as I have previously pointed out,
all history shows that the landing could not
be prevented.
I fancy some one asking me: Do you really
and Seriously believe that Germany could ac-
IN THE UNITED STATES 85
tually capture New York in the manner you
have described 2 And I answer: No, I do not.
But the only reason why I do not believe it
is because I am confident that the people of
this country, with their strong common. Sense,
when they understand this proposition, will
...----------- *** = -------- *** ********** - *-
...--...-- ~~~~~~~~-- “***
ficiently trained, with an adequate reserve,
and with a proper number of highly educated
officers; and that we shall have an abundance
of Scout aeroplanes which can constantly
reconnoitre the Ocean within a range of at
least 200 miles from the coast so as to give
warning of the enemy's approach. With our
admirable railway system we could concen-
trate our mobile army—if we had one—op-
posite the point selected for the landing. And
I should expect this mobile army—if we
had one—to attack the invading army as
soon as the latter passed out of the range of
the guns on its ships, defeat it, and drive it
back in disorder to within the range of these
guns, and with no alternative Save a hasty
86 MILITARY SITUATION
re-embarkation under their protection, before
a storm came up to disperse the fleet. And
so the whole expedition would end in failure
—like the failure to capture Paris on or be-
fore August 26. If these things did not hap-
pen—if we did not have a mobile army, if
that army did not defeat the invading army
as soon as it landed—then the capture of New
York and the levy of a colossal indemnity
would be as certain as any event in the future.
It is proper, however, to point out—and
this is the whole purpose of my address—that
we do not at this moment possess such a mo-
bile army. We have no reserve, we have an
insufficient number of highly educated of-
ficers. The General Staff of the army has
asked for these things year after year, with-
out serious attention being paid to its recom-
mendations and advice. The Secretary of
War in his last annual report—a document
of rare sanity, calmness, close reasoning, and
an adequate appreciation of the actual facts
—has stated what is necessary to make a
start in the right direction. I am leaving
IN THE UNITED STATES 87
with you a number of these reports, and I
beg you to read them with as much care as
you study the balance-sheets of your business.
If his advice is disregarded too long, your bal-
ance-sheets may not be worth the studying.
His programme is a modest one.
The Secretary says (p. 7): “The Regular
Army of the United States on June 30, 1914,
consisted of 4,701 officers and 87,781 men
(including quartermaster corps, 3,809, and
hospital corps, 4,055). Of these, 758 officers
and 17,901 men belong to the coast artillery,
and are therefore practically stationary in
coast defenses; 1,008 Officers and 18,434 men
belong to the staff, technical and noncombat-
ant branches of the army, including recruits
and men engaged in recruiting. This leaves
the army which can be moved from place to
place—that is, the mobile army, so called—
composed of 2,935 officers and 51,446 men.” "
He goes on further to show that we had,
on June 30, 1914, in the Philippines, 9,600
men; in the Hawaiian Islands, 8,200 men; in
the Canal Zone, 2,200 men; in China, Alaska,
88 MILITARY SITUATION
and Porto Rico, 2,400 men, and in Vera
Cruz, 4,100 men; or in all, 26,500 men on
service outside of the continental limits of
...the United States. Of these about 4,000 be-
. . . º o ng to the coast artillery, and 22,500 to the
tºmobile army. I quote again from the Sec-
* retary's report (p. 7):
“Practically all these organizations in the
United States are on what is known as a
peace footing, which means that an infantry
company, which upon a war footing should
have 150 men, now has 65 men; a cavalry
troop, which upon a war footing should have
100 men, now has 71 men; an artillery bat-
tery, which upon a war footing should have
190 men, now has 133 men. The coast ar-
tillery companies are always kept on a war
footing of 104 men each.
“In addition to work with the troops them-
selves, the officers of the army are called upon
to do a great variety of work known as de-
tached service. For instance, the engineers
have 66 officers detached for river and harbor
work, and the other branches of the army



IN THE UNITED STATES 89
have 578 officers of the line detached for Serv-
ice in training the organized militia of the sev-
eral States, on duty at Schools, recruiting, etc.
“As a result, scarcely any unit in the army
ever has its proper complement of Officers,
and the need for an increase of officers is
urgent and imperative. In continental United
States we had in the mobile army on June 30,
1914, 1,495 officers and 29,405 men.”
“We have a reserve—that is, men who
have been trained in the army and under the
terms of their enlistment are subject to be
called back to the colors in time of war—con-
sisting of 16 men.”
Now, “the wayfaring men, though fools,”
can understand that we cannot expect to
resist successfully an invasion of 240,000 men
with an army of 29,405 men.
What does the Secretary of War, realizing
the responsibility which goes with his great
office, propose to do in order to rectify this
glaring state of unpreparedness? His propo-
sition, as I have previously stated, is ex-
* The italics are mine,
90 MILITARY SITUATION
tremely modest. I quote again from his re-
port (pp. 10–11), and though the quotation is
long, I do not apologize for taking up your time
with it, for it is the nub of the whole matter:
“My recommendation of what we should
immediately do is to fill up the existing or-
ganizations which compose the aggregate mo-
bile army force just mentioned to their full
strength. This would require 25,000 men.
In addition to the enlisted men just men-
tioned, we should be authorized to obtain
1,000 more officers. The legislation to ac-
complish these purposes would be of the very
simplest character, being merely authoriza-
tions to the department to do these things.
“On June 30, 1914, 20.43 per cent of the
line officers of the army were away from their
commands. This results in depleting the
proper quota of instructors in the army. The
instruction of the organized militia suffers
wofully from the lack of Officers available for
service with the militia. Efficient Officers,
above all things, cannot be improvised. De-
pending, as we are, upon a small regular force,
IN THE UNITED STATES 91
and contemplating a large expansion in time
of war, it is essential that we at least should
not permit the number of officers to fall be-
low that number which is absolutely requi-
site for the proper performance of current
military duties.
“An increase of the enlisted personnel of the
army by 25,000 men would accomplish three-
fold results. It would, as before mentioned,
bring up to full strength the existing units of
the mobile army in continental United States,
and thus supply a more adequate force.
Second, it would afford training for the of-
ficers in the command of such units as they
must command in time of war and would
prevent, as far as the regular army is con-
cerned, the crowding of the ranks with raw
levies which always disorganize and render
inefficient the organizations into which they
come. Third, it would be a wise investment
from the standpoint of economy, in that no
material increase of overhead charges would
be necessary, and the addition of these men
could be effected at a per-capita cost to the
92 MILITARY SITUATION
government of about one-third the per-capita
cost of existing conditions. Since the exist-
ing physical plant and the administrative or-
ganization would not have to be in any way
increased to take care of this increased force,
the only additional expense would be the
clothing, feeding, and paying thereof.
“By the time these 25,000 men could be
procured the mobile forces in the United
States, as hereinbefore pointed out, would
number 24,602; SO that after the addition
the mobile army in continental United States
would consist of 49,602 men.
“With the army thus increased, we would
then be able to undertake the next necessity,
which is absolutely imperative, and that is
the preparation of a reserve. The present
legislation with respect to a reserve has
proven utterly useless for the purpose, it hav-
ing produced in 24 months only 16 men, and
there is little or no hope that it will ever
properly accomplish its purpose. The reasons
why it will not do so it is not profitable to
discuss.
IN THE UNITED STATES 93
“Again, without attempting to wait until
perfection has been reached, it seems to me
that it is only the part of wisdom to do that
which we know will produce a beneficial re-
sult, and one that approximates the best. I
am firmly convinced that if we can use the
standing army as a school through which to
pass men who come into it, with the knowl-
edge that if they are proficient they can be
discharged at any time after a year or 18
months, we will begin at once to build up
the necessary reserve, and will, for the first
time in the military history of this country,
have something approximating a balanced
organization. There is, unfortunately, oppo-
sition to this policy. I say “unfortunately’
because it is always the part of wisdom, it
seems to me, to select the best that is pos-
sible, out of what is obtainable, rather than
to reject that obtainable best because it is
not perfection. Some of the opposition is on
economical grounds, and, in my view, should
not be determinative if the other considera-
tions that I have noted are true. Other of
94 MILITARY SITUATION
the opposition is based upon the idea that
1 year or 18 months is not sufficient to train
a soldier. As to this, it is a curious exhibi-
tion of mental operations to realize that
those who make this argument and who have
to acknowledge that without reserves we must
depend upon volunteers, are constantly as-
serting that we can safely rely upon volun-
teers because they can be thoroughly trained
in 6 months. It is furthermore true that
by intensive military training any young man
of good health and average mentality can
be made a serviceable soldier in 12 months,
and, in fact, has been so made. This has
been tried abroad, and I have caused it to
be tried under my own administration and
inspection. Even if there were doubt about
it, it would not cause a different conclusion
to be reached by a reasonable man, because
we certainly would be better off with a re-
serve of men who had "had 1 year's train-
ing than we are without any reserve at all,
and having to depend, as we do, upon men
who have never had any training whatever.
IN THE UNITED STATES 95
I caused, about a year ago, recruits, as they
came in, and without Selection, to be organ-
ized into a battery of artillery, a troop of
cavalry, and a company of infantry; and
from my own observation and from the re-
ports of experts, each of these units, well
within a year, was found proficient to a very
high degree. -
“I am therefore firmly convinced that we
should have immediate legislation dealing
with the matter of enlistment and reserve.
I am not so much concerned with the length
of the enlistment, provided the Secretary of
War is given power to discharge into the re-
serve, at the end of 12 months, those who
have shown themselves proficient up to a
required standard.”
That is the whole programme at the pres-
ent moment. I again repeat that it is most
modest. There will be other things to come
later—summer camps of university students
like those which were so splendidly success-
ful last summer at Burlington and elsewhere;
instruction in the rudiments of the military
96 MILITARY SITUATION
art at public schools, colleges, and universi-
ties; arrangements by which every young
man in this great land of ours shall hold in
his hand before he is 21 years of age an
army rifle, and aim and fire it at a target;
enlargement of the Military Academy at West
Point, and when it reaches the point when it
can no longer be enlarged, without injury to
its unique system of instruction, then found
another West Point on the Pacific coast, and
subsequently, if needed, a third in the Mis-
sissippi valley; improvement of the militia,
and recognition of the great services which
the men in the militia render by giving up
to their military duties time which would
otherwise be spent in recreation—all these
will come in due time, and their cost will be
but a trifle compared with the benefits which
they will produce. But for the present the
Only thing to do is to GET SQUARELY BEHIND
THIS MODEST PROGRAMME OF THE SECRETARY
OF WAR, AND SEE THAT YOUR REPRESENTA-
TIVES IN CONGRESS ENACT IT INTO LAW BE-
FORE CONGRESS ADJOURNS ON THE FOURTH
IN THE UNITED STATES 97
DAY OF NEXT MARCH, WHICH IS ONLY 40
DAYS FROM THIS DATE.
Gentlemen of the Economic Club, I sup-
pose that it is fair for me to assume that
when you asked me to address you on this
subject you considered me competent to dis-
cuss it, and to give you advice at the end of
the discussion. What advice have I to give?
Simply this: this great subject is, above all
Others, non-partisan. A week ago to-day I
sat beside the Secretary of War at lunch, and
at the close of the lunch listened to a great
speech from him. I say it was a great speech,
because it was so calm, so forceful, so clearly
reasoned out, so absolutely convincing to
every one of his hearers, so entirely devoid of
hysteria. The speech was made in the Re-
publican Club of the City of New York, of
which I have been a member since before the
time when my hair began to turn gray. The
audience, which packed the room to the walls,
was composed of hidebound Republicans; the
Speaker was a Democratic Secretary of War.
He was received with tumultuous applause
98 MILITARY SITUATION
at the beginning; and, though he spoke with-
out notes, his thought was so logical, SO con-
cise, so free from dogmatism, so absolutely
unanswerable, that the applause at the close
was, I may fairly say, overwhelming.
Now, what is there to do for you men here
in Maine? First of all, keep this question
strictly non-partisan. I fear the partisanship
of an overzealous gentleman from Massa-
chusetts has already lessened the chances
of getting the desired legislation at this ses-
sion of Congress. Partisanship has no place
in any question which extends beyond the
Ocean's edge. Next, get the Secretary's re-
port and read it; ponder over it. His mil-
itary advisers give their whole lives to this
question. They are men of good repute,
they are very able, they do not want war,
which will make their wives widows and their
children orphans. But they know what their
duty is, and they fearlessly do it. It is to
tell the Secretary truthfully what the real
situation is, as derived from their lifelong and
constant study of it, based on data and in-
IN THE UNITED STATES 99
formation possessed by no other body of men
in this country to an equal degree.
The Secretary was new to this problem 2
years ago. He frankly says that he is now
ashamed of the ignorance which he then pos-
sessed, and which is the ignorance of the
average highly educated lawyer or business
man of to-day. But he has said that he
means from now on to try by every proper
means to remove this ignorance in others.
He brought to the problem a trained legal
mind, accustomed to forming judgment upon
important legal questions during the years
that he sat on the bench of the New Jersey
Court of Appeals. He has given 2 years of
study to this case, longer than he ever gave
to any case which came before him on the
bench. He has now given you his matured
conclusions—first a statement of the actual
facts and then a synopsis of the measures
which in his judgment are necessary to meet
this state of facts.
With the increasing complexity in our af-
fairs we are obliged every year more and
100 MILITARY SITUATION
more to intrust questions of great importance
to referees, masters in chancery, and other
experts, for examination and report; and
when we get their reports, unless they con-
tain some glaring error, we adopt them and
put them into operation. No question has
been so thoroughly examined by experts of
the highest competence as this question of
national defense, beginning, as I have said,
40 years ago by General Sherman and con-
tinued by his successors in command of the
army—Sheridan, Schofield, and Miles—and
especially in recent years by the younger men
of the General Staff, which was not in exist-
ence prior to 1903. The result of 40 years'
study is now before you, condensed and sum-
marized and brought up to date by the dis-
tinguished lawyer who now holds the Office
of Secretary of War. Can you do better than
follow his advice?
If you approve it, then see that it is carried
into effect. Whenever the voters of this
Country make up their minds on any question,
Congress is quick to respond to their wishes.
IN THE UNITED STATES 101
There is need for prompt action. Congress
will adjourn in less than 6 weeks. Your
Legislature meets only biennially, but for-
tunately it is now in Session. See that peti-
tions are sent to it, bearing thousands of
names, requesting the Legislature to pass
without delay a joint resolution instructing
your Senators and representatives in Con-
gress to vote in favor of the adoption of the
Secretary's recommendations. They have al-
ready been incorporated in the Army Ap-
propriation Bill. Last night they were de-
feated in the House; Monday morning they
will be before the Senate, where they have
been already favorably reported from the
Military Committee.
There used to be a saying in my youth:
“As goes Maine, so goes the Union.” Since
you no longer have October elections, this
saying is not now heard. But the men of
Maine are just as hard-headed, just as full
of plain common sense, as they were when you
held your national elections in October. If
such a joint resolution is passed by the Legis-
102 MILITARY SITUATION
lature of Maine, it will be noted the following
morning by every State Legislature which is
in session from New Hampshire to Arizona,
and from Washington to Florida.
“Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel
just.” Thus, in Shakespeare's incomparable
words, meditated Henry VI just after he had
witnessed the violent quarrel of Warwick and
Suffolk over the blood-stained corpse of mur-
dered Gloucester. Five centuries have gone.
Henry Plantagenet and Richard of York, War-
wick and Suffolk and Gloucester are but dust.
Their quarrels, save for Shakespeare, are less
than dust. Still is it true, as then it was.
Thrice is he armed that hath his quarrel
just. Ay, true indeed! But quarrels there
yet will be. And no nation unarmed can en-
force its quarrel, however just. - - - - -
iMAR 2 6 975
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
||||||||||
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！！！！ ！！ ！！！, º ~ ~ ！！ ！！ ！！ ！！ ！！
º ,，, ſae s.l.ºp ·į， º
∞：
kºſº, º vººr es-3· -：
*** • • • • • • •~№
| s=s.ſ. •
• • • • • • • • • • • • •»， ， ， ,
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• • • • • • • • • • •■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ .
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