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THE EMPIRE
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Kriedrich Brinkmama.
THE
EMPIRE IN INDIA.

-

Colonel and Me Hillyard
with Wihus Bell'
kindest regards


THE
EMPIRE IN INDIA:
LETTERS FROM MADRAS
AND OTHER PLACES,
BY
MAJOR EVANS BELL,
MADRAS STAFF CORPS;
"
AUTHOR OF THE ENGLISH IN INDIA,
LETTERS FROM NAGPORE, WRITTEN IN 1857-58."
LONDON:
TRUBNER AND CO., 60, PATERNOSTER ROW.
M.DCCC.LXIV.
7
A
DS
447
343
"Our life is turned
Out of her course, wherever man is made
An offering, or a sacrifice; a tool,
Or implement; a passive thing employed
As a brute mean, without acknowledgment
Of common right, or interest in the end;
Used or abused, as selfishness may prompt.
Say, what can follow for a rational soul
Perverted thus, but weakness in all good,
And strength in evil? Hence an after call
For chastisement, and custody, and bonds,
And oft'times death-avenger of the past,
And the sole guardian in whose hands we dare
Entrust the future. Not for these sad issues
Was man created: but to obey the law
Of life, and hope, and action.
WORDSWORTH.-The Excursion.
823492-234
то
:
THE HON. R. S. ELLIS, C.B.,
MEMBER OF THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL OF INDIA,
CALCUTTA.
MY DEAR ELLIS,
I have no right to assume your entire concur-
rence in the more distinctive views set forth in these
Letters, the two last in particular-those views which,
if they attract any notice at all, may arouse the very
general reprobation of our countrymen in India. But
the temptation to express my confidence that this
reprobation will not be unanimous, and to claim openly
a certain modicum of sympathy and support from one
so distinguished in the practical work of Indian adminis-
tration, is, I confess it, too strong for my remaining
scruples. We have talked over so many of the topics
+
2
3
vi
contained in this book; I am indebted to you for so
much instruction, and for so many friendly offices; you
have borne so much from me, and for me, already; that
I think I may venture to make one more trial of your
patience, and to illustrate my work with your name,
without your formal permission.
Ever yours,
36, Bernard Street, Russell Square,
January 11th, 1864.
EVANS BELL.
:
CONTENTS.
LETTER
PAGE
I.
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE
1
II.
LORD DALHOUSIE
13
III.
THE CARNATIC
47
IV.
THE MUSNUD IN ABEYANCE
106
V.
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION
127
VI.
SATTARA
154
VII. NAGPORE
174
•
VIII. JHANSI
202
IX.
THE BHONSLA FUND
220
X. THE TIGERS OF MYSORE
251
XI.
COMPENSATION
263
XII. RESTITUTION
270
XIII. PLANTERS AND LANDLORDS
285
XIV.
PRECEPT AND EXAMPLE
294
XV.
MYSORE AS IT MIGHT BE
304
XVI.
REINFORCEMENT AND RECONCILIATION
317
XVII. RIGHTS AND TITLES
333
XVIII. A GOLDEN BULL
379
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
LETTER I.
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE.
Madras, April 2nd, 1861.
It is difficult to speculate freely on the political
prospects and possibilities of our Indian empire,
without the danger of incurring the character either
of an alarmist or of a pretended prophet. I am no
alarmist. I am not alarmed. I do not despair or
despond. I certainly do not pretend to the gift of
prophecy. But do not let us be content to sit down
and to fold our arms, and to think that to-morrow
will be like to-day, and to forget the storm and the
struggle of yesterday. Many people appear very
much to under-estimate the magnitude of the crisis.
through which we passed in 1857-8, and to look
upon the great Indian rebellion as an ephemeral con-
vulsion, devoid of all moral significance, and convey-
ing no lesson or warning to the Government, but
one of increased vigilance and greater military pre-
parations. The " greased cartridge" is too often
referred to, as if it had been the real, efficient cause
B
-
2
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
:.
of the mutinies; whereas it was a mere pretext, and
a popular war-cry. The national pride and resent-
ment, the hopes and the projects, which burst forth
in the mutinies, were of much older origin, of much
broader and deeper meaning, than the exaggerated
and fictitious fears for their religion and their caste,
which were insidiously instilled and fostered through-
out the army and the lower classes.
These points are not sufficiently understood. In
many quarters I have perceived with great dissatis-
faction what seems to me to be a strange apathy, a
careless and false security; in others a complete mis-
calculation of the sources of our strength, and of the
elements of political danger.
For example, Mr. George Campbell, now a Judge
of the High Court at Calcutta, in a pamphlet, Our
Finances, published at Lucknow in 1859, appears to
derive great confidence from the complete failure of
the rebellion. This I believe is a very wide spread
notion. He says that "the events of the crisis" have
"generated a legitimate contempt" for the natives;
that "they made very bad rebels at a time when they
had every opportunity;" that there was "an absence
of individual energy;" and that "the upper class being
altogether deficient," there were "no leaders." "When
the whole country was in a flame," says Mr. Camp-
bell, "in consequence of the military mutiny, we have
no where experienced formidable popular resistance."
"The moment the resistance of mutineers was over-
come, we re-entered into possession of our districts,
and governed them without difficulty as peacefully as
ever."
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE.
3
Mr. Campbell and many others, seem to think that
a nation displays the full extent of all its good and
bad qualities in its first great movement, and must
spring in a day to its full strength, or fall to its lowest
degradation; that a rebellion must be an inspiration
that succeeds, or a folly which collapses at once and
for ever.
It would be more properly considered as an
art to be learned; and for a first attempt, 1857 was
no trifle, worthy alone of "legitimate contempt." It
deserves to be carefully studied: in all its wickedness,
in all its weakness, its madness and its horrors, in the
destruction of the rebels and in our triumph, there lie
lessons of awful import if we only choose to read
them. There never yet was a rebellion, since the
world began, that did not bring a lesson and a warn-
ing to the ruler, to be neglected and despised at his
peril.
The theory which pretends to measure the physi-
cal and mental capabilities of the races of India by
the events of 1857, contradicts all history. A peo-
ple brought up in slavery and superstition, its old
hierarchy of chieftains and classes broken down, and
replaced by no new organisation, bewildered and mad-
dened by unaccustomed and unexpected opportunities
of action, was unable immediately to turn them to
good account, to make great and deliberate sacrifices,
to recognise and choose efficient leaders, and to sub-
mit loyally to their command,-in short, was in-
capable of effecting one of those majestic national
movements of which the nations of Europe were in-
capable until within the last two hundred years. But
because the plans of the rebels were clumsy and ill-
* B2
4
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
concerted, their behaviour in the field generally timid
and irresolute, and their conduct to prisoners bloody,
brutal, and cruel, we are not therefore to conclude
that there is any incurable defect in the Asiatic
character, and that it contains none of the noble
dements of human nature. To do so, would be to
deny that Asiatics are men, and to deny, in defiance
of historical facts, that European rebels have dis-
graced themselves and their cause by acts of horrible
cruelty.
France and Italy have no great reason to boast of
the Jacquerie or the Sicilian Vespers; yet they have
done great things since those days. The atrocities
committed by Wallace against enemies of the same
religion and of cognate race, far surpass those of
Cawnpore and Jhansi; yet even the Scotland of that
barbarous time is no object of "legitimate contempt.
Wat Tyler and Jack Cade were poor precursors and
prototypes of Hampden and Cromwell.¹
""
In the survey of India's growing strength and con-
sciousness, and of our prospective difficulties, we must
not omit to estimate the invisible and silent effects of
political experience, and the patient remonstrances of
1 It is only with a painful moral effort that one can dwell with
cool and deliberate judgment on this subject; but it is highly neces-
sary to call attention to the fact that there is not anything pecu-
liarly Asiatic in the authentic horrors of Delhi and Cawnpore. In
the outbreak of an exasperated people, and especially where a
marked distinction of race adds rancour and terror to the feelings
of the insurgents, extermination is always their plan. It was so
during the Greek uprising of 1821, when upwards of twenty thou-
sand Turks, a peaceful agricultural population,-men, women, and
children, were murdered in cold blood, "as a necessary measure
of wise policy," according to the Hetairists," because the Turkish
population in Greece was small, and could not be renewed." Fin-
lay's Greek Revolution, vol. i, pp. 172, 182, 187, 188.
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE.
5
10
•
a nation's foremost men. "C
Serving and suffering,"
says Bishop Hall, "are the best tutors to Govern-
ment." Nor must we overlook the startling results
that are produced, when the hour has arrived, and a
man of genius makes his appearance upon the scene.
A mere military despotism-should we ever be tempted
to resort to one as an escape from political agitation,—
or even a much longer continuance in the exclusion of
natives from all share in the Government, and from all
the higher branches of administration, may soon drive
all the moral and mental energy of the Hindoo race
into hopeless and incurable hostility.
The great want of the rebels in 1857 was a leader
of commanding ability and recognised position, with
his own material resources, his own basis and centre of
operations, and a distinct and intelligible cause of his
own, a leader whom they could obey and trust, who
would relieve them of individual responsibility, and
make them feel as if the law was on their side. Not
a single native prince of any importance saw his way
to taking part in the movement. But this may not
always be the case. We may be very sure that the
next rebellion-if we are to have one-will not break
out exactly as the last one did.
What if the game of Victor Emmanuel and Garibaldi
in Italy,—which will probably be imitated by some
German prince or leader before many years are over,
should be repeated in India at our expense, with assist-
ance from some great rival power, with all continental
Europe, all America and half England sympathising
with the rebels and the invaders, until Bombay and
Calcutta became our Rome and Venice! It may be
6
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
ten, or it may be a hundred years before our quiet is
disturbed; but events move rapidly in this nineteenth
century; and if we follow the despot's example, we
deserve and can expect no other but the despot's fate.
We do not deserve it yet; we are not perceptibly mov-
ing in that direction; but unless we steadily set our
faces in the opposite quarter, unless we determine to
govern India on English principles, is there not some
danger that we shall in a few years be driven by some
antagonistic outburst to resort to Austrian devices and
mere coercion? The educated natives are learning
every day to contend with our weapons, the platform
and the press, and if we do not enlist them on our side,
we shall soon have them arrayed against us.
But it may perhaps be said that at least Christian
principles and Christian faith, when spread abroad
among the people, as the promises of the Gospel com-
pel us to believe they will be in the fulness of time,
would preserve the Empire from such terrible convul-
sions as that of 1857. Many persons, such for instance
as Sir Herbert Edwardes and Lord Shaftesbury, place
their greatest hope and reliance upon the success of ·
Missionary exertions, and regard proselytism not only
as a Christian duty, but as the most powerful of poli-
tical engines. The Friend of India has constantly
written as if every native Christian was necessarily a
soldier or an advocate of our Government. I have ex-
tracted the following sentence from the Friend of the
28th March :- "The Government of India has never
yet awoke to the fact that Christianity is the only
means of consolidating our power in India. With
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE.
7
that our military expenditure may be reduced to five
millions."1
This is a confidence I have never been able to share.
I have never been able to perceive that it rests upon
any foundation, or is supported by any reasoning
whatever. Speaking simply as a conservative poli-
tician, I should look with as much anxiety and alarm
upon a Christian, as upon a Sikh or a Mahomedan
religious movement. I consider a rebellion or a revo-
lution to be the certain and inevitable consequence of
a national reformation or revival. A great thinker
has observed:
"All the epoch-forming revolutions of the Christian
world, the revolutions of religion, and with them the
civil, social, and domestic habits of the nations con-
cerned, have coincided with the rise and fall of meta-
physical systems. So few are the minds that really
govern the machine of society, and so incomparably
more numerous and important are the indirect con-
sequences of things than their foreseen and direct
effects."2
It is true that the Moslems of India are bound by
their religious principles to wage war against infidels;
it is true that Hindoos dislike outcasts and 'mlechas,'
and feel that their caste system and ceremonial cannot
flourish under our rule: it is true, on the other hand,
that St. Peter says:-"Submit yourselves to every
1 The following extract from an article in the Guardian, August
5th, 1863, will also testify to the prevalence of this opinion :-" Our
Government of India will never be secure until we can convert the
people of India. "Till then we must be content to walk "per ignes
suppositas cineri doloso.”
2 S. T. Coleridge: Statesman's Manual, a Lay Sermon.
i
8
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
•
ordinance of man for the Lord's sake,-fear God and
honour the King;" and St. Paul teaches that "every
soul should be subject unto the higher powers," and
that "the powers that be are ordained of God." But
surely we do not find, either from history or from con-
temporary experience, that these texts have ever re-
strained Europeans from opposition or rebellion, when
a good cause and a good opportunity appeared; and
for my part I doubt very much their efficacy in Asia.
The time has gone by for our missionaries to preach
passive obedience, though they might and would have
done so three centuries ago. Indeed I had always
thought that it was the proudest boast of Christianity
to have raised mankind, wherever its precepts have
penetrated, from a state of brutal submission and
slavish indifference, to the capacity of self-rule and to
the consciousness of individual dignity. Are we then
to dread or to deprecate the propagation of Chris-
tianity? Certainly not. It is our duty not to do evil
that good may come; and it is equally our duty not
to omit to do good from a fear lest evil should come,
or rather lest what we in our selfish blindness suppose
to be evil, should come.
The world will not stand still. During that process
of social development and intellectual expansion, of
which the English supremacy has been the chief source
and agent, India must pass through that period of
throes and paroxysms which we have witnessed, or are
witnessing, in Europe, Arabia, and China. This last
country, the hackneyed type and illustration of station-
ary and immovable conservatism, is now agitated by a
religious and social revolution, the consequences of
•
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE.
9
which are incalculable. We cannot tell how it may
come or commence-as a revolution in some native
state, as a new faith, as a Wahabee, a Sikh, or a Chris-
tian reformation, or as a reverberation from Java,
when the Dutch forcing-pump explodes,¹-we cannot
tell when it will come,-in ten years or in a century,
-but come it will; the stimulus has been given; the
ferment has been introduced; the inorganic mass has
become vascular and sensitive. It remains for us to
decide whether we will be prepared for it or not, when
it does come; whether we will comprehend, co-operate
and guide, or strike and struggle blindly.
•
A candid exposition of native feeling and an occa-
sional discussion of native claims would be of the
greatest advantage and assistance to our rulers. The
centralised despotisms of Europe are worshipped by
officials, because the views and commands of the Sove-
veign and his Ministers are in ordinary times carried
out with promptness and effect; but we know how
1 Sooner or later it will assuredly explode. The Javanese are
Mahomedans, and there is a considerable annual pilgrimage to
Mecca, whence they pick up some knowledge of the world and
recruit their faith and pride. They have also some intercourse
with India. Java was much agitated by the news of the rebellion of
1857, and revolts broke out in the adjacent island of Celebes and
in the Province of Banjermassing; some Europeans were massacred
and extensive military operations were required to suppress the
disturbance. The atrocious Dutch system for sucking a country
dry, and proscribing all its intellectual life, is sufficiently exposed,
for those who can read through a book, in Mr. J. W. B. Money's
panegyric, How to Govern a Colony; but it has been thoroughly
described and denounced by Van Hoevell, an eminent Dutch official,
long resident in Java. The finances of Holland are so completely
dependent on Java, from which it now derives a net annual revenue,
applicable to home purposes, of three and a half millions sterling,
its debt is so large, and its military strength so small, that a really
formidable rebellion in its eastern possessions would have most
ruinous consequences.
B 3
10
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
liable they are to tremendous convulsions, because they
trust to physical force, and ignore and disregard the
feelings of the middle class, the educated minority, the
living and active elements of the nation. But what
should we think of a Government which habitually
ignores and disregards the views and feelings of an
overwhelming majority! Has not the British Govern-
ment of India sometimes fallen into that danger? No-
thing could so effectually avert that danger, nothing
would invigorate the Government so much, as a real
working opposition both within and without the Coun-
cil Chamber; it would at once enlighten and enliven
the proceedings of Council, add force and currency to
its enactments, and give weight to the decisions of the
Executive Government.
We have done a great deal for the people of India.
They were blind, we have taught them to see; they
were unthinking and unconscious, we have taught them
to be conscious and observant; they were accustomed
only to a Government of force and arbitrary caprice,
which renders a whole people dependent upon the per-
sonal disposition of the Monarch, we have shown
them a Government of law and order, of rights and
principles. We cannot stop here; we must allow them to
touch, to handle, to taste and to enjoy, all those glorious
fruits of British civilisation which we have taught them
to understand and to appreciate. We cannot give and
withhold at the same time. We must continue to show
the way in reform and reconstruction; we must al-
ways confer and never concede: so long as the British
Government keeps moderately in advance of native
opinion and native capacity, it will preserve the moral
RETROSPECTIVE AND PROSPECTIVE.
11
support of the influential classes, without which peace
and good order will for ever be precarious, and phy-
sical force will be a doubtful and discreditable safe-
guard.
The people of India have not yet come to that stage
of social and political development when a nation can
plan its own progress, and intelligently demand reforms
and franchises from its rulers. They are only begin-
ning to be conscious of a collective life; and the most
advanced and enlightened among them are politically
children; they can barely articulate, and have not ac-
quired the rudiments of national strength and action.
They can only feel at present; they are in the imita-
tive stage; they are pupils and recipients; the British
Government and people must take upon themselves all
the responsibility, and will gain all the loyalty and
popularity that arise from freely granted enfranchise-
ment. Our Government will be able within the next
ten years to wield all the powers, and to rally all the
forces, at once of the Dictator and of the Tribune.
But if it neglects to take the lead, we cannot expect
the country to remain much longer quiescent. On
the other hand, until public confidence is restored, more
especially in the native states, until a general belief in
its good will and good faith is re-established, the lead
of the British Government will not be followed; its
reforms and innovations,-perfected, projected and ru-
moured,-will be regarded with dislike and distrust.
Our moral influence, which never attained the revo-
lutionary strength that is required, was shattered to
pieces by Lord Dalhousie's iniquitous greediness, and
will never be revived by any quantity or any quality
12.
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
•
of red tape, monthly returns, and annual reports.
When the living soul is wanting, this superficial regu-
larity of functions affords but little hope. The breath
of Royalty must put a soul into the Empire of India,
or it will soon become possessed of a devil.
At present the popular choice by universal suffrage,
in almost every province of India, would probably give
an overwhelming majority in favour of a native prince,
as against our administration; but, for my part, I am
no advocate for counting heads; I have no respect for
an ignorant and impulsive cry, when opposed to the
real superiority of the power and knowledge, of the
principles, objects and motives of an established Go-
vernment such as ours. But I should not fear to trust
even to the popular choice, if the people had once
learned to believe in the existence of a Sovereign, and
had felt the genial influence of royal magnanimity.
How can they be loyal to the destroyer of their princes?
How can they be loyal to the beadle and the bailiff?
X
13
LETTER II.
LORD DALHOUSIE.
Madras, June 28th, 1861.
LORD DALHOUSIE's death was a public misfortune. It
deprived us of that personal advocacy of his own cause,
that defence and explanation of his peculiar policy,
the absence of which causes every criticism and every
attack to appear one-sided, and leads the disengaged
inquirer to suspend his judgment in expectation of the
reserved rejoinder. It deprives us also of the great
moral lesson that would in a few years have been ga-
thered from the spectacle of a great nobleman, loaded
with all the honours that the Sovereign can confer, en-
joying the accumulated wealth of an eight years' Vice-
royalty, besides an immense annuity, occupying as
master one of the national palaces, and yet living to
see and to feel his labours nullified and his plans an-
nihilated by wholesale revision and reversal, his titles
and dignities tarnished and vulgarised, his wealth turn-
ed into a shame and a reproach, every memory em-
bittered and every thought of posterity poisoned, by
the unanimous censure of two nations. I do most
sincerely regret and I trust the regret is not uncha-
14
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
ritable that Lord Dalhousie could not have lived a
few years more to witness the definitive downfall of
his once great reputation.
It is one of the most hopeful omens for our Indian
Empire that the downfall of that once great reputation
is so manifestly approaching. Lord Stanley has un-
equivocally condemned the annexation policy, and attri-
buted the rebellion in a great measure to the bad spirit
which that policy created. Sir Charles Wood has cha-
racterised Lord Dalhousie's views on the treatment of
Tippoo's family as "most impolitic, harsh, and unjust ;"
the Saturday Review, usually cool, moderate and
guarded in its remarks on Indian affairs, declares those
same views to have been "shabby and pettifogging."
No one in England would have so spoken of Lord Dal-
housie three years ago; and most certainly the change
in public opinion has not been caused by the noble
Lord's lamented death. That change has been slowly
but surely preparing ever since the events of 1857
were seen to contradict completely his allegations as
to the weakness and hostility and uselessness to the Em-
pire of the native States; and has been lately accelerated
by the practical condemnation involved in the Adop-
tion despatches of Lord Canning and Sir Charles
Wood, and in the sentence of extinction passed in the
Bombay Inam Commission.
Lord Dalhousie's greatest iniquities did not even
last his time. He survived his retirement but four
years, yet he lived to see his boasted acquisitions scat-
tered and dissipated, his most confident anticipations
ridiculously falsified, his most peremptory mandates
reversed and condemned.
LORD DALHOUSIE.
15
One by one, slowly but surely, the imposing material
results of his eight years' Viceroyalty, so pompously
recapitulated in the farewell Minute of February 1856,
are melting away like snow beneath the warmth of
the conservative and restorative reaction which has
naturally followed this destructive and rapacious policy.
He boasted of having added four millions to the
annual revenue; but it has been proved that during
his time the expenditure increased much more rapidly
than the income; while the last four years' accounts
show an average annual deficit of ten millions, surpass-
ing the disastrous wonders even of Austrian finance.
In the recently published Adoption despatch Lord
Canning with scarcely concealed irony indicates his
condemnation of the refusal to recognise the lawful
heirs of the Rajahs of Sattara and Jhansi. The in-
justice of the annexation of Nagpore has been virtually
acknowledged by the concession of the name of
Bhonsla, the title of Rajah, the old family estates, and
a large stipend to our late ally's grandnephew and
heir, whom Lord Dalhousie sought to extinguish by
designating him "a Mahratta youth,"-" a stranger,'
--and "somebody else."
ور
The highest legal authority in England, the Judicial
Committee of Privy Council, emphatically denounced
the Tanjore spoliation,¹ and there is good reason to be-
1 Kamachi Bai, the senior widow of the Rajah of Tanjore, filed
a bill in the Supreme Court of Madras, to recover possession of her
deceased husband's private property, which had been sequestrated
by the local Government. The Court decided in her favour. The
Government of Madras carried the case in appeal before the Judi-
cial Committee of the Privy Council. The decree of the Supreme
Court of Madras was reversed, because the Lords of the Privy
Council held that the seizure was "an act of State," and therefore
not questionable in any municipal court. But Lord Kingsdown,
16
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
lieve that the final settlement of the case, now so near
at hand, will constitute a denunciation still more em-
phatic.
The increased and permanent grant to Tippoo Sul-
tan's family, the absence of all opposition to it in
Parliament or in the English press, and the incidental
allusions to Lord Dalhousie, are eminently significant
of the altered temper at home, both of the Govern-
ment and of the country at large.
There are several other strong moral claims, the con-
sequences of Lord Dalhousie's arbitrary acts, which
are still unsettled, and by no means abandoned.
Prince Azeem Jah, de jure Nawab of the Carnatic,
has to this day refused to take the pension offered to
him, or to resign the inheritance of his forefathers.
He, the heir of our faithful Allies in peace and war,
is not likely to lose heart when he observes the gene-
rous consideration shown to the descendants of our
most persevering enemies.
The Calcutta Review for December 1859 contains
an article in defence of Lord Dalhousie, his policy, and
who delivered the judgment, made use of the following emphatic
language:-
"It is extremely difficult to discover in these papers any ground
of legal right, on the part of the East India Company, or of the
Crown of Great Britain, to the possession of this Raj, or of any
part of the property of the Rajah on his death; and, indeed, the
seizure was denounced by the Attorney-General (who, from cir-
cumstances explained to us at the hearing, appeared as Counsel
for the Respondents, and not in his official character for the Ap-
pellants), as a most violent and unjustifiable measure. The Rajah
was an independent sovereign of territories undoubtedly minute,
and bound by treaties to a powerful neighbour, which left him,
practically, little power of free action; but he did not hold his
territory, such as it was, as a fief of the British Crown, or of the
East India Company; nor does there appear to have been any
pretence for claiming it, on the death of the Rajah without a son,
by any legal title, either as an escheat or as bona vacantia."
LORD DALHOUSIE.
17
its results. The article is judiciously written for the
purpose, full even to redundancy where the ground is
safe, perfunctory even to emptiness where a plausible
palliation is hopeless. For instance, great care and
considerable space are devoted to proving that the
second Burmese war, and the annexation of Pegu, were
justifiable, and that not "one tittle of the blame of the
mutiny can be laid at the door of the Burmese cam-
paign." But the conquest of Pegu was never a fre-
quent subject of objection; the propriety of the war
was scarcely disputed by any one but Mr. Cobden;
and, as to its influence on the Indian rebellion of 1857,
the Calcutta reviewer's argument is superfluous and
irrelevant, for no one has ever advanced such an
absurd supposition. Pursuing the same judicious plan,
the reviewer is very bold and very verbose on the sub-
ject of the Punjaub, the trump-card of the Dalhousie
school, while he treats the confiscations of Sattara,
Sumbhulpore, and Jhansi as "lapses," and dismisses
them without an attempt at justification. Shallow
and superficial, this article is yet well written, and
well calculated to mislead readers in England who are
not familiar with the facts, and I shall therefore not
permit it to escape without a few words of protest and
exposure.
The question of the annexation of Oude has been
thoroughly discussed, almost exhausted, but I must
still offer a few observations on its treatment by the
reviewer. It is true, as he points out, that "of all
the political measures taken by Lord Dalhousie, not
one was taken with greater deliberation, was made the
subject of such ample reference to England, united in
18
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
approval men of more varied experience and opinions,
or”—but here I must put in a caveat-" was effected
at so slight a cost." By "cost" I suppose the reviewer
means the actual expense by which the decree of an-
nexation was carried out in 1856; for if the receipts
and expenses of Oude from that date up to the present
day were to be fairly exhibited, I suspect that there
would be a heavy balance on the wrong side, notwith-
standing "extraordinary receipts" from the auction
sales of the king's elephants, horses, tigers, including
the "celebrated Junglar" now to be seen at the Surrey
Gardens, not to mention the shawls and kincobs which
attracted so much competition at Cawnpore, and the
sale of which excited so much hatred and contempt
against the Honourable Company all over India. With
equal justice and truth it might be said, that the an-
nexation of Jhansi was "effected at a very small cost,"
for at the time there was, in fact, no cost at all to
the Government. No resistance was offered by the
widowed Ranee; a few tears, a few curses, were all
the means of offence in her possession at that time;
and as to the heir, the rajah's kinsman and adopted
son, a boy of six years old, what could he do? But
the Ranee's time came in due course, the time when
the cost of Jhansi, in blood and treasure, was to be paid
in full. And placing a somewhat high value on the
blood of British soldiers, and, I may add, on the blood
of human beings of all castes and colours, I humbly
venture to think that Jhansi has cost a good deal more
than it is worth. Even by the gross material test of
receipts and expenses, I doubt not that in that little-
province also, the balance sheet would be found to
LORD DALHOUSIE.
19
condemn the advocates of annexation, and will continue
to do so for an indefinite period.
But the reviewer was not ashamed, after two years
of rebellion, in which torrents of biood had flowed,
and forty millions sterling had been added to the
Indian debt, to reproduce those same puerile and
despicable apologies for the annexation of Sattara,
Nagpore, and Oude, which were used with so much
ostentation, and with so much effect on the unthink-
ing, at the several periods of those great political
crimes—“The territory of Nagpore," he says, "lapsed
without a shot being fired"-"The annexation of Oude
was effected with tranquillity"-as if the sternest
opponents of annexation had ever doubted that our
power was sufficient to overawe all immediate oppo-
sition, or to overcome it if any had been offered. But
it is pretty well known by this time, that Lord Dal-
housie's confident assertions that the change of rule
was hailed by the population as a blessing, and that
not "a murmur was heard beyond the palace walls,¹
were erroneous and unfounded; that both in Oude
and in Nagpore the chieftains, the local armies, and
the military classes, were most ready and willing, and
even importunate, to be allowed to have at least one
fight, to save their honour; and that if not a shot was
fired at Nagpore or Lucknow, we are indebted for this
temporary tranquillity not to Lord Dalhousie or his
lieutenants, but to the efforts of the widowed Ranees
and the deposed King.
When the reviewer expatiates, as he does, on the
bad government of Oude, the want of protection for
1 Minute of February 1856, para. 27.
20
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
".
life and property, and the profligacy of the court, he
is simply wandering from the subject, and throwing
dust in the eyes of his readers. All the public and
private faults of the royal family of Oude cannot
justify the extinction of the sovereignty, the seizure
of the territory and revenues, and the confiscation of
a great part of the private property of our faithful
Ally. By the enormous cession of territory, amounting
to nearly two-thirds of his possessions, made in the
treaty of 1801, the Nawab Saadut Ali purchased our
support for himself and his descendants, and "paid
such a price for it as no other native ruler ever did,”
as General Low, when negotiating the treaty of 1837,
wrote to the Government of India. In that same
treaty of 1801, the strongest guarantees that words.
could convey (three separate articles reiterating them)
were given, that the ruler of Oude should thenceforth
be exempt from all those pecuniary demands, which,
by a succession of arbitrary exactions, had risen to
seventy-six lakhs of rupees per annum. In Article 6
of that treaty the Company guaranteed to the Nawab,
his heirs and successors, "the possession of the re-
maining territories, together with the exercise of his
and their authority within the said dominions.
"
The misgovernment of Oude continued, notwith-
standing the constant good advice of our residents; a
thoroughgoing Lucknow partisan would say, in con-
sequence of the incessant meddling and interference,
and greedy exaction of loans, by which nearly four
crores (four millions sterling) were taken from the
Oude treasury in twenty years. There are always two
sides to a question; but let that pass. Admit the
LORD DALHOUSIE.
21
misgovernment; let it all be attributed to the King
of Oude and his ministers; but all these admissions
cannot help Lord Dalhousie and his friends. The
treaty of 1801 gave us no right of interference except
as friendly advisers, and the treaty of 1837 was made
expressly to supplement this defect, and to give us the
positive right to interfere effectually, and to assume
the management of the country on certain definite
terms, in case of "gross and systematic oppression
and misrule."
The charge against Lord Dalhousie is, that he deli-
berately violated both treaties. But, says the Calcutta
reviewer, whom I charitably acquit of all originality,
repeating the wretched excuses advanced by Lord Dal-
housie at the time of the annexation, the Home Au-
thorities "cancelled" the treaty of 1837. It is im-
possible to deal gently with these unscrupulous sub-
terfuges, or to expose them in mild language. The
statement is false: the treaty was not, and could not
be, cancelled. A treaty concluded with every forma-
lity between the Governor-General of India and the
Sovereign of Oude,-signed, and sealed, and ratified,
and copies exchanged,—could not be cancelled by the
Home Authorities without the full knowledge and
consent of the Sovereign of Oude; without, in fact, a
fresh negotiation with that express object. The Go-
vernor-General had full power to conclude treaties,
and the final exchange of ratified copies made the
treaty binding upon both parties. The fact is, that
the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors simply
disapproved of the increased burden of providing a
contingent force imposed upon Oude by the new
22
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
>
treaty, and desired that the King should be "exone-
rated from these obligations," to which his assent had
been most reluctantly given. But the Secret Com-
mittee added-" Although we thus convey to you our
directions for the abrogation of the treaty, we leave it
discretional with your Lordship to adapt your mea-
sures to the state of circumstances as they may exist
when you receive this letter." The Governor-General,
Lord Auckland, with the advice of his Councillors,
General Morrison and Mr. Robertson, decided on
merely signifying to the King of Oude that he was re-
lieved from the military expenses imposed by the
treaty of 1837; and they came to this decision on the
express grounds of the difficulty under the treaty of
1801 "of enforcing its conditions," and of the "solemn,
recorded, and effectual warning contained" in the new
treaty of 1837, and of the power obtained by it to
assume the administration as a remedy for gross
misrule.'
(C
[ני
But the reviewer adds-"The treaty when publish-
ed," (in 1845) "bore, if we mistake not, a foot note
to the effect that it was not considered in force by the
British Home Government." The reviewer is mis-
taken; but what if he were right? Can a treaty be-
tween two States, solemnly signed, sealed, and deliver-
ed, be subsequently cancelled by a foot-note, the sug-
gestion of an Under-Secretary, or perhaps the bright
thought of a compiling clerk? But there is no such
foot-note. There is a note in the printed volume of
Treaties as follows:-"The Home Government disap-
1 Minutes by Lord Auckland, Colonel Morrison, and Mr. Robert-
son: Oude Papers, printed in March 1858.
LORD DALHOUSIE.
23
proved of that part of the treaty which imposed on
the Oude State the expense of the auxiliary force,
and on the 8th July 1839 the King was informed that
he was relieved from the cost of maintaining the aux-
iliary force, which the British Government had taken
upon itself." The treaty of 1837, and our right under
it to interfere, and to assume the management of the
country, was made the text of a long memorandum
of advice and remonstrance addressed by Lord Har-
dinge to the King of Oude in 1847, which is printed
also among the papers to which we have referred.
Lord Hardinge distinctly threatens therein to enforce
the stipulations of the treaty of 1837; whilst Lord
Dalhousie, his counsellors, and his apologists pretend
to consider it cancelled by a secret letter in 1838, and
by an imaginary foot-note in 1845!
The Calcutta reviewer has either never heard the
real charges brought against Lord Dalhousie's govern-
ment, or purposely evades them, to make a show of
refuting charges that have never been advanced. He
writes like a true partisan, a true disciple, of Lord
Dalhousie. He writes with real gusto and admiration
of the "
extent, depth, and variety of his Lordship's
minutes," and other "comprehensive State-papers ;'
and by the devices of his own slippery rhetoric shews
how closely he has studied his great master's style.
There is the true Dalhousie touch in the statement,
that "no objection was raised at the time to the dis-
continuance of the titles of the Raja of Tanjore and of
the Nawab of the Carnatic"-a mild, modest, inex-
plicit statement, which averts discussion, and assumes
the entire question, but which is totally contrary to
·
24
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
the fact. No objection was made at the time! No
objection to the extinction of the Carnatic Principality
was made by the Prince Azeem Jah, the late Nawab's
uncle and heir, who up to this day has refused to touch
the stipend allotted to him, and still maintains his
claim! No objection to the extinction of the Tanjore
Raj was made by the Ranees, who are still carrying on
an expensive agitation in England! No case, we sup-
pose, of Kamachee Baee versus the East India Company
was ever tried at Madras and decided in the Ranee's
favour, and afterwards on appeal elicited the sarcastic
and indignant comments of the judges of the Privy
Council! Of course these "objections" quite escaped
the reviewer's observation " at the time," or his memory
subsequently. But were no objections made by the
public press? The Tanjore and Carnatic spoliations
excited, it is true, little interest either in Calcutta or
Bombay; but, with the exception of the Friend of
India, which in those days was ever ready to support
Lord Dalhousie with a little epigrammatic sophistry,
I do not remember that a single journal attempted to
defend those shameless confiscations; while the press
of Madras denounced them with an unanimity most
creditable to it, and a cogency of argument that left no
room for reply. The Madras Athenæum in particular
contained a series of most able articles on these flagrant
infractions of our treaty obligations. But the Calcutta
reviewer would have us to understand that "no objec-
tion was made at the time;" and the statement is so
indefinite, so seemingly innocent and candid, that hun-
dreds of general readers will accept it as a fair and
truthful representation. It is just as truthful as Lord
LORD DALHOUSIE,
25
Dalhousie's assertion, in the farewell Minute glorifying
his own administration, that the widows of the late
Rajah of Nagpore had " themselves admitted" that no
son was adopted by them at the Rajah's death; while
at that very time the Ranees were maintaining wakeels
at an immense expense in England to prosecute the
claims of their adopted son. The apologist is verily
worthy of his client.
In pursuance of the same tactics, the reviewer
assumes that Lord Dalhousie is charged with intend-
ing to absorb all the Native States of India; a charge
which he proceeds to answer by cataloguing the States
that still exist. Thus he tells us that Lord Dalhousie
did not annex Bhurtpore during the infancy and child-
hood of the present rajah. He describes this absti-
nence from a course for which no possible pretext
existed, as "a just and dignified forbearance;" but
adds, with somewhat ludicrous inconsistency, “We
should feel it almost an insult to the Government to
vindicate it from the charge of having acted as a per-
fidious guardian to a helpless ward, were it not con-
stantly asserted that it had spared no one on whom it
could lay hands." Lord Dalhousie has never been
accused of annexing or confiscating without pretext
or pretence. He is charged with having invented pre-
texts for the annexation of friendly and allied States
to which we owed protection. Lord Dalhousie never
defied the world's opinion by open and avowed aggres-
sion, but tried to gain it by special pleading, and pro-
fessing a plausible regard for the welfare of the people
whom we were to rescue from misrule. Unhappily
C
26
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA,
for his reputation, there was a way defined by treaty
to rescue Oude therefrom, which the temptation of its
treasury made him overlook, while Nagpore and
Sattara were both well governed, and in Tanjore
and the Carnatic there were literally no people to be
rescued, since the entire administration was in our
hands.
The charge against Lord Dalhousie is, that he per-
verted our position altogether; that he destroyed our
fair fame, annulled treaties at will, and placed the de facto
paramount power, of which he was for eight years the
executive head, in untenable and unintelligible relation
towards the dependent sovereignties of the empire.
His policy, neither honestly protective nor honestly
hostile, was one destroying the confidence of our
friends, justifying the distrust of our worst enemies,
converting loyal submission into mere imbecility, and
what were once calumnies, and what might have been
called conspiracy, into legitimate reproaches and rea-
sonable precautions. Lord Hastings and Lord Wel-
Tesley crushed or coerced our foes: Lord Dalhousie
ruined our friends. He was, and always would have
been, the best and noblest of servants; he was the very
worst and basest of rulers.
These are hard words, but they are carefully chosen.
I say he was the basest of rulers, because he lowered
the reputation of our Government by repeated breaches
of our pledged faith; because he raised many of our
faithful and submissive and unobtrusive feudatories
into the conspicuous position of victims and martyrs,
and placed them on a moral elevation far above us. It
was this flagrant transformation of the legitimate Im-
LORD DALHOUSIE.
27
perial position of protector into that of spoliator, that
spread throughout India the notoriously general im-
pression that our time was up, that God was no longer
on our side, and that the first whisper of rebellion
would be sufficient to call every native prince and
chieftain into the field against us. It had been talked
of for years, though more especially after the annexa-
tion of Oude, and this feeling was universal among
the Bengal sepoys.
The British Government, by its actual preponder-
ance, and in most cases by the express concessions and
stipulations of treaties, is bound to be the controlling
and protecting power of the continent of India; and
is in fact, though not by the letter of treaties, endowed
with imperial functions and supremacy over all its
allies, whether tributary or not. But no paramount
and protecting power, no imperial or federal head in
Asia or in Europe since the world began, has ever
continued for any lengthened period to retain its com-
manding influence by common and peaceable consent,
when it has ceased to respect and protect the integrity
of the possessions, and the privileges and the dignity.
of the minor constituent States. The British Govern-
ment has lost both influence and reputation by the an-
nexations of the last twenty years. When the para-
mount power avows-as Lord Dalhousie did in the
name of the British Government,-a policy of consoli-
dation, and begins absorbing the smaller principalities,
it virtually abdicates its protecting and federal supre-
macy, and assumes a hostile and destroying character,
which can lead to nothing but alarm and intrigue, and
c 2
28
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
..
which will be submitted to, and tolerated, so long as
the fear of overwhelming power prevents resistance,
and no longer.
There is no more prejudice, no more moral aversion
in India, probably much less, against the abstract
principle, or the practice of a war of aggression and
conquest, for the acquisition of "natural frontiers,"
than there is in France. Indeed there can be no
doubt that, before commencing such a war, a plausible
or colourable pretext, to satisfy a certain party at
home, and to conciliate the public opinion of surround-
ing nations, would be more urgently required in
France than in the East, where civilisation is less ad-
vanced, and international law is not much studied.
For instance, the princes, chieftains, and people of
India, viewing only the outward events from afar, and
imperfectly acquainted with the details previous to
the rupture, expressed and felt none of that disgust
and horror at the conquest of Scinde, that they did at
the annexation of Nagpore, Jhansi, and Oude, and at
the Carnatic and Tanjore spoliations. Looking at
their own interests and prospects, they undoubtedly
felt anxious and alarmed at this new result of our
gradual encroachments; but the case in itself appeared
to them quite fair and simple; nothing in it jarred
against their primitive notions of political justice.
There were battles and victories; a city was taken
and plundered; the princes who had opposed us in
the field were sent into exile, their dominions and
treasures were appropriated. There was nothing here
to offend the moral sense of an Oriental. If the
captive princes had all been avowedly despatched by
LORD DALHOUSIE,
29
واحد
the bow-string or poison, little indignation would
have been excited in India beyond the range of En-
glish ideas.¹ Væ victis! Such things are not un-
familiar to readers of Indian history, nor indeed are
they without precedent in the annals of Europe. They
might be set down by the rude casuistry of the East
as acts done in hot blood, or under the stress of im-
mediate danger.
But to assail in cold blood, and without the slight-
est provocation or excuse, our best friends, those to
whom, in return for gifts, concessions and continued
service, we had promised perpetual protection; and to
the extinction of their sovereignty to add the spolia-
tion of their wealth, not sparing even their women's
trinkets, these things do indeed appear, to the un-
tutored mind of the Hindoo, most indescribably revolt-
ing. The mutual obligations of sovereign and vassal,
of protector and dependent, of master and servant,
have constituted in India, from time immemorial, the
very keystone of society and of the state. Lord Dal-
housie, by his acquisitive policy, reduced all our rela-
tions with the native powers to a state of hideous
ruin and confusion. It was, in the eyes of all India,
the abandonment of every duty, and the abdication of
all right.
When the annexation of Nagpore was being dis-
1 Scinde, in common with all our territorial acquisitions of the last
quarter century, including the Punjaub, is an unprofitable burden
on our finances and on our military strength. For the reasons stated
in the text I believe that the conquest of Scinde was less injurious
to our reputation in India, than the quiet absorption of Oude and
Nagpore; but the conquest of Scinde was, in its design and in its
details, a most flagrant piece of freebooting. That, I am sure, will
be the verdict of posterity.
30
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
4
cussed at Calcutta, in February, 1854, General Low¹
was the only Member of the Supreme Council who
dissented from that measure, and he called attention,
in the following passages of his Minute, to that very
distinction which I have endeavoured to point out.
"In my conversations with natives when I was in
Rajpootana, there never was any unpleasant remark
made to me respecting the annexation of the Punjaub.
Some said Dhuleep Sing was an unlucky youth in
having such bad counsellors; but no one ever said
that the British Government acted with injustice in
annexing that territory to its own.
But every person who mentioned the subject to
me, and there were numerous persons who did so, held
totally different language in regard to the annexation
of Sattara.
"It is very remarkable that every native who ever
spoke to me respecting the annexation of Sattara,
asked precisely the same question, viz., 'What crime
did the late rajah commit that his country should be
seized by the Company,'-thus clearly indicating their
notion, that if any crime had been committed our act
would have been justifiable, and not otherwise.
"As soon as the annexation of Nagpore shall be
known, similar questions will be anxiously asked by
natives all over India, and no human being will be
able to answer them to their satisfaction. They only
know a few facts, and they reason upon them. They
know that the late Rajah did not make war upon us,
or upon any of our allies; they know also that he did
1 Now Sir John Low, K.C.B., the last surviving pupil and assist
ant of Sir John Malcolm.
LORD DALHOUSIE
31
not neglect to pay his tribute to us; they know that
he did not so mismanage his country as to cause in-
convenience to us; they consider that the succession
to a Raj like that of Nagpore, is one of those matters
of interior arrangement with which the paramount
state has nothing to do, unless there should happen to
be rival competitors."1
Open undisguised conquest can be understood by
all, and may be admired as a grand display and exer-
cise of force, even though it be not approved. But
the processes, so often adopted by Lord Dalhousie, of
"bouncing" a family not only out of its principality
but out of its private wealth and household goods, by
asserting that there was no heir, when it was notorious
that there were hundreds who could claim in succes-
sion, and of declaring the right of the British Govern-
ment, as the "paramount power," to refuse to recognise
Hindoo adoptions,—a right for which no precedent has
ever yet been shown, and which can in fact be proved
on the best legal and historical grounds to be a figment
of the imagination,-these processes, more cruel and
mortifying than conquest and less susceptible of gene-
rous mitigation, for any admission of a rejected heir
logically involved his full recognition, were always
incomprehensible and inexplicable to the native mind,
and the arguments in their favour merely excited con-
tempt and incredulity. Conquest produces terror and
submission, but despotic equivocations simply exas-
perate, and encourage resistance. Nor is this distinc-
tion novel or unnatural. Two thousand four hundred
years ago Thucydides wrote the following passage:
¹ Blue-Book, Rajah of Berar, 1854, pp. 42, 43.
·
32
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
:
..
(Book i. c. '77)—"The Athenian ambassadors observed
to the Lacedæmonian magistrates, that men are much
more provoked by injustice than by violence, inasmuch
as injustice, coming as it were from an equal, has the
appearance of dishonesty, while mere violence, pro-
ceeding from one stronger, seems but the effect of
inevitable necessity."
I am very far, however, from asserting or imagining
that all the latent opposition and rankling hatred ex-
cited by the annexation policy, are to be entirely attri-
buted to pure and patriotic motives, or even to clan
affection and allegiance to a dynasty. Undoubtedly
there was a strong admixture of the baser element of
self. Whether they belonged by birth or service to
the intruding or to the superseded power, the natives
found that their occupation was gone, that their assist-
ance was no longer courted or rewarded. The native
soldiery, and through them the nations of India, were
grievously injured and menaced, both in their self-
interest and in their personal dignity, by the ignoble
sequestrations of Oude and Nagpore. They not only
saw the princely families of their own blood and re-
ligion, whose patriarchal splendour reflected some light
even upon their humble path, treated with utter con-
tempt, but they saw also that their own time was
gone by. The British Government had now apparently
grown so strong by their aid, that it no longer needed
their active services, but could produce all the effect of
a campaign and a conquest by an imposing demonstra-
tion. In Scinde we expelled a dynasty, and plundered
a great city; but we divided the spoil with the army,
and every sepoy received, as his lawful share, what to
LORD DALHOUSIE.
33
him was a small fortune.¹ For the Punjaub also there
were distributions of prize-money, as well as donations
of “batta.”
But at Nagpore and at Lucknow the royal jewels
and plate, the furniture of the palaces, the wardrobe,
even the ladies' clothes, were publicly sold, but the
troops got no share; all the proceeds went into the
Honourable Company's pocket. Lord Dalhousie thus
contrived to exhibit the British Government, on the
most conspicuous stage, in the most odious of charac-
ters, and to direct against it every feeling at once of
compassion and cupidity, of national pride and privatę
greed.
Not only does an annexation appear more intelli-
gible and more justifiable to popular conceptions, when
preceded by open war, but I have no doubt that we
might still for a time secure the hearty concurrence of
any number of native troops, by making them partners
and accomplices in a career of conquest and violence.
For example, of all the great annexing operations that
have been proposed during the last twenty years, that
of the Nizam's dominions-which has been repeatedly
proposed and planned-would in my opinion be the
most impolitic and the most dangerous. The Madras
army, to which the execution and subsequent occupa-
tion would fall in the ordinary course, is essentially a
Mahomedan army, and the men have a traditional
regard for the Nizam's family, which has grown into
2
1 About £15, or nearly two years' pay. Of course a good deal of
"loot" was also picked up as usual in an irregular manner,
2 The English in India, Letters from Nagpore, p. 21.
c 3
34
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
}
1
a by-word and proverb among them. If our Go-
vernment, following the bad precedent of Oude in
1856, were silently to envelope Hyderabad,—as
was done at Lucknow-with a large force; no ex-
planation, or a false one,-as at Lucknow-being
offered, until the net was drawn close; and were then,
trusting to gain the object-as at Lucknow-without
fighting, by overawing resistance, to press terms of
abdication or mediatisation upon the Nizam, under
some specious plea of his indebtedness or misgovern-
ment, I should look with certainty, as a direct conse-
quence of these proceedings, and of the mingled feelings
1 And yet the Nizam has never been exactly a popular Prince.
His court has always been more stately and aristocratic, and the
Prince himself more punctilious and secluded, than native courts
and native Princes are in general. His Government has never been
popularly credited with that profuse liberality of rewards and pro-
motions, on great occasions, to the humbler class of its servants,
particularly to its soldiers after victory, which glorifies the vulgar
notion of Sivajee, Tippoo and Runjeet Sing. Chiefly owing to
their long and steady alliance with the English, the rulers of
Hyderabad have won no independent military laurels within the
last century, have done nothing to efface their complete humilia-
tion by the Mahrattas at Kurdla in 1794. The fall of Tippoo, a
favourite hero, is attributed to British prowess, and the share taken
in it by the Nizam is looked upon rather as a disgrace than a glory.
And thus, in consequence of the prevalent habit of the common
people in every country, who endow the Prince, noble, or landlord
of the day with special hereditary gifts or defects, the Nizam has
much less prestige, and much less general influence, beyond his
own frontiers, than several Mahratta and Sikh potentates of very
inferior possessions. Even taking into consideration the Nizam's
position with reference to the Madras army and the Mussulmans
of Southern India, I believe that on the whole, his open defection
during the crisis of 1857, would not have been so formidable a
blow to us, or so irresistable an attraction to the unquiet spirits of
India, as would that of the Nagpore Bhonslas, or of the Rajah
Holkar of Indore, invested as the latter is with the imaginative
halo of gallantry, good fortune, and generosity which surrounds
the memory of Jeswunt Rao Holkar, whose transient success
against the English under Monson-the last success gained by
any native Prince-is popularly magnified into a series of splendid
victories,
LORD DALHOUSIE.
· 35
of wounded pride and injured interests excited by them,
for a tremendous general mutiny of the Madras army,
and a rebellion in Southern India. It might break
out at once, on the spot, as it would have done in
1856 at Lucknow, had the King of Oude accepted the
offer that was certainly made to him by the Bengal
sepoys, or it might be deferred during a year or so of
importunity, intrigue and conspiracy, but sooner or
later it would come. The longer it was postponed, the
greater probably would be the area of insurrection.
A violent revolution-such as is an uncalled for an-
nexation, where the feelings of the people are outraged,
and the foundations of social order disturbed-cannot
be made with rosewater, or with ink, or with any fluid
except blood. In the case of Jhansi the bloodshed was
merely put off for three years; in Oude for only one year.
No; if the annexation were to be done, it should
be done quickly, with unwashen hands, and in hot
blood. The city of Hyderabad should be rapidly in-
vested with a large army, taken by assault and sacked.
The native troops, even the Mahomedans, would for-
get all their scruples in the midst of that pleasing
excitement; they would even ask for more; and the
terror and wholesome severity of this process would
make a much deeper and more lasting impression
upon the local malcontents, and keep them quiet much
more effectually, than a proclamation. I have no
doubt that every capital city in India might be occu-
pied and plundered, and every principality might be
annexed in turn, in this style, with much less danger
and much less odium at the time, and with much less
bloodshed at the end, than by the slower and more.
36
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
* ་
formal process which Lord Dalhousie recommended
and commenced.
Lord Dalhousie was a man of talent and ability,
but not a man of genius; none of the sacred fire of
the poet and of the great statesman burned in that
passionless bosom. His was no prophetic soul. He
thought of nothing but the ways and means of the
day, of some immediate, tangible, showy result to be
produced. He wanted even the most ordinary fore-
sight, that elementary moral instinct without which
power must lead to tyranny. He knew not that an
unjust decision is from its origin null and void, will
not be accepted, and contains within itself the germs
of an endless brood of discreditable difficulties that
cannot be set at rest so long as the first injustice
stands,
5.
Personally disinterested and thoroughly unselfish,
even when worn and broken by disease, and under
the very shadow of death, he spared himself no labour,
physical or mental: but on the other hand-with-
drawn and set apart, as it were, from all human hopes,
all social sympathies-he never spared any one who
stood in the way, however innocently, of his settled
policy of territorial aggrandisement. He devoted him-
self so intensely and exclusively to active duties, that
he came to despise mere passive vested rights,-to look
upon them simply as obstacles to what he conceived
to be the general good of the empire, as valuable
assets unfairly kept out of the common stock. At
last, in some of his Minutes on the Bombay Inams
and other alienations of the revenue, and on some of
his meditated annexations, he propounded doctrines
LORD DALHOUSIE.
37
of systematic spoliation to be paralleled only in the
speeches of Marat and St. Just, or in the works of
Fourier and Proudhon. Of course he did not proceed
with these measures, or place on record his socialist
denunciations against "an idle and profligate no-
bility," without some pretensions and professions of
equity, and some appearance of argument. Had he
done so, he could not even have deceived himself,--
that first and most essential preliminary to deceiving
the public in political matters.¹ Nor did he lack
support in his career of confiscation. A few old and
experienced officials, such as Sir Henry Lawrence,
Sir William Sleeman and General Low, did on occa-
sion raise a warning voice; Mr. Henry St. George
Tucker and two or three other Directors vainly pro-
tested; but on the whole the great body of Indian
officials, civil and military, were heartily in accord
with the great annexator. Servile Secretaries, emulous
of a seat in Council; supple Councillors, aiming at a
Lieutenant-Governorship, and, we may charitably ad-
mit, quite incapable of contending against a great
name and a strong will; all contributed, after their
kind, compliant Minutes and volunteer Notes; here
they proffered a sophism and there they wrested a
fact. Anything and everything that could be rounded
into a period was acceptable; prevarication was at a
premium. And how could it be otherwise? When
he, who in that kingly place ought to have represented
1 "To deceive one's-self is quite as likely a case as to be de-
ceived by another, and probably no religious impostor ever existed,
who did not either begin or end by imposing on himself." (Hinds
on Inspiration, part I, page 95.) This is equally true of political
impostors.
38
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
the scrupulous moderation and generous forbearance
which become the majestic power and imperial posi-
tion of Great Britain, was straining and twisting and
torturing the plainest phrases in solemn treaties and
viceregal letters, to make the worse appear the better
reason, and to destroy, not only the sovereignty
but the very existence of princely families to whom
we owed protection, and who owed us nothing,-
for we had exacted perpetual payment in advance by
cessions or subsidies,-when such was the policy, and
such the practice of the descendant of a long line of
nobles, the pupil and companion of the greatest states-
men of England, what could be expected from the
hacks of Calcutta? Even their standard of political
morals was deteriorated under Lord Dalhousie's in-
struction.
"Mankind in general are not sufficiently aware
that words without meaning, or of equivocal meaning,
are the everlasting engines of fraud and injustice."1
Horne Tooke's vigorous text, though originally applied
to "the grimgribber of Westminster Hall, worse than
the abracadabra of magicians," is equally applicable to
the grimgribber of the Supreme Council, when record-
ing its deliberations on some acquisitive "act of state."
Since Horne Tooke uttered his vehement diatribe, a
series of improvements in the law, and in the pro-
cedure of our courts, has removed the reproach from
our judicial institutions. The proverbial sneers at
special pleading are now quite out of place and out of
date. And it may be added that our European diplo-
macy is now conducted in a much more candid and
1 Diversions of Purley.
LORD DALHOUSIE.
39
}
straightforward style, in a higher moral tone, and
with more honest and generous objects, than was the
case fifty years ago. But, although there have very
lately been some hopeful indications of larger views
and a nobler spirit, there has on the whole been no
corresponding improvement in the foreign politics
and diplomacy of India during the last fifty years.
On the contrary, there has been a visible deterio-
ration. From the stern but generally upright deal-
ings of Lord Wellesley during the critical struggle
with the great native military States, and from the
imperial magnanimity by which Lord Hastings con-
solidated our power, down to the offensive arrogance
and reckless rapacity of Lord Dalhousie, in a time of
peace and prosperity, and of acknowledged British
supremacy, is a fearful descent.
Warren Hastings was unscrupulous in his exertions
to supply the public treasury during difficulties and
dangers that frequently rendered his position most
precarious, but he did little or nothing that he hesi-
tated to avow; he worked openly in the Oriental
fashion among Orientals, a plan which Anglo-Indian
morality, the morality of a weak and struggling com-
munity among uncivilised strangers, approved and
upheld up to his last day of power. His plea was
necessity; he neither feared nor despised public
opinion, he simply disbelieved in its extension to
India. No one believed in the influence of public
opinion on the affairs of the East, until the burning
eloquence of Burke awoke attention to the wrongs of
India, and to the disgrace and injury which they
entailed upon Great Britain. The government of
40
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
Warren Hastings led to the India Bill, and the esta-
blishment of the Board of Control; and henceforth
the administration of India ceased to be mercantile
and corrupt, and was tempered and guided to some
extent by the honour and interests and proud tra-
ditions of a great and free empire. The influence of
Great Britain continued to increase for many years;
the purity of our officials was enforced and established
by Lord Cornwallis, and our respect for treaties and
engagements became celebrated throughout Asia. But
uninterrupted success, and unquestioned supremacy,
were too much for us; the Affghan expedition, and
the annexation of Colaba in 1841, were symptoms of
a lower tone prevailing, of that spirit of pride and
impatience, and hasting to be rich, which has hurried
so many individuals and nations into great crimes, and
great disasters; until at last, during the eight years of
Lord Dalhousie's rule, our reputation for good faith
and fair dealing sank to a lower level than had ever
been known since the time of Warren Hastings.
For Warren Hastings was true and consistent in
the line which he adopted. Lord Dalhousie was
neither true nor consistent. He never pleaded ne-
cessity, but promised immense material advantages
from his policy. The distinguishing feature of Lord
Dalhousie's annexation policy was that it was entirely
directed against our friends, against friendly royal
families to whom we were not only bound by treaties,
but in several cases by gratitude.
No one, perhaps, ever made a more lavish use of
words without meaning, or of equivocal meaning,"
than Lord Dalhousie did in his well-known annexation
LORD DALHOUSIE.
41
Minutes. Their effect was irresistible at the time,
and with the men for whose persuasion they were
penned those fluent decisive sentences, those confi-
dent peremptory assertions, the neat peroration re-
capitulating every inference as a fact, and every surmise
as a proof, and the logical practical conclusion which
followed so naturally from undisputed illicit premisses,
were quite sufficient to secure, and to justify before
the world, the concurrence of Councillors, Directors,
and Ministers, who, satisfied with the result, never
thought of questioning the process. It may seem
very extraordinary that writings whose chief charac-
teristics of which I shall give ample illustrations-
are sophistry at once bold and transparent, incessant
evasions and enormous assumptions, should have
proved so fearfully effective as "engines of fraud and
injustice," but it must be remembered that they were
written for the perusal and persuasion of only four
or five men, who were well prepared for the foregone
conclusion, and who submitted themselves to the
sweeping, confident dexterity of Lord Dalhousie's style,
-which with a concise symmetrical arrangement is
its only real merit,-and to that peremptory, oracular,
determined tone which, although it would have been
at once impertinent and impotent in an English atmo-
sphere, was at Calcutta appropriate and successful.
For all purposes of fair consultation and discussion
and honest conflict of opinions, the Civilian Members
of the Supreme Council, ever since the present form
of Government was established, have been utterly
useless. Men of official habits, accustomed to sub-
ordination, dependent on official emoluments, and to
42
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
most of whom the good or bad will of the Governor
General can decide whether they are to be shelved or
promoted, they are not likely to cultivate very strong
or marked political opinions. Every Governor-General
who has had an opinion and a will of his own, has
always had his own way until checked by the Home
Government. Only when emboldened by the hesita-
tion and timidity of the Governor-General, or by the
known hostility of the Court of Directors, have the
Members of Council presumed to think for themselves
on questions of first-rate importance.
And then it must be remembered that no oppor-
tunity of argument or objection, remonstrance or reply,
was ever allowed, not even a knowledge of the adverse
case in preparation against them, not a glance of it,
not a hint of it, was in any one instance afforded to
the victims of annexation, until the fiat had gone
forth.
Sir Bartle Frere,¹ who was the Resident when the
Rajah of Sattara died in 1848, was strongly impressed
with the impropriety and iniquity of the intention,
clearly manifested from the first by Government on
that occasion, of deciding the question of the con-
tinuance or lapse of the State, without the slightest
reference to the claimants, or any communication with
the Rajah's family; and he protested against it in the
following terms:-
"I would take this opportunity of respectfully, but
very earnestly, pressing on Government the risk of
pronouncing any final decision, whether in favour of
one adoption against another, or of the British Go-
1 Now Governor of Bombay.
LORD DALHOUSIE.
43
*
vernment against both, and against all other claimants,
without allowing every party, whose claim may be
.negatived, the fullest possible opportunity, not only of
himself stating the grounds of his own claim, but of
answering all objections.
"It may be that both sides of the case have been
already very fully argued in the proceedings of
Government; but no man is likely to admit the
justice of a decision which negatives a claim to an
inheritance when his case has been nowhere stated
but by the counsel for his opponent, and when he,'
the defeated party, has had no opportunity of answer-
ing the objections taken to his claim.
"Moreover, in the possible case of the ultimate
decision being in favour of the lapse to the British
Government, that opponent will have necessarily been
judge in his own case. It is surely not desirable to add
to the necessary and inevitable invidiousness of such a
position, the circumstance of the judge having been also
the self-constituted counsel for the defeated party."1
This bold and honest warning failed to produce
any effect upon Lord Dalhousie; and the Govern-
ment, acting as plaintiff, counsel for both sides, and
judge, gave a summary ex parte decree in its own
favour, ejected the Sattara family, sold them up, pen-
sioned them off, and thus fabricated the precedent
which was used for the extinction of the Jhansi,
Nagpore, and Tanjore principalities.
The Ranees of Nagpore were treated in exactly the
same manner as those of Sattara. They were never
invited to express an opinion on the subject of the
1 Parliamentary Papers, Sattara, 1849, p. 119-120.
44
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
i
succession; and the grounds of the decision of Govern-
ment, annihilating their sovereignty and their family,
were never communicated to them. They were abruptly
told that there was no heir to the musnud, and that
the Rajah's dominions had "reverted to the British
Government," and not another word of explanation
was vouchsafed to them.¹ A year or so after the
annexation, they were able, in common with the
general public, to inspect Lord Dalhousie's Minute.
of the 28th January, 1854, penned about a month
after the Rajah's death, in which his grand-nephew
and heir, their adopted son, is styled "a Mahratta
youth," and "a stranger;" and in which, without
any inquiry having been made, without any facts
or information whatever, but by a purely à priori
argument,—evolved, we must suppose, "from the
depths of his moral consciousness," just as the Ger-
man philosopher constructed the ideal elephant,-
Lord Dalhousie proved, to the satisfaction of Mr.
Halliday and Mr. Dorin, that the Ranees' natural
jealousies, "their feelings and interests," must make
them averse to the continuance of the Raj in the
person of an adopted son, and that it would really be
inhuman to encourage them to adopt.2
And in that painful case of the succession to the
Carnatic musnud, which has naturally excited more
interest at Madras than any of the other instances I
have mentioned, and which is the subject of the peti-
tion to Parliament adopted at the native meeting held
on the 15th of this month, the same measure of fair-
1 Papers relating to the Rajah of Berar, 1854, p. 37.
2 Ditto, pp. 25-26.
LORD DALHOUSIE.
45
ness and candour was meted out to Prince Azeem Jah.
This Prince, the son of the reigning Nawab with whom
the treaty of 1801 was made, himself officially recog-
nised by the Court of Directors in 1829, and by Lord
Tweeddale's Government in 1843, as
(( 'next in suc-
cession to the musnud," has never been allowed by
Government to obtain the slightest insight into the
grounds on which his rights were assailed, and would
never have known anything about them but for the
Parliamentary Papers printed in April 1860. And in
that same publication, which revealed to him the pre-
posterous prevarications by which he was deprived of
his inheritance, Prince Azeem Jah also found himself
represented to Parliament and the public by Sir Charles
Trevelyan and the Secretary of State, as "perfectly
understanding and acquiescing in his new position,"
and as having "abandoned the chimerical idea of the
restoration of the Nawabship, and accepted his posi-
tion as the first native nobleman of Madras." And
yet up to that time he had, as he has up to this day,
steadily refused to touch one rupee of the stipend
allotted to him, and had never ceased, to the best of
his ability and means, to maintain and uphold his
manifest rights. "Litera scripta manet." There stands
this prodigious statement, the last item in the Parlia-
mentary Papers of April 1860, and a fitting tag and
tail-piece to a collection containing such unscrupulous
Minutes as those of Lord Harris and Lord Dalhousie.
This supposititious acquiescence, this convenient
transmutation of submission into admission, will be
found to be one of the favourite rhetorical artifices of
1 Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 50,
:
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
46
our acquisitive politicians, one of the most frequent
forms in which "words of equivocal meaning" are
applied by them with cruel though ephemeral effect.
I say ephemeral, for the truth must come out at last;
and whatever may have hitherto been the delusion on
that point, it will soon be known to Her Majesty's
Government that Prince Azeem Jah has never acqui-
esced in the disinheritance of himself and his children,
and in their reduction from the rank of Princes to that
of pensioners at will; and that not only the Mussul-
man community, but the Hindoos of all classes, have
never ceased to take a strong interest in the case, or
to hope that justice may yet be done to the family of
Wallajah.
47
LETTER III.
THE CARNATIC.
Madras, June 21st, 1861.
Here
THERE was no family in India to which we were so
much indebted, to which we were bound by so many
reiterated promises, conveyed even in autograph royal
letters, as that of the Nawabs of the Carnatic.
is an extract from a Minute by the President of Fort
Saint George in Council, dated 4th February, 1779:-
"All attention and support is certainly due to the
Nabob as our old and faithful ally, connected with us
by every tie, and demanding from us every indul-
gence;" and the Minute concludes with these memor-
able words" who, with his family, it is to be wished,
may long remain instances of our national faith."
A contemporary historian, who was personally ac-
quainted with the Nawab Mahomed Ali Wallajah, may
enable us to form a fair idea of the estimation in which
that prince's character was held by our countrymen in
Southern India, at the close of the great contest be-
tween the French and English, and of the value they
attributed to his past services and to his continued
friendship. "In the Deccan the British are almost as
.
48
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
powerful as in Bengal. We support Mahomed Ali as
Nabob of the Carnatic, and he defrays the expense of
our army in defence of his own country. There is in
a manner no separate interest between the Nabob and
the Company. It is from him they derive their con-
sequence in the Carnatic, and it is by their force he is
maintained in his government."
"Mahomed Ali's manner attaches the stranger to
him, and commands the friend. The first rarely sees
him without feeling an immediate interest in his wel-
fare; and the latter has never been known to desert
him. Calm, affable and full of dignity, he has im-
proved the elevated passions of the Asiatic with what
is amiable in the character of the European. The
duplicity of the East is lost in the good heart of Ma-
homed Ali. He is possessed of ambition, without any
of those vices which too frequently attend that passion;
and his policy is never unworthy of the magnanimity
of a virtuous Prince. A great man,' says Mahomed
Ali, 'may conceal his sentiments, but never ought to
deceive. It was my fortune to place the way of rec-
titude before me in my youth, and I never deviated
into the paths of deception. I met the British with
that openness which they love; and it is my honour,
as well as security, to be the ally of a nation composed
of princes.' This was his declaration at the conclusion
of the late war, when he was put in peaceable posses-
sion of the Carnatic; and these were his sentiments
when, at the head of his father's army, he rejected the
offers of France, and saved the very being of the Com-
pany by raising the siege of Fort St. David."
1 Dow's Hindostan, 1770, vol. ii, p. 397.
THE CARNATIC.
49
Sir Thomas Rumbold, Governor of Madras, writing
in January 1780, remarks as follows on the advantages
derived from the Nawab's friendship
"It is unquestionably to this influence that we are
indebted for a great part of our prosperity, for our
success against the French in India in the last war,
and for the decisive stroke made against them so early
in the present war, to which, as affairs have since
turned out, we owe perhaps our present existence in
the East."
It may be said that the Nawab derived great ad-
vantage from the alliance; and that he owed his
recognition as a Sovereign Prince to our powerful
influence. But in the first place it must be replied
that not one of the Nawabs has ever denied his obli-
gations to us; all that they have asked for is recipro-
city and in the second place it is to be observed that
the French set up Chunda Sahib as a rival Nawab,
not from any enmity to Mahomed Ali, to whom they
made repeated overtures, but solely as a means of
annoying and attacking us, who were chiefly sup-
ported by Mahomed Ali's assistance.
The services rendered by the Nawab Wallajah are
acknowledged in the following terms by the Court
of Directors in a letter to His Highness dated the
1st of June 1764. The Directors say:
"The assur-
ances Mr. Pigot, our late Governor of Madras, has
given us of your continued attachment to the Com-
pany, and the strong proofs you have yourself pro-
duced of your generous attention and good will, in
taking on yourself the whole charges of the sieges of
Madras and Pondicherry, and in the grants you have
D
:
50
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
lately made to the Company of lands in the vicinity
of Madras, are pleasing and acceptable to us in the
highest degree. We are at a loss how to express our
acknowledgments otherwise than by the strongest
assurance of our firm intention to prove to you at
once the sincerity of our past and the warmth of our
present friendship, by supporting you in the most
effectual manner in your government, and by endea-
vouring as much as in us lies to perpetuate the suc-
cession thereof in the direct line of your family.”
Prince Azeem Jah is a direct lineal descendant in the
male line of the Nawab Wallajah.
And this promise was renewed in a higher quarter.
An autograph letter from his Majesty George III to
the Nawab Wallajah, dated the 19th March 1771, is
couched in the following terms :—
We received from the hands of our East India
Company, in July last, your letter, accompanied with
your different presents. We shall look upon the
picture of yourself and your children with pleasure,
as it will put us continually in mind of that affection
which you have always shown towards us, and which
we have no doubt will be hereditary in your offspring,
as we are satisfied that our friendship and protection
to you and your posterity will descend through our
successors from generation to generation. That we
may the more readily afford it, in any circumstances
which may arise to you, and to our Company, whose
interests we look upon as inseverable, and whom we
wish to link together, in an indissoluble knot, by our
Royal hand, we have thought fit to send a great force
of our ships of war into the seas of India; and having
THE CARNATIC.
51
occasion in our own kingdom for the services of
our late Commander-in-Chief and Plenipotentiary, Sir
John Lindsay, we have appointed to the command of
our fleet Sir Robert Harland, Baronet, one of the
Admirals of our Navy, and have made him our Pleni-
potentiary to you, ordering him to deliver you this
letter, and present to you a pair of pistols, out of our
private armoury, and some cloths of the manufacture
of our country, which we pray you to accept as a
token of the continuance of our esteem, of which you
will be fully assured by our Plenipotentiary; and we
desire that you put entire confidence in whatever he
shall say in our name. And so repeating our wishes
for your prosperity, we bid you heartily farewell.
Given at our Court at St. James's, the nineteenth
day of March, one thousand seven hundred and
seventy-one, and in the eleventh year of our reign.
"Your affectionate friend,
"GEORGE R."
Thirty-three years later the venerable King, in reply
to the Nawab Azeem-ood-dowlah's letter announcing
his accession, and after that new treaty had been
made, by which, if we are to believe Lord Harris, the
hereditary rights of the family were resigned for
ever, once more declared his gracious intention to-
wards the Wallajah family in the following terms:-
"We congratulate your Highness on your accession to
the musnud of your ancestors, on which may you long
remain with honour and happiness. Your Highness
may be assured that we shall seize every occasion of
affording you proofs of regard, and of continuing to
your Highness and to your family our especial friend-
"
D 2
52
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
ship and protection." This letter is dated "at our
Court at St. James's, the 27th day of January, 1804,
and in the 44th year of our reign," and Prince Azeem.
Jah, the son and representative of Azeem-ood-dowlah,
to whom this letter was addressed,—and who was
then a living member of the family to whom the royal
friendship and protection were promised,-now claims
"the friendship and protection" of the representative
and successor of George III. I do not believe that he
will meet with a refusal. No member of the Wallajah
family has done anything since those letters were
written to merit the loss of that royal protection
which is promised to them.
It is difficult to know where or how to begin with
a refutation of the various pleas by which Lord Harris,
in his minute of the 25th October, 1855,¹ attempts to
overthrow the rights of Prince Azeem Jah to succeed
to that rank, dignity and revenue, for the perpetual
security of which to their descendants, his predecessors
entrusted all their possessions and resigned all their
power to the British Government. I feel more in-
clined to search for excuses for poor Lord Harris, than
to weary and disgust my readers with the monotony
of repeated and direct contradictions on points of fact
which must form the staple of my remarks. The
Parliamentary Papers present to us the humiliating
picture of the Governor of Madras, a feeble journey-
man in the Dalhousie forge, working under the very
eye and rod of the great master himself, to pick the
locks and burst the bars of those solemn treaties and
engagements which were expressly framed as a pro¬
1 Papers relating to the Nawab of the Carnatic, 1860, p. 12.
›
1
THE CARNATIC.
53
tection of the perpetual rights of the weak against the
changing interests and policy of the strong.
The late Nawab of the Carnatic died on the 7th
October, 1855. Lord Dalhousie was then residing at
Ootacamund, and lost no time in communicating his
views and expectations to the Government of Madras.
On the 23rd October Mr. Secretary Edmonstone writes
on the subject, and even while asking for information
as to what passed at the several accessions to the
musnud subsequent to the treaty of 1801," his letter
contains the following paragraphs :-
"3. The late Nawab, the Governor General ob-
serves, has left no son, so that there is no direct heir
to the musnud.
“4. Under these circumstances his Lordship appre-
hends that the future disposal of the title of Nawab of
the Carnatic must be the subject of immediate and
grave consideration.
"7. In the meantime, his Lordship assumes, as a
matter of course, that, until the question regarding
the vacant musnud shall have been considered and
decided, the Government of Madras will not recognise
any one, or permit any one to represent himself as
successor to the late Nawab of the Carnatic."
A foregone conclusion is distinctly denoted here,
and it was accepted as the Governor General's instruċ-
tions; the domineering influence at the Hills could not
be resisted at Madras. How could Lord Harris strain
at such a gnat as the "titular" Nabobship of the
Carnatic, "a mere pageant," as he himself called it,
when Lord Dalhousie had swallowed so eagerly and so
easily the camels of Sattara, Jaloun and Jhansi, an
54
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
:
important State like Nagpore, and was known to have
decided on the deglutition of Oude? In such a case
hesitation was impossible. On the 25th October Lord
Harris recorded his Minute; early in November Lord
Dalhousie arrived at Madras from Ootacamund, took
his seat in Council, and expressed his entire concur-
rence with "that full, able and conclusive paper.
Lord Harris desires to prove, firstly, that the Nawab
Azeem-ood-dowlah, with whom the treaty of 1801 was
concluded, and his successors, Azum Jah, his son, and
Mahomed Ghous, his grandson, the late Nawab, were
not hereditary Princes, but (para. 46) merely "de-
pendents of rank," to whom "the sovereign power "
chose to grant "certain rights, privileges and allow-
ances," which "the sovereign power had undoubtedly
the right to rescind " at any time: and 2ndly, that
the treaty of 1801 was merely "a personal treaty"
with Azeem-ood-dowlah, and that as there was no
mention in it of "heirs and successors," it was not
binding on the British Government after his death,
although " as a matter of grace and favour" they
permitted his son and grandson to succeed to the
musnud.
To test the correctness of these views we must
examine the terms of the treaty of 1801; and we find
in the preamble that "the Prince Azeem-ood-dowlah
has been established by the English East India Com-
pany in the rank, property, and possessions of his
ancestors, heretofore Nawabs of the Carnatic." The
next question, therefore, and the only question to be
decided is, what was the rank of his ancestors,
1 Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 13.
THE CARNATIC.
55
"heretofore Nawabs of the Carnatic,"-because, ac-
cording to the treaty, in that rank, the rank of his
ancestors, Prince Azeem-ood-dowlah was established.
Nor are these words weakened by those immediately
following, which speak of " establishing the connection
between the contracting parties on a permanent basis
of security in all times to come," not exactly the
terms we should expect to find in a personal agree-
ment made for one life only.
Lord Harris however says (par. 69):-"The here-
ditary right to the Carnatic, the royal titles and privi-
leges, were assumed and certainly allowed by us; but
I imagine on no authority which could be considered
legal for a Mussulman subject of the Mogul." I might
stop here, and claim that Lord Harris has here con-
ceded the whole question; for as he admits that "the
hereditary right and royal privileges" were possessed
by the Nawabs, and "allowed by us," they must have
descended to Azeem-ood-dowlah, who was established
by the treaty of 1801 in "the rank, property, and
possessions of his ancestors."
But let us not be hasty in our judgment; we will
carefully recall the historical facts. The first Nawab
of this family, Anwar-ood-deen Khan, was the Go-
vernor of the Carnatic, appointed by the Nizam as his
deputy, the Nizam himself being deputed as Suba-
dar of the Deccan by the King of Delhi. Neither ap-
pointment was hereditary by the original grant, but
the ancient customs of India were in favour of here-
ditary office, and in the decline of the Empire the
great vice-royalties, such as the Deccan, Oude, and
1 Carnatic Paperş, 1860, p. 14.
•
56
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
Bengal, acquired hereditary rights and virtual inde-
pendence by gradual encroachments and opportune
demands, conceded and confirmed in his time of need
and difficulty by the Sovereign to whom they still paid
ceremonial homage and allegiance, and in some cases.
tribute. And thus the Mahratta Rajahs, originally
Subadars, feudatories and tributaries of the Peishwa,
and in Europe the Electors, Markgraves and Counts of
the Holy Roman Empire, by the same or an analogous
process, became by degrees hereditary Princes, with
sovereign jurisdiction within their own territorial
limits, and owning merely a federal supremacy in the
great monarch who was at first their absolute lord
and master.
The founder of the dynasty, Anwar-ood-deen Khan,
though by no means an immaculate character, was
always friendly with the English; and in 1746 pro-
tected our settlements at Madras and Cuddalore, when
the French had gained a temporary superiority over
our forces by land and sea. Anwar-ood-deen was
killed at a very advanced age in the battle of
Amboor, on the 3rd of August, 1749, fought against
the French and Chunda Sahib, who had been set up
by them as a pretender to the Nawabship, with a view
to the destruction of British influence.
The inordinate ambition of the French, and the
avowed designs of Dupleix, had, by this time, com-
pletely alarmed the Honourable Company's Governors
at the three Presidencies. It was evident that, under
colour of supporting the pretensions of a native Prince,
the French were forming the most extensive scheme of
territorial aggrandisement. Nothing remained for us
THE CARNATIC.
57
but to contend against these powerful enemies with
their own weapons, by supporting a rival candidate
for the rule of the Carnatic. Actuated by these
motives, we embraced Mahomed Ali's proposals, and
took up arms ostensibly in his cause, but really in our
own. Our efforts were successful; and the title of
our ally was fully recognised by the King of France in
Article XI of the treaty concluded at Paris in 1763.¹
In pursuance of the same policy we obtained in
1765, after much negotiation, a complete release and
acquittance of Mahomed Ali from all dependence upon
and allegiance to his original superior the Nizam, and
his exaltation by the firman of the King of Delhi to
the dignity of hereditary Nawab, with the title
of Wallajah Ameer-ool-Hind, or Exalted Prince of
India. "No authority, I imagine,"-if Lord Harris
will allow me to echo his language with a difference,—
could be considered' more legal for a Mussulman
subject of the Mogul."
In October 1774 Wallajah writes thus to the Court
of Directors :-"By the blessing of God I am a here-
ditary Prince, and a firm and steady friend and ally
of the King of Great Britain, and am the most attached
to the English nation of all the Princes of India." At
a much later period (18th of March, 1801), in Omdut-
ool-Oomra's time, when some legal difficulty had to be
settled, the Madras Government write thus to the
Court of Directors :-"We consulted the opinion of
the Attorney-General upon this case, and informed
Mr. Latour that we considered the Nabob of the Car-
natic to be an independent Prince."
¹ Martens, Recueil de Traités, tome i, p. 113.
י
D3
58
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
-
-
Mahomed Ali Wallajah then was clearly an here-
ditary Sovereign Prince, and no dependent of the
Honourable Company: his son Omdut-ool-Oomra suc-
ceeded him, and no new engagement of the Nawab
with the East India Company took place during his
reign. Azeem-ood-dowlah succeeded his uncle Omdut-
ool-Oomra, and was established by the treaty of 1801
"in the rank, property, and possessions of his ances-
tors, heretofore Nawabs of the Carnatic ;" and we may
call upon Lord Harris and Lord Dalhousie to show how
he lost the rank of a hereditary Prince, how and when
he was degraded to the position of the Honourable
Company's dependent, with rank, privileges and allow-
ances which the Company could rescind at will.
The fullest acknowledgments of his rights and pri-
vileges as a Sovereign were repeatedly made, both at
Azeem-ood-dowlah's accession and on several occa-
sions during his reign, by all the British authorities.
Of these I shall in this place give only two examples.
Three years after the treaty of 1801 the Governor of
Madras writes to the Nawab Azeem-ood-dowlah in
the following terms :-
"The Government was pleased to establish your
Highness upon the throne, reserving to itself the ad-
ministration of the Civil and Military affairs of the
country; a very considerable portion of the revenue
was appropriated to the support of the rank and
dignity of the Sovereign in his former splendour, as
well as to the no less princely purposes of extensive
charity and benevolence."1
1 Letter from Lord W. Bentinck to the Nawab Azeem-ood-dowlah,
dated the 22nd May 1804; Papers relating to Carnatic Stipendaries,
Madras, 1858, pp. 97-98.
THE CARNATIC.
59
And nine years later the Court of Directors write as
follows:-
"It appears from the report of the Advocate-
General, of the 22nd of September, 1810, that the
rights of His Highness the Nabob as a Sovereign
Prince have been allowed and confirmed by the
Supreme Court of Judicature, and declared to be
exempt from its local jurisdiction."
The closest and most friendly connection subsisted
between the Nawab Wallajah and the Company for
upwards of thirty years, without any specific treaty
or agreement whatever. In 1787 Wallajah concluded
a treaty with the East India Company, after many
solicitations by the Madras Government, in which
the subsidy that he was to pay for the maintenance
of troops was fixed; and in 1792, the annual pay-
ments having proved to be far beyond his means,
Lord Cornwallis made a more favourable treaty in
1792, by which the burden upon the Nawab's shoul-
ders was very much lightened. Neither of these
treaties contained any cession of territory. Omdut-
ool-Oomra succeeded his father in 1795, and no change
whatever in his political relations with the British
Government took place during his reign. But at his
1 From the Court of Directors to the Government of Madras, dated
23d of February 1813; Carnatic Stipendaries, Madras, 1858, p. 138.
The following extract from Mill's History is also sufficiently explicit :
-" In the Carnatic, during the contest with the French, they had
upheld Mohammed Ali; upon the termination of it, they had
acknowledged him as the undoubted Sovereign of the country. He-
was established therefore in the possession of both branches of
power, both that of Nazim or the military power, and that of
Derwan or the financial power; and the Company held the station
of dependents, possessing their privileges through his sufferance,
and owing obedience to his throne." Mill's History of India, edited
by Wilson, 1848, vol. iv, p. 64.
:
60
THE EMPIRE IN. INDIA.
death a great change was to be effected. It had been
the leading object with the British Government for:
several years before the Nawab's Wallajah's death,-
but more especially since Lord Cornwallis had effec-
tually broken the power of Tippoo in the campaign of
1792,-to obtain the entire civil and military admin-
istration of the Carnatic, and to reduce the Nawab,
amply endowed with a large share of the revenue as
his civil list, to that position of the porc en engrais,
provided for the grand Pensionary of France in Sieyes'
last and most elaborate constitution, which was so
decidedly rejected by Napoleon Bonaparte. This po-
sition was rejected with equal decision by the Nawabs
Wallajah and Omdut-ool-Oomra, to the great dissatis-
faction of the Company, who attributed their obsti-
nate objections to the "perverse counsels" of "inte-
rested intriguers."
The instalments of the subsidy were regularly paid
during Omdut-ool-Oomra's reign; but the country
was said, and probably with truth, to be oppressively
and wastefully administered. The Nawab was killing
the goose with the golden eggs; the Company alone
knew how to make her lay continuously. Soon after
Omdut-ool-Oomra's accession, therefore, in 1795, Lord
Hobart, then Governor of Madras, vigorously renewed
the attempts to induce the Nabob to transfer the
Government of the Carnatic to the Company. With
this view he wrote several Minutes, explaining what
he alleged to be the supreme necessity of such transfer,
and the Court of Directors, writing on the 31st August
1791 to the President in Council at Madras, use these
words:"We sincerely lament that the Nabob could
THE CARNATIC.
61
not be prevailed upon to adopt the modification of
the treaty proposed by you" (this modification con-
templated the much desired transfer) " and we autho-
rise you to renew the proposition in our name, and
you will render a most acceptable service to the
Company should you by address, conciliation, and
persuasion be successful in procuring his Highness"
consent thereto." The Nawab's consent could by no
means be procured; and the payment of the subsidy
was punctual, affording no pretext for any summary
interference. In 1798, Lord Mornington, afterwards
Marquis Wellesley, was appointed Governor-General,
and immediately on his arrival at Madras he opened
a negotiation with the Nawab with a view to a new
treaty, but "found His Highness," in the words of
the despatch to the Court of Directors, "completely
indisposed to that arrangement." In April 1799,
the Governor-General addressed from Calcutta a long
argumentative letter of sixty-two paragraphs to Omdut-
ool-Oomra on the same subject; but the Nawab “ op-
posed a determined resolution to the modification of
the treaty of 1792.”
But towards the end of 1799 news reached Calcutta
that Omdut-ool-Oomra's health was failing; and a
new expedient occurred to the mind of Lord Morn-
ington, which, it is important to observe, contained
the germ of the plan by which the desired arrange-
ment was subsequently carried out. I must give a
somewhat lengthy extract from the letter addressed
to the Governor of Madras, which is dated "Calcutta
the 26th March 1800," containing "directions for hist
Lordship's guidance in the event of the Nabob Omdut-
ool-Oomra's death."
62
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
(6
Although the treaty of 1792 was concluded in
the name and on the behalf of the Nabob Wallajah
and his successors, no obligation of that treaty binds
the Company to place or to support on the musnud
any individual of the family (if any should be nomi-
nated by the reigning Nabob) whose pretensions to
the succession may be actually disputed or may appear
questionable.
"Various rumours exist relative to the birth of the
person of whom the Nabob Omdut-ool-Omrah declares
himself to be the father; it is, however, certain that
the mother of this young man is of low origin, and
that she was never married to the Nabob. It is
reasonable to believe that the succession of this young
man would be felt as an injury to the rights of the
late Ameer's son¹ by all who might think favourably
of the latter's title, and all such persons would un-
doubtedly use every practicable effort to defeat such
a succession.
"Under the circumstances, neither party could
claim our support under existing treaties; and in
determining to whom your support shall be granted,
we are at liberty to consider the security of Great
Britain's interest in the Carnatic, and the general
prosperity of the country, and the happiness of its peo-
ple, as the primary objects both of our right and duty.
"On this principle, it is manifest that, from the
candidate whom we may resolve to raise to the
musnud, we may justly require the most ample
pledges for the effectual remedy of the evils which
now afflict the Carnatic.
· Azeem-ood-dowlah, who was eventually raised to the musnud.
THE CARNATIC.
63
"For this purpose, the successor of Omdut-ul-
Omrah must be required to surrender to the Com-
pany, in the most absolute manner, the civil and
military administration of the Carnatic, not retaining
possession of a single fortress, nor maintaining any
armed force, under any pretext whatever.” 1
These terms were to be offered in the first instance
to Ali Hoossain, the son of Omdut-ool-Oomra.
"If the Nabob's supposed son should refuse or
delay to subscribe to these conditions within twenty-
four hours from the present Nabob's death, you will
then give the son of the late Ameer the option of the
succession on the same terms." 1
Two points have now been made abundantly clear:
-1st. That the Company were deeply impressed,
whether rightly or wrongly is of no consequence,
with the opinion that the Nawab's administration
was not only injurious to himself and to his subjects,
but threatened to be, at least ultimately, destructive
of the securities for British interests in the Carnatic:
2nd. That the Company were completely puzzled to
devise any means by which the administration of the
country could be taken by them out of the Nawab's
hands without an open rupture, without the employ-
ment of force, and a manifest violation of the treaty.
But when this embarrassment was at its greatest
height, when some advisers, despairing of a friendly
settlement, were approaching the question of stretch-
ing the provisions of the existing treaty, and employ-
ing coercive pressure; while the Governor-General
was anticipating the death of Omdut-ool-Oomra, and
¹ Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 249 251.
64
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
insinuating, in a very ingenious and quite Oriental
style, the possibility of there being contending claim-
ants to the throne, and sowing the seeds of contention
by originating a doubt, which none of the Wallajah
family entertained, as to the right and title of the
next heir, a circumstance occurred, which, to the
relief of all their embarrassment, was at once and
with undisguised eagerness seized upon as affording
a plausible pretext for assuming an attitude of menace,
and for imperiously demanding that the proposals of
the British Government should, without reply or dis-
cussion, be accepted.¹
After Seringapatam was taken, a correspondence
was found among the Palace records, which had
passed between Tippoo Sultan and the two wakeels,
or agents, Gholam Ali Khan and Ali Reza, who had
"When the Governor-General, and all his superiors, and all
his subordinates, in the Government of India, were languishing
and panting for the possession of the Carnatic, but afraid, without
some more plausible reason than they yet possessed, to commençe
the seizure, here it was provided for them in extraordinary perfec-
tion. But the very circumstance which recommended it to the
eager affections of the East India functionaries, will recommend it
to the rigid scrutiny of those whose minds are more happily situ-
ated for appreciating the facts." Mill's History of India, 1848, vol.
vi, p. 311. And Lord Wellesley himself, in the first glow of success,
writes as follows to the Court of Directors in October 1801:-"It is a
great satisfaction to have ultimately accomplished an object, long
and earnestly desired by the Honourable Company, and earnestly
recommended by the Court of Directors to my special attention,
when I had the honour to receive the charge of this Government.
Your honourable Committee is apprised of the early solicitude
which I manifested for the accomplishment of this important mea-
sure, upon my first arrival at Madras, in April 1798, as well of the
repeated attempts which I made on various occasions, in the years
1798 and 1799, to effect the same salutary arrangement. The suc-
cessive failure of these attempts, combined with the reflections
arising from the equally unpropitious result of every preceding
proposition of a similar nature, have enhanced, in my mind, the
pleasure of witnessing the conclusion of the late treaty." Carnatic
Papers, 1802, p. 86.
THE CARNATIC.
65
accompanied in 1792 the hostage sons of the Sultan
to Madras. These letters from the wakeels to their
master were decided by some unexplained process of
reasoning to be equivalent to letters directly written
by the Nawab Wallajah and his son Omdut-ool-Oomra
to Tippoo Sultan. Every compliment reported by
Tippoo's servants to have passed in conversation with
the Nawabs was interpreted into a proposal for alliance
in a holy war against all Christians; and the cor-
respondence was set down as not merely proving the
insincerity of the two Nawabs' attachment to the
Company, but as constituting them "public enemies"
who had forfeited every claim to consideration.
I shall in my next letter make a few remarks on the
alleged treasonable correspondence, and other evidence
against the Nawabs, in order to give some general
notion of its value and weight; but the question of the
reality of their disaffection and hostile designs is in
fact quite immaterial, for two reasons in particular,-
1st, I have already shown, from Lord Wellesley's letter
of 26th March, 1800, that the Government of India
had determined to obtain the entire administration of
the Carnatic on Omdut-ool-Oomra's demise, long before
any charge of perfidy was insinuated against the
Nawabs-2nd, even granting that this perfidy was
proved, the full penalty was exacted in 1801 by our
assuming the Government, and forcing upon Azeem-
ood-dowlah a new treaty, by which he resigned the
exercise of sovereign power beyond the precincts of
his palace, and accepted a fixed income as his share of
the revenues of his principality.
Lords Harris and Dalhousie, however, in their
66
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
respective Minutes on the Carnatic case, think proper
to resuscitate these refuted calumnies, though they
prudently abstain from quoting any of the ridiculous
documents, or of the still more ridiculous verbal
evidence; and harping on some hyperbolical phrases,
in which Lord Wellesley states what, in his opinion,
are the penalties that might have been inflicted
on the Wallajah family if the British Government
had not preferred to act with "magnanimity and
generosity," the two Lords maintain that by the perfidy
of the two Nawabs they were placed in the position of
"public enemies," that the old treaties were thereby
abrogated, and that Azeem-ood-dowlah was placed on
the musnud, as an act of "grace and favour," by the
treaty of 1801, which was "a purely personal treaty,"
containing "no mention of heirs and successors," and
conferring no hereditary right. I allow that no new
right was conferred by the treaty of 1801, but in what
part of that treaty is the old hereditary right taken
away? How did this new treaty work a corruption
of blood in the Wallajah family? Surely hereditary
right cannot be forfeited by an occult implication, or
by the silence of a treaty, especially when that treaty
is made "to establish the connection between the con-
tracting parties on a permanent basis of security in all
times to come." But the treaty in fact is not silent
upon this point. The disinheriting interpretation is
directly contradicted by the fact that Article II of the
treaty of 1801 expressly "confirms and renews such
parts of the treaties heretofore concluded between the
East India Company and their Highnesses, heretofore
Nabobs of the Carnatic, as are calculated to strengthen
THE CARNATIC.
67
the alliance, to cement the friendship, and to identify
the interests of the contracting parties." And the 3rd
Article speaks of "reviving the fundamental principles
of the alliance" between the Nawab's ancestors and
the English nation. As the former treaties contain
ample guaranties of succession to the Nawab Wallajah's
heirs, there was no necessity for any special and de-
tailed renewal of that particular guaranty in the
treaty of 1801, which confirms, in general, all such
parts of former treaties as were favourable and friendly
to the Nawab. There is not a word of "grace and
favour" in any part of the treaty.
Azeem-ood-dowlah,-the father, be it remembered,
of Prince Azeem Jah, the present claimant,-was
repeatedly assured by Lord Clive and by the nego-
tiators of the new treaty,—as was also Ali Hoossain,
his cousin, Omdut-ool-Oomra's son, who, nevertheless,
firmly refused to sign away at once the rights of the
family and the honour of his father and his grand-
father,—that nothing but empty power was lost by the
new engagement, that his dignity and privileges, and
the advantages enjoyed by the family were unimpaired,
and would be maintained without diminution.¹ Ar-
1 Extract from Report of the Commissioners for the Treaty of
1801 :-"We replied to the Khans, that the condition now proposed
actually existed in the treaties of 1787 and 1792; and that, although
the entire civil and military Government of the Carnatic had been
transferred under the operation of that condition to the exclusive
administration of the Company, no doubt was entertained that the
rank and dignity of Mahomed Ali and Omdut-ool-Oomra, as the
Nabobs of the Carnatic had been preserved; we therefore drew
this conclusion, that the rank and dignity of the Nabod of the
Carnatic could not be injured by extending the operation of that
condition; and that the object of proposing an amicable adjust-
ment, instead of proceeding to exercise the rights acquired by the
British Government, was manifestly founded on the desire of pre-
serving to the family the rank, dignities, and splendour of the Nabobs
of the Carnatic."
:
68
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
ticle 1 of the treaty establishes Azeem-ood-dowlah
"in the state and rank, with the dignities dependent
thereon, of his ancestors, heretofore Nabobs of the
Carnatic." Their status and rank was that of here-
ditary Sovereign Princes, and in that status therefore
was Azeem-ood-dowlah established.
All the official documents of the day prove that not
a doubt was ever cast upon his sovereignty, or upon
his hereditary rights; while two successions have
taken place since his death. Yet Lord Harris¹ asserts
that he, his son, and his grandson were "dependents of
rank," whose "rights," "privileges," and "allowances"
could be "rescinded" at any time by the other party
to the treaty. His Lordship arrives at this conclusion
in para. 46 of his Minute, after discoursing at some
length, in a very confused style, on the distinction be-
tween "real" and "personal" treaties, as explained
by Vattel, from whom he quotes several passages.
But it is obvious that he completely misunderstands
the bearing of these passages, and that he completely
misapprehends the true difference between a real or
public and a personal treaty. A personal treaty, ac-
cording to the doctrines and illustrations contained in
chapter xii, b. ii of Vattel, is clearly one of those con-
ventions concluded between two Princes, "for an
affair," as he says, (§ 190) "peculiar to themselves or
their families," and having nothing in it essentially
public, or directly affecting the common weal,-one of
those family compacts or treaties of dynastic alliance,
which obviously depend for their fulfilment or perma-
nence upon the continuance of personal friendship or
1 Papers relating to the Nawab of the Carnatic, 1860, p. 13.
THE CARNATIC.
69
<<
family connection. Revolution, conquest, and even
the demise of the crown may annul such engagements,
but do not affect the validity of public treaties, so long
as peace is preserved with the other contracting party.
Treaties," says Vattel, (§ 187) "that are perpetual,
and those made for a determinate time, are real;
since their duration does not depend on the lives of
the contracting parties." The treaty of 1801 was
made "for the purpose of supplying the defects of all
former engagements, and of establishing the connection
between the said contracting parties on a permanent
basis of security in all times to come." These words,
from the preamble, certainly indicate perpetuity, and
therefore the treaty is real and not personal.
But even if considered as a personal treaty, it would
remain in force so long as the Wallajah family existed.
Treaties, properly so called, are either personal or
real. They are personal, when their continuation in
force depends on the person of the sovereign, (or his
family), with whom they have been contracted. They
are real, when their duration depends on the state, in-
dependently of the person who contracts. All treaties
made for a time specified, or for ever, are also real"
(Law of Nations, translated from G. F. Von Martens,
London, 1803, page 54.) Wheaton, on the same sub-
ject, writes as follows:-" Treaties are divided into
personal and real. The former relate exclusively to
the persons of the contracting parties, such as family
alliances, and treaties guaranteeing the throne to a
particular Sovereign and his family. They expire, of
course, on the death of the King, or the extinction of
his family." (Elements of International Law, Boston,
70
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
1855, page 39.) The treaty of 1801 does not "relate
exclusively to the persons of the contracting parties,”
and therefore is not a personal treaty. It purports to
be made for great public objects, and for "all time to
come," and therefore is a real treaty. But even if it
had been personal, it would not have expired, because
the family of the contracting Sovereign is not extinct.
""
And then who were "the contracting parties re-
ferred to several times in the preamble and in Article
ii of the treaty of 1801? The recital of the previous
treaties, especially those of 1787 and 1792, as having
"been intended to cement and identify the interests of
the contracting parties;" the statement that "the in-
tentions of the contracting parties have not been ful-
filled by the provisions of any of the treaties heretofore
concluded between them;" and finally the declaration
that the new treaty and its "additional provisions,”
are to "supply the defects of all former engagements
and to establish the connection between the contracting
parties on a permanent basis of security in all times
to come," manifestly and necessarily denote and in-
clude as "the contracting parties," the representatives
of the Wallajah family, and of the East India Com-
pany, in the past, in the present, and in the future, and
point to a permanent alliance and a perpetual suc-
cession. Any other interpretation would be neither.
grammatical nor logical. And therefore the treaty is
real and not personal.
Again, Vattel says (§ 189) "When a treaty expressly
declares, that it is made for the good of the kingdom,
it is a manifest indication that the contracting parties
have not intended to make it depend on the duration.
THE CARNATIC.
71
of their lives." The treaty of 1801 expressly declares
that it is made "for vesting the civil and military
administration of the Carnatic” in the East India
Company, who are more particularly empowered by
Article iv "to constitute and appoint, without any in-
terference on the part of the said Nabob, officers for
the collection of the revenue, and to establish courts
of civil and criminal judicature." These are no per-
sonal or private objects, but are express provisions for
the better government of the country, for the public
good; and therefore the treaty is real and not per-
sonal.1
If this treaty were personal, then the treaties made
by the King of Prussia on the 7th December 1849
with the two Princes of Hohenzollern Hechingen and
Hohenzollern Sigmaringen, by which they gave up
their dominions to the King, in consideration of certain
perpetual annuities and of their dignities and immuni-
¹ This is still more clearly explained in the Proclamation, dated
31st July 1801, and published by the Orders of Government in the
Revenue Department, to all the inhabitants of the Settlement of
Fort St. George and of the Carnatic:-" His said Highness the
Nabob Azeem-ul-dowlah Behauder, and the said Company, being
desirous of correcting such errors as have been heretofore introduced
into the Government of the Carnatic, and of supplying the defects
of all former engagements between the said contracting parties; and
being also anxious to give full vigour and efficiency to the Govern-
ment of the Carnatic, with a view to fix the rights of the people and
the interests of the state on a broad and stable foundation, have
mutually, and of their own accord, agreed, by a Treaty bearing date
the 31st of July 1801, that all former provisions for securing a par-
tial or temporary interference on the part of the Honourable
Company in the government, or in the administration of the revenues
of the Carnatic, shall be entirely annulled; and that in lieu thereof
a permanent system for the collection of the revenue, and for the ad-
ministration of civil and criminal judicature, under the sole and
undivided authority of the Honourable Company, shall be established
throughout the entire territories of the Carnatic. Carnatic Papers,
1861, p. 105.
}
72
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
ties being secured to them, must be personal also, and
would be good for their lives only; so that the King
of Prussia could "rescind the privileges" of their
descendants "at his will," confiscate the income se-
cured to them by the treaties, and refuse them their
promised rank as junior Princes of his house. For if
the treaty of 1801, in consequence of its conveying
the guaranty of a certain revenue and rank to the
Nawab, became a mere personal treaty, then the
treaties of 1849, by which a similar compensation for
similar sacrifices is secured to the Princes of Hohen-
zollern, must be personal also. The cases are exactly
analogous, with this exception, that whereas the
Princes of Hohenzollern explicitly ceded their terri-
tories, and resigned their sovereignty, the Nawab
Azeem-ood-dowlah neither consented nor was required
to do so.
The whole of this part of Lord Harris's argument,
so far as it is intelligible, is quite untenable. A treaty
is not degraded to a personal engagement by its con-
taining any provisions for the private advantage of an
individual or family, but by its containing no public
provisions. The treaties of 1801 and 1849 are real
and public, because they were made for great public
and political objects, for the general good of the State.
Immediately after his installation, Azeem-ood-
Dowlah addressed letters to the King of England,
the Prince of Wales, the King of Delhi, the Nizam
and the Peishwa, which were perused and approved
by Lord Clive,¹ in which he informed them that he
The second Lord Clive, afterwards Earl of Powis, then
Governor of Madras.
THE CARNATIC.
73
had succeeded to the Musnud "by virtue of his right
of inheritance." On the 18th December 1801, a cir-
cular issued by Lord Clive to all the members of the
Nawab's family explains to them, (paragraph 2,) that
the new arrangement was made--" to preserve to that
respectable family its ancient rank among the Princes
of Hindostan," and "that when the Nawab Azeem-
ood-Dowlah was raised to the rank of Nawab of the
Carnatic, his Highness succeeded to the rights of his
illustrious ancestors heretofore Nawabs of the Car-
natic." In paragraph 10 of the same document he
says that his Highness "succeeded to the rights of
the Carnatic." In paragraph 11 he speaks of the
"restored alliance," and of the "rank and dignity of
this illustrious family," and says that "the alliance is
now firmly and perpetually established."
On the accession of Azeem-ood-Dowlah a Declaration
was transmitted to the Governors of Bombay and
Ceylon, and the Residents of Poonah and Hyderabad
respectively, in which occurs the following passage—
"And his Highness, Prince Azeem-ood-Dowlah Baha-
door, having entered into engagements for the express
purpose of reviving the alliance between the Company
and his illustrious ancestors, and of establishing an
adequate security for the British interests in the
Carnatic, the British Government has now resolved
to exercise its rights and its power, under Providence,
in supporting and establishing the hereditary pre-
tensions of the Prince Azeem-ood-Dowlah Bahadoor,
in the Soubadary of the Carnatic.”1
Simultaneously with the signing of the treaty of
¹ Marquis Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 560.
E
~
74
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA,
i
1801 the Madras Government issued a proclamation
in which they acknowledged that Azeem-ood-Dowlah
"has succeeded by the hereditary rights of his father,
and by the full acknowledgment of the Honourable
Company, to the possession of the said Musnud."1
On 3rd August 1801 the Government of Fort St.
George address a despatch to the Secret Committee of
the Court of Directors, in which occurs the following
passage-"The rights of Omdut-ul-Omrah founded
on the treaty of 1792 having been vitiated by that
Prince's violation of the alliance and of the stipula-
tions of that instrument, the hereditary claims of the
house of Mahomed Ally descended to the second
branch of the family represented by the Prince
Azeem-ood-Dowlah, the son of Ameer-ul-Omrah,
who was the second son of the Nabob Mahomed
Ally.”2
There is not a word of either past or future
hereditary right having been lost or impaired.
3 دو
Lord Harris boldly asserts in his Minute (para-
graph 25) that "Azeem-ood-Dowlah was positively
and openly declared to have no hereditary claims,"
but I think I have adduced a sufficiency of positive
and open declarations to the contrary effect; and we
may now challenge his Lordship to point out where
those declarations to which he alludes are to be found.
The truth is, that Lord Harris, misled by the im-
pression on his mind that no rights whatever had
been secured to the descendants of Azeem-ood-Dowlah
after the transactions of 1801, seems to mingle and
I Carnatic Papers, 1861, p, 105.
2 Carnatic Papers, 1861, p. 108.
3 Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 12.
THE CARNATIC.
75
confound in his Minute the consideration of two per-
fectly distinct and independent questions, the first,
whether Azeem-ood-Dowlah himself succeeded by
virtue of his hereditary right, or by the grace and
favour of the British Government; and the second,
whether after his installation the dignity of Nawab
of the Carnatic ceased to be a hereditary dignity.¹
Lord Wellesley took a particular interest and mani-
fested considerable anxiety in the settlement of the
first point; he was especially desirous that the eleva-
tion of Azeem-ood-Dowlah to the musnud should not
appear as an ordinary succession by inheritance, but
that it should be recorded and announced as an act of
grace and favour, as being due to the "liberality and
moderation" of the British Government."? But with
reference to the second point, when we examine all
the official papers connected with the transactions of
1801, we find nothing whatever to detract from
Azeem-ood-Dowlah's sovereignty, or from the future
position, and prospects of the Wallajah family; nothing
is said to be given up but political power; there is
nothing to show that Lord Wellesley ever intended
or wished to raise a doubt or suspicion as to the in-
herent hereditary nature of the Nawab's dignity.
Lord Wellesley objected to the original preamble
of the treaty as concluded by the Governor of Madras,
in which it was stated that "the right of Prince.
Azeem-ood-Dowlah founded upon the hereditary right
1 Carnatic Papers, 1860 (Minute, paras. 10 to 24), p. 10-11;
and, p. 45, letter from Court of Directors, who fall into the same
error.
2 Lord Wellesley's Despatch to Lord Clive, 18th August, 1801,
para. 12, Carnatic Papers, 1861, p. 109.
E 2
76
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
of his father, the Nawab Ameer-ool-Omrah Bahadoor,"
had been " acknowledged by the English East India
Company;" and he succeeded in having a new pre-
amble substituted, declaring that the Nawab had been
"established by the East India Company in the rank,
property, and possession of his ancestors, heretofore
Nabobs of the Carnatic;" but beyond this sort of
indirect admission by Azeem-ood-Dowlah of his obli-
gations to the British Government for their favour
and support, and of their right, in return for that
support, to demand new concessions from him, "to
supply the defects of former engagements," I do not
see that anything was gained by the alteration. It
is a mere distinction between "acknowledge" and
"establish."
Lord Wellesley attached so little importance to the
desired alteration, that he expressly cautioned Lord
Clive that it should not be proposed to Azeem-ood-
Dowlah "at the hazard of exciting any alarm or
jealousy in his Highness's mind," or of incurring his
"dissent or displeasure." And in the mean time,
anticipating the possibility of Azeem-ood-Dowlah's
objections, Lord Wellesley ratified the original treaty.
But the modified preamble was accepted by the Nawab
without discussion.
1
The most singular part of the case, the most com-
plete contradiction of Lord Harris's unfounded asser-
tion, consists in the fact that although Lord Wellesley
undoubtedly desired, without actually denying Azeem-
ood-Dowlah's hereditary right, to keep it as much as
possible in the back-ground, he completely failed to
1 Carnatic Papers, 1861, p. 109-110.
THE CARNATIC.
77
do so.
(6
It is true that he succeeded in persuading
Azeem-ood-Dowlah to allow the reference to the
hereditary right of his father" to be taken out of
the treaty, and the word " acknowledge" to be altered
into the word "establish;" but when we observe that
Lord Wellesley ratified the original treaty,-thus ad-
mitting the truth of its terms,-and was willing to
let it hold good if Azeem-ood-Dowlah objected to the
alteration, it becomes quite clear that the advantage
gained by the Governor-General,-if it can be called
an advantage,—was merely formal. But this triffing
result dwindles to nothing when the formal silence
of the modified treaty as to Azeem-ood-Dowlah's
hereditary right, is found to be fully countervailed
by the numerous assertions and acknowledgments of
that hereditary right, promulgated or approved by
the British Government in the explanatory, decla-
ratory, and diplomatic documents of 1801.
When the treaty of 1801 had been concluded, the
Nawab, in accordance with the terms of Article XII,
issued a circular order "to all his civil and military
officers" to deliver up all the districts, forts, and trea-
suries to the persons appointed by the Company “to
manage" them. The order was drafted by the Gover-
nor of Madras himself, translated into Persian, and
then submitted to the Nawab Azeem-ood-Dowlah for
his seal and signature. This order was as follows :—
"Whereas the musnud of the Carnatic Soobadary was
vacant, and I the Nawab Wallajah Ameer-ool-Oomra
Madar-ool-moolk Ameer-ool-Hind Azeem-ood-dowlah
Anwar-ood-deen Khan Bahadoor, have by the grace
of God taken possession of the said musnud, in
pur-
78
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
suance of the lineal right and title, as well as with
the acknowledgment of the British Company, it is
therefore directed that you do immediately on re-
ceiving this order deliver without any resistance or
excuse the Talooks, &c., under your control into the
charge of the officers of the British Company, who
have been appointed with my approval.'
And yet this Prince, who takes possession by the
grace of God, who approves of the appointment of
British officers, and who, as we have seen, is bound
by a special stipulation of the treaty not to interfere
with the collection of the revenue, or with the esta-
blishment of courts of justice, is said by Lord Harris
(§ 35 of his Minute) to have been a "dependent" of
the other contracting party, the East India Company.
Perhaps the most important document extant bear-
ing on this subject, is the Declaration issued by the
Government of Madras on the 1st February, 1803, in
order to secure exemption for the Nawab and his
household from the process of the Supreme Court,
which is as follows:-
"We, the undersigned, the Governor in Council of
Fort St. George, do hereby certify That the Nabob
Wallajah Ameer-ul-Omrah Madar-ul-Hind Azeem-ul-
Dowlah Anwer-ul-Deen Cawn Bahadur Showkut Jung,
Sipah Salar, Soubadar of the Carnatic, is acknow-
ledged and recognised by our said Government AS AN
INDEPENDENT PRINCE, the Soubadar of the Carnatic
Payen Ghaut, and an ally of our said Government,
and we do further certify, That from the year 1768
hitherto, his late Highness the Nabob Wallajah, his
1 Carnatic Papers, 1861, p. 126.
THE CARNATIC.
79
late Highness Omdut ul-Omrah, and his Highness the
said Azeem-ul-Dowlah, being successively Soubadars
of the Carnatic, and allies of the Government of Fort
St. George, have severally, with their respective fami-
lies, resided, and his Highness the said Azeem-ul-
Dowlah doth now reside, with the approbation of the
Government of Fort St. George, near Madras, and
within the territories dependent upon the said Go-
vernment, for the purpose of carrying on, in concert
with the Government of Fort St. George, the common
and united interests of the said Government, and of
the said several successive Soubahdars of the Carnatic
Payen Ghaut, as such allies.
((
(Signed)
""
CLIVE.
WM. PETRIE.
M. DICK."
Azeem-ood-Dowlah is here proclaimed to be an in-
dependent Prince, and an ally of the British Govern-
ment; the fact of several successions having taken
place is pointed out; no distinction is made between
his position and that of his predecessors; and he is
said to act in concert with the Government of Fort
St. George on behalf of their common and united in-
terests. Lord Harris says the Nawab was a dependent,
whose rights could be rescinded at any time.
Lord Dalhousie, in his Minute (par. 8) says that
"when Lord Wellesley, while negotiating treaties with
the Nawab of Oude and others, and forming the trea-
ties with those Princes, their heirs and successors, is
found negotiating with the Nawab Azeem-ood-Dowlah
alone, and omitting all mention in it of heirs and suc-
cessors, it is very certain that Lord Wellesley did not
80
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
intend to extend the provisions of that treaty beyond
the life of Azeem-ood-dowlah himself;" for "Lord
Wellesley was not a man who did things without a
reason." No,-and Lord Wellesley was not a man
to use words of equivocal meaning for a fraudulent
purpose; he was intent and determined on establish-
ing British supremacy, he was ambitious and im-
perious, but he was not the man to attempt, by a side
wind, by a sly and silent omission of words in the
renewal of a contract, to juggle away the hereditary
right of the Wallajah family, while he was incessantly
declaring his sense of their strong claims to considera-
tion, and his intention of treating them with “mag-
nanimity and generosity."
"2
Lord Wellesley had two great objects in view: the
first and most important was to obtain the civil and
military administration of the Carnatic; the second
to effect this change as gently as possible, and to give
it a colouring of moderation and mutual agreement.
He never alluded to the possibility of a personal or
life treaty being made with Ali Hoossain or with
Azeem-ood-dowlah, and, so far as can be ascertained
from the published papers, never thought of attempt-
ing such an arrangement. Indeed throughout his
persevering scheme for taking the administration of
the country out of the Nawab's hands,-from the first
germ in the gratuitous doubts of Ali Hoossain's pa-
ternity, down to the mature fruit, painfully forced
from Tippoo's records,-Lord Wellesley never attacks
¹ Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 48.
2 Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 559; and Carnatic Papers,
1860,
p. 33.
3 Ante, p. 62.
THE CARNATIC.
81
the rights of the Wallajah family in general, but only
maintains that the British Government is not bound
to maintain unconditionally the succession of any
particular member of the family,¹ at first solely under
the supposition that Ali Hoossain's legitimacy would
or might be assailed by some opposing claimant, and
that he would require our support, for which we
might impose our own terms; and ultimately, on the
plea that the alleged treachery of Wallajah and his
son entitled us to demand the most ample security
from their successor.
And it is clear that no difficulty was anticipated
in persuading Ali Hoossain to come to terms. Lord
Clive writes to Lord Wellesley:-"I am persuaded
that it was not more in your Lordship's contem-
plation than it was in mine, that Ali Hussein could
be so infatuated and misled, as finally, under the cir-
cumstances of doubt which overhang his birth, and of
disqualification arising from the faithless conduct of
his reputed father, to reject the terms by which
alone he could have become Nabob of the Carnatic."2
But there was found to be no party in the Wallajah
family adverse to Ali Hoossain, or doubtful of his
right; that prince rejected the terms; and the plan
would no longer work smoothly. If he had accepted,,
there would have been no scandal, and no public men-
tion would have been made of the alleged treachery of
his predecessors. His bold refusal compelled Lord.
1. "No obligation of the Treaty binds the Company to place or
to support on the musnud any individual of the family, if any
should be nominated by the Nabob, whose pretensions to the suc
cession may be actually disputed or appear questionable." Ante, p.62-
2 Wellesley's Dispatches, vol. ii, p. 551.
E3 ..
82
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
31
Clive to set up Azeem-ood-dowlah, and to explain the
irregular succession, against which the whole of the
Wallajah family protested, by the Declaration from
which I have already quoted, denouncing "the flagrant
violation of the alliance," and the "peremptory re-
fusal" by "the reputed son" of "a more adequate
security" for British interests in the Carnatic.
The key-note of Ali Hoossain's doubtful parentage,
struck at a venture by Lord Wellesley before the new
theme was selected from Tippoo's répertoire, is still
continued as the dominant phrase throughout the con-
certed piece. Ali Hoossain is always spoken of as
"the supposed son," or "the reputed son;" it is con-
stantly hinted, as in Lord Wellesley's original letter
of instructions, that Azeem-ood-dowlah's right to the
succession is the stronger;' and it is perfectly clear,
from the whole tenor of the published papers, that,
even if the Seringapatam discoveries had never been
made, the same programme would have been carried
out; Ali Hoossain would have been excluded on his
declining our first proposals, and his exclusion would
have been justified by his alleged illegitimacy; Azeem-
1 "Various rumours exist relative to the birth of the person of
whom the Nabob Omdut-ool-Oomra declares himself to be the
father; it is however certain that the mother of this young man is
of low origin, and that she was never married to the Nabob. It is
reasonable to believe that the succession of this young man would
be felt as an injury to the rights of the late Ameer's son," (Azeem-
ood-dowlah, who was eventually raised to the musnud)" by all
who might think favourably of the latter's title,"-" the young man
who passes for his Highness's son."-Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii.
p. 249-251.
"The impression upon the Governor-General's mind was, that
the right of inheritance, if any such had existed, belonged to Azum-
ood-dowlah, and that the elevation of Ali Hoossain, the reputed
son, would probably give great disgust to the Mahomedans, and
induce efforts to defeat the succession."-Carnatic Papers, 1860,
p. 27.
THE CARNATIC.
83
ood-dowlah would have been installed on the ground
of his hereditary right, and the new treaty would have
been imposed upon him as the price of our support.
I am of course not concerned to defend the justice,
the moral or logical consistency of Lord Wellesley's
schemes; but when we find that the main plea upon
which he originally based our right of interference,—
Azeem-ood-dowlah's superior claim by legitimate and
lineal descent-was maintained by him to the last, we
cannot allow Lord Harris, fifty years later, to assert,
in defiance of the truth, that this same Azeem-ood-
dowlah was declared to have no hereditary rights at
all, or Lord Dalhousie to insinuate that because Lord
Wellesley did not "do things without a reason," there-
fore he must have intended slyly and silently to annul
those parts of the old treaties which on the contrary
he openly and specially confirmed and renewed.
But having now shown that the hereditary rights
of Azeem-ood-dowlah's descendants were fully gua-
ranteed to them by his establishment in "the rank,
property, and possessions of his ancestors," and by
the express renewal and confirmation of all the favour-
able and friendly conditions of the old treaties; having
searched in vain for any hint or suggestion adverse to
those hereditary rights in any contemporary docu-
ment; I shall now proceed to show that there are
direct and positive official admissions on record, both
in contemporary and in recent documents, that the
Nawab's dignity after the treaty of 1801 was still
considered and expected to be hereditary in its tenure.
I deny that it is incumbent on me to do this, for
even if Lord Wellesley,-" who never did things
84
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
without a reason,"-had really wished or intended
to gain a secret and unfair advantage by the un-
observed admission of the words "heirs and success-
ors," or had anticipated that some future Governor-
General, in some more secure and settled time of our
power, would be able to seize such an advantage, it
is obvious that no such advantage could be fairly
claimed under any canon of international law, or sup-
ported by any maxim of political morality. I am
fully convinced that Lord Wellesley is undeserving
of Lord Dalhousie's calumny, but even if he had been
guilty, his guilt would have been an ineffectual blun-
der. Even if the favourable provisions of the old
treaties had not been "confirmed and renewed" in
1801,-if the treaty of that year had been the first
one between the East India Company and the Nawab
of the Carnatic,-the establishment of Azeem-ood-
Dowlah in "the rank, property, and possessions of
his ancestors," would have been quite a sufficient
acknowledgment of that hereditary tenure, which
had been admitted by the Nizam, the King of Delhi,
and the King of Great Britain, which had been the
basis and justification of the Honourable Company's
political action, on which alone depended the Com-
pany's territorial title, and which is, in fact, inherent
and essential in the dignity of a Sovereign. But Lord
Wellesley had no intention or wish to disinherit Azeem-
ood-Dowlah's descendants.
All that Lord Wellesley required was the perpetual
transfer of the civil and military administration, which
Wallajah and Omdut-ool-Oomra, relying on the rights
secured to them by the treaty of 1792, pertinaciously
"
THE CARNATIC.
85
*
refused to resign, and which Lord Wellesley conceived
the alleged detection of their treachery justified him
in exacting as the condition of the renewal of friendly
relations with their successor. That was the extent
of Lord Wellesley's demands, and that was the extent
of the penalty inflicted on the Wallajah family by the
treaty of 1801.
No verbal omission in the treaty of 1801 could
weaken the effect of its 2nd Article, " renewing and
confirming " the favourable provisions of former trea-
ties; no private design or mental reservation of Lord
Wellesley's could transmute or vitiate that "state and
rank of his ancestors, heretofore Nabobs of the Carnatic,"
which was secured to Azeem-ood-dowlah by the 1st
Article of the same treaty. But not only is there not
a vestige or a trace to be found in Lord Wellesley's
despatches and letters, of any such private design or
mental reservation against the hereditary tenure of
this dignity, but it is distinctly recorded in a state-
paper which was certainly submitted to Lord Welles-
ley's revision and approval, if it did not proceed from
his pen, that all the advantages secured to Azeem-
ood-dowlah by the treaty of 1801, were also secured
to his heirs.
The state-paper to which I allude was only pub-
lished in 1859; it will be found in vol. IV of the
Duke of Wellington's Supplementary Despatches,
p. 546 to 586. It is a Memorandum on the Marquis
Wellesley's Government of India, said to have been
written after the Session of Parliament of 1806, and
to have been completed, and filled up with the exact
sums and dates at the Board of Control and the India
86
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
House. It is not merely improbable, but quite im-
possible, that this elaborate vindication of his brother's
policy should have been prepared by the Duke of
Wellington for the information of the Ministry, and
as materials for a Parliamentary defence, without its
having undergone Lord Wellesley's scrutiny, and re-
ceived his deliberate sanction, Many parts of this
Memorandum bear a very close resemblance to the
elder brother's style; and in my opinion we are
justified in considering it as a statement of Lord
Wellesley's views, quite as authentic and quite as
direct, as if it had been found in his own hand-
writing and attested by his own signature.
After an explanation of the difficulties caused by
Omdut-ool-Oomra's obstinate independence, and of
the opportunity of coercion afforded by his alleged
correspondence with Tippoo, the writer of the Memo-
randum describes the Carnatic revolution in the fol-
lowing terms:-"The supposed son was then ap-
son¹
prised of the discoveries which had been made at
Seringapatam, of the sentiments of the British Go-
vernment in consequence of these discoveries, and of
the measures which they proposed to adopt in the
Carnatic. But he refused to accept the situation
held out to him under the new arrangement. As
the claim of this Prince to succeed to his father,¹
supposing that circumstances had allowed of the suc-
cession, was by no means clear,¹ and as it was desirable
for the peace of the Carnatic that the Nabob's family
should adopt the arrangement, Lord Clive (now Earl
of Powis) determined to set aside Ali Hoossam en-
1 The key-note!
,
THE CARNATIC.
87
tirely, and to propose it to Azeem-ood-Dowlah, the
eldest legitimate son of Ameer-ool-Oomra, who was
the second son of the Nabob Mahomed Ali, and
brother of the late Nabob Omdut-ool-Oomra. This
Prince having agreed to the arrangement, a treaty
was concluded by which the whole of the civil and
military government of the Carnatic was transferred
for ever to the Company; and the Nabob Azeem-
ood-Dowlah, and his heirs, were to preserve their
title and dignity, and to receive one-fifth part of the
net revenues of the country." 1
This precise and positive declaration leaves no room
whatever for doubt or cavil as to Lord Wellesley's
intentions.
Three years after Azeem-ood-Dowlah's installation,
when the real objects and original interpretation of
the treaty of 1801 must have been fresh in the
memory, and familiar to the mind of every high
official at Madras, the Governor, Lord William Ben-
tinck, in a letter to Azeem-ood-Dowlah, alludes inci-
dentally, and as a mere matter of course, to the
hereditary descent of the Nawab's dignity:-" The
eldest son of Seyf-ool-Moolk having been at one
period next in lineal succession to your Highness,
I feel averse to the diminution of his stipend.
"2
Azeem-ood-dowlah died on the 3rd August 1819,
leaving several sons, the eldest of whom was the
Nawab Azum Jah.-"Under date 2nd October 1819,
the Madras Government stated to that of India, that
1 Supplementary Despatches, Vol. IV, p. 564-565.
2 Letter from Lord W. Bentinck to the Nawab Azeem-ood-
dowlah, dated the 22nd May 1804; Papers relating to Carnatic
Stipendiaries, Madras, 1858, p. 98.
88
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
it would have been satisfactory to them to have been
informed whether the Governor General in Council
considered the treaty concluded with the late Nabobi
on the 31st July 1801, to have guaranteed the suc-
cession to the musnud to his family in the direct and
legitimate line of descent, to which opinion they them-
selves had always been inclined, as well from the
spirit in which the treaty was concluded, as from the
tenor of its professions, and also from the terms of the
declaration published at that period." They thought
it advisable, "now that the Nawab Azum Jah had
virtually become a party" to the new treaty, that he
should be called upon "to execute some formal instru-
ment" recognising its conditions. The Governor-
General, the Marquis of Hastings, was of opinion that
no such instrument or new treaty was required, as he
considered "his Highness to be ipso facto a party to
the treaty concluded with his father in 1801." The
eldest son, Azum Jah, was therefore installed on the
3rd of February, 1820, and congratulated by the Go-
vernor on "ascending the Musnud in the direct line
of hereditary succession to your late father."
Lord Dalhousie's comment upon this first succes-
sion after the new settlement appears to me to be
singularly disingenuous. He says (§9 of his Minute) :
-"Upon the death of Azeem-ood-dowlah the Treaty
of 1801 was not renewed. It has never since
been renewed. The Government of India on a for-
mer occasion expressly declined to renew it. The
Treaty of 1801, therefore, has had no existence, and
its provisions have had no binding force since the
1 Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 35.
2 Ditto, p. 40.
:
THE CARNATIC.
89
death of the Nawab Azeem-ood-dowlah, with whom
it was concluded, and to whom alone it was appli-
cable." Now it certainly is true that the Treaty of
1801 has never been renewed; it is true that the Go-
vernment of India declined to renew it, but not, as
Lord Dalhousie insinuates, because they considered it
void and did not wish it to be made valid, but because
they considered it to be still valid; not because, as
Lord Dalhousie audaciously asserts, "it was applicable
to the Nawab Azeem-ood-dowlah alone," but because
his son and successor was "ipso facto," (by the fact of
his accepting the succession,) "a party to it," not
because a renewal would have been inexpedient and
unprofitable, but because it would have been super-
fluous. The expression used by Lord Hastings that
the elder brother was "ipso facto a party to the treaty
concluded with his father,"-has no meaning except
as an allusion to the collective hereditary rights and
obligations of the family, and the special obligations
of its head and representative.
Lord Harris also misinterprets the transactions of
1819. He says (§ 13-14 of his Minute) :-"It will
be remarked that the treaty has reference solely to the
Prince Azeem-ood-dowlah. . . . So apparent was this
fact to the Government of Madras in 1819, that on the
death of Azeem-ood-dowlah in that year, they pointed
out to the Government of India that they were not
authorised by the treaty to acknowledge any suc-
cessor." No-I do not think this exactly represents
what they pointed out. Neither Lord Dalhousie nor
Lord Harris choose to quote the actual words of the
1 Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 48. 2 Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 10.
•
•
90
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
despatches that passed between Madras and Calcutta,
but it is quite clear, even from what they allow us to
see, that no doubt was expressed or entertained in
either quarter as to the necessity of some member of
the Wallajah family being nominated or acknowledged
as successor to the deceased Nawab. There was no
hesitation any where on the general question of a suc-
cession. But the Madras Government asked for par-
ticular instructions as to the line of descent, the forms
and the conditions of a succession. What they seem
to have pointed out was that they were not authorised
to acknowledge any particular member of the family
as the unconditional successor. There is not a word
of grace and favour throughout the correspondence
that is published. Neither the Government of Madras
nor that of India expressed the slightest doubt as to
the hereditary nature of the dignity; the only doubt
was whether the British Government, by the transac-
tions of 1801, had not established and reserved to
itself the right of regulating the succession, so that
no particular member of the Wallajah family could be
allowed to succeed immediately on the demise of a
Nawab, "until he had executed some formal instru-
ment recognising the conditions under which he had
succeeded." The Madras Government did not doubt
the rights of the family under the treaty of 1801, but
doubted whether the direct heir ought to be installed,
or could be held as bound to the same conditions as
his father, without a special renewal of the treaty.
The Government of India had no such doubt, and
declared the treaty of 1801 to be in full force. The
1 Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 35.
THE CARNATIC.
91
eldest son of that father succeeded accordingly; and
another son of that same father now claims to succeed
in due course. How can he be excluded? If the elder
brother on his succession was "ipso facto a party to
the treaty concluded with his father in 1801," so also
must be the younger brother, on his becoming the
head of the family.
On
Azum Jah died on the 13th November, 1825.
the 23rd December, the late Nawab Mahomed Ghous
Khan, son of Azum Jah, was proclaimed by the Madras
Government as successor to his deceased father. There
was not a word of grace and favour on this occasion.
On the 14th January, 1829, the Court of Directors,
in their public letter, express their approval of certain
acts of the Madras Government, on the ground of
Prince Azeem Jah's being "the next heir in case of
the Nabob's demise," and, in 1843, Lord Tweeddale's
Government caused the Prince's name to be placed
first in the list of persons exempted from judicial
process, "in consideration of the position he has lately
occupied in communication with the British Govern-
ment, and that which he still holds in relation to his
Highness the Nawab, and to his succession to the
musnud." In short, previously to the death of his
nephew, Prince Azeem Jah had invariably been treated,
both privately and officially, as heir presumptive and
successor to the musnud. Not a hint or a surmise
had ever been dropped against the hereditary rights
of the family. It was not till after the late Nawab's
death that the Prince received any intimation that his
succession would be opposed. The late Nawab, Ma-
1 Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 15. 2 Ditto, p. 9.
92
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
:
homed Ghous, died upon the 7th of October, 1855,
without issue; and his uncle, Prince Azeem Jah,
second son of the Nawab Azeem-ood-Dowlah, and
heir to his nephew, according to Mahomedan law and
custom, as in English law also, now claims to be his
nephew's successor. And how can he be excluded?
How could the East India Company expect to get rid
of him, the de jure Sovereign of the Carnatic, the
undoubted "heir" and lawful "successor," who claims
under the favourable provisions of the treaty of 1792,
expressly "renewed and confirmed" by the treaty of
1801, made with his own father. I have shown that
the hereditary right was never given up, or lost, or
even assailed for fifty-four years after that treaty; it
was in fact admitted and upheld by every Governor-
General from Lord Wellesley down to Lord Dalhousie,
and by every Governor of Madras from Lord Clive
down to Lord Harris.
I shall now prove that the sovereignty of the Car-
natic has never been alienated from the Wallajah family,
and has never been acquired by the British Government.
By the treaty of 1801 no territory is ceded, there is
no transfer of sovereignty to the Company; all that
is conveyed is the administration of the civil and
military government. By the treaty of 1801 the
Arcot family were deprived of the administration of
the Carnatic and of all real power beyond the walls of
their palaces. A great change was introduced by the
treaty of 1801, but most certainly no greater change
than was expressly provided for by its terms. This
treaty is by no means singular in its provisions. Just
as the Nawab Azeem-ood-dowlah in 1801 granted to
THE CARNATIC.
93
the Company "the civil and military administration"
of his territorial possessions, so did the Nizam of
Hyderabad in 1853 assign Berar and other provinces
to "the exclusive management" of the British Govern-
ment.¹ In neither case was there any cession, or any
relinquishment of sovereignty. We received the Car-
natic from the Nawab, as we received Berar from the
Nizam, as a trust on certain conditions, and not as an
absolute possession. And at the present day we hold
the Carnatic, as we still hold Berar, as a trust,² and on
no other terms. If any other terms exist, where are
they to be found?
At no period from 1801 down to the present day
could we have ceded the Carnatic, or any part of it, to
any foreign power. We could not now cede the Car-
natic, any more than the Nizam's province of Berar.
We could not give a title to any foreign power. We
could not even state a title for the British Government.
We could not even point to any claim or assertion of
a title by the British Government. The uninterrupted
exercise of the civil and military administration for
fifty years, seems to have blinded the Company as to
the real nature of its connection with the Sovereign
of the Carnatic. The Nawab Azeem-ood-dowlah, his
son and his grandson, were not mere stipendiaries of
the Honourable East India Company, but its allies.
1 Parliamentary Papers, Nizam's Debts, 1854, p. 144. Scindia
also assigned districts in 1843: Vol. of Treaties, 1856, p. 92.
2 This very term is used by Lord Clive himself in the Procla-
mation of 31st July 1801, already quoted several times: "His
Lordship, in accepting the sacred trust transferred to the Company
by the present engagements, invites the people of the Carnatic to a
ready and cheerful obedience to the authority of the Company."
Carnatic Papers, 1861, p. 105.
94
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
A
Lord Harris however gives the following extra-
ordinary opinion in his Minute ($34, 35):-"It is
perhaps rather difficult to define the positions of the
contracting parties, but there can be no doubt as
to what those positions actually were. The Honour-
able East India Company was the dominant power;
the family of Arcot were in the position of de-
pendents." If by using the equivocal term "domi-
nant power," Lord Harris intended to say that the
material power and general influence of the Honour-
able Company on the continent of India had, towards
the latter part of the Nawab Wallajah's reign, in-
creased to such an extent as to preponderate, or
dominate very decidedly over the power and influence
of the Nawab, then he is quite right. But if by using
the term "dominant power" he intended, as I sup-
pose he did, to imply that the Honourable Company
at any time assumed, or pretended to exalt itself to the
position of Suzerain, Lord Paramount or superior, and
to degrade the Nawab to the position of feudatory,
vassal or inferior, then he is completely wrong.
The relative positions of the contracting parties
were certainly very peculiar and very perplexing,
were gradually complicated by opposing interests,
and became at last almost contradictory in principle,
and quite incompatible in practice, with the good
government of Southern India. All this I am quite
willing to admit; I am quite willing to admit that
the settlement of 1801 has been beneficial in its
results. All that I argue for is that it was a real
1 Carnatic Papers, 1860, p. 12.
THE CARNATIC.
95
settlement between two contracting parties; and that
in that settlement their relative positions and mutual
relations were not altered, either by the exaction of
the stronger, or by the capitulation of the weaker
party. The Nawab was still to be the Sovereign, the
East India Company was to assume permanently those
executive functions which under the former treaties
it had frequently exercised for a limited period.
Azeem-ood-Dowlah was the Sovereign, the Governor
of Fort St. George was the administrator of the
Carnatic.
These anomalous relations were in those days fami-
liar to Indian politicians. The Great Mogul, whose
Imperial supremacy was unquestioned, even by us, in
whose name rupees were coined in the British mint,
and to whom British Governors and Generals pre-
sented tribute and offered humble petitions, styling
themselves his Majesty's "devoted slaves," had been
for more than half a century subject to the custody.
and tutelage of a succession of upstart chieftains.
The Rajah of Sattara, a prisoner in his palace, was
Sovereign of the Mahratta Empire; the Peishwa
was its executive head. So late indeed as the year
1818 the British Government negotiated a treaty by
which Maha Rao Omed Sing was recognised as the
Sovereign of Kota, while Raj Rana Zalim Sing was
constituted hereditary and absolute administrator of
the principality. And even within the sphere of
1
1 "After Maha Rao Omed Sing, the Raja of Kota, the princi-
pality shall descend to his eldest son and heir apparent, Maharaj
Koowar Kishore Sing, and his heirs, in regular succession and
perpetuity; and the entire administration of the affairs of the
principality shall be vested in Raj Rana Zalim Sing, and after him
96
P
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
European politics there have been not a few instances
of a similar arrangement. The King of Prussia was
Sovereign of Neufchatel, which was under republican
government, and formed part of the Swiss confederacy.
The Sultan is Sovereign of the Danubian provinces,
of Servia and of Egypt, yet he is by treaty forbidden
to interfere in their ordinary administration. The
Queen governs the Ionian Islands, of which she is not
the Sovereign.
Although, therefore, it may be difficult, as Lord
Harris says, to define the peculiar relation of the
contracting parties, it will be seen that this relation
is not incapable of being defined, that this relation
was by no means singular or unparalleled, and that
Lord Harris's own definition of the East India Com-
pany as "the dominant power," and the Nawab as
"a dependent," is a direct contradiction of the facts.
of history, and of the terms of all the recorded engage-
ments between the parties.
The East India Company, possessing Madras and
Cuddalore, and districts in other parts of India, by
grants from Hindoo Rajahs, the Nizam, the Nawab
of Bengal and the Great Mogul,-quite irrespective
of the Nawab's authority,-and also as a military
power, were allies of the Nawab, and dealt with him
on terms of perfect equality. But with respect to
their other holdings in the Carnatic the Nawab was
the Suzerain, the Company was the vassal.
in his eldest son Koowar Madhoo Sing, and his heirs, in regular suc-
cession and perpetuity." Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 443. The
system did not prove harmonious; and, after several struggles, we
had to arrange matters again in 1838, when by a new treaty the
territory was divided between the Sovereign and the hereditary
ruler, and now forms the two states of Kota and Jhullawur.
THE CARNATIC.
97
Wallajah, who found the British in possession only
of Madras and Cuddalore, made successive grants, by
sunnud, of Poonamallee and other talooks, to round
off the Company's domain; and in 1763 he made over
to his allies the district formerly called the Jaghire,
now the Zillah of Chingleput, with a revenue of eighteen
lacks of rupees. The English Company, though rapidly
acquiring a superiority of material power, were still
technically and formally feudatories of the Nawab,
and held all their territory, except the town of Madras,
as jaghires under sunnud from him as Sovereign of
the country; and these technical and formal relations
between the two parties were not only left intact by
the treaty of 1801, but have never been disputed or
questioned either before or since the death of the late
Nawab in 1855.
The importance that was attached by the East India
Company to the recognition of Mahomed Ali as Sove-
reign of the Carnatic by the treaty of Paris, appears
strongly marked in a letter from the Court of Directors
to the Government of Fort St. George, dated March
9th, 1763:-"A farther advantage we hope to derive
from the recognition of this Prince" (the Nawab) "and
of Salabut Jung," (the Nizam) "whose title you will
see is also acknowledged, is that it is a confirmation
of our title to the territories we hold under grants
from those Princes, and a farther security to the
peace of the country, leaving the French no colour to
interpose hereafter in favour of any other pretenders
to the sovereignty of the Deccan or the Carnatic.”1
During the reign of Azum Jah, son and successor
¹ Asiatic Annual Register, vol. x, 1808, p. 495.
F
98
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
..
:
of Azeem-ool-Dowlah, Sir Thomas Munro, then Gover-
nor of Madras, thus refers to Article 3 of the Treaty
of 1801 :-"By this the Nawab does not relinquish his
sovereignty. He merely renews the Article of former
treaties by which he engaged not to correspond with
foreign states without the consent of the Company.
"The fifth part of the revenue is his.claim as Sove-
reign of the whole Carnatic.
"He is still Prince of the Carnatic, and he is a
party to the treaty by which one-fifth part of the
revenue is secured to him.
The present assumption of the country is perma-
nent, but the relative situations of the Company, and
the Nawab, are the same as in former cases of as-
sumption. The Nawab is still Prince of the Carnatic,
and receives in that capacity one-fifth of the net
revenue." 1
"1
And it must be observed that in alluding to "for-
mer cases of assumption,”—when under the old trea-
ties the Company assumed the administration of the
Carnatic during the wars with the French, Hyder and
Tippoo,-Sir Thomas Munro declares that the "rela-
tive situations" of the Company and the Nawab Azum
Jah, son of Azeem-ood-Dowlah, are the same as in
the time of the Nawab Wallajah and his son Omdut-
ool-Oomra.
The following extract of a letter from Fort St.
George to the Court of Directors, dated 17th Feb-
ruary 1802, will show that the sovereignty and feudal
supremacy in the Carnatic of the Nawab were, after
the treaty of 1801, upheld by the British Government,
1 Gleig's Life of Sir Thomas Munro, vol. ii, p. 356.
THE CARNATIC.
99
both in India and at home, undisturbed, unchanged,
and undiminished.
Paragraph 89.-"Having received from the Resi-
dent at Travancore an application on the part of the
Rajah requesting to be made acquainted with the
channel through which his stipulated annual pay-
ments were in future to be made to his immediate
superior Lord, we directed his Excellency to be in-
formed that the Peshcush, nuzzuranahs and nuzzurs
payable by his Excellency were to be transmitted,
according to the ancient usage, to the Durbar of the
Nabob of the Carnatic." 1 And in a letter from Fort
St. George to the Court of Directors, dated the 22nd
February 1803, it is said :-"We have the honour to
inform you that, conformably to the principle already
explained to your Honourable Court, the Rajah of
Travancore has paid to his Highness the Nabob, as
the Sovereign of the Carnatic, the sum of 2266
pagodas and 15 annas, in full discharge of the Peish-
cush and Cape Comorin Nuzzurana, due to his High-
ness for the preceding Phuzly." 2
The Travancore Peishcush always continued to be
paid into the Nawab's treasury; but since the late
Nawab's death, it has been transferred to the Madras
Government, and appears among the receipts of
1861-62 with the following extraordinary entry :-
"Rajah of Travancore, on account of the late Nabob
of the Carnatic,-13,320 Rupees." 8
Lord Dalhousie absurdly enough says in his Mi-
nute, * "that no grant of anything is made by this
1 Carnatic Papers, 1861, p. 118.
2 Ditto, p. 127.
3 Madras Administration Report, 1861-62, para. 604, p. 106.
4 Para. 7, p. 48, Carnatic Papers, 1860.
F 2
100
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
treaty," that of 1801, "to any one but the Nawab
Azeem-ood-Dowlah himself." Really and truly, no-
thing was granted by it to any one but the East India
Company. The Nawab was first established in his an-
cestral possessions, and then became the grantor; the
Company was the grantee. From the first addition
made to the limits of the town of Madras, from the
grants of Poonamallee and the Jaghire down to the
transfer by Azeem-ood-Dowlah of the civil and mili-
tary government, the Nawabs were always the grantors
and we the recipients. And whatever they, the Sove-
reigns in possession, did not grant, they retained.
When Azeem-ood-Dowlah relinquished by treaty the
administration to the Company, he still remained the
hereditary Sovereign of the Carnatic, and, as I have
shown by official documents, he was repeatedly re-
cognised and proclaimed as Sovereign by the British
Government. Two successions have taken place since
his death; his son Azum Jah, and his grandson, Ma-
homed Ghous, have occupied the musnud; and since
the death of the late Nawab our Government has made
no proclamation, has laid no claim publicly or officially
to the sovereignty. Prince Azeem Jah is the son of
Azeem-ood-Dowlah; and by the death of his nephew
the late Nawab, whose heir he is equally by Maho-
medan and by English law, he has become the repre-
sentative not merely of his father, but of Ali Hoossain
his father's cousin, who was set aside because he re-
fused to consent to the terms of 1801, and of his great-
grandfather Mahomed Ali, his grand-uncle Omdut-ool-
Oomra, and, both in the male and female lines, of his
great-great-grandfather, Anwar-ood-deen Khan, the
THE CARNATIC.
101
founder of the dynasty.¹ To all intents and purposes,
by every principle of law, by the terms of solemn
treaties, in justice and in fact, the sovereignty of the
Carnatic is at present inherent in the person of Prince
1 TABLE OF PRINCE AZEEM JAH'S DESCENT.
ANWAR-OOD DEEN KHAN, Nawab of the Carnatic, 1741,
killed in battle, 1749, succeeded by

his son
MAHOMED ALI, afterwards by Royal Firman entitled
WALLA JAH AMEER UL HIND,
died Oct. 13, 1795, leaving

Eldest Son,
1
Second Son,
OMDUT UL OMRAH, who suc-
ceeded his Father, and died
15th July, 1801.
Left reputed Son, ALI HOOSSAIN,
died 6th April, 1802, without
issue.
AZUM JAH, Succeeded his Father,
died 12th November 1825, leaving
an infant Son,
1
MAHOMED GHOUS KHAN, who suc-
ceeded his father under the Regency
of his uncle, AZEEM-JAH. Died
without issue, 7th October, 1855.
AMEER UL OMRAH,
died leaving a Son,
I
AZEEM OOD-DOWLAH, suc.
ceeded his uncle, Omdut-ul
Omrah: died 3rd Aug. 1819.
I
*AZEEM JAH, now de jure
Nawab.
Lord Harris, with a marvellous want of knowledge of the exist-
ing facts, which is only equalled by his ignorance of the past history
of this case, says in para. 60 of his Minute, (Carnatic Papers, 1860,
p. 14), that "Prince Azeem Jah has no legitimate sons. He has
four,-(1.) Zaheer-ood-dowla Mahomed Ali Khan, son of a nikah
wife, married after his birth; (2.) Intizam-ool-Moolk Ahmed-oollah
Khan: (3.) Oomdut-ood-dowlah Noor-oollah Khan; and (4.) Mow-
zaz-ood-dowla Mahee-ood-deen Yar Khan, the last three being all
sons of one mother, the late Saadut oon-Nissa Begum, a lady of
highly respectable family, daughter of Khan Mahomed Khan,
whose grandfather was the last hereditary Killadar of Beejapoor.
Lord Harris was probably misled by the vulgar notion that the
custom of Shadee is necessary to complete a regular marriage. This
is altogether erroneous, as the legal advisers of Government would
have told him.
102
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
Azeem Jah. And it is a matter of fact that not only
has that Sovereignty never been lawfully acquired,
but it has never even been assumed or claimed by our
Government.
Our possession of the right to rule secures the right
to reign to the head of the Wallajah family. Azeem-
ood-dowlah was a hereditary Sovereign Prince; and
whatever was his status, and whatever were his rights,
under the treaty of 1801, such was the status and such
were the rights of his two successors, for that treaty
was repeatedly referred to by the British Government
as in full force and effect, and its provisions were
quoted as binding upon both parties, down to the very
year 1855 in which the late Nawab died.¹ And such are
the rights of the late Nawab's legal heir. And such will
be the rights of the representative head of the Wal-
lajah family, so long as any legitimate representative
may exist.
And if it should be objected that it is absurd to em-
ploy this tone of high prerogative and right divine,
when speaking of the representative of a very recent
line of Princes, the last three of whom possessed
merely a pageant sovereignty,-I reply that our only
right to the occupation and administration of Southern
India, our only moral claim to the submission and
obedience of its inhabitants, is derived from the un-
The Madras Government, "after quoting the 5th Article of the
Treaty, remarked (in Extract from the Minutes of Consultation,
dated 7th December 1847) that these ladies having long enjoyed
the stipends assigned to them, the character and good faith of the
British Government were concerned, and that His Highness was
bound by the Treaty to support them." Papers relating to Carnatic
Stipendiaries, Madras, 1858, p. 327. There are many similar refer-
ences to the treaty to be found in the Proceedings of the Madras
Government.
THE CARNATIC.
103
questioned sovereignty of that line of Princes, which
we have repeatedly bound ourselves to maintain. The
English had certainly no natural rights; any that they
enjoyed were held under grant from the native Sove-
reign. The Company acquired no rights by conquest
from the Nawab Wallajah or from the Nawab Omdut-
ool-Oomra, because not only had they never been at
war, but they had continually been close allies. No-
thing was acquired from Azeem-ood-Dowlah except
what was expressly granted by the treaty of 1801. I
have shown that all our promises and engagements in
every form, even to the personal assurances of the
reigning King of England, were renewed and confirmed
when Azeem-ood-Dowlah was placed on the musnud.
If he consented to divest himself of the substance of
political power, it was only on the faith of a solemn
treaty, according to the terms of which, by written
and spoken declarations, and by the forms, ceremonies
and observances at his accession, it was distinctly pro-
claimed that he remained Sovereign of the Carnatic,
with the right to a certain share of the revenue, and
that nothing was gained by the East India Company
but the perpetual civil and military administration.
In the present state of affairs it is quite open to any
hostile person or power to declare that we hold the
Carnatic by no tenure or warrant whatever; that the
country has never been ceded to us, or conquered by
us, or confiscated by us; that up to October 1855, we
administered the Government under the treaty of 1801
as trustees for the head of the Wallajah family; but
that since that time we have violated the treaty by
withholding his stipulated share of the revenue from
►
.
..
•
P
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THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
•
the Sovereign; and that we are now simply in con-
tumacious possession, without any right or title or
pretext whatever.
I can cast divine right and personal sovereignty to
the winds, when the intelligent will and choice of the
people revolt against such sanctions; but India has
not yet arrived at that stage of political education, and
I can see no advantage to be gained by its untimely
and factitious development. I have no rooted objec-
tion to revolutions, whether of popular, dynastic or
even of foreign origin; my opinion is that when they
make their appearance they are wanted. I hold the
ancient dogma of hereditary monarchy very cheap,
when it opposes or obstructs the public liberties or the
common weal; but here there is no such question in-
volved. In claiming the sovereignty, Prince Azeem
Jah can claim no regal power, no authority to interfere
with or influence the legislative or executive action of
our Government. The hereditary sovereignty of the
Carnatic, secured by a series of uncancelled treaties to
the Wallajah family, remains undisputed, unimpugned
and unclaimed by any opponent, even by us, inherent
in the person of Prince Azeem Jah. In claiming our
acknowledgment of that sovereignty, he is simply
pleading for the existence, protesting against the ex-
tinction of the Wallajah family, which is either a
royal house, having rights under the treaty of 1801,
and under the friendly and favourable clauses of the
old treaties, or it is nothing, and our right to the
civil and military Government and to the revenues of
the Carnatic, is a nonentity. The two rights stand
1
Article 2 of Treaty of 1801.
THE CARNATIC.
105
and fall together. Is the Wallajah family extinct? If
so, our Government ought to proclaim the fact, and
assume the sovereignty. This proclamation should be
made, because it is the public duty of the actual ad-
ministrators of the country, to prevent and forbid any
feeling, now or hereafter, of unsettled or doubtful
allegiance; and the proclamation should be made in
the Queen's name, assuming the territorial sovereignty
as a lapse or escheat to the de facto paramount
power, and the de jure ruling power. But this pro-
clamation never has been and never will be made, for
there would be a falsehood on the face of it. The
royal family of the Carnatic is not extinct, nor is it
likely to be so. We have certainly acquired no right
by Usucaption or Prescription,¹ for up to the late
Nawab's decease the existence of his sovereignty and
of our administrative trust were never disputed; and
since his decease the lawful successor has kept up a
continuous claim. Prescription is entirely on the side
of the Wallajah family. If then, the family not being
extinct, we yet refuse to acknowledge the right of its
head to the dignity of Nawab and to the stipulated
share of the revenue, the treaties are violated, and our
right to the civil and military administration and to
the rest of the revenue, absolutely ceases and expires.
Our actual power may perhaps be unimpaired,—but,
said the great Lord Chatham, "Power without right
is a thing hateful in itself, and ever declining to its
fall."
¹ See Grotius, Droit de la Guerre et de la Paix, liv. ii, chap. iv,
Amsterdam, 1724.
"
F 3
106
LETTER IV.
THE MUSNUD IN ABEYANCE.
NOT only was the alleged treachery of Wallajah and
his son Omdut-ool-Oomra employed by Lord Wellesley
in 1801 as the instrument for extorting the civil and
military administration of the Carnatic from Azeem-
ood-dowlah, but it is in fact the solitary plea brought
forward by Lords Harris and Dalhousie for depriving
Prince Azeem Jah of the inheritance secured to him
by treaty. The noble Lords revive these ridiculous
charges, and assert that as a consequence of their being
proved against the two Nawabs, the treaty of 1792,
and all previous engagements, were “abrogated” and
a merely "personal" treaty concluded with Azeem-
ood-dowlah. I showed in my last letter that this
assertion is totally incorrect, and that on the con-
trary those treaties, so far as hereditary right is
concerned, are expressly confirmed by the treaty of
1801. But as the denial of justice is entirely based
upon this alleged treachery, by which the Wallajah
family are said to have become "public enemies," and
to have justly "forfeited their territories," and as Lord
THE MUSNUD IN ABEYANCE.
107
Dalhousie, with all his command of words of equivocal.
meaning, could not have made the slightest attack
upon Prince Azeem Jah's rights without reviving
these apocryphal slanders, I will consent, under pro-
test, to pay a little more attention to them. I protest
against being supposed to lie under any obligation to
notice them, because, as I have already observed, that
matter was decided by the treaty of 1801, which was
imposed upon Azeem-ood-dowlah, without any real
discussion or negotiation, by our superior power, but
by which no greater change, no greater penalty, can
have been introduced than was expressly provided for
by its terms.
We are called upon then to believe that the Nawab
Wallajah, in his old age, after fifty years of faithful
alliance and friendship with the English, and thirty
years of almost incessant warfare with Hyder Ali and
Tippoo Sultan, both of whom, and especially the
latter, had seized every opportunity of injuring him
and of loading him with insults,-suddenly took it
into his head to conspire against his friends of half a
century, and to league with his enemies of thirty
years. And we are called upon to believe that the
time chosen for this sudden change of policy was just
when the power of his friends was apparently estab-
lished without a competitor, and when the power of
his old enemy had fallen to nothing, beneath all hope
of recovery. Wallajah and Omdut-ool-Oomra are ac-
cused of having begun their hostile intrigues with
Tippoo in 1792, after Lord Cornwallis's campaign,
when he had been compelled to cede half his do-
minions, to pay three crores and thirty lacks of rupees
108
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
+
as a war indemnity, and to submit to the humiliating
condition of sending two of his sons as hostages to
Madras. And it is with two of Tippoo's officials who
were sent to Madras in attendance on these young
Princes, that the Nawabs are accused of having con-
certed and carried on this desperate conspiracy with
their discomfited foe against their triumphant friends
and allies.
Extravagantly improbable as such a tale of con-
spiracy must appear, we should of course be bound to
believe it if a sufficiency of evidence were produced.
But not only is there no trustworthy evidence brought
forward, but if every statement made by Gholam Ali
and Ali Reza, Tippoo Sultan's Wakeels, both in their
written reports from Madras found among the records
at Seringapatam, and in their depositions before the
commission of inquiry, were to be accepted as truth,
it would amount to nothing. The proofs of dark
designs and hostile intentions on the part of Wallajah
and his eldest son, which were collected by the com-
mission of inquiry, are really so frivolous, even if con-
sidered as true, that but for the strong bias towards
any conclusion affording a pretext for assuming the
administration of the Carnatic, which we know from
his previous endeavours in that direction actuated
Lord Wellesley, we should be surprised that he did
not throw the whole mass of gossip and guess-work
into his waste paper basket.
As Lord Wellesley, and Lord Clive, Lord Dalhousie
and Lord Harris speak about "a treasonable corre-
spondence" having been discovered, we naturally expect
to hear an awful revelation of diabolical wickedness.
THE MUSNUD IN ABEYANCE.
109
But there is really nothing. All that the Government
ventured to publish some years after the event,-Lords
Harris and Dalhousie do not quote a word,-amounts
to this, that Tippoo's Wakeels in their written reports
to their own master, represent Wallajah as dissatisfied
with his subordination to the Company, and declare
that he constantly complimented Tippoo as a pillar of
the Mussulman faith, and frequently said that all
Mahomedans should be united. The contemptuous
term "Heech,” or nothing, is adopted to denote the
Nizam, one of our Allies; the word "Pooch," or ab-
surdity, to designate the Peishwa, another Ally; while
the English themselves are stigmatised by the treason-
able epithet of "Taza Waridan," or the new-comers, in
a certain cypher and key, which cypher and key were
found, not as my readers will be prepared to hear,—
in Chepauk Palace, the residence of the Wallajah family,
but among the Seringapatam records. But then, the
Commissioners assure us, these alarming expressions
are brought home to Wallajah and his son, because the
key to this Persian cypher is in a hand-writing which
resembles exactly that of Omdut-ool-Oomra's favourite
Moonshee, who had died long before these charges were
thought of. Such are the proofs of treason! Such is
the treason when proved,--"Heech, Pooch and Taza
waridan!" "Chops and tomata sauce," and "don't
forget the warming pan.
The historian Mill. discusses the subject of this cor-
respondence at great length, and arrives at the following
conclusion :—“ Not only does this evidence afford no
proof of a criminal correspondence with Tippoo on
the part of the Nabob, but the total inability of the
110
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
English to produce further evidence, with all the
records of the Mysore Government in their hands, and
all the living agents of it within their absolute power,
is a proof of the contrary, since it is not credible that
criminal correspondence should have existed and not
have left more traces of itself." He adverts to the pos-
sibility of the documents being fabricated, which he
rejects as extremely improbable, on account of the
high character of the officers engaged in the inquiry;
and he goes on to say: "But an argument more
conclusive than any argument from character, either
national or individual, can almost ever be,-at any
rate to strangers, and to those whose partiality one
has no reason to expect, is this, that the papers:
prove nothing; which most assuredly would not have
been the case had they been fabricated for the purpose
of proving." 2 So obviously do the Wakeels' letters
fail to afford anything that can be called evidence,
that even Mr. Horace Hayman Wilson, the last editor
of Mill's History, who generally agrees to differ with
his author on points affecting the justice of the Com-
pany's policy in India, is forced to admit, "that upon
the face of the correspondence little appears to convict.
the Nawabs of the Carnatic of actual treachery against
the British Government." 3
I
It was enough, however, for the Governor-General,
and he ordered a Commission to be assembled at
Seringapatam to examine witnesses in the hope of
strengthening this precious "documentary evidence."
1 History, edited by Wilson, 1848, vol. vi, p. 322.
2 Ditto, ditto, p. 312, 213.
3 Ditto, ditto, note, p. 324.
THE MUSNUD IN ABEYANCE.
111
This hope was doomed to disappointment, but the
plan was not to be relinquished for want of evidence.
In the Commissioners' general review of the papers
found at Seringapatam there is a considerable use of
words of equivocal meaning. The Nawabs are accused
of negotiating to establish "a reciprocity of views,
""
"
a union of interests,"—" a secret intercourse, "a
connection" with Tippoo Sultan; and similar vague
phrases are scattered about, until at last, after a series
of gradual insinuations, it is assumed as proved that
they tried to form, or agreed to form, "an alliance."
Yet nothing definitely or even indirectly hostile is
shown, even from the Wakeels' reports, and the inqui-
sition held at Vellore and Seringapatam added nothing.
to the "documentary evidence." The principal wit-
nesses examined by the Commission were the two
Wakeels, who, of course, could best elucidate their
own correspondence. But, says the historian Mill,
"the evidence of both, taken together, tends not to
confirm one single suspicion, if any could have been
justly derived from the papers, but to remove them,
every one." The Commissioners themselves say in
their report:-"We examined Gholam Ali Meer
Suddoor, the Dewan Poorneah, and the Moonshee
Habeeb Oollah," the very men above all others ac-
quainted with the secrets of Tippoo's government,-
"but as their testimony did not establish any fact,
we thought it unnecessary to record their evidence." 1
Lord Wellesley himself, in a letter to Lord Clive of
the 28th May 1801, observes, "The tendency of those
examinations is of a nature, in some important parts
1 Mill's History, 1848, vol. vi, p. 322.
་
112
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
1 وو
of the evidence, rather to weaken than to confirm the
impression made on my mind by the written docu-
ments.' And in 1808, when all the papers found
at Seringapatam, and the Report of the Commission,
had been printed in obedience to Parliamentary calls,2
and the case was undergoing the ordeal of a debate in
the House of Commons, the leading lawyers in the
House, among whom was Sir Samuel Romilly, were
unanimous in declaring that the proofs brought for-
ward to convict Wallajah and his son of treacherous
and hostile designs, were positively frivolous.
Mr. Edmonstone, the Persian translator, in his re-
port on the documents found at Seringapatam, gene-
ralises on their tone and spirit in the following
terms:-
"It has already been remarked that the phrase of
'supporting the cause of the faith,' (and which is so
frequently mentioned by and on the part of the
Nabob,) implies a determined hostility against those
of another persuasion.” 3
The Wolf's complaint against the Lamb is scarcely
more groundless than this. These are mere conven-
tional phrases, which between Mussulman Princes
could not be omitted without positive incivility. The
Nawab Wallajah's expressions are no more inflam-
matory than those used by the Marquis Wellesley
himself, who, when forwarding a letter from the
1 Asiatic Annual Register, 1808, p. 502.
2 The whole, including the depositions taken by the Commission,
will be found in vol. iv of the Asiatic Annual Register, published in
1803.
* Report of Mr. Edmonstone, Persian Translator, on the Docu-
ments found at Seringapatam; Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p.
745.
THE MUSNUD IN ABEYANCE.
113
Sultan of Turkey to Tippoo, takes the opportunity
of "exhorting" him "to manifest his zeal for the
Mahomedan religion by renouncing all intercourse
with" the French, "the common enemy of every
religion, and the aggressor of the Mahomedan church."
The Sultan in his letter written at the instance of
the British ambassador at Constantinople, to detach
Tippoo from his French advisers, adjures him by "the
general ties of religion;" observes that he is "justly
famed for his zeal and attachment to the faith," calls
upon him to assist "his brother Mussulmans, accord-
ing to the obligations of religion," and to "place
confidence in the Omnipotent source of all succour,
and in the intercession of him who is the glory of
prophets."
In the mouth of Wallajah such words are invita-
tions to commence a holy war against all Christians!
Tippoo himself openly writes as follows to the
Nawab Wallajah in a letter which was communicated
by the latter to the Madras Government :-" My hope
from Almighty God, and my confidence in the prophet,
is that according to the command of God and of the
prophet, which is well known to all Mussulmans, all
the faithful will exert themselves with heart and soul
in maintaining and rendering permanent the religion
of Mahomed. Upon your Highness, who is one of
the heads of the faith, this is an absolute duty, and I
am confident that your Highness will by all means
constantly employ your time in performing what is
obligatory on you." "1 According to Mr. Edmonstone's
rule this would be an open invitation to join in a holy
¹ Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 743.
114
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
3
war against all infidels. Yet it does not seem to have
alarmed our Government at the time, or to have caused
the slightest remark or inquiry.
On the whole, after a careful examination of all the
evidence that has been allowed to see the light, I must
deliberately state my opinion that the private exhibi-
tion of these apocryphal calumnies in 1801 was far
more discreditable to Lord Wellesley than to the un-
fortunate Wallajah family, and that the attempt to
revive them, and to make them do double duty in
1855, to the detriment of the rights of our ally, is
even more discreditable to our Government, and must
not be allowed to succeed.
"During the last autumn, the Nawab of the Car-
natic very suddenly died. As the treaty by which the
musnud of the Carnatic was conferred on his High-
ness's predecessor was exclusively a personal one; as
the Nawab had left no male heir; and as both he and
his family had disreputably abused the dignity of their
position, and the large share of public revenue which
had been allotted to them; the Court of Directors has
been advised to place the title of Nawab in abeyance,
granting fitting pensions to the several members of
the Carnatic family." Such are the memorable words
in which Lord Dalhousie, on the eve of his departure
from India, recorded the proposed extinction of all the
rights, privileges, and possessions of the descendant,
heir, and representative of our oldest, most service-
able, and most faithful ally. The passage is remark-
able, as it contains examples of every fault of literary
1 Lord Dalhousie's Minute, dated the 28th February 1856, para-
graph 43.
THE MUSNUD IN ABEYANCE.
115
style and moral tone, for which Lord Dalhousie's
political writings are so conspicuous. There are fre-
quent instances of the use of vague, or ambiguous
slipslop phrases in Lord Dalhousie's Minutes. The
application of the term "in abeyance," where it was
obviously and certainly intended to signify that the
title was extinguished, is an illustration in point. A
second still worse instance occurs in this same passage,
where the incorrect expression amounts to a false alle-
gation, and is evidently used with the object of con-
cealing the iniquity that had been perpetrated. This
is the statement that the Nawab of the Carnatic died
without leaving any "male heir," where all that could
have been said with truth was that he died without
any “male issue." The fact is that while Prince Azeem
Jah is undoubtedly the heir of the late Nawab his
nephew, by English, as well as by Mahomedan law,
there are, besides Prince Azeem Jah's sons, numerous
other descendants of the Nawab Wallajah, who could
claim successively as the late Nawab's male heirs.
But this audacious employment of the terms "no male
heirs," "no direct heirs," and "no natural heirs," as
if they were synonymous with “no male issue,” is
the great pivot upon which Lord Dalhousie's ma-
chinery of annexation was made to work.
The next point which calls for observation is a spe-
cimen of Lord Dalhousie's favourite device of heaping
obloquy upon his victims, to withdraw public sym-
pathy from them, and the reader's attention from the
facts and law of the case, by introducing, either as an
argument or as an illustration, irrelevant. and often
unfounded aspersions on the private morals or public
1
116
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
character of the Prince whose heir and representative
was marked for destruction. Thus, on no foundation
whatever, except some gossiping rumours from the Re-
sident's diary, Lord Dalhousie stigmatised the late
Rajah of Nagpore as "having lived and died a seller
of justice, a miser, a drunkard, and a debauchee."
Yet the poor Rajah was our good friend and humble
ally for thirty-five years, he never required our as-
sistance or interference, and he was much beloved
by his subjects. In the same manner, Lord Dalhousie
recommends the extinction of the Carnatic princi-
pality, because, says he, "both the late Nawab and his
family had disreputably abused the dignity of their
position, and the large share of public revenue which
had been allotted to them." Now, before making any
further comment upon this, I must observe that what-
ever revenue was allotted" to the Nawab, was “al-
lotted," or rather reserved to him, by treaties which
secured to us the exclusive use of the remaining re-
venue of his dominions.
((
But why should Lord Dalhousie have used these
guarded phrases, this generalised disparagement?
Why not go the whole length at once, and say plainly
that the late Nawab was "a circumcised ruffian,'
or "an infidel sensualist," and that princely titles and a
large income were not for him or his compeers in these
enlightened days? Lord Harris, as I shall show, did
say something very like this. Such language would
have been quite equal in logical force and applicability
to that employed by Lord Dalhousie, and far superior
in honesty. For what connection was there between
1 Papers relating to the Rajah of Berar, p. 33.
THE MUSNUD IN ABEYANCE.
117
the Nawab's private character and his right, or the
right of his heir, to the dignity and revenue guaran-
teed to them by treaties. We did not make any
such stipulation as that the Nawabship should remain
with the descendants of Wallajah so long only as the
head of the family abstained from the seven deadly
sins; or on condition of his avoiding the bad example
of George, Prince of Wales, and Frederick, Duke of
York; or place any other restrictions over the vices
or extravagance of our ally. Such virtuous stipula-
tions are not usual in treaties; but Lords Harris and
Dalhousie, and the Honourable Court of Directors
seem to think they might be taken for granted, though
unexpressed. Lord Harris, indeed, went considerably
further, and took the opportunity to object to all na-
tive Princes, unless, as I understand him, they consent
to become Christians. "I will not say that greater
care could not have been bestowed on his training, or
that greater success might not have been obtained by
some other method of education than those which were
tried; but I do assert it as my belief, that nothing
that any Government can do will be sufficient to
counterbalance the evil effects which will be derived
by a native Prince, either Hindoo or Mahomedan, from
the circumstances of family, of creed, and of position,
1 Let us try to imagine the reception that a Radical member of
Parliament or writer would meet with, who should propose to annul
the hereditary charge upon the Post Office or the Excise revenues,
or to resume the Crown or Church lands, enjoyed by some noble
family, on the ground of the immoral life of the actual or late
possessor! And yet what comparison can there be between the
validity of such tenures and of that which rests upon solemn treaties,
—treaties moreover upon which alone depends our right to occupy
and govern the Carnatic?
118
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
in which he must be placed." We might be very
grateful to Lord Harris for a demonstration of the in-
curably evil effects of the Hindoo and Mahomedan
creeds, if he would only give it to the world at a pro-
per time and in a proper manner; but I cannot see
that an obiter dictum on the inevitably bad morals of
Hindoo and Mahomedan Princes, which involves a wish
that all such Princes could be extinguished, ought to
have found a place in a Minute by the Governor of
Madras, or ought to have had any weight in deciding
the question of the rights of inheritance, and the sa-
credness of treaties. Yet it evidently did have weight,
for the Court of Directors in their despatch of the
15th March, 1856, say, "the effect has (as was truly
observed by Lord Harris) been morally most perni-
cious;"'" and Lord Dalhousie, as we have seen, repro-
duces the same virtuous sentiments in his self-glorify-
ing parting address.
(
It is wonderful how the moral indignation of Lord
Dalhousie rises when it affords an excuse for repu-
diating an inconvenient treaty. But in point of fact
these moral professions and virtuous objurgations,—
extended as they are by Lord Harris to include the
inhabitants of the Mussulman quarter of Madras,
Triplicane, "an idle and dissipated population in the
chief city of the Presidency," 2-are as unjust and
libellous as they are insincere, impertinent, and irre-
levant to the question. The idea of a population of
100,000 people, twenty times more than can have
ever been directly or indirectly dependent on the
1 Papers relating to the Nawab of the Carnatic, p. 14.
2 Ditto, p. 46.
THE MUSNUD IN ABEYANCE.
119
Nawab's revenues, being in general "idle and dissi-
pated," is preposterously absurd, and contradicted by
all experience of human nature, and of the nature of
Indian Mahomedans in particular. But I have insti-
tuted a careful inquiry on this subject, and I entertain
no doubt of the fact, that the Mussulman inhabitants
of Triplicane constitute as sober, orderly, and indus-
trious a population as can be found in any part of
India. That the late Nawab, notwithstanding some
redeeming features in his character, was dissipated in
his habits and reckless in his expenditure, cannot, I
believe, be denied. But his father and grandfather
were most excellent Princes; and there are many
members of the family, and many other Mahomedan
gentlemen at Madras, who are remarkable for their
learning, charity, and for their enlightened attention
to that limited portion of public affairs in which the
present system of administration permits native gen-
tlemen at the Presidency towns to participate.
What the better class of Mahomedans at Madras,
the inhabitants of Triplicane, and the Mussulman
population of Southern India, may become in the
future, what change a few years may make in their
political and religious feelings and hopes, I do not
pretend to prophesy. It will depend very much on
the general circumstances of the country, on our
external relations, and even on events in Europe or
Western Asia. During a period of commercial suc-
cess and prosperity, and political tranquillity, there
would probably be a very small tendency towards
religious fanaticism or seditious movements. But of
this I am certain, that the great barrier against
120
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
Mussulman fanaticism in Southern India has been
broken down, the most effectual restraint removed,
and a cause of offence and hatred instituted, by the
disinheritance of Prince Azeem Jah, the bitterness of
which will rather be aggravated than diminished by
the lapse of years.
Not only is there great dishonour and disadvantage
to Government in being reproached by all classes with
the injustice and ingratitude of ruining the family of
the Nawab, but the Mahomedans in particular,-
erroneously, I admit, but with feelings neither un-
natural nor unreasonable,-attribute the repudiation
and degradation of their Imaum, their spiritual chief,
the patron and guardian of their religious rites, to
deliberate persecution. There is no priesthood, pro-
perly so called, in the Mahomedan religious system.
Mussulman devotions require no officiating minister;
no class is set apart and consecrated to perform sacri-
fice or other public ceremonies, or to pronounce autho-
ritatively on doubtful or disputed points of dogma or
morals. On these occasions the leading part is taken
by the Sovereign, if he is a Moslem, or by the person
of the highest rank and authority present. Islam is,
in short, the perfection of Erastianism. The Prince
is everywhere the Imaum, or spiritual chief. There
are, it is true, schools of divinity; there are teachers
of religion-who are not, however, priests, but doctors
of the law, the Mussulman criminal, civil, and canon
law being all founded upon the Koran-and there
are monastic orders, mostly of the mendicant and
itinerant class, whose members are venerated as holy
men without having any priestly functions.
But
THE MUSNUD IN ABEYANCE.
121
neither doctors nor ascetics have any mode of assert-
ing authority, or can give any weight to their sen-
tences and their lessons, except so far as they are
supported by the Imaum or spiritual leader. There
may, sometimes, be differences of opinion between the
schoolmen and the ruler; the Sheikh-ool-Islam at
Constantinople has often been in opposition to the
Sultan, but has invariably been compelled to succumb
to the head of the church, or has been removed. If
he were at any time to persist, and were backed by
a considerable party, it would be at once a rebellion
and a schism.
It was, therefore, an inestimable advantage to our
Government to have a person of the highest rank,
allied and associated with us by ancient ties, tradi-
tionally and habitually obedient and dependent, placed
at the head of the Mahomedan community of Southern
India, as their Imaum or religious leader. I am
distinctly of opinion that if there had been no Nawab
of the Carnatic, we ought to have invented one. A
Prince so situated, residing at one of the great centres
of our power, with so much to lose, and so little to
expect from any disturbance, could not be anything
but conservative in politics and moderate in religion;
and in a time of religious revival or excitement he
could be held responsible for the manner in which he
made use of his influence. Now, by a flagrant breach
of faith, we have deposed the recognised hereditary
Imaum, our friend and ally, and have handed over
the Mahomedans of the Madras Presidency, guideless
and uncontrolled, to the first mad fakeer or Moulavee
G
122
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
who can contrive, perhaps at some difficult crisis, to
set himself up as a spiritual leader.
In the Administration Report of this Presidency
for 1861-62 (§ 681, p. 125), Prince Azeem Jah's claim
to the musnud of the Carnatic, is said to have been
"finally rejected." But the Prince has not, it is un-
derstood, abandoned his claim; nor is it to be believed
by any one who has patiently examined the published
papers, that he or his sons, or the lineal male repre-
sentative of the Wallajah family, to the latest posterity,
will ever consent to abandon or compromise those
rights which are secured to them by four solemn
treaties, ratified by the autograph letters of four British
Sovereigns. I cannot look upon this decision as final,
nor can I advise the Prince or his adherents to accept
it as final, for it was originally founded on arguments
manifestly unfair, and statements of facts positively
false; nothing has since been added to the arguments
and statements brought forward by Lords Harris and
Dalhousie in 1856; and even Sir Charles Wood, while
declining "to disturb" the decision of the Court of
Directors,¹ carefully abstains from upholding it on its
merits. That decision has neither foundation nor
support, and it must fall, whether Sir Charles Wood dis-
turbs it or not. It has produced in the Carnatic, as I
have endeavoured to show in the preceding Letter, a
political position of unexampled depravity, under which
the British Government is left with no legal title to
the occupation of the country, and no moral claim to
the obedience of the inhabitants. Our administration
1 In a Despatch to the Government of Fort St. George, dated
8th April 1862.
THE MUSNUD IN ABEYANCE.
123
is at present based neither upon compact nor upon
conquest, but simply upon a breach of trust, which
offers a cruel provocation to our best friends, and a
most plausible pretext to our enemies, both internal
and external.
The present Nizam's father in 1853, when called
upon to cede territory for the pay of the Hyderabad
Contingent, made the following observations to the
Resident, General Low:-"I am a Sovereign Prince,
born to live and die in this kingdom, which has be-
longed to my family for seven generations; if I were
to give up a portion of my kingdom to your Govern-
ment in perpetuity, it is totally impossible that I
could be happy; I should feel that I was disgraced.
I have heard that one gentleman of your tribe con-
sidered that I ought to be quite contented and happy
if I were put upon the same footing as Mahomed
Ghous Khan,' (meaning the present Nawab of Arcot,)
'to have a pension paid to me like an old servant,
and have nothing to do but to eat, and sleep, and say
my prayers.' Here his Highness made use of an
exclamation in Arabic, which expresses both surprise
and anger, and with a manner and a tone of voice
which seemed to me to indicate anger in no ordinary
degree." 1
Since that interview took place, even the.
"pension paid to him like an old servant " has been
denied to Mahomed Ghous Khan's heir. And the
Government of Hyderabad has not ceased to watch
with interest our treatment of their former dependent,
the Nawab of the Carnatic. It is generally under-
stood at Madras, the report having come from very
1 Blue Book, the Nizam; 1854; p. 120.
G 2
124
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
good authority, that, in August 1857, the Resident at
Hyderabad informed the Government of Fort St. George
that the Nizam had remonstrated in open Durbar on
the disinheritance of Prince Azeem Jah, and observed
in a sarcastic manner that they might next think of
treating him, or his heir, in the same manner. We
do not seem, then, to have much strengthened our
political position, or added to our moral dignity, in
Southern India, by destroying so influential a friend
as the Nawab of the Carnatic. That measure appears
to have been-as Talleyrand said of Napoleon's invasion
of Spain-worse than a crime: it was an enormous
blunder. Will the Queen's Government have the
moral courage to redress it?
Lord Dalhousie in his Minute of review dated 28th
February 1856, thus mentions the result of his delibe-
rations on the vacant musnud of the Carnatic:-
The Court of Directors has been advised to place
the title of Nawab in abeyance." This is a word for
which we may well feel grateful to Lord Dalhousie;
this is a word, not of equivocal meaning, but the
meaning of which, whether Lord Dalhousie understood
it or not, is eminently favourable to the cause of truth
and justice, and points to the only mode by which the
British Government can be extricated from an unten-
able and discreditable position. The title is in abey-
ance-
"We thank thee, Jew, for teaching us that word !”
A title that is in abeyance is not extinct.
The title is "in abeyance" according to Lord Dal-
housie, and I accept the phrase as of good omen, and
as an accurate description of the state of affairs.
THE MUSNUD IN ABEYANCE.
125
Neither the feeble evasions, nor the bold assertions
of Lords Dalhousie and Harris; not the confident
orders of the Court of Directors, nor the otiose ap-
proval of the Board of Control, can annihilate or
weaken the rights of sovereignty belonging to the
representative of the Nawab Wallajah, and secured
to him by existing treaties. Those rights remain
undiminished; and, as the British Government has
never acquired, or assumed, or even claimed the sove-
reignty, those rights, although ignored and disregarded,
are actually intact to this day. But as a matter of
fact the title is in abeyance; and, after so long an
interval, the abeyance can be terminated with a good
grace, with honour, and beneficial effect, by no sanction
less solemn, by no less august authority, than that of
the Queen herself.
Let us be Radicals, or Republicans if we will, in
Europe or in America; but in India every sane poli-
tician, English or native, must be a Conservative and
a Royalist. Confidence and security cannot be felt,
peace and prosperity cannot long continue, in the pre-
sent stage of Indian civilization, under any other rule
than that of a Monarch, and of a Monarch whose per-
sonal influence is felt, and whose power is known to
be a reality. It matters not much what the natives
say of the Company, or of Lord Dalhousie, or of Lord
Harris, but the Queen's name must not be despised;
the stigma of bad faith must not be cast upon our
Royal Mistress by a positive refusal of justice given
in her name to a Prince who claims the fulfilment of
treaty engagements, and of promises made to his
ancestor and to his father by her Majesty's royal
126
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
grandfather. The title of Nawab of the Carnatic is
in abeyance, but the abeyance may be terminated, and
I trust it will be terminated, when a Prince of our
Royal House arrives from England, and having re-
ceived the homage of Prince Azeem Jah on behalf
of his Royal Mother, restores him to the musnud of
his ancestors in her name, and by her command.
4
127
LETTER V.
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
Madras, June, 1861.
SOME political falsities, some gross social impostures,
have proved themselves to be wonderfully tenacious of
life. Fallacies refuted in the metropolis and the
mother country, survive in the counties and the colo-
nies; abandoned in the colonies or in India, they are
unsuspectingly cherished at home; driven from one
stronghold they find a refuge in another; destroyed in
their original shape they rise in some new form to push
us from our stools. It will not do to scotch the snake,
it must be killed and buried. The last drop of poison,
and the stink of the dead carcase are both to be
avoided.
This is more especially the case with fallacies re-
lating to Indian law and politics. So unfamiliar, un-
interesting and distasteful is the subject in general to
English ears, so liable are we to prejudice and distort
Indian cases by referring them to European precedents
and analogies, that some of the most flagrant violations
of the first principles of Hindoo and of international
law, some of the most direct and audacious breaches
128
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
of the letter of solemn treaties, were perpetrated uu-
der Lord Dalhousie's administration without exciting
a doubt or a misgiving in the minds of the Queen's
Government, as represented by the Board of Control,
-though a few of the Directors took the alarm;—
and but for the rebellion, which threw a lurid light
into many dark chambers, these iniquities would have
been firmly established, without the possibility of re-
versal or modification, as the axioms and first princi-
ples of British policy in India.
Of course I allude to the various pleas under which
principalities have been annexed, titles extinguished,
and landed estates resumed and confiscated, and espe-
cially to the pretended right of sanctioning or forbid-
ding adoptions, which our Government has arrogated
to itself, and which it has exercised to the ruin and de-
struction of several Hindoo royal and noble families
to whom we owed friendship and protection, and who
owed us nothing.
These unjust and groundless innovations and en-
croachments on the rights of our faithful and submis-
sive allies and tributaries, these wanton spoliations of
real and personal property, were not allowed to take
place at the time without in almost every instance an
ample and sufficient protest and refutation from the
aggrieved families, from a minority of the Court of
Directors, and from the élite of the Indian Press.
But all remonstrances in those days, even though
amounting to demonstrations of injustice, fell upon
ears that were deaf to all considerations but those of
an immediate material display and semblance of gain
and advantage; Lord Dalhousie's word was law and
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
129
gospel in India and in England; and, in the insolent
and immoral cant of the day, the rights of Princes,
represented by certain musty old parchments called
treaties, were allowed to weigh as nothing against the
"real good" of their contented subjects, "whose best
interests, we sincerely believe," says Lord Dalhousie,
'will be promoted by the uniform application of our
system of Government." In those days the native
Princes and nations never seem to have been credited
with having any lawful policy or opinions or feelings
of their own; no one seems to have supposed that
they possessed any rights, even under treaties, except
such as might from time to time be granted or ac-
quiesced in, restricted or withdrawn, by the British
Government; no one ever seems to have contemplated
the possibility of a native Prince or chieftain being
thrown entirely upon his own resources in a time
of great danger and difficulty, and having to think,
and act for himself, without the support of British
troops, without the counsel or control of a British Re-
sident. Still less was it contemplated that tremendous
issues, perhaps the very existence of our Empire,
should come to hang upon the decision of such a small
potentate as the Rajah of Puttiala,-to whom we owe
the fidelity of the Sikh troops and the quiet of the
Punjaub,—or of the Nagpore Ranees, and the young
Prince their adopted son, to whom we are indebted
for the preservation of the Nizam's country and the
Mahratta Provinces from a general rebellion, and of
the Madras army from the irresistible contagion and
1 Minute on the Sattara succession, 30th August 1848, Sattara
Papers, 1849, p. 83.
G 3
130
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
overpowering temptations that would have assailed the
brigades of Madras sepoys at Nagpore and Hyderabad,
if the signal of revolt had been given.
In those days the doctrine had become universally
accepted at Calcutta that the native Princes were
powerless for any good purpose, useless as allies, im-
potent as enemies, and yet capable of being very
troublesome both in peace and war, and that our only
true policy was, in Lord Dalhousie's own words, that
of "getting rid of those petty intervening princi-
palities, which may be made a means of annoyance,
but which can never be a source of strength."l
The time of trial for this policy was not delayed for
many years after the annexation of Sattara, Jhansi,
Nagpore and Oude; and the course of events during
the storm of 1857-58 effectually contradicted and falsi-
fied all Lord Dalhousie's anticipations. The Rajahs of
Jheend, Puttiala, and Nabha, and the Nawab of Ram-
pore, are not powerful monarchs,--they are but petty
dependent Princes,-yet during the perilous crisis of
1857 the value of their material aid in men and money
was only exceeded by the moral effect of their firm and
loyal adherence. And most certainly the "consolida-
tion of our territory" by the iniquitous extinction of
the small, well-governed and ever faithful State of
Jhansi, and the consequent conversion of its Brahmin
Ranee into a murderess and a rebel-leader, did not
prove to be "
a source of strength." Nor were the re-
maining "petty intervening Principalities" found to be
a means of annoyance.
((
""
The natural result of this conspicuous refutation,
1 The same Minute.
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
131
and practical reversal of all Lord Dalhousie's policy,
has been a salutary reaction in favour of the native
Princes. Cessions in full sovereignty, not only of con-
fiscated estates but of British territory, which two years
before would have been looked on as an impossible con-
tingency, have been made to several native Princes as
rewards for their inestimable aid. Two successive
Secretaries of State, Lord Stanley and Sir Charles
Wood, have evinced the most liberal intentions to-
wards our native allies and tributaries; both of them
insisted on the restoration of Dhar, contrary to the
advice of the "experienced political officer," who had
unfortunately been allowed by Lord Canning to lead
him astray on this point; and both of them, in re-
viewing some of the worst political cases, took some
imperfect steps towards restitution and compensation,
the full effects of which are yet to be seen. And in
every instance, even in that of the Mysore grant, which
was bitterly opposed in India, and, being made on behalf
of the descendants of a formidable enemy, was least
calculated to excite sympathy, the Home Government
has met with the heartiest support from English public
opinion. But undoubtedly the strongest evidence of
the reaction is recorded in Lord Canning's Despatches
of the 26th of April and 10th of May, and in Sir
Charles Wood's reply of the 26th of July, 1860, which
have given to "every chief above the rank of Jaghire-
dar, assurance that the paramount power desires to see
his government perpetuated, and that, on failure of
natural heirs, his adoption of a successor, according to
the Hindoo law (if he be a Hindoo) and to the customs
of his race, will be recognised."
=
132
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
A confession of offences, or an avowal of repentance,
would be out of place in the public despatches of Go-
vernment; and I do not therefore complain that both
Lord Canning and Sir Charles Wood talk as if they
were performing a signal act of grace and generosity,
instead of simply falling back from an odiously ag-
gressive and acquisitive attitude, to rest once more on
the ancient laws of India, and on the stipulations and
obligations of treaties. But I regret very much to see
the subject treated from the same point of view in Par-
liament, and in some of the most influential journals
and reviews, and to find the promised recognition of
future adoptions in Hindoo princely families approved,
more under a sense of the inexpediency of the opposite
course, than from a conviction of its injustice and dis-
honesty. Until that conviction has gained full pos-
session of the public mind, the question will not be
placed on a solid and permanent basis, and there will
still be room left for some future Dalhousie, in some
future time of our wealth, strength, security and pride,
to revive pretensions which, it might be said, have
never been abandoned except by way of grace and
favour.
This is a striking and painful instance of that tenacity
of life for which, as I have pointed out, political false-
hoods are so remarkable. Although all the sophisms,
misrepresentations, misquotations and misstatements
of Captain Cowper, Mr. Hart, Mr. R. D. Mangles, and
the other champions of the Inam Commission, by which
they endeavoured to uphold the fictitious "ruling sanc-
tion," the pretended power of Government to prevent
landed property from passing to an adopted heir,—
+
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
133
Zi
were unrelentingly exposed, mangled, and torn to rags
in a long series of able and excellent articles in the
Bombay Times; although Mr. J. M. Ludlow and Mr.
J. B. Norton have, in several of their publications,
shown with the perspicacity and logical force of prac-
tised lawyers, the exaggerated absurdity of this ima-
ginary prerogative when applied to Princes with whom
our relations are defined and circumscribed by treaty,
yet I find the doctrine, to the fullest extent of disin-
heriting and confiscating power, accepted as an ancient
principle of Indian law by the Times in January last,
even when approving of Lord Canning's policy; and
in the last number of the Quarterly Review, when
suggesting doubts of that policy.
The Times, reviewing in January (1861) Lord Can-
ning's North West progress, approves of the Governor-
General's "qualified and exceptional recognition of the
right of adoption" in the families of Scindia, the Rajahs
of Cashmere, Rewah, and others, as "a most judicious
measure." The "privilege of adoption, in other words
the right of nominating an heir in cases where actual
issue failed," is said to be "dearly prized by Indian
dignitaries," but that "for this the consent of the Su-
preme Government is necessary. Such consent in fact
amounts to a fresh grant of the estate or dignity in
question, and to a surrender of the reversionary in-
terest belonging to the Sovereign." And in conse-
quence of the bold assertions and bold doings from
1848 to 1857, I presume that this has become in Eng-
land the popular and usually accepted view of adop-
1 Since collected and republished as "the Inam Commission
Unmasked," by Mr. Robert Knight, a gentleman to whom India
owes much for this and for many other good services.
134
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
ཝ;
tion. Yet it is totally untrue. No "reversionary
interest" ever belonged to the Sovereign: and the
"privilege of adoption" so "dearly prized by Indian
dignitaries," is simply the legal right of adoption
which is necessarily enjoyed by every Hindoo. When
the full effect and benefit of the Hindoo law of in-
heritance are allowed to all our Hindoo subjects, how
could we ever pretend to refuse or restrict it in the case
of Hindoo Princes, who are our friends and allies; but
who are not our subjects?
The following extract is taken from the Quarterly
Review of April :-
"We have heard of a new policy towards native
Princes, inaugurated by Lord Canning, which is to
generate or to revive loyalty and attachment to us in
their breasts. Until we know more fully and distinctly
in what that policy consists, we cannot pronounce on
it as a whole. Meanwhile, however, as to one part
of it, we must express our surprise at the announce-
ment that henceforth our Indian Government will not
exercise the office,-hitherto always appertaining to
the paramount power in India, when such a power,
whether Mogul or English has existed,-of recog-
nising, or refusing to recognise, the adopted son of a na-
tive Prince as heir to his dominions. Such a prerogative
no doubt is susceptible of abuse; but the moderate,
honest, and beneficent exercise of it is also possible.
""1
No such prerogative ever appertained to the para-
mount power in India, whether Mogul, Mahratta or
English. This supposed imperial prerogative of dis-
approving and forbidding adoptions in the families of
1 Quarterly Review, No. 218, April 1861, p. 606-607.
:
i
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
135
Hindoo dependent Princes, is historically false and
contrary to the law of nations and the political pre-
cedents of India. Neither the doctrine nor the prac-
tice can be detected in the recorded acts or in the
diplomatic documents of the most powerful and widely
extended monarchies that existed in India before ours.
Neither the Kings of Delhi nor the Peishwas ever
exercised or claimed the right of forbidding adoptions
in the families of dependent chieftains,-not even
when the chieftain's rank was merely that of a Ze-
mindar or military jaghiredar,—when once the tenure
had been established or acknowledged as hereditary.
Undoubtedly a nuzzurana, or personal attendance, or
some other mark of fealty and homage, was exacted
at each succession from inferior and subject chieftains;
undoubtedly the ultimate decision in cases of a dis-
puted inheritance, rested with the supreme power; but
however pompous and extravagant the despotic pre-
tensions of the confirming authority may have been,
the inviolability of the Hindoo law and custom of in-
heritance was always scrupulously adhered to both by
the Mussulman and the Brahmin Sovereign. And yet
those Sovereigns, even in the decline of their power,
never made treaties with the Nawabs or the Rajahs
from whom they claimed allegiance. The King of
Delhi granted firmans or sunnuds; the Peishwa re-
ceived written applications for concessions, and re-
turned them with his answers, favourable or unfavour-
able, attached. On the other hand, however imposing
and overwhelming our power may have become, it is un-
deniable that the British Government has at no period
claimed or assumed either the imperial status of the
.
136
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
King of Delhi or the federal supremacy of the Peishwa.
On the contrary, it has made treaties on equal terms
with several of their former dependents; and from the
language of those treaties alone can the reciprocal re-
lations of the parties be determined.
There is another erroneous view of this subject that
has been too frequently set forth both in official docu-
ments, and in popular sources of information. The
Saturday Review, for example, (February 26th, 1859)
speaks of adoption as if it were only "practised by an
extinct dynasty or family to prolong or renovate itself.”
This is a complete mistake. Even when the agnates of
the dynasty constitute a very tribe in numbers,—when
numerous collateral relations of the head of the fa-
mily are in existence-an adoption frequently be-
comes necessary. An adoption ought to take place
whenever there is no lineal male descendant. Far
from being an unusual privilege, or an extension of the
rules of inheritance commonly prevailing among na-
tions, (under which the most distant collaterals in the
male or female line can succeed) the law of adoption
operates very frequently as a restriction of the rights of
consanguinity. What the Hindoo about to adopt re-
quires is not an heir to his crown or property, but a
son to perform certain religious duties on his behalf;
and although he is generally restricted in his choice,
both by natural affection and established custom, to
his own kindred, the person whom we should con-
sider next in succession is often legally and ceremo-
nially ineligible for the filial position,¹ and is there-
1 A boy who has been married cannot be adopted; a person in an
equal or higher degree of descent from the common ancestor, how-
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
137
fore excluded in favour of his own son or nephew, and
sometimes of a very remote kinsman, or of a perfect
stranger.
The right, or rather duty, of adoption is no peculiar
privilege; it is the specific and inherent principle of
the Hindoo law of inheritance; and there is no re-
ligious obligation that is held more sacred among
Hindoos. When a man has no reasonable hope of male
issue, it is a sin in him not to adopt. Should he how-
ever die without having effected this great object, it is
the duty of his widow, with the concurrence of the
senior male relatives, to adopt a son for her deceased
husband. The adopted son performs the funeral cere-
monies and becomes the heir of the deceased, and
henceforward loses all share and interest in the property
of his natural parents. Unless there is a son or lineal
descendant, there ought always to be an adoption, for
even the nearest relation is not entitled to succeed
merely by reason of his consanguinity; and in the
event of there being no blood-relation eligible for adop-
tion, a duly adopted son from another family is the
heir, to the exclusion of all collaterals.¹
ever young in years, cannot be adopted; an only son ought not to
be resigned by his parents, though his adoption, when completed,
would be valid; and there are other points of disqualification.
1 The eminent jurist, Mr. Henry Sumner Maine, now a Member
of the Governor General's Council, has clearly defined the scope
and effect of the adoptive right in the following passages of a work
which has already become a European classic:-
Among the Hindoos, the right to inherit a dead man's property
is exactly co-extensive with the duty of performing his obsequies.
If the rites are not properly performed or not performed by the
proper person, no relation is considered as established between the
deceased and anybody surviving him; the Law of Succession does
not apply, and nobody can inherit the property. Every great event
in the life of a Hindoo seems to be regarded as leading up to and
bearing upon these solemnities. If he marries, it is to have chil-
138
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
The writer in the Times therefore, in the passage
already quoted, though erroneously speaking of it as
"a privilege" for which "the consent of the Supreme
Government is necessary," has correctly defined the
right of adoption as that of "nominating an heir in
cases where actual issue has failed." Adoption is not,
as commonly supposed, a remedy for lack of heirs, but
is the selection of one from a number of possible heirs,
—often from a long list of agnates and cognates,—to
be not merely an heir but a son to his predecessor.
In the vast majority of cases the son adopted would
be the natural heir according to European law, or a
son of the natural heir,-a nephew, or a first cousin's
son of the adoptive father. In every one of those
cases of adoption in princely families which Lord Dal-
housie refused to recognise, the rejected claimant was
a blood relation of the adoptive father.
All the best authorities on Hindoo law, and the
known and recorded practice both of native Princes
and chieftains, and of private individuals throughout
dren who may celebrate them after his death; if he has no children,
he lies under the strongest obligation to adopt them from another
family,' with a view,' writes the Hindoo doctor,' to the funeral cake,
the water, and the solemn sacrifices.' Ancient Law, pp. 191-192.
"In Hindoo law there is no such thing as a true will. The place
filled by wills is occupied by adoptions; we can now see the relation
of the testamentary power to the faculty of adoption and the reason
why the exercise of either of them would call up a peculiar solici-
tude for the performance of the sacra. Both a will and an adop-
tion threaten a distortion of the ordinary course of family descent,
but they are obviously contrivances for preventing the descent being
wholly interrupted, when there is no succession of kindred to carry
it on.
Of the two expedients, adoption, the factitious creation of
blood-relationship, is the only one which has suggested itself to
the greater part of archaic societies. The Hindoos have, indeed,
advanced one point on what was doubtless the antique practice, by
allowing the widow to adopt when the father has neglected to do
so." Ibid., pp. 193-194.
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
139
India, concur in testifying that the nearest eligible
relation ought in all cases to be the adopted heir.
"The nearest male relation of the adopter is the
proper object of adoption. This of course is the
nephew, or son of a brother of the whole blood.
Where there is none, the choice should still fall upon
the next nearest male relation; with liberty, in default
of such, to select from among distant ones, and among
strangers, on failure of all kin." (Strange's Hindu
Law, 1825, vol. i, p. 72.) "A person being about to
adopt a son, should take an unremote kinsman, having
convened his kindred, and announced his intention to
the King." (Vyavahāra Mayookha, translated by H.
Borradaile, Surat, 1827, p. 72.) There is a right to
be adopted as well as the right to adopt, and though
the former is certainly not absolute, and the unjust
adoption of too distant a relative or of a stranger in
blood, if performed with due ceremonies, is irreversible,
still the right to be adopted is very generally respected
and observed; and among the families of Hindoo Sove-
reigns it has been almost invariably held sacred, both
as a point of family honour, and as a matter of public
policy.
The following passage from the Code of Menu, is
quoted in Mountstuart Elphinstone's History of India,
vol. i, p. 66 :—"The natural heirs of a man are the
sons of his body, and their sons, and the sons of his
daughters, when appointed in default of heirs male
to raise up issue to him; on the failure of issue of
the above description, an adopted son succeeds; such
a son loses all claim on the inheritance of his original
father, and is entitled to a sixth of the property of his
:
140
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA..
adoption, even if subsequently to his adoption sons of
the body should be born; on the failure of sons come
brother's sons, who are regarded as standing in the
place of sons, and who have a right to be adopted, if
they wish it, to the exclusion of all other persons : on
failure of sons, grandsons, adopted sons and nephews,
come father and mother; then brothers, grandfathers
and grandmothers, and then other relations, such as
are entitled to perform obsequies to common ances-
tors." Various schools in different parts of India
interpret Hindoo law with some disagreement on these
points; but the tendency of all the schools has been
to extend and not to contract the privilege of adoption.
"Most of them," says Mountstuart Elphinstone, (His-
tory of India, vol. i, p. 160,) “admit a species of adoption
unknown to Menu, which is made by a widow on be-
half of her deceased husband in consequence of real or
supposed instructions imparted by him during his
life. Some schools give the power to the widow in-
dependent of all authorisation by the deceased.”
One of the best authorities on this subject is the
Summary of Hindoo laws and customs in the Deccan,
printed by order of the Honourable Mountstuart
Elphinstone in 1826, when he was Governor of Bom-
bay. Nothing can be more clear and decisive than
the following statements, of which the first will be
found in the Preface:-
"1. A general conformity is observable amongst all
the castes in the practice of adoption, even by widows,
in order to secure the continued performance of funeral
oblations. (p. 15.)
"2. The widow may adopt one of the husband's re-
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
141
lations, with their concurrence and that of the caste,
who will be the heir." (p. 177.)
And it is laid down in an authority from which I
have already quoted :—"If there must be an order
from the husband, it is for a married woman only;
but, for a widow, even without it adoption may be
made, with the permission of her father, or, on failure
of him, of the relations. The right of adoption, even
without the order of her late husband, does pertain to
a widow." (Vyavahāra Mayookha, pp. 72, 73.)
The
When the health of Dowlut Rao Scindia, Maharajah
of Gwalior, was obviously failing in the year 1826, he
was strongly urged by the Resident, under instructions
from the Supreme Government, to adopt a son, so as
to avoid the dangers of a disputed succession. The
sole cause alleged by the Rajah for delay was, "that
from all his relations being so distant and unknown
to him, he was not exactly aware who was the proper
person for him to adopt, and had therefore sent people
to the Deccan to make the necessary inquiries."
Resident's opinion on the subject was given to Go-
vernment in a despatch dated the 4th October 1826,
in the following terms :-" Although according to the
regular canons of Hindoo law neither widow might
have a valid title to adopt without being empowered
by the husband, yet the result of my inquiries leads
me strongly to believe that practically when the hus-
band dies suddenly, or otherwise, without making any
arrangements for an adoption, the right of the senior
wife is universally acknowledged, but she is considered
1 Blue Book, Succession by Adoption, 1850, p. 9.
142
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
bound to adopt the nearest male relative within seven
degrees.”1
On the 20th March 1827 the Resident reports that
the Maharajah's health is much worse, and that "he
cannot survive many days," and he adds: "In as far
as I am able to judge from appearance, no steps are
likely to be taken before the Maharajah's death to-
wards the adoption of a son. Indeed, as the persons
who are supposed to have the best claim to adoption
are still in the Deccan, though their pictures have
been sent here, I doubt if it will now be possible for
his Highness to perform that ceremony, unless he
were, on the emergency of the occasion, to adopt some
very
distant relation here, which is, however, not at
all probable."2 Dowlut Rao Scindia expired the very
day after this despatch, and without having adopted a
son. His widow, the Baiza Baee,—who would have pre-
ferred postponing the ceremony, and thus keeping all
the authority in her own hands for an indefinite period,
and who required a little persuasion and pressure by
the British Resident and some of the ministers of
state before she would acquiesce,-formally adopted
on the 18th June 1827 the nearest eligible relation³
of the deceased Rajah, a boy named Moogut Rao, who
was placed on the musnud under the name of Janko-
jee Rao Scindia.
In 1843 Jankojee Rao Scindia died without male
issue, and without having effected an adoption. With
the full subsequent approval of the Governor-General,
1 Succession by Adoption, p. 13.
2 Ditto, p. 19.
3 Ditto, pp. 23, 24.
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
143
the same course was pursued as on a former occasion;
the senior widow, Tara Baee, adopted Bhageerut Rao,
"the nearest in blood" to the deceased Rajah, who was
immediately installed and proclaimed as Jyajee Rao
Scindia.¹ This is the present reigning Prince, who
proved himself so loyal and devoted an ally in the
critical days of 1857 and 1858.
In reply to inquiries made by Government regarding
the heir apparent to the musnud of Indore, adopted by
Hurree Rao Holkar during his illness in 1841, Sir
Claude Wade, the Resident, in a letter of the 2nd
March, 1843, writes :-"Khunde Rao was selected in
the following manner: the Maharajah himself not
being acquainted with the hereditary descent of his
family, summoned from Mahesur an old woman, Gopika
Baee, the widow of one of the Holkar tribe, and famed
among its members for her knowledge of its genea-
logy; she stated that Bapoojee and Suntojee, the sons
of Ithoba, residing near Indore, were the nearest in
connexion to him. One of the Maharajah's attendants
was accordingly sent to bring them and their sons, of
which the former had two and the latter one, before
his Highness. On their arrival his choice fell on
Khunde Rao, as well from his being in appearance the
most intelligent, as on account of his name, that of the
husband of Ahalya Baee, and of the Deity whom the
Mahrattas chiefly worship."
The same rule and custom have always prevailed in
the Rajpoot principalities, the most ancient sovereign
houses of India. Col. Sutherland, Governor-General's
1 Succession by Adoption, pp. 39, 40.
2 Ditto, p. 76.
-
-
144
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
Agent in Central India, in a letter dated 25th August,
1841, gives the following opinion with reference to a
disputed succession in the petty state of Kishengurh :
"There may be some difference of opinion on the
subject of the right of a widow to adopt a son, where
she was not enjoined or permitted to do so by her
husband; where she had his authority, her right to do
so would not, I think, be questioned anywhere in Raj-
pootana; and even where she had not his authority,
her right would, I think, in most cases be recognised;
the adoption being of course made from the nearest of
kin to her deceased husband, although even in this
respect great latitude is allowed."
Sir Richard Jenkins, in his Nagpore Report of 1827,
(p. 146) declares the rule that had been observed in
seating the Rajah, then a minor, on the throne, and
that should be observed in choosing his successor from
the female line, in case he should die without leaving
a son. That rule was "to choose the nearest male
descendant of the last Rajah who had any." Accord-
ing to that rule the late Rajah's grand-nephew, the
great-grandson of Rughojee the Second's daughter, and
that Rajah's "nearest male descendant," was chosen
and adopted as a son, on the death of his grand-uncle,
the late Rughojee the 3rd of Nagpore. Lord Dalhousie,
without inquiry or notice, declared the Bhonsla family
to be extinct, and the Nagpore State to have "lapsed”
for want of an heir.
The real object and significance of the Monarch's
sanction to adoptions in the families of his vassals,—
besides that of enforcing homage and asserting supre-
1 Succession by Adoption, p. 178.
•
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
145
macy,—was to prevent the "great latitude" of choice
permitted by the letter of Hindoo law from operating
to the prejudice and exclusion of blood-relations. The
only passage in Colebrooke's great work on Hindoo
law in which the "ruling sanction" is referred to, is
the following extract from the ancient commentary of
Vasishta "He who means to adopt a son, must
assemble his kinsmen, give humble notice to the King;
and then having made an oblation to fire with words.
from the Veda, in the midst of his dwelling house, he
may receive, as his son by adoption, a boy nearly allied
to him, or, on failure of such, even one remotely allied.”¹
In the important case of Bhasker Buchajee v. Naroo
Rugonath, Select Reports, 24, (approved in Perry's
Oriental Cases, 151,) it was decided “that want of the
permission of the ruling authorities, is an insufficient
ground for setting aside an adoption once made with
the proper ceremonies.”
Another great authority, Sir Thomas Strange, in his
Elements of Hindu Law (Vol. ii. p. 64), after detailing
the various forms and ceremonies required to consti-
tute a valid adoption, appends the following remark:
-"Most of these rules are general: they are not all
imperative. The notice to the King may be dispensed
with."
Now let us examine the first case in which the
British Government transformed the "ruling sanction"
into the power of ignoring adoptions. We had made
a treaty with Rughojee Angria, Rajah of Colaba, in
1822,2 by which "the entire supremacy," and the
1 Colebrooke's Digest of Hindoo Law, vol. iii, p. 242.
2 Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 340.
H
146
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
"right of investiture," were expressly reserved to the
British Government. In 1841, standing on this right
of investiture, Lord Auckland refused to permit an
adopted son to succeed. But this right of investiture
was not a right of arbitrary resumption, or of escheat
on failure of lineal heirs. No Hindoo or Mahomedan
monarch ever asserted such a right over his feudatories.
If the Mogul or the Peishwa ever annexed a dependent
principality, or resumed a Zemindaree, it was done by
an act of violence, seldom if ever at the period of a
succession, and always-justly or unjustly-as the
ostensible punishment for some rebellion, treason or
defalcation of feudal duty. The right of investiture
imposed the duties of homage, fealty and service on
the feudatory, and entitled him to protection; but it
gave the Suzerain no right to divest the obedient and
dutiful dependent. The right of investiture is not a
right of refusing investiture. The Indian Suzerain
always claimed his nuzzurana, and imposed some ad-
ditional penalty when his authority had been slighted
by an unsanctioned adoption; but he could no more
obtain the right of resumption by declining the proffered
homage and refusing investiture, when the lawful heir
presented himself, than an English Lord of the Manor
could obtain possession of a copyhold, by rejecting a
pepper-corn rent, or than the Queen could resume
Strathfieldsaye from the Duke of Wellington, by de-
clining to receive the Union flag, the annual presenta-
tion of which is the service tenure by which the estate
is held.
There were no restrictions on the operation of the
Hindoo law of inheritance contained in our treaty of
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
147
༈
1822 with the Rajah of Colaba; there was more than
one precedent for a succession by adoption in this
principality; and all claim to nuzzurana and tribute
having been waived and remitted by Article 4 of the
treaty, the "supremacy and right of investiture," re-
served by that same Article, simply entitled the
British Government, as Suzerain, to exercise super-
vision and control over each succession, whether by
natural descent or by adoption, until satisfied that
everything had been done conformably with law, with
local custom, and with an equitable regard to the
general interests of the family, and to the individual
rights of each of its members. This and this alone is
the meaning and scope of the "ruling sanction.”
The act of adoption is irreversible; and the Sovereign
had no more power to refuse succession to an adopted.
son than to a son of the body. In cases of surinjam
property, or service Jaghires, held, according to the
written terms of the grant or according to immemorial
custom, at the Prince's pleasure, he could and fre-
quently did decline to place any heir in possession,
simply because the service was no longer required, or
because he wished to confer the estate on somebody
else. This resumption could be, and sometimes was
effected during the lifetime of a Jaghiredar, but more
often, as might be expected, after his demise. And
undoubtedly an irregular or unauthorised adoption did
from time to time afford a just occasion, or a convenient
pretext, for resuming a surinjam or service jaghire.¹
1 The infancy of the heir to a jaghire held on a military service
tenure was sometimes also made the ground for resuming the
estate. But it must be observed, with general reference to the
entire question, that a resumption by a native Prince by no means
H 2
148
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
But in the case of Sawasthāns or ancient Zemin-
daries, and of Inam estates,-which were considered
as private property, descending to heirs general, mort-
gageable, and even saleable, with the consent of the
co-heirs,¹-there is not a single instance on record,
there is not even a tradition or rumour extant, to
show that any Hindoo or Mahomedan Sovereign ever
elaimed the right of preventing an adopted son from
succeeding. The sanction by the ruling power was
never withheld, and never could be, where the adoption
was unexceptionable.
The only corrective infliction, the utmost extent of
interference in the succession to a hereditary estate,
upon which a native monarch ever ventured, when an
unauthorised or inequitable adoption had taken place,
.was the exaction of an enhanced or unprecedented
nuzzurana or fine before he would grant investiture
to the claimant. Many such instances of deferred
investiture and of the levy of a fine have been found
in the records of the Peishwa's government at
Poonah; but during all the researches of the Bombay
Inam Commission not a single case was discovered in
which an adopted heir had been excluded by royal
prerogative from succeeding to his adoptive father.
It would be still more vain to search for a precedent
involved the ruin and degradation of a family, as it does under our
Government. The heir was always treated with consideration, and
provided for by a stipend or sinecure office; and if on attaining
manhood he displayed ability, or otherwise obtained the Prince's
favour, he was probably placed in as good a position as his father
had occupied. This has been impossible under our system.
1 "The concurrence of sons in the alienation by the father of
land, as required by the Mitacshara, is dispensed with, where they
happen to be all minors at the time. Strange's Hindu Law, vol. i,
p. 19.
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
149
for the exercise of such a power by any native poten-
tate over his feudatory chieftains, or over dependent
allies of princely rank.
No such precedent exists in the annals of India.
No such prerogative, no such power, no such pretence
was ever set forth or heard of in India, until the Bri-
tish Government,—beginning in 1841 with Colaba,
which was undoubtedly a petty feudatory State over
which it had the right of investiture; advancing still
further in 1848 with Sattara, which, though certainly
subordinate and dependent, was held under a treaty
confirming the sovereignty, without any words of
limitation, to the Rajah's "heirs and successors,"
rose at last to the climax of assumption in 1854,
when Lord Dalhousie denied the right of succession
by an adopted son in the Nagpore State, with which
we had a treaty of "perpetual friendship and alliance,”
and which had been officially declared in 1826 to be
one of the substantive powers of India." The first
lapse from a conservative and protective policy in the
case of the petty feudatory State of Colaba, led to the
subsequent application of the rule to the more im-
portant principalities of Sattara, Nagpore and Jhansi,
after which no Hindoo sovereignty could be considered
as secure from a sudden extinction.¹
(6
"The principality of Colaba has been held by the family of
Angria for nearly two centuries in a state of independence. It has
never been in our possession. Our connection with it rests upon
the foundations of a formal treaty, freely contracted; and while a
vestige of the Angria family remains, it belongs of right to them,
and cannot be seized and appropriated by us otherwise than by an
act of violence, perpetrated by our superior power. It is assumed
that the principality has lapsed to the paramount state, by reason
of the failure of heirs. But the ground I rest upon is, that the
widow of Rughojee Angria possessed, under the authority of that
150
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
But our first encroachment was not merely a lapse
from conservative policy, it was a positive denial of
justice and an abuse of our material strength. Far
from being a proper and opportune assertion of Impe-
rial rank, duties, and functions by our Government,
as several persons have argued, it was an absolute
abdication of that federal rank, and a repudiation of
those duties and functions of protection and control,
which alone can entitle the de facto paramount power
to be recognised and obeyed as the Imperial sove-
reignty of India. By this new policy our Government
assumed the offensive and defiant position of an all-
absorbing acquisitive Kingdom, denied its origin and
history, contradicted all its precedents, and cast all
treaties to the wind.
No prerogative of resumption, no right of escheat
can be silently conveyed or implied in a treaty, when
the terms neither of that treaty nor of the antecedent
negotiations show any trace of such a claim, or of
such a concession. Nor could any such prerogative
Prince, which is not disputed, the right to adopt, and still possesses
that right unimpaired. Adoption, with a Hindoo, is both a right
and a duty.”
"I never can satisfy myself that true policy can comport with
injustice and oppression. The native princes and chiefs of India
will see in the fate of Colaba their own destiny; their fidelity and
attachment cannot be relied upon while they have such cause for
distrust and alarm, and although they may be overawed and kept
down by our irresistible military power, the occasion may arise
when their hostility might become dangerous. The feelings of our
Indian subjects are not to be trifled with; and it is not wise or safe
to depart from that conciliatory conduct or to efface from their
minds those impressions of our justice, wisdom, and good faith,
which have hitherto constituted our bond of union with the people,
and the true basis of our power in India." (Selections from the
Papers of Henry St. George Tucker, pp. 27 and 100.) This most
convincing protest, the whole of which is worth reading, had no
effect on the Court of Directors.
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
151
and right be suddenly acquired or gradually amassed
by the enormous increase of our power, without an
explicit assertion on the one part, and an explicit
admission on the other.
Our Government has on many occasion introduced
limitations and explanations into those clauses of
treaties which guaranteed hereditary descent. In a
treaty with the Rao of Cutch in 1819, the succession
was limited to the Rajah and "his legitimate off-
spring." We made a treaty with the Raj Rana of
Jhullawur in 1838, by which the sovereignty was
secured to the reigning Prince, "his heirs and his
successors being his descendants." We made a treaty
with Goolab Sing of Cashmere in 1846, limiting the
succession to "the heirs male of his body." We
tried to make a treaty with the King of Oude in 1856,
by which the succession was to be confined to "the
heirs male of his body born in lawful wedlock."
1 Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 447.
"3
2 Volume of Treaties, 1856, p. 57. This limitation was removed
by Lord Canning in 1859 as a reward for the services rendered by
the Rujah of Cashmere during the rebellion. This was a special
act of favour quite unconnected with the general tenor of the Adop-
tion despatches of 1860.
3 This was a most insidious limitation, quite novel and unknown
to Mahomedans, and especially offensive to a Mahomedan Sove-
reign. The Sultan and the Shah never marry. Two successive
predecessors of the present Nizam, Salabut Jung and Nizam Ali
Khan, were both sons of concubines. So long as there is paternal
recognition, there is really nó illegitimacy under Mahomedan law,
although precedence and a preferential birth-right are given by
custom to the sons of a married wife over those of a concubine or
slave, and in India, especially in the South, to the sons of a Shadee
wife over those of a Nikah wife. The Shadee merely consists in
certain Hindoo ceremonies added to the indispensable forms of the
Nikah, which is the only marriage known to Mahomedan law or
recognised in our Courts. In the case of Mahomed Bauker Hoos-
sain v. Shurfoon Nissa, on appeal from the Supreme Court of
Madras, Lord Justice Knight Bruce, in delivering the judg
152
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
These are express and intelligible restrictions; but
whenever we have guaranteed a principality to a
Hindoo Prince, his heirs and successors, without any
qualifications or restrictions, it is quite clear that no
limited right of succession, no rule except that of the
Hindoo law in all its integrity, can have been con-
templated by either party to the treaty.
It would have been well, indeed, if the rulers of
this great Empire had always cautiously abstained
from performing those sweeping "acts of State" by
which Lord Dalhousie's administration was so dis-
creditably distinguished, until they had sounded all
the depths and shoals of the ground upon which they
were proceeding, and had ascertained that it really
would bear the enormous superstructure they wished
to build upon it. It would have been well if they
had consented simply to hear what the representatives
of princely families, threatened with extinction, had to
say as to the fact of their continued existence, when the
whole question turned upon the admission or denial of
that fact. If Lord Dalhousie and his flexible advisers in
1848 had only listened to the not very unreasonable
advice of Mr. Frere,¹ who was then Resident at Sat-
tara,—not to come to a final decision as to the right
of the last Rajah's adopted son to succeed to the
throne, until he, as well as the other claimants, had
ment of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (3rd and 4th
February, 1860), pronounced it as an old and long admitted posi-
tion, that, "according to the Mahometan law, the legitimacy or
legitimation of a child of Mahometan parents may properly be pre-
sumed or inferred from circumstances, without any direct proof,
either of a marriage between the parents, or of any formal act of
legitimation." Moore's Indian Appeals, vol. viii.
1 Now Sir Bartle Frere, K.C.B., Governor of Bombay: v. Sattara
Papers, 1819, p. 120.
:
THE RIGHT OF ADOPTION.
153
been "allowed an opportunity of stating the precise
grounds on which they claimed to be heirs,"—the in-
iquitous annexation of Sattara could never have taken
place; no fresh brand-new precedent-in default of
an old one-for the confiscation of Jhansi and Berar
would have been fabricated; and the conspiracies of
Poona, Sattara, Kolapore, and Nagpore, and the agita-
tion of the Southern Mahratta country in 1857, would
never have placed our Empire on the very verge of de-
struction.
The position of the British Government as the de
facto paramount power, and the stipulations of treaties
restricting the external action of the native States, un-
doubtedly impose upon it Imperial duties and respon-
sibilities. And I am very far from deprecating the
public avowal of these Imperial duties. On the con-
trary it appears to me that much difficulty and mis-
understanding have arisen from our imperfectly de-
fined and asserted supremacy. The disappearance of
the Company, and the assumption of direct rule by the
Queen, have rendered an open and distinct declaration
of Imperial power still more advisable and more feasi-
ble than before; and I trust that the first suitable op-
portunity will be taken to make such a declaration to
all India. But whether the Queen's supremacy re-
mains as at present tacitly assumed, or is formally
avowed and acknowledged, it must be exercised to con-
trol, to protect and to instruct, but not to confiscate,
to disinherit, or to destroy.
.
H 3
2
154
LETTER VI.
SATTARA.
!
Madras, April 1863.
A HIGHLY laudatory article in the Edinburgh Review
for January, on Lord Dalhousie's administration of
India, compels me to recur to that unpleasant subject,
the right of an adopted son to succeed to a Hindoo
principality. Associated, as this question is, with
many painful and humiliating convictions of political
ingratitude and iniquity recorded against our Govern-
ment, and, still worse, with too many instances of the
spoliation of private property, the subject is indeed
unwelcome and repulsive. But until its true bearings
are clearly understood and accepted by the English
press and public, I shall never allow an erroneous
statement of facts, or of doctrine, to pass unchallenged
and unrefuted. It is not my fault, if I am compelled
to a certain extent to combine, in one inquiry, thẹ
consideration of two perfectly distinct questions,—the
succession to sovereignties and the succession to private
estates. These questions ought undoubtedly to have
been always kept separate. But Lord Dalhousie, his
Indian advisers, and his English supporters, having
T
SATTARA.
155
first stretched the Sovereign's prerogative of receiving
homage and granting investiture, in the case of feu-
datory chiefs, jagheerdars, and holders of Inam estates,
far beyond its true limits, then proceeded to apply this
preposterously exaggerated prerogative to the case of
Sovereign Princes, with whom our relations were strictly
defined by treaty. And thus a very simple question
has become confused with false analogies, and overlaid
with false illustrations.
The Times of India¹ may claim, in common with
one or two of its Indian contemporaries, the credit of
having largely contributed to establish that altered
tone of thought and political principle throughout the
press and the official correspondence of India, which
in the fulness of time found its positive expression in
Lord Canning's Adoption despatch. I do not at
present apprehend much difference of opinion to exist
in the Indian press, either on the general question of
annexation, or on this particular topic of succession by
adoption. Even the Friend of India feels that the
atmosphere has changed; that its old standing dish
of spoliation will not go down now either raw or plain,
but requires a highly spiced sauce, in the shape of a
"Mecca pastoral," or a bouncing canard from Hyder-
abad, to make it palatable and presentable, even to the
Friend's own circle at Calcutta. There is perhaps
not a newspaper published in India, that would at
this time venture to reproduce the "ruling sanction"
in that hideous shape of "ruling disfranchisement,"
which it was uniformly made to assume during Lord
Dalhousie's eventful reign.
1 In which this Letter appeared..
156
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
But I can feel no confidence in the permanence of
the present impression. I am afraid that it is founded
much more on apathy than on sympathy, and that a
decided change in the political wind, either in London
or Calcutta, would go very far to dissipate it. The
Adoption despatches of Lord Canning and Sir Charles
Wood, followed by special letters from the Viceroy to
nearly every Prince and Chieftain of India, were indeed
received with acquiescence even among the old advo-
cates of annexation. They have not hitherto been
directly assailed, partly from a feeling very prevalent
towards the close of the rebellion, that the native
Princes had not, on the whole, been fairly appreciated
or well treated, that they had behaved well in our diffi-
culties, and deserved some boon at our hands; and
partly, but I believe to a very small extent, from
altered views, and from a suspicion that the preroga-
tive claimed by us was really not sustainable in argu-
ment, or deducible from recorded facts. The Adoption
despatch itself tacitly acknowledged, that the ima-
ginary precedents for ignoring adoptions could not be
found, did not in fact exist. Every one was willing
to drop the dispute for the time; no one was inclined
to pursue it to a conclusion,
The article in the Edinburgh Review goes much
farther than anything I have seen since 1857; and
its conclusions are eminently calculated to rejoice the
heart and revive the hopes of the Friend. And yet
the reviewer is evidently but scantily acquainted with
the controverted portion of his theme. He does not
once allude to any one of the writers who have at-
tacked and exposed Lord Dalhousie's acquisitive pro-
SATTARA.
157
ceedings; he seems never to have travelled out of the
Blue Books, and generally puts forward his apologetic
pleas and explanations in the language of Lord Dal-
housie's own Minutes, every word of which is quietly
assumed to be both logical and veracious. Thus the
annexation of Nagpore is described, in his Lordship's
own words, as "a simple lapse for want of an heir
either natural or adopted." The name of Rajah Janojee
Bhonsla, and the news of his partial recognition by
Lord Canning, have apparently not yet penetrated to
the latitude of Paternoster Row. Lord Canning's Adop-
tion despatch is not mentioned. The absolute right of
the "paramount power" in India, to prevent a suc-
cession by adoption, is taken for granted. The exer-
cise of that supposed right in the cases of Sattara and
Jhansi is upheld as wise, prudent, and beneficent. The
existence of a deliberate and systematic policy of an-
nexation during Lord Dalhousie's administration is
denied; but such a policy is indirectly commended,
and by no means deprecated for the future. The
article is neither powerfully nor pleasingly written ;
there is little attempt at research or argument; no
new information is given; but from its unimpassioned,
apparently candid, and moderate tone, and from the
high character of the Edinburgh Review, it might do
serious mischief, if allowed to circulate for any time
without a contradiction. I shall therefore offer a few
remarks on the general question, and on the particular
case of Sattara, which the reviewer, though still con-
fining himself to the Blue Book, notices at some
length.
A variety of circumstances combine to render the
ป
•
158
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
.
annexation of Sattara an extremely interesting and
important case the case of all others most suitable
for the purposes of example and illustration, and the
least open to exception by opponents. In the first
place, it is a case that can be discussed without bitter-
ness of feeling, or personal accusation against Lord
Dalhousie, for I at once admit that he was less to
blame in this particular instance than in any of the
subsequent annexations. It did not fall to him to
take the initiative; when the question came before
him, it was already prejudged by men of long official
experience and high position, whose knowledge of
Indian politics and history was naturally presumed to
be most accurate and profound. Their confident alle-
gations fell in exactly with the young Governor-
General's ambitious predilections; and taking their
conclusions as to the Hindoo Prince's rights and the
British prerogative, to be incontrovertible, he contented
himself with arguing for the general expediency of
absorbing the minor states whenever a fair opportunity
presented itself. Mr. J. P. Willoughby, then a member
of Council at Bombay, now one of Sir Charles Wood's
advisers in the Indian Council, was the real parent of
Annexation; Lord Dalhousie was only its nursing
father. Beneath his fostering care the Monster grew
to such giant proportions, and wrought such fearful
havoc, that the world has quite lost sight of the true
original Frankenstein, who probably is now by no
means anxious to claim the credit of his handiwork.
I shall endeavour to do him justice.
The annexation of Sattara was a critical measure;
it marks an epoch in our Indian policy. Colaba having
SATTARA.
159
been undeniably a petty feudatory State, over which
our Government had expressly retained the right of
investiture, the case of Sattara was the first in which
we claimed to limit and restrain the Hindoo law of
inheritance, when an adoption had been made by a
Sovereign who had always been treated by us with
great form and ceremonial as a royal personage, and
with whom, "his heirs and successors," we had con-
cluded a treaty of "perpetual friendship and alliance.”
Without this precedent, the annexation of Nagpore
could never have taken place.
I would say of the Rajah of Sattara, as I have just
said of the Nawab of the Carnatic, that, if no such
potentate had existed, we ought to have invented
him. But those bulwarks of political stability and
social order, a popular line of Princes, and a terri-
torial nobility, cannot always be invented, or made at
a moment's notice, or even revived, although they may
have been very easily destroyed. We may yet feel
the want of them in many parts of India where they
formerly did us good service.
If the Rajah of Sattara had cost the Imperial Go-
vernment the full amount of his personal expenditure,
the money would have been well laid out. But he,
in fact, cost us nothing. The small force usually
stationed at Sattara could safely have been with-
drawn at any time, if required elsewhere, while the
Rajah would still have been responsible for the peace
of his country. The province of Sattara, since the
annexation, has never paid its own expenses. The
Rajah was also bound by treaty to furnish a small
but useful body of Irregular Cavalry, on our requisi-
凯
​י
.
160
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
tion, in time of war. But the value of any material
aid in men or money that the Rajah of Sattara, or
any other native Sovereign could afford us in time of
war or rebellion, would have been as nothing when
compared with the moral support of his faithful ad-
herence. It was the example and demeanour of the
Rajah of Puttiala, the leading Sikh chief, that deterred
the other Princes on the Punjaub frontier, and the
Sikh troops and people, from joining in the revolt at
the most dangerous crisis, and kept them steady in
their allegiance and duty. Had the signal been given
by an influential chieftain, not all Sir John Lawrence's
exertions, nor even the 12,000 British soldiers he had
in the Punjaub at the outbreak of the mutinies, could
have prevented that tremendous accession to the ranks
of the rebellion.
The Rajah of Sattara, though endowed with only a
small territory, (which might have been extended
with great advantage to us,) and though not of such
pure and ancient lineage as the Rajpoot Princes, was
yet regarded throughout India not only as the most
illustrious of the Mahratta Rajahs, but as pre-
eminently the Hindoo of the Hindoos, the repre-
sentative of that mighty warrior Sivajee, who avenged
seven hundred years of national degradation, humbled
the Mogul Emperor, restored the splendour and pub-
licity of Hindoo worship, and founded a great Hindoo
confederation on the ruins of Mahomedan supremacy.
The good will and manifest subordination of this pe-
culiarly popular Sovereign, secured to us by the wise
policy of Mountstuart Elphinstone and Lord Hastings,
ought to have been considered as forming a natural
"
SATTARA.
161
and essential element in the Imperial system, and
would have been of inestimable value during the dan-
gers and difficulties of 1857. The re-establishment of
the dignity of the Peishwas,-the faithless officials
who had for several generations usurped their master's
authority, and from whose custody the last Rajah had
been rescued by a British army,-would have been
even more threatening to the Rajah of Sattara than
to the British Government; and such a proclamation
as would necessarily have been issued by a reigning
Rajah of Sattara under our guidance, would have made
a pretender like the Nana powerless and ridiculous,
and would have retained the adherents of Scindia,
Holkar, and the other ancient Mahratta feudatories,
in a state of obedience to their rulers, and of cheerful
reliance on the wisdom and power of the Company
Bahadoor.
But as a direct consequence of Lord Dalhousie's
contempt for such remote considerations, and of the
flagrant repudiation of all our pledges of protection and
fair dealing, evinced by the annexations of the friendly
and well-governed states of Sattara, Jhansi and Nag-
pore, the minor chieftains and military classes of Gwa-
lior and Indore, Kolapore, and the Southern Mahratta
country, were thoroughly roused, alarmed, and exas-
perated, and believing from the moral deterioration of
our rule,-for such was the prevailing superstition,-
that it was drawing to its destined close, they were
prepared for some great change, welcomed the bloody
scenes of 1857, and prepared to take part in our de-
struction. The Sovereigns themselves, and their im-
mediate families and ministers, having larger views,
162
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
greater interests at stake, and better means of infor-
mation, attempted with but partial success to stem the
tide; but the universal feeling was against us.
•
Rajah Appah Sahib, the younger of the two brothers
whom we released from the Peishwa's power after the
battle of Ashtee, died on the 5th April, 1848, aged 46,
having on his death-bed adopted as his son and suc-
cessor a youth of the Bhonsla family, lineally de-
scended from the great Sivajee's uncle. Of the regu-
larity and propriety of the adoption, according to
Hindoo law and Mahratta custom, there never was
any question.
The majority of the Bombay Council, and of the
Supreme Government, rejected this successor, on the
ground that no one but a lineal descendant of one of
the two last reigning Rajahs, with whom we had con-
cluded treaties, had any right to succeed without our
express permission.
The Edinburgh Reviewer hardly does justice to
the personal weight and ability of the official oppo-
nents by whom the new doctrines of annexation were
resisted in India and in the Court of Directors, when
he summarises the course of the discussion in the fol-
lowing perfunctory style :-"Sir George Clerk, who
was then Governor of Bombay, alone of all the autho-
rities in India was in favour of allowing the succession
of the child. He admitted that the adoption required
our sanction. He admitted that no uniform rule of
practice required us to give it. But he held that the
'treaty' securing the principality to 'heirs and suc-
cessors,' included heirs by adoption as well as heirs by
birth." (p. 18.) "In these views the Governor of
SATTARA.
163
Bombay could not carry his Conncil with him. On
the main point his arguments were conclusively an-
swered in an able paper by Mr. Willoughby. The
new Governor who succeeded when the question was
still pending-Lord Falkland-adopted, after full con-
sideration, the opinion of the Council; and the Go-
vernor-General, in a Minute marked by all his vigour
and ability, gave his voice against the continuance of
the principality, both on the ground of right and on
the ground of policy. The Court of Directors, by a
large majority representing the weight of opinion not
less than the weight of numbers, adopted the view of
the Governor-General."
I cannot agree with the reviewer's estimate of the
majority in the Court of Directors: the names of
Messrs. Henry St. George Tucker, John Shepherd,
William Leslie Melville, Major Oliphant and General
Caulfield, all of whom recorded written dissents against
the annexation, appear to me to outweigh in authority
and distinction the name of Mr. Ross Donnelly Mangles
-the only Director who gave his reasons in writing,—
as clearly and as brilliantly as their arguments out-
shine his sophisms and dispel his forced illustrations.
But the entire effect of the article is produced by a
series of these rhetorical assumptions. The general
tenor and effect of Sir George Clerk's Minute is by no
means adequately or accurately conveyed in the re-
viewer's summary. Sir George Clerk did indeed admit
"that the adoption required our sanction,"-" by cus-
tom,”—but the reviewer omits to mention that he
immediately asks the question, "Can we, without in-
justice, exercise that right of sanction to the extent of
164
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
prohibiting adoption?" This question, after an able
argument, he answers in the negative, on grounds both
of justice and expediency.
The fact is, that the reviewer, following the Minutes
of Lord Dalhousie and his advisers, succumbs to that
enormous fallacy, which is perhaps most concisely
stated in the words of Mr. Lestock Reid, who was then
a member of the Bombay Council,—“A right to grant
implies a right to withhold such sanction." The
whole transaction was made to depend on this falla-
cious dogma, strengthened by our own false precedent
of Colaba. The reviewer does not quote the follow-
ing very explicit statement from Sir George Clerk's
Minute :—“To judge from the expression of 'perpetual
friendship' to a man, his heirs and successors,' these
ordinarily would seem to mean a sovereignty which
should not lapse for want of heirs, so long as there
is any one who can succeed, according to the usages of
the people to whom the treaty refers. The lad now
adopted by the Rajah is such a successor." Having
thus lightly skipped over Sir George Clerk's weighty
opposition, the reviewer relieves himself from dealing
directly with his arguments by observing that they
"were conclusively answered in an able paper by Mr.
Willoughby."
Lord Falkland, the next "authority" referred to by
the reviewer, succeeded Sir George Clerk as Governor
a few days after the latter had recorded his views on
the subject, and we know from the revelations arising
1 Annexation of Sattara, 1849, p. 62.
2 Ditto, 1849, p. 65.
3 Ditto, p. 62; §7 of the Minute.
SATTARA.
165
from the Baroda Khutput scandals that his Lordship's
Minutes were usually written by the Chief Secretary,
or one of his assistants.¹ I cannot, therefore, consider
Lord Falkland's paper as a distinct and independent
expression of opinion. It emanated from the Secre-
tariat, of which Mr. Willoughby had so long been the
presiding genius, and over which he still exercised
a complete influence and control, and it is obviously
and almost avowedly a mere paraphrase and echo of
that gentleman's "very able Minute."
We now come to Lord Dalhousie's Minute; and not-
withstanding the reviewer's admiration of its "vigour
and ability," we may look in vain for any evidence of
research or inquiry, or even of thought, on a subject
so worthy of careful consideration. Lord Dalhousie,
like Lord Falkland, trusts implicitly to Mr. Willoughby,
appeals to his "demonstration," adopts his conclusions,.
and reiterates with undoubted vigour his assertion of
paramount prerogative. But he does not think it ne-
cessary, any more than Mr. Willoughby, to explain
why not a single precedent can be produced for the
exercise of that right of the extinction of sovereignties
which, according to him, "appears to have ever been
the practice throughout all the states of India." How
it can "appear" to have been the practice, without a
single instance of the practice appearing in the history
or in the political records of India, it still remains for
some admirer of Lord Dalhousie to teach us.
We are
thus left face to face with Mr. Willoughby. Lord
¹ Letter to the Daily News, by L. R. Reid, Esq. (Smith, Elder,
and Co., 1853), p. 5. See also the Parliamentary Papers, Baroda,
1852, p. 1115.
2 Annexation of Sattara, 1849, p. 81.
166
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
Falkland, Lord Dalhousie, the Court of Directors, and
the Edinburgh Reviewer, all refer us to that gentle-
man for the arguments on their side. If, therefore, I
can effectually refute those arguments, my task will be
completely accomplished.
The staple of Mr. Willoughby's argument, the major
premiss upon which he rests his whole cause, consists
in an incessant reference to some precedent, or series
of precedents, which he declares to have come down
to the British Government from "the Governments
which preceded us," "the universal and immemorial
custom of India," "the imperial house of Delhi,” and
so forth. All this is very confidently and very posi-
tively urged, and had, as we have seen, a very
convincing and comforting effect upon those great
"authorities" of the Edinburgh Review, who had
made up their minds to annex already: but to any
one who brings an unbiassed mind to bear upon the
subject, Mr. Willoughby's Minute presents a most
curious aspect. We find him persistently pointing
out a precedent to us, which appears to recede as we
advance. He assures us that he has hunted it out,
and has got it, but he concludes and departs, without
having either displayed its beauties, or declared its
qualities, or even told us its name.
"A more important question," says Mr. Wil-
loughby, "than that of the continuance or extinction
of the Sattara State has not arisen since I became a
member of this Government. It does not affect that
State exclusively, but raises the general question of
what is the right policy to be pursued towards any
other native State of India under similar circum-
SATTARA.
167
stances. In other words, it raises the question, whe-
ther on failure of heirs natural it is expedient to
absorb them in the general sovereignty of the Anglo-
Indian empire, or to continue them by the Hindoo
custom of adoption."
It appears somewhat ominous and threatening that
at the very opening of his Minute, and before he has
alluded to the possibility of there being any claim of
right involved, Mr. Willoughby proposes to treat the
question as one of expediency. However, on the
whole, the temper and spirit in which he professes to
enter on the discussion are quite unobjectionable. "A
question of this grave and comprehensive character
can only be determined after much study and research,
and the most dispassionate consideration, and with a
full knowledge of the prerogatives vested in the go-
vernments we have succeeded."1 All this is very fair
and proper; nothing can be more reasonable and equit-
able than Mr. Willoughby's declared intentions. But
I am compelled to ask, after carefully perusing his
Minute, where is there any sign or symptom of "the
study and research" which he admits ought to have
been employed in discussing this very important case?
He asserts in various passages that it is our
doubted prerogative to refuse to recognise heirs by
adoption ;" he says that "the imperial house of Delhi
would have exercised this prerogative in the days of
its vigour," but not a particle or a vestige of docu-
mentary evidence of this prerogative, not a historical
fact bearing upon it, not a single precedent can be
adduced from the records of any one of "the Govern-
1 Annexation of Sattara, 1849, p. 67.
un-
168
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
ments that preceded us." The only precedent he pro-
duces is that of Colaba, which was one of our own
creation, and had occurred just five years before the
date of Mr. Willoughby's minute. The fact is, that
no other precedent could be found.
I endeavoured to prove in the last Letter, that the
"ruling sanction," even as applied to petty feudatories
and hereditary zemindars, was not a right of forbid-
ding or annulling, or ignoring, but simply the right
of regulating adoptions, asserting supremacy, and en-
forcing subordination; and that the right of investiture
was not a right of refusing investiture. Even in the
case of hereditary zemindars and inamdars, we have,
therefore, never justly possessed the right of disallow-
ing adoptions for our own purposes: even where we
had retained or acquired the prerogative of investiture
over minor principalities, we had no more right to
forbid the succession of an adopted son than of a
lineal male descendant. But with respect to Hindoo
Princes, with whom we had contracted treaties of
perpetual friendship and alliance, this new claim of
mutilating and perverting their law of inheritance so
as to corrupt the blood of all collaterals, of all cog-
nates, and of all agnates, except the lineal male descend-
ants of the first Prince who was induced to become our
ally, rests upon no precedent whatever, and upon no
analogy except the false analogy of Colaba,-which in
1848 was a very recent confiscation. This prepos-
terous claim had its origin, and depends for its justifi-
cation, entirely upon the bold and confident assertions
of Mr. J. P. Willoughby, without a vestige of histori-
cal, legal, or documentary proof.
SATTARA.
169
.
The following sentence from Mr. Willoughby's
"very able Minute" contains what is perhaps at once
the boldest, the most confident, and the most utterly
unfounded of these momentous assertions :-
"No member of any of the other branches of
Sivajee's family can have any claim to the posses-
sions held under the treaty of 1819, which in fact
created the State, and limited the succession to the
descendants of the party on whom it was gratuitously
conferred."1 Now, it is perfectly true that, without a
duly solemnised adoption by the Rajah or his widow,
no particular member of Sivajee's family could claim
the succession; it is also quite true that the treaty of
1819 did "in fact create the State." The Rajah,
though titular Suzerain of all the Mahrattas, had been
a mere political puppet and prisoner, we had never
had any connection or communication with his ances-
tors or with him, but had always dealt with the
Peishwa as the real and recognised executive head of
the Mahratta confederation. The dominions under
the Peishwa's government were fairly conquered in a
war which he commenced himself by an unprovoked
and treacherous aggression; and while the Rajah of
Sattara was established by the treaty of 1819 as the
ruling Sovereign of a portion of those conquered do-
minions, the Governor-General, Lord Hastings, very
judiciously thought fit,-following the precedent and
language of the treaty by which the central portion
of Tippoo's conquered territories was, under similar
circumstances, allotted to the Rajah of Mysore,—to
employ such terms in that treaty as should be a per-
1 Sattara Papers, 1849, p. 121.
I
170
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
petual bar to the revival of the Rajah's federal pre-
tensions, a perpetual record of his obligations to the
British Government. Certainly, I have no objection
to admit that the State of Sattara was "created" by
the treaty of 1819, or, even to use Mr. Willoughby's
other formula, and say that it was "gratuitously con-
ferred." These studied phrases of covert disparage-
ment can bring no aid to Mr. Willoughby's cause,
unless, indeed, he can quietly lead us to the strange
conclusion that whatever has been "gratuitously con-
ferred," can at any convenient opportunity be arbi-
trarily resumed by the donor. This would indeed be
a new interpretation of the word "gratuitous." And
yet from the general tenor of Mr. Willoughby's argu-
ment, he really seems to aim at such a conclusion,
since he actually does claim for the British Govern-
ment, notwithstanding the silence of the treaty, and
on no grounds but these "creative" and "gratuitous'
grounds, not only an implied right of investiture, but
also a constructive right of confiscation.
Still Mr. Willoughby is not satisfied with the silence
of the treaty. He does not feel sufficiently strong
with his implied right of investiture, or with his con-
structive right of confiscation, or with his wonderful
array of indefeasible and invisible precedents; he is
not content with saying that the British Government,
by the treaty of 1819, "created" the State of Sattara,
and "gratuitously conferred" it upon the Rajah,-
which I do not dispute,-but he must force the silent
treaty to speak. And here I think he goes too far.
He distinctly states in this same passage, which I have
quoted at full length, that the treaty of 1819 "limited
SATTARA.
171
the succession to the descendants" of the other con-
tracting party. This is not one of those statements of
equivocal meaning in which Lord Dalhousie rejoiced;
it is simply a mis-statement. In the treaty of 1819
there is not one word of "descendants;" there is not
one word of limitation. Treaties have been made in
more than one instance, as I have already pointed out,
with a limitation to the descendants of the other con-
tracting party; but the treaty with the Rajah of
Sattara is not one of those treaties. It purports to
be a treaty of "perpetual friendship and alliance
with the Rajah of Sattara, his heirs and successors,
and contains nothing whatever to restrain the opera-
tion of the ordinary law of inheritance. But Mr.
Willoughby's groundless assertion to the contrary
passed current at Calcutta.
ور
Mr. Willoughby's decree of annexation having
passed triumphantly through the Supreme Council,
then came before the Court of Directors and the
Board of Control in London. It was here unsuccess-
fully resisted, as already mentioned, by Messrs. H.
St. George Tucker, W. L.
Melville and J. Shepherd,
General Caulfield and Major Oliphant. Mr. R. D.
Mangles replied to the written protests of the minority
in a long paper "exhibiting," as he said, "in detail
the grounds on which the annexation was approved ;"
and the majority of the Directors expressed their
general concurrence in his remarks.
There is very
little new matter brought forward by Mr. Mangles;
he reiterates Mr. Willoughby's version of the ruling
sanction, extending, as that gentleman did, the right
1 Ante, p. 151.
I 2
172
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
.
to be consulted and to regulate successions, into the
right to disallow and ignore adoptions. But the utter
impossibility, after the most audacious assertions, of
producing a single precedent, or the semblance of a
precedent, from the practice of any ancient or modern
Government in India, receives its final confirmation
from the ridiculous and solitary instance which Mr.
Mangles offers as "a case in point."
"It will be remembered," says he, "that in the re-
cent instance of Kristna Rao, whose father by adoption
had received a grant of a nemnook from the Guicowar
(the sunnud conferring which was couched in quite
as strong terms, as respects hereditary descent in per-
petuity, as our agreement in 1819 with the Rajah of
Sattara), although there has been great diversity of
opinion, both in this country and in India, as to the
manner in which the claim ought to be disposed of,
the right of the Guicowar to put a limit to his own
grant, by refusing to recognise the adoption continuing
the family of the grantee, as far as succession to the
nemnook is concerned, has been admitted by all.” ¹
Mr. Mangles must have been in fearful straits for
a precedent when he presented such an absurd case as
this. He instinctively tries to gloss over the extrava-
gance of this false analogy, by disguising the treaty
under the vague and colourless appellation of an
agreement." The document granting an annuity to
the family of a subject and servant, is compared by
him with a treaty of "perpetual friendship and alli-
ance" made with a Sovereign, "his heirs and suc-
cessors." A nemnook is a hereditary pension in money,
1 Annexation of Sattara, 1849, p. 148,

SATTARA.
173
usually connected with some honorary or sinecure
office. Mr. Mangles consequently argues that if a
Government can abolish a sinecure office or stop a
political stipend, it can also confiscate a great noble-
man's estate, or annex a dependent principality. It
is as if some Radical politician in England were to
maintain, that as Parliament had abolished the offices
of Deputy Chaff-wax and first Lord of the Powder-
closet, and had commuted the annual charge on the
Post Office Revenue enjoyed by some noble family, it
ought next to proceed to resume the Duke of Bedford's
manors, and ultimately to annex the kingdoms of
Greece and Portugal.
!
174
LETTER VII.
NAGPORE.
2
.
It is the unanimous testimony of all persons possess→
ing local knowledge and experience, that at no native
Court in India was there so complete and cordial a
recognition of British supremacy entertained and en-
couraged, as there was at the Court of Nagpore, during
the last few years of its political existence. Rughojee
Bhonsla the 3rd, Rajah of Nagpore, died on the 11th
December, 1853, at the age of 47, and after a few
days' illness. The Banka Baee, widow of Rughojee
the 2nd, a lady of great talents and energy, who had
been Regent during her grandson's minority, and who
had for upwards of fifty years exercised a dominant
influence both in domestic and public affairs, proposed
that Yeshwunt Rao Aher Rao, commonly called Appa
Sahib, the deceased Rajah's grand-nephew, should at
once be adopted as a son, but that no public ceremony,
installation or procession should take place until the
approval and sanction of the Governor-General had
been obtained. The wishes of the Ranees were com-
municated to Mr. Mansel the Resident, who, adhering
NAGPORE.
175
to the standing instructions of his office, would neither
forbid nor give any "special encouragement" to the
proposal,¹ but distinctly said that he would not recog-
nise an adoption in any manner, until the orders of
the Supreme Government were received. The cere-
monies of adoption were then duly performed in the
Palace, and the funeral rites were celebrated by Appa
Sahib, who subsequently received the name of Janojee
Bhonsla. On the 28th January, 1854, little more than
a month after the Rajah's decease, Lord Dalhousie re-
corded a Minute declaring that there was no heir or
representative of the Bhonsla family, no claimant to
the musnud of Nagpore, and that the sovereignty had
"lapsed" to the paramount power. The Council, with
the exception of General Low, concurred with the
Governor-General, and the orders for annexation were
at once issued and executed.
The unequivocal inherent rights of Appa Sahib, the
natural, intended, and adopted heir to the musnud,
were strangely underrated and overlooked after the
Rajah's death, which can only be attributed to the
inability of the Ranees to plead their own cause, and
to their actual ignorance of what adverse case, what
objections of fact or law, were set up against them.
They indeed did not anticipate that any objections
would be made the annexation came upon them like
a thunder-bolt. Lord Dalhousie, in pars. 9, 17, and
27 of his Minute of the 28th January, 1854,2 three
times in the same terms, objects to "the gratuitous
alienation of the State of Nagpore in favour of a
:
1 First Nagpore Blue book, 1854, p. 56.
2 Ditto, pp. 23, 26, 30.
*
་
176
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
Mahratta youth." In par. 28 of the same Minute,¹
his Lordship states "the simple question for determi-
nation is, whether the sovereignty of Nagpore, which
was bestowed as a gift on a Goojur in 1818, shall now
be conferred upon somebody else, as a gift a second
time." In par. 14 of his Lordship's farewell Minute
reviewing his administration, dated the 28th February,
1856, he states that the sovereignty of Nagpore "was
left without a claimant," and "the British Government
refused to bestow the territory in free gift upon a
stranger." Neither in Lord Dalhousie's Minutes, nor
in those of the Members of the Supreme Council, is
there any serious discussion of Appa Sahib's claims ;
there is scarcely any allusion to his existence. It may
not, therefore, be considered out of place, if I endeavour
to supply former deficiencies and to elucidate his real
position by birth and by adoption.
According to a family custom, applicable only to the
lineal descendants of the Rajahs, his mother Myna Baee,
the late Rajah's niece, and great-grand-daughter of
Rughojee the 2nd, came to reside in the Palace a short
time before her confinement, and was there delivered
of a son on the 14th August, 1834. On his birth
being announced, a salute of twenty-one guns was fired
in the public square of the Palace, and a feu de joie
was fired by the Rajah's Artillery and Infantry. And on
the 25th of the same month the principal Chiefs and
Ministers of the Court visited the Resident on the part
of the Rajah, for the purpose of distributing sugar on
the occasion. At the birth of no other person now
1 First Nagpore Blue-book, p. 30.
2 Sugar is sent to relatives and intimate friends by a Hindoo
NAGPORE.
177
living in Nagpore were such honours paid, or such a
communication made to the British Resident. This
boy was brought up entirely as a child of the Palace,
in which he much more usually resided than in his
own father's house. Wherever he went, ten or twelve
of the Mahratta and Mussulman Maunkurrees (here-
ditary officers of rank and family) were appointed to
attend upon him, spearmen and other servants, horses
and elephants from the Rajah's establishment, were
detailed for his service and retinue. Directions re-
garding his education and companions were always
given by the Rajah himself. As he grew older, he ac-
companied the Rajah on all his progresses through the
country, and sat by his side on public occasions in
durbar and on his visits to the Resident. The Rajah
would not permit his marriage to take place, a cere-
mony which among the Nagpore Mahrattas is usually
celebrated at a very early age, but the conclusion of
which precludes subsequent adoption. In a few words,
as year by year the prospects of the Rajah having legi-
timate off-spring appeared to diminish, all the family
and followers of the Court became accustomed to look
upon Appa Sahib as the destined successor to the
musnud. But for Lord Dalhousie's extraordinary
Minute of the 28th January, 1854, in which he stated
that the musnud was left "without a claimant," in
which he alluded to Appa Sahib as "a Mahratta
youth," and finally as "a stranger;" but for the fiat
of the Honourable Company's Government, this young
father when a son is born in his house. On this occasion it clearly
signified the birth of an heir presumptive to the Rajah, whose
health was frequently very delicate at this period, and who had
been married for three years without issue.
•
1 3
178
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
man would undoubtedly have been the Rajah of
Nagpore.
The entire contents of pars. 15 and 16 of Lord
Dalhousie's Minute ¹ before mentioned, avowedly
founded on nothing but inferences and surmise, con-
vey an impression directly opposed to the real cir-
cumstances which followed the death of the late
Rajah. There never was the slightest difference of
opinion or jealousy between the Banka Baee and the
other Ranees; there never was the least doubt or
question among them as to their right to adopt, or
as to the advisability of adoption, or as to the person
to be adopted. Appa Sahib was at once summoned
by the Banka Baee and by Anpoorna Baee, the senior
widow; and at the request of both these Ranees, his
father Nana Aher Rao, and his mother Myna Baee,
formally, and in presence of all the assembled rela-
tives, consented to resign him to Anpoorna Baee. The
Banka Baee proposed that until the orders of the
Supreme Government were received, the public cere-
mony of giving a new name to the young Rajah, and
the usual procession and installation, should not take
place; and while this question was being debated in
the family circle, the information that the Resident
had ordered seals to be put on the Treasury and Jewel
Office, and had otherwise taken measures for exercising
all authority in his own person, decided it in favour
of the Banka Baee's consistently submissive policy.
The Baee said at that time, and on many subsequent
occasions, that she had already seen the affairs of the
Nagpore State settled several times by orders from
1 First Nagpore Blue-book, pp. 24 26.
NAGPORE.
179
Y
Calcutta, and that she had no doubt they would be
settled once more on the old terms. Mr. Mansel's
kind, considerate, and consolatory manner and ex-
pressions, still more tended to confirm the Ranees as
to the prudence and propriety of trusting to his good
offices, and to the friendship of the Honourable Com-
pany. It is remarkable that General Low, in pars.
26, 38, and 41 of his second Minute¹ of the 11th
February 1854, with singular accuracy divined and
described the state of affairs and of feeling at Nagpore
on the subject of adoption. The Ranees and their
advisers having indicated their wishes to the British
Resident, waited patiently for the orders of the Su-
preme Government. And yet, although no reference
was made to the Ranees during the consultations of
Government, and although, after the orders for an-
nexation had been communicated to them, the Ranees
protested against them and begged that their adoption
of Appa Sahib should be recognised and approved, so
permanent appears to have been the misunderstanding
produced by the original imperfect explanation, that
in his farewell Minute of the 28th February 1856,
para. 14, Lord Dalhousie writes as follows:-"No
son had been born to his Highness; none was adopted
by him; none, as they have themselves admitted, was
adopted at the Rajah's death, by the Ranees his
widows." This is extraordinarily and inexplicably
erroneous. The Ranees, so far from admitting any-
thing of the sort, have never ceased to the best of
their poor ability to press the claims of their adopted
son upon the Government.
¹ First Nagpore Blue-book, pp. 48-50.
180
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
1
But Lord Dalhousie has intimated in para. 27 of his
Minute ¹ that he should under any circumstances have
been prepared to offer his decided opposition to the
approval by the British Government of any adoption
by the Rajah or by the Ranees. His Lordship denies
the legal validity of any such adoption until confirmed
by the paramount power; and paras. 19 to 24 inclu-
sive are devoted to disproving a supposed plea that
the British Government was bound to recognise suc-
cession by adoption in the Bhonsla family, because it
had already recognised the right of adoption in the
elevation of the late Rajah to the musnud on the
deposition of Appa Sahib in 1818. In order to give
a full exposition of all the various phases of this re-
markable case, I shall proceed to point out the con-
fused and erroneous nature of Lord Dalhousie's com-
ments on the events attending the late Rajah's succes-
sion to the musnud, and of his inferences and arguments
founded thereon. The conclusion arrived at is contained
in a sentence of paragraph 19 of the Minute :-"The
Government of India in 1818 did not recognise that
the Nagpore succession had passed by adoption, and
did not place the late Rughojee on the musnud be-
cause he had been adopted into the Bhonsla family."
This is a mere discursive objection, which at once
raises a false issue, and implies an absolute falsity.
No one ever maintained or imagined that the late
Rajah was placed on the musnud "because he had
been adopted;” most certainly none of the family, or
any native politician or pundit, could ever have made
1 First Nagpore Blue-book, p. 30.
2 Ditto, p. 27.
NAGPORE.
181
1
use of such an incorrect expression. He was placed
on the musnud because he was the next heir; and he
was adopted because he was the next heir. On the
other hand the British Government in 1818 had never
pretended-though Lord Dalhousie insinuates it had,
-to the prerogative of sanctioning or forbidding
adoptions, or of interfering with the Hindoo law of
inheritance in the succession to Hindoo sovereignties.
That political heresy arose at a much later period.
What really occurred in 1818 was very simple, and
can be easily explained. The British Government
having subdued the hostile party at Nagpore, and
deposed the faithless Appa Sahib, decided not to en-
force the penalties of conquest, and not to expel the
Bhonsla dynasty: therefore the late Rajah's right to
the succession became good; and as next heir he had
a right to be adopted as a Bhonsla. But the Hindoo
religious ceremony of adoption was a matter that con-
cerned the Rajah and his relations much more than it
did our Government, which was in fact quite indiffe-
rent on the subject.
It is not correct that the late Rajah was adopted,-
as Lord Dalhousie states," long after" his installa-
tion. His Lordship appears to lay some stress on the
supposed want of connection between the two cere-
monies.¹ But the truth is that the late Rajah,-as
stated in Sir R. Jenkins's Nagpore Report, p. 137,
and as I have ascertained beyond a doubt from mem-
bers of the family who were present on the occasion,
-was adopted by Rajah Pursojee's widow, and placed
¹ Vide para. 19, 20, 21, and 22 of his Minute, First Nagpore
Blue-book, p. 27-28.
182
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
:
•
upon the musnud as Rughojee Bhonsla the 3rd on the
same day, the 26th June 1818. The solemnities for
which the presence of Goojabba Dada, the eldest male
of the family, was required, and which were deferred
until his arrival, were the ceremony of the adopting
Ranee taking her son through the city to the temple
of Jagheshwur, and the other rejoicings usual on the
accession of a Rajah, the very same ceremonies that
were deferred in 1853 until the pleasure of the Supreme
Government should be known, and which were not fully
performed until August 1856, when the Ranees took
their adopted son in solemn procession to the temple,
and publicly acknowledged him as the head of their
family under his new name of Janojee Bhonsla.
In 1818 the late Rajah's position as next heir was
indubitable and undisputed. Not only was he the
grandson of Rughojee the 2nd, but a large party in
the family and among the nobles of Nagpore, had con-
sidered him to be the rightful heir on the death of his
uncle Pursojee, to the exclusion of Appa Sahib, who
was Pursojee's first cousin. The accompanying genea-
logical tree will make the various points of the case
quite clear and distinct. It will be observed that
Janojee Bhonsla is the grandson of the late Rajah's
sister, and a lineal descendant of the late Rajah's
grandfather, Rughojee the 2nd; while Yeshwunt Rao
Goojur, called by Mr. Mansel, the Resident, "another
pretender to the throne," 1 is only descended from the
late Rajah's grandfather's sister.
1 First Nagpore Blue-book, p. 20.
NAGPORE.
183

SENA SAHIB SOOBA LINE.
RAJAH RUGHOJEE
the 1st
Sena Sahib Sooba.
RAJAH JANOJEE
Sena Sahib Sooba.
adopted his nephew.
1
RAJAH RUGHOJEE
the 2nd
Sena Sahib Sooba.
Bunna Baee
married to
Nana Goojur.
SENA DHOORUNDHUR LINE.
MOODHOJEE
Sena Dhoorundhur.
YENKOJEE
Sena Dhoorundhur.
APPA SAHIB
Sena Dhoorundhur,
Tuckoo Bace
married
to Yeshwunt Rao
Goojur.


afterwards Rajah, Goojabba Dada.
RAJAH PURSOJEE
Sena Sahib Sooba.
his widow adopted
his nephew.
RAJAH RUGĦOJEE
the 3rd
deposed,
and died
without issue.
Yeshwunt
Chitko Baee
married to
Rao
Goojur.
Sena Sahib Sooba. Yellojee Mohitay.

his widow adopted
his grand nephew.
APPA SAHIB
now
JANOJEE BHONSLA.
Myna Baee
married to
Nana Aher Rao.
According to Hindoo belief, not only temporal but
eternal happiness depends on having a son. A son or
male descendant alone, by performing the Sraddh or
offerings for the dead parent or ancestor, can obtain
rest for his departed spirit. Hence the adoption of a
son, in default of legitimate issue, is a religious obliga-
tion. Thus, for instance, Rajah Janojee was obliged by
the strictest precepts of his religion to have a son to
perform his funeral rites; and this son, whether of his
body or of adoption, must of necessity be his heir.
But he was also bound by an old established Mahratta
4
184
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
7
custom, founded on the wisest principles of state
policy and in perfect harmony with Hindoo law, to
choose his nearest male relative, in the male line of
descent, and in a lower generation to himself,-a
brother, or a cousin in a corresponding generation or
equal degree of descent, being considered on an
In
equality and incapable of being adopted as a son.
due course, therefore, he adopted Rughojee, the eldest
son of his brother Moodhojee, who was himself, ac-
cording to our notions, the next heir.
Again Rajah Pursojee was obliged to have a son to
perform his funeral rites; and a son of Appa Sahib,
his first cousin, being the nearest relation in the male
line and in a lower generation, would have been the
undoubted heir, entitled to be adopted by Pursojee or
his widow. But Appa Sahib himself,-although ac-
cording to European ideas the presumptive heir,-
being in a corresponding or equal generation to Pur-
sojee, was absolutely incapable of adoption as his son.
Appa Sahib had no son, and therefore as he was the
last descendant in the male line, the right of succes-
sion by adoption fell, by the Mahratta rule referred to
at page 146 of Jenkins' Report, to the nearest de-
scendant in the female line from the founder of the
dynasty, "the nearest male descendant of the last
Rajah who had any (offspring)." This was the late
Rajah, the grandson of Rughojee the 2nd and Pur-
sojee's nephew, who was also preferred as a direct de-
scendant in the Sena Sahib Sooba line, while Appa
Sahib, although descended through males, was the
third in descent in the collateral line of Sena Dhoor-
1 Ante, p. 144.
NAGPORE.
185
undhur, that secondary title and its appanage of
Chanda having been enjoyed by himself, his father,
and his grandfather. Appa Sahib, by his position in
the family, undoubtedly had the right of regency and
guardianship during Pursojee's incapacity and his suc-
cessor's minority; but Appa Sahib's first and most
sacred duty was, either during Pursojee's life or at his
death, to effect the adoption by Pursojee or his widow
of the late Rajah. This duty he evaded; and it was
to prevent the adoption being effected by other mem-
bers of the family, that he imprisoned the Banka
Baee, caused Goojabba Dada to fly for his life to Alla-
habad, murdered Dhurmajee Bhonsla, and at last had
Pursojee himself put to death. He then with daring
impiety himself performed Pursojee's funeral rites,
and usurped the succession. The Banka Baee was at
the head of the opposition party; and could they have
obtained the countenance of the British Resident,
they were quite strong enough, with her talents, in-
fluence and popularity, to have restrained Appa Sahib
from all interference in the Government during the
life of Pursojee, and at his death to have placed the
late Rajah on the musnud as his adopted son.¹
If these facts did not entirely escape the notice and
attention of Lord Dalhousie, he strangely misinter-
preted their import. In para. 20 of the same Minute²
his Lordship thus remarks on the policy of the Mar-
quis of Hastings :-"The Governor-General regarded
1 "The present ruler of Nagpore," writes Sir John Malcolm to
Lord Hastings in 1817, "sought our alliance to fix him on a dis-
puted throne." Malcolm's Political History of India, vol. ii, Appen-
dix, p. cxlv. And in the same work, vol. i, p. 503, he says:-
"Appah Sahib was in a great degree indebted for his elevation to
the English government."
2 First Nagpore Blue-book, p. 27.
186
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
the Nagpore State as forfeited by the acts of Appa
Sahib, and the treaty of alliance at an end. The
Governor-General thereupon resolved to set up a boy,
whom he selected to be Rajah, with a regency which
he also selected. No reference whatever was made
to adoption. The Governor-General selected this boy,
not because adoption gave him a claim, for he was
not adopted till long afterwards;¹ but because policy
recommended him as one who had a party in the
State and in the family, and who was therefore likely
to be acceptable. In one word the Government re-
garded the State of Nagpore as absolutely at its dis-
posal. It bestowed the sovereignty upon the person
whom it thought best; and it conferred the gift upon
him under the influence of no consideration, but its
own free will and pleasure."
▸
A more correct description of these measures and
of their grounds may, I believe, be very plainly and
simply stated thus:-the State of Nagpore was un-
doubtedly at the disposal of the British Government,
which had, in consequence of Appa Sahib's treacherous
hostility, obtained the full rights of conquest; but
from motives of generosity and policy it waived those
rights and allowed the next of kin to succeed. It
is expressly stated in the preamble to the treaty of
1826 that "The Maharajah Rughojee Bhonsla having
succeeded to the same by the favour of the said Go-
vernment, the following treaty is concluded." Whether
Appa Sahib be considered, as the Banka Baee's party
did and do consider him, as a usurper, or not, there
can be no doubt that on his deposition or civil death
¹ This, as I have already shown, is a mistake.
NAGPORE.
187
the late Rajah was the next heir; and the elevation of
any more distant relation or of a stranger to the vacant
musnud, would have borne the appearance of unmean-
ing caprice, would in fact have been a gross injustice,
and must have inevitably led to endless intrigue, dis-
content and violence. This is the correct explanation
of the "selection of a boy" to be Rajah after Appa
Sahib's deposition. It was not considered just or ex-
pedient to extinguish the sovereignty. Appa Sahib
was the sole offender, while the Banka Baee had
rendered our Government most valuable services, and
her influence had in a great degree neutralised the
effect of her nephew's treachery.
Lord Hastings himself gives the following account
of Nagpore affairs in 1818, in the Summary of his
Administration, submitted to the Court of Directors
with his letter, dated Gibraltar, 6th May, 1823:-
"When Appa Sahib, the expelled Rajah of Nagpore,
stood in a perilous condition, from his proximity to
the rule of that country, and the jealousy which the
reigning Prince entertained of him, we secured his life
by our avowed protection. The subsequent decline
of that reigning Prince's intellect into complete
idiotcy, made it necessary for the British Government
to place the Regency in the hands of Appa Sahib.
The Regent, availing himself of the facility which his
situation afforded, caused the Rajah to be poisoned,
lest he should adopt a son, who might, notwithstand-
ing the Rajah's incapacity of choice, find support from
some party in the State. The crime was suspected;
but as there was not then anything like proof of it,
the surmise could not stand in the way of Appa Sa-
·
188
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
..
hib's accession to the musnud, or throne, so that he
was immediately recognised by us as the lawful head
of the Government. Our further intercourse was a
succession of favours lavished by us, till the Peishwa
resorted to arms." He then briefly describes Appa
Sahib's treachery and deposition, and states that the
disturbed state of the country "made it expedient for
us to lose no time in establishing a new Government.
The members of the reigning family, and the principal
persons of the State, were consulted. They unani--
mously recommended the nearest of blood in the
Bhonsla (the Rajah's) family, for the succession, and
he was raised to the musnud in the room of Appa
Sahib." What a contrast to Lord Dalhousie's con-
temptuous assertion that Lord Hastings "set up a boy
whom he selected.”
It was only natural that arguments establishing the
late Rajah's absolute legitimacy, and the justice and
wisdom of the Banka Baee's original policy, should
have been encouraged and become popular during her
Regency and the late Rajah's reign. But so far as I
can ascertain, her view of the late Rajah's right of
succession is entirely in accordance with established
Mahratta custom and state policy, while it is quite
conformable to strict Hindoo law. It is also quite in
accordance with the brief outline of events, and with
the explanation of the law and custom of inheritance
among the Bhonslas, contained in Sir Richard Jen-
kins's Nagpore report. The sole reason he gives for
rejecting the Banka Baee's policy is as follows:-
1 Report of Select Committee of House of Commons on the East
India Company, 1833, Appendix, pp. 103, 104.
NAGPORE.
189
"We recognised Appa Sahib's right, because Pursojee
was acknowledged to be too imbecile an intellect to
exercise, sui juris, the privilege of adoption." At
first sight this reason appears sound; but I doubt if
it will hold good either on principles of the Hindoo
religion or of the established customs of Mahratta
States: for such a rule would debar all persons whose
minds were weak from disease or advanced age, from
having a son adopted for them, (a family arrangement
that is often made) while it sets aside entirely the
right of the wife or widow to adopt for her husband.
1
It must be remembered that all the English pub-
lished accounts of the events of 1816-18 are based on
the official reports, and that the Banka Baee's side of
the question has hardly been heard yet. The Baee
always maintained that if her proposals had been ac-
cepted, there would have been no war. She made re-
peated overtures regarding a subsidiary treaty, and
warned the Resident that Appa Sahib was merely
negociating as a pretence, and to gain a temporary
safeguard against the partisans of her grandson. And
the result showed that her warnings were true. Appa
Sahib only wanted English protection while Pursojee
was living. From the time that he had assumed in
his own name the honours and authority of the Raj,
he lent himself wholly to the designs of the Peishwa
Bajee Rao. Persons are still living, who when the
firing had commenced at the battle of Seetabuldee,
1 The fullest and clearest narrative of Nagpore affairs during
that critical period that I have seen, is to be found in the History
of the Marquis of Hastings' Administration, by Mr. H. T. Prinsep,
published in 1825. It in general agrees with the local chronicles,
except in some few respects, such as the character of Dhurmajee
Bhonsla, Appa Sahib's murdered opponent, which stands very high
in the Nagpore traditions.
190
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
3
were sent by Gholam Mohammed Khan, the principal
Commandant of Cavalry, to tell Mr. Jenkins that if he
would give the order, they would declare for the Baee
and Rughojee's grandson, and attack Appa Sahib's Ro-
hillas and Arabs. Mr. Jenkins is said nobly to have re-
plied—“ I am not your master, and I have no order to
give; your master the Rajah will have to answer for
this day's work." Even at that moment of life and
death he refused to deviate from the straightforward
undisguised course of action which his opinions had
dictated, or to sanction intrigue even against his
treacherous enemy. Both before and during the battle
messages came from the Banka Baee; and it is well
known that in consequence of her influence the Mah-
ratta horse totally declined to fight, and ten thousand
of them fled before the first forward movement of one
hundred and twenty Bengal Cavalry. Sir Richard Jen-
kins's name is revered at Nagpore for his fatherly care
of the late Rajah, for his rescue of the finances and
resources of the country from a miserable state of de-
pression and decay, and for his upright and beneficial
administration during nearly twelve years; but the
misfortunes of the family and of the State are attributed
in a great measure to his error in promoting Appa
Sahib's claim both to the Regency and to the succes-
sion. The actual and ultimate cause was of course
the weakness and perfidy of Appa Sahib. But even
by the published narratives it will be seen that until
within a week of the treacherous attack on the Resi-
dency, Sir Richard Jenkins was supporting Appa Sa-
hib against the Banka Baee and the old ministers of
Rughojee the 2nd, with all the weight of his influence
NAGPORE.
191
and of the British troops. Sir Richard Jenkins's
policy, though it failed to preserve peace, was through-
out characterised by good faith; and his choice of Ap-
pa Sahib's party was founded on fair and reasonable
grounds. And its result, although destructive of the
position of the Nagpore State as a separate power,
undoubtedly added to the influence as well as to the
territorial possessions of the British Government. But
we ought not to forget the Banka Baee's share in those
transactions, or that Appa Sahib was deservedly
punished and ample compensation exacted at the
time; while she was still living in 1858 to plead a
friendship of half a century, even more effectual in
our favour in 1857 than in 1817.
I must explain that in stating the case contended
for by the Banka Baee and her party in 1817-18, and
expressing my own conviction of its justice, I do not
intend to assert that the Mahratta law and custom of
inheritance therein upheld can be shewn, by any
authoritative document or by the uniformity of pre-
cedents, to be so clearly laid down, and so universally
accepted that there never was any ground for doubt or
contention. This desirable point has not hitherto
been attained in Hindoo or in Mahomedan States;
and it has only been very gradually accomplished in
Europe; indeed, within the last twenty-five years we
have seen wars of succession in Spain and in Portugal.
Disputed inheritances and wars of succession have
occurred frequently both in Asia and in Europe,-
more frequently, however, from political or military
complications affording a chance to a pretender, than
from any real uncertainty as to the person in whom
the legal right vested.
192
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA,
I do not, therefore, intend to assert that the views
of the Banka Baee and her party were never ques-
tioned, and are perfectly unquestionable; but only that
the right of the descendant in the female line to suc-
ceed and to be adopted, in default of a descendant in
the male line eligible for adoption, as maintained by
them, cannot be dogmatically contradicted by Hindoo
law, but is conformable both with its letter and its
spirit.
The whole tenor of Lord Dalhousie's arguments is
intended to show that the Nagpore territory was for-
feited, that a new principality was created by the will
and pleasure of the British Government, and granted
to the late Rajah without reference to his position in
the Bhonsla family. In para. 6 of his Minute¹ he
says, "In consequence of the treachery and hostility
of Appa Sahib, the State was declared to be ours by
conquest in 1818; a portion of the territory was con-
ferred by the British Government upon the late Rajah
in that year, and was confirmed to him, his heirs and
successors, by treaty in 1826." There are two errors
of some importance in this short extract. The State
of Nagpore was never at any time 2 " declared to be
curs by conquest." Doubtless by the laws of war and
of nations it might have been declared ours; but such
a declaration was not made. It is also a mistake to
say that in 1818 "a portion of the territory was con-
ferred upon the late Rajah." The late Rajah by the
favour of the British Government was allowed to
1 First Nagpore Blue-book, p. 23.
? Of course, I mean, publicly declared; I do not allude to the
terms used in despatches (though I have seen none to that effect)
but to those used in proclamations and treaties.
.
NAGPORE.
193
succeed to the whole of the Nagpore territory without
any deduction. A reference to Article V of the treaty
of 1826 will show that Appa Sahib had ceded, in lieu
of the subsidy and contingent, the Saugor and Ner-
budda Territories, and other districts, previously to his
second act of hostility, and that the late Rajah merely
confirmed this cession, the ratifications of which had
not been exchanged during Appa Sahib's short tenure
of power. The form was not gone through of annex-
ing the territory, or of proscribing, condemning, and
then condoning the Bhonsla family. The Nagpore
dominions were not annexed by the Company, and
then conferred as a gift on the late Rajah. On the
contrary, they were without any interregnum or in-
termission, administered during his minority in his
name by British officers, without any treaty or agree-
ment or instrument of gift of any description, until
his majority in the year 1826, when a treaty was con-
cluded, in which he was expressly declared to have "suc-
ceeded" to the musnud of Nagpore, and in which he
was required to confirm former cessions, which of
course would never have been required or permitted
had he received the Principality as a gift or new grant.
The arguments which I have already noticed are
thus summed up by his Lordship at the end of para.
28 of his Minute :-" The simple question for deter-
mination is whether the sovereignty of Nagpore, which
was bestowed as a gift upon a Goojur in 1818, shall
now be conferred upon somebody else, as a gift a second
time."
The late Rajah undoubtedly was born a Goojur; but
1 First Nagpore Blue-book, p. 30.
K
+
194
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
he was also the grandson of Rughojee the 2nd, and
next of kin and heir both to Pursojee and Appa Sahib ;
and in 1818 the British Government forbore to enforce
its rights of conquest, or to subvert his right of suc-
cession. The late Rajah is not, therefore, adequately
described as having been merely "a Goojur:" he was
a lineal descendant and next of kin. Janojee Bhonsla
was not adequately described as "a Mahratta youth:"
he is a lineal descendant of Rughojee the 2nd, and
next of kin to the late Rajah. And the real question
for determination would have been more properly
stated as follows:-Whether the sovereignty of Nag-
pore, to which the next of kin was allowed to succeed
in 1818, when the treacherous hostility of Appa Sahib
had placed the State and musnud at the mercy of the
British Government, should a second time be allowed
to descend to the next of kin, after thirty-five years of
faithful and useful alliance; during which periods up-
wards of two crores of Nagpore rupees¹ were paid to
the British Government as subsidy, and during which
period the Rajah's troops marched four times across
the Nagpore frontier to the assistance of the para-
mount power.
But it seems to be objected that though Janojee
Bhonsla was next of kin, an adoption, according to
Hindoo law and Mahratta custom was insufficient;
that his blood-relationship was insufficient; and that
an adoption approved and confirmed by the Imperial
power was required, to make that relationship opera-
But
tive and productive of a title to succession.
where is such a limitation to be found? In the
1 About two millions sterling.
NAGPORE.
195
successors.
treaty there is no trace of any disallowance or re-
striction of the ordinary Hindoo law of inheritance.
And should it be held that any such restriction was
essential in the contemporary position, or derivative
from the gradually altered position of the parties to
the treaty, it is at least certain that no right of re-
striction was at any time openly claimed or communi-
cated by the superior, conceded or acknowledged by
the inferior power. The treaty of 1826 guaranteed
the Nagpore dominions to the Rajah, "his heirs and
Now, whatever control over the descent
of the sovereignty may be claimed by the paramount
power, the Bhonsla family must be allowed to have
some law of inheritance. According to Hindoo law
and Mahratta custom Janojee Bhonsla was declared
by all the members of the family to be the next of
kin and heir to the late Rajah, and as such adopted
by the widows. According to English, European, I
may say universal law, in default of direct descendants
in the male line, he, the direct descendant in the
female line, was the natural heir to any sovereignty,
title, estate, or personal property descending from his
ancestors. By what law, by what semblance of law,
can this heir be excluded? The British Government
cannot have at once as much and as little of Hindoo
law as will exclude him;-just so much as requires the
form of an adoption to render his blood relationship
effective for succession, and just so little as enables it
to step in and to disallow that adoption. It must be
remembered that not only does Hindoo law under
certain, circumstances confer the right and obligation
of adoption upon the widow, but Mahratta custom
A
K 2
196
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
very clearly confers the right to be adopted upon the
nearest relative whose parents consent to resign him.
There is a right to be adopted as well as a right to
adopt; and in the present case there never was the
shadow of a doubt as to the respective persons in
whom those rights existed when the late Rajah died,
-his widow and his grandnephew.
Wherever we have guaranteed a Principality to a
Hindoo Prince, "his heirs and successors," surely there
can be no doubt that no law of inheritance except the
Hindoo law in all its integrity, was ever contemplated
by either party to the treaty. And the addition of the
word "successors," indicates that the protecting power
claims no right to interfere in the domestic policy of
the reigning family, except so far as it is entitled to do
so by the express stipulations of the treaty.
Nothing but the express stipulation of a treaty can
give us any right to mutilate the Hindoo law of descent,
or to ordain that adoption shall be good for the con-
veyance of private property but not for succession to a
Principality. There never was any precedent for so
preposterous a distinction, until, within the last ten
years,―under erroneous constructions which have ex-
cited the greatest alarm and indignation, the British
Government made some such precedents as those of
Sattara and Jhansi. Not only have all Hindoo
Princes a right to the full benefit of Hindoo law,
but they have the right to regulate the succession
by their own family customs and their tradition-
ary state policy, so long as they can carry it out
peaceably. This is, I am convinced, the only true in-
terpretation of the expression their "heirs and suc-
NAGPORE.
197
cessors." The heir is an heir according to Hindoo law,
and who succeeds de jure; the successor is a future
ruler de facto of the State with which the treaty is
made; and while every rightful heir on his accession
is a successor, that word also provides for and includes
every case of doubt, or dispute, or actual change of
dynasty, in which although the British Government
might not consider itself bound by duty or interest to
interfere on either side, it is thus enabled to insist that
all local engagements and obligations shall be preserved
inviolate.
The word "heirs" is used in all European as well
as in Indian treaties, to denote the regular succession
in the reigning family; the word "successors,"-trans-
lated in Persian "jae nisheenan," literally "sitters in
the place,”—while including all heirs, is used to denote
the succession of sovereign power, and to prevent en-
gagements becoming invalid by national or family revo-
lutions and abdications. Thus treaties made with the
elder branch of the Bourbons, and with the King of the
French, are binding upon the Emperor Napoleon, who
is their successor though not their heir; and our treaties
made with the King of Naples are binding upon the
King of Italy. The word "successors" has no reference
to genealogical descent, but to the descent of the func-
tions of sovereignty.
And although there may appear to be but little
scope for irregular successions and dynastic changes
in petty, protected feudatory Principalities, it is un-
deniable that the ties of our absolute de facto supre-
macy over every State in India, have been drawn much
more closely than before during the last twenty years,
198
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
i
and that the extent of our interference has always
depended, and always must depend, on the political
circumstances and aspect of the time. When there
was a disputed succession at Jhansi in 1835, the Su-
preme Government authorised Mr. Begbie, the Political
Agent, to recognise Ragonath Rao, the Rajah who ac-
tually succeeded, but added," it being presumed that
“it
he is able to establish his authority, and that his suc-
cession will be acknowledged by disinterested parties
at Jhansi." These qualifying expressions indicate no
absolute dictation to the family, no positive claim to
regulate or restrict the succession.
Now the position of Jhansi,-where this freedom of
action was allowed,-undoubtedly was that of a petty,
protected, subordinate state; but the Rajah of Nag-
pore was never treated or considered as a dependent
or feudatory Prince. In the year 1826, when the late
Rajah Rughojee Bhonsla was approaching his majority,
Sir Richard Jenkins wrote as follows:-"The early
restoration of the State of Nagpore to its rank as one
of the substantive powers of India, continued to be the
earnest wish of the Governor-General in Council."2
According to the accepted ceremonial and political tra-
ditions of India, the Bhonsla was the first in rank and
precedence of all the confederated Mahratta Princes,
both under the Rajah of Sattara's and the Peishwa's
supremacy. Scindia, Holkar, and the Guicowar were
originally Soobadars appointed by the Peishwa; the
Bhonslas, although their ancestor was sent as Sena
Sahib Sooba to Berar by the Rajah of Sattara, acquired
the principal provinces of their kingdom by conquest
¹ Jhansi Blue-book, p. 17. 2 Nagpore Report, 1827, p. 314.
NAGPORE.
199
and treaty from the ancient Gond and Rajpoot rulers;
and although they continued to receive investiture of
the office of Sena Sahib Sooba from Poona, the teeka
or mark of royalty, on their accession to the musnud,
was given by the aboriginal Lord of the soil, the Gond
Rajah. Their submission to the Peishwa, though fre-
quently extorted, was never distinctly acknowledged.
And it has been already satisfactorily established that
the State of Nagpore was not conferred as a grant or
a gift on the late Rajah, that no new Principality was
created in his favour by the British Government, but
that by its forbearance and favour he succeeded to the
throne of his ancestors.
The conclusion is not to be avoided that the reign-
ing family of Nagpore, "one of the substantive powers
of India," had the right to retain its own law and
custom of inheritance, and, in short, to arrange its
own household affairs without the interference of the
British Government, unless it should have been neces-
sary to prevent bloodshed, or unless an appeal had
been made by some member of the family against
violent exclusion and usurpation. Such was and is
the view taken by the Bhonsla family; such was the
view taken and acknowledged by the British Govern-
ment until a very late period.
A reference to Sir Richard Jenkins's Nagpore Re-
port will prove that that eminent and experienced
officer, in the year 1827, never doubted the right of a
Rajah or his widow to adopt, and never supposed that
the British Government had by its altered relations
with the Bhonsla family acquired the prerogative of
investiture or any power of interference with the
"
200
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
:
Mahratta customs of inheritance. Lord Dalhousie
thus disposes of the recorded opinion to the same
effect of Major Wilkinson, who was Resident at Nag-
pore in 1840 :-" Major Wilkinson considered that the
Rajah had been placed in exactly the same position as
had been occupied by Appa Sahib, and that he or his
widow would have a right to adopt. This view was
certainly not accepted by the Government of India,
for no reply was ever made to the Resident's letter."1
This I think constitutes what is commonly called a
non sequitur. It would be in fact equally reasonable
for me to say:-"This view certainly was accepted by
the Government of India, for silence gives consent."
2
In the year 1844 the Governor-General in Council,
in reply to the Resident Colonel Speirs' request for in-
structions in the event of the Rajah dying without
issue, made a distinct recognition of the right of adop-
tion by the Rajah, and by members of the family in
case of his death without having made an adoption.
The passage to which I allude is the more worthy of
attentive consideration, because it is quoted in Lord
Dalhousie's Minute, par. 26, as a proof that the ques-
tion of adoption was "left open" by the Government
of India. But the passage will not bear such a con-
struction. It is as follows: "In the event of the
death of the present Rajah, without leaving children,
or an adopted son, you should make arrangements for
conducting the Government of Nagpore, pending the
orders of the Government of India, which orders will
be based on the circumstances that may present them-
selves at the time, and the right to make the adoption
1 First Nagpore Blue-book, p. 29.
2 Ditto, p. 30.

NAGPORE.
201
which might be considered to attach to any surviving
member of the Rajah's family."
The right of the Rajah himself to adopt a suc-
cessor (which Lord Dalhousie denied¹) is here clearly
recognised; while, to say the least, no doubt, no hint
of disapproval is thrown out against the contingent
right of the widow or other surviving relative to adopt
on behalf of the deceased Rajah. The ordered refer-
ence to Calcutta in such a case is obviously intended
to guard against a disputed adoption, but conveys no
doubt as to the general right.
1 Vide para. 27 of his Minute, First Nagpore Blue-book, p. 30.
K 3
·
202
LETTER VIII.
JHANSI.
THE last Rajah of Jhansi, Gungadhur Rao, died on the
21st November, 1853, having on the 19th of the same
month adopted a young kinsman as his son. This
boy, named Anund Rao, was the sixth in descent from
the common ancestor, Ragonath Rao the 1st, and re-
ceived after the ceremony of adoption the name of
Damoodhur Gungadhur Rao. Of the regularity of the
adoption in every point of view there never was any
doubt or question raised; the dying Rajah announced
the step he had taken in the presence of two British
officers,―Major Ellis, the Political Agent, and Major
Martin, who commanded a detachment of Scindia's
Contingent stationed at Jhansi,-and with his own
hand he delivered to those officers letters to the
proper authorities, commending his adopted son and
his widow to the protection of the British Govern-
ment. Indeed the adoption was recognised as regular
and irreversible, both by the orders of the Supreme
Government that Damoodhur Gungadhur was to suc-
ceed to his adoptive father's private property, and by
JHANSI.
203
-、
·
the terms of the proclamation issued on the receipt of
the final orders of annexation. That point therefore
is not in dispute. The decision of the Government
on that point is summed up in the following words:
"The adoption was good for the conveyance of private
rights, though not for the transfer of the Principality."
I shall not stop to ask for any precedent or principle
on which such an anomaly can be sustained as that of
a Prince whose acknowledged "heir" is not admitted
to be his "successor" in the Principality; it is not
necessary to inquire whether the King of Delhi or the
Peishwa ever dealt so with their unguaranteed de-
pendents; because in the present case the hereditary
succession is guaranteed by a treaty, by which alone
the question can be decided. When the territories in
the possession of Sheo Rao Bhow, Soobadar of Jhansi,
were confirmed by the British Government "in per-
petuity" to his grandson Ramchund Rao, "his heirs.
and successors," by the treaty of 1817, it was certainly
not contemplated by either party to the treaty that
the heir of a Soobadar of Jhansi could under any cir-
cumstances fail to be his successor. No other law of
inheritance was intended or thought of except the
Hindoo law of inheritance, in which adoption is an
ordinary and essential incident. No article or stipu-
lation in the treaty gave us the right to interfere with
the operation of the Hindoo law, to mutilate it, or to
substitute any other law of descent.
A singular feature in the inquiry which preceded
the annexation of Jhansi in 1854, is the citation of
Lord Metcalfe, both in the Note by the Secretary to
1 Jhansi Blue-book, 1855, p.
31.
204
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
Government and in the Governor-General's Minute, as
an authority for the prerogative of confirming or in-
validating adoptions in dependent States, whereas his
opinion, as may be very easily shown, was directly
contradictory of that supposed Imperial right.
Lord Metcalfe, in reference to the Chiefs of Bundel-
cund, observes that there is a wide distinction to be
drawn between "Sovereign Princes" and "Jagheer-
dars," "between those in possession of hereditary
Sovereignties in their own right, and those who hold
grants of land or public revenue, by gift from a
Sovereign or paramount power.
"Those who are Sovereign Princes in their own
right and of the Hindoo religion, have by Hindoo
law a right to adopt, to the exclusion of collateral
heirs, or of the supposed reversionary right of the
paramount power; the latter in fact, in such cases,
having no real existence, except in the case of abso-
lute want of heirs; and even then the right is only
assumed in virtue of power; for it would probably be
more consistent with right that the people of the
States so situated should elect a Sovereign for them-
selves.
"In the case therefore of Hindoo Sovereign Princes,
I should say that on failure of male heirs of the body,
they have a right to adopt, to the exclusion of col-
lateral heirs, and that the British Government is
bound to acknowledge the adoption, provided that it
be regular and not in violation of Hindoo law.
"With respect to chiefs who merely hold lands or
enjoy public revenue under grants such as are issued
by a Sovereign to a subject, the power which made the
1
1
JHANSI
205
grant, or that which by conquest or otherwise has
succeeded to its rights, is certainly entitled to limit
succession according to the limitations of the grant,
which in general confines it to heirs male of the body,
and consequently precludes adoption. In such cases,
therefore, the power which granted, or the power
standing in its place, would have a right to resume on
failure of heirs male of the body."
It will be observed how restricted a right of re-
sumption is allowed by Lord Metcalfe even in a case
of Jagheerdars; he considers that the Sovereign only
has the power of refusing to sanction adoptions, when
"the terms of the grant limit succession to heirs
male of the body." But although this paragraph is
quoted by Lord Dalhousie in support of his argument
for the annexation of Jhansi, it is obvious that it was
intended to refer to a totally different class of posses-
sions; and moreover even if Jhansi were reducible
to the category of Jagheers or grants of land, there
is no (6
limitation of the grant," confining its succes-
sion “to heirs male of the body."
But the Rajah of Jhansi was clearly not a Jagheer-
dar; nor did he, as erroneously stated several times
in the late Governor-General's Minute, hold his
Principality as
(C
a grant;" nor did either his
father Sheo Rao Bhow, or his nephew Ramchund
Rao receive it as a "gift" from the British Govern-
ment.
For many years before the treaty of 1817, the au-
thority and influence of the Court of Poona had almost
entirely ceased in Bundelcund. Under these circum-
stances Sheo Rao Bhow was able to render us valuable
206
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
military assistance;¹ and in 1804, while formally re-
cognising the sovereign rights of the Peishwa, we
made a treaty of "defensive alliance" with his no-
minal tributary the Soobadar of Jhansi. During the
political supremacy of the Peishwas, all office, from
the government of a Province to the charge of a
garden, had a tendency to become hereditary. Mah-
ratta chieftains of much greater importance than the
Soobadar of Jhansi were really proud of investiture
by the Peishwa, were content to own his supremacy,
and were careful to avoid any open assertion of in-
dependence which would have thrown them into a
dangerous position of political isolation. But they
preserved all the substance of power; and their here-
ditary rights were never in any one instance denied by
the federal head.
The policy of the Peishwas was to preserve every
old custom as far as possible intact, to respect practi-
cally every one's rights and rank, but to leave all titles
to possessions and to power in a state of vague un-
certainty, by which means they retained the semblance
of supremacy over their most formidable rivals, and
were always prepared to take advantage of disputed
successions and other opportunities for extending their
1 "Soon after Captain Baillie's arrival in Bundelcund he received
proposals from the Soubadar of Jhansi, who holds the fort of that
name and its dependent districts under the nominal authority of
the Peishwa. On the 4th of January the Soubadar of Jhansi ar-
rived in the British camp.
"The troops of the Soubadar of Jhansi have since been employed
in co-operating in the defence of Bundelcund and the adjoining
districts. The example of the Soubadar has induced several other
chiefs in that quarter to place themselves under the protection of
the British Government." Despatch of the Governor General in
Council to the Secret Committee, April 1804; Marquis Wellesley's
Despatches, vol. v, p. 92.
JHANSI
207
4
substantial authority or for obtaining pecuniary con-
tributions. In fact the Mahratta confederation, in the
period of its greatest unity and coherence, was kept
together by a system of compromises and formalities.
The Peishwa's own authority constituted the greatest
paradox of all, since he professed to act as the first
minister and obedient servant of the Rajah of Sat-
tara, whom he kept in close confinement. But in
1817, these anomalies were to disappear: by the
treaty of Poona the Peishwa Bajee Rao renounced his
"former situation as Executive head of the Mahratta
Empire," and transferred his "interests and preten-
sions in Bundelcund," to the British Government.¹
And while the Peishwa's policy had been to leave the
rank and the rights of all in a state of uncertainty,
our policy was to define and fix carefully and exactly
the rights and privileges of each Prince, and his rela-
tions with the paramount power. A new treaty was
therefore made with the Soobadar of Jhansi, by which
the political supremacy of the British Government
was enforced, while the sovereign rights and actual
possessions of the Soobadar were secured to him and
his family. We constituted him "the hereditary
ruler" of Jhansi; confirming the territory "in per-
petuity" to him, "his heirs, and successors," but not
in any article or in any expression assuming or pre-
tending to make a gift or a grant, to cede to him or to
confer upon him that territory, the possession and
government of which had previously been enjoyed by
his grand-uncle and his grandfather, to the latter of
⚫ whom he had himself succeeded, while yet under the
nominal supremacy of the Peishwa.
1 Volume of Treaties, pp. 273, 275.
208
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
On the condition of his continued faithful alliance
and subordinate co-operation, we offered him a higher
status and a better security than he had inherited as a
tributary of the Peishwa. Under the Peishwa's su-
premacy the hereditary tenure of Jhansi was never
denied, but it was unguaranteed, and was subject to
the payment of an indefinite nuzzur for investiture;
the Soobadar's authority was supreme in his own ter-
ritory, but his obligations and allegiance were unde-
fined; and though his dependence had for many years
been little more than nominal, political changes might
at any time have brought him into more strict subor-
dination, and exposed him to heavy exactions.
I am very far, therefore, from asserting that the two
States came to terms as two States of equal power
and dignity; that no concession was made by the
British Government or that no superiority was ac-
knowledged by the ruler of Jhansi. On the contrary,
in the preamble to the treaty of 1817, the former
position of Ramchund Rao and his predecessors as
tributaries of the Peishwa, and the transfer of that
Sovereign's rights to the British Government, are ex-
pressly mentioned. But in that same preamble and
in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 7th Articles, the parties to
the treaty are specified as "the British Government"
and "the Jhansi Government," and as the "two Go-
vernments." Is the form, is the style of this docu-
ment¹ that of a grant, such as is issued by a Sovereign
to a subject?"
Lord Dalhousie in his Minute, paragraph 6, declares
that Jhansi 2 was "held by a Chief under very recent
' Jhansi Blue-book, p. 22.
2 Ditto, p. 20.
JHANSI
209
grant from the British Government as Sovereign,"
and in paragraph 12, "under a grant such as is issued
by a Sovereign to a subject ;" but I think that I have
already adduced sufficient proof that this view of the
question is incorrect. The preamble and the first
Article of the treaty of 1817, prove that the first
treaty of 1804 was in full force during the first three
years of Ramchund Rao's reign, and that a new treaty
was only concluded “in consequence" of our altered
relations with the Peishwa. There was no gift, be-
cause Ramchund Rao was already in possession; there
was no pretension to the relations of Sovereign and
subject, for there already existed relations of amity
and defensive alliance; there was no grant made,
no sunnud issued, but a new treaty was concluded
between two States. The Rajah of Jhansi was not a
Jagheerdar, but a "hereditary ruler," a Hindoo Prince.
There are still two statements contained in the late
Governor-General's Minute on Jhansi, which require
notice. The first is contained in the following sentence
of paragraph 7:1-"The chief thus made hereditary
retained however his inferior position, and was not
named a Rajah until 1832.” Now it may be true that
the title of Soobadar or Rais 2 is inferior to that of
Rajah, just as that of Grand Duke or Elector is in-
ferior to that of King; but the inferior title involves
no inferiority in sovereign power or hereditary right,
1 Jhansi Blue-book, p. 21.
2 The original and proper meaning of Soobadar is a Provincial
Governor; Räis, an Arabic title, has from a very early period of
Mussulman supremacy been applied to a large number of territorial
magnates, of diverse rank and political position; the term is still
officially used by our Government, and is usually translated "chief-
tain."
210
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
while I presume Lord Dalhousie did not wish to imply
that the superior title and insignia conferred upon
Rao Ramchund by Lord William Bentinck in 1832,
invested him with any new authority or privilege or
immunity, or rendered him less dependent on the pa-
ramount and protecting State. The observation ap-
pears, therefore, to be irrelevant to the point at issue.
The hereditary rights of the Rajahs of Jhansi were
guaranteed by the treaty of 1817, without reference
to their titles or insignia, and that treaty contained no
clause or expression restricting the ordinary operation
of Hindoo law, or giving any right of confirmation
or investiture to the British Government. Scindia,
Holkar and the Guicowar were originally Soobadars
and feudatories of the Peishwa; their personal and
hereditary rights before the year 1817 differed in no
respect from those of the Soobadar of Jhansi; their
virtual independence rested only on their great mili-
tary strength and political influence; and their present
undisputed rank as Sovereign Princes rests upon the
same foundation as did that of the Rajah of Jhansi,—
their treaties with the British Government. The
Peishwa, before the year 1817, had never acknow-
ledged their independence or the right of their heirs to
succeed without his investiture, nor had they ever
openly made any such pretensions. It may also be
1
1 Marquis Wellesley's Despatches, vol. iv, p. 161.
Governor General to Secret Committee of 13th July, 1804,
para. 93.
"Dowlut Rao Scindia expressed great anxiety for the introduction
of a stipulation, by which the British Government should engage
to employ its influence in securing from the Peishwa in favour of
Dowlut Rao Scindia that treatment and consideration which was
due to Dowlut Rao Scindia's rank, and was consistent with usage.
JHANSI.
211
remarked that the only titles borne by the independent
ruler of Hyderabad are those of Nizam-ool-Moolk,
conferred upon his ancestor while he was merely a
Minister at Delhi, and of Soobadar of the Deccan;
and it is well known that nothing could induce that
Sovereign to accept or assume the title of King.
The second error is of very much greater import-
ance, and is four times repeated:-in the last sentence
of paragraph 7 it is said,-"In 1835 Rao Ramchund
died. Although he had adopted a boy as his succes-
sor the day before his death, the adoption was not re-
cognised; and his uncle, Rugonath Rao was declared
Rajah :”—again in paragraph 11, "There is no need
of and no room for argument on this head. The his-
torical facts on record negative the Ranee's assertion
conclusively; for Rao Ramchund did adopt a boy,
but the British Government did not acknowledge the
boy as successor, and it nominated another person to
be Rajah.”2 In paragraph 12 it is stated that "a pre-
vious adoption by a Rajah whom the British Govern-
ment constituted hereditary chief of Jhansi, was not
acknowledged by the British Government." And in
the last sentence of the same paragraph "the existence
of a precedent" for refusing to sanction adoption, is
asserted.
Lord Dalhousie assumes that Rao Ramchund did
Dowlut Rao Scindia also expressed an earnest desire that his right
to countries, which he held under grant from the Peishwa, and of
which he had taken possession, in consequence of orders from His
Highness, should be recognised in the treaty of defensive alliance,
and that the British Government would employ its endeavours to
prevent the subversion of any acts of Dowlut Rao Scindia or his
ancestors, under the authority reposed in him or them by the
Peishwa."
2 Ditto, p. 22.
•
¹ Jhansi Blue-book, p. 21.
212
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
=
undoubtedly adopt a son before his death, and that the
British Government on that occasion exercised the pre-
rogative of forbidding to recognise the adoption. The
facts are very different.
There was a disputed succession in 1835; there were
four claimants. The fact of the adoption was denied
by the adverse parties. In the note on Jhansi by the
Secretary to Government, the decision in 1835 is thus
described :¹-"On this occasion the lawful heir by
blood, descended of the body of Sheo Ram Bhow, was
recognised as successor to the Raj, to the disallowance
of a boy alleged to have been adopted, or nominated
as successor by the late Rajah the day before his
death, who, if adopted, would have been unquestion-
ably the heir to any property of his adoptive father
to the exclusion of the uncle; and this was done with-
out inquiry into the fact of adoption or nomination
(which was doubtful) as though it was an immaterial
circumstance."
It is to be observed, therefore, that in 1835 the
adoption or nomination was doubtful; in 1853 the
adoption was not doubtful, or in the slightest degree
irregular or suspicious, but was effected in strict ac-
cordance with Hindoo law, and in the presence of
British officers, and was officially reported to Govern-
ment in writing by the dying Rajah. There is no
parallel here; no precedent can be founded on the
decision of 1835.
The settlement of 1835 was either right or wrong.
If right,-on account of the adoption having been
irregular or doubtful,-then no precedent is arrived
1 Jhansi Blue-book, p. 18.
JHANSI.
213
:
at. If wrong, then the fact of a wrong having been
done once is no reason that it should be done again.
But whether the settlement was right or wrong, it
was not a succession decided by our Government, and
it is certain that on the death of Rao Ramchund no
conclusion as to the power of annulling adoptions was
promulgated, for the question was not discussed, not
merely because the "alleged adoption" was disputed
and doubtful, but because no one in those days had
ever thought of claiming that power for our Govern-
ment, and because on this particular occasion our
Government declined to interfere at all.
The fact of an adoption in 1835 not having been
proved or admitted, there would have been no ground
or motive for exercising the supposed prerogative of
confirmation or rejection, even if that pretension had
then existed. But it was not in existence, nor had it
ever been asserted or alluded to. Therefore in 1853
there was no precedent in existence to cast a doubt
upon the right of the Rajah of Jhansi to adopt a son
and heir, a right enjoyed by him in common with all
Hindoos, but especially removed from our interference
by treaties which clearly defined the relations between
"the two governments," and which gave no right of
resumption or even of investiture to the paramount
power.
The fact is, that the settlement of 1835 was not a
decision of our Government at all, but that of a cer-
tain party in the Jhansi Durbar. The only decision
at which our Government arrived was the decision of
not deciding, interposing, or even advising in the dis-
pute. The Political Agent was authorised to recog-
•
214
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
nise Ragonath Rao, the deceased Rajah's uncle, who
was in actual possession, but no opinion was given as
to his right; and these qualifying expressions were
added," It being presumed that he is able to establish
his authority, and that his succession will be acknow-
ledged by disinterested parties at Jhansi."
ވ .
"1
The law of adoption has often been evaded by am-
bitious relatives, and misunderstood by British autho-
rities. The most remarkable instance of this on record
is perhaps that of the Holkar succession in 1834, when
the widow of the deceased Rajah having regularly
adopted a boy, who had been approved and selected
by her husband before his death, and "of the same
tribe and lineage,"—" only three degrees removed from
Tookajee Holkar," the Governor-General, Lord Wil-
liam Bentinck, declined to sanction or support the
adoption, to allow the British Resident to be present
at the installation, or to confer the usual khillut of
honour upon the young Rajah. The reason assigned
for deeming it "proper and expedient" on this occasion
"to preserve the principle of non-interference," was
that there were two other possible claimants.
"There would appear," the Secretary to Govern-
ment writes to the Resident at Indore,-"to be three
individuals whose pretensions to the sovereignty might
be alleged with some colour of right, namely, Hurree
Holkar, the cousin of the late Maharajah; the infant
born subsequently to his death; and the adopted son.
His Lordship in Council is not prepared to pronounce
upon the relative superiority of these claims. The
decision may fairly be left to the voice of the country,
1 Jhansi Blue-book, p. 17.
•
JHANSI.
215
and our duty will be to maintain whatever arrange-
ment may appear to be unequivocally consonant to
the general wish.”¹
It can hardly be said that there was a disputed
succession at all, until ambitious hopes were excited
by our cold and unfavourable demeanour. The cere-
monies of adoption and installation were performed
with the concurrence of all the members of the family
and ministers of state at the capital; and but for the
significant absence of the Resident from the Palace on
both occasions, and his undisguised avowal of non-
interference, the partisans of Hurree Rao Holkar,—
who eventually succeeded by a skilful and daring
enterprise in placing him on the musnud,-would
never have dared to mention their candidate's name.
There can be no doubt that the adopted son was
the rightful successor: the posthumous son was ille-
gitimate and Hurree Rao Holkar, a collateral rela-
tion of the deceased Rajah, had no claim whatever.
This was exactly the case in which our Government
ought to have interfered decisively and effectually,
and to have settled the succession, not as Suzerain
investing a feudatory, for the terms of our treaties
with the Holkar Rajahs do not admit of such a rela-
tion, but simply as the de facto paramount power, the
power most interested in the public peace not being
disturbed, the most disinterested and unconcerned as
to all the personal, private, and individual questions
depending on the succession, and the most capable of
preserving peace and enforcing submission to its award.
The duty of deciding in doubtful and disputed suc-
1 Succession by Adoption, p. 49.
216
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
*
cession is a moral and not a legal duty, imposed upon
us by our actual position and immense material
strength. In the case just referred to, this duty was
certainly neglected; and in consequence of this neglect
the lawful heir was excluded.
We were certainly wrong in declining to interfere
in favour of Mulhar Rao Holkar's adopted son at
Indore in 1834: I believe that we were equally wrong
in not maintaining the right of Ramchund Rao's
nephew and adopted son at Jhansi in 1835. I am
not so firmly convinced of the injustice in this latter
instance, because the circumstances are not so clearly
detailed in the published papers, while the fact and
the validity of the adoption were certainly challenged
and impugned at the time. But on both occasions
our duty as the great protecting and pacificating state
of India was clear; and on both occasions our refusal
of that duty led to manifest injustice, to a system of
intrigue and passive opposition under which good ad-
ministration became impossible, and at Indore to a
series of disturbances, culminating in "a murderous
attack" on Hurree Rao Holkar's palace, and to
of bloodshed and disorder,"¹ which were only dispelled
at last by our decided and peremptory interference,
backed by a display of troops. Thus having begun
by declining "to pronounce upon the relative supe-
riority" of the several claims to the musnud, and
having left the question to be settled by "the voice
of the country," and "the general wish," Lord Wil-
liam Bentinck was doomed to see an attempt made to
settle the question by a general rush and scramble;
1 Succession by Adoption, pp. 70, 71, 75.
scenes
JHANSI
217
having declared for scrupulous non-interference, he
found himself compelled to interfere with all the
power of the British Empire, and to support the
usurping party which had the upper hand for the
moment, and was in possession of the capital and
Palace. It was truly said by Sir George Clerk, the
late Governor of Bombay, that "the inconsistency,
caprice, and mutability of our opinions regarding all
great. principles, is the bane of our supremacy in
India.'
In 1825, during the siege of Bhurtpore by Lord
Combermere, great excitement prevailed throughout
Central India; a rebel chief named Nana Pundit, who
had taken the field originally as a pretender to the
musnud of Jaloun, had collected a considerable force
and was threatening a descent upon the British town
of Calpee. The Rajah of Jhansi, at the request of
Mr. Ainslie, the Political Agent, immediately sent off
400 sowars, 1,000 foot-soldiers and a few artillery-men
with two guns, who arrived in time to save Calpee from
being plundered, and restored general confidence to the
people of the district.
This was the last important military service ren-
dered to our Government by the ruler of Jhansi, and
was expressly referred to by the Governor-General,
Lord William Bentinck, in the highest terms of com-
mendation and gratitude, when at a great durbar, held
in the Palace at Jhansi on the 19th December, 1832,
he conferred upon Ramchund Rao the title of Maharaja
Dhiraj, and invested him with the royal insignia of the
"nakkara" and "chowar," on which occasion the
1 The kettle-drum, and the fly-flapper made of the yak's tail.
L
218
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
Rajah asked and obtained permission to adopt the
British flag, and to append to his titles the addition
of "Fidwee Badshah Janujah Englistan,"-devoted
servant of the glorious King of England. Major Mal-
colm, the Political Agent, reporting in 1854 on the
Ranee's appeal, observes :-"The Baee does not, I
believe, in the slightest degree over-estimate the
fidelity and loyalty all along evinced by the State of
Jhansi towards our Government, under circumstances
of considerable temptation, before our power had ar-
rived at that commanding position which it has since
attained."
"
The treaty being totally disregarded by Lord Dal-
housie, or rather transformed by his vigorous fancy
into a sunnud, or grant from a sovereign to a sub-
ject," it may well be supposed that he passed over all
these minor ties and sanctions with contemptuous
neglect.
For the last time, then, the Rajah of Jhansi's troops
crossed the frontier, and appeared at Calpee, in co-
operation with those of the British Government, in
1825. But in 1858 we again hear of a Ranee of
Jhansi in person with her troops at that same town
of Calpee,-not, however, this time in co-operation
with the Government, but in rebellion against it.
Driven by Sir Hugh Rose from the Fort of Jhansi,
where those horrible atrocities were committed which
were but numerically exceeded by those of Cawnpore,
she was defeated by the same General at Calpee, joined
Tantia Topee in his successful attack on Gwalior, and
was killed in the action near that city at Kote-ka-
1 Jhansi Blue-book, p. 24.
JHANSI.
219
serai on the 16th June 1858. By all accounts she
was the life and soul of the most formidable rebel
army that ever was raised in India.
In 1854 Major Malcolm, the Political Agent, re-
ported that this same Ranee,-who would have been
Regent during her son's minority,-was "highly re-
spected and esteemed, and fully capable of doing
justice to this charge," the regency,-" a lady of
very high character, and much respected by every
one at Jhansi."1 Four years had scarcely elapsed
since the annexation, when she fell in the front of
battle, branded with fifty murders.
1 Jhansi Blue-book, pp. 7 and 28.
L 2
..
220
LETTER IX,
THE BHONSLA FUND.
Madras, December 21st, 1862.
In an article entitled "The Cinderella of the Empire,"
the Friend of India, of the 4th of this month, gives
some remarks upon the finances of the Central Pro-
vinces,¹ and upon the general plan and scope of Mr.
Temple's Administration Report for 1861-62, the first
since the annexation of Nagpore in 1854. Of course,
when the Friend ventures among figures, and when
he is tempted to touch upon Lord Dalhousie's political
morality, he gets, as usual, into a mess; and one or
two of his errors are so monstrous in scope and so
calculated to mislead, that, at the risk of being drawn
into a very long dissertation, I feel bound to correct
them with the least possible delay.
The Friend says:-"Twenty-five per cent. of the
1 The Central Provinces were formed, under a Government
Resolution of 2nd November 1861, by joining the Nagpore annexed
Province to the Saugor and Nerbudda Territories, formerly part of
the Nagpore dominions and ceded to us in 1818. Sumbulpore and
some other districts, which were also old dependencies of Nagpore,
were added by a Government Resolution of 30th April 1862. The
Central Provinces are administered, on the Non Regulation sys-
tem, by a chief Commissioner, in immediate subordination to the
Governor General in Council.
THE BHONSLA FUND.
221
revenues of Nagpore is devoted to the support of the
one family of the Bhonslas. Not less than £100,000
are annually given to some 2158 pensioners, while
we lately conferred on Janojee Rajah the lands of
Deoor, near Sattara."
The Friend concludes with these words :-" We
do not grumble at the expense, which was politically
necessary, but what a commentary is this, as well as
the Bhonsla Fund, on the charges brought against
Lord Dalhousie of ruthlessly despoiling an ancient
family!" This is a very imprudent allusion on the
part of Lord Dalhousie's advocate. Does he really
know what this Fund is? The Bhonsla Fund simply
represents the proceeds of the auction sales of the
jewels, clothes, and other private moveables of the
Bhonsla family, including the spoons, plate, and
crockery-ware purchased for about £3000, and kept
by the Rajah to furnish forth the entertainments
which he occasionally gave to the English society at
Nagpore and Kamptee. The heirlooms of the family,
ancient jewels and choice arms, which had belonged
to Janojee Bhonsla's ancestors many years before the
sovereignty of Nagpore was acquired; the late Rajah's
new and favourite English fowling-pieces and rifles;
the clocks and watches that were found in his sleeping
apartment; the musnud of state, the wardrobe, and,
it is said, the very bedding on which the Prince ex-
pired, everything that was saleable,—the Ranee's own
personal jewels, and the necessary furniture of the
palace excepted,-all went to the hammer. The
Rajah's savings during twenty-five years of power,
a poor eight lakhs of rupees, were hunted out, ex-
1 £80,000.
1
t.
222
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
tracted by gentle persuasion from the strong boxes in
the Nagpore zenana, and went to swell the Bhonsla
Fund.
1
In the following sentence (section 366 of Mr.
Temple's Report), the origin of this Fund is de-
scribed :-" The Government had deemed that if the
State jewels, treasure, and household paraphernalia of
the late Rajah, were left to the control of the family
and dependants, this valuable property would be
wasted, or irregularly disposed of. It was therefore
determined that all these effects should be collected,
and their value realised. The proceeds were to con-
stitute a deposit in the hands of the British Govern-
ment, to be termed the Bhonsla Fund, for the benefit.
and support of the Bhonsla family. The realised pro-
ceeds of the property, according to accounts finally
closed, amount to twenty lakhs of rupees: and that
sum constitutes the Bhonsla Fund."
In this passage he calls the Fund "a deposit"; in
another, upon which I shall have to make a few ob-
servations, he claims it as "a set off" to the expense
of pensioning the family and retainers of the late
Rajah of Nagpore. Mr. Temple calculates the present
amount of the Bhonsla Fund at twenty lakhs, while I
shall constantly state it at twenty-seven lakhs of rupees.
The difference between the two sums is caused by his
having deducted about seven lakhs on account of the
payment, in the year 1854, of certain arrears and
debts of the Khasgee establishment; a deduction which,
for reasons to be shortly explained, I must distinctly
decline to allow.
The description here given by Mr. Temple, of the
:
THE BHONSLA FUND.
223
motives which induced the Government to lay its
hands upon the private treasure and moveable goods
in the Nagpore Palace, are substantially the same as
those put forward at the time by Lord Dalhousie, who
said that this property should "not be given up to be
appropriated and squandered by the Ranees." Now,
I must remark, that there really was no question of
giving up anything to the Ranees; all the property
was in their possession, not in ours. Merely verbal
criticism would be quite out of place when a matter
of right is being discussed; but no such trifling point
is in question here. A great principle is involved;
and the evidence as to the nature of the property
must depend in a great measure on its receptacle and
on its custody. The property could not possibly have
been given up by us, because we were eventually com-
pelled to make a forcible entry, and to take it away
from the Ranees, not, as I shall show, without remon-
strance and resistance. But not only was the pro-
perty in the possession of the Ranees and not of the
Government, but it never had even been in the pos-
session, or entered in the accounts, of the Mahratta
Government. It was Rajah Rughojee Bhonsla's pri-
vate wealth: a great part of it was kept, and had been
kept for years,-concealed, according to Colonel Elliot
and Lord Dalhousie's phraseology,-in certain apart-
ments of the zenana, from which the ladies had to be
turned out, before our officials could touch it.
The late Rajah, as head of the Bhonsla family, pos-
sessed private property, both real and personal. The
ancient estates of the family,-jagheers, inams, and
1 Annexation of Berar, 1856, p. 10.
"ו
224
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
..
+
simple patelships,—were all situated beyond the limits
of the Raj, in the zillahs of Poonah, Sattara, Ahmed-
nuggur, and Sholapore, and in the Nizam's territory.
A great part of them had belonged to his ancestors be-
fore they attained to sovereign rank. There ought to
have been no doubt, therefore, that these estates were
strictly of the nature of private property. Lord Dal-
housie, however, and his nominee, the Commissioner of
Nagpore in 1854, took a very different view of the case.
They were of opinion that the estates lapsed with the
Principality. It is a singular fact, that the ancient
Wuttundarees of the Bhonslas were only saved from
forming an addition to Mr. Temple's "set-off," by the
Bombay Inam Commissioner, Captain Cowper, whose
proceedings, for once at least, one is glad to be able
to approve. He decided that the deceased Rajah did
not hold these estates as part of his sovereignty, but
as private property; and that under the ordinary
rules, the estates would fall to his widow for her life.
At this time, the adopted son was completely ignored.
Accordingly, after a sequestration of about three years,
all the Wuttundarees, which had been in charge of the
Collectors of the several districts, were handed over,
with the accumulated rents, to the agents appointed
by the Ranees to receive them.
The estates remained in the widow's possession
until 1860, when Lord Canning having, as a partial
and very imperfect reparation to the Bhonslas, recog-
nised Janojee Bhonsla as the head of the family, the
lands were transferred to him, with the remnants of
the private moveable property that had escaped Lord
Dalhousie's auctions. In the notification of his title
THE BHONSLA FUND.
225
of Rajah Bahadur of Deoor, in the Calcutta Gazette,
Lord Canning, certainly with no intention of insult or
offence, designated the grandnephew and adopted son
of our faithful ally as "the adopted son of the widow
of the late ruler of Nagpore," an impossible relation-
ship according to Hindoo law, a solecism in legal
phraseology, and colloquially about as contemptuous
and offensive a designation in India as "son of a
priest" is in Italy.¹ Of course, Lord Canning's object
was to avoid the appearance of conceding or acknow-
ledging Janojee Bhonsla's direct heirship to the late
Rajah, Rughojee the 3rd. But the evasion is as in-
effectual as the mode of expression was ungracious.
The Government having recognised this young Prince
as the representative of the Bhonsla family, and having
at last permitted him to succeed to the ancient family
estates, it was a puerile contradiction to call him "the
widow's son," with no ostensible father at all. If he
be correctly described as "the adopted son of the
widow of the late ruler of Nagpore," then he is the
son of the late ruler also, unless we are to assail the
honour of this lady, and that without any great re-
finement or subtlety of allusion. By the Hindoo law
the ceremony of adoption severs the relationship be-
tween Janojee and his "natural father," the widow's
late husband taking the place of the latter. An un-
1 The notification runs as follows:-" No. 1,115: Camp Hoshiar-
poor, the 30th March 1860):-
"His Excellency the Viceroy and Governor General has been
pleased to confer on Janojee Bhonsla, the adopted son of the
widow of the late Ruler of Nagpore, the title of Raja Bahadur of
Deor,' in the district of Sattara, in recognition of the loyal conduct
of the family during the rebellion, and of the faithful attachment
of the late Banka Baee to the British Government."
L3
226
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
י.
married woman cannot adopt a son, nor can any woman
but a widow; and the child is not adopted to remove
the reproach of barrenness from her, but its spiritual
evils from her deceased husband. If the adopted son
be not the son of the deceased husband, then is he
not the widow's son? Vasishtha says:-“A son
given is the child not of his adoptive mother, but of
his adoptive father." (Colebrooke's Digest, vol. iii,
p. 254.)
But Lord Canning seems to have argued thus:-
"If Janojee Bhonsla be the Rajah's son, then is he his
heir, and ought to be his successor. The treaty was
made with the Bhonsla, his heirs and successors; and
an admission that this young Prince is the adopted
son of the Bhonsla, is an admission that in annexing
Nagpore we have robbed him of his inheritance.
Therefore we must never admit that he is anything
but the widow's son." Now, nothing can be easier
than to perceive that this sorry evasion is of no effect.
The adopted son of the Rajah's widow is, by Hindoo
law and custom, either the Rajah's son and heir, or
else he is the offspring of the most degrading species
of illegitimacy, which would completely disqualify
him from succeeding to the family estates, and which
most certainly Lord Canning never intended to im-
pute to Rajah Janojee Bhonsla. There stands the
dilemma, quite unassailable by any weapon in the
Calcutta Foreign Office, or in any store-house of Hindoo
law; and there it will remain-a moral, legal, and
political paradox-until, as I hope, obliterated for ever
by a royal restitution.
When Janojee Bhonsla was officially recognised by
THE BHONSLA FUND.
227
Lord Canning in 1860 as "the adopted son of the
widow," and the head of the Bhonsla family, the
estates were transferred to him. The Friend of
India, implicitly following Mr. Temple's statement,
speaks of a grant of the estates to Rajah Janojee.
It is very true that the Governor-General issued a
fresh sunnud on the occasion in Janojee's name, and
I am glad to say that this sunnud concedes the future
right of adoption without reserve. The Governor-
General, under the embarrassing circumstances of this
partial restitution, naturally strove to give it the air
of an act of grace, but the Bhonsla family cannot be
expected to admit that it was anything of the sort.
Indeed, as Mr. Temple himself allows that the estates
had been in their hereditary possession "for 125
years," I think the Friend ought to have understood
that this transfer from the widow to the young
Rajah did not really amount to a new grant. But
several of these estates had been in their hereditary
possession for a very much longer period than 125
years.
The jaghire of Deoor near Sattara, the most ancient
Wuttun of the Bhonslas, having been theirs from time
immemorial, was re-granted to them by the Adil
Shahee King of Beejapoor, upwards of three hundred
years ago; was confirmed to them by Aurungzebe's
sunnud about the end of the 17th century, constitut-
ing the head of the family a Munsubdar of the Empire;
and has remained uninterruptedly in the possession of
the family ever since. It was their private estate, for
at least two centuries before they fought their way
to sovereign rank; and though the application of Lord
228
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
:
1
?
Dalhousie's leading dogma,-that a treaty with the
British Government works silently such a corruption
of blood in heathen families, that none but a lineal
descendant can succeed without the permission of
their Christian friend and ally,—forbade the succes-
sion of the late Rajah's grand-nephew and heir, Janojee
Bhonsla, to the sovereignty, and the bare mention of
his name at Nagpore under heavy penalties, still the
old Wuttundaree estates, including that of Deoor,
were after a short inquiry transferred by the Bombay
Inam Commission to the late Rajah's widow. Even
Captain Cowper could not pick a flaw in the Bhonsla's
title. Though the statement, therefore, may be tech-
nically correct, a true impression is not produced
when the estates are said to have been "lately con-
ferred on Janojee Bhonsla."
Let us now inquire how the personal property was
disposed of. Upon the death of the late Rajah, the
government of the Nagpore country was conducted by
Mr. Mansel, the Resident, with the counsel and assist-
ance of three of the principal noblemen of the State.
When the decree of annexation went forth from Cal-
cutta, he was appointed Commissioner, but was almost
immediately removed by Lord Dalhousie for having
recommended that the adopted son should be recog-
nised as titular Rajah, and should be allowed six lakhs
of rupees per annum, while the province should be
kept under British management. On the question of
the sovereignty, Mr. Mansel unfortunately despatched
his report after so long a delay, and evinced so dim an
appreciation of the absolute rights of the Rajah's heir,
that his recommendation, based on grounds of prudence
THE BHONSLA FUND,
229
and general policy, had no effect but that of causing
his own censure and removal. But on the question
of the family property he spoke with no such uncer-
tain tone.
"The private treasure," said Mr. Mansel, "about
twenty lakhs of Nagpore rupees; the jewels, said to
be from fifty to seventy-five lakhs of Nagpore rupees
in value (but I shall be pleased if on sale they yield
the half of the former sum); and the household pro-
perty, not above a lakh in value, I would propose to
leave with the family, to be disposed of by them in
such way as was most agreeable to their feelings, and
would be generally approved of by the courtiers and
the native public. I apprehend that the general de-
sire would be to throw the whole or the main part of
the effects into a family fund, to be held by one re-
presentative, just as would be done in England in an
entailed property, subordinate interests being provided
for by a settlement. The right of the family by the
female branch seems to me clearly quite as strong as
by the male, to everything but the possession of sove-
reign power."1
· Lord Dalhousie disagreed as completely with Mr.
Mansel with regard to the Rajah's personal property
as he did on the question of the titular sovereignty.
He decreed that it should not be "given up to be
appropriated and squandered by the Ranees," but
that "it should not be alienated from the family,"
and that "jewels and furniture, and other personal
1 Letter from C. G. Mansel, Esq., to Secretary to Government,
dated 29th April 1854. (Parly. Papers, Annexation of Berar, 1856,
p. 9.)
:
230
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
property suitable to their rank, having been allotted
to the Ranees, the value of the rest of the jewels, &c.,
should be realised, and that the proceeds should be
constituted a fund for the benefit of the Bhonsla
family." So far we might set down the Governor-
General's plan as a somewhat arbitrary and irregular
interference, but still as decidedly paternal in its ob-
ject. But the next sentence undeceives us. "As the
Commissioner seems to think that the value likely to
be realised has been over-estimated, the Government
should be prepared to make up any sums that may be
wanting to afford adequate stipends to the family.
" 1
The private personal property of the Bhonsla family,
computed by Mr. Mansel at some fifty-five or sixty lakhs
of rupees, was thus declared to be the first source from
which the Ranee's life-annuities were to be supplied,
and it was only in case of any deficiency that the
annexing Government was to be called upon to bear
any part of the expense. In short, their private pro-
perty is sequestrated and sold, to provide the public
stipends granted as compensation for the loss of their
sovereignty; their capital is confiscated, their valu-
ables sold by auction, and life-annuities are conferred
upon them out of the proceeds! But not only is this
process not to be called "spoliation," but we are told
that it is not even "alienation" of property. And the
Friend evidently considers it as a crucial instance of
Lord Dalhousie's liberality!
Setting aside for the moment the utter iniquity of
the annexation, and assuming that there was a genuine
lapse for want of an heir capable of reigning, I find it
1 Parliamentary Papers, Annexation of Berar, 1856, p. 10.
THE BHONSLA FUND.
231
very difficult to trace the process of reasoning, by which
Lord Dalhousie and the Court of Directors contrived
to persuade themselves that the immediate family of
a friendly Sovereign whose territory we had annexed,
were not entitled to the custody and management of
their own private property, but were entitled only to
a life-interest in such a proportion of it as the annex-
ing Government chose to consider sufficient for their
maintenance. Most people, I think, would on mature
consideration decide, that the intrusive power was
bound in honour and in justice to provide from its
own revenues, augmented as they were by the revenue
of the new acquisition, an adequate and becoming in-
come for the representatives of the ejected dynasty,
for those members of the royal family who had for-
merly depended upon the Civil List of the Sovereign.
Most people would come to the conclusion, that even
if the representatives of the friendly dynasty were, or
were assumed to be, merely the widows of the last
Sovereign, the obligation to provide for them would
remain equally strong. And this being granted, it
appears by no means equitable that the whole, or any
part, of this provision should be derived from the
confiscated personal property of the deceased Sove-
reign. Nor does it appear equitable that any part of
the family property should be applied, as was done
under Lord Dalhousie's orders, to the payment of the
debts of the Khasgee or household. For let us sup-
pose, that instead of leaving property valued at fifty
lakhs of rupees, and which, notwithstanding all the
disadvantage of a forced sale by auction, actually rea
lised twenty-seven lakhs,¹ the Rajah of Nagpore had
1 £270,000.
-
232
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
dissipated the whole of the family property before his
death, and had left a mass of debts in every public
department, and among others in the royal household,
or Khasgee establishment. Would the British Go-
vernment have appropriated the public revenue, and
repudiated the public responsibilities? Would Lord
Dalhousie and the Honourable Court have declared
that in consequence of the insolvency, or very small
value, of the Rajah's private estate, the Ranees and
other inmates of the palace were entitled to no public
provision whatever, and that the Khasgee debts must
be left unpaid for want of private treasure? I trow
not. The Ranee's stipends could not have been stop-
ped, or diminished, to cover the debts of the abolished
household. The Ranees were not in the slightest de-
gree interested in the bygone expenditure of the Palace;
nor could they be held responsible for the financial
state of a royal establishment over which they never
had the slightest control.
The Khasgee establishment was the Rajah's royal
household. It was just as much a public department
of the State, as the Rajah's army; and we might as
fairly have paid the military arrears out of the private
treasure, as the arrears of the household. The ex-
penses of the Khasgee establishment during the Rajah's
life were defrayed from what may be called his Civil
List, or that share of the public revenue which, from
ancient custom, with the advice of his ministers and
of the Resident, was allotted for the support of the
royal dignity. On the annexation, this Civil List was
withheld. The debts of the Khasgee were contracted
on the credit of the Rajah's Civil List, the usual
اد
THE BHONSLA FUND.
233
?
".
;
monthly payments of which our Government stopped
in that department after the annexation, and appro-
priated as part of the public revenue, in whatever way
it pleased. Having appropriated the Civil List, we
were bound to accept its liabilities in full. The debts
of the Khasgee were not contracted on the credit of
the Rajah's private property. There were large re-
ceipts and disbursements constantly going on in the
Rajah's private treasury, but these were not entered
in the public accounts of the household, but in certain
private accounts which have never been surrendered or
submitted to the British authorities. The Governor
General however had no misgivings on the subject.
He says, that the property is "fairly at the disposal of
Government," and that it is "justly available for the
payment of arrears due to the Khasgee establishment."
(p. 31.) So long as Lord Dalhousie confined himself
to a mere general assumption of this property being
"fairly at the disposal of Government," with a vague
assurance that it shall be used "for the benefit of the
Bhonsla family," the gross injustice and illegality of
the whole transaction, may easily escape detection by
the ordinary reader. But there are certain principal
items of cash in the Bhonsla fund which he specifically
claims for public purposes, with a certain show and
pretence of equity, that enable us to come to closer
quarters, and to prove by a thorough exposure
of Lord Dalhousie's reckless assertions, that this
violation of private property was totally without
excuse.
At page 31 of the Parliamentary Papers of 1856,
from which I have so often quoted, Colonel Elliot
•
234
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
쿵​.
makes the following "financial" proposal to the Secre-
tary to Government at Calcutta:
"There appears to me no other mode of adjusting
the heavy arrears due to the Khasgee establishment,
but by making use of the treasure in the Palace,
claimed by the Banka Baee and the other Ranees, but
undoubtedly the property of the late Rajah, and justly
available, in my opinion, for the purpose indicated."
Now before noticing the cordial reception this ex-
traordinary proposal met with at Calcutta, let us give
a little passing attention to the singular coolness and
off-hand contempt of those simple legal considerations,
which had been constantly pressed upon him by the
Ranees in every form,-verbally and in writing, in good
Mahrattee and in bad English,-which Colonel Elliot
manifests. He places the claim to this treasure by
the Ranees, and his own opinion that it was un-
doubtedly "the property of the late Rajah," in utter
antagonism, as if the two propositions were incom-
patible, instead of being, as they are, essentially and
inextricably interdependent. The Ranees did not claim
the treasure in their possession, in defiance of Colonel
Elliot's opinion that it was "undoubtedly the late
Rajah's property;" they claimed it because it was the
late Rajah's property. They agree with Colonel El-
liot as to the facts entirely, instead of differing, as he
seems to imply. And Lord Dalhousie evidently saw
this. He perceived that Colonel Elliot had not in the
least helped him to a plea for appropriating the trea-
sure. He therefore trusts to his own brilliant imagi-
nation and dashing rhetoric, and comments on Colonel
Elliot's letter in the following terms:
“There can
THE BHONSLA FUND.
235.
:
be no doubt that the accumulated treasure is available
for this purpose. It was not private treasure, derived
from private estates, or from personal sources of any
kind. It was public treasure hoarded by the Rajah."
What will Lord Dalhousie's apologists say when I as-
sure them, on the best information, that it is notorious
to every member of the late Rajah's family, to every
Palace attendant, and to every native official in our
employ at Nagpore, that this reckless assertion, made
by Lord Dalhousie on no foundation whatever, unsup-
ported even by Colonel Elliot's letter, was false in
every particular? The private treasure was not
"hoarded from the public revenue"; it was derived
from the Rajah's "private estates" and other “per-
sonal sources"; no part of it had ever been kept in
the public treasury; and not the least allusion to its
existence, no trace of its origin or of its management,
can be found in any part of the public accounts.
It might very fairly and properly have been saved
-"hoarded," if you please-from the public revenue,
and yet not have been any the less private property.
The Rajah had a perfect right to save any part of his
share of the revenue-of his Civil List or Privy
Purse,—and to set it apart as a family fund not avail-
able for public purposes. But even this was not the
Such was not the origin of this "hoard.' To
this day it is a source of exultation, and I will add of
legitimate and honest exultation, among the old re-
tainers of the Palace at Nagpore, that the Government
has never been able to lay its hands upon the accounts
relating to this private treasure, or to get any inform-
ation on the subject, from the persons to whose de-
case.
""
236
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
partment it belonged. But there is no great mystery
as to the sources from which it was accumulated. It
was derived from nuzzurs presented at festivals and
state ceremonies, and on appointments to office, fines
on household officers and servants, the rents of the
Wuttundaree estates, and of the Hoozoor Khasgee
villages, or domains within the Nagpore territory, and
also from the profits of the Rajah's two banking es-
tablishments. In short a direct unqualified contra-
diction is given to Lord Dalhousie's unfounded asṣer-
tions: it was not "public treasure hoarded by the
Rajah;" it was "derived from private estates and per-
sonal sources.
دو
But although I have thus glanced at the sources
from whence these funds are known to have been de-
rived, I cannot allow that we have, or ever had, any
right to inquire into their origin, or to dictate, other-
wise than judicially, as to their disposal. The places
where the treasure was deposited, the titles under
which the accounts were kept, and the total absence
of connection with the accounts of the public revenue,
point it out as strictly private property. It is quite
evident from Colonel Elliot's own report, that he did
not know what was the amount of the private treasure.
Mr. Mansel had estimated it at about twenty lakhs;
but he also speaks from mere rumour, and without
any official accounts before him. And no doubt Lord
Dalhousie had his eye upon this splendid sum.
when the Ranees had been turned out of their sleep-
ing apartments, and Colonel Elliot's exploring party
had completed their interesting labours, the private
treasure was found to amount to only four lakhs and
But
THE BHONSLA FUND.
237
›
a half of Nagpore rupees, and twenty thousand gold
mohurs, or altogether about eight lakhs of rupees.
And these sums are regularly entered in the receipts
of the Bhonsla fund.
This private treasure was kept,-" concealed," ac-
cording to our elegant political jargon,—in the Ranees'
sleeping apartments. It had always been kept there,
and in no other place. A large sum, probably not
exceeding a lakh and a half of rupees, was expended
by the Ranees during the first two years of their
widowhood, chiefly in advocating the cause of their
adopted son. The Ranees have never been asked to
account for these funds, for the simple reason that
the British authorities have never had any data, any
record whatever, on which to base a demand. Lord
Dalhousie decided on taking the Zenana deposits, but
the public books affording no clue to their existence
or amount, he was obliged to take what he could get.
The accounts of the receipts and disbursements of the
private treasure were kept during the Rajah's life-
time, and down to the date of its appropriation, not
by any public official, but by certain special personal
attendants of the zenana. These accounts, it is said,
would prove to a demonstration, if there were any
excuse for such an inquiry, that the private trea-
sure was private family property. We had no right
to touch that money, those jewels, those clothes, or
those spoons. So long as a rupee of "the Bhonsla
deposit " remains in our possession, there will be a blot
upon the royal scutcheon of Great Britain, and Rajah
Janojee Bhonsla will be a pecuniary creditor of the
Queen. He may not be a troublesome or importunate
►
238
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
creditor; but the debt is a debt of honour, and the
Queen must not be a defaulter. The appropriation of
the property was a most scandalous outrage; and the
moral discredit and political dishonour entailed by it
on our Government, and the profound disgust excited
by it in many parts. of India besides Nagpore, can
hardly be exaggerated, and certainly ought not to be
lightly regarded.
Mr. Temple himself tells us (section 366 of the Re-
port) that "the only attempt at disturbance, in conse-
quence of measures connected with the annexation,
was that which occurred in 1855."1
*
*
*
"When the State property was given up, an un-
successful attempt at disturbance was made by the
palace retainers, and a Reverend Missionary (mistaken
apparently for an officer) was maltreated by the mob."
But on referring to the Parliamentary Papers of 1856
on the Annexation of Berar, we find that the disturb-
ance was of a more serious character than would ap-
pear from Mr. Temple's cursory notice. Colonel Elliot's
despatch of 3rd November 1854 (page 32, Parlia-
mentary Papers, 1856) states that there was "great
excitement in the city," that he was obliged to em-
ploy "a detachment of 500 men" on this gallant
expedition, and to have "a heavy gun equipped and
got ready, in case of being needed." "An express
was also sent off to Kamptee to reinforce Seetabuldee
with a corps of infantry, with cavalry and guns."
And after expressing his acknowledgments to the mili-
tary authorities for the promptitude with which his
1 A mistake for 1854; the occurrence took place on the 11th
October 1854.
THE BHONSLA FUND.
239
requisitions were complied with, and for those "ad-
mirable arrangements which soon showed the evil-
disposed the utter folly of all opposition," he adds,
that "had there been any delay, the consequences
might have been most serious." Not only was Mr.
Hislop, the Free Church Missionary,-being mistaken
for one of the officers engaged in this conveyancing
business,―ill-treated by the mob, but a person named
Jamal-ood-deen, "the native official employed on the
part of this Government, was maltreated, assaulted,
and wounded" (p. 36), or, as Colonel Elliot explains
more fully in his first report of the disturbance, re-
fused admittance to the apartments where the jewels
and treasure were kept, compelled to "retrace his steps
by the way he had come," and "on reaching the outer
gate of the palace he was hustled, his palanquin de-
stroyed, and himself beaten," while "the guards on
duty, if not assisting," looked on without interfering,
and enjoyed the fun. (Parliamentary Papers, 1856,
p. 32.)
These little incidents clearly indicate the general
effect produced, and the popular feeling excited, by the
paternal exertions of Lord Dalhousie's administration
to prevent the Ranees from squandering their sub-
stance. In the same Parliamentary return we find
several letters and short notes from the Ranees to the
Commissioner, raising very strong and reasonable ob-
jections, couched in very bad English, against the sum-
mary confiscation of their property, and protesting
against it, "in the name of Her Majesty Queen Victo-
ria," very much no doubt to the amusement of Lord
Dalhousie, who exhorted the Commissioner to "disre
240
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
gard the petulance and vexatious opposition" of the
Ranees, and to show them all the courtesy due to
"their rank, their sex, and their changed condition."
(P. 29.) Lord Dalhousie's admirers may assert, that
the Bhonsla family ought to have accepted all this
magnanimity and gracious consideration, as quite
cheap at twenty-seven lakhs of rupees. But somehow
or other, owing to the narrow-minded prejudices of
Mahrattas, or to the proverbial ingratitude of natives,
or because they would have selfishly preferred squan-
dering the property themselves, they never have
viewed our appropriation with complacency, and never
have ceased to protest against it, and to claim the
restoration of the whole.
It is somewhat remarkable that there is a singular
confusion of terms, and inconsistency of statement,
both in Lord Dalhousie's original instructions, and in
Mr. Temple's recent report on this financial master-
piece. In the very Minute in which Lord Dalhousie
mildly deprecates their "petulance and vexatious op-
position," he states that "a fund for the use of the
Ranees, is to be formed out of the value of property
to be sold for their behoof." (p. 30.) And in the
minute on the reported tumult during the removal of
the property, he observes that it is "to be sold on be-
half of the family." (p. 36.) In his very natural de-
sire to overlay this ugly deed with a little moral gild-
ing, Lord Dalhousie betrayed himself into some incon-
sistency of language, but his practical object is not at
all ambiguous. He intended absolutely to appropriate
the private property of the family, and with the pro-
ceeds to supply, or reduce as much as possible, the
THE BHONSLA FUND.
241
annual expense of their maintenance. He does indeed
repeatedly declare, that the proceeds shall not be
"alienated from the Bhonsla family." But as he
simultaneously employs in these very Minutes, and in
the orders issued at the same time to the Commis-
sioner, other terms implying a totally opposite mean-
ing, these pretty expressions become mere prevarica-
tions, and fail entirely to give an air of decency to
what was in fact a daring act of spoliation.
Mr. Temple, in paragraph 366 of the Report, which
has already been quoted at full length, terms the
Bhonsla fund "a deposit in the hands of the British
Government," and in my opinion the term is correctly
used. Whatever that gentleman's conviction may be,
whatever the cause of the slight confusion and incon-
sistency of his expressions, he does actually leave open
and undecided the question of the proprietary right to
the capital raised by the sequestration of the late
Rajah's personal estate. But as he seems in the fol-
lowing passage to claim this Fund for Government as
"a set-off" against the stipendiary provision made for
the Rajah's family and retainers, we will waive for the
present all preliminary objections, and inquire whether
that stipendiary provision was, or is, fixed upon so
liberal a scale as to constitute anything like an indem-
nity or equivalent for the capital appropriated and
sunk. If we were to accept without further inquiry
either the statement of that provision contained in the
Friend's article, or that set forth officially in Mr.
Temple's Report, the settlement would appear to be
not merely liberal, but profuse and excessive. Ten
M
242
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA..
lakhs per annum would soon exhaust a fund of twenty-
seven lakhs.
Liberal provision has been made," says Mr. Tem-
ple (paragraph 371), "for the family and connexions
and dependents of the late Ruler. These are very
numerous, owing to the extraordinary and complicated
domestic relations which it was the custom of Mah-
ratta Princes to contract. All these cases have now
been finally investigated and submitted to Govern-
ment. The total sum already granted or recommended
amounts to 7,87,000 rupees, or 72 lakhs per annum.
The pensioners number some 2158 persons; and the
pensions range from 3 rupees per annum, the lowest,
to 35,000 rupees, the highest. The stipends of both
classes, then, aggregate 9,82,000 rupees, or 10 lakhs
per annum, an amount which will yearly grow less by
lapses. Besides these cash payments, the family have
landed grants, free of revenue, worth about 50,000
rupees, or half a lakh per annum. The total as it
now stands (cash and land) is equal to about 25 per
cent. on the revenues of the Nagpore province proper,
or, in other words, one-fourth of the income of the
late Nagpore kingdom is devoted to the support of the
Bhonsla family, together with the retainers and de-
pendents of the late Ruler, in accordance with the
political obligation of the British Government. But
as a partial set-off against this, there is the Bhonsla
Fund already alluded to."
I have italicised a few words towards the close of
this paragraph, which appear to disclose at once the
means and the motive of what I must reluctantly call
Mr. Temple's misrepresentation. I cannot consider
THE BHONSLA FUND.
243
him justified in classing all the military and civil
pensioners, a large proportion of whom served during
the last eight years under our rule, among "the re-
tainers and dependents of the late Ruler." I can
make considerable allowances for a tendency to "make
things pleasant," when Mr. Temple is now, for the first
time since its annexation, describing the past proceed-
ings and previous measures of Government in a Pro-
vince placed under his own immediate control. A
graceful and generous regard for the credit of his local
predecessors will explain his reticence on some points,
and the peculiar light or shade given to other features
in the administration. But in the present instance,
all permissible licence has been exceeded. Lord Dal-
housie cannot be allowed to escape over the bridge of
gold constructed for him by Mr. Temple. That gentle-
man cannot be allowed to cast into one mass such
incongruous elements, in order to manufacture a moral
"set-off" for the Bhonsla fund. He cannot be per-
mitted to exhibit all the pensions of the Province as if
they benefited the late Rajah's family, and formed some
compensation for their lost sovereignty, or to balance
a flagrant spoliation by this delusive show of profuse
liberality.
The Friend of India, misled by the round sums and
sweeping classification, so congenial to his object of
making out a case for Lord Dalhousie, has adopted Mr.
Temple's figures; and, overlooking his vague allusion to
certain "retainers and dependents," presents this annual
sum of ten lakhs of rupees as being devoted to the
support of the one family of the Bhonslas,”—a rather
large family, if it really includes as many as 2158
M 2
244
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
members. Although a little consideration of this
startling muster-roll of 2158 persons, a little closer
attention to particular indications,-such as the
absence of any item of civil or military pensions in
the accounts, might, perhaps, have saved the Friend
from this extraordinary error, I must admit that he
was led into it by too implicit a reliance on the
exactitude of Mr. Temple's phraseology. When "the
extraordinary and complicated domestic relations of
Mahratta Princes" are adduced in explanation of the
large number of pensioners; when it is said that
“besides these cash payments, the family have landed
grants;" who could divine, who, without previous
knowledge of the facts, could suspect, that all the
military pensioners from the Rajah's army, and from:
the recently disbanded irregular force, were included
among the Rajah's "family connexions and depend-
ents" by Mr. Temple, and that all their pensions,
with those of the old civil officers, and of the holders
of sinecures and hereditary charges on the revenue,
who were relegated to the pension-list, when the an-
nexation was complete, and in fact all the pensions of
every description, and all the Inams and other rent-
free lands enjoyed by relatives of the late Rajah, had
been thrown together into that round sum of ten lakhs
of rupees, or twenty-five per cent. of the revenues of
Nagpore, which the Friend told us were devoted to
the support of the "one family of the Bhonslas ?"
When the Friend has made a more accurate calcula-
tion, he will find that out of the sum of ten lakhs of
rupees per annum allotted to pensioners, not even one
half, not five lakhs, but rather more than four lakhs,
THE BHONSLA FUND.
245
are allotted to the "one family of the Bhonslas,” in-
cluding all the most distant relations by affinity of
the late and of former Rajahs; so that, instead of
twenty-five per cent., the charge on the Nagpore
revenue will be about seven per cent.
The only stipends of which the particulars are
given by Mr. Temple in his Report are those of
Janojee Bhonsla, the Ranees, and the other inmates
of the late Rajah's zenana, which amount to 2,33,000
rupees per annum. I have not yet been able to pro-
cure the exact items, but I am able to state, with
substantial accuracy, that all the persons registered as
relations of the Bhonsla family, about two hundred in
number, are in the receipt of pensions which amount
in the aggregate to about 1,75,000 rupees. This sum
added to the stipends of the late Rajah's immediate
family, makes the total of four lakhs and eight thou-
sand rupees, which I offer, instead of the Friend's ten
lakhs, as the actual provision, subject to constant re-
duction by lapses, which has been made for the Bhonsla
family; using that word family in the most extended
sense, to include all the connexions by marriage of the
late and former Rajahs.
But it must now be further explained, that these
pensions amounting to the sum of 1,75,000 rupees, are
not new grants, made by our Government from sheer
beneficence and generosity, but old stipends and allow-
ances granted by the Sovereigns of Nagpore, and which
were confirmed by our Government to the persons
whom we found in the actual enjoyment and posses-
sion of them. So that all that has actually been
granted to the late Rajah's immediate family, in-
246
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
cluding his lawful heir, as a compensation for the
loss of the sovereignty secured to them by treaty, is
the above-mentioned sum of 2,33,000 rupees per an-
num; a certain portion of which consists of life an-
nuities to the Ranees, although the whole is under
the control and management of Rajah Janojee Bhonsla
as the recognised head of the family. For no part of
it has yet, as I understand, been declared to be a here-
ditary settlement on Rajah Janojee's line. All pay-
ments beyond this from the Nagpore revenue, whether
the amount be ten lakhs or four, neither benefit, nor
compensate, the immediate family of the late Rajah.
Rajah Janojee Bhonsla and the Ranees are benefited
by the payment of the pensions amounting to 1,75,000
rupees per annum to about two hundred relations and
connexions of the late Rajah and his predecessors, to
this extent only, that if the Government had refused
to recognise and continue the allowances which had
been granted to these persons by the late Rajah, many,
if not most of them, must have become dependent for
food and clothing on the Palace establishment, as the
only refuge from starvation. It is not quite so easy,
as Lord Dalhousie and the Honourable Court of Direc-
tors seemed to think, for even the humblest connexions
of a royal family to throw off their old habits, to learn
at a moment's notice to do without their accustomed
income, and "to earn an honest livelihood like their
neighbours." To this limited extent, therefore, Rajah
Janojee and the Ranees may well be thankful that the
stipends enjoyed by their distant relatives were not
confiscated after the annexation.
But claiming, as I do, to have shown clearly in a
THE BHONSLA FUND.
247
previous part of this letter the utter injustice of making
even the new stipends allotted to the late Rajah's
nearest relatives a charge against the family property,
I may be allowed, without recapitulating any part of
the argument in this place, simply to urge & fortiori
â
that this same private property should not be charged
with the maintenance of old stipends to more distant
relations.
Before finally dismissing the plea of "set-off," I
shall give the particulars, taken from Mr. Temple's
Report, of the pensions formerly and at present as-
signed to the late Rajah's immediate famiiy. "The
terms of the provision for the Bhonsla family," says
Mr. Temple (para. 367), "were, in the first instance,
declared at the annexation. These included the widows
and connexions of the late Rajah. Accordingly, the
following pensions were granted :—
The Banka Baee
Per annum
Rupees.
1,20,000
:
Unpoorna Baee
50,000
Darya Baee
25,000
Anunda Baee
-25,000
Kamuljee Baee
25,000
Savitree Baee (widow of Rajah Appa Sahib)
15,000
2,55,000"
But it must be remembered that whatever Lord
Dalhousie granted, was simply given as life pensions
to the Rajah's grandmother and widows; and while
for some time he completely ignored the existence of
Janojee Bhonsla, he at last, when pressed by the Ra-
nees, declared that the adopted son had not the vestige
of a claim to any consideration, and declined to hear
his name mentioned.
248
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
If Mr. Mansel's expectations and Lord Dalhousie's
hopes had been fulfilled, the clear gain to our Govern-
ment, by this extraordinary transaction, would have
been enormous. For a sum of ready money estimated
at not less than fifty lakhs of rupees, (£500,000,) we
should have undertaken to provide life annuities
amounting to Rs. 2,40,000 (£24,000) to six ladies ;
one of them, whose pension of Rs. 1,20,000 consti-
tuted one-half of the annual burden, being nearly
eighty years of age!
But even with the sum of twenty-seven lakhs,¹
actually realised by the sale of the jewels, spoons,
clothes, and other personal property, and by the appro-
priation of the private treasure, the Government would
have made a very handsome profit, had Lord Dal-
housie's original intentions and instructions been ad-
hered to. Two of the Rajah's widows are dead; his
grandmother, the Banka Baee, died in 1858; and un-
der Lord Dalhousie's liberal arrangements their life
pensions would long ago have lapsed; and the Bhonsla
family, instead of two lakhs and fifty-five thousand,
would have been receiving just sixty thousand rupees
per annum, not one rupee of which would have be-
longed to the Rajah's heir, who might have subsisted
on the bounty of his adoptive mother during her life,
and after her death might have become a cooly, a
beggar, or a rebel, according to his temper, ability,
and opportunities. At the beginning of 1859, the
life annuities of the three surviving Ranees only
amounted to Rs. 60,000 per annum, or less than half
of the interest at 5 per cent. on the realised capital.
1 £270,000.
THE BHONSLA FUND.
249
No thanks are due to Lord Dalhousie for the revised
arrangement that has recently been made; which Mr.
Temple's report (paragraph 369) informs us stands as
follows:-
JANOJEE BHONSLA
Darya Baee
Per annum.
Rs. 90,000
45,000
Widows...
Anunda Baee
Savitree Baee
•
45,000
""
15,000
Zenana Ladies
Household slaves, called Bhonslas
,, 18,000
and Barakurnees
" 20,000
Total.
. Rs. 2,33,000
Mr. Temple adds:-"Janojee was constituted head
of the house, and to him the payment of the stipends
of the Ranees, and the general control of the Palace
and household were entrusted." But although a very
general impression prevails at Nagpore, that the an-
nual sum payable at present cannot be diminished, at
least not during Janojee Bhonsla's life, all that has
actually been settled upon him is the above-mentioned
stipend of Rs. 90,000 per annum; and both this and
the Ranees' pensions are still nominally life-annuities.
Thus the Government of India is at present paying
an annual sum of Rs. 2,33,000 in pensions to the late
Rajah's immediate family, several of whom are aged
females; while it has held during the last seven years,
under the name of the Bhonsla Fund, a sum of twenty-
seven lakhs of rupees, derived from the sequestration
and sale of the late Rajah's personal estate, the annual
interest of which is Rs. 1,35,000 per annum. If the
Government claims the possession or reversion of the
Bhonsla Fund,-as Lord Dalhousie certainly intended,
M 3
250
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
!
--
and as Mr. Temple would seem to imply by the use of
the term "set-off”—an actuary's report on the trans-
action would show that the annual pensions to the late
Rajah's immediate family are really provided without
any cost or charge whatever, or with a very insignifi-
cant charge, against the revenues of India. So finally
vanishes into thin air, the last vestige of the annual
ten lakhs of rupees allotted to "the one family of the
Bhonslas" by Lord Dalhousie's unexampled liberality,
according to the Friend of India's version.
251
LETTER X.
THE TIGERS OF MYSORE.
March 30th, 1861.
IN the final settlement which he has recently made
of the Mysore Princes' claims, Sir Charles Wood ap-
pears-so far as can be judged at present,—to have
picked out for redress the least hard and least pressing
of the many hard cases before him, to the detriment and
neglect of several much more urgent moral claims,
arising from the late Governor General's eight years'
raid among the tall poppies of India, and with the effect
of adding to the probabilities and facilities of those
weightier cases being more vigorously agitated. It is
difficult to understand how Prince Azeem Jah, and the
representatives of the Tanjore and Nagpore families
can be rejected, when Tippoo's descendants have met
with such liberal treatment.
And for this last reason I am surprised to find that
so many natives at Calcutta have been induced to sign
their names to petitions, and thus to swell the chorus
of the commercial and official opposition to the Mysore
..
252
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
grant. The intention of the Secretary of State to
re-establish that confidence in our good faith which
was so effectually shaken by Lord Dalhousie, requires
to be encouraged rather than checked, more especially
after the resistance offered by the Legislative Council.
Whatever our financial difficulties may be, they must
not be allowed to prevent the satisfaction of any ap-
proved claim to mere restitution, still less to form a
plea for refusing to listen to any such claim.
While I consider the claims of Tippoo's family on
the generous consideration of our Government to be
very weak when compared with others still disre-
garded, and while I have not a doubt that the family
had no legal claims at all,—since they were never ad-
mitted as parties to any treaty, or agreement or capitu-
lation with their conquerors,-I am well aware that
the adverse case against the Mysore Princes has been
too often supported by arguments that will not bear a
close examination, and by rhetoric of the flimsiest tex-
ture. For instance, I have never had any patience
with the cuckoo-cry of tyrant and barbarian against
Tippoo. It is not to the purpose, it is scarcely in-
genuous to declaim, as many have done, on the vio-
lent rise and ephemeral existence of Tippoo's dynasty,
to term Hyder Ali a robber chief and a usurper, and
his son a blood-thirsty fanatic,-and then to assume
that the princely dignity of the family, and their
claims upon our generous consideration, are destroyed
and disposed of
1 The natives at Madras were too cautious to be drawn into any
such course. They rejoiced at the good promise of this liberal
measure.
THE TIGERS OF MYSORE.
253
Hyder and Tippoo were both of them Sovereign
Princes whom we had recognised in every possible
form, and with whom we and our allies had been from
time to time connected by every international obliga-
tion. We made war and peace with them; we ac-
cepted cessions of territory from them; we made
treaties of perpetual friendship and of defensive al-
liance both with father and son.
Nor can Hyder Ali's successful assumption of su-
preme power in Mysore be fairly considered as the
mere result of a greedy and traitorous ambition. It
was a most legitimate dynastic revolution,-the only
revolution possible in a certain stage of society,-
urgently and imperatively called for in a great political
crisis by the weakness of a secluded Rajah, and the
vicious incapacity of a hereditary minister. By its
physical conformation Mysore seems as naturally
adapted for independence as Switzerland; and this
was more especially the case, when the frail fabric of
Aurungzebe's Empire was rapidly disintegrating under
the influence of the Hindoo national revival and revolt
initiated by Sivajee, which tempted and almost com-
pelled the Viceroys of the King of Delhi to strengthen
themselves against Mahratta conquest and local insur-
rection, by assuming monarchical power and virtual
independence.
Nothing but the vigour of Hyder's rule could have
preserved the “autonomy" of Mysore, or prevented it
from falling into the hands of the Nizam, to whose re-
gency, according to the Mogul provincial system, it
belonged. Nothing but a strong and able government
could have saved the flourishing provinces of the Bala-
!
254
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
29
ghaut, the Baramahl, Malabar and Canara, from the
swift devastation of the Mahratta "moolk-geeree,
the perpetual and usurious demands of the Mahratta
Chout.
The Nizam, with the addition to his dominions of
Mysore and its dependent provinces, integral parts of
the Deccan Vice-royalty, which but for the genius and
energy of Hyder he would easily have wrested from
the effete government of the Rajah, would have been
the most powerful monarch in India. The Nawab of
Arcot could not have gained his nominal independence
under our tutelage and protection, and for our benefit,
but must have remained the humble vassal of Hydera-
bad. From the passes of Mysore the Nizam would
have domineered over the Carnatic and Madras even
more effectually than the Peishwas actually did over
Bombay from the Western Ghauts, until family and
federal intrigues, and the mutual enmities of the Mah-
ratta chieftains, invited our interference in 1802.
Lord Wellesley's Minutes after the fall of Seringa-
patam in 1799, prove that these were his views, and
that the chief argument for exhuming the infant Rajah
and placing him on the musnud, was that "the parti-
tion of Mysore with the Nizam would have raised the
power of that Prince to a dangerous height; and would
have given him many strong fortresses which could
not have been placed in his hands without imminent
danger to the British frontier."1
It might appear paradoxical to assert that Hyder
Ali contributed more than any other individual to pre-
pare the way for the establishment of our supremacy
1 Mill and Wilson's Hist. Ind., vol. vi, p. 165.
THE TIGERS OF MYSORE.
255
in the South of India; and yet the fact is undeniable.
He opened the way for us by setting aside the ancient
rights and nominal sovereignty of the incapable Rajah,
while he warded off and evaded, at once the established
and pompous authority of the Nizam, and the national,
or, as we may call them, the Hindoo-federal preten-
sions of the Mahrattas, to either of which powers the
possession of Mysore and its dependencies would have
given a tremendous preponderance, and an inestimable
vantage-ground.
Hyder Ali, in seizing on the supreme executive
power in Mysore, acted on sound statesmanlike prin-
ciples, and on motives which as well deserve to be
called patriotic as those which led Vespasian to the
throne of the Cæsars, or Oliver Cromwell to the Pro-
tector's chair. Whatever admixture of a lower ele-
ment there may have been in their motives and their
intentions, the Roman, the Englishman, and the Indian
Mussulman must have been, each of them, in his time
and in his place, conscious of being the best, if not the
only possible ruler. Whether it is natural, honest,
courageous or patriotic, to resist such a consciousness,
and to shrink from its dangers and its glories, I leave
to the candour or to the casuistry of my readers.
I demur then to the ordinary judgment upon Hyder's
elevation, as if it had been something violent, irregu-
lar and illegitimate. I equally demur to the generally
accepted presumption that Hyder and Tippoo were
sanguinary tyrants and cruel oppressors of their sub-
jects. On this point I shall call for the evidence of
two intelligent officers to whom we are indebted for
the best information of the campaigns of 1791-2.
+
.
256
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
"When a person," says Lieutenant Moore, "travel-
ling through a strange country, finds it well cultivated,
populous with industrious inhabitants, cities newly
founded, commerce extending, towns increasing, and
everything flourishing so as to indicate happiness, he
will naturally conclude it to be under a form of Govern-
ment congenial to the minds of the people. This is a
picture of Tippoo's country, and this is our conclusion
respecting its government.¹"
And Captain Dirom says:-"Whether from the
operation of the system established by Hyder, from
the principles which Tippoo has adopted for his own
conduct, or from his dominions having suffered little
by invasion for many years, or from the effect of these
several causes united, his country was found every-
where full of inhabitants, and apparently cultivated to
the utmost extent of which the soil was capable;
while the discipline and fidelity of his troops in the
field, until their last overthrow, were testimonies
equally strong, of the excellent regulations which
existed in his army. His government, though strict
and arbitrary, was the despotism of a politic and able
sovereign, who nourishes, not oppresses, the subjects
of his future aggrandisement."2
In 1799, without taking our treaties with him into
consideration, no Prince in India was more legitimate
than Tippoo Sultan, more firmly seated in possession
of his throne, or surrounded by a more devoted body
of servants or a more contented people. He was our
1 Narrative of the Operations of Captain Little's Detachment
p. 201.
2 Dirom's Narrative, p. 249.
THE TIGERS OF MYSORE.
257
enemy, no doubt, and with good reason, and we were
his enemies and with good reason also: it suited us to
attack him, we conquered and he fell. Having decided
to extinguish the Mahomedan sovereignty, and to
divide the territory, we found a large family of Princes
thrown upon our hands,-Princes born in the purple,
nurtured in palaces, whose hereditary rights had been
recognised by treaties, and some of whom had in for-
mer years been received as royal guests by the British
Viceroy. What was to be done with them? The
simple old Oriental plan would have been to cut off
all their heads, or to immure them in dungeons: but
as that did not exactly suit our notions, the only al-
ternative was to treat them handsomely, and Lord
Wellesley determined to do so.
Lord Wellesley's first plan after Seringapatam was
taken, was that of recognising one of Tippoo's sons;
and he was not deterred from this settlement by any
doubt of its justice, or by any disregard for the claims
of the family, but solely by considerations of British
interests, and a dread of French influence. He writes
to Dundas, the 7th June 1799, "It would certainly
have been desirable that the power should have been
placed in the hands of one of Tippoo's sons; but the
hereditary and intimate connection established be-
tween Tippoo and the French, the probability that the
French may be enabled to maintain themselves in
Egypt, and the perpetual interest which Tippoo's
family must feel to undermine and subvert a system
which had so much reduced their patrimony and power,
precluded the possibility of restoring any branch of
the family of the late Sultan to the throne, without
258
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
exposing us to the constant hazard of internal com-
motion, and even of foreign war." 1
And he expresses similar views in his report on
Mysore affairs to the Court of Directors :-" The
usurpation, though not sanctioned by remote anti-
quity, had subsisted for such a length of time as to
have nearly extinguished the hopes of the Hindoo
family, and to have accustomed them to the humility
of their actual fortunes; while the sons of Tippoo
Sultaun, born in the state of royalty, and educated
with the proudest and most exalted expectations of
sovereignty and power, would be proportionably sensi-
ble to the sudden change of their condition, and to
the unexpected disappointment of their splendid pro-
spects. In this view of the subject it would have been
more grateful to my mind (securing a munificent pro-
vision for the ancient family of Mysore) to have re-
stored that of Tippoo Sultaun to the throne; if such
a restoration could have been accomplished without
exposing Mysore to the perpetual hazard of internal
commotion and foreign war, and without endangering
the stability of the intended settlement of your inter-
ests and those of your Allies in this quarter of India.”
The Duke of Wellington, who was his brother's
chief local adviser at this period, writing from Seringa-
patam, 23rd May 1799, would seem to have been at
first inclined to prefer the pretensions of Tippoo's
family to that of the infant Rajah.
"I think," says he, "that the persons about the
General now seem to be of opinion that it would be
best to restore part of the country to one of the sons
¹ Wellesley's Despatches, vol. ii, p. 36.
2 Ditto, p. 78.
THE TIGERS OF MYSORE.
259
of Tippoo, keeping garrisons in its forts and strong-
holds, or taking from him annually a certain sum as
tribute. This is one of Purneah's proposals, upon
which it must be observed that they were all framed
with a view to his own interest, and the future man-
agement of the revenues of the country to be restored,
by himself. Although I don't think that there is any
reason to believe, as he states, that the country can-
not be settled unless part of it is restored in some
manner to one of Tippoo's sons,-that, on the con-
trary, I am certain, it can be settled under any ar-
rangement that you think proper,-it is not quite
clear that the most politic and most proper measure,
and certainly the most generous one, would not be to
place one of them in the Government of part of it."
Having thus endeavoured to throw some light on
the status of Tippoo and his family at the time when
we conquered and divided his dominions, let us next
examine our own position under the treaty of Mysore
with the Nizam. When the alleged claim of the
Mysore Princes, which probably was never made,-
to be considered as principals or parties to the treaty
is dismissed as quite untenable, it is still not apparent
how we can repudiate or withdraw from our accepted
responsibilities as trustees for the share of revenue set
apart for Tippoo's family, over and above our share,
under the Partition Treaty of Mysore. It is true that
to avoid perplexing relations and possible disputes
with the Nizam, we stipulated that neither govern-
ment should have the right of questioning the distri-
bution or diminution of the incomes reserved for the
1
Supplementary Despatches, vol. i, p. 221.
260
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
families of Tippoo, and of his great Cavalry General,
Meer Kummer-ood-deen; but it seems to me that we
thereby assumed a heavier moral obligation, and were
more firmly bound to a generous construction of our
duties as the conquering power.
In the Legislative Council on the 8th December
last, Sir Barnes Peacock, already committed to a total
denial of the Mysore claims by his advice given as
legal member of the Supreme Council five years be-
fore, but who, as an experienced lawyer, ought to be
aware of the indispensable obligation to precision in
defining and explaining all the terms used in a
case, was most unfortunate in one of his arguments.
He tried to prove that the provision made for Tippoo's
family by the Partition Treaty of Mysore, was only
"intended for those in existence at that time, and not
for their descendants," by citing the corresponding
case of Meer Kummer-ood-deen, to whom the Nizam,
in the same treaty, undertook to grant a "personal
jaghire" of 210,000 rupees. Sir Barnes Peacock argues
that if the Nizam only bound himself to grant a "per-
sonal jaghire" to Kummer-ood-deen, while we bound
ourselves to provide for Tippoo's descendants in per-
petuity, we should have been placing ourselves in a
worse position, and assuming a heavier burden than
our ally.
But as Sir Barnes admits that the intention of the
treaty was to give each of the two powers an equal
share of the revenue acquired by the partition, their
net shares being in the treaty expressly calculated
after deducting the annual incomes provided for Tip-
poo's family and for Meer Kummer-ood-deen respec-
THE TIGERS OF MYSORE.
261
tively, it is obvious that Sir Barnes Peacock's inter-
pretation would have placed the British Government
in a much more advantageous position than that of
the Nizam, for if the incomes provided for these two
families were only "intended for those in existence,
and not for their descendants," we should have secured
a reversion of seven lakhs of rupees, while the Nizam
only secured one of two lakhs.
Sir Barnes Peacock's mistake arises from his mis-
understanding, and consequently misstating, the mean-
ing of the word "personal" when applied to a jaghire.
He supposes it to be equivalent to "for life only,"
and to be opposed to "hereditary," an
'hereditary," an error from
which a very little research even in the records of the
Bombay Inam Commission would have saved him. A
"khass" or "personal" jaghire was granted for the
support of the grantee's rank and dignity, and is dis-
tinguished from a "tunkhwah" or "service" jaghire
which was granted for the support of a quota of troops.¹
The term "personal" was not opposed to "hereditary"
but to "service." The Nizam in the treaty promised
to grant Meer Kummer-ood-deen a "service" jaghire
in addition to his personal estate. Indeed, it was the
class of personal jaghires alone that was ordinarily,
almost invariably, held on a hereditary tenure, while
service jaghires were seldom allowed to descend un-
conditionally, and were always resumable at will.
The truth is apparent from all the contemporary
papers, that the income for both families was intended
to be hereditary, and not merely for those in existence
at that time. The doctrine, so dear to Lord Dalhousie
¹ Called "surinjam" in the West of India: ante, p. 147.
262
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
A
and to the Mangles section of the Court of Directors,
that the descendants of Sovereign Princes in the second
or third generation should learn "to mingle with the
people," and to "gain an honest livelihood," was not
then in vogue. Sans-culotte principles were not much
cultivated in 1799 among the governing classes of
England, and least of all among Lord Wellesley's
compeers.
263
LETTER XI.
COMPENSATION.
Madras, January 1863.
EVERY executive government is bound in the strictest
obligations of duty to avoid being entangled in an
inconvenient precedent, when an appeal for the re-
dress of grievances above or beyond the reach of
municipal law is under consideration. The danger
of an embarrassing precedent never ought to be over-
looked by the Executive Government in India or in
England; for this reason, that having once promul-
gated a principle and instituted a precedent, a Govern-
ment of our character and pretensions must scrupu-
lously abide by them. I could excuse and extenuate,
though I might not entirely approve, a strong aversion
on the part of Government, even where the abstract
justice of the claim was admitted, to relinquish an-
nexed territory, for fear of a precedent being esta-
blished; because I know that certain trite accredited
apprehensions of loss of prestige and of injury to the
inhabitants, will obstinately intrude themselves into
the question, and gloss over by their apparent moral
·
--
,
264
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
#
lustre the dark suggestions of our self-esteem and
self-interest. The time has perhaps not yet come
when the futility of these apprehensions can be clearly
demonstrated; and it may be admitted that, from the
absence of any definite Imperial plan or process for
the reform of native administration, there is still a
good deal of truth in these apprehensions and objec-
tions which for the present renders their existence
excusable.
But when the grievance, for which redress is de-
manded, involves no question of territorial dominion
or sovereign power, but merely one of landed estates
or personal property irregularly or erroneously seques-
trated, I do not believe that even the most hackneyed
of our Indian politicians would pretend that the repu-
tation or prestige of Government could suffer in the
least by an equitable restitution. I am not prepared
to hear with patience or forbearance, nor do I expect
to hear from any English gentleman, these objections
advanced against a just settlement of mere pecuniary
claims, against the alleged rights of the existing re-
presentatives of certain mediatised royal families, to
succeed to the private domains and personal property
of their predecessors. It is true that, in cases of this
description more especially, the Government is bound
to be careful and cautious in coming to a decision, so
as neither to waste the public money in a single in-
stance by romantic generosity, nor to establish an
extravagant and unnecessary precedent. But when,
after a full inquiry and due deliberation, the merits of
one of these claims has been clearly ascertained, no
considerations of economy must be allowed to interfere
COMPENSATION.
265
with its full satisfaction, even though its settlement
should obviously and certainly entail that of half a
dozen analogous cases. Whatever our financial diffi-
culties may be, they are not yet so great as to prevent
us from paying our just debts. Moreover, it must be
remembered that the settlement of these debts does
not really constitute any burden on the country; these
debts do not represent any expenditure of revenue
that has to be incurred; they are simply accounts of
money and goods in deposit, which, never having formed
part of the income or of the assets of Government, are
now repaid or restored to the proper owners.
Convinced, therefore, that,-in default of that com-
plete redress which the political maxims of the day
seem to forbid,-a liberal settlement of the pecuniary
claims of the deposed families, and a permanent pro-
vision for their comfort and dignity, are imperatively
required for the re-establishment of a healthy public
feeling, and for the honour of our Sovereign, I have
heard with much gratification, that the restoration to
the senior Ranee of all the personal property and pri-
vate estates of the late Rajah of Tanjore, is proceeding
in the most satisfactory manner. The general decision
of the question in favour of the Ranee, was one of
Lord Canning's last performances, the approval of
Sir Charles Wood and the Cabinet to the most liberal
terms having been intimated very plainly by antici-
pation nearly a year ago. Lord Elgin, to whom seve-
ral references have been made as to the details of the
restitution, has invariably ruled in favour of a gene-
rous interpretation. The result will be that the Tan-
jore family will recover, besides numerous villages
N
266
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
and gardens, upwards of thirty lakhs of rupees' worth
of property, partly in plate and jewels, partly in cash,
the proceeds of our sales by auction.
α
It is reported that Sir Charles Wood, in one of his
last despatches on Tanjore affairs, expresses extreme
regret that any of the property should have been sold
by auction, observing that "the auction sales of Nag-
pore property,”-elephants, horses, and cattle, clothes
and jewels,-at Nagpore and Calcutta, had been
great source of distress and mortification to the
Bhonsla family." This, no doubt, is a perfectly true
description of the feelings of the Bhonsla family; but
I wonder if it has yet occurred to Sir Charles Wood
that if it is right, and just, and becoming to restore to
the proper heir the private personal wealth of the late
Rajah of Tanjore, it must be equally right, and just,
and becoming to restore to the proper heir the private
personal property of the late Rajah of Nagpore. The
two cases are perfectly parallel and analogous; no
political difficulties, no punctilios of state, can be.
alleged to impede a pecuniary settlement in the one
case any more than in the other. Poor as India is,
she can yet pay her just debts, and account faithfully
for all sums that she holds in deposit.
While all possible credit should be given to Sir
Charles Wood, to Lord Canning, and to Lord Elgin,
for the earnest desire they have manifested on not a
few occasions to efface, where it could be quietly done,
the darker stains of Lord Dalhousie's rapacity, there
can be no doubt that the Bhonslas of Tanjore are
mainly indebted for the recovery of their family pro-
perty to the able, patient, and judicious advocacy of
COMPENSATION.
267
Mr. J. B. Norton. The Secretary of State may have
the best general intentions, but there is always a
stimulus required to set him in motion. He must
have something urgent before him. It is exactly the
same with the Governor-General and his Secretaries.
Repentance by intuition and unsolicited reparation
are not plants that flourish in public offices. But for
the prompt institution of the suit of Kamachi Bai v.
the East India Company, in the Supreme Court of
Madras, which was decided in the Ranee's favour, and
which, although reversed on appeal before the Judicial
Committee,-on the ground that the seizure was an
"act of state" not cognisable by municipal law,
called forth a stern condemnation of the whole pro-
ceeding from Lord Kingsdown, who delivered the
judgment of the Privy Council; but for this previous
ventilation and public exposure, eliciting the solemn
and weighty opinion of the highest judicial authorities
in India and in England, I must be allowed to doubt
whether Mr. Norton would have been so completely
successful in his final negotiations.
The spoliation of private property at Nagpore in
1854 was actually used as an argument and precedent
for the similar outrage on the Tanjore family in 1856.
In the latter case, while the Privy Council decided
that an act of state could not be reversed by muni-
cipal law, Lord Kingsdown, who delivered the judg-
ment, condemned the sequestration as "a most violent
and unjustifiable measure," and declared that he could
see no ground of legal right on the part of the East
India Company, or of the Crown of Great Britain, to
the possession of any part of the property of the Rajah
N 2
268
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
on his death." Though not legally bound by this
dictum of the Queen in Council, Lord Canning and
the Home Government considered the principle as
settled by it, and that they were bound in honour to
make restitution, which has been done. It remains
for Lord Elgin to make restitution to the Nagpore
family.
All the condemnatory dicta put forth by the Judges
on the subject of the Tanjore confiscation, are equally
applicable to the counterpart proceedings at Nagpore.
Sir Charles Wood has already stigmatised the auction
sales of jewels and clothes. But the Bhonslas of Nag-
pore—although, it is said, frequently advised to do
so,―never attempted to make the sequestration of
their family property a matter for judicial inquiry.
Under some scruples of pride or policy, they refused to
bring an action against the East India Company, and
in fact, never employed a lawyer at all, or obtained a
legal opinion on their case. Had they done so, they
must by this time have arrived at the same goal as
their fellow-sufferers of Tanjore. Now is it advisable,
is it politic, is it dignified, for the British Government
to allow it to be practically demonstrated that no one
can hope for success in an appeal of this description
without the assistance of skilled advocacy, and that
redress cannot be obtained from the moral conviction,
the innate justice and honour of the British Govern-
ment, but only under the pressure of publicity, and in
unwilling submission to a solemn judicial censure?
The effects of such a belief being established would be
most disastrous. It would destroy all the grace and
goodwill of the restitution already made, while in all
COMPENSATION.
269
other existing unsettled cases it would lead to an un-
reasonable and exclusive reliance on legal aid, and
would create the impression that no claim need be
hopelessly abandoned until all the arts of advocacy
and agitation were exhausted. One or two strong
claims spontaneously settled by Government would
strengthen its moral position greatly; and Lord Elgin
might very well begin by accounting for the Bhonsla
Fund. Nagpore was made a precedent for the unjust
extinction of the Tanjore Raj. Let Tanjore now be
made a precedent for the just restitution of the Nag-
pore property.
F
...........
:
270
LETTER XII.
RESTITUTION.
THE science of politics is pre-eminently an experi-
mental science. All attempts to construct a govern-
ment, or a social polity, on abstract principles, have
failed. Plato's Republic, Sir Thomas More's Utopia,
the reign of Liberty and Equality in France, and
Robert Owen's Harmony Hall, are all examples and
monuments of undoubted genius, and irreproachable
benevolence, leading to contradictions of thought and
morals in theory, and in practice to confusion and ruin.
The much abused "expediency" is the only true rule
of guidance, the only true political morality for the
practical statesman who has the responsibility of rule
thrown upon him, and who has always before his
eyes the necessity of immediate and decisive action.
The short-sighted policy that grasps at the first mate-
rial advantage within reach and in its power, without
regard to rights or thought of ultimate results, is not
expediency. Deliberate injustice and defiance of in-
ward convictions, are never expedient. Where there
is no right there can be no expediency.
That there are absolute principles of politics and of
·
271
RESTITUTION.
government, that both a science of history and a social
science are possible, and will in time be constructed,
I am as firmly convinced as Comte or Buckle could
desire. We have already a foretaste and a sample of
what the future Sociology will be, in Political Eco-
nomy, which has surely and rapidly risen to the dignity
of exact science. But Political Economy, one branch
of an immense subject, is the growth of a single cen-
tury, and a few only of its leading truths are univer-
sally accepted, even in England, as incontrovertible
and axiomatic; while political and historical science
is at present little more than a brilliant vision per-
ceptible only to the eye of faith. "Ars longa, vita
brevis." Science progresses slowly, but this work-a-
day world cannot stand still.
Besides this, the doctrine of the division of labour
is as applicable to politics and morals as to industrial
affairs. We very seldom find the same man gifted
both with speculative and with practical ability. And
therefore, however much we may admire and venerate
the noble performances of Bentham, Mill, and Buckle,
in the field of legal, social, and historical science, we
may at the same time very reasonably prefer to leave
the government of the country in the hands of such
men as Pitt, Peel, and Palmerston. The philosopher
may cast his prophetic glance into futurity, and the
influence of his writings may be felt and acknowledged
after the lapse of generations or of centuries, but the
statesman is well occupied in providing for the wants,
the difficulties, and the dangers of the present time.
To him "sufficient for the day is the evil thereof."
Even when the work of the philosopher has produced
272
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
..
its full effect, when the press has spread and multi-
plied his conclusions, when the pressure from without
is irresistible, and the time is ripe for change,-the
statesman, even when preparing great measures of
reform, must work from the actual to the possible,
and will not shake the old fabric or weaken its pillars
and foundations. His first question will always be
that of the Duke of Wellington,—the practical man
of his time, though anything but a philosophic states-
man,-" How is the Queen's government to be carried
on?" If that question can be satisfactorily answered,
he will move on boldly; otherwise he will pause or
oppose. Stability is the great object of government,
and every wise politician in power is a conservative.
Stability is the great object; and the principal ele-
ment of political stability is public confidence. In
India, more particularly during the last twenty years,
flushed with a rapid career of victory, and relying on
our material resources, we have pursued a destructive
policy, and, while careful of our solvency and military
strength, we have despised all means for preserving
public confidence in our good faith, and for supporting
social subordination. We have grievously vexed the
conservative interests of India, and thereby have pro-
bably done more for a time to check its progressive
tendencies, than we have done in any other direction
to advance them.
«
For among the few discoveries of historical science
that may, from the uniformity of phenomena in every
clime and age, be considered as established facts, as
primary data from which the perfect science is to be
constructed, is this one,—that every community in its
:
RESTITUTION.
273
J
progress from barbarism to an advanced civilisation,
must pass through an era of great nobles and great
landlords, before it arrives at the far more stirring
and productive stage of a great middle class. The
progress of a nation depends, not upon the King or
Government, except in the very earliest stage, so much
as upon the entire class that is removed from the toil,
and anxiety of supplying its material wants of food,
fire and clothing, and has leisure for intellectual pur-
suits. This class, at first limited to the great land-
lords, becomes gradually extended, until in our own
age and country, in consequence of the immensely in-
creased application of machinery,-viewed at first
with so much ignorant dread and jealousy by the
class which has most benefited from it,-our artisans
and skilled labourers are becoming every day pos-
sessed of more and more leisure, and are devoting
more and more of that leisure to intellectual pursuits;
and a state of things now exists predictive of incalcu-
lable social changes, which in free Great Britain we
may anticipate and welcome with very few misgivings.
The balanced forces of our constitution will secure us
from revolutionary shocks and from stolid obstruction;
and good will and hearty co-operation between the
higher and lower classes are visibly increasing every
day.
But what have we done, and what are we doing in
India? In almost every province we have done our
best, or worst, to sweep away every link between the
Government and the tiller of the soil. Over the greater
part of the Madras Presidency the Princes, the nobles,
the Polygars, and the Zemindars, have sunk and ex-
N 3
274
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
pired under the exactions and confiscations of our
system, and we have handed the ryot over to the
tender mercies of the Curnum and the Tahsildar. The
genial relations of landlord and tenant have been dis-
solved, the ancient social hierarchy has been destroyed,
and the leisure class has disappeared. For our Go-
vernment, a government of foreigners, this result has
been especially detrimental. It is only through a re-
cognised and wealthy higher class that we can reason-
ably expect to establish close relations, a vital com-
munication with the masses of the people, and a
dominant influence over their opinions, manners, and
customs.
•
As a consequence of our annexations, confiscations,
and resumptions, we have lost the confidence of the
residuary Princes and landlords, who have naturally
been visited with an incessantly recurring dread that
they were only spared for some more convenient op-
portunity. Even now, notwithstanding the Queen's
Proclamation and other reassuring incidents of the
last two years, but little confidence in the security of
their rank, privileges, and possessions, can be felt by
the few remaining Princes and chieftains of the Car-
natic, when they have seen the greatest among them,
their feudal superior and Sovereign Lord, declared to
have been a mere dependent on the will and pleasure
of the Honourable Company, and when they still see
the rights which have descended to him by inherit-
ance, and which were guaranteed to him by treaty,
refused to the heir and representative of the Walla-
jah family, of the reigning Nawabs of the Carnatic.
This prevalent want of confidence is the greatest im-
RESTITUTION.
275
pediment to the peaceable stability of our rule, and to
progressive improvement; and I have no doubt that
the general tone and temper thereby given to popular
opinion and popular conversation, and the consequent
expectation of unanimous revolt, were the great causes
of the rebellion of 1857. The conservative inter-
ests which we had neglected and injured, but which
were still of considerable weight and importance,-
and especially the native Princes and chieftains,-
saved us from the general insurrection that was im-
minent.
And now, while all the better classes of natives, all
native interests and intellectual energies, except those
of trade and agriculture, are in a state either of perfect
stagnation or of sullen and expectant hostility, every
British adviser calls upon the Government to initiate
and to carry out reforms, to apply remedies to every
failure and every deficiency, and to stimulate all the
latent capacities of India. The Government is to be
an official Providence, supplying education, irrigation,
scientific agriculture, telegraphs, railways, and an ex-
ample of virtue; and any want of public spirit and
national life is to be amply outbalanced by the vigour
of annual reports, and the liveliness of tabular state-
ments.
This undue reliance upon Government is fatal. A
Government can do a great deal; but it can do little
that is solid and permanent, little that is not super-
ficial, and hollow and delusive, unless its measures are
planned and based upon the understanding and con-
sent of the reflecting and influential classes of the
people, built and cemented upon their existing cir-
276
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
cumstances, and upon their actual civilisation and
ancient customs.
Rights and privileges, creeds and customs, and even
material improvements, that have been introduced and
maintained, directly or indirectly, by a foreign govern-
ment, until they have been worked for and won, re-
alized and appropriated by the people,—are exotic,
and have no root in the soil. The first storm will
sweep them all away. Our Government is not an
organism but a mechanism; our institutions have no
vitality, and no reproductive power. If the English
were to leave India, what would become of the tele-
graph, the railways, the river steamers, the freedom of
speech and of the press, the right of public consulta-
tion and combined petition, the personal liberty and
open courts of justice, that we have brought into the
country? English law and English science have been
very imperfectly appreciated, even by the most en-
lightened natives, they have not been effectually natu-
ralised in our own provinces, and in the allied and
dependent States they are unheard of, or heard of with
dread and distrust by Princes and people.
Without the confidence and co-operation of the
highest and most influential classes, our mission in
India will be barren of any permanent good, of any
enduring glory to the British nation. Without that
confidence there can be no political stability; without
it our reforms and our supremacy will be alike super-
ficial and precarious. To gain that confidence we
must cast off our pride, our prejudices, and our selfish
interests; we must take India and its people for
bètter, for worse; we must place confidence and en-
RESTITUTION.
277
trust power to those whose good will and assistance
we require; and we must grant a large measure of
restitution.
It would be unjust and unfair to Lord Canning to
deny or to keep out of sight the fact that he has evi-
dently perceived many of these truths, and that he
has been working steadily in the right direction by
re-establishing the landlord rights of the Talookdars
of Oude, by conferring upon them and upon the Sirdars
of the Punjaub extensive magisterial powers, and by
his promised recognition of future adoptions in Hindoo
princely houses. His recent step of requesting the
British Indian Association of Calcutta to nominate
two of their members to consult with the Secretary
to Government on the proposed modification of the
Income Tax, is an example of the same wise policy.
And the three Acts creating the High Courts, and the
Legislative Councils, and opening the Civil Service,
will afford, if judiciously applied, and cautiously ex-
tended, ample powers and full scope for inaugurating
a more liberal and equitable era, and for instilling
some national life into our administration. The pre-
sent day is not destitute of performance or of promise;
and I am far from advocating a rash and rapid ad-
vance, or sweeping and ostentatious changes.
But some matters do not admit of delay. When a
great wrong is made manifest, justice cannot be too
speedy. We cannot restore that faith in our adherence
to treaties which was so fearfully impaired by Lord
Dalhousie's proceedings, we cannot instil that full
confidence in our political justice and moderation
which we have never acquired or deserved, and which
*
278
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
is the foundation of political stability, without a large
and generous measure of restitution.
For unless might absolves from all obligations, and
weakness annuls every right, Prince Azeem Jah, for
one instance, has a clear right to the dignity and re-
venues of Nawab of the Carnatic, and, for another
instance, Rajah Janojee Bhonsla as clear a right to
the sovereignty of Nagpore as any reigning Prince in
Europe or in Asia has to his crown and possessions.
Neither they nor their immediate predecessors, by any
sin of omission or commission, forfeited that royal in-
heritance, which was not granted or given by us, but
which, in consideration of important acquisitions and
advantages, we guaranteed by treaty, and promised to
protect and uphold. Their rights are as strong now
as they were when their immediate predecessors died;
the lapse of a few years has no tendency to alter their
hereditary and inherent position, or to weaken their
continuous claim. An act of state, however arbitrary
and iniquitous, can be reversed by no process of muni-
cipal law; but on the other hand, the recovery of
political rights, withheld by an act of state, is barred
by no statute of limitations.
(C
In the case of Prince Azeem Jah it was expressly
declared by Lord Dalhousie that the title of Nawab
was placed in abeyance." Indeed, the lapse of a few
years, though it could not add to the actual strength
of their rights, has manifested and displayed their
strength in a very remarkable manner. The official
papers have been published in obedience to Parlia-
mentary calls, and each case has been so thoroughly
ventilated by the press, that neither the Calcutta ad-
RESTITUTION.
279
ministration nor the Home Government could venture,
or indeed would condescend, to repeat in despatches
intended for publication, or openly before Parliament,
the misstatements, misrepresentations, misunderstand-
ings, presumptions, suppressions, and equivocations,
which were employed to destroy our friends, but which
have now been submitted to an effectual process of
public refutation and exposure. They served their
turn at the time, but they have now been transferred
to the opposite scale, and aggravate the burden which
the Honourable Company has bequeathed to the Queen
of Great Britain and Ireland. That burden cannot
be removed; public confidence cannot be established;
the Queen's name cannot become the tower of strength
that it ought to be in India, without a large measure
of restitution.
It is not uncommon to hear an opinion expressed
that it is imprudent and dangerous to push a policy
of conciliation and concession too far; that such a
course, particularly in the form of territorial restora-
tions, conveys an impression of weakness, and implies
that we have more provinces than we can conveniently
manage and defend, and that we fear the secret hos-
tility of the despoiled Princes.
Let us understand clearly what this danger of con-
ciliation means.
Is it supposed that on account of
our conciliatory measures, certain disaffected persons
will think us weak when we really are strong, and
will thereupon seek an opportunity of revolt? If so,
I think the supposition a very absurd one, and the
supposed danger, if it were probable, very trifling.
The disadvantage of any hostile Prince or faction
280
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
thinking us weak, when we really are strong; and the
advantage of such persons, or of the people at large,
thinking us strong when we really are weak, are
equally likely and equally nugatory, or may very well
be balanced the one against the other. The Government
need not fear such fancies as a popular belief in its
weakness founded on its justice, and ought not to rely
on such an impossible fact as its superior physical
strength. India could never be held by us as a co-
herent Empire, as a profitable and useful possession,
against its population united in revolt or in passive
resistance. But our strength will always be over-
whelming against external enemies and local insur-
rection, so long as we preserve a certain moral superi-
ority, and retain the general confidence of the conser-
vative classes.
I do not in the least deny or doubt that there are
times when concessions would have the appearance of
weakness, and of submission to a rebellious or threat-
ening faction, and would therefore be most undignified
and impolitic, possibly dangerous. This is exactly
what I wish the Government to avoid in the future;
this is exactly what Prince Azeem Jah and the leading
native inhabitants of Madras, have assisted the Go-
vernment to avoid, by their prudence and patience in
not agitating the question of the Carnatic musnud
during the rebellion in Hindoostan. But this is not a
period of political crisis or difficulty; and no act of
grace or restitution could in these days suggest the
idea of weakness or of apprehension.
There is another point to be taken into considera-
tion. There are several Dalhousie annexations and
RESTITUTION.
281
.
resumptions, not less iniquitous in plea and procedure
than the two I have mentioned, but in which restitu-
tion cannot now be expected, and would not be practi-
cable, politic or just. The policy of annexation has
failed and is condemned; but it does not therefore
follow that we who openly condemn it, or the Govern-
ment which has abandoned it for ever, are necessarily
bound to adopt an indiscriminate policy of restitution.
We cannot shut our eyes to accomplished facts, or
lightly shake off our obligations to the people who
have, by whatever means, become subject to the
British Government. Several of the provinces an-
nexed since 1848 could not now be prudently or justly
restored to the representatives of their former rulers.
How could we expect good government or a friendly
policy from any member of the Oude family, after
seven years of hatred, idleness and conspiracy? The
widows and adopted son of Sattara, as was but natu-
ral after brooding for nine years over their wrongs,
were deeply implicated in plots during the most
dangerous crisis of the rebellion. We have paid fully
for Jhansi in blood and treasure: the Ranee nullified
all the rights of her family in the horrors of 1857.
And, in addition to all other reasons of policy and of
duty to the inhabitants of Oude, we have now ac-
quired that kingdom by the most legitimate and intel-
ligible of all public transactions, by conquest, capitu-
lation, and submission. The chief members of the
ex-royal family do not seem to have been implicated
in the rebellion, and are still deserving of the most
liberal treatment; but after trying conclusions with
the entire aggressive population, we alone are entitled
and warranted to possess and govern the country.
!
282
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
But the impossibility of restitution in these in-
stances only renders more certain and conspicuous the
necessity of restitution in the two cases I have men-
tioned, which so far from being weakened by any sus-
picion of hostility against the deprived Princes, are
sustained and strengthened by our acknowledged ob-
ligations to them for their active assistance and pacific
influence at Nagpore and at Madras.
The State of Nagpore was on the whole well-
governed, was always submissive and well affected to
British supremacy, and during twenty-five years of
purely native administration, our interference was
never once required, to check oppression, to keep the
peace, or to restore order. The country was annexed,
and the Bhonsla family declared by Lord Dalhousie to
be extinct, when the heir apparent was not only a re-
gularly adopted son, but was also the late Rajah's
grand-nephew, and a lineal descendant of the Rajah
with whom we made the first treaty of peace and
amity after the Assaye campaign. And during the
perilous emergency of 1857, far from countenancing
or joining in any plot or hostile intrigue, the wholet
family, under the guidance of the celebrated Banka
Baee, threw all their weight and influence on the side
of loyalty and order. Several near relatives of the
Ranees, and persons of high consideration at the late
Rajah's court, who had declined to take employment
under our Government immediately after the annexa-
tion, now came forward at the Ranees' desire and
volunteered to serve in the Irregular Cavalry, and in
other temporary situations, in order to set a good ex-
ample, to manifest clearly the intentions of the Rajah's
RESTITUTION.
283
family, and to restore general confidence in the
strength and stability of our Government. The pro-
pitious influence and active co-operation of the Nag-
pore family,—moved no doubt by no romantic love for
us, but by their traditional policy and the sound calcula-
tions and foresight of a very clever and experienced old
lady, the Banka Baee,-were most beneficial in their
effect, and diminished the dangers and difficulties of
the rebellion by one-half. The link was never forged,
for which one well known Mahratta leader alone was
wanting, to connect the Deccan and the Carnatic with
Hindoostan, the Madras and Bombay armies with that
of Bengal, in one electric chain of mad revolt.
The tranquillity during the mutinies in Hindoostan
of the city of Madras-supposed to contain nearly
100,000 Mahomedans, and any excitement in which
would have immediately spread among their brethren
in the districts of Arcot, Cuddapah and Kurnool,-may
be entirely attributed to the influence of Prince Azeem
Jah and his intimate councillors. In spite of the re-
cent notification he had received in February 1857,
that the Court of Directors had rejected his appeal, all
the Prince's efforts were directed, quietly but effectu-
ally, to suppress the fanatical spirit and the smoulder-
ing spark of revolt, which a few words of provocation
would have blown into a blaze.
The Secretary of State can make no candid, con-
sistent, conscientious reply to the claims preferred from
Madras and Nagpore. Obstinate silence, or inexplicit
refusal would not annihilate right, or dispel hope, but
would fix indelibly upon the Queen's Government that
reproach which, if the opportunity is not lost, may
284
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
yet be attributed by history and by popular tradition,
with truth and with justice, exclusively to the Honour-
able Company and Lord Dalhousie.
I confess to a simple, old-fashioned notion, that it
cannot be wrong to do right. I believe that any con-
cession may safely be made if it be royally done. It
would be rather injurious than beneficial to the Queen's
glory and authority, if a Prince of her House were to
make a tour through India, receiving homage and dis-
tributing a few compliments and decorations, staring
and being stared at, and doing nothing. If a Prince
of Great Britain were indeed to visit India, he should be
entrusted with a specific and weighty mission, that of
completing and confirming the majestic pacification of
this great continent which has been so wisely and wor-
thily commenced by Lord Canning, of openly claiming
and assuming in person the Imperial supremacy over
all the Sovereigns of India, and of effacing, in every
practicable instance, the traces of a rapacious policy
by gracious and royal acts of restitution and restora-
tion. And then throughout the States and Provinces
of India, Royalty will become a reality and a faith;
political stability will be secured, and national progress
will be instituted.
285
LETTER XIII.
PLANTERS AND LANDLORDS.
Madras, June 18th, 1861.
THERE has been a marked tendency in the more im-
portant measures of Lord Canning's administration
during the last two years, to revive, extend, propagate,
and perpetuate the class of landlords, which under our
rule in general has hitherto been depressed and dimi-
nished, and to restore and strengthen their social in-
fluence and their weight in the country. The orders
conferring magisterial powers on so many of the
Sirdars of the Punjaub, the Oude Talookdars, and
the Zemindars of Bengal, and the revised legislation
for settling the Bombay Inam estates, are the most
conspicuous manifestations of the new policy. To
that policy I give my cordial adhesion, convinced as
I am, both by history and theory, that the seeds of
prosperity and enlightenment can neither spring up
spontaneously among the labouring masses of a nation,
nor be sown broadcast among them by the action of
any Government, however beneficent, but are naturally
and certainly produced as the ripened fruit of a wealthy
upper class, which unconsciously dispenses its acquisi-
286
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA,
..
tions among its dependents and inferiors, until with
slow but certain development many of those dependents
and inferiors become equals and rivals, and the centres
of wealth and knowledge are multiplied progressively.
The recent ordinances for the sale of waste lands in
freehold, and for the limited redemption of the land-
tax, were doubtless intended by Lord Canning to com-
plete that constructive and conservative framework
which he wished to see spread over India; but I re-
gret to say that I look upon this latter series of mea-
sures in a very different light. If they were likely to
become extensively operative, which I do not believe,
they would prove revolutionary and destructive, rather
than conservative. Rules for the sale of public land
in the vast unsettled and unexplored tracts of Aus-
tralia and North America, cannot be applicable or
suitable to a populous country like India, the seat of
a written law and a complex social economy for the
last two thousand years.¹
Many of our contemporaries, especially in England,
seem to regard with favour Lord Canning's freehold
regulations, chiefly as affording space and facilities
for the acquisition of land in fee simple by European
settlers, who now for the first time possessing full
command over the soil, and ample sway over the ryots,
will be able by legitimate influence, persuasion, and
purchase, to extinguish all minor tenures in their
vicinity, to reduce the tillers of the soil from their
unprofitable position of petty occupants to that of
1 These rules for the sale of waste lands were, after mature con-
sideration, so materially modified by Sir Charles Wood, as to render
them innocuous,-another proof of the beneficial supervision of
tropical measures in the cool atmosphere of Downing Street.
PLANTERS AND LANDLORDS.
287
paid labourers, and eventually to develope the re-
sources of India in a style and on a scale that has
hitherto been totally impossible. After giving the
most careful consideration to this subject, I have re-
luctantly arrived at the opinion that all such antici-
pations are quite visionary; that no large number of
European agriculturists can be expected to settle in
India under existing circumstances, and that it would
be highly impolitic, inexpedient, and unjust to en-
courage any such persons to come to this country by
any special inducements, by the offer of exceptionally
liberal terms, or of exclusive privileges. I do not be-
lieve that English capitalists will ever come to India
as planters, and even if they would come, I do not
look upon their advent as anything to be desired or
invited.
If indeed I thought there were any prospect of Eng-
lish capital being largely invested in land, and that
the "resources" of India could thus be "developed" in
every direction, on the same plan and in the same
spirit as has been done in Malabar by Mr. F. C. Brown,
and in Salem by Mr. Fischer,—if we could secure for
every well situated tract of waste or jungle such a
man as Captain Nelson, who has devoted himself for
years, with great benefit to the people around him,
with great prospective advantage to the revenue of
the country, but with small profit to himself, to re-
claiming the deserted Zemindaree of Siddapoor in the
Kurnool district,-I should say without a moment's
hesitation that of such work and of such workmen
there cannot be too much or too many in India. But
while of their own accord, and by their own means,
288
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
and without any special encouragement or privileges,
a certain number of such men, of each of the classes
I have indicated, will always be found at work, the
number of such men must always be very limited, and
cannot be increased by any legislative or administra-
tive contrivance.
Mr.
The great merchants of the Presidency towns, who
employ agents to grow sugar, cotton and coffee,
are in fact, what the majority of the Bengal indigo
planters were only in pretence-capitalists.
Fischer purchased the Mootta of Salem for a large
price in the open market; he has expended large sums
on the improvement of the estate, he has made it his
home during the last quarter of a century, and he in-
tends, I believe, to die there. Captain Nelson is an
industrial hero, with a strong dash of the ascetic, and
(as by all accounts he cannot be daunted) I may add,
that he is as likely, as he is ready, to end by being an
industrial martyr.
But where are such settlers as these to be found?
Candidates for a laborious hermitage and slow mar-
tyrdom are scarce. Tropical jungles don't attract
moneyed men. A man with £20,000 or so, can do
very well in England, or can make a fortune in the
midst of agreeable society at Madras or Bombay. As
to the great mercantile houses, although some of them,
or their local agents, are to a certain extent land-
owners or landholders, they are not so by choice:
they may really be much more properly considered as
purchasers and manufacturers of produce than as agri-
culturists. If in certain localities they do actually
grow sugar, coffee, or cotton on land in their own
PLANTERS AND LANDLORDS.
289
occupation, it is only because no one else grows those
valuable staples in the quantity, or of the quality they
require; but wherever the natives do grow them, the
merchants much prefer confining themselves to making
advances and buying, in which operations their com-
mand of capital gives them a practical right of pre-
emption, while their European connections enable them
to sell without delay and to the best advantage. They
want the produce, and to get it they will consent to
hold land, but they have no vocation as landlords.
No part of the Madras Presidency has ever been
cursed with anything approaching to the indigo plant-
ing system, which has made the European name so
cheap and so hateful in certain districts of Bengal.
That system has happily collapsed at last by its own
rottenness; and I have no intention of inflicting on
my readers any more arguments on a subject which
so lately occupied all the newspapers of India usque
ad nauseam. I merely allude to it as the most striking
exhibition possible of what might be expected from an
influx of European agriculturists without capital, such
as are nine-tenths of the Bengal indigo planters. We
do not want planters but landlords.
And while I should rejoice to see any addition to
the number of such English landlords as Mr. Browne,
Mr. Fischer, or Captain Nelson, if they could be kept
in India, I must frankly avow my belief that any im-
portant addition to that number is not to be looked
for; and that any incursion of the average, ordinary
European planters,-even should they bring a little
capital with them, which is highly improbable,—is
very much to be deprecated.
290
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
•
The European landlord, if not immediately and ex-
traordinarily successful, would be, I fear, almost in-
variably exacting and oppressive in good seasons, and
unable, or not particularly inclined, to support his
poor tenants or labourers in hard times, as would be
done by a native Zemindar. For the European in
India, more especially in remote districts, is almost
exempt from the salutary influence of public opinion
in his dealings with his native fellow-subjects. Even
if he ever hears of what the natives around him think
and say of his acts, he does not associate with them,
he is perfectly indifferent to their opinion, and quite
independent of their judgment; and his European com-
peers, far and near, are very unlikely to hear anything,
and are certain to care nothing, about his transactions
with his native tenantry and neighbours, unless some-
thing should occur amounting to positive criminality;
and in such a case the spirit of clanship generally makes
the social verdict very lenient. It is not so with the
native landlord: he may be oppressive, but if so he
will certainly hear of it again; and there is a limit
beyond which any exaction or cruelty will bring popu-
lar contempt, reprobation, or vengeance upon him in
some form that he and his family can feel.
Then let us suppose, on the other hand, that the
European landlord, by dint of his capital, skill, and
energy, is completely successful, and after a certain
number of years finds himself in possession of a noble
estate, surrounded by a prosperous and happy tenantry,
and his rent-roll paid like clock-work; while a routine
of business and a system of supervision have been
established, that secure to each his rights, and from
PLANTERS AND LANDLORDS.
291
each his regular duties. Now comes the vexatious
doubt, the intrusive difficulty which would qualify
my satisfaction, a doubt which applies as much to the
very best landlords as to the very worst; for—to re-
vert to those representative names which I have already
used to illustrate my argument-even if Mr. Fischer
or Captain Nelson should determine, however great
their profits may be, to remain for life in India, who
can guarantee that their sons or their grandsons will
be content to do so? Is it not far more probable
that the successful landholder, secure in his ample
rent-roll, will sooner or later hand over his estate to
an agent, and prefer to expend his income in the more
congenial atmosphere of London or Paris? We know
that every successful West India proprietor became an
absentee, and that the greatest among them had been
absentees for several generations before the abolition
of slavery. And for my part I cannot understand
what attraction there is in the climate, the scenery,
or the society of the East Indies, that should render it
a more pleasant place of residence for a wealthy Euro-
pean than the West Indies. If the rich English land-
holder stays in India after his fortune is made, there
must be some mysterious charm in the sacred soil to
work such a revolution in his natural tastes and de-
sires; for every other species of Nabob,-civil, military,
and commercial,-has always gravitated homewards
with the certainty of a physical law.
If then the English landlord is most likely to quit
India just when his labours have been most success-
ful, his smiling ryots will lose their best protector just
as they have got something of their own to lose. The
02
292
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
master's triumphant exodus will be the commence-
ment of their purgatory. Experience in Ireland and
the West Indies tells us what an absentee estate be-
comes under the management of an ordinary agent.
I do not anticipate any such evils for India; as already
explained, I believe success for Europeans in agricul-
tural enterprises in India to be possible only in pecu-
liar localities, for certain high-priced staples, on a com-
paratively limited scale, or for temporary purposes of
initiation and instruction. There are exceptions to all
rules, and there are existing exceptions to this one.
I would throw no obstacles in the way of colonists;
I would not legislate against absentee proprietors in
any part of the world. But I feel it my duty can-
didly to state that I do not wish to anticipate any
arrival of English settlers in India, that I consider any
European colonisation of this country to be impracti-
cable, and that I would most strongly deprecate all
encouragement of such a revolution. Against the
Contract Law,¹ and generally against all legislation
which, by one-sided penalties summarily administered,
tends to give an undue advantage to British employers
and masters over native labourers and servants, I
have always raised, and shall never cease to raise, the
strongest opposition in my power. The fact that the
whole English planting and mercantile community is
now clamouring for such legislation, indicates to me
that they are, morally, socially, and economically, in a
1 Twice passed, in different shapes, at Calcutta, under the influ-
ence of the local press and commercial classes, this law was twice
vetoed by Sir Charles Wood, and received its coup de grace from
the weighty speeches of two new members of the Governor Gene-
ral's Council, Mr. H. S. Maine and Mr. R. S. Ellis, in February 1863.
PLANTERS AND LANDLORDS.
293
false position. They have no stake, they have no ties
in the country. They are hasting to be rich, they are
hasting to take their riches away, and they can, toler-
ate no opposing rights or interests. Let us have Eng-
lish merchants, manufacturers, schoolmasters, doctors,
and missionaries; we cannot have too many. But
Englishmen are not made to be landholders and terri-
torial magnates over under-tenants and minor occu-
pants of another race and colour. We do not want
planters but landlords.
To produce a high state of prosperity in the present
state of Indian civilisation, there must be a lord and
master, be it only a name, to form a centre of recog-
nised authority, to collect and lead the working mul-
titude and to keep it together. But this is work for
Natives and not for Europeans. The landlord ought
to be tied to the soil, born, bred, and destined to leave
his bones in it, connected with his tenants and de-
pendents by blood and language, belief and customs.
Without these powerful ties and genial sympathies,
there is no vital and organic connection between the
European landholder and the great body of humanity
around him; his presence is liable to become that of
a foreign and irritating intruder; his absence exposes
the whole organisation to a cruel and fatal disease.
We do not want planters but landlords, and landlords
in India must be natives.
ན་
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​294
LETTER XIV.
PRECEPT AND EXAMPLE.
2
If I were asked by an intelligent native of India, what
are the two great pillars which have so long preserved
English society in a state of stable equilibrium, and
have made the English nation and Government the
most powerful and influential in the world,-I should
point to the right of private property in land, and to
the complete separation of judicial and executive func-
tions in our administration.
No Asiatic nation under a native Government has
ever fully and firmly obtained possession of either of
these advantages; and-strange to say-completely
English as they are, and tenaciously as we cling to
them at home, we have not merely done less than
might have been expected towards their establishment
in India, but we have actually done much to unsettle
landed tenures which we found in existence, and which
could scarcely be distingnished from private property;
and we have lately adopted, and largely extended, the
Oriental confusion of offices in our Non-Regulation
districts.
PRECEPT AND EXAMPLE.
295
We cannot expect the native Princes to introduce
any reform into their administration, which we have
not thoroughly naturalised and exemplified in the Pro-
vinces under our direct rule. Princes and people are
ready enough to learn from us. Imperceptibly and
silently, without any formal avowal but not the less
with absolute and final effect, the native Princes of
India, following our example, have divested themselves
of arbitrary power over the lives of their servants
and subjects, the most ancient prerogative of Oriental
sovereignty. That this has been in a great measure
brought about, and is still sustained by the influence
of our Residents, and the supervision of the Governor
General, is perfectly true; the example was set and
has been unremittingly upheld by us; but the doctrine
has now been so thirstily imbibed, the lesson so inti-
mately learned by the people of India, that there is no
fear lest it should ever be repudiated or forgotten.
:
The servants and subjects of no native Prince would
in these days tamely and uncomplainingly be witnesses
of a violent and capricious sentence of death, without
the arraignment and deliberate trial of the offender;
nor would they tolerate mutilation or other cruel
punishment. In what form their disapproval would
be shown, and how far their opposition would proceed,
would depend upon the nature and circumstances of
the case, and would vary in different parts of India,
but in many States open resistance would be certain.
This primary lesson of personal rights, and of the
sacredness of human life, has been taught by us, and
has been learned by the people of India. Would it be
unjust to say that it is the only lesson that we have
296
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
taught them, and that they have learned? It may be
replied that if so, it is their fault, and that they will
not learn; but still such a scanty result, such a sum-
ming up of "the blessings of British rule," ought to be
somewhat humiliating to us, and may, I think, be
made somewhat instructive.
Beyond this lesson of a greater regard for human
life, has our Government practically illustrated and
enforced by its policy and example in India, any more
of those elementary principles by which our greatness
has been secured, and by which alone a civilised, en-
lightened, and liberal Government would profess to be
guided in this latter half of the nineteenth century?
Precepts we have had in abundance, and professions
have not been wanting; but where is the example?
No Government in India, native or foreign, not even
the Mahomedan invaders, ever swept away tenures as
we have done; we have destroyed and upheld them
all in turn; we established the landlords in Bengal as
owners; we abolished them, for the most part, in
Madras, and made landowners of ryots who were little
better than prædial slaves; and the effect has been
chronic ruin and beggary to all classes. We extin-
guished the great landlords in the North-West Pro-
vinces, and converted the village communities into
owners, subject for many years to an indefinite assess-
ment, with an effect not much less destructive than the
ryotwaree system in Madras. In the Bombay Presi-
dency our great efforts have been directed against the
holders of Inams or rent-free estates. Both in the
Madras and Bombay Presidencies, however, the reduc-
tion of assessment in many districts, better communi-
:
PRECEPT AND EXAMPLE.
297
cations and increased exports, have, within the last ten
years, led both to an improvement in the revenue from
extended cultivation, and to the accumulation of capi-
tal. But while the new class has been rising from the
bottom, we have lost precious opportunities of obtain-
ing a moral and social influence over the aristocracy of
the first growth. They are ruined and hostile, and
having by no means lost the natural authority of rank
and position, they have imbued with distrust and dis-
affection even the rude uncultivated yeomen who have
risen under British rule.
I do not myself profess to have an abstract and
symmetrical theory of property, or of the distribution
of wealth; I am not a Proudhonian or a Fourierist.
I in fact abhor, as much as Burke did and as Buckle
does, all abstract principles of government and of
society; I throw to the winds all natural possessions,
all fundamental compacts. Political science is an ex-
perimental science, and its greatest conquests have
been and ever will be achieved, not by skilful dialectics
and inexpugnable theories, but by working from the
actual to the possible, and by harmonising every change
with the human desires, the human habits, and the
human knowledge of the time and of the people.
I strongly suspect that the more valid abstract
theories, the more compact and finished logic, will be
found with Fourier and Proudhon, and their practical
though unintentional followers, Mr. Mangles, Captain
Cowper, and Lord Dalhousie. I suspect that a French
communist would have found as good or better reasons
for despoiling Mr. Mangles and Lord Dalhousie of
their estates in Great Britain, and dividing them
0 3
298
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
among the farming occupants, than they did for oust-
ing the Deccan Inamdars and the Talookdars of Oude.
I have a coarse, vulgar, unreasonable, old-fashioned
love and respect for mere possession, and for mere
prescriptive rights, and consider them to surpass all
theories, and to supersede all logic. I see that the
wealth, solidity, and security of England, have arisen
from the indefeasible rights of property, and especially
of private property in land. I see that the family,
the community, and the nation, are all built, and all
subsist, upon the strong human desire of individual
acquisition, possession, and transmission of property
to offspring. History teaches me that the most bene-
ficial revolution in European society, and the great
stimulus to activity and production, arose from the con-
version by royal favour, and by violent or fraudulent
encroachment, of feudal, communal, and service tenures
into allodial estates. This vast and silent change was
effected by means ten thousand times more illegiti-
mate than those which have so often distressed the
"crack" Collector and the Inam Commissioner.
they were natural processes, called for by the gradual
wants of society, and approved by the general opinion
and instinct of both rulers and people. And I see the
same tendencies at work in India, the same great
conversion of tenures in progress, both under the
Mussulman monarchies, and during the Mahratta
revolution.
But
According to Indian principles, very similar to those
of the European feudal system, the real proprietor of
the land was the Sovereign; but a distinct tendency,
and a partial progress, may be traced in the annals of
PRECEPT AND EXAMPLE.
299
every native State, Hindoo and Mahomedan, to pass
through the feudal Talookdaree, and the service jaghire
estate, to an allodial tenure or absolute proprietor-
ship.
It was exactly so with landed property in England.
The Earldoms were originally granted for life only,
and a hereditary succession was imperceptibly esta-
blished, as among Zemindars and Jaghiredars in
India,—only because the Earl's son was generally so
much more powerful than the rest of the Barons in
the district as to ensure his nomination upon his
father's decease. Both in Europe and in India,-
though in the latter country that step was less fre-
quently obtained,—the obligation of furnishing troops
to the Sovereign gradually fell into desuetude, or was
commuted into a money payment, and the property in
land became absolute and complete.
But we interfered in India, and checked effectually
that nascent change of tenure which would doubtless
have proved as beneficial in India as it has in Europe.
Whenever we gained possession of a province we seem
to have "cried havoc, and let slip the dogs of war,
upon every one in the shape of a landowner. The
more valuable the possession, the more complete and
absolute the ownership, the more nearly it approached
to a freehold, the more does it seem to have roused
the cupidity of our Collectors and Commissioners.
A perusal of the Madras Board of Revenue Minute,
of the 5th January 1818, will show how a clearance
was made of the great landlords in the districts of
Chingleput and the two Arcots. The Board write
very much as if they had begun to repent now that
300
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
the mischief was done, the hereditary Zemindars placed
on the shelf with pensions for their lives, and the
"rights" of the ryots restored.
“There cannot be any doubt," they say (para. 121),
"that the greater number of the Zemindars and seve-
ral of the Polygars also, were in fact the descendants
of the ancient Hindoo Princes of the country." "122.
Whatever may have been the origin of these persons,
certain it is that most of them were confirmed by the
Mahomedan Government, at the period of their inva-
sion, in the hereditary title to collect the revenues of
the land which they occupied, on condition of paying
to the Government a revenue called a 'jumma' or
'peshcush."""134. The ancient Zemindars and Poly-
gars were, in fact, the nobility of the country, and
though the origin of some of their tenures would not
bear too minute a scrutiny, they were connected with
the people by ties which it was more politic, more
liberal, and more just to strengthen than to dissolve."
And we learn from a foot-note to this very para-
graph, that the number of these great landlords ousted
and pensioned in the Ceded Districts,¹ on our acquisi-
tion of the country, was eighty. They may have been
hard masters, they may have been "a set of debauched
wretches," "profligate aristocrats," or whatever the
pure and virtuous officials of those and these days
may choose to call them, but I have a strong notion
that the poor ryots of Bellary and Cuddapah have
1 The districts of Bellary, Cuddapah, and Kurnool, acquired by
the Nizam in the partition Treaties of 1792 and 1799, from Tippoo's
dominions, were transferred in 1800 to the British Government, to
provide for the expense of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force, and
have ever since been called the Ceded Districts.
PRECEPT AND EXAMPLE.
301
found the little finger of the Curnum and the Tah-
sildar heavier than the Zemindar's loins, and that
they have found the Collector a poor substitute for
the Polygar in time of need.
Even at this very moment one of the largest estates
in the Madras Presidency is marked for confiscation;
one of the oldest princely families,-that of the Sétu-
pati Zemindars of Ramnad,—is threatened with official
extinction, on the death of the widow of the late
Rajah Ramasamy Sétupati; although that widow has
adopted, in due conformity with Hindoo law, and with
every local rule and family custom, and with her de-
ceased husband's express authorisation, one of his near
relatives, a descendant from their common ancestor,
as his son and heir.
The rebellion in Oude laid bare the grievances of
the Talookdars of Oude, and led to the restoration of
their rights. The murder of Mr. Manson; Collector
of the Sholapore district, by the Nurgoond Zemindar,
who was the first among the few Mahratta chieftains
that took up arms in 1857, told a tale of the desperate
hatred engendered by the refusal to recognise the
succession of adopted sons, and was undoubtedly one
of the most urgent inducements to that reconsideration
of the results of the Bombay Inam Commission, which
called forth Lord Elphinstone's admission not only of
its iniquity, but of its being "a costly failure" in a
financial point of view, and terminated in the repeal
of its legislative basis, the reversal of its whole system
of procedure, and its reconstitution on more equitable
and conservative principles. Cannot the Government
of Madras profit by the dearly bought experience of
Bengal and Bombay?
302
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
1
The unsettled and perplexed state of the Mirassi
question will prove how cruelly our revenue authorities
have misunderstood and tampered with a most valu-
able and beneficial right; and the attack on the
Mirassidars is still persistently continued, both by
the majority of British officials, and by the entire
British mercantile community. Will nothing but a
rebellion in the Madras Presidency reveal to our rulers
the destructive tendency of their proceedings against
certain great landlords, and the inflammatory effect
of heart-sickening delay in the settlement of Mirassi
rights ?
But these injuries to landed interests are not all. I
must add, with the greatest reluctance and shame,
that during the last twelve years,-I firmly believe
only under Lord Dalhousie's instructions,-we have
struck some fearful blows at the sacredness of personal
property, by our sequestrations and public sales of
jewels, clothes, spoons, furniture, cattle, carriages and
children's toys, at Sattara, Nagpore, Lucknow, Tan-
jore and Madras, the private property of friendly royal
families. Nothing but repentance, manifest even if
inexplicit, and a series of acts of restitution, can efface
those deeds of spoliation, or destroy that evil example,
and those wicked precedents, displayed before the
Princes of India on so many occasions.
With indefeasible rights of private property in land,
and of transmission by inheritance or will; with a
total separation of the office of Judge and Magistrate,
from that of Collector and Superintendent of Police,
and with Judges placed above temptation by large
emoluments, and irremovable except on publicly
PRECEPT AND EXAMPLE.
303
proved misconduct, any country would be in the
certain road to wealth, prosperity and civilisation.
With such laws, with such administrative arrange-
ments, we could trust even a Rajah of Mysore to play
at soldiers with his little army, to preside at his little
Council, and to exercise his little patronage. With-
out such laws and such a distinction of duties, even the
British Government in India may become a tyranny.
And much remains to be done, great changes must be
accomplished, especially in our Non-Regulation Pro-
vinces, before we can be said to have set that example
in our own Imperial institutions which we owe to the
Princes and people of India. They will not be slow
to learn our lessons and to follow our example.
:
304
LETTER XV.
MYSORE AS IT MIGHT BE.
Madras, April 16th, 1861.
I UNDERSTAND that the report which has circulated
about Madras for the last week, and which has been
generally received either with incredulity or with
strong disapprobation, is authentic, and that General
Sir Mark Cubbon's last official act of any importance,
before making over charge to his provisional successor,
Mr. Saunders, was to write a despatch upholding the
application made by the Rajah of Mysore, and ad-
vising the Governor General in Council to restore the
government of the country into the hands of the
Rajah, its Sovereign.
The grounds of Sir Mark Cubbon's recommendation
are said to be nearly to the following effect:-that
Articles IV and V of the Treaty of 1799, (under
which we assumed the administration in 1831,) allowed
us to bring "such part or parts" of the Mysore terri-
tory under our "direct management," as should appear
to the Governor General in Council necessary to secure
the regular payment of the subsidy, and to render the
MYSORE AS IT MIGHT BE
305
R
funds of the State "efficient and available in time of
peace or war;" but that the Treaty does not appear
to contemplate the perpetual retention of the govern-
ment in our hands, since all the provisions of these
articles are expressly stated to be applicable only "so
long as any part or parts of His Highness's Territories
shall remain under our "exclusive authority and
control."
In summing up the accounts of his stewardship of
nearly thirty years, unexampled in its material success,
Sir Mark Cubbon is able to point out that the Mysore
State was given over to the Commission burdened
with a mass of debts,-partly arrears of subsidy and
money advanced by the Government at Madras, partly
incurred in the Rajah's household,—which, including
interest, has involved the payment of sixty-five lakhs
of rupees; but that all these debts have been paid off,
and the accounts closed; that the subsidy has for
many years been paid in monthly instalments accord-
ing to the terms of the Treaty; that there is now no
reason to doubt that the funds of the State are
cient and available in time of peace or war;" and that
consequently no cause remains, under the strict terms
of the Treaty, for any longer retaining the Rajah's
dominions under the "exclusive authority and control"
of the British Government.
"effi-
I do not intend on the present occasion to enter
fully upon the questions of the Rajah's rights, or of
the policy of ceding, or restoring to a Hindoo Prince's
personal rule, any districts that have been completely
settled under our system of management; but I wish
to draw attention to the fact that in this particular
..
306
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA,
case of Mysore, the eventual restoration of the country
seems certainly to have been intended by Lord William
Bentinck, both from his letter to the Rajah in which
he terms the assumption of the government, "the
course which the wisdom of the Marquis Wellesley es-
tablished for a crisis like the present;" and also from
the instructions given by him to the Governor of
Madras that under the two Commissioners whom he
originally appointed, "the agency should be exclusively
native indeed that the existing native institutions
should be carefully maintained." But while in Mysore
the entire fabric of native institutions has been pre-
served in outline, the original plan of governing by
"an exclusively native agency" under two English
Commissioners, was very soon abandoned as impracti-
cable, and English officers were introduced into all the
higher appointments. It may be argued, it has been
argued, from the results of this experiment, that
native agency, except in subordinate offices, is a
failure under our legal and orderly system; and that
all the district officers, whether they be called Col-
lectors, Deputy Commissioners, or Superintendents,
and all the superior Judges, in provinces under our
control, must be European.
I allow that the experiment in Mysore was a failure;
but I maintain that the failure was inevitable, that the
experiment of native administration in the higher
ranks under British supervision has never been fairly
tried, has never been allowed a fair chance of success
there or elsewhere.
In Mysore we tried to work our civilised machinery,
requiring punctuality, patience and assiduous attention,
MYSORE AS IT MIGHT BE.
307
and presupposing the equality of all before the law,
with the instruments we found to our hand, with the
old set of proud, indolent, corrupt and uneducated
native officials. We tried to keep a complex and
delicate engine at work with unskilled labour. For
example, the weakest point of the Mysore administra-
tion under General Cubbon, was notoriously the judicial
department. The highest Court of Justice, the
Hoozoor Adawlut, consisting of three native judges,
which sits at Bangalore, and from which an appeal
lies to the Commissioner only on special grounds, has
never borne a high character in any sense of the
expression. The judges are very badly paid, con-
sidering that this is the Court of Appeal for the Princi-
pality, the senior receiving only six hundred rupees a
month;¹ they have not received what we should con-
sider at the Presidency either a good general education
or any sufficient legal training. They are merely old
men who have had a long practical experience of the
primitive law and rude procedure, slightly modified
since the appointment of the Mysore Commission,
which have been handed down by tradition from
ancient times.
No attempt seems ever to have been made to ob-
tain men of English education, judicial training and
established character, for such offices. And yet the
remedy was not far to seek or of difficult application.
If liberal salaries had been offered (and the revenue
of Mysore could easily have borne the charge), com-
petent judges could have been brought from Calcutta,
Bombay, or Madras, who would soon have worked a
1 £700 per annum.
308
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
reform both in the principles and practice of the judi-
cial department, would have made the bench of the
Mysore Hoozoor Adawlut respected, and would have
raised at once the reputation of native judges, and of
English rulers. But no one thought of turning to
such men for assistance. No one thought of finding
an appointment for any one who was not an English
gentleman, a "covenanted" civilian, an Ensign, a Lieu-
tenant, or a Captain. Is this lust of patronage, is this
proscription of native talent, to continue for ever?
.
As our Government improves, and gains the confi-
dence and adherence of the people; as railway com-
munications become perfected throughout India; our
provocations and our obligations to interfere with the
administration of native States will be multiplied.
We must retain our right to interfere and to dictate,
wherever it already exists; but in order to be able to
use it with effect, and without moral disturbance, we
must establish a character for disinterested and liberal
motives; we must dispel by the practical logic of facts
the popular belief that we are determined not only to
allow the natives no share or voice in the government
of our own provinces, and to exclude them from all
high and lucrative office, but also to narrow and dim-
inish as much as possible their legitimate prospects
and honourable career in native States. We should
have natives of our own training planted everywhere
throughout India by our special care and influence, to
work with us and for us. The tendency of our over-
whelming supremacy up to the present day has been
the very reverse of this. Our annexations and com-
missions have swept whole tribes of high functionaries,
MYSORE AS IT MIGHT BE.
309
replacing them by English officers, while our political
agents at the foreign courts of India, far from exerting
their great influence in favour of educated natives,
have more frequently thrown obstacles in their way.
Madava Rao¹ is, I believe, the solitary instance of a
Hindoo brought up at a Presidency College attaining
to the rank of Minister; and I rather think he owed
his elevation to the Royal family of Travancore, and
not to the Resident's recommendation.
The Residents at Nagpore never relinquished or
slackened that firm grasp over the administration of
that country which was bequeathed to them by Sir
Richard Jenkins; but they never introduced, or at-
tempted to introduce, a single enlightened and able
native into any department of the Government. Seve-
ral of them jobbed freely for their own dependents,
especially just before their departure; each one was
ready enough to force his own particular measure
down the throats of the Rajah and his advisers, or to
insist on the immediate settlement of his own pet case
of grievance; and the Rajah seldom resisted for any
length of time: but not one of them ever thought of
strengthening the native administration by bringing
a well educated and trained native judge or financier
from Calcutta or Madras. They would have rejected
the notion, if it had ever been proposed to them, with
something like scorn and pity at the proposer's igno-
rance of "political" affairs. They had no wish to
make the Rajah's weak government, and loose admin-
istration, so strong, so wise, so regular and compact,
1 The present Dewan of the Travancore State.
310
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA,
as to render the Resident's interference unfrequent or
unnecessary.
The same story must be told of our Residents at
Hyderabad. There, undoubtedly, our influence has at
no time been so oppressive, our surveillance so inces-
sant, as it was at Nagpore. But we have never lost
any opportunity of recommending European agency,
and our recommendations have not been fruitless.
Besides the introduction by our influence of well-paid
Thuggee appointments for English officers, many little
occasional jobs of surveying, road-making, geologising,
and so forth, have, in this and several other native
States, been devised by Residents for their relations and
friends. The quondam Nizam's Army, which has now
by the treaties of 1853 and 1860 become a permanent
Contingent Force at the disposal of our Government,
was in its origin nothing but a gigantic Resident's
job, all the patronage of which was for years in his
hands, and which, though connived at by us, and en-
dured by the Nizam under persuasion and misrepre-
sentation, was not officially recognised by either Go-
vernment. During nearly the whole reign of Secunder
Jah, and until the accession of the present Nizam's
father, Nasir-ood-dowla, who insisted on their removal,
a great part of the Hyderabad dominions was managed
by European Superintendents, who collected the re-
venue, and had extensive magisterial and judicial
functions, very similar to those exercised by the
Superintendents in the Mysore Commission.
In short, the task of improving the official body
might not have been so easy at Hyderabad as at
Nagpore or Sattara, but if our Government and its
MYSORE AS IT MIGHT BE.
311
diplomatic representatives had been half as anxious
to see a few of the best qualified natives of the Presi-
dency towns,-men familiar with our literature and
science, and imbued with our principles of law and
justice,-worthily placed in the administration of
native States, as they have always been to provide
good appointments everywhere for English gentlemen,
it could have been done without great difficulty, and
on a very extensive scale.
For instance, within the last three years the pre-
sent able and accomplished Resident at Hyderabad¹ has
very kindly and charitably recommended two recently
cashiered English officers for employment as Captains
in the Minister's Body-guard, and his recommendations
in both cases were successful. If he or any of his pre-
decessors had taken as much, or a little more trouble,
and exercised a little more persuasion to lay the foun-
dation of a reform in the courts of justice by importing
two or three trained judges selected from our principal
Sudder Ameens, or from the most eminent Vakeels at
Calcutta and Bombay, he would equally have succeeded,
and a great step would have been gained.
But notwithstanding the ability and skill of our
representative at Hyderabad, and those good intentions
towards the Nizam's Government for which I give
him full credit, I suspect that in common with
almost all our officials of the old school, those who at
present occupy the most important places, he would
consider any reform to be dearly purchased by any
measure that should render the native Prince and his
ministers less dependent upon the Resident for infor-
1 Colonel Cuthbert Davidson, C.B., since deceased.
312
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
mation, less amenable to his authoritative suggestions.
I suspect that he, and most of his compeers at other
Courts, would be terribly jealous and impatient of
educated and enlightened natives. The fact is, that
according to the accepted traditional language of our
Indian political officers, all consultations at a native
Court to which the Resident is not privy, and of which
he has not expressed his approval, are called “in-
trigues." Every man, whatever his rank may be, who
has access to the Prince or the Minister, and who is
supposed to have an opinion of his own, or to give
advice contrary to that of the Resident, is said to be
"a man of an intriguing and turbulent disposition."
The frequency of such irregular consultations, the dis-
turbing action of such interloping individuals, would
be incalculably increased by placing Hindoos or Ma-
homedans, brought up and trained in a British atmo-
sphere of legal order and social freedom, in a position
where they could make themselves heard by the rulers
of a native Principality. An old-fashioned Resident
would shudder at the mere supposition that the ad-
vice of natives might be asked instead of his, perhaps
accepted and acted on in preference to his; and that
reliance might be placed on their experience of Presi-
dency affairs, and their knowledge of our laws and
system of Government, which ought to have depended
only on his assurances and instructions. An impres-
sion, not the less strong for being vague and unrea-
sonable, would be fixed in the old gentleman's mind,
that such partial independence of his advice, and free-
dom from his dictation, must be injurious to British
power and influence. He would feel that his occupa-
tion was gone.
MYSORE AS IT MIGHT BE.
313
One prevailing idea hitherto among our governing
and official classes has been, that the establishment of
English appointments throughout India in constantly
increasing numbers, and the exclusion of natives from
all high and independent posts, had the effect of ex-
tending and confirming the direct influence of our
Government. Another prevailing idea has been that
educated natives entrusted with power, and raised to
dignified positions, especially in native States, would
be corrupt, and disaffected, and dangerous to our supre-
macy. Both these ideas I believe to be fallacious; and
unless they can be entirely dismissed as the principles
of executive policy, and entirely abandoned in prac-
tice, I can anticipate no progressive and permanent
improvement in the administration of Mysore, or of
any other native State; I can see no probable gua-
rantee for stability and peace, whether the head of the
Government is to be a Commissioner, or the Rajah ad-
vised by a Resident. If men are never trusted, they
will never be trustworthy.
The extension of direct administration and govern-
ment by natives of English training, both in our own
Provinces and in the dependent Principalities, is a
matter of the deepest importance, and of the most
pressing necessity; and upon it depends the accept-
ance of European principles of law and society, and of
English education in the broadest sense throughout
India. The permanence and the glory of our Empire
are indissolubly and inextricably bound up with this
great act of justice. Its commencement has been de-
ferred too long. We have perhaps never before had
so good an opportunity of inaugurating a generous
P
314
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
policy, as the reorganisation of the Mysore Govern-
ment now offers, and if it is allowed to pass away,
another may not soon be presented.
I have always been among those who maintain that
the very fact of our enormous power, and virtual su-
premacy over the native States of India, ought to make
us even more scrupulous of imposing distasteful mea-
sures and new engagements upon them, and more
liberal in our construction of their rights and claims
under existing treaties, than we should be in dealing
with States of greater pretensions, and of more inde-
pendent position. My objection to the policy of our
Government during the last thirty years, pushed to
a climax of intensity under Lord Dalhousie, is that it
has been the policy of an aggressive and absorbing
Kingdom, rather than that of a controlling and pro-
tective Empire. We have aimed more at extending
our boundaries than our laws and customs, more at
enlarging our possessions than our moral influence.
But I am far from being of opinion that our power,
and the duty arising naturally out of that power,
should be timidly used in controlling and superintend-
ing the government of native States. I should rather
complain that it has not been used sufficiently, and
not in the most effectual and acceptable manner and
direction.
I consider a treaty between two Sovereigns,-as I
do a constitution as between Sovereign and people,
whether the one or the other be freely granted, or
extorted, or amicably concluded,-to be a most solemn
and sacred instrument, with which neither party can
play fast and loose. A strong Government cannot,
MYSORE AS IT MIGHT BE.
315
without overturning the first principles of international
aw, cede, confer, or restore a country to a weak and
dependent Government as a free gift, and then at any
subsequent period, on any convenient plea, claim the
right of cancelling the gift and resuming the country.
I believe that the Rajah of Mysore has certain rights
under the treaty of 1799, among others that of adopt-
ing a son according to Hindoo law; but I believe that
the people of Mysore have rights also, and that the
British Government has Imperial duties to perform
both towards Sovereign and people.
My opinion is that the exclusive administration of
Mysore in all the higher and many secondary appoint-
ments by English officers, should be much diminished,
and the substitution of educated and trained natives
as Judges and Superintendents of districts, commenced
as soon, and effected with such gradual degrees, as
may be consistent with the permanence of all that is
good in the existing system, and the reform of all
that is bad, and there are many bad points in it,-
but I conceive that this change might be effected, and
that the Rajah might be made somewhat less of a
cypher, and somewhat more of a Sovereign, without
that absolute power being replaced in his hands which
he is said to have misused between 1820 and 1830.
The Rajah is entirely in the hands of the Supreme
Government. If, instead of a new Commissioner, a
well selected Resident, acting under wise and generous
instructions, were to be sent to Mysore as the Rajah's
Prime Minister, and, above all other conditions, if the
Rajah by a solemn and public instrument were to
abdicate for himself and his successors all judicial
P 2
316
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
.:
power, original and appellate, which should be con-
fided entirely to skilled and learned judges of high
rank and emolument, removable only on proved mis-
conduct, there need be no fear of the result. If the
Resident, guided and supported by our Government,
were to devote his energies to the cautious and gra-
dual introduction of a native official body, and of a
Council of State to revise the fundamental laws and
to control the finances, the Rajah or his successor
would in a few years become a constitutional Mon-
arch, and would exercise only those executive functions
to which so many Monarchs of Europe have learned,
or have been compelled, to confine themselves.
This is a mere outline of the measures to which I
should wish to see our foreign policy directed, not only
in Mysore, but in every native State in India. This
in my opinion would be at once an Imperial and a
national work, a policy at once reforming and conser-
vative, controlling and conciliatory. This would solve
the mystery of reconciling our material and moral
superiority with the inherent rights and legitimate
aspirations of the people of India, and of extirpating
their most conspicuous evils and miseries by native
and natural means, instead of merely suppressing their
outward manifestation by foreign, artificial, and re-
pulsive methods. The native cure alone is radical.
317
•
LETTER XVI.
REINFORCEMENT AND RECONCILIATION.
May 16th, 1861.
THE writer of these letters is not a native; his inter-
ests, his natural tastes and predilections, his life-long
sympathies and daily associations, are all intimately
and indissolubly bound up with "the services" and
with "home." Yet I find myself impelled by motives
of duty to write in favour of what are commonly sup-
posed to be purely native interests, and especially to
advocate a much more extended employment of edu-
cated natives in the higher branches of the public
service, and their introduction through British influ-
ence into places of rank and power in the allied and
tributary States. The truth is that I do not consider
it either as a matter of purely native interest, or sim-
ply as a question of justice to natives. I do not think
that any Indian question can be viewed in a true light,
unless India is regarded as an important constituent
part of the British Empire, and not as a conquered
country, and a mere dependency upon England; unless
the Hindoos and Mahomedans of India are regarded
as British subjects, with all the rights, immunities,
-
--
318
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
and privileges of their European fellows at home and
abroad.
What are the rights of a British subject with re-
ference to the legitimate objects of human ambition,
-rank, and power, and public influence, and weight
in the national councils? No man, no member of a
class in Great Britain, has an inherent right to be a
voter, or a vestryman, a justice of the peace, an alder-
man, or a Lord Lieutenant,-in short to hold any
office, or to enjoy any honour or emolument, which is
unattainable by other classes. No class is specially
entitled by birth; no race is excluded; but certain
qualifications of property or education are demanded.
This statement is quite unaffected by the fact of our
hereditary peerage; because the restriction of its pri-
vileges to the eldest son, prevents it from becoming
an exclusive caste; and its ranks, far from being closed
to the people, are incessantly recruited by meritorious
and distinguished persons who have sprung from the
middle classes. Any man may rise to the peerage, if
he can.
We may also leave out of consideration the two or
three great offices of State to which Roman Catholics
are still by statute ineligible, because no one now at-
tempts to uphold these restrictions on principle; and
although they are still cherished as the land-marks of
Protestant ascendancy, nobody in the House of Com-
mons defends their existence with any serious con-
viction but Mr. Spooner and Mr. Whalley; they are
not oppressive, but merely anomalous and offensive;
and no one doubts that they will disappear some day
without any noticeable discussion or struggle, and that
no practical result will follow their disappearance.
REINFORCEMENT AND RECONCILIATION.
319
Besides the rights of open tribunals, freedom of
petition, of speech and of the press, the inviolable
domicile, and the responsibility of public functionaries
to the law,-rights which, the two last in particular,
can scarcely be said to exist in any European State
except our own, but which we have, practically in the
Presidency towns and professedly all over India, be-
stowed upon the natives, there is still one right,
denied to no one born in the British Isles,—the right
of free access to all the legitimate objects of a citizen's
ambition, to the honours and prizes of the Empire,
which is closed to Indian British subjects, and which,
in their own country at least, ought to be unreservedly
opened to them.
It is very true that there is no legal obstacle to the
appointment of natives to the highest posts. There are
no such insulting and galling restrictions against the
advancement of "Turks and heathens," as formerly
existed in Great Britain and Ireland in the penal laws
against Jews and Roman Catholics. On the contrary,
long before the gracious promises of the Queen's Pro-
clamation, it was expressly enacted in the 87th clause
of the Act of William IV, 1833, that no person "shall
by reason only of his religion, place of birth, descent,
colour, or any of them, be disabled from holding any
place, office, or employment."
But, speaking candidly, we all know that practically
this has been of no avail, and that natives are deli-
berately and systematically excluded from numerous
appointments for which they are perfectly competent,
solely on account of their "birth," "colour," and "re-
ligion." The greater number of appointments in the
320
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
possession of the covenanted Civil Service, are still,
probably for a very short time, secured to them by
Act of Parliament, and no outsiders have yet been al-
lowed to trespass on those preserves.¹ I have nothing
therefore to say on that score at present. But there
are other departments to which military officers, and
the “uncovenanted" of every race and colour, except
the pure native, have been admitted. No native has
been placed in charge of a district in the Non-regula-
tion Provinces,-the Punjaub, Nagpore, or Mysore,-or
even admitted into the list as a regular Assistant Com-
missioner. Though frequently invested with the same
powers, and engaged in the same duties as the English
officers, the native officials, with some of the less fa-
voured of the uncovenanted, are always separately
classified under some inferior designation, such as that
of Extra Assistant, and thus kept out of the line of
promotion. And thus in the Regulation Provinces.
there is a distinct list of Deputy Collectors and Sudder
Ameens, with subordinate functions, undefined rank,
and circumscribed prospects.
And if it were now to be proposed to make a native
the Superintendent of a district in Mysore; or, at
some future period, when the privileges of the close
Civil Service are abolished, if there should be any ru-
mour of a native being raised to the position of a Ses-
sions Judge, or of a Collector, no one who knows the
traditional prejudices, the general tone and temper of
the official class, can doubt that the strongest opposi-
Nearly all the appointments formerly reserved for the cove-
nanted service have been thrown open by an Act of Parliament of
1862.
.
REINFORCEMENT AND RECONCILIATION.
321
tion would be offered, the most vigorous objections
made, not on account of want of qualifications, not on
the ground of defects of character, but simply because
the nominee was a native." I wish to see this ex-
clusive and insulting prejudice practically disavowed
and abandoned as speedily as possible, before that
pressure commences which destroys the grace and
favour of concession. I am convinced that the ques-
tion of the fair participation of the higher class of edu-
cated natives in the administration and government
of India, will at no distant period, if it be neglected,
become the question of the day, and will assume giant
proportions.
It is chiefly for this reason that I hope the Governor
General will never be a man of long Indian official
experience, but always a distinguished English states-
man, not necessarily a Peer,-though I should prefer one,
and even a Prince, if there were one of sufficient age and
ability, but a man used to power, used to view large
questions in a large way, free from local attachments,
and able to look down with perfect indifference on the
petty prejudices and personal interests of the official
hierarchy.¹ Lord Canning, whatever may have been
1 Certainly if any one could be expected to rise superior to the
failings and prejudices of his class and profession, and to contra-
dict practically my misgivings, it would be the distinguished man
who has just been appointed Viceroy of India. There may be ex-
ceptions to every rule; but an exception proved in this instance,
would not alter the general opinion expressed above, and in the
English in India (p. 188-192). Nor is it probable that a highly
successful completion of the next Viceregal term, would constitute,
according to my views, a real exception to the rule. The material,
and even the moral advantages, to be expected from Sir John Law-
rence's administrative skill and experience, and from the great
qualities of his mind and character, might appear to me merely
negative results, quite overbalanced by the loss of five precious
.
P 3
322
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
.
his short-comings, has never failed in this respect; he
has never shown any particular tenderness for the
covenanted services; the tendency of his policy, and
of his administrative measures, and the terms of his
occasional "allocutions," have been generally high-
toned, impartial, and imperial. Lord Dalhousie cer-
tainly was a failure, from want of moral ballast; but
even he does not form a real contradiction to the rule
in the particular point now under consideration.
Though tenacious of his viceregal rank and power, he
was liberal and public-spirited in the disposal of his
patronage, leaving many first appointments and many
promotions in their own immediate Provinces and
departments, to the nomination of the Lieutenant
Governors, Chief Commissioners, and other high offi-
cials; and he himself placed several English gentlemen
from the uncovenanted ranks, in appointments which
up to that time had only been filled from the Civil
Service or the Army, in the regular list of the Pun-
jaub, Nagpore and Oude Commissions, in the Magis-
tracy, and in the Post Office.
But neither in Lord Dalhousie's nor in Lord Can-
ning's time, has much been done for the native officials.
The salaries of the native Judges are still very in-
adequate to their services and responsibilities, and
quite insufficient to induce a pleader in good practice
to accept a judicial appointment. The class of Deputy
Collectors and Deputy Magistrates has certainly been
years to the cause of Imperial revival. I would as soon look for a
reform of the Church to the bench of Bishops, or for law reform to
the bench of Judges, as to a Bengal civilian and the former Chief
Commissioner of the Punjaub, for those conservative reforms and
restorative innovations, which must be based on national and pro-
fessional self-abnegation.
·
REINFORCEMENT AND RECONCILIATION.
323
increased in number; but they are destined to remain
Deputy Collectors and Deputy Magistrates for ever,
subordinate and inferior to the youngest newly-
arrived covenanted Assistant or military officer, and
incapable of attaining to any post where distinction
may be won by original and independent action.
I have never been able to extract from any published
work, or from any official paper, or to elicit from any
person of Indian experience, a distinct and intelligible
argument-apart from the arrogant prejudices of race
and religion,—against the elevation of natives to the
very highest posts for which they are qualified. When
religious objections are openly avowed and displayed,
of course there is little scope and little necessity
for discussion; we know the old intolerant babble,
and we know the peculiar class who give vent to
it; we know how useless it is to reason with them,
as useless as to reason with an orthodox Brahmin
on his caste prejudices,-and we know how need-
less it is; for the party, though still retaining an ex-
tensive but declining social influence, is politically
powerless, and does not count a single statesman of
the first, or of the second, or of the third rank, among
its adherents.
The Friend of India, which has for twenty years
consistently upheld a policy of fanaticism and rapa-
city, and is too well informed not to know how that
policy has failed, how universally it is now reprobated
in high places, and how impossible it is that it should
ever be revived, occasionally sounds its old war-cries
with spiteful but hopeless pertinacity. A short time
ago I pointed out the Friend's extraordinary craze
324
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
that Christianity would prevent rebellion, and ren-
der large armies unnecessary,¹ the Utopian nature of
which pretty theory is abundantly illustrated in the
history of Christian Europe during the last three hun-
dred years. In its issue of the 2nd May, the Friend
declares that it cannot see any "reason why a Chris-
tian people like the English should give equal rights
to Asiatic idolators." Now, all this one can under-
stand: it is absurd and silly, but it is not new, or un-
natural, or unintelligible. We know that spirit, whence
it comes; we have marked it in every era of humanity.
It is happily dying out in Europe, except among the
Ultramontanes and the Ultra-puritans, both of them
impotent parties; but we expect it from the Record,
the Friend of India, and Exeter Hall in general, and
we can afford to let it pass unmolested to oblivion.
But what I do not understand is that the same re-
sult,—that of postponing indefinitely the practical ad-
mission of the natives of India to equal rights with
their British fellow-subjects,-is arrived at by so many
persons whose political professions are liberal, and
who are certainly not blinded by fanatical arrogance ;
and my great difficulty, hitherto unsurmountable, has
always been to extract a clear statement of their ob-
jection, which generally seems to consist of a vague
sensation that any substantial influence and power
gained by natives, even in the ranks of our adminis-
tration, would be a loss and a weakness to Govern-
ment. This I believe to be a complete delusion, a
desperate political heresy, which, if it were adopted by
the State, would amount to a confession of the violence,
the illegitimacy, and the incapacity of British rule.
1 Ante, p. 7.
· REINFORCEMENT AND RECONCILIATION.
325
Can it be supposed that the efficiency of the public
service would be impaired? If any man means to
assert that we cannot occasionally select a better man
from the class of educated native officials and Sudder
Court pleaders, to be a Judge, or an Assistant Com-
missioner, or an Assistant Collector, or a District
Superintendent of Police, than can be got hap-hazard
in the usual way, by seniority or by favour, from the
Civil Service or from the Army, all I shall say in reply
for the present is that I do not agree with him. I
know a little of the "patriarchal" system in Nagpore,
the Punjaub, and Oude, and of the "heaven-born
system in our older possessions.
"
But it will be asked, do you doubt that Europeans
are of a superior race, more intellectual and more
energetic than the people of India, and therefore more
fit to rule? This is a most interesting ethnological
problem; but even if settled in favour of our largest
self-assertions, it would be quite inadequate to decide
either the question of policy or the question of good
administration. The foremost natives of India, in the
present day, may be incapable of the higher achieve-
ments of European genius, and yet they may be, as I
believe they are, peculiarly competent to give counsel
in matters affecting native interests, and to conduct
their local affairs. If we are naturally superior, that
is our advantage, and a sufficient one, it might be
supposed, and one which would be more imposing,
and more to our credit, if we talked less about it, and
if competition were not forbidden. English horses, I
have been told, are excluded from some races in this
country, or heavily weighted, because they are so su-
·
326
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
perior in strength and swiftness to the Oriental breeds,
but I never heard of country-bred horses in India, or
Arabs in England, being prevented from running be-
cause they are so very inferior. If we wish to Euro-
peanise and to Christianise the people of India, we
must not adopt or tolerate Asiatic forms and pagan
principles in our government. If we wish to dis-
courage caste distinctions, we must take care to claim
no caste distinctions for ourselves,—above all, not to
make European caste the indispensable requisite for
high official rank and political influence.
At present European caste is that indispensable
requisite. But a still worse feature in our system is
that the lust of patronage operates very extensively in
both directions,below as well as above. From time
to time, when the man in power, or an influential ad-
viser, is hard pressed to provide for some expectant,
or from sheer indifference to native claims, and sensi-
tiveness to social importunity, an Englishman or an
East Indian¹ with English connections, is thrust into
some vacant place which has been previously filled
with efficiency by a native, or for which a native is
notoriously the best qualified candidate.
It is a mistake to assume, as Parliamentary and
literary eulogists appear to do, that every English
official who supplants a native in a recently annexed
Province, or excludes one in a settled district, is neces-
sarily a Lawrence, a Temple, or an Edwardes; or that
the members of the Indian services are for the most
1 Such is the vague and inaccurate term by which the class of
mixed Indo-European parentage or descent, prefer to call them-
selves. The old word' half-caste' is proscribed by them as offensive
and insulting.
1
REINFORCEMENT AND RECONCILIATION.
327
part men of first-rate capacity. A very little reflec-
tion would of course convince any one that such a
disproportionate aggregation of talent in a body of
men so constituted, is simply impossible.
The truth is, that a district or a province in India
is very easily managed in quiet times. The people
prefer very much being left to conduct the greater
part of their communal affairs-rural police, village
roads, and small public works-in their own way,
without much official interference; and by means of
the ancient village organisation, the revenue is paid
and collected with marvellous punctuality. There
have been at all periods of our rule, and there are
now, some Commissioners, Collectors, and Judges,
who have been a blessing in their respective locali-
ties; who are venerated by the inhabitants, and whose
departure would be a signal for universal mourning.
There have been, and are others,-a class, I firmly
believe, much smaller than the last,-who have dis-
credited our nation and Government by their bad
conduct, both private and official. There are many
who are accomplished and exemplary public servants.
But there is another class,-much too large a class,-
the peculiar offspring of the European caste monopoly,
composed of gentlemen, really very incompetent, who
have, nevertheless, attained to a certain dexterity in
getting through business with the aid of clever native
subordinates, and in keeping up their monthly returns,
their annual reports, and their English correspondence
with the authorities at the Presidency. It is thus that
a superficial regularity of routine is secured, at the
expense of much popular discontent, and of the general
328
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
discredit of our administration, more especially in the
judicial department.
For instance, it is mainly through the presence in
the Magistracy and in the Police, of a certain propor-
tion of English gentlemen who are in a perpetual state
of perplexity and irritability, from their imperfect
knowledge of the language, and their want of famili-
arity and sympathy with native manners and customs,
that a certain prevalent class of crimes, which have
brought great obloquy on the native character, have
become possible and profitable. I allude to those cases
which too often occupy both the civil and criminal
courts, false claims and false charges and counter-
charges, supported by elaborate conspiracy, false evi-
dence and false documents,-cases which would not
have a chance of success before the rude tribunals of
a native State, or before a native judge or magistrate
of dignified position, and armed with sufficient au-
thority. At present, with our ill-paid native magistrates
of inferior rank; with an ill-paid and corrupt set of
ministerial parasites, who pull the wires of the visible
judiciary; and with an interminable series of appeals ;
no Hindoo Clodius, no Sir Giles Overreach, need despair
of success, until he has gone the whole round of the
courts; and even then he is pretty sure of getting off
unharmed.
But the radical defect and inherent weakness of this
exclusive employment of English gentlemen in the
higher branches of the public service, consists in a
certain consciousness of absolute superiority and pri-
vileged security, which nullifies both the wholesome
fear of public obloquy and the most powerful motives
REINFORCEMENT AND RECONCILIATION. 329
•
2
to exertion. The introduction among them, on an
equal footing, of well educated and qualified natives,
would excite a healthy emulation and competition;
and would necessarily terminate that practical im-
punity which has frequently screened some of the
worst members of the covenanted service.¹ The
native officials, however high their position, would be
-as ought to be done, especially at first-most strictly
watched; and would be reproved, or removed, or dis-
missed, without compunction, if any error, incompe-
tence or mal-practice on their part, called for the ani-
madversion of Government. It would of course be
impossible to apply a lower standard of efficiency, or
a discipline more lenient and more lax, to the European
officials than to their native compeers.
And to these considerations may be added the un-
doubted fact, that a native Judge or Prefect would be
fully subjected, in all the relations of life, to the public
opinion of his town or district; and that if he became
justly obnoxious to the community, not only might he
be visited with those legitimate social penalties from
which the European in a similar position is perfectly
exempt, but there would be none of that despair of
being heard, and dread of the consequences of such
audacity, which too often prevents a complaint being
made against an English civilian.
Just in proportion as our direct possessions have
been extended by annexation, competent English officers
Sir Charles Trevelyan, when Governor of Madras, was assailed
with great virulence in the local English society, and in the Indian
press, which chiefly reflects their views, for having on one or two
occasions departed from the usual plan of smothering scandals re-
lating to covenanted civilians.
330
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
have been more thinly scattered over the country. The
Civil Service has been largely supplemented by the
Army. Even that source has frequently seemed to be
exhausted; and promotions have then been made from
the uncovenanted ranks,—although, as I have already
remarked, only for a secondary class of appointments,
and not in the case of pure natives. The occasional
inefficiency of our civil administrators has long been,
and is, a growing evil; it threatens to be aggravated
by the increased aversion to Indian exile, and the de-
creased emoluments of Indian service. The evil will
assuredly not be mitigated, nor will the risk of flagrant
scandal and exposure be lessened, by the spread of edu-
cation and enlightenment among certain classes of the
natives, or by the higher scale of erudition demanded
by Government from native candidates for the public
service. On the contrary, injurious comparison, and
damaging collisions must necessarily become more
common. The native press has received a great expan-
sion within the last ten years; and, although there is
still great apathy among the mass of the higher and
middle class, the germ of political organisation exists
at the three Presidency cities,¹ and might be found
susceptible of a formidable development, under the
stimulus and agency of talent and self-devotion.
Setting aside all question of justice and imperial
policy, there seems to me to be no conceivable correc-
tive to this formidable and festering disease in our
administration but by the infusion of new blood, with
a cautious but not a timid hand, from the source that
1 The British Indian Association, with its affiliated branches,
and some minor societies, with similar objects.
REINFORCEMENT AND RECONCILIATION.
331
I have indicated. When the two races are fairly
combined in relations and duties of trust and respon-
sibility, interested in the same great results, and im-
pelled by the same ambitions, their respective good
qualities and faculties-roused by publicity and com-
petition—would, I believe, act and react both upon
them and upon their work with most beneficial effect
to the Empire.
It is very easy to avoid entering on the merits of
the question by misrepresenting its proportions, by
presenting it in an exaggerated and ridiculous light,
by asking whether it is proposed to cashier all the
European civil servants, covenanted and uncovenanted,
and to replace them by natives, because they would
be so much cheaper; whether it would not be advis-
able to have a native Commander-in-Chief, a native
Governor-General, and even a native Prime Minister
of Great Britain. To this I should have only to reply
that whenever enlightened public opinion points to a
native as the best possible Governor-General, I hope
the appointment will be made; that whenever a natu-
ralised Hindoo statesman has succeeded in getting
a majority to follow him in the House of Commons, I
trust he may be made First Lord of the Treasury; and
that I am content to wait a few years for those events.
But at present enlightened public opinion and official
experience do teach us that a few natives,-I believe
as yet a very few,—are admirably fitted for the highest
judicial offices, for the administrative charge of dis-
tricts, and for seats in local Councils; we want their
aid, their counsel, and their support, and I sincerely
hope we shall not be much longer deprived of them.
332
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
But
We do not want Hindoos to govern us in Great
Britain, but to govern themselves in their own coun-
try. We must consolidate the interests and the am-
bitions of England and of India. Until the two races.
are engaged in common objects, and actuated by com-
mon aspirations, our Empire will always remain with-
out the first element of stability. There are no such
conservative people in the world as the people of India,
if we will only give them something to conserve.
until we give them better men to look up to
exemplars and leaders-higher objects, grander achieve-
ments, and more attainable prizes, to admire and to
emulate-they will continue to take a pride in the
old glories of Sivajee, Tippoo, and Holkar, and in the
recent exploits of Tantia Topee, Kooer Sing, and the
Ranee of Jhansi, which we may be sure are very dif
ferently related in their annals and their ballads from
what they are in our records, and which are by no
means of a conservative tendency. A nation must
have an ideal.
as
333
;
LETTER XVII.
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
London, November 1863.
EVERY great act of state in India seems to have been
planned and executed, every general scheme of Indian
policy seemed to have been based, since Lord Dalhousie
assumed the reins of power, upon the supposition that
India is, and will for ever remain, removed from the
arena of European diplomacy. But is this so certain?
Have we any permanent security against inquiries and
remonstrances that might be both humiliating and
embarrassing?
Russia has always resented the objections of other
powers to her treatment of Circassia and Poland; and
the stern necessity of existence still compels her to pro-
test, though in a somewhat lowered tone, more querul-
ous than threatening, against foreign sympathy with
Polish insurgents, and foreign suggestions for their
conciliation. But she can no longer avoid or decline
discussion. And allowing for the greater force and
influence of public opinion, for the outward homage to
certain general principles of humanity and justice de-
manded by the spirit of the age, the heaviest pressure
that has been brought to bear upon Russia, the most
334
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
efficient obstacle to her summary rejection of all advice,
has certainly been found in those Articles of the treaties
of Vienna, which were intended to give her the King-
dom of Poland. Every allusion to the violated pro-
visions of those treaties tends to impugn and menace
the title of Russia, and to strengthen the Polish cause
with the sanction of public law.
Lord Russell, in his speech at Blairgowrie on the
26th September, remarked in very plain and distinct
language on the dangerous position into which Russia
was falling:-"It seems to me," said the noble Lord,
"that it was an act of great imprudence in Russia,
when she had the great advantage to have the act of
partition condoned, to reject the terms on which, by
the treaty of Vienna, that title was, as it were,
accepted by Europe. What may be the consequences
of that act-what conduct the different powers of
Europe may follow, are not questions upon which I
can properly enter. I merely wish to remark the fact
that these conditions, which are contained in the
treaty of Vienna, by which Russia obtained the king-
dom of Poland, have not been complied with. The
conditions of the tenure broken, the title itself can
hardly be complete."
So strongly have the Russian statesmen felt this
difficulty, that they would evidently much prefer to
relinquish altogether their acknowledged title under
treaty, and to claim a new one by right of conquest.
Russia may hesitate some time before openly throwing
herself into so defiant an attitude, but if pressed too
hard by the Western powers, she will certainly do so
at last, and would then probably find that she had,
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
335
both in moral and in logical strength, gained, rather
than lost, by the sacrifice. Always supposing that the
Russian Government could place a well-founded reli-
ance on its material ability, the violated allegiance and
two obstinate rebellions of Poland, and the analogy of
coercion, when thus forced upon a Government, with
conquest, in all its rights and results, would, if skil-
fully urged, form the most simple answer and ex-
planation possible, to any demand for the constitu-
tional privileges secured to Poland by the treaties of
Vienna. But situated as Russia is,-not quite con-
fident in her power of internal coercion or of external
resistance, not quite insensible to the force of public
opinion, she does not under-rate the advantage of
having the letter of the law on the side of her terri-
torial possession, she cannot despise the moral repro-
bation or the contingent hostility of Western Europe.
It appears, then, to me, that we have in India-to
adopt Lord Russell's phraseology-committed more
than one "act of great imprudence," similar to that
which he considers to have vitiated the title of Russia
to Poland, and to justify the interference of Great
Britain and France. Perhaps the clearest and the
most indisputable instance of an imprudent act of
state is that of the Carnatic disinheritance.
As I have pointed out in Letter III, the British
right to administer the Carnatic has been destroyed
by the violation of the conditions under which that
right was held; while no title to the territorial sove-
reignty, recognisable by international law or accepted
by the people, has ever been acquired or even assumed.
The British Government is not even able to plead a
336
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
་་
revolution or a rebellion, as Russia does, or to com-
plain of violated alliance or allegiance on the part of
any reigning Prince or other member of the Wallajah
family, or of any of their adherents, or of any inhabi-
tant of the Principality. Nothing whatever has oc-
curred within the last sixty or within the last hundred
years, that could authorise any change in the relations
between the administering power and the reigning
Sovereign, without a special negotiation between all
the contracting parties. Everything remains in statu
quo, as in 1763, when the Treaty of Paris was con-
cluded with France, as when the treaty of 1801 was
concluded with the Nawab Azeem-ood-dowlah.
short, it is obvious,—to make use again of Lord Rus-
sell's own words,-that "the conditions of the tenure
being broken, the title itself can hardly be complete."
In
But the case becomes more perplexed, and more
suggestive of future complications and discussions, in
view of the fact that the Honourable Company did
not act alone, and did not profess or pretend to confer
or contribute anything, of its own mere motion and
inherent authority, in any single passage of the formal
and solemn documents by which Mahomed Ali was
finally recognised in India as an independent Prince.
The necessary firmans having been procured from the
Great Mogul, the Emperor of Hindostan,¹ the next,
and most important step of all, was to obtain, in favour
of Mahomed Ali, an acquittance for the past, and
absolution for the future, of all tribute and allegiance
to his immediate superior, the Nizam Sooba of the
1 He is so termed throughout the negotiations, and in all the
treaties and sunnuds: Volume of Treaties, 1853.
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
337
Deccan, who had nominated his father, Anwar-ood-
deen Khan, to the subordinate dignity of Nawab of
the Carnatic, then a part of the Nizam's dominions.
This was effected after much delay, reluctance, and
resistance on the part of the Court of Hyderabad, by
the Treaty of 1768, declaring "perpetual friendship
and alliance" between the Nizam, the Nawab Walla-
jah, and the Honourable Company, and in Article VII
of which "it is agreed and acknowledged by the said
Asoph Jah Nizam-ool-Moolk, that the said Nawab
Wallajah, his son and their heirs in succession, shall
enjoy for ever as an altamgah, or free gift, the govern-
ment of the Carnatic, in the fullest and amplest man-
ner." Thus, if there were the slightest ground or
pretext for saying that the rights of the Wallajah
family were extinguished, the Nizam, as the original
Suzerain and grantor, might prefer a claim to the
reversion of the Carnatic, at least as good, if not
stronger, than that of the Honourable Company.
This Treaty of 1768, under which many advantages
were gained by the Company from the Nizam, is still
in force; it was expressly confirmed by the Treaty of
1800;2 and the Nizam's Government has never given
its consent or adhesion to any alteration of the settle-
ment thereby concluded. Indeed, the Nizam has never
been consulted on the subject; no intimation of that
settlement having been abrogated, was ever given to
that Prince, either in 1801 or at any subsequent
period.
Nor is the subversion of that settlement a matter
on which the Nizam can be supposed to look with
i
Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 123.
2 Ditto, p. 146.
338
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
indifference. Even if we set aside as romantic non-
sense all those considerations of common race and
religion, and ancestral ties, which might be expected
to influence the Nizam,—even if we summarily reject,
as they would do at Calcutta, any pretensions of the
Nizam to an external policy of his own,-there will
still remain certain points in the Carnatic case so
manifestly affecting his interests, so directly threaten-
ing his own possessions, that it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to evade or resent his demand for ex-
planations. If, after fifty years of uninterrupted
"civil and military administration," and after two
successions, we were entitled,-without form, apology,
or public notice,-to confiscate the Carnatic, and to
refuse the stipulated share of the revenues to the
Nawab,-after how many years of “exclusive manage-
ment," "2 and after how many successions, shall we be
entitled to appropriate the Nizam's two provinces of
Berar, and to refuse any longer to "render true and
faithful accounts," and "make over the surplus re-
venues "2 annually to the Sovereign of Hyderabad ?
How this question could be answered, how any dis-
tinction could be drawn between the two cases, so as
to reassure the Nizam's Government, appears to me
to be quite an insoluble problem.
There is another similar case impending. In the
establishment or revival, under Lord Wellesley's ad-
ministration, of the Hindoo state of Mysore, the
Honourable Company did not act alone, but in con-
1 The words used in the Treaty of 1801 with the Nawab Azeem-
ood.dowla.
2 Terms used in the Treaty of 1853 with the Nizam Nasir-ood-
dowla; Volume of Treaties, 1856, p. 70.
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
339
1
cert with the Nizam. The Subsidiary Treaty of 1799
with the Rajah of Mysore is declared in the preamble
to be concluded in consequence of what was "stipu-
lated in the Treaty of the 22nd of June 1799" (the
Partition Treaty of Mysore) " between the Honourable
English East India Company and the Nawab Nizam-
ood-dowla ;"-" for effecting a settlement of the terri-
tories of the late Tippoo Sultaun," and "in order to
carry the said stipulations into effect." The princi-
ple of the original offensive and defensive alliance be-
tween the Company and the Nizam was that of " an
equal division of conquered territory," as stated in
Article VI of the Treaty of 1790;2 and although Lord
Wellesley considered that, according to the letter of
the new treaty of 1798, the Nizam could not demand
a share in the territorial acquisitions beyond his rela-
tive proportion in the expenses and exertions of the
campaign, yet the principle of equal division was in
fact adopted as the basis of the new arrangements.
Indeed, so clearly was the spirit of the long standing
engagements between the allies in favour of the Nizam's
claim, that the same plan of equal partition was pur-
sued in the treaties of 1804 and 1818, after the first
and second Mahratta wars.3 On both occasions the
Nizam received rather more than his fair share of the
territories conquered by the allied forces.
The following passages from the contemporary de-
1 Collection of Treaties, 1812, p. 454.
2 Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 133.
3 Volume of Treaties, 1853, pp. 157-159. By the Treaty of 1818
the Nizam not only gained an exemption from debts which he owed
the dethroned Peishwa, amounting to about sixty millions of
rupees (six millions sterling), but cessions of territory which gave
him at least eighteen lakhs of additional revenue.
4
ལྟ་་་་་
+
Q 2
340
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
spatches will prove that Lord Wellesley fully acknow-
ledged the Nizam's concurrent right and interest in
the disposal and settlement of the provinces conquered
from Tippoo.
"It is almost superfluous to state to you that the
whole kingdom of Mysore, having fallen to the arms
of the Company and the Nizam, is at present to be
considered as a part of their dominions by right of
conquest.”1
"From the justice and success of the late war with
Tippoo Sultan, the Company and the Nizam derived
an undoubted right to the disposal of the dominions
conquered by their united arms. The right of con-
quest entitled the Company and the Nizam to retain
the whole territory in their own hands; the cession of
it to any other party, might be a consideration of policy
or humanity, but could not be claimed on any ground
of justice or right."
"2
"To have divided the whole territory equally be-
tween the Company and the Nizam, while it would
have afforded strong grounds for jealousy to the Mah-
rattas, would have aggrandized the Nizam's power
beyond the bounds of discretion."3
"The Rajah of Mysore will therefore be restored to
the throne, and maintained on it under the protection
of the Company, the Nizam, and I trust also of the
Mahrattas, who certainly all have a concurrent and
common interest in the exclusion of Tippoo's family."4
It surely might be supposed, when a Principality
had thus been constructed or reconstituted out of ter-
1 Wellesley's Despatches: vol. ii, p. 13.
3 Ditto, p. 36.
2 Ditto, p. 72.
4 Ditto, p. 38.
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
341
ritories conquered by two allies, and in consequence of
the stipulations of a treaty between them, that this
settlement ought not to be disturbed, that this Princi-
pality ought not to be summarily appropriated by one
of those two allies, without the other's consent having
been asked, without any previous consultation having
taken place, without any explanation or notice having
been given. The impropriety and irregularity of such
a proceeding do not seem to be lessened in the present
instance, when we recall to mind that for ten years
before and for twenty years after that settlement, those
two powers had continued to act upon that principle of
equal partition which was the basis of their original
alliance; that Lord Wellesley himself declares that the
only alternative to the Hindoo restoration, would have
been to divide the conquered country with our ally;
and that he anticipates the maintenance of the Mysore
State under the protection of the Company and of the
Nizam.1
By the Treaties of Vienna, to which France and
Great Britain were parties, Cracow and Poland were
established as separate States,—the former as a Free
City under the protectorate of the three partitioning
powers, the latter as a constitutional Kingdom under
the Romanoff dynasty, but not incorporated in the
Russian Empire. The absorption of Cracow by Austria
in 1846, and the several encroachments by Russia on
1 And this reliance on the Nizam's concurrent protection, which
I have quoted, is not stated in a document intended to persuade or
flatter that Court, but in a despatch addressed to Dundas (Lord
Melville), then President of the Board of Control, where no empty
compliment to the Nizam could possibly find a place, and where
Lord Wellesley would be sure to express himself frankly on such a
point.
342
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
the constitution and separate existence of Poland, have
from time to time formed subjects of remonstrance and
protest by Great Britain and France. Mysore was
established as a separate State by the Partition Treaty
of 1799; and if its incorporation into the British
Empire were contemplated, the Nizam, as joint-con-
queror, joint-restorer, and joint-protector, would have
at least as strong grounds of complaint against Great
Britain, as ever Great Britain and France had against
Russia or Austria.
Well-it is generally understood that Mysore is
marked for absorption at the death of the present aged
Rajah; and that the same factitious and unfounded
plea of a lapse for want of heirs natural, under which
Sattara, Nagpore, and Jhansi were annexed, is the ap-
pointed engine of destruction.
Not only would the Nizam have a good cause of
protest against the appropriation of Mysore by the
British Government for its own aggrandisement as
an unauthorised reversal of the settlement of 1799,
as a measure opposed to the traditional policy of his
house, but even in the case of a genuine and unavoid-
able "lapse," by the extinction of the reigning family,
his claim to a partition would be irresistible. If, on
the contrary, the "lapse," pronounced or prognosti-
cated, were not genuine, but, as I contend, factitious
and unfounded, the protest and remonstrance of the
Court of Hyderabad would be still more formidable
and embarrassing.
Of course, it may be said, and it probably would
be said by some of the Dalhousie-Resident school of
Indian politicians, that any such disagreeable inquiries
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
343
+
by so insignificant a potentate as the Nizam,-"one
of our feudatories," "a mere nobleman," as the Friend
of India loves to call him,—would be simply disguised
treachery and intolerable insolence, and should be not
answered but punished. This slashing style of diplo-
macy, false in principle, defiant of historical fact and
public law, and utterly reckless and hopeless of the
future, has been much in favour of late years. In my
humble opinion it has never been really successful,—
not even in outward show,-and a state of things
might very easily and speedily arise, under which its
imprudence and impotence would be obvious even to
those Calcutta gentlemen who look upon the Friend
of India as an oracle.
The Nizam is not " a nobleman,” or “one of our
feudatories,”¹ but the Sovereign of Hyderabad, and an
ally of the British Government. I doubt not that he,
and several other Indian Princes, who are, equally
with the Nizam, left, under the terms of their treaties
with the East India Company, in the possession of ab-
solute local power, and of every prerogative of mon-
archy, might be induced, by very simple and equitable
means, not only to acknowledge the Queen as their
Imperial Suzerain, but to adopt, under her Majesty's
guidance and example, a constitutional form of govern-
ment, and a sound financial system; but this policy
2
1 Friend of India, June 5th, 1862, "The Nizam, like all his
fellow feudatories"-August 28th, 1862, "We would teach great
Hindoo and Mussulman nobles as Holkar, Seindia, and the Nizam"
-April 23rd, 1863, “ A Mussulman noble, our own subject, in Hy-
derabad," and so forth, in the same regal style, on innumerable
occasions.
2 I may observe that in speaking of a constitutional form of
government, I by no means contemplate the hasty introduction of
representative institutions. What I understand by a constitutional
-W
•
..
344
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
•
will never be advanced by false pretensions, or by
arrogant misrepresentation.
4
2
The Nizam had asserted and secured his indepen-
dence of Delhi for upwards of forty years before our
first treaty with him in 1766.1 The English have
never known the Nizam, have never had any dealings
or any communications with him, except as an inde-
pendent Sovereign. Lord Dalhousie himself, while
aiming to deprive the Nizam of a large portion of his
dominions, observed that he was "an independent
Prince," and that "the British Government was bound
by the solemn obligations of a treaty to abstain from
all interference in his Highness's internal affairs," and
had “guaranteed to him the exercise over his own
subjects of his own sole and absolute authority." As
an independent Sovereign ruling over ten millions of
subjects, as the most ancient and influential Mussulman
Prince in India, the Nizam will not, I think, be generally
considered in Europe as a very insignificant person-
age.
The Nizam, in consequence of his great power and
Monarch, is a Monarch who acknowledges the supremacy of the
Law, who has divested himself of direct judicial functions, and who
carries on the work of legislation by some formal process, which
admits, at the least, the full right of petition. I do not call our
Government of India a despotism; its forms are constitutional,
and present a fair prospect of future popularisation.
1 Grant Duff's History of the Mahrattas, 1826, vol. i, p. 478;
Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 116.
2 Papers relative to the Nizam, 1854, p. 107. See also The Eng-
lish in India, p. 79.
3 Ditto, p. 39.
4 Ditto, p. 38.
5 Ditto, p. 39. The treaty obligation referred to will be found in
Article XV of the Treaty of 1800,-Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 149.
"The Honourable Company's Government, on their part, hereby
declare that they have no manner of concern with any of his High-
ness's children, relations, subjects or servants, with respect to whom
his Highness is absolute."
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
345
influence, his assumed and acknowledged dignity, and
independence of all feudal and federal ties, at the period
of our first connection with the Court of Hyderabad,
and of our uninterrupted alliance during one hundred
years of war and peace, has never been required to
divest himself so completely of all power of negotia-
tion and external political action, as have, almost
without exception, the other Princes of India.¹
He certainly has renounced the right of making war,
except under our wing. In Article XVI of the treaty
of 1800, the Nizam "engages never to commit any
act of hostility or aggression against any power what-
ever; and in the event of any differences arising, what-
ever adjustment of them the Company's Government,
weighing matters in the scale of truth and justice, may
determine, shall meet with full approbation and ac-
quiescence."2
3
But whereas the Nawab of Oude engaged not to
open any communication with other States except
with "the knowledge and concurrence" of the British
Government, and the Rajah of Nagpore to hold no
intercourse with other powers, "except through the
Resident or other minister of the Honourable Com-
pany;" while the feudatory and tributary Princes are
1 The only Prince in India who retains the full power of declar-
ing war and peace, and of establishing diplomatic relations, is the
Rajah of Dholpore, a petty State with about 100,000 inhabitants!
The treaty of 1805 provides that this State" will remain exempt
from all orders of the Adawlut and other demands of the Honour-
able Company, and Maha Rajah Rana hereby agrees to take upon
himself the responsibility of adjusting all disputes which may arise,
either external or internal, and no responsibility for assistance or
protection remains with the Honourable Company." And there
are no restrictions whatever. Vol. of Treaties, 1853, p. 383-4.
2 Vol. of Treaties, 1853, p. 149.
3 Ditto, p. 73.
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Q 3
346
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
subjected to still stricter conditions,-the stipulations
made by Lord Wellesley with the Nizam in the treaty
of 1800, which have not been modified by any later
agreement, leave him much more free; recognise his
common interest in the pacification and general policy
of the Empire; and place him in a position of confi-
dential partnership with the British Government.
Thus in Article XV:-"His Highness the Nizam
engages neither to commence nor to pursue, in future,
any negotiations with any other power whatever, with-
out giving previous notice, and entering into mutual
consultation with the Honourable East India Company's
Government." The Nizam agrees to inform and con-
sult his ally before entering on any negotiation, but
neither undertakes absolutely to abstain from such
negotiation, after due notice and consultation, nor to
adopt the views of the British Government, if the
opinion of the two States should unfortunately differ.
He promises, by Article XVI, to acquiesce in the Hon-
ourable Company's decision, where hostilities have
occurred or are likely to occur, between his own and
some other Government. He makes no such promise
with reference to any other cause or ground of nego-
tiation. Still less does he abandon his natural right
to discuss and remonstrate with the British Govern-
ment on any of their measures which may be opposed
to his interests, or incompatible with the existing en-
gagements between the two States.
The British Government, indeed, fully admits the
consultative equality of the Nizam; and by Article II
it is laid down that if "either of the contracting par-
ties" be compelled to go to war, then "the contracting
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
347
parties will proceed to concert and prosecute such
further measures as the case shall appear to demand."
I am not aware whether on every subsequent occasion
of hostilities breaking out, the British Government
has, in conformity with this Article, consulted and
concerted measures with the Court of Hyderabad; but
it is clear that such a course ought to have been
adopted.
Again, it is agreed by Article XII, that "the con-
tracting parties will employ all practicable means of
conciliation to prevent the calamity of war; and, for
that purpose, will at all times be ready to enter into
amicable explanations with other States, and to culti-
vate and improve the general relations of peace and
amity with all the powers of India, according to the
true spirit and tenor of this defensive treaty."
Until the accession of Naseer-ood-dowla, father of
the present ruler of Hyderabad, in the year 1829, the
Nizam, in his correspondence with the Governor-
General, had always used the imperial phrase of
"mā ba-dowlut," or "our royal self," while the British
Viceroy employed the style of an inferior in rank,
calling himself "niyāzmund," or "this petitioner.
The Governor-General, with great judgment, took the
convenient opportunity of a new succession to discon-
tinue this objectionable practice, and the correspon-
dence has been since that time conducted in terms of
perfect equality.2 But the long continued form proves
how far removed the Nizam's political position was
above that of "a feudatory.
""
1 Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 147.
2 The Nizam, by G. H. Briggs, 1861, vol. i, p. 104.
1
348
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
Whatever theory, in short, may be assumed as to
the political demeanour and style proper to feudatory
and tributary Principalities, would be by no means
applicable to the State of Hyderabad. An animated
and persevering controversy on the subject of the an-
nexation of Mysore, or the confiscation of the Carnatic,
would be neither unwarrantable nor unbecoming on
the part of the Nizam, while it might be most detri-
mental to the honour and credit of the British Crown.
But some of our Calcutta friends may still declare
that our Government would show culpable weakness
and timidity, if any impertinent interference or in-
quiries on the part of any native Prince, were tolerated
for a moment, or allowed to pass unrebuked, even if
unpunished; they may treat with derision the military
power and resources of the Nizam, and assert that the
Governor-General could, as Lord Dalhousie threatened,
"crush him at his will" at any time. Perhaps there
may be within the grasp of the Hyderabad Govern-
ment some material and some moral means of defen-
sive war and offensive coalitions, that are very little
suspected by irresponsible journalists; but as to the
immediate result of such a contest, if promptly and
vigorously pushed to an issue, there can be no doubt
or question whatever. Indeed, I have myself pointed
out what appears to me to be the shortest and safest
process.2 But there it is, according to my views, that
1 Papers relating to the Nizam, 1854, p. 42:-see also The Eng-
lish in India, pp. 77-79. I have never seen a copy of the Persian
original of Lord Dalhousie's letter, but it is said that the word
officially translated "crush," literally means "trample under foot."
Imagine this language used, in a time of profound peace, to the
pettiest Prince or President of Christendom!
2 Ante, p. 35.
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
349
our real difficulties would begin. Without counting
the direct cost and known risk of war or coercive
execution against a large native State, there would be
a great chance of our being driven into annexation,
with the inevitable financial loss, further dispersion of
the army, and all the occult and cumulative dangers
of that delusive policy.
I am not, therefore, ashamed to confess that, on
merely prudential grounds, I strongly object to such
provocations and temptations being thrown in the
Nizam's way, as the confiscation of the Carnatic, or
the impending extinction of the Mysore State. I do
not like the idea of its being open to that Prince to
make demands and remonstrances which could neither
be satisfied nor refuted, and which, if persisted in,
could be answered by no argument but war.
But it is by no means inconceivable that these ques-
tions might be raised by the Nizam's Government at
an awkward crisis,-perhaps when we had just hanged
or transported, or were about to hang or transport,
some of the Wallajah family, or some of their here-
ditary adherents for high treason or sedition, or during
some local disturbance or a war in some other native
State, or with a European power, when it would be
very inconvenient to add to the general excitement or
disaffection, or to widen the area of hostilities.
But it is not the Nizam alone, among all the Princes
and potentates of the world, who could, in pursuance
of a national policy, or in response to an outcry of
public opinion, fix upon some Indian grievance or
scandal as a point for inquiry and remonstrance.
With the exception of Portugal, closely allied and
•
350
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
almost dependent upon Great Britain, France is the
only other European power which has any territorial
dominion or direct interests upon the continent of India.
Besides "the foot-hold," as Thiers calls it,¹ of Pondi-
cherry, France possesses the four smaller settlements
of Karical, Chandernagore, Yanaon, and Mahé.
I have not been able to ascertain whether the
pro-
position was ever seriously entertained by our Go-
vernment,—but rumours to that effect have prevailed,
and it has more than once been discussed both by
English and French writers,-that the four minor set-
tlements should be relinquished to Great Britain, in
exchange for a proportionate cession to France of ter-
ritory adjacent to Pondicherry. It appears to me that
a negotiation on this subject could hardly be brought
to a very advanced stage, without the question of title
assuming a very ugly aspect. All the territory sur-
rounding Pondicherry is included in the Carnatic ;
and if the facts and arguments adduced by me in this
Letter and in Letter III, are worth anything, it would
be difficult for the British negotiators to show that
this Province belonged to the Government which they
represented, or to show by their credentials that they
were duly authorised or vested with powers to treat
for the cession of any part of it. All the old treaties,
capitulations, and sunnuds, would of course be over-
hauled on the occasion, and there are probably some
very curious documents of this description to be found
in the French archives.
1 "Les deux pieds-à-terre de Chandernagor et Pondichéry,
placés dans la peninsule Indienne." Histoire du Consulat et de
l'Empire, Paris, 1845, vol. iii, p. 27.
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
351
The French Government did not acquire Pondi-
cherry, and does not continue to hold it, by virtue of
any grant or gift from the British Government. It is
true that Pondicherry and the other French settlements
were repeatedly captured during war, and restored at
the several treaties of peace of 1782, 1802, and 1814,
as other captured islands and districts were similarly
restored to us and our allies. But this mutual resti-
tution of conquests is not equivalent to a cession; it
confers no new title, and cannot amend a defective.
one, though in each instance it clearly amounts to a
recognition by the party which restores the conquered
territory. But, for his right against the world, for
his answer to any adverse claimant, the restored power
must fall back upon his original title. The original
title of the French to the site of Pondicherry, and a
small adjacent tract, is founded on a grant from the
Mussulman King of Beejapore in 1672, confirmed by
various sunnuds from the Nizam and the Nawabs of
the Carnatic. But the two small districts of Valanour
and Bahour, now included in the settlement of Pondi-
cherry, were acquired at some period subsequent to
the Treaty of Peace of 1782,¹ having been, in accord-
ance with Article XIV of that treaty, "procured" for
the French Government, by the good offices of His
Britannic Majesty, from the Nawab Wallajah.¹
The French, therefore, hold at present a part of
their possessions in India as a cession, or more probably
1 Treaty of Peace of 1782, Art. XIV :-" Pondichery sera égale-
ment rendu et garanti à la France, de même que Karical: et Sa
Majesté Britannique procurera, pour servir d'arrondissement à
Pondichery, les deux districts de Valanour et de Bahour." Mar-
tens' Recueil, tome iii, p. 525.
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352
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
;
as a perpetual jaghire,' from that veryNawab Wallajah
whom both powers had previously recognised, by the
Treaty of Paris in 1763, as the legitimate Sovereign
of the country. Although four successions have taken
place since that Sovereign's demise, although a lineal
descendant now claims the succession, the arbitrary
decree of the Honourable East India Company, de-
claring that sovereignty to be extinct, still remains
unreversed and undisturbed by Her Majesty the Queen.
And yet there has been no war or rebellion, no revo-
lution or coup d'état, upon which a new system might
have been founded; and the arbitrary decree of the
Honourable Company is simply known to the world
by the silent refusal of Prince Azeem Jah's rights, un-
justified and unexplained by any visible process, by any
public proclamation, or by any diplomatic document.
Under these circumstances, it would clearly be as im-
possible for the French, or any other Government, to
accept a cession of any part of the Carnatic from the
power in whose hands the civil and military adminis-
tration of that country was placed in trust for the
lawful Sovereign, as it would be to accept a cession of
any of the districts similarly placed in trust by Scindia
and the Nizam, or of the Ionian Islands, or any part
of those Islands, which were by the Treaty of Vienna,
and on analogous principles, placed under the protec-
tion of the British Monarch.
But this is not all. By Article XI of the treaty of
Paris in 1763, it was in fact agreed that the rivalry of
the French and English in the Carnatic should cease,
1 Such was the usual form at that time, but I do not know that
the French sunnuds, or their treaties with the native Princes, have
ever been published.
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
353
but on certain conditions, one of which was the re-
cognition of Mahomed Ali Wallajah by both of the
contracting parties.¹ The struggle for predominancy in
the Deccan and the Carnatic, had commenced, and had
been chiefly promoted, by the European rivals taking
part in the disputed successions and other quarrels of
native Princes, and for some years was carried on with
varrying success, until, during the brilliant career of
Dupleix, the dominion of India seemed to be allotted
to France. But during the Seven Years' war, the dis-
sensions of the French leaders and the incapacity of
the French Government, gave full effect to the superi-
ority of British arms; and the French King, while
recovering his Indian possessions by the Treaty of
Paris, joined with his Britannic Majesty in recognising
that Nawab of the Carnatic, whose succession had
been opposed by the French and their native allies.
during the war.
The stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, so far as
they have not been altered by subsequent treaties, are
as much part of the public law of Europe as the
Treaty of Vienna. The lapse of a century has no
more invalidated the former, than the lapse of half
a century has abolished the latter. The treaty of
Paris has never been abrogated as a whole; and
Article XI is not one among those Articles that
have been annulled or modified by more recent en-
gagements.
Nor was it an Article to which the French Govern-
1 “Et afin de conserver la Paix future sur la Côte de Coromandel
et d'Orixa, les Anglois et les François réconnoitront Mahomet Ally
Khan pour Légitime Nabob du Carnate." Martens' Recueil, tome i,
p. 113.
354
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
ment agreed without difficulty or discussion. On the
contrary, the whole history of the negotiation proves
that the French diplomatists considered that they were
making a great sacrifice, while the British plenipo-
tentiary, and the Directors of the East India Company,
exulted at having gained an important advantage.¹
The Duke of Bedford, who represented Great Britain
on the occasion, makes the following remarks in his
analytical report on the treaty, addressed to the Secre-
tary of State, Lord Egremont. "Art. 11. We have
carried this material Article in its fullest extent. Ben-
gal is extended to the états du Soubah de Bengale,
and those limits are explained by my declaration, as
pointed out by the East India Directors: add to this,
that the Eastern Princes are acknowledged, and the
pretensions for satisfaction renounced (without the
addition at first insisted on by France); and it clearly
appears that the whole of this Article has passed, in
the fullest extent to the desire of the East India
Directors themselves."2
And we learn from Lord Russell's Introduction to
the Bedford Correspondence, that this same Article
XI was the only Article in the treaty which was so
keenly contested as nearly to lead to a suspension of
the negotiations, if not to a renewal of the war. The
Article had been framed by the East India Directors
in terms which they supposed would secure all the
fruits of their latest successes; but after the prelimi-
naries had been signed, they found that the period by
which the mutual restoration of conquests in Bengal
and on the coasts of Coromandel and Orissa, was to
¹ Ante, p. 97.
1
2 Bedford Correspondence, vol. iii, p. 193, 194.
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
355
be regulated, had been injudiciously stated as "the
time of the war breaking out in the year 1749,"
under which condition the French would have retained
and reentered upon several extensive districts; and the
Duke of Bedford, therefore, on their urgent repre-
sentation, insisted that the draft should be altered in
the definitive treaty, so that the regulating period
should be thrown back to "the commencement of the
year 1749,"1
"The French ministers," says Lord Russell, "de-
murred. The Duke of Bedford said, in that case he
could only demand his passports, and lay his case be-
fore Parliament. The Duc de Choiseul knew his
firmness, respected his straightforward character, and
yielded the point. "2
The Article as ultimately agreed upon, was clearly
intended upon both sides to be at once a compromise,
and a pledge of future non-intervention. Mahomed
1 The Article as finally settled stood as follows:-
"Great Britain shall restore to France in the condition they now
are, the different factories which that Crown possessed, as well on
the coast of Coromandel and Orissa, as also in Bengal, at the be-
ginning of the year 1749. And France renounces all pretensions
to the acquisitions which she has made on the coast of Coromandel
and Orissa;" (Fort St. David, Cuddalore and its dependencies,) "and
his Most Christian Majesty shall restore on his part all that he may
have conquered from Great Britain in the East Indies during the
present war, and will expressly cause Natal and Tampanouly"
(Bencoolen) "in the Island of Sumatra, to be restored. And he
further engages not to erect fortifications, or to keep troops in any
part of the dominions of the Subadar of Bengal; and in order to
preserve future peace on the coast of Coromandel and Orissa, the
English and French shall acknowledge Mohammed Ali Khan for
legitimate Nabob of the Carnatic, and Salabut Jung for legitimate
Subadar of the Deccan, and both parties shall renounce all de-
mands and pretensions of satisfaction, with which they might
charge each other or their Indian allies, for the depredation or
pillage committed on either side during the war."
2 Bedford Correspondence, Introduction, p. xxiii.
356
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
!
•
Ali, who from the first had attached himself to British
interests, was now recognised by the French. Salabut
Jung, on the other hand, who owed his elevation to
Bussy, and had always been friendly to the French and
obedient to their influence, while his brother Nizam
Ali was hostile to them, was acknowledged by the
British as Nizam Subadar of the Deccan.¹ But, al-
though the French Government, after some years of
war, and after exhausting all the resources of diplo-
macy, consented to give up the contest in Southern
India by recognising our ally, it does not at all follow
that they could by any means have been induced at
that time to consent to our taking possession and as-
suming the sovereignty of the Carnatic, any more
than France and Russia, though agreeing to place the
Ionian Republic under British protection, would have
consented in 1815 to resign those islands to Great
Britain in full possession and sovereignty,-any more
than Great Britain, Spain, and Austria, though tolerat-
ing, and perhaps approving of the occupation, would
now, as a matter of course, consent to the French as-
suming the sovereignty of Mexico. It has been re-
marked by one of the ablest modern writers on History
and Politics as a science, that at the epoch of the Peace
of Paris, the French by no means despaired of regain-
ing their share of influence and power on the continent
of India. "In the East," says Heeren, "from the time
England established herself in Bengal, (1763) the pre-
1 It so happened that while the negotiations were proceeding in
Europe, Sulabut Jung was dethroned and imprisoned by his brother,
Nizam Ali, who put him to death as soon as the terms of the treaty
of Paris became known. Mill's History, book iv, chapters iii, iv,
and viii.
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
357
ponderance was clearly in her favour. France, never-
theless, still retained hopes of being able to restore the
balance."1 It is quite clear that, by the treaty of
Paris, the French Government not only did not ac-
knowledge British sovereignty in the Carnatic, but actu-
ally joined with Great Britain in effecting a settlement
which forbade and precluded the assumption of British
sovereignty. And they have never consented to that
settlement being disturbed; they have no official cog-
nisance of its ever having been disturbed.
Some writers on international law, and some emi-
nent diplomatists, have on particular occasions upheld
the position that the specific provisions of previous
treaties are annulled by war, unless expressly renewed
and confirmed by the terms of the subsequent treaty
of peace. But this principle has seldom been main-
tained in argument, and never practically enforced,
without considerable limitations and exceptions. On
the other hand, many celebrated jurists have declared
that, although suspended during hostilities, all old es-
tablished treaties,-if not absolutely and manifestly
incompatible with an altered state of affairs produced
by the war, and recognised by the new treaty,-are
revived in full force on the conclusion of peace. Thus
Vattel pronounces that "to take up arms for a fresh
cause is no breach of the treaty of peace." "It is of
great importance to draw a proper distinction between
a new war and the breach of an existing treaty of peace,
because the rights acquired by such treaty still subsist,
notwithstanding the new war."2
1 Heeren's Historical Treatises, Oxford, 1836, p. 338.
2 Vaitel, book iv, chap. iv, London, 1811, pp. 446, 447.
358
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
The more matured and modern doctrine seems to be
that which was eventually admitted on both sides
during the negotiations at Ghent, which preceded the
Treaty of Peace between Great Britain and the United
States in 1815, namely, that there are treaties and parts
of treaties which, by their nature, are irrevocable and
unalterable, while other treaties, or some of their par-
ticular stipulations, may be fairly said to have ex-
pired by lapse of time, or by the force of unforeseen
circumstances. The English plenipotentiaries on this
occasion, at first asserted that certain privileges of
fishing off the coast of Newfoundland, secured to
American citizens by the treaty of 1783, were abro-
gated by the recent war. The Americans protested
against this rule; and contended that this treaty, con-
taining the first general recognition of their indepen-
dence, their territorial boundaries, and the other
fundamental bases of their separate existence as a
sovereign state, was intended, and must be considered
to be of perpetual and unchangeable obligation.
"It is to be observed," says Sir Robert Phillimore,
referring to this discussion, in his Commentaries on
International Law, "that England did not wholly tra-
verse this allegation, but denied the application of this
principle to the provision relating to the Fisheries.”
"It appears," he continues, "to the writer of these
pages, that the doctrine intended to be conveyed in the
English note was in harmony with that conveyed in
the text, namely, the doctrine that there is a distinc-
tion between the parts of a Treaty which recognised
a principle and object of permanent policy, and the
parts which related to objects of passing and tem-
porary expediency."
·
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
359
"Nor is this doctrine at variance with the opinion
of Mr. Wheaton himself, who says in one part of his
Elements
"General compacts between nations may be divided
into what are called Transitory Conventions, and
Treaties properly so termed. The first are perpetual
in their nature, so that being once carried into effect,
they subsist independently of any change in the sov-
ereignty and form of government of the contracting
parties; and although their operation may in some
cases be suspended during war, they revive on the
return of peace, without any express stipulation.
Such are Treaties of cession, boundary, or exchange
of territory.'"1
་་
The same distinguished authority, Wheaton, in
another passage, still more pertinent to our inquiry,
remarked that "the reasoning of England seemed to
confine the perpetuity of obligation to recognitions and
acknowledgments of title."2 It is precisely within
this category of "recognitions and acknowledgments
of title,” that Article XI of the treaty of Paris must
be classed. This Article was, as pointed out by the
Court of Directors in their letter to Fort St. George
of the 9th March 1763, at once a recognition and ac-
knowledgment of Mahomed Ali's title as legitimate
Sovereign of the Carnatic, and of our title to the ter-
ritories held under grant from that Prince. Indeed,
3
¹ Phillimore (R. J.) Commentaries on International Law, vol.
iii, pp. 668.9.
2 Wheaton's Elements, p. 341, quoted in Phillimore's Commen-
taries, vol. iii, p. 668.
3 I have already extracted this passage at p. 97, but I annex it
here for more easy reference:-"A farther advantage we hope to
derive from the recognition of this Prince" (the Nawab)" and of
360
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
from the peculiar terms of the Article, this recognition
might well be held as a guaranty of the sovereignty
to the family of Wallajah by the two great European
powers. And the contemporary English historian,
fully qualified to represent the general opinion of the
day, seems to have taken exactly this view of the
Nawab Wallajah's position.
"His nabobship being guaranteed to him by the
late definitive treaty between Great Britain and France,
he possesses a greater security of power than any other
Prince in Asia."
"The Carnatic has lately been an important scene
of war; and the circumstance of the Nabob of Arcot
being the first Asiatic Prince who had his dominions
guaranteed to him in Europe, renders him an object
of public attention, exclusive of his unsullied reputa-
tion for honour and fidelity to the British nation."1
The provisions of Article XI of the Treaty of Paris,
involving "a principle and object of permanent po-
licy," "relating to cession, boundary, and exchange
of territory," and to "recognitions and acknowledg
ments of title," are clearly of perpetual obligation.
And in making use of this term,-" perpetual obliga-
tion," I am very far from asserting that these pro-
visions were, or are utterly incapable for ever of alter-
ation, that they could not be modified or nullified
Salabut Jung" (the Nizam) "whose title you will see is also acknow-
ledged, is that it is a confirmation of our title to the territories we
hold under grants from those Princes, and a farther security to the
peare of the country, leaving the French no colour to interpose
hereafter in favour of any other pretenders to the sovereignty of the
Deccan or the Carnatic."
1 Dow's Hindostan, 1770, vol. ii, pp. 396 398.
2 Phillimore, ante, p. 358.
4 Wheaton, ante, p. 359.
8 Wheaton, ante, p. 359.
•
.
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
361
by conquest or compact, by mutual consent, or, for
good cause shown, by due notice and warning to the
parties concerned. All that I assert is this,—and I
am quite confident that no jurist in Europe would
controvert it, that there having been no subsequent
modification by war, or conquest, or compact; no con-
sent having been given by any of the parties concerned;
no notice or warning having been communicated to
any of those parties; even the ordinary means of pub-
lic exposition by a manifesto or proclamation having
been neglected or avoided; the provisions of Article XI
of the Treaty of Paris, and also the provisions of the
treaty of 1768 with the Nizam, and of the treaty con-
cluded with Azeem-ood-dowla in 1801,¹ being by their
nature and essence of perpetual obligation, are still in
full force, and are binding upon all parties; and that
any suspension of these provisions, especially under
the continuous protest of the injured party, is simply
a wrongful and contumacious act, of no effect towards
the acquisition of a title or the extinction of adverse
rights, but affording fair ground for remonstrance and
intervention to any power who may be interested in
the maintenance of those provisions.
And it has just been remarked, that the provisions
of Article XI of the treaty of Paris amount to a
guaranty of the Carnatic musnud to the Wallajah
family, by Great Britain and France. Now, it is pre-
cisely in cases where a guaranty has been given, and
1 It must always be borne in mind that by Article II of this
treaty, all the favourable provisions of former treaties between the
Nawabs and the Company, were expressly renewed and confirmed.
Ante, p. 66.
R
362
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
where the interests of third parties are concerned, that
remonstrance and intervention are unanimously pro-
nounced by the greatest juridical authorities to be
justifiable and obligatory.
Treaties," says Sir Robert Phillimore, " may con-
cern not only the contracting parties, but third par-
ties, who may or may not be literally contracting
parties in the first instance, but the protection of
whose interests, or the maintenance of whose status,
may be the object of the treaty." And this distin-
guished jurist explains in another part of his Commen-
taries that every State may in certain circumstances
be under "the necessity of intervening in the rela-
tions, and, to a certain extent, of controlling the con-
duct of other States; and this where the interest of
the intervener is not immediately and directly, but
mediately and indirectly affected." And among the
circumstances and sanctions which, by the common
consent and practice of nations, appear to justify this
intervention, he enumerates "the Rights and Duties of
a Guarantee."2
And the same author declares that even "the gene-
ral right incident to every State of adopting whatever
form of government, whatever political and civil in-
stitutions, and whatever rules she may please," is
subject to a limitation "in the instance of a guaranty
given by a foreign nation, either generally to secure
the inviolability of the provisions of a particular treaty,
or specially to support a particular constitution or
form of government established in another country,
1 Commentaries, vol. ii, p. 70.
2 Ditto, vol. i, p. 434.
3 Ditto, vol. i, 435.
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
363
or to secure some particular possession, or other indi-
vidual object appertaining to it."l
Both the French treaty of 1763, and the Nizam's
treaty of 1768, contain just such a guaranty in favour
of the Wallajah family, just such a security for their
possessions, as seems to be contemplated by Sir Robert
Phillimore in the passage last quoted. And I think
I may now claim to have made it abundantly clear,
that those same provisions of the treaty of Paris,-
hailed by the Court of Directors as at once confirm-
ing Mahomed Ali's title, and the British title to pos-
sessions held under that Sovereign's grant, and as
"leaving the French no colour to interpose hereafter,”"2
-do now, in their actual state of wrongful suspen-
sion, leave the French the very best possible colour
to interpose, and would justify such an interposition
by the established canons of international law.
It may undoubtedly be urged with considerable
effect, that my appeal to international law is extrava-
gant and delusive; that the treaty of 1763 has expired
by lapse of time, by force of altered circumstances and
subsequent war, and for want of special renewal in the
last treaty of peace; and that any French interposi-
tion, founded on its provisions, would be a trans-
parently dishonest pretext for premeditated hostili-
ties.
I am not prepared to abandon easily the position
which I have taken up, and which I believe is suscep-
tible of being strengthened by many additional facts
and illustrations. For instance, our Government, in
the matter of the Spanish marriages in 1846, main-
1 Commentaries, vol. i, p. 441. 2 Ante, p. 97, and note, p. 359.
R 2
364
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
tained that France was still bound by the stipulations
of the treaty of Utrecht (1713), notwithstanding the
several wars, revolutions, and changes of dynasty, and
the want of specific renewal in treaties of peace since
its conclusion.1 And we are now charging Russia
with a breach of the treaty of Vienna, regardless of the
revolutionary war of Poland in 1830, and of the
Crimean war; although that treaty was not renewed,
or even mentioned, in the treaty of peace of 1856.
Both German and Danish politicians, and disinter-
ested European diplomatists, are in these very days
referring to a treaty of A.D. 1460, and even to the de-
cretals of Charlemagne, to decide on the rights of suc-
cession to the sovereignty in Schleswig Holstein, and
on the popular privileges of those duchies. But the
absolute validity of the argument, and the strictly
legal justification of the supposed French intervention,
are really points which I am not concerned to press.
If I have shown the possibility of a plausible remon-
strance, I have done all that is necessary for my case.
Every experienced Indian official, however much he
might combat my general views, would, I am sure,
agree with me here,-that the mischief would be done
by a remonstrance; that if once the native Princes and
people were assured, at some critical period, of a strong
interest in their affairs, and in the destinies of India,
manifested by a great European power, a serious shock
would be given to British supremacy, and our influence
would commence to decline. A most damaging effect
¹ Phillimore's Commentaries, passim. And see a pamphlet and
postscript, Considerations on the Montpensier Marriage (Ridgway,
1846-7), attributed to Lord William Hervey, Secretary of Legation
at Paris, and quoted with approval in Phillimore's Commentaries.
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
365
might be produced at the proper opportunity, without
any hostilities, or menace of hostilities, or unfriendly
demonstration. No one, I presume, can doubt that
we did, for a time at least, very much strengthen the
hands of the Polish insurgents by our gentle inquiries
and mild remonstrances.
We have set the example on many occasions,-
most of them very proper occasions-of lecturing
Sovereigns on the duties of mercy and conciliation,
of deprecating political severities, and advocating am-
nesties and concessions. Some day our lessons of hu-
manity may be retorted upon us with crushing effect.
There are two inevitable fatalities of our rule in India,
-as of every nation whose destiny it has been to rule
an alien race-the first, that we shall never have a
general or very extensive rebellion, without atrocities;
the second, that we shall never put down a rebellion,
without employing atrocities for the purpose-not
perhaps deliberately by the orders of Government, but
in the stress and agony of each local reign of terror,
and in the fury of retaliation. I am not here appor-
tioning either blame or approval; the question does
not require me to do so. That such have been the
phenomena of every important rebellion, in every part
of the world, down to the present day, and that they
are likely to reappear in any future Indian rebellion,
will not, I think, be disputed. And it will hardly be
disputed that the display of these phenomena in any
part of the Empire, can never contribute to the honour
of the British Crown and nation, and might afford a
subject of reproach against us to our enemies and
rivals,
366
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
7
Some people may say that it would be very difficult
to get up the slightest interest or excitement about
India, in France or any other country of Europe. I am
not of that opinion. I am rather inclined to think
that a more lively interest in Indian politics, is felt in
France and Germany, than in Great Britain; and that
a selfish familiarity has bred something like contempt
among us, for that wonderful continent, and for the
races who had built its renowned cities, cultivated its
vast plains, and constructed stupendous works of
public utility, long before the era of our commercial
and official occupation.¹ Political foresight cannot
exist, except under the influence of the imagination
and the generous emotions. Perhaps the arrogance of
race, the dictatorial habits, and the supercilious feelings
in which we English indulge, may blind us to the
latent energies of the Indian people, and conceal from
us-even when the curtain is about to rise,—the part
they yet may play in the world's drama. An impar-
tial foreigner, informed by history,-which we despise
-and inspired by high thoughts and human sympa-
thies,-which we should reject as romantic illusions
may be better qualified than any of us, to appreciate
the present capacity of the Indian people, and even to
forecast their future destinies.
Our human interest in the social and political pro-
gress of India-apart from that interest that may be
1"The French and Germans," said Reschid Pasha to Mr. Senior,
"think that the strength of England is in India; that if you lose
India you sink into a secondary power like Holland." (Senior's
Journal in Turkey, p. 117, quoted in The Empire, by Professor
Goldwin Smith, p. 257.) I agree with Mr. Senior and Professor
Goldwin Smith, that this is a great mistake; but it bears witness to
the ordinary continental opinion of the importance and value of
India to Great Britain,
•
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
367
•
called national and selfish,—has been so deadened by
the satiety and security of long possession, that it would
sometimes appear as if nothing less than a terrible
war or a bloody rebellion, could make us realise the
weight of our moral obligations. The events of 1857
did rouse the nation to something like enthusiasm,
and under its influence-and in spite of the irresistible
exasperation of the hour,-many noble principles were
avowed by statesmen of all parties, some of which were
embodied in the Royal Proclamation; the great mea-
sure of replacing the delegated authority of the
Company by Her Majesty's direct rule, which in or
dinary times would have met with a formidable oppo-
sition, and with no cordial support, was successfully
carried through Parliament; and an Imperial system
for the first time became possible.
But the excitement soon died away, upon the restora-
tion of order. When none but financial difficulties re-
mained, and when even these were surmounted, the
season of self-complacent apathy set in once more. We
have sung "Te Deum" so often, and so long, over our
military and administrative triumph, that we seem to
have forgotten the check and the humiliation, the fear-
ful cost and the permanent loss; we seem not to per-
ceive how much for which the rebels were instinctively
fighting, has been conceded, how much of the fruits of
victory remain with the vanquished.
It would be easy to adduce evidence from the poli-
tical literature of the continent during the last five
years, that foreign politicians, more dispassionate, and
less biassed than we are, comprehend very clearly that
the Indian Empire has entered on a new phase of its
368
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
existence; and that they are watching the course of
events with very considerable interest.
Of course,
just as our attention to Indian affairs is roused, and
our interest heightened, by war and rebellion, while it
slackens during peace and prosperity, so it must be
among our European neighbours. The most unex-
pected combinations might present themselves during
a general war. Our insular position renders us pecu-
liarly unassailable at home; and we have been accused
of abusing this advantage, both by opportune aggres-
sions, when anything was to be gained, and by selfish
abstention and isolation, when no immediate profit
was in view. A hostile or rival power might therefore
be induced, or compelled, to turn to India, to find the
means of annoyance and retaliation, to occupy and
divert our strength,—or to convince us, by judicious.
pressure, without war, of the "solidarity" of our for-
tunes with his own.
With a little more gallantry, with a few positive
exploits added to his negative strategic feats, Tantia
Topee would soon have become a Hindoo Garibaldi.
Indeed, about the time of his capture, he was becoming
an object of interest in Europe; and a few months
more of his daring raid through Central India,—even
though amounting only to a successful evasion of our
forces,-would have raised that interest to a much
higher pitch. Of course, I would not for a moment
compare the deeds or the motives of the Brahmin rebel,
with those of the Italian patriot; though I dare say
the Pope, the Emperor of Austria, the King of Naples,
and their adherents, do not look upon Garibaldi with
much more respect and admiration, than we do upon
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
369
Tantia Topee. But distance lends enchantment to the
view. And it is not a very wild supposition that some
day there might be a Tantia Topee of a higher type, of
greater talents and of loftier character, with a better
cause and a better cry before the world; there might
be a rebellion with a more definite and comprehensible
origin and object than that of 1857. There are signs
that India is becoming conscious and reflective. If we
despise those signs, there may be "an idea" about
India yet.
""
By the treaty of Vienna, the French Government is
bound not to erect fortifications upon any of its Indian
settlements, nor to maintain in them "a larger number
of troops than are necessary for the purposes of police."
This stipulation is very indefinite and discretionary.
During the crisis of 1857, the military force at Pondi-
cherry, usually. consisting of two hundred sepoys, was
strengthened by a detachment of French soldiers,
which has not, I believe, been withdrawn from that
post since the restoration of tranquillity. In the
midst of the alarm and anxiety of a great political
and social convulsion, it would not be easy to calcu-
late the exact number of troops required "for the
police" of the French possessions. Another still more
formidable rebellion, especially if it had originated, or
were complicated, by a war with one or more of the
native Princes,-might reasonably alarm France for
the safety of her own "footholds." She might even
feel compelled to turn one of her footholds into a
stronghold. It would be difficult to enforce the re-
strictions of the treaty, if the honour of the French
flag were threatened, either by a rebel force, or by the
R 3
370
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
army of a native Prince. We might not, for the mo-
ment, be in a position to offer assistance; or the offer
-an offer of the military occupation of French terri-
tory,-might be declined-with thanks.
Perhaps the terms of disarmament imposed upon
the French settlements, are counted among those parts
of the treaties of Vienna which have "crumbled away,"
or from which British encroachments-for instance,
this very matter of the Carnatic-have taken away
all the binding obligation. There were no such dis-
abilities in the treaty of Amiens. Or, even if their
nullity has not already been pronounced in petto,—-to
be asserted openly, or quietly included, at the first
convenient occasion,-their reimposition, after they
had been infringed with our consent or acquiescence,
during troublous times, might be found to be quite
unsuitable to the epoch, or incompatible with the
honour of a great power.
But is there not an idea about India already? Is
there not an old and permanent idea about India and
the East,―older than General Bonaparte's invasion of
Egypt and correspondence with Tippoo Sultan,-and
of which the permanency may be suspected from the
favour shown to the Suez Canal scheme; from the ex-
peditions to Annam and to Syria; from the officious
help pressed upon Great Britain in China; and from
the costly line of mail steamers, based on a very
small trade and a very large subsidy-recently es-
tablished in the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean? In-
deed, I am perversely disposed to see the permanency
of the French idea still more transparently exhibited
in the two friendly offers made by the Emperor, on
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
371
the arrival of the most alarming news from India in
1857, of a body of troops to assist in suppressing the
rebellion, and of safe transit for our own reinforcements
through French territory to Marseilles. Even the sym-
pathetic paragraphs in the Moniteur, alluding to these
friendly offers, and declaring the complete suppression
of the rebellion to be essential to the progress and
civilisation of the world, tend rather to confirm than
to dispel my feelings of distrust.
The first Napoleon's hankerings after Syria and
Egypt, his aspirations after "ships, colonies and com-
merce," did not originate with him; they were
thoroughly French; he inherited them from his pre-
decessors, the Kings; they have descended in full
force to his successor, the present Emperor.
We may deride such aspirations; we may boast
that our colonies are the fruit of genuine emigration
and national enterprise; that the richest Provinces
of our Indian Empire were acquired involuntarily,
in the process of self-defence, by a mercantile Com-
pany, against the wishes of the home authorities;
and that our trade and our merchant navy-the
foundation of our maritime strength-are the natural
growth of the people's genius, and owe nothing to
governmental interference. Perhaps we are rather
disposed to under-rate our obligations to the Govern-
ment; but on the whole this immemorial distinction
may be drawn between the two nations; that in
France political action, domestic and external, pro-
ceeds from the Government,-in England from the
people. So long as the ruling power is strong and
active, the French believe in it, trust it, and submit
372
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
to it, much more than the English do.
The fact is
that in France, as in other European countries blessed
with the same gigantic apparatus of centralisation, a
larger proportion of the national intellect and ability is
found in the ranks of the official hierarchy, than in
Great Britain, not simply as a consequence of
greater numbers, but on account of the better pro-
spects and higher career that are open to men of
talent. Many a French Minister, many a French
Ambassador, has begun life as clerk in a public office.
No such promotion has ever been known, or is likely
to take place in England.¹ The official class in
France, stronger than ours in number, in talent and
in social consideration, and yet more popular in its
origin, forms a most important element in the national
life, and exercises a direct power and a pervading
influence over the supreme ruler and his immediate
advisers, and over the press and the people, to which
no parallel or analogy can be found in Great Britain,
And thus it is that French foreign policy is so per-
sistent and traditional, and that French public opinion
on foreign affairs is always in the main the official
opinion.
•
There can be no doubt that the Indian idea exists
in the French bureaux in a very perfect form, fea-
thered and armed, and ready for display, whenever
1 Our popular institutions, and the powerful influence of the
press, produce an effect on the prospects of our Civil Service, that
is decidedly prejudicial to their interests, and exactly contrary in
its results to the general tendency of the French administrative
system; for, to satisfy claims established in our elective chamber,
or in submission to the pressure from without, our Government
occasionally interpolates an outsider into one of the highest per-
manent posts in some public office, over the heads of all the old
servants of the department.
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
373
an appropriate crisis may arrive. A treasure of docu-
ments, protocols, capitulations, and other piéces
justificatives, could be produced from the national
archives; and complete plans for active operations,
founded on the best information, from the earliest
period up to the present day, would certainly not be
wanting, if matters ever arrived at that height.
The present Emperor, as I have already remarked,
has adhered very closely to the traditional French
policy in the East; and the following passage from
his speech on opening the Legislative Chambers in
November 1863, does not show any intention of de-
parting from it :—
"The distant expeditions which have been the
subject of so much criticism have not been the result
of any premeditated plan; they have been brought
about by the force of circumstances; and yet they are
not to be regretted. How, in fact, could we develope
our foreign commerce if, on the one hand, we were to
relinquish all influence in America; and if, on the
other, in presence of the vast territory occupied by
the Spaniards and the Dutch, France was to remain
alone without possessions in the seas of Asia.'
There is a singular reticence in this declaration;
for surely there is a power in "the seas of Asia” of
much greater importance than either the Spanish
or the Dutch power; another nation occupies a terri-
tory in the East, much more "vast," and infinitely
more wealthy, than all "the possessions of the
Spaniards and Dutch" combined. No allusion to
that power, or to its Eastern dominions, is made in
this part of the Imperial speech; but some people
·
374
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
have learned to consider Louis Napoleon's silence as
more expressive and more ominous than the most
explicit avowal of his intentions.
The loss of Poland would certainly not destroy or
impair the power of Russia in the East. Without
Poland, the Russian Empire would still include a popu-
lation of fifty millions. The irreconcileable and uncon-
querable hatred of the Poles, and the European opinion
in their favour, would obviously make the loss irre-
trievable and final; all hope of aggrandisement and
dominant influence in the West would disappear for
ever; and an expansion of Russian interests and in-
fluence in the East, would appear to be among the
necessary consequences of the alteration of her fron-
tiers, and diversion of her strength. Relieved from a
heavy burden and constant source of anxiety in the
West, the real amount of her military force disposable
in the opposite direction would be absolutely aug-
mented.
We may have made an awkward precedent by our
ostentatious declaration of neutrality on the breaking
out of the slaveholders' aggressive rebellion in the
United States, and by our prompt acknowledgment of
the Confederates as lawful belligerents. This precedent
would of course be very much strengthened, if France
or England, or both powers combined, were as has
been urged upon them-to recognise the belligerent
position of the Polish insurgents.¹ There are several
1 I am not to be understood as objecting to the recognition of
belligerent rights, either in the actual instance of the slave holding
Confederacy, or in the contingent instance of Poland. I am not
arguing either the moral or the international question. I simply
point out that the precedent does constitute a danger for us.
may be a necessary danger, or it may be a danger worth facing.
It
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
375
.
native Princes in India, whose status as Sovereign
powers, and whose right of levying war, are much
more clear than those of the rebel States of America,
or the anonymous National Government of Poland.
Under certain circumstances a very profitable trade in
arms and munitions of war might spring up; and it
would be very difficult to establish an effective block-
ade of all the coasts in India, or even to enforce an
embargo in all its ports.
I am not going to sketch out a scheme for invasion,
or intervention, or intrigue in India; but I shall not
be easily persuaded that all such schemes must for
ever be visionary, impracticable or ineffectual. I shall
not be easily persuaded that a naval expedition of
15,000 men to some suitable place of disembarkation
in India, is an impossibility; or that such an expedi-
tion would not be in the least facilitated by several
establishments in the Eastern seas. The difficulties
and dangers of an invasion of India, by sea or land,
are sufficiently obvious; but the former process has
been very much simplified by the employment of
steamers, and by the experience gained in the Cri-
mean and Italian wars, and in the invasion of Mexico;
while, as to the latter, I cannot understand why
Nadir Shah's enterprise of 1739, or that of Ahmed
Shah Abdallee twenty years later, could not be re-
peated in this century, with a force much smaller in
numbers, but more formidable in matériel, mobility,
and discipline, than that of the Persian or of the
Affghan conqueror. Both Nadir Shah and Ahmed
Shah found auxiliaries in India, and so might a Euro-
pean invader. Indeed, if his military chest were suffi-
1
376
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
ciently well supplied to enable him to pay his way
without plundering, for a few months, he might soon
-without counting on captured treasure or the con-
tributions of native confederates-begin to make the
war support itself by the collection of revenue.
But it must never be overlooked that even an un-
successful invasion of India might shake the British
power to its base, and, notwithstanding our apparent
triumph, might disorganise the military strength, and
scatter the moral elements of our administration. The
rebellion of 1857 cost forty millions sterling: another
uprising, more generally supported by the native
Princes, and by European aid, would probably destroy
the financial resources and credit of India, and throw
a direct burden upon Great Britain. The inhuman
exasperation on both sides, the waste of blood and
capital, the perversion of every principle of justice, and
the hopelessness of reconciling order and progress,
would soon render our continued domination an utterly
hateful idea both to the patriot and the philanthropist,
and would disincline the great body of the nation
for
any further efforts or sacrifices in a cause so un-
profitable and so inglorious.
At last then, it may be said, the author has betrayed
himself; he appears in that miserable character of a
prophet of evil, which was so eagerly disclaimed in the
first page of this book. I deny it; I still disclaim that
character. I have, indeed, pointed out what appear to
me to be certain defects and dangers in our situation,
and I have endeavoured to dispel the notion of our abso-
lute security from European interference. But I have
not attempted to predict any particular course of events.
•
RIGHTS AND TITLES.
377
On the contrary, no one can be more impressed than I
am with the belief, that the next crisis or convulsion
in India will arise in some quite unnoticed quarter,
and from causes as yet quite unknown or unsuspected.
And if I have shown how the moral aspect of British
supremacy has been marred and blotted by Lord Dal-
housie's acquisitive operations,-how the spirit of that
policy has led, and is still leading, to a general deterio-
ration of title, and relaxation of pledges, and to the
accumulation of scandals and grievances that may be
turned hereafter into formidable engines for our an-
noyance,-I do so, not only as an Englishman, as a
loyal subject and servant of the Crown, but as a citi-
zen of the world, who recognises the great mission
confided to the British nation in India, and who be-
lieves that mission to be threatened, and its permanence
endangered, by the faults which he has endeavoured
to expose.
I do not fear France or Russia; but I do not run
into the opposite extreme of despising either their
material power, or the force of public opinion in
Europe. And I object to supply topics and temptations
for reproach and remonstrance. Still less do I fear the
Nizam, or a coalition of native Princes. But rather
than drive them into distrust and disaffection, I would
rally them round the Imperial throne, both for the se-
curity of the Empire, and in the cause of civilisation
and progress. I fear neither invasion nor rebellion,
but I wish always to feel that the right is on our side.
I wish to see every source of moral weakness, every
subject of rebuke, obliterated. I desire the rights of
every one to be respected, in order that our own may
378
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
be strengthened. I would have the title to each Pro-
vince and each village, made so clear and so secure,
that we may be able to hang, or fight, all gainsayers-
domestic or foreign-without compunction, with a good
conscience, and with a good story for the world and
for posterity.
I do not despair of the Empire in India. I should
take little interest in its future, if I thought that its
past and its present were all barren. It is not because
we have done so little, but because we have done so
much, that I wish to see our work consolidated, and
naturalised. If I call for a certain measure of restitu-
tion, it is not merely for the redress of a grievance,
not as a mere act of abstract justice, not as an act of
contrition, but as an act of faith and hope. There is
no faith, and no hope, in a policy which is afraid or
ashamed to do justice, and to make restitution. That
is the policy of defiance and despair. Far be it from us,
379
LETTER XVIII.
A GOLDEN BULL.
London, December 1863.
Is there any one who supposes that India is a source
of military strength to the British Empire? Can any
´one fail to see that it is a serious burden in time of
peace, and threatens to strike us with paralysis in
time of war? It is becoming every day more difficult
to recruit our army; and, as the condition of the
people amends, and wages rise, it is to be hoped that
recruiting may become even yet more difficult. Im-
provements in the soldier's treatment and prospects-
partly rendered necessary as an attraction for a
labouring class better instructed and more prosperous
than they were during the last great war, partly attri-
butable to the growing spirit of human brotherhood—
may continue to fill the ranks of the army, perhaps
with a fair proportion of better men; but every
amelioration of the soldier's lot, every advance in the
quality of the recruit, will of course add to the costli-
ness of the establishment. The time may not be far
380
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
distant when the important and irrevocable step of
raising the scale of pay, will have to be taken.¹
Seventy-five thousand of these precious British
soldiers are locked up in India; 2 where by death,
and by disease, five thousand men are annually ex-
pended, or incapacitated for work; and where all who
survive, must be exposed for long years to the miser-
able weariness, the incurable tædium vitæ, and all the
enervating and demoralising effects of military service
in tropical Asia. Seventy-five thousand men, the
prime of the physical force and manhood of Great
Britain-a host that, at an opportune conjuncture,
might dictate terms to Europe-are to be shut up,
wearing their hearts out, in their Indian prison,
while, for want of their assistance, some noble cause
is neglected or abandoned, while national honour is com-
promised or lost. For not a man could be safely with-
drawn from India in the event of a general war.
I have explained in the last Letter, it would probably
be our most vulnerable point; and we might have to
augment considerably our forces in the East,-not
only in India, but in Burmah, at Aden, at Singapore
and at our settlements in China.
As
There seems to be a very general impression that
1 Until discipline can be maintained in the army-and in the
navy also—without the disgusting and degrading infliction of tor-
ture; until dismissal from the service is a severe penalty and a real
disgrace, instead of a boon, as at present; until each man is legally
entitled to his discharge in time of peace, on giving a fair notice;
our military establishments cannot be considered to stand on a safe
or solid foundation. We may be entitled, even while systematic
enticement and misrepresentation are practised, to boast of volun-
tary enlistment, but no candid person can pretend that there is
voluntary service in our army.
2 Eighty thousand, if we include the returning and relieving
troops, the discharged men and invalids.
A GOLDEN BULL.
381
our military forces in India-both in case of a regular
war, and of a rebellion-will be immensely strength-
ened on the completion of the railway system; that
distances will then be annihilated, the delay and
fatigue of marching abolished; and that our European
troops being thus preserved in better health and
strength, and having become practically ubiquitous,
their numbers may be much reduced. I believe this
impression to be well-founded to a very limited
extent only. If the Government of India were simply
engaged against a foreign invader, against a hostile
native Prince, or an insurrection of circumscribed
proportions,—the population in general being quies-
cent and taking no part-we should doubtless enjoy
all the military advantages of the most perfect and
rapid communications. But rails are easily torn up;
bridges are easily destroyed. If war were aggravated
by insurrection, if foreign invasion were complicated
by general revolt, I am afraid that the railway system
would soon prove to be of little or no value, even if it
did not, through the undue confidence of strategists,
become a snare and a cause of disaster. The following
paragraph appeared in all the daily papers in August
of this year:-"No less than about twenty thousand
men, we learn from Russian sources, are required at
this present moment as a safeguard for the Peters-
burg-Warsaw railway. At every bridge there is
stationed a military camp of between 600 to 1000
men; and the whole length of the rails is watched by
patrols marching up and down from station to station."
And the Special Correspondent of The Times, in a
letter dated from Richmond, 19th November, 1863,
སྐར མ 5, "
382
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
tells a similar tale of the heavy demand for men to
protect the railways during the military operations in
the United States.
"It is already very manifest that the Federals are
realizing the difficulties of repairing railroads for
hundreds of miles through a country bitterly hostile
to them, and in which every bridge and every yard of
trestlework has to be vigilantly guarded by night and
day. To repair and keep in working order the rail-
road from the Mississippi to Corinth, and from Corinth
to Chattanooga, would require 70,000 Infantry and
30,000 Cavalry."1
The distances to be traversed and watched in India,
may be very fairly compared with those in Russia and
America; but the Viceroy of India could not so easily as
the Emperor of Russia, find twenty thousand trusty men
to guard a thousand miles of railway. If the requisite
line ran through our own peaceful districts, or through
the dominions of a friendly Sovereign, this duty would
be almost unnecessary, or might be performed,—as the
ordinary work of the intelligence department would
be-by our own irregular cavalry, and the auxiliary
troops of our ally. But if the whole country were up,
if the spell of supreme authority were broken, and
wild hopes and fears were spreading terror and trea-
chery everywhere, this duty could not be entrusted to
doubtful friends; nor could the Government afford to
fritter away thousands of European troops in small
detachments, and in exposed situations. It is obvious,
therefore, that the system of railways, as an element
in our military strength, is liable to fall to pieces at
the moment of our greatest need.
1 The Times, January 1st, 1864.
A GOLDEN BULL.
383
But even in quiet times, and when no exceptional
difficulty is apprehended, the relief to be obtained from
the completion of the railways has, I fear, been much
over-rated. A few stations, perhaps, might be given
up; but the most important strategetic points,—such
as Allahabad, Cawnpore, and Poonah-many great
centres of population and political feeling-such as
Lahore, Calcutta, Bombay and Delhi-must still be
occupied with an imposing force; and, on the whole,
while the area and the population to be protected and
kept in order, remain undiminished, I do not think
the military burden can be much lightened.
I can see no prospect of the military burden ever
being lightened, except by the encouragement and
development of the native Principalities, by placing
confidence in them, and by leading them to place
confidence in the Imperial supremacy of the British
Sovereign.
The policy of annexation has failed; it is con-
demned by its results. This is now very generally
admitted. Far from augmenting our revenues, as Lord
Dalhousie pretended, the confiscated provinces, each
and all, have steadily, since their incorporation with
British India, exhibited a deficiency which no fiscal
skill can diminish, no cookery of accounts can dis-
simulate. The Punjaub, Sattara, Nagpore, Jhansi and
Oude, had effectually disturbed the financial equili-
brium before the rebellion came upon us with its four
years' disastrous balance sheets, and forty millions of
debt. Far from the transfer to our rule being hailed
as a blessing by the people,-"whose best interests,"
as Lord Dalhousie professed to believe, "would be
$84
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
thereby promoted,"-it was in every instance received
with disgust and discontent; and the repeated shocks
to our moral superiority, inflicted by so many in-
stances of rapacity and bad faith, did more to create
the feelings and excite the hopes that led to the rebel-
lion of 1857, than all the material weakness on our
side, all the temptations and religious excitement on
the part of the rebels, that were observed at the time,
or have been subsequently detected, suspected or
imagined. Far from consolidating our military strength,
as Lord Dalhousie predicted, the policy of annexation
is proved to have scattered and frittered it away, and
to have converted more than one important city or
district into a centre of disaffection and conspiracy,
requiring to be watched and over-awed by troops at
every time of excitement or difficulty, instead of being,
as it formerly was, and would always have been under
a tributary native government, a bulwark and break-
water against rebellion, a centre of conservatism in
time of peace, a rallying place for our adherents, and
a resting place for our troops in time of war.
The threatened absorption of Mysore, on the demise
of the present aged Rajah, deserves, therefore, our
careful attention,-not only on account of the just
grounds of remonstrance which, as I have pointed out,
would thereby be afforded to the Nizam,—not only
with regard to the threatened rights and interests of
the Rajah's family and clan,-but also as the first
infringement of that general pledge in favour of the
existing native sovereignties, contained in the Queen's
Proclamation, and confirmed by Lord Canning's latest
measures.
A GOLDEN BULL.
385
That Lord Canning did really meditate the annexa-
tion of Mysore, is, I fear, placed beyond a doubt by
the fact that he tacitly, but very effectually, excepted
the Rajah of Mysore from the benefit of the amende
honorable to Hindoo Sovereigns, which was based on
the Adoption despatches of 1860.¹
When all the other Rajahs of India received the
assurance in a circular letter from the Governor
General, that Her Majesty desired the dignity of their
houses to be perpetuated, and would for the future
recognise the right of succession by adoption, no copy
of this letter was sent to the Rajah of Mysore; and
this letter, representing Her Majesty's intentions to
be confined to "the several Princes and Chiefs who now
govern their own territories," was expressly worded
so as to exclude the case of the Rajah of Mysore, and
his case alone, by this captious and accidental dis-
tinction.2
The administration of the Mysore territories was
assumed by the British Government, and carried on
To
1 Ante, p. 131.
2 The following is a translation of one of these letters :-
L. S.
RAJAH RAVI VURMAH,
&c., &c., &c.,
OF COCHIN.
After compliments.-Her Majesty being desirous that the Go-
vernments of the several Princes and Chiefs of India who now govern
their own territories should be perpetuated, and that the represen-
tation and dignity of their Houses should be continued; I hereby,
in fulfilment of this desire, convey to you the assurance that on
failure of natural heirs, the adoption by yourself and future rulers
of your State of a successor according to Hindoo Law and to the
custom of your race, will be recognised and confirmed.
Be assured that nothing shall disturb the engagement thus made
to you, so long as your House is loyal to the Crown and faithful to
the conditions of the treaties, grants or engagements which record
its obligations to the British Government.
CANNING.
S
-
386
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
in the Rajah's name, by virtue of Articles IV and V
of the treaty of 1799. There certainly is nothing in
the nature of those provisions of the treaty, or in the
actual continuance of our administrative intervention,
that can affect the Hindoo law of inheritance, or
weaken the rights of an adopted son.
But according
to the Rajah's interpretation of the treaty, to which I
have briefly adverted in Letter XV,¹ in which I my-
self concur, and which, to say the least, is not deserv-
ing of hasty rejection, this administrative intervention
ought long ago to have ceased. If, therefore, the
Rajah had resumed his active functions, either by the
favour and good will of our Government, or as he
contends he should have done, by right, when the
payment of his debts and the improvement of the
revenue had removed all fear of his solvency, he would
then, according to the terms of Lord Canning's
circular, have become entitled to adopt a successor.
And thus, upon the disputed construction of Article
IV of the treaty, would come to depend not only that
temporary question of the Rajah's personal rule, to
which alone the Article was meant to refer, but also
the vital question, unimagined by those who framed
the treaty, of the extinction or perpetuation of this
ancient Hindoo sovereignty.
-`
I shall be excused from recapitulating in this place
the arguments fully stated in Letter V on the Right
of Adoption. I shall simply declare my opinion,
founded on those arguments, that the Rajah of My-
sore, in common with all other Hindoo Princes, and
in common with all other Hindoos, can legally exer-
1 Ante, p. 304-6.
A GOLDEN BULL.
387
cise that right; and that an adoption, affording, as it
does, the only channel by which the nearest collateral
or cognate can succeed, cannot reasonably be con-
sidered either as a privilege or as an unusual process,
but is an essential and indispensable incident of the
Hindoo law of inheritance. The Rajah has, I believe,
several grandsons in the female line, and the act of
adoption would convey to one of them, or to any other
person legally eligible, an indefeasible title to the
succession, and to the sovereignty of Mysore. In
short, while highly applauding-as a graceful retreat
from an offensive and untenable position-the general
plan and object of Lord Canning's circular, I must
repudiate the notion that the Rajah of Mysore, or any
other Hindoo Sovereign, ever had, or has now, any
need of the Viceroy's permission, in any form, as
the preliminary or as the ratification of a fully effec-
tive adoption. I regret that a copy of the circular
was not sent to the Rajah of Mysore, but I cannot
allow that his rights, or the rights of his family, are
in the least diminished by that omission.
That significant omission, and the more significant
terms of the circular itself, indicate Lord Canning's
intention to carry out the annexation by that process
of claiming a "lapse," for want of "heirs natural" and
for want of the ruling sanction to an adoption, which
was so destructive in Lord Dalhousie's hands, and
which Lord Canning himself seemed to deprecate and
to abandon, in the Adoption despatches of 1860. And
it is very remarkable that Lord Canning, in his deter-
mination not to allow the coveted reversion of Mysore
to escape, was not content with reproducing this
$ 2
388
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
discredited and discarded engine, but was prepared, if
necessary, to take stronger measures, and to nullify
the Rajah's rights with a still more cruel weapon,-a
weapon used by Lord Dalhousie only in the Carnatic
spoliation to deny that the sovereignty of Mysore
was hereditary, to declare the treaty of 1799 "a per-
sonal treaty," made only for one life, and renewable
merely at the good pleasure of the British Govern-
ment, as a matter of grace and favour.
Such at least is the only meaning that I can attach
to the following passage in a letter addressed by Lord
Canning in 1861 to the Rajah of Mysore, in reply to
one in which that Prince, claiming the restoration of
his executive authority, had alluded incidentally to
the "rights of his successors." Referring to the share
of the net revenue of his country secured to the Rajah
by Article V, Lord Canning proceeds thus :-"This
provision is the only right that your Highness can
claim under the treaty of 1799. It is a personal right,
not a heritable right, and would not be claimable even
by a natural born heir." This extraordinary inter-
pretation of "a treaty of perpetual friendship and
alliance," "-worthy of the Calcutta Foreign Office,
inspired by the shade of Lord Dalhousie, and the
bodily presence of Colonel Durand,³-clearly rests
upon nothing but the absence of the words "heirs
1 These papers have not to my knowledge been published; but
I have seen a small printed collection, and the accuracy of my
citation, though only from memory, may be relied on.
2 Collection of Treaties, 1812, p. 454.
3 Who instigated the last plan of annexation,-that of Dhar,—
happily rendered abortive by the firm and repeated rejection of
the Court of Directors, and of two successive Secretaries of State,
Lord Stanley and Sir Charles Wood. See House of Commons'
Papers, Principality of Dhar, April 1859.
A GOLDEN BULL.
389
and successors," which all writers on international
law declare to be an accidental and insignificant cir-
cumstance.
The treaty of 1799 declares itself to be perpetual,
and to be made for important public objects; it is
therefore a real and not a personal treaty.¹ What-
ever the ancestors of the Rajah of Mysore or himself
may have been at certain periods, "feudatories of
Beejapore," or "state prisoners of Hyder,"-taunts
that are thrown in his teeth, by the before mentioned
Calcutta missive, in a manner that appears to me
most indecent-he was certainly recognised, and con-
stituted by a solemn treaty, as the reigning Sovereign
of Mysore, and an ally of the British Government.
The dignity of a reigning Sovereign is essentially
hereditary in India, as in Europe. There were ancient
precedents in the British annals for the creation of
life-peerages, yet our House of Lords lately refused to
admit their validity; but there are no precedents
whatever in the annals of Great Britain, or of India,
for the creation of life-sovereignties, of sovereignties
terminable at the will of one of two perpetual friends
and allies.
Notwithstanding the very generally acknowledged
iniquity and impolicy of persistent and systematic
annexation, the case of Mysore has been represented
as quite exceptional and peculiar. It has been urged,
in addition to arguments drawn from the growing value
and capabilities of this country, that it is so com-
pletely encircled by British provinces, that it would
be highly impolitic and unadvisable to perpetuate the
1 Ante, p. 69, 70.
•
390
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
separate jurisdiction. Twenty-five lakhs of rupees,
one quarter of the actual gross revenue of Mysore, are
paid annually, under existing engagements, as a sub-
sidy to the British Government. I do not believe,—
and judging from past experience of our annexations,
I do not think any one can reasonably maintain the
probability,—that Mysore would ever, under our
direct management, produce a larger annual surplus,
applicable to Imperial purposes, than this.
If the course of annexation be resumed in the
tempting instance of Mysore, a long series of similar
temptations will be re-opened, and every little sove-
reignty, embedded in the British dominions, will be
doomed to assimilation in its turn. For although the
large revenue of Mysore-a million sterling per
annum¹-makes it appear a more than usually desir-
able acquisition, there is really no special cause that
can render its appropriation more defensible than that
of any other State in India.
If there were any weight in the considerations
founded on the geographical position of Mysore in
relation to our immediate possessions, it would not be
difficult to show that there is nothing exceptional in
that position, and that those considerations must be
equally true of Travancore, Bhopaul, Kolapore, Rewa,
and many other Principalities; while every inclusion
of a new province within our jurisdiction, will ob-
viously draw the net closer, will tend to embed or
encircle those who have hitherto felt themselves to be
secure.
1 The charges and liabilities are of course in proportion; and, as
I have already stated, a quarter of the income is payable to the
imperial treasury.
L
A GOLDEN BULL.
391
All the plausible and familiar topics of the horrors
of native misgovernment and the blessings of British
administration, could be paraded with equal effect in
the case of most native States, as in that of Mysore.
The truth is that we have taken no steps, at least
no proper steps, to induce the adoption of reforms in
the government of native States. Our diplomacy in
India, since we began to feel our undoubted supremacy,
has been of the rudest and coarsest description, and
though widely differing in its tone and tendency from
that of our allies or opponents, little more refined or
more intellectual. We dictate and bully; they pre-
varicate and postpone; they in general have to submit,
sometimes we are deceived or tired out.
The exigencies of European negotiations, the vast
interests and balanced forces engaged, and the brisk
combat of wits that may be expected, compel the
Government to employ as its representatives none but
men of known qualifications, practised powers, and of
cool and persuasive manners and temper. But in deal-
ing with Oriental States, the arrogant confidence of
overwhelming power has led us almost invariably to
despise argument or conciliation, to refuse an equality
of standing to native negotiators, always to present
our ultimatum at an early stage, and to enforce its
acceptance by the display or menace of warlike pre-
parations. The hopelessness of getting their argu-
ments patiently considered, and in most cases their
inability to frame arguments that would have any
weight against our fixed determination and impatience
of contradiction, have led the ministers of Asiatic
States into a settled system of delay and passive
392
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
..
obstruction as the only means to retain or regain their
most desired objects. Ever since the full establish-
ment and consolidation of our power by the Marquis
of Hastings, our Indian diplomacy has not only been
meddling, overbearing, and rapacious, but has been
eminently unsuccessful in securing its avowed objects,
and dangerous and disadvantageous in the results.
which it has actually produced. It has not succeeded
in protecting the subjects of native States from oppres-
sion, where oppression undoubtedly exists; it failed
in Oude; it has effected no reforms in Hyderabad ; it
is impotent in Rajpootana. This general and noto-
rious failure, and the consequent complete want of
weight in the counsels of Government of our old poli-
tical officers,-who, with all their faults, were gene-
rally in favour of maintaining the native Princes-
enabled Lord Dalhousie to carry out his policy of
systematic annexation.
We cannot now control or coerce Princes or
ministers, or the refractory feudatories of a native
ally, without incurring odium and suspicion. No one
gives us credit for good motives. We have lost our
moral hold over the passions and prejudices of India,
we have forfeited our right of correction, by our want
of good faith and moderation. Any pressure exer-
cised upon a native State, or upon any one within its
boundaries, is looked upon as the preliminary step to
annexation.
And while the threatened resumption of Mysore
shows how well founded and how reasonable these
suspicions are, and how necessary it is for us, who
disapprove of Lord Dalhousie's measures, to guard
A GOLDEN BULL.
393
vigilantly against fresh violations of principle, a very
recent transaction in the Rajpoot State of Oodeypoor,
tells but too plainly that the traditions of the Calcutta.
Foreign Office still reign triumphant,-that not a
glimmering notion prevails of reforming native ad-
ministration by native and natural means, and that
no possible intermediate policy is conceived to exist,
between the blind support of local authorities, and the
summary substitution of European officials. The
Maharana of Oodeypoor, the head of the Sesodia
family, and of the Sooraj-bunsee, or Solar tribe of
Rajpoots, pretends to a direct descent from Ram-
chunder, the mythological monarch of Oude and con-
queror of Ceylon, the hero of the national epic poem,
the Ramayana, and who is worshipped all over India
as an incarnation of the Deity. All Hindoo Princes
acknowledge the precedency of the Rana of Oodey-
poor, styling him "Hindooa-Sooraj," or Sun of the
Hindoos; and all those of Rajpootana, and several in
other parts of India, receive from him the teeka, or
mark of royalty on the forehead, in confirmation of
their accession. The Oodeypoor dynasty, which, apart
from its mythical splendour, can really boast a royal
genealogy of two thousand years, is also renowned for
having, amidst the most terrible reverses, maintained
its independence of Delhi, and for having preserved
the family honour pure and inviolate, unlike the other
Rajpoot Princes, by refusing to give its daughters
in marriage to the Mahomedan Emperor or his sons.
The present Maharana, who succeeded about a year
ago, being a minor, the government was in the hands
of a Council of Regency. Two of the principal nobles
s 3
394
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
employed in the administration, were guilty of enor-
mous delinquencies. Kesree Sing, a financial officer,
embezzled twenty lakhs of public money. Ajeet
Sing, the head of police and criminal justice, after
having extorted confessions, by beating, from two
men charged with highway robbery and killing cows,
had them both put to death under circumstances of
revolting cruelty.¹ Instead of punishing both these
high offenders, the Council, when pressed by the
Political Agent, tried to justify the former, and
connived at the escape of the latter. There could
not well have occurred a more fair and favourable
pretext, a more imperative call, for British interfer-
ence.
But the weightiest considerations should have in-
duced the Viceroy to perform the moral duty of
interference in that gracious style, and to that limited
extent that would be most palatable, most persuasive,
and least alarming, to the nobles and people of Oodey-
poor, and of the adjacent States. The ninth Article
of the treaty of 1818, which defines our relations with
1
¹ It may be thought that these facts conflict with the opinion
given at p. 295, as to the respect for the sacredness of human life,
and the aversion to cruel punishments, that we have taught to the
inhabitants of native States; but I remarked in that place that
opposition and disapproval would vary in degree in different parts
of India. Now, firstly, Rajpootana is exactly that part of India in
which we have the least control, and the least intercourse; and
where ancient customs and manners exist in the greatest force:
and secondly, there is nothing to show that there was not, in this
instance, a certain amount of opposition and disapproval, and that
public opinion was not to some extent roused against the evil doers.
Those who kill and eat cows are looked upon with horror and in-
dignation by Rajpoots, as worse than cannibals; but still there
must have been some complaint, and the Political Agent must have
got his information on certain points from some persons of rank
and authority,
2
A GOLDEN BULL.
395
*
Oodeypoor, stipulates that "the Maharana shall always
be absolute ruler of his own country, and the British
jurisdiction shall not be introduced into that prin-
cipality.”¹ Admitting the moral right of effectual
intervention, where the first principles of justice and
humanity are insulted in a dependent State, I still
think that the letter of this Article ought to have
made us very scrupulous as to the details of that
intervention, which should have been as far as possible
removed in form from the direct introduction of British
authority. Instead of this, the course adopted by the
Calcutta Foreign Office must appear most offensive
and most portentous to the brave and sensitive popu-
lation of Rajpootana, and is in fact the very measure
best calculated to alienate and alarm, to render in-
struction impossible, and to make improvement odious.
By a decree, dated Simla, August 14th, 1863, the
Viceroy confers upon the British Political Agent the
highest powers in judicial, police and financial affairs,
subject to an appeal in certain cases to the Governor
General's Agent in Central India, and requiring the
Viceroy's own confirmation of capital sentences,
"these powers to be exercised until the Maharana is
pronounced of age and capable of undertaking the
responsibility of administration." Thus to all out-
ward appearance, if not to all intents and purposes,
British jurisdiction is introduced into the Principality
of Oodeypoor.
It is very remarkable that not one member of the
guilty Regency is removed; no addition is made to
their number; and the person of the Maharana, and
1 Volume of Treaties, 1853, p. 426.
396
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
1.
1
his household, are still confided to their care. The
whole scheme of administrative reform seems studi-
ously devised to be as foreign, as artificial, and as
ephemeral in character as possible. No attempt is made
to strengthen the executive Council, or the depart-
ments of finance and justice, by the employment of a
few educated and experienced native functionaries.
There are several enlightened Hindoos of high rank,
of great wealth, of proved integrity and distinguished
qualifications, known to be devoted to Imperial in-
terests, and placed for years under the very eye of the
Supreme Government, any one of whom would have
been proud to undertake the office of Prime Minister
of Oodeypoor; and who, duly advised and supported
by the Viceroy, and recommended to the local mag-
nates by their consciousness that he alone averts that
foreign jurisdiction which they dread as the forerunner
of annexation, would be able to secure their confidence,
to develope their capacity for self-government, to
inaugurate a permanent reform in the laws and pro-
cedure, and to train up a new generation of statesmen
and officials to perpetuate the work of his adminis-
tration.
Snch a man, for instance, as Rajah Dinkur Rao,
now a Member of the Legislative Council of the Go-
vernor General, and formerly for several years the
successful Minister of the Gwalior State, could, as
1 I assume the validity of all the charges, against the two chief
offenders and against the Regency, to be undoubted; but observing
that the Council are said "to justify" Kesree Sing in his appropria-
tion of public funds, and that they are still left in a position of
great dignity and trust, one would be glad of a little more informa-
tion.
A GOLDEN BULL..
397.
Dewan of Oodeypoor, effect changes that a British
Political Agent could not, and would not attempt.
His title and honours, the high offices he had already
held, and his sacred character as a Brahmin,¹ would
all combine to make his person respected, and to
lessen the jealousy of a stranger's authority. A
Prime Minister of his antecedents and habits could
work with the tools which he found ready to his
hand; could make himself understood and obeyed, and
would know when and how he was obeyed. No Eng-
lish Political Agent could do this in the atmosphere
of dislike, distrust and sullen opposition by which he
would be surrounded. He would never feel assured
whether his orders were carried out or not, and
would either become dependent for information upon
some favourite native, or would be compelled to
resort to our own elaborate apparatus of official
checks, records, reports and correspondence,—with
the indispensable staff of European Assistants, and
a corrupt and insolent train of native subordinates.
Such is the inevitable downward course of direct
British management: so it has been in Mysore: so it
will be in Oodeypoor.
Not two months elapsed from the date of the
Governor General's order superseding the native
authorities, before the next step had to be taken,—
the introduction of British troops, to preserve order,
and to protect the Resident's person. The following
extract is taken from the summary of news from
' But the idea of taking advantage of Hindoo prejudice and
superstition, and turning it to account, or quietly allowing it to
operate, for a good purpose, would of course be scouted in Calcutta.
398
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
÷.
Bombay of the 29th October:-"A small force has
been sent from Neemuch to Oodeypoor; as the Poli-
tical Agent, Major Eden, was apprehensive of a rising
there at the Dussera festival." Nothing but "a trea-
cherous attack" on the Resident's escort is now re-
quired, to render Oodeypoor quite ripe for annexation.
And even supposing-as is very probable-that
everything went on peaceably; that the public affairs
of Oodeypoor were conducted with a superficial
smoothnesss and regularity, and even with marked
success, -as in Mysore,-until the period of the
Maharana's majority, and that the government were
then transferred to the Sovereign,-as the Viceroy
promises ¹-I should fear that no solid or substantial
progress would have been made. The British manage-
ment, tainted in its origin as a national humiliation,
watched with suspicion and dislike, and endured with
patience only as a temporary infliction, would be
shaken off with delight as soon as our coercion ceased;
every vestige of its procedure would be gradually
effaced, and the subordinate native agents quietly
dismissed and proscribed. No provision appears to
have been made at present for the education of the
Maharana, The Council of Regency, deprived of
executive power, though left in charge of the young
Prince's person, are not very likely to accuse themselves
of incapacity and misconduct, by extolling the Political
Agent's administration, or by inculcating those prin-
ciples of public justice and economy, which the British
Viceroy would approve.
1 Very few, probably, of the inhabitants of Rajpootana believe
that this promise will be performed.
A GOLDEN BULL.
399
Never, perhaps, has a more suitable occasion pre-
sented itself for exercising the noblest functions of
Imperial power, for asserting a disinterested and
beneficent supremacy, and for enforcing reform in an
influential native State, while preserving its autonomy,
and instructing its leading men, than this occasion of
the Oodeypoor Regency. But this opportunity, as
well as that of Mysore, has been thrown away; and
yet I believe that only by watching for such oppor-
tunities, by seizing upon such opportunities, and by
making such opportunities, the Empire can be placed in
a position of stable equilibrium, the actual and pro-
spective strain on our own military resources relieved,
and those of India made available for Imperial objects.
Military strength does not consist in the numerical
strength of armies, but in the number of disposable
troops. Wherever there is a native State, there is a com-
petent and visible authority, responsible for the peace
and good order of a certain area, and of a certain popu-
lation. Wherever we annex a State, or assume its
management, there we at once become chargeable with
the preservation of tranquillity; our troops become
more scattered; a moveable column is converted into
a stationary garrison, or an occasional camp of exer-
cise into an army of permanent occupation. With
every cession of territory to a native Prince this pro-
cess can be reversed. Even now, we could, on an
emergency, march all our troops out of Mysore, or out
of the Nizam's dominions, with much more confidence
and with much less anxiety, than out of any part of
our immediate possessions.
I wish deliberately to record my fixed opinion that
400
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
1
our immediate possessions are at present very much
too large, too large for us to defend; too large for
us to administer; too large for us to instruct.
}
I am so convinced of the truth of this opinion in
general, and I am so convinced of its truth with parti-
cular reference to Mysore, that, in case of a genuine
lapse for want of a valid adoption, I would rather see
a native government reconstituted under a Prince of
Tippoo's line, under Maharajah Dhuleep Sing, or
under any other conceivable candidate upon whom
the Principality might be conferred, than see Mysore
transformed into a British Province. As a dependent
State, with a well-affected Court and a contented
people, Mysore would be invaluable as a natural
place d'armes,—healthy for troops and teeming with
supplies—as a centre and base of operations, defensive
or offensive, in Southern India. As a British Pro-
vince,-filled with bitter regrets and reminiscences,
where no one would be responsible, and no one would
have anything to lose-it could never be denuded of
troops; it could never be relied on, and might at any
time become a source of anxiety, or the scene of
anarchy and confusion.
1 Those who venture to believe in the secondary and secular
causes of the propagation of Christianity and of the Reformation in
Europe, might reasonably look upon the political establishment or
aggrandisement of a Christian Prince like Dhuleep Sing, or of one
almost persuaded to be a Christian, like Rajah Rundhur Sing of
Kuppoorthulla, as the most powerful and practicable engine of con-
version, and therefore of civilisation and progress. And if such a
step were taken at a judicious crisis, on fair and just grounds of
general policy, with no ostentatious or aggressive reference to
religious objects, and with all the conditions and guaranties of Im-
perial supremacy to prevent persecution and partiality, I maintan
that the measure would be quite justifiable, and I should not fear
its proving offensive to the people.
A GOLDEN BULL.
401
If the government of Mysore were reformed, on the
principles suggested in Letter XV, I consider that it
would be one of those native States that might be
most conveniently and advantageously enlarged, per-
haps even to the full extent of Tippoo's Empire,
excepting the sea-board Provinces. And I am glad to
say that Sir John Malcolm, one of the most far seeing
of our few Indian statesmen, long ago anticipated
these views. Writing of the recently established
State of Mysore, he says:-" While these fundamental
principles are respected, this connexion will form the
bulwark of our strength in the south of India; and it
may, in the course of events, be a consideration of
policy to increase, instead of diminishing, the wealth
and limits of a State which, while it affords us
resources fully equal to the same extent of our own
dominions, is exempt from some of the objections to
which those are subject."1
I shall be grievously misrepresented or misunder-
stood, if the element of time be omitted in the analysis
of that plan for reconstructing the Empire in India,
to which my aspirations are directed. To enter into
the details of such a plan, and of the process by which
it might be carried out, in a work of this descrip-
tion, and for a person in my position, would be
obviously absurd. But I may observe that while pre-
cipitate overtures should be avoided-and would in
fact be quite unnecessary-unpremeditated and spon-
taneous occasions for the transfer of territory, are
presenting themselves every day. There is a great
deal of profitable business to be done already in the
¹ Malcolm's Political History, 1811, p. 375.
402
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
*
way of restitution. In ten years much might be
effected; much more in twenty: perhaps our Euro-
pean troops might be reduced in the former period to
the standard strength before 1857, of about forty
thousand men. Retaining, and acquiring by ex-
changes, all the ports and sea-board under our direct
rule, large tracts of country which we now occupy
might be entrusted to dependent Princes. The limits
of some existing States might be beneficially extended;
some new or revived Principalities might be carved
out of those British possessions which lie at a great
distance from the coast. It seems to me quite impos-
sible to mention any advantage that Great Britain
enjoys from the direct administration of Nagpore and
the Central Provinces, or from those parts of the
Madras Presidency called the Ceded Districts, Coim-
batore and Salem, that would not be equally enjoyed
if those Provinces were ruled, in federal subordination,
by the Bhonsla, the Nizam, and the Rajah of Mysore.
The Imperial power should continue to undertake
the external defence, and international relations of
India; the native Princes should be made responsible
for internal tranquillity. The railroads should be
expressly confided to their care and protection. The
change of rule need not offer the slightest obstruction,
impediment or discouragement to British enterprise
of any description. Commerce, manufactures, planta-
tion and settlement, missionary and educational opera-
tions, could all proceed without interruption or
damage. Capitulations-such as already exist-with
the native Princes through whose dominions our rail-
roads and canals may run, or to which British subjects
A GOLDEN BULL.
403
may resort for purposes of trade, would place the
magisterial and judicial control of Europeans, as in
Turkey, Persia and China, in the hands of local English
authorities; whose jurisdiction should be locally effec-
tive and summary, checked by publicity and by the
presence of assessors-in default of a jury-but not
subjected to an appeal, and requiring no confirmation,
except of capital sentences,
I trust that indications have not been wanting
throughout these Letters, that I do not seek to relax
the tie of Imperial supremacy, but, on the contrary, to
draw it more closely around all the States of India, to
the benefit and with the consent of each and all. The
fact of British supremacy is undoubted; but in many
respects that supremacy is still undefined, unattested
and undeclared. A Golden Bull is required for the
Indian Empire. A single formal document, of arbi-
trary origin and straitened construction, would not
comport with the real political circumstances, would
be neither effective nor equitable. Well-timed asser-
tions of Imperial preeminence would appropriately
accompany that general revision of existing engage-
ments, consequent on the proposed territorial changes.
And thus the impersonal and equivocal relations be-
queathed by the East India Company, would gradually
cease and expire, and would be replaced by more
intelligible relations of federal allegiance, and by the
clear definition of reciprocal rights and duties. The
genial deference due to allied Princes, and the homage
due to the Imperial Sovereign, might well be disclosed
and illustrated, in the personal intercourse, the forms
and ceremonies, and the brilliant paraphernalia, of
more than one Royal progress. As Great Britain
404
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
rejoices in her unwritten Constitution, so may India
flourish for many centuries with an unwritten Golden
Bull!
No congeries of States, no people on the face of the
earth, were ever so disposed-by their natural bent,
by their historical traditions, by the peculiar phase of
their civilisation and manners, and even by the tenets
of the two prevailing creeds,-to accept with gladness,
if it were offered to them, the idea of an actual living
Monarch, and to regard with a loyalty amounting to
devotion and reverence, the person of that Monarch,
and every member of the Royal family. But no such
idea has ever been offered to them. It seems to have
been sedulously kept out of sight. Not only have the
people been accustomed to see their own Princes, and
princely families, treated with contempt, but too
many cases have occurred where everything has been
done to make a native Sovereign contemptible in the
eyes of his own subjects. A long course of this un-
generous conduct has not tended to encourage respect
for Royalty in the abstract, or to create a belief in the
ruling influence, or even in the existence of any Royal
Personage in Great Britain, endowed with those qua-
lities of high honour and magnanimity, which have
been associated in all ages, and all over the world,
with the idea of a great Sovereign.
All this may appear, to some of my readers, to be
very ridiculous, and very unworthy of attention.
Philosophical Radicals may regard the idea of a per-
sonal Sovereign as decidedly retrogressive. But India
is not England; nor are Hindoos in general Philoso-
phical Radicals. What they may become in time is
A GOLDEN BULL.
405
another question, Loyalty began to decline in Great
Britain, and patriotism to expand, when Puritanism
became a power in the land. I cannot see that it is
the interest or the duty of any Government of India
to promote the growth of what may be called patriot-
ism, and to neglect the source of power that lies in
the encouragement of loyalty. Those royal deeds of
restitution and compensation, which have been advo-
cated in these Letters, and that policy of Imperial
federalism, which has here found so feeble an exponent;
would excite a fervent spirit of loyalty throughout
India, and, far from being retrogressive, would be the
surest steps in the path of harmony and progress.
Hitherto the repulsive domineering of our Govern-
ment and its agents, has made native Princes and
Ministers averse to our laws and institutions: and the
acquisitive proceedings of the last twenty years have
served to render our principles of government even
more conspicuously offensive to the higher classes, as
the cause and badge of their degradation and ruin.
But if British good faith and the majesty of the Bri-
tish throne were vindicated by gracious acts of restora-
tion and restitution, royally decreed and royally per-
formed; if the era of annexation were manifestly
closed for ever; and a proposal of innovations were
seen not to be an insidious encroachment, but the
preliminary step to territorial aggrandisement and
admission to the security and dignity of a place in the
Imperial Federation,-reform would appear in a much
more favourable light.
No one can fail to observe how powerful a lever to
move the mass of prejudice and ignorance that op-
406
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
presses India, is placed in our hands by the possession
of so much superfluous and unprofitable territory.
Under no pressing necessity to part with it, under no
obligation to confer any portion of it on any particu-
lar Prince, or to abstain from founding any number of
new sovereignties, the Imperial power could, in every
case of transfer, impose its own conditions. The pro-
portion of the Indian debt to be paid off or assumed
by the enlarged feudatory, would be a matter of easy
calculation and arrangement; while the advantages
gained by the Imperial government, would be found
not only in the riddance of so much dead-weight, but
also in the reduction of the civil and military esta-
blishments, and in the prospective diminution in the
annual tribute of pensions, furlough allowances, pas-
sage money of troops, and other home charges.
Is it not quite clear that the interest of the British
nation in the annual provision made for some hun-
dreds of young gentlemen, and the fortunes and pen-
sions acquired by some scores of retired officials, is of
very circumscribed importance, of infinitesimal value,
when compared with its interest in the development
of the energies, in the cultivation of the tastes and
desires of an immense and intelligent population?
India must no longer be regarded as a field for patron-
age, but as a field for spreading our commerce, our
laws, our science, and all that we have of good to
give; as an inexhaustible field of producing and pur-
chasing power, from whose gifts and wants our indus-
try by land and sea may for ages reap a liberal and
ever increasing harvest.
A GOLDEN BULL.
407
In the Provinces retained under direct British ad-
ministration, I should advocate a general rule of selec-
tion for office and for promotion, which would perhaps
shock the feelings, or excite the ridicule of most
Anglo-Indian officials, but which will, I think, be
considered in England as a sound, just and prudent
principle,—that when well qualified in every respect,
a native should always be preferred to a European.
Due consideration might still be given to special
grounds of policy-temporary or permanent—and to
special personal claims, but cæteris paribus the native
candidate should have the preference. The fair
promise of 1862,-when the High Courts and Legis-
lative Councils were constituted, has blossomed with
very scanty performance. Ten or twelve native
gentlemen have been appointed to honorary seats in
the local Councils, with very confined powers of legis-
lation; three or four have seats in the Governor
General's Council, for legislative purposes only, with
no right to any information whatever on matters of
general policy or finance. One eminent Hindoo law-
yer has been made a Judge of the High Court of Cal-
cutta, the solitary instance, I believe, of a native
having been promoted, under the powers granted by
the Acts of 1862, to a paid office that had been pre-
viously unattainable. And with this one act of homage
to the declared intentions of Parliament, the liberality
of the Government of India seems to have stopped.
The great body of native advocates and public ser-
vants, after the first congratulations had died away,
can have derived but little practical encouragement
from the elevation of one distinguished Hindoo to the
408
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
highest judicial office, a place to which few of them,
as, indeed, few English civilians, can aspire. A some-
what broader entrance to a career of usefulness and
honour, some earnest of a share in the ordinary prizes,
would have been far more convincing, and far more
gratifying than this allotment of one extraordinary
prize to one conspicuous person.
All the institutions of Great Britain, so far as they
are applicable to altered circumstances, should reap-
pear in India. There is a Privy Council in Ireland, to
advise and support the Viceroy, when he requires their
aid. There ought to be a Privy Council in India. The
distinction, being one of Royal grant and European
analogy, would be much valued; and as the members
would of course, according to the practice at home, only
attend when formally summoned, there could be no in-
convenience or restraint from the existence of such a
body. In times of uneasy excitement, or actual disturb-
ance, the special knowledge and experience, the local
authority and influence of the assembled Councillors,
would lay open many sources of information, and
might afford the most efficient means of suppressing
tumult and restoring order. It appears to me that a
feudatory Prince like the late Rajah of Puttiala, or like
the Nawab of Rampore,-recently nominated to the
Legislative Council of India-would be more appro-
priately and usefully placed in the Privy Council of
the Viceroy, where he could be consulted on Imperial
acts of state, and on points of general policy not suit-
able for public discussion, than in a public Council of
legislation, engaged in making laws for the British
Provinces only, and having no force within his own
territories.
A GOLDEN BULL.
409
We have done nothing to make our Presidency cities
attractive to the nobility of India. Their sons have
no inducement whatever to attend our Universities,
or even to attain a colloquial knowledge of our lan-
guage. We have done nothing to make an English
education an object of pride and ambition, a fashion-
able and indispensable accomplishment, among the
families of the highest rank and greatest wealth.
The small class of educated natives consists, for the
most part, of men who have sought education as the
passport to official employment, which they have been
willing to enter at the lowest grade, a class, there-
fore, who can have no great influence even in their
own districts, and none in the native States.
No native of India, however erudite and accom-
plished, can enter the arena by the favoured door of
the covenanted Civil Service, without undergoing a
competitive examination in London,-a rule which
places him at a very unfair disadvantage in compari-
son with his English contemporaries, imposing upon
him and his family a burden of expense, discomfort
and self-sacrifice, to which not many can be expected
to submit, even if they have the means. An equally
high standard of education might easily be exacted by
an examination in India, if a fair share of first nomi-
nations were assigned for local patronage.
1
If, convinced of the errors and crimes of the past,
our rulers were seriously and sincerely bent upon
establishing more equitable relations with the native
1 One young Bengalee has competed successfully in London for
an appointment in the Civil Service, and has lately proceeded to
the Bombay Presidency.
T
410
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA.
States for the future, not only ought the Government to
lay down and promulgate the principles of its future Im-
perial policy, but great care would have to be taken in
selecting the agents by whom those principles were to
be inaugurated and applied. They should be chosen
with as much reference to their moral qualities and
social habits, as to their knowledge of languages and
official experience. But even with the most careful
selection of our Residents and Political Agents, the
diplomatic reconstruction of the Empire would demand
the employment of able native Assistants. Without
their aid, misunderstandings would occur at every step,
delays would multiply, and results would be doubtful
and insecure. In the days before 1819, when our
negotiations with Indian Princes were not mere arbi-
trary dictations, native diplomatists were among the
most trusted and valued of our public servants, and
their services were splendidly rewarded. And even
now our "political" officers throughout India would
be paralysed and blinded without their native agents,
sheristadars and moonshees. But these are men, like
the common run of the Amla or ministerial officers of
our courts, of mean origin and imperfect education,
with no public trust or responsibility, with mediocre
salaries, no recognised position and no prospects.
No one would think,-certainly not I,-of excluding
from promotion those who have fairly earned it by
meritorious service in inferior situations; but what
are now urgently wanted for the political department
are natives of rank and education, and especially
young natives as junior Assistants, of a class similar
to the attachés of European embassies.
A GOLDEN BULL.
411
-
If a Prince or nobleman, summoned perhaps to
Calcutta or Bombay to take his seat in Council,—
and having himself experienced the advantage, or
felt the want, of a knowledge of the English language,
-were to ascertain that appointments in the Civil
Service, in the political department, and, I should
hope, commissions in the Army, could be obtained by
his younger sons and relatives, on their showing the
proper qualifications, it appears to me very probable
that he would take measures to have some of them
properly qualified, and that a very superior class of
young natives,-hitherto left to indolence, discontent
and debauchery-would present themselves as our
active coadjutors. Men whose birth and connections
are known, who have something to hope for them-
selves, and whose fathers have something to lose, both
in property and dignity, are not exactly the men
whom, of all others in the country, I should suspect
of being dangerous and corrupt.
Both in the organisation of the Federal Empire, and
of the Imperial Provinces,-both in what would now
be called foreign and in home affairs--I believe the
same rule will hold good,-that the maximum of
immediate dominion and of direct European agency,
involves the minimum of European influence. It is
because I wish to extend British influence, that I
would contract British possessions. And the reason
of this is very simple and easily understood. What-
ever tends to facilitate and promote intercourse and
harmony between the higher classes of India and the
higher classes of Great Britain, will tend to assimilate
their habits and modes of thought, and to diffuse new
412
THE EMPIRE IN INDIA,
ideas and new wants among the mass of the popu-
lation. Where this intercourse is impeded, or has
never been established, there will be stagnation or
antagonism. At present it may be said that British
influence in India beyond the limits of the three
Presidency towns, is chiefly the influence of un-
licensed force; our moral influence is very imper-
fect; and we exercise no social influence whatever.
And no British government, no imaginable number
of British merchants, planters, missionaries or teach-
ers, can produce any appreciable impression upon the
hundred and fifty millions of Hindoos, so long as the
inevitable effect of all our direct efforts is to ex-
asperate and alienate the most powerful and the most
influential men among them. We must gain the
leaders, and the flock will follow.
THE END.
T. RICHARDS, 37, GREAT QUEEN STREET.
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