ARISTOTLE
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DE MEMORIA
GR.T.ROSS
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Aristoteles

ARISTOTLE
DE SENSU AND DE MEMORIA
TEXT AND TRANSLATION
WITH INTRODUCTION AND COMMENTARY
BY
G. R. T. ROSS, D.PHIL. (EDIN.)
CAMBRIDGE:
at the University Press
1906
Cambridge:
PRINTED BY JOHN CLAY, M.A.
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.
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ROBERTO PURVES HARDIE
AMICO
VIRO PHILOSOPHIA ARISTOTELEA ERUDITISSIMO
AMICUS, DISCIPULUS
HANC EDITIONEM DEDICAT
PREFACE.
IN
N the following pages I have attempted to give an
adequate translation of the first two tractates belonging
to the Parva Naturalia and I have appended a commentary
which, I hope, will elucidate the many difficulties occurring
in the interpretation of the text.
As regards the text I have been fortunate in having to
my hand the admirable edition prepared for the Teubner
series by the late W. Biehl. Before its appearance many of
the difficulties seemed absolutely hopeless, but now there are
but few passages where emendation seems to be desirable or,
at least, where any alteration that can come nearer to the
ipsissima verba of Aristotle may be successfully devised.
As my interest in preparing this edition was not mainly
textual, I have refrained from discussing variant readings at
great length unless they were of importance in determining
the actual doctrine of the treatise. My purpose was to give
a rendering of the Greek which should be accurate and
should meet the needs of students of philosophy who, not
being expressly classical scholars, have hitherto had no
adequate means of becoming acquainted with these two
important works. I have not prepared an apparatus criticus,
but simply reproduce Biehl's text, indicating at the foot of
the page little else than the alterations I have made. For
viii
PREFACE
full information as to the MS. sources of our text I refer to
Biehl's introduction. Suffice it to say that the MSS. fall into
two main classes, LSU and E MY; the former, though often
agreeing with the excerpts found in Alexander's commentary
and drawn from a source of high antiquity, yet seem to be
specimens of an 'improved' version in which the crabbedness
of the original text has been smoothed down, though often
with a loss of the significance which a more thorough-going
interpretation might have found in the concise and often
awkward phrasing of the authentic statements. The E MY
group (of which Paris E-10th century-is the most im-
portant), though full of misspellings and inaccuracies, seem
to have suffered less from editorial tampering, and thus
apparently give us hints as to the genuine reading; they
are often supported by the ancient Latin translation of
William de Moerbeka used by Thomas Aquinas. Unfor-
tunately the commentators generally have followed the
MSS. of the former group, especially Vatican L (14th century),
and often expend great pains on explaining passages where
their version is hopeless.
In my commentary I have tried not only to give such
explanations of ordinary words and expressions as a student
not yet versed in the Aristotelian philosophy will find useful,
but to contribute an adequate elucidation of the undoubted
difficulties which continually arise. In dealing with these.
I have derived much assistance from M. Rodier's monu-
mental edition of the De Anima. Many of the ȧropía in
the De Sensu arise also in connection with the larger psycho-
logical treatise and, as a result of M. Rodier's labours, the
path is now much clearer than formerly. Mr Beare's work
on Greek Theories of Elementary Cognition came to hand
just after I had finished the correction of the proofs of the
present volume. Though I notice some points in which we
PREFACE
ix
are not in agreement, I see many more in which I should
have been able to profit by his great learning if the result
of his researches had been accessible at an earlier date.
It should be stated that the present work originally
formed a thesis, for which the University of Edinburgh
awarded me, in April, 1904, the degree of Doctor of Philo-
sophy. Since that date it has been revised and slightly
enlarged.
It remains for me to thank the Syndics of the Cambridge
University Press for undertaking the publication of this
volume, and to express my gratitude also to the Press
Reader and Staff for their valuable assistance. I am much
indebted also to Mr J. A. Smith, of Balliol College, Oxford,
for many important criticisms and suggestions. Above all
my thanks are due to Mr W. D. Ross, of Oriel College,
Oxford, who has read the whole work both in proof and in
manuscript and whose counsels and criticisms have guided
me at every turn.
May, 1906.
G. R. T. ROSS.
NOTE. I should like to point out to readers that though I have
used Bekker's paging for purposes of reference, it has been found
necessary to take a larger number of lines than he requires for the
printing of each of his columns. Hence there is a tendency towards
a discrepancy (which increases as we approach the foot of the Bekker
page) between the number of the line in which a word or passage stands
in this edition and its line-number in Bekker's text.
G. R. T. R.
TABLE OF CONTENTS.
PAGES
I.
INTRODUCTION
I-40
II. TEXT AND TRANSLATION OF THE DE Sensu .
41-99
III.
TEXT AND TRANSLATION OF THE DE MEMORIA
100-119
IV.
COMMENTARY ON THE De Sensu
V. COMMENTARY ON THE DE MEMORIA
121-243
244-286
VI.
APPENDICES
VII. INDICES
•
•
287-292
293-303
INTRODUCTION
(
SECTION I. THE PARVA NATURALIA.
THE two treatises styled briefly the De Sensu and the
De Memoria form the initial members of that collection of
tractates on separate psychological topics known to the Latin
commentators as the Parva Naturalia. The full list of these
opuscules' is not found in De Sensu, ch. 1, but practically
the whole of the topics to be discussed are there set forth.
They are essays on psychological subjects of very various
classes, and there is so much detail in the treatment that, if
incorporated in the De Anima, they would have detracted
considerably from the unity of the plan of that work. Con-
sequent on the separateness of the subjects in the Parva
Naturalia, the method of treatment is much more inductive
than in the De Anima. There, on the whole, the author is
working outwards from the general definition of soul to the
various types and determinations of psychic existence, while
here, not being hampered by a general plan which compels
him to move continually from the universal to the particular,
he takes up the different types of animate activity with an
independence and objectivity which was impossible in his
central work.
Some plan, of course, there must be in any coherent
scientific exposition, and Aristotle seems to proceed from
a discussion of those activities which are dial to animals,
i.e. belong to animals quâ animate, to those which are κovaí,
viz. affections which, though found in animals, are not
R.
I
2
INTRODUCTION
uniquely a feature of animate existence; to the former
category belong sensation and memory etc., to the latter
evidently such phenomena as νεότης καὶ γῆρας, ζωὴ καὶ
θάνατος. I have selected the first two treatises of the
former class, on Sense and on Memory, for translation and
comment. They have perhaps more importance for general
psychological doctrine than any of the others, and in them
certain metaphysical problems of unusual interest are raised.
SECTION II. THE DE SENSU.
The περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν-Sense and its Objects,
is not merely a treatise on the subjects referred to in the title
but takes in also an account of the organs of sensation, not
an account of each organ in detail but of the general character
and ultimate constituents of the sensitive members. This
occurs in chapter 2, and thereafter the objects of the special
senses are discussed not merely as relative to sense but in
their own proper nature as modifications of external reality.
It is this which distinguishes the account of sense given here
from that in the De Anima; there the objective physical
nature of that which stimulates the sense organ is only
glanced at. The treatment of taste and odour is particularly
minute, and here we get involved in the details of the
Aristotelian physics which now-a-days seems so crude and
remote from our habits of thought. In fact, in the whole
of this treatise we seem to be immersed in detail, and there
is less of the wide generalisation and speculative insight
which characterise Aristotle's chief psychological work.
In the treatment of the special sense objects there are
notable omissions. Not a word is said about touch, while
the physical process involved in hearing has little more than
a reference made to it¹.
In chapters 6 and 7 Aristotle goes on to discuss
certain problems which have arisen in the course of the
1 In ch. 6, 445 b 3 sqq.
INTRODUCTION
3
discussion, problems lying at the root of all perceptive
process. First, do the objects of perception have any part
too minute to be perceived? Are there any imperceptible
magnitudes? The answer is no; but this is not stated
without an important reservation. Considered separately the
minute parts of an object are only potentially perceptible,
though taken in conjunction with the other parts that go
to make up the total object, they do make an impression on
the sense and hence are actually perceptible. The simple
converse of this proposition is proved at the end of chapter 7.
Every sensible object has magnitude; whatever has magni-
tude has parts and there is no atomic object of sensation.
If you suppose an object to be so far removed as, while
yet remaining visible, to be perfectly indivisible to the
eye, it must occupy a mere point in space; any further
removal from us would render it invisible, while any nearer
approach would give it magnitude. It then occupies a point
where the distance at which it is invisible and that at which
it is visible meet; but, since a point is an absolute numerical
identity and is without parts, the object occupying this point
must be simultaneously visible and invisible-an absurd con-
clusion.
In the second part of chapter 6¹ Aristotle raises points
about the process involved in the stimulation of sense by a
distant object, deciding that in the case of sight it is instan-
taneous. In chapter 7, he inquires about the principle of
coordination in sense perception. He decides that, except in
the case of sensations which fuse, we cannot account for the
simultaneous perception of two objects unless we assume that
there is some unitary principle over and above the special
senses which, though numerically a unit like a point, yet has
a double aspect, like the point, which may be regarded as the
terminus of each of the two lines which it separates; or again.
the unity of the central sensitive principle may be regarded
on the analogy of that of the self-identical object which yet
may have diverse attributes. This central sense is λóyw or
1 446 a 22 sqq.
I-2
4.
INTRODUCTION
τῷ εἶναι plural, though it is ἓν ἀριθμῷ. Its organ is localised
in the heart, and to it other functions as well as those of
coordination are ascribed¹.
SECTION III. THE DE MEMORIA.
The full title of this treatise is περὶ μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως
(Memory and Recollection), and the two subjects occupy
respectively the first and second of the two chapters which
the book contains.
Memory (μvýμn) depends upon the retention of a sense
stimulation after the object producing it has ceased to affect
us. The stimulus appears to persist in the heart and is then.
known as an image (pávтaoua). Memory consists in re-
garding this þávтаoμa as the image of the absent object and
not merely as an object of consciousness that does not refer
to a reality other than itself. The condition to be fulfilled, if
the image of an object is to be regarded as objective, is the
union with it of the image representing the time which has
elapsed since the experience took place2.
Memory may occur either through the persistence of the
original sense stimulation or through its reinstatement by
another process which has been originally experienced in
connection with it. This latter process of reinstatement it
is which Aristotle distinguishes by the term ȧváμvnois. In
its most typical meaning it is the purposive revival of a
previous experience by a process of active search among the
contents of mind, but apparently involuntary recollection is
also grouped along with the voluntary³. In describing the
process Aristotle formulates definitely for the first time the
three well-known laws of the Association of Ideas, the laws
of Similarity, Contiguity, and Contrast. With some sub-
sidiary discussions, e.g. that which shows the dependence of
1 De Mem. and Section IX. below.
2 De Mem. ch. 2, 452 b 26 sqq.
3 Cf. De Mem. ch. 2, 451 b 26.
INTRODUCTION
5
memory and recollection on bodily processes, the treatise on
memory closes. On the whole this treatise is on a higher
level and contains more suggestive thoughts than the previous
one.
SECTION IV. ARISTOTLE'S PHYSIOLOGY.
In order to understand the relation in Aristotle of the
Physiology to the Psychology of sense and memory we must
go back to the De Anima and seek the sources of our
discussion there. The common terms for the phenomena
belonging to both faculties alike are Tábos-modification,
and Kivnois-change or process. But the question is, of what
are they the changes or modifications? They are πálŋ of
the soul, but all the wáon (with the exception of vous¹) are
common to soul and body alike (De An. I. ch. 1) and are
as much affections of the body as of the soul. The true
þvoɩkós—scientist-who studies the phenomena of life must
not leave out of account the material embodiment of the
psychic processes. Sight is, as it were, the soul of the eye
but it cannot be studied apart from the eye; and this holds
good of all psychical phenomena generally. At the same
time Aristotle does not lose sight of the superiority of the
mental aspect of the facts. The soul generally is an évépyeta
or evтeλéxela; that is to say, in manifesting soul the body
realises its proper end and fulfils its proper function. evтe-
λέχεια means perfection and properly like ἐνέργεια) refers
to something mental. Aristotle illustrates the relation of
soul to body, by that existing between a manufactured
article (an axe) and the idea realised in it. Here once more
the ẻvépyeia or eîdos is something mental (though of course
the cases are different, as the eidos of an axe is not an
immanent motive principle regulating the existence of the
thing through a series of changes, as the soul of a man
maintains his bodily life). Similarly an act of perception
which is a πáðos—a passive affection, in so far as it involves
1 De An. II. ch. 1, 413 a 7.
6
INTRODUCTION
a bodily affection, is, as an act of mind, an évépyeia and not
a mere πάθος or κίνησις. Just as in the act of perception
or knowledge the passive bodily determination serves as the
instrument for the realisation of a mental act; so in the
passive alteration which must be experienced in building up
a state of knowledge there is involved a transition which is
not aλλoiwois-qualitative change, in the usual acceptation,
but is the realisation of a determinate state of mind the
existence of which alone makes the processes of transition
intelligible. We may generalise then and say that only in
so far as they are bodily affections are mental phenomena
processes or passive modifications; mind as such is amalns ;
in thinking we are not passively affected'.
This is especially true of the highest faculty of con-
sciousness, vous or vónois, the apprehension of concepts, but
the question need not be raised here whether in the human
soul this impassivity or pure spontaneity of thought is any-
thing that has a separate existence. Aristotle's answer in
his special discussion of the subject in De An. III. ch. 5,
leaves no room for doubt that in his view it is not so. The
human vous is παθητικός, i.e. it is merely the cognitive aspect
of a process ultimately material.
Thus Aristotle's theory of the relation of mind and body
may in a way be designated as a doctrine of psychophysical
parallelism. But this should not blind us to the fact that
with him the mental aspect of the process is no epipheno-
menon. Mind occupies the higher place in the scale. It is
the important member of the pair of correlatives, is the end
for which the bodily changes exist and has all the dignity
implied in the epithets ἐνέργεια, εἶδος and ἐντελέχεια. Having
made this reservation we may be quite untroubled at finding
in his account of sensation and memory what looks like the
crudest materialism. Objects exist in the physical world
external to and in relation with an organism; they, whether
when in contact with it, or at a distance, act upon this
1 De An. II. ch. 5 passim.
2 Cf. De An. II. ch. 5, 417 b 8; cf. also I. ch. 3, 407 a 32.
INTRODUCTION
7
organism and produce changes, whether mechanical (mere
popá), or qualitative (ảλλoíwols), in certain of its members.
The reception of these changes in the sense organ is per-
ception. But why should the mere production of a process
in a bodily part be an apprehension of the object which
causes it? We must remember what Aristotle says about
sense being δεκτικὴ τοῦ εἴδους, and what he affirms about the
sense holds equally of the sense organ. In fact, he frequently
talks of a sense and its organ without discrimination of the
two¹. Evidently then what gets inside the organ must be
the eidos of the external object. If we think of the eidos or
knowable character of the object as existing independently
in the external world, then the eîdos which is present in the
sensorium cannot be numerically the same; it will be only
specifically identical with it or analogous to it. With regard
to the subjective processes persistent in the central sensorium
and representative of absent objects this seems to be the view
held². Again with sense a similar position seems at times to
be taken up. The eye is transparent and receives the light
which exists in the external medium³, and similarly the
movement of the air which sound is, is something aλλóтpios*,
and merely sets in activity a corresponding movement in the
air of the internal ear. But from another point of view it
seems erroneous to talk of the eidos in the object and that
in the organ as being numerically different. You may not
talk of the same concept when realised in two distinct
individuals as being numerically different; it is rather the
individuals that are numerically distinct, while in concept,
i.e. specifically, they are one. Thus it is in eidos that the
object and the organ are one.
The eidos of the object is
its ἐνέργεια. Hence the ἐνέργεια of the object and that of
the sense organ are one; it is only in respect of particular
existence (τ eivai) that they can be regarded as distinct.
¹ De Sens. ch. 2, 438 a 13 note; cf. De An. III. ch. 2.
2 De Mem. ch. 2, 452 b 16 note.
3 De Sens. ch. 2, 438 b II.
4 De An. II. ch. 8, 420 a 17.
5 Cf. De An. III. ch. 2, 426 a 15 and 425 b 27.
8
INTRODUCTION
A grave difficulty¹ arises here; the object as it is for
knowledge will, on this showing, only exist in the act of
perception; it will have merely potential existence before
this. Such is the view taken in De An. III. ch. 2, and
Metaph. IV. ch. 5, 1010 b 30 sqq.; but there Aristotle is
quite sure that though the sense object as such only exists
in perception yet its vπoкeiμevov (substrate) exists indepen-
dently. There is, however, no way of characterising this
substrate if all the qualities given in sensation are abstracted
from it, and yet it is clear that, when Aristotle talks of the
úπокеíμеνа of sense objects, he cannot mean the mere un-
differentiated πрάтη λn. He cannot, on the other hand,
mean by them objects with geometrical and kinetic qualities
only, the subterfuge by which atomistic physics avoids
the difficulty of the independence of the external object;
Aristotle did not believe in atoms. Accordingly we con-
tinually find expressions which imply that the evépyeta or
Évтeλéxea already exists as realised in some way in the
external object. In truth, the fact that the external object
is the agent in perception and transmits its character to the
sense, shows that it must already possess that character³.
It is from this point of view that Aristotle discusses the
physiology of the sense organs.
It is obvious that, if the sensoria are to be capable of
receiving the same eidos as that existing in the external
object, they must consist of the same An; if, on the other
hand, the subjective affection were merely an áváλoyov of
the external as is suggested in De Mem. ch. 2, 452 b 17
it would hardly be necessary for the λn to be identical.
The latter, of course, is the modern conception. Molecular
disturbances in the brain correspond one by one to different
transferences of energy in the external world; every event
in the universe can have an appropriate and more or less.
adequate symbolisation in the human brain. But one would
¹ Cf. below, Sec. x. of Introduction, for a further discussion of the objectivity
of objects of sense.
2 e.g. De An. II. ch. 5, 418 a 3.
3 This is implied in De An. loc. cit. 417 a 6 sqq.
INTRODUCTION
9
hardly say that the formula of the neural process (if it could.
be found) was the same as that which expressed the produc-
tion of a red light or the flight of a projectile, nor would the
oscillation of particles in the brain be in the least like those
external phenomena. Aristotle, on the other hand, tried to
think of the subjective Kivnois as occurring in pari materia
with the external event, and probably where he refers to the
subjective eidos as an áváλoyov of the external he does so
because he is thinking of the processes in the central organ
involved in memory; the heart, probably to be identified as
the organ of memory, is not of the same character as the
external transparent medium; but the eye, the organ of the
special sense of sight, is¹.
SECTION V. PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SPECIAL SENSES.
The qualitative identity of the organ with the vehicle or
medium in which the objective sensuous quality is generated
is most conspicuous in the case of sight and hearing. The
ovµpuns ảýp of the ear² and the transparent pupil accept,
in the one case the impulsive movement set up in the
external air, in the second the light which is the basal
principle of all specific modifications of colour. The primary
constituent of the visible eidos of things is light. Light is
the activity of a transparent element which penetrates all
bodies in differing degrees and, at the extremity of solid
bodies, shows as colour. This colour is either positive or
negative, black or white, and all other colours are mixtures
of those two elements in different proportions. The visible
form of a thing is therefore the determinate mixture of these
two constituents and, when we see, this (by a propagative
process said to be not a transition in time¹) gets, as it were,
stamped upon the sense-organ". We hear that it is the
1 De Sens. ch. 2, 438 b 7 sqq.
2 De Sens. ch. 2, 438 b 21; De An. II. ch. 8, 420 a 3.
3 De Sens. ch. 3, 439 b 19 sqq.
4 Cf. De Sens. ch. 6, 446 b 31.
5 De An. III. ch. 12, sub fin., and De Mem. ch. 1, 450 a 33; also De An. II.
ch. 12, 424 a 19.
ΙΟ
INTRODUCTION
colour which stimulates the medium¹ and consequently the
sense, and one would thus suspect that the colour was
something different from the process which it produces.
But that can hardly be so; the colour or modification of
light must be the visible form of the object, and it is that or
something qualitatively identical with it which enters the eye.
The process of transition in the medium which results in the
establishment of vision, or indeed of any of the mediated acts
of sense perception, seems to be conceived as consisting in a
pushing forward of this sensuous character until it actually
gets embedded in the percipient organ. In the case of
hearing this process is mere popá-change in place, whereas
in smell it is a continuous qualitative change-aλλoíwois, and
in sight something still higher, something not a transition
at all in the sense of occupying time. There must be,
however, some object which originates the process, which
itself does not move. This is, we must suppose, the ŮTOKEί-
μevov of the sensuous character. It is, however, Aristotle's
practice to allude both to the object which causes sensation
and to its sensuous character, the sound or colour, by the single.
word τὸ αἰσθητόν.
It had been the ambition of the earlier psychologists to
identify each sense organ with one of the four elements. On
the theory that like is perceived by like each organ will
perceive the qualities of that element with which its nature
is identical. Aristotle shows that, prior to perception, the
organ must be unlike the quality perceived. The sense organs
are not all composed of a single element. As we have seen
two are (the eye and the ear); but the organ of smell con-
sists of both air and water, or perhaps one element in some
animals, the other in others, while up, if present anywhere,
enters into all and yŷ into that of touch. But we do not by
any organ perceive the qualities actually possessed by the
substance composing it. The qualities possessed by any of
the elements are tactual, while those apprehended by the
1 De An. II. ch. 7, 418 a 31.
2 Cf. De Sens. ch. 6, 446 b 30 and also De An. III. ch. 12, 434 b 30 sqq.
3 Here I follow the account in De An. III. ch. 1, 425 a 3 sqq.
INTRODUCTION
I I
senses of sight, hearing, and smell are not tactual. The organ
fulfils its function in being the vehicle or neutral receptacle of
qualities existing in a vehicle of the same nature outside it.
In being neutral in this way the organ will be capable of
receiving the opposite determinations which characterise the
contents of each sense. In the case of the qualities appre-
hended by touch, the organs, being composed of the various
elements, must show a μeσórns of the various tactual qualities;
this must mean a combination in equal proportions of those
qualities in order that something neutral and capable of
registering the variations on this side and that of the mean
point may be formed. This organ would naturally be the
flesh, which is a composite formed from all the elements, and
we should expect that its λόγος τῆς μίξεως was the μεσότης in
question, but though at times this is his doctrine, in the De
Anima Aristotle apparently will not have it so, probably,
however, meaning only that the external surface of the body
is not the sensorium but rather the medium which communicates
tactual impressions, the real organ or eσxatov aioOŋτýpɩov being
the heart. This, however, is after all a fleshly organ, and in
fact, on the analogy of the senses of sight and hearing, the
medium must be of the same nature as the receptive organ,
for it has to be capable of transmitting the stimulus which
ultimately reaches the organ and so causes perception¹.
Evidently he conceives of the exterior flesh of the body
transmitting the tactual properties of things, heat, cold, hard-
ness, softness, etc., by a progressive qualitative alteration like
the propagation of odour in the air, or, in a way, of light in the
transparent medium. Since in this case the organ and the
medium alike are bodily members and they receive and
transmit the differentiae of other elements than earth, they
cannot consist of one element alone; they cannot be the hard
1 For confirmation of this view cf. De Part. Animal. II. ch. 8, 653 b 24.
Talking of the flesh he says : ταύτης (άφῆς) δ' αἰσθητήριον τὸ τοιοῦτον μόριόν ἐστιν,
ἤτοι τὸ πρῶτον ὥσπερ ἡ κόρη τῆς ὄψεως, ἢ τὸ δι᾽ οὗ συνειλημμένον, ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις
προσλάβοι τῇ κόρῃ τὸ διαφανές πᾶν. The flesh functions both as organ and as
medium, cf. Bäumker, Des Aristoteles Lehre von den Aussern und Innern Sinnes-
vermögen, pp. 55, 56.
12
INTRODUCTION
parts of the body, e.g. bone, etc., which must be referred to
earth¹, and hence there is nothing left for them to be but the
flesh.
The eye consists of water; though air would have served,
being also transparent, yet water is more easily retained in
position. The material out of which it is constructed is
derived from the brain, which Aristotle describes as an organ
with an excess of moisture³. The material of the organ of
hearing is simply a ouµpuns anp. The ultimate organ of
συμφυής ἀήρ.
touch seems, as we have seen, to be the heart, and consists
of flesh, a compound of all the elements. Yet, though not
consisting of yŷ alone, the flesh, as something owμarôdes, i.e.
solid, seems to contain a preponderance of yŷ, that element
which is most characteristically a oŵµa¹. This fact may lend
some countenance to a statement made at the end of the
second chapter of the De Sensu", according to which the
organ of touch consists of earth. This assertion as it stands
without qualification is in flat contradiction with the teaching
in the De Anima, and it is noteworthy that it occurs in a
passage where Aristotle is not stating his own final opinions,
but is discussing in a tentative way some possible working
interpretation of the theory which assigns a special element
to each organ®. Aristotle there tries to combine with it his
own theory that the organ is, before perception, only potentially
of the nature of the determination which it perceives. But
this will conflict with the doctrine that the organ of touch
actually consists of y; for, in order to perceive the qualities
of yn, it will need to be only potentially of that nature, and is,
in fact, Aristotle says, warm, being connected with the heart,
the seat of the animal heat, and qua hot it must have the
character opposite to yn (which is cold).
1 Cf. De An. III. ch. 13, 435 a 20 and De Part. Animal. II. ch. 1,
2 De Sens. ch. 2, 438 a 15.
647 a 14.
3 De Sens. ch. 2, 438 b 30, and De Gener. Animal. 11. ch. 6, 744 a 5 sqq.
4 Cf. De Part. Animal. II. ch. 1, 647 a 19 sqq. and ch. 8, 653 b 29, and cf.
also notes to De Sens. ch. 5, 445 a 20 sqq.
438 b 32.
6 Cf. De Sens. ch. 2, notes to 438 b 17 sqq., and Bäumker op. cit. pp. 47, 48.
INTRODUCTION
13
Similarly the organ of smell will be only potentially warm,
if the nature of odour lies in heat. This will accord with a
derivation of the sensorium of smell, like that of vision, from
the watery substance of the brain. But, though heat is required
for the diffusion of the odorous principle, it is not that principle,
and consequently the theory breaks down once more.
His
own doctrine, as we have seen, is that the organ consists both
of air and of water or of either one or the other.
The organ of taste is the tongue, though, as in the sense
of touch, there is a reference back to a still more primary
organ—the heart¹. Aristotle regards taste as a subvariety of
touch, evidently on the ground both that contact with the
object is necessary in each alike and that taste discriminates
in an indirect way the tactual properties of things which go to
make up their nature as the possible constituents of nutriment.
A certain independence, however, is allowed to the tongue,
and, since tastes only exist in humid matter, the tongue must
have a neutral humidity³,-once more the doctrine that the
sense organ shows a μeσóτns of opposite determinations. In
this case, however, the parallel to the other senses cannot
be consistently worked out. The opposite determinations in
taste are not excess and deficiency of vypóτŋs but rather
τὸ γλυκύ and its negative τὸ πικρόν, which are ultimately
reduced to To Kоûдov and тò Bapú respectively. Again, in
the passage from De An. II. ch. 10 referred to above, Aristotle
confuses two distinct conceptions; if the tongue is only
potentially humid, as he says, it cannot be described as of a
neutral humidity.
The above inconsistencies only show the enormous difficulty
in giving any coherent account of the process of sense stimula-
tion in terms of the ancient physics. They in no way detract
from the value of the central principle involved that the
organ is of a nature capable of manifesting in itself the
contrary determinations which characterise the objective
qualities falling under any one specific sense; that apart
1 Cf. De Part. Animal. II. ch. 10, 656 a 29 and De Sens. ch. 2, loc. cit.
2 De Sens. ch. 4 passim.
3 De An. II. ch. 10, 422 a 34 sqq.
14
INTRODUCTION
from stimulation by an object the organ is perfectly neutral
as regards these determinations, and hence may in certain
cases (touch¹ at any rate) be regarded as a μeσóτηs, for the
mean is neutral as regards opposite determinations and hence
is κριτικόν.
SECTION VI. THE PHYSIOLOGY OF THE SO-CALLED
COMMON SENSE.
In addition to the special senses there is an unifying or
central function of sense by means of which we perceive the
Kowà aloonтá, i.e. the determinations of number, unity, figure,
magnitude, and change involved in the apprehension of the
special sensations of colour, sound, hardness, etc. Figure and
magnitude are perceived at least by two senses, viz. sight and
touch, and unity seems to be an idea involved in the functioning
of each single sense alike. Again, the comparison and dis-
crimination of qualities belonging to different senses require
a unifying principle in some way over and above the particular
sense organs. Indeed, the simultaneous discrimination of
qualities given by the same sense seems to require the
existence of such a principle". Lastly, to this also is to be
ascribed the self-consciousness that accompanies all perception,
e.g. the perception that we see, hear, and feel, etc.“
This central function of sense' is localised in an internal
1 The explicit references are only to touch (De An. 11. ch. 11, 424 a 4, III. ch.
13, 435 a 21, Meteor. IV. ch. 4, 382 a 19) and the discrimination of pleasure and
pain (De An. III. ch. 7, 431 a 11).
2 Cf. De Sens. ch. 4, 442 b 8.
3 Cf. De An. III. ch. 1, 425 a 20 and De Sens. ch. 7, 447 b 27. It is specific
unity which is perceived by the functioning of a single sense.
4 De An. III. ch. 2, 426 b 12 sqq.
5 Cf. De An. loc. cit. infra and III. ch. 7, 431 a 17 sqq. ; also De Sens. ch. 7,
449 a 1 sqq. and notes.
6 Cf. De Somno, ch. 2, 455 a 15 sqq.; De An. III. ch. 2, 425 b 12 sqq.
7 It is well to note that the mere fact of talking about the common sense' or
'the central sense' may give a wrong impression of the way in which Aristotle
conceived this faculty to exist. Aristotle, in fact, does not talk except in one
instance (De Mem. ch. 1, 450 a 12) of Kown alonσis but usually of Tà kolvà
INTRODUCTION
15
organ, and that is universally admitted to be the heart¹. But
great difficulties arise when we attempt to determine whether
it is the heart as a whole which is the organ, or only some part
of or constituent in it. Great uncertainty also surrounds the
question as to how the central and the peripheral organs are
connected, and similarly what is the exact relation between
the inner faculty and the special senses. As to the physiology
of the central organ there is but little said in the two treatises
which we are discussing (the passages, De Mem. ch. 1, 450 b,
and ch. 2, 453 a 16, do not help us much), while as to the
connection between central and end organ there is not a
word. Accordingly a full discussion of this subject belongs
rather to a treatise dealing with the De Somno, De Insomniis,
and De Juvent., De Resp., etc. At present it will be sufficient
to examine the main contentions of Neuhäuser2 as to the
subject in question in so far as they derive confirmation or
the reverse from passages in our text.
So.
Neuhäuser maintains (1) that, though many passages³
would lead us to believe that the perception of the special
sense qualities is localised in the end organs, this is not really
The stimulation communicated from the external objects
or the medium to the end organ is continued right up to the
heart. Perception does not result unless the heart is in a
αἰσθητὰ and τὸ κοινὸν αἰσθητήριον. It is not a sense functioning in independence of
the special senses, as any one of these may function in independence of the others;
as such it would require to have a special organ independent of the other sense-
organs-a doctrine against which he argues in De An. III. ch. 1, 425 a 13-21.
The common sense is, in fact, that common function which all the special senses
possess, namely that of discrimination, which, as common to all, is contrasted
with the special receptivity which each has for the separate kinds of objective
quality, e.g. sound, colour, etc. It is this function of discrimination which requires
the coordination of the stimuli received by the special sense organs in a central or
common sensorium. Perhaps then, in strictness, we should talk not about a
common sense but about the common discriminative function of sense. Cf.
section x. below and Neuhäuser, Aristoteles Lehre von den sinnlichen Erkennt-
nissvermögen, pp. 30 sqq. .
¹ Cf. De Juvent. ch. 3, 469 a 10, ch. 4, 469 b 3. De Gener. Animal. 11. ch. 6,
743 b 25, De Part. Animal. II. ch. 10, 656 b 24 etc.
2 Aristoteles Lehre von den sinnlichen Erkenntissvermögen und seinen Organen,
pp. 30-132.
3 Cf. Bäumker, pp. 79, 80.
16
INTRODUCTION
condition in which it can function¹, hence it is the presence
of the kinoes in the central organ that constitutes perception.
Secondly (2), the medium of communication between the
peripheral and central organs consists of Tóρoɩ—canals (in
the case of the three senses of sight, hearing, and smell),
which are filled with a substance identical with that which
composes the end organs themselves. This he extracts from
statements³ (a) that these organs are in connection with the
heart, (b) that Tóρo from them extend into the veins of the
brain, (c) that the organs of hearing and smell are themselves
really πόροι full of air4 (σύμφυτον πνεύμα), and (d) that in the
case of the eye its substance has issued through the πópor
from the brain"; finally (e), it is neither the blood nor any
bloodless part which is the organ of sensation, but a structure
created out of the blood. Thirdly (3), the central organ of
sensation is not the heart itself, but a substance found in its
middle chamber and designated by Aristotle тò кaλοúμevov
θερμόν and also πνεῦμα. We hear as well that this substance
is analogous to the element found in the stars (ἀνάλογον οὖσα
τῷ τῶν ἄστρων στοιχείῳ), yet it is not πῦρ, though we generally
identify rò avo o@pa-the aether, with fire, and we hear else-
where that the ψυχή is ὥσπερ ἐμπεπυρευμένη-suffused with
fire. The point is that this substance is different from the
elements of the sublunary world and seems to serve as a basis
or substratum for terrestrial conscious life, just as the upper
aether serves as the substratum for the psychical existence of
the heavenly bodies. It is frequently named τὸ φυσικὸν θερμόν,
τὸ σύμφυτον θερμόν, and is to be identified with τὸ σύμφυτον
πνεῦμα, of which we hear so much in the περὶ ζῴων κινήσεως.
Neuhäuser seems to show pretty conclusively that the
1 De Somno, ch. 2, 455 a 33 and b 11.
2 Neuhäuser, op. cit. pp. 123 sqq.
6
9
3 Cf. De Part. Animal. II. ch. 10, 656 a 27 sqq., 656 b 16; De Gen. Animal.
II. ch. 6, 743 b 32 sqq.
4 Cf. De Sens. ch. 2, 438 b 21.
5 De Sens. ch. 2, 438 b 29.
6 In De Gen. Animal. II. ch. 3, 736 b 30 sqq.
7 De Juventut. ch. 4, 469 b 6-17; De Resp. ch. 8, 474 b 12, ch. 16, 478 a 29.
8 Cf. Neuhäuser, op. cit. pp. 94, 95.
9
pp. 104, 105 and p. 85.
INTRODUCTION
17
heart is properly characterised as the place in which the central
organ or faculty of perception is situated, not as the organ
itself (except surely in the case of the sense of touch¹); again,
if the organ of consciousness is not the heart as a whole but
only some constituent in it, the seat of this organ is probably
the middle chamber2 of the heart.
Now these contentions may all be just, but the question
arises whether this element or anything of the nature of a
substance will serve as a counterpart of that principle of unity
which, according to Aristotle, the common sense must be.
This σύμφυτον θερμὸν or σύμφυτον πνεῦμα must be a substance
and hence quantitative. Aristotle tells us that the primary
organ of sensation or that which perceives must be a magni-
tude³. It is the sense or its concept which is non-quantitative.
Now in the De Anima, III. ch. 2, 427 a 1 sqq., he likens the
principle of unity to something for which the only analogue
is a point, the point which, while remaining indivisibly one,
has yet a double reference as the end of the two segments
respectively of a line which it divides. This is also the
doctrine to be extracted from De An. III. ch. 7, 431 a 19 sqq.
and De Sens. ch. 7, 448 b 19–449 a 224. In the latter passage
he takes up the supposition that different qualities could be
simultaneously discriminated by an organ which, while not
atomic, was yet atomic in the sense of being completely con-
tinuous. Such a description would fit, if not the heart, that
supposed internal substance of celestial affinities which it
contains. The hypothesis is negated, and Aristotle passes
on to the conclusion of the De Anima-that that which
accounts for the holding of different sensations in unity must
be actually a perfect unity, though in aspect diverse. It is
true that he also compares the unity of this psychic principle
1
In the passage in De Part. Animal. 11. ch. 1, 647 a 28, where he talks of a
μópiov (evidently the heart) being capable of receiving all sense-qualities he is
probably referring to tactual αισθητά.
2 Neuhäuser, op. cit. p. 86.
3 De An. II. ch. 12, 424 a 17 sqq.
* Cf. notes ch. 7, below loc. cit.
5 The heat in the heart is xabaрwтáтn; De Gen. Animal. II. ch. 6, 744 a 29.
R.
2
18
INTRODUCTION
to the unity of an object with diverse qualities'. But, as we
shall see, this involves no difference of theory; the ascription
of two attributes to one spatial thing involves a reference to
an identity which is itself not spatial.
Hence we come to the conclusion that Aristotle in
accounting for 'apperception' has to make reference to a
unity that cannot be described as a material organ. It is
true that in consonance with his general psycho-physical
parallelism he should be forced to try to think of it as an
organ, but it has that characteristic which nothing corporeal
can possess ; it is ἄτομόν τι. Hence we cannot conceive both
the soul and its immediate substrate (numerically the same as
the central organ of sensation) as unity³.
α
It is naturally just here that the parallelism of mind and
body, αἴσθησις and αἰσθητήριον, should break down. It is
just in coordinating and distinguishing the contributions of
the senses that the évépyeta of a typical act of mind comes in.
It is as referred to a unity that sensations are anything for
mind. Now quâ èvépyeia, i.e. quâ mental, a psychical phe-
nomenon is nothing passive and nothing to be ascribed to
body. Mind in its proper nature is dπaðýs, and hence, if we
were to ascribe the function of apperception of sensations to
anything, it would need to be assigned to the voûs, which is
ἀπαθής, and “ comes in from outside." The essence of my
contention is, that it is impossible to ascribe to an organ that
which, not being an instance of πáσɣew-passive alteration,
it is the function of nothing corporeal to account for. Unless
Aristotle were to maintain that the substrate of the soul, the
σύμφυτον θερμόν or πνεῦμα, were not extended (which would
be the same as making it immaterial) he could not attribute
to it the unification of consciousness. As facts are, he says or
implies in De An. II. ch. 12 ad init. that the organ is a µéyelos.
At the same time this psychical substance may very well
1 Both here and in De An.
2 I note that Neuhäuser, p. 110, agrees with me in thinking that rŵ ảтbµw kai
¿oxάrw, De Mem. ch. 2, 451 a 28, refers to the organ of sensation.
3 Neuhäuser, p. 104.
4 De Gen. Animal. 11. ch. 3, 736 b 28 tòv voûv µóvov lúρalev ételoiéval.
INTRODUCTION
19
be the organ which accounts for the plurality of impressions
which are united in one act by the mind. It may be this
which is the delicate structure capable of receiving and
retaining the multitude of impressions which function in
memory. In our treatise (the De Memoria) there is nothing
which bears this out. We hear about processes in τὸ αἰσθη
TIKOV being interfered with by the too great pressure of the
parts above them¹, and of defects of memory being due to
excessive fluidity or hardness of the receptive structure².
This last description would surely suit the heart as a whole
better than the mysterious Tveûμa which it contains. It
really does not matter which was Aristotle's theory; anything
extended will suffice, so far as space goes, for the reception of
a plurality.
On the subject of the connection between central and end
organ there are, in our treatises, no materials to enable us to
come to a decision. We hear³ of affections going on kaì
ἐν βάθει καὶ ἐπιπολῆς, i.e. both in the central and the end
organ, and we hear that it is the kívnous going on in the eyes
which causes us to have light sensations still when we turn
aside out of the sun into the dark. Of course it may still be
the case that perception does not occur until the kívŋois reach
the heart, but it is not necessary to believe that the medium
of communication was, according to Aristotle, qualitatively
the same as that of the end organ, and that the process
transmitted to the heart was hence qualitatively the same.
as that realised in the end organ¹. An impression in the
central organ is known as a φάντασμα; the question is
whether an alonμa is, as Neuhäuser maintains, numerically
the same as and only in aspect different from a þávτaoµа.
σμα.
Without committing ourselves to an answer it might be
profitable to point out that a possible solution is that,
1 De Mem. ch. 2, 453 b 1.
3 De Insom. ch. 2, 459 b 7.
2 Ch. 1, 450 b 1 sqq.
I
* Neuhäuser thinks that in maintaining this doctrine Aristotle anticipated the
discovery of the nerves (due to Herophilus) or at least invented an analogue to
them.
5 Cf. De Mem. ch. 1, 450 a II.
2-2
20
INTRODUCTION
though consciousness cannot arise unless the central organ
be stimulated, the stimulation reaching it might be only
analogous¹ to and not identical with the modification of the
peripheral organs.
SECTION VII. THE OBJECTS OF SPECIAL SENSATION.
It
(a) Colour. The ground-work of all colour phenomena
is τὸ διαφανές, which is a κοινὴ φύσις, a common characteristic,
of two of the four elements, namely air and water. We trans-
late To Siapavés as the transparent medium, but though it
functions as a medium between the coloured object and the
eye, it is not merely as a medium that Aristotle considers it.
It is most frequently referred to simply as Tò diapavés without
the further qualification that it is a medium. It is properly a
vehicle or ground-work for the manifestation of colour.
penetrates all bodies to a greater or less degree² (doubtless
Aristotle means all composite bodies, which contain air and
water in some proportion), and it is in so far as they are thus
permeated by it that they are capable of showing colour.
The colour of a solid body is the limit, i.e. the surface, not of
the body itself but of the Siapavés in it. That is the colour
seen, but the same nature extends right through the body.
Similarly bodies that are not opaque but consist of a diaphanous
substance altogether (avτŵv Tŵv diaþavŵv)* show colour. But
that colour is light. This brings us to the consideration that
it is not merely the existence of the transparent vehicle that
causes colour or light phenomena to arise. In itself it is a
mere dúvapus; it must be raised to the state of évépyeta by
the presence of fire in it. Hence light is the colour' of
the diaphanous quality in bodies and is due to some other
determining cause (kaтà ovμßeßηKós); it is not anything
(κατὰ συμβεβηκός)
self-existent. It is equally defined as the ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέ-
χεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς.
1 Cf. note to De Mem. ch. 2, 452 b 16, 17.
2 De Sens. ch. 3, 439 b 9.
4 439 b 13.
5
439 b I.
4
3
439 a 34 sqq.
6
439 a 20 sqq.
INTRODUCTION
2I
>
The presence of fire causes the existence of actual light,
the positive determination of the transparent medium, its
absence that of darkness, the privation of light. These are
the contrasted determinations for substances typically trans-
parent: in definitely bounded (opaque) bodies, in which, it
is implied, To Siapavés does not exist in the same degree or
purity, the contrasted determinations are black and white'.
Thus far there is no particular difficulty in the Aristotelian
conception; light and colour are determinations ultimately
identical, of the type évépyeia, affecting a material or vehicle
which, apart from these determinations, is neutral to them.
Light is to be perceived as an all-pervasive character of
transparent substances equally and instantaneously present
in every part. But when we come to consider the action of
a coloured object upon the eye, and remember that it is said
to affect the vision by means of a kívnous through the medium²,
it seems natural to consider this Kivnois to be light. When,
in De Sensu, chapter 6³, Aristotle talks of light proceeding
from the sun through the medium to the eye, it is evidently
thought of as the stimulation which causes sight. Similarly,
when in the latter part of the same chapter¹ he affirms that
all parts of the medium are affected at the same time³, e.g.
that light travels instantaneously (and hence is not really a
Kívηois), he seems to be still thinking of it as an activity
exerted by the object on the eye (τὸ γὰρ φῶς ποιεῖ τὸ ὁρᾶν).
Yet in other passages it seems to be rather the indispensable
condition of the operation of a coloured object on the eye.
The colour stimulates the transparent medium which already
is in a condition of actuality, ie. is illuminated; objects are
seen év pwrís. Again, in De Sensu, ch. 2, 438 b 4, light is
referred to as possibly itself the medium. It is the kívnois
through the medium, whether that be light or air (in a state
of illumination), that causes vision. Hence from this point of
view light is not the activity exerted by the object on the
sense organ but merely the condition of the exertion of this
1 De Sens. ch. 3, 439 b 17.
3 Ch. 6, 446 a 30 sqq.
5
447 a 10.
2 Ch. 2, 438 b 5.
4 446 b 30 sqq.
T
6 De An. II. ch. 7, 419 a 7 sqq.
22
INTRODUCTION
activity. When in chapter 6 Aristotle denies that light is a
κίνησις (equally whether that κίνησις be of the type φορά
spatial transference, or aλλoíwois-qualitative alteration¹) he
is still thinking of it as an activity, and the substance of his
contention is, that that évépryeca, which was elsewhere treated
as the indispensable condition of that activity, is itself the
activity which accounts for vision. It is very difficult to get
the two conceptions to blend. The transference of the eidos
of the object to the sense organ can only be thought of as a
Kívŋois, i.e. a process involving time. The activity as such is
caused by the coloured object, whereas the évépyeta is caused
by the presence of the illuminating fire. Yet Aristotle, misled
by the apparent instantaneousness of light, wished to conceive
as not a kívŋous that which could only be a kívŋois and to
raise it to the rank of an évépyeɩa, i.e. something not physical
at all.
The fundamental colour-tones are black and white, and
Aristotle thinks to account for all other tints by the mixture
of these two. He apparently wishes to make out that a
mixture or rather chemical union of the substances which
are black and white will give the chromatic tints. One
might have thought that common observation would have
refuted this, and it is true that he does not say exactly this
but merely "when substances unite so do their colours."
True union of any two substances is one in which the original
character of the component substances is lost and a third
distinct qualitative character emerges as characterising every
minutest part of the compound. To our modern chemical
theory this holds true only if we stop our subdivision of the
composite at the molecule. Any further analysis is supposed
to give us parts which are not qualitatively identical, ie. the
molecule is supposed to split into atoms which have the
qualities of the diverse component substances. But to
Aristotle this was not so; the minutest conceivable sub-
division of a true compound would still yield parts which
were qualitatively identical with the whole. The compound
2 Cf. De Sens. ch. 3, 440 b 15 sqq.
1 Cf. notes ch. 6 ad loc.
INTRODUCTION
23
was oμoloμepés¹. Of such a sort was the mixture of black
and white resulting in the chromatic tones supposed to be.
Mere juxtaposition of the minute parts of differently coloured
substances resulted only in the production of an indeterminate
neutral tint which varied with the acuteness of our perception
and our remoteness from the object. It is noteworthy that,
if one were to define black and white' in the modern way as
the capacity of a surface to reflect none or all of the light
cast upon it, one could still describe the chromatic tints as
intermediate between these, as diverse aptitudes for reflect-
ing one portion and absorbing the rest of the total light.
But of course nothing like this is to be found in Aristotle.
What is suggestive in his theory is his contention that the
difference of the composite tones depends upon the different
proportions of the ingredients entering into them. This is an
attempt to assimilate the theory of colours to that of harmonies;
the pleasantest colours are those in which the proportions are
simplest. This idea, if erroneous, is interesting as showing
his readiness to recognise that mathematical relations enter
into the constitution of reality. These relations are arith-
metical; from mere geometrical characteristics you cannot
derive any new quality, but, given a pair of opposed funda-
mental sensuous attributes, you can by a proportionate com-
bination of the two account for the intermediate qualities.
The same theory is worked out also in connection with flavour.
1 Cf. notes to ch. 3, 440 a 34 sqq.
2 In Metaph. x. ch. 7, 1057 b 8 sqq. white and black are distinguished as 7ò
διακριτικὸν χρῶμα and τὸ συγκριτικὸν χρῶμα, and one might suspect that this
implied some theory that white was the active and black the passive element in
colour mixture in conformity with the principle in Meteorol. IV. ch. 1, 378 b 22
τὸ γὰρ συγκριτικὸν ὥσπερ ποιητικόν τι ἐστίν. But from various passages in the
TỤ
Topics, e.g. III. ch. 5, 119 a 30, IV. ch. 2, 123 a 2, we find that it is white which
is τὸ διακριτικὸν χρῶμα. It is also said to be διακριτικὸν ὄψεως. I suppose
the fact alluded to by this term is that it dissipates and exhausts the energy of
the sense organ.
If indeed the term is properly Aristotelian and not simply
taken by way of illustration from some current popular theory, it is to be
connected with the doctrine referred to in De An. III. ch. 13, 435 b 13 and else-
where, that excessive stimulation destroys the sense organ, and white being the
purest and most characteristic colour will tend to this extreme.
24
INTRODUCTION
(b) Sound is not treated at length in the De Sensu, and
the theory of taste and smell involves to a still greater degree
than that of light the crudities of the Aristotelian psychics.
Not that we should speak with entire disrespect of the genera-
lisation which assigned the constituents of all things to but
four ultimate elements. The grouping of substances together
according as they. were dry, fluid, gaseous, or manifested
warmth, implied something more than a mere universal of
sense in each case. The distinctions reappear in modern
science not as the designations of different primitive sub-
stances but as marking distinct states in which all matter
can exist. At least τὸ ξηρόν or γῆ, τὸ ὑγρόν or ὕδωρ, and ὁ
ȧýp correspond to the solid, the liquid, and the gaseous states,
and in the celestial fire-rò άvw oŵµa-which though not
identical with is yet analogous to πûp, Aristotle in a way
shadows forth the conception of the ether.
(c) Flavour is, according to the De Sensu, a qualitative¹
affection of liquid by dry substance. This modification is
effected by the agency of heat (heat is the cooperating cause
-σvvaíTiov), and the process by which it is produced is a sort
of solution of the dry in the liquid (πλύσις, ἐναποπλύνειν).
Knowing Aristotle's theory of the qualitative modification of
one substance by another, we shall, however, refuse to regard
this as a diffusion of the particles of the solid in the liquid.
It is no mechanical diffusion, but what we should call a
chemical union of the dry with the moist; it is, in fact, a
union more intimate than our chemical union is supposed to
be. If it were not so, then really the particles of the solid
would stimulate the sensation, and there would be some
ground for the Democritean theory that it was the different
shapes of these particles that produced the different flavours.
This Aristotle entirely rejects; though taste is a tactual
sense, that does not mean that it is acted upon by the spatial
and mechanical properties of the minute parts of bodies,
1 ποιόν τι τὸ ὑγρὸν παρασκευάζει, ch. 4, 441 b 21.
2 De Sens. 441 b 17, cf. also ch. 5, 445 a 15.
3 Cf. above in connection with colour mixture.
4 Ch. 4, 442 a 31 sqq.
INTRODUCTION
25
analogous to those properties discerned by touch when the
bodies have an appreciable mass. It is not the particle
impinging on the tongue that causes the taste, but the
qualitative modification of the liquid medium which is
identified as the flavour. If we lived amidst this vehicle',
surrounded by it as we are by the air, then it would act as a
medium just exactly as the air does in odour or sound, and
the sense of taste would be a mediated one. In assigning the
sense of taste as a subvariety of touch2, Aristotle no doubt
has in mind the fact that, as things are, it is only effected by
contact with a portion of the substance in which the qualitative
modification known as flavour subsists; he also, of course, has
in view his theory that the fundamental qualities of flavour,
sweetness and bitterness, are really indices of the tactual
properties of food which go to determine its value as nutri-
ment. The sweet-тò yλUкú-is identified with the light—
TÒ KоûДov, i.e. with that light substance which can be raised
up by the supposed vital heat operative in digestion and so
get incorporated in the organism. The bitter-Tò TIKρóv-
being heavy, sinks down and passes away as excrement³.
Those actual properties, be it noted, are not spatial or
dynamical according to Aristotle, but qualities given by the
special sensations of touch, and it is upon such tactual attri-
butes of objects that their value or hurtfulness for our organisms
depends*.
All other tastes than sweet and bitter are composites of
those two qualities in different proportions, exactly as the
chromatic tones are compounds of black and white³.
(d) For odour to exist we require the prior production
of flavour; we must already have тò eyxvμov vypóv, i.e. liquid
modified by flavour, or, what is the same things, тò exνμov
Enpóv, dry substance which has produced a qualitative modi-
fication on liquid. The further solution of this flavoured
substance in either air or water is, it seems, that which
1 De Sens. ch. 6, 447 a 8.
3 441 b 26 sqq.
5 Cf. above (a) on colour.
2 Ch. 4, 441 a 3.
4 De An. III., ch. 13, 435 b 4 sqq.
6 Cf. notes to ch. 5, 442 b 31.
26
INTRODUCTION
produces odour¹. The diffusing agency is again heat, but
it must be a fresh diffusion of the sapid substance which
produces odour; if not, odour to creatures living in water
would be identical with taste, whereas Aristotle distinctly
assigns the sense of smell as such to them³. Similarly odour
to animals that respire is not simply the presence in air of
exactly the same thing that in liquid causes taste; it is a
'diffusion' in the air of the flavour itself, not of the cause of
the flavour. But, since flavour is the basis of odour, differences
in the latter correspond to the varieties of the former¹, and
the scents derive their names from those distinguishing the
tastes to which they correspond, owing to the similarity of
the actual sensations 5.
Animals that respire perceive odour by means of the air
in which it is diffused' entering the nostrils. The character-
istic which modifies the air seems to be thus transferred to
the organ, which Aristotle probably thought was composed of
air alone in respiring animals. The air in entering the organ
displaces a membrane and so effects communication. But in
animals which dwell in water, the organ (probably consisting
of water) is uncovered, just as the eyes also of fishes have no
protecting covering; though the manner of perception is
different the sense is still the same, for it is the same objective
quality which affects them as in us causes smell®.
Thus far odours are strictly parallel to flavours, and serve
as an index to the character of the food from which they
proceed. But we can classify them in a different way and
not according to the taste to which they correspond; or
rather, as Aristotle says, there are two different varieties or
groups of odour. As we saw, heat is required in the propaga-
tion of all, i.e. the dúvaµis or puois of odour contains the heat.
Now in man¹º this heat entering the nostrils tempers the cold
1 De Sens. ch. 5, 443 b 7.
4
443 b 9.
2 443 b 17.
3 443 a 4, 444 b 21.
5 Cf. De An. II. ch. 9, 421 b 1.
6 Cf. De An. III. ch. 1, 425 a 5 (0αтÉρOV TоÚтwv SC. ȧépos кal üdatos) and cf.
section v. above.
7 De Sens, ch. 5, 444 b 24.
9 Cf. 444 a 27.
8 Cf. notes to 444 b 21.
10 Ch. 5, 444 a 19 sqq.
INTRODUCTION
27
which is supposed to prevail in the brain and its neighbourhood.
Odours then appear to have a direct effect upon health and to
be regarded as pleasant or the reverse in proportion as their
action is beneficial or not. It is thus that Aristotle accounts
for the appreciation felt by man for the scents of flowers and
perfumes which have no association with edible things, an
appreciation not felt by the lower animals. In the latter the
brain, not being nearly so large in proportion to their size,
does not apparently need this tonic influence. Thus Aristotle
assigns to what we should call an aesthetic satisfaction a purely
physiological and naturalistic explanation.
SECTION VIII. PERCEPTION AS QUANTITATIVE.
In chapters 6 and 7 of the De Sensu Aristotle raises the
question (1) whether all perception is of a quantum¹ and
(2) whether all quanta are perceptible². Both are answered
in the affirmative; the reasons for maintaining the former
principle we have already seen³. Spatial quantity is to be
identified as the continuous (Tò σvvexés), and the continuous is
just that in which there is no least part, in which you never
come to the indivisible; objects of perception may, however,
appear to be indivisible and therefore non-quantitative*. What
this admission amounts to we must now discuss. In raising
the problem whether there are an infinite number of perceptible
parts in any object (e.g. whether all quanta are perceptible),
Aristotle points out that the different species of qualities
belonging to any one sense must form a limited number³.
They can all be arranged in a linear series with the simple
qualities most opposed to each other forming the extreme
points and the others arranged in proximity to the two poles
in accordance with the preponderance of the one or the other
element respectively in them. But though thus arranged in
linear fashion, they do not form a continuum, ie. in analysing
the whole of which they are constituent parts, you come
1 De Sens. ch. 7, 449 a 22 sqq.
2 Ch. 6, 445 b3 sqq.; cf. also ch. 7, 448 a 21 sqq.
3 Sec. II. above.
4 Ch. 7, 448 b 17.
5 Ch. 6, 445 b 24.
28
INTRODUCTION
ultimately to units which cannot be subdivided, i.e. you come
to the indivisible. Hence there must be a finite number of
parts or steps between the ends of the scale. This is a
general proposition that holds good equally of a series of
cognate qualities and of the number of middle terms to be
interposed between subject and predicate in the proof of any
proposition¹. It is true equally of any finite magnitude.
There must be a finite number of assignable parts (equal,
loa, cf. ch. 6, note ad loc.) between point A and point B, or
else Achilles can never overtake the tortoise 2. What then
becomes of the assertion that all quantities are perceptible,
i.e. that no matter how far you analyse the object the parts
obtained are still something for sense? Aristotle solves the
difficulty by pointing out that it is one thing for a part to be
perceived by itself and another as in the whole. We come to
a limit at which a part ceases to be per se actually (èvepyeíą)
an object of perception. The very minute parts of bodies are
in their individuality only potentially (Svváμe) perceptible.
As taken along with the others and going to compose the
whole they are, no doubt, actually perceptible. They do
produce an effect upon the sense, but taken in their indi-
viduality they do not; in fact, if a very minute part of any
substance is actually isolated from the whole it is altered
qualitatively and reduced to the nature of the new medium
in which it is placed³. The conclusion of the whole doctrine
is, that the sum of distinct objects of consciousness into which
any total can be divided is limited, and that, for explicit
consciousness, such units are indivisible. All specific exist-
ences are as such indivisible, and the mind can grasp absolute
unity. This must be the truth underlying the statements that
sense objects can appear indivisible; as objects of mind they
may be indivisible, though, as existences in the physical
world and hence continuous, they cannot really be soª.
1 Cf. notes, De Sens. ch. 6, 445 b 24. 2 Cf. Physics, VI. ch. 9, 239 b 14 sqq.
3 De Sens. ch. 6, 446 a 8 sqq.
4 Cf. Metaph. X. ch. 3, 1054 a 27 where it is pointed out that тò πìî¤os and
τὸ διαιρετόν is μᾶλλον αἰσθητόν, and unity and the indivisible only known by
opposition to these.
INTRODUCTION
29
Aristotle's distinction between the actual and the potential
perceptibility of a sense object may throw some light upon
the conception of the subconscious existence of ideas which is
so much in evidence in modern psychology. To many writers
it seems to be the case that ideas or sensations may go on
diminishing in intensity until they reach a zero point-the
threshold of consciousness, after which they pass over into the
subconscious region and go on existing as 'petites perceptions
with a separate individuality just as good as that which they
had before. They are not 'unconscious mental modifications,'
i.e. they are still in some way present to consciousness, for,
it appears, they may go on diminishing still further in inten-
sity until they reach a zero of total oblivion. Now such a
conception of an intermediate subconscious zone interposed
between the conscious and the unconscious is quite self-
contradictory¹. A sensation in its individuality is either an
object of consciousness or it is not; if it is not you may
call it subconscious if you like, meaning by that that in
conjunction with others it produces an effect upon the mind,
but in its individuality it is not an object of consciousness
of any grade whatsoever. The subconscious 'region' should
then be defined, not as a region, but as that state of an object
in which, as a separate thing, it cannot be distinguished, but
still in conjunction with others helps to produce a total
psychical disposition. Whether the object can ever become
a distinct element in consciousness per se depends upon
circumstances. Sometimes by straining the attention
banishing other stimuli we can detect separate sensations
hitherto unnoticed; sometimes sensations which, we know,
must to a more acute sense appear distinct, are known to us
only in the total volume which they produce. So too with
ideas and memories, some can be aroused in their individuality
by recollection, while others are real only in so far as by
their former existence they modify our total present mood.
or
Aristotle's doctrine of the infinite divisibility of sensation
1 This is what Lewes (Aristotle, p. 253) seems to have in mind in criticising
Hamilton's theory of 'latent' knowledge. He by no means, however, makes his
point clear.
30
INTRODUCTION
(as above explained) fits in well with his general polemic
against the atomic theory. With his expressly physical
objections to atoms we are not here concerned. What his
teaching amounts to is, that, though the characters of the
minute parts called atoms are supposed to explain the sensa-
tional quality of the total substance which they compose,
they themselves as occupying space will have parts and hence
will want explaining by the nature of their minute parts and
so on ad infinitum. Merely mathematical or mechanical
qualities will not explain the special differentiae perceived by
sense, and the atoms themselves, if corporeal, cannot be
thought of as having merely mathematical and mechanical
properties. To think of them we must invest them with the
attributes known to us by sense. Hence instead of assuming
that the sense-quality of an appreciable object is due to the
configuration alone of its parts, it is as well to suppose that
those parts have qualitative affections which, if not identical
with those of the whole, are yet like them sensuous and
contribute in some way to the resultant nature of the total
object.
SECTION IX. APPERCEPTION.
Apperception is, of course, a term not corresponding to
any expression in Aristotle, but by it we may designate that
function of sense in which it judges (κpível) and by so doing
coordinates in the same indivisible act different objects. The
physiology of the matter we have already dealt with; Aris-
totle localises the function in a central organ and hence it
may be held to correspond to what is known to modern
science as the action of the higher centres as opposed to the
stimulation of end organ and lower ganglia merely. The
latter affection does not result in perception of the typically
human kind, which requires that higher coordination which
has often been referred to by the current psychological term
' apperception.' The term aioláveolaι with Aristotle in-
cludes discrimination (κpíveiv), and though in the discussion
INTRODUCTION
31
in the De Sensu he almost invariably employs the former
term, whereas in the De Anima the latter emerges more
conspicuously, he does not mean to distinguish two different
functions by the different expressions. Alo@áveolar implies
both receptivity and discrimination, and would not be alo@nois
without discrimination. Accordingly, when Aristotle asks
how perception of two objects at the same time is possible,
he is not asking how two impressions may be received at the
same time; the sense organ, being a péye@os and having an
indefinite plurality of parts within it, can easily account for
that the different parts may be differently modified. What
he wants to find out is how the different determinations can
be simultaneously discriminated, for that requires simulta-
neous existence in the same individual entity, not merely
in different parts of it. Discrimination and coordination go
together; as he shows in the De Anima¹, the consciousness
which discriminates must be single. The objects perceived
must not be present in separate moments² or to a divided
consciousness.
་
In chapter 7 of the De Sensu, Aristotle without first
hinting at his theory of how an indivisible unit of conscious-
ness is possible, and thus leaving the field free for any
other theory, asks whether discrimination of different sense
elements in an indivisible moment can be effected. He
distinguishes the cases of (1) perception of opposite qualities
belonging to the same sense, e.g. black and white, and
(2) determinations due to different senses-sweet and white.
If, he says, such discrimination were likely to occur, it would
be most natural to expect it in the case of the evavría³.
contrary determinations of one single sense,—µâλλov yàp
ἅμα ἡ κίνησις τῆς μίας— for the modifications due to
black and white colour being localised in the same organ are
more 'together' than those caused by sweetness and white-
ness (which exist in different organs), and hence they have
more chance of being coordinated. But, as it turns out, when
1 111. ch. 2, 426 b 17 sqq.
3 447 b 23.
4
2 De Sens. ch. 7, 448 a 21 sqq.
4 447 b 9.
32
INTRODUCTION
two modifications occur together one either drives out the
other or modifies it in some way, and, in the latter case, it is
so modified in return that a third and new modification arises
in which the individuality of the component elements is lost.
Two equal and contrary determinations might completely
annul each other, but when we get qualities belonging to the
same sense simultaneously presented, what does occur is μížis,
a fusion of the two elements, as in the case of harmony; they
form one thing, a compound, and though they are, as forming
such a thing, present to consciousness, their individuality is
lost and hence they cannot be discriminated. In an obscure
passage² which Biehl has had to reconstruct almost entirely,
Aristotle rejects the theory that this discrimination can be
effected by the determination in different ways of the different
parts of an organ which are yet continuous with each other
This leads up to his own theory that, if either contrary or
diverse qualities are to be simultaneously perceived there
must be an absolutely indivisible psychical unity which can
yet be viewed in two different ways at the same time. Its
nearest analogue is, as has been said³, the mathematical
point, or the unity of an object which possesses diverse attri-
butes. It has been debated whether those two solutions of
the difficulty are the same, or whether the latter, if satis-
factory for the case of qualities like white and sweet, belong-
ing to different senses, will not be insufficient to account for
the harder¹ case of contrary modifications like black and
white. A passage in the De Anima³ might make us think so,
but, as Rodier in his elucidation of De An. III. ch. 76 points
out, there is no real discrepancy between the two theories.
Opposed qualities—èvavría-though existing in different parts
of the same total object must (if between them they cover
the whole extent of the ground) meet in a common indivisible
point if they are still to be ascribed to the same object, and
diverse characters (érepa) like white and sweet, which do not
exist in different parts of the substance, must be deemed (as
1 De Sens. ch. 7, 447 a 27.
3 Section VI.
5 III. ch. 2, 426 b 28 sqq.
2
448 b 19 sqq.
4 Cf. notes to 449 a 4 sqq.
6 Traité de l'Âme, Vol. 11. p. 501.
INTRODUCTION
33
long as the substance has those qualities) to belong equally
to its minutest parts, ie. to be held together in a unity
which, like the point, is absolutely indivisible. Of such a
nature, then, is the psychic faculty involved in discrimination.
It would be natural, if we followed out the parallelism
between mind and body mechanically, to imagine that there
was some corporeal organ which had the same properties,
and there is a passage in the De Memoria¹, where, having
evidently the organ of consciousness in mind, Aristotle
refers to it as atomic; hence there is some countenance for
Neuhäuser's theory that this organ is the mysterious vital
heat of heavenly or transcendent origin. But as we have
seen, nothing corporeal can fulfil the functions of an absolute
indivisible unity; the unity of apperception is generally
styled ἕν τι τῆς ψυχῆς", and perhaps the emphasis is on the
latter word. We might have expected that it would have
been in some way affiliated with the operation of vous, which
is non-spatial and has a really transcendent origin. The
account of the activity of vónois in De An. III. ch. 6, is almost
entirely parallel to his description of the higher function of
sense. However, the tendency of Aristotle to treat vous
simply as the highest of the intellectual faculties that of
pure conceptual thought-prevents us from making this
identification; but, on the other hand, his refusal to see in
discrimination of any kind mere passivity or determination
by what is foreign to one's own being, leads us to surmise
that the faculties of Sense and of Reason must be in essence
one.
This no doubt is his real belief but, as usual, it is veiled
by his cautious manner of presenting the subject.
SECTION X. MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION.
The text of the treatise on Memory and Recollection
presents some difficulties in interpretation which are perhaps
still greater than those met with in the De Sensu. The worst
1 Ch. 2, 451 a 28. Cf. above, Section v1.
2 Cf. De Sens. ch. 7, 449 a 10, 448 b 23.
R.
3
34
INTRODUCTION
of these occur in passages where (e.g. 452a 18sqq., 452b 16sqq.)
symbols are employed, and in one case at least it is not
claimed that a perfectly satisfactory explanation has been
arrived at.
The main results of the treatise now claim our attention.
(1) Memory (µvýµn) is used in a very restricted sense,
one much narrower than that assigned to it in modern
psychology. It does not comprise retention: that rather is
an element present in the general faculty of Imagination, of
which Memory is a special determination. A sense impres-
sion which persists as a psychic change resulting from an
actual perception¹ is an image (þávтaoμa); it is the ascrip-
tion of this image to some object existing in past time which
is memory in the proper sense. In φαντασία generally
(though not apparently always 2) the object which has
produced the originating sense-impression is not present,
but that fact does not constitute the mental state a memory.
The sense of time, either determinate or indeterminate, must
enter into the apprehension before we can be said to re-
member. Thus Memory is relatively a high mental function,
and though it is not denied of several of the lower animals,
it is nothing which need emerge in that assimilation of
present to past which must be found in any consciousness
which profits by experience.
(2) Aristotle thus thinks that a mental image may be
used and become an object of thought without the reference
to historical reality which memory implies. It was quite
natural that he should do so. As we have already seen,
the kivŋois in the body reproduces some kívŋois which has
existed in the external world, and the tendency of his
thought is to ascribe as nearly as possible identity of nature
to the two; at least his whole theory of sense-perception
implies this. Hence, if a bodily kívŋois give knowledge of
external reality in sense perception, there is no reason why
it should not do so when the source of sense stimulation is
no longer present. Certainly it is only when we remember
1 De An. III. ch. 3, 429 a 1, 428 b 11 sqq.
2 Cf. De Mem. ch. 1, note to 449 b 32.
INTRODUCTION
35
in the strict sense, that the bodily kívηois, which functions
as νόημα οι θεώρημα—an object of thought, gives us know-
ledge of the external object which caused the perception to
which it is due; nevertheless it has an objective character,
just as the animal in a picture has a definite nature as an
object of consciousness independent of the reference to the
actual living model from which it was copied or which
suggested it¹. From this account of the matter it might
appear that Aristotle believed that the physiological modi-
fication in our bodies was the object of our thought when
we imagined anything. So it is in a way, but it is only
physiological per accidens; it is the same eidos whether
existing in the external world or in the human body. To
our minds the disparateness between the physiological and
the merely physical seems extreme and we can think of
the physiological process only as being some very remote
symbolization of the external; not so was it to Aristotle,
by whom the complexity of organic structures was very
inadequately comprehended. It is noteworthy that the
difference of the physiological and the physical seems to
have been much more clearly realised by the time of
Spinoza, who, when defining mind as 'idea corporis,' avoids
the objection we have instanced above by explaining that our
ideas involve the nature both of the external bodies and of
the human organism2; he holds, however, that in perceiving
the external we perceive also the nature of our own body.
Nevertheless, the fact that no thought is the thought of
the physiological process occasioning it, but is rather the
consciousness of that which this process symbolizes, need
not conflict with Aristotle's definition of memory or his
account of the objective nature of a pávrаouа apart from
memory. Just as the animal in a picture has an existence
κаl' avтó-quâ animal, and not merely as a certain arrange-
ment of paint devised to represent a living animal, so the
þávтaσµa may have an objective character without referring
to the particular event or object to which it owes its origin.
2 Ethics, II. Prop. xvI. and Corollaries.
¹ 450 b 23 sqq.
3-2
36
INTRODUCTION
When it does so refer and is used as an εἰκών or μνημό
vevμa¹, the representation of the object is coincident with a
representation (either definite or vague) of the time which has
elapsed since it was present to sense, and it is this coincidence2
alone which gives memory in the true sense.
To modern thought it may seem strange that Aristotle
should regard a þávтaoµa, a mere alteration in the bodily
organs, as something objective. But one must remember
that this Kivnois was to him something of a definite pattern,
as definite as that of any object external to the human
organism, and that the knowledge of the one would not
differ from that of the other in point of 'objectivity.' The
stimulation of the sense organs by an external object might
originally cause the kivnois. But this stimulation is nothing
else than the communication of the eidos of the external
object to the human organism. It is this eldos which forms.
the content of thought, and whether existing in the external
physical object or in the sense organ it is equally objective.
The psychological problem as to how we perceive and re-
member and think is never for Aristotle the question of
how mind knows a real object. This latter, a metaphysical
difficulty, is quite distinct. That real objects existed and
could be known was the assumption from which he started.
Knowing was a fact which must be accepted, but how a
corporeal organism could manifest this function wanted ex-
planation. The presence of the actual fact thought of in the
body of the thinking being and at the moment of thought
was the only solution he could offer. It is for modern
physiology to discover a better. But his was an attempt
in the right direction and a very natural answer also, for his
question was, not how mind thinks, but how we-embodied
creatures-think.
If it be asked: 'Is Aristotle's a theory of representative.
knowledge or perception?' we must answer no, at least it is
not so in the modern sense of such a theory. In a sense, no
doubt, there is representation; between the individual and a
1 De Mem. 451 a 3.
2 ch. 2, 452 b 26.
INTRODUCTION
37
body external to his organism the kivŋois in the sense organs
mediates, but between 'mind' and its object nothing inter-
poses, and our apprehension of an external object is direct,
-the immediate awareness of an objective, real character
of things. Hence Aristotle could think of a þávτaσµa which
was not due to an object at the moment stimulating the
senses, but was merely retained in the organs, as having
objectivity apart from memory. This was so because the
eidos or character it had was equally real whether in the
body or out of it. Memory in fact adds nothing to the
objectivity of the pavтáoμara involved in it. It is merely
the union of the kivŋois caused by lapse of time and the
pavтaoua originated by an external thing.
(3) The characteristic of involving continuous quantity,
spatial or temporal, which cleaves to sense perception¹ infects
also imagery, and hence memory. Thus memory must be
assigned to the faculty of sense and its organ; it is not a
function of pure thought. The function of pure thought
(νούς) is the apprehension of concepts apart (κεχωρισμένα)
from this continuity which forms their λn vonτn; the
concept (vónμa) is to the image as the equation to a curve
is to the curve in which it is realised. But memory, the
apprehension of time, which is a continuum, can thus never
belong to pure thought as such. Hence we may conclude
(indeed, if my interpretation of ch. 1, 450 a 20 be correct, we
find it stated) that higher beings whose activity is purely
intellectual do not share in memory.
(4) Differences in powers of memory Aristotle accounts
for by the condition of the bodily organ (which is identical
with the central organ of sensation). In language suggested
largely by a passage in the Theaetetus of Plato he describes
the causes of variation between different individuals and the
different ages of life. Generally speaking too great 'fluidity'
of the receptive structure causes impermanence of the im-
pression; too great 'density' occasions a difficulty in getting
1 Cf. De Sens. ch. 6, 445 b 32.
2 De Mem. ch. 1, 450 a 12 sqq. and notes.
3 Theaetetus, 191 c sqq.
38
INTRODUCTION
any experience ever impressed. Similarly in the process o'
recollection (which we shall next proceed to discuss) bodily
conditions influence the recall of ideas either by impeding¹
the series of changes which occur in the central sensorium or
by causing it to diffuse and so cause emotional disturbance².
(5) Recollection (áváµvnois) is to be distinguished from
memory, the ascription of an image to some event in the
past, which may be due either to the persistence of a sense-
impression or to its reinstatement afresh; ȧváµvnois is just
that process of reinstatement and is so to be defined. It
must, however, be carefully distinguished from the process.
involved in learning (which was identified with it by Plato).
We may actually have reproduced in us by learning some
knowledge previously possessed which might have been
recalled but has totally passed into oblivion; under those
circumstances the process is quite different from recollection;
the latter process is self-conducted, while, for the former, we
require instruction. Again, the basis from which we start is
different in the two cases; much more than the meagre
knowledge required in order to be capable of receiving
instruction will be necessary, if we are to recall the previous
idea unaided.
The objects to be recalled are twofold; they are
either those which have a necessary connection with one
another, like the concepts and judgments in mathematical
science, or again they may be contingently related. The
former are easily remembered, the latter not so, but in both
cases the order of recall depends upon the experienced
connection of the facts, and the connection is either that of
like with like, or of things contiguous or opposed. The
ease with which an idea may be recalled depends upon the
frequency of the repetition of the particular series of con-
nections by which it is reinstated. Frequent repetition due
to custom produces a natural disposition which tends to
actualisation just like any other δύναμις or φύσις. Here,
5
3
1 De Mem. ch. 2, 453 b 1.
4 451 b 32.
2
453 a 16 sqq.
451 b 1 sqq.
5
452 a 29 sqq.
INTRODUCTION
ION
39
however, just because the disposition is due to custom, it is
liable to be interfered with, just as any tendency in nature
may be thwarted, only more so.
The laws of Association here formulated by Aristotle
(Contiguity, Similarity, and Contrast) are obviously merely
principles governing the reinstatement of ideas previously
experienced. Hence their scope is much narrower than that
assigned to them by modern psychology. Aristotle certainly
held no 'Associationist Theory of Knowledge,' but for that
the most recent theorists are hardly likely to blame him.
There are, however, other psychical operations like 'com-
plication, his αἴσθησις κατὰ συμβεβηκός, which many writers
would rank generally under 'association' but which he left
unaffiliated to the process involved in recollection. This
discreteness in his treatment of mental functions is no doubt
due to his empirical way of approaching his data and his
caution in all but the widest generalisations.
2
(6) Finally we hear that recollection is a higher activity
than mere memory. It is peculiar to man¹. Though it may
operate involuntarily it is typically a purposive operation³
and is to be regarded as a kind of search, like the search for
the middle term in demonstration or for the means to effect
the fulfilment of an end in practical deliberation. Its pur-
posiveness seems to argue to its higher nature; it is in this
way illustrative of the άñáßela which belongs to mind per seª.
In recollecting the soul seems to be active, producing an
activity which proceeds towards the organs of sense. Apart
from the aspect of activity we must, however, recognise that,
in recollection, there is a process going on in the organs of
sense or rather in the central sensorium. The various ideas
which reinstate one another are all to be described as
kɩvýσeis, and the end of a process of recollection seems to
be attained when one particular kivnois is produced which
seems to constitute a terminus to the series—namely the
1 De Mem. ch. 2, 453 a 11.
CHANGE
2 451 b 26.
3 Cf. Prof. Laurie's Institutes of Education, p. 233 sqq.
4 Cf. Section IV. above ad init.
5 De An. 1. ch. 4, 408 b 17.
40
INTRODUCTION
Kívηois corresponding to the idea to be recalled. It is
throughout implied that these kinoes, prior to the act of
recollection, are dormant; that is to say they are not, until
revived, κινήσεις. What then persists or what is the κίνησις
when it is dormant? Aristotle talks of the impression on
the organ being like an imprint-rúπos, and, no doubt, he
must have thought of the impression left by an experience
as being some kind of structural modification of the organ.
He talks of the subjective affections involved in apprehending
magnitudes as being σxnμara¹ like the objective magnitudes
themselves. He does not work out his theory of the persist-
ence of impression, but doubtless the dormant impression is
merely something of the nature of a σxôµa (at least in the
case of the perception of magnitude), while the affection
whether when first experienced or when revived is of the
nature of a kívŋois, though a kívŋois which still has a spatial
configuration and can be represented by a motion passing
along a determinate path-as in the construction of a
triangle. At any rate we find no hint in Aristotle of that
modern theory which would make psychical dispositions
consist in the faint functionings of the same parts as are
brought into play when an idea is explicitly realised.
1 Cf. De Insom. ch. 3, 461 a 8 sqq.
ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΙΣΘΗΤΩΝ
436 a
ΠΕΡΙ ΑΙΣΘΗΣΕΩΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΙΣΘΗΤΩΝ
I
Ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ ψυχῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν διώρισται καὶ περὶ
τῶν δυνάμεων ἑκάστης κατὰ μόριον αὐτῆς, ἐχόμενόν ἐστι
ποιήσασθαι τὴν ἐπίσκεψιν περὶ τῶν ζῴων καὶ τῶν ζωὴν
ἐχόντων ἁπάντων, τίνες εἰσὶν ἴδιαι καὶ τίνες κοιναὶ
5 πράξεις αὐτῶν. τὰ μὲν οὖν εἰρημένα περὶ ψυχῆς ὑπο-
κείσθω, περὶ δὲ τῶν λοιπῶν λέγωμεν, καὶ πρῶτον περὶ
τῶν πρώτων. φαίνεται δὲ τὰ μέγιστα, καὶ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ
τὰ ἴδια τῶν ζῴων, κοινὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα καὶ τοῦ σώματος,
οἷον αἴσθησις καὶ μνήμη καὶ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία καὶ
το ὅλως ὄρεξις, καὶ πρὸς τούτοις ἡδονή τε καὶ λύπη· καὶ
γὰρ ταῦτα σχεδὸν ὑπάρχει πᾶσι τοῖς ζῴοις. πρὸς δὲ
τούτοις τὰ μὲν πάντων ἐστὶ τῶν μετεχόντων ζωῆς κοινά,
τὰ δὲ τῶν ζῴων ἐνίοις. τυγχάνουσι δὲ τούτων τὰ μέ
γιστα τέτταρες συζυγίαι τὸν ἀριθμόν, οἷον ἐγρήγορσις
καὶ ὕπνος, καὶ νεότης καὶ γῆρας, καὶ ἀναπνοὴ καὶ
ἐκπνοή, καὶ ζωὴ καὶ θάνατος· περὶ ὧν θεωρητέον, τί
τε ἕκαστον αὐτῶν, καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας συμβαίνει.
φυσικοῦ δὲ καὶ περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου τὰς πρώτας ἰδεῖν
ἀρχάς· οὔτε γὰρ υγίειαν οὔτε νόσον οἷόν τε γίγνεσθαι
20 τοῖς ἐστερημένοις ζωῆς. διὸ σχεδὸν τῶν περὶ φύσεως
15
οἱ πλεῖστοι καὶ τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφωτέρως τὴν τέχνην
436b μετιόντες, οἱ μὲν τελευτῶσιν εἰς τὰ περὶ ἰατρικῆς, οἱ δ'
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS.
436 a
I
Now that we have given a definite account of soul in its
essential nature and of each of its faculties individually, the
next thing to do is to consider animals and all things possessed
of life and to discover which activities are specific and which
they have in common.
Assuming as a basis our exposition about the soul, let us 5
discuss the remaining questions, beginning with those that
are primary.
The most important of the characteristics of animals,
both generic and specific, evidently belong to soul and body
in common, e.g. sense-perception and memory, passion, desire
and appetite generally, as well as pleasure and pain. These 10
are found practically in all animals.
But further, certain of the phenomena in question are
common to all things which participate in life, while others
are shared by particular kinds of animals. Of these the most
important fall into four pairs of correlatives, to wit, waking
and sleep, youth and age, the inhalation and expulsion of 15
breath, life and death. These phenomena call for discussion,
and we must investigate both the nature of each and the
reasons for its existence.
It falls within the province of the natural scientist to
survey the first principles involved in the subject of health
and disease, for to nothing lacking life can either health or
sickness accrue. Hence pretty well the most of our in- 20
vestigators of nature do not stop until they have run on into
medicine, and those of our medical men who employ their 436 b

TOTLE
φυσεως ἄρχονται περὶ τῆς ἰατρικῆς, ὅτι
λεχθέντα κοινὰ τῆς τε ψυχῆς ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ σώμα
τος, οὐκ ἄδηλον. πάντα γὰρ τὰ μὲν μετ' αἰσθήσεως
5 συμβαίνει, τὰ δὲ δι᾽ αἰσθήσεως· ἔνια δὲ τὰ μὲν πάθη
ταύτης ὄντα τυγχάνει, τὰ δ᾽ ἕξεις, τὰ δὲ φυλακαὶ καὶ
σωτηρίαι, τὰ δὲ φθοραὶ καὶ στερήσεις. ἡ δ᾽ αἴσθησις
ὅτι διὰ σώματος γίγνεται τῇ ψυχῇ, δῆλον καὶ διὰ τοῦ
λόγου καὶ τοῦ λόγου χωρίς. ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν αἰσθήσεως
το καὶ τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι, τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τί συμβαίνει τοῖς
ζῴοις τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, εἴρηται πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ
ψυχῆς. τοῖς δὲ ζῴοις, ᾗ μὲν ζῷον ἕκαστον, ἀνάγκη
ὑπάρχειν αἴσθησιν· τούτῳ γὰρ τὸ ζῷον εἶναι καὶ μὴ
ζῷον διορίζομεν. ἰδίᾳ δ᾽ ἤδη καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἡ μὲν ἁφὴ
15 καὶ γεῦσις ἀκολουθεῖ πᾶσιν ἐξ ἀνάγκης, ἡ μὲν ἁφὴ διὰ
τὴν εἰρημένην αἰτίαν ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, ἡ δὲ γευσις
διὰ τὴν τροφήν· τὸ γὰρ ἡδὺ διακρίνει καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν
αὐτῇ περὶ τὴν τροφήν, ὥστε τὸ μὲν φεύγειν τὸ δὲ διώκειν,
καὶ ὅλως ὁ χυμός ἐστι τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ πάθος. αἱ δὲ
20 διὰ τῶν ἔξωθεν αἰσθήσεις τοῖς πορευτικοῖς αὐτῶν, οἷον
ὄσφρησις καὶ ἀκοὴ καὶ ὄψις, πᾶσι μὲν τοῖς ἔχουσι
σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν ὑπάρχουσιν, ὅπως διώκωσί τε προαι-
σθανόμενα τὴν τροφὴν καὶ τὰ φαῦλα καὶ τὰ φθαρτικὰ
437 a φεύγωσι, τοῖς δὲ καὶ φρονήσεως τυγχάνουσι τοῦ εὖ
ἕνεκα· πολλὰς γὰρ εἰσαγγέλλουσι διαφοράς, ἐξ ὧν ἤ
τε τῶν νοητῶν ἐγγίνεται φρόνησις καὶ ἡ τῶν πρακτῶν.
αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πρὸς μὲν τὰ ἀναγκαῖα κρείττων ἡ ὄψις
5 καθ' αυτήν, πρὸς δὲ νοῦν καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡ ἀκοή.
διαφορὰς μὲν γὰρ πολλὰς καὶ παντοδαπὰς ἡ τῆς ὄψεως
ἀγγέλλει δύναμις διὰ τὸ πάντα τὰ σώματα μετέχειν
χρώματος, ὥστε καὶ τὰ κοινὰ διὰ ταύτης αἰσθάνεσθαι
436b 19 γευστικού LU Alex., θρεπτικού etiam Bas. et Sylb. | post θρεπτικοῦ
addunt μορίου exceptis Ε Μ Υ et scripti et impressi, atque addit etiam τῆς ψυχῆς Ρ
vet. tr., θρεπτικού sine ullo additamento probant etiam Hayduck et Biehl.
SENSE AND ITS__ OBJECTS
45
art in a more scientific fashion, use as the first principles of
medicine truths belonging to the natural sciences.
There is no lack of evidence that the phenomena we have
mentioned are shared by both soul and body in common,
for they all either occur in concomitance with sensuous ex-
perience or are due to it. Some are modifications, some 5
permanent dispositions of sensuous experience, while some
protect and preserve and others destroy and annul it.
That the psychical function of sensation depends upon
the body is clear both à priori and apart from such evidence.
However, the nature of sense and its function and the reason
why this phenomenon is found in animals, have already been 10
explained in the Psychology. Animals quâ animal must
possess sensation, for it is by means of this that we dis-
tinguish animate from inanimate.
To each animal in its own proper nature touch and taste
must necessarily accrue, touch for the reason given in the 15
Psychology, taste owing to the fact that it takes nutriment;
for by taste the pleasant and unpleasant are distinguished in
food, so that as a consequence the one is pursued and the
other shunned; to put it generally, flavour is a determination
of that which is nutritive.
In animals with the power of locomotion, are found the
senses which are mediated by something external, to wit, 20
smell, hearing, and sight. These exist uniformly for the
purpose of the self-preservation of the animals possessing
them, in order that they may become aware of their food
at a distance and go in pursuit of it and that they may avoid
what is bad and injurious. Where intelligence is found they 437 a
are designed to subserve the ends of well-being; they com-
municate to our minds many distinctions out of which
develops in us the intelligent apprehension alike of the
objects of thought and of the things of the practical life.
Of these three sight is per se more valuable so far as the
needs of life are concerned, but from the point of view of
thought and accidentally, hearing is the more important. 5
The characteristics are many and various which the faculty
of sight reports, because all bodies are endowed with colour;
46
ARISTOTLE
Ο
ΤΟ
μάλιστα (λέγω δὲ κοινὰ σχῆμα καὶ μέγεθος, κίνησιν,
το ἀριθμόν· ἡ δ᾽ ἀκοὴ τὰς τοῦ ψόφου διαφορὰς μόνον,
ὀλίγοις δὲ καὶ τὰς τῆς φωνῆς. κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ
πρὸς φρόνησιν ἡ ἀκοὴ πλεῖστον συμβάλλεται μέρος.
ὁ γὰρ λόγος αἴτιός ἐστι τῆς μαθήσεως ἀκουστὸς ὤν, οὐ
καθ᾽ αὑτὸν ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ἐξ ὀνομάτων γὰρ
15 σύγκειται, τῶν δ᾽ ὀνομάτων ἕκαστον σύμβολόν ἐστιν.
διόπερ φρονιμώτεροι τῶν ἐκ γενετῆς ἐστερημένων εἰσὶν
ἑκατέρας τῆς αἰσθήσεως οἱ τυφλοὶ τῶν ἐνεῶν καὶ
κωφών.
II
Περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δυνάμεως ἣν ἔχει τῶν αἰσθήσεων
20 ἑκάστη, πρότερον εἴρηται. τοῦ δὲ σώματος ἐν οἷς ἐγ
γίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν αἰσθητηρίοις, νῦν μὲν ζητοῦσι κατὰ
τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων· οὐκ εὐποροῦντες δὲ πρὸς
τέτταρα πέντ᾽ οὖσας συνάγειν, γλίχονται περὶ τῆς
πέμπτης. ποιοῦσι δὲ πάντες τὴν ὄψιν πυρὸς διὰ τὸ
25 πάθους τινὸς ἀγνοεῖν τὴν αἰτίαν· θλιβομένου γὰρ καὶ
κινουμένου τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ φαίνεται πῦρ ἐκλάμπειν· τοῦτο
δ᾽ ἐν τῷ σκότει πέφυκε συμβαίνειν, ἢ τῶν βλεφάρων
ἐπικεκαλυμμένων· γίνεται γὰρ καὶ τότε σκότος. ἔχει
δ᾽ ἀπορίαν τοῦτο καὶ ἑτέραν. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἔστι λανθάνειν
3ο αἰσθανόμενον καὶ ὁρῶντα ὁρώμενόν τι, ἀνάγκη ἄρ᾽ αὐτὸν
ἑαυτὸν ὁρᾶν τὸν ὀφθαλμόν. διὰ τί οὖν ἠρεμοῦντι τοῦτ᾽
οὐ συμβαίνει; τὰ δ᾽ αἴτια τούτου, καὶ τῆς ἀπορίας καὶ
τοῦ δοκεῖν πῦρ εἶναι τὴν ὄψιν, ἐντεῦθεν ληπτέον. τὰ γὰρ
λεῖα πέφυκεν ἐν τῷ σκότει λάμπειν, οὐ μέντοι φῶς γε
437 b ποιεῖ, τοῦ δ᾽ ὀφθαλμοῦ τὸ καλούμενον μέλαν καὶ μέσον
મ
λεῖον φαίνεται. φαίνεται δὲ τοῦτο κινουμένου τοῦ ὄμ
ματος διὰ τὸ συμβαίνειν ὥσπερ δύο γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἕν.
τοῦτο δ᾽ ἡ ταχυτής ποιεῖ τῆς κινήσεως, ὥστε δοκεῖν
5 ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον. διὸ καὶ οὐ
K
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
47
thus by this sense especially are perceived the common
sensibles (by these I mean figure, magnitude, motion, and
number).
IU
But hearing gives merely differences in sound and, in a
few cases, in articulate utterance too. Hearing, however, has
the greatest share in the development of intelligence, though
this is an accidental function. Speech being audible is in-
strumental in causing us to learn; but this function it
possesses not per se but accidentally, for speech is a complex 15
of words, every one of which is a conventional symbol. A
consequence is that of those who from birth have been
without one or other of those two senses, the blind are more
intelligent than deaf-mutes.
II
We have already given an account of each of the sense
faculties. But each develops, according to the course of 20
nature, in a bodily sense organ, and these we shall proceed
to discuss.
Present-day investigators attempt to reduce them to the
ultimate elements of all bodies; but, since the senses are
five, they have a difficulty in reducing them to the four
elements, and the fifth causes them anxious consideration.
Sight they all ascribe to fire owing to the misunder-
standing of a certain phenomenon, viz. when the eye is 25
pressed and moved, fire appears to flash out from it; and
it is the nature of this phenomenon to occur in the dark, or
when the eyelids are closed, for then, too, there is darkness.
But this theory—that sight is of the nature of fire-raises
a fresh difficulty; for, if it is impossible for that which is
conscious of and sees some object to be unaware that it does 30
so, the eye will of necessity perceive itself. Why then is this
not the case when the eye is at rest?
From the following considerations we shall discover the
cause of this circumstance and of the apparent identity of
fire and vision. It is the nature of smooth things to shine
in the dark, but, nevertheless, they do not produce light; now
what we call the "black" and "middle" of the eye has a 437 b
smooth appearance and it shows on the eye moving, for the
reason that this occurrence is a case of the reduplication of a
single thing. The swiftness of the motion effects this, causing
that which sees and that which is seen to appear to be
distinct. Hence also if the motion is not swift and does not 5
48
ARISTOTLE
Ο
αν
ע:
Ο
γίγνεται, ἂν μὴ ταχέως καὶ ἐν σκότει τοῦτο συμβῇ·
τὸ γὰρ λεῖον ἐν τῷ σκότει πέφυκε λάμπειν, οἷον κεφαλαί
ἰχθύων τινῶν καὶ ὁ τῆς σηπίας θολός· καὶ βραδέως
μεταβάλλοντος τοῦ ὄμματος οὐ συμβαίνει, ὥστε δοκεῖν
10 ἅμα ἓν καὶ δύο εἶναι τό θ᾽ ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον.
ἐκείνως δ᾽ αὐτὸς αὑτὸν ὁρᾷ ὁ ὀφθαλμός, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν
τῇ ἀνακλάσει, ἐπεὶ εἴ γε πῦρ ἦν, καθάπερ Εμπεδοκλῆς
φησὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ γέγραπται, καὶ συνέβαινε τὸ
ὁρᾶν ἐξιόντος ὥσπερ ἐκ λαμπτῆρος τοῦ φωτός, διὰ τί
15 οὐ καὶ ἐν τῷ σκότει ἑώρα ἂν ἡ ὄψις; τὸ δ᾽ ἀποσβέν-
νυσθαι φάναι ἐν τῷ σκότει ἐξιοῦσαν, ὥσπερ ὁ Τίμαιος
λέγει, κενόν ἐστι παντελῶς· τίς γὰρ ἀπόσβεσις φωτός
ἐστιν; σβέννυται γὰρ ἢ ὑγρῳ ἢ ψυχρῷ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ
ξηρόν, οἷον δοκεῖ τό τ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἀνθρακώδεσιν εἶναι πῦρ
20 καὶ ἡ φλόξ, ὧν τῷ φωτὶ οὐδέτερον φαίνεται ὑπάρχον.
εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα ὑπάρχει μὲν ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ ἠρέμα λανθάνει ἡμᾶς,
ἔδει μεθ᾽ ἡμέραν τε καὶ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ἀποσβέννυσθαι τὸ
φῶς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάγοις μᾶλλον γίνεσθαι σκότον· ἡ γοῦν
φλοξ καὶ τὰ πεπυρωμένα σώματα πάσχει τοῦτο· νῦν δ'
25 οὐδὲν συμβαίνει τοιοῦτον. Εμπεδοκλῆς δ᾽ ἔοικε νομί
ζοντι ὁτὲ μὲν ἐξιόντος τοῦ φωτός, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον,
βλέπειν· λέγει γοῦν οὕτως·
30
438 a
Εν
T
ὡς δ᾽ ὅτε τις πρόοδον νοέων ὡπλίσσατο λύχνον,
χειμερίην διὰ νύκτα πυρὸς σέλας αἰθομένοιο,
ἅψας παντοίων ἀνέμων λαμπτήρας ἀμοργούς,
οἵτ᾽ ἀνέμων μὲν πνεῦμα διασκιδνᾶσιν ἀέντων,
πῦρ δ᾽ ἔξω διαθρῶσκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν,
λάμπεσκεν κατὰ βηλὸν ἀτειρέσιν ἀκτίνεσσιν·
ὡς δὲ τό τ' ἐν μήνιγξιν εργμένον ὠγύγιον πῦρ
λεπτῇσιν ὀθόνῃσι λοχάζετο κύκλοπα κούρην·
αἱ δ᾽ ὕδατος μὲν βένθος ἀπέστεγον ἀμφινάοντος,
πῦρ δ᾽ ἔξω διαθρῶσκον, ὅσον ταναώτερον ἦεν.
ὁτὲ μὲν οὕτως ὁρᾶν φησίν, ὁτὲ δὲ ταῖς ἀπορροίαις ταῖς
5 ἀπὸ τῶν ὁρωμένων.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
49
occur in the dark, the phenomenon does not take place. It
is the nature of smooth things to shine in the dark, as e.g. the
heads of certain fishes and the juice of the cuttle-fish. When
the eye moves slowly, the effect-the apparent simultaneous
identity and duality of that which sees and that which is
seen-is not produced. But in the former case-that of 10
swift movement-the eye sees itself as it does too when
reflected in a mirror; this is so, for, if it really consists of
fire, as Empedocles alleges and we read in the Timaeus, and
if vision is produced by the issuing forth of light from the
eye as it were from a lantern, why does not sight function in
the dark as well as by day?
The explanation in the Timaeus, that the sight issuing 15
from the eye is extinguished in the darkness, is quite without
point, for what can the extinction of light mean? Heat and
dryness are annulled by damp or cold, as we see in the case
of the fire and flame in burning coals; but neither of these 20
is a characteristic of light. If they are and we do not detect
their presence owing to the smallness of their amount, light
would of necessity be extinguished in broad daylight too,
when it was wet, and darkness would increase in frosty
weather. This at any rate, viz. extinction, is what happens
to flame and burning bodies, but nothing of the kind occurs
in the phenomenon in question.
Empedocles evidently holds the view at times, that we 25
see upon the issuing of light from the eye, as we mentioned
before. At any rate these are his words:
"As who a journey intendeth, himself with a candle equippeth
Thorough the blustering night with its fiery radiance gleaming,
And, to ward off every gust, in lantern-case fits it,
That this may part to this side and that the breath of the wild winds
While the fire pierces through, inasmuch as its nature is subtler,
And shines over the threshold with splendour that naught can conquer,
Thus too the world-old fire was confined in the delicate membranes
And lies hid 'neath the screens of the spherical-fashioned pupil ;
These keep in check the ocean of water that circles around it,
But the fire pierces through, inasmuch as its nature is subtler."
Sometimes he says this is the way in which we see, but at
other times he explains it by a theory of effluxes issuing from
the objects seen.
30
438 a
5
R.
4
50
ARISTOTLE
5
20
Επι
TO
ΕΠ
Ο
Δημόκριτος δ᾽ ὅτι μὲν ὕδωρ εἶναί φησι,
λέγει καλῶς, ὅτι δ' οἴεται τὸ ὁρᾶν εἶναι τὴν ἔμφασιν,
οὐ καλῶς· τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ συμβαίνει ὅτι τὸ ὄμμα λεῖον,
καὶ ἔστιν οὐκ ἐν ἐκείνῳ ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τῷ ὁρῶντι· ἀνάκλασις
γὰρ τὸ πάθος. ἀλλὰ καθόλου περὶ τῶν ἐμφαινομένων
το καὶ ἀνακλάσεως οὐδέ πω δῆλον ἦν, ὡς ἔοικεν. ἄτοπον
δὲ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἐπελθεῖν αὐτῷ ἀπορῆσαι διὰ τί ὁ ὀφθαλμὸς
ὁρᾷ μόνον, τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἐν οἷς ἐμφαίνεται τὰ
εἴδωλα. τὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ὄψιν εἶναι ὕδατος ἀληθὲς μέν,
οὐ μέντοι συμβαίνει τὸ ὁρᾶν ᾗ ὕδωρ ἀλλ' ᾗ διαφανές·
15 ὃ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀέρος κοινόν ἐστιν. ἀλλ᾽ εὐφυλακτότερον
καὶ εὐπιλητότερον τὸ ὕδωρ τοῦ ἀέρος· διόπερ ἡ κόρη
καὶ τὸ ὄμμα ὕδατός ἐστιν. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ ἐπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν
ἔργων δῆλον· φαίνεται γὰρ ὕδωρ τὸ ἐκρέον διαφθειρο-
μένων, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πάμπαν ἐμβρύοις τῇ ψυχρότητι
ὑπερβάλλον καὶ τῇ λαμπρότητι. καὶ τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ
ὄμματος ἐν τοῖς ἔχουσιν αἷμα πῖον καὶ λιπαρόν· ὅπερ
διὰ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστί, πρὸς τὸ διαμένειν τὸ ὑγρὸν ἀπηκτον.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τοῦ σώματος ἀρριγότατον ὁ ὀφθαλμός
ἐστιν· οὐδεὶς γάρ πω τὸ ἐντὸς τῶν βλεφάρων ἐρρίγωσεν.
25 τῶν δ᾽ ἀναίμων σκληρόδερμοι οἱ ὀφθαλμοί εἰσι, καὶ
τοῦτο ποιεῖ τὴν σκέπην. ἄλογον δὲ ὅλως τὸ ἐξιόντι τινὶ
τὴν ὄψιν ὁρᾶν, καὶ ἀποτείνεσθαι μέχρι τῶν ἄστρων, ἢ
μέχρι τινὸς ἐξιοῦσαν συμφύεσθαι, καθάπερ λέγουσι
τούτου μὲν γὰρ βέλτιον τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ συμφύεσθαι
30 τοῦ ὄμματος. ῾ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦτο εὔηθες· τό τε γὰρ συμφύ-
εσθαι τί ἐστι φωτὶ πρὸς φῶς; ἢ πῶς οἷόν θ' ὑπάρχειν;
438b οὐ γὰρ τῷ τυχόντι συμφύεται τὸ τυχόν. τό τ᾽ ἐντὸς
τῷ ἐκτὸς πῶς; ἡ γὰρ μήνιγξ μεταξύ ἐστιν. περὶ μὲν
οὖν τοῦ ἄνευ φωτός μὴ ὁρᾶν εἴρηται ἐν ἄλλοις· ἀλλ᾿
εἴτε φῶς εἶτ᾽ ἀήρ ἐστι τὸ μεταξὺ τοῦ ὁρωμένου καὶ τοῦ
5 ὄμματος, ἡ διὰ τούτου κίνησίς ἐστιν ἡ ποιοῦσα τὸ ὁρᾶν.
καὶ εὐλόγως τὸ ἐντός ἐστιν ὕδατος. διαφανές γὰρ τὸ
τινες.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
51
Democritus is in the right in saying that the eye consists 5
of water, but his theory that sight is the mirroring of an
object is wrong. This phenomenon indeed-the visibility of
an object as in a mirror-occurs in the case of the eye
because it is smooth, and exists not in it (the reflecting eye)
but in the spectator; for the phenomenon is one of reflection.
But he seems to have attained to no clear general theory of
the mirroring and reflection of objects. It is ridiculous too 10
that it never entered his head to ask why the eye alone sees
and none of the other things in which images are mirrored.
Thus his theory is true that the sight-organ consists of
water; but the eye functions not quâ aqueous but quâ
transparent; this property it shares with air as well. But 15
water is more easily kept in, being denser than air; and hence
the pupil and the eye are composed of water.
The facts themselves make this clear; what issues from
the eyes when they are seriously hurt is evidently water, and
when they are quite in the embryonic stage it is excessively
cold and brilliant. Further, in sanguineous animals the white 20
of the eye is fat and oily; this is designed to keep the
moisture unfrozen. Hence the eye is less liable to be chilled
than any other part of the body; no one ever felt cold under
the eye-lids. In bloodless animals, however, the eyes have a
hard skin and this it is which protects them.
The theory is wholly absurd that sight is effected by
means of something which issues from the eye and that it
travels as far as the stars or, as some say, unites with
something else after proceeding a certain distance.
25
Than this latter a better theory would be, that the union
is effected in the eye-the starting point; but even this is
childish. What can the union of light with light mean? 30
How can it come about? The union is not that of any 438 b
chance light with any other chance light whatsoever.
Again
how can the internal light unite with the external? The
membrane of the eye divides them.
We have elsewhere stated that vision without light is
impossible; but whether it is light or air that intervenes
between the object seen and the eye, it is the motion
propagated through this that produces sight. Thus, as our 5
theory would lead us to infer, the interior of the eye consists
4-2
52
ARISTOTLE
ὕδωρ. ὁρᾶται δὲ ὥσπερ καὶ ἔξω οὐκ ἄνευ φωτός, οὕτως
καὶ ἐντός· διαφανὲς ἄρα δεῖ εἶναι. καὶ ἀνάγκη ὕδωρ
εἶναι, ἐπειδὴ οὐκ ἀήρ οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐσχάτου ὄμματος
1ο ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικόν ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ δῆλον
ὅτι ἐντός· διόπερ ἀνάγκη διαφανὲς εἶναι καὶ δεκτικὸν
φωτὸς τὸ ἐντὸς τοῦ ὄμματος. καὶ τοῦτο καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
συμβαινόντων δῆλον· ἤδη γάρ τισι πληγεῖσιν ἐν πολέμῳ
παρὰ τὸν κρόταφον οὕτως ὥστ᾽ ἐκτμηθῆναι τοὺς πόρους
15 τοῦ ὄμματος, ἔδοξε γενέσθαι σκότος ὥσπερ λύχνου
ἀποσβεσθέντος, διὰ τὸ οἷον λαμπτῆρά τινα ἀποτμη-
θῆναι τὸ διαφανές, τὴν καλουμένην κόρην. ὥστ᾽ εἴπερ
τούτων τι συμβαίνει, καθάπερ λέγομεν, φανερὸν ὡς εἰ
δεῖ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον ἀποδιδόναι καὶ προσάπτειν ἕκα
20 στον τῶν αἰσθητηρίων ἑνὶ τῶν στοιχείων, τοῦ μὲν
ὄμματος τὸ ὁρατικὸν ὕδατος ὑποληπτέον, ἀέρος δὲ τὸ
τῶν ψόφων αἰσθητικόν, πυρὸς δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν. ὃ γὰρ
ἐνεργείᾳ ἡ ὄσφρησις, τοῦτο δυνάμει τὸ ὀσφραντικόν·
τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργεῖν ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὥσθ'
25 ὑπάρχειν ἀναγκαῖον αὐτὴν ὃ δυνάμει πρότερον. ἡ δ᾽
ὀσμὴ καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασίς ἐστιν, ἡ δ᾽ ἀναθυμίασις
ἡ καπνώδης ἐκ πυρός. διὸ καὶ τῷ περὶ τὸν ἐγκέφαλον
τόπῳ τὸ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως αἰσθητήριόν ἐστιν ἴδιον· δυνά
μει γὰρ θερμὴ ἡ τοῦ ψυχροῦ ὕλη ἐστίν. καὶ ἡ τοῦ
30 ὄμματος γένεσις τὸν αὐτὸν ἔχει τρόπον· ἀπὸ τοῦ
ἐγκεφάλου γὰρ συνέστηκεν· οὗτος γὰρ ὑγρότατος καὶ
ψυχρότατος τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι μορίων ἐστίν. τὸ δ᾽
439 a ἁπτικὸν γῆς. τὸ δὲ γευστικὸν εἶδός τι ἁφῆς ἐστίν.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ τὸ αἰσθητήριον αὐτῶν,
τῆς τε γεύσεως καὶ τῆς ἁφῆς· ἀντίκειται γὰρ τῷ
ἐγκεφάλῳ αὕτη, καὶ ἔστι θερμότατον τῶν μορίων. καὶ
438 b, 18
ús el deî (Biehl)] ús deî E M Y et omnes edd., ws ei deî reliqui codd.
vet. tr. et sine dubio Alex., etiam Bäumker, Arist. Lehre von den Sinnesvermögen
S. 47, ita scribi vult, cui assentitur Zeller, Gesch. der gr. Ph. II. 2, S. 538.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
53
of water; for water is transparent. Just as we cannot see
without the presence of light outside the eye, so without
light inside the eye vision is impossible; this is the reason
why the eye must be transparent, and since it is not air it
must be water.
The reason for these contentions is that the consciousness,
or the psychical faculty of sense perception, does not reside 10
on the surface of the eye but evidently within; this is why
the interior of the eye must be transparent and receptive
of light. The facts make this plain; for there have been
cases of people wounded in war by a blow grazing the
temple in such a way that the passages of the eye were
severed, to whom darkness seemed to ensue just as when 15
a light is put out; this was because the transparency we
call the pupil was severed like a lamp that has its wick
cut.
Thus if our account is at all in accordance with fact and
if, as in the fashion proposed, we should reduce the sensoria
to the elements and correlate each of the former with one of
the latter, it is clear we should ascribe the eye's power of 20
sight to water and the capacity of perceiving sounds to air
and the sense of smell to fire.
This is because that which has the faculty of smell is
potentially what smell is in actuality; for the object of
sensation rouses the sense to activity, which hence necessarily
is that which, before stimulation, it was potentially.
Now odour is a smoke-like fume and smoke-like fumes 25
originate from fire; hence the organ of smell is appropriately
located in the regions around the brain, as the substrate of
that which is cold is potentially hot.
The origin of the eyes is of the same fashion; they derive 30
their composition from the brain, the coldest and most watery
of the bodily members.
The sense of touch is connected with earth; and taste is 439 a
a species of touch. Hence the sensoria of both
both-taste as
well as touch-are closely related to the heart, which has
qualities contrary to those of the brain and is the warmest
of the members.
54
ARISTOTLE
5 περὶ μὲν τῶν αἰσθητικῶν τοῦ σώματος μορίων ἔστω
τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον διωρισμένα.
ΙΟ
20
III
Περὶ δὲ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον,
οἷον λέγω χρώματος καὶ ψόφου καὶ ὀσμῆς καὶ χυμοῦ
καὶ ἁφῆς, καθόλου μὲν εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, τί
τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν καὶ τί τὸ ἐνεργεῖν καθ᾽ ἕκαστον τῶν
αἰσθητηρίων. τί δέ ποτε δεῖ λέγειν ὁτιοῦν αὐτῶν, οἷον
τί χρῶμα ἢ τί ψόφον ἢ τί ὀσμὴν ἢ χυμόν, ὁμοίως δὲ
καὶ περὶ ἁφῆς, ἐπισκεπτέον, καὶ πρῶτον περὶ χρώματος.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἕκαστον διχῶς λεγόμενον, τὸ μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ
15 τὸ δὲ δυνάμει. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐνεργείᾳ χρῶμα καὶ ὁ ψόφος
πῶς ἐστὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἢ ἕτερον ταῖς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν αἰσθή
σεσιν, οἷον ὁράσει καὶ ἀκούσει, εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ
ψυχῆς· τί δὲ ἕκαστον αὐτῶν ὂν ποιήσει τὴν αἴσθησιν
καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, νῦν λέγωμεν. ὥσπερ οὖν εἴρηται
περὶ φωτὸς ἐν ἐκείνοις, ὅτι ἐστὶ χρῶμα τοῦ διαφανοῦς
κατὰ συμβεβηκός· ὅταν γὰρ ἐνῇ τι πυρῶδες ἐν διαφανεῖ,
ἡ μὲν παρουσία φῶς, ἡ δὲ στέρησίς ἐστι σκότος· ὃ δὲ
λέγομεν διαφανές, οὐκ ἔστιν ἴδιον αέρος ἢ ὕδατος οὐδ᾽
ἄλλου τῶν οὕτω λεγομένων σωμάτων, ἀλλά τις ἔστι
25 κοινὴ φύσις καὶ δύναμις, ἢ χωριστὴ μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν, ἐν
τούτοις δ᾽ ἔστι, καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις σώμασιν ἐνυπάρχει,
τοῖς μὲν μᾶλλον τοῖς δ᾽ ἧττον· ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν
σωμάτων ἀνάγκη τι εἶναι ἔσχατον, καὶ ταύτης· ἡ μὲν
οὖν τοῦ φωτὸς φύσις ἐν ἀορίστῳ τῷ διαφανεῖ ἐστίν·
30 τοῦ δ᾽ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι διαφανοῦς τὸ ἔσχατον ὅτι μὲν
εἴη ἄν τι, δῆλον, ὅτι δὲ τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ χρῶμα, ἐκ τῶν
συμβαινόντων φανερόν. τὸ γὰρ χρῶμα ἢ ἐν τῷ πέρατί
ἐστιν ἢ πέρας· διὸ καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν
χροιὰν ἐκάλουν· ἔστι μὲν γὰρ ἐν τῷ τοῦ σώματος πέρατι,
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
55
Let this be the way in which we discriminate the sensitive 5
organs of the body.
III
In the Psychology we have given a general account of the
objects corresponding to the particular sense-organs, to wit
colour, sound, smell, flavour, and touch; we have stated what
their function is, and described the mode of their operation in 10
relation to the several sense-organs. But the nature we must
ascribe to any one of these objects we have still to consider ;
we must ask, for instance, what is colour, or sound, or odour,
or flavour? So, too, what is the object of touch? Let us
begin our inquiry with colour.
Now we can regard each of these sense objects in two
ways, as potentially or as actually existent. We have ex- 15
plained in the Psychology in what sense actual colour and
sound are identical with or different from actual sense ex-
perience, e.g. sight and hearing; but now we are to discuss
the nature of those sense objects in virtue of which they cause
sensation and its activity.
It was stated in the work quoted above when we treated
of light that it is the colour of the transparent medium con- 20
tingently determined; for when anything of the nature of fire
is found in the transparent medium its presence constitutes
light, its absence darkness.
What we have spoken of as the transparent element is
nothing which is found exclusively in air or in water or in
any one of the substances of which transparency can be
predicated; it is some sort of constitution and potency which
they have in common, and which, not being an independent 25
reality, finds its existence in these bodies and subsists in
varying degrees in the rest of material substances. Thus, in
so far as these bodies must have boundaries, this too must
have its limits.
Now it is in the transparent medium apart from its limits
that light has its being; but it is clear that the boundary of
the transparent element which exists in bodies is something 30
real. That this is colour the facts make plain, for colour
either exists in the boundary or constitutes the boundary
of a thing, and hence (a corroborating circumstance) the
Pythagorean terminology identified the visible superficies
with colour. This was plausible, for colour exists in the
56
ARISTOTLE
ου
Ο
35 ἀλλ᾽ οὔ τι τὸ τοῦ σώματος πέρας, ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν φύσιν
439 b δεῖ νομίζειν, ἤπερ καὶ ἔξω χρωματίζεται, ταύτην καὶ
ἐντός. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἀὴρ καὶ ὕδωρ χρωματιζόμενα
καὶ γὰρ ἡ αὐγὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστιν. ἀλλ᾽ ἐκεῖ μὲν διὰ τὸ
ἐν ἀορίστῳ οὐ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐγγύθεν καὶ προσιοῦσι καὶ
5 πόρρωθεν ἔχει χροιάν οὔθ᾽ ὁ ἀὴρ οὔθ᾽ ἡ θάλαττα· ἐν
δὲ τοῖς σώμασιν ἐὰν μὴ τὸ περιέχον ποιῇ τὸ μεταβάλλειν,
ὥρισται καὶ ἡ φαντασία τῆς χρόας. δῆλον ἄρα ὅτι τὸ
αὐτὸ κἀκεῖ κἀνθάδε δεκτικὸν τῆς χρόας ἐστίν. τὸ ἄρα
διαφανές καθ' ὅσον ὑπάρχει ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν ὑπάρχει
το δὲ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον ἐν πᾶσι) χρώματος ποιεῖ μετέχειν.
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐν πέρατι ἡ χρόα, τούτου ἂν ἐν πέρατι εἴη. ὥστε
χρώμα ἂν εἴη τὸ τοῦ διαφανοῦς ἐν σώματι ὡρισμένῳ
πέρας. καὶ αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν διαφανῶν, οἷον ὕδατος καὶ
εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον, καὶ ὅσοις φαίνεται χρῶμα ἴδιον
15 ὑπάρχειν κατὰ τὸ ἔσχατον, ὁμοίως πᾶσιν ὑπάρχει.
ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἐνεῖναι ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ τοῦθ᾽ ὅπερ καὶ ἐν
17 τῷ ἀέρι ποιεῖ φῶς, ἔστι δὲ μή, ἀλλ' ἐστερῆσθαι.
17
T
εν
αν
Εν
Ωσπερ οὖν
ἐκεῖ τὸ μὲν φῶς τὸ δὲ σκότος, οὕτως ἐν τοῖς σώμασιν
ἐγγίγνεται τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων
20 χρωμάτων εἴδη διελομένους ποσαχῶς ἐνδέχεται γίγνεσθαι
λεκτέον. ἐνδέχεται μὲν γὰρ παρ᾽ ἄλληλα τιθέμενα τὸ
λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ὥσθ' ἑκάτερον μὲν εἶναι ἀόρατον
διὰ σμικρότητα, τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ὁρατόν, οὕτω γίγνεσθαι.
τοῦτο γὰρ οὔτε λευκὸν οἷόν τε φαίνεσθαι οὔτε μέλαν
ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἀνάγκη μέν τι ἔχειν χρῶμα, τούτων δ᾽ οὐδέτερον
δυνατόν, ἀνάγκη μικτόν τι εἶναι καὶ εἶδός τι χρόας
ἕτερον. ἔστι μὲν οὖν οὕτως ὑπολαβεῖν πλείους εἶναι
χρόας παρὰ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, πολλὰς δὲ τῷ
λόγῳ· τρία γὰρ πρὸς δύο, καὶ τρία πρὸς τέτταρα, καὶ
κατ᾿ ἄλλους ἀριθμοὺς ἔστι παρ' ἄλληλα κεῖσθαι, τὰ δ᾽
30
439 b, 20 εἴδη conicio | ἤδη omn. codd. et edd.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
57
boundary, but it by no means is the boundary of the body; 35
nay, we must believe that internally there exists the same 439 b
constitution as externally displays colour. So both air and
water show tint; the sheen they have is a phenomenon of
this kind; but here, because it exists in something with no
definite boundaries, the colour both of the air and of the sea
is not the same when regarded from afar and from near at
hand. In solid bodies, however, unless the surrounding 5
medium cause it to change, the coloured appearance remains,
equally with the surface, fixed. It is therefore clear that in
both cases it is the same nature which is capable of being
endowed with colour: hence the transparent element in so
far as it is found in bodies (and it exists in all in varying
degrees) causes them to be endowed with colour. But since 10
it is in a bounding surface that colour is found, it is in the
surface of this-the transparent element-that colour exists.
Colour then is the limit of the transparent element in a
determinately bounded body; and it is found in all bodies
alike, both in transparent substances themselves, such as
water and anything similar to it, and in those which appear
to have a surface colour of their own. Consequently, that, 15
which in air causes light, may be present in the trans-
parent medium or it may not, i.e. may be awanting.
Thus, just as we can explain light and darkness re-
spectively by the presence or absence of this cause in the
air, so in the case of solid bodies we can account for the
existence of black and white colour. But the other colours
still await classification and an inquiry into the various ways 20
in which they may be produced.
Firstly, white and black may be juxtaposed in such a way
that by the minuteness of the division of its parts each is
invisible while their product is visible, and thus colour may
be produced. This product can appear neither white nor
black, but, since it must have some colour and can have
neither of the above two, it must be a sort of compound and 25
a fresh kind of tint. In this way, then, we may conceive that
numbers of colours over and above black and white may be
produced, and that their multiplicity is due to differences in
the proportion of their composition. The juxtaposition may
be in the proportion of three of the one to two of the other,
or three to four or according to other ratios. Others again 30
58
ARISTOTLE
Το
T
Ο
ὅλως κατὰ μὲν λόγον μηδένα, καθ᾽ ὑπεροχὴν δέ τινα
καὶ ἔλλειψιν ἀσύμμετρον, καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον
ἔχειν ταῦτα ταῖς συμφωνίαις· τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς
εὐλογίστοις χρώματα, καθάπερ ἐκεῖ τὰς συμφωνίας, τὰ
440 a ἥδιστα τῶν χρωμάτων εἶναι δοκοῦντα, οἷον τὸ ἁλουργὸν
καὶ φοινικοῦν καὶ ὀλίγ᾽ ἄττα τοιαῦτα, δι᾽ ἦνπερ αἰτίαν
καὶ αἱ συμφωνίαι ὀλίγαι, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς τἆλλα
χρώματα, ἢ καὶ πάσας τὰς χρόας ἐν ἀριθμοῖς εἶναι, τὰς
5 μὲν τεταγμένας τὰς δὲ ἀτάκτους, καὶ αὐτὰς ταύτας, ὅταν
μὴ καθαραὶ ὦσι, διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς εἶναι τοιαύτας
γίγνεσθαι. εἷς μὲν οὖν τρόπος τῆς γενέσεως τῶν χρω-
μάτων οὗτος, εἷς δὲ τὸ φαίνεσθαι δι' ἀλλήλων, οἷον
ἐνίοτε οἱ γραφεῖς ποιοῦσιν, ἑτέραν χρόαν ἐφ᾽ ἑτέραν
το ἐναργεστέραν ἐπαλείφουσιν, ὥσπερ ὅταν ἐν ὕδατί τι ἢ
ἐν ἀέρι βούλωνται ποιῆσαι φαινόμενον, καὶ οἷον ὁ ἥλιος
καθ᾽ αὑτὸν μὲν λευκὸς φαίνεται, διὰ δ᾽ ἀχλύος καὶ
καπνοῦ φοινικους. πολλαὶ δὲ καὶ οὕτως ἔσονται χρόαι
τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῷ πρότερον εἰρημένῳ· λόγος γὰρ ἂν
15 εἴη τις τῶν ἐπιπολῆς πρὸς τὰ ἐν βάθει, τὰ δὲ καὶ ὅλως
οὐκ ἐν λόγῳ. [τὸ μὲν οὖν, ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι, λέγειν
ἀπορροίας εἶναι τὰς χροίας καὶ ὁρᾶσθαι διὰ τοιαύτην
αἰτίαν ἄτοπον· πάντως γὰρ δι᾽ ἁφῆς ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς
ποιεῖν τὴν αἴσθησιν, ὥστ᾽ εὐθὺς κρεῖττον φάναι τῷ
20 κινεῖσθαι τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ
γίνεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἁφῇ καὶ μὴ ταῖς ἀπορροίαις.]
ἐπὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν παρ᾽ ἄλληλα κειμένων ἀνάγκη ὥσπερ
καὶ μέγεθος λαμβάνειν ἀόρατον, οὕτω καὶ χρόνον ἀναί-
σθητον, ἵνα λάθωσιν αἱ κινήσεις ἀφικνούμεναι καὶ ἓν
25 δοκῇ εἶναι διὰ τὸ ἅμα φαίνεσθαι· ἐνταῦθα δὲ οὐδεμία
ἀνάγκη, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐπιπολῆς χρῶμα ἀκίνητον ὂν καὶ κινού-
μενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑποκειμένου οὐχ ὁμοίαν ποιήσει τὴν
ע:
T
οι
αν
440 a, 21 interpositis vers. 16—21 contextum interrumpi recte iudicat Thurot,
cui assentitur Susemihl, Philol. 1855.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
59
may be compounded in no commensurate proportion, with an
excess of the one element and deficiency of the other which
are incommensurable, and colours may, indeed, be analogous
to harmonies. Thus, those compounded according to the
simplest proportions, exactly as is the case in harmonies, will
appear to be the most pleasant colours, e.g. purple, crimson, 440 a
and a few similar species. (It is an exactly parallel reason
that causes harmonies to be few in number.) Mixtures not
in a calculable ratio will constitute the other colours. Or
again, all tints may show a calculable proportion between
their elements, but in some the scheme of composition may
be regular, in others not, while when those of the latter class
are themselves impure, this may be due to an absence of 5
calculable proportion in their composition.
This is one of the ways in which colours may be produced; a
second is effected by the shining of one colour through another.
This we may illustrate by the practice sometimes adopted by
painters when they give a wash of colour over another more
vivid tint, when, for example, they wish to make a thing look 10
as though it were in the water or in the air. Again, we may
illustrate by the sun, which in itself appears white, but looks
red when seen through mist and smoke.
According to this account the multiplicity of the colours.
will be explained in the same way as in the theory mentioned
before; we should have to suppose there was some ratio
between the superficial and the underlying tints in the case
of some colours, while in others there would be an entire lack 15
of commensurate proportion.
[Thus we see that it is absurd to maintain, with the early
philosophers, that colours are effluxes and that vision is
effected by a cause of the efflux type. It was in every way
binding on them to account for sensation by means of contact,
and therefore it was obviously better to say that sensation was
due to a movement set up by the sense object in the medium 20
of sensation, and thus account for it by contact without the
instrumentality of effluxes.]
According to the theory of juxtaposition, just as we must
assume that there are invisible spatial quanta, so must we
postulate an imperceptible time to account for the imper-
ceptibility of the diverse stimuli transmitted to the sense
organ, which seem to be one because they appear to be
simultaneous. But on the other theory there is no such 25
necessity; the surface colour causes different motions in the
medium when acted on and when not acted on by an under-
60
ARISTOTLE
TO
κίνησιν. διὸ καὶ ἕτερον φαίνεται καὶ οὔτε λευκὸν οὔτε
μέλαν. ὥστ᾽
ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὴ ἐνδέχεται μηδὲν εἶναι μέγεθος
30 ἀόρατον, ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἔκ τινος ἀποστήματος ὁρατόν, καὶ
αὕτη τίς ἂν εἴη χρωμάτων μίξις; κἀκείνως δ᾽ οὐδὲν
κωλύει φαίνεσθαί τινα χρόαν κοινὴν τοῖς πόρρωθεν
ὅτι γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν μέγεθος ἀόρατον, ἐν τοῖς
ὕστερον ἐπισκεπτέον. εἰ δ᾽ ἐστὶ μίξις τῶν σωμάτων
440b μὴ μόνον τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὅνπερ οἴονταί τινες, παρ'
ἄλληλα τῶν ἐλαχίστων τιθεμένων, ἀδήλων δ᾽ ἡμῖν διὰ
τὴν αἴσθησιν, ἀλλ᾽ ὅλως πάντῃ πάντως, ὥσπερ ἐν τοῖς
περὶ μίξεως εἴρηται καθόλου περὶ πάντων· ἐκείνως μὲν
5 γὰρ μίγνυται ταῦτα μόνον ὅσα ἐνδέχεται διελεῖν εἰς τὰ
ἐλάχιστα, καθάπερ ἀνθρώπους ἵππους ἢ τὰ σπέρματα
τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπων ἄνθρωπος ἐλάχιστος, τῶν δ᾽
ἵππων ἵππος· ὥστε τῇ τούτων παρ᾽ ἄλληλα θέσει τὸ
πλῆθος μέμικται τῶν συναμφοτέρων· ἄνθρωπον δὲ ἕνα
το ἑνὶ ἵππῳ οὐ λέγομεν μεμίχθαι· ὅσα δὲ μὴ διαιρεῖται εἰς
τὸ ἐλάχιστον, τούτων οὐκ ἐνδέχεται μίξιν γενέσθαι τὸν
τρόπον τοῦτον ἀλλὰ τῷ πάντῃ μεμίχθαι, ἅπερ καὶ
μάλιστα μίγνυσθαι πέφυκεν· πῶς δὲ τοῦτο γίγνεσθαι
δυνατόν, ἐν τοῖς περὶ μίξεως εἴρηται πρότερον· ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι
15 ἀνάγκη μιγνυμένων καὶ τὰς χρόας μίγνυσθαι, δῆλον,
καὶ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν εἶναι κυρίαν τοῦ πολλὰς εἶναι
χροίας, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὴν ἐπιπόλασιν μηδὲ τὴν παρ᾽ ἄλληλα
θέσιν· οὐ γὰρ πόρρωθεν μὲν ἐγγύθεν δ᾽ οὐ φαίνεται
μία χρόα τῶν μεμιγμένων, ἀλλὰ πάντοθεν. πολλαὶ δ᾽
20 ἔσονται χρόαι διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς λόγοις ἐνδέχεσθαι μίγνυ
σθαι ἀλλήλοις τὰ μιγνύμενα, καὶ τὰ μὲν ἐν ἀριθμοῖς
τὰ δὲ καθ᾽ ὑπεροχὴν μόνον. καὶ τἆλλα δὴ τὸν αὐτὸν
τρόπον ὅνπερ ἐπὶ τῶν παρ' ἄλληλα τιθεμένων χρωμάτων
ἢ ἐπιπολῆς, ἐνδέχεται λέγειν καὶ περὶ τῶν μιγνυμένων.
T
440a, 31 τίς...μίξις; Simon | τις... μίξις. Biehl, Bek. et ceteri omnes.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
61
lying tint. Thus it appears to be something different, and
neither black nor white.
Therefore, if an invisible spatial quantity is an impossibility
and every magnitude must be visible at some distance, we
must dismiss the former theory and ask what sort of a colour 30
mixture this latter also is. But, on the former theory as well,
there is nothing to prevent distant objects appearing to have
a uniform colour; for no magnitude is invisible, a problem to
be discussed later on.
But let us premise that substances are mixed not merely 4401
in the way some people think-by a juxtaposition of their
ultimate minute parts, which, however, are imperceptible to
sense-but that they entirely interpenetrate each other in
every part throughout; how this happens in all cases was
explained in general terms in our dissertation on mixture.
The former theory accounts for the mixture only of those 5
things which can be resolved into ultimate least parts, e.g.
men or horses or seeds. In a division of men, a man is the
least part; in the case of horses, a horse; thus by the juxta-
position of these individuals the mixture produced is a mass
consisting of both components, whereas we do not talk of
mixing single man with single horse. On the other hand, 10
things which cannot be resolved into least parts, cannot be
mingled in this way; they must entirely interpenetrate each
other; and these are the things which most naturally mix.
We have already, in our treatment of mixture, explained how
this is possible.
Now, all this being so, it is clear that when substances are 15
mixed their colours too must be commingled, and that this is
the supreme reason why there is a plurality of colours; neither
superposition nor juxtaposition is the cause. In such mixtures
the colour does not appear single when you are at a distance
and diverse when you come near; it is a single tint from all
points of view. The reason for the multiplicity of colours.
will be the fact that things which mix can be mixed in many 20
different proportions, and some mixtures will show a numerical
ratio, others only an incommensurable excess of one of the
elements. So far indeed as other considerations go, the same
account will apply to the juxtaposition or superposition of
b
62
ARISTOTLE
25 διὰ τίνα δ᾽ αἰτίαν εἴδη τῶν χρωμάτων ἐστὶν ὡρισμένα
καὶ οὐκ ἄπειρα, καὶ χυμῶν καὶ ψόφων, ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν.
IV
Τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ χρῶμα καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν πολλαὶ
χροιαί εἰσιν, εἴρηται· περὶ δὲ ψόφου καὶ φωνῆς εἴρηται
πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς· περὶ δὲ ὀσμῆς καὶ χυμοῦ
30 νῦν λεκτέον. σχεδὸν γάρ ἐστι τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος, οὐκ ἐν
τοῖς αὐτοῖς δ᾽ ἐστὶν ἑκάτερον αὐτῶν. ἐναργέστερον δ'
ἐστὶν ἡμῖν τὸ τῶν χυμῶν γένος ἢ τὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς. τούτου
441 a δ' αἴτιον ὅτι χειρίστην ἔχομεν τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων τὴν
ὄσφρησιν καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν αὐτοῖς αἰσθήσεων, τὴν δ᾽
ἁφὴν ἀκριβεστάτην τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ἡ δὲ γευσις
4 αφή τις ἐστίν.
4
A
Α
Ἡ μὲν οὖν τοῦ ὕδατος ψύσις βούλεται
5 ἄχυμος εἶναι· ἀνάγκη δ᾽ ἢ ἐν αὑτῷ τὸ ὕδωρ ἔχειν τὰ
γένη τῶν χυμῶν ἀναίσθητα διὰ μικρότητα, καθάπερ
Εμπεδοκλῆς φησίν, ἢ ὕλην τοιαύτην εἶναι οἷον παν
σπερμίαν χυμῶν, καὶ ἅπαντα μὲν ἐξ ὕδατος γίγνεσθαι,
ἄλλα δ᾽ ἐξ ἄλλου μέρους, ἢ μηδεμίαν ἔχοντος διαφορὰν
το τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ ποιοῦν αἴτιον εἶναι, οἷον εἰ τὸ θερμὸν
καὶ τὸν ἥλιον φαίη τις. τούτων δ᾽, ὡς μὲν Εμπεδοκλῆς
λέγει, λίαν ευσύνοπτον τὸ ψεῦδος· ὁρῶμεν γὰρ μετα
βάλλοντας ὑπὸ τοῦ θερμοῦ τοὺς χυμοὺς ἀφαιρουμένων
τῶν περικαρπίων εἰς τὸν ἥλιον καὶ πυρρουμένων, ὡς
15 οὐ τῷ ἐκ τοῦ ὕδατος ἕλκειν τοιούτους γιγνομένους, ἀλλ᾽
ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ περικαρπίῳ μεταβάλλοντας, καὶ ἐξικμαζο.
μένους δὲ καὶ κειμένους, διὰ τὸν χρόνον, αὐστηροὺς ἐκ
γλυκέων καὶ πικροὺς καὶ παντοδαποὺς γιγνομένους, καὶ
ἑψομένους εἰς πάντα τὰ γένη τῶν χυμῶν ὡς εἰπεῖν
20 μεταβάλλοντας. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ πανσπερμίας εἶναι
4412, 14 πυρρουμένων conicio | πυρουμένων Biehl, Bek. etc.
|
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
63
colours as to their mixture. The reason why they, and like- 25
wise tastes and sounds, have definite species limited in number,
will be given later on.
IV
We have defined colour and accounted for the multiplicity
of its tints, while sound and articulate utterance have been
treated in the Psychology; we are now to discuss smell and
taste.
While as subjective phenomena they are practically 30
identical, their vehicle is diverse; and tastes as a class are
more vividly presented to human perception than odours.
The reason for this is that our sense of smell is inferior to that 441 a
of other animals, and is the poorest of the human senses.
In
delicacy of touch, however, we excel all other animals; now
taste is a sort of touch.
To proceed to our discussion-water is characteristically
of a flavourless nature; yet, either it must, tasteless as it is, 5
be the receptacle in which the various flavours reside in
amounts too minute to be detected the Empedoclean theory
—or it must be a material adapted to be the matrix, as it
were, for the germs of all tastes. In this case all tastes will
originate out of water, but different ones will arise from
different parts of the matrix. Or we may hold that water
is entirely undifferentiated, and impute the causality to that
which acts upon it, for instance heat or the sun. A glance 10
will suffice to show the falsity of the Empedoclean theory;
for we can observe that the alteration in flavour is due to heat,
when fruits are plucked, integument and all, and set in the sun
and reddened. Their new flavour, then, cannot be extracted
from water; nay, the change must take place within the fruit- 15
covering itself. Through lying and drying fruits become, in
time, harsh and bitter instead of sweet, and display all sorts
of flavours; further, any kind of taste, so to speak, can be
produced by subjecting them to the process of cooking.
Similarly water cannot possibly constitute the material of 20
64
ARISTOTLE
ΤΟ
τὸ ὕδωρ ὕλην ἀδύνατον· ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ γὰρ ὁρῶμεν ὡς
τροφῆς γιγνομένους ἑτέρους χυμούς. λείπεται δὴ τῷ
πάσχειν τι τὸ ὕδωρ μεταβάλλειν. ὅτι μὲν τοίνυν οὐχ
ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ θερμού δυνάμεως λαμβάνει ταύτην τὴν
25 δύναμιν ἣν καλοῦμεν χυμόν, φανερόν· λεπτότατον γὰρ
τῶν πάντων ὑγρῶν τὸ ὕδωρ ἐστί, καὶ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἐλαίου·
ἀλλ᾽ ἐπεκτείνεται ἐπὶ πλεῖον τοῦ ὕδατος τὸ ἔλαιον διὰ
τὴν γλισχρότητα· τὸ δ᾽ ὕδωρ ψαθυρόν ἐστι· διὸ καὶ
χαλεπώτερον φυλάξαι ἐν τῇ χειρὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἤπερ ἔλαιον.
30 ἐπεὶ δὲ θερμαινόμενον οὐδὲν φαίνεται παχυνόμενον τὸ
ὕδωρ αὐτὸ μόνον, δῆλον ὅτι ἑτέρα τις ἂν εἴη αἰτία·
οἱ γὰρ χυμοί πάντες πάχος ἔχουσι μᾶλλον· τὸ δὲ
θερμὸν συναίτιον. φαίνονται δ' οἱ χυμοὶ ὅσοιπερ καὶ
441 b ἐν τοῖς περικαρπίοις, οὗτοι ὑπάρχοντες καὶ ἐν τῇ γῇ.
διὸ καὶ πολλοί φασι τῶν ἀρχαίων φυσιολόγων τοιοῦτον
εἶναι τὸ ὕδωρ δι' οἵας ἂν γῆς πορεύηται. καὶ τοῦτο
δῆλόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἁλμυρῶν ὑδάτων μάλιστα· οἱ γὰρ
5 ἅλες γῆς τι εἶδός εἰσιν. καὶ τὰ διὰ τῆς τέφρας διηθού
μενα πικρᾶς οὔσης πικρὸν ποιεῖ τὸν χυμόν. εἰσί τε
κρῆναι πολλαὶ αἱ μὲν πικραί, αἱ δ᾽ ὀξεῖαι, αἱ δὲ παντο-
δαποὺς ἔχουσαι χυμοὺς ἄλλους. διὸ εὐλόγως ἐν τοῖς
φυομένοις τὸ τῶν χυμῶν γίγνεται γένος μάλιστα. πά-
το σχειν γὰρ πέφυκε τὸ ὑγρόν, ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα, ὑπὸ
τοῦ ἐναντίου· ἐναντίον δὲ τὸ ξηρόν. διὸ καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ
πυρὸς πάσχει τι· ξηρὰ γὰρ ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις. ἀλλ᾽
ἴδιον τοῦ πυρὸς τὸ θερμόν ἐστι, γῆς δὲ τὸ ξηρόν,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς περὶ στοιχείων. ᾗ μὲν οὖν πυρ
15 καὶ ᾗ γῆ, οὐδὲν πέφυκε ποιεῖν καὶ πάσχειν, οὐδ᾽ ἄλλο
οὐδέν· ἡ δ᾽ ὑπάρχει ἐναντιότης ἐν ἑκάστῳ, ταύτῃ πάντα
καὶ ποιοῦσι καὶ πάσχουσιν. ὥσπερ οὖν οἱ ἐναποπλύ
νοντες ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τὰ χρώματα καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς τοιοῦτον
ἔχειν ποιοῦσι τὸ ὕδωρ, οὕτως καὶ ἡ φύσις τὸ ξηρὸν
T
441 b, 8 διὸ εὐλόγως LSU | εὐλόγως δ' Biehl et Bek.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
65
a universal matrix of flavours. It is a matter of observation
that out of the very same water taken as nutriment, plants
develop different flavours.
True, this leaves us with the theory that the water is acted
on in some way, and changes in consequence. Now, plainly,
it is not owing to the power resident in heat that it acquires
the potency we call flavour; water is the thinnest of all liquids, 25
thinner even than oil, though oil on the other hand spreads
out more than water on account of its viscosity. Water,
however, is non-cohesive, and hence is more difficult to keep
in the hand without spilling than oil.
Since water by itself is the only substance which shows no 30
thickening under the influence of heat, clearly something else
must be the cause of the phenomenon in question, for all
flavours tend to exhibit density. The heat is the cooperating
cause.
It is a conspicuous fact that all the savours found in fruits
exist also in the soil. Hence many of the early physical 441 b
philosophers allege that water takes its character from the
soil through which it passes. This is clearly so in the case of
saline waters, for salt is a species of earth. Filtration through 5
ash—a bitter substance-makes the taste bitter, and there are
many springs, some of which are bitter, some acid, and others.
possessing manifold other tastes. Hence, as one would expect,
it is principally in plants that flavours as a class develop.
The reason for this acquisition of a specific character by
water is—it is the nature of humidity, as of everything else,
to be acted on by its opposite; now its opposite is dryness. 10
Hence fire too has an effect upon it, for fire by constitution is
dry. But of fire heat is a peculiar property, of earth dryness,
as we explained in discussing the elements.
Now, by constitution, fire quâ fire and earth quâ earth do
not display activity and passivity, nor do any of the other 15
elements per se; it is in so far as they have opposing qualities
that the elements one and all react on each other. Thus, just
as men by dissolving colours or savours in water communicate
those qualities to the water, so nature acts upon that which is
dry and earthy in character; by the aid of heat it causes liquid
R.
5
66
ARISTOTLE
20 καὶ τὸ γεῶδες, καὶ διὰ τοῦ ξηροῦ καὶ γεώδους διηθοῦσα
καὶ κινοῦσα τῷ θερμῷ ποιόν τι τὸ ὑγρὸν παρασκευάζει.
καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο χυμὸς τὸ γιγνόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ εἰρημένου
ξηροῦ πάθος ἐν τῷ ὑγρῷ τῆς γεύσεως τῆς κατὰ δύναμιν
ἀλλοιωτικὸν εἰς ἐνέργειαν· ἄγει γὰρ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν εἰς
25 τοῦτο δυνάμει προϋπάρχον· οὐ γὰρ κατὰ τὸ μανθάνειν
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἐστὶ τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι. ὅτι δ᾽ οὐ
παντὸς ξηροῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ τροφίμου οἱ χυμοί ἢ πάθος
εἰσὶν ἢ στέρησις, δεῖ λαβεῖν ἐντεῦθεν, ὅτι οὔτε τὸ ξηρὸν
ἄνευ τοῦ ὑγροῦ οὔτε τὸ ὑγρὸν ἄνευ τοῦ ξηροῦ· τροφὴ
30 γὰρ οὐχ ἓν μόνον τοῖς ζῴοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ μεμιγμένον. καὶ
ἔστι τῆς προσφερομένης τροφῆς τοῖς ζῴοις τὰ μὲν ἑπτὰ
τῶν αἰσθητῶν αὔξησιν ποιοῦντα καὶ φθίσιν· τούτων
μὲν γὰρ αἴτιον ᾗ θερμὸν καὶ ψυχρὸν τὸ προσφερόμενον·
4422 ταῦτα γὰρ ποιεῖ καὶ αὔξησιν καὶ φθίσιν· τρέφει δὲ ᾗ
γευστὸν τὸ προσφερόμενον· πάντα γὰρ τρέφεται τῷ
γλυκεῖ, ἢ ἁπλῶς ἢ μεμιγμένως. δεῖ μὲν οὖν διορίζειν
περὶ τούτων ἐν τοῖς περὶ γενέσεως, νῦν δ᾽ ὅσον ἀναγκαῖον
5 ἅψασθαι αὐτῶν. τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν αὐξάνει καὶ δημιουργεί
τὴν τροφήν, καὶ τὸ μὲν κοῦφον ἕλκει, τὸ δ᾽ ἁλμυρὸν
καὶ πικρὸν καταλείπει διὰ βάρος. ὃ δὴ ἐν τοῖς ἔξω
σώμασι ποιεῖ τὸ ἔξω θερμόν, τοῦτο τὸ ἐν τῇ φύσει
τῶν ζῴων καὶ φυτῶν· διὸ τρέφεται τῷ γλυκεῖ. συμμί-
το γνυνται δ' οἱ ἄλλοι χυμοὶ εἰς τὴν τροφὴν τὸν αὐτὸν
τρόπον τῷ ἁλμυρῷ καὶ ὀξεῖ, ἀντὶ ἡδύσματος. ταῦτα
δὲ διὰ τὸ ἀντὶ πάντων λίαν τρόφιμον εἶναι τὸ γλυκὺ
13 καὶ ἐπιπολαστικόν.
13
T
ὥσπερ δὲ τὰ χρώματα ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ
μέλανος μίξεως ἐστιν, οὕτως οἱ χυμοὶ ἐκ γλυκέος καὶ
15 πικροί. καὶ κατὰ λόγον δὴ τῷ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον
ἕκαστοί εἰσιν, εἴτε κατ᾿ ἀριθμούς τινας τῆς μίξεως καὶ
441 b, 30
442a, 12
οὐχ ἓν μόνον | οὐδὲν αὐτῶν Biehl.
ἀντὶ πάντων Biehl | ἀντισπᾶν τῷ Bek. et reliqui edd.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
67
to percolate and pass through dry and earthy substance, and 20
thus gives it a definite quality. This is flavour, the modification
which the said dry element produces in liquids, and which is
capable of stimulating the sense of taste existing as a poten-
tiality into active operation. This effect which it produces
upon the sense-faculty has already potential existence in the
sense-faculty, for sensation is parallel, not to learning, but to
the exercise of knowledge.
It is not of all dry substance but of that which is nutritive 25
that flavours are a modification positive or negative. The
fact that neither does the dry apart from the humid nor
liquidity apart from dryness yield savour, supplies us with a
proof of this, for neither of these alone, but their mixture,
furnishes nutriment to animals. In the food of animals it is 30
the objects of tactual sensation that cause growth and decay;
it is qua hot or cold that the food they eat is responsible for
these phenomena, as heat and cold cause growth and decay. 442 a
On the other hand it is in so far as it affects the taste that
what is given to animals nourishes them, for they all thrive
on that which is sweet, either pure or mixed with something
else.
The full discussion of these facts which is entailed will be
found in the work On Generation; at present we must touch
on them only so far as is necessary. Heat causes growth; it 5
is the active cause in the preparation of food, making the light
elements rise and allowing the saline and bitter to fall on
account of their weight. In fact, in plants and animals, their
native heat performs the same function as that fulfilled by
external heat in the case of external bodies; hence it is by
sweet things that they are nourished. Other tastes are com-
mingled with food for the same reason as the saline and acid; 10
they serve as seasoning. This is necessary because the sweet
is, in comparison with all other things, excessively nutritive,
and tends to rise in the stomach.
Just as colours arise from a mixture of black and white, so
tastes are a product of the sweet and the bitter. Proportion
it is a difference in the quantity of their components, that 15
gives them individuality; and either the mixture and conse-
5-2
68
ARISTOTLE
Ο
κινήσεως, εἴτε καὶ ἀορίστως. οἱ δὲ τὴν ἡδονὴν ποιοῦντες
μιγνύμενοι, οὗτοι ἐν ἀριθμοῖς. μόνος μὲν οὖν λιπαρὸς
ὁ τοῦ γλυκέος ἐστὶ χυμός, τὸ δ᾽ ἁλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν
20 σχεδὸν τὸ αὐτό, ὁ δὲ αὐστηρὸς καὶ δριμὺς καὶ στρυφνὸς
καὶ ὀξὺς ἀνὰ μέσον. σχεδὸν γὰρ ἴσα καὶ τὰ τῶν χυμῶν
εἴδη καὶ τὰ τῶν χρωμάτων ἐστίν. ἑπτὰ γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων
εἴδη, ἄν τις τιθῇ, ὥσπερ εὔλογον, τὸ φαιὸν μέλαν τι
εἶναι· λείπεται γὰρ τὸ ξανθὸν μὲν τοῦ λευκοῦ εἶναι
25 ὥσπερ τὸ λιπαρὸν τοῦ γλυκέος, τὸ φοινικοῦν δὲ καὶ
ἁλουργὸν καὶ πράσινον καὶ κυανοῦν ἀνὰ μέσον τοῦ
λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα μικτὰ ἐκ τούτων. καὶ
ὥσπερ τὸ μέλαν στέρησις ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ τοῦ λευκοῦ,
οὕτω τὸ ἁλμυρὸν καὶ πικρὸν τοῦ γλυκέος ἐν τῷ τροφίμῳ
30 ὑγρῷ. διὸ καὶ ἡ τέφρα τῶν καομένων πικρὰ πάντων·
31 ἐξικμασται γὰρ τὸ πότιμον ἐξ αὐτῶν.
31
Δημόκριτος δὲ καὶ οἱ
πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιολόγων, ὅσοι λέγουσι περὶ αἰσθήσεως,
442 b ατοπώτατόν τι ποιοῦσιν· πάντα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἑπτὰ
ποιοῦσιν. καίτοι εἰ καὶ τοῦτο οὕτως ἔχει, δῆλον ὡς
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων αἰσθήσεων ἑκάστη ἁφή τις ἐστίν· τοῦτο
δ᾽ ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐ χαλεπὸν συνιδεῖν. ἔτι δὲ τοῖς κοινοῖς
5 τῶν αἰσθήσεων πασῶν χρῶνται ὡς ἰδίοις· μέγεθος γὰρ
καὶ σχῆμα καὶ τὸ τραχὺ καὶ τὸ λεῖον, ἔτι δὲ τὸ ὀξὺ
καὶ τὸ ἀμβλὺ τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὄγκοις κοινὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεών
ἐστιν, εἰ δὲ μὴ πασῶν, ἀλλ᾽ ὄψεως γε καὶ ἁφῆς. διὸ
καὶ περὶ μὲν τούτων ἀπατῶνται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἰδίων οὐκ
1ο ἀπατῶνται, οἷον ἡ ὄψις περὶ χρώματος καὶ ἡ ἀκοὴ περὶ
ψόφων. οἱ δὲ τὰ ἴδια εἰς ταῦτα ἀνάγουσιν, ὥσπερ
Δημόκριτος τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν· τὸ μὲν γὰρ τραχύ
φησιν εἶναι τὸ δὲ λεῖον, εἰς δὲ τὰ σχήματα ἀνάγει τοὺς
χυμούς. καίτοι ἢ οὐδεμιᾶς ἢ μᾶλλον τῆς ὄψεως τὰ
15 κοινὰ γνωρίζειν. εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα τῆς γεύσεως μᾶλλον, τὰ
T
T
4422, 22 ἑπτὰ] ἓξ volunt legi Biehl et Susemihl, Philol. 1885.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
69
quent stimulus is in terms of some numerical ratio, or it varies.
indefinitely.
The mixtures, however, which produce pleasure are in a
calculable proportion. Sweet flavours alone are oily; saline
and bitter are practically the same; but sour, pungent, 20
astringent, and acid occupy an intermediate position. The
species of tastes and colours are practically equal in number.
If, as is reasonable, one reckons grey to be a kind of black,
there are seven of each, for there remain yellow-to be
referred to white, as oily was to sweet-with crimson, purple, 25
green, and blue intermediate between black and white; and
all other colours are got by combining these. Just as black
is absence of white in the transparent medium so salinity and
bitterness are a deficiency of sweetness in nutritive liquid.
Consequently the ashes of things which have been burned 30
are bitter, for the scorching they have received has expelled
their palatable fluid qualities.
Democritus and most of the physical philosophers who
treat of sensation commit a most senseless blunder. They 442 b
identify all sense qualities with the tactual. It is clear
that if this were true each of the other senses would be
a sort of touch; but it is not difficult to see that this is
impossible.
In addition they treat the common sensibles as though
they were the objects of a special sense; but this is erroneous,
for magnitude, figure, roughness, and smoothness, as well as 5
the sharpness and bluntness found in material bodies, are
generic objects of sensation which, if not discerned by all the
senses, are common to sight and touch at least. Hence we
can explain the fact that we can make mistakes in perceiving
the latter, but are never deceived as to the special sensibles;
sight, for instance, makes no mistakes about colour, nor does 10
hearing err in the matter of sounds.
IO
These philosophers, however, reduce the special to the
common, following the example of Democritus in the case of
black and white. He identifies the one with the rough, the
other with the smooth, and he reduces flavours to geometrical
figures. But it falls to sight first, if to any sense, to discriminate 15
70
ARISTOTLE
γοῦν ἐλάχιστα τῆς ἀκριβεστάτης ἐστὶν αἰσθήσεως δια-
κρίνειν περὶ ἕκαστον γένος, ὥστε ἐχρῆν τὴν γεῦσιν
καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινῶν αἰσθάνεσθαι μάλιστα καὶ τῶν
σχημάτων εἶναι κριτικωτάτην. ἔτι τὰ μὲν αἰσθητὰ
20 πάντα ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι τῷ μέλανι τὸ
λευκὸν καὶ ἐν χυμοῖς τῷ γλυκεῖ τὸ πικρόν· σχῆμα δὲ
σχήματι οὐ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἐναντίον· τίνι γὰρ τῶν πολυ-
γώνων το περιφερὲς ἐναντίον; ἔτι ἀπείρων ὄντων τῶν
σχημάτων ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς εἶναι ἀπείρους·
25 διὰ τί γὰρ ὁ μὲν ἂν ποιήσειεν αἴσθησιν, ὁ δ᾽ οὐκ ἂν
ποιήσειεν; καὶ περὶ μὲν τοῦ γευστοῦ καὶ χυμοῦ εἴρηται·
τὰ γὰρ ἄλλα πάθη τῶν χυμῶν οἰκείαν ἔχει τὴν σκέψιν
ἐν τῇ φυσιολογίᾳ τῇ περὶ τῶν φυτῶν.
Ο
V
Εν
Τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον δεῖ νοῆσαι καὶ περὶ τὰς ὀσμάς·
30 ὅπερ γὰρ ποιεῖ ἐν τῷ ὑγρᾷ τὸ ξηρόν, τοῦτο ποιεῖ ἐν
ἄλλῳ γένει τὸ ἔγχυμον ὑγρόν, ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ὕδατι ὁμοίως.
κοινὸν δὲ κατὰ τούτων νῦν μὲν λέγομεν τὸ διαφανές,
443 α ἔστι δ᾽ ὀσφραντὸν οὐχ ᾗ διαφανές, ἀλλ᾽ ἡ πλυντικὸν ἢ
ῥυπτικὸν ἐγχύμου ξηρότητος· οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐν ἀέρι
ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ὕδατι τὸ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως ἐστιν. δῆλον δ'
ἐπὶ τῶν ἰχθύων καὶ τῶν ὀστρακοδέρμων· φαίνονται γὰρ
5 ὀσφραινόμενα οὔτε ἀέρος ὄντος ἐν τῷ ὕδατι (ἐπιπολάζει
γὰρ ὁ ἀήρ, ὅταν ἐγγένηται) οὔτ᾽ αὐτὰ ἀναπνέοντα. εἰ
οὖν τις θείη καὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ ἄμφω υγρά,
εἴη ἂν ἡ ἐν ὑγρῷ τοῦ ἐγχύμου ξηροῦ φύσις ὀσμή, καὶ
ὀσφραντὸν τὸ τοιοῦτον. ὅτι δ᾽ ἀπ᾽ ἐγχύμου ἐστὶ τὸ
το πάθος, δῆλον ἐκ τῶν ἐχόντων καὶ μὴ ἐχόντων ὀσμήν·
τά τε γὰρ στοιχεῖα ἄοσμα, οἷον πῦρ ἀὴρ γῆ ὕδωρ, διὰ
τὸ τά τε ὑγρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ αὐτῶν ἄχυμα εἶναι, ἂν μή τι
μιγνύμενον ποιῇ. διὸ καὶ ἡ θάλαττα ἔχει ὀσμήν· ἔχει
ΤΟ
ΤΟ
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
71
the common sensibles; it is, at any rate, the function of the
most delicate sense to discern the finest differences in its
particular domain, and so, if it fall to taste first to perceive
the common sensibles, taste would need to possess the finest
discrimination of figure and be as well the best means of
perceiving the other common sensibles.
A further objection is, that the objects of special sense
all show contrariety in their determinations; for example, in 20
colour black and white are opposed, in taste sweet and bitter.
But there seems to be no opposition between one figure and
another. To which of the polygons is the circle a contrary?
Again, as figures are infinite in number, there must be an
infinitude of tastes also, for why should one figure produce a 25
taste and not another?
This is our account of flavour and its effect on taste. The
other qualities which flavours present find their special treat-
ment in the Natural History of Plants.
V
The theory to be accepted about odour also is the same
as that about flavour. Precisely as dry substance produces 30
an effect in liquid, liquid impregnated with flavour acts in a
new field, operating in air and water alike.
We have just said that the transparent element is common
to these two substances, but it is not quâ transparent that 443 a
they affect the sense of smell; they do this in so far as they
dissolve and absorb by erosion dry substance which possesses
flavour; both substances form a medium for this sense, for
smell is exercised not only in air but in water also. The
case of the fishes and the testacea makes this plain; they
evidently employ the sense of smell and yet neither is there 5
air in the water (for it rises to the surface if ever it gets in)
nor do these animals breathe.
Premising, then, the fact that air and water are both
moist, we might define odour as the nature dry substance
possessing flavour assumes in the moist, and the object of
the sense of smell will be anything so qualified.
That this phenomenon issues from the possession of
flavour, is clear on a review of those substances that are and 10
those that are not odorous. The elements have no odour, to
wit-fire, air, earth, and water, since they are flavourless-
both those of them which are moist and those which are
dry—except when forming a combination. Hence the sea
too smells, for it has a taste and contains dry substance.
72
ARISTOTLE
20
ΤΟ
Το
γὰρ χυμόν και ξηρότητα. καὶ ἄλες μᾶλλον νίτρου
15 ὀσμώδεις· δηλοῖ δὲ τὸ ἐξικμάζον ἐξ αὐτῶν ἔλαιον· τὸ
δὲ νίτρον γῆς ἐστὶ μᾶλλον. ἔτι λίθος μὲν ἄοσμον,
δέ
ἄχυμον γάρ, τὰ δὲ ξύλα ὀσμώδη, ἔγχυμα γάρ· καὶ
τούτων τὰ ὑδατώδη ἧττον. ἔτι ἐπὶ τῶν μεταλλευομένων
χρυσὸς ἄοσμον, ἄχυμον γάρ, ὁ δὲ χαλκὸς καὶ ὁ σίδηρος
ὀσμώδη. ὅταν δ᾽ ἐκκαυθῇ τὸ ὑγρόν, ἀοσμότεραι αἱ
σκωρίαι γίγνονται πάντων. ἄργυρος δὲ καὶ καττίτερος
τῶν μὲν μᾶλλον ὀσμώδη τῶν δ᾽ ἧττον· ὑδατώδη γάρ.
δοκεῖ δ᾽ ἐνίοις ἡ καπνώδης αναθυμίασις εἶναι ὀσμή,
οὖσα κοινὴ γῆς τε καὶ ἀέρος. [καὶ πάντες ἐπιφέρονται
25 ἐπὶ τοῦτο περὶ ὀσμῆς·] διὸ καὶ Ἡράκλειτος οὕτως
εἴρηκεν, ὡς εἰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα καπνὸς γίγνοιτο, ὅτι ῥίνες
ἂν διαγνοῖεν. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὴν ὀσμὴν πάντες ἐπιφέρονται
<ἐπὶ τοῦτο>, οἱ μὲν ὡς ἀτμίδα, οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἀναθυμίασιν,
οἱ δ᾽ ὡς ἄμφω ταῦτα· ἔστι δ᾽ ἡ μὲν ἀτμὶς ὑγρότης τις,
30 ἡ δὲ καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, κοινὸν ἀέρος
καὶ γῆς· καὶ συνίσταται ἐκ μὲν ἐκείνης ὕδωρ, ἐκ δὲ
ταύτης γῆς τι εἶδος· ἀλλ᾽ οὐδέτερον τούτων ἔοικεν· ἡ
μὲν γὰρ ἀτμίς ἐστιν ὕδατος, ἡ δὲ καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις
ἀδύνατος ἐν ὕδατι γενέσθαι· ὀσμᾶται δὲ καὶ τὰ ἐν τῷ
443 b ὕδατι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον· ἔτι ἡ ἀναθυμίασις
ὁμοίως λέγεται ταῖς ἀπορροίαις· εἰ οὖν μηδ' ἐκείνη
καλῶς, οὐδ᾽ αὕτη καλῶς. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐνδέχεται ἀπο-
λαύειν τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ
5 ὕδατι καὶ πάσχειν τι ὑπὸ τῆς ἐγχύμου ξηρότητος, οὐκ
ἄδηλον· καὶ γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ ὑγρὸν τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν. ἔτι δ᾽
εἴπερ ὁμοίως ἐν τοῖς ὑγροῖς ποιεῖ καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι οἷον
ἀποπλυνόμενον τὸ ξηρόν, φανερὸν ὅτι δεῖ ἀνάλογον εἶναι
τὰς ὀσμὰς τοῖς χυμοῖς. ἀλλὰ μὴν τοῦτό γε ἐπ᾿ ἐνίων
το συμβέβηκεν· καὶ γὰρ δριμείαι καὶ γλυκεῖαί εἰσιν ὀσμαὶ
καὶ αὐστηραὶ καὶ στρυφναὶ καὶ λιπαραί, καὶ τοῖς πικροῖς
IO
...
4432, 24 καὶ ὀσμῆς 25 damnat Thurot.
addidit Christ probat etiam Biehl.
28 ἐπὶ τοῦτο om. codd. et edd.,
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
73
Salt smells more than natron, as the oil extracted from it 15
proves, while natron is more of the nature of earth. More-
over, stone is odourless, since flavourless; but woods, being
possessed of taste, are scented, the watery ones less so.
Again, among metals gold is odourless, having no taste;
bronze and iron have a smell. The dross left, when the 20
fluid element is smelted out of these metals, in every case
possesses less odour than the ore itself. Silver and tin smell
more than the one class and less than the other; for they are
aqueous.
Some people think that the smoky variety of fume
constitutes odour, since it is a joint product of earth and
air. [All ascribe odour to this.] Hence too the saying of 25
Heraclitus that "if all things were turned into smoke the
nostrils would distinguish them." Now all ascribe odour to
this phenomenon, some taking it to be steam, others a fume,
while some again ascribe it to both.
Steam is a sort of moisture, and smoke-like fume is a
joint product of air and earth, as has been said; out of the 30
former water condenses, out of the latter some species of
earth. But neither of these seems to be odour; for steam
may be classed as water, while again smoke-like fumes
cannot exist in water; but creatures living in water do
employ the sense of smell, as already said. Further the 443 b
theory of fumes is similar to that of effluxes and, if that
theory was erroneous, so is this.
It is clear that moisture, both as it exists in the atmo-
sphere and as it exists in water, can derive something from
and be modified by dry substance which possesses flavour, 5
for air too has moisture in its constitution. Moreover if the
effect of the dry substance in liquids and in air, when it is, as
it were, dissolved in them, is similar to its previous action in
liquid alone, manifestly odours and tastes must be analogous
to each other. Indeed in several cases this correspondence
occurs; odours are pungent and sweet, harsh, astringent and 10
74
ARISTOTLE
Ο
τὰς σαπρὰς ἄν τις ἀνάλογον εἴποι. διὸ ὥσπερ ἐκεῖνα
δυσκατάποτα, τὰ σαπρὰ δυσανάπνευστά ἐστιν. δῆλον
ἄρα ὅτι ὅπερ ἐν τῷ ὕδατι ὁ χυμός, τοῦτ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἀέρι καὶ
15 ὕδατι ἡ ὀσμή. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ ἡ πῆξις
καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς ἀμβλύνει καὶ τὰς ὀσμὰς ἀφανίζει· τὸ
γὰρ θερμὸν τὸ κινοῦν καὶ δημιουργοῦν ἀφανίζουσιν ἡ
ψύξις καὶ ἡ πήξις.
Εἴδη δὲ τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ δύο ἐστίν· οὐ γὰρ ὥσπερ
20 τινές φασιν, οὐκ ἔστιν εἴδη τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν.
διοριστέον δὲ πῶς ἔστι καὶ πῶς οὐκ ἔστιν· τὸ μὲν γάρ
ἐστι κατὰ τοὺς χυμοὺς τεταγμένον αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ εἴπομεν,
καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρὸν κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔχουσιν·
διὰ γὰρ τὸ θρεπτικοῦ πάθη εἶναι, ἐπιθυμούντων μὲν
25 ἡδεῖαι αἱ ὀσμαὶ τούτων εἰσί, πεπληρωμένοις δὲ καὶ
μηδὲν δεομένοις οὐχ ἡδεῖαι, οὐδ᾽ ὅσοις μὴ καὶ ἡ τροφὴ
ἡ ἔχουσα τὰς ὀσμὰς ἡδεῖα, οὐδὲ τούτοις. ὥστε αὗται
μέν, καθάπερ εἴπομεν, κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἔχουσι τὸ ἡδὺ
καὶ λυπηρόν, διὸ καὶ πάντων εἰσὶ κοιναὶ τῶν ζῴων· αἱ
30 δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὰς ἡδεῖαι τῶν ὀσμῶν εἰσίν, οἷον αἱ τῶν
ἀνθῶν· οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον οὐδ᾽ ἧττον πρὸς τὴν τροφὴν
παρακαλοῦσιν, οὐδὲ συμβάλλονται πρὸς ἐπιθυμίαν οὐδέν,
ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον μᾶλλον· ἀληθὲς γὰρ ὅπερ Εὐριπίδην
σκώπτων εἶπε Στράττις, “ὅταν φακὴν ἕψητε, μὴ ἐπιχεῖν
444 2 μύρον.” οἱ δὲ νῦν μιγνύντες εἰς τὰ πόματα τὰς τοιαύτας
δυνάμεις βιάζονται τῇ συνηθείᾳ τὴν ἡδονήν, ἕως ἂν ἐκ
δύ᾽ αἰσθήσεων γένηται τὸ ἡδὺ ὡς ἂν καὶ ἀπὸ μιᾶς.
τοῦτο μὲν οὖν τὸ ὀσφραντὸν ἴδιον τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστίν,
5 ἡ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς χυμούς τεταγμένη καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων,
ὥσπερ εἴρηται πρότερον· κἀκείνων μέν, διὰ τὸ κατὰ
συμβεβηκὸς ἔχειν τὸ ἡδύ, διήρηται τὰ εἴδη κατὰ τοὺς
χυμούς, ταύτης δ᾽ οὐκέτι, διὰ τὸ τὴν φύσιν αὐτῆς εἶναι
καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡδεῖαν ἢ λυπηράν. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ ἴδιον εἶναι
το ἀνθρώπου τὴν τοιαύτην ὀσμὴν διὰ τὴν ἕξιν τὴν περὶ
ΙΟ
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
75
oily, and we might regard fetid odours as corresponding to
bitter tastes; this would explain the parallel unpalatability
of the latter and noisomeness of the former. Thus it is clear
that smell is in air and water precisely what flavour is in water.
It is for this reason that cold and frost blunt flavours 15
and reduce odours to non-existence, for the heat which is
the active and creative cause is nullified by the cooling and
congelation.
There are two sorts of odorous qualities; it is not the
case, as some allege, that there are not different species of 20
odour. They do exist; but we must determine in what
sense they are authentic and in what sense not.
The one set are in order parallel to the various flavours
as we have explained. Their pleasantness and unpleasantness
belong to them contingently, for, since they are qualities of
that which forms our food, these smells are pleasant when we
are hungry, but when we are sated and not requiring to eat, 25
they are not pleasant; neither are they pleasant to those who
dislike the food of which they are the odour. Hence, as we
said, their pleasantness and unpleasantness are contingent
and hence too they are common to all animals. But the other
class of smells are per se pleasant, for example the scents of 30
flowers. They have no influence either great or small in
attracting us to our food nor do they contribute anything
to the longing for it. Their effect is rather the opposite;
there is a truth contained in Strattis's jibe at Euripides-
Pray perfume not the good pea-soup." Those who do as a 444 a
fact mix such elixirs with their drink get a forced pleasure
by accustoming themselves to it, so that the pleasantness
arising from the two sensations becomes apparently the
result of one. This sort of odorous quality is thus peculiarly
the object of human sense, but that coordinate with the
varieties of flavour is proper to the other animals as well, 5
as said before. Those odours, because their pleasantness is
contingently attached to them, are classified in species which
correspond to the several flavours, but in the other group this
feature disappears, as there agreeableness and the reverse
attach to the essential nature of the odour.
(C
The cause of the restriction of odour of this kind to
human sense comes from the constitution of the body in the 10
76
ARISTOTLE
τὸν ἐγκέφαλον. ψυχροῦ γὰρ ὄντος τὴν φύσιν τοῦ ἐγκε-
φάλου, καὶ τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ περὶ αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς φλεβίοις
ὄντος λεπτοῦ μὲν καὶ καθαροῦ, εὐψύκτου δέ (διὸ καὶ
ἡ τῆς τροφῆς ἀναθυμίασις ψυχομένη διὰ τὸν τόπον τὰ
15 νοσηματικὰ ῥεύματα ποιεῖ), τοῖς ἀνθρώποις προς βοή-
θειαν ὑγιείας γέγονε τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος τῆς ὀσμῆς· οὐδὲν
γὰρ ἄλλο ἔργον ἐστὶν αὐτῆς [ἢ τοῦτο]. τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ
φανερῶς· ἡ μὲν γὰρ τροφὴ ἡδεῖα οὖσα, καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ
ὑγρά, πολλάκις νοσώδης ἐστίν, ἡ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐώδους
20 ὀσμὴ ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν <ἡδεῖα> ὁπωσοῦν ἔχουσιν ὠφέλιμος
ὡς εἰπεῖν ἀεί. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο γίγνεται διὰ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς,
οὐ πᾶσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις καὶ τῶν ἐναίμων οἷον
τοῖς τετράποσι καὶ ὅσα μετέχει μᾶλλον τῆς τοῦ ἀέρος
φύσεως· ἀναφερομένων γὰρ τῶν ὀσμῶν πρὸς τὸν ἐγκέ-
25 φαλον διὰ τὴν ἐν αὐταῖς τῆς θερμότητος κουφότητα
ὑγιεινοτέρως ἔχει τὰ περὶ τὸν τόπον τοῦτον· ἡ γὰρ
τῆς ὀσμῆς δύναμις θερμὴ τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν. κατακέ
χρηται δ᾽ ἡ φύσις τῇ ἀναπνοῇ ἐπὶ δύο, ὡς ἔργῳ μὲν
ἐπὶ τὴν εἰς τὸν θώρακα βοήθειαν, ὡς παρέργῳ δ᾽ ἐπὶ
30 τὴν ὀσμήν· ἀναπνέοντος γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐκ παρόδου ποιεῖται
διὰ τῶν μυκτήρων τὴν κίνησιν. ἴδιον δὲ τῆς τοῦ ἀν
θρώπου φύσεώς ἐστι τὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς τῆς τοιαύτης γένος
διὰ τὸ πλεῖστον ἐγκέφαλον καὶ ὑγρότατον ἔχειν τῶν
ἄλλων ζῴων ὡς κατὰ μέγεθος· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ μόνον
35 ὡς εἰπεῖν αἰσθάνεται τῶν ζῴων ἄνθρωπος καὶ χαίρει ταῖς
τῶν ἀνθῶν καὶ ταῖς τῶν τοιούτων ὀσμαῖς· σύμμετρος γὰρ
4445 αὐτῶν ἡ θερμότης καὶ ἡ κίνησις πρὸς τὴν ὑπερβολὴν
τῆς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ ὑγρότητος καὶ ψυχρότητός ἐστιν. τοῖς
δ᾽ ἄλλοις ὅσα πλεύμονα ἔχει διὰ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν τοῦ ἑτέρου
γένους τῆς ὀσμῆς τὴν αἴσθησιν ἀποδέδωκεν ἡ φύσις,
4442, 1η ἢ τοῦτο leg. LSU Alex. vet. tr. et omnes edd. excepto Biehl.
18 ǹ ante έnpå et ante vypà legunt exceptis EM Y et Biehl omnes codd. et edd.
19 et 20
ἡ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς τῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἑαυτὴν LP U) εὐώδους (quibus verbis
ἡδεια addunt L SU) habent omnes codd. et edd., text. recept. omisso ἡδεια Biehl.
444 1,3 τὸ ἀναπνεῖν edd., τοῦ Ρ U et Wilson.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
77
region of the brain. The brain is of a cold nature and the
blood around it in the veins is thin and pure and is easily
chilled (this explains why the upward ascending fumes from
food on turning cold owing to the nature of that region cause
a morbid flow of rheum). Hence it is for man's benefit, for 15
the preservation of his health, that this species of odour has
come into existence. This is its only function and it evidently
fulfils it. Food, though sweet, being both dry and moist, is
frequently unhealthy; but the odour, per se pleasant, of a 20
fragrant perfume, is beneficial to us in whatever state we are.
It is for this reason that it is by means of respiration that
smell takes place, if not in all animals, yet in man and, among
sanguineous animals, in the quadrupeds and such as parti-
cipate more largely in an aerial constitution. When scents
are carried up to the brain, owing to the lightness of the 25
warm element contained in them, the parts in this region
have a healthier tone; this takes place because the power
in odour to produce an effect is constituted by heat.
Nature employs respiration for two purposes; its chief
function is to maintain the action of the chest, its secondary
one subserves the ends of smell, secondary, for the passage 30
of the breath through the nostrils is, as it were, a cursory
contrivance.
The reason why the class of odours of this description is
restricted to man, is, that his brain is larger and more humid
than that of all other animals in proportion to his size. This
is why he alone, so to speak, among the animals, perceives 35
and also enjoys the odours of flowers and similar scented
objects; they are pleasant because their heat and activity 444
are proportionate to the excess of humidity and cold in that
part of the body.
Among other animals, in those which have lungs, breathing
is the means which nature has bestowed upon them for the
78
ARISTOTLE
ΙΟ
ΤΟ
τα
5 ὅπως μὴ αἰσθητήρια δύο ποιῇ· ἀπόχρη γὰρ καὶ ἀναπνέ
ουσιν, ὥσπερ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἀμφοτέρων τῶν ὀσφραντῶν,
τούτοις τῶν ἑτέρων μόνων ὑπάρχουσα ἡ αἴσθησις. τὰ
δὲ μὴ ἀναπνέοντα ὅτι μὲν ἔχει αἴσθησιν τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ,
φανερόν· καὶ γὰρ ἰχθύες καὶ τὸ τῶν ἐντόμων γένος πᾶν
ἀκριβῶς καὶ πόρρωθεν αἰσθάνεται, διὰ τὸ θρεπτικὸν
εἶδος τῆς ὀσμῆς, ἀπέχοντα πολὺ τῆς οἰκείας τροφῆς,
οἷον αἵ τε μέλιτται καὶ τὸ τῶν μικρῶν μυρμήκων γένος,
οὓς καλοῦσί τινες κνίπας, καὶ τῶν θαλαττίων αἱ πορφύ
ραι, καὶ πολλὰ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν τοιούτων ζῴων ὀξέως
15 αἰσθάνεται τῆς τροφῆς διὰ τὴν ὀσμήν. ὅτῳ δὲ αἰσθά
νεται, οὐχ ὁμοίως φανερόν. διὸ κἂν ἀπορήσειέ τις τίνι
αἰσθάνεται τῆς ὀσμῆς, εἴπερ ἀναπνέουσι μὲν γίνεται
τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι μοναχῶς τοῦτο γὰρ φαίνεται ἐπὶ τῶν
ἀναπνεόντων συμβαῖνον πάντων), ἐκείνων δ᾽ οὐθὲν ἀνα-
20 πνεῖ, αἰσθάνεται μέντοι, εἰ μή τις παρὰ τὰς πέντε
αἰσθήσεις ἑτέρα. τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀδύνατον· τοῦ γὰρ ὀσφραντοῦ
ὄσφρησις, ἐκεῖνα δὲ τούτου αἰσθάνεται, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ τὸν
αὐτὸν ἴσως τρόπον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀναπνέουσι τὸ πνεῦμα
ἀφαιρεῖ τὸ ἐπικείμενον ὥσπερ πῶμά τι (διὸ οὐκ αἰσθά
25 νεται μὴ ἀναπνέοντα), τοῖς δὲ μὴ ἀναπνέουσιν ἀφῇρηται
τοῦτο, καθάπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τὰ μὲν ἔχει βλέφαρα
τῶν ζῴων, ὧν μὴ ἀνακαλυφθέντων οὐ δύναται ὁρᾶν, τὰ
δὲ σκληρόφθαλμα οὐκ ἔχει, διόπερ οὐ προσδεῖται οὐδενὸς
τοῦ ἀνακαλύψοντος, ἀλλ' ὁρᾷ ἐκ τοῦ δυνατοῦ ὄντος αὐτοῦ
30 εὐθύς. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὁτιοῦν οὐδὲν
δυσχεραίνει τῶν καθ᾽ αὑτὰ δυσωδῶν τὴν ὀσμήν, ἂν μή
τι τύχῃ φθαρτικὸν ὄν. ὑπὸ τούτων δ᾽ ὁμοίως φθείρεται
καθάπερ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀνθράκων ἀτμίδος
καρηβαροῦσι καὶ φθείρονται πολλάκις· οὕτως ὑπὸ τῆς
મ
ત્ર
444b, 5 ἐπείπερ καὶ ὡς ἀναπν. leg. exceptis ΕΜΥ et Biehl reliqui omnes et
scripti et impressi, etiam Alex. et vet. tr. 29 ὄντος Biehl | ὁρᾶν LSU Alex.
et omnes edd., “a facultate existente" vet. tr. | αὐτοῦ ΕΜΥ Biehl, αὐτῷ reliqui
et scripti et impressi.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
79
perception of the other genus of odour. This was to avoid
creating two sense-organs; for if creatures merely breathe, 5
the sense of smell is sufficiently well provided for, in the case
of the animals the perception of the one class of odorous
qualities, the only one possessed by them, just as it is in man
who perceives both kinds.
That non-respiring animals perceive odorous quality is a
matter of observation. Fishes and the insect-tribe perceive 10
quite accurately and at a distance by means of the species of
odour connected with nutriment, even when they are far away
from the things that form their special food. For example
bees and the kind of small ants called knipes and, among
marine creatures, the purple-murex and many similar animals,
have a very acute perception of food by means of smell.
But the organ of perception is not so obvious and so one 15
might raise a difficulty and ask, "what is the organ with
which these animals perceive smell, if in all respiring animals
the sensation occurs in one way only, viz. by respiration (as
is evidently the case in all creatures that breathe), and none
of these breathe but yet do perceive odour? Perhaps they 20
do not smell but have a new sense over and above the five."
This, however, is impossible; it is smell that is the sense
of that which smells and this they perceive. Yet perhaps
the manner of perception is not the same; perhaps in the
case of respiring animals the breath displaces a superficial
structure which serves in a way like a lid to cover the sense-
organ; (this will explain why when we do not inhale the
breath we do not smell;) but in the non-respiring animals 25
this is entirely lacking. A parallel for this is the eye; some
animals have eyelids and, unless these are open, they cannot
see; but hard-eyed animals, not possessing them, do not
require anything to open them, but see an object directly
out of the organ which itself has the capacity of vision.
Similarly in accordance with our previous distinction we 30
must notice that none of the other animals are distressed by
the smell of things per se malodorous, unless any of these
chance to be destructive to life. These noxious odours have
a destructive effect upon them, just as they have upon men
too, in whom the gas arising from coal causes headache and
frequently death. So too, sulphurous and bituminous fumes
80
ARISTOTLE
35 τοῦ θείου δυνάμεως καὶ τῶν ἀσφαλτωδῶν φθείρεται
445 α τἆλλα ζώα, καὶ φεύγει διὰ τὸ πάθος. αὐτῆς δὲ καθ᾿
αὑτὴν τῆς δυσωδίας οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν, καίτοι πολλὰ
τῶν φυομένων δυσώδεις ἔχει τὰς ὀσμάς, ἐὰν μή τι
συμβάλληται πρὸς τὴν γεύσιν ἢ τὴν ἐδωδὴν αὐτοῖς.
5 ἔοικε δ' ἡ αἴσθησις ἡ τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι περιττῶν οὐσῶν
τῶν αἰσθήσεων καὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ ἔχοντος μέσον τοῦ
περιττοῦ καὶ αὐτὴ μέση εἶναι τῶν τε ἁπτικῶν, οἷον
ἁφῆς καὶ γεύσεως, καὶ τῶν δι᾽ ἄλλου αἰσθητικῶν, οἷον
ὄψεως καὶ ἀκοῆς. διὸ καὶ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν τῶν θρεπτικών
1ο ἐστὶ πάθος τι (ταῦτα δ᾽ ἐν τῷ ἁπτῷ γένει) καὶ τοῦ
ἀκουστοῦ δὲ καὶ τοῦ ὁρατοῦ, διὸ καὶ ἐν ἀέρι καὶ ἐν
ὕδατι ὀσμῶνται. ὥστ᾽ ἐστὶ τὸ ὀσφραντὸν κοινόν τι
τούτων ἀμφοτέρων, καὶ τῷ τε ἁπτῷ ὑπάρχει καὶ τῷ
ἀκουστῷ καὶ διαφανεῖ· διὸ εὐλόγως παρείκασται ξηρό-
15 τητος ἐν ὑγρῷ καὶ χυτῷ οἷον βαφή τις εἶναι καὶ
πλύσις. πῶς μὲν οὖν εἴδη δεῖ λέγειν καὶ πῶς οὐ δεῖ
τη τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ, ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον εἰρήσθω.
17
Ὁ δὲ λέγουσι τινες
εὔλογον· τρέφεσθαι γάρ
πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ὁρῶμεν
ΤΟ
τῶν Πυθαγορείων, οὐκ ἔστιν
φασιν ἔνία ζῷα ταῖς ὀσμαῖς.
20 ὅτι τὴν τροφὴν δεῖ εἶναι συνθέτην· καὶ γὰρ τὰ τρεφόμενα
οὐχ ἁπλᾶ ἐστίν, διὸ καὶ περίττωμα γίνεται τῆς τροφῆς,
ὃ μὲν ἐν αὐτοῖς ὃ δὲ ἔξω, ὥσπερ τοῖς φυτοῖς. ἔτι δ'
οὐδὲ τὸ ὕδωρ ἐθέλει αὐτὸ μόνον ἄμικτον ὂν τρέφειν·
σωματώδες γάρ τι δεῖ εἶναι τὸ συστησόμενον. ἔτι
25 πολὺ ἧττον εὔλογον τὸν ἀέρα σωματοῦσθαι. πρὸς δὲ
τούτοις, ὅτι πᾶσίν ἐστι τοῖς ζῴοις τόπος δεκτικὸς τῆς
τροφῆς, ἐξ οὗ ὅταν εἰσέλθῃ λαμβάνει τὸ σῶμα· τοῦ
δ᾽ ὀσφραντοῦ ἐν τῇ κεφαλῇ τὸ αἰσθητήριον, καὶ μετὰ
πνευματώδους εἰσέρχεται ἀναθυμιάσεως, ὥστ᾽ εἰς τὸν
30 ἀναπνευστικὸν βαδίζοι ἂν τόπον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐ
συμβάλλεται εἰς τροφὴν τὸ ὀσφραντόν, ᾗ ὀσφραντόν,
ΤΟ
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
81
have the power of causing death in the other animals and are 35
shunned by them in consequence. But they reck not at all 445 a
of the essential unpleasantness of the smell (though many
plants are malodorous) unless it make some difference to the
taste and to eating.
The number of the senses is uneven and the sense of 5
smell, since an uneven number has a middle term, seems
itself to occupy the intermediate position between the senses
which require contact, viz. touch and taste, and those where
the perception is mediated by something else, to wit, sight
and hearing. For this reason also odour is a quality both of
that which is nutritive (which falls within the class of things 10
tangible) and of the audible and the visible, and hence the
sense of smell is exercised both in air and in water. Thus
the object of smell is something common to both of these
and is found in things tangible, things audible and things
transparent.
We had, therefore, good reason in comparing it to an
infusion and solution of dry substance in that which is liquid 15
and fluid. This is the sum of our account of the sense in
which it is correct and that in which it is incorrect to talk
of species in odour.
The theory held by certain Pythagoreans that some
animals live on odours is an irrational doctrine.
In the first place, food must be a composite substance;
the creatures that it nourishes are themselves not simple in
structure. Hence from food a waste residue is developed 20
which in some is internal, in others- plants, external;
secondly, water by itself alone and unmixed has no nutritive
tendency; food which is to form a concrete body must have
solidity. Much less reason is there for supposing that air
can be solidified. Furthermore, in all animals there is a 25
receptacle for food and out of this the body is supplied upon
the entrance of nutriment. But the organ for perceiving
smell is in the head; odour enters the body along with the
waft of the air we breathe and so must pass into the organs
of breathing.
It is clear, then, that the object of the sense of smell has, 30
R.
6
82
ARISTOTLE
δῆλον· ὅτι μέντοι εἰς ὑγίειαν, καὶ ἐκ τῆς αἰσθήσεως
καὶ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων φανερόν, ὥστε ὅπερ ὁ χυμὸς ἐν
τῷ θρεπτικῷ καὶ πρὸς τὰ τρεφόμενα, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ πρὸς
445 b ὑγίειαν τὸ ὀσφραντόν. καθ᾽ ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν αισθητή
ριον διωρίσθω τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον.
VI
Απορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις, εἰ πᾶν σῶμα εἰς ἄπειρα διαι-
ρεῖται, ἆρα καὶ τὰ παθήματα τὰ αἰσθητά, οἷον χρώμα
5 καὶ χυμὸς καὶ ὀσμὴ καὶ ψόφος καὶ βάρος καὶ ψυχρὸν
καὶ θερμὸν καὶ κούφον καὶ σκληρὸν καὶ μαλακόν; ἢ
ἀδύνατον· ποιητικὸν γάρ ἐστιν ἕκαστον αὐτῶν τῆς
αἰσθήσεως· τῷ δύνασθαι γὰρ κινεῖν αὐτὴν λέγεται
πάντα. ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη τήν τε αἴσθησιν εἰς ἄπειρα διαι
το ρεῖσθαι καὶ πᾶν εἶναι μέγεθος αἰσθητόν· ἀδύνατον γὰρ
λευκὸν μὲν ὁρᾶν, μὴ ποσὸν δέ. εἰ γὰρ μὴ οὕτως,
ἐνδέχοιτ' ἂν εἶναί τι σῶμα μηδὲν ἔχον χρώμα μηδὲ
βάρος μηδ' ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον πάθος. ὥστ᾽ οὐδ᾽ αἰσθητὸν
ὅλως· ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ αἰσθητά. τὸ ἄρ᾽ αἰσθητὸν ἔσται
15 συγκείμενον οὐκ ἐξ αἰσθητῶν. ἀλλ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον· οὐ γὰρ
δὴ ἔκ γε τῶν μαθηματικῶν. ἔτι τίνι κρινοῦμεν ταῦτα
ἢ γνωσόμεθα; ἢ τῷ νῷ, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ νοητά, οὐδὲ νοεῖ ὁ
νοῦς τὰ ἐκτὸς μὴ μετ᾿ αἰσθήσεως. ἅμα δ᾽ εἰ ταῦτ᾽ ἔχει
οὕτως, ἔοικε μαρτυρεῖν τοῖς τὰ ἄτομα ποιοῦσι μεγέθη·
20 οὕτω γὰρ ἂν λύοιτο ὁ λόγος. ἀλλ᾽ ἀδύνατα· εἴρηται δὲ
περὶ αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις τοῖς περὶ κινήσεως. περὶ δὲ
τῆς λύσεως αὐτῶν ἅμα δῆλον ἔσται καὶ διὰ τί πεπέρανται
τὰ εἴδη καὶ χρώματος καὶ χυμοῦ καὶ φθόγγων καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν. ὧν μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἔσχατα, ἀναγκαῖον
25 πεπεράνθαι τὰ ἐντός· τὰ δ᾽ ἐναντία ἔσχατα. πᾶν δὲ
τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν, οἷον ἐν χρώματι τὸ λευκὸν
Το
Ο
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
83
per se, nothing to do with nourishment. That it makes a
difference to health is, however, obvious; both the experience
of the sensation itself and our argument prove it. Hence we
may conclude that odour has precisely the same office in
relation to health as flavour has in food and in relation to
the creatures that food nourishes.
This finishes our account of the objects relative to the 445 b
several sense-organs.
VI
The question might be raised whether, if all bodies are
infinitely divisible, the same is the case with their sensuous
qualities also, e.g. colour, flavour, odour, sound, weight, cold, 5
heat, lightness, hardness and softness. Or is this impossible?
Each of those phenomena is able to cause sensation; they
are all styled sense-qualities owing to their power of stimu-
lating the sense. Consequently, on the former alternative
sensation will be capable of infinite subdivision and, as well,
every magnitude will be perceptible, since it is impossible to 10
perceive anything white which is not a quantum.
If this were not so, body might exist which was totally
without colour or weight or any other similar attribute.
Consequently it would be totally imperceptible, for the above
form the list of the sense-qualities. The object of sensation
must then be composed of things which are imperceptible.
But it must be composed of constituents which are sen- 15
sible; for it certainly cannot consist of mathematical entities.
Further how should we distinguish them or be aware of
them? By means of thought? But they are not objects
of thought; thought does not think external objects unless
sense cooperates.
At the same time also, this, if true, seems to give evidence
in support of the theory of atomic magnitudes, since that
would furnish a solution of the problem. But atomic magni- 20
tudes are impossible, as was explained in our treatment of
motion.
The solution of this problem and the reason why the
species of colour, taste, sound, etc. are limited in number, will
become apparent at the same time.
Where extremes exist the internal parts must be deter-
minate. Now contraries are extremes and every object of 25
sense exhibits contrariety, e.g. in colour black and white,
6-2
84
ARISTOTLE
ΤΟ
ΤΟ
ΤΟ
ΤΟ
καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ἐν χυμῷ γλυκὺ καὶ πικρόν· καὶ ἐν τοῖς
ἄλλοις δὴ πᾶσιν ἐστιν ἔσχατα τὰ ἐναντία. τὸ μὲν οὖν
συνεχὲς εἰς ἄπειρα τέμνεται ἄνισα, εἰς δ᾽ ἴσα πεπε-
30 ρασμένα· τὸ δὲ μὴ καθ᾽ αὑτὸ συνεχὲς εἰς πεπερασμένα
εἴδη. ἐπεὶ οὖν τὰ μὲν πάθη ὡς εἴδη λεκτέον, ὑπάρχει
δὲ συνέχεια ἀεὶ ἐν τούτοις, ληπτέον ὅτι τὸ δυνάμει καὶ
τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ ἕτερον· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο τὸ μυριοστημόριον
446 a λανθάνει τῆς κέγχρου ὁρωμένης, καίτοι ἡ ὄψις ἐπελή-
λυθεν, καὶ ὁ ἐν τῇ διέσει φθόγγος λανθάνει, καίτοι
συνεχοὺς ὄντος ἀκούει τοῦ μέλους παντός. τὸ δὲ διά-
στημα τὸ τοῦ μεταξὺ πρὸς τοὺς ἐσχάτους λανθάνει.
5 ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις αἰσθητοῖς τὰ μικρὰ πάμπαν·
δυνάμει γὰρ ὁρατά, ἐνεργείᾳ δ᾽ οὔ, ὅταν μὴ χωρὶς ᾖ· καὶ
γὰρ ἐνυπάρχει δυνάμει ἡ ποδιαία τῇ δίποδι, ἐνεργείᾳ
δ' ἤδη διαιρεθεῖσα. χωριζόμεναι δ' αἱ τηλικαῦται ὑπε-
ροχαὶ εὐλόγως μὲν ἂν καὶ διαλύοιντο εἰς τὰ περιέχοντα,
ὥσπερ καὶ ἀκαριαῖος χυμὸς εἰς τὴν θάλατταν ἐκχυθείς.
οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ οὐδ᾽ ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὑπεροχὴ καθ'
αὑτὴν αἰσθητὴ οὐδὲ χωριστή (δυνάμει γὰρ ἐνυπάρχει
ἐν τῇ ἀκριβεστέρᾳ ἡ ὑπεροχή), οὐδὲ τὸ τηλικοῦτον
αἰσθητὸν χωριστὸν ἔσται ἐνεργεία αἰσθάνεσθαι, ἀλλ᾽
15 ὅμως ἔσται αἰσθητόν· δυνάμει τε γάρ ἐστιν ἤδη, καὶ
ἐνεργείᾳ ἔσται προσγενόμενον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἔνια μεγέθη
καὶ πάθη λανθάνει, καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν, καὶ πῶς αἰσθητὰ
καὶ πῶς οὔ, εἴρηται. ὅταν δὲ δὴ ἐνυπάρχοντα οὕτω
ἤδη πρὸς αὑτὰ ᾖ ὥστε καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι, καὶ
20 μὴ μόνον ὅτι ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ ἀλλὰ καὶ χωρίς, πεπερασμένα
ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμὸν καὶ χρώματα καὶ χυμοὺς
22 καὶ φθόγγους.
ΙΟ
22
او
αν
᾿Απορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν τις, ἆρ᾽ ἀφικνοῦνται ἢ τὰ
αἰσθητὰ ἢ αἱ κινήσεις αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν, ὁποτέρως
7 τῇ
4462, 6 μὴ χωρὶς ᾖ] μὴ χωρὶς ή Ε Μ Υ vet. tr., χωρισθῇ Biehl, Bek.
δίποδι] τῷ ποδι Ε Μ Υ 18 ἐνυπάρχη τούτῳ τοσαῦτα LSU Alex., ενυπάρχοντα
οὕτω πως ἄττα ᾗ P vet. tr. Bek. Didot text. recept. Biehl.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
85
in taste sweet and bitter, and in the others every one the
contrary qualities form extremes.
Now continuous quantity when divided falls into an
infinite number of unequal parts but into a finite number of
equal parts. On the other hand that which is not per se 30
continuous, falls into a finite number of species. Thus, while
on the one hand sense-qualities must be considered as species,
but on the other hand universally present the aspect of
continuity, we must, to solve the difficulty, bring in the
distinction between potential and actual. It is by this means
that we explain why the ten thousandth part of a visible 446 a
grain of millet escapes notice although the sight has encoun-
tered it, and why a sound within a quarter-tone escapes
detection, although the whole series of notes in which it
exists, being continuous, is heard; the interval between
the mean point and extremes is not discernible and so too 5
it is with very minute fractions in other objects of sense;
they are potentially perceptible but not actually so unless
they be isolated. So even the one-foot measure has but
potential existence in the two-foot rule but, from the moment
bisection takes place, it is something actual.
But it is reasonable to believe that, when fractions so
excessively minute are isolated, they are moreover resolved
into the surrounding medium, just as a tiny drop of flavouring 10
is lost when spilled in the ocean, and so escapes perception.
However that may be, since not even in the perception of
minute objects is the excessively minute sensation in its
individuality appreciable or isolable (it has a potential exis-
tence in that which is more accurately discriminated), neither
will it be possible to have actual perception of the similarly
minute object of sense in its separateness. Nevertheless
perceptible it is; for it already is so potentially and, when 15
taken in union with the whole, it becomes actually percep-
tible. Thus certain magnitudes and their qualities escape
detection; this is our account of them and of the reason why
that is so and of the senses in which they are and are not
perceptible. But when the constituents of anything are
already so related among themselves as to be also actually
perceptible and perceptible not merely in the whole but 20
individually as well, the determinations of colour and flavour
and sound must be finite in number.
It may be asked-Do the objects of sense or the motions
which issue from sense-objects (whichever of the two theories
perception involves), when acting on us penetrate the medium
through which they pass, prior to causing sensation? This is
86
ARISTOTLE
αν
Ο
Ο
ποτέ γίνεται ἡ αἴσθησις, ὅταν ἐνεργῶσιν, εἰς τὸ μέσον
25 πρῶτον, οἷον ἥ τε ὀσμὴ φαίνεται ποιοῦσα καὶ ὁ ψόφος·
πρότερον γὰρ ὁ ἐγγὺς αἰσθάνεται τῆς ὀσμῆς, καὶ ὁ
ψόφος ὕστερον ἀφικνεῖται τῆς πληγῆς. ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὕτω
καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον καὶ τὸ φῶς; καθάπερ καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς
φησὶν ἀφικνεῖσθαι πρότερον τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς εἰς
30 τὸ μεταξὺ πρὶν πρὸς τὴν ὄψιν ἢ ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν. δόξειε
δ᾽ ἂν εὐλόγως τοῦτο συμβαίνειν· τὸ γὰρ κινούμενον
κινεῖται ποθέν ποι, ὥστ᾽ ἀνάγκη εἶναί τινα καὶ χρόνον
446b ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται ἐκ θατέρου πρὸς θάτερον· ὁ δὲ χρόνος πᾶς
διαιρετός, ὥστε ἦν ὅτε οὔπω ἑωρᾶτο ἀλλ᾽ ἔτ᾽ ἐφέρετο
ἡ ἀκτὶς ἐν τῷ μεταξύ. καὶ εἰ ἅπαν ἅμα ἀκούει καὶ
ἀκήκοε καὶ ὅλως αἰσθάνεται καὶ ᾔσθηται, καὶ μή ἐστι
5 γένεσις αὐτῶν, ἀλλ᾽ εἰσὶν ἄνευ τοῦ γίγνεσθαι ὅμως οὐδὲν
ἧττον, ὥσπερ ὁ ψόφος ἤδη γεγενημένης τῆς πληγῆς οὔπω
πρὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ. δηλοῖ δὲ τοῦτο καὶ ἡ τῶν γραμμάτων
μετασχημάτισις, ὡς γιγνομένης τῆς φορᾶς ἐν τῷ μεταξύ·
οὐ γὰρ τὸ λεχθὲν φαίνονται ἀκηκοότες διὰ τὸ μετα-
το σχηματίζεσθαι φερόμενον τὸν ἀέρα. ἆρ᾽ οὖν οὕτω καὶ
τὸ χρῶμα καὶ τὸ φῶς; οὐ γὰρ δὴ τῷ πως ἔχειν τὸ μὲν
ὁρᾷ τὸ δ᾽ ὁρᾶται, ὥσπερ ἴσα ἐστίν· οὐθὲν γὰρ ἂν ἔδει
που ἑκάτερον εἶναι· τοῖς γὰρ ἴσοις γιγνομένοις οὐδὲν
διαφέρει ἢ ἐγγὺς ἢ πόρρω ἀλλήλων εἶναι. ἢ περὶ μὲν
15 τὸν ψόφον καὶ τὴν ὀσμὴν τοῦτο συμβαίνειν εὔλογον·
ΙΟ
αν
ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἀὴρ καὶ τὸ ὕδωρ, συνεχῆ μέν, μεμέρισται
δ᾽ ἀμφοτέρων ἡ κίνησις. διὸ καὶ ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ
ἀκούει ὁ πρῶτος καὶ ὁ ὕστερος καὶ ὀσφραίνεται, ἔστι
δ᾽ ὡς οὔ. δοκεῖ δέ τισιν εἶναι ἀπορία καὶ περὶ τούτων·
20 ἀδύνατον γάρ φασί τινες ἄλλον ἄλλῳ τὸ αὐτὸ ἀκούειν
καὶ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τ᾽ εἶναι πολλοὺς
καὶ χωρὶς ὄντας ἀκούειν καὶ ὀσφραίνεσθαι· τὸ γὰρ ἓν
χωρὶς ἂν αὐτὸ αὑτοῦ εἶναι. ἢ τοῦ μὲν κινήσαντος
πρώτου, οἷον τῆς κώδωνος ἢ λιβανωτοῦ ἢ πυρός, τοῦ
αν
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
87
evidently the case, e.g., with odour and sound; he who stands 25
nearer perceives the odour earlier, and a sound reaches the
ear after the blow is struck. Is the same thing true of the
object of vision and light? Empedocles too had the very same
theory; he says that the light coming from the sun penetrates
the medium first before meeting our sight or reaching the earth.
This looks like a reasonable account of the phenomenon, for 30
when a thing moves it moves from starting point to terminus
and hence there must be some lapse of time as well while it
passes from the one point to the other. Now every lapse of 446 b
time is divisible and so there was a moment when as yet the
ray of light was not perceived but was still on its passage
through the medium. Though, in every act, hearing and
perception generally are complete as soon as exercised and
there is no process in the establishment of the content of
sense, yet sensation is not devoid of process on this account
nor possesses it any the less; take for example the case of 5
sound which does not meet the ear simultaneously with the
striking of the blow. This is shown too by the distortion
of the letters of a word when uttered, which is explained by
their passage through the medium; we appear not to hear
what has actually been said because the air in moving gets
distorted. Does the same lapse of time in transmission occur
in the case of colour and light? It is not, certainly, in virtue 10
of some such modal determination as constitutes the relation
of equality that subject and object in vision are related. If
it were, they would not require both to be in a definite place;
when things are equal it makes no difference to their equality
whether they are near or far apart. In the case of sound and
odour it is reasonable that this lapse of time during trans-
mission should occur. Like the air and the water they are 15
continuous, yet in both cases the motion of transmission falls
into a number of parts. Hence too there is a sense in which
it is the same thing which is heard by the person who stands
nearest and by him who is farthest away and the same thing
which is smelled by both; and there is a sense in which it is
not. This seems to constitute a difficulty for some people;
they say it is impossible that what is identical should be
heard or seen or smelt by different persons and that they 20
cannot hear and smell it because they are many and apart;
if they could, what is one thing would itself become separated
from itself.
The solution is, that all do perceive the numerically
identical and self-same thing which is the originating cause
of the movement, eg. the bell, the frankincense, or the fire,
88
ARISTOTLE
a
Ο
25 αὐτοῦ καὶ ἑνὸς ἀριθμῷ αἰσθάνονται πάντες, τοῦ δὲ δὴ
ἰδίου ἑτέρου ἀριθμῷ, εἴδει δὲ τοῦ αὑτοῦ, διὸ καὶ ἅμα
πολλοὶ ὁρῶσι καὶ ὀσμῶνται καὶ ἀκούουσιν. ἔστι δ'
οὔτε σώματα ταῦτα, ἀλλὰ πάθος καὶ κίνησίς τις οὐ
γὰρ ἂν τοῦτο συνέβαινεν), οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ σώματος. περὶ δὲ
30 τοῦ φωτὸς ἄλλος λόγος· τῷ ἐνεῖναι γάρ τι φῶς ἐστίν,
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κίνησις. ὅλως δὲ οὐδὲ ὁμοίως ἐπί τε ἀλλοιώ-
σεως ἔχει καὶ φορᾶς· αἱ μὲν γὰρ φοραὶ εὐλόγως εἰς
τὸ μεταξὺ πρῶτον ἀφικνοῦνται (δοκεῖ δ᾽ ὁ ψόφος εἶναι
447 2 φερομένου τινὸς κίνησις), ὅσα δ᾽ ἀλλοιοῦται, οὐκέτι
ὁμοίως· ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀθρόον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ
ἥμισυ πρότερον, οἷον τὸ ὕδωρ ἅμα πᾶν πήγνυσθαι. οὐ
μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἂν ᾖ πολὺ τὸ θερμαινόμενον ἢ πηγνύμενον,
5 τὸ ἐχόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐχομένου πάσχει, τὸ δὲ πρῶτον
ὑπ᾽ αὐτοῦ τοῦ ἀλλοιοῦντος μεταβάλλει, καὶ οὐκ ἀνάγκη
ἅμα ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καὶ ἀθρόον. ἦν δ᾽ ἂν καὶ τὸ γεύεσθαι
ὥσπερ ἡ ὀσμή, εἰ ἐν ὑγρῷ ἦμεν καὶ πορρωτέρω πρὶν
θιγεῖν αὐτοῦ ᾔσθανόμεθα. εὐλόγως δ᾽ ὧν ἐστὶ μεταξὺ
το τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου, οὐχ ἅμα πάντα πάσχει, πλὴν ἐπὶ τοῦ
φωτὸς διὰ τὸ εἰρημένον. διὰ τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ
ὁρᾶν· τὸ γὰρ φῶς ποιεῖ τὸ ὁρᾶν.
ΤΟ
αν
Εν
αν
ΤΟ
VII
Ἔστι δέ τις ἀπορία καὶ ἄλλη τοιάδε περὶ αἰσθήσεως,
πότερον ἐνδέχεται δυεῖν ἅμα δύνασθαι αἰσθάνεσθαι ἐν
15 τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀτόμῳ χρόνῳ, ἢ οὔ, εἰ δὴ ἀεὶ ἡ μείζων
κίνησις τὴν ἐλάττω ἐκκρούει· διὸ τὸ ἐπιφερόμενον ἐπὶ
τὰ ὄμματα οὐκ αἰσθάνονται, ἐὰν τύχωσι σφόδρα τι
ἐννοῦντες ἢ φοβούμενοι ἢ ἀκούοντες πολὺν ψόφον. τοῦτο
δὲ δὴ ὑποκείσθω, καὶ ὅτι ἑκάστου μᾶλλον ἔστιν αἰσθά
446 b, 3ο τῷ ἐνεῖναι Alex., είναι Biehl et codd.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
89
but yet the stimulus peculiar to each is numerically different 25
though specifically the same. We can hence explain how
many people may see and smell and hear the same thing and
do this at the same time too. Here we are dealing not with
bodies, but qualities and motions (if this were not so the
latter phenomenon could not occur), though they do not exist
apart from body.
About light a different account must be given. Light
is due to the presence of something but is not a motion. 30
Universally speaking there is not even similarity between
qualitative alteration and spatial transference; motions of
translation, as one would expect, penetrate the medium first
before reaching us (sound seems to be a motion of something
which travels). On the other hand with things that suffer 447 a
alteration this ceases to be true; they may be altered in one
mass, and not one half before the other; for example water
freezes all at one time. However if what is heated or frozen
is great in bulk, one part is acted on by that which is
contiguous to it, the change in the first being due to the 5
agent itself which is the cause of the alteration; and the
alteration does not necessarily take place at the same time
and over the whole. Taste would be like odour if we lived
in water and perceived things at a distance before touching
them. It is reasonable to believe that in those cases where
the organ of perception employs a medium the effects are not 10
all simultaneously produced; but we except the case of light
for the reason given and, on the very same account, sight
too, for it is light which causes vision.
VII
There is a certain other problem also connected with
perception-Can we perceive two things in the same individual
moment of time, or can we not? Not, if it is the case that a 15
stronger stimulus displaces one which is more feeble. This is
the reason why one does not see things that directly meet the
eyes, when one is in a state of profound meditation or of terror
or when hearkening to a loud sound.
Let us posit this as true, and likewise the fact that any
90
ARISTOTLE
Εν
η
او
20 νεσθαι ἁπλοῦ ὄντος ἢ κεκραμένου, οἷον οἴνου ἀκράτου
ἢ κεκραμένου, καὶ μέλιτος, καὶ χρόας, καὶ τῆς νήτης
μόνης ἢ ἐν τῷ διὰ πασῶν, διὰ τὸ ἀφανίζειν ἄλληλα.
τοῦτο δὲ ποιεῖ ἐξ ὧν ἕν τι γίνεται. εἰ δὴ ἡ μείζων τὴν
ἐλάττω κίνησιν ἐκκρούει, ἀνάγκη, ἂν ἅμα ὦσι, καὶ
25 αὐτὴν ἧττον αἰσθητὴν εἶναι ἢ εἰ μόνη ἦν· ἀφῄρηται
γάρ τι ἡ ἐλάττων μιγνυμένη, εἴπερ ἅπαντα τὰ ἁπλᾶ
μᾶλλον αἰσθητά ἐστίν. ἐὰν ἄρα ἴσαι ὦσιν ἕτεραι οὖσαι,
οὐδετέρας ἔσται αἴσθησις· ἀφανιεῖ γὰρ ἡ ἑτέρα ὁμοίως
τὴν ἑτέραν. ἁπλῆς δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι. ὥστε
30 ἢ οὐδεμία ἔσται αἴσθησις ἢ ἄλλη ἐξ ἀμφοῖν. ὅπερ καὶ
γίγνεσθαι δοκεῖ ἐκ τῶν κεραννυμένων ἐν ᾧ ἂν μιχθῶσιν.
ἐπεὶ οὖν ἐκ μὲν ἐνίων γίνεταί τι, ἐκ δ᾽ ἐνίων οὐ γίνεται,
447 b τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέραν αἴσθησιν (μίγνυνται γὰρ ὧν
τὰ ἔσχατα ἐναντία· οὐκ ἔστι δ᾽ ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ ὀξέος ἓν
γενέσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός, ἀλλ᾽ οὐχ ὡς ἐξ
ὀξέος και βαρέος συμφωνία)· οὐκ ἄρα οὐδ᾽ αἰσθάνεσθαι
5 ἐνδέχεται αὐτῶν ἅμα. ἴσαι μὲν γὰρ οὖσαι αἱ κινήσεις
ἀφανιοῦσιν ἀλλήλας, ἐπεὶ μία οὐ γίνεται ἐξ αὐτῶν· ἂν
δ᾽ ἄνισοι, ἡ κρείττων αἴσθησιν ποιεῖ, ἐπεὶ μᾶλλον ἅμα
δυεῖν αἴσθοιτ᾽ ἂν ἡ ψυχὴ τῇ μιᾷ αἰσθήσει ὧν μία
αἴσθησις, οἷον ὀξέος καὶ βαρέος· μᾶλλον γὰρ ἅμα ἡ
το κίνησις τῆς μιᾶς ταύτης ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν, οἷον ὄψεως καὶ
ἀκοῆς. τῇ μιᾷ δὲ ἅμα δυοῖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι
ἂν μὴ μιχθῇ· τὸ γὰρ μῖγμα ἓν βούλεται εἶναι, τοῦ δ᾽
ἑνὸς μία αἴσθησις, ἡ δὲ μία ἅμα αὑτῇ. ὥστ᾽ ἐξ ἀνάγκης
τῶν μεμιγμένων ἅμα αἰσθάνεται, ὅτι μιᾷ αἰσθήσει κατ'
15 ἐνέργειαν αἰσθάνεται· ἑνὸς μὲν γὰρ ἀριθμῷ ἡ κατ'
ἐνέργειαν μία, εἴδει δὲ ἡ κατὰ δύναμιν μία. καὶ εἰ
μία τοίνυν ἡ αἴσθησις ἡ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, ἓν ἐκεῖνα ἐρεῖ.
μεμίχθαι ἄρα ἀνάγκη αὐτά. ὅταν ἄρα μὴ ᾖ μεμιγμένα,
IO
447 2, 31
ἐν ᾧ, fort. ἐφ᾽ ᾧ
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
91
single thing is more perceptible by itself than when in a 20
compound. For example, a wine is more readily distinguished
when pure than when mixed; so with honey and tint, and the
tonic is more distinctly perceived when alone than when it is
sounded along with the octave, as the two when together annul
each other.
This result is produced by things out of which a unity
is formed. If it is the case that the stronger stimulus
displaces the weaker, it must, if they are simultaneous, itself
be less distinct to sense than if it were alone, having suffered 25
diminution to some extent by the admixture of the weaker,
if the pure is always the more perceptible. So if two different
stimuli are equal, neither will be perceived; either will annul
the other to an equal extent. But they cannot be perceived
as pure; hence either no sensation will result or another one 30
derived from both, precisely as things when mingled yield
something fresh so long as it is true mixture that takes place.
Thus in certain cases of the simultaneous presentation of
sensation something derivative results, but in certain cases
not, and such are instances of objects falling under diverse 447 b
senses. (Mixture occurs with objects when their most extreme
divergences of quality are related as contraries; white and
shrill do not yield anything unitary except per accidens, but,
quite otherwise, low and high yield a concord.) Since then
this is so, neither will it be possible to perceive them together.
If they are equal in intensity the stimuli will cancel each 5
other, since no unitary sensation is derived from them, while
if they are unequal the stronger will produce sensation, and
both will not be perceptible, since consciousness would more
readily distinguish two objects by a single sense and if they
both belonged to a single sense, e.g. high and low, than it
would these, for the stimuli are more closely located in the
case of this selfsame sense than when we have two different 10
senses, e.g. sight and hearing.
But by a single sense we cannot perceive two objects
simultaneously unless they combine with each other. For
the combination requires to be something unitary, and of a
unitary object the perception is single and a single sensation
is one possessing internal simultaneity. Consequently things
in combination must be simultaneously perceived, because
apprehended by a single act of perception. It is of what is 15
numerically one that the explicit perception is single while it
is of the specifically one that the implicit perception is unitary.
Hence also, if the explicit perception is single it pronounces
those objects to be numerically one. Hence they must have
entered into combination, and so, when they are not combined,
92
ARISTOTLE
20
او
Εν
δύο ἔσονται αισθήσεις αἱ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν. ἀλλὰ κατὰ
μίαν δύναμιν καὶ ἄτομον χρόνον μίαν ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὴν
ἐνέργειαν· μιᾶς γὰρ εἰσάπαξ μία κίνησις καὶ χρῆσις,
μία δὲ ἡ δύναμις. οὐκ ἄρα ἐνδέχεται δυεῖν ἅμα αἰσθά
νεσθαι τῇ μιᾷ αἰσθήσει. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰ τὰ ὑπὸ τὴν αὐτὴν
αἴσθησιν ἅμα ἀδύνατον, ἐὰν ᾖ δύο, δῆλον ὅτι ἧττον ἔτι
25 τὰ κατὰ δύο αἰσθήσεις ἐνδέχεται ἅμα αἰσθάνεσθαι, οἷον
λευκὸν καὶ γλυκύ. φαίνεται γὰρ τὸ μὲν τῷ ἀριθμῷ ἓν
ἡ ψυχὴ οὐδενὶ ἑτέρῳ λέγειν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ τῷ ἅμα, τὸ δὲ τῷ
εἴδει ἓν τῇ κρινούσῃ αἰσθήσει καὶ τῷ τρόπῳ. λέγω
δὲ τοῦτο, ὅτι ἴσως τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ μέλαν, ἕτερον τῷ
30 εἴδει ὄν, ἡ αὐτὴ κρίνει, καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ πικρόν, ἡ
αὐτὴ μὲν ἑαυτῇ, ἐκείνης δ᾽ ἄλλη, ἀλλ᾽ ἑτέρως ἑκάτερον
τῶν ἐναντίων, ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως ἑαυταῖς τὰ σύστοιχα, οἷον
448 a ὡς ἡ γεῦσις τὸ γλυκύ, οὕτως ἡ ὄψις τὸ λευκόν· ὡς δ᾽
αὕτη τὸ μέλαν, οὕτως ἐκείνη τὸ πικρόν. ἔτι εἰ αἱ τῶν
ἐναντίων κινήσεις ἐναντίαι, ἅμα δὲ τὰ ἐναντία ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ καὶ ἀτόμῳ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρχειν, ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν
5 αἴσθησιν τὴν μίαν ἐναντία ἐστίν, οἷον γλυκὺ πικρῷ,
οὐκ ἂν ἐνδέχοιτο αἰσθάνεσθαι ἅμα. ὁμοίως δὲ δῆλον
ὅτι οὐδὲ τὰ μὴ ἐναντία· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ λευκοῦ τὰ δὲ
τοῦ μέλανός ἐστιν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὁμοίως, οἷον τῶν
χυμῶν οἱ μὲν τοῦ γλυκέος οἱ δὲ τοῦ πικροῦ. οὐδὲ τὰ
το μεμιγμένα ἅμα· λόγοι γάρ εἰσιν ἀντικειμένων, οἷον τὸ
διὰ πασῶν καὶ τὸ διὰ πέντε, ἂν μὴ ὡς ἓν αἰσθάνηται.
οὕτως δ' εἷς λόγος ὁ τῶν ἄκρων γίνεται, ἄλλως δ᾽ οὔ·
ἔσται γὰρ ἅμα ὁ μὲν πολλοῦ πρὸς ὀλίγον ἢ περιττοῦ
πρὸς ἄρτιον, ὁ δ᾽ ὀλίγου πρὸς πολὺ ἢ ἀρτίου πρὸς
15 περιττόν. εἰ οὖν πλεῖον ἔτι ἀπέχει ἀλλήλων καὶ διαφέρει
τὰ συστοίχως μὲν λεγόμενα ἐν ἄλλῳ δὲ γένει τῶν ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ γένει λεγόμενων (οἷον τὸ γλυκὺ καὶ τὸ λευκὸν ἀλλ᾽
ὡς σύστοιχα, γένει δ᾽ ἕτερα), τὸ γλυκὺ δὲ τοῦ μέλανος
πλεῖον ἔτι τῷ εἴδει διαφέρει ἢ τοῦ λευκοῦ, ἔτι ἂν ἧττον
ΙΟ
Ο
4482, 19 τοῦ λευκοῦ LSU Alex. Ald. Bus., τὸ λευκόν reliqui codd. Sylb.
Bek. Didot, Torst. coni. 18 του λευκοῦ et 19 ἢ τὸ μέλαν p. 169, cui assentitur
Thurot; τῷ εἴδει 19 deleri volunt Torst. et Biehl.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
93
there will be two explicit sensations. But when the faculty is
single and the time individual, the activity of sense must be nu- 20
merically one; the stimulation and exercise of a single faculty
at a unitary time must be single; and the faculty is single.
Thus it is impossible to perceive two things simultaneously
by a single sense. But certainly, when objects of the same
sense, if dual, cannot be simultaneously perceived, it is clear
that still less will this be possible in the case of objects of two 25
different senses, e.g. white and sweet.
Consciousness appears to recognize numerical identity not
otherwise than by the simultaneity of the perception, while
specific unity is given by the unity of the sense which dis-
criminates it and the manner in which the perception occurs.
By this I mean that, though supposing it be black and white,
objects specifically distinct, which the same sense discriminates, 30
and sweet and bitter, which a sense that is self-identical,
though different from the former, distinguishes, yet there is a
diverse manner in which it perceives either contrary, and it is
in the same manner as each other that the senses apprehend
corresponding members of different pairs of opposites; e.g.
sight perceives white in the same manner as taste does sweet- 448 a
ness, and the former perceives black as the latter does bitter.
Further, if contrary sensibles give contrary stimuli and
contraries cannot coexist in anything identical and individual,
but under a single sense we find things opposed to each other, 5
as, for example, sweet is opposed to bitter, it is impossible to
perceive them simultaneously. Similarly it is clear that neither
will things that are not opposites be simultaneously intuitable.
Some of them fall within the province of white and others of
black, and in the same way in other cases, e.g. flavours, some
are assignable to sweet, others to bitter. Neither can com-
posites be simultaneously perceived unless as forming a unity, 10
for they are proportionate combinations of opposites, eg. chords
of the octave and of the fifth. If they are apprehended as
one, a single ratio prevails between the extremes, but otherwise
not, for that would require the simultaneous apprehension of
the ratio of greater to less or odd to even on the one hand,
and on the other that of less to greater or even to odd.
The consequence of all this is that, if there is a still greater 15
remoteness and diversity between qualities which, though
occupying corresponding positions in their respective genera,
yet are heterogeneous, than between those ascribed to the
same genus, e.g. sweet and white, which, though corresponding
to each other, nevertheless are heterogeneous, and if sweet
differs still more from black than from white in kind,
then they, sweet and black, are still less capable of being
94
ARISTOTLE
20 ἅμα ἐνδέχοιτο αὐτὰ αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ τὰ τῷ γένει ταὐτά.
21 ὥστ᾽ εἰ μὴ ταῦτα, οὐδ᾽ ἐκεῖνα.
21
ει
اد
Ὃ δὲ λέγουσι τινες τῶν περὶ
τὰς συμφωνίας, ὅτι οὐχ ἅμα μὲν ἀφικνοῦνται οἱ ψόφοι,
φαίνονται δέ, καὶ λανθάνει, ὅταν ὁ χρόνος ᾖ ἀναίσθητος,
πότερον ὀρθῶς λέγεται ἢ οὔ; τάχα γὰρ ἂν φαίη τις καὶ
25 νῦν παρὰ τοῦτο δοκεῖν ἅμα ὁρᾶν καὶ ἀκούειν, ὅτι οἱ
μεταξὺ χρόνοι λανθάνουσιν. ἢ τοῦτ᾽ οὐκ ἀληθές, οὐδ᾽
ἐνδέχεται χρόνον εἶναι ἀναίσθητον ἢ οὐδένα λανθάνειν,
ἀλλὰ παντὸς ἐνδέχεται αἰσθάνεσθαι. εἰ γὰρ ὅτε αὐτὸς
αὑτοῦ τις αἰσθάνεται ἢ ἄλλου ἐν συνεχεῖ χρόνῳ, μὴ
30 ἐνδέχεται τότε λανθάνειν ὅτι ἐστίν, ἔστι δέ τις ἐν τῷ
συνεχεῖ καὶ τοσοῦτος ὅσος ὅλως ἀναίσθητός ἐστι, δῆλον
ὅτι τότε λανθάνοι ἂν εἰ ἔστιν αὐτὸς αὑτόν καὶ εἰ ὁρᾷ
448b καὶ αἰσθάνεται· καὶ εἰ αἰσθάνεται ἔτι, οὐκ ἂν εἴη οὔτε
χρόνος οὔτε πρᾶγμα οὐδὲν ὁ αἰσθάνεται ἢ ἐν ᾧ, εἰ μὴ
οὕτως, ὅτι ἐν τούτου τινὶ ἢ ὅτι τούτου τι ὁρᾷ, εἴπερ
ἔστι τι μέγεθος καὶ χρόνου καὶ πράγματος ἀναίσθητον
5 ὅλως διὰ μικρότητα· εἰ γὰρ τὴν ὅλην ὁρᾷ, καὶ αἰσθά
νεται τὸν αὐτὸν συνεχῶς χρόνον, οὐ τῶν νῦν τούτων
τινί. ἀφῃρήσθω ἡ [τὸ] ΓΒ, ἐν ᾗ οὐκ ᾔσθάνετο. οὐκοῦν
ἐν ταύτης τινὶ ἢ ταύτης τι, ὥσπερ τὴν γῆν ὁρᾷ ὅλην,
ὅτι τοδὶ αὐτῆς, καὶ ἐν τῷ ἐνιαυτῷ βαδίζει, ὅτι ἐν τῳδὶ
το τῷ μέρει αὐτοῦ. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐν τῷ ΒΓ οὐδὲν αἰσθάνεται.
τῷ ἄρα ἐν τούτου τινὶ τοῦ ΑΒ αἰσθάνεσθαι λέγεται τοῦ
ὅλου αἰσθάνεσθαι καὶ τὴν ὅλην. ὁ δ᾽ αὐτὸς λόγος καὶ
ἐπὶ τῆς ΑΓ· ἀεὶ γὰρ ἐν τινὶ καὶ τινός, ὅλου δ᾽ οὐκ
ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν αισθητά ἐστιν,
15 ἀλλ᾽ οὐ φαίνεται ὅσα ἐστίν· τοῦ γὰρ ἡλίου τὸ μέγεθος
ὁρᾷ καὶ τὸ τετράπηχυ πόρρωθεν, ἀλλ᾽ οὐ φαίνεται ὅσον,
ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοτε ἀδιαίρετον, ὁρᾷ δ᾽ οὐκ ἀδιαίρετον. ἡ δ᾽ αἰτία
εἴρηται ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν περὶ τούτου. ὅτι μὲν οὖν
19 οὐθείς ἐστι χρόνος ἀναίσθητος, ἐκ τούτων φανερόν·
19
T
448b7 ἡ] τὸ omisso ἡ LSU Alex.
Περὶ δὲ
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
95
simultaneously perceived than members of the same genus; 20
hence, if in the latter case this is impossible, neither can it
occur with the former.
There is a theory mooted by certain people about concords,
that the sounds, though not arriving simultaneously, yet appear
to do so, their lack of simultaneity being undetected, when the
time between them is imperceptible.
Is this correct, or is it not? If true, one might readily
assert that we also apparently see and hear at the same time 25
because the intervening moments are undetected.
We answer that it is not true, and there can be no imper-
ceptible time, none that escapes us; every moment can be
perceived. For if, when one has consciousness of one's self
or of another person during a continuous period of time, one
cannot at that time be unaware that one exists, but there is 30
within the continuous time a section of such minute size as to
be wholly imperceptible, clearly one would then be unaware
whether one was one's self and whether one saw or perceived;
if one still perceived, there would be neither time in which 448 b
nor thing of which one could be conscious except thus-by
being percipient during part of the time or perceiving part of
the thing, if there are magnitudes both in time and in things
which their minuteness makes imperceptible. But this is not
so, for if one sees a whole line and perceives a time continuously 5
identical, one does not do so by means of one of the particular
"now's" contained in it. Subtract, from AB the whole line, a
part CB in which there is no sensation; then perception in
one part of this whole or of one part of it gives consciousness
of the whole, which is like seeing the whole earth because one
sees this particular part of it, or walking a whole year because
one walks during this part of it. Remember, in BC there is 10
no consciousness; hence, by being conscious in part of this
whole, AB, one is said to be conscious of the whole time and
see the whole extent.
The same reasoning will hold with the part AC, for percep-
tion is always in a part and of a part, and it is impossible to
perceive anything in its entirety. Hence, the above conclusion
being absurd, everything is perceptible though its size is not
apparent; we see the extension of the sun or a four-cubit 15
measure from afar, though the determinate size is not ap-
parent, and sometimes things seem not to have size but to
be indivisible.
We cannot, however, see the indivisible; the reason for
this was stated before. Hence from these considerations it
is clear that no part of time is imperceptible.
But we have to discuss the problem raised before-whether
96
ARISTOTLE
20
ωο
او
τῆς πρότερον λεχθείσης ἀπορίας σκεπτέον, πότερον
ἐνδέχεται ἅμα πλειόνων αἰσθάνεσθαι ἢ οὐκ ἐνδέχεται.
τὸ δ᾽ ἅμα λέγω ἐν ἑνὶ καὶ ἀτόμῳ χρόνῳ πρὸς ἄλλη-
λα. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ἆρ᾽ ὧδ᾽ ἐνδέχεται, ἅμα μέν, ἑτέρῳ
δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀτόμῳ, οὕτω
25 δ᾽ ἀτόμῳ ὡς παντὶ ὄντι συνεχεῖ; ἢ ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν τὰ
κατὰ τὴν μίαν αἴσθησιν, οἷον λέγω ὄψιν, εἰ ἔσται ἄλλῳ
αἰσθανομένη ἄλλου καὶ ἄλλου χρώματος, πλείω γε μέρη
ἕξει εἴδει ταῦτα; καὶ γὰρ αἰσθάνεται πάλιν τῷ αὐτῷ
γένει. εἰ δὲ ὅτι ὡς δύο ὄμματα φαίη τις, οὐδὲν κωλύει,
30 οὕτω καὶ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ, ὅτι ἴσως ἐκ μὲν τούτων ἕν τι
γίνεται καὶ μία ἡ ἐνέργεια αὐτῶν· εἴδει δὲ ἡ μὲν ἓν
τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἔσται, εἰ δὲ
χωρίς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἕξει. ἔτι αἰσθήσεις αἱ αὐταὶ πλείους
449 a ἔσονται, ὥσπερ εἴ τις επιστήμας διαφόρους φαίη· οὔτε
Εν
γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργεια ἄνευ τῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἔσται δυνάμεως,
οὔτ᾽ ἄνευ ταύτης ἔσται αἴσθησις. εἰ δὲ τούτων ἐν ἑνὶ
καὶ ἀτόμῳ <μὴς αἰσθάνεται, δῆλον ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἄλλων·
5 μᾶλλον γὰρ ἐνεδέχετο τούτων ἅμα πλειόνων ἢ τῶν τῷ
γένει ἑτέρων. εἰ δὲ δὴ ἄλλῳ μὲν γλυκέος ἄλλῳ δὲ λευκοῦ
αἰσθάνεται ἡ ψυχὴ μέρει, ἤτοι τὸ ἐκ τούτων ἕν τί ἐστιν
ἢ οὐχ ἕν. ἀλλ᾽ ἀνάγκη ἕν· ἓν γάρ τι τὸ αἰσθητικόν
ἐστι μέρος. τίνος οὖν ἐκεῖνο ἑνός; οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τούτων
Εν
ΕΚ
448 b, 24 οὐ τῷ ἀτόμῳ et mox δ' om. LSU et Alex., qui autem pro οὕτω
δὲ habet καὶ οὕτως, quam Alexandri lectionem genuinam esse putant Thurot et
Baumker (Jahrb. für Philol. 1886), praeterquam quod pro καὶ Thurot καὶ ἐν vult
poni, Bäumker autem κἂν, sed nihil eorum satisfacit; legendum videtur: οὐ τῷ
ἀτόμῳ, η οὕτω ἀτόμῳ; vertit vet. tr.: et non indivisibili, sic autem indivisibili, ut
omni existenti continuo. | οὕτω δὲ ἀτόμον ΕΥ, ἄτομα pro ἀτόμῳ Μ. 28 ταῦτα
EM et Biehl, Taúrá reliqui omnes et scripti et edd. | yàp] yàp ä LSU P et edd.
except. Biehl | πάλιν ΕΜΥ, ev rel. et edd. except. Biehl. 29 γένει ἐστίν LSUP
et edd. except. Biehl. | κωλύει ΕΥ, κωλύειν reliqui codd., etiam Alex. Ald. Basil.,
κωλύει Sylb. 31 αὐτῶι Ε Υ | εἴδει δὲ ᾗ conicio, εἰ δὲ ᾗ E Biehl, εἰ δὲ ἡ MY,
ἐκεῖ δὲ εἰ reliqui codd. et edd. etiam Alex. et vet. tr. 32 ἓν καὶ Biehl, ἐκεῖνο
LS UP Alex. vet. tr. et omnes reliqui edd. except. Biehl. 449 2, I ἀδιαφόρους
P vet. tr. 4 un iam Alex. desiderat, probant Biehl, Thurot, Bäumker,
Neuhäuser, Poppelreuter. 7 ἐκ om. Biehl.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
97
it is possible or not to perceive several things simultaneously. 20
By simultaneously I mean, in a time which, for the various
things relatively to each other, is one and atomic.
Firstly, then, is the following solution possible-that they
are indeed simultaneously perceived but by different psychical
organs, not by an individual organ, though by one which is
individual in the sense of forming a continuous whole? Or 25
is it the case that if so, in a single sense, for instance sight,
which will perceive different colours by something different
in each case, these partitions will assuredly form a plurality
specifically various? This is so, for it, again, perceives by
means of generic identity.
If some one were to allege that there is no difficulty in the
psychical faculties being like the two eyes, specifically alike, 30
we may reply that perhaps in the case of the eyes there is a
single product and the exercise of their function is unitary,
and, so far as they yield a unitary result, specifically the
sense-organs are also single, but when the sensations are
diverse the case is different.
Further identical senses will be rendered multiple and
distinct in the same sense as one talks of distinct sciences ; 449 a
for neither is there activity apart from its appropriate poten-
tiality, nor without activity does sensation exist.
But if these contentions are correct and hence these
qualities cannot be perceived in a single individual moment
by means of a division in the organ of perception, it is clear
that no other qualities can, for there was a better possibility
of these in their severalness being simultaneously perceived 5
than of qualities generically different. If it is really the case
that the mind perceives sweet with one part, white with
another, the product of these must be either one or not one.
But it must be a unity because the sentient organ is a unity.
What is the unity then which that perceives? There is no
such unitary product.
R.
7
98
ARISTOTLE
ΤΟ
το ἕν. ἀνάγκη ἄρα ἔν τι εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ ἅπαντα αἰσθά
νεται, καθάπερ εἴρηται πρότερον, ἄλλο δὲ γένος δι᾽ ἄλλου.
ἆρ᾽ οὖν ᾗ μὲν ἀδιαίρετόν ἐστι κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν, ἕν τί ἐστι
τὸ αἰσθητικὸν γλυκέος καὶ λευκοῦ, ὅταν δὲ διαιρετὸν
γένηται κατ' ἐνέργειαν, ἕτερον; ἢ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγ
15 μάτων αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεται, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς. τὸ
γὰρ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ λευκὸν καὶ γλυκύ ἐστι, καὶ
ἄλλα πολλά, εἰ μὴ χωριστὰ τὰ πάθη ἀλλήλων, ἀλλὰ
τὸ εἶναι ἕτερον ἑκάστῳ. ὁμοίως τοίνυν θετέον καὶ ἐπὶ
τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν εἶναι ἀριθμῷ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν
20 πάντων, τῷ μέντοι εἶναι ἕτερον καὶ ἕτερον τῶν μὲν γένει
τῶν δὲ εἶδει. ὥστε καὶ αἰσθάνοιτ᾽ ἂν ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ
22 ἑνί, λόγῳ δ᾽ οὐ τῷ αὐτῷ.
22
ὅτι δὲ τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν ἐστὶ μέ
γεθος καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδιαίρετον αἰσθάνεσθαι, δῆλον.
ἔστι γὰρ ὅθεν μὲν οὐκ ἂν ὀφθείη, ἄπειρον τὸ ἀπόστημα,
25 ὅθεν δὲ ὁρᾶται, πεπερασμένον· ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ ὀσ
φραντὸν καὶ ἀκουστὸν καὶ ὅσων μὴ αὐτῶν ἁπτόμενοι
αἰσθάνονται. ἔστι δέ τι ἔσχατον τοῦ ἀποστήματος ὅθεν
οὐχ ὁρᾶται, καὶ πρῶτον ὅθεν ὁρᾶται. τοῦτο δὴ ἀνάγκη
ἀδιαίρετον εἶναι, οὗ ἐν μὲν τῷ ἐπέκεινα οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
3ο αἰσθάνεσθαι ὄντος, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐπὶ ταδὶ ἀνάγκη αἰσθά
νεσθαι. εἰ δή τί ἐστιν ἀδιαίρετον αἰσθητόν, ὅταν τεθῇ
ἐπὶ τῷ ἐσχάτῳ ὅθεν ἐστὶν ὕστατον μὲν οὐκ αἰσθητὸν
πρῶτον δ' αἰσθητόν, ἅμα συμβήσεται ὁρατὸν εἶναι καὶ
ἀόρατον· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἀδύνατον.
30
449 b
περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν αἰσθητηρίων καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν
τίνα τρόπον ἔχει καὶ κοινῇ καὶ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον αἰσθητήριον
εἴρηται· τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν πρῶτον σκεπτέον περὶ μνήμης
4 καὶ τοῦ μνημονεύειν.
SENSE AND ITS OBJECTS
99
Hence there must be some unity in the soul by which we 10
perceive all things, as before stated, though different genera
are perceived by different organs. Is that, therefore, which
apprehends sweet and white, a unit so far as it is actually
indivisible, but diverse in so far as it is actually divisible?
We answer that in the case of the soul it is the same as with
things. An identical and numerically single thing can be 15
sweet and white and have many other qualities, so long as its
properties are not disunited from one another, though in aspect
of existence each is diverse. Accordingly we must in the
same way affirm that with the soul too, that, which is per-
cipient of everything, is self-identical and numerically single,
though, in apprehending objects now generically now in species 20
different, it has a corresponding diversity in the aspect of its
existence. Hence the mind may perceive things simultaneously
by means of something selfsame and unitary though not
notionally the same.
That every object is a magnitude and that the indivisible
cannot be perceived, is clear. The distances from which an
object cannot be seen are infinite in number, but the range
from which it is visible is limited, and this holds true also for 25
the objects of smell and hearing and all things perceived
without actual contact. But there is a point which ter-
minates the range from which vision is impossible and is the
first from which the thing becomes visible. That indeed
must be indivisible which, when at a distance beyond this 30
point, cannot be seen, but must be seen when nearer. If,
then, there is really anything indivisible which is an object of
perception, when placed at the terminal point which, while
the last at which it is not perceptible, is yet the first at which
it is perceptible, it will turn out to be both visible and invisible
at the same time, which is impossible.
This is our account of the sensoria and the objects of 449 b
sense and the manner of their existence both generally and
relatively to each sense-organ. Of the remaining subjects let
us consider first memory and the act of remembering.
Uor M
7—2
449 b 4
4
αν
ΠΕΡΙ ΜΝΗΜΗΣ ΚΑΙ ΑΝΑΜΝΗΣΕΩΣ
T
I
TO
Περὶ δὲ μνήμης καὶ τοῦ μνημονεύειν
5 λεκτέον τί ἐστι καὶ διὰ τίν᾽ αἰτίαν γίγνεται καὶ τίνι
τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων συμβαίνει τοῦτο τὸ πάθος καὶ
τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι· οὐ γὰρ οἱ αὐτοί εἰσι μνημονικοὶ
καὶ ἀναμνηστικοί, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ μνημονικοὶ μὲν
οἱ βραδεῖς, ἀναμνηστικώτεροι δὲ οἱ ταχεῖς καὶ εὐμαθεῖς.
Το πρῶτον μὲν οὖν ληπτέον ποιά ἐστι τὰ μνημονευτά·
πολλάκις γὰρ ἐξαπατᾶται τοῦτο. οὔτε γὰρ τὸ μέλλον
ἐνδέχεται μνημονεύειν, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστι δοξαστὸν καὶ ἐλπιστόν
(εἴη δ᾽ ἂν καὶ ἐπιστήμη τις ἐλπιστική, καθάπερ τινές
φασι τὴν μαντικήν), οὔτε τοῦ παρόντος, ἀλλ᾽ αἴσθησις·
15 ταύτῃ γὰρ οὔτε τὸ μέλλον οὔτε τὸ γενόμενον γνωρίζομεν,
ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὸν μόνον. ἡ δὲ μνήμη τοῦ γενομένου· τὸ δὲ
παρὸν ὅτι πάρεστιν, οἷον τοδὶ τὸ λευκὸν ὅτε ὁρᾷ, οὐδεὶς
ἂν φαίη μνημονεύειν, οὐδὲ τὸ θεωρούμενον, ὅτε θεωρῶν
τυγχάνει καὶ ἐννοῶν· ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν αἰσθάνεσθαί φησι,
20 τὸ δ' ἐπίστασθαι μόνον· ὅταν δ᾽ ἄνευ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν
ἔχῃ τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὴν αἴσθησιν, οὕτω μέμνηται
[τὰς τοῦ τριγώνου ὅτι δύο ὀρθαῖς ἴσαι], τὸ μὲν ὅτι
ἔμαθεν ἢ ἐθεώρησεν, τὸ δὲ ὅτι ἤκουσεν ἢ εἶδεν ἢ ὅ τι
τοιοῦτον· δεῖ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ κατὰ τὸ μνημονεύειν,
25 οὕτως ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγειν, ὅτι πρότερον τοῦτο ἤκουσεν
ἢ ᾔσθετο ἢ ἐνόησεν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἡ μνήμη οὔτε
αἴσθησις οὔτε ὑπόληψις, ἀλλὰ τούτων τινὸς ἕξις ἢ
449 b, 22
ή
Α
τὰς...ἴσαι recte volunt deleri Biehl et Freudenthal.
J
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION.
449 b 4
I
We must define and account for memory and the act of
remembrance and assign the psychical faculty which provides 5
for this phenomenon and for the act of recollection. The two
phenomena are not identical, for it is not the same people
who have good memories and who have good powers of
recollection; as a rule those people remember well who are
slow-witted, while on the other hand those excel in powers of
recall who are clever and quick at learning.
Hence as a preliminary to our argument the question 10
arises-how are the objects of memory characterised? Mis-
takes are often made about this. Now the future cannot be
remembered; it is rather the object of opinion and hope.
(There might be a science which belonged to the province of
hope; some people say that prophecy is such a science.) Nor
does memory regard the present; it is perception which is
concerned with this, for by perception we apprehend neither 15
the future nor the past but the present only. Memory con-
cerns the past; no one would say that he remembers that
the present is present, eg. this particular white object, when
he is looking at it. Nor would he say that he remembers that
the object of thought is present whensoever he chances to be
engaged in thought or contemplation; in the one case he says.
he perceives, in the other merely that he knows. But when 201
knowledge or perception is present without actual experience
of the real objects, in those circumstances one remembers in
the one case that he learned something or thought of some-
thing, in the other that he heard, or saw, or had some similar
sense-experience. When one actually remembers, he must
recognize in consciousness that previously he had heard or 25
perceived or thought of the thing remembered.
Hence memory is neither perception nor conceptual
IO2
ARISTOTLE
ΤΟ
πάθος, ὅταν γένηται χρόνος. τοῦ δὲ νῦν ἐν τῷ νῦν οὐκ
ἔστι μνήμη, καθάπερ εἴρηται καὶ πρότερον, ἀλλὰ τοῦ
30 μὲν παρόντος αἴσθησις, τοῦ δὲ μέλλοντος ἐλπίς, τοῦ δὲ
γενομένου μνήμη. διὸ μετὰ χρόνου πᾶσα μνήμη. ὥσθ'
ὅσα χρόνου αἰσθάνεται, ταῦτα μόνα τῶν ζῴων μνημονεύει,
καὶ τούτῳ ᾧ αἰσθάνεται. ἐπεὶ δὲ περὶ φαντασίας εἴρηται
πρότερον ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ
450 a φαντάσματος· συμβαίνει γὰρ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος ἐν τῷ νοεῖν
ὅπερ καὶ ἐν τῷ διαγράφειν· ἐκεῖ τε γὰρ οὐθὲν προσχρώ
μενοι τῷ τὸ ποσὸν ὡρισμένον εἶναι τοῦ τριγώνου, ὅμως
γράφομεν ὡρισμένον κατὰ τὸ ποσόν· καὶ ὁ νοῶν ὡσαύ
5 τως, κἂν μὴ ποσὸν νοῇ, τίθεται πρὸ ὀμμάτων ποσόν,
νοεῖ δ᾽ οὐχ ᾗ ποσόν· ἂν δ᾽ ἡ φύσις ἢ τῶν ποσῶν,
ἀορίστων δέ, τίθεται μὲν ποσὸν ὡρισμένον, νοεῖ δ' ᾗ
ποσὸν μόνον· διὰ τίνα μὲν οὖν αἰτίαν οὐκ ἐνδέχεται
νοεῖν οὐδὲν ἄνευ τοῦ συνεχούς, οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ χρόνου τὰ μὴ
το ἐν χρόνῳ ὄντα, λόγος ἄλλος· μέγεθος δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖον
γνωρίζειν καὶ κίνησιν ᾧ καὶ χρόνον· καὶ τὸ φάντασμα
τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως πάθος ἐστίν· ὥστε τοῦτο φανερὸν
ὅτι τῷ πρώτῳ αἰσθητικῷ τούτων ἡ γνωσίς ἐστιν· ἡ δὲ
μνήμη καὶ ἡ τῶν νοητῶν οὐκ ἄνευ φαντάσματός ἐστιν·
ὥστε τοῦ νοητικοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ἂν εἴη, καθ᾽ αὑτὸ
δὲ τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ. διὸ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶν ὑπάρχει
τῶν ζῴων, καὶ οὐ μόνον ἀνθρώποις καὶ τοῖς ἔχουσι δόξαν
ἢ φρόνησιν. εἰ δὲ τῶν νοητικῶν τι μορίων ἦν, οὐκ ἂν
ὑπῆρχε πολλοῖς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων, ἴσως δ᾽ οὐδενὶ τῶν
20 θνητῶν, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ νῦν πᾶσι διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντα χρόνου
15
*
αἴσθησιν ἔχειν· ἀεὶ γὰρ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ τῇ μνήμῃ, καθάπερ
καὶ πρότερον εἴπομεν, ὅτι εἶδε τοῦτο ἢ ἤκουσεν ἢ ἔμαθε,
προσαισθάνεται ὅτι πρότερον· τὸ δὲ πρότερον καὶ
449 b 29 καὶ πρότερον om. L SUM Them. vet. tr., deleri volunt Freudenthal
et Biehl.
450 2, 20 θνητῶν] θηρίων Rassow et Biehl.
!
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION
103
thought, but some permanent condition or modification
attaching to them dependent upon lapse of time. What is
now present we do not now in present time remember, as has
been said before; with the present perception is employed, 30
with the future hope, with the past memory. Hence all
remembering implies lapse of time; and so, those that have
a sense of time are the only animals that remember, and the
organ of memory is that which enables us to perceive time.
Imagination has been already discussed in the Psychology.
We cannot think without imagery, for the same phenomenon 450 a
occurs in thinking as is found in the construction of geometrical
figures; there, though we do not employ as a supplementary
requirement of our proof a determinateness in the size of the
triangle, yet when we draw it we make it of a determinate
size. Similarly in thinking also, though we do not think of 5
the size, yet we present the object visually to ourselves as a
quantum, though we do not think of it as a quantum. If the
nature of the object be quantitative but indeterminate, our
presentation is of a determinate quantity, though we think of
it as quantitative merely.
The reason why we can think of nothing apart from
continuity and cannot think of objects not in time apart from
time, belongs to a different inquiry from this, but we must 10
apprehend magnitude and change by the same means as that
by which we are conscious of time. Imagery is a phenomenon
belonging to the common sense; so this is clear, that the
apprehension of these determinations belongs to the primary
organ of sensation: and memory, even the memory of con-
cepts, cannot exist apart from imagery.
Hence since all this is so, indirectly it belongs to the 15
noëtic faculty, but in its essential nature to the primary
principle of sensation. This is the reason why it is found in
several of the other animals and not only in man or those
possessing the power of entertaining opinions and endowed
with intelligence. If it belonged to the conceptual faculties
it would not be found in many of the other animals and perhaps
in none that are mortal, since, as facts are, all living beings do 20
not possess it, because not all have a sense of time. Always,
when in the act of memory, as already said, we remember
that we have heard or seen or learned this thing, we are
conscious also that it was prior; now prior and posterior are
distinctions in time.
104
ARISTOTLE
ὕστερον ἐν χρόνῳ ἐστίν. τίνος μὲν οὖν τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς
25 ἐστὶν ἡ μνήμη, φανερόν, ὅτι οὗπερ καὶ ἡ φαντασία· καὶ
ἔστι μνημονευτὰ καθ᾽ αὑτὰ μὲν ὅσα ἐστὶ φανταστά, κατὰ
27 συμβεβηκός δὲ ὅσα μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας.
27
ἀπορήσειε δ᾽ ἄν
τις πῶς ποτὲ τοῦ μὲν πάθους παρόντος τοῦ δὲ πράγματος
ἀπόντος μνημονεύεται τὸ μὴ παρόν. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι δεῖ
30 νοῆσαι τοιοῦτον τὸ γιγνόμενον διὰ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἐν τῇ
ψυχῇ καὶ τῷ μορίῳ τοῦ σώματος τῷ ἔχοντι αὐτήν, οἷον
ζωγράφημά τι τὸ πάθος, οὗ φαμὲν τὴν ἕξιν μνήμην εἶναι·
ἡ γὰρ γιγνομένη κίνησις ἐνσημαίνεται οἷον τύπον τινὰ
τοῦ αἰσθήματος, καθάπερ οἱ σφραγιζόμενοι τοῖς δακτυ-
450 b λίοις. διὸ καὶ τοῖς μὲν ἐν κινήσει πολλῇ διὰ πάθος ἢ
δι' ἡλικίαν οὖσιν οὐ γίγνεται μνήμη, καθάπερ ἂν εἰς
ὕδωρ ῥέον ἐμπιπτούσης τῆς κινήσεως καὶ τῆς σφραγῖδος·
τοῖς δὲ διὰ τὸ ψήχεσθαι, καθάπερ τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν οἰκο-
5 δομημάτων, καὶ διὰ σκληρότητα τοῦ δεχομένου τὸ πάθος
οὐκ ἐγγίγνεται ὁ τύπος. διόπερ οἵ τε σφόδρα νέοι καὶ
οἱ γέροντες ἀμνήμονές εἰσιν· ῥέουσι γὰρ οἱ μὲν διὰ τὴν
αὔξησιν, οἱ δὲ διὰ τὴν φθίσιν. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ οἱ λίαν
ταχεῖς καὶ οἱ λίαν βραδεῖς οὐδέτεροι φαίνονται μνήμονες
το οἱ μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ὑγρότεροι τοῦ δέοντος, οἱ δὲ σκληρό-
τεροι· τοῖς μὲν οὖν οὐ μένει το φάντασμα ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ,
τῶν δ᾽ οὐχ ἅπτεται. ἀλλ᾽ εἰ δὴ τοιοῦτόν ἐστι τὸ συμ-
βαῖνον περὶ τὴν μνήμην, πότερον τοῦτο μνημονεύει τὸ
πάθος, ἢ ἐκεῖνο ἀφ᾽ οὗ ἐγένετο; εἰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦτο, τῶν
15 ἀπόντων οὐδὲν ἂν μνημονεύοιμεν· εἰ δ᾽ ἐκεῖνο, πῶς
αἰσθανόμενοι τούτου μνημονεύομεν, οὗ μὴ αἰσθανόμεθα,
τὸ ἀπόν; εἴ τ᾽ ἐστὶν ὅμοιον ὥσπερ τύπος ἢ γραφὴ ἐν
ἡμῖν, τούτου αὐτοῦ ἡ αἴσθησις διὰ τί ἂν εἴη μνήμη
ἑτέρου, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ αὐτοῦ τούτου; ὁ γὰρ ἐνεργῶν τῇ μνήμῃ
θεωρεῖ τὸ πάθος τοῦτο καὶ αἰσθάνεται τούτου. πῶς οὖν
τὸ μὴ παρόν μνημονεύει; εἴη γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὁρᾶν τὸ μὴ
ΙΟ
20
οι
Ο
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION
105
Hence it is clear to what psychic faculty memory belongs;
it belongs to that to which imagination must be assigned. 25
To the class of objects of memory per se belong all things
that can be imagined; to the indirect, all that cannot be
divorced from imagination.
A difficulty might be raised as to how it can ever come
about that, though contemporaneously with our present mental
modification the real object is not present, yet it is the absent
object which is remembered. But this is no impossibility, for
it is clear that we must regard the modification arising from 30
sensation in the soul and in that bodily part where sense
resides, as if it were a picture of the real thing, and memory
we call the permanent existence of this modification. When
a stimulus occurs it imprints as it were a mould of the sense-
affection exactly as a seal-ring acts in stamping.
This is the reason why memory does not occur in those 450 b
who are in a rapid state of transition, whether owing to some
perturbing experience or their period of life; it is as if this
stimulus, like the seal, were stamped on running water.
Again in others their worn-out condition-like that of old
buildings—and the hardness of the receptive structure, pre- 5
vent the sense-affection from leaving an impression. Hence
we explain why the very young and the aged have no memory;
in the former growth, in the latter decay, cause rapid transition.
For like reasons, neither very quick-witted nor very slow
people seem to have good memories; in the one class there 10
is too much fluidity, in the other too much density, and hence
the former do not retain the image in the mind, while in the
latter it never gets fixed.
If these are indeed the facts with regard to memory,
whether do we remember this resultant modification or that
which caused it? If the former, there would be no such thing
as memory of things absent. On the other hand, if it is the 15
latter we remember, how, though perceiving the former, do
we remember the absent object which we do not perceive?
Once more, if what is retained is like the original in the
fashion of an impression or copy, why is the perception of
this very thing the memory of some other thing and not of
it itself? It is this modification of consciousness which one
engaged in remembering has present to his mind, and it is
this that he perceives. How then can one remember what is 20
106
ARISTOTLE
رد
ท
ΤΟ
αν
παρὸν καὶ ἀκούειν. ἢ ἔστιν ὡς ἐνδέχεται καὶ συμβαίνει
τοῦτο; οἷον γὰρ τὸ ἐν τῷ πίνακι γεγραμμένον ζῷον καὶ
ζῷόν ἐστι καὶ εἰκών, καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶν ἄμφω,
25 τὸ μέντοι εἶναι οὐ ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἀμφοῖν, καὶ ἔστι θεωρεῖν
καὶ ὡς ζῷον καὶ ὡς εἰκόνα, οὕτω καὶ τὸ ἐν ἡμῖν φάντασμα
δεῖ ὑπολαβεῖν καὶ αὐτὸ καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸ εἶναι θεώρημα καὶ
ἄλλου φάντασμα. ᾗ μὲν οὖν καθ' ἑαυτό, θεώρημα ἢ
φάντασμά ἐστιν, ᾗ δ᾿ ἄλλου, οἷον εἰκὼν καὶ μνημόνευμα.
30 ὥστε καὶ ὅταν ἐνεργῇ ἡ κίνησις αὐτοῦ, ἂν μέν, ᾗ καθ'
αὑτό ἐστι, ταύτῃ αἴσθηται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτοῦ, οἷον νόημά
τι ἢ φάντασμα φαίνεται ἐπελθεῖν· ἂν δ' ᾗ ἄλλου, ὥσπερ
ἐν τῇ γραφῇ ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρεῖ, καὶ μὴ ἑωρακὼς τὸν
Κορίσκον ὡς Κορίσκου· ἐνταῦθά τε ἄλλο τὸ πάθος τῆς
451 a θεωρίας ταύτης καὶ ὅταν ὡς ζῷον γεγραμμένον θεωρῇ,
ἔν τε τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ μὲν γίγνεται ὥσπερ νόημα μόνον, τὸ
δ᾽ ὡς ἐκεῖ ὅτι εἰκών, μνημόνευμα. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἐνίοτ᾽
οὐκ ἴσμεν, ἐγγινομένων ἡμῖν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ τοιούτων κινή-
5 σεων ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰσθέσθαι πρότερον, εἰ κατὰ τὸ ᾐσθῆσθαι
συμβαίνει, καὶ εἰ ἔστι μνήμη ἢ οὐ διστάζομεν· ὁτὲ δὲ
συμβαίνει ἐννοῆσαι καὶ ἀναμνησθῆναι ὅτι ἠκούσαμέν
τι πρότερον ἢ εἴδομεν. τοῦτο δὲ συμβαίνει, ὅταν θεωρῶν
ὡς αὐτὸ μεταβάλλῃ καὶ θεωρῇ ὡς ἄλλου. γίγνεται δὲ
το καὶ τοὐναντίον, οἷον συνέβη ᾿Αντιφέροντι τῷ Ὠρείτῃ
καὶ ἄλλοις ἐξισταμένοις· τὰ γὰρ φαντάσματα ἔλεγον
ὡς γενόμενα καὶ ὡς μνημονεύοντες. τοῦτο δὲ γίγνεται,
ὅταν τις τὴν μὴ εἰκόνα ὡς εἰκόνα θεωρῇ. αἱ δὲ μελέται
τὴν μνήμην σώζουσι τῷ ἐπαναμιμνήσκειν· τοῦτο δ᾽ ἐστὶν
15 οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ τὸ θεωρεῖν πολλάκις ὡς εἰκόνα καὶ μὴ ὡς
καθ' αυτό. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶ μνήμη καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν,
εἴρηται, ὅτι φαντάσματος, ὡς εἰκόνος οὗ φάντασμα, ἕξις,
καὶ τίνος μορίου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν, ὅτι τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ
καὶ ᾧ χρόνου αἰσθανόμεθα.
450 b, 27 αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ ΕΥ αὐτό τι καθ᾽ αὑτὸ Biehl | om. θεώρημα L SU
Them. vet. tr. Biehl, θεώρ. et φάντασμα deleri vult Freudth.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION
107
not present to one? One might as well see or hear what is
not present.
But perhaps there is a way in which this can occur and it
does really come about? That is so, for, as the animal depicted
on the panel is both animal and representation, and, while
remaining one self-identical thing, is yet both of these, though
in aspect of existence the two are not the same, and we can 25
regard it both as animal and as copy, so too the image in us
must be considered as being both an object of direct conscious-
ness in itself and relatively to something else an image; in its
own nature it is an object of direct inspection or an image, so
far as it represents something else it is a copy and a souvenir.
Hence when the change connected with it is actually 30
experienced, if the mind perceives it in terms of its own
proper nature, it appears to present itself to consciousness in
the guise of an object of thought or an image; but when it
is perceived as referring to something else, we regard it as the
copy in the painting and as the picture of Coriscus although
we have not then beheld him. Here this way of regarding
the thing is an experience different from what occurs when 451 a
we regard the object as an animal in chalk merely; in the
latter case the psychical modification occurs merely as an
object of thought, in the former as a memory, because there
it is viewed as a representation.
Hence sometimes we do not know, when those psychical
changes due to previous perception take place in us, if it is 5
as connected with a previous perception that they occur, and
we are in doubt whether it is a memory or not. Sometimes
it chances that on reflection we recollect that we have heard
or seen the thing previously; this takes place when, after
regarding the object of consciousness in its own nature, we
change and refer it to something else. The reverse of this
also occurs, as befell in the case of Antipheron of Oreos and 10
other ecstatics; they took their mental images to be objective
and said they remembered the occurrences. This comes
about when we take what is not a representation as though
it were one. But exercise strengthens the memory through
the repeated performance of the act of recollection, which is
merely to view the image frequently as a copy and not in its 15
own nature.
This is our account of memory and the act of remembering;
it is the permanence of an image regarded as the copy of the
thing it images, and the member in us to which it appertains
is the primary seat of sensation and the organ employed in
the perception of time.
108
ARISTOTLE
20
II
η
ων
Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι λοιπὸν εἰπεῖν. πρῶτον
μὲν οὖν ὅσα ἐν τοῖς ἐπιχειρηματικοῖς λόγοις ἐστὶν ἀληθῆ,
δεῖ τίθεσθαι ὡς ὑπάρχοντα. οὔτε γὰρ μνήμης ἐστὶν
ἀνάληψις ἡ ἀνάμνησις οὔτε λῆψις· ὅταν γὰρ τὸ πρῶτον
μάθῃ ἢ πάθῃ, οὔτ᾽ ἀναλαμβάνει μνήμην οὐδεμίαν (οὐ-
25 δεμία γὰρ προγέγονεν) οὔτ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς λαμβάνει· ὅταν
δὲ ἐγγένηται ἡ ἕξις καὶ τὸ πάθος, τότε ἡ μνήμη ἐστίν.
ὥστε μετὰ τοῦ πάθους ἐγγινομένου οὐκ ἐγγίνεται. ἔτι δ᾽
ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ἐγγέγονε τῷ ἀτόμῳ καὶ ἐσχάτῳ, τὸ μὲν
πάθος ἐνυπάρχει ἤδη τῷ παθόντι καὶ ἡ ἐπιστήμη, εἰ δεῖ
30 καλεῖν ἐπιστήμην τὴν ἕξιν ἢ τὸ πάθος οὐθὲν δὲ κωλύει
κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς καὶ μνημονεύειν ἔνια ὧν ἐπιστάμεθα)·
τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν καθ᾽ αὑτὸ οὐχ ὑπάρξει πρὶν χρονισθῆ
ναι· μνημονεύει γὰρ νῦν ὃ εἶδεν ἢ ἔπαθε πρότερον, οὐχ
451 b ὁ νῦν ἔπαθε, νῦν μνημονεύει. ἔτι δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι μνη-
μονεύειν ἔστι μὴ νῦν ἀναμνησθέντα, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξ ἀρχῆς
αἰσθόμενον ἢ παθόντα.
ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν ἀναλαμβάνῃ ἣν
πρότερον εἶχεν ἐπιστήμην ή αἴσθησιν ἢ οὗ ποτὲ τὴν
5 ἕξιν ἐλέγομεν μνήμην, τοῦτ᾽ ἐστὶ καὶ τότε τὸ ἀναμιμνή-
σκεσθαι τῶν εἰρημένων τι. τὸ δὲ μνημονεύειν συμβαίνει
καὶ ἡ μνήμη ἀκολουθεῖ. οὐδὲ δὴ ταῦτα ἁπλῶς, ἐὰν
ἔμπροσθεν ὑπάρξαντα πάλιν ἐγγένηται, ἀλλ᾽ ἔστιν ὡς,
ἔστι δ᾽ ὡς οὔ. δὶς γὰρ μαθεῖν καὶ εὑρεῖν ἐνδέχεται τὸν
το αὐτὸν τὸ αὐτό· δεῖ οὖν διαφέρειν τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι
τούτων, καὶ ἐνούσης πλείονος ἀρχῆς ἢ ἐξ ἧς μανθάνουσιν
12 ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι.
12
ΤΟ
συμβαίνουσι δ' αἱ ἀναμνήσεις, ἐπειδὴ
πέφυκεν ἡ κίνησις ἥδε γενέσθαι μετὰ τήνδε· εἰ μὲν
ἐξ ἀνάγκης, δῆλον ὡς ὅταν ἐκείνη κινηθῇ, τήνδε τὴν
451 2, 28
τι post ἐγγέγονε inseri vult Freudenthal.
ει
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION
109
II
Recollection remains to be dealt with. First of all we 20
must posit as fact all the conclusions come to in our " Tentative
Reasonings" which were correct. Recollection is neither the
recovery nor the acquirement of memory.
When, on the first occasion, one learns or experiences
something, he neither reacquires a memory, for none has
previously existed, nor does he acquire it initially then. But
when a disposition as well as the experience has once been 25
produced then memory is found; hence it does not come
into being in conjunction with the origination of the experi-
ence in us.
Further, when memory first has been produced in the
individual and ultimate organ of sensation, the experience
and the knowledge in question (if it is proper to call the
disposition or experience knowledge; but there is nothing to 30
prevent our having indirectly remembrance also of some of
the objects of knowledge) have already existence in the
experiencing subject. But memory in the proper sense will
not exist till after the lapse of time. We remember in
present time what we have previously seen or heard, we do not
now remember what we have now experienced. But further, 451 b
clearly, we may remember, not in virtue of a present act of
recollection, but by being conscious or feeling the experience
from the start. On the other hand, when we reacquire the
knowledge or perception or whatever it was, the permanence
of which we called memory, here and now we have recollection 5
of any of these. As a result we remember them and memory
ensues; not that that can be said without restriction in all
cases when previous experiences are repeated in consciousness;
in some cases it is so but in others not, for the same man may
learn or discover the same thing twice. Recollection then 10
must differ from the latter operations; it requires a more
considerable basis to start from than in the case of learning.
The occurrence of an act of recollection is due to the
natural tendency of one particular change to follow another.
If the sequence is necessary, it is clear that, on the former
ARISTOTLE
15 κίνησιν κινηθήσεται· εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀλλ᾽ ἔθει,
ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ κινηθήσεται. συμβαίνει δ᾽ ἐνίους ἅπαξ
ἐθισθῆναι μᾶλλον ἢ ἄλλους πολλάκις κινουμένους· διὸ
ἔνια ἅπαξ ιδόντες μᾶλλον μνημονεύομεν ἢ ἕτεροι πολ-
λάκις. ὅταν οὖν ἀναμιμνησκώμεθα, κινούμεθα τῶν
20 προτέρων τινὰ κινήσεων, ἕως ἂν κινηθῶμεν μεθ᾽ ἣν
ἐκείνη εἴωθεν. διὸ καὶ τὸ ἐφεξῆς θηρεύομεν νοήσαντες
ἀπὸ τοῦ νῦν ἢ ἄλλου τινός, καὶ ἀφ᾽ ὁμοίου ἢ ἐναντίου
ἢ τοῦ σύνεγγυς. διὰ τοῦτο γίνεται ἡ ἀνάμνησις· αἱ
γὰρ κινήσεις τούτων τῶν μὲν αἱ αὐταί, τῶν δ᾽ ἅμα, τῶν
25 δὲ μέρος ἔχουσιν, ὥστε τὸ λοιπὸν μικρὸν ὃ ἐκινήθη
μετ᾿ ἐκεῖνο. ζητοῦσι μὲν οὖν οὕτω, καὶ μὴ ζητοῦντες
δ' οὕτως ἀναμιμνήσκονται, ὅταν μεθ᾿ ἑτέραν κίνησιν
ἐκείνη γένηται· ὡς δὲ τὰ πολλὰ ἑτέρων γενομένων
κινήσεων οἵων εἴπομεν, ἐγένετο ἐκείνη. οὐδὲν δὲ δεῖ
30 σκοπεῖν τὰ πόρρω, πως μεμνήμεθα, ἀλλὰ τὰ σύνεγγυς·
δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι ὁ αὐτός ἐστι τρόπος. λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐφεξῆς
οὐ προζητήσας οὐδ᾽ ἀναμνησθείς. τῷ γὰρ ἔθει ἀκολου-
θοῦσιν αἱ κινήσεις ἀλλήλαις, ἥδε μετὰ τήνδε. καὶ ὅταν
τοίνυν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι βούληται, τοῦτο ποιήσει· ζητή
35 σει λαβεῖν ἀρχὴν κινήσεως, μεθ᾽ ἣν ἐκείνη ἔσται. διὸ
452 a τάχιστα καὶ κάλλιστα γίνονται ἀπ' ἀρχῆς αἱ ἀναμνήσεις·
ο
ὡς γὰρ ἔχουσι τὰ πράγματα πρὸς ἄλληλα τῷ ἐφεξῆς,
οὕτω καὶ αἱ κινήσεις. καὶ ἔστιν εὐμνημόνευτα ὅσα
τάξιν τινὰ ἔχει, ὥσπερ τὰ μαθήματα· τὰ δὲ φαῦλα
5 χαλεπῶς. καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρει τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι τοῦ
πάλιν μανθάνειν, ὅτι δυνήσεταί πως δι᾽ αὑτοῦ κινηθῆναι
ἐπὶ τὸ μετὰ τὴν ἀρχήν. ὅταν δὲ μή, ἀλλὰ δι᾽ ἄλλου,
οὐκέτι μέμνηται. πολλάκις δ' ἤδη μὲν ἀδυνατεῖ ἀνα-
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION
III
change occurring, the second will be summoned into activity;
when, however, the connection is not necessary but due to 15
custom, the occurrence of the second process will take place
only in most cases. It so happens that some people receive
a greater bent from a single experience than others in whom
the sequence has frequently taken place, and hence, in some
instances, after seeing the things once, we remember them
better than others who have seen them frequently. Thus,
when we recollect, one of our previous psychic changes is 20
stimulated which leads to the stimulation of that one, after
which the experience to be recollected is wont to occur.
Consequently we hunt for the next in the series, starting our
train of thought from what is now present or from something
else, and from something similar or contrary or contiguous to
it. This is the means of effecting recollection; the change in
those cases is now identical, now concomitant with, and now
partially inclusive of the idea to be recalled, and hence the 25
remainder formerly occurring subsequently to the rest is but
small.
This is the way in which the search for the idea not
present is carried out, and, even when there is no search, it
is in this way that recollection occurs, when the one process
occurs after the other; and in general it is after experience of
other changes such as we have described that the process in
question occurs. We must consider, not how we remember
things remotely connected but those that are close to each 30
other, for it is clear that the method is the same in both
cases. I use the expression "next in order" without implying
a prior search or act of recollection; for it is owing to the
custom of their being experienced in sequence that one par-
ticular process follows another. Hence, when one wishes to
recall something, this is what he does-he tries to find the
starting point of a process after which the one in question 35
will recur. This is why the swiftest and best way of recol- 452 a
lecting is to start from the beginning; the subjective changes
are related to each other in the same way as the facts
remembered stand to each other in virtue of their place in
the series. Those things are easily recalled which have an
orderly arrangement such as we find in mathematics; but
things wanting in exactitude are with difficulty remembered.
To recollect and to learn a second time differ in this, that he 5
who recalls a thing will be able by his own agency to pass to
the process succeeding the starting point; when this is not so
and the instrumentality of someone else is required, it is no
longer a case of remembering.
Often when as yet unable to recollect, by searching one
II2
ARISTOTLE
IO
ΤΟ
μνησθῆναι, ζητῶν δὲ δύναται καὶ εὑρίσκει. τοῦτο δὲ
το γίνεται κινοῦντι πολλά, ἕως ἂν τοιαύτην κινήσῃ κίνησιν
ᾗ ἀκολουθήσει τὸ πρᾶγμα. τὸ γὰρ μεμνῆσθαί ἐστι τὸ
ἐνεῖναι δυνάμει τὴν κινοῦσαν· τοῦτο δέ, ὥστ᾽ ἐξ αὑτοῦ
καὶ ὧν ἔχει κινήσεων κινηθῆναι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται. δεῖ
δὲ λαβέσθαι ἀρχῆς. διὸ ἀπὸ τόπων δοκοῦσιν ἀναμιμνή-
15 σκεσθαι ἐνίοτε. τὸ δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ταχὺ ἀπ᾽ ἄλλου ἐπ'
ἄλλο ἔρχονται, οἷον ἀπὸ γάλακτος ἐπὶ λευκόν, ἀπὸ λευκοῦ
δ᾽ ἐπ᾽ ἀέρα, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου ἐφ' ὑγρόν, ἀφ' οὗ ἐμνήσθη
μετοπώρου, ταύτην ἐπιζητῶν τὴν ὥραν. ἔοικε δὴ καθόλου
ἀρχῇ καὶ τὸ μέσον πάντων· εἰ γὰρ μὴ πρότερον, ὅταν
20 ἐπὶ τοῦτο ἔλθῃ, μνησθήσεται, ἢ οὐκέτ᾽ οὐδὲ ἄλλοθεν,
οἷον εἴ τις νοήσειεν ἐφ᾽ ὧν ΑΒΓΔΕΖΗΘ· εἰ γὰρ μὴ
22 ἐπὶ τοῦ <Θ ἐμνήσθη, ἐπὶ τοῦ Ε μέμνηται, εἰ τὸ Η ἢ
22 τὸ Ζ ἐπιζητεῖ>· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἐπ' ἄμφω κινηθῆναι ἐνδέ
χεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ Δ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ Ζ. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων τι
ἐζήτει, ἐπὶ τὸ Γ ἐλθὼν μνησθήσεται, [εἰ τὸ Η ἢ τὸ Ζ
25 ἐπιζητεῖ]· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπὶ τὸ Α· καὶ οὕτως ἀεί. τοῦ δ᾽
ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἐνίοτε μὲν μνησθῆναι ἐνίοτε δὲ μή, αἴτιον
τὸ ἐπὶ πλεῖον ἐνδέχεσθαι κινηθῆναι ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς,
οἷον ἀπὸ τοῦ Γ ἐπὶ τὸ Ζ ἢ τὸ Δ. ἐὰν οὖν δι᾽ ἃ πάλαι οὐ
κινηθῇ, ἐπὶ τὸ συνηθέστερον κινεῖται· ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσις
30 ἤδη τὸ ἔθος. διὸ πολλάκις ἃ ἐννοοῦμεν, ταχὺ ἀναμιμνη-
σκόμεθα· ὥσπερ γὰρ φύσει τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἐστίν, οὕτω
452b καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ· τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φύσιν ποιεῖ. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐν
τοῖς φύσει γίγνεται καὶ παρὰ φύσιν καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης,
ἔτι μᾶλλον ἐν τοῖς δι᾽ ἔθος, οἷς ἡ φύσις γε μὴ ὁμοίως
ΤΟ
α
452 2, 21-25 text. recept. habet Biehl, primus scripsit Freudth., Rh. Mus.
XXIV. et Archiv für Gesch. d. Philos. II. 1889. 2I vulgo legitur : εἰ γὰρ μὴ
ἐπὶ τοῦ Ε μέμνηται, ἐπὶ τοῦ ΕΘ ἐμνήσθη, sed ἐπὶ τοῦ Ε μέμνηται om. ΕΜΥ,
pro
Εθ habet ν θΕ, ηθΥ, θ Ε Them. Mich. Didot. 23 A] a E M. | pro Z vulgo
E, Z etiam vet. tr.
24 ἐζήτει Biehl, ἐπιζητεῖ S et reliqui edd., etiam Freudth.,
ἐπεζήτει L | Z] Θ Ε Υ.
25 ἐπιζητεῖ habet etiam E (Bus.) | A] δ Υ. 28 Ε
pro Γ legi vult Freudth. | ἐὰν οὖν δι᾽ ἃ πάλαι οὐ Biehl, ἐὰν οὖν μὴ LSU Y et
omnes reliqui edd. | διὰ παλαιοῦ LSUM Them. Mich. vet. tr. et omnes reliqui
edd., δι' ἃ πάλαι οὐ Υ et E (Bus.).
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION
113
manages to do so and finds what he was seeking. Here what
happens is, that one initiates many processes before he arrives.10
at the stimulation of that one on which the object sought will
ensue. Remembering depends upon the potential presence
in consciousness of the causal process, and upon this, on the
condition that, as mentioned, the transition be effected by
one's own agency and by means of processes that one already
possesses.
A starting point from which to begin must always be
found. Hence commonplaces seem to be often the initial
point in the act of recollection. The reason why these are 15
employed is that we pass quickly from one to another, e.g.
from milk to white, from white to air, from this to wet, passing
from which we call to mind the late autumn, which is the
season we had in view.
It is true that in general the middle member also of a
whole series of terms seems to be a starting point; if one does
not recollect before, one will do so when he comes to it, or
else there is no other point from which he can pass to the 20
recollection of the thing in question. Suppose for instance
one has a series of thoughts ABCDEFGH; if one has not
remembered at H, one remembers at E, if he is seeking
for G or F; for from that point we can go in either
direction both towards D and towards F. But if we are
not seeking for one of these members of the series, i.e. G
or F, by going to C we shall effect recollection; if that is
not so, by going to A we can. This is universally the
process.
The reason why, though the same link is employed, 25
recollection sometimes is and sometimes is not successful,
is that we can pass to a further distance at one time than at
another from the same starting point, e.g. from C to F or to
D. Hence, if the transition is mediated by some connecting
link which has not lately been employed, one passes to the
more familiar consequent, for the newly acquired habit has
become exactly like a natural disposition. It is thus that we 30
explain why frequently we recollect quickly what we have
been meditating upon. It is just in accordance with a natural
tendency to follow one another in a particular order that
things actually happen; and it is frequent repetition that
produces a natural tendency. But since in the realm of 452 b
Nature we meet with events contrary also to the order of
Nature and due to chance, this is still more likely to occur
in things due to custom, among which a natural order does
R.
8
114
ARISTOTLE
ὑπάρχει· ὥστε κινηθῆναι ἐνίοτε κἀκεῖ καὶ ἄλλως, ἄλλως
5 τε καὶ ὅταν ἀφέλκῃ ἐκεῖθεν αὐτόσε πῃ. διὰ τοῦτο καὶ
ὅταν δέῃ ὄνομα μνημονεῦσαι, παρόμοιον μέν, εἰς δ᾽ ἐκεῖνο
σολοικίζομεν. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι τοῦτον συμ-
8 βαίνει τὸν τρόπον.
8
او
T
τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, γνωρίζειν δεῖ τὸν χρόνον,
ἢ μέτρῳ ἢ ἀορίστως. ἔστω δέ τι ᾧ κρίνει τὸν πλείω καὶ
το ἐλάττω· εὔλογον δ' ὥσπερ τὰ μεγέθη· νοεῖ γὰρ τὰ
μεγάλα καὶ πόρρω οὐ τῷ ἀποτείνειν ἐκεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν,
ὥσπερ τὴν ὄψιν φασί τινες (καὶ γὰρ μὴ ὄντων ὁμοίως
νοήσει), ἀλλὰ τῇ ἀνάλογον κινήσει· ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ
τὰ ὅμοια σχήματα καὶ κινήσεις. τίνι οὖν διοίσει, ὅταν
15 τὰ μείζω νοῇ, ἢ ὅταν ἐκεῖνα νοῇ τὰ ἐλάττω; πάντα γὰρ
τὰ ἐντὸς ἐλάττω, καὶ ἀνάλογον καὶ τὰ ἐκτός. ἔστι δ'
ἴσως ὥσπερ καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσιν ἀνάλογον λαβεῖν ἄλλο ἐν
αὐτῷ, οὕτως καὶ τοῖς ἀποστήμασιν. ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ τὴν
ΑΒ ΒΕ κινεῖται, ποιεῖ τὴν ΓΔ· ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἡ ΑΓ
20 καὶ ἡ ΓΔ. τί οὖν μᾶλλον τὴν ΓΔ ἢ τὴν ΖΗ ποιεῖ;
ἢ ὡς ἡ ΑΓ πρὸς τὴν ΑΒ ἔχει, οὕτως ἡ [το] Θ πρὸς
τὴν Ι ἔχει. ταύτας οὖν ἅμα κινεῖται. ἂν δὲ τὴν ΖΗ
βούληται νοῆσαι, τὴν μὲν ΒΕ ὁμοίως νοεῖ, ἀντὶ δὲ
τῶν ΘΙ τὰς ΚΛ νοεῖ· αὗται γὰρ ἔχουσιν ὡς ΖΑ
25 πρὸς Β Α.
ὅταν οὖν ἅμα ἥ τε τοῦ πράγματος γίνηται κίνησις
καὶ ἡ τοῦ χρόνου, τότε τῇ μνήμῃ ἐνεργεῖ. ἂν δ' οἴηται
ΤΟ
απ
452 b, 13 αὐτοῖς Ε ΜΥ, αὐτῇ etiam vet. tr. et Mich. 14 τίνι] τίνα Biehl, err.
typograph. 15 vulgo: νοῇ; ἢ ὅτι ἐκεῖνα νοεῖ, ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω; ἢ ante ὅτι om. E M Y,
¿keîva voî ǹ M, voeîv L S U, textum receptum de coniectura Freudenthalii scripsit
Biehl.
16 και LM SU, ὥσπερ Biehl. 19 TA Biehl M Sylb., AA
reliqui codd. et edd., etiam vet. tr. et Mich., qui autem γ δ Aristoteli scribendum
fuisse annotat, ΓΔ recte coni. etiam Freudenth.
20 ἢ τὴν om. ΕΜΥ.
21 ΑΓ] AZ con. Freudth., codd. et edd. except. Biehl ΑΓ | τὸ] κ Y, v E, om. Μ.
τὴν Ι] τὸ μ L, τὴν ι Ε ΜΥ, τὴν M Biehl. | οὖν fort. γάρ. 23. μὲν om. Ε]
B] M, om. Y. 24 Λα ΕΥ 25 προς] ξ Μ.
22
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION
115
not prevail to the same degree. Hence in some cases we are
impelled to pass both to one point and to another, especially
when something diverts us from the one to the other. Hence 5
too, when we have to remember a name, we may recollect one
like it and commit a verbal blunder as regards the proper one.
This is the explanation of the way in which recollection
Occurs.
But there is a most important fact to be noticed—that
we must have apprehension of time either determinate or
indeterminate. Let us grant as real something by which we
discriminate greater and less periods. It is reasonable that 10
we should do so in the same way as we discriminate extended
magnitudes; we know things that have great size and are at
a distance, not by our thought reaching out to them there, as
some say our sight does (for though they are non-existent
they can equally be known), but by a psychic process analo-
gous to them: there exist in the mind figures and changes
similar to the external objects.
What then is the difference between knowing the objects
of greater size (the objective) and knowing the other set (the 15
subjective) which are smaller? All the inner are smaller and
analogous to the outer, and probably, just as in the case of
the knowable forms of things the subject has another cor-
responding one within him, so it is with distances. Thus, if
AB, BE be the process, that produces AC, CD, for AC and
CD are in the same ratio as AB and BE. Does not this then 20
give AF, FG quite as much as AC, CD? No, for AC is to
AB as H is to I. These processes, then, occur together, but,
if one wants to think FG, while he equally at the same time
thinks BE, instead of the ratio of H to I he thinks that of
K to L, for the latter lines are in the same proportion as FA
stands in to BA.
25

H
F
C
K
B
E
L
A
G
Hence when the process corresponding to the concrete
object and that corresponding to the time are coincident we
have an act of memory. If one thinks that they are coincident
8—2
116
ARISTOTLE
ΤΟ
μὴ ποιῶν, οἴεται μνημονεύειν· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει δια-
ψευσθῆναί τινα καὶ δοκεῖν μνημονεύειν μὴ μνημονεύοντα.
30 ἐνεργοῦντα δὲ τῇ μνήμῃ μὴ οἴεσθαι ἀλλὰ λανθάνειν
μεμνημένον οὐκ ἔστιν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν αὐτὸ τὸ μεμνῆσθαι.
ἀλλ᾽ ἐὰν ἡ τοῦ πράγματος γένηται χωρὶς τῆς τοῦ χρόνου
ἢ αὕτη ἐκείνης, οὐ μέμνηται. ἡ δὲ τοῦ χρόνου διττή
4532 ἐστιν· ὁτὲ μὲν γὰρ μέτρῳ οὐ μέμνηται αὐτό, οἷον ὅτι
τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ὁδήποτε ἐποίησεν, ὁτὲ δὲ καὶ μέτρῳ· ἀλλὰ
μέμνηται καὶ ἐὰν μὴ καὶ μέτρῳ. εἰώθασι δὲ λέγειν
ὅτι μέμνηνται μέν, πότε μέντοι οὐκ ἴσασιν, ὅταν μὴ
5 γνωρίζωσι τοῦ πότε τὸ ποσὸν μέτρῳ.
5
ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὐχ οἱ
αὐτοὶ μνημονικοὶ καὶ ἀναμνηστικοί, ἐν τοῖς πρότερον
εἴρηται. διαφέρει δὲ τοῦ μνημονεύειν τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκε
σθαι οὐ μόνον κατὰ τὸν χρόνον, ἀλλ᾽ ὅτι τοῦ μὲν
μνημονεύειν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων μετέχει πολλά, τοῦ
το δ' ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι οὐδὲν ὡς εἰπεῖν τῶν γνωριζομένων
ζῴων, πλὴν ἄνθρωπος. αἴτιον δ᾽ ὅτι τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαί
ἐστιν οἷον συλλογισμός τις· ὅτι γὰρ πρότερον εἶδεν ἢ
ἤκουσεν ἤ τι τοιοῦτον ἔπαθε, συλλογίζεται ὁ ἀναμιμνη-
σκόμενος, καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ζήτησίς τις. τοῦτο δ᾽ οἷς καὶ
15 τὸ βουλευτικὸν ὑπάρχει, φύσει μόνοις συμβέβηκεν· καὶ
16 γὰρ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι συλλογισμός τίς ἐστιν.
16
TO
ὅτι δ᾽ ἐστὶ σω-
ματικὸν τὸ πάθος καὶ ἡ ἀνάμνησις ζήτησις ἐν τοιούτῳ
φαντάσματος, σημεῖον τὸ παρενοχλεῖν ἐνίους, ἐπειδὰν μὴ
δύνωνται ἀναμνησθῆναι καὶ πάνυ ἐπέχοντες τὴν διάνοιαν,
20 καὶ οὐκέτ᾽ ἐπιχειροῦντας ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι οὐδὲν ἧττον,
καὶ μάλιστα τοὺς μελαγχολικούς· τούτους γὰρ φαντάσ
ματα κινεῖ μάλιστα. αἴτιον δὲ τοῦ μὴ ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῖς εἶναι
τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι, ὅτι καθάπερ τοῖς βάλλουσιν οὐκέτι
4532, 19 ἐπέχοντες Christ, Biehl, ἐπέχοντας Bek. codd.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION
117
without securing that they really are so one thinks one
remembers, for there is nothing to prevent one's being deceived
and thinking one remembers when one does not. When,
however, one actually remembers, it is impossible not to 30
know it or to be unaware that that is so, for it is just in
being aware of this that memory consists. But if the object-
processes occur independently of that corresponding to the
time, or the latter take place without the former, there is no
memory.
The time-apprehending process is twofold; sometimes one
does not remember the interval with exact precision, as e.g. 453 a
that someone did something the day before yesterday, but
sometimes our sense of time is accurate. All the same one
remembers, though not aware of the exact interval; we are
wont to say we do remember though we don't know when the
thing happened, when we cannot tell what is the exact extent
of the interval.
We have already asserted that it is not the same people 5
who remember well and who recollect well. Recollection
differs from remembering not merely in the superiority of the
sense of time which it involves, but in the fact that, while
many of the other animals possess memory, we may say that 10
none of those now known, except man, share in recollection.
The reason is that recollection is like a syllogism. One who
recollects comes to the conclusion that he saw or heard or had
some such experience previously and the process resembles a
search and, owing to its nature, recollection accrues only to
those that have the power of deliberation, for deliberation is 15
a sort of syllogistic process.
Evidence that this experience is of a corporeal nature, and
that in recollecting we search for an image in a corporeal
organ, comes from the fact that it distresses some people
when they cannot recall a thing though applying their mind
hard in attempting to do so and, when they no longer try to 20
recollect, none the less the disturbance goes on. This happens
especially with liverish people, for they are the class most
easily moved by images. The reason why recollection is not
under their control is, that, just as when one has thrown a
118
ARISTOTLE
Ο
ου
ΤΟ
ἐπ' αὐτοῖς τὸ στῆσαι, οὕτως καὶ ὁ ἀναμιμνησκόμενος καὶ
25 θηρεύων σωματικόν τι κινεῖ, ἐν ᾧ τὸ πάθος. μάλιστα δ'
ἐνοχλοῦνται οἷς ἂν ὑγρότης τύχῃ ὑπάρχουσα περὶ τὸν
αἰσθητικὸν τόπον· οὐ γὰρ ῥᾳδίως παύεται κινηθεῖσα, ἕως
ἂν ἐπανέλθῃ τὸ ζητούμενον καὶ εὐθυπορήσῃ ἡ κίνησις.
διὸ καὶ ὀργαὶ καὶ φόβοι, ὅταν τι κινήσωσιν, ἀντικινούν-
30 των πάλιν τούτων οὐ καθίστανται, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπὶ τὸ αὐτὸ
ἀντικινοῦσιν. καὶ ἔοικε τὸ πάθος τοῖς ὀνόμασι καὶ
μέλεσι καὶ λόγοις, ὅταν διὰ στόματος γένηταί τι αὐτῶν
σφόδρα· παυσαμένοις γὰρ καὶ οὐ βουλομένοις ἐπέρχεται
πάλιν ᾄδειν ἢ λέγειν. εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ οἱ τὰ ἄνω μείζω
453b ἔχοντες καὶ οἱ νανώδεις ἀμνημονέστεροι τῶν ἐναντίων
διὰ τὸ πολὺ βάρος ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῷ αἰσθητικῷ, καὶ μήτ'
ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰς κινήσεις δύνασθαι ἐμμένειν ἀλλὰ διαλύ-
εσθαι μήτ' ἐν τῷ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι ῥᾳδίως εὐθυπορεῖν.
5 οἱ δὲ πάμπαν νέοι καὶ λίαν γέροντες ἀμνήμονες διὰ τὴν
κίνησιν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐν φθίσει, οἱ δ᾽ ἐν αὐξήσει πολλῇ
εἰσίν· ἔτι δὲ τά γε παιδία καὶ νανώδη ἐστὶ μέχρι πόρρω
τῆς ἡλικίας. περὶ μὲν οὖν μνήμης καὶ τοῦ μνημονεύειν,
τίς ἡ φύσις αὐτῶν καὶ τίνι τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μνημονεύει τὰ
10 ζώα, καὶ περὶ τοῦ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι, τί ἐστι καὶ πῶς
γίνεται καὶ διὰ τίνας αἰτίας, εἴρηται.
MEMORY AND RECOLLECTION
119
thing one can no longer check its course, so a man engaged
in recollection and on the hunt for an idea stimulates into
activity a bodily organ in which the experience is localised. 25
Those feel the vexation most who happen to have fluid in the
region of the sensory organ, for once the fluid substance is set
in motion it is not easily brought to rest until the object
sought for returns to mind and the process resumes its direct
course. Hence, when they have set something in agitation,
emotions of anger and fear, owing to the reaction of these
organs, do not come to rest; on the contrary they react once 30
more on them. The phenomenon resembles that which occurs
when a name or a tune or a sentence has come to be much
on one's lips; after one has stopped, and without one intending
it, one is prompted again to sing or to speak.
Dwarfs and those who have a greater development in the
upper parts of the body have poorer memories than those of 453 b
the opposite type, because they have too great a weight
pressing upon the organ of consciousness; the processes can
neither persist in it from the time of the initial experience (on
the contrary they are effaced), nor in the act of recollection
can they easily take a direct course. The very young and 5
the exceedingly aged remember badly because of their tran-
sitional state: the former are growing, the latter decaying
rapidly; and besides, children are dwarf-like in type up to a
considerably advanced time in their life.
This is our account of memory and remembering, the
nature thereof and the psychical organ employed by animals
in remembering; likewise of recollection, its nature, mode of 10
occurrence, and causes.
COMMENTARY
DE SENSU
CHAPTER I.
436 a I. περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ αἰσθητῶν. This is the common title
of the treatise and that known to Alexander of Aphrodisias. As,
however, the discussion is to be not about the soul per se, but in par-
ticular about its connection with the body, i.e. not merely psycho-
logical but especially physiological, Alexander suggests that weρì
αἰσθητηρίων τε καὶ αἰσθητῶν would be a more legitimate title.
Sometimes αἴσθησις is used loosely instead of αισθητήριον, even
by Aristotle himself. Simon Simonius adopts this amended title,
translating it 'De Organis Sensuum et Sensilibus.'
This is evidently the investigation promised in De An. 1. ch. 1,
402 b 15, where Aristotle asks if the objects of sensation may not be
more profitably treated of before the function of sensation itself. In
the whole passage 402 b 5 sqq. he points out that a definition of soul in
the abstract is not sufficient for a comprehension of what soul is, åλλà
καὶ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ συμβεβηκότα συμβάλλεται μέγα μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι
Tò Tí ẻσTW. Thus we must proceed beyond our abstract definition
and give an account of the various μópia-faculties of soul, but these
again cannot be understood apart from their epya-functions, and,
once more, point to an account of their avtikeíµeva—objects.
Aristotle doubts if these subjects should not be treated in the
reverse order; to do so would be to begin with things 'notiora
nobis'; for, as later psychology also has pointed out, it is the things
presented to our senses and not the psychical functions through
which they are apprehended, which are in the order of time the
primary objects of consciousness.
As a matter of fact, Aristotle does not adopt this reverse order in
his exposition, thinking it sufficient to have pointed out the danger
of resting content with a merely abstract treatment.
I22
DE SENSU
Thus we come finally to a discussion of alo@nrá, the objects of
sense and the bodily organs through which they are apprehended.
It is not to be thought, however, that the separation of topics in
Aristotle's psychological writings is observed with perfect logical
rigidity. The general outlines of what is here laid down have already
been anticipated in De An. II. chs. 7-11, and the detailed treatment
of sound which is omitted from this treatise is to be found there
in ch. 8.
What in particular distinguishes this treatise from the De Anima
is the greater detail with which aio@nrá are treated and the attention
devoted to the bodily organ of each sense.
διώρισται, διορίζειν is a technical term with Aristotle, almost
equivalent to to define' (opos, optouós definition).
=
Kaľ' aúτην, another technical term; it is defined in Anal. Post.
1. ch. 4, 73 a 34 sqq. Those characteristics of a thing without which
it would be impossible for it to be that thing, belong to it κať aνтó.
They are stated in the definition. Cf. also Metaph. VII. ch. 5,
1030 b 23 sqq.
It is assumed that a thing can preserve its indi-
viduality though stripped of certain qualities. These latter are
συμβεβηκότα. When Aristotle says he has given a definition of the
soul per se, he means that he has stated the ultimate attributes that
everything psychical (or rather everything living, for plants have
ʊxý) must have. This definition appears in De An. II. ch. 1,
412 b 5: εἴη ἂν ἐντελέχεια ἡ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ ὀργανικοῦ.
The question is, whether the soul per se is here contrasted with
its faculties, or whether-as Alexander suggests is also possible-he
is opposing soul considered alone to soul considered in its relation
to the body. To this it may be objected that Aristotle never does
consider soul apart from body. It is clear that Aristotle here means
just what he says, after a discussion of soul in general and its
faculties he is to go on to investigate their epya or, as he here calls
them, the pages of the living creatures. This is a progress in the
direction of greater detail, for one and the same dúvaμus is capable of
being determined in various ways when it passes into activity or
évépyeta. This will involve the more detailed treatment of the bodily
organ of each évépyeɩa also. Hence the predominantly physiological
character of this treatise.
For the reason why a definition of soul in general is not sufficient,
see De An. 11. ch. 3, 414 b 20 sqq. Things ev tą ¿peģŷs, like souls
and figures, have no common nature which can exist apart from the
COMMENTARY
123
particular type, e.g. triangle, quadrilateral, etc. Such things have a
nature, media inter univocorum et equivocorum naturam.'
436 2 2. δυνάμεων, δύναμις is the regular word for potentiality
a
translatable by 'faculty,' by which term we also render μópiov.
This latter term Aristotle inherited from the Platonic psychology.
The word itself and the way in which Plato employs it suggest
rather a theory of the separable and independent nature of the
various faculties, the point of view, in fact, of 'faculty psychology.'
Aristotle's is, however, far removed from any such theory.
436 2 3. ἐπίσκεψιν ποιεῖσθαι is an equivalent for θεωρίαν ποιεῖσθαι:
cf. Metaph. 1. ch. 8, 989 b 24-27.
τῶν ζωὴν ἐχόντων. This brings in plants, which also have ψυχή,
and to which some of the phenomena proposed for discussion belong
(e.g. νεότης καὶ γῆρας, ζωὴ καὶ θάνατος).
436 a 4. "Siaι, idios is that which is the peculiar possession of
any one species.
κοιναὶ, κοινός is the reverse of ἴδιος. Alexander points out that
Aristotle desires not merely to classify the psychical functions of
animals but to discuss the things classified.
Simon would make out that the distinction falls wholly within
the functions of animals and that here dia and кować mean re-
spectively 'belonging to them quâ animal and quâ living' because
there is no discussion of the functions of plants in the Parva
Naturalia. However, the missing treatise De Plantis (cf. De Long.
et Brev. Vit. 467 b 4) seems to have been intended to carry on the
discussion of the most universal of all the conditions of life. Simon
seems to be right in denying that by kować Aristotle is referring
merely to the functions which plants share with animals. But
neither is it evident that the distinction falls wholly within the
functions of animals as he asserts. As a matter of fact the Parva
Naturalia though dealing chiefly with the functions of animals
contain reference too to the phenomena of plant life. Possibly,
however, Aristotle had no strict and complete classification in his
mind, but merely wished to suggest that some functions might be
the peculiar attributes of a certain species and of certain wider
groups, as ἀνάμνησις of man and ἀναπνοή and ἐκπνοή of animals with
lungs. Simon's view, however, derives confirmation from a passage
further on (cf. note to 436 a 7).
436 a 5. πρážειs, pâέis is here employed in an unusual sense, as
though it were a general term-action-used instead of the specific,
124
DE SENSU
C
évépyea, which is par excellence the name for the function or activity
of anything possessing mind (κυρίως γὰρ πρᾶξις λογικὴ ἡ ἐνέργειά
ẻστw. Alex. p. 4, 1. 5 [W.]). But πpâģis has generally a very restricted
application, meaning as a rule distinctively human actions into which
deliberation and thought enter. Cp. passim in the Ethics, especially
I. ch. 1, 1094 a 1; VI. ch. 2, 1139a 31 etc.
ὑποκείσθω. ὑποτίθεσθαι is to state as a υπόθεσις. This word
has both a technical and a general meaning. It is used to refer
(1) to certain of the undemonstrable but indubitable principles
which lie at the basis of the several sciences; this is its most
common technical meaning.
Again it may be used (2) to indicate a statement which is
assumed as an ultimate principle without proof for the purposes of a
particular discussion, but which is demonstrable and will be proved
when it is convenient to do so (cf. Alex. 4, 1. 23 [W.]).
Alexander is wrong in saying that the vπóleσis which is an
indemonstrable principle of science is an agioua. Aristotle (Anal.
ἀξίωμα.
Post. 1. ch. 10) distinguishes three classes of first principles, (1) the
KoLvà áέióμata of all science, e.g. the Law of non-contradiction,
(2) definitions of the subject of demonstration (тà прŵта 76 а 32)
and their properties (mán), (3) voléσes, which affirm the existence.
of the subject to which the science is to attach predicates, e.g. lines
and figures in geometry (76 b 5). These two latter classes of ávañó-
Seikta are idia—appropriate to the science in question; they are both
species of féσis (Anal. Post. 1. ch. 2, 72 a 15 sqq.). It is thus evident
that, according to this technical use, a vπóleσis is that which
"renders conclusions unconditional and categorical' (Poste, Posterior
Analytics, Appendix B, p. 140). It corresponds to what Mill (Logic,
Bk 1. ch. 8, §§ 6 and 7) calls a 'postulate'-the assertion that,
e.g. the figure in geometry, the triangle, exists, which renders our
conclusions unhypothetical. Without this postulate which asserts the
existence of the things defined there is no way of distinguishing
a science from any self-consistent system of mythology. Upon
definitions alone a science cannot be built.
There appears, however, to be another technical use of vπóðeσis
which was common in Greek geometry. The vπóleσis is the Q.E.F.
of a problem or Q.E.D. of a theorem, the proposition set up for proof.
This seems to be the sense in which it is employed in Eth. Nic. vII.
ch. 9, 1151 a 17 (cf. Mr Burnet's note on the passage), though
Poste (op. cit. p. 105 note) cites it as an instance of the former usage.
COMMENTARY
125
It is quite clear that here Aristotle uses vπокEίσ0w in the wider
sense of vπóleois. The conclusions of the De Anima which can be
proved are to be used as apxaí in this treatise. These, therefore,
though not indubitable first principles, are still certain; they are not
'hypotheses' in the modern sense, which are statements the certainty
of which is still in doubt and which are assumed in a merely pro-
visional way.
436 а 7. πрŃтwv. In Posterior Analytics 1. ch. 4, 73 b 33 sqq. it
is shown that what is a universal and peculiar attribute of a species
belongs to it primarily, e.g. the equality of its angles to two right
angles belongs to the species triangle primarily and not to figure, the
genus (τὸ καθόλου δὲ ὑπάρχει τότε, ὅταν ἐπὶ τοῦ τυχόντος καὶ πρώτου
δεικνύηται).
To be πρώτος then is to be ἴδιος, and πρώτων will refer to the ἴδιαι
mentioned above, 1. 4. Το proceed from ἴδια to κοινά is to follow
the ' ordo doctrinae,' while from Ková to idia is the 'ordo naturae,' and
this latter is the method which on the whole Aristotle follows in the
De Anima in spite of his statement in De An. 11. ch. 2, 413 a 11 sqq.
Here, however, he is to begin with the dia which belong to
animal quâ animal (if we interpret dia as Simon will have it, cf. note
to 436 a 4), e.g. Sense and Memory, and later he will go on to those
functions which animals share with other living things.
The 'ordo doctrinae' is also employed by him when he treats of
sight before touch in the De Anima, and in treating of animals before
plants ; it often proceeds from the γνωριμώτερα ἡμῖν to the γνωριμώ
Tepa púσe, cf. Physics 1. ch. 1. Perhaps, however, pórov refers to
ζώων τῶν ζωὴν ἐχόντων
Lov as opposed to tŵv (wǹv exóvτwv merely. This, which is Ziaja's
interpretation, makes the upshot of the whole matter that he is
going to treat of animals and their functions first, as in fact he does.
This interpretation relieves us from the necessity of limiting idiaι
definitely to one or other of the two alternatives-peculiar to animal
quâ animal, and-peculiar to individual species.
436 a 8. κοινὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα. The most important both of the
generic and specific functions of animals are functions both of the
soul and the body, and hence (as Thomas says) the necessity of
a separate treatise.
436 a 9. μvýμn. Memory does not belong to all animals, cf.
De Mem. 450 a 16 and 453 a 9, also Metaph. 1. ch. 1, 980 a 29 sqq. ;
hence he says only that these functions belong to almost all animals
(σχεδόν, 1. 11).
126
DE SENSU
436 a 10. тò öpektɩkóv
öpeğis or Tò oρEKTIKOV (cf. Eth. 1. ch. 13, 1102 b 30) is
the general name for the appetitive or conative element in the soul.
It appears in three specific forms, ἐπιθυμία, θυμός, and βούλησις ; the
latter is a function of the rational soul. Cf. De An. 111. ch. 9, 432 b 5:
ἐν τῷ λογιστικῷ ἡ βούλησις γίνεται καὶ ἐν τῷ ἀλόγῳ ἡ ἐπιθυμία καὶ
ὁ θυμός.
The Aristotelian distinction between Ovμós and èπovμía is not
the same as the Platonic (cf. Repub. III. and Iv., especially
439 E sqq.), for Aristotle in Ethics 1. ch. 13, 1102 b 13 sqq. assigns
both Ovμos and vμía to that irrational part of the soul which truly
is not absolutely irrational (kupíws aλoyov) in so far as it partakes in
a way (μetéɣeɩ tŵs) in reason, but yet is irrational in so far as it
opposes reason (ἀντιτείνει τῷ λόγῳ). According to Plato ἐπιθυμία
tâ
belongs to the wholly irrational part of the soul. Nevertheless
though, according to Aristotle, vμía and Ovμós belong to the
same puois Ts yuxs, yet they are distinguished in a way analogous
to the Platonic; cf. Eth. vII. ch. 7, 1149 a 25 sqq. 'Eπivμía is a
mere desire for what is pleasant as such, Ovuós is passion acting.
without reflection, but not mere craving for pleasure, cf. Zeller, Arist.
and Earlier Peripatetics II. pp. 112-13. Anger is an inadequate render-
ing of Ovμós, as the tenderer emotions are also ascribed to it by
Aristotle, cf. Polit. vII. ch. 7, 1327 b 40. Tò оρEKTɩKóν has been already
treated in the De Anima. The accurate distinction of Ovµós and
Ovμía really falls into the background in Aristotle, since their
demarcation was not of importance for his psychology.
In
436 a 12. tŵv μetexóvtwv (wns, i.e. plants as well as animals.
addition to the above class there is second a class of 'communissima'
such as νεότης καὶ γῆρας, ζωὴ καὶ θάνατος, and a third class which are
κοινὰ ζῴων ἐνίοις, eg. ἀναπνοὴ καὶ ἐκπνοή. If by ἴδια in l. 4 Aristotle
means, as Simon maintains, peculiar to animal quâ animal, then
the first list-alo@nois etc.—is the tale of the dia, and the four
σvvyíaι form the constituents of the two latter classes.
436 a 14. ovjvyía. Simon says, 'Est enim horum quasi pri-
vatio alterius.' They are related as a positive quality, and its
σTéρnois, i.e. the contradictory, within the same genus.
436 а 16. τί τε ἕκαστον αὐτῶν. The τί ἐστιν of anything consists
of the characteristics revealed in its definition-the scientific 'con-
notation' of the name, cf. Anal. Post. 11. ch. 3.
436 a 17. airlas. ỷ airía or tò airɩov is cause,—that, the existence
of which entails the existence of the thing of which it is said to be
COMMENTARY
127
the cause. According to Aristotle's logical theories it is impossible to
prove the τí ẻστw of anything; only its existence, i.e. that it occurs
(ovußaível), can be demonstrated; and this is done by giving its acriov.
436 a 18. voiкov. In De An. 1. ch. 1, 403 a 29 sqq. there is a
discussion of the spheres of the puoikós and the dialektikós, and it is
first suggested that the physicist pays attention to the matter, the
other to the λóyos or eldos (in his illustration the final cause) in
natural phenomena. But the conclusion is come to, that the real
þvσikós pays attention to both. Cf. also Metaph. VII. ch. 11, 1037 a
16 sqq.
περὶ ὑγιείας καὶ νόσου. This tractate, which should have followed
the Tepì avaπvons (cf. 480 b 22), is not extant.
436 a 19. apxás, the premisses from which deduction is made.
436 2 20. έστερημένοις.
a
This word is applied both to those
that lack and those that have been deprived of a quality. Cf. Metaph.
v. ch. 22, 1022 b 22 sqq.
436 a 22. laтρikîs. Aristotle cites a case in which we can
explain a phenomenon in medicine by geometrical principles,-that
circular wounds are slowest to heal (cf. Anal. Post. I. ch. 13, 79a 15).
436b 2. äρxovтai, a reference to apxaí (cf. 1. 19 above).
436 b 4. μer' alo@horews. That sensation cannot exist apart from
the bodily life is affirmed in De An. 11. ch. 2, 413 b 27. Hdový,
λύπη, θυμός, ἐπιθυμία, and ὄρεξις generally, occur along with sensation ;
it enters into their being: cf. loc. cit. 413 b 22–24.
436 b 5. δι' αἰσθήσεως. μνήμη is due to αἴσθησις : it is a ἕξις
pavτáoµatos (cf. de Mem. 451 a 17) and a þáνtaoµá is a kívnois vπò
Toû aioðéobaɩ, i.e. a psychical affection originating with, and being a
persistence of, a sense stimulation; it is the μový roû aiolńμatos
talked of in Anal. Post. 11. ch. 19, 99 b 36 and De An. I. ch. 4,
408 b 18. Again the φάντασμα is called a ὑπόλειμμα τοῦ αἰσθήματος.
Cf. De Mem. ch. 1, 451 a 4 and De Insom. 461 b 21, and also An.
Post. II. ch. 19, 1oo a 3, ἐκ μὲν οὖν αἰσθήσεως γίνεται μνήμη.
πάθη. A málos is (1) in its most general signification, any
attribute of a thing whatsoever as opposed to the concrete reality
itself (cf. De Gen. et Corr. 1. ch. 4, 319 b 8 etc.). In accordance
with the etymology of the word there is, however, generally the side
implication of the πálos, being a determination produced in a thing
which is passive and suffers modification (άoxe) by something else.
Hence (2) Táðos, though often used indiscriminately, tends to be
demarcated from a permanent quality and to refer to a more
128
DE SENSU
temporary attribute: cf. Categ. ch. 8, 9b 28. It is often indis-
tinguishable from συμβεβηκός.
If the subject-the thing which has the Tábos-is mind or one of
its faculties, then the Tábos is some modification of consciousness.
We must, however, distinguish as a special meaning that sense of
Tálos (found in De Mem. ch. 1, 450 b 1), where it means mental
perturbation.
ως
For the use of málos cf. Burnet, Eth. Nic. p. 88. Here, accord-
ing to Alexander, ὕπνος καὶ ἐγρήγορσις come under the designation of
Táoη τns alooηoews: cf. Comment. in De Sensu, p. 7 (Wendland),
1. 25: ταύτης γάρ τι πασχούσης ὁ ὕπνος. The explanation is that
exhalations from food proceed upwards to the brain, condense and,
descending once more, press upon the seat of consciousness (the
heart), and so produce sleep. Cf. also De Somn. 454 a 22: ẵµ&w
γάρ ἐστι τὰ πάθη ταῦτα περὶ αἴσθησιν τοῦ πρώτου αἰσθητικοῦ.
436 b 6. εels. A eέis is a fixed and determinate disposition
(mere temporary disposition is diábeσis). Cf. Categ. ch. 8, 8b 27.
Aristotle seems here to be describing the character of the four σvv-
yía mentioned above in 436 a 14 sq. Hence by ges he can hardly
be referring to memory, which indeed is a έis of the image left by
sensation, not directly of sensation itself. Alexander thinks that
by eέes sensation itself is referred to. But, if we hold that one
of the pairs of correlatives is indicated, perhaps veórηs kai yŵpas
may be intended, though in what sense these are ëέes of aïolŋ-
σis is not clear; they belong rather to rò OpETTIкóv-the 'nutritive.
soul.'
436 b 7. σωτηρίαι. ἀναπνοή preserves the life because it cools the
heart-the ultimate organ of sensation, and prevents it from de-
stroying itself by means of its own heat. Cf. De Juvent. ch. 3, 469 a
5 sqq. and De Resp. chapters 1, 8 and 16.
στερήσεις. νόσος and θάνατος are φθοραί and στερήσεις of life.
σTéρnois is used here in the sense of deprivation (cf. note to 436 a
20).
436 b 8.
Sià TOû Móyou here is equivalent to 'deductively' as
opposed to 'inductively'-d' èraywyns (cf. Phys. III. ch. 3, 210 b 8
sqq.). No reference to à priori in the Kantian sense is intended.
436 b.9. aioenoews. The distinction between noun and verb
seems here to correspond to that between faculty and function. Cf.
μvýμn and μvypoveveiv De Mem. passim. In the famous passage in
μνήμη μνημονεύειν
Anal. Post. 11. ch. 19, 100 a 17 it is generally understood to be that
COMMENTARY
129
between content and function—καὶ αἰσθάνεται μὲν τὸ καθ᾽ ἕκαστον, ἡ
δὲ αἴσθησις τοῦ καθόλου ἔστιν.
436 b 11-12. TEρl Yuxîs. The reference is to De An. II.
chapters 2, 3, 5 etc.
Cf. 413 b 1 sqq.
436 b 14. isía.
436 a 4 above. If touch belongs peculiarly to each and every
species, that must mean that it is a peculiar property of that nature
which they all have in common. It is something which they have
quâ animal. The usual meaning of duos is 'belonging to a species
exclusively,' but as each species is here said to have the properties in
question, the usual sense is out of the question.
This supports Simon's interpretation of dia in
436 b 15. Cf. De An. 11. ch. 3, 414 b 2 sqq. By touch we dis-
criminate dry and moist, hot and cold-the ultimate properties of
things material and also important characteristics of τροφή (ἡ γὰρ
άon Tηs Tроons aloOnois). Compare also III. ch. 12, 434 b 9 sqq.
ἀφὴ τῆς τροφῆς αἴσθησις).
Touch is necessary for the animal's preservation.
In the former passage (11. ch. 3) we find that yevois also dis-
criminates characteristics of τроpń and cf. below ch. 4. Taste dis-
criminates flavour, but xvuós is simply a dvoua of the fundamental
characteristics of Tpoon-the tangible ones, and hence yeûơɩs is a
species of touch (441 a 3 below).
436 b 19.
τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ. The omission of μορίου (which is read
by LSUP and Bek.) after OрETTIкоû makes this passage intelli-
gible. Aristotle here refers to that which nourishes, not to the
'nutritive faculty' of the soul. (1) In the first place, it is not xvμós
but yeûous which should be a Tálos of any of the faculties of the soul,
and (2) that would be a πάθος, not τῆς θρεπτικῆς δυνάμεως, but τοῦ
αισθητικοῦ.
The first of the above reasons makes us reject Alexander's inter-
pretation of τοῦ θρεπτικοῦ μορίου as τοῦ γευστικοῦ, which wants
explanation and besides makes this statement a tautology.
Alexander himself suggests that the meaning is τὸ μόριον τρέφειν
Suváμevov, i.e. the nutritive object. But μóptov is strange and is better
omitted as in E M Y.
Hammond does not notice the importance of the alteration in
Biehl's text, and translates: 'flavour is an affection of the nutritive
soul,' and explains that 'flavour as a property of food affects the pro-
cesses of growth or the nutritive soul.'
But τὸ θρεπτικόν here = τροφή.
==
436 b 20. Aristotle is clearly demarcating animals in general
R.
9
130
DE SENSU
from the smaller number that possess local movement, by a distinc-
tion in their sensational consciousness also. In all animals we have
touch and taste, but in those that have kívησis Kaтà TÓTоv we have
also the senses which are stimulated by a medium external to the
body (dià Tŵv ëέw0ev). The objects of touch and taste are external as
well as those of the other senses, and hence it is no differentia of the
senses of sight, hearing, and smell to be 'excited by external objects'
as Hammond translates: cf. De An. III. 12, 434 b 14: ai yàp älλai
αἰσθήσεις δι' ἑτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἷον ὄσφρησις ὄψις ἀκοή.
For a discussion of the media (air, water and rò diapavés) cf. ch.
3-5, the discussion of the special senses, and Bäumker, Des Ari-
stoteles Lehre von den Aussern und Innern Sinnesvermögen, pp.
38 sqq.
436 b 22. σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν. For the question of Aristotle's teleo-
logical interpretation of nature cf. Zeller, Arist. 1. pp. 359 sqq.
πрoaιolavóμeva, ¿e. perceiving their food before they are in actual
contact with it.
437 a I. φρονήσεως. φρόνησις is here used in a wide and
general sense as equivalent to diάvoia-the faculty which gives us
universals; but used more accurately, as in Eth. Nic. vi., it is πepì
περὶ
ὧν ἔστι βουλεύσασθαι (II4I b 9), i.e. knowledge of τὰ πρακτά. Cf.
1140b 4: λείπεται ἄρα αὐτὴν (sc. φρόνησιν) εἶναι ἕξιν ἀληθῆ μετὰ
λόγου πρακτικὴν περὶ τὰ ἀνθρώπῳ ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά.
I I
The póvuos is able to determine what is good and profitable
πρὸς τὸ εὖ ζῆν ὅλως, i.e. for his general welfare. φρόνησις is one of the
'intellectual virtues.' Some of the animals seem to have Ópóvŋois:
cf. Metaph. 1. ch. 1, 980 b 22, where some are said to be opovɩ-
μтepа than others.
437 a 3. νοητῶν. νοητά are the objective counterpart of νοήματα,
which are concepts generally, the contents of vóŋois or voûs, i.e.
intellect. Cf. De An. 1. ch. 3, 407 a 7: ǹ vónσis tà vońμata, and
Metaph. XII. ch. 7, 1072 b 22: τὸ γὰρ δεκτικὸν τοῦ νοητοῦ. νοῦς.
φρόνησις τῶν νοητῶν is equivalent to θεωρία or ἐπιστήμη, which are
regularly opposed to πρᾶξις as well as to a knowledge of τὰ πρακτά.
Cf. Eth. vi. ch. 5, 1140b 1: oùk av ein ǹ þpóvnois étiorýµn, and cf.
φρόνησις ἐπιστήμη,
ch. 3, 1139 b 17 sqq. ἐπιστήμη concerns τὰ ἐξ ἀνάγκης, φρόνησις
those things which ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν. Hence, in the strict sense of
the terms, the expression opóvnois Tŵv vonтŵv contains a contradiction.
I
437 a 5. κal' avrýv, i.e. sight in its own sphere, in the objects
directly presented to it. To the sphere of sight belong colour and
COMMENTARY
131
the mathematical qualities of objects perceived by sight-rà Kowà
aloonτá (cf. 11. 9-10 below). Compare De An. II. ch. 6, 418 a 9, where
the κοινὰ αἰσθητά are said to be perceived καθ' αυτά. Besides those
things which are thus perceived there are others that are perceived
karà ovµßeßŋkós, e.g. we perceive by sight qualities referring to another
sense, which are 'complicated' with the visual one in the same
object, and again we can perceive all sorts of other determinations of
the visible object, e.g. that such and such a white object is 'the son
of Diares' (418 a 21). Here some modification of the visual quality
must pass as a symbol for or mean the other characteristics which
we infer from it. But it is in the perception of these associated
elements that hearing contributes more to intellectual life, for to the
audible sounds we have by convention (karà ovvýkηv) attached the
concepts by which we think the whole of reality so far as it is
known to us.
πρὸς δὲ νοῦν. voûs seems to be best described as the faculty of
conceptual thought. Though sometimes defined so widely as to
take in all mental activities superior to ato@nois (cf. De An. III.
ch. 4, 429 a 23 : λέγω δὲ νοῦν ᾧ διανοεῖται καὶ ὑπολαμβάνει ἡ ψυχή:
cf. also De An. 111. ch. 3, 427 b 27-29), in its most characteristic
application it refers to the highest faculty of all. That seems to be
the apprehension of concepts in abstraction from the imagery, the
sensuous setting or λŋ by which they seem generally to be attended.
Cf. De An. 111. ch. 4, 429 b 21 and Rodier's notes to the preceding
passage, also ch. 6, 430 b 30. Such simple concepts seem to form
the starting point of all scientific knowledge, and in Eth. vi. ch. 6,
1141a7 voûs is said to be the faculty for apprehending them, not
a faculty of discursive thought. Cf. also Anal. Post. II. ch. 19,
100b 12.
katà ovµßeßnkòs. Cf. above, note to κaľavтηv. Aristotle does not
mean to equate κατὰ συμβεβηκός and πρὸς νοῦν; as we saw, by sight
we may perceive objects κатà σvμßeßnкós. But it is audible sound
κατὰ συμβεβηκός.
alone which is elaborated into a system corresponding to the scheme
of ideas and in each item suggestive of them.
437 a 8. τα κοινά. Cf. De An. II. ch. 6, 418 a 17, III. ch. 1,
425 a 14, III. ch. 3, 428 b 22, and also below ch. 4, 442 b 2 sqq.
ἠρεμία is here omitted from the list, though codex L reads στάσις.
437 a II. pwvŷs. Cf. De An. II. ch. 8, 420 b 5 sqq. The
general description of φωνή is ψόφος τίς ἐστιν ἐμψύχου. The
narrower usage appears in 42o b 32: σημαντικὸς γὰρ δή τις ψόφος
9-2
132
DE SENSU
EoTìv ʼn pwvý. It is sound which conveys a meaning. In 420 b 22
we find that it is owvý which permits of the realisation of rò eu: cf.
above 437 a 1.
The ȧvaykaîa (cf. 420 b 19, where yeûous is said to
be αναγκαίον) are the things chosen σωτηρίας ἕνεκεν. Aristotle means
quite clearly that intelligence and the higher life generally depend
upon άkoń and its special object pwvý. For the special reasons why
φωνή.
sounds are best fitted to represent concepts, cf. Stout, Manual of
Psychology, pp. 464 sqq.
437 2 15. σύμβολόν. Α σύμβολον is the token given by any
of the parties to a compact (ovvýкn). Hence the apprehension of
the meaning of a word is conventional and κατὰ συμβεβηκός, for φύσει
Tŵv ovoμátov ovdév éori (de Interp. 16 a 27). The opposite doctrine
had been maintained in the Cratylus (ch. IX. sqq.). Cf. also 16 a 19.
No sound is a word unless it become a conventional sign.
CHAPTER II.
437 2 19. δυνάμεως. δύναμις is the characteristic word for faculty
a
or potentiality, not function (as Hammond has it), the appropriate
word for which is epyov.
437 a 20.
437 a 22.
πрÓτεроν. In De An. 11. loc. cit.
στοιχεία.
σTOXECα. The four physical elements-the primary
differentiations of porn vλn-are fire (up), water (vdwp), earth (y),
and air (ảńp). Each has a pair of ultimate qualities one of which it
shares with another of the elements and the other with another.
Thus there are four ultimate qualities and those elements are most
opposed to each other which have no qualities in common. Thus
fire is hot and dry (epμòv kaì έnpóv); water is cold and moist
(vxpòv kai vypóv). These are contraries of each other. But fire
and water share their heat and moisture respectively with air, their
dryness and coldness with earth. Thus these latter two elements
are relatively to each other contrarily opposed. Thus
πυρ

ἀήρ
θερμόν
ὑγρόν
ξηρόν
ψυχρόν
γῆ
Cf. Zeller, Arist. 1. pp. 480 sqq.
ὕδωρ
437 2 23. τέτταρα. The traditional four elements were first
distinguished by Empedocles. Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Phil. p. 59,
also pp. 240 sqq. Empedocles referred smell to air also. Theo-
phrastus, De Sensu, 7 (R. P. 177 b, 8th ed.), says he did not assign
any particular element as connected with touch and taste. Aristotle's
statement here need not mean more than that there was a general
134
DE SENSU
tendency to correlate each sense with a particular element, and that
the disparity of the number of the senses and the elements respec-
tively caused a difficulty when it was attempted to carry out the
correlation completely.
437 a 24. ÉμжTηs. Hearing and smell on the Empedoclean
theory, touch and taste on the Aristotelian are grouped together.
437 a 25. Xßouévov. Apparently the sensation caused by con-
cussion of the optic nerve owing to a blow in the region of the eye.
The words used however do not convey a very graphic description
of this experience. Perhaps Aristotle is here generalising so as to
include such light sensations as are caused by chemical changes in
the eye itself. The theory is to be referred to Alcmaeon of Kroton.
Cf. Theophrastus, De Sensu, 26 : ὅτι δ᾽ ἔχει πῦρ (ὁ ὀφθαλμός)...δῆλον
εἶναι· πληγέντος γὰρ ἐκλάμπειν.
437 a 31. ἑαυτὸν. Because in the dark no other object is
visible, the eye, being of the nature of fire, will be visible. It should
thus be visible at any time in the dark. As this is not the case, the
theory is rejected.
Aristotle next goes on to give his own account of the phenomenon,
which professes to explain why this sensation of light experienced in
the dark occurs only when the eye moves rapidly.
437 a 34. λεία. Cf. 437 b 7, where he adds confirmatory in-
stances. From Meteor. III. ch. 4, 373 a 35: åvakλwµévŋ pèv ovv ý
ἀνακλωμένη οὖν
ὄψις ἀπὸ πάντων φαίνεται τῶν λείων, and 372 a 31 we should infer that
this was really a case of reflection. Though, however, smoothness
is assigned as the source both of luminousness in the dark and of
reflection generally, the two phenomena are never identified. Cf. De
An. 11. ch. 7, 419 a 2 sqq., where fungi, horn and scales are enumerated
along with the eye and the heads of fishes, as a class of ȧvárvμa
which are πυρώδη φαινόμενα καὶ λάμποντα. Νote πυρώδη φαινόμενα is
kaì
all he says. He would not allow that they were really πuρwdŋ, for in
that case they would really produce light. Thus according to Aris-
totle these substances were not in the strict sense phosphorescent
(Bäumker, p. 26).
φῶς is the ἐνέργεια or ἐντελέχεια τοῦ διαφανούς (cf. De An. II.
ch. 7, 418 b 9, 419 a 11)—the proper function of the transparent
medium.
Again, in ch. 3, 439 a 21 below, it is said to be the presence of
something of the nature of fire in the transparent medium. Since,
then, it requires something of the nature of fire to produce light and
COMMENTARY
135
the eye does not consist of fire, it cannot be said to produce light.
Hence it would be suggested that the phenomenon is one of re-
flection, though where the light is to come from when the eyes are
closed is not apparent.
437 b 2.
φαίνεται (2). There are many instances of φαίνεται
taking this sense (cf. 3, 440 a 8 etc.). But most interpreters take
paíveraι de TOûTo to mean 'This is evident,' i.e. what was said before
about the eye not producing light is evident because of what follows.
But that is not the sense required. The 'one becoming two' is not
the reason why the eye does not emit light. But the eye is seen
because, though really one, it appears when quickly moved to be
two.
437 b 3. δύο γίγνεσθαι τὸ ἕν. This is very difficult to understand.
Simon prefers to take Alexander's second interpretation, that one
part of the eye sees the other-that which is in loco naturali' sees
that which is not. But the interpretation does not explain why
swiftness of motion is essential to the phenomenon. Probably
Aristotle was thinking of common instances of a single object
appearing to be made double by rapid motion (as e.g. a vibrating
string) and applied this in a confused way to the present case.
He
apparently thought that the eye, when at the one position, could see
itself at the other if the oscillation between the two was so rapid that
it appeared to be at both points at the same time. It will not do to
say, as Ziaja does, that the eye regains its former position before the
light from it, when at the place from which it has moved, arrives.
According to Aristotle the propagation of light is instantaneous and
one must not read into his words a theory of light vibrations.
437 b 5. τὸ ὁρώμενον.
moves.
437 b 7.
437 b 12.
The eye at the position to which it
Cf. 437 a 34 above.
ȧvakλáσel. Aristotle does not mean to identify the
present phenomenon with reflection but merely to adduce another
instance illustrating the apparent duality of the eye by the apparent
duality of seer and seen caused by reflection in a mirror.
Εμπεδοκλής. Cf. Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy, pp. 264 sqq.,
Meno 76 c, and De Gen. Animal. v. ch. 1, 779 b 15.
Τιμαίῳ.
437 b 13. Tipale. For the Platonic theory of sight-perception
compare Timaeus ch. VII. 31 B and ch. xxx. 67 c sqq., and especially
ch. XVI. 45 в sqq.
437 b 16. ô Típaros. Cf. Timaeus, 45 D.
136
DE SENSU
437 b 17. κενόν. κενός and its adverb κενώς are constantly used
in the sense of 'irrelevant': cf. De An. 1. ch. 1, 403 a 2 of definitions
that are mere vague generalities.
Cf. also Eth. Nic. II. ch. 7, 1107 a 30 etc. but it may mean as
well 'unfounded,' as in An. Post. 1. ch. 3, 73 a 18. Here probably
both implications are to be assigned to the word. The thought is,
that it is absurd to talk of the άπóσßeσis of sight, because the notion
of 'quenching' has nothing to do with the nature of light. Hence
the theory is groundless because of the irrelevancy of the ideas to the
phenomena in question. In addition, even if they were relevant, the
theory would conflict with facts. The argument of the whole passage
is that απόσβεσις can be predicated only of τὸ πῦρ and ἡ φλόξ, not
ή
of light, for, as we saw before (cf. note to 437 a 34), light is not fire
though it requires the presence of πυρῶδές τι Plato and Empedocles,
however, when alleging that the light which issues from the eye
is quenched in darkness, imply that it is of the nature of fire which
is Оeрμòv κai έnpóv and is quenched by either moisture or cold, the
contrary qualities. (The Aristotelian theory is that things are neu-
tralised by and pass into their opposites.) Now pws is not of the
nature of πûρ and hence to talk of its åñóσßeois is absurd.
Secondly, even if there were something of the nature of fire in
light though imperceptible, it would be extinguished by wet and
cold weather; which is not true.
For the distinction of πup and oŵs cf. also Top. v. ch. 5, 134b 28.
437 b 20. To OwTì. The mere bringing forward of the fact that
light is not quenched by wet shows that Aristotle really means to
deny that it is of the nature of fire.
Alexander, however, evidently troubled by the fact that light is
warm and hence perhaps should be identified with fire, suggests an
emendation or rather a reconstruction of the passage which would
make out that Aristotle, while conceding that fire is 'dry' and
warm,' points out that darkness which is supposed to extinguish it
has neither of the opposed qualities and hence cannot do so. On
this interpretation the rest of the passage would run-'but if dark-
ness is really, though imperceptibly, cold and wet, we should expect.
the marked presence of those characteristics to make a difference to
sight by daylight. But this is not found to hold good.'
437 b 22. ὕδατι. It would not be correct to say that light is
not diminished when it penetrates water; dop frequently signifies
rain or rainy weather.
COMMENTARY
137
Similarly wάyos must be here frosty weather, not ice.
437 b 25. TOLOûтov, i.e. the behaviour of light in cold or damp
weather.
437 b 27. οὕτως. Cf. R. P. 177 b. Burnet, Early Greek Philo-
sophy, pp. 231–2. They are vv. (Stein) 316-23, Fr. 84 (Diels, Die
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker).
438 a I. λοχάζετο. ἐχεύατο—suffused, is another reading which
would make the construction easier.
438 a 3. Sialpŵσкov. Súεσкov, suggested by Blass, N. Jahrb. J.
Phil. u. Päd. 1883, p. 19, would improve the grammar of the passage.
Translate 'but they (ai 8') let the fire through.'
438 a 4. áπoppolais. Cf. Empedocles and Plato loc. cit. in note
to 437 b 13. Aristotle's words imply that Empedocles had no con-
sistent theory but had recourse alternately to the doctrine that fire
issued from the eyes and illuminated objects, and to that according
to which effluences from bodies entered into the pores of the eye
and so created perception.
The fact seems to be that Empedocles intended to account for
vision by postulating that both those operations took place, but had
great difficulty in reconciling them, and that thus at one time we hear
more about the one than about the other.
The difficulties attending the acceptance of either one or both
theories are pointed out below by Aristotle in 438 a 26 sqq.
We may conjecture as Hammond does, Aristotle's Psychology,
p. 152 note, that he imagined that the images of things entering
by means of the pores through the outer covering of the eye are
illuminated by the fire issuing from the pupil. But it is not clear
that he said anything so definite unless Aristotle means (in ll. 29–30
below that τὸ ἐν ἀρχῇ συμφύεσθαι τοῦ ὄμματος was one of the
positions held by Empedocles. It is manifest from what Theo-
phrastus says (R. P. 177 b) that, according to the Empedoclean
theory, fire existed both in the external world and in the eye, and
that the effluences from things which produced the perception of
visible objects consisted of fire. Fire was the finest of all substances
and could thus penetrate the finest of the pores. Through the
passages of the water we perceived dark objects.
This must surely mean that objects throw off effluences composed
both of fire and water and that the fire penetrating through the fine
pores is perceived by its 'like' fire, and the water, a crasser substance,
can enter only by the wider pores and is recognised by its 'like' the
138
DE SENSU
water in the eye; cf. R. P. 177 b. Of course it is quâ light that
objects are visible (dark being but a privation of light), and hence
the really important part in vision is that played by the fire. Thus
Aristotle is justified in regarding the Empedoclean theory as one
which referred vision to fire.
438 a 5. Aŋμókкpuтos. Cf. Zeller, Presocratic Philosophy, II. pp.
266 sqq., cf. p. 268. This doctrine was also shared by Leucippus
and Epicurus.
The theory of Democritus was also one of årópрotal. Things
threw off eldwλa which affected the sense organs.
But in the case of
sight it seems to have been not actually the dwλov thrown off from
the object but the impression caused by this in the air which was
reflected in the eye. (Cf. Theophrastus, de Sensu, 50, Zeller, op. cit.
II. p. 219.) This was connected with his doctrine that we did
not perceive things as they were in themselves but only as they
affected the senses. Nevertheless he seems to hold that the medium
is at the same time affected by an effluence from the seeing eye, but
how it is possible to reconcile this with any intelligible theory of
reflection it is difficult to see.
It is noteworthy that Plato too had some such theory of inter-
action between the effluence from the eye and from the external
object; cf. Timaeus, 45 C.
The effluences are, however, according to him, fire (cf. the com-
parison of the eye to the sun in Rep. vi. 508). But he also agrees
with Democritus in holding that by like we perceive like and that
perception takes place with the whole soul.
438 a 6. éµpaoi. Cf. notes to 437 a 34 sqq. ἔμφασις means
the appearing or being visible of one body in another: cf. Meteor.
III. ch. 4.
438 a 8.
ekeivų. The visibility or being seen of the reflected
object exists not in the eye in which the reflection takes place but in
the eye of the spectator who sees the reflection.
I have here followed Ziaja and Bender in opposition to Alexander,
Simon, Thomas, St Hilaire and Hammond. Hammond appears to
make ToûTo refer to Tv čupaow and then to supply a new subject-
τὸ ὁρᾶν—as the subject of ἔστιν. This is surely in defiance of
grammar.
If one took τοῦτο to mean τὸ τὴν ἔμφασιν ὁρᾶν the sense would be
plain enough and would be exactly what we require. This is how-
ever to give a very liberal interpretation to ToûTO which should mean
COMMENTARY
139
τὸ ἐμφαίνεσθαι, which is the appearance of an εἴδωλον in a smooth
surface. Now, though Aristotle could not say that the edwλov
(a special term used by Democritus) was not ev ekeivų (the reflecting
eye), he can quite well maintain that the appearing of the edwλov in
the reflecting surface is not itself in the surface. Alexander also
takes τὸ ὁρᾶν as the subject of ἔστιν and interprets ἐν ἐκείνῳ as ἐν τῇ
μpáσe. Simon and St Hilaire differ from him only in taking èv
ἐκείνῳ to mean ὅτι τὸ ὄμμα λεῖον.
If, therefore, we were to follow Alexander we should render-
'For reflection occurs because the eye is smooth; but vision does not
lie in the reflection or take place by means of it, but occurs in the
seer, i.e. is an affection of one who has the power of sight.' Accord-
ing to Simon and St Hilaire we should turn the latter part of the
sentence thus 'but vision does not lie in this property of the
eye, etc.'
In addition to the syntactical objections to these interpretations,
they have the demerit of making Aristotle reason in a circle. In
arguing against the theory that vision is reflection, to state as one's
reason that vision does not lie in the reflection of things in the eye
and in its property as a reflecting structure, is merely to reiterate.
one's objection without proving it. èkeivų must refer to rò oµµa and
ἐκείνῳ ὄμμα
the argument is to the effect that reflection must presuppose vision,
because the mirroring of anything is a fact not for the subject in
whose eye it takes place but for a second person who sees it.
438 a 13. ö. Note that ow, the word for the sense-faculty,
is used as though it referred to the sensorium. Cf. Neuhäuser,
Aristoteles Lehre von den sinnlichen Erkenntnissvermögen und seinen
Organen, p. 79, and cf. note to 438 b 22 below.
438 a 14. Siapavés. The whole nature of τὸ διαφανές will be
treated below in ch. 3.
a
4382 16. εὐπιλητότερον. εὐυποληπτότερον is the variant reading
(LSU Alex.) which, if possible, only repeats the idea of cupuλaktó-
τερον. With evπɩληTÓTεpov the kaì becomes epexegetic.
Aristotle is here referring to what are now called the aqueous and
vitreous humours.
438 a 21. τοῖς ἔχουσιν αἷμα. The sanguineous and non-san-
guineous animals were two main divisions in Aristotle's Zoology.
Cf. De Part. Anim. IV. ch. 5, 678 a 33. Insects and Crustaceans
were placed in the latter class as the fluids in their bodies, not being
red, were not thought to be blood.
140
DE SENSU
438 a 26. λoyov. Aristotle here returns to his criticism of the
Empedoclean and Platonic theory. Cf. above 437 a 24—438 a 5.
The transition to this topic once more is probably to be explained
by the fact that Democritus, too, held a theory according to which
something emanates from the eye. Hence Aristotle first mentions
the doctrine in its most general form (ὅλως τὸ ἐξιόντι τινὶ ὁρᾶν) and
then glides on to discuss the specially Empedoclean and Platonic
theories.
D
438 a 28. ovµþúcolaι. The fire from the eye unites with that
which is the effluence from external bodies.
438 a 29. τινες. Probably the more scientific Platonists or
interpreters of Empedocles.
ἐν ἀρχῇ. Alexander and Simon interpret as I have translated.
Aristotle proposes to simplify the phenomenon by supposing that
the union of fire with fire takes place in the eye itself before the
internal fire issues out, i.e. in the starting place of the internal fire
according to the more complex theory. It will be easier, he thinks,
to support the theory if one omits that part which makes the union
of fire with fire take place outside the eye.
One must not translate with Hammond 'It would be better to
assume that the combination of the eye with its object were in the
eye's original nature.'
In the first place, this makes Aristotle propose to supersede the
older theory by an explanation which merely shelves the difficulty
and refers it to a 'faculty.' Secondly, Aristotle is talking not of a
combination of eye with object but of fire with fire; as is apparent
from the next sentence, apart from which this one cannot be under-
stood.
Simon quotes De Part. Animal. 111. ch. 4, 665 b 14 (öπov yàp ẻv-
δέχεται μίαν βέλτιον ἢ πολλάς) as an illustration of the principle of
parsimony in Aristotle.
438 a 31. φωτὶ πρὸς φῶς. Alexander affiliates this and the
following statement-ou yàp T TUXÓVTI K.T.λ.—to the doctrine ex-
pounded in De Gen. et Corr. I. ch. 10, where we find, 327 b 20: ov
γὰρ ἅπαν ἅπαντι μικτὸν ἀλλ᾽ ὑπάρχειν δεῖ χωριστὸν ἑκάτερον τῶν μιχ
Oévrov, i.e. only concrete objects (xwpioτá), i.e. oopara, can be mixed;
now light is a málos of the definite type eέis (cf. De An. 111. ch. 5,
430 a 15) and hence cannot experience μiis. This explanation
assumes that the ouμpvois here talked about is a case of µíέis, which
is not quite evident. Neither is it evident that the union of light
COMMENTARY
141
with light (ovμrayès yevóμevov) mentioned in Plato, Tim. 45 C, against
which this argument is directed, is properly a case of μiĝis. Plato
uses the term ovμpués below in 45 D probably hardly in the exact
sense in which ovμpucola is here employed. It need mean no
more than 'kindred.'
σvμþúcσðaι means no more than to grow together or unite, and
not the union of two different substances which results in the pro-
duction of a third distinct one, which is the sense in which Aristotle
employs μicis. Hence Alexander's discussion of the blending of
lights (he denies that they can be united) seems to be irrelevant, and
whether ouμovois can be brought under the category of µíέis is
not clear.
Besides, if Alexander's were the correct interpretation, a Platonist
might still reply that according to his theory light is nothing dowμaтov,
and hence (according to Aristotelian principles) could combine with
other light. Cf. Timaeus, 45 C: ev oŵμa oikeɩwlèv ovvéorη by the
union of the internal and the external light.
Perhaps Aristotle need mean no more than that the union of
light with light is on the Platonic theory quite unexplained. Com-
pare next note.
438 b 1. τὸ τυχόν. The commonest interpretation and that in
consonance with Alexander's explanation (cf. above) is 'Not every-
thing will unite with anything else' and that is referred to the
doctrine où уàρ åπav åπavтi μikтóv in De Gen. et Corr. I. ch. 10.
According to the translation I suggest the argument would run,
'How will this unexplained "union" of the Platonists produce sight?
When we see, we see something definite, i.e. it is not with rò Tuxóv
that the union is effected. The theory is not capable of explaining
in detail how we see.'
438 b 3.
5, 430 a 16.
ἐν ἄλλοις.
De An. 11. ch. 7, 418 b 1, 419 a 9, 111. ch.
438 b 5. This seems to contradict what is said below in ch. 6,
446 b 31: ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κίνησις (τὸ φῶς). It is true that κίνησις is fre-
ov
quently used for all the four varieties of change and as equivalent
to μeraẞoλn-change in general, not merely to popá-local motion,
which is its most characteristic sense. The four species of change
are I. (κατ' ουσίαν) γένεσις καὶ φθορά: 2. (κατὰ τὸ ποσόν) αὔξησις καὶ
φθίσις: 3. (κατὰ τὸ ποῦ) φορά: 4. (κατὰ τὸ ποιόν) ἀλλοίωσις. Hence,
if light is an aλoíwois (qualitative change) and Kívηois is here used
vaguely as including it, there is no contradiction between the two
142
DE SENSU
statements. We shall, however, maintain when we come to chapter 6,
that in the Aristotelian theory the propagation of light is not even to
be described as ἀλλοίωσις.
438 b 10. чux is wider than consciousness, but Aristotle,
though of course meaning merely consciousness here, is forced to
use the wider term for want of a special word to designate conscious
life in general without suggesting any one special faculty. We shall
be forced to translate vyý thus more than once.
438 b II. ἐντός. This surely must mean ἐντὸς τοῦ ὄμματος.
The faculty or dúvaμis of the special sense of sight resides within the
eye. If this statement is capable of being generalised at all, it can
be extended only so far as to include the organs of the other two
mediated senses (hearing and smell). This cannot be taken as
a reference, as Alexander (p. 36) and Neuhäuser (pp. 65 and 127)
seem to think, to the central sense, which resides further within the
body (in the heart). It is not the function of this central faculty to
discriminate the objects of the special senses. It is the seat rather
of that self-consciousness which also discriminates the various special
senses (cf. De An. III. ch. 2), and is generally the organ of kowǹ
αἴσθησις and φαντασία.
If the faculty of vision resided in the central organ then surely
according to Aristotle's argument there would need to be a trans-
parent medium extending through the body right up to it, and it
itself would need to have the same property. Neuhäuser indeed
maintains that something like this is, according to the Aristotelian
theory, the case. But a much simpler explanation is possible.
Something internal is the organ, Aristotle says, and hence it must
be transparent. The interior of the eye is that which fulfils the
conditions. Why the organ should be transparent is due to his
general theory that it should be capable of receiving the same deter-
minations as those existing in the world outside, i.e. should be SEKTI-
KÒV TOû Eldovs of the external bodies (De An. 11. ch. 12, 424 a 18).
Cf. Introduction, sec. iv. pp. 7 sqq.
The statement that the sense faculty resides within is not a
deduction from what is said in the De Anima about the internal or
central sense; it is a truth said to be given by observation (dîλov)
and Aristotle at once proceeds to adduce a confirmatory instance.
If we hold with Neuhäuser that the seat of perception is really
always a central organ-even in the case of the special senses -and
that Aristotle held a theory according to which substance of the same
COMMENTARY
143
kind as that composing the peripheral organ extended along the
Tóρo up to the central chamber of the heart, then perhaps evτós
might mean 'in the central region.' Perhaps Alexander, when he
says πόρους ἐν οἷς τὸ διαφανές, may also be referring to a similar
theory. It seems an extraordinary hypothesis (cf. Introduction,
sec. vi.) and it is not at all clear whether Neuhäuser has succeeded
in substantiating it or merely in disproving the rival theory, viz. that
the blood is, in Aristotle's eyes, the medium of communication
between the end organ and the central one. Cf. note to 439 a 2:
Neuhäuser, Aristoteles Lehre von den sinnlichen Erkenntnissvermögen
und seinen Organen, pp. 111-129.
438 b 14.
TOÙS Tópous. Those who (e.g. Thomas, etc.) think
that the reference is here to the central sense must hold that the
Tópо are the optic nerves, which Aristotle imagined to be ducts
leading to the brain and ultimately to the heart. Cf. Hist. Animal.
IV. ch. 8, 533 a 13, De Part. Animal. 11. ch. 10, 656 b 17. Alexander,
however, seems to understand them to be the Tópo of the older
philosophers—the passages through which (according to their view)
the eye's internal fire issued. Cf. Theoph. De Sensu, 7 (R. P.
176 b) and Arist. De Gen. et Corr. 1. ch. 8, 324 b 26.
Alexander says τοὺς πόρους ἐν οἷς τὸ διαφανές ἐστι and since the
nerves are not (except on Neuhäuser's theory) transparent we can
assume only that he means the passages supposed to exist in the eye
itself. Blindness ensuing on the cutting of the optic nerve would
show rather that the sense was not localised in the eye, but we have
seen reason (see previous note) for maintaining that this is not the
Aristotelian view. Hence Aristotle is not here referring to such
a serious wound as one which would sever the optic nerve but to a
more superficial injury to the eye, This is also borne out by the
simile which follows. You cut the wick and the flame goes out;
and so you destroy the channel communicating the external light to
the pupil and sight is destroyed. This interpretation also gives #αρà
its characteristic sense. On the other hand we must remember that
παρὰ need mean no more than on. To read ὥστε τμηθῆναι in this
line along with Mr Bywater (Journal of Philol. xxvIII. p. 243)
would probably be better.
438 b 19. TOÛTOV TÒV Tρóжоν. Cf. above 437 a 21. Aristotle
does not commit himself to the proposed reduction.
438 b 22. ψόφων. Cf. De An. III. ch. I, 425 a 4 : ἡ δ᾽ ἀκοὴ ἀέρος.
πυρὸς δὲ τὴν ὄσφρησιν. This statement seems to contradict what is
144
DE SENSU
said in De An. III. ch. I, 425 a 5 : ἡ δ᾽ ὄσφρησις θατέρου τούτων (sc.
ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος)...τὸ δὲ πῦρ ἢ οὐθενὸς ἢ κοινὸν πάντων. If then we
take ooppηois to be the sense organ here (a very common use; cf.
above 438 a 13, Bonitz, Ind. p. 538 a 30), the two passages are in
disagreement. Again the statement in ll. 25-26 beneath & 8 doµnj
καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασίς ἐστιν is in contradiction with ch. 4, 443 a 23
sqq., where it is denied that ὀσμή is of the nature of ἀναθυμίασις.
These considerations have led Alexander and most interpreters
to maintain that here Aristotle is not putting forward his own theory
(ov yàp dη аρéσKovтa avт@ λéyei, Alex. 38, l. 14 [W.]), but merely dis-
cussing the consequences and the detailed working out of the doctrine
suggested by the earlier philosophers-namely the ascription of each
sense organ to a separate element.
On this interpretation the reading of the majority of the codices
w's el deî in 11. 18-19 above, which Biehl adopts and Bäumker, p. 48,
prefers, is particularly welcome. E M and Y read merely pavepòv ws
Seî and Bekker follows.
Thus it is contended that Aristotle's adoption of the correspon-
dence of each sense organ to a separate element is merely hypo-
thetical. Nevertheless it is strange that if this is so, Aristotle should
go on to work out the connection between smell and fire by the aid
of his own technical terms and connect it with his own theory of the
excessive coldness of the brain. It almost looks as though the
doctrine were one which had attractions for Aristotle and which was
left as an unexpunged suggestion even after the possibility of recon-
ciling it with the rest of his philosophy had been removed.
But, as it is stated, there are great difficulties to be overcome.
The proof in 11. 22-25, as Alexander recognises, merely shows that
the organ of smell is potentially (ovvάuet) of the nature of fire and is
actually cold. It is not on all fours with the former two sense organs
which are actually (èvepyeía) water and air respectively.
Hence Hayduck (Prog. Kön. Gym. zu Meldorf, 1876-7) proposes
not to take those lines (o yàp eveρyelα K.T.λ.) as a proof of the
previous statement and to read ὁ δὲ ἐνεργείᾳ κ.τ.λ. He also pro-
poses to omit 1. 25 8' oop...1. 27 Tupós as being in hopeless dis-
agreement with the other passage at 443 a 23 sqq. His explanation
is that Aristotle, beginning with a discussion of the organs corre-
sponding to each sensuous function, naturally mentions the act of
smelling and so proceeds to discuss its peculiar organ, which, though.
not parallel to the organs of sight and hearing in that it does not
COMMENTARY
145
consist of any single element, he yet takes the opportunity of dis-
cussing. It seems however that Aristotle is really attempting to make
the sense of smell in some way parallel to the other two and that
11. 22 sqq. are intended to prove this. Hence the elaborate doctrine
about the coldness of the region in which the sense organ is situated
and which is potentially warm; and we hear elsewhere that ǹ Tŷs
ὀσμῆς δύναμις θερμὴ τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν (4442 27). So that, in spite of
the fact that he has not proved the sense organ to consist of actual
fire, Aristotle evidently wishes to establish some connection between
fire and odour. Hence Ziaja (De Sensu, p. 11) maintains that he does
not intend here to discuss the nature of the sense organ of smell and
that there is no conflict between this passage and any other.
He
points out how, when the brain is said to be υγρότατος καὶ ψυχρότατος
τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι μορίων, that agrees with the passage in De An.
425 a 3 sqq. where it is held that the sense organs are composed
only of air and water. This latter statement however, it must be
observed, is not perfectly unqualified, for Aristotle goes on to say
that fire, though not a special ingredient of any one, may be said to
exist in all (οὐθὲν γὰρ ἄνευ θερμότητος αἰσθητικόν) and that earth is
either in none or is specially incorporated in the organ of touch (cf.
below 11. 32 sq.: Tò dè åttikov yês). This passage (q.v.) shows the
difficulty which there is in extracting a consistent statement from
Aristotle as to the nature of the sense organs, and the fact that his
theories on this subject seem to fluctuate makes it difficult to avoid
thinking that here he at least starts with an attempt to work a parallel
between the organs of sight and hearing on the one hand and that of
smell on the other. It is quite evident, as Rodier, De An. 11. p. 349,
points out, that τὴν ὄσφρησιν must here mean τὸ τῆς ὀσφρήσεως
αἰσθητήριον, otherwise it could not support the statement φανερὸν ὡς
ei deî k.t.λ.; besides Aristotle plainly means the sense organs in the
other cases-τὸ ὁρατικόν, τὸ τῶν ψόφων αἰσθητικόν, τὸ ἁπτικόν.
Hence, unless we adopt Hayduck's bold emendations, we must
conclude (1) that the doctrine here is a tentative construction of
a parallel between the organs of smell, touch and taste and those of
sight and hearing; (2) that the parallel consists in assigning each to
a special element (touch and taste, being generically the same, share
one between them); (3) that though Aristotle cannot work out the
parallel in the case of smell and the attempt to do so endangers
conflict with the rest of his teaching, the theory has attractions for
him owing to its symmetry and the fact that in so far as it can be
R.
ΙΟ
146
DE SENSU
worked out it connects with his account of the nature of the brain;
and hence it was not deleted, but became incorporated with the re-
mainder of his preserved writings.
yap. On Hayduck's suggestion this is changed to dè, and the
following statement is not a reason for the preceding one but a
new premise from which, in combination with the preceding one, dɩò
kaì K.T.λ., 11. 27 sqq., is deduced.
438 b 23. Suváμe. Cf. De An. II. ch. 5, 418 a 3: Tò d' aiσOŋTIKÒV
δυνάμει· ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ. Cf. also II. ch. 12, 424 a
17−20: ἡ μὲν αἴσθησίς ἐστι τὸ δεκτικὸν τῶν αἰσθητῶν εἰδῶν ἄνευ τῆς
ὕλης and III. ch. 2, 425 b 23 : τὸ γὰρ αἰσθητήριον δεκτικὸν τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ
ἄνευ τῆς ὕλης ἕκαστον, etc.
The theory is, that the sense organ is potentially capable of
receiving the 'form' i.e. the perceptible properties of the object of
sense. In the act of perception object and sense are one, but, when
the sense organ is not stimulated, it is only potentially percipient,
the object only potentially perceived. Cf. 425 b 26: η Tоû aiσlnτov
τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ
ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτή ἐστι καὶ μία. In the act of percep-
tion the organ becomes like its object; previously to perception it is
unlike ; cf. 418 a 5, 6: πάσχει μὲν οὐχ ὅμοιον ὄν, πεπονθὸς δ᾽ ὡμοίωται
καὶ ἔστιν οἷον ἐκεῖνο.
Note that Aristotle has no need to assume that the sense organs
consist of the elements because like is perceived by like. The
organ was not like its object in consisting of the same material but
in receiving its eldos or λóyos-the pattern according to which it was
constructed. Cf. Introduction, sec. iv.
438 b 24. ποιεῖ. The external object is the agent in percep-
tion; the sense organ is passive. Cf. De An. 11. ch. 5, 417 b 20: Tà
ποιητικὰ τῆς ἐνεργείας ἔξωθεν, τὸ ὁρατὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ
τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν αἰσθητῶν.
If we read ồ in 1. 25 below we cannot translate 'the latter (sc.
the sensation) must have an antecedent potential existence,' as
Hammond does, but 'the sensation is what it previously had the
potentiality of becoming.'
438 b 27. Tòv éyképaλov. The brain was not the organ of sensa-
tion according to Aristotle but played a subsidiary part in the bodily
economy as neutralising the heat of the heart. On the other hand
excessive cold in the brain was tempered (at least in man) by the
dry warmth of odours which were healthful and hence delightful.
Cf. below ch. 5, 444 a 9 sqq.
COMMENTARY
147
438 b 29. This is an application of the general Aristotelian
doctrine that opposites pass into each other. Things are only
opposite in so far as they have the same "An and it is through having
the same vaŋ that they can pass into each other. Hence the λn is
potentially capable of being either. Cf. Phys. 1. ch. 9, 192 a 21:
φθαρτικὰ γὰρ ἀλλήλων τὰ ἐναντία, and Iv. ch. 9, 217 a 22: ἐστὶν
ὕλη μία τῶν ἐναντίων, θερμοῦ καὶ ψυχροῦ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν φυσικῶν
ἐναντιώσεων, etc.
τοῦ ὄμματος.
Cf. De Gen. Animal. II. ch. 6, 743 b 28 sqq., 744.
438 b 33. yîs. Cf. De An. III. ch. 1, 425 a 7: cf. above note
to 438 b 22.
τὸ δὲ γευστικὸν κ.τ.λ. Cf. 441 a 3 sq.: ǹ yeûσis åþý tɩs ẻotív and
De An. III. ch. 12, 434 b 18. Comment on this doctrine will be
postponed until we come to chapter 4, where taste is discussed at
length.
439 a 2. πρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ. It is true that the organs of taste and
touch transmit kɩýσes—sense affections—to the heart, but we cannot
translate pòs Tŷ Kaρdía by 'conduct to the heart,' as Hammond
does, because, according to Aristotle's general theory, all sense
organs should do so, and besides Aristotle is here not discussing the
question of the communication of the exterior sense organs with the
inner πρώτον αἰσθητήριον, but the nature of the composition of those
sensoria. It is true that Aristotle does not make clear how the
Kunσes from the special senses are conveyed to the heart (cf.
Zeller, Aristotle II. pp. 67-70, English Trans.). Alexander says that
there are three Tópoɩ extending from the heart to the brain and then
to the three sense organs of sight, hearing and smell respectively,
but in the case of taste and touch the Tópo communicate directly
with the end organs; by these the Kinoes are transmitted. For
confirmation of this cf. De Juvent. ch. 3, 469 a 12 sqq.; De Insom. ch.
3, 461 a 1 sqq. The blood seems to some to be the medium of
transmission but we cannot certainly say so. According to Neu-
häuser it certainly is not. The medium is a substance of the same
nature as the end organ extending (in the case of the three senses of
which the organs are localised in the head) along Tópoɩ first to the
brain and ultimately to the heart. Cf. Introduction, sec. vi. and Neu-
häuser, pp. 110 sqq. It is true also that the heart, which is the organ of
the common sense (cf. De Juvent., De Insom. loc. cit. above and De
Somno ch. 2, 455 a 21: Tò Kúpιov aio◊ηtýpiov), seems to be also the
special organ of touch (cf. 455 a 23 : τοῦτο (τὸ κύριον αἰσθητήριον) τῷ
IO-2
148
DE SENSU
e
ἁπτικῷ μάλισθ᾽ ὑπάρχει), between which and its object the flesh
seems to be the medium (cf. De An. II. ch. 11, 423 b 26: TÒ µETA§Ù
τοῦ ἁπτικοῦ ἡ σάρξ, and III. ch. 2, 426 b 15: ἡ σὰρξ οὐκ ἔστι τὸ
oxarov aio Onτýptov). But however that may be-and if the latter
point is to be insisted upon we had better translate 'their organ is
situated in the region of the heart'—the question is here not one of
communication, but of the origin of the organs in question. If the
organ of smell is actually cold and potentially warm and apprehends
what is in actuality warm (ỏσµý), so conversely the organ of taste and
touch should be actually warm but potentially cold if it apprehends
what is actually cold, viz. y.
Alexander, however, will not allow that yn is the proper object of
touch. Certainly it is the Aristotelian theory that touch perceives
not merely the qualities of γῆ, i.e. τὸ ψυχρόν and τὸ ξηρόν, but all the
four ultimate (and primary in that sense) qualities of objects (cf.
above note to 437 a 22) and others as well (cf. De Gen. et Corr. II.
ch. 2, 329 b 17 sqq.). Hence once more we have evidence that the
above argument is at best only tentative.
If we take it that the organ of touch is actually of the nature of
earth and has the characteristic qualities of earth, then it is impos-
sible to see how it is connected with the heart, which is the seat of
warmth. If it is potentially of the nature of y then it will, like the
heart, have actually the opposite qualities. But in that case we
shall have failed to account for the perception of тò Оepµóv, as well as
other qualities, by it, in the sense of reconciling that to the general
Aristotelian doctrine that the organ is unlike the object before
sensation but in the act of perception becomes qualitatively identical
with it, as is stated in De An. 11. ch. 5, 417 a 20.
Cf. also De Part. Animal. 11. ch. 10, 656 a 29: Kaì dióti ai µèv
δύο φανερῶς ἠρτημέναι πρὸς τὴν καρδίαν εἰσίν, ἥ τε τῶν ἁπτῶν καὶ ἡ τῶν
χυμών.
aiołŋtýpιov. One more proof that the whole passage is a dis-
cussion of sensoria.
CHAPTER III.
(This chapter begins the treatment of the objects of the special senses.
It treats of colour.)
439 a 9. ¿v Toîs πepì ĻuxĤs. Cf. De An. 11. ch. 7–12.
439 a Io. epyov. In De An. 1. ch. 1, 402 b 12 Aristotle talks
about the function (epyov) of the sense.
The function of the sense
is to perceive, that of the object to cause perception; but as we
shall see (cf. note to 439 a 17-18), when functioning, sense and its
object are qualitatively identical.
ἐνεργεῖν. This practically repeats the sense of ἔργον. ἐνέργεια
contains more explicitly the notion of the realisation of an end
than pyov, but the two are often almost identical and tend to replace
each other in our texts, e.g. in De Mem. ch. 1, 449 b 20.
439 a II. τὸ τί ἐστιν is the essential nature of a thing as
revealed in its definition (without going on to state its additional
properties). Aristotle is now to discuss what each object of sense is
in its own objective nature apart from its action on the sense organs.
439 a 17-18. ÉV TOîs πEpì Ļνxîs. Cf. De An. 111. ch. 2, 425 b 26:
ἡ δὲ τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ ἐνέργεια καὶ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἡ αὐτὴ μέν ἐστι καὶ μία, τὸ
δὲ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐταῖς.
learn that, in the act
Whatever is said in
sense faculty and, as
of the faculty inter-
His theory shows in
Similarly in De An. 11. ch. 5, 417 a 20, we
of sensation, object and sensorium are alike.
this connection of the sensorium holds of the
we have seen, Aristotle often uses the name
changeably for that belonging to the organ.
this respect what we might call a thorough-going psycho-physical
parallelism.
It is by his distinction between the actual and the potential
object of sense that Aristotle attempts to explain the problem about
the independent existence of external objects of sense. Considered
κατὰ δύναμιν or as ὑποκείμενα (cf. Metaph. iv. ch. 5, 1010 b 30 sqq.)
they have an independent existence, Kar' évéрyelav not. Apart from
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DE SENSU
actual perception the sense also is a dúvaus merely and, as potentiali-
ties, sense and its object are different and have different names—
χυμός and γεύσις, ψόφος and ἀκοή, χρώμα and ὄψις etc. But the
ἐνέργεια of each is one and the same, e.g. ψόφησις and ἄκουσιs are
one and the same.
It is, however, impossible for Aristotle to maintain this attitude
towards external reality consistently. If the sense is that which is re-
ceptive of the eîdos of things, how can it be said to receive that which
prior to this reception had no existence? It is not sufficient to say
that its vπokeίμevov existed; if we strip the external world of all eîdos,
nothing is left but the prη ʊλŋ, and this, being perfectly undiffer-
entiated, cannot account for the difference of the eidos which we
apprehend at different times. Aristotle is forced to think of the
eidos as existing antecedently to the perception of it, and conse-
quently we find in De An. 11. ch. 5, 418 a 3: Tò dè aioOntɩkòv
δυνάμει ἐστὶν οἷον τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἤδη ἐντελεχείᾳ. Thus the object apart
from perception, which is said (in Metaph., loc. cit.) to cause the
perception and is yet called a UTокeίμevov, cannot be regarded as
a mere υποκείμενον, for to exist ἐντελεχείᾳ is to have εἶδος (cf.
Metaph. Ix. ch. 8, 1050 b 2 and Bonitz ad 1043 a 18, cf. also
Ind. p. 219 a 25). According both to ancient and modern
physical atomism this TOKEίuevov, which is yet something actual
and not mere λŋ, would be described in terms of spatial configura-
tion, mass and motion-the primary qualities from the atomistic
point of view. This solution however could not be entertained by
Aristotle, for whom the qualities relative to the special senses
were as primary determinations of physical reality as motion, figure
and mass (cf. notes to ch. 6, 445 b 6 sqq.). The atomistic solution
is only a makeshift; but we are left with a bad contradiction in the
Aristotelian theory.
ΤΟ
او
439 a 20. TEρì þwròs. Cf. De An. 11. ch. 7, 418 b 11: Tò dè pŵs
οἷον χρῶμά ἐστι τοῦ διαφανοῦς, ὅταν ᾗ ἐντελεχείᾳ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ πυρὸς ἢ
τοιούτου οἷον τὸ ἄνω σῶμα (τὸ ἄνω σῶμα is the upper fre, the celestial
ether).
ΤΟ
Toû Siapaνoûs. For Aristotle's theory of Tò diaparés cf. Intro-
διαφανούς.
duction pp. 20 sqq.
At first sight it seems strange to define light as
the colour of the transparent medium, especially as he goes on (in 439 b
11 below) to define colour as the limit of the transparent element in
bodies. But that which renders bodies visible is colour and, though
an object must have a definite boundary or surface for this colour to
1
COMMENTARY
151
be detected, still we are bound to assume that throughout, so far as
it is a coloured thing, its nature is the same (439 a 35 below). This
quality on which its colour depends and which transpierces it
through and through is light (ps), which is, however, but the activity.
or the proper function of that property-rò diapavés—which per-
meates all bodies to a greater or less degree. Cf. De An. II. ch. 7,
418 b 9: φῶς δέ ἐστιν ἡ τούτου ἐνέργεια, τοῦ διαφανοῦς ᾗ διαφανές, and
419 a II: ἡ δ᾽ ἐντελέχεια τοῦ διαφανοῦς φῶς ἐστίν.
Thus though pŵs is not xpŵμa in the sense in which that is the-
Tépas of the transparent element in bodies, still it is the colour
principle which transfuses all substances.
439 a 21. Ву катà σνμßeßηkós Aristotle means, not 'casually,'
but 'indirectly' i.e. subject to some condition being fulfilled, not in
its own nature without further determination. Relatively to the
thing which has a certain attribute only upon the supervention of
some condition, that attribute is contingent, and it seems to be with
this in mind that Kant identifies the contingent and the conditioned
in the proof of the antithesis in the fourth antinomy. But, from
another point of view, when we take into account the dependence of
this attribute upon its conditions it is seen to be necessary. κατὰ
σvμßeßηkós in Aristotle is by no means equivalent merely to 'due to
chance' but in its general sense is used simply as opposed to кað’
avró, due not to the essence of the thing to which it belongs but to
some external condition.
πupŵdes.
20
Cf. De An. 11. ch. 7, 418 b 12 quoted above in note to
439 a zo and again 419 a 24: τὸ γὰρ διαφανὲς ὑπὸ τούτου (sc. πυρὸς)
Iga Tò
yívetai diapavés. It is fire, then, or anything of the nature of fire,
γίνεται διαφανές.
the sun or the celestial ether (rò åvw oŵµa), which raises the trans-
parent medium from a state of mere potentiality in which it is
axpovv-colourless and invisible (418 b 28)—to a state in which
colour is actually visible. The fire evidently makes it actually trans-
parent, and this state of actual transparency, this èvépyea, is light.
We cannot say with Hammond that 'light is that which converts
the potentially diaphanous into the actually diaphanous.' It is fire
which performs this function.
439 a 22. Tapovσía (cf. De An. 418 b 16 and 20) seems here
to be reminiscent of its technical Platonic signification-immanence,
and thus we could define light as 'the immanence of fire in the
transparent medium.'
But there are two points of view from which light can be
152
DE SENSU
regarded, (1) as a state of illumination, cf. De An. 111. ch. 5, 430 a 15,
and (2) as though it were the stimulation proceeding from the
coloured object to the eye (cf. De An. 11. ch. 7, 418 a 31: πâv dè
χρώμα κινητικόν ἐστιν τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν διαφανούς).
Yet according to this passage in the De An. it is implied that
the state of illumination must be already realised for the stimulation
which causes vision to take effect. Aristotle, though frequently
asserting that there is a stimulation proceeding from object to eye
and talking as though this were light, yet in chapter 6 below turns.
round and says that light is not a stimulation at all. According to
the interpretation of that chapter which I adopt, it is not a stimu-
lation of the type åλλoiwσis even (¿.e. qualitative change). Yet light
is still said to cause us to see (447 a 12), and if it is not the
stimulus through the medium, what is that stimulus? It appears
as though Aristotle, influenced by the apparent instantaneousness of
light transference, were trying to combine into one the notion of it
(1) as a ëģis, the state of illumination, and (2) as an action passing
from the object to the eye, two notions which will not unite.
Compare chapter 6, 446 a 22-447 a 12, and Introduction,
sec. VII.
439 a 23. Tò Siapavés is no proprium of air or any one trans-
parent substance.
439 a 25. þúσis kai dúvaμis. Cf. De An. 11. ch. 7, 418 b 8: ẻσTì
φύσις ὑπάρχουσα ἡ αὐτὴ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀμφοτέροις (sc. ὕδατι καὶ ἀέρι) καὶ ἐν
τῷ ἄνω σώματι.
χωριστή. Light is not a substance. χωριστά is a common desig-
nation for substances. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. 1. ch. 10, 327 b 21.
439 a 26. Cf. below 439 b 10. τὸ διαφανές is found in all, not
merely in certain bodies.
439 a 29. άoρíory. pôs as the general colour principle permeates
bodies through and through in so far as they share in the material
condition of colour phenomena.
439 a 31-32. ÉK TŵV σvμßaιvóvтwv. Cf. 438 b 12-13 and note
ἐπὶ τῶν συμβαινόντων δῆλον.
4392 33. Πυθαγόρειοι. Cf. Plut. Epit. Mem. 1. 15; Stobaei
Eclog. 1. 15 quoted by Diels, Dox. Gr. p. 313.
439 a 34-35. The point is that colour
The point is that colour is not the boundary or
surface of the body but, as appears in 439 b 12 below, of the trans-
parent element in the body.
439 b 2.
We may supply εἶναι after ἐντός, not necessarily χρωμα-
COMMENTARY
153
Tileolau. Aristotle does not actually say that colour, in the sense of
definite tint, pervades the body through and through. That resides
in the surfaces. But the colour principle, which is made definite
only when the body has a definite surface, must pervade the body in
every part in so far as it is diapavés. This colour principle can be
nothing else than φῶς, and its opposite is σκότος.
Most of the commentators, however, will have it that here
Aristotle is distinguishing bodies which are coloured 'externally'
e.g. air and water, which have no proper colour of their own, and
those coloured 'internally' i.e. with a proper colour of their own,
opaque bodies, and that he here declares that it is an identical
The
principle in each class that makes them receptive of colour.
difference between the two classes of objects is that the former set,
having no definite surface, have no definite limit of the Siapavés in
them and it is a definite boundary that gives definite colour. But
it is solely the want of definiteness in their limits which causes the
indefiniteness of the colour. Since they show colour of some kind,
they must have the constitution which renders colour possible.
This is their transparency, which we must hence ascribe to opaque
bodies also.
If we accept this theory the translation will run as follows: 'We
must, however, believe that the type of construction which internally
and of its own nature takes on colour is the same as that which
receives its colour from without. Now air and water show colour,
for the gleam they have betrays tint.'
The advantage of this interpretation is that it does not make
Aristotle say that the colour pervades the whole of an opaque object,
for this, unless we explain the distinction between definite and in-
definite colour as above, seems to conflict with his statement that
colour resides on the surface. Cf. also Top. v. ch. 8, 138a 15.
paíveraι. Simon would translate 'appear to be coloured,' as
though they really were not. But, though colour were held to
pervade pellucid substances which have no definite surface, that
would not entail as a consequence that it permeated opaque bodies
as well—which is the conclusion against which Simon wishes to argue.
439 b 3. avyǹ. Thomas and Simon translate this by 'aurora,’
on what grounds it is difficult to discover. Perhaps it means the ray
e.g. of the sun falling upon these bodies.
439 b 6. σúμaoiv. Alexander says that Aristotle here means to
indicate σTepeά—solids, as though they were more properly owμata
154
DE SENSU
than air and water. But the distinction should properly be between
pellucid and opaque bodies as in l. 13-15 below. Aristotle had
already, in De An. 11. ch. 7, 418 b 7, noticed that many σTEρEŃ
were transparent. Probably here he leaves this latter class out of
account. (Cf. ch. 5, 445 a 17 sqq. and notes on σŵµa and owµɑ-
Tovσðaɩ: cf. beneath 439 b 18.) The argument certainly requires
oμaoiv here to mean definitely bounded or solid bodies. The
omission of the class of transparent solids from consideration is
simply a sign of the inadequacy of the theory.
ιν
439 b 10. TOLEî. Tò Siapavés is the 'material' cause of colour, i.e.
it accounts for its possibility.
439 b 12. χρώμα κ.τ.λ.
This is the definition, the rí ẻσtw of
xpŵμa per se, and, in stating this, the De Sensu makes an advance on
the De Anima which defined it merely in reference to the organ of
sight as κινητικὸν τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν διαφανοῦς.
439 b 14. σous K.T.λ. These are the 'corpora terminata' or
σTEрEά of the commentators, which have a colour of their own and
ἐντὸς χρωματίζεται. Many interpreters, however, disjoining κατὰ τὸ
ἔσχατον from ὑπάρχειν and uniting it with ὁμοίως, find themselves in a
difficulty and identify those referred to by καὶ ὅσοις with αὐτῶν τῶν
διαφανών!
439 b 20. διελομένους. διαιρείσθαι constantly means to break up a
genus into species or to discriminate species from each other. But,
as Aristotle has not yet given any classification of the 'intermediate'
colours, i.e. those over and above black and white, we must interpret
non dieλoμévovs (the reading of all MSS. and edd.) as meaning merely
'after recognising the distinction' between the other colours and
black and white. This is to take Sieλoµévous in its vaguest sense.
It is thus much better to read edŋ instead of on. The phrase
then becomes a common one and gives dɩeλoµévous its wonted sense.
Cf. Politics IV. ch. Io, 1295 a 8: τυραννίδος δ᾽ εἴδη δύο μὲν διείλομεν
It is true that, owing to the aorist dieλoµévovs, we seem still to
be committed to the promise of a preliminary classification of the
species of colour which is not fulfilled. The full list of the colours
appears only in ch. 4, 442 a 22 sqq. Thus a minor inaccuracy is left
in any case, and it may be argued that non dieλouévous need give no
more than this sense. But eon is a rather tempting emendation.
etc.
Aristotle's theory is that the chromatic tones are obtained by a
mixture of substances which already have the basal tones of white
and black. The chromatic tones are intermediate between black
COMMENTARY
155
and white, which appear to be regarded as lying at the two extremities
of a continuum in the centre of which the other tints are found.
Aristotle does not however attempt to assign its exact place in the
scale to any one colour or state its affinity to either of the extremes.
Each distinct colour depends upon the proportion in which the black
and white, out of which it is formed, are mingled. But he does not
venture to state the proportion which obtains in any one case. Cf.
also Metaph. x. ch. 2, 1053 b 30.
439 b 26. μKTóv. The doctrine of composition or mixture is
referred to again directly: cf. especially 440 b 14 sqq.
439 b 29.
A Móyos appears to be the relation which prevails
between two numbers when a division of the greater by the less
yields a rational quotient. Numbers that are not so related are said
to be οὐκ ἐν λόγῳ (cf. 44oa 16). λόγος then is not ratio in general
but commensurate ratio. The incommensurate is the irrational
—ἄλογον. Thus we cannot translate οὐκ ἐν λόγῳ, μὴ ἐν ἀριθμοῖς
etc. by 'disproportionate,' for that applies to a ratio when one of
the terms is excessive, not to one where the quantities are in-
commensurate.
439 b 34. evλoyíσrois—easily reckoned, from λoyíčeo daι to reckon.
Cf. Metaph. XIV. ch. 6, 1092 b 27.
440 a 2. The reason is that the evλóyiσтoɩ άpılµοí, i.e. propor-
tions where the division of one term by the other takes very little
trouble, are few in number. The author of the Problems in 920 a 27
avers that the most agreeable harmony is that of the octave, and the
reason for this is that the terms are whole numbers 2 and 1, or 4
and 2, and the division yields no remainder. The next harmony in
order of pleasantness is that of the fifth, where the two notes are
related as 1 to 1, and so on.
440 a 5. Teтayμévas. The proportion of elements may be uni-
form in every part, i.e. the combination is according to a regularly
recurring pattern, e.g. 3:1, 3:1, 3: 1 etc., not
I,
2:1, 4: I,
3: I etc.
ע
440 a 6. μǹ kalapai. Some commentators (e.g. Simon, Ham-
mond) identify the aтaктоL Xpóα with the un kalapai, but, unless we
read roîs avtoîs before ȧpilμoîs in 1. 6 as Biehl suggests, this is im-
possible, for Aristotle has immediately before said that both the TETAY-
μέναι and the ἄτακτοι are ἐν ἀριθμοῖς.
The impurity referred to must be want of saturation, i.e. want of
colour, if it is caused by absence of proportion between the elements,
156
DE SENSU
and all chromatic colour involves a proportion between its com-
ponents. But one may ask, why does impurity seem to occur only
in the second class of colours-those due to an irregular structure?
The reason I would suggest is this-Aristotle identifies the most
pleasing colours with those which depend upon a regularly recurring
structure in the combination of their elements. Relatively to these,
other colours are not so pleasing and hence not regarded as so pure,
kalapaí, if purity is a mark of excellence (as frequently in Plato, cf.
Philebus 57 A et passim); but the colours of this second class
contain in themselves differences in purity. Their impurity we may
assign to a total want of commensurate proportion in their composi-
tion. Unless some such explanation as this is adopted we shall have
to make avràs Taúτas refer to both classes of colours; but this is to
strain the Greek.
440 a 8.
tò þaíveolai k.T.λ. Literally 'the shining of one colour
φαίνεσθαι κ.τ.λ.
through another.'
This second theory is, like the first, also rejected by Aristotle.
440 a 12. διὰ δ᾽ ἀχλύος. The reason for this is discussed in
Meteorology III.
440 a 16-21. It is difficult to see what connection this para-
graph has either with what precedes or what follows. Thurot and
Susemihl (Philol. 1885) think that it is misplaced in the text. It
refers back to the theories of Empedocles and Democritus mentioned
in chapter 2.
4402 17.
ȧπoppolas. Cf. 438 a 4.
ἀπορροίας.
440 a 19. eveùs—directly, without the intervention of any inter-
mediate steps in the argument.
necessary for the atomists to
Surely because differences in
440 a 21. ȧn. Why was it
identify all sensation with touch?
sensation corresponded to differences in the tangible properties of
things. Cf. chapter 4, 442 b 1 and 11: oi dè tà idia eis taûta åvá-
yovσw K.T.λ. The argument runs—if sensation is to be effected by
contact, contact with a medium which is sensitive to stimulation will
explain perception better than a theory according to which the
actual particles of the distant objects impinge upon the sense organs.
On the other reading (LSU Alex. vet. tr.) ✈ áþî кaì тaîs άπор-
poíais there is no argument.
Thomas and Alexander try to connect this with what follows; but
Aristotle goes on to talk of kwýσas impinging on the sense organ,
not effluxes.
COMMENTARY
157
440 a 23. μéyelos is almost always a spatial quantum, but cf.
μέγεθος χρόνου ch. 7, 448 b 4
The discussion on the possibility of the existence of imperceptible
quanta is contained in chapter 6, 445 b 3 sqq.
χρόνον ἀναίσθητον. Aristotle argues at length against there being
any such thing as an imperceptible time in ch. 7 below 448 a 21 sqq.
The two moments of time in which the two sensations arrive
would, on this hypothesis, be indistinguishable as two distinct
moments, but would appear as one single moment which had no
parts. Now, as time is a continuum, each part of it must be capable
of resolution into other parts. Hence the supposition of an atomic
time is absurd, no part is imperceptible. Cf. notes to chapter 7,
and Introduction, sec. VIII.
440 a 26. åkívητov—when not set in motion. The surface
colour sets in motion the medium and so affects the sense (cf. De
An. II. ch. 7, 418a 31: πᾶν δὲ χρώμα κινητικόν ἐστι τοῦ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν
Siapavovs). But Aristotle thinks that the action of the surface colour
would be different if it itself were acted on by an underlying tint.
EM Y read kƖŋròv, which would imply that the surface colour
was independently itself in motion; but this is not an Aristotelian
doctrine.
440 a 30-31. The common reading is καὶ αὕτη τις ἂν εἴη χρω-
μárov píģis. Alexander interprets this to mean that Aristotle admits.
that the superposition theory is one which accounts for one way of
mingling colours. But it is strange that, after rejecting the juxta-
position theory of mixture, Aristotle should say kaì aνтη-'this too
is a theory which accounts for the mixture of colours.' Simon,
thinking that the difficulty about µɛyébŋ áópara still applies to the
superposition theory, suggests the punctuation and accentuation
I have adopted and contends that here Aristotle is calling in question
this second theory as well. If this is not so, he says, Aristotle must
be convicted of carelessness, for he nowhere else points out the
defect in the theory.
Without accepting his argument (which seems to be unfounded)
I think we can still accept his interpretation of the intention of the
clause. Aristotle calls the imóλaσis theory in question because it
really is not an account of the µígis of the colours. The two colours
are simply juxtaposed, in this case one on the top of the other
instead of in minute parts side by side. This is merely a case of
the σúveσis of the colours, not of their true mixture. We may
158
DE SENSU
anticipate the doctrine which Aristotle refers to further down and
which is expounded in De Gen. et Corr. I. ch. 10, 327b 32 sqq.
There are two spurious kinds of mixture, uícis merely ρòs
alonow, i.e. the substances appear to sense to be mixed but are
really not so. (1) First there is the juxtaposition of things that
can be resolved into ultimate individual parts, e.g. grains of corn,
men, etc. (εἰς τὰ ἐλάχιστα 440b 5 sq. below); ὅταν...οὕτως εἰς
μικρὰ διαιρεθῇ τὰ μιγνύμενα, καὶ τεθῇ παρ᾽ ἄλληλα τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον
ὥστε μὴ δῆλον ἕκαστον εἶναι τῇ αἰσθήσει. This is the kind of
μíέis referred to in 440 b 4 below, which explains the xpóav кowǹv
(440 a 32) of distant objects, which vanishes when we approach
them. This is a case in which oúveσis and μíέis are identical in
the sense that ouveσis is the only pigis of which the objects are
capable. (2) Secondly, when there is no limit to the minuteness
of the parts (e.g. in liquids), the mere juxtaposition of minute parts
is merely apparent mixture (πρòs aïo◊ŋow). To more accurate
vision the appearance of mixture ceases to exist. In true mixture
(which seems to be analogous to what we should call chemical
combination; cf. Mr Joachim in Journal of Philol. XXIX.) every
part of the compound produced by the union of two substances
must be homogeneous with the whole: cf. 328a 10: тò μxtèv
ὁμοιομερές εἶναι and below 440 b 3: πάντῃ πάντως. Each part of the
one must completely interpenetrate the other, or rather, in union the
two substances must completely change their nature so as to be
incapable of being found in actuality in any part however minute.
(This implies a still closer union than that of chemical combination,
according to which the atoms are juxtaposed in the molecule, which
is not homogeneous in every part.)
αισ
Now superposition of colours one over the other does not imply
their mixture in the true sense.
440 a 31. kåkeivws must mean 'on the former,' i.e. the juxta-
position, theory, not 'in this way' (referring to the Timóλaσis account)
as Hammond has it.
The argument is, that the one colour shines through the other
and that at close quarters the duality of the tint can possibly be
detected, though at a distance the two produce a certain common'
(Kowǹv) tint. But, says Aristotle, this general indeterminate tint can
equally well be produced by the juxtaposition of parts of different
colour provided they are minute enough or we are far enough away.
But it is not this neutral tint, which varies with the accuracy of the
COMMENTARY
159
vision, that has to be accounted for. Composite colours are on a
different footing, and neither of the two theories has succeeded in
accounting for them, cf. 440 b 16-19 beneath.
440 a 33. There is no need for substituting & for yàp with
Susemihl (Philol. 1885).
The fact that no magnitude is invisible is the reason why we can
account for the juxtaposition of minute parts differently coloured
producing a common tint. If the parts were really invisible they
would not produce any colour sensation either alone or together.
Compare chapter 6 below and notes.
The theory of juxtaposition is then rejected in so far as it implies
the existence of invisible magnitudes, and retained to explain the
production of neutral tints relative to the keenness of our vision, in
so far as it is conceded that the parts do produce an effect upon our
sight. The parts, as we shall see, are perceived évepyeía only in the
whole (ev Tą oλ); individually taken they are only duváμe perceptible.
440 a 34.
From ei 8' 440 a 34 to b 14 is one long protasis.
440 b 2. τῶν ἐλαχίστων. Cf. De Gen. et Corr., loc. cit. and note
to 440 a 30-31. Tà éλáɣioτa are not infinitely minute parts, but the
smallest parts that can be treated as individuals. Many things on
division do not present such parts, e.g. water and other continuous
substances are specially evdiaípera and prone to mix. Cf. beneath
ll. 10 sqq., De Gen. et Corr. 328b 3: Tà vypà µiktà µádiota tŵv
σωμάτων· εὐόριστον γὰρ μάλιστα τὸ ὑγρὸν τῶν διαιρετῶν, since μικρὰ...
μικροῖς παρατιθέμενα μίγνυται μᾶλλον, 328 a 33.
440 b 3. πάντῃ πάντως. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. 328 a II.
èv toîs tepì µlĝews. Probably only the passages referred to above.
440 b 10. ὅσα δὲ μὴ κ.τ.λ. e.g. water. Cf. above.
The modern atomic theory holds that there is a limit to the pro-
cess of resolution and that that is found when the atom is reached.
But there is a difficulty here, for the atom, if anything occupying
space, must be divisible into smaller components.
440 b 16.
Kuρíaν. This is the reason of the real constant
colour of objects.
440 b 22-23. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον κ.τ.λ. i.e. the mathematical de-
velopment of all three is alike.
440 b 25. ὡρισμένα.
aploμéva. How Aristotle reconciles this with the
undoubted continuous graduation between colour and colour will be
discussed when we come to chapter 6.
440 b 26. VoTepov. Chapter 6.
CHAPTER IV.
440 b 28. This is the only place where Aristotle mentions the
omissions in the De Sensu. Hence Biehl conjectures åpîs instead of
pwvns (as otherwise the absence of any other treatment of touch will
be unnoticed). pwvý is defined in De An. II. ch. 8, 420 b 32 as
σημαντικός τις ψόφος and again in 420 b 5 as ψόφος τις ἐμψύχου. It is
significant sound uttered by a living creature (cf. above chapter 1,
437 a 11 and note).
Vópos, of which owvý is thus a species, is defined in De An.
420 b 11 as ȧépos kívŋoís tɩs: cf. below ch. 6, 446 b 34: Sokeî & å
ψόφος εἶναι φερομένου τινὸς κίνησις. This movement of the air is
of the nature of a rebound. The air rebounds when struck in
the same way as smooth bodies rebound from a smooth surface
(cf. De An. 420 a 21 sqq.).
440 b 29. ἐν τοῖς περὶ ψυχῆς. De An. II. ch. 8.
440 b 30. Tálos (cf. note to chapter 1, 436 b 5 above) may
mean phenomenon or affection generally, though it is not phe-
nomenon in the widest sense in which that term is employed by
modern thought, viz. as including concrete substances. πáðos is
phenomenon in the sense in which that means an affection, event or
attribute ascribed to any concrete subject. Now Tábos is often
used for a peculiarly psychical affection and so perhaps the subject
to which, as wάon, smell and taste are relative, is the perceiving soul.
Hence it will be as subjective phenomena that they are almost
identical. This seems to be borne out by a passage in the De An.
11. ch. 9, 421 a 31 sqq.: Sià tò µǹ opódpa diadýλovs eîvai ràs doµàs
ὥσπερ τοὺς χυμούς, ἀπὸ τούτων εἴληφε τὰ ὀνόματα καθ᾽ ὁμοιότητα τῶν
πраɣμάτшν: odours not being distinctly presented like flavours have
borrowed their names from the latter owing to the resemblance of
the actual experience in the two cases. This is to follow Alexander
and render τŵν прауμάтшν by 'the sensation.' Cf. Rodier, Traité de
l'Âme, Vol. 11. pp. 309–311.
COMMENTARY
161
For the connection between taste and smell cf. also De An. II.
ch. 9, 421 a 16: ἔοικε μὲν γὰρ ἀνάλογον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ
ὁμοίως τὰ εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν τοῖς τῆς ὀσμῆς and 421 a 26 ὥσπερ χυμὸς
ὁ μὲν γλυκὺς ὁ δὲ πικρός, οὕτω καὶ ὀσμαί.
Alexander, Thomas and Simon, however, seem to interpret
Táðos here not as subjective affection but as objective quality. It
is true that this subjective similarity rests upon an objective
foundation. Alexander explains the identity by means of the
passage in ch. 5 beneath, 442 b 29 sqq. Odour is produced by the
further modification of a substance in which flavour has been
already developed; rò έnpóv is needed as a basis for both and the
effect produced in the first case by τò έŋpóv is obtained by disso-
lution (ἐναποπλύνειν), the same process as that by which τὸ ἔγχυμον
vypóv produces odour both in air and water: cf. Rodier, op. cit.
Vol. 11. pp. 309-316, Alex. De Sens. pp. 66, 67, 88-91 (W.).
But though the similarity has an objective foundation it does not
cease to be a subjective phenomenon, and it is as such that we
should infer τὸ αὐτὸ πάθος to be understood in antithesis to οὐκ ἐν
Toîs auToîs, which must be interpreted as 'non in eisdem subjectis,' as
Simon renders it, following Thomas and Alexander. The vehicle of
taste is water, that of smell is air and water alike, or rather that
common nature which both have, named by Theophrastus rò dí-
oσμov (cf. chapter 5 beneath). St Hilaire and Hammond think that
οὐκ ἐν τοῖς αὐτοῖς refers to the diversity of the organs of the two
But χυμός and ὀσμή could hardly be said to exist ἐν τοῖς
aioonτηpíois, and if Aristotle meant here to refer to the organs his
statement is singularly obscure.
senses.
441 a г. αἴτιον κ.τ.λ. This is the explanation of a difference
in function by a difference in faculty, a method much derided in
modern psychology. But when one remembers that the 'faculty'
is a determinate structure or disposition of the sense organ, and was
so to Aristotle, the explanation, though not a genetic one, is seen to
be adequate to the purpose in hand.
4412 3. ἀκριβεστάτην. ἀκρίβεια contains at once the notions of
complexity and delicacy, or precision. The emphasis is probably on
the former in the famous passage in De An. 1. ch. 1, 402 a 2, where
Psychology is said to rank among the first of the sciences in point
of ȧkρíßeια. For the want of definiteness in our sense of smell
ἀκρίβεια.
cf. De An. II. ch. 9, 421 a 9 sqq.: Tηy acolηow тαúтην ouк exоμEV
ἀκριβῆ, ἀλλὰ χείρω πολλῶν ζῴων. The reason is—φαύλως ἄνθρωπος
R.
II
162
DE SENSU
ὀσμᾶται, καὶ οὐθενὸς ὀσφραίνεται τῶν ὀσφραντῶν ἄνευ τοῦ λυπηροῦ ἢ
TOû déos. That is to say, where feeling-tone enters largely into the
sensation there can be no exactitude in our perception, as modern
Psychology teaches is in most cases true But the final reason for
both phenomena is the indefiniteness of the structure of the sense
organ (ὡς οὐκ ὄντος ἀκριβοῦς τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου). Compare De An. II.
ch. 9, 421a 21: κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἁφὴν πολλῷ τῶν ἄλλων διαφερόντως
ἀκριβοί.
(ws
The reason for the superiority of touch in man is the greater
softness of his flesh. Softness of flesh is an index not only of
tactual discriminativeness but of intellectual endowment.
a
Cf. De
An., loc. cit. 421 a 26 and De Part. An. 11. ch. 16, 660 а II: μаλaкw-
τάτη δ᾽ ἡ σὰρξ ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπῆρχεν. τοῦτο δὲ διὰ τὸ αἰσθητικώ-
τατον εἶναι τῶν ζῴων τὴν διὰ τῆς ἀφῆς αἴσθησιν.
C
τα
Aristotle's ideal of a evpuns would, on this showing, be the skilful
surgeon or mechanician.
But we must remember that τὸ θερμὸν καὶ
τὸ ψυχρόν were among τὰ ἁπτά, and probably by softness of flesh he
means sensitiveness to these influences as much as anything else and
hence merely delicacy of constitution in general. At least so Alex-
ander understands him. Would this be an argument for the mental
superiority of the female sex? If so, Aristotle is forgetting himself.
441 a 3-4. ἡ δὲ γεύσις άφή τις ἐστίν, and hence is more
ȧkρißýs than smell. Cf. De An. 11. ch. 9, 421 a 18-20, also ch. 10,
422 a 8: Tò dè yevotóv čotiv áttóv Tɩ and De Sens. ch. 2, 439 a 1: Tò
δὲ γευστικὸν εἶδός τι ἁφῆς ἐστίν. Compare also De An. II. ch. 3, 414 b
II and III. ch. 12, 434 b 18, likewise De Part. An. 11. ch. 10, 656b
37 and ch. 17, 660 a 21.
The chief arguments to prove the identity of taste and touch are
(1) that by taste we are sensible of the presence of food which is an
object of tactual sensation (414 b 7 sqq., 434 b 18–19), (2) that rò
υγρόν is the ὕλη, the vehicle of taste, and it is ἁπτόν τι (422 a II).
But (3) Aristotle finds strong confirmation for his theory in the fact
that neither requires an external medium for its operation as the
others do (422 a 8 sqq.). The flavoured substance impinges directly
upon the sense organ-the tongue. Again (4) the division into
right and left parts, which is not to be detected in the case of the
organ of touch, is almost unnoticeable in the tongue (656 b 33 sqq.)
and (5) the softness of the human tongue causes its greater sensi-
tiveness, just as softness of the flesh generally causes delicacy of
touch (660 a, 17-21, cf. De An. 11. ch. 9, 421 a 20 sqq. and
COMMENTARY
163
last note). For this doctrine compare also the passage beneath,
441 b 26 sqq.
441 a 6-7. Cf. Zeller, Presocratic Phil. (Eng. Trans.), II. p. 166,
Burnet, Early Greek Phil. p. 231, Empedocles v. 312 (Stein).
But cf. Theophrastus De Sens. 7 (Dox. 500, R.P. 177 b), who says
that Empedocles did not push his investigation of taste or touch
further than to say that in them too sensation was caused by
particles fitting into the pores of the sense organ.
441 a 7-8. The meaning of wavσTepμía is best illustrated by a
passage in the De Gen. Animal. Iv. ch. 3, 769 a 26 sqq., where he
explains a theory that the various qualities of animals all lie com-
mingled in the semen which forms as it were a паνστeρμía of all
characteristics, by comparing the yový to a liquid in which many
different flavours are dissolved. TаvσTEрμía then evidently means a
πανσπερμία
substance in which the germs of all things lie.
Trendelenburg (De An. p. 214) thinks that the word is a
Democritean term. It certainly is employed by Aristotle three
times (Physics, III. ch. 4, 203 a 21, De Coelo, III. ch. 4, 303 a 16 and
De An. 1. ch. 2, 404 a 4) to describe the mixture of atoms out of
which, Democritus asserted, the world was fashioned. It is however
once employed with reference to the theory of Anaxagoras (cf. De
Gen. et Corr. 1. ch. 1, 314a 18 sqq.), according to which bone and
flesh were the simple elements out of which air, fire, earth and
water were constructed: oi dè (sc. oi πepì ’Avaέayópav) taûta pèv åtñλâ
καὶ στοιχεῖα (λέγουσι), γῆν δὲ καὶ πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα σύνθετα παν-
σñepµíav yàp eivaι TOúтwr: i.e. 'for they-flesh and bone-constitute
that in which the latter all lie in germ.' Cf. Zeller, Presocratic Phil.
II. p. 332, Burnet, Early Greek Phil. p. 290 and note.
It is quite
likely that the term originated with Anaxagoras, whose interests lay
more in biological phenomena than those of his predecessors, but
there seems to be no doubt that Democritus, however inconsistent it
may have been with the general drift of his mechanical philosophy,
also employed it.
είναι
This special theory-that water is οἷον πανσπερμία χυμών—must
be assigned to Democritus, at least in the first form in which it is
stated (see next note). As Alexander (p. 68) points out, we must
assume a spatial difference to be responsible for the difference of
flavour in different parts, and this, says Alexander, stamps the theory
as Democritean.
The first theory differs from the second in that it supposes that
II-2
164
DE SENSU
flavours exist in water évepyeía-in actual fact though imperceptible
to sense, while the second gives them only potential existence;
according to it they exist in water only in germ. This second theory
is then contrasted with a third, according to which water is quali-
tatively identical in every part, and any flavour can be derived from
any portion of it, the differences which we actually find being caused
τῷ μᾶλλον ἢ ἧττον θερμαίνειν—by the different amounts of heat to
which different portions of water are exposed. Simon acutely con-
jectures that this third theory must be assigned to Anaxagoras owing
to its compliance with his doctrine of πάντα ἐν πᾶσιν.
It still com-
prises the doctrine that water is oîov πavσepµía in which tastes lie
in germ, but assigns their actual differentiation out to an active
external cause. (Note that Aristotle says τὸ ποιοῦν not ποιοῦν τι.
All theories may have recognised the agency of heat in producing
taste but not in producing differences in flavour.)
441 a 14. This passage causes difficulty, for at first sight it
seems strange that, if Aristotle meant that the fruits were plucked,
he should not have said καρπών instead of περικαρπίων. Hence
Thurot and Susemihl (Philol. 1885) propose to read κаρπŵv. But
though the word properly means σкéжασμа карпоû, yet there are
passages in which it can only mean the fruit as a whole, e.g. Meteor. iv.
ch. 3, 380 a 11 and Problems, 25, 925 b 30, and cf. below 441 b 1.
Alexander suggests that it is possible to use reрɩкάрπɩov in its literal
sense and, in that case, the point will be that fruits change in taste
independently of the removal or permanence of the husk or peel.
But this is hardly the meaning required. The other interpre-
tation is possible, and the point is that, as the connection with the
root has been severed, the water drawn up by the plant through its
roots (Tò ẻKTòs vdwp) does not give the change in taste.
πνρоνμévшv is the Ms. reading, but it should mean, on the whole,
'ignited': cf. De Part. Animal. 11. ch. 2, 649 b 5, where уρоûν is
distinguished from θερμαίνειν and identified with φλόγα ποιεῖν. Where
it does not mean actually to ignite, it at least denotes such intense
heating as occurs in roasting or baking (cf. De Gen. Animal. 111. ch. 2,
753 b 4, and Problems, 927 b 39 sqq.). Now, here, in the case of
the sun's action, no such intense degree of heating is involved.
Hence I propose to read Tuppovμévwv which means 'reddened,' and
suggest that Aristotle is thinking of the reddening effect the sun
He is here then refer-
produces on many fruits as it ripens them.
ring to the ripening effect of the sun which actually makes fruits
COMMENTARY
165
become sweet. (Mere cooking without adding a sweetening in-
gredient does not.) In the next clause he contrasts it with the
effect produced by drying and withering which makes them bitter
(cf. Problems 925 b 36 : ἐλαῖαι καὶ βάλανοι παλαιούμεναι πικραὶ γίνονται).
It is in the final clause-l. 18, kaì Evoμévovs K.T.A.-that he talks of
the effect of cooking.
441 a 20. The sense is the same whether we read πаνσπeρμías
(which is grammatically preferable) or πavσπepμíav. The water is a
material in which the germs of the flavours lie commingled.
441 a 21-22. ὡς τροφῆς. Alexander, who reads ὡς ἐκ τῆς
avτηs τроpηs, explains that many tastes arise out of the same water,
as many different parts of the body-bones, flesh etc., are formed
out of the same nourishment, and again different trees are nourished
by the same water; and thus similarly each part of the same tree,
root, bark and fruit, has a characteristic flavour though feeding on
the same moisture. He is followed by Thomas who nevertheless
used the early Latin translation which gives the equivalent of our
reading. Both readings no doubt render such an interpretation
possible, but ours rather suggests the translation I have given. In
that case the sense is simpler. There is no parallel between water
and food in general. Aristotle simply says that different tastes are
developed by plants that live upon the same water; he may mean
either the different tastes found in bark and fruit or the different
flavours of different fruits. The latter is more probable since he has
just been talking of fruits. He means that the same water can
be supplied to different trees, yet you get different flavours, which
ought not to be the case if one definite flavour resides in one
definite portion of water as the second-the Democritean-theory
would make out. The Tavoтeрμía theory in its first form is thus
refuted and Aristotle passes on to the opinion of Anaxagoras.
441 a 24. Súvaμis, in this line and again in the next, is practi-
cally equivalent to puois; cf. above ch. 3, 439 a 25: koɩǹ þúσis
Kaì dúvaµis. Cf. also De Mem. ch. 2, 452 a 31 and note.
441 a 25. λεπτότατον. The argument is directed merely against
the proposition that water acted on by heat, without any other
determinant, will develop flavour. Water alone when heated does
not thicken, but all flavours reside in substances that show traces of
thickening to a greater or less degree. Hence water plus heat is not
alone the cause of flavours. That which causes the thickening in
fluids must be the cause. This is earth (yŵ) or rather one of the
166
DE SENSU
qualities of y—тò έηpóv. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. II. ch. 2, 330 a 4:
τὸ δὲ παχὺ τοῦ ξηροῦ.
The whole of the above discussion is a good example of the
'dialectical' development of an Aristotelian argument. Previous
theories are dealt with in an order relative to the amount they con-
tribute to the final solution of the problem. Though each is in turn
set aside, some part of it remains unabrogated in the next, and the
last to be discussed is that which approaches most nearly to the true
account of the matter.
44I a 32. πάχος ἔχουσι.
πάχος ἔχουσι. It is not sufficient for the argument to
say that flavours thicken when heated, but that at all times they
show traces of density.
The
441 a 33. συναίτιον. Cf. De An. II. ch. 4, 416 a 14 where
Tup is likewise said to be the σvvaitiov of the growth of bodies.
αἴτιον is ψυχή. (συναίτιον μέν πώς ἐστιν, οὐ μὴν ἁπλῶς γε αἴτιον.)
Some translators render paívovтaι 'apparently,' but with the
participle it should mean 'evidently.' The sense also requires it,
for this to Aristotle's mind is not merely an apparent fact, but a real
fact which furnishes the proof positive that xvuós is dependent on
Tò έŋpóv. The previous proofs have been merely negative and
ξηρόν.
directed against the claims of other circumstances to fill the position
of cause.
This reasoning will support the reading diò evλóyws in 441 b 8
below.
441 b 5. γῆς τι εἶδος. Cf. Meteor. IV. ch. 7, 383 b 20 sqq. The
#oλλoí in 441 b 2 above are Metrodorus and Anaxagoras, according
to Alexander.
441 b 8. Siò evλóyws is the reading of MSS. LSU and evidently
of the ancient Latin translation. Alexander also interprets as though
this were the reading: διὰ τοῦτο οὖν φησὶν εὐλόγως καὶ τοὺς χυμοὺς ἐν
τοῖς ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυομένοις, τουτέστιν ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς, καὶ ταύτῃ τρεφο-
μένοις μετὰ ὑγρότητος ἐγγίνεσθαι μάλιστα: the vet. tr. renders terra
nascentibus' as though it actually read ek tŷs yŷs. Whatever the
reading, Alexander's must be the correct interpretation (cf. note to
441 a 33). It is on account of the savours being primarily in earth
that they can enter into plants. Aristotle does not say εὐλόγως
without being able to produce reasons.
441 b 10. ὥσπερ καὶ τἆλλα. Aristotle is no doubt thinking in
particular of the other elementary qualities—rò έnpóv etc., but this
statement is with him a universal principle.
:
COMMENTARY
167
441 b 14. EV TOîS TEρÌ σTOLxelwv. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. II. ch. 1 sqq.
The fuller discussion (év érépois aкpiẞéσтepоv, 329 a 27) referred to there
seems to be lost, as all other references to the subject are more brief.
Up to this point the argument is clear. Aristotle is explaining
what he has already proved as a fact. Earth in possessing the
quality of dryness can act on rò vypóv, since opposites modify each
other. It is a case of explaining the qualities presented to the other
senses by the interaction of the tactual properties of things. Cf.
De An. 11. ch. 5, 417 a 6, where he talks of the other aionτá as the
σvμßeßnkóтa of fire, earth, air and water. (Though he insists that
in one way the former are prior to the latter, cf. De Gen. et Corr. II.
ch. 2, 329 b 14: καίτοι πρότερον ὄψις ἀφῆς.)
The difficulty which now ensues is in connection with the function
of Tò epμóv in helping to produce flavour.
441 b 15. oúdèv téþuke k.T.λ. This statement seems to conflict
with that in De Gen. et Corr. II. ch. 2, 329 b 22: deî dè toɩNTIKÀ
ἀλλήλων καὶ παθητικὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα, μίγνυται γὰρ καὶ μεταβάλλει εἰς
anλa. But probably there Aristotle is simply stating his doctrine
ἄλληλα.
in a rough provisional way. Really as owμara and hence ovơíaι the
elements cannot be opposed to each other and act on each other.
(So Alexander explains.) Cf. Categ. 3b 24: vñáрɣeι dè тaîs ovoíais
καὶ τὸ μηδὲν αὐταῖς ἐναντίον εἶναι, and it is ἐναντία that act on each
other; οὐσία is merely δεκτικὴ τῶν ἐναντίων. The upshot of the
matter is, that it is not as substances, but as possessed of opposite
qualities, that the elements act on each other. This sentence is
then inserted as a caution, but how it furthers the main argument
here is not apparent, unless indeed we connect it with that pre-
ceding clause in which we find it stated that heat is the peculiar
property of fire, dryness of earth. Liquidity (Tò vypóv) will thus be
the special characteristic of water, and the implication will be that
the latter element will be acted on in a more pronounced way by
earth, the element which has in an especial degree the attribute most
opposed to its most characteristic quality. Fire possessing Tò
έŋpóv in a less marked degree will act upon it also, but not in the pre-
eminent way in which yŷ does.
When Aristotle says that τὸ θερμόν is the ἴδιον of πῦρ, this cannot
be in the full sense of idɩov consistent with the rest of his doctrine,
for rò depµóv is also shared by aýp and, as we have seen, rûp is also
Enpóv. He must mean, as Alexander explains in conformity with
De Gen. et Corr. Iv. ch. 4, 382 a 3: Tŵν σTоIXEíwv idiaíтata έnpov µèv
168
DE SENSU
yî, vyρoû dè vdwp, that earth is the principal illustration of dryness
or possesses dryness in a special degree, as fire does heat, and so on.
Cf. Alex. De Sens. pp. 72-73 (W.). Cf. also De Gen. et Corr. IV.
ch. 5, 382 b 3: ὑγροῦ σῶμα ὕδωρ.
441 b 17-18. ἐναποπλύνοντες. A cognate word πλύσις is used
in 445 a 16 for the corresponding process which produces odour.
Susemihl (Philol. 1885 and Burs. Jahresb. 17) wishes to delete
Toùs xvμoùs, but in mentioning flavours here Aristotle is not illus-
trating a thing by itself. He compares the solution of the primitive
Enpóv which produces flavours to the solution of flavours actually
produced.
φύσις.
441 b 19. ǹ purus. No personification of Nature is implied
here. Aristotle merely means that this is a natural process. The
function of up in the process is obscure. Alexander makes it the
cause of the percolation as well as of the kívnous which renders tò
υγρόν determinate in quality; κινοῦσα he renders by ἀλλοιοῦσα, i..
changing qualitatively. But it is possible to understand it literally—
of the motion involved in the percolation. Some, e.g. Hammond
and St Hilaire, translating Kivovoa in different ways, will have it to
be concerned only with the former process. But, unless we adopt the
conjecture that the function of τὸ θερμόν is to act on τὸ γεώδες,
we may as well understand it to bring about local motion in this case
as beneath in 442 a 6, where it is said to cause the light particles in
food to rise upwards.
441 b 23. Here Tálos is used in a wide sense, but still with
the signification of being the attribute of a subject that is passively
affected when it (the attribute) comes into being.
44I b 24. ἀλλοιωτικόν. Cf. De An. II. ch. 5, 416 b 34: dokεî yàp
(ἡ αἴσθησις) ἀλλοίωσίς τις εἶναι· ἀλλοίωσις is that kind of κίνησις
denoting qualitative change. ἀλλοιοῦσθαι is practically identical
with πάσχειν (cf. Phys. vii. ch. 3, 245 b 13 : τὸ πεπονθὸς καὶ ἠλλοιω-
µévov πрoσayopevoµev: cf. Alex. De An. 84, 12), and both words are
employed indifferently in the De Anima for psychical modifications
(cf. 11. ch. 5, 418 a 2 and 417 b 14). But Aristotle points out that,
though they both are used as though they were the proper terms (ws
kupíois) for all psychical changes, there are some operations to which
they are really not applicable.
I.
In the first place, the transition from the state in which man
possesses knowledge to the exercise of that knowledge is hardly
a case of πáσɣew or åλλoíwors in the usual sense. The change is not
COMMENTARY
169
produced by anything external. To exercise his intelligence is in a
man's own power—èπ'avτ—for the universals which are the objects of
knowledge are in a way in the soul. Again it is a case not of poρà vπò
τοῦ ἐναντίου but of σωτηρία, i.e. the realisation of a predetermined end.
2. Secondly, change such even as that from a state of ignorance
to a state of knowledge, where the alteration is in a definite direction
and towards the establishment of a definite higher development,
towards the realisation of the potentialities of the individual in
question (ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν 417 b 16), is hardly ἀλλοίωσις
proper, even though in the acquisition of knowledge one requires.
an external agent-the teacher.
With these reservations Aristotle proposes still to use the terms
dddoíwσis and tάσɣeш. They are no doubt, in one way, specially
applicable to sensuous processes, because there must be an external
agent the individual object (cf. 417 b 25: avaукаîоν уàр vπáрxew Tò
aio◊ŋτóv, and cf. 417 a 6 sqq.). But Simon points out that even
sense perception cannot be properly a case of máσɣew, for agent
and patient must be in the same genus (De Gen. et Corr. 1. ch. 7,
323b 32 sqq.), which the sense faculty and its object are not.
Introduction, sec. iv.
Cf.
441 b 25. It would be possible to make роüάpуov agree with
the subject of ayeɩ, namely rò...πάlos, and this interpretation
would give a meaning consistent with Aristotle's general doctrine,
for previous to the act of perception the object is only δυνάμει αἰσθη-
τόν. The next clause, however, requires us to construe it with Tò
aiσoŋτɩкóv (as Hammond, Bender, St Hilaire do), or still better with
TOUTO (Simon), for it is not the sense faculty which existed dvváμei
before the act of sensation, but its operation. The Súvapus, the
δύναμις,
faculty, actually exists before the sensational experience.
For the doctrine of this passage see De An. 11. ch. 5, 417 b 19:
καὶ τὸ κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν (αἰσθάνεσθαι) δὲ ὁμοίως λέγεται τῷ θεωρεῖν. In
knowledge (cf. last note) there is a two-fold transition, (1) from a
state of ignorance to the acquisition of a definite body of know-
ledge, ¿.e. from mere indeterminate dúvaμus to a determinate one or
έis; (2) there is also the change from the possession to the exercise
of this ἕξις (εἰς ἐντελέχειαν, b 7). There is a corresponding double
transition in sensuous process. The first is effected by the parent
(VπÒ Tоû YEνVÔVтos, b 17) of the sensitive individual and is the creation.
of a being with fully developed sense faculties. The second, corre-
sponding to the exercise of knowledge, is the actual exercise of the
170
DE SENSU
sense faculty and is produced by the object of sense.
In sense,
then, the formation of a permanent psychical disposition is due to
natural agency, in knowledge to instruction; actual exercise of a
faculty is in both a higher process, originated in the first case
externally, in the second internally.
441 b 26-27. oỦ πаνтòs Éηрoû. Alexander thinks that this state-
ment is made in order to rule out odour, which also owes its exist-
ence to τὸ ξηρόν. But, as ὀσμή is produced by τὸ ἔγχυμον ξηρόν, it is
clear that those words are not used for the purpose of excluding it.
By Tò έnpóv Aristotle surely means dry substance, and it is the same
substance as has flavour that is odorous. The intention is obviously
to rule out all έŋpóv that is not µeμiyμévov, i.e. does not enter into a
compound.
"
441 b 27-28. ἢ πάθος... ἢ στέρησις. The positive modification is
το γλυκύ, the negative τὸ πικρόν: cf. 442 a 7 sqq.
441 b 30. I read oux ềv µóvov instead of ovdèv aůrŵv with Bekker
and Biehl. Wendland restores oux ev μóvov to the text of Alexander,
p. 77, and the vet. tr. renders 'non est unum solum,' which, in spite
of what Biehl says, can be a translation only of oux ev μóvov. This
version apparently read also οὐδὲ αὐτοῖς τοῖς φυτοῖς after ζῴοις
for it inserts 'neque ipsis plantis.' ovx èv μóvov gives the best sense,
but μóvov might be dispensed with.
ειν
441 b 31. τὰ μὲν ἑπτὰ κ.τ.λ. Alexander points out that αὐξάνειν
and тρéþew are not identical. Things so far as quantitative cause
increase; only in so far as potentially capable of forming the sub-
stance of the body which they nourish are they said to be nutritive.
Cf. De Gen. et Corr. 1. ch. 5, 322 a 20 sqq. and also De An. 11. ch. 4,
416 b 12 sqq.: ἔστι δ᾽ ἕτερον τροφῇ καὶ αὐξητικῷ εἶναι· ᾗ μὲν γὰρ ποσόν
τι τὸ ἔμψυχον αὐξητικόν (sc. τὸ προσιόν oι τὸ προσφερόμενον: cf.
Rodier, op. cit. 11. p. 242), ĥ dè tóde tɩ kaì ovơía τрopń. That is to
say, Tрooń (the abstract term) or Tрépe is the continuous renewal
of the individual which preserves its identity as an individual
of definite type, i.e. as an οὐσία; αὔξησις is that renewal in its
quantitative aspect.
The point here, however, seems to be not to hold avέnois and
τρодń apart, but to show that that which has the function of causing
growth must also have the properties of nutritive food, and re-
ciprocally τὸ τρόφιμον is known to sense as τὸ γευστόν (4422 2)
and the fundamental positive characteristic of things that have
flavour is sweetness.
COMMENTARY
171
But food, as that which causes growth, is that which can rise
up (owing to the agency of heat-for fire is the lightest element)
and so become incorporated in the body. Hence it is both warm
and light (each of which is a tactual quality); but that which is
light is sweet, and hence that which causes growth is just that which
has the gustatory quality of nutriment.
The whole argument rests upon the identification of Tò KUÛPOV
(one of the ἁπτά) and τὸ γλυκύ, the basal quality of τὸ γευστόν, and
hence of το τρόφιμον.
442 a 1. τρέφει κ.τ.λ.
This is treated simply as a statement to
be verified by observation. It is not a proposition established by
any special proof elsewhere. It gives the first obvious definition of tò
τρόφιμον.
For the facts cf. Problems, 930 a 34 and Meteor. 11. ch. 2, 355 b
7, also cf. note to 1. 5 below.
442 2 3. ἢ ἁπλῶς κ.τ.λ.
a
We must not translate 'whether pure or
mixed,' as thus we should assume that it was indifferent whether
the sweetness was pure or mixed. As a matter of fact Aristotle,
below in 1. 12, says that pure sweetness makes the food in-
digestible.
442 a 4. EV TOîS TEρl Yevéσews. De Gen. et Corr. 1. ch. 5, pp.
350-352. Alexander also refers to the De Gen. Animal., but it
is difficult to find any strictly relevant passage there.
442 a 5. av§áve must be used absolutely, much as it looks as
though it should govern τροφήν along with δημιουργεί. Aristotle
is discussing not the production of food but the growth of the body
owing to feeding. For the process cf. De Part. Animal. 11. ch. 3,
650 a 2 sqq.: ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἀνάγκη πᾶν τὸ αὐξανόμενον λαμβάνειν τροφήν,
ἡ δὲ τροφὴ πᾶσιν ἐξ ὑγροῦ καὶ ξηροῦ, καὶ τούτων ἡ πέψις γίνεται καὶ
ἡ μεταβολὴ διὰ τῆς τοῦ θερμοῦ δυνάμεως... διὰ ταύτην τὴν αἰτίαν) αναγ-
καῖον ἔχειν ἀρχὴν θερμοῦ φυσικήν.
The ultimate ȧpxý of heat in the body of sanguineous animals is
seated in the heart. Cf. De Juvent. ch. 4, 469 b 9: avaукaîov d
ταύτης τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς θερμότητος ἐν τῇ καρδίᾳ τοῖς ἐναίμοις εἶναι.
For Neuhäuser's theory, that this σúμputov depμóv, which see
to be the ultimate substratum both of the sensitive and nutr
soul, is also to be identified as the central organ of sensati
Introduction, sec. vi.
For the connection of lightness and sweetness, bitte
weight, cf. Meteor. 11. ch. 2, 355 b 4 sqq.: tò µèv ådµvpòv v

172
DE SENSU
τὸ βάρος, τὸ δὲ γλυκὺ καὶ πότιμον ἀνάγεται διὰ τὴν κουφότητα, καθάπερ
ἐν τοῖς ζῴων σώμασιν...τὸ γὰρ γλυκὺ καὶ πότιμον ὑπὸ τῆς ἐμφύτου
θερμότητος ἑλκυσθὲν εἰς τὰς σάρκας καὶ τὴν ἄλλην σύνταξιν ἦλθε τῶν
μερῶν κ.τ.λ.
The bodily heat is, however, only the σvvaíriov in the production
Οἱ τὸ αὐξάνεσθαι καὶ τρέφεσθαι. The natural process due to heat is
indefinite and has no direction. Fire burns on until its material is
exhausted. But in living organisms there is a πέρας καὶ λόγος μεγέ
BOVS TE Kaì avέýσews, i.e. there is a definite scheme and restriction in
the development and this is due to ψυχή which is the real αἴτιον.
Cf. De An. II. ch. 4, 416 a 8–18.
In De Resp. ch. 20, 480 a 8 we hear that the blood ev Tŷ kaρdía
δημιουργείται. Aristotle probably there refers to the very same
process. We read in De Part. Animal. 11. ch. 4, 651 a 14: Tò
δ' αἷμα ἡ ἐσχάτη τροφή.
πάντα
442 a 8. Tò EV Tŷ þúσel. Cf. De Juvent. ch. 4, 469 b 6 sqq. : πávта
δὲ τὰ μόρια καὶ πᾶν τὸ σῶμα ἔχει τινὰ σύμφυτον θερμότητα φυσικήν :
cf. also above and the passage there quoted from Meteor. II.
Aristotle is there talking to begin with of the evaporation from
the sea, one of rà ëέw owµata. He expressly compares evaporation
by the sun to the process of animal nutrition. The sea remains salt
though the moisture which is evaporated from it and descends again
in rain is not salt.
He has now
442 a 9. Cf. quotation in note to 442 a 5 above.
explained what was previously proved as a fact-that xvuòs ToÛ TρO-
píμov čotív, and he has done so by identifying flavour par excellence
with sweetness. Positive flavour is sweetness, just as positive
colour is white. Their opposites are σrepýσeis--defects of being.
ταῦτα must refer to the latter-τὸ ἁλμυρὸν καὶ ὀξύ,
or else it means simply 'this fact.'

442 a II.
442 a 13. There is no one English word which will translate èπɩ-
ToλaσTIKÓV. It is almost the technical expression for 'indigestible,'
ut it implied a theory of indigestibility—that the food tended to
e too much. Cf. one of Aristotle's illustrations of final causality.
- final cause of taking a walk after eating is τὸ μὴ ἐπιπολάζειν τὰ
An. Post. 11. ch. 11, 94 b II sqq.
T
hl's reading ἀντὶ πάντων in l. 12 instead of ἀντισπᾶν τῷ
tless correct. It does not, however, alter the general
7. κινήσεως. It is not clear what exactly κίνησις refers
COMMENTARY
173
to-the sense stimulus caused by xvμós or the kívŋois which produces
χυμός.
442 a 18. LSU and all editions prior to Biehl's have ourol év
But there is no
ἀριθμοῖς μόνον· ὁ μὲν οὖν λιπαρὸς τοῦ γλυκέος κ.τ.λ.
reason for making Aristotle say that the pleasant flavours alone were
due to proportionate combination. On the analogy of the corre-
sponding theory about colours they would rather be the class where
the ratio of the ingredients was a simple one. Cf. ch. 3, 439b 33 sqq.
above.
442 a 22. All мss. give éπτά but Susemihl (Philol. 1885) argues
that it is quite impossible to reconcile this with the rest of the
passage. Yellow is assigned to white, as oily is to sweet; hence, if
the two lists are to square, the number must be either six or eight,
as Alexander too maintains. (It is by distinguishing paóv from
μέλαν and ἁλμυρόν from πικρόν that eight members are distinguished.)
Hence, followed by Biehl, he boldly substitutes έ for Tà. The
difficulty, however, disappears, when we recognise that rò av@òv is
included in the list, though, as an afterthought, assigned to white.
In other passages the different position of grey from that of the
true chromatic tones is not noticed. They are both said to be avà
µéσov TOû Xevkov kaì µéλavos: cf. Categ. ch. 10, 12 a 18, Top. 1. ch.
15, 106 b 5, Metaph. x. ch. 5, 1056 a 27 sqq. The reason doubtless
for ascribing grey to black rather than white when it is relative to
both (cf. Physics, v. ch. 1, 224 b 31 sqq., and ch. 5, 229 b 17 sqq.)
is that it is less positive than white, in a way a σrépηois of white, as
black also is.
442 a 24. λelTTETαι K.T.λ. The ascription of yellow to white seems
to be a recognition of its higher luminosity than that of the other
colours. Cf. Plato, Timaeus 68 B, who brings in rò λaumpóv into its.
composition. For the correspondence of the tastes and the colours.
generally and the ascription to sweet and bitter of Tò Aарóν and
Tò åλμvρóv respectively, cf. De An. II. ch. 10, 422 b 10 sqq. The
ground for the identification of τὸ λιπαρόν and το γλυκύ seems to be
the lightness of both. Cf. De Part. Animal. III. ch. 9, 672 a 8 sqq.
τὸ λιπαρὸν κουφόν ἐστι καὶ ἐπιπολάζει ἐν τοῖς ὑγροῖς. τὸ λιπαρόν is
light because it is warm. Cf. also De Gen. Animal. 11. ch. 2, 735 b 25.
Similarly τὸ ἁλμυρόν and τὸ πικρόν are both heavy.
442 2 25. φοινικοῦν κ.τ.λ. Three of these are the colours of the
rainbow (with ξανθόν intermediate between φοινικοῦν and πράσινον :
cf. Meteor. III. ch. 2, 372 a 8 sqq.). They alone are said not to be
174
DE SENSU
obtained by mixing (other chromatic tones presumably); Kvavovv is
less frequently mentioned.
442 a 27.
τούτων should naturally refer to τοῦ λευκοῦ καὶ μέλανος,
but it is generally held to signify the other colours. Both statements
would be in conformity with Aristotle's teaching.
442 a 31. TÒ TÓTIμOV. Cf. De An. II. ch. 10,
καὶ ἄποτον are equivalents for γλυκύ and πικρόν.
cf. Theophrastus, De Causis Plantarum, VI. I, 2.
422 a 31: TÒ TOTÒV
For the doctrine
442 b I. ἁπτά. Cf. Theophrastus, De Sensu, 60-82, R.P. 199.
Zeller, Presocratic Phil. 11. pp. 265-270. This is part of the doctrine
of aπóрporaι; the atoms which emanate from bodies actually impinge
upon our sense organs and so cause sensation by contact.
against this that Aristotle wishes to argue in the first place.
It is
The transition to this discussion is not mediated by the dis-
tinction between avέáve and rρépew as Alexander thinks, but by
the connection between taste and touch which suggests the Demo-
critean theory that all sensation is effected by contact.
442 b 4. ἀδύνατον. Alexander (p. 83 [W.]) gives four separate
reasons which might be employed. But the most important
consideration is the fact that the other senses require an external
medium. It is the absence of this that makes taste a kind of touch.
The other senses do not act by contact (cf. De An. 11. ch. 7, 419a 26:
οὐθὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν (sc. ψόφου, ὀσμῆς κ.τ.λ.) ἁπτόμενον τοῦ αἰσθητηρίου
ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν).
τοῖς κοινοῖς. For the distinction between the Koivά and the "Sia
aiołŋrá cf. De An. 11. ch. 6, 418 a 17, 111. ch. 1, 425 a 14, III. ch. 3,
428 b 22 and above 437 a 8, etc. The former comprise motion and
rest, figure, magnitude, number and unity. The latter are the
qualities, e.g. colour etc., reported by the special sense organs. The
κοινὰ αἰσθητά are known however in modern philosophy as the
primary qualities of bodies (cf. Hamilton's Reid, note D). They
must be distinguished from what the commentators call the 'primae
qualitates in the Aristotelian scheme viz. θερμόν, ψυχρόν, ξηρόν,
vypóv. It has been pointed out (e.g. by Hamilton, p. 829) that
these ková are hardly sense qualities at all and confirmation for this
contention is drawn from Aristotle himself (cf. De An. 11. ch. 6, 418 a
24: τὰ ἴδια κυρίως ἐστὶν αἰσθητά; and below b 14-15: ἢ οὐδεμίας τὰ
KOLȧ yvwρĺžεL). They may be all described as the mathematical
κοινὰ γνωρίζειν).
and dynamical qualities of body and, according to the Atomistic
philosophers, these were the only objective attributes of things, all
• •
COMMENTARY
175
the rest being merely changes in our sensibility. (Cf. Theophrastus,
De Sens. 63: τῶν δ᾽ ἄλλων αἰσθητῶν οὐδενὸς εἶναι φύσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντα
πάθη τῆς αἰσθήσεως ἀλλοιουμένης.)
This holds good without qualification of four of the senses, but
to some tactual qualifications they did assign objective existence,
e.g. τὸ μαλακόν, τὸ σκληρόν, τὸ βαρύ and τὸ κούφον, deriving these
however ultimately from μέγεθος and σχῆμα; things that are light
have more of void space in them than others. Tò Tрaxú and tò
λεῖον with τὸ ὀξύ and τὸ ἀμβλύ seem to have been modifications
of oxyμa. Here Aristotle also treats the latter four attributes as
belonging to the category of τὰ κοινά. He takes care to define
τὸ ὀξύ and τὸ ἀμβλύ as τὸ ἐν τοῖς ὄγκοις (the word commonly
employed also for the atoms themselves as well as for mass in
· general) as these are also the names for determinations of such idia
as ψοφός and χυμός. He commonly puts τραχύτης and λειότης along
yopós
with other σωματικαὶ διαφοραί οι σωματικὰ πάθη as μαλακόν and
OKAŋpóv which are consequent upon the primary determinations-
θερμόν, ψυχρόν etc. Cf. De Part. Animal. II. ch. 1, 646 a 17 sqq.:
αἱ δ᾽ ἄλλαι διαφοραὶ ταύταις ἀκολουθοῦσιν, οἷον βάρος...καὶ λειότης κ.τ.λ.
Among such, even µéyelos is included in 644b 14; but this
is simply one of his rough general classifications. Aristotle did
not, of course, mean to imply that σxâμa and μéyeos are in them-
selves tactual differentiae of the same nature as hard and soft,
but it was his view that you do not have the concept of body
without some characteristically tactual datum. It is impossible to
construct bodies out of merely mathematical determinations, a point
which modern Atomists do not sufficiently consider. You cannot
analyse body into something that has no sensuous qualities, not even
tactual ones.
If μéyeos and oxua are to be regarded as the ultimate charac-
teristics of bodies, they must be treated as though they already
possessed a tactual content, as though they were merely tactual
differentiae, and this is exactly Aristotle's point here. The Atomists
treat determinations of figure as though they in themselves contained
a reference to tactual experience-as though they were given by one
special sense, that of touch, whereas as a fact they, though given in
connection with tactual experience, are not simply to be identified
with it, and in fact can be discerned by means of other senses,
notably that of sight.
In the De Anima, 111. ch. 1, 425 b 4 sqq., Aristotle points out
176
DE SENSU
that it is owing to the fact that these mathematical and dynamical
qualities of objects are given by more than one sense that they can
be readily discriminated. Otherwise they would be confused with
the special data of the single sense to which they were attached,
just as he contends that, if the whole surface of the body gave the
same sensations as the tongue (which discriminates both flavour and
tactual properties) taste and touch would seem to be the same sense.
For a discussion of åøý cf. De An. 11. ch. 11. Aristotle does not
there fully debate the question of the plurality of the ἐναντιώσεις,
e.g. θερμόν and ψυχρόν, ξηρόν and ὑγρόν, μαλακόν and σκληρόν, which
touch presents to us, nor does he consider to what extent determina-
tions like ὀξύ and βαρύ, τραχύ and λείον, which appear in φωνή
apparently as idɩa, must be treated as kowά in the case of touch. His
definition of Tрaɣú and λeîov in Categ. 8, 10 a 22 sqq. confirms his
inclusion of them here in the list of the κοινά—λεῖον μὲν τῷ ἐπ᾿ εὐθείας
πως τα μόρια κεῖσθαι· τραχὺ δὲ τῷ τὸ μὲν ὑπερέχειν τὸ δὲ ἐλλείπειν;
¿.e. these qualities are due to variations in figure.
π
T
442 b 8. ei Sè µǹ taoŵv. Cf. De An. II. ch. 6, 418 a 10 KOLVÒV
Tασŵν, where however he illustrates only in the case of åþý and
ὄψις. Number and unity seem to be given by the exercise of any
sense (cf. 425 a 20: ἑκάστη γὰρ ἓν αἰσθάνεται αἴσθησις). On the
other hand all are said to be perceived by means of kívŋois (425 a 17)
and, in the case of the mathematical qualities such as are mentioned
here, the kívnous which discriminates them can be nothing else than
the motion of the only two sense organs which have a surface
continuously graded in sensitiveness, the eye and the surfaces of
the bodily members. Aristotle does not work this out, but hence,
probably, the reason why the discrimination of size and figure is
limited to sight and touch.
442 b 9. Cf. De An. II. ch. 6, 418 a 15; III. ch. 3, 428 b 18, 25,
where he qualifies the statement that idía aïo@nois is true, by the
expression ἢ ὅτι ὀλίγιστον ἔχουσα τὸ ψεῦδος. Apparently he did not
know of colour blindness.
اد
442 b II. oi dè cannot mean another set of people as Simon
and St Hilaire think. It is part of the same doctrine as the
preceding one to reduce the dia to the koiά. The error is (
(1) to
assume that all sensation takes place by means of contact; (2) not
to discriminate universal qualities of objects from the purely tactual,
i.e. to treat them all as the data of a single sense; (3) to reduce all
the sense qualities to these quasi-tactual determinations.
COMMENTARY
177
442 b 13. σxhuara. Cf. Theophrastus, de Sensu, 65: Tòv pèv
σχήματα.
ὀξὺν εἶναι τῷ σχήματι γωνιοειδῆ τε καὶ πολυκαμπῆ καὶ μικρὸν καὶ
λεπτόν....τραχὺν δ᾽ ὄντα καὶ γωνιοειδή...τὸν δὲ γλυκὺν ἐκ περιφερῶν
συγκεῖσθαι σχημάτων, οὐκ ἄγαν μικρῶν κ.τ.λ.
Angularity was a characteristic of the atoms which caused acid
and harsh tastes, roundness of those that caused the sensation of
sweetness; but their size and their difference of impact on the body
toge.her with the heat supposed to be thus caused (vid. loc. cit.)
played a part also.
For the Democritean theory of colour cf. Theophrastus, 73
ard 80. The behaviour of the atoms relative to the trópoɩ (cf. above
›n Empedocles, ch. 2, 437 b 12) also was a determinant, as well
as the density of the atmosphere, according to Democritus.
442 b 14. Alexander says that the preference is given to sight
rather than touch because the latter does not perceive diάornμa
(distance outward) and πλî¤os (a multitude of units). But surely
the clause τὰ γοῦν κ.τ.λ. contains the reason. The illative force
of your is continually backwards. The clause rà yoûv K.T.A. cannot,
of course, be a consequence of εἰ δ᾽ ἄρα...τῆς γεύσεως μᾶλλον. It
must be the ground for it. Hence the construction is loose; after
μᾶλλον should follow ἐχρῆν without ὥστε and the τὰ γοῦν κ.τ.λ. clause
should succeed. But that would make the argument too long and
lumbering. Hence the rà yoûv clause is brought up and has the
additional function of confirming the Kairo ovdeμiâs K.T.λ. clause.
It is clear that if it confirm the ei d' apa clause, it will, whether
intended or not, support the previous one. Aristotle argues ‘if it
is the function of taste to discriminate the Kowά,' and this we should
infer from the atomist theory that taste discriminates the most
minute spatial difference-Tò тpaɣú and тò letov in particles im-
perceptible to the other senses, then it must in addition to perceiving
the other kowά be the best judge of figure.
και
But if the claim of taste to perceive best the κowά rest on the
fineness of its discrimination (falsely asserted), surely the real
delicacy of the sense of sight is the cause of its justifiable claim.
The superiority of the sense of sight is as a rule assigned to its
intellectual character: cf. ch. 1, 437 a, Metaph. 1. ch. 1, 980 a 25,
De An. III. ch. 3, 429 a 3, ch. 13, 435 b 21. In the Problems, 886 b 35,
we read that sight is evapyeσrépa than hearing, which comes to much
the same thing as åkρißeσrépa in the sense of distinct. It is not said
that touch generally is the most delicate of the senses; it is only
R.
I 2
178
DE SENSU
contended that relatively to the senses of the other animals it is
most delicate in man (441 a 2—3).
It looks, of course, strange to assign the discernment of the
common sensibles to one sense when they are said to be common.
Aristotle no doubt means their accurate discrimination Simple
experience would show that this is best obtained by sight.
442 b 20.
445 b 26 sqq.
¿vavríwow. Cf. De An. II. ch. II and below ch. 6,
442 b 22-26. Surely an account of proportionate elements in
figure could be given analogous to the theory of proportionate
numbers which he accepts.
442 b 28. Aristotle's treatise on plants is not extant. Twc
by Theophrastus survive, De Causis Plantarum and Historia
Plantarum.
CHAPTER V.
442 b 29. Τὸν αὐτὸν κ.τ.λ. Alexander maintains that this refers
to ch. 4, 440 b 30, where smell and taste are said to be σxedòv TÒ
αὐτὸ πάθος. He is now to explain the analogy between the two.
Its objective basis is the fact that the process involved in the genesis
of each is the same; it is oĉor Badń tis kaì tλúσɩs (445 a 15); it is a
process of infusion or solution. Add to this the fact that in both
cases rò έnpóv is the agent, with the sole difference that in taste it is
not already modified, but in producing odour it must have been
previously mingled with liquid. Further, as the vehicle of taste is
Tò vypóv, so that of odour is vypóv, for, as pointed out in 443 b 6, air
as well as water is vypós. Heat also seems to be operative or rather
co-operative in the production of both (cf. 443 b 17 and note).
Here Aristotle calls the agent operative in the production of
odour τὸ ἔγχυμον ὑγρόν. Elsewhere he names it τὸ ἔγχυμον ξηρόν,
and cf. De An. 11. ch. 9, 422 a 6: čσtɩ 8 ý doµǹ тoû έnрoû. Hence
Thurot, Torstrik, De An. p. 158, and Neuhäuser (Aristoteles' Lehre
von dem sinnlichen Erkenntnissvermögen und s. Organen, p. 25)
propose to read έŋpóv here instead of vypóv, and Susemihl (Burs.
Jahresb. XVII. p. 266) has lent his support to this conjecture. But,
as Alexander points out, it makes no difference whether we call the
agent here ξηρόν or ύγρόν. We can call it either dry substance mixed
with liquid or liquid mixed with dry. The main point is, that it
must be μεμιγμένον τι i.ε. τὸ ἤδη χυμὸν ἔχον.
442 b 30-31. ἐν ἄλλῳ γένει. The new γένος is the identical
element in air and water of which it is the function to form a vehicle
and medium for odour. Alexander (p. 89, 1. 2 [W.]) has named this
Tò Síoσμov (following Theophrastus) on the analogy of the term
Tò diapavés which is applied to the common constitution of air and
water which enables them to form media for light. Cf. De An. 11.
ch. 7, 419 a 22 sqq., where however he says (1. 32) that the medium
of smell has no special name.
The expression ev äλλw yéveɩ is, however, quite vague and may
12-2
180
DE SENSU
mean merely ev tậ ỏσppavтậ—'in the domain of odorous quality.’
τὸ ὀσφραντόν is the object of smell as τὸ ἀκουστόν is the object of
hearing.
4432 1-2. ᾗ πλυντικὸν ἢ ῥυπτικόν.
ἢ Cf. ch.
Cf. ch. 4 εναποπλύνοντες
441 b 17, and beneath 443 b 8 åñoñλúvoµev and 445 a 16 πdúois.
#λúvw is to wash; púπтew seems to contain more definitely the idea
of scouring; the Latin rendering for it is abstergere. In the ex-
amples of its use in Aristotle (e.g. Problems, 935 b 35) it takes the
accusative of the thing cleansed. Hence evidently pUTTIKòv Enpó-
ῥυπτικόν ξηρό-
τητos means 'able to cleanse, by scouring off and absorbing the
surface of dry substance. St Hilaire translates ᾗ πλυντικὸν ἢ ῥυπτικὸν
'en tant qu'il peut transmettre et retenir,' Hammond, 'by virtue of
its capacity to exude and throw off (dry savour).' But these render-
ings are impossible.
443 a 3. καὶ ἐν ὕδατι, Cf. De An. 11. ch. 9, 421 b 10: kai yàp
τὰ ἔνυδρα δοκοῦσιν ὀσμῆς αἰσθάνεσθαι, and beneath passim.
4432 4. όστρακοδέρμων.
ὀστρακοδέρμων. Testacea must not be taken as a
modern zoological designation. Any animal with a shell from the
turtle to the sea-urchin is ranked under the ỏσтρакódeрµа: cf. Hist.
Animal. VIII. ch. 2, 590 a 19 sqq. Aristotle is, no doubt, thinking
here of shell-fish. An example is afterwards given in 444 b 13—
(ai Toрpúpai) the purple-murex which, he asserts in Hist. Animal.
VIII. ch. 2, 590 b, goes in pursuit of its prey and feeds on minute
fishes.
443 a 5. ÉTIπoλáge. Air rises upwards by a 'natural' motion.
Cf. Meteor. IV. ch. 7, 383 b 26: kai yàp ô aǹp pépeтaι avw.
οὔτ᾽ αὐτὰ κ.τ.λ.
મ
443 a 6.
Aristotle thought the motion fishes
make with their gills was not breathing. It is the expulsion of the
water, which is taken in with their food, and which performs the
'cooling' function effected in respiring animals by the air. Cf. Zeller,
Aristotle, II. pp. 43, 44, and Aristotle, De Resp. 476 a 1 sqq. especially
1ο: τὰ δὲ βράγχια πρὸς τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ ὕδατος κατάψυξιν.
443 a 7. vypá. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. II. ch. 3, 330 b 4,
331 a 5, etc.
443 a 8. þúσis. Cf. note to 442 b 30-31. Mr Cook Wilson
Journal of Philol. XI. p. 119) conjectures λuous instead of púois.
This is possible but not necessary. Tò doppavTóv is indifferently the
Táðos of the thing that smells and the odorous thing itself.
άooμa. Cf. 437 a 22, 441 b 14 and notes.
443 a II.
sources of the whole discussion cf. Meteor. IV.
For the
COMMENTARY
181
443 a 12. For the doctrine contained in this statement cf. De
Gen. et Corr. II. ch. 2, 329b 11; the elements differ only κarà άπTYV
ἐναντίωσιν.
443 a 14. xvμòv kai Énpótηta. Cf. De Gen. Animal. 761 b 9:
ἡ θάλαττα υγρά τε καὶ σωματώδης. The dry element is of course the
salt contained in it; cf. 441 b 4: οἱ γὰρ ἅλες γῆς τι εἶδός εἰσιν. The
reference for Xíos below is Meteor. Iv. ch. 7, 383 b 20: (λílos) yŷs
μᾶλλον, for ξύλα also ch. 7 and for χρυσός etc. chs. 8, 9, 1o.
443 a 15. ἔλαιον.
Malov. Either the oil said to be extracted from salt
has more smell than that which comes from natron and so the
previous statement is directly verified, or there is a greater quantity
of this product derived from salt and thus the strong smell of salt is
explained by the fact that it contains more vypóv than the other
substance.
What the process referred to is, one can hardly tell. Aristotle in
Prob. 935 a 8, talks of τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἅλασιν ὑφιστάμενον ἔλαιον, and this
should mean a deposit or sediment. έıkμáčov should point to some
process in which heat was employed. vírpov was compounded with
oil to form soap. Perhaps something similar was done with salt.
Impure salt and oil may have been boiled together, and the product
which distilled over collected. This would rather confirm the sug-
gestion that Aristotle is referring to the stronger smell of the one
compound than of the other.
víтpov is any salt of sodium or potassium that has a strong alkaline
reaction. It is not potassium nitrate—our salt-petre.
443 a 20. τὸ ὑγρόν. For ἄργυρος, καττίτερος cf. Meteor. IV.
ch. 10, 389 a 8. Anything that melted with heat was held to be
aqueous. We must remember however that the concepts of rò vypÓv
and vdwp are wider than what we understand by moisture and water.
They correspond more nearly to the modern concept of the fluid
state of matter. Hence Aristotle could talk of rò vypóv in metals
without meaning exactly that water, the actual particular substance
known as such, was found in them. He was under the necessity of
using popular terms with a more or less restricted denotation and a
particular intension, for wide and far reaching scientific generalisa-
tions. To our mind this inevitably suggests both a fancifulness in
the generalisation and a vagueness in the concept of the particular
substance which permitted the name for it to be so widely applied.
Both those characteristics are true of all primitive theories for, as
Aristotle himself remarks (Phys. 1. ch. 1, 184 a 21): čσti dýµîv πρŵTOV
εστι
182
DE SENSU
δῆλα καὶ σαφῆ τὰ συγκεχυμένα μᾶλλον. τὸ ὑγρόν is fluidity or the
fluid element generally, of which dop is the typical example. The
concept corresponds, as modern science shows, to an important
objective distinction in the condition of matter. The peculiarity of
the Aristotelian theory lies in regarding rò vypóv not as a state into
which matter may pass but as a quality which certain species of
matter (anp and dwp) always possess.
ἀναθυμίασις
443 a 23. Cf. above ch. 2, 438 b 26 sqq. and notes. avaluμíao is
(cognate of Latin fumus) is used in two senses: (1) in its generic
meaning it corresponds more exactly to our word reek; it is any
vapour which rises up and is wafted upwards from a substance. As
such it has two species (cf. especially Meteor. II. ch. 4, 359 b 27 sqq.)
which are distinguished as being respectively moist and dry or at
least as containing a greater proportion of vypóv or έnpóv respectively.
The former is steam or moist vapour, the latter is more accurately
described as smoke. Aristotle expressly proposes to use the general
term to represent the latter variety (as he does in 1. ch. 3, 340 b
27 sqq.) and this (2) is its second and more restricted meaning. Both
species of ȧvalvμíaois are hot by nature. The dryness of the
smoky kind comes from the earth which enters into its composition
(340 b 26).
This seems to be a case of
443 a 24-25. καὶ πάντες...ὀσμῆς.
dittographia of the passage beneath 1. 27.
In consequence of the
scribe's mistake 1. 27 was mutilated and hence we must restore to it,
with Christ, the πì TOûTo which appears here.
443 a 25. Heraclitus, fragment 37 in Bywater's edition : cf. Burnet,
Early Greek Phil. p. 136. Hence Heraclitus must have held that
odour was smoke.
Cf.
443 a 28. áтµída.
¿¿ údaτos ȧvalvµíaσis äτµis.
4432 34. όσμᾶται κ.τ.λ.
رو
ή
Meteor. 1. ch. 9, 346 b 32: čσri 8 ý µèv
Cf. also note to 443 a 23.
Cf. De An. 11. ch. 9, 421 b 10 sqq.
443b 2. ȧπoppolais. If the sense of smell were stimulated by
effluxes it would be really a sense of touch, cf. 440 a 21 and note.
Another reason against the efflux theory (noticed by Alexander) is
given in Problems, 907 a 33. If that theory were true, odorous
objects would evaporate away in time. Aristotle does not deny that
smoke and vapour are odorous (cf. above ch. 2, 438 b 26 and Prob.
906 a 21 sqq. where he talks of the odorous qualities of Ovμiáμara);
he only means that exhalations are not the mechanism for trans-
mitting odour. The sensation of smell is not caused by the evapo-
COMMENTARY
183
rated substance impinging on the sense organs (cf. De An. 421 b 16).
The μeragú in respiring animals is the air, and when that enters the
nostrils it can be described as an ava@vuíaois indeed, but it is
Tνενμатúdns (cf. below 445 a 29)-a waft of air.
Aristotle has, however, great difficulty in not regarding odour
as a gas or the analogous diffusion of a solid in a liquid. Cf.
438 b 26 and below ȧruídos 444 b 33, De An. 421 b 24, and below
444 a 24 sqq.
443 b 4. πνεûua-air or wind-is more especially the air we
breathe.
443 b 7. óμolws. Between what is the similarity? Aristotle is
explaining the correspondence between tastes and odours; he has
already pointed out one identity—the vypórns of the vehicle of both.
Now he asserts that the process which generates the two is identical—
άπóπλvσis. The argument is 'If in this case—the production of
odour-the action of dry substance on moist is the same as in the
production of taste—åñóπλvσis, then we can explain the analogy of
the two.' He is not comparing the effect of rò έnpóv on air with its
effects on the fluids proper, otherwise he would have said ev Toîs
ἄλλοις ὑγροῖς after just pointing out that ἀὴρ ὑγρὸν τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν.
He means Toîs vypoîs to include air and then gives air as the example
of rà vypá which is most important for present purposes. It is a
very common function of κaí in Aristotle to coordinate the generic
and the specific, the latter coming second and illustrating the former
or defining it more exactly (cf. Bonitz, Ind. p. 357). Cf. in this
treatise 439 a 18 sq.: τὴν αἴσθησιν καὶ τὴν ἐνέργειαν, 441 a 10 sq.: τὸ
θερμὸν καὶ τὸν ἥλιον, 441 b 19 sq.: τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ γεώδες, etc.
>
The above is Alexander's interpretation, but he suggests that the
argument may be intended to compare the action of тò exμov
έnpóv in producing odour in air and in the fluids proper. If it is
the same, then, assuming already that odour is produced by flavoured
substance, we could explain why the odours we are cognisant of
(which are propagated in air) correspond singillatim to flavours
(which exist in liquid), Alex. 94, 1. 20 (W.): katà yàp Tàs tŵV Xvµŵv
διαφορὰς ἔσονται καὶ ὀσμῶν διαφοραί, εἴ γε ὑπὸ τούτων ἐκεῖναι γίνονται,
ὡς ἕπεσθαι ἐκείνῳ ὁ φίλον ἐκείνῳ, εἰ οὕτως ἔχοι.
One thing seems certain, that Aristotle is not comparing the
action of rò έnpóv in producing tastes in water, with its action in
diffusing odours in air, for in that case all mention of the propa-
gation of odour in water would be omitted, and it would be natural
184
DE SENSU
to infer that it did not exist in water: but this is the reverse of the
theory for which he contends.
443 b 8. áváλoyov K.T.λ. Cf. De An. 11. ch. 9, 421 a 16–18: čolke
μὲν γὰρ ἀνάλογον ἔχειν πρὸς τὴν γεῦσιν καὶ ὁμοίως τὰ εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν τοῖς
Tŷs ooμns. But further on (loc. cit.), in 26 sqq. he points out that
though smells are distinguished as γλυκύ, πικρόν, δριμύ etc., the epi-
thets applied to taste, yet not all objects have the taste and smell
designated by the same name-τὴν ἀνάλογον ὀσμὴν καὶ χυμόν. Some
are sweet, both to taste and smell, others not.
443 b 15-16. Cf. Meteor. IV. ch. 3, 380 b 2, where unripe
flavours are said to be yvxpoí. Cold generally is the principle which
counteracts heat (åvríoτpopov rŷ Оepμóτηti De Gen. Animal. 11. ch. 6,
743 b 28), which is the great principle of life or activity according to
the Aristotelian philosophy.
443 b 17. κινοῦν καὶ δημιουργούν. Cf. the similar role played by
heat in the development of taste and nutrition (chapter 4 especially
442 a 5). Its function in producing odour is not brought into such
prominence; but cf. 444 a 26: ἡ γὰρ τῆς ὀσμῆς δύναμις θερμὴ τὴν
púow èorív and 438 b 27 and also Problems, 906 b 37: nooμn Depμó-
Tηs Tís eσTɩ, and elsewhere for the influence of heat in producing smell.
443 b 19. edn...Súo. It is unlikely that Aristotle here refers
to rò ŋồù kaì Tò λʊπηрóν as Hammond (p. 173) thinks. If that were
so it would mean that odour per se was exhaustively divided into
two species, the pleasant and the unpleasant, but nothing is said to
confirm this. Aristotle certainly implies that all odours are either
pleasant or unpleasant, but he does not elevate those epithets into
specific differences. Alexander (De Sens. p. 97, 1. 23 sqq. [W.]) con-
jectures that perhaps rò dú and rò λuπηρóv are the primary species
of that kind of odour which is independent of taste, and that the
others are subsequent to them and, possessing no names of their
own, correspond to the particular flavours and perfumes from which
they originate.
This would make the classification of odours per se pleasant
and the reverse correspond on the whole to the classification of the
species of the other sense qualities. But it is hardly possible that
τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ λυπηρόν can be regarded as objective determinations
like yλukú and Tɩкρóv. Besides, it is clear from De An. II. ch. 9,
421 b 1 sqq. that the same epithets mark the species of odour per se
pleasant as those which distinguish the varieties dependent on taste.
Among odours per se pleasant are included the scents of flowers
COMMENTARY
185
(1. 30 below) and to these in the De Anima are applied the terms
γλυκύ, δριμύ etc.ἡ μὲν γὰρ γλυκεῖα [ἀπὸ τοῦ] κρόκου καὶ μέλιτος, ἡ δὲ
δριμεία θύμου καὶ τῶν τοιούτων.
The smell of honey is, no doubt, one of the class of odours
which follow the taste. That of crocus or saffron is a scent per se
pleasant, for the taste of the substance is not sweet. Probably
Aristotle would have explained the phenomenon that many things
did not have the corresponding odour and flavour by this distinction
between the two different orders of smell. The problem is, however,
not worked out.
Alexander, though lending some colour to the suggestion that
τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν are the species of odour per se pleasant and
the reverse, yet does not hold that edn... Svo here refers to them.
Aristotle is referring to the two great divisions of odour-ỏσμn
καθ᾿ αὐτὴν ἡδεία, and that which is only κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς ἡδεῖα. The
latter is called τὸ θρεπτικὸν εἶδος in 444 b 10. It is true it should
rather be a yévos and that term is employed in 444 a 32 and b 4, but
Aristotle frequently uses yévos and eldos indifferently to designate
a class.
Here it certainly looks strange that Aristotle after using eidos
to denote a wide group should in the next line employ it to refer to
infimae species, but this is characteristic of the carelessness of his
style. He says 'There are two species of odour' meaning by that
two divisions, and then the word 'species' suggests to him the fact
that some people have denied the existence of any species at all
in odour.
443 b 23. Kaтà σνµßeßηKòs, i.e. indirectly: cf. note on KATà
σvμßeßηkós chapter 1, 437 a 5, 11.
443 b 33. Evρimídηy. Euripides is criticised by the comic poet
for sickening over-refinement of style. Cf. Meineke, Frag. Com.
Graec. Strattis, p. 298.
Perhaps there may be a hit in comparing to pak what would be
left if the meretricious additions were removed. μúpov is a perfume,
not a spice. Cf. Cic. ad Att. 1. 19, 2.
Perhaps the force of the taunt may be thus rendered: 'Don't
put hair-oil in your soup!'
444 a I. vôv. Aristotle is not necessarily to be regarded as
mourning the degeneracy of his own time. The vôv need not have
that signification.
444 a 2. βιάζονται. Anything contrary to nature (φύσις) is
186
DE SENSU
Bíacos: cf. the famous Blaiós Tis or ẞía oσris in Nic. Eth. 1. ch. 3,
1096 a 6.
The idea here seems to be that gourmands get a pleasure from
odour which appears to arise from taste. It is in the exercise of the
latter sense (along with that of touch) that men are intemperate.
Cf. Prob. 949 b 6, etc. and Sir A. Grant, Ethics of Aristotle, 11. p. 49.
444 a 4. Stov here and in 1. 9 below is interpreted as μáλiora
dov by Alexander who, influenced by 21-24 below (q.v.), thinks that
other respiring animals also perceived, though in a less degree, this
kind of odour. But in 21-24 Aristotle is talking merely of odour in
general and explaining why it is perceived by means of inhaling the
breath. It is because of its higher function in man that odour is
drawn in with the breath, and the same mechanism is provided for
animals (in which the higher functions are lacking) in order that
Nature might not have to devise a new organ for them (444 b 5).
Independently, however, of the influence of 11. 21-24, there was
some reason for Alexander interpreting ἴδιον as μάλιστα ἴδιον, for
otherwise Aristotle appears to make an absolute qualitative dis-
tinction in sensation depend upon a mere quantitative difference-
the greater size of the human brain as compared with that of other
animals.
Cf. De Gen. Animal. II. ch. 6, 743 b 28 sqq.
444 a 10-II.
444 a 13-15. This is obviously the same account of the origin
of catarrh as is given in De Somno, ch. 3, 458 a 2. The ἀναθυμίασις
is not an exhalation from food as it exists outside the body; it arises
from the food that has been eaten. The process by which the
nutritive element in food is diffused into the blood is called by
Aristotle an ava@vpíaois-volatilisation-in 456 b 3. It is an excess
of this exhalation which, when carried up to the brain, produces a
flow of phlegm.
vyícia is defined in Phys. vII. ch. 3, 246 b 5; Prob. 859 a 12, etc.
as a ovµµerpía-balanced proportion-of heat and cold (cf. beneath
1. 36).
444 a 18 sqq. Cf. above ch. 4, 441 b 30. Food is always a
mixture. Alexander explains that it is always the cold associated
with the liquid element in food which is the cause of its un-
healthiness. He, however, identifies the ava@vuíaσis from food
which causes catarrh with the odour which is connected with taste.
There is, however, nothing in the text to justify this and Aristotle
has just refused to identify odour with ȧvalvμíaois. Probably in
COMMENTARY
187
order to get my translation ovσa should be inserted after vypá. This
is ugly but possible. If we render 'whether dry or cold' there is no
point and, indeed, there is disagreement with the doctrine that all
food has both characteristics.
Aristotle is probably thinking of the supposed efficacy of some
perfumes in expelling colds and warding off infectious diseases.
444 a 20. seîa must be understood, if not read, after n ka' avтnv.
It appears after evwdous in MSS. LSU. Alexander interprets ǹdeîa
ὀσμή and Aristotle does not elsewhere talk of ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ὀσμή,
but of ἡ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡδεῖα (ὀσμή): cf. 443 b 30. Bekker's text is d
ἀπὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς τῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εὐώδους ὁπωσοῦν κ.τ.λ.
If we retain this reading the missing substantive after
evdovs cannot be τpoon as Bonitz (Ind. p. 533 a 3) suggests.
Aristotle is discussing not the food but the odour which is
ὠφέλιμος.
woéλuos. Hayduck (Prog. Kön. Gym. zu Meldorf, 1877) suggests
dový after evdovs, as also does Mr Cook Wilson (Journal of
Philol. XI. pp. 119-120); but it is doubtful whether dorn could
designate the objective quality of odour which is supposed to
promote health. The latter also suggests ἡ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς τῆς
καθ᾽ αὑτὴν ἡδείας εὐωδία.
I suggest ἡ δ᾽ ἀπὸ τῆς ὀσμῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν εὐωδία. Cf. 445 a I : αὐτῆς
δὲ καθ᾽ αὑτὴν τῆς δυσωδίας οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν.
Aristotle could quite well talk of εὐωδία καθ᾽ αὑτὴν and δυσωδία
καθ' αυτήν. ἡ καθ᾿ αὐτὴν εὐωδία would mean odour essentially pleasant,
whereas ἡ καθ' αὐτὴν ὀσμή would mean smell which is essentially
smell. But Aristotle does not wish to show that the opposite kind
of odour is not essentially odour, but that it is not essentially
pleasant.
444 a 21. διὰ τοῦτο. Because of its function in maintaining
health in man who is the final aim and end of all the endeavour
of nature. Aristotle is talking of smell in general; he does not
mean that its higher function is shared by any of the animals.
444 2 23. μετέχει κ.τ.λ. Aristotle seems to think of the air as
entering into the constitution of the body. Certain organs e.g. that
of hearing (cf. ch. 2, 438 b 21 and De Gen. Animal. v. ch. 2,
781 a 24 sqq.) seem to contain air. Animals that do not breathe
have a σúµquтоν пνeûμа which performs the same function as the
breath. (Cf. De Somno, 2, 456 a 12.) The probably spurious
writings περὶ πνεύματος and περὶ ζῴων κινήσεως also declare that
there is a σúμpuтov πveûµa in the lungs of respiring animals and in
188
DE SENSU
the heart. This doctrine may be a legitimate deduction from such
passages as the present. Cf. 481 a 1, 27, 482 a 34, 703 a 15 etc.
Cf. Introduction, sec. vi. and the passage there quoted where the
σύμφυτον θερμόν is also called πνεῦμα.
4442 26-27. ἡ γὰρ τῆς ὀσμῆς κ.τ.λ. Cf. Prob. 907 b 9: öλws ǹ
ỏσμn Sià Depμótŋta yívetai and cf. note to 443b 17.
444 a 27-31. There is no reason for considering that kara-
KÉXPηTAI…….KÍVηow should be postponed till 444 b 7 as Susemihl
(Philol. 1885) and Hammond think, or for deleting it as Hayduck
(op. cit.) wishes. It is certainly better to postpone it than to delete
it and it comes in quite well at b7, but it may stand here quite well
as a note to amplify what has been already said. It points out the
double function of åvarvon, the operation which has just been under
discussion.
ὡς παρέργῳ.
ús Tарéруw. Cf. De Resp. 473 a 24. The windpipe is the
essential organ for conveying the breath. When it is closed death
Not so in the other case.
ensues.
444 a 34. karà µéyeðos. Cf. De Part. Animal. 11. ch. 14, 658 b 8.
444 a 35. xalpe. St Hilaire (p. 61) has a marvellous notion
that Aristotle in distinguishing the higher kind of odour is erecting
a personal liking into a theory. But for evidence that the distinction
was widely recognised cf. Eth. Eud. 111. ch. 2, 1231 a 11: diò éµµetŵs
ἔφη Στρατόνικος τὰς μὲν καλὸν ὄζειν, τὰς δὲ ἡδύ.
444 b 3. Biehl and Bekker read dià tò åvaπveîv which, of course,
must be taken along with ὅσα πλεύμονα ἔχει. In that case we must
understand διὰ τὸ ἀναπνεῖν to be equivalent to ἀναπνοῆς ἕνεκεν because
we learn from De Resp. 476 a 7 that breathing is the final cause of
the existence of the lung (ὁ μὲν πλεύμων τῆς ὑπὸ τοῦ πνεύματος
καταψύξεως ἕνεκέν ἐστιν); the determining cause in the ordinary
sense both of the existence of the lung and of ava¬von alike is
rather the greater vital heat of respiring animals (cf. 477 a 14).
But if we take this reading, the sense becomes very difficult.
The sentence Toîs d'äλλois…..dúo πo 11. 2-5 will mean that Nature
gave the rest of the respiring animals the kind of smell not necessarily
connected (for health reasons) with the head, in order not to make
two organs and one of them have no functions. The thought will
be that the animals, having nostrils, may as well smell by them.
This is to make ὅπως μὴ αἰσθητήρια δύο ποιῇ equivalent to the well
known Aristotelian doctrine that Nature does nothing in vain. But
this doctrine may be variously interpreted; here it would mean that,
COMMENTARY
189
But such a
having once made a thing, Nature must assign it a use.
maxim is hardly to be identified with the principle of parcimony
-'entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem '--which is
surely the true import of the Aristotelian doctrine. If Nature really
does nothing in vain and does not wish to make a superfluity of
organs, it would surely be better not to give the lower animals
nostrils at all if the species of smell connected with food has no
necessary connection with the upper part of the head. A still
greater objection to the above interpretation is, that alonτnpia has
to be taken as referring (1) to the organ of smell and (2) to the
organ of breathing—the windpipe which is not an aiσ¤ŋτýpιov at all
(Alexander notices this).
It is as above that St Hilaire, following most commentators,
takes this passage, but Simon proposes to detach Sià rò άvaπveîv
from what precedes and connect it with what follows translating
as I have done. The reading must thus, of course, be dià toû
άvaπveîv which is the version found in мss. PU pr. S. This is also
supported by Mr Cook Wilson (Journal of Philol. XI. p. 120).
Cf. De Resp. 475 b 19: (τὴν κατάψυξιν ποιεῖται) διὰ τοῦ ἀναπνεῖν
Kai KπVεIV. The argument then is, that Nature made respiration
the means of perceiving odour in the case of the other respiring
animals in order to avoid making a separate sense organ for them.
The aioOnrypia dúo are the nostrils in man and the problematical
new organ of sensation in the other animals. Nature, in making
the lower respiring animals perceive odour by means of the nostrils,
avoided making a second sense organ of a new type-a type not
found in man, her chief creation. But in the case of the non-
respiring animals, as he goes on to say, probably some other
contrivance has to be resorted to. It is thus that Alexander
interprets from dróxpη onwards; hence it is strange he does not
notice the ineptitude of the reading διὰ τὸ ἀναπνεῖν.
444b 5. ἀπόχρη κ.τ.λ. Biehl, following EMY, strikes out
ἐπείπερ before and ὡς after the καὶ which precedes αναπνέουσιν.
These stand in Bekker's text, which if retained will hardly give the
sense required. St Hilaire renders-'et il leur suffit, quoiqu'ils
respirent les deux espèces d'odeurs comme les hommes, d'avoir
uniquement la perception de l'une des deux,'-a mistranslation.
Hammond-'It is enough for these respiring animals that they
have the sensation of only one class of smells' etc. But this is
merely an obvious and insipid deduction from what has been said
190
DE SENSU
about the greater size of the human brain, and besides it throws no
light, as it should, on the previous clause.
444 b 8.
Cf. De An. II. ch. 9, 421 b 26.
444 b 9. Evróµwv. Though insects live in air they do not respire,
thinks Aristotle. He had not the means at our disposal for obser-
vation, which show that the opposite is the case; cf. Packard, The
Study of Insects, p. 40; Owen, Compar. Anatom. and Physiol. of the
Invertebrate Animals, p. 368. Cf. ouк avaπveî тà evтоμα, De Resp.
οὐκ ἀναπνεῖ ἔντομα,
475 a 29. But they employ τὸ σύμφυτον πνεῦμα in a way analogous
to respiration cf. De Somno, ch. 2, 456 a 11 sqq. Cf. Hammond,
P. 305.
444 b 13. κνίπας. Not the species known by the name knipes
in modern Zoology, which is a 'beetle allied to the Cryptarcha.'
Cf. Hammond, p. 176.
444 b 13-14. ai Toppúpal. Not 'purple sea-fish' nor 'les rougets
de mer.' Aristotle asserts in Hist. Animal. VIII. ch. 2, 590 b 2 sqq.,
that Toppúρa is among the class of shell-fish that move and that it
is caught by a bait, as it feeds on small fishes.
444 b 21. érépa. Cf. De An., loc. cit. 421 b 20.
TOû yaρ K.T.λ. Cf. De An., loc. cit. 21-23.
γὰρ
It is strange that
Wallace (Aristotle's Psychology, p. 246) should think that Aristotle did
not really mean that the manner of perceiving smells was different
in respiring and non-respiring animals when he quotes (§ 7) the
passage from the De Sensu here beginning οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον.
By a difference in 'manner' Wallace must mean a difference in
the quality of the sensation. He blames Aristotle for being 'misled
by language' in assuming that odorous quality should be perceived
by the sense of odour.
But Aristotle throughout proceeds on the principle that the only
way for establishing the identity of sensations is the identity of their
objective ground. It is really impossible to tell whether the quali-
tative character of the mere subjective affection is identical in any
two people or any two species. We have to assume that, where the
objective content is the same, the quality of the sensation is the
same. Thus I believe that my sensation when I enjoy the perfume.
of a rose is the same as my neighbour's. We apprehend something
that is chemically identical.
Now, though Aristotle knew nothing of chemical qualities in our
sense, he tries to prove the objective identity of that which is
perceived both by respiring and non-respiring animals. He points
COMMENTARY
191
out in De An., loc. cit. 23, that it has the same physiological effect.
Strong odours-and he meant by odours practically chemicals
diffused either in air or water (cf. note to 443 b 2 and Introduction,
sec. VII.) have a destructive action upon both classes alike and
hence are the same. This inference was all the more easily made
because he conceived their effect to be exercised upon the organ of
smell or, at least the head, the region in which it is situated and out
of the material of which it is formed (cf. beneath 1. 34 kapnẞapovσi).
That there should be chemical qualities apart from taste or smell,
and qualities of any kind which are not perceived by some of the
senses, would have appeared strange to Aristotle and the normal
Greek mind, for which had not been shattered the harmony between
Nature and man, in whom evolution has developed senses to give
warning of most of the ordinary collocations of qualities which affect
his well-being. But, if Aristotle had discovered that any quality,
not distinguishable directly by man, still had an effect upon the
sentience of some other form of life (e.g. the ultra-violet rays on
ants), he would have been bound by his own principles to assume
the existence of a new sense in these creatures, if the quality which
affected them had a sufficient amount of objective difference from
the qualities which stimulate human sensibility.
444 6 24-25. ἀφαιρεῖ κ.τ.λ.
b
Cf. De An. 421 b 26-422 a 6, for a
closely parallel account. 422 a I : τοῖς δὲ τὸν ἀέρα δεχομένοις ἔχειν
ἐπικάλυμμα, ὃ ἀναπνεόντων ἀποκαλύπτεσθαι.
μὴ ἀναπνέοντα Cf. De An. 421 b 14: μὴ ἀναπνέων δὲ ἀλλ᾽ ἐκπνέων
ἢ κατέχων τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ ὀσμᾶται.
a
444 b 26. Cf. De An. 421 b 28: rà µèv yàp exeɩ þpáɣμa kai
ὥσπερ ἔλυτρον τὰ βλέφαρα, ἃ μὴ κινήσας μηδ᾽ ἀνασπάσας οὐχ ὁρᾷ.
444 b 28-29. Cf. De An., loc. cit. (continuing): tà dè σkλnpóp-
θαλμα οὐδὲν ἔχει τοιοῦτον ἀλλ᾽ εὐθέως ὁρᾷ τὰ γινόμενα ἐν τῷ διαφανεῖ.
Alexander and all other editors read ἐκ τοῦ δυνατοῦ ὁρᾶν αὐτῷ
evoús. In that case the meaning would be 'from the possession
of the faculty' or 'from the time when the faculty (of seeing) exists.'
The ancient Latin translation has ' a facultate existente.'
444 b 31. Svoxepaível. In Hist. Animal. IX. ch. 40, 626 a 26
he points out that bees dislike unpleasant smells. He probably is
thinking of this here and below in 1. 35-0eíov.
But in the De An. III. ch. 13, we hear that excessively strong
odours, colours, sounds do not destroy life except кarà ovμßeẞnкós,
435 b 10.
192
DE SENSU
444 b 35. θείου.
445 2 8. δι' ἄλλου.
ἔξωθεν αἰσθήσεις.
Cf. De An. 421 b 25.
Cf. above ch. 1, 436b 20: ai dè dià tŵv
The flesh (cf. De An. II. ch. 11, especially 423 b 26) really forms
a medium for touch. But the difference between this and an
external medium forms an important basis for classifying the senses.
Cf. De An. III. ch. 12, 434 b 15, and ch. 13, 435 a 16 sqq.
445 a II. καὶ ἐν ἀέρι κ.τ.λ. Because the objects of sight and
hearing exist in air and water. Alexander says that so far as the
γένεσις οἱ ὀσμή is due to ξηρότης it is related to taste and touch, so
of
far as ev vypoîs yíveral it is related to the externally mediated senses.
Note below τῷ διαφανεῖ = τῷ ὁρατῷ : cf. chapter 3.
445 a 15. οἷον βαφή τις.
Note that Aristotle does not say that
this is anything more than an analogue to the process which
produces odour.
445 a 18-19. Cf. De An. III. ch. 12, 434 b 20: vópos Sè kai
χρῶμα καὶ ὀσμὴ οὐ τρέφει. The Pythagoreans may have observed
the stimulating effect of some odours. Cf. Alex. De Sens.
p. 108 (W).
445 a 21. Alexander thinks that Aristotle means that, because
TEрITTOμата (TEрíтTwμα = excrement) are both dry and liquid, they
show that the food from which they are secreted is composite,
i.e. consisting of both y and dwp. (This must be so indeed
according to the doctrine of the IIepì paкpoßiórnτos, ch. 3, 465 b
18-19, where περίττωμα is said to be υπόλειμμα του προτέρου, i.e.
the food.)
αν
But probably the argument does not run quite in this way.
Aristotle says that food must be composite. But probably he
means a little more than merely μeμyμévov as in chapter 4,
441 b 30 sqq. σúveros when applied to the objects of sense tends
to mean more than merely composite, but refers continually to
things that have density: cf. Meteor. Iv. ch. 5, 382 a 26 sqq.: åπavтa
ἂν εἴη τὰ σώματα τὰ σύνθετα καὶ ὡρισμένα οὐκ ἄνευ πήξεως. τὸ
σύνθετον = τὸ συνεστηκός. Cf. συστησόμενον below. σώμα once more
tends to have the same application: cf. beneath 1. 25: erɩ ToλÙ ŶTTOV
εὔλογον τὸν ἀέρα σωματοῦσθαι, and σωματώδες above. Though all
the four elements, fire and air included, are σopara, yet we hear in
Prob. 932 b 2 : πυκνότερον ἡ θάλαττα καὶ μᾶλλον σῶμα. σωματώδης
and yewdns are constantly conjoined: cf. Bonitz, Ind. p. 745 b 21 sqq.
Now doun is nothing crassly material in this sense; cf. Prob.
COMMENTARY
193
865 a 21: oμµn où σwμaтwons. Hence he must prove that y
ἡ ὀσμὴ οὐ σωματώδης.
the most bodily of the elements, is an essential constituent of tρopý.
Hence he is probably thinking of Epírтwμa as something solid (it
is the heavy element in food (cf. 442 a 7), and hence is to be
identified with y, the heaviest element; cf. De An. III. ch. 13),
and more or less yeŵdes, and yŷ is έnpa. The argument is the
excrement proves that in the compound of which food consists there
must be solid matter. But it might be objected that the water in
it (and water is one of the media of odour) is the really nutritive
element. No, says Aristotle, water alone does not nourish; some
of the more solid elements must be mingled with it and, if that is
so, still less likely is it that air, which cannot be solidified, should
support life. The reasoning is very much condensed. Water, aukтov
apiktov
ov, cannot nourish a solid body. But cannot it be solidified?
Not unless something ye@des is mixed with it. This would be true
(cf. 44I a 30: θερμαινόμενον οὐδὲν φαίνεται παχυνόμενον τὸ ὕδωρ) except
in the case of freezing, which would certainly not produce a nutritive
solid! Still less likely is it that air could be solidified. On this
interpretation there is no need to insert i after ễrɩ 8, 1. 22, as
Hayduck, op. cit., suggests.
ม
The waste residue in plants is, Alexander explains, such sub-
stance as gum, the bark and in a way the leaves, etc.
445 a 26. TÓTOS SEKTIKòs, i.e. ʼn Koiλía: cf. De Somno, 3, 456 b 2, 3:
τῆς μὲν οἶν θύραθεν τροφῆς εἰσιούσης εἰς τοὺς δεκτικούς τόπους.
445 a 29. άvalvμiáσews. Cf. note to 443 a 23 and cf. 444 a 24.
Aristotle allows the ava@vuíaois theory in this modified form. The
medium may be described as an avabvuíaois. Just as in the previous
chapters, here also he adopts something from previous theories.
The medium is a gas, in the case of breathing animals at least, but
not an exhalation from the odorous substance. But he can only
explain odour as a quasi-diffusion of substance in this gas. With
Aristotle, however, it is difficult to distinguish medium and object
(cf. above 445 a 14 where he identifies rò ôparóv and rò diapavés),
and so we should be bound to say odour was an avalvμíaois of
some sort; cf. Introduction, sec. vii. That is however not quite
accurate, as it is some nature common to both gases and liquids
that is rò Síooμov or the κown puois of the two to Aristotle.
He seems here to have in a way anticipated the discovery of the
truth that the diffusion of a substance in a liquid is analogous to its
behaviour as a gas. Once more he differs from modern theory in
R.
13
194
DE SENSU
regarding τὸ δίοσμον as a κοινὴ φύσις which had a permanent existence
of its own instead of as a mere state, or disposition to act, of matter
which may cease to be so characterized.
445 a 32. aiołńoews. This perhaps points to some subjective.
experience of his own.
445 b I. As Biehl suggests, περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν must have fallen
out or must at least be presupposed before καθ᾽ ἕκαστον αισθητήριον.
Aristotle has not discussed the aioOnrypta since chap. 2, except
incidentally in chap. 5, and at the beginning of chap. 3 (439 a 7) he
proposes to give an objective account περὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ᾿
ἕκαστον αισθητήριον.
CHAPTER VI.
445 b 3. ei πâv oŵμa K.T.λ. This is a principle with Aristotle. Cf.
De Coelo, I. ch. I ad init. σῶμα is μέγεθος ἐπὶ τρία—a tridimensional
magnitude. More strictly péye@os is the quantitative determination
that all bodies possess. μéyelos is that which is divisible into con-
tinuous parts (cf. Metaph. v. ch. 13, 1020 a 11: μéуelos dè Tò Eis
συνεχή (διαιρετόν)). The continuous (τὸ συνεχές) is that which is
infinitely divisible. Compare De Coelo, 268 a 6: ovvexès µév ẻσTI Tò
διαιρετὸν εἰς ἀεὶ διαιρετά, σῶμα δὲ τὸ πάντῃ διαιρετόν. Cf. also Phys.
III. chs. 6, 7. There Aristotle tells us that μeyéon are infinitely divisible
only; ¿.e. though the process of division can be carried ad infinitum
there are no actually existing infinitely small parts. Compare μéyelos
1. 10 below, ouvexés 1. 29, etc.
TO
445 b 4. πаðńμаτа, a variant for ά0ŋ: cf. Bonitz, Ind. p. 554.
In De Coelo, 1. ch. 1 Aristotle tells us that the objects of physical
science are μεγέθη καὶ σώματα with their πάθη and κινήσεις, and the
apxaí, i.e. the elements.
4455 7. ποιητικόν. Cf. ch. 3, 439 a 18: ποιήσει τὴν αἴσθησιν etc.
This is not intended as an argument for the alternative adúvarov, but
is rather a development of the positive thesis that infinite divisibility
of the σώμα entails infinite divisibility of the πάθος.
4455 9. τήν τε αἴσθησιν. Infinite divisibility of the παθήματα
αισθητά means infinite divisibility of the αἴσθησις. Hence all bodies,
however minute, will cause sensation and be perceptible.
445 b 10. ἀδύνατον κ.τ.λ. This looks as if it established not the
proposition to be proved but its converse. But the reasoning no doubt
is-'could we not have ato@nois, extremely minute, which is not the
perception of a body?' 'No,' says Aristotle, 'we cannot have any
perception, take colour for example, in which the content is not a
quantum and hence a determination of σώμα.
Cf. below ch. 7, 449 a 22 : τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν ἐστὶ μέγεθος κ.τ.λ.
445 b 16. Tŵv µaðŋµatikŵv, e.g. lines, points, planes etc. It had
been part of the Pythagorean doctrine to give these substantial exist-
ence and to make everything consist of them. (Cf. Metaph. 1. ch. 8,
Uor M
!
13-2
196
DE SENSU
989 b 29 sqq., and also Metaph. xIII. ch. 1.) Aristotle distinguishes
the objects of mathematics from those of physics in Phys. II. ch. 2,
and elsewhere. They are determinations of number and magnitude
taken in abstraction from the concrete-rà ¿§ åpaιpéσews (cf. De
An. 1. ch. 1, 403 b 15) and more particularly considered apart from
the motion or change of the objects to which they belong. Compare
also Metaph. vi. ch. 1, 1026 a 7 sqq. They are not really separable
from the things of sense like the object of metaphysics but are con-
sidered as such. Cf. De An. III. ch. 7, 431 b 15: тà μаlημатikà ov
111. µalnµatikà
κεχωρισμένα ως κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ (ὁ μαθηματικός). The argument is that
if the constituents of sensible objects are not themselves sensible, the
only alternative left is that they are mathematical entities.
ἔτι κ.τ.λ. We must take this as a further argument against the
existence of imperceptible bodies.
It has been conceded that if sensation is not divisible ad infinitum
the ultimate constituents of bodies are not objects of sense, and
further they cannot be objects of consciousness at all, as they cannot
be merely mental entities-voŋrá. We know objects either by
alo@nois or by vous or, as in the case of mathematical entities
(already ruled out of court), by a union of the two.
445 b 17. voûs is that faculty of the soul which is peculiar to
man among mortal creatures and which receives the en-forms or
intelligible character-of things without their matter (λn). Cf. De
An. III. chs. 4-8. The objects of voûs are voŋrά and these
evidently are simply conceptual contents, as they are said to have
their concrete existence in the sensible forms of things. Cf. De
An. 111. ch. 8, 432 a 2 sqq. νοῦς in operation (ἐι εργεία) is identical
with its objects (431 b 17, Metaph. XII. ch. 7, 1072 b 21).
οὐδὲ νοεῖ κ.τ.λ. These insensible objects are the constituents of
external bodies and hence must be external. They must be owμara
σώματα
and contain ʊλŋ, and aïo¤ŋoɩs is indispensable for the apprehension
of such objects. Cf. Metaph. VIII. ch. 1, 1042 a 25: ai SaioOntai
οὐσίαι πᾶσαι ὕλην ἔχουσιν. They must be καθ' ἕκαστα, and these are
the objects of aïo@nois: cf. De An. 11. ch. 5, 417 b 22, etc.
Though Aristotle does not employ this argument here against
the existence of imperceptible magnitudes, it raises a difficulty which
besets all modern theories of atoms, ether etc. Physical scientists of
a certain school continually talk of the atom as a mere concept.
They do not explain how it is possible for solid bodies to be composed
of concepts. Cf. Karl Pearson, Grammar of Science, ch. vII. passim.
Mnou
COMMENTARY
197
445 b 19. The theory of atoms lies at the basis of the doctrine
of aπóрporaι previously discussed, chapter 4 ad fin. It consists in
finding the reality of physical bodies not in their sensuous cha-
racteristics, but in some quantitative determination of their minute.
parts. But Aristotle refuses to entertain the theory that there are
bodies with no sensible and only mathematical qualities, and in par-
ticular that they are atoms in the strict sense of bodies perfectly
indivisible.
περὶ κινήσεως.
445 b 21. Toîs Tepi Kɩvnσews. The reference is to the Physics-
frequently styled тà teρì kɩýoews, and in particular, as Alexander
says, to the last books. Thomas is still more explicit and says the
sixth, where indeed the chief discussion of the doctrine of indi-
visible magnitudes is to be found. The theory that magnitude is
infinitely divisible will be found in the third book, chs. 6 and 7
(cf. note to 445 b 3) and the definition of continuity which, being
the characteristic of all magnitude, entails its infinite divisibility, is
to be found in Book v. ch. 3. Things that are continuous have a
common boundary—ὅταν ταὐτὸ γένηται καὶ ἓν τὸ ἑκατέρου πέρας οἷς
άπтоνтαι (227а 11). This is practically repeated in VI. ch. 1: σuvex
μèv ův тà čσxaтa ev (231 a 22), where he goes on to show that nothing
continuous can be made up of indivisible parts. Indivisible parts
must be either entirely discrete or entirely coincident, and so cannot
compose the continuous.
Hence Aristotle arrives at another definition of the continuous.
It is that which is divisible into parts themselves infinitely divisible—
déyw dè tò ouvexès tò diaɩpetòv eis deì diaipetá (232 b 24). Since
continuity is the universal characteristic of magnitude, this yields us
the further proposition that magnitude is that which is divisible into
magnitudes πᾶν μέγεθος εἰς μεγέθη διαιρετόν 232 23). Aristotle
shows in addition that, if magnitudes were composed of indivisible
parts, motions would be impossible; every distance would be tra-
versed as soon as entered upon if motion, like magnitude, were made
up of indivisible parts. Motion is continuous and likewise time.
a
Those proofs, it is obvious, affect only atoms that are held to be
spatially indivisible. To the modern theory which recognises that
the atom must have a definite bulk and even a composite structure
Aristotle's refutation does not apply. The atoms are only physically
not spatially discontinuous, and there is no more difficulty in
imagining minute discrete bodies than in the perception of discrete
masses appreciable to sight. Aristotle's other objections to an
198
DE SENSU
atomic theory are to be found mostly in the De Coelo and the De
Generatione et Corruptione (cf. Zeller, Aristotle and the Earlier
Peripatetics, Vol. I. pp. 430 sqq., pp. 445 sqq.). As Zeller says,
without the modern theories of chemical, molecular and gravitational
attraction, it was difficult to see how discrete atoms could cohere in
a solid body, and hence Aristotle's criticism of the ancient atomists
was justified. At the same time also, the arguments in the Physics
form a valuable corrective to such modern thought as regards all the
individual things of sense as really discrete in structure and only
apparently continuous. They are only discrete from one point of
view; relatively to the molecule or the atom they are discrete, but
relatively to other composite structures water and iron are continuous.
To be continuous is to be thought of merely as a magnitude so far as
internal structure is concerned. So elastic balls may have many
properties and many forms of action on each other and on other
things; but these are relations to external things that affect them as
a whole; when regarded in this way they are considered as being
internally merely magnitudes, i.e. as continuous. The atom itself
relatively to which they are discrete must itself relatively to them be
regarded as merely a magnitude, i.e. as continuous. One does not
inquire what makes the parts of the atom cohere together and, if one
did, one would have to think of the atom as being composed of
smaller atoms which again must be continuous. But there comes a
point where this continual division and subdivision of matter ceases
to have interest. Hence we cannot look to the discreteness of
matter for its reality. The reality of objects must lie, as Aristotle
said, in the 'form' or, as modern theory would put it, in the law of
the combination of their elements and the qualitative difference to
which that gives rise.
445 b 24. ῶν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. The passage where we find the
doctrine expounded is in the Posterior Analytics 1. ch. 20, 82 a 21 sqq.
(Cf. also ch. 22, 84 a 29.) There, however, it is set forth in another
connection. Aristotle shows that the number of terms to be inter-
posed between the subject and predicate of any proposition which
we desire to demonstrate, is not infinite. If it were, the proposition
could never be proved, as it is impossible to traverse the infinite.
All the terms in the series must be contiguous, with nothing inter-
vening between them...ἐχόμενα ἀλλήλων ὥστε μὴ εἶναι μεταξύ (82 2 31).
If there were an infinity of terms to be inserted at any point in the
series, it would constitute a break and the terms would not be
a
COMMENTARY
199
contiguous. (For the definition of exóμevov cf. Phys. v. ch. 3,
227 2 6—ἐχόμενον δὲ ὃ ἂν ἐφεξῆς ὂν ἅπτηται, and 226 b 23-ἅπτεσθαι
δὲ ὧν τὰ ἄκρα ἅμα.)
τα
There is some difference, however, between a series of terms
bound together by the identity of the subject of which they are pre-
dicated and a number of specifically diverse but generically identical.
qualities. According to Aristotle, in both cases they are to be con-
sidered as a series arranged between two extremes. In the case of
qualities these extremes are the members of the series with least
specific resemblance and, if one takes seriously the spatial designation
(tà ẻvtós or tà ảvà μéσov) applied to them, the intermediate members
of the group must be thought of as being arranged in accordance
with the amount of the resemblance they each possess to the
extremes. We have seen, however, (chapters 3 and 4) that Aristotle
does not prefer to think of them as forming a continuum like a line,
but as being formed by different proportions in the admixture of the
two fundamental extreme qualities, e.g. black and white, sweet and
bitter. Though forming a linear series, they do not constitute a
uniformly continuous line. Thus though he may, as here, talk of
opposites (èvavría) in terms of spatial relation and call them čσxara
(cf. Categ. ch. 6, 6 a 17: τὰ πλεῖστον ἀλλήλων διεστηκότα τῶν ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ γένει ἐναντία ὁρίζονται) qualitative difference is really other than
spatial diversity. It is this that causes the number of species in a
genus to be limited in number. If a genus were really a spatial
whole, its parts, the species, would need not merely to be exóμeva-
contiguous, but ouvex-continuous, and hence capable of resolution
into an infinite number of subdivisions (cf. note to 445 b 21). If the
members of the series were not merely contiguous but had a common
boundary, as things continuous have, it would mean that there was
no reason for drawing the boundary between any two at one point
rather than another. The only common boundaries are spatial exist-
ences-point, line and surface, and these can be drawn anywhere.
It is magnitude that is per se continuous, but in so far as genera are
not magnitudes they are not per se continuous (кať avtò ovveɣès, l. 30)
and besides do not present this aspect of infinite divisibility.
445 b 25. oxara. Cf. notes to ll. 21 and 24 above.
πᾶν δὲ κ.τ.λ. Cf. 442 b 20.
445 b 28-30. Division into unequal parts is, Alexander tells us,
progressive division of the parts which the first division yields into
the same fraction as that which they are of the whole, e.g. the division
200
DE SENSU
of a line into two and again of the half into two and so on. This is
the special example of 'unequal division' which Aristotle, in Phys.
VIII. ch. 8, 263 a 3 sqq. in reply to Zeno, shows to be infinite-év dè
τῷ συνεχεῖ ἔνεστι μὲν ἄπειρα ἡμίση, ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ ἐντελεχείᾳ ἀλλὰ δυνάμει
(263 b 28). Any actual division of a continuum into distinct parts is
finite. In order for the parts to be distinct the termini of adjacent
parts must be, at least, reckoned as distinct. Hence the whole,
which was continuous, by the division ceases to be so and ipso facto
loses that capacity for infinite division which, as continuous, it
possessed.
True the parts again can be divided, but any division of them
into distinct elements which can actually be realised is once more
finite.
εἶναι.
All this seems to point to the conclusion that the very spatial
determinant by which we are able to construct a continuum, e.g. a
line, and to consider it as resoluble into distinct parts, is itself a
qualitative distinction (e.g. direction right or left) which exists over
and above the characteristic of magnitude, which is the universal
attribute of spatial quantity. Aristotle goes so far as to say (263b 7)
συμβέβηκε γὰρ τῇ γραμμῇ ἄπειρα ἡμίσεα εἶναι, ἡ δ᾽ οὐσία ἐστὶν ἑτέρα
Kai Tò eivaι. Thus, not only has a line (with all other figures) a
non-quantitative aspect, but the possibility of determining it as a
quantity depends upon this qualitative character. (Cf. also for the
general doctrine III. ch. 7, 207 b 10: ажεɩpoɩ yàp ai dixotoμíaι Tov
μeуélovs.) The result, however, of this is that anything considered
as a continuum divides into a limited number of units (oa can mean
little else than units; all things considered as units are held to be
equal) but an infinite number of diminishing fractions. Units are
the constituents of a continuum, species of a genus.
απ
445 b 30. τὸ δὲ μὴ κ.τ.λ. Cf. note to 1. 24 above.
445 b 31. ὑπάρχει δὲ κ.τ.λ.
Cf. above 445 b 10 sq.: ádúvatov
λευκὸν μὲν ὁρᾶν, μὴ ποσὸν δέ. Spatial quantity or μέγεθος = τὸ συνεχές.
Cf. also De An. III. ch. 3, 428 b 24: kívησis kai μéуelos å ovμẞéẞηке
τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς.
445 b 32 sqq. There is a somewhat similar passage in Phys. VII.
ch. 5, 250 a 20 sqq. The sound which one single grain of millet
makes in falling exists as a separate sound (κaľ avтò) only potenti
ally in the whole, ie. it is not actually a separate sound-ovdè yàp
οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀλλ᾽ ἢ δυνάμει ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ (2502 24). For the general
question as to how far Aristotle by his distinction between potential
COMMENTARY
201
and actual settles the difficulty about petites perceptions and sub-
consciousness generally, cf. Introduction, sec. VIII.
446 a 2. Siéσe. A quarter of a tone was the least interval taken
notice of in Greek music. Hence, I fancy, ó év Tŷ diéσel plóyyos
διέσει
must be a sound with difference in pitch from that of the one before
it within, e. less than, a quarter-tone. Aristotle means that the
interval of a quarter of a tone is not thought of as resoluble into
parts, as larger intervals are. The parts of an interval are not
however sensations. Hence this phenomenon is hardly parallel to
that in the illustration from sight or that quoted in note to 445 b 32
above from the Physics. In those instances we have sensations
which per se are not actually appreciable when existing concomitantly,
being merged in the whole of which they are elements.
For Sieσis cf. Anal. Post. 1. ch. 23, 84 b 38: apyn (i.e. ultimate
simple (åπλoûv) constituent) év pédei dieσis. In Metaph. XIV. ch. 1,
1o87 b 35 it is called ὑποκείμενον ἐν ἁρμονίᾳ.
446 a 3. συνεχούς ὄντος. The notes are still continuous in time.
446 a 4. λavlável. Hence there seems to be no μeraέú; the notes
seem to be exóμeva áλλýλwv, i.e. contiguous but separate, and hence
the continuity of the scale is broken up.
446a 6. Suváμel K.T.λ. The difficulty in this obscure passage is
increased by the discrepancy between the MSS. ΕΜΥ read ὅταν μὴ
χωρὶς ᾖ; ὅταν χωρισθῇ is the reading given by most others and by
Alexander. I have followed that of EMY, which is supported by
the ancient Latin translation, because of the difficulty of giving any
sensible interpretation to the following sentence, καὶ γὰρ διαιρεθεῖσα,
if we read xwpion; the sense it gives does not really conflict with
what is said later on.
··
Aristotle says that the very minute parts of the objects of sense,
if not separated, are perceived only potentially and not actually. But
this does not commit him to the statement that, if severed from the
whole, they are actually perceptible. This is no doubt the general
rule; an object like a one-foot measure which has only potential
existence in a larger whole is made actual by being marked off. It
then becomes an explicit object of consciousness, not merely a
potential one. But, he goes on to say, very minute fractions cannot
exist in isolation from the whole, as the larger parts of a whole can
when broken off. They lose their identity (cf. note to 446 a 9 below,
De Gen. et Corr. 1. ch. 10, 328 a 24 sqq.) and become parts of the
new substance into which they are absorbed, and increase its bulk.
202
DE SENSU
As such they cannot be even merely potentially perceptible as parts
of the substance to which they belonged originally. They are, no
doubt, potentially perceptible parts of the new substance but, if they
have lost their eldos, as Aristotle says in De Gen. et Corr., loc. cit., they
cannot be on the same footing as elements which have entered into
a true mixture and which, on resolution of the mixture, become
actually what they were before.
σ
These considerations make it clear that, when in 1. 11 √ TÊS
aiσlýσews vπeρoxý is mentioned, Aristotle means the minute sen-
sation which can be even potentially per se perceptible only when
coming from a part of the object which is not separated from the
whole. He argues the minute alo@nois which has only existence
in a more distinct sensation (ev Tŷ ȧкρißeσтépa) and, as such, is only
potentially in its individuality a sensation, is not per se actually per-
ceptible and hence capable of isolation; hence the similarly minute
object of sense (Tò TηλIKOÛTOν alonτov), which causes it, must be in
the same case. It is not per se actually perceptible, but added to
and taken along with the other parts of the whole it is actually
perceptible and, since that is so, it, even in its individuality, must be
thought of as being only potentially an object of sense.
It is, I suppose, прoσуevóμevov (1. 16) which has prompted some
interpreters to think that Aristotle is considering the fortunes of the
minute part of the grain of millet in actual isolation. But, if it were
per se potentially perceptible when in actual isolation from the whole
to which it belongs, one would expect that the change caused by
addition to the whole would be to raise it, as such, to actual
perceptibility; but this Aristotle will not allow. πроσуevóμevov, as we
see from 1. 20 below and Phys. 250 a 24, just means ev tậ öλw.
There is no reason why it should not be used of intellectual as well
as of actual addition.
τὸ αἰσθητὸν χωριστὸν αἰσθάνεσθαι (1. 14) does not imply that the
αἰσθητόν exists χωρίς; it means, practically, to perceive it καθ' αυτό.
Similarly things that exist χωρίς-χωριστά—are identified with οὐσίαι,
the independent existences which are the subjects of predication,
and which Aristotle in Anal. Post. 1. ch. 4, 73 b 9 calls κaľ AνTά.
Cf. Metaph. vII. ch. 3, 1029 a 28: Tò xwpiσtòv kaì tò tóde ti útápɣei
δοκεῖ μάλιστα τῇ οὐσίᾳ.
We can easily explain the substitution of χωρισθῇ for μὴ χωρὶς ᾖ
by an editor who read on and found that xwpís the minute parts of
objects were not actually perceptible, and indeed could not exist
COMMENTARY
203
and retain their previous character, if his logic led him to believe
that 'if not separate then not actually perceptible' contradicted the
statement 'if separate not perceived' (xwpisóμevai K.T.λ.). Such
statements are only apparently in opposition. If we retain xwpioły,
we shall have to translate 'they are potentially perceptible but not,
when in isolation, actually so. [This is different from the case of]
the one-foot measure which exists potentially in the two-foot rule
and actually when bisection is made.' But the ellipse to be supplied
is so extraordinary that one might justly, with Biehl, suspect the
authenticity of the whole clause if xwpion is to be read. Its
genuineness, if we adopt the better attested reading, is confirmed by
the force of kai yàp. Aristotle is pointing out that even in the case
of large objects like the one-foot rule the same thing holds good as
οἱ τὰ μικρὰ πάμπαν.
a
446 2 8. διαιρεθεῖσα is here equivalent to ἀφαιρεθεῖσα if it is to
make any sense.
It is not the one-foot rule which is bisected but
Hence one would expect diapedeion (Bywater,
the two-foot measure.
J. of P. xvIII. p. 243) or diαipedeίons Taútηs. But perhaps this sense
of diapeîv is idiomatic. Cf. note to ch. 3, 439 b 20 diedoµévovs.
446 a 9. καὶ διαλύοιντο. In addition to being so very minute as
to surpass (vπepéxew) the discrimination of the sense, these minute
particles lose their self-identity on being isolated.
vπeрoуý is, as the commentators notice, employed in rather a
different sense from the usual. It naturally means excess in great-
ness: cf. chapter 3, 439 b 31.
For the doctrine cf. De Gen. et Corr. I. ch. 10, 328 a 24 sqq.:
ὅσα εὐδιαίρετα, πολλὰ μὲν ὀλίγοις καὶ μεγάλα μικροῖς συντιθέμενα οὐ
ποιεῖ μίξιν, ἀλλ᾽ αὔξησιν τοῦ κρατοῦντος· μεταβάλλει γὰρ θάτερον εἰς
τὸ κρατοῦν, οἷον σταλαγμὸς οἴνου μυρίοις χοεῦσιν ὕδατος οὐ μίγνυται·
λύεται γὰρ τὸ εἶδος καὶ μεταβάλλει εἰς τὸ πᾶν ὕδωρ.
446 a II. The minute fraction of substance in isolation from
the rest is not perceptible at all. Aristotle goes on to discuss what
happens when we do perceive it in some way when ἐπελήλυθεν ἡ ὄψις.
δυνάμει
446 a 12. Suváμa yap. We are not now discussing the separate
existence, but the separate perceptibility of the object—rò aiolŋtóv,
but in the sensation (ato@nois) to exist and to be perceptible is the
same; hence it is indifferent which of the two we assert to be
potential.
446 a 18. évvπάрɣew means practically to form a constituent ;
cf. Metaph. v. ch. 13, 1o2o a 7: ποσὸν λέγεται τὸ διαιρετὸν εἰς ἐνυπάρ-
204
DE SENSU
Xovra and Anal. Post. I. ch. 22, 84 a 14 sqq.; 'odd' évvπáрxeι
in the definition of number, while number irápxe-belongs to, or is
a predicate of, odd. Cf. also the definition of ὕλη-ἐξ οὗ γίνεταί τι
évvπáруоνтos, etc., cf. Bonitz, Ind. p. 257. Hence it is probable
that Aristotle is thinking of the μeyéon which compose finite bodies
as the subject here, as évváрxew is generally used of that which
stands to anything in the relation of An.
Perhaps, however, he is thinking of xpuμara etc. as the subject.
In that case the translation will run--'But when determinations of
colour, taste or sound, existing in the concrete are so related to each
other as to be also actually perceptible and perceptible, not merely
in the whole but individually, they must be limited in number.'
This would mean that he is talking once more of the πeπepaσμéva
eton of sense qualities. But they have already been accounted for,
and this seems to touch on the only case left undescribed—the
distinguishable parts of a continuum, which are èvepyeía perceptible
not merely in combination but in isolation. If this be the inter-
pretation, the argument is that, in the case when the constituents of
the objects perceived are distinct and individually perceptible and
hence limited in number, the qualities presented by them must
have the same limitation. xpúμara etc. are but items of sensuous
determination, though, no doubt, Aristotle is thinking of the different
colours and sounds etc., as presented in the form of segments in a
continuum.
446 2 19 πρὸς αὐτὰ, Alexander reads Toσaura which perhaps, if
understood as meaning 'of sufficient size or intensity,' i.e. Tоσαûтa Tò
μéyelos, improves the sense. We must not understand 'sufficiently
numerous,' i.e. тоσаûтα тò πλños, as no multiplication of the numbers
of the insensible parts of objects makes the parts any the more per-
ceptible per se. πрòs avтà can, however, quite well mean 'in relation
to each other.' Cf. kavraîs below ch. 7, 447 b 32.
a
4462 24. ὅταν ἐνεργῶσιν may be taken either with the clause
before or with ἀφικνοῦνται.
τὸ μέσον = τὸ μεταξύ, which is defined in terms of this pheno-
menon in local movement in Phys. v. ch. 3, 226 b 23: µETAέv
δὲ εἰς ὃ πέφυκε πρῶτον ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὸ μεταβάλλον, ἢ εἰς ὃ ἔσχατον
μεταβάλλει κατὰ φύσιν συνεχώς μεταβάλλον.
446 a 28. 'Eμπedoкλns. Cf. De An. 11. ch. 7, 418 b 20: kaì oỷk
ὀρθῶς Εμπεδοκλῆς...ὡς φερομένου τοῦ φωτὸς καὶ τεινομένου ποτὲ μεταξὺ
τῆς γῆς καὶ τοῦ περιέχοντος, ἡμᾶς δὲ λανθάνοντος.
}
COMMENTARY
205
Aristotle goes on to say that it is asking too much to wish us to
believe that light passes from east to west across the whole sky
without the movement being detected. It was, of course, impossible
without modern scientific instruments and methods to discover the
movement of light. For the Empedoclean theory cf. chapter 3.
Cf. also R. P. § 177, Zeller's Presocratic Phil. (Eng. Trans.), II. p. 158.
According to Philoponus, on this theory light was a oua issuing
from the illuminating body, vide below 446 b 30.
446 2 32. ποθέν ποι Cf. Metaph. XII. ch. 2, 1069 b 26 and Nic.
Ethics, x. ch. 3, 1174a 30, and Phys. vII. ch. 1, 242 a 31: TÒ KƖVOÚ-
μενον πᾶν ἔκ τινος εἴς τι κινεῖται.
446 b I.
Time is infinitely divisible like motion and magnitude;
cf. Phys. Iv. chs. 11, 12; VI. 1, 2, 3 etc.; VIII. ch. 8, 263 b 27: ovx
οἷόν τε εἰς ἀτόμους χρόνους διαιρεῖσθαι τὸν χρόνον.
ἅμα
446 b 3. aμа K.T.A. This is equivalent to saying it is instan-
taneous. An act of perception is in this characteristic distinct from
local movement, which cannot be instantaneous: cf. Phys. vi. ch. 1,
231b 30: εἰ Θήβαζέ τις βαδίζει, ἀδύνατον ἅμα βαδίζειν Θήβαζε καὶ
βεβαδικέναι Θήβαζε. Perception is an ἐνέργεια, which as such has no
yéveσis: cf. Alex. De Sens. p. 126 (W.) and above, Introduction,
sec. IV.
446 b 5. The construction here seems to be defective. As I
have translated, instead of οὐδὲν ἧττον, οὐδὲν μᾶλλον should have
been written; but it was natural to say τTOV when denying that
they possessed the aspect of process any the less on account of the
instantaneousness of the act of perception considered as a psychical
event. Perhaps, indeed, Aristotle wrote µâλλov, for which by a
blunder ἧττον was substituted; or he may have written ἀλλ᾽ οὐκ εἰσιν.
Thomas and Simon, however, punctuate after yíyveσðaɩ, making
the apodosis begin at oμws. In this case we must regard dŋλoî……
d'épa, 11. 7–10, as a parenthesis and translate from 1. 4 kaì µÝj K.T.λ.—-—
' and if sensations have no genesis, but exist without coming to be,
yet, as sound, etc...., is not the same true of colour and light?'
Cf. Phys. VIII. ch. 6, 258 b 17, De Coelo, 1. ch. 11, 280 b 27.
Aristotle means that the instantaneousness of the psychic act
does not detract from the lapse of time in the physical process.
Though there is no yéveous in the former, there is in the latter.
Hammond conjectures oµoíws for oμws and translates, 'Also if
thing at the same moment hears and has heard, and in a word
perceives and has perceived, and there is no time process in sensa-
every-
206
DE SENSU
tions, nevertheless they lack this process in the same way in which
sound, after the blow has been struck, has not yet reached the ear.'
But I fail to see how a sound which is on its passage to the ear can
be said to 'lack process' and how, if this were so, it would help
Aristotle's argument. Moreover Aristotle does not say that we are
unaware of the lapse of time which takes place while a sound is
being transmitted. He implies the opposite. He only says that in
the psychical act there is no process.
αν
446 b 8. μeтаoxnμátiσis is a change of shape: cf. De Coelo, II.
ch. 7, 305 b 29 (γίγνεσθαι) τῇ μετασχηματίσει, καθάπερ ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ
κηροῦ γίγνοιτ' ἂν σφαῖρα καὶ κύβος. μετασχηματίζεσθαι is also con-
joined with (though differentiated from) åλλocovoða. It consists in
the rearrangement of elements which retain the same nature, while
adλoovσlaι indicates qualitative change.
μετασχηματίζεσθαι is that form of γένεσις that would specially suit
an atomic theory and hence Aristotle applies it to the propagation
of sound, which he conceives of in quite a mechanical way. He
evidently thinks of the air taking on a different oxua for every
different articulate sound. These are subject to alteration in pro-
portion to the distance we are from the person with whom we are
talking. He is evidently thinking mainly of mistakes in following
some one's words, not merely of inability to hear at all. That would
rather be accounted for by the absence of definite σxîμa than
by change of oxμa in the air which communicates the motion or
in the motion transmitted.
446 b 11. τῷ πως ἔχειν. Alexander interprets—τῷ κατὰ σχέσιν
εἶναι. He distinguishes three classes of relata :
(1) Those which are κarà σxéow, e.g. loa, ouoia etc., in which
the mode of their relation (the σxéσɩs) does not depend upon their
relative position in space.
(2) Those which are κατὰ σχέσιν, but where the σχέσις con-
sists in spatial relation (ἐν ποιᾷ θέσει), e.g. δεξιόν.
(3) Those, e.g. aïolŋois and aionτóv, which, though requiring
some σχέσις which consists in spatial relation (οὐχ ᾧ μηδὲν αὐτῇ
(sc. τῇ ὄψει) διαφέρειν τὴν θέσιν τῶν ὁρωμένων καὶ τὸ διάστημα πρὸς τὸ
ὁρᾶν) are not strictly ἐν σχέσει, like τὸ δεξιόν, but require a δύναμις
ἀντιληπτική on the part of the αἴσθησις. Light might travel from
object to eye on account of the spatial relation of the two, but vision
would not result unless the eye were endowed with a certain faculty.
This, in the minds of certain other commentators, e.g. Simon and
COMMENTARY
207
Thomas, seems to connect with the distinction drawn between certain
classes of relata in Metaph. v. ch. 15, 1020 b 26 sqq.
In this chapter there are likewise three main divisions of relata :
(1) τὰ κατ' ἀριθμὸν λεγόμενα, e.g. τὰ ἴσα. Things are equal of
which the quantity is one (loa dè ŵv tò toσòv év,
ων
πο
1021 a 12).
(2) τὰ κατὰ δύναμιν λεγόμενα, eg. τὸ θερμαῖνον πρὸς τὸ θερ-
μαινόμενον.
(3) Such as τὸ ἐπιστητόν and ἐπιστήμη, αἰσθητόν and αἴσθησις.
In the first two classes (cf. Bonitz, Metaph. p. 261) the whole
notion of the relata can be discovered in the relation. A is under-
stood by being referred to B, and B by being referred to A. In the
third class, however, the relation is not mutual; one of the terms
requires independent explanation; rò aio@nróv can be explained by
referring alo@nois to it, but aïo@nois requires other definition than
reference to rò aiolŋróv. We advance no further by saying that
vision is relative to those things of which there is vision, dis yàp
tavtòv eipnµévov av ein (1021 a 32).
Aristotle's meaning, however, is no more than this, that oyis
is not explained by being regarded as relative to rò opoμevov, but if
we refer it to xpôμa it can very well be defined and we obviate any
useless repetition. Hence the distinction does not affect the real
relation of the object of vision (xpŵµa) to vision (os), but only the
mental way of relating them when the former is styled not xpŵμa but
the object of vision—τὸ ὁρώμενον.
Thus there is no justification for Simon's attempt to connect this
distinction with that here. He says, the 'ratio' in a relation of this
kind pendet ab alio, and hence there must be activity on the part of
Tò aiσOŋTóv which, hence, must be at a distance.
Nor is there necessarily a reference to the δύναμις ἀντιληπτική οf
sense, as Alexander conjectures.
Aristotle simply states that seer and thing seen must occupy
definite positions; their relation must depend to some extent at least
upon their relative féσis. They are not like things of which the
relation is purely non-spatial like equals. It is not the manner and
mode of their being which relates them, as in the case of equal
quantities, but something else which entails a definite spatial position.
We cannot translate πws purely indefinitely as 'anyhow.' Things
that are equal do not exist ‘anyhow' but 'somehow.'
The result of the argument is to establish the necessity of deter-
minate spatial position for seer and thing seen and hence it advances
208
DE SENSU
a plea in favour of the transmission of light in the same way as sound
is carried to the ear. The last argument had shown that the
object which sounds and the hearer must be in determinate spatial
positions.
446 b 12. If we do not read av before de the clause will refer
to ἴσα not to τὸ ὁρῶν καὶ τὸ ὁρώμενον, and becomes identical in mean-
ing with the following one and Twя above will have to be translated
as utcunque.' 'It is not by being anywhere etc.' But this is
not possible.
446 b 16. The air which is a0vpós (as water also is: cf. above
ch. 4, 441 a 28) is made continuous by being struck by an object that
is smooth of surface and so continuous; it is thus that sound is
transmitted: cf. De An. 11. ch. 8 passim. Sound is caused by a
movement (a blow, which involves popá or spatial movement, occa-
sions it, cf. 419 b 10-13) which is quick enough to strike the air
and make it continuous. If the movement is too slow the air
disperses (419 b 20 sqq.). It is hard and smooth bodies which, when
struck, have this effect upon the air, though apparently the air itself.
when imprisoned in any closed or partially closed space can function
in the same way—as in the case of the echo (419 b 25 sqq.).
Sound is this movement (ἔστι γὰρ ὁ ψόφος κίνησις τοῦ δυναμένου
κινεῖσθαι τὸν τρόπον τοῦτον ὅνπερ τὰ ἀφαλλόμενα ἀπὸ τῶν λείων,
отaν TIS KρоÚση, 420 a 21), or rather this movement is sound, for
Aristotle does not, like the modern physicists, think of sound as
being merely a movement when outside the ear; its peculiar quality
seems to exist objectively though entirely relative to the act of
hearing (cf. Introduction, sec. IV. and De An. 111. ch. 2, 425 b
26 sqq.).
At the same time it will not do to go so far as Rodier (Traité
de l'Âme, Vol. 1. p. 286) and say that sound is not to be identified
with the motion that causes it but is an objective quality in the
same way as, according to Aristotle, colour is to be regarded, and
that its transmission to the ear is not a movement any more than the
transmission of light is.
(Rodier appears to me to misunderstand μetaσxnμátiσis; it
(cf. note to 446 b 8) is not qualitative change and, even if it were,
his argument would not be advanced any the further. Aristotle
distinctly says above (1. 10) that, in the transmission of sound,
the air experiences popá, and if in 7-10 Aristotle were describing
the increase in faintness in sound (which he is not) it would be only
COMMENTARY
209
caused by a transition of the air from a state of motion to some other
condition.)
At the same time there is a difficulty here. In the De Anima
Aristotle describes the popá, the movement which causes us to hear,
as a rebound and quivering of the air all in one mass—wσte Tòv åépa
ἀθροῦν ἀφάλλεσθαι καὶ σείεσθαι (420a 25) and again in 42oa I he
says τότε δὲ (when struck) είς γίνεται ἅμα. That would make this
popá have the same characteristics as that species of aλotwors which,
below, in 446 b 32 sqq, he wishes to distinguish from popaí (and
among them the popά which constitutes sound) as being in-
stantaneous · ἐνδέχεται γὰρ ἀθρόον ἀλλοιοῦσθαι, καὶ μὴ τὸ ἥμισυ
πρότερον, οἷον τὸ ὕδωρ ἅμα πᾶν πήγνυσθαι (447 a 2 sqq.). It seems
then that in the De An. Aristotle is simply emphasising the assertion
that the air is rendered one and continuous throughout the whole
extent of the space between the sonorous object and the ear—έvòs
ἀέρος συνεχείᾳ μέχρις ἀκοῆς. ἀθροῦν need mean no more than this ;
but qua, if by qua is meant 'at the same moment' (vide Rodier,
ad loc. cit.), is putting the point too strongly. Here he plainly affirms
that though the medium is continuous, the movement (in which
it becomes continuous) falls into successive parts, just as qualitative
change may also betray succession, as appears from the passage
below and Phys. vII. chs. 4 and 5 esp. 250 a 31 sqq.: Kai Tò
ἀλλοιοῦν καὶ τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον ὡσαύτως τὶ καὶ ποσὸν κατὰ τὸ μᾶλλον
καὶ ἧττον ἠλλοίωται, καὶ ἐν ποσῷ χρόνῳ, ἐν διπλασίῳ διπλάσιον
κ.τ.λ.
It is indeed necessary to grant this, as ỏoµn is an alloíwσis and
occupies successive times in propagation.
446 b 17-18. TÒ AUTÒ K.T.λ. On a theory which reduced all the
senses to do this could not be so; each person would perceive only
the tangible things that impinged upon his own sense organs.
ἔστι μὲν ὡς... ἔστι δ' ὡς. This continually means 'in one sense...and
another' not 'at one time and at another' as Bender and Hammond
take it. Cf. Meteor. III. ch. 6, 378 a 32 and cf. πŵs µèv ….. πŵs
dè, Phys. 111. ch. 6, 206 a 13, πпŵ……..πŵs above 446 a 17-18; cf. also
Phys. VIII. ch. 8, 263 b 5, etc.
If the kinous has μépn, then the πpŵτos is in contact with one
μέρος, ὁ ὕστερος with another. Hence in one sense it is not rò avró
which they perceive.
446 b 19. ἀπορία. Hammond seems to regard this as a new
problem. But ToÚTwv naturally refers to what has just been said.
R.
14
210
DE SENSU
446 b 20. There is no need for adding 'in the same way' as
Hammond does; aλ cannot bear such a meaning. The doctrine.
controverted is the unqualified assertion that the same thing can
be perceived by only one person. It seems to be an echo of
nominalism. It was left to Aristotle to resolve the difficulty by
pointing out that there are different ways of perceiving the same
thing.
446 b 25–26. Tôi sẽ ổn tốiou. Alexander explains this as rò
προσεχὲς καὶ ἴδιον μέρος τοῦ ἀέρος ἢ τοῦ ὕδατος, and so Simon also.
It is the part of the medium in contact with the sense organ—what
he might have called τὸ ἔσχατον κινούμενον (cf. De An. III. ch. 12,
434 b 33) as opposed to the sense object which is тò πрŵтOV KIVOÛV
(eσxarov can, however, be used in both senses, that of nearest and of
farthest; cf. Phys. vII. ch. 2, 244 b 1 sqq. and De Gen. et Corr. 1.
ch. 7, 324 a 26 sqq.). The meaning is, that this nearest part of the
medium is numerically different in each case, though it is qualitatively
identical in all; the qualitative change or motion produced in the
medium by propagation outward from the sense object must be
numerically a different ráoos or a different μépos of the Kivnois when
issuing to the right and to the left and when near and far, but it is of
the same kind. Aristotle, it must be remembe.ed, thinks of the
sense quality, and that is to him an aio@nrór, as existing objectively
in the medium. The word to be supplied after idíov is no doubt
aiσ◊ŋroû and, as a sense quality is an aiσėŋróv to him, perhaps he is
thinking of Toû idíov more as quality-the quality relative to the
special sense, than as the portion of the medium which is nearest.
We might paraphrase his meaning thus-The qualitative affection
of sense proper (idía alo@nois) is numerically different for each person
though specifically, i.e. quâ quality, identical, while an object
numerically one and identical is perceived by all.' appós and
v are among the contributions of κοινὴ αἴσθησις. Hence perhaps
Aristotle is obscurely hinting that, as idia ato Onois gives an object.
numerically different in each individual, it is the function of KOLỲ
aïolŋois to introduce numerical identity and hence real objectivity
into the perceptible world.
</
ἅμα πολλοί.
446 b 26-27. äµa wool. This is an additional point; if per-
ception is due to kívηois of the medium, and numerical difference in
the Kívnous directly affecting the sense does not necessitate difference
οἱ τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν, perception of it—τὸ πρῶτον κινοῦν—may be
simultaneous in different people.
COMMENTARY
211
446 b 28. If sound etc. were σáuara then, in perception, the
object would really be 'divided from itself' as a body can only
be in one place at the same time. According to the aróрроiaι
theory, the sound, scent and light are owμara-material particles.
i.e.
446 b 29. οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ σώματος, ε.ε. the κίνησις or ἀλλοίωσις which
is propagated in different parts must be the ráðos of a σŵµa (which
has μópia). The plurality of the sense experiences depends upon
μόρια).
the medium having μópia and hence being a oŵμa. Thus this
sentence refers merely to what goes before. As we shall see it
makes no sense if taken with what follows.
446 b 30. τῷ ἐνεῖναι γάρ τι φῶς ἐστίν. I have here followed
Alexander and cod. P, as no other reading seems to give an
adequate meaning. Alexander connects this with the doctrine
in De An. 11. ch. 7, 418 b 16 sqq. where light is defined as the
παρουσία...πυρὸς ἢ τοιούτου τινός. Cf. also above ch. 3, 439a 21 sq.:
ὅταν γὰρ ἐνῇ τι πυρῶδες ἐν διαφανεῖ, ἡ μὲν παρουσία φως. The argu-
ment, then, is, that though light is due to the presence of something,
yet it is not, as one might expect, a movement set up by it. It
is hence, if not a movement, an évépyeta as said before (418 b 9).
évépyeta in the proper sense is not kívŋois (cf. De An. II. ch. 5,
417 a 16) nor even åλλoíwors. Compare also Phys. VII. ch. 3,
246 a 10 where it is said that bodily and mental έes are not
åλλoσeis. Light is described as a ëģɩs in De An. 11. ch. 7, 418b 19
and 111. ch. 5, 430 a 15. The change from dúvajus to èvépyaa in the
proper sense is not mere alteration from one quality to its opposite,
but is a movement ἐπὶ τὰς ἕξεις καὶ τὴν φύσιν. A positive ἕξις like
virtue is a Teλeiwois, or state which reveals the true nature of the
thing which possesses it. It is Alexander's contention that light is
something of this kind and is not to be described as an åλλoíwors
like odour. Hence it does not require time for its propagation.
Cf. Introduction, sec. vii.
If we read to civaɩ we shall have to render with the vet. tr.-' per
esse enim aliquod lumen est' which Thomas expands into-'per
unum aliquod esse, id est, per hoc quod totum medium sicut unum
mobile, movetur uno motu a corpore illuminante.' Or else we must
suppose that there is some contrast between being and motion.
This, however, is not an Aristotelian doctrine, though there were
other theories which identified motion with тò µǹ ov: cf. Phys. III.
ch. 2, 201 b 20: ἔνιοι, ἑτερότητα καὶ ἀνισότητα καὶ τὸ μὴ ὂν φάσκοντες
εἶναι τὴν κίνησιν.
14-2
212
DE SENSU
Bender (p. 29) renders ' das Licht ist Licht durch ein
gewisses Sein,' which seems to require some such explanation as
the above.
St Hilaire (p. 81) gives rather a different interpretation. Light
exists because it is 'un être particulier.' Hammond (p. 184) seems
to follow him in rendering 'Light has a substantial nature.' εἶναί
τι may mean to be an οὐσία—something χωριστόν. Cf. Phys. IV.
ch. 6, 213 a 31-οὔκουν τοῦτο δεῖ δεικνύναι, ὅτι ἔστι τι ὁ ἀήρ. But, if
it meant that here, it would imply that light was something concrete,
a owμa, which it is not. To imagine, then, that Aristotle here
declares that light is a oua as opposed to sound and smell which he
has just declared not to be owμara, is quite unwarranted and besides
it does not in the least help us to understand how the transmission
of light is instantaneous.
Perhaps we might translate T eiva (it should possibly be
Tò elva) as frequently elsewhere (cf. 449 a 19) by 'in aspect' and
render 'In aspect light is something real' i.e. 'light may be regarded
as something real'; it is not concrete-ovoía-in the ordinary sense,
but ovoía ws eidos (as the soul is said to be in De An. II. ch. 2,
414a 13 sqq.). Light is an eldos or évépyeu. If this be the
interpretation and we adhere to the reading rộ elvaɩ it will give
exactly the same meaning as Alexander requires, who gets it by
other means.
εινα
The
The difficulty remaining, however, is how what is said in the first
clause should lead one to expect that light is a movement.
presence of où in the åλλà clause gives the Greek this sense. On
Alexander's reading there is some ground for expecting light to be a
Kívŋoɩs, which it is then denied to be; not so much according to my
interpretation of the other reading.
I suggest τῷ κινεῖν γάρ τι φῶς ἐστίν τι, i.e. light shows its reality
by stimulating something. Light Kive-stimulates-something-
Tɩ—viz. the sense, but is not a movement itself.
446 b 31.
ȧλλ où kívηois. The question here is-What does
ἀλλ᾽ οὐ κίνησις.
Aristotle mean by kívηois? Does he mean 'un simple mouvement'
(St Hilaire) i.e. popá, or motion generically, i.e. μeraßoλn? It is
quite impossible, from Aristotle's use of the term, to decide whether
he employs it here in its specific or its generic signification. In the
Physics Kivnois is continually used in the sense of popá but, where he
has occasion to distinguish the various kinds of change, he employs
the specific terms if there is any likelihood of confusion arising.
Cf.
COMMENTARY
213
Phys. III. ch. I for the distinction between the four kinds of
change γένεσις καὶ φθορά, ἀλλοίωσις, αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις, φορά. They
are divided according to the categories respectively of οὐσία, ποιόν,
Toσóν and Toû, which have nothing in common. Hence the diversity
alluded to hereὅλως κ.τ.λ. 1. 31. If the light is to be identified as
a kind of aλoíwois, as Thomas thinks, then this latter statement
is brought forward in support of the former. The argument runs
light is an oíwois, which may be (cf. below 447 a 1-2) instantaneous,
and hence not φορά and hence not κίνησις, for κίνησις proper is φορά.
Cf. Phys. VIII. ch. 7, where it is contended that popά is πρÚTη TŵV
κινήσεων.
On the other hand, as we have seen, if Aristotle is in earnest
about light being an ἐνέργεια, it cannot be even ἀλλοίωσις. This
is Alexander's contention and according to his interpretation, öλws…..
popûs must come as a reply to a possible objection-'Is it not true
that ἀλλοίωσις is different from φορά, i. e. κίνησις κατὰ τόπον, and that
hence light may be an alloíwois?' Aristotle replies 'It is true
that they are distinct, for aλoíwois may take place in all parts at
once; however (où un aλλ', 447 a 3 sq.), when the quantity is large.
(of substance to be changed) this is impossible. Hence light is not
an αλλοίωσις and hence not a κίνησις at all.
As against this theory and in support of the former view we have
these statements in the De Anima, viz.-the medium KIVETαι by
the object of vision and again itself kɩve the sense. There κίνησις
is apparently used vaguely in its generic sense without distinction
from allowσis, so that it seems necessary to hold that, if, in the
stimulation of the sense by the object of vision, a kívŋσɩs, in the strict
sense of popá, is not set up in the medium, at least aλλoíwoɩs is.
Cf. De An. 11. ch. 7, 419a 13 sqq.: ảλλà tò µèv xpŵµa kiveî TÒ
διαφανές, οἷον τὸν ἀέρα, ὑπὸ τούτου δὲ συνεχούς ὄντος κινεῖται τὸ
αἰσθητήριον ; ΙΙI. ch. 12, 434 b 3o sqq.: ὥσπερ γὰρ τὸ κινοῦν κατὰ
τόπον...οὕτω καὶ ἐπ᾽ ἀλλοιώσεως and 435 a 4: ὁ δ᾽ ἀὴρ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον
κινεῖται καὶ ποιεῖ καὶ πάσχει... βέλτιον τὸν ἀέρα πάσχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ
σχήματος και χρώματος...διὸ πάλιν οὗτος τὴν ὄψιν κινεί. Cf. also Phys.
VII. ch. 2, 244 b 10 sqq. esp. 245 a 6.
υπο
•
The explanation of the difficulty seems to be that Aristotle
regards light in two different ways which are not properly reconciled.
(1) According to his own peculiar conception it is the évépyelα тoû
Siapavoûs caused by the presence of fire. This is the concept of the
objective nature of light. It is a qualitative determination of certain
214
DE SENSU
objects and, considered as such, it has absolutely no connection with
any such thing as motion or transmission. Light is the colour of the
medium realised, its true activity, just as the soul is the true activity
of the body. This is its teleological definition. But (2) Aristotle
likewise inherited from previous philosophy and popular thought the
theory that light was something passing between seen thing and seer
or vice versâ. He allows that there must be some action whether
mechanical or qualitative exerted by the object directly upon the
medium and indirectly upon the sense.
According to the popular idea this exactly was light. So, when
the question was raised-'does light take time to travel?,' Aristotle,
if he had wished to identify light with the κίνησις or ἀλλοίωσις
that stimulates sense, should have answered in the affirmative or
admitted that it was at least possible. But, instead, he recoils
upon the teleological definition of light to which the notion of move-
ment is irrelevant. Hence his doctrine really is, not that it is an
'instantaneous movement' but rather (what that really is) no move-
ment at all.
But, as his opponents mean by light a movement between the
eye and the object, it appears as if, in denying that light is a
movement, he were denying his own theory that an actual movement
of some kind did take place between object and eye. Without
doubt too there was a confusion in his own mind on the subject.
His raising it in connection with sound and odour shows this.
Naturally the fact that there is no noticeable interval between the
production of any object and our seeing it led him practically to
contradict his previous assertions.
447 a 2. ἀθρόον. Cf. Phys. 1. ch. 3, 186 a 16 and vIII. ch. 3,
253 b 23: οὐ γὰρ εἰ μεριστὸν εἰς ἄπειρον τὸ ἀλλοιούμενον, διὰ τοῦτο
καὶ ἡ ἀλλοίωσις, ἀλλ᾽ ἀθρόα γίνεται πολλάκις, ὥσπερ ἡ πήξις.
We cannot say that all qualitative change proceeds continuously
(συνεχώς) or is συνεχής in the full sense of the word which is explained
in Phys. v. ch. 3, 226 b 27 sqq. It is not sufficient that the time
should be continuous but that the action should be continuous also
(μὴ τοῦ χρόνου (οὐδὲν γὰρ κωλύει διαλείποντα, καὶ εὐθὺς δὲ μετὰ τὴν
ὑπάτην φθέγξασθαι τὴν νεάτην) ἀλλὰ τοῦ πράγματος, ἐν ᾧ κινεῖται).
Themistius (Paraph. ad Phys., loc. cit.) explains that movement such
as the galloping of horses is not continuous, though the time in
which the movement takes place is. Qualitative change seems to
be more comparable to this and appears to take place by a series of
COMMENTARY
215
successive bounds. There seem to be ultimate sections in the process
which are instantaneous and not divisible into smaller sections each
diverse in point of time.
So it is too with αὔξησις καὶ φθίσις. If a drop wears away so
much of a stone in a given time, the half of it does not perform so
much of the attrition in half the time. It does it in no time. What
is washed away is divisible, but its parts were moved not separately
but all together.
In Phys. vII. ch. 5, 250 a 28 sqq. it had been admitted
(cf. above) that, in general, qualitative change falls into different
time sections just like kívŋois proper, yet the half of the cause of
change need not cause a change of half the extent. But this is true
also of kívŋois proper. Though two men push a boat so far in a
given time, one man need not be able to move it at all.
The point
here is different. It is, as said, that often change either in quality or
bulk proceeds in sections.
447 a 3. πnέis is congelation of any kind (cf. Meteor. IV.
chs. 5-7) and is produced either by heating or cooling. Oeppaíveolaι
and xeola are examples of adλoiwois (cf. Phys. vII. ch. 3,
246 a 7 sqq.). Compare also Phys. 253 b 25 quoted above. By Tò
Depμaivóμevov kaì πŋуvýμevov (cf. note to 443 b 7 on the function
of κai) no doubt the thickening of milk or some such substance by
heat is indicated.
447 2 8. ὀσμή seems to be propagated by an ἀλλοίωσις and is
admitted not to be instantaneous (1. 10 beneath). The instantaneous-
ness of the sections of qualitative change does not make the aλλoíwors
as a whole instantaneous in this case. Obviously there is 'much' to
be changed. If light is conceived of as an alloíwois, then the
whole distance from object to eye must be thought of as being
one section. How this can be reconciled with οὐ μὴν ἀλλ᾽ ἂν ᾖ
πολύ κ.τ.λ.
TOλν K.T.λ. it is difficult to see, for, if a considerable quantity of
water cannot undergo qualitative alteration all in one moment,
a fortiori the vast extent of medium intervening between eye and
object should require a long time to transmit the light. If the
words οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' κ.τ.λ. only affect such qualitative changes as
Dépμavois, Aristotle should have pointed out in what respect those
differ from the aλoíwois involved in light and should have ascribed
the slowness of the change in these cases to those peculiarities.
yevσis is brought in as a qualitative change too which would be
perceived in the same way as odour if we were surrounded by water.
216
DE SENSU
As we have seen, Aristotle does not distinguish between the diffusion
of a quality in that which serves it as a vehicle and its transmission
through a medium. The difference between the mediated sense
qualities and the others is, that in the former their vehicle is a
medium always in contact with the sense organs, while in the other
cases it is not so. Special contact has to be effected between the
body possessed of the quality and the sense. Hence one reason
why the latter are both called tactual senses.
Aristotle's declaration here is interesting, because from it we may
infer what we already know from ch. 4, 442 a 29 sqq., that he did
not conceive even taste to be a diffusion of the actual particles of the
flavoured substance, since he would not allow that to be the means
of producing smell, and the only difference between taste and smell is
due to the fact that we do not live in water.
Hence we must lay stress on the fact that diffusion is only a
metaphorical term for the process by which odour and flavour alike are
propagated; cf. 441 b 17: wσrep oùv oi évatotλúvovtes; 443 b 7 sq.:
οἷον ἀποπλυνόμενον; 445 a 15 sq. : οἷον βαφή τις καὶ πλύσις.
447 a 9. μETağỳ. Cf. 445 a 8, 436 b 20, De An. III. ch. 12,
434b 15: αἱ γὰρ ἄλλαι αἰσθήσεις δι᾽ ἑτέρων αἰσθάνονται, οἷον ὄσφρησις
ὄψις ἀκοή, etc.
447 a 11-12. As we have seen, his customary way of stating
the matter is, that xoŵμa causes sensation, while without pŵs, which
is the evépyeta of the medium, colour cannot stimulate the sense
(De An. 11. ch. 7 passim). That rò diapavés should be illuminated is
a precondition of the perception of colour. (Cf. Rodier, op. cit.
Vol. 11. p. 281.) In that sense it could be said toiÊîv Tò opâv. From
another point of view φως is the χρώμα του διαφανούς and as such is
the object of sense itself and Toleî тò ópâv. Thus Aristotle might use
this expression without thinking of light exactly as the kívŋois which
produces sight (cf. above notes to 446 b 30 sqq.). Tò aioonτóv means
both the quality spread over the medium and To TрÔTOV KIVOûv itself.
Cf. above note to 446 b 25 sq. But in so far as the sense object
which causes sensation is a quality and hence an eidos and hence
also an évépyeɩ, process cannot be imputed to it. Though due to
an ἀλλοίωσις it is not, itself, an αλλοίωσις; it is an ἐνέργεια. But
all sense qualities may be so regarded and hence there should be no
grounds for supposing that in the case of one sense there was not to
be found that process of transition by which the objective quality
was realised in the particular consciousness in the case of the others.
}
CHAPTER VII.
447 a 15. ȧTóμw. Alexander explains that this is not an abso-
lutely atomic time, for such according to Aristotle does not exist,
but a time which, when divided, does not yield one part qualified by
one sensation—another by another: cf. beneath 448 b 22.
447 a 16. ÈKKρOVEL. Cf. De Gen. Animal. v. ch. 1, 780 a 8,
with reference to light stimuli, and for the general case De Insom.
ch. 3, 460 b 32 sqq.
447 a 19. Cf. note to ch. 1, 436 a 5 for the interpretation of vπо-
κείσθω.
συμ-
µâddov K.T.λ. This seems to be a self-evident principle with
Aristotle, but perhaps it might be held to be in antagonism to such
passages as De An. 1. ch. 1, 402 b 21 sqq.: åλdà kaì åvátadıv tà ovμ-
βεβηκότα συμβάλλεται μέγα μέρος πρὸς τὸ εἰδέναι τὸ τί ἐστιν. Aristotle
would, however, distinguish between the two cases. The entering
of one sensation into relation with another by means of combination
alters the essential nature of the sensation. You no longer have the
same sensation to investigate but a new one—a compound. Hence
we may say that the original sensation may be more adequately
perceived per se when in isolation than when in composition.
αἰσθάνεσθαι. αἴσθησις is a δύναμις κριτική (cf. Anal. Post. II. ch. 19,
99 b 35) and by it we recognise a thing as what it is. We must, as
Alexander points out, remember that aloŋois has two aspects, one
of πάθος the other of κρίσις. Its function as κρίσις is the function of
mind in general and hence, as e.g. above in ch. 6, 445 b 16 sqq., we
get the terms applicable to mind in general (κρινοῦμεν, γνωσόμεθα)
applied in the special case of sense perception. Cf. also De An. III.
ch. 9, 432 a 16 : τῷ τε κριτικῷ, ὃ διανοίας ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ αἰσθήσεως.
447 a 23. TOÛTo, i.e. in the case of harmony when the two tones
combine to form a third thing-a concord. Aristotle is arguing
against the simultaneous perception of two things which remain
diverse. His point is that, if they are to be perceptible at one and
218
DE SENSU
the same time, they must combine or, in some way, form a third
thing. The combination is obvious in the case of harmonies.
εἰ δὴ κ.τ.λ. Aristotle goes on to argue that where the combination
is not obvious, as it is in harmony, still the result of the simultaneous
presentation of the two sensations must result in a modification of
the stronger, if one is stronger than the other.
447 а 30. ожεр K.T.λ. Aristotle is arguing from the case of the
objective mixture of things to the intermingling of subjective sensa-
tions. He may do this in virtue of his realism. To a modern
sensationalist who holds that complex things are simply fused sensa-
tions this would not be possible; the argument would need to run
the other way.
For Aristotle's doctrine of μícis cf. notes to ch. 3,
440 a 30 sqq.
447 a 31. év ❀ äv pixlŵoiv. Alexander explains that he is ex-
cluding such cases as those mentioned in ch. 6, 446 a 8 sqq. where
there is no proper mixture but an absorption of a minute volume of
one thing into the substance of the other. ' & would give the sense
required more easily than ev .
447 b I. τοιαῦτα. Cf. below also in 449 a 6 sqq. esp. 1. 9:
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τούτων ἕν.
TOÚTOV = objects of different senses. There is no qualitative union.
such as occurs in the combination of tones and, on his theory, of
colours, tastes etc.; the union is κarà σvußeßnкós-co-existence in
one thing (rò avrò kaì èv åpi0µê, l. 16). How the perception of such
union is possible is discussed in that passage and in De An. III. ch. 2,
426 b 8-427 a 16.
µlyvuvтaι K.T.λ. Cf. De Gen. et Corr. 1. ch. 10, esp. 328 a 32.
447 b 3. kaтà σνµßeßηкós. This is a case in which the percep-
tion of the object of one special sense may be effected indirectly,
through the instrumentality of another. Cf. De An. III. ch. 1,
425 a 3o sqq.: τὰ δ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἴδια κατὰ συμβεβηκός αἰσθάνονται αἱ
αἰσθήσεις,...οἷον χολὴ ὅτι πικρὰ καὶ ξανθή. The union is union in
one thing, not a qualitative union of the sensations.
447 b 4. αισθάνεσθαι. He is arguing once more from the
absence of objective unity to the absence of subjective unity.
447 b 7. Reading ème with Biehl we should have to regard this
clause as an explanation of the reason why we can argue a fortiori
from the case of objects falling under a single sense to the case of
heterogeneous senses. It is not a confirmation merely of the previous
clause,
COMMENTARY
219
If we reader with Alexander and LSU, the sequence of the
argument is not so clear, but the possibility of connecting this with
the previous clause too intimately is removed.
447 b 10. κίνησις. By the κίνησις is indifferently meant either
the sense affection or the stimulus. We may therefore translate—-
'the stimuli are more closely located.' This clause forms a premiss
on which the previous one rests. It, itself, seems to be an accepted
topical maxim which connects the possibility of simultaneous
functioning with the physical connectedness of the two elements;
they are both Kivýσes in the same organ and hence qua in space.
Aristotle means more than that they are similar, as Alexander
interprets.
447 b 12. äv µn μixon. This contention—that if not combined
two things cannot be simultaneously perceived, i.e. if simultaneously
perceived then combined-is not proved by the clauses which
immediately follow but by the section from καὶ εἰ μία 1. 16—αὐτά
1. 18. Lines 12-16 rather prove the simple converse-that, if combined,
sensations are perceived åμa.
The argument runs-A mixture is a unit. Perception of a unit
is unitary and a unitary perception occurs in a unitary time, i.e. aµa.
For support of the statement that perception of a unit is unitary (ie.
the last premiss) we get or piậ…..dúvaµiv µía in lines 14-16. The
perception of a unit with which we are concerned, the perception
that occurs in unitary time, is explicit perception (èvepyeía) and
the explicit perception of a unit is numerically one, ¿.e. unitary; it is
of a specific unity that the potential perception is single.
(This is the very idea of évépyeia-to be complete in one and
the same moment, not to be a kívηois which varies from moment
to moment. Cf. De An. II. ch. 5, 417 a 16-17 and Rodier, ad
loc. cit.)
447 b 15. Évòs K.T.λ. By saying that it is of the specifically single
that the implicit perception is one, Aristotle means that the percep-
tion of various white objects is specifically identical. It is the same
qualitative affection; but actual perception is the perception of this
particular white object here and now; it is numerically different
from the perception of any other white object. It is only as a faculty
that the sense of white colour is a unity and its unity is the specific
unity of the various sensations of white. Again, relatively to black
and white taken as numerical units the sense of sight itself is a
specific unity.
220
DE SENSU
447 b 16. καὶ εἰ, Here the proof of the proposition first laid
down begins. The sequence of the argument is best seen by
beginning at the other end-l. 22, µía dè ǹ dúvaμs. We are, by
agreement, considering the case of a single faculty, e.g. sight. The
act of vision must occur in a unitary time-l. 21 μιᾶς γὰρ εἰσάπαξ
K.T.A.; when the faculty is single and the time a unit, the act of
sense or vision must be unitary-1. 19, åλλà Katà µíav dúvaμiv. Going
back to l. 16, kaì ei µía K.T.λ., we find it further stated that if the act
is single the objects perceived by it must be single. We still lack
the completing premiss that if two things are perceived as one they
must be combined. This is not explicitly stated unless, instead of
apa before μn in l. 18, we read yàp. If we read yàp we make the
train of reasoning complete and much improve what is at best a very
ill-arranged argument.
447 b 24. ádúvarov. Cf. above 1. 7 and beneath 449 a 4.
447 b 27. Consciousness is here an adequate interpretation of
xn, though the term vx has generally a wider meaning.
φαίνεται κ.τ.λ.
This sentence—paíveтαι yàp K.T.λ.—seems merely to support the
argument generally or rather one of the previous statements viz.,
that if you perceive simultaneously it is a unit which must be
perceived.
447 b 28. εἴδει. Alexander will have it that here Aristotle
includes generic identity. The different qualities falling under one
sense are specifically distinct, merely generically identical (cf. 1. 30),
and according to Alexander it is these which have their relative
identity recognised by the same sense, while it is a single sense
functioning in a certain manner which recognises actual specific
identity. This latter contention is correct, but Alexander can hardly
be right in saying that here generic identity is included in specific.
The train of thought is rather as follows-Specific identity is per-
ceived by a single sense functioning in a certain manner (cf. De An.
III. ch. 1, 425 a 20: ἑκάστη γὰρ ἓν αἰσθάνεται αἴσθησις). “I add the
latter qualification,' says Aristotle, 'because a single sense without
specifying the manner of its functioning merely recognises generic
identity (the identity e.g. of black and white) not specific; (the
function of a single sense is to discriminate the specifically diverse.
Cf. De An. III. ch. 2, 426 b 8 sqq. esp. 10: kaì kpívei ràs toû νTO-
κειμένου αἰσθητοῦ διαφοράς); but, in recognising various white things
as white, i.e. as possessing specific identity, it operates in a definite
different mode, and one other than that by which it recognises the
COMMENTARY
221
contrary quality black. There is a corresponding difference of mode
in which each sense recognises the corresponding positive qualities
e.g. white and sweet, and the corresponding negative qualities like
black and bitter.'
Thus the conclusion is, that it is the same sense functioning in a
definite manner which is different in the case of each of two con-
traries, though corresponding in the various senses according as
the contraries are ἕξεις or στερήσεις. As Alexander points out,
numerical difference of the sensations can be discerned only by tem-
poral difference of the perception, specific difference by the difference
of the manner, generic by the difference of the sense faculty.
447 b 32. σúσToxa. Cf. beneath 448 a 17-18, cf. Bonitz, Ind.
p. 736 b 61, σúσтoɣa 'ea sunt, quae in eadem serie continentur.'
The 'series' (σvoroixía) need not be a genus; generally it is not.
Aristotle here ranks the opposed qualities of all the generically
different senses under the two heads of έis and σrépnois. It is these
which form the titles of the two series. Cf. Metaph. IV. ch. 2,
1004b 27: τῶν ἐναντίων ἡ ἑτέρα συστοιχία στέρησις. Cf. also the
Pythagorean distinction of two συστοιχίαι, the one headed by τὸ πέρας
the other by To άπEроν. Metaph. 1. ch. 5, 986 a 23 sqq.
τὸ ἄπειρον.
(The use of σvoτoxía in Metaph. x. 1054b 35 and 1058 a 13
seems to be somewhat different.)
For the use of cavraîs cf. above ch. 6, 446 a 19: πρÒS AνTÀ.
448 a 2. ἔτι. This section further shows that the opposition of
the kinoes of the respective sense affections which are specifically
distinct makes simultaneous perception of them impossible.
448 2 3. ἅμα κ.τ.λ. Cf. De An. III. ch. 2, 426 b 29: åλdà µǹv
ἀδύνατον ἅμα τὰς ἐναντίας κινήσεις κινεῖσθαι τὸ αὐτὸ ἡ ἀδιαίρετον καὶ ἐν
ἀδιαιρέτῳ χρόνῳ. εἰ γὰρ γλυκύ, ωδὶ κινεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν ἢ τὴν νόησιν, τὸ
dè πikρòv évavтíws. This comes in the De Anima in a different con-
nection; there he is proving that there must be something unitary
which distinguishes the opposed sense modifications, something which
is only in aspect divisible (cf. beneath at the end of the chapter).
Cf. also De Coelo, II. ch. 13, 295 b 14: ἅμα δ᾽ ἀδύνατον εἰς τἀναντία
ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κίνησιν.
Alexander understands xpóve after avr@ (1. 4). The whole dis-
cussion, he thinks, is one about time. We are not at present
raising the question of the unity of what perceives as in the De
Anima. But this restriction of r avr to time is impossible. It
must be one thing that is diversely affected if there is to be any
222
DE SENSU
controversy as to the possibility of the two affections being simul-
taneous (aµa). Aristotle denies as a general principle that they can
be so.
448 a 7. τὰ μὴ ἐναντία. These are evidently the intermediate
qualities. It is not quite clear whether the theory about them here
is quite the same as that presented in earlier chapters. There they
are held to be mixtures of the two extreme qualities and, if by
saying that some can be assigned to one extreme, others to the other,
Aristotle simply means that there is a greater proportion of the one
element in one case, of the opposite one in another, then the two
theories can be reconciled. This is Alexander's explanation.
On the other hand rà μeμiyμéva seem to be introduced in l. 10
as a fresh class and are explicitly illustrated only by musical
examples.
But probably there is no real discrepancy between this chapter
and previous ones. By Tà μèv and rà Sè in 1. 7 he probably refers
to τὸ ξανθόν and τὸ φαιόν which are assigned to white and black
respectively, αλμυρόν and λιπαρόν which are claimed by πικρόν and
yλukú (cf. ch. 4, 442 a 18 sqq.); and by ra peμypéva to the other
qualities.
%
448 a 9-10. Though rà μeμiyμéva are illustrated only by
musical examples, Alexander thinks that the words in which he
describes the ratio between the components of these compounds
make it evident that he is thinking of colours and tastes as being
composed by the intermixture of various amounts of two original
components. Cf. 1. 13: ὁ μὲν πολλοῦ πρὸς ὀλίγον...14: ὁ δ᾽ ὀλίγου
πρὸς πολύ.
But this is to confuse the matter. When Aristotle says
it is impossible to perceive rà peµiyµéva åµa, unless as one, he does
not mean to repeat that we cannot perceive their components simul-
taneously unless as one. He has already said that contraries cannot
be perceived simultaneously unless perceived as one, i.e. unless they
form an intermediate colour, taste, etc. Aristotle is here asserting
that we cannot perceive two intermediate colours simultaneously unless
they coalesce.
448 a 10-II. τὸ διὰ πασῶν κ.τ.λ. By this Aristotle surely means
the harmony of the fifth with the tonic and of octave with tonic.
It is difficult to see how the different notes of the scale could be
regarded as mixtures.
This is, in fact, the case in connection with which a difficulty is
raised beneath in 448 a 21 sqq.
COMMENTARY
223
The chords in question are, in modern terms, composed of two
sets of vibrations, one of which is in the case of the octave concord,
twice as rapid, in the case of the fifth, 1 times that of the other.
448 a 12. els λóyos. Aristotle's point is that two blended
sounds, e.g. the chord of the fifth or the octave, themselves depend
upon a relation between tones of different pitch and hence cannot
themselves be simultaneously perceived unless they form a new com-
bination. If they do there is a single ratio formed once more, but
if not we shall have the impossible task of presenting together two
incompatible relations, that of the fifth-3 to 2—i.e. odd to even—
and that of the octave 2 to 1 or even to odd, and this is impossible.
The only difficulty left is to explain why Aristotle seems to iden-
tify the former relation with that of much to little and the latter
with that of little to much. But probably he does not mean to identify
them. The explanation will be, as Alexander suggests, that by the
mention of the ratio of much to little he is indicating the composi-
tion of some mixed colour, e. g. red, which contains a large proportion
of one quality, e.g. white, and, by the relation of little to much,
another colour, in which the proportion of white is small compared
with the other component.
ου
Alexander and most of the commentators seem to think that
Aristotle is in this passage discussing, not the simultaneous percep-
tion of qualities themselves composite but of the components in
composite qualities. This (cf. note to ll. 9-10 above) is erroneous
and makes them distort the sense and take ἔσται γὰρ ἅμα κ.τ.λ., 1. 13,
as explaining the outws...yivera, l. 12, not the adλws Sou. They
would translate 'Thus and not otherwise we get a ratio between the
extremes, for there will be in the one case the simultaneous pre-
sentation of the relation of odd to even, etc., in the other case of
even to odd, etc.' As Alexander explains, Aristotle is referring to
the difference of the single ratio in each case. But the point is, that
the simultaneous presentation of two such diverse ratios is im-
possible. Besides, the other interpretation requires us to take åμa
as applying separately to both clauses ὁ μὲν κ.τ.λ. and ὁ δ᾽ ὀλίγου. But
there is no sense in saying that the relation of odd to even is simul-
taneous; the simultaneity must apply to the two ratios.
In my interpretation I am on the whole in agreement with
Hammond.
448 a 16. yével. It is wrong to confuse specific and generic
difference as Hammond does. The point is that, if specific diffe-
224
DE SENSU
rence renders simultaneous perception impossible, a fortiori generic
does.
448 a 19. πλεῖον κ.τ.λ. We now proceed to a still wider diver-
gence. Sweet and white, though heterogeneous, are still in the same
σvoroixía; sweet and black lack even that connection. Torstrik's
conjecture of τοῦ λευκοῦ for τοῦ μέλανος and τὸ μέλαν for τοῦ
λευκοῦ weakens the sense. It makes this clause merely a deduction
from the principle quoted above and not an advance on it. Bekker's
reading of τὸ λευκόν for τοῦ λευκοῦ brings a perfectly irrelevant pre-
miss into the argument.
T esa, deleted by Torstrik, is unnecessary and, if allowed
to stand, can only be translated vaguely in the manner given.
Still it is quite in Aristotle's manner to change readily from the
restricted to the wider use of a technical term, and we must bear in
mind the essential identity of the notion of eidos as species, and
eidos as form. We might render-'in ideal content.'
448 a 21 sqq. The case cited is apparently not the simultaneous
perception of two different chords but of the two tones in one
concord. The theory put forward is that really the perception is
not simultaneous but only apparently so. With the first part of the
conclusion Aristotle does not disagree, if it be meant that the two
tones cannot be heard together as two separate units. But, on the
other hand, when they form a ovμpovía they have coalesced and are
heard simultaneously. Thus his argument becomes an attack on the
doctrine that the coalescence is not real but apparent merely.
448 a 23.
palvovτal. The contention is, that the union of tones
is merely apparent, just as it was contended in the juxtaposition
theory of colour in ch. 4, 440 a 22 sqq. that the union of elementary
tints which produced an intermediate one was of the same nature—
that it was effected by a mixture πρòs aïσ◊ŋσw merely (cf. notes ad loc.
cit.).
The means by which such an apparent union can be obtained
is in both cases the same; it is owing to the interval between the
sensations being imperceptible that this happens. Without this being
granted the theory will not hold, and, accordingly, Aristotle proceeds
to argue against the existence of a χρόνος ἀναίσθητος.
448 a 25. If the theory, that imperceptible moments of time
exist, is true, it will be as possible to have simultaneous sensations of
sound and colour as of different tones. But this conclusion is
repugnant to Aristotle. Sensations of different senses cannot com-
bine-hence cannot be simultaneously presented.
COMMENTARY
225
This is the first ground on which he rejects the theory.
448 a 26-28. We must remember the principle laid down in
Physics Iv. ch. 14, 223 a 16 sqq., that apart from vxý time cannot
exist. Hence a time in which we are not conscious is not time.
A xpóvos ávaíontos is strictly a time in which we are not conscious,
for, as Alexander points out, time is not perceived κať aνró but by
means of the events which happen in it. Aristotle expresses this
frequently when he says, e.g. De Gen. et Corr. 11. ch. 10, 337 a 23,
that time does not exist apart from change.
The argument here is derived from the continuity of time (cf.
Physics Iv. ch. 11, 219 a 13, etc.), which itself depends upon the
continuity of the change apart from which it cannot exist. If in a
single continuous time there are sections in which no consciousness
occurs, the continuity of the consciousness will be broken; but, when
one is continuously conscious, one is not aware of breaks.
Alexander apparently reads εἰ ὁρᾷ καὶ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται (1. 32), the
latter words merely repeating the sense of λav@ávoi äv (1. 32).
Simon follows the reading καὶ οὐκ αἰσθάνεται καὶ αἰσθάνεται, which
simply states more explicitly the contradiction implied above.
448 b 1. The ancient Latin version does not translate kaì ei
aioðávetai (1. 33), nor does Alexander read it. It is probably a
gloss. In that case we should have to remove the comma after ěɩ,
making the sentence start with that word.
If we retain the clause, the sense will be-"But if there are no
breaks in our consciousness and we still perceive whatever object is
before us during the whole of the time even though certain sections
of it are imperceptible, then we shall have to say that perception
throughout any whole time is really always effected by perception in
some part of it only." Thus, as Alexander says, we do not perceive
this time åλŵs kaì kvρíws, but only indirectly. We do not perceive
a whole as a whole. The argument then goes on to show how by
subtracting the xpóvoi avaíonтo from any whole and from the
remainder successively ad infinitum, you could show that no time,
however small, was, per se, an object of consciousness.
448 b 2. прâуμа. Bound up with and illustrative of the proof
we have just outlined (note to 448 a 26-28) of the non-existence of
insensible moments of time, there runs a parallel proof of the non-
existence of insensible material magnitudes. Alexander explains their
conjunction by making out that it is the supposed owμara ávaío Onta
Kai aμeρn which have motions in imperceptible times. These have
R.
15
226
DE SENSU
already been disposed of in chapter 6 and in the Physics etc.
But it
is obvious that this proof which shows that there are no Xpóvol
ἀναίσθητοι, will equally well get rid of σώματα ἀναίσθητα, indeed of
insensible magnitudes of all kinds, for the discussion is carried on
wholly in terms of μέγεθος.
Here the two cases are argued out concurrently, and so closely
interwoven that they seem to get confused.
448b 5. τὴν ὅλην. It is absurd to make this refer to τὴν
yŵv (1.8) as Bender and Hammond do. How can CB be taken
away from the whole earth? Alexander correctly explains that
Aristotle is illustrating both magnitudes, the temporal and the spatial,
by a line AB, and the feminine inflection here refers to the ypaµµń.
The contention of the whole passage leads to the conclusion that
here, as in many cases, our text consists of notes either written for or
taken from a lecture in which there were many cursory explanations
and asides, which have not come down to us. Probably by this
stage in the proof Aristotle had already drawn the line on something
analogous to our blackboard, and this explains the sudden appear-
ance of the feminine inflection in the adjective without the previous
introduction of any feminine substantive for it to agree with.
If we make the apodosis begin at kaì we must say that Aristotle
implicitly, if not explicitly, identifies perception of a whole time with
perception during a continuous time, i.e. during the whole of it.
That is in fact what he means by the latter, and what he frequently
expresses, e.g. in 448 b 2 by aiołáveolai év: cf. also 1. 9 èv Tậ
ἐνιαυτῷ = during a whole year, and ἐν ᾗ οὐκ ᾔσθάνετο 1. 7, 4482 29
ἐν συνεχεί χρόνῳ.
For this way of translating Tv vûv ToÚTwv, cf. Phys. vi. ch. 6,
237 a 16, Iv. ch. 10, 218 a 15.
448 b 7. In order to carry on the parallel proof affecting an
extended magnitude he should have added to ἐν ᾗ, ἢ ἧς. The
reference to the extended magnitude appears once more, however,
in the next clause—ǹ TAÚTηS TI.
448 b 8. ἐν ταύτης τινὶ ἢ ταύτης τι. We must remember that the
same line is representing indifferently either a temporal or a spatial
magnitude.
τὴν γῆν κ.τ.λ. Simon and St Hilaire rightly say that this is the
reductio ad absurdum of the theory that, by perceiving a part, we can
perceive the whole. On this interpretation we must render év TO
éviavr―during the whole year, 'totum annum,' Simon, p. 257.
COMMENTARY
227
0
π
Alexander does not give quite the same interpretation. He
thinks that σTeρ την yŵv is an illustration of how we may have
indirect (karà μépos) perception of a whole. We may, in an improper
and unqualified way (áros), say that we perceive the whole earth
by perceiving a part, or assign the Olympic contest to such and such
a year because it occurs in a certain time falling within the year.
Whichever interpretation we follow, the result is the same. Such
perception is only indirect perception of a whole, not of a whole per
se, and, if there are imperceptible moments, it alone is possible, and
we can never have perception of a whole as a whole.
448 b 10. οὐδὲν αἰσθάνεται. This is doubtless put in as a reply
to an objection that the line AB by which he was illustrating was
perceived as a whole
(A
CI B).
He reminds the objector that they have agreed that CB shall repre-
sent an imperceptible part.
448 b 14. ἅπαντα μὲν οὖν κ.τ.λ. We must understand that the
conclusion reached in the previous clause is rejected. For the
doctrine cf. chapter 6, 445 b 30 sqq. where he shows that the minute
parts of objects, though not per se actually perceptible, are still
perceptible evepyeía in the whole, i.e. when taken in conjunction
with the other parts, and that even per se they are potentially
perceptible (446 a 15 sq.: δυνάμει τε γάρ ἐστιν ἤδη, καὶ ἐνεργείᾳ ἔσται
προσγενόμενον).
The doctrine involved in both passages is the same and the
conclusion the same, viz. πᾶν μέγεθος αἰσθητόν.
448 b 16. ἀλλ᾽ οὐ φαίνεται ὅσον—ἀλλ᾽ ἐνίοτε ἀδιαίρετον, ὁρᾷ δ᾽ οὐκ
ådɩalpetov. This should probably be connected with what is said in
De An. III. ch. 3, 428 b 29 sqq. about the falsity which may attach
to φαντασία. pavraσía may be exercised along with sensation
(παρούσης τῆς αἰσθήσεως). In the case of the perception of size
(and the other кowà aiσ0ŋτá) which may itself be erroneous, the
pavraσía which results from this perception may also be false,
whether the perception is present or not, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν πόρρω τὸ
aloonTòv . If, with Freudenthal (Ueber d. Beg. d. Wort. pavт. b.
αἰσθητὸν
Arist., p. 12), we take Toppw as referring to spatial distance, as
Tóрршev does here (but cf. Rodier, Vol. II. p. 433), then Aristotle is
instancing the error which attaches to our idea of distant objects.
Cf. also 428 b 3: olov paívetaι μèv å λιos Todiaîos and De Insom.
ch. 1, 458 b 28, and ch. 2, 460 b 18. But though, in the above
15-2
228
DE SENSU
passages, the discrepancy between pavraoía and belief (íoris) is
discussed, we nowhere meet with an explanation of any conflict.
between imagination and perception of the common sensibles which
goes so far as to assert that something which is imperceptible is yet
imageable.
Hence we may conclude that, when Aristotle says that magni-
tudes sometimes appear to be indivisible, he would not probably
refer the act of mind to pavraoía in the strict sense defined in
De An. III. ch. 3 (κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως γιγνομένη 429 a i) or as
the faculty of images (cf. 428 a 1). It is rather to be classed as a
mistaken opinion and to be ascribed to dóga. In fact paíveral is
φαίνεται
here used vaguely, and кaтà μeτapopáv (cf. 428 a 2), but in a sense
which is very common (cf. above 448 a 23 and frequently elsewhere)
as implying' appearance' in the modern sense, as opposed to reality.
(For a discussion of the minimum visibile cf. Introduction, sec. vIII.)
448 b 18. ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν. I hold (following Alexander's
second alternative) that this refers to ch. 6, 445 b 11: ådúvaтov
γὰρ λευκὸν μὲν ὁρᾶν, μὴ ποσόν δέ, not to the subsequent discussion
(cf. note to 448 b 14), for the principle involved is not râv µéɣelos
αἰσθητόν but πᾶν αἰσθητὸν μέγεθος, the simple converse, which is also
discussed at the end of this chapter, 449 a 22 sqq.
448 b 19. This passage from 448 b 19 to 449 a 22 presents very
serious difficulty. In the first part of it the text has been practically
reconstructed by Biehl, who attaches great authority to MSS. E M Y.
Consequently the interpretations of Alexander and most commen-
tators who follow a very different version have to be in many places
discarded. This in itself is small loss, as it can hardly be said that
those interpretations were consistent either among themselves or
with the previous part of the treatise. But the difficulty still remains
of extracting the exact drift of the argument from the crabbed Greek
of the reconstructed and, it is supposed, more ancient version.
Down to 449 a 10 runs an argument to which we can find no strict
parallel in the De Anima, and it is here that the textual reconstruc-
tion takes place. From this point onwards we can trace an identity
between the reasonings here and those passages in De An. 111. ch. 2,
426 b 8-427 a 16 and ch. 7, 431 a 19 sqq., which are themselves.
already so famous for their obscurity. Consequently the advantage
resulting from a greater unanimity as to the text is annulled by a
greater divergence of opinion as to the purport of the argument.
In order to arrive at a conclusion as to the general meaning of
COMMENTARY
229
the passage we must, as it were, take our bearings and recapitulate
the results attained in the previous part of the chapter together with
the main conclusions arrived at in the De Anima.
α
The solution already given of τῆς πρότερον λεχθείσης ἀπορίας is,
that consciousness of two sensations simultaneously is only possible
when the two combine to form a unitary product (447 b 11: Tô μuậ
δὲ [αἰσθήσει] ἅμα δυοῖν οὐκ ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἂν μὴ μιχθῇ). Only
sensations, however, belonging to the same sense can give a unitary
product (447 a 32 sqq.), and, as an illustration of this unitary product,
he gives the concord which two different tones compose and, though
Aristotle does not explicitly mention them (cf. notes to 448 a 7 sqq.),
everything points to his having in his mind the composite colours,
odours and flavours which in previous chapters he asserted to be
formed by the combination of the two qualities which in each sense
are most opposed to each other (ἐκ μὲν ἐνίων γίνεταί τι... . μίγνυνται γὰρ
ὧν τὰ ἔσχατα ἐναντία). Qualities of diverse senses do not combine
(ἐκ δ᾽ ἐνίων οὐ γίνεται, τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ ὑφ᾽ ἑτέραν αἴσθησιν...οὐκ ἔστι
δ᾽ ἐκ λευκοῦ καὶ ὀξέος ἓν γενέσθαι ἀλλ᾽ ἢ κατὰ συμβεβηκός). This state-
ment is repeated again in the passage we are to discuss 449 a 9–10:
οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐκ τούτων [γλυκέος καὶ λευκοῦ] ν.
ων
ej
The conclusion then is, that sensations of different senses cannot
be simultaneously present in consciousness, while those belonging to
the same sense escape the same disability only by sacrificing their
individuality and merging in a compound (uîyua) in which they are
not èvepyeía, actually, discernible.
αν
Now, in view of the opposition between this conclusion and the
passages in the De Anima as well as the solution finally come to at
the end of this chapter (ὥστε καὶ αἰσθάνοιτ᾽ ἂν ἅμα τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἑνί,
449 a 21), which is evidently Aristotle's final opinion, how are we to
treat the arguments in the earlier part of the chapter? Are they
merely dialectical? Or do they merely emphasise a point of view
which, while so far legitimate, is modified and transcended by the
final presentation of the subject? To us who have followed Aris-
totle's method of developing an argument in previous chapters, this
seems the more likely answer, but whether he has made the relation
between the two points of view quite plain, and whether indeed he
was clear about it in his own mind, is another question.
In the passages in the De Anima there is no mention whatsoever
of the sensations coalescing with each other. The question is raised
how we distinguish the various sense qualities, and the word chiefly
230
DE SENSU
used for this action is kpíve, which is paraphrased once (426 b 14)
by αισθάνεσθαι ὅτι διαφέρει [τὰ αἰσθητά]. The reply is, that they
[rà
must be distinguished by something unitary and in a unitary moment
of time (åµa). If the first condition were not fulfilled, consciousness
would be divided into independent parts, separate like the minds of
different individuals; if the moment of their distinction were not
a unit, qualities could not be pronounced to be distinct at one and
the same moment.
Obviously Aristotle is there not discussing qualities which have
merged with each other and lie indistinguishably commingled in
their product. It is noteworthy also that, apparently, he finds the
greatest difficulty in explaining the simultaneous distinction of
contrary qualities, not of those belonging to diverse senses. (Cf.
Rodier, Vol. II. pp. 388 sqq. and pp. 501 sqq. On the whole
I follow Rodier and Alexander.) (1) The first explanation proposed
is, that what perceives is in aspect or mode of existence (r@ elva)
diverse, though a numerical and spatial unit (тóπ dè κai apiμậ
adiαípeтov 427 a 5), just as things have various diverse qualities, but
yet are numerically and spatially one (cf. beneath 449a 16: rò yàp
αὐτὸ καὶ ἓν ἀριθμῷ λευκὸν καὶ γλυκύ ἐστι). (I agree with Rodier and
Alexander in identifying the second solution in this chapter of the
De Sensu with the former of the two explanations in the De Anima
in III. ch. 2.)
But (2) it is only potentially that contrary qualities (as distin-
guished from those merely diverse) can form a unity. When actual
they cannot be realised in the same subject. When forming a mixture
they have potential existence and thus can be realised in the same
subject. Hence we must think of the soul, not as being analogous
in this case to a thing in which diverse qualities are combined, but
rather to something incorporeal, e.g. a point, which is at one and the
same time actually one or two, according to the way in which it is
viewed. A point per se is a mere unit and indivisible, but, viewed
as the end of one line and the starting point of another, it is two.
In the line AB which is intersected at the point C
A
IC
B
e
C is employed in two ways at the same time, as the terminus of AC
and the starting point of CB (δὶς γὰρ τῷ αὐτῷ χρῆται σημείῳ ἅμα
427 a 12).
This is, without doubt, the same solution as that mentioned
briefly below in 449 a 12 sqq. 'In so far as that which perceives
COMMENTARY
231
sweet and white is actually indivisible it is one, in so far as actually
divisible it is diverse.'
Note that in the De Sensu Aristotle applies the explanation, which
he had reserved in the De Anima for contraries, to mere differents
like white and sweet, afterwards returning to the more general solu-
tion which he had given in the De Anima (ἢ ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων
αὐτῶν ἐνδέχεται, οὕτως καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς 4492 14-15) and which
seemed to be inadequate to account for the perception of contraries.
This need not mean a recoil on Aristotle's part from the teaching in
the Psychology. From the discussion there in 111. ch. 7, it appears
that he thought the cases of contraries and of differents not to be
fundamentally diverse. (I follow here Rodier's text and interpreta-
tion.) Vide 43 I a 21 : ἔστι γὰρ ἕν τι, οὕτω δὲ καὶ ὡς ὅρος. καὶ ταῦτα,
ἓν τῷ ἀνάλογον καὶ τῷ ἀριθμῷ ὄν, ἔχει πρὸς ἑκάτερον, ὡς ἐκεῖνα πρὸς
ἄλληλα· τί γὰρ διαφέρει τὸ ἀπορεῖν πῶς τὰ μὴ ὁμογενῆ κρίνει ἢ τὰ
ἐναντία, οἷον λευκὸν καὶ μέλαν ; κ.τ.λ.
Here we find (1) that that which discerns the sensibles is s
opos, as it were a limiting point (cf. πépas in the previous passage);
(2) that the sensations (Taûra) are, in virtue of this principle, related
to each other as the qualities (èkeîva) are among themselves; (3) that
this numerically identical consciousness relates the various pairs of
évavría in an analogous fashion (as we can gather also from De Sensu,
ch. 7, above 447 b 32 sqq.: ὡς δ᾽ αὕτως ἑαυταῖς τὰ σύστοιχα κ.τ.λ.).
Hence, if white bears to black the relation that sweet bears to bitter,
the proportion will be transposable, as we may say that white is to
sweet as black to bitter. Here now we are relating to each other rà
μn oμoyev and hence it follows that the mode of distinguishing them
is not essentially different from the way in which we discriminate
contraries.
It follows, then, that Aristotle's final opinion contained both
elements and that the two are really complementary to each other
(cf. Rodier 11. p. 501), viz., (1) that the relation of sensations in con-
sciousness is the same as that of objective qualities in things, (2) that
the only parallel we can find for the relating consciousness is the
mathematical point with its double function of oneness and duality.
Notice that Aristotle is confident that this perception of two
qualities is simultaneous, while it must be different from the only
kind of simultaneous perception of qualities yet accounted for (up
to 448 b 17) in the De Sensu. This was the perception of qualities
in fusion; that is the distinction (кpíσis) of the different sensations,
232
DE SENSU
It is true that in De Sensu, ch. 7, 447 b 28 sqq. Aristotle says it is
the function of a single sense to discriminate specifically different
and opposite qualities like white and black. But there is no indi-
cation at that point that this discrimination must be instantaneous;
the drift of the argument seems rather to be that what is perceived
at a single instant must be a numerical unit. Alexander (De Sensu,
p. 167, 11. 10 sqq. [W.], p. 352, ll. 10 sqq. [Thurot]) professes to find
the account given of the perception of contraries here unsatisfactory.
It is merely, he thinks, the same as that first hazarded in the De
Anima and there set aside. The same thing cannot be both white
and black, and hence, if the union of sensations in the soul is similar
to the union of qualities in things, we have left the case of contrary
sensations unexplained. Hence he thinks that either discrimination
of contraries can only be effected by means of memory, not by
present sensations, or that it is by the central organ (the heart) being
affected in different parts simultaneously (just as it must be different
parts of the same object that have contrary determinations) that we
can at the same time distinguish different sensations. Hence, though
the simultaneous experience (πálos) of two opposite qualities is not
possible, simultaneous discrimination (κpíσɩs) is.
This seems to me to be an untenable position. Though, in
perception, there can be distinguished the two different aspects of
discrimination and experience or reception of the sensations, yet they
cannot exist apart from each other; at any rate the discrimination of
the diversity cannot exist without the presentation of the differents,
and simultaneous discrimination of the differents cannot exist without
simultaneous modification of the same thing by the differents.
Besides, this theory seems to be exactly that which Aristotle, in
anticipation of his final solution, is going to disprove below in
the passage from 448b 19-449a 9 : ἅμα μὲν, ἑτέρῳ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς
aioláveolai. This is impossible, he says, even though the different
parts belong to one continuous whole-οὕτω δ᾽ ἀτόμῳ ὡς παντὶ ὄντι
ovvexeî (cf. infra 23 sqq. and notes). This would be a good descrip-
tion of the central organ functioning by means of different parts.
The way out of the difficulty is found by paying close attention
to the conclusion established in De An. III. ch. 7.
There is no essential difference, Aristotle says, between the dis-
crimination of differents and of contraries. Similarly we might add
there is no essential difference between the way in which both classes
of qualities are realised in things. Incompatible qualities must, if
COMMENTARY
233
realised in one thing (by belonging to different parts of it), meet in a
common point which is two or one according to the way of looking
at it, just as much as a particle of matter which is both sweet and
white has both a dual and a unitary aspect.
If this is Aristotle's final opinion, what is to be thought of the
purport of the earlier part of this chapter? It might be suggested
that in the De Sensu he is talking of aio@áveolaι in the sense of
πάσχειν, in the De Anima as κρίνειν. But this can hardly be
accurate; the final verdict in the De Sensu is the same as in the De
Anima, while there is no indication that he is at the end thinking of
aloonois merely as κpíσis. As we have seen, there cannot be simul-
taneous κpious without simultaneous rάeos, while again sensation is
always with him a dúvaµis кpiтiký, always cognitive. Perhaps the
meaning to be extracted from the discussion is as follows-Sense
qualities as such cannot be perceived simultaneously. True, if the
sensations they give rise to can combine, as they may do if they
belong to the same sense (since the corresponding stimuli are in
closer proximity than in other cases-μᾶλλον γὰρ ἅμα ἡ κίνησις 447 b
9 sq.), they can both be experienced. But in combination they
cannot be discriminated, hence not perceived. But since, as we
learn in the De Anima, to be discriminated they must be simul-
taneously apprehended, it is to their objective realisation in things,
to their unity kaтà σνμßeßnкós, i.e. as accidents of the same substance,
that we must look for the grounds of the possibility of their dis-
crimination, while their discrimination is effected by a consciousness
which has a unity, not like that of different spatial parts in a whole,
but like that of the different qualities in one object.
ко
If this be the meaning of our author, it forms a remarkable fore-
shadowing of the psychological doctrine that discrimination and
objectification go together and, if objects can exist only in space, it
is an argument for the necessity of the spatial form of things for the
development of knowledge.
Aristotle says that this faculty which distinguishes the sense
qualities belonging to the different genera is still a form of sense, for
the qualities distinguished are sense qualities (αισθητά γάρ ἐστιν, De
An. ii. ch. 2, 426 b 15). Yet it cannot be idía alo@nois, which
merely discriminates qualities belonging to a single sense. It is not
located in the organ of any special sense, nor in the flesh. Its
organ he calls τὸ κύριον αἰσθητήριον, which is evidently to be identified
with what he elsewhere calls tò kúpιov aio◊ŋtýpiov, De Som. ch. 2,
234
DE SENSU
455 a 21 sqq., τὸ πρῶτον αἰσθητήριον ibid. 456 a 21, etc., and τὸ κοινὸν
aio Onτýpiov De Juvent. ch. 1, 467 b 28, ibid. ch. 3, 469 a 12, namely the
heart or some constituent found in it. This is the organ of the кown
aloOnois, one function of which we have already discussed, namely
the perception of the 'common sensibles,'-number, figure, magni-
tude, motion, and unity. If we look however to De Som. ch. 2,
455 a 13 sqq. we find that the faculty by which we distinguish the
various genera of sensations, e.g. white and sweet, is also called a кown
δύναμις ἀκολουθοῦσα πάσαις, and this it is, too, which enables us to be
not only conscious but self-conscious (ᾗ καὶ ὅτι ὁρᾷ καὶ ἀκούει αἰσθά
νεται). It resides in the κοινὸν αἰσθητήριον (τινὶ κοινῷ μορίῳ τῶν
αισθητηρίων πάντων).
Hence we come to the conclusion that the faculty by which we
discriminate and hence objectify sense qualities is also the same as
that in virtue of which we are self-conscious, a striking anticipation
of Kant's doctrine of the objectifying function of the 'transcendental
unity of apperception.' Cf. Introd. sec. Ix.
448 b 22. ȧróµw xpóvą. Cf. note to ȧróµw above 447 a 15; this
has been the sense in which Aristotle has used 'individual time'
throughout. Cf. Physics VIII. ch. 8, 263 b 27: oux oîóv te eis átóμovs
Xpóvovs Siaipeîobaι тòv xpóvov, cf. also vI. ch. 9, 239 b 8.
448 b 23. Tép Sè. This seems not to be exactly the theory
rejected in De An. III. ch. 2, 426 b 17 sqq.: ouтe dǹ Kexwpioμévois
ἐνδέχεται κρίνειν ὅτι ἕτερον τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λευκοῦ, κ.τ.λ.
There it was shown in general terms that it is not by separate
organs or faculties that the soul discriminates diverse sensations.
Here it is proved that not even though the different organs were to
form a continuous whole could it be said that through them the dis-
tinction of the sensations is effected.
In short, both arguments are directed against the contention that
it is by means of spatially different parts that the simultaneous
presentation and discrimination of two different sense qualities is
rendered possible. In the De Anima these different parts seem to
be regarded as the various end organs, but as it might have been
objected that they need not be regarded as separate in that way, since,
on Aristotle's own theory, the various sense organs all connected with
the heart, and the real organ of discrimination might hence be the
various parts of that member, Aristotle here refutes this second version
of the theory.
448 b 24. . oủ rộ ảτóµw. This is omitted by MSS. LSU and
COMMENTARY
235
14
also by Alexander, who reads, instead of the subsequent ourw SȧTóµw,
καὶ οὕτως ἀτόμῳ ὡς παντὶ ὄντι συνεχεί. This he takes to refer to the
aua in 1. 21 above and to be a second attempt to define the sense in
which the organ is individual (Alex. p. 157 ll. 17 sqq. [W.], p. 331 l. 7
[Th.]). This reading and interpretation is supported by Thurot and
also Bäumker (Jahrb. für Class. Philol. 1886, p. 319) who, of course,
assign the où T aróμg to dittographia. But, if the interpretation is
to be supported and ouros aróμg is to be referred to time, we must
read either καὶ ἐν οὕτως with Thurot or κἂν οὕτως with Bäumker.
However, it is impossible that us Tavтì oνTI σvveɣe can elucidate the
ὄντι
meaning of qua or be a relevant description of the atomic time
mentioned above (cf. previous notes). That is a time which rela-
tively to the two sensations is atomic, which is such that the two
sensations are not subsequent to each other, but both experienced
concurrently throughout the whole duration of the time. But, though
the time is continuous, one sensation may quite well be subsequent
to another, for the time uniting two events in immediate succession
is continuous.
It is true that the time in which the sensations are presented
must be continuous, i.e. must be capable of resolution into still
briefer times: cf. the general discussion of continuity in the notes to
ch. 6, 445 b 3 and 28 sqq.
But to point this out in no way shows how the sensations are
aua; on the contrary, it would lead one to believe they were not
really qua, i.c. Ev To avτÔ Xpóvo (Physics IV. ch. 10, 218 a 25, Categ.
ch. 13, 14b 25) in the sense of being concurrently present in all
parts of it, but that one was voteрov, the other πрóтероν. Сf. Physics,
loc. cit.—ἅμα εἶναι κατὰ χρόνον = μήτε πρότερον μήτε ὕστερον τὸ ἐν τῷ
αὐτῷ εἶναι.
Hence, if it was said that the individuality of the time in which
two sensations were presented consisted in its being composed of
continuous parts and that they were 'together,' qua, merely in the
sense of occupying different parts of this continuous whole, this
would contradict the definition of their simultaneity given above in
1. 22, which Alexander explains as not being merely immediate suc-
cession in time.
In short, if it can be asserted that a time of continuous parts is
atomic in a sense (i.e. in the sense that no division in it has been
made), yet this is not the sense in which the time in which sensations
are simultaneously perceived is atomic.
236
DE SENSU
Hence if ovтw άτóμg refers to time, it is a misleading irrelevancy.
It must refer to the organ or faculty of perception. (For the sense
in which rò σuvexés is a unity cf. Metaph. x. ch. 1, 1052 a 19 sqq.)
The ancient translation runs et non indivisibili, sic autem indi-
visibili ut omni existenti continuo.'
Biehl's conjecture καὶ οὐ τῷ ἀτόμῳ ἢ οὕτως ?] ἀτόμῳ seems to
give little visible improvement.
(
448 b 28. ταῦτα. All Mss. except E M and all editors except
Biehl read Taůrá. Accordingly, following that reading we should
have to interpret there will be a plurality of organs specifically
alike.' Not only the interpretations but the readings also which
we are to accept in the subsequent passage will depend upon our
decision here.
Firstly, it is clear that whatever reading we accept we must not
have the temerity to translate yéve in this line 'species.' Hammond
reading Taurá renders: it will then have parts specifically the same.
For its repeated sensations belong to the same species.' This is
certainly to cut the knot and leave the difficulty unsolved.
Supposing that Tavτά be read, then we may, throughout the subse-
quent lines also, follow pretty closely the version of the class of mss.
which gives us that reading.
Bekker gives καὶ γὰρ ἃ αἰσθάνεται, ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει ἐστίν, which we
may render 'for the objects of a single sense belong to the same
genus.' This does not seem to be a confirmation of the rará unless
we remember that, though the actual sensation is identical with the
sense quality as actually perceived and that, hence, as qualities are
specifically diverse so are sensations, yet as a dúvaμs the sense
is specifically a unit. The perception of black and of white
is dvváμe specifically one. What has a generic unity évepyeía has
specific unity potentially.
The senses considered as faculties are only specifically distinct.
Now the sense faculty and the sense organ are from many points of
view one and the same thing. They are, of course, relatively to
each other σῶμα ὀργανικόν and ἕξις—the ἕξις of the particular organ ;
but they are often referred to by the same term; aloŋois is often
equivalent to aiơ◊ŋtýpɩov (cf. above ch. 3, 440 a 20, and ovis is even
used for ὄμμα: cf. ch. 2, 438 a 13: τὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ὄψιν εἶναι ὕδατος
ἀληθὲς μέν), and so ακοή for the ear, ὄσφρησις for the organ of smell
(cf. De An. III. ch. 1, 425 a 4: 8 akoǹ åépos, K.T.λ. and De Sens.
ch. 2, 438 b 21-22 and note).
COMMENTARY
237
Hence we might argue that, corresponding to the specifically
identical faculty which perceives objects specifically distinct, there is,
if it requires a separate organ to apprehend every separate determi-
nation, a corresponding plurality of sense organs which yet are speci-
fically identical, for, if the faculty is specifically one, so are the organs.
Hence we should have to interpret εἰ δὲ ὅτι ὡς δύο ὄμματα, κ.τ.λ.
1. 29 sqq. in some such way as this-If it be said that this may
very well be the case because (e.g.) the eyes are specifically alike, and
so the soul may have a plurality of similar organs, it must be observed
that the cases are not parallel.
'The two eyes have an identical function, not two images but
one alone is present when we see; but the case you try to explain
is that of the perception of diversity.' (This would require to be the
sense to be arrived at, whatever reading we follow.)
'Once more, if the organs are specifically alike, so will the faculty
of perceiving black, white, etc., be specifically identical, i.e. you will
have different sense faculties only numerically distinct (aio@noes ai
avtaì tλeíovs ëσovтaι 1. 33) which is like saying that there may be
different sciences of the same subject.'
But this last argument is sufficient to throw suspicion on the
whole proof. If it is the case that, as the authors of this interpreta-
tion would themselves admit, the perception of black and the per-
ception of white are only as actualised specifically different, and
dvváμeɩ, or as a faculty, they are specifically identical and only numeri-
cally to be distinguished as different possible acts of the same sense
(cf. Alex. De Sens. p. 158, 1. I5 [W.], p. 333, 1. 6 [Th.]: rv gào ê tô
yévei ý avtǹ kar' eidos aïolnois. Alexander, however, shows some
perplexing hesitation between oμoyevî and dµoeidî), then it is clear
that Aristotle would not have the least objection to saying that the
same sense faculty may be reduplicated, provided one understands
what this means. If it mean, as is the only view consistent with the
reading Taurá, that it is one sense faculty which is particularised and
made determinate in the perception of black, white, etc., then this is
precisely his theory.
(Compare 447 b 27 sqq. above. There he cannot maintain the
unqualified assertion that, corresponding to a specifically identical
object, there is a single (specifically identical) sense. A single sense
corresponds to and discriminates specifically diverse objects (cf. 447 b
29). It is the single sense functioning in a determinate manner which
gives specific identity in the object.)
238
DE SENSU
Hence it would be Aristotle's own theory that the different organs
by which we perceived white and black, if there were any, must be
specifically alike, just as the eyes are alike.
But his argument is this-'If you postulate a diversity of organs,
you will have to make them specifically unlike each other. Where
we have different organs, as is the case with diverse senses, the unity
of the senses is only generic; hence here too, within one sense, if
you are to have separate organs, they will only have a generic
resemblance to each other. You object and say there are the two
eyes, specifically alike, but yet serving the one sense-sight.
I reply
that these have a single function; the sensations given by each
combine to form one product. So too the different sensations
mediated by specifically identical (eïde dè 1. 31) parts of the same
organ may form a compound, e.g. black and white, and sounds of
various pitch, which combine. But, when that is so, the different
sensations are not discriminated. Your proposal was to account for
the perception, ¿.e., discrimination of the sensations, by the diversity
of the organs by which they are apprehended. If, as shown, a mere
numerical difference in the organ does not render that possible, you
will have to try specific disparateness. The different organs must be
specifically diverse.
(
But, if so, contained within each sense there will be diverse
faculties, distinct from each other as the various sciences are dis-
tinct and as the admittedly different senses are distinct. Distinct
sciences have each an appropriate dúvaμis and so have distinct
senses. The perception, then, of (e.g.) different colours will, because
each has, as shown, its appropriate duvaus, be distinct in the way that
the sciences are.'
This carries us down to 449 a 3, after which the argument takes
a new turn.
οτι
448 b 28-29. TO AUTO YÉVEL. Cf. 447 b 29-30; where you have
αὐτῷ γένει.
different organs you have only generic identity in the sense.
448 b 29.
If we read ovồèv kwλúe in this way as governing oτɩ
ὅτι
(see translation), we must supply λEKTéov before or tows in order to
avoid an ugly anacoluthon. This, however, is very common in
Aristotle. Cf.
Сf. отι
ὅτι
τι πρώτον 1. 25 above. The ὅτι ἴσως clause can
hardly be an argument against the suggestion that we may have
different organs specifically alike, as in the case of the eyes; it will
rather be in support of it. Alexander, however, wishes to take or
lows as an objection to a different thesis (cf. note to raûra above).
او
οτι
COMMENTARY
239
If it is intended as an argument in support, it can only be the plea
of an intelligent supporter. He (the supporter) says 'here you
have two eyes of identical construction functioning alike and co-
operating in the act of perception.' Aristotle in the next sentence
replies 'that is exactly the point, the objects they perceive are
numerically one, not diverse as is required in the case of the organs
which are to perceive both white and black simultaneously.'
448b 31-33. Bekker reads èkeî dé, ei µèv èv tò éέ åµpoîv, ékeîvo
τὸ αἰσθανόμενον ἔσται, εἰ δὲ χωρίς, οὐχ ὁμοίως ἕξει, following LSUP
and Alexander.
Biehl's text is εἰ δέ, ᾗ μὲν ἓν τὸ ἐξ ἀμφοῖν, ἓν καὶ τὸ αἰσθανόμενον
K.T.A.; he bases his restoration on readings in EMY. This would
give us 'But if that is so, then, consequent to the unity of the
product, the perceptive organ (faculty?) is single, while again if the
sensations are separate the case is altered.' We may extract a
meaning out of it somewhat like that which Alexander gets from the
other reading-viz. that in the case of the eyes you have really a
single psychic faculty functioning through the two organs and not two,
as is claimed. This will give a sense satisfactory to our argument;
but it is difficult to see how тò aiolavóμevov could be said to be
numerically single when it is quite as naturally an epithet for
the eye as for the faculty, and the eyes are manifestly double.
Hence I propose, while following Biehl and the older class of
MSS., to read eldeɩ dè ei instead of ei dè in 448 b 31, and interpret as
in note to 448 b 28. The point is, that two perceptive organs
specifically alike will account for the perception of a single object,
but that to account for the perception of two things (simultaneously),
the organs must be specifically unlike.
Hammond translates, following Biehl's text, "If, however, the
continuation of both forms a unit, then that which is perceived will
be a unit and, if they remain uncombined, then the result will
likewise be uncombined.'
448 b 33.
ἔτι αισθήσεις κ.τ.λ. For Alexander's interpretation
cf. note to b 28 above.
449 a 3. It seems to be the universal practice to take raúrηs as
referring to èvépyeɩa in 1. 2. We thus get a syllogism—if aïodŋois
then ἐνέργεια, if ἐνέργεια then οἰκεία δύναμις; hence all αἰσθήσεις
have their oikeía dúvaμis. But perhaps there was no need to prove
this. Whether we read raůrá or taûta in 448 b 28, we might prefer
aloonois here to be taken in the sense which it has in 448 b
240
DE SENSU
33—as a distinct sense (not as sensation as I have translated). Now
a sense is by definition a dúvaμis (cf. De An. III. ch. 9, 432 a 16)
and more accurately a dúvaμs in the sense of ëģis (cf. De Sens. ch. 1,
436 b 5, and note to ch. 4, 441 b 25, and De An. 11. ch. 5). A sense
is like a distinct science, a determinate potentiality; the actual
exercise of both alike depends upon this, which may be called the
οἰκεία δύναμις of the ἐνέργεια in each case. It may be of these princi-
ples that Aristotle reminds us here. It has already been shown that,
if the organs by which we perceive white and black are distinct, they,
and therefore the faculties which reside in them, must be distinct.
Hence these latter will be distinct in the sense that sciences are
distinct. The two clauses-οὔτε...δυνάμεως, οὔτε...αἴσθησις—will
then form only a single premiss in the argument which proves that
a distinct sense is like a distinct science.
449 a 4. Unless u be read before aio@áveraι we get a shocking
piece of bad reasoning; though if B can be perceived, a fortiori
A can be perceived, we cannot infer that if A then B (B=Twv tậ
γένει ἑτέρων, Α = τὰ ἐναντία). Besides the presence of μὴ does not
incommode the argument, in fact improves it.
The best defence of this emendation (which though authorised
by no text is seen to be necessary by Alexander unless TOÚTOV
= ἐκείνων, i.e. heterogeneous objects, ἄλλων = ὁμοειδών. So St Hilaire
and Leonicus) is by Bäumker in the Jahrb. für Class. Philol. 1886,
p. 320. He points out that though in classical Greek if u is read
we should expect ovdè not kaì after öτɩ in the next clause, yet we
find instances of the contrary usage in Aristotle, e.g. De Coelo, 1.
ch. II, 281a 16 : οἷον ὁ χίλια βαδίσαι στάδια μὴ δυνάμενος, δῆλον
ὅτι καὶ χίλια καὶ ἕν.
The presence of the kaì, being so contrary to common usage,
probably led to the omission of the un
For the principle compare above 447 b 7 sqq. and 448 a 15 sqq.
év ¿vì kaì átóµy must refer to time (cf. 448 b 22-24 and notes). It
is the simultaneousness of the perception which is under discussion,
and which cannot be accounted for by the theory that the faculty or
organ is diverse.
449 a 7. From ἤτοι, 1. 7, to ἐκ τούτων ἕν, 1. 9, the passage is
almost hopelessly obscure.
τούτων, 1. 7, must surely refer to γλυκέος and λευκοῦ. The phrase
TÒ ÈK TOÚTOV Continually refers to a compound. Cf. De An. II. ch. 1,
412 a 9, where οὐσία συνθέτη, consisting of ὕλη and εἶδος, is so
COMMENTARY
241
designated, and Metaph. vII. ch. 3, 1029 a 3, etc. Thus if here TÒ ÈK
TOÚTOV refers to the organ or faculty of perception, it can hardly
imply that it is a substratum or Tокeíμevov, as Alexander (De
Sensu, p. 162, 1. 23 [W.], p. 343, 1. 6 [Th.]) and Rodier (11. p. 390)
take it.
However, apart from this, all except Simon (Simon, De Sensu,
p. 261) admit that (Tò) K TOÚTwv in 1. 9 refers to a compound of
qualities or sensations, and it is hardly likely that in three lines Aristotle
would employ the same expression to refer to two different things.
Moreover the meaning of rò è dµpoîv in 448 b 32 above, as well as
¿§ ŵv 447 a 23, ěk...ěvíwv 447 a 32, etc., all point to this phrase
referring to a fusion of sensations, and so St Hilaire takes it. On
the other hand, Alexander, Thomas, Simon, and Rodier wish to take
it as referring to the soul or the central organ, the heart. The only
advantage resulting from this is that the connection of aλλ' áváyкn
ἕν and ἓν γάρ τι τὸ αἰσθητικόν ἐστι μέρος is quite clear, but it leaves the
connection between the latter clause and those which follow it
absolutely unexplained.
Simon is more consistent than others in thinking that the refer-
ence may be to the central sense and its organ throughout.
ત
If we take TÒ ÈK TOÚTWV as referring on both occasions to a
product of sensations, then the argument will be clear except as to
the connection between ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη ἕν and ἓν γάρ τι τὸ αἰσθητικόν ἐστι
μépos. The only way I can see for explaining this is as follows:
'It is claimed that we perceive black and white simultaneously
by means of a single organ with spatially diverse though continuous
parts. But in such a case the two sensations must coalesce and
form a unity, and hence, if it is by the same means that we per-
ceive sweet and white, then they too must form a unity. But
such a unitary product does not exist. Hence it is not by the
spatial diversity of the organ that those qualities are perceived simul-
taneously.'
The question is still as to the means of perceiving the two
simultaneously (which he is sure can take place), and the objection
to the solution proposed is not that it postulates different organs, for
he admits that such exist (aλλo dè yévos di ẵλλov, 1. 11), but that
it is through a spatial diversity of the organ that they are supposed
to be related in the same moment of time.
Thus, in the whole of this section from 448 b 19 onwards
Aristotle has been working up to his own theory. He rejects the
R.
16
242
DE SENSU
solution proposed in the form in which it is offered but, more suo,
abstracts from it the legitimate part. There are different faculties, but
it is not quâ located in different physical organs that they are able
to allow their different contributions to be correlated in a single
consciousness.
449 a 8.
ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη. If Aristotle is still discussing the solution
hazarded in 448 b 23-25, as he must be, this is proof positive that
according to that theory the soul must be a unity of a kind, and so
our interpretation of our 8 áróμe in 448 b 24-25 is confirmed. If it
were under dispute whether what perceives is something unitary or
not, Aristotle could not bring in without proof the very statement
which was denied—ἓν γάρ τι τὸ αἰσθητικόν ἐστι μέρος. Indeed if
he knew this to be true and to be excluded by the other theory
—ἄλλῳ μὲν γλυκέος ἄλλῳ δὲ λευκοῦ αἰσθάνεται ἡ ψυχὴ μέρει—he would
need to start with a direct proof of it.
υτω
449 a IO. Biehl proposes to read dè instead of apa, no doubt
because, apparently, all that has been said is in opposition to what
follows. But, as we have seen (note to 449 a 7), what precedes is
directed not against the doctrine of a unitary principle (indeed
that has been affirmed in 1. 8), but against the interpretation of
it given.
449 a
I2. ἢ μὲν ἀδιαίρετον κ.τ.λ. The meaning of this is
elucidated in De An. III. ch. 2, 427 a 10 sqq. Cf. note to 448 b 19
above.
449 a 17. Alexander reads, l. 17, εἰ γὰρ μὴ χωριστά κ.τ.λ.
The sense then is—'One and the same thing numerically can be
white and sweet and have many other qualities, for, though the
qualities do not exist in separation from each other, yet in mode of
existence they are different from each other.'
Bekker and Biehl both reject yap, though Rodier accepts it.
The latter also translates rò civaɩ by 'essence.' Cf. next note.
449 a 18.
Tò eîval. Alexander seems to countenance Rodier's
translation of 'essence' by giving as equivalents λóyos and rò tí yv
εἶναι. But, though not so far from Xóyos in meaning, rò eîvaɩ is
hardly as a rule equivalent to 'essential nature' or 'real being,'
which is the special force of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. It is rather aspect of
existence'; we might almost say 'existence for consciousness.' Tậ
είναι
eivaɩ almost = 'notionally': cf. note to ch. 6, 446 b 30, and for a
typical case De An. 111. ch. 2, 425 b 27, where it is said that though
the évéρycia of the sense object and that of the sense faculty are one
COMMENTARY
243
and identical, yet in aspect of existence, i.e. as related to an external
object in the one case and the human organism in the other, they are
different τὸ δ᾽ εἶναι οὐ τὸ αὐτὸ αὐταῖς.
We may take λóyw in 1. 22 (with Bonitz, Ind. p. 221 a 60) as
equivalent to T elva and translate 'but notionally not the same,' or
we may take λóyos here as equivalent to 'ratio' and say 'but not by
means of an identical relation [to them],' i.e. to the two sensations.
449 a 24. άπepov. Aristotle cannot mean that the point from
which a thing ceases to be visible is infinitely far away. Of course
the point from which it ceases to be dvváµei, i.e. potentially visible, is
infinitely far away, ie. is non-existent. This is a consequence of the
doctrine, that every magnitude is sensible, discussed in the first part
of chapter 6. But here we are discussing the converse proposition
which answers the question raised in ch. 7, 448 b 17 and mentioned
in ch. 6, 445 b 10. Simon (p. 256) is wrong in thinking that it is
this issue which is raised in ch. 3, 440 a 29; it is the other statement,
πᾶν μέγεθος ὁρατόν.
Alexander at first takes ἄπειρον as πολύ τε καὶ σχεδὸν ἄπειρον, but
later on gives the correct interpretation : οὐ γὰρ ἔστι λαβεῖν τὸ
μέγιστον διάστημα ἀφ᾽ οὗ οὐκ αἰσθανόμεθα (De Sens. p. 168, 1. 27 [W.],
p. 356, 1. 6 [Th.]).
The argument is worked out in terms of sight, but applies to all
other senses which employ a medium. It is as the distance
between object and seer increases, we arrive at last at a point
beyond which the object is invisible, though short of it vision is still
possible. This is a single mathematical point, and the object, as it
diminishes, will, if indivisible to sight anywhere, be indivisible when
this point is reached. But this point is the first in the series from
which vision is possible, the last where it is impossible. Hence,
when at this point, the object will be both visible and invisible;
which is impossible.'
449 a 28. TOÛTO. Alexander takes this to refer to the μeraέú,
the mean point at which vision begins and invisibility ceases. Thus
all others too. But, if we interpret it so, it is difficult to construe
ὄντος,
OVTOS, 1. 30. The indivisibility of the point seems to be implied
strongly enough in the last clause-ἔστι δέ τι ἔσχατον κ.τ.λ., and, at
any rate, whether expressed or not, it is a necessary part of the
argument that an indivisible aio@nróv will be found at this point if
anywhere.
449 b 2. Kown. For this sense of κowós cf. ch. 1, 436 a 7.
16—2
DE MEMORIA
CHAPTER I.
449 b 4. μνημονεύειν is simply the verb corresponding to μνήμη,
and means to have something (consciously and at the time) in one's
memory. It is paraphrased by evepyeîv τŷ μvýμy in 450 a 21 beneath.
It is to be distinguished from avaμμvýσкeσat which implies the
active search for the memory of some particular item of one's past
experience. Though we employ 'to remember' for the former, to
recollect' for the latter, the English words are hardly so sharply
contrasted as the Greek; in fact, in ordinary use they are hardly to
be distinguished, as is natural considering that both contain the
prefix corresponding to the Greek ává. But even in Greek, and
sometimes in Aristotle himself, the terms are not used with perfect
precision. Cf. Freudenthal in Rheinisches Museum, 1869, p. 403.
449 b 8.
μvημovikol. This is one of the characteristics enu-
merated in Aristotle's hardly complimentary list of the peculiarly
feminine qualities. Cf. Hist. Animal. IX. ch. 1, 608 b 13.
449 b 10. ληπτέον we must make an assumption. Aristotle is
going to show grounds for this assumption, but he could not say
ÚTOKEίow, because that would imply that the grounds had been
already shown. Cf. note to De Sensu, ch. 1, 436 a 5. This seems
to be the distinction generally maintained between λaµßávev and
ὑποτίθεσθαι.
term.
449 b 12. SoğaσTòv. Sóέa, as a faculty, means generally the
power of forming opinions and thinking, in the widest sense of the
When defined more closely, however, it takes rank as the
lowest of the rational faculties; it is practically equivalent to vπóλNYIS
in its most restricted application and is opposed to
has for its object necessary truth. Cf. De An. 111. ch.
Cf. De An. III. ch. 3; Anal. Post.
I. ch. 33; Metaph. vII. ch. 15, 1039 b 32 sqq.
wτýμŋ, which
449 b 14. There is a special treatise Περὶ τῆς καθ᾽ ὕπνον
μaνTIKηs 462 b 12 sqq., on supposed prevision of the future by means.
COMMENTARY
245
of dreams. Aristotle accounted for the phenomena in question by
means of natural agencies.
449 b 16. Here Aristotle agrees with Locke (Essay, Bk. IV. ch.
II. § 14 and ch. XI.) with whom 'sensitive knowledge' occupies pretty
much the same place as alooŋous with Aristotle.
Though only the present is known by perception, this does not
mean that only perception knows the present. In 1. 18 beneath, Tò
θεωρούμενον is given as an example of τὸ παρόν.
449 b 17. Biehl prefers or before mάρeστw instead of ore, the
reading adopted by all other editors. The point to be made out
is that quâ present an object of consciousness is not an object of
memory. One might remember, while he was looking at a white
thing, that he had seen it before; but he cannot remember that it is
now present. This is the only point to be made out here, viz. that
memory is the apprehension of a thing not as present but as past.
How this is possible is discussed in 450 a 27 sqq. That which is
present to consciousness when we remember, is not the object
remembered but its copy (eikov). When the present object of con-
sciousness is recognised as a representation of something in the
past, then we have memory.
(
ανευ
449 b 20. ἄνευ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν. Themistius and Michael read
ἔργων. Themistius explains thus—ἔργα δὲ λέγω οἷον τοδὶ τὸ ζῷον ἢ
τοδὶ τὸ λευκὸν καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷδε τῷ βιβλίῳ τρίγωνον, i.e. as practically
equivalent to payμara = the real things. Whatever the reading be,
the sense must be the same; eveрyev must mean the actual
operation of the real objects, or something similar; aveu Tôv évepyeɩŵv
cannot mean without actually having knowledge or perception,'
which would imply that only the έes providing for knowledge or
perception existed, for these may persist throughout unconsciousness,
e.g. in sleep. There really is perception or knowledge of something
present whenever we remember; an èvépyeta is realised (cf. 450 b 30:
ὅταν ἐνεργῇ ἡ κίνησις αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ.), but to be memory it depends upon
whether or not this ἐνέργεια is referred to something else (ἄλλου 1. 32)
existing in the past.
What is actually present in the act of memory we shall find to be
a φάντασμα ; a φάντασμα is a persisting sensation or sense content.
Now, though it is true that this is in most cases the intermediary
employed by memory, yet that intermediary might in certain cases be
an actual perception, as e.g. when we see a thing for the second time
and remember we have seen it before.
246
DE MEMORIA
449 b 22.
Biehl and Freudenthal (Rheinisches Museum, xxiv.
p. 394) wish to delete ràs Toû тpiуávov...loαi, on the ground that if
these words are left standing we shall have to translate 'he remem-
bers that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right, in the one
case because he learned or thought of it, in the other because he
heard or saw it or had some sense knowledge of the fact.' But
Freudenthal points out that we cannot have sensuous knowledge of
any mathematical principle according to Anal. Post. 1. ch. 31,
especially 87 b 34 sqq. : οὐδ᾽ ἐπίστασθαι δι' αἰσθήσεως ἔστιν. ἀλλὰ
δῆλον ὅτι καὶ εἰ ἦν αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ τρίγωνον κ.τ.λ.
Freudenthal quotes Themistius, who paraphrases 'he remembers
that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, and that
Socrates is white, in the one case because he learned, in the other be-
cause he heard or saw it' (Themist. Sp. 11. p. 233, ll. 12 sqq.). The writer
of the paraphrase, he thinks, felt the same difficulty and accordingly in-
serted καὶ τὸν Σωκράτην ὅτι λευκός as an example of sensuous memory.
This, however, is not convincing; it is not a case of knowing in
the full sense of having scientific knowledge of a fact but of remem-
bering it. Perception is of the particular, but there is no reason why
we should not perceive in a particular case and without proof that
the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles; cf. Anal. Post.
loc. cit. infra: we can perceive that the moon is eclipsed without
knowing the reason. However, there is an additional reason for
rejecting ràs...oa (which is such a common Aristotelian example
that it might easily have crept into the text); it is the necessity of
translating orɩ before eμadev and йkovσev by 'that,' not by 'because.'
The point to be brought out is that memory refers to the past; we
are not here explaining why memory takes place. Cf. next clause-
δεῖ γὰρ λέγειν, ὅτι πρότερον. The disputed words are probably a
gloss that has crept in at the wrong place. Some such expression
inserted after cúpnoev would be quite in harmony with the thought
here.
449 b 27. imóληis is here used in its widest sense as equivalent
to conceptual thought. It seems to include ewpía: cf. 1. 18 above
and 450 b 25, 35 etc. The present objects of consciousness are
objects either of αἴσθησις or ὑπόληψις, sense or thought, αἰσθήματα or
νοήματα.
In its more restricted application vóλnyis is the poorest of the
intellectual faculties. Cf. De An. 111. ch. 3, 427 b 17, 25, 28, and
Anal. Post. I. ch. 33, 88 b 37, and cf. Rodier, II. p. 411.
COMMENTARY
247
449 b 29. Freudenthal (op. cit. p. 395) rejects κai TρóтEρov
because these words cannot refer to a statement which immediately
precedes, while here it is simply to the previous paragraph that
reference is made.
Themistius, the ancient translation, and LMSU also omit the
two words.
449 b 30. αἴσθησις. As we have seen above, ὑπόληψις also
deals with the present; but Aristotle is here talking generally and,
in fact, a sensuous element is always involved in knowledge of the
present, because the object of thought, as we shall see, is always
accompanied by imagery which, again, depends upon sense.
449 b 33. TOUT. The heart (or according to Neuhäuser, cf.
Introduction, sec. VI., the ouμovтоν TVεûμа contained in it) is the
organ of the Kowǹ aïolŋσis: cf. De Juvent. ch. 3, 469 a 11, cf. also
beneath 450 a 11 sqq. and notes.
At éreì begins a protasis, the apodosis corresponding to which is
not reached till 45o a 15: ὥστε τοῦ νοητικοῦ κ.τ.λ. Φαντασία is
treated in De An. III. ch. 3. There it is defined as a (psychic)
change due to sensation (κίνησις ὑπὸ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τῆς κατ᾽ ἐνέργειαν
γιγνομένη 429 a r). Again we find in ch. 8, 432 2 9 : τὰ γὰρ φαντά
σματα ὥσπερ αἰσθήματά ἐστι, πλὴν ἄνευ ύλης, i.e., an image is identical
in character with a perception except that in the former case the
real concrete thing which contains vλŋ is absent; only the eldos of
the sensible object is present. As Themistius (Sp. II. p. 237, l. 18)
says, it is that which is left over (after perception), and remains even
though the sense object is not present, which is called pavraoía.
Besides the fact of the absence of the real object in pavτaoía, the
only other difference between it and sensation seems to be its
greater liability to error (428 a 26 sqq.), and that it is weaker in
intensity cf. Rhet. I. ch. 11, 1370 a 28: y de parraoía éorìv alobnois
Tis åσbevýs. It is like Hume's 'idea' as opposed to his 'impres-
sion.'
On the other hand it does not seem to be perfectly necessary
that the real object should cease to be present; eg. in 428 b 2 the
appearance of the sun as of a foot in diameter is given as a case of
pavracía, and again, from 428 b 28, it is clear that pavraoía and
alooŋois can synchronize. But the pavraσía is probably to be dis-
tinguished as the kívŋous which has penetrated to the heart-the
ȧpxý; cf. De Insom. ch. 3, 461 b 12, 461 a 6; cf. also ch. 2, 459 a 23
sqq. at least special emphasis is laid on this aspect. Sensations
σ
248
DE MEMORIA
or stimuli travel from the end organ to the central one and persist
after the exciting object is removed, καὶ ἐν βάθει καὶ ἐπιπολῆς. It
must be the former which is the pávτaoua proper, for we hear in
450 a 11 sq. below that it belongs to the кown alo@nois and the
πрŵтоν alonτýplov (cf. note to 450 a 11).
મ
This all goes to emphasize the sensuous character of imagination,
but however they are to be related to each other, we must not go so
far as Themistius, who practically makes pavraoía a genus, which is
known as aloŋous if the object is present, as μvýμn if it is absent,
and makes the pavraoía in both cases the presentation of a Túπos
or imprint left by the external object in the sensorium-the heart.
But, after all, rúπos is only a metaphor to Aristotle. The alonµa
(sensation) is not strictly a Túπos; it is rather the Xóyos of the
αισθητόν, and the φάντασμα present in memory is not per se a τύπος,
but only in so far as it represents the original perception. Even
then it is only oîov (wypάonμa. Themistius himself sees that, accord-
ing to his theory, only the very vaguest sense could be given to TÚπOS
(238, 1. το : χρὴ δὲ κοινότερον τοῦ τύπου ἐπὶ τῆς φαντασίας ἀκούειν).
449 b 34. νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν κ.τ.λ. Cf. De An. III. ch. 7, 431 a 16:
διὸ οὐδέποτε νοεῖ ἄνευ φαντάσματος ή ψυχή and 431 b 2 : τὰ μὲν οὖν
εἴδη τὸ νοητικὸν ἐν τοῖς φαντάσμασι νοεῖ, also ch. 8, 432 a 8 : ὅταν τε
θεωρῇ, ἀνάγκη ἅμα φαντάσματι θεωρεῖν.
The reasons which Aristotle adduces for this contention seem to
be twofold, (1) firstly that brought forward in chapter 8 of De Anima
III., that nothing self-dependent or 'isolated' (keɣwpioµévov 432 a 4)
exists beyond the extended things given by sense perception; know-
ledge can occupy itself only with the edn, forms of or concepts
realised in sense objects. Hence, when the actual object is not
present, thought is possible only if the pávтaoua originated by per-
ception is present to the mind. Secondly (2) there is the reason
obscurely implied in ch. 7, which culminates in the statement in
431 b 10 that truth and falsehood, the distinctions applicable to
theoretical consciousness (cf. 431 a 14: Tŷ diavoŋtiên ¥vxn) are
generically the same as good and evil, the objects of pursuit and
avoidance in the practical life (cf. also Eth. Nic. vI. ch. 2, 1139 a 26);
cf. Rodier, II. p. 515; affirmation and negation are at bottom the
same as pursuit and avoidance (the germ of Pragmatism). Now, it
is by means of sense that animals are able to distinguish between
the pleasant and the unpleasant (cf. 431 a 10). Hence the pursuit
of truth, which is distinguished from the quest of the good merely by
COMMENTARY
249
having an absolute as opposed to a relative end (431 b 12), will
employ the same sensuous images as the latter. This doctrine
seems to be implied in Aristotle's statements, and we must remember
that it in no way conflicts with what he elsewhere teaches—that
there are entities capable of existing in isolation from the things of
sense. There are τὰ ἀκίνητα τοῦ οὐρανοῦ εἴδη—the intelligible natures
of the heavenly bodies (cf. Alexander ap. Simp., De An. 284,
23; Rodier, 11. p. 524) which seem to be referred to by rà µỶ ev
Xpóvą ovra beneath (450 a 9-10). Again voûs-Reason-is said to be
ὄντα
xwpɩorós, and we need not understand this of the human reason, but
as applying to the mind of God, who is held to exist beyond the
confines of the world and to stand to it in the relation of rÒ πρŵτоν
κινοῦν—the ultimate source of change in it. His activity is νόησις,
and, if he exists in isolation from things sensible, one would expect
that the contents of his thought would be likewise transcendent,
and would not exist merely as realised or realisable in the world of
change and decay. (Whether, if that is so, the object of the divine.
consciousness is a differentiated scheme of distinct intelligible entities
existing apart from the material world, or whether the activity of
God, the vónois vonσews, is merely the affirmation of a blank
identity-the eternal assertion of 'I am I'-—it would be difficult
to decide.)
But such statements constitute no assertion of the real separa-
bility of certain concepts, the Platonic doctrine of transcendent edŋ,
which is so consistently attacked by Aristotle. Though he con-
tinually talks of κεχωρισμένα or ἀκίνητα καὶ χωριστά as being the
objects of metaphysical science (De An. 1. ch. 1, 403 b 15; Metaph.
VI. ch. 1, 1026 a 8 sqq.), pavraoía may be necessary for the realisa-
tion of such science in the mind of man. (In the passage in De An.
III. ch. 8, where Aristotle says, 'as it appears no objects but sensible
magnitudes exist,' we need find no denial of the objective existence
of xwpiσrá, but merely his reiterated doctrine, that for human reason,
which is not åtalýs, there are no objects of thought not realised in a
sensuous material.)
450 a 9. άveU TOû σUVEXOÛS. Quantity, Tò Toσóv, which is either
discrete (as in number) or continuous (as in space or time) is here
alluded to in the latter form, in which indeed it has been illustrated
just above. It is the continuity which forms the perceptual element
in the concepts of mathematical objects. We read in De An. III.
ch. 8, 432 a 5 that concepts, including those belonging to mathe-
!
250
DE MEMORIA
II.
matics, exist in the perceptual forms of things (ev roîs eldeσi Toîs
aloonToîs Tà vonтá éσT) which, therefore, when we think, form the
total object of consciousness from which the mind disengages the
higher concept or νόημα. νοῦς is εἶδος εἰδῶν, whereas perception (as
actualised) is the eîdos aiσ0ŋtŵv. The perceptual setting, as opposed
to the higher concept, will form the vλŋ voŋrý of which Aristotle tells
in Metaph. vII. ch. 11, 1037 a 4 and ch. 10, 1036 a 9 sqq.: vλŋ &
ἡ μὲν αἰσθητή ἐστιν ἡ δὲ νοητή, αἰσθητὴ μὲν οἷον χαλκὸς καὶ ξύλον καὶ
ὅση κινητὴ ὕλη, νοητὴ δὲ ἡ ἐν τοῖς αἰσθητοῖς ὑπάρχουσα μὴ ᾗ αἰσθητά,
oîov тà µaðŋμaтikά. (Cf. the discussion of De An. III. ch. 4, 429 b
10-22 in Rodier, 11. p. 442 sqq. The λn aiolŋrý is the actual
αισθητή
matter of the physical substance apprehended. It is not this which
gets into the soul when we perceive, but the dos of the thing; cf.
De An. III. ch. 8, 43Ib 29: οὐ γὰρ ὁ λίθος ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀλλὰ τὸ
eidos.) But this perceptual form itself supplies a matter for the
higher concept, e.g. in mathematics. The pure mathematical concept
is not τὸ εὐθύ or τὸ κοῖλον, the straight line or the curved, but τὸ
evbeî eîvaɩ and koλórηs—straightness or curvature (cf. loc. cit. 429 b 18
and ch. 7, 431 b 12, also Metaph. VI. ch. 1, 1025 b 30 sqq., x. ch. 8,
1058 a 23, etc.). But these concepts cannot exist apart, though they
are for mathematical purposes assumed to exist apart (τὰ ἐξ ἀφαιρέ-
σεως)τὰ μαθηματικὰ οὐ κεχωρισμένα ὡς κεχωρισμένα νοεῖ. The
general expression for this matter, 'matière logique,' without which
these concepts cannot exist, is tò ouvexés (cf. 429 b 19: µetà ovvexoûs
γάρ, and Philop. De An. 531, 15, ὕλη γάρ ἐστιν, ὥς φησιν, τῶν
σχημάτων τὸ συνεχές).
ἄνευ χρόνου.
Aristotle here mentions a different class of ob-
jects from the mathematical entities referred to in the last clause.
He seems in particular to mean the heavenly bodies (cf. note to
449 b 34), which he continually refers to as dídia and aplapта (cf.
Phys. IV. ch. 12, 221 b 3), and as not being in time. They differ
from other bodies in not having a ❝λŋ which admits of growth and
decay, but one which admits of motion only. Cf. Metaph. VIII. ch.
4, 1044 b 7.
One may say with Freudenthal (op. cit. p. 396) and Hammond that
Aristotle here refers also to 'eternal laws'; they must be those of
existence generally, and not merely the laws governing the motions
of the heavenly bodies, as is implied by Hammond, for we hear in
Phys. IV. ch. 12, 222 a 5: τὸ ἀσύμμετρον εἶναι τὴν διάμετρον ἀεί ἐστιν.
He does not, however, talk of laws or principles as existing apart
COMMENTARY
251
from the objects which obey them. They at least are not on the
same level of objectivity as the objects.
To suppose him to do so would be to impute to him the
Platonic theory of elồn xwpioτá. The concepts involved in thinking
of the things of sense are not ovoía, e.g. neither the point (σTIYμŃ,
cf. Metaph. vIII. ch. 5) nor the infinite (Tò aπeɩрov, cf. Phys. III. ch. 5,
204 a 23, and Metaph. xI. ch. 10, 1066 b 13 sqq.) are ovoía. Again,
τὸ ἀγαθόν and το καλόν are not εἴδη χωριστά. Though in the case of
some concepts their essence and their existence is identical (De An.
III. ch. 4, 429 b 12, and Rodier, ad loc. pp. 442 sqq.) this does not
mean that these are to be regarded as substances (e.g. that their
essence involves their existence, as according to Spinoza's definition of
substance), but that their existence is a purely conceptual one. The
ὅσα
öσa årev vλŋs mentioned in De An. 111. ch. 6, 430 b 30, which are
the ultimate simple constituents of intellect or objects of voûs (ådiaí-
ρετα, τὰ ἄνευ συμπλοκῆς, πρῶτα νοήματα, De An. III. ch. 8, 432 2 12)
and which are to be identified in part with the categories (cf. Rodier,
II. p. 474, and Metaph. vIII. ch. 6, 1045 a 33 sqq.) partly with vague
conceptions like the Good, Being, and the One, or again with Tò
ἄπειρον, στιγμή, μονάς, etc., are not to be regarded as existing apart
from sensible things. If Aristotle says that they have neither vλŋ
νοητή nor ὕλη αισθητή (Metaph., loc. cit.), that simply means that they
are ultimate and simple and are not formed by a complex of con-
stituents, even mental constituents. These concepts must in fact be
the constituents out of which the complex ones are formed. In that
sense they themselves must be ἄνευ ύλης but they are not χωριστά
nor ουσίαι in the sense in which the individual is ουσία.
The connection with the thought here and the main contention
that thought cannot function apart from davraσía-is not quite
plain. Why should the impossibility of a thing being thought apart
from time require the presence of a pávτaoµa when it is appre-
hended? Doubtless it is because of the continuous nature of time
which accrues to it owing to its connection with change. Cf. Phys.
IV. ch. II, 219 a 12 : διὰ γὰρ τὸ τὸ μέγεθος εἶναι συνεχὲς καὶ ἡ κίνησίς
ἐστι συνεχής, διὰ δὲ τὴν κίνησιν ὁ χρόνος· ὅση γὰρ ἡ κίνησις, τοσοῦτος
kaì ô xpóvos åeì dokeî yeyovévaɩ. Time is the 'measure' or 'number'
of change; cf. ch. 12, 220 b 8 sqq. (though not number in the
proper sense, for that implies discreteness): and change is the great
characteristic of the sensible world. No doubt it is because the
heavenly bodies are μeyé0ŋ and participate in kívŋois, though merely
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252
DE MEMORIA
κίνησις κατὰ τόπον, that they must be represented as in time—a
characteristic of the sensible world, and that they too can be appre-
hended only by means of pavravía (cf. note to 449 b 34).
450 a II. ᾧ. By this, as we have seen, Aristotle refers in-
differently to the faculty or the organ and there is no ground for
Freudenthal's refusal to think that the organ is here referred to.
μéyelos is certainly here not the simple equivalent of Tò πoσóv above;
it is, rather, a particular example of quantity. Aristotle in this
clause merely particularises what he had said before more uni-
versally of Toσóv in general, and at the same time the mention of
kívŋois and xpóvos carries us beyond the particular example of spatial
quantity which was indicated by the triangle. μέγεθος, κίνησις, and
Xpóvos, are all united (cf. previous note) as species of tò ouvexés, and
it is pointed out that, in consequence, it must be the same function
(and hence faculty and organ) which apprehends them all. If we
keep the following sentences in the order given in the text, the
argument will then be, "Magnitude, motion and time are perceived
by the same faculty. But they (being continua, cf. previous note)
form the sensuous and hence imageable element in consciousness.
Now imagery belongs to the sensus communis. Hence the appre-
hension of these determinations of quantity belongs to the organ of
the common sense-the primary sensorium. But memory, even that
which deals with concepts, implies imagery. Hence it is a function
of the primary organ of sensation directly, though indirectly it con-
cerns the faculty of thought."
The whole argument as it stands is not well arranged and hence
Freudenthal proposes to remodel it, but it is not much more confused
than many others in the Parva Naturalia and the want of order can
be explained. There are two conclusions to prove, (1) the minor
premiss of the final conclusion-that thought must employ imagery,
enunciated first in 449 b 34 sq.; (2) that, since that is so, even the
memory which deals with the objects of thought must be a function
of the organ to which imagery is due. Involved in all this there is
also the briefer argument that memory in general, employing imagery,
must be attributed to the primary organ of sensation.
It is the involution of these three difficult discussions which
causes the apparent want of coherence. There is moreover one
premiss which is merely implicit and never formulated-that which
identifies the imageable element—τὸ φανταστόν—with τὸ συνεχές.
Aristotle simply assumes their identity as obvious, and any arrange-
COMMENTARY
253
ment of the passage would have to fall back upon this principle as a
constituent in the proof. Freudenthal proposes (op. cit. p. 397) to
pass from χρόνον, 1. II, to ὥστε, 1. 1 2, and insert the clause καὶ τὸ φάντ.
...πάθος ἐστίν after φαντάσματός ἐστιν, 1. 14. For this he has the
support of Themistius. Accordingly he gives the following as the
sketch of the argument “Every memory is bound up with a
perception of time, every concept accompanied by a pávтaoμa. To
perceive time is identical with the perception of magnitude and
motion, and is provided for by the πрŵтоv aiolηTIKóv. Memory also
uses concepts, but not apart from imagery, and this belongs to the
πρŵτоν alσONTIкóv. Hence, memory belongs to it also."
But this does not do justice to the real complexity of the
argument or bring out the main point-that even conceptual memory
is a function of the primary sensorium. To prove that memory
which does not specially deal with voŋrá is a sense function would
not cost so much argument.
Freudenthal seems to have been led astray by his misunder-
standing of the reference to xpóvos in 11. 9 and 11. He thinks
that there Aristotle refers to memory as a sense of time, as in
449 b 31. But there is no particular reference to this here. Aris-
totle is forced to talk of xpóvos because he wishes to illustrate the
objects of thought which cannot be apprehended without an image in
the mind, not only by the concepts of mathematics, rà è apaιpéσews,
e.g. rò тpiywvov, the scientific interest in which does not affect the
matter in which they are realised, but by the eternal substances,
which, though appearing in time, are not conditioned by it.
450 a 15. The texts all have voovμévov, which must be a mistake in-
stead either of vonтikov or of diavoovμévov (Bywater, J. of Philol., XXVIII.
p. 243). Biehl relying on the vet. tr. "intellectivi” has voŋtɩkov.
450 a 16.
kal érépoɩs. Cf. De An. 111. ch. 3, 428 a 10, 11,
ἑτέροις.
III.
where pavraoía is attributed to the ant and the bee but not to the
worm. Themistius brings in the dove (πEрισтEρά) also.
450 a 20. The reading of all мss. is Ovητŵv, but Rassow, Prog.
d. Joachimsth. Gym. 1858, suggests Onpiwv, which Biehl accepts.
Most of the commentators certainly take OvηTŵv as referring to the
lower animals. Themistius writes åλóywv. If Aristotle meant to
refer to them, certainly Onpíwv is the more suitable term.
But Simon (p. 287), who also leans to the view that by Ovηtŵv
"bruta" are meant, suggests as an alternative an interpretation which
gives its proper sense to Ovητŵv.—If Memory belonged to the faculty
254
DE MEMORIA
of pure thought it would not belong to many animals (for few possess
reason), and perhaps to none that have a perishable body (which
requires their thinking to be mediated by imagination). Relying on
the famous passage at the end of De An. III. ch. 5, where the
impassivity of the eternal voûs is set forth, and it is declared that we
have no memory of a previous state of existence, because our
thought depends upon the perishable reason which alone can ex-
perience impressions, he contends that, in Aristotle's opinion,
memory does not belong to the superior and divine reason but only
to the human, being exercised by the latter only through the instru-
mentality of φαντασία.
Whatever be the exact interpretation of the passage in the
De Anima referred to, it is clear that, according to the Aristotelian
teaching, vous, in the sense of a faculty of pure thought, cannot
exercise memory.
Its function is the ἀδιαιρέτων νόησις (De An. III.
ch. 6, 430 a 26) which must be something totally different from the
apprehension of time in which there is no part which is indivisible.
Again, in its characteristic sense, it is not a faculty of synthesis
(ibidem) such as human thought and memory must be. (When we
remember we must affirm that the image is like the real object,
i.e. there must be synthesis: cf. below.)
Simon, however, takes the next clause (èreì ovdè vûv tâσi, K.T.λ.)
to refer to the lower animals which have not even got pavraoía (cf.
De An. II. ch. 3, 415 a 10: άdλà toîs µèv ovdè pavтaoía); but, if that
is so, it is difficult to see what it has to do with the previous state-
ment. Even though we read θηρίων or interpret θνητών as θηρίων, we
should have to render—“ If memory were an affair of the intellect
not many, perhaps none, of the lower animals would possess it, and,
as a fact, as things are (memory being not an affair of the intellect),
not all the lower animals do possess it, seeing that they do not all
have the sense of time." But we can hardly carry this meaning,
and, even if it did, the latter clause adds nothing to the argument.
That some animals, being without pavravía, do not remember, does
not in the least show why, if memory were a matter of pure thought,
none would remember.
Yet it must be in some such way that Rassow and Biehl, reading
Onpíwv, take the sentence; and Simon, taking the last clause as he
does, rather inclines to give up his first interpretation and follow the
other commentators.
Hammond (p. 198) translating Biehl renders "perhaps in none
COMMENTARY
255
of the brutes, seeing that they do not, as a matter of fact possess it,
because they all lack the sense of time." This is an impossible
rendering of οὐδὲ νῦν πᾶσι and διὰ τὸ μὴ πάντα... ἔχειν, and, besides,
contradicts 11. 16-17 immediately above, where memory is said to
be found in certain other animals—διὸ καὶ ἑτέροις τισὶν ὑπάρχει τῶν
ζώων.
Rassow, defending his emendation, maintains that it could not
be said that if memory depended on thought it would be absent in
man, one of the Ovηrá. But that is not so: memory exists in man
only because he possesses the faculty of pavтaσía; if he were a being
whose sole activity was pure thought he would not remember. It
should be clear that, if memory depends solely upon the vous Talŋ-
τικός (which involves φαντασία and αἴσθησις), a being whose reason
is not similarly to be described as passive will not remember.
Hence the solution of the difficulty is to take ἐπεὶ οὐδὲ νῦν πᾶσι,
K.T.A. as referring to that being or those things whose sole activity is
the exercise of voûs—dewpía, i.e. Ocós-God, or perhaps to the
heavenly bodies. Hence, after âσ we are not to understand Toîs
θνητοῖς but τοῖς ζῴοις.
It is not at all unprecedented for ov to refer to living beings.
generally, nor is it impossible for it in this wide acceptation to
include eos and the heavenly bodies. Cf. De An. II. ch. 3,
414b 15 sqq. : τῶν ζῴων. ἐνίοις δὲ ὑπάρχει καὶ τὸ κατὰ τόπον κινη-
τικόν, ἑτέροις δὲ καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἰ τοι-
οὗτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ τιμιώτερον. By the latter Simplicius (De An.
106, 27) tells us the stars are meant; cf. also De Caelo, 11. 12, 292 a,
20 sqq. and ch. 8, 290 a 32. The stars are in the last passage called
(@a. Cf. De An. 1. ch. 1, 402 b 7, where it is implied that Ocós
ζωα.
is a species or particular example of @ov. Cf. also Metaph. XII.
ch. 7, 1o72b 28: φαμὲν δὲ τὸν θεὸν εἶναι ζῷον ἀίδιον ἄριστον, also
XIV. ch. 1, 1088 a 10. Since the activity of God is vónσis (1072 b 18),
and since, being åídios and ap0apros, he is not in time, it would be a
safe deduction that he has not the xpóvov ato@now which is indis-
pensable to memory.
Hence, the sense of the passage is clear-"Memory is not a
function of pure thought for, if it were, none of the living creatures
that are mortal, i.e. have perishable bodies and think by means of
the sensuous images which are bound up with bodily changes would
have memory. (Cf. De An. 1. ch. 1, 403 a 13 sqq. The psychical
changes we experience are λóyoɩ ěvudoɩ 403 a 25.)
In fact certain
256
DE MEMORIA
living beings, which are freed from the conditions of human life, do
not possess it.”
450 a 22-23. Rassow (op. cit.) proposes to read ἢ ἔμαθε πρότε-
ρον, αἰσθάνεται and make αἰσθάνεται govern ὅτι εἶδε κ.τ.λ. The chief
ground for the change is that προσαισθάνεται seems to be a ἅπαξ
λεγόμενον. But Biehl lets it stand, reading ἐνεργῇ τῇ μνήμῃ as
equivalent to μνημονεύει and as governing ὅτι εἶδε.
450 a 27. ὅσα μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας. The question is whether there
are any concepts which can be divorced from all imagery. Cf.
previous notes.
450 a 32. Freudenthal (op. cit. p. 401) proposes either to omit Tò
πάθος or to read it after τοιοῦτον, 1. 30. Certainly the words seem
out of place and Rassow, who proposes either to delete rò after
TOLOÛTOV or to read rɩ, interprets the sentence following an order
which places τὸ πάθος, οὗ. εἶναι after νοῆσαι 1. 30.
450 a 34. Aristotle uses the metaphor of the seal-ring in
another connection in the De Anima, III. ch. 12, 435 a 2. The
object as it were stamps an impression on the air which as it were
transmits it onwards until it meets the sensory organ. Again in II.
ch. 12, 424 a 19 the impression on the organ produced by the sense
object is compared to the impression left by a seal-ring on a surface.
But cf. above note to 449 b 33.
450 b 1.
ch. 3, 429 a
450 b 2.
7.
πάθος Themistius renders by νόσου. Cf. De An. III.
Sử ýλɩkíaν. This, in consonance with the common use
of yλɩkía (cf. Bonitz, Ind.), seems to refer both to the aged and the
young. In both the mind seems to be too "fluid" to retain im-
pressions, cf. péovori, 1. 7 beneath.
450b 4. το ψήχεσθαι.
τὸ ψήχεσθαι. This may be another simile for the minds
of the aged, and Aristotle may have in view the crumbling condition
of an old stone surface. But in the light of its conjunction with
σKλпρоτητа 1. 5, perhaps it refers to the inner walls of a building
that had originally a prepared surface in which a design was cut, but
which gets worn off and leaves nothing but the hard layer beneath.
This is suggested by a perusal of the famous passage in the Theaetetus
(191 c sqq. especially 194 c sqq.) from which Aristotle seems to have
drawn almost all the illustrations here employed. There the heart is
compared to a waxen tablet (kýρшvov éкμayeîov) on which impres-
sions are stamped. The surface must be neither too soft nor
too hard, for, in the former case, the mind, though easily receiving
COMMENTARY
257
an impression, soon loses it (ὧν μὲν ὑγρόν, εὐμαθεῖς μέν, ἐπιλήσμονες
dè yiyvovτα), while, with the hard surface, the opposite is the case.
For a mind of good capacity, the waxen surface must be not only of
the proper consistency but deep (βαθύς τε καὶ πολὺς καὶ λεῖος καὶ
μετρίως ὠργασμένος). People with such an organ are both εύμαθεῖς
and μνήμονες.
Now an ekμayeîov or prepared surface need not be composed of
wax; it may consist of gypsum (cf. L. and S.), and probably the
decorated parts of Greek houses and buildings (where marble was
not employed) may have had a layer of plaster imposed on the
stone, with bas-reliefs cut thereon.
450 b 6-7. Cf. also ch. 2, 453 b 5.
450 b 18. Freudenthal proposes to read ToÚTOV aïolŋois
instead of τούτου αὐτοῦ ἡ αἴσθησις with Themistius (S. II. p. 239,
1. 25). The change is not important.
450 b 27. Biehl brackets eúpnua, while Freudenthal (op. cit.
p. 401) deletes both it and pávтaoua, on the ground that if we read
αὐτό τι καθ᾽ αὑτὸ εἶναι θεώρημα the next line ᾗ μὲν οὖν καθ᾿ ἑαυτὸ,
θεώρημα ἢ φάντασμά ἐστιν forms a tautology and, if we read ἄλλου
pávтaoua, is contradictory.
Biehl has the support of LSU, Themistius and the ancient
translation, in omitting eúpnua. If we read ewpnua it will be
better to follow EY and read καὶ αὐτὸ καθ' ἑαυτὸ εἶναι θεώρημα καὶ
ἄλλου φάντασμα—" is both an object of consciousness per se and the
image of something else." Then the next sentence goes on to
explain and correct this statement. "Per se it is an object of con-
sciousness or an image; so far as it is the appearance of something
else it is a copy and souvenir."
The contradiction, or rather the duality, in the use of pávraoµа
here, which causes Freudenthal to expunge it from the former clause,
is really one which goes right down into the heart of the concept of
φαντασία and φαίνεσθαι as used by Aristotle Α φάντασμα is at once
a sensuous image posited like a simple sensation or a fundamental
concept before the mind, and at the same time it claims to represent
something objective. In its first aspect, as a simple element in the
content of consciousness, it has nothing to do with either truth or
falsity; in its second capacity it falls within the domain of synthesis,
in which truth and error reside. (Cf. note on pavτaσía above 449 b
33.) Here Aristotle uses it first in the second of the two above
senses, but immediately reminds us that properly and per se the
R.
17
258
DE MEMORIA
pávтaoμa has no reference to the object, that, so far as it has this, it
is considered in a new light-as an eikov.
Hence, if Aristotle is in the second sentence really guarding his
former statement, it would not be out of place to repeat that part of
the former statement with which part of the second is identical.
Hence, we may retain Оewpŋua; it is no doubt used to signify the
direct, immediate object of consciousness, something that is present
as if to the senses (cf. Bonitz, Ind. p. 328). It would include a
present perception and so cover the case, never separately treated by
Aristotle, of the recognition that an object in present perception has
been seen before.
On the other hand vonua is substituted in 451 a 2, which rather
makes it appear as though lepnua meant a concept specially. But
probably this change is not significant.
450b 29. Freudenthal proposes to omit kai after elkov, tr.
"a memorial after the fashion of a copy." uvnμóvevμa is a аañaέ
λεγόμενον in Aristotle
450 b 33. μὴ ἑωρακὼς. It is not hereby implied that we can re-
member without a prior sensuous experience. That would contradict
what has been already said (cf. 449 b 24 sqq. above). μnewрakw's
must mean-without having then had present to vision the veritable
Coriscus.
450 b 34. évтavla к.T.λ. All commentators from Michael Ephesius
to Freudenthal notice that this paragraph is mere repetition. If
more condensed and obscure it is not thereby less Aristotelian.
ἔθει.
451 a 13-14. Cf. chapter 2, 451 b 15 and 32, ë0eɩ.
CHAPTER II.
Themistius (Sp. II.
451a 21. ἐν τοῖς ἐπιχειρηματικοῖς λόγοις.
P. 241, 1. 7) says ἐπιχειρηματικοῖς καὶ προβληματικοῖς, and, if we trust
Diogenes Laertius, R. V. § 23-24, there was more than one work
falling under the first title, viz. ὑπομνήματα ἐπιχειρηματικά γ' and
ἐπιχειρημάτων α' β'. Hence it is probably to them that we are
here referred. Michael Ephesius thinks rather that the Problems
are indicated, but in the extant Problems no such discussion is
found.
An exεíρnua is defined in Topics, vII. ch. 11, 158 a 16 as
συλλογισμὸς διαλεκτικός, and ἐπιχειρεῖν very often means to discuss
controversially (cf. Bonitz, Ind. p. 282 b 59). Now Aristotle fre-
quently, even in the same book, prefaces his proper scientific treat-
ment of a subject with a 'dialectical' account. This seems to be
necessary in his view in order to attain a preliminary clearing up
of notions, and hence we may conjecture that he wrote several
popular tentative tractates (the literal sense of mixeɩpéw, = to attempt,
seems to linger about èixeípnua) on various matters, and that
these, owing to their tentative character, have been dropped out
of the canon. Certainly we cannot here translate with Hammond
'treatise On Argumentation. A reference to recollection could
occur only as an illustration in a logical work, and λόγοι επιχειρημα
TɩKOί could not be discussions on dialectical argumentation but
discussions of a dialectical nature.
451 a 23 sqq. We may set aside Simon's theory that by λŵyɩs is
here meant not Anys μvýμns but the acquirement of fresh knowledge.
There is no evidence that that is an Aristotelian usage, nor will the
Greek bear the interpretation.
At the same time it is difficult to see what relation this statement
bears to the following one. Having asserted that recollection is
neither the reacquirement nor the first acquirement of memory,
he goes on to point out that in μálnois-the first acquirement of
17-2
260
DE MEMORIA
knowledge, there is no such thing as recovery or acquisition of
memory.
The doctrine that recollection is to be thus described is, as
Freudenthal, Rheinisches Museum, p. 404, points out, not a Platonic
one; but, of course, the teaching that µálŋois is ȧváµvnois is the famous
tenet set forth in the Meno and other dialogues; cf. esp. Meno, 85D:
τὸ δὲ ἀναλαμβάνειν αὐτὸν ἐν αὐτῷ ἐπιστήμην οὐκ ἀνάμνησις; Πάνυ
ye. Phaedo, 72 E sqq. Hence the tortuous argument here seems.
to be... 'When you recollect, you do not reacquire or acquire
memory. If you take ȧváμvnous with the Platonists as equivalent
to μάθησις it is certainly not so (ὅταν γὰρ 1. 23...ἐγγίνεται 1. 27),
nor when taken in the ordinary sense, as the remembering again of
something forgotten, is it strictly defined either as the acquisition or
reacquisition of a memory' (TI SOTE K.T.λ. 1. 27 sq.).
Freudenthal (loc. cit. p. 403) points out that Plato really anticipated
the Aristotelian distinction between áváμvnois and μvýμn (cf. Phaedo,
77 C sqq.). Recollection is a knowing again of what has been
c
forgotten. It is to be reminded of something by oneself or by another;
cf. Phaedo, 73. B, άvaµvηobîvaι = commonefieri: μéµvητaι = meminit.
Recollection implies (rnois Meno, 81 D. But the scientific dis-
crimination of the two functions belongs to Aristotle.
(Plato also noticed the three ways in which ideas may be
associated; cf. 451 b 22 sq. infra, contiguity, similarity, and contrast.
Cf. Phaedo, 73 (1) A lyre or garment belonging to the beloved one
puts the lover in mind of him and from seeing Simmias you may
remember Cebes. (2) From seeing the picture of Simmias you may
remember him. (3) Recollection may be derived from things unlike
as well as from similar things.)
451 a 25. If we translate è apxns as 'at the beginning,' then
this argument becomes practically identical with the next, and
Freudenthal will be right in saying that we have here the same
thought as is repeated in erɩ 8 K.T.λ. ll. 27 sqq.
But perhaps the sense is rather...' when we learn, we neither have
a memory reinstated in us, nor derive it (as a memory) from some
origin, ¿.e. some other experience. Once the present experience
is produced you may remember it; quâ present experience it is
not remembered. To start memory you need present experience,
and hence you cannot derive the present experience from the
memory.'
Aristotle is thus dealing here not with the temporal but the
COMMENTARY
261
logical priority of present experience. It is in the next paragraph
that he goes on to show that memory requires, in addition to
the originating experience, a period of time to have elapsed before
it can be called memory. In addition, this is now brought in when
he is dealing with ȧváμvnois in the customary sense, not as identical
with μálŋois, and hence the point of view is different.
But without adopting this hypothesis we may detect a note of
individuality in the present passage. Perhaps in orav Sè K.T.λ.
(11. 25-27) the emphasis is on the necessity of there being a ģɩs—a
disposition to remember-as well as an experience (Tábos) which is to
be remembered, while in the next paragraph the lapse of time neces-
sary becomes more prominent.
451 a 26. §ls.
ἕξις. As I take it, this means the permanent dis-
position which itself is memory; it is not to be identified with v
eğɩ in 1. 30 beneath, which is a disposition produced by learning
regarded as a source of memory. It is, however, somewhat misleading
to think of that as being a source of memory in the same way as
a πάθος is. Qua ἕξις nothing is an activity (ενέργεια) of consciousness
and all memory must start from a present activity.
451 a 28.
τὸ πρῶτον ἐγγέγονε, Biehl and Bekker; τὸ πρῶτον
ἐγγεγόνει ἐν, LSU.
Freudenthal proposes to insert Ti after eyyéyove in order to provide
it with a subject, Tò pтov being taken adverbially.
τῷ ἀτόμῳ καὶ ἐσχάτῳ. All commentators take this as referring
to time, and that would be the most likely meaning of the Greek
if we read ἐν τῷ ἀτόμῳ with LSU. But the dative which ἐγγίγνεσθαι
governs should rather indicate the real окeíμevov in which the
Tálos originates, not the time. Hence perhaps we should interpret
τῷ ἀτόμῳ κ.τ.λ. as referring to the αἰσθητήριον which is the primary
seat of sensation and which, we learn in De Sensu, 7, is avтò kaì èv
ἀριθμῷ and is also elsewhere called τὸ ἔσχατον αἰσθητήριον, De An. III.
ch. 2, 426b 16 and 7, 431 a 19. This is also Neuhäuser's inter-
pretation: cf. Introduction, sec. vi.
The argument then is, that the mere realisation of the impression
in the primary organ of sensation-the heart or its σύμφυτον πνεῦμα
is not memory. There must be lapse of time before it can function
as an eikov of the absent object.
If we take ȧróμų kai éσxáтw as referring to time, it is difficult
to interpret oɣáτw. We should have to translate 'in the same
individual and proximate moment of time.' But the proximate is
ἐσχάτῳ.
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DE MEMORIA
not the same moment, unless in the improper sense in which the
same thing may be said to be proximate to itself.
Michael Ephesius thinks that the reference here is to the
moment after complete perception and that this is here distinguished
from the moment of perception mentioned in the last sentence.
Freudenthal finds this too 'spitzfindig' and accordingly chooses
to regard this passage as another version of the former one (cf. note
to 1. 25 above).
Kатà σνμßeßηкòs. Cf. ch. 1, 450 a 15-16.
451 a 31.
45I a 32.
πρὶν χρονισθῆναι.
451 b 2.
Cf. ch. 1, 449 b 28.
N
Unless we accent or with Freudenthal the sentence
will not construe.
The interpretation of eέ apyŵs here confirms our rendering of the
same phrase in 451 a 25. The dpxý is the starting point in time
rather than the original experience from which the continued con-
sciousness known as memory is derived.
451 b 3. ἀλλ᾽ ὅταν κ.τ.λ. Here at last is the distinction between
áváµvŋσis (in the proper and customary, as distinct from the Platonic
sense) and μνήμη.
Recollection is the reproduction of a previous experience (apart,
of course, from renewed sense perception or repetition of the ex-
perience, whatever its nature, afresh), which has passed out of the
mind, and a revival-avavéwots (Themistius)-quâ experience,
not quâ memory. The memory, holding the present experience
as the eiku̸v of the past, can be produced either by the continued
presence in consciousness of the previous experience or by its
reinstatement through recollection. It is a consequence (ovµßaíve 1. 6)
that, when we reinstate an experience identical in character with the
previous one, we should remember, i.e. that it is an eikov of the
previous one. But it is the act of reinstatement which is accurately
to be described as άváµvnois, not the referring of the reinstated
experience to the past.
451 b 6-7. Michael (132 a), Simon (p. 301) and Gesner,
apparently (cf. Freud. Rh. Mus.), read tŵ dè µvypoveveiv ovµßaívei
καὶ μνήμην ἀκολουθεῖν. This Freudenthal (p. 407) approves of,
objecting to the absolute use of ovμßaíve in the other reading
and trying to make out that we should, if we kept it, have to
distinguish as different from each other, (1) ἀνάμνησις, (2) μνημονεύειν
and (3) μvýμn. That is surely captious and, on the reading which
he approves, we should have (with Gesner) to interpret µvnµoveveiv as
COMMENTARY
263
ȧvaμμvýσкeσai; but Freudenthal admits (p. 403) that, where
Aristotle is distinguishing the two functions, he never employs a
term, which refers to remembering merely, to designate the act
of recollection, however much he may depart from this rule on other
occasions.
dè
Themistius says—ἕπεται δὲ τῇ ἀναμνήσει ἐξ ἀνάγκης ή μνήμη,
understanding by eπeraι apparently (and if there is any sense in his
explanation) mere logical implication. He explains 'recollection
implies memory because, to recollect, you must remember something
connected with the thing which you are trying to recollect...the
starting point in the ¿rnois which is recollection' (cf. infra 26 sqq.).
Not only, however, is this a strange interpretation of ovµßaíve and
ảkoλovßeîv, but, if recollection may start ảnò тoû vûv (1. 22 infra)
it is not necessary for its starting point to be an object of memory.
451 b 7. ταῦτα refers vaguely and inclusively to ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι
and μvnμoveveiv. The sense is...'you do not get recollection and
memory every time an experience which has lapsed from the mind
is repeated. It may be repeated without your remembering you had
it before. In such cases the repetition of the experience is not
recollection.' This is pretty nearly Simon's interpretation. St Hilaire,
evidently basing upon Themistius's interpretation of the preceding
sentence, thinks that here Aristotle is making explicit his distinction
between the revived and the non-revived elements in consciousness
in the act of recollection. (St Hilaire, p. 123): 'Ce ne sont pas du
reste des choses antérieures qui se reproduisent complètement de
nouveau dans l'esprit ; mais il y a alors une partie des choses qui
se reproduit et une partie qui ne se reproduit pas; car la même
personne pourrait très bien deux fois découvrir et apprendre la
même chose.' But this interpretation can only be come at by
reading éyyíverau 1. 8 (impossible Greek) or by supplying it after
ἐγγένηται; further ταῦτα would have to refer to ἐπιστήμην etc., 1. 4,
which is rather too far back and would suggest the use of èkeîva;
thirdly the thought is still more elliptical and loosely arranged than
on the interpretation I give. The previous experience is not
wholly reinstated for, if it were, it would be a case of µálnois
not ἀνάμνησις. This renders ἀλλ' ἔστιν... ἔστι δ' equivalent to 'partly
...partly' and makes us refer dìs yàp µabeîv not to the clause
immediately before it but to the previous one.
>
Hammond (p. 204) gives a totally new rendering, 'Neither do
the phenomena of recollection, if their occurrence is the repetition
264
DE MEMORIA
of a previous recollection (sic), follow absolutely the same order, but
sometimes they occur in one way, sometimes in another. It is
possible for the same individual to learn and discover the same thing
twice. Recollection then must differ from learning and discovery,
and there is need of greater initial latitude (sic) here than is the case
with learning.' He elucidates this in a note, ‘In the case of learning
and discovery there is a definite and exact process by which a given
result may be twice arrived at.' (What Aristotelian doctrine is
this?)
In the case of recollection, on the other hand, there is
not the same fixity of procedure. There are not only many forms
of suggestion and association, but a given suggestion may not effect.
the same result in two instances.' This is to introduce a point
mentioned in 452 a 27 below but not relevant here. It is in no way
apparent that Aristotle ever meant to compare the acquisition and
the revival of knowledge with regard either to the relative fixedness
of the processes or the fixity of the starting point.
I I
St Hilaire quite fails to see that τούτων (l. 11) refers to μαθεῖν
kaì evρeîv, and so he completely distorts the sense.
451 b II. καὶ ἐνούσης κ.τ.λ. On the whole this favours my
interpretation of the previous passage rather than St Hilaire's. On
his theory, relearning a thing implies complete reinstatement of
everything in consciousness and it is difficult to see how there would
be any ȧpxý at all in that case.
It is Aristotle's theory that in learning (either for the first or
second time) as well as in recollection there is an άpxý from which
we set out. We find no contradiction to this in 451 a 25 above;
there he simply says that in the process of learning memory does
not begin concurrently with the initial step. Here he merely
distinguishes learning and recollection according to the amount of
the apxý involved; but we can gather his doctrine from other
passages. We learn either by deduction or induction (Anal. Post. 1.
ch. 18, 81 a 38 sqq.) and, in either case, we must have some previous
knowledge which is the starting point of our deduction or our
induction. (Cf. Anal. Post. 1. ch. 1, 71 sqq. and Metaph. 1. ch. 9,
992 b 30 sqq.) In the one case we must know the premises of any
particular conclusion and ultimately the constituents of the definitions
of the terms (which enter into our premises); δεῖ γὰρ ἐξ ὧν ὁρισμὸς
πpoeɩdévai kai eivaɩ yvópiµa (992 b 32). In the latter, the knowledge
of particular cases which are given in perception (τὰ καθ᾽ ἕκαστα, τὰ
¿YуÚTEρov Tηs aio0noews Anal. Post. 1. ch. 2, 72 a 2, 3) and which are
COMMENTARY
265
less intelligible naturally (Tv TTоv yvwρíμwv þúσe Metaph. VII. ch. 4,
1029b 4), is required before we can gather from them the universal
law. But in learning by induction we do not have previous know-
ledge of the universal law, nor in deduction have we a prior
acquaintance with the particular case. (It is only in so far as the
particular is implicit in the universal that it is previously known. In
its particularity and in the full sense of the word it is not known:
ἁπλῶς δ᾽ οὐκ ἐπίσταται 71 a 28.) If it had been explicitly thought of
previously, then we should have a case of recollection not of µálŋois,
which must be distinguished from áváμvnois and is thus to be
distinguished.
Another point of difference is that mentioned below in 452 a
5 sqq. Learning requires a teacher; the process of recollection is
self-originated.
There is also a sense in which the act of learning is not a process.
Cf. Phys. VII. ch. 3, 247 b 10 sqq. and also De An. 1. ch. 3, 407 a 32.
This however comes to no more than the familiar doctrine that
per se the intellectual life is not a σwμatiкòv táłos like memory and
recollection. But in this sense it cannot apply without qualification
to the functioning of the vous Tа0ηTIкós which is realised in finite
individuals.
451 b 14. ég áváукηs. Hamilton (Reid, p. 894) points out that
Locke too, in Essay II. ch. 33 $ 5, distinguishes between those ideas
which are naturally connected by a 'union and correspondence
which is founded in their peculiar beings' and those that are asso-
ciated 'through chance or custom.' By those necessarily connected
Aristotle means notions which objectively imply one another, like
centre and circumference. As Hamilton indicates, it was typical of
members of the empirical English school (other than Locke) to
ascribe all collocations of ideas to custom.
451 b 16-17. Freudenthal's reading (op. cit. p. 407)-ovußaível
δ᾽ ἐνίας μᾶλλον ἢ ἑτέρας πολλάκις κινουμένας—seems unnecessarily to
anticipate the doctrine of 452 a 3 sqq. infra.
451 b 20. Freudenthal's conjecture of rvàs instead of rivà makes
the reading smoother, 'we experience a number of previous changes
conducting to the stimulation of that one' etc.
"
451 b 22. τοῦ νῦν ἢ ἄλλου τινός. By this Aristotle cannot mean
merely 'a time present or otherwise.' It is difficult to see how one
could start a process of reflection otherwise than from the present
time. The idea is that the object, the thought of which starts the
266
DE MEMORIA
train of recollection, can be given either in present perception or in
memory.
ἀφ᾿ ὁμοίου κ.τ.λ. This describes the character of the object or
content of the notion which starts the process.
It is the first recorded formulation of the celebrated laws of
association, though they are all to be found instanced in the Phaedo.
Cf. above note to 451 a 23.
45Ib 24. Tŵv 8' apa. This evidently is capable of being illus-
trated by the evavríaɩ kɩvýσeis which, being affections of a single sense
organ, must be aμa; cf. De Sens. ch. 7, 447 b 9 sq.: µâλλov yàp äµa
ἡ κίνησις τῆς μιᾶς ταύτης (αἰσθήσεως) ἢ τοῖν δυοῖν. Here of course the
Kɩvýσeɩs seem to be regarded as existing in the central not in the end
organ, but evidently the characteristic of being apa, which dis-
tinguishes évavríaι kɩvýσes in the end organ, is regarded as attaching
to them when they are transferred to the heart.
If this interpretation be correct 'Association by Contrast' is to be
assigned to 'Contiguity.'
451b 27. δ' οὕτως.
S' OUTWS. Söµws Freudenthal, G. A. Bekker. The
change is immaterial unless with Themistius, Leonicus, and Simon we
take the ourws with ηTouvres and translate 'and we recollect, even
though we do not search in this way.' But we see from 453a 18 sqq.
below, that Aristotle does not limit åváμvnois to the volitional process
which reinstates an idea. Recollection is there said in some cases
not to be èπ avtoîs, i.e. subject to the will.
Cf. also Hamilton op. cit. p. 902, note.
451b 30. μεμνήμεθα here must be used inaccurately for ἀναμιμ
vησкóμεða: cf. 452 a 8, 11.
τὰ πόρρω.
τà Tópрw. Hamilton, op. cit. p. 903, takes this as 'things remote
and irrelevant to our inquiry' and (apparently) not as the object of
μεμνήμεθα. This is surely very unnatural; the use of τὰ πόρρω and
Tà σúveyyvs to denote something else than objects and processes
which are connected in the train of recollection, just where the
series has been described in terms of similar notions, would be a
most flagrant instance of slipshod writing on the part of Aristotle.
Hamilton translates, 'Nor is there any necessity to consider things
remote [and irrelevant] how these arise in memory; but only the
matters coadjacent (and pertinent to our inquiry). For it is manifest
that the mode is still the same-that, to wit, of consecution,-[in
which a thing recurs to us, when] neither pre-intentionally seeking
it, nor voluntarily reminiscent. For [here too], by custom, the several
COMMENTARY
267
movements are concomitant of one another—this determinately following
upon that. Hamilton, reading τρόπος πῶς (λέγω δὲ τὸ ἐφεξῆς) οὐ
K.T.A., thinks that reference is still being made to the case of voluntary
and involuntary reminiscence, and that it is the manner of occurrence
of these two which is said to be identical. But προζητήσας and ἀνα-
μvŋobeís cannot distinguish intentional as opposed to unintentional
recollection. (What can 'pre-intentionally' mean?) It is the
method of recalling τὰ πόρρω and τὰ σύνεγγυς which is the same.
the remoteness of two distantly connected ideas can be bridged over
by inserting intermediate ones, it is the mode of connection of these
latter we have to consider.

•
ει
As
451 b 31-32. λέγω δὲ ἀναμνησθείς. A gloss according to Freuden
thal. But, if we let it stand, it simply points out the fact that he
refers to the order of a series of psychic changes determined, not
hy any previous act of recollection, but by the way in which
they are accustomed (T@ yàp 0e 1. 32) to be experienced together.
451b 35. áρx kýσews. This is simply the term for efficient
cause used in Phys. 11. ch. 7, 198 b 1, Metaph. 1. ch. 3, 984 a 27, etc.
Here we are dealing with that class of efficient causes or sources of
change which are themselves motions or changes. The series of
changes in conscious process is conceived by Aristotle quite in the
same way as all other changes occurring in the world of generation
and decay. The whole series is a kívŋous which is made up of parts
which are themselves Kivýσes. Hence Themistius's illustration of the
series of mental sequences by a chain in which, if one link be lifted,
the next will also be moved (Sp. 11. p. 243, l. 12) is inadequate. The
links in the series are themselves nothing static but processes also.
So far as we have gone, the Kunσes which are stimulated in the
ct of recollection seem to be dormant in the soul or its organ the
heart prior to stimulation, and this is apparently the view maintained
through the De Memoria. In De An. 1. ch. 4, 408 b 15 sqq., how-
ever, a rather different attitude is taken up. In recollection the
κίνησις is said to pass from the soul to the affections (also κινήσεις)
or their traces (uovás) existing in the sense organs; this is opposed
to what occurs in sense perception, where the kívnous proceeds in the
reverse way. In neither case is the process in the soul.
By this however Aristotle probably means no more than to em-
phasize the fact that in the higher faculties the mind is an originating
Of course, in all cases the soul is an apxý (cf. De An. 1.
ch. 1, 402 a 7) and to be regarded as an efficient as well as a final
cause.
268
DE MEMORIA
ЕП
cause (De Part. Animal. 1. ch. 1, 641 a 27). But, just as none of
its modifications, even a primitive one like perception, is mere
passivity (cf. De An. II. ch. 5) so we seem to find a progressively
greater absence of passivity as we pass from lower to higher faculties;
e.g. scientific knowledge—πiστýμn--is not passive change of the type
aλλoíwσis in the proper sense at all (417 b 6). A mechanical deter-
mination of psychic processes by each other may go on and be beyond
the control of the individual in whom they occur (cf. 453 a 18 sqq.
infra). This is held to show the corporeal nature of such changes,
or rather their dependence upon corporeal conditions. Hence it is
suggested by implication that a function which was exclusively
psychical would not be determined in this mechanical way but would
be completely under control (è' avroîs: 453 a 22). Notwithstanding
Aristotle's determination to make out all human faculties to be con-
ditioned by the bodily organism, and thus establish a thorough-going!
parallelism of psychical and corporeal changes, notwithstanding the
fact that he declares the human vous to be πaðηTiкós, there seems to
be this tendency to free itself from bodily conditions which is always
manifested by that which is most characteristically psychical. It is
significant that in this passage where Aristotle talks of the process
in recollection proceeding outward from the soul, he immediately
goes on (as if impelled by association of ideas) to talk of the voûs
which is impassive and imperishable, and practically identifies yux
with it. The decline of the mental faculties is just like the dimness
of sight in an old man, due to the bodily organ becoming impaired.
It is not the ψυχή which suffers change but its organ (ὥστε τὸ γῆρα
οὐ τῷ τὴν ψυχήν τι πεπονθέναι, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ᾧ, 408 b 22). Hence th
ultimate core of the yvyn seems to consist of this imperishable voî
which, no doubt, relatively to the body will be like the divine voûs in
relation to the world, the prime source of movement—тò πрŵтоν кɩvoûv.
Aristotle, however, does not state this explicitly, and though,
indeed, he tells us that the vous enters the living being from outside
and its activity has nothing in common with that of the body (De
Gener. Animal. II. ch. 3, 736 b 28) yet the relation of this to the
other mental faculties is most obscure in his philosophy, and really
leads to difficulties much the same as those surrounding the relation
of the Platonic idea to the things of time and sense.
452 a 2. Tà Tрáуpara (the facts) may be either static elements,
e.g. contiguous objects or different parts of a mathematical theorem,
or events themselves. The series may be either temporal or not.

COMMENTARY
269
452 a 4. φαύλα is the version of LSU. Themistius and
Michael read φαύλως καὶ χαλεπῶς. For φαῦλος in the sense of inexact
cf. Thuc. vI. 18. Cf. also Metaph. vII. ch. 4, 1029 b 10.
μέμνηται.
452 a 8. μéμvηra. Referring a reinstated process to the past is
a characteristic of remembering as distinct from learning a second
time: cf. 451 b 6. Hence Aristotle is justified in using memory here
as the generic term to include recollection.
452 a Io. κινοῦντι πολλά. This surely refers to many different
starts not to many different items in a single series.
452 a 11-12. τὸ γὰρ μεμνῆσθαι κ.τ.λ. The act of memory cannot
be the merely potential existence of a process in the mind.
Svváμei. Súvaμiv LSU, Themistius, vet. tr. But we do not else-
where hear of a special dúvajus kɩvovσa in the mind. It is an actual
process which functions in recollection.
452 a 14. ἀπὸ τόπων. This, surely, as the illustration below
bears out, refers to the Tóro-commonplaces of thought in general
which Aristotle defines in their most universal sense in Rhet. 1. ch. 2,
1358 a 12 : (οἱ τόποι) εἰσὶν οἱ κοινῇ περὶ δικαίων καὶ φυσικῶν καὶ περὶ
πολιτικῶν καὶ περὶ πολλῶν διαφερόντων εἴδει, οἷον ὁ τοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον
TÓTOS: cf. also 1. 32. The Tóπos is a rule or general statement
that will readily recur to one and hence it may be used as the ȧpxý
of a train of ideas in recollection. E.g. it is a róπos of the Aris-
totelian philosophy that air is damp, and apparently from Meteor.
III. ch. 4, 374 a 2 that it is λevkós; that milk is white and the autumn
damp are given by ordinary perception.
dè
Unfortunately Aristotle in illustrating the use of Tómo in recollec-
tion by those drawn from his own philosophy gives a series of ideas
which would hardly with plausibility be used in the purposive recall
of an idea. Hence Hamilton (followed by St Hilaire) proposes to
read άn' άτóπшv. But if the series is an absurd one still less likely is
ἀπ' ἀτόπων.
it to be employed in voluntary recollection, which is now being dis-
cussed. Themistius (Sp. 11. p. 247, ll. 8 sqq.) gives a variety of alterna-
tive explanations to τόπων. τόπους δὲ ἢ ἃς ἀρχὰς ἐνεῖναι δεῖν τῇ ψυχῇ
λέγομεν, ἢ τοὺς κατὰ τὰ σύστοιχα καὶ ὅμοια καὶ ἀντικείμενα ὡς ἐν τῇ
διαλεκτικῇ εἴρηται, ἢ τοὺς σωματικοὺς καὶ τὰς ἐν τῷδε τῷ μέρει θέσεις.
Thomas interprets it as meaning the last merely. In that case, the
reference would be to the art of memorising objects by attaching
each to a special point in a spatial series-an art said to have been
discovered by Simonides of Ceos and referred to by Cicero in De
Oratore, II. ch. 86.
اد
270
DE MEMORIA
So Hammond and Freudenthal, loc. cit. p. 409 (who indeed in
consequence wishes to read ráxiara instead of évíore in l. 15). But
it is strange that Aristotle after mentioning this method of memo-
rising should give an example which has no reference to it.
II
452 a 18. Tò kalóλov is read by LSU Y, Themistius and
Michael. Both those commentators, however, render it by ws èπì Tò
Toλú, a meaning which, according to Freudenthal (Archiv für Gesch.
d. Philos. II. 1887, p. 11) каłóλov can certainly have. They thus
interpret To καóλov as though the To were inessential. Siebeck how-
ever in Philol. 1881, pp. 350–2, and his Untersuchungen zur Philoso-
phie der Griechen, p. 155, wishes to retain To and to make it essential.
He thinks that here Aristotle identifies the middle of a series of
terms employed in reminiscence with the pérov of logical inference
which is a universal and furthest from sense. The connecting bond
in recollection is a universal concept which binds together various
particulars by means of their implication in it.
This comes to pretty much the same as Mr Bradley's doctrine
that 'Association marries only Universals,' or more simply, that there
is a bond of identity between the thing remembered and the thing
that brings it to mind. This however has been already made clear
enough in 451 b 21-26 above, and it is strange that Aristotle should
confuse that implication of a predicate in the middle term of a
syllogism, which accounts for the truth of the conclusion, with that
relation between psychical states which causes the presentation of the
one to entail the presentation of the other. In the latter case you
are accounting for a process, in the former for a connection which is
independent of process. Moreover the 'universal' which connects
different ideas in reminiscence is hardly the universal of logic—that
which is 'furthest from sense'; it is often of the most sensuous
character. Once more, it would be unfair to represent it as a separate
member in the train of connected ideas; it is rather the identical
element pervading any two.
In the details of the subsequent passage Siebeck's interpretation
is beset with at least no fewer difficulties than Freudenthal's.
Cf. also next note sub fin.
452 a 21. ἐφ᾽ ὧν ΑΒΓΔΕΖΗΘ κ.τ.λ.
Biehl's text, which I print, follows Freudenthal's reconstruction of
the passage.
I have translated it as it stands.
as it stands. But it can hardly be
said that all difficulties have been removed even by this radical altera-
tion of Bekker's text. The general drift seems to be that the
t
COMMENTARY
271
you
middle term of a series of connected ideas is of unique importance
because from it you can go in either direction to the other members.
If have a series of ideas A BCDEFGH and want to remember
F or G and are not able to do so when you think of H, by thinking
of E you may be able to recall them. Then from E you can get
either to D or F, or from C you can pass to B, the term before it.
But this is not at all persuasive. Why should the final possibility
of recall be the starting from A, which is an extreme in the series, if
it is the employment of the middle term which Aristotle is illus-
trating? Besides, as Freudenthal himself points out, there is no
single middle term in a series of eight.
Again, Freudenthal does not seem to give sufficient weight to the
objection that this makes Aristotle talk of recollection as proceeding
in a reverse order with equal facility.
T
Bekker's text is as follows (l. 21): εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ε μέμνηται,
ἐπὶ τοῦ ΕΘ ἐμνήσθη· ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἐπ᾽ ἄμφω κινηθῆναι ἐνδέχεται, καὶ
ἐπὶ τὸ Δ καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ Ε. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων τι ἐπιζητεῖ ἐπὶ τὸ Γ ἐλθὼν
μνησθήσεται, εἰ τὸ Η ἢ τὸ Ζ ἐπιζήτει. εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπὶ τὸ Α (11. 19-23, Bek.).
Now, perhaps Aristotle only means that, after all, it is the con-
necting link, the intermediate term, which accounts for and must
universally account for the recollection. If one does not remember
by thinking of another term in the series one does so by coming
to it. It is the proximate and universal (κaðóλov, 1. 18) cause of the
recall of the idea in question. Hence I propose to read and translate
as follows, 452 a 21 sqq.:
ΑΒΓΔΕΖΗΘ
(A
ABCDEFGH
εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ Ε ἐμνήσθη ἐπὶ τοῦ Η τὸ (τοῦ ?) Θ μέμνηται· ἐντεῦθεν
γὰρ ἐπ' ἄμφω κινηθῆναι ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ Η καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ Ζ. εἰ δὲ
μὴ τούτων τι ἐζήτει, ἐπὶ τὸ Γ ἐλθὼν μνησθήσεται, εἰ τὸ Δ ἢ τὸ Ε ἐπι-
ζητεῖ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπὶ τὸ Α· καὶ οὕτως ἀεί.
'If one has not remembered at E, at G one does remember H.
The reason why one does not remember at E is that from that
point one can pass to both G and F. If one does not want to
remember these he will remember by going to C if he is seeking for
D or E; if he is not seeking for these he goes to A. This is uni-
versally the process.'
Ms. Y reads Toû HO (1. 20, Bek.). The omission of the roû before
would easily occur. For the other changes of letter no MS. authority
is available, except that the vet. tr. reads Z in l. 23 (1. 22, Bek.),
272
DE MEMORIA
a change approved by both Siebeck and Freudenthal. The other
alterations are mild in comparison with those made by Freudenthal.
The point is that it is the term just before the one to be re-
called that you must get. There is no intention of dealing with a
fixed middle term of the whole series. When Aristotle says the
middle term may be considered as the åpyn, he means that in a way
it is really πрôтоv. It is πp@тоv in the sense of being the proximate
Now it is anything #porov in this way that is universally
(Kabóλov) a cause.
cause.
πρώτον.
Hence κałóλov may be read in 1. 18 and its normal meaning
'universally' given to it, if my conjecture as to the meaning of the
subsequent passage is adopted. It is the intermediate link between
any two terms which is universally the cause of the transference
from one to the other, just as it is the proximate cause which uni-
versally produces an effect, or as it is quâ triangle, the middle term,
that we can universally predicate equality of the angles of any figure.
to two right angles. Cf. Anal. Post. 1. ch. 4, 73 b 25 sqq.
But another interpretation has been suggested to me (by Mr
W. D. Ross, of Oriel College). It is proposed to adopt the following
text instead of that of Bekker:
452 a 21 sqq. εἰ γὰρ μὴ ἐπὶ τοῦ Α μέμνηται ἐπὶ τοῦ Ε ἐμνήσθη·
ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ ἐπ᾽ ἄμφω κινηθῆναι ἐνδέχεται, καὶ ἐπὶ τὸ Δ καὶ ἐπὶ
TÒ Z. εἰ δὲ μὴ τούτων τι ἐζήτει, ἐπὶ τὸ Ζ ἐλθὼν μνησθήσεται, εἰ τὸ Η ή
τὸ Θ ἐπιζητεῖ· εἰ δὲ μή, ἐπὶ τὸ Δ.
The only changes here for which there is no Ms. authority are A
instead of E in l. 22 (1. 20, Bek.) and Z instead of F in l. 24 (l. 22, Bek.),
while the other variations from Bekker and Biehl follow the best MSS.
The translation will then be as follows:
'If one does not remember at A he remembers at E, for from
that point he can pass in both directions-both to D and to F. But
if he is not searching for one of these (D or F), by going to F he will
remember, if he is looking for G or H; while if he is not (looking
for G or H, but those in the other direction-C and B) he goes
to D.'
In explanation of this interpretation it is maintained that A is
not included in the series of terms of which тò µéσov távтwv is said
to be the apyý (hence they form an odd number and E becomes
a real middle term). A is rather a term immediately outside the
group in which the idea to be recalled is contained.
Aristotle is held to be illustrating the well-known process of recall
COMMENTARY
273
in which, when we wish to revive an idea, we pass first of all to the
group of former presentations within which we must already know it
to lie. E, then, will symbolize the central idea or nucleus of this
group from which it is possible to pass, in more than one direction,
to the idea lying in the outskirts of the group.
This interpretation is ingenious and gets rid of minor difficulties,
e.g. it does not require that Aristotle should be held to commit him-
self to the statement that we can recall ideas by proceeding back-
wards among terms experienced in a linear series like the letters
of the alphabet. Though Aristotle symbolizes his terms by the
letters of the alphabet he is thinking not of a series following the
direction of the time process but of a set of notions formed
by those notions being frequently thought of together and grouped
round one striking topic.
452 a 28. Freudenthal, in conformity with his interpretation of
the above passage, proposes to read E instead of F (C). The
associative process may go in either direction. But the meaning is
quite satisfactory and does not involve the special difficulties of this
contention if we keep the Ms. version. Aristotle has just before
said that the intermediate term is universally the ground of
recollection. But it is objected that from a given term sometimes
you pass to a certain other one and sometimes not. That will be
true, he says, of the remoter terms in the series, for sometimes from
C we pass all the way along to F, sometimes to the next member D
only. Again, the particular series CDEF may become obliterated
and the association branch off in some other direction that has
become more familiar. Hence, though starting from C, we may
not arrive at F.
"
452 2 28-29. ἐὰν οὖν δι᾽ ἃ πάλαι οὐ κινηθῇ. All editors except
Biehl, following LSU, read ἐὰν οὖν μὴ διὰ παλαιοῦ κινῆται and
Freudenthal wishes to follow the same text with the omission
of μn.
All difficulties, however, vanish when we take ráλaι as
'lately,' a sense which it often bears in Aristotle (cf. Bonitz, Ind.
P. 559 a 19: “τὰ πάλαι λεχθέντα, οἱ πάλαι λόγοι refertur ad ea
quae antea in eodem libro exposita sunt') and in other writers.
One may not have lately experienced the succession CDEF,
and hence when C occurs one goes off on some more familiar route.
452 a 30. Toλλákis å: LSU and all editors before Biehl read
å πоλλáκis, especially since the explanation is based upon the
frequency of the repetition; cf. 452 b 1 below: tò dè todλákis þúσiv
R.
18
274
DE MEMORIA
ποιεί.
But the idea of frequency or continued action is contained in
the imperfect tense ἐννοοῦμεν.
452 b I. èvepyelą. Mr Cook Wilson (Journal of Philol. XI.
p. 120) conjectures ovvnocía; but this makes the sentence simply
a repetition of II. 29-30 above. Though Themistius reads outw kai
eɩ, that is no guide. It is just the practice of that commentator to
reduce significant statements to idle repetitions.
Every one of those who read ẻvepycía will have it that the
reference is to the activity of mind and, as it is the function of
intellect which is most appropriately styled an évépyea, the term
may perhaps be used absolutely as referring to that without further
qualification. But the meaning will not be, as some think, that the
order of connection of things in nature must be reproduced in the
mental process of recollecting. That would only be the case if the
order of recall was always identical with the order of notions in
science, which is admittedly a reproduction of the objective order.
(Cf. De Interp. ch. 9, 19a 33: ὁμοίως οἱ λόγοι ἀληθεῖς ὥσπερ τὰ
πрáɣμaтa and Metaph. ix. ch. 10, 1051 b 3.) It is only the order of
experience, though at times that might coincide with the scientific
order, which is reproduced in association, and it is doubtful if it
could be said that that takes place púσe. The meaning would then
rather be that, just as in the order of nature things succeed in
a definite sequence, so it is in the functioning of thought. It is
the occurrence of a particular order which is common to both.
Perhaps, however, the meaning is much wider than this. One
of the мss. (M) inserts ✈ dvváμe after púσe and this, which seems to
be a gloss, may, however, give us a clue to an interpretation-
'Things when actually produced in a definite order do so by virtue
of a natural disposition (or dúvaμis) to do so. Now frequency of
repetition produces this púous, and hence you explain the way in
which we actually associate such and such ideas, since the los
produced by frequent repetition is a kind of púσis.' This púσis
φύσις
might well have been called a eέis, as the tendency to virtuous action
produced by practice is called in the Ethics. This eέis is, it must be
noticed, a dúvaμis, though determinate, and from púσis you can
never dissociate the idea of potentiality. Thus it can quite well be
opposed to evépyeia. In fact púois as the world of Nature is, apart
from actual sensation, merely the potentiality of a sensible object,
а ŮжокÉíμevov. Cf. Metaph. 111. ch. 5, 1010 b 31 sqq.: Tò µèv
οὖν μήτε τὰ αἰσθητὰ εἶναι μήτε τὰ αἰσθήματα ἴσως ἀληθές..., τὸ δὲ
COMMENTARY
275
νατον.
μενον.
τὰ ὑποκείμενα μὴ εἶναι, ἃ ποιεῖ τὴν αἴσθησιν, καὶ ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ἀδύ-
Something must exist to cause sensation, but it is a útokeί-
Cf. also De An. 11. ch. 5, 417 a 12 and III. ch. 2, 426 a 15 sqq.
The one sense of púσis is not totally dissevered from any of the
others. It is not a homonymous term. Here in this line púσw is used
in a way which would suggest natural tendency' or 'constitution
as a translation and it is used in the same connection as ev toîs púσei
and wapà púσw (452 b 2) which imply a reference to the world of
Nature. Cf. Introduction, sec. iv.
6
452 b 2. παρὰ φύσιν. Cf. Phys. II. ch. 8, 198 b 35 sqq. and III.
215 a 2, etc. τὸ αὐτόματον oι τύχη is the source of what we should call
exceptions to the laws of Nature. Those deviations from the normal
which we should ascribe to the operation of special subsidiary and
counteracting laws Aristotle did not regard quite in the same light.
As the action of Nature is not merely according to law, but
purposive, Aristotle seems to consider these deviations from the
general rule as being opposed to this purpose which aims for the
best and as thwarting it. Hence the expression πaρà þúσw. Cf.
Zeller, Arist. 1. pp. 465 sqq. (тò avτóμatov and rúxŋ may be dis-
tinguished, the former being specially the tendency to produce the
unexpected found in natural phenomena). Cf. Bonitz, ad Metaph.
XI. ch. 8, Io65 a 30.
452 b 5. åþéλкηтaι which Christ suggests, would make the read-
ing smoother. But Aristotle continually works with an exceedingly
indefinite subject, especially when discussing mental phenomena (cf.
Rodier, ad De An. 111. ch. 5, 430 a 25); it is, indeed, possible
for the subject to be changed between κινηθῆναι and ὠφέλκῃ.
452 b 6. δέῃ ὄνομα : ἐπίη Christ: EY have ἐπείη μόνον.
452 b 8. yvwplšelv deî tòv Xpóvov. This is not a special character-
istic of recollection, but is common to it and memory: ch. 1, 449 b
32 et passim. From here up to 453 a 5 Aristotle deals with the per-
ception of time, a common function of both activities, and there-
after he goes on once more to contrast the two.
452 b 9. TL. This is evidently the common sense or its organ,
the Ev Tɩ Ts uxs mentioned in De Sensu, 449 a 10. To perceive
time is a function of the common sense: cf. above, ch. 1, 450 a 11 and
notes.
452 b ro. Tà μeуéoŋ. Compare the way in which the perception
of time is illustrated by the perception of a spatial magnitude in
De Sensu, ch. 7, 448 b 3 sqq.
18—2
276
DE MEMORIA
ἀποτείνειν κ.τ.λ.
452 b II.
This would be a device for effecting
thought by contact. Plato suggests in the Timaeus that thought is
effected by contact (cf. De An. 1. ch. 3, 406 b 26 sqq. and Rodier,
ad loc.). But thought would thus be itself a μéyelos. Cf. Timaeus,
34 C sqq. and especially 37 A. Aristotle, however, does not disdain to
speak of the activity of intellect as a contact with its object—which
is itself. Cf. Metaph. xII. ch. 7, 1072 b 21: Oiyɣávwv kai voŵv (o
vous).
Plato, though making thought to be effected by contact, does
not suggest that it issues from the body and reaches out to the
things thought of, but as we see in De Sensu, ch. 2, he, along with
Empedocles, holds this to be true of sight.
452 b 14-16. Bekker reads τίνι οὖν διοίσει, ὅταν τὰ μείζω νοῇ; ἢ
ὅτι ἐκεῖνα νοεῖ, ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω; πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐντὸς ἐλάττω, ὥσπερ
ἀνάλογον καὶ τὰ ἐκτός. This is pretty nearly the traditional version
of the commentators and it seems to have given rise to the inter-
pretation descending from Themistius, which is to the effect that
Aristotle is comparing the relation of external magnitudes and
objective time to subjective processes by some relation between a
whole and its parts. The inner processes in the subject are ἐλάττω,
but so are the parts contained in a whole. Themistius takes the
évtós as referring to the parts which are contained in the whole, not,
apparently, as referring to v avtỷ (Sc. tỷ diavoíą), 1. 13. Never-
theless, тà Évròs-the parts contained in the whole-do correspond
to the subjective processes but, when they are described as ¿λáttw,
that primarily characterises their relation to the whole (rà μeišw)
and only secondarily the relation of inner process to the external
reality.
The argument then is (Themistius, Sp. II. p. 250) that, if you
know the whole, the knowledge of the part is annexed to it, but that
knowledge first attaches to the parts (rà êvròs) and then, because
they are analogous to each other, and to the whole, proceeds to the
whole. The relation between whole and parts is like that in the
Timaeus between the demiurge, or rather the animal of perfect figure
which is to contain all others (Timaeus, 33 A), and the created gods
which are within it and yet like to it.
It looks as though Themistius, having consulted the Timaeus in
connection with the passage above, has been led on by some
similarities of expression in the two works (τὰ ἐντός, ὁμοιότης and
the notion of figures containing one another) to introduce as a parallel
COMMENTARY
277
something perfectly irrelevant.
As Freudenthal points out, though a
whole contains its parts, the parts do not contain the whole and it is
impossible merely from the relation of part and whole to understand
how a part can represent a whole. Among the commentators
Simon and Thomas dismiss all this construction and take rà
évròs as referring simply to the inner psychic affections which
correspond to the external objects and periods of objective time.
LS
All
It might seem at the first glance that rà oμoia σxýμaтa which
reside within the soul or its organ are what corresponds to the
external spatial magnitudes, the Kivýσes what answers to the periods
of real time; but this distinction can hardly be maintained.
internal affections must be kwýous and those by which time is
apprehended must themselves be spatial, i.e. capable of being
represented by figures (cf. De Insom. ch. 3, 461 a 8-11). The
relation of inner to outer is represented by similar triangles (cf.
18-19 below). Though Themistius employs such triangles (the one
including the other) in his elucidation of the passage, the one does
not, according to him, represent the psychic states, the other the
external realities, but one is held to symbolize time, and its smaller
parts the subjective processes apprehending time, the other the
objective thing, with its parts representing the concepts by which we
know the objective, and what is asserted is not merely a proportion
between the inner elements of each triangle and the whole, but
between the two triangles as a whole and consequently between the
inner elements of each triangle. Cf. Themistius, Sp. II. p. 250, l. 23:
ὡς τὸ ἔλαττον πρᾶγμα πρὸς τὸ μεῖζον ἔχει, καὶ ὁ ἐλάττων χρόνος πρὸς τὸν
μείζονα ὁμοίως ἕξει, καὶ ἐναλλάξ, ὡς τὸ πρᾶγμα <πρὸς> ἅπαντα τὸν
χρόνον ἔχει καὶ τὰ μέρη πρὸς τὰ μέρη. (Spengel conjectures πρὸς
before άπavтα.) But Themistius has completely missed the point,
which is how can the internal represent the external? He is
continually using vóŋua and πpâуua as interchangeable (cf. 1. 21, loc.
cit.); but the question is-how is it possible to use the vónua (in
the sense of psychic process) instead of being in actual contact with
the πрâyμa? How are they related to one another?
тà
1.
Freudenthal, in Rheinisches Museum, XXIV. p. 415, conjectures
practically the identical reading which Biehl reproduces and which
makes quite plain to what rà ẻvtòs and tà ẻkтós refer. We must,
however, depart from Biehl to some extent and delete before ȧvá-
Aoyov in 1. 16 the wσep which obscures the sense and may have easily
crept in from the subsequent line. We read kaì with Freudenthal.
278
DE MEMORIA
452 b 17. St Hilaire and Hammond take edeow to mean
figures (mathematical); 'just as a figure may contain a proportionate.
one within it, so with distances.' But eidos is never used as identical
with oxμa-figure, though oxua may be regarded as an instance of
eidos in the most general sense; and besides, since the sides of
geometrical figures are drooтýμara, in comparing the relations of
άπоσтýμата to those which exist between proportionate figures,
Aristotle would only be comparing a thing with itself.
Bender translates ideou by 'Bildern,' and this may be founded
on an illustration which Simon gives when he compares the psychic
states to statuettes of equal size reproducing on the small scale the
lineaments and features of two different men. Simon, however,
seems to agree with Thomas that ev avr (ll. 17-18) refers not to
the eidos as Bender seems to take it (-'in der Sache'-but that
would rather be ἐν αὑτῷ or ἐν αὑτοῖς) but to the perceiving subject
'in ipso cognoscente,' and he thinks that Aristotle is comparing the
function of the internal quantum in representing external quantity to
the function of the internal eîdos in representing that which exists in
the objective universe. In both cases the internal is analogous to
the external. This account of the eidos in the soul is rather different
from the usual one. Aristotle generally says that the eldos of the
object gets into the soul. For example, sense is a faculty for
receiving the eîdos—the form without the matter; cf. De An. II.
ch. 12, 424 a 18, and so of voûs in III. ch. 4, 429 a 15, but again in
429 a 27 the soul is said to be the τóπos eidwv. Now, if the eidos of
the sensible object only exists actually (èvepycía) when it is perceived
or thought of, the eidos in the soul will be identical both numerically
and specifically with that in the object so far as the latter exists
évepycía, and this seems to be from one point of view the Aristotelian
theory: cf. De An. 111. ch. 2, 426 a 15 sqq., and Metaph. III. ch. 5,
1010b 30; but here we seem to have the more common-sense
position that the eidos exists realised in the external object inde-
pendently of the percipient mind and that what exists in the mind is
at least numerically different from the objectively existing one. Here
indeed Aristotle would seem to go so far as to suggest that the eîdos
in the mind is only analogous to that existing in the external world.
In this passage, then, Aristotle's purpose is to illustrate the repre-
sentation of an external dróσтημа by an internal axua, by the
function which the eldos of an external object communicated to the
sense organs has in giving us knowledge of that object. He refers
COMMENTARY
279
to the latter operation as to something already agreed upon. Cf. De
Interp. ch. 1, 16 2 6 : παθήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, καὶ ὧν ταῦτα ὁμοιώματα,
πράγματα κ.τ.λ.
452 b 18.
In the following lines, while I adhere to one of the
emendations which Biehl adopts from Freudenthal (TA for A▲ in
1. 19), I disagree with the latter in his interpretation of the passage.
My interpretation enables us to read AT with Bekker and all other
editors and MSS. instead of AZ in l. 21, and I instead of M in l. 22,
a lection supported by мss. EM Y.
The figure I give in illustration of the text (for which, along with
this interpretation, I am indebted to Mr W. D. Ross of Oriel College)
differs from that suggested by Freudenthal as much as from the one
found in Themistius; it will be found to be simpler than either and
open to fewer objections. My contention is that Aristotle's sole
point is to show how external dooτýμata and kɩýoes may be repro-
duced in parvo in the psychical organs. His explanation is that the
internal oxýμata and kivýσes are analogous to the external ones,
just as the sides of a small triangle are in the same proportions as
those of one any number of times larger, obtained by producing the
sides to any distance and drawing the base parallel to the base of
the small one.
He accordingly draws the triangle AFA with BE near the apex
and parallel to TA. (That this is the first figure to be drawn is
evident from the fact that the letters round it succeed each other in
the order of the alphabet.)

(Z) F
(r)C
G(H)
D(A) H
-(0)
-(1)
K
(B) B
E(E)
L
- (A)
(K)
(A)A
The internal σxîμa or kívησis then represents the external just as
the sides AB, BE represent AT, TA by being proportional to them.
But the question arises, why should the internal σχήμα or κίνησις
symbolized by AB, BE represent the external Aг, гA rather than
AZ, ZH (obtained by producing AF and A▲ and drawing ZH parallel
to гA), which are equally proportional to AB, BE?
280
DE MEMORIA
Will not an internal σxâμa which represents a length of six feet
at a certain distance represent one of twelve feet at double the
distance? Aristotle replies that this is so, but that in the two cases
we are conscious of a different proportion between the external and
the internal. We have some standard by which we measure real
size. We are conscious of the real distance from the eye outwards
of the various objects, and hence (to state the case in modern terms)
we know that an affection of the retina, which may mean a size of
two inches in a near object, may mean two miles in a distant one.
This is what Aristotle means when he says that AT is to AB in the
proportion of to I, but AZ is to AB in the ratio of K to A.
This interpretation requires us to regard ®, I, K and ▲ as the
names of single lines, not as referring to points at the ends of lines
as Freudenthal and Themistius would have it. This usage is common
in Euclid. On the other hand it is impossible that Tv ®I or Tàs
KA could refer each to single lines as Freudenthal maintains; nor is
there anything in the passages he quotes (Phys. VIII. ch. 10, 266 a 16,
Meteorol. III. ch. 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11) to show that Aristotle could, by ℗
or M (I) in l. 22, be referring to a single line by means of a point at
one end of it, if the point at the other end is denoted by another
letter. The difficulty is increased by the fact that his interpretation
requires the full designation of the former line to be [M], of the
latter [K] M. There is nothing to show that M was in Aristotle's
original scheme; it seems to have crept into some of the Mss. from
the figure of Themistius where it is found along with several other
μ
λ
Fig. Themist.
Y
δ
K
n
'ρ
€
ע
superfluous letters. For further
criticisms of the figure of Themis-
tius, cf. Freudenthal in Rheinisches
Museum, loc. cit.

श्र
Freudenthal's text is as follows:
452b 18 sqq.:—ὥσπερ οὖν εἰ τὴν
ΑΒ ΒΕ κινείται, ποιεῖ τὴν ΓΔ· ἀνά-
λογον γὰρ ἡ ΑΓ καὶ ἡ ΓΔ. τί οὖν
μᾶλλον τὴν ΓΔ ἢ τὴν ΖΗ ποιεῖ; ἢ
ὡς ἡ ΔΖ πρὸς τὴν ΑΒ ἔχει, οὕτως
ἡ Θ πρὸς τὴν Μ ἔχει. (The rest is
identical with the version followed
here.) He constructs two diagrams.
I. αζη and μθι are two similar
triangles one inscribed in the other and both are intersected by a
COMMENTARY
281
line κβελ drawn parallel to θι oι ζη so that μκ : κθ :: αβ : βζ. γδ is
also drawn parallel to (n.
Then the following result will hold:
αγ αβ αζ
γδ βε
Be in
αζ
Ө
vis 213
Also
11
i.e.
αβ μ
(ท
Өг ζα
Finally
В
Κ
Fig. Freudenth.

δ
€
门
​βε κλ βα
According to Freudenthal, aß, ße
represent inner affections; ay, yồ con-
cepts; as, ʼn are objective magnitudes,
while
µê, кλ represent our idea of time,
μo, ɩ actual objective time.
μ
a
This scheme is not wholly unlike that of Themistius whose outer
triangle represents time and its subjective apprehension, while the
inner one symbolizes objects and the ideas by which they are
thought.
But, as the whole point of the argument is, that the internal
σxýμaτα and knoes, though much smaller, are still analogous to the
external magnitudes and periods of time, it is strange to find the
internal kívŋoɩs, which is the means of apprehending time, symbolized
by lines in the external triangle. If there is any point at all in
drawing inserted triangles to represent the relation in question, the
inner one should certainly represent the subjective and 'smaller
process. A series of similar triangles, the one enclosing the other,
would be a much better means of bringing out Aristotle's contention.
It would thus be shown that differences in magnitude are non-
essential; the proportions in the sides of the smallest interior triangle
are still analogous to those of the largest exterior one.
There is no
need for Aristotle to represent objective time by different lines and
symbols from those which represent external spaces (cf. De Sensu,
ch. 7, quoted above), nor need the internal kívŋois be distinguished
by different letters from the internal oxμa. In fact, the internal
σχῆμα.
state corresponding to both spatial and temporal magnitudes must be
a kívŋois (and perhaps it is this that Aristotle means when he says in
De An. III. ch. 1, 425 a 17-18, that we know both figure and
magnitude by means of Kivnois). But this kívnous can be represented
by a figure, ie. it is spatially determined, it is a kind of popá, and it
282
DE MEMORIA
is as such that it can represent the objective magnitudes whether of
time or space.
What the difference is between the kivŋois which
represents a magnitude which is itself a kívnous (as in time) and
that which represents a space, Aristotle does not say; he seems
merely to be bent on describing everything internal in terms of
κίνησις.
Again, it is difficult to believe that here Aristotle is distinguishing
inner affections ('innern Affectionen,' Freudenthal in Rheinisches
Museum, p. 417) from concepts (Begriffe). In the previous sentence
(11. 16-18) he had (by implication) distinguished the apprehension of
εἴδη from that of ἀποστήματα, holding that in both cases there is
something analogous in the soul which corresponds to the objective
εἶδος oι ἀπόστημα. Now the distinction between εἶδος and ἀπόστημα
-magnitude or spatial figure generally-is quite different from that
between inner affection (pávraσμa?) and concept. Further, eldos is
not a psychological term; it could not be used to mean concept as
opposed to image. Though the eldos of a thing means the concept
or knowable character of a thing, it is used only in the epistemo-
logical reference not in the psychological. The appropriate term to
designate the concept as a psychical entity is vónμa not eidos. Com-
pare the usage all through this treatise as in De An., especially
432 a 12, 430 a 28. Further, even though one did take eidos in the
sense of νόημα and held that the lines αγ, γδ represent νοήματα or
elon, yet, as they are not of the nature of spatial quantity, what
is here said about their analogy to the objects they represent will be
the merest metaphor. A concept represents the external reality by
having the same λóyos, or in fact being the λóyos of the external
thing (cf. De An. 11. ch. 12, 424 a 24); but that λóyos is not a spatial
proportion, neither in the external object (for that would be the
Democritean theory) nor, consequently, in the soul. On the other
hand the pάvraσμa is spatial in character; as we saw in ch. 1,
450 a 9, not to be able to think without pavтáoμara is just the same
as not being able to think ἄνευ τοῦ συνεχούς. (This συνέχεια, as we
saw, forms the "An vont of the concept.) Hence the analogy
between the φάντασμα (or αἴσθημα which is equally a spatial κίνησις)
and the objective magnitude whether temporal or not, can be ade-
quately symbolized by spatial figures, e.g. by the identical ratios
which may be found in similar triangles of diverse magnitudes,
whereas the analogy between the vóŋua proper and its external
object must be something very different.
COMMENTARY
283
Hence, even though we were to keep Freudenthal's figure, we
need not appropriate special lines to the symbolization of particular
classes of psychical states. The point seems to be merely that
within a triangle of the same apex the shorter lines may be propor-
tional to those obtained by producing the sides.
2. Freudenthal gives another illustration with three triangles,
the smaller progressively inscribed in the larger, but the alteration
is not material.
The only reason for following Themistius's explanation of the
passage the alleged correspondence of the triangulum rei' and
passage—the
'triangulum temporis '-would be the difficulty of accounting for ouv
at the beginning of the next paragraph (1. 26) by any other. Hence,
(since the process corresponding to the time and that corresponding
to the thing may themselves correspond), we may explain memory.
When they occur together we remember, etc.' But the alleged
correspondence of time-apprehending and object-apprehending pro-
cesses does not account for the fact of remembering. It is their
coincidence that does so. It is also difficult to see what sense there is
in making out a correspondence between an object and the time in
which it is apprehended or between the subjective processes pro-
duced by each. Both may be illustrated by the same lines and
figures as above, but that need not imply an analogy other than
generic between the two classes of processes.
The ovv does not
imply that the act of memory is explained by the previous passage;
all that has been accounted for is the possibility of an internal
process representing external reality, whether that be spatial magni-
tude or temporal process. Memory, as such, is accounted for by the
coincidence merely of the two subjective processes.
(In 1. 22 yàp instead of our would give a smoother sense, but the
change is not necessary.)
453 a 1-2. Bekker reads οἷον ὅτι τρίτην ἡμέραν ὁδήποτε ἐποίησεν,
OTE dè Kai μéтρw. This gives no material difference. But Freudenthal,
(op. cit. p. 419) pointing out that тpírηv njµépar makes one think of
an exact interval of time, and hence can hardly be employed as an
instance of indeterminate time, wishes to read οἷον ὅτι τρίτην ἡμέραν,
ὅτι μέντοι ποτὲ ἐποίησεν· ὅτι δὲ καὶ μέτρῳ. ὅτι μέντοι is read by
LS Michael and vet. tr.
The change is surely not essential. I take ὅτι τρίτῃ ἡμέρᾳ ὁδήποτε
¿ñoiŋoev to be an example of remembering μérpo. Aristotle says
284
DE MEMORIA
that sometimes one does not remember the exact interval, as e.g.
that it was an interval of three days, but at other times one
does.
Freudenthal's objection against ódýτore is not convincing. The
indefiniteness of the subject acting need not entail any indefiniteness
in the act performed.
453 a 7-8. Evidently to have recollection proper one must.
remember μέτρω.
453 a 10. yvwpilouévwv. The reading of LSU yvwpípov is per-
haps a little smoother.
453 a 12. οἷον συλλογισμός τις. This would point either to
Siebeck's theory or to the one I have given as to the meaning of
452 a 18 sqq. Beginning with your present thought, as it were
with a minor premiss, you develop it further by a series of middle
terms which finally lead to the idea you are in search of, just as
your middle terms in a deduction finally bring you the ultimate
predicate which is to be attached to the subject.
Here Aristotle lays emphasis on the purposive character of avá-
μνησις. He treats it as a Crnous depending on will. It is evidently
as such only that it is the exclusive possession of man. But ává-
μvnois is not in all cases purposive: cf. 451 b 26, and 1. 28 below.
453 a 14. Boúλevois is also a species of lýτnois: cf. Eth. Nic.
VI. ch. 10, 1142 a 32, and again we have in 1142 b 1: 8 dè Boudevő-
μενος ζητεῖ καὶ λογίζεται. Cf. also III. ch. 5, 1112 b 2o sqq. It is a
search for means to an end and for means which are in our power.
There is another kind of ¿ýrŋois—theoretic, such as in mathematics is
a kind of áváλvous. Aristotle calls it in Metaph. Ix. ch. 9, 1051 a
22 sqq., διαίρεσις (at least he says διαιροῦντες γὰρ εὑρίσκουσιν. This is
of course not the Platonic diaípeois). The process involved is thus
explained by Mr Burnet in The Ethics of Aristotle, p. xxxv. 'Figures
are resolved by making actual the divisions into other figures which
are there potentially. If they were already actually divided the
proof would be plain; as it is, we must make a construction which is
always in the long run some form of division. For instance, why
are the angles of a triangle equal to two right angles? It is because
the angles about one point are equal to two right angles. If the
line parallel to the side were already drawn, the truth would be
plain at first sight.'
This process is obviously just απόδειξις-demonstration, or συλλο-
COMMENTARY
285
yoμós-the finding of the middle term. Scientific analysis and
demonstration are just the same thing, as is borne out by the name
of the treatises on demonstration-rà avaλUTIKά. Recollection is
then like a syllogism in being an analysis, though a psychological
one, corresponding to the logical analysis involved in scientific
reasoning.
tò
4532 16-17. σωματικὸν τὸ πάθος, σωματικόν τι πάθος is read by
LSU, the commentators and all editors other than Biehl.
EV TOLOÚTŲ. Cf. De An. 1. ch. 4, 408 b 17 and above, note to
451 b 35, ἀρχὴν κινήσεως.
453 a 19. Éπéxovτes. For this Christ is responsible. If we read
Eπéxovтas with the мss. and Bekker we must place a comma after
ἀναμνησθῆναι and, taking the ἐπέχοντας along with ἐπιχειροῦντας,
translate it and though they restrain their thoughts.' The vet. tr.
however, though taking it along with mixeɩpouvтas, has 'adhibentes
intellegentiam.'
453 a 20. After οὐδὲν ἧττον I understand with Simon παρεν
oxλeîr. It is this which it is the purpose of the proof to maintain.
So Thomas also. Themistius explains that the search still goes on.
This is not far wrong though it is difficult to see how what is against
one's will can be a lýτnois (cf. Themistius, Sp. 11. p. 253, 1. 29).
Hammond and Bender wish to have it that people remember when
they are not trying and in fact trying not to. This does not suit the
Greek so well and is hardly the point. Aristotle does not attempt
to show the bodily nature of recollection by its occurring involun-
tarily (though that it does so is also implied, cf. 11. 27 sq.). In fact
he has lately understood by ȧváµvnois the voluntary recall of an idea.
He wishes rather to show its corporeal connection by pointing out
that it may stimulate bodily disturbances beyond the control of the
will. This is the meaning of τοῦ μὴ ἐπ᾿ αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ ἀναμιμνή-
σкEσαι (11. 22 sq.) and the subsequent illustration.
453 2 25. σωματικόν τι.
a
The heart, according to everyone but
Neuhäuser: cf. Introduction, sec. vi. In De An. I. ch. 4, 408 b 18
Aristotle talks of the Kivores stimulated in recollection as being in
the sense organs (èv roîs aioonTnpíois), but that is probably only
a vaguely worded statement.
We have seen above in ch. 1, that the organ of кovǹ aïolŋois and
pavraσía is the heart, or is situated in it. Cf. also De Juvent. ch. 3,
469 a 12. These κινήσεις or πάθη are φαντάσματα,
286
DE MEMORIA
453 a 28. éπavéλon LSU. Michael, Themistius, and almost all
editors read étéλon, which does not give the sense of returning which
is involved in éπavéλoy and seems to be required.
453 a 34. εἰσὶ δὲ κ.τ.λ. Another proof of the bodily nature of
memory and recollection. Dwarfs are people with the upper parts
of their bodies more developed than the lower extremities just like
young children.
453 b 5-6. Sià Thν kívηow. Cf. ch. 1, 450 b 7 sqq.
APPENDIX I.
THE ARISTOTELIAN THEORY OF LIGHT.
It is difficult to reconcile Aristotle's doctrine that light is a eģis
(cf. pp. 211-14 above) with his other statements which imply that,
if not a motion, it at least has direction in space.
We must, indeed, disregard those passages (e.g. Meteorol. 1. ch. 8,
345 b 10 and II. ch. 9, 369 b 13-14) where his use of language which
has such an implication is due to the fact that some Empedoclean
doctrine is under discussion; and again in Anal. Post. II. ch. 11, 94 b
29 sqq., where he talks of the passage of light through the enclosing
walls of a lantern, he expressly safeguards himself by saying errep
φῶς γίνεται τῷ διέναι. Once more, statements in the Problems (e.g.
904b 17: τὸ μὲν φῶς κατ᾿ εὐθεῖαν φέρεται) may be set aside as not
being of necessity genuinely Aristotelian.
Nevertheless, in Meteorol. 111. ch. 4, 374 b 4, Aristotle speaks
of rays proceeding from the sun, and the whole of his account of the
phenomena of eclipse and illumination rests on the assumption that
light has direction; in De An. 11. ch. 8, 419 b 29 sqq. he explains
the diffusion of daylight by the reflection of the sun's light from the
spots directly illuminated.
It is noteworthy, however, that when he talks of the formation
of images in mirrors and tries to show that rainbows, haloes, etc. are
due to reflection (e.g. in Meteorol. III. ch. 2, 371 b 17 sqq.) he always
speaks of the reflection of sight, not of the reflection of light. More-
over it is evident that he was as far as his predecessors from
understanding that the visibility of an object which is not self-
luminous is a phenomenon of reflection.
It is precisely when he comes to explain the perception of such
an object that his theory, like that of prior philosophers, breaks
down. The perception of anything which is a source of light
(Tɩ πupŵdes) is relatively a simple matter. The luminous body, by
288
APPENDIX I
producing a έis in the medium intervening between it and the eye,
is enabled to act upon the organ of vision and so cause perception
of itself. But the non-luminous object must also act upon the eye,
if it is to be seen, and yet, not being of the nature of fire, it cannot
produce a ĝis in the medium. The fact that it is illuminated, i.e.
endowed with the έis produced in the transparent medium (which
penetrates it to a greater or less extent) by the presence of a source
of light, may be a prior cause of its visibility (rò yàp pŵs Toleî tò
opâv), but does not explain how it acts upon the eye. Light can be
the proximate cause of vision only in the case of a self-luminous
body. We may think it strange that Aristotle, whose general
doctrine of perception involved the action of all visible objects upon
the eye, and who in De Sensu, ch. 2, 438 b 5, is content to call this a
kívŋoɩs, did not leap to the conclusion that illumination is itself due
to a kívŋous which is identical with this. As things stand, his theory
of the perception of bodies which are not self-luminous is left
incomplete and is not reconciled with the rest of his teaching.
It can only be described as an advance upon the Empedoclean
doctrine, which made the act of vision a phenomenon of illumination--
the illumination of an object by the eye, and thus took as obvious the
fact most in need of explanation, namely the perception of an illumi-
nated object.
APPENDIX II.
THE ARISTOTELIAN THEORY OF TIME-PERCEPTION
A TENTATIVE rendering of the difficult passage.452 b 8-25 (Bek.
7-22) has been suggested to me by Mr J. A. Smith and Mr W. D.
Ross. The same figure is retained in illustration of the text and the
explanation is of the same general type as that which I have adopted
in pp. 279 sqq.
But the reading in ll. 14-16 (Bek. 13–15) is altered
to-τίνι οὖν διοίσει, ὅταν τὰ μείζω νοῇ, ὅτι ἐκεῖνα νοεῖ ἢ τὰ ἐλάττω ;
πάντα γὰρ τὰ ἐντὸς ἐλάττω, ὥσπερ ἀνάλογον καὶ τὰ ἐκτός. 'When
one thinks of the greater (and more distant) objects, what is the
difference between thinking of them and of the smaller (and nearer)?
For all the internal (subjective) are smaller (than the external) as it
were in proportion to the external (objective).'
The internal AB, BE is smaller than AT, TA, but preserves the
same proportion as AT, TA, and also as AZ, ZH. What then is the
difference between interpreting AB, BE as meaning AT, FA and
interpreting it as meaning AZ, ZH? The difference lies in the
power (assumed by Aristotle 1. 9 above—eσrw dé ti ♣ kpívei tÒV
πλείω καὶ ἐλάττω) of knowing the distance in space or time of the
object for which our mental object stands, and knowing, therefore,
K
H
I A
This tells
by what to multiply AB and BE-whether by or
us (to take the case of µeyé0ŋ) whether the image in us stands for
a cat at ten yards' distance or a tiger much farther away. Similarly
it enables us to say whether the kívnous in us represents an event
which took ten minutes a week ago or twenty minutes a fortnight
ago. When the image is multiplied by us in the same ratio as that
in which its distance from us is multiplied, we think of (or recollect)
the right object at the right distance of space or time. When
different ratios are used we get a false thought or a false recollection.
According to this interpretation AB is the aπóorημa of the image
from us, AF and AZ the arroσrýμara (in space or time) of the objects
R.
19
290
APPENDIX II
BE represents our subjective image or κίνησις, ΓΔ and
If you wish
from us.
ZH the objects (spatial or temporal) which we think of.
to think of ZH rather than T▲ you must think of the άπоστýμaτa as
K
being different too, and multiply AB by not by
Λ
H
I'
The chief objection to this interpretation is that it implies that
Aristotle thought of the image in the mind as existing at a distance
from us, as though there were within us an inner spectator (the real
self) whose relation to mental images merely reproduced on a small
scale the relation between a percipient being and the spatial objects
external to his organism. In fact we have the scholastic and
Cartesian theory of the relation of the soul to the motions in the
'animal spirits.' But surely such a doctrine is definitely non-
Aristotelian. Further if AT and AZ can be interpreted as being
designed to represent distances in time of past events, AB will also
(when compared with these) represent an áróσrnua in time. But
how can a present image or kívηois (BE) be said to be distant from
us in time? It will thus be seen that there are difficulties in working
out the consequences of this tempting and ingenious theory. I
myself cannot believe that Aristotle meant his symbols to be anything
more than a general illustration of the relation which internal
κινήσεις bear to external κινήσεις and μεγέθη. The fact that motion
always implies extension made it possible for the former class to
symbolize both the latter.
APPENDIX III.
LIST OF PRINCIPAL AUTHORITIES REFERRED TO
TEXTS:
Aristotelis Parva Naturalia, ed. Biehl, Leipzig, 1898 (Teubner).
Bekker's Aristotle, Berlin, 1831.
TRANSLATIONS:
Barthélemy St Hilaire: Psychologie d'Aristote-Opuscules-Paris,
1847.
Bender: Parva Naturalia, Stuttgart.
Hamilton Note D** in Reid's Works (Commentary on and transla-
tion of part of the De Memoria).
Hammond: Aristotle's Psychology, 1902.
Ziaja: De Sensu 436 a 1—439 b 18, Breslau, 1887 (Prog.).
COMMENTARIES :
Alexander De Sensu, ed. Wendland, Berlin, 1901; ed. Thurot,
Paris, 1875.
Maynetius: De Sensu, Florence, 1555.
Michael Ephesius: De Memoria (Aldine).
Simon Simonius: De Sensu et De Memoria, Geneva, 1556.
Themistius: Paraphrases Aristotelis, ed. Spengel, Leipzig (Teubner).
Thomas Aquinas: De Sensu et De Memoria, Parma ed., vol. xx.
WORKS BEARING ON THE SUBJECT:
Bäumker: Des Aristoteles Lehre von den äussern und innern Sinnes-
vermögen, Paderborn, 1877.
Bonitz: Index Aristotelicus; Aristotelis Metaphysica, Bonn, 1848.
Burnet: Early Greek Philosophy, 1892; The Ethics of Aristotle,
1900.
Bywater-in Journal of Philology, XVIII,
19-2
292
APPENDIX III
Cook Wilson-in Journal of Philology, XI.
Freudenthal—in Rheinisches Museum, 1869; Archiv für Geschichte
der Philosophie, 1889.
Hayduck: Prog. Kön. Gym. zu Meldorf, 1876–77.
Neuhäuser: Aristoteles Lehre von dem sinnlichen Erkenntnisver-
mögen und seinen Organen, Leipzig, 1878.
Rassow Prog. d. Joachimsth. Gym., 1858.
:
Rodier: Traité de l'Âme, Paris, 1900 (2 vols.).
Siebeck-in Philologus, 1881; Untersuchungen zur Philosophie der
Griechen.
Torstrik: De Anima, Berlin, 1862.
Trendelenburg: De Anima, Berlin, 1877.
Wallace: Aristotle's Psychology, 1882.
Zeller: Presocratic Philosophy (English Translation, 1881), Plato and
the Older Academy (E. Tr., 1876), Aristotle and the Earlier
Peripatetics (E. Tr., 1897).
INDEX I (Greek).
ἀδιαίρετος 448 b 17; 4492 12, 23, 29,
31
ἀδυνατεῖν 4522 8
ἀέντων (Emped.) 437 b 31
ἀήρ. ὁ ἀὴρ ὑγρὸν τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν
443 b 6; 443 a 7. οὐκ ἔστιν ἀὴρ ἐν
τῷ ὕδατι 443 2 5, 6
αιθομένοιο πυρός (Emped.) 437 b 29
αἰσθάνεσθαι. οὐ κατὰ τὸ μανθάνειν
ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸ θεωρεῖν ἐστι τὸ αἰσθά-
νεσθαι 441 b 26. καὶ εἰ ἅπαν ἀκούει
καὶ ἀκήκοε καὶ ὅλως αἰσθάνεται καὶ
ᾔσθηται 446 b 3. ἑκάστου μᾶλλον
ἔστιν αἰσθάνεσθαι ἁπλοῦ ὄντος ἢ κε-
κραμένου 447 2 19, 27. πῶς ἐνδέχε-
a
ται ἅμα πλειόνων αἰσθάνεσθαι 448b
19 sqq., 449 2 21. αἰσθάνεσθαι ὀξέως
444b 15. ὅτε αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τις αἰσθά
νεται 448 a 28. χρόνος ἐν ᾧ αἰσθά
νεται 448 b 2
αἴσθησις. κοινὴ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ
σώματος 436 a 9, b 7. περιτταὶ αἱ
αισθήσεις 445 2 5. εἰ μή τις παρὰ
τὰς πέντε αισθήσεις ἑτέρα 444b 21.
αἱ αισθήσεις ἁπτικαί dist. αἱ δι᾿ ἄλλου
αἰσθητικαί 445 b 7, 8; 436 a 20. τῷ
κινεῖσθαι τὸ μεταξὺ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὑπὸ
τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ γίνεσθαι τὴν αἴσθησιν
440a 20, 21 ; cf. 438 b 5. ἡ κοινὴ
αἴσθησις 450 a 12; cf. 442 b 4 sqq.
ἡ αἴσθησις τοῦ παρόντος ἐστίν 449 b
14, 30. πάθη, ἕξεις αἰσθήσεως 436 b
5, 6. ἡ τῆς αἰσθήσεως ὑπεροχή 446 2
I I
αἰσθητήριον. ἐν οἷς αισθητηρίοις ἐγ
έγ
γίγνεσθαι πέφυκεν ἡ αἴσθησις, ἔνιοι
ζητοῦσι κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα τῶν σωμάτων
437 a 21; 438 b 20. ὅπως μὴ αἰσθη
τήρια δύο ποιῇ (ή φύσις) 444b5
αἰσθητικός. ἄγει (τὸ αἰσθητὸν) τὸ αἰσθη-
τικὸν εἰς ἐνέργειαν 441 b 24. οὐκ ἐπὶ
τοῦ ἐσχάτου ὄμματος ή ψυχὴ ἢ τῆς
ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικόν ἐστιν 438 b 1ο.
θετέον καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ
ἓν εἶναι ἀριθμῷ τὸ αἰσθητικὸν πάντων
449 a 19, 8. τὸ πρῶτον αἰσθητικόν
4502 13, 16; 45I a 18. πολύ βάρος
ἔχειν ἐπὶ τῷ αἰσθητική 453 b 2
αἰσθητός. τῶν αἰσθητῶν τῶν καθ᾿ ἕκασ
τον αἰσθητήριον,...τί τὸ ἔργον αὐτῶν
dist. τί ἐστι ἕκαστον αὐτῶν 439 2 7,
18. ἔστιν ἕκαστον διχῶς λεγόμενον,
τὸ μὲν ἐνεργείᾳ τὸ δὲ δυνάμει 439 2
14, 15. τὸ αἰσθητὸν ἐνεργεῖν ποιεῖ
τὴν αἴσθησιν 438 b 24; 445 b 7. οὔτε
σώματα (τὰ αἰσθητά), ἀλλὰ πάθος
καὶ κίνησίς τις, οὐδ᾽ ἄνευ σώματος
446 b 28. τὸ αἰσθητὸν πᾶν ἐστὶ
μέγεθος 449 2 22 ; cf. 448 b 14 sqq. ;
440 a 30; 445 b 10. τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἢ αἱ
κινήσεις αἱ ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν 446 2 23.
τὰ παθήματα τὰ αἰσθητά 445 b 4; cf.
439 a 8. τὰ κοινὰ opp. τὰ ἴδια (αίσθη-
Tá) 442 b 4 sqq.; 437 a 8. πᾶν τὸ
αἰσθητὸν ἔχει ἐναντίωσιν 445 b 26;
442 b 19. τὰ μικρὰ πάμπαν λανθάνει
δυνάμει γὰρ ὁρατά, ἐνεργείᾳ δ᾽ οὔ 446 2
5 sqq. πάντα τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἑπτὰ ποιεῖ
Δημόκριτος καὶ οἱ πλεῖστοι τῶν φυσιο-
λόγων 442 b I. αἰσθητός, dist. νοητός
445 b 17
αἴτιος 437 a 13
ἀκαριαίος 4462 10
ἀκοή 437 2 10, 12. πρὸς τῇ ἀκοῇ 446 b
ἀκούειν 446 b 3, 18
ἄκουσις κατ' ενέργειαν αἴσθησίς ἐστιν
439 a 17
ἀκουστός 437 2 13. τὸ ἀκουστόν 445 2
ΙΙ
ἄκρατος 447 2 20
ἀκριβής 44Ι 2 3; 442b 16
ἀκριβῶς 444 b 1ο
ἄκρος 448 a 12
ΙΟ
ἀκτίς. ἀκτίνεσσιν (Emped.) 437 33
ἀλλοιοῦν 447 2 1, 2
ἀλλοίωσις 446 a 31 sqq.
ἀλλοιωτικός 441 b 24
a
αλμυρός 441 b 4. τὸ ἁλμυρόν 442 2 19
¿λovpyós 440 a 1; 442 a 26
ἅλς. ἄλες γῆς τι εἶδός εἰσιν 441 b 5.
ἅλες ὀσμώδεις εἰσίν 443 2 14
ἅμα. δυεῖν ἅμα αἰσθάνεσθαι 447 2 14
sqq. ἅμα κινεῖσθαι 448 b 22, 26
ἀμβλύνειν 443 b 16
ἄμικτος 4452 23
ἀμνήμων 453 b r, 5 ; 450 b 7
294
INDEX I (GREEK)
ἀμοργούς (Emped.) 437 b 30
ἀμφινάοντος ὕδατος (Emped.) 438 a 2
ἀνάγειν 442 b 11, 13
ἀνάγκη. ἐξ ἀνάγκης dist. ἔθει 451 b 13
ἀναθυμίασις 443 a 23 sqq. ἡ πνευμα
τώδης ἀναθυμίασις 445 a 29. ἡ τῆς
τροφῆς ἀναθυμίασις 4442 14
(τὰ) ἄναιμα 438 2 25
ἀναίσθητος 440 a 23; 44I a 6; 448 a
27, b 4, 19
ἀνακαλύπτειν 444 b 27
ἀνάκλασις 437 b 12; 438 2 1ο
ἀναλαμβάνειν μνήμην 451 2 24
ἀνάληψις μνήμης 451 a 23
ἀνάλογον. ἀνάλογον εἶναι τὰς ὀσμάς
τοῖς χυμοῖς 443 b 13.
ἐκτὸς τοῖς ἐντός 452b
ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι 45I a
μνημονεύειν 451 b 2 ;
ἀνάλογον τὰ
16 sqq.
20 sqq.; dist.
453 a ro; dist.
πάλιν μανθάνειν 451 b 1ο
ἀνάμνησις; cf. ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι
ἀναμνηστικός dist. μνημονικός 449 b 8;
453 a 6
ἀναπνείν ; cf. ἀναπνοή
ἀναπνοή. γίγνεται (τὸ ὀσμᾶσθαι) διὰ
τῆς ἀναπνοῆς 444 2 21 sqq.
ἀναφέρειν 4442 24
ἄνθος 443 b 31; 444 2 36
ἀνθρακώδης 437 b 19
ἄνθραξ 444b 33
ἄνθρωπος. πλεῖστον ἐγκέφαλον καὶ
ὑγρότατον ἔχει τῶν ζῴων 4442 33.
μόνον χαίρει ταῖς τῶν ἀνθῶν ὀσμαῖς
444 2 36. έχει δόξαν καὶ φρόνησιν
a
450 a 17; cf. 453 a II
ἄνισος 445 b 29; 447 b I
ἀντικείμενος 4482 10
ἀντικινεῖν 453 a 29, 31
᾿Αντιφέρων ὁ Ὠρείτης 451 a 10
ἀόρατος 439 b 22; 440 2 30
αόριστος 439 2 29,
ἄοσμος 443 2 II
ἅπαξ 451 b 15
ἀπατᾶσθαι 442 b 9
b
4
ἄπειρος opp. ὡρισμένος 440 b 26. vel
πεπερασμένος 445 b 29, 3; cf. 449 a
24; 442 b 28, 29
ἀπέχειν 444b II; 4482 15
ἄπηκτος 438 2 22
ἁπλοῦς 445 a 21 ; 447 2 20
ἁπλῶς dist. μεμιγμένως 442 2 3
ἀποδιδόναι 438 b 19
ἀποπλύνειν 443 b 8
ἀπορεῖν 438 a II; 444 b 16; 445 b 3;
446 a 22; 450 a 27
ἀπορία 437 a 29; 446 b 29; 447 2 13;
448 b 20
απόρροια 438 2 4; 440 a 17, 21 ; 443 b 2
ἀποσβεννύναι 437 b 15; 438b 16
ἀπόσβεσις 437b 17
ἀποστέγειν (Εmped.) 438a 2
ἀπόστημα 440 a 30; 449 a 24, 27;
452 b 18
ἀποτείνειν 438a 27; 452b It
ἀποτέμνειν 438b 16
απόχρη 444 b 5
ἅπτειν. ἅψας (Emped.) 437 b 30
ἅπτεσθαι 442 a 5; 450b 12
ἁπτικός. τὸ ἁπτικὸν (αἰσθητήριον)
439 a I. αἱ ἁπτικαί αισθήσεις 445 a
7
ἁπτός. τὸ ἁπτόν 441 b 31; 4452 13.
τὸ ἁπτὸν γένος 4452 το
ἀριθμός. ἀριθμὸς περιττός 445 a 6.
κατ' ἀριθμούς sive ἐν ἀριθμοίς 442 2
16, 18; 439 b 30, 33; 440 a 4, 6,
b 21. εὐλόγιστοι ἀριθμοί 439 b 34·
ἓν τῷ ἀριθμῷ 446 b 25; 447 b 26;
449 a 16 sqq.
(οι) ἀρχαῖοι 4402 16
ἀρχή 451 b 35 ; 452 a 7, 19, 27; ἐξ
ἀρχῆς 451 2 25, b 2
a
ἀσύμμετρος 439 b 32
ἀσφαλτώδης 4441 35
άτακτος 440 2 5
ἀτμίς, ἡ τῶν ἀνθράκων ἀτμίς 444 b 33;
dist. ἀναθυμίασις 443 2 28 sqq.
ἄτομος. ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀτόμῳ χρόνῳ
447 a 15; cf. 448 b 22; 449 a 4.
τῷ ἀτόμῳ (opp. ἑτέρῳ τῆς ψυχῆς)
αισθάνεσθαι 448b 24; cf. 45Ia 23.
τὰ ἄτομα μεγέθη 445 b 19
άτοπος 448 a 10; 442b
αὐγή 439 b 3
αὐξάνειν 4422 5
αὔξησις 442 2 I;
αυστηρός 442 2 20;
αὐτόσε 452 b 5
ἀφαιρεῖν 441 b 32;
24, 25; 448b 7;
ȧpavíšeiv 443 b 16,
ἀφέλκειν 452 b 5
45o b 8; 453 b 6
443 b 11
44I a 13; 444 b
med. 447 a 25
17; 447 a 22
åøń 436 b 14; 439 a 1; 441 a 3, 4;
442 b 8
αχλύς 4402 12
ἄχυμος 44 a 6 : 443 2 12
βαδίζειν 448 b 9; 445 2 30
βάθος. τὰ ἐν βάθει 440 a 15
I
Bápos 445 b 5; 442 a 7; 453 b 1
βάρος
βαρύς opp. ὀξύς 447 b 4
βαφή coni. πλύσις 445 a 15
βηλός.
33
κατὰ βηλόν (Εmped.) 437 b
βιάζεσθαι 444 2 2
βλέπειν 437 6 27
βλέφαρον 444 b 26
βούλεσθαι. ἡ τοῦ ὕδατος φύσις βούλεται
ἄχυμος είναι 44I a 4; cf. 447 b 12
βουλεύεσθαι 4532 16
INDEX I (GREEK)
295
βουλευτικός. τὸ βουλευτικόν 4532 15
βραδύς. μνημονικώτεροι οἱ βραδείς 449 b
9
ἐν τοῖς περὶ γενέσεως
γένεσις 446 b 5.
442 a 4
yévos 443 b 27, 32;
449 a 20; 445 a
γέρων 450 b 7; 453
γεύεσθαι 447 2 7
448 a 16-20, b 29;
10; 441 a 19
5
γεύσις 436 b 15; 4392 3; 44I a 3,
b 23; 442 b 15, 17
b 26
γευστικός. τὸ γευστικόν 439 2 1
γευστός 442 2 2,
γεώδης 441 b 20
γῆ.
γῆς ἴδιον τὸ ξηρόν 441 b 13:
χυμοί ... ὑπάρχοντες καὶ ἐν τῇ γῇ
441 b I. οἱ ἅλες γῆς τι εἶδός εἰσιν
441 b 5. ἡ καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασίς ἐστι
κοινὴ γῆς τε καὶ ἀέρος 443 2 26, 30.
τὸ ἁπτικὸν γῆς ἐστίν 439 a I
Yĥpas 436 a 15
γίγνεσθαι 446 1 5, 6
γλισχρότης 44I a 28
γλίχεσθαι 437 a 23
γλυκύς. ἐκ γλυκέος καὶ πικροῦ (μίξεως)
οἱ χυμοί 442 2 14.
το γλυκύ 442 2 3
sqq.; 448 a 17, 18; 449 a 6
γνωρίζειν 449 b 15; 453 a 5, 10
γράφειν 450 a 4, b 23; 451 2 1
a I
γραφεύς 440 a 9
γραφή 450 b 17, 33
δεκτικός. δεκτικόν φωτός 439 b II.
δεκτικὸν τῆς χρόας 439 b 8.
τόπος
δεκτικὸς τῆς τρόφης 445 a 26
δημιουργεῖν 442 2 5;
443 b 17
442 2 31, b 12
27
Δημόκριτος 438 a 5;
διαγιγνώσκειν 443 2
διαγράφειν 450 a
διαθρώσκον (Emped.) 437 b 32; 438 a 3
διαιρεῖν. εἰς ἄπειρα (σώμα) διαιρεῖν
445 b 3. εἰς τὰ ἐλάχιστα 440b 5
sqq. ἡ ποδιαία... διαιρεθεῖσα 446 a 8.
διῄρηται τὰ εἴδη 444 2 7; cf. 439 b
20
b 13
διαιρετός 449
διακρίνειν 442b 16
διαλύειν 446 a 9
διάνοια. ἐπέχοντες τὴν διάνοιαν 453 2
τοῦ ἐν τοῖς σώμασι διαφανοῦς τὸ ἔσχα
τον 439 2 30 sqq.
διαψεύδεσθαι 452 b 28
δίεσις 446 2 2
διηθεῖν 441 b 5, 20
διορίζειν 436 a 1, b 14; 439a6; 442 2
3; 443 b 21; 445 b 2
διστάζειν 451 a 6
δόξα 450 2 17
δοξαστόν 449 b 12
δριμύς χυμός 442 20. δριμεία ὀσμή
443 b Io
ΙΟ
δύναμις 437 a 6; coni. φύσις 439 a 25.
ἡ τοῦ θείου δύναμις 444 b 35· μίγνυν-
τες εἰς τὰ πόματα τάς τοιαύτας δυνά-
μεις 444 2 2. δύναμις opp. ἐνέργεια
445 b 32 sqq. ; 447 b 16 sqq.; 449 a 2.
ἡ γεύσις ἡ κατὰ δύναμιν 44I b 23.
δυνάμει προϋπάρχον 441 b 25. ἐνεῖναι
δυνάμει 452 a 12
δυσανάπνευστος 443 b 13
δυσκατάποτος 443 b 13
δυσχεραίνειν 444
δυσώδης 444 b 3I;
δυσωδία 445 2 2
31
445 2 3
a
ἐγκέφαλος 438 b 27, 31; 444 2 11,
33
ἐγρήγορσις 436 2 14
ἔγχυμος 442 b 31; 4432 2, 17
ἐδώδη 445 2 4
ἐθέλειν 445 a 23; cf. βούλεσθαι
ἐθίζειν 451 b 17
ἔθος. ὥσπερ φύσις τό ἔθος 452 a 30.
ἔθει dist. ἐξ ἀνάγκης 451 b 15. δι'
ἔθος dist. φύσει 452 b 3
είδος = forma 452 b 17; dist. γένος 449 2
21, 5 ; 448 b 28, 31. εἴδη =species,
442 a 22, 23; 445 b 23; 439 b 20;
444 a 7. εἴδη = varietates 443 b 19.
εἴδει διαφέρειν 448a 19. εἴδει ἕν,
447 b 16, 28. εἴδει ἕτερον 449 2 21
εἴδωλον 438 a 13
εἰκών 450 b 24, 26, 33; 4512 15, 17
είναι. τὸ είναι=notio 449 2 18, 20
cf. τῷ ἐνεῖναι vel είναι 446 b 30,
Pp. 211, 212
εἰπεῖν.
19
εἴργειν.
ὅμοια
εἶς.
19. ἔστι γὰρ ἐν αὐτῇ τὰ
σχήματα καὶ κινήσεις τοῖς ἐκτός)
452 b II
διασκιδνᾶσιν (Εmped.) 437 b 3r
διάστημα 446 a 3
διαφανής. τὸ διαφανὲς κοινὸν τοῦ ἀέρος
καὶ ὕδατος 4382 14; 442 b 32; cf.
439 a 23 sqq. τὸ διαφανές χρώματος
ποιεῖ μετέχειν 439 b 9. διαφανές ἐστι
τὸ ἐντὸς τοῦ ὄμματος 438 b r1 sqq.
ὡς εἰπεῖν 4442 35, 2Ι; 441 2
ερημένον (Emped.) 437 b
·34
ἓν ἀριθμῷ dist. ἓν εἴδει 446 b 25;
447 b 16, 26, 28; 449 a 16 sqq.
εἰσαγγέλλειν 437 2 2
εἰσάπαξ 447 b 21
εἴωθα 453 a 3
ἐκκαίειν 4432 20
ἐκκρούειν 447 2 16
ἐκλάμπειν 4372 26
ἐκρεῖν 438 a 18
296
INDEX I (GREEK)
ἐκτέμνειν 438 b 14
ἔλαιον 441 a 26
ἕλκειν 44Ι 2 15
ἐλπὶς τοῦ μέλλοντός ἐστιν 449 b 30
ἐλπιστικός 449 b 13
ἐμμένειν 453 b 3
Εμπεδοκλής 437 b 12, 25; 441 2 6, 11 ;
446 a 28
ἐμφαίνεσθαι 438a 9, 12
ἔμφασις 438 a 6
ἐναντίος 441 b ro sqq.; 442 b 22.
τὰ
ἐναντία b 25. αἱ τῶν ἐναντίων κινήσεις
448 a 3
ἐναντιότης 441b 16
ἐναντίωσις 442b 20; 445 b 26
ἐναποπλύνειν 441 b 17
Évapyńs 440 a 10, b 31
ενεός coni. κωφός 437 2
ἐνέργεια; cf. δύναμις.
φύσει 452 b I.
449 b 20
ἐνεργεῖν 446 2 24.
452 b 26, 30;
ἐννοεῖν σφόδρα τι
ἐνοχλεῖν 453 2 26
1η
ἐνεργείᾳ opp.
ἄνευ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν
ἐνεργεῖν τῇ μνήμῃ
cf. 449
cf. 449 b 24
4472 18
ἐνσημαίνεσθαι 450 a 33
ἐξαπατᾶν 449 b ΙΙ
I I
ἐξιέναι. ἐξιόντος τοῦ φωτός 437 a 26;
cf. 438 a 26 sqq.
ἐξικμάζειν 441 2 16; 4422 31; 4432
15
ἕξις.
ἕξεις (τῆς αἰσθήσεως) 436 b 6.
φαντάσματος ἕξις 451 2 17; 450 a 32 ;
451b 5. τὴν ἕξιν τὴν περὶ τὸν ἐγκέ-
paλov 444 a 10. ἕξις ἢ πάθος 449 b
27; 45I a 30. ἡ ἕξις καὶ τὸ πάθος
451 a 26. τὸ πάθος, οὗ φαμὲν τὴν
ἕξιν μνήμην είναι 450 a 32
ἐξίστασθαι 4512 11
ἔοικε νομίζοντι 437 b 25.
καὶ τὸ μέσον 4522 18
ἔοικε ἀρχῇ
ἐπαλείφειν 440 a 10
ἐπαναμιμνήσκειν 4512 14
ἐπέκεινα opp. ἐπὶ ταδί 449 2 29
ἐπεκτείνειν 441 2 27
ἐπέρχεσθαι 450 b 3I; 438 a
31; 438 a 10; cf.
453 a 28. έπελήλυθεν ἡ ὄψις 446 a
ἐπέχειν τὴν διάνοιαν 4532 19
ἐπί. τὸ μὴ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς εἶναι τὸ ἀναμιμνή-
σκεσθαι 453 2 22
ἐπιζητεῖν 452 a 18, 22, 25
ἐπικαλύπτειν 437 a 28
ἐπιπολάζειν. ἐπιπολάζει ὁ ἀήρ 443 2 5
ἐπιπόλασις (χρωμάτων) 440 b 17
ἐπιπολαστικός 442 2 13
ἐπιπολής 4402 15 sqq.
ἐπίσκεψις 436 2 3
ἐπίστασθαι 451 a 3
Επιστήμη 449 2 1; 45I a 29, 30
ἐπιφάνεια 431 a 33
ἐπιφέρειν 447 2 16; med. 443 2 24, 27
ἐπιχεῖν (Strattis) 443 b 34
ἐπιχειρεῖν 453 2 20
(οι) ἐπιχειρηματικοί λόγοι 452 21
ἔργον. ἐπ' αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων δῆλον
438 2 18. ἔργον dist. πάρεργον 4442
28, 17
ἔσχατος 449 a 26, 32. τὸ ἄτομον καὶ
ἔσχατον 451 a 28. τὰ ἔσχατα 445 b
24, 25; 447 b 2; cf. èvavríos
εὖ. τοῦ εὖ ἕνεκα 437 a
εὐήθης 438 a 30
εὐθυπορεῖν 453 a 28, b 4
εὐλόγιστος 439 b 34
εὔλογος 445 a 18.
εὐλόγως 438 b 6;
441 b 8; 445 a 19
εὐμαθής 449 6 9
b
εὐμνημόνευτος 4522 3
εὐπίλητος 438 a 16
εὐπορεῖν 437 a 22
Ευριπίδης 443 b 33
εὐσύνοπτος 4412 12
εὐφύλακτος 438a 15
εὔψυκτος 4442 13
ευώδης 4442 το
ἕψειν 44I a 19; (Strattis) 443 b 34
ζητεῖν 451 b 26, 4522 24
ζήτησις. οἷον ζήτησίς τις (ἡ ἀνάμνησις)
453 a 14, 17
ζωή 436 a 16
πάντα
ζῷον. ζῷον ἢ ζῷον 439 b 12.
τα ζωα 445 2 26. τὰ ἄλλα ζώα
444 a 5-445 a 4; 450 a 16 sqq.
τὰ γνωριζόμενα ζωα 4532 11
ǹdový 442 a 17; 444 a 2; 436 a 10
ἡδύς. τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ λυπηρόν 443 b
23
sqq.; 444 a 20. τὰ ἥδιστα χρώματα
440 a I
ήδυσμα 442 2 11
ἡλικία. δι' ηλικίαν 450b 2. μέχρι
πόρρω τῆς ἡλικίας 453 b 8
ἥλιος 440 a II. τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φῶς
446 a 29. εἰς τὸν ἥλιον 441 2 14
ἠρεμείν 437 2 31
θάλαττα 439 b 5, 4432 13
θαλάττιος 444b 13
θάνατος 436 2 15
θεῖον. τὸ θεῖον καὶ τὰ ἀσφαλτώδη 444b
35
θερμαίνειν 4412 30
θερμός 441 b 33. θερμὴ τὴν φύσιν (ἡ τῆς
ὀσμῆς δύναμις) 444 2 27. τὸ θερμόν
441 b 13; 442 a 5
θέσις, ἡ παρ' ἄλληλα θέσις 440 5 8,
17
θεωρείν 450 b 20, 25; coni. ἐννοεῖν 449 b
17
INDEX I (GREEK)
297
θεώρημα 450 b 27, 28
θηρεύειν 451 b 2I; 4532 24
θιγγάνειν 447 2 9
θλίβειν 437 a 25
θολός (ὁ τῆς σηπίας) 437 b 8
θρεπτικός. τὸ θρεπτικόν 436 b 19;
443 b 24; 445 a 9, 34. τὸ θρεπτικὸν
εἶδος τῆς ὀσμής 444b το
θώραξ 4442 29
(ή) ιατρική 436 b I
(ὁ) ἰατρός opp. ὁ περὶ φύσεως 436 2 21
toos 445 b 29; 446 b 12; 447 a 27
καθαρός 440 2 6
καθίστασθαι 4532 30
καθόλου 4522 18
κάλλιστα 4522 I
καπνός. εἰ πάντα τὰ ὄντα καπνὸς
γίγνοιτο (Herac.) 443 2 26
(ἡ) καπνώδης ἀναθυμίασις 443 2 23 sqq.
κατακαίειν 4422 30
καταλείπειν 4422 7
καταχρῆσθαι 4442 27
καττίτερος 443 2 21
κενός = vanus 437b 17
κεραννύναι 447 2 20
κινείν 437 2 26; 440 a 26; 44Ib 21.
τὸ κινοῦν καὶ δημιουργοῦν 443 b 17.
τὸ κινούμενον 446 a 31. τὸ πρῶτον
κινησαν 446 b 23. κίνησιν κινηθήσεται
441 b 15; cf. κίνησις
κίνησις dist. ἀλλοίωσις 446 b 31 sqq.
ἡ μείζων κίνησις 447 2 16 sqq. ἡ διὰ
τούτου (sc. τοῦ μεταξὺ κίνησις 438 b 5.
πάθος καὶ κίνησις 446 a 28. κίνησις
καὶ χρῆσις 447 b 22. ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῇ
(sc. τῇ διανοίᾳ)...κινήσεις 452 b 14; cf.
451 b 12-453 b 6. ἐν κινήσει πολλῇ
είναι 450 b Ι
κνίψ 444 b 13
κοινός; cf. ἴδιος. τὰ κοινὰ αισθητά 437 a
9; 442 b 9 sqq.
κόρη 4382 16, b 17
Κόρισκος 450 b 34
κούρη (Emped.) 438 a
κούφος 442 2 6
κουφότης 4442 25
κρηναι 441 by
κρίνειν coni. γιγνώσκειν 445 b 16; coni.
γνωρίζειν et νοείν 452 b 8 sqq.
κρινοῦσα αἴσθησις 447 b 28, 30
κριτικός 442 5 19
κρόταφος 438 b 14
κυανούς 442 2 26
κύκλωψ (Emped.) 438 a r
κώδων 446 b 24
κωφός 437 2 18
λαμβάνειν 451 a 25. ἐντεῦθεν ληπτέον
32; 449 b 10;
437 a 33; 445 b
cf. 441 b 28; 440 a 23
λάμπειν 4372 34
λαμπέσκειν (Emped.) 447 b 33
λαμπτήρ 438b i6; (Emped.) 437 b 30
λέγειν. λεκτέον 439 b 21; 440b 30;
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ λέγειν 449 b 25; cf.
447b 27
λεῖος. τὰ λεία 4372 34, b 7
λείπειν. λείπεται 441 a 22 ; 442 2 25
λεπτός. λεπτῇσιν ὀθόνησι (Emped.)
438 a I
λευκός. το λευκόν 439 b 19; 442 2 13;
447 b 26 sqq.
λῆψις dist. ἀνάληψις 45I a 23
λιβανωτός 446 b 24
λιπαρός. λιπαρὸς ὁ τοῦ γλυκέος ἐστὶ
χυμός 442 2 18, 25
453 a 32.
2Ι.
451 a
δῆλον διὰ
λόγος = oratio 437 2 13;
=disquisitio 445 b 21;
= argumentum 445 b 20.
τοῦ λόγου καὶ τοῦ λόγου χωρίς 436 b
9. =notio, λόγῳ ταὐτό 4492 22.
= ratio (mathematica) 439 b 29, 31;
440 a 14, 16; 440 b 20; 448 a 10, 12
λοχάζετο (Emped.) 438 a 1
λύειν τὸν λόγον 445 b 20
λύσις 445 b 22
λύχνος 438b 15; (Emped.) 437 b 28
μάθημα 4522 4
μαθηματικός. σώματα μαθηματικά 445 b
16
μανθάνειν. κατὰ τὸ μανθάνειν dist. κατὰ
τὸ θεωρεῖν 441 b 25.
25. μαθεῖν ἢ παθεῖν
451 a 24. τὸ πάλιν μανθάνειν 452 2
6; 45Ib 9, ΙΙ
μαντική 449 5 14
μαρτυρείν 445 b 19
τὸ
μέγεθος. ἔνια μεγέθη λανθάνει 446a 17.
πᾶν μέγεθος αἰσθητόν 445 b ro; cf.
4402 23, 29; 448b 15-17.
αἰσθητὸν πᾶν ἐστὶ μέγεθος 449 2 22
sqq. μέγεθος καὶ χρόνου καὶ πράγ
ματος 448 1 4
(οι) μελαγχολικοί 4532 21
μέλας. τὸ μέλαν 442 2 28; cf. λευκός
μελέτη 4512 13
μέλιττα 4445 12
(τὸ) μέλλον 449b ΤΙ
μερίζειν 446 b 16
μέσος. τὸ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ μέσον 437 b I.
μέση (ἡ ὄσφρησις) 445 2 7.
πάντων 4522 19
(τὰ) μεταλλευόμενα 4432 18
μετασχηματίζειν 446 b το
μετασχημάτισις 446 b 8
μετιέναι τὴν τέχνην 436 b Ι
μετόπωρον 4522 18
τὸ μέσον
μήνιγξ 438 b 2 ; (Emped.) 437 b 34
298
INDEX I (GREEK)
μίγμα 447 6 12
μιγνύναι 440 b 5 sqq.; 4442 I. τὰ
μεμιγμένα 440b 19 sqq. ; 447 b r2sqq.;
cf. μίξις
μικρός 440 b 2 sqq.; 446 a 5
μικρότης 448 b 5
μίξις. χρωμάτων μίξις 4402 31 sqq.;
442 2 13 sqq. τὰ περὶ μίξεως 440 b 4
μνήμη. περὶ μνήμης 449 b 4 sqq.; def.
449 b 26 sqq.; 451 a 14 sqq. ¿vepyeîv
τῇ μνήμῃ 450a 21; 452b 27
μνημονεύειν; cf. μνήμη.
τὸ μνημονεύειν
καθ᾽ αὑτό dist. κατὰ συμβεβηκός 451
b 31, 32; dist. τὸ ἀναμιμνήσκεσθαι
451 b 2 sqq.; 453 a 7 sqq.
μνημόνευμα 450 b 29; 451 2 3
μνημονευτός 449 b 1o.
ΙΟ.
a
τὰ μνημονευτά
καθ᾽ αὑτὰ καὶ κατὰ συμβεβηκός 450 2
26
μνημονικός. οἱ μνημονικοί dist. οἱ ἀνα-
μνηστικοί 449b η; 4532 6
(τὸ) μυριοστημόριον λανθάνει 445 b 33
μύρμηξ 4445 12
μύρον (Strattis) 4442 1
νανώδης 453 b 1, 7
νέος. oi opódpa véoɩ 450b 6; 453 b 5
νεότης 436 a 15
(ή) νήτη 4472 21
νοείν 442 b 29; 45I b 21; 4522 21.
τὰ ἐκτὸς νοεῖν 445b 17; 452b to sqq.
νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαντάσματος
449 b 34 sqq.
νόημα 450 b 31; 45I 2 I
νοητικός. τὸ νοητικὸν μόριον 450 2 15, 18
νοητός. τὰ νοητά dist. τὰ πρακτά
437 a 3; dist. rà aio0ŋtá 445 b 17;
450 a 14
(τὰ) νοσηματικά ρεύματα 4442 15
νοσώδης 4442 19
νοῦς 445 b 17; cf. νοεῖν
ξανθός 442 2 24
ξηρός. τὸ ξηρόν 441 b ir sqq.; 442 b
30 sqq.; 444 a
18
ξηρότης 443 2 2, 14, b 5
ξύλον 443 2 17
ὄγκος. ἐν τοῖς ὄγκοις 442 b 7
ὁδήποτε 453 a 2
οθόνη (Emped.) 438 a
οἰκεῖος 442 b 27; 444b 11
ὅλος 448 b 5 sqq.
ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ 446 2 20
ὄμμα 438 a 7 sqq.
τὸ ἐντὸς τοῦ ὄμματος
438 b 6, 21. ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐσχάτου ὄμ
ματος 438 b 9. τὸ λευκὸν τοῦ ὄμματος
438 a 21. οἱ πόροι τοῦ ὄμματος 438 a
15. πρὸ ὀμμάτων τίθεσθαι 450 2 5
ὅμοιος. ἀφ᾽ ὁμοίου θηρεύειν, ἀναμιμνή-
σκεσθαι) 451 b 22
a
ὄνομα. τὰ ὀνόματα 437 a 15; 453a 31.
ὄνομα μνημονεύσαι 452b 6
ὀξύς opp. ἀμβλύς 442 b 6; opp. βαρύς
447 b 4. ὀξὺς χυμός 441 b 7; 442 2
II, 21. ὀξέως αἰσθάνεσθαι 4445 14
ὡπλίσσατο (Emped.) 437 b 28
ὁρᾶν 437 a 3o sqq.; 440 a 17. ἡ κίνησις
ἡ ποιοῦσα τὸ ὁρᾶν 438b 5 ; cf. 4472 12.
ὁρᾶν rel. ad ὁρᾶσθαι 446 b 12. ἅμα
τὸ αὐτὸ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὀσμᾶσθαι καὶ ἀκούειν
446 b 27; 448 a 25. ev¤ùs оpâv 444 b
29. οἴεσθαι τὸ ὁρᾶν εἶναι τὴν ἔμφασιν
438 a 6
ὅρασις 4392 1η
ὁρατικός.
21
τὸ ὁρατικὸν τοῦ ὄμματος 438 b
ὁρατός. τὸ ὁρατόν 445 a 11
ὀργή 4532 29
ὁρίζειν 439 b 7; 440b 25; 4502 3, 4
ὀσμᾶσθαι 4432 34; 444b 18; 445 a 12;
446 b 27
ὀσμή 438 b 26 sqq.; sed cf. 443 2 23 sqq.,
444 a 10-445 b 2. ὀσμὴ καὶ χυμός
440 b 29 sqq.; 442 b 29 sqq.; 443 b
9, 16; 447 2 8. τὸ θρεπτικὸν εἶδος
τῆς ὀσμῆς 444b 12. αἱ τῶν ἀνθῶν
ὀσμαί 443 b 30. ἡ τῆς ὀσμὴς δύναμις
4442 27. ἡ ὀσμὴ καὶ ὁ ψόφος 4462
25
ὀσμώδης 443 2 15, 20
(τὰ ὀστρακόδερμα 443 2 4
ὀσφραίνεσθαι 443 2 5 ; 4452 55 446 b
17 sqq.; cf. ὀσμᾶσθαι
ὀσφραντικός. τὸ ὀσφραντικόν 438 b 23
ὀσφραντός. τὸ ὀσφραντόν 443 a
a
sqq.
τὸ ὀσφραντὸν καὶ τὸ ἀκουστὸν κ.τ.λ.
445 2 9 sqq. τοῦ ὀσφραντοῦ τὸ αἰσθη-
τήριον 445 2 28 ; cf. 444 2 31 ; 438 b
28. τὸ ὀσφραντὸν τὸ ἴδιον τῶν ἀν-
θρώπων 444 2 4 sqq.
ὄσφρησις; cf. ὀσφραίνεσθαι et ὀσμή
ὅτι pleonastice positum. ὡς ὅτι 443 a
26
2
ὀφθαλμός; cf. ὄμμα. τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ τὸ
καλούμενον μέλαν καὶ μέσον 437 b I
ὄψις 4372 24 sqq.; cf. 4372 4. τὸ
ἐξιόντι τινὶ τὴν ὄψιν ὁρᾶν 4382 27;
452 b 12. ἀφικνεῖσθαι τὸ φῶς πρὸς
τὴν ὄψιν 446 2 30
πάγος 437 b 23
παθήματα 445 b 4
πάθος dist. ἕξις 436 b 5; 449 b 28; dist.
στέρησις 441 b 27; coni. ἕξις 4512
26, 30. πάθος τῆς κοινῆς αἰσθήσεως
450 a 12; cf. 450 a 1, 28, 33, b 5;
437 2 25. τὸ πάθος τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης
450 b 34; cf. 453 a 17 sqq.; 440 b 30.
διὰ πάθος 450b I. διὰ τὸ πάθος
445 a
I. πάθη=τὰ παθήματα τὰ
a
INDEX I (GREEK)
299
αισθητά 445 5 13;
b
17; 445 a 10
a
446 2 17;
449 2 a
πανσπερμία 441 2 7, 20
παρακαλεῖν πρὸς τὴν τροφήν 443 b 32
παρασκευάζειν 441 b 21
παρεικάζειν 4452 14
παρενοχλεῖν 4532 18
πάρεργον 4442 29
πάροδος 444 2 30
πάσχειν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου 441b 10, 15
παρόμοιος 452b 6
παρουσία 439 2 22
πᾶς. τὸ διὰ πασῶν 447 2 22.
πάντη
πάντως 440 b 3
πάχος ἔχειν 44Ι 2 32
παχύνειν 4412 30
περαίνειν 445 b 25.
πεπερασμένα εἴδη,
446 2 20
μεγέθη 445 b 30;
I
πέρας (τοῦ σώματος) 439 2 32 sqq.
(τὸ) περιέχον 439 b 6; 446 a 9
περικάρπιον 44I a 14, 16, b r
περιττός 445 a 7; 448 a 15
περίττωμα 4452 21
περιφερής 442 b 23
πῇ 452b 5
πηγνύναι 447 2 3, 4
πήξις 443 b 15, 18
πικρός 442 2 7, 15, 19, 29
πίναξ 450 b 23
πληροῦν 443 b 25
πλήττειν 438 b 13
πλυντικός 443 2 1
πλύσις 445 a 16
πνεῦμα = ἀήρ 443 b 4; = κινούμενος ἀήρ
437 b 31; 444 b 23
πνευματώδης 445 2 29
ποδιαῖος. ἡ ποδιαία 446 a 7
ποιεῖν τὴν ΓΔ 452b 19, 20. οἱ τὰ ἄτομα
ποιοῦντες μεγέθη 445 b 19; cf. 437 a
24
ποιόν τι τὸ ὑγρὸν παρασκευάζειν 441 b
21
πολύγωνος 442 b 22
πόμα 444 2 Ι
πορεύεσθαι (τὸ ὕδωρ) 441 b 3
(τὰ) πορευτικὰ τῶν ζῴων 436 b 20
(οί) πόροι τοῦ ὄμματος 438 b 14
πόρρω 446b 14; 452 b II. τὰ πόρρω
μεμνήσθαι 451b 30
πόρρωθεν 440 b 18
προαισθάνεσθαι 436 b 22
πρόοδος (Emped.) 437 b 28
προσαισθάνεσθαι 450 a 23
προσγίγνεσθαι 446 a 16
προσφέρειν. ἡ προσφερομένη
441b 31, 33; 442 a 2
προϋπάρχειν 441b 25
τροφή
(οί) Πυθαγόρειοι 439 2 33; 4452 18
πῦρ. ἡ τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις 441 b 12sqq.;
437 a 24 sqq.; 438 b 22 sqq.
πυροῦν. τὰ πεπυρωμένα σώματα 437 b
24
πυρρούν 441 a 14
πυρώδης 439 a 21
πῶμα 444b 24
peîv 450 b 3, 7
ρεύμα 4442 15
ῥυπτικός 443 2 2
σαπρός 443 5 12
σβεννύναι 437 b 18
σηπία 437 b 8
σκέπη 438 a 26
σκεπτέον 448 b 20; 449 b 3
σκέψις 442b 27
σκληρόδερμος 4382 25
σκληρόφθαλμος 444 b 28
σκοπείν 451 b 30
σκότος 439 a 22, b 18. ἐν σκότει 437 a
27, 34, b 6, 7
σκώπτειν 443 b 34
σολοικίζειν 452 7
στερείν 436 a 20; 439b 17
στέρησις coni. φθορά 436 b 7; opp. παρ-
ουσία 439 2 22; opp. πάθος
στοιχείον 437 a 22; 443 2 11.
στοιχείων 441b 14
Στράττις 443 b 34
στρυφνός 442a 20; 443b II
συγκείσθαι 445 b 15
441 b 28
τὰ περὶ
συζυγία 436 a 14
συλλογίζεσθαι 453 2 13
συλλογισμός 453a 12, 16
συμβαίνειν 451 b 6; 437 b 3.
ἐπὶ τῶν
συμβαινόντων (δῆλον) 438 b 13; cf.
439 b 32
σύμβολον 4372 15
συμβάλλεσθαι 443 b 32; 4452 31
(ή) πορφύρα 444 b 13
ποσόν 445 b 11.
ποσόν 450 a 3 sqq.
πότιμος 4422 31
ὡρισμένος κατὰ τὸ
πράγμα. ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων opp. ἐπὶ
τῆς ψυχῆς 449 2 14; cf. 450a 28;
4522 2, II, b 26. πρᾶγμα καὶ χρόνος
448 b 2, 4; 452 b 26, 32
πρᾶξις = ἐνέργεια 436 2 5
πράσινος 442 2 26
σύμμετρος 4442 36
συμμιγνύναι 442 2 9
συμφύεσθαι 438 a 28, 29, 30
συμφωνία 439 b 33 sqq.; 447 b 4;
448 a 22
συνάγειν 437 2 23
συναίτιος 44Ι 2 33
συνέχεια 445 b 32
συνεχής 4466 16; 448 b 25. τὸ συνεχές
445 b 29, 30; 450 a 9
συνήθεια 444 2 2
300
INDEX I (GREEK)
συνήθης 452 α 29
συνίστασθαι 438 b 31; 4432 31
συνορᾶν 442 b 4
σύστοιχος 447 b 32; 448 a 18
συστοίχως 448 a 16
σφόδρα 447 2 17; 450 b 6; 453a 33
σφραγίζεσθαι 4502 34
σφραγίς 450 b 3
σχήμα 442 5 21, 22
σώμα 446 b 28; 445 b 12.
437 a 7. σῶμα ὡρισμένον
σωματικός 4532 16, 25
σωματοῦσθαι 445 2 25
σωματώδης 4452 24
σωτηρία 436 b 7
τὰ σώματα
439 b 12
ταναός. ταναώτερον πῦρ (Emped.) 437
32; 438 a 3
τάξιν ἔχειν 4522 4
τάττειν 443 b 22; 444 2 5. τεταγμένος
opp. ἄτακτος 4402 5
ταχύς. οἱ λίαν ταχεῖς 450 b 9
τέμνειν. εἰς ἄπειρα τέμνεσθαι 445 b 29
(τα) τετράποδα 444 2 23
Τέφρα 441 b 5; 442 2 30
a
τιθέναι. ἄν τις τιθῇ τὸ φαιὸν μέλαν τι
eîvaι 442 a 23; cf. 443 a 7.
449 a 18
(δ) Τίμαιος 437 b 13, 16
τραχύς 442 b 6
θετέον
τρέφειν dist. αὔξησιν ποιεῖν 442 a I sqq.
τρέφεσθαι ταῖς ὀσμαῖς 443 2 19
τρίγωνον 449 5 22; 450 a 3
τροφή 441b 29 sqq.; 443 b 26 sqq.;
445 2 20
τρόφιμος. τὸ τρόφιμον ξηρόν 441 b 27.
τὸ τρόφιμον υγρόν 442 2 29.
λίαν
τρόφιμον (τὸ γλυκύ) 442 2 12; cf. τροφή
τυγχάνειν. τό τυχόν (φῶς) τῷ τυχόντι
οὐ συμφύεται 438 b I
τύπος 450a 33; 450 b 6, 17
υγίεια 436 2 18.
πρὸς βοήθειαν ὑγιείας
444 a 16; 445 a 32
ὑγιεινός 4442 26
υγρός opp. σκληρός 450b 1ο. σβέννυσθαι
τῷ ὑγρῷ 437 b 18. τὸ ὑγρὸν πάσχει
ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐναντίου 441 b 1o sqq. ; 442 b
ἐν ὑγρῷ εἶναι
30 sqq.; 443 a 20.
447 a 8
ὑγρότης 444b 2
ὑδατώδης 443 2 18, 22
vdwp 438 a 17; 439 a 21; 441 a 4, 29,
b 3, 19; 442 b 31; 443 a 7, 33,
b 5, 14
ὕλη πανσπερμίας 441 a 20, η
ὑπάρχειν. τιθέσθαι ὡς ὑπάρχοντα 451 a
23
ὑπεροχή opp. ἔλλειψις 439 b 3Ι ; 440 b
22. =pars exigua 446 a 13
ὑποκεῖσθαι. ὑποκείσθω 436 a 5; 447 2 19.
τὸ ὑποκείμενον dist. τὸ ἐπιπολής 440 2
27
ὑπολαμβάνειν.
ὑποληπτέον 438b 21
ὑπόληψις 449 b 27
φαίνεσθαι. φαίνεται τὸ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ
μέλαν 437 6 2; cf. 439 b 2.
b
οὐ φαί-
νεται ὅσον (τὸ τοῦ ἡλίου μέγεθος)
448 b 15, 16
φαιός 442 2 23
φακή 443 b 34
·
φαντασία. ἡ φαντασία τῆς χρόας 439 b
7. περὶ φαντασίας 449 b 33; 450 a 25
φάντασμα. νοεῖν οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φαν
τάσματος 450 2 I sqq. θεώρημα ή
φάντασμα 450b 29, 32. θεώρημα
καὶ ἄλλου φάντασμα 450 b 28. φαν-
τάσματος ἕξις 4512 17
φανταστός 450 2 26
φαῦλος. τὰ φαῦλα coni. τὰ φθαρτικά
436 b 23. τὰ φαῦλα opp. ὅσα τάξιν
ἔχει 4522 4
φέρειν. φερομένου τινὸς κίνησις 447 2
I; cf. 446b 2
φθαρτικός 436 b 23; 444 b 32
φθείρειν 444 b 32 sqq.
φθόγγος 445 b 23; 446 2 2
φθορά coni. στέρησις 436 b 7
φιλόσοφος. τῶν ἰατρῶν οἱ φιλοσοφωτέρως
τὴν τέχνην μετιόντες 436 a 21
φλόξ 437 b 20
φόβοι 4532 29
φοινικούς 440 a 2, Ι3; 4422 25
φορά 446 b 8; dist. ἀλλοίωσις 446 b 32
φρόνησις 437 a I, 12; coni. δόξα 450 a
18. ἡ τῶν νοητῶν φρόνησις dist. ἡ
τῶν πρακτῶν 437 2 3
φρόνιμος 437 a 16
φροντίζειν 445 2 2
φυλακή coni. σωτηρία 436 b 6
(τα). φυόμενα 44Ib 9; 445 2 3
φυσικός. ὁ φυσικός 436 b 18
φυσιολογία. ἡ περὶ τῶν φυτῶν φυσ.
442 b 28
(οί) φυσιολόγοι 442 2 32
φύσις.
τὰ περὶ φύσεως 436 b 2.
. ή
φύσις 441 b 19; 444 b 4.
φύσει
dist. παρὰ φύσιν 452 a 31, b 2. φύσις
coni. δύναμις 439 a 25. φύσιν ποιεῖν
452 b 1. ὥσπερ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος
452 a 29. ἡ τοῦ ὕδατος φύσις 441 b
4; cf. 439a 35; 441 b 12; 443 b
6; 444 a 11, 24; 450 a 6; 453 b 9
φυτόν 442 b 28
pws 437 a 34, b 14, 20; 438 a 31 sqq.
φως
περί φωτός 439 2 20 sqq.; 439 b
18 sqq.; 446 a 28-447 a 12
χαίρειν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθῶν ὀσμαῖς 4442 35
INDEX I (GREEK)
301
χαλκός 443 2 19
χειμερίην διὰ νύκτα (Emped.) 437 b 29
χρήσις 447 b 21
χρόα sive χροία (cf. χρώμα) 439 b 28;
440 a 9, 17, b 17, 20, 28
χρονίζεσθαι 45I a 32
Xpóvos 450 a 22. χρόνου αἴσθησις 450 b
18; 450 a 11; 451 a 19; 452b 8 sqq.
ἡ τοῦ χρόνου κίνησις 452 b 27 sqq.
eb
μετὰ χρόνου 449 b 31, 28. διαφέρειν
κατὰ τὸν χρόνον 453 a 8. τὰ μὴ ἐν
χρόνῳ ὄντα 450a το sqq. χρόνος
ἀναίσθητος (οὐκ ἔστιν) 440 2
448 b 19. οἱ μεταξὺ χρόνοι (λανθά
νουσιν) 448 a 26 sqq. χρόνος ἐν ᾧ
κινεῖται τὸ κινούμενον 446 a 32
χρυσός 4432 19
23;
χρώμα; cf. χρόα. περὶ χρώματος 439 2
13 sqq. τὸ ἐνεργείᾳ χρῶμα 439 a 15.
χρώματος μετέχειν 439 b Io; 437 a 8.
τα χρώματα 439 b zo_sqq. ; 442 2
13 sqq. τὰ ἤδιστα τῶν χρωμάτων
440 a I. ἡ γένεσις τῶν χρωμάτων
440 2 7 sqq. τὰ παρ᾽ ἄλληλα τιθέμενα
χρώματα 4402 22, b 23. τὸ ἐπιπολῆς
...τὸ ὑποκείμενον χρώμα 440 a 15, 26.
τὰ εἴδη τῶν χρωμάτων 440 b 25, 445 b
23 sqq ; 446 2 21
χρωματίζεσθαι 439 b
χυμός 440 b 29 sqq. τὸ τῶν χυμῶν
γένος 440 b 32; 44Ib 9.
τα γένη
b 1, 2
τῶν χυμῶν 441 a 6. οἱ χυμοί 441 2
32, 442 2 14 sqq. τὰ εἴδη τῶν χυμῶν
440 b 26; 445 b 23. οἱ τὴν ἡδονὴν
ποιοῦντες χυμοί 442 2 17. ἀνάλογον
εἶναι τὰς ὀσμὰς τοῖς χυμοῖς 443 b 9
χυτός coni. ὑγρός 445 a 16
χωρίζειν 446 a 8
Xwpis 446 a 6, b 22, 23
χωριστός 439 a 25; 446 a 12, 14;
449 a 17
ψαθυρός 44Ι 2 28
ψήχεσθαι 450 b 4
ψόφος 446 2 25 sqq.; 446 b 33. αἱ τοῦ
ψόφον διαφοραί 437 10. τὸ τῶν
ψόφων αισθητικόν 438 b 22
ψύξις 443 b 18
ψυχή. ή ψυχὴ αἰσθάνεται 450b 31.
λέγειν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ 449 b 25. μένειν
ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ 450b II. γίγνεσθαι ἐν
τῇ ψυχῇ 450 a 30. τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς
μόρια 436 a I; 449 b 6; 450 2 18,
24; 45I a 18; 453 a 17, b II. τῆς
ψυχῆς τὸ αἰσθητικόν 438 b ιο.
ἕν τι
τῆς ψυχῆς, ᾧ ἅπαντα αἰσθάνεται 449 a
IO, I9; cf. 448b 24 sqq. τὰ περὶ
ψυχής 436 a 5, b 12, 16; 439 a 9;
449 b 34. τὰ κοινὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα
καὶ τοῦ σώματος 436 a 8, b 3. περὶ
ψυχῆς καθ᾽ αὑτὴν καὶ περὶ τῶν δυνά-
μεων αὐτῆς 436 a I
ὠγύγιον πῦρ (Emped.) 437 b 34
ὡς. ἔστι μὲν ὡς τὸ αὐτὸ ἀκούει...ἔστι δ'
ὡς οὗ 4461 17-19. ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὡς
τροφής 441 a 22. is eiπeiv 441 a 19;
444 a 21. ὡς κατὰ μέγεθος 444 2 34.
ὡς τὰ πολλά 451 b 28. ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ
πολύ 449 5 8
Alcmaeon, 134
INDEX II (English).
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 121-286
passim
Anaxagoras, 163, 166
Apperception, 30-33
Association, 38-40, 266 sqq.
Atoms, 197 sqq.
Atomists, 30, 150, 175
Baumker, 11, 15, 130, 235, 240
Bender, 138, 169, 209, 212, 278
Bonitz, 144, 150, 183, 187, 207, 221,
243, 273, 275
Bradley (F. H.), 270
Burnet (Professor), 128, 133, 137, 163,
182, 284
Bywater, 132, 253
Christ, 275, 285
Chromatic tones, 23, 154 sqq.
Cicero, 269
Colour, 20-23, 149-159
Cratylus, 132
Crustaceans, 139
Democritus-see Greek Index
Ear, 9, 144 sqq.
Elements, 10, 133
Empedocles—see Greek Index
Eye, 12, 142 sqq.
Faculty-Psychology, 123
Flavour, 24, 160-178
Freudenthal, 227, 244–288 passim
Gesner, 262
Grant (Sir A.), 186
Hamilton (Sir W.), 174, 265, 266, 269
Hammond, 137-288 passim
Hayduck, 144, 146, 187
Heart, 15 sqq., 147, 248
Heraclitus, 73, 182
Hume, 247
Hypotheses, 124
Insects, 139, 191
Joachim (H. H.), 158
Kant, 151, 234
Leonicus, 240, 266
Lewes, II
Light, 20-23, 134 sqq., 150 sqq., 205
sqq., 287-288
Locke, 265
Meno, 260
Metrodorus, 166
Michael Ephesius, 258 sqq. passim
Mill (J. S.), 124
Nature, 168, 275
Neuhauser, 15-20, 33, 39, 142 sqq.,
171, 179, 247, 261, 285
Odour, 25-27, 179-194
Pearson (Professor Karl), 196
Phaedo, 260
Philebus, 156
Philoponus, 205
Physiology (Aristotle's), 9-20
Plato, 37, 126, 135, 137, 138, 249,
260
Poste, 124
Potentiality, 8
Quantitative character of Perception,
27-30, 194 sqq.; of Imagery, 36-38,
249 sqq.
Rassow, 206, 253, 255
Rodier, 32, 131, 161, 170, 208, 230,
241, 242, 251, 276
Ross (W. D.), 272, 279, 289
St Hilaire, 138-286 passim
Siebeck, 270 sqq.
Simon Simonius, 121-286 passim
Simonides of Ceos, 269
INDEX II (ENGLISH)
303
Simplicius, 255
Smith (J. A.), 289
Sound, 24, 206 sqq.
Spinoza, 251
Susemihl, 156, 159, 164, 168, 173,
188
Theaetetus, 37, 256
Themistius, 214-286 passim
Theophrastus, 133, 137, 138, 163, 174,
175, 177, 181
Thomas Aquinas, 138-286 passim
Thurot, 156, 164, 179, 235
Timaeus, 135, 138, 141, 173, 276
Torstrik, 179
Touch, 11, 143 sqq.
Trendelenburg, 163
Wallace (E.), 190
Wendland, 170
Wilson (Professor J. Cook), 180, 187,
189, 274
Zeller, 126, 130, 147, 163, 180, 205,
275
Ziaja, 135, 138, 144
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