- |
| .
|-
：
| . ||
：
|×
|-
|- |×


NAPOLEON'S
LAST CAMPAIGN
I N G E R M A N Y
Br THE SAME AUTHOR is
NAPOLEON'S CAMPAIGN
IN POLAND, 1806–1807 is
NAPOLEON'S CONQUEST
OF PRUSSIA, 1806. With an
Introduction by LoRD RoBERTs
NAPOLEON AND THE
ARCHDUKE CHARLES, 1809 |
SIMON BOLIVAR : EL LIBER-
TADOR º $ º jº

NAPOLEON'S
LAST CAMPAIGN
INGERMANY 1813
BY F.” LORAINE PETRE
WITH SEVENTEEN MAPS& PLANS
LONDON: JOHN LANE, THE BODLEY HEAD
TORONTO : BELL & COCKBURN
NEW YORK : JOHN LANE COMPANY MCMXII
Turnbull & Spears, Printers, Edinburgh
AUTHOR'S PREFACE

HE author's first two volumes, on Napoloen's
campaigns of 1806 and I 807, dealt with the
Emperor at the culminating point of his military
genius. In the third, the campaign of I 809,
signs of decline had already begun to appear, and the great
master neglected the relentless pursuit of the enemy's main
army which had hitherto been the guiding principle in all
his wars.
In the campaign of 1813, described in the present volume,
it is only at times that the flame of his genius burns with
its old vigour. Time after time he seems to lose sight of
the real objective, and to hanker after secondary objectives
and the occupation of mere geographical points, the attain-
ment of which would inevitably have followed on success
in the true objective, the decisive defeat of the enemy's
main army.
Over Napoleon's opponents a change in the opposite
direction showed signs of approach. They had learnt
something from their great enemy, though they still too
often hesitated and were lost. Yet now the hesitation was
not, as heretofore, all on their side, and the picture of
Napoleon sitting at Düben in doubt and uncertainty is one
which could never have been imagined of the conqueror of
Ulm, of Austerlitz, or of Jena.
The whole character of the war against Napoleon had
changed. He found himself no longer opposed to dynasties,
but rather to whole peoples, encouraged by the examples of
Spain and Russia to rise en masse against the tyranny of the
oppressor.
One consequence of this was a vast increase in the
- y
* * ~ *. Fºr , ºr –
- • , *
* - - - * . . . . . . . . . ;
*...* Tº... ...; ~~~~~ *... --> ... A
vi NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
numerical strength of the armies which opposed him, and a
complete change in their spirit and enthusiasm. War
assumed more the character of that of our own day. It
became, not the war of one hired army against another, but
of nations against nations. Leipzig was justly called “The
battle of the Nations,” and in the numbers engaged we
must wait for the war of to-morrow to see it largely
exceeded.
At the same time, it would be wrong to draw too close a
comparison between I 813 and war in the twentieth century.
The immense improvements in range and accuracy of
weapons necessitate the operation of modern armies on
fields many times greater, even in proportion to their
numbers, than those on which Napoleon fought in 1813.
This was brought very vividly before the author's eyes in
the manoeuvres of the 4th French division, from which he
has just returned. The general idea was the advance of
Napoleon, in 1814, to the battle of Craonne, and on to that
of Laon. The troops engaged, representing Napoleon's
army, were about one-third of his numbers; yet they
covered a front two or three miles broader than he did.
Another point which gives special interest to the study
of the campaign of 1813 is the breakdown, under the new
conditions, of Napoleon's centralised system of command.
He was compelled, at least in the campaign of the autumn,
to wage war with armies, not with an army of moderate
dimensions always controllable by himself alone, as had
been the case in his earlier campaigns. His marshals, who
had served him well when they were only required to com-
mand units of the army which the Emperor controlled in
person, showed themselves unfitted, as some of them had
already done in Spain, for semi-independent command.
When the leading strings to which they had hitherto been
accustomed were perforce relaxed, Oudinot, Macdonald, and
Ney in succession showed themselves incapable of walking
alone. Marmont, at least, had the wisdom to foresee the
result when he wrote, “I fear greatly lest on the day on
which your Majesty has gained a victory, and believe you
AUTHOR'S PREFACE vii
have won a decisive battle, you may learn that you have
lost two.” It was but a few days after this was written
that Napoleon, flushed with victory at Dresden, learnt that
Macdonald had been disastrously beaten on the Katzbach,
that Oudinot had been checked at Gross Beeren, and
Vandamme destroyed at Kulm.
All the maps and plans for this volume have been drawn
by the author. The contours in the plans of Lützen,
Bautzen, Dresden, and Leipzig are taken from modern
surveys, whilst the villages, woods, etc., are filled in from
old maps representing them as they were in 1813.
The contours in the plans of the Katzbach, Gross
Beeren, and Dennewitz are only rough conversions from
old “hâchured ” maps.
F. L. P.
5th October 1912.
CONTENTS
FAGE
AUTHOR’s PREFACE tº ſº e e & e g V
CHAPTER I
AFTER RUSSIA . & e gº e gº g e 3
CHAPTER II
THE NEw GRAND ARMY OF 1813 . to º e tº 9
CHAPTER III
THE ALLIED ARMIES . g e º ſº $ º 2I
(1) The Prussian Army te º º º ſº e 2I
(2) The Russian Army g e e ſº g o 26
(3) The Austrian Army ſe º © e tº * 27
(4) Swedish Army . ſe º e º ſº & 28
(5) Anglo-German Troops . ſº g re wº re 28
(6) Mecklenburg Contingent º & º wº e 29
(7) The Allied Commanders tº º g g g 3O
CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONS BETween NAPOLEON's DEPARTURE FROM AND His
RETURN TO THE ARMY * e º ſº ſº 32
CHAPTER V
NAPOLEON'S CONCENTRATION ON THE SAALE ſº º 47
CHAPTER VI
THE BATTLE OF LüTZEN OR GROSS GöRSCHEN dº gº & 66
ix
x NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
- CHAPTER VII
FROM LüTZEN TO BAUTZEN
CHAPTER VIII
THE PRELIMINARIES OF BAUTZEN
CHAPTER IX
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN
The Battle of the 21st May .
CHAPTER X.
FROM BAUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE
CHAPTER XI
DURING THE ARMISTICE. PREPARATIONS AND PLANS OF CAMPAIGN
CHAPTER XII
FROM THE END OF THE ARMISTICE TO THE BATTLE OF DRESIDEN
CHAPTER XIII
THE BATTLE OF DRESIDEN
(a) The 26th August ©
(b) The Battle of the 27th August .
CHAPTER XIV
FROM DRESDEN TO KULM
CHAPTER XV
THE KATZBACH AND GROSS BEEREN .
PAGE
9I
Ioô
II6
I25
- 16o
I85
2OO
2OO
2I4.
227
250
CONTENTS xi
CHAPTER XVI
PAGE
THE SECOND ADVANCE AGAINST BLÜcHER, AND NEY'S DEFEAT AT
DENNEWITZ 265
CHAPTER XVII
FROM THE 6TH SEPTEMBER TO THE END OF THE MONTH . ſº 279
CHAPTER XVIII
NAPOLEON's QUEST OF BERNADoTTE AND BLücher . ſº e 297
CHAPTER XIX
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG ON THE I6TH OCTOBER ſº e 324
(I) Wachau . tº e tº ſº º * © 33I
(2) Lindenau tº g e d e e e 339
(3) Möckern. ſº © © e g te & 34 I
CHAPTER XX
THE BATTLE OF LEIPzig—18th October o o ſº o 352
CHAPTER XXI
THE STORMING OF LEIPZIG . º ſº e g 373
CHAPTER XXII
THE PURSUIT AFTER LEIPZIG AND THE BATTLE OF HANAU . {} 386
388
The Battle of Hanau
INDEX . ſº e o * & s e º 395
MAPS AND PLANS
(AT END OF VOLUME)
SHEET I.
GENERAL MAP OF THEATRE OF WAR.
INSETs : (a) NAPOLEON's MARCH To THE SAALE IN APRIL 1813.
(b) Positions of Borh SIDEs on 30TH APRIL 1813.
(c) DIAGRAM of GENERAL POSITIONs, 7TH October 1813.
(d) DIAGRAM of GENERAL POSITIONS, 12TH October 1813.
SHEET II.
(a) THE BATTLE of LützEN.
(b) THE BATTLE ON THE KATZBAck.
(c) THE BATTLE OF GROSS BEEREN.
(d) THE BATTLE OF DENNEwiTz.
SHEET III.
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN.
INSETS : (a) THE FRENCH MARCH FROM. LützEN To BAUTZEN, AND
PoSITIONs, Even ING OF 19th MAY.
(b) DIAGRAM OF GENERAL POSITION OF BOTH SIDEs AT THE
RE-OPENING OF HOSTILITIES IN MIDDLE OF AUGUST.
SHEET IV.
(a) THE BATTLE of DRESDEN.
(b) CountRY SouTH of DRESDEN–BATTLE of KULM.
(c) PRUSSIAN PASSAGE OF THE ELBE ON THE 3RD OCTOBER,
AND ACTION AT WARTENBURG.
(d) THE BATTLEs ABOUT LEIPzIG, 16th-18TH OCTOBER.
(e) THE BATTLE OF HANAU,
w
xiii
NAPOLEON'S
LAST CAMPAIGN
I N G E R M A N Y
NAPOLEON'S LAST CAM-
PA I G N IN G E R M A NY

CHAPTER I
AFTER RUSSIA

HE amount of ground to be covered in
describing Napoleon's Saxon campaign of
I8 I 3 compels economy of space in regard to
events between the Emperor's departure from
the remains of his army of 18 I 2 and his reappearance,
in April, at the head of the new Grand Army of I 813.
Still, some account, however brief, of the military and
political situation, consequent on the great disaster to his
arms in Russia, is necessary to the understanding of the
events of 18 I 3.
On the 5th December 1812 the defeated Emperor set
out from Smorgoni on his weary journey across Europe
to Paris, leaving to Murat the command of the miserable
remnants of over 600,000 men who had crossed the
Niemen at one time or another in the last six months.
His departure has been criticised as a disgraceful abandon-
ment of the troops who had sacrificed so much for him.
That view of his conduct can only be based on ideas of
chivalry which he certainly never entertained. His vast
ambition had as its goal an empire such as the world
had hitherto never known. . In 18 I 2 he had suffered his
first great defeat, but his ambition still remained, and he
was resolved on another effort to recover the power and
prestige which, for the moment, he seemed to have forfeited
º * 3
4 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN N GERMANY
in Europe. The question whether he should remain with
his army or return to France was, from his point of view,
entirely one of expediency. However much we may
condemn his projects, it seems impossible to deny that,
holding to them as he still did, he took the wisest course
in hurrying back to France. If he did not altogether
realise the magnitude of his disaster at the moment, he
certainly knew that, for the next campaign, he would
require a fresh army, which he alone was capable of
creating, and the organisation of which demanded his
presence at his capital. Moreover, he "knew that his
position in France was threatened in his absence by plots,
and that only the magic of his personal presence could
ensure its maintenance.
Had he elected to remain with what was left of the army
of Russia, he could have done nothing either to save it, or
to alleviate the miseries of its inevitable retreat. Napoleon's
journey across Europe was certainly not a dignified one.
As far as Dresden he travelled in a sleigh, with infinite
precautions to conceal his movements from the numerous
bands of disaffected persons in Germany, who, had they
known that the hated tyrant was passing through their
midst almost without escort, might well have made an end
of him. After a short halt, during which he endeavoured
to reassure his ally the King of Saxony, and wrote to the
Ring of Prussia and the Austrian Emperor demanding a
fresh auxiliary contingent, he left Dresden in a carriage.
He reached Paris on the 19th December, and at once set
to work to organise his new army, a matter which will be
dealt with presently.
The political results of the Russian disaster were immense,
though the terror of the Emperor's name still sufficed to
keep the greater part of Europe outwardly submissive.
Russia, of course, was openly at war with France, though
even in that country there were two parties; one headed
by Kutusow, the Russian commander-in-chief, was by no
means inclined, now that the invader had been driven from
Russian soil, to follow him westwards, or to fight battles for
AFTER RUSSIA 5
the liberation of Germans and others who, willingly or
unwillingly, had formed a large part of Napoleon's army of
invasion. The Tsar Alexander, on the other hand, was
quite inclined to play the part of Liberator of Europe, but
found himself unable, during Kutusow's last days, to drag
the old general in his train.
Prussia and Austria had both supplied contingents to
Napoleon's army of Russia, both really under compulsion.
In both countries Napoleon was hated as the tyrant who
had torn from each a large portion of its former possessions.
In Prussia especially, he and the French soldiery had
rendered themselves odious, and the country had long been
preparing for, and looking forward to, the day of reckoning.
But the king, Frederick William, stood in mortal terror of
the conqueror of Jena, and was perpetually haunted by
visions of the complete destruction of Prussia as an
independent power.
As it happened, the only parts of Napoleon's army of
18 I 2 which escaped comparatively uninjured from the
great “ débâcle" were the right wing, of which the principal
constituent was the Austrian contingent of about 3 O,Ooo
men, and the left, of which the Prussian contingent, under
Yorck, formed the greater portion. Napoleon, when he
left Smorgoni, and for some time even after he reached
Paris, thought, or professed to think, that he could still rely
on these two contingents, and even wrote from Dresden
demanding an increased contingent both from Prussia and
from his father-in-law the Austrian Emperor. The Prussians
were the first to fail him. Yorck had been kept informed
of the real state of affairs in the French centre when
Macdonald, the commander of the whole French left wing,
had been purposely kept in ignorance. Yorck's information
was derived from the Russians in Riga.
When, at last, Murat and Berthier found it necessary to
enlighten Macdonald, and to recall him from Riga behind
the Niemen, there was only just time for him to escape
with his mixed division of Poles, Bavarians, and West-
phalians. Yorck had managed to get separated with his
6 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Prussians from Macdonald, and though, as General von
Câmmerer remarks," there was no military necessity for
his doing so, he concluded with his Russian opponent the
famous convention of Tauroggen on the 3 oth December.
By it the Prussians were nominally neutralised ; in fact,
they practically passed over to the enemy, though, for the
present, they took no active part against their late allies.
Yorck concluded this convention with the rope round his
neck; for the French would probably have shot him if he
had fallen into their hands, whilst Frederick William's
dread of Napoleon induced him to disavow and publicly
condemn the action of his general. Yorck's action was of
supreme importance, for it was the first overt act of revolt
against the tyranny of Napoleon, the signal for the gradual
uprising of all Germany against the oppressor.
On the other wing of the French army, Schwarzenberg,
the commander of the Austrian contingent, characteristically
acted with less boldness and openness than the Prussian.
He would put nothing in writing ; nevertheless he presently
came to a verbal understanding with his Russian opponent
Miloradowich, under which the Austrians were to retire,
not on Kalisch as ordered by the French commander, but
on Cracow. The French general, Reynier, who com-
manded a mixed corps of Saxons and French under
Schwarzenberg, was left to shift for himself, and to retire
on Kalisch, whilst Poniatowski, with his 8ooo or 90oo
Poles, had to accompany Schwarzenberg to Gallicia. He
took no part in the spring campaign, and it was only during
the armistice in the summer that he was allowed to march
back through Austria to rejoin Napoleon's army in Saxony.
Austria now assumed a position of armed neutrality,
posing as the mediator between Napoleon and his Russian
and, later, his Prussian adversaries.
Another prospective adversary of Napoleon was his
former marshal, Bernadotte, now Crown Prince and Regent
of Sweden. His conduct as a marshal of France had never
been marked by straightness, and during the years 1812-
* Die Befreiungskriege, 1813-1815, p. 6.
AFTER RUSSIA 7
sº
I814 he appears in a peculiarly unfavourable light. In
1812 he had desired to filch Norway from Denmark, a
project which Napoleon refused to countenance, the result
being that Bernadotte turned for help to the Emperor's
enemies, especially when Napoleon occupied Swedish
Pomerania in January I 8 I 2. In April I 8 I 2 a treaty was
concluded with the Tsar Alexander, under which Sweden
was to be compensated for the loss of Finland by the
transfer to her of Norway. Though Bernadotte concluded
another treaty with Great Britain in March 1813, and
shortly afterwards landed in Swedish Pomerania with I 2,000
Swedes, it was not till the reopening of the campaign in
August that he was at last induced to take an active
part in the war against Napoleon. The crookedness and
selfishness of his conduct will appear in the course of this
history.
All Germany was seething with the spirit of revolt
against French tyranny. Austria endeavoured to form a
group of states to join her as armed neutrals, but, for the
present, only had some success with Saxony, whose king
was, however, Soon wheeled into line on Napoleon's appear-
ance at his capital in May 1813. The French Emperor,
therefore, in the early months of 1813 found himself
actively opposed by Russia; Prussia was clearly contem-
plating a junction with the Russians. Sweden, as repre-
sented by Bernadotte, was only waiting to enter the lists
against him until the Crown Prince could make what he
considered a satisfactory bargain with Napoleon's enemies.
England, of course, was still at war with Napoleon, and
gradually pressing forward against his rear, thereby detain-
ing in Spain a large army, which otherwise he might have
used in Germany. He still maintained his hold on the
Rhenish Confederation, though he did so only through
force, and the whole population was hostile at heart. It
was the same in his brother Jerome's kingdom of West-
phalia.
Austria was, for the present, neutral, but her conduct
was more than suspicious, and it was impossible to say
8 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
when she might openly join the side of Napoleon's enemies.
Italy and Naples were, for the present, safe, and Denmark
was being forced, by Bernadotte's schemes for robbing her
of Norway, into active alliance with France.
Napoleon's prestige in Germany had been terribly shaken
by the Russian disaster, and nothing short of a decisive
victory over the Russians, and the Prussians when they
decided on hostilities, could restore it. Such a victory
might yet right all, might ensure the continued fidelity of
the states of the Rhenish Confederation, and might compel
Austria to return to her French alliance. The result to
Russia of such a victory would be to drive her back to the
position she held previously to the late campaign. As for
Prussia, a defeat such as Napoleon hoped to inflict on her
and the Russians, must inevitably mean the end of her in-
dependent existence, at least during Napoleon's life-time,
and the dethronement of Frederick William.
CHAPTER II
THE NEW GRAND ARMY OF 1813 1

OR his contemplated campaign in Germany
Napoleon required practically an entirely new
army. It was not a case of a reorganisation of
the army of Russia, for that once great force
had almost ceased to exist. On the right wing, when
Schwarzenberg and his Austrians retired on Cracow, there
was nothing left but Reynier's weak corps ; for Poniatowski
and his Poles were for the present interned in Gallicia. Of
the left wing there remained, after the defection of Yorck
at Tauroggen, only one weak corps of 7ooo or 8ooo
1I] Cºl.
It was in the centre that the destruction had been most
complete. Davout's corps had crossed the Niemen in June
1812 with a strength of 66,345 officers and men ; on the
13th January 1813 it counted only 228 I. On the 2 Ist
December 1812 there remained of the 50,000 men of the
Guard only 5 Oo fit for service, and 8oo sick and cripples,
of whom 200 were permanently disabled by amputations
necessitated by frostbite or wounds.
The I., II., III., and IV. corps had, in June 1812, a
strength of over I 25, ooo men; on the Ist February 1813
their united strength was reported as 64.oo combatants.
There were a certain number of reinforcements in Germany
which had never reached Russia, two divisions on the march
from Italy, and the garrisons of the German fortresses, but
it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the army of 1812
had ceased to exist.
* This chapter is based largely on Camille Rousset's Za Grande Armée de
1813, and Die Französische Armée, etc., published in Berlin in 1889.
9
Io NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
The Emperor's task, looking to the tremendous sacri-
fices he had already required from France and his allies,
was Herculean, but he faced it undauntedly, and his success
in conjuring up, as if by magic, a fresh army is perhaps one
of his most remarkable achievements.
He had certain elements for his task in France, in
Germany, in Spain, and in Italy.
In September 1812, when the calls on the conscription
of 1812 had been practically exhausted, Napoleon had
obtained a Senatus Consultum decreeing the levy of I2O,Ooo
conscripts of 18 I 3, a number which he subsequently raised
to I37,OOO by assigning an extra I 7,OOO to complete the
so-called “cohorts.” The greater part of this levy had
reached the depôts when the Emperor got back to Paris
in December, but the men were naturally not ready for
service. ;
The force readiest to hand consisted of the “cohorts.”
This body had been instituted, in March 1812, when
Napoleon, about to leave France for the farther end or
Europe, desired to leave behind him to protect the country
something so nearly akin to the regular army that, in case
of need, it might take its place in it. -
By a Senatus Consultum of the 13th March 1812, the
National Guard was organised in three “bans.”
(1) Those men of from 20 to 26 years of age, of the
classes of the six years 1807-1812, who had never been
called up to active service. tº
(2) Men of sound physique aged from 26 to 40 years.
(3) Similar men of between 40 and 6o.
The decree ended with a demand for Ioo “cohorts"
(reduced next day to 84) from the six classes of the first
ban.
These cohorts, which were not for service beyond the
limits of France, were organised by Departments in the
different headquarters of military divisions. Each cohort
consisted of 6 companies of 140 men, a depôt company,
and an artillery company of IOO men. The officers were
taken either from retired officers and men of the regular
THE NEW GRAND ARMY OF 1813 II
f
army, or from men of the National Guard who had served
with the active army. Each cohort should have had a
strength of Io&o officers and men, which would give about
9 I,ooo for the 84. As a matter of fact, the strength was
about 78,000.
After the Russian disaster the cohorts were induced,
often by the exercise of considerable pressure, to volunteer
for foreign service. A Senatus Consultum of the I Ith
January 1813 finally transferred them bodily from the
National Guard to the active army. They were organised
in regiments of 4 battalions. The number of cohorts
having now been raised to 88, there were 22 regiments.
Their strength, at 6 line companies and I depot company
per battalion, should be 86,240. Once this strength was
attained, future recruits would be available for other corps.
The artillery companies (I to each battalion) were reduced
to I per regiment, the rest being formed into 3 regi-
ments of artillery “à la suite de l'armée.”
In addition to disposing of the cohorts, the Senatus
Consultum of the I Ith January authorised a supplementary
levy of Ioo,ooo on the classes of 1809-1812. This was
commonly known as the “levy of the four classes.” Also a
call of I 5 O,Ooo was made, nearly two years in advance, on
the conscription of 1814. The levy of the “four classes”
was called up at once ; the other I 5 O,OOO were not
demanded till February, as it would, Napoleon said, be
inconvenient to arm too many conscripts at once.
The Emperor, at the same time, induced the Depart-
ments and large towns to come forward with an offer of
some I 5,000 to 20,000 men, mounted and equipped.
The Municipal Guard of Paris had two battalions of a
total strength of Io 50 men. These were sent to Erfurt to
form the nucleus of a new regiment. In the same way,
4ooo men raised by contributions from the Municipal
Guards of capitals of Departments were amalgamated to
form the new 37th light infantry. In the ports there were
I 2 battalions of marine artillery standing idle owing to
British supremacy at sea. These the Emperor split into
:
|
12 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
24 battalions which, according to him, made up I 6,ooo
men. He raised them to a nominal strength of 20,000 by
the addition of 2000 from the levy of the “four classes,” and
2000 from the conscription of 1814. The actual strength
was, however, only I 2,08o, of whom the marines were 8ooo.
Yet another Senatus Consultum, of the 3rd April,
authorised the following levies: (1) 80,000 men of 1807-
I 812 from the Ist ban of the National Guard, that is,
from the source which had already supplied the cohorts;
(2) 9o,ooo from the conscription of 18 I 4 ; these were to
be replaced from the Garde Nationale Sédentaire of the
South and West; (3) Io,000 mounted Guards of Honour.
These last were so-called volunteers, young men of well-to-
do families, whose real position was indicated by the
soubriquet of “the hostages,” given to them in the army.
To sum up, the military elements which the Emperor
sought to utilise in the first part of 1813 were :— -
(I) Old Soldiers of the Paris and other Municipal
Guards who had served before . e ſº 5,000
(2) Artillerymen of the Marines, averaging 23
years of age . i e Q © o 8,OOO
(3) The cohorts, aged 20 to 26 years . & 78,000
(4) Conscripts of the Ist ban of 20 to 26 years 80,000
(5) Conscripts of the “four classes,” 20 to 24
years . dº e e e º . I OO,OOO
(6) Guards of Honour, and horsemen “offered ”
by Departments, 20 to 25 years . o 25,000
(7) Levy of September 1812, on the conscrip-
tion of 18 I 3, 19 to 20 years . tº . I 20,000
(8) Conscripts of 1814, 18 to 19 years . . 24O,OOO
Total . . 656,ooo
With the later levies of August 1813 (30,000) and
October (240,000) we need not concern ourselves, as they
took no part in the campaign in Saxony.
The 50oo at the head of the above list were old soldiers
who had seen service; the marine artillery had no experience
THE NEW GRAND ARMY OF 1813 I3
of land warfare or infantry manoeuvres ; the rest were con-
scripts of various degrees of efficiency, but all without
experience of war. Of them St Cyrº says: “For some
time past, and more than formerly, one had noticed that
our young men were very delicate and unformed when they
attained the age for conscription ; those who were two
years younger were weak to a degree which was painful to
behold.” Marmont, on the other hand, speaking of the
cohorts, says * that, though the officers were often too old,
and generally indifferent, the soldiers were admirable.
He adds that the four-battalion regiment drawn from the
Departments was magnificent, as were the fifteen battalions
of marine artillerymen whom he commanded. There was,
as might be expected, a great dearth of officers, and various
devices had to be resorted to to fill up the vacancies.
When the remains of the Grand Army were formed into
four weak divisions, the superfluous “cadres” were sent
back to help with the new levies. Many young and
inexperienced cadets from the military colleges were utilised.
These were generally sent to the older regiments, where less
leading was required. On the other hand, there was among
the officers of the younger battalions a strong leaven of
sergeants and corporals promoted to lieutenancies, men of
long experience of war, though perhaps not likely to make
really good officers. Many officers were drawn from the
army in Spain, which was over-supplied in this respect.
The Emperor decided on the following method of re-
organising his infantry — -
(1) The 36 regiments which had formed the first four
corps in Russia were to be reconstituted with four battalions
each. For these more than Ioo “cadres de bataillon,” over
2000 officers, were required.
(2) There were in France (besides depôt battalions) Ioo
battalions of regiments serving in Spain, Illyria, etc. These,
being merely “cadres,” were completed from the recruits
of 1813, and were grouped in twos or threes to form
“regiments de ligne” or “regiments provisoires,” according
* Hest. Mil., iv. p. 53. * * M4m., v. p. 7.
14 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
as the battalions belonged to the same or to different regi-
mentS.
(3) The cohorts, as already mentioned, formed 22 regi-
ments.
\ (4) The marine artillery formed 4 regiments of marine
infantry. -
(5) The 5000 veterans of the Municipal Guards formed
2 regiments (6 battalions).
(6) Two old regiments in Italy (9 battalions) were
transferred for service in Germany.
Of these elements the following corps were provisionally
constituted :-
(I) The Corps of Observation of the Elbe (afterwards the
V. corps), General Lauriston ; 3 divisions (48 battalions).
To assemble at Magdeburg between I 5th February and
I 5th March. These were all cohorts.
(2) The Ist Corps of Observation of the Rhine (later
the III. corps), Marshal Ney ; 4 divisions (6O battalions).
To assemble about Mayence during March.
(3) The 2nd Corps of Observation of the Rhine (later
the VI. Corps), Marshal Marmont; 4 divisions (50 battalions).
Three divisions to assemble about Mayence at the end of
March and beginning of April. The fourth was not ready
till the end of May.
(4) The Corps of Observation of Italy, General Bertrand ;
4 divisions (54 battalions). These later became the IV.
and XII, Corps.
(5) The I. Corps; 4 divisions (64 battalions).
(6) The II. Corps; 4 divisions (48 battalions).
(7) Durutte's division of the VII. corps, to which 2
Saxon divisions were to be added.
(8) The Guard. One division of the Old Guard to be
formed of what had returned from Russia, added to 3ooo old
soldiers drawn from Spain. Three divisions of Young Guard
to assemble at Mayence. These were conscripts, differing
in no respect from those who formed regiments of the line.
(9) Two corps of reserve to be formed at Mayence.
They were not ready till the end of August.
THE NEW GRAND ARMY OF 1813 I5
The cavalry was still more difficult to constitute than the
infantry. About 90oo or Io,ooo had wandered back from
Russia. For the rest, conscripts had to be taken. As far
as possible, men were chosen who had some acquaintance
with horses. It was decided
(I) To reconstitute the Guard cavalry entirely.
(2) To reorganise the 52 regiments of the late Grand
Army in two corps under Latour-Maubourg and Sebastiani,
altogether three heavy and four light divisions. “Cadres'
were to be completed from the regiments in Spain.
(3) A third corps, under Arrighi, was to be formed
about the nucleus of one squadron supplied by each of the
regiments in Spain. d
It is not within the scope of this work to enter into all
the complicated details of the reorganisation of the French
army. Those who are curious on the subject will find full
details in the works referred to at the commencement of this
chapter.
But something must necessarily be said regarding the
military value of the troops with which the great Emperor
conducted this his last campaign in Germany.
Colonel Lanrezac, on the whole, passes a more favourable
judgment on the army than do Camille Rousset and the
author of Die französische Armée. He states the numbers
of infantry present, according to a return of the 20th April,
at 2 IO,OOO, of whom I 75,000 were French and 35,000
Allies. Of the 175,000 French not more than 75,000
were conscripts of 1813; the rest were men of earlier years,
for the recruits of the 18 I 4 conscription had not yet joined.
Even the 18 I 3 men had four months’ service, and averaged
20 years of age. The weaklings and malingerers had
dropped out on the way to the front. On the other hand,
Camille Rousset tells of one detachment of 6oo which had
to leave IOO in hospital in Brussels, and another of 950 at
La Rochelle, which had 3oo in hospital and an excessive
mortality. In the west of France it became necessary to
hunt up the “réfractaires” with mobile columns, and the
commander of one of these reported that he was afraid to
I6 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
use his young recruits for this purpose. He would, he said,
rather have IOO old soldiers than 600 conscripts of I 813,
such as filled most of his companies. They had never had
a musket in their hands before quitting the depôts, and
were unfit for the necessary marches. The training seems
to have been less than elementary at the depôts. There
was an order which required that no conscript be sent
forward till he had fired at least six blank and two ball
cartridges Yet commandants of depôts who tried to insist
on this very rudimentary fire training often found them-
selves censured for delaying their conscripts. Camille
Rousset gives the following as a common type of report on
inspection : “Some of the men are of rather weak appear-
ance. The battalion has no idea of manoeuvring ; but
nine-tenths of the men can manage and load their arms
passably.”
There was the wildest confusion in the depôts, where it
seems to have been tacitly agreed that infantry depôts were
equally liable to be drawn on for other arms. In the con-
fusion training was neglected. It often happened that
where there were four series of battalions to be reformed
the fourth was ready first. There were bitter complaints of
the state in which the “detachements de marche” reached the
regiments. From Osnabruck General Lambardière writes,
on the 15th April : “These battalions arrive very fatigued ;
every day I supply them with special carriage for the weak
and lame. . . . All these battalions are French : I must say
that the young soldiers show courage and good-will. Every
possible moment is utilised in teaching them to load their
arms and bring them to the shoulder.”
When the conscripts of 1813 required to complete the
Ist battalions began to run short, the Emperor said the
deficiency could be supplied from conscripts of I 8 I 4, pro-
vided only the “big and strong” were picked out. The
adjectives could only be applied to the conscripts selected
in relation to the weaklings, who were distinctly small and
weak. So poor were they in physique that the Minister of
Police protests against their being drilled in the Champs
THE NEW GRAND ARMY OF 1813 I7
Elysées during the hour of promenade, on account of the
scoffing and jeering they gave rise to. Besides all this,
there was a shortage of muskets, so much so that Napoleon
even suggested arming the I 8 I 4 levies with foreign ones of
the same calibre as the French, though he insisted on ample
reserves of French weapons being kept at Strasburg,
Mayence, and Wesel for issue to troops on their way to
Germany.
Camille Rousset insists on the deficiency of officers, but
Colonel Lanrezac shows, on the other hand, that the III.
corps, on the 15th April, had the high average of one officer
to every 3 I men, whilst even less favoured corps had one
to every 40. The real difficulty, he says, was that there
were no reserves of officers to supply the waste of war. As
long as the numbers of the men went on diminishing pro-
portionally the matter was not so important. The rub
came when, in the second half of the campaign, reinforce-
ments in men were poured up, without a corresponding
number of officers.
Of the whole corps of officers, perhaps, the central por-
tion was the best. The commanders of corps, of divisions,
of brigades, of regiments, and, perhaps, even of battalions,
were, almost without exception, still the old experienced
leaders of many years of war. But the Emperor's system
of command, whilst excellent for the training of tacticians,
was fatal to the development of strategical initiative. His
corps commanders were not encouraged to look upon them-
selves as responsible in any way for strategy. That, they
considered, was the Emperor's province alone, and, with the
possible exceptions of Davout and Masséna, they were in-
capable of exercising an independent command on a large
scale. Spain had already laid bare the deficiencies of
several of them in this respect. So long as Napoleon had
but one army in the field, and that of dimensions which he
could manage alone, the strategical deficiencies of his
immediate subordinates mattered comparatively little. But
when he himself was commanding a vast host in Russia,
and at the same time carrying on, through one of his
B
I8 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
marshals, a deadly struggle in Spain, he had to recognise
that his curbing of initiative in his lieutenants must be fatal.
As regards his war in Germany in 1813, Eugène's mistakes
on the Oder and the Elbe were one instance of the want of
good independent commanders, though certainly Eugène
was a particularly bad example, and something better might
have been expected from Davout, Soult, or Gouvion St Cyr.
When the Emperor once more gathered the reins in
Germany into his own hands, in April I 8 I 3, he was again
operating with a single army of dimensions within his own
power of control, and the marshals slipped back into their
old position of mere instruments of the great leader. In
the second half of the war it was different. The numbers
of the army were too great to be directly commanded by a
single man, even by a Napoleon. Moreover, the strategical
position necessitated something more like the modern
system of a war of armies, each commanded by a subordinate
capable of acting independently, without having the great
director always at his elbow.
The marshals, or some of them at least, were aware of
their deficiencies, as is evidenced by Marmont's famous
prophecy, which was realised almost as soon as uttered.
In August 1813, that marshal, criticising the Emperor's
plans," wrote: “I fear much lest, on the day when Your
Majesty has won a victory and believe you have gained a
decisive battle, you may learn that you have lost two.” A
few days later came the news of Macdonald's defeat on the
Katzbach, and Oudinot's at Gross Beeren, which had
almost coincided in time with the Emperor's own victory
at Dresden. His power, his throne, everything depended
on himself alone. As Count Yorck von Wartenburg says:
“All his actions were connected with his own personality,
and based upon it alone; so, when this became weak, there
was no longer anything in his army or state that could
support or sustain him.”” Europe freed herself from the
* What a change from the old days is evidenced by the mere fact of Napoleon's
inviting his marshals to offer an opinion on his own plan of campaign -
* Napoleon as a General (English translation), vol. ii. p. 270.
THE NEW GRAND ARMY OF 1813 I9
tyranny of the Corsican by the uprising of her peoples, and
at enormous expense in blood and treasure. All that would
have been saved had a stray bullet taken the charmed life
of the conqueror; for his empire must have collapsed at
once with his own disappearance from the scene.
The same causes resulted in an absence of capacity in
the personnel of his headquarters staff. He, like Frederick
the Great, was his own chief of the staff, he managed every-
thing, and Berthier was but a glorified head-clerk. The
organisation of the General Staff was what it had been in
the days of the Revolution. The Emperor only awoke to
its deficiencies as an instrument for the governance of the
vast armies he was now leading when, on the 2nd July
1812, he wrote: “The general staff is organised in such a
manner that nothing is foreseen.” + It was good enough for
the management of an army; but, “the war of armies
requires staffs of the first rank, staffs constituted of chosen
men, educated in the higher knowledge of war, united by a
community of doctrine, and amongst whom initiative has
been carefully developed.”” That description is utterly
inapplicable to the staff of which Berthier was the nominal
head.
Perhaps the worst part of the army of 1813 was its
cavalry. In the first part of the war, up to Lützen, it
numbered but I 5,000, mostly old soldiers, I I,000 French
and 4Ooo allies. It was opposed to a far more numerous
cavalry of generally excellent quality, against which it
was almost impotent. Later, it was greatly increased in
numbers, but the recruits were of very inferior quality and
training. On the other hand, the artillery was very good
and numerous, though the draught horses were rather
young.
On the whole, we may well accept Lanrezac's estimate of
the army of 1813. “Certainly, the new troops were not
the equals in value of the bands destroyed in Russia, and,
moreover, their constitution exposed them to a rapid
exhaustion; nevertheless, they were good. . . . Anyhow,
* Corr. 18,884, * Lanrezac, La Mama'uzºre de Lutzen, p. 31.
2O NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
the army with which Napoleon opened the campaign . . .
was a good instrument of war; however, it had in itself
serious germs of weakness.” . The estimate is supported
not only by the opinion of contemporaries like Odeleben,”
certainly not prejudiced in favour of the French, but still
more by its actual achievements in the victories of Lützen,
Bautzen, Dresden, and even the gallant but unsuccessful
fighting at Kulm and Leipzig.
In one department especially, the attack or defence of
localities, of woods or villages, the French infantry ever
displayed that capacity which, in the French soldier, seems
to be an inborn instinct.
Of the Emperor himself what shall we say? Perhaps it
will be best to show as we go along the evidences of the
decline of his personality, and of his failures to be true to
his own principles, which alternated with flashes of the old
genius and decision.
As for his marshals and generals, most of them were
long since tired of war, by which they had been enriched.
Now they looked for a period of peace in which to enjoy
their wealth. The prevalence of such a spirit augured ill
for success. t
* Lanrezac, La Mamaentz re de Lutzen, pp. 28 and 29.
* “The good military bearing which predominated in this new army, sprung,
as it were, from the earth, and assembled by the wave of a wand, was truly
admirable ; and, if one felt horror at the excesses of the French soldiers, the
military spirit, the activity in marches, and the bravery of the young troops so
rapidly formed and opposed to experienced soldiers, excited no less astonishment.”
—Odeleben, Campagne de 1813 (French translation), vol. i. p. 62.
CHAPTER III
THE ALLIED ARMIES
(1) THE PRUSSIAN ARMY }

Y the Treaty of Tilsit in 1807, Prussia's army
was limited to 42,000 men of all arms, the
proportion of the arms being also fixed.
Napoleon had carried 20,000 men, nearly
half of the whole army, to Russia with him in 1812,
and we already know what had become of that, thanks
to Yorck's defection from the cause of the French. In-
cluding what Yorck had left, there remained a standing
army of about 33,000 men. This “old” army was
extremely good, with young and well-instructed officers.
So good was it that Von Boyen, writing in 1838.” described
the infantry as the best he had ever seen. The cavalry
was also good, though the horses of some regiments were
rather old. It consisted of 2 Guard and 18 line regiments.”
which, at 600 men per regiment, made I 2,OOO, in 80
squadrons of I 5 o each.
The artillery comprised three brigades, each of three
horse and I 2 foot companies. Total 6000 men, in 2 I
batteries, with 168 guns. There were six companies of
engineers (pioneers). In 1813 the strength was raised by
calling up reservists, so that there were 36,846 infantry,
and the total strength of the army was about 56,ooo.
Moreover, artillery had been collected to such an extent
that there were available, even in the spring of 1813, 236
* This section is mainly based on Friederich's Der Herbstfeldzug 1813, vol. i.
chap. ii.
* Erinnerungen, iii. p. 35.
* Seven heavy and thirteen light.
2I
22 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
guns. This army was the nucleus round which the new
formations were collected.
In 18 Io Scharnhorst had started his “Krumper" + system,
under which each company or squadron, at fixed intervals,
discharged a given number of trained soldiers, and took in
an equal number of fresh men for training. By thus
constantly passing men through the ranks, Napoleon's
restrictions were evaded, and it became possible to nearly
double the 42,000 by calling up the men who had been
trained. So when the king issued his order of the Ist
February 1813, calling up the reserves and “Krumpers,”
52 reserve battalions could be formed. Several of these
took part in the spring campaign ; others were only called
to the army at a later period. By these means the army
received eventually a reinforcement of 42 battalions—
33,642 men.
At first these regiments of “Krumpers” and reservists
left much to be desired, but, by appointing to them ex-
officers of regiments which had been disbanded in 1807,
they were worked up to a state of efficiency equal to that
of the rest of the army. -
It must be noted that the lesson of I 806-7 was taken to
heart in Prussia, and the whole military system was radi-
cally reformed. It was sought to induce the obedience of
the soldier not, as in the old days, by force alone, but
chiefly by an appeal to his patriotism. Corporal punish-
ment was abolished, save for dishonourable offences, and
the military man, from being the lowest in the social scale,
as he was in I 806, was raised to a position of respect, and
had come to be looked upon as the eventual saviour of his
country from French tyranny.
Though artillery had been collected, there was a great
shortage of uniforms. Many of them were of the simplest
character. Black or grey cloth jackets with various coloured
facings were worn over trousers of the poorest cloth. Some
* Krumpen-to shrink. According to a memorandum by the king, printed in
Von Boyen's Memoirs (ii. p. 345), the total effective strength of the army on the
24th July 1810 was only 22,392.
THE ALLIED ARMIES 23
regiments even had old English uniforms. The muskets
were of four or five different patterns.” To facilitate the
supply of ammunition and prevent confusion, advantage
was taken of the cessation of hostilities in June–August
I 813 to effect exchanges of weapons, so that each regiment
might be, as far as possible, armed with muskets of the
same calibre.
The next body to be raised consisted of “Volunteer
Jägers,” young men of independent means, of from 17 to
24 years, equipped and armed at their own expense, or at
that of the neighbourhood. They were those who did not
already belong to the army, and had no sufficient cause for
exemption. As the decree of the 3rd February dealing
with them was supplemented by another of the 9th, limiting
the causes of exemption and prescribing penalties for failure
to join, it seems clear that these were volunteers only in
name.” Their numbers are uncertain, but they probably
never exceeded 5 Ooo infantry, 3ooo cavalry, and 5 Oo
artillery and engineers. Their moral was probably
greater than their military value, though, later, they
formed good schools for the training of officers and
under-officers, in supplying whom there was considerable
difficulty. -
A few “free corps" were established as follows:—
Lützow's—3 battalions, 5 Squadrons, 8 guns.
Von Reiche's Jäger battalion.
Hellwig's—3 squadrons, one Jäger detachment.
The “Schill” free corps—2 squadrons of hussars.
The Elbe regiment—2 battalions raised from the
provinces torn from Prussia in 1807.
These free corps consisted largely of foreigners, were of
very varied constitution, not always either well led or well
* Two Prussian, one Austrian, one English, and, later on, the French muskets
captured in the field. .
* On this subject there is a significant note in Colonel Lanrezac's book, p. 36:
“What happened in France in 1792, and in Prussia in 1813, proves that, how-
ever great the patriotic feeling of the nation, voluntary enlistment furnishes in
time of war but a small number of defenders. Without a law compelling to
military service all citizens of a certain age, only insignificant results are obtained.”
24 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
disciplined, and, altogether, not so important as they might
have been.
More was still required for an army which had to
struggle for the very existence of the Fatherland.
A decree of the king established the “landwehr,” based
on the model of that of Austria of 1809. This decree,
signed on the 9th February 1813, but only brought into
force on the 17th March, required universal service. No
preparations for this had been possible during the years
succeeding 1807. As the impoverished state of Prussian
finances precluded much assistance from the State, the
expense of equipment had to fall on the men themselves, or
their villages. The consequence was that the men had
miserable clothing, which was ruined by the first heavy
rain. They had caps which protected them neither against
the weather nor against blows; they had shoes which, being
unprovided with gaiters, were often drawn off by the mud
through which the men had to march—and wretched linen
trousers. At first, the front rank was often armed with
pikes or scythes, and it was only as French muskets were
taken from the battlefields that the men were armed with
yet another pattern of firearm. There was a great dearth
of officers, as most of the half-pay officers still fit for service
were required for the reserve battalions. All sorts of
officials, many of them very unsuitable as military officers,
joined, and it was only later on that men of some experi-
ence were got from the “Volunteer Jägers,” etc.
Naturally, the landwehr, as a whole, was at first of no
great military value, though their initial worth was in some
corps (Yorck's and Bülow's especially) enhanced by long
marches and still more by early successes.
The landwehr infantry numbered about I oo,000 at
their highest strength, and the cavalry about I I,500. The
latter were, on the whole, proportionately better than the
infantry, but their horses, drawn from the fields and other
sources, were a very mixed lot. Friederich says that once
a body of this cavalry began to give way no power on earth,
saving an insurmountable physical barrier, could stop them.
THE ALLIED ARMIES 25
The whole strength of the Prussian army in August 1813,
after the armistice, may be summarised thus in round
numbers:—
Infantry.
Regular, exclusive of garrison and depot bat-
talions . ſe ſº (* tº e e 72,OOO
Landwehr, garrison and depot battalions,
“free " corps, Volunteer Jägers, and
Landwehr reserve . tº tº º . I 56,000
228,000
Cavalry.
Regular, excluding depot squadrons. tº e I 2,600
Landwehr, Volunteer Jägers, etc. . * tº I 8,500
3 I, IOO
Artillery (376 guns) and engineers . o g I3,OOO
This total of 272,OOO later rose to about 3OO,Ooo, which
represents about 6 per cent. on the then population of
Prussia.
Of the 272,000 there were actually in the field at the
close of the armistice in August about I 92,500, inclusive
of 30,500 (mostly landwehr) blockading Küstrin, Stettin,
Danzig, and Glogau. Prussian writers justly claim that
their country supplied the backbone of the uprising which
overthrew Napoleon. The greatest actual numbers of
troops in 18 I 3 were furnished by Russia, but looking to
the general quality of the troops, and the spirit of patriotism
and enthusiasm which pervaded them, the slightly smaller
Prussian forces were of distinctly greater value. It must
always be remembered that they were fighting for hearth
and home, whilst the Russians had already saved their
own country in 1812, and in 1813 and I 8 I 4 were
fighting, not so much for their own safety, as for the
liberation of Germany and Europe from the yoke of
Napoleon.
26 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
(2) THE RUSSIAN ARMY
There is a good deal of uncertainty as to the actual
numbers of the half-disciplined troops, such as Cossacks and
Bashkirs. Though very inferior in quality from a military
point of view, these half savages had created such alarm
amongst the French that they were far from being a
negligible quantity. -
The Russian officers were still, as they had been i
I807, very ill-educated and rough, except those drawn
from the nobility for the Guard and a few crack cavalry
regiments.
The Russian soldier of the regular army was what he
was in 1807, and what he still is, a fighter of the ut-
most bravery and obstinacy, without education or much
intelligence.
In the beginning of February 1813 the total strength of
the Russian army pursuing the French did not exceed
7O,OOO infantry, 30,000 cavalry and Cossacks, I O,OOO
artillery and engineers—I Io,000 in all. Most of the
infantry regiments were reduced to a single battalion of
about 350 men ; the cavalry regiments had only 4 Squadrons
(instead of 8) of Ioo men each.
A “ukase,” of the 5th February 1813, prescribed the
formation of a reserve army of I 63 battalions, 92 squad-
rons, 37 batteries, to assemble about Bialystock. Its
formation was much retarded by want of “cadres" and
material. Between March and August 1813, it furnished
to the active army 68,000 infantry, I 4,Ooo cavalry, and
5 batteries. At the close of the armistice the Russian army
in Germany and the reserves in Poland numbered about
296,000 men.
The corps, both of infantry and cavalry, were so split
and mixed that Lanrezac quotes the saying of an unnamed
eye-witness that “the generals did not know what troops to
command, and, similarly, the troops knew not which chief
to obey.” "
* La Manacuzire de Zutzen, p. 39.
THE ALLIED ARMIES 27
(3) THE AUSTRIAN ARMY
Austria was neutral till the close of the armistice in August
I 813, but it will be convenient to deal here with the army
which she then brought into the field. After the campaign
of 1809, the strength of the Austrian army was fixed at
I 50,000 men. The war had brought her almost to the
verge of bankruptcy, the strictest economy was required,
and it was practised largely at the expense of the army,
especially of the Austrian (as distinguished from the
Hungarian) portion. It was kept on the lowest peace
footing, and the rest of the men received an extremely
short annual training. Differences with his brother the
Emperor had, unfortunately for Austria, resulted in the
disappearance from her councils of her best leader and
organiser, the Archduke Charles. Schwarzenberg's auxiliary
force in the Russian campaign of 1812 numbered about
29,000 men and 7ooo horses. After his return, Austria
was quite unable to put a respectable force in the field to
join the Russians and Prussians. Therefore, she was com-
pelled to go no further than playing a neutral part, and
pretending to serve as mediator between Napoleon and the
allies, whilst she was reorganising her army. When, at
last, she openly joined the allies, in August 1813, her
armed strength was as follows:–
Battns. Squadns. Guns. Men.
(a) In Bohemia tº ſº Io 7 II 7 29O I 27,345
(b) Between the Enns and
the Traun, opposed to
Wrede's Bavarians on 3O,O79
the Inn . ©
(c) In Upper Austria )
(Hiller) . e . ) 36,557
Total Field Army, I 93,981
27,544
In garrison at Prag, König-
gratz, and Josefstadt
Total, 22 I,525
28 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Besides these, a reserve army, strength not known, was
organising at Vienna and elsewhere. There was no corps
organisation, the army being divided into 12 infantry
divisions, with 3 divisions and I brigade of cavalry.
As a consequence of the conditions above mentioned,
two-thirds of this army consisted of recruits with scarcely
three months’ service.
Information regarding the military value of the Austrian
army is not so plentiful as in the case of Prussia. The
corps of 1812, however, appears to have been excellent,
whilst the reserves and recruits were perhaps not far behind
the corresponding elements of the Prussian army.
The cavalry was generally good, the artillery less so.
(4) SWEDISH ARMY
Bernadotte,Crown Prince of Sweden, ex-Marshal of France,
does not cut an admirable figure in any way in 1813. His
political conduct was crooked in the extreme, and as for his
Swedish contingent, his main object seems to have been to
expose them to as little fighting as possible." The army
consisted partly of Swedes, partly of Germans recruited in
Pomerania and the island of Rügen. In discipline, equip-
ment, and clothing they left nothing to be desired. They,
too, only appeared in the north after the armistice, when
their strength was :-
Battns. Squadns. Guns. Men.
(a) In Brandenburg © 33 27 54 23,449
(b) In Mecklenburg with
Walmoden tº 6 5 8 3,8 I 4
39 32 62 27,263
(5) ANGLO-GERMAN TROOPS
Most of these were Germans, or a mixture of all nations.
The only really British troops were :—
* Friederich refers to an English caricature representing the Crown Prince lead-
ing back his army in the guise of a flock of sheep and saying to the old king,
“Here am I with the sheep you entrusted to me. Behold ! I have not lost one
of them.”
THE ALLIED ARMIES 29
I 1 regiment of hussars—5 Squadrons.
2 horse artillery batteries with I 2 guns, and—
28 rocket apparatus. These Congreve rockets, then a
new invention, created much alarm amongst the French at
Leipzig. -
The strength of this Anglo-German contingent was about
9000 men.
There were also 6 English battalions (3459 men) in
garrison at Stralsund.
(6) MECKLENBURG CONTINGENT
Four battalions, 4 squadrons, 2 guns, 6 I49 men.
Of these only the Guard Grenadier battalions were old
troops. The rest were recruits.
To sum up the field forces” of the allies, about the begin-
ning of the autumn campaign they stood as follows :-
Battns. | Squadns. º: Guns. Men.
Prussian Field Army . 185% 174 t-tº- 362 I61,764
Russian 25 . . 2 I 2 228 68 639 I84, 123
Austrian 9 3 . . Io 7 I I 7 *mºs 29O I27,345
Swedish 53 • 39 32 * 62 23,449
Anglo-German Contingent 9 17 sºmº-me 26 9,283
Mecklenburg 93 e 4. 4 * 2 6, 149
556% 572 68 I 381 512, II 3
Adding to these the Russian and Prussian blockading
corps, reserves in second line, the garrison of Stralsund, the
Austrian armies on the Italian and Bavarian fronts, etc., the
allies had some 860, Ooo troops.
* This is Friederich's statement. It seems doubtful if it is correct as regards
the hussar regiment. The present-day O Battery, R.H.A., has claimed to be the
representative of Captain Bogue's rocket battery, but here too it appears that the
claim to direct descent has not been made out. The author is indebted for this
information to the author of the History of the British Army.
* Exclusive of blockading troops before the fortresses and of the Austrian
and Russian reserve armies. - .
30 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
(7) THE ALLIED COMMANDERS
Napoleon's great advantage over the allies, at periods
when he began to find himself with inferior numbers, con-
sisted in the absolute unity of his command. The final de-
cision always rested with him alone. The disadvantages of
his system in depriving him of men trained to semi-indepen-
dent command have already been noted.
The allies, on the other hand, had no unity of command
whatever. No one could know with whom the final decision
lay. Even when the Russians were alone there was some
difficulty, so long as Kutusow lived : for he was strongly
opposed to embarking on chivalrous adventures for the
benefit of the rest of Europe. So great had been his ser-
vices to Russia that, until his death, even his master, the
Tsar, felt bound to defer to some extent to his views.
Then Prussia joined in the war against Napoleon, and
the difficulties at once increased ; for it became necessary to
consider the new ally, and the opinions of her generals,
amongst whom were men of the highest military capacity,
such as Clausewitz," Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, Müffling, and
others, like Blücher and Yorck, who, if they were not great
commanders, had at least very decided opinions, and still
more decided wills. Then came Austria, the views of
whose leaders had again to be consulted, and who, on at
least one occasion, insisted on changes in the allied plans.
Bernadotte introduced a further complication, for he wanted
to be commander-in-chief of the allied armies, a position
which it was impossible to confer on him.
Of the allied sovereigns, the Tsar generally succeeded in
taking the most influential position. He was surrounded
by a multitude of advisers, Toll, Barclay de Tolly, Wittgen-
stein, to whom were added, later, Jomini and Moreau.
Knesebeck, Borstell, Von Boyen, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau,
Clausewitz, Schwarzenberg, Radetzky, and Müffling all had
* Clausewitz was still in the Russian service which he had entered in 1812, but
he had been a Prussian officer and may fairly be classed as such. He returned to
the Prussian service in 1815.
THE ALLIED ARMIES 3I
their say in the perpetual councils of war which discussed
and tinkered with the allies' plans. To such a pitch did
dissensions come that when the Tsar, before Leipzig, was
unable to gain over Schwarzenberg to his views, he took
the extreme course of telling the Austrian (and allied)
commander-in-chief that he might keep his Austrians be-
tween the Pleisse and the Elster, but that the Russians and
Prussians, being the affair of the Tsar and the King of
Prussia, should be brought over to the right bank of the
Pleisse. After the battle of Lützen there were dissensions
between the Russians and the Prussians, each blaming the
other for the defeat.
Then the divergent interests of the Russians, desiring to
preserve their direct communication with Poland, and of the
Prussians, thinking of directly covering their capital and
the Mark, nearly led to a separation which would certainly
have been fatal to Prussia.
Even when a commander-in-chief had been appointed to
succeed Kutusow, his position became almost intolerable ;
for Wittgenstein, who was selected, constantly found the
Tsar consulting Toll and others without reference to him,
and passing important orders over his head.
Many of these difficulties will appear in their proper place
in the course of this history. They are only briefly referred
to here in order to indicate generally the extremely divided
state of the allied command, and the many obstacles to the
co-operation of armies with such divergent interests as those
of the allies. One expedient adopted was the intermixture
of the various forces, so that Bernadotte, Blücher, and
Schwarzenberg each commanded troops of two or more
nations. By thus mixing them up in separate commands
it was hoped to remove the temptation to any one nation
to act on its own account.”
* This chapter certainly anticipates much ; but the author has thought it better
to collect in two preliminary chapters a general view of the organisation of the
armies of both sides, rather than to recur again and again to the same subject as
each new force comes on the scene. -
CHAPTER IV
OPERATIONS BETWEEN NAPOLEON'S DEPARTURE
FROM AND HIS RETURN TO THE ARMY

HEN Napoleon left Smorgoni for France he
entrusted the Supreme command to Murat,
with instructions which it was impossible for
him, or any one else, to carry out. With
the wretched rabble which was all that represented the main
body of the army, it was out of the question either to wait
at Wilna or to make a stand on the Niemen. The King
of Naples could but continue the retreat as best he might.
On the 19th December, the day of Napoleon's arrival in
Paris, the few thousands of stragglers, and the few hundreds
of the Guard, reached Königsberg. They had not been
pursued by Tchichagow's Russians beyond the Niemen, but,
on the 1st January 1813, the news of Yorck's defection at
Tauroggen warned Murat that he must continue his retreat
across the Vistula. Leaving in Danzig the remains of
Macdonald's corps and Heudelet's “division de marche,”
which he met coming forward in East Prussia, he reached
Posen on the 16th January. There he gave over the
chief command to Eugène Beauharnais, and betook himself
to his kingdom of Naples.
Eugène's position was a difficult one, far too difficult for
a commander of his very limited capacity. With the
remains of the Guard, the I., II., III., IV., and VI.
(Bavarian) corps, he had some I 2,OOO worn-out troops.
As the mixed division of Macdonald's corps, and Heudelet's
“division de marche,” the only troops still worth anything,
had been thrown by Murat into Danzig, the unfortunate
Viceroy would have had practically no army at all, but for
32
EUGENE'S OPERATIONS 33
some Io,000 men of various nationalities gathered from
“regiments de marche.”
As for the Prussians, Yorck, as we know, was with the
Russians, busily reorganising and recruiting his corps about
Rönigsberg, Bülow, in Pomerania, was organising another
corps, nominally in response to Napoleon's call for a fresh
contingent. Blücher was doing the same in Silesia. Both
were merely waiting for their king to summon up courage
to declare against Napoleon.
When Eugène took over command, he found himself with
the prospect of a fortnight's breathing space in which to
reorganise his forces. If the French army had been almost
annihilated in the retreat from Russia, their pursuers had also
suffered severely, and were far from being in a condition to
carry on an active winter campaign. Wittgenstein, on their
right, crossed the Vistula on the I3th January with 30,000
men ; but he found himself at once compelled to send the
greater part of his force to watch Danzig, in which there
was a garrison of 30,000, of whom two-thirds were service-
able troops. He stopped, therefore, at Stargard to await the
arrival of the other Russian corps on his left. Tchichagow
was marching slowly on Thorn with 20,000 men ; Kutusow
was moving with 30,000 on Plock, and Miloradowich was
very slowly pushing back Schwarzenberg, Reynier, and
Poniatowski on Warsaw. There was little chance of the
Russians being abreast of one another on the Vistula till
after the end of January. As the ruins of the infantry of
the I., II., III., and IV. corps were unfit for employment in
the field, Eugène sent them respectively to garrison Stettin,
Küstrin, Spandau, and Glogau. The “cadres” set free
by this arrangement were sent back to Erfurt for use in
organising new units.
Eugène was now left with a few of these men whom he
kept back, the remains of the Guard, two fresh battalions
of Young Guard called up from Stettin, and the “détach-
ments de marche” already mentioned—some I 2,Ooo in all.
These he organised as four weak divisions. He had not
more than 2000 cavalry, a very mixed lot. -
C
34 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
With these small forces he took post at Posen,
pushing out his Bavarians to Gnesen in order to keep
in touch with Thorn and Warsaw. He soon found that
he could expect little help either on his right or his left.
Schwarzenberg, as already mentioned, had arranged to
go off to Gallicia, and Bülow refused to take Eugène's
orders.
Behind him the Viceroy had Lagrange's division of the
XI. corps, guarding Berlin and Spandau. Between the 20th
and 25th January, Grenier's division (18,Ooo men) reached
Berlin from Italy. There it was split into two divisions
which, joined to that of Lagrange, constituted the XI. corps,
under the command of Gouvion St Cyr, It was intended
to call it up to Posen, but, as Grenier's men required rest,
and Lagrange's had partly to be called in from the fortresses
it would require some time before they could move. More-
over, Eugène considered the whole corps not too much to
keep order in Berlin and the Mark. He, being on the spot,
judged the danger of Prussian disaffection more accurately
than his stepfather the Emperor, who still pretended to
believe in the permanence of the Prussian alliance. A
fresh danger now threatened Eugène, for Wittgenstein,
though unable to advance beyond Stargard, had organised
his Cossacks as the “free corps’ of Czernitchew, Benkendorf,
and Tettenborn. These columns, of I 5oo or I 600 men
and a couple of guns each, pushed far and wide through
Pomerania, raising the country, cutting off French detach-
ments, and penetrating as far as the lower Oder. Mean-
while Tchichagow reached Thorn on the 28th January, and
Bromberg on the 8th February, on which date Kutusow
and Miloradowich arrived respectively at Plock and
Warsaw.
On the I oth and I Ith February, Eugène's advanced
troops were attacked and driven in. On the following day
he prepared to retreat, and on the 18th he was at Frankfort-
on-Oder, where he learned that, two days earlier, the Cossacks
of the free corps, crossing the river above and below Küstrin,
had harried the country almost to the gates of Berlin.
EUGENE'S OPERATIONS 35
Here also he found waiting for him St Cyr with the 35th
and 36th divisions.”
Meanwhile, Reynier (VII. corps), who had incautiously
halted at Kalisch, had been surprised from Plock, had
suffered heavily, and been compelled to retreat on Glogau,
which he reached, on the 19th February, with only 90oo
IIle11.
The general position on that day was this—
Eugène was at Frankfort with 30,000 men.”
Reynier at Glogau with 9ooo.
Augereau at Berlin with 6ooo or 7ooo.
Lauriston at Magdeburg with two divisions of the V.
corps, waiting for the other two to come up.
Morand * had 200o Saxons in Swedish Pomerania.
The garrisons of the fortresses on the Oder were, Stettin,
90oo ; Küstrin and Glogau, 4ooo each.
Spandau was held by 3ooo men.
As for Poniatowski, Schwarzenberg had carried him and
his 8ooo or 9ooo Poles off to Gallicia, and included him in
his own armistice with the Russians.
Regarding the enemy, it is true that the 5 odo Cossacks
of the three Free corps were beating up the country in
Eugène's rear, and that they actually got into Berlin for a
short time on the 20th February ; but, after all, this was a
mere raid, which could not meet with any permanent success,
seeing that its supports were still far east of the Oder.
Wittgenstein had, on the 18th February, only 19,000 men
(exclusive of the Free corps) available for active operations,
and was still I 5 O miles from the Oder in Pomerania.
Kutusow with 4O,Ooo men was at Kalisch ; Sacken with
2O,OOO was watching Schwarzenberg towards Gallicia.
Prussia had not yet declared war. Yorck was two or
three marches behind Wittgenstein, Bülow at Colberg, and

*The two into which Grenier's division had been split.
* 12,000 whom he had brought with him from Posen, and 18,000 of St Cyr's
wo divisions.
* Not Count Morand, the commander of a division at Auerstadt in 1806. He
till commanded a division of the corps marching from Italy.
36 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Blücher at Breslau. So long as Berlin and a large part of
Prussia was in the hands of the French, Frederick William
was not in the least likely to risk a declaration of war.
Under these circumstances, there was no immediate
necessity whatever for Eugène to retire behind the Oder.
But he now came under the influence of Augereau, who
was extremely nervous about an insurrection in Berlin.
Even if that had occurred, Eugène might well have dealt
with it by posting himself half-way between Berlin and the
Oder, 20 miles from each. Thence he could have con-
trolled Berlin, and, at the same time, have defended the line
of the Oder.
Napoleon's view of the situation is stated in a subsequent
letter to Eugène," where he says, “an experienced general
who had established a camp east of Küstrin would have
given time to the Corps of Observation of the Elbe
(Lauriston's V. corps) to reach Berlin; or, at any rate, if
such a general had camped in front of Berlin he could not
have been attacked, except by the extensive dispositions
which he would have forced the enemy to make.” Napoleon
himself would certainly have defended the Oder from the
eastern bank. Later on, on the I 5th March,” he wrote :
“If, . . . instead of retiring on Frankfort, you had concen-
trated in front of Küstrin, the enemy would have thought
twice before throwing anything on to the left bank. You
would have gained at least twenty days, and given time for
the Corps of Observation of the Elbe to occupy Berlin.”
But Augereau's fears prevailed, especially as St Cyr was
ill and unable to urge the view, which he afterwards
expressed,” that the line of the Oder should have been
defended, though he was for a defence on the left bank.
On the 22nd February Eugène retired once more to
Köpenick a short way south-east of Berlin. He had been
alarmed once more by the destruction, on the 2 Ist, of a
1 Corr. 19,688 of 9th March. * Corr. 19,721.
* Hist. Mil., iv. pp. 6-9. On the next page St Cyr says he found Augereal"
nervously keeping his troops in the streets of Berlin. St Cyr promptly sent.
them back to barracks.
EUGENE'S OPERATIONS 37
regiment of Italian chasseurs by Cossacks. Even now, he
took half measures and, instead of keeping his force united,
left 4ooo of Gérard's division at Frankfort, where such a
paltry force was useless. Rechberg's Bavarians were at
Krossen, and a battalion of the Guard at Furstenwalde
maintained communication between these two outposts and
the main body.
Frederick William of Prussia + at last made up his mind
to join the crusade against Napoleon, and signed (28th
February) the Convention of Kalisch, allying himself with
the Russians. Had that agreement been made public there
and then, Yorck and Bülow could have joined Wittgenstein,
and Blücher could have brought his forces to the Russian
left. But the King of Prussia, trembling for the fate of
Berlin, refused to publish his decision, or to sanction active
measures by Prussian troops, before the Russians were in
secure possession of his capital. Kutusow, the Russian
commander, on the other hand, refused to move forward
without Prussian co-operation. The deadlock was solved
by a compromise. Frederick William directed his troops to
follow the Russians to the Oder, but to avoid active hostilities
until war was declared.
It was not till the I 5th March that the French am-
bassador in Prussia got wind of the Convention of Kalisch.
Prussia's declaration of war only reached Paris on the 27th.
The allied sovereigns, under the impression that the
French were in no position to offer resistance, decided on a
very widely extended advance to the Elbe, on which river
they proposed to concentrate towards their left, so as to be
in touch with Austria, whose adhesion to the side against
Napoleon was hoped for, and believed to be imminent.
Kutusow was to be in supreme command. Wittgenstein,
with the right wing (I 9,000 Russians and 3 O,OOO Prussians
under Yorck and Bülow), was to cross the Oder between
Küstrin and Stettin. Blücher, on the left, with the corps
of Winzingerode (14,000, mostly Russian cavalry) and his
* He had left Berlin on the 22nd February on the pretext that he was going
to Breslau to raise the fresh contingent for Napoleon.
38 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
own 27,ooo Prussians, was to advance from Silesia on
Dresden ; Kutusow, with the reserve (Miloradowich and the
Russian Guard) of 30,000, to follow three or four marches
behind the left wing. Altogether there were I2O,Ooo men
in three groups, separated by distances which forbade any
hope of mutual support. What a chance for a capable
French leader, and what advantage Napoleon himself would
have taken of it !
But Eugène was certainly not even a capable general,
and, as soon as Wittgenstein crossed the Oder, on the
Ist March, half-way between Küstrin and Stettin, he fell
back to the west side of Berlin. What Napoleon thought
of this move is best shown in the words of his letter of the
9th March to his stepson."
“Nothing could be less military than the course you
have taken in posting your headquarters at Schönberg, in
rear of Berlin ; it was quite clear that that was to call up
the enemy. If, on the contrary, you had taken a position
in front of Berlin . . . . the enemy would have had to
believe you wished to fight a battle. Then he would not
have passed the Oder till he had assembled 60,000 or
8o,ooo men with the serious intention of capturing Berlin ;
but he was still far from being able to do that. . . . You
could have gained twenty days, which would have been
very advantageous from a political, as well as from a
military point of view . . . . But from the day on which
your headquarters were placed behind Berlin it was tanta-
mount to saying that you did not wish to keep that city;
you have thus abandoned an attitude which it is the art of war
to know how to preserve.”
The enemy clearly thought little of Eugène after his
successive retreats, and ventured to advance on Berlin with
7Ooo cavalry and Cossacks (inclusive of the Free corps) and
5 Ooo infantry, whilst Wittgenstein's main body was still
(4th March) full five days' march short of Berlin. It was
before this puny force that Eugène's 30,000 men fell back.
The Viceroy was making for Wittenberg, leaving to their
1 Corr. 19,688.
EUGENE'S OPERATIONS 39
fate Gérard at Frankfort and Rechberg at Krossen. The
former succeeded in cutting his way through to Wittenberg,
whilst Rechberg got away by Güben and Luckau to Torgau.
Admission to that fortress was refused to him by Thiel-
mann, commanding the Saxon garrison, and he was
therefore compelled to make for Meissen.
Eugène continued his retreat till he had placed practically
the whole of his army behind the Elbe. Under his orders
of the Ioth March, his forces were thus disposed. In the
centre, astride of the Elbe at Wittenberg, Grenier commanded
the 35th and 36th divisions of the XI. corps, I 8,Ooo men.
The right wing, commanded by Davout, comprised the
remains of Reynier's (VII.) corps, which had retreated from
Glogau, the 3 Ist division, with which had been amalgamated
the divisions of Girard and Gérard, and the 1st brigade of
the Ist division—I 7,ooo men in all. With these Davout
had to hold Dresden and defend the Elbe from Königstein
to Torgau. At the last-named place was Thielmann, with
5ooo or 6000 Saxon levies. He refused to admit either
side, though his sympathies were clearly with the allies.
The left wing consisted of about 35,000 men of the V.
corps under Lauriston at Magdeburg. º
Headquarters and Roguet's Guard division (3 Ooo men)
were at Leipzig.
Victor, with I 2,Ooo men of the 4th division and the 2nd
brigade of the Ist, was organising behind the Saale at
Bernburg.
Carra St Cyr was at Hamburg, where his I ooo men, in
the midst of a hostile population, were in a very critical
position. Morand, with 200o Saxons, had been forgotten,
and, on hearing by chance of the evacuation of Berlin, had
started for Hamburg. It was very doubtful if he would be
able to escape.
Eugène, with the choice of defending either the upper or
the lower Elbe (for he could not defend the whole), had
elected the former, the effect of which would be to leave open
to the enemy the 32nd military division, which was French
territory, and to expose Holland and Hamburg. He under-
40 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
stood that his rôle was that of an army covering the assembly
of Napoleon's new army in the valley of the Main, and it
seemed to him that he must hold Dresden, and cover directly
the roads from the Main to the Elbe. He had not yet
received the Emperor's letter of the 9th March, already
quoted,” censuring his arrangements for the defence of the
line of the Oder from the rear. Not only did he propose
to defend the Elbe in a similar manner, but he also com-
mitted the fatal blunder of spreading his forces in a cordon
of I 50 miles in length, with no reserves to speak of. On
the I 5th March, Napoleon hearing of these dispositions
wrote condemning them absolutely.” They were, he said,
well calculated to stop the passage of light troops ; but
what was to happen if the enemy passed in mass, as he
could easily do when and where he pleased ? The only
way to defend a river line was to place large forces in the
bridge heads beyond the river, where they would be ready
to take the offensive as soon as the enemy should commence
his passage:—
“Nothing is more dangerous than to attempt seriously
to defend a river by lining the bank opposite (to the enemy);
for once the enemy has surprised the passage, and he always
does surprise it, he finds the army in a very extended
defensive position, and prevents its rallying.”
But already Napoleon had written on the 2nd March
and again on the 9th. In the letter of the 2nd * he had
told Eugène exactly what to do if he retreated from Berlin,
a measure which, in the letter of the 9th,” when he had
heard of it, he condemned as unnecessary as matters then
stood. The main body of the available forces should be
collected in front of Magdeburg, only a small portion being
spread along the river to prevent the passage of light troops.
If circumstances forced the army to abandon Magdeburg, it
* Supra, pp. 36, 38. f * Corr. 19,721.
* The letter was addressed to Lauriston in cypher, in which form he was to
pass it on to Eugène, if he had a cypher arranged with the Viceroy, which the
Emperor had not. Lauriston had no such cypher, and the orders only reached
Eugène on the 9th. Lanrezac, p. 61. See also Corr. 19,640 to Lauriston.
* Corr. 19,688.
EUGENE'S OPERATIONS 4I
should have its line of operations on Wesel, not on Mayence.
In fact, Napoleon preferred to defend the lower rather than
the upper Elbe, whilst Eugène, by retreating on Wittenberg,
exposed (as the writer believed) Magdeburg itself, as well
as Hamburg, Holland, etc. That was not quite so, seeing that
Eugène had 35,000 men at Magdeburg. No doubt, as Col.
Lanrezac says, the Emperor's reproaches were, strictly speak-
ing, deserved ; but it must be admitted that the task imposed
on the Viceroy was a very difficult one, especially when it is
remembered that a large portion of his troops had deteriorated
in consequence of a long retreat unrelieved by any success,
and that he was very inferior to the enemy in cavalry.
Moreover, Napoleon, according to his custom, persistently
over-valued Eugène's strength, and undervalued that of the
enemy. He does not blame himself for not taking the
obvious measure of putting at the head of his covering
troops, not a young and inexperienced general like his
stepson, but a man like Davout or Gouvion St Cyr, both of
whom were available. The former had so often, especially
in 1806 and 1809, proved his worth that it seems inexplic-
able that the Emperor should not have chosen him on this
occasion, or, later on, for the task of the command in Silesia,
which was given to the honest but by no means brilliant
Macdonald. Eugène did not in the least understand what
the Emperor contemplated, and it is not much to be
wondered at that he did not. One thing he did know was
that Napoleon was, in his instructions and censures, mis-
representing the actual condition of affairs. He had told
Eugène that the enemy had not as many troops as he had.
That was wrong, for they had I 2 O,Ooo good troops, whilst
Eugène could not put more than 80,000 in line, when he
had deducted the Saxons in Torgau, who would not move,
and the divisions of Durutte and Rechberg, which would
have to be sent to the rear to reorganise. Of the 8o,ooo
men, I 2,OOO (the Ist and 4th divisions) were not yet
properly organised.
Accepting his own false assumptions on these points,
what Napoleon now required to be done was this:—
42 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Eugène was to take post with 65,000 men east of Magde-
burg, in a position guarded by works at such a distance
that he could manoeuvre between them. Behind his right
rear would be Victor on the left bank, guarding the Elbe
as far as Torgau. From Torgau to Bohemia the river had
to be watched by Reynier with 12,000 men (he really only
had 6ooo). Davout would be on Eugène's left rear, about
opposite the infall of the Plauen canal. Both Victor and
Davout, whilst depriving the enemy of the chance of using
boats on the river, were to maintain means of passage for
themselves, in case they were required to cross and operate
against the flank of a general attack on Eugène. In con-
sequence of these arrangements, the enemy would be
compelled, if he attempted to pass the Elbe, to do so three
marches at least above or below Magdeburg, and would
certainly not dare to do so both above and below, with two
bodies separated by six or seven marches, and with Eugène
in the middle of them.
As for Dresden, Napoleon admitted the importance which
Eugène attached to it, but said it was useless to attempt to
defend it with Reynier's force, if the enemy marched against
it in strength. All Reynier could then do would be to fall
back successively behind the Mulde and the Saale, whilst
Eugène faced south, with his left on the Elbe and his right
on the Harz Mountains.
The last thing the Emperor desired, if Eugène was driven
from the Elbe line, was to have him falling back on the
new army towards Mayence. His retreat should be towards
the lower Rhine. If the enemy were rash enough to follow
him in that direction, the Emperor, advancing from the
Main, would be in a position analogous to that before Jena ;
only, thanks to the possession of Magdeburg, his strategic
position would be much better than it was in 1806. His
new army would not be ready before the middle of April ;
therefore he wanted the enemy, if he succeeded in passing
the Elbe, to be drawn away from, not towards, Mayence
and the Main. That was why he prescribed Eugène's line
of operations on the lower Rhine. .
EUGENE'S OPERATIONS 43
But Napoleon thought the allies might very well be kept
beyond the Elbe for a considerable time by the arrange-
ments he ordered. If they were to cross towards Dresden,
he held that a threat of advance by Eugène on Berlin
would very soon compel them to return to the right bank,
and he was convinced that, if they did attempt a passage,
it would be above Magdeburg, not below it. Also, he
held that they would not dare to cross at all without
watching Eugène with at least 8o,Ooo men, a force he
rightly held them incapable of finding in addition to an
equal force thrown over the river, and exposed to be
attacked by Eugène rapidly falling back to the left bank
through Magdeburg. Moreover, they could not cross
between Dessau and Magdeburg, owing to Victor's posi-
tion. Consequently, they would have to force the lines of
the Mulde and the Saale, on which they could be delayed
by Victor and Reynier whilst Eugène came up.
Eugène's task did not include the fighting of a great
battle. He must carry it out by manoeuvring, not by
fighting.
The Emperor reckoned without his host when he cal-
culated that a threat of advance on Berlin by Eugène would
fetch the allies back to the right bank. They had lost all
fear of the French after their long retreat, and they were
quite prepared to treat Eugène's army as an almost negligible
quantity.
Notwithstanding all that was said in the letter of 9th
March, it was only on the 18th that the Viceroy made up
his mind to take post east of Magdeburg. It was a diffi-
cult operation to concentrate his dispersed army.
Davout left Dresden on the 17th March, after blowing
up an arch of the bridge there, leaving behind only 6000
or 7ooo men under Durutte." When he was within a
march of Leipzig (2 Ist March), the 35th and 36th divisions
and Roguet's Guard division marched from Wittenberg and
* Reynier had fallen ill. Davout's destruction of the bridge was censured by
Napoleon as calculated both to invite an advance of the enemy and to exasperate
the inhabitants (Corr. 19,767). The latter effect it certainly had.
44 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Leipzig on Magdeburg, leaving Victor along the left bank
of the Elbe. On the 23rd March a division of the V.
corps moved to Möckern, a short way east of Magdeburg,
so as to draw the enemy away from Wittenberg; but the
main body of the corps still remained on the left bank.
Meanwhile, Carra St Cyr had lost Hamburg to Tetten-
born, and had later lost 2000 men under Morand, who
were destroyed or captured as they advanced on Lüneburg,
unsupported by the other 3ooo whom Carra St Cyr took
back to keep Bremen in order. On the other flank, Durutte,
reduced to 3ooo men owing to the departure of his Saxons
for Torgau, was forced to leave Dresden, where Blücher
passed the Elbe with light troops on the 27th March.
At this time there was a good deal of hesitation at the
headquarters of the allies. Wittgenstein was, on the 20th
March, still at Berlin with his main body, with advanced
troops towards Magdeburg and the Elbe. Blücher, in the
south, was moving slowly towards Dresden, with the head
of his main body no farther forward than Liegnitz, though
his partisans and cavalry were already on the Elbe. The
army of reserve was still far behind at Glogau and Kalisch.
Kutusow and Scharnhorst viewed matters in very different
lights. The latter, and the Prussians generally, wanted to
push rapidly on ; the Russian did not believe much in the
value of his Prussian allies, and insisted on holding back
till he had reorganised his own army. The Tsar would
have gone with the Prussians but could not induce Kutu-
SOW to COncur.
Kutusow's plan was for Wittgenstein to leave a few
thousands to mask Magdeburg, whilst, with his main body,
he marched to join Blücher by the right bank of the Elbe.
When the two had joined forces, they could cross the Elbe
and march on Leipzig. Wittgenstein objected that that
would mean exposing Berlin, and he proposed moving to
the south-east of Magdeburg, whence he could cover
Berlin indirectly. At the same time he would throw
a bridge at Rosslau. He would thus, whilst still covering
Berlin, be ready, when Blücher was on a level with him,
EUGENE'S OPERATIONS 45
to cross the Elbe. He thought a rapid movement of his
advanced guard on to the lower Saale, the heads of Blücher's
corps being already on the Pleisse, would effectually stop
any idea of an advance on Berlin by Eugène. At the
same time, a raid was to be carried out by Czernitchew
crossing the Elbe below Magdeburg at Havelburg, and
trying to penetrate into Hanover and Westphalia. Eugène,
a prey to various, generally unfounded, rumours of hostile
operations on the lower Elbe, still kept his main body on
the left bank, and even withdrew the division of the V.
corps which he had advanced to Möckern. At last, on the
3 Ist March, he learnt that Wittgenstein had left Berlin
and appeared to contemplate passing the Elbe at Rosslau.
Then the Viceroy decided to carry out the Emperor's
orders, by taking his main body across the river, leaving
Victor to guard the lower Saale, and twelve battalions to
watch the Elbe towards Tangermunde, below Magdeburg.
The latter were to be supported, in case of a passage below
Magdeburg, by Davout with I I,000 men. Eugène still
could not make up his mind to take over a large enough
force. He had about 5 O,OOO men, including 4oDO cavalry
and I 80 guns.
We do not propose to describe in detail the combats
known by the name of Möckern, which took place on the
3rd, 4th, and 5th April, between Eugène's forces and those
of Wittgenstein. The Viceroy, obsessed by the fear of
losing his communications with Magdeburg, wasted a large
portion of his troops in guarding posts which could have
been held safely by much smaller forces. His heart was
not in the operation, and he was within a hair's breadth of
being beaten when night brought the combat of the 5th
April to a close. An incorrect report that Wittgenstein
was passing the Elbe at Rosslau gave Eugène the desired
excuse for taking his whole force back to the left bank
next day.
His action had done no good. He had only drawn
against himself a portion of Wittgenstein's force, instead of
the main body, and his ill-success enabled the allies, with
46 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
some show of truth, to vaunt a great victory. If they had
not gained that, they were, at least, able to produce a favour-
able moral effect in Germany. As for Wittgenstein, he
crossed the Elbe without difficulty on the I oth April, that
is exactly at the juncture, which he had intended all along,
when Blücher had reached Leipzig.
After his failure at Möckern, the Viceroy decided to
take post on the lower Saale, for the defence of the strip
of country between that river and the Harz mountains.
From the 6th to the 21st April nothing of much import-
ance happened on this part of the theatre of war. Thiel-
mann in Torgau would give it over neither to one side nor
the other, but he seems to have incited the allies to an
attack on Wittenberg. He would probably have gone
over to them himself, had he been sure that his officers
would support him.
The attack on Wittenberg failed, thanks to Lapoype,
who commanded the French troops there.
The allies were waiting for the rest of their army, since
they had available at present only about 70,000 men. The
Russian Guard, having only left Kalisch on the 7th April,
could not be at Leipzig till the 27th or 28th. Kutusow
was still obstructive. Miloradowich was following Blücher.
Barclay de Tolly, with 14,000 men, was besieging Thorn.
He was set free to march to the front by the surrender of
the fortress on the 18th April. Spandau yielded three
days later.
The allies, meanwhile, busied themselves repairing the
bridge at Dresden, constructing two more there, and others
at Meissen and at Mühlberg. The King of Saxony was
trying to play the neutral, and it was under his orders that
Thielmann held Torgau against both sides.
On the 19th April, the allies, alarmed by a report that
Napoleon was advancing from the Main to join the Viceroy,
began to concentrate. It was, in fact, not till the 2 I st
April that the advanced guard of Napoleon's army began
to appear at Erfurt.
CHAPTER V
NAPOLEON'S CONCENTRATION ON THE SAALE

APOLEON had lost in Russia, in killed,
wounded, sick, and prisoners, half a million
of men. Yorck's corps of Prussians, and
Schwarzenberg's Austrians, had deserted him,
and the latter had carried off Poniatowski’s Poles. Such
disasters would have crushed most men ; on Napoleon
they had no such effect. His ambitions of Empire, and his
hopes of recovering his position of the beginning of I 812,
were as high as ever, and his active brain was as busy as
ever in evolving great schemes.
His first project for the coming campaign, says Count
Yorck,” “need not fear comparison with his best, either in
point of boldness or of brilliancy.” It is explained in
“Notes for the Viceroy of Italy,” dated the 11th March.”
After estimating various distances in marches, the Emperor
says that the principal objective of the army appears to be
to come as soon as possible to the rescue of Danzig. He
assumes Eugène's army concentrated at Magdeburg, Havel-
berg, and Wittenberg. From the two latter it is only three
marches to Berlin. The army of the Main, which was in
process of assembly when he wrote, he assumed to be con-
centrated at Würzburg, Erfurt, and Leipzig. It would be
a natural movement, which could easily be concealed from
the enemy, to march the army of the Elbe, followed by
that of the Main, via Havelberg to Stettin. Arrived there,
the army would have passed the Oder and gained ten
days, without the enemy (whom Napoleon assumed to be
at Dresden, Glogau, and Warsaw) being able to arrange
* Mapoleon as a General, ii. p. 242. - * Corr. 19,697.
47
48 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY.
himself so as to cover Danzig. He continues : “After
having made all demonstrations to induce the belief that
I wish to march on Dresden and into Silesia, my intention
will probably be (under cover of the Thuringian mountains
and the Elbe) to march by Havelberg, reaching Stettin by
forced marches, with 300,000 men, and to continue the
march of the army on Danzig, where I could arrive in
fifteen days; and on the twentieth day of movement, after the
army had passed the Elbe, I should have relieved that town,
and should be master of Marienburg, of the Island of Nogat,
and of all the bridges of the lower Vistula. So much for
the offensive.”
He regretted that Magdeburg with its fortress was not at
Werben, but, as that could not be helped, he was anxious to
have, if possible, a fortified passage of the Elbe at Werben,
or somewhere in that direction. It would not be possible
to take the offensive decidedly before the beginning of May.
This project at once strikes one as a deviation from the
Emperor's general principle of making his objective the
enemy's army. But, if he went direct for that army, there
was always the danger that it would fall back straight
before him, and that, with his great deficiency in cavalry,
he would not be able to bring it to a decisive action. On
the other hand, as Colonel Lanrezac remarks, a “coup de
théâtre" of the kind contemplated would go much farther
to re-establish the Emperor's lost prestige than merely
driving the enemy straight back on Warsaw. Moreover,
in his march through the north of Germany, Napoleon
would have Prussia at his mercy, and it must be remembered
that on the date of his note he knew nothing of the
Convention of Kalisch, and was not to receive Prussia's
declaration of war for more than a fortnight. By relieving
the fortresses of the Oder and the Vistula he would be able
to draw in the veterans of their garrisons. Finally, he
would be in a position as he advanced (unless the Russians
retreated with great expedition) to fall from the north on
their communications with Poland, and fight a new Jena
with his front towards France. As he still held all the
NAPOLEON'S CONCENTRATION ON THE SAALE 49
permanent fortified passages of the Elbe and the Oder, the
Russians would be dependent for their retreat on temporary
bridges.
The scheme was never carried out, though we shall find
the Emperor recurring to modifications of it later on. The
reasons for its abandonment are not difficult to infer. To
begin upon, at the commencement of May, when the
offensive movement was contemplated, Napoleon had hardly
more than two-thirds of the 3oo,ooo men with whom he
proposed to reach Stettin, to say nothing of a force left to
“fix” the enemy towards Dresden during his movement
by Havelberg. For such a scheme as his he would
require a great superiority of numbers. Moreover, great
mobility and endurance were requisite for the forced
marches extending over many days. Could these be
expected from the young troops now being raised ? Again,
long before the beginning of May, Prussia had joined the
Russians.
The Emperor talks of its being easy to conceal his move-
ment from the enemy. But, with his inferiority in cavalry,
and with the widespread hostility to the French all over
Germany, that was hardly probable.
Lastly, before May arrived, it had become necessary to
wheel into line the King of Saxony, who was coquetting
with the Austrian scheme of armed neutrality. Bavaria and
other States of the Rhenish Confederation were also not
above suspicion.
Let us now turn from the scheme which did not come
off to the newer one which was actually executed. The
Emperor's first objective now was to defeat the enemy's
army, drive it across the Elbe, and re-establish himself in
Saxony.
About the beginning of April he had the following forces
assembling in or near the valley of the Main —
(I) III. corps (Ney), 40,000 men," about Schweinfurt and
Würzburg. -
* Strengths are given in round figures. The corps were not yet completed.
See Map I. (inset a).
D
50 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
(2) VI. Corps (Marmont), 25,000 men, about Hanau.
(3) Guard (Mortier and Bessières), I 6,ooo men, Mayence.
(4) Corps of Observation of Italy (Bertrand), 40,000 men,
marching from the Tyrol on Bamberg, where its head was
due about the 15th April. It was echeloned by brigades
over a length of ten marches.
(5) Bavarian division (Raglowich), 8ooo men, Baireuth.
(6) Baden-Hessian division (Marchand), 8ooo men,
Würzburg.
(7) Wurtemberg division (Franquemont), 7 Ooo men,
Mergentheim.
Altogether between I 4O,OOO and I 5 O,OOO men.
The new scheme, if less ambitious than that for the relief
of Danzig, might yet lead to great results, if all went well
for Napoleon.
He had very little exact information as to the positions
and movements of the enemy, but he did know for certain
that their headquarters were still at Kalisch on the 22nd
March, that they would probably not move thence before the
Ist April, and that, consequently, the Russians and Prussians
could not be in full force on the left bank of the Saale
before the end of April. But, like Moltke in 1870, he had
to contemplate the possibility of their risking an advance
without waiting for their full force. In that case, they
might cross the Saale so early as the 20th April. He, on
the other hand, would not be ready to advance from the
Main before the I 5th, and could not reckon on assembling
his corps on the Saale before the last days of April. In
order to conform to his own principle that “all unions of
corps d'armée should be effected in rear and far from the
enemy,” he must choose a point well to the west of that
river. He selected Erfurt as the point of assembly for all
but Bertrand’s group. The enemy could not pass the Saale
by the 20th with more than about 70,000 men, so, even
without Bertrand, he would still have a large superiority.
In the event of this premature advance by the enemy,
Eugène's army of the Elbe would take post behind the
Wipper, with its left on the lower Saale, and its right on
NAPOLEON'S CONCENTRATION ON THE SAALE 5T
the Harz Mountains. Seeing that Napoleon held all the
fortified passages of the Elbe,” and also that, for political
reasons, the allies would not be willing to move far away
from Austria, it was certain they would pass the Elbe above
Torgau. If, after passing it, they advanced westwards they
would be threatened in right flank by Eugène's army, very
little inferior to them in numbers, in the position above named,
whilst in front they would have at first 50,000 of the army
of the Main, with another 40,000 arriving very shortly.
The Elbe army would thus be covering, indirectly from a
flank position, that of the Main. Such a system of defence
was preferable to a directly covering position, since, in the latter
case, Eugène, falling back before a superior enemy, would
have done so on the heads of Napoleon's own columns, and,
not to speak of difficulties of supply, etc., would have pro-
duced a very bad moral effect in the new army. Moreover,
the enemy would not hesitate to attack him if he were
directly in front of the army of the Main. It would be a
very different matter for them to attack him when their
own left flank was threatened by Napoleon's advance.
However, as it was not at all likely that the allies would
venture to advance before the arrival of the Russian Guard,
Napoleon calculated that they were not likely to be
north of the latitude of Leipzig, by which town he proposed
to debouch in full force, drawing to his assistance the army
of the Elbe.
There were two possibilities with regard to the allies. In
the first place they might, and, with their superior oppor-
tunities for acquiring information, it was probable they would
realise the true direction of his movement. In that event,
if they resolved not to retreat but to meet him, he would be
able to attack with double their strength, he was almost
certain of victory, and it was possible he might be able to
ruin them by driving them into the Elbe.
But that was not what he most desired. He hoped that,
having in their mind the manoeuvre of Jena, and noting the
* Torgau was held by the Saxons, but Napoleon was not aware that Thielmann
held it against both sides. Anyhow, it was not open to the allies.
52 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN ON GERMANY
advance of the corps from Italy, which was marching by the
line Bamberg-Coburg-Saalfeld-Naumburg, they might be
induced by demonstrations to move towards the upper
Saale. In that case he would move rapidly with his left on
Dresden, sweeping away the detachments which he might
meet, and severing the enemy's communications. That
would be precisely the manoeuvre of Jena, carried out from
the north instead of from the south, with the French left,
instead of the right, in advance.
Supposing the allies marched against Eugène, the Viceroy
would fall back slowly, and the allied movement would be
almost immediately arrested by the threat of Napoleon's
forces from Erfurt against their left flank. If they persisted
in advancing they would very soon find themselves hemmed
in between Eugène, Napoleon, and the Elbe about Magde-
burg. Seeing that they would not be more than half the
combined French strength, their position would be almost
desperate.
Orders of the 28th and 29th March required the III. corps
(Ney), VI. (Marmont), and the Guard to be, on the 18th
April, on the road to Erfurt, the first by the road
Schweinfurt-Meiningen, the two latter by that through
Hanau, Fulda, and Eisenach. The Bavarian division from
Baireuth would watch the Franconian forest towards Hof and
Schleiz; the Badeners at Coburg, with an advanced guard
at Gräfenthal, would watch towards Saalfeld. On the same
date the corps of Italy would have its two leading divisions
at Bamberg, ready to start next day towards Saalfeld.
On the 9th April the Emperor heard of the occupation
of Dresden by the allies; a day or two later he knew that
Eugène's operations beyond the Elbe had failed, and that
he was posting the army of the Elbe behind the Wipper.
Napoleon at once pressed on the march of his own
columns. The following passages from his letter of the
12th April to Bertrand 1 explain his views:–
“The Prince of the Moskowa (Ney) will have informed
you that it is my intention to refuse my right . . . thus
* Corr. 19,852.
NAPOLEON'S CONCENTRATION ON THE SAALE 53
making a movement the converse of that which I made in
the campaign of Jena, so that if the enemy penetrate to
Baireuth, I can arrive before him at Dresden, and cut him
from Prussia. . . . The Duke of Istria (Bessières), having
under his orders the Duke of Ragusa (Marmont), 40,000
infantry and I O,Ooo cavalry, is moving on Eisenach, where
he will arrive the I 8th or 20th. The Prince of Moskowa is
moving on Erfurt, where he also will arrive on the 20th ;
he has under his orders 60,000 men, including the allies,
and some thousands of horses. . . . As I suppose your
cavalry and your two divisions will be at Bamberg on the
16th, you will support the movement of the Prince of
Moskowa by moving with these two divisions and your
cavalry on Coburg. This movement is the most natural,
since it is the shortest, and at Coburg you will be distant
only two long marches from Meiningen, three from
Erfurt, and three from Jena, and thus you could always
manoeuvre on the Saale. Thus, if affairs turn out so that
the Prince of the Moskowa moves on Erfurt, your position
at Coburg will place you on his right, and thence you can
move, according to circumstances, on Jena, Erfurt, or
Meiningen. . . . The enemy is far from suspecting the
considerable number of forces which are advancing on the
Saale. If we were lucky enough for the enemy to make a
strong advance on Baireuth, he would soon be recalled to
Dresden. . . . You can . . . direct the march of your
2nd and 3rd divisions on Würzburg.”
The French were thus, on the 12th April, in three
Iſla SSGS 2—
(a) Army of the Elbe, 60,000 to 65,000 + men, behind
the Wipper.
(b) The III., VI., and Guard corps, the Baden and
Wurtemberg divisions, IO 5,000 to I IO,Ooo men, moving
from the Main by Schweinfurt and by Fulda to Erfurt.
(c) The corps of Italy and the Bavarian division marching
by Bamberg on Coburg. -
This last group was intended as a bait to draw the enemy,
* Exclusive of 18,000 or 20,000 under Davout on the lower Elbe.
54 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
if possible, towards the upper Saale. Bertrand would avoid
compromising himself, and, if seriously threatened, would
avoid action, either by drawing nearer to the other corps on
his left, or, if it so happened that transverse communications
rendered this difficult, he could always fall back towards
Coburg, or even farther south. Till he should be seriously
threatened he would follow the line Coburg-Saalfeld–Jena,
always keeping on the left bank of the Saale. The army
of the Elbe held fast for the present about Aschersleben,
whilst that of the Main and the Corps of Observation of Italy
were moving towards the Saale ; but, though not attacked,
it was not unmolested ; for the enemy's cavalry gained
several small successes which, though not important in
themselves, were calculated to create alarm in Eugène's
army. One detatchment, under the son of Blücher, reached
Weimar and was joined there by a Saxon battalion, which
passed over to the enemy. Helwig, with I 50 cavalry, made
a successful attack on the greatly superior rearguard of
Rechberg, capturing two guns and Ioo men. Next day
the same detachment dispersed a Westphalian regiment,
thereby creating a quite disproportionate alarm in the mind
of the commander of the Westphalian division, who magni-
fied this single squadron into a strong force of all arms.
These raids even created some excitement at Ney's head-
quarters, which had reached Erfurt.
Napoleon, leaving Paris at 4 A.M. on the I 5th, was in
Mayence forty hours later, and remained there till the 24th,
considering that there was no urgency for his appearance
at the front. There he made some changes in the organ-
isation of his army. The “Corps of Observation of
Italy” was split up into the IV. corps, consisting of
Morand's French, Peyri's Italian, and Franquemont's
Wurtemberg division, under Bertrand, whilst a XII. çorps,
under Oudinot, was formed of Pacthod’s and Lorencez's
divisions and Raglowich's Bavarians. The latter had been
acting somewhat suspiciously, falling back on Baireuth, in-
stead of holding the heights of Ebersdorf as ordered by
Napoleon. When called to account by Bertrand, Raglowich
NAPOLEON'S CONCENTRATION ON THE SAALE 55
pleaded orders of the King of Bavaria, and it was not till
the 22nd April that that sovereign directed him to obey
Bertrand.
part in his allegiance to Napoleon.
The incident pointed to hesitation on the king's
Marchand's Baden-Hessian division was placed by the
Emperor under Ney's orders as part of the III. corps, which
now had five divisions.
The armies of the Main and the Elbe now, on the 25th
April, comprised the following corps : *—
ARMY OF THE MAIN
III. corps (Ney), 8th, 9th, I oth, I Ith, and 39th
(Baden-Hessian) divisions © g 45, OOO
VI. corps (Marmont), 20th, 2 Ist, 22nd, 23rd
(not yet formed) divisions . . e 25, OOO
IV. corps (Bertrand), 12th, I 5th (Italian), 38th
(Wurtemberg) divisions tº º 3O,OOO
XII. corps (Oudinot), I 3th, I 4th, 29th
(Bavarian) divisions e e ſº º 25,000
Guard (Dumoustier), infantry. Partly Young,
partly Old Guard . II,OOO
Guard, cavalry 4,000
Total I 4O,OOO
ARMY OF THE ELBE
XI. corps (Macdonald), 3 Ist, 35th, 36th,
divisions g g ſe G º 22,OOO
V. corps (Lauriston), I 6th, I 7th, I 8th, I 9th
divisions c Q Q & º © 22,OOO
Guard (Roguet) . 3,5 OO
32nd division (Durutte) 4, 5 OO
4th division (Victor) sº o 6,OOO
Ist cavalry corps (Latour-Maubourg) 4,000
62,000
Grand total, both armies 202,OOO
* Lanrezac, p. II6. Figures and organisation based on present states in
Ministère de la Guerre.
56 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Their positions were as follows, from left to right:—
Army of the Elbe, headquarters at Hoym, with Victor
south of Bernburg, on the left bank of the Saale ; the rest
about Hoym and Aschersleben.
III. corps at and behind Weimar.
Guard, at and behind Erfurt.
VI. corps behind the Guard, from near Gotha to
Vach. -
Baden division about Ilmenau.
Wurtemberg division, between Königshofen and Hild-
burghausen.
IV. corps, Coburg.
XII. corps, Anspach and Nürnberg, with the Bavarian
division at Baireuth and Munchberg (detachment).
On the 22nd, Napoleon had despatched the following
orders for the 25th :—
(a) The army of the Main to advance on Jena and
Naumburg.
(b) Army of the Elbe to move up the Saale, occupying
Halle and Merseburg.
(c) Corps of Italy, if circumstances permitted, to
march by Saalfeld on Jena by the left bank of the
Saale. -
In a letter to Eugène, of the 22nd, Berthier says:—
“The intention of the Emperor is to guard the whole of
the Saale, in order to prevent the enemy from detaching
any party on the left bank of that river.” Napoleon was
so conscious of his inferiority in cavalry that he was obliged
to use the river as a screen for his movements.
On the 24th April, Napoleon left Mayence, reaching
Erfurt in the afternoon of the next day.
The assembly of the armies on the Saale was effected
without fighting, except at Halle, where an attack by
Lauriston was beaten off by the Prussian general Kleist.
Eugène, for reasons not apparent, moved very slowly, and
Bertrand was delayed by the difficulties of the road throu
the mountains from Coburg to Saalfeld.
By the 30th April, a considerable part of the army was
NAPOLEON'S CONCENTRATION ON THE SAALE 57
on the right bank of the Saale, the positions on the evening
of that day being as follows :-
Army of the Elbe :-
Headquarters, V. corps, and Guard at Merseburg (left
bank). Four battalions at Halle, which Kleist had evacu-
ated when Merseburg was occupied by the French.
XI. corps, on right bank in front of Merseburg, with the
Ist cavalry corps in front of it.
Durutte's (32nd) division, behind at Schäfstadt.
Victor (4th division). Headquarters at Bernburg, with
troops spread along the Saale from Barby to Wettin.
Westphalian division, assembling at Sondershausen.
Army of the Main :-
Imperial headquarters, Guard cavalry division, the Old
Guard portion of Dumoustier's Guard division," Weissen-
fels. Young Guard, Naumburg.
III. corps. Headquarters and four divisions east of
Weissenfels. Marchand's division, Stössen.
VI. corps. Headquarters and two divisions, Naumburg.
Friederichs' division, Kösen.
IV. corps. Headquarters and Morand's division, Dorn-
burg, with three battalions at Camburg.
Peyri's division, Jena.
Franquemont's division, Burgau, Kahla, and Rudolstadt.
XII. corps echeloned between Saalfeld and Coburg.
The assembly of the army was not yet complete, for the
XII. corps and the Wurtemberg division of the IV. were
still two days' march away from the main body. -
Let us now see what the allies had been doing whilst the
army of the Main was marching to the Saale.
Miloradowich, passing the Elbe at Dresden, between the
I6th and the 19th April, marched to join Blücher, who had
been in cantonments about Altenburg since the 14th. The
* Roguet's and Dumoustier's divisions after this became Old and Young Guard
respectively by transfer of troops. Each had been partly Old and partly Young
Guard so far. .
58 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Russian Guard, with which were the Tsar and the King of
Prussia, only reached Dresden on the 24th.
Hitherto, the influence of Kutusow had prevailed in the
councils of the allies, and, as we know, he distrusted the
value of the Prussian troops, whom he judged by the recol-
lection of 1806. He was now lying on his death-bed at
Bunzlau. He died on the 28th April, and henceforward
the command fell into the hands of men who, unlike their
great opponent, were incapable of forming a positive decision,
uninfluenced by the opinions or advice of others.
The Tsar had, before Kutusow's death, decided that the
command should be given to Wittgenstein. But there were
grave difficulties in the way of his appointment, for he was
only 44 years of age, many years the junior of Blücher,
Tormassow, and Miloradowich, and junior to the two latter
in the Russian army. He was, according to Clausewitz, full
of good will, activity, and enterprise, and Napoleon himself
was aware of his reputation for boldness.
Blücher, never inclined to overrate his own strategical
ability, or to push himself forward as a candidate for
supreme command, was willing to serve under Wittgenstein ;
but with the two Russians it was different. Consequently,
when Wittgenstein received his written appointment on the
27th April, though it styled him “Commander-in-chief of
the combined army of the allied powers,” it only gave him
“chief command of all troops under General of Cavalry
Blücher, and General Adjutant Winzingerode,” making no
mention of Tormassow's and Miloradowich’s commands.
To these two generals orders were conveyed by the Tsar
over the head of Wittgenstein, who, throughout his period of
command, found himself in the difficult position of having
orders thus passed, sometimes without his knowledge, by
the Tsar, who had successfully arrogated to himself the lead-
ing position. Wittgenstein's relations with Blücher were
cordial, partially owing to the esteem in which the latter's
Chief of Staff, Scharnhorst, was held at Russian head-
quarters by Wolkonski, Toll, d'Auvray (Chief of Staffº
Wittgenstein), and other advisers of the Tsar.

NAPOLEON'S CONCENTRATION ON THE SAALE 59
Up to 25th April Alexander's military advisers had their
attention fixed on Leipzig and Altenburg as the front line
for Wittgenstein's and Blücher's forces, whilst Miloradowich
should advance to Zwickau, and Tormassow to Chemnitz.
They believed that several weeks must elapse before
Napoleon could make his attack, and they believed that, if
he attacked earlier than the end of May, he would advance
with his right, refusing his left, that is, he would move for-
ward with the army of the Main. In that case, Toll, who
had been studying the writings of Jomini, advocated an
advance from Altenburg with the allied left, against
Napoleon's communications on the Leipzig-Naumburg road.
Toll was with Blücher and Scharnhorst at Altenburg on the
25th ; the information gathered there convinced him that the
decision was nearer at hand than had hitherto been believed.
He therefore posted off to Dresden, only to find the Tsar
had gone to visit his sister at Teplitz. As time pressed,
Wolkonski, Alexander's Chief of Staff, assumed the re-
sponsibility of ordering Tormassow to march at once from
Dresden in two columns, which were to reach Rosswein
and Freiberg on the 28th, Frohberg and Kohren on
the 3oth."
On the 26th April the allied positions were these :—
Wittgenstein's command—Bülow, in the north, with main
body between Cöthen and Rosslau, and advanced troops on
the lower Saale. Yorck at Zorbig, half-way between Halle
and Dessau, with two advanced guards at Wettin (Zilinski)
and Halle (Kleist). Berg at Landsberg.
Blücher's command—Winzingerode, main body between
Leipzig and Borna. Prussian infantry in the triangle Borna-
Altenburg-Mittweida. Russian cavalry pushed forward
on Weissenfels, Merseburg, and west of Altenburg. Under
orders from Blücher, reconnaissances in strength were made
on Dornburg, Camburg, and Naumburg.
On the 27th April, Berg was called into Leipzig, Yorck
to Schkeuditz, and Wittgenstein took post at Lindenau, the
* See Map.I.
60 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
western suburb of Leipzig. Zilinski having to retire from
Wettin before the advance of the army of the Elbe, burned
the boat bridge there and fell back on Leipzig.
To the south of Blücher, Miloradowich was at Chemnitz
on the 24th with a cavalry brigade at Zwickau.
On the 26th, Wittgenstein issued an order expressing
his intentions clearly, though he rather confused matters by
a subsequent “instruction ” of the 27th. In the order of
the 26th he wrote: “I desire to assemble all available troops
at Leipzig, so that, in union with the forces of Generals
Blücher and Winzingerode, I may, if the enemy assumes the
offensive by Weissenfels, offer battle at Lützen.”
His staff next drew up an impracticable scheme aiming at
meeting all possible combinations. The most notable point
about it was that it kept steadily in view the idea of fighting
a battle. It was severely criticised by Scharnhorst, whose
proposal was to withdraw to Brandis (midway between
Leipzig and Wurzen) if Napoleon appeared to be moving on
Leipzig, though he was willing to wait a little in the present
stations to see if the Emperor proposed to threaten the
allies' left flank by an advance on Pegau.
Clausewitz, on the other hand, had advocated a defensive
position between the Freiberg Mulde and the Elbe. Toll,
on hearing these different views, expressed his own that
Napoleon meant to push forward between Leipzig and
Altenburg, so as to separate Blücher from Wittgenstein.
Therefore, he proposed collecting all the allied forces about
Altenburg. If Napoleon advanced on Altenburg, the allies
would hold a good position in which to meet him, and also
cover their line of operations through Dresden. If, on the
other hand, the French moved towards Leipzig, they would
be threatened in right flank from Altenburg, and might
be driven on the Elbe between Wittenberg and Magdeburg.
At Altenburg the allies would have behind them a bridge
over the Elbe at Mühlberg, another at Meissen, and three
more at Dresden. To the Leipzig position Toll objected
that Napoleon, manoeuvring against the allies' left, might
cut them from their line of operations and drive them
NAPOLEON'S CONCENTRATION ON THE SAALE 6I
on Rosslau, where they had only one bridge. Meanwhile,
Wittgenstein’s “instruction" of the 27th reached the Tsar
on the 29th. Alexander would have nothing to do with
a battle east of Leipzig on the Partha, and sent Wolkonski
to stop the idea. By the time Wolkonski reached Witt-
genstein, the enemy had appeared in Weissenfels and
Naumburg, and Wittgenstein at once accepted Toll's pro-
posal for an assembly between Leipzig and Altenburg,
with the idea of moving forward from that position
towards Lützen, to attack the French right flank from
the south.
On the 28th April, Kleist had repulsed Lauriston's
attack on Halle, and was contemplating a counter attack.
Yorck remained at Schkeuditz, but sent a detachment to
replace the Russian cavalry in Merseburg. Berg remained
west of Leipzig.
On the 29th there were two small fights. In the first
place, Yorck's detachment was driven out of Merseburg,
the result of which was to compel Kleist to evacuate Halle
during the ensuing night. The other fight was at Weissen-
fels, between Souham's division of Ney's corps and the
cavalry of Lanskoi, ending in the repulse of the latter by
the French infantry.
Wittgenstein reached on this evening a position south
of Lützen, where he was protected by Lanskoi's cavalry.
The allied movements on the 3oth April were as
follows:–
Berg from Leipzig to Zwenkau.
Yorck from Schkeuditz to in front of Berg at Zwenkau.
Kleist from Schkeuditz to Lindenau.
Blücher's corps assembled at Borna.
Main army (Tormassow) reached Frohberg and Kohren.
Miloradowich remained at Penig, though Toll says he
was “invited ” to march to Altenburg.
As has been already noted, Napoleon had not completed
the concentration of his army on the evening of the 3oth
April, for the XII. corps and the Wurtemberg division
62 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
were still two days' march off. He had, however, imme-
diately at hand about I 45,000 men, and though he, as
usual now, somewhat underestimated the enemy's forces,
they certainly had not above two-thirds of that number.
With such numbers, and with Napoleon in personal com-
mand, there could not be much doubt of the result of a
battle. Something decisive was of the utmost importance
to Napoleon, in order to restore his prestige, so badly
shattered by the events of 1812, and to bind once more
to their allegiance Austria and the Princes of the Rhenish
Confederation. The Emperor's information regarding the
allies was, owing to his want of cavalry and the hostility
of the country, very meagre. He believed them to be
scattered from Dessau to Zwickau with their main body
about Altenburg.
If he delayed his decisive movements, the enemy, recog-
nising his vast numerical superiority, might lose heart and
slip away across the Elbe again, to lead him away on a
long stern chase in which, with his weakness in cavalry,
he would be powerless to force a decision. Once the
enemy realised fully that his object was to pass round their
right and force them to a battle with reversed front, they
would take fright and retreat. After all, the four divisions
which were spread along the upper Saale might help his
movement by drawing the enemy's attention in that direc-
tion. These reasons, and the necessity for gaining space
beyond the Saale, are doubtless, as Colonel Lanrezac
thinks, what prompted Napoleon to push on on the Ist
May, without waiting for the complete concentration of his
army. His orders for that day required the Elbe army
to advance from Merseburg to Schladebach ; III. corps and
cavalry of the Guard, from Weissenfels on Lützen ; VI.
corps to support the III. with two divisions, the third being
left at Naumburg; IV. and XII. corps to close as quickly
as possible towards Naumburg.
The march of the corps from Weissenfels and Naumburg
would take them on to an open plain eminently favourable
for cavalry, in which Napoleon was so very weak that his
NAPOLEON'S CONCENTRATION ON THE SAALE 63
troops were compelled to march in mass, so as to be ready
at any moment to receive the enemy's cavalry. Winzin-
gerode's cavalry, which attempted to interfere with the
passage of the Rippach brook, was beaten off, but the
French suffered a heavy loss by the death of Bessières, who
was killed at this spot by a round shot. The infantry
divisions drove off several Russian cavalry charges, and
Ney reported to the Emperor that his young troops had
done magnificently." In the evening of the Ist May the
French had attained the following positions —
The army of the Elbe had the XI. corps at Quesitz
and Markranstädt ; the V. behind Günthersdorf; I st
cavalry corps between Schladebach and Oetzsch. A
regiment was detached at Halle, and Durutte's division
guarded the passage of the Saale at Merseburg. Napoleon,
with the cavalry of the Guard, was at Lützen.
The army of the Main was thus distributed :—
Infantry of the Guard (2 divisions), Weissenfels.
III. corps. Headquarters, Kaja. Souham's division in
the four villages Gross and Klein Görschen, Kaja, and
Rahma, about three miles south of Lützen.
Girard's division in Starsiedel, west of Souham.
Brennier's and Ricard's divisions somewhere about Lützen,
exact position not certain, and Marchand's towards Lützen.
VI. corps. Headquarters, Rippach. Bonnet's division on
the heights east of Rippach.
Compans', west of the Rippach brook.
Friederichs', Naumburg.
IV. corps, Headquarters, Stössen; also Morand's division,
with advanced guard at Pretzsch. &
Peyri's division, Gross Gestewitz.
Wurtemberg division, Jena.
XII. corps, from Kahla back to behind Saalfeld.
* A great deal of fuss was made about this trifling affair, not because there
was anything remarkable in the repulse of the cavalry, but because the Emperor
was desirous of inspiriting and flattering his new troops.
St Cyr (iv. p. 34) thinks there was a great deal of unnecessary forming of
squares at this time in Napoleon's army. He believes neither in the necessity
for nor the efficacy of squares.
64 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
There was no fresh information about the enemy, and
the French army now consisted of a “corps de demonstra-
tion ” (IV. and XII. corps), which it was hoped might
draw the enemy, in part at least, up the Saale. The rest
of the army formed the “masse de manoeuvre,” assembled in
an area of about I 9 miles by 9, from Markranstädt to Stössen,
ready either to march on Leipzig, or to receive an attack by
the enemy, whether from Leipzig, from Pegau, or from Zeitz.
During this 1st May the allies moved thus : *—
Blücher from Borna to Rötha.
Main army (Tormassow) assembled at Borna.
Miloradowich to Altenburg.
Winzingerode's corps, after the repulse of its cavalry
already noted, bivouacked a mile or two west of Zwenkau,
thus forming the advanced guard of the army.
The day's fighting had demonstrated clearly that Napoleon
was marching towards Leipzig, but two unfortunate failures
of the cavalry misled the allied headquarters. In the first
place, the Russian cavalry failed to report that there was a
whole French division in the four villages about Kaja, and
another at Starsiedel. Secondly, the Prussian cavalry
reported that there were French troops of all arms in the
villages just beyond Droysig, that is some six miles to
the south-east of Stössen, whereas Bertrand certainly had
not spread half that distance from the latter village.
The consequence of this exaggerated report was the
creation of apprehension of an attack on the allied left
towards Zeitz, whilst the failure to report Souham's presence
about Kaja led to the belief that there was only a weak
flank guard there. The numbers and positions of the
allies available for battle on the 2nd May are thus
given by Von Cämmerer in his larger history of the spring
campaign.
* For positions of both sides see Map I. (inset b).
NAPOLEON'S CONCENTRATION ON THE SAALE 65
|
I. RUSSIANS
Infantry Cavalry Cossacks Artillery, etc. Guns
Berg (Zwenkau) o . 6,200 4oo 5oo 90o 6o
Kleist (Lindenau) * . . I,8oo 56o 8oo 2Oo 32
Winzingerode (Schkorlop). 6,400 4,ooo 2,700 1,35o 9o
Tormassow (Lobstedt) . 9,600 5,200 — I,7oo 136
Miloradowich (Altenburg). 5,ooo 1,740 1,000 1,13o 86
29, ooo II,90o 5,000 5,28o 404
II. PRUSSIANs
Blücher (Rotha) tº . I 8,500 5,500 – I,480 92
Yorck (Zwenkau) . 6,540 I,3oo — 7oo 4O
Kleist (Lindenau)! . . 2, 200 44O – 2 OO I6
27, 24O 7,24O — 2,38o 148
Grand Total 56,240 I9, I4o 5, ooo 7,660 552
In all 88,040 men, of whom 24, 140 were cavalry (including
Cossacks) and 552 guns.”
To these Napoleon could easily oppose I 40,000 men
and 372 guns, but only 75 OO of these would be cavalry.
The great superiority of the allies in both cavalry and artil-
lery naturally made them desire a battle in open country,
where these arms would tell most, and where the French
would lose the advantage of their superiority in village or
wood fighting.
* Kleist’s force was made up partly of Russians from the corps formerly com-
manded by Wittgenstein, partly of Prussians from Yorck's corps. Hence he
appears under both I. and II.
* Danilewski (p. 75, German translation) says there were 69,125 (35,775
Russians and 33,350 Prussians) at Lützen. Apparently he omits Kleist (62OO)
and Miloradowich (8870), neither of whom was engaged in the main battle.
CHAPTER VI
THE BATTLE OF LÜTZEN OR GROSS GóRSCHEN 1
T appears to have been assumed at the allied head-
quarters that Napoleon's corps were spread out in a
long column marching from Weissenfels by Lützen
to Leipzig, and that his right flank was guarded
only by a weak detachment at Kaja. The assumption was
rather a rash one, when it is remembered that Napoleon
himself was commanding. The assumed weakness of the
flank guard was, as already mentioned, based on the failure
of the Russian cavalry to report.
Wittgenstein's plan was to attack by surprise this long
column on its right flank,” to destroy the detachment at
Kaja, to advance thence on Lützen, breaking Napoleon's
line, and driving all that had passed Lützen northwards of
their line of operations on to the marshes of the Elster
below Leipzig.
Wittgenstein's orders for the 2nd May were not formally
issued till nearly midnight of the Ist-2nd, though it would
appear they had been partially communicated at an
earlier hour, since Blücher began his march so early as
I 1 P.M." on the 1st. Briefly, they were as follows:–
I. Blücher was to reach the Elster by 5 A.M. in two
columns, the right at Storkwitz, due east of Werben, the
left at Karsdorf, just north of Pegau. By 6 A.M. his right
column was to be across the Flossgraben, near Werben, his
left having already crossed half an hour earlier.
* See Maps II. (a) and IV. (d).
* Jomini (Vie de Map., iv. p. 278) says Wittgenstein expected to come on his
rear.
* Danilewski (p. 75) has a story that Blücher started late as the orders were
delivered to a sleepy staff officer, who put them unread under his pillow.
66
THE BATTLE OF LUTZEN 67
2. Yorck and Berg were to follow respectively Blücher's
left and right columns.
3. The Russian heavy artillery was attached to Blücher.
4. Winzingerode was to leave three battalions and a
company of light artillery to guard the defile of Zwenkau,
and to watch the Elster between that place and Leipzig.
The rest of his corps was to cover Blücher's right.
5. The Russian Guard was to be at 7 A.M. at Pegau and
Storkwitz, as reserve, holding the defiles at Stöntzsch,
Karsdorf, and Storkwitz.
6. After crossing the Flossgraben, Blücher was to bear
leftwards in first line, seeking, as soon as possible, to gain
with his left the insignificant Grüna brook which flows from
Gross Grimma to Dehlitz, and sending cavalry and artillery
to hold the heights beyond the brook. His right was to be
kept refused on the Flossgraben, and an advance was to be
made with the left leading, between the Rippach stream
and the Flossgraben. The second line to follow the Ist.
7. Kleist, at Lindenau and Leipzig, was only to act when
he heard the main body of the army engaged far to his left.
If he found himself attacked by very superior forces, he
would retreat through Leipzig on Wurzen.
8. Miloradowich to advance towards Zeitz.
9. In the event of an attack in force by the enemy from
Weissenfels on Blücher's left, the Russian Guard would
move to the left from Stöntzsch, and attack the French
right.
Io. The aim of all manoeuvres was to reach the enemy's
right flank. 1
These orders have met with very severe criticism from
both French and Prussian writers. They are enormously
long, extending to about I IOO words, and they give all
sorts of instructions regarding the tactics of all arms,
conduct of skirmishes, and other matters which should find
no place in general orders. Yet they entirely omit all
reference to the order of march of the columns before
reaching and in passing the Elster, the result of which
* Orders given in extenso by Lanrezac in Appendix.
68 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
was crossing of columns and consequent delay. Practically
no independence was left to corps commanders in the
battle, which, as Colonel Lanrezac remarks, Wittgenstein
seemed to think could be arranged in advance like a ballet.
The orders to Blücher to push his left along the Rippach,
whilst keeping his right on the Flossgraben, would eventually
result in his having a front of two-and-a-half miles, just
about double what his force, under the conditions of I 813,
was capable of covering. h
General von Caemmerer points out that, looking to the
actual positions of the allies on the evening of the Ist May,
the best way to pass the Elster would have been this :
Yorck and Berg direct on Hohenlohe village, Blücher at
Storkwitz, Russian Guard at Pegau. As Blücher's was the
longest column, it could have been shortened by sending
the Prussian cavalry by Pegau. It was necessary, no
doubt, to hold the defiles in rear in view of the probability
of eventual retreat, but, looking to the enemy's weak-
ness in cavalry, the guards were unnecessarily strong on
a day when every available man was required on the
battlefield.
It was, the same authority holds, unnecessary to send
Miloradowich's whole corps towards Zeitz to guard
against the supposed French advance from Stössen. His
cavalry would have sufficed, and his infantry could have
been used for the battle. Colonel Lanrezac suggests that
he should have gone to Predel, where he would have been
able to protect the allied left against the supposed danger,
or to have joined in the battle when that danger was found
to be illusory. Victory in the main battle would have
settled the question of the flank attack. For some unex-
plained reason, Miloradowich marched so slowly that he was
quite unable to take any active part. -
The consequences of the failure to give proper orders for
the march east of the Elster were that it was after 9 A.M.
when Yorck was able to begin passing, and that he crossed
Röder, who was delayed thereby till Io.3o. It was only
after Röder had passed that the Russian Guard, which
THE BATTLE OF LÜTZEN 69
had been waiting at Groitzsch since 7 A.M., could begin
to move. It could not have cleared Pegau before 2 or
2.30 P.M.
Here we must give some description of the battlefield,
which is contained in the space between the Rippach brook
and the Flossgraben. The latter is a small channel flowing
north-eastwards to Hohenlohe, where it sweeps round to the
north-west to the Weissenfels-Leipzig road, north-east of
Lützen. As a watercourse it is utterly insignificant, and is
no real obstruction to the passage of infantry. But it flows
generally between steep banks, which render it unpassable
by cavalry and artillery, except at the bridges. Moreover,
it was in most parts lined by trees and shrubs, which
increased the difficulty for those arms. The Elster, on the
other hand, which flows from south to north about a mile
east of the Flossgraben, is a stream generally unfordable,
and passable only at the bridges, even for infantry.
From Pegau through Stöntzsch towards Lützen is almost
a dead level as far as the Flossgraben, after which there is
a fairly sharp rise in the road for half-a-mile or so. Then
there is another stretch of nearly a mile of practically level
road to the height now known as the “Monarchen Hügel.”
From that point there is a steady, though slight, descent of
about I + miles to Gross Görschen, whence the road again
descends very slowly all the way to Lützen. Looking
southwards from Gross Görschen, one can see the edge of the
plateau which begins at the Monarchen Hügel, but it would
be impossible to see troops even I Oo yards beyond that
edge. The whole battlefield can be described as an undu-
lating, perfectly open plain, but the contours described
above must be remembered, for they caused all movements
of the allies on either side of the Flossgraben as far down
as Sitteln to be completely screened from the French in
the quadrangle formed by the four villages, Gross and Klein
Görschen, Rahna, and Kaja. -
On the western portion of the field the ground is some-
what more cut up as it falls to the valley of the Grüna
brook, but, generally speaking, it is a splendid country for
70 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
the operations of a powerful cavalry such as the allies had.
To the (French) right of the quadrangle of villages, about
a mile distant is the village of Starsiedel, whilst to the
left, rather closer but beyond the Flossgraben, is the village
of Eisdorf. It is not possible from the space between the
four villages to see Starsiedel. Only the upper part of its
church spire appears over the intervening height.
The villages were generally enclosed by gardens, hedges,
or earthen banks; the houses, though solidly built, were
thatched, and easily set on fire.
From the Monarchen Hügel,” there is an extensive view
over Lützen, and the level plain on which, in I 632,
Gustavus Adolphus met his death in the hour of victory.
At Io A.M. the allies' outposts and a staff officer or two,
who had ridden as far forward as the Monarchen Hügel,
could see clouds of dust rising from the Leipzig road as the
French troops marched. Müffling had already ridden
somewhat nearer the quadrangle of villages, and reported
that there appeared to be about 2000 men there, quite
unsuspicious of danger, and with no outposts. It was not
till I 1 A.M. that Wittgenstein arrived at the Monarchen
Hügel. A prisoner had stated that the troops in Gross
Görschen belonged to Souham’s division. As for the
allies, the corps of Blücher, Yorck, Berg, and Winzingerode
were on the plateau, but there was no chance of the Russian
Guard being in line before 3 P.M. The men, after many
hours of marching or standing under arms, were very
fatigued, and it was decided to give them some rest before
beginning the action.
Leaving them there, we must return to the French head-
quarters. It was for long accepted, partly on the strength of
Napoleon's own bulletin,” that he did not expect a battle on
the 2nd May, and that he was taken by surprise by the
offensive of the allies west of the Elster. There was cer-
* There are several heights called by this name on the battlefields of 1813.
The name was subsequently given to record the fact that the heights were where
the allied monarchs took their post. It seems convenient to refer to these spots
by a name which, of course, they had not acquired before the battle.
* Corr. I9,951.
THE BATTLE OF LÜTZEN 7I
tainly, as we shall see, a tactical surprise of Souham, but
there was no strategical surprise of the Emperor.
He was, on the evening of the 1st May, informed of an
assembly of hostile forces towards Zwenkau, and his orders
during the night and early morning clearly show that he
hoped, and believed it possible, that the allies would cross
the Elster to attack him. If they did not, but elected to
wait for him east of that river, he intended to “fix " them
on the Elster with part of his army, whilst with the rest he
crossed the river at Leipzig, turned their right, and, as he
hoped, destroyed them. If they were rash enough to cross
to the left bank and attack, they would be playing his
game; for, holding them with his centre, he would be able
to close in upon them on both wings. His evening orders
Were :-
I. Mortier, with the Guard, to reach Lützen early.
2. Marmont (VI. corps) to call up the division left at
Naumburg, to take post on the right bank of the Rippach,
releasing Marchand's battalions which were there, and
reconnoitring towards Pegau, whither the enemy had
retired. *-
3. Bertrand (IV. corps) to march on Starsiedel with, at
any rate, Morand's division, and, if possible, Peyri's, the
Wurtemberg division moving up to Naumburg.
4. Oudinot to make for Naumburg. -
At 4 A.M. Napoleon issued orders for Eugène's army —
Lauriston (V. corps) to march on Leipzig, Macdonald (XI
corps) on Markranstädt, whence he was to send reconnais-
sances on Leipzig and Zwenkau, the latter to act with one
which Ney was ordered to send in the same direction.
Ney was also ordered to send a strong reconnaissance on
Pegau, and to assemble all his five divisions on Kaja. Ney
was to be informed of the direction to be taken by Lauriston,
Marmont, and Bertrand, and that the last-named was due
at Kaja about 3 P.M. Under these orders, which von
Câmmerer commends as an example for all time in their
brevity and simplicity, an attack from the direction of
* Corr. 19,942.
72 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Pegau or Zwenkau would be held by Ney's 45,000 men
in front, whilst Marmont, Bertrand, Macdonald, and Lauris-
ton manoeuvred against the flanks and rear of the allies, the
Guard, as usual, was general reserve. In less than three
hours from the commencement of the attack Ney would be
supported by another 50,000 men. In at most six or seven
hours I 4o,ooo men would be on the field. The movements
were promptly commenced on the morning of the 2nd May,
with two all-important exceptions, due to the negligence of
Ney. In the first place, he left his divisions as they were,
that is to say, Souham in the quadrilateral of the four
villages, with no other division nearer him than Lützen,
except Girard’s in Starsiedel.
The second, even more important, fault of Ney was his
omission to send out the two strong reconnaissances on
Pegau and Zwenkau. Had they been sent, there was
nothing whatever to prevent both of them reaching posi-
tions whence the whole movement of the allies would have
been clearly visible. The one on Pegau would have had a
splendid view from a point two miles in front of Gross
Görschen as soon as it approached the farther edge of the
level plateau beyond the Monarchen Hügel.
The hours passed and Napoleon, hearing nothing from
Ney's direction, began to believe that, after all, the allies
were not going to be rash enough to attack him west of the
Elster. If that was so, it was certainly not to be thought
of that he should stand idle all day waiting for an attack
which now would probably not come off. The day must
be utilised for the advancement of his manoeuvre against
the enemy on the east of the Elster. At the same time,
he must not risk anything if, after all, there should be an
attack from Pegau or Zwenkau. Between 8 and IO A.M.
Napoleon issued a fresh series of orders :-
Lauriston was to proceed with his attack on Leipzig.
Macdonald to advance beyond Markranstädt, so as to be
able to march either on Leipzig or on Zwenkau.
Ney to remain at Kaja.
Marmont to advance towards Pegau.
THE BATTLE OF LÜTZEN 73
Bertrand to reach Taucha, or, at least, to have his three
divisions echelonned from Taucha to Stössen.
The Guard to remain at Lützen.
The result of these movements would have placed the
troops thus on the evening of the 2nd :—
Marmont would be in front of Pegau, with Ney and the
Guard behind him at Kaja and Lützen, and Bertrand on
his right rear. Oudinot, still on the march from Jena to
Naumburg. Lauriston would have secured the passages of
the Elster and the Pleisse at Leipzig, and Macdonald would
be between Markranstädt and the Elster, still in a position
to lend a hand either at Leipzig or to Ney and Marmont.
If the allies' attack was not made on the 2nd, all would
have been in readiness for the turning movement by Leipzig
next day, whilst Marmont, supported by Bertrand," held the
enemy in front, and the XII. corps was marching from
Naumburg. Ney had been told to report the position of
his divisions and the result of his reconnaissances. It is not
clear if compliance with the former order was insisted on,
but, as regards the latter, Napoleon seems to have been
satisfied with a general statement to the effect that there
was nothing new, and that the enemy only showed the
ordinary service (of cavalry outposts and patrols). This
was about I O A.M., and Ney was with him ; at least they
rode off together somewhere about I I A.M. to Markranstädt.
It certainly seems curious that Napoleon should be so easily
satisfied, when a word of inquiry from Ney should have
elicited the facts that the three divisions near Lützen had
not been started off to Kaja, or even ordered there, and
that nothing which could possibly be called a “strong
reconnaissance” had been sent either towards Pegau or
towards Zwenkau.”
* V. Caemmerer asks whether, if the allies had not fought at Lützen, Napoleon
would have sent Ney to Pegau or to Leipzig. Surely he would have sent him to
Leipzig, leaving Marmont, Bertrand, and perhaps the first arrivals of Oudinot's
troops to fix the enemy at Pegau.
* This point, which strikes the author as of some importance, is not noticed by
Col. Lanrezac. It certainly looks as if the Emperor was unusually confiding in
his belief in Ney's careful execution of orders.
74 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
The first episode in the battle commenced at about Io
A.M. at Lindenau. Kleist, it will be remembered, had
orders not to begin fighting till he heard the main body of
the army heavily engaged on his left towards Lützen. But
at Io A.M. he had to defend himself against Lauriston, who
had left Günthersdorf, midway between Leipzig and Merse-
burg, at 8 A.M. Leaving two battalions to watch the passage
of the Luppe south of Schkeuditz, the French commander
pushed forward towards Lindenau, where Kleist was drawn
up in front of the causeway leading to Leipzig. Lauriston
had but Ioo cavalry, which was useless against the 18OO of
his adversary. However, he drove off Kleist's cavalry with
artillery fire. Then he sent his left division (Maison) to
outflank the enemy by way of Leutzsch. Kleist, soon
recognising that he was largely outnumbered, gave orders
for retreat. He was hurried up by the French passing the
Elster by a ford. In Leipzig itself there was some fighting
between the rearmost Prussian battalion and Lauriston, but
Kleist got safely away and took post at Paunsdorf, three miles
east of Leipzig, whence he fell back towards Wurzen. Whilst
Lauriston was actually passing through Leipzig, he received
the Viceroy's orders to keep back most of his corps, as Ney
was engaged south of Lützen. It was noon when Napoleon,
reviewing the XI. corps at Markranstädt, and watching the
course of Lauriston's fight with his glass, suddenly heard a
furious cannonade from the direction of Gross-Görschen.
Instantly he realised that the allies' attack on the west bank
of the Elster, which he had begun to believe was not after
all coming off, was commencing at this late hour. He must
then have realised that the reconnaissances ordered on
Zwenkau and Pegau had either not been made at all, or
had been so in an utterly futile fashion. Still, if Ney had,
as ordered, assembled his five divisions at Kaja, there was
ample, with 45,000 men, to hold the enemy till the other
corps came up. But, as we know, Ney had not moved a
man, and still had three divisions about Lützen, two to
three miles behind the advanced divisions of Souham in the
quadrilateral of the four villages, and Girard at Starsiedel.
THE BATTLE OF LUTZEN 75
The Emperor's orders were issued at once as follows—
III. corps to hold its position, which Napoleon evidently
still believed to be at Kaja, at all costs,
VI. corps to prolong the right of the III.
IV. corps to advance against the enemy's left flank.
XI. corps and Ist cavalry corps to move against his
right.
V. corps to hold Leipzig with one division, and to
echelon the other two on Markranstädt, ready to move on
Kaja.”
We now return to Wittgenstein on the plateau, I } miles
on the road from Gross Görschen to Pegau.
Shortly before noon, Blücher rode up to Wittgenstein.
Notwithstanding his grizzled locks and his seventy-one years,
the old Prussian had lost nothing of his youthful fire or of
his intense hatred of Napoleon and the French as he saluted
and asked permission to begin the battle. “With God's
help" answered Wittgenstein in German.” Blücher at
once sent his Prussians over the brow, pouring down the
gentle slope leading to Gross Görschen, the nearest of the
four villages in the midst of which Souham was bivouacking.
As yet he had not even occupied Gross Görschen, and it
was only now at the last moment that he sent a brigade
into it, and hurriedly arranged the rest of his I 2,Ooo men in
rear of it. Till the dark lines of Prussians showed on the
skyline of the Monarchen Hügel the French had been
cooking in blissful ignorance of the fact that a large part of
the enemy's army was within two miles of them.
Only a visit to the spot can bring out clearly the absolute
inefficiency of the French outpost work which had enabled
the enemy to effect this surprise. Had Wittgenstein allowed
Blücher's men to go forward in mass with the bayonet, it is
* General von Caemmerer thinks the orders regarding the XI. corps and the
1st cavalry corps must have been delayed, as they could, if started at once, have
reached Eisdorf by 3.30 or 4 P.M. at latest, whereas it was only between 6 and 7
P.M. that Napoleon ordered the decisive attack by the XI. corps. The author
was unable to find, in the historical section of the French general staff, any
evidence of the precise hour at which the orders were received.
* Danilewski, p. 76. --
76 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
scarcely possible to doubt that they would have driven
Souham out of the quadrilateral of villages on to the plain
of Lützen, the advantages of which for the greatly superior
cavalry of the allies were obvious. But he, in turn, had
been surprised to find a whole French division where he
had expected only a weak force of at most 2000 men as
reported by Müffling. Arrived within 8oo yards of Gross
Görschen, he stopped the infantry and engaged during forty
minutes in a bombardment, to which the French were only
able to reply with two batteries. These were soon silenced
by the superiority in numbers of Wittgenstein's guns.
Then Klüx's brigade, the left of Blücher's corps, rushed
on Gross Görschen, which they took with very little loss.
Souham, who had got his men in order beyond the village,
now made a vigorous counter attack. It is true he could
not recapture Gross Görschen, but his attack gained time,
and stayed the advance of the Prussian brigade, which was
now in strength very much below its opponents, from whom
it had already taken many prisoners and two disabled guns.
Farther to the allied left, Dolffs’ Prussian cavalry, followed
by Winzingerode's Russian cavalry, had moved forward on
Starsiedel, which was held by Girard's French division. The
latter was as completely surprised as Souham had been.
The men were still bivouacking, and the artillery teams had
been sent off for forage and water. A bold charge by the
great force of allied cavalry would probably have carried
them away, but, instead of that, the allies opened with their
artillery, to which there was no reply. Covered by the
village, Girard was able to resist the partial attacks which
were made, and to hold on till he was relieved by the arrival
of Marmont.
That marshal, when he received Napoleon's order from
Markranstädt, was already an hour on his march from
Rippach to Starsiedel. When he reached that village he
was marching in six large squares of a brigade each. His
arrival enabled Girard to leave the defence of Starsiedel to
him, and to march to the aid of Souham in the four villages.
Such was the position about I P.M. when Blücher, seeing
THE BATTLE OF LUTZEN 77
Klüx's brigade almost exhausted, sent Ziethen to support
him on his right towards Klein Görschen. The two brigades
stormed forward furiously, driving Souham's men out of
Rahna and Klein Görschen, back on to Kaja, Ney had
now rejoined his corps. He had galloped off from Mark-
ranstädt as soon as he received Napoleon's orders issued in
consequence of the cannonade which he heard. The
marshal was probably tormented by the thought of the
consequences of his own neglect to reconnoitre. On the
way to Kaja he passed Marchand, whom he ordered forward
to Eisdorf. Brennier's and Ricard's divisions he found now
close up to Kaja, in which village Girard had arrived from
Starsiedel, French artillery was assembling south-west of
Kaja, and preparing to sweep the space between the four
villages. Souham was slowly falling back on Kaja before
the victorious Prussians.
Leaving Ricard as reserve, Ney put himself at the head
of Brennier's division, and led it forward with those of
Girard and Souham. The Prussians, unable to stand
against these much greater numbers, were driven again
from Rahna and Klein Görschen, and Ney continued his
advance on Gross Görschen. Met by a storm of artillery
fire, the marshal was unable to recapture the village.
Then the tide turned once more as Blücher sent in a
third brigade (Röder's). The three brigades of Prussians
again advanced from Gross Görschen with such fury that
Ney's men were, for the second time, driven out of Rahna
and Klein Görschen and forced back on Kaja.
Whilst these events were in progress in the four villages,
Marmont had begun to debouch from Starsiedel with
Compans' and Bonnet's divisions, keeping Friederichs' in
reserve. As he did so he was charged by Dolffs' cavalry,
and though the infantry held firm, Marmont decided to
confine himself to defending Starsiedel. -
Wittgenstein, with a view to relieving the pressure in the
village quadrilateral, had marched Berg from the right across
the front of Yorck's corps with orders to attack Starsiedel.
But as Berg was moving he witnessed Ney's recapture of
78 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Rahna and Klein Görschen. This decided him to stop
south-west of Rahna.
It was 2.30 P.M. The Prussians, having taken Rahna
and Klein Görschen for the second time, one of their
battalions, with which was the King of Prussia, actually
got into Kaja. Napoleon had galloped up from Markran-
städt to find affairs in this parlous condition. His presence
at once worked a marvellous change. From all sides rang
out the cry of “Vive l'Empereur !” “Hardly a wounded
man passed before Bonaparte without saluting him with
the accustomed ‘ vivat.' Even those who had lost a limb,
who in a few hours would be the prey of death, rendered
him this homage.” "
Yet the Emperor found grave cause for anxiety. As he
rode up he had met many fugitives from the battlefield
making for the rear. He saw that three of Ney's five
divisions had been badly shaken. As he reached Kaja he
received an urgent demand from Marmont for reinforce-
ments at Starsiedel. “Tell your marshal,” was the reply,
“that he is mistaken ; he has nothing against him, the
battle turns about Kaja.” Ney's corps had almost been
driven from the village quadrilateral on to the plain of
Lützen. That must be prevented at all costs until the
Viceroy, on the one hand, Bertrand, on the other, could
close in on the enemy's flanks and rear. That could not be
for some time yet.
The Guard reached Kaja almost simultaneously with the
Emperor, but it was not to be employed yet without absolute
necessity. Napoleon knew that the enemy must have
reserves approaching, and that the battle was not “ripe"
for his own final thrust with the Guard.
On the side of the allies, the Russian reserves (the two
divisions of grenadiers and the Guard) were not yet up.
They had been stopped by Wolkonski who, when he saw
the early successes of the Prussians, had sent Danilewski to
tell the Guard there was no hurry, as all was going well.”
* Odeleben, i. p. 5 I (French translation).
* Danilewski, p. 77 (German translation),
THE BATTLE OF LÜTZEN 79
He apparently wished to reserve them for the personal
orders of the Tsar, who had now practically superseded the
unfortunate Wittgenstein in the command. The latter, who
had already heard of the approach of Macdonald against
his right, and Bertrand against his left, was much hampered
in providing a force to oppose them.
Blücher, meanwhile, had been wounded and succeeded in
command of the Prussians by Yorck. Should Yorck's
whole corps be now thrown in to support Blücher's P
Wittgenstein, with both his flanks threatened, dared not
do it before the Russian reserves arrived, and they were
not on the Monarchen Hügel till nearly 4 P.M.
Towards 3 P.M. Napoleon ordered Mouton (Lobau) to
take Ricard's division forward through Kaja. On the way
he was joined by all that were fit to move of Souham's,
Girard's, and Brennier's men. Kaja was cleared of the
enemy, and the French once more stormed Klein Görschen
and Rahna in the face of a desperate defence by the
Prussians. The French attack was supported by a battery
between Kaja and Starsiedel. The villages and the space
between them presented a dreadful picture. They were a
veritable shambles, for the fighting had been for hours of the
most desperate description. The Prussians, inspired by
a hatred of their foe bred of years of oppression, fought
with a bitterness which had been unknown in their earlier
wars against the French. Perhaps the most graphic descrip-
tion is that quoted by von Caemmerer from the diary of a
Prussian Guard Jäger battalion : “The field between Klein
and Gross Görschen resembled a bivouac where whole
battalions had lain down.”
Shortly before 4 P.M., the Russian reserves at last came
on the field south of the villages, and Wittgenstein sent
forward two out of Yorck's three brigades. Hünerbein’s
went to the right on Klein Görschen, Horn's to the left on
Rahna, Steinmetz's was still kept in reserve. These rein-
forcements, added to Blücher's men, once more drove back the
French. Klein Görschen and Rahna were taken for the third
time by the Prussians, who again pushed forward into Kaja.
80 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Napoleon had all along been exposing himself freely,
urging on and encouraging his men, and personally leading
them forward. “This is probably the day of all his career,”
says Marmont,” “on which Napoleon incurred the most
personal danger on the battlefield. . . . He exposed him-
self constantly, leading back to the charge the defeated
troops of the III. corps.” With the Prussians in Kaja, he
felt himself compelled to send in Lanusse's brigade of
Young Guard. Some of Ney's battalions were already
beginning to break up, and the situation was desperate.
Charging with the bayonet, Lanusse's men, joined by those
of Ney's divisions, cleared Kaja of Prussians. There the
Guard brigade halted, leaving the pursuit to Ney's people.
The awful struggle was renewed as the French again
stormed Klein Görschen and Rahna, and again failed to
break into Gross Görschen. This phase of the battle, since
Yorck's two brigades joined in it, had lasted an hour and a
half. The details of it are impossible of description.
Death and wounds had wrought havoc among men and
officers alike. On the French side, Girard and Gouré º were
killed ; Brennier and several of the brigade commanders
were wounded ; Ney had his horse killed under him. Here
it was that the allies suffered an irreparable loss by the
wounding of Scharnhorst, the re-organiser of the Prussian
army.”
By 5.30 P.M. the Prussians had regained the upper hand,
and driven Ney's men back out of Klein Görschen and
Rahna, so that Yorck's and Blücher's corps stretched across
the space between the villages, with their right on the
Flossgraben in front of Klein Görschen, their left on the
Lützen road north of Rahna. The latter village was held
by Berg.
There remained less than two hours of daylight in which
to decide this sanguinary battle, which was now very nearly
“ripe" for Napoleon's deciding stroke. His corps were
* Mém., v. p. 26.
* Ney's chief of staff. He was succeeded by Jomini.
* He died, as a result of his wounds, at Prag, on the 28th June.
THE BATTLE OF LüTZEN 8I
closing in, Macdonald on the right flank of the allies,
Bertrand on their left.
Napoleon had been failed by Bertrand, who, at 1 P.M.,
had his leading division (Morand's) behind Taucha, less
than four miles from the battlefield. Yet, instead of march-
ing to the cannon at once, he must needs halt and “await
orders,” on the ground that, Miloradowich's advanced guard
having reached Zeitz, Napoleon might wish him to operate
in that direction. But Zeitz was too far off for Milorador-
wich to be able to interfere in the battle, especially as his
main body only reached it at 5 P.M. It was only on
reiterated orders that Bertrand moved forward again after
3 P.M. To oppose his advance, Wittgenstein deputed the
cavalry of the Russian Guard (Gallitzin), and that of
Winzingerode, the latter being behind Dolffs. When he
did that, the Russian reserve infantry was still not up, so
he dared not send in Winzingerode's infantry under Prince
Eugen of Wurtemberg.
About 5.30 P.M. Morand’s division had advanced through
Pobles to a point south of Starsiedel. Peyri's Italians (of
Bertrand's corps) were still not over the Grünabach.
About the same time, Marchand's division of Ney's corps
had at last reached the right bank of the Flossgraben north
of Klein Görschen, and Macdonald was approaching Eisdorf.
To meet these Winzingerode's infantry was now used.
Prince Eugen advanced with one of his brigades through
Klein Görschen, whilst St Priest with the other occupied
Eisdorf, into which Wittgenstein had already sent two
Prussian battalions. He was intended to make a flank
attack on Ney's left from beyond the Flossgraben, whilst
Eugen joined the frontal attack towards Kaja.
But St Priest found himself threatened in Eisdorf by
Macdonald's advance, and Eugen had to deal with Marchand.
St Priest at once reported the situation, whereupon Wittgen-
stein sent the 2nd Russian grenadier division, under Konow-
nitzin, to support him south of Eisdorf.
Marchand now threatened the right flank of the advance
on Kaja, but Eugen's men found -a good defence in the
F
82 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
trees and bushes along the Flossgraben. Here they
managed to check Marchand's right brigade, and to drive
out his left, which had momentarily got into Klein Görschen.
Now, however, Charpentier's division of Macdonald's corps
had driven St Priest from Eisdorf, whilst Fressinet with the
3 Ist division had occupied Kitzen.
Wittgenstein had built up a strong defensive line from
Gross Görschen to Hohenlohe, composed of St Priest's
brigade and the Russian grenadiers, behind which were
numerous cavalry and the Russian Guard infantry in
support. Against this line the Viceroy of Italy did not
feel himself strong enough to advance. The time was
6.30 ; Napoleon's final advance with the Guard was just
commencing. -
About 6 P.M. the Emperor had decided that, if he was to
win the battle before dark, the time for his decisive blow
had arrived.
He ordered Drouot to form a battery of 80 guns 1 south-
west of Kaja to sweep the space between the four villages.
Between this battery and Kaja the Young Guard was drawn
up in four columns, each of four battalions, in line, one
behind the other. Behind the Young Guard was the Old,
behind them the Guard cavalry. At 6.30 all was ready,
and, with the words, “La garde au feu,” Napoleon ordered
the advance.
The left column of the Young Guard marched on Klein
Görschen, the right on Rahna, the two in the centre on
Gross Görschen. As the Guard advanced under cover of a
tremendous storm of artillery fire from Drouot's battery,
they were joined by all the remains of Ney's five divisions.
Marmont, too, sent Bonnet's division, followed by Compans',
against Rahna from Starsiedel. The village, attacked in
front by the right column of the Guard and in flank by
Bonnet, was taken. The same fate befell Klein Görschen
under the attack of the left column in front, and of
Charpentier from Eisdorf. Blücher's and Yorck's men were
driven back to Gross Görschen and beyond, though part of
* 58 of the Guard and 22 of other corps.
THE BATTLE OF LUTZEN 83
the village was still held by them when, shortly after 7 P.M.,
the fall of night put a stop to the battle.
The ghastly scene was illuminated by the light of the
burning villages, all four of which were blazing furiously.
Beyond the north side of Gross Görschen the French made
no further attempt to advance. South of the village the
allies sought to assemble. Blücher's corps gathered south-
west of Gross Görschen, covered by Steinmetz's brigade,
which had stood all day in reserve. Yorck's other brigades,
and the infantry of Eugen of Wurtemberg were south of
the village on Blücher's right, the Russian guard infantry
behind Eugen. Berg's corps fell back fighting before
Marmont on the road to Pegau, while the cavalry on the
allied left, which had kept up the fight with Morand's
division of Bertrand’s corps in a somewhat half-hearted way,
retired in the same direction.
Even after dark the fighting was not quite over; shortly
before 9 P.M. a desperate charge was executed by nine
Prussian squadrons against Bonnet's infantry. The infantry
was carried away in part by the fury of the charge. Mar-
mont himself, on foot in the midst of it, unable on account
of half healed wounds to mount quickly, narrowly escaped
death or capture. His staff was fired on by their own
men who took them for the enemy. The Prussian cavalry
pushed on almost up to the square in which was the
Emperor, before they were compelled to retire. If this
charge did not do any very great material damage, it at
least produced a very considerable moral effect, convincing
the French, as it did, that the allies had still plenty of fight
left in them. Moreover, it prevented them from taking the
rest they so badly needed.
When the Tsar and the King of Prussia left the field
about 9 P.M. they could hardly be convinced that the battle
was lost. When, however, news came in that Kleist had
evacuated Leipzig, thereby leaving the French in possession
of the nearest road to their rear, they were compelled to
admit that no course but immediate retreat was open to
them.
84 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Napoleon at Lützen had won a battle, but he had certainly
not gained the decisive victory which was so necessary to
him to restore his lost prestige in Europe. On the evening
of the battle, according to Marmont," the Emperor said to
Duroc, “I am once more master of Europe.” That was a
great over-estimate of the result of the battle, and if
Napoleon did not in his in most soul know it at that moment,
he must very soon have realised it. The allies were beaten,
but they hardly knew it, and in one way at least they had
gained an advantage. The Prussians had fought splendidly,
and had shown to others and to themselves that they were
able to fight the French on equal terms. Even Napoleon
contemptuously admitted the improvement since 1806,
when he remarked, “Ces animaux ont appris quelque chose.”
Nesselrode, writing to Vienna, expressed the idea in more
courteous terms: “The Prussian troops have covered them-
selves with glory; they have become once more the Prussians
of Frederick.” ” Up to 3 P.M. they had generally been
fighting against double their numbers, and had more than
held their own. -
Gneisenau said of Wittgenstein's scheme that it was good
in conception but spoilt by faults of execution. That seems
too favourable an estimate. Wittgenstein who, thanks to
his large superiority in cavalry, was much better informed
generally of his enemy's movements than was Napoleon,
decided to fight on the strength of an entire misconception
of the situation. He assumed that the French corps were
spread out in a long procession extending from Naumburg,
or even Jena, to Leipzig, and that their right, about Lützen,
was protected only by a weak flank guard opposite to him.
With an opponent like Napoleon, such an assumption was
unwarranted. As we have seen, the Emperor intended to
cover his march with the whole of Ney's 45,000 men,
backed by the guard at Lützen, and with Marmont and
Bertrand coming up from Weissenfels. If Wittgenstein had
succeeded in assembling his army, as he intended, by 7 A.M.,
* Mém., v. p. 25. -
* Friederich, Die Befreiungskriege, 1813-1815, i. p. 244.
THE BATTLE OF LÜTZEN 85
Napoleon would have had time to bring against his flanks
Marmont and part of Bertrand's corps, Macdonald's corps,
two of Lauriston s divisions, and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry.
In all, including Ney, he would have about I 4o,Ooo men,
against whom Wittgenstein would have had only about
7o,ooo, after deducting Kleist and Miloradowich, who were
out of range of the main battle. All that Wittgenstein
could hope to do with his inferior numbers was to surprise
Ney, inflict a severe blow on him, and then get back beyond
the Elster as he found himself threatened with envelopment
by the other French corps.
His orders for the assembly were, as has already been
said, very defective. Whilst dealing with many things
which should find no place in general orders, they entirely
failed to prescribe a proper order of march to the crossing
of the Elster. The consequences were much delay, owing
to the crossing of columns, and the infliction of much un-
necessary fatigue on his troops. The army was not on the
battlefield: till at least four hours later than the hour pre-
scribed. Yet, curiously enough, this delay perhaps saved
the allies from the decisive defeat which Napoleon hoped
to inflict on them. With two hours more of daylight it
seems almost certain that, instead of gaining an indecisive
victory, Napoleon would have been able to drive the allies
into the Elster and almost completely to destroy them.
He might still have done so, but for the failure of his
subordinates. The blame must fall chiefly on Ney, who
failed either to assemble his corps at Kaja, or to make
the reconnaissances on Pegau and Zwenkau ordered by
Napoleon at 4 A.M. Looking to the delay which actually
occurred on the allies' side, it is easy to picture the scene
which would have met the eyes of a French reconnaissance
pushed forward from Kaja at dawn. As it reached the top
of the slope leading down to the Flossgraben on the road to
Pegau, it would have seen the whole of the enemy's army
moving to cross the Elster, and Napoleon would have had
no doubt of Wittgenstein's intentions. There was nothing
on the plateau to prevent a mixed force from moving to
86 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
this point. As Col. Lanrezac remarks, Ney had only about
I ooo cavalry, but he could have perfectly well made up for
this by sending a force of all arms, for the distance to be
traversed was short. The appearance of this force (say
the strength of a brigade) would not necessarily have
alarmed Wittgenstein, or made him hesitate to carry out
his plan. Had it been sent out by, say, 6 A.M., Napoleon
would have known for certain by 8 that he was to have the
hoped-for battle. Macdonald and Marmont would have
been hurried up at their best speed, Lauriston would prob-
ably have been ordered to observe Leipzig with one division,
whilst the other two pressed forward on Pegau. Bertrand,
too, would have been urged on from the opposite direction,
and Ney's whole corps, with the Guard behind it, would
have strongly occupied a line having its left supported by
the four villages, its right in Starsiedel.
As it was, Ney's, or Souham's, idea of a reconnaissance
in force seems to have been the sending of a few patrols
half-way up the slope to the Monarchen Hügel, where they
could see just as much and no more than they could see
from Gross Görschen itself. When Wittgenstein at last
caught Souham asleep at Gross Görschen, he lost his
chance, owing to his hesitation and his successive attacks,
first with only one brigade, then with two, then with three.
His initial bombardment of Gross Görschen probably did
not do very much harm, and gave Souham time to repair
his fault to some extent. The shock of the discovery that
the “weak flank guard ” was a strong division seems to
have upset the Russian's balance. The shock would have
been much greater if, instead of one division in the village
quadrilateral and one at Starsiedel, he had found five
divisions there, as there would have been had Ney carried
out Napoleon's orders. Marmont would have been approach-
ing, as he actually was, and the Guard would have been up
from Lützen in an hour. Marmont and Ney alone had
7o,ooo men, and, when he commenced his attack, Witt-
genstein had only about 56,ooo within reach. &
At Starsiedel there was the same fault of hesitation in
THE BATTLE OF LUTZEN 87
attack, which gave time to Girard to get his men into order,
and for Marmont to come up and release Girard to support
Souham.
Had Wittgenstein sent the whole of Blücher's corps
against Gross Görschen at once, and Yorck against Star-
siedel, he would still have had Berg and Eugen of Wurtem-
berg, with Winzingerode's infantry, in reserve, whilst the
Russian Guard was coming up. Instead of that, he dribbled
in Blücher's and Yorck's brigades one at a time, whilst,
owing to Berg's stoppage, he never had any infantry at all
against Marmont at Starsiedel.
Bertrand was another corps commander who failed
Napoleon. He wasted two hours waiting for orders at a
distance of only 3% miles from where he heard the battle
raging. Colonel Lanrezac has pointed out that there
might possibly have been something to be said for him if
he had been sent on a special mission, though even then he
probably ought to have marched to the sound of the guns.
But his orders were to advance against the enemy's left
flank, and he certainly had no business to halt, merely
because a Russian advance guard had appeared at Zeitz,
Io miles from the battlefield. At most, he might have left
a brigade to watch in that direction. Another general who
is blamed by the French writer is Lauriston. He was
ordered to leave only one division in Leipzig, though he
had no distinct orders to march against the enemy's right.
Still, a corps commander of the modern French or German
school would probably have marched without orders, or
at least started in anticipation of them, and sent urgent
demands for them. According to Berthezène, Napoleon,
next day, expressed to an aide-de-camp of Lauriston his
opinion of that general's inaction in terms more forcible
than polite. “What were you doing yesterday,” said the
Emperor, “when we were fighting here P You were warm-
ing your behinds in the sun * * Still Napoleon himself
cannot escape blame for not having sent definite orders.
Nor is it clear why Macdonald and Latour-Maubourg were
* Lanrezac, p. 166 note.
88 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
so late in arriving, seeing that it is only about six miles as
the crow flies from Markranstädt to Eisdorf, and in the open
country they could march straight. As yet no evidence is
available in support of Von Cämmerer's suggestion that
their orders were delayed. Again, Marchand must have
received Ney's order from him personally about 12.30.
Yet he was not up till after 4 P.M. In his case it appears
that he was hampered by Russian cavalry and Cossacks,
who, however, could not have been any very serious ob-
struction to a whole division. He had only about three
miles to cover, and took nearly four hours to do it.
On the side of the allies it was no doubt necessary to
keep Kleist at Leipzig to watch the French advance in that
direction, though the force he had was too insignificant to
offer any serious resistance, and probably one-fourth of it
would have served the purpose as well.
Miloradowich's absence from the battle was a much more
serious matter. For the direction of his march Wittgenstein
was responsible. The reason for its slowness is not
apparent. The object in directing him on Zeitz was to
meet an attack of the enemy on the allied left in that direc-
tion, which was supposed to be possible in consequence
of the erroneous report by Prussian cavalry as to Bertrand's
position. º
Zeitz is Io miles from Pegau, and it was practically
certain that, when he arrived there, Miloradowich would be
too late to make his influence felt in the main battle. We
have already mentioned the suggestion that Miloradowich
should have marched on Predel. He would have heard
before he reached Predel that there was no danger to the
left. He might have reached Predel by 1 P.M., though he
probably would not have done so, considering the slowness
with which he actually marched. Even if he had only
reached Predel at the hour at which he reached Zeitz
(4 P.M.) he would, with only five miles to march, have been
able to join in the battle by 6 P.M. But he would probably
have got news of the groundlessness of the fear of a
French advance on Zeitz in time to enable him to turn to
THE BATTLE OF LUTZEN 89
his right towards the battlefield long before he reached
Predel.
The French cavalry did nothing on this day. Latour-
Maubourg with the Ist cavalry corps was with Macdonald,
according to whom * both he and Latour-Maubourg wanted
the latter to charge the allies' right. This was prevented
by the Viceroy, who dared not risk heavy loss to the weak
cavalry. ->
Nor did the allied commanders do much with their
cavalry, though it, and still more their great preponderance
of artillery, prevented Marmont from debouching from
Starsiedel, in support of Souham, till the final attack in the
evening. It seems as if Marmont might, under the circum-
stances, have displayed a little more enterprise.
The losses on both sides in this sanguinary battle were
enormous, though probably those of the allies were not much
more than half of those of the French.
Von Cämmerer gives the losses of the two Prussian
corps of Yorck and Blücher as 84oo out of a total of
33,000, whilst Eugen of Wurtemburg lost 16oo out of
6ooo, rather over 25 per cent. in each case.
Allowing for the losses of the other troops engaged,
regarding which he appears to have had less reliable
statistics, he takes the total loss at I I,500, of whom nearly
Io,ooo were killed and wounded. In trophies they lost
nothing but two dismounted guns.
The French losses he estimated at 22,000, including 8oo
prisoners carried off by the allies. He puts the loss of
Ney's corps alone at I 5,000 men. They lost also five
guns. Lanrezac, on the other hand, gives the French losses
as I 8,000, of whom 12,000 belonged to the III. corps.
He states, however, that, when the French crossed the Elbe
a few days later, their army was weaker by 35,000 men
than when it crossed the Saale, owing to the great number
of stragglers and deserters. The Prussian writer appears to
have made an allowance for this cause in estimating the
losses at Lützen.
* Mém., p. 197.
90 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
The enormous leakage in stragglers, deserters, and
marauders is attributed by Lanrezac to two causes—
I. The extraordinary exertions which Napoleon demanded
from his men.
2. The bad organisation of his administrative services,
which almost compelled the soldier to maraud, in order to
live.
For the former he finds a defence in the decisive advan-
tages obtained in many cases by almost superhuman activity.
For the failure of the Emperor, after twenty years' ex-
perience of war, to organise his supplies on a better system
he sees none.
CHAPTER VII
FROM LÜTZEN TO BAUTZEN 1

HILST the battle of Lützen was in progress,
Bülow, finding Halle only weakly held, had
attacked it with 6ooo or 7.Ooo men, and
driven the four French battalions from it
back on to Durutte's division at Merseburg. This action
had no influence on Napoleon's battle, the result of which
compelled Bülow to withdraw in the direction of Berlin,
by Rosslau. .
At I 1 P.M. Napoleon ordered Lauriston to withdraw the
one division he had in Leipzig, and to be ready to com-
mence the pursuit on the 3rd May with his own corps and
Latour-Maubourg's cavalry. When Lauriston evacuated
Leipzig, Kleist sent some Cossacks into it before he
received orders for his own retirement. When it was clear
to the allied commanders that immediate retreat behind
the Elbe was their only possible course, orders were issued
for it to be made in three columns. The Russians were
to retire on Dresden by Frohburg and Rochlitz. The
Prussians and part of Winzingerode's cavalry took the road
by Borna and Colditz to Meissen. Miloradowich and
Eugen of Wurtemberg covered the retreat. Kleist was to
go by Wurzen to the Elbe at Mühlberg, where there was a
bridge of boats.
It was 3 A.M. on the 3rd May when Napoleon, assured
that the enemy was retreating, issued orders for the pursuit.
Ney's corps had been so shattered in the battle that it was
left for the moment to recuperate at Lützen. The rest of
the army crossed the Elster at Zwenkau, Pegau, Predel, and
* See Map III. (inset a).
92 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Ostrau. Except for a small affair with Eugen and another
with Miloradowich, the French met with no opposition, but
they were so exhausted that they made little progress
during the 3rd. Macdonald with the XI. corps and the
Ist cavalry corps only reached Podelwitz, five miles beyond
Pegau, with Lauriston on his left at Peres. Marmont
halted at Löbnitz on Macdonald's right rear. Bertrand
found the bridge at Predel destroyed, and was delayed also
by Miloradowich, so got no farther than Ostrau. Napoleon,
with headquarters and the Guard, passed the night of the
3rd-4th at Pegau. Oudinot, who had not received his
orders in time to change direction to his right, was spread
along the line Jena-Naumburg. The allies were in two
masses at Borna and Frohburg with their main army. The
Emperor was still uncertain as to the exact direction of the
allies' retreat ; he learnt more during the night, and
decided to advance with his main army direct on Dresden,
cutting off what he could of stragglers and convoys. At
the same time he constituted an auxiliary army under
the command of Ney. It consisted of Ney's own corps
(III.), the VII. (at present only Durutte's division at Merse-
burg, but destined to have added to it the Saxons in
Torgau), Victor's provisional II. corps, and the provisional
corps of Sebastiani, consisting of the 2nd cavalry corps
(25oo), and Puthod's division of the V. corps. Puthod was
no longer required on the lower Elbe, for Vandamme was
now coming up below Magdeburg, and he, with Davout,
sufficed to guard that portion of the river, and even to
retake Hamburg. -
Ney was to relieve Torgau and Wittenberg, and cross to
the right bank of the Elbe as soon as he was joined by
Sebastiani from Bernburg. He would then have about
6O,OOO infantry and 4Ooo cavalry, with I 29 guns, including
the Saxons at Torgau. The Emperor, on the other hand,
would have, including Oudinot, I 20,000 infantry, I I,5oo
cavalry, and 386 guns. He was without a bridge train,
and, as he expected the allies to defend the Elbe at
Dresden, he looked to Ney's advance from Torgau on their
FROM LUTZEN TO BAUTZEN 93
right to compel them to drop the river line. During the
4th May, Napoleon's columns reached without adventure
the following points:—
Right—
IV. corps, Frohburg. The XII. was far behind on the
march from Naumburg to Zeitz.
Centre—
Ist cavalry corps and XI. corps as advanced guard under
the Viceroy, Lausigk. Behind these the VI. corps and
Guard, with Imperial headquarters, Flössberg and Borna.
Left—
V. corps, Stockheim. This column was now directed
on Wurzen. Napoleon, hearing of a strong Prussian column
(it was in reality only Kleist) marching on Mühlberg, had
directed Lauriston to move leftwards, so as to be able, if
necessary, to support Ney, who was now marching on
Torgau.
During the 5th May, whilst Lauriston was marching as
above, Napoleon's other two columns continued their advance
on Dresden.
When Eugène debouched with the XI. corps from the
Colditz forest, about I I A.M., he found Steinmetz's brigade
drawn up to dispute the passage of the Mulde. Into the
details of the action which ensued we need not enter.
Steinmetz, naturally, was compelled to retreat, and was
followed to in front of Hartha, where he again took position.
His retreat had endangered the communications of Milora-
dowich, who, finding himself not pressed, was crossing the
Mulde at Rochlitz in a somewhat leisurely fashion. Seeing
his danger, he sent all available forces to the assistance of
Steinmetz, who was thus enabled to show front again at
Hartha, but both retired to Waldheim behind the Zschoppau.
The Viceroy did not carry his main body beyond Hartha,
though he had outposts as far as the Zschoppau. During
the day he reported having seen on his left a hostile force,
alleged to be Kleist on his way to Mühlberg. Other informa-
tion showed that the main body of the allies was making
for Meissen and Dresden. Under these circumstances,
94 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Lauriston's march on Wurzen was no longer necessary, and
he was ordered to proceed, by forced marches of from 17 to
20 miles, towards Dresden.
In the evening of the 5th May the French army reached
the following points:—
XI. corps and Ist cavalry Corps, Hartha and beyond.
VI. corps, close behind XI.
Guard and headquarters, Colditz.
IV. corps, which had by its slowness left Miloradowich
to cross the Mulde unmolested, Rochlitz.
XII. corps, Altenburg and behind.
Napoleon was not satisfied with Eugène's action. They
were, he said, now in a hilly country, where the enemy's
cavalry was comparatively useless, and the Viceroy should
have succeeded in taking at least 2000 or 3ooo prisoners."
In the very early hours of the 6th, Napoleon wrote” to
Ney expressing his anxiety to hear that the marshal was
at Torgau, and had relieved Wittenberg. He now had
information that the Prussians and Russians were marching
in separate columns, and he deduced from this fact, and from
various rumours of dissensions in the enemy's camp, that, as
soon as they had crossed the Elbe, the allies would separate
definitely, the Russians sticking to their own line of com-
munications by Bautzen, Görlitz, and Breslau with Warsaw,
whilst the Prussians went more to the north, with a view to
covering their capital. If they knew that Ney was at
Torgau, within 90 miles of Berlin, it was probable that the
news would help to decide the Prussians in favour of cover-
ing Berlin. If this separation occurred, Napoleon's scheme
was to contain the Russians with a small force, whilst he
himself, with a force double the 60,000 or 7o,ooo available
Prussians, fell upon and destroyed them.
When one looks to the way in which he cherished the
hope of this division of the enemy's forces, one cannot help
suspecting that the wish was father to the thought. Had
he been in their position himself, he would certainly not
have thought of directly covering Berlin, when, by holding
* Corr. I9,971. * Corr. 19,972.
FROM LUTZEN TO BAUTZEN 95
together on the Dresden-Breslau line, he would indirectly do
so. Moreover, Berlin was after all only a geographical point,
though its capture by the French would certainly have had
a considerable moral and political effect. On the other
hand, he probably knew how anxious the Prussian king was
to prevent a reoccupation of his capital by the French, and
that the Russians were equally averse to any abandonment
of their direct line of communications. That, perhaps, to
some extent justified his assumption that the allies, of whose
abilities he entertained a very poor opinion, would be induced
by their divergent interests to separate.
An “ordre du jour” of the 6th May 1 shows clearly the
state of indiscipline existing at this time in the French army.
It complains of the straggling, and blames commanders for not
keeping a special rearguard to pick up these men. Another
thing reprobated is the soldiers' habit of unloading their
muskets by firing them off, instead of drawing the charge,
thereby creating alarms. For doing this the penalty was
to be imprisonment and degradation, or, if anyone was
killed or injured by the discharge, death.
Further details of the allies' retreat and the French
pursuit to Dresden are unnecessary. The most notable
point in it is the way in which Miloradowich conducted his
rearguard. He constantly halted to take up a position,
compelling his opponents to deploy and take measures to
turn him. With admirable judgment, he always selected
the latest safe moment to retire, only to take up another
defensive position farther on. He would have been less
successful had Bertrand, on the French right, kept in
advance, but that general marched so slowly that he was
generally not even on a level with the centre and left,
instead of being well in advance of them.
On the 7th May the main body of the Russians, marching
by Wilsdruf, passed the Elbe at Dresden. On the same day
the main Prussian army crossed at Meissen, whilst Kleist's
detachment crossed at Mühlberg. Miloradowich, who
retired through Nossen and Wilsdruf, crossed the river on
* Foucart, i. 59.
96 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
the 8th at Dresden, where the span of the stone bridge,
which Davout had blown up on the 20th March, had been
temporarily restored by the Russians, and was now once
more broken. The Russians had also fired their raft and
boat bridges at Dresden, but the work was badly done, and
the French were able to rescue many of the boats. On the
8th May all the allies were on the right bank of the Elbe,
whilst Napoleon's army stood thus:—
XI. corps, 1st cavalry corps and headquarters, Dresden.
VI. corps, behind Dresden.
IV. corps, Potzschappel to Tharandt.
XII. corps, Oederan and behind.
V. corps (Lauriston), Meissen.
The French march from Lützen to Dresden had averaged
only I 23 miles a day.
Leaving Napoleon for the moment at Dresden, we return
to Ney. -
On the 4th May he was at Leipzig with his own III.
corps and Durutte's division, which for the present repre-
sented the VII. corps, of which, when complete, Reynier
was to have the command. Bülow had gone back to
Rosslau on hearing of the result of Lützen, and, though
his cavalry were all over the space between the Saale
and the Mulde, they could be disregarded, for they must
retire as Victor debouched from Bernburg. Ney started
on the 5th May for Torgau via Eilenburg, sending two
divisions of the III. corps to relieve Wittenberg. On the
7th May Reynier, with Durutte's division, arrived before
Torgau, only to find himself in a very awkward position.
Thielmann, the Saxon commander, refused admission to
the French, pleading his own sovereign's order. The
Ring of Saxony, who had been trying hard to play the
neutral, as he had tried for a time in 1806, had gone off
with two regiments of Guard cavalry to Prague. As soon
as Napoleon heard, on the 8th, of Thielmann's attitude,
he took very summary measures for dealing with his ally.
M. de Serra, the Emperor's minister at Dresden, was
directed to represent that Metternich had stated that
FROM LUTZEN TO BAUTZEN 97
Austria had nothing to do with Saxony or her king. The
latter was given six hours in which to answer Napoleon's
demands, which were:—
I. Thielmann to be at once ordered to leave Torgau and
unite his troops to the VI. corps under Reynier.
2. The king to send his cavalry back to Dresden at
Oſ] ce.
3. He was also to write a letter to the Emperor,
admitting that his engagements of past years still sub-
sisted, and expressing his intention of fulfilling them.
If the king failed to comply with these demands within
the time allowed, he was to be informed that “I (Napoleon)
declare him a felon, outside my protection, and that, in
consequence, he has ceased to reign.” This business was
to be carried out by De Serra if he was at Prague ; if not,
Baron de Montesquieu, the bearer of the letter, was to do
so. To anticipate somewhat, the king surrendered at
once, and, on the I2th May, was back in person at
Dresden, once more under the thumb of Napoleon. Orders
were despatched to Thielmann, who yielded to them, but
himself went off to join the allies.
Though Napoleon might not feel much doubt as to the
success of his peremptory orders to the King of Saxony,
seeing they were issued from that monarch's capital, still
he could not afford to risk anything by waiting for the
reply. Therefore, he sent orders to Ney to concentrate
the III. corps and Durutte's division to the south of
Torgau, and collect materials for the construction of a
bridge at Belgern, half a day's march above the fortress.
Lauriston, leaving a detachment at Meissen, could once
more bear to the left, to a point half-way between Meissen
and Torgau, whence he could join Ney if required.
Accordingly, Ney, on the I Ith May, was ready to cross
the Elbe with 60,000 men. He would have had to go
without Sebastiani, who only reached Bernburg on the
I 2th. Napoleon, reaching Dresden on the 8th, had at
once begun making preparations for a passage of his own
army. With the Russians still holding the Neustadt, the
G
98 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
part of Dresden on the right bank of the Elbe, it was not
possible to repair the broken arch of the stone bridge.
Therefore, the Emperor proposed to cross at Briesnitz, a
short way below Dresden. Here the river makes a sharp
bend to the south-west and then back again, the apex
of the bend being at Briesnitz. At the apex and below
it the left bank commands the right, but this is not so
above Briesnitz, where both banks are low, about level with
one another. Still, guns on the left bank can sweep the
opposite peninsula. At Briesnitz Napoleon placed his
bridge, sweeping the peninsula with 60 guns, partly on the
heights, partly on the plains where the public slaughter-
house now stands. He also had 20 guns on the Brühlsche
Terrasse close to the stone bridge. Two battalions first got
across on rafts to protect the head of the new bridge. The
Russians attempted to drive them out of their retrench-
ments, bringing up 60 guns for the purpose. But Napoleon,
using 80 guns, compelled them to desist. The bridging
operations at Briesnitz began at 7 A.M. on the 9th. The
French guns on the Brühlsche Terrasse also drove the
Russians in the Neustadt from the water's edge, enabling
3oo French voltigeurs to cross in boats and effect a lodg-
Iment in a large building at the farther end of the stone
bridge. Protected by them and the guns, the repair of the
broken arch was hurried on and completed by the morning
of the I Ith May. It was a difficult task, owing to the
great height of the trestle work which had to be erected,
but the time in which it was completed was only a fraction
of what it had taken the Russians in March.
All difficulties of the passage were solved for Napoleon
by the fact that the allies made no serious resistance. By
the evening of the I Ith May, 7o,ooo French had crossed
at Dresden.
Ney also crossed on the same day with the III., V., and
and VII. corps, about 45,000 men. He passed, not by the
temporary bridge at Belgern, but at Torgau, where, under
orders of the King of Saxony, the gates were thrown open
to the French, and the Saxon division (90oo infantry, 250
FROM LUTZEN TO BAUTZEN 99
cavalry, and three batteries) was added to the VII. corps
of Reynier.
Meanwhile, there had been much hesitation on the part
of the allied commanders, and a succession of different
plans. The interests of the Prussians, and their desire to
cover their capital and the Mark, led them to favour a
movement to the north, whilst the Russians were anxious
to cover their direct line of communication with Warsaw
by Bautzen, Görlitz, and Breslau. All were agreed that a
stand should be made somewhere west of the Oder ; for
the spirit of the army demanded it, and moreover, if another
battle were not fought, Austria and the German princes
would naturally be led to believe in the decisiveness of the
French victory at Lützen, a view which Napoleon was
endeavouring to impress upon them. But where were the
allies to fight? It was here that the many commanders
differed.
At first, Wittgenstein was in favour of taking up a
position between Herzberg and Luckau, whence he could
fall with all his forces on the enemy as he passed the
Elbe. Then, on the 8th May, he issued orders for the
defence of the river itself, the Russians above Meissen, the
Prussians below it, Kleist holding the passage at Mühlberg.
In consequence of these orders the Russian main body
took post at Radeburg, the Prussians at Grossenhain.
Then came Miloradowich's failure to prevent Napoleon's
passage at Briesnitz. He had received no support, and
headquarters appear to have given up, as beyond their
power, the idea of preventing the French passage. Witt-
genstein was now in favour of a retirement northwards, in
conformity with the desire of the Prussians to cover Berlin
and the Mark. That was peremptorily stopped by the
Tsar, who would not hear of abandoning the Russian com-
munications. On the Ioth, Wittgenstein believed Napoleon
to be concentrating towards his left for a march on Berlin,
the threats at Dresden being only a ruse to divert attention
in that direction. That determined the allied commander
to withdraw and await developments, with the Russians
IOO NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
at Bischofswerda and the Prussians at Königsbrück. If
strongly attacked here, he proposed to retire behind Bautzen,
whilst, if Napoleon moved from Wittenberg and Belgern
on Berlin, the allies would attack his right flank.
The offensive idea in this last plan was abandoned on
receipt of news that the French were moving towards
Bautzen, Königsbrück, and Reichenberg with three corps,
and that Napoleon in person was in Dresden. On the
I2th orders issued for assembly in a position beyond
Bautzen, which the Russian Chief Engineer was sent on
to fortify." All these movements led Napoleon to cherish
the hope that the Russians and Prussians were about to
separate. He certainly would not have separated had he
himself been in command ; for a position such as Wittgen-
stein proposed to take on the Ioth would cover Berlin
indirectly better than a direct covering force could do.
In this case Napoleon probably allowed the wish to be
father to the thought, as he now so often did.
The allies now retreated concentrically on Bautzen, with
Miloradowitch acting again as rearguard. The latter,
supported by Eugen of Wurtemberg, fought a sharp rear-
guard action with Macdonald on the I Ith at Weissig, and
then fell back on Schmiedefeld. Kleist was attacked by
Bertrand the same day near Königsbrück and forced back
on Kamenz. Miloradowich again fought at Schmiedefeld
on the 12th, whilst the allied main body got across the
Spree at Bautzen. It was only in the evening that the
Russian rearguard fell back, fighting at every step, nearly
to Bautzen. Not till the I 5th was the left bank of the
Spree entirely evacuated by the allies.
Barclay de Tolly, with I 3,500 men, set free by the
capitulation of Thorn, was about to join them.
Here we must return to Napoleon at Dresden, busily
preparing for his further advance. Reinforcements were
coming up, among them a division of Young Guard, four
battalions of Old Guard, and two cavalry “divisions de
* For the above account of the allied plans, see Friederich, Die Beſreiungs-
. Kriege, 1813-1815, i. pp. 253-255.
FROM LÜTZEN TO BAUTZEN IOI
marche.” The Saxons, now again at the Emperor's dis-
posal, were distributed, the infantry division to the VII.
corps, the four cavalry regiments to the Ist cavalry corps.
On the I 5th May the French army comprised the
following corps :—
I. NEY'S ARMY
Battalions. Squadrons, Batteries. ( lº,
III. º ) 66 8 I 2 3O, ooo
V. corps (Lauriston
(including Puthod) } 44 tº- I 2 27,ooo
VII. corps (Reynier) I6 I sº 9,500
II. corps (Victor) . 22 ſº- 2 I3,Ooo
Light cavalry division
(Châtel) of 1st l mºmºm 8 or fººtº 1,800
cavalry corps at- 9 2
tached to V. corps |
2nd cavalry corps tº-º-º-º: I5 to 20 — 3, Ooo
143 32 to 38 26 84,300
II. MAIN ARMY (NAPOLEON)
IV. corps (Bertrand) 34 4. 7 25, ooo
VI. corps (Marmont) 39 4. IO 22, Ooo
XI. corps (Macdonald) 3 l 2 8 I 7,ooo
XII. corps (Oudinot) 33 *m; 7 24, Ooo
Old Guard (I division) 6 or 7 tºº } I 4, OOO
Young guard (2 divisions) 25 to 30 tº-º 4 I5,ooo
Guard cavalry sº 2O 3 4,000
1st cavalry corps (less -
light division) (La-
tour-Maubourg) g== 45 to 50 4 8,000
Total 168 to 174 75 to 8o 53 II 9, ooo
Grand total 2I 6 to 222 Io'7 to 118 7 203,300°
To these the allies could not oppose more than about
I 10,000, inclusive of Barclay's corps and that of Bülow,
the latter covering Berlin.
Napoleon now formally dissolved what had hitherto been
the army of the Elbe under the Viceroy of Italy. He
had had enough of his stepson's incapacity, and sent him
* Lanrezac, pp. 185-186.
IO2 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
off at a moment's notice to take command of the army
which the Emperor was organising in Northern Italy for
the purpose of detaining a part of the Austrian army on
its southern frontier, in the event of that power joining the
allies.” -
Dresden was henceforward to be the great advanced
depôt for Napoleon's operations in Germany. Durosnel
was appointed governor with a garrison of about 6000
men, including the depôts of the IV., VI, VII., XI., and
XII. corps. For the II., III., and V. corps depôts were
established at Torgau. Cavalry depôts at Leipzig and
Dresden.
The rearward communications of the army were laid
down as the following : *—
I. Main line, Mayence, Frankfort, Fulda, Erfurt,
Weimar. From this point the line bifurcated, one
branch going to Dresden by Jena and Altenburg, the
other by Naumburg and Leipzig.
2. From Leipzig a branch to Wittenberg.
3. From Augsburg by Nürnberg, Bamberg, Schleiz,
Gera, Altenburg.
The route from Augsburg by Würzburg was abolished,
though it would have been better than the last-named route
which subsequent experience showed was too far east. The
activity of the allies' partisans extended far west of the
Elbe. - -
Three marches might have been saved by carrying a
line from Erfurt direct to Altenburg, in addition to the
one by Leipzig. -
The stages on these routes averaged about I 5 miles,
with a day's rest in every six or seven. To guard against
surprise by partisans, detachments on the march were to
comprise at least 5 Oc combatants.
In order to have a bridge head at Dresden, the enceinte
of the Neustadt, on the right bank of the Elbe, was repaired
and palisaded.
At Briesnitz there was a bridge of rafts and another of
* Corr. 19,998. * Lanrezac, p. 188.
FROM LÜTZEN TO BAUTZEN IO3
boats, whilst in Dresden itself there was the stone bridge.
Later on the Emperor also had two boat or raft bridges,
one above and one below the stone bridge. Also, during
the armistice, the partially demolished enceinte of the
Altstadt was repaired, and five forts were built outside the
suburbs.
The general position of Napoleon's armies on the I Ith
May was this —
I. At Dresden, on both sides of the Elbe, I Ig, ooo men
under his personal command.
2. At Torgau, also on both banks, Ney with 84,000.
3. On the lower Elbe, under Davout, Vandamme's pro-
visional corps of about 30,000 which, for the present at
any rate, need only be mentioned, as it had its own sepa-
rate theatre of operations far removed from the main
theatre,
The Emperor's design was to have Ney's army posted by
the I6th as follows:–
III. Corps and headquarters, Luckau, with advanced
guard Lübben.
V. corps Dobrilugk.
VII. corps Dahme.
II. corps and 2nd cavalry corps, Schönwald.
In those positions it would be the “bataillon carré" posted
about three good marches from Berlin, and half a march
farther from Napoleon's own army. It would be ready to
march in any direction.*
On the I3th May Napoleon was still in doubt as to the
direction or directions taken by the allies. On that day
he wrote to Ney: *—
“I do not see clearly what the Prussians have done; it
is certain the Russians are retiring on Breslau : but the
Prussians ; are they retiring on that town, as it is said,
or have they thrown themselves towards Berlin to defend
their capital, as seems natural P That is what I shall learn
*As usual in these days, the Emperor exaggerated its numbers, representing it
as IOO,OOO instead of 84,000. Corr. 20,006, to Ney, 13th May.
* Corr. 20,006. -
IoA NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
exactly from the information I expect to-night. You must
feel that, with the considerable forces you have, it is not a
case for remaining quiet. To unblock Glogau, to occupy
Berlin (so as to put the Prince of Eckmühl in a position to
re-occupy Hamburg and advance with his five divisions
into Pomerania) and to gain possession of Breslau myself,
those are the three important objects which I propose to
myself, and which I should wish to accomplish within the
month. In the position which I am going to make you
take, we shall always be united, able to move right or left
with the maximum masses possible, according to informa-
tion received.”
When Napoleon writes that it seems natural that the
Prussians should leave the Russians and move towards
Berlin, he certainly did not mean that he would have done
so himself had he been in their place, but that it was what
he would naturally expect from his past experience of
their strategical capacity, and their known anxiety lest the
capital should again fall into his hands. -
Again, it was not, strictly speaking, correct to say that
he and Ney were united, since they were more than three
marches apart. But, looking to the facts that they were
not separated by any serious obstacle or difficult country,
and that, whilst Ney's army was numerically not much
inferior to the combined Russians and Prussians, whilst
Napoleon's own was superior to them, there could be no
doubt that the allies could not prevent a close union when-
ever it should please the Emperor to decide on it.
On the I Ith May Napoleon still had the Guard and
Oudinot in Dresden, on the left bank of the Elbe. The
IV., VI., and XI. corps were across the river, gaining space
for manoeuvre. The XI. corps and a division of cavalry
acting as advanced guard got forward on that day to
Weissig. On the 12th it had pushed Miloradowich's rear-
guard beyond Bischofswerda, though the Russian general
had again displayed his capacity as a rearguard commander
in the same way as he had done between Lützen and
Dresden
FROM LUTZEN TO BAUTZEN I05
We have already mentioned the rearguard actions fought
by Miloradowich against Macdonald, whose reports clearly
exaggerate the strength of the enemy opposed to him.
Marmont at first went northwards as far as Reichenberg,
with Beaumont, commanding a Westphalian cavalry brigade
and three battalions, scouting towards Grossenhain. On
the I3th, Marmont, leaving Beaumont at Moritzburg, turned
eastwards to Radeberg on the byroad to Bischofswerda.
The Emperor was now convinced that both Russians and
Prussians were retreating by Bautzen. He was inclined to
think they would not stand and fight there, notwithstanding
reports that they were fortifying a position.
On the 15th, Macdonald advancing from Bischofswerda,
again collided at Gödau with Miloradowich's rearguard,
which he drove across the Spree, and himself took post on
the heights on the near side. The VI. corps was now close
up behind him, the IV. at Kloster-Marienstern, halfway
between Gödau and Kamenz. The XII. closed up also.
From his position Macdonald could clearly see the camps
of the enemy beyond Bautzen, where it was now pretty
clear he meant to stand fast.
CHAPTER VIII
THE PRELIMINARIES OF BAUTZEN

NCE he was convinced that the enemy intended
fighting at Bautzen, Napoleon hastened the
assembly of his armies for the battle he so
greatly desired. He had failed to gain a
decisive victory at Lützen with numbers far larger than his
opponent. He now hoped to unite against him a force
very nearly double the combined Russians and Prussians.
His orders were for the XI., VI, and IV. corps to take
position facing Bautzen, the XI. on the right, and the IV.
on the left. The XII. in front of Bischofswerda, would be
the reserve for this first line of 64,Ooo men, and would send
three mobile columns of I 2 Oo to I 5 Oo men each to clear
the woods between the Dresden - Bautzen road and the
Austrian frontier, which was only some ten miles south
of Bautzen. Napoleon would thus have nearly 90,000
men covering directly the advance of the Guard from
Dresden, and indirectly that of Ney's army from the
north.
The left flank was to be cleared by Mortier with the 1st
cavalry corps, Beaumont's detachment, and a division of
Young Guard, thus assuring communication with Ney.
Beaumont's mission was to clear out the enemy's raiders
towards Grossenhain and Königsbruck. On the 16th
Mortier sent Beaumont after some 2000 hostile cavalry who
were at Grossenhain. They fell back precipitately on Elster-
werda. Beaumont, on the I7th, was in communication with
Lauriston's corps; on the 18th he returned to Moritzburg.
Mortier was at Bischofswerda on the 17th. To Ney's army
the orders sent were :—
roö
THE PRELIMINARIES OF BAUTZEN Io'7.
Lauriston received orders direct to march from Dobrilugk
on Hoyerswerda, a copy being sent to Ney." -
Ney himself was ordered from Herzberg on Spremberg.
These orders only reached their destinations on the evening
of the 16th when, though Lauriston was at Dobrilugk, Ney
was at Luckau, whither he had been ordered to march on
the 15th and I 6th. Napoleon, or Berthier, seems to have
forgotten these previous orders. Moreover, the order, as
sent to Ney, did not specify what troops were to go to
Spremberg. Napoleon had intended Victor to take the
offensive against Bülow, with the II. and VII. corps, and
the 2nd cavalry corps. Ney had thus only the orders for
Lauriston to move on Hoyerswerda, and for himself to move
on Spremberg. Quite naturally, he assumed, as suggested
by Jomini, his chief of staff, that all his force, except
Lauriston, was to make for Spremberg, and he acted
accordingly. In reality it was much better to do thus
than to act as the Emperor had intended ; for, by doing as
he did, Ney was bringing all available forces to overwhelm
the enemy's main army, whilst Bülow could easily be con-
tained, in the event of his marching southwards, by a few
thousands.
The route prescribed for Ney was not his shortest to
Bautzen. Napoleon seems to have feared lest his appear-
ance on the direct road should frighten the enemy into
continuing his retreat on Silesia, the very last thing the
Emperor desired. But by the morning of the 16th,
Napoleon had received further reports which convinced him
that the allies meant, under any circumstances, to defend
themselves at Bautzen. He, therefore, in the afternoon,
issued fresh orders to Ney, who was now to go to Hoyers-
werda. The first order was sent at I P.M.,” as follows:– “The
Emperor orders you to betake yourself with all diligence to
Hoyerswerda.” A later order (5 P.M.) says : * “The Emperor
approves that you should arrive as soon as possible with
your corps (in the singular) and that of Lauriston at Hoyers-
werda.” Then it goes on to explain that the Emperor
* Foucart, i. p. 204. * Zbid., i. p. 217. * Ibid., i. p. 218.
IO8 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
desired to send Victor, with Reynier and Sebastiani under
him, to manoeuvre towards Berlin, to retake that city; also,
if possible, Spandau, and to pursue Bülow. This was the
first Ney had heard of the Berlin project. He at once
informed Victor of his mission, and ordered Reynier to stop
at Luckau. This was on the evening of the 17th. That
meant that Victor, with about 25,000 men, would be kept
back from arriving for the coming battle.
By morning of the 17th, Napoleon seems to have come
to the conclusion that Ney's original arrangement for bring-
ing Victor and Reynier with himself was the better. At
Io A.M. Berthier writes to Ney : “Give orders to the Duke of
Belluno (Victor), and to Generals Reynier and Sebastiani
according to what you have ascertained regarding the
enemy, and as you judge most suitable according to the
circumstances. Everything leads to the belief that we are
going to have a battle.”
Ney at once acted on these orders by directing Victor
and Reynier to leave Dahme and Luckau respectively on
the 19th, and to march for Bautzen via Kahlau and Hoyers-
werda. Unfortunately they had lost twenty-four hours, and
could hardly reach Bautzen in time for the battle. For this
the Emperor seems alone to blame. His hankering after
the secondary objectives of Bülow and Berlin was a distinct
falling away from his own principles. With the destruction
of the main army of the allies, Bülow's ruin and the fall of
Berlin must inevitably have followed, and the extra 25,ooo
men of Victor, Reynier, and Sebastiani would probably have
made all the difference at the battle, as we shall see presently.
Ney's positions on the morning of 18th May were—
V. corps, less Puthod's division, Senftenberg.
III. corps and headquarters, Kahlau.
VII. corps, Luckau. -
II. corps, Puthod's division (of V.), and 2nd cavalr
corps, Dahme. -
During the day Lauriston (V.) reached Hoyerswerda, his
fourth division (Puthod) Finsterwalde, III. corps, Sorne.
Berthier's cypher despatch of Io A.M. on the 18th from
THE PRELIMINARIES OF BAUTZEN I09
Dresden seems to show that the Emperor ignored the
effects of his previous orders (of 5 P.M. on 16th) regarding
the Berlin expedition. He now writes as if Ney had been
ordered all along to march with all his forces on Bautzen.
He says, “The Emperor informs you that we are within
cannon range of the little town of Bautzen, which the
enemy has occupied as head of his position, and where he
has thrown up some entrenchments; that on the (enemy's)
right are placed the Prussians, on the left the Russians;
that he desires that, with General Lauriston and all your
forces united, you should make for Drehsa near Gottamelde;
having passed the Spree you will find that you have turned
the enemy's position ; you will take up a good position
there. The Emperor supposes that you are in a position to
reach Hoyerszwerda completely on the 19th. You will draw
towards us on the 20th, and on the 2 Ist you will be able
to reach the position (described above), which will either
have the effect of making the enemy retire farther, or of
putting you in a position to attack him with advantage.””
The instruction to Ney to draw towards the main army
on the 19th and 20th was apparently intended to lull any
anticipations of the enemy of an attack on his right flank
and rear by Ney. The movement of that marshal to his
right would seem to point to a mere frontal attack. At the
last moment, he would turn leftwards across the Spree to
a position which would bring him down on and beyond
their right. -
On this 18th May, Napoleon, with the Guard, marched
half-way to Bautzen, intending to be there early on the
19th. Orders were issued sending Mortier and Latour-
Maubourg forward from Bischofswerda. As they came up,
Oudinot was to come into line on the right of Macdonald,
and, with the assistance of Latour-Maubourg, to thoroughly
* Brösa on the map.
* Foucart, i. 218, 219. The dates given are those in Berthier's despatch which
differ somewhat from those in Corr. 20,024. Nor does the Emperor describe
Drehsa as “near Gottamelde.” Gottamelde is not shown on Petri's map. It is
a small village in the neighbourhood of Guttau.
IIIO NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
search the woods on the right, driving out any enemies
found there. Bertrand was directed to get into communi-
cation with Lauriston and Ney at Hoyerswerda, where the
Emperor expected them to be that day (19th). Beaumont
was still to remain on the watch at Moritzburg.
In the instructions to Durosnel, Governor of Dresden, it
is said, “the artillery will be parked on the left bank till the
battle is decided, so that if the battle were lost we could
pass to the left bank without losing anything ”*—a charac-
teristic mark of the Emperor's care in securing his own
retreat, however certain he might feel of victory. Ney's
orders of the 18th for the next day's march were designed
to bring the V. corps on the right, and the III. on the left
on to the line Zerna-Neudorf, facing south. He directed
Lauriston to keep in communication with the main army
zozwards Kloster Marienstern. From this it is clear that he
was under the false impression that the allies were drawn
up west of the Spree, and that Napoleon was facing them
with his left at Kloster Marienstern. When Ney issued
these orders he was acting on those of the Emperor of
Io P.M. on the 17th which, as conveyed by Berthier, were
far from indicating clearly that the allies had crossed the
Spree. They said, “Our army has nearly reached (touche à)
Bautzen ; the enemy's army and ours are in presence.”
That did not make it quite clear on which bank of the
Spree the enemy was.
The orders of Io A.M. on the 18th, saying the enemy
occupied Bautzen (right bank of the Spree) “as the head
of his position,” made it quite clear that his main position
was beyond the river, but they did not reach the marshal
in writing till he arrived at Hoyerswerda towards noon on
the 19th.
On the morning of the 19th the Emperor, with the main
body, was posted thus in front of Bautzen :-
Headquarters and Old Guard, Klein Förstchen.
Young Guard and Ist cavalry corps, Gödau and behind it.
IV. corps (less Peyri's division sent to make connexion
* Corr. 20,025.
THE PRELIMINARIES OF BAUTZEN III
with Lauriston at Königswartha), Gross-Welkau, with
advanced Guard, Lubachau.
VI. corps, between IV. and the Dresden road, rather in
front of the IV.
XI. corps level with VI., south of the Dresden road.
XII. corps on the right of XI., with an advanced guard
in Guaschwitz. One of Lorencez's brigades of this corps
was clearing the country on the right and right rear.
Of Ney's army, Lauriston (V. corps) was marching by
Wittichenau for Zerna,
The III. corps was marching on Hoyerswerda.
The VII, and the II. corps and the 2nd cavalry corps
also marching for Hoyerswerda, but still far behind.
Napoleon's orders to Ney of Io A.M. on the 18th were
carried by Major Grouchy, son of the future marshal. As
he rode towards Hoyerswerda early on the morning of the
I9th, he learnt that a hostile force was advancing from the
direction of Bautzen. This news induced Lauriston to halt
for fresh orders, after Ney should have heard it. Mean-
while, he ordered the V. corps to close up on Wittichenau
and Maukendorf.
Ney, reaching Hoyerswerda about I I A.M., received the
clear orders of the 18th, and at once changed his own. The
V. corps was now to march by Mortke 1 on Opitz and Lip-
pitsch on the direct road to Klix and Brösa. The III. corps
was to send Souham's division and Kellermann's cavalry
brigade as advanced guard to Neudorf, the other four
divisions to go half to Niesendorf and half to Königswartha.
The country between the Black Elster and the Spree
was marshy, wooded, and covered with ponds to such an
extent that it was not practicable to march through it at all
in the autumn, and in the spring there were available only
two narrow roads.”
Lauriston being still not clear of Hoyerswerda, the con-
sequence was that the III. corps had to wait till even his
* This and a few other names do not appear on the maps. The general
position is shown on Map III., inset (a).
*Jomini, Vie de Map., iv. p. 302.
II2 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
baggage was gone before it could get forward on the road
to Königswartha."
It will be observed that Lauriston's corps, which was
leading, was now to be passed across from Ney's right to
his left. Evidently the marshal did this in order to have
his left leading, and to be certain of reaching the Spree
with it on the 20th.”
We now return to the allies and their movement on
Königswartha, which had been correctly reported by Major
Grouchy to Lauriston. They were, as Napoleon desired,
entirely under the impression that they were about to be
attacked, in their position behind the Spree, from
the west only. On the 18th May a despatch was
captured, which showed that Lauriston would be at
Senftenberg on the 17th, and at Hoyerswerda on the 18th.”
Though this enlightened the allies as to the fact that
Lauriston was coming up, the direction of his march led
them to believe that he would join Napoleon, and the
attack would still be a frontal one from the west only.
They also believed Ney to be a day's march behind
Lauriston. This induced Wittgenstein to think that it
might be possible to cut off Lauriston before he was sup-
ported. The plan was communicated to Barclay, who was
to carry it out, in the evening of the 18th, and early in the
morning of the 19th Wittgenstein wrote to him that, when
he (Barclay) was heard to be in action, an attack would be
made on the French left in front of Bautzen, in order to
prevent its interfering with the expedition. This, von
Caemmerer says, was nonsense; no preparations were ever
made for such an attack. -
* General von Cämmerer points out that Ney might have got over this difficulty
by sending Lauriston's main body by Wittichenau to Königswartha, and detain-
ing his baggage till the III, corps was clear of Hoyerswerda, Instead of that
he sent Lauriston by the Maukendorf road, the III. corps had to wait till his
baggage was gone, and only reached Königswartha with its advanced guard in
the evening.
* In the above account of the orders to and by Ney, Col, Lanrezac's analysis and
criticisms have been generally followed.
* Foucart i., p. 233 (Berthier to Bertrand), and p. 263 note.
THE PRELIMINARIES OF BAUTZEN II3
Barclay's force for this very risky adventure consisted of
his own Russians and Yorck's Prussians, in all about 24,OOO
men. Tschaplitz, with the advanced guard, crossed the
Spree, very early in the morning of the 19th, at Nieder
Gurig, marching direct for Johnsolorf over the wooded
heights beyond the French left.
Langeron and Rajewski, crossing at Klix, made for the
same point by Milkel and Opitz. Yorck went farther
north by Brösa, Guttau, Lomischau, and Lieske, through the
woods towards Hermsdorf.
Tschaplitz's line took him within I} miles of Bertrand's
outposts at Lubachau, who observed and reported his march.
But Bertrand took no action. He had already sent off
Peyri's Italian division to Königswartha to get into touch
with Lauriston. There it bivouacked about noon with total
disregard of all measures of security. The outposts were
badly placed, and no attempt was made to discover what
there might be in the surrounding woods.
At 1 P.M. Barclay joined Tschaplitz, who was quite aware
of the presence and unmilitary attitude of the Italians, since
his scouts had been close up to their outposts. Of what
ensued there is no very clear account forthcoming. All
that is certain is that Peyri, whom the Russians believed to
be Lauriston's advanced guard, was attacked and badly
beaten, with a loss of 2860 men, including 750 prisoners.
The pursuit only ceased at Wartha at 5 P.M., when Keller-
mann was met with Ney's advanced guard.
Yorck, meanwhile, had started at the same time as
Langeron. Having to go by a road five miles longer, by
Hermsdorf, Weissig, Neu Steinitz, and Wartha, against
Lauriston's left flank, he should have started two hours
earlier. At 3 P.M. he found the enemy in force at Herms-
dorf. It was the head of Lauriston's corps. Yorck was
fighting this when he received an order from Barclay to
move to Johnsdorf as reserve.
Circumstances having changed since the order was
dispatched, Yorck would have been justified in delaying
compliance with this order. But his ideas of unhesitating
H
II4 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
obedience induced him to attempt to break off his action
and comply at once. As he was doing so, another order
arrived from Barclay, who, having discovered that he was
not engaged with Lauriston, but with Peyri's division of
Bertrand's corps, now desired Yorck to hold on at Weissig.
He did his best, and as he received reinforcements from
Barclay, was able to put up a very good fight, though he
could not recover the position he had evacuated. It was
only late at night that, leaving his bivouac fires burning, he
retreated on Klix, where he had been preceded by Barclay.
Both rejoined the main army on the 20th, though it was not
till after noon that Yorck was back. He had lost about
I IOO, Barclay about 900 men.
This expedition must be characterised as a very rash one,
from which the allies escaped more by good luck than good
guidance. They had sent about one-fourth of their whole
army in the hope of striking a blow at Lauriston, whose
corps, if complete, should have been I 9,000 strong. The
expeditionary force passed almost under Bertrand's nose,
but he did nothing. Even Napoleon, when he heard the
firing on his left rear at Königswartha, took no notice. He
afterwards censured Bertrand for his slackness, but he must
bear a considerable share of the blame himself.
Again, the allies had a great piece of luck in colliding
only with Peyri's division and part of Lauriston's corps.
Had Ney managed his march better, they might have had
him also on their hands.
Napoleon, posted as he was in front of Bautzen, could
have easily contained the allied main army with the VI.,
XI., XII., and Guard corps (86,000 in all against 72,000
allies), whilst he sent the rest of Bertrand's corps against
the left and rear of Barclay and Yorck.
The attack on Peyri and Lauriston had a very remark-
able effect on Ney. At 9 P.M. he wrote from Maukendorf
to Berthier, saying that he had learnt from a prisoner that
the enemy was marching on Hoyerswerda. “Two divisions,”
he added, “are here with me ; it is at Buchwalde” that I
* Less than two miles south of Maukendorf.
THE PRELIMINARIES OF BAUTZEN II5
shall receive battle if the enemy attacks me to-morrow.”
He was clearly very much at sea still as to the real
positions about Bautzen. For that he had no sufficient
excuse after the receipt of the letter from Berthier saying
the enemy held Bautzen as the “head of his position.”
During the 19th there was no operation on the main
front, except a reconnaissance by Eugen of Wurtemberg
towards Quatitz, which only returned at I I P.M.
CHAPTER IX
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN 1
T is now necessary to describe the field of the two
days' battle of Bautzen.
The general line of division between the opponents
on the 20th May was the river Spree, from about
Doberschau, where it changes its course from north-west to
a little east of north, to Leichnam beyond Klix. From
Doberschau to Oehna, just below Bautzen, the stream
flows in a steep-sided valley, some I 50 feet in average
depth. The command varies from bank to bank. Be-
yond Oehna, as far as the Gottlobsberg, about two miles
lower down, the right bank generally commands the left.
Beyond this point the river is bordered by meadows, in
which, especially on the right bank, are numerous shallow,
muddy ponds used for breeding carp, of which one sees a
whole cart-load taken from a single pond. Through these
ponds run a little branch of the Spree, which enables them
to be filled or emptied when the fish have to be taken up.
Across them, as in the case of the long line running north
from Doberschütz, there are narrow causeways separating
them into compartments. These ponds, and the marshy
land around them, are a very serious military obstacle even
for infantry. The Spree is here a small stream, comparable,
perhaps, to the Mole about Dorking. It is fordable in most
places in ordinary weather, though here and there are deep
reaches, one of which is where the road from Nieder Gurig
to Bautzen crosses above the former village between the
Gottlobsberg and the Kiefernberg.
* In some accounts the first day's battle (20th May) is called the battle of
Bautzen, whilst the second day's is called Wurschen. For plan of battle, see
Map III.
116
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN II7
The extreme south of the battlefield was on the wooded
heights of the Drohmberg and the Schmoritzberg, the last
outliers of the Lusatian mountain in this direction.
The space enclosed between the Spree and the villages
of Doberschau, Rieschen, Litten, and Kreckwitz is a rolling
plateau of no very marked features. North-west of Kreck-
witz is a mass of somewhat more marked elevation, known
generally as the Kreckwitz heights.” North of this mass the
field is generally flat, with a few knolls scattered about, the
most notable being those between Malschwitz and Gleina,
culminating in the windmill height south-west of the latter
place. All this part of the field is dotted over with carp
ponds, as shown on the map. -
Roughly parallel to the Spree, on an average about two
miles east of it, flows the Blösaer Wasser, from about Blösa
to Kreckwitz. Hence it flows past Purschwitz and Klein
Bautzen to join the Löbauer Wasser. As a stream it is
quite unimportant, but its valley, especially from about
Auritz to Kreckwitz, was marshy, and an excellent protec-
tion for a position east of it. One feature outside the
battlefield must be mentioned, the church spire of Hochkirch,
where Frederick had been surprised by Daun. It is covered
with copper, turned green with verdigris, and, standing out
as it does on a commanding spur of the mountains, it forms
a notable landmark, visible from almost every part of the
battlefield, and from far beyond it.
The town of Bautzen had, in 1813, some 7ooo or 8ooo
inhabitants. It was surrounded by an old wall, of which
small portions are still to be seen on the river front. The
deep narrow gorge of the Spree, west of the town, was
hardly open to frontal attack, but could be turned by the
stone bridge higher up, or from lower down.
The allies' first idea had been to defend the line of the
Spree, but the objections to this were (1) the varying com-
mand of the bank; (2) the fact that the river was generally
* It was to a position on these heights, extending from about Kreckwitz to ,
Burk, that Frederick the Great retired after his disastrous defeat at Hochkirch ; ,
on the 14th October 1758. - º, , ; ; ;
y
2
y
Y
y
:
II8 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
fordable; and (3) the extent of the line as compared with
their available forces.
They decided, therefore, on placing their main line
behind the valley of the Blösaer Wasser, and only fighting
an advanced guard action on the line of the Spree about
Bautzen.
In addition to the natural protection of the valley of the
Blösaer Wasser, they had carried out a very considerable
amount of fortification on a line which generally offered an
excellent field of fire. Their left rested on the hills, the
Drohmberg and Schmoritzberg, which, with their woods and
villages, made a strong support. The centre, from the hills
to Kreckwitz, was covered with redoubts or batteries armed
with a powerful artillery sweeping open slopes. The chief
of these were :—
(I) One on the left, on the height north-east of
Mehlteuer. .
(2) One on a height behind Rabitz.
(3) Three between the Bautzen-Hochkirch road at Jenk-
witz, and Baschütz.
(4) Three between Baschütz and the Bautzen-Weissen-
berg road.
(5) Three, in continuation of these, between the road and
Litten.1
Besides these there were numerous smaller works along
this line, and on the Kreckwitz heights villages were fortified
and abattis set up in the woods. The French engineers,
sent for the purpose later on, destroyed no less than 78
redoubts, batteries, and epaulements on the allies'
position.” -
The position, including the Kreckwitz heights projecting
like a bastion on the right front, was generally a good one.
Its left was within about 6 miles of the Austrian frontier,
and, therefore, not likely to be turned by a large force.
* No traces of these redoubts are now apparent, except, perhaps, in a mound
, near the modern drill ground, which may represent one of the northernmost
: group.
* * Foucart, i. p. 293, note.
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN II9
The weak points were its extent, and the danger of its
being turned on its right from the north. It was excellent
so long as it was only attacked from the west. With the
advance of a strong force from Klix on Hochkirch, it was
untenable for long, as the right was “in the air.”
But all the allies' dispositions proceeded on the assump-
tion that an attack was to be expected from the direction
of Dresden only. On the 19th May, Gneisenau inferred,
from the reports received, that there might also be an
attack from the north, but his warnings were disregarded.
There was a strong difference of opinion on several points
between him and Wittgenstein. The hope of the allies was
to be able to hold the French centre and right, whilst
turning their left.
The strength of the allied army was as follows— 1
I. RUSSIANs.
Infantry Cavalry Cossacks #. & Guns Men
ngineers.
Miloradowich 8,800 3,400 1,750 65o 54 I4,6oo
Gortchakow Io, 5oo 2,000 45o 750 66 I 3, 7 Oo
Grand Duke } II, 2OO O * 2 tº O 2 tº 2 I C). OOO
Constantine 53 5,35 3, 25 5 9,9
º de } 9, 15o I,8oo I, 220 1,420 84 I 3,590
1. Kleist I,4oo 42O 55o 18O I6 2,55o
41, I5o 12,970 3,970 6,250 472 64,34o
II. PRUSSIANs.
Blücher I 7, O40 4, 7 Io — I,55o 9d 23,3Oo
Yorck 4, I2O I, 2 IO sm 34O 36 5,670
* Kleist 2,300 330 sºme 3oo 24 2,930
23,460 6,250 – 2, 190 I5o 3I,90o
Grand total 64,610 19,220 3,970 8,440 622 96,240
* Fruhjahrsfeldzug, ii. 181.
* Kleist's corps was partly Russian, partly Prussian, as shown.
I2O NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
A round IOO,Ooo was made up by detachments on the
French flanks and rear.
These troops were thus disposed—
(I) Miloradowich, holding the line of the Spree from
Doberschau to Burk as advanced guard.
(2) Russian main body (Gortchakow) on the line
Rieschen-Jenkwitz-Baschütz, supported by a powerful
artillery from the reserve.
(3) Russian reserve infantry south of Canitz-Christina,
cavalry and horse artillery on both sides of the Weissenberg
road. -
. (4) Blücher, with a brigade on the Kreckwitz heights, in
front of his main body.
(5) Barclay, with Yorck behind him at Guttau, stretching
from Brösa to Klix, with Tschaplitz's advanced guard
beyond.
The orders for the battle, issued on the 19th, attempted
to provide for all contingencies, but missed the very one
which occurred.
If Miloradowich found the enemy crossing with superior
forces above and below Bautzen, he was to fall back on the
heights between Auritz and Klein Jenkwitz.
In case the enemy attempted to advance against the
main position, the following provisions were made :-
(a) If his attack was directed against the allied right,
the army was to reinforce that flank by a “flank march,” a
very vague order, as von Caemmerer remarks. :
(b) If the centre were attacked, Barclay and Kleist to
attack the enemy's left flank. -
(c) If the left were attacked, Barclay and the centre
were to swing forward and drive the enemy against the
mountains.
(d) So, too, if the attack were on both flanks, the right
was to be strengthened so as to drive the French south-
wards. :
No provision was made for what was to happen if
Napoleon did not attempt the main position at once, or for
the case of an attack from the north.
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN I2I
Blücher was directed to move to his right, so as to have
his left at Kreckwitz and right at Brösa, his line to the
latter being completed by the Russian cuirassiers and Prussian
reserve cavalry. Gortchakow was to move into Blücher's
former position. Then the order for the move of the
cavalry to Blücher's right was cancelled, and Yorck was
ordered back to Litten. That decided Barclay to confine
himself to the line Malschwitz-Gleina. Blücher, on the
other hand, kept his main body east of the Kreckwitz
heights, on which was Ziethen's brigade. Two battalions
held Plieskowitz. Kleist was on the Kreckwitz heights and
at Burk, Nieder Kaina, and Basankwitz.
Napoleon, anxious about his broken communications
with Ney, had, about 7 A.M., ordered Soult, with Bertrand's
Corps and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, to re-open them.
Then, finding that they were again open, when he received
Ney's letter of 9 P.M. on the 19th, he stopped his move-
ment." Napoleon, now assured of the retreat of Barclay
and Yorck, decided to attack the line of the Spree, so as to
give Ney more time to come up. About noon the VI. and
XI. Corps began the advance below and above Bautzen.
Oudinot, with the XII., moved on Singwitz, linked to
Macdonald's right by Reiset's cavalry brigade.
It was about I P.M. when Oudinot crossed by the bridge
and a ford at Singwitz, driving the weak Russian line back
on the Falkenberg till he was stopped by Russian cavalry.
He had sent Lorencez's division * to the right. Finding
the Drohmberg and Schmoritzberg weakly held, Lorencez
got well forward towards Pielitz and Mehlteuer.
Whilst these events were occurring, Macdonald had got
over the bridge above Bautzen, and had constructed two
more bridges there. Marmont, from the heights near
Oehna, had bombarded the opposite bank with sixty guns.
Then, passing by a ford, he had got with Compans' division
into the north-western suburb of Bautzen about 3 P.M.
* The fact that he ordered it on the 20th shows that he might well have done
so on the 19th, to the probable undoing of Barclay and Yorck.
* Only one brigade. The other was clearing the woods on the right rear.
122 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
The Russians in Bautzen now evacuated it before the double
threat of Marmont and Macdonald. Miloradowich, alarmed
lest he should be cut off by Oudinot, ordered a general
retirement, for which he was very unfairly blamed at head-
quarters.
Marmont's left had gone forward on Nadelwitz, and
Macdonald to a position facing the heights of Rabitz. As
the enemy retired, Marmont reinforced his left against Burk
so as to support Bertrand's attack farther north. Behind
Macdonald and Marmont, the Guard and two of Latour-
Maubourg's cavalry divisions crossed and took post on the
east of Bautzen. In the centre the fighting came to an end
in this position.
We return to Oudinot before describing what happened
in the north. The effect of Lorencez's advance on Pielitz
and Mehlteuer had been very marked, for it confirmed in
the mind of the Tsar his preconceived idea that Napoleon
meant to cut the allies from Austria by turning their left
and driving them northwards. Since the Tsar was really
the supreme authority, his belief had a very serious effect
on all the plans of the allies during both days of battle.
Nothing would convince him that Napoleon's design was
the exact reverse of what he had taken it into his head to
assume. In reality, the Emperor's great design was to roll
the allies up from their right against the Bohemian frontier.
Nothing could be more natural in the circumstances ; for
he knew that Austria was not ready to declare against him,
and would not be so for several weeks to come. Had she
then found herself, still unready, with a defeated army
driven over her northern frontier there was every proba-
bility that, like Prussia in 1805, she would give way and
hasten to make her peace with Napoleon by refusing to
allow the allies to utilise her territory. The allies them-
selves knew she was not ready, for Stadion had just
brought a memorandum by Radetzky showing that it would
not be till the middle of June, at the earliest, that Austria
could have I2O,Ooo men in Bohemia.
It was, therefore, Napoleon's wish to draw as many of the
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN I23
allied reserves as possible to their left wing, and prevent
them reinforcing their right against the projected attack of
Ney from the north. Alexander played into his hands by
drawing on his already weak reserves to reinforce his left
against Oudinot. Had Napoleon manoeuvred as Alexander
expected, he might, no doubt, have temporarily separated
the allies from Austria, but there was nothing to interfere
with their retreat on Görlitz, Liegnitz, and Breslau. Then
the farther the French advanced the greater would have
been the danger from Austria, busily arming on their right
flank and rear.
The Tsar's erroneous view was not shared by Wittgenstein ;
but his opinion counted for little, and Alexander sent a
substantial portion of his reserve against Oudinot,
The latter was now forced back by superior strength to
Grubditz (Pacthod's division) and Denkwitz (Lorencez's),
where he bivouacked for the night.
Meanwhile, Soult, on the French left, had advanced with
Bertrand's corps. He succeeded, though with heavy loss, in
reaching the Spree at the Gottlobsberg, and driving its
defenders on to the Kiefernberg, but he only got a small
force across the river there. At Nieder Gurig he also had
a severe struggle to take the village and drive its garrison
back on the main position at Doberschütz. Briesing was
found unoccupied, and Soult's left pushed through it part
of the way to Plieskowitz. Whilst Soult was attacking,
Marmont's left division (Bonnet) had succeeded in driving
Kleist from Burk, and eventually compelling his retreat on
Litten. This operation had been facilitated by the move-
ment of Friederichs' division down the valley of the Blösaer
Wasser on Kleist's left against Basankwitz, which was taken.
Soult's exit from the defile at the Gottlobsberg was barred
by a single Prussian battalion on the Kiefernberg, which
only retired in the night.
Ney, during the 20th, advanced to Brehmen. He was
annoyed during the march by Lanskoi's and Tschaplitz's
cavalry, but these were presently driven off by Kellermann
and Ney's leading division. That night Ney's five divisions
I24 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
bivouacked at Sqier ; Lauriston was at and behind Sărchen ;
Puthod's division (of Lauriston's corps) was at Steinitz;
Reynier at Hoyerswerda; Victor still far behind at Senften-
berg.
The object of Napoleon's attack on the 20th had been
to “fix” the enemy in his main position until he could
bring up Ney on his right flank and rear. There was a
certain amount of risk if the allies should make a deter-
mined counter attack on the IV., VI., XI., and XII. corps
when they had crossed the Spree. On the whole, however,
it seems probable that this would have failed, seeing that
Napoleon still had the Guard and Latour-Maubourg's
cavalry in reserve. With them he was very little inferior in
strength to the whole allied army. Colonel Lanrezac
points out that Napoleon did by design what the allies had
done unintentionally at Lützen, namely, had attacked so
late in the day that it was out of the question for the enemy
to inflict a decisive defeat on him, even if they succeeded
in compelling him to recross the Spree. If he had to do
that he would still be in a position to carry out his design
for the next day; for the line of the Spree was not nearly
so defensible for the allies as their main position behind
the Blösaer Wasser.
Wittgenstein had, indeed, at one time contemplated such
a counter attack, but it had been abandoned before the
issue of his orders of the 19th ; for the order to Milora-
dowich not to hold on too long on the Spree was entirely
inconsistent with any such idea.
During the night the allies held councils of war, both at
the headquarters of the King of Prussia (Wurschen) and at
those of the Tsar at Purschwitz. What was said at them
has not been recorded, but von Caemmerer concludes that
even then the allied commanders completely failed to
recognise the danger of their position.
Napoleon had in reality only very imperfectly “fixed"
the enemy. Had they not already unwisely decided to
defend their main position under any circumstances, there
was nothing in the events of the 20th to forbid their retreat
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN - I25
during the ensuing night. That would have been their
wisest course.
THE BATTLE OF THE 2 IST MAY.
Napoleon's orders to Ney of the 18th only directed him
on Drehsa (Brösa). On the 20th fresh orders were sent.
They appear to have been issued about 4 P.M., to have
been carried by Ney's own staff officer, and to have reached
him only at 4 A.M. on the 21st.” They were signed by
Berthier, and directed Ney to drive the enemy from
Drehsa, and thence march on Weissenberg, so as to turn
the enemy.
These orders, as von Caemmerer points out, were wanting
in clearness, since they mixed up matters which should be
kept distinct. The direction to march on Weissenberg
could only come into force, he says, if it was desired to
manoeuvre the enemy from his position, or if he of his own
accord withdrew from the battle. If the enemy were still
in his position on the 2 Ist, Ney ought to march, not south-
east on Weissenberg, but due south on Hochkirch. There-
fore, the Prussian writer thinks, there is nothing remarkable
in Ney's replying that, as he heard firing in the direction of
Hochkirch and Bautzen, he should await further orders
before marching on Weissenberg. Here we must raise the
question whether Napoleon ever meant “Drehsa near
Gottamelde” to be sent to Ney as a direction. On Petri's
map, which he is said to have used, there are two Drehsas,
one (really Brösa) near Gottamelde (Guttau), the other
south of Wurschen, in the direct line from Klix to Hoch-
kirch.” Napoleon's order to Berthier speaks merely of
Drehsa, without any description. Napoleon, who had studied
* Foucart, i. p. 289, note 2. * /bid., i. p. 309, note 2.
* Petri was a Prussian officer of Frederick, and published his map in 1763.
Why should he have made a mistake and written Drehsa for Brösa P (It seems
probable Brösa was the right name as it is now.) The mistake may have arisen
from the local pronunciation which sounds “6” or “oe” as “e.” The author
himself was directed by a blacksmith at Nimmschütz to “Ena,” which, on con-
sulting the map, he found to be CEhna.
I26 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Frederick's campaigns, would know Drehsa south of Wur-
schen, as the strong position where Frederick made a stand
to cover his retreat from Hochkirch to Kreckwitz. It was
right in the centre of the space between the roads by which
the enemy could retreat on Görlitz and Löbau, and the
point on which, looking at his map at Dresden, he would
naturally direct Ney ; for the map did not tell him that
Hochkirch spire was a much better landmark. Most writers
assume that Berthier was right in adding the description
“near Gottamelde.” On the other hand, Jomini” says
Napoleon indicated the Drehsa south of Wurschen, and
that he (Jomini) got Ney to march on Hochkirch spire,
which was the same direction.” Count Yorck von Warten-
burg • also says Napoleon indicated “Drehsa in the rear
of the allies,” a description which does not apply to “Drehsa
near Gottamelde.” Again, Ney's main point of passage of
the Spree would naturally be by the road at Klix. Why
should Napoleon give him as a further line of direction one
of scarcely a mile (the distance from Klix to Brösa) P The
prolongation of this short line (Klix-Brösa) would carry
Ney on parallel to the line of the main attack to a point
north even of Weissenberg.
The bearer of Ney's reply to the order to march on
Weissenberg reached Napoleon on the heights east of
Bautzen after 7 A.M. The Emperor personally explained
to him the enemy's position. Whether he told him where
Ney was to make for is not clear. The staff officer was
sent back with a pencil note as follows:– “The intention
of the Emperor is that you should follow constantly the
movement of the enemy. His Majesty has shown your
staff officer the positions of the enemy, which are defined
by the redoubts which he has constructed and occupies.
The intention of the Emperor is that you should be this
morning at I 1 o'clock at the village of Preititz, You
will be on the extreme right of the enemy. As soon as
the Emperor sees you engaged at Preititz we shall attack
* Vie de Maft. iv., p. 311, note. * Ibid., p. 305, note.
* Mapoleon as a General, ii., p. 257. -
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN I27
vigorously at all points. Cause General Lauriston to march
on your left so as to be in a position to turn the enemy if
your movement decides him to abandon his position.”
It was perhaps proper in a “directive,” which should
leave a commander of a separate force a free hand, not to
prescribe the direction to be taken after Preititz, but, on the
other hand, the orders were much too definite in prescribing
the hour at which Ney was to reach Preititz. Again, there
is in the orders no clear statement of the Emperor's general
plan, and of the part Ney was to play in it. The effects of
this order will be seen later as the course of the battle is
described, which may best be done in periods.
First period—up to II A.M.
Oudinot began the attack with the French right at day-
break. At first he was successful, Pacthod capturing
Rieschen, and Lorencez storming Pielitz and Döhlen.
This so alarmed the Tsar, who still believed in Napoleon's
design to cut the allies from Bohemia, that he drew again
on his weak reserves to reinforce Miloradowich. That
general, with about 20,000 men against Oudinot's I 5,Ooo,
now drove the latter back on to the Drohmberg and the
heights east of Binnewitz. This was about I I A.M.
Oudinot, who had already asked for reinforcements, again
appealed for them to the Emperor, who did not even
reply.
On Oudinot's left, Macdonald got on to the heights of
Rabitz, from which he maintained a heavy cannonade.
In the centre Marmont's three divisions stood inactive on
the heights of Burk, with infantry occupying Nadelwitz,
Nieder Kaina, and Basankwitz.
The Guard infantry stood in squares on the high ground
north-east of Bautzen. Guard cavalry and Latour-Mau-
bourg on the right of the infantry, behind Macdonald's
left.
Soult, with Bertrand's corps, had announced that at day-
break he would be on the plateau east of the Spree. But
Ziethen’s battalion was only withdrawn from the Kiefern-
berg at dawn, and there were difficulties in constructing a
I28 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
bridge below the Gottlobsberg, where the water was deep.
At I I A.M. Bertrand was still not across, and it was not till
2 P.M. that he had 20,000 infantry, Iooo cavalry and 30
guns on the right bank. He was therefore very far from
having done what Napoleon expected when he sent orders
to Soult (at the same time as he sent those to Ney), to
attack the enemy vigorously with three divisions advancing
between Marmont and Ney.
Ney, on the French left, had started at between 4 and 5
A.M. to cross the Spree at Klix. As Lauriston's leading
division reached Klix, it found Kellermann's advanced
guard still in bivouac there. Crossing the Spree Lauriston
met Tschaplitz's Russians, and turned leftwards towards
Leichnam in order to outflank them. Lanskoi's Russian
cavalry (24OO) was still on Lauriston's left at Lomischau.
Leaving four battalions, a squadron, and two guns to deal
with Lanskoi, Lauriston marched on Brösa, Tschaplitz
retiring from Salga before him through Brösa and Guttau,
which latter he fired in order to delay Lauriston's passage
of the Löbauer Wasser. Lauriston had only two divisions
with him, as Ney had stopped Maison's, and sent it by
Salga on Malschütz to protect his own right.
Ney now decided to attack Barclay, who stood on the
heights of Gleina with about 5000 men, the rest of his
I 5,000 being 24OO with Lanskoi, 2 battalions in Guttau,
2 in the wood between Brösa and Gleina, and 3 in Mal-
schütz. As Ney had some 18,Ooo men, Barclay fell back
without serious resistance on Preititz with his main body,
whilst he sent his reserve to reinforce Tschaplitz, who was
now at Buchwalde east of Gleina. Barclay had already
called on Blücher for reinforcements to be sent to Preititz.
There, however, he was alarmed for his line of retreat by
the advance of Lauriston, who had driven Tschaplitz back
as far as the Schafberg east of Buchwalde, where the
Russian was joined by Lanskoi and Barclay's reserve.
Lauriston was now trying to turn his right.
Barclay, therefore, leaving only two battalions in Preititz,
marched to Baruth to protect the line of retreat. It was
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN I29
Io A.M. when Ney found himself on the windmill heights of
Gleina. On his right Maison was preparing to storm
Malschütz ; Lauriston had still not got beyond Guttau.
It was at this juncture that his staff officer, who had had
to make a long round by Klix, returned with Napoleon's
pencil orders and verbal explanations. Jomini urged Ney
to advance at once on Preititz, but the marshal pointed to
the order saying he was expected to be there at I I.
Nothing would induce him to act otherwise than by the
letter of the orders, and he remarked that an hour hence
Maison would have taken Malschütz, and Lauriston would
have got to Buchwalde. He decided to wait an hour. He
had now got up the divisions of Souham, Delmas, Albert,
Ricard, 23,Ooo infantry, so that he could have taken
Preititz with the greatest ease.
Now, however, according to Jomini, Ney had got into his
obstinate and not over clear head a new idea. “When
Ney saw the fine heights of Klein Bautzen, he was carried
away by the idea that they were the key of the position.” "
That made him hold that he ought to wait for the arrival
of Reynier, and then attack the heights. Therefore, towards
II o'clock, he adopted a half measure by sending Souham
alone against Preititz. Delmas was echeloned, out of sup-
porting distance, on Souham's right, whilst Albert and
Ricard were kept right back in reserve. At the same time,
orders were sent to Lauriston to close in on Ney's left.
Lauriston, however, did not obey at once, for he saw that
by a flank march he would merely lose time.
As we have said, Barclay had left only two battalions in
Preititz, who could practically make no fight against Souham.
Thus at I I A.M. Ney had a division in Preititz, which was
more or less of a literal compliance with Napoleon's orders.
Had he had his whole corps there, and been on the move
towards Hochkirch, as Jomini urged him, Blücher could
hardly have held on to the Kreckwitz heights, and, the
* Letter from Jomini to Major Wagner, dated 15th April 1823, quoted by von
Caemmerer in “Fruhjarhrsfeldzug, 1813.” The “heights of Klein Bautzen”
mean the Kreckwitz heights.
I
I3o NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
pressure in front of Soult being removed, that marshal also
would have got forward.
Second period—I I A.M. to 3 P.M.
We left Oudinot, at I I A.M., falling back before Milora-
dowich. At noon he again urgently demanded reinforce-
ments. This time he got an answer: “Tell your marshal,”
said the Emperor to Oudinot's galloper, “that the battle
will be won by 3 o'clock, from now till then he must hold
on as best he may.” As a matter of fact, Oudinot's position
was not so bad as he imagined. He had not yet engaged
his Bavarian division, and, when Macdonald on his left
threatened an advance with his right from Grubditz on
Binnewitz, the Russian advance came to a standstill, and
Oudinot was able to hold on at Ebendörfel and on the
heights in rear of Binnewitz.
Napoleon was quite satisfied ; for Oudinot and Macdonald
had drawn on themselves nearly the whole of the allies' left
wing, and a great part of the reserve, which it was the
Emperor's design to prevent being sent to the allied right.
If Macdonald and Oudinot were forced back, so much the
better, for that would facilitate the scheme for driving the
enemy against the mountains. &
The Tsar and the King of Prussia had taken post in the
early morning on the heights near Klein Jenkwitz, on the
Bautzen-Hochkirch road. Thence, they could, with a good
glass, recognise the person of Napoleon about two miles off.
At 9 A.M. the French Emperor, exhausted by a sleepless
night, had lain down on the ground and gone calmly to
sleep in the midst of his Guard. In this extraordinary
position, with the enemy's shells bursting at times close to
him, he slept till I I.
The Tsar, meanwhile, had become more and more con-
vinced that the danger was to his left. In vain did
Wittgenstein say to him, “I will wager my head that this
is only a demonstration ; Napoleon's idea is to outflank our
right and drive us on Bohemia,” +
When Napoleon awoke at I I A.M. to hear the sound of
* Danilewski, p. IoI.
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN I31
Souham's attack on Preititz, his view of which was shut out
by the Kreckwitz heights, he ordered Marmont forward
across the Blösaer Wasser between Nieder Kaina and the
Bautzen-Hochkirch road. The infantry of the VI. corps,
sheltered by the ground, now stood within twenty minutes'
march of the enemy's redoubts, whilst the artillery kept up
a tremendous fire.
Into the gap between Marmont's left at Nieder Kaina
and Bertrand's right the Emperor sent Barrois' division of
Young Guard who fired with artillery on Kreckwitz village
on their left, and the redoubts south of Litten on their
right."
The rest of the Guard and Latour-Maubourg stood as
reserve, with eighty guns, behind Basankwitz.
It was I P.M. before Bertrand, under Soult's orders, had
his bridge ready close under the Kiefernberg, where it was
defiladed from the enemy's artillery on the Kreckwitz
heights. His artillery, which had hitherto kept silent,
leaving the enemy to waste his ammunition, now opened
fire from the Gottlobs and Kiefern Bergs to prepare the way
for the advance, about 2.30 P.M., of Franquemont's Wur-
tembergers on Kreckwitz. This division, regardless of a
murderous artillery fire, pushed gallantly on, forcing the
allied batteries to retire from the Koppatschberg, which
was stormed, and artillery brought up on to its flanks. One
Wurtemberg battalion even got into Kreckwitz, but was
driven out and almost all of it taken prisoner by reinforce-
ments sent from Yorck's right at Litten.
Simultaneously with Franquemont's advance, Morand's
division had one column moving against Plieskowitz from
Briesing, another from Nieder Gurig on Doberschütz, and a
third from the Galgenberg on the Weisser Stein.”
By 3 P.M. Blücher was forced back to the line Dober-
schütz-Weinberg-Kreckwitz (village).
* Two of Barrois' five regiments with half a battery had been sent there
earlier.
* This appears to be the curious outcrop of white stone close to which one
passes in walking by the cross road from Kreckwitz to Doberschütz.
I32 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
We left Ney, at I I A.M., with Souham's division in
Preititz, or just arriving there. It will be remembered that
Barclay, seeing Ney's advance on Gleina, had asked support
from Blücher. In compliance with this demand, Blücher
had, at IO A.M., sent four battalions to the eastern slope of
the Kreckwitz heights above Klein Bautzen. Then he ordered
Röder to send three more battalions into Preititz. As the
latter advanced along the left bank of the Blösaer Wasser,
they met Souham debouching from Preititz and attacked so
vigorously as to drive him back into it. The rest of Röder's
brigade coming up, as well as a regiment sent by Kleist
from east of Purschwitz, there ensued a desperate struggle
in Preititz, the result of which was that Souham was driven
from the village back on the divisions of Albert and Ricard.
About I P.M. the three divisions fell back on Gleina
heights. -
Ney, who could now see the rear of the allied centre and
knew that Napoleon had not yet attacked it, sent urgent
calls to hurry up Reynier, who was just crossing the Spree
at Klix, and to insist on Lauriston's closing in from the
left.
The latter had manoeuvred Tschaplitz off the Schafberg,
and was following him towards Barclay, who now occupied
the heights between Rackel and Briesnitz.
Lauriston, leaving Rochambeau's division and half his
cavalry to contain Barclay, reluctantly marched with
Lagrange's division and the rest of the cavalry by Buch-
walde on Preititz. All told, he had only about Io,000 men,
including Rochambeau ; for Puthod's division was only just
coming up to Gleina, and Maison's had been sent by Ney
against Malschütz.
Maison, after storming Malschütz, had taken Plieskowitz,
then being driven from it again, and only finally got posses-
sion of it when, towards 3 P.M., the Prussians retired on to
the heights before the combined advance of Maison and that
of Bertrand's left column from Briesing.
When Souham was driven from Preititz, Ney sent Delmas,
supported by Albert and Ricard, to retake it. The village
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN I33
was now held by Kleist only; for Blücher had been obliged
to recall Röder to form his own reserve. Kleist now (about
2 P.M.) saw Preititz threatened by Ney's three divisions in
front, and by Lauriston on the right. The village was
stormed by Delmas; then he was driven out again, once
more re-took it, and finally held it as Kleist, alarmed for his
retreat, fell back on the heights south-west of Belgern.
As Delmas advanced on Preititz, he had suffered from
artillery fire from the northern slopes of the Kreckwitz
heights. This seems to have confirmed Ney in his belief
that he was bound to attack the heights. If the marshal
was amenable in the council chamber, he took the bit
between his teeth on the battlefield, and it was in vain that
Jomini again told him that the decision lay in a march
directed on the Hochkirch spire. He had now 32,000 men
available, without counting the shattered division of Souham,
Maison, Rochambeau, or Reynier. The “accursed heights
of Kreckwitz,” as Jomini styles them, continued to attract
Ney.
As soon, therefore, as Delmas was in Preititz, he was
ordered to face to his right for the attack on the heights,
which would have to be made in face of a heavy artillery
fire, and across a tract divided up by ponds with narrow
causeways between them.
Third period. After 3 P.M.
During this period almost the whole interest of the battle
centres round the Kreckwitz heights and the allied right.
Blücher's position on these heights was becoming more and
more perilous. Bertrand's advance had driven him back to
the line Doberschütz-Weinberg-Kreckwitz, facing west.
Maison was coming from the north ; Delmas, Ricard, Albert,
and Lauriston were advancing from the north-east ; Barrois
threatened Kreckwitz from the south.
Blücher had already called on Yorck for help ; he could
see Marmont's masses threatening the allies' centre, and the
Imperial Guard apparently on the point of advancing from
Basankwitz on Litten. Yorck was very weak in his position
about Litten, but he at once sent off Steinmetz's brigade,
134 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
which apparently was the force that destroyed the Wurtem-
berg battalion in Kreckwitz. As soon as Yermolow with
part of the Russian Guard came up to relieve him south of
Litten, Yorck, leaving behind only two battalions, started
with the rest.
But it was too late, for Blücher, soon after 3 P.M., finding
himself quite unable to resist the immensely superior forces
advancing from three sides against the heights, decided to
evacuate them. He had very little time to spare ; indeed,
Müffling says 1 that he warned Blücher that there was just
a quarter of an hour left before the narrow gap in the circle
of French would be closed. The old Prussian consented
most reluctantly to retreat. Klüx was sent off first,
followed by Ziethen. As they reached Kreckwitz, they
met and passed through Steinmetz's and Horn's brigades of
Yorck's corps. The Prussian troops retired in perfect order
to a position north and south of Purschwitz, where Röder's
brigade had already taken post. The cavalry covered the
retreat, and succeeded in saving one of their batteries,
which had very nearly fallen into the hands of the Wurtem-
berg cavalry. -
Meanwhile, as the Prussians left the Kreckwitz heights,
the tide of the French attack rose over them. Ney's men
from the north and north-east, Bertrand's from the west and
south, rushed on to the plateau to find no enemy left there,
and to meet only their friends from the opposite side. The
two corps were “clubbed ” on the plateau, and it took an
hour before they could get properly disentangled. Ney,
as he reached the heights, saw to his disgust that the
Prussians had slipped unharmed through the gap which he
had left by his fatal right turn at Preititz, and were
retreating in perfect order. He sent immediate orders to
Lauriston to head them off, but it was too late.
It was not till Ney had taken Preititz for the second
time that the Tsar at last realised that the danger was to
the right of the allies, and that now there was nothing left
but immediate retreat. Yermolow, with part of the Russian
* Passages from my Life, etc., p. 41.
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN I35
Guard, was sent off to support the right, and took Yorck's
place south of Litten. His infantry was very weak, and,
though with the cavalry and artillery they might have
checked Barrois' Young Guard division alone, they could
not withstand him as well as the Wurtembergers following
the Prussians through Kreckwitz. Yermolow, therefore, fell
back eastwards with the guns, covered by one of Yorck's
battalions and by Corswant’s cavalry.
In the centre, Napoleon still hoped, with Marmont's
corps, Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, and the Guard, to drive
the allied left on the mountains. But Eugen of Wurtem-
berg retired so slowly and threateningly along the Löbau
road that all the troops of the allied left got safely away
under his protection. Latour-Maubourg's inferior cavalry
could do nothing against that of the Russians.
Orders for the allies' retreat were only issued at 4 P.M.
It was to be in three columns; on the north Barclay, in a
strong position at Briesnitz, and Rackel, was to hold on till
the centre, the Prussians and Yermolow, got away to
Wurschen. The southern column, Miloradowich, was to
march on Löbau, covered by the left centre.
In this manner the retreat was carried out in perfect
order. The French pursuit was hindered, not only by the
action of the rearguards, but also by a violent storm of rain
which broke over the field about 6 P.M. There was never
the slightest foundation for the statement in Napoleon's
bulletin that the retreat “soon became a flight.”
Into the details of this retreat we need not enter. There
were several sharp fights, by no means always ending in
the victory of the French.
When darkness finally stopped the fighting, the allies
stood thus:–
Barclay, north of Weissenberg, with rearguard (Tschaplitz
and Dolffs' cavalry) at Gröditz.
Blücher and most of the Prussians east and south-east of
Weissenberg.
Yermolow's division and Katzeler's cavalry brigade,
Kotitz. -
136 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Russians (less Barclay and Yermolow), Löbau.
St Priest's rearguard, Hochkirch.
Immanuel, Kassarow, and Orłow were four or five miles
south at Cunewalde.
The allies still had, after allowing for the losses of the
day, some 45,000 men on the northern, and 4O,Ooo on the
southern road.
The French had reached the following points:—
XI. corps (Macdonald) at Meschwitz, south-west of Hoch-
kirch.
XII. corps (Oudinot), behind XI., at Söritz and Blösa.
VI. corps (Marmont), Waditz, with cavalry at Canitz-
Christina.
IV. corps (Bertrand), at and south of Drehsa.”
III. corps (Ney), and V. (Lauriston), Wurschen.
VII. corps (Reynier), Belgern.
Guard and Imperial headquarters, Neu Purschwitz.
The losses of the allies for the two days' battle are given
by von Caemmerer as Io,850, of whom 2790 belonged to
Blücher's corps. Very few prisoners were lost, and no
trophies, except a few disabled guns, which had to be left
behind.
The French lost at least double these numbers. The
lowest estimate puts them at 20,000, the highest at 25,000.
Perhaps it is safe to take von Caemmerer's of 22,500,
inclusive of 37 oo “missing,” of whom 8oo were prisoners,
and the rest marauders and stragglers, many of whom re-
joined later, or turned up at Dresden.
Napoleon had on the field on the 21st May—
Ney's army . 87,500
Main army . I I 5,Ooo
Total . 202,500 * with 543 guns.
* The Drehsa south of Wurschen. o
* Statement given at beginning of Foucart, i. These numbers are exclusive
of Victor and Sebastiani, who were not up. Lanrezac puts the total at 170,000
men, of whom, he says, only about 90,000 were seriously engaged, viz. the III.,
IV. and XII. corps, and parts of V. and XI.
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN I37
Yet he had only gained another Lützen, something very
far short of the decisive victory which he hoped for, and "
had a fair right to expect.
Before going further, we may note here that Lanrezac
freely admits that much of the failure of the French was
due to the superior morale of the allied troops, especially of
the Prussians, who were animated by a noble spirit of
patriotism, and by the desperation of men fighting for the
preservation of hearth and home. They had a long series
of grievous wrongs to avenge. But this spirit alone could
hardly have saved them against Napoleon's overwhelming
superiority of numbers, had his scheme been executed as it
was designed.
Von Caemmerer has remarked on the strong resemblance
in general design between the battle of the 2 Ist and that
which the Prussians fought fifty-three years later at Sadowa.
If we take the Blösaer Wasser as representing the Bistritz,
the Kreckwitz heights as those north of Chlum, Napoleon's
army as the Prussian I. and Elbe armies, and Ney's as that
of the Prussian Crown Prince, the resemblance is obvious.
There was, it is true, no river corresponding to the Elbe
behind the allies, but the defile leading to Görlitz may be
taken to represent that. Napoleon, for the first time in his
military career, deliberately aimed at concentrating on and
not short of the battlefield, and the event showed that the
instruments at his disposal were not sufficiently good for his
purpose. Not that he could blame for this anything but
the system of centralised command which he had habitually
employed, depriving his subordinate commanders of all
initiative or self-reliance.
That the failure to make of Bautzen a complete and
decisive victory was mainly Ney's fault is held by all critics.
But the Emperor must bear his share of the blame, inas-
much as he chose Ney for a command for which he was very
ill-suited. Perhaps most of the other marshals would have
done no better, but with Davout, Soult, Marmont, or Gouvion
St Cyr there was at least a better chance.
Von Caemmerer, whilst suggesting that possibly Napoleon
I38 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
looked to Jomini to keep Ney straight, observes that the
cases in which a Chief of Staff can make up for the de-
ficiencies of his general are rare. With a man so impetuous
as Ney, there was very little chance on the battlefield, where
he allowed himself to be carried away by impulse, and
became as obstinate as a mule.*
We have already, in detailing the various orders given to
Ney, shown that they failed to explain to him with sufficient
clearness the part he was expected to play, and the scheme
of his master. We have also argued that the Drehsa
which Napoleon originally meant was not the one “near
Gottamelde,” but the one rendered famous in Frederick's
battle. Against this theory is the fact that the pencil note
of the morning speaks of Ney's occupying Drehsa, and then
marching on Weissenberg. But may not this order have
been wrongly drafted by Berthier, who assumed that Drehsa
“near Gottamelde’’ was meant P In favour of it is the fact
that the earlier orders speak of Ney's taking “a good
position ” at Drehsa. There appears to be no position
which could be called “good" at Brösa, whereas there is a
good one at Drehsa south of Wurschen, one, too, the
excellence of which had been practically demonstrated by
Frederick.
Little has hitherto been said about Bertrand's delay
in crossing the Spree. Yet it would seem he ought to
have been across much earlier. He held the Gottlobsberg
on the night of the 20th, and there was nothing to
oppose him except Ziethen's single battalion on the
eastern slope of the Kiefernberg. Surely he might have
got on with his bridge building during the night? Had
he been well forward with his attack when Ney took
Preititz for the second time, it is possible the latter might
have seen the advantage of getting across the Weissenberg
road, so as to block Blücher's last avenue of escape east-
wards. Bertrand, it is true, was weak; for practically he
* In the Waterloo campaign, when Soult objected to Grouchy as not sufficiently
strong for the command of the right wing, Napoleon replied that he had given
him two strong subordinates in Vandamme and Gérard.
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN I39
had only the two divisions of Franquemont and Morand,
seeing that Peyri's had been rendered almost useless at
Königswartha on the Igth. But he might very well have
been reinforced from the centre. There were there the
corps of Marmont and Macdonald, the Guard and Latour-
Maubourg's cavalry. The allied position there was so
strong as to be really unassailable, until the intended advance
of Ney in its rear should render it no longer tenable.
Marmont, the Guard, and a great part of Macdonald's corps
did practically nothing beyond bombarding the enemy's
main position. They could not have held him there, or
prevented his retreating, had he not been determined to hold
on. Therefore, the attack on the Kreckwitz heights might
well have been begun by troops drawn from the centre,
when Ney reached Preititz. That would have prevented
Blücher's sending the troops which drove Souham from
Preititz, and perhaps would have enlightened Ney as to the
real state of affairs and his own task. His failure to
appreciate the latter is shown by the way in which he
weakened Lauriston by taking away from him Maison's
division. With that additional force, and most of the
cavalry, Lauriston would have been able to sweep away
rapidly the weak forces of Barclay, instead of hesitating
before them as he did. Moreover, Puthod's division should
have been hurried up, as well as Reynier, and sent straight
on to Lauriston, to whose corps it belonged. Instead of
that, Puthod was kept at Gleina, and Lauriston was called in
from the left. The latter measure was entirely opposed to
the Emperor's order, “Cause Lauriston to march on your
left, so as to be in a position to turn the enemy if our move-
ment decides him to abandon his position.” Ney entirely
failed to appreciate his task, but for that Napoleon must
bear a good deal of the blame. He might, as Colonel
Lanrezac says, have easily arranged a meeting with Ney in
the night of the 20th-2 Ist, at which he could have explained
the marshal's task beyond all possibility of doubt. We
would venture to suggest that, possibly, the Emperor might
have been better placed had he himself been with Ney's
* ,
I4o NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
army, leaving Marmont or Soult in charge of the frontal
attack. The great objection to that would probably have
been that his presence in the north would have come to the
knowledge of the allied commanders, and would have called
their attention to the real point of danger. As it was, they
(or rather the Tsar) persistently played into Napoleon's
hands by strengthening their own left against Oudinot, and
withdrawing their already weak reserves from the centre.
Bautzen, comparative failure though it was, was perhaps the
battle for which Napoleon prepared his plans, almost in
detail, longer before its occurrence than any other. He was
able to do so from the certainty which he had acquired some
days before, that the allies were determined to fight a
defensive battle on a carefully prepared and fortified
position.
St Cyr's account of his interview with Napoleon, early in
May at Dresden, is remarkable as an exposition of the
Emperor's general views. After relating how Napoleon
complained of the want of promise among his marshals, and
then expounded his plan of attack at Bautzen, St Cyr con-
tinues : “The means on which Napoleon seemed to me to
count most was the disposition he had made for turning the
enemy's army by its right in its position at Bautzen. I
observed to him that he seemed to me to be departing from
his ordinary practice, inasmuch as I believed that he pre-
ferred attacks on the centre to those on the wings, whilst
the latter seemed to have always been preferred by Frederick;
that the first, whilst offering greater obstacles to be sur-
mounted in the beginning, offered in the end, when they
succeeded entirely, greater results, since it was almost
impossible for an enemy, beaten and pierced in his centre,
to avoid a complete rout and to effect a passable retreat.
I added that this form of attack had always appeared to me
most in accord with the nature of his genius, and the wish
he had to be, on the day of battle, the sole spring of this
great machine; that it lent itself better than any other to
the union in his hands of all his resources. He replied,
that he gave no preference to the attack on the centre over
THE BATTLE OF BAUTZEN I4I
that on the wings; that his principle was to attack the
enemy with the greatest force possible; that the nearest
corps being once engaged, he left them to act, without
troubling himself much about their good or bad chances;
that he only took great care not to yield too easily to
demands for succour from their chiefs. He cited as an ex-
ample Lützen, where, he said, Ney had demanded immediate
reinforcements, though he had still two divisions not engaged ;
he assured me that, in the same affair, another marshal * had
also demanded them before having any enemy in front
of him. He added that it was only towards the end of the
day, when he perceived that the enemy was worn out, and
had employed the greater part of his resources, that he
united what he had been able to keep in reserve, in order to
be able to launch on the field of battle a strong mass of
infantry, cavalry, and artillery; that, the enemy not having
foreseen this, he made what he called an “evènement,” and
by this means he had almost always obtained a victory.””
This very remarkable passage, if we may assume that it
was not an unconscious afterthought of St Cyr, is a very
clear profession of the Emperor's tactical faith.
At Lützen the “evènement” only partially came off,
when Napoleon launched the Guard, supported by Drouot's
great battery, on the quadrilateral of the four villages. At
Bautzen, it never came off at all ; for, owing to the failure of
Ney's movement, the enemy was already in retreat, and the
Guard did little or nothing. What he thought of the
results of Bautzen is shown by Napoleon's remark, as he
rode over the battlefield, “What after such a slaughter, no
trophies P. These people will leave me no claws ' " The
words are curiously like those of Ney after Eylau.
1 Marmont, * Aſſist. Mil., iv. pp. 40-4I.
CHAPTER X
FROM BAUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 1
N the very early hours of the 22nd May the Russo-
Prussian army resumed its retreat, both columns con-
verging on Reichenbach. Thence to Görlitz there
is a long defile, which they successfully negotiated,
under the protection of their rearguards.
At 3 A.M. firing commenced at the outposts, which were
in close contact all along the line. At 7 A.M. the French
VII. corps (Reynier) set out for Reichenbach, with the 1st
cavalry corps (Latour-Maubourg). On its left was the
V. corps (Lauriston), in rear of it the Guard and the VI.
corps (Marmont). The XI., followed by the IV., marched
by Löbau ; the III. took post at Weissenberg, and the
XII. (Oudinot), which had suffered heavily in the battle,
was left to rest at Bautzen, and to collect its detachments,
including Lorencez's brigade from the right rear. -
By 1o A.M. the Emperor, with the VII. corps, arrived
before Reichenbach, and found Eugen of Würtemberg, with
6ooo or 7ooo men, standing on the heights to the east of
the town to cover the retreat on Görlitz.
Reynier deployed for the frontal attack, whilst Lauriston
manoeuvred to outflank the enemy's right. The French were
very cautious, and presently Napoleon, to expedite matters,
ordered the Guard cavalry to cross the brook on which
Reichenbach stands above the town, so as to threaten the
enemy's line of retreat. As they got across and began to
mount the heights, they were fired on by two batteries of
horse artillery, and then charged by Russian cavalry.
Latour-Maubourg joined in the fight, which was indecisive,
* Map I.
I42
FROM BAUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE I43
but, by 3 P.M., Eugen found his right seriously threatened
by Lauriston. Having succeeded in his task of gaining
time for the main body, he fell back on his reserves at
Markersdorf on the way to Görlitz. It took the French an
hour to rearrange their advance, and then, when they arrived
before Markersdorf, Eugen retired again on a position short
of Görlitz.
Reynier's men being very fatigued by the long marches
they had made in the last few days, their commander
requested permission to halt. Napoleon's reply was a
, peremptory order to move on Görlitz
Whilst the VII. corps was coming to the attack, a round
shot passed close to the Emperor. It killed on the spot
Kirgener, the general of engineers, who had conducted the
siege operations at Danzig in 1807, and then mortally
wounded the Grand Marshal Duroc, who died twelve hours
later. There was, perhaps, none of his subordinates, except
Lannes, who lost his life four years before at Essling, whom
Napoleon regarded with such personal affection as Duroc.
As in the case of Lannes, he was genuinely affected by this
loss, though one cannot but feel that he would have shown
better taste had he not inserted in his bulletin of the 22nd
May a full, and perhaps doubtful, account of his last inter-
view with the dying man. It was a good opportunity for
a “coup de théâtre,” and that Napoleon could never resist.
Yet he must have been feeling that death was now beginning
to take heavy toll amongst his old friends and servants,
who, so far, had escaped with wonderfully little loss. Three
weeks earlier he had lost Bessières, and on this fatal day of
Reichenbach he lost Bruyère, Kirgener, and Duroc. Mortier,
who was talking to the last two when they were struck, had
a very narrow escape. Perhaps the most remarkable
evidence of Napoleon's feeling in the matter is the fact that
he ordered the combat then proceeding to be broken off.
That night the V., VI., and VII. corps and the Guard
were about Markersdorf,” whilst the IV. and the XI. were a
little south of Reichenbach ; III. corps at Weissenberg;
* Four miles east of Reichenbach.
144 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Victor, with the II. and Sebastiani's cavalry, behind at
Baruth. Thanks to the Emperor's personal presence with
his leading corps, he had got from them fourteen hours of
marching and fighting, over a distance of 17% miles. The
cavalry fighting had mainly devolved on the Guard, who
lost 3Oo men, whilst Latour-Maubourg, nearly double their
strength, lost only about Ioo. The VII. corps lost about
4OO.
At Görlitz the allies had again divided into two columns,
one marching on Bunzlau, whilst the other took the southern
road towards Lauban and Löwenberg. During the 23rd
May there was again some fighting between Lauriston's
advanced guard and the rearguard of the allies on the road
to Bunzlau. In the night of the 23rd-24th the positions
were as follows:—
French—
V. corps, Hochkirch, on the road to Waldau.
VII. corps, Troitschendorf.
VI, corps, Hermsdorf.
Headquarters and Guard, Görlitz.
XI. corps on the road to Schönberg, with an advanced
guard in that place.
IV. corps, south of Troitschendorf.
III. corps, Weissenberg.
II. corps, Krobnitz.
The columns of the allies were respectively at Waldau
and Lauban.
On the 24th and 25th of May there were frequent rear-
guard actions, serving to delay the French pursuit, which
was further kept back by bad roads and difficulties in
crossing rivers, especially the Neisse and the Quiess. Con-
sequently, Napoleon's programme for each day was not
worked up to, and on the evening of the 25th the positions
reached were as follows:–
V. corps and Ist cavalry corps, between Wolfshain,
Thomaswalde, and Martinswalde.
VII. corps, Neu-Jaschwitz.
VI., Alt-Jaschwitz and Ottendorf.
FROM BAUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE I45
The XI. and IV. corps, the former at Stekicht, the latter
towards Wenig Rächnitz.
Guard and III. corps approaching Bunzlau.
The II. corps, at last coming up, was on the left at
Thommendorf, after a march of 20 miles.
The corps which had the greatest difficulty on this day
was the XI., which came upon the Russian rearguard, and
was engaged with it from I O A.M. till IO P.M. So vigorous
was the resistance of the Io, Ooo Russians that Macdonald
was induced to believe he had been engaged with forces
triple his own. The IV. corps, following the XI., had
turned to the left at Seifersdorf to make a link with the
left column. When the sound of Macdonald's action reached
Bertrand, he again turned towards the right to give assist-
ance, but arrived too late according to Macdonald, though
Bertrand says that it was the appearance of his advanced
guard on their right which at last induced the Russians to
give way.
In the allies' camp there was again a serious divergence
of views. Wittgenstein's position had become impossible,
with Alexander passing orders and taking counsel over his
head, and he tendered his resignation, which was accepted,
and Barclay appointed in his place, he being a commander
acceptable at Prussian headquarters. But Barclay's views
were practically identical with Wittgenstein's. He saw that
the allied army was melting away, being now reduced to
80,000 men, very much demoralised by defeat and retreat.
He, therefore, wished to fall back on Poland to completely
reorganise the Russian army. This did not at all suit the
views of the Prussian leaders, such as Blücher and Gneisenau,
who were all for fighting again, and who viewed with dismay
the prospect of a complete evacuation of their own territory,
and the consequent stoppage, in great part, of their recruit-
ment of fresh levies. At this juncture, Alexander again
intervened with a compromise, which, to some extent, satis-
fied the Prussians, who had many complaints against their
allies, for having, as they alleged, failed in assisting them in
the matter of supplies. It was arranged that the retreat,
K
I46 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
instead of continuing due eastwards, should be diverted
towards the south-east on Schweidnitz. This would mean
still holding on to Silesia, and, at the same time, keeping in
touch with Austria, whose intervention was urgently desired.
Yet Schweidnitz was a dangerous point on which to retreat,
since it gave Napoleon an opportunity of again outflanking
the allies on the right, of cutting their line of retreat on
Warsaw, and of forcing them against the Austrian frontier.
Austria was not ready yet, and it was very problematical
what she would have done at that time had the Russians
and Prussians been forced over her boundary. A lateral
retreat like this necessarily implied the resumption, sooner
or later, of the offensive by the allies, and they were hardly
in a state for that at present.
On the 26th May there was friction between Ney and
Marmont, an evil symptom, seeing that, however much
they might squabble amongst themselves when the master
was not present, the French marshals generally kept their
personal disagreements in the background when Napoleon
was at hand. Marmont resented being placed under Ney's
orders, and was anxious to get away from him. Accordingly,
he persuaded himself that the enemy had only a rearguard on
the Bunzlau-Liegnitz road, and that the bulk of his forces
was retreating on Löwenberg and Goldberg. He had been
ordered by Ney to march on Ottendorf, and he now, under
the circumstances represented by him, demanded permission
to move instead on Löwenberg. This Ney refused, and
Marmont continued on Ottendorf on the 25th. But
Napoleon had been much struck by Marmont's reiterated
asseverations that the greater part of the enemy was towards
Löwenberg, and that nothing but Prussians had passed
through Bunzlau. At 6 A.M. on the 26th he issued orders
to the following effect—
(I) Ney, with the V. and VII. corps, to move on Hainau,
with one advanced guard on Liegnitz and another towards
Glogau.
(2) Marmont, with his own corps and Latour-Maubourg,
to manoeuvre in communication with Macdonald and
FROM BAUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE I47
Bertrand, to turn the right flank of the enemy on the
southern road.
(3) III. corps to take post 2% miles in front of Bunzlau
under orders of Ney.
(4) As there was a report that part of the enemy had
disappeared northwards, Victor, with the II. corps, was to
reconnoitre towards Sprottau, and to follow anything that
might be making for Berlin. Victor during the day dis-
covered that this report was false.
It was 3 P.M. when Maison's division, at the head of the
V. Corps, passed through Hainau. It was now only 4ooo
strong. Maison marched to the heights east of Michelsdorf,
a couple of miles out of Hainau, on the road to Liegnitz.
He was in a gently rolling country, quite open, and well
suited for cavalry action. An enemy standing behind any
of the ridges was invisible except from the ridge itself, and
might lie hidden within a very short distance of his
opponent, if that opponent did not send cavalry on to the
heights to reconnoitre. Maison was marching about as
carelessly as Peyri had done on the Igth, though his
skirmishers had been all day bickering with those of the
enemy. For the protection of his flanks he had nothing
but some 50 troopers, and they performed their duty so
perfunctorily that they did not even take the trouble of
riding on to the nearest heights to see what was in the next
valley. Chastel's cavalry division, which should have been
with Maison, had stopped short of Hainau, under the
impression that their day's march was over. Just as Maison
halted beyond Michelsdorf, a mill on his right flank burst
into flames. The fire was a signal arranged by the Prussian
general Ziethen. Immediately afterwards a Prussian horse
artillery battery appeared on the heights, only 4oo yards from
Maison's position, and opened fire on his division. At the same
moment, a mass of 3OOO cavalry surging up from the valley
beyond, galloped down the hill against the right flank of the
French infantry, who had already began to prepare to bivouac.
Before they could assume a formation for defence, the
Prussian horsemen were in their midst, sabring and riding
148 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
over the almost defenceless infantry, who fled in the wildest
disorder to the village of Michelsdorf. There they
fortunately found two battalions of another division, who
were able to check the pursuit and drive off the Prussian
cavalry. The arrival, at the double, of Puthod's division,
finally put an end to the danger. The attack had lasted
only a few minutes, but in that short time Maison lost over
I ooo men in killed, wounded, and prisoners, and five guns.
It was fortunate for him that the Prussian charge fell upon
him when he was still close to the village. Had he got
farther from shelter, probably his division would have been
cut up. Ziethen had intended to let him do so, but had
given the signal for attack sooner than arranged, because,
being informed of the approach of Reynier, he thought, if
he waited, he might be too late. In this charge Dolffs, the
leader of Blücher's reserve cavalry, was killed.
Farther to the French right, Marmont, Bertrand, and
Macdonald had all been delayed by various causes, and,
when at last they came upon the Russian rearguard a little
east of Pilgramsdorf, night was already falling, and an
attack was no longer feasible. On this day the allies' main
body had crossed the Katzbach and stood with its right at
Liegnitz, left at Goldberg.
On the 27th May Lauriston got to Gross Rechern, east
of Liegnitz, with Reynier on his right, watching towards
Jauer. Headquarters and the Guard were in Liegnitz, the
III. corps at Hainau, with Marchand's division at Bunzlau,
On the French right, Marmont marched on Kröitzsch to
cut the road between Goldberg and Liegnitz, whilst the IV.
and XI. corps continued towards Goldberg. Between
Pilgramsdorf and Goldberg Macdonald found a strong
Russian rearguard. He sent against the enemy's cavalry
the division of Latour-Maubourg's cavalry which he had
with him, but the French cavalry behaved badly, and had
the worst of the fight." When the French infantry attacked
* Macdonald reported that “the cuirassiers did their duty, but the other
regiments did not support them.” (Foucart, ii. p. 148.) Macdonald himself
headed the last charge, and was abandoned by his men.
FROM BAUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE I49
the enemy retired, and Macdonald, passing through
Goldberg, took post between the Liegnitz and Jauer roads,
on Marmont's right. Bertrand, following Macdonald, had
found Marmont crossing his front and stopped at Giersdorf.
Victor had occupied Sprottau and cut off a Russian
artillery convoy.
On the 27th the allies began their movement on Schweid-
nitz. Their right reached Mertschütz, with a rearguard at
Kloster-Wahlstadt; the left marched from Goldberg to Jauer,
rearguard at Hermannsdorf. On the 28th the French left
stood fast. On the right, Marmont, crossing the Katzbach,
drove back a detachment of the enemy, the strength of
which Marmont probably overstates at “several thousands.”
Macdonald reached Jauer, Bertrand Hermannsdorf.
Victor, far on the left at Sprottau, marched to Primkenau,
where he was in communication with Glogau, the blockade of
which had been raised by the enemy.
The allies on this day reached Striegau.
On the 29th May, the III. corps moved up to Liegnitz,
leaving Marchand at Hainau; the V. and VII. corps,
followed by the Guard, moved towards Neumarkt. But
the Emperor stopped the VII. at Kloster-Wahlstadt, at
which Ney took offence, as he had ordered Reynier to keep
in line with Lauriston, and the counter order was, perhaps
owing to Berthier's carelessness, not at once communicated
to him. He asked to be replaced in the command of the
advanced guard, pleading his wounds as an excuse. Like
the rest of the marshals, he was showing signs of weariness
of the war. There was a good deal of trouble in pacifying
him.
On this day the allies reached Schweidnitz, which they
found not a fit place to stop at, as the fortifications, de-
molished in I 807, had not been restored.
On the 3 oth May, Reynier came abreast of Lauriston, who
remained stationary. Guard and headquarters Neumarkt.
The VI. corps and Latour-Maubourg moved to Eisendorf
and Ober Moys. The IV. and XI., though ordered to
Striegau, only moved a short way out of Jauer, as Macdonald
150 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
heard that the main body of the allies was retiring on
Schweidnitz.
Victor advanced to Randten. -
On the 31st May, Lauriston got to within three miles of
Breslau, driving before him Schuler's detachment, of 5ooo
or 6ooo men, which, falling back from before Glogau,
endeavoured to cover Breslau.
The VII. corps took post at Arnoldsmühl, the III. closed
on Neumarkt, where headquarters and the Guard remained.
The VI. did not move from Eisendorf. The IV. and IX.
were ordered to occupy Striegau, but both commanders,
exaggerating their difficulties and the strength of the rear-
guard opposed to them, ended by not getting forward at all.
Marmont, too, raised a very unnecessary cry about the
danger of his position, for which he was severely snubbed
by the Emperor. Evidently most of the corps commanders
were suffering from severe attacks of nerves.
On the 1st June, Napoleon, now aware that the enemy
was retreating on Schweidnitz, arranged his army thus."
Headquarters and Guard, Neumarkt.
V. corps, main body Kryptau and Mochbern, facing
south ; a detachment in Breslau, and a division at Purschwitz.
Chastel's cavalry at Hartlieb.
VII. corps, Purschwitz.
III. corps, south of Neumarkt, with Marchand at
Liegnitz.
VI. corps and two divisions of cavalry at Eisendorf and
Moys.
IV. and XI. corps about Jauer.
Victor was ordered to prepare to march back on Sagan,
en route to support Oudinot at Hoyerswerda in a movement
on Berlin, of which more anon.
From the 2nd to the 4th June, when the armistice was
finally arranged, the French made no movement of import-
ance. But it was otherwise with the allies, for Barclay, on
the 2nd June, when a suspension of hostilities began,
pointed out that, should Napoleon close to his left on
Positions marked on Map I.
FROM BAUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 151
Breslau, the allies would be in great danger of being cut
from the Oder. In consequence, it was decided to move
more to the east, so as to be within reach of the Oder
between Ohlau and Brieg. The river was to be bridged.
On the two succeeding days the Russo-Prussian army
moved to the line Strehlen-Nimptsch. On its right was
Schuler's detachment and the head of Sacken's corps, now
arriving from Poland.
To Blücher and Yorck this seemed symptomatic of a
return to the former Russian idea of a retreat on Poland,
and they wrote to the King of Prussia proposing that, if the
Russians crossed the Oder, the Prussians should leave them,
and retire along the Bohemian mountains, whilst the Silesian
landwehr assembled about Neisse and Glatz.
Before describing and discussing the armistice, it is
necessary briefly to mention what had been taking place in
Napoleon's rear since Bautzen.
Oudinot had been left behind after the battle, with
instructions to gather in Beaumont from Moritzburg, and
his own detachments, including Lorencez's 2nd brigade.
He was then to march on Berlin. He was only able to
reach Hoyerswerda on the 27th May.
Bülow, meanwhile, had collected some 30,000 men, of
whom a large proportion were landwehr, at present of very
little fighting value, and had marched towards Luckau as
soon as he felt the relaxation of pressure due to Napoleon's
concentration on Bautzen.
On the 28th May, he attacked Hoyerswerda, where he
expected to find only a weak detachment, instead of the
whole XII. corps and Beaumont's detachment. He was
badly repulsed. Then, hearing that Victor was moving on
Sagan, he proceeded to disperse his troops along a front of
over sixty miles, in an attempt to cover Krossen and Berlin
at the same time. Had Oudinot marched promptly on
Luckau, the Prussian rallying point, he might have destroyed
Bülow's separated forces in detail. But he delayed until
Bülow, realising his danger, had concentrated by forced
marches. When Oudinot appeared at Luckau on the 6th
I52 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
June, Bülow had practically his whole force there in a
strong position. Now, when it was too late, Oudinot rashly
attacked. In the action which followed he was badly
beaten, and, after losing 2000 men, had to retreat with the
rest on Uebigau. Bülow's men were too tired to pursue at
once, and, when the Prussians began to move on the 9th,
his operations were stopped by news of the armistice. On
the lower Elbe, Davout had been joined by Vandamme, and
also had 8ooo Danes placed at his disposal, owing to the
decision of their king to throw in his lot with Napoleon.
Walmoden, commanding on behalf of the allies at Hamburg,
finding himself unsupported by Bernadotte's Swedes from
Mecklenburg, evacuated the place, which was occupied by
Davout on the 30th May. Lübeck fell into the hands of
the French on the Ist June, so that they occupied the whole
of the 32nd military division before operations were stopped
by news of the armistice.
On the French lines of communications farther south,
there were constant raids of Cossacks and other bodies
of “free" troops, which did a great deal of damage,
and kept up a constant feeling of alarm and con-
fusion. Czernitchew's Cossacks, on the 25th May, de-
stroyed a cavalry “regiment de marche”; on the 30th,
they captured a convoy of artillery escorted by 16oo West-
phalian troops, and forced four battalions, marching up to
the rescue from Brunswick, back on that place. But the
most serious affair was an attack upon Leipzig itself, which
was full of sick and wounded, besides parks, and a “division
de marche” of cavalry, under Arrighi. The latter were
absolutely untrained as yet, and useless for fighting.
Woronzow, the Russian general observing Magdeburg, re-
solved on an attempt to surprise Leipzig. Leaving before
Magdeburg only IOOO cavalry and 7ooo Prussian landwehr,
he crossed the Elbe near Dessau with some 5 Ooo infantry
and cavalry, in the night of the 5th-6th June, to meet
Czernitchew from the Bernburg direction with another
I 200 cavalry before Leipzig. He marched hard, following
Napoleon's example in carrying his infantry in wagons or
FROM BAUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 153
other conveyances. At dawn on the 7th June, he reached
Leipzig and made short work of the helpless French
cavalry recruits. He was actually entering the town, when
he was stopped by notification of the armistice.
Any full account of the political negotiations after the
return of Napoleon from Russia is beyond the scope of this
military history of the campaign, but a general outline of
them, as affecting its course, is necessary.
Napoleon, as soon as he was back in Paris, endeavoured
to get into direct communication with the Tsar, with a view
to the conclusion of an arrangement with him in which
Prussia and Austria should play no part independent of
himself. Though Napoleon did not succeed in this, negotia-
tions were constantly more or less on the “tapis.” When
the French army reached Dresden, Austria had sent two
emissaries to the contending parties, Count Stadion to the
allies, Count Bubna to Napoleon.
Stadion's instructions from Metternich represented as the
aim of Austria's armed neutrality the attainment of a
durable peace, with a curtailment of French influence and
possessions east of the Rhine. The curtailment proposed
was very considerable. Poland was to be restored to its
position before the last peace of Vienna, Prussia was to
receive back all her old possessions, France to renounce all
claims in Germany east of the Rhine, Holland to be inde-
pendent, the states of the Church to be restored, and all
French garrisons to be withdrawn from Italy. Austria was
to be reinstated in all that she possessed in Italy previous
to the Peace of Lunéville. Tyrol, the Illyrian and Dalma-
tian provinces also to be returned to her. France was to
renounce all claim to suzerainty in Germany, or to special
influence in the kingdom of Italy. -
That was the maximum, to which it was hopeless to expect
Napoleon to agree. As a minimum, Austria proposed to
exact the following concessions: surrender of Dalmatia and
Illyria, dissolution of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, a new
boundary between Austria and Bavaria, return of South
Prussia to Prussia, abandonment by Napoleon of his posses-
I54 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
sions on the right bank of the Rhine, and dissolution of
the Rhenish Confederation. There was not much proba-
bility of the Emperor's accepting even these terms, except
under compulsion.
Stadion also brought a memorandum showing when
Austria would be in a position to join the allies in the field,
in the event of Napoleon's refusing these terms.
The upshot of the negotiations was the “Programme of
Wurschen,” in which the allies laid down as their aim—
(I) Restoration of Austria to her position previous to
I 8o 5.
(2) Restoration to Prussia of her possessions previous to
I 806.
(3) Dissolution of the Rhenish Confederation.
(4) Independence of Germany.
(5) Dissolution of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw.
(6) Independence of Holland.
(7) Restoration of the ancient dynasty in Spain.
(8) Entire freedom of Italy from French influence.
This was even more than the Austrian maximum, and
Stadion said plainly his country would certainly not fight
for all this.
Meanwhile Bubna, who had only left Vienna after receipt
of the news of Lützen and the retreat of the allies, was
singing a considerably softer tune at Dresden. Nothing
was said of the Austrian maximum. The points pressed
were the dissolution of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, the
return to Austria of Illyria and Dalmatia, and the surrender
of the French possessions beyond the Rhine. The re-
adjustment of the Austro-Bavarian frontier, the abandonment
of the Protectorate of the Rhenish Confederation, were only
lightly touched upon as desirable, and the independence of
French influence of Central Europe was only suggested as
conducive to permanent peace. Napoleon, however, knew
a good deal more about Austria's real aims from his am-
bassador at Vienna, and from the King of Saxony.
The interviews between Bubna and the Emperor were
somewhat stormy, and the latter eventually discovered that,
FROM BAUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 155
if he was to negotiate for peace, or even for an armistice,
he was expected to retire behind the Elbe, and to comply
with other conditions which, under the circumstances of the
moment, he was certainly not willing to accept.
The next step taken was on the 17th May, when the
battle of Bautzen was clearly imminent. Napoleon de-
spatched Caulaincourt to endeavour again to negotiate
separately with Alexander. His instructions of that date *
directed him to endeavour to get into personal communica-
tion with Alexander, who had known and liked the Duke
of Vicenza when he was ambassador at Petersburg. He
was to represent to the Tsar that it would be to his
advantage to negotiate directly with Napoleon, rather than
to allow Austria the credit of acting as mediator. The
French Emperor was to be represented as desirous of
avoiding the impending bloodshed, whilst Austria was to
be held up as having treated Russia scurvily, and as acting
from selfish motives. Every effort was to be used to flatter
Alexander, and induce him to look upon himself as the
destined arbiter of Europe.
These are secret instructions. The open instructions, of
course, do not allude to all this, but state that Napoleon is
prepared to agree to the assembly of a Congress at Prague,
or some other neutral place, for the settlement of terms of
peace. Napoleon said that he was willing to conclude an
armistice with the allied armies, in order to allow time for
peace negotiations, and to avoid bloodshed.
Another letter, probably ante-dated, was sent to the
Emperor of Austria, expressing Napoleon's readiness to
agree to a Congress. Nothing came of this before the
battle of Bautzen, for Caulaincourt was politely refused
permission to pass the allied outposts.
The day after the battle found the allies ready to open
negotiations, though they did so through Stadion and not
direct. From this time the negotiations proceeded regularly
though slowly. The most remarkable point in the cor-
respondence is Napoleon's eagerness to conclude an armistice,
* Foucart, ii. p. 135.
I56 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
which has been characterised by Jomini, and by the majority
of later writers, as the greatest mistake he ever committed
in his whole career as a general-in-chief.
In the end, he accepted terms differing materially from
those he wanted. He wished the armistice to extend over
the whole period of peace negotiations. If that could not
be obtained, he must have it for at least three months, plus
fifteen days' notice before hostilities recommenced. He told
Caulaincourt that anything less than two and a half months
would be too short to enable him to reorganise his cavalry.
He wanted Breslau to be included within the French line of
demarcation, and there were other points on which he laid
stress. In the end, he accepted an armistice of about seven
weeks 1 with only six days' notice, and with Breslau placed
in the neutral strip, in which neither side was to keep troops.
The French line in Silesia was, roughly, that of the Katzbach
to its infall into the Oder ; the allies' line was that of the
Striegau Wasser. The French were limited, on the north,
by the northern frontier of Saxony, from the Oder to
Wittenberg on the Elbe. From Wittenberg downwards they
were confined to the left bank of the Elbe, except that they
were to hold the islands in the river, and so much of the
32nd military division as might be actually in their posses-
sion at midnight on the 8th June. Danzig, Mödlin, Zamosc,
Stettin, and Küstrin were to be regularly supplied with
provisions every five days by the besiegers, and, if Hamburg
was still only besieged by the French, the same provision
was to hold good.”
We must now consider Jomini's dictum as to the in-
expediency, from his own point of view, of Napoleon's
conclusion of the armistice of Poischwitz.”
In the first place, it must be noted that the idea of an
armistice was no sudden conclusion on the Emperor's part,
* Afterwards extended to Ioth August.
* As a matter of fact Davout had possession of Hamburg, Lübeck, and the whole
32nd military division well before the 8th June.
* This armistice is dated “Pleiswitz” (Foucart, ii. p. 355). Lanrezac, and
many others, call it the “armistice of Poischwitz,” and Lanrezac adds the alter-
native name of “Neumarkt.”
FROM BAUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE 157
arrived at in consequence of his failure at Bautzen, and in
his subsequent endeavours to bring the allies to a general
action. He had already expressed his desire for it in his
instructions to Caulaincourt of the 18th May, two days before
the battle.
His reasons for wishing it he subsequently stated as
(I) the necessity for time to organise his cavalry, and (2) the
danger impending from a declaration of war by Austria,
situated as she was on the flank of any further forward
movement.
Many critics have treated with disdain the story of the
influence of the cavalry idea. But, in the instructions to
Caulaincourt, issued through the Minister for Foreign Affairs
on the 29th May,” it is quite clearly stated that Napoleon
wishes time to re-establish his cavalry. That letter was
secret, containing an outline of instructions and addressed to
the Foreign Minister; it clearly expresses the Emperor's
real thoughts, and it indicates that the story of the influence
of this consideration was not an invention of St Helena
days. With this before us, it is impossible to argue that
Napoleon was not influenced by the question of cavalry.
Whether the Napoleon of earlier days would have allowed
himself to be dominated by such a consideration, or by fear
of Austria, is quite a different matter, which we will consider
presently.
What was his position before the suspension of arms on
the 2nd June P. Up to that time he could perfectly well
have broken off the negotiations on several grounds.
On the Ist June he stood * on the line Jauer-Breslau,
facing south, with the V., VII., VI., III. corps. The Guard
and 1st cavalry corps were on the shorter line, Ober Mois-
Breslau, whilst the allies were concentrated near Schweid-
nitz, with only a rearguard at Striegau. Napoleon could,
as Lanrezac points out, have easily placed the whole of his
army, including Victor's corps and Marchand's division, in
thirty-six hours, between the Weistritz and the Neisse,
barring the allies from the Oder between Ohlau and Brieg,
* Foucart, ii. p. 174. * See positions marked on general Map I.
I58 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
by which section they afterwards proposed to establish their
communications. He would have been there before they
began to move on the 3rd. Schuler's detachment was too weak
to interfere seriously with this movement. The allies must,
then, either have fought with their backs to the mountains,
or have hurried south-eastwards to take up a position the
communications of which with Poland would still have been
seriously threatened. If they fought, they would do so with
an army which had already suffered two defeats and had
been necessarily demoralised by a long retreat. They could
hardly have hoped for victory against the French, who, if
they too were demoralised, were not so much so as the allies.
Defeat entailed their being driven on to the mountains and
the Austrian frontier, and, it must be repeated, the Austrian
army was not ready in Bohemia, and would not be so for
another month. The chances were all in favour of Austria
not daring to espouse the cause of the allies after a third
defeat, even if it had only been another Bautzen. On the
other hand, a retreat behind the Neisse would have accentu-
ated the differences of opinion between the Prussian and the
Russian leaders, and, in all probability, would have induced
the former to separate from their allies, leaving them to fall
back towards Poland alone. That must almost certainly
have led to the destruction of the Prussians, for once the
Russians had started for Poland they could have been easily
contained, and prevented from returning westwards, by part
of the French army, whilst the rest of it dealt with the
Prussians with at least double their numbers. Besides, the
Russians would probably have been disgusted at what they
would have deemed the desertion of the Prussians, and would
have abandoned the idea of a return to help them. There
probably still survived amongst the Russians some of the
ideas of Kutusow, which were opposed to fighting other
people's battles in Central Europe, now that the invader had
been expelled from Russia.
On the 4th June, when the allies had moved to the line
Strehlen-Nimptsch, Napoleon's chance was gone, and the
armistice was concluded.
FROM BAUTZEN TO THE ARMISTICE I59
Of course there was always the difficulty about want of
cavalry against Napoleon's moving to his left, but he had
advanced so far notwithstanding it, and it would seem that
it was worth his while to try one more throw for decisive
victory.
In a recent English work it is argued that where
Napoleon felt the pinch of his inferior cavalry was, not so much
in reconnoitring, as on the battlefield itself; that, owing to
it, his men were compelled to advance on the battlefield in
formations constantly ready to repel cavalry, and that they
were therefore hampered and delayed in their movements.
But that argument would have applied equally at Bautzen.
On the other hand, the French superiority in infantry was
so great that Napoleon could hope for decisive victory
even with the weak cavalry he had.
The acceptance of the weak cavalry theory has been
attributed mainly to German criticisms, based on the want
of cavalry for reconnoitring and screening purposes. Yet
the French critic, Colonel Lanrezac, does not see it in this
light, and concurs in the verdict of Jomini as to the mistake
of the armistice. He, like Yorck von Wartenburg, sees in
it a falling off on the part of Napoleon from his former
standards. He will not have it that either the want of
cavalry, or the threat of Austrian intervention, justified the
armistice from Napoleon's point of view. He had advanced
in 1805 with Prussia threatening him in flank, and in 1806–
I 807, with Austria in a similar position.
CHAPTER XI
DURING THE ARMISTICE. PREPARATIONS AND
PLANS OF CAMPAIGN

HERE is not the slightest reason for supposing
that either Napoleon or his opponents had any
expectation that the Congress of Prague would
lead to peace between parties whose views of
its terms differed so very widely. Each side, as well as
Austria, utilised the period of the armistice to the fullest
extent for recruiting and increasing its forces for the new
campaign, which all saw to be inevitable.
Napoleon, after arranging for the cantonments to be
occupied by his troops during the suspension of hostilities,
left Neumarkt on the 4th June. After stopping to inspect
his troops and attend to affairs generally at Liegnitz, Hainau,
Bunzlau, Görlitz, and Bautzen, he arrived at Dresden on the
I oth June. His headquarters, when he was in the Saxon
capital, were in the Marcolini Palace," but he spent by no
means the whole of the armistice in Dresden. From the
Ioth June to the 9th July he stayed there, working hard at
arrangements for the coming campaign, and attending to
the innumerable other affairs which could be dealt with by
no one less phenomenally gifted with the power of hard
work. Even in the midst of all this cabinet work, he was
constantly riding or driving all over the neighbourhood of
Dresden, till there was scarcely a yard of it which he did
not know “comme sa poche.”” Between the 9th July and
the I 5th August he was absent from Dresden on seventeen
* Now the Friederichstadt Municipal Hospital.
* Space will not allow of a description of Napoleon's daily life in Dresden,
It is very fully and admirably described in Odeleben's account of the campaign,
which has been translated into both French and English.
I6o
PREPARATIONS AND PLANS OF CAMPAIGN I6I
days, including a week given to a visit to Mainz to meet
Marie Louise, through whom he hoped to influence Austria.
He also visited Wittenberg, Dessau, Magdeburg, Leipzig,
Luckau, Lübben, Würtzburg, and Bamberg.
Napoleon began the settlement of his plans for the new
campaign at once.
On one point the Emperor was decided from the very
first. He had no intention whatever of retiring behind the
Rhine, there to await the attack of united Europe. Nor
would he even retire behind the Saale. He would utilise
as his forward base, not the comparatively small stream of
the Saale, but the line of the great river Elbe, one of which
he held all the permanent passages from Bohemia to its
mouth, and on which all these passages were covered by
fortified bridge heads of more or less strength.
That he was right, from his point of view, not to retire
behind the Rhine is now universally admitted. There was
certainly no necessity for his doing so after the events of
the spring campaign, in which he had inflicted two severe,
though not decisive, defeats on the allies, and had pushed
forward again right up to the Oder.
Supposing he decided on a defence of the Rhine, what
would have been the consequences P. He would at once
have lost, for good and all, his control over the states of
the Rhenish Confederation, which he well knew were seeth-
ing with the spirit of revolt, only waiting their opportunity
to throw off his yoke. In addition, he would lose Italy,
Naples, and Holland. Peace on the basis of the Rhine
frontier was not at all what he was prepared to accept, even
if that would be granted, and even of this there was no
certainty. If he had to fight behind the Rhine, he would
find a large proportion of his forces absorbed by garrisons
of the too numerous fortresses, and he would lose all the
garrisons he had left behind in the fortresses of the Vistula
and the Oder. The numbers required for garrisoning the
French fortresses are estimated as high as I 50,000, and he
would be far better off in Central Germany with these
. I 5 o,ooo available in the field, than in France with them
L
162 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
locked up. The Rhine may, therefore, be set aside at
once.
As for the Saale, that was a comparatively small stream,
easily passable in many places, and with no fortress-pro-
tected permanent passages.
Undoubtedly, therefore, he rightly decided for the Elbe.
His first cares, having decided on the Elbe as a base,
were for the protection of its fortified passages, and for the
collection of supplies of all sorts on it.
The great fortress of Magdeburg, in those days one of
the strongest in Europe, required little or nothing in the
way of strengthening of its means of defence, Torgau, and
still more Wittenberg, required a good deal, and their
strengthening as fortified places was taken in hand at once.
Of Dresden we will speak presently. Above Dresden, the
fort of Königstein, and the Lilienstein rock, stand opposite
one another, like two grim sentinels commanding the Elbe,
which flows, hundreds of feet below, between them. König-
stein, as the guide who shows one round it is careful to
explain, has “no military value” in the present day. It is
a mere shell trap now, but in 1813 it was different ; the
army which held it and the Lilienstein could have just as
many bridges between them as it could possibly want in
perfect safety. Napoleon had two built, and one at Pirna,
all with bridge heads. Between Königstein and Pirna lies
the famous camp in which Frederick the Great blockaded,
and eventually compelled the surrender of the Saxon army
in 1756. The “camp" is a perfectly open, almost level
plateau, extending like a great shelf from Königstein to
Pirna. The palace of the Sonnenstein at Pirna, though
hardly to be called a fortress even in Napoleon's day, was
still useful as a support, and was, in September 18 I 3,
cleared of the lunatic asylum which occupied it, and used
as a temporary fort. On this great shelf, protected towards
the west by the valley of the Gottleuba brook, there was
room for a large army, which would be right on the left
flank of any advance from Bohemia by the left bank of the
Elbe on Dresden. To connect Königstein with Bautzen
PREPARATIONS AND PLANS OF CAMPAIGN I63
via Stolpen the Emperor had a road constructed or im-
proved. Dresden itself had been a fortress up to 18 I I,
though never a really strong one, lying as it does in a
hollow commanded by considerable heights on both banks
of the river, and with the Dresden Forest, on the right
bank, coming close down to the Neustadt.1. By 1813
a great part of the fortifications, especially those of the
Altstadt, had been demolished. Napoleon had already, in
May, started work on the reconstruction of the Neustadt as
a bridgehead on the right bank. As it became more and
more evident that Austria might join the allies, he started
fortifying the Altstadt as a bridgehead on the left bank to
meet any attack on that side from Bohemia. The Neu-
stadt, surrounded by new works and the patched-up remains
of the old, was by the end of the armistice a formidable
place, quite proof against a “coup de main.” With the
Altstadt it was different, for the defensive works were of
much less strength, owing mainly to want of time. The
old enceinte, of which the outline can still be traced by the
alignment of the Ringstrasse and by a mound and pond
near the Opera House, was as far as possible reconstructed
and armed. Its field of fire was greatly hampered by the
circle of suburbs (“schlags,” as they were locally termed),
which had grown round it to a distance of 6oo or 7oo
yards. Still, guns on some of the old bastions could sweep
the ground beyond these “schlags.” The outer edge of
the suburbs was put in a state of defence by the loopholing
of houses and garden walls, the barricading of doors and
windows, the deepening of ditches, and other temporary
devices. In front of the main entrances “tambours ” were
constructed, whilst the smaller entrances to the town were
blocked up. Streets were cleared so as to afford free
passage for artillery within the suburbs, and the squares
and open places were kept free for the posting of reserves.
About 2 oo or 3oo yards beyond the outer line of the
suburbs Napoleon had built five redoubts or lunettes, with
* The part of Dresden on the right bank of the Elbe. The more important
part on the left bank is called the Altstadt.
164 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
a small “flèche' in addition close to the Elbe above
Dresden. These works covered the space between the
river above the town and the tributary Weisseritz below it.
To facilitate communication across the Elbe, the Emperor
had made two boat or raft bridges, one above and one
below the stone bridge, within the limits of the city.
The works were by no means complete in the end of
August, as may be seen from a letter of the 25th August from
Napoleon to Rogniat." At that date the Altstadt was in a
condition to resist a “coup de main * by forces approximately
equal to the garrison, but perhaps not one by forces greatly
superior. It certainly could not hold out for eight days
against very superior strength, as Napoleon believed on the
I 3th August.” In addition to these greater fortifications,
others were carried out at Meissen, and, in the form of
blockhouses, redoubts, and batteries, at various points
between Dresden and Magdeburg. It was found im-
possible, owing to the lie of the ground on the left bank
and Napoleon's confinement to that bank by the terms of
the armistice, to fortify a position opposite the mouth of
Plauen canal, below Magdeburg, as was desired.
Hamburg, the only strong place on the lower Elbe, was
in a different position from Dresden. Its possession was of
great importance to Napoleon, for it cut off the allies from
direct communication with England, and also served to
keep Denmark to the alliance with him which she had
made. But it was far removed from the main theatre of
operations, and, unlike Dresden, could not look to the
presence close at hand of a great army for its protection.
All that Napoleon could spare to hold it were the 4o,ooo
or 5 o,ooo French and Danes whom he had placed under
the command of Davout. Hamburg must depend for its
defence on this unsupported force, and Davout himself must
look to Hamburg as his place of refuge against the advance
of superior forces in Northern Germany.
The Emperor would have wished it to be strong enough
* Corr. 20,465. * Corr. 20,373.
PREPARATIONS AND PLANS OF CAMPAIGN I65
to hold out for at least two months against a regular siege,
but there was neither time nor money available for its
fortification on this scale. Yet Davout's energy and skill
were such that he held firm till long after the fall of his
master, and only surrendered under the orders of the new
government of I 8 I 4. He has been much abused for his
conduct at Hamburg, but Germans themselves, notably
Count Yorck von Wartenburg and Sporschil, have not
hesitated to say that what he did was necessary for the
execution of his task, and that “There is certainly no
military power in Europe but will wish for men like Davout
to command besieged fortresses.”* Davout may have been
severe, unjust in particular instances, yet, looking to his
position as a commander under Napoleon, he certainly did
his duty splendidly, and merited the highest praise.
Having decided to use the line of the Elbe as his base,
Napoleon set to work to provision and supply it in such
manner that it should be really a base, not a mere line of
defence. He wished to make himself, and he did make
himself, independent temporarily of his communications
with France. “What is important to me,” he wrote, “is
not to be cut from Dresden and the Elbe ; I care little for
being cut from France.””
The Emperor's most important arrangements for pro-
visioning his army and his base are contained in his letter
to Daru of the 17th June : *—
(I) From Erfurt 20,000 hundredweights of flour were to
be forwarded to Dresden, 5oo a day for 40 days.
(2) From Magdeburg to Dresden, by land and water,
4O,OOO hundredweights.
(3) In the markets of Saxony and Bohemia 20,000
hundredweights to be bought, and Io,000 in Bamberg and
Baireuth.
These measures would collect 8o,ooo hundredweights of
flour in Dresden by the 20th July.
(4) The neighbourhood of Dresden was to supply daily
1 Napoleon as a General, ii. p. 267. * Corr. 20,398
* Corr. 20, 142.
I66 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
3O,OOO rations of bread, of which I 8,Odo would be for
immediate consumption, and I 2,Ooo would go into store.
(5) All military train battalions coming from Mayence
or Wesel were to fill up their wagons with flour or rice.
(6) Ten days before hostilities recommenced, all caissons
were to be sent from the army to Dresden to fill up with
flour for the troops.
(7) By the end of the armistice, each corps was to have
ready baked ten days' supply of biscuit, six days’ “pain
biscuité,” and four days' bread.
(8) In Glogau was flour representing I,ooo,000 rations,
for the use of the garrison. Enough for 2,000,ooo more
rations for the army was to be bought.
(9) The flour sent from Magdeburg to Dresden was to
be replaced by 50,000 hundredweights of corn from Ham-
burg, and 50,000 more collected in the 32nd Military Division.
There were numerous mills for grinding it worked by the
Elbe at Magdeburg.
(IO) Brandy, wine, and rum to be sent from Hamburg to
Magdeburg.
(II) In Erfurt 5oo, Ooo rations of biscuit, and Io,ooo
hundredweight of flour to be kept always in stock, to replace
what was sent to the front.
(I.2) 6ooo cattle to be requisitioned in the 32nd Military
Division.
36,000 meat rations to be delivered daily by Saxony at
Dresden.
4ooo or 5ooo cattle to be kept in reserve at Dresden.
Magdeburg and Erfurt to send their beef supplies to
Dresden, replacing them by local purchases.
(I 3) The Emperor, considering rice to be a valuable pre-
ventive of dysentery, ordered an ounce to be supplied daily
to every man. As he required 20,000 hundredweight to
last till the 20th September, he had to procure 14,500, for
which he relied chiefly on attachments of ships at Hamburg
and Bremen. In addition to all this, the army was to live
at first as much as possible on the country, husbanding the
four days' rations which each man carried. It was hoped,
PREPARATIONS AND PLANS OF CAMPAIGN I67
by increasing the rice and decreasing the bread ration, to
make it possible for the men to carry twelve days’ food.
On paper there appeared to be no possibility of a shortage
of food ; but orders were certainly not executed to the full,
and the French soldier in the autumn campaign often found
himself marching and fighting on a very empty stomach.
St Cyr relates how his conscripts, arriving at Freiberg, found
the question of their food had been entirely forgotten.
Orders were issued for the organisation of an ambulance
battalion with 6oo wagons, and for hospitals at Dresden,
Leipzig, Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdeburg, capable of
providing for 24,000 sick and wounded, and I I,ooo con-
valescents. But the hospitals, in the end, were not half
what was required, and their condition was often indescrib-
ably horrible."
In addition to fortifying and provisioning his base,
Napoleon carried out a most elaborate system of reconnais-
sance. The whole probable theatre of operations, within
his own lines, was flooded with surveyors and map makers,
for the existing published maps were wretched.” St Cyr
was employed for a month, from the 5th July, in inspecting
the fortifications at Königstein and the Lilienstein, and in
making himself thoroughly acquainted with all the roads,
passes, and military positions between Bohemia and Stolpen
on the right bank of the Elbe, and from Dresden as far as
* The following ghastly description of a Dresden military hospital is taken from
Die französische Armee in 1813, p. 160 :—
“The pestilential hospital smell became more suffocating as we advanced,
making breathing difficult as we found ourselves in this great incurable
ward. At broken windows, stopped up with rags or dirty straw, sat disfigured,
wretched soldiers, buried alive in that horrible place. Still more terrible were
the sights as we entered the hospital itself. On bundles of mouldering straw,
mixed with filth and ordure, lay dead and dying side by side. From the con-
fused mass attendants sought to separate the corpses, as one picks the rotten
apples from a heap. The sick and wounded lay helpless all around in the pesti-
lential atmosphere of that room, abandoned to their fate, without care or atten-
tion. Here and there a solitary surgeon was met, where a hundred would not
have sufficed.”
* Petri’s was the one hitherto used. It was made in 1763, and was so unreliable
that no modern tourist would condescend to use it for planning a walking tour.
I68 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Hof on the left. We have already mentioned Napoleon's
daily drives and rides over part of this country.
The armistice, which had originally been for seven weeks,
was subsequently extended to the IOth August, with six
more days after denunciation before hostilities commenced.
That would be on the I7th ; but Blücher had already on
the I 5th began to move into the neutral zone near Breslau.
Into the controversy regarding his conduct in this matter it
is not necessary to enter. The armistice was duly
denounced by the allies on the Ioth August, and two days
later Austria, in a lengthy document,” declared war against
Napoleon. -
Both sides had been busy during the armistice recruiting
their forces. Napoleon by the time of its conclusion had
collected in Germany very nearly the whole of his forces
likely to be available for the present. The allies, on the
other hand, though already considerably superior to him in
numbers, were still awaiting the arrival of Bennigsen with
6O,OOO of the Russian reserve army, and Prussia was daily
adding to her forces by the recruitment of fresh levies. We
have already shown the strength of the opposing forces at
the conclusion of the armistice.”
Napoleon had probably from the very beginning of the
armistice begun elaborating his plans for the next campaign.
He did not communicate them to any of his subordinates
till the very eve of the opening of hostilities. He kept
them back, no doubt, for two reasons ; first, because he
relied on himself alone for the elaboration of a great scheme ;
secondly, because up to the last he hoped to keep Austria,
at the worst, neutral, though he felt that in settling his
plans he must keep on the safe side by considering her as
an enemy.
In describing, and later in criticising, his plan, it is neces-
sary to keep before our eyes the facts as they appeared to
him in the light of the somewhat meagre information which
alone he could obtain, owing to the general hostility of
* Printed, with Napoleon’s marginal comments in Corr. 20,376.
* Cf. supra, chaps. ii. and iii.
PREPARATIONS AND PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 169
Germany to him. It would be unreasonable to judge of
them in the light of facts which Napoleon did not, and
could not, know when he formulated his scheme. He
believed that Austria could bring against him in Bohemia
not more than IOO,Ooo men, after allowing for the forces
which she must keep to watch Wrede with the Bavarians,
and Augereau on the Inn, and the army of Italy on the
Isonzo.
The main army of the allies he assumed to be that in
Silesia, which had retired before him in May and June.
The Tsar and the King of Prussia he believed to be with it,
as they actually were up to the first week in August. The
strength of this army he estimated at less than 200,ooo
men, considerably less as it seems to us; for, on the I2th
August, he wrote : “I am far from believing that the
Prussians and Russians together can have 200,000, counting
£hose whom they have at Berlin aud in that direction.”
At what strength he estimated the army of Bernadotte
in the north, protecting Berlin and threatening Hamburg
with Walmoden's detachment, it is difficult to say. It is
not stated in his instructions either to Davout or Oudinot.”
In any case, he clearly underestimated both its numbers and
quality; for, with I 2 O,Ooo men advancing concentrically
on Berlin, he expected to occupy that capital within a week
of the opening of the campaign, and to be able to push on
to the relief of Stettin and Küstrin, driving the Swedes to
return to their own country, and the Russians and Prussians
across the Oder.
He estimated his own forces at about 42O,Ooo, exclusive
of the garrisons of the Elbe fortresses, and of course of
those of the Oder and the Vistula.
The actual strengths are thus stated by von Caem-
merer *:—
* Corr. 20,360. On the other hand, he says (Corr. 20,365) that he is equal in
force to the armies of Silesia and Bohemia, and (in Corr. 20,360) he computes
his own “equal” force at 300,000, which would seem to show he allowed 200,000
for the army of Silesia alone.
* Corr. 20,353 and 20,365.
* Die Befreiungskriege, 1813-1815, p. 38.
17o NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Allies. Napoleon.
Field army, & o tº 5 I:2,OOO 4.5 O,OOO
Reserve army and besieging forces, I 43,000 nil
Garrisons of fortresses, e . I I 2,Odo * 77,oooº
767,ooo 527,OOO
The Emperor's scheme is promulgated provisionally in
two letters of the I 2th August, addressed to Ney and
Marmont,” and to Oudinot.” In the former he says the
plan of operation will only be definitely fixed by the
ensuing midnight.
The scheme is this : The main army was to be concen-
trated on the defensive between Görlitz and Bautzen, and
in the entrenched camps at Dresden and Königstein. It
would consist of the I., II., III., V., VI., XI., and XIV.
corps, with the Ist, 2nd, 4th, and 5th cavalry corps, and the
Guard ; in all nearly 300,ooo men. With these he would
be in a position where he could not be cut from his supplies
at Dresden or from the Elbe, and where he could wait to
see what the Russians and Austrians were going to do, and
profit by the turn of events. He would prefer to be at
Liegnitz or Bunzlau, for there he would be in a position to
prevent a flank march by the army of Silesia towards Berlin
and the rear of Oudinot. But, as Liegnitz was eight, and
Bunzlau six marches from Dresden, a position at either of
them would risk his being cut from Dresden, whereas
between Görlitz and Bautzen (four and two marches respec-
tively from Dresden) he would be safe; if defeated he would
be nearer the Elbe than the enemy, and able to take advan-
tage of their mistakes. The Austrian headquarters were at
Hirschberg, and Napoleon expected their advance through
the mountains by Zittau.
The instructions to Oudinot will be dealt with in more
detail when we come to his operations. Briefly they, and
those to Davout," required Oudinot, with the IV., VII., and
* Fortresses in Prussia and Bohemia. * On the Elbe, Oder, and Vistula.
* Corr. 20,360. * Corr. 20,365. * Corr. 20,357.
PREPARATIONS AND PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 171
XII. corps, and the 3rd cavalry corps, to advance on Berlin,
and thence on Stettin. He would have 7o,ooo to 75,000
men. Davout, with 40,000 (including I 5,000 Danes),
would simultaneously advance from Hamburg on Berlin,
drawing on himself as many as possible of the enemy.
Between Davout and Oudinot would be Dombrowski with
3ooo or 4ooo Poles, and Girard with 8ooo or 9ooo men.
Altogether there would be about I 20,000 men moving con-
centrically on Berlin.
Whilst his left was gaining Berlin, the Emperor would
overwhelm the Silesian and Bohemian armies, or, if he were
defeated, retire on Dresden.
Then, in marked contrast to anything he had done
before, he invites criticism of his schemes by Ney and
Marmont, and goes on to defend it. “I suppose all should
finish with a great battle, and I think it is better to deliver
it near Bautzen, two or three marches from Dresden, than
at six or seven marches; my communications will be less
exposed ; I shall be able to subsist more easily, all the
more so that during this time my left will occupy Berlin
and sweep the lower Elbe, an operation which is not
hazardous, since my troops, in any case, have Magdeburg
and Wittenberg to retreat upon.” He again hankers after
Liegnitz, but rejects the idea as involving a division of his
army, and a possible long retreat with flank exposed to
attack from Bohemia.
Then he goes on : “It seems to me that the present cam-
paign can only lead us to a good result if, to begin upon,
there is a great battle. . . . However, it appears to me
that, in order to have a decisive and brilliant affair, there
are more favourable chances in holding ourselves in a more
concentrated position and awaiting the arrival of the enemy.”
Briefly summarised the scheme was—
(I) Offensive in the north, with 120,000 men converging
on Berlin.
(2) Defensive with 300,000 men between Görlitz and
Dresden, waiting for the enemy to move, and always ready
to profit by his mistakes.
172 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
This scheme, as modified next day," leaves the Berlin
project unchanged. But there is a considerable change in
the defensive scheme ; for the III. and V. corps are to be
placed on the Katzbach between Hainau and Goldberg, with
VI, and XI, in second line on the Bober, between Bunzlau
and Löwenberg.
Why had the Emperor gone back to the idea of holding
Liegnitz and Bunzlau, which he had condemned as dangerous
only the day before ? No reasons are stated, and it can
only be inferred that his dread of the Silesian army slipping
away unperceived north-westwards, between him and the
Oder, overcame his fear of being cut from Dresden.
Here it will be convenient to set out the disposition of
his forces under these final orders.”
(I) Facing east, in first line on the Katzbach were Ney
(III. corps), Lauriston (V.), and Sebastiani (2nd cavalry
corps). Altogether 78,000 men (of whom about I 3,OOO
cavalry) and 226 guns.
Behind them, in second line on the Bober, Marmont
(VI.), and Macdonald (XI.) 52,000 men, I 82 guns.
(2) Facing south about Zittau. Poniatowski” (VIII.),
8OOO men.
(3) In reserve, about Görlitz. The Guard, Victor (II.),
and Latour-Maubourg (1st cavalry corps). In all about
IOO,OOO men (of whom about 25,OOO cavalry), and 330
guns.
(4) At Bautzen. Vaudamme * (I.) and Kellermann (4th
cavalry corps), about 37,000 men (about 50oo of them
cavalry), and 88 guns.
(5) About Dresden, Pirna, and Königstein. St Cyr
(XIV.), L'Heritier (5th cavalry corps), garrisons of Dresden,
Königstein, and Lilienstein. In all 35,000 men (about
5500 cavalry), and I 98 guns.
* Corr. 20,371 and 20,373. * See diagram. Map III., inset (5).
* Poniatowski, it will be remembered, had been carried off to Gallicia in
February by Schwartzenberg. During the armistice he had been allowed to re-
join the French through Austria.
* Vandamme was on the march from the lower Elbe, and only reached Bautzen
40n the I7th August.
PREPARATIONS AND PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 173
(6) The army operating against Berlin was thus dis-
tributed :-
(a) Bertrand (IV.), Reynier (VII.), Oudinot (XII.),
Arrighi (3rd cavalry corps) concentrating on Luckau, 67,000
men (8ooo or Io,000 cavalry), and 2 I 6 guns.
(b) Girard and Dombrowski, between Luckau and
Wittenberg, I 3,800 men (I 5oo of them cavalry), and 23
guns.
(c) Davout (XIII.) in front of Hamburg, 37,500 men (of
whom about 2000 cavalry), and 94 guns.
The position of the army under the immediate command
of Napoleon was really this. There were three strategic
advanced guards. The first on the Katzbach in an open
country, was very strong, two infantry and one cavalry
corps. The second at Zittau, was weak, but, on the other
hand, it was guarding very easily defensible passes, and
moreover, it could be supported in a single march by
Ioo,Ooo men of the Görlitz group, and very shortly by
37,000 more from Bautzen. The third was not very
strong on the left bank of the Elbe, but it had the en-
trenched camp at Dresden to fall back upon, and could be
supported in a day and a half by the 37,000 men at
Bautzen.
Napoleon puts the matter thus:
The Austrians, if they take the offensive, must do so on
one of three lines. First, if they debouched by the Peters-
walde road on the left bank of the Elbe, they would, even
with Ioo,ooo men, be delayed in the strong positions which
St Cyr could find between the mountains and Dresden.”
He would retire on Dresden which could be reached by
Vandamme in a day and a half. The two together, with
over 70,000 men, could easily hold out till the arrival of
Napoleon from Görlitz (four marches) with the Guard and
II. corps raised the force to over I 5o,Ooo men.
Secondly, if they attacked by Zittau, as Napoleon
expected they would, they must meet Poniatowski, the
* St Cyr knew all this country thoroughly, thanks to his deputation for the
purpose of studying it during the armistice.
174 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Guard, and II. corps. Before they could advance any
distance they would find themselves faced by I 5 o,ooo men.
If the Silesian army moved westwards simultaneously with
the Austrian advance by Zittau, it would encounter the
two corps on the Katzbach which, as they fell back towards
the Bober, would be raised to 130,000 by the two on that
river. This army would unite at Bunzlau.”. In a day and
a half Napoleon could add to them such of the Görlitz
group as he deemed superfluous for dealing with the
Austrians. He would probably have dealt with the
Austrians first, driving them back through the mountains,
and then turning on the Silesian army.
The third possible movement of the Austrians was to
join the Silesian army by Josephstadt. In that case the
whole French army, except Oudinot and Davout, would
assemble on Bunzlau.
It will be observed that nothing is said of the converse of
the last case, namely, the march of the Silesian army to
join that of Bohemia, and advance by the left bank of the
Elbe. That was what actually happened, except that only
the larger half of the Silesian army went to Bohemia,
leaving Blücher with about 90,000 men to face the French
on the Katzbach. That, of course, shifted the centre of
gravity of the allied armies from Silesia to Bohemia, and
made the army of Bohemia their principal army. That
Napoleon could not know to be in progress when he pre-
pared his scheme. We shall see presently how he dealt
with the altered circumstances, when they came to his know-
ledge.
As regards this scheme for the defensive army, all critics
seem to be agreed that it was as nearly perfect as was
possible in the circumstances, and a most admirable design
for the use of interior lines. Later on we shall see it failing
in the execution. -
Three questions have been raised : (1) whether the
Emperor was right in deciding for the defensive as
* “Bautzen” is in the text (Corr. 20,373). But is not Bunzlau meant? The
subsequent reference to sending troops from Görlitz seems to indicate this.
PREPARATIONS AND PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 175
opposed to the offensive ; (2) whether he was wise, whilst
acting defensively with his main army, to act offensively
with another part ; (3) if the last question is answered
affirmatively, was Berlin the best direction for the offensive P
The idea of acting on the defensive was repugnant to
Napoleon's genius, and he had never yet adopted this
course. His previous successes had been gained by a
vigorous offensive. We may be certain he would only
adopt the defensive if circumstances absolutely required it.
If he decided for the offensive he would have to operate in
one of three directions : against the Silesian army eastwards;
against the Bohemian southwards; or against Bernadotte
and Berlin in the north, and of course he must operate with
the bulk of his forces, or so large a force as to be much
superior to the enemy attacked.
Assuming, as he did, that the Silesian was the main
army he would certainly wish if possible to attack it. But,
if he advanced in great force against it, the probabilities
were it would retire before him without fighting. He would
be drawn away eastwards, without gaining the great victory
which alone would be of real value to him. In the mean-
while, the Bohemian and Northern armies, closing in behind
him, would seize his base on the Elbe, and his store house,
Dresden, which was too weak to resist long.
The idea of an attack on the Bohemian army was more
tempting ; for a decisive victory over the Austrians might
yet tear them from the arms of their allies, and even bring
them back to the French alliance. If he could bring them
to a general action towards Prague he might well hope to
make an end of them, before the Silesian army could come
to their assistance.
But what certainty was there that the weak Austrian
army would not retire hurriedly before him, and that he
would not strike a blow in the air P If he penetrated far
into Bohemia, in pursuit of the retreating enemy, he risked
being surrounded, as he afterwards was at Leipzig, or being
forced to the very difficult, perhaps impossible, operation of
changing his line of operations to one through south
176 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Germany. Besides, when he was making his plans, it was
still not certain that Austria would declare war. If he
was to hope for a success against her, it was absolutely
necessary to make a dash for Bohemia the moment the
armistice came to an end.
There remains the case of an offensive against Bernadotte.
Here, again, Napoleon had many temptations to the offensive,
and he showed, by his decision in favour of an attack on
Berlin and north Germany with part of his army, that
he could not entirely resist them. In the first place he
was very bitter against both Prussia and Bernadotte.
Marmont goes so far as to say: “Passion prompted him to
act quickly against Prussia. He desired the first cannon
shots to be fired against Berlin, and that a startling and
terrible vengeance should follow immediately on the renewal
of hostilities.” 1 But, undoubtedly, there were substantial
advantages offered by a successful attack on Bernadotte.
Berlin itself had no political or strategical value, since the
government was no longer there, and the magazines and
treasury were empty. But a decisive defeat of the northern
army of the allies would give the Emperor possession of the
greater part of Prussia, and of its great resources. It would
probably drive Bernadotte to desert his allies, and compel
the rest of their troops to seek safety beyond the Oder.
The capture of Berlin would certainly produce a great moral
effect in Germany, and the establishment of the French in and
north of the Mark of Brandenburg would cripple the Prussian
recruiting arrangements. Moreover, an advance towards the
Oder would result in the relief of Küstrin and Stettin, with
the addition of their garrisons to the field army. But
there were grave objections to a general offensive in this
direction. It would draw Napoleon far away from south
Germany, where he required to keep a firm hand on the
wavering states of the Rhenish Confederation. It would
leave his base exposed to the united attack of the Silesian
and Bohemian armies against the inferior forces which alone
he could afford to leave behind for its protection. He
* Mém., v. 139
PREPARATIONS AND PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 177
would probably lose Dresden with all the vast military
stores he had collected there. His communications with
Mayence would probably be permanently cut, and he would
be reduced to a line via Hamburg and the lower Elbe,
which had not been prepared. On the whole, then, it seems
that Napoleon was undoubtedly right in deciding for the
general defensive. He need have had less care for his base
on the Elbe had he been, as he had been in earlier wars, at
the head of superior forces. But, on this occasion, he was
certainly numerically inferior, perhaps inferior even in the
fighting qualities of his troops. It must be remembered
that the idea of a purely passive defensive never could have
entered his head. Indeed, he specially warns his marshals
against such conceptions when he writes to Ney and
Marmont, “I need not say that, whilst disposing yourself in
echelons, it is indispensable to threaten to take the offen-
sive.”" On the other hand, acting generally on the defensive,
he felt himself safe. “What is clear,” he writes to St Cyr
on the 17th August,” “is that no one can turn an army of
4OO,Ooo men, planted on a system of fortresses, on a stream
like the Elbe, and able to debouch at pleasure by Dresden,
Torgau, Wittenberg, and Magdeburg.” No doubt the
Austrians might turn this base by a wide movement
through south Germany by Baireuth, but in that case, says
the Emperor in the same letter, “I wish him “bon voyage”
and let him proceed, being quite certain that he will return
faster than he went.”
So much for the case of the general offensive, as opposed
to the general defensive. Now the question remains whether,
having decided for the latter, Napoleon was justified in
taking the offensive with part of his army. On this point
critics are more divided in opinion.
Count Yorck von Wartenburg & seems to approve the
whole plan for the campaign, though his discussion of the
partial offensive on Berlin gives reason to doubt if he really
thinks there was “a just proportion between the advantages
* Corr. 20,360. * Corr. 20,398.
* Napoleon as a General, ii. 280-82.
M
178 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
to be gained and the stake involved.” Von Caemmerer 1
does not distinguish clearly between the general and the
partial offensive on Berlin, though, on the whole, he seems
to condemn the former.
Of Napoleon's contemporaries, Marmont and St Cyr, in
the replies which he invited from them, both unhesitatingly
condemn the idea. The former deprecated the separation
of the Emperor's forces into three armies, one for Berlin,
one to cover it against the army of Silesia, and a third to
cover it against an advance by the Bohemian army by the
left bank of the Elbe. He added his famous prophecy, so
soon to be realised : “I fear greatly lest on the day on
which your Majesty has gained a victory, and believe you
have won a decisive battle, you may learn that you have
lost two.” By the course proposed, Napoleon, he thought,
was depriving himself of forces which he would require on
the Elbe and upper Spree to ensure a decisive victory over
the allies' main army, a victory which, once gained, would
carry with it as a consequence the fall of the north. Berna-
dottes' army could be contained by a single corps in front of
Torgau and a few threats from Magdeburg and Hamburg.
He advocated the offensive southwards, which, he said,
would take the army from exhausted Saxony into a richer
country. k
St Cyr was equally opposed to the partial offensive on
Berlin. According to his own account,” the marshal warned
his master that he had underestimated both the numbers
and the fighting value of Bernadotte's army. What St Cyr
wished to do was to leave 1 50,000 men well posted between
Magdeburg and Dresden, whilst, with the other 25o,ooo
Napoleon undertook a great offensive movement against the
Austrians in Bohemia towards Prague. The Emperor
replied that he had not the time to make these movements,
or to take up a plan entirely different from his own, already
thought out. St Cyr maintained that the Austrians would
move by the left bank of the Elbe, which was opposed
* Die Befrieungskriege, 1813-1815, p. 43.
* Mém., v. pp. I40 and 207. * Hºst, MŻl., iv. p. 59, etc.
PREPARATIONS AND PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 179
to Napoleon's belief that they would come by Zittau.
Grouard * agrees with the two marshals in condemning the
offensive on Berlin.
Friederich * goes into this question more fully and clearly
than most critics. He first asks the question whether the
offensive with part of the army was justifiable in any
direction. He holds that Napoleon, being in this case
numerically inferior to the forces opposed to him, was bound
by his own principles to seek decisive battle with the most
powerful force available. Clearly a victory decisive of the
result of the war was only to be sought against either the
Silesian or the Bohemian army, one of which certainly was
the enemy's main army. Napoleon clearly meant to seek a
decisive battle with one of these, though waiting for them to
move before deciding on his actual first objective. To act
on the defensive with his main army, and at the same time
to act offensively with a considerable force, was to leave
himself less strong than he might have been at the decisive
point. No success against a secondary army could be of
decisive importance, however great it might be in itself.
He holds, therefore, that Napoleon was guilty of a serious
error in deciding for the offensive with any part of his army
before it was clear where the final decision was to be sought.
If, however, it were to be held that a partial offensive was
justifiable, he thinks that the direction of Berlin promised
the quickest and best results.
Considering all these opinions, it seems safe to hold :—
(I) That Napoleon was absolutely right in his decision
for the general defensive.
(2) That his offensive against Berlin was a mistake, based,
as it would seem, largely on his underestimate of the value
of the Prussian levies.
(3) That where he failed was in the chain of assumptions,
not in accordance with facts, to which he was led by the
information available.
He certainly made a fatal mistake in selecting Oudinot
* Stratégie Mapoleonienne, p. 49, etc.
* Die strategische Zage Mapoleon's, p. 29.
180 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
for the command of a more or less independent army.
That marshal, though no doubt a capable commander of a
division, perhaps even of a single corps, was not of the
calibre to command an army of 7o, ooo or 8o, ooo men.
Whether any of Napoleon's lieutenants was fit for it is
perhaps doubtful. Of those then in Germany, Davout,
Marmont, and St Cyr were alone possible." The last-named
marshal himself says, speaking of an earlier part of the
campaign : “In my opinion there was not then in the whole
of the belligerent armies a single man capable of command-
ing a greater number (than 50,000 men).””
Napoleon's orders display absolute unity of command,
and a self-confidence which it is impossible to blame, con-
sidering what the Emperor was, as compared with all other
leaders of his time. On the side of the allies a very
different state of affairs is disclosed, one which Napoleon
reckoned as an important advantage to himself. There
could be no unity of command where so many divergent
interests were involved. Every plan had to be evolved in
consultation between the several sovereigns concerned, and
the final result was necessarily a compromise. Napoleon's
scheme was evolved from his own brain, in his cabinet,
without anything of the nature of a council of war. It
was divulged to his own commanders only at the last
moment. The allies spent days and weeks in consultation
and debate. Among the many advisers of the allies, since
the death of Scharnhorst, the only men who had a true
conception of the necessity for vigorous concentric action,
and the bringing of the enemy's main army to a decisive
battle, were Toll the Russian, and Gneisenau the Prussian,
now Chief of Staff to Blücher.
It is not possible for us to describe in detail the many
schemes which came under discussion. They began with
one drawn up by Toll on the 9th June. Simultaneously
with this Radetzky had proposed another. Toll's plan was
modified by Barclay. Bernadotte sent in three plans, all of
which, as might be expected, aimed more at his own
* Soult had gone to Spain. * Hist, Mil., iv. 16.
PREPARATIONS AND PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 181
advantage than at that of the allied cause generally. He
wanted to be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the whole
allied army, an arrangement which would have suited no
one but himself, and, perhaps we may add, Napoleon.
Then came a scheme drawn up by Knesebeck, and two
more prepared by Borstell and von Boyen. Knesebeck
wanted to have two-thirds of the armies in Bohemia, and
one-third in the north. The result would have been to
divide the command between Bernadotte and an Austrian,
leaving Prussia and Russia out altogether. As a mean
between Toll's and Knesebeck's plans, it was proposed to
give Bernadotte a large command in the north, to make the
Bohemian army the main one, by moving all but about
55,000 of the Silesian army to its aid, and to leave these
55,000 under a Prussian. This plan was apparenly
accepted by the Russians, though it left them with no
command. But Austria preferred Knesebeck's plan, which
contemplated transferring the whole Silesian army to
Bohemia. It had apparently been generally assumed by
the allies that Napoleon would act on the offensive against
Bohemia.
On the 9th July, the Tsar, the King of Prussia, and
Bernadotte met by arrangement at Trachenberg, north of
Breslau, and spent the next three days in consultation.
Bernadotte, it may be remarked, could not be persuaded to
believe that Austria would join the allies. He thought she
would wait till both parties were exhausted, and then step
1I].
In the end, a protocol was drawn up, the responsibility
for which is claimed by Toll, and also by von Boyen. It
terms were briefly these :—
(I) As a general principle for guidance, it was laid down
that all forces of the allies should aim at the direction of the
enemy's main force, and that forces operating on his flanks
or rear should aim, by the shortest road, at his communica-
tions.
(2) The main body to take up a position from which it
could advance against the enemy in whichever direction he
182 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
might move. The bastion-like projection of Bohemia would
facilitate this.
(3) From 90,000 to IOO,Ooo men to move, a few days
before the end of the armistice, from the army of Silesia, by
Landshut, Glatz, Jung Bunzlau, and Budin, to join the
Austrians, raising their numbers to over 200,000 men.
(4) Bernadotte to leave I 5,ooo or 20,000 men to watch
Hamburg, and with 70,000 to take post about Treuenbriet-
Zen, so as to be able to advance on Leipzig, crossing the
Elbe between Torgau and Wittenberg.
(5) The army of Silesia to follow the enemy as he retired
on the Elbe, but not to engage in any important action,
unless under circumstances of peculiar advantage. On
reaching the Elbe it would endeavour to cross between
Dresden and Torgau, to unite with Bernadotte. Should
that be found impossible, it would march at once to join
the Bohemian army.
(6) The Bohemian army would move, according to
circumstances, on Eger, Hof, or Silesia, or would retire
towards the Danube. Should Napoleon attack it, Berna-
dotte would endeavour, by forced marches, to fall on his
1 C&lſ.
(7) Similarly, if Bernadotte were the object of attack,
the Bohemian and Silesian armies would fall on Napoleon's
communications, and compel him to a general battle.
(8) All allied forces to act on the offensive, with the
enemy's camp as their objective. -
(9) Bennigsen, with the Russian reserve army, to march
by Kalisch towards Glogau, ready either to attack the
enemy or to prevent his advance on Poland.
The whole scheme is, according to Friederich, a com-
promise between the ideas of Toll, Knesebeck, and
Bernadotte, with traces of those of Borstell and von
Boyen. It is based on the assumption that Napoleon's
first attack would be on Austria and the Bohemian army.
To Toll is to be attributed the idea of the Offensive, and the
fixing of the objective, not in a geographical point, but in
the enemy's army. That was not in accordance with the
PREPARATIONS AND PLANS OF CAMPAIGN I83
ideas of Austria, who, if she had learnt something in
tactics from Napoleon, had completely failed to grasp his
strategical ideas. Even her best general, the Archduke
Charles, now in retirement, had shown by his writings that
he was still largely dominated by 18th century ideas of
manoeuvring, rather than seeking a tactical decision.
It will be observed that the Trachenberg protocol only
prescribed the avoidance of a great battle in the case of the
Silesian army. That was necessary, both because the army
was weak, and because its commander, Blücher, was
notoriously hot-headed, and required definite instructions to
prevent him from hurling himself on Napoleon, of whom he
alone was not afraid.
Whilst the Trachenberg scheme was being evolved,
Radetzky, Schwartzenberg's chief of staff, had worked out
another scheme, under which any of the armies which might
be attacked by Napoleon was to go on the defensive, whilst
the other two advanced.
When, therefore, the Trachenberg plan was sent for the
approval of Austria, she insisted on making the instructions
to avoid a general action with Napoleon, unless under very
advantageous circumstances, applicable to all three armies.
In order to secure her adhesion, the others agreed to this
at Reichenbach on the 19th July.
No written record of the final arrangements, which may
be called those of Trachenberg-Reichenbach, has been traced,
but it is supposed that they are summarised in a memor-
andum drawn up by Schwarzenberg, in November 1813, of
which the main points are these :—
(I) Fortresses encountered by the allies to be masked,
not besieged.
(2) The main force to operate on the enemy's flank and
communications.
(3) By attacking his communications he was to be forced
either to detach, or to hurry with his main army to the
threatened point.
(4) He was only to be attacked when divided, and when
the allies were largely superior.
184 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
(5) If the enemy advanced in mass against one of
the allied armies it would retire, whilst the other two
advanced.
(6) The point of union for all the armies to be the
enemy's headquarters.
These rules show that the allied leaders were still under
the influence of 18th century ideas. They were afraid of
bringing on a great battle by a general concentric advance,
and hoped by small measures to carry out a dilatory scheme.
This, notwithstanding the fact that they over-estimated their
numbers as compared with Napoleon's. It is clear, as
Friederich remarks, that Napoleon's teaching was lost on
them, and the early part of the war could only lead to
partial decisions. It was only later that the allied leaders
found themselves, almost against the wishes of many of them,
forced to a final decision at Leipzig.
CHAPTER XII
FROM THE END OF THE ARMISTICE TO THE
HATTLE OF DIRESIDEN

APOLEON left Dresden in the afternoon of
the I 5th August, quite satisfied with his plans.
Two days earlier he had said : “I have allowed
for everything; the rest depends on Fortune.”
After inspecting the fortifications round the Lilienstein, he
proceeded along his new military road to Stolpen, and on
to Bautzen, which he reached at 2 A.M. on the 16th. He
remained there till the evening of the 17th, busy with his
orders for the operations now commencing.
On the I6th 1 he received information from a reliable
spy that on the 12th, the Russian * army had left Reichen-
bach and started for Bohemia, except the corps of Sacken,
which had, on the same day, debouched with Blücher and
Eleist from Breslau, where they had no business to be
during the armistice. On the I 5th they had captured
French vedettes. Under these circumstances, the Emperor
expressed his intention of placing Ioo,ooo men on the
position of Eckartsberg behind Zittau, and occupying on
the 17th Rumburg, Schluckenau, and Georgenthal. Here
he would menace Prague by the shortest road, and would
be in communication by Neustadt with Königstein. Mac-
donald was asked if, with his own (XI.) corps, the V., and
5ooo or 6ooo cavalry (about 60,000 in all) he could hold
a position which the Emperor understood to exist at Löwen-
berg, whilst Ney, with 70,000 or 8o,ooo, took position
between Bunzlau and Hainau. Mortier would be at Lauban
* Corr. 20,390, to Macdonald.
* The march had really begun on the 7th. This Reichenbach is south-east of
Schweidnitz.
185
I86 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
with three divisions of the Guard to-day (16th). “When I
am certain that Blücher with Yorck, Kleist, and Sacken (who
cannot be more than 5 O,OOO men) is advancing on Bunzlau,
and that Wittgenstein and Barclay de Tolly are in Bohemia,
en route for Zwickau or Dresden, I shall march in force to
carry away Blücher.” Napoleon's estimate of Blücher's army
is entirely wrong, for it consisted of the Prussians of Yorck,
and the Russians of Sacken, St Priest, and Langeron,
altogether at least 9o,ooo men. *
In the evening of the 17th Napoleon was at Reichenbach,
on the 18th at Görlitz. Here he learnt that Wittgenstein,
with 40,000 Russians, had reached Bohemia, and that the
Austrians had passed the Elbe for an unknown destination.
Vandamme, whose first division was only just arriving at
Stolpen, was ordered to Rumburg, where he would find the
42nd division of St Cyr's corps and would keep it, if St
Cyr were not hard pressed. Also he would have 3 ooo
Guard cavalry under Lefebvre-Desnoettes. The Emperor
was going to Zittau, possibly to Rumburg. “It is possible
I might enter Bohemia at once to fall upon the Russians
and catch them “en flagrant délit.’” + Accordingly,
Napoleon moved to Zittau on the I 9th, still waiting to
get a clearer idea of the enemy's intentions. During the
day he went forward in person with a strong reconnaissance
as far as Gabel. By this means he ascertained that the
Austrians were marching westwards, followed by a large
Russian force. Clearly there was not likely to be a serious
attack on Zittau for the present. “When the enemy learns
that I have been at Gabel, he will march on this point with
all his forces.”” But before he could arrive Vandamme
would have had four or five days in which to fortify himself
in the passes about Rumburg, and so would Victor at Gabel.
Vandamme's whole corps, Lefebvre - Desnoettes' Guard
cavalry, Victor's and Poniatowski's corps would be available
for the defence of the passes, about 65,000 men. The
Emperor was off to destroy Blücher, as he hoped, and he
calculated that these 65,000 men, fighting to the last
* Corr. 20,408, to Vandamme. * Corr. 20,421.
FROM ARMISTICE TO BATTLE OF DRESDEN 187
extremity in very strong positions, could easily hold the
enemy's main army till his own return. He still apparently
either did not believe in an advance of the allies on Dresden
by the left bank of the Elbe, or, if he thought they con-
templated it, he believed that his own appearance at Gabel
would bring them back.
He was back at Görlitz by 2 P.M. on the 20th, ready to
move against Blücher, who that evening stood east of the
Bober opposite Löwenberg. Facing him, on the left bank,
on the line Löwenberg-Bunzlau, were Ney (III.), Lauriston
(V) and Macdonald (XI.); Marmont (VI) and the Guard
were coming up. By evening on the 20th Napoleon had
reached Lauban, whence he issued orders for the attack.
“My intention is to attack to-morrow. The Prince of the
Moskowa will attack what is in front of him, and, after
passing the Bober, will move on Alt-Giersdorf to form my
left. The Duke of Ragusa will be, at IO A.M., two leagues
(5 miles) from Löwenberg on my left. You will debouch
at Löwenberg with General Lauriston, the XI, corps on
the right of Löwenberg, My Guard, horse and foot, will be
at Löwenberg by noon.”’’ The Emperor now estimated
Blücher at Ioo,ooo, or rather less, which was fairly correct.
The attempt to destroy Blücher failed completely.
Napoleon saw Löwenberg captured without difficulty. The
bridge over the Bober, which had been partially destroyed,
was repaired, and the French advanced against the heights
beyond, only to find Blücher retreating. Napoleon put
this down to want of confidence in their generals on the
part of the allies. He was, of course, ignorant that the
retirement was in accordance with the Trachenberg arrange-
ment. Next day he wrote to Maret : * “It appears that
their army of Silesia had not advanced with as much rapidity
as was contemplated by the general plan of the allies, and
their belief that we should repass the Elbe. They thought
they had only to pursue, and consequently, as soon as they
saw our columns debouch to reassume the offensive, they
1 Corr. 20,428, to Macdonald, midnight, 20th August.
* Corr. 20,437, of 22nd August.
188 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
were filled with fear, and one was convinced that the chiefs
wished to avoid a serious engagement. The whole plan of
the allies has been founded on the assurance, given them by
Metternich, that we should repass the Elbe, and they are
much disconcerted to find it is otherwise.” But he also
shows that he realises the incompetence of his own sub-
ordinates ; for he continues: “In general, what is most
regrettable in the position of affairs is the little con-
fidence which the generals have in themselves; wherever
I am not personally present, the enemy's forces appear to
them considerable.”
In the same letter he shows that he is beginning to
believe the Austrians are making for Dresden. That he
welcomes as entailing a battle, “Since we can arrive at
no result without a battle, the most fortunate thing that
could happen is that the enemy should march on Dresden,
since then there would be a battle.”
During this day (22nd) the French continued to advance
eastwards. There was a fight between Lauterseifen and
Pilgramsdorf, and by evening the enemy was driven beyond
the Katzbach. The Emperor himself went to about half-way
between Löwenberg and Goldberg, and then returned to the
former in the evening. There he received an important letter,
dated Pirna, 21st August (noon), from St Cyr 1 in which that
marshal very frankly stated his view of the position. The
Austrians, he said, now reinforced by a large part of the
Silesian army, were posted in two lines behind the Erzgebirge,
on the left bank of the Elbe, and he believed they meant to
swing round their left towards Wittenberg, shutting in
Dresden and Torgau. However much he hoped for it,
St Cyr could not believe Napoleon's movement on Zittau
would draw them back in that direction. They would hope
to contain him with their right on the upper Elbe, whilst
they blockaded Dresden and Torgau so closely that it
* Hist. Mil., p. 372. Napoleon's reply (Corr. 20,445) is dated “Görlitz, 23rd
August 1813,” and refers to “your letter of 22nd August at II P. M.” There is
palpably some mistake about the dates, as the letter quoted above is undoubtedly
that to which the Emperor was replying.
FROM ARMISTICE TO BATTLE OF DRESDEN 189
would be impossible to issue from them, even if they did
not fall.
In his reply,” Napoleon, without distinctly admitting his
acceptance of St Cyr's theory, shows plainly that he realises
the danger threatening Dresden, and that he must hurry to its
assistance. He assumes that St Cyr has left no boats on
the left bank of the Elbe, and that he has made safe the
communications between Dresden and Königstein by the
right bank. He promises that he will soon have 200,000
men at Dresden. St Cyr had reported that the Russians
and Prussians were already in contact with his outposts,
and that he did not believe the Königstein passage was
safe, once he had to withdraw his army.
As Napoleon was about to leave the eastern army, he
entrusted its command to Macdonald, christening it the
“Army of the Bober.”” He stated its total strength at
IOO,Ooo men. Macdonald’s principal task was to hold in
check the enemy's army of Silesia, to prevent it from
operating either against Napoleon's communications towards
Zittau, or against Oudinot towards Berlin. Therefore,
Macdonald was to push Blücher back beyond Jauer, and
then to take post on the Bober. Three divisions of the
III. corps were to hold a fortified position near Bunzlau.
Another similar position at Löwenberg was to be held by
three divisions of the XI. corps, with the 4th division in
reserve on the Queiss. The V. corps was to hold a position
near Hirschberg. Communications were to be behind the
Bober, along the left bank of which fortified posts were to
be constructed at every I + miles, so as to prevent Cossacks
crossing. Each flank of the whole position was to be
strengthened by a strong body of cavalry and infantry,
reconnoitring and preventing the enemy from turning it.
A great deal of field fortification was prescribed, both in
the front line and in Marchand's second line on the Queiss.
When this position was thus occupied and fortified, Napoleon
believed that it would be impossible for the enemy either to
* Corr. 20,445, Görlitz, 23rd August.
* Corr. 20,442, of 23rd August, to Berthier.
190 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
turn it by an advance between its right and the Riesen-
gebirge, or to move between its left and the Oder towards
Berlin. The army was to be kept in a state of mobility,
and, if the enemy took the offensive, and advanced, Mac-
donald would be strong enough, unless Blücher were greatly
reinforced, to issue from Löwenberg, or some other point,
and attack him.
It certainly looked as if the Emperor's rear was thoroughly
protected during his march on Dresden. But the choice
of Macdonald for this important semi-independent command
was not a wise one. In order that there might not be
difficulties, owing to the presence of more than one marshal
out of the Emperor's sight, Ney was summoned to head-
quarters. It would, of course, have been out of the question
to leave him with the Bober army under Macdonald, his
junior in rank as marshal. Unfortunately, Ney did not get
the order 4 which summoned him to headquarters, and
directed transfer of the command of the III. corps to Souham,
yet he marched for Bunzlau with the III. corps. It is not
clear what induced him to do this.
On the 24th August, the Emperor wrote to Maret, in
cypher, directing him to pass on the orders to St Cyr, whose
opinion was again invited on them. He said : “My inten-
tion is to move to Stolpen. My army will be assembled
there to-morrow. I shall spend the 26th there in pre-
parations, and rallying my columns. On the 26th, in the
night, I will send my columns by Königstein, and at
daybreak on the 27th, I shall be in the camp of Pirna with
IOO,OOo men. I shall operate so that the atttack on
Hellendorf begins at 7 A.M., and I shall be master of that
place at noon. Then I shall place myself astride of that
communication, and seize Pirna. I shall have two bridges
ready to throw at Pirna, if necessary. Either the enemy
has taken as his line of operation the road from Peterswalde
to Dresden, in which case I shall be in his rear with all my
army opposed to him, whilst he cannot assemble his in less
than four or five days ; or he has taken his line of operation
* Corr. 20,440, to Berthier.
FROM ARMISTICE TO BATTLE OF DRESDEN 191
by the road from Kommotau to Leipzig. In that case he
will not retire, and will move on Kommotau ; Dresden will
be relieved, and I shall find myself in Bohemia, nearer than
the enemy to Prague, on which I shall march. Marshal St
Cyr will follow the enemy as soon as he appears to be dis-
concerted. I shall mask this movement by lining the bank
of the Elbe with 30,000 cavalry and light artillery, so that the
enemy, seeing all the river lined, will believe my army to be
at Dresden. . . . I assume that, when I undertake my
attack, Dresden will not be attacked so as to be able to be
taken in twenty-four hours.””
The scheme was beautifully simple, but it all depended
on St Cyr's being able to hold Dresden unsupported against
the allies. This Napoleon evidently felt to be the weak
point, for he said his scheme might have to be modified in
consequence of the enemy's movements.
Meanwhile, the allied army of Bohemia had been slowly
pressing on towards Dresden. Schwarzenberg's first idea
had been to march on Leipzig, according to Napoleon's
second supposition, but, as he crossed the Erzgebirge, he
changed his plan to a direct advance on Dresden. St Cyr's
troops were everywhere forced back by superior numbers,
only the 42nd division remaining behind at Königstein, and
between that fortress and Dresden on the Pirna plateau.
On the 22nd, Wittgenstein had appeared at Hellendorf,
driving in the French outposts on Berggiesshūbel. The French
XIV. corps was watching the whole line, some seventy-five
miles, from the Elbe to Hof. At Berggiesshūbel there were
only available the 43rd division and L’Heritier's cavalry,
which had replaced Pajol’s, detached to the right towards
Freiberg.”
A sturdy resistance was made, but when, in the afternoon,
Wittgenstein began to turn the position, the French retired
to Zehista, where they again held out till nightfall.
On the same afternoon, the 44th division had been
brought up from the old road to Teplitz to support the
43rd at Zehista. The XIV. corps was ordered to take up
* Corr. 20,449, dated Görlitz, 24th August. * See Map IV. (5).
I92 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
a position next morning near enough to Dresden to be
certain of not being cut from it. The 45th division, which
had been fighting on the 22nd near Dippoldiswalde, took
post on the 23rd on the heights of Räcknitz a couple of
miles outside Dresden ; the 44th was on its left. The 45th
then retired to the Pirna suburb of Dresden.
Pajol had also been attacked towards Freiberg on the
22nd, and his cavalry driven back on two battalions of the
45th division supporting him. On the 23rd he stood, with
his right on the Mulde and his left at Rabenau, watching the
enemy's movements in this direction and towards Leipzig.
L’Heritier's cavalry was on St Cyr's left.
On the 23rd a Russian light division approached Dresden
by Zehista, drove in the French outposts, but made no
serious attack. Desultory skirmishing continued on the
24th. On the 25th these Russians were driven back from
the heights of Strehlen, enabling the French to see that
heavy columns were moving towards Dresden. L'Heritier's
cavalry lost three guns in this affair, thanks to Murat's 4
rashness, if we may credit St Cyr. The latter refused now
to follow the suggestions of the King of Naples, who
advocated withdrawing the whole army within the fortifica-
tions of Dresden, and kept his infantry as far out as the
heights beyond Strehlen. Fortunately for him, the allies
could not make up their minds to a general attack that day,
which might very well have resulted, looking to their immense
superiority of numbers, in the capture by storm of the
Altstadt. This failure to attack is universally condemned ;
for St Cyr had not more than about 20,000 men, and it is
scarcely possible to suppose he could have held the weak
defences of Dresden very long against the enormous forces
which the allied commander might have hurled upon him
on the afternoon of the 25th. But Schwarzenberg had
clearly no inkling of the neighbourhood of Napoleon, and
chose to wait till next day for his attack, when he hoped
to have the Austrian army up.
* Murat had been fetched back from Naples to command the cavalry, and also
to remove him from the temptation of Austrian intrigues. -
FROM ARMISTICE TO BATTLE OF DRESIDEN 193
The allied sovereigns were on the heights of Räcknitz
between 9 and Io A.M. on the 25th. The Tsar and
Moreau," who accompanied him, saw clearly the weakness
of St Cyr, and wanted to make an immediate attack, but
Schwarzenberg insisted on waiting for the Austrians. Late
that evening Wittgenstein came personally to Barclay at
Räcknitz with a request to be allowed to storm the city
during the night. Barclay refused on the ground of
superior orders prohibiting an attack that day. The golden
opportunity was lost.
We now return to Napoleon. Leaving Görlitz on the
24th, he was at Bautzen by 3 P.M., the Guard being ex-
pected there the same evening. By 7 A.M. on the 25th,
he was at Stolpen, still intent on his plan of crossing with
Ioo, ooo men at Königstein, to seize the enemy's line of
operations by the Peterswalde-Dresden road ; Vandamme
was at Neustadt and Stolpen on this day. The Guard,
and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry, on the road from Bautzen
to Stolpen, Victor and Marmont still a day's march short
of Bautzen.
The Emperor was anxious about Dresden, on the holding
of which it depended whether he could leave it alone
whilst he debouched from Königstein. His doubts on the
subject are evidenced by letters to St Cyr and to Rogniat,
his engineer-general. He had also sent Gourgaud to
Dresden to bring information on the subject. Gourgaud
arrived at Stolpen at I I P.M. on the 25th with such a poor
account of the Dresden fortifications, and their chance of
being able to hold out, that Napoleon, no longer daring to
carry out his great scheme, decided to march direct to the
Saxon capital with the bulk of his forces. At I A.M.
on the 26th the new orders issued. The Guard and
Latour-Maubourg were to start at once for Dresden, Victor
and Marmont to follow. Between 9 and Io A.M. the
* Moreau had, at the instance of the Tsar, returned from America and joined
the allies. He was thought much of by Alexander, who constantly consulted
him. Whatever sympathy might be felt for him on account of the past he largely
forfeited by consenting to serve against his own countrymen.
N
I94 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Emperor himself was in Dresden, busy examining the
fortifications and reconnoitring. The troops, which he
was hurrying up, began to arrive soon after himself.
He had not entirely given up the Königstein and Pirna
expedition, but he left it to Vandamme alone, with his
own corps, to be joined by Mouton-Duvernet with the
division (42nd) which St Cyr had left behind about
Königstein.
Here we must pause to describe the neighbourhood of
Dresden, especially the left bank of the Elbe, which, during
this and the succeeding day, was to be the scene of very
notable events." The student of military history at the
present day has to exercise a good deal of imagination in
studying the battlefield of Dresden ; for the city, which
had only some 3O,OOO inhabitants in 18 I 3, now has about
half a million, and has spread far and wide over what was,
in 1813, open country with villages scattered about, the
names of which now stand for quarters well within the
city area. The old fortifications had by 1813 been only
partially dismantled, now they have cntirely disappeared.
The city lies in a broad, open valley, astride of the Elbe,
which in 18 I 3 was spanned within the walls by only one
stone bridge, that which led from opposite the royal palace
to the Neustadt.
The Altstadt was enclosed by the remains of the old
enceinte, but suburbs (“schlags,” as they were locally called)
had already extended on an average 6OO or 7 OO yards
beyond it, covering its field of fire. The western suburb,
the Friedrichstadt, beyond the river Weisseritz, extended
much further. The Neustadt, on the other hand, was in a
much better condition for defence. The enceinte had been
reconstructed by Napoleon since his re-occupation of
Dresden in May, and several fresh forts had been built.
It was only during the armistice, as Austria seemed to be
likely to join the allies, that much attention had been
given to the defences on the left bank. What had
been done in the way of temporary fortification during
* Map IV. (a).
FROM ARMISTICE TO BATTLE OF DRESDEN 195
the armistice has already been described. But the works
were still incomplete and defective, as is shown by
Napoleon's letter of the 25th to Rogniat (his engineer-
officer), saying he would feel reassured about Dresden
if he knew that “the three entrenchments already
marked out were ready, if the barricades in the town
were finished, and if the Pirna ditch were properly
excavated.”"
The Altstadt had three weak lines of defence—
(I) The ring of lunettes.
(2) The barricades, palisades, and garden walls of the
suburbs.
(3) The old enceinte.
With a strong garrison, and an enemy of not very great
superiority, it was safe ; but it certainly was not so when
the allies could attack with Ioo,ooo men a garrison of
little more than 20,000.
We have said there were defects in the works. Some
of them were these. The lunettes I., II., III. were out of
sight of one another, and therefore incapable of mutual
support. In front of No. IV. there was a good deal of
dead ground, and there was a large building, the Feld-
schlösschen, in which an enemy could effect a lodgment within
3oo yards of it. There were no redoubts beyond the
Weisseritz, and the Friedrichstadt suburb on that side was
very poorly fortified.
Outside the eastern suburbs stretched for some 200o
yards, with a breadth of IOoo, on perfectly level ground,
the Grosser Garten, which was very much the same
in 18 I 3 as it now is, with its palace in the centre
forming a sort of réduit. Its importance to the defender
is obvious ; for, so long as he held it, he was on the flank
of any advance against the city along either its northern or
its southern side, and the part between it and the Elbe
was also open to artillery fire from the opposite bank
against the right flank of an attack, provided, as was the
case in 1813, the defender was in undisputed possession
* Corr. 20,465.
I96 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
of the right bank. At some distance outside its eastern
and northern sides was the Landgraben, a drainage cut
running, according to the undulations of the country, either
in a low embankment or in a sunken ditch. It was not
much of an obstruction to infantry, or even to cavalry,
but it was so to artillery; for the foot-bridges across it
were not wide enough for the passage of guns. Artillery
could only cross by the main roads. -
The country between the Grosser Garten and the Elbe
was only slightly undulating, and was open, except for a
large wood, about Blasewitz and south-west of it, which
was of no great importance.
The next section of the semicircle is different ; for
within I ooo yards of the southern suburbs the ground
begins to rise to the line of heights which, from Tschert-
nitz to Briesnitz, surrounds the southern and western sides
of Dresden. From Tschertnitz these heights curve back
southwards, whilst beyond the Weisseritz they trend for-
wards towards the Elbe at Briesnitz. t
At Räcknitz the level is about 25o feet above Dresden ;
beyond the Weisseritz it is greater, but the crest is further
from the city.
The ridge is cut through above Plauen by the little river
Weisseritz, flowing through a precipitous gorge 200 feet
or more in depth, which was only passable with great
difficulty by one or two bad roads for a mile or so
above Plauen. The Weisseritz is now carried away from
below Plauen to the Elbe at Briesnitz; in 1813 it flowed
straight down to the Elbe between the city and the
Friedrichstadt suburb. In ordinary weather it was gen-
erally fordable, but in torrential rain, such as fell on
the 27th August 1813, it became a serious obstacle,
only passable at the bridges, of which there were four
of stone and two of wood between Coschütz and the
Elbe.
Beyond the Weisseritz, the heights were in places
rather more intersected by ravines than those between the
stream and Tschertnitz. These ravines specially favoured
FROM ARMISTICE TO RATTLE OF DRESDEN 197
attacks on some of the villages on the slopes ; but most
of this country was open, and excellently suited for
Cavalry.
The troops immediately available for the defence of the
city on the 26th August were :—
(a) Three divisions of St Cyr's corps, about I 5,000 men,
the 42nd division being at Königstein.
(b) About 45 od Westphalians.
(c) I French and I Italian cavalry regiment, and 2
Polish squadrons.
(d) A few Dutch, Polish, Saxon, and Baden allies.
Of these, the Westphalians were set apart as the regular
garrison. The XIV. corps occupied the 1st and 2nd lines
of defence. Of the three divisions, the 43rd on the left
held the space between the Elbe and redoubt III., the
44th held the Grosser Garten, and the 45th had to hold
the whole space thence round to the Friedrichstadt. The
line, except in the Grosser Garten, was necessarily very
thinly occupied.
On the other side, during the night of the 25th-26th,
the Russians on the allied right held Blasewitz and the
great wood, Striesen, Grüna, and the Grüne Wiese, with
outposts in front.
The Prussians were in Prohlis, Torna, Leubnitz, and
Ostra.
More Russians held Gostritz and behind it.
Colloredo's and Lichtenstein's divisions (Austrians) were
on the heights behind Räcknitz.
Chasteler's two divisions arrived at 8 P.M. on the right
bank of the Weisseritz, about Plauen, with the French
outposts close in front of them.
The 2nd Russian Guard division, the Ist Grenadier
division, the 3rd Cuirassier division, and the Prussian
Guard cavalry, all under Miloradowich, were still at
Dippoldiswalde. Klenau had only just reached Freiberg.
Schwarzenberg had at last made up his mind to attack
Dresden on the 26th August, Had he done so with vigour
in the early morning of that day, he would probably have
198 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
been still in time to storm it before the arrival of Napoleon's
reinforcements, of which the nearest was half Teste's division
of the I. corps, which was half way between Dresden and
Stolpen. But, in order to take the city, there must be no
hesitation in the attack, and it was necessary to have fas-
cines and scaling-ladders ready for storming the old
enceinte. Schwarzenberg had prepared none of these
things, and his orders were anything but decided. He
seems to have meant to divide his attack into two portions,
a sort of preparatory reconnaissance in force during the
morning, to be followed at 4 P.M. by the general attack,
which should have commenced ten or twelve hours sooner,
and should have been carried straight through. The attack
was to be made in five columns.
Ist column. Wittgenstein, with Io,ooo Russians on the
right, to make a demonstration, drawing on himself as much
as possible of the enemy's attention.
2nd column. 35,000 Prussians to attack, as a demon-
stration, the Grosser Garten.
3rd column. Colloredo, with I 5,Ooo Austrians, to demon-
strate towards redoubt No. III., covering the heavy batteries
in that direction.
4th column. Chasteler (less his grenadier division) to
occupy Plauen and cover the leftward march of the 5th
column.
5th column. 35,000 Austrians under Bianchi to attack
Lobtau and work down, beyond the Weisseritz, to Friedrich-
stadt and the Elbe.
Chasteler's grenadier division (Io, ooo) to act as reserve
towards Coschütz, and, if necessary, to support the rest of
the corps at Plauen.
Cavalry divisions, Nostitz and Lederer, to act as a further
reserve between Coschütz and Kaitz.
The advance of the left wing and the bombardment of the
place were to be held back till 4 P.M., when the forces of the
enemy had been drawn away by the attacks of the right and
Centre.
Thus Schwarzenberg was bringing to the attack of St
FROM ARMISTICE TO BATTLE OF DRESDEN 199
Cyr's 20,000 men well over IOO,OOO, and, had he pushed
them boldly in in the morning, there can be little doubt
that they would have carried everything before them, before
even the arrival of Teste's division, which started only at
4 A.M.
CHAPTER XIII
THE BATTLE OF DRESIDEN 1
(a) THE 26TH AUGUST

IRST Period, up to moon.—The first of the allies
to attack were the Prussians advancing from the
south against the nearest part of the Grosser
Garten. The French had evacuated Strehlen at
4 A.M., an hour before Ziethen, supported by Pirch, moved
from it against the Grosser Garten. The Prussians made but
slow progress, and it was only as Roth, with the Russian
advanced guard, came to their assistance, by attacking the
north-eastern corner of the garden, that they were able to
push slowly forward.
Roth appears to have attacked between 7 and 8 A.M.,
and, by the latter hour, when they had been already fighting
for three hours, the Prussians had only mastered the outer
half of the garden as far as the palace in its centre. By
9 A.M. they had got about half-way from the palace to the
city end of the garden. Here they were ordered to break
off the fight for the time. On the right of the Prussians the
Russians began their advance between the Grosser Garten
and the Elbe between 7 and 8 A.M. As they advanced from
the Blasewitz wood they suffered severely from the artillery
fire of the Marcolini fort on the right bank of the Elbe.
They could make little progress till the Prussians, aided
by Roth, got forward in the garden, and the Russians coming
from Striesen planted a strong battery on a slight elevation,
the Windmill height. Covered by this, they succeeded in
capturing the building known as Engelhardt's, near the Elbe.
* Map IV. (a).
2OO
THE BATTLE OF DIRESIDEN 2OI
An attempt to advance on the Hopfgarten was repulsed.
No further progress was made before the general lull in the
battle, which began about noon. On the Prussian left
between Zschertnitz and Räcknitz operations up to noon
were confined to an artillery duel with the opposite French
lunettes. -
The Austrian attack towards Plauen began about 6 A.M.
By 9 they had driven the French back past the Feld-
schlösschen, which was stormed, and on to redoubts Nos. IV.
and V. From the Feldschlösschen the French artillery fire
from redoubt IV. failed to drive the Austrians, as, the walls
of the building being of lath and plaster, the French shells
passed straight through them without setting fire to the
building. A serious mistake had been made by the French
engineers in not destroying this building before the battle.
On the other hand, Austrian advances against redoubts
IV. and V. were driven off by the fire of those forts,
supported by the guns of one of the bastions of the old
enceinte.
Thus when the fighting died away about noon the allies
had attained the following positions. The Russians on the
right stretched from Engelhardt's to the Grosser Garten, of
which about three-fourths of the length was in possession of
their own left and the Prussians. In the centre no progress
had been made. On the left, up to the Weisseritz, the
Austrians were close in front of the French redoubts
IV. and V. Beyond the Weisseritz the Austrians had
driven the French out of Lobtau. On the extreme left,
Meszko's division had met with little opposition, and had
succeeded in getting as far forward as Schusterhaüser on
the Elbe.
In Dresden, meanwhile, the early attacks spread the
greatest alarm among the inhabitants, who were aware that
the allied troops were especially bitter against them, on
account of alleged ill-treatment of Russian and Prussian
prisoners. Confidence was to a great extent restored by the
appearance of Napoleon between 9 and IO A.M. Men began
to say, “There is Napoleon. Things will soon be very
2O2 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
different.” ". There was no longer any talk of abandoning
homes and escaping across the river. The Emperor was
still reputed invincible in Germany.
Leaving Stolpen in his carriage at 5 A.M. he had mounted
his horse as soon as he came in sight of Dresden from the
hills above. At the Marcolini (Meissenberg) fort he stopped
to watch the Russian advance, and to direct more artillery
on them. Then he galloped into Dresden, paid a visit of a
few moments to the king, and hurried off to inspect the
defences. St Cyr found him, between I I and 12, on the
French left, on foot in the midst of the horse artillery, which
at the moment was not firing, as the pause in the battle had
commenced. Then the Emperor rode along the defences
towards the right. The garrison was terribly weak. Behind
the garden walls in many places there was only one man to
every ten paces. At the Dippoldiswalde road he went
farther forward to observe the enemy. Arrived at redoubt
IV., he was annoyed to find the Feldschlösschen in the
enemy's possession and ordered St Cyr to retake it. The
battalion sent for the purpose succeeded for a moment, but
was driven out again. Having passed along the whole of
his line, Napoleon returned to the Schloss Platz, where he took
his position at the head of the stone bridge, watching the
arrival of his troops and directing them to their posts in the
line. Teste, with eight battalions, arrived first, and was sent
to Friederichstadt, where Murat was put in command of this
infantry, of the Ist cavalry corps, when it arrived at 2 P.M.,
and of Pajol’s cavalry of St Cyr's corps.
Next came Decouz's and Roguet's Young Guard divisions
under Mortier. These were sent to the suburbs on the
* Aster, Schilderungen der Kriegsereignisse in und zor Dresden. This author
was a Saxon officer of artillery in Dresden, in 1813. After his retirement from
the service he wrote most careful accounts of the battles of Dresden, Kulm, and
Leipzig, and other events in the war. He supplemented his personal knowledge
of facts by the most careful local inquiries, and his facts appear to be accepted
generally by modern German writers.
As regards these stories against the citizens of Dresden which were current in
the Russo-Prussian army, he denies that there was any foundation in fact for
them.
THE BATTLE OF DRESIDEN 2O3.
left. Two more divisions of Young Guard, under Ney, went
to the Dippoldiswalde and Falken “schlags,” left and right
of redoubt IV. The Old Guard remained in the city in
reserve, sending only one regiment to each of the suburbs of
Pirna (on the left), Falken (centre), and Freiberg (on the
right). The Guard had marched 90 miles in the last seventy-
two hours, and that not on good roads but alongside of them,
for Napoleon kept the roads for his guns and wagons, whilst
the infantry and cavalry marched on a broad front across
country. Latour-Maubourg's 78 squadrons went to behind
Friederichstadt, where the public slaughter-house now stands,
and there also were Pajol's 46 squadrons—23,OOO cavalry in
all. The rest of Teste's division, when it arrived, followed
the first 8 battalions to Friederichstadt. It was between
3 and 5 P.M. when Roguet's I4 battalions and Barrois' Io
of the Young Guard arrived. These went to the suburbs
on the right bank of the Weisseritz. The general reserve
of Old Guard, under Friant and Curial, counted Io battalions
and 30 guns in the Altstadt, besides the 3 regiments sent
as special reserves to the right, centre, and left. These were
all the troops Napoleon could expect for this day's battle.
We have somewhat anticipated in noting their arrival.
On the side of the allies, the Tsar and the King of
Prussia stood, about I I A.M., on the heights of Räcknitz in
company with Jomini," Moreau, and their other advisers and
staff. They could clearly see the stream of Napoleon's
soldiers hurrying to Dresden by the Bautzen road beyond
the Elbe. Yet, the glow of bivouac fires towards Stolpen in
the previous night should have warned the allied leaders
that a great army was approaching. Jomini, clearly realis-
ing that the capture of Dresden was now hopeless, counselled
retreat to Dippoldiswalde, and the Tsar agreed with him.
* Jomini had been Ney's chief of staff at Bautzen. He went over to the allies
just before the end of the armistice. His defence of his conduct attributes it
largely to Napoleon's refusal to let him leave his service in 1810, and to his dis-
approval of Napoleon’s ambition. But it is difficult to avoid the suspicion that,
had Ney's recommendation of him for appointment to a division after Bautzen
been accepted, he would not have gone over. His case is different from Moreau's,
inasmuch as he was a Swiss, not a Frenchman.
204 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
But the King of Prussia thought otherwise. Hours of dis-
cussion followed, ending in the decision to countermand the
general attack fixed for 4 P.M. Whether Schwarzenberg
deliberately neglected to give the counter-order, or whether
there was a misunderstanding, it is certain that the three
guns, the prearranged signal for attack, were fired and the
battle recommenced.
Second Period, from 4 to 6 P.M.–It was towards 4 P.M.
when Napoleon was informed that the allies appeared to be
preparing for a general attack. Galloper after galloper was
dispatched to hurry the march of the approaching French
reinforcements.
The Russians on the allied right were still much annoyed
by the French artillery beyond the Elbe, and, farther to
their left, hampered in their movements by the Land-
graben. French troops, too, had been pushed out along
the Elbe, sheltered by an embankment constructed to
restrain floods, and by several villas and farms. Neverthe-
less, the Russian right advanced for some distance victoriously
from Engelhardt's, capturing Anton's and Lämmohen. In the
centre they got little beyond the windmill height. On the
left, between the Landgraben and the Grosser Garten, they
pushed close up to redoubt II., but all their efforts to storm
it were repulsed.
The Prussians in the Grosser Garten also arrived in front
of redoubt II., which they attempted to storm along with
the Russians on their right. They, too, were driven off
here, as well as from the adjoining Prince Anton's garden,
which was protected by a wall with a ditch in front of it.
Rleist, with his Prussians, advanced from the Rothe Haus
against the Bürgerwiese and the Hospital garden.” In the
attack on the latter they were joined by the right of the
Austrians. Kleist had arrived within ten yards of the
Dohna suburb when the Austrians on his left gave way
before the terrible fire. At this juncture, too, Serurrier, with
* On the outer edge of the Dohna Schlag to the east of redoubt III. The
Bürgerwiese is the open space cutting into the Schlag. Prince Anton’s garden is
directly behind the Grosser Garten,
THE BATTLE OF DRESDEN 205
St Cyr's 44th division, broke out from the Bürgerwiese,
compelling Kleist to retire.
The signal guns for the general attack were followed
immediately by the advance of numerous Austrian columns
in the space between Kleist's left and the right bank of the
Weisseritz. As the Austrian right advanced against the
Hospital garden and redoubt III., they found their move-
ment facilitated by the ditches and channels which then
scored the slopes below Tschertnitz and Räcknitz.
The fate of the extreme right in this period has been noticed
above in connexion with Kleist's attack. Two columns
farther to the left were directed on redoubt III. Notwith-
standing the support of their own and of Russian guns
pushed forward with them, the Austrians were almost
stopped by the terrible fire of the redoubt and the French
batteries on either side of it. The two leading Austrian
lines had already given way, when suddenly the work was
silent. The supply of ammunition had given out. Seizing
their opportunity, the Austrians dashed forward once more,
mounting the parapet of the redoubt and engaging in a
desperate hand-to-hand conflict with its defenders, who were
nearly all killed or wounded before the remains at last
retreated and sought shelter in the gardens behind.
The next Austrians on the left nearly got possession of
the gardens; a few, indeed, penetrated into them, but the
latter were turned by French reserves. In one of these
attacks on the gardens several hundred Austrians, hemmed
in against the walls by the French reserves, were compelled to
surrender. So desperate was the fighting in this part that
it is said that in redoubt III. alone I 80 French and 344
Austrian dead were found in the evening, after its recapture.
The attack on redoubts IV. and V. was less successful.
In redoubt IV, the allies' artillery fire wrought such havoc
that 96 of its small garrison were hors de combat, and the
fort was deserted for the moment. As the Austrian infantry
rushed forward from the Feldschlösschen to seize it, French
reserves issued from the “Schlags” in rear and drove the
enemy back to their starting-point. Two attacks, from
206 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Kohler's Garden and the “Meisterei,” on redoubt V. likewise
failed before the steady fire of the French. A third attack
from the Tharandt road met with the same fate. Beyond
the Weisseritz, on the signal for the general advance, Bianchi
pushed on towards Friedrichstadt from the positions gained
before noon. He was met by a heavy artillery fire in
front from the Freiberg road, and by a flanking fire from
redoubt V.
On the extreme left, Meszko's men were in front of
Cotta and Schusterhaüser, and a small party even got along
below the Elbe bank to nearly opposite Uebigau. Thence,
however, they had to fall back hurriedly, to avoid being cut
off by French reserves and cavalry.
Napoleon, in Dresden, had been anxiously marking the
course of the battle during this period, waiting for all the
troops he could collect before making his counter-attack.
|By 5 P.M. he had some 70,000 men in the Altstadt
and in the line of defence. The allies had about I 5 O,Ooo
on the field, but they had acted throughout with want of
decision, and had kept nearly two-thirds of this great army
in reserve.
Alarm had once more taken hold of the unfortunate
citizens as they saw great masses of the allies pouring down
from the heights, and the shells began to burst in all
directions in the suburbs. Many houses were in flames.
There was a general rush for safety in the cellars.
The streets were full of French troops, especially the open
spaces in the suburbs where reserves were massed, ready to
move at a moment's notice to any gravely threatened point.
Amongst these troops the bursting shells produced only a
feeling of exhilaration and eagerness. They were to fight
under the immediate command of a leader whom they still
believed to be invincible.
Aster tells a curious story of a battery which received
orders to be ready to move into the fighting line. The men
were dust-stained and untidy after their long march. The
moment they heard of the order, each man began to get out
of his haversack his parade uniform, which it was thought
THE BATTLE OF DRESIDEN 2O7
suitable to don on such an occasion. Comical scenes
ensued, as men, in the act of changing their trousers, had to
skip off as they might to avoid a shell about to burst. All
were laughing and cheery, as if about to go to some fête.
Such was the spirit of Napoleon's soldiers.
Third Period, from 6 P.M. till dark.-The tide of the
allied advance had reached its height towards 6 P.M.
Their front line is shown on the plan, and it was one
which made matters look very black to the uninitiated.
Not so to Napoleon, who, between 5 and 6 P.M., had
issued orders for the counter-attack which commenced
at the latter hour. Ney, who had been ordered to take
command in the Falken and Blinde “schlags" behind
redoubt IV., had no fresh charger up. The Emperor, seeing
his difficulty, turned to Caulaincourt saying he could lend
Ney his horse. The Duke of Vicenza hesitated for a
moment. “Descendez,” was Napoleon's brief, stern order,
and Caulaincourt instantly dismounted and changed chargers
with Ney.
As soon as the orders for the general advance were
issued, the Emperor left the Schloss Platz to watch their
execution. First he went to the bridge of boats above
the stone bridge, thence he was guided by Count Nostitz to
the Rammischer “schlag,” near the Elbe on the French left.
Hence he passed through the Pirna and See “schlags,” so
close to the foremost line of the enemy that one of his
orderly officers and several of his suite were wounded. It
was 8 P.M. before, being finally satisfied that everything was
going as he wished, he returned to the king's palace.
Meanwhile, on Napoleon's extreme left, the 3rd and 4th
divisions of the Young Guard under Mortier began to issue,
about 6 P.M., from the Ziegel “schlag ’’ close to the Elbe.
At that moment an ammunition wagon blew up, and the
terrified horses dashed wildly amongst the troops. For a
moment they were delayed, then Roguet advanced close to
the Elbe, whilst Decouz attacked the Russians at Engel-
hardt's, driving them back on the Windmill height, which,
after a desperate hand-to-hand struggle, was taken at 7 P.M.
208 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
By 8 P.M. the French on this wing had driven the Russians
back into the Blasewitz wood and Striesen. :
Wittgenstein was now so hard pressed that he personally
rode over to Barclay to ask for reinforcements. Klüx's
Prussian brigade was sent up to behind Striesen, which
village the Russians evacuated only at midnight.
Simultaneously with this advance, three more columns of
Mortier's troops issued from behind redoubt II., and from
Prince Anton's garden, driving back Wittgenstein's left and
the Prussians, whose attack had just failed. By 7 P.M. the
French had driven the allies through half the length of the
Grosser Garten to the palace. Here the fight swayed back-
wards and forwards till, at 8 P.M., the Prussians, still holding
the palace, were separated from their antagonists only by
the width of the central cross avenue. At that hour the
turmoil of the struggle gave place to a still more ghastly
silence, broken only by the groans of the wounded.
About redoubt III, the counter-attack began very soon
after the Austrians were in possession of it. It was facili-
tated by the threat to the Austrian flank, due to Ney's
advance by redoubt IV., to be described presently. The
attack on the captured redoubt was commenced by a column
of the Young Guard from the west of the Hospital garden.
The first attempt failed, though about 50 men got in
through a gate in the gorge of the work which, being closed
behind them, left the little party isolated in the midst of
about 500 Austrians. Refusing the enemy's calls to
surrender, the gallant band held firm against tenfold
numbers. As no officer was with them the drum-major
took command, brandishing his baton, with which he
promptly felled the Austrian leader. Help was at hand,
and this little band of heroes held their ground till what
remained of them was rescued by a fresh irruption, through
the palisading, of their comrades, now reinforced by two
regiments led by Berthezène. The redoubt was now re-
captured, and some 4OO Austrian prisoners were taken
in it.
Ney, from the Falken and Blinde “schlags,” had begun
THE BATTLE OF DFESIDEN 209
to advance about the time the Austrians took redoubt III.
He passed on both sides of redoubt IV., threatening by his
movement the flanks of the Austrians in front of redoubts
III. and V. His right column marched from the paper-mill
on Kohler's garden, from which it drove the Austrians. The
left column, charging along the upper Plauen road, failed in
its first attempt to retake the Feldschlösschen. The second
succeeded in taking it at the point of the bayonet. After
this the Austrians in this quarter fell back fighting towards
Plauen till darkness stopped the combat. In the low ground
on the right bank of the Weisseritz the enemy, now re-
inforced by Chasteler's grenadiers, still held on, though
suffering heavily.
During Ney's attack, Dumoustier issued from the Freiberg
“schlag,” drove the enemy in front of him across the
Weisseritz, and recaptured the Chaussée Haus near the
crossing of the Freiberg road. The Austrians retired to
Riesentzien's garden," which they still held, destroying the
wooden bridge near it.
Beyond the Weisseritz, Teste's infantry, with part of
Dumoustier's, issued from the Lobtau “schlag” against
Altona and the neighbouring buildings. The Austrians
made a desperate resistance in the buildings, but were
eventually driven from all but a small inn at Klein Hamburg,
which they evacuated at midnight. In this combat even
Pajol’s cavalry took part. As darkness fell, the Austrians
on the Tharandt road withdrew behind Lobtau and
bivouacked south-west of it. The village was occupied
by neither party during the night, but the Austrians still
held Cotta, Dölzschen, Nauslitz, Rossthal, Wolfmitz, and
Nieder- and Ober-Gorbitz.
As a result of the day's fighting, the line of French out-
posts, marked on the plan, shows that they had regained
practically all that they had lost earlier in the day.
Between 9 and Io P.M. there were brought to Napoleon
at the Royal Palace 7oo Austrian prisoners, most of whom
had been captured in or near redoubt III. After inspecting
1 Marked “garden” on plan; just north of Plauen.
O
2IO NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
them by torchlight, the Emperor distributed crosses to the
battaliq of Young Guard escorting them.
The day had been fine, but towards midnight rain began
to descend in torrents, which continued for the rest of the
night, and during the whole of the next day.
If terror still reigned amongst the citizens, the French
troops were jubilant over the great success which they had
undoubtedly gained against vastly superior numbers. More-
over, their spirits were further raised by the knowledge of
the approach of strong reinforcements, and by the fact that
they were amply supplied with food and drink in the midst
of the magazines and resources of Dresden.
During the night there was a constant stream of reinforce-
ments pouring into the Altstadt over the three bridges
across the Elbe.
In the evening of the 26th August Napoleon was inclined
to believe that the allies would retreat in the night, but he
issued orders for his troops for the next day, in the event
of a fresh battle, should the enemy decide to maintain his
position. During the night there arrived
II. Corps (Victor), 36 battalions, 2 Squadrons, 68 guns.
VI. Corps (Marmont), 4o battalions, 8 squadrons, 78 guns.
Guard cavalry (Lefebvre - Desnoettes), Io squadrons,
6 guns.
These raised the total available on the 27th to 18O
battalions, I 37 squadrons, 486 guns. At most, after allow-
ing for losses on the 26th, these could not amount to more
than from I 2 o,ooo to I 2 5,000 men. The allies, on the
other hand, had I 58,000 men (less the losses of the 26th)
actually on the field, and expected the arrival of 2 I,000
more with Klenau early next morning.
Nevertheless, the feeling in their camp was one of general
despondency. They had gained little or no ground as the
result of the day's fighting. This was attributable mainly
to Schwarzenberg's indecision, and the confusion of his
•orders. It was almost impossible to say whether he aimed
at a general attack, or merely at a reconnaissance in force.
He had missed the great opportunity for storming Dresden
THE BATTLE OF DRESIDEN 2II
before Napoleon's arrival with reinforcements. There had
been no unity of command, no co-operation of the various
columns. Amongst the troops all confidence had dis-
appeared ; they were filled with the dread of Napoleon's
presence. Moreover, they were very short of food and
drink, owing to the wild confusion prevailing amongst the
supply columns on the miserable roads between Dresden
and the Erzgebirge. The best road, that by Peterswalde,
was already threatened by Vandamme. That general,
crossing by the Königstein bridges, had, by 5 P.M., got
across 34 battalions and Corbineau's cavalry, but no artillery.
With these he had attacked the inferior observing force
under Prince Eugen of Wurtemberg. Though Eugen's men
held out bravely till dark, they were obliged by their weak-
ness to evacuate during the night the whole Pirna plateau,
and the town itself. Eugen's appeals to headquarters for
reinforcements had resulted in nothing but his supersession
in the command by Osterman Tolstoi, who was ill and
unfit for the task. -
Eugen, seeking above all things to protect the rear of the
army at Dresden, had abandoned, the Peterswalde road and
fallen back to a position north and south of Zehista, facing
the Elbe. This was known both to the allies and to
Napoleon.
At the council of war at allied headquarters there were
again many differences of opinion and lengthy discussions,
which ended in a decision to hold on next day to the
heights before Dresden.
When the allied troops had, during the night, taken up
the positions ordered by Schwarzenberg, whose orders
Friederich considers by no means clear, they stood as
follows:–
I. RUSSIANS AND PRUSSIANS
(a) Russian advanced guard, still holding Blasewitz
weakly, stretched in a feeble line from the Elbe at
Blasewitz to Grüna, where its left was supported by the
Prussian reserve cavalry.
2E2 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
(5) The Russian 5th infantry division was spread from
Torna to Leubnitz, with Ziethen’s and Klüx's Prussians
behind and on its right.
(c) The rest of the Prussians stood, two brigades between
Leubnitz and Gostritz, one behind Gostritz ; landwehr
cavalry in 3rd line; reserve artillery in front of Nothnitz.
(d) Miloradowich's Russians held Tschertnitz, Klein
Pestitz, and Mockritz.
2. AUSTRIANS
(a) Between Tschertnitz, Klein Pestitz, Coschütz, and
Plauen were the corps of Colloredo and Chasteler, and
Lederer's cavalry in Ist line. Civillart's division and
Moritz Lichtenstein's cavalry in 2nd. In 3rd line Nostitz's
cavalry.
Ignaz Gyulai, with the reserve, consisting of Weissen-
wolf's and Bianchi's divisions and Schuler's cavalry, was at
Gittersee. These troops had been brought back from
beyond the Weisseritz, on Klenau's promise to be on the
field early in the morning of the 27th.
(b) Beyond the Weisseritz, Weissenwolf was in com-
mand. On his right in Dölzschen, Rossthal, and Neu
Nimptsch, with detachments in front, were Czöllich's
brigade, two infantry regiments sent ahead by Klenau,
and two squadrons of cuirassiers. As reserve to these,
Messery's brigade stood between Pesterwitz and Alt
Franken.
On the left was Meszko's division, at and to the left
of Nieder Gorbitz and Leutewitz, supported by Mumb's
brigade.
The Austrian and Russian artillery trains, when they
came up in the night, were sent to Nothnitz and Mockritz.
Napoleon's arrangements, which were completed before
midnight, were these :- -
(a) On his right, beyond the Wiesseritz, Murat commanded
Victor's corps and 6 battalions of Teste's division, besides
68 squadrons of Pajol’s and Latour-Maubourg's cavalry.
(5) From the right bank of the Weisseritz to beyond
THE BATTLE OF DRESIDEN 2I3
redoubt III., Marmont commanded his own corps (VI.) and
Normann's cavalry brigade. -
(c) On Marmont's left, St Cyr, with the XIV. corps and
Jacquet's cavalry brigade, stood behind Strehlen with his
left in front of the south-east corner of the Grosser Garten.
(d) Ney, with Barrois' and Dumoustier's Young Guard
divisions, was to advance through and on the north side of
the Grosser Garten.
(e) On Ney's left was Mortier, with Decouz's and Roguet's
Young Guard divisions. On his extreme left was Nansouty
with two divisions of Guard cavalry.
Comparing the positions of the opponents, we find that
Napoleon had beyond the Weisseritz about 35,000 men
(I2,OOO of them cavalry) and I of guns, opposed, until
Klenau's arrival, to 24,OOO allies with only 34 guns, and
including less than 2000 cavalry. Once the French were
in possession of Plauen, the allies would be cut off, by the
gorge of the Weisseritz, from all hope of rapid support from
their reserves in the centre. Klenau was supposed to be
coming up from between Freiberg and Tharandt, but he
did not arrive in time to support the isolated allied left
wing. The 24,000 men beyond the Weisseritz were too
strong for a mere corps of observation, not strong enough
to fight a serious battle. Moreover, on a day of torrential
rain, as the 27th August was, infantry was comparatively
useless ; for their muskets could often not be fired owing to
their primings being damped.
In the centre, from Plauen to Strehlen, the allies had
about IOO,Ooo men opposed to 41,000 of Marmont and
St Cyr. There were 83 squadrons of allies in this section,
where they could be of comparatively little use. Napoleon
only had a couple of cavalry brigades here. He had no
intention of a serious attack in the centre; for his plan,
notwithstanding his inferior numbers, was to attack on both
wings, driving the allies off their two best roads to Bohemia
on to the wretched tracks through the mountains between
the roads via Peterswalde and Freiberg.
The allied right wing consisted of about 24,000 men,
2I4 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
including 83 squadrons. Napoleon's left, taking Ney as its
right, had about 40,000 infantry and IO,Ooo cavalry.
It was all-important to the allies not to be cut from the
Pirna-Peterswalde road, which was by far the best they had.
Though the centre of their position was naturally the
strongest, they massed two-thirds of their army on it.
What they should have done, apparently, was to confine
their defensive to the country on the right of the
Weisseritz, and to strengthen their right especially. As
for the left, beyond the Weisseritz, they would have been
wise to attempt no defence of it.
(b) THE BATTLE OF THE 27TH AUGUST
When day broke on the 27th, the rain was still descend-
ing in torrents, and it was almost dark ; a depressing
outlook for all, especially for the allies, conscious as they
were of failure on the previous day. Moreover, their com-
manders felt themselves handicapped by being able to see
through the mist but a small area of a country which they
knew indifferently, whilst Napoleon knew it thoroughly.
At 6 A.M. Mortier, on the French left, began his advance
with Roguet on the left and Decouz on the right. The
Guard cavalry followed the former.
By 7 A.M. Roguet had taken Blasewitz without serious
fighting, and was proceeding to clear the Blasewitz wood.
South of the wood Decouz was supported by Ney's two
divisions, advancing on his right along the north edge of the
Grosser Garten, from which the Prussians had retired at
daybreak. The Russians, driven from Grüna, retired on
Seidnitz, and, as Roguet with the French left swung round
from Blasewitz, the whole of the Russian advanced guard
(Roth) fell back to a position extending north-eastwards
from Seidnitz to the Elbe.
The French were now pivoting on their right at Seidnitz,
their left moving on Tolkewitz, threatening to surround
Roth's right. Wittgenstein now ordered Roth, who was
making a stubborn resistance, to retire on Reick and Prohlis,
so as to join the right of the allied main position at Torna.
THE BATTLE OF DRESIDEN 2I5
He still held firmly to Seidnitz, where his left repulsed
several French attacks. *
As soon as the Russians had evacuated Tolkewitz, the
French cavalry passed through it towards Laubegast, and
drew up south of it in two lines, facing the Pirna road.
Meanwhile the French had at last taken Seidnitz, whence
Roguet set out to attack Gross- and Klein-Dobritz. The
cavalry, at the same time, advanced towards Leuben.
Nansouty, by passing Leuben and wheeling to his right,
threatened the retreat of the Russians in Dobritz, and
determined them, after repulsing several of Roguet's attacks,
to retreat to Reick and south-east of it. This movement
Nansouty made no attempt to harass with his cavalry,
as apparently he might have done, seeing that the infantry
were unable to fire their muskets in the wet. On the other
hand, the allies had 62 squadrons on their right, which
might have annihilated Nansouty's 28. Possibly the difficulty
of seeing any distance in the blinding rain may account
partially for the inactivity of the cavalry on both sides.
Whilst Mortier was thus getting forward on the left, Ney
had reached Grüna. St Cyr, on his right, had taken
Strehlen, between 8 and 9 A.M., without much difficulty,
since it was only defended by one Prussian battalion, which
presently retired to Leubnitz, where the Prussians still held
the right bank of the Kaitzbach. St Cyr had not yet
moved the main body of his corps beyond a position between
the Grosser Garten and Strehlen, but he had posted a
powerful battery on the rising ground just east of the latter
place, with which he was firing heavily on Tschertnitz and
Leubnitz.
Such was the position at I I A.M., when Napoleon reached
Leubnitz. The Emperor had betaken himself, at 6 A.M., to
a post just behind redoubt IV., where a great bonfire was
lighted for him, and a tent pitched. Here he remained till
Io, waiting for news of Murat's attack with his right beyond
the Weisseritz. At that hour he received a report which
satisfied him that all was going well in that direction, and
that he might now go to look after his left. Riding through
2I6 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
the Pirna suburb and the Grosser Garten, he reached
Seidnitz about I I A.M., and at once ordered an attack
on Reick. The village was strongly protected on the
north and east by the Landgraben, here about 8 feet deep,
flowing in a channel 6 to 8 feet wide at the top. The
channel ran along an embankment IO to I2 feet high, and
I 8 to 20 feet thick. The French attack was made on both
sides of the angle where the watercourse turns from north-
east to north-west. Meeting the Russians in front on
the embankment, and charged in left flank by Russian
and Prussian cavalry, the French were driven 'off with
heavy loss. The attack was renewed with reinforcements,
but the defenders would not yield till a French shell fired
the north part of the village and reduced them to the
southern part. In the smoke the Russians failed to see
that the French had almost surrounded them, and when
they attempted to retreat on Prohlis, they found themselves
cut off. Then they sold their lives as dearly as they could
in a fierce hand-to-hand struggle in the houses. It was not
till noon that the French were finally in possession of Reick,
where the horror of the scene was enhanced by the burning
of many in the raging fire.
The remains of Roth's force fell back on Torna. Beyond
Reick the French advanced but a short way after noon,
though they continued to bombard and set on fire the
villages in front of it. After witnessing the storming of
Reick, Napoleon betook himself to St Cyr's corps. This
he now found with its right in Strehlen, and left in contact
with Ney's right at Grüna.
Presently the relief of the Prussians in Leubnitz by the
Russians induced a belief that they were retreating, and an
attack was at once made on the village from Strehlen. The
French got into the nearer part of it, but, swept with grape
by two guns at the church, and then charged with the
bayonet by two Prussian battalions, they were driven out
again. A second attack failed before it reached Leubnitz.
It was at this juncture that Napoleon arrived on the
Scene. He was furious at the failure of the attacks, and
THE BATTLE OF DRESIDEN 217
ordered a third, to support which he had added horse
artillery guns to the battery east of Strehlen. This attack
was nipped in the bud by a storm of artillery fire directed
on the French as they issued from Strehlen. Skirmishing
continued along the Kaitzbach till evening, when the French
surprised, and got into the north-east corner of Leubnitz,
whence they were promptly ejected again.
It was I o'clock when Napoleon, disgusted with his failure
at Leubnitz, started on his return journey to redoubt IV.
On the way he ordered a horse artillery battery forward to
fire on the enemy's battery near Räcknitz. After a few
rounds it stopped firing, and, on his inquiring the reason,
he was informed that the object battery had withdrawn.
He then ordered his own battery to fire on a group of
horsemen a little to the left of Räcknitz. The first shot
fired had momentous results; for the ball hit Moreau as he
was riding just in front of the Tsar. It tore through his
right leg above the knee, passed through his horse, and
shattered the left leg also.”
Before this, the Tsar, seeing things going badly on the
right, had, on the advice of Jomini and Moreau, directed
Barclay and Wittgenstein to attack Mortier's front with all
available reserves, whilst Kleist and Miloradowich attacked
his right towards Strehlen and Grüna. The plan was good ;
but Barclay objected that, if it failed, he would lose all his
artillery, as, in the muddy state of the country, he could not
get his guns up the hill again. This remonstrance arrived
just as Moreau was wounded, and in the confusion no reply
was sent. Barclay, therefore, did nothing ; and the counter
attack never came off, though Danilewski " and Jomini say
Kleist and Miloradowich had actually changed front to the
* Moreau behaved heroically, calmly smoking a cigar, whilst both his legs were
amputated by the Tsar’s surgeon, Wylie, at a farm a short way in rear. “I am
done for,” he said, as Alexander spoke to him, “but how good it is to die for the
good cause, under the eyes of so great a monarch.” He was carried, suffering
great agony, to Laun, in Bohemia, where he died a week later. His body was
embalmed and taken to St Petersburg, where it was buried with great pomp.—
Danzlewsk2, p. 173.
* Danilewski, pp. 143-145.
218 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
right ready for it. Perhaps, too, the ardour of headquarters
for this move had cooled in consequence of the news just
received, that Vandamme, at Pirna, had driven Eugen of
Wurtemberg off the Peterswalde road. The news, perhaps,
did not reach Napoleon till later, as the Saxon general,
Gersdorf, who had received it, had been sent to inform the
King of Saxony of the impending victory of the French.
Marmont's troops, all along the line from redoubt III.
to the Weisseritz, had been heavily fired on since early
morning by a long line of Austrian guns, extending almost
continuously along the heights from Räcknitz to above
Plauen. On his right the French had driven the Austrians
from all the gardens and houses right up to Plauen.
Beyond this, nothing happened on Marmont's front.
We must now describe the course of events beyond the
Weisseritz. The Austrian main position on this side rested
its right on the gorge of the Weisseritz at Dölzschen.
Thence it passed through Nauslitz, Rossthal, Neu Nimptsch,
and Nieder Gorbitz, almost up to Leutewitz.
Murat started his advance against this line between 6 and
7 A.M. Victor's corps (II.) assembled opposite the Weisseritz
woodyard, near the bridge on the Freiberg road. Thence
they were to spread out fanwise in four columns moving
towards Nauslitz, Rossthal, Wolfnitz, and Nieder Gorbitz.
The artillery was in advance covered by skirmishers, the
corps cavalry followed the main body of the infantry.
Teste's division assembled behind the rising ground at
Lobtau. Pajol's cavalry took post between Victor and
Teste, whilst Latour-Maubourg's squadrons came up on
Teste's right, having the Saxon Guard cuirassier regiment
on his extreme outer flank moving towards Leutewitz.
Victor's artillery, pushing forward, opened a heavy fire
on Nauslitz and the Austrian guns there, whilst the infantry
advanced in four columns. The Ist, on the left, followed
the small ravine (perhaps better described as a hollow road)
which leads up the slope to between Rossthal and Dölzschen.
The 2nd column attacked the gardens about Nauslitz, the
3rd went by the right of Nauslitz, the 4th moved by the
THE BATTLE OF DRESIDEN 2I9
Freiberg road against Wolfnitz and Nieder Gorbitz. The
cavalry followed in rear of the infantry.
The 1st column, covered by the ravine and the orchards
on either side of it, had little difficulty in reaching its head,
where it found itself close to the Austrian position between
Rossthal and Dölzschen.
The 2nd column was not so fortunate, and had to make
several attacks before it was in possession of Nauslitz.
Thence it followed the two ravines which lead, one into
Rossthal, the other rather to the left of it. The ravines
were admirably suited to the French infantry, adepts in the
use of cover, and as the Ist and 2nd columns issued from
them, the Austrians between Dölzschen and Rossthal gave
way, retiring partly on each of these villages. The Ist
column now turned to its left, hemming the now separated
right of the enemy against the great ravine of the Weis-
seritz. At the same time, the 2nd column turned to the right
against Rossthal, which they stormed, taking 3OO prisoners.
From Rossthal the 2nd column attacked the right flank
of the Austrians opposing the 3rd column, and drove them
partly towards Neu Nimptsch and partly on Pesterwitz.
Neu Nimptsch was also stormed by the 3rd column. The
4th column, advancing on Nieder Gorbitz, had stormed
Wolfnitz. The defenders of Nieder Gorbitz were surrounded
and captured in a ravine between Neu Nimptsch and Alt
Franken with the aid of Victor's cavalry, which was now
up on the height between Neu Nimptsch and the Austrian
reserves of Messery towards Pesterwitz.
During the attacks on the other villages, Meszko's troops
had fallen back from Nieder to Ober Gorbitz and to the
west of it, where Mumb's brigade had joined them.
About noon the Austrians from Wolfnitz, and those now
driven out of Ober Gorbitz, were in considerable disorder in
the open space between the latter village and Neu Nimptsch.
Victor's cavalry was preparing to charge them, so they
formed themselves into four squares as far as possible.
Their muskets, however, would not go off in the rain, and
they were ridden down by the French cavalry. Many were
220 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
cut down, a great many more taken prisoners, and only a
few got away to Pesterwitz.
The capture of Ober Gorbitz had cut Meszko completely
from Alois Lichtenstein's division at Neu Nimptsch, so that
the Austrian line was now pierced in two places, between
Dölzschen and Rossthal, and between Neu Nimptsch and
Ober Gorbitz.
As soon as Victor's cavalry had destroyed the four
Squares as above described, Pajol's cavalry had moved along
the Freiberg road.
Whilst all this was happening in the Austrian centre
and right, between the Freiberg road and the Plauen
gorge, Murat, with the main body of the French cavalry
and Teste's infantry, had advanced against Meszko's left
and Mumb's brigade west of Ober Gorbitz. The Austrians
fell back, as they were bound to do, after the ruin of the
troops in the centre. Indeed, by this time, when it was too
late to save a disaster, Weissenwolf had ordered a general
retreat. His left was to make its way by Pesterwitz to the
Weisseritz in rear below. Czöllich, with the right, was to
reach the same point by Potzschappel. .
The French cavalry followed Meszko. Teste's right
moved round Gompitz to Pennrich, which they easily took,
as Meszko's attention was fixed in front of him. He and
Mumb retreating in squares, now found themselves with
their retreat by Pennrich cut off by Teste's infantry there,
and attacked by the cavalry of Murat and Pajol on the
other three sides. The Austrian infantry, unable to fire
their muskets, and threatened by cavalry and artillery, laid
down their arms and surrendered.” Four entire regiments
* Marbot, no doubt, refers to this part of the battle in his famous story of
Bordesoulle riding up to an Austrian square, and calling on it to surrender
as it could not fire. When they replied that his cavalry equally could not
charge in the heavy mud, he clinched the argument by opening out and
showing a battery of artillery ready to fire. The Austrians at once gave in.
The story may or may not be true.
The neighbourhood was an unpropitious one for the Austrians, for it is within
two miles of Kesselsdorf, where they and their Saxon allies were so badly beaten
by the “Old Dessauer’ in 1745, though, it is true, very few Austrians actually
fought that day,
THE BATTLE OF DRESIDEN 22I
were captured here, with Meszko and Mumb. The Saxon
cuirassiers who, during the fights at Wolfnitz and Nieder-
Gorbitz, had marched from Leutewitz to Ober Gorbitz, had
already taken two Austrian Squares of 2000 men.
We must return for a moment to the Austrian right,
which had been hemmed against the gorge at Dölzschen by
Victor's left column. Protected in front by a garden wall
facing towards Rossthal, they had behind them as means of
retreat nothing but a very difficult and steep footpath from
Dölzschen down to the Weisseritz at the point where the
Felsenkeller brewery now stands, and a bad steep road from
their left along the face of the cliff.
For some time they managed to keep the French off, but
about 2 P.M., a shell fired Dölzschen, and the village was
rushed in the consequent confusion. Some of the defenders,
pursued by the French fire, got away by the path or the
road, and attempted to scale the opposite heights, which are
in many places sheer precipices. Those who got so far
narrowly escaped drowning in the swollen Weisseritz. One
battery succeeded in getting down the bad road, but could
not cross the stream short of Potzschappel, as the bridge
had been destroyed. Numerous prisoners were taken in
Dölzschen. Here the French infantry broke into the wine
cellars and indulged in what Aster calls a “Bacchus-feast,”
which might have cost them dear had there been any
Austrians to make a counter attack. There were plenty in
sight, just across the gorge, where the reserves stood ; but
they were compelled to look idly on at the destruction of
their comrades, to whom they could bring no help in time.
By 2 P.M. the whole Austrian left beyond the Weisseritz
had been practically destroyed. The number of prisoners
taken was enormous, Aster thinks I 5,000 is not too high a
figure to take."
* With regard to prisoners, the author found the following returns in the Paris
records—(1) One showing I407 prisoners received at headquarters up to midnight
on the 26th, and 4209 more up to 7 P.M. on the 27th. (2) Prisoners in Dresden
on the 29th August, I2,535.
These two returns give riseto a suspicion that the numbers taken at Dresden may
222 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
What remained of this unfortunate left wing got into the
Weisseritz Valley about Potzschappel, whence they reached
the Dippoldiswalde road by Rabenau, far in rear of the
allies' main position. Some who tried to escape to Freiberg
were followed by French cavalry and lost many prisoners.
They probably hoped to meet Klenau, but that general had
marched by Tharandt. When he heard of the disaster to
the Austrian left, he at once moved to his right to the
Dippoldiswalde road.
Victor's cavalry had found Alt Franken still occupied by
Austrians. They were shelled by horse artillery, and the
village was stormed by French infantry from Ober Gorbitz,
just as its garrison was retiring on Pesterwitz.
All fighting on this side of the Weisseritz was over by
3 P.M., though the French cavalry continued the pursuit as
far as Herzogswalde, taking many prisoners and some
guns.
In the rear of the allies, Vandamme had not done very
much on the 27th August.” Even on that morning he had
not got his corps completely across the Elbe at Königstein,
but Mouton-Duvernet” was able to occupy Pirna, and the
plateau above it, whilst Phillippon's division took post to the
left of Krietschwitz, and Corbineau's cavalry advanced to
between Langen Hennersdorf and Berggieshūbel. A
battalion was placed on the Kohlberg, the hill at the junction
of the Gottleuba and Seidnitz Valleys.
Vandamme, deceived partly by the thickness of the
weather, partly by the reports of a doctor who had been
captured from the enemy, believed he was not strong enough
to attack till the whole of his corps was up. At 4 P.M.,
have been exaggerated. But there is a later return showing the total number
received up to the 8th October at 23,518 (over I5,OOO Austrians). The greater
part of these must have been taken at Dresden, for there were few other large
captures of prisoners by the French. Of the 590 others who deserted from
the allies only sixteen soldiers were Prussians, and not a single officer |
478 are classed as “miscellaneous,” i.e. neither Russians, Austrians, nor
Prussians. -
1 Map IV. (5), and Map I.
* 42nd Division belonging to St Cyr's corps, but temporarily under
*Vandamme.
THE BATTLE OF DRESDEN 223
hearing of the progress of the battle at Dresden, he prepared
to march next day on Berggieshūbel and Hellendorf.
At 3 P.M. the battle at Dresden was nearly over, the
artillery fire had ceased. At 4 P.M., Napoleon, wet to the
skin, with the famous cocked hat reduced to pulp by the
rain and hanging limply about his ears and down his neck,
rode through the Dippoldiswalde suburb to the palace.
Behind him marched Iooo Austrian prisoners. Later on
I 2,000 more" came in from beyond the Weisseritz, including
Meszko, two other generals, sixty-four officers of high, and
many of lower rank. Fifteen Austrian standards were
borne by the grenadiers of the Old Guard ; twenty-six guns,
and thirty ammunition wagons followed. Save the one
battery which escaped from Dölzschen, practically the
whole of the Austrian artillery of the left wing was there.
“When an army of I2O,ooomen, in the presence of 18O,Ooo
enemies, deploys from a bridge-head, then surrounds the
enemy on both wings, and seriously damages both ; when it
compels a whole division to lay down its arms in the open field,
when it brings in immediately from the battlefield I 3,000
prisoners fifteen standards, and twenty-six guns, that is a
quite undeniable victory,” So says von Caemmerer,” thinking
apparently of less honest historians, who would attempt to
deny that at Dresden Napoleon gained one of his most
remarkable, though almost his last, great victories.
Could he have carried out his original plan of holding the
allies before Dresden, whilst he, with I oo,ooo men, instead
of Vandamme with 4o,ooo, issued by Königstein on their
rear, the result would perhaps have been decisive of the
whole campaign. But the weakness of Dresden diverted him
from his purpose, and as it was, he owed much to the
irresolution of the allies, to their postponement of the attack
on the city till the 26th, and to its general feebleness during
the hours in which he was bringing up his reinforcements.
Yet it is tempting to speculate what might have happened
had he kept to his original plan, and sent 4O,OOO of
* See previous note on this subject.
Die Befreuzngskrieg 1813-1815. p. 56,
224 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
his nearest troops to support St Cyr, whilst with IOO,Ooo
he himself crossed at Königstein. Would not St Cyr,
with another 40,000 men, have been able to hold
on at least to the Altstadt behind the old enceinte,
for the scaling of which the allies had made no prepara-
tions P Would the allies have dared to continue their
attack on Dresden after the 26th, perhaps even after
noon on that date P By that time they might well have
learnt, from Eugen of Wurtemberg, that Napoleon himself
was crossing at Königstein. Would not that have sent them
hurrying back to Bohemia, harassed and delayed by St
Cyr with 60,000 men 2 Napoleon at Stolpen, be it remem-
bered, was nearer to Königstein than he was to Dresden,
and he had at least as good a road. Latour-Maubourg and
the Guard were also nearer to Königstein than to Dresden ;
Victor and Marmont no farther from one than from the
other.
However, this is mere speculation, and we must return to
actual facts. These were,that theallies had been badly defeated
at Dresden, that they had lost probably at least 25,000
men, that the Peterswalde road was already intercepted by
Vandamme, and the next best road, by Freiberg, was in
Murat’s hands. They were practically confined to the bad
tracks between the two, on which their movements, hampered
by the congestion of trains, must be slow. By the Peters-
walde road Napoleon could be across the Erzgebirge and in
Bohemia, ready to meet them there as they debouched from
the difficult passes of the mountains. We shall see presently
how he lost his chance. On the 26th and 27th August his
genius flashed forth, he was the Napoleon of Austerlitz,
Jena, and Friedland ; on the following days he relapsed into
the declining energy of 18 I 3.
His unerring appreciation of the advantages to himself of
the separation of the allied left by the Plauen gorge recalls
his similar estimate of the position of the Russian left at
Friedland, separated by the smaller obstacle of the mill
stream from the centre and right. His bold resolve to
attack on both wings, notwithstanding his inferiority of
THE BATTLE OF DRESIDEN 225
numbers, was a novelty with him. The only question is
whether he might not have still further weakened his centre
in order to strengthen his left, and break in the allied right;
that is, whether he might not have added at least half of St
Cyr's corps to his left.
He owed much, no doubt, to the faults of his enemy, to
the massing of the allied army on its centre, to the neglect
of the right, and especially to the collection in the centre of
the great mass of their cavalry, where it was useless. If the
support of Dresden rendered Napoleon's centre safe, the
allies equally were safe in their centre. Possibly their
action may have been due to their belief that he would
always make his great effort to break the centre. That was
an idea held by St Cyr, as we have already seen when that
marshal discussed the plan for Bautzen." Still, Bautzen
itself should have warned them that he allowed himself to
be tied down by no such hard and fast rule.
Again, they committed a grave error in leaving their
exposed left wing miserably weak both in guns and cavalry,
the two arms which could do most in the pouring rain of
the 27th August, in an age when neither breech-loaders nor
even percussion caps had been invented to do away with
the necessity for primings, which could not be kept dry.
One thing must be said in favour of the allies' treatment
of their left wing, namely, that they had good reason to be-
lieve Klenau would have joined it early in the morning,
nearly doubling its strength. They had not reckoned on
that commander's slowness, due doubtless to the terrible
meteorological conditions, and had been content to accept
his assurance that he would be up in time. It is not, how-
ever, clear why Klenau should have gone by Tharandt
instead of by Kesselsdorf. He started that move before he
knew of the ruin of the allied left. Surely the allies should
have known that Klenau was delayed in time to repair their
error to some extent by sending reinforcements, from their
reserve at Gittersee, across the Weisseritz to the left wing.
When their right wing was hard pressed, the proposal for
* Supra, p. 140.
P
226 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
a strong counter attack with Kleist and Miloradowich came
to nothing, partly on account of Barclay's rather weak
objection, partly on account of the depressing effects of
Moreau's mortal wound, and the news of Vandamme's pro-
gress at Pirna. The former, however it may have affected
Alexander, was after all only an incident, the latter was an
additional reason for attempting to clear the Pirna road, as
well as for the despatch of reinforcements from the centre to
Osterman at Zehista.
For the counter attack on Napoleon's left, cavalry might
also have been sent to the right from the centre, where it
was standing idle. It may also be remarked that the
Russo-Prussian cavalry, already available on the right, might
well have displayed more activity than it did against
Nansouty's.
CHAPTER XIV
FROM DRESIDEN TO KULM 1

T 7 P.M. on the 27th August Napoleon ordered
Ney to be informed, “that the enemy is not
in retreat, that he only regarded the affair of
yesterday as an attack that had failed, that it
is doubtful if he will commence his retreat to-night.””
In the same orders Ney was to be informed that, “every-
thing leads to the belief there will be a great battle to-
morrow, and that the enemy is numerous.” An hour later
the Emperor was still making preparations for a renewal of
the battle, even to prescribing the garrisons of the redoubts.”
Precisely when he came to the conclusion that the allies
would not renew the battle, and had begun their retreat, is
not quite clear. Apparently he was not quite sure at day-
break on the 28th, when he returned to his old position
near redoubt IV. The orders, if there were any in writing,
which he then issued to Marmont and St Cyr have not yet
been found, but it is certain that by 9 A.M. those marshals
were in the allies' position of the 27th on the heights, which
was now empty. The rain had ceased, but for some time a
thick mist obscured the view. -
On the afternoon of the 27th, after Moreau's fall, a
council of war was held by the allied commanders round a
badly burning camp fire. The King of Prussia advocated
renewing the battle next day. Jomini still counselled re-
treat to Dippoldiswalde. The majority were for retreat
right back to Bohemia, and their opinion was supported
by the statement of Schwarzenberg that bread, shoes, and
ammunition were all wanting, and not to be procured.
i Map IV. (5). * Corr. 20,479. * Corr. 20,481.
227
228 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Thousands of men were barefooted, their shoes having been
sucked off their feet by the mud. There was, he maintained,
no hope of taking Dresden, no advantage to be gained by
fighting another battle. Retreat in the night was decided
on. About 4 P.M. Toll and Radetzky produced a draft
order to the following effect:-
(I) Barclay, with Wittgenstein, Kleist, and the Russo-
Prussian reserves, to march by Dohna, Berggieshübel, and
Peterswalde to Teplitz.
(2) All the Austrians on the right bank of the Weisseritz
to go by Dippoldiswalde, Altenberg, and Eichwald to Dux
and Brüx in Bohemia. -
(3) Klenau, and the remains of the left wing beyond the
Weisseritz, to march by Tharandt, Freiberg, and Marienberg
towards Kommotau. This direction was upset by the fact
that the remains of Czöllich's and Alois Lichtenstein's
divisions had joined Klenau at Potzschappel and marched
with him to Gittersee.
Radetzky's orders assigned one road to each column, but
they were not all available. That on the left by Kessels-
dorf and Herzogswalde to Freiberg was already in the hands
of Murat's cavalry. If Klenau marched by Tharandt on
Freiberg, he could not reach Naundorf, the junction of that
road with the one from Kesselsdorf, before night on the
28th. The road, already bad when the allies advanced, had
been rendered almost impassable by twenty-four hours of
rain. The column might well be attacked by the French at
the passage of the Mulde near Freiberg. Klenau, therefore,
alarmed at the risk, decided to march by Rabenau to Pre-
tzschendorf, whence he would endeavour to reach the Chem-
nitz-Kommotau road at Marienberg. In the end he
reached Pretzschendorf on the 28th, Gross Waltersdorf on
the 29th, Marienberg on the 3oth.
The head of the centre column reached Altenberg
on the 28th, Dux on the 29th. Its rearguard (Moritz
Lichtenstein) was at Wendisch-Carsdorf on the 28th,
Falkenhain on the 29th, Altenberg early on the 30th.
Barclay, with the right column, also thought Radetzky's
FROM DRESIDEN TO KULM 229
orders impracticable, for he believed Vandamme was with
35,000 or 40,000 men on the Peterswalde road between
himself and Teplitz, whilst Napoleon with 50,000 men from
Dresden was following him. Believing that to follow the
new road would endanger the very existence of his command,
he ordered :—
(1) The reserves to march by the Dippoldiswalde road.
(2) Kleist by Maxen and Glashütte.
(3) Wittgenstein to cover the retreat on the heights of
Leubnitz and Prohlis.
(4) Osterman, if he found the main road blocked by
Vandamme, to join the rest by Maxen.
Had these orders been carried out, the result would
have been the meeting of I2O,Ooo men on the single bad
road from Dippoldiswalde to Bohemia. The resulting con-
fusion would have been almost unimaginable, and by the
time the great crowd of disordered troops reached the passes
leading down to Bohemia, Vandamme would have arrived at
their mouths, via Peterswalde, quite unopposed. As it was, the
Russians and Prussians of Barclay's column marched at night-
fall on the 27th for Dippoldiswalde. The main body going
by Lockwitz, Maxen, and Hausdorf, only reached Fursten-
walde on the 29th. Their night march to Dippoldiswalde,
though they were not pursued, was one of dreadful suffering
for the weary, hungry men on a wretched road in pouring
rain. Had there been any immediate pursuit, nothing could
have saved them from destruction. Klüx, standing as rear-
guard at Leubnitz, followed the rest on the morning of
the 28th, via Possendorf. -
It was not till 9 A.M. on the 28th, when the allies had
disappeared from the heights, that Napoleon's orders 1 for
the pursuit were issued, St Cyr and Marmont being
already on the enemy's position of the previous day.
St Cyr was directed to march on Dohna, following the
enemy and keeping in the plain between Dohna and the
Elbe, so as to be always in sight of Mortier, who was
ordered to Pirna, where Napoleon would join him. Van-
* Corr. 20,483.
230 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
damme was to be informed of the orders, and, as soon as
he and St Cyr were in touch, he was to take his whole corps
on to the heights of Berggiesshūbel and Hellendorf. No
orders appear to have been issued to Marmont on the 28th
beyond one of 9 P.M." directing him to follow and do as
much harm as possible to the enemy.
Osterman and Eugen of Würtemberg had waited in vain
for reinforcements on the 27th. On the morning of the
28th they heard of the results of the battle at Dresden, and
that Barclay was to retreat by the Peterswalde road to
Teplitz. Wolzogen, who brought the orders from the Tsar,
was also to say that they could easily hold Zehista till
Barclay's arrival. At the same time, however, Barclay's
orders arrived saying he was going by the Dippoldiswalde
road, and that Osterman would march by Maxen if the
Peterswalde road was already blocked by Vandamme. As
the latter contingency was already known to have occurred,
it appeared to be the duty of Osterman and Eugen to
march by Maxen. Eugen vigorously urged the fatal conse-
quences of thus leaving the new road open to Vandamme ;
but Osterman demurred to running any risks with the
precious Russian Guard. Even Wolzogen supported Eugen,
and in the end, when Eugen had threatened to go off with
his own corps alone to Peterswalde, Osterman gave in, on
condition Eugen would take the entire responsibility on
himself. This he did in a letter to the Tsar. Nevertheless,
Eugen continued to be hampered by the anxiety of Oster-
man and Yermolow to keep the Guard out of danger.
Vandamme at this time had Quiot's brigade on the
plateau above Pirna, with a battalion of light infantry on
the Kohlberg. On Quiot's left was Mouton-Duvernet, be-
yond him Dumonçeau ; Philippon's division and Corbineau's
cavalry at Hennersdorf. The allies now drew in all the
troops they had north of Zehista for a demonstration against
the Kohlberg and Krietschwitz, under cover of which the
Guard and artillery marched for Hellendorf.
Vandamme soon saw through this, and at 3 P.M. sent
* Marmont. Mém., v. 222.
FROM DRESIDEN TO KULM 23I
Quiot hurrying along the Gottleuba valley, whilst the de-
monstration was dealt with by other troops.
When the head of the Russian Guard reached Berggies-
shübel it found the enemy in the woods, and had to force a
passage with the bayonet. The Guard reached Peterswalde
without serious loss. The 2nd corps, following them, was
driven off the road by Quiot and part of it had to escape
by by-paths to Hellendorf during the night. When Eugen,
about 5 P.M., assembled the remains of his corps at Hellen-
dorf, he had but 2000 men left.
In front of Hellendorf Vandamme stopped his pursuit for
the night. There he had the brigade of Prince Reuss and
the cavalry of Corbineau and Gobrecht. The rest of his
troops were on the road between Berggiesshūbel and
Hellendorf, and on either side of it.
We now return to Napoleon after he had issued his 9 A.M.
orders for the pursuit. Shortly afterwards he rode off towards
Pirna. On the way, at 9.45 A.M., he received a dispatch
from Vandamme, who stated that the enemy was retreating
across his front with 25,ooo men, and that he was being
attacked. As we know, he had been deceived as to the
enemy's strength. Napoleon, however, felt certain that he
could have no great force before him. He was convinced
that the right of the allies was making for Maxen, their
centre for Dippoldiswalde, their left for Marienberg and
Annaberg. He thought it desirable to draw St Cyr closer
to Marmont, who was following the main body of the enemy.
If Murat bore south-west from Freiberg he would come on
their flank and rear. He had begun to think he could do
more with Murat, and that Vandamme's 4o,ooo men were
ample to drive on Eugen of Wurtemberg and to make
connexion by Tetschen with Poniatowski at Gabel. Satisfied
with the progress of affairs, he decided to send the Old
Guard back to Dresden and to stop the Young Guard at
Pirna.
Getting into his carriage at Pirna, he started back to
Dresden. With the story that Napoleon was compelled by
illness to return to Dresden we will deal later. At 4 P.M.,
232 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
“one league from Pirna,” Napoleon stopped to dictate an
order to Vandamme which was sent by Berthier. Van-
damme was to move on Peterswalde with the I. corps, 42nd
division, Corbineau's cavalry, and Prince Reuss' brigade of
the II.1 Pirna would be held by Mortier. “The
Emperor desires you to unite all the forces which he places
at your disposal, and with them to penetrate into Bohemia,
overthrowing the Prince of Wurtemberg, if he opposes you.
The enemy, whom we have defeated, appears to be retiring
on Annaberg. His Majesty thinks that you could arrive
before him on his communications of Tetschen, Aussig, and
Teplitz, and there take all his carriage, ambulances, baggage,
in fine, everything which marches behind an army. The
Emperor orders the boat-bridge at Pirna to be removed, in
order to be able to throw one at Tetschen.” ”
At Dresden Napoleon heard of Macdonald's defeat on
the Katzbach; he had already heard of Oudinot's at Gross
Beeren.
Late that night (28th) he received Vandamme's report of
8.30 P.M. saying that the enemy had been beaten and was
in flight. His orders to Vandamme thereon are not yet
forthcoming, but as that general next day occupied Aussig
instead of Tetschen, and threw a bridge at the former, it may
be presumed they directed him to do so.
During the whole of the 28th the French were pursuing
in four columns directed respectively on Freiberg (Murat),
Dippoldiswalde (Marmont), Maxen (St Cyr), and Berggies-
shübel (Vandamme), capturing many prisoners and guns,
with much material of all sorts. The interest of the 29th
and 30th August centres mainly about the operations of
Vandamme.
1 Teste's division, except Quiot’s brigade, was with Victor. Vandamme had
Prince Reuss' brigade in exchange. -
* Du Casse (Le général Vandamme, ii. 504) quotes this despatch with the name
“Altenberg,” instead of “Annaberg,” which, as will be seen later, makes a
considerable difference in the question as to the responsibility for Vandamme's
subsequent defeat. The name in the “Registre du Major Général” at Paris is
“Annaberg” which seems to show beyond doubt that Du Casse’s version is
wrong. - . .
FROM DRESIDEN TO KULM 233
During the night of the 28th-29th Osterman sent a
report to Teplitz, where he believed the Tsar to be, saying
he was compelled to retire before Vandamme, and must
cross the Eger.
In the early morning of the 29th Osterman started first
with the Russian Guard. At 6 A.M. there was a rearguard
action about Hellendorf, in which the allies were driven
back. In this fight Prince Reuss, on the French side, lost
his life. There was another rearguard action about Peters-
walde, in which a flank attack by French cavalry from
Raitza, east of Peterswalde, had considerable influence.
Schachowski, the allied commander, lost I ooo men. He
made another stand at Nollendorf, and again at Vorder
Tellnitz. Thence he was followed to Kulm, where yet
another fight took place about Io A.M., the confusion of
which was added to by the intrusion of some unfortunate
villagers returning from church.
Osterman's envoy to the Tsar had not found him at
Teplitz, but he found there the King of Prussia and the
Austrian Emperor. The latter rode off to Laun, but the
King, realising the situation, at once sent off to Osterman,
pointing out the danger to the army of his retreat beyond
the Eger. He added that it would endanger the personal
safety of the Tsar, who was still in the mountains. This
latter consideration convinced Osterman that the time had
come for making use of his Guard. Frederick William also
despatched his adjutants in all directions in search of
troops to support Osterman at Priesten.
Alexander left Altenberg, where he had slept, early on
the 29th. At 2 P.M. he was on the crest of the mountains
on the road to Dux. Thence he saw what was happening
at Priesten. He at once ordered Colloredo, who was nearest
him, to Priesten. The Austrian refused on the ground of
Schwarzenberg's orders.” The latter could not be found,
but the Tsar found Jomini and Metternich. The latter
assumed the responsibility of sending Colloredo to Priesten,
saying that circumstances had changed since Schwarzenberg's
* Danilewski, p. 150-152.
234 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
order. Meanwhile, Osterman had taken up a position at
Priesten facing east, with his left on the wooded heights
above Straden, his centre in and west of Priesten, and his
right between Priesten and Karbitz. He had, at the
beginning of the action, about I 4,700 men ; by the end
of the day he had received reinforcements raising his
numbers to, at most, 20,000 men.
The scene of the battle of the 29th and 30th August is
the slope below the last really steep part of the Erzgebirge.
Kulm is a short mile from the real foot of the mountains,
though there is a fairly steep slope all the way down from
the railway station of to-day to the village, which is of a
fair size. At Tellnitz, 2% miles north-east of Kulm, the
road by which Vandamme arrived comes winding round
the angle of the hill from Nollendorf. In Kulm itself there
is a knoll rising Ioo or I 20 feet above the village, and
affording an excellent view of the surrounding country.
The road from Kulm to Priesten is of the “switchback ’’
class, Priesten being at the top of the second rise, not
counting the slight rise about 300 yards out of Kulm.
South of Kulm there is a wood in which is the “Schloss,”
and beyond that more hills, between Karbitz and Deutsch-
Neudörfel. Vandamme had got possession of Kulm by
Io A.M., but his troops were still spread out in a long
column in the pass over the mountains. Believing appar-
ently that he was only going to have another small rear-
guard action, like those he had already had earlier in the
morning, he sent Reuss' brigade to try and cut the Russians
from the mountains by their left. Tactically this was
perhaps the better course, as the protection of the marshy
ground on the other flank was stronger. Strategically,
however, he would have done much better to have turned
their right, driving them into the mountains, and on to the
heads of their own columns as they debouched by the Geiers
Berg pass and those farther west.
First, Straden was taken by the French, and retaken by
the Russians. Then, as nine battalions of the 42nd divi-
sion arrived, it was again taken. About noon, more troops
FROM DRESIDEN TO KULM 235
having now come up, Vandamme began his advance on
Priesten, whilst his right wing attacked the Eggmühl, the
support of the Russian left on the spur of the hill. They
even succeeded in getting a gun on to the spur above it. On
the other hand, two battalions of French here fell into a
Russian ambuscade, and were mostly taken prisoners. Up
to 2 P.M. a furious combat raged all along the line from the
Eggmühl to Priesten. The latter village was taken by
greatly superior French forces, who, when they attempted
to push beyond it, were driven back by artillery fire, and
then ejected from the village by infantry.
At 2 P.M. Philippon arrived with fourteen fresh battalions.
The Russians now began to yield on the left and in the
centre, and it was only when Eugen insisted on sending in
part of the Russian Guard, much against Yermolow's wish,
that they were able to hold their own for a time. Then
Priesten was again taken, and again lost by Vandamme.
It was by this time filled with dead and wounded. The
Russian general, Krapowitzki, was killed in the hand-to-
hand combat, and Osterman had his left arm carried away
by a round shot.
The Russian position was very critical, with French
reinforcements constantly arriving. Only one Guard battalion
and the cavalry remained in reserve. Fortunately, some of
the troops collected by the Tsar and Frederick William
were now coming up. At 5 P.M. Vandamme made his
decisive attack. It was momentarily checked, north of
Priesten, by the Russian infantry. But at that instant two
cuirassier regiments led by Diebitsch charged the left of the
French, and an Uhlan regiment fell on the other flank.
Before these charges the French fell back on Corbineau's
cavalry, which was south of the road between Kulm and
Priesten. Then more cavalry came to the aid of the
Russians.
This decided Vandamme to abandon his attack till he
could get up the rest of his troops. They kept arriving
throughout the night. During the night Vandamme sent
* Commanding the Guard.
236 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
3oo sappers to throw a bridge over the Elbe at Aussig,
where he already had a battalion. He was under the impres-
sion that he was certain to receive support during the next
day from Mortier or St Cyr.
The Russians had put up an excellent fight in the last
position in which it was possible to cover the issue of the
main army from the mountains. For this the credit was
mainly due to Eugen of Wurtemberg, who, with I 5,ooo
troops, had done what Barclay with Ioo,ooo had not dared
to attempt, namely, to force his way by the Peterswalde
road. Perhaps it would have been better to fight at Kulm,
but Priesten was a good position. Vandamme's chief fault
had been in attacking piecemeal, instead of waiting for the
arrival of a considerable force.
The losses had been heavy ; the Russians lost 6ooo men,
the French probably nearly as many.
Elsewhere the pursuit by the French had been rather
feeble, though they had taken great numbers of wagons and
much material, which had to be abandoned on account of
the badness of the hill roads. In two places the pursuers
found regular lines of piled arms, and great quantities of
boots sticking in the mud, where they had been left behind
by the exhausted battalions of the enemy. The sufferings
of the allies from hunger, cold, wet, and mud up to their
knees had been almost indescribable. Their positions in
the night of the 29th-3 oth were :—
Rlenau and the divisions Weissenwolf and Alois Lichten-
stein at Gross-Waltersdorf.
Civillart and Crenneville at Sayda, south-east of Walters-
dorf.
Colloredo and Bianchi between Dux and Teplitz.
Chasteler on the road to Dux.
Wittgenstein on the heights of Altenberg.
Kleist at Furstenau and Liebenau.
As for the French, Murat only reached Lichtenberg,
instead of Frauenstein, where Napoleon expected him to
be. He probably got the Emperor's orders of the morning
FROM DRESIDEN TO KULM 237
of the 29th 1 too late to enable him to comply. This was
lucky for the allies, as had he been there he would have
come upon Klenau's flank and probably done great harm.
Marmont, following Wittgenstein, got as far as Falken-
hain. St Cyr, following Kleist, had a sharp fight with him
at Glashütte. A good cavalry charge, led by Colonel
Blücher, delayed him considerably. St Cyr and Pajol, in
the mistaken belief that this was a flank guard and not a
rear guard, marched by Rheinhardsgrimma, expecting to find
Kleist retiring by that valley. This direction led St Cyr
into Marmont's area near Falkenhain. He consequently
stopped at Rheinhardsgrimma, and sent to Pirna for orders,
but found both Napoleon and Berthier gone. Kleist thus
had an opportunity of which, as we shall see presently, he
availed himself.
Meanwhile, the allied headquarters had reached Priesten
in the evening of the 29th. The King of Prussia had been
in the neighbourhood most of the day, Barclay arrived at
5 P.M., Schwarzenberg at 6, and the Tsar later. The
Austrian Emperor, as we know, had gone off to Laun.
As no Austrian troops were at present engaged,
Schwarzenberg left matters to be arranged by the two
sovereigns concerned. Vandamme had been held all day,
and it was clearly necessary to go on holding him on the
3oth, if the allies were to debouch in safety from the
Erzgebirge. With the 50,000 men on whom they could
count for the 3oth the task was easy, always provided
Napoleon did not support Vandamme with other troops.
So far, there were no signs of the Emperor's approach.
Unless he arrived in the small hours of the 3 oth, the allies
might well hope to defeat Vandamme before Napoleon was
up. They decided, therefore, on the offensive, a course
recommended, it is said, by Toll and Jomini.
There was no news of Kleist, and his absence caused
much alarm. Still, there was a chance that he might appear
in Vandamme's rear. Colonel Schuler was despatched to
find him, and urge this course on him if possible. So great
* Corr. 20, 485.
238 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
was the apprehension regarding Kleist that Schuler was told
to try and bring away the young Prince Frederick of the
Netherlands, who was with the Prussian general.
The two monarchs then rejoined Schwarzenberg at Dux.
One anxiety which they felt was lest Augereau and the
Bavarians on the Inn should, on hearing of the victory of
Dresden, march to meet Napoleon as he entered Bohemia.
So great was the alarm that, though Blücher's victory on
the Katzbach had been reported, Schwarzenberg sent to
him, requiring him to march with 50,000 men into Bohemia
at Once, .
Meanwhile, this is what had happened to Kleist. His
orders were to reach the southern side of the mountains and
support Osterman in the Teplitz valley. The bearer of
the order, however, reported, from personal observation, that
the road to the valley by Graupen was hopelessly blocked.
That over the Geiersberg by Ebersdorf was also blocked,
and could not be cleared in less than twenty-four hours.
That left Kleist no hope save in a return to the Peterswalde
road, along which Vandamme was known to have passed.
However, cavalry patrols reported it to be now clear of the
enemy. That was not true, for Vandamme's troops were
passing along it all night. The risk was great, and Kleist
was hampered by only having a wretched map of I72 I, on
which several actually existing roads found no place. The
cavalry now reported a practicable track along the crest of
the mountains, through Streckenwald to Nollendorf”. The
other forest roads, running through deep valleys, were im-
practicable for large forces. Kleist's acceptance of this
route was received with satisfaction by his subordinates,
and was communicated to headquarters. Kleist announced
his intention of attempting to cut his way, sword in hand,
through Vandamme's corps. His orders were for assembly
at 3 A.M., and announced that he was moving on Vandamme's
rear.
Leaving Kleist to his difficult and dangerous march, we
return to the opposing forces at Kulm.
* Marked BB on Map IV. (5).
FROM DRESDEN TO KULM 239
Into the details of Vandamme's battle of the 3oth, we do
not propose to enter at great length, for its importance was
far greater from a strategical and general, than from a
merely tactical, point of view.
Vandamme took up a position with his right well up into
the hills above the Eggmühl, his centre across the Teplitz
road in front of Kulm, and his left south of the road, stretch-
ing as far as the Striesowitz Berg. His cavalry were on this
wing. Allowing for his losses on one hand, and his
reinforcements on the other, he had about 32,000 men left.
The allies faced him across the Teplitz road, with about
44,Ooo men. Their left was opposite Vandamme's right
on the hills, centre at Priesten, right stretching as far as
opposite Böhmisch Neudörfel—reserve at Sobochleben.
They proposed to fight a defensive action with their left,
whilst the right turned Vandamme's left and drove him in
on to the mountains. It was hoped that Kleist would close
his line of retreat by the Nollendorf road.
The battle began at 7 A.M. Vandamme's right, meeting
at first with some success, was presently checked by Russian
reinforcements. The advance of the allies’ right began at
8 A.M. The Striesowitz Berg was taken after a severe
struggle, and the allies began to press forward towards
Arbesau, compelling Vandamme to set up a defensive flank
with Quiot's and Dunesne's brigades against them. Their
cavalry soon began to get round the left even of this. It
was beginning to be doubtful if Vandamme, with his left
thus threatened, could hold on at Kulm much longer.
We now return to Kleist who, in the darkness and
cramped space, had only succeeded in starting his march
at 5 A.M., two hours later than he intended. At 8 A.M. he
had reached Nollendorf, having sent Ziethen to his left on
Peterswalde as rearguard. At Nollendorf there was more
confusion, and it was not till somewhere about I I A.M. that
the head of his column began to appear round the hill above
Tellnitz.
The battle about Kulm was in the condition above
described when the sound of Kleist's first cannon shots
24o NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
reached the ears of the combatants. Vandamme felt sure
that they came from Mortier's or St Cyr's men hurrying to
his assistance ; the allies knew better. Vandamme was
soon undeceived. His decision was taken with the greatest
promptitude. His artillery, or the greater part of it, must
be abandoned to its fate, after checking the main attack as
long as possible, whilst the cavalry and infantry did their
best to cut their way back to Peterswalde through Kleist's
Corps. -
The fight which ensued in the space between Schande,
Arbesau, and Tellnitz was a glorious one for the young
French troops. It was so confused that it is almost im-
possible to understand it, except by standing at the Austrian
and Prussian monuments, where the road from Aussig joins
that from Tellnitz to Kulm, and following the details book
in hand. French guns were lost, and for the moment
replaced by others captured from the Prussians. There
was desperate fighting at Schande, Arbesau, and on the
road. Great numbers of French were captured, after fight-
ing to the last cartridge, in the villages; many were driven
into the hills above. Part actually cut their way through
to Jungferndorf, where, utterly exhausted, they encountered
the comparatively fresh rearguard of Ziethen, and many of
them were killed or taken.
The woods were full, not only of French, but also of
Prussians, who, in various episodes of the confused fighting,
had been driven there. Kleist himself only escaped capture
by getting into the woods and passing by by-paths, through
Schönwald, to a point on the road between Peterswalde and
Nollendorf, where he learnt from Ziethen that the victory
was complete. Parties of French and Prussians wandered
at times peacefully together in the woods, on the mutual
understanding that one party should be prisoners to the
others, according to the eventual result of the battle.
Vandamme remained with the defenders of Kulm till all
hope had vanished. Then, as he sought to escape alone to
the hills, he was captured and taken to the Tsar. There he
dismounted, and theatrically kissed his charger. He was
FROM DRESIDEN TO KULM 24I
kindly received by the Tsar, and, two days later, was sent
off to Russia, where he remained a prisoner till the fall of
Napoleon. Somewhat to the scandal of Danilewski, who
considered that he should have been looked upon only as
the unfortunate general, he met with many insults on his
way through Germany." Perhaps that was hardly to be
wondered at, considering his notorious brutality in former
times. Haxo, whom Napoleon had sent to him as adviser
in engineering matters, was taken about the same time as
Vandamme. Dunesne fell at the head of his men when they
met Ziethen. The I. corps had been half destroyed. The
prisoners alone numbered 8ooo to Io,ooo; the killed and
wounded probably raised the loss to I 5,000. The prisoners
included many generals and officers of high rank. There
fell into the hands of the allies 82 guns, 2 OO wagons, 2
eagles, and 3 standards. The allies stated their loss at
33 19 killed and wounded, but Friederich considers this
probably under the mark, as Kleist's artillery alone is known
to have lost nearly 600 officers and men. The French
detachment at Aussig escaped by Königswald and reached
the Lilienstein late the same night, without their guns or
wagons, which they had to abandon in the woods, where
they were led astray by some peasants (formerly Austrian
soldiers) whom they compelled to act as guides.
On this day it was only at I I.30 that St Cyr began to move.
He had, as we know, waited for orders when he found himself
on the 29th in rear of Marmont. The orders * which
reached him at the hour above named, said that, in his
actual position, he had better support Marmont, though the
Emperor would prefer to see him between Marmont and
Vandamme.
Marmont, pursuing the enemy before him, drove a rear-
guard from Altenberg, and again from the Zinnwald plateau,
and followed almost up to Eichwald, where in the evening
he heard through St Cyr of Vandamme's disaster.
Napoleon's conduct of the pursuit after Dresden, and his
responsibility for Vandamme's disaster, have been much
* Danilewski, p. 161. * Berthier to St Cyr, Hist. Mil., p. 388.
Q
242 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
discussed, often with considerable prejudice on one side or
the other.
The first question that arises is, why did not the
Emperor start his pursuit much earlier than 9 A.M. on
the 28th; The answer to that question has already been
given in quotations from his correspondence of the evening
of the 27th August, which show that, at that time, he was
strongly of opinion that the battle would be renewed next
day. He hardly appreciated the difficulties of the allies, or
the very severe shaking they had received. Next day he
went to the opposite extreme, by estimating his victory too
‘highly.
Exactly when he became convinced that the allies had
retreated is not quite clear, but it seems very doubtful
if it was before his return to redoubt IV. at 5 A.M. on the
28th. It may be said the mere fact of his return there
proves that he still expected a renewal of the battle; but
it is not alone conclusive proof; for, in his letters of the
night before, he had given that as his post early on the
28th. Ought he to have been aware of the retreat at an
earlier hour? It is easy to say he should have been in-
formed of it; but when it is remembered that the night
was pitch dark, that it still rained hard during the earlier
portion of it, and that the rain was followed by a thick
morning mist, the difficulties of reconnoitring are apparent.
Moreover, the heights on which the allies stood were a very
effective screen, even in daylight, for movements going on
behind them. Even on the morning of the 28th, it was
only when Napoleon, riding with Marmont, reached the
heights above Räcknitz, that he could plainly see the
streams of troops passing over the hills in rear which,
though higher, are defiladed from the low ground near
Dresden by the heights near the town.
When he reached Dresden on the 26th, aimost his first
inquiry was for news of Oudinot. He had already heard
rumours of the defeat at Gross Beeren. With the possi-
bility of having to defend Dresden, the weakness of which
he had seen, and his rear against an advance of the allied
FROM DRESIDEN TO KULM 243
Northern army, he must have felt that his hopes of being
able to pursue the main army far into Bohemia were
vanishing. He had probably, by the morning of the 28th,
heard rumours of Macdonald’s disaster on the Katzbach.
By the evening he heard the news definitely. That rendered
the idea of an advance on Prague even less feasible. Still,
calculating that the main body of the allies was going by
Dohna and Dippoldiswalde, with their left by Freiberg, he
might still hope to reach Teplitz by the shorter and better
road (by Peterswalde) with the three nearest corps of
Vandamme, Mortier, and St Cyr. At Teplitz he would
still have time to inflict great damage on their columns as
they debouched in disorder from the passes, pursued by the
rest of his army, Marmont, Victor, and Murat. That was
why he rode off to Pirna.
When, however, on the way to Pirna, he saw Barclay's
movement westwards, he was convinced that the allies were
going by roads farther to the west than he had at first
expected. If, as Napoleon now fancied, they were going
by Annaberg, he would meet nothing at Teplitz and would
merely strike a blow in the air. He began to think that
he could do more harm to the allies by the movement of
Murat and Victor on his right, than by sending forward his
left.
Though it would be useless to send three corps to
Teplitz, he could yet send Vandamme alone, without much
risk of his falling in with the main body of the enemy, but
with the probability of his being able to do them immense
harm, by destroying all their resources towards Aussig and
Tetschen, whilst they themselves were far away west. Hence
his orders to Vandamme of 4 P.M. on the 28th. Those
orders spoke only of the overthrow of the weak corps of
Eugen of Wurtemberg, and of the capture of “everything
which marches behind an army.” There was no mention
of fighting a great battle. Mortier was stopped at Pirna,
St Cyr was sent farther west, and Vandamme was informed
of this. Clearly, when those orders were sent, the Emperor
had abandoned the idea of any great incursion into Bohemia,
244 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
for he believed the allies to be moving so far to the south-
west that he had no longer any chance of reaching the
southern issues of the passes before them.
Yorck von Wartenburg argues that Napoleon sent
Vandamme unsupported on a dangerous mission, and that
he cannot be supposed to have held an erroneous view of
the situation as regards the direction of the allies' retreat.
The order to Vandamme, however, shows, as Friederich
points out, that Vandamme's operation was meant to be,
not a great one, but merely one of “la petite guerre" on a
somewhat large scale. Nothing is said of what Vandamme
was to do if he met the main body of the allies ; for
Napoleon thought he had no chance of doing so. He
wrote that “the enemy whom we have beaten appears to
have taken the direction of Annaberg.” Vandamme was
only ordered to attack Eugen of Wurtemberg if he made
any opposition, and Eugen's strength was not half Van-
damme's. I tº -
At 7.30 A.M. on the 29th, Napoleon writes to Murat that
“to-day, 29th, at 6 A.M., General Vandamme has attacked
the Prince of Wurtemberg near Hellendorf,” etc.; also that
Vandamme was marching on Teplitz with his whole
force.1
It is quite clear, then, that Napoleon knew Vandamme
was marching on Teplitz, that he approved his doing so, and
that he had no intention of supporting him either by Mortier,
who was ordered to stay at Pirna, or by St Cyr, who had
been ordered “to follow the enemy on Maxen and in all
directions he may have taken.” The same direction had
been given to Marmont, substituting Dohna for Maxen. As
has been said, the Emperor believed the enemy to be going
mainly for Annaberg. If he should go, as he did, by
Altenberg, it might be expected that he would issue from
the mountains so closely pursued by Marmont and St Cyr
* Corr. 20,486. How Napoleon, at Dresden, could have heard in an hour
and a half of the result of Vandamme’s action at Hellendorf is incomprehensible.
The hours given make it doubtful if the letter was written so early as 7.30.
* Corr. 20,485. Dresden, 29th August, 6.30 A.M.
FROM DRESIDEN TO KULM 245
that he would be in disorder, and scarcely a serious danger
to Vandamme. Moreover, if he did issue there, Napoleon
had perhaps a right to expect that a general of Vandamme's
experience would, if he found himself hard pressed, make
good his retreat on Nollendorf. But clearly the Emperor
did not expect the enemy's main body to go in that direc-
tion. Had he done so, he would probably have ordered
Mortier to support Vandamme, as he actually did on the
3oth, when it was too late."
He had also a right to expect Vandamme to confine him-
self to the task prescribed for him, namely, the capture of all
that was on the enemy's communications at Teplitz, Tetschen,
and Aussig, and not to engage in an enterprise which was
too great for his strength. Where Napoleon seems really
to have been to blame was in assuming, on insufficient
grounds, that the enemy was going by Annaberg, and in
putting himself, by returning to Dresden, in a position
where he was not able to correct that false assumption.
It was not till 4.30 P.M. on the 29th August that he was
disillusioned about the line of retreat of the enemy, “whose
whole army is retiring by Altenberg on Teplitz.”* It was
not till at least eight hours later, perhaps a good deal more,
that he wrote to Mortier to find out what was happening
with Vandamme, and to support him with two divisions if
necessary.” Clearly the order to Mortier should have been
despatched by 5 P.M. on the 29th, and should have ordered
him to march at once. Mortier would have received that
order, at latest, by 7.30 or 8 P.M. He could have reached
Peterswalde early on the morning of the 3 oth, and would,
in all probability, have met and destroyed Kleist there, or
at any rate have come upon his rear between Peterswalde
and Nollendorf. That order it seems should have been
issued with reference to Vandamme's probable situation
at Teplitz, and without any reference to Kleist's march
in the early morning of the 3oth, a march of which
Napoleon could know nothing, and which he had no
reason to expect; for he could know nothing of
* Corr. 20,494. * Corr. 20,491 to Murat. * Corr. 20,494.
246 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
the complete blockage of the Prussian general's direct
route to the plains by Graupen, or by the Geiersberg.
Nevertheless, Friederich thinks that, as the Emperor
could not know Vandamme's exact position, and as he had
a right to expect so experienced a general to adapt himself
to the altered circumstances and retire on Nollendorf, he
was not so much to blame as appears at first sight. Grouard,
on the other hand, as well as Yorck, thinks that Napoleon
was alone to blame.
Now for the case for and against Vandamme. Napoleon
wrote on the 1st September to St Cyr : “That unhappy
Vandamme, who appears to have killed himself, had not left
a sentinel on the mountains, or a reserve anywhere ; he
threw himself into a gulf without reconnoitring in any way.
If he had only had four battalions and four guns in reserve
on the heights, all this disaster would not have occurred.
I gave him positive orders to entrench himself on the
heights, and only to send parties to disturb the enemy and
obtain news.” . Of any such order to Vandamme there is
no trace at present. -
On the other hand, Du Casse” says, on the authority of
Vandamme, that he had orders from Napoleon to go “téte
baissée" for Teplitz, and that he need have no care for his
flanks and rear, which would be safeguarded by St Cyr,
supported by Victor (sic). He also says that, in his report
of the 28th (8.30 P.M.), Vandamme said, “I attack them
to-morrow, and march on Teplitz with the whole I. corps,
if I receive no orders to the contrary.” This would be very
important evidence in favour of Vandamme, and against
Napoleon, were it supported by documents. But Du Casse
says Napoleon, believing Vandamme was dead, seized his
papers in Dresden, and, presumably, destroyed anything
telling against himself. As for the original orders, Van-
damme destroyed them just before he was taken prisoner.
Anyhow, at present, they are not forthcoming, except the
report of 8.30 P.M. on the 28th, which the author found in
* Hist. Mil. iv., p. 391.
* Le gºnéral Vandamme, ii. pp. 505, 511, 512, 532, 533, 540.
FROM DRESIDEN TO KULM 247
the Section Historique de l’Etat Major-Général at Paris.
There also he found an account of Kulm written by
Gobrecht some years later." Its handwriting, misspelling,
and bad grammar are a curious example of the bad educa-
tion of a man in the position of the commander of a cavalry
brigade. The remarkable part of it is that in which Gobrecht
says that Vandamme told him, during the battle, that
Mortier had orders to support him from Pirna with the
Young Guard. This seems to confirm Du Casse's assertion
that Vandamme was aware, on the morning of the 3 oth, of
Napoleon's orders of that date to Mortier. If so, Napoleon
must have issued them very soon after midnight.
To go fully into this controversy as to the respective
shares of blame to be borne by Napoleon and Vandamme
would require much more space than we can afford.
On the whole, the evidence so far available seems to point
to Napoleon as the culprit, as Yorck and Grouard hold him
to be. His great fault would appear to be in having
returned to Dresden, though Friederich thinks it was not
unnatural that he should do so, looking to the news of
Gross Beeren and the Katzbach, and to the possibility that
the heavy losses which fell on the Austrian army at Dresden
might cool the ardour of the Emperor Francis Joseph in
the cause of his new allies.
As for Napoleon's censure of Vandamme for not leaving
a rearguard in the hills, Friederich thinks it could have
done no real service in stopping Kleist, and that Vandamme
was right to bring every man he could on to the battlefield.
We would venture to suggest that even a few squadrons
left on the road would have given Vandamme notice of
Kleist's approach by 8 A.M., when the Prussians got to
Nollendorf. It took them more than two hours to reach
the battlefield at Tellnitz, and during that time Vandamme
might quite possibly have escaped, at anyrate without total
ruin. The finger-post at Vorder Tellnitz marks “Aussig
8 kilometres,” only 5 miles. The French had a detach-
* It is printed, but apparently revised in spelling, etc., in Bertin’s Campagne
de 1813, pp. II 7-122.
248 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
ment at Aussig busy building a bridge. Might not
Vandamme have escaped in that direction, seeing the allies’
right was largely composed of cavalry P. At Aussig he
could have crossed the Elbe, and got away to join
Poniatowski at Gabel.
If that is not considered feasible, there is the route now
followed by the railway by Königswald. At the present
time, at any rate, it is not a difficult country, at least not
till the descent on Tetschen begins. Had Vandamme
taken that road, as soon as he heard from his rearguard (if
he had had one) of the approach of Kleist, it is extremely
improbable that either Kleist or the main army would have
followed him by it, and from Tetschen he could probably
have got back to Saxony by either bank of the Elbe. At
Tetschen, as well as at Aussig, he would no doubt have
picked up the enemy's supplies in sufficient quantity to
support himself.
Of the other French generals, Mortier, looking to the
Emperor's orders up to the 29th, can hardly be blamed.
St Cyr is blamed by Thiers, and it certainly seems that
he acted rather feebly in the night of the 29th in waiting
for orders, instead of keeping close on the heels of Kleist.
Here again Napoleon must share the blame ; for it is
apparent, from St Cyr's account,” that the marshal had not
been informed of the departure of headquarters for Dresden
on the previous afternoon.
There is one more question, viz., whether the story
told by Pelet, Thiers, and others of Napoleon's being
obliged to return to Dresden by an attack of illness,
the result of exposure, is true. Friederich thinks he
had sufficient reasons for leaving Pirna without this.
Irrespective of this, it may be noted that the illness is
mentioned neither by Odeleben nor Marmont. Indeed,
Odeleben says that the Emperor started for Dresden “with
the greatest tranquillity, and very cheerfully.” Moreover, it
does not seem by any means clear why a man suffering, as
Napoleon is said to have done, from fever and severe pains
* Hist, MŻl., iv. p. 123.
FROM DRESIDEN TO KULM 249
in the stomach should have wanted to start off on a long
drive to Dresden, instead of resting at Pirna, where there
is no reason to suppose he could not have found fairly
comfortable quarters.
On the side of the allies much credit is due to the Tsar
and the King of Prussia for their action in collecting troops
to support Osterman at Kulm, a difficult matter, as was
shown by Colloredo's refusal to obey till Metternich
interfered.
To Kleist is due almost the whole credit for the fact
that Vandamme was almost annihilated instead of getting
away, in part at least, as he might have done, had not the
Prussians appeared in his rear. Yet Kleist had very little
idea of the great success awaiting him when he started on
his march. He only hoped to be able to cut his way
through to safety. Had it not been for the blocked roads
leading by the shortest way to the plains, and the fear that
St Cyr would be on him before he could clear them, Kleist
would almost certainly have attempted to descend to the
plains by Graupen, or by the Geiersberg. In that case
there would have been nothing on Vandamme's rear. To
march back to the Peterswalde road was, for Kleist, a
counsel of despair. He deserves all credit for following it.
He received his reward in finding himself in a position to
complete a victory which almost counterbalanced all that
Napoleon had gained at Dresden, and infused a fresh spirit
of hope into the half-desponding allies.
CHAPTER XV
THE KATZBACH 1 AND GROSS BEEREN

ARMONT'S prophecy of the 16th August
had already been fulfilled before the end of
the month ; for the results of Napoleon's
victory at Dresden had been more than
counterbalanced by the defeats of Vandamme at Kulm, of
Macdonald on the Katzbach, and of Oudinot at Gross
Beeren. We must turn back a little in time to describe
the two latter defeats.
When Napoleon left the army of the Bober on the 23rd
August, he decided to take Ney with him, so as to leave
Macdonald as the only marshal with that army. The
orders of the 23rd,” which were clear enough, that Ney was
to join the Emperor in person, leaving the III. corps under
Souham, miscarried, and it was only on the 25th that
Napoleon learnt from Macdonald that Ney had gone off
with his corps towards Bunzlau.” -
Napoleon's instructions to Macdonald have already been
described.*
On the 24th August Macdonald's command stood thus—
III. corps * at Rothkirch, west of the Katzbach, two
battalions in Liegnitz.
V. corps at Wolfsberg and Röchlitz, on the right bank
beyond Goldberg. -
XI. corps behind Goldberg, on the left bank.
On that day Blücher, already beginning to suspect
1 Map ii. (b) and Map i. * Corr. 20,440.
* Corr. 20,463. It is not quite clear what orders induced Ney to march the
III. corps westwards. * Supra, p. 189.
* Now only four divisions, as Marchand's had been provisionally transferred
to the XI.
250
THE KATZBACH AND GROSS BEEREN 251
Napoleon's departure, had issued orders for a general
reconnaissance by Sacken on Liegnitz, by Yorck between
Liegnitz and Goldberg, and by Langeron between Goldberg
and Schönau.
By the 25th he had come to the conclusion that
Macdonald was taking up a position on the left bank of the
Katzbach. He ordered, for the 26th, Sacken to advance
on Malitsch ; Langeron on Hermannsdorf; Yorck, sup-
ported by Sacken, against the left flank of the enemy
opposed to Langeron.
The Katzbach, a stream of small importance in dry
weather, but liable to sudden floods in heavy rain, flows
north-east from Goldberg to Liegnitz. Three or four miles
before it reaches the latter it is joined on its right bank by
the Wuthende Neisse, the name of which suggests its
character as a stream liable to sudden spates of great
violence. The space been the Katzbach and the Neisse is
not very elevated or hilly, whilst the right bank of the
latter stream rises in formidable heights to the plateau east
of it, which is open and fairly level.
On the 26th Macdonald also had decided on the
offensive, believing apparently that Blücher was still on
the defensive towards Jauer, and that he would retire
towards Breslau as soon as he saw the French advancing
on Jauer.
Blücher, equally intent on the offensive, also expected to
find the enemy on the defensive behind the Katzbach. He
now believed that the III. corps was at Liegnitz, the V. and
XI. at Goldberg. At I I A.M. he, consequently, changed
his orders, Sacken was to hold the III. corps at Liegnitz
in front, whilst Yorck fell on Souham's right flank. At the
same time Langeron was to protect Yorck's rear by contain-
ing the two corps supposed to be at Goldberg.
Meanwhile, Macdonald, proposing to reach the plateau in
front of Jauer on the 26th, and to attack Blücher on the
27th, if he still held fast there, issued the following
orders –
* “Raging” or “roaring.”
252 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
III. corps to cross the Katzbach below Kroitzsch, and
seek to reach the Liegnitz-Jauer road.
XI. corps (less Ledru's division) and Sebastiani to cross
the Katzbach at Kroitzsch, then to cross the Neisse, and
march towards Jauer on the right of the III.
V. corps (only two divisions) to advance from Goldberg
by Seichau on Jauer, always on the left bank of the Neisse.
The marshal, alarmed by the appearance of St Priest on
his right flank, sent Puthod's division of the V. corps with
orders to reach Schönau on the 27th, and to detach one
brigade still farther to the right to Hirschberg, whither also
Ledru's division of the XI. corps was to go.
Thus Macdonald proposed to advance with widely sepa-
rated forces :—
(1) 12,000 men detached to protect his right against St
Priest, who was no serious danger.
(2) 22,Ooo men were to go with himself from Goldberg
towards Jauer, partly direct, partly by Schönau.
(3) 67,000 to go to the left, across the Katzbach and
Neisse, and descend on the enemy's right in his supposed
position at Jauer.
Before Blücher's orders of II A.M. on the 26th issued, the
two advancing armies had met and begun the battle.
At the commencement the opposing forces were thus
grouped :-
On the left bank of the Neisse, Langeron with 31,000
men faced Lauriston with 23,OOO.
On the plateau of the right bank were the allied forces
of Yorck and Sacken, 55,000 strong; against these were
advancing, though much separated, the XI. and III. corps,
and Sebastiani's cavalry, about 67,000 in all.
Blücher was quite as surprised to find the French on the
offensive as Macdonald was to find Blücher advancing.
About I I A.M. the allied advanced guard, after beating off
one attack on Kroitzsch, evacuated it and fell back across
the Neisse. The infantry on both sides were generally
unable to fire their muskets, as the rain was very much
what it was on the 27th at Dresden.
THE KATZBACH AND GROSS BEEREN 253
Then confusion began to be introduced into the French
advance by the crossing of Sebastiani's cavalry from
Kroitzsch, and the XI. corps (now commanded by Gérard)
from Goldberg. However, the Prussians had left the
passage of the Neisse open, and the French now began to
mount to the plateau in two columns, the stronger, on the
left, by the paths leading to Janowitz, the weaker, on the
right, by Nieder Weinberg and the Kuhberg. In both
columns the infantry and cavalry were mingled, and the
latter caused much confusion by their efforts to get through
the former to the front. The first of the infantry only
began to reach the plateau, a battalion at a time, towards
I.30 P.M.
Meanwhile, Lauriston with his two divisions of the V.
corps had found Langeron in a strong position, with his
right on the Neisse and his line extending about 50oo paces
to the Mönchsbach, on which his left rested. His front was
protected by the Silberfliesz brook and the Plinsengrund,
and he had light troops pushed forward. Lauriston began
his advance with a small detachment on his right, moving
along the valley towards Buschhäuser, and then sent his main
body across the Plinsengrund in five columns. Langeron's
advanced guard was driven back on to his main position on
the line Schlaupe-Buschhäuser. Langeron was now alarmed.
He reported, incorrectly, that he was attacked by superior
forces, and began falling back. He was anxious to retire
on Jauer.
At 2 P.M., Lauriston was preparing for a decisive attack.
At the same time, the centre group of the French on the
plateau, the XI. Corps and Sebastiani, was partly on the line
Klein Tinz-Gross Janowitz-Ober Weinberg. 'All told, they
did not exceed 27,ooo men, including a considerable pro-
portion of the force which was still trying to climb the
heights leading from the Neisse to the plateau.
Opposite them were 55,000 Prussians and Russians of
Yorck's and Sacken's corps. They could not hope for the
arrival of Souham with the III. corps for hours to come.
He was still not up to the Katzbach.
254 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Yorck had his advanced guard between Bellwitzhof and
Christianenhöhe, his main body just in front of the line
Bellwitzhof-Triebelwitz, in two columns.
Sacken was moving on Yorck's right, on Eichholz.
Neither Macdonald nor Blücher was altogether responsible
for the condition of affairs. The former had no reason to
expect that Souham's advance would be so slow as it was ;
the latter could see very little in the blinding rain, and it
was only when Gneisenau and Müffling rode forward that
they were able to report the advance of about 3000 French
cavalry, and a strong force of infantry, on Janowitz. They
concluded that, if Yorck advanced at once, he would be at
the hollow road from Nieder Krain before the French could
possibly have 20,000 men up to oppose him.
As Yorck started, he was forced to detach two battalions
to hold Schlaupe, which was threatened by Lauriston, and
the loss of which would separate him from Langeron.
Sacken, at the same time, had got his artillery on the
Taubenberg, and was firing heavily on the French, whose
left he threatened.
Blücher advanced with Yorck's men, encouraging them,
and telling them to use the bayonet, as their muskets would
not go off.
“Now, my children,” said the old man, “I have enough
French over here ; now at them.” There was some delay,
owing to Yorck's obstinately wanting to advance in line, till
Blücher insisted on his re-forming column.
Space will not allow us to go into the details of the fierce
hand-to-hand struggle, with bayonets and clubbed muskets,
which ensued. Sacken's troops joined in, his cavalry over-
threw that of Sebastiani, which they attacked in front and
rear. Yorck's cavalry too, pushing through the infantry,
added to the discomfiture of the enemy, who, despite the
bravery with which the French fought, was gradually driven
back to the edge of the plateau, and in many places over it.
In one place the pile of overturned guns and ammunition
wagons completely blocked the Nieder Krain road. Some of
Souham's men had now arrived through Kroitzsch and
THE KATZBACH AND GROSS BEEREN 255
Nieder Krain. For a moment they had some success
against the Russian cavalry, now disordered by their own
success. Then Yorck's infantry once more turned the tables,
and the whole of the French who had ascended the plateau
from the Neisse were sent streaming down again in wild
confusion. The river, which had been small in the morning,
was now a raging torrent, in which many of the fugitives
were drowned in attempting to cross it elsewhere than by
the overcrowded bridge at Nieder Krain. That village was
captured by the pursuing Prussians before darkness finally
stopped the combat in this direction.
Whilst these events were occurring, Sacken had turned in
pursuit of some still formed bodies which were trying to
escape across the Katzbach towards Dohnau. Here he met
the divisions Albert and Ricard of the III. corps, who had
crossed the Katzbach at Schmogwitz, too late to retrieve the
fortunes of the day. The bridge had been carried away by
the raging stream, which had to be forded with the water
up to the men's hips. Only twelve guns could be got
across. As the two divisions advanced on the heights of
Klein Schweinitz, they found them held by Sacken's artillery.
At 7.30 P.M. they returned to Schmogwitz, where they were
constantly annoyed by Cossacks, till 2 A.M., when they
marched for Hainau. -
On the French right, Lauriston had at first met with
some success. Hennersdorf and the Weinberg” were stormed,
and both Langeron's wings driven back. It was not till
4 P.M. that Langeron realised that his own somewhat feeble
conduct was endangering the rest of the army. Blücher
now sent Yorck's reserve brigade to assist him by an attack
on Lauriston's left from across the Neisse. Langeron, too,
began to act with some energy, and before darkness fell he
and Yorck's brigade had retaken nearly all that had been
lost earlier on this side. Lauriston still held on to Henners-
dorf.
* That is the Weinberg between Hennersdorf and Hermannsdorf. Langeron
bad also troops, withdrawn from his right, on the other Weinberg just west of
Peterwitz.
256 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
The night after the battle was almost more terrible for
the allies than for the French. Yorck's landwehr were
soaked to the skin, their linen trousers clung to their legs,
and most of them were without shoes. So fearful were their
trials that only the strongest amongst them held out. Next
morning one battalion had only 202 men fit for work out of
5 Io who had gone into action. In another the proportion
was 271 to 577. On the other hand, another battalion,
which took the precaution to fit themselves out with the
cloaks and shoes of the French dead, only lost 93 men.
According to the allies' reports, they took 36 guns, I IO
wagons, and I 2,OOO to I4,OOO prisoners, but Friederich
thinks these figures are under the mark. There is no return
of Blücher's losses, though they were certainly heavy.
The battle on the Katzbach was an encounter unex-
pected by either general. Each thought the other on the
defensive. Macdonald did not expect to meet Blücher short
of Jauer; the old Prussian, on the other hand, believed the
French to be standing at Goldberg and Liegnitz, and hoped
to contain the former body with Langeron, whilst he fell
with two corps on Souham alone.
Macdonald meant to march all his corps on Jauer.
Lauriston was to go direct from Goldberg; Gérard and
Sebastiani were to go in a single column by Kroitzsch and
Nieder Krain to the plateau on the right bank of the Neisse,
and thence on Jauer. Souham was to cross the Katzbach
at Schmogwitz, below the infall of the Neisse, reaching the
plateau at the same time as Gérard. But the unfortunate
mistake under which the III. corps had started for Dresden
delayed its arrival, though that was not the only cause.
But what was Macdonald doing on the offensive at all P
The Emperor's instructions, whilst professing to leave him a
good deal of latitude in detail, distinctly prescribed a defen-
sive rôle, until the enemy himself took the offensive; then,
“the enemy in taking the offensive will march on several
points, whilst the Duke of Tarentum, on the contrary, should
unite all his troops on one point, in order to debouch in
force against him (the enemy) and at once to reassume the
THE KATZBACH AND GROSS BEEREN 257
initiative.” + Blücher was, as a matter of fact, resuming
the offensive, but Macdonald did not know it, and believed
he was advancing against an enemy still on the defensive,
and that at or beyond Jauer, the point to which the previous
instructions” had required him to be driven.
“The principal object of this army (Macdonald),” said
this order, “is to hold in check the army of Silesia, and to
prevent it moving on Zittau to interrupt my communica-
tion, or on Berlin against the Duke of Reggio. I desire
him (Macdonald) to push the enemy to beyond Jauer, and
then at once to take post on the Bober.”
It may be said that Macdonald's first task was to drive
back Blücher to Jauer. There had been a fight at Goldberg
on the 22nd, and it was on the 23rd that Blücher fell back
on Jauer, where he was on the 24th, expecting to be
attacked. This part of the task was, therefore, practically
completed when Napoleon was dictating his instructions on
the 23rd. It cannot be supposed that he contemplated its
being done over again at once, and it appears that Mac-
donald should first have fixed himself in the prescribed
position on the Bober, and waited there till he had definite
information of Blücher's fresh offensive. Then would have
been the time for him to make a united attack on the
divided forces of Blücher, not on the Katzbach, but within
easy reach of his own fortified line, Löwenberg-Bunzlau.
But Macdonald, in the operation he undertook, made
another very serious blunder in detaching the divisions of
Puthod (V. corps) and Ledru (XI. corps) far to his right,
where they could be of no use to him, and were guarding
against a danger which was largely imaginary. When
Puthod heard of the disaster to the main army, he saw that
it was impossible for him to rejoin it at Goldberg without
falling in with Langeron. Hoping to rejoin it behind the
Bober, he made for Hirschberg, where he found the bridge
over the Bober gone, and the stream too swollen for its
restoration to be possible. Marching down the right bank
of the Bober, he was at Löwenberg on the 29th. There
* Corr. 20,443. * Corr. 20,442.
E.
258 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
again the bridge was gone, and he failed to restore it.
Bunzlau alone remained with a bridge, and that place had
already been reached by the allied cavalry. Puthod, pursued
by Langeron, now found himself hemmed in against the
Bober. On the heights of Plagwitz, a little east of Löwen-
berg, he resolved to sell his liberty as dearly as possible.
But, attacked by enormously superior numbers, he had no
option but surrender, with what remained of his division,
after an obstinate fight.
As for Macdonald, his whole force repassed the Katz-
bach during the night of the 26th–27th. On the 27th
Langeron attacked Lauriston at Goldberg and drove him
to a farther retreat on Löwenberg, where he arrived that
evening, after losing I 8 guns. More fortunate than
Puthod, he was able to reach Bunzlau, where he, as well as
the other corps, crossed the Bober.
Macdonald evidently feels that he has no case, for his
memoirs set up little in the way of defence beyond com-
plaints of the failure of his subordinates to carry out orders
properly. Souham certainly was unaccountably slow in
his movements, but it seems unjust to blame Puthod. The
marshal blames Sebastiani for ascending the plateau with
all his cavalry, and the artillery for taking guns up on to
it, when they could hardly be moved in the deep mud, and
had only a narrow road, which was soon completely blocked,
by which to retreat.
The blame for this grievous failure must be borne by
Macdonald ; it is impossible to lay any of it at Napoleon's
door, except as regards his choice for the command of a
marshal who, if he stands above many of his fellow-
marshals as an honest, well-meaning man, was certainly
one of the least competent of them as a commander.
Napoleon's instructions, if intelligently carried out, should
have ensured the army of the Bober against misfortune, and
it must be remembered that the Emperor had not stinted
Macdonald in the number of his troops, which was at least
equal to that of Blücher's army.
We have now to describe Oudinot's movements, after the
THE KATZBACH AND GROSS BEEREN 259
close of the armistice, against Berlin. Napoleon's orders to
him have already been stated.”
On the 18th August.” Oudinot had his three corps (IV.,
VII., and XII.) concentrated at Baruth, only three marches
from Berlin. From Baruth he marched to his left to
Luckenwalde, which he reached on the 20th. Why he
went by Luckenwalde, instead of direct on Berlin, is not
very clear, unless it was to pick up Arrighi. He turned
northwards towards Berlin on the 21st; the XII. corps, with
Oudinot himself, marched by the Trebbin road on the left;
Reynier in the centre by Munsdorf; * Bertrand on the
right by the Blankenfelde road. The allied outposts fell
back on Trebbin, Munsdorf, and towards Zossen. Trebbin
was taken by a frontal attack by Pacthod, combined with
a flank attack by Reynier from Munsdorf. Beyond that
nothing particular happened on the 2 Ist or 22nd, by the
evening of which latter day Bertrand held Juhnsdorf. Reynier
was north of Wittstock, and Oudinot north of Trebbin.
Oudinot's orders for the 23rd apparently anticipated no
serious opposition on that day. The XII. corps, with
Fournier's cavalry division, was to March on Ahrensdorf;
the VII. to march on Gross Beeren ; the IV. and the
cavalry divisions of De France and Beaumont to advance
to Blankenfelde.
The divisions of Raglowich, Lorge (cavalry), and the
Wurtembergers were left behind to guard the rear.
The advance was through a thickly-wooded country,
much cut up by watercourses and marshes, offering no
facilities for lateral communication between the somewhat
widely separated columns.
The dispositions led up to two separate actions.
Opposed to the French right column was Tauenzien,
who, after failing to retake Juhnsdorf from Bertrand on the
previous evening, had bivouacked at Blankenfelde. He had
about I 3,OOO men and 32 guns.
* Supra, p. 170. * Maps I. and II. (c).
* Not shown on Map I. It is east by north from Trebbin, and west by south
from Wilmersdorf. -
260 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
It was 9 A.M. on the 23rd when Bertrand began to
advance against Tauenzien, who had his troops south of
Blankenfelde and on either side of it. He did not occupy
the village itself, as his landwehr were not properly trained
in village fighting.
The position was protected on both flanks, but not in
front, and it was too close to the wood east of Blanken-
felde, which offered good cover for a French approach.
At Io A.M. Bertrand sent Fontanelli against Tauenzien's
front, and six battalions into the wood on his left. From
this they could not issue, owing to heavy Prussian artillery
fire. A desultory fight continued till 2 P.M., without
any decisive result. Then Bertrand withdrew, apparently
thinking that Reynier's advance on Gross Beeren must
presently compel the Prussians to evacuate Blankenfelde.
It was not till 3 P.M. that Reynier appeared before Gross
Beeren, which was weakly occupied. The Prussians were
soon driven from it, and Reynier, thinking the fighting was
over for the day, proceeded to bivouac with Sehr's Saxon
division just west of Gross Beeren, Durutte on Sehr's left,
and Lecoq left of Durutte. The windmill height was occu-
pied, and the cavalry was behind Durutte. t
Bülow had marched in the morning from Heimersdorf
to Ruhlsdorf, by order of Bernadotte. Hearing the firing
at Blankenfelde, he returned to Heimersdorf, which he
reached at 1 P.M. His troops were tried with this march
in torrential rain.
At 2 P.M. Borstell came up and took post east of the
road from Gross Beeren to Berlin, whence, at 3 P.M.,
he heard the sounds of the fight at Gross Beeren. Von
Boyen, sent out to reconnoitre, met the Prussians retreat-
ing from that place. He reported that Reynier might
easily be attacked as he debouched from the forest. Bülow,
therefore, decided to advance.
Reynier had his right supported by Gross Beeren, on
the east side of which a marshy ditch, 5 or 6 feet deep in
places and running north and south, prevented the village
being turned on that side. The windmill height, rising
THE KATZBACH AND GROSS BEEREN 26I
20 or 3o feet above the plain just west of Gross Beeren,
would have afforded a good view, but for the heavy rain.
As it was, the French were unable note Bülow's advance
till he was close up.
Reynier's weak point was his left, on which he quickly
recognised that he could not hope for help from the distant
XII. corps. If it were turned, he would be in danger of
being driven off his line of retreat. Therefore, he drew up
the whole of Lecoq's division in a great square with a few
guns to protect it. Between 5 and 6 P.M. Bülow was firing
from a distance of I 3OO yards with 62 guns against 44
French. The artillery duel lasted for one and a half hours,
when the arrival of Borstell raised the Prussian numbers to
8o guns against, at most, 69 French. The Prussian
infantry, 3oo yards behind the guns, had already suffered
considerably before the advance began.
Borstell was intended to act as reserve to Bülow's attack,
but, instead of that, he moved to his left to Klein Beeren,
whence he proceeded to attack the wood east of Gross
Beeren. The wood was only held by one Saxon battalion
which, unable to fire its muskets in the rain, had to
retreat into the village. Gross Beeren was now attacked
from the north by Krafft's division, and from the east by
Borstell, whilst the Hessen-Homburg division advanced on
the windmill height. The village was stormed, and an
attack was then commenced from it against the east side
of the windmill heights. Before this combined attack the
French on the heights soon began to fall back in disorder.
A brave attempt by two Saxon battalions to stop the
Prussians as they descended from the heights failed.
Whilst Reynier's right had thus suffered defeat, Durutte
and Lecoq, farther to the left, had scarcely been damaged.
Durutte was now sent to attempt the recapture of the
windmill heights, but his division gave way completely
when they met the fugitive Saxons of Sehr. All broke
and fled together to the wood.
Lecoq, too, failed in an attempt to retake the heights,
where the Prussians were now established with superior forces.
262 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Reynier, now despairing of retaking the heights, em-
ployed Lecoq's division to cover his retreat, as he fell back
by the Neu Beeren road. Thus covered, he was able to
retreat in good order. There was some cavalry fighting,
as Borstell attempted to pursue, but Reynier was not
seriously molested, and by IO P.M. was back at his bivouac
of the preceding night, at Löwenbruch, with Sehr's,
Durutte's, and Lecoq's divisions.
Bülow's divisions, unable to continue the pursuit in the
darkness, had bivouacked about Gross Beeren, when suddenly
a fresh fight broke out. Oudinot's XII. corps had reached
Ahrensdorf at 6 P.M. Hearing the sounds of the battle at
Gross Beeren, the cavalry division of Fournier and Guille-
minot's infantry went in the direction of Ruhlsdorf. It
was 8 P.M. when Fournier came upon the battlefield ; Guille-
minot was half an hour later. Then ensued a confused
fight between Prussian hussars and the French cavalry, and
the struggling crowd bore down on Bülow's infantry, who
were powerless to assist where friend and foe were so
mixed up. The French cavalry had arrived by Neu
Beeren on Bülow's right. It was only at Heimersdorf that
the combatants got separated from one another, and the
French returned by roundabout ways to Neu Beeren.
This fight was of no real importance to either side,
except in so far as it influenced Bülow who, warned by
this attack of the proximity of the XII. corps, withdrew
all his troops to Heimersdorf, except Thümen and Borstell,
who remained on either side of Gross Beeren.
During the night Oudinot met Reynier, who assured
him that his corps was not fit to renew the battle.
Accordingly, Oudinot withdrew his whole army to its
starting - point, abandoning for the present all hope of
gaining Berlin.
The losses were not very heavy. The Saxons lost 2000
men, 7 guns, and 6o loaded wagons.
Durutte and Lecoq lost IOoo men and 6 guns.
Bülow's loss was only about I ooo men and 200
horses.
THE KATZBACH AND GROSS BEEREN 263
It is apparent, from a letter from Napoleon to Macdonald;"
that Oudinot had been very nervous about the country
through which he was to advance. The Emperor writes:
“He (Oudinot) was no longer afraid of the inundations ;
that monster had disappeared as he advanced.” Neverthe-
less the country was much cut up by woods, marshes, and
drainage cuts, and it was not possible to move straight
across country in the Napoleonic manner. Friederich
remarks that Oudinot must either have advanced, as he
did, in three columns, or he might have left a weak re-
taining force at the Juhnsdorf defile, whilst he strengthened
Reynier by sending the greater part of Bertrand’s corps
with him. He did not expect to meet a strong force as
he debouched from the north side of the forest, and he
started the XII. corps so late that it never got out of the
forest at all on the 23rd. Bertrand might have forced his
way out, but did not, as he relied on the advance of the
VII. corps to open a way for him. The result was that
only the centre one of the three columns debouched, and
that opposite the strongest part of the enemy's line.
Oudinot should have arranged to unite his three columns
behind the northern edge of the forest, and to have issued
from it with all three together. Instead, Reynier alone
issued, and that in isolation. He was probably unwise to
fight when he did. He could easily have retired to the
forest again, whither Bülow would not have dared to follow.
When he did fight, he left Sehr's division to fight superior
forces at first, instead of supporting him at once with all his
troops -
As for the allies, Bernadotte might have supported Bülow
against Reynier's left with one of his corps, whilst with the
other he contained Oudinot. He refused assistance, on the
ground that he believed Oudinot had Victor's corps as well
as the XII. and Arrighi. He would have had to use his
Swedes, and, as we have said before, his great object was
not to engage them. He thought Bülow, with 38,000 men,
was strong enough to deal with Reynier's 27,ooo, and
* Corr. 20,454.
264 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
he knew that Tauenzien had stopped Bertrand, so there
was no danger in that direction.
Bülow would have done better to attack Reynier's left, but,
as a matter of fact, Gross Beeren was so weakly held that
the attack on it succeeded easily. Borstell played a great
part in the battle, but, on the other hand, his division being
Bülow's only reserve, his move into first line was very risky.
Had Bülow been in greater difficulties when attacked by
Durutte and Lecoq, he would have had no reserve whatever
available. As a result of Oudinot's repulse at Gross Beeren,
Girard, from Magdeburg, found himself isolated in the midst
of the allied army of the North. He was attacked at
Hagelberg, near Belzig, by Hirschfeld and Czernitchew's
Cossacks, and driven to seek safety again at Magdeburg,
considering himself fortunate in losing only I 200 prisoners.
Napoleon's opinion of Oudinot's conduct is given in his
orders for his successor, Ney.” “The Duke of Reggio never
attacked the enemy, and he has been so clever as to let
one of his corps attack separately. If he had attacked
vigorously, he would have overthrown him everywhere.”
Davout's advance from Hamburg had not had much
effect, and Oudinot's retreat necessarily compelled him also
to fall back.
For Oudinot's failure it seems impossible not to agree
with Grouard in considering that the blame must fall entirely
on the marshal. Setting aside the mistake that Napoleon
probably made in taking the offensive towards Berlin at all,
there was no reason why Oudinot should have suffered
defeat, even if he did not find it possible to reach Berlin.
In this case, as in that of Macdonald, Napoleon can hardly
avoid blame for having selected, for a semi-independent
mission, a commander who was at most qualified for the
subordinate command of an army corps.
* Corr. 20,502, dated 2nd September, to Berthier.
CHAPTER XVI
THE SECOND ADVANCE AGAINST BLüCHER, AND
NEY'S DEFEAT AT DENNEWITZ 1

N the 3oth August Napoleon drew up a long
note on the general situation of his affairs, which
is of the greatest importance.
He begins by assuming that Macdonald
would rally on the Bober; he did not mind if it was as far
back as the Queiss.
Were he to withdraw Poniatowski and send him to the
Berlin army, the passes at Zittau, leading to Macdonald's
rear, would be unguarded, and it would be necessary for
Macdonald to fall back on Görlitz, or even on Bautzen.
A single corps at Hoyerswerda would suffice to guard the
rear of the Berlin army. It would take Poniatowski four
days to get to Kalau. Supposing the Emperor were to
decide to give up all idea of an expedition to Bohemia and
join the Berlin army, he would leave Murat in front of
Dresden with St Cyr, Marmont, Victor, Vandamme (whose
destruction was not yet known), and Latour-Maubourg, with
his left on the Elbe, facing south. If Murat were forced to
retire on Dresden, Napoleon could be back there from
Luckau as soon as Murat. At the same time, Macdonald,
with his left at Weissenberg, and holding Bautzen and
Hoyerswerda, would protect Dresden on the right bank of
the Elbe. Thus Napoleon would have two armies covering
Dresden on the defensive, whilst he himself was marching to
take Berlin, and transferring the theatre of war to the lower
Oder. If he had 6o,ooo men at Stettin, he would be
menacing the blockade at Danzig, and threatening the
* Maps I. and II. (d).
265
266 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Russian frontier, which would probably induce the Russians
to leave Bohemia, in order to defend their own territory.
He had two possible plans of operation. The first, to
march on Prague. The objections to this were, that he
could not now reach that place before the allied army of
Bohemia, and against that he might not be able to take it.
Moreover, he would be in person at the extreme end of his
line, which he recognised was not a suitable position for
him, considering the demonstrated incapacity of his lieuten-
ants. His position would be specially critical if Blücher
attacked Macdonald. Again, Oudinot's army, as well as
Davout's, would be reduced to the strict defensive, and about
the middle of October he must lose 90oo men by the
capitulation of Stettin. He goes on to remark that he
would be holding an enormously long line on the Elbe,
from Prague to Hamburg. Any breach effected by the
allies in that line must mean his own immediate retreat on
the Rhine. He sums up the Prague idea thus: “Thus the
project of going to Prague has objections—(1) I am not
certain of getting Prague; (2) I should there find myself
with my chief forces in quite another system, and, finding
myself in person at the extremity of my line, I should not
be able to go to threatened points, and mistakes would
occur. That would carry the war to between the Elbe and
the Rhine, as the enemy wishes. As a third objection, I
should lose my fortresses on the Oder, and should not be
on the way to Danzig.” O
Then he deals with the project of an advance on Berlin,
towards which he is evidently drawn. He would be in the
centre, protecting the Elbe from Dresden to Hamburg; he
would obtain an immediate result in drawing the Russians
away from the Austrians, who, with only 120,000 men,
would be reduced to the defensive between Dresden and
Hof. He would be threatening Prague without going there.
Even the Prussians would not stay in Bohemia when their
capital was lost, and the Russians would be alarmed for
Poland.
The Russians and Prussians in Bohemia might insist on
THE SECOND ADVANCE AGAINST BLUCHER 267
a fresh advance on Dresden, but that could not be before
fifteen days. By that time, the Emperor would have taken
Berlin, re-victualled Stettin, and have got back to Dresden
with his army united. “Finally, in my present position, no
plan is admissible under which I am not present in person
in the centre.”
Then, in order to get a general picture of the two projects
for comparison, he sketches out the movements of each.
1st–Prague project. He would have to go there with the
I., II., VI. and XIV. corps, leaving Davout in front of
Hamburg, Oudinot at Wittenberg and Magdeburg, Mac-
donald at Bautzen. “In that situation I should be on the
defensive, leaving the offensive to the enemy. I should
threaten nothing. It would be absurd to say I was threaten-
ing Vienna. The enemy could mask my army of Silesia
and send his corps by Zittau to attack me at Prague; or else,
masking the Silesian army, he could detach to the lower
Elbe and march on the Weser, whilst I was at Prague ; I
should have nothing left but to gain the Rhine as quickly
as possible. . . .
“2nd hypothesis. Now the I., II, VI. and XIV. corps
and Latour-Maubourg can rest peacefully round Dresden
without fear of the Cossacks ; Augereau's corps will move
up on Bamberg and Hof, the army of Silesia on the Queiss,
or the Bober, and Bautzen ; no anxiety for my communica-
tions ; my two armies of Hamburg (Davout) and Reggio
(Oudinot), will be towards Berlin and Stettin.”
In a postscript he calculates that next day (3 Ist) he will
have 30,000 men at Hoyerswerda, and 54,000 of Oudinot's
three corps, over 80,000 in all, for the Berlin expedition,
not to speak of Davout. If he took his headquarters to
Luckau, he would be two marches from Torgau, three from
Dresden, four from Görlitz, ready to go where he wished,
and either to send all he wanted to Berlin, or to go there
himself. Communications between Dresden, Torgau, and
Berlin could be maintained by Io,000 cavalry, of whom
3ooo could be taken from Murat. All this is very unlike
the old Napoleon, in that there is little or nothing about a
268 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
great battle for the overthrow of Schwarzenberg, Blücher,
or Bernadotte. On the contrary, it is full of considerations
of mere geographical points, and of something very like the
old 18th century war of manoeuvres.
He definitely abandons all idea of a decisive blow at the
main army of the allies; he had practically done so already
on the 28th, when he left the pursuit to his lieutenants,
without even appointing one of them to the general
command.
The whole note shows that he was prejudiced in favour
of the march on Berlin and Stettin ; for he argues against
the advance on Bohemia on the ground that two of his
armies would be reduced to the defensive, but takes no
objection to the same fact in the case of the Berlin project.
Surely, too, as Grouard points out," it was essential to the
proper utilisation of interior lines to take the offensive in
one direction only, whilst remaining on the defensive in the
others. So far, since the armistice, Napoleon had been
attacking in every direction at once. In two directions he
had failed, through the incapacity of his lieutenants. In the
third he had missed a great opportunity, after Dresden, of
inflicting perhaps mortal injury on his true objective, the
army of Bohemia.
He was now planning a vigorous offensive northwards
and north-eastwards, leaving the army of Bohemia to recover
itself, which it was still in a position to do without much
difficulty.
But his vigorous offensive, led by himself, was destined
not to take place, and it ended in his deputing Ney to carry
it out with inferior forces—scarcely a better choice of a
commander than Oudinot. Though Napoleon had accepted
as the better the project of going himself towards Berlin,
circumstances prevented his execution of it. In the first
place, the news of Vandamme's disaster at Kulm deprived
him of one of the corps which he proposed to leave under
Murat at and before Dresden. It is true he set to work to
reconstruct the I. corps; but nothing could replace the men
* Stratégie Napoleonienne. Za campagne d’automne de 1813, p. 156.
THE SECOND ADVANCE AGAINST BLUCHER 269
who had been lost at Kulm. Teste's division had to be
again withdrawn from Victor for the reconstruction of the
corps, which was put under Lobau. News of the most
unsatisfactory character regarding the state of demoralisation
of Macdonald's army made it more and more doubtful how
far it could be depended on to hold on at Görlitz, or even
at Bautzen.
As for the army of Berlin, the Emperor was furious at
Oudinot's incompetence, and superseded him in the command
by Ney. Oudinot had much better have been withdrawn
altogether from that army, where he was still allowed to
command the XII, corps. He resented his supersession as
an injustice, and was not in the least inclined to work
willingly, to the best of his ability, with Ney, who, after all,
and as the event further showed, was not much more com-
petent than himself for semi-independent command.
The orders to Ney were dictated in full on the 2nd
September." They recite that Oudinot has deemed it
necessary to retire to a position two marches above Witten-
berg, thus enabling Tauenzien to send detachments towards
Luckau and Bautzen, to harrass Macdonald's communica-
tions. “It is really difficult to have less head than the
Duke of Reggio.” The Emperor was himself about to
move his headquarters to Luckau. Ney was to march with
his new command to Baruth, reaching it on the 6th, when
the Emperor would be at Luckau with a corps ready to
support him, and Ney would be only three marches from
Berlin, which he could reach and attack on the 9th or I oth.
Napoleon still speaks with contempt of the allied army of
the North as, “all this cloud of Cossacks and pack of bad
landwehr,” which would fall back on Berlin as soon as
Ney advanced. After the orders to Ney, comes one of
severe censure of Oudinot.
But the Emperor had to abandon even the idea of
supporting Ney with one corps from Luckau, for a bitter
cry for help reached him from Macdonald who, with his
army utterly demoralised and reduced by 20,000 men by
* Corr. 20,502 to Berthier.
270 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
the events on the Katzbach, had fallen back on Bautzen and
the Bober. He must be succoured at once.
On the 3rd September Napoleon left Dresden, after
sending on to Bautzen the Guard, Marmont (VI. corps) and
Latour-Maubourg. He reached Harthau that night. Next
morning he rode forward to Hochkirch, encountering every-
where bands of stragglers and fugitives from Macdonald's
army, offering the strongest proof of the terrible demoralisa-
tion of that force. The Emperor was so furious that he
gave a childish exhibition of temper, by drawing his pistol
to shoot a village cur which ran out and barked at him.
When the pistol missed fire, he hurled it at the dog. Then
he burst out furiously at Sebastiani who, he said, had mis-
handled his cavalry. He was so angry that Caulaincourt
had to be careful to keep away from him any one who had
been concerned. At Hochkirch he met Blücher's advanced
guard who, in the evening, were forced back by the superior
numbers of the French. Napoleon had at once taken the
offensive, sending Murat with the III. corps and Latour-
Maubourg by Wurschen ; Macdonald, with the V. and XI.
corps and Sebastiani on Murat’s right ; and Poniatowski on
Lobau. All these had opposed to them only Blücher's
advanced guard of Io,000 men. Napoleon himself was
with the centre.
Blücher very soon found out that he was now opposed
by Napoleon in person, and, in accordance with the
Trachenberg-Reichenbach arrangements, proceeded to re-
treat. Napoleon followed him as far as Görlitz. He now
realised Blücher's design to retire as soon as the Emperor
himself was in the field against him. Avoiding the attempt
to draw him away from Dresden into Silesia, Napoleon
returned from Reichenbach, with the Guard and Marmont,
to Bautzen in the evening of the 5th, arriving there at
2 A.M. on the 6th. Now he again proposed a dash north-
wards. On the 6th he ordered Marmont and Latour-
Maubourg to Hoyerswerda, an order which was at once
countermanded in consequence of news that the Bohemian
army was again advancing on Dresden. Thither the
NEY'S DEFEAT AT DENNEWITZ 27I
Emperor must go in person, and he also ordered Latour-
Maubourg thither, whilst Marmont was ordered to Kamenz,
to be ready to move on Dresden at a moment's notice.
Macdonald was left to pursue Blücher who, on the 6th,
re-crossed the Queiss without serious molestation. That
evening Napoleon was again in Dresden, after less than
four days’ absence.
This same 6th September witnessed the undoing of Ney,
though Napoleon was not aware of it till the night of the 8th.
When Ney took over command of the army of Berlin
on the 3rd September, the three corps stood on the arc of
a circle north of Wittenberg–Bertrand (IV.) on the right,
Oudinot (XII.) in the centre, Reynier (VII.) on the left.
The allies were very widely scattered, but when, on the
4th September, Oudinot made a demonstration towards
Zahna, Bernadotte drew his corps closer together, though
they were still not closely concentrated. On his left was
Tauenzien's corps at Zahna, in the centre Bülow, on the
right, about Lobbese, Stedingk, Winzingerode, and the
division of Hirschfeld, which had recently defeated Girard.
Ney's orders for the 5th directed the 58,000 men whom
he commanded to move thus:–
XII. corps to start first, followed by the IV., both march-
ing towards Zahna and Juterbogk. The VII. was to march
northwards at first, and then turn to the right towards
Baruth, thus forming a flank guard to the other two, and
threatening the right of the enemy at Zahna. Bernadotte's
plan was for Tauenzien to oppose the French advance at
Zahna with an advance guard, whence he would retire on
his main body at Dennewitz and Juterbogk. The rest of
the North Army, moving leftwards, would fall on the left
flank and rear of the French.
When Oudinot's attack fell upon Tauenzien's advance
guard at Zahna, Reynier was marching south of him, as was
evidenced to the Prussians by the clouds of dust. Zahna
was taken after a severe fight, and the defenders retired,
partly direct by the Juterbogk road, partly by Gadegast and
Oehna. :
272 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Ney's positions at night were—
XII. corps—Pacthod's and Guilleminot's divisions in front
of Sayda ; Fournier's cavalry and Raglowitch's Bavarians
behind Gadegast.
VII. corps about Zahna.
IV. corps and Lorge's cavalry at Seehausen and Naundorf.
For the 6th, Ney's orders directed Reynier to advance on
Rohrbeck by Gadegast and Oehna. Oudinot was to wait at
Sayda till the VII. had passed Oehna, and then to march
in the direction of Dahme and Luckau, where the Emperor
was supposed to be.
Bertrand to march south of Juterbogk, guarding the left
flank of the march on Dahme.
The IV. corps started a little before 8 A.M.
The VII., though it had farther to go, started later, and
then, instead of going by Gadegast and Oehna, went direct
to Dennewitz.
Oudinot, meanwhile, waited at Sayda for the VII. to pass
on its way to Gadegast. Owing to Reynier's deviation from
the route by Gadegast he never did pass, as Oudinot was told
to expect. Oudinot appears not to have started till he got
orders, between I and 2 P.M., though he had been ready to
do so from Io A.M. A strong north-west wind was raising
clouds of sand, which obscured his view. The consequence
of all this was that the three corps reached the battlefield
at considerable intervals, between I O A.M. and 4 P.M.
The battlefield of Dennewitz is generally, speaking,
a sandy plain with woods and low knolls scattered about
it. It is crossed by several brooks flowing in deep
channels, of which the most important is the Agerbach,
flowing from Nieder Görsdorf to Dennewitz and Rohrbeck.
The country offers advantages to all arms. There
are good artillery positions on the knolls, which form
a screen for reserves behind them, and the plain is open for
cavalry. Infantry can find good supports in the villages of
Gölsdorf, Dennewitz, and Rohrbeck, in the various woods,
and in the passages of the Agerbach.
When Bertrand with the IV. corps reached Dennewitz,
NEY'S DEFEAT AT DENNEWITZ 273
he saw Tauenzien in front of him. He at once deployed
Fontanelli's division beyond the brook, with Lorge and
Morand on his left. The latter division, in support, had at
first to remain in Dennewitz, for want of room to deploy
beyond the brook.
Tauenzien had his artillery (19 guns) on the knoll north of
Dennewitz, his infantry behind them.
Fontanelli's attack began about I I A.M., and was at first
completely successful. Both Tauenzien's wings were driven
in, and the situation was only saved for the time by a charge
of Prussian cavalry. The landwehr had got somewhat out
of hand, and had fired wildly over the heads of their own
skirmishers.
The French, however, hearing of Bülow's approach on
their left, had not dared to push home their attack on
Tauenzien's right. Nevertheless, that general, though prac-
tically defeated, had held out long enough to give Bülow
time to arrive. The latter had started from Eckmannsdorf
at Io. 3O ; by I 2.30 the heads of his columns were
arriving at Nieder Görsdorf. His first attack, with Thümen's
brigade, which joined Tauenzien's right, was badly repulsed
by Morand. Then the Hessen-Homburg division arrived,
and compelled Morand to retire eastwards from the heights
north of Nieder Görsdorf, though he did so in good order. A
pause in the fighting now occurred, during which the French
took up, about 2.30 P.M., a new position north of the brook,
with their left resting on the Dennewitz windmill height and
fronting westwards. Thiimen and Tauenzien now made a
combined attack on the wood north-east of Nieder Görsdorf,
on which the French right rested. Though a vigorous
defence was made by the Wurtembergers, the wood was
eventually captured and many prisoners taken. In con-
sequence of this, the French were compelled to fall back on
Rohrbeck. Bertrand’s effort to restore the battle with his
last reserve of two Wurtemberg battalions failed completely.
He had been badly defeated, and Thümen was now in pos-
session of everything north of the Agerbach.
It was 2 P.M. when Reynier, with the VII. corps, began
S
274 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
to reach the field. There were still no signs of Oudinot's
approach. Ney, who had arrived, sent a brigade of Durutte's
division (VII. corps) across the brook. This, in conjunction
with Bertrand's corps, succeeded with difficulty in retaking
the windmill height, which the Prussians had occupied.
The French were, however, again driven from it, and by
4 P.M. Thiimen had got through Dennewitz and stood with
his troops in a semi-circle facing south, between Dennewitz
and Rohrbeck. Bülow, meanwhile, had brought up Krafft's
division south of the brook.
Reynier, owing to the heavy wind, knew nothing of the
battle till, about I P.M., he met Lorge's defeated cavalry
between Oehna and Rohrbeck. Sending Durutte on to
Dennewitz, he turned leftwards with his two Saxon divisions,
which, with De France's cuirassiers, went against Bülow's
right, south of the Agerbach. The Saxons took part of
Gölsdorf about 2.30 P.M., but were driven out again. The
space between them and Durutte was filled by De France's
cuirassiers.
Reynier, finding himself too weak to do much, sent to
hurry up Oudinot, who had began to arrive about 3 P.M.
Bülow, seeing that the French were now gathering
strength, had thrown in Borstell with his last reserve, and
sent an urgent demand for reinforcements to Bernadotte.
Bülow was now advancing on Gölsdorf. Before he got
there, however, Oudinot had brought up Guilleminot's and
Pacthod's divisions behind the Saxons, and had posted a
strong battery on Reynier's left. Thus supported, Reynier
had recaptured Gölsdorf without difficulty.
Bülow's position was now very critical, for Bernadotte's
Swedes and Russians were still two or three miles off. He
might very well have been rolled up from his right, or
driven away from the troops beyond the brook, had not
Ney seized this moment to ruin his own chance of success.
As usual, the Prince of the Moskowa had been carried
away by impulse on the battlefield. Standing where he
did on the heights south-east of Dennewitz, he could see
little of what was going on on the left, for the air was thick
NEY'S DEFEAT AT DENNEWITZ 275
with the whirling dust. He judged only by what was
nearest to him, and he believed that the decision lay in
that direction, whereas it clearly lay on his left. He pro-
posed to make an attempt to restore the battle on the right
by a vigorous attack with Oudinot's corps and what re-
mained of Bertrand's. Orders were sent to Oudinot to
march to his right. When they reached him, that marshal
was with Reynier, who begged him to leave at least one
division to complete the success at Gölsdorf. But Oudinot,
still smarting under his supersession by Ney, maintained
that he was bound to obey the order literally. He had
already started towards Rohrbeck when Borstell attacked
the Saxons in Gölsdorf. The I 56th regiment, which was
just following the rest of Oudinot's troops, stopped to assist
in the defence. But the Prussians attacked with such fury
that the Saxons, after losing nearly I 5 od men, were driven
from the village, and only saved from total destruction by
a timely charge of De France's cuirassiers.
It was 5 P.M. when Bertrand had been driven from
Rohrbeck, long before Oudinot could arrive. The Prussians
again held the whole field north of the Agerbach.
Bülow, too, was now beginning to receive Russian and
Swedish reinforcements, especially artillery. Before these,
Reynier's Saxons, shattered and disordered, were falling
back eastwards, carrying away Oudinot's troops as they
marched on Rohrbeck.
In vain did Ney and Reynier endeavour to turn the
flight into an orderly retreat. Panic and confusion reigned
Supreme. Ney, at 6 P.M., had ordered a retreat on Dahme,
but his orders only reached part of the troops, which fled
in different directions, pursued by the enemy's cavalry and
artillery. Reynier and Oudinot made direct for Torgau;
Ney, with Bertrand, went towards Dahme, where they were
joined by Raglowich's Bavarians, who had scarcely been
engaged. Dahme was evacuated by a Prussian detachment
which had held it.
Of Reynier's corps, one column went by Langen-Lips-
dorf, Körbitz, and Wendisch Linde, reaching Annaburg at
276 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
daybreak, and Torgau at mid-day on the 7th. Another
column started on the Dahme road, then turned towards
Schönwald, and reached Wendisch Ahlsdorf at 11 P.M.
. They were at Torgau by 2 A.M. Oudinot's three divisions,
though they had borne less of the stress of battle, fled
as wildly as the rest by Schweinitz and Annaburg to
Torgau.
Ney, finding himself at Dahme with only a small part of
his army, decided also to make for Torgau. As he left
Dahme, he was attacked by Wobeser from Luckau, who
took the village and over 28oo prisoners. He picked
up another 4oo as he pursued Bertrand who, having
left Dahme at 3 A.M., only reached Herzberg by 9 p.m. on
the 7th.
In the fight at Zahna, the battle at Dennewitz, and the
subsequent actions in the pursuit, the Prussians had lost
about Io,5oo men killed and wounded. The losses of the
Russians and Swedes were probably not serious.
Ney, on the other hand, had lost about 22,OOO men, of
whom I 3,500 were prisoners, 53 guns, 4 I 2 wagons, and
4 standards. His army was utterly disorganised, more so
even than Macdonald's on the Katzbach.
Ney, like Oudinot at Gross Beeren and Macdonald on
the Katzbach, had not expected a battle. Had he done
so, perhaps he would have held his corps more together, in
which case he might well have defeated Tauenzien and
Bülow before Bernadotte could come up. Possibly he
might have split the allied army in two.
His information regarding the enemy was very poor. He
had not utilised his cavalry properly. His object being to
reach Dahme, there was no need to go so far north as he
did. He might have marched two of his corps straight
there, using the third as a flank guard on his left, as he
had done on the previous day. He was so furious when
he found Bertrand engaged at Dennewitz that he remarked
to a Wurtemberg general, “Mais nom dieu, mon général,
quelle cochonnerie fait ce Bertrand,” which shows clearly
that he did not expect a battle, or desire one, that day.
NEY'S DEFEAT AT DENNEWITZ 277
Once engaged, he, as usual, let himself be carried away
by his fiery temperament, and became a corps commander
rather than a general-in-chief. Consequently, his outlook
became localised, and he completely failed to see that it
was his left which should have been reinforced, or that
victory against Bülow's right would be decisive, whilst
victory in the opposite direction would only drive the
Prussians back on the support of Bernadotte.
Had he taken up a defensive position behind the brook
with his right, and reinforced his left with Oudinot, he
would, at the worst, have had a safe retreat open, either on
Dahme or Torgau. Oudinot was in a position to judge
the position better, but he obeyed Ney's order to move to
the right without remonstrance, and without any attempt to
explain the true situation to the commander-in-chief. He
must share the blame for the defeat with Ney.
Friederich considers that the allied leaders worked well
together. Tauenzien, not hesitating to engage superior
numbers, trusted to the support promised by Bülow. When
Tauenzien, and the whole of Bülow's corps were arrayed
against Bertrand and Reynier, the Prussians were the
stronger, but Oudinot's arrival turned the scale against
them.
Bernadotte has been charged with delay, but Friederich
shows that he was not really to blame on this occasion ;
for, up to IO a.m., it was uncertain whether Ney meant
to march direct for Berlin, or was moving to his right.
Nor was there any information as to whether he was
likely to be supported by Napoleon. In view of the
possibility of Ney's moving direct on Berlin, Bernadotte
could not safely march towards Juterbogk earlier than he
did. Though his troops took no great part in the battle,
the 36 guns which he was able to get up prevented the
French from rallying towards Oehna and covering their
retreat.
Bernadotte's troops marched over 9 miles between I I
A.M. and 2 P.M., when they reached Eckmannsdorf. The
remaining 6% miles to Dennewitz were covered by 5.30 P.M.
278 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
and, considering the heat of the day, they cannot be accused
of want of activity in covering over I 5 miles in 63 hours,
Bülow might possibly have obtained greater results
by bringing up all his troops south of the brook, but
that would have risked Tauenzien's destruction in the
meanwhile.
CHAPTER XVII
FROM THE 6TH SEPTEMBER TO THE END OF
THE MONTH

HE movement of the allies from Bohemia, which
had brought Napoleon back in a hurry to
Dresden on the 6th September, differed con-
siderably from that which led to the battle of
Dresden. Instead of an advance of the whole of the army
of Bohemia on the left bank of the Elbe, Schwarzenberg
was now moving with 60,000 Austrians on the right bank
towards Rumburg and Zittau, and threatening the right
flank of the French operating against Blücher. Barclay
was left in Bohemia with the Russians and Prussians, and
the two Austrian divisions of Lichtenstein and Klenau.
He was to advance through the mountains towards Dresden,
spreading reports that he was only waiting for siege guns
to take the place. This, Schwarzenberg hoped, would
compel Napoleon to concentrate, and afford an opportunity
for the destruction of Macdonald by Blücher in his front,
acting with Schwarzenberg against the French right.
If Napoleon moved south in force from Dresden, Barclay
was to avoid a battle, to retire on Teplitz, and, if he still
found himself threatened by superior forces, even to cross
the Eger. & *
Schwarzenberg's plan of taking a large force to the right
bank was apparently due to the belief that Napoleon con-
templated a movement to his right into northern Bohemia,
by Zittau and Rumburg, as soon as Blücher had been forced
back." That might end in his getting to Prague in rear of
the allies, if the main army all remained on the other side of
the Elbe.
* Danilewski, p 19C.
279
280 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Such a division of the allied main army into two groups,
separated by a great river like the Elbe, across which
Napoleon could pass at pleasure at Dresden, Pirna, or
königstein, was very risky in the face of such an opponent.
On the 4th September 1 St Cyr, with the XIV. corps, had
his right at Borna, centre at Berggiesshūbel, left at König-
stein and the Lilienstein. Advanced guard and cavalry
(Pajol) at Hellendorf, Oelsen, and Breitenau. The left
division (42nd) astride of the river, watched the left flank
of an allied advance on Rumberg, the right of one on
Dresden. For the latter purpose it had six battalions dis-
tributed between the redoubts at Cunnersdorf and Henners-
dorf, and Krietschwitz on the Pirna plateau, with one more
at Pirna. In the evening of the 5th September Pajol, with
the advanced guard, was pressed back by the Russians and
Prussians to Berggiesshūbel and Borna, where he took post
behind the 44th and 45th divisions.
On the 6th St Cyr had again to retire till he stood, on
the morning of the 7th, with his advanced guard stretching
from Pirna to the heights of Zehista and Zuschendorf. He
still had most of the 42nd division about Königstein. His
main body was at Dohna, Mügeln, and Heidenau. Here he
stood fast all day. During the day Napoleon arrived.
St Cyr gives an account of his interview with the Emperor,
which is unfortunately too long for quotation. According
to him, Napoleon admitted having lost an opportunity, on
the 28th August, by not supporting Vandamme. St Cyr
replied that he had now another opportunity of a battle
with the Bohemian army, but the Emperor's thoughts
seemed to be far away in the direction of Bernadotte and
Blücher.” On the morning of the 8th St Cyr's position
was on the left bank of the Müglitz. His advanced guard
was driven in across the stream, but parts of it still held
on in Dohna and Heidenau. About 2 P.M. Napoleon
returned from Dresden, where he had slept the night before.
St Cyr says he hesitated to attack till all his troops were
up from Dresden, which meant doing nothing till next
* Map IV. (3). * Hist, Mil., iv. p. 137.
FROM 6TH SEPTEMBER TO END OF MONTH 281
morning. At last, however, the XIV. corps was sent for-
ward, its repassage of the Müglitz being facilitated by its
retention of Dohna and Heidenau.
The enemy, after a sharp fight, fell back beyond Zehista.
Barclay's force was much scattered, since Lichtenstein's
Austrians had been sent towards Freiberg, and Klenau's
by the Chemnitz road. They were linked to the Russians
and Prussians on the right by Kasarow at Maxen, where
he was supposed to be in a position to turn St Cyr's right.
That night the XIV. corps stood with its right at
Köttwitz, left in front of Sedlitz.
During his supper, at which St Cyr was a guest,
Napoleon received a full account of Ney's defeat at
Dennewitz. His reception of it was remarkable. The
man who, a few days before, had burst out in furious
abuse of Sebastiani for his real or supposed mis-
handling of his cavalry, now received this crushing news
with the utmost calmness. No word of ill-humour, or of
abuse of Ney or the other generals, passed his lips. Every-
thing was put down to the difficulties of the art of war,
which were so little understood. A curious remark which
he made was that no great soldier, except Turenne, had
ever learnt much of war by experience, and he admitted, in
his own case, that he had never done anything better in
the fullness of his experience than his first campaign in
Italy. As for the Dennewitz disaster, he discussed it, says
St Cyr, “with all the coolness he could have brought to a
discussion of events in China or in the preceding century.” "
Daybreak on the 9th saw Napoleon at the front, where
he eventually accepted St Cyr's proposal to march by the
old road, by Dohna and Furstenwalde to Teplitz, in order
to arrive on the enemy's rear as he retreated by the Peters-
walde road. As soon as Wittgenstein discovered what
was happening, he set out towards Peterswalde, the French
marching parallel to him by the old road, and for some
time actually in sight. That night there were at Fursten-
walde, Lefebvre-Desnoettes' Guard division, two divisions
* Hist. Mil., iv. p. 148, etc.
282 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
of the XIV. corps, and Pajol's cavalry; the third division
of the XIV. was at Breitenau, and a reconnaissance of the
Guard had driven the enemy's flankers out of Oelsen. The
Emperor's headquarters were at Liebstadt.
Napoleon's presence had been recognized and reported
to Schwarzenberg, who now hurriedly ordered back his
troops from the right bank of the Elbe towards Dux, and
recalled Klenau and Lichtenstein from the directions of
Chemnitz and Freiberg. By Io A.M. on the Ioth the
XIV. corps was on the Geiersberg, just above the field of
Vandamme's action of the 29th August. Napoleon arrived
in person an hour later.
From the Geiersberg he looked down on the plains
below, where he saw the Russians and Prussians hurrying
in all directions to prepare for the attack which they
expected to fall upon them, constantly changing their
positions as their columns emerged from the Nollendorf
road. The weather being fine, he could count every file in
the enemy's ranks, and could see exactly what he had
before him. The 43rd division of St Cyr's corps was
already half-way down the steep slope, and sappers were
rapidly clearing the road for the artillery. Not an Austrian
was to be seen, either of those beyond the Elbe or of those
to the west.
But already some of the French artillery had got into
difficulties in a premature descent of the road, and the
dangers foreshadowed by this may have had a good deal to
do with Napoleon's decision not to follow St Cyr's sugges-
tion of a descent into the plain, with the object of defeating
the Russians and Prussians whilst still far from their
Austrian allies. He would retire, he said, leaving St Cyr
for the present to keep up the alarm which appeared to
exist in the Russo-Prussian camp."
St Cyr expresses his astonishment that the man who had
not hesitated at the passage of the Alps with a mere hand-
* Odeleben (i. p. 277) says Napoleon only abandoned the scheme of a descent
from the Geiersberg with great regret, on an unfavourable report on the possi-
bilities of the road for artillery. A single breakdown might ruin everything.
FROM 6TH SEPTEMBER TO END OF MONTH 283
ful of troops, should have refused to take this smaller risk
which held out such strong hopes of a brilliant success.
He was convinced that the Emperor could no longer hope
to assemble an army sufficient to beat his enemies united,
but he might very well defeat the Russians and Prussians
alone. It must be remembered, though, that however
calmly he appeared to take the disaster of Dennewitz,
Napoleon doubtless felt the risk of engaging in a descent
into Bohemia when Bernadotte might even now be crossing
the Elbe and marching on Leipzig.
On the I Ith the allies, below still, at first seemed to be
expecting an attack from the mountains. Presently, when
nothing happened, they began making small attacks on the
foot of the Geiersberg. In the Nollendorf-Peterswalde
direction, whither Napoleon had himself gone by Breitenau,
there was some artillery firing, directed by him. It was
only that evening that Austrians from beyond the Elbe
began to reach Teplitz—two divisions of them—and take
post as reserve behind the Russian right.
When Napoleon left St Cyr on the Ioth, he would have
slept at Ebersdorf or Furstenwalde, but there was absolutely
no accommodation. Even at Breitenau there was only the
parish priest's house, and that had to be cleaned before the
Emperor, who was not squeamish, could use it for himself
and Berthier. All Saxony was ruined by the constant
advance and retreat of the tide of war ; the part adjoining
the Bohemian frontier was perhaps the worst; for within
the last few weeks the allies had advanced and retreated
through it twice, and the French the same. There was not
much to choose, from the wretched inhabitants' point of
view, between the starving French soldiers and “Russia's
Savage warriors,” as the Cossacks are described on a stone
just outside Dresden, which still records the horrors of their
occupation of Räcknitz, Odeleben's description of the
frontier is worth quoting. “The troops were short of food;
they were obliged to sleep, in the cold autumn nights, on
the damp ground of the mountains. There was no forage
for the horses, the frontier villages were entirely destroyed,
284 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
every house which was not built of stone had been pulled
down to feed the bivouac fires; the whole neighbourhood
bore the stamp of the horrors of war. . . . The soil, already
ten times turned over, was again ransacked in the search
for a few potatoes.”
It was on the morning of the I Ith, as Napoleon went by
a difficult path through Oelsen towards Peterswalde, that
his escort met Prussian cavalry. The latter, unable to
avoid the superior French force, were attacked and beaten.
In this combat there was wounded and taken prisoner, near
Peterswalde, Colonel Blücher, son of the victor of the Katz-
bach. It was late when the Emperor at last reached
Nollendorf, where Lobau took post with the I. corps, of
the withdrawal of which from behind him St Cyr only
learnt on the I2th ; a curious example of the inefficiency of
Napoleon's staff work.
At Peterswalde the Emperor lodged at the house of the
parish priest; all the other inhabitants had fled. Next day
he returned to Pirna, where he ordered the construction of
a fortified bridge-head.
St Cyr retired with the 43rd division to in front of
Breitenau, the 45th between Liebstadt and Borna, the 44th
and Pajol still watching the enemy from Furstenwalde,
linked, by a post at Streckenwald, to the I. corps at
Nollendorf, and by another at Lauenstein to Victor (II.
corps) at Altenberg. The 42nd division, after following
the retreating Russians from Königstein towards Peters-
walde, was back again at Langen-Hennersdorf.
On the I 4th Lobau was attacked and driven back behind
Berggiesshūbel. For this affair the allies had made pre-
parations as if they were attacking a whole army, instead of
a single corps, with only Dumongeau’s weak division as
advanced guard. -
On the I 5th St Cyr, whose advanced guard was now
forward again as far as Breitenau, expected an attack, but
nothing happened, except a small affair on its right rear,
which was exposed, owing to the withdrawal of Victor,
which again only came to St Cyr's ears accidentally at a very
FROM 6TH SEPTEMBER TO END OF MONTH 285
late period. The attack on Lobau brought Napoleon once
more southwards with reinforcements. Lobau had now
been placed under St Cyr, but the Emperor, being present
in person, of course took command.
On the 16th Napoleon advanced on Peterswalde by the
road from in front, whilst St Cyr co-operated on the enemy's
left by Oelsen and Schönwald. The enemy was driven
from Peterswalde and Nollendorf, where the Emperor him-
self arrived in weather so misty that it was impossible to
discern from the heights what was happening in the valley
below.
On the 17th, in the early morning, Napoleon went to the
chapel of Nollendorf. Though the weather was still nearly
as thick as the day before, he sent troops down the road,
whilst others filled the woods on its sides. These, after
some fighting, were cleared, and the French reached the
plain. Napoleon himself went to Tellnitz. The sky had
cleared somewhat, but the view was still obscured, and it was
impossible to judge of the enemy's forces. Then there
broke a sudden storm of artillery fire, the source of which
was uncertain in the mist. It appeared that there was a
strong allied column about Kninitz, on the road to Königs-
wald, which seemed to be endeavouring to cut off the
French retreat by the Nollendorf road. Napoleon had to
take measures for occupying this village and guarding his
retreat with his reserve. Some of his troops had now
advanced almost to Kulm, when torrents of rain put a stop
to the fighting. Napoleon himself went back for the night
to Peterswalde. His troops still held Tellnitz on the 18th,
and on that day he again went forward to Nollendorf and
Kninitz. As he issued from the neighbouring wood, he
had to turn back before an attack of some of the enemy's
cavalry. Ascending again to the heights, he was now able
to see the enemy, and remarked to Berthier : “All I see
are two corps of about 60,000 men each, which will need
an entire day to unite for attack.”
Making over the command to Lobau, he then returned
to Pirna, convinced that his army was not strong enough to
286 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
remain where it was, and that the time had passed for an
invasion of Bohemia.
On the 16th he had written to Lobau 1 that the enemy's
“principal forces in this direction are on the Peterswalde
“chaussée, which it is important to him to hold, in order to be
sure that I do not take the offensive whilst he is engaged in
his operations.” The operations referred to—that is, those on
the right bank of the Elbe towards Rumburg—had already
been abandoned. The Emperor's move into Bohemia on
the 17th does not appear to have been intended to be more
than a reconnaissance for the purpose of gaining information.
Napoleon's rearward communications had throughout the
campaign been much harassed by the operations of partisans
who had displayed the greatest activity and enterprise. So
serious had the losses become that, on the I Ith September.”
the Emperor directed Lefebvre-Desnoettes to take up the
special duty of clearing off the Cossacks and others. He
was reinforced up to 4ooo cavalry at Freiberg, where he
was on the 14th,” besides another 2000 under Lorge, with-
drawn from Ney. A division of Victor's corps was ordered
to Freiberg. The cavalry was to sweep the whole country
west of the Elbe in rear of the army; Margaron, the governor
of Leipzig, was to help ; and, finally, Augereau was ordered,
on the 17th,” to march with his whole corps from Würzburg
by Coburg to Jena, whence he was to keep open the passages
of the Saale and protect the rear of the army with the I I,000
men he would have left, after sending one of his divisions to
join the I. corps.
Considerations of space forbid our entering into the
details of this partizan warfare, but this seems a convenient
place for a brief statement, anticipating somewhat, of the
principal operations of the allied flying columns in the
French rear.”
Prince Kudaschew was sent during the battle of Dresden
with a party of cavalry to carry despatches to Bernadotte.
* Corr. 205,72, dated Pirna, 16th September, 8 A.M.
* Corr. 20,543. * Corr. 20,562. * Corr. 20,576.
* For fuller accounts, see Danilewski.
FROM 6TH SEPTEMBER TO END OF MONTH 287
After a most adventurous ride to the North, across the Elbe
and back again to Bohemia, he was able to give information
as to the unprotected state of the French communications.
In consequence of his news, Thielmann 1 and the Austrian
Count Mensdorf were sent off to operate on the Saale, and
between Leipzig and Erfurt, against the French convoys and
reinforcements. Their force consisted chiefly of Cossacks.
On the 12th September Thielmann was at Weissenfels,
where he took I ooo prisoners and 26 guns, and seized the
defile of Kösen. On the 18th he took Merseburg and 2000
prisoners. Mensdorf acted with equal vigour, cutting off
convoys, despatch riders, etc. It was against these two that
Lefebvre-Desnoettes was sent. At the same time, the allied
free corps had been strengthened by seven Cossack regiments
under Platow. These, with Thielmann, attacked Lefebvre-
Desnoettes at Altenburg on the 28th September, drove him
out, and captured IOOO prisoners from him.
About this same period a still more important raid was
carried out from the north, Czernitchew, with 23oo
Cossacks and cavalry and 6 guns, crossed the Elbe, and
marched rapidly on Cassel, the capital of Jerome Bonaparte's
kingdom of Westphalia. Spreading false reports regarding
the direction of his march, he unexpectedly appeared before
Cassel on the morning of the 28th September, and defeated
some French infantry, taking 6 guns from them. Then he
attacked 2000 French troops approaching the place and dis-
persed them. Returning to Cassel, he induced the garrison
to surrender it, and captured a number of guns. Jerome
had fled in haste on Czernitchew's first appearance. After
proclaiming the end of the Westphalian kingdom, Czer-
nitchew returned unharmed to Bernadotte.
On the 16th September a raid of Walmoden’s troops
crossing the Elbe destroyed a detachment of Davout's corps
at Görda. This detachment was on its way to Magdeburg.
Later, on the 17th October, Tettenborn surprised and
took Bremen, far in Davout's rear.
* Formerly Saxon commandant of Torgau. He went over to the allies in
May.
288 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
These are only a few of the exploits of the allied partizans.
A full record of their doings would fill a volume. Some
more of them are chronicled in an order of Napoleon of the
19th September," prescribing precautions against surprise to
be taken by officers commanding detachments.
These extensive expeditions of considerable bodies of
cavalry far in the French rear are a peculiarity of this
campaign, which is the only instance of their employment
on a large scale in a European war. Similar raids played a
considerable part in the American Civil War of fifty years
ago. In this case, as in 18 I 3, the raids were generally
carried out in a country the inhabitants of which were often
sympathisers with the raiders, to whom they supplied food,
forage, and information. Moreover, there were few or none of
the modern facilities for sending information to the other side.
It seems more than doubtful what success such raids could
hope for in these days of telegraphs in Europe. There has
recently been another example of such a raid in the Russian
expedition under General Mistshenko against Yinkon in
the Japanese rear, in January I go 5.” The raid can hardly
be deemed a great success, and it was only possible to
carry it out at all owing to the route taken being through
an area devoid of telegraphs, in which the inhabitants were
not likely to go out of their way to give information to
either side. Looking to the intensity of the anti-French
feeling in Germany in 18 I 3, it would have been impossible
for Napoleon to have made such raids, and, in I 8 I 4, for a
similar reason, the invading allies could not continue their
practice of 1813 in France.
The Emperor was now waiting at Pirna for the enemy
to offer him an opportunity. The inactivity which is a
marked characteristic, surely a strangely novel one, of
Napoleon's conduct during the greater part of September,
was very dangerous ; for the surrounding armies were
* Corr. 20,595.
* See Vol. V., German Official Account of the Russo-Japanese War (English
translation). The question of such raids is discussed at some length at pp. 37
et Ségg.
FROM 6TH SEPTEMBER TO END OF MONTH 289
gradually closing in on him, threatening to convert the
strategical advantages of holding the interior lines into the
dangerous position of being tactically surrounded. More-
ever, Bennigsen with 5 O,OOO or 60,000 men was now coming
up to reinforce the allies, whilst Napoleon could look for
very few fresh troops beyond the I6,ooo of Augereau's
(IX.) corps ordered up from Würzburg. Saxony was
almost completely exhausted, and the provisioning of the
army was day by day increasing in difficulty. “The army
is not nourished. It would be an illusion to regard matters
otherwise.”" So wrote Napoleon on the 23rd September,
and at an earlier date he had sent Marmont and Murat, with
the VI. corps and two cavalry corps, to Grossenhain to cover
a convoy of food coming up the Elbe to Dresden. The
magnitude of the covering force shows the immense import-
ance which the Emperor attached to this supply.
On the 19th Napoleon received a report from Macdonald
to the effect that his flankers on the left had been driven
from Pulsnitz on Radeberg. Thereupon, the Emperor
ordered two divisions of Young Guard, under Mortier, to
cross the Elbe at Pirna, and advance to Lohmen on the
way to Stolpen. This movement was to be concealed from
the enemy by Poniatowski at Stolpen, and Napoleon indi-
cated his intention, if the weather improved, of moving to
drive Blücher back beyond Bautzen, on which he had advanced
as soon as he found Napoleon was no longer with Macdonald.
Next morning, Napoleon writes to Marmont that the weather
has been too bad to move, but, as he also says Macdonald's
report of the enemy's force towards Radeberg was an
exaggeration, that is perhaps the chief reason for delay.
On the 19th September the XII. corps was dissolved and
distributed thus:–The two French divisions, amalgamated
into one under Guilleminot, were made over to the VII.
corps (Reynier). The Bavarian division was relegated to
escort duty with the parks. Oudinot was recalled on the
25th to headquarters, and put in command of two divisions
of Young Guard.
* Corr. 20,619.
T
290 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
On the 21st September a new set of orders 1 was issued
from Pirna, where the Emperor still stayed, complaining
that the weather was too bad for any movements.
The Old Guard was sent to Dresden, Mortier, with a
division of the Young Guard to hold Pirna. To St Cyr was
given the command of his own (XIV.) corps, the I. and the
V., the last-named being called in from Macdonald's army.
St Cyr's duty was to guard the Elbe from Pilnitz to
Königstein, and to watch the roads from Bohemia between
the latter place and Freiberg. The Emperor reckoned he
would have 40,000 to 50,000 men—Victor to hold
Chemnitz, with his left towards Freiberg, right towards the
Saale ; Marmont to Freiberg; Macdonald, with the XI.
corps, to the command of which alone he was now reduced,
to fall back to the exits of the forest in front of Dresden.
All this would enable the army to rest.
Ney was charged with the defence of the Elbe from
Magdeburg to Torgau, with the IV., VII. and III. corps.
There was news that the enemy was throwing a bridge at
Dessau, which required Ney to move the IV. and VII.
towards Wittenberg. Murat and Marmont, who had, at
Grossenhain, protected the convoy from Torgau, would now
pass the Elbe at Meissen. If the news of the bridge at
Dessau were confirmed, they would proceed at once to
Torgau. This was a conditional modification of the orders
sending Marmont to Freiberg.
A later order” directed Macdonald to support Poniatowski,
and prevent his being driven from Stolpen, which was
alleged to be threatened by the enemy.
On the 22nd the Emperor writes,” at 2 A.M. from Dresden,
to Macdonald that, as it seemed uncertain what were the
movements of Blücher's army, he should carry out a re-
connaissance in force, with the object of ascertaining where
his main forces were. The Emperor would probably be
behind in support. Then he decided to go in person to
Macdonald's front.” He reached Harthau the same day,
* Corr. 20,603 and 20,604. * Corr. 20,607.
* Corr. 20,609. * Corr. 20,612.
FROM 6TH SEPTEMBER TO END OF MONTH 291
after driving Blücher's advanced troops back with the III.
and XI. corps and capturing Bischofswerda. On the 23rd the
advance continued, Blücher, as usual, falling back to Förstgen,
short of Bautzen. According to Odeleben, the Emperor
showed signs of irresolution at Harthau. After watching
the retirement of Blücher, he returned to Harthau.
He had heard from Ney that the enemy had completed
a bridge over the Elbe at the mouth of the Black Elster,
and could cross when he chose.
Napoleon had now decided that the time had come for
abandonment of all territory east of the Elbe, excepting
that immediately in front of the fortresses and bridges. He
would have one bridge at Königstein, one at Pilnitz, three
at Dresden, one at Meissen, and, of course, those at Torgau,
Wittenberg and Magdeburg. All would be defended by
powerful bridge-heads, and Macdonald, recalled to Dresden
would hold strongly the issues from the Dresden forest. He
would watch the enemy, and, if the latter undertook any
offensive operations, the Emperor would fall upon him and
compel him to battle.
As Count Yorck points out," Napoleon came to this
decision at the dictation of the enemy, not, as when he
decided to retire behind the Passarge in 1807, of his own
free will.
We must here return for a few moments to the doings of
Ney and his opponents after the disastrous battle of Denne-
witz, and to those of Blücher. Ney, having assembled the
remains of his army at Torgau on the 8th September,
crossed to the left bank of the Elbe and went to Düben,
where he had his hands full with the task of reorganizing
his army.
Bernadotte, on the other hand, sent Bülow to besiege
Wittenberg, though, as that general was very ill-provided
with siege artillery, there was not much prospect of his
gaining any material success at an early date. In order to
shut in the fortress on the left bank, and to be ready for a
passage of the Elbe, Bernadotte, about the 15th September,
* Napoleon as a General, ii. p. 324.
292 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
began building three bridges—one below the mouth of the
Black Elster, one at Rosslau, and one at Acken, both the latter
below Wittenberg. On the 21st September, Ney, alarmed
by a false report that the whole of Bernadotte's army was
about to pass the Elbe, set his troops in motion towards
Wittenberg.
On the 24th, when the enemy appeared in some force
opposite Wartenburg, Ney drew up his army there. Berna-
dotte at once removed his bridge and withdrew.
Blücher was now about to make a momentous move.
After the defeat of Dresden, Schwarzenberg, fully expect-
ing an invasion of Bohemia by Napoleon, sent urgent orders
to Blücher to march to his assistance with 50,000 men.
Blücher could hardly be expected to divide his army, taking
50,000 men to Bohemia and leaving the rest to face
Macdonald. The victory of Kulm changed the aspect of
affairs, and this scheme dropped for the moment. On the
7th September it was revived. Blücher was ordered to
march by Rumburg, sending his baggage by Zittau, to
Böhmisch Leipa. Bennigsen, when he came up, was to
march direct to the Elbe. If the French evacuated the
right bank, he was to blockade Königstein, Dresden,
and Torgau. If they continued on the right bank, he
was to keep in touch with them, avoiding a general
action. Regarding these arrangements, however, Blücher
was consulted at the instance of the King of Prussia,
and in consequence of what he said, orders of the 12th,
recognising that Blücher was already near the Elbe, trans-
posed his rôle and that of Bennigsen. Blücher proposed
that he should march, not to Bohemia, but to his right, in
order to join the North army, whilst Bennigsen, now nearly
up, went to reinforce the Bohemian army. Blücher would
remain in Eastern Saxony long enough to cover the flank
march of Bennigsen to Bohemia. The latter was expected
to reach Zittau about the 20th September. He actually
reached Leitmeritz on the Elbe on the 27th.
As Bennigsen approached, Radetzky (Schwarzenberg's
Chief-of-Staff) proposed, on the 22nd September, that the
FROM 6TH SEPTEMBER TO END OF MONTH 293
whole army of Bohemia should start on a fifteen days'
march by Hof to Baireuth, in order to threaten Napoleon's
communications with France. It will be remembered that
such a movement was one of the contingencies contemplated
by Napoleon at an earlier date. He then remarked that,
if the allies went off in that direction, he would be content
to wish them “bon voyage,” in the certainty that they
would come back quicker than they had gone. Had they
done so, he would have been left time to fall upon
Bernadotte and destroy him. Fortunately for the allies,
Radetzky's wild scheme met with no encouragement. On
the other hand, it was decided now to operate through the
Erzgebirge, not on Dresden as heretofore, but by Chemnitz
direct towards Leipzig.
Thus, just when Napoleon decided to bring his whole
army over to the left bank of the Elbe, the allies were pre-
paring, first, for Blücher's flank march to his right to join
Bernadotte, secondly, for the advance of the Bohemian army
on Leipzig.
The withdrawal of the French army to the left bank
began on the 24th September. Mortier went to Dresden.
Souham and Lauriston were called in to the same
place, to reach it on the 26th. Poniatowski was to march
by Fischbach and across the Elbe at Dresden, covered by
Macdonald and Sebastiani at Weissig. Marmont and
Latour-Maubourg were ordered to cross at Meissen, leaving
L’Heritier, with the 5th cavalry corps, to watch at
Grossenhain,
On the 25th the positions of the French were these—
Macdonald (XI. corps), Weissig,
Lauriston (V. corps) and Guard, Dresden.
III. corps (Souham), V.I. corps (Marmont), and Ist
cavalry (Latour-Maubourg), Meissen
VIII. corps (Poniatowski), marching on Waldheim to
support Lefebvre - Desnoettes in his operations against
Thielmann's and the other allied “Free-corps.” "
South of Dresden, under the general command of St Cyr,
were his own (XIV.) corps at Pirna and Borna.
294 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
I. corps (Lobau) at Berggiesshūbel.
II. corps (Victor) at Freiberg.
Ney, with the IV. (Bertrand) and VII. corps (Reynier),
was in front of Wartenburg.
Napoleon was now beginning seriously to look forward
to the time when he must retreat over the Rhine, as is
evidenced by his order * to Clarke to prepare the French
fortresses on the Rhine for defence.
As September closed the positions on both sides were
these—
French.-XI. corps (Macdonald), Weissig. -
I. and XIV. corps (Lobau and St Cyr), south of Dresden,
the latter linked to the XI. corps by the Pirna bridge.
II. corps (Victor), Freiberg. 4
Guard, Dresden.
V. corps (Lauriston), near Dresden, on the Leipzig road.
VIII, corps (Poniatowski), on the Waldheim-Leipzig road,
acting with Lefebvre-Desnoettes' column.
IV. corps (Bertrand) and VII. corps (Reynier), under
Ney, between Torgau and Wittenberg, on the left bank of
the Elbe.
III. corps (Souham), VI. corps (Marmont), and Ist
cavalry corps (Latour-Maubourg), towards Meissen, ready
to support Ney if the enemy passed the Elbe.
IX. corps (Augereau), marching on Jena.
Bavarians (30,000 under Wrede) opposed to 30,000
Austrians on the Inn.
Davout (XIII. corps), in Hamburg.
Allies.—Army of Bohemia, between Aussig and Brüx,
with Klenau towards the passes leading to Chemnitz.
Blücher, at and about Bautzen.
Bernadotte, Herzberg to Zerbst.
On the 25th September the time had come when Blücher
could, without exposing Bennigsen, begin his march to the
right to join the northern army. He left, to face Macdonald
and Dresden, Tscherbatow with 8ooo Russians, and Bubna
with Io,000 Austrians.
* Corr. 20,646, dated 27th September.
FROM 6TH SEPTEMBER TO END OF MONTH 295
On his left his flank march was covered by the Russian
cavalry under Wassilsikow, before whom Latour-Maubourg
fell back from Grossenhain across the Elbe at Meissen.
Of the allied army of the North, Bülow had advanced to
Wartenburg, where he threw two new bridges.
Tauenzien had reached Jessen.
The rest were at Barby and Rosslau.
Means of passage were provided also at Rosslau, Acken,
and Barby.
The chapter in von Caemmerer's “strategical survey" of
this campaign which deals with this period is headed
“Indecision on both sides,” and that is certainly the most
marked characteristic of the three weeks succeeding the 6th
September. With the allies generally this frame of mind
was the rule. We see Bernadotte, after Bülow's victory at
Dennewitz, hanging about without making any serious
attempt to reap the fruits of his success by crossing the
Elbe ; building bridges, and then removing them as soon as
an enemy appeared. Blücher, no doubt, knew his own mind,
but he was restrained by superior orders, and compelled to wait
in order to cover the march of Bennigsen. Schwarzenberg
was perhaps the most irresolute of all, moving forward first
by both banks of the Elbe, then hurrying back again as
Napoleon moved south from Dresden, then making feeble
advances towards Dresden, only to withdraw the moment
Napoleon showed any disposition to move south again.
But indecision, such as he showed at this time, was
certainly not characteristic of Napoleon in his better days.
It looks almost as if, like a tiger surrounded by hunters,
he was half bewildered, and unable to make up his mind to
do more than make short dashes, first on one part, then on
another, of the circle which was steadily closing in on him.
The time had really come for him to abandon much more than
the right bank of the Elbe. The rescue of the garrisons of
the Oder and Vistula fortresses was no longer to be hoped
for after Dennewitz, but the Emperor could still have
carried with him in his retreat those of Hamburg, Magde-
burg, Wittenberg, Torgau, and Dresden. Including the
296 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
troops in Dresden, he had still 270,000 men in the open
field, though his losses since the armistice are estimated by
von Caemmerer at I 40,000 to I 50,000. Adding the
garrisons of the Elbe fortresses, and deducting the German
allies, who would no doubt desert him, he could still have
returned to the Rhine with at least 25o,ooo men. The
Elbe had played its part, and the Emperor seemed to be
succumbing to the temptation, so dangerous to weaker
leaders, to allow himself to be tied to fortresses. The real
fact was that he could not make up his mind to part with
his dominion in Germany, which he knew must collapse
with his own withdrawal. Nor could he be certain what
his reception in France would be.
The despot in him was suppressing the general, whose
purely military view of the situation would probably have
insisted on sacrifices which the Emperor could not endure.
Thus we see him satisfied to frighten back first Blücher,
then Schwarzenberg, then Blücher again, without dealing
a really serious blow at either. His decision to advance
northwards had withered under the shock of Ney's defeat
at Dennewitz, coupled with the Emperor's discovery of the
fearful demoralisation of Macdonald's army. k
CHAPTER XVIII
NAPOLEON'S QUEST OF BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER

N the 1st October, Ney, fearing that Bülow
might pass at Wartenburg and cut him from
Dresden, ordered Bertrand to the former, It
was, however, Blücher who was now at Warten-
burg. He had marched to Jessen, setting free Bülow and
Tauenzein to return to Bernadotte. Sacken, having per-
formed his function as flank guard, had now rejoined
Blücher.
Bertrand was in Wartenburg on the 2nd October, in
front of the Prussian bridge head, which was at the salient of
the bend of the Elbe in the neck of which Wartenburg lies."
The Prussians had selected this place as quite theoretically
suitable for forcing a passage, but they had omitted to
reconnoitre the area within the bend, and were ignorant of
the fact that it was exceedingly unfavourable for deploy-
ment after they had crossed under the protection of their
artillery sweeping the peninsula. It was marshy and cut
up by backwaters which, when the Elbe was in flood, were
quite impassable, and were so in great part at all times.
The village of Wartenburg stood behind one of these, and
also had in front of it an embankment to protect it from
floods. It was right in the centre of the neck, and was
practically safe against a mere frontal attack. It could
only be reached by troops passing along a narrow strip of
land between it and the Elbe, in the part above the bridges.
Whilst the Prussians underestimated the defensibility of
the Wartenburg position, Bertrand erred in the opposite
direction; for he had only recently seen it at a time
Map IV. (c).
297
298 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
when the Elbe was in very high flood. He believed it to
be almost impregnable.
At 7 A.M. on the 3rd October, Prince Charles of Mecklen-
burg passed the Prussian bridges with three battalions of
Yorck's corps. It was only when he got to the left bank
that he was compelled to acknowledge that his guides had
told him correctly that Wartenburg could only be reached
by the narrow strip of land along the Elbe on his left leading
to Bleddin. This strip was enclosed between the Elbe and
a backwater or overflow pond.
Yorck himself, following over the bridges, sent Prince
Charles against Franquemont's Wurtembergers who held
Bleddin.
Steinmetz's brigade went against the front of Warten-
burg. They got as far as the embankment running across
the peninsula in front of Wartenburg, but could get no
farther, and with difficulty held on there against the fire of
the French beyond the old watercourse parallel to the dam,
between it and the village.
Between Steinmetz and Prince Charles, Horn's brigade
was brought up, with Hunerbein’s in reserve.
It was I P.M. before Prince Charles could make his
advance against Bleddin. Then he gradually drove
Franquemont back towards Wartenburg, in which was
Morand’s division, with Fontanelli's in reserve. Presently,
however, the progress of Horn's advance, on Prince Charles'
right, interposed between Franquemont and Morand, com-
pelling the former to fall back to his right with 9oo
infantry and 200 cavalry. His artillery was practically
annihilated. It was about 2 P.M. when Bleddin fell into
the hands of the Prussians.
Steinmetz was still holding on at the embankment with
the utmost difficulty, and Horn's men had equal difficulty
in getting forward over walls and ditches against the south-
east side of Wartenburg.
Blücher had now come upon the field. He was very
anxious, and sent orders to Prince Charles that he must
take Wartenburg at any cost. That commander had now
BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER 299
available only some 600 or 7oo men, and 9 guns, but he
boldly advanced against the south-west of the village whilst
Horn continued against the south-east. By 3.30 P.M.
Morand was driven in disorder from it. Bertrand had been
very slow to perceive the danger which threatened his right.
He now began his retirement in two columns, under
cover of his artillery on the heights behind Wartenburg.
Morand led the left column, Fontanelli (who had been in
reserve west of Wartenburg) the right. Both columns were
near the river below Wartenburg.
As Fontanelli marched his right flank was attacked by
Mecklenburg's cavalry, who took some guns and prisoners.
Morand suffered from the fire of artillery beyond the Elbe,
which followed him as he retired.
The Prussian weakness in cavalry prevented any effective
pursuit.
Friederich gives Yorck's losses at 67 officers and I 548
men. If the French lost perhaps somewhat less in killed
and wounded, they lost, on the other hand, I ooo prisoners,
I I guns, and 70 wagons. Bertrand's strength at the com-
mencement was about I 3,OOO or I 4,Ooo men, with 32 guns.
He appears to have thought that the passage at Wartenburg
was only a diversion to withdraw attention from the real
crossing, which he believed to be at Rosslau.
Yorck brought into action a force slightly inferior to
Bertrand's, but he had behind him, what Bertrand did not
realise, the whole strength of Blücher's army.
On the 4th October Blücher's Silesian army completed
its crossing at Wartenburg, leaving only Thümen to blockade
Wittenberg, and Wobeser in front of Torgau. On the same
day Bernadotte, crossing at Rosslau and Barby, marched up
the Mulde.
The appearance of Bernadotte on his left and of Blücher on
his right compelled Ney to fall back towards Delitzsch.
Holding the passages of the Mulde, he might have engaged
either Bernadotte or Blücher separately, but was debarred
from thinking of this by the fact that he had little more
than half the strength of either of them.
300 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Meanwhile, on the 2nd October, Napoleon sent Murat to
Freiberg to take command of an army comprising the II.,
V., and VIII. corps, and the 5th cavalry corps, to oppose
the Bohemian army, which had once more passed the
Erzgebirge, aiming now no longer at Dresden, but direct
at Leipzig. On the 3rd October it had 70,000 men holding
the heads of the passes on the line, Ebenstock, Annaberg,
Marienberg; 80,000 still south of the mountains, on the
line Kommotau-Karlsbad ; Bennigsin with 50,000 at Teplitz
and Aussig.
The army of Silesia, of 64,000 men, was fighting at
Wartenburg; that of the North, 76,000 strong, held the
passages of the Elbe at Rosslau, Acken, and Barby.
On the 4th October Klenau's advanced guard entered
Chemnitz, but was driven out by Lauriston who, in turn,
was compelled by Platow to retire on Mittweida.
The news of Blücher's passage at Wartenburg reached
Napoleon on the 5th, though only through Marmont, and
without details. He at once ordered the III. corps, from
about Meissen and Riesa, to join Marmont. The latter,
taking command of the two corps (III. and VI.) was to
march on Torgau, picking up there all available men in the
the depôt. He was then to re-establish the bridge on the
Mulde at Düben and to join Ney and Dombrowski.
Augereau was to go to Leipzig, and form its garrison in
union with the 6000 men already there under Arrighi.
It was a matter of urgency, the Emperor said, to
throw the enemy back over the Elbe before he was
reinforced.1
Ney was to have command of Marmont's force as soon
as it reached him. This was explained to Marmont as
necessary, looking to Ney's seniority.”
The division of the Guard still on the right bank of the
Elbe was ordered over to the left, by which it was to march
to Meissen, where Oudinot (now commanding two divisions
of Young Guard) would fix his headquarters.
To Muratº orders to the following effect were sent. It
* Corr. 20,695. * Corr. 20,696. 8 Corr. 20,698,
BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER 3OI
was important to be at Chemnitz, at which place and at
Zschoppau, Victor should take up a good position—Ponia-
towski to move to Penig. The Emperor believed there
was only Klenau with I 4,000 men in this direction.
St Cyr received orders (1) to withdraw the Pilnitz bridge
to Dresden ; (2) to post Lobau with headquarters and one
division at Pirna ; (3) to bring his own headquarters to
Dresden with two divisions; (4) to guard the left bank from
Dresden to Pirna with cavalry.
The Emperor's general plan was decided on, though there
were still some details on which he had not made up his
mind. At 9 A.M. on the 6th 1 he wrote to Marmont that
he would be the same evening at Meissen with 80,000 men,
having his advanced guard at the junction of the roads from
Leipzig and Torgau. He expected the III. corps to be at
Torgau, but was not certain in which direction Marmont
might have sent it. His present idea was to march on
Torgau, to cross there to the right bank of the Elbe, in
order to cut off the enemy and destroy his bridges, without
being compelled to storm his bridge heads on the left bank,
and also to prevent any possibility of his avoiding a battle
by slipping back to the right bank.
The Emperor's main force was to be brought to bear,
under his own command, on Blücher and Bernadotte, whilst
Murat contained Schwarzenberg's movement on Leipzig,
and St Cyr with Lobau defended Dresden. Murat had only
about 45,000 men.
In the afternoon of the same 6th October St Cyr arrived
at Dresden, and had a long interview with Napoleon, who
explained his plan of holding back, with Murat, the
Austrian advance sufficiently long to enable himself to finish
with Blücher and Bernadotte before Schwarzenberg reached
Leipzig,
Then he hoped to fight another battle disposing of
Schwarzenberg. He spoke to St Cyr of various positions
south of Dresden, but impressed specially on him the
paramount importance of defending the city itself. Thither
* Corr. 20,705.
302 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
he hoped to return, continuing to make it the pivot of his
operations, after defeating the enemy in a great battle or
battles. On this occasion he was so vehement that St Cyr
thought it best to attempt no argument.
At midnight the Emperor sent for him again. He said
that having received news of Ney, he had now decided to
take St Cyr and Lobau with him against Bernadotte and
Blücher, abandoning Dresden.
St Cyr's report of his remarks' runs thus: “I am
certainly going to have a battle ; if I win it, I shall regret
not having had all my troops under my hand ; if, on the
contrary, I suffer a reverse, in leaving you here you will be
of no service to me in the battle, and you are hopelessly
lost. Moreover, what is Dresden worth to-day P It can no
longer be the pivot of the operations of the army, which,
owing to the exhaustion of the surrounding country, cannot
subsist there. This city cannot even be considered as a
great depôt ; for you would find in it subsistence for a few
days only. There are in Dresden I 2,000 sick who will
die, since they are the residue of the 60,000 who have
entered the hospitals since the commencement of the cam-
paign. Add to this that the season is advancing, and that
the Elbe, once frozen over, no longer offers a position. I
wish to take up another for the winter, refusing my right
on Erfurt, and stretching my centre along the Saale, which
is a good position in all seasons, because the heights of the
left bank are always excellent for defence. I shall rest my
left on Magdeburg, and that city will become for me of
greater importance than Dresden.” . . . Here he describes
the greater strength of Magdeburg as compared with
Dresden, and then continues: “Besides, I repeat, I want
to change my position ; Dresden is too near Bohemia; as
soon as I make the smallest movements from the neighbour-
hood of the city to approach Bohemia, the enemy's armies,
having a very short distance to cover, will return to it, and
I have no means of cutting them off by moving on their
rear. Finally, by the more distant position I am going to
* Hist. Mil., iv. 185.
BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER 303
occupy, I wish to “leur donner un cul’’ (you understand
me?), in order to be able to strike great blows, to force the
allied sovereigns to a solid peace, putting an end to the
calamities of Europe.”
St Cyr duly received orders on the 7th * for retreat to
Dresden, for sending the sick down the Elbe to Torgau,
and to be ready to evacuate the city on the 8th and 9th.
It was 1 A.M. on the 7th October when Napoleon dictated
the following note * on “the movements of the different
corps d'armée":—
“Ist. To make a forced march on the 7th to Wurzen. I
can have my headquarters there with the cavalry of Sebas-
tiani, that of the Guard, and the corps 4 of Oudinot, Io
miles from Wurzen, so as to be at Leipzig to-morrow (8th)
if absolutely necessary. -
“2. The III. infantry corps will probably be at Wurzen,
since the Duke of Ragusa has directed it on the Mulde.
“3. General Lauriston can take position at Rochlitz; he
has only three leagues (7% miles) to march ; the Duke of
Belluno can go to Mittweida, commencing his movement
rather late; they will be in communication with Prince
Poniatowski, who is at Frohburg. To-morrow they can be
at Frohburg, thus containing the head of the enemy's army.
“Marshal St Cyr can turn to-day (7th) the I. and XIV.
corps on Dresden, occupy Meissen to-morrow (8th) and
commence his movement, evacuate Dresden the 9th,” and
make forced marches on Wurzen.
“As a result of this movement, I shall be able to do what
I choose. From Wurzen I can go to Torgau against the
enemy, debouching from Wittenberg (myself), or turn my
whole army on Leipzig for a general battle, or repass the
Saale.
“Details.—The King of Naples would move on Mittweida,
masking his movement; he would only evacuate Flöha in
* In the English translation of AWapoleon as a general, this phrase is trans-
lated, “to form a blind alley.” The author feels some doubt as to whether this
was the Emperor's precise meaning.
* Berthier to St Cyr. Hist. Mil., iv., p. 431. * Corr., 20,711.
* Four divisions Young Guard. * Printed 7th. The 9th is clearly meant.
3o4 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
the night of the 7th ; the enemy would not know till the
morning of the 8th that there is no longer any one on the
road from Chemnitz to Dresden.
“General Lauriston would reach Rochlitz, and would only
leave Mittweida when the head of the II. corps had arrived.
“On the 8th the II. corps would move on Rochlitz, and
would be in observation from Rochlitz to Frohburg, holding
Colditz, so as to link itself with the army. It would remain
there till further orders, unless pressed by the enemy; in
that case it would approach Leipzig, without allowing itself
to be separated from the Mulde.
“On the 8th the army commanded by me in person would
be at Wurzen.
“On the Ioth the corps of Marshal St Cyr would be at
Wurzen.” 1
Thus at I A.M. the Emperor had decided to abandon
* It will be observed that we have not quoted the long note of the 5th October,
accepted by Yorck as probably genuine. It is given in M. de Norvins' Porte-
feuille de 1813, vol. ii. p. 366. Yorck admits that it is not usual for Napoleon,
in such notes, to speak of corps by their numbers, as he does throughout this
alleged note. But this is not very convincing evidence; for he does so speak of
them occasionally in the undoubtedly genuine note of I A.M., on the 7th ; though
he only does so when it is necessary to distinguish part of the command of a
general having more than one corps under him. What seems to us to throw
much more doubt on the authenticity of the document is the way in which the
writer speaks of himself as “the Emperor,” or “His Majesty,” expressions
which find no place in his other notes of this period. They, as well as the
indication of corps by their numbers instead of by their commanders, would
probably be used by a person trying to imitate the Emperor, and yet forgetting
himself for the moment. M. de Norvins, in his preface, does not indicate
precisely whence he obtained this note, or the evidence of its authenticity. If it
were genuine, there seems no special reason why it should have been omitted by
the publishers of the correspondence; for it is, as Yorck remarks, “a true picture
of the state of affairs at the time, and of the Emperor's views.”
On the other hand, why should any one concoct such a note P Once more,
there is against its authenticity the fact that there are several palpable mistakes
in the numbers of the corps. One of these, the writing of “quinzième corps” for
“quatorzième corps,” was not in the least likely to be made by the Emperor, for
there was no such corps as the “15th.” Even his secretarv would probably not
have allowed such a slip, if made, to pass.
On the whole, while admitting that the document may possibly be genuine, its
authenticity seems so open to doubt that we prefer not to rely on it. Possibly
French writers, now working at the records in Paris, may hereafter be able to
clear up the point.
BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER 305
Dresden, and to leave Murat no longer in connection
with it.
Twelve hours later all is changed. Napoleon, writing at
1 P.M. on the 7th from Meissen,” tells St Cyr he has decided
to hold on to Dresden. The convoys are to proceed thither,
the marshal is to hold the positions in front of Pirna all the
8th, and to send a detachment to Nossen.” The fortifica-
tions of Dresden to be improved, supplies got in, wounded
sent out, etc. The Emperor, hoping for a battle immedi-
ately, moving by Torgau, would have his communications
open by both banks with Dresden.
Here was an inexplicable change in the whole plan, a
change which was absolutely inconsistent with the Emperor's
guiding principle of uniting the greatest possible forces for
battle, and neglecting secondary matters, in the certainty
that all would be rectified regarding them by decisive
tactical success at the main point. He was now leaving
two whole army corps to hold a place which certainly was
now of quite secondary importance. Yet, unless we are
to believe that St Cyr's account of the midnight interview
on the 6th October is a pure invention, Napoleon had
explained precisely and correctly why it was useless for
him to hold Dresden, may worse than useless, for to do so
would deprive him of two corps on the battlefield. It is
impossible to see in this decision to hold on to Dresden
anything but a vast deterioration in Napoleonic strategy.
Count Yorck considers it, “not so much the mistake of a
general, as the obstinacy of a ruler, who will not admit that
he can be compelled to relinquish anything, and who, not
without reason, is alarmed for the continuance of his rule,
based only upon force, so soon as he gives any indication
that this force has diminished.” ”
On the evening of the 7th the opposing forces in the
north stood thus :4—
French.-III. corps (Souham) at Torgau.
* Corr. 20,719 and St Cyr, Hist. Mil., iv. 433 (for hour of dispatch).
* Apparently to maintain touch with Murat as well as with Meissen.
* Mapoleon as a General, ii. p. 338. * Map I., inset (c).
U
306 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Guard, Macdonald (XI. corps) and Sebastiani at and near
Meissen.
Marmont (VI. corps) at Taucha.
Ney (IV. and VII. corps) at Bennewitz (adjoining
Wurzen).
Latour-Maubourg watching the Elbe to Torgau.
Allies.—Bernadotte with about 30,000 men at Dessau and
4O,Ooo at Zorbig and Jessnitz on the west of the
Mulde.
Blücher.—Yorck's and Langeron's corps, and head.
quarters at Düben.
Sacken at Mockrehna, midway between Eilenburg and
Torgau.
Blücher held the passages of the Mulde at Mühlbeck,
Düben, and Eilenburg.
A day's march separated the Northern and Silesian
armies, and Blücher was filled with a very reasonable though
very violent distrust of his Gascon colleague.
Napoleon had from 140,000 to I 5 O,Ooo men concentrated
about Wurzen on the 8th, and he believed that Blücher
was with 60,000 at Düben. That was generally correct,
and, moreover, Blücher's position, facing Leipzig, offered his
left flank to Napoleon at Wurzen.
The Emperor, in a letter dated Wurzen, 9th October,
at 9 A.M., to Murat," sums up his views of the situation and
his intentions. He says that he is starting for Wittenberg,
which is besieged. He counts on attacking Blücher at
Düben, where his information points to the presence of that
general with 60,000 men, whilst Bernadotte is at Dessau
with 4o,ooo. He hopes to be at Wittenberg on the 9th,
to raise the siege, and, passing to the right bank, to seize
the enemy's two bridges at Wartenburg and Dessau. He
had issued orders for the advance.
(1) The three divisions of Guard cavalry (Lefebvre-
Desnoette's at Leipzig, Ornano's and Walther's) were
summoned to Eilenburg.
(2) Arrighi, at Leipzig, was told that that city was
* Corr. 20,735.
BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER 307
covered in every direction but those of Halle and Dessau,
and it was explained to him with what forces he could
defend it in those directions,
(3) Ney was ordered to march with the III. corps at 6
A.M. by the right bank of the Mulde on Eilenburg. He
was to send Reynier with the VII. by the left bank, to
which he would cross at Eilenburg. Bertrand, who was on
the right at Schildau, to move on Mockrehna. Sebastiani
was also placed under Ney, who thus commanded the III.,
IV., and VII. corps, the division of Dombrowski, and the
2nd cavalry corps. The Emperor would himself support
Ney with the whole of the Guard.
(4) Marmont to march at 6 A.M. by the left bank towards
Düben. Latour-Maubourg, and all the cavalry of the Guard
to go with him.
(5) Macdonald to start at the same hour from Dahlen for
Mockrehna, in support, if necessary, of Bertrand.
The Emperor was anxious to have possession of Düben
the same day, and, if the enemy were not more than
3O,Ooo strong there, he would be attacked in the evening.
Napoleon would be in person at Eilenburg at 8 A.M.,
marching with I 20,000 men on Düben.
It is time to see what was happening on the allies' side
between Blücher and Bernadotte. On the 6th October
Blücher wanted his colleague to take a strong position in
front of Merseburg, whilst he himself stood between the
Saale and the Mulde. Thus placed, each would threaten
the flank of an advance by Napoleon against the other.
On the 8th October the Crown Prince wrote to Blücher
to the effect that, since their mission was to hold Napoleon
till the Bohemian army could come up on his flank and
rear, there were only two alternatives open to them. The
first, which was clearly the one he favoured, was immediate
retirement to the right bank of the Elbe. The second was
retirement to the left bank of the Saale. In the event
of Blücher's accepting the second alternative, he was
requested to take up his bridge at Wartenburg and send
it (by land of course, as it could not pass through
308 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Wittenberg and Magdeburg by water) to Ferchland, 25
miles below Magdeburg. Bernadotte would either remove
or destroy his bridge at Rosslau, and would leave six
battalions to defend that at Acken. Bernadotte was dying
to get back across the Elbe, to avoid Napoleon, of whom
he was in mortal dread, and to get away by Ferchland if he
could not get Blücher over the Elbe direct. He did not
give any real consideration to the Bohemian army. The
first alternative would have spelt ruin for Blücher, who
would in all probability have been caught by Napoleon
when he was in the very act of crossing the Elbe. He
unhesitatingly chose the second, and promised to march at
once. The great risk in going behind the Saale was lest
the allies should lose their communications with Berlin.
Blücher said that Yorck, with his right column, would reach
Jessnitz in the evening of the 9th, his headquarters would be
near Mühlbeck. He would only leave a few companies at
Wartenburg, which could rejoin Wobeser before Torgau.
He also said he would make a demonstration against Eilen-
burg, as he thought it necessary to cover the westward
march.
Blücher's orders required Yorck to pass the Mulde at
Jessnitz; Langeron near Bitterfeld ; Sacken, who was the
farthest to the left and from Düben, was to pass at that
place, but he would probably be in contact there with the
French.
Napoleon's march on the 9th progressed without opposi-
tion worthy of mention. Ney was at Düben by 3 P.M.
At Probsthain Sebastiani dispersed some of Sacken's
troops, and he, as well as Bertrand, followed Sacken towards
Kemberg. The French advance had come sooner than
Blücher expected, so nothing came of his proposed demon-
stration, and Sacken, finding it impossible to cross the
Mulde at Düben before the French came up, turned north-
wards, and, by dint of hard marching through the night,
got across at Raguhn, which he only reached at Io A.M. on
the I oth. Yorck and Langeron reached Jessnitz and Mühl-
beck respectively. Blücher and Bernadotte were united on
BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER 309
the I oth towards Zorbig. The French positions in the
evening of the 9th were—
II., Ney's advanced guard, beyond Düben.
VII., Düben. -
III., Lausig.
Dombrowski at Priestāblich.
Napoleon and Guard—Eilenburg.
IV. corps south-east of Mockrehna.
XI. corps, Mockrehna.
On the I oth Napoleon remained at Eilenburg, sending
letters and orders, till after I O A.M. Then, after a parade of
his cuirassiers, he set off in his carriage to Düben, where
the letter-writing begins again at 3 P.M., when he had taken
up his residence in the little water - surrounded château.
The correspondence of this day is fairly voluminous, but it
is strangely uncertain in its tone. It is wanting entirely in
that decision which generally characterises the correspond-
ence of the Emperor when he is in hot pursuit of some great
object. He was suffering under the grievous disappoint-
ment of having missed the blow which he had aimed at
Blücher, and, moreover, it is clear that he is unable to guess
with any certainty how the old Prussian has evaded it, or
where he has gone. There are a great many “ifs" used.
There are no less than five letters to Maret, Duke of
Bassano, much of their contents repetition or speculation, a
great deal about the movements of the King of Saxony,
who was under Maret's charge at Wurzen, and so on.
Napoleon is at times despondent on the subject of Murat's
capability of holding the Bohemian army back from Leipzig,
and tells Maret' what he proposes to do if Murat has to
abandon it. “My intention is, if the King of Naples were
obliged to evacuate Leipzig, to repass the Elbe with all my
army, throwing the army of Silesia and Berlin on to the
right bank, and taking all the time to destroy it ; or, if it
prefers to abandon its bridges, to leave it on the left bank
and take my line of operation on the right bank from
Dresden to Magdeburg.” According to Friederich, it is not
* Corr. 20,746.
3Io NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
credible that Napoleon ever entertained the idea, attributed
to him by some modern French writers, of abandoning
everything west of the Elbe, and operating, based on it
from Magdeburg to Dresden, towards the Oder. Surely
this passage indicates clearly that he did intend, at one
time at least, to go to the right bank. He again refers to
the idea of passing to the right bank in a letter to Reynier,"
in one to Berthier,” and in one to Arrighi.” The corre-
spondence of this day shows how uncertain the Emperor
felt as to Blücher's own and Sacken’s movements. He
says, in the letter to Reynier just mentioned, (I) that Sacken
was making for the Wartenburg bridge, (2) that all reports
show that the enemy is retiring from all directions on
Dessau. He orders Reynier to Wartenburg and also
Bertrand,” both letters being dated 4 P.M. But, in a post-
script to that to Bertrand, he says Sacken had left
Leipnitz at 6 A.M. and got to Raguhn. Of his prospects
he writes to Murat at 5.30 P.M. : * “To-morrow, the I Ith,
either I shall have swept away the enemy or I shall have
destroyed his bridges and thrown him on to the other side of
the river (Elbe). Having thus driven off the army of Silesia,
I can, on the I 3th, be at Leipzig with my whole army.”
Then he proceeds to estimate Murat's strength thus:–
Infantry. Cavalry.
VIII. corps (Poniatowski) . e 5,000 3,OOO
V. corps (Lauriston) . o . I 2,OOO 5 OO
II. corps (Victor) & e . I 6,OOO I,2OO
IX. Corps (Augereau). g º 8,OOO 3,OOO
Arrighi from Leipzig . e º 8,Ooo 3,OOO
5th cavalry corps (L'Heritier) . e e Q 2,000
49,000 I 2,700
and says that, on the 12th, he could send another 20,000,
raising Murat to 80,000. If Murat had only Kleist and
Wittgenstein against him, they could not have more than
* Corr. 20,750. * Corr. 20,752. * Corr. 20,749.
* Corr. 20 757. Corr. 20,754.
BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER 3II
50,000 men. If Klenau was with them, they might have
8o,ooo. On the I Ith the Emperor's uncertainty and
irresolution continued. In the early hours he is convinced
that the whole army of the enemy is concentrated at Dessau,
with a great quantity of baggage. He proposes to march
by the right bank of the Elbe on the Rosslau bridge.
Reynier, Sebastiani, Dombrowski are to pass at Wittenberg
as soon as possible, so as to make way for Bertrand,
Macdonald, and the rest of the army to pass. Bertrand to
see that the Wartenburg bridge is gone. Ney, meanwhile,
to remain at Gräfenhainchen, watching the roads to Dessau,
Raguhn, Jessnitz, and Mühlbeck, and supported by the
Emperor with the Guard about Kemberg. Marmont to
come back to the right bank of the Mulde, leaving only
Lorge's and Nordmann's cavalry on the left to scout towards
Bitterfeld and Delitzsch, and enough infantry to force the
enemy out of Bitterfeld. -
At 3 P.M. he has heard that there is no enemy at
Raguhn, and very few at Dessau.”
By 3 A.M. on the I 2th he learns that, on the Ioth,
Blücher was marching on Halle. Ney is ordered * to
Dessau. As soon as Reynier had mastered Rosslau on the
right bank, Ney was to destroy the enemy's bridge-head
and throw two bridges there, Ney to call up Bertrand
from Wartenburg, Oudinot to remain at Gräfenhainchen.
Marmont to go towards Delitzsch to watch towards Halle
and Leipzig. Macdonald was only to pass at Wittenberg
if Reynier required assistance beyond that of Sebastiani.”
At Io A.M. he draws up a note “on the union of the
different corps d'armee at Taucha,” in the following
terms : *—
“I am ordering Ney to Düben. He will not receive this
order till 2 P.M., his troops can start at 3 ; he cannot pass
the bridge at Düben till to-morrow, I 3th (when the Guard
will have already passed); he can easily be at Taucha in
the evening of the 13th.
* 20,757 to 20,761. * Corr. 20,764. * Corr. 20,765,
* Corr. 20,768. 5 Corr. 20,772.
312 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
“Latour Maubourg, being at Kemberg, will have no more
difficulty.
“The Duke of Tarentum will only receive orders at
3 P.M.; if he has passed the Elbe, he will require the night
to recross ; he can only be at Düben to-morrow, I 3th ;
during the day of the 14th he will march on Taucha.
“General Reynier, marching on Rosslau, can only get to
Wittenberg this night and reach Taucha on the I 5th. He
can come by Eilenburg.
“It is the same for General Sebastiani.
“As for the Dukes of Treviso (Mortier) and Reggio
(Oudinot) and the reserve of the Guard, all that will pass
the Düben bridge to-day and reach Taucha early to-morrow.
“The King (of Naples) is to-day at Cröbern, to-morrow
he will be at Leipzig and Taucha, where I shall have arrived
to-morrow with Curial, the Old and Young Guard, and the
Duke of Rugusa, nearly 40,000 men, which, with the king's
5 O,OOO, will make nearly 90,000. These 90,000 will be
reinforced during to-morrow (I 3th), when the enemy neces-
sarily cannot attack, by Ney, Bertrand, and Latour-Mau-
bourg. The I 5th our whole army will be united. To-morrow
(I 3th) the enemy arrives at Cröbern. He will know that
the Grand Army has arrived. He will spend the 14th in
placing himself for battle. I have, therefore, the I3th and
I 4th for concentration. I say more ; if all my army were
at Düben, it could not arrive earlier, unless it had five or
six issues.”
Then he recapitulates the situation.
“The King of Naples is at Cröbern on the 12th, Marshal
Marmont at Lindenhain ; they can be to-morrow, I 3th, at
Taucha, a good position ; my Guard, to-day at Düben and
Eilenburg, will easily be to-morrow at Taucha ; Oudinot
and Mortier will be to-day at Düben with Ornano, Walther,
and Latour-Maubourg.
“To-morrow all this will be at Taucha.
“I shall then have to-morrow at Taucha.
“In the first line, the King of Naples' 50,000 men,
inclusive of the garrison of Leipzig, which will remain
BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER 3I3
there ; Marmont, 20,000 infantry, 2000 cavalry ; the
Guard, 3O,OOO infantry, 8ooo cavalry; Latour-Maubourg,
3OOO Cavalry; total, nearly I 2 O,Ooo men, at Taucha to-
II) Orr OW,
“In second line, the Duke of Tarentum, to-night at
Remberg, to-morrow at Düben ; the Prince of the Moskowa,
to-night at Gräfenhainchen, to-morrow at Düben ; Bertrand,
to-morrow at Düben ; Sebastiani, to-morrow at Düben ;
Dombrowski and Reynier, to-morrow half-way to Düben.
“On the I 4th all can join me ; Tarentum, 20,000
infantry, 2000 cavalry; Moskowa, I 2,Ooo infantry, 2000
cavalry ; Bertrand, Io,ooo men ; Sebastiani, 3 Ooo men ;
Dombrowski and Reynier, 20,000 men. Thus : First line,
nearly I 20,000 men ; second line, 70,000 men ; total, about
I 9o,ooo men.” "
Here is, once more, a complete change of plan. The
idea of the passage of the Elbe and the pursuit of Blücher
is abandoned in favour of concentration for battle at
Taucha.”
Odeleben's famous description of the Emperor at Düben,
sitting idly drawing Gothic characters on a sheet of paper,
is not quite consistent with the actual outturn of corre-
spondence. Still, all accounts represent him as a very
different person from the ceaseless worker of former times.
He talked for five hours in the night of the I Ith-12th to
Marmont, who says : “One no longer recognises Napoleon
again during this campaign.”* Fain says: “He remains
almost constantly shut up in his room, to which his bed and
his maps have been moved.” “
In proof of the irresolution and uncertainty which
mastered him at Düben, it is only necessary to look back
* The totals, according to the Emperor's details, come to, 1st line, 113,000;
2nd line, 69,000; total, 182,000. But he apparently does not include artillery
and engineers, and as he generally uses round figures, the arithmetical difference
is more apparent than real.
* “My intention being to give battle there (at Taucha) with all my forces
united ” (Corr. 20,771).
* Mém. v. 271.
* MSS. de 1813, ii. 372.
3I4 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
over the correspondence which we have quoted or described.
On the I oth he proposes to go to the right bank of the
Elbe if Murat could not keep Leipzig; the same afternoon
he talks of only driving Blücher and Bernadotte over the
Elbe, and keeping them there by destroying their bridges.
Then he would return to Leipzig. On the I Ith he is in
great uncertainty as to Blücher's and Bernadotte's where-
abouts, and reverts to the idea of going to the right bank
and leaving them stranded on the left. Then he finds out
that they are not, as he had fancied, towards Dessau, but
towards Halle. On the 12th he has changed his plans
entirely, and proposes fighting a great battle at Taucha.
All this is very different from the quick grasp of the
situation and the immediate decision as to his course of
action which characterise his earlier campaigns.
There is no mention of Bernadotte in the correspondence
of the 12th till 3 P.M., when the Emperor writes to Mar-
mont * that he has seized the enemy's bridges on the Elbe,
and that the army of Berlin has gone to the right bank.
On this subject, Marmont says * he reported to the
Emperor, in the evening of the I Ith, that he had made
certain that the whole of the enemy's army was on the
hither side of the Elbe. If he is correct, the Emperor's
letter of the 12th is only one of many instances of the way
in which he now chose to believe what would suit him.”
Let us see now what had really been happening whilst
Napoleon sat in doubt and hesitation, very unusual in him,
in the “Schloss * at Düben. Blücher had marched to his
right on the morning of the 9th October, just as Napoleon
was beginning his advance down the Mulde on Düben.
He was making for the Saale towards Halle, as arranged
with Bernadotte. His movements on the 9th, and the
escape of Sacken by Raguhn have already been described.
Bernadotte went to Rothenburg, but he left Tauenzien
behind at Dessau to cover the bridges at Rosslau and
Acken.
* Corr. 20,775. * Mºm. iv. 270. * For positions, Map I., inset (d).
BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER 3I5.
On the I Ith Tauenzien heard that Reynier had crossed
the Elbe at Wittenberg on the previous day, and had
driven the blockading force on Coswig ; also that Mac-
donald was following Reynier. He, therefore, himself
crossed to Rosslau on the I2th, leaving one division at
Dessau, which was dispersed with the loss of some 2000
prisoners on that day.
On the same day (12th) Bernadotte was still at Rothen-
burg, whilst Blücher had reached Halle and occupied
Merseburg. He had thus passed with the Silesian army
from Bernadotte's left to his right.
That same night Napoleon was still hesitating as to
whether he would himself go to Leipzig or not. At 8 P.M.
he wrote to Murat, estimating the latter's force at 60, ooo,
and adding that Marmont will be “to-night” only ten miles
from Leipzig. “If I do not decide to go there (Leipzig)
myself, I will send him to you, which will give you 85,000
to 9o,ooo men ; with that you ought to be able to gain
some days.”* The Emperor still believed that Bernadotte
had retired to the right bank of the Elbe ; for Ney, in
reporting his action with Tauenzien's division at Dessau,
mentioned that he had seen immense baggage columns and
packs marching up the right bank from Acken. Reynier
and Dombrowski, the Emperor also says, had passed
Coswig and were marching on Rosslau.”
At 5 A.M. on the I3th Napoleon was decided to concen-
trate on Leipzig, but thought there was still time for
Reynier to march to Acken, in which operation Ney could
support him by a diversion from the left bank.” As soon
as that was done, Ney must hurry back to Düben. An
hour later * Napoleon ascertained that Reynier had been
fighting, on the previous day, only with Thümen and
Tauenzien, whom he had driven to a hurried and somewhat
disorderly retreat on Berlin. Bernadotte's headquarters
had been at Bernburg on the I Ith ; he had not re-crossed
the Elbe, but, on the contrary, was with Blücher behind the
Saale.
1 Corr. 20,781. * Corr. 20,783. * Corr. 20,789. * Corr. 20,790.
316 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Macdonald and Reynier were called back on Düben.
There was no advantage now in operating on the right
bank of the Elbe, where there was no enemy of importance
left. Even Thümen and Tauenzien were off to Berlin in
such a hurry that there was no probability of their returning
at present.
Leaving Napoleon to his concentration on Leipzig, we
turn back to bring up to date the events in the south.
When Napoleon left Dresden, Colloredo and Bennigsen
began their advance from Teplitz on Dresden by the now
well-known route. On the 8th Colloredo's advanced guard
was at Zehista. On the same day, Bubna who, it will be
remembered, was left by Blücher to watch Dresden on the
right bank of the Elbe, took the bridge head opposite Pirna,
The garrison retired to Dresden, taking their boats with them.
On the I oth Bennigsen, after making a reconnaissance
on Dresden, left Osterman to observe it with 20,000 men,
and himself marched by Colditz for Leipzig with 30,000.
Chasteler was left behind at Teplitz with Io,000 men to
guard Bohemia.
Murat’s movements had been as follows:–
On the 8th he was at Mittweida. Poniatowski drove the
Austrians from Penig.
On the 9th Klenau recaptured Penig, and, threatening
Poniatowski's left, compelled him to fall back towards
Murat at Rochlitz.
On the Ioth Murat retired northwards, on learning that
Wittgenstein was moving on Borna.
On the I Ith he took post at Wachau and Liebertwolk-
witz” with the II., V., and VIII. corps, and 5th cavalry
corps. His outposts were on the line Threna-Gross Pösna-
Naunhof.
It was this move which alarmed Napoleon, and induced
him to propose sending 20,000 men to support Murat.
Schwarzenberg's headquarters had been on the 8th at
Chemnitz. On the I Ith they were at Altenberg. Witt-
genstein, Kleist, and Klenau were about Borna.
* Map IV. (d).
BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER 317
On the I2th Augereau (IX. corps) reached Leipzig.
Schwarzenberg was more intent on getting into com-
munication with the northern armies than on fighting a
battle with Murat.
Napoleon, in his bulletin of the 15th October, says that
he gave up the project of operating on the right bank of
the Elbe, because, on the 13th, he learnt of the defection
of Bavaria, and feared that of other German states.
That is certainly an afterthought, since (I) the Conven-
tion of Ried, by which Bavaria joined the allies, was not
ratified till the 14th ; (2) Napoleon himself writes to Murat,
“in the evening ” of the 13th, that he has seen the Austrian,
Krafft, who had been captured with papers showing the
positions of Blücher and Bernadotte, and the terms of
peace the allies would grant. From this man he had
learnt that there was nothing definite about Bavaria.
Napoleon's orders for the 14th were issued at 3 A.M."
His own headquarters would be at the gates of
Leipzig.
Ney was expected to pass the Düben bridge that evening,
so as to be at Leipzig on the I 5th.
Macdonald was believed to be at Kemberg on the
I 3th, and to be able to pass at Düben in good time on the
I4th, so as to make room for Ney to pass at night.
Reynier was supposed to be at Wittenberg on the night
of the 13th. He would be near Düben on the 14th.
Sebastiani to hurry up past Macdonald, and reach Leipzig
as soon as possible.
Latour-Maubourg also to hurry forward on the right,
reconnoitring towards Delitzsch.
Oudinot and Mortier, the Guard cavalry, and Old Guard
to approach within two and a half miles of Leipzig.
Curial and Lefebvre-Desnoettes to march on Eilenburg
and Taucha at daybreak, accompanied by the King of
Saxony, who would be sent on with an escort to Leipzig.
General Durrieu to guard Eilenburg, where he would
collect parks, etc., on the left bank of the Mulde.
* Corr. 20,799.
318 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Bertrand to leave Düben at 9 A.M., and to be within two
and a half miles of Leipzig by evening.
In writing to Macdonald at 7 A.M., the Emperor says:
“There can be no doubt that to-morrow, I 5th, we shall be
attacked by the army of Bohemia and by the army of
Silesia. March then in all haste, and if you hear a
cannonade, march to its fire.” +
Napoleon left Düben some time after 7 A.M., reaching
Leipzig about midday. He had intended staying there,
but went on to Reudnitz after riding through Leipzig.
To the south, as he rode towards Reudnitz, he could hear
plainly, and even see the artillery of the action then pro-
ceeding between Murat and the Bohemian army.
The positions of Murat's forces on the morning of the
14th were *:—
Infantry. Cavalry. Guns.
VIII. corps . . 5400 6oo 3o Markkleeberg, Dölitz, -
Lösnig and Connewitz
4th Cavalry corps . — 18oo P Main body behind
Markkleeberg, with
detachments beyond
the Pleisse.
II. Corps º . 15, ooo — 58 On heights between
Wachau and Mark-
kleeberg, the former
being strongly held.
V. corps º . I2, ooo 7oo 53 About Probstheida.
5th cavalry corps and Just west of Liebert-
Berkheim’s division X. — 4, ooo P wolkwitz.
of the 1st
In reserve at Holz-
A division of the g==º
hausen. .
Guard cavalry 2,700 P
In all 32,400 infantry, 9,800 cavalry, and I 56 guns.
Early in the morning Pahlen, with Wittgenstein's ad-
avnced guard, moved forward by Cröbern. He had I 800
Russian cavalry and Cossacks, IOOO Prussian cavalry, and
2O guns.
The Cossacks came to a standstill in face of the great
cavalry masses in front of Wachau and Markkleeberg.
* Corr. 20,8ol. * Map IV. (d).
BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER 3I9
Pahlen was first reinforced by 6 squadrons, and then by
14 more, with 16 guns, under Röder, sent by Kleist from the
Prussian reserve cavalry.
Eugen of Wurtemberg, reconnoitring in front of Gulden-
gössa, denied Diebitsch's assumption, according to which
there was only a French rearguard. He succeeded in con-
vincing Diebitsch, who went off for more cavalry. Pahlen,
however, advanced as soon as the Prussian reserve cavalry
began to come up. The cavalry combat which ensued in
this direction swayed backwards and forwards with varying
success. On the whole, the French got a little the worst
of it.
About 2 P.M. Klenau attacked Liebertwolkwitz and took
the whole of it, except the church, in which the enemy
obstinately held out. Counter attacks failed to dislodge
Klenau, but there was a long fight, and in the evening he
evacuated the village.
There were more cavalry combats in the afternoon in the
centre, when again the French got rather the worst of it.
In one of the charges here, Murat, leading in person,
narrowly escaped capture. He was easily recognised by the
extravagance of his costume.
About Markkleeberg the French cavalry, at first victorious,
were in the end driven back.
The upshot of the whole affair was that both sides re-
mained in their original positions.
The battle was the greatest cavalry contest of the war.
Friederich considers there were faults in leading on both
sides. The allies attacked piecemeal, instead of in masses,
whilst Murat kept his cavalry so closely massed that, once
they were shaken, it was impossible to prevent their getting
into confusion. Neither side could hope for a decisive vic-
tory, and Murat caused his cavalry unnecessary loss, when
he should have preserved it for the battles of the following
days. Pajol’s in particular was so knocked about as to be
quite unserviceable in the evening. All that Murat required
to do was to keep the Liebertwolkwitz-Wachau line of
heights, and prevent the enemy from seeing into his position
320 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
behind them. That he could have done by using his in-
fantry more freely, and sparing his cavalry.
The allies, on the other hand, had not enough troops up
for decisive success. What they wanted was (I) to get a
view of the positions behind Murat's front, in which they
succeeded to some extent, and (2) to ascertain if he really
meant to hold it. The latter they could infer from the re-
sistance encountered.
On the morning of the 15th October Murat came to
headquarters to report the events of the previous day. After
a long conversation with the Emperor, both rode to the
heights between Liebertwolkwitz and Wachau. Here
Napoleon remained for several hours in conversation with
Berthier, Murat, and others. Thence he went, after noon, to
the position occupied by Poniatowski, who had his right on
Dölitz and Markkleeberg. Here he gave much attention to
the ground beyond the Pleisse, to the possible points of
passage, and to the marshes interfering with the movement
of troops. Then he rode to Reudnitz along the front by
Holzhausen and Zweinaundorf.
The published correspondence of the I 5th is very scanty.
At 8 A.M. the Emperor writes 4 to Macdonald, saying it is
not known yet what has become of Murat's opponents of
the day before. He tells Macdonald at Lindenhain to re-
port when he will be at Taucha, but not to cross the bridge
there over the Partha, in case it should be necessary to send
him by Naunhof. Then follows an important passage:—
“All reports are that, by a manoeuvre which I cannot
understand, the Prince of Sweden has passed the Saale, and
is marching on Merseburg, so that the Duke of Ragusa can
have nothing but cavalry in front of him.”
This, he thought, was folly on Bernadotte's part, as it
would leave him (Napoleon) time to destroy the Bohemian
army.
This passage seems to show that the Emperor believed
the Silesian and Northern armies to be united under Berna-
dotte, towards Merseburg. In another letter of Io P.M.” he
* Corr. 20,807. * Corr. 20,812.
BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER 32I
tells Marmont, who was towards Breitenfelde in the direction
of Halle, that many camp fires had been seen at Markran-
städt, which seemed to indicate that the enemy was to be
expected, not by the Halle road, but by that from Weissen-
fels, on which he would have his right connected, by Zwenkau
or Pegau, with the left of the army of Bohemia.
Four hours earlier Napoleon had sent orders to Macdonald
that he was to start from Taucha at daybreak, to march on
Holzhausen and Seifertshain, where he would receive orders
for turning the enemy's right, that is, the right of the army
of Bohemia.
These conclusions were erroneous ; for Blücher had ad-
vanced from Halle towards Leipzig, and was already facing
east with his right about Schkeuditz. The Emperor had
good reason for regretting, in his letter to Marmont, that
the latter had not pushed his reconnaissances as far as
Schkeuditz.
Bernadotte was not at Merseburg, but far away on the
the line Wettin-Zorbig. The fires which were seen at
Markranstädt were those of the left wing of the Bohemian
army, which extended thence by Cröbern and Guldengössa.
Napoleon believed it to extend only from Cröbern to
Naunhof.
The French corps stood this evening thus :-
Bertrand at Eutritzsch.
Marmont at Lindenthal facing towards Halle.
Poniatowski at Markkleeberg and Dösen, with his right
thrown back along the Pleisse as far as Connewitz.
Victor at Wachau.
Lauriston—Liebertwolkwitz.
Polish cavalry (Kellermann) at Dösen.
Latour-Maubourg—Zweinaundorf.
Pajol at Holzhausen.
Augereau—Zuckelhausen.
Guard—Reudnitz and Crottendorf, as general reserve.
Souham—Two divisions at Mockau, the third behind, on
the road from Düben.
Macdonald—Taucha.
X
322 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Sebastiani—Marching on Taucha.
Reynier—Düben.
We have already referred sufficiently to the indecisions of
Napoleon. There is only one story on which we need say
a word further, that which pretends that Napoleon gave up
his plan of crossing the Elbe under pressure from a deputation
of his own marshals and generals. Friederich shows that the
evidence of this is very slight, and the probabilities strongly
against it. In this connection the German critic mentions
that there was an idea that Napoleon might cross the Elbe at
Wittenberg, march behind it to Magdeburg and recross there
to retreat in safety by Wesel, picking up Davout as he went.
Friederich seems to think that if the Emperor ever really
contemplated abandoning the left bank in order to pass to
the right, it would have been with this object, rather than
with the intention of operating eastwards, or across the line
of the allies' communications.
Of the allies, Bernadotte was at this time as shifty as ever.
Blücher's scheme for posting him in front of Halle,
whilst he himself faced south on the right bank of the Saale,
did not suit the Crown Prince at all ; for it put him in the
forefront of the battle, exposed to Napoleon's first attack.
Seeing that Bernadotte and Blücher together were only
about equal in numbers to Napoleon, it seems doubtful
whether the plan was not too risky.
As for Schwarzenberg, von Caemmerer is very severe on
him. Starting with 160,000 men, he had taken I 7 days to
march 70 miles, though he had nothing to stop him except
the 45,000 * men under Murat, a mere handful in compari-
son with his host, not enough to do more than watch him.
“Schwarzenberg's operations in western Saxony can only be
characterised as a most defective piece of generalship, which
was also diametrically opposed to any reasonable interpreta-
tion of the Reichenbach agreement.”.” Such is von Caem-
merer's general verdict. He goes on to point out that, had
* When Napoleon, on the Ioth October, estimates Murat's strength at 60,000,
he had been reinforced by Augereau and Arrighi with 22,000 men.
* Die Beſreiungskriege, 1813-1815, p. 73.
BERNADOTTE AND BLUCHER 323
gº
Schwarzenberg used his cavalry as he had seen Napoleon
do, he should have known at once the weakness of the
enemy opposed to him. By the 9th October he knew that
Napoleon could not at once support Murat, and that Blücher
was in great danger. Had he had the decision to attack
Murat at Borna on the I oth, he could have decisively de-
feated him, have seized Leipzig next day, and have cut off
Augereau, who had only reached Weissenfels on the Ioth.
He had still great opportunities even up to the 14th. “The
battle against the King of Naples, south of Leipzig, which
he missed, is a grave reproach against the commander of the
allies, for which he alone must bear the responsibility.” "
* Ibid.
CHAPTER XIX
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG ON THE
I6TH OCTOBER 1

EIPZIG, like Dresden, has increased in population
from about 3O,OOO in 18 I 3 to over half a million.
Like Dresden, too, it was no longer a fortress in
I 813, and, though the old wall still stood in a
rather dilapidated condition, the suburbs had spread out
some distance on all sides of it. Since then they have
absorbed large areas, which were then open country dotted
with villages, the names of which now represent areas of
closely-built city.
The suburbs of 18 I 3 contained numerous open spaces,
and were separated from the old fortified city (an irregular
quadrilateral of 8oo or 9oo yards) by the open ring on the
site of the old glacis, which is now represented by the Ross
Platz, and other open gardens and boulevards.
The principal entrances to the city were by the four gates,
Halle in the north, Grimma east, Peters south, and Rannstadt
north-west. These were all suitable for wheeled traffic, and
there were several others for foot passengers only. The
southern and eastern suburbs were the best built, full of
substantial houses, with garden walls and other readily
adaptable means of defence. The northern and western
were poorer quarters, with narrow, crooked streets.
The western side of Leipzig rested on the Pleisse and the
ramifications of that river and the Elster, which unite here,
and the former is absorbed in the latter. Both rivers arrive
from points only a very few degrees east and west of south.
The space between them is a network of channels, with
* Maps I. and IV. (d).
324
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG 325
woods, marshes, and gardens between them, a very difficult
country in which to move troops. After passing Leipzig,
the Elster turns almost at right angles to its former course,
and makes for the Saale above Halle. South of this part
of its course is the Luppe, which seems to be really a branch
of the Elster. Between the two is a strip similar to that
between the Elster and the Pleisse above Leipzig. The
channels between the Elster and the Pleisse are so numerous
that it is almost impossible to say which belongs to which
river. The road from the north-west gate of Leipzig was
carried to Lindenau on an embankment, which had five stone
and several wooden bridges over the numerous channels in
a distance of about a mile and a half. The principal bridge,
one destined to gain a terrible notoriety, was just outside
the Rannstadt gate.
The Partha, rising south of Grimma, flows north-west to
beyond Taucha, where it turns suddenly to the south-west
to join the Pleisse just north of Leipzig. Though a small
stream, it was very tortuous, with steep or marshy banks,
which made it a serious obstacle to troops. The Rietschke
brook, flowing past Eutritzsch to join the Elster near Gohlis,
was also a lesser obstacle.
The circle round Leipzig is divided by the Elster, the
Pleisse, and the Partha into three main segments, with a
fourth in the shape of the marshy ground between the two
first named. The western segment lies between the upper
Elster and the Luppe, the northern between the lower Elster and
the Partha, the southern between the Partha and the Pleisse.
The southern area is marked by a succession of low
ridges, like waves flowing outwards from Leipzig. The
ridges, low though they are, formed good positions for troops
defending Leipzig, whilst the hollows behind them served to
conceal reserves. At the same time, the country was very
open and well suited to cavalry, which was only obstructed
by the marshes and ponds in the hollows. The highest
point on this side was the Galgenberg, between Wachau and
Liebertwolkwitz. A feature to be noticed is the low, flat
hill called the Kolm Berg, half a mile east of Liebertwolk-
326 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
witz, crowned by the remains of an old Swedish redoubt, a
relic of the days of Gustavus Adolphus. A marshy brook
flowed round its western and northern sides.
The western segment is an almost level plain. Two
slight elevations west of Lindenau alone afforded some
command for artillery.
The plateau of the northern segment is less undulating
than that of the south, though perhaps the descent to the
Rietschke brook is rather steeper than the southern slopes.
The villages surrounding Leipzig were generally well
built (least so in the west), with broad streets, massive
churches, and clay or brick garden and cemetery walls.
Napoleon had caused the existing means of defence in
the suburbs, such as garden walls, ditches, and tanks, to be
improved by loopholing, palisading, and excavation. Round
Lindenau he had constructed several small works, besides
palisades, chevaux de frise, etc.
The road over the causeway to Lindenau was the only
one left for the French retreat, and the allies were threaten-
ing to close that. The Emperor himself had contributed to
the difficulties of a retreat by Lützen, for, in order to render
the bad ground between the rivers a better protection to his
flank, he had destroyed nearly all the bridges of the Pleisse
and Elster, except those of the causeway.
The only paved roads to the south and east were those
leading to Borna, Grimma, and Wurzen, and even these
were only in good repair within municipal limits. From
the north of Leipzig one more such road issued, dividing
outside into the roads to Halle, Landsberg, Delitzsch,
Düben, and Eilenburg. With these exceptions, there were
nothing but very bad country roads.
Schwarzenberg's first orders for battle on the 16th con-
templated the following operations :—
(1) Blücher, with the Silesian army, to advance by the
Merseburg road on Leipzig, through Günthersdorf, maintain-
ing at the same time his communications with Halle.
(2) Gyulai, with Moritz, Lichtenstein, and Thielmann,
to concentrate at Markranstädt and advance direct on
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG 327
Leipzig. For the day he was to be under Blücher's
orders.
(3) Meerveldt's corps, with the Austrian reserve and the
Russian Guard, to assemble at Zwenkau and move on
Leipzig, between the Elster and the Pleisse.
(4) Wittgenstein, Kleist, and Klenau, to attack on the
right bank of the Pleisse, and drive the enemy northwards
on Leipzig. All attacks to begin at 7 A.M.
These orders came to this ; that Wittgenstein, Kleist,
and Klenau, with 72, ooo men, were to attack Napoleon, who
was assumed to be concentrated south of Leipzig, in front.
Meerveldt, with 52,000, to attack his right and rear about
Connewitz, through the difficult tract between the Elster and
the Pleisse. Gyulai and Blücher to attack Leipzig in the
western segment, between the upper and the lower Elster ;
with 73,000 men. These were to stop the Lindenau outlet.
The lesson of Dresden had been forgotten ; the army was
to be split by the marshy valley of the Elster and Pleisse,
as at Dresden it had been split by the Plauen gorge.
Blücher, Gyulai, and Meerveldt, with two-thirds of the
army, were set an almost impossible task, against a point
which Napoleon had satisfied himself could be defended by
comparatively small forces. Meanwhile, he would be able to
fall with greatly superior forces on the 72,000 on the south
of Leipzig. y
Toll," Jomini, and others protested against this, and
finally appealed to the Tsar. Even he could not convince
Schwarzenberg, and, in the end, he was forced to tell the
Commander-in-Chief that he could please himself about his
Austrians, but that the Russians must come to the right
bank of the Pleisse.
Then Schwarzenberg at last gave way, and issued fresh
orders :—
(1) Blücher to remain as he was, on the right bank of
the lower Elster, attacking, not Lindenau, but the north
side of Leipzig.
(2) Gyulai to attack Lindenau.
* Danilewski, pp. 233-235.
328 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
(3) Meerveldt's force was reduced to 28,000 Austrians only.
(4) 24,OOO of the Russian Guard and cuirassiers, with-
drawn from Meerveldt, were ordered to Rötha, five miles
behind Wittgenstein.
Napoleon had hoped to be able to attack the army of
Bohemia on the I 5th of October, but was prevented by the
absence of Macdonald's and Souham's corps.
On the morning of the 16th October he had available
round Leipzig, or approaching it, these forces :—
Men. Guns.
(I) South of Leipzig tº e I 38,600 488
(2) At Lindenau . ſº Q 3,200 I6
(3) North of Leipzig, including
Delmas' 4,800 men still
marching from Düben . 49, 5 OO I 86
Total e tº I9 I,3OO 690
The number was really not quite so great, as no deduction
has been made for the losses in Murat's battle of the I 4th.
The only other troops to come up were Reynier's I4,OOO,
who could not arrive from Düben till the next day. Against
these the allies had :—
I. South of Leipzig—
Men. Guns.
(1) On the line Fuchshain,
Gross Pösna, Gulden-
gössa, Cröbern . g 62,000 I 8 I
(2) Reserve at Grühna ſº IO,5 OO 34
(3) Marching on Rötha e 24,OOO 243
Total e e 96,500 458
II. Between the Pleisse and Elster 3O,OOO 90
III. Opposite Lindenau o © I 9,000 58
IV. At Schkeuditz (Blücher) e 54, 5 OO 3 I O
Grand total ge 2Oo,ooo 9 I 6
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG 329
Including Cossacks, etc., they had, in round figures,
2O5,OOO men and 9 I 6 guns, against Napoleon's I 9 I,ooo
men and 690 guns. They already had an immense
superiority in guns, though many of them never came into
action. Of cavalry they had on the 16th about 40,000,
against 3O,OOO of Napoleon. Still, except in artillery, it
cannot be said they had any marked superiority; certainly
not sufficient to compensate for the superiority of Napoleon
as a commander.
But when we come to look at what the two opponents
could bring on to the field between the 16th and the 19th,
it is different. Napoleon could only expect another 14,Ooo
men with Reynier, raising his total to 205,ooo, with about
7OO guns.
The allies had to be joined by the 18th by :-
Men, Guns.
(1) Bernadotte º gº . 6 I,000 226
(2) Beningsen * e . 3 I,OOO I 34
(3) Colloredo e * g I 9,000 I O6
Total . & . I I I, OOO 466
Grand total, including those
available on the I 6th . 3 I 6,OOO I,382
Even to this number must be added 5 Ooo Cossacks
with Bernadotte's army. The whole of the allied cavalry
(exclusive of 85 Oo Cossacks) would be roughly 60,000
against 30,000. Briefly, in the whole of the battles round
Leipzig the allies had a superiority of about I 3O,OOO
IIle11.
The troops on either side on the southern battlefield were
disposed thus at the commencement :—
I. FRENCH
(1) On the line Connewitz-Lösnig-Dôlitz-Markkleeberg,
330 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Lefol's small French division, the VIII. corps (Poniatowski)
and the Polish cavalry.”
(2) Victor behind, and on both sides of Wachau.
(3) Lauriston between Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz, with
the Young Guard and Curial's division of Old Guard behind
him.
(4) Augereau (IX. corps) behind Zuckelhausen.
(5) Macdonald and the 2nd cavalry corps marching on
Holzhausen.
(6) In reserve about Probstheida, Friant's Old Guard
division, and the mass of the cavalry (Ist corps, Guard
cavalry, and 5th corps).
II. ALLIES
(1) Between the Pleisse and the Elster, about I 5,ooo men
each at Gautzsch and between Zobigker and Prödel.
(2) Kleist advancing on Markkleeberg.
(3) Eugen of Wurtemberg on Wachau from the south.
(4) Pahlen's cavalry linking Eugen to Gortchakow.
(5) Gortchakow, moving on the south side of Liebert-
wolkwitz.
(6) Klenau and Ziethen on the east side of the same
village.
(7) Reserve at Grühna. Russian grenadiers and cuiras-
siers. -- -
(8) Russian and Prussian Guards, marching on Rötha
from between the rivers, under the second set of orders.
Of the allied troops elsewhere than on the south we need
only say, for the present, that Gyulai was at Markranstädt;
Blücher about Schkeuditz, opposed to Marmont about Lin-
denthal and Breitenfeld.
Of the French, Bertrand was at Eutritzsch; Brayer's and
Ricard's divisions (III. corps) marching on Mockau ; and
Delmas' of the same corps convoying the trains from Düben.
Dombrowski's division was at Plaussig ; Arrighi (Governor
of Leipzig) with the small force at Lindenau.
* Consisting of portions of his “regiments de marche” newly arrived, and not
yet distributed to their units. |
* Commanded by Sokolnicki in the absence of Kellermann–sick.
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG 33I
The first act of the “battle of the nations,” that which
was played on the 16th October, comprises three distinct
actions.
(I) The attack on the south, generally known as the
battle of Wachau, with its flank attack between the Pleisse
and the Elster.
(2) Gyulai's attack on Lindenau.
(3) Blücher's attack on the north.
These we will describe in the order given.
(1) WACHAU 1
Ist period, 9 A.M. to I I A.M.—The chief command of the
frontal attack in the south was vested in Barclay, with
Wittgenstein in executive command under him.
Wittgenstein decided to attack in five columns.
(I) Klenau on the right, with about 33,000 men and 8o
guns, to assemble between Fuchshain and the Ober Holz,
and to attack Liebertwolkwitz from the east.
(2) Gortchakow, 9ooo men and 20 guns, to march from
between the Ober Holz and Störmthal, against the south
side of Liebertwolkwitz.
(3) Eugen of Wurtemberg, I I,000 men and 3 I guns, to
assemble at Guldengössa for an attack on the south-east of
Wachau.
(4) Kleist, 84Oo men and 26 guns, to start from south of
Cröbern, advancing through it on the space between Wachau
and Markkleeberg.
(5) Pahlen, with 54oo cavalry, was to move from Gulden-
gössa on the heights between Wachau and Liebertwolkwitz,
* Danilewski (p. 237) gives Schwarzenberg's proclamation to his troops before
the battle of the 16th October. It is a palpable, and by no means bad, imitation
of Napoleon's proclamations of happier days. It runs thus:—
“Brave soldiers The most important epoch of this holy war is at hand.
The decisive hour is striking. Prepare yourselves for battle ! The bond which
unites the mighty nations in one great enterprise will be drawn closer and tighter
on the battlefield. Russians ! Prussians ! Austrians you fight for a cause !
You fight for the independence of Europe, for the freedom of your sons, for the
immortality of your name ! All for one one for all ! With this sublime, manly
cry, enter upon the sacred battle. Remain ever constant and victory is yours.”
332 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
thus linking the attacks of Gortchakow and Eugen of
Wurtemberg.
In reserve, the Russian grenadiers and cuirassiers, Io,500
men and 34 guns, on the high road south of Grühna.
The 24,OOO men and 243 guns, withdrawn by the second
set of orders from Meerveldt, were at Audigast on the night
of the I 5th. They were to march at I A.M. on Rötha.
Wittgenstein's five columns were spread over a front of
some six miles, unable to see one another. There was,
therefore, little hope of simultaneous action. Napoleon's
positions have already been described.
The morning of Saturday, October 16, broke cold and
rainy, with a thick mist shutting out the view. Attack at
7 A.M. was out of the question, and the allies only began to
move an hour later, as a west wind sprang up and cleared
away the mist and smoke.
Napoleon reached the battlefield shortly after 9 A.M. At
the Galgenberg he was met by Murat, who had been
observing from the château at Wachau. The Emperor
made a long and careful study of the battlefield through his
glass. He saw that the enemy had anticipated the attack
he himself intended, and that his own corps were by no
means all up. Accordingly he sent reinforcements to the
points most threatened.
The Tsar, arriving about the same hour on the height
south of Guldengössa, saw the weakness of Wittgenstein's
attack in widely separated columns, and that it must fail,
unless supported. He immediately ordered up the Russian
grenadiers and cuirassiers, from Grühna and Magdeborn, to
Auenhain, directed the Russian and Prussian guards from
beyond the Pleisse on Cröbern and Guldengössa, and sent
to request Schwarzenberg, who was with Meerveldt's force,
to send the Austrian reserve over the Pleisse.
Eugen of Wurtemberg, the first of the allies to advance,
easily got possession of Wachau, but could not get beyond
it, owing to heavy artillery fire. Napoleon had sent the
artillery of the Young Guard to this part of the field. It
was 9.30 when Eugen got into Wachau. For the next
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG 333
hour, a furious hand-to-hand fight raged in the village
which, after changing hands several times, was finally re-
captured by the French by I 1 A.M. Eugen's men took
shelter in a fold of the ground south of Wachau, on which
they kept up a continuous fire. Eugen held on pluckily,
for he felt that his defeat would mean ruin for the rest of
the army.
On Eugen's left, Kleist had got possession of Markklee-
burg, and he managed to hold on there, though he could not
get forward in face of the French artillery. He still held it
at I I A.M., though he had suffered heavily, especially in an
attempt to support Eugen by an attack on the west side of
Wachau.
Gortchakow's column, on Eugen’s right, had advanced on
Liebertwolkwitz without waiting for Klenau's attack from
the east. Crushed by the French artillery, it fell back
towards the Nieder Holz, thus making a gap between
Gortchakow and Eugen, which the latter had to fill with
Pirch's brigade from his second line. Pahlen's cavalry had
equally been unable to face the French artillery.
Klenau had not begun his advance from Gross Pösna
till I o A.M. The Kolmberg was found unoccupied, and
Klenau sent two battalions and I 2 guns on to it, supported
by Schäfer's brigade in rear. At the same time, he sent
5 battalions, 4 Squadrons, and I4 guns against Liebertwolk-
witz, which had been almost reduced to ruins on the I 4th,
except the church, in which the French now held out after
they had lost the rest of the village.
From the Kolmberg Klenau had marked the advance of
heavy French columns between Baalsdorf and Holzhausen.
He, therefore, appealed to Pahlen for help in cavalry, and
received I4 squadrons. At I I A.M. his left was fighting in
Liebertwolkwitz, and he held the Kolmberg, the garrison of
which was supported by Schäfer's brigade, having Pahlen's
I4 squadrons on its left. Abele's and Ziethen's brigades
were between Fuchshain and Gross Pösna.
Whilst all this was going on east of the Pleisse, Meerveldt
had found insuperable obstacles to his attack on Napoleon's
334 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
right. He could not bring up his artillery in the bad
ground, all the bridges over the channels and the Pleisse
were gone, except one which was barricaded, and flanked by
artillery. By II A.M. all his attacks had failed, with the
solitary exception of that on the “schloss" at Dölitz, on the
hither side of the Pleisse. He was reduced to the defensive
against the French counter-attacks. -
It was about this time that Wolzogen, carrying the
Tsar's message to Schwarzenberg, found him and Radetzky
at Gautzsch. Both were very depressed, saying Meerveldt
had already lost 4ooo men and had no hope of crossing the
Pleisse. It was not till noon that Schwarzenberg could be
persuaded to part with the Austrian reserve. At that hour
Bianchi's and Weissenwolf's brigades, preceded by Nostitz's
cavalry, started viá Gaschwitz and Deuben.
Napoleon, meanwhile, had reinforced his weakest points
by sending Augereau to support Poniatowski on the line
Dösen-Wachau. Letort’s division of Guard cavalry also
supported the Poles. Four divisions of Young Guard, and
Curial's of Old Guard, were placed behind Liebertwolkwitz
when Klenau attacked it, and Friant's was moved forward
from Probstheida to the Meusdorf farm. Oudinot was sent
to behind Wachau when that place first fell.
The Emperor had no reason for dissatisfaction with this
first defensive period of the battle. Macdonald was now
deploying between Holzhausen and Liebertwolkwitz, with
Sebastiani's cavalry on his left, marching on Seifertshain.
The attack on Napoleon's right had failed, as he could now
see, since the weather had quite cleared up.
2nd period, from II A.M. till 2 P.M.–Napoleon now pre-
pared to pass from the defensive to the offensive. He
expected presently to be strengthened by Marmont from
the north, as well as by Souham (III. corps). He had
obstinately maintained, notwithstanding Marmont's reports
to the contrary, that there was nothing of importance on the
Halle road, and that the enemy was to be expected rather
by that of Merseburg. He wished Marmont to come south
across the Partha, to halfway between Leipzig and Liebert-
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG 335
wolkwitz, whence he would be in a position to support the
Emperor, or, in the improbable event of a strong force
approaching from Halle, to assist Bertrand in that direction."
It suffices here to record the fact that Napoleon's hopes
were disappointed, and that, of all these expected reinforce-
ments, only two divisions of the III. corps arrived, and they
too late for a decisive stroke. The reasons for this will
appear later.
In the meanwhile, Macdonald was ordered to storm the
Kolmberg and push thence on Seifertshain, turning the
right flank of the allies. When this movement was complete,
the Emperor proposed to advance all along his line. Victor
and Oudinot would advance on Auenhain, Lauriston on
Guldengössa, Mortier with two divisions of Young Guard
on the Nieder Holz, the attack being supported, and the
enemy's centre shattered by the fire of a great battery, to be
collected by Drouot between Victor's left and Lauriston's
right.
Having thus driven a great wedge into the centre of the
allies, the Emperor hoped to drive their left into the Pleisse,
their right eastwards off its communications with Dresden.
It was to give the finishing touch to this great movement
that he wanted Marmont and Souham.
Macdonald himself went with Charpentier's division against
the Kolmberg, whilst Gérard's division moved on Klein
Pösna, and Ledru's on Seifertshain. Marchand in reserve.
There was a moment's hesitation before the artillery fire
from the Kolmberg, then it was carried with a rush, four
guns being taken in the Swedish redoubt. Klenau narrowly
escaped capture, his horse being killed. Schäfer's reserve
brigade, led forward by Toll, broke and fled when only one
battalion had come into action. It made for Fuchshain.
The only redeeming point was a gallant charge by four
squadrons of Ziethen's cavalry, which recaptured three guns
taken by the French at the southern foot of the knoll.
Sebastiani's cavalry came near to making an end of Schäfer's
fugitives, but their leader's heart failed him on the arrival of
* Corr. 20,814, dated 16th October, 7 A.M.
336 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Pahlen's I4 squadrons and a few of the dreaded Cossacks,
whose shouts were more effective than their charge.
During this fight Lauriston drove the Austrians in
Liebertwolkwitz back on Gross Pösna. Farther west,
Klenau's repulse compelled Gortchakow to retire to the line
Guldengössa - University Wood." Pahlen followed suit;
Kleist had been forced back, leaving only a detachment
desperately holding out in Markkleeberg. Eugen of
Wurtemberg alone, though two-thirds of his force had been
killed or wounded, obstinately held his place. A confused
cavalry fight on Kleist's left had eventually ended in the
repulse of the allies.
Then Kleist, receiving a fresh impulse from the advance
of Rajewski's grenadiers, pushed forward again to the
heights between Wachau and Markkleeberg, whence meeting
Poniatowski and Augereau, he was again slowly forced back
towards Cröbern. His detachment still clung desperately to
the southern part of Markkleeberg.
Between the Pleisse and the Elster, Meerveldt made no
progress during this period.
Napoleon had remained on the Galgenberg, watching the
progress of the battle. When Macdonald had stormed the
Kolmberg, and Lauriston had retaken Liebertwolkwitz, he
wrote to the King of Saxony that “all is going well, and we
have occupied the heights and villages.” He also ordered
all the bells of Leipzig to be rung, to announce his victory.
At 2 P.M. all the attacking columns of the allies had been
driven back to their starting points.
3rd period. After 2 P.M.–During Macdonald's turning
movement, Napoleon had been preparing for the general
attack. The 1st cavalry corps and the Guard cavalry were
massed at Meusdorf. Victor formed columns of attack,
with Oudinot's two divisions of Young Guard on his left;
Lauriston did likewise, with Mortier's two divisions behind
him. Friant's division of Old Guard moved up towards
Wachau.
When Napoleon gave the signal for the general advance,
1 The Ober and Nieder Holz.
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG 337
he still anxiously expected the arrival of Marmont, though
he knew Bertrand had already been sent to Lindenau.
Victor and Oudinot advanced on Auenhain farm, Lauriston
on Guldengössa, Mortier on the University Wood, Macdonald
on Seifertshain.
Kleist was in desperate straits as he fell back before
Poniatowski and Augereau on Cröbern. At this juncture
Nostitz's cavalry arrived from beyond the Pleisse, just as
Letort's French Guard cavalry and Berkheim, with ten more
squadrons, reached the plain north of Cröbern. Nostitz sent
two regiments against Letort and two against Berkheim. In
each case the French were driven back, but the Austrians,
suffering severely from the fire from infantry squares, and
meeting more cavalry, were driven back to Cröbern. In
support of the general advance, which had commenced just
after 2 P.M., Drouot had collected a battery of 84 guns on
the plateau in front of the Galgenberg.
Behind the guns was the Ist cavalry corps, now com-
manded by Doumerc, since Latour-Maubourg had lost a leg
by a round shot. It was about 2.30 P.M., whilst the cavalry
fight on the right was still in progress, when Doumerc sent
forward Bordesoulle with his cuirassier division of I 8
Squadrons, 25 Oo men at most.* Sending 4 Squadrons of
Saxons against the battery on his right, Bordesoulle charged
straight ahead with the rest, starting from a point on the
right of Drouot's great battery. One of the battalions of
Eugen of Wurtemberg, still holding on in their old position,
was carried away, and, though another had time to form
Square, Bordesoulle gained possession of 26 guns. Hewing
down the enemy right and left as they passed, the cuirassiers
arrived at some ponds in front of the Wachtberg, on which
were Alexander and the King of Prussia. The position of
* Pelet represents this cavalry charge as made by III squadrons, 12,000 men.
His story is disposed of by a letter from Bordesoulle to the Spectateur militaire,
dated 23rd March 1827. His narrative, which bears the stamp of truth, shows
that only his own division charged. It is confirmed, not only by the omission of
mention of this charge in the regimental histories of the regiments of the other
divisions, but also by the fact that he was beaten off in the end by 13 allied
squadrons, a fate which could hardly have fallen on III squadrons.
Y
338 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
the sovereigns was analogous to that of Napoleon at Eylau
after Augereau's repulse. But the French charge was nearly
spent. As they struggled to get forward between the ponds,
they were charged by the Cossack escort, and, on their left
flank, by I 3 squadrons of Russian cuirassiers. The French
horses being blown, and their riders exhausted, the whole
division was driven back in confusion behind Drouot, whose
grape fire finally brought the pursuit to an end. It was
3.30 P.M. when the last of Bordesoulle's horsemen dis-
appeared behind the guns, and the artillery fire, which had
been partially suspended during their charge, broke out with
renewed violence. During this cavalry action Napoleon's
infantry had pressed steadily on. Victor and Augereau on
the right drove Kleist back on Cröbern, from which Bianchi,
at the head of the Austrian reserves, began to debouch at
4 P.M.
Eugen of Wurtemberg had been forced back to the line
Auenhain-Guldengössa, with Rajewski's grenadiers behind
him.
The Prussian Guards were now marching on Guldengössa,
where there was a battery of 94 Russian guns.
Klein Pösna had been occupied by Gérard and Sebastiani;
Macdonald was advancing with Ledru's division to the
attack (4 P.M.) of Seifertshain, and Charpentier's against the
University Wood. At 5 P.M. Seifertshain had been stormed
and retaken several times. As darkness fell, Gérard retired
on Fuchshain, Ledru towards Marchand on the Kolmberg,
Charpentier, after driving the Austrians from the Nieder
Holz, and failing to take Gross Pösna from Ziethen, still
held the Nieder Holz when darkness stopped the fighting.
Mortier, meanwhile, after assisting Charpentier's attack
on the Nieder Holz, failed to make his way into the Ober
Holz.
Maison, leading Lauriston's advance on Guldengössa, got
into the village, but was driven out by reinforcements and
compelled to retire in such disorder to the heights that
nothing more could be done. He was himself badly
wounded.
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG 339
Victor, at 4 P.M., had got possession of Auenhain, except
the Manor House, which the Russians held. Presently
Augereau, on Victor's right, was forced back from before
Cröbern by Bianchi, with Kleist on his right, a movement
which compelled Victor to retire from Auenhain.
Weissenwolf had now come up, and enabled Bianchi to
get forward again to Markkleeberg and towards Dólitz.
The French right was now in a critical position, as
Meerveldt, relieved by Bianchi's advance, had at last got
across the Pleisse. At 5.30 he even got into Dölitz. But
Napoleon had now sent Curial's Old Guard division, and
Ricard's of Souham's corps, which was at last up, to strengthen
his right. This resulted in the stoppage of Bianchi's ad-
vance, and the driving of Meerveldt's troops back over the
Pleisse. Meerveldt himself, being shortsighted, rode into
the midst of some Saxons and Poles, whom he mistook for
Hungarians, and was taken prisoner.
At nightfall Bianchi was still between Dölitz and Mark-
kleeberg, the former, including its “schloss,” having been
recaptured by the French. As a whole, the battle had been
a drawn one : the gains of the allies on their left towards
Markkleeberg were counteracted by the advance of the
French on the other wing to Klein Pösna, to in front of
Gross Pösna, and into the Nieder Holz.
Artillery fire continued into the night after darkness had
stopped other fighting.
The ensuing night was spent by the allied sovereigns in
Rötha, Borna, and Grüna. Napoleon was in the centre of
Friant's division of the Old Guard.
(2) LINDENAU
Gyulai's attack on Lindenau can be described more
briefly than the battle about Wachau. His task was to form
a connecting link between the Austrians on the left bank of
the upper Pleisse and Blücher on the right bank of the
Elster below Leipzig; also, by his attack on Lindenau, to
lighten the task of the allies on his right and left. Any
real success against Lindenau, which Napoleon had fortified,
34o NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
or any turning of the defile behind it, was not to be looked
for. Therefore, Gyulai resolved merely to demonstrate, in
order to withdraw as many as possible of the allies' opponents
north and south of Leipzig. At 8 A.M. his look-out, on the
church tower of Markranstädt, reported heavy fighting south
of Leipzig, and Gyulai began his advance.
It was Io.3o when the Austrians, approaching Lindenau,
saw the French drawn up in two lines across the Lützen
road in front of the line Lindenau-Plagwitz, their artillery
in three redoubts, and their cavalry (6 Squadrons) advancing
from their left wing.
Whilst Gyulai's artillery was bombarding the French
position, and especially Lindenau, from both sides of the
road, his Io squadrons drove the French cavalry back
behind their guns. At the same time, Austrian infantry
moved on Klein Zschooher, seeking to drive the French on
Lindenau. The only reserves were 3 battalions on the
Markranstädt road, and two at Schönau. Cavalry escorted
the guns.
Klein Zschocher was taken after a desperate struggle
with the French garrison, which retired on Plagwitz. All
attacks on the latter place failed, as it was strongly held,
and was flanked by artillery beyond the Elster.
On the Austrian left, Leutzsch was taken by the Hessen-
Homburg division. Beyond it the Austrians found them-
selves in a network of ditches and branches of the Luppe,"
flanked by the fire of batteries beyond the stream. With
great courage and patience they succeeded at last in
approaching Lindenau, only to find the near side closed by
walls and other defences. On the Leipzig side it was open,
but was defended by artillery on the causeway leading to
the city. Nevertheless, the Austrians succeeded in getting
into Lindenau, which they had almost immediately to leave
under the storm of artillery fire. In a second attack they
captured two guns, which, however, they had to abandon,
after spiking them, as they were once more forced from the
village.
* The southern branch of the lower Elster.
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG 34I
At Io A.M. Ney had directed Bertrand (instead of
Marmont, whom it was impossible to send owing to the
development of affairs on his front) to proceed to the south
of Leipzig. The commander of the IV. corps was on his
way when he received an urgent appeal for help from
Arrighi at Lindenau, who saw himself threatened by the
advance of Gyulai's vastly superior force. Bertrand, accord-
ingly, turned towards Lindenau with the whole of his corps.
The position was really so strong that a brigade would have
enabled Arrighi to hold it easily, and he would probably have
done without any help. But it was the sole line of retreat of
the French army to the Rhine, and must be held at all costs.
Bertrand had joined Arrighi with Morand's and Fontanelli's
divisions when the Austrians were finally ejected from
Lindenau. The Hessen-Homburg division now retired to
the heights west of Leutzsch, but, by placing skirmishers in
the meadows along the Luppe, kept the French in appre-
hension of a fresh attack.
After the bells of Leipzig had announced the Emperor's
apparent victory in the south, Bertrand began to advance
towards Klein Zschooher, covered by a furious artillery
fire from beyond the river. Twice he attacked the
village, but each time was repulsed by Czöllich's brigade,
reinforced by a battalion and some Cossacks. After this,
the action was confined to artillery fire till evening, when
Gyulai, withdrawing his main body to Markranstädt, still
kept advanced posts in Klein Zschocher, Schönau, and
Leutzsch.
(3) MöCKERN
Perhaps the most important of the three battles fought on
the 16th October was that on the north of Leipzig, between
Marmont and Blücher.
It will be remembered that Marmont had been ordered
to seek out a position north of Leipzig, covering it in the
directions of Halle and Landsberg. He selected one at
Lindenthal and Breitenfeld, the yery ground on which
342 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Gustavus Adolphus had defeated Tilly on September 7th,
1631.1
The Emperor approved the position, but said some field
fortifications were required. Marmont had reported the
position good, though too extensive for defence by his corps
alone. He required 24,Ooo to 30,000 men in order to
be able to hold it for twenty-fours against Blücher. Napo-
leon promised that he should be supported by the III.
corps if attacked by Blücher. That quite satisfied Mar-
mont, who set to work at his fortifications, setting up many
abattis in the wood which still stands between Lindenthal
and Radefeld, and which he made almost into a fortress.
He also threw up some redoubts. His advanced guard
held Radefeld. On the I 5th, Marmont felt more than
ever secure, as the III. and IV. corps stopped behind him
at Eutritzsch. That evening some French sappers, who had
been captured two days before, escaped from Halle, and
reported to Marmont that Blücher was about to march
from Halle on Leipzig, a report which was passed on to the
Emperor at Reudnitz. At Io P.M. Marmont, mounted on
the church tower at Lindenthal, saw the whole sky towards
Halle illuminated by the enemy's camp fires, and again
reported to Napoleon, saying he required the aid of the
III. corps. That night he received a letter from Berthier
saying, “In case the enemy appears before you in great
force, your corps, that of General Bertrand, and that of the
Prince of the Moskowa are destined to be opposed to him.”
All seemed to be well, when a thunderbolt fell on Marmont
in the shape of the Emperor's letter of the 16th at 7 A.M.,”
ordering him to the south of Leipzig, his own place being
taken by Bertrand, and asserting the Emperor's belief, in
the face of all Marmont's reports, that there was no enemy
of importance towards Halle. “Thence (from between
* Napoleon had already drawn comparisons between his battle of Lützen and
that in which Gustavus Adolphus lost his life in the moment of victory. As a
matter of fact, the scene of Gustavus Adolphus' battle is on the opposite side of
Lützen to that of the battle of 1813. Napoleon now sent Marmont an account
of the battle of Breitenfeld to assist him (Corr. 20,805).
* Corr. 20,814.
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG 343
Leipzig and Liebertwolkwitz),” writes Napoleon, “you can
march on Lindenau if the enemy attacks seriously on that
side, which seems to me absurd to suppose.”
There was nothing for it but for Marmont to obey, since
the Emperor had fallen deliberately into his error as to
Blücher's movement, with all the information before him.
His doing so is a remarkable instance of Napoleon's growing
habit of making the wish father to the thought.
Scarcely had Marmont begun his movement towards
Leipzig, when the enemy appeared and occupied Radefeld
with a strong advanced guard.
Blücher, at Schkeuditz, having succeeded in getting
Schwarzenberg's first orders changed, prepared for his
march on Leipzig, Believing that the enemy would fight
either at Lindenthal and Breitenfeld, or on the line Podel-
witz-Hohenössig,” he thought he had two alternatives open,
either to march direct on Leipzig, leaving the enemy on his
left, or else to attack him. Of assistance from Bernadotte
he had no hope ; for the British Commissioner, Colonel
Stewart, had brought a message from the Crown Prince,
saying he could only reach Landsberg on the I6th, but on
the 17th he could support Blücher with 8ooo or Io, ooo
cavalry and light artillery.
Blücher decided on attacking Marmont, and issued orders
accordingly. Langeron, on the left, followed by Sacken as
reserve, was to attack Freiroda and then Radefeld.” Yorck
turning leftwards from the Leipzig road at Lützschena, and
leaving his advanced guard on the road, would move on
Lindenthal. St Priest, on arrival, to follow Langeron and
Sacken.
Blücher's intention was to gain the heights of Radefeld,
and there decide, according to what he saw of the enemy's
position, what was to be done next. Stewart was sent back
to Bernadotte to urge him on.
It was Io A.M. before Blücher's troops left their bivouacs
* That is on the Düben-Leipzig road facing west.
* Radefeld is on the Landsberg-Leipzig road, just beyond the limit of Map IV.
(d), and Freiroda about half a mile from Radefeld towards Schkeuditz.
º
t
344 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Langeron reached Radefeld without opposition, and drove
Coehorn's rearguard from it. Blücher, who was with
Langeron, was surprised to see the French retiring on
Lindenthal, but, still fearing an attack from Hohenössig, he
left Langeron to watch it from Breitenfeld.
Yorck, meanwhile, had driven Normann's cavalry and
I6 guns from Lindenthal, whilst his advanced guard had
moved forward by the main road on Möckern, compelling
the French to evacuate Stahmeln and Wahren.
It was 2 P.M. when Blücher discovered the error of his
assumption that the French would defend the Hohenössig-
Podelwitz plateau. Yorck, also realising this, wheeled to
his right on Horn's brigade at Lindenthal. But he still
had to keep in touch with Langeron on his left, and this
resulted in the formation of a gap between Horn's brigade
and Hunerbein’s on its left, with a still larger gap between
Horn and the advanced guard on the main road.
Blücher now ordered Langeron to clear Wiederitzsch.
Being still afraid of an attack on his left by some of
Napoleon's corps marching from Düben, he kept Sacken's
and part of Langeron's troops in that direction.
Marmont, meanwhile, had seen without surprise that it
was impossible for him to comply with Napoleon's order to
go to the south of Leipzig. He took up a position with his
left in the long village of Möckern on the right bank of the
Elster, his right resting on the marshy Rietzschke brook
towards Eutritzsch. The barracks of the present day stand
much where his centre was. Beyond the brook, Gross and
Klein Wiederitzsch were occupied by Dombrowski's Poles
and Fournier's cavalry, all that Ney had been able to leave
for Marmont's support, though, when he took post, the
latter understood that Souham's two divisions (Ricard's
and Brayer's) were still available.
The VI. corps was perhaps the best in the army, for it
consisted largely of old soldiers. The artillery (84 guns),
posted on the highest point of the front, flanked by I 2 guns
the approach to Möckern which, Marmont argued, must be
the side to be attacked, since the French right was thrown
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG 345
back, and an attack on it would be endangered by
Dombrowski's advanced position beyond the brook.
Yorck, too, saw matters in the same light, not daring to
advance with his left in front, so long as Wiederitzsch was
held against him. At 2 P.M. his advanced guard went
forward against Möckern, supported on its left by Prince
Charles of Mecklenburg's brigade.
The two first attacks on Möckern were repulsed. Then
ensued one of the most desperate struggles of the war for
the possession of this village. It was partially taken and
retaken again and again. Reinforcements were sent in by
both sides.
Almost simultaneously with the first attack on Möckern,
Langeron sent his advanced guard and Kapzewitch's division
against the Poles in Wiederitzsch. Here, too, the fighting
between the Poles and their hereditary enemies was of the
most desperate character. It was about 3 P.M. when Dom-
browski had been driven back on Eutritzch. Then
Fournier's cavalry, with half of De France's division of
cavalry, charged, and Kapzewitch was ejected from Wiede-
ritzsch by the rallied Poles. Again he took it, and had
driven the Poles in disorder on Eutritzsch, when there
appeared Delmas' division escorting the parks and baggage
by the road from Eilenburg. Though he had only 47OO
men, Kapzewitch took him for a whole corps, on account of
the trains accompanying him, and retired to the birch wood
north-east of Wiederitzsch, whilst Olsuview deployed
against Delmas. A detachment, sent by the latter to cover
his right, took the wood, but was driven out again with
the loss of a standard. Then Delmas, finding his line split
in two, retired over the Partha, losing many wagons to the
pursuing cavalry.
Yorck, meanwhile, after the failure of his first attacks on
Möckern, had made up his mind to attack the centre of the
French position, as well as the village, where the fight still
swayed backwards and forwards with varying success.
Mecklenburg's attack with the bayonet on the French
batteries was driven off with great slaughter; the French
346 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
were already preparing to complete their victory when the
explosion of several ammunition wagons spread confusion
in their ranks. The gunners, with their own shells bursting
amongst them, abandoned their pieces, which the Prussians
rushed forward to take. But Compans' infantry fell on
their left, and they were driven back in disorder till the
enemy was again checked by grape from the Prussian
artillery. Hunerbein’s and Horn's brigades were now
west of the Lindenthal-Leipzig road, but Steinmetz's brigade
was the only one still intact and in action.
It was 5 P.M. when Steinmetz went forward with his right
on Möckern, into which the right hand regiment of each
line turned as it got to the cross road through its centre.
The Prussian artillery had now been brought up to within
7oc yards of the French. Steinmetz's first line was within
Ioo yards of the enemy when, overwhelmed by artillery
and musketry, it hesitated, turned, and fled. Marmont
ordered Normann to charge with his cavalry and complete
the victory. He refused, probably treacherously, as
Marmont alleges. He did charge at a later stage, but the
golden opportunity, on this occasion, was lost. Had he
charged home then, Steinmetz's first line would probably
have broken his second, which, as it was, held firm.
In Möckern things had gone better for the Prussians who
had at last driven the defenders out, though they had the
greatest difficulty in maintaining themselves in the village.
The crisis of the battle had arrived. Marmont was lead-
ing forward his infantry to complete the ruin of Steinmetz,
when Yorck sent sent forward the only reserve within reach.
Breaking through the intervals of the infantry, the whole
of his cavalry charged furiously on the advancing French
infantry. Two battalions were ridden over, Normann's
and Lorge's cavalry were swept away, and the Prussian first
echelon was in the midst of Marmont's guns. The fight
which ensued is indescribable ; all arms were inextricably
mixed up ; cavalry, infantry, gunners fought in desperate
personal encounter with swords, bayonets, clubbed muskets,
* We say this having regard to his subsequent conduct on the 18th.
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG 347
gun rammers, anything that came to hand. Then the
French yielded, falling back in the greatest disorder, leaving
behind 35 guns, 8 ammunition wagons, 2 standards, and
4OO prisoners.
Marmont's left, now that Möckern was lost, could hold no
longer. All he could do was to cover his retreat with his
still unbroken right. This, too, attacked now by Horn's
and Hunerbein’s brigades, was soon forced to retreat, though
still maintaining good order.
When Marmont was across the brook he left 3oo
Wurtembergers to guard the crossing at Gohlis, whilst he
reorganised his broken left behind it. His right fell back
on Eutritzsch.
That night the Prussians bivouacked with their right
south of Möckern, left in front of Eutritzsch.
Blücher, always obsessed by the fear of an attack from
the direction of Düben, had remained with Langeron beyond
Lindenthal. It was only at 5 P.M. that he could make up
his mind to call Sacken up. It was then too late for him
to cover the four miles to the battlefield before all was over.
St Priest had been sent forward earlier, but only one of his
brigades fought at Wiederitzsch. To Yorck alone belonged
the glory of the victory; on his corps fell the heaviest loss
Going into action 2 I,779 strong, it lost 7969 men, more
than one-third. His infantry lost 7 I 20 out of 16,120
Langeron lost about I 5 Oo men.
Marmont puts his losses at 6ooo or 7 ooo, but they were
probably greater. Two of his divisional generals, Compans
and Friederichs, were wounded, as well as himself.
Yorck captured 2000 prisoners, one eagle, two standards,
and 40 guns; Langeron, one standard, I 3 guns, and some
hundreds of prisoners. Many ammunition wagons, Mar-
mont's as well as Delmas', fell into the enemy's hands.
The battle ended dramatically ; for, as the fighting
ceased, the victorious Prussians joined in a vast chorus of
the hymn of thanksgiving, “Nun danket alle Gott.”
Here we pause to take a general survey of the results of
348 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
the battles of the I6th October, and to call attention to the
faults and merits of the combatants.
That Wachau was not a great defeat for the allied right
was probably due to the Tsar and his advisers, especially
Jomini and Toll. But for his pressure on Schwarzenberg,
52,Ooo men would have been left between the Pleisse and
the Elster, to attempt a task which was perhaps more
difficult for them than for the 28,000 who eventually
undertook it, and failed. Napoleon knew the strength of
his right wing, due to the difficulties of moving troops, and
especially guns, through the intricate space between the
rivers. Again, Blücher would have been brought, against
his will, across the lower Elster, only in all probability to
fail, as Gyulai failed, against the defenders of Lindenau,
reinforced by Bertrand, and, if necessary, by Marmont.
Napoleon would have had nothing to care for on the Halle
road, and very little to fear either at Lindenau or on the
side of Connewitz. He would have had his hands free to
throw at least IOO,OOO men on the 72,000 whom the allies
would have had between Gross Pösna and the Pleisse.
There he would probably have gained a decisive victory, and
would have been free next day to turn with a large portion
of his army on the forces cooped up between the rivers, and
on Blücher in the western segment.
To the Tsar, again, was due the hurrying forward of the
reserves to support Wittgenstein's disjointed attack in
widely separated columns, and the withdrawal of yet more
troops from Meerveldt, in the Austrian reserves which
Schwarzenberg so reluctantly parted with. Without these
reinforcements the results of the day would still probably
have been defeat on the right bank of the Pleisse, failure
everywhere, except at Möckern.
Napoleon was not ready when he was attacked, and had
to resort to expedients, such as using his Guard to reinforce
weak places at the very beginning of the battle, which he
was not accustomed to. The fact that Macdonald was not
up, and that Reynier could not arrive on the 16th at all,
were the result of the late date at which the latter was kept
THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG 349
\---
on the right bank of the Elbe, in pursuit of what Napoleon
believed to be the army of the north, and only discovered
too late to be nothing but Tauenzien and Thümen.
The Emperor's position south of Leipzig was an ex-
tremely strong one on the right, and to a less extent in the
centre, but his left was in the air. The allies might well
have occupied the Kolmberg overnight, in which case
Klenau's attack on Liebertwolkwitz would have come off at
least an hour earlier, and, with Macdonald not yet up, the
French position there would have been critical. As it was,
Gortchakow and Klenau did not support one another.
Napoleon, on the other hand, was tactically surprised
before he was ready, and had to act on the defensive till
after II A.M. Macdonald's late arrival has not yet been
explained. Owing to it, Napoleon's scheme for turning the
right of the allies was a failure, indeed it could hardly
succeed in any case without reinforcements from the north,
especially as the Emperor had to strengthen his right
more than he anticipated, owing to the strenuous attack
of Kleist on Markkleeberg, and of Eugen of Wurtemburg on
Wachau.
It would seem that Napoleon would have done better to
advance with his reinforced right at I I A.M. instead of at
2 P.M. He would then probably have defeated Kleist and
Eugen before Schwarzenberg had started off Bianchi,
Weissenwolf and Nostitz, and before even the Russian and
Prussian Guards were up. He could have sent Victor,
Lauriston, and the whole of the Young Guard at I I A.M.
on Guldengössa and Auenhain against Kleist, Eugen, and
Gortchakow, whilst Macdonald kept Klenau and Pahlen in
play. These three columns of the allies would have been
driven back, and would probably have involved the reserve
in their ruin.
It would have been well, too, when the Emperor did
advance at 2 P.M., if he had used the whole of the I I I
squadrons, of whom Pelet and Thiers speak. Looking to
what Bordesoulle actually effected with only 18, it seems
possible that the larger force might have gained a very real
350 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
success. Gyulai's attack at Lindenau was too late to effect
anything. The French force, at first, was so weak (4
battalions and 6 squadrons) that he might, in the early
morning, have captured Lindenau and blocked up Napoleon's
only line of retreat. When he did attack, Bertrand was up
with about 7000 more men, and success was hopeless. Gyulai
did very little good ; for all he managed was, with his
19,000 men, to prevent 8ooo or 9ooo French from joining
Napoleon.
The Emperor wrongly reckoned on Marmont's being able
to come south. For this his own obstinacy, in refusing to
believe what Marmont had seen and reported to him, was
largely to blame. It was quite impossible for Marmont,
with his own corps only, to defend the Breitenfeld line
against Blücher's army, and he rightly decided for that of
Möckern-Eutritzsch. Even here, he had little hope, if
Blücher brought his whole force into action. But the
Prussian general employed only a small portion, owing to
his apprehensions as to his left flank. Though they were
as a matter of fact unfounded, Blücher was not unreason-
able in entertaining them. He had every reason to suppose
that a considerable part of Napoleon's army was still on the
march from the north. He knew that, on the night of the
I 5th, there were still considerable French forces at Düben,
and some of these might well intervene as they marched
south. Indeed, there was serious danger from Reynier's
corps, had that general marched direct from Düben, instead
of going, as he decided at the last moment, up the right
bank of the Mulde, and across at Eilenburg.
Yorck's corps, as matters stood, very narrowly escaped
defeat, and was only saved by its commander's prompt and
decided employment of all his cavalry at the crisis of the
battle.
The result of Marmont's defeat was to shut Napoleon
completely in on the north of Leipzig; for Marmont's lost
position could easily be held against Leipzig by a com-
paratively small force.
The general result of the fighting on the I6th was a
THE BATTLES ROUND. LEIPZIG 35I
serious defeat of the French at Möckern ; a successful
defence at Lindenau, and a drawn battle at Wachau. In
Napoleon's then position, nothing short of a decisive victory
at Wachau was of any use to him. Without that, he must
be reduced to the defensive against the still increasing forces
of the allies. There can be no possible doubt that the
evening of the 16th should have found him hard at work
arranging and commencing the retreat on the Rhine, which
he was compelled to carry out on the 19th. He could still
escape by Lindenau, for Gyulai could easily have been
brushed aside from Markränstadt, as was done later. Had
he been in full retreat on the 17th, Napoleon would prob-
ably have reached the Rhine with at least 50,000 men
more than he actually did, and the army would have been
in a far less disorganised condition. Who can guess what
would then have happened in 18 I 4 P
CHAPTER XX
THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG—I 8TH OCTOBER

HAT the night of the 16-17th October was
like on the southern battlefield is best de-
scribed in the words, quoted by Friederich, of
a Hessian diarist of Marchand’s division
which bivouacked on the Kolmberg. “It was the worst
bivouac that the division had in this campaign. The
weather was raw and damp, there was neither food, nor
water, nor wood. Broken wheels, musket stocks, and
saddles served for firing ; the rain water, standing in
puddles, into which men and horses had bled, had to be
used for cooking. Numerous patrols were sent out, many
piquets posted, so that half the men had to be under arms
by turns.”
Napoleon's tents were pitched “in the bed of a dried-up
pond near the old tile factory, a short distance from the road
leading to Rochlitz.”" The Old Guard surrounded them.
Before they were pitched, Meerveldt was brought in as a
prisoner. Napoleon, who knew him before, spoke affably
with him for some time, and again sent for him later in the
evening. Meerveldt has left a full account of the conversa-
tion. The most important point in it, from Napoleon's
point of view, was the definite announcement that Wrede
had joined the Austrians opposed to him on the Inn, and
was about to march against the French communications at
Frankfort and Mayence. That really convinced Napoleon
that retreat was inevitable, though he still wanted to put it
off. He then sent Meerveldt back to the Emperor of
Austria, in the vain hope of opening negotiations which
* Odeleben, ii. 23.
352
THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG 353
might, at least, give him more time. Needless to say,
nothing came of Meerveldt's mission.
During the night, news of events at Lindenau and
Möckern came in. Bad though the news was in general,
the Emperor could not make up his mind for immediate
retreat. Even allowing for the losses of the day, whilst
adding in the 14,Ooo men of Reynier to be expected on
the 17th, the Emperor could still have made good his
retreat with at least I 5o,ooo men. But the Emperor
Napoleon was now, to a great extent, the master of General
Bonaparte, and the Emperor could not bear to yield what
practically meant his dominion in Germany, though the
General doubtless saw that to do so was the only hope.
At any rate, he would hold the battlefield for another day,
which might impress on France the fact that he had not yet
been beaten.
Early on the 17th Murat came over from Wachau, where
he had spent the night, with consoling accounts of the
enormous losses suffered by the enemy. Yet Napoleon
must have known that his own losses had been equally
great, and, what was worse, that ammunition would scarcely
last for a repetition of yesterday's battle. He had really
decided for retreat, though he meant to stay till the 18th.
He had open to him three roads —
(1) By Merseburg, Freiburg, and Buttelstädt, to Erfurt.
(2) By Weissenfels, Kösen, and Weimar, to Erfurt.
(3) By Zeitz, Jena, and Schweinfurt.
The orders, issued at 7 P.M., directed Bertrand to secure
the passages of the Saale and the Unstrut at Merseburg,
Freiburg, Weissenfels, and Kösen. Mortier would replace
Bertrand at Lindenau.
But why, if Napoleon meant to retreat by the west side
of Leipzig with a great army, did he leave himself with a
single difficult issue over the long causeway to Lindenau ?
Why were not numerous bridges built over the Pleisse and
the Elster above the causeway P It is certain none were
constructed, and, so far, no orders for them have ever been
Z
354 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
*
discovered. If none were given, was it because the Emperor
feared the moral effect of advertising his intention to his
own men, or the value of such information to the enemy P
Before he actually retreated through Leipzig, he decided
to take up a fresh position on a smaller circumference round
the city. At 2 A.M., on the 18th, in pouring rain, the troops
left their bivouacs for their new positions on the line
Connewitz - Dölitz - Probstheida- Zuckelhausen-Holzhausen-
Zweinaundorf - Paunsdorf. Thence the line extended,
through Schönefeld, along the left bank of the Partha to
Pfaffendorf, whence it went to Gohlis. In detail the positions
were these :—
I. RIGHT WING, UNDER MURAT
Lefol on the Pleisse ; Poniatowski on the line Connewitz-
Lösnig ; Augereau in support of these two ; 4th cavalry
corps behind Poniatowski.
Victor on the right of Probstheida, with the 5th cavalry
corps behind him.
Guard, with Ist cavalry corps behind, between Stötteritz
and Probstheida.
II. CENTRE–MACDONALD
Macdonald at Zuckelhausen, Holzhausen, and behind.
Lauriston in reserve behind Macdonald, with part of his
corps in Zweinaundorf and Molkau.
Also Walther's Guard cavalry, with Nansouty left of him.
III. LEFT WING—NEY
Reynier—Saxon division in Paunsdorf with an advanced
post at Heiterer Blick farm ; Durutte's division left of
Paunsdorf.
Marmont—From Durutte's left to Schönefeld.
De France's cavalry division (less Quenette's brigade with
Bertrand) behind Paunsdorf.
Fournier's cavalry behind Schönefeld.
Souham in reserve between Schönefeld and Volkmarsdorf.
THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG 355
IV. IN LEIPZIG, HALLE SUBURB, AND ALONG THE
PLEISSE TO GOHLIS
Dombrowski (infantry and cavalry) and Lorge's cavalry.
V. AT LINDENAU
Mortier, with two divisions of Young Guard.
After the departure of Bertrand, and allowing for losses
on the one hand and for Reynier's arrival on the other,
Napoleon still had about 160,000 men in and around
Leipzig. Against these, when Bernadotte, Colloredo, and
Bennigsen were in the field, the allies could bring about
295, OOO.
After the battle on the 16th, Schwarzenberg's orders of
that evening required his troops to hold on where they were.
Colloredo was expected at Magdeborn at 6 A.M., as
reserve to the right wing ; Bianchi and Weissenwolf at
Cröbern would occupy the same position towards the left.
Gyulai would form the link with Blücher by the west of
Leipzig. Bennigsen to come up by Grimma and Naunhof
from Colditz. A French attack in the morning of the 17th
was expected, and during the night Colloredo was directed
to halt behind Magdeborn, near the Leipzig road.
Nothing happened up to Io A.M. on the I 7th, when the
sound of guns north of Leipzig gave rise to the belief that
Napoleon was attacking Blücher. Accordingly, an attack
from the south, in three columns, was ordered, the right
on Liebertwolkwitz and Holzhausen, centre also on Liebert-
wolkwitz, left along the right bank of the Pleisse. Gyulai,
and Meerveldt's corps, now commanded by Lederer, were
also to attack, all at 2 P.M.
At that hour a council of war was held on the heights
of Guldengössa. Firing in the north had then ceased.
Colloredo had arrived at I O A.M., but his men were dead
beat. Bennigsen was present in person, but his army was
still behind. The attack was put off till next day. Gyulai
had at first been ordered over to Cröbern, but, just as he
started, he was ordered to wait till he was relieved by St
356 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Priest, who, as we know, had long been with Blücher.
Then he began to demonstrate towards Lindenau, not being
able to tell, in the wind and rain, whether the main army
was engaged or not. Darkness finally stopped all but a
little skirmishing.
During the night of the 16th - 17th Blücher brought
Sacken on the right, and St Priest on the left, into Ist
line. Marmont had now retired across the Partha, leaving
Delmas' division, and part of the 3rd cavalry corps between
the Partha and the brook. He held Gohlis and Eutritzsch ;
Dombrowski was at the Gerber gate of Leipzig.
Yorck's four brigades were now amalgamated by Blücher
into two, owing to their reduction by the losses of the 16th.
Blücher, desiring to clear the country north of the Partha,
sent Sacken, at 9.30 A.M., against Gohlis, Langeron against
Eutritzsch. This brought Ney on to the field, who replaced
the one and a half Wurtemberg battalions at Gohlis by
Dombrowski, and ordered Delmas to the slopes between
Gohlis and Schönefeld.
The Russian cavalry now drove Fournier and Lorge back
into Leipzig, taking 5 guns and 5 OO prisoners. It also
charged Delmas' infantry, who, however, repulsed them and
went back to the Halle suburb. It was only after his
retirement that the Poles evacuated Gohlis, going partly to
the Rosenthal, partly to the Pfaffendorf farm. By Io A.M.
there were no French north of the Partha in this direction.
The stream here was so marshy that a crossing in face
of the French was out of the question. At first, Blücher
thought of sending Langeron round by the left, whilst St
Priest and Sacken held the French in front. Then hearing
the main army was not engaged, he postponed his attack
till next day.
Meanwhile, Reynier coming from Eilenburg, reached
Taucha, where he beat off a small attack by Winzingerode's
cavalry. Then, after some hours' rest, he marched for the
Heiterer Blick farm. Here he was compelled, by the flight
of Arrighi’s cavalry already mentioned, to take post facing
Schönefeld. When, however, he was not attacked, he sent
THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG 357
the Saxon division to Paunsdorf, Durutte's French between it
and Schönefeld ; Saxon cavalry at Heiterer Blick. In the
evening, under orders from Napoleon, Guilleminot's division
went to Lindenau.
Schwarzenberg's orders for the 18th are not forthcoming,
but can easily be inferred from the actual formation and
movements of the troops. The attack was in six columns.
I. The Hereditary Prince of Hessen-Homburg, with the
1st and 2nd “abteilungs” of the Austrian army, the Reserve
divisions of Bianchi and Weissenwolf, and Nostitz's cavalry
division, to attack by Markkleeberg-Lösnig, with a detach-
ment beyond the Pleisse helping when it could.
II. Barclay—Corps of Kleist and Wittgenstein, Russian
and Prussian Guards, and Reserves. To take Wachau and
Liebertwolkwitz, and then move on Probstheida.
III. Bennigsen — Polish reserve army, Bubna’s (2nd)
Austrian light division, Klenau's corps, Ziethen’s brigade,
and Platow's Cossacks, to envelop the enemy's left, moving
from Fuchshain and Seifertshain on Zuckelhausen and
Holzhausen.
IV. Bernadotte—Such parts of the northern army as were
up, Langeron's and St Priest's corps (given over by Blücher) *
* Blücher had, throughout, infinite trouble with the unreliable Bernadotte, who
was always playing for his own hand. The Crown Prince had compelled him to
go behind the Saale, when the old Prussian was for fighting Napoleon on the
right bank. Then Bernadotte had laid claim to the command of the united
Northern and Silesian armies, a claim which Blücher had quietly ignored.
Bernadotte continued to hang back, and had only promised a reinforcement of
Io,000 cavalry even on the 17th. Colonel Stewart had to keep him up to the
mark with hints of a stoppage of the British subsidy.
When the two armies crossed the Saale, Blücher, in the post of danger nearest
Napoleon, had passed south of Bernadotte, thus becoming the right of the two
armies, instead of the left as hitherto. Bernadotte wanted him to revert to the
former order of battle for the 18th. This was absurd, especially as Blücher's
position before Leipzig was too small for more than 30,000 men. In the end,
Bernadotte could only be induced to join in the battle of the 18th on condition that
Blücher placed the larger part of his army under the Crown Prince. With true
patriotism, Blücher agreed, but he resolved to go himself with Langeron and
St Priest, so that they should not be frittered away, or left to do nothing, by
Bernadotte. It is difficult to condemn too strongly Bernadotte's conduct in the
whole of this campaign, or to praise too highly Blücher's honesty and devotion to
the general cause.
358 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
to cross the Partha and form the link between Blücher
and the main army.
V. Blücher, with the rest of the Silesian army, to advance
against the north-east side of Leipzig.
VI. Gyulai, with the 3rd Austrian “abteilung,” Moritz
Lichtenstein's light division (Ist), and the detachments of
Mensdorf and Thielmann, to attack Lindenau from Klein
Zschooher.
The strengths of the various forces are estimated by
Friederich, after allowing for losses on the 16th, as
follows:—
Men. Guns.
Main army . e . I I 5,OOO 7 16
Polish army . e ſº 3O,OOO - I 34.
Colloredo ſº º & 2O,OOO 5 O
Bubna . g © e 6, 5 OO I 8
Silesian army tº . 42,OOO 3 IO
North army . º tº 65,000 226
Cossacks ſº e e I6, 5 Oo I 2
Total . . 295, OOO I,466
They had a superiority of I 35,000 over Napoleon, and
more than double his guns.
The battle up to 2 P.M.–Monday, the 18th October, broke
dull and cloudy after a wet night. By 8 A.M. it had cleared
and the sun was shining brilliantly. Meerveldt had reached
the allies' camp in the early morning, bringing Napoleon's
proposals. There was no place for negotiations now short
of the Rhine, unless in the very improbable event of a great
French victory.
Napoleon's troops had been already five hours on the
move when the allies began to advance at 7 A.M.
He had moved his headquarters to Stötteritz on the
previous evening ; at 2 A.M. he went to Probstheida, the
key of his battlefield, to superintend the movements. As it
was too dark to see anything, he adjourned to Ney's head-
quarters at Reudnitz till 5 A.M., when he went into Leipzig,
THE BATTLE OT LEIPZIG 359
met Bertrand, and gave him his instructions for the march
to the Saale, which was not to commence without a special
order. Then, after visiting Lindenau, the Emperor returned
to Stötteritz at 8 A.M. At 9, hearing of the enemy's move-
ment, he sent orders, from the tobacco factory near
Probstheida, to which he had now moved, to Bertrand to
start for Weissenfels.
The battle up to 2 P.M. can be briefly described.
The allies soon found that Napoleon was gone from his
position of the 16th, where they seem to have expected to
find him still. Their left column, under the Prince of Hessen-
Homburg, had some severe fighting at Dölitz, Dösen, and
Lösnig, all of which, as well as Meusdorf, were taken and
re-taken, but eventually remained in the hands of the allies.
The Prince of Hessen-Homburg, being wounded, was suc-
ceeded in command of this column by Colloredo. By noon
it was in front of the French main position, with Lederer's
detachment, between the rivers, in front of Connewitz. The
fight after this was restricted to an artillery duel. Up to
2 P.M. the French on this side had merely been driven on
to their main position.
Barclay, with the next column on the right, got within
cannon shot of Probstheida, where he waited for the columns
on his left and right to come up. He stood just in front
of the elevation since known as the Monarchen Hügel, on
to which the Tsar and the King of Prussia moved from
the Galgenberg, as their troops advanced. By 2 P.M. this
second column was thus in front of Probstheida, but unable
to attack it, pending the arrival of the third. Here again
the allies' artillery was busy preparing the way for attack.
Bennigsen, charged with the envelopment of the French
left, had farthest to go. From Machern, at 3 A.M., he sent
Platow by Hirschfeld and Althen to get into communication
with Bernadotte's army. Platow's unexpected appearance
created considerable confusion amongst Macdonald's trains,
which were still at Sommerfeld, Engelsdorf, and Molkau.
The rest of Bennigsen's army was assembled at Fuchshain
by 6 A.M., waiting for Bubna, who only got across the Partha
360 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
from Machern by Beucha at 8 A.M. He was delayed by the
bridge at Beucha having been carried away.
As soon as Bennigsen heard that Bubna was marching on
Klein Pösna, he advanced on that village, where he believed
the French left to be. Another column went by Seifert-
shain towards the Kolmberg to attack it, with a third ad-
vancing from the south, whilst Ziethen with the fourth was
to clear the Nieder Holz and move on between the Kolmberg
and Liebertwolkwitz, in touch with Barclay's right. On
Bennigsen's extreme right, Platow and Bubna were to seek
to gain the Leipzig-Wurzen road by Engelsdorf and
Sommerfeld. As the French had retired, Bennigsen met
with no opposition before I O A.M., when Ziethen was before
Zuckelhausen ; Hohenlohe before Holzhausen ; Doctorow
and the advanced guard east of Baalsdorf; Bubna between
Engelsdorf and Sommerfeld. There was no sign of Berna-
dotte. The roar of artillery fire was heard on the entire
circle round Leipzig, except in the gap between Bennigsen's
right and Langeron's left, where Bernadotte should have
been.
It was important for Klenau and Ziethen to take Zuckel-
hausen and Holzhausen from Marchand and Charpentier
respectively, in order to protect the right of an attack on
Probstheida. About 1 P.M. Charpentier, attacked from the
south and east by very superior forces, had to retreat in
some disorder from Holzhausen. This compelled Marchand,
who had hitherto maintained himself in Zuckelhausen, to
retire also, though in good order. As the Austrians and
Russians advanced on either side of Holzhausen, which was
on fire, they were charged by Sebastiani and Walther's
Guard cavalry, who were driven off by the allied cavalry.
Gérard, behind Holzhausen, had now to retire, and another
cavalry combat ensued in which Pahlen was not so success-
ful, owing to momentary delay caused by his horse being
killed and himself stunned. Macdonald had now fallen
back to between Zweinaundorf and Paunsdorf, where he was
heavily fired on by Austrian artillery established on the
Steinberg, west of Holzhausen.
THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG 36I
Doctorow and Bennigsen's advanced guard stood opposite
the line Zweinaundorf-Molkau. On his extreme right
Bubna, after bombarding Paunsdorf for two hours, ventured
on an assault at noon. His first attack failed but the second
sent Reynier back on Sellerhausen. Then Reynier, coming
down on Bubna’s left, compelled him to evacuate Paunsdorf
again.
About this time Platow, near Heiterer Blick farm, more
or less got between Normann's Saxon cavalry and the
French. Normann solved the difficulty by going over to
the allies, though he said he could not fight against the
French without orders from the King of Saxony.” Some
other bodies of Saxons and Westphalians had already
changed sides.
At 2 P.M., then, Bennigsen had driven the French from
some of their advanced posts, but they still held Zweinaundorf,
Molkau, and Paunsdorf. Bennigsen dared not advance
farther till he received the long expected support of
Bernadotte.
That astute but unreliable personage, after his arrange-
ment with Blücher, had ordered
(I) Bülow to march on Taucha, to force the passage of
the Partha there, and to watch with detachments towards
Wurzen.
(2) Winzingerode to follow Bülow's movement on
Taucha, sending cavalry towards Eilenburg and Wurzen to
protect his left.
(3) Langeron to search out all passages of the Partha
between his present position and Taucha, to throw bridges,
and pass the stream below Taucha in touch with Win-
zingerode's right.
(4) The Swedes to cross between Langeron and Win-
zingerode.
* Normann and several other commanding officers were afterwards cashiered
for their conduct on this day, and banished from Saxony; the regiments con-
cerned were disbanded. Whatever may be thought of Napoleon’s tyranny in
Germany, there is no excuse for this desertion on the field of battle. Normann,
who, it will be remembered, had behaved badly at Möckern, died in 1822, fight-
ing for the independence of the Greeks.
362 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
(5) If the enemy should attack the northern and Silesian
armies, all to take post on the heights of Plaussig.
Bülow, marching at 9 A.M., was by 2 P.M. nearly up to
the line Plaussig-Heiterer Blick, facing west.
The rest of the North army was slowly approaching by
Taucha, but it was not till 4 P.M. that the Swedes crossed
the Partha at Plaussig. Some Cossacks, sent by Bülow to
try and seize Napoleon's trains at Eilenburg, failed, as the
Bavarian, Saxon, and Hessian escort remained faithful.
The trains retired to Torgau.
Blücher, notwithstanding Bernadotte's orders, would not
allow Langeron to go far towards Taucha, away from himself.
He ordered him to cover Bülow's march at Mockau
and Plaussig, only forcing the Partha when the North army
should be engaged on its left bank. Nevertheless, part of
Langeron's corps was across between Mockau and Plösen
before Bülow was up, and had driven Marmont back towards
Schönefeld.
Sacken, attacking with Blücher's right at Gohlis, had not
succeeded in getting into the Halle suburb or the Rosenthal,
in the face of a strenuous resistance by the Poles. At
I P.M. Yorck had to be called up in support.
On the French side, Ney, seeing threats from Paunsdorf,
Mockau, and Thekla, had drawn Marmont back to between
Schönefeld and Paunsdorf. The VII. corps (Saxons) was
between Paunsdorf and Stüntz ; Souham (III.) in reserve
at Volkmarsdorf. When Normann's cavalry had gone
over they were soon followed by Von Fabrice's Saxon
cavalry.
Between I and 2 P.M. Langeron's artillery opened on
Schönefeld, and he presently received orders from Berna-
dotte saying that, as most of the north army was across the
Partha, he was to attack the village.
Meanwhile, Bertrand, bursting out impetuously from
Lindenau, had completely defeated Gyulai, driving most of
his forces across the upper Elster, part across the Luppe,
and capturing many prisoners at Klein and Gross Zschooher.
Bertrand was now marching on Weissenfels with three
THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG 363.
divisions," and Quenette's cavalry brigade. The line of
retreat on Weissenfels had been re-opened for Napoleon.
To sum up, by 2 P.M. the allies had gained no substantial
success, though they had driven the French from Dölitz,
Dösen, Zuckelhausen, Holzhausen, and Baalsdorf. Napoleon
still held Lösnig, Probstheida, Molkau, Zweinaundorf,
Paunsdorf, and Schönefeld ; his main position was intact.
Sacken in the north had been repulsed.
After 2 P.M.–On the left of the allies, towards Dölitz and
Dösen, the French now again took the offensive. It was
with the utmost difficulty that Bianchi and Colloredo kept
their position, and were eventually able to return to the
offensive. The fighting was furious, and it was only after
repeated failures that the allies at last captured Lösnig.
From Connewitz they were repulsed by Augereau and
Poniatowski, the latter now reduced to 2 5 Oo Poles.
The attack on Probstheida fell to Barclay's column.
This was the key of Napoleon's position, the loss of which
must result in the collapse of the whole. Barclay would
have waited for the advance of the columns on either side of
him, but the Tsar insisted on an immediate attack.
The first attack was by two Prussian brigades, supported
by the 2nd Russian infantry corps. They bravely faced an
overwhelming rain of projectiles, and got partly into the
south of the place, whence they were driven again with
awful loss by Victor's reserves. On the east, where there
was a gap in the wall surrounding the village, the Prussians
made more progress at first. Then, coming under the fire
of a I 5-gun battery and charged by cavalry, they fell back.
Again they advanced, this time right up to the centre of the
village ; again they were driven by infantry from the village,
this time in disorder, notwithstanding reinforcements sent up.
by Ziethen from Zuckelhausen.
It was after 5 P.M. when Eugen of Wurtemberg with
I 4oo men, all that he had left, made another attempt on
Probstheida from the south. But Napoleon had now re-
placed Victor's exhausted troops by those of Lauriston, and
* Including Guilleminot's, the French division of the VII. corps.
364 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
these were sent forward. Eugen’s feeble force was driven
off in disorder. Any further attack on Probstheida was for-
bidden by the allied monarchs, who had now received good
news of the progress of the battle on their right. Barclay
remained on the defensive, easily stopping Victor's attempts
to break out. The struggle for Probstheida had been an
heroic one on both sides. Vial had been killed at the head
of his brigade of Victor's corps, which lost three-fourths of its
numbers : Rochambeau and many of his staff, fighting with
equal valour, were killed. The Prussians and Russians had
behaved with equal gallantry. So terrible was the artillery
fire that, next day, Kleist found no less than 30 disabled
guns in and about Probstheida.
We now return to Bennigsen, and to the army of the
North. It was 2.30 P.M. before Bülow's leading troops were
really up. Then it was decided, in consultation with
Bernadotte, that Bennigsen's right should not extend beyond
Paunsdorf, whence the North army would take post up to
the Partha. This enabled Bennigsen to close up his divided
columns and act in greater force against Zweinaundorf and
Molkau.
On the French side, Reynier's Saxons had been posted
in front of Sellerhausen, to support Paunsdorf.
The Prussians now advanced on Paunsdorf, supported by
a tremendous artillery fire and by that of Bogue's rocket
brigade." The then recently-invented Congreve rockets had a
* The English rocket brigade, commanded by Captain Richard Bogue, had
been attached to Bernadotte's bodyguard, on the understanding that, on days of
battle, it was to be more freely used than the rest of the bodyguard. Congreve
rockets had been used for the first time in war on the 16th September, when Davout's
detachment under Pecheux was destroyed at Görda (supra, p. 287). As the
French left Paunsdorf, Bogue charged at the head of the squadron of dragoons
escorting his brigade, and was killed soon after by a musket ball. His grave is
now to be seen at Paunsdorf. He was succeeded by Fox-Strangways, who,
curiously enough, it is said, was the first officer killed at Inkerman, fighting
against his former allies the Russians. It is also said that, in acknowledgment
of his gallant leading of the rocket battery, Fox-Strangways was decorated by the
Tsar with the badge of the Order of St Anne, which he himself was wearing at
the time.
The rocket brigade afterwards distinguished itself at Waterloo.
(For this subject see Progs R. A. Znstitution, vol. xxiv.; also Kinglake's
THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG 365
specially demoralising effect on the defenders, as the village
was stormed. From the position to which they were driven
back they were again forced, largely by rocket fire, to retire
on Sellerhausen.
The two Saxon brigades chose this moment to abandon
their French allies and pass over to the enemy. It appears
that the Saxon officers had in the morning decided on this
step. They informed General von Zeschau (the Saxon
commander-in-chief). An adjutant was then sent to inform
the king of this proposal. He returned at 2 P.M. saying the
king looked to Von Zeschau to keep his men to their
allegiance. The officers held this answer to be ambigu-
ous ; moreover, they said, the king was not a free agent.
The French had lost the campaign, and now, when Durutte's
French had enough on their hands to occupy them, without
thinking of keeping their Saxon comrades in order, was the
best opportunity, perhaps the last, they would have to go
over. When Reynier ordered the Saxon 1 2-pounder battery
back, it marched off to the enemy, followed by the two
infantry brigades. De France's cavalry, thinking they were
going to attack the Prussians, cheered them as they passed.
Von Zeschau made an attempt to induce them to remain,
but his personal authority only sufficed to recall 24 officers
and 593 men. Napoleon himself, in his bulletin,' attributed
his defeat largely to the Saxon desertion. Some French
writers have followed him, but Friederich shows that the
total strength of the Saxon division on the 17th October
was only 4544 and 22 guns. Allowing for losses and those
who remained true to the French, on one side, and adding
Normann's cavalry on the other, the total defection probably
did not exceed 4ooo men and 20 guns. That is hardly a
loss which could vitally affect the course of a battle of such
Inzasion of the Crimea (cabinet edition, vol. vi. p. 518), where Fox-Strangways
is shown as killed at Inkerman. The story about the Order of St Anne, as well
as about Fox-Strangways generally, was told to the author by Colonel Shea,
Royal Artillery, who was responsible for looking after the repairs to Bogue's
grave at Pannsdorf.)
* Corr, 20,830.
366 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
proportions, though it may be admitted to have had a
demoralising effect.
Bennigsen's column could not venture on any general
advance before the greater part of Bernadotte's army was on
the field, and that was not till about 5 P.M. It was a little
before that hour that the Saxons had changed sides, and
then Nansouty, with the French Guard cavalry, issuing from
between Stüntz and Stötteritz, made an attack on the gap
between Bubna and the rest of Bennigsen's army. The
attack never got beyond the line Paunsdorf-Zweinaundorf.
At this moment, Bennigsen, seeing that the North army
was at last up, moved forward. Klenau, after getting into
Zweinaundorf and being again expelled, finally took the
village. Bubna stormed Molkau. There was another
cavalry combat, as Klenau issued from Zweinaundorf, be-
tween the Russians and Sebastiani and Walther, who
eventually retired before the fire of 24 guns and a Jäger
brigade north of Zweinaundorf. Klenau now failed in an
attack on Stötteritz, which was strongly defended by walls
and ditches, and flanked by artillery from Probstheida. A
counter-attack by the French on Zweinaundorf was repulsed
before darkness brought the fighting here to an end. Ben-
nigsen, like the commanders on his left, had gained no
decisive success.
On his right, after Durutte's flight from Paunsdorf, Seller-
hausen was stormed, but the captors were unable to get
beyond it. Durutte and Delmas retired to the fork of the
roads to Wurzen and Taucha. Durutte's retirement had
exposed the flank of Marmont, who wheeled his right back
till he stood on the line Sellerhausen-Schönefeld. He would
still have been in danger, had not Ney sent Durutte to
retake Sellerhausen, in which he was successful. Occupying
it, Durutte was linked by Delmas to Marmont's right.
As the rest of the North army came up, it took post
with its left on Paunsdorf, and its right touching Langeron,
who continued the line to the Partha.
We left Langeron at 2 P.M., preparing for his attack on
Schönefeld. The place was very strong, the marshes of
THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG 367
the Partha prevented its being turned, the few entrances to
it had been barricaded, and, as at Probstheida, there were
numerous ditches, walls, and other obstacles. Marmont in
person superintended the defence, which was entrusted to
Lagrange's division (3 Ooo men), with that of Friederichs on
his right. Nevertheless, the Russians managed to force a
way into it and up to the centre of the village. Thence the
French counter attack drove them back to the outskirts.
Just at this time Durutte's retreat had rendered possible
an attack on the right flank of the village, which was to be
executed by St Priest, whilst Kapzewitch reinforced the
frontal attack. Marmont's guns were silenced by an over-
whelming force, and he felt compelled to withdraw Lagrange
and Friederichs to Reudnitz about 4.3 o P.M.
Ney had now in reserve only about 7000 men and
40 guns of the divisions of Brayer and Ricard, who were
ordered to retake Schönefeld. At this time both Ney and
Souham were wounded as they reconnoitred the place.
Langeron's artillery ammunition having given out, he had
again to retire, and the French, bursting into Schönefeld,
became once more masters of it. Then the tide turned as
Bernadotte replaced Langeron's guns by 60 of Winzin-
gerode's and 20 of the Swedish corps. Brayer was wounded
and his men had to fall back in disorder on Reudnitz along
with Ricard. They occupied a position between Reudnitz
and Schönefeld till 9 P.M., when they were once more
driven back to the brook in front of Reudnitz. The North
army, considering its great superiority of numbers, had
done remarkably little.
On the north of Leipzig, Sacken, renewing his attacks on
the Rosenthal and the Pfaffendorf farm, had again failed.
When, towards evening, Blücher heard that the enemy
was retreating, apparently on Merseburg and Weissenfels,
he ordered Yorck to occupy the passages of the Saale at
Merseburg and Halle. Yorck started at 8 P.M., and, by
7 A.M. on the Igth, had the reserve cavalry and Horn's
brigade at Halle, Hunerbein’s at Burg Liebenau." -
* On the Elster, north-east of Merseburg.
368 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
As early as 2 P.M., Gyulai had orders to watch the French
retreat. At 3 P.M. he reported Bertrand on the Lützen
road. An Austrian detachment, too weak to maintain itself
at Weissenfels, destroyed the bridge and retired on Zeitz.
Napoleon had ordered the retreat to begin at I I A.M.,
and at once there commenced a continuous stream across
the Lindenau causeway of everything that was not actually
required on the battlefield. At 4 P.M. the 1st cavalry corps,
followed by the 3rd and 5th, was sent to the slight eleva-
tions beyond Lindenau.
Napoleon had spent the morning at the tobacco factory.
There is no record of his orders, or of what he said. At
noon he had paid a short visit to Probstheida, and went
there again at 2 P.M., when he was in the thick of the fire,
encouraging his troops in their defence of the village.
When he heard of the Saxon defection he went to the left
and had a long conversation with Ney. Here he personally
ordered the attack by NanSouty's cavalry. At 4 P.M. he
had ordered the cavalry corps to Lindenau, and directed
the whole artillery park to follow, after replenishing the
ammunition supplies at the front, and destroying part of the
empty wagons.
At 5 P.M., exhausted by a sleepless night, he slept calmly
at the tobacco factory, sitting on a wooden bench, until he
was waked by a round shot scattering the fire close by him.
Whilst he slept, his staff stood silent and dejected around
him.
Waking, he calmly dictated orders for the retreat of the
troops next day. Up to the present these orders have not
been found. According to Pelet, part of the artillery and
parks was to go first, then, starting before daybreak, the rest
were to follow in this order : Old Guard, Oudinot's two
divisions of Young Guard, 4th cavalry corps, IX. and
II. corps, 2nd cavalry corps. The rest were to defend
Leipzig and cover the retreat.
At 6.3 o P.M., finding his tents had gone on, the Emperor
betook himself to the Hotel de Prusse, which still stands in
the Ross Platz. Strange coincidence that he should spend
THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG 369
this night in a hostel bearing the name of the nation which
had taken the principal part in his overthrow ! The roads
were so encumbered with the wreckage of his army that it
was long before he got there.
The allied monarchs had spent most of the day on the
Monarchen Hügel, where the Tsar and Frederick William
remained till 8 P.M. The story that they knelt and publicly
thanked the Almighty for their victory is devoid, Friederich
says, of historical foundation. The allies bivouacked thus:
Colloredo behind the line Lösnig-Dôlitz-Dösen ; Barclay in
front of Dösen and Probstheida, and in Zuckelhausen ;
Bennigsen on the line Zuckelhausen-Zweinaundorf-Molkau ;
Bernadotte about Stüntz, Sellerhausen, Paunsdorf, and
Abtnaundorf; Langeron at Schönefeld ; Sacken between
Gohlis and the Partha. The French line ran from Con-
newitz to Probstheida, Stötteritz, Crottendorf, Reudnitz, and
the Halle suburb of Leipzig. The outposts of the opposing
forces were so close as to be able to distinguish one another's
orders. We may appropriately close this account of what
was certainly the greatest battle, so far, of modern war, with
a quotation from Danilewski describing the scene on the
battlefield that night :-
“Night fell ; the sky glowed red, Stötteritz, Schönefeld,
Dölitz, and one of the suburbs of Leipzig were in flames.
Whilst with us (the allies) all were intoxicated with joy,
and messengers of victory sped in every direction, in-
describable confusion reigned in the enemy's army. Their
baggage, their artillery, their broken regiments, the soldiers
of which had been for days without food, were stopped for
want of bridges over the streams round Leipzig. In the
narrow streets resounded the cries of woe of innumerable
wounded, as our shot and shell fell upon them. Over the
battlefield, so recently filled with the thunder of 2000 guns,
there reigned the stillness of the grave. The silence ensuing
after a battle has something terrible in it which inspires the
soul with an unspeakable feeling.”"
The first remark to be made about the battle of the I 8th
* Danilewski, pp. 259-60.
2 A
370 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
is that, from the point of view of Napoleon's interests, it
should never have taken place at all, at least, not on the
scale or in the position in which it did. There can be no
possible doubt that, after the negative result of the 16th,
the Emperor's hope of success was gone, and he should,
from a military point of view, have set about preparing for
retreat on the 17th, starting that same night. Had he done
so, he could have had the greater part of his army beyond
the Elster by the morning of the 18th. The allies would
probably have advanced cautiously on Leipzig; for, as
it was, they were not aware of his evacuation of his
forward position of the 16th. Leipzig lent itself to the
fighting of a rearguard action to gain more time for the
French army to pass behind the Saale. The Emperor could
have built more bridges on the I7th for the rapid passage
of his army, and these, as well as that at the head of the
causeway, would have been destroyed as his rearguard left
Leipzig on the 18th. But his invincible obstinacy, based
mainly on political grounds, in holding on to Leipzig, ruined
the Emperor. Knowing that Bernadotte, Bennigsen, and
Colloredo were coming up, he could hardly fail to realise the
enormous superiority of the allies on the 18th.
The position which he chose for what was practically a
purely defensive battle was, no doubt, an admirable one for
that purpose ; but there were no facilities for the offensive, if
he had been able to contemplate it. On the defensive, the
circumscription of the circle occupied facilitated the rapid
movement of reserves to threatened points.
The allies played into the Emperor's hands by distributing
their forces all round the circle instead of concentrating great
strength against his most sensitive point. The blame for
the failure to make an end of Napoleon there and then lies
chiefly at Bernadotte's door. For days past he had been
hanging back ; even on the 18th he might easily have been
up three or ſour hours before he was. Then there would
have been an overwhelming force against Napoleon's left on
the Partha. Even when he did arrive, Bernadotte acted
very feebly. His Swedes did practically nothing, and the
THE BATTLE OF LEIPZIG 37I
real success in this quarter was gained by Langeron in the
capture of Schönefield, which cost him 37 oo men.
When Bertrand issued from Lindenau, Gyulai was actually
recalled across the Pleisse, though the order was counter-
manded before he reached the river. There has always
been a suspicion that the allies in this intended to
leave open a road for retreat to the French. Friederich
says, however, that there is no evidence of this to be found
in the archives of Berlin, Vienna, or St Petersburg. The
fear of Napoleon on the Continent was still so great that it
cannot but seem far from improbable that the allies would
have felt relieved to find him gone, even at the expense of
a failure to destroy his army. Eighteenth century ideas
were still powerful in the allied camp.
The allies were fully aware of their great numerical
superiority, for Meerveldt told Napoleon that they had
350,000 men, and believed him to have only I 20,000. That
was an exaggeration of the disproportion, but still it seems
strange that, when Bertrand drove Gyulai across the Elster,
the Austrian was not reinforced, instead of being at first told
to withdraw farther. Much must probably be attributed to
distrust of Bernadotte, who might still fail to appear in his
full strength. As it was, he made an unnecessary circuit to
cross the Partha at Taucha. He might perfectly well have
saved hours by crossing where Langeron did.
There seems to have been a fear amongst the allies that
Napoleon would endeavour to break out towards Taucha,
between Bennigsen and Bernadotte. When it is remem-
bered that in doing so he would have had Bernadotte and
Blücher on his left, Bennigsen on his right, the idea seems
absurd. Nothing but a remnant of the French army could
hope to get through to Torgau.
Had Bernadotte been earlier on the field, the superiority
of the allies in his direction would have been so enormous
that Napoleon would have had to use all his reserves thére.
What, then, would have become of Probetheida, which in
any case must have fallen if Bennigsen held Stötteritz and
Stüntz, with Bernadotte in force on his right.
372 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
There was no commander on the side of the allies great
enough to take full advantage of their splendid opportunities.
To realise this, it is only necessary to think what Napoleon
himself would have made of the situation had it been
reversed.
That the French troops fought magnificently is admitted
by all, and the credit due to them is all the greater when it
is remembered how much they had suffered from almost
superhuman exertions, from deficiency of food, and from
privations of all sorts. If the rank and file could not realise
the desperate position they were in, the knowledge of it
probably extended far down in the ranks of their com-
manders. We have already shown that the attempt to
throw the blame on the defection of 4ooo or 5ooo German
allies will not hold water.
CHAPTER XXI
THE STORMING OF LEIPZIG

CHWARZENBERG'S orders to the generals
assembled on the Monarchen Hügel on the
evening of the 18th were very short and simple
“All parts of the army must be ready in battle
order at daybreak to renew the battle. In case of the
enemy's retreat, the army will advance, as on the 18th, in
five columns concentrically on Leipzig, since only on the
capture of the city can the victory be deemed decisive.”
The following orders issued in the night –
(I) Colloredo, now commanding the Ist column, to send
Nostitz with three cavalry brigades to reach Pegau at
7 A.M.
(2) Lederer (left of the Pleisse) also to reach Pegau at
7 A.M. Alois Lichtenstein's division also to go thither.
(3) Bubna to march on Pegau, as soon as his troops were
sufficiently rested.
Thus Schwarzenberg had already ordered 40,000 men
from the battlefield to follow the enemy, and 20,000 more
to be ready to move with the same object next day.
An order, sent through Nostitz at midnight, cancelled
(I) and (2) above. It said the enemy's retreat was not yet
certain. In reality there could be no doubt, and it is not
clear why Schwarzenberg gave this counter order.
The night was dark and misty, the French outpost
service very good, so it was difficult to get any knowledge
of their actual movements. º
At 2 A.M. they began evacuating Connewitz, Probstheida,
and Stötteritz, and drawing off to Leipzig, leaving rear-
guards in these places, and numerous camp fires burning.
373
374 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Only at 5 A.M. did the allies' patrols bring positive news of
the French withdrawal.
Napoleon, as soon as he reached the Hotel de Prusse
with Berthier and Murat, began issuing orders for the
retreat, which he now recognised as inevitable. First,
orders were sent to all the marshals to expedite the march
during the night of troops, artillery, and all wounded fit to
be moved.
Bertrand, with the IV. corps, Guilleminot's division,
Quenette's cavalry brigade, and the French part of
Margaron's troops were already gone, as well as Mortier
with two Young Guard divisions, and two divisions of light
cavalry of the Guard.
On the march to Lindenau were the Ist, 3rd, and 5th
Cavalry corps.
The order of march prescribed was —(I) Old Guard,
except the allied brigade of Rottenbourg; (2) Oudinot's
two divisions of Young Guards; (3) the 4th cavalry corps;
(4) Augereau and Victor; (5) Sebastiani's 2nd cavalry
Corps.
For the defence of Leipzig the troops were thus posted —
Durutte's division, all that remained of the VII. corps
after the Saxon defection, in the Halle suburb.
Marmont (VI.), and one division of the III. corps, were
to hold the section from the Partha to the Grimma gate.
Souham (less one division) on Marmont's right, right of
Souham, the V. corps, then the XI., and finally the VIII,
the last resting its right on the Pleisse.
These corps to march away as soon as circumstances
permitted.
Macdonald was to command the rearguard, consisting of
the VII., VIII., and XI. corps, and, if possible, to hold Leipzig
for twenty-four hours longer.
The bridge leading over the Elster to the Lindenau
causeway was to be mined at once, and blown up as soon
as Macdonald was over.
Having issued these orders, the Emperor looked farther
ahead. Bertrand, who should have reached Weissenfels on
THE STORMING OF LEIPZIG 375
the evening of the 18th, was to spread over the country
between Kösen and Merseburg, watching the passages of
the Saale and occupying Freiburg. He was also to arrange
for the collection of supplies at Erfurt, and other convenient
points.
The despatch rider who took these orders to Bertrand
was to go on to Kellermann at Mayence, with orders to
recall thither all recruits on the march to Erfurt and Würz-
berg. Also, Kellermann received orders regarding the
calling out of the National Guard, and the defence of
France. Erfurt and Würzburg were to be provisioned at
once. To St Cyr, at Dresden, orders were sent to escape
as best he could. Torgau and Wittenberg could capitulate,
on condition of free exit for all troops, including sick and
wounded.
The Emperor thought of everything, and it was only
towards morning that he slept for a short time. Whilst he
slept, Murat went to the King of Saxony to propose his
going with Napoleon to Erfurt, the Emperor guaranteeing
his security. This the king declined, saying he would await
the arrival of the allies.
With the fall of darkness the troops began marching
through Leipzig. Streams of them poured through each
gate into the streets, which no one had thought of arranging
to light. Naturally, confusion ensued, columns crossing
columns, broken-down wagons barring the roads, and, still
worse, the cavalry and artillery recklessly pushing past and
through the infantry. Towards morning there was a feeble
moonlight, which rendered less difficult the march of the
II., IX, and V. corps.
Everywhere in the streets wounded men lay in agony,
hungry and unattended. Many of them met an ignominious
death by being ridden or driven over in the darkness.
Stragglers who had sought safety in houses came out and
joined whatever troops happened to be passing, thus adding
to the confusion of the columns.
At 2 A.M. the troops told off for the defence of Leipzig
began to withdraw from their advanced positions to the
376 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
suburbs. As day dawned, strenuous efforts were made
everywhere to improve the defences of the place. There
were massive houses, brick or clay garden walls, plank
fences, hedges, ditches, every sort of defence likely to be
found in an open town. But, as Napoleon had selected for
the defence of the city just those corps which were nearest
the enemy, and would have him following close on their
heels, there was necessarily little time left for improvising
defences, or for studying the situation. The French soldier,
with his inborn genius for the defence of localities, might be
trusted to make the best of matters, but some places were
insufficiently occupied, others were overcrowded. The gates
and smaller entrances were closed, hedges and fences
embanked, palisades set up as far as possible Batteries
were placed at the ends of streets, and the reserves collected
on the open places.
When the allies began their attack, the defenders, under
Marmont, Macdonald, and Poniatowski, were thus placed —
(I) In the Halle (northern) suburb, Durutte's division and
the special garrison of Leipzig. Behind him, two divisions
III. corps.
(2) On Durutte's right, as far as the Hintertor, Ricard's
division of the III. corps, with the 22nd division (VI. corps)
behind.
(3) From the Blindentor to the outer Grimmator, the
other two divisions of the VI. corps.
(4) From the Grimmator to the Windmill gate, Ledru's
and Gérard's divisions of the XI. corps, with Charpentier's
and Marchand's in reserve. Of Marchand's men, the Baden
brigade was on the right, the Hessian brigade before the
inner Grimma gate. ^s.
(5) From the Windmill to the Munz gate, near the Pleisse,
was Rottenbourg's foreign division of Old Guard (only two
battalions) and Poniatowski's corps. Dombrowski's division
in reserve behind.
In the inner city, within the old wall, the Badener Count
von Hochberg had succeeded Arrighi as governor. He had
two Baden battalions and one Italian. The I2Oo Saxons
THE STORMING OF LEIPZIG 377
who had not deserted were left in front of the king's
quarters in the Market Platz.
Altogether, Leipzig was defended by about 30,000 men
on a perimeter of about 65 od paces ; four to five men to
the pace.
Day broke on Tuesday, October 19th, into a beautiful
Sunny autumn morning. The Tsar and the King of Prussia,
with their headquarters, were early on the battlefield. The
French, indications of whose movement had appeared in the
night, were found to have retired on the suburbs. Even
now, when there could no longer be any possible doubt of
the French retreat, there was no serious idea at the allied
headquarters of attempting to disturb it on the west of
Leipzig. At 7 A.M. the allies began to advance on the
city.
The battle up to Io A.M. :-
The whole allied army advanced concentrically on
Leipzig; Colloredo, nearest the Pleisse, and Barclay against
the south side; Bennigsen on the south-east; the North
army on the east; Blücher on the north. Only on the west
was there nothing.
Friedrich has given as full a description as is possible of
the details of the storming of Leipzig; but there is not much
military interest in details of an affair of this sort, and all we
propose is to give a general outline of it.
Blücher, on the allied right, was the only general who had
any choice of directions, and he decided to make his principal
attack with Langeron direct across the Partha on the Halle
suburb, whilst a secondary attack, to the right across the
Pleisse, was made by Sacken.
Bülow began the advance of the North army about 8 A.M.,
driving the French from Reudnitz and the other villages
which they still held. By 1o A.M. he stood outside the
eastern suburbs, with Borstell on his right and the Hessen-
Homburg division on his left. At that hour the French had
abandoned everything they held outside the suburbs all
round Leipzig. The allies stood ready for the attack on the
suburbs."
378 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Then there ensued a pause in the action, ordered by the
Tsar with a view to negotiations for the surrender of the
city. He had been approached by a deputation of the
magistracy, who had really been urged to that course by
Napoleon in order to gain time. At this time Alexander
and Frederick William were at Napoleon's headquarters of
the day before, at the tobacco factory. Soon after this
deputation, an emissary from the King of Saxony also
arrived. Neither he nor the deputation had any military
authority. Nevertheless, they proposed to negotiate for the
surrender of the city on the basis of an unhindered with-
drawal of the French garrison. The two monarchs, anxious
to spare Leipzig the horrors of a storm, were willing to
agree, and sent Natzmer to say so. Into the details of this
negotation which, as might be expected, came to nought, we
need not enter.
Napoleon, meanwhile, had been relieved to learn that the
allies were making no serious attempt to cut off his retreat
by the left bank of the Elster. He had also heard at 7 A.M.
from Bertrand, that the Saale bridge at Weissenfels was
restored. He at once sent orders for the construction of
more bridges there. Bertrand was to occupy the defile of
Kösen, and, if possible, Merseburg.
About 9 A.M. the Emperor mounted and went off with
Murat to bid adieu to the King of Saxony. Even then he
could not make up his mind to speak the truth ; for he
appears to have assured the king that he would be back
again in a few days. The king had, before this, believed he
was rid of the French for good, and, as he assured the
emissary of the Tsar, it was in this belief that he had
already sent his proposals for negotiations.
After a visit of half an hour, Napoleon left his ally and
started for the Rannstädt Gate, leading to the causeway to
Lindenau. The narrow gate and the causeway were so
crowded with the retreating troops that the Emperor and
his staff had literally to abandon themselves to the human
stream and drift along with it. It was not till I I A.M.
that he dismounted at the Lindenau mill, after giving
THE STORMING OF LEIPZIG 379
orders for officers to be posted to direct stragglers to their
corps.
Odeleben and others say that he bore the look of a ruined
man. Knowing what we do of the calmness which he
showed in the midst of the horrors of the retreat from
Moscow, it seems safer to believe the evidence of an eye-
witness who says, “In his countenance there was nothing
which could be read as betraying fear or anxiety.” He
had schooled himself too well to allow his feelings to be read
from his face.
After dictating orders for the defence of Leipzig, he
yielded to exhausted nature and slept calmly in the
mill.
Second period, from Io A.M.–Soon after I O.30, when the
negotiations had broken down, the attack recommenced.
By I 1.30 the French had everywhere been driven from the
suburbs into the inner city. So far, all had behaved
splendidly; now the thought uppermost in the minds of all
was of escape. Where men stood to resist, they did so
generally because the way behind them was blocked. The
left wing was nearest to the bridge, the VII. corps and the
XI. were farthest, and in danger of being completely cut
from it, as the allies got forward from north and south.
At the Grimma Gate, in the east, the fighting was more
desperate than anywhere, for the French, driven by Bülow
against the gate, found it shut against them by the Baden
troops, who had instructions to allow no one to pass. The
massacre was horrible, till at last the gate gave way,
Through it the French poured, and, as they got through,
the Badeners again closed and barricaded it.
Durutte, meanwhile, had held out beyond the Partha till
the advance of Bülow's right, threatening his retreat, com-
pelled him to retire. The bridge over the Partha was
stormed by Langeron with fearful loss on both sides. Some
of Durutte's men surrendered, the rest made for the - Elster
bridge.
The awful struggle, at the Grimma Gate had continued
* Huszell, Leipzig wahrend die Schreckentage, p. 68.
380 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
with unabated fury, but now the defenders were turned, and
the Hessians who held the gate surrendered. It was about
I 2.30 P.M. On the south, Poniatowski and his companions
fought fiercely, but in vain, against overwhelming numbers.
Bülow's troops were pushing westwards through the city;
Blücher was struggling forward from the north ; the French
cause was lost, and the troops had no hope save in reaching
the bridge and the Lindenau causeway, now covered by a
struggling crowd of desperate fugitives. Even this hope
was soon taken from them.
Shortly before 1 P.M. Napoleon, sleeping calmly in the
Lindenau mill, undisturbed by the roar of cannon, was at
last awakened by a far louder and more awful explosion.
As will be remembered, the bridge at the Leipzig end of the
long causeway had been mined by Napoleon's orders. The
mine was only to be fired when the last of the French had
quitted the city. Colonel Montfort of the engineers was in
charge of it. In vain he inquired of many passing generals
which corps was to be the last over. No one knew. Then
he went off to Lindenau to inquire of Berthier. In charge
of the bridge he left a corporal of sappers named Lafontaine,
with instructions not to fire the mine unless it appeared that
the enemy was on the point of mastering it.
Montfort was carried along with the stream of fugitives
to Lindenau, but getting back against the stream he found
to be impossible. Meanwhile, some of Sacken's skirmishers
had got forward into the meadows north of the causeway,
whence they began firing at the fugitives. The unfortunate
corporal, seeing these men, and seeing no French troops to
drive them off, believed the time had come to blow up the
bridge and lighted the train. As the fire reached the mine,
it exploded with appalling effect. The air was filled with
flying fragments of the bridge, with broken parts of waggons,
and with the limbs of horses and men, which descended in
a ghastly shower on the whole neighbourhood.
As the smoke cleared off, the unhappy soldiers on the
Leipzig side of the stream found themselves with no alterna-
tive but surrender or a desperate endeavour to escape by
THE STORMING OF LEIPZIG 381
swimming. Thousands surrendered, others tried swimming ;
some succeeded, many were drowned.
Macdonald, plunging into the Elster on his horse, suc-
ceeded in getting over; Poniatowski and Dumoustier were
drowned in the attempt.
Towards the north-west corner of the city another fear-
ful struggle had been taking place as the French and
Dombrowski's Poles found themselves between Blücher's
troops on the north and Bülow's on the east. Here
the slaughter was so awful that, in places, the Pleisse was
choked by a gruesome dam of dead men and horses, across
which their comrades found a means of escape to the
gardens beyond, only to be surrounded there and forced to
surrender. k
At I P.M. the fighting in the city was practically over,
and the French troops still on that side had yielded them-
selves prisoners.
About that hour the Tsar and the King of Prussia, with
Schwarzenberg and their staffs, rode into Leipzig by the
Grimma Gate to the market-place. Troops lined the streets,
bands played, and even the French prisoners, whom there
had been no time to disarm, presented arms. The inhabi-
tants, filling the windows and covering the roofs, cheered
vehemently, forgetting the horrors of the moment in the
prospect of a brighter future. In the market-place the
sovereigns met Bernadotte and Bennigsen coming from the
presence of the King of Saxony. A little later came
Blücher and Gneisenau from the Rannstädt Gate.
Passing the residence of the King of Saxony, who in
vain awaited a visit from them, the monarchs tried to go to
the Rannstädt Gate, but were prevented by the blockage of
• the streets, and by the shells which Marmont was throwing
from beyond the river to prevent the issue of the enemy.
They returned by the Grimma Gate to meet the Emperor of
Austria, then arriving from Rötha, whither he soon returned.
The Tsar and the King of Prussia then, at Bernadotte's
request, went to inspect the Swedes at Reudnitz.
In the midst of the excitement, Blücher alone thought of
382 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
pursuit. He would have sent Langeron after Yorck in
the morning, had he not required him to support Sacken.
He had to rest content with despatching the cavalry of both
corps, which crossed the Elster at Schkeuditz at I I A.M.
When the bridge was blown up Blücher, seeing that there
were already ample troops in Leipzig, stopped Sacken and
Langeron and ordered both on Schkeuditz, which they
reached early on the 20th.
In the evening Bennigsen's cavalry crossed the Elster by
Swimming, whilst Paskiewitch's infantry got across by an
extemporised bridge. This brought to an end the Freneh
bombardment which had continued all day.
Sappers worked all night at constructing bridges for the
allies. The rest of the troops bivouacked in the meadows
round Leipzig.
What the losses were on both sides in the four days,
16th-19th October, will probably never be known with any
accuracy. All attempts to distribute them between the
different days are useless.
The allies' losses have been calculated at from 4o, ooo to
7o,ooo killed and wounded, both of which Friederich con-
siders extreme figures. He estimates them roughly as
follows, for the four days by nationalities:—
I. PRUSSIANS
Officers. Men. Total.
Yorck . º . I 76 5,467 5,643
Kleist . ſº , 244 7,882 8, 126
Bülow . to § 78 2, 186 2,264
498 I 5,535 I 6,033
II. RUSSIANS
Main Army . . 5 I 2 II,4 II I I,923
Silesian Army . 25 O 6,897 7, I 47
North Army . g 33 4.32 465
Polish Army . . . 7o 3,OOO 3,070
865 2 I,74O 22,605
THE STORMING OF LEIPZIG 383
III. AUSTRIANS
General Staff . º IO tº tº tº º ºs
Ist Light Division . 25 52.5 55 O
2nd Light Division . I I 227 238
I. Army Abteilung . 53 I,44. I I,494
II. Army Abteilung. 53 I,885 I,938
III. Army Abteilung 39 I,486 I,525
IV. Army Abteilung 99 3,900 3,999
Reserve Corps . I 3 O 5, O74 5,2O4
sº-ºº-ººººº-
IV. SWEDES, ETC.
42O I 4,538 I 4,958
9 I 69 178
Grand total . I,792 5 I,982 53,784
Other estimates are :-
PLOTHO. HOFMANN. BEITZKE,
Officers, Men. Officers. Men.
Prussians . ū . 522 I4,950 62o 13,55o I6,43o
Russians . e fe 576 21,740 8oo 20, ooo 22,604
Austrians . e . 406 8, ooo 360 7, Ooo 8,399
Swedes . o º IO 3oo IO 3oo IO3
I,514 44,990 I,790 4o,850
S——” *—-vº-'
46,504 42,640 47,536
It is still more difficult to estimate the losses of the
French.
Friederich takes them at—
Killed and wounded
Prisoners g tº Q
Sick and wounded in hospitals
Germans gone over to allies.
Camille Rousset says Napoleon had
38,000
I 5,000
I 5,OOO
5,000
******mº.
73,000
8o,ooo men left
384 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
after crossing the Rhine. Marmont reckons only 60,000
fit to fight.
The trophies taken by the allies were: 28 flags and
eagles, 325 guns, 9oo ammunition wagons, besides many
burnt by the French before the retreat; I4,400 cwt. of
powder, and 40,000 muskets.
Of well-known French generals there were—
Azlled. — Poniatowski, Dumoustier, Vial, Rochambeau,
Friedrichs, and Delmas.
Wounded.—Ney, Macdonald, Marmont, Reynier, Lauri-
ston, Souham, Latour-Maubourg, Pajol, Sebastiani, Compans,
Gérard, Maison.
Prisoners. — Thirty-six generals, including Lauriston,
Reynier, Charpentier, Pino, Count Hochberg, and Prince
Emil of Hesse.
The most illustrious of the prisoners was the King of
Saxony. After waiting in vain all day for a visit of the
allied sovereigns, he sent Von Zeschau to request an inter-
view with the King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria.
They referred him to the Tsar. But already the Russian
Privy Councillor, Anstett, had informed the king, in the
Tsar's name, that he was to be sent to Berlin, where all
suitable arrangements would be made for his comfort.
Nevertheless, he was a prisoner of war, guarded by a com-
pany of Russian Grenadiers. He left for Berlin on the 23rd
October.
“The greatest general of the age would have found no
retreat from his chosen position unless the enemy had
allowed it. It did not depend on him that Sedan was not
merely a repetition.”.” No attempt was made by the allies
to forestall Bertrand, to occupy Freiburg, Kösen, and
Naumburg, or to destroy the bridges at those places. Some
allowance must be made for the exhaustion of the allied
troops on the night of the 18th, but still it seems more might
have been done. With the great superiority of the allies in
the east, they might apparently have reinforced Blücher, so
as to enable him to interfere with the retreat by way of
* Quistorp, Geschächte der Word Armée in Jahre 1813, ii. 307.
THE STORMING OF LEIPZIG 385
Schkeuditz. There was a quantity of cavalry which had
done very little on the 18th, and might have been sent to
Pegau during the night, and thence, on the Igth, against
the line of retreat. The fact is that Schwarzenberg was not
of a sufficient calibre as a general. To this may perhaps be
added the mortal dread in which Napoleon's genius was
held, and the fear that he might have some surprise in
reserve against any bold movement. If the allies desired
to cut off the retreat of the garrison of Leipzig, their attack
should have been directed in greatest force against the
French right and left near the rivers, rather than against
their centre in the east, where they required to be “fixed.”
There was a good deal of confusion in the allies' attack,
which was unnecessarily deferred. Columns crossed, got in
one another's way, and put one another out of action. This
was especially the case in the southern attack.
Napoleon's fault was in his neglect of details, which he
appears to have left largely to his subordinates, with the
result that, whilst his attention was fixed farther west, there
was no unity of command in Leipzig. He had hitherto
saved his subordinates practically all of the thinking, and
now they still looked to him to arrange everything. The
greatest fault of all was the reliance for the retreat of a
great army on a single bridge. The Elster and the Pleisse
are not great rivers like the Elbe, or even the Mulde. Even
during the night of the 18th- I 9th, temporary bridges might
have been built. But for this there has as yet been found
no order of the Emperor, and, under his system of command,
no initiative was to be expected from subordinates.
The premature explosion of the mine at the bridge
probably cost the Emperor from I O,Ooo to I 5,000 troops
cut off in Leipzig. It appears to have been due to in-
sufficient instructions given to the officer in charge. He,
too, must bear some share of the blame for his conduct in
leaving the mine in charge of an ignorant corporal, whilst
he himself went off to get more definite orders.
2 B
CHAPTER XXII
THE PURSUIT AFTER LEIPZIG AND THE
BATTLE OF HANAU

YULAI and Lederer joined Nostitz's cavalry on
the 19th October, and were about to march on
Naumburg when Schwarzenberg's counter-order
stopped them. At 2 P.M. a fresh order reached
them, directing them to proceed at once to Teuchern, and
to reach Naumberg next day. Later came news that
Thielmann already held Naumberg. Yorck reached Halle
at Io A.M. on the 19th, and the reserve cavalry passed
through. Yorck, who had noticed little progress in the
battle before he left on the 18th, thought that, though
Napoleon would probably be beaten, he would yet be able to
retreat in good order, and that it would, therefore, be
dangerous to risk attacking him. It was only at 6 P.M. on
the 19th that he heard of the fall of Leipzig and the march
of Blücher on Schkeuditz. The positions of the allies in
pursuit on the evening of the 19th October were :-
Gyulai, M. Lichtenstein and Nostitz, Dobergast.”
Murray's detachment—Zeitz.
Thielmann, Mensdorf, etc.—Naumburg.
Yorck—Halle.
Sacken and Langeron—towards Schkeuditz.
Russian and Prussian Guards and reserve—Pegau.
On the 20th the French main body passed the Saale at
Weissenfels, protected by Marmont with the III., VI., and
VII. corps, facing towards Merseburg. Oudinot had left
Lindenau only at daybreak, and was not at Weissenfels
till late in the evening.
* Three miles south-west of Pegau.
386
THE BATTLE OF HANAU 387
That evening the advanced troops of the allies were :-
Gyulai, etc.—Naumburg.
Russian and Prussian Guard, etc.—Teuchern."
Kleist and Wittgenstein—Pegau.
Bennigsen—Schönau.
Yorck—Gross Kaina.
On the 2 Ist Gyulai's corps came up with Bertrand's
rearguard at Kösen, standing on the heights of the left bank
of the Saale, on to which Davout had marched on the 14th
October I 806 to the battle of Auerstädt.
The first object of the allies was to prevent the destruc-
tion of the bridge. At first they not only got across, but
succeeded in nearly reaching the top of the heights. Then
they were driven down again and pursued across the bridge.
Gyulai, putting himself at the head of a strong force, again
turned the scale, repassed the bridge, and captured Neu
Kösen on the left bank below the heights. It was not till
Io P.M. that Bertrand retreated. The losses were about
I ooo killed and wounded on each side, but the French lost
also 649 prisoners.
Yorck attacked the French rearguard at Freiburg on this
day, as the army was passing the Unstrut. He was, in the
end, compelled to retire, leaving the enemy to complete his
passage unmolested.
Napoleon reached Erfurt on the 23rd with, even at the
highest estimates, 90,000 or Ioo, Ooo demoralised men,
quite unfit to face the great armies behind them. At Erfurt
he remained till the morning of the 25th when he started
again. On the 26th there was a fight with Hunerbein’s
brigade of Yorck's corps at the Horselberg, before reaching
Eisenach. Yorck's cavalry, at the eastern end of the ridge,
drove some French skirmishers on to it, and themselves got
there, but found it impossible to descend by its south side to
the road. They had, therefore, to rest content with shelling
the French camp at the east end of the defile, thereby ex-
pediting the movements of its occupants. Then they tried
to go round to the west end, but were prevented by marshy
* Half-way from Pegau to Naumberg.
388 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
ground. There was another fight at the west end, where
Hunerbein arrived in sight of the camp of two divisions of
the Young Guard, amongst whom his shells at first created
much alarm. Then, however, a sharp fight developed, which
eventually compelled Hunerbein to retire to the hills in his
Tea. I’.
The line of the French retreat showed very unmistakable
traces of the demoralisation of the army. “The roads on
which the French retreated,” says Plotho, “showed the
most unmistakable traces of the disorganisation of the
enemy's army. The numbers of corpses and dead horses
increased every day. Thousands of soldiers, sinking from
hunger and fatigue, remained behind, unable to reach a
hospital. The woods for several miles round were full
of stragglers and worn out and sick soldiers. Guns and
wagons were found everywhere.”" The allies pursuing
Napoleon moved in several columns, the distribution of
which need scarcely be dealt with here. They concern
more closely the history of the subsequent campaign in
France.
But, in addition to the direct pursuit, Napoleon was now
threatened by the advance of Wrede with the united
Austrians and Bavarians who had recently stood as enemies
on the Inn.
THE BATTLE OF HANAU.”
It is curious to find Wrede, who certainly owed his
military advancement as well as his title of Count to Napoleon,
now becoming the bitterest enemy, after Blücher, of the man
he had followed since I 805. Even German writers seem to
look rather askance at his conduct.
It was perhaps due to his well-known favour with
Napoleon that he had earned a reputation in Austria which
led to his being appointed to the chief command of the
army, with which he moved, south of the Main, to intercept
* Der Krieg in Deutschland und Frankreich, ii. 440,
* Map IV. (e).
THE BATTLE OF HANAU 389
such of the beaten French army as might be making for
Frankfort and Mayence. With the details of his march we
are not concerned.
On the 27th October, he was under the impression that
he had only to deal with a flank column of 18,000 or
2O,Ooo men, and that Napoleon was farther north on the
road to Coblence. With some trifling successes on the 28th
and 29th, Wrede became still more confident. He was at
Hanau by 2 P.M. on the 29th with all his troops, except
Rechberg's division, which he sent ahead to occupy Frank-
fort. His army had dwindled, owing to hard marching and
detachments, including one he had to leave before Würzburg,
which he had failed to take. He had at Hanau about
3O,OOO men and 58 guns.
Hanau, then a town of some I 5,000 inhabitants, stands
in the angle between the Main and the Kinzig, a tributary
reaching it from the north-east. The town was still sur-
rounded by a wet ditch, though the fortifications had fallen
into disrepair. The Kinzig, which flows in a semicircle
round the northern side of the town, was, especially in the
rainy autumn of I 8 I 3, a serious obstacle, passable for all
arms only at the bridge north-west of Hanau, and at that a
mile or so to the east, near the Lamboi forest. The
forest comes down to within a mile of Hanau on the
eastern and northern sides. The main road from Erfurt to
Mayence passes north of the town, without crossing the
Kinzig.
Still under the impression that Napoleon was far away,
Wrede, on the morning of the 3oth October, posted his army
east of Hanau and across the great road, to bar the retreat
of the French. His left was astride of the road, facing its
issue from the forest. This wing consisted chiefly of
cavalry, and of 28 guns. A few squadrons watched north-
wards on the Friedberg road. The centre stretched from
the road to the Kinzig (which was behind it) at the
Lamboi bridge. The right was south of the Lamboi bridge.
The position was so bad as to justify Napoleon's remark
that he had been able to make Wrede a count, but not a
390 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
general. The separation of the front by the Kinzig, the
position of the centre with its retreat barred by that stream,
and the facilities offered by the forest to the approach of the
French, were the chief defects of the position. If the
enemy could seize the Lamboi bridge, the right would be
hopelessly separated, and the ruin of the centre and left
was almost certain. Napoleon had but I 6,ooo or I 7,Ooo
men available for the moment, but they were sufficient,
under him, against Wrede with nearly double that
strength.
By noon, after some fighting with the Bavarian advanced
troops in the forest, Victor, supported by Macdonald, was at
the outer edge of the wood opposite Wrede's centre. Even
then Wrede had only just realised that he was opposed to
the Emperor. He now called over a brigade from his
right to protect the Lamboi bridge. Napoleon had decided
to attack in superior force against Wrede's left. Drouot
had reported the feasibility for artillery of a track he had
discovered through the forest north of the road. The wood
opposite Wrede's left was cleared about 3 P.M. by two
battalions of Old Guard, and Drouot gradually collected a
battery of 50 guns in that direction, whilst the 2nd cavalry
corps and the Guard heavy cavalry assembled behind him.
Wrede's 28 guns were soon mastered, and then the
French cavalry charged that of Wrede's left, who were
carried away and driven off the field. Wrede's centre,
hard pressed by Drouot's guns, and with the French
cavalry now descending on it from the left, held out for
a time, but was presently compelled to retreat. With
the Kinzig barring direct retreat, it had to move to its
left, an operation in which it naturally suffered heavily.
The last three battalions were cut off and driven in-
to the Kinzig, where several hundreds were drowned.
The remains of Wrede's centre and left assembled at
Gross Auenheim.
When Wrede saw the danger to his left and centre, he
tried to bring help from his right across the Lamboi bridge.
The first brigade, called over earlier, was already retreating
THE BATTLE OF HANAU 39I
when the second succeeded, for the moment, in driving the
pursuers back to the wood. Then the tide turned again,
and both brigades were pushed in confusion on to the
bridge, which was insufficient for their passage. Here again
several hundreds were drowned in the Kinzig.
That night Wrede bivouacked with his right on the
Lamboi bridge, his centre and left along the Aschaffenburg
road and holding Hanau.
Napoleon, having driven Wrede across the Kinzig, had
no desire to pursue him. He continued his retreat on
Frankfort, leaving a rearguard to keep Wrede from interfer-
ing with the remainder of the army still behind.
At 2 A.M. on the 3 Ist Hanau was bombarded, and
presently Wrede evacuated it, leaving it to be occupied
without resistance by Bertrand when he arrived at
8 A.M.
With Bertrand in Hanau, and Marmont preventing his
issue over the Lamboi bridge, Wrede could do nothing
against Napoleon's troops passing along the road beyond.
By 3 P.M. all had passed and Marmont followed with the
III. and VI. corps, still leaving Bertrand with the IV. to
cover the retreat.
When Wrede again advanced he completely failed in
his attack on the Lamboi bridge. In storming Hanau
itself, he was badly wounded. An attack on the Kinzig
bridge beyond the town, to which the French retired,
failed, and there was now no further obstacle to Napoleon's
retreat to Mayence through Frankfort, which had been
evacuated by Rechberg as the French approached.
In the four days, 28th to 31st October, Wrede lost about
92.5o officers and men. The French loss in killed and
wounded was probably less, but during this period there fell
into the hands of the enemy, in small detachments or as
stragglers, 5 generals, 28o officers, and about I O,OOO
IIle11. *e
There is not much to be said about the battle of Hanau.
The position taken up by Wrede was hopelessly bad, and
he suffered the penalty of taking it. He seems to have
392 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
realised what was coming when he learnt that he was in the
presence of his late master, for he remarked that he was
bound to fight, and that he and his men must just do their
best. On the whole, he might consider himself fortunate in
saving any part of his centre and left, which had to pass
round the northward bend of the Kinzig before reaching a
passage at the bridge of the branch road joining Hanau to
the main road. .
Napoleon had, with unerring instinct, instantly seized the
features of the battlefield and the weaknesses of Wrede's
position. He could not avoid fighting. He was probably
not anxious for another battle, though he felt satisfaction in
reading Wrede, who after all had treated him with consider-
able ingratitude, a severe lesson.
Here we close the history of this campaign, for it is
unnecessary to follow the course of the operations of the
allies against the fortresses still held by Napoleon's garrisons
in Germany. A few words may, however, be said about the
fate of Dresden and St Cyr. It has already been told how
Napoleon, after deciding to take St Cyr north with him and
to abandon Dresden, made that fatal change which deprived
him of the I. and XIV. corps, which he so badly needed at
Leipzig. Not only that, but he also insisted on keeping
Magdeburg, Torgau, and Wittenberg, the garrisons of which
and of Dresden would have given him at least 5 O,Ooo more
men at Leipzig, and might even have changed the result of
the battle of the I6th.
St Cyr at Dresden, blockaded by Russians and Austrians
after Leipzig, made some ineffectual attempts to escape
down the right bank of the Elbe. Then, the garrison and
the inhabitants being reduced to the greatest straits by
starvation, he accepted a capitulation under which the
garrison was to be sent back to France under promise not
to serve again in the war. The capitulation was signed on
the I I th November, and the garrison was already on the
march to France, when it was announced that Schwarzenburg
had refused to ratify it. Though the allies offered to replace
St Cyr in Dresden in exactly the same position, as to arms,
THE BATTLE OF HANAU 393
provisions, etc., as he held when the capitulation was signed,
he considered it useless to return, and he and his army
became prisoners of war.
Under all the circumstances, the conduct of the allies in
this matter seems open to censure.
INDEX
ALBERT (French General), 129, 132,
255
Alexander I. (Tsar of Russia), 5, 58,
59, 83, I22-124, 130, 134, I45, I53,
I8I, I93, 203, 217, 233, 237, 238,
249, 327, 332, 337, 348, 359, 363,
377, 378, 381. s
Armistice of Poischwitz, 156-159
Army (French)—Losses in Russia,
9 ; Organization in 1813, Io;
cohorts, Io, II ; levy of four
classes, II ; Municipal Guards,
II ; levies of conscripts, Io-I2 ;
National Guard, Io; elements
available, I2; quality of recruits,
I3 ; marine artillery, II ; in-
fantry, I3, I4 ; provisional corps,
I4 ; Cavalry, I5 ; its quality, Ig ;
village fighting, 20 ; Eugène's
organization, 32, 33
(Prussian) — Limitation in
1807, 21 ; “old” army, 21, 22;
“Krumper’’ system, 22 ; general
reforms, 22 ; artillery, 21 ; ma-
terial, 21, 22, 24 ; “free '’ corps,
23 ; “Volunteer Jägers,” 23 ;
compulsory service, 23 ; “land-
wehr,” 24; strength of army in
August 1813, 25 ; its spirit, 25
(Russian), 26
— (Austrian), 27, 28
— (Swedish), 28
(Other allies), 28, 29
Arrighi (Duke of Padua), 3oo, 341,
356, 376 e
Aster (Saxon writer), 202, 206
Augereau (Marshal), 36, 286, 300,
317, 337,338, 339, 363
Austria (policy, etc.), 5–7, 30, 62, I53,
I68
(Emperor of), 4, 155, 233,
237, 381
BARCLAY DE TOLLY (Russian
general), 30, 46, IOO ; attack on
Lauriston, II2-II 4 ; at Bautzen,
I2O, I2 I, I28, 129, I32 ; appointed
commander-in-chief, I45; sees
danger on 2nd June, I5o ; plan of
campaign, I80 ; at Dresden, IQ3,
2I 7, 228, 229 ; at Priesten, 237 ;
in Bohemia, 279 ; at Leipzig, 359,
363, 377
Barrois (French general), I31, I.33,
I34, 203
Bautzen (battle of)—Description of
field, II6, II 7 ; fortifications,
II8; allies' mistaken assumptions,
II9 ; their strength, II9 ; disposi-
tions, I2O ; Napoleon decides to
attack on 20th May, I2I ; action
of Oudinot, Macdonald, and
Marmont, I21, 122 ; Napoleon's
design, I22 ; Soult's action, 123,
I24 ; Ney approaches, I23 ;
battle of 21st May, Ist period,
Oudinot and Macdonald, I27 ;
Soult, I27, 128; Ney, 128-130 ;
2nd period, French centre, I31 ;
Soult's advance, I31 ; Blücher
falls back, 131 ; Ney at Preititz,
I32 ; 3rd period, attack on
Blücher, I 33, 134 ; Ney's and
Soult's corps clubbed, 134 ; re-
treat of allies, I35, I36 ; remarks,
I36-I4I
Bavaria, political attitude, 55, 317
Beaumont (French general), IoS,
IO6, 259
Benkendorf (Russian general), 34
Bennigsen (Russian general), 289,
292, 294, 3I6, 355, 359, 360, 361,
364, 366, 376, 38I, 382
Berg (Prussian general), 59, 77
Berkheim (French general), 337
Berlin, 34-38, 44, 45, I76. I78
Bernadotte (Crown Prince of
Sweden)—Position in I812-13, 6 ;
and Swedish army, 28 ; after
armistice, 176, 180, 181 ; at Gross
Beeren, 26o, 263 ; at Dennewitz,
271, 277 ; in September, 29I, 292,
299; with Blücher, 306, 307, 308,
3I4, 315, 321, 322 ; at Leipzig,
343, 357, 361, 364, 366, 371, 381
Bertrand (French general), 50, 52,
54, 55, 64; at Lützen, 81, 83, 87,
95 ; at Bautzen, II.3, I2 I, I27,
395
396 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
I33, I34, I 38; I45, 148; at Gross
Beeren, 259, 26o ; at Dennewitz,
272-275 ; at Wartenburg, 297-
299; at Leipzig, 362, 387 ; at
Hanau, 39 I
Bessières, Marshal, 50, 53, 63
Bianchi (Austrian general), 206, 339,
355, 363
Blankenfelde, action at, 259, 26o
Blücher (Prussian general), 30, 33,
36, 37, 44, 46, 57-61, 66 ; at
Lützen, 73, 75, 77 ; at Bautzen,
I2O, I2 I, I29, I31-I34 ; in retreat
after Bautzen, I45, I51 ; after
armistice, I68 ; retires before
Napoleon, I87 ; at the Katzbach,
250, 25I, 254, 256 ; again re-
tires before Napoleon, 271 ; in
September, 290, 29I, 292, 294 ;
at Wartenburg, 298, 299 ; and
Bernadotte, 306–308, 3I4, 315, 321,
322 ; at Möckern, 341-344; at
Leipzig, 356, 357, 362, 367, 377,
38I, 382
(Prussian colonel), 237, 284
Bogue, Colonel, 364
Bonnet (French general), 63, 77, 82,
83, I23
BordeSoulle (French general), 220,
337, 338
Borstell (Prussian general), 260, 261,
274, 377
Brayer (French general), 367
Bremen, taken by Tettenborn, 287
Brennier (French general), 77
Breslau, 36, 150, I56, 185
Briesnitz, passage of Elbe at, 98
British troops, 29, 364
Bubna, Count, I53, 154, 294, 359-
36I
Bülow (Prussian general), 33, 91,
I5I ; at Gross Beeren, 260-262,
264 ; at Dennewitz, 27I, 273-275,
278; in September, 291 ; at
Leipzig, 362, 364, 377, 379, 381
CASSEL, raid on, 287
Caulaincourt, Duke of Vicenza, 155,
2O7
Charles of Mecklenburg, Prince, 298,
299
Charpentier (French general), 82,
335, 338, 362, 376
Chasteler (Austrian general), 212,
316
Clausewitz, 6o
Colloredo (Austrian general), 212,
233, 3I6, 359, 363, 376
Commanders (French), 17, 18
(allied), 30, 3I
Commissariat, 9o, I65-I67, 289
Communications, line of (French),
I O2
(allied), 94
Compans (French general), 63, 77,
82, I2 I, 346
Constantine, Grand Duke, II9
Corbineau (French general),
222, 23O, 235
Corswant (Prussian general), I35
Curial (French general), 339
Czernitchew (Russian general), 34,
35, 45, 152, 264, 287
Czöllich (Austrian general), 220, 228
2II,
DANILEwsKI (Russian historian),
65, 78, ISO, 217, 233, 331, 369
Danzig, 32, 47, 48
Davout, Marshal, I8, 39, 41-43, 45,
53 n., I52, 264
Decouz (French general), 2O2, 207,
2I4
De France (French general), 259,
274, 275, 345
Delmas (French general), I29, I32,
I33, 345, 356, 366 tº 8 º'
Dennewitz (battle of)—Description
of field, 272 ; Bertrand’s fight
with Tauenzien, 273; Reynier and
Oudinot arrive, 274; Ney ruins
battle, 275; defeat of French,
275 ; retreat, 276 ; losses, 276 :
criticisms, 276-278
Diebitsch (Russian general), 235,
3I9
Discipline, 95
Doctorow (Russian general), 361
Dolffs (Prussian general), 78, 81, I48
Dombrowski (French general), 300,
344, 345, 356, 376, 381
Doumerc (French general), 337
Dresden, 4, 38, 42-44, 46, 47, 48, 53,
57, 59, 60, 96, 98, IO2, 160, I63-
I64, 192, Ig3, IgA-I96; battle at,
2OO-226 ; surrender of, 392, 393
Dresden (battle of)—Description of
field, 194-197; positions of both
sides, 25th-26th August, 197-198;
allied plan of attack, IoS, I99 ;
Russian and Prussian attack, 200,
20I ; Austrian attack, 20I ; Na-
poleon arrives, 201, 202 ; French
reinforcements, 202, 203; hesita-
tion of allies, 203, 204; re-
newal of battle, 204; progress
INDEX
397
of allies, 204-206; spirit of
French, 206, 207; French counter-
attack, 207-209; results of battle
of 26th August, 209 ; rain sets in,
2Io; French troops arrive during
night, 2 Io; forces available for
27th, 2Io; despondency of allies,
2ro, 2II ; Vandamme's operations
of 26th, 2II ; positions on morn-
ing 27th, 2II-2I4 ; advance of
French left, 2I4-2I 6; Napoleon
reaches left, 216, 217 ; death of
Moreau, 217 ; affairs in centre,
218 ; Prench attack beyond
Wesseritz, 218, 219 ; breaking of
Austrian line, 2I9; captures by
French cavalry, 219, 22O ; ruin
of Czöllich's brigade, 22I ; Aus-
trian left destroyed, 22I, 222 ;
Vandamme’s operations of 27th,
222 ; Napoleon's return to
Dresden, 223 ; losses of allies,
223 ; criticisms, 223-226
Drouot (French general), 82, 98, 337,
390
Du Casse (“Le général Vandammé”),
232 n., 246
Dumonçeau (French general), 230,
284
Dumoustier (French general), 57,
209, 381
Dunesne (French general), 239, 24I
Durosnel (French general), IO2, IIo
Durutte (French general), 4 I, 43, 44,
92, 26o, 26.I, 366, 376, 379
ELBE-Army of, 50, 51, 53, 55, 57,
63, IOI
Erfurt, 33,47, 50, 52, 53,56, 387
Eugen of Wurtemberg (Prince)—At
Lützen, 81 ; between Lützen and
Bautzen, 91, 99; at Bautzen, II5,
I35 ; in retreat, I42 ; about
Pirna, 2II, 218 ; from Pirna to
Kulm, 230, 234, 235, 236 ; at
Leipzig, 332, 333, 337, 338, 363
Eugène Beauharnais (Viceroy of
Italy)—Commands in Germany,
32 ; position and troops, 33 ;
retires to Frankfort-on-Oder, 34 ;
to Berlin, 36, 38 ; behind Elbe,
39 ; decides to defend lower Elbe,
4o ; recrosses Elbe and fights at
Möckern, 45; retires again, 45;
at Lützen, 82, 89 ; in pursuit
after Lützen, 93 ; Sent to Italy,
IOI
FONTANELLI (French general), 26o,
273, 299
Fortifications—At Bautzen, II8; at
Dresden, I63, I64, Ig3, IQ5, 196,
2OO, 20I ; Magdeburg, Torgau,
etc., I62 ; Hamburg, 164 ; on the
Bober, 189 ; at Leipzig, 326, 376
Fortresses, I62-165
Foucart (French historian), Io9 n.,
I36
Fournier (French general), 262, 344,
345, 356
Fox-Strangways, 364 n.
Frankfort-on-Oder, 34
Franquemont (French general), 50,
54, 57. I31.298
Frederick William, King of Prussia,
5, 6, 37, 58, 83, I24, I30, 181, 203,
2O4, 227, 233, 237, 238, 249, 292,
337, 359, 377, 378, 381
Flºorps. 23, 34, 35, 54, I52, 287,
2
Freiburg, action at, 387
Friederich (Prussian historian), 21,
I79, I82, I84, 2II, 24I, 244, 246,
277, 299, 309, 3IO, 3I9, 352, 365,
377
Friederichs (French general), 123
G#RARD (French general), 27, 39,
253, 256, 335, 338, 376
Girard (French general), 39, 63, 76,
77, 8o, 264
Glashütte, action at, 237
Glogau, 33, 35, 44; 47, I49, I5o
Gneisenau (Prussian general), 30,
84, II9, I45, 381
Gobrecht (French general), 231
Görda, action at, 287
Gortchakow (Russian general), I2O,
I2 I, 333, 336
Gourgaud (French general), 193
Grenier (French general), 34, 39
Grosser Garten, IQ5, 196, 200, 20I,
2O4, 208, 2I4
Gross Beeren (battle of)—Bertrand at
Blankenfelde, 259, 260 ; Reynier
at Gross Beeren, 260-262 ; cavalry
fight in evening, 262 ; criticisms,
263, 264
Gross Görschen, battle
Lützen, battle of),
Grouard (French writer), I79, 246
Grouchy (French colonel), III, II2
Guilleminot (French general), 262
Gustavus Adolphus, 70, 342
Gyulai (Austrian general), 339-34I,
355, 362, 368, 386, 387
of (see
398 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
HAGELBERG, action at, 264
Halle, 56, 57, 59, 61, 91, 386
Hamburg, 39, 44, I52, I64, I65
Hanau, battle of, 388-392
Harz mountains, 51.
Havelberg, 45, 47, 48
Haxo (French general), 24I
Hellendorf, 230, 23.I
Helwig (Prussian colonel), 54
Hessen-Homburg division, 26I, 273,
3
Hºn-Homburg. Prince of, 359
Hirschfeld (Prussian general), 264,
27I
Hochkirch, II 7, I.33, 271
Holland, 39, 41
Horn (Prussian general), I34, 298,
346,347, 367, 387
Hörselberg, action at, 387
Hospitals, 167
Hotel de Prusse (at Leipzig), 368, 374
Hoyerswerda, action at, I5I
Hunerbein (Prussian general), 298,
346,347, 367, 387
Huszell (Saxon writer), 379
ITALY, Corps of Observation of, I4,
52, 53, 54, 56
JENA, 53, 56
Manoeuvre of, 51-53
Jerome Bonaparte, King of West-
phalia, 7, 287
Jomini (general and writer), 30, 66,
IO7, III, I27, I29, 133, I38, IS3,
2O3, 2I 7, 227, 233, 327
KALISCH, Convention of, 37, 48
Rapzewitch (Russian general), 345,
36
Kºach (battle on)—Description of
field, 251 ; Blücher's orders, 25I ;
Macdonald’s orders, 252 ; allies
evacuate Kroitzsch, 252 ; con-
fusion among French, 253 ; Lau-
riston and Langeron, 253, 255;
battle on plateau, 254 ; defeat of
French, 254 ; repulse of Albert
and Ricard, 255; night after the
battle, 256 ; losses, 256 ; Criti-
cisms, 256
Rellermann (French general), II.3,
I23, I28, 330 n.
Kirgener (French general), I43
Kleist (Prussian general), 56, 61 ; at
Lützen, 73, 74, 83 ; in retreat,
9I ; at Bautzen, I32, I33 ; at
Dresden, 204, 217 ; in retreat and
at Kulm, 229, 237, 238, 239, 240,
249 ; in advance on Leipzig, 316;
at Leipzig, 333, 336-339
Klemau (Austrian general), at
Dresden, 222, 225, 228 ; in
September, 279, 282, 3oo, 316;
at Leipzig, 333, 335, 336, 360, 366
Klüx (Prussian general), 76, 77, 134
Knesebeck (Austrian general), 30,
I8I
Königstein, 39, I62
Königswartha, action at, II 3
Konowintzin (Russian general), 81
Köpenick, 36
Kösen, action at, 387
Krafft (Prussian general), 261
Krapowitzki (Russian general), 235
Kudaschew (Russian general), 286,
287
Kulm, battles at, 233; description
of field, 234 ; battle of 29th
August, 234, 235; 30th, 239-24I ;
action of 17th September, 285
Küstrin, 33-35
Kutusow (Russian general), 4, 33,

35, 37, 38, 44, 46, 58
LAFONTAINE, Corporal, 38o
Lagrange (French general), 34, I32
Langeron (Russian general), Ir 3,
25I, 252, 253, 258, 344, 345, 362,
_ 366, 367, 379,382
Lanrezac (French writer), 15, 17, 19,
23, 36, 39, 4I, 48, 55, 62, 68, 86,
89, go, I 38
Lanskoi (Russian general), 61, I:23,
I28
Lapoype (French general), 46
Latour-Maubourg (French general),
89, 91, I:21, I:22, I27, 142, 203, 271
Lauriston (French general), 35, 39,
56, 61 ; at Lützen, 74 ; in pursuit,
9I, 93, 94, IIo, III, II2, II4 ; at
Bautzen, I24, I28, I29, 132, I33,
I42 ; at the Katzbach, 252, 253,
in September, 3oo ; at Leipzig,
336, 338, 363, 384
Lecoq (French general), 26o, 261
Lederer (Austrian general), 212
Ledru (French general), 252, 257,
335, 338, 359, 376
Lefebvre-Desnoettes (French gene-
ral), 281, 286, 287
Lefol (French general), 330
Leipzig, 44, 47, 59-61, 64, 66, I52
Leipzig, battle of (see also Wachau,
Lindenau, Möckern)—Description
of field, 324-326; positions
INDEX
399
morning of 18th October, 354, 355;
allies' plan, 357, 358; strength
of forces, 358 ; battle up to 2 P.M.,
358-363 ; allies' failure against
Probstheida, 363, 364; advance
of allied right, 364; defection of
Saxons, 365 ; Bennigsen's ad-
vance, 366 ; Paunsdorf stormed
and retaken, 366 ; fighting at
Schönefeld, 367 ; failure of allies
in north, 367; Gyulai watches
retreat, 368; end of battle, 369 ;
remarks, 369-372
Leipzig, storming of, Schwarzen-
berg's orders, 373 ; French retire,
373 ; Napoleon's orders for re-
treat, 374 ; orders to Bertrand
and Kellermann, 374,375; Leipzig
at night, 375 ; measures of de-
fence, 376; French positions,
376; advance of allies, 377 ;
Blücher, 377 ; Bülow, 377 ; pause
for negotiations, 378 ; Napoleon
goes to Lindenau, 378 ; attack
on suburbs, 379 ; the Grimma
Gate, 379 ; explosion of mine,
38o ; last combats, 381 ; losses,
382–384 ; comments, 384, 385
Letort (French general), 337
L’Heritier (French general), 192
Lichtenstein, A. (Austrian general),
220, 228, 279, 282
Lichtenstein, M. (Austrian general),
228
Liebertwolkwitz, Murat’s action at,
318, 3.I.9
Lilienstein, 162
Lindenau, action at, 339; Gyulai's
advance, 34o ; Bertrand arrives,
34I ; repulse of Austrians, 341
Lobau (French general), 79, 284,
285
Loewenberg, 187, 189, 190
Lorencez (French general), 121, 127
Lorge (French general), 259, 286,
356
Losses in battles in Russia, 9 ; at
Lützen, 89 ; at Bautzen, I36 ;
at Dresden, 221, 223; at Kulm,
236, 24 I ; at Katzbach, 256 ;
at Gross Beeren, 262 ; at Denne-
witz, 276 ; at Wartenburg, 299 ;
at Leipzig, 382–384; at Hanau,
39 I
Lübeck, I52
£uckau, action at, I 52
Lützen (battle oſ)—Wittgenstein's
plan and orders, 66-68; descrip-
tion of field, 69, 70 ; Napoleon's
orders, 71-73 ; Kleist and Laur-
iston, 75; Prussian attack, 75,
76; cavalry at Starsiedel, 76;
Ney returns to Kaja, 77; Na-
poleon arrives, 78; Kaja taken
and recovered, 79 ; Blücher
wounded, 79 ; arrival of Russian
reserves, 79 ; struggle for the
villages, 79-81 ; Bertrand, Mar-
chand and Macdonald arrive, 81 ;
allies driven back, 83 ; Prussian
cavalry charge, 83 ; end of battle
and criticisms, 83-90 ; losses, 89
MACDONALD, Marshal, 5; at Lützen,
81 ; in pursuit, IoS ; at Bautzen,
I2 I, I22, I27, I30 ; after Bautzen,
I45, I48 ; left on Bober, I87, 189,
I90 ; at Katzbach, 250, 25I, 253,
254, 256-2.58 ; in September, 270,
27I ; at Leipzig, 334, 335, 337,
338, 359, 360, 376 ; at Hanau,
390
Magdeburg, 35, 39, 4 I-44, 47, 48,
52, 6O, I62
Main, Army of the, 49-51, 53, 55, 56,
57, 63
Maison (French general), 74, 128,
I29, I32, I47, I48, 338
Marchand (French general), 55, 57,
8I, 82, I89, 335, 360, 376
Marmont, Marshal, 50, 53 ; at
Lützen, 76, 77, 78,83; at Bautzen,
I2 I, I22, I31, I.33, I46, I48; be-
tween Bautzen and Dresden, 176,
178, 187; at Dresden, 218, 227,
229, 232 ; pursuit after Dresden,
232, 237, 24I, 248, 250 ; in
September, 270, 289, 300, 30I ;
at Möckern, 341-347 ; at Leipzig,
367, 376 ; at Hanau, 391
Mayence, 54, 56
Mecklenburg, Prince Charles of, 298,
345
Meerveldt (Austrian general), 333,
334; 339, 354, 371
Mensdorf (Austrian general), 287
Merseburg, 57, 61, 32O, 32.I
Messery (Austrian general), 219
Meszko (Austrian general), 2O6, 2I9-
22 I
Metternich, 233 *
Michelsdorf, action at, I47, I48
Miloradowich (Russian general), 33,
38, 46, 57, 60, 61, 64, 81, 86, 88,
9I, 93, 99, IO5, I2O, I27, I30, 2I 7
400 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
Mine, explosion at Leipzig, 38o
Möckern (near Magdeburg), 44, 45
(Leipzig), battle of, 341 ;
Marmont's first position, 34I ;
his views and orders, 342 ; re-
tires to new position, 343;
Blücher's plans, 343 ; his ad-
vance, 344; Yorck's movements,
344 ; Marmont's plans, 344 ;
failure of attack on Möckern,
345; affairs at Wiederitzech,
345 ; arrival of Delmas, 345 ;
Yorck attacks French centre,
345, 346 ; Crisis of battle, 346 ;
defeat of Marmont, 346, 347 ;
losses, 347 ; criticisms, 350
Montfort, Colonel, 38o
Morand, Count (French general), 54,
57, 63, 71, 81, I31, 273, 298, 299
Morand (French general), 35, 39, 44
Moreau, 3O, Ig3, 203, 2I7
Mortier, Marshal, 50, IOG, 208, 2I4,
2I5, 289, 337
Mouton (see Lobau)
Mouton-Duvernet (French general),
I94, 223, 23O -
Müffling (Prussian general), 30, 70,
I34.
Mumb (Austrian general), 219–22I
Murat (King of Naples), 5, 32, 192;
at Dresden, 202, 2I8, 220, 224 ;
in pursuit, 232, 236 ; in Sep-
tember, 270, 289 ; sent against
Schwarzenberg, 300, 30I, 316 ;
battle at Liebertwolkwitz, 318-
320 ; at Leipzig, 374, 375, 378
NANsouTY (French general), 215,
366
Napoleon—Returns from Russia, I ;
political situation, 2, 7, 8 ; or-
ganises new army, 9-2O ; evils
of system of command, 17; corre-
spondence with Eugène, 36, 38,
40, 42 ; first scheme for spring
campaign, 47-49; revised plan,
49-52 ; orders of 28th-29th March,
52 ; explains views, 52, 53 ;
leaves for front, 54 ; his use of the
Saale, 56; decision to advance,
62 ; orders before Lützen, 71-73 ;
Orders at noon, 74, 75 ; reaches
battlefield, 78; arranges decisive
attack, 82 ; in pursuit after
Lützen, 91, 96; and King of
Saxony, 96, 97 ; orders to Ney,
97 ; crosses Elbe at Briesnitz, 98 ;
prepares further advance, Ioo,
Ior ; dissolves army of Elbe,
IOI : rearranges communications,
Io2 ; his doubts, Io:3, Io.4 ;
Orders advance on Bautzen, Ioë-
Io9 ; leaves Dresden, Io9 ; orders
to Durosnel and Ney, IIo; plan
for Bautzen, 124; orders to Ney
for 21st May, I25-127, 129;
during battle, I27, 13o, I31, 135;
his views on tactics, 14o ; criti-
cisms, I37-I4I ; his remark on
result, I4I ; and Duroc, 143 ;
pursuit after Bautzen, I42-145,
I46, I5o ; negotiations, I53-156;
why he accepted armistice, 156-
I59 ; returns to Dresden, I60 ;
plans for autumn campaign, 161 ;
prepares Elbe base, I62 ; for-
tresses, I62-165 ; commissariat,
I65-167 ; hospitals, 167; recon-
naissances, 167, I68; his assump-
tions regarding enemy, 168-170 ;
plan of campaign, I 70-180 ; leaves
Dresden, I85; view of situation,
I85, I86 ; moves against Blücher,
187, 188; order for Army of the
Bober, I89 ; scheme for move-
ment by Pirna, Igo, IQI ; decides
to move on Dresden, IQ3 ; arrives
there, I 94, 202 ; his arrangement
of troops, 203, 204; prepares for
counter-attack, 206 ; return to
Palace, 209 ; arrangements for
27th August, 2IO, 2I3 ; on morn-
ing of 27th, 2I5 ; goes to left,
216 ; directs battery which killed
Moreau, 217 ; return to Palace,
223 ; criticisms, 223-226 ; orders
for pursuit, 227, 229, 230 ; goes to
Pirna, 231 ; returns to Dresden,
23I ; orders to Vandamme, 232 ;
conduct of pursuit and responsi-
bility for Kulm, 241-248; alleged
illness, 248 ; how far responsible
for ISatzbach, 258; for Gross
Beeren, 264 ; his note of 30th
August, 265-268 ; orders to Ney,
269 ; changes plans, 269 ; drives
Blücher back, 270, 271 ; returns
to Dresden, 271 ; position of
affairs, 6th September, 279 ; joins
St Cyr, 28o ; hears of Denne-
witz, 281 ; drives enemy to
Bohemia, 281-284; returns to
Pirna, 285; goes south again,
285; back to Pirna, operations
against “free '’ corps, 286 ; in-
activity at Pirna, 288, 289;
INDEX
4OI
orders of 21st September, 290 ;
third advance against Blücher,
290, 29I ; decides to abandon
right bank of Elbe, 29I ; orders
for this, 293 ; orders regarding
Rhine fortresses, 294; remarks
On his indecision, 295, 296 ; sends
Murat against Schwarzenberg,
3OO ; scheme for destruction of
Bernadotte and Blücher, 3oo, 301 ;
question of holding Dresden, 302-
305 ; note of 7th October, 303,
3O4 ; views and orders, 9th
October, 306, 307 ; advance, 9th
October, 308, 309 ; vacillation
at Düben, 309-314 ; decides to
concentrate on Leipzig, 315 ;
defection of Bavaria, 317 ; orders
for I4th October, 317; leaves
Düben for Leipzig, 318; meets
Murat, 320 ; correspondence of
I5th October, 320, 321 ; alleged
influence of Marshals, 322 ;
reaches battlefield of Wachau,
332 ; reinforces weak points, 334 ;
passes to offensive, 334, 335 ;
announces victory, 336 ; pre-
pares general attack, 336 ; at
night, 339 ; interview with Meer-
veldt, 352 ; hesitates to retreat,
352, 353 ; failure to provide
bridges, 353 ; retires to new
position, 354 ; personal move-
Iments on 18th October, 358, 368,
369 ; mistake of delayed retreat,
370 ; orders for retreat, 374; to
Bertrand and Kellermann, 374,
375; on 19th October, 378-38o ;
reaches Erfurt, 387 ; at Hanau,
390-392
Ney, Marshal, 49, 52, 53, 63 ; faults
at Lützen, 72, 73, 76, 77, 85, 86;
from Lützen to Bautzen, 92, 94,
96, 97, IO7, II.4, I2 I-I23 ; at
Bautzen, I25-Izo, I 32-I34, I37-
I39, I46, I49, I87, Igo ; at
Dresden, 203, 207-209, 2I5, 250 ;
at Dennewitz, 27o, 271-277 ; in
September, 299, 300 ; at Leipzig,
356, 362, 367
Normann (Saxon general), 346, 361
Norvins, M. de (quoted), 30.4 n.
Nostitz (Austrian general), 337, 386
ODELEBEN (quoted), 20, 248, 283,
29I, 379
Qder, R., 35-37, 47, 49
Olsuview (Russian general), 345
2 C
Osterman Tolstoi (Russian general),
2II, 230, 233-235, 3I6
Oudinot, Marshal, 92 ; at Bautzen,
I2 I-I23, I27, I30 ; against Bülow,
I5I, I52 ; ordered on Berlin, 179,
I8o ; at Gross Beeren, 258, 259,
262, 267 ; at Dennewitz, 271, 272,
274, 275,277 ; his corps dissolved,
289 ; at Leipzig, 337
PACTHOD (French general), 54, 127
Pajol (French general), 192, 202,
2O3, 209, 218, 22O
Petri (Prussian mappist), I25, 167 n.
Peyri (French general), 54, 57, 63,
II.3
Philippon (French general), 222,
23O, 235
Plagwitz, action at, 258
Platow (Cossack Ataman), 3oo, 359-
361
Poniatowski (French general and
Marshal), 6, 9, 33, 35, 47, 270,
316, 337, 363, 376, 380, 381
Positions on various dates :—
(French), 19th February, 35 ;
25th April, 56; 30th April, 57 ;
Ist May, 63 ; 4th May, 93 ; 5th
May, 94; 8th May, 96; IIth May,
IO3 ; I8th May, Io8 ; 19th May,
IIo ; 20th May, I23, 124 ; 21st
May (evening), I36; 22nd May,
I43; 23rd May, I44; 25th May,
I44 ; 27th May, I48; 3oth May,
I49 ; 3.I.St May, I5o ; after
armistice, 172 ; at Dresden, 26th.
August, Ig7 ; 27th August, 212,
213 ; 29th-3oth August, 236, 237 ;
Macdonald, 24th August, 25o ;
Ney, 5th September, 272 ; 25th
September, 293, 294 ; end of
September, 294; 7th October,
305, 306, and Map I inset (c) ;
9th October, 309 ; evening, 12th
October, 3I4, and Map I inset (d) ;
evening, I5th October, 32 I, 322 ;
I6th October, 329, 330 ; morning,
I8th October, 354, 355; Igth
October, 376
(Allies), Igth February, 35 ;
26th April, 59 ; Ist May, 64;
I9th May, I2O ; evening, 21st
May, I35, I36 ; 23rd May, I44;
27th May, I49 ; 4th June, I51 ;
26th August at Dresden, Ig7 ;
27th August, 2II, 212 ; 29th-
3Oth August, 236 ; end of
September, 294; 3rd October,
402 NAPOLEON'S LAST CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY
3oo; 7th October, 306; 16th
October, 330, 33 I ; morning, I8th
October, 355; night, 18th October,
369 ; evening, 19th October, 386 ;
20th October, 387
Prague, Congress of, I60
|Prussia, 5, 34, 35, 37, 49
Puthod (French general), 92, I24,
I48, 252, 257, 258
QUIOT (French general), 230, 231,
239
Quistorp (Prussian writer), 384
FADETzKY (Austrian general), 30,
I80, 228, 292, 293, 334
Raglowich (Bavarian general), 5o,
54, 259, 275
Raids, 35, 54, I52, 287, 288
Fajewski (Russian general),
336, 338 e
Rechberg (Bavarian general), 37, 39,
4I
Teichenbach, combat at, I42
Reiset (French general), I21
Reuss, Prince, 23.I, 233
Reynier (French general), 6, 33, 35,
42, 43, 96, IoS, I32, I42, 259, 260-
262, 272, 274, 275, 356, 361, 364,
365
Rhenish Confederation, 7, 62
Rhine, R., 41, 42, 162
Ricard (French general), 77, I29,
132, 255, 367, 376
Ried, Convention of, 317
Rochambeau (French general), 132,
II.3,
364
Rockets (Congreve), 364
Röder (Prussian general), 68, 77,
I32, I34
Roguet (French general), 39, 43, 57,
2O2, 203, 2I4, 2I5
Roth (Russian general), 200, 2I4,
2I6
Rousset, Camille (French writer),
9 n., I5-I.7
SAALE, R., 42, 43, 45, 50, 56, 57,
I62, 307, 322, 387
Sacken (Russian general), 35, 25I-
255, 347, 356, 362, 367, 382
St Cyr, Carra (French general), 39,
44
St Cyr, Marshal Gouvion, I 3, 18, 34,
35, 36, 4I, 63 n., I4o, I67, I78, I80,
I88, 189, 191-193, 202, 215, 224,
227, 229, 232, 24I, 280-285, 301,
375, 392, 393
St Priest (Russian general), 81, 252,
347, 356, 367
Saxony, King of, 46, 96, 97, 98, 361,
365, 375, 378, 381, 384
Schäfer (Prussian general), 333, 335,
Scharnhorst (Prussian general), 44,
58, 6o, 8o
Schuler (Prussian colonel), 237, 238
Schwarzenberg (Austrian general),
6, 30, 33, 34, 35, 47, I9 I, I92, I97,
I98, 204, 227, 237, 279, 282, 292,
3I6, 3I7, 322, 323, 326, 327, 328,
331, 332, 334, 355, 375, 381, 392
Schweidnitz, I46, I49
Sebastiani (French general), 92, Io8,
252, 253, 256, 270, 335, 338,
360
Sehr (Saxon general), 26o, 261
Serrurier (French general), 204
Sokolnicki (French general), 330 n.
Souham (French general), 61, 63,
64, 77, I29, I32, 25I, 256, 258,
339
Soult, Marshal, 18, 121, 123, 127
Spandau, 33-35, 46
Stadion, Count, I53, I54
Stedingk (Swedish general), 271
Steinmetz (Prussian general), 93,
I33, I34, 346
Stettin, 33, 35, 38, 47, 48, 49
Stewart (Colonel), 343
Strengths on various dates :-
(French) 19th February, 35 ;
Ioth March, 39 ; beginning of
April, 49 ; I2th April, 53 ; 25th
April, 55 ; I 5th May, IoI ; 21st
May, 136; after armistice, I69,
I70 ; at Dresden, IQ7, Igg, 2Io ;
end of September, 296 ; 7th
October, 306 ; Murat on Ioth
October, 3Io; morning, I6th
October, 328; 18th October,
358, in Leipzig, 19th October, 377
(Allies) 18th February, 35 ;
15th March, 38 ; Ist May, 65 ;
I 5th May, IOI ; 19th May, II9 ;
after armistice, I69, I70 ; at
Dresden, Ig8, Igg ; at Blanken-
felde, 259 ; at Gross Beeren, 263 ;
16th October, 328; 16th to 19th
October, 329 ; 18th October, 358
Striegau, I49
Sweden, 6, 7
TANGERMUNDE, 45
Tauenzien (Prussian general), 259,
26o, 27I, 273, 3I4, 315, 3I6
Tauroggen, Convention of, 6
INDEX
403
Tchichagow (Russian general), 32,
33, 34
Teste (French general), 202, 203,
209, 218
Thielmann (Saxon general), 46, 96,
97, 98, 287
Thorn, 34, 46, Ioo
Thiimen (Prussian general), 273,
274, 299, 3I4-316
Toll (Russian general), 30, 58, 59,
6o, I80, I8I, 228, 327, 335
Torgau, 39, 92, 96, 98, I62, 299
Tormassow (Russian general), 58, 59,
6I
Trachenberg, protocol of, I81-183;
modified, I83-184, 27I
Tschaplitz (Russian general), II.3,
I23, I28, I32
VANDAMME (French general), Ig4,
2II, 218, 222, 224, 229, 230-232,
234, 235, 237, 238-24I
Victor, Marshal, 39, 92, IoS, I47,
I49, 218-222, 284, 337-339, 363,
390
von Boyen (Prussian general), 21,
26o
von Caemmerer (Prussian writer),
68, 73, 75, 88, 89. II2, I24, I25,
I37, I69, 223, 295, 322, 323
von Hochberg, 376
von Zeschau (Saxon general), 365
WACHAU (battle of)—Description of
field, 324-326; Schwarzenberg's
orders, 326-328; positions of
troops, 329, 330 ; Wittgenstein's
plan of attack, 331 ; Schwarzen-
berg's proclamation, 331 m. ; Tsar
tries to correct faults, 332; Eugen
of Wurtemberg's attack on
Wachau, 332, 333; Kleist's on
Markkleeberg, 333; Gortchakow,
Pahlen and Klenau, 333 ; Meer-
veldt, 333, 334 ; Napoleon re-
inforces weak points, 334 ; Mac-
donald takes Kolm Berg, 335 ;
Lauriston retakes Liebertwolk-
witz, 336 ; fight at Wachau and
Markkleeberg, 336; Meerveldt's
failure, 336; Napoleon antici-
pates victory, 336 ; prepares
general attack, 336, 337; ad-
vance of Victor, Oudinot, Ponia-
towski, and Augereau, 337 ;
cavalry fight of Letort and
Berkheim, 337 ; Drouot's battery,
337; Bordesoulle's cavalry charge,
337, 338; French left advance,
338 ; Maison at Guldengössa,
338 ; Victor at Auenhain, 339 ;
critical position of French right,
339 ; Meerveldt crosses Pleisse
but is driven back and taken, 339 ;
positions at night, 339 ; criti-
cisms, 348-350
Walmoden (Swedish general), 152,
287
Wartenburg, passage of Elbe at,
description of field, 297 ; Meck-
lenburg's attack, 298; Steinmetz,
Horn, and Hunerbein, 298 ;
Blücher arrives, 298; Franque-
mont's retreat, 298 ; retreat of
French, 299 ; losses, 299
Weissenwolf (Austrian general), 220,
339, 355 &
Winzingerode (Russian general), 37,
76, 81, 271, 367
Wittenberg, 92, 96, 162
Wittgenstein (Russian general), 33,
37, 38, 44, 46, 58, 60, 61, II2, II9,
I23, I24, I3o, I45, I9I, I93, 208,
2I4, 229, 28I, 3I6, 331, 332
Wobeser (Prussian general), 299
Wolkonski (Russian general), 59,
61, 78
Wolzogen (Russian general), 230,
234, 334
Woronzow (Russian general), I52
Wrede (Bavarian general), defeated
at Hanau, 388-392
YERMOLow (Russian general), 134,
23O, 235
Yorck (Prussian general), 5, 33, 35,
º 25I-255, 298, 344, 345, 346,
387
Yorck von Wartenburg (Prussian
writer), 47, 80, 82, II 3, I26, 131,
I33, I34, I5I, I65, I77, 244, 29I,
356, 362, 367, 387 -
ZIETHEN (Prussian general), 134,
I47, I48, 239, 240, 335, 338, 360
Apr. 21 1022
234, 3
-
- - -
ANATION. . . . .
* -
FOR ALL MAPS.
leafy Gr, Gross. French Troops (Infa
K1, Klein. tº a " Cavalry, º,
Pine wood. © Q ºr Allied Troops (Infº
A
A. A
A w
&
(#)
-
df (termination) dorf. Cavalry, Artillery
Earlier positions of Fiſ
Lake or pond. bg. -- berg or burg Troops where twº
B. (after a ºn *...; in case Cl of positions are sh
of a hill: Bach in case on same Map,
Marsh or marshy meadows of a stream. Earlier positions of A
hsm. (termination) hausen. o 2 ºf
/~\
;
Redoubts, etc. of positions are s
on same Map.
Map Sheet I,
GENERAL MAP OF THEATRE OF WAR.
Positions marked in Eastern portion are those of 1st June, 1813. The numbers º
Corps are shown by Roman figures in brackets.
Imperial Guard. - M. Marchand's Division, III. cº
INSET (a) -
The French march to concentrate on the Saale in April, 1813.
Positions shown are those of Corps, etc., on the 24th April. Nuxº
Roman figures in brackets. Those along the Lines of March.”
Imperial Guard. Bau, Bavarian Y
Westphalian Division. E. Army of
Baden Division.
INSET (b)
Positions of both sides on the 30th April (ser
Numbers of French Corps in Roman figur
Four Battalions, W. Corps at Halle.
Durutte's Division, VII. Corps,
1st Cavalry Corps.
Guard Cavalry.
ALLIES.
Yorck's Corps.
Blücher's Corpg.
Berg's Corps.
Diagram of r
F’
Guard, M.
Arrigº'
Of"
n




Tc - - d
234, 3 -
ANATION. . / >
2*
FOR ALL MAPS. dº
*>
º
He?lan.
__ eafy Gr. Gross. -French Troops (Infº"
A a A K1, Klein. A 2 Autº: *::::A; -
- - - - - le roops (Infa" - -
43% Pine wood. df (termination) dorf. • 2 ºr *...*.*. WarGºT33377.7°
Earlier positions of French -
bg. -- berg or burg
@ Lake or pond. Troºps where twº sets rº)
B. (after a ºn *...; in case G 2 of positions are show” •%.
-E- - of a hill: Bach in case on same Map. - N -
==Marsh or marshy meadows of a stream. Raº. º of º ſº da - r! slº. 6.o 5 wº g - - &
- - - roops where twº sº Aze 7-
/2=N Redoubts, etc. hsm. (termination) nausen. O 2 of º are shown Wi n/? R%l.s ſam *\.
-- on same Map. \\ Äuääs \ Æeizke sa'ſ W
- -
A 1- -
Map Sheet 1. *...
reasdf * ren #. ;felde
} 7ts
(w);
GENERAL MAP OF THEATRE OF WAR.
itions marked in Eastern portion are those of 1st June, 1813. The numbers of French #;"
SID c
Pos
Corps are shown by Roman figures in brackets.
G. Imperial Guard. - M. Marchand's Division, III. Corps.
INSET (a)
ſ
- º Ż AZ & r
n <<2*,” 272&72-tº-
º *#33. AE-1 wa'eſs4e^
Zhresdeºs ** 7;euenbriehen
The French march to concentrate on the Saale in April, 1818. -
positions shown are those of Cºps: etc. on the 24th April. Numbers of Corps shown ºn
Roman figures in brackets. Those along the Limes of March are in the order of Marºº.
- Imperial Guard. Bau, Bavarian Division.
wn westphalian Division. E. Army of the Elbe. \ (8” ->
Baden Division. - 9 ©oºty
• Tº
INSET (b) ſ%
Positions of both sides ºn the 30th April (see general explanations above) and 1st Maj. ax. It xv. … & &a o
Numbers of French Corps in Roman figure8. I. -> * • ?:&aſ$4.
%. Fº º Wii º at Halle. % 3. ºws temberg Division ºf oëbese M zak “terlºgsk ** (W3) s Sagāts
- urutte's Division, . Corps. - ranquemont's ūrtemberg Divisio - r - - -
ſi) ist Cavalry Corps. * fººps. Zerbst KuźI: sdf 7 a. 71 Zennewiſ. &l - - • źrzigºoſen £ers&
G.C. Guard Cavalry. wi, Friederich's Division, VI. Corps. - _T it. l rºl - - -
k ALLIES. W. W de's C / >Zahna.o adº #" - - 2 &xcăş
y. Yorck's Corps. - Winzingerode's Corps. - * - -
gi. Blücher's Corps. R.G. Russian Guardº Grenadiers. oswig - •Se da S - º 2 &
Bg. Berg's Corps. M. Miloradowich's Corps. - AMWU. ths 7t £8 :/ - •Z: d. º º h 77te zz & kaw - ****
- - - - - - E7& -- -
INSET (c) lster hönwald EYA. :82; reuſ;
- - - -
Diagram of general positions, evening * 7th October:- CS 7. c/?07tw. <E'ſ "are #eir . 2a)
*...is S-ºº: \. (X.
~ - - --
*- ſala &L *Aersen&eim /Wºrx.4%
*— ArtsAack
FRENCH.
G. Guard, Macdonald and Sebastiani.
A. Arrighi (Garrison of Leipzig).
other corps shown by Roman numerals.
Murat's Army not shown—farther South.
ALLIES.
Be Bernadotte.
BI. Blücher.
•Gräſenkäinchen
Przà? •Schönewalde
esszáſz
e Määzáeek fºrº
(Dotri wgk
Bohemian Army not shown—farther South facing Murat.
Also Bennigsen and Bubna not shown.
INser (d) Dille -
J. Ueliga.
$4.austs
- Trackezé4.
Diagram of general positions, evening of 12th October, 1818:-
French Corps marked as usual.
M. Murat, G. Guard and Napoleon.
... ...,’ \,P isställick ºt
elitzs;4 -- - Árch º
* Z. **u. Tº- '##. Helger £isſerwe 4 º'
*
A 1 11Fs.
#n . and º § §: ..." 'L'orgau. - -
e. Bernadotte-North Army. 1. Blücher-Army o Silesia. - - -- - - *_*::
S. Schwartzenberg's Army: Bn. Bennigsen-Reserve Army. Ao enlein 1.44 a wº - -**/~~~ -*…*º: - -
. Bubna—watching dresden—right bank of Elbe. -Aſ -- - LL-7 -
- | - - o e Jºl - ſcia. - - - - - r- *
- - N-
sucka
-- a
- Fººd ºran ºf
Bunzlau . Marāzswa/4.
7%émaswa -
Tº ſaz22Su
Woffs ar
{{#e3?-iº
- & Wałęs 'adº
•Mºróscá, Ā ©º
&0&AMois
Aisºd;"
Giers
‘Jase? - -
**, Årotºzst
8×es/aw
#arfliel,
0//en. #:
*: ãe
4 - -
- lsniã. 65da.”
Sloessen
•6'Ges * ! Wºº, º ºri "A*SS / > * * º - - - 1-
- - - - 2. -- -- - º º - º º º - ſº- º º €. - ºr . - **** º º - - fºr- ---. yº. - º - º - - º **: º -- º { -
- º - * * Vº --- º reº." * º - - # Sł: égau. wº
Droysis:
*... }/ſº
*{\º-
3°
Šº. - - -.
e?"a, º º ºg º º º * ...
NW ºf**.*. º **\º. º º ! 3öcákº
**** 'º º ` * - º, º ºſº, *…* - -
º, º ºxº~hºleºnā - -
*...*&A's Cº-º: enčºck. tºſseſſ.
TTTTTTT;
——-----
- - -
_-
"--- - - - - -













































































































2334, 3 |
#
%
;
%
#
22
- - * * * w
.25- Map Sheet ||. | cl *.*.* 4. `
- -
r Bekmannsdf *: ...".
(a) THE BATTLE OF LüTZEN. t *** ? Sºº -
--- (£& Y 33°/ Q @
Positions of Troops about 11 a.m. ( CJ O &c. ) and 6 p.m. ( = 8 &c.). (sy \},
Figures on Map are approximate heights in feet above contour - 4. & Z.Že nāor Ž. \ Ç) yº)
- -" . d. - -
- F; & Cº., ----- - -
FRENCH. | E.T | * ag. `--a
3. Infantry. Br. #. Division, III. Corps. --- i .*.*-
uard Cavalry. M. archand's - … -- Aaº
Young Guard. 8. Souham’s . . A” 6árs &f 4%
Old Guard. Gi. Girard's -- % ſº - ©
Ney with remains of Four Divisions, III. Ma. Marmont's VI. Corps. --~~ a/£ehow Wºl c{ 47 ©
Corps. Mo. Morand's Division, IV. Corps. " … 727s {{ e & º º -
Macdonald XI. Corps. Pi. Peyri's -- -- ( \ - - & º Ex (L) -
Latour-Maubourg 1st Cavalry Corps. Dt. Drouot's 80-gun Battery. \ ---, & (Y. Zazzêwää.
Ricard's Division, III. Corps. TSU * º
ALLIES. -
Blücher's Corps. R. Reserve. \\
Yorck's 17 R.G. Russian Guard and Grenadiers. - h & eck
Berg's º: Kn, Konowmitzin's two Divisions, Russian 2-
Prince Eugen of Wurtemberg (Winzin- Grenadiers. M
gerode's Infantry). G. Gallitzin—Russian Guard Cavalry. M 44 a 4A 4 a. --
Dolff's Prussian Jºe Cavalry. Sz. Steimetz's Division, Yorck's Cºrps. M a 4 & ; t M
Winzingerode's Corps. A d A. A ;
- ; Zied, ºf Wegó..., :
4. t
M. M. M. A 4% "A A "^*44
. . .'','º','º','º'; ;...
- M A
* . " A " " (, , , "," "A , 1 A, . AA "A"
(b) THE BATTLE ON THE KATZBACH.
Positions about 2 p.m.
" ("...ſ. - M. A.
FRENCH. £622-e 7. Wºe ſ ,"," ". '. º AA "A ‘. "A º {, , º º •e
Sebastiani's Cavalry. La, Lauriston, W. Corps. A M M M A & M A ſº. A 4 * A M f " | A M M A * © -
Gerard, XI. Corps. A.R. Aiberºs and Ricará's Division, III. Corps. AA A SA". Å i Å", A M (*. M !. º M M M A *A*, M ! K. M. . 4, ^ A A A * @ A M •-Cº.) - /2 N.
Souham, One Division III. Corps. *** ","... , ", , , , , , ) * * , , , , M a", " " ", , , , , ; – A º, " " ". . . * ... (C/ cº-lo- 'w
A a. 'il M. : A A - a, 4
ALLIES. A "* (" "," A.A . . . . . . . A ... ''A' | }. N . . . . a. Aſ -
Yorck Ln. I \{A : A' A M A , "," ", ", , " A. 4 A. A "^ A A M 4 44 A **,4, * , A4 *...* a a .4 w
sacken Jr. angeron. , , '"; A 4 M A ſ * * * 4 & A i ( / ^ 4 a A a 44. A 4, "T-A º 44, A M.A.'' 4-4. ~ &rº.
- - ‘. . . . . . . . . . .';. * {, , "W". " . A "***** M ñº"; ; *... | < e < *3. * Nº &ehwa
" ". A A " A." A 4 Å. - R A. A - & 3 & 4%. 4
(c) BATTLE OF GROSS BEEREN. , "Akyensa'ſ Wººd ſº.", ''," " & a “...º. (Judinot. ‘ºp) 'f
--- A a 4, M. Aſ i i". A '' M . A * , , "A", - «»
Positions about 3.30 p.m. M A ; , A Aſ 4 / M M A M A , /l a ^ 4 a * 2. zº as
* Aſ a - M. - . -
FRENCH. | "...' . . . . . A M . Aſ, ºr ", ! A " / º, A. A Jºhnso'ſ Wood - | 4.- cº- A (R) l
Saxons of VII. Corps. L. Iorge's Cavalry. { { A A M M A A M A ; * - - \ AE, AA* % * * *A. AA -
Durutte's Division, VII. Corps. Bd. Bertrand retiring from Blankenſeld. | | | | 1 , , . " A M {, - ^* A A a 44 a 4A , a a f
ALLIES , , , "," ","A A Ansd?'," - T-I-I-V-I T- .
- i" A. A A * * * , a tºnsdí, A ! o / £ 3. *
Bernadotte, with Russians and Swedes. B1. Borstell's Corps. A-A M A ; , & A aw ſ -
Hessen-Homburg's Division. Tn. Tauenzien's Corps at Blankenfeld. - T-
Krafft's Division.
(d) BATTLE OF DENNEWITZ.
Positions about 3.30 p.m.
FRENCH.
Saxons of VII. Corps. Sg. Spitzenberg.
Defrance's Cavalry. G. Guilleminot's Division, XII. Corps.
Durutte's Division, VII. Corps. P. Pacthod's -- ->
Morand’s , IV. Corps. R. Raglowich's » 17
Fontanelli’s -> -> Fr. Fournier's Cavalry.
Franquemont's, ->
ALLIES.
Cppen's Cavalry. Thn. Thiimen's Division (Bülow's Corps). -
Borstell's Corps. Tn. Tauenzien's Corps. -
Krafft's Division (Bülow's Corps). K. Kleist’s Detachment from Juterlogk. ſ
Hessen-Homburg's Division (Bülow's Be. Bernadotte, with Russians and Swedes. \9/º
Corps). --- º - º (§
| Śląż
| Šſº
$ Ş §
gº
| 2× @#3.
@ 32
(M) §§ - %
O % - -
% tº º gº Y2
$º-yº
- \ § º: ---
Z/º
* &sº },G^Görschen º' º .
aſºns ſº - \\e e º
º 2% (52)--> º iſe *Christianenko
*Tillº > & º Be lſº of -
~ \*-a-a- E
.
:
i.
~~~
*
zºº/
*miles
ſº
º
--
3
Af
JOHN LANE : 1.ONDON.
%
T
ſ
º



















































































T- - – &
2 c 3. - £ister
22*… ? Map Sheet IV.
,25- (a) THE BATTLE OF DRESIDEN.
J. V. French redoubts round Altstadt. x. Flèche. -
a. Stone bridge. bb. Boat and raft bridges. - ºve -
Dresden suburbs, not named on Map:-c. Ziegel Schlag. d. Itaminischer Schlag. - - TSN & (A £ ãº. *******
e. Lobtau Schlag. - - - N. (e) - 3׺"tº -
Figures on Map show approximate heights in feet above level of Altsta t. Pºlsº SQ-3 ^ - - (8) ſ g *
-º-o-o Extreme limit of Allies' advance on 26th August. - ſ - º,2...ºf %;
*-* - French Qutpost Line, might of 26th and 27th August. \ \; Wärä 7tó à 'i.
* * * * French Outpost Line, night of 27th and 28th August, t \ º - %. %3A
Troop positions at beginning of Battle of 27th August:- l A. º -
ſ If A */67.3
- ... wº
FRENCH. (Mº.) t * ... 2", 4ammekek/
Mu. Murat's Cavalry. 9.6. Old Guard (Reserve) * ! ! - ºxº~2 €7 3.Azzº kgiesers *
% Teste's Division. ; G. §: %. º: º * l | F- 4. & º, Z- '**'.
- Pajol's Cavalry. - ey (Young Guard). Fºr - -
- Victor's Corps (II.). Mo. Mortier (Young Guari). Ço fºa zº( - 57-e 2. º º %Afgtº § 5a zed/º -
- 4ſ. d77& ºnqelā azºr
Ma. Marmont's Corps (VI.). My Nansouty's Cavalry - - ------- Æa wº & 4 º Aſ % ſº =\ſ / *ge arºr */
º - - % SJºš º
ALLIES. `Aodh Aº, "yº. %'s
Rh. Roth's Advanced Guard. gh. ... Chasteler's Division. \ x 2. º ~
P.R.C. Prussian Reserve Cavalry. C.G. Ghasteler's Grenºdiers. \ ^2.
Wn. Wittgenstein's Corps. º, Biancai's Division. . (Pºl
P. Prussians (Kleist, etc.). - Wf Weisgenwoºf’s Divisiºd. -
Zn. Ziethen's Advanced Guard. 3.2% Schººler's ayahry. =-37; ºw-wi.
Ph. Pirch's Division. ºz, ºzºljieh's Brigade. "…---
P.A. Prince August (Prussian Reserve, ... Alois Lichtenstein's Erigade /2.5" (V).
Mi. Miloradowich. º Mo. Meszko's Division. - -R
Co. Colloredo's Division. r - Mb. Mumb’s Brigade. 3 %
M.L. Moritz Lichtenstein's Cavalry, My, Messery's Brigade,
Wz, Nostitz's Cavalry.
* { {AAAZZºº/
AAA A &
º r
* A A * Z. A ** a 22 A
rtººkøklér Wº%
* A A&M 4, "A K*A A -
* * * * * * * * * *
(b) CO, CNTRY SOUTH OF DRESDEN, BATTLE ( I. KULM.
Figures on Map show approximate heights in feet above sea level.
Troºp positions at Kulm about 10:30 a.m., 30th August, as Kleist reached mºnitz:--
A-A. Original Iine of French, left and centre, in early morning.
B-B, Kleist's Line of March, Furstenwalde to Nolienāorf.
Z. Ziethen’s rearguard.
Kſ. Kleist's main + º-
(c) PASSAGE OF THE ELBE, AND ACTION AT ... RTENBURG,
3RD OCTOBER.
wi, & 44
A * { } {
ºr a "AA#
ſ
M
| A.A.A.A.
A.
"ºf
A.
SS
FRENCH, \s
*
Morand's Division, IV. Corps. A-A. Line of Franquémont's retreat. Żołº Zz.
F. Fontanelli's -- :- B-B. , Morand's. -- F) ſº N
Fr. Franquemont's a -- 0-0. , Fontanelli's --
O
ALLIES. "º,
S. Steirºmetz's Brigade. D-D. Prince Charles of Mecklenburg's move- - *
H. Horn's and Hunerbein’s Brigades. ment to turn Wartenburg, o -
Mg. Prince Charles of Mecklenburg's Advanced 0. Prussian Bridges over Elbe. |. (Z (P iès
Guard. - 7t. ©
7 - 2- -
ſ T ~) ºft”
gº 37%eniſ. © -
º)
(d) THE BATTLES ROUND LEIPZIG, 16th–18th OCTOBER.
* ures on Map show approximate heights in feet above the level of the Rosen Thal.
References in Leipzig to places which there is not Space to name on Map :-La. Halle suburb.
º, Hinter Gate. c. Grimma Gate, a sand Gate, "... Peters Gate. f Rammstadt
Gate and Bridge leading to Lindenau.
French fronts at beginning of Battles of the 16th October.
- - - - French fronts at end of Battles of 16th October. -
%
y
#.
377,
T*T*Tº French front morning of 18th October. -T t
* * * * French front evening of 18th October, 2T T t y º 3, 2.7miſes
- - |
(e) THE BATTLE OF HANAU, -
* 3: "French positions at the time of decisive attack.
* 2 "Tº Wrede's positions at same time.
J (2) Wrede's positions after the Battle. -
** * Ty
º si // / / al |
º% |
==%2ečháusen -
º
º
Fº *. *** º, -
* Wendiscă N
º** * *f - -
effeifferºck
737
__^TN
QP_,
* ,
(
%2Fjºrsåf } º
Tº: offen& Q&nge
S/ãºKas 77
a ſa; - ºº:: sº-Tº Żºłº, and 2^ Asa.
- - a al-. º - 3.345
2" * chönail, ‘. - .."; 4. º &? f
º
- Z- a-2\-
_2^ / ) sº -
saf 24 #3
- >,” / ſº
º, Markkégº, WA. i.)4}\ ſºliº;
º/ºakse, Nº. tº-e-Iz Tºy Sº
*. - & º Z
* A- º / / .
- \ - | | - - - A. (,ſº (
-
ºut 4 a. wº-
adel j \ ^ £ilºsº; * *@**...* 3rºiesewi
º - -
| º Bāhº
§620 º :%; worſet sº
Karłºż e º Aº
º
-
*
-
-
º, (s.3%
Nº. Y S Sfºnthals:
T - ,-, .
0 / º 3 lº 5 ºzáčes
------------ - -------









































































































































THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
DATE DUE
#AR 9 f iggº

w /g
2. + .. ~. f
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
Millſ
1877
DO NOT REMOVE
MUTILATE CARD