THE
INVASION
OF THE
CRIMEA
AW KINGLAKE
B 442841
VOL. VII.
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THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA.

EUPATORIA
Sasik
Sak.
THE SOUTHERN
CRIMEA.
anding Ground
Old Fort
The Invasion
executed
by
Farghy
SIMPHEROPOL
Kanghil
Boulganak. R
Bourlicu
AL
20th Sept 1854.
matamak
Katcha
the Allies
Sept
1854
Belbek
BAKTCHI-SARAÏ
Map No 1 Frontispiece.
KARA-SU-BAZAR
Aran
enatyr Dagh
Chouma
ALOUSHT
SEBASTOPOL
KAMIESON
WOT
Thermaya
BALACLAVA
Road
BAIDAR
Mount
Woron
Road
pa
Simphéropol, conceived
huis Napoleon in 185
The Plan of a second invasion
Scale
MILES 10
100
10
20
30
40 MILES
RITCHIE & SON EDIN
THE
INVASION OF THE CRIMEA:
ITS ORIGIN,
AND
AN ACCOUNT OF ITS PROGRESS
DOWN TO THE DEATH OF
LORD RAGLAN.
By A. W. KING LAKE.
BY
VOLUME VII.
FROM THE MORROW OF INKERMAN
TO THE FALL OF CANROBERT.
WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS,
EDINBURGH AND LONDON.
MDCCCLXXXVII.
The Right of Translation is reserved.
DK
214
.K54
1863
67
Wols
arfe
Replacement
1
Harding
7-38-52
80078
CONTENTS OF VOLUME VII.
CHAPTER I.
THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL FROM THE 6TH OF NOVEMBER 1854, TO THE
MIDDLE OF THE ENSUING FEBRUARY.
I.
The Allies now committed to what might prove a long siege,
The predicament in which they had placed themselves,
The duress they suffered,
The bearing of this duress upon their power as combatants,
The task of defence now weighing upon their energies,
And defence under hard conditions, .
No idea of raising the siege could be well or even prudently har-
boured,
•
II.
The double task now pressing upon the Allies,
Their defensive works,
III.
•
•
The designs of the French, though postponed, still pointing to the
Flagstaff Bastion,
Checked in carrying forward their approaches,
They resort to mining,
Extension towards their left of siege-work carried on by the French,
The part taken at this time by the English in the work of the siege,
The great strain put on their fortitude,
IV.
One of the advantages conferred on the enemy by giving him time,
Todleben's means of drawing advantage from time, .
PAGE
1 2 2 0 0 +
3
3
4
4
5
10 10
5
6
6
6
8
∞ ~ ~
7
9
9
vi
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER I.-continued.
As compared with the means which the Allied Engineers could
command,
Todleben's defences,
His more strictly defensive measures,
By his strictly defensive measures did he make the fortress secure?
His opinion,
V.
Todleben's measures for averting attack,
PAGE
10
11
11
12
12
13
14
14
15
16
•
17
17
17
18
18
18
18
19
19
20
His aggressive batteries,
His rifle-pits,
His lodgments,
His aggressive countermines,
Petty sorties,
The strain they put on the guards of the trenches,
French in these sorties, .
Indignation of the French army,
•
Novel contrivance resorted to by the Russians when attacking the
Generous concession to its feeling by Osten-Sacken,
The sorties always sooner or later repressed with due vigour,
The French guards of the trenches compared with the English,
The enemy encountering our guards of the trenches,
Without discovering their extreme numerical weakness,
Departure of Prince Napoleon,
VI.
Natural reluctance of the French to alter their main plan of siege, .
21
Burgoyne's insistence upon the expediency of assailing the Malakoff,
The French at first adverse to his counsels, .
21
22
•
But afterwards more willingly listening to them,
Acceptance of Burgoyne's opinion in a Conference of Three,
23
23
Step tending in an opposite direction immediately taken by
Canrobert,
24
His official letter to Lord Raglan,
24
Lord Raglan's way of dealing with it,
24
The French ultimately reverting to the decision of the 'Three,'
And on certain conditions agreeing to assail the Malakoff front,
The gravity of the dangers thus averted,
26
27
27
The envoy sent by Lord Raglan to the French headquarters,
Long delay,.
28
29
1st and 2d February. Modified plan put forward by the French,
And approved by Lord Raglan,
30
30
But now known to have masked another design,
31
CA
CONTENTS.
vii
CHAPTER I.-continued.
VII.
Import of the change of plan as first understood by the French,
VIII.
The French mining operations,
Todleben's skill and power in the science of mining,
His countermines,
Progress of the mining and countermining operations,
Their result, .
IX.
The peremptory part of the besieger's design now shifting from the
Flagstaff Bastion to the Malakoff,
PAGE
31
32
33
33
33
35
35
X.
Dispositions consequent upon Canrobert's resolve to operate against
the Malakoff,
36
The Allies commencing works destined to aid a meditated attack on
the Mamelon,
37
•
XI.
Various movements and changes,
On the part of the Russians, .
On the part of the French,
Their reconnaissances,
The treatment experienced by Forey,
The French breastplates,
On the part of the English,
Field-telegraph,
Railway,
Command of fleet,
38
38
>
39
39
39
41
41
·
•
41
41
•
41
XII.
Result of the conflict from the 6th of November 1854 to the middle
of February 1855,
XIII.
Questions raised by scientific critics,
41
43
viii
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER II.
EUPATORIA.
I.
Condition of things in Eupatoria and its neighbourhood,
II.
Assembly of the force under Baron Wrangel,
Its task,
Danger threatening the enemy's communications,
Arrival of some Turkish battalions, and soon of Omar Pasha in per-
son, at Eupatoria,
Question calling for Mentschikoff's decision,
His measures,
Mentschikoff's resolve to have Eupatoria attacked,
By forces withdrawn from Baron Wrangel,
•
And placed under General Khrouleff,
•
III.
PAGE
45
46
46
46
47
47
47
•
48
49
49
The defences and resources of Eupatoria,
The forces under General Khrouleff now charged to attack Eupa-
toria,
Their preparations, .
Their plan in its earlier stages,
IV.
The engagement of the 17th of February,
The enemy's acquiescence in this repulse,
49
51
51
52
52
57
•
CHAPTER III.
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.
The Czar's feelings after his discomfiture before Eupatoria,
His illness,
Subsequent rumours,
Power of grief over the body,
Official account of the Czar's malady,
•
This consistent with the belief that it was brought about by grief,
Sequence of facts,
Death of the Czar,
The fate of Nicholas,
Justice administered to a highly placed criminal,
•
The personal contention thus brought to end,
588
58
58
58
58
59
59
•
59
59
59
60
•
61
CONTENTS.
ix
CHAPTER IV.
SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL FROM THE MIDDLE OF FEBRUARY 1855
TO THE SECOND WEEK OF APRIL.
Morning of the 22d of February,
Sight observed by the French,
I.
Todleben's inferences from what the Allies had been visibly doing,
His counteracting plans,
His Selinghinsk Redoubt,
II.
•
French night attack on the Selinghinsk Redoubt,
False report of this fight made to Canrobert,
Truce for burying the dead, .
PAGE
63
63
64
65
65
67
71
71
III.
Reason of the French for not renewing the attack, .
72
The Volhynia Redoubt,
72
Continued acquiescence of the French,
72
Import and effect of these counter-works on Mount Inkerman,
Decisions of the French on finding themselves thus confronted
JNNNN
72
73
IV.
Council assembled, but with little prospect of advantage,
Council of the 4th of March,
Adjourned Conference sitting on the 6th of March, .
8th March. Canrobert renewing his endeavours to obtain Turkish
reinforcements,
•
Completion and armament of the two White Redoubts,
73
74
76
77
•
77
V.
Arrival of the young Grand-Dukes Nicholas and Michael,
•
The Mamelon,
225
77
78
Advice of Bizot to Canrobert,
78
Declined,
78
Night of the 10th of March, Todleben establishing a Work on the
Mamelon,
78
•
Sight greeting the French on the morning of the 11th,
79
The Kamtchatka Lunette,
79
Deliberations of the French in face of this new apparition,
Their resolve not to assault the new work,
79
•
79
But to proceed against it by 'approaches,'
21st March. Todleben's completion and armament of his Kamt-
chatka Lunette,
79
80
•
X
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER IV.-continued.
VI.
PAGE
Mortifying and perplexing effect of Todleben's counter-works,
Canrobert's reason for declining to seize the Mamelon,
81
81
The vast scope of his objection,
81
Its dangerous tendency,
82
Niel's comment on the objection,
82
Canrobert's determination to abstain from assaulting the embryo
Lunette,
83
Representation on this subject imparted by Lord Raglan to Canrobert,
83
VII.
The gloomy apprehensions of Canrobert imparted to Lord Raglan,
Lord Raglan's comment,
84
84
And its tendency to relieve his despondency,
84
Lord Raglan's power of repressing despondency,
85
Did this change Canrobert's tone?
85
·
Allusion to recent disclosures,
85
VIII.
Vigorous advance of the French approaches' against the new
Lunette,
86
Anxiety of the enemy to check them,
86
•
His sorties, 22d of March,
86
His great sortie against the French,
87
The sorties effected against the English siege-works,
89
Colonel Kelly's dispositions,
90
·
Zavalichine's flank movement,
92
•
Boudistcheff's attack,
92
Charge by Vicars with 70 or 80 men of the 97th,
93
Vicars joined by Kelly and Gordon, .
93
Defeat of the column,
93
•
Defeat of Zavalichine's column,
94
Sound of firing towards the more western part of the Woronzoff
Ridge,
95
Colonel Kelly taking his measures,
95
But wounded and taken prisoner,
96
•
The attack under Astapoff,
97
•
Means of resistance collected,
97
Fight at the Mortar Battery,
98
Defeat and flight of the Russian columu,
98
Béruleff's surprise of our advanced siege-works in the Left Attack,
Part of the invading force checked by some men of the 21st Fusi-
99
liers under Carlton,
99
CONTENTS.
xi
CHAPTER IV.-continued.
And ultimately retreating before it,
Russian troops for a while in the two advanced batteries,
But routed by the men of our working-parties,
Comments on the great sortie effected against the French,
IX.
PAGE
100
100
•
100
102
Great extension given by Todleben to his counter-approaches,
The design of the 1st of January now so far frustrated as to be
almost in abeyance,
104
105
X.
The siege operations maintained against the town front,
105
And by the English against the Redan and its neighbours, .
106
XI.
Continuance and final success of General Canrobert's efforts to draw
reinforcements from the Turkish army at Eupatoria,
106
Arrival of Omar Pasha in person with a large force of Turks,
107
•
XII.
Sinking of more Russian ships,
107
Death of Nicholas imparted to the Sebastopol garrison,
107
Change of Russian commanders,
108
Prince M. Gortchakoff,
108
What made this a supremely fortunate choice?
108
Admiral Istomine killed,
Departure of Sir John Burgoyne,
109
109
XIII.
Preparations for a great cannonade, .
•
112
Allusion to recent disclosures,
112
CHAPTER V.
THE SECRET TERMS OF THE MISSION ENTRUSTED TO GENERAL NIEL.
The French Emperor beginning in secret to interfere with the
siege,
General Niel,
His opinions on the subject of the war in the Crimea,
VOL. VII.
114
115
115
b
xii
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER V.-continued.
PAGE
The desire of the French Emperor,
116
The 'mission' of General Niel,
116
Niel's position at the French Headquarters,
116
His plan,
117
peror; and approved by Canrobert,
Niel's task,
The plan in general conformity with the wish of the French Em-
The army of Canrobert kept secretly under restraint,
119
120
120
The Emperor's plan put in course of execution,
Concealment of the plan from the English,
•
120
121
•
And of its 'separate article' from Canrobert,
Impressions caused by the prospect of the Emperor's going to the
Crimea,
121
121
The concealment from Lord Raglan maintained with continued
123
success,
•
Greatness of the difference between the plan concerted with Lord
Raglan by Canrobert, and the one framed by Niel,
The all but inevitable consequence of imparting the Emperor's plan
to Canrobert,
125
126
Disloyalty of the concealment practised against the English,
Way in which the Imperial will was brought to bear on Canrobert,
No apparent reluctance on the part of Canrobert to be guided by
his Emperor's wish,
127
127
128
Lengthened and baneful incumbency of the Emperor's plan,
Explanations that might be appropriately given by Marshal Can-
128
robert,
129
The bare facts,
129
The light thrown by this chapter on Canrobert's successive
'abstentions,'
129
CHAPTER VI.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
I.
Expectations formed by those who were uninitiated in the secret
of Niel's Mission,
II.
Preparation for the April cannonade,
Counter-preparations by the Russians,
Conditions placing the Russians at a disadvantage,
130
132
133
133
CONTENTS.
xiii
CHAPTER VI.-continued.
III.
Opening and continuation of the April bombardment,
Continuance and general effect of the bombardment,
Over both the Town front, and the eastern part of the Faubourg,
But not over the intermediate batteries directly confronted by the
English,
IV.
PAGE
135
136
136
138
What kept within limits the battering-power of the English,
Incompleteness of some of the English preparatives,
The Left Attack,
138
139
·
139
•
The arming of its two advanced batteries delayed,
140
•
The angry impatience thus caused,
141
•
Its apparent effect,
142
A coincidence,
142
Order given to Captain Oldershaw,
142
And executed the same night,
143
12th April. The advanced No. VII. completed, and its guns be-
fore sunset engaged with the enemy,
143
Decision said to have been based on observation of this encounter,
144
V.
The two advanced batteries of our Left Attack,
144
The advanced No. VII.,'
144
The enemy's accustomed way of dealing with an advanced battery,
Great, yet insufficient strength of its parapet,
145
147
The ways of a cannon-ball when obstructed, without being stopped,
The advanced No. VIII.',
147
150
VI.
The order directing Captain Oldershaw to engage the 'advanced No.
VII. battery' on the 13th of April,
150
Captain Oldershaw,
150
Entering the battery.
•
152
Its state,
152
Sir Gerald Graham,
•
152
His account of what the battery confronted,
The fight,
•
153
154
The losses sustained in Oldershaw's battery,
General Dacres,
His words to Oldershaw,
An order given out by mistake,
And the touching incident to which it gave rise,
166
167
•
167
168
169
xiv
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VI.-continued.
VII.
Ground for laying full stress on the fight of the 13th of April,
Sir Gerald Graham,
His judgment of Oldershaw's fight,
•
VIII.
PAGE
170
171
171
Both the advanced Nos. VII. and VIII. batteries got ready for
fighting on the morning of the 14th,
172
Engagement of the No. VII. battery under Captain Henry on morn-
ing of the 14th of April,
172
Simultaneous engagement of the No. VIII. battery, under Captain
Walcott, on the morning of the 14th,
174
The engagements in the Nos. VII. and VIII. batteries on the 14th
continued by the reliefs until dark,
177
IX.
What put limits on the bombardment,
178
Consumption of siege-gun ammunition,
178
Losses of men sustained by the Allies in the artillery conflict,
Large proportion of the losses sustained by our sailors,
Their ways whilst manning a battery,
178
178
179
X.
The defenders of Sebastopol,
180
Their Easter festivities mingling with the fights in the batteries,
The fortitude they needed for their task,
180
180
Their want of ammunition,
180
The sacrifices they had to make in order to be ready to meet assaults,
The heroism of their defence at this time,
181
181
Supplies of ammunition and reinforcements,
183
The tasks which the defence of Sebastopol at this time involved,
183
The two White Redoubts crushed and silenced, and not repaired,
But still not assaulted by the French,
184
185
The Malakoff covered by counter-approaches, and not therefore
strongly assailed,
185
The Kamtchatka Lunette brought to ruin,
185
•
Not, however, assaulted by the French,
186
But still approached' by their sap,
186
Complete failure of the English batteries against the Great Redan,
The Town Front,
186
186
The Russians imagining the French to be resolute, and determined
to seize the Flagstaff Bastion,
187
Havoc sustained by the Flagstaff Bastion and its auxiliaries on the
first day,
187
CONTENTS.
XV
CHAPTER VI.—continued.
So, on the second day,
So, on the third day,
So, on the fourth day,
So, on the fifth day,
So, on the sixth day,
State of Flagstaff Bastion,
•
The great effort made to repair it,
Peril of the Bastion on the seventh day,
On the eighth day,
PAGE
188
188
189
189
189
189
189
·
189
190
On the ninth day,
190
•
On the tenth day,
190
Desperate state of Bastion,
190
Cessation of the general bombardment,
191
Flag of truce.
Compliments exchanged between French and
Russian officers, .
191
'Siege of Troy,'
191
Continuation of the bombardment directed against the Flagstaff
Bastion and its auxiliaries,
191
Their peril on the 21st of April,
192
XI.
Question whether the bombardment opened paths for assault,
Answered by the facts, and by the authoritative opinion of General
Todleben,
192
192
The bombardment achieved its set purpose,
194
•
But, not being followed up, it resulted in harm to the Allies,
Todleben's inquiry,
195
195
The clue,
195
CHAPTER VII.
THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL (WITH EXCLUSION OF THE APRIL BOMBARD-
MENT, ALREADY NARRATED) FROM
MIDDLE OF MAY.
THE 9TH OF APRIL TO THE
I.
Bizot mortally wounded,
196
And succeeded after an interval by Niel,
198
The French opening ground by mines in front of the Flagstaff Bastion, 198
And there forming a 4th Parallel,
199
The tendency of this successful exploit to embarrass Canrobert and
Niel,
200
Todleben's encroachments in front of the Central Bastion,
201
xvi
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER VII.-continued.
PAGE
Canrobert's unwillingness to resist them,
This, however, overcome,
Pélissier,
201
•
202
202
The anomaly thence resulting,
Fights for the Cimetière Lodgments,
The Sousdal Counter-guard converted into a French Work,
And held fast,
Not brooking the encroachments against his own front,
Resulting, after some days, in the definitive success of the French,
Todleben's project for a new work of counter-approach,
The fighting for lodgments constructed in furtherance of the project,
The Sousdal Counter-guard,
•
Brilliant attack by the French on the Sousdal Counter-guard,
And capture of the Work,
Resulting in the complete success of the French,
Losses sustained in the night combat of the 1st of May,
Canrobert apologising for this victorious exploit,
The fighting for lodgments in front of 'Gordon's Attack,'
Egerton's achievement,
202
203
203
204
204
204
205
206
206
207
207
A
208
208
208
208
209
His death,
210
•
His fame,
210
The praises bestowed by Lord Raglan on the troops taking part in
this combat,
211
The losses it caused our people,
211
•
The night sorties during this period,
211
A reconnaissance by Omar Pasha,
212
Why recorded,
213
Submarine telegraph connecting the Chersonese with Varna,
213
Its counterbalancing mischiefs,
213
The Eupatoria cable,
The accession of 15,000 Sardinian troops under General de la Marmora, 213
213
CHAPTER VIII.
TROUBLED COUNSELS OF THE FRENCH.
I.
Tendency of a successful bombardment to derange the working
of Niel's 'mission,'
Canrobert ignoring the success of the bombardment,
216
217
II.
Conference of 14th April,
218
Disposition on the part of the French, except Pélissier, to stop the
bombardment,
218
CONTENTS.
xvii
CHAPTER VIII.-continued.
But successfully combated by Lord Raglan and Lyons,
A slight relaxation of the fetters imposed on Canrobert by Niel's
'mission,'
The miserable instruction given to Canrobert by his Emperor,
Canrobert's state of mind,
The conduct and bearing of Niel,
PAGE
218
218
220
220
220
•
His letter of the 16th of April to the Minister of War,
221
No termination of the secrecy which had shrouded Niel's 'mission,'
222
16th April. Agreement made between Canrobert and Lord Raglan,
But abandoned three days afterwards by Canrobert,
17th April. Letter from Niel to the Emperor,
222
223
223
III.
Ebullition of warlike impatience on the part of the French army,
Canrobert either sharing the feeling or hurried along by it,
224
224
Niel, .
224
Preliminary conference,
23d April. The French ostensibly ready to assault,
Evening of the 23d,
Agreement between Canrobert and Lord Raglan for a general assault
225
226
226
of Sebastopol,
•
Lord Raglan's impression,
226
226
•
IV.
General Canrobert's apparently uneasy state,
His letter next day (24th April) to the Emperor,
Niel writing to the Emperor at the same time,
The Emperor's account of the two letters,
Morning of 25th. Canrobert resolved to put off the assault,
+
The interview between Niel and Lord Raglan,
Course taken by Lord Raglan,
•
25th April. Canrobert's letter putting off the attack,
Lord Raglan's observation on the French change of counsel,
Circumstances under which the letter to Bruat was put forward,
Weight due to the letter of the 7th of April,
V.
The previous concealment from Canrobert,
227
227
227
227
228
228
229
230
230
231
•
232
·
232
VI.
Uncertainty as to the duration of the postponement,
234
Canrobert's idea of its scope, .
234
The old fetters refastened upon him,
235
xviii
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER IX.
THE NOW ACTIVELY PERTURBING INTERFERENCE OF LOUIS NAPOLEON
IN THE WAR FOR SEBASTOPOL.
I.
PAGE
The hitherto paralysing interference of the French Emperor,
Now changed into actively perturbing dictation,
His visit to England,
236
236
236
The Council of War at Windsor Castle,
237
.
The Emperor's resolve to join his army,
237
His agreement with our Government upon preliminary questions,
237
•
II.
The Emperor's proposals,
238
Acceptance by our Government of the preliminary arrangements,
As recorded at Buckingham Palace, ·
239
239
III.
The Emperor's plan of campaign,
239
His plan as regarded the '1st army of operation,'
239
That not objected to by our Government,
240
The Emperor's plan as regarded the '2d army of operation,'
Opinion formed by our Government of that last part of the plan,
General purport of the entire plan,
240
241
241
IV.
The Emperor abandoning his intention of going out to the Crimea,
His letter of instruction to Canrobert,
242
242
V.
3d of May. The Generals in the Crimea acquainted with the im-
perial plan,
The joy of Lord Panmure,
The frail basis on which it all rested,
VI.
•
245
246
247
CONTENTS.
xix
CHAPTER X.
THE INTERPOSITION OF THE FRENCH EMPEROR CONTINUING AND
BRINGING ABOUT THE RECALL OF A JOINT EXPEDITION.
I.
Project for opening a passage into the Sea of Azof,
The Straits of Kertch,
II.
The enemy's endeavours to guard them,
The Peninsula of Kertch,
Baron Wrangel there in command,
His forces,
The task set before him,
His dispositions,
•
PAGE
249
•
249
250
251
251
•
•
251
251
252
III.
The eagerness of the English to have the attack set on foot,
General Canrobert's assent to it,
His subsequent doubts and objections,
J
•
Lord Raglan's masterly answer to him,
Canrobert deferring to Lord Raglan,
IV.
Sailing of the expedition on the 3d of May,
V.
The Submarine Cable,
VI.
254
254
254
255
256
•
256
257
Telegrams from Paris,
259
Night of the 3d of May,
259
Canrobert's visit to Lord Raglan with a new telegram,
259
Discussion between the two commanders,
260
Its result,
261
2.15 A.M. Arrival of aide-de-camp with yet another telegram,
261
And letter from Canrobert declaring himself,
262
Compelled to recall Admiral Bruat,
Reception of this by Lord Raglan,
262
·
262
VII.
Venturesome course taken by Lord Raglan,
The latitude he gave to Sir George Brown,
263
·
265
XX
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER X.-continued.
VIII.
PAGE
265
IX.
Return of the expedition,
268
Feelings excited by its recall,
269
On board the flotilla, .
269
In Constantinople,
270
•
On the fleets and the troops, .
Canrobert's account of the recall,
The justice due to him,
271
272
273
X.
Letter from the French Emperor,
In explanation of the course he had taken,
Comment on the letter,
CHAPTER XI.
THE EMPEROR'S DICTATION RESISTED, THE COLLAPSE OF HIS PLAN,
AND THE RESIGNATION OF CANROBERT.
I.
Canrobert and Niel proposing consideration of the Emperor's
plan,
Course taken by Lord Raglan,
His opinion of the plan,
And of what would be the right course,
II.
•
•
Pélissier's letter of the 5th of May,
•
Wholesome bearing of the letter upon the counsels of the Allies,
Corollary resulting from the letter in its bearing upon the Past,
Pélissier's growing ascendant,
Contrast,
Effect of the letter,
•
274
274
275
277
278
278
279
279
281
281
282
283
283
III.
Expositions of the Emperor's plan now before the Commanders,
The duties it assigned to Canrobert and Pélissier,
12th May. The three allied Commanders in Conference,
283
283
284
CONTENTS.
xxi
CHAPTER XI.-continued.
14th May, renewed Conference. Lord Raglan prevailing,
Agreement as to plan of field operations,
But no further,
Canrobert peremptorily refusing to guard the English trenches,
Omar Pasha also refusing,
The consequences of these refusals,
•
Lord Raglan's mortification,
Rejection of plan,
•
An anomaly,.
·
Canrobert's idea that the English army might be split into two,
The Emperor's plan exposed to contact with realities,
With what result,
Statement by Canrobert that he was going to take the field,
Duration of the harm done by General Niel's 'mission,'
PAGE
284
285
•
285
285
286
286
286
286
287
287
288
•
288
289
289
IV.
General Canrobert's first endeavour to rid himself of the command,
290
16th April.
His second endeavour,
291
•
His resignation tendered,
291
•
Strange interposition of Niel,
291
Canrobert's command given up and transferred to Pélissier,
Assigned causes of Canrobert's resignation,
292
292
The merit of Canrobert's self-sacrifice,
294
The lesson apparently taught him by Pélissier's letter,
294
Feeling of the French army towards Canrobert,
The 'morale' of the French army under Canrobert,
Opinions of Canrobert expressed by men in authority,
Effect of recent disclosures on Canrobert's reputation,
295
295
•
297
299
CHAPTER XII.
THE RELATIONS OF AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA WITH THE BELLIGERENTS.-
THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA. THE AUSTRIAN PROPOSALS.
-THEIR REJECTION ENTAILING A CHANGE OF AUSTRIA'S POLICY.
I.
The union of Austria and Prussia with the Western Powers,
301
Its anomalous character,
302
Its efficacy for the first proposed object,
303
Tendency of this too speedy success,
The danger increased by another cause,
The defection of Prussia,
The loyal course taken by Austria,
304
304
305
307
•
•
xxii
CONTENTS.
CHAPTER XII.-continued.
II.
Step taken by Austria which made a beginning of her mediation,
Course taken at first by the Czar Nicholas,
And afterwards,
His acceptance of the Four Conditions,
Treaty of the 2d of December 1854,
•
Preliminary negotiations for the Conference,
Exclusion of Prussia from the Conferences,
•
•
Question as to the effect of Nicholas's death on the prospects of
peace,
•
III.
PAGE
309
309
309
309
310
310
311
312
The Peace Negotiations at Vienna,
313
•
Lord John Russell,
313
•
Prince Alexander Gortchakoff,
316
M. Drouyn de Lhuys,
317
Debates in the Conference,
317
•
Compared with the mere adduced 'reasons,' the actual stress of the
' motives,'
322
Failure of the Peace negotiations carried on between the bellig-
erents,
327
IV.
The Austrian proposals,
328
Allusions to a subsequent attack on Lord John Russell,
328
The Third of the three Austrian plans,
330
The dead-lock in front of Sebastopol,
332
The need that there was for effecting a new move against Russia,
334
The lever to be found at Vienna,
334
Neglect of this by the Rulers in Paris and London,
335
But not by De Lhuys and Lord John,
335
The tendency and value of the measure,
336
De Lhuys,
337
Lord John Russell,
337
Reception of this plan by Lord Palmerston's Cabinet,
338
And by the French Emperor,
Pronounced difference in the counsels of the Western Powers,
338
339
The French Emperor and Lord Cowley,
Marshal Vaillant,
His words,
Their sudden effect,
339
340
•
341
341
Resignation of De Lhuys,
342
Unaccepted resignations of Lord John Russell,
342
CONTENTS.
xxiii
CHAPTER XII.—continued.
Unanimity after the 5th of May of the English Cabinet,
The Governments of France and England once more in substantial
PAGE
342
accord,
343
.
Opening for the new policy suggested by Vaillant,
343
•
The soundness of Vaillant's conclusion,
343
The course of duty prescribed to D. de Lhuys and Lord John,
What they did,
344
345
Vote of the House of Commons,
347
The Conference kept formally open until the 4th of June,
347
And then closed,
347
V.
Change brought about by the rejection of the Austrian proposals,
Austria set free to change her course,
348
348
The course she rightly took, .
348
APPENDIX.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I.
1. Outnumbered by tens of thousands,
2. On General Bosquet's front,
3. Only by hundreds,
4. Of the Flagstaff Bastion,
5. Minor pieces of ordnance,
•
6. Only 290 men,
7. At the object kept always in sight,
8. Against the Malakoff front,
9. Happily able to accept the condition imposed,
10. Till the latter part of the month,
11. Words described as 'Instructions,'
12. Other mortal then living,
13. Spreading system of countermines,
14. Unleashed a camouflet,
•
15. The intervening Mamelon,
16. Did the work,
17. Destroying the Inkerman Bridge,
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV.
1. With their blows,
2. Lost their way in the darkness,
•
351
351
•
351
352
•
352
352
352
353
353
354
354
354
354
•
354
355
355
355
355
356
xxiv
CONTENTS.
APPENDIX-continued.
3. Had been victoriously achieved,
4. Without a simultaneous advance on the Malakoff front,
5. Not again to attempt to drive the enemy from their new works,
6. For which he was yearning,
7. With grossly inadequate means,
8. Were 'postulates' rather than facts,
PAGE
356
356
356
357
357
357
NOTES TO CHAPTER V.
1. 14th February 1855,
358
2. Begun and continued,
359
3. Lasting success,
359
4. By approaches,'
359
5. To Vaillant, 8th February 1855,
360
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI.
1. Grave affair,
360
2. See Appendix, Note (2),
3. Enthusiasm,
4. Camel,
5. Battery,
6. To retire,'
7. To Oldershaw,
8. Came to an end,
•
9. Strength of only three men,
10. Any less formal document,
11. Under him,
12. To make the truth known,
13. Engaged under them,
C
14. The fire of the two advanced batteries,'
15. Defence of Sebastopol,
•
361
362
363
·
363
363
364
364
365
365
366
366
368
369
369
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII.
1. Might not after all be unwise,
2. Somewhat unscrupulous,
3. Always thoroughly cordial,
370
371
371
NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.
1. To be attempted,
371
CONTENTS.
XXV
APPENDIX-continued.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IX.
1. This part of the plan,
2. Take effect by surprise,
3. Or otherwise into the sea,
4. To avert the catastrophe,
1. Into full play,
2. Could not divine,
•
NOTES TO CHAPTER X.
PAGE
372
372
373
·
373
374
374
•
374
3. In their rear,
NOTES TO CHAPTER XI.
375
1. Campaigning Plan,
375
2. To act in the field,
3. The hopes he had entertained of being attacked by the enemy
on the reopening of the bombardment,
375
ILLUSTRATIONS.
Map
I. The Southern Crimea,
>>
54
II. The French Lines of Countervallation,
III. Eupatoria. The Russians repulsed by the Turks,
17th February 1855,
IV. Diagram illustrating the design and purpose of
Todleben's Counter - approaches in the Fau-
bourg of the Karabelnaya,
•
V. The Great Night Sortie of the 22d of March,
showing positions reached by the Assailants,
VI. Scene of Captain Oldershaw's Fight in the "Ad-
vanced No. 7" on the 13th of April,
VII. Scene of the Fights maintained by Pélissier before
his accession to the supreme command.-The
Counter-approaches in front of the Central
Bastion down to the 1st of May, .
VIII. The Country between Aloushta and Simpheropol
in illustration of the French Emperor's plan,
IX. The Kertchine Peninsula,
Frontispiece
to face page 4
48
""
""
33
64
86
""
144
""
204
240
""
""
250
FROM THE MORROW OF INKERMAN
TO THE FALL OF CANROBERT.
THE SIEGE OF
OF
CHAPTER I.
SEBASTOPOL
SEBASTOPOL
FROM
FROM THE 6TH OF NOVEMBER
1854, TO THE MIDDLE OF THE ENSUING FEBRUARY.
I.
I.
The Allies
now com-
mitted to
what
prove a
By following the course they approved on the CHAP.
morrow of 'Inkerman,' the Allies did more than
make waste of that onward momentum which vic-
tory is wont to confer;* for they even, as we saw,
gave their adversary the priceless respite he needed might
for his Flagstaff Bastion; and not judging the long siege.
Sebastopol front to be anywhere else in a state
that could warrant assault, they now found their
armies committed to what-unless roughly cut
short by recurrence to bold resolves, or by some
grave disaster befalling them-seemed destined to
prove a long siege.
* See ante, vol. v. p. 480 et seq., and also note to chap. i. vol. vi.
† See ante, vol. v. pp. 34, 35, and 480.
VOL. VII.
A
2
CONDITIONS AFFECTING
CHAP.
I.
The pre-
dicament
in which
they had
placed
them-
selves.
The duress
they suf-
fered.
*
Yet, to any such task as that of putting stress
on Sebastopol by what men in general mean when
they speak of a 'siege,' the Allies were then wholly
unequal. They had been guided into their troubles
by accomplished, highly skilled engineers, but of
those there were none who at first saw whither
their counsels were tending; and thus it resulted
anomalously that by great scientific advisers
they had been not only led by degrees into what
was an ugly predicament, but also into open. rebel-
lion against the first precepts of Science. Instead of
approaching their object with that huge preponder-
ance of numbers-before Vauban's time ten to one
-which Science had declared to be needed for the
reduction of a fortress, they were themselves on the
contrary outnumbered by tens of thousands; (¹) and
far from having the power to fold their coils round
the place after the manner of normal besiegers, they
had confessed themselves unable to invest it at all
on the north, whilst even too on the south-their
own chosen side of the Roadstead-they were
leaving the enemy free to come in and go out as he
chose.
And whilst thus altogether unable to beleaguer
Sebastopol, the Allies were in some sort beleaguered.
Confronting them-and this at close quarters-with
the garrison part of his forces now strongly en-
trenched, the Russian commander there leant upon
the resources of a vast naval arsenal, and a fleet
* See vol. iii. chap. xi. Men thought they could use battering-
guns, and even give those guns cover, without sliding into a 'siege.'
THE BESIEGERS.
3
I.
broken up for land-service, whilst left free, as he CHAP.
was, to communicate with Simpheropol, Odessa, St
Petersburg-he could always be drawing new strength
from the Muscovite empire at large, and moreover
could wield at his pleasure the army he always kept
imminent in the open field.
By a part of that Russian field-army on their
flank, and the garrison of Sebastopol entrenched
along their whole front, the Allies, as we saw, had
allowed themselves to be completely hemmed in on
the land side; and how they thus became hampered
in the task of supplying their armies, we already
have painfully learnt; but the bearing that this The bear-
duress had upon their powers as combatants must duress
not the less be remembered.
*
ing of this
upon their
power as
combat-
ants.
So long as they had been able to promise them-
selves that within a few days they would break
their way into Sebastopol, the duress they suffered
could of course be regarded as only a brief re-
straint to be followed by a dazzling conquest well
fitted to end all their troubles; but the moment
they had resolved that the crisis of their enterprise
should be indefinitely put off, this Chersonese on
which they had lighted, as though it were simply
their stepping-stone, seemed thenceforth rather their
prison. With their 'parallels' 'first,' 'second,' and
'third,' and all their siege apparatus, they still had
the air of assailants, yet were not in reality minded
to risk striking any prompt blow; and on the other weighing
hand now, they lived subject to whatever might be energies;
* Ante, vol. vi., chaps. i. v. vi. vii. and viii.
The task
of defence
110W
upon their
4
I.
and de-
fence
under
hard con-
ditions.
CONDITIONS AFFECTING THE BESIEGERS.
CHA P. adventured against them by a closely hovering
army which they could not shake off, and besides—
at still closer quarters-by the garrison of a fortress.
which they had not even tried to invest. They
indeed might still be preparing the means of some
future attack, but meanwhile, they found themselves
thrown upon the defensive, and this too, under condi-
tions of a perilous kind; for whilst closely cooped in
as we saw, on the land side, they stood with their
backs to a shore overhung by precipitous cliffs; and
tacticians all know that to have to accept battle from
a powerful enemy without enjoying due freedom of
movement towards the rear, is to be in a sort of
predicament which is adverse to the hope of a vic-
tory, and makes defeat utter ruin.
No idea
of raising
the siege
could be
well or
even pru-
dently
harboured.
Pride alone would perhaps have sufficed to prevent
the thus hampered Allies from indulging any thought
of retreat; but it is certain that motives deriving
from a warlike sense of honour and courage were
reinforced by the dictates of prudence; for, whatever
the peril and difficulty of forcibly reducing Sebasto-
pol, an undertaking to withdraw the Allied armies,
and to cover their embarkation, would have been
one of a kind still more formidable, and—except
upon condition of abandoning siege-guns to the
enemy-must have proved a task utterly desperate.*
* Under stress of an imprudent question exacting a categorical
answer, Lord Raglan confidentially informed Lord Panmure that
any such withdrawal was 'impossible.' He added-'We have no
'retreat.' Letter marked 'Confidential,' 3d March 1855.
THE FRENCH LINES OF
COUNTERVALLATION.
Peschana Bay
Sommelier Bay
Map No 2 to face page 4

Streletzka
Magazine
W
H
Telegraph
Telegraph
Kazatch Ba
ད་
LIN
KAMIESH
FRENCH
(NES OF
Bakery
L
S
F
COUNTER VALLATT
COUNTERVALLATIONS
Scale.
MILES O
N S
SMILES
ALANGHILASON, EDING
THE NOW DOUBLE TASK IMPOSED ON THE ALLIES.
II.
5
СНАР.
I.
task now
upon the
So, because the Allies were now minded to defer The double
their assault of Sebastopol, it did not at all therefore pressing
follow that, by coming to such a resolve, they had Allies.
purchased the bliss of repose; for their now doubly
aiming exertions were not only henceforth addressed
to the object of an ulterior attack, but also—and
this with great diligence-to the more instant task
of defence.
fensive
Imagining that the enemy might some day renew Their de-
his great enterprise of the 5th of November, they works.
constructed, they armed, they maintained defensive
works on Mount Inkerman; they threw up works of
countervallation on their left; they perfected the
eastern and north-eastern defences of Balaclava, and
even strengthened yet further the hardly assailable
lines which crested the Sapounè Heights on General
Bosquet's front. (2) They still indeed aimed a great
proportion of their labours at the capital object of
some day reducing Sebastopol; but even where so
applied, their efforts tended also to guard them
against apprehended attacks, because the maintenance
of their attitude as apparently determined assailants
helped largely to keep unimpaired the moral strength
and weight of their armies, whilst moreover their
long chain of siege-works, though of course designed
for attack, was also a formidable barrier in the way
of any armed force coming out from the place to
assail them, and therefore formed part of the means
6
FRENCH OPERATIONS.
CHAP. by which they were able to hope that any new Rus-
I.
ང.
The de-
signs
of the
French,
though
still point-
ing to the
Flagstaff
Bastion.
Checked
sian onslaught directed against their approaches'
might be either averted or baffled. Thus even
more largely than observers might judge at first
sight-self-defence entered into the motives which
impelled the now harassed Allies to toil day and
night at their works.
III.
It was still by the Flagstaff Bastion that the
French at this time were hoping they might, some
day, break into Sebastopol. Because baffled by
postponed, conditions which made it seem unduly hazardous to
attempt such a step, they did not indeed try to
lessen the distance of some 180 yards which still
parted their most advanced trench from the counter-
scarp of the opposite Bastion, and on the contrary,
resigned themselves to the plan of constructing their
in carrying foremost batteries on the line they had reached (at
proaches, night) between the 2d and the 3d of November;
but they did their full utmost to perfect the third
parallel then opened, to give it due extension at
the flanks, and prepare to break down by over-domi-
nant metal the fire that threatened to rage against
any column advancing to storm and capture the
Work.
forward
their ap-
they resort
to mining.
As is usual with besiegers when stayed in their
task of pushing forward approaches' by trench-
work, the French with great diligence resorted to
the expedient of mining.
PART TAKEN BY THE ENGLISH.
7
I.
Extension
The besiegers by this time had learnt, yet were CHA P.
day by day learning more thoroughly, that-because
each opposite bastion was so placed and so armed towards
for duty towards its neighbour as to be effectively of siege-
6
their left
work car-
French.
subserving the principle of mutual support'-they ried on
must choose a wider front for attack' than at first by the
appeared to be necessary; and the French by degrees
got to see that their own special task (as distinguished
from that of our people) must be made to include a
great extension of siege-work towards their left.
They therefore not only made ready to deal with the
'Central' as well as the Flagstaff' Bastion, but
became step by step the besiegers of all the Sebas-
topol front from the line of the Woronzoff Road to
the edge of the Quarantine Bay.
C
The part
taken at
this time
by the
the work
siege.
The French also very well understood that, because
the Flagstaff Bastion drew support from the Barrack
Battery and the Great Redan, they would need once English in
again some such aid on their right as Lord Raglan of the
had been able to give them on the day of the first
bombardment; but for the siege-like co-operation
thus wanted they looked, as before, to the English,
and our people, with small and decreasing resources,
and difficult ground before them, were unable to
execute earth-works upon any scale matching the
greatness of Todleben's new creations. To maintain,
to improve, and a little advance their approaches, to
confront now and then with new batteries an enemy
ever restless and aggressive in his use of the pick-
axe and spade, and finally to prepare for the object
of supporting the French on their right, if ever, in
со
THE STRAIN ON OUR MEN.
CHAP. the future, disposed to assault the Flagstaff Bas-
I.
The great
strain put
on their
fortitude.
tion--this was all that in the way of siege-work
our people were able to do. They did no less than
their utmost; yet in face of the mighty defences by
this time piled up before them they could not at all
make sure, nay indeed could scarce venture to hope
that they would once more be able to win for the
French such immunity in the direction of their right
front as was given them—though given in vain
on that 17th of October when under the fire of our
guns the Malakoff Tower was silenced and the Great
Redan lay in ruins.
6
Only those who have formed some conception of
the hardships undergone by our army at the time of
the Winter Troubles' will fully imagine the strain
that was put on its fortitude by the exigencies of
siege-work and continuous strife with the enemy,
superadded to the bare task of living or painfully
trying to live;* yet sometimes it happened that
the nature, though not the extent, of the struggle
maintained, and the imperious domination of military
exigencies over other dire needs, could almost be
learnt at a glance. In the midst of its most grievous
straits for want of other means of land-transport, one
might too often count several hundreds of our weary
soldiery—every man of them heavily laden-pain-
fully employed in carrying up the supplies over
miles and miles of deep quagmire, whilst also, and
at the very same time, might be seen on the track
by Karani a team reckoning no less than from thirty
* See ante, vol. vi. chap. viii.
EFFECT OF GIVING TIME.
9
I.
to forty of our few surviving horses, engaged in CHAP.
dragging up to the front by ploughing and plough-
ing and ploughing through depths and depths of
clay some mighty gun, judged to be wanted for the
all-demanding siege. There were Frenchmen at
this cruel time who complacently spoke of their
efforts to 'galvanise' into activity the English sloth;
yet Canrobert himself frankly owned that the whole
of the army thus taunted for not doing more heavy
siege-work in addition to its other huge tasks, was
scarcely greater in numbers than one of his strongest
divisions.‡
IV.
advantages
on the
When determining once more to take time, the Allies One of the
of course could not but know they were giving time conferred
to the enemy; but, though making him, and know- enemy by
ingly making him, this dangerous concession, they time.
did not apprehend its full import.
giving him
means of
advantage
In words hardly varied from those that were used Todleben's
once before, it seems fitting here to repeat that, drawing
besides their other artillery, the garrison had not from time;
only all the ship's guns-some 1900 in number-
not only the ammunition, the iron, the timbers, the
cordage, the spars, the tanks, the canvas-all, in
short, that a great fleet could need, with vast
quantities of stone, already detached from the
* Journal Royal Engineers, vol. i. p. 69.
+ Bizot to Marshal Vaillant, quoted by Rousset, vol. ii. p. 32.
Ibid., p. 14.
1
10
TODLEBEN'S VAST RESOURCES.
I.
CHAP. neighbouring rocks, but also the machinery, the
implements, and the materials which had been in
use for the ordinary business of the dockyards, or
for quarrying stone on the Chersonese, or carrying
on endless works in the port, whether formed by
excavations, by embankments, or masonry, including
amongst such resources the windlasses, the cranes,
the gins, the levers, the engines of all kinds, by
which Man enforces his dominion over things of
huge bulk and weight, and that all these appliances
were not only at the disposal of the defenders, but
closely within their reach, coming apt to the hands
of labourers who had long been accustomed to wield
them.* What, however, still remains to be shown
is the strength in numbers of workmen which the
besieged and the besiegers respectively could during
this winter command for the purposes of defence or
attack.
as com-
pared with
which the
Engineers
could com-
mand.
Whilst the suffering and hampered Allies could
the means employ workmen only by hundreds, (3) the Russians
Allied kept engaged on their works an organised body of
labourers with a varying strength of no less than
from six to ten thousand; nor does even this state-
ment suffice to show the real disparity; for, com-
paring them man against man, the Russian labourers
were a great deal more hardy, were endowed with
more physical strength than those the Allies could
employ; and if we take care to remember that the
enormously superior command of constructive re-
* Vol. iii. chap. vii.
† Todleben, i. p. 514. The men were organised in two brigades.
HIS DEFENSIVE MEASURES.
11
I.
sources thus possessed by the garrison was wielded CHAP.
by Colonel de Todleben with prodigious skill and
activity, we shall form perhaps some conception of
that inferiority in working power which long kept
down the Allies. I suppose it might safely be
reckoned that in military engineering well conceived
and well executed, the enemy-whom ardent be-
siegers had invited to a trial of strength at this very
sort of toil-could achieve much more in one day
than his challengers could accomplish in ten.
C
defences.
strictly
measures.
It was with these vast advantages, wielded by Todleben's
consummate genius, that the formidable colonel of
Sappers proved able to work his wonders. Not even His more
neglecting that quiet, that unmolested North Side' defensive
which a less wary man might have judged to be ex-
empt from all risk, he converted Sebastopol into a
mighty fortress prepared for the fight at all points,
and defended on the land side alone by great guns
already numbering no less than 700, with besides
all the lesser artillery held ready at every apt spot
to confront storming columns with round-shot, or
to greet them when a little more near with his
favourite salutes of mitrail.
He closed the gorge of the Little Redan, and of
the Malakoff, and afterwards that of the Flagstaff
Bastion. (4)
To make sure, if he could, that in the event of
their carrying the Flagstaff Bastion, the French
should there meet destruction, he, by means of
conductors laid down underground, connected the
powder-magazine of the Work with a peaceful spot
12
TODLEBEN'S OPINION.
CHAP. answering his purpose in one of the Sebastopol
I.
By his
strictly
*
churches; and not forgetting our people-he took
like precautions for arresting the triumph of English-
men who, after storming their way through all the
fourfold defences of the Great Redan, might find
themselves alive in its precincts.†
As regards the French mining operations, Colonel
Todleben met them by countermines in a way we
shall presently learn.
By all the works thus accomplished did the great
defensive engineer make his fortress secure against any attack
of such kind as-with even the strength they then
had the Allies, if they chose, might attempt?
measures
did he
make the
fortress
secure?
ion.
<
He himself did not so believe. If trusting that
everywhere else he as yet might defy the assailants,
he still confessed to himself that he had a weak
His opin point in his armour which could not by art be made.
good. He knew indeed that the troops defending
his Flagstaff Bastion might be supported by such
strong appliances as would enable them, if they
chose, to die hard'; and to that end amongst many
others he bent his designs, never ceasing to provide
for the Work, and for all the ground near its gorge
such doubled, such trebled, such quadrupled means
of resistance that the assailants on the day of the
struggle must either recoil from the venture, or
dearly buy their conquest with blood; but he be-
lieved that with all his resources he could not defend
the threatened Bastion against a determined attack;
whilst, moreover, he judged that the loss of the Work
* Todleben, p. 503.
+ Ibid.
HIS AGGRESSIVE MEASURES.
13
would so split the Sebastopol defences as to ensure CHAP.
the fall of the place.*
It may seem at first sight that this twofold con-
clusion would warrant an approach towards de-
spondency.
I.
V.
measures
ing attack.
But apart from what, narrowly speaking, may be Todleben's
called the defence' of the Flagstaff Bastion,' there for avert-
might be measures well fitted to save it by averting,
instead of resisting, the threatened attack; and in-
deed, as we saw, it was to a policy of that sort,
adopted on the 5th of November, that the Bastion
then owed its immunity from what on the previous
day seemed a closely impending assault.
6
Colonel Todleben could not well ask that another
battle of Inkerman should be hazarded for the Flag-
staff Bastion, and apparently it may be taken for
granted that he did not perseveringly counsel that
measure of a 'sortie in strength and by day-
light,' which, according to the judgment of many
highly skilled engineers, might have brought the
besiegers to ruin; for he almost acknowledges that
his own darling plan-his plan of assailing Mount
Rodolph with powerful forces and so wresting it
from the grasp of the French-was one hardly with-
in the competence of Prince Mentschikoff's army
when crippled and in some sort disorganised by its
losses on the Inkerman day.
* See his words, quoted post, p. 194.
14
TODLEBEN'S
CHAP.
I.
His ag-
gressive
But short of undertaking great sorties, Colonel
Todleben did all he could to conduct his defence of
Sebastopol in an eagerly aggressive spirit. His
batteries. lately, his yet more lately, his still more lately raised
batteries never ceased to be harrying the besiegers
with new, perturbing challenges delivered at break of
day by means gathered during the night which forced
his overmatched adversaries to be straining their
inferior resources in efforts to meet his designs; and,
so great was the quickness, the ease with which
he thus prepared fire- the fire of heavy, well-
covered guns-from changed and changing fronts,
that, if hazarding a form of expression rather
true than exact, one might say he 'manœuvred '
with earth works as others manoeuvre
troops.
His rifle-
pits.
6
-
6
manoeuvre' with
Another way in which Todleben maintained his
aggressive defence was by sinking and maintaining
Rifle-pits' at points so far in advance that the fire
from marksmen there posted tormentingly galled the
besiegers, thus oftentimes making it hard for them,
if not indeed almost impossible, to mend their em-
brasures in the daytime, and subjecting them besides
to the bane of having their lines overlooked by
observers both near and well sheltered.
So vexatious a kind of encroachment was not to be
always maintained without provoking resistance, or
rather counter-attack, and the struggles for Rifle-pits
occurring in the course of the siege may be said to
have only begun with the exploit of young Tryon,
who wrested one of these lairs from the hands of the
AGGRESSIVE MEASURES.
15
I.
enemy, and achieved his little conquest so brilliantly CHAP.
as to win and deserve the warm praises of both the
Allied commanders, General Canrobert no less than
Lord Raglan.
ments.
But the idea of the Rifle-pit soon proved to be only His lodg
the embryo of another and more formidable concep-
tion which was afterwards brought to maturity by
Todleben's fertile brain. Instead of sending out a
small party of riflemen to choose, on the spur of the
moment, a speck of ground in advance, and there
dig themselves down into shelter, might he not rather
act-though of course on a diminutive scale-as
besiegers are wont to do? Might he not cause
beforehand a sufficing breadth of ground to be
scientifically chosen and duly taped out by skilled
engineers, then deliver it, under cover of night, into
the hands of strong working - parties, who would
instantly and swiftly entrench it? All this, he saw,
could be done; and thenceforth the besiegers had
cares which resembled in some sort the cares of a
people besieged; for too often the morning disclosed
a small bit of what, if more lengthy, might almost
have been called a 'counter-parallel '; and these 'lodg-
ments 'so Todleben called them-from which the
harassed Allies could be either assailed or inspected,
soon became beyond measure oppressive. It was on
the French-not the English (whose approaches'
had been less closely pressed)-that the lodgments'
especially frowned.*
The besiegers could resent
C
6
'
* Out of 34 'lodgments' which at one time were counted, two
only menaced the English.
16
HIS COUNTERMINES.
CHAP. these aggressions, could assail a lodgment in force,
I. and perhaps drive out of its precincts the enemy's
His ag-
gressive
counter-
mines.
troops; but, such attacks being foreseen, and there-
fore of course counter-planned by gunners kept on
the watch, they used to involve heavy loss.
When speaking of Todleben's measures for simply
resisting attack, I of course included the counter-
mines by which he found means to arrest the subter-
ranean advance of the French; but the genius of
this man in war was essentially aggressive; and, far
from being content with the strictly defensive results
attained by his underground warfare, he besides
strove to make it the means of assailing the French,
in their siege-works; and thus-taking, as it were,
the offensive in regions below-he kept his foes
under dread of the mighty volcano he, some day,
might bid to break out from the ground lying under
their feet. The explosion he effected on the 9th of
February did the French no physical harm; but they
well might see in it an earnest of further attacks
bursting up from the ground underfoot, and thus
find themselves kept more or less on the torturing
rack of expectancy. Todleben indeed was convinced
that by the vigour of his countermining opera-
tions he caused the French to mistrust every foot
of the ground they must tread when marching
against the Flagstaff Bastion, and in that way
did much to deter them from ever assaulting the
Work.*
* This impression is not strongly supported by French accounts of
the siege.
PETTY SORTIES.
17
I.
Petty sor-
they put
on the
guards
of the
There was no resort during the winter to that CHA P.
measure of a powerful sortie which, as some able
critics conceived, the Russians ought to have hazarded, ties.
but of small sallies, ventured at night, the garrison
made frequent use; and, although of course reckoned The strain
singly, each enterprise of this petty sort did no more
than augment by a little the troubles of the harassed
Allies, its repetition, occurring again and again and
again, contributed and contributed sensibly towards
the weight of that hostile pressure which Todleben
was always applying; for the more-though by only
small onsets-the guards of the trenches were kept
on the alert, the greater of course was the strain-
the continuous strain-on their powers.
trenches.
trivance
to by the
when at-
tacking
the French
And, to all the vexations inflicted by these petty Novel con-
sorties, the Russians superadded at one time a newly resorted
invented oppression which, although perhaps seem- Russians
ing half comic to people in safety at home who
have never known any such trials, proved outraging in these
-beyond measure outraging-to the feelings, the sorties.
not unjust pride, and the self-respect of the French.
It was only against them that the Russians put
their odd contrivance in force.
The expedient, I suppose, was less meant for the
exigencies of actual fighting than as one for dealing
with soldiers surprised, confused, and distracted by a
sudden incursion at night-time; but, be that as it
may, the Russians at one time did certainly use the
lasso, and also the 'gaff,' or some tool resembling a
boat-hook, as their means of first upsetting or other-
wise arresting an adversary, and then so pulling him
VOL. VII.
B
18
PETTY SORTIES.
CHAP. in as to be able to make him their prisoner. The
I. French were indignant at this measure, denouncing
tion of the it loudly as one that had never before been em-
Indigna-
French
army.
Generous
concession
to its feel
ing by
Osten-
Sacken.
The sor-
sooner or
later re-
pressed
ployed except against the brute creation; and cer-
tainly it is intelligible that a soldier with his mind
duly schooled to meet the event of being killed,
wounded, or made prisoner in the ordinary way,
should revolt at the thought of being caught by the
lasso like a wild horse in Mexico, or-still worse-
gaffed and secured like a floundering salmon or trout.
The feeling of the French ran so high against
this abhorred innovation, that General Canrobert
under a flag of truce made it the subject of a com-
plaint addressed to the Russian authorities; and in
a kindly, magnanimous spirit of concession to the
feelings and just pride of a gallant enemy, General
Osten-Sacken (then commanding the garrison) at
once put an end to the practice.*
There was one sortie pushed to the length of
ties always enabling those who took part in it to wrest from
Canrobert's trenches some minor pieces of ord-
nance; (5) but I believe it may be said-speaking
generally-that, whether made against the French
or the English, these onsets-sooner or later-were
always repressed with due vigour.
with due
vigour.
The
French
guards
of the
trenches
When making their sorties, the Russians com-
monly found that, to receive their sudden attacks,
the French guards of the trenches were not only in
far greater strength than the English engaged in
like duties, but also much better prepared, much
* Niel, pp. 128, 129.
PETY SORTIES.
19
I.
compared
more on the alert; and the difference they observed CHA P.
will not surprise those who, whilst knowing the
characteristics of English troops generally, have also with the
learnt the conditions under which at this period English.
our men in the trenches were acting. Even when
enjoying full health, English soldiery are more apt
to be wanting in vigilance than those of most other
nations; and at this cruel time, the bodily state of
our men was scarce such as would make it possible
for them to go through their long hours of duty in
the trenches with the watchfulness, the vigour, the
care which from men in full health the plain rules
of siege-business exact. The excuses for default of
vigilance were therefore only too sound, but still,
the default was grave. There prevailed indeed so
great a laxity that men were not seldom found to
be cooking their food in the trenches; and indeed
our engineers became sure that their siege-work
appliances proved only too often the store from
which a half-famished soldier with a piece of raw
meat in his sack took what he wanted for fuel,*
But happily, there was one priceless truth which
the enemy always failed to discover. When making ing our
these sorties against the English he might
enough see or infer that the guards of our
trenches were few as compared to those of the
French; but he did not unmask that extremity of
numerical weakness which really existed, and per- discover-
haps at the time, there was no sort of testimony extreme
that well could have made him believe in the weakness.
* Journal of the Royal Engineers, Part II., p. 2.
The enemy
encounter-
guards
of the
trenches;
well sands
without
ing their
numerical
20
PRINCE NAPOLEON.
I.
CHAP. statement I am going to present. I base it on the
authority of our Royal Engineers.
Engineers. They assure us
that, instead of the thousands whom the routine of
siege-business would assign for the task, our cover-
ing party on duty along the entire right attack
(upwards of a mile in extent) was at this period
only 350 in number, and that on the night of the
21st of January it mustered only 290 men ! (6)
Departure
of Prince
war.
Whilst the garrison was plying its foes with all
Napoleon. these hostile expedients, the French army saw a
step taken which apparently was not one well fitted
to cheer a soldiery tried by hardships and stress of
Prince Napoleon quitted his division, departed
from the Crimea, went down to Constantinople, and
left those who till then had been his companions in
arms to imagine how gloomy their prospects must
seem in the eyes of the augurs, when-whatever the
cause this gifted, this keen-witted member of the
then reigning family proved no longer minded to
stand fast with them in the conflict, and share their
doubtful fortunes. Upon receiving intelligence of
his cousin's departure, the French Emperor gave
strong expression to the anger he felt; but I abstain
from recording the measures he took in his rage,
because they were not followed up, and there is
consequently room for conjecturing that they may
have been stayed from a sense of justice, after
learning aright the condition of Prince Napoleon's
health.* The Prince returned to France.
* I do not myself choose to touch any question respecting his
health, though materials for doing so have been placed within reach
of the curious by M. Rousset's book, vol. i. pp. 397 et seq.
COUNSELS OF BURGOYNE.
21
CHAP.
I.
VI.
reluctance
French to
alter their
main plan
of siege.
Still, though under this weight of discouraging Natural
troubles, the French were so deeply committed to of the
the enterprise of breaking into Sebastopol by the
path of the Flagstaff Bastion that, without the sup-
port of reasons adduced from outside their own
camp, they could hardly perhaps have endured to
make such a change in their policy as would seem
to admit that for months their energies had been
wrongly applied, and their sacrifices made all in
vain.
goyne's
upon the
ency of
the Mala-
koff.
Burgoyne all this while had not ceased to insist Bur-
that the Malakoff front was the one more than all
others meet for attack had not ceased to be expedi
counselling plans put forward day after day which, assailing
whether directly or not, were aimed with command-
ing ability at the object kept always in sight;(7) and
apparently, it was almost a torture to him to find
that, the French being deaf to his counsels, and the
English having no men to spare, he could not induce
the Allies to press the left flank of the Work from
the side of Mount Inkerman-could not even make
them determine that their defence of that part of the
Mount which they knew they must hold should at
least be that kind of defence which, far from being
inert, is active, bristling, elastic, and always in its
spirit aggressive.*
In the face of our dread 'Morning States,' and the
only too well foreknown scantiness of any English
* Journal Royal Engineers, p. 72.
22
RECONSIDERATION OF PLANS.
CHAP. succours approaching, he long clung fast to a hope
I. that the honour of attacking that Work which he
The
French
at first
adverse
to his
counsels.
held to be the one all-mastering key of the position
might accrue to his own fellow-countrymen; and
even when forced to see that there could not be laid
on our people any heavier share of siege-duty than
the one they already were bearing, he still tried to
find a way to the object of his heart's desire by pro-
posing that Canrobert's troops should relieve the
English infantry from the task of supporting our
Left Attack, and that with the force thus set free
Lord Raglan should undertake the Malakoff.*
This English proposal, however, was not adopted
by Canrobert; and all people now at length saw
that, to insist on the necessity of subduing the Mala-
koff was substantially the same as declaring that
French troops ought to assail it.
So long as they were ardently hopeful of bringing
the strife to an issue on their own chosen ground,
the French seemed to hearken unfavourably, and not
always without signs of impatience, to Burgoyne's
able counsels, all tending to draw their energies
eastward, and engage them in some way or other
against the Malakoff front; (8) but at last, when
under the stress of those gathering perils and
* Journal Royal Engineers, pp. 63, 139. M. Rousset therefore errs
when making it appear, as he does (vol. ii. p. 31), that, instead of
assailing it themselves, our own people cast off on the French the
great task of assailing the Malakoff. He errs also when saying (ibid.)
that the French consented to 'substitute themselves for the English in
'besieging the Malakoff.' The English had never besieged it. When
they ruined it on the 17th of October 1854, they did this by firing
across the Dockyard Ravine.
+ Ibid., p. 63.
THE CONFERENCE OF THREE.
23
I.
But after-
wards
more will-
ingly lis-
tening to
them.
troubles to which we saw them laid open by their CHA P.
measures against the Town front, they became more
ready to listen; and Burgoyne, on the other hand,
seemed going half-way to meet them; because under
one of its aspects, he treated the new move as one
that was auxiliary to their old plan of siege against
the Sebastopol town. Assuming that the French, as
before, would assail the Flagstaff Bastion, and that--
still as before our people would give them the best
support that they could by operating against the
Great Redan and the Barrack Battery, he showed
that in the existing state of the defences very dif-
ferent from what they had been on the 17th of
October that support would almost surely be neu-
tralised or made ineffective, unless the fire from the
Malakoff could first be subdued. He urged, there-
fore, that the fire of the Malakoff should be subdued
accordingly; and it followed that the task of sub-
duing it must rest with the French, because they,
and they only (since refusing to take on themselves
the duties of our Left Attack), could dispose of
any bodies of troops great enough for the object
thus sought.
*
ance of
goyne's
These ideas found favour with Bizot, the com- Accept-
mander of the French Engineers;† and prevailed in Bur-
a Conference of Three (attended by Bizot, Burgoyne, opinion in
and General Airey), which accordingly determined
(though subject of course to the approval of the
* Journal Royal Engineers, Part I., p. 85.
+ From the papers before me I gather that his conversion must
have taken place so early as the 26th of December.
a Confer-
ence of
Three.
24
CANROBERT'S DISSENT.
I.
CHAP. Commanders-in-Chief) that, before it would be pos-
sible to assail the Redan and the Barrack Battery
with any prospect of success, it was necessary to
attack the left of the enemy's works, and to get the
better of the defences of the Malakoff.*
Step tend-
ing in an
opposite
direction
immedi-
ately taken
The conversion of the French at that time was,
however, so far from complete that, instead of the
ratification expected from their Commander-in-Chief,
by Canro- there came from him to Lord Raglan a paper so
framed that, far from importing agreement, it
bristled with language well fitted to provoke dispute
and antagonism.
bert.
His official
letter to
Lord
Raglan.
Lord Rag-
lan's way
of dealing
with it.
.
Accompanied by a short private note which
merely announced the sending of the other epistle,
this paper was in form a despatch-an official letter
-from Canrobert detailing the several schemes that
had been put forward, reflecting upon the different
plans that had been suggested by Sir John Burgoyne,
setting forth the various duties which the French
army had to perform, and calling upon Lord Raglan
to state specifically what he could undertake to do
in a given time.†
Lord Raglan had 'always felt that as the French
army increased in numbers his personal position
would become more difficult;' and he now at once
saw that, if met in the spirit which seems to have
dictated its composition, or even if fully answered at
all by a despatch from himself, this missive might
prove, with its set interrogatories, to be the begin-
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State-Secret-January 2, 1855.
+ General Canrobert to Lord Raglan, 30th December 1854.
COURSE TAKEN BY LORD RAGLAN.
25
6
I.
ning of an antagonistic correspondence imperilling CHAP.
that thorough accord between the French and the
English which, he said, it had been the object of his
almost every thought to maintain.' *
Lord Raglan therefore determined to address to
the French headquarters some indirect communica-
'tions,' which he hoped might serve as a substitute
for any full, written answer proceeding straight from
himself, and might even perhaps enable him to ward
off altogether that interchange of controversial epistles
which (for reasons already made plain) he judged to
be a 'great evil.' †
Accordingly, after handing to Sir John Burgoyne
the French commander's despatch, in order that Sir
John might prepare replies to that part of the mis-
sive which an officer of engineers might fairly con-
sider professional, he conversed very fully with
General Rose, and then took his ulterior step.
Believing it politic that-at least for the moment-
he himself should stand aloof personally from the
approaching discussion, he requested one of his Staff
officers to wait upon General Canrobert.
Accordingly, on the 1st of January the Staff
officer charged with this mission rode off to the
French headquarters, where Canrobert received him
with kindness in presence of the 'État Major,' as
well as of General Rose, and he then adduced
grounds in support of the plan approved at the
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State-Secret-January 2, 1855.
+ Ibid.
‡ The English commissioner at the French headquarters.
26
CANROBERT CONVERTED.
CHAP. recent Conference of Three by Bizot as well as
The
I.
French
ultimately
to the
decision
of the
Burgoyne.
That the Staff officer charged with this task pressed
his way to the object in view with consummate
ability will be almost taken for granted by those who
happen to know how richly he was gifted with that
kind of natural eloquence which rapidly, vividly pic-
tures a given condition of things, and at once un-
leashes such motives upon the minds of his hearers
as shall drive them towards action in the sense
desired by the speaker; but it is hardly credible
that the drama of real life should-like the more
clear, the more compact drama of poets-display
such a sequence as that of persuasive speech caus-
ing instantly, by its own force alone, a change of
design momentously affecting great nations; and
accordingly, one may treat it as probable that before
this last meeting took place, General Canrobert must
already have felt some regret for the step he had
taken when sending his recent despatch must
already have much reconsidered his objections to
that joint advice which his own engineer General
Bizot had concurred with Burgoyne in submitting.
Be that as it may, he at once, and in presence of
the officers of the French headquarters staff and of
reverting General Rose, admitted the accuracy of what Lord
Raglan's envoy had urged, and then intimated that
he would, after all, follow the decision of the last Con-
ference.* He required that, to cover his troops
whilst effecting a lodgment on the Mamelon in front
'Three';
* Ibid.
CHANGE OF PLAN ACCORDINGLY.
27
I.
certain
conditions
of the Malakoff, the English should furnish two CHA P.
flanking batteries-one of eight, one of fifteen great
guns; but being provided with the heavy pieces of and on
ordnance as well as the ammunition required, and agreeing
understanding that their known want of "hands" to assail
would be made good by French working-parties, our
people were happily able to accept the condition
imposed. (9)
the Mala-
koff front.
ity of the
thus
Thus at last General Canrobert acceded to the gist
of the counsel long tendered and pressed by Bur-
goyne; but of even higher moment, and of more The grav-
happy augury than the change he so made, was his dangers
consequent, though tacit withdrawal of the perilous averted.
despatch he had sent hardly two days before to Lord
Raglan's headquarters. What appeared on the Sat-
urday evening to be only too probably the opening
of an antagonistic correspondence between the French
and the English commanders was happily turned
into nothingness on the following Monday; and the
almost measureless value of the service Lord Raglan
thus rendered will be recognised by any one competent
to imagine the train of calamities that might well have
been expected to follow any lengthened dissension,
or even approach to dissension, between the French
and the English headquarters. Lord Raglan accom-
plished his object by boldly taking a course which
struck out of the beaten path, and by making that
gentle, yet powerful use of sagacity which, until some
one called it 'tact,' people hardly knew how to desig-
nate. Still, fortune too, under one aspect, may be
said to have aided Lord Raglan in this anxious crisis
28
LORD RAGLAN'S ENVOY.
I.
CHAP. of his relations with the French; for it is rarely the
lot of a general not also a sovereign to have at his
side so gifted, so persuasive an envoy as the one he
charged with that mission to General Canrobert's
quarters.
The envoy
sent by
But who was the envoy thus trusted for a work
Lord Rag. truly vital-the envoy thus happily able to return
from his mission with tidings of absolute concord
instead of the threatened dissension?
lan to the
French
head-
quarters.
He was one whom our people at home were
visiting with their bitterest wrath-wrath not caused,
I gladly believe, by any deep malice, but rather by
sheer mistake. It sometimes happens in battle that
-confused by mist, smoke, and tumult-a regiment
stands busily firing upon a friendly body of troops,
because taking it for an enemy's column; and the
regiment, if English, and therefore tenacious of
purpose, is not very easily checked; for the men
having warmed to their baneful work-look up
angrily and deafly at the excited young aide-de-
camp who has galloped up shouting, protesting with
a vehemence they quite disapprove, and turn savagely
on the bugler who, under some orders from an un-
known officer on horseback, has begun to sound the
'Cease firing'!
It was by a mistake no less innocent, yet also, one
must own, no less obstinate, that whilst this devoted
Staff officer-the right-hand man of Lord Raglan-
was toiling day and night at headquarters in the
business of the winter campaign, our misjudging
people in England were making him a mark for
--
LONG DELAY.
29
I.
attacks, conducted with a power, strength of will, CHAP.
and set purpose sufficing to carry along with them
'the Government' of what used to pass for a sober
monarchical State. So high, so seemingly absolute
was the warrant his assailants obtained for the cry
they set raging against him, that two successive
Administrations at home persistently, angrily laboured
to deprive our headquarters of his services, and were
only prevented from thus doing grievous harm to
their country, because met and baffled by Lord
Raglan's unshaken firmness, and fairly conquered at
last by the sure yet slow progress of truth. The
envoy was General Airey.
*
lay.
General Canrobert on the 1st of January had
insisted with energy that the arrangements then
made should be 'instantly' carried into effect; but
his words, as it happened, were followed by im-
mensely protracted delay. The stress of hard winter, Long de-
the sufferings of the troops, the throes of that vital,
that painful, that dangerous question between General
Canrobert and Lord Raglan, which we saw lasting on
till the latter part of the month, (10) the harassing
communications from the French Emperor, now
gravely alarmed-alarmed, it was said, for his
'dynasty'—the perturbing foreshadow of a general
coming out to the Crimea from Paris with full power,
as was thought, to 'advise,' to conduct an inquisition
in camp, nay even indeed to reorganise' the staff
of Canrobert's army, the arrival on the 27th of
January of General Niel, the engineer officer sup-
*
See vol. vi. chap. ix.
30
THE MODIFIED PLAN
CHAP. posed to be armed with all this transcendent authority,
I.
1st and 2d
February.
Modified
plan put
forward
by the
French,
and ap-
proved
by Lord
Raglan ;
the painful changes that followed, and then after-
wards, under new auspices, the reopening of a once
closed discussion about choice of plans for the siege
these circumstances, and perhaps many more,
contributed to prevent the besiegers from giving
any effect to the agreement of the 1st of January
until more than four weeks had elapsed; and mean-
while-as though having learnt something of Anglo-
French counsels-the enemy had been visibly de-
voting increased attention and care to his Malakoff
front.
C
This Russian change on the one hand, and on the
other, the presence of General Niel with authority to
inquire and advise,' made it seem very natural that
—without being therefore suspected of any desire to
retreat from their engagements of the 1st of January
-the French should bring fresh thought to bear on
the management of their promised enterprise against
the Malakoff Tower.
6
After lengthened discussions with Burgoyne, our
allies framed a plan from which indeed it appeared
that they then were more strongly inclined to pro-
ceed against the Mamelon by approaches' than by
summary modes of attack; but still the plan seemed
to aim at a faithful, if not swift performance of the
engagement made on the 1st of January, and accord-
ingly Lord Raglan approved it.* After having been
also approved by a council of French generals, held
on the 1st of February, the particulars of the newly
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State-Secret-6th February 1855.
OF 1ST FEBRUARY.
31
wrought plan were recorded on the following day in CHAP.
words described as 'Instructions.'(11)
I.
known
masked
We now know that, though outwardly wearing but now
an honest appearance, this 'plan' masked a settled to have
design on the part of Niel and his Emperor to take another
a course irreconcilable with the engagements of the
1st of January.*
design.
VII.
Import of
the change
of plan as
first under-
by the
When determining, on the ground we have shown,
to assail the Malakoff front, our allies, we know,
looked on the measure as auxiliary to their former stood
operations; and even when seeing deeper into the French.
consequences of the change, they still did not at all
mean to loosen that pressure by siege-work and
heavy batteries which they had long been applying
to the defences of the Sebastopol town, nor indeed
did they all at once tell themselves that they would
abandon the idea of storming the Flagstaff Bastion.
On the contrary, both the resolutions of the council
of the 1st of February, and the paper of Instruc-
tions which issued from the French headquarters on
the following day, were based upon a supposition
that assaults of the Flagstaff Bastion, if not indeed
also of the Central,' were soon to be hazarded.
6
But, however regarded at first, this now ordained
war against the Malakoff was, after all, war against
the masterful key of the position, with therefore a
tendency-an ever-increasing tendency-to draw to
* See post, cap. v.
32
MINING AND
I.
CHAP. itself more and more of the energies that could be
roused on each side by a conflict charged with great
issues; and besides, it so happened that on the very
morrow of the day when they issued that paper of
Instructions our allies encountered a blow which
destroyed some long-cherished hopes, and materially
weakened their prospect of ever breaking through
the Town front.
The
French
mining
VIII.
It was on the 20th of November that the French had
begun to push forward their great mining enterprise,
operations. and they had thenceforth conducted it with unwearied
energy, their first design being to surprise the enemy
by effecting an explosion under his Flagstaff Bastion.
Unenlightened, it seems, by either spies or deserters,
or by even those inferences which might fairly have
been drawn from known facts, they worked their
way somewhat unguardedly, moving earth-trucks
backwards and forwards without duly muffling their
sounds, and besides often talking aloud, as though-
because twenty feet deep in the bowels of the earth-
they needs must be out of the earshot of any listen-
ing enemy.
Yet the foe whom they had challenged by entering
on this underground warfare was perhaps one more
thoroughly practised, more highly skilled in its mys-
teries, more eager to use its resources than any other
mortal then living; (12) and before they had bur-
rowed their way to the ground required for their
COUNTERMINING.
33
purpose, an enemy-like themselves subterranean, CHA P.
but-silent, unheard, unsuspected, was awaiting them
in his listening galleries.
I.
skill and
the science
of mining.
termines.
The great engineer whose sagacity they were Todleben's
going to encounter scarce awaited the reports of power in
deserters; for, when he saw that the French (after
having had time for the venture) did not visibly push
their approaches beyond the third parallel, he inferred
that almost as of course-they would try to work
their way underground, and therefore at a huge
cost of labour, he resolved to meet any such enter-
prise by a vast spreading system of countermines. (18) His coun-
The work he thus set on foot was continued with
unflagging energy, though during several weeks it
did no more than aim darkly at an enemy—unseen
and unheard who was only to be reconnoitred by
inferences, and as yet earned no certain reward.
But at length, on the 30th of January, the expected Progress
reward of long toil was attained and joyfully wel- mining
comed; for then Colonel Todleben learnt that at the termining
extremity of one of his listening galleries the French operations.
could be heard, and he even proved able to assure
himself that-burrowing through the same stratum
(a stratum of yellow clay) in which he had estab-
lished his countermines-they were piercing ground
on a level with that to which he pressed his keen
ear when listening for signs of their presence.
In the dark, creeping science of underground war,
the moment of first hearing the enemy is one of
enthralling interest, whilst also it is one of exulta-
tion, if there be reason to think that the hearing has
VOL. VII.
C
of the
and coun-
34
COUNTERMINING.
I.
CHAP. not been reciprocal; for in the strife between miner
and counterminer, he who is the first to hear his
antagonist has already obtained the ascendant.
On the 30th, those sounds of hostile mining that
the Russian counterminer detected were only slight
and faint; but the very next day, sounds reached his
listening ear with so great a distinctness as to prove.
that the underground Frenchmen must be then very
near; and moreover, it could be soundly inferred that
they were suspecting no countermine, because they
worked noisily, and could even be heard freely talking.
By means of a powerful explosion, Colonel Todleben
could have then broken through what remained of
the clay still dividing him from the French; but a
charge strong enough for that purpose would have
also pressed up with such force as to disturb the
surface of the ground above, and might thus afford
cover to an enemy advancing against the Flagstaff
Bastion. Therefore Todleben, with a great self-
restraint, determined that, before he assailed them,
he would let the French burrow still closer, and thus
so reduce the thickness of the interposed clay as to
give him the means of overwhelming them by an
explosion of only moderate strength.
At length, on the 3d of February-the fourth day
after the one when the miner's approach was first
heard-Colonel Todleben unleashed a camouflet (14)
which left undisturbed the whole surface of the
ground overhead, but tore its way into the gallery
where the French had been heard, killing two of
their men as it passed, and visibly finding its issue
COUNTERMINING.
35
in the open air through ground behind their third CHA P.
parallel, thus showing him where lay the entrance
to their system of mines.
I.
The French of course then understood that their
project of surprising the enemy by a mine to be
sprung from ground under his Flagstaff Bastion had
been discovered and baffled; but it occurred to their
chief engineer that they might still draw advantage
from the system of underground approaches on
which they had bestowed so much labour, because
it would enable their miners to open up by explo-
sion a line of craters half-way between their fore-
most trench and the counterscarp of the opposite
bastion, and he hoped that the ground, when so
broken, and therefore affording some cover, might
be made the beginning of a fourth parallel. He
therefore by means of explosion threw up, to begin
with, one crater of moderate size;* but it was
seized, was crowned, was definitively held by the
Russians;† and, the second design of the French
being thus-like the first one-defeated, it results Their re-
that, so far, Colonel Todleben obtained and kept his
ascendant at the seat of this underground war.
sult.
IX.
emptory
This result of their mining operations against the The per-
Flagstaff Bastion tended strongly of course to with-
* Evening of the 7th of February.-Niel, p. 146; Todleben, p. 619
et seq.
+ Niel and Todleben, ubi ante.
part of the
36
ITS BEARING ON THE FRENCH PLANS.
besieger's
shifting
from the
Flagstaff
Bastion
to the
CHAP. draw our baffled allies from any still extant idea of
I. making the Work their real pathway for leading
design now them into Sebastopol; and thenceforth, if not yet
resolved, they were far on the road towards resolv-
ing that their plans against the main town need no
Malakoff. longer include a set purpose to carry its defences.
by storm; so that what perhaps one may call the
peremptory part of their siege, that is, the Attack'
they would push to the issue of a determined assault,
was the one now about to be opened against the
Malakoff Tower, or rather that girdle of works
which by this time had closed round its base.
.
In bringing themselves to this choice the French
were much governed by thinking of what might
await them after once breaking through the de-
fences. They judged that their troops in such case
would operate much more massively, and therefore
more advantageously, in the spaces afforded by the
Karabel Faubourg than in the ravines and the
streets which intersected the town.*
Disposi-
tions con-
sequent
upon Can-
X.
General Canrobert entrusted the operations he was
going to undertake against the Malakoff to his
robert's second corps-the 'Corps of Observation' then still
posted, as before, under Bosquet along the Sapounè
Malakoff Heights. With forces thence drawn he relieved our
troops theretofore holding the lofty Victoria Ridge,
and completed the Work at its summit. This
resolve to
operate
against the
* Niel, p. 139.
DISPOSITIONS RESULTING FROM CHANGE OF PLAN.
I.
37
Work was a simple redoubt, but by many-including CHAP.
Lord Raglan-had been called the Victoria Fort.
The works of defence on Mount Inkerman were by
this time complete; and those of them which from
the first had remained in charge of the English our
people continued to hold; but the bulk of our troops
on the Chersonese lay henceforth compactly disposed
between the 2d French Corps on their right, and
the 1st French Corps on their left.
Acting smoothly in concert, and each, in so far as
was possible, making good the other's deficiencies,
the French and the English armies began to fulfil
the condition laid down on the 1st of January, and
accordingly to construct the two batteries which (by
means of flanking fires thrown from different and
far-parted ridges) were destined to aid our allies in
their meditated attack on the Malakoff, or rather as
their more immediate object on the intervening
Mamelon. (15)
The greater of these was the one-here called the
Artilleur Battery*-which (after first opening ap-
proaches on ground near the site they designed for
itt) the French began to construct on a western spur
of Mount Inkerman; the other one-the King Battery
-found a place in the second parallel of Gordon's
Attack, and fronted towards the north. ‡
It was
+
+
* An aggregate appellation comprising what were more strictly
called the No. 1,' and the 'No. 2.' The battery, destined from the
first for fifteen heavy guns, received afterwards more, and was armed
by our people. It was constructed by the French Artillery.
+ Niel, pp. 141, 150.
This battery-strictly called 'No. 9'—was armed by our people
The Allies
ing works
to aid a
attack on
commenc-
destined
meditated
the Mame-
on.
38
VARIOUS MOVEMENTS
CHAP. constructed in the main by French soldiery; and
I.
the sight of those troops briskly, steadily, ably
performing their allotted task, caused our people to
admire, caused them even indeed to record the
efficient, the orderly way in which their allies did the
work. (16)
Various
move-
XI.
In the course of the long winter period which this
ments and chapter spans, there occurred, besides all I have told,
and much more that I leave unrecorded, the following
movements and changes:
changes:
On the
part of the
Russians;
6
When towards the close of November a French
officer, M. Saint Laurent (a chief of battalion), taking
with him a few engineers, supported by a number
of Zouaves, performed the gallant exploit of cutting
the East Sapper's Road,' Prince Mentschikoff no
longer clung to his power of moving guns and
wheeled carriages by that line of route, but on the
contrary, stopped short its connection with the
opposite bank of the Tchernaya by destroying the
Inkerman Bridge; (17) so that thenceforth he trusted
exclusively to his peaceful, undisturbed communica-
tions still effected, as usual, by moving across the
roadstead to or from what was called the North
'Side.' The arrangements for that last course of
6
with eight guns. In calling the parallel which received it the 2d,
'Parallel,' I follow the old nomenclature, though, in consequence of
new siege-works taking ground in its rear, the authorities afterwards
promoted it to the rank of a 3d Parallel.
1
AND CHANGES.
39
I.
transit were carefully systematised, and brought to CHAP.
a high state of efficacy.
*
In the early part of December, the Russians dis-
mantled the little redoubts on the line of the
Woronzoff Road, withdrew their camps from the
plain of Balaclava, and thenceforth kept only out-
posts on the left bank of the Tchernaya.+
After his defeat at Inkerman, General Dannenberg
was removed from the command of the 4th Army
Corps, and replaced by General Osten-Sacken.
part of the
French;
connais-
More than once in the course of this period, French On the
troops reconnoitred a broad sweep of territory, which
comprised the whole plain of Balaclava, with also a
line of country extending beyond towards the east; their re-
and they not only pushed to completeness their sances.
search for the knowledge desired, but effected their
tasks with a brilliant smartness and skill which drew
warm praise from Lord Raglan.
It was to one of these admirably conducted re-
connaissances that the Allies owed their knowledge
of the enemy's withdrawal from the plain of Bala-
clava.
Amongst those 'reorganising' directions which
General Niel had brought out, there was one which
removed General Forey from the command of the
1st Corps d'Armée, and entrusted it to General
Pélissier-an officer destined to reach, though not
until some months afterwards, a yet more exalted
command.
*Todleben, p. 589.
+ Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, December 8, 1854, No. 120.
The treat-
ment ex-
perienced
by Forey.
40
VARIOUS MOVEMENTS AND CHANGES.
СНАР.
I.
General Forey on the 2d of December 1851 had
done an act of great moment, and he possibly thought
himself one who, whatever might be the mute feel-
ing of his country at large, did at least deserve well
of the Empire.' *
(
So far as concerns his part in the siege of
Sebastopol, I am not myself cognisant of any fault
or shortcoming with which he could rightly be
charged; for the care, the severity with which he
strove to maintain the warlike spirit of the French
army, and to expose evasions of duty on the part of
its officers was plainly a merit, and one of very
high value. Still, by merit of that unpleasing
kind he of course stirred up hatred; and it seems
probable that the enemies he thus raised up against
himself may have been the men who found means
to compass his fall. Be that as it may, he was
visited by treatment which, in the absence of any
more knowledge than I on this subject possess,
must seem unaccountably harsh. Deposed from the
command of his Corps d'Armée, he was relegated to
the command of a single division forming part of
Canrobert's forces, and being also refused permission
to retire from active service, he was thus, as it were,
kept picketed under the eyes of that army which
had seen him put down from the higher to the
lower place. It was only after some lapse of time
that the treatment of the General was softened by
appointing him to the governorship of Oran.
*He captured Parliament' sitting,' and marched it off to prison.
See ante, vol. i. chap. xiv. p. (in 5th edition) 248 et seq.
THE EMPEROR'S BREASTPLATES.
41
The
I.
breast-
The French Emperor in this month of February CHAP.
gave actual, physical effect to what modern soldiers
regard as a fanciful notion. The better to enable French
his soldiers before Sebastopol to carry defences by plates.
storm, he sent out to them 4000 breastplates.* Of
these, 3000 were divided equally between the 1st
and 2d Corps d'Armée, but were never used; and
-alive to what they call 'a Ridicule '—the French,
as they expressed it, advised themselves to 'main-
'tain on this delicate subject a prudent silence.' t
part of the
Under the directions of Lieutenant Stopford of the On the
Royal Engineers, our people in the beginning of English.
December constructed an electric field-telegraph; Field-
telegraph.
and it was towards the close of the same month that
a civil engineer (Mr Campbell) began his operations Railway.
for making the railway between Balaclava and camp
of which we before had to speak when dealing with
the means of supply.§
In December the command of our fleet passed from Command
Admiral Dundas to Admiral Sir Edmund Lyons.
of fleet.
XII.
The defenders of Sebastopol entered upon this
period of the conflict on the morrow of Inkerman
Result of
flict from
the con-
the 6th of
and therefore whilst under the shadow of not simply, November
1854 to
the middle
* Vaillant, Minister of War, to Canrobert, Feb. 3, 1855. Quoted by of Febru-
Rousset, vol. ii. p. 23.
+ Ibid., p. 24.
Journal of Royal Engineers, p. 66.
§ See ante, vol. vi. p. 385.
ary 1855.
42
RESULTS.
I.
CHAP. a bloody defeat sustained by the 'relieving army,'
but a defeat with all its horrors brought closely home
to the garrison by the propinquity of the battle-field,
by the spectacle of disordered troops coming back
beaten into the streets, by the piteous sight and
sound of the wounded whether led or supported or
carried in heaps by endless trains of waggons, and
soon after by seeing and hearing how what a few
hours before had been strong, proud battalions, were
some of them only poor remnants-remnants stricken
with even more weakness than the scantness of their
numbers imported, because in a measure disorganised
by the huge loss of officers; yet, so high was the
spirit of the people, and so great the firmness, the
skill, the resource of the great engineer then direct-
ing their energies that, far from yielding to depres-
sion, or suffering the defence to grow weak, they
carried it on with a vigour which almost undid the
curse the potent curse-of defeat, and so bore
themselves that, after a while, they stood, as some
thought, in less jeopardy than the baffled victors of
Inkerman.
This vigour did not drive the Allies to so desperate
a course as that of raising the siege, and trying to
regain their ships; but at least it impelled them so
strongly to escape from an ugly predicament that
they resigned themselves to a change implying con-
fession of error. By accepting Sir John Burgoyne's
counsels, they seemed in effect to acknowledge that
what they had done already had been, much of it,
done in vain, and that what they would henceforth
QUESTIONS RAISED.
43
I.
treat as the cardinal act of their enterprise was only CHA P.
now to begin.
In the course of this period therefore, as must
now have been seen, the great colonel of Sappers
wrought wonders; for, as before under yet more.
appalling conditions he (with Korniloff then at his
side) had found means to ward off from Russia what
seemed the natural consequence of her defeat on the
Alma, so now he in large measure neutralised the
effect of her terrible overthrow sustained on the 5th
of November, and even turned the scale against
victory by a masterful exertion of power which
made the invaders despair- - not indeed of their
siege altogether, but-of their siege as hitherto
planned.
XIII.
raised by
critics.
Since vast efforts during this period had on both Questions
sides been made without being brought to the test scientific
of a great and determined attack by either the Allies
or the Russians, there of course was left open a
field for any critic inclined to speak in the potential
mood, saying—not what happened in fact, but—
what in his judgment might well have been ex-
pected to happen, if the measure he approved had
been tried.
Some not only judged, as we have seen, that a
determined assault of the Flagstaff Bastion must
needs have carried the Work, but also declared it
certain that the fall of the Bastion must have ren-
44
QUESTIONS RAISED.
I.
CHAP. dered altogether impossible a continued defence of
Sebastopol; whilst others maintained that the Rus-
sians by a powerful sortie might have brought the
besiegers to ruin. The two creeds at first glance
might seem to be antagonistic, because he who clung
to the one happened often, if not almost always, to
run down the other, yet they did not in reality
clash; for possibly either expedient, if ventured with
boldness and skill, might have served to achieve its
full purpose; so that victory under this aspect would
be said to have awaited the bidding of him who
might be the assailant—of him who, whether Russian
or French, should prove himself the first of the two
to strike a determined blow.
If this last conclusion were sound, we might say
of the besieger and the besieged that during several
months, each lay at the mercy of each.
EUPATORIA.
45
CHAPTER II.
EUPATORIA.
I.
II.
THAT seaport town Eupatoria which surrendered to CHA P.
our Admiral in the earliest hour of the invasion had
of late been a subject of conflict.
of things
toria and
its neigh-
bourhood.
From the day when Mr Hamilton, the humorous
purser of the Britannia, first set his foot in the place,
and there jovially opened a market, the owners of
flocks and herds pasturing in the adjacent districts Condition
had been glad to sell their cattle to purchasers who in Eupa-
approached them with money in hand; and the Allies
thus established close, friendly relations with not
only the people of the town but also their country
neighbours.* Those countrymen, however, soon found
that they were dangerously circumstanced; for-un-
able to plead compulsion, like their happier brethren
in the surrendered town-they lay open of course
to the charge of wilfully aiding an enemy. There-
fore, when they descried Russian cavalry alarmingly
near to their homesteads, these yeomen hastened to
* Ante, vol. ii. cap. x.
46
EUPATORIA.
CHAP. fly from the imagined wrath of their Czar, took shel-
II.
ter within the town, and pastured their flocks in its
neighbourhood.
Russian cavalry after a while drew a cordon
about Eupatoria on its land side, and took care to
maintain it so closely that the flocks in their neigh-
bouring pastures were no longer safe against capture.
Some ten thousand head of cattle which would other-
wise have furnished good meat to our suffering troops
on the Chersonese, were seized instead by the enemy,
and driven off into his camp. *
of the
force
under
Baron
Wrangel;
its task.
II.
At the close of the out-pasturing season, the cav-
alry, busied till then in maintaining this landward
blockade, became the nucleus of a much larger force
Assembly of all arms placed under General Baron Wrangel.
The force stood charged with the task of securing
Prince Mentschikoff's line of communication from
those attacks on its flank which, he thought, might
be made by an army brought over the sea, and col-
lected in the town of Eupatoria. Prince Mentschi-
koff's apprehensions were sound; for the Czar's
communi- retreat from the country of the Danube had set
free the victorious soldiery of Omar Pasha; and by
using the mighty prerogative which belongs to com-
mand of the sea, the Allies could present a new army
Danger
threaten-
ing the
enemy's
cations.
* Todleben, vol. i. p. 649. The number carried off is there stated
at 9872.
EUPATORIA.
47
II.
on the flank of those all-precious roads which carried CHA P.
the life-blood of Russia to nourish her strength in
Sebastopol.
of some
Turkish
battalions,
and soon
of Omar
Pasha in
person, at
Eupatoria.
calling for
koff's de-
The English indeed had begun to seize this Arrival
plain opportunity, and already their Admiral (Lyons)
had moved some of Omar's battalions across the
Black Sea to their destined post in Eupatoria, when
Prince Mentschikoff, made aware of their landing,
and assured that more battalions would follow, be-
came absolutely obliged to determine a question Question
of no small moment.-Should he patiently stand Mentschi-
acquiescent whilst our seamen were planting an cision;
army on the flank of his artery-roads, or try, whilst
yet there was time, to reconquer the seaport and
town in which this new danger was gathering?
With an eye to his eventual choice of that latter his meas-
alternative, he at once, though not yet quite re-
solved, brought up Baron Wrangel's troops to a
strength great enough for the purpose-that is, for
the twofold purpose of continuing to guard the
communications, and also attacking Eupatoria.
After causing the ground to be examined, Baron
Wrangel confronted the notion of hazarding the
projected attack with a judgment decisively ad-
verse; but Prince Mentschikoff bluffly commanded
him to execute another reconnaissance, saying also
that he was to do this in person; and besides, put
General Khrouleff—an officer about to be prominent
in recommending the measure-at the head of the
Baron's artillery.
Then-excited by the visible passing of great
ures.
48
EUPATORIA.
CHAP. English steamers in the direction of Eupatoria,
II.
and not waiting for the fruits of the newly directed
reconnaissance-Prince Mentschikoff on the 8th of
February directed Baron Wrangel to assault the
place to assault it without delay."
He
Baron Wrangel, however, by this time had com-
pleted his further reconnaissance; and-speaking
now even more confidently than ever before-he
stated it to be his opinion that an attack on
Eupatoria would be hazardous in the extreme.
declared that upon receiving from his chief a formal
order in writing to attack the place he would do his
best to attain the end proposed, and said he was
proceeding accordingly-despite the state of the
ground, and despite want of water and firewood-
to effect the necessary concentration of troops; but
he declined to accept responsibility' for the con-
sequences of an assault.†
For a moment, Prince Mentschikoff yielded to the
resistance thus offered, and sent a reply in that
sense; but two hours afterwards, he did the very
opposite. Upon learning that General Khrouleff
had carefully explored the ground, and considered
it possible to take Eupatoria without incurring great
Mentschi- losses, he not only made up his mind to have the
enterprise tried, but to have it conducted by him
who-directly in the face of the judgment pro-
nounced by his immediate chief (Baron Wrangel)—
had formed a counter-opinion, and imparted it to
the Commander-in-Chief.
koff's re-
solve to
have Eu-
patoria
attacked;
* Todleben, p. 679.
+ Ibid., p. 681.
FURE &
7
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COLUMN.
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á
á
á
á
ó
ó
ób
ó
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Map No 3 to face page. 48

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Turkish Steamer
English Steamer
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A
EUPATORIA.
The Russians repulsed by the Turks,
17th February 1855.
3 MILES
• MOTORTE A SON (brri”
EUPATORIA.
49
II.
To General Khrouleff accordingly, by Mentschi- CHAP.
koff's orders, Baron Wrangel at once handed over
that chosen part of his forces which was to make withdrawn
and support the attack.
by forces
from
Baron
under
A man of Teuton blood set aside for giving what Wrangel;
he thought prudent counsels, and a Sclave leaping
up into power with the force of his more sanguine
nature—such a spectacle could not but charm any
Russians indulging that jealousy with which the and placed
bricks of the fable are said to have looked on the General
builder. Yet before giving vent to the joy of seeing
a vehement Sclave vault over the head of a Teuton,
those Russians perhaps should have waited to see
the result should have waited till a quarter past
ten on the morning of the 17th of February.
III.
Khrouleff.
fences and
resources
of Eupa-
toria.
Before the 17th of February, Eupatoria under the The de-
auspices of the French Major Osmont (the governor
of the place) had been fortified on the land side by
an arc-shaped belt of defence with a crown-work
in front of its centre. The belt was formed mainly
of earthen ramparts (with a fosse sunk along the
outside), but consisted in part of only piled stones,
or the ruins of demolished houses provided with
banquettes for infantry.
All these works, it is true, were still but half
finished, yet already they furnished the means of
offering fair resistance to troops which might seek
to carry the place by merely summary means.
VOL. VII.
D
50
EUPATORIA.
II.
CHAP. Owing only, it seems, to the thaw, and not to
laboured design, the fosse had some water within
'
it, and was destined to pass with the Russians for
what science calls a • Wet Ditch.' The Works
had been armed with 34 heavy guns, and provided
with five rocket-stands. Omar Pasha in person had
landed; and the part of his army already in Eupa-
toria numbered 23,000 men.* There was also in
the place a detachment of nearly 300 soldiers left
in garrison there by the French, with besides, the
saved crew of their stranded ship Henri IV. The
place was not only secure towards the sea, but more-
over so circumstanced that ships could take part in
the land-side defence. Besides the stranded ship
(which could still use some of her batteries) another
French steamer-the Véloce-was lying on the
east of the bay; as was also the Turkish ship
Shaffaer, with the Admiral Ahmed Pasha on board
her; and near its western extremity there lay an
English detachment under Captain Hastings, com-
prising the Curaçao, the Furious, the Valorous, and
the gunboat Viper.
The place held within it a native population which
may be computed at about 26,000, of whom some
5500 were in easy circumstances, and the rest in
a state of indigence.t
* Colonel Simmons (Major-General on the staff of Omar Pasha) to
Lord Raglan, Feb. 22, 1855.
+ The Report of the Commission which sat on this subject gives
exact numbers and is before me, but it relates to the 16th of March.
EUPATORIA.
51
II.
At short distances outside the town, there were CHAP.
not only quarries, but also several burial-grounds,
and the desire of the engineers to clear the ground
under their guns from all such obstructions was
controlled by respect for the dead.
under
under General
Khrouleff
apart now
charged
Without reckoning-although it lay near-any The forces
part of the much-reduced force still left
Wrangel's command, the enemy's troops set
for this enterprise against Eupatoria comprised to attack
horse, foot, and artillery, with a strength of about Eupatoria.
20,000, and 108 guns, of which 24 might be said
to have siege - train calibres.* All this force,
as already we know, was commanded by General
Khrouleff.
parations.
To shelter their guns and their gunners when Their pre-
opening fire on the morrow, the Russians passed
the night of the 16th in throwing up a line of
epaulments at a distance of from 600 to 800 yards
from the place; and in front of each interval they
sank rifle-pits for five sharpshooters.
Nor was this line of 76 guns the only one
destined to press upon Omar's defences; for at an
early hour, General Khrouleff brought up two light
* Without the artillerymen, Todleben (p. 684) puts the strength at
18,883. The 24 heavy guns were what the Russians call 'guns of
position,' and included some which-though heavier-our people
called 32-pounders.
52
KHROULEFF'S
II.
CHAP. batteries from his reserves to positions north-east of
the town, whence their fire might take it in flank.
Their
plan in
stages.
The Russians meant first to deliver a strong, yet
its earlier brief cannonade, and then to advance towards the
place disposed in a line of three columns of infantry
supported by squadrons of horse.* For the
For the purposes
of the intended assault, Khrouleff's forces brought
with them a quantity of fascines, or, as our people
called them, small fagots, with also ladders, and
planks.
The en-
gagement
of Febru-
ary.
IV.
From the line of epaulments at daybreak on the
of the 17th 17th of February, the Russians opened their fire
against the defences of Eupatoria with 76 pieces of
cannon; but they afterwards pushed forward their
line of artillery to ground so far in advance as to be
within some four or five hundred yards of the de-
fences. On the whole, aided always by riflemen,
this strong cannonade proved effective.
It com-
pletely disabled one Turkish battery, inflicting upon
it a loss of 19 men. It weakened more or less other
batteries. It killed Selim Pasha and struck down
another general. It brought about several ex-
plosions, and the town at last slackening fire seemed
to own itself ripe for assault.
Then accordingly General Khrouleff began to
move forward his columns. Against the western
* I say nothing of the ulterior measures designed, because they
were not executed.
ATTACK.
53
II.
part of the town he made only a feint-a feint CHA P.
very soon checked and stopped by the presence of
the English ships, and the fire that poured from
the ramparts.
It was on the opposite the eastern-flank that
the General had by this time resolved to de-
liver his real attack; and at length by a circuitous
march he brought down his left-hand column to
ground on the shore of Lake Sassic some 900 yards
from the town.
Omar Pasha perceiving all this, took care to
strengthen his right with additional troops, and
besides, asked Captain Hastings to send across his
gunboat, the Viper, to the eastern side of the bay.
The Viper moved thither accordingly; and-along
with the Véloce and the Shaffaer-was soon taking
part in the combat.
Whenever occasion allowed, these vessels of course
brought their fire to bear on the enemy's troops; but
great would be the error of fancying that the value
of this naval contribution to the defence of Eupatoria
can be measured by counting the Russians struck
down by fire from the ships. The seamen did more
than kill and wound. Because forcing the enemy to
know or imagine what they could and would do
against him, if seen by their gunners, they painfully
cramped his movements; and besides, kept him
under that sense of being assailed by unassailable
adversaries which must and will always be hateful
to even the most valiant men.
In execution of his real attack General Khrouleff
54
KHROULEFF'S ATTACK
II.
CHAP. by this time was operating against the east and
north-east of the town with a chosen part of his
forces no less than some 6000 strong; but substan-
tially, all his movements of troops brought about
only one little effort of a combative sort the effort
we shall now see him make with a couple of light
field-batteries, and two of his Azoff battalions.
Close outside of the town on its north-eastern side,
there lay the burial-ground of the Russians, and
beyond it one of much greater size set apart for the
Jewish community.
community. Being surrounded by walls,
and containing many tombstones and monuments,
both the burial-grounds offered cover to any forces
advancing against that part of the 'curtain' which
connected the No. 2' with the No. 3' salient.
So, against that same part of the curtain General
Khrouleff at last had resolved to deliver his promised
assault.
Along with other bodies of infantry the two
chosen Azoff battalions were drawn up under the
shelter afforded by the Jewish burial-ground; and
bringing up his two reserve batteries to within grape-
shot range of the parapet, General Khrouleff caused
the part of the ramparts marked out for assault
to be well plied with round-shot and shell, but also
with blasts of mitrail. Then, after a while, the
almost abrupt cessation of this artillery-fire portend-
ed a coming of infantry; and at last-in columns
of companies the two battalions approached. They
attained to within some twenty-five yards of the
ditch, but were then beaten back by the fire of the
REPULSED BY THE TURKS.
55
II.
place. Soon, however, they rallied, and were ad- CHAP.
vancing once more when-stricken again by the
fire from the parapet - they again began to fall
back.
Rallied yet once again, and yet once again brought
to move forward, the two Azoff battalions, this time,
reached ground almost close to the ditch; but-as-
sailed as before by the Osmanli's withering fire-
they yet again shrank from its blast; and, their
movement of simple recoil lapsing now into final
retreat, they made off-with no aid from 'supports'
—to regain, if they could, their old shelter under the
walls of the Jewish burial-ground. Yet, to do even
this unmolested was more than their foes would allow
them; for now-led out opportunely from the Pere-
kop gate, and then facing half-about to its left-
a Turkish battalion pressed forward with bayonets
fixed, sprang intent on the beaten columns retreat-
ing across its front, and apparently so pushed them
northwards as to prevent their yet reaching the shel-
ter of even the nearest burial-ground. Nor was this
the last blow they sustained; for before their retro-
grade movement had brought them even so far as
the wall of the Russian burial-ground, a new dis-
turber appeared on what-since they began to fall
back—had become of course their right hand. With
some two hundred horsemen who constituted what
was almost the whole of Omar's then landed cavalry,
Iskender Bey trotted up on the flank of the beaten
battalions, cut them off from the shelter of the Rus-
sian burial-ground, and pressed their retreat in the
56
KHROULEFF'S REPULSE
II.
CHAP. open till one of them-formed up at last in a hollow
square—proved able to stop the pursuit.
General Todleben has sought to account for this
little discomfiture by saying that the water found in
the Ditch was a surprise upon the assailants, and that
the ladders they brought were too short to be ser-
viceable for the planned escalade; but he also has
stated a circumstance that well might have more
lasting weight than any slight physical obstacle, or
any mechanic defect in the Russian preparatives. A
strange revulsion took place in the opinion of General
Khrouleff. When he found himself closely engaged
with the valorous Turks, that sanguine anticipation
of his which had lifted him up into power was
turned to nought all at once by an access of
chilling despair. He suddenly found himself sure
that, to take Eupatoria would cost the Russians
enormous losses - cost them losses so great that
even at the price of the greatest sacrifices they
would not be, after all, able to hold their ground in
the place. So, conforming-conforming too late,
and under the stress of a fight-to what the good
Teuton had counselled before being rudely sup-
planted, this more fiery, less steadfast Sclave ac-
cepted the trebled repulses of his two vanquished
Azoff battalions as putting an end to the strife.
After what proved a farewell discharge from
Khrouleff's line of artillery, his general retreat be-
gan, and it was not molested, since Omar, scarce
having more than one full squadron of horse, could
* Todleben, p. 695.
FROM BEFORE EUPATORIA.
57
II.
undertake no pursuit. At half-past ten o'clock in CHA P.
the morning, the engagement had come to an end.
enemy's
cence in
this re-
pulse.
In killed and wounded the Russians lost some 800
men, and the garrison about half that number.*
This repulse in itself might seem only a trifling The
discomfiture, yet (as oftentimes happens in war) was acquies-
destined to gather some weight from the fact of its
proving conclusive. From the moment of Khrou-
leff's retreat to the end of the war, Russia always
acquiesced in the briefly delivered arbitrament of the
17th of February, and thenceforth left to her foes
the absolute, unchallenged ownership of that Eupa-
toria which, as many advisers believed, was the key,
was the true master-key for laying open Sebastopol.
Why the key,' though held fast, was not used,
we shall by-and-by have means of seeing.
6
* More exactly, the Russian loss is put at 769 (Todleben, p. 696),
and the loss of the garrison (including 13 French) at 387.-Colonel
Simmons to Lord Raglan, Feb. 18, 1855. Of the native Tartars also
24 were either killed or wounded.-Ibid.
58
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.
CHAPTER III.
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.
The Czar's
after his
discomfi-
ture before
Eupatoria;
CHAP. ALTHOUGH the little discomfiture thus sustained by
III. the Russians was only one of the kind that soldiers.
feelings call a 'repulse,' the Czar Nicholas still felt it
acutely as another of the humbling blows dealt him
by those very Turks whom he had loved to imagine
less warlike than his own highly disciplined troops.
By relieving Prince Mentschikoff of the command
he perhaps found some vent for his feelings, yet
could not allay his anguish, and continuing to
grieve he fell ill.
his ill-
ness.
Subse-
quent
rumours.
Power of
grief over
Weeks after, the voices of Rumour grew busy with
more tragic versions of what at this time had been
happening; but the Palace account after all seemed
for once better worthy of credence than the whis-
pered assurances; and at least one may say that it
harmonised with what we know of the facts.
Grief perhaps may have rarely killed men by
the body. direct and summary means, but at least it can do pite-
ous harm to a human body, whilst also it can weaken
the springs by which Nature, if not thus beset, might
perhaps win a way back to health. Official state-
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.
59
III.
Official
the Czar's
ments have told us that the Emperor's malady was CHAP.
'paralysis' of a part of his lungs; and whether so
called, with strict accuracy, or more properly account of
deserving the name of what Science here terms malady.
'Congestion,' this disorder was certainly one of
which the immediate cause may have well been a
'want of heart - power.' Now, want of heart-
'power,' we know, is a kind of bodily ailment
not unfrequently brought on by grief; and thus, This con-
putting all together, we see that the Palace accounts with the
of this illness are consistent, so far as they go, with it was
the commonly accepted belief-the belief that it
sprang from a sense of humiliation, entailing bitter
anguish of mind.
sistent
belief that
brought
about by
grief.
of facts.
The bare sequence of facts ran thus:-The Czar's Sequence
troops were repulsed by the Turks on the 17th of
February: the cruel wires of the telegraph soon
forced him to know the truth; and he died on the Death of
2d of March.
the Czar.
sonal con-
thus
to end.
In that pregnant time of a former year when the The per-
question between continued peace and eventual war tention
still hung in a trembling balance, Lord Stratford one brought
day at Therapia received a communication from
Dundas which-read as he knew how to read it-
imported the ending of doubt-imported the-not
yet immediate but-sure approach of war. Then,
whilst yet in the presence of one who had come in
all haste with a duplicate of the Admiral's words,
he fell into a mood so abstracted as to be pacing
60
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.
III.
CHAP. up and down the long room with the air of a man
half forgetting that he was not alone, who, although
he allowed a few words to drop from his lips, was
still rather intent on reflection than wishing to make
his thoughts known. With something of sadness.
he said Well, well, there'll be war; the Em-
peror has chosen to make this a personal question.
against me, and he must take the consequences.'
The fate of
Nicholas.
C
'
On the 2d of March 1855, the misery of 'taking
the consequences' had at last been endured to the
full by unhappy Nicholas; and, although the war
might still rage, there at least was on that day an
end of the great single combat maintained through
many a year between the once haughty Czar and
the always haughty Ambassador.
It is interesting to know, as I do, that-mag-
nanimous in spite of his wrath-the Ambassador
had always acknowledged the best, the noblest qual-
ities of his Imperial adversary, regarding him even.
as one who, by Russians with Russian ideas, might
well be revered and admired.
The Emperor's noble face after death wore an air
of majestic repose; and perhaps gave support to a
writer who brought himself to believe that this man,
after all, though betrayed into wrong and sinuous
paths, when vanity had weakened his judgment, was
not without love of honour.
The fate of the Emperor Nicholas may be said
to have furnished a sample of good, wholesome
justice administered to a highly placed criminal.
* See ante, vol. i. cap. iv.
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.
61
III.
Justice
a highly
criminal.
From that fatal hour in 1853, when he despatched CHA P.
Prince Mentschikoff to the Porte, he had been
encountering a lengthened series of reverses both adminis
diplomatic and warlike; had been publicly forced tered to
to disgorge that 'material guarantee,' as he called placed
it, which he had ostentatiously seized; had been
defeated on the Alma, defeated at Inkerman; had
so quickly repressed his outrageous, though not
steadfast, pride as to be treating already for peace
with invaders close fastened on Russia; and now
writhing under the agony of a military discomfiture
once more inflicted upon him by the valorous Turks
-whom he had thought he could venture to scorn
- he died, it seems, at the last from ills due
to his sense of disgrace, a humbled, coerced, and
even disciplined man, believed by some who well
knew him to be conquered in mind, and yearning
to end the war on almost heart-breaking terms.
Nor did sympathy with the fallen, this time, undo
any part of the good that is wrought by chastising
great criminals. Men remembered that the Czar
had been cruel.
We long ago saw that despite his fond love of
details connected with soldiering, this Czar was an
unwarlike man. Believing that he could best serve
his cause by attending to business at home, he
still-far away at St Petersburg-went on inspect-
ing, inspecting-inspecting troops to the last; and,
indeed, it was when he came in after one of these
62
THE EMPEROR NICHOLAS.
CHAP. tasks that an uneasy panting for breath disclosed
III. his fatal illness. To judge from those letters of
his which have happened to meet the light, he
did not at all understand the wondrous defence of
Sebastopol. I can hardly indeed even say that he
knew who defended the place, for in all of the
letters I have seen, he omits the illustrious name!
He was not a sovereign worthy of so great a sub-
ject as Todleben.
By initiating that strife for Sebastopol from which
neither they nor the Czar could recede without some-
thing like shame, the Allies had built up a new
quarrel less easy perhaps to assuage than the one
which a few months before had caused them to take
up arms; but now besides, there was danger that
-freshly acceding to empire-a Czar more gentle
than Nicholas might scarcely have power enough
to make his subjects content with a plainly in-
glorious peace.
Thus, strangely enough, it resulted that the pros-
pects of peace were not strengthened by even the
death of a Czar who, without the advice or support
of any true statesman, had recklessly brought on the
war.
THE COUNTER-APPROACHES.
63
CHAPTER IV.
SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL FROM THE MIDDLE OF FEBRUARY 1855
TO THE SECOND WEEK OF APRIL.
L
IV.
Morning of
the 22d of
February.
LOOKING out in the early morning-the morning CHAP.
of the 22d of February-from their works of
'approach' on Mount Inkerman the French descried
a new object which excited at first curiosity, then
graver attention, but still, it would seem, did not
cause any anxious foreboding of evil. What they
saw was a white-looking circlet or loop which some- Sight ob-
how had come to appear on the ground lying north- by the
west before them.*
Portending, as we now so well know, a fresh
and mighty development of the enemy's defensive
resources, and-by consequence-a long, long frus-
tration of all the besieger's fond hopes, this white
circlet flung round a knoll on the north-western
side of Mount Inkerman did not instantly show its
full import to even the more skilled observers.
The white circlet or loop had been made in the
*The white line had its angles, but seen from afar appeared rounded.
served
French.
64
THE COUNTER-APPROACHES.
CHAP. night-time by workmen whose diggings laid bare
IV.
Todleben's
inferences
an extended, re-entering strip of the natural lime-
stone rock; and of course the new object imported
some fresh creation of earth-works; but why a
garrison busied in defending Sebastopol should
come out far from their lines to fasten with pick-
axe and spade on a part of Mount Inkerman, few or
none at first seemed to divine.
Yet the new apparition sprang out of a piece of
from what sound knowledge which by acts-not unseen from
afar the Allies had themselves disclosed to their
keen, sagacious adversary.
the Allies
had been
visibly
doing.
To seam the hills with fresh earth-work on the
sites we
saw chosen for the 'King' and the
'Artilleur' batteries, and to do this under the field-
glass of the enemy's keen engineer, was to tell him
as though in plain speech of the great change of
counsel to which the besiegers had come; for, al-
though the two embryo works then newly appearing
before him stood distant the one from the other,
he perceived them to be both plainly meant for the
same immediate purpose, because visibly fashioned
for guns which would cross their fires on the
Mamelon, and the interposed neck of ground that
divided it from the Malakoff front.
Inferring thence that the Mamelon must be the
proximate object of attack, and one plainly craved
as a stepping-stone from which to spring at the
Malakoff, he quickly went on to convince himself
that the more early measures to be taken for its
defence must be-not on the Mamelon itself, but-
Site of the Kamtchatka Lunette.
Patteries previously constructed.
0
ـا
OPRES MAN
No. 9
New English Battery.
Map No 4 to face page 64
Site of the Selinghinsk Redoubt.

Site of the Volhynia Redoubt,
MOUNT INKERMAN.
AMRIA CENTRY AGIN
New French Batteries worked at
first by English Seamen.
DIAGRAM illustrating the design and purpose of Todleben's
Counterapproaches in the Faubourg of the Karabelnaya.
SCALE OF 2 INCHES TO A STATUTE MILE.
2 MILES
A MITCHIE & SON, LOIN)
TODLEBEN'S COUNTER-APPROACHES.
65
IV.
on ground far away towards his left; for he judged CHAP.
that the new French approaches' then making their
way on Mount Inkerman would bring his opponents
to ground whence their batteries might take the
Mamelon in flank, take it even almost in reverse;
and he conceived that it could not be held, if assailed
in that way, whilst also under the fire of the King'
and the Artilleur' batteries. He therefore resolved His coun-
teracting
that, to defend the Mamelon, he must arrest the new plans.
French approaches' on his left front, and that, to
do this effectually, he must move out beyond the
near borderland of his Faubourg defences, must
cross the Careenage Ravine, must ascend the steep
hillside above it, and construct a new system of
Works on the north-western heights of Mount
Inkerman. The new system of Works, whilst ful-
filling its primary object, and baffling the Inkerman
approaches, might also, he saw, be conducing to an
ulterior purpose-might give him the means of di-
recting such a fire towards the south as would cover
his efforts to fortify the Mamelon in the teeth of the
French, thus barring their road to the Malakoff.
In determining to take this bold course, he was
moved by yet one other reason; for he hoped
that by arresting the approaches of the French on
Mount Inkerman he might prevent them from
attaining to ground whence their batteries would be
able to drive off all Russian ships from the eastern
part of the Roadstead.
The steps he took were like those which besiegers- His Se-
and not the besieged-are commonly wont to adopt. Redoubt.
VOL. VII.
E
linghinsk
66
TODLEBEN'S COUNTER-APPROACHES.
IV.
CHAP. Having taped down beforehand the lines of his
newly planned Work, and already bespoken such
aid as the ships in the Roadstead could give, he
at night on the 21st of February moved out with
seven battalions commanded by General Khroust-
choff, crossed the chasm of the Careenage Ravine,
ascended to the heights of Mount Inkerman, and
there under shelter of darkness laid hands on the
fore-chosen site.
To cover his designed operation, the four Volhynia
battalions drew up on a front placed half-way be-
tween the newly marked site and the foremost of the
enemy's trenches; whilst the three Selinghinsk bat-
talions which made up the rest of the force were
charged to construct the planned work, and with all
the speed they could use to make it grow under their
hands. These men-each with his musket beside
him—were kept in a state of readiness to lay down
their tools, and to take instant part as combatants
whenever the need might occur; but they toiled
undisturbed the first night, and when morning broke,
it was seen that the cover already obtained by dint
of pickaxe and spade and gabions rapidly filled was
even then solid enough to be good against musketry-
fire. This Work, after the name of the regiment
which bore the toil of constructing it, was called the
Selinghinsk Redoubt.
So, the white-looking circlet or loop which met
the gaze of the French on the morning of the 22d,
marked simply the slight, early rudiments of a new,
though fast-growing earth-work-the Selinghinsk
FRENCH NIGHT ATTACK.
67
و
C
IV.
Redoubt, and the firstling of those Ouvrages CHA P.
blancs for so our allies always called them—
which were destined to play no small part in the
subsequent defence of Sebastopol.
Colonel Todleben did not suppose that the French,
when seeing his purpose, would brook this counter-
approach, and in concert with General Khroustchoff
prepared to resist their attacks.
So long as day lasted, the troops not busied in
working were withdrawn to sheltered ground near at
hand; but, when darkness returned on the 22d,
and again on the 23d, the four Volhynia battalions
were thrown forward once more to the ground they
had held the first night, and they ranged in what,
with their people, was the favourite order of battle,
that is, with, in front, a line of skirmishers, next,
a line of small company columns, and in support
to all, a line of three columns each massed, and
comprising each one whole battalion. With their
muskets at hand, the men of the Selinghinsk bat-
talions still toiled at the new redoubt.
II.
tack on
night at-
hinsk Re-
the Seling-
Except by distant musketry-fire, producing but little French
effect, the French did not molest the new Work until
the night of the 23d, or rather the early morning of
the 24th. They then undertook to assault it with a
force of three battalions, supported by two more in
reserve, and entrusted the command of the troops to
doubt.
68
FRENCH NIGHT ATTACK
IV.
CHAP. General Mayran. The attacking part of the force
was under the immediate orders of General Monet,
and consisted of one battalion column of Zouaves
at each flank and one of Marines in the centre.
The two battalions ordained to be held in reserve
were selected from the troops of the Line.
When the moon had gone down, General Monet's
three battalions moved forward; and, although the
expedient of attacking at night was not destined to
give them the advantage of surprising the enemy,
they made good their advance with great spirit,
driving in both the line of skirmishers and the line
of company columns which constituted the front of
the Volhynia regiment, and apparently forcing back
also two out of its three massed battalions. The
ships in the Roadstead and even the Karabel bat-
teries soon began to intervene with their thunder,
if not indeed with their blows; (¹) but the onset
of the French was not checked. The battalion of
Zouaves on the right of the assailing force was
commanded by Colonel Cler-a daring and brilliant
officer much liked and admired by our people. At
the head of his Zouaves he turned the flank of the
Russians, and pushed forward so vigorously that
before long, he carried the tumult of midnight
fighting to ground on the left-Russian left—of
the growing redoubt. To meet the stress of battle
brought thither, the unengaged column of the
Volhynia regiment was by Khroustchoff moved
laterally from his right towards the ground on
his left where the Russians were most hotly pressed.
ON THE SELINGHINSK REDOUBT.
69
IV.
Before long, it resulted that the four Volhynia bat- CHAP.
talions with some men of the Selinghinsk inter-
mixed became gathered irregularly in advance of
the new Redoubt and presented to their assailants
a broad, concave front.
Like their comrades on the right, the Zouaves on
the opposite flank of the assailing force had by this
time pressed forward with vigour, and a correspond-
ing effort of will on the part of the centre column
with which General Monet was present) might per-
haps have enabled the French to deliver their final
assault with a great compactness and weight; but
this column was seemingly weakened by the absence
of some of the men who had lost their way in the
darkness; (2) and besides, it unhappily chanced that
General Monet now received several wounds. Find-
ing himself compelled to give up the command, he
handed it over to Cler, who was called away from
the right in order to receive his new charge.
Cler, however, soon returned to his Zouave bat-
talion, taking with him all the troops that he found
on his road. Then in person going up to the Work
he knocked over the gabions revetting a part of
its counterscarp, crossed its Ditch, overthrowing the
Russians there gathered, and mounted the parapet.
To be there was to learn, notwithstanding the inter-
posed darkness, that the Redoubt and its precincts
were swarming with troops;* and those of the
French who had till then remained alive on the
parapet were forced back into the Ditch and there
* Obviously the bulk of the Selinghinsk battalions.
70
CLOSE OF THE ATTACK.
CHAP. surrounded by Russians coming from all directions.
IV.
To the fire of musketry then converging on the
French there seemed to be added the fire from
ships in the Roadstead and even from the Faubourg
Defences. Still as yet-because not without hope
that reinforcements might come-Colonel Cler stood
his ground in the fosse.
Where General Mayran was posted at this turning
moment, or why he judged it expedient to with-
hold reinforcements, I am unable to say; but be-
coming, it seems, convinced that his foremost troops
were in danger of being overwhelmed by numbers,
he caused the retreat to be sounded.
Thereupon Colonel Cler passed back over the
counterscarp, led the men acting with him against
the host of Russians who were barring his path,
clove a way through their ranks with the bayonet
or the musket-stock used as a club, and rejoined the
rest of the force which General Monet had led.
The thus reunited French force made good its
retreat without seemingly being pursued.
General Mayran did not bring into action the
troops which formed his reserve.'
The fight lasted an hour.*
In killed, wounded, and missing the French lost
some 270,† and the Russians rather more than 400.†
The reports of this fight made to Canrobert
* Niel's narrative of the combat is in p. 152 et seq., and Todleben's
(vol. ii.) in p. 27 et seq.
+ Including a few who were struck in the daytime of the 23d, they
officially acknowledged a loss of 275.-Niel, p. 154.
‡ Todleben, vol. ii. p. 30.
CLOSE OF THE ATTACK.
71
IV.
False re-
port of
this fight
Canrobert.
and by him despatched to Lord Raglan, conveyed CHA P.
a full assurance that by dislodging the enemy and
demolishing his redoubt the enterprise had been
victoriously achieved; (³) and Lord Raglan, on Can- made to
robert's authority, imparted at once to his Govern-
ment what seemed true and joyful intelligence.
He afterwards saw General Canrobert, and learnt
from him that he had not received any further
account of the fight.t
Lord Raglan afterwards visited the brave General
Monet, and found him laid up with five wounds.
Several other French officers were present, including
Colonel Cler, the hero of the right wing. All spoke
with truthful candour of the late night-attack, and
simply called it a failure. ‡
When the truth at last made its sure way to the
French at headquarters, they seemed to be gravely
distressed.§
On what caused not only the error of mistaking
a repulse for a victory, but also the ugly scandal of
a French commander-in-chief being put, and long
kept in the dark by his own trusted officers, a veil
was indulgently thrown.
When asking on the 24th for a truce in order to
bury the dead, General Osten-Sacken preferred his
request with exuberant politeness, and accompanied
it by an acknowledgment of the 'exemplary intre-
Despatch to Secretary of State, 24th February 1855.
+ Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure, Private Letter, March 27, 1855.
‡'Un coup manqué.'-Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure, Feb. 27, 1855.
§ Ibid.
Truce for
burying
the dead.
72
ANOTHER COUNTER-APPROACH.
IV.
CHAP. pidity' which the French had displayed in the
fight. The communication excited much interest,
and even some speculation.
Reason of
the French
for not
renewing
the at-
tack.
The Vol-
hynia Re-
doubt.
III.
The French did not renew their attack. Con-
vincing themselves that, if captured, the Selinghinsk
Redoubt might be swept by so potent a fire of artillery
as would make it untenable, they resolved, however
unwillingly, that they needs must stand by acqui-
escent whilst the enemy-losing no moments-com-
pleted and armed his new Work.*
And this bold encroachment effected under their
eyes was only, after all, a beginning of the counter-
approaches with which the Czar's great engineer was
minded to try their patience. Seizing ground that
lay towards the left front of the newly formed Work,
he there, on the night of the 28th of February,
began to construct yet another one of a similar kind
Continued which was called the Volhynia Redoubt; † and, the
French once more acquiescing, he made haste, as
may well be supposed, to render it stronger and
stronger with every day suffered to pass..
acqui-
escence
of the
French.
Import
and effect
of these
counter-
New counter-works thus springing up to challenge
the new French approaches were all the more galling
works on to some French and English observers because per-
Inkerman. ceived to be fastening on a part of their Inkerman
battle-field, and so taking away with the pickaxe
† Todleben, vol. ii. p. 32.
Mount
* Niel, p. 154.
RESOLVE OF THE FRENCH.
73
IV.
what soldiers had won with the sword; but men of CHAP.
skill knew that the check was other than one of a
sentimental kind. It was painfully real.
of the
on finding
thus con-
fronted.
Our allies by this time saw the object at which Decisions
their foe must be aiming. They even indeed divined French
his ulterior purpose, and perceived that these new themselves
works of his would enable him to attempt with
advantage the fortification of the Mamelon, thus
throwing perhaps a strong barrier directly across
that one path by which they could reach the Mala-
koff. With this clearly scanned prospect before
them, they still resolved to abstain from storming
the newly reared Works which now formidably
obstructed their siege, and made to themselves
instead a kind of promise or vow-not destined to
receive its fulfilment-that, so soon as the enemy
should try to plant any field-work on the coveted
Mamelon, they would carry it at once by assault.
Meanwhile, their counsels induced them to await
the actual happening of the apprehended contin-
gency, and not undertake to avert it.t
IV.
assembled,
little pros-
pect of
However, the question whether the Allies should Council
submit to these aggressions was one of course merit- but with
ing their joint consideration, and accordingly, a
Council assembled; but not with any good prospect
of being able to choose a vigorous course of action;
* Niel, p. 157.
+ Ibid.
advantage.
74
CONFERENCES OF GENERALS.
IV.
CHAP. for it was in the teeth of Canrobert's troops that the
encroachments had been dared; and, the French
having thus proved their readiness to acquiesce in
such measures, no words of any English deliberator,
whether uttered in Council or not, seemed likely to
change their resolve.
Council of
the 4th of
March.
The longer our allies acquiesced in the spectacle
of hostile redoubts thus fastened and fastening on
Mount Inkerman, the clearer it seemed that the
whole plan of siege which had been adopted on the
1st of January, and ratified on the 2d of February,
was being brought under challenge; and, if Todleben
had (by witchcraft) been present in the Council of
generals which sat at the English headquarters on
the 4th of March, he could hardly have failed to
exult in that power of his by which he had raised
up the fallen, and confounded the design of the
victors.
The Council included General Canrobert, Lord
Raglan, General Bosquet, General Niel, General
Bizot, Sir John Burgoyne,* Sir George Brown, and
General Harry Jones. It lasted several hours with-
out coming to any decisive resolve.
Against any proposal requiring them to assail the
new works our allies put forward the theory before
ascribed to them, and maintained that, even if cap-
tured, the ground would not be tenable under the
fire that might be brought to bear upon it from three
sides.
Burgoyne controverted the opinion thus formed,
* Respecting Burgoyne's presence, see post, p. 109.
CONFERENCES OF GENERALS.
75
IV.
and maintained that by taking due precautions the CHAP.
evil anticipated might be more or less completely
averted.
The Conference determined that the question thus
raised should be investigated on the following day by
the general officers of engineers belonging to both
armies; but meanwhile, went on with its debates,
and discussed the general prospects of the siege.
(
(
The difficulties of the attack on Sebastopol were
' a good deal dwelt upon, and were acknowledged to
'be increasing rather than diminishing, and in con-
sequence of the impediment placed upon the pro-
gress of offensive operations on the right by the
bold advance of the enemy in that direction, a
desire was manifested by the French engineer offi-
cers to revert to the desperate expedient of an
assault on the Redan, under circumstances much
more unfavourable than when it was rejected by
'the Note of the 2d of February, without a simul-
'taneous advance on the Malakoff front.' (4).
6
6
*
The importance of after all endeavouring to take
what with normal besiegers has commonly been the
first step, that is, to invest the place, or in other
words to cut off communication between Sebastopol
and the Russian field-army, was much dwelt upon;
whilst General Canrobert-and not for the first time
-declared his opinion to be that, if from any cause
Omar Pasha should be unable to act upon the rear
or flank of the enemy from Eupatoria, he should be
* No doubt by Niel. See the next chapter, and the Appendix,
Note (2), thereto annexed.
76
CONFERENCES OF GENERALS.
CHAP. requested to come to the Chersonese with two-thirds
of his army.
IV.
Adjourned
Conference
sitting on
the 6th of
March.
Lord Raglan stated his reasons for not at all shar-
ing the opinion thus formed by General Canrobert.*
The French and English engineers did not come
to any agreement, and the adjourned Conference sat
again on the 6th of March. Then, the French mak-
ing no proposal, Burgoyne submitted a memorandum
recommending an attack on the Selinghinsk and
Volhynia Redoubts with a view to drive the enemy
effectually from that part of the ground. He urged
that the French objections to that plan were not of
the importance apprehended, and that the French
Note of the 2d of February (in which all had con-
curred) could never be carried into effect without
first obliging the Russians to loose their new hold
on Mount Inkerman.
General Canrobert and the French officers attend-
ing him did not consider his [Burgoyne's] scheme,
nor the reasoning by which Sir John Burgoyne
supported it, to be well founded; and they at once
(
' declared their determination not again to attempt
'to drive the enemy from his new works.' (5)
A weak resolve that for months kept back and
kept down the Allies!
For a purpose no longer worth notice, the Con-
ference directed an examination of some specified
ground, but did nothing more.t
* Despatch marked 'Secret,' from Lord Raglan to Secretary of
State, March 6, 1855.
+ Despatch (Secret) from Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, March
10, 1855.
CONFERENCES OF GENERALS.
77
IV.
8th March.
renewing
his en-
deavours
Turkish
reinforce-
Late in the evening of the 8th of March, General CHA P.
Canrobert came to Lord Raglan's headquarters, and
again urged that it should be proposed to Omar Canrobert
Pasha to come to the Chersonese with a considerable enem
part of his army. Lord Raglan saw no reason for to obtain
changing his former opinion; but consented that
(with a view to full discussion of the question) Omar ments.
Pasha, with also Sir Edmund Lyons and Admiral
Bruat, should be invited to attend a Conference on
the following Monday. In his almost passionate
eagerness to have Turkish troops on the Chersonese,
General Canrobert refused them French aid for any
operations elsewhere. He announced that he could
not reinforce Omar Pasha whilst at Eupatoria with
any force at all of either cavalry or infantry.*
Whilst the Allies were thus vainly deliberating,
their adversary was acting, and acting with ceaseless
vigour.
6
Comple-
tion and
of the two
The Volhynia' Work was completed in the course
of ten days; and the armament which the two new armament
Redoubts had received on the 10th of March com- White
prised twenty-two pieces of cannon.†
Redoubts.
V.
Arrival of
the young
Dukes
The pair of Grand-Dukes whom we saw driving
into Sebastopol on the eve of the battle of Inkerman Grand-
were destined to pass as the harbingers of Russian Nicholas
enterprise; and their return to the Crimea soon Michael.
* Ibid.
+ Todleben, vol. ii. pp. 34, 35.
and
78
THE MAMELON.
IV.
CHAP. after Todleben's enterprise of the 21st of Febru-
ary was rightly thought to portend an increase of
warlike activity.
The Ma-
melon.
Advice of
Bizot to
To have a strong hold on the Mamelon—this, we
saw, was the object of besieged and besiegers alike—
the object for which they were toiling on several
distant hills—but it had not been up to this time
the chosen scene of their efforts. Lightly held-
though of course duly watched by an outpost of
Russian infantry, it had neither been touched by the
pickaxe nor assaulted by troops, nor even approached
by 'approaches'; but on the morning of the 10th
of March, its time of repose was drawing fast to
an end.
By that time, the jointly planned Works of the
Canrobert, French and the English-the 'King' and the
'Artilleur' batteries-were closely approaching com-
pletion, and Bizot, the commander of the French
engineers, proposed to General Canrobert that on
the following night the Mamelon should be seized
by his troops.**
declined.
Night of
the 10th
of March,
establish
Todleben
ing a Work
on the
Mamelon.
General Canrobert met the proposal by a reason
of great scope and gravity, which shall be afterwards
stated, and brought himself to resolve that he would
not hazard the step.t
On the night of that very same day, the enemy
passed into action. Colonel Todleben at last gave
reality to what from the time of his planning the
two White Redoubts, had been his ulterior pur-
and prepared a new, unwelcome spectacle for
* Niel, p. 168.
+ Ibid., p. 169.
pose,
THE KAMTCHATKA LUNETTE.
79
the
IV.
Sight
the French
on the
morning
of the
he 11th.
chatka
tions of
in face of
those of our baffled allies who held the Victoria CHA P.
Ridge.* Looking towards the north-west on the
morning of the 11th of March, they saw that greeting
during the night, their great adversary had been
fastening on the Mamelon, and that there, with
rudiments of a Work plainly meant to defend it
already had saddled the Ridge.† Though as yet of
course only inchoate, this new barrier-the Kamt- The Kamt-
chatka Lunette-lay directly across the one path Lunette.
by which the French could advance against the Delibera-
Malakoff front, and they knew that they must the French
needs overcome the interposed obstacle, if they this new
meant to go on with the siege in accordance with apparition.
their last ordained plan. They, however, could still
question whether their more prudent course would
be to attack the new outwork at once whilst still
only in embryo, or wait until it should grow up to
the estate of a completed Lunette, and be brist-
ling with guns. The alternative which forbade a
recourse to any speedy assault was the one the
French chose; and accordingly on the following
night-the night of the 11th-they opened their
first parallel against the young, tender Work,'
not then one day old; thus almost repeating in
miniature the all-involving mistake of the previous
autumn-the mistake of besieging' an embryo.
To enter on a course of 'approaches' was to give
the enemy time; and time of course was the bless-
ing he craved for his infant Lunette. So whilst day
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 46 et seq.
‡ Ibid., p. 170.
+ Niel, p. 167.
Their re-
solve not to
assault the
new work;
but to
proceed
against
'proaches."
it by 'ap-
80
CANROBERT'S DETERMINATION.
CHAP. after day, and night after night, his antagonists.
IV. worked in their trenches, he was driving on the
completion of his newly interposed outwork, and
covering both its front and its flanks with a double.
chain of lodgments.'
C
The Allies before long brought a powerful fire of
artillery to bear on the growing Lunette, and the
French battled hard-battled even on the whole
with advantage-for some of its covering lodg-
'ments'; but-taken alone-no such measures were
sufficing to carry the Work; and, since (under the
bonds of that reason which had held back their
general on the 10th of March) the French as yet
were not minded to undertake an assault, they had
to bear the torment of seeing or otherwise know-
ing that every day, every night, their unwearied
adversary was bringing his Work towards com-
21st pleteness. He finished it on the 21st of March; *
Todleben's and by that time had not only armed it with ten
March.
completion
ment of
and arma- 24-pounder guns,t but covered it too by the
his Kamt- fire of twelve other pieces of ordnance for that
purpose planted in battery on chosen sites less in
advance.‡
chatka
Lunette.
VI.
As may well be supposed, this condition of things
proved distressing to both the French and the Eng-
lish, but of course to the French more especially,
+ Todleben, p. 55.
* Niel, p. 175.
‡ Ibid., p. 57.
CANROBERT'S REASON.
81
IV.
since theirs, as it chanced, was the army, and CHA P.
theirs too the anxious commander, confronted,
mocked, baffled, perplexed by the enemy's advanc-
ing encroachments.
and per-
effect of
counter-
The third stage of Todleben's triumph began, as Mortifying
we saw, on the night of the 10th of March, and plexing
that day (at an earlier hour) was also the one on Todleben's
which Canrobert after carefully weighing the works.
question-brought himself to reject the proposal
of his chief engineer, and abstain from seizing
the Mamelon—an enterprise that appeared to be
almost peremptorily required for the advancement
of the siege, and besides to be one recommended
by many favouring circumstances.
bert's
reason
for declin-
seize the
Then, by what course of reasoning was it that Can- Canro-
robert maintained his conclusion? What restrained
him, according to Niel, and prevented his seizing ing to
the Mamelon was-not any grave apprehension of Mamelon.
the obstacles his troops might encounter whilst per-
forming so simple a task, but rather a belief that
the measure would provoke some great sortie directed
against the guards of the trenches, thus bringing
about an engagement of more or less extended dimen-
sions, and doing so under conditions which he judged
to be disadvantageous.
Whether sound, or de- The vast
ceptive, the objection was one of vast scope; for, his objec-
if valid against that proposal of the 10th of March
which asked General Canrobert to seize what was
then an unfortified knoll, it would seemingly prove
no less adverse to any real step in advance that
* Niel, pp. 168, 169.
VOL. VII.
F
scope of
tion.
82
CANROBERT'S
CHAP. could well be conceived; for how to carry Sebas-
IV.
topol without doing some act of aggression? And,
how to plan an act of aggression which the enemy,
if such were his mood, might not answer with
powerful sorties? And, again, how on earth to
contrive that any engagement thus generated should
take place under conditions well fitted to please the
besieger-to please a besieger so circumstanced that,
whether for conquest or whether for safety, he must
fight under the guns of Sebastopol, with before him
a labyrinth of mighty defences, and behind him the
sea and sea-cliffs? To harbour such an objection
whether sound or fallacious was plainly to open a
path that led down towards despondency; and,
although of course none can be sure that the
fendency. painful decision of Canrobert may not have averted
disasters, it is hard to see how a commander, whilst
haunted by forecasts so dismal, could be keeping
his mind or his will in the iron condition required
for breaking into Sebastopol.
Its dan-
gerous
Niel's
comment
on the
Marshal Niel in recording the objection did not
either support or condemn it; but-pursuing his
objection. fixed idea-he took care to insist that the fact of its
having stayed Canrobert, and prevented him from
seizing the Mamelon, brought out into strong relief
the inherent vice of that policy which had turned
the conquerors of the Alma into hampered besiegers.*
And indeed the original error of laying siege to
Sebastopol without forces meet for the purpose
might well seem more glaring than ever to the
* Niel, p. 169.
GLOOMY STATE.
83
IV.
official narrator when he not only heard Science CHA P.
telling him that no belligerent weak enough to be
confronted in a serious engagement by the garrison
of a fortress can have any warrant in reason for at-
tempting to reduce it by siege, but also saw her teach-
ing illustrated by the predicament of General Can-
robert, who could not dare drive in an outpost for
fear of provoking a battle.*
bert's de-
tion to
The reason' which had prevented Canrobert from Canro-
consenting on the 10th of March to seize the then termina-
unfortified Mamelon proved sufficiently strong to abstain
deter him from assaulting the embryo Work which sau
had newly grown over its surface.t
from as-
saulting
the em-
bryo Lu-
nette.
To our people the notion of suffering the enemy
to construct a defensive Work on the path-the one
path-which could lead our allies to the Malakoff,
seemed almost the same as abandoning the main
design of the siege; and, to deprecate such acqui-
escence, our chief engineer drew up a memoran- Represen-
dum on the expediency of occupying the Mamelon,'
which Lord Raglan imparted to Canrobert; but all
this insistence proved vain; and the Mamelon-
growing daily in strength-continued to remain un-
assaulted.
* Cormontaigne, Mémorial pour l'attaque des places, cap. vi.,
cited Niel, pp. 181, 182.
+ So that the resclve which I called the 'vow' was disregarded. See
ante, p. 73.
++ Despatch, 'Secret,' to Secretary of State, March 17, 1855.
tation on
this sub-
parted by
lan to Can-
ject im-
Lord Rag-
robert.
84
CANROBERT'S
CHAP.
IV.
VII.
The
gloomy
sions of
imparted
to Lord
Raglan.
Meanwhile, the French commander had been going
laid open.*
C
<
6
6
apprehen- yet further and further on that gloomy road towards
Canrobert despondency which his reasoning, as we saw, had
General Canrobert,' writes Lord Raglan,
taking rather a gloomy view of what might possibly
arise, represented that it was probable that when
'the Allies should open their fire upon Sebastopol,
'the enemy would attempt a general attack upon us,
making a sortie with 20,000 men on the extreme
left of the French with a view to reach their ship-
ping and establishments at Kamiesh, and assailing
at the same time the right of our position on this
ridge with 40,000 men, and the ground in front
' of Balaclava with an equal force by a simultaneous
movement. He expressed also some apprehension
'that, if this great operation should be undertaken,
'the Allies, occupied as they would be by the Siege,
might be overpowered.'
Lord
Raglan's
comment;
and its
tendency
to relieve
his des-
દ
<
<
<
Sir Edmund Lyons and myself were surprised to
hear him hold such desponding language. I ven-
tured to express my opinion that the tone of his
observations was somewhat serious.'t
Whether Canrobert felt, or felt not, that this re-
ception of his anxious forebodings implied a gently
pondency. veiled censure, he well may have quitted the room
a much happier and a much stronger man than when
he came in. The greater the diversity of character,
* See ante, p. 81.
+ Despatch marked 'Secret' to Secretary of State, 13th March 1855.
GLOOMY STATE.
85
IV.
sentiment, habit, and social station between any two CHA P.
men in council, the abler will one of them be to
allay the other's despondency. It is amongst men
ground down to a state of what the French call
'equality' that panic revels and spreads.
.
í
Raglan's
In those times of trial,' said one who best knew Lord
Lord Raglan, 'he ceased to be equal with other men.' power of
Without dissembling facts, he would despond-
calmly withhold his assent to all gloomy apprehen-
'sions, and manfully force attention to the special
'business in hand, and thus-or rather perhaps by
a kind of power that cannot be traced or described
in words-he threw upon those who conversed
'with him the spell of his own undaunted nature.
Men went to him anxious and perturbed. They
came away firm.'*
(
C
C
repressing
ency.
change
robert's
May it be that-in part from their contact with Did this
the mind of Lord Raglan-the spirit of the French Can-
commander began to undergo a great change? tone?
What we know is that, having spoken to Lord Raglan
in the desponding language' above recorded of the
battle that he thought might be provoked by the re-
opening of the fire, General Canrobert (in addressing Allusion
his Emperor †) soon after began to point out that very disclos-
same dreaded contingency as one for which he was
yearning. (6)
* Speech of General Airey to the Board of General Officers.
+ See his words to the Emperor of the 10th of April, in which he
speaks of the previously dreaded contingency as 'cette attaque désirée
avec tant de raison;' Rousset, ii. p. 147; and his letter to the Em-
peror of the 19th May, ibid., p. 178 et seq., partly quoted also post, in
Appendix to chap. xi. p. 375. See also reference to these letters post,
chap. viii. and chap. ix.
to recent
ures.
86
THE ENEMY'S
CHAP.
IV.
In common with but few of his time (of whom
Lord John Russell was one) Lord Raglan was able
to write a sentence so naturally that it recalled the
very sound of his voice. So to read the five follow-
ing lines is like hearing Lord Raglan speak, nay al-
most like seeing him smile: 'I think our friends.
[meaning the French] are a little uneasy, and are
'anxious for the arrival of some of the Turkish army
'from Eupatoria; but they continue,' he archly adds,
'to have full confidence in their English allies.'
'
? *
VIII.
Vigorous
advance
of the
French
ap-
'proaches'
against
the new
Lunette.
Anxiety
of the
enemy
to check
them.
His sor-
ties, 22d
of March;
General Bizot, meanwhile, had been pushing on his
approaches' with a good deal of vigour; and before
many days, the moment seemed to be near when by
working close up to the lodgments he might con-
vert a whole chain of them into a new parallel, and
thus become clothed with a power which would put
the Lunette in grave danger.
To check the advance of approaches' which threat-
ened such consequences, and perhaps at the same
time to compass an object of yet greater moment,
the Russians judged it expedient to hazard a step
that might cost them a not trifling sacrifice of men.
So, on the night of the 22d of March, the enemy
undertook an adventure with a much greater num-
ber of troops than are commonly charged with the
task of making a sortie in darkness.
* To Lord Panmure, 30th March 1855.
Nicholas
Fort Paul
Dock Ya
WAR HARBOU
Peression
Battery
THE FLAGSTAFE
BASTION
Barruck Batt
SCRULEFT
ROADSTEAD
OF
SEBASTOPOL
BOURG
TH REDA
The
oronzor
Batter
of the
Foint
THE LITTLE
REBAN
THE MALAKOEF
THE KAMET GHATKA
EUNETEE
PARALLEL
ROULEFF
5,500 Strong
ZAVALTCHINE
ASTORO
BOUDISTONEFF
Map No 5 to face page 86

The Right Lancaster
Battery
VICTO
TORIA FORT
Tehernaya
River
THE LEFT ATTAC
(Chapmans
Green Hill
THE RIGHT AFTACK
(Gordons){/
The Woronzoff Height
THE GREAT NIGHT SORTIE OF THE 22nd OF MARCH,
showing positions reached by the assailants.
A RITCHIE & SON, LOIN"
GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
87
i
IV.
sortie
his great
against the
He effected four sorties (of which we shall after- CHA P.
wards hear) against his English besieger, thus largely
extending the front of his great night attack, but
still threw the main weight of his onslaught on that
chosen part of the ground where our French allies were
engaged in sapping their way towards the Mamelon.
The night was dark, and a wind blowing high
intercepted the sound of troops marching, when at
about ten o'clock nine battalions of infantry com-
manded by General Khrouleff moved out from the
flanks of the Kamtchatka Lunette along the Victoria
Ridge; and, another battalion acceding, it was with
a strength of no less than 5500 men that the Russians
soon came into action.*
What these forces had before them were first, the
disputed lodgments, next, the foremost of the new
French approaches' where (with no troops at all
under arms except a few score of Zouaves) 500
men gathered in working-parties' were labour-
ing at their appointed tasks, and beyond, the one
parallel which as yet had been brought to com-
pletion. The French guards of the trenches,' that
night, were under General d'Autemarre, and com-
prised four battalions. Three of these were so posted
that they could be brought up in time for resistance
to Khrouleff's impending attack.
6
Though not without some hard fighting, and even
at one point encountering a somewhat long check,
General Khrouleff's battalions recovered the lodg-
* Khrouleff was the general repulsed by the Turks when assailing
Eupatoria. See ante, chap. ii.
French.
88
THE ENEMY'S
IV.
CHAP. ments which their adversary had been suffered to
occupy, advanced to the head of the sap, and invaded
the foremost approaches,' whence-after, however,
encountering a brave and stubborn resistance they
at last drove in the French working-parties along
with the handful of Zouaves. After leaving in the
' approaches' thus seized a large number of sailors
who there wrought all the havoc they could, Khrou-
leff's force moved on in pursuit, and did this with-
out being met by any blasts of artillery, since the
Frenchmen retreating before it were retreating on the
completed parallel, and therefore masking its fire.
Here, however, by this time were gathered the
three French battalions which d'Autemarre had with-
in reach; and his force now opposed to the Russians
a resistance so strong that those of them who made
bold to adventure beyond the parallel met only their
deaths, whilst those who remained on its verge soon
found themselves engaged in a hot and obstinate fight.
To the enormous preponderance of numbers al-
ready enjoyed by the Russians there now acceded
a new and unexpected advantage; for-led for-
ward by Enseigne Zavalichine-a little body of
troops had by this time moved up a good way upon
what one may call English ground along the edge
of the Woronzoff Ridge; and thus it came to pass
that the French, whilst engaged against the host in
their front, now suddenly found themselves stricken
by a fire from across the ravine, and moreover from
ground so far south that it took their troops in reverse.
Under this serious trial, however, the French showed
GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
89
*
IV.
what on the whole may well be called excellent CHA P.
firmness; and the enemy on the other hand failed
to receive any wholesome impulsion from the sight or
the sound of the fire thus newly befriending him.
His masses still remained hanging back on the verge
of the parallel, and apparently with the loss of their
headway they lost all their clearness of purpose.
There were glimmers of light in the sky which
enabled the French to observe that their assailants
were gathering into groups, like men-not stricken
with panic, yet-bewildered, and in need of sure
guidance. The onset had spent its force, and the
counter-sway followed. Whether simply, as Todle-
ben says, obeying their general's signals reiterated
again and again, or yielding, as Niel asserts, to the
prowess of d'Autemarre's force, the assailants at all
points fell back. They were pressed for a while in
retreat, but soon found the shelter they needed
beneath the guns of the fortress.t
effected
the Eng-
lish siege-
The conflict thus sustained by the French had The sorties
hardly yet reached its height when their English against
neighbours, established on the Woronzoff Ridge,
were also becoming engaged in what-because now
far extending seemed almost a midnight battle.
* General Todleben says that their left fell into a complete rout
'déroute complète'; but, it being undisputed that the French, on the
whole stood fast and repulsed the attack, I have not been brought
to think that my statement in the text is unwarranted.
+ Todleben, vol. ii. p. 68 et seq.; Niel, p. 177 et seq. The two ac-
counts are conflicting.
works.
90
THE ENEMY'S
CHAP.
IV.
Colonel
Kelly's
disposi-
tions.
*
In designing the enterprise levelled against his
English adversaries, the enemy did not make the
mistake of sending out into the darkness a huge,
unwieldy force; but divided his attack on our
siege-works into four distinct sorties, each effected
with moderate numbers; whilst he wisely resolved
that these columns (which comprised in their ranks
many sailors) should all be commanded by naval
officers-men whose skill and resources were such
that they would know how to steer in the dark.
We shall see every one of these captains over-
coming the obstacle of darkness, and successfully
bringing his craft to the chosen point of attack. †
6
The field officer,' that night, on duty in the pre-
cincts of 'Gordon's Attack' was Colonel Kelly; and
of the 1200 men he had under him, one-half at first
guarded the third or their foremost parallel which (if
reckoned with the trench-work prolonging it) may
be said to have crossed the whole breadth of the
Woronzoff Ridge from the Dockyard Ravine on his
right to the Woronzoff Road on his left. These last
600 men were composed of detachments from several
regiments, and stood ranged in the order here
shown:-
Left.-Rifles, 90th, 34th, 88th, 77th, 97th.-Right.
* I do not undertake to give these numbers except in the case of
Béruleff's column.
+ It will be remembered that, when advancing by night upon Tel-el-
Kebir, our army received welcome guidance from the skill of a naval
officer who led it by aid of the stars.
GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
91
IV.
With 300 of his men Colonel Kelly had furnished CHA P.
the working-parties' employed that night, under
the guidance of Colonel Tylden of the Royal Engin-
eers, and the remaining 300 he kept higher up
in reserve. Colonel Kelly enjoyed an advantage
which of course for one acting at midnight
was beyond measure great-that of having at his
side Major Gordon (the directing engineer of the
'Gordon's' or 'Right Attack' siege-works), who
thoroughly well knew the ground.*
Marking all that through darkness and storm the
eye and the ear could still tell him of the conflict
sustained by the French, and learning thus that-
though slowly—the enemy had carried their trenches,
Colonel Kelly divined that the Russians would
very soon turn to their right, and try to make a
sweep along the ground in his rear, where the 300
men he had furnished were busy with pickaxe and
spade. To prepare against any such onset, Colonel
Kelly made these dispositions:-Not disturbing at
all the detachment composed of the 97th men
which formed the extreme right of the line, and
was critically circumstanced, but resorting instead
to the two next detachments (troops furnished by
the 77th and 88th Regiments), he shifted them both.
from their places in the advanced trench, and drew
them up at right angles to it, the 77th men fore-
most, in skirmishing order, supported by the 88th
6
* The greatly distinguished officer who was afterwards General Sir
William Gordon, K.C.B.
,
92
THE ENEMY's
IV.
CHAP. men in line.* To take up the positions thus vacated,
there came down soon afterwards a fresh detachment
one furnished by the 7th Fusiliers.
Zavalich-
ine's flank
Directed by Enseigne Zavalichine (whose fire,
movement. though from "English ground,' had been hitherto
poured on French troops), the attack planned against
our right flank was opening with some shots from
his skirmishers, when under the orders of Boudist-
cheff, and designed to take effect on our front, a
heavier onslaught began.
Boudist-
cheff's
attack.
Greatly favoured of course by the darkness, but
also by the roar of a wind overpowering the sound
of their march, a body of Russian troops moved out
from the lines of Sebastopol, and ascended the Wor-
onzoff Ridge.t Undertaking a front attack on the
extreme right wing of our advanced parallel, the
column opposed its strength to the detachment of
our 97th Regiment - a detachment comprising no
more than some 70 or 80 men, but commanded
by a brave, warlike officer--by Captain Hedley
Vicars.
The column advancing in silence had not seem-
* These dispositions were highly prized by the gifted officer-Major
Gordon-who saw them made, and were afterwards officially eulogised
by General Eyre, 'the general officer of the trenches.' Lord Raglan
to Secretary of State, 27th March 1855.
+ 'A force so far as I could judge of at least 800 men.' So writes
Colonel Kelly, relying upon such personal observation as was possible
in the darkness, but also upon a Russian despatch which purported to
give a detail of the forces engaged by the enemy. The estimate, how-
ever, cannot be reconciled with Todleben's account.
GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
93
IV.
Charge by
with
70 or 80
men of the
97th.
ingly come up so close as to be yet driving in the CHAP.
out-sentries, when it all at once fired a volley. Then
instantly awaiting no orders, entertaining no doubt, Vicars
and listening only, it seems, to that gallant spirit of
his which used always to prompt him in action,
Captain Vicars sprang over the parapet, carrying
with him the whole of the 70 or 80 men who formed
his little detachment, and their ringing cheer, heard
amid darkness that gave to every sound a more than
treble significance, was the cheer of a soldiery-not
halted but―joyously attacking an enemy.
Vicars
joined by
Kelly and
Gordon.
With Gordon still at his side Colonel Kelly was at
this moment busied with the lesser affairs of the
flank attack, but on ground not far from our ad-
vanced parallel; and at the sound of the volley
followed close by the cheer, they both of them sped
off at once to the new scene of action, and were
presently in the midst of the men of the 97th who
had newly sprung over the parapet. Gordon sharing
the fervour of the soldiery was even lending his
voice to the joyous tumult of war when he received
a wound from a musket-shot which struck his right
arm, and disabled him; but Colonel Kelly running for-
ward overtook Captain Vicars and was presently mov-
ing down alongside him against the enemy's column.
It is supposed that, baffled by darkness, the Russians Defeat of
perhaps may have failed to divine the exceeding umn.
scantiness of the impetuous little force that assailed
them with a strength we have already seen estimated
at only about one to ten ;* for, when the advance of
* See ante, p. 92, and footnote.
the col-
94
THE ENEMY'S
IV.
CHAP. our soldiery was becoming, or had nearly become
what Englishmen mean by a charge,' the column
fired a last volley; and then-still hanging together
after the manner of Russians in flight-began to
retreat at the double, its rear files turning however,
and firing back shots whilst they ran.
Defeat of
Zavalich-
ine's col-
umn.
By one of these Parthian balls there was taken
the life of the captain who had ordered and led the
charge. Whilst moving eagerly forward at the side
of Colonel Kelly, and whilst listening indeed to his
words, Hedley Vicars was stricken and killed.
Our soldiery, in spite of the darkness, saw enough
to be sure that their cheers were accelerating the
flight of the column; and a brave little bugler of
the 97th, whose irrepressible zeal kept him always
far out towards the front, was unsparing in the use
of a power with which he seemed to think himself
armed. As he rightly or wrongly imagined, he
made the retreating mass spring at the blast of his
clarion like a horse that is touched with the whip,
and so kept the whole force at a gallop by 'sounding
the advance' in its rear.
?
Colonel Kelly at last stayed the chase, and
brought back the 97th detachment' to its former
post at the trench.
C
With his men of the 77th detachment,' supported
by that of the 88th, Captain Rickman, after a well-
sustained fight, and losing several men, defeated the
venturesome column which Zavalichine had led, and
drove it back down the Ravine.
From this time—about midnight-until one other
GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
95
hour had passed, there was peace on the Woronzoff CHA P.
Heights.
IV.
firing
towards
western
But again at one o'clock in the morning the tumult Sound of
of more and more fighting began to make itself heard;
and the seat of conflict, this time, was a part of the
Ridge further west.
the more
part of the
Woronzoff
Ridge.
measures:
With his newly received detachment of the 7th
Fusiliers now marching westward by fours along the
course of the foremost parallel, Colonel Kelly made
what haste he could towards the sound of the firing; Colonel
Kelly tak-
but the darkness and the state of the trench-still ing his
unfinished and encumbered with stone made the
progress of the troops somewhat slow; and the Colo-
nel himself being able to move at a faster pace pushed
forward impatiently in advance of his men. Soon, he
met Lieutenant Jordan with some men of the 34th
(the Colonel's own regiment), and by him was ap-
prised that the Russians had seemingly entered a
part of the trench further west. The Colonel said
that our people must try to drive the enemy out,
told Jordan to get his men together, informed him
that the detachment of 7th Fusiliers was coming up,
and then once more hastened on towards the sound
of the firing. He had gone but a little way further,
when-standing together in the trench-he saw a
group of seven or eight soldiers whom he took in the
darkness to be men of his own regiment-the 34th.
So, going close up to them, he directed these men to
'fall in' with the other men under Jordan.
He was
96
THE ENEMY'S
but
IV.
wounded
and taken
CHAP. met by an uproar of outlandish cries, and found that
he had been accosting the enemy. He brought out
his revolver, and pointing it at the head of his nearest
prisoner. foe, pulled hard, though in vain, at a trigger held fast
by the 'safety catch.' Whilst lowering his weapon
in order to push back the bolt, he was felled-felled
by numbers of blows laid upon him with the butt-
ends of muskets, and when on the ground was bayo-
neted in the right shoulder, in the left hand, and in
the right leg, whilst also his assailants-not Russians
but Albanian Christians, engaged in the enemy's
service were so emulous in the truculent work of
pounding and battering at him with the stocks of
their firearms that many of the blows they were
levelling intercepted each other, and the victim had
not succumbed, nor even indeed lost his conscious-
ness, when a young Russian officer no less gen-
erous than brave interposed. Standing over the
prostrate Colonel, and so courageously shielding him
as himself to become the recipient of some of the
fiercely aimed blows, this chivalrous noble at last
proved able to make good the rescue, and caused
the wounded Colonel of course as a prisoner of
war to be safely brought into the fortress.*
The misfortune which threw Colonel Kelly into
the hands of the enemy was unknown at the time to
our troops, and men supposed after a while that ‘the
'field officer of the night' had been killed.
* Where by all, let me say, by Prince Gortchakoff, by General
Osten-Sacken, by Admiral Pamphiloff, he was treated with the most
generous and thoughtful kindness. It was from the table of General
Osten-Sacken (the Commandant of Sebastopol) that food was supplied
to the wounded officer.
GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
97
IV.
under As-
Jordan did not mistake when he said that a part CHAP.
of our foremost parallel was seemingly in the enemy's
hands. Moving out from the fortress a body of
troops under Astapoff had advanced, and advanced The attack
unobserved so far up the right bank of the gorge tapoff.
which carries the Woronzoff Road as to be able to
assail by surprise the left flank, to operate advan-
tageously against the left of our foremost parallel.
They accordingly-surprising the trench-guards—
broke into a part of the parallel lying westward of
the Mortar Battery; * and after thus entering the
work, pursued the advantage some way along the
course of the trench without meeting, so far as is
known, any strongly sustained resistance at the
hands of troops caught under circumstances which
prevented them from showing a front.
(
resistance
Able officers, however, were busied in the task of Means of
collecting some means with which to repel the in- collected.
vasion. Marsh (the Adjutant of the trenches'
that night) got together some men. Lieutenant
Jordan went on endeavouring to increase the small
number of 34th men already brought under his
leadership. The detachment of the 7th Fusiliers
under Captain Cavendish Browne was coming up
in a collected state; and finally, Colonel Tylden of
the Royal Engineers (the officer destined to com-
mand our people in the approaching combat), got
together the men of the working - parties whose
* Whether they entered (as Todleben thought) at the flank, or (as
Lord Raglan supposed) by the left front, or, as seems probable, by the
left rear, there are seemingly no means of showing.
VOL. VII.
G
98
THE ENEMY'S
CHAP. labours he before had been guiding, and caused
them to stand to their arms.
IV.
Fight at
the Mortar
Battery.
The conflict drew to a head on the site of a new
mortar battery which occupied the trench near its
centre.
The enemy advanced on this battery from the
west, the English from the east, and within it the
two forces met, moving each of them with bayonets
fixed alongside the parapet, and of course therefore
facing the traverses. At the first traverse, the Rus-
sians made a protracted stand. Colonel Tylden
came up in person, and his own idea seemingly was
to execute a charge straight forward from east to
west along the foot of the parapet; but our people
instead, with a rush, drove their way round the end
of the traverse, overthrew at the point of the bayo-
net all they then found before them, and, pursuing,
approached the next traverse, where the enemy
Defeat and made his last stand. Colonel Tylden by yet one
charge more' overcame the resistance there offered,
drove the Russians all out of the battery, and pur-
sued them some way along the course of the trench,
but the fugitives before very long were all of them
over the parapet and making off towards the Redan.
flight of
the Rus-
sian col-
umn.
C
C
The two English detachments engaged in this
part of the field lost three officers and several
men.*
Whilst this last combat was raging, yet one other
* Captain the Hon. Cavendish Browne of the 7th Fusiliers and
Lieutenant Jordan of the 34th were killed, and Lieutenant McHenry
of the 34th Regiment wounded.
GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
99
C
IV.
Béruleff's
our ad-
vanced
siege-
the Left
Attack.
sortie began, and was directed against our Left CHAP.
Attack. A column commanded by Béruleff about
500 in number moved out against that foremost surprise of
trench at the base of Green Hill which was after-
wards called the 4th Parallel.*
Favoured greatly, works in
as had been other columns, by the darkness of the
night and the roaring of the wind, but also by the
sound of the fighting then rife on the Woronzoff
Ridge, this column surprised and drove in the
detachments of the 20th Regiment, which had lined
the parapet of the advanced trench, and, driving
forward yet further, a great number of the assailants
soon entered the two new and incomplete batteries,
the advanced No. VII.' and the advanced No.
VIII.,' which had been established in our 3d Par-
allel, there surprising the 'working-parties'-250 in
number which under Captain Montagu of the
Royal Engineers were busied in thickening the
parapets. The rest of the assailants, if minded to
pursue their advantage, were still at the time hang-
ing back in or near to the trench they had carried.
In the hope of opposing to these some beginning Part of the
at least of resistance, Lieutenant Carlton of the force
21st Fusiliers-a young officer on guard at the
Zigzag uniting the two foremost parallels-col-
lected his own little force-about 50 in number
adding to it some men of the 57th whom he found
within reach, and then at once opened fire on the
hesitating conquerors of the advanced trench who
* Todleben puts the strength of this column at 475, with besides a
company of the Okhotsk regiment in reserve.-Vol. ii. p. 76.
invading
checked
by some
men of the
21st Fusi-
liers under
Carlton;
100
THE ENEMY'S
IV.
CHAP. were thus, as it seemed, brought to bay. Instead
of advancing, they replied to the fire of our people
with fire from the ground where they stood. After
combating in this way for some time with the small
English force which had challenged them, the in-
truders slackened their fire without seeming in-
clined to advance. Observing this, Carlton once
more collected his men, pushed forward into the
trench, and there found the enemy already in the act
of deserting it.
and ulti-
mately re-
treating
before it.
Russian
troops for
a while in
the two
advanced
batteries;
but routed
by the
Those separated bodies of men which had entered
the VII.' and 'VIII.' batteries, where our men were
at work, took three of them prisoners with also the
captain of engineers who was directing their labours.
They made themselves at home in the advanced No.
'VII.' and the advanced No. VIII.' during nearly,
it is said, half an hour, doing all the little mischief
they could to unfinished sandbag-batteries which had
not at that time been armed.
6
They also possessed themselves of seventy pick-
axes, together with fifty shovels, and the simple
Russian soldier-always strangely enjoying the cap-
ture of any small chattel-was perhaps somewhat
slow to infer that those who had thrown down their
tools might be taking up arms-might be on him
with what men in general can see through even
much darkness-the shining of bayonets fixed.
Yet that was the sequel awaiting him. Captain
men of our Chapman of the 20th (but acting that night as an
engineer) led forward some men of the working-party
working-
parties.
GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
101
IV.
who already had stood to their arms against the CHAP.
500 intruders, overthrew them by a charge with the
bayonet, and drove them all out of our siege-works.
They left behind them ten of their killed, and two of
their wounded men.
In two out of those four sorties which the enemy
thus aimed with much skill at his English besiegers,
he surprised the guards of the trenches, so that ob-
viously, in the planting of the out-sentries, or in
some of the other known tasks by which troops
maintain a good watch, there must needs have
occurred grave defaults; but against want of vigi-
lance the usual defect of our people may be set
the rare prowess, the warlike presence of mind, the
inborn love of close fighting which sooner or later
defeated and turned to rout and confusion every one
of these midnight attacks.
Lord Raglan was warm in his praises of the gal-
lantry with which officers and men-men so many
of them called from their toil with pickaxe and
spade--had met the successive emergencies, and—
not confused by the darkness, not putting a weak
trust in cartridges-proved able to drive off the
masses one after another by simply the use of the
bayonet.
To this wise appreciation of feats which, although,
it is true, taking place in very small spheres of
action, were not the less fraught with good proof of
102
THE ENEMY'S
CHAP. the quality of our officers and men, the Queen was
IV. pleased to respond in gracious words of approval.*
Comments
on the
great sortie
effected
against the
French.
Still, of course, the great dominant feature of the
engagements which the enemy undertook on the
night of the 22d of March was his attack delivered
in darkness against the French 'approaches' with
5500 men.
Tested simply by what it effected, or avowedly
sought to effect, a night attack of this kind might be
made to seem almost trivial. What, however, pre-
vented the enterprise from ranging with those petty
sorties which I do not undertake to record was the
strangely great number of troops that the enemy
engaged in his venture, and the carnage his effort
involved. Moving out into darkness with several
thousands of men, he inflicted, it is true, on the
French a loss of 600 in killed, or wounded, and on
the English a loss of 70, but then also of his own
troops he sacrificed no less than 1300.
General Niel has officially stated that the injuries
this strong effort wrought on the works of the be-
siegers were, after all, insignificant ; † and has thence
gone on to submit that an enterprise which effected
so little at so heavy a cost is a wholesome example
* Lord Raglan's means of informing himself on this subject were
impaired by losses of officers; and with the materials before me, I
have been prevented from adopting some of his conclusions. His
reports are contained in despatches to the Secretary of State of the 24th
and 27th March (published), and in a private letter of the 24th to Lord
Panmure. The Official Record of the combats by the Royal Engineers
is in Part II. of the Journal, p. 94.
'Insignifiants.'-Niel, p. 179.
GREAT NIGHT ATTACK.
103
of the error there always must be in attempting any CHAP.
great sortie under cover of darkness.
On the other hand, General Todleben has com-
mented on the very same enterprise in a victori-
ous, satisfied tone, and maintained that the capital
object of putting a check on the French approaches
at the point they had reached was one of truly great
moment which the sortie completely achieved; but
then, I see, he goes on to eke out his defence of
the measure by referring to its moral effect, and
insisting that it not only cheered opportunely the
hearts of the Russians, but also wrought such dis-
couragement on the minds of the French as long
sufficed to deter them from closing with his darling
Lunette.*
It may be that, to check the approaches,' though
for only a very brief interval, was to gain some great,
lasting advantage; † but in the absence of even a
statement on which to found such a belief, it is
hard to feel sure that for any purpose so small as
that of merely upsetting gabions, or doing other like
mischief, the enemy would really have brought him-
self to plunge into outer darkness with the thousands
of men he thus hazarded; and perhaps one may
fairly surmise that in secret he harboured some
greater, some much more ambitious design than the
one he avowed-some design of which-since it was
frustrated he did not feel bound to speak. Con-
jecture points to an enterprise which, if compassed,
* Todleben, vol. ii. pp. 78, 79.
† As, e.g., to gain time until the arrival of expected reinforcements.
IV.
104
PROGRESS OF THE COUNTER-APPROACHES.
CHAP. and well followed up by the proper ulterior measures
IV. might have forced the Allies to give battle-give
battle by daylight -under desperately adverse
conditions.
Great ex-
tension
given by
Todleben
to his
coun-
ter-ap-
proaches.
IX.
Whilst continually strengthening the armament
of his three new creations, Colonel Todleben at this
time, fore-trenched them by connecting some of the
lodgments already protecting each Work; and more-
over he added and added to those annexed lines of
defence which prolonged right and left the front
shown by his now strong Lunette. When the first
week of April was ending, he had fastened his
counter-approaches on a front (in advance of the
Mamelon) which from ground so far east as the bed
of the Careenage Ravine stretched far away towards
the south-west, and at last crossed the Woronzoff
Road.*
As though he were indeed the besieger, and his
new trenches so many parallels, he armed them here
and there with artillery. If he had not yet barred
by an unbroken line of entrenchments the ground
lately won on Mount Inkerman, he had covered
it nevertheless by the fire of his two White
Redoubts; and on the whole one may say that his
new outer line of defence extended now from the
* Todleben, ii. p. 80 et seq. The gorge which carried the Woronzoff
Road was by the Russians called 'the Laboratory Ravine.' Our people
used to call the ravine by the name of the road passing through it.
FRENCH AND ENGLISH SIEGE-WORKS.
105
foot of St George's Ravine to the course of the CHAP.
Woronzoff Road. It encircled at all but one place
the whole land-front of the Faubourg.
C
Thus on that newest front for attack' of which
the Allies had made choice when devising their great
change of plan, the terrible Colonel of Sappers was
already forestalling, and baffling their studied de-
signs; nay was even indeed so employing the spells
of his art that-not the garrison merely but rather
-the fortress itself might almost be said to advance
against the Frenchmen besieging it.
IV.
of the 1st
now so far
as to be
The French did not arrest their approaches' The design
along the Victoria Ridge (where by this time they of January
touched on their left a new parallel formed by the frustrated
English), and they still continued their siege-works almost in
begun long ago on Mount Inkerman; but in the abeyance.
absence of any resolve to counteract recent checks
by seizing the two White Redoubts and the now
strong Lunette on the Mamelon, it would be hard to
deny that at this time, the great design of the 1st
of January had undergone so much frustration as
to be nearly in a state of abeyance.
X.
tained
Our allies, all this time, both above and below the The siege
operations
earth's surface had been pressing their siege opera- main-
tions against the town front of Sebastopol, whilst against
the English with scantier numbers, and besides on front;
more difficult ground, had been slowly pushing for-
the town
106
MOVEMENT OF TURKISH TROOPS.
IV.
and by
the Eng-
CHAP. ward their batteries against the Redan and its
neighbours; but then also-resorting to means such
as those we before saw him use-the unwearied
Colonel of Sappers had never for one moment ceased
to keep his assailants confronted by so strong a
growth of defences, and so eager, so constant a
the Redan handling of his warlike resources, that, although it
cost them great sacrifices, and extended along a front
of four miles, this now subordinate part of the
general conflict did not rage in a way that seemed
tending towards any momentous result.
lish
against
and its
neigh-
bours.
Continu-
ance and
final suc-
cess of
General
Canro-
bert's ef-
forts to
forcements
from the
Turkish
army at
XI.
General Canrobert, as we have seen, had long
been desiring, and at last craving almost passion-
ately that a great part of Omar Pasha's force at
Eupatoria should be brought to the Chersonese; but
draw rein- Lord Raglan was strongly opposed to the idea. He
conceived that Omar Pasha firmly planted at Eupa-
toria with 40,000 victorious troops on the flank and
Eupatoria. rear of the enemy was doing excellent service, and
besides did not like that the narrow, the cramped.
seat of war to which the besiegers unfortunately had
perforce become chained should be loaded by the
additional presence of Turkish troops, whilst more-
over he took it for granted that the measure would
be displeasing to Omar Pasha. But in proportion
to the increasing depth of that gloom which we
have seen overcasting the mind of General Canrobert
VARIOUS OCCURRENCES.
107
IV.
was his anxiety to secure the proposed reinforce- CHA P.
ment; and his instances made with this object
became more and more constant and more and more
urgent. Lord Raglan still resisting, Canrobert ap-
proached Omar Pasha himself, and found him willing
on certain specified terms to come on in person to
the Chersonese with a large portion of his army, and
to remain there for a limited time. Lord Raglan
did not think fit to oppose the thus conjoined wishes
of the French and Turkish commanders; and before Arrival
the close of the period which this chapter spans, Pasha
Omar Pasha was brought to the Chersonese with with a
from 15,000 to 18,000 men supported by thirty of Turks.
pieces of field-artillery.*
of Omar
in person
large force
XII.
It was perceived by the Russians that the men-of-
war they had sacrificed after the battle of the Alma
in order to close the entrance of the Roadstead were
no longer so holding together as to constitute a Sinking
secure barrier, and towards the end of February they Russian
sank six more of their ships.t
of more
ships.
Death of
but imparted
new bastopol
Nicholas
In Sebastopol, the death of the Emperor Nicholas
was concealed with much care for some time;
afterwards, there came in a Rescript from the
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, April 7, 1855.
+ Todleben, vol. ii. p. 40.
‡ Ibid., p. 45.
to the Se-
garrison.
108
BURGOYNE.
IV.
CHAP. Czar which brought both condolence and greeting
to the valiant garrison. With none of the misty
grandeur which veils like conceptions in the poems
of Ossian, and rather indeed with the air of a flat—
though celestial-Court Circular' describing the
movements of princes, the garrison were informed
that translated to eternal life the supreme chief of
'the orthodox warriors' (that is, the late Emperor
Nicholas) was blessing from on high their unequalled
'firmness and intrepidity.'*
Change of
Russian
com-
manders.
Prince M.
Gortcha-
koff;
<
In the command of the Russian forces Prince
Mentschikoff was succeeded by Prince Michael Gort-
chakoff; and General Osten-Sacken was placed at
the head of the Sebastopol garrison.
Prince Michael Gortchakoff was a man of intellect
and ripe cultivation, with some theoretical know-
ledge of the art of war; but what rendered the
choice of this general supremely advantageous to
a supreme- Russia was his early and sustained appreciation of
ate choice? the great volunteer.
what
made this
ly fortun-
The new commander-in-chief being he who had
had the good fortune to launch Colonel Todleben on
the scene of his glory, might prove able to secure
him against strong and jealous opposers-in his
hold of the power he needed for continuing the
defence of Sebastopol.
* Ibid., pp. 45, 46. The Russians are a poetic people, and I cannot
doubt that in that true Muscovy of which Moscow is the centre, people
might have been found who could express a thought of this kind with
dignity and genuine enthusiasm; but to get such a task performed
worthily by a cold-blooded clerk at St Petersburg was beyond the
range of things possible.
BURGOYNE.
109
IV.
On the 17th of March, the Russians lost their CHA P.
valiant Admiral Istomine. A cannon-ball killed
him whilst standing by the then new Kamtchatka Istomine
Lunette.*
Admiral
killed.
Before the close of the period embraced by this
chapter, our Headquarters lost the assistance of that
veteran engineer officer whose counsels, since the
day of the Alma, had exerted an unrelaxed sway on
the chequered course of events. Pursuant to the
early decision of Lord Palmerston's new Administra-
tion, General Harry Jones on reaching the Crimea
was at once put in orders as the commander of our
military engineers, and Sir John Burgoyne being
apprised of the instructions recalling him ceased of
course to hold power officially at the seat of war. +
Lord Raglan, however, believed that at that par-
ticular time when the French overmastered by
Todleben were submitting to his counter-approaches,
the continued aid of Burgoyne would be of great
value to the public service,§ and he therefore
requested the general to remain for a while at
headquarters.
+
of Sir John
This Burgoyne did, and it was Departure
only in the third week of March that he left the Burgoyne.
Crimea.
* Ibid., p. 64.
† Ante, vol. vi. p. 320.
Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure-Private Letter-3d March 1855.
§ Lord Raglan of course imparted to his Government the step he
thus took. Ibid.
|| Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, 19th March 1855.
110
BURGOYNE.
CHAP.
IV.
In the autumn of the previous year Burgoyne
not only championed that measure which restored
to the enemy's forces their all - precious line of
communication, but opposed himself to any prompt
seizure of the then almost helpless Sebastopol
which Mentschikoff had left to its fate; and he
clung indeed so tenaciously to the idea of pro-
ceeding against the place by means of covered
batteries that—almost without knowing it—he drew
the Allies on and on into the curious error of pre-
ferring a siege to a conquest, though better than
most men he knew that the siege thus strangely
preferred must needs be one undertaken with grossly
inadequate means; (7) and of course with the plain
facts before me, I have not been able to think that
any such counsels were sound.+
But when once the Allies had committed them-
selves to the task of a siege, and the thus narrowed
question asked only how best to conduct it,
Burgoyne-then no longer the strategist but-the
skilled, the accomplished engineer, brought to bear
on his objects a keen, piercing intellect, a bold,
hopeful spirit, vast energies always sustained by a
manful warlike zeal; and the events of the 17th of
October the day he dealt his first blow-showed
plainly enough to all that the veteran when striking
struck hard.
* See ante, vol. iii. pp. (in 3d edition) 86, 87, 92, 161, 168, 195,
213, 214, 215.
+ See ante, vol. iii. chaps. ii. iv. vii. viii. ix. x. xi. xii. xiv. xvi.
xvii. xviii. and xx.
BURGOYNE.
111
IV.
Owing mainly perhaps to the circumstance of his CHAP
being styled an adviser' instead of holding simple
'command,' he used often to recommend measures
without having learnt antecedently the number of
troops or workmen that well could be spared for
the purpose, and therefore of course the foundations
on which any such project rested were 'postulates'
rather than facts; (8) but, although for this reason
his counsels furnished often much more of sugges-
tion than of actual, present guidance, they still
were always enlightening, and at last, as we saw,
they won their own way to acceptance by Canrobert
and all his generals.
Lord Palmerston's newly formed Government
were content with the plan of siege formed on the
1st of January at the instance of Sir John Bur-
goyne; and one therefore may fairly surmise that,
when determining to recall the adviser,' they
mainly based their resolve upon a disapproval of
those early counsels' anterior to the siege which
I have not attempted to screen from the charge
of being pernicious; so that, if my conjecture be
sound, the Ministers may be said to have judged
him for what he had done much more than for
what he was doing. In the absence of that
explanation, it would seem in some measure anom-
alous that they should be determining to withdraw
him from the scene of action at a time when they
knew that the French had at last accepted his
guidance.
The actual withdrawal of Sir John Burgoyne
112
GREAT AND VAIN PREPARATIONS.
CHAP. from the seat of war was-for him at least-more
IV.
opportune than the order recalling him. From the
24th of February to the time of his departure on
the 20th of March, he had been under the torment
of seeing the French acquiesce in the counter-
approaches, and this too on 'the Inkerman flank
where his very heart seemed to dwell.
Lord Raglan did not suffer Burgoyne to depart
without addressing to him a letter expressive of the
grateful appreciation with which he regarded his
services.
Prepara-
tions for a
great can-
nonade.
Allusion
to recent
disclos-
ures.
XIII.
During all the latter part of the period embraced
by this chapter, the Allies had been not only busied
in arming their batteries with more and heavier
guns, but also—and with good help at last from the
railway our people had made-in bringing up to
their heights such huge loads of ordnance ammuni-
tion, and other artillery stores as might serve for a
great cannonade.
The bulk of the allied armies had looked forward
for weeks and for weeks to the thus prepared effort
of heavy ordnance power as a measure that seemed
to be big with the long-delayed fate of Sebastopol ;
but some light newly thrown on the transactions of
1855 has enabled me, if so one may speak, to avert
disappointment, and warn inquirers beforehand that,
when seeing General Canrobert engaged in the
GREAT AND VAIN PREPARATIONS.
113
IV.
promised bombardment, they will see in him—not C H A P.
a real Chief, but rather a fettered lieutenant with-
out the freedom of action, without the ulterior pur-
pose which alone could give mighty significance to
his use of the French breaching guns.*
* The nature of the 'light newly thrown' will appear post, in
chap. v.
VOL. VII.
H
114
SECRET TERMS
CHAPTER V.
THE SECRET TERMS OF THE MISSION ENTRUSTED TO
GENERAL NIEL.
V.
CHAP. THOSE who now have sufficiently seen General Can-
robert yielding and yielding to the series of affronts.
put upon him by an audacious garrison, will be in
the mood for inquiring whether this long-continued
submissiveness was all his own, or might partly be
traced to misguidance imposed by the hand of
authority.
The
French
Emperor
beginning
in secret
with the
siege.
The engagements of the 1st of January were still
only new, when the Emperor Louis Napoleon began
to counterplot them, and-concealing his design
to interfere from our people-to frame an ill-omened scheme
which tended to put in abeyance the enterprise of
Canrobert's army, and keep it for nearly three
months in what might well seem to observers a
faltering, half-hearted state, though its real condition,
as now we are able to see, was one of another kind.
It was an army-not stricken with palsy from any
defect in itself, but-persistently held back by its
sovereign in furtherance of a secret design.
OF NIEL'S MISSION.
115
V.
General
Niel.
His opin-
ions on the
the war
The Emperor concerted his measures with General CHAP.
Niel, an engineer officer of 'high standing and
'repute' who, though not having yet taken part in
the Eastern campaign, had still brought himself to
form on the subject some strongly rooted opinions.
So far as concerned that past era which extended
from the victory of the Alma to the opening of subject of
trenches against Sebastopol, his opinions were of in the
a kind which-in deference to general accord-
may now be treated as sound. He considered that
the Allies had gone far astray when they wilfully
restored to the enemy his captured line of communi-
cation, and instead of breaking into Sebastopol-
resolved to assail it by siege without first investing
the place.
Fully granting the errors thus charged against the
Allies, it did not of necessity follow that, after all
they had done—after giving back to the enemy his
strong Mackenzie Heights, and for months at the
cost of huge sacrifices going on with the siege-the
wisest course they could take was to act, as it were,
penitentially, and try to retrace their false steps.
Niel, however, entertained no such doubt. He be-
lieved that by simple resort to what he considered
fit means, Sebastopol might surely be taken, whilst
also he firmly maintained that, without resort to
those means, it could never be taken at all.
In
order to carry Sebastopol, the Allies, he declared,
must invest it.
This condition involved a resort to some new cam-
paign in the open.
Crimea.
116
SECRET TERMS
CHAP.
V.
The desire
of the
French
Emperor.
The 'mis-
'sion' of
General
Niel.
Niel's po-
sition at
Now also, the brooding French Emperor had
begun to imagine that a little campaign of this sort
might win for him infinite glory with proportionate
increase of strength, if he himself—present in person
-were to lead the field-army, thus bringing about
by swift magic that long-deferred fall of Sebastopol
which other mortals as yet had been signally failing
to compass.
The judgment of the engineer officer was there-
fore found to harmonise well with the desire of the
Emperor; and the two men were soon of one mind,
nay apparently were so well agreed that the object
of General Niel's 'mission' was rather to mature on
the spot an already sketched plan of campaign than
simply to inquire, and seek light. It was seemingly
intended at first that, after maturing the plan, Gen-
eral Niel should return to France, and submit his
conclusions to the French Emperor; but after a
while, it appeared that, without resort to that step,
the understanding between the Emperor and his
counsellor had been rendered sufficiently complete
by interchanged letters or messages; and, although
it is true, General Niel had at one time made all his
arrangements for returning to France, and did indeed
go to Constantinople (whilst waiting for further in-
structions), we still may say that substantially, his
mission was uninterrupted.*
The position he held at the French Headquarters
the French could not plainly be other than one of a strange and
Headquar-
ters.
* This results, I think, clearly from the extracts which M. Rousset
gives of Niel's letters, vol. ii. p. 34 et seq.
OF NIEL'S MISSION.
117
6
exceptional kind. His ostensible function was that CHAP.
of an 'Aide-de-camp of the Emperor on mission to
the Army of the East,' with a military position
which placed him at the top of the Engineer Staff;*
but of course the bare fact of his 'mission' sufficed
amply to show that he must be acting in concert
with the Emperor, and therefore wielding great
power. He did not disguise from himself that the
'mission' entrusted to him was perforce overshadow-
ing Bizot, the commander of the French Engineers,
whilst also indeed it is plain that his presence
obscured the authority of even the Commander-in-
Chief, though to Canrobert-a man not self-seeking,
but fevered by doubt and anxiety-the shade which
thus overcast him may perhaps, after all, have been
welcome. He might naturally enough have been
glad to find himself much shorn of power, and pro-
portionately disburdened of care.
V.
When advising the arrangements recorded on the His plan.
2d of February, General Niel, we now see, was pre-
paring a retreat for the French from their engage-
ments of the 1st of January, and bringing things
into conformity with his inchoate plan of campaign
then already approaching completion. By the middle
of February he had not only brought this new plan to
what he thought perfect maturity, but had even pro-
ceeded to use it, or rather, I must say, to use part of it †
for the enlightenment-or guidance-of Canrobert.
* As shown by 'la situation' of the 15th February.—Niel, p. 476.
+ See post, p. 120, as to the 'Separate Article' which was withheld
from him.
SECRET TERMS
118
CHAP.
V
The all-governing condition of the new plan was
one which required the Allies to reverse, as it were,
their 'flank march,' to win and take up a position
between the Tchernaya and the Belbec in the neigh-
bourhood of Mackenzie's Farm, to besiege the Star
Fort, and in short to make themselves masters on
the north of the Roadstead. The resources Niel
judged to be needed for effecting this reconquest
of ground both won and abandoned by the armies
which made the 'flank march' were stated to be
50,000 men and 6000 horses provisioned for two
days with 220 waggons, 1100 draught-horses, and
3500 mules. † By a due use of these resources
the investment of Sebastopol was to be completed;
and the measure was supported for reasons which,
if once accepted by Canrobert, would at once ex-
tinguish all chance of his going on with the siege
in any such spirit as that which had ruled the
Allies on the 1st of January. The authoritative
adviser explained that, until completely invested,
Sebastopol could not be taken; thus in other
‡
words laying it down that, till that undefinable
time when a newly imagined campaign might
be brought to a fortunate close, any enterprise
attempted by storming would be a vain sacrifice
*Line 27 et seq. in the Letter from General Niel to the French
Emperor, 14th February 1855. (1) Rousset, vol. ii. pp. 33, 34.
+ Ibid., line 62 et seq. However sound in its main principles, the
plan without more explanation than Niel gives is made to seem
strangely crude.
Ibid., line 25 et seq. In a letter to the Minister of War (quoted
by Rousset, vol. ii. p. 34) he says: 'Croyez, Monsieur le Maréchal,
qu'on ne fera rien sans investir.'
OF NIEL'S MISSION.
119
*
V.
of life. He did not, however, leave this conclusion CHA P.
to inference, but went on in set terms to denounce
as too hazardous the idea of any great onslaught
attempted by storm against either the Town or the
Faubourg. There was to be an artillery-fire carried
on without undue haste under cover of which the
'approaches' might be pushed on so close to the
defences as at last to allow of assault by compara-
tively small numbers of men against either the
Flagstaff Bastion or the Malakoff; but those
future assaults were not meant to take place
until the investment of Sebastopol should be
brought to completion by the newly projected
campaign.
6
After having thus shown what he meant as
regards abstention from enterprise, Niel used a
compendious adverb. He summed up his con-
clusions by saying that the right course was this:
To go on "prudently" with the siege,' and to cut
off' as soon as possible the communications [of the
garrison] with the interior of the Crimea.' This
plan was one framed in substantial conformity with
what Niel rightly understood to be the wish of
French Emperor; § and so early as the 14th
February, it won the
the approval of Canrobert;
whilst also I gather that from the day (the 23d of
+ Ibid., line 49 et seq.
* Ibid., line 45 et seq.
Ibid., line 56 et seq.
the
The plan
in general
conformity
with the
wish of
the French
of
Emperor
and ap-
||
proved by
§ Speaking of a time not later than the 3d of February 1855,
Rousset says: 'L'Empereur avait en principe adopté les idées de
'son aide de camp.' Vol. ii. p. 35.
|| Ibid., line 58 et seq. It is immediately after his summing up of
the plan that Niel adds: 'Le Général Canrobert le juge ainsi.'
Canrobert.
120
SECRET TERMS
V.
CHAP. February *) when Niel returned to the French Head-
quarters after his very brief visit to Constantinople,
he constantly made it his task to keep the siege in
conformity with that restrained system of action
which his written precepts enjoined.t
Neil's
task.
The army
of Canro-
secretly
under
restraint.
course of
<
Thus the first of the two objects indicated by
bert kept General Niel's summary-that of putting restraint
on Canrobert's army-was fully secured; and
measures were promptly taken for achieving the
other great object-the investment of Sebastopol on
The Em- its North Side. A part of the plan which-be-
peror's
plan put in cause not imparted to Canrobert-may be called its
execution. Separate Article' had laid it down from the first
that the task of thus completing the investment
should be undertaken by the Emperor in person
with the aid of fresh troops in large numbers sent
out from France or Algeria; and, so early as the
3d of February, Marshal Vaillant, the Minister of
War, was already giving his orders for assembling on
ground near Constantinople the new forces meant
to take part in Louis Napoleon's enterprise.‡
So, the project of Niel and his Emperor was no
longer a mere creature of the brain, but a military
plan in full course of execution. The very peculiar
task of restraining Canrobert's forces without show-
* Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure, 24th February 1855.
+ See the quotations from letters of Niel given by Rousset, vol. ii.
p. 34 et seq, and especially the one of the 17th of February 1855.
‡ From 40,000 to 60,000 men.-Vaillant to General Larchey, quoted
Rousset, vol. ii. p. 35. However, in the middle of April, the French
'Reserve' army collected in the neighbourhood of Constantinople
had a strength of only 25,000.
OF NIEL'S MISSION.
121
V.
ing them to be under restraint was successfully CHA P.
begun and continued. (2) The business of assem-
bling an army to serve under Louis Napoleon was
carried on with alacrity. There of course came a
time when the process of collecting this force on
the Bosphorus disclosed itself to the world; but the Conceal-
object for which it was destined could still be con- the plan
cealed. And, concealed it was-concealed from our English;
Government, and concealed from Lord Raglan,* but
also, strange to say, from General Canrobert himself,
the Emperor's half-trusted commander!t
France and England, remember, were not merely
joined in alliance but-arrayed side by side in the
presence of a powerful enemy; and, that under
such conditions the French Emperor, and official
men under him, could deliberately persist in the
notion of hiding away from Lord Raglan the very
plan they were executing may seem almost too
strange for credence, yet must needs be believed—
because true. Our people are not suspicious, and
the Emperor's scheme of concealment was crowned
with real, lasting success. (3)
ment of
from the
and of its
separate
article
*
from Can-
robert.
sions
It is true that with what seemed like frankness the Impres-
Emperor from time to time spoke to Lord Cowley and caused
others of his intention to go out to the Crimea, but prospect
those surface disclosures apparently gave actual aid Emperor's
* So late as the 3d of April, Lord Raglan wrote:-
What a body
'of French troops is collecting at Constantinople for, I cannot divine.'
To Lord Panmure, Private Letter.
Rousset 'Le secret sur ce grand envoi de troupes devait être
'absolument gardé. Le général Canrobert lui-même n'en devait rien
'apprendre.' Vol. ii. p. 35.
by the
of the
122
SECRET TERMS
V.
going
to the
Crimea.
6
CHAP. to concealment of the inner purpose by causing the
surmises of men to fly off in other directions. Some
thought with alarm of what might happen in Paris
during the Emperor's absence; and others-with yet
more anxiety-of what might take place in the
Crimea, if the Emperor should go out and entrust
himself with the command of the French army.
General Canrobert was apparently left to hear from
private sources or from rumours in camp of the
Emperor's intention to visit the Crimea ;t and he
thought that the step would be a very false move.'‡
Lord Raglan considered that, if ever adventured at
all, the visit from Louis Napoleon would be a measure
fraught with dangers and mischiefs to be looked for
in France as well as at the seat of war;§ and his
conditional forecast included the embarrassing burthen
-the 'great gêne,' as he expressively called it-that
would be laid upon the Allies before Sebastopol by
the Emperor's undesired presence; but he did not
allow himself to be made at all anxious on the
subject, being sanguine enough to believe, in face
of all contrary assurances, that the Emperor would
never come out. No one seems to have divined
that the Emperor-though a man strangely fond of
* Lord John Russell to Lord Raglan, Private Letter, March 12, 1855.
+ Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure, Private Letter, April 3, 1855.
Ibid.
§ Ibid., and letters to same of 17th, 20th, 27th, and 31st March.
|| Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure, Private Letter, March 17, 1855.
Lord Raglan liked Louis Napoleon personally; and after writing to
the effect above stated, he added this :-'Personally I should have no
'difficulty in communicating with him.'
T Same to same, April 3, 1855.
OF NIEL'S MISSION.
123
V.
effecting theatric surprises, and believed to be intent CHA P.
on the notion of assuming high command at the seat
of war-might desire to keep Canrobert's army in a
state of restraint, with its fires, as the phrase is,
'banked up' until the time of his own arrival, when
troubles unnumbered, and successive disappointments,
and the weariness of hope long deferred would be
all at once followed by what the play-books call
flourishes,' by victory, conquest, and triumph. The
'mission' of General Niel was full fraught, as we
saw, with this purpose; yet-secrecy being main- The con-
tained-it did not afford to observers apt means from Lord
Raglan
of seeing the truth. Lord Raglan knew that the main-
General-an Engineer officer-had come out with with con-
instructions to look into the state of the siege
but, far from appearing disposed to put restraint
on Canrobert's army, the new comer spoke as one
urgent in the very opposite direction.
In conversa-
.
tion with Lord Raglan he professed to maintain
that ‘a regular approach to the Tower of Malakoff
'would inconveniently defer the attack of the
'place,' and caused his hearer to think he was
'evidently bent on an assault !'†
Lord Raglan would scarce have complained, if
frankly informed by Canrobert that the Emperor's
new adviser disapproved the engagements of the 1st
of January, and wished them to be all reconsidered.
* Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle, Private Letter, January 29,
1855.
+ Ibid. Niel spoke mysteriously of other measures,' and we can
now see that he was thinking of the proposed investment, but he
conveyed no such idea to Lord Raglan.
cealment
tained
tinued
success.
124
SECRET TERMS
V.
CHAP. But no such suggestion was made. With the aid of
very recent disclosures we have been able indeed to
perceive that by his dispositions of the 1st and 2d
of February Niel was preparing-and covering—
a retreat from the engagements made with Lord
Raglan at the beginning of the previous month; but
our allies at the time, gave no indication at all of
any such purpose. Both Lord Raglan and Burgoyne
were effectually led to believe that the French ar-
rangements of the 1st and 2d of February had been
honestly adopted in furtherance-though with varied
appliances of the stipulations made between Gen-
eral Canrobert and General Airey on the opening
day of the year.
*
A day indeed was approaching when Lord Raglan
would be openly told that the French commander
was hampered by his sovereign's restraining orders;
but I am speaking now of the interval from the
27th of January to the third week of April ;
and what I say is that from the beginning to the
end of that period, all knowledge of the fact that
Canrobert had been brought under the restraints im-
posed by the Emperor's plan was effectually con-
cealed from Lord Raglan.
After the close of the period above indicated the
Emperor and his confidential servants still went on
* The 27th of January was the day of Niel's landing. It was on
the 16th of April that Canrobert (as recorded in the secret despatch of
the 17th) read out to Lord Raglan the passage of a letter from the Em-
peror which will be found post, chap. viii. p. 220; and that, I believe,
was the earliest intimation Lord Raglan received of the 'tethering' to
which the French army was subject.
OF NIEL'S MISSION.
125
V.
concealing the fact of their having been pursuing a CHAP.
plan during several months which they had all the
while kept strictly hidden from their English allies;
and it was only from disclosures which the fall of
the Empire made possible that the unseemly truth
came to light.
6
'
of the dif-
tween the
certed
the with Lord.
before any
Raglan by
and the
one framed
by Niel.
Between the plan concerted with Lord Raglan on Greatness
the 1st of January, and the one now accepted from ference be-
Niel by General Canrobert, the difference of course plan con-
was immense; for this project of invading
North Side' had had no part at all in the former Canrobert,
arrangements; and, so far as concerned all those
weeks if not months that must pass before
investment of Sebastopol could be completed, the
difference between the old and the new plan of siege
was almost as wide as the difference between a sword
and a scabbard, or between using force and conserving
it; for the engagements of the 1st of January pro-
vided that, with no more delay than was needed for
perfecting two designed batteries, the French should
make themselves masters of the Mamelon, and
thence drive on at once by siege-process against
the Malakoff Tower; whereas those new counsels of
Niel's and of the Emperor seemed in terms to ordain
for the time, strict avoidance of onslaughts with
troops on any serious scale, not allowing in the way
of aggression any effort of war more adventurous
than a steadily maintained cannonade, and slow
*
* 'Dès que le temps le permettra, on marchera sur la tour Malakof.
Nous nous chargerons de cette attaque.'-Bizot to Vaillant, 12th
January 1855, quoted Rousset, vol. ii. p. 31.
126
SECRET TERMS
V.
CHAP. advance by approaches.'(4) So, whatever might be
the hopes based on this newly imagined campaign
when at some later time-driven home against the
'North Side,' and whatever might then be the duties
assigned to General Canrobert, it is plain that during
the interval, his adoption, or even approval, or even
indeed his mere cognisance of the Imperial plan
must have tended to throw his whole spirit of war-
like enterprise into lifeless abeyance, and render him
morally powerless to execute the engagements of
the 1st of January with the daring, the firmness
required for promptly seizing the Mamelon, and
making it his path to the Malakoff.
inevitable
For, although partly aiming at measures still in
the future, the secret counsels aimed also at a
change of great moment intended to take effect
The all but instantly, and indeed were of such a kind that,
when once imparted to Canrobert, they could not
but tend to deflect him from the straight path
of duty-the path of duty marked out for him by
Canrobert. engagements made with Lord Raglan.
conse-
quence of
imparting
the Em-
peror's
plan to
This is easily shown. To any thoughtful com-
mander engaged in besieging a fortress it must
always of course be distressing to have to ordain an
assault which seems likely to cost him the sacrifice
of numbers of his most precious troops; and it is
only under the cogency of what he deems a great
purpose that he steels himself by sheer force of mind
for so painful an effort of will; but how doubly hard
would he find it to perform the stern duty, if a
General skilled in siege business were to come out
OF NIEL'S MISSION.
127
V.
express from his Sovereign and assure him with un- CHA P.
flinching confidence that (unless the essential prelimi-
nary of a thoroughly completed investment should
first be made good) all this painfully contemplated
sacrifice must, after all, fail in its object-must be
therefore a sheer waste of life! And how yet more
hard-how impossible-will the effort become, if he
himself by the processes of genuine conversion is
brought to share the opinions thus authoritatively
pressed on his mind by the recognised Chief of the
State!
of the con-
against
the Eug.
lish.
It is under this aspect that concealment of the Disloyalty
pith of Niel's mission from our Government and cealment
from Lord Raglan shows the stain of revolting dis- practised
loyalty. Whilst consulting together in secrecy, the
Emperor and General Niel were at liberty to frame
a new plan without being bound to disclose it to
any ally; but, after having caused General Can-
robert to know-nay to share their conclusion,
and prove ready to give it effect, they of course
could no longer with honour-go on maintaining
concealment against the English Commander.
The Emperor did not yet go the length of address-
ing to General Canrobert decisive, positive orders
which would force him, whether willing or not, to
break loose from his engagements of the 1st of Janu-
ary; but proceeding from an unfettered Sovereign
whose will in such matters was legally absolute, the
expression of a formal opinion, and of a consequent
wish, may have naturally appeared all-sufficing; and
so it apparently proved. Nor indeed do we see that
Way in
Imperial
brought
Canrobert.
which the
will was
to bear on
128
SECRET TERMS
CHAP. the General deferred to the wish of his Sovereign
V. with any degree of reluctance. On the contrary, we
are led to believe that this sudden interposition of
Louis Napoleon found an eager--because ready—
welcome at the French Headquarters.
No appar-
ent reluc-
tance on
the part of
Canrobert
to be guid-
ed by his
Emperor's
wish.
Length-
ened and
baneful
incum-
bency
of the
Emperor's
plan.
There, apparently, unless signs mislead us, the
authorities after a while had grown to be so little
enamoured of the frowning Malakoff that they re-
pented—and not without anger-of having under-
taken the task. Forgetting that the English had
themselves desired eagerly to undertake the Mala-
koff instead of the Redan, and had only been pre-
vented from doing so by Canrobert's rejection of
their proposal,* the French seem to have thought
that, to their own injury, and to the advantage
of their English allies, they had been unwittingly
drawn into what, on reflection, they judged to be
an ugly predicament.† If their chief shared at
all in those feelings, he may not have been griev-
ously pained, when his Sovereign (through Niel)
interposed, and thus-in a manner-released him
from the arduous part of his promise.
The Imperial plan was one destined to reach a
much fuller maturity than Niel at first gave it, but
still to be ultimately discarded, though not until
the end of three months; and there seems to be no
room for doubting that its pendency during the inter-
val was baneful enough to account for much of what
* See ante, p. 22.
+ 'Les difficultés de la position que nous ont faite nos alliés.'-Bizot
to Vaillant, 8th February 1855.(5)
OF NIEL'S MISSION.
129
perhaps otherwise might be unfairly traced to the CHAP.
weakness of an anxious-too anxious-commander.
V.
tions that
appropri-
by Marshal
Marshal Canrobert is happily living; and although Explana-
of course-being mortal-he may hardly know what might be
on the whole were his really dominant motives, ately given
there would still be much interest in hearing how Canrobert.
far, if at all, he believes that his conduct was
swayed by the judgment which nature had given
him, and how far pursued under stress of those
counsels, scarce short of commands, which (along
with the opinions of Niel) had imparted the wish of
his Sovereign. One might also be told how the
Marshal would justify any concealment from Lord
Raglan of this newly formed plan which already in
course of execution-was surely, though secretly, al-
tering the whole spirit and tenor of that share of war-
like duty which the French had engaged to assume.
Apart from all question of motive and conscience, The bare
the bare facts seem plain. From the time when
Niel's 'mission' came into full play, General Can-
robert's course of action fell out of all harmony with
his enterprising engagements of the 1st of January,
and conformed to all the restrictions imposed by
the Emperor's plan.
Thus in knowledge of the Emperor's plan, or
rather of its heavy incumbency on the French Head-
quarters, we have found means that help to account
for General Canrobert's tolerance of all the counter-
approaches, and the same light will usefully fall on
those other 'abstentions' of his to which we shall
presently come.
VOL. VII.
I
facts.
The light
this chap-
thrown by
ter on Can-
robert's
successive
'absten-
'tions.'
130
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAPTER VI.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
I.
VI.
6
CHAP. IN determining (against the counsel of Niel) to un-
dertake the bombardment now planned for the 9th
of April, General Canrobert's object apparently was
to meet the requirement insisting that 'something
ought to be done,' and besides, to indulge a wild
hope that, though not followed up by assault, the
mere artillery effort might produce some stupendous
result; but—if keeping the Emperor's counsel—he
could not, of course, turn his troops-the splendid
legions of France-into thousands of fellow-conspir-
ators entrusted-by a whisper-with knowledge of
Louis Napoleon's secret; and accordingly, although
preordained by the inexorable stress of the 'Mission,'
to be always striking in vain, we shall not the less
see them acting as people busied in earnest, and dis-
closing a strength in rude contrast with the hollow-
ness of their commander's design.
Expecta-
tions
formed
General Canrobert and General Niel knew their
own concealed purpose too well to be capable of
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
131
VI.
by those
in the
Niel's
dreaming, like others, that the bombardment about CHA P.
to begin would be followed up by the French with
any decisive attacks; but-effectually kept out of who were
such secrets-the Allied armies generally, as also uninitiated
indeed their antagonists within the lines of Sebas- secret of
topol, were agreed in believing that, whether for mission.
good, or whether for evil, this vast and long promised
exertion of artillery - power must be pregnant with
desperate fights resulting in some mighty change;
and even Lord Raglan himself a known enemy of
overcharged language-did not differ at heart from
the officer who spoke of the business in hand as
being a grave affair.'(1)
When, however, Lord Raglan thus judged, he had
not discovered the secret which Time has now
rudely laid open, and therefore took it for granted
that the merely preparative blow then about to be
struck by artillery was as matter of course to be
followed by those ulterior measures which alone
could make it conduce to the ruin and fall of
Sebastopol.
So believing, he lived, we now see, under what
was not other or less than a practised deception;
for of course the genuine use of this long-designed
cannonade was to open a way for assaults; and the
last brief chapter has taught us that from enter-
prises of that pithy kind the French Army would be
firmly held back by the leading-strings of General
Niel's mission.'
The conditions, moreover, were such that no
imaginable attempt to carry the Fortress could be
132
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP. made by our people alone; so that, to forbid an
VI. assault by the French was substantially raising a
bar against any assault at all; and on the whole,
with our newly gained knowledge of the Imperial
devices which thus clogged and hampered the action
of both the besieging armies, we see, and see in
good time (so as thus to escape disappointment)
that because never meant by the Emperor to be
firmly spelt out to the end-this merely penulti-
mate measure of a great cannonade will achieve no
decisive results. We shall have to observe the
performance; but the narrative of its progress and
sequel will rather complete our knowledge of
General Niel's mission' than bring us perceptibly
nearer to any momentous crisis.
6
Prepara-
tion for
cannonade.
II.
In preparing, however, to execute this long-
the April designed cannonade the Allies had expended great
efforts, undertaking to deliver their fire with 501
pieces of ordnance which (except thirty-seven of
them) were all of great calibre; * and for the
service of all this artillery, they had accumulated a
vast supply of ammunition. Of the 501 pieces only
123 were English, the rest being, all of them,
French; † but, in aggregate weight of metal, the
* Niel, pp. 187-190. Table printed in Journal of the Royal
Artillery, or rather in its Appendix, p. 205.
+ I believe that on the first day the English opened with only
101 guns.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
133
VI.
difference was less; for computed in that way the CHAP.
proportion of the French siege-train power to that
of the English was only as sixteen to thirteen.*
prepara-
the Rus-
Of the 998 guns which by this time they had Counter-
established in battery the Russians could bring into tions by
action against the now threatened attack as many sians.
as 466 pieces of ordnance, with an aggregate weight
of metal which, compared with that of their adver-
saries, was as twenty-three to twenty-nine.t In
that one respect, therefore, we see that the conflict
would open on terms not far removed from equality;
but by other and weighty conditions the scale was
decisively turned.
placing
First, with only some small exceptions, the Conditions
batteries of the Allies were on Heights overlooking the Rus-
the Fortress. `
sians at a
disadvan-
Next, the zone of ground reached by their missiles tage.
included, besides the defences, much more that was
hardly less precious-included bodies of troops,
included barracks and streets, included the vast
buildings used for warlike stores, warlike factories,
and all the treasures unnumbered that constitute a
fortress and arsenal; so that any projectile, though
The weight of projectiles thrown by the French pieces of
ordnance in one salvo was
15,957 lb.
By the English
Conjoined salvo
13,333,
29,290 19
(
-Todleben, vol. ii. p. 164. With respect to the 'effectively batter-
ing-power' at the command of our people, see post, p. 138.
+ The weight of the single Russian salvo being 23,102 lb., and that
of the Allies 29,290.-Todleben, vol. ii. p. 165.
The little advanced batteries No. VII. and No. VIII. in the 3d
Parallel of our Left Attack were both of them on low ground.
134
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP. sparing the outer line of the ramparts, might still
VI. go on driving its way through flesh and blood,
through those all-precious works of men's hands
which contributed, each in its way, to maintain
the defence of Sebastopol.
Next again, the besiegers enjoyed that blissful
prerogative which the nature of things-almost
cruelly-has bestowed on him who attacks as com-
pared with him who defends; since of course for
those conflicts with infantry on which all (except
only a secret knot of French counter-plotters) sup-
posed them to be firmly resolved, they could choose
their own time, could choose their own place, and
were not under any such exigency as would oblige
them to keep under fire collected masses of soldiery;
whilst he who defended Sebastopol, without knowing
when or where his immense line of Works might be
stormed, was on the contrary forced-a hard and
distressing trial of warlike resolve !-was forced to
keep many and powerful bodies of men on ground
close to his front, where hour by hour and day after
day they had to stand ready, yet passive under the
enemy's fire.
Yet again, it so happened that during the earlier
days of this April bombardment, the garrison, which
always before had been richly abounding in muni-
tions of war, and indeed ever ready to squander
them, was now so far straitened for gunpowder as to
be obliged to economise its fire with a stringency
which was distressing, and even fraught with grave
danger.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
135
VI.
On the whole, it beforehand seemed plain that in CHAP.
this artillery conflict the balance of advantage leant
strongly against the besieged.
III.
and con-
of the
April bom-
bardment.
On Monday the 9th of April, the morning opened Opening
so dimly with heavy mist, storm, and rain, that each tinuation
object on which the Allies had been minded to drive
their projectiles was thickly obscured, but not the
less, soon after daylight they began their designed
cannonade; and the piety of Sebastopol gave them
a little time of immunity from hostile shot and shell;
for the sacred festivities and greetings commenced
on the previous day-the Easter Sunday of the
Greek Church-were still-on the Easter Monday
-so strangely engrossing as to cause a good deal
of delay, and in almost every bastion some twenty
or twenty-five minutes were suffered to pass before
their batteries opened. At the end of that time, the
garrison began to make answer, but still-for the
reason we gave-to fire with a rigid economy of war-
like munitions; and this very unequal interchange
of artillery missiles had not gone on many hours,
when already, as may well be supposed, the richly
supplied besiegers were seen to be having the mastery.
All day, the besiegers went on with their great
cannonade, and, even when darkness came, they did
not relapse into silence, but plied the defences at
night with a powerful vertical fire.
136
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP.
VI.
Continu-
ance and
general
effect of
the bom-
bardment ;
On the 10th, and on all the days following, until
the close of the 18th of April, they-less rapidly and
with long intermissions-continued to work their
guns, and to work them with destructive effect; but
then always at night-time, though still more or less
under fire, the enemy laboured indomitably, never
failing before morning dawned, to repair his broken
defences and restore his artillery-power. Still, al-
though the gains made good by day were thus sub-
ject to resumption at night (since not clenched in
good time by assault), it is nevertheless strictly true
(this will afterwards be shown more particularly)
that, so far as concerned the great duel of guns
against guns when regarded as a conflict apart, the
besiegers prevailed in the west against the lines of
Sebastopol, and prevailed besides in the east against
front, and the main counter-approaches protecting its Karabel
part of the Faubourg; for (with some little help from our
people) French siege-guns broke down the most
precious, the most fondly cherished defences of
what was called the Town front'; and again in
the opposite quarter, put to silence the two White
'Redoubts' that had fastened themselves on Mount
Inkerman; whilst (with aid from Canrobert's ord-
nance) our English artillery mastered the interposed
batteries of that Kamtchatka Lunette which had
blocked all approach to the Malakoff.
over both
the Town
the eastern
Faubourg;
6
With the light that has tardily fallen on the con-
trivance of the French Emperor, and the two or
three agents who served him, it is galling to have
to speak of these siege-work achievements, since we
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
137
VI.
now can no longer be ignorant that-foredoomed to CHAP.
sheer barrenness by the spell of General Niel's
'mission'-they involved exertions and losses which
(so far as concerned any purpose directly, honestly
warlike) were deliberately meant to prove bootless;
and this cold-blooded sacrificing of troops for a
sovereign's personal object was more especially cruel
to Canrobert's forces, because their siege-work was
vast, and—against the Town front-so close-pressed
as to be engaging them night after night in struggles
costly to life. Excepting Canrobert and Niel, and
the very, very few men, if any, to whom their
secret was trusted, the gallant French troops did
not know but what they were real besiegers-be-
siegers commissioned in earnest to toil and to
fight, and if need be, to die in the effort to carry
Sebastopol; yet, as now we have learnt, they were,
all the while, rather what courtiers might call an
'Army in waiting.'
Still, it must not be put out of sight that, al-
though--because not followed up the advantage
obtained ran to waste, the siege-trains, French and
English together, did nevertheless achieve the essen-
tial part of their task. They prevailed towards the
east, they prevailed towards the west, and in each
of the two distant quarters, laid open a path for
assault.
They, however, obtained no such mastery over those But not
intermediate defences which extended inclusively intermedi-
* Treated as distinct from the 'April Bombardment,' those strug-
gles will be recorded in another chapter.
over the
138
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP. from the
VI.
ate bat-
teries
Garden' Batteries on the skirts of the
Town to the great Redan in its Faubourg; and,
since those were, all of them, works which our
confronted people directly confronted, it was impossible to
avoid sharp comparison between what was done by
the French, and what by the English artillery.
directly
by the
English.
What kept
within
limits the
ing power
batter-
of the
English.
IV.
The extent of real battering-power at the command
of our people was far from being commensurate with
the number and weight of the ordnance they brought
into play; for their means of compassing havoc were
always kept within limits by the nature of the
ground in their front, and by want of the 'hands'
they required for more instant, more closely pressed
trench-work; but also, to judge from the frequency
of recorded complaints, they were too often checked
by the way in which our system applied itself to
the ordinary toils of a siege.
Our system did not invest any officers under Lord
Raglan with that comprehensive authority which-
applied to the tasks of the siege might have
brought the Engineers, the Artillery, and, with these,
the infantry working - parties' to act as trained
fellow-servants obeying in their several ways the
same all-propelling director; and from want of such
governance, there often occurred a great slackness, if
not indeed actual default in the rendering of that
needed help which men in one 'branch,' as we call
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
139
VI.
it, were forced to be daily requiring from some other CHA P.
'branch of the service'; whilst also there some-
times appeared an only too plain want of concert in
matters where concert was needful.t
દ્
pleteness
of the
tives.
It was natural enough that a system which failed Incom-
in this way to co-ordinate the forces required for of some
siege-business should cause our people to furnish a English
sample of English 'unreadiness'; and Official Nar- prepara-
rative tells us that on the eve of this April bom-
'bardment,' General Dacres preferred a request-one
not however conceded-that, in order to enable him
to complete his arrangements, the opening of the fire
might be postponed for forty-eight hours.‡
Attack.
What caused General Dacres to ask for delay was The Left
the backwardness of certain preparatives in the
realms of our Left Attack.
There, the state of the siege-works was this :-
In the 1st Parallel, there ranged a line of power-
ful batteries all ready for action, but at a distance of
1340 yards from the Great Redan, the nearest of the
enemy's Works. In front of this array, there stretched
the 2d Parallel, then unfurnished with any siege-
battery. Beyond it, however, in the 3d Parallel,
* See the Journal of the Royal Engineers. It teems with com-
plaints against the infantry summoned to aid in the siege-works,
sometimes denouncing the officers, and sometimes denouncing the
men.
+ As e.g. in the omission to countermand the order for Oldershaw's
fight in the advanced No. VII. when the endeavours to arm the sister
battery had failed, see post, p. 150.
Journal of the Royal Engineers, vol. ii. p. 145. Lord Raglan
would not listen to the proposal.—Ibid.
§ It was only in later days that they constructed other batteries in
the 2d Parallel.
140
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP. and on ground so far in advance as to be only
VI. some 700 yards from the nearest of the enemy's
The arm-
ing of its
two ad-
vanced
batteries
delayed.
Works, two batteries had been long since begun ;
and at the opening of the April bombardment,
the task of constructing them had nearly been
brought to a close. They had not, however, been
armed; and it was from his anxiety to attain that
last object before the opening of the bombardment
that Dacres had asked-though in vain-for a little
extension of time.
So, in point of siege-guns prepared to open im-
mediate fire, the spectacle presented by our Left
Attack at the opening of the bombardment was a
single array of batteries looking down on the New
Sebastopol created by Todleben's genius from a dis-
tance as great as at first in the old autumn days of
the siege.
This spectacle caused irritation on the part of our
people, and it turned out that what had prevented
the two advanced batteries from being brought into
action was the difficulty of arming them. The task
of taking siege-guns over more than a half-mile of
ground sloping down towards the enemy was one
that could be only attempted under cover of night;
but the darkness sought as a screen proved at times
so intense as to become an insurmountable obstacle,
and torrents of rain brought the ground to a state
which baffled the power of even large bodies of men
applying their strength to the drag-ropes;* whilst
* That these difficulties were very formidable is shown (at least as
to one night) by the fact that they baffled so able, so determined a
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
141
VI.
also in the interposed parapet of the 2d Parallel CHA P.
there existed a physical barrier which would have
to be eluded or conquered before any guns could be
lodged in the advanced batteries. Some advised the
course afterwards followed; but the idea at Head-
quarters was that the guns-they were 32-pounders
-might each, one after the other, be forced up and
over this obstacle by using the machine called a
'gin.'
But, even to reach the foot of the interposed para-
pet was not for some time found practicable. On
the night of the 8th, on the night of the 9th, and
again on the night of the 10th, the stubbornness of
physical obstacles defeated the efforts of all who suc-
cessively tried hard to conquer them; and accord-
ingly, all day on the 9th, all day on the 10th, all
day on the 11th, the Left Attack was still seen to
be having no siege-guns in action except those which
plied their fire from the line of the good old 1st
Parallel.
impatience
caused.
There resulted, as may well be supposed, a great The angry
deal of angry impatience; and this, it would seem, thus
was most felt by the Royal Artillery, since theirs
was the branch of our service entrusted with the arm-
ing of batteries. By Artillery officers chafing at
all the protracted delay there seems to have been
formed at this time an extremely high standard of
duty for judging what ought to be done when at
man as Captain-now Lieutenant-General-Henry.
With respect
to his services and Lord Raglan's warm appreciation of them, see
post, sec. viii,
142
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
VI.
Its appar-
'
CHAP. last the two advanced batteries should be armed and
ready for fighting. As expressed in the language of
ent effect. friendly intercourse not aiming at rigid exactness,
men plainly enounced the opinion that, when once
in action, these batteries should not be silenced,
'whatever the odds against them.'* Those speakers
might think they were exercising their faculties of
military judgment; yet in truth, they were rather
expressing the genuine old fighting sentiment that
bases itself on just pride -on the personal pride
of the man, on the aggregate pride of the corps.
Hence seemingly sprang the instruction for the fight
of the 13th of April, to which we shall presently
A co-
incidence.
Order
given to
Captain
Older-
shaw;
come.
The officer destined soon afterwards to execute
that grave instruction was the one, as it chanced,
now directed to try to conquer the obstacles which
had hitherto baffled all efforts.
Before evening on the 11th of April, the ground
had become much more firm than it was on the days
last preceding; and when our Left siege-train com-
mander directed Captain Oldershaw of the Royal
Artillery to take down the 'guns meant for the
arming of the advanced No. VII.,' and lodge them,
6
'
<
that night, in the battery,' he was answered by a
cheerful 'All right, sir,' that had the ring of de-
cisiveness.t
* I give what I believe to have been the purport of interchanged
words, and do not undertake to supplement them by attempting to
show what the speakers may have really desired to inculcate.
+ With respect to the number of guns sent down, see Appendix,
Note (2).
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
143
VI.
and exe-
With the aid of 300 infantry men whose services CHA P.
he obtained for the purpose Captain Oldershaw
opened a road through the parapet of the 2d Par- cuted the
allel, brought his guns through the passway thus night.
won, and before morning, lodged them all safely
in the advanced No. VII'
same
The ad-
No. VII.
and its
fore sun-
with the
enemy.
On the morrow of the night in which he ren- 12th April.
dered this service, Captain Oldershaw was on vanced
duty elsewhere; but that day-I speak of the completed.
12th our Engineers executed some completing guns be
work in the advanced No. VII.,' and supplied it setengaged
with mantlets. In the course of the same after-
noon, four out of the five guns brought down
were put in battery;* and with these, some two
hours before sunset, our artillerymen opened fire
on the enemy's Works, drawing fire in return from
the garrison; but it does not appear that the en-
gagement thus begun at a somewhat late hour
proved gravely destructive, that day, to either our
small advanced battery,' or the enemy's opposing
defences. t
With a view to the morrow, however, this be-
ginning of a fight did some harm. It withdrew
from our advanced No. VII.' the shelter of that
blank indifference with which the enemy's gunners
were wont to treat every dumb battery, and in-
vited them to perfect their ranges.' Moreover,
though by what exact means no one seems
:
* One of the five guns was disabled, it seems, by a shot striking its
muzzle whilst still on its travelling-carriage.'
+ I have not been able to learn who commanded in the battery that
day.
144
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP. to have learnt, it caused the new mantlets to
VI.
Decision
said to
based on
observa-
tion of this
vanish.*
An official narrator has stated that our gunners
have been on the 12th of April were very soon ordered to cease
firing, and this for the reason that-unsupported--
encounter. the battery could be of no service; but, if any
such judgment then held the ascendant, it was-not
merely changed, but-reversed.
The two
advanced
of our Left
Attack.
V.
The advanced No. VII. of our Left Attack was the
batteries battery destined to be fought on the 13th of April
by Captain Oldershaw, and on the 14th by Captain
Henry. It was one of two batteries rooted in the
3d Parallel of our Left Attack, and was not only in
a position of great comparative proximity to the
enemy's frowning defences, but moreover so very low
down as to be commanded from most of the ramparts
which it seemed to be audaciously challenging. †
No. VII. To say nothing of the nests of riflemen ensconced in
its front, the Work was so circumstanced as to be
looking up into an arc that bristled along its whole
bend with well-covered, well-planted artillery.§ Of
course, it was certain enough that this vast arc
The 'ad-
'vanced
* They apparently were either 'shot away' by the enemy's guns or
'blown away' by our own.-Journal Royal Engineers, vol. ii. p. 135.
† Journal of the Royal Artillery, p. 80.
From all of them, I believe, except the 'Péressip' or 'Creek
battery.
§ See the Plan.
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LAGSTAFF
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RALLEL
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BARRACK BATTERY
BATTERY
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١١١١٠٠٠٠٠٠ البت
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3RD
Map No 6 to face page. 144

SCENE OF
CAPTAIN OLDERSHAW'S FIGHT
IN THE "ADVANCED No. 7"
THE REDAN 13TH OF APRIL.
ON THE
"The Advanced No. 7," having been
restored in the night, was fought
again the next day (the 14th) under
Captain Henry; and on that day
also, the Advanced No. 8," having
at last been armed, was fought under
Captain Walcott.
་་་་་་་་་་་
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PARALLEL
Smaly
Graveyard
N°8
Inot armed on
the 18th
N°7
Distinguished as
The Advanced No 7
a
པ ནི པུ
V
е
YARDS 100 50 0
100
200
300
2ND
PARALLEL
口腔
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والمسيلة
Scale.
400
500
600
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800
300
1000 YARDS
a
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PARALLEL
ENGLISH LEFT ATTACK
A NICCHIE & 500.c014”
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
145
VI.
of ordnance array would exert its main strength CHA P.
against other and greater 'objectives'; but it is
not the less true that the little advanced No.
VII.' was placed so forlornly as to be openly in-
viting a fire of almost indefinite power. Thus, if
(say on the 13th of April) the garrison by chance
should be minded to crush the then lonely assailant
presuming to approach them so closely, they could
pour, and pour down on their victim the fire of a
hundred guns-guns all of fortress dimensions, and
some of them of the greatest calibre then used in
even sea warfare.*
my's ac-
way of
with an
The enemy had his own settled way of treating The ene-
these advanced batteries. With other huge tasks on customed
his hands, he did not turn aside lightly, to bend his dealing
giant power on a weak, unoffending adversary; and, advanced
so long as any small ' advanced battery' was suffered battery.
to remain strictly silent, he in general, did not molest
it. If unmasking its guns-the small battery
—
opened against him, he took care to answer the chal-
lenge with a fire immensely superior, yet still hardly
such as could aptly be called 'overwhelming.' But,
if the advanced battery should do signal harm to
his Works or their armament, then the enemy's pol-
icy, reinforced by hot anger, impelled him to ruin,
to crush the offender by an unsparing use of his
power.
The distance of the advanced No. VII. from the
*If trying to deal more exactly with the number of guns that
could be used against our advanced No. VII.,' one might reckon
them at 113.
VOL. VII.
K
146
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
.
CHAP. Crow's Nest' (the nearest of the enemy's guns) was
VI.
only about 700 yards.
The battery, when brought into action on the
morning of the 13th, would have to fight all alone
in the 3d Parallel;* and moreover have to fight
without any artillery support from our 2d Parallel
in its rear, because there, at the time, no guns at all
had been planted.t
The nearest artillery support that this advanced
No. VII.' could receive from the rear was that
which might be afforded by our Green Hill batteries
in the 1st Parallel, and these were far off. The
nearest of them was more than half a mile in rear
of the advanced No. VII.'‡
'
How under conditions so adverse, our siege-conduc-
tors persuaded themselves that this little advanced
No. VII.' should singly adventure a fight beneath
the guns of the Fortress, I cannot at all fully say;
but it seems that one of their objects was to try
to gain better security for the men and guns in
our distant 1st Parallel by causing its assailants
to be themselves assailed at close quarters; § and on
the other hand, they trusted much to a theory that
our artillerymen thus thrown out in front to tempt
the wrath of Sebastopol might be effectively sup-
* Because, though constructed, the sister battery (No. VIII.) had not
then been armed. This I say with full knowledge, though in the
teeth of the official R.A. Journal, p. 83. There were two field-guns
(9-pounders used against riflemen) in the 3d Parallel, but they formed
of course no exception to the above statement.
+ It was afterwards that the batteries 9 and 10 were established in
the 2d Parallel.
966 yards.
§ Journal Royal Engineers, vol. ii. p. 147
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
147
VI.
ported by the fire passing over their heads from our CHA P.
batteries on the top of Green Hill, if not also indeed
by some guns on the left flank of Gordon's Attack.
Still our Engineers did not conceal from themselves
that the fight of the 13th under Oldershaw was to
be an experiment.*
This No. VII. battery' had a small return' at each
flank, and within the two angles thus formed, good,
sound magazines had been built; but elsewhere, the
Work was on a straight line.
insuffi-
strength
Composed almost entirely of sand-bags, its para-
pet, with a height of some 8, had a width of about
18 feet; but nevertheless was not strong enough Great, yet
on the day of Oldershaw's fight to absorb the whole cient
force of such missiles as might well be directed of its
against it by an enemy rich in ship's guns; and, parapet.
before seeing how men once fought under this almost
treacherous shelter against the mightiest ordnance,
one ought to have some idea of the ways of a cannon-
ball when obstructed without being stopped.
The ways
of a can-
when ob-
Whether taking its flight through the air, or
encountering more solid obstacles, a round-shot of non-ball
course must be always obeying strict, natural laws, structed,
and must work out the intricate reckoning enjoined being
by conflict of power with absolute, servile exactness ;
but between the 'composition of forces' maintained
* See post, p. 153, the words of Sir Gerald Graham.
+ Our Engineers reckoned its width in some places at so much as 22
feet or more.
without
stopped.
148
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP. in our physical world and the fixed resolve of a mind
VI. made up under warring motives there is always
analogy, with even sometimes strange resemblance ;*
and to untutored hearers a formula set down in
algebra would convey less idea of the path of a
hindered, though not vanquished cannon-ball than
would the simple speech of a savage who, after
tracing its course (as only savages can), has called
it a demon let loose. For not only does it seem to
be armed with a mighty will, but somehow to
govern its action with ever-ready intelligence, and
even to have a 'policy.' The demon is cruel and
firm; not blindly, not stupidly obstinate. He is not
a straightforward enemy. Against things that are
hard and directly confronting him he indeed frankly
tries his strength, and does his utmost to shatter
them, and send them in splinters and fragments to
widen the havoc he brings; but with obstacles that
are smooth and face him obliquely he always com-
pounds, being ready on even slight challenge to
come, as men say, to 'fair terms' by varying his
line of advance, and even if need be, resorting to
crooked, to sinuous paths. By dint of simple fric-
tion with metal, with earth, with even the soft,
yielding air, he adds varied rotatory movements to
those first enjoined by his mission; he improves his
fell skill as he goes; he acquires a strange nimble-
ness, can do more than simply strike, can wrench,
* I once saw an instance in which 'composition of forces'-forces
simply mechanical-was so completely mistaken for heroic resolve
that it excited a lively enthusiasm.(3)
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
149
VI.
can lift, can toss, can almost grasp; can gather from CHA P.
each conquered hindrance a new and baneful power;
can be rushing for instance straight on in a hori-
zontal direction, and then-because of some contact
-spring up all at once like a tiger intent on the
throat of a camel. (4)
So far, one may say, his devices are not unfamiliar
to men versed in war, and some of his changes in-
deed, as for instance, his flight by ricochet, they can
dictate at their own will and pleasure; but under
special conditions, he sometimes will toil in a way
that is much less commonly known. When en-
countering things that are tough (such as gabions
or sand-bags well filled) which do much towards
obstructing his course, yet have not the required
strength of numbers with which to withstand and
defeat him, he plays the conqueror over them, he
presses them into his service, he compels them
to forget their inertness, compels them to fight
on his side, and sends them hurled this way
and that against all they can reach with their
blows.
To know how one round-shot disports itself when
able to tear through a sand-bag parapet is to have
some help towards imagining the condition of a bat-
tery where ruthless intruders like this from time to
time come driving in at the rate of some ten in the
minute.
Our advanced No. VIII. was the battery destined
150
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
VI.
CHAP. to be fought on the 14th by Captain Walcott, having
Lieutenant Torriano as his subaltern; but at the
time of Oldershaw's fight on the 13th, it had not
been armed.
The ad-
'vanced
No.
'VIII.'
The order
directing
Captain
Oldershaw
thead-
'vanced
VI.
On the evening of the 12th, Captain Oldfield (the
officer commanding the artillery of the Left Attack)
to engage ordered Captain Oldershaw to work the No. VII.
advanced battery on the morrow. He peremptorily
forbade the opening of fire until mantlets (if not
there already) should be supplied by the Engineers,
and then he added an order which under the exist-
ing conditions was one of a very grave kind. He
'No. VII.
battery'
on the
13th of
April.
Captain
Oldershaw;
*
was an able, a gallant officer; and perhaps did
not mean to do more than make his instruction
conform to what, as we saw, had become a ruling
idea; but, be that as it may, he unflinchingly en-
joined Captain Oldershaw 'to work the battery to
'extremity.'
As on the former occasion, when only directed to
go and try to overcome teasing obstacles, so now,
charged with desperate service, Captain Oldershaw
answered once more with the same ready, cheerful
'All right, sir.'
Of rather small stature, compact, fearless, quietly
resolute, an accomplished artillery officer endowed
with powerful energies, Captain Oldershaw was a
* He (Captain Oldfield) was killed not long afterwards before
Sebastopol.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
151
VI.
man always bent upon carrying his warlike zeal to CHAP.
the extreme of devotion, yet so persistently firm in
abstaining from self-celebration that (as sometimes
occurs in such cases) the people around him in camp
proved all the more ready to see his genuine worth ;*
and-whether governed by whim, or by inference
from close observation-there were numbers of our
gunners who persistently thought that the 'Zouave
-for so, amongst themselves, they used to like
calling their favourite-was a man they would gladly
have over them in any hard-fighting battery.(5)
Considering not only the confidence he was known
to inspire in men under him, but also what he had
done on the night of the 11th towards arming this
very same battery, one might be easily led to imagine
that he was singled out personally, on account of
his well-known qualities, for the obviously adven-
turous service of once more attempting an enterprise
which only a few hours before had been abandoned
as hopeless; but Captain Oldershaw himself did not
know that the selection had been made on such
grounds. It was only, he thought, in conformity
with what is called 'turn of duty' that both he and
the force he commanded were assigned to the work
they went through on the 13th of April.t
Yet if so, how superb must have been that old
'Regiment' of the Royal Artillery from which a
* A characteristic instance-and proof-of the 'abstinence from
'self-celebration' will be seen post, p. 170.
+ I have reason to doubt whether Oldershaw's belief on this subject
was the right one, and to conjecture that both he and his men were
specially selected for the work set before them.
152
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
VI.
.
CHAP. blind choice by the roster' could tell off' the man
and the men for fighting a little lone battery in the
way we are going to see!
entering
the bat-
tery;
its state.
Long enough before sunrise to be under cover of
darkness, Captain Oldershaw moved down into the
Work, having with him one subaltern (Lieutenant
W. R. Simpson*), one surgeon, and as many as sixty-
five gunners.
Captain Oldershaw found time to visit the No.
VIII. battery, and discovered what we have seen to
be the fact, that no guns had there been mounted.
Without any support of the kind that that battery,
if armed, might have given him, he saw that his own
'No. VII.' would have to fight out its own fight.
6
There, four guns stood planted in battery, and a
fifth one was near them, but lying on its travel-
'ling-carriage.' It was with the four guns already
established in battery that Oldershaw undertook to
fight.
The effort about to be made was regarded by the
scientific conductors of the siege as a bold, if useful,
experiment; and therefore it was that an able young
Sir Gerald officer of our Engineer force (now a far-famed victori-
Graham.
ous commander), went down to the 3d Parallel on the
morning of the 13th, and there-first from a part of
the trench close adjacent to Oldershaw's battery, and
afterwards, until wounded, from within the battery
* Now Major-General Simpson.
+ So left, it was presumed (see footnote ante, p. 143), because out
of order. Captain Oldershaw caused it to be moved to the most
sheltered part of the battery.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
153
C
VI.
itself observed the course of the fight.* For means CHAP.
of showing what was confronted by our four 32-
pounder guns, I gladly resort to his words. Sir
Gerald Graham thus writes to me:- On the 13th His ac-
"of April, I was the Engineer officer on duty on the what the
Left Attack, and I took a strong interest in the confront-
artillery conflict about to commence.
It was our
6
'first attempt at taking up an advanced position for
6
6
our artillery, and I knew well that we were greatly
overmatched by the enemy's guns in number, weight,
and position. Before us, we had the Barrack and
'Creek batteries; to our right, the Great Redan;
' and to our left, the Flagstaff and Garden batteries.t
The latter were perhaps the most formidable, being
'armed with guns equal to our 68-pounders, and
'having a considerable command over our advanced
'battery, of which, as events showed, they-the
enemy knew the range very accurately.
C
(
'To the best of my recollection, owing to diffi-
'culties in transporting the guns across the trenches
by night, only four guns were ready to open fire in
'No. VII. battery on that morning under Oldershaw
and Simpson of the Royal Artillery. I placed my-
'self on the right of the battery in the advanced
trench' [ie., the trench of the 3d Parallel] 'so
as to note the effects of our fire, and if possible,
6
6
* At the time, a lieutenant, now General Sir Gerald Graham, R.E.,
V.C., K.C.B., renowned for his victories in the Eastern Soudan.
count of
battery
ed.
There being two tiers of these, and of widely different altitudes
(one firing over the other), they were distinguished as the Upper
'Garden' and the 'Lower Garden' batteries. It was to those last
that the 'Crow's Nest' battery belonged.
154
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP. to assist the artillery officers in getting their
range.'*
VI.
Morning came without yet rousing fire from either
the Allies or the Russians; and, so far as concerned
his own battery, Captain Oldershaw was not at
liberty to break the general silence; for, as we saw,
he had been peremptorily instructed that he must
not let his men open fire without having mantlets
before them to guard against the enemy's rifle-balls,
and no mantlets were found in the battery.†
The fight.
Captain Oldershaw and his men, as seems natural,
were chafing at the painful restraint which thus
kept their battery silent, when from the (proper)
left face of the Flagstaff Bastion, a 68-pounder shot
came tearing in through the parapet, struck the
sergeant (who was speaking at the moment to his
captain), and tossed him up high into the air; whilst
also by the blow it had dealt them when forcing
itself through the barrier, there were some of the
sand-bags so driven that they came charging, knock-
ing, and banging against all that stood in their way.
By sand-bags thus hurled, the captain with two of
his men was roughly thrust, knocked, and sent lifted
over a pile of shot. Discovering-almost with sur-
* Letter to me, August 19, 1883.
+ They had been duly placed in the battery by our Engineers on
the 12th (Journal, vol. ii. p. 135), but were afterwards destroyed.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
155
·
VI.
prise-that, despite all the blows heaped upon him, CHAP.
he was not a disabled man, the captain hastened
back to where the mangled-nay separated!—re-
mains of the poor shattered sergeant were lying.
The sufferer was still able to see, and even to
speak. He saw the tempting hilt of a pistol in
Oldershaw's breast-pocket, and asked his captain
to shoot him. This of course was a favour that
Oldershaw could not grant. He could only tell
the poor sergeant (with all tenderness, yet still in
words giving firm guidance, if not indeed even
command) that-good soldier to the last-he must
'die properly.'
Of course, all understood without words that the
68-pounder shot thus crashing into their battery was
a challenge that released them at once from the order
not to fire without mantlets; and, the gunners that
Oldershaw saw now awaiting his orders were men
angry indeed, yet rejoicing in the sudden escape from
delay, men devoutly intent on a purpose, men elate
with the sense of having vengeance-swift vengeance
—in their own, in their very own hands, men hardly
moving their lips except for some such brief utter-
ance as, Now then we'll give it 'em,' but looking
intently to their chief for the pregnant monosyllable,
Load' and almost anticipating his word of com-
mand by hastening to strip off their coats, and
with something of truculent carefulness-rolling up,
every man, his shirt-sleeves, to bare the arms for
hard work.
6
He died a few minutes afterwards.
156
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP.
VI.
The embrasures stript of their mantlets, and not
yet wrapped in dense clouds of smoke, invited the
enemy's sharpshooters; and at first, during interval
moments, the malicious ping-ping' of the rifle-balls
too often carrying death was from time to time
catching the ear; but soon, this sharp twang either
ceased, or else was drowned, turned into nothingness
by the masterful roar of great guns. It was well,
I believe, on the whole that the mantlets had all
disappeared; for in so hot a fight of artillery as the
one now beginning, they would not have long kept
their places, and must soon have been found taking
part with the enemy's gunners by helping them to
choke our embrasures, and to fill them with cumber-
some wrecks.
Captain Oldershaw now found himself engaged
against five batteries, and undergoing the concen-
trated fire of their twenty heavy guns.
C
However unequal this strife, our four guns were
worked so effectively that after two hours, they had
silenced the far-famed Crow's Nest' battery;* and
-a spectacle always enchanting to gunners who
compass the change-its disabled guns stood tilted
up, making public confession of ruin.
But in vengeance, as it seemed, for this con-
quest, the enemy then brought to bear on Older-
shaw's little battery a greater weight of metal
than ever. It might seem that, if not long before,
*The afterwards famous nickname of the Work had not at that
time become familiar, and Oldershaw only designated the battery his
gunners had silenced as the one that was 'circular'; but there is no
doubt that the Crow's Nest' and the 'Circular battery' are identical.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
157
the time had now come when a conflict so unequal CHA P.
should cease; but Oldershaw remembered the order
6
to work his battery to extremity'; and not
choosing to let his obedience under such a com-
mand fall short of being exact, whilst happily
sure that his men were still in good heart-he re-
solved to hold on. For a while, the chief's losses.
in men went on faster than the disabling of his
guns; and there soon came a time when, with three
pieces still undisabled, he could barely find unstricken
men in number sufficient to work them. Still, all
who could toiled heart and soul, and one of those
seen (with coat off) to be labouring thus, hard as
any, was Oldershaw's subaltern Lieutenant Simpson,
a zealous and valiant officer.
At this period of the fight (when still he had three
guns in action) Captain Oldershaw sent off a mes-
senger to the 1st Parallel with directions to ask for
reinforcements.
Great and greater with every minute was the
havoc thenceforth being wrought in his hugely over-
matched battery. Soon, another of his guns was
disabled; and-insatiate of destruction-the ene-
my's mighty ship cannon-balls never ceased to come
crashing in at a rate computed by some at no less
than ten in the minute.
He who happily escaped actual contact with one
of these missiles might still not escape its power,
for the sand-bags set going by round-shot struck
and swept men before them with a terrible violence,
inflicting now and then what at first might be
VI.
158
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP. easily taken for death-blows, and leaving a man for
the time in an utterly prostrate state.
VI.
We observed the immense weight of metal by
which, if so minded, the enemy might repress
the lone battery of only four 32-pounders; but
with all that command of power, how far was he
deigning to use it for a small special purpose?
Engaged in defending the Fortress on a front of
several miles, he of course did not bend all the
energies of a hundred guns upon one diminutive
battery; but against it, whether acting deliberately,
or, as sometimes occurred, in hot anger, he brought
to bear what power he chose. And, the power he
thus chose to exert against our little lone battery
was not at all narrowly stinted. From even the
most distant extremity of the blazing are the
batteries that armed the right face of his Great
Redan thundered raging against the small prey;
and it was well for our advanced No. VII.' that a
hair's-breadth of uncorrected error in the nicety of
gun elevation' caused the missiles of war tearing
down from the furthermost Work to fly howling and
screaming in vain close over the heads of our people.
Nowhere else did the enemy seem to be wasting his
ordnance-power. From the opposite extremity of
the arc, that is, from the Flagstaff Bastion (which
had dealt, as we saw, the first blow), the big round-
shot again and again came tearing in through the
parapet of Oldershaw's little battery; whilst be-
sides, in the north it was powerfully, directly con-
fronted, and confronted, as we have seen, at close
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
159
VI.
quarters; since from not only the Upper and the CHAP.
Lower Garden batteries, and the rampart formed on
the Péressip, but again further east from the ranges
of the Barrack Battery and its neighbouring sat-
ellites there poured in an unsparing fire, and this,
too, at so close a range that for some of the 68-
pounders placed high on commanding ground the
firing was almost point - blank.' On the whole,
we can say that the little advanced No. VII. with
its four 32-pounder pieces, of which two had now
been disabled, was from time to time kept under
fire by not less than thirty great guns.
*
With all the power yet left them our gunners still
answered the storm, but their guns of course, after a
while, had been wrought by incessant discharges to
a state of intense, scorching heat, and could only be
fired at intervals.
Not content with his mighty ascendant in weight
of metal the enemy even increased it; and it was on
a battery newly opened against him that Oldershaw
with his own hands was 'laying' his No. 3 gun
when the voice of Mr De Vine (a devoted, brave,
non-commissioned officer, standing up on the top of
the parapet) was heard giving warning of shell'!†
Then delivered by vertical fire a hollow shot
entered the embrasure through which Oldershaw
was laying his gun, and achieved what perhaps is
6
* General Simpson writes: At least 30 guns'; and the italics
are his.
+ It was for the purpose of giving such warnings that Mr De Vine,
in a spirit of valiant self-sacrifice, had asked leave to go up, and stand
on the top of the parapet.
160
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
VI.
CHAP. unique in the annals of gunnery conflicts; for, killing
two, wounding the rest, and yet sparing the Captain
himself, it laid the whole of the gun detachment'
at his feet.
The same widely ravaging shot wrenched away the
right wheel of the gun, turned its spokes into deadly
missiles, and flung off its 'round' with a force that
jammed it deep into the side of the nearest 'traverse.'
Twice before, this same gun had been struck by a
shot without becoming unserviceable, but it now of
course was disabled.
So, of the four guns with which Oldershaw had
begun the conflict there was now only one that re-
mained undisabled. With that one gun, however, the
Captain still continued to fight.
In compliance with the request of Captain Older-
shaw preferred, as we saw, at a time when he still
had three guns undisabled, two fresh gun detach-
'ments' had, by this time, come down to the battery;
but, considering the state of its parapet and of its
armament reduced to one gun still remaining in a
serviceable state, the Captain did not judge that
this succour could now be of any great use. He
thoughtfully, rightly determined that the men newly
come should not be needlessly sacrificed in the des-
perate service which had fallen to his own lot, and
sent off all those he could spare to find shelter and
peace in the empty battery near him.*
In the midst of the havoc surrounding him, Captain
In the advanced No. VIII.,' which had not, as we saw, been then
armed, and was unassailed by the enemy.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
161
VI.
Oldershaw with his now only gun was obediently CHAP.
working his battery to the enjoined limit of ex-
'tremity,' when he found himself receiving the
visit of a brave and true-hearted soldier, who came
because he divined that the battery must be in dire
trouble.
We saw Graham place himself in the 3d Parallel
and near to Oldershaw's battery with the double
object of watching a hazardous experiment deeply
interesting to our Engineers, and if possible helping
our gunners to 'get their range.' In that last object,
however, he constantly found himself baffled by the
keenness, the skill, the alacrity with which the
Russians exerted their vast artillery-power; for
they did not so much as allow him to find out what
points had been reached by shots already discharged.
Whenever a gun of ours fired, the garrison instantly
answered it with three or four guns from their side,
and by thus piling up banks of smoke put it out of
the power of Graham to see where the English shot
struck.
And, so far as concerned the 'experiment' of
operating against the great Fortress with Oldershaw's
four advanced guns, Graham seems to have found
himself driven to an early and decisive conclusion.
The battle,' he writes, was from the beginning a
hopeless one for us.
No. VII. made a
6
C
6
C
gallant fight, but in a short time three out of the
four guns were disabled, and half the gun detach-
'ments killed or wounded.'
Then Graham goes on to say simply, and as
VOL. VII.
L
162
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP. though it were merely a law of any man's nature
VI.
to go where conditions are desperate - About this
6
time seeing how our fire had slackened, I visited
the battery.'
It would have been interesting to hear an account
of any conference passing at such a moment, and
between two such men as Captain Oldershaw and
Lieutenant Graham, but the enemy granted no time.
By the blow of a round-shot, or rather by blows from
the substances and the mass of stone which the
round-shot-after striking a sand-bag-sent driving
against his breast, Graham was struck down, and it
seemed for a while that he had received his death.*
In the battery, destruction was rife. Shells from
time to time dropped down and burst upon the tops
of the magazines, blowing up in one instance a num-
ber of powder-boxes; in another, tearing bodily off,
and carrying away with its blast so much of the all-
precious roof as to be choking an embrasure, and
silencing its overwhelmed gun under the weight of
the ruins. Gunners seeing such incidents might
well think perhaps for a moment of the one least
beloved form of danger; but happily from the first
to the last, there was no magazine that wholly gave
way under either the blows of the round-shot, or the
bursting of shells on its top.
Elsewhere, however, the havoc had been increasing
from minute to minute during a period of several
The mass of stone was hurled with a force which drove it through
Graham's greatcoat, and caused it to strike at his heart. It smashed a
watch which was in his waistcoat-pocket.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
163
VI.
hours; and at length a time came when nearly the CHAP.
whole of the parapet had been torn into ruins. The
battery, wrote Mr De Vine,* was almost demolished.'
'My poor little battery,' wrote Oldershaw,
6
literally swept away.' +
6
was
The men, I believe, would have judged it, as their
phrase is, more 'comfortable' to work a gun in the
open than in what yet remained of the battery; but
so entire was their devotion to the chief that he
and they by some magic were all, as it seemed, of
one mind.
He did not address the brave men in
any sort of harangue, but mingled encouraging words,
spoken calmly in genial tones with every special
direction required for guiding their labours. What
they liked was to see him, and to hear him, to
feel that they were ruled by his will. With no
longer a parapet left that could even do so much as
delude them with any specious promise of shelter,
they went on working, and working their one undis-
abled gun.
(
That one gun however at last became, like the
* With respect to whom, see ante, p. 159, and Note (9) in the
Appendix.
+ And, hear the Engineers who looked at the havoc scientifically,
and had to repair it: The embrasures and magazine, and the battery
generally, are much cut up by the enemy's shot and shell.'-Journal
Royal Engineers, vol. ii. p. 138, April 13th. 'It' [the No. VII. on
13th April] 'was moreover much broken, and its salients knocked
into grotesque forms.'-Conolly's History of the Sappers and Miners,
vol. ii. p. 275.
Mr De Vine (who was one of them) writes eloquently on the
effect produced upon the men by their feeling of devotion to the
chief, and the absolute, unmeasured trust they gladly reposed in his
guidance.
164
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
VI.
CHAP. others, unserviceable, and then-since unable to
strike at the enemy, able only to stand and be
stricken the man and the men, one would say, had
reached the uttermost limit of what any commanding
officer could have meant to assign when directing
that the battery should be worked to 'extremity.'
Still Oldershaw did not retire, because he had an idea
that no such step should be taken without the
warrant of 'orders'; and accordingly, even after the
silencing of the fourth and last gun, he remained with
his men in the battery.
He did not from first to last see that (in harmony
with the reasons adduced for undertaking the ven-
ture*) there was given him any support from other
English batteries. †
Captain Oldershaw had maintained the conflict
nearly five hours, when at length Captain Shaw-
an officer his superior in rank-came down into the
battery, pronounced it untenable, and directed him
to retire. (6)
He however was allowed, before moving, to indulge
a whim characteristic of the Artillery Arm. Of his
guns-all disabled-there were three deranged only
so far that they could not be 'laid' for an aim; and
these last, although useless of course for anything
like fighting purposes, and 'pointed' grotesquely
from under the superincumbent ruins, could still be
* See ante, pp. 146, 147.
+ Whether it was possible that he might have been receiving some
little support from other and distant batteries without being able to
discern it, artillerymen will judge.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
165
fired-could still therefore be made the means of CHAP.
bantering the enemy's gunners.
This last quaint object achieved by a mocking
salute of three guns which proved not to be dumb,
although 'silenced' in the Artillery sense, Captain
Oldershaw withdrew his small remnant of men from
the ruins of what, if for hours, that day, a hard-
fighting battery, had since become rather the scene
of an almost romantic self-sacrifice.
VI.
Captain Oldershaw's lengthened persistence had
been sanctioned of course-because dictated-by
the order bluntly enjoining him to work his guns to
extremity'; but one does not very easily see how
the long keeping up of a fight by an advanced,
weak, isolated, and commanded battery engaged at
close quarters against enormous odds, could have
well been an object so vital as to warrant indefinite
sacrifices; and accordingly, there is room for sur-
mising that Captain Oldfield-an excellent officer-
did not mean to have his words construed literally
when he gave the direction to Oldershaw.(7)
If the sanction of 'command' had been wanting,
one perhaps would be forced to confess that through-
out the latter half of this conflict of five hours' dura-
tion, the persistency of Oldershaw and his gunners
was Chivalry rather than War.
The losses sustained by our gunners in this long,
166
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
VI.
The losses
sustained
in Older-
shaw's
battery.
CHAP. unequal fight were, of course, very great; and in-
deed, when people compared the original strength of
the detachment with that of the little remnant
which came out unscathed at the close of the action,
they thought there was ground for saying that the
force had been almost annihilated'; but, happily,
that simple plan of testing the loss involved a mate-
rial error, because some of those who had entered
the battery in the morning were sent on duty else-
where before the fight came to an end. (8)
The numbers seem to stand thus: The detach-
ment at first comprised 65 gunners. Of these, at
the close of the fight, 18 had been moved by Older-
shaw, and sent away out of the battery with orders
to bear off wounded men; so that thus the number
of gunners destined to be in the battery, without
being sent away from it in the course of the fight,
was no greater than 47. Of those 47, the enormous
proportion of 44 were either killed or wounded; and
so on the whole it occurred that the remnant of the
original body of 65 gunners with which Oldershaw
at last marched out of the battery had a strength of
only three men. (9)
However, along with these three, the 18 men we
saw charged with duties outside of the battery made
up a strength of 21 gunners not only surviving but
unwounded, and of the warlike spirit of this score
of men we are presently going to hear.
The fairest parallel to this engagement of Older-
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
167
VI.
shaw's might be found, I believe, on board ship— CHAP.
on board some ship of war close beset in the fiery
'heart of oak' days; for it would be hard to say
where-on dry land-a like concourse of shot and
shell ever had such a five hours' revelry in one small,
yet still fighting battery as the one that fate re-
served for our advanced No. VII. on the 13th of
April; and in truth, to bring about what took place,
there was needed a concurrence of circumstances
that may never before have been joined :-
1. A small and weakly armed battery brought and
kept all alone for some hours beneath the fire at close
range of a mighty artillery commanding it from
higher ground:
2. A sand-bag parapet strong enough to wrestle with
the 68-pounders, but not strong enough to arrest them:
3. A captain not only directed to work his four
guns to extremity, but obeying the grim command,
and carrying it through to the letter:
4. A body of gunners so valiant, and so passion-
ately devoted to their chief that
without any
seeming unwillingness to be sacrificed with him-
they worked and fought on to the last.
Dacres ;
On the day of the fight the Brigadier-General General
commanding (afterwards Sir Richard Dacres) rode
accompanied by his staff to the tent of Captain
Oldershaw, and there thanked the Captain person-
6
ally for his exploit of that morning, saying, 'You his words
to Older-
fought your battery nobly, and are an honour to shaw.
your regiment.' Asked by Dacres what he would
6
like, he said, 'Staff duty as Adjutant,' and a Staff
168
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
VI.
CHAP. appointment as Adjutant he quickly received. A
greater Staff appointment soon followed, but that
last one withdrew him from the Sebastopol theatre
of war.
An order
given out
by mis-
take;
On the evening of the 13th, our authorities pro-
mulgated a direction, which was to be the next day,
' in orders.' This order in orders' directed a body
of men told off for the purpose to go down in the
morning the morning of the 14th-under the com-
mand of Captain Oldershaw, and to fight the ‘ad-
'vanced No. VII.' The order-given out by mis-
take was countermanded in time to prevent any
baneful confusion;* but it happily remained in force
long enough to elicit the manful petition of which I
am going to speak.
He
From the moment of becoming apprised of the
order in orders' until he received the counter-
mand at 4 o'clock the next morning, Captain Older-
shaw followed a course which was characteristic of
the man and of the soldierly bent of his mind.
did not judge it his duty to interchange explanations
with the authorities,' but-in silence-to obey their
commands; and accordingly in the early morning of
the 14th, he was preparing to go on parade and to
march down once more with the men there already
assembling to the scene of yesterday's havoc, when
he received a message so touching that it ought to
* It would have clashed with the order which was given, as will be
afterwards seen, to Captain Henry.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
169
VI.
and the
be known and remembered a message truly illus- CHAP.
trative of the quality of our soldiers, and the love,
the trust, the devotion with which they range under touching
an officer who, whilst able in other respects, seems
instinctively prone to hard fighting.
6
-
The score of undisabled survivors who had fought
under Oldershaw might be few, yet were many
enough to have an aggregate sentiment-the senti-
ment of a body proved staunch by the ordeal of a
long, hearty fight; and these brave men believing
that the direction set out in orders' must import
a resolve to go on, as it were, with their fight,
they were filled with an eager desire to be once
more amid the mad sand bags' of advanced
'No. VII.,' affronting the pride of Sebastopol, and
obeying their favourite chief. Knowing that a
sand-bag battery, though broken up into ruins,
could still be quickly repaired, and that all the
disabled guns might be either made ready for use
or else be replaced before sunrise, they saw before
them a prospect that strangely fascinated their im-
aginations—a prospect of fighting once more under
Oldershaw, and having it out' with the enemy on
the site of their five hours' strife.
C
They imagined, it seems, that if Oldershaw would
prefer their request, they, although not told off' for
the service in accordance with strict 'turn of duty,'
might still have him once more for their chief in
that new fight on old ground which the orderin
' orders' announced.
The message that resulted from this nobly warlike
incident
to which
it gave
rise.
170
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP. impulsion was brought to Captain Oldershaw in his
tent by the corporal on duty' in the artillery camp,
VI.
?
and delivered in dry, simple words :-The men who
fought with you yesterday, sir, wish to fight again
'with you.' Captain Oldershaw answered the Cor-
poral, and briefly confessed himself proud. He
spoke of his own feelings only towards those who
had sent him the message; but our people now,
after long years, will understand and will share the
pride he took in such men.
Ground
for laying
on the
VII.
One is all the more bound to lay stress on this
full stress fight of the 13th of April since-withdrawn by a
series of mischances from the cognisance of the
Commander-in-Chief—it was never by him record-
ed in either a public despatch, or any less formal
document. (10)
fight of
the 13th
of April.
Besides Lieutenant Graham, disabled in the way
we observed, there was simply no witness of the
fight of the 13th of April except Captain Oldershaw
himself and the officers and men engaged under
him. (11) Oldershaw was not ordered to make a re-
port of his fight, and-true to that singular modesty
or was it not soldierly pride?—which I have as-
cribed to him he not only omitted to volunteer
any formal account of his engagement, but even
refrained from those unofficial statements which
might have sufficed to make the truth known. (12)
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
171
VI.
So austere a neglect of the task of self-assertion CHA P.
by an officer in command of a detached force was,
after all, too majestic for this busy maze of a world,
and his subsequent absence from the Crimea-be-
cause on staff duty elsewhere-completed the chain
of circumstances which prevented Lord Raglan from
receiving any account of the fight of the 13th of
April in the advanced No. VII.' On that subject
the Artillery Records fell into a state of confusion,
and so remain to this day.
6
But the chasm thus left in our records has now
been substantially filled. We saw an Engineer offi-
cer keenly watching the fight; but he was only a
young lieutenant, well able indeed to give testimony
of the highest value, yet not to speak with authority.
Time, however, has changed the conditions; for the
then young lieutenant was destined to attain to high
fame in the profession of arms; and it is with the
mature judgment of a general officer well versed in
the business of war that now he reviews what he
witnessed on the 13th of April 1855-the fight
maintained under Oldershaw in the advanced No.
VII.'
Sir Gerald
Graham.
judgment
shaw's
Speaking thoughtfully of a branch of the service His
which was not, remember, his own, Sir Gerald of Older-
Graham says:The Royal Artillery never hesi- fight.
'tated to engage at any odds, and they never had a
6
6
hotter morning's work than in No. VII. on that
13th of April.'*
* Letter to me, dated Cairo, Egypt, Nov. 18, 1883.
172
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP.
VI.
Both the
advanced
and VIII.
batteries
got ready
for fight-
morning of
the 14th.
VIII.
The advanced No. VII.' was restored and pre-
<
Nos. VII. pared for new fights with so great a despatch as to
be again in working order before sunrise on the very
next day, that is, on the 14th of April; and, its sister
ing on the work No. VIII.' having also at last been armed,
the commanders of the two little batteries now sup-
posed to be both in readiness could engage them,
men thought, side by side, in a renewal of the ven-
turesome conflict which had been maintained the day
before, that is, on the 13th, by our advanced No.
'VII.' alone.
Engage-
ment of
the No.
*
On this day (the 14th) the advanced No. VII.'
was commanded by Captain Henry of the Royal
tery under Artillery, having under him Lieutenant Conolly,†
and thirty-five men.
VII. bat-
Captain
Henry on
morning
of the 14th
of April.
6
Again, as on the previous morning, it was with
four 32-pounders only that the advanced No. VII.'
at daylight once more delivered its challenge to such
of the hundred guns opposite as the enemy might
deign to unleash against so small an antagonist. †
Captain Henry engaged the Barrack Batteries, and
they answered him with a power that soon proved
him to be hugely overmatched; whilst also he was
assailed front and flank by the Garden Batteries, and
* Now Lieutenant-General Henry.
+ Now no more.
As to the hundred guns potentially opposing our advanced bat-
teries, see ante, p. 145. Much of what goes before, including especially
the pages from p. 144 to p. 150, applies to the conditions under which
this fight of the 14th took place.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
173
VI.
placed besides under fire-under strong enfilading CHA P.
fire-by the (proper) left face of the Flagstaff
Bastion.
<
6
In so far as Captain Henry could see, his four
guns were working no havoc in the mighty array of
the 'Barrack' defences; and the enemy,-not, this
time, provoked by the silencing of his Crow's
Nest' battery,-was of course unimpelled by the
rage-rage vented in unmeasured storms of artillery-
fire-which had given a wild, strange character to
the fight of the previous day maintained in the same
little battery; whilst moreover, this day on its right,
the now armed and unmasked No. VIII.' was draw-
ing some of the fire that might otherwise have been
lavished on the sister battery. It would seem that,
when restoring the shattered parapet of this 'ad-
vanced No. VII.,' our Engineers must have given
it a greater degree of strength than it had on the
previous morning; for, although it is true there were
instances of the 68-pounders impinging upon the
tops of the parapets, and thence driving the sand-bags
before them, it was generally through one or other of
the embrasures that the shot and the shell on this day
came leaping into the battery. One of these took a
life of much worth. Brave, zealous, endowed beyond
other mortals with the gift of cheerliness, Boyd (a
corporal of the Royal Artillery) was laying a gun, and
casting a satisfied glance along the line of its sights,'
when a cannon-ball shot away the upper part of his
skull, and killed him so instantaneously that his face
-with the blood pouring down-still kept its radiant
174
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
VI.
CHAP. smile. The body of this valiant corporal, with that of
another good artilleryman who had also been killed,
was placed with care on a spot where one of the tra-
verses seemed to offer a semblance of shelter; but
soon, a shell blew up the traverse and buried the
dead in its ruins.
Out of his small force Captain Henry lost two men
killed, and five men wounded.
From each of his 32-pounders he fired about one
hundred rounds, but one of his guns was, after a
while, disabled.
6
Kept for nearly eight hours under a powerful fire,
the battery and its embrasures suffered havoc. 'I
remember,' says Colonel Torriano, 'going down to
'see the No. VII. battery, and found it quite a
wreck. I always wondered how Henry and his
'detachments could have stood up to it as they did
for so long.'*
.
'Stand up to it,' however, they did with an admir-
able valour and persistency during a period of nearly
eight hours, never ceasing their fire until-at half-
past one o'clock-the reliefs came down to suc-
ceed them.†
Simultane- Manned by Captain Walcott of the Royal Artil-
gagement lery, with under him Lieutenant Torriano, § Assistant-
ous en-
* Letter of 30th Oct. 1883.
+ Lord Raglan's warm appreciation of the services of Captain Henry
and the officers and men under his command will be shown post,
P. 176.
ل
Now no more.
§ Now Colonel Torriano, R.A., commanding the Royal Artillery at
Sheerness. To the best of his memory, the armament of the No. VIII.
was as I state it.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
175
VI.
of the No.
tery, under
Walcott,
Surgeon Cockerell, and the requisite number of CHAP.
gunners, the advanced No. VIII.' was on the right
of the 'advanced No. VII.,' and in the same-that VIII. bat-
is, the 3d—Parallel. Armed with six 32-pounders, Captain
it courted the fire of those same hundred guns which the
-potentially opposed the sister battery; and by morning
some indeed of those guns-guns arming the (proper) 14th.
right face of the great Redan-it could be even more
effectively searched.
Thence accordingly, and (in an opposite direction)
from the Garden Batteries as well as from other
works, our advanced No. VIII.' was brought and
kept under a strong fire-fire, some of it, enfilading,
and some bestowed on its front.
Within the first half-hour, two of Walcott's guns
were disabled, and he began to lose men.
And to this cannonade no effective reply could be
made. Our Engineers had not found time to shape
down the soles' of the embrasures to the level
required; so that thus the allotments of space left
open in front of our guns were not sufficiently deep.
Discharged under such conditions, the round-shot
impinged every time on the outermost edge of the
'sole'; and-because by this contact deflected into
a higher path-flew harmlessly over the object at
which our people had aimed it.
Perplexed by this baffling obstacle, Captain Wal-
cott went to the sister battery and there consulted
its chief. Captain Henry advised that, rather than
submit to be silenced, the advanced No. VIII.'
should, however ineffectively, continue its fire; and,
on
176
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
VI.
CHAP. when afterwards Walcott despatched Lieutenant
Torriano to the 1st Parallel with orders to represent
the condition of things in the advanced No. VIII.,'
and to ask for further instructions, he received from
his commanding officer some words of guidance equiv-
alent to Captain Henry's counsels.
Whether rightly or wrongly conceived, this in-
struction made clear the path of duty; and Captain
Walcott with the officers and gunners he commanded
passed manfully through a long ordeal that could
hardly have been otherwise than galling to warlike
men; for they had to remain submitting to so much
of fire as the enemy might vouchsafe them, without
having themselves any sense of a power to strike
in return. For the sake of what they owed to punc-
tilio, they of course could go on with a fire which, if
harmless to the enemy, was still provoking enough
to make him persevere in his efforts against their
own hampered battery; and this they faithfully did,
never ceasing from the task thrown upon them till,
after nearly eight hours of what was perhaps too
one-sided to be aptly called 'fighting,' the appointed
reliefs in due course came down to take their
places.
'
Of the force under Walcott, Assistant-Surgeon
Cockerell and seven men were disabled.
It was in recognition of the services thus rendered
in the No. VII. and No. VIII. batteries on the 14th
of April that Lord Raglan awarded high praise to
Captain Henry and Captain Walcott and the officers
and men engaged under them; (13) doing this at
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
177
6
VI.
the first by an Order of the 15th of April, which CHAP
not only expressed his 'approbation of their conduct,
but also his warmest thanks for their gallantry and
steady perseverance in the discharge of their duty;
and two days afterwards by a despatch of like import
addressed to the Secretary of State.*
}
Their
The en-
in the Nos.
gagements
VII. and
teries on
the 14th
continued
Our reliefs, bravely steadfast, gave full effect to
the theory then largely accepted in camp-to the
theory laying it down that with even so much VIII. bat-
as one gun in an undisabled state, these batteries
ought not to turn silent until after sunset.
tenacity even exceeded what opinion enjoined; for
when darkness had fully set in, our people in camp
were still hearing the fire of the two advanced
• batteries.' (14)
6
Though constraining me indeed to record them
for the sake of our valiant artillerymen, and the
country they served, those fights that we have seen.
undertaken-undertaken one hardly sees why-in
two small, forlornly placed batteries, were not, after
all, efforts destined, nor even, I may say, at all cal-
culated to govern the course of the siege.
* I believe that Lord Raglan trusted mainly to the Report framed
by Major (now Lieutenant-General) Bent, R.E. See Appendix, Note
(13). With respect to the brilliant part taken by General (then Cap-
tain) Bent, R.E., in the battle of Giurgevo, see ante, vol. ii. chap. 2.
by the re-
liefs until
dark.
VOL. VII.
M
178
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP.
VI.
IX.
I lay no stress at all on the havoc sustained at
this period by the principal batteries of the Allies,
since it was not so great as to be overpowering,
could be always repaired in due time, and did not
for a moment coerce them into either any change of
their plans, or any relaxation of effort. What kept
within bounds the intensity and the duration of their
What put bombardment, was-not the enemy's fire, but the
limit they knew there must be to all their stores—
though immense-of heavy siege-gun ammunition.
limits
on the
bombard-
ment.
Consump-
tion of
siege-gun
ammuni-
tion.
Losses of
men sus-
the Allies
With their siege-guns in this bombardment of
ten days the Allies are believed to have fired some
130,000 shots, and to have been answered by the
Russians with about 88,000.*
Though inflicting on the Russians huge losses, of
tained by which we shall afterwards hear, the mere artillery
conflict provoked by this lengthened bombardment
cost the French and the English together no more
than a few hundred men.
in the
artillery
conflict.
Large pro-
portion of
sustained
Of this loss in killed and wounded a large propor-
the losses tion, as usual, was borne by our sailors. They had
whims of their own so deep-rooted that authority did
not like to disturb them, or else for this too is
possible—the young naval officers present were them-
by our
sailors.
* Todleben, ii. p. 169. As to the weight of the respective salvoes-
French, English, and Russian-see ante, p. 133.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
179
C
VI.
whilst
a battery.
selves prone to share in the joyous, dare-devil spirit CHA P.
which always gave life to a combat maintained by
those men of the sea. A landsman observing the Their ways
numbers in which they liked to work a great gun manning
might almost suppose them determined by some
such gay rule as that of the more the merrier';
and, when they had loaded, they did not deign to
move aside in such way as to obtain the shelter of
the parapet, but maintained instead a 'look-out '
through the embrasure open before them. They
were masters of the art of bantering the enemy by
making humorous signs to him; and, too often a
Russian officer, when seen to be bending his field-
glass on one of these batteries, was destined to find
himself mocked by some kind of raillery, as for
instance, by a seaman standing up on the top of the
parapet to tease his observer by gestures, or perhaps
by the favourite prank of extinguishing his own
mirthful head beneath an inverted bucket. By these
careful arrangements our seamen proved able to
draw upon themselves much more than their due
share of fire, and their losses were heavy; but the
spirit they kept alive was a treasure of untold worth.
To appreciate the general tenor of the bombard-
ment, to teach ourselves whether it opened, or whe-
ther it failed to open a hopeful path for assault, and
withal, to learn something of the stress that it put on
the enduring courage of the garrison, we must leave
the Allies for a while, and pass over into Sebastopol.
180
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
СНАР.
VI.
The de-
fenders of
Sebasto-
pol.
Their
Easter
mingling
with the
fights in
the bat-
teries.
X.
Those duties and pleasures of Easter which had
long been engrossing the enemy, and even for some
minutes luring him from his post in the front, were
allowed, one may say, to commingle with the fight-
ing maintained in his batteries. At a time when
festivities the Flagstaff Bastion lay stricken, and torn, and
bleeding beneath a fire of great power then hotly
raging against it, the work was visited by General
Osten - Sacken (the brave officer in command at
Sebastopol), who came to give each of the comba-
tants his rital embrace, and inform every man of
them separately-inform him under round-shot and
shell-of the rising of Christ from the dead. To
that practice of a Church which in peace-time our
young Western Churches might spurn, the hour of
battle gave dignity. At every step the commander
thus addressing Easter words to his troops, was
greeted, was followed, was cheered by the roar of
their warlike 'hourrahs.'
The forti-
tude they
their task.
If thus cheered for a while by religious and
needed for festive distractions, the enemy was at all events
entering on a task that demanded rare fortitude.
Because forcing him to maintain a great parsi-
mony of fire under a hot cannonade, the dearth of
Their want ammunition was torture; whilst moreover it al-
of ammu-
nition.
ways compelled him to harbour the ugly thought
that, from this mere material want of sufficing
barrels of gunpowder, Sebastopol might be des-
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
181
VI.
tined to fall; and, when he sought to parry the CHAP.
evil by borrowing a supply from the sea-forts or the
unsunken ships, those resources were at first closed
against him by signs that they all might be needed to
meet an attack from the fleets. He was driven to the
expedient of obtaining for his Flagstaff and Central
Batteries a small supply of gunpowder taken from
out of the infantry cartridges.
And, because of the need that there was to keep
troops in readiness for withstanding the expected
assaults, he had to bear cruel losses; so that, whilst
the Allies by comparison were losing only a few from
the fire their bombardment had challenged, he
every day, whilst it lasted, was sending heavy num-
bers of his people to their graves on the Severnaya,
or else painful contrast of thoughts!-to the once
brilliant, gay, sparkling ball-room in the Assembly
House of the Nobles, then changed to a reeking
hospital. Within the ten days taken up by this
April bombardment, and mainly from the effect of
its fire, the Russians lost 6000 men.* In almost
cold blood, and with a greater distinctness than
commonly attends such hard sacrifices, these thou-
sands of men were surrendered to what I have called
a 'prerogative'-the prerogative wielded by him
who-resolving to take the offensive-is able to
choose time and place.
The sacri-
had to
fices they
make in
order to
be ready
to meet
assaults.
ism of
The submission to losses so great without means of The hero-
avenging them was a striking example of passive, their de-
enduring heroism whilst of that other kind of this time.
;
* 6131 killed and wounded, Todleben, vol. ii. p. 170,
fence at
182
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
VI.
2
CHAP. heroism which, along with a valiant and protracted
confronting of danger, demands also a prodigious
exertion of human energy, the Russians gave signal
proof; for when towards the close of each day.
they found their defences in ruins, they calmly
moved out in the twilight, began to repair their
Works, and, though kept all the time under
vertical fire which was commonly one of great
power, toiled on throughout the night, never fail-
ing (except in one instance) to bring the shattered
defences into a state for fighting again so soon as
the morning should break. To attain such an end,
no sacrifice, says the great Engineer, should be ever
considered too great, and according to his belief, it
was by efforts in that direction that the French for
ten days, were prevented from carrying forward
their siege-works; whilst also he holds that thus
checked, they perforce became greatly discouraged,
and even shaken in purpose. *
On the whole, one may say and there is no
higher praise to utter-that, although conducted,
this time, with the aid of mighty appliances, their
resistance to the April bombardment was not un-
worthy of those who-inspired by the then living
Korniloff, and the matchless Colonel of Sappers
still kindling and guiding their energies-had be-
gun under desperate conditions their glorious de-
fence of Sebastopol.
In some respects, after seven days, the ordeal
became less trying; for on the night of the 15th,
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 187.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
183
r
VI.
Supplies
nition and
the enemy obtained a supply of gunpowder, with CHAP.
assurance that much more would follow; and soon,
he began to enjoy a good measure of those many of ammu-
blessings which are commonly denied to a Fortress reinforce-
when really beleaguered; for the needed ammunition ments.
came peacefully into Sebastopol, whilst the garrison
was strengthened and comforted by the arrival of
reinforcements, and besides, by exchanges of troops
made at will with the Russian Field army.
Apart from that object of checking the French
approaches with which we were dealing elsewhere,
the enemy's task was twofold. He had, if he
could, to prevent the assailant's artillery from open-
ing a path for assault.
in
The tasks
which the
was
cost
defence of
Sebastopol
at this
And, because he well knew that his efforts
that first direction might, all of them, fail, he
forced, as we have seen-and this at a dire
of life-to keep himself in absolute readiness for volved.
the climax in that case assumed to be certain, and
close at hand.
Towards maintaining that terrible 'readiness'
throughout the ten days' bombardment, the enemy,
it is certain enough, did all that well could be
compassed by skill of the highest order, by vast
unremitting energy, and by resolute sacrifices of life
exacted under trying conditions; but did he prove
able to achieve the first part of his task, and prevent
the besieger's artillery from opening through the
defences a practicable path for assault?
time in-
184
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
СНАР.
VI.
The two
White
Redoubts
crushed
and si-
lenced,
To see our way towards an answer, we need not
be taking account of the havoc from time to time.
wrought on the enemy's other defences, but must
look to those Works which more closely protected
the life of his Fortress by blocking the paths for
assaulting it.
On the side of the Faubourg, those Works were
the Malakoff Tower itself and the counter-approaches
protecting it.
On the side of Sebastopol Town, the 'Flagstaff'
and the Central' Bastions with their closely adja-
cent auxiliaries.
6
Between the two fronts for attack' which thus
offered themselves to bombardment on both the
east and the west, there stood ranged an extended
and strongly armed line of ramparts which included
the 'Great Redan,' and its western neighbours the
Barrack,' the 'Creek,' and the 'Garden' Batteries ;
but, although these Works all formed good links in
the enemy's chain of defence, they still guarded his
Fortress at points which were not for the moment
endangered.
6
Dealing first with the Faubourg, its principal
counter-approaches were the two White Redoubts on
Mount Inkerman, and the now strong Kamtchatka
Lunette which covered the front of the Malakoff.
The two White Redoubts on Mount Inkerman
were confronted by the French, and by them so
successfully battered as to be silenced and crushed
on the second day of the bombardment ;* but what
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 127.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
185
VI.
is more, the conditions were such that the Russians CHAP.
for once proved unable to repair the havoc, and they
supposed that the worst' was at hand.
worst' was at hand. They repaired;
assembled their troops before dawn and awaited
'
the expected assault.*
and not
not as-
by the
The French did not follow up their advantage, but still
and refrained from laying hold by assault of the saulted
path which their guns had laid open to them. This French.
was the more astonishing to Todleben, since he
knew-and supposed all must know-that by taking
the White Redoubts the French would have ensured
the fall of the Kamtchatka Lunette.
When the enemy afterwards found that the French
were not moving in the thus opened path of conquest,
he proceeded at his leisure to repair and rearm the two
White Redoubts thus strangely left under his sway.
We next come to the Malakoff Tower; but regarded The Mala-
as an 'objective' for the fire of the April bombard- ered by
ment, this Work, though not spared altogether, was ter-ap-
of course for the moment a less provocative target and not
than that bold Kamtchatka Lunette which had therefore
sprung up to cover its front.
koff cov-
coun-
proaches,
strongly
assailed.
chatka
to ruin.
This Lunette, as we have seen, was confronted, The Kamt-
and even in siege-form approached,' by a part of Lunette
Canrobert's army; whilst also the Work was so cir-
brought
cumstanced that it could be assailed by the French
with their Artilleur' range of great guns established
on the slopes of Mount Inkerman, and on the other
flank by no less than nine English batteries pouring
fire of great power from the precincts of Gordon's
* Ibid., p. 130.
C
186
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
VI.
Not, how-
ever, as-
saulted
by the
French;
CHAP. 'Attack.' By this strong and concentrated fire the
Lunette was 'cruelly tried' the first day of the bom-
bardment, and brought to a state of sheer ruin ;*
but, the French not assaulting it, the Work was
restored at night; and thenceforth, although mightily
plied by vertical fire, it was less torn by round-shot. †
There were signs-and the signs proved true guides
proached that the French would not promptly assault the
Work; for they continued to approach it by sap.‡
but still
ap-
by their
sap.
Complete
failure of
the Eng-
lish bat-
teries
against
Redan.
>
In all their artillery efforts against the Great
Redan our people-and with them mainly rested this
part of the task-may simply be said to have failed;
the Great since by dint of their ten days' bombardment they
did not lay open the Work, did not make it more
ripe for assault than it was when the firing began.
Here and there in the batteries of the Work and its
neighbours they of course, every day, wrought some
mischief, but mischief so far from overwhelming that
always, and with comparative ease, the enemy found
means to repair it in the course of the following
night. General Todleben was able to say that in its
conflict with the English batteries, his Great Redan
won a full victory.'S
The Town
Front.
'
Moving always from east to west we come last to
the close-threatened part of what men called the
*Todleben, p. 109.
Ibid., pp. 140, 143.
+ Ibid., pp. 127, 132.
§ Ibid., p. 182.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
187
VI.
sians ima-
French to
'Town Front-to the 'Flagstaff Bastion,' to its CHAP.
neighbours the Central,' and the lesser Works
clustering near them. There, the Russians in many The Rus-
a combat had been feeling the keen, sustained vigour gining the
of General Pélissier; and it seemed to them that be resolute,
the French, in a resolute and peremptory mood were
intent to take the life of the Fortress by coming at
last to close quarters with its Flagstaff Bastion.†
To win this all-mastering key, it was necessary,
or at all events right, that the neighbouring Central
'Bastion' and other adjacent Works should be also
assailed by siege-guns.
and deter-
mined to
seize the
Flagstaff
Bastion.
sustained
Flagstaff
On Monday the 9th April, the first day of the Havoc
bombardment, the Central Bastion with its auxiliary by the
batteries suffered heavily under the fire, and towards Bastion
evening was reduced to silence; whilst also in the auxiliaries
crenelled wall near it, there was wrought a breach day.
seven yards wide. The Flagstaff Bastion itself was
"
C
'
declared by Todleben to have been literally buried
' under an enormous mass of hollow projectiles which
inflicted upon it great damage, and terrible losses
of men.' At sunset on this, as on every succeed-
ing day of the bombardment, the task of repairing
began, and was continued all night.‡
Next day
the 10th of April
the 10th of April - the besiegers
* Then commanding the 1st Corps, see post, pp. 202-208.
† That the fall of this Bastion would involve the fall of Sebastopol,
see post, p. 188 and p. 194.
When I speak of 'repairs' and 'repairing,' I include substitu-
tions; as for instance, the replacing of crippled guns by sound ones,
and the construction of new defences with which to close a gap opened
in part of the crenelled wall.
and its
on the first
188
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP. renewed their fire; and the dearth of ammunition
VI.
So, on the
second
day;
So, on the
third day;
from which the enemy suffered was on this day
brought home to him painfully by orders directing
that the guns with which he replied to the mighty
bombardment should only be fired at long intervals.
On this, as on the previous day, the Flagstaff
Bastion was buried' once more under a mass of
projectiles, and eight of its guns were dismounted ;
whilst besides almost all its embrasures were
brought to ruin. There at last remained only two
guns with which to continue the action; and,
although for some reason the French had not
clenched their success yet more tightly by the
opportune use of dismounting batteries' established
on well-chosen sites, it was judged by him who
best knew that the all-precious Flagstaff Bastion
which he held to be the key of Sebastopol had at
last been made ripe for assault. This besides, as
we saw, was the day when the White Redoubts
seemed to be placed at the mercy of the French ;
and accordingly Todleben writes: We were then
' in expectation of seeing the Allies take advantage
' of this opportunity for advancing to the assault of
'the Flagstaff Bastion and the White Redoubts.'
On the 11th of April, the French artillery-
fire brought the Central Bastion and its auxiliary
the Schwartz Redoubt to a state of utter disorder,
*Todleben, p. 127.
† According to Todleben, the French were in possession of admi-
rable sites for any such dismounting batteries; and he particularly
specifies one-viz., the site of their Mortar Battery, 'No. 25, bis.'
-Ibid., p. 109.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
189
VI.
and assailed the Flagstaff Bastion with so great a CHAP.
power that all the guns in its salient were dis-
mounted and all the embrasures of its left face
destroyed.*
fourth
On the 12th of April the Flagstaff Bastion was so, on the
again plied with violent fire, and Todleben judged day;
it to be in a critical state.†
fifth day;
On the 13th of April the enemy concentrated his so, on the
efforts on the Flagstaff Bastion, which was once
more thrown into a state of complete disorder, and
towards evening it was silenced.‡
sixth day.
On the 14th as on former days of the bombard- so, on the
ment, the Flagstaff Bastion was the Work that
suffered the most.§
Flagstaff
By this time, the Flagstaff Bastion had been State of
under a fire of great power during several successive Bastion.
days; and Todleben judged that, to keep it in fight-
ing condition, a more than common effort was
needed. There were therefore applied to this task The great
the concentrated energies of no less than 1500 men made to
who toiled all night in the battery, and with so
much the more of devotion since they toiled, all the
time, under fire.||
effort
repair it.
the Bas-
seventh
day;
On the 15th of April again, the Flagstaff Bastion Peril of
lay stricken under a devastating fire; and it was tion on the
only, says Todleben, from the brave emulation of all
its defenders that this Work more menaced than all
others by assault maintained its means of defence. T
* Ibid., p. 131.
+ Ibid., p. 137 et seq.
§ Ibid., p. 147.
‡ Ibid, p. 140.
|| Ibid., p. 141.
T Ibid., p. 147.
190
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
VI.
CHAP. No effort was spared to keep the Work in a condi-
tion for answering assault with mitrail.*
on the
eighth
day;
on the
ninth day;
on the
tenth day.
Desperate
state of
Bastion.
The evening of this 15th of April was the one
on which our allies opened up by explosion three
craters in front of the Flagstaff Bastion; † and, since
this measure visibly offered to aid the advance of
infantry, there seemed to be now one more reason
for making sure that French columns would be
presently assaulting the Work. ‡
On the 16th of April, the Flagstaff Bastion was
once more buried' under a mass of projectiles,
and its armament was thrown into a state of utter
disorder; whilst also its embrasures and its merlons.
were demolished and swept away.§
On the 17th of April, the Flagstaff Bastion with
its auxiliary the Kostomaroff Battery sustained
heavy injuries, having five guns dismounted, and six
gun-carriages broken; whilst those of its embrasures
which confronted the advanced works of the French
were, most of them, demolished.
On the 18th of April, the Flagstaff Bastion was the
main object of the besieger's fire; and at the close of
this the last day of the general bombardment, the
Work was in so ill a plight as to be judged no longer
sustainable by even augmented exertions; since apart
from that outward, that instantly visible havoc which
the labour of each night had made good, the con-
tinued fire by degrees had been acting against the
* Todleben, p. 147.
+ See post, p. 198.
Todleben, vol. ii. p. 150.
§ The 'merlons' are those parts of the parapet which stand be-
tween the embrasures.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
191
6
VI.
strength of the Work with a cumulative effect, and CHA P.
had caused at last injuries of the deeper sort that
could hardly be met by any common repairing.'
The salient of the Bastion had fallen in, and its
ruin seemed to be imminent; but, like all the pre-
ceding temptations to assault the Work, this last
one, great as it seems, was successfully resisted by
Canrobert.
*
of the gen-
eral bom-
bardment.
Flag of
truce.
Compli-
ments ex-
changed
French
sian offi-
On the 19th, the general bombardment ceased, Cessation
and under a flag of truce agreed to for the burial of
the dead, French and Russian officers met at the
boundary line. In the course of the friendly con-
versation that followed, they exchanged warm ac-
knowledgments of the prowess displayed by their between
respective foes; and it was then that a straddling and Rus-
comparison which afterwards had vogue in Paris is cers.
said to have first been made. In recognising the
splendid tenacity of the defence a French officer
compared the siege of Sebastopol to the siege of
Troy. He did not say (as said Menelaus according
to one tradition) that the siege had been a wretched
mistake.t
Siege of
• Troy.'
tion of
bardment
In the course of the four days that followed the Continua-
cessation of the general bombardment, the Flagstaff the bom-
Bastion with its neighbouring auxiliaries continued directed
to suffer heavily under the fire of the besiegers, and Flagstaff
on the 20th, the breach wrought in the 'crenelled and its
'wall' was increased to a breadth of 28 yards.
On the 21st of April, the Flagstaff Bastion was
reduced to complete silence; and this, we shall see,
+ Lemprière, voce Helen.
* Todleben, p. 156.
against the
Bastion
auxiliaries.
192
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
VI.
CHAP. was the day when the French, after dark, proved
able to top the craters opened up by their mining,
Their peril
on the 21st to join them all three together, and to connect them
of April.
with their system of trenches, thus establishing at
last their 4th Parallel at a distance of but a hundred
paces from the counterscarp of the opposite Work.
Then indeed the concurring success of two separate
and vast operations might well seem to threaten a
crisis in the life of the Flagstaff Bastion.
At the cost of exciting an ebullition of warlike
wrath in his own army, General Canrobert still
abstained from assaulting the battered Work.
Question
whether
the bom-
bardment
opened
paths for
assault;
answered
by the
facts, and
by the
authorita-
tive opin-
ion of Gen-
eral Todle-
ben.
XI.
Here then is a long string of facts, pointing all of
them in the same direction; but, to judge of their
cogency, and say whether this great bombardment
did or not open paths for assault, it is right to hear
the voice of authority.
Commanding on this subject more weight than
any other man of our times, General Todleben answers
the question.
Having previously disclosed an opinion that the
two White Redoubts on Mount Inkerman, and the
Kamtchatka Lunette might have been successfully
and advantageously stormed, he goes on to speak of
the Flagstaff Bastion, and says of it that after having
undergone a constant and violent bombardment the
Work was 'in a desperate plight. Its artillery had
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
193
C
VI.
been dismounted, its embrasures and its merlons CHA P.
'almost entirely demolished, and a part of its salient
had fallen in. So, during each of these days we
' were continually expecting to see the enemy take
'advantage of the critical state to which the bastion
was reduced, and advance to the assault of the
• Work.'*
t
દ
C
The French might have advanced to the assault
' of this Bastion with an absolute certainty of success,
and this so much the more since they found them-
'selves at a distance from it of only some hundred
paces.' +
(
After stating that the Allies had planned assaults,
and failed to execute them, he goes on to say:
It
is thus that the Allies failed to profit by the im-
portant advantage they had obtained; yet they
' had it completely in their power to take the Flag-
staff Bastion, and that would have carried with it
'the fall of Sebastopol. Let us remember that, like
the rest of the defences, the Flagstaff Bastion had
C
'
been never secure against an attack by assault, and
that at this time from the effect of a prolonged
bombardment, it was in a state of half ruin, because
' a part of its salient had fallen in. Each day, after
a firing of some hours, its artillery was thrown into
(
a state of complete disorder, and it happened several
'times that the Work could only fire with two guns.
'The violent fire of mortars under which the Bastion
was constantly kept forbade our keeping there
'more than a weak garrison; and even this was not
† Ibid., p. 182.
* Todleben, p. 181.
VOL. VII.
N
194
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
CHAP. kept within the Work itself, but placed under cover
VI.
in rear of the gorge, for otherwise the enemy's shells
'must have inevitably destroyed the whole force.'
'
6
Under such conditions, the besieger, with the
power of choosing his own day and his own hour
for the assault, would always have been able to an-
ticipate our troops on the ramparts of the Bastion."*
Then, after showing with care and detail that the
fate of the Bastion, if assaulted, could not have been
averted by any of the Works on its flanks, or by any
of those in its rear, the great defender of Sebasto-
pol goes on to say what the besiegers might have
done: +-
C
'After having occupied the Flagstaff Bastion, and
fortified himself in that advantageous position
'where the ditch of the Work offered a covered lodg-
ment for large reinforcements, the besiegers might
6
have turned its batteries against the Works of the
'Central Bastion which, deprived of the co-operation
of the troops of the 2d section, would have been
soon reduced to the same plight as the Flagstaff
'Bastion.'
'The fall of the Flagstaff and the Central Bastion
would have necessarily rendered impossible all
· further defence of Sebastopol.'(15)
The bom-
bardment
The bombardment must therefore be said to have
achieved really achieved its set purpose; but then, after
its set pur- all, the proceeding was only preparative, and the
pose;
* Todleben, p. 185.
+ Ibid., pp. 185, 186.
‡ Ibid., p. 186.
THE APRIL BOMBARDMENT.
195
VI.
but, not
lowed up,
in harm to
French did not take their next step. * After hav- CHAP.
ing brought to bear on their object for several
months both strong energies, and immense State being fol-
resources, the Allies at last with their siege-guns tested
laid open fit paths for assault to General Canrobert.
He did not use them when opened; and therefore,
of course, what resulted to the Allies was a huge
waste of time and of power, with a yet further loss
of the ascendancy won by their battles.
the Allies.
"
inquiry;
To understand why the Allies thus abstained from Todleben's
assaulting his Fortress, General Todleben has exerted
divining power. He had not, however, the clue. the clue.
It was only in a later year that the Government of
France-then once more a Republic-allowed a ser-
vant of the State to search the long-hidden archives
of the War Department, and on their authority show
that what had passed for an Army sincerely em-
ployed by its Chief in earnest, though misman-
aged efforts against the lines of Sebastopol, was,
after all, only an Army kept waiting for Louis
Napoleon, and meanwhile restrained from engaging
in any determined attack.‡
I say 'the French,' not the Allies, because it was only to the
French that an opportunity of assaulting accrued.
+ Todleben, p. 186 et seq.
The disclosure was made through Monsieur Rousset, a public
functionary on the staff of the French War Department. See ante,
cap. v.
196
THE DEATH
CHAPTER VII.
THE SIEGE OF SEBASTOPOL (WITH EXCLUSION OF THE APRIL
BOMBARDMENT, ALREADY NARRATED) FROM THE 9TH OF
APRIL TO THE MIDDLE OF MAY.
VII.
I.
CHA P. SIMULTANEOUSLY with the great cannonade, and
with those troubled counsels which lasted until the
middle of May, there took place not only some
fights, but also some other occurrences that must
not be left unobserved.
Bizot
mortally
wounded.
Com-
On the 11th of April, the French-and indeed
I will say the Allies sustained a painful loss.
Whilst making his way along one of our unfinished
trenches, General Bizot was struck by a shot, and
the wound, some days later, proved mortal.
manding the French Engineers, he had pursued his
huge task with a zeal that never relaxed. So
habitually a scorner of danger that he always had
seemed to be courting it, he preserved in the most
trying moments a noble serenity of mind, with be-
A
OF GENERAL BIZOT.
*
197
VII.
sides that serenity of temper which was one of the CHAP.
characteristics of his kindly nature. The French
army had always held Bizot to be a man of genuine
worth. Disloyally treated, and weakened by his
Emperor's self-seeking intrigue, he still was so true
a soldier that he did not allow himself to become
at all soured by the overshadowing presence of Niel,
and went on thinking only of duty, duty, duty.
From the counsel we heard Bizot giving on the
10th of March it may well be inferred that he
had not been then made a sharer of the ugly
design set on foot for keeping a French army
tethered in the enemy's presence; and those who
respect his memory may hope to remain in the faith
that even down to his death, he stood apart, free
from the stain of having been ever initiated in any
such ignoble mysteries. An abrupt disinterment of
words confidentially written has indeed compelled
us to see that in February-when still the Winter
Troubles' were rife-General Bizot could find heart
to sneer at the 'indolence' of the English, whose
only real fault, as we know, was that of being so
few; but already we have learnt how that perilous
want of numbers was masked by the noble de-
meanour of our suffering army, and may therefore
forgive a French officer who imagined that its
semblance of strength implied a power of adding
* Niel, p. 199.
<
+ Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure, 17th April 1855.
'
‡ M. Rousset, vol. ii. p. 32, prints the words in which Bizot (writ-
ing to the French Minister of War) speaks of Niel's having 'tried in
'vain to galvanise their indolence.'
198
A PARALLEL OPENED BY MINING.
CHAP. to its daily allotment of work. If acquainted with
VII.
And suc-
ceeded
after an
interval
by Niel.
our dread 'Morning States,' he - a man noble-
hearted and just-would never have harboured the
thought which inspired his ungenerous words.
It was on the 15th of April that General Bizot
died. Lord Raglan in person, together with those
of his Staff who could be spared from their impera-
tive duties, showed the feeling with which they
regarded the memory of the brave Engineer by
following his remains to the grave.
In command of the French Engineers General Bizot
was succeeded provisionally by General Dalesme,
and definitively after an interval which lasted
until the 5th of May-by General Niel, who pro-
posed himself for the place. This last appointment,
however, was not of a nature to clash with the
secret, the personal services which Niel had en-
gaged to perform.
mines in
front of
the Flag-
staff Bas-
The
General Bizot had scarce breathed his last, when
French
opening
the French carried into effect a design he had long
ground by
entertained, and had long been seeking to execute.*
At the close of that series of mining operations
which he had devised for the purpose, they at
length on the evening of Sunday the 15th brought
about some convulsing explosions which opened up
from below a line of volcano-like craters at a distance
of less than a hundred yards from the counterscarp
tion;
* See ante, p. 35, an account of his earlier effort in the same
direction.
GROUND FOR EXULTATION.
199
VII.
of the Flagstaff Bastion, and thus formed in front CHA P.
of the Work a long, deep cavity, interrupted, it
is true, in one place, but forming elsewhere what,
if shaped by the hand of nature, might almost be
called a ravine.' *
forming
a 4th
Parallel.
This artificial opening of the ground close in front and there
of the Flagstaff Bastion became for the French a be-
ginning of their 4th Parallel, and-though not until
after hard struggles-they were ultimately able to
establish themselves in the hollow, taking care of
course also to connect it with their 3d Parallel-
full 100 yards less in advance-by covered lines
of way. t
Unaware of the secret resolves which were too
surely baffling its efforts, the French Army taken at
large might have well felt a right to exult, when two-
thirds of the distance which had separated their
foremost Parallel from the Flagstaff Bastion, were
thus all at once overleapt by the art of the miner,
and their people-with cover to shelter them-were
planted at last within stone's-throw of that very
counterscarp which they had hopefully begun to
approach on the earliest night of the siege. But that
same French Army comprised in its thousands two
men who must needs have been gravely embarrassed
by seeing on the day of his death-this completion
* The incompleteness of the hollow at one spot resulted from the
afterwards ascertained fact that in part of the mine some charges had
failed to explode.
In anticipation of the explosions destined, as we saw, to take effect
on the 15th, the formation of these covered lines of way was begun on
the night of the 11th.-Niel, p. 201.
200
SUCCESS FOUND EMBARRASSING.
VII.
The ten-
dency of
this suc-
ploit to
embarrass
Canrobert
and Niel.
C
CHAP of Bizot's design; for, in faithful obedience to the
Mission,' both Canrobert and Niel had been minded
to abstain from attacking the Bastion; yet how to
cessful ex- excuse themselves for thus hanging back when at
last after six months of toil their troops were now
close to the goal, and when also in that dire ex-
tremity which before we observed, the defence of
the Bastion was collapsing under the fire of great
guns?*
The two generals, it seems, would have
liked to resume their subterranean warfare against
the Flagstaff Bastion; † and in such case of course
their resolve to abstain from assaulting it instant-
ly might have been palliated, or even defended by
alleging a not empty reason; but from that resource,
it soon proved, they were altogether cut off by their
own engineering exploit; for the mighty explosions
it wrought had blown away into mere chaos the
useful stratum of clay which till then had always
welcomed their miners, and-confronted now instead
by hard rock-they could not hope to make good
any further advance underground. ‡
Thus for not following up the creation of his 4th
Parallel to its natural conclusions General Canrobert
found himself left without any more valid 'reason'
than the one put forward by Niel of which we shall
afterwards hear.§
When writing in 1870, General de Todleben had
the 'reason' before him, but apparently did not re-
* See ante, p. 190.
§ Post, pp. 201, 202.
passage in p. 208.
+ Niel, p. 208.
‡ Ibid.
See Niel, pp. 196, 197, and his reference to
TODLEBEN'S TOWN-SIDE ENCROACHMENTS.
201
VII.
gard it as having been set up in earnest. Why-un- CHAP.
less still intent upon mining-the French did not
come on at once to storm his Flagstaff Bastion, he
professed that he could not divine.*
encroach-
front of
tral Bas-
Passing yet further west to the front of the Central Todleben's
Bastion, Colonel Todleben at this time began to ments in
fasten new Works on the zone there dividing his the Cen-
lines from the French, doing this-at the first-by tion.
establishing lengthened chains of those greatly aggra-
vated Rifle-pits which he has taught us to distinguish
as 'lodgments'; and, as previously on Mount Inker-
man, and the Victoria Ridge, so here too before the
Town front, General Canrobert, it seems, showed Canro-
reluctance to make any resolute stand against the willing-
offensive encroachments.†
+
<
In professing to explain the reluctance attributed
to General Canrobert, Niel, as usual, has passed by
in silence that ill-omened Mission' of his which,
we know, was the true master-key for unlocking any
such secrets; and instead, has given this reason
to account for his Chief's state of mind:-He has
explained General Canrobert's reluctance to with-
stand the enemy's main encroachments in this west-
ern part of the field by saying that the Malakoff
had become the real object of attack, that the siege
against the Town front had grown to be a task of
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 150.
+ Niel, p. 239; Rousset, ii. pp. 166, 167.
I See ante, cap. v.
bert's un-
ness to re-
sist them.
202
THE RISE OF PÉLISSIER.
VII.
CHAP. less moment, and that therefore, to grudge making
sacrifices in conflicts no longer thought cardinal
might not, after all, be unwise. (¹)
This, how-
ever, over-
come.
Pélissier;
But whatever its cause, the French commander's
reluctance to make a vigorous stand against Todle-
ben's successive aggressions was destined, this time,
to be vanquished, or perhaps one may say over-
ruled.
The truth is that in this the 'old siege '-the
siege against the Town front-a man stronger than
Canrobert, and stronger than Canrobert's Emperor,
was beginning to make himself felt.
Pélissier, it is true, at this time commanded only
a corps; but his, as it chanced, were the troops
affronted, challenged, defied, by this last growth of
new Russian works thrown out in advance of Sebas-
topol; and, although of course lawfully he was even
on this his own ground a subordinate owning obe-
dience to the acknowledged Commander-in-Chief, he
still was by nature so constituted as to be in hot
rage at the notion of quietly, tamely enduring the
not brook- enemy's audacious encroachments. And rage with
ing the en-
croach- him was a power. Having great strength of will,
ments
whilst able at pleasure to arm himself—almost
dramatically-with an overpowering vehemence of
manner and speech, and besides, exerting his pressure
on one who well knew him to be indicated by a
Dormant Commission for the exercise (under certain
contingencies) of even the highest command, he-
against
his own
front.
PÉLISSIER'S APRIL FIGHTS.
203
VII.
after some effort apparently-got his way over Can- CHAP.
robert, and was either empowered or suffered to
make that war against 'lodgments' of which we
are going to speak.*
aly thence
Thence sprang the anomaly of Frenchmen yielding The anom-
tamely to pressure in that chosen part of the field resulting.
where they meant the attack to be real, and assert-
ing their strength with decisiveness on ground far
away towards the west where their chief regarded
the task as one of inferior moment.t What thus
turned the scale against seemingly fair presump-
tions was a well-known disturbant of inference-
the strong, fierce will of one man.
6
for the
Lodg-
The Cimetière' chain of Lodgments was one so Fights
boldly thrown forward that from some of them the Cimetière
enemy commanded a near, an endangering view of ments.
the French siege-works; and Pélissier, not willing to
brook so plain an affront, determined to attack them
on the night of the 10th of April. His purpose
being divined by the Russians (who had seen him.
preparing his enterprise), they resorted to a plan
which apparently was based on some theory that in
contests for lodgments, it is better to have to attack
than it is to have to defend them. Under cover of
evening, they withdrew their troops from the lodg-
* Niel, p. 203. With respect to the 'counter-guard lodgments,' my
inference that Pélissier carried his point after some 'effort,' is war-
ranted, I think, by Niel's account, pp. 239, 240, and more decisively
by Rousset's, vol. ii. p. 166.
+ Ibid.
204
PÉLISSIER'S APRIL FIGHTS.
VII.
CHAP. ments and prepared to ply the new occupants who
might soon be there posted with a powerful fire of
artillery poured out from the Central Bastion.
Between nine and ten o'clock in the evening the
French, taking it for granted that a combat awaited
them, advanced in some strength and planted them-
selves in the then empty lodgments, but were pres-
ently assailed (in accordance with their adversary's
design) by a powerful artillery - fire. Under this
ordeal, the French held their ground firmly during
several hours, but not without suffering losses.
Then at two o'clock in the morning, the enemy
made a powerful sortie, retook at once two of the
lodgments, and did not give himself rest until he had
Resulting, recovered them all. In like manner, on the nights
of the 11th and the 12th there was a taking and
retaking of these pits; but on the night of the 13th,
cess of the Pélissier caused them to be attacked in some force.
and destroyed.
after some
days, in
the defini-
tive suc-
French.
Todleben's
project for
a new
Work of
counter-
approach.
The fight-
ing for
lodgments
With the deliberate purpose of covering a some-
what weak part of his defences by a species of
counter-guard,' Colonel Todleben had established in
front of his Schwartz Redoubt another strong chain
of lodgments which were to make a beginning of the
Work designed.
These lodgments Pélissier seized on the last-men-
construct- tioned night-the night of the 13th of April; but
after dark on the 23d, and again on the 24th, the
of the pro- strife was renewed. From that last night forward
ed in fur-
therance
ject.

BAY
પાણ
N°38
Scale.
0
2
Nº33
CEMETERY
70mmmmnin
Map No 7 to face page.204
SCENE OF THE FIGHTS MAINTAINED BY PLISSIER
BEFORE HIS ACCESSION TO THE SUPREME COMMAND
THE COUNTER-APPROACHES IN FRONT OF THE CENTRAL BASTION
DOWN TO THE 1ST OF MAY.
No 5
CENTRAL BASTION
N°44
N:28 bis
N°28
3RD PARALLEL
N°4
N°42
N°43
No3+
RUSSIAN
Communication
COUNTER APPROBE
APRIL
N°34bis
Nº40
N39
Nº16
N°17
N°18
No 20
N°19
4 Furlongs
N°14
N13
N°12
The Town Ravine
No 25 bis
PARALLEL
N°24
N22
No 25
Nº15
No 27
N° 4
FLAGSTAFF BASTION
A. RITCH A SON. EDIM
THE SOUSDAL COUNTER-GUARD.
205
VII.
dal Coun-
until the close of the month, the Russians not only CHA P.
remained masters of the lodgments, but deliberately
converted them into a new Work of counter-approach
affecting the form of a redoubt, and so audaciously
thrown forward as to be 141 yards in advance of
the Russian line of defence and within 116 yards of
the French siege-works.* Although not yet sup-
plied with its appointed armament, this new Work-
the Sousdal Counter-guard-was furnished already The Sous-
with nine little 6-pound mortars which, along with ter-guard.
the fire of the riflemen, were used to annoy the
French workmen who toiled in their most advanced
trenches. The work was connected with the flank
of the Schwartz Redoubt by a trench so placed as
to be concealed from the eyes of French gunners
by a fold of the ground. On the whole, this new
counter-approach, if endured long enough to allow
of its being completed and armed and defiantly
maintained (as had been the Kamtchatka Lunette),
would bring General Pélissier's corps d'armée into
almost the same sort of plight as that in which we
saw the French placed when fended off by new
Works to a distance greater than ever from the
front of the coveted Malakoff.
General Canrobert, we know, grudged the loss
that would have to be suffered in wresting this
Sousdal Counter-guard from the enemy; but by
* Todleben does not deny that this extreme proximity to the
enemy's siege-works was a defect, but says its position was dictated
by the lay of the ground. The new Work was executed by troops of
the Sousdal Regiment, and thence acquired its name.
+ Niel, p. 239, and Rousset, vol. ii. p. 166.
206
PÉLISSIER'S CONQUEST
VII.
CHAP. strength of will armed with overpowering vehe-
mence Pélissier brought his Chief to consent that
the attack should be made, and orders were given
accordingly.*
Brilliant
attack by
on the
Sousdal
Counter-
guard,
At half-past ten o'clock on the night of the 1st
the French of May, a strong body of French infantry com-
manded by General Motterouge advanced against
the Work in three columns, of which those on the
right and left flanks were respectively under the
orders of General de Salles and General Bazaine,
whilst General Motterouge in person led forward the
two battalions which formed his centre column.t
and cap-
ture of the
Work;
Either in or about the Work, the enemy at this
time was present with no less than four battalions;
but devoting his care to the task of repairing havoc
done in the daytime by French artillery, he is said
to have been off his guard, and to have been taken
in part by surprise.‡
Without firing a shot, the assailants made good
their advance to the edge of the Work, and
the centre column at once broke over its parapet
intent on the use of the bayonet. Some lively
fighting ensued, but did not last long. The centre
column prevailing soon drove out the Russians,
pursued them some way in their flight, and was
master of the counter-approach including its nine
little mortars.
* Niel, pp. 239, 240; Rousset, ii. p. 166.
† Niel, p. 240 et seq. I am unable to give the numerical strength of
the columns; but they comprised, it seems, altogether two entire
battalions, with besides twenty-seven companies.-Ibid.
‡ Todleben, vol. ii. p. 198.
OF THE SOUSDAL COUNTER-GUARD.
207
Then with admirable valour and skill Colonel CHAP.
VII.
Guérin of the French Engineers and the officers and
men working under his guidance made haste to
clench the victory. Reversing the parapets of the
captured Work, they converted to the use of the
French what so lately had sheltered the Russians, resulting
and achieved under fire the perilous and difficult plete suc-
task of forming (by flying sap) the gabionaded French.
approach-full 350 yards long-that would link to
their system of trenches the newly effected conquest.
The conduct of the French troops, that night, was,
as Lord Raglan said, 'very brilliant.'*
The time for attacking and seizing this work of
counter-approach was happily chosen; for (except as
regards the small mortars) it had not as yet been
armed, though its ramparts had already attained
such a height and solidity that, when once in the
hands of the victor, they afforded him a much-
needed shelter against the fire of the place.
in the com-
cess of the
Losses sus-
tained in
the night
combat of
It was not without making sacrifices that the
French achieved this conquest of what at the first
had been only a chain of those aggravated Rifle-pits the 1st of
which Todleben used to call Lodgments.'
killed and wounded, they lost, it would seem, about
600 officers and men; † the Russians 425.†
In May.
*I quote this high praise from Lord Raglan's published Despatch,
May 5, 1855.
+ Niel, p. 241. The numbers killed and wounded on the French
Left at the time in question-i.e., from the 1st to the 2d of May-is
stated at 602, and it does not appear that there was any other combat
that night. The French losses at the battle of the Alma were not, it
seems, quite so great as those they sustained in this combat.
‡ Todleben, vol. ii. p. 199.
208
EGERTON'S ENGAGEMENT,
CHAP.
VII.
Canrobert
6
Strange as it may seem to those who have not
grasped the full bearing of General Niel's 'mission,'
apologis- it is actually true that General Canrobert offered an
ing for this
victorious excuse to the Home Government for this victorious
exploit.
exploit, as one of a kind inconsistent with the sys-
'tem of waiting'-a system which seemed to forbid
all such actions; and he added that the embarrass-
ment thus caused was one of the difficulties of the
situation.'*
The Sous-
dal Coun-
converted
C
On the following day, the French strengthened
ter-guard themselves yet further in the conquered Work, and
gave it a name. They called it, The Work of the
2d of May'; and afterwards, at about three
o'clock, they promptly repulsed a sortie which the
Russians attempted against it.
into a
French
Work;
and held
fast.
The fight-
ing for
in front of
દ
'Attack.
On the night of the 13th, they repulsed a new
sortie attempted against the Work, as also one made
further west with a view to aid the main object by
making a diversion elsewhere.
C
Pélissier had not yet opened his small, though
lodgments
determined campaign against the Counter-guard'
Gordon's Lodgments, when on other and distant lodgments
confronting the left advanced sap of Gordon's Attack
our people made an assault. Against that same
part of our siege-works, and to prevent the English
from seizing those very same lodgments (which
our people still always called rifle-pits), the enemy
had determined to make a sortie on the night of
* Rousset, vol. ii. p. 167.
AND CAPTURE OF RIFLE-PITS.
209
>
+
ments.
*
VII.
achieve-
the 20th of April; but our people anticipated CHA P.
him by twenty-four hours; and it was at nine
o'clock on the evening of the 19th of April that,
commanding in person a detachment of his splendid
77th Regiment, Colonel Egerton assaulted the lodg- Egerton's
He attacked them with an 'impetuosity' ment.
-Lord Raglan uses the word-which did not pre-
vent the conflict from being severe for a time, but
caused it nevertheless to be short. He promptly
carried the lodgments, but suffered some loss, and
Captain Lemprière of his regiment, a young, though
most able officer, was one of the killed.
In one of the captured lodgments, our Engineers
resolved to establish a lodgment of their own, and to
connect it with the head of their sap. This, though
only of course incompletely, they found means to do
in the course of three or four hours. They deter-
mined that they would not retain the other lodg-
ment; but some men-perhaps eight or ten-were
left there on watch for the time.
At about one o'clock the Russians advanced with
a whole battalion of their famous Vladimir Regiment,
reinforced by some hundreds of men volunteering
from its other battalions for this special service.
The assailants drove in our covering sentries and
the eight or ten soldiers left watching in the other-
wise unoccupied lodgment.
Then advancing against the lodgment which our
people had resolved to hold fast, the Russian force
moved in its strength; but the English coming up
* Todleben, vol. ii. p. 162.
VOL. VII.
210
EGERTON'S DEATH.
VII.
CHAP. in good time, soon drove back the Vladimir troops,
thus defeating the enemy's efforts to reconquer what
he had lost. Thenceforth accordingly the lodgment
thus taken and held remained connected definitively
with the siege-works of 'Gordon's Attack.'
This capture destroyed all the value of the other
lodgment, which therefore was left unoccupied by
the Russians as well as the English. *
C
But this brilliant achievement' I quote the
two words from Lord Raglan-was one that cost our
people some lives, and-what is more-it cost them
a life. Whilst forming his troops for the second
of the two encounters, Colonel Egerton was killed.
His death. In his official despatch, Lord Raglan speaks with
great warmth of Colonel Egerton's services, declaring
His fame.
indeed that the army could not have sustained a
:
more severe loss' than the one which his death in-
flicted, and that 'so it was felt in the army, and in
the 77th where he was much beloved and was
6
deeply lamented'; but in a private letter of the
same date he could not help giving a further ex-
pression to his sense of Egerton's worth; saying even
that although the achievement would, he 'doubted
not, produce a good effect both on the enemy and
C
6
our allies, it was dearly bought by the sacrifice of
the life of Colonel Egerton, who was one of the
'best officers in the army, and looked up to by all.' +
* And so it remained until the morning of the 21st, when Lieutenant
Walker of the 30th, moving gallantly out with a party of volunteers,
completely filled in and razed it.—Lord Raglan to Secretary of State,
April 24, 1855.
+ Private Letter to Lord Panmure, 21st April 1855.
REPULSE OF SORTIES.
211
VII.
But more puissant than all words of praise is the CHA P.
memory of what Egerton did on the morning of
Inkerman, where, General Buller commanding, he
with less than 300 men of his glorious 77th turned
back the whole tide of a battle then rolling in with
the weight of Soimonoff's gathered masses.
*
It happened that, in proportion to the strength of
the rank and file, a somewhat large number of offi-
cers were present in these fights for the lodgment,
and I observe that the conduct of eight of them won
the high approval of Lord Raglan.†
Lord Raglan reported the conduct of the troops to
have been admirable.
The praises
by Lord
bestowed
the troops
Raglan on
taking
part in this
combat.
In killed and wounded, all reckoned, the losses The losses
were, it seems, sixty-eight. ‡
+
it caused
our people.
sorties
In the course of this period the sorties-made The night
always at night-against the French and the English during this
trenches, were efforts of a determined kind, but period.
* His exact strength was 259. See cap. vi. sec. xvi. of Inkerman
volume, p. 148 et seq. of 1st (Octavo) Edition, vol. vi. of Cabinet Edi-
tion, p. 127 et seq. It will be seen that the gallant young Lemprière,
struck down on this 19th of April, was one of the officers present
under Egerton at Inkerman.
+ Namely, besides Colonel Egerton and Captain Lemprière, both
killed, General Lockyer (general officer of the trenches in the Right
Attack), Colonel Mundy of the 33d (who succeeded Egerton in the
command of the force), Colonel Tylden, Captain Owen, and Lieu-
tenant Baynes, all three of the Engineers, and Captain Gwilt of the
34th Regiment. The same despatch mentioned Captain King of the
Engineers in words of high praise, but for services rendered before the
19th. He had been wounded on the 17th.
Journal of Royal Engineers, vol. ii. p. 158. The amount of the
Russian loss is not given.
212
OMAR PASHA'S RECONNAISSANCE.
VII.
CHAP. after more or less fighting, were all of them duly
repulsed without having done any harm great enough
to be specially memorable. The real advantage
achieved by these petty enterprises was of a general
-not special-kind. They kept the besiegers on
the alert, and made it their duty to go on unceas-
ingly with the always harassing task committed to
their 'guards of the trenches.'
A recon-
naissance
by Omar
Pasha;
These night sorties against the English trenches
took place sometimes under conditions which gave
our people occasion for showing their superb fighting
qualities, and winning the gracious approval of Lord
Raglan-a commander so just and so generous, that
he did not like his praise to be stinted by the small-
ness or obscurity of the arena in which his officers.
and men might be often disclosing their prowess.
There for instance was heart in his tone when, to
take but one sample, he told the Home Government
that a determined sortie had been most nobly met.
' and repulsed.'
6
*
Omar Pasha, one day, from his camp in the plain
of Balaclava, effected a little reconnaissance to the
left bank of the Tchernaya. This I mention because
* See his published Despatches on the sorties of the nights of the
5th, 9th, and 11th of May.-Sayer's Collection, pp. 158, 160, 161. In
these Lord Raglan accords high praise to the troops, and-by name—
to Captain Williamson and Lieutenant Gubbins of the 30th, Lieutenant
Rochfort of the 49th, Colonel Trollope, Lieutenant-Colonel Mundy,
Captain Turner of the Royal Fusiliers, Captain Jordan of the 34th,
and Captain Edwards of the 68th, killed.
ACCESSION OF FRESH ALLIES.
213
VII.
Why re-
the battalions composing his principal force were CHAP.
flanked on their left by some cavalry, and field-
batteries, which with excellent courtesy the French corded.
and the English Commanders had placed-for once
-under the guidance of a Turkish and Mussulman
Pasha.
the Cher-
with
Towards the end of the month of April, the task Submarine
telegraph
of laying down a submarine telegraph cable con- connecting
necting the Chersonese with Varna was brought to sonese
completion; and so early as the 2d of May the Varna.
arrangements for intercommunication were per-
fected. Thenceforth a few hours sufficed for the
passage of messages flying from either Paris or
London to the camps in front of Sebastopol.
This facility of communication, however, was not
an unmixed advantage; and perhaps indeed many
of those who will see its effects as experienced in the
night of the 3d of May will impatiently say that the
change was rather a curse than a blessing.*
Its coun-
terbalanc-
ing mis-
chiefs.
There also was laid down a cable which connected The Eupa-
the Chersonese with Eupatoria.
toria cable.
The acces-
and 15,000
sion of
his
Lord Raglan towards the close of this period was
happily strengthened in numbers by a large
welcome accession of troops placed under
orders.
The King of Sardinia had so aimed his exalted
* See post, p. 257 et seq.
Sardinian
troops
under Gen-
eral de la
Marmora.
214
ACCESSION OF
VII.
CHAP. ambition as to make the cause of Italy his own, and
his counsels at this time were guided by a Minister
of rare sagacity, who perceived that an object so
great, yet also so perturbing to Europe, was one
wholly out of the reach of common, hand-to-mouth
statesmanship, and could only be accomplished, if
ever accomplished at all, by what, as distinguished
from 'statesmanship,' may perhaps be called far-
sighted statecraft. When England and France had
taken up arms against Russia, Count Cavour-with
some aid, it would seem, from the clear-seeing mind
of a woman *-made bold to adopt a policy which
appeared at first sight highly venturesome, and by
many perhaps would be treated as somewhat un-
scrupulous; (2) but, so far as concerned its policy,
he at least knew how to support it by a fair show of
reasoning. He argued that sooner or later, the war,
as matter of course, would be followed by a treating
for peace in which the belligerents, all of them,
would naturally have to take part, and that there-
fore, if the King of Sardinia were simply to take
the step of declaring war against Nicholas, he too
(by his Minister) would be necessarily present in
Congress, and there by mere utterance of the name
of 'Italy' might already be advancing her cause;
whilst also, if furnishing troops to fight side by side
with those of the Western Powers, he might earn a
clear right to have their goodwill, and deserve it
* Cavour's niece, the Countess Alfieri. I owe my knowledge of
this to Mr Hayward. See in his Biographical Essays, the one on
Count Cavour.
THE SARDINIAN ARMY.
215
indeed all the more, since he had not himself any CHA P.
grievance, or ground of complaint against Russia.
Thus it happened that on the 8th of May General
de la Marmora, with a part of the 15,000 Sardinian
troops despatched to the seat of war, and followed
by the rest of the force, was already landing at
Balaclava, and placing himself, as agreed, at the
English Commander's disposal.
Words other than mine will commemorate the
battle of the Tchernaya, and the part there victori-
ously taken by General de la Marmora at the head
of his Sardinian army; but without breaking loose
from that tether which confines me within the
period ended on the 28th of June, I can say that,
whilst Lord Raglan lived, his relations with the
welcome allies thus joining their strength to his
own were always thoroughly cordial. (3)
VII.
216
TROUBLED
CHAPTER VIII.
TROUBLED COUNSELS OF THE FRENCH.
*
I.
CHAP. THE work of destruction effected in the two White
VIII.
Redoubts, in the Kamtchatka Lunette, and above
all, in the clusters of batteries which included the
Flagstaff Bastion, must needs have been partly de-
scried, and partly also inferred by many of the
artillerymen busied in the French advanced bat-
teries; but, supposing him to have bestowed little
care on their necessarily piecemeal accounts, it was
possible for General Canrobert to be far from com-
pletely aware of the havoc his siege - guns had
wrought; and indeed, if well knowing the whole,
or even one-half of the truth, he must have found
Tendency himself strangely embarrassed by the exigencies of
his Emperor's plot; since, to own that the April
Bombardment had opened fit paths for assault,
would be almost the same as acknowledging that
sound warlike counsels demanded those very exer-
of a suc-
cessful
bombard-
ment to
derange
the work
ing of
Niel's
'mission.'
* For the extent of that work of destruction, see ante, pp. 184-186.
་
COUNSELS.
217
C
VIII.
tions of force which the ill-omened Mission' for- CHAP.
bade.
ignoring
the suc
Be all this as it may, General Canrobert ignored Canrobert
from the first, and persistently went on ignoring the
effects of his own cannonade.
*
So early as the 10th of April (which was only the
second day of the bombardment, and one on which
the defence of Sebastopol was languishing for want
of ammunition, and whilst also the White Redoubts
and the Flagstaff Bastion were falling into that state
of utter helplessness which they reached before sun-
set) General Canrobert intimated to Lord Raglan
that he did not much expect the bombardment to
produce a successful result; and on the same day,
he addressed to his Emperor this very significant
letter: If the superiority of our fire is not com-
pletely established (which we shall know to-morrow)
we shall diminish it, and if necessary, stop it alto-
gether, keeping ourselves in readiness against any
' attack by the relieving army. If this attack (de-
sired with so much reason) does not take place,
we (though harassing the enemy meanwhile to the
'best of our power) shall await the arrival of your
Majesty's Army of Reserve, convinced in such case
C
6
6
•
6
C
that upon the action of that Reserve army will
depend the fate of Sebastopol.' +
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, April 14, 1855.
+ Rousset, ii. p. 147.
cess of the
bombard-
ment.
218
TROUBLED
СНАР.
VIII.
Conference
of 14th
April.
Disposi-
tion on
the part
of the
French,
except
II.
On the 14th of April-a day when the Flagstaff
Bastion, as we saw, was in desperate plight-there
took place a conference at which (besides the prin-
cipal French and English Artillery and Engineer
officers) there were present General Canrobert, General
Pélissier, General Bosquet, Omar Pasha, Sir Edmund
Lyons, Sir George Brown, and Lord Raglan.* The
Conference lasted more than four hours, and all
agreed that an immediate assault ought not to be
attempted. (¹) The French (excepting Pélissier, who
advised going on with the siege) were at first for
Pélissier, arresting the bombardment, if not indeed even for
bombard stopping all other aggressive proceedings until the
place should be invested. Then Canrobert, Lord
Raglan, Omar Pasha, and Sir Edmund Lyons re-
tired into another room, and it appeared that Can-
robert was for maintaining the status quo'; but
ultimately, though with no little difficulty, Lord
Raglan-greatly aided by Sir Edmund Lyons-pre-
combated vailed upon Canrobert to agree that the bombard-
ment should be continued, though with diminished
and Lyons. fire, in order that the ammunition might last the
longer.†
to stop the
ment;
but suc-
cessfully
by Lord
Raglan
A slight
relaxation
General Canrobert at this time obtained what
of the fet- might seem at first glance like some small, very
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, April 14, 1855.
+ Lord Raglan to Lord Panmure, private letter, 14th April 1855, and
same (Secret) to Secretary of State, 17th April 1855.
COUNSELS.
219
VIII.
ters im-
Canrobert
mission.'
small relaxation of the miserable fetters he wore in CHA P.
obedience to General Niel's 'mission.' Whilst con-
fronting at close quarters a powerful enemy, and posed on
having encamped at his side an unsuspecting ally by Niel's
kept in ignorance of the all-ruling 'mission,' he had
patiently held the command during several weeks of
what I called an army in waiting'; and against the
strange lot cast upon him, his pride, it seems, had
not rebelled. But when the time for a great artillery
effort drew nigh, the French Emperor dimly per-
ceived that he had been placing his army in a pre-
dicament which might prove under certain conditions
to be one of an odious sort, and well calculated, if
the truth should leak out, to bring his name into
disgrace. If indeed the bombardment should pro-
duce good and wholesome results, yet not of a kind
so conspicuous as to be appreciable by all observers,
its success might be ignored, concealed, and denied;
but what if its destructive power should prove over-
whelming? If Sebastopol should seem to be lying
at the mercy of a French army, was Canrobert still
to be hindered from laying his hand on the prize by
the exigencies of the Imperial mission? Plainly
under the stress of such thoughts, yet clinging still
to a hope that both the French army on the Cher-
sonese, and the Army of Reserve at Constantinople
might be kept in unimpaired force to await his
good pleasure, he did, as too often men must, when
torn by conflicting motives. He tried, as well as he
could, to give some effect more or less to each of the
opposing forces which strove for the mastery of his
220
TROUBLED
CHAP. will; and at last, whilst announcing that he would
VIII. have 40,000 men at Constantinople before the end
able in-
struction
given to
Canrobert
by his Em-
peror.
C
†
of the month; he yet did not grant the general
leave to move any part of that force, save only in
the desperate conjuncture of its proving to be per-
emptorily needed for the safety of his army. And,
after thus perversely continuing the disjoinder of his
forces in the East, the Emperor ended by giving to
The miser- General Canrobert this miserable instruction: Do
what you can, but do not compromise yourself.' ‡
With the slight, very slight relaxation of the rules.
of Niel's mission which this letter granted it also
kept in force so much of the old restraint that General
Canrobert, it would seem, suffered tortures. There
were times when he thought himself capable of
directing that an assault should take place within
perhaps less than a week, but none that found him
inclined to take such a step the same day, or even so
soon as the morrow; and one who has had access to
his correspondence with the Emperor and the War
Minister describes him as a man who between the
conflicting ideas was 'painfully oscillating.'§ Niel
bearing of never forgetting his 'mission'-stood over the
Canro-
bert's state
of mind.
The con-
duct and
Niel.
* Letter from Emperor to Canrobert, partly read out by him to
Lord Raglan. Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, 17th April
1855. The letter, or at all events the part of it read out to Lord
Raglan, did not say what use was to be made of the 40,000 men.
+ Lord Raglan (after hearing this from Canrobert) to the Secretary of
State, Secret, 14th April 1855, and again (there stating the exception
above shown) same to same, Secret, 24th April 1855.
Canrobert on the 16th of April read out to Lord Raglan the passage
of a letter he had received from the Emperor which contained those
words. Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, 17th April 1855.
§ Rousset, pp. 146, 147.
COUNSELS.
221
VIII.
Commander-in-Chief with a will to denounce every CHA P.
notion that Canrobert might venture to harbour of
assaulting Sebastopol, and the Imperial aide-de-camp
thus superintending the general mingled even some
scorn with his use of the curb; for he did not so
much as believe that any design of assaulting would
last until the cardinal moment for turning resolve
into action.*
6
6
6
On the 16th, General Niel seems to have been
displeased with Canrobert for not acting with more
steadfast deference to the precepts of the 'Mission,'
and apparently for even allowing the growth of
consultations with reasoners who harboured the
thought of assault; for he thus wrote to the Minis-
ter of War: I am going to try to turn the minds
of the commanders from an attempt no less dan-
gerous than useless, which I hope will be aban-
'doned. . . . I did not advise
I did not advise engaging in this
artillery conflict; for I had, and still hold the con-
'viction that, even if it had proved more success-
ful than it has, there still would not have been
an assault driven into the town.'t Incredible, as
it would seem, if not proved, this Aide-de-camp
superintendent established at the French Head-
quarters made bold to reprove the Minister of
War for not having lectured the unfortunate Can-
robert, and thus kept him in more close obedience.
to the commands of the 'Mission.'
I must regret,
'M. le Maréchal, that you did not speak to the
6
6
* See post, p. 224, his letter to the Emperor of the 17th April 1855.
+ Rousset, ii. p. 145.
His letter
of the 16th
of April to
the Minis-
ter of War
222
TROUBLED
CHAP.
VIII.
C
C
Commander-in-Chief about the conduct of the
siege. From the accounts furnished to you, you
know pretty well what Sebastopol is, and besides,
being close to the Emperor, you know many things
'that are not known here. I am convinced that if
you had written in the sense in which I spoke, a
great deal of faltering would have been avoided.'*
It was on the 16th of April that Lord Raglan
received his first knowledge of what I have called
the 'miserable instruction';t and thenceforth he of
course understood that the French Commander asso-
ciated with him in the enterprise against Sebastopol
was not at the time a free agent; but one must not
be led to infer that an end was thus put to the
No termin secrecy which had shrouded the Mission' of Niel.
the secrecy Nothing short of the fall of the 'Empire' with other
shrouded favouring circumstances sufficed to lay bare the
mission.' truth, and show how the 'Mission' of Niel had been
secretly taking effect from the time of his arrival in
January to the mid-April period now reached.
ation of
which had
Niel's
16th April.
Agreement
made be-
tween Can-
Lord
Raglan;
On the 16th of April (after a preliminary discus-
sion between the chief Engineer and Artillery officers
robert and of the allied armies), the three commanders met
in conference determined that the contemplated
assault should be delayed for some days (not saying
how many), in order to give time for the construc-
tion of certain additional works; and they also
put off their decision respecting what should be
done against the Kamtchatka Lunette as well as
* Rousset, ii. pp. 145, 146.
+ See ante, p. 220, and footnote.
COUNSELS.
223
VIII.
against the place generally; but they agreed that an CHAP.
attack in one quarter should be made by a joint use
of forces, French, English, and Ottoman. They re-
solved that, upon orders to that effect being given,
the White Redoubts should be seized by troops to
be drawn for the purpose from each of the three
allied armies.*
doned
afterwards
Three days afterwards, however, Lord Raglan, but aban-
when reminding his colleague of the agreement, three days
found Canrobert appearing to think that the cap- by Can-
ture of those works, after all, 'would not be
attended with any important advantage';
accordingly the project was dropped.
and
robert.
On the 17th of April-the morrow of a day when
the Flagstaff Bastion had been brought to a state of
miserable wreck-Niel wrote direct to the Emperor:
6
Sire, our artillery has not obtained great results.
Every morning the Place resumes its fire, and each
'embrasure has its gun in a state for firing. The
6
English little frightened at having to pass over 600
'mètres of ground before getting from their parallel
to the Redan had declared that they were ready to
assault; but since, reflections have come, and yes-
terday evening, the three commanders determined
that they would prolong and diminish their fire
without stopping it. Sire, it is with lively regret
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, April 17, 1855.
+ This was on the 19th. Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret,
21st April 1855.
17th April.
from Niel
Letter
to the Em-
peror.
224
TROUBLED
CHAP. that I see the confirmation of what I have always
VIII.
C
6
(
thought the assault is so difficult, so dangerous
for the army that when the moment comes, people
'shrink from before it. The truth is that in this
(so-called) siege, people aim at an object which
they yet do not venture to grasp when they closely
'approach it, that there is no solution but in the
investment of the Place after having beaten the
enemy, and that consequently it is necessary to
'hasten as much as possible the arrival of the Army
'of Reserve which your Majesty is forming at Con-
stantinople.'
C
'*
Ebullition
of warlike
III.
When the Flagstaff Bastion, on the evening of the
impatience 21st of April, had been not only silenced and brought
part of the to ruin by overwhelming fire, but also laid under
on the
French
army.
the pressure of a 4th Parallel then newly opened
against it at less than a hundred yards' distance, the
French army hitherto patient could no longer be
prevented from judging that the time for final action
was ripe; and in the course of the following day a
great weight of opinion pronounced that the enemy's
shattered defences were meet to be carried by storm.
Canrobert Whether hurried along by this feeling, or--for the
moment-advisedly sharing it, General Canrobert
or hurried took strides on the road which seemed leading to
along by
either
sharing
the feeling
it.
Niel.
resolute action.
But Niel? Ruled alike by the exigencies of
* Rousset, ii. p. 146.
COUNSELS.
225
6
VIII.
his Mission,' and by the strength of his con- CHAP.
victions, he could hardly have relaxed his desire
that the prudently guided Allies should adventure
no assault of Sebastopol without first investing
the place; and, if he did not stamp out the notion
of prompt appeals to the bayonet by a peremptory
use of his delegate power, nay even appeared for
some hours to approve a resort to such measures, he
has left behind him a clue from which one perhaps
may infer that without foregoing his object he only
changed his means of obtaining it. He believed
that, though determined beforehand to assault the
Redan, Lord Raglan, when it came to the point,
would never send forward his columns of infantry
across the breadth of interposed ground-which
divided the goal set before them from their most
advanced parallel; and accordingly, he was free
to imagine that his long-pursued task of prevent-
ing assaults might be, this time, performed by the
English. Let the French with apparent decisive-
ness propose a general assault. The English, thus
brought to the point, would refuse, he imagined, to
march against the distant Redan. Their refusal
would at once put an end to the whole project, and
on them not the French or their Emperor-would
fall the whole anger of those who were yearning for
an assault of Sebastopol.
*
It was with a purpose made to seem firmly settled 23d April.
that the French on Monday the 23d of April began French
to concert fitting measures for a general assault.
The
At
ostensibly
ready to
assault.
* See ante, p. 223. Niel's Letter of the 17th of April to the Emperor.
VOL. VII.
P
226
TROUBLED
CHAP. a conference held in the morning, the chief Engineer
VIII.
-
Prelimi-
nary con-
ference.
Evening of
the 23d.
and Artillery officers of the French and English armies
declared their opinion in writing-a writing drawn
up by Niel himself—and advised that, unless the
investment of Sebastopol should be effected within
ten days, the place should be assaulted.*
In the evening, General Canrobert came to Lord
Raglan's quarters, bringing with him, as it seemed,
bold resolves. He proposed that the Allies should
assault Sebastopol; and to this Lord Raglan agreed.
After a discussion which lasted two hours, General
Canrobert and Lord Raglan arranged that the fire
Agreement which had been slack for some days should be re-
Canrobert sumed on the 26th, and that after this fire should
have been kept up for two days and a half, ad-
vances should be made against the place in such
manner as should be thought most desirable.t
between
and Lord
Raglan for
a general
assault of
Sebasto-
pol.
Lord Rag
lan's im-
pression.
6
(
6
On the ground, as he wrote, that 'General Can-
robert and the greater portion of the French supe-
'rior officers had hitherto shown such unwillingness
'to undertake anything that might involve serious
'risk,' and that the General-in-Chief had always
' previously manifested a disposition to pursue a very
cautious course,' and had been warned by the
Emperor not to commit himself,' Lord Raglan was
greatly surprised at the apparently sudden conver-
sion of his French allies to the policy of undertaking
assaults, but at first-he did not doubt their sin-
(
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, April 24th, 1855.
Rousset, ii. p. 154.
+ Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, April 24th, 1855.
COUNSELS.
227
cerity;* and accordingly addressed his Government CHA P.
in terms well befitting what seemed to be a grave
VIII.
conjuncture.†
IV.
Canro-
uneasy
state.
His letter
as- (24th
next day
the Em-
April) to
peror.
Not many hours had passed, when Lord Raglan
perceived, as he thought, that under this new resolve
to assault Sebastopol, General Canrobert did not feel General
'comfortable'; and how well he divined the truth bert's ap-
we are able to see; for on the very morrow of the partly
agreement made with Lord Raglan in the evening
of the 23d, General Canrobert was writing to the
Emperor in terms which not only declared the
sault he had proposed on the previous evening to
be a hazardous measure, but even shadowed out an
intention then already appearing half formed-to
abandon the accepted agreement, and supplant it by
other designs. Niel also wrote to his sovereign by
the same mail, and the Emperor thus cites the two
letters A letter from General Canrobert of the
24th of April, and another from General Niel an-
'nounce to me that in accord with Lord Raglan
they have decided that the assault should be de-
'livered on the 28th or 29th of April, that the
'enterprise is hazardous, and that perhaps they will
* This is shown, I think, by his surmises as to the cause of their
being determined (as he then thought they were) to undertake an
assault.
+ Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, April 24th, 1855. In
quoting some words from the despatch, I have corrected what seemed
to me a clerical error by substituting 'involve' for 'incur.'
Ibid.
Niel writ-
Emperor
ing to the
at the
same time.
The Em-
count of
peror's ac-
the two
letters.
228
TROUBLED
VIII.
CHAP. make up their minds to attack the enemy* and to
'invest the place, if the army of reserve receives
' orders to proceed to the Crimea. I received these
'two letters on the 5th of May.'t.. 'Canrobert
Morning
of 25th.
resolved
to put off
the as-
sault;
The inter-
view be-
C
himself says that on the 24th the situation was so
'strained that it could not last more than fifteen
'days.' +
With his mind in the state thus disclosed, General
Canrobert might perhaps be expected to appreciate a
newly found reason for abandoning the warlike agree-
ment he had made on the previous day, and this he
accordingly did-did even within a few hours.
On the morning of the 25th, Niel came to the
Canrobert English Headquarters, bringing with him a letter-
a letter not very new (dated Paris, the 7th of April)
from the Minister of Marine to Admiral Bruat-
which intimated that the French Reserve troops at
Constantinople would be ready to embark for the
theatre of war on the 10th of May. This letter Niel
read to Lord Raglan, and he founded upon it a con-
clusion which already, he showed, had been reached
with unanimity by General Canrobert and all the
French Generals assembled to give him counsel—a
conclusion pronouncing it desirable to postpone the
'offensive operations against Sebastopol.' He urged
that, although inconvenient, delay was 'preferable
to the immediate adoption of a course which would
tween Niel
and Lord
Raglan.
* Some such words as 'in the field,' or 'on the north side,' appear
to be wanting; but, if the sentence be without them imperfect, it can
hardly be called obscure.
+ The Emperor of the French to Lord Cowley, dated Palace of the
Tuileries, 7th May 1855.
Ibid.
COUNSELS.
229
VIII.
'be attended with great risk and could be pursued CHA P.
' under altered circumstances with better chances of
'success.'*'Niel,' continued Lord Raglan, 'made
6
6
८
some rather curious admissions. He avowed that
' he had been strongly opposed to the reopening of
the batteries of the Allies, and that he held to the
opinion he had originally formed that an assault
could not be successful, and yet he had been con-
'stantly urging General Rose to press upon me the
necessity of resuming the fire, and he drew the
Paper of the 23d already before your Lordship
'which contained the recommendation of the Artil-
lery and Engineer officers that an attack should
'be made upon the place after an active bombard-
'ment of forty-eight hours. I ventured to point this
'
6
out to him, and he fully acknowledged that I was
'right, but he observed :-"I am not the Command-
'er-in-Chief."'+
taken by
Lord Raglan of course could not baffle a scheme of Course
postponement demanded by the unanimous authority Lord
of the assembled French generals; but, after all that Raglan.
had passed, he thought himself entitled to require
that the proposal to put off the assault should be in
writing. Niel judged the demand to be reasonable;
and accordingly on the same day General Canrobert
addressed to Lord Raglan a letter fulfilling the pur-
pose. After saying that all had been prepared for
the delivery of a general assault on about the 28th
of April, he wrote:-To-day, I communicated to
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, 28th April 1855.
+ Ibid. I translate the last words from the original French in which
Lord Raglan gives them.
230
TROUBLED
}
1
VIII.
25th April.
Canro-
bert's
letter put-
ting off
the attack.
'
CHAP. the generals commanding the two Army Corps and
'the Engineers and Artillery of the French army
' an official despatch announcing that the Corps of
'Reserve forming at Constantinople will be ready to
commence operations on the 10th of May next. In
the face of this communication, and seeing the
possible consequences of a general assault beset by
the most difficult circumstances that can take place
in war-circumstances that might compromise the
two allied armies, and the future of the great
interests which they defend, the conference unan-
imously expressed the opinion that it was fitting
'to wait for the commencement of operations by the
Lord Rag-
lan's ob-
servation
on the
French
change of
counsel.
6
6
C
6
C
Corps of Reserve. I submit to your Lordship this
opinion which seems to be inspired by considerations
of a value that will not escape you, and to which I
'think you will be willing to give your approval.'
'What surprises me,' writes Lord Raglan, 'is that,
the proposition of the assault having emanated from
'the French on the 23d, they should all have been
opposed to the proceeding on the 25th.'
The letter of the 7th of April, from the French
Minister of Marine, which General Niel brought to
Lord Raglan on this Wednesday the 25th had seem-
ingly reached Admiral Bruat in the course of the
previous week; * and on the 24th, in the presence of
both Canrobert and the English Commander, the
admiral had stated its purport; † yet no one then
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, 28th April 1855.
'Must' have done so is what Lord Raglan says.
+ Ibid.
COUNSELS.
231
F
broached the idea of making it serve as a ground for CHA P.
VIII.
under
putting off the assault. Nor indeed can one say Circum-
that this rudely disturbing idea would have ever stances
been broached at all, if Lord Raglan (instead of which the
consenting) had justified the calculations of Niel by Brat was
declining to assault the Redan.t
When Canrobert (having found that the English
were ready to take part in the assault) fell afterwards
into the state of unhopefulness, and doubt, and
anxiety disclosed by his plaint to the Emperor, he of
course became ripe for that logic which drew from
the letter to Bruat a reason for stopping the enter-
prise; but a general who, ever since February, had
been suffering the audacious garrison to defy him
with its counter-approaches, and had thrown away
every occasion for seizing the Flagstaff Bastion could
hardly bespeak from our people a welcome for any
discovery which only furnished new reasons for not
yet assaulting Sebastopol.
Still, what men in dispute call' an afterthought'
is not of necessity worthless; and in fairness it
ought to be said that on this 25th of April, the
opportunities offered by the bombardment had already
been lost; so that then there were not those sharp
reasons for prompt appeal to the bayonet which we
* This clearly results from the 2d paragraph of the last above-cited
despatch.
+ With respect to Niel's idea that the English on reflection would
not undertake a task so desperate as the assault of the Redan, see ante,
his letter of the 17th of April.
‡ The general bombardment had ceased on the 18th, and the fire
directed specially against the Flagstaff Bastion had not lasted beyond
the 22d.
letter to
put for-
ward.
232
TROUBLED
VIII.
Weight
due to the
letter of
the 7th of
April.
CHAP. saw had been pressing enough on many of the earlier
days. Perhaps therefore, if men had been free from
the anger provoked at the time by Canrobert's num-
berless falterings, they might hardly have refused to
acknowledge that, whilst having before him the
prospect spread out to his sight by the letter of the
7th of April, the French Commander was justified in
resolving to wait for the co-operation of the Corps of
Reserve before venturing to undertake such a measure
as the general assault of Sebastopol.
The pre-
vious con-
from Can-
robert.
V.
But supposing this conclusion accepted, and ac-
cealment cordingly agreeing with Canrobert that a vitally mo-
mentous decision was rightly averted by the letter of
the 7th of April, it seems wondrous that he of all
men should have long been excluded from that
very parcel of knowledge which was held (when
discovered at last) to afford the sure clue for his
guidance, and left to find it out accidentally, after
many a day, from a letter which Admiral Bruat had
for some other purpose adduced.
The truth is that on the subject of his Corps of
Reserve the French Emperor had been maintaining
from the first a system of almost childish conceal-
ment against his own general Canrobert; though
perhaps it was mainly from sloth, or from want of
*
* As well showed by Marshal Vaillant's mysterious letter to Canro-
bert. Rousset, ii. p. 35, and quoted post, in the next page. 'Le gén-
éral Canrobert lui-même n'en devait rien apprendre.' These words are
COUNSELS.
233
VIII.
comprehensive brain-power that he let concealment CHA P.
run on to its more extravagant lengths. That his
admirably organised Ministry of War failed to save
him from so huge a default, is not perhaps very
wonderful; since plainly his interposition, being
fitful, ill conceived, and mysterious, must have
tended to hamper its clock-work. "The Emperor'
6
-
writes Vaillant to Canrobert chooses to have his
Army of Reserve in hand; I cannot better explain
myself.' When absolute concealment from Can-
robert of what thousands were partially knowing
had become impossible, the Emperor still went on
concealing from him as much as he could-conceal-
ing from him, for instance, the aim with which a
French Army had been gathered on the shores of
the Bosphorus.
This discrediting collapse of an enterprise which
had quickened the pulse of three armies would have
all been escaped, if the Emperor, or the Emperor's
Government, proceeding in a straight course of
action, had simply kept Canrobert's knowledge
abreast of that furnished to Bruat; for the outburst
of warlike impatience which provoked strong resolves
on the Monday would have plainly been calmed on
the Saturday or the Sunday before, by assigning that
ground for delay which was afterwards declared to
be cogent by all the assembled French generals.
given by Rousset authoritatively because he had had access to the
secret papers of the War Department. Vol. ii. p. 35.
* Ibid.
234
TROUBLED
СНАР.
VIII.
Uncertain-
ty as to the
duration
VI.
How long this postponement of the assault might
continue no one then could divine. The letter
ponement. from the Minister of Marine to Admiral Bruat
of the post-
Canro-
bert's idea
of its
scope.
showed indeed that (as judged by its writer) the
Corps of Reserve would be ready to take ship at
Constantinople on the 10th of May; but whither it
was to be borne when embarked, and when, and
where, and how it was to be brought into real
co-operation with Canrobert's army no men in the
Crimea yet knew. If falling into accordance with
the design of Niel and his Emperor, the postpone-
ment would be one carried on to that fondly im-
agined time when, after a brilliant campaign that
was not to be even commenced until some—as yet-
unknown period, Sebastopol would be on all sides
invested.
Nor indeed was a general assault the only measure
postponed until that imagined time. General Can-
robert desired that meanwhile, the Allies should
even abstain from the easier, the narrower task of
storming the outworks thrown out in advance of the
fortress; and accordingly, when on the 30th, Lord
Raglan proposed to Canrobert an assault on the
counter-approaches, he encountered a decisive re-
fusal.*
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 5, 1855. Experi-
ence soon afterwards proved the wisdom of Lord Raglan's proposal.
COUNSELS.
235
A
VIII.
The old
It was thus that after an interval of seeming CHAP.
freedom which lasted some forty-eight hours, Gen-
eral Canrobert once more submitted to have refast- fetters re-
ened upon him the whole suit of long-worn fetters
with which Niel's Mission' had loaded him.
fastened
upon him.
We are beginning to see something now of war
business superintended by the Emperor Louis
Napoleon. It was this same weak, meddlesome
hand still playing with the same State machinery,
that afterwards in the fulness of time brought cruel
disasters on France.
236
THE FRENCH EMPEROR TRYING
CHAPTER IX.
THE NOW ACTIVELY PERTURBING INTERFERENCE OF LOUIS
NAPOLEON IN THE WAR FOR SEBASTOPOL.
I.
CHAP. How oppressively Louis Napoleon had been weigh-
ing on the allied armies from February to the close
IX.
The hith-
erto par-
alysing
of April, we have well enough seen; but (with the
interfer- idea of suspending decisive action until after his
ence of the arrival) he had been hitherto only preventing -
French
Emperor
now
changed
into ac-
tively per-
turbing
dictation.
His visit
to Eng-
land.
not ordering any attacks. When, however, the 3d
of May came, General Canrobert found himself
placed under more perturbing instructions. He
learned that his Emperor-this nearly a fortnight
before-had entered upon the system of driving him
into warlike activity by orders sent from afar-from
indeed—of all the places on earth!--Windsor Castle
and Buckingham Palace.
At a time in the middle of April when still the
bombardment was raging, when it seemed that the
war was fast entering upon a critical phase, and
when also the advance of the spring was inviting to
enterprise, the French Emperor with his beauteous
TO SWAY THE WAR FROM ENGLAND.
237
*
IX.
The Coun-
cil of War
at Windsor
Castle.
Empress paid a visit to England; and alike by the CHAP.
Queen, by the Government, by the people at large,
was received with a genial welcome-a welcome all
the more animated, since he came with a warlike
intent-with intent to form and execute plans for
compassing the fall of Sebastopol. He had with
him Marshal Vaillant, his Minister of War.
The first Council of War (if so one may call such
a conclave) was held at Windsor Castle, and there
were present the Emperor, Prince Albert, Lord Clar-
endon, Lord Palmerston, Lord Cowley, Lord Panmure,
Sir John Burgoyne, Marshal Vaillant, and Count
Walewski. The Emperor at this meeting was pressed The Em-
to abandon his project of going out to the Crimea, resolve to
but without being then at all shaken in what seemed
his steadfast resolve; and he not only gave his opinion
on the prospects of the Sebastopol siege, and the prin-
ciple which should rule future action, but also went
on to disclose the plan of campaign he had formed.
peror's
join his
army.
ment
Govern-
prelimin-
With his consciousness of all he had done towards
arresting (through General Niel's mission') the His agree-
genuine advance of the siege, the French Emperor with our
of course had some grounds on which to found a ment upon
prophecy that the then still raging bombardment ary ques-
would fail in its object; and he found our Govern-
ment ready to avow the same faith, as also to accept
his theory that Sebastopol could not be taken without
first investing the place.
* He came on Monday, the 16th of April.
tions.
238
THE EMPEROR'S PLAN.
СНАР.
IX.
The Em-
peror's
proposals.
IL
The preliminary arrangements on which the Em-
peror proposed to base his plan of campaign were
framed in a spirit appreciative of both our army and
its chief; for Lord Raglan with his whole English
force, and a largely extended command over the
troops of other nations was to be withdrawn from
the tedious labours of the siege, and entrusted with
the more brilliant service of opening a campaign in
the field.
With an understanding that Eupatoria should be
held by 30,000 Turks under Omar Pasha, the Em-
peror proposed that the forces to be engaged against
Sebastopol should be divided into three armies: One
of these armies charged with the task of holding the
trenches and guarding the siege material as well as the
ports of supply was to have a strength of 60,000, con-
sisting of 30,000 French, with besides a like number of
Turks, and to be commanded by General Canrobert.
The other two armies were to be called respectively
the 1st,' and the 2d army of operation.'
C
The 1st army of operation' was to act in the
open field with the 25,000 infantry (supported by
our cavalry and artillery) which constituted the
English force, but with also a body of 5000 French
troops; with besides, the 15,000 men of the Sar-
dinian contingent, and moreover-so it was hoped
-with as many as 10,000 Turks, the whole num-
bering not less at the least than 45,000 men (with
THE EMPEROR'S PLAN.
239
perhaps indeed 10,000 more), and to be commanded CHA P.
by Lord Raglan.
The '2d army of operation'—called afterwards by
Louis Napoleon 'the army of Diversion '-was to con-
sist of 45,000 French troops withdrawn from before
Sebastopol, and of the 25,000 men-also French
-assembling in reserve at Constantinople, in all
70,000 men, under the personal command of the
Emperor or such person as he might appoint.
*
IX.
ance by
ernment of
liminary
ments;
So far, our Government approved the suggested Accept
arrangements; and accordingly, after another Council our Gov-
of War assembled at Buckingham Palace (at which the pre-
were present the Queen, the Emperor, Prince Albert, arrange
Marshal Vaillant, Lord Palmerston, Lord Clarendon,
and Lord Panmure), there was framed a Memorandum
recording the agreement thus reached. Lord Pan- as re-
mure duly signed the agreement by command of the Bucking-
Queen, and Marshal Vaillant by command of the Palace.
Emperor.
corded at
ham
III.
peror's
his plan
For the conduct of the field operations, the Em- The Em-
peror's proposals were these :-He proposed that Lord plan of
campaign:
Raglan, at the head of the 1st army of operation,
'should move forward across the Tchernaya, and,
'first of all, take and occupy the high ground above
Inkerman, including Mackenzie's farm.'t Not
* Put in subsequent expositions at 65,000.
+ So understood at the time by our War Minister. Lord Panmure
to Lord Raglan, Private, 20th April 1855.
as regard.
ed the '1st
army of
opera-
'tion.'
240
THE EMPEROR'S PLAN.
IX.
CHAP. aware that those Heights were by many deemed all
but impregnable, our Government seemed to ap-
prove, and at all events, expressed no dislike of this
part of the plan; (¹) but did not of course prema-
turely, and without consulting Lord Raglan, send
out any peremptory orders for carrying it into effect.
That not
objected
to by our
Govern-
ment.
The Em-
peror's
plan as
regarded
the2d
'army of
opera-
'tion.'
With respect to the task reserved for his army
' of Diversion,' the Emperor's project was this:-By
the marching of the 45,000 French troops withdrawn
from before Sebastopol over a distance of some 70
miles, and the arrival of the steamers from the Bos-
phorus with the reserve force of 25,000, his army of
70,000 men was to be gathered at and near the
distant port of Aloushta, on the south-east coast of
the Crimea, was thence to reconnoitre the ground,
was (if then the advance should seem feasible) to
ascend from the shore to the mountains, to move
up and over the shoulder of the lofty Tchatir Dagh
by way of the Ayen Pass, was thence to march on
Simferopol, and at length, in co-operation with Lord
Raglan (already victorious, on its left), was to over-
throw all Russian forces collected on the north of
Sebastopol, and so complete the investment.*
If following this plan of campaign Lord Raglan
should be storming the Mackenzie Heights, and the
Emperor at the same time filing through the Ayen
Pass with his army of Diversion,' the two com-
manders would be separated from one another by a
*Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, Private, 20th April 1855. As will
be afterwards seen, I have before me several expositions of the plan in
its successive stages of development.
MILES 5
*
My
3
& Sebastapo! →→→
Tu Buktchi Sarai.
MPHEROPOL
Mount
tyr Dagh
FIAN
Map No 8 to face page 240

Demerjin
Yajta
TEOUSHTA
Post Station
The Country between ALOUSHTA and SIMPEEROPOL
in illustration of the French Emperor's plan.
Consult also the Frontispiece plan.
مجھے
Scale.
15
20 MILES
5
10
10
A RITCHIE & SON, EDIN*
THE EMPEROR'S PLAN.
241
IX.
mountainous and trackless region extending, even CHAP.
as crows fly, to a distance of some 34 miles, and
substantially so prohibitive of transit that the
readiest mode of communicating would be to send
horsemen circuitously by a trebly long route. The
idea of the field telegraph' was unripe, and not
brought to bear on the project.
6
*
formed by
ernment
plan.
By our Minister of War this last project was re- Opinion
garded as 'perfectly visionary,' as a wild, imprac- our Gov-
'ticable scheme,' and even as one that, if executed, of that last
would lead to the inevitable ruin of his (the Em- part of the
'peror's) army'; but Lord Panmure does not say,
and plainly it is not the fact that he imparted his
adverse opinion to Louis Napoleon. He seems to
have calculated that, in the closer presence of reali-
ties, our imperial ally would abandon the more
flighty part of the plan prepared for his army
of Diversion,' and bring its left into contact with
the right of Lord Raglan's field army; so that
thus (after fighting and happily gaining a battle),
the two forces acting together would effectually
conquer their way to the object of investing Se-
bastopol. +
purport of
plan.
Although only a portion of the forces to be em- General
ployed would consist of troops newly landed, the the entire
intended operation was to be one far dissevered from
the tasks of the besiegers, and perhaps on the whole
might be called a re-invasion of the Crimea from its
south-eastern coast-a re-invasion to be executed
by 65,000 or 70,000 French troops, commanded by
VOL. VII.
* Ibid.
+ Ibid.
242
THE EMPEROR'S PLAN.
CHAP. the Emperor or his lieutenant, and a composite force
IX.
of 45,000 or 55,000 troops (English, French, Sar-
dinians, and Turks) under the orders of Lord
Raglan, making up altogether a strength for these
field operations alone of from 120 to 135 thousand
men.
The Em-
peror
abandon-
ing his
intention
IV.
On the 21st of April, the Emperor closed his visit
to England; and in Paris a few days afterwards he
abandoned his intention of going out to the Crimea.*
of going
out to the By a letter of instruction to Canrobert, dated the
Crimea ; 27th of April, he announced his change of purpose;
and showed as one of its consequences that Canro-
bert (not replaced by his Emperor) would continue
His letter in command of the army, whilst Pélissier (not re-
placed by Canrobert) would command the Siege
Canrobert. Army. With great elaboration and care-not omit-
of instruc-
tion to
ting to explain his design for making a feint on the
Euxine-he showed how he himself (as he thought)
would have led the imagined campaign, and (not
without vehement diatribe against the rival scheme
of an advance from Eupatoria) declared his unabated
approval of the plan he had formed. He fondly ex-
pounded it. He showed how he would dispense
with a base of operations for his Aloushta campaign
by not only putting eight days' rations on the backs
*Not, as M. Rousset imagined, after Pianori's attempt of the 28th,
but before it.
THE EMPEROR'S PLAN.
243
IX.
of his soldiers, but also (in the way pointed out) CHAP.
bringing up more supplies from the west. Comput-
ing the garrison of Sebastopol at 35,000, and the
Russian troops gathered on the north of Eupatoria at
15,000, he attributed to the enemy's field army be-
tween Simferopol, the Belbek, and the Tchernaya a
strength of 70,000; but disclosed what was evidently
his ruling idea-an idea that the conquest thus
planned for his army of Diversion' would or might
take effect by surprise. (2)
C
*
In this later development of the imperial plan,
the task assigned to Lord Raglan was declared (at
the outset) to be still, as before, that of seizing the
Mackenzie Heights; but upon going into fuller de-
tails the Emperor forgot or ignored the earlier part
of his exposition, and proposed that Lord Raglan
should go on conducting a series of only preparatory
operations until after the anticipated capture of Sim-
feropol by the French, when by virtue of pro-
cesses more easy to dramatists than to generals en-
gaged in 'flank marches' under the eyes of a powerful
enemy-he was to either advance in pursuit of the
Russian field army then already compelled to fall
back by the advance of the French in its rear, and
to seize the 'Old City Heights,' or else find himself
brought into contact with the army of Diver-
sion' victoriously advancing to meet him from
the town newly seized. Then of course was to
follow a triumphant co-operation of the two forces.
thus joining hands, and the whole of the enemy's
'S'emparer des hauteurs de Mackenzie.'
244
THE EMPEROR'S PLAN.
CHAP. field army was, as the Emperor expressed it, to be
IX. either driven into Sebastopol, or otherwise into the
sea. (3)
Such, we know, was the dream. But men versed
in real war understood that the plan sought to break
up an army of 180,000 men into three fractions so
far disparted as be incapable of affording to one
another any mutual support, and next, so contrived
that, supposing the enemy to be at all fairly served
by his emissaries, his spies, and his scouts, two
at least of the fractions thus separated would be
brought into desperate peril, whilst the third-the
one under Lord Raglan-would perhaps for a while,
be intact, and possibly even victorious against its
immediate adversaries, yet find itself in the crisis
so placed as to be unable to come to the rescue of
either of the two other armies' in time to avert
the catastrophe. (4)
Whilst professing in terms to desire that his plan
should be calmly weighed by Canrobert in concert
with Lord Raglan, the Emperor nevertheless took
pains to urge its adoption with almost vehement
earnestness, and in doing so disclosed a strange
confidence in his own untried powers as a strate-
gist. 'Such is,' so he wrote, 'such is, my dear
General, the plan I wished to execute at the
head of the brave troops which you have hith-
erto commanded; and it is with the deepest and
'the most bitter grief that-forced by interests.
more weighty to remain in Europe-I am obliged
to renounce a plan in the execution of which I am
6
C
6
THE EMPEROR'S PLAN.
245
6
'sure I should have succeeded.* Consider it coolly CHAP.
' with Lord Raglan; and, although I do not pretend
'to be always right, I cannot abstain from remind-
6
ing you that, if Marshal St Arnaud had followed
exactly the plan which I traced out for him, we
'should now have Sebastopol in our power, and
6
the army would not have been exposed to so much
suffering.' +
Before this imperial letter had passed the sixth
day of a journey performed by old-fashioned means,
the injunctions it carried were destined to be out-
stripped, outdone, overpowered by words that flying
more swiftly were also a great deal more wild.‡
IX.
V.
3d of May.
The Gen-
erals in the
Crimea ac-
with the
plan.
By despatches brought out with the mails, and
already in their hands before noon on the 3d of May,
the French and the English Commanders were made quainted
acquainted with the general purport of the arrange- imperial
ments concluded at Buckingham Palace, and with the
tenor of the Emperor's projected campaign, whilst
Lord Raglan was also apprised of the opinion which
our Government had formed of its merits, and of the
prospect of superseding it by a more feasible scheme.
* Made on the 27th of April, this the first mention of the Emperor's
change of purpose was despatched by mail, but outstripped by the
telegram to the same effect which we shall see reaching Canrobert in
the night of the 3d of May.
+ The Emperor to General Canrobert, 27th April 1855.
See post, pp. 259-262.
246
LORD PANMURE'S SATISFACTION.
CHAP. He soon after received the Agreement drawn up at
Buckingham Palace, with instructions to concur in
IX.
The joy of
Lord Pan-
mure.
the measures for carrying it into effect; and, the Paper
containing a proviso that orders were to be given to
6
(
Generals Canrobert and Lord Raglan to take the
necessary steps for rendering their troops available
for the intended services,' it followed of course that
those words when imparted to the two commanders
were meant to be the rule of their conduct.
Owing plainly of course to some accident this
State Paper was not transmitted by the Emperor's
Government to the French Headquarters; but Lord
Raglan imparted his copy of it to General Can-
robert.
It resulted from the Agreement that General Can-
robert (drawing plentiful aid from the Turks) was
to relieve Lord Raglan in the English trenches, and
Lord Raglan-set free from all the toils of the siege
-was to make ready with all fit despatch for his
promised command in the field.
It was in a spirit of unconcealed exultation that
Lord Panmure framed this announcement. From
the day when he made, as we saw, a strange and
ugly beginning of his task as War Minister, he had
been learning every day more and more to see,
to feel, to confess the true worth of the English
Commander; and having spoken indignantly of what
the War Minister wrote in his early despatch, I can
all the more gladly commemorate the unstinted, the
generous confidence he now reposed in Lord Raglan
when entrusting him (as he believed he was doing)
ITS FRAIL BASIS.
247
IX.
with the splendid task of undertaking a campaign CHAP.
against Russia on open ground, at the head of a
separate army not less than 45,000 strong.*
*
VI.
basis on
which it
all rested.
How joyfully the English Commander and the The frail
army under his orders would have bidden farewell
to the siege-works, and entered upon a campaign
in the open may be easily imagined; as may also
of course the vexation of being mocked by an
offer which could never be really made good. The
whole plan was one built on a notion that (if only
receiving the promised accession of Turks) General
Canrobert could and would send away 50,000 of his
French troops,† losing also the accustomed support of
Lord Raglan's whole army, and in the truncated
state thus attained attempt to hold the Chersonese
and the ports of supply against the Sebastopol garri-
son, or rather, one may say, against Russia, because
her field army could join (as indeed it had done
at Inkerman) with the not yet invested fortress.
Lord Raglan did not believe that General Canrobert
would accept such a task.
In the day-time, however, of that Thursday the
3d of May which was destined-at night-to be
stirring with almost mad orders from Paris, both
Lord Raglan and General Canrobert might naturally
* Secretary of War to Lord Raglan, Secret and Confidential, 23d
April 1855.
+ 45,000 to his Emperor, and 5000 to Lord Raglan.
248
ITS FRAIL BASIS.
CHAP. enough understand that the elaborate plan of cam-
IX.
paign submitted a fortnight before to the conclave at
Windsor Castle was not so much a subject inviting
to prompt, sudden action as one meet for subsequent
study, and accordingly, until evening came, they
were rather intent on the enterprise of which it is
now time to speak.
A COMMENCED EXPEDITION.
249
CHAPTER X.
THE INTERPOSITION OF THE FRENCH EMPEROR CONTINUING
AND BRINGING ABOUT THE RECALL OF A JOINT EXPEDI-
TION.
I.
To
open
X.
Project for
passage
the fortified straits leading into the 'closed' CHAP.
Sea of Azof, Lord Raglan adopting with warmth the
eager counsel of Lyons had been pressing the French
to concur with some of our land and sea forces in a to the
joint expedition to Kertch, or, more explicitly speak-
ing, to that long, bare, steppe-land peninsula which
borrows its name from the town.
Sea of
Azof.
of Kertch.
This peninsula of Kertch on the one side, on the The Straits
other, a forked tongue of land jutting out from the
coast of Circassia, approach each other so nearly
that the waters there rolling between them are nar-
row enough to be reached by artillery planted on
shore. Whilst sundering thus the two headlands,
these waters unite the two seas and so form the
straits giving entrance from the Euxine to what was
the Palus Mæotis, that is, the Sea of Azof. Known
of old as the difficult waters of the Cimmerian
Bosphorus, they are now called the Straits of Kertch.
250
COMMENCED EXPEDITION
CHAP.
X.
By seamen the straits were regarded as consisting
of two distinct Narrows'-the first one extending
off ground adjacent to Cape St Paul, and the other
one off Yeni Kalé. The town of Kertch (Panti-
capæum, once the dwelling-place of King Mithridates)
faces those somewhat broader waters which spread
out between the two Narrows.
The ene-
my's en-
deavours
to guard
them.
II.
The enemy had long been alive to the importance
of keeping the straits firmly closed against the enter-
prises of the Allies, and had made great exertions to
compass his object. Owing mainly to storms, and
the strength of the currents, he had failed, it is true,
in the strenuous endeavours he made to block the
two narrow channels by either the sinking of ships,
or the sinking of anchors, or resort to explosive con-
trivances, and his expedient of collecting an armed
flotilla in the roadstead of Kertch was not one that
strengthened him greatly against powerful navies.
He had planted no artillery on the Circassian side
of the straits; but along the opposite shore-the
shore of the Kertchine Peninsula-where it faced
and commanded the two narrow channels, he had
established seven powerful batteries which effectually
kept the straits closed against the ships of his ad-
versaries. These batteries, whilst open in rear, were,
each of them, also commanded by higher ground
rising behind them which had not been fortified ;
THE
KERTCHINE PENINSULA.
HE ARABAT
The
Siva sh
1.
L. Solenoie
ARABAT
PARNATCH
LAtchi
P
C. Kara-Burune
AIB-EU
е
n
几
​ARGHIN
S
C.Kazantine
Salt Lake
Aktasch
BAY OF THEODOSIA
THEODOSIA
StElie
Laki
Chik
Kuk Atlama
ན་
*
Clash Kitchik
ས ”
prvws-"སྟོན་་་་
、8*****་
a
KARMISH-KELETCHL
8
་་
།་་
A
SULTANOVK
参
​Salt Lake or
Teljpkcak
$
SEA OF AZOF
Kertch - Y
Yenikale
KERTCH
BAY
OF KERTCH
YENIKAL
Akbouroum
Pavlovsky
KAMYSH BURUN
Salt Lake of Tobelchik
HEN
ELTIGHEN
Straits
C. Touzla
Taman
BAY
OF TAMAN
famagori
Lak
Hanskie
Mount El Baour
Takli
THE PAULOFFSKI. AND AKBOUROUM BATTERIES.
BARRACKS
BARRACKS
Scale
MILES 0 12
3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10
20
30
40 MILES
T
.
Cape ST Paul
Cape
Akbouroum
Map No 9 to face page.250)

S
S
A
RITOWE & SON kõigi
=
M
:
:
TO KERTCH.
251
X.
and the way in which a Russian commander could CHA P.
hope to be able to protect them from seizure was by
operating against the assailants with Horse, Foot,
and Field-Artillery.
On the whole, it appeared to result that, if there
should spring up a conflict for the key of the straits,
it would take the shape of field operations main-
tained in the Kertchine Peninsula.
This Peninsula jutting out eastward from the
main of the Crimea is some sixty-six miles in length,
and the isthmus, at its narrowest part, is not much
more than ten miles across; though, if measured (as
indeed has been usual) from the old fort of Arabat,
on the Sea of Azof, to Theodosia on the Euxine, its
breadth is doubly as great.
Baron Wrangel commanded the forces in this Kert-
chine Peninsula, and they numbered not far from
9000;* of whom some 3000 were cavalry. The in-
fantry comprised two battalions and one company of
troops of the line, the rest consisting of Fencibles-
that is, Foot Cossacks—and what were called 'local
troops'-forces not at all approaching in quality to
Russian troops of the line, and hardly, I believe,
thought presentable on fair, open ground to good
European battalions.
Approaching without toil or trouble under the
wing of supreme naval power, and gliding along off
* 8750.
+ 1143 Hussars, 152 Horse-Artillery, and 1711 Cossacks.
The above details as well as those which follow are all based upon
General Todleben's expositions, vol. ii. pp. 264 et seq., and Appendix,
415 et seq.
The Pen-
Kertch.
insula of
Baron
Wrangel
there in
command:
his forces.
The task
set before
him.
252
COMMENCED EXPEDITION
CHAP. a coast-line which offered several fit landing-places,
X.
His dis-
positions.
the troops of the Allies could make feints, or com-
mence real attacks at their pleasure. One excellent
landing-place on the beach, not far distant from
Theodosia, invited the Allies to make an attack on
the isthmus. Another no less convenient on the
beach of Kamish Boroune, attracted them towards
what, we know, was their real object; for it
offered a footing on shore at a distance of only
four miles from the westernmost of the seven coast.
batteries.
Of course under these conditions, the defence of
the Peninsula was embarrassed by conflicting exi-
gencies. Baron Wrangel must have eagerly yearned
to secure, if he could, the great object for which he
was there, and accordingly to defend the coast
batteries which kept the straits closed; but then
also and on ground so far west as to be many miles
distant from the centre of such operations, he yet
more anxiously wished, and indeed had been specially
ordered by his Commander-in-Chief, to defend the
Arabat Isthmus, and the great road passing along it
which gave him his means of communication with
the main of the Russian army.
Regarding this last part of his task as one of great
moment he suffered his posts on the Isthmus to ab-
sorb three-fifths of his limited infantry strength, and
(if quality be considered) much more, thus immensely
curtailing, and substantially indeed quite annulling
his means of effective resistance to any strong body
TO KERTCH.
253
X.
of troops which might seek to wrest from him the CHAP.
key of the straits by simply assailing in rear his
string of seven coast batteries.
abounding in
On the whole, it results that
anxiety for the defence of the Isthmus, and the great
road passing along it which linked him with the
main of the army-he reluctantly made up his mind
that the seven coast batteries must be left in a state
of defencelessness against attacks made in their rear
by powerful bodies of troops. He of course did not
mean to endure that the batteries should be insult-
ingly seized without resistance by any small body
of men put on shore-as in scorn-from the ships;
and accordingly, whilst keeping his Hussars at
Arghine within a distance of only some 30 miles
from the landing-place of Kamish Boroune, he re-
tained in the neighbourhood of Kertch four pieces of
field-artillery, and a body of some 2500 men (chiefly
Fencibles) of whom nearly 1900 could be spared to
act as infantry; but on the other hand, his
adopted plan was to abstain from defending these
batteries against an enemy disembarking in strength,
and even to destroy them himself, as soon as he
might perceive that they were about to be gravely
attacked by soldiery either landing, or landed on
the neighbouring part of the coast.
* More exactly 1883, the rest being employed in serving the coast
batteries, and other tasks confining them to particular spots. In this
body of 1883 men only 133 were regular troops, the rest being
'Fencibles.'
254
COMMENCED EXPEDITION
CHAP..
X.
The eager
ness of the
English to
have the
attack set
on foot:
General
Cauro-
bert's as-
sent to it.
III.
Amongst those who had considered this project,
the French and the English alike were agreed that
their land and sea forces co-operating in the measures
proposed might put a great stress on the enemy by
embarrassing his more easterly lines of communica-
tion, and cramping his means of supply; but our
own people lured by an enterprise in which their
Navy would act, whilst rejoicing besides in a pros-
pect of carrying the empire of the sea to waters
hitherto closed, were more especially eager to have
the attack set on foot; and it was mainly, I believe,
from his wish to meet this strong English feeling
that on Sunday the 29th of April General Can-
robert in a spirit of friendliness agreed at last to
the scheme.*
A too anxious commander is the natural prey of
false 'emissaries.' Upon returning to his quarters
General Canrobert there found awaiting him the
report of an impudent spy who, whilst either so
ignorant or so deceptive as to say nothing of the most.
conspicuous fact-Baron Wrangel's great strength
in cavalry-made bold to declare that the enemy's
infantry at Theodosia and Kertch alone had a
strength of no less than 27,000; and, though Can-
doubts and robert did not give his full credence to such an
account, he allowed it to weigh on his mind. The
next day, accordingly, he wrote anxiously on the sub-
His sub-
sequent
objections.
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 4, 1855.
TO KERTCH.
255
X.
ject to Lord Raglan.* At a later hour of the same CHAP.
day, he fell into a state very near to despondency.
His imagination no longer content to dwell on the
great strength in numbers with which it invested
Baron Wrangel, went on to picture them concen-
trated, and whilst asking Lord Raglan's counsel, he
declared it to be his own opinion 'that the chances
against succeeding in the enterprise were much
greater than those in its favour.'t
6
6
6
Lord Raglan thus answered: The operation can
only be undertaken on condition of its execution
being immediate. The enemy is working at the
task of barring the straits; and, if he were to
succeed in completing the obstructions he is now
raising up, we should have to abandon all hope of
'occupying the Sea of Azof-an object to which our
'Governments attach great importance.
It might
6
(
(
C
possibly have been well, if we had been able to
spare more troops for the enterprise; but it is in
rapidity of action, as it seems to me, that we shall
find our best chances of success. Considering that
'we do not mean to establish ourselves in the Penin-
'sula of Kertch, but only by a coup de main to
'destroy the defences which prevent the passage of
our ships, we may fairly believe that 10,000 men
'will achieve this result. The enemy's numbers in
6
t
the Peninsula may be greater, but they are not
concentrated; and, to effect a concentration, he
* Canrobert to Lord Raglan, 30th April 1855, first letter of that date.
+ Canrobert to Lord Raglan, 30th April 1855, second letter of that
date.
Lord Rag-
terly an-
lan's mas-
swer to
him.
256
COMMENCED EXPEDITION
CHAP. ' would need more time than we should require for
X.
Canrobert
deferring
to Lord
Raglan.
our coup de main.'* Then after showing in detail
how great (after landing) would be the advantages
of the Allies over the enemy in point of comparative
proximity to the batteries which had to be taken, he
ended by declaring his opinion that the projected
operation might be executed without incurring risks
other than the ordinary risks of war, and with
chances of success which, considering the importance
of the result desired, were sufficient to justify the
enterprise; but always, he said, on condition that it
be undertaken without the least delay.'t
6
.
<
General Canrobert replied :- Since your Lordship
notwithstanding the observations I felt it my duty
to make in my letter of yesterday is of opinion
that this enterprise undertaken with the troops
before indicated presents itself with fair chances of
success, I hasten to say that I am giving orders for
'the prompt embarkation of the French corps which
is to participate in it concurrently with the English
troops.'‡
C
C
Sailing of
the ex-
pedition
on the 3d
of May.
IV.
So at last on the 3d of May, there embarked
upon this expedition from 10,000 to 12,000 troops,
of which three-fourths were French and one-fourth
English. The English squadron was commanded by
* Lord Raglan to Canrobert, 1st May 1855. The original is in Lord
Raglan's always excellent French.
+ Ibid.
Canrobert to Lord Raglan, 1st May.
TO KERTCH.
257
X.
Admiral Lyons, the French one by Admiral Bruat. CHA P.
The French troops were under the immediate direc-
tion of General d'Autemarre, but both that and the
English part of the land-service force were commanded
by Sir George Brown. Our people carried with them
the all-precious light of sound knowledge respecting
the enemy's dispositions and strength in the Kert-
chine Peninsula, and Major Gordon of the Royal
Engineers whose admirable report had made clear
the path of action was himself on board the flotilla
in command of a body of Sappers. Together with
the papers accompanying it, Lord Raglan's instruc-
tion to Brown was a model of lucid guidance.*
It was believed that after rapidly accomplishing
their tasks, the troops might be promptly brought
back, and that no risk of harm to the cause of
the Allies would be run by withdrawing them for
a very brief period from the Sebastopol theatre of
war.
To mislead Russian scrutiny, the flotilla at first
steered away as though making for Odessa, but
assumed its true course after dark.
V.
marine
But now, and even with suddenness, there began The Sub-
to interpose in the war that new and dangerous Cable.
magic which has hugely augmented the already
* A copy of this was enclosed in Lord Raglan's despatch to the
Secretary of State, cited ante.
VOL. VII.
R
258
COMMENCED EXPEDITION
CHAP. great powers of mischief conferred on an absolute
X.
-
ruler by carrying for him his orders with a
speed so transcendent of space that, although per-
haps the commanders to whom he is dictating action.
be men parted from him by distance extending over
thousands of miles, he still may dare to look for
obedience commencing from almost the hour in
which perhaps smoking the while he lazily
utters his orders to some Palace servitor, or him-
self writes down a direction to one of the telegraph
clerks.
Where no electricity penetrates, a distant com-
mander is able to tell his rulers at home that the
clever instructions they send him are based upon a
layer of facts which has long ago ranged with the
past; but of course no such shield can be used where
the magic 'conductors' are working; so that, if there
be the ripest experience, the amplest knowledge and
wisdom at one end of the cable, and at the other,
mere folly, mere ignorance propped up by conceit
and authority, it is the experience, the knowledge,
the wisdom-now unshielded by Distance and Time
-that may have in the clash to give way; for
wholesome jeers of the kind that after cruel dis-
asters laughed down the old 'Aulic Council,' have
been hardly as yet brought to bear with any suffic-
ing severity on those who dictate by telegraph.
No one saw the grave dangers of electric communi-
cation more clearly than did the commander of the
Emperor's Reserve at Constantinople. They will be
'able,' wrote General Larchey, 'to send orders and
6
TO KERTCH.
259
6
6
counter-orders from Paris which will shake the CHAP.
command of the army. *
The Submarine Cable connecting the seaport of
Varna with the shore of the Chersonese now came
at last into full play (¹); and our Government did
not abuse it; but-exposed to swift dictation from
Paris-the French had to learn what it was to try
to carry on war with a Louis Napoleon planted at
one of the ends of the wire, and at the other, a com-
mander like Canrobert, who did not dare to meet
Palace strategy with respectful evasions, still less
with plain, resolute words.
X.
VI.
from Paris.
The first message brought out from Paris by sub- Telegrams
marine cable was one of a wholesome sort; for it
simply empowered-and did not command-General
Canrobert to call up from Constantinople the Corps
of Reserve; but the messages that rapidly followed
were each of them strangely perturbing.
the 3d of
Between ten and eleven o'clock on the night of Night of
this 3d of May, General Canrobert came to the May:
English Headquarters and informed Lord Raglan,
that by what was described as an important tele-
graphic despatch' newly come in from Paris he had
received-not authority merely, but-positive orders to Lord
6
Canro-
bert's visit
Raglan
to bring up at once the army of Reserve from Con- with a new
6
stantinople, and for that purpose to send down telegram.
* Quoted, Rousset, ii. p. 164.
260
COMMENCED EXPEDITION
CHAP. without loss of time every ship he could place his
hands upon to the Bosphorus-to detach as soon
X.
Discussion
between
.
' as these new troops should arrive a division to
6
be landed at Aloushta, and moved from thence to
the head of a defile leading to Simferopol, and
thus threaten that town-to march a large body
by Baidar towards Baktchi Seräi, and a third
column by Tractir to the attack of Mackenzie's
Heights, and, to enable him to make these move-
'ments in sufficient force, to bring half of Omar
Pasha's army to this position from Eupatoria.'*
6
This was ordering the subservient, yet painfully
anxious Canrobert to go at once into a fit of strategic
hysterics, and in that weakly violent state-after
first too approaching Lord Raglan-begin a cam-
paign against Russia.
In the frenzy thus enjoined upon Canrobert, he
was to become amongst other things a generalissimo
-was to 'march' Lord Raglan with the English
army against the enemy in the field, and to bring'
Omar Pasha's army from Eupatoria!
C
With a smile, I am sure, in his mind, though not
perhaps on his lips, Lord Raglan told Canrobert that
command- the plan appeared very complicated.' After dis-
the two
ers:
<
cussing it for some time, General Canrobert announced
6
6
that these orders of the Emperor would compel him
'to recall the troops which had left Kamiesh for
Kertch.' Lord Raglan observed that 'such a pro-
ceeding would be a great misfortune, and would
'create a bad impression' both in the army and
* Lord Raglan to Sir Edmund Lyons, 4th May 1855, to 3 A.M.
TO KERTCH.
261
(
6
X.
' elsewhere,' and at last,' he wrote, I persuaded' CHA P.
General Canrobert not to recall the troops upon the
understanding that he relinquished his intention of its result.
doing so at my instance."*
General Canrobert remained with his colleague till
nearly one o'clock in the morning; and, when he had
at last gone away, Lord Raglan was soon in that
sleep with which nature blesses the weary, and
especially a weary commander; but there had not
as yet come an end to even this single night's rev-
elry of the electric currents now inaugurating their
turbulent mission. At a quarter past two, Lord 2.15 A.M.
Raglan was awakened by the arrival of a French aide-de-
aide - de - camp, bringing with him a letter from with yet
Canrobert, and another, and later telegram newly telegram;
come from the Emperor-from the Emperor acting in
person. It was thus that the Emperor telegraphed :
6
6
The moment is come for getting out of the 45
in which you are. It is absolutely necessary to
'take the offensive 450. As soon as the Corps of
Reserve shall have joined you, assemble all your
forces and do not lose a day. I greatly deplore
6
my
not being able myself to go out to the Crimea.'
The confusion that well might be wrought by thus
madly pelting with telegrams an already distracted
commander was a little augmented by failure in the
use of conventional signs; for what had been meant
by 45,' and what by 450,' the decipherers could
not divine; (2) but the interpreted words of these
telegrams were so wild, so perturbing that perhaps
*Sur ma demande.' Ibid.
Arrival of
camp
another
262
COMMENCED EXPEDITION
CHAP. by comparison the two occult signs were not alto-
gether unwelcome.
X.
and letter
from Can-
claring
himself
to recall
Admiral
Bruat.
The accompanying letter from Canrobert to Lord
robert de- Raglan announced with strong expressions of regret
and vexation that this last Imperial telegram made
it impossible for him to let the French troops con-
tinue their voyage towards Kertch, and that accord-
compelled ingly he was sending a despatch-boat in pursuit of
Admiral Bruat requesting him to return to Kamiesh.
He added that he should feel very grateful if Lord
Raglan would address the same request to Sir
Edmund Lyons; and Canrobert's aide-de-camp pro-
posed that Lord Raglan should send his letter to the
Reception Admiral by the French despatch-boat; but Lord
Raglan declined the offer, saying that for the task
of imparting what had occurred to Sir Edmund he
required a little time, and would send his communi-
cation by an English ship.t
of this by
Lord
Raglan.
*
With respect to General Canrobert's wish as ex-
pressed in his last communication, Lord Raglan was
sternly reserved, and did not undertake to do more
than convey to Admiral Lyons the terms of Canro-
bert's letter.
VII.
'I cannot say,' wrote Lord Raglan to Admiral
Lyons, how deeply I deplore this unexpected inter-
* General Canrobert to Lord Raglan, ce 4 Mai 1855, 1 heure du
matin.
+ Lord Raglan to Admiral Lyons, 4th May 1855, † past 3 A.M.
Ibid.
TO KERTCH.
263
X.
ruption of an enterprise from which I anticipated CHA P.
'not only success, but the most important conse-
(
(
quences. My only consolation is that both you
and I have done our utmost to forward an object
which the Government had much at heart.
*
some
course
taken by
Raglan.
But Lord Raglan gave more than condolence. Venture-
Perceiving at once the wide scope of the mischiefs,
the troubles, the dangers with which the Great Lord
Alliance was threatened by this French secession
occurring and perforce with publicity-in the midst
of a warlike enterprise, he was not a man to sit
moaning over such a dispensation' without an
effort of will to lessen or avert the misfortune; nor
again was he one who in such a condition of things,
could fail to be thinking of our Admiral (Lyons)
of Sir George Brown-they were, both of them, his
personal friends-now about to be overtaken at sea
by the palsying words of arrest despatched to Bruat
by Canrobert; and, though not of course wishing or
meaning that, when they should see the Expedition
deprived of three-fourths of its soldiery, the Ad-
miral and the General should-in anger-go on,
spite of all, with aims and plans wholly unchanged,
he yet dwelt with evident wistfulness on a lurking
idea that the two gallant men, upon learning the
orders sent out to the French, might become passion-
ately eager to reconnoitre the coast with a mind to
seize any fair opening for the action of the truncated
force which still would remain under Brown. The
force numbered less than 3000, but these were prime
* Ibid.
264
COMMENCED EXPEDITION
X.
CHAP. troops: the Highland Brigade, some Rifles, some
skilled engineers, 700 of the Royal Marines; and,
considering that to the very utmost of naval com-
petence, they would be eagerly supported by Lyons
with his ships close at hand, what might not be done
by such troops? It is true that Baron Wrangel was
supposed to be holding the district with forces about
9000 strong, of whom some 3000 (consisting mainly
of Fencibles) were believed to be in or near Kertch;
but according to the latest Reports, his troops-far
from having been concentrated-were established at
distant posts. Was it not therefore possible, or even
within the range of fair likelihood that Sir George
being stronger immeasurably than all the troops
about Kertch, might complete the destruction of the
coast batteries without being even molested by any
force brought from a distance except perhaps bodies
of cavalry with which he would know how to deal?
The latitude we are going to see granted was not
destined to be used by Sir George; but to such as
would know the true lineaments of Lord Raglan's
magnanimous nature the bare fact of his giving
this warrant for separate action under circumstan-
ces so strange and at first sight-so full of peril,
will not be an unwelcome aid.
With rare boldness, with rare generosity, and with
a carefulness for the honour and fair name of others
which was never surpassed, he framed a couple of
sentences which opened a path of high enterprise for
his chosen lieutenant to take upon the distinct respon-
sibility of the commander-in-chief, yet-before-
TO KERTCH.
265
X.
band raised up a firm barrier against all the CHAP.
impatient observers who might otherwise blame the
lieutenant for not exerting his power.
tude he
Sir George
The two sentences' addressed to Admiral Lyons The lati-
were these 'I apprehend that, if the French troops gave to
'which form three-fourths of your force be withdrawn, Brown.
there can be no chance of your being able to proceed
6
on the Expedition with a fair prospect of success,
and without incurring a risk which the circum-
'stances would hardly justify. Should you and Sir
George Brown, however, after due deliberation
'think it advisable to go on, and see what the state
of things may be on the coast with the view to
6
6
take advantage of any opening which may pre-
sent itself, I am perfectly ready to support any
'such determination on Brown's part, and to be
' responsible for the undertaking.'
, *
Thus Lord Raglan accomplished the task of giving
his lieutenant full swing, yet relieving him before-
hand from all risk of blame for the choice he might
happen to make of either one or the other alternative.
VIII.
Detractors of course may pronounce that this
warrant for separate action was the evident offspring
of
anger, and by natural consequence rash; nor can
any deny to such critics the vantage-ground on which
they will stand, when reminding us that the English
* Lord Raglan to Admiral Lyons, 4th May 1855, past 3 A.M.
266
THE KERTCH
X.
CHAP. Commander gave leave to push on the enterprise
with troops having only one-fourth of the strength
he himself and his colleague had agreed to allot
for the enterprise. But Lord Raglan at least based
his daring on fairly accurate knowledge of the
enemy's last dispositions.* This knowledge gave
him a right to anticipate with something like con-
fidence that our troops after landing in the eastern
part of the Peninsula could be only encountered
at first, if even encountered at all, by some
3000+ troops of inferior quality which could have
no pretensions to stand against any such forces
as our Highlanders, or the Royal Marines, and
that before the coming up from elsewhere of any
strong bodies of Russians, our people (taking care
against Cavalry, as already he had warned them
to do) might complete their brief, simple task
-the task of destroying or maiming a string of
coast batteries lying all of them open in rear.
Still Lord Raglan, as we have seen, did not force
the adventurous step on his lieutenant, and though
arming him with power to hazard it, did this
only on condition that both he and the admiral
with him should themselves feel impelled towards
the enterprise.
That the granting of even this sanction was a
venturesome act I do not affect to deny; but the
* This I am enabled to say by comparing the knowledge as evi-
denced by the papers before me with the statements of General
Todleben.
+ The real number as we have seen being less-viz., 2572, of whom
only 1883 could be spared for field operations.
EXPEDITION RECALLED.
267
enlightenment we have received since the morning CHAP.
*
of the 4th of May, when the letter to our admiral
was written, gives us much better reason for confi-
dence than people can generally have when speaking
in the potential mood; for we see nearly all the con-
ditions under which Baron Wrangel would have
been called upon to act if Sir George in concert with
Lyons had thought fit to go on with the enterprise ;
and all that seems undetermined is a question how
far the shoal waters would have suffered our navy to
act—by either gunboats or otherwise-in repression
of cavalry masses coming down the smooth slopes of
the steppe, and undertaking to operate against our
troops on the shore. But even supposing them safe
against any fire from the sea, the Russian horse if
thus venturing would have found themselves con-
fronted by bodies of infantry which (duly forewarned
as they were, against the attempted surprises of horse-
men by Lord Raglan's thoughtful precaution) might
be expected to prove staunch as rocks against cav-
alry charges, and well able to meet all such onsets
with so steady a fire as would be likely to prevent
the experiments from being too often repeated.
Turning thence to conjecture on the subject of
infantry against infantry, we find on the one side, a
body of 1750 Fencibles with only 133 men of the
Line supported by four guns; on the other, the whole
Highland Brigade, with 700 of the Royal Marines,
with a battery of field-artillery, and besides a number
of Riflemen, and a company of Sappers under Gordon,
* See last footnote.
X.
268
RECALL OF
X.
CHAP. all contributing to make that choice body of less
than 3000 men a formidable instrument of warlike
power. Under conditions like these, there was no
such approach to equality as could well raise a doubt
of the issue. What however seems most likely is
that not deeming himself to be insulted by the scan-
tiness of a disembarked force which was, after all,
greater in numbers than his own 1900 foot-soldiers,
Baron Wrangel would have acted on his foregone
resolve, and abandoned at once to our people the
seven precious coast batteries which formed the key
of the Straits.*
Thus inquiry if conducted with care, goes far to-
wards making it clear that Lord Raglan in giving
the warrant was, after all, rightly inspired.t
Lord Raglan must have thought with great care
of the state of effervescence into which our allies
might be thrown, if the enterprise should be pushed
to an issue in spite of General Canrobert's seces-
sion, and must seemingly have convinced himself
that the effect of this resolute measure on the minds
of the French would prove in the end to be good.
Return of
the ex-
pedition.
IX.
With the forces engaged in this Kertch Expedition
all seemed as yet to be prospering. The conditions
* See post, vol. viii. chap. iv.
+ The enlightenment' is more than commonly vivid, being not
only furnished by Todleben's admirable expositions, but also by the
actual experience deriving from the second Kertch Expedition.
THE KERTCH EXPEDITION.
269
Χ.
were such that a highly effective reconnaissance CHA P.
could be made from the sea. Captain Spratt look-
ing out from the Spitfire, and Captain Le Bris from
the Fulton, were able to reach a conclusion-now
known to have been soundly based--that the success
of the enterprise was likely to prove sure and prompt;
but when so nearly approaching the field of the
contemplated operations as to be seen and duly re-
ported from the Light-tower marking Cape Takli,
the flotilla with all its keen hopes was overtaken at
sea by General Canrobert's orders; and under the
bitter compulsion thus put on the French, their Ad-
miral—Admiral Bruat-obeyed the command to turn
back. He moved slowly in order that Lyons, if also
recalled, might the sooner overtake and rejoin him.
When Lyons, some hours later, received the letter
despatched to him from the English Headquarters,
he and Brown did not make up their minds to use
that power and separate action with which Lord
Raglan had armed them; and therefore our people
soon followed the retrograde move of the French.
excited by
Next day it was Sunday, a Sunday remembered Feelings
with bitterness—the flotilla returned into port; and its recall:
the thousands on board it brought back under such
conditions as these were hurt, were aggrieved, on board
were almost forced to know that some untrustworthy tilla;
hand had seized for the moment a power to trifle
with the armies and navies whilst busied in warlike
enterprise.*
* Lord Raglan declared his belief that the feeling of disappoint-
ment endured by the men-French and English alike—was universal
the flo-
270
RECALL OF
СНАР.
X.
in Con-
stanti-
nople;
The French Admiral's-Bruat's-report stated
only the facts without comment; yet the facts
being such as they were, it reads like a pitiless charge
against him who had sent the recall.
Amongst the myriads wondering at the recall of
the flotilla were not only the enemy, not only the
fleets and the armies, but also a multitude planted
on the all-precious line of communication which
connected the invaders of Russia with their homes
in the West of Europe.
Apart from any ideas of Sultan, statesmen,
diplomatists (all only adjacent dignitaries not
mingling in streets or Bazaars), the Mind of the
Imperial City, if in those days unmastered by judg-
ment, and affording no trustworthy guidance to
any mortals on earth, was still other than null, was
still-if hardly enlightened, yet-after a manner
suffused by the smouldering fire of Greek Intellect
-was keenly, was loudly alive. Over-blest in her
number of creeds, over-Babeled in her number of
races, and customs, and tongues, brooding over the
grave of one empire, and the bed-the sick-bed-
of another, distraught between the East and the
West, distraught between the Past and the Future,
inarticulate, deaf to the reasoners, Stamboul all the
more heaved with opinions, if not with Opinion,
and was roaring with the voices of prophets.
commonly fed upon Rumour, but fastened, this
time, on a truth on the tidings of a Western
She
and deep.-To Secretary of State, Secret and Confidential, May 8,
1855.
THE KERTCH EXPEDITION.
271
flotilla returning, as in fear or in penitence, from CHAP.
before the Cimmerian Bosphorus.
We shall presently see, or infer, that the emotion
of French troops encamped near Constantinople drew
some at least of its strength from the murmur of the
Imperial city.
The fleets and the armies of the Allies had met no
reverse in arms. It was simply the message-the
hysterical message-from Paris that, taking effect on
an enterprise already begun, had raised the growth
of scorn in their rear. (3)
X.
on the
fleets and
The fleets on the coast, and the armies encamped
before Sebastopol shared the rage of the forces the troops
brought back, and this angry feeling extended with
even augmented savageness to the Emperor's corps
of Reserve assembled on the west of the Bosphorus ;
for these regiments lay so near Constantinople as to
be reached, one may say, by the howl of the Im-
perial city; and, though guiltless themselves of all
fault, they seem to have felt gravely wounded by
what other Frenchmen had done. All the world,'
wrote General Larchey, the commander of the French
Reserve force at Constantinople, accuses the electric
telegraph of having caused the failure of the Expedi-
'tion to Kertch from which the best results were ex-
pected.* Rightly or wrongly there is a general
6
C
' outburst of indignation at the counter-order of the
Expedition to Kertch. Sailors and soldiers alike.
have been tearing themselves with rage.'t
* How just this instinctive suspicion was we have seen.
Se sont rongé les poings.' To the Minister of War. Quoted
Rousset, ii. pp. 164, 165.
272
RECALL OF
X.
CHAP. The indignation of the fleets and the armies,
whether English or French, extended to our people
at home, and was fiercely expressed by our Govern-
ment. Lord Panmure wrote: If he [General
Canrobert] had refused his consent to the em-
Can-
robert's
6
C
.
C
barkation, he might have been forgiven, but to
recall an expedition after it has sailed, and to
expose your game to the enemy, shows him to be
utterly incapable of high command or of weighing
'the results of so false a move as he has made.
Well may the army and fleet be disgusted. I only
'wonder Bruat obeyed so desponding an order.* I
never will believe that the Emperor's instructions
'were such as to leave Canrobert no discretion.'t
ઃ
The Emperor soon spoke for himself, and the
tenor of what he alleged we shall presently learn;
but first, we must hear General Canrobert, and then
try to do him more justice than was possible in that
angry time.
In his telegram to the Emperor dated the 4th of
account of May General Canrobert after stating that the Kertch
expedition had started on the previous evening, went
on to say this:
the recall.
"Your despatch of yesterday 3d May, 1 P.M.
has arrived. It compels me without losing a day
'to send all the means of transport of the French
'fleet to Constantinople. I am making the expedi-
* Disobedience on the part of Admiral Bruat would have been
mutiny, for he was under General Canrobert's orders.
+ To Lord Raglan, Private, 7th May 1855. In several subsequent
despatches Lord Panmure repeated strong expressions of his anger and
disgust.
THE KERTCH EXPEDITION.
273
6
'tion return contrary to the advice of Lord Raglan, CHAP.
and am proceeding to conform myself to your
' orders.'
X.
due to him.
It seems just to acknowledge that if Canrobert
really owed strict obedience to the Emperor's flighty
commands, he could not have well helped recalling
his troops from that Kertch Expedition, which, far
from aiding at all towards the instant concentration
of forces enjoined by his sovereign, was drawing off
the French means of transport, and several thousands
of men to serve for a while at some distance from the
three allied camps. General Canrobert, it is true,
went astray, but his error was one of old growth. The justice
It lay-not, as believed Lord Panmure, in any mis-
construction of orders, but-in his then confirmed
habit of undue subserviency to the will of a master
who of course could have no just pretensions to be
wielding his army from Paris.* Plainly not under-
standing at all that a general with allies at his side
who would worthily command a great army in an
enemy's country must perforce be a statesman as
well as a soldier, he seems to have fancied that his
duty of simple obedience was analogous to that of
the Private expectant of the 'halt!' or 'quick
'march!'
*The Emperor himself once declared (though of course incon-
sistently with much of what he had done) that he had no such pre-
tension. 'Je ne prétends pas commander l'armée d'ici.' To Pélissier
23d May 1855, quoted Rousset, ii. p. 192.
VOL. VII.
S
274
RECALL OF
СНАР.
X.
Letter
from the
French
Emperor
X.
It seemed that the wrath of our people was en-
dangering all prospect of concert between the Allies;
and in explanation of the course he had taken, the
French Emperor addressed a long letter to our Am-
bassador in Paris:-
in explan-
ation of
the course
he had
taken.
C
6
'PALAIS DES TUILERIES, 7 Mai 1855.
MY DEAR LORD COWLEY,—I request you to bring
under the full consideration of the English Govern-
'ment the bearing of the facts which I am going to
state in a few words.'
6
Then after citing four documents with which we
are already acquainted,* the Emperor proceeds.
6
'
:
You see then, Milord, that I have not counter-
manded the Expedition to Kertch, but that in the
opinion of Canrobert this expedition is incompatible
' with the offensive movement against the Russians,
and in this alternative, hesitation is not possible,
for Canrobert says himself that on the 24th the
'state of things was too strained to allow of its last-
ing more than fifteen days. Also under date of
the 6th of May midnight I have received a de-
spatch from Canrobert to this effect:-"The squad-
"ron has just returned; I am going to send all the
6
6
* Viz., the letters of the 24th April from Canrobert and Niel, the
telegram from the Emperor personally of the 3d of May, and Can-
robert's telegram to the Emperor of the 4th of May, mentioned
ante, pp. 272, 273.
THE KERTCH EXPEDITION.
275
6
6.66
t
6
:
6
'
6
6
Χ.
disposable vessels to Constantinople. Lord Raglan CHAP.
"awaits instructions from London for his concur-
66
rence in the field operations." Thus, then, the
vessels which were to have gone to Kertch are now
engaged in going to fetch troops at Constantinople,
and I strongly approve this determination of General
Canrobert.* The Expedition to Kertch might have
'been advantageous at either an earlier or a later
time, but now, when the salvation of the army
'before Sebastopol is in question, and that this salva-
'tion can come only from a combined attack on the
Russians, it would be madness, as it seems to me,
not to concentrate all one's means of action on the
principal point, and to take on one's hands a new
expedition which, although useful, would have no
immediately decisive effect. I request you there-
'fore to be very seriously urgent with the English
Government in pressing it to send Lord Raglan
precise orders, to the end that a general attack may
be made against the Russians, and that, in these
'critical circumstances, not an instant be lost.-
Receive, &c.,
NAPOLÉON.'
C
6
6
(
on the
The defence contained nothing dishonest; and, Comment
indeed, it showed fairly the process by which this letter.
singular monarch had guided himself into error.
First, by plainly misreading General Canrobert's
letter of the 24th of April, he had brought himself
to believe that his army was in imminent danger.
* He says:—J'approuve fort cette détermination du Général Can-
robert.
276
EXPEDITION RECALLED,
X.
CHAP. How was this to be met? Of course by his infallible
remedy. Having long before made himself sure that
his plan of campaign was the one road to victory
and conquest, he then got to see in it also the one
plank of safety by which to escape great disasters.
Next-as though at the time in a frenzy of prophetic
assurance-he complacently took it for granted that
a telegraphed message from him would not only
drive General Canrobert, but even Lord Raglan him-
self and all the gathered Allies to clutch at 'salva-
'tion' by the 'only' way open, and enter at once
on his travesty of the famous Marengo campaign.
Thence it was that he had sent the hysterical tele-
grams which broke the rest of the Generals on the
night of the 3d of May, and stopped short in mid-
course a flotilla already in sight of the enemy.
DICTATION FROM PARIS NOW RESISTED.
277
CHAPTER XI.
THE EMPEROR'S DICTATION RESISTED, THE COLLAPSE OF HIS
PLAN, AND THE RESIGNATION OF CANROBERT.
I.
XI.
and Niel
considera-
Emperor's
THOSE telegrams which had the effect of arresting CHA P.
the Kertch Expedition were messages addressed to
the object of pressing on the execution of the Em- Canrobert
peror's campaigning plan; and, whatever General proposing
Canrobert in his heart may have thought of the tion of the
project, he was not strong enough to encounter it plan.
with even respectful evasions, still less to set it aside
with a laugh, or an oath, as some other men might
have done; whilst Niel was even so circumstanced
that he could scarcely help trying to defend those
Imperial notions which he himself, as we saw, had
greatly helped to inspire.
*
Niel was not a bashful man; and on the 4th of
May-the very morrow of Canrobert's secession from
the enterprise commenced against Kertch-he came
to the English Headquarters full fraught with the
Emperor's plan. After amply expounding the pro-
* See ante, chap. v.
278
LORD RAGLAN'S JUDGMENT
XI.
Course
taken by
Lord
Raglan :
CHAP. ject, he requested that Lord Raglan would discuss
it with Canrobert. Lord Raglan did not respond.
On the ground that he was still in expectation of the
instruction which Lord Panmure had promised to
send him, he avoided—at least for a time—the dis-
his opin- cussion proposed; but his opinion of the Emperor's
plan was soon and decisively formed.
The pro-
ion of the
plan;
×
'ject,' he writes,' the project of his Imperial Ma-
'jesty appears to be open to many objections. It
'would divide the allied forces far more than is
C
desirable, and throw a large portion of them into
' a country where from its nature the difficulty of
' communication between the several columns would
be necessarily great, and where therefore the enemy
might fall in great force upon one body without the
one next it being able to render it assistance.'
:
6
And reflection confirmed his opinion; for in refer-
ence to that part of the plan which committed the
defence of the siege-works to 30,000 French and
30,000 Turks, he afterwards wrote: The trenches
' with the material in them would not be safe; and,
'should they be forced, the depots of Balaclava and
Kamiesh upon which the existence of the allied
armies depends would be exposed to great danger.
The garrison of Sebastopol is estimated at from
'37,000 to 42,000 men. The troops on the north
'side consist of very large numbers, and a great por-
<
tion of them might be so massed in the town as
'that they could fall with a superior force upon
' either the right or the left attack, without the one
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 5, 1855.
BROUGHT TO BEAR ON THE PLAN.
279
6
XI.
being able to assist the other.' Lord Raglan also CHA P.
said he should urge such a scheme as might seem
(
calculated to produce the desired result in the
simplest and readiest manner.'*
what
the right
course.
And this he well knew how to do. What Lord and of
Raglan desired to achieve against the Sebastopol would be
garrison was first to attack and reconquer the
counter-approaches which still remained in their
hands; whilst in reference to the plans suggested
for completing the investment of the fortress, he
preferred to all others a movement which, with com-
petent aid, Omar Pasha might find means to execute
by advancing from Eupatoria against the enemy's
rear; and the Pasha himself approved a campaign of
that sort, saying even that, to make good the task,
he needed no help at all except some French regi-
ments of horse.
Of the opinion of Canrobert, who had submitted
himself, as we saw, to the government of General
Niel's 'Mission,' yet was destined, after all his sub-
serviency, to take a step roughly extirpating his mys-
tified Emperor's Plan, I need not here speak; but in
the French camp, a general of other quality was now
fast attaining to a great meed of power.
II.
On the 5th day of May, General Pélissier addressed
to his Chief General Canrobert a letter so masterly,
*Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret and Confidential, May
8, 1855.
Pélissier's
letter of
the 5th of
May.
280
PÉLISSIER'S
CHAP. but also so masterful that it became an event in the
XI.
siege, and was pregnant with consequences. First,
Pélissier laid it down confidently that with their
then strength in numbers and their other advantages,
the Allies were secure on the Chersonese from every
great Russian attack. Next, he treated it as certain
enough that in spite of all the interposed difficulty
they could carry Sebastopol by proper siege opera-
tions. Next again, he declared a conviction that
without too much turning aside in search of other
expedients, the right course was simply to push the
siege to extremity. Then boldly, but with con-
summate adroitness, he went on to deal with the
contingency which would have to be met if the error
(as he considered it) of resorting to field operations
should be 'inexorably' commanded by the Emperor.
To comply 'in that case with the mandate, or to
treat it at the least with an outward seeming of
deference, he sketched a plan of campaign, which—
since mentioning the port of Aloushta-might be
said to have borne at first sight a kind of superficial
resemblance to the Imperial project; but then he
went on to show-to show with his Vauban in hand
—that neither this his own plan, nor any other field
operation could be wisely or otherwise than rashly
attempted without first confining the garrison to a
strictly narrowed defensive, and reconquering, to
begin with, all those of the counter-approaches which
still remained in their hands. Though well know-
ing of course that, through Canrobert, he was sub-
stantially addressing the Emperor, he pressed this
DOMINANT LETTER.
281
conclusion in language that might well be called CHAP.
peremptory.
XI.
some bear-
letter upon
sels of the
Now, whilst so pointed out by Pélissier as an Whole-
absolutely needed preparative for any field operations, ing of the
this measure of reconquering the counter-approaches the coun-
was also the one he pronounced to be no less essen- Allies.
tially requisite for duly pressing the siege; so that,
whether the Emperor's instructions should be main-
tained, or revoked, the course to be taken at once
would in either event be the same. * And this, as
we have seen, was the very same course which Lord
Raglan had already advised.
Thus, supposing him to stand unresisted in the
argument he based upon Vauban, Pélissier was paving
the way for a happy convergence of opinion which
would serve at the least to provide for the immediate
future of the Allies, and-without contravening too
flatly a sovereign's plan of campaign-might cause
the preparatives made towards rendering it eventu-
ally feasible to be absolutely the same as those needed
for pressing the advance of the siege. From reasons
thus offering guidance for the immediate future there Corollary
also resulted a corollary which applied with bitter from the
force to the Past. If the reasoning was sound, it its bearing
appeared that the way in which the Emperor had upon the
clandestinely prepared for the execution of his plan
was in point of warlike expediency, so wildly, so
glaringly wrong as to be almost the actual opposite
of what skill and wisdom enjoined. Instead of turn-
ing his army on the Chersonese into an army in
*Rousset, ii. pp. 168 et seq.
resulting
letter in
Past.
282
PÉLISSIER'S
XI.
CHAP. waiting,' and making it submit-almost shamefully
-to the enemy's audacious encroachments, he, if
primed with that knowledge of War which Pélissier
now pressed upon him, would have, months ago,
urged Niel and Canrobert to prepare for the due
execution of his favourite project by peremptorily
reconquering beforehand every one of the counter-
approaches, and effectually confining the garrison to
the strictest defensive.
Pélissier's
Thus the Emperor was taught after all, that
Honour would have been his best policy, and that
such a sincere prosecution of the siege as would have
kept him free from the guilt of disloyalty towards
Lord Raglan would besides have saved the French
army from that error of submitting to the counter-
approaches which, if rigidly obstructive (so long as
it lasted) to the advance of the siege, was also one
that forbade the essentially needful preparatives for
his own cherished plan of campaign; so that what
to the cynic was 'only a crime,' and-still better—
a crime undetected, now stood out exposed as a
blunder.'
6
Pélissier's insistence on the policy of wresting the
growing
ascendant. counter-approaches from the enemy's hands came
specially well from a general who was fresh from
the conquest of one of these strongly held Works ;*
and it was in the nature of things that he whose
strong will had some five days before achieved the
capture of the Sousdal Counter-guard should be taking
an ascendant over one whose relation towards the
* See ante, p. 204 et seq.
DOMINANT LETTER.
283
XI.
exploit of the 1st of May was that of a general who CHA P.
had only consented to the enterprise under violent
pressure, and had afterwards even apologised to his
Government at home for a victory implying devia-
tion from the tasks of an army in waiting.'
6
Then again, the frank, manful, wise boldness Contrast.
which marked Pélissier's treatment of the Emperor's
instructions contrasted superbly with the subservi-
ent attitude of the Commander-in-Chief towards his
mischievous sovereign; and on the whole one may
say that from after the administration of this power-
ful letter on the 5th of May, General Canrobert was Effect of
an almost annulled, and Pélissier a conquering man.
the letter.
III.
tions of
peror's
before the
Com
manders.
Before the middle of May, the Emperor's letter of Exposi-
the 27th of April had reached both the French and the Em-
the English Headquarters; as had also a new, though plan now
in most respects similar Exposition of his campaign-
ing Plan. (¹) At the instance of Louis Napoleon,
our Government had been framing a set of instruc-
tions for Lord Raglan on the subject of the Emperor's
Plan, but these did not reach him in time for the
Council of the 14th of May, to which we shall pres-
ently come. They, however, were not at all needed.
Lord Raglan knew the mind of his Government.
From Louis Napoleon's abandonment of his in- The duties
tention to come out to the Crimea, and from the
* See ante, p. 208.
it assigned
to Canro-
284
CONFERENCES ON
XI.
bert and
CHAP. order providing that Pélissier should be in charge
of the Siege-Army,' it followed that General Can-
Pélissier. robert, if adopting the Imperial plan, would himself
have to execute that imagined advance from Aloushta
which the Emperor had intended to lead.
12th May.
The three
allied
Command-
ference.
Omar Pasha, invited by General Canrobert and
Lord Raglan to take part in their deliberations, came
ers in Con- up for the purpose from Eupatoria; and on the 12th
of May, the three allied Commanders met in Confer-
ence. Though not coming then to any resolve, they
discussed at great length the Emperor's plan of
Campaign.
14th May,
renewed
Confer-
ence.
Lord Rag-
lan pre-
vailing.
As we saw, the opinions of both Lord Raglan and
Omar Pasha had been adverse to the Emperor's
plan; and each of them greatly preferred the idea
of an advance from Eupatoria; but Canrobert, as
seemed very natural, could not easily escape alto-
gether from the pressure of his sovereign's will; and
it was only by yielding a little in that direction that
agreement could well be attained. Lord Raglan on
the whole thought it wise to humour the Emperor
by consenting to an attack from the south, but took
care nevertheless to reject all the more flighty parts
of Louis Napoleon's plan.
Omar Pasha seemed to take the same view; and,
when therefore on the 14th of May the three allied
Commanders were again brought together in Confer-
ence, they agreed to make a forward movement from
their right, and Lord Raglan brought Canrobert to
engage that, instead of advancing from Aloushta
upon Simferopol, he would place his extreme right
THE PLAN.
285
ΧΙ.
at Baidar, and thence move on Baktchi Seräi.* CHAP.
In such case, the task of Lord Raglan would be to
advance on Canrobert's left, and storm the
kenzie Heights.
Mac- Agree-
ment as to
plan of
field opera-
but no
So far, therefore, the Commanders agreed; but tions;
their hope of ever really engaging in this projected further.
campaign was conditional on their making it har-
monise with the still greater object for which they
had not yet provided the vital, the paramount
object of maintaining the position of the Allies in
front of Sebastopol and securing their ports of
supply.
This condition they did not fulfil.
Adverting to the detailed arrangements by which
the Imperial plan sought to meet this great exigency,
and in particular to the agreement of Buckingham
Palace, which stipulated that the positions held by
the English army in front of Sebastopol should be
occupied by French and Turkish troops, Lord Raglan
asked General Canrobert and Omar Pasha how they
meant to provide for the defence of our siege-works.
The answers he obtained were positive. Both Canro-
bert and Omar Pasha declared that it was impos- Canrobert
sible for them to guard the English trenches. 't torily re-
Omar Pasha assigned some reasons for his refusal; guard the
but-more flatly- General Canrobert said he could trenches:
6
.
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 15, 1855. General
Canrobert did not admit to his Emperor that he had so far yielded.—
Rousset, ii. p. 173 et seq.; but that he did in fact so yield is not only
shown by the above despatch of the 15th, but also—and more
pointedly-by the secret despatch of the 19th.
Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 15, 1855.
peremp-
fusing to
English
286
CANROBERT'S NOTION OF
CHAP.
XI.
Omar
Pasha also
refusing.
The conse-
quences of
these re-
fusals.
lan's mor-
C
C
> *
not impose such a task on any portion of his army;'
' and thus,' continues Lord Raglan, 'it became evi-
dent that the four Divisions of her Majesty's
troops now engaged in occupying the trenches
would have to remain on that duty when any
operations of an offensive nature should be under-
taken. I confess that this is a great mortification
' to me.' +
'
Lord Raglan might well have felt pained when
contrasting that great command in the field which
the united Governments of France and England had
agreed to provide for him with the task to which he
Lord Rag- found himself riveted by the absolute refusal of our
tification. French and Turkish allies to take his place in front
of Sebastopol. He may even have felt disappoint-
ment. It is true that, when hearing at first of the
Buckingham Palace agreement, Lord Raglan had
smiled at the notion of Canrobert's ever consenting
(whether aided or not by the Turks) to hold the
entire position of the besiegers without an English
force on the Chersonese to share his anxious task;
but the change which substituted for Canrobert so
strong a man as Pélissier to hold the immediate
command in front of Sebastopol may have led the
English Commander to think or hope for a moment
that the French (as enjoined by the plan) would
really take charge of his siege-works.
Rejection
of plan.
The refusal of Canrobert and of Omar Pasha to
*Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 15, 1855.
+ Ibid.
DIVIDING THE ENGLISH ARMY.
287
XI.
take charge of the English trenches was substan- CHAP.
tially of course a rejection of the Emperor's project,
and besides of that modified plan into which Lord
Raglan had changed it.
aly.
In this Conference of the 14th of May, it so hap- An anom-
pened at first sight anomalously-that Lord Raglan
-by concessions-was able to approach at some
points towards the wishes of Louis Napoleon; and
that he who delivered the blow which destroyed the
Emperor's plan was-of all men!-General Canrobert.
*
bert's idea
army
might
be split
into two.
When Canrobert reported these transactions to Canro-
the Minister of War, he disclosed an idea that Lord that the
Raglan might have divided his force into two dis- English
tinct armies, leaving one in front of Sebastopol and
with the other (supported by the Piedmontese con-
tingent) undertaking to act in the field. (2) To go and
thus split up a body of some 25,000 English troops
into two little far-sundered armies-dividing the
diamond into halves !-would have been contrary
to all policy, to all common-sense, and, one may
add, to the dominant conception of the Emperor,
who had not only made it a chief feature of his plan
to keep the English army entire, but taken pains
to augment its power by assigning troops of other
nations to act with it under the same commander.
6
.
The British army,' writes Lord Raglan, 'is too
small to be divided. It should act in one body.'†
* By assenting to an attack from the south, and by undertaking to
operate against the Mackenzie Heights.
+ To Lord Panmure, Private Letter, May 1, 1855.
288
THE PLAN SUBJECTED
CHAP.
XI.
The Em-
peror's
plan ex-
posed to
contact
A part of the havoc sustained by this ill-fated
Plan when it reached the Crimea can be shown in
arithmetical figures. The Emperor's Palace-made
reckoning had laid it down, as we saw, that, to
with reali- guard the positions of the besiegers in front of
ties;
Sebastopol, there were needed no more than 60,000
men, of whom one half might be French, and the
other half Turks; but inquiry at the seat of war
soon made it appear that the army or armies en-
trusted with this momentous charge should have a
strength of 90,000—that is, a force exceeding the
with what one which had seemed great enough to the plan-
ners in Buckingham Palace by no less than 30,000
result.
*
men. And again, the whole force which Omar
Pasha now consented to leave in the south of the
Crimea was less by 15,000 than the Palace com-
puters had imagined or hoped it would be ; † so that,
after making these two corrections, and then begin-
ning to learn what forces might be actually assembled
for campaigning in the open field, the difference be-
tween estimate and reality would already appear to
be one of no less than 45,000 men, and the next
glance at these hard realities would show that of the
30,000 Turks who were to concur with the French
in guarding the siege-works not a man would in fact
be there present.
* A joint commission appointed by the three Commanders to inquire
and report on this subject, recommended unanimously that the strength
of the force remaining planted before Sebastopol should be 90,000.
+ Omar Pasha was sending some troops to the Chersonese, but with-
drawing others, and the upshot of his arrangements was as stated above.
Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, May 15, 1855.
TO MILITARY EXAMINATION.
289
XI.
There was no reason why the French Emperor CHA P.
should not have set himself free from the error of
15,000, and the two enormous errors of 30,000 each,
before constructing his plan. If taking that simple
precaution, he would have seen the imagined French
Corps he meant to collect at Aloushta reduced all at
once from 65,000 to a strength of but 5000 men.
When inquiry pushed close had thus shown that,
to defend the position before Sebastopol and the
ports of supply, there would be needed-not merely
60,000, as provided by the Emperor, but-90,000
men, that Omar Pasha, instead of contributing 30,000
men (as Louis Napoleon assumed) towards the work
of the siege, would spare no troops at all for the
purpose; and finally, when General Canrobert, dis-
obeying his sovereign, refused to liberate the Eng-
lish army for field operations by taking charge of
their trenches, there sank from under this project
the basis on which it had rested, and the structure of
course fell to pieces.
by Can-
he was
The French Commander indeed reported to his Statement
Government that he and Omar Pasha would immedi- robert that
ately prepare to take the field; but few, I suppose, going to
can have thought that this second invasion of the
Crimea—without an English army to share it would
be really undertaken by Canrobert.
take the
field.
of the
Big with Louis Napoleon's scheme, the baneful Duration
'Mission' of Niel began, as we saw, to clog France harm done
in the first days of February; so that, when the Niel's
VOL. VII.
T
by General
'mission.'
290
RESIGNATION OF
CHAP. design-meeting criticism at the seat of war-
XI. collapsed in the middle of May, its incumbency had
been keeping the siege in a state of impuissance for
nearly three months and a half.
General
Clanro-
bert's
first en-
deavour to
rid himself
of the com-
mand.
Nor even then-strangely enough-shall we see
its effects wholly cease. The Emperor was never
informed that his Plan, at the touch of realities, had
collapsed in the way we have seen, and accordingly
did not attempt to remove or break down the huge
obstacles it had encountered at the seat of war, nor
to build up anew calculations there roughly upset;
but, as though he were walking in sleep, he still
carried with him his dream, still went on vainly
commanding that people would hear and obey it.
IV.
Whilst in conference on the 14th of May, General
Canrobert was either fast reaching, or already had
reached the conclusion that, consistently with his sense
of duty, he could no longer command the French army.
Producing the Dormant Commission, he placed it
in the hands of General Pélissier, and requested him
to assume the command.* This, Pélissier, with a
plainly wise self-control, declined to do, maintaining
that the instruction was only meant to be acted upon
in the event of Canrobert's death or serious illness.†
*This step, as Pélissier said, was taken by Canrobert 'five or six
'days' before the 19th of May.
+I do not observe that this transaction was ever made known to the
French Government; but General Pélissier imparted it to Lord Raglan.
Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, 19th May 1855.
GENERAL CANROBERT.
291
'
XI.
16th April.
endeavour.
General Canrobert, however, on the 16th of May, CHAP.
wrote by telegraph thus to his ruler :- My health
' and my mind fatigued by constant tension no His second
'longer allow me to carry the burthen of an immense
responsibility. My duty towards my sovereign His resig
and my country forces me to ask leave to deliver to dered.
'General Pélissier a commander of skill and great
6
6
C
C
experience the letter for him which I hold. The
army which I shall quit is intact, inured to war,
(
ardent, and confident.
I ask the Emperor to
'leave me a combatant's place at the head of a
6
simple division.'*
nation ten-
interposi-
Niel.
General Niel must have felt that his 'mission,' Strange
and his claim to be superintending the ostensible tion of
commander-in-chief were brought into jeopardy by
a change which removed the docile Canrobert, and
raised up in his place so strong a man as Pélissier;
but acting, as may well be believed, under an
imperious sense of public duty, whilst also perhaps
somewhat eager to move, if moving at all, on the
topmost crest of the wave, he was audacious enough
to advise, nay almost, one may say, to enjoin the
immediate withdrawal of one man, the immediate
raising up of the other; for he telegraphed thus to
the Minister of War: 16th May, 10 A.M.-Accept
' without hesitation the resignation of General Can-
robert. He is very much fatigued. Answer by
telegraph. General Pélissier is ready to take the
'command.' +
In reply to Canrobert's letter of resignation, the
* Rousset, vol. ii.
+ Ibid.
292
CANROBERT'S REASONS
XI.
Canro-
bert's
command
given up
CHAP. Minister of War telegraphed :-The Emperor accepts
your resignation. He regrets that your health is
affected. He felicitates you on the sentiment which
'makes you ask leave to remain with the army.
You will command in it—not a division merely
but-General Pélissier's Corps. Give up the com-
mand to that general.'*
and trans-
ferred to
Pélissier.
Assigned
causes of
'
6
General Canrobert accordingly handed over the
command of the army to General Pélissier. Per-
sisting in his wish to have only the lesser command
for which he had asked, he was placed at the head
of his old force, that is, the 1st Division.
In a letter to his Emperor General Canrobert
Canro- pointed out several troubles as those which had
signation. caused him to give up the command, and he stated
them to be these:-
bert's re-
1. The slight relative effect produced on Sebasto-
pol by the excellent batteries of the Allies.
2. The disappointment of the hopes he had enter-
tained of being attacked by the enemy on the re-
opening of the bombardment. (3)
3. The arduous difficulties encountered in prepar-
ing the execution of the Emperor's plan—an execu-
tion rendered nearly impossible (according to his
account) by the non-co-operation of the English
commander.
4. The very false position in which he had been
placed with the English by his sudden recall of the
Kertch Expedition.
5. The exceptionally great fatigues moral and
* Rousset, vol. ii.
FOR GIVING UP THE COMMAND.
293
XI.
physical which he had never for an instant ceased CHA P.
to be undergoing for the last nine months.*
With respect to the first of the reasons adduced,
we have seen that General Canrobert was in error;
for over and over again the French and English
batteries brought to ruin the works they assailed.†
With respect to the second of the reasons, we saw
much of the cruel anxiety suffered by General Can-
robert from an opposite cause—that is, from the not
irrational and not therefore unwarlike dread of being
brought to battle in an execrable position. He
afterwards, as we have seen, represented himself
to be longing for another Inkerman, but on what
grounds I do not know.
With respect to the third of the reasons, we have
seen that a main foundation of the Emperor's plan
was his proposal to obtain the services of Lord
Raglan and his army in the field by causing Can-
robert to relieve him and them from all their siege
duties, and that is exactly what Canrobert-in dis-
obedience for once to his Emperor-peremptorily
refused to do. §
To the untoward circumstances which constituted
the fourth of Canrobert's reasons Lord Raglan at-
tached great weight. 'It is evident,' he writes,
· that General Canrobert has felt very uneasy since
4
6
6
he recalled Admiral Bruat from the Kertch Expe-
dition, and that he has been very much weighed
* To the Emperor, 19th May 1855. Quoted, Rousset, ii. p. 180.
+ See ante, the last fifteen pages of chap. vi.
See ante, chap. iv.
§ See ante, p. 285.
294
MERIT OF CANROBERT'S ACT.
CHAP. down by the anxiety this has occasioned him, and
XI.
The merit
of Canro-
bert's self-
sacrifice;
The lesson
apparently
taught
him by
6
that he is not sorry to be relieved from a respon-
sibility which had almost overpowered him.'*
Whilst agreeing that the remembrance of his seces-
sion from the Kertch Expedition was a burthen on
Canrobert's mind, one may also give weight to the
twelve first words of his third reason, and withal to
the now felt ascendancy of General Pélissier.
The letter of the 5th of May had dominion, and in
every line seemed to show that the writer—not the
recipient was the man who plainly ought to com-
mand. It is under this aspect that General Canro-
bert's surrender of the command to Pélissier seems
loyal, patriotic, and wise. For the honour of the
French army, it was necessary to shelter it from the
dictation of an incompetent sovereign undertaking
to wield it from Paris. To give it the shelter thus
needed, and to confront a powerful enemy with the
resources of his very own mind-a steadfast mind
apt for war business-Pélissier was abundantly able;
and, General Canrobert not having the gifts or the
stern independence required, it followed of course
that the change must be one of the most wholesome
kind; but not the less was there merit in the resign-
ing commander who forbade thoughts of 'self' to
prevent him from achieving a great public good.
Under the discipline of Pélissier's letter General
Canrobert must at last have discovered that what he
Pélissier's had mistaken for an honourable, loyal obedience to
letter.
* Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, May 19, 1855.
+ See last letter of Pélissier's, ante, p. 279.
SPIRIT OF THE FRENCH ARMY.
295
XI.
the will of his sovereign was a noxious and un- CHAP.
patriotic subserviency which brought discredit on
France, and endangered the repute of her army.
He knew that what successful revolutionists are
always the first to call 'law' had directed him to
obey the mere Emperor as distinguished from the
Emperor's Government, and apparently knew nothing
at all of that greater though unwritten law which
commanded him to do no such thing. It was reserved
for his successor to show how the commander of
a French army should comport himself when put
under stress of the meddling persistently attempted
against him by a man such as Louis Napoleon.
the French
wards Can-
By his well-tried personal bravery, by his zeal, Feeling of
by his fervour and many good, warlike qualities he army to-
had won the esteem of his army; and this blessing robert.
had not been torn from him at the time of his resig-
nation by any untoward disclosures. Unaware of
his having concurred in that machination which had
long kept the siege of Sebastopol in a state of semi-
abeyance, they never, it seems, marked him out as
the object of camp discontents, and were thoroughly
in the mood to admire him when hearing of his
honest resolve to exchange high and tempting com-
mand for simply a combatant's place.
The 'mo-
'rale' of
the French
When Canrobert declared that upon resigning the
command of his army, he left it in a state of high
warlike ardour and confidence, he made an assertion der Can-
which, although not inaccurate, might, if taken
army un-
robert.
296
SPIRIT OF THE FRENCH ARMY.
CHAP. alone, prove deceptive, and lead to a notion that
XI.
the prank of turning an army into an army in
waiting' can be played with impunity.
The actual truth is that towards the end of March,
the baneful mission' of Niel had produced its
natural effect on the French troops; and, although
Lord Raglan himself had wisely refrained from
writing on so tender a subject, our Home Govern-
ment drawing its knowledge from other sources,
became very deeply concerned at what it believed
to be the fallen spirit of Canrobert's army. Bas-
ing himself upon what were then his latest accounts
on this subject, our War Minister thus wrote to Lord
Raglan: I think you may be quite sure now of the
Emperor's advent to the Crimea. He professes
that it is his desire to place the fullest confidence
in you, and to consult you as to all his plans. I
fear he will have great difficulty in restoring the
morale of his troops which, from all . . tells
me, is greatly shaken not only in the eyes of the
English soldiers, but in the estimation of the French
' officers themselves. This is altogether a very pain-
ful state of things, and gives me great anxiety as to
'the result of our present operations.*
6
<
C
:
Down to even the middle of April, the spirit
of the French army was in such a condition that
Rousset describes it thus: The Russians were sur-
prised and joyful, the English disgusted, the French,
6
•
to say the least, astonished.
One could no longer
'make out anything about the conduct of this siege,
* Lord Panmure to Lord Raglan, Private Letter, 16th April 1855.
OPINIONS ON CANROBERT.
297
6
of these demonstrations of force ending always in CHAP.
XI.
C
6
the contrary, and men returned sadly into the
labyrinth of the trenches as though destined never
6
6
to leave it. There was not discouragement but
'—a fatalist's sort of resignation to orders and
'counter-orders alike. The very Turks of Omar
'Pasha did not render a more dismal obedience.'*
Soon, the vigour of Pélissier exerted itself so
superbly against the wishes of Canrobert that the
spirit of the French army was restored-was raised
to a high pitch of warlike ardour on the 22d of
April, and to a victorious sense of its power on the
1st of May when Pélissier, overcoming the resistance
of his then Chief, attacked, and carried, and con-
quered the Sousdal Counter-guard. It was there-
fore in spite of Canrobert, and by the happily over-
dominant energy of his irrepressible subordinate that
the French army proudly emerging from out of that
state of depression to which the 'mission' had
lowered it, stood ready and eager for action.
of Can-
expressed
The men in authority were swift, I observe, to Opinions
appreciate the sacrifice implied in General Canrobert's robert
resignation; yet, even whilst expressing this senti- by men in
ment, they did not conceal their desire to see the authority.
French army commanded by a more determined
Chief.
6
6
General Canrobert,' wrote Marshal Vaillant,
is a noble heart.' . . . I hope we are now going
to advance more resolutely." +
* Rousset, ii. p. 145. What gives value to this statement is that
the writer spoke with knowledge of all the most secret papers in the
French War Office.
+ To Niel. Quoted, Rousset, ii. p. 177.
298
OPINIONS OF CANROBERT EXPRESSED
СНАР.
XI.
Lord Panmure, after speaking of Canrobert's
' vacillation and indecision of character,' writes: 'I
am not sorry that he no longer fills a position to
6
C
the responsibility of which he appears to have been
quite unequal. Possessing in the most eminent
degree all the qualities of courage and zeal which
'constitute the brave soldier he did not possess
'those comprehensive views, nor that moral courage
in Council which mark a sagacious and resolute
'general.' *
'
General Niel was not silent. Referring to the
extraordinary letter in which he had reproved the
Minister of War for not giving better instructions to
Canrobert,† he now wrote to Marshal Vaillant: 'I
quite understand, Monsieur le Maréchal, that it
'must have seemed to you extraordinary that I
should have addressed complaints to you of the
'silence which you observed towards the General-in-
'Chief on questions which were ceaselessly occupying
'him. Now, you have the explanation. He was bend-
ing under the burthen; and you will see that I
'must have gone through much embarrassment before
determining to speak and act as I did.' Then,
strange as it seems, General Niel proceeds to explain
how it was that he had not before advised the re-
moval of Canrobert!— Certainly, I do not hesitate,
'where I see my line of duty clearly marked out; but
in this case, I have long been in doubt as to that
singular nature [the nature of Canrobert] which
6
C
6
* Despatch to Lord Raglan, 21st May 1855.
+ See ante, p. 221.
BY MEN IN AUTHORITY.
299
.
6
6
'has so exactly the appearance of decision when a CHAP.
' resolution is to be taken a long time beforehand,
and which always draws back when the moment
for execution has come. He is a very worthy
man.’*
Long afterwards, Marshal Pélissier (then Duke of
Malakoff and Ambassador at the Court of St James's)
tried kindly, one day, to impart to me his estimate
of the commander to whom he had succeeded in the
Crimea, but did this on a plan so dramatic-he set
up a kind of 'lay figure' to represent General
Canrobert! that I cannot here trust myself to
attempt a reproduction of the fervid, energetic per-
formance by which he showed the immensity of the
difference established by nature between his prede-
cessor and himself.
Lord Raglan had perhaps been more troubled by
the failings of Canrobert than any other man living,
but he penned no severe, unkind word on the qualities
of the retiring Commander.
XI.
recent dis-
on Can-
The disclosures of a more recent time tend to Effect of
lighten or rather divert the weight of blame thrown closures
upon Canrobert by showing him to have lost his robert's
free-will since the first days of February, when Niel reputation.
put him under the generalship of Louis Napoleon ;
and, although it be true that the attempt of this
fanciful sovereign to govern from Paris the fight
going on in Crim - Tartary was an abuse of mon-
* Niel to the Minister of War, May 18, 1855. Rousset, ii. 177 et seq.
300
OPINIONS OF CANROBERT.
XI.
CHAP. archical power which Canrobert ought to have
checked, just men, before wording their censure,
will at least try to gauge the predicament of a 'hap-
less commander who could only have shielded his
army from imperial dictation by breaking or evad-
ing the law.
1
DIPLOMACY MEANWHILE ALERT.
301
CHAPTER XII.
THE RELATIONS OF AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA WITH THE BELLI-
GERENTS. THE PEACE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RUSSIA.
THE AUSTRIAN PROPOSALS.-THEIR ULTIMATE REJECTION
ENTAILING A CHANGE OF AUSTRIA'S POLICY.
I.
XII.
NONE must think that, because the war raged, CHAP.
Diplomacy had been all this while idle; but, to
know the condition of things which the Conference
of Vienna encountered in the spring of 1855, one
needs must recur for a moment to rather an earlier
time.
The union
and Prus-
of Austria
sia with
ern Pow-
ers.
When, as long since we saw, France and England
at last declared war against Russia in the spring of
1854, both Austria and Prussia united themselves the West-
with the Western Powers-not indeed by engaging
at once to take part in the physical strife, but-by
preparing for the eventuality of having to take the
field, by making together the treaty devised with
that object, and withal by declaring in Conference
that the delivery of the summons by which France
and England had brought themselves into a state of
302
THE RELATIONS OF AUSTRIA AND PRUSSIA
CHAP. war with Russia was a step supported by Austria
and Prussia as being founded in right.'*
XII.
Its anoma-
lous char-
acter.
6
It was anomalous of course that four Powers
should be allied for allied they were-against
Russia, when two of them only as yet had come to
be at war with the Czar, the other two simply an-
nouncing that they 'supported,' and approved the
course taken by their more adventurous friends.
One can hardly deny that the part thus played
before Europe by the two applauding States had an
aspect in some degree comic; for, though both of
them owned mighty armies, and though both were
more closely aggrieved by the lawless act of the
Czar than either of the Western Powers, they,
whilst not themselves taking up arms, declared in-
stead with solemnity-as though they were Grotius
and Puffendorf-that the conflict undertaken by
others, that is, by England and France, was what
teachers call a just war.'
Still, in favour of this quaint proceeding there
really existed some reasons which obtained and de-
served no small weight; for statesmen perceived that
by dispensing at least for a while-with the armed
intervention of Austria and Prussia they might narrow
the area of the war, thus postponing, or even indeed
altogether averting that evil which the phrase of the
time used to indicate as a general conflagration in
Europe;' whilst moreover there was room to be-
lieve that the Turks, and the two Western Powers,
* Protocol of the 9th of April 1854. Treaty of 20th April 1854
between Austria and Prussia. See ante, vol. i. cap. xxv., and the
Papers in the Appendix to that volume.
WITH THE WESTERN POWERS.
303
XII.
for the first
with, to aid them, the merely potential, the merely CHAP.
half-drawn sword of Austria, could effectually expel
the Czar's army from those Danubian provinces.
which he had seized as his 'material guarantee.'
And accordingly, in spite of the plan which dis- Its efficacy
pensed the two more aggrieved Powers from any proposed.
immediate need to be taking up arms, the alliance of
the four quickly proved that, so far as concerned
the repression of that particular outrage which had
brought on the war, these States could enforce their
will against Russia in a high-handed, summary way.
Secured against the contingency of any Russian
attack by the attitude of her Western allies, Austria
had been able to approach the once haughty Nicholas
with commanding and peremptory words.
By mere summons, without the necessity of hav-
ing to strike a blow, she had soon forced the Czar to
abandon his hold of the principalities, and to recross
the Pruth; but also by convention with the Sultan
she had been peaceably enabled to occupy the de-
livered provinces with her own troops, thus establish-
ing-at least for the time-her authority on that
Lower Danube which was precious as an outlet for
not only her own dominions, but also those of all
Germany. This, not only for Austria herself but
also for Germany, and therefore also for Prussia
(which could not but heed German interests) was
a happy result--so happy, indeed, that, if Austria
along with Prussia and Germany had obtained it as
the fruit of a war victoriously waged against Russia,
the achievement securing so full a measure of justice
might well have been treated as 'glorious.' Yet,
object
304
STRAIN ON THE LOYALTY
CHAP. without themselves going to war, Austria and Prus-
XII. sia had been enabled to attain these advantages,
because the Western Powers (but more especially
France) had been, all the while, standing ready to
come to their aid in resisting any measures of
vengeance attempted against them by Russia.
Tendency
of this too
speedy
success.
The dan-
ger in-
creased
by another
cause.
The too speedy good fortune, however, thus won-
drously blessing the German-that is, the non-com-
batant powers
had a tendency to weaken their
union with England and France; for, since Austria
and Prussia had already obtained what they sought,
their new friendships in the West might grow cool.
They were plighted auxiliaries who had received
their great prize in advance, before being called
into action; and, unless stayed by feelings of honour,
might be tempted perhaps to desert.
Moreover, France and England soon showed that
against the aggressor they meant to be aggressive
themselves, and that their chosen plans of campaign
would withdraw no small part of their forces to
countries and seas far away, thus materially reduc-
ing their power to support German States in resist-
ance to any invasion by Russia. It resulted that,
after a while, the two great Powers of Germany
which, though not themselves taking up arms, had
still solemnly blessed the good cause of the Western
belligerents, were less and less under motives for
going to war with the Czar, and also less and less
sure that, if once committed against him, they would
have all the help they might need from their French
and their English allies.
OF THE TWO GERMAN POWERS.
305
XII.
tion of
Under stress of the reasons thus tending to make CHAP.
them hang back, the two German Powers were put
to the proof of their loyalty, and one of them soon
fell away.
Prussia-destined in later years to become a great, The defec-
conquering Power, and the basis of a new, mighty Prussia.
empire was then under the rule of a king-they
called him Frederick William-who, although not
endowed with the qualities for any such task, still
kept in his very own hands the whole conduct of
foreign affairs. His policy, if so one may call it,
appeared to be in no degree shaped by any sense
that he had of the duty attaching on Prussia as
one of the five great Powers, and what he seemed to
take for a guide was the mere composition of forces
brought to bear on his mind by many and conflicting
fears. Amongst these of course might be reckoned
-for think of the ruin that followed on Jena and
Auerstadt!—his lively fear of the French, with also
his fear that, if tamely enduring the Czar's occupa-
tion of the Danubian Principalities, he would find
himself deserted by Germany, and accordingly, as
we have seen, he allied himself to the Western
Powers and to Austria by the Protocol of the 9th,
and the Treaty of the 20th of April.
But when he saw France and England engaging
their strength in the East far away from Berlin,
those tremulous scales that he used for weighing
fears against fears began to show a great change;
for the separated armies of France were of course
for the moment less terrible to him as enemies than
VOL. VII.
U
306
THE DEFECTION OF PRUSSIA.
CHAP. when held together, and besides, as befrienders,
XII. less able to help him against the contingency of
his being attacked by Russia; so that, visibly,
his dread of the French now became on the whole
less oppressive than his awe of the Czar; whilst
also his fear that Germany would turn against
him for acquiescing in a Russian occupation of the
principalities came soon to an end; because their
of Nicholas
approaching deliverance from the grasp
was then already in process of being secured by the
valour of the Turks, and by the energy of Austria,
co-operating with the two Western Powers.
No dread of the evils that come with the lower-
ing of a Nation's repute appeared to find any place in
the Royal collection of fears; and, if the king for a
moment felt qualms at the idea of deserting those
more warlike States which had virtually wrought
the deliverance, he very soon stifled his conscience.
Before the last week of July, Frederick William
began to hang back, and then by fast degrees lapsed
away into undissembled neutrality. His defection
of course made it perilous for Austria to fulfil her
engagements, laid Germany everywhere open to
Russian diplomatists, made it even a clear, tempt-
ing field for all their decomposing exploits, and
soon broke up the Confederacy into Statelets so
feebly united that, whilst some of them were con-
senting, there were others refusing to 'mobilise '
*
* See ante, vol. i. pp. 444, 445 of the fifth edition, and the footnotes
in the same pages. Prussia's first overt act of retrogression was a re-
fusal to attend the Conference of the 22d of July, that had been
summoned for giving effect to the Protocol of the 9th of April.
THE LOYALTY OF AUSTRIA.
307
XII.
their respective armies, and one at least, if not CHAP.
more, that ingeniously found for its troops a happy
medium state between being, and not being sum-
moned to gather in arms-between standing up and
sitting still.*
The harm Prussia did to her late-now aban-
doned allies, by laying Germany open to Nessel-
rode's emissaries, was of a serious kind; † for, in its
then absurd state of multiplied sovereignties, the
country offered intriguers a rich field of action; and
the once famous Russian diplomatists had not yet
been superseded, or robbed of their well-tried power
by marplots ranting at Moscow.
Prince Bismarck, it seems, in referring to the
origin and course of this war, has denied that his
country was bound to take a part against Russia; and
no one, of course, should say lightly that the great
statesman erred; but, to weigh his contention with
any advantage, it is essential to know, step by step,
the policy he would have chosen for Prussia from
the time when Austria, Prussia, and Germany being
all of them treated as nullities, Moldavia and Wal-
lachia were defiantly seized by the Czar.
The statesmen of Austria-in that respect like our
diplomatists have long been accustomed to govern
their public acts by the dictates of personal honour;
and, her honest, young Emperor clinging fast under
difficult trials to sound patriotic designs, she at
this anxious time was well steered through the num-
* Called 'Kriegbereitschaft.'
† See the Official Diplomatic Study.
The loyal
course
taken by
Austria.
308
COUNT BUOL.
XII.
CHAP. berless troubles besetting her by a Minister of com-
manding ability and invincible firmness. Against
all the contrivances of Russia and her industrious
emissaries, against the hysteric urgency of the Prus-
sian king, against the ceaseless embarrassment of
acting under an Emperor whose feelings, although he
controlled them, still painfully clashed with his duties,
against a formidable proportion-including perhaps
the most powerful-of all his fellow-subjects, and
finally in the opposite quarter against France and
England when striving to draw him too far in the
direction of their special desires, Count de Buol held
his course with a steadiness, temper, and skill that
never seemingly failed him throughout the long,
perilous struggle.
Kept by this master-hand in the path of honour
and prudence approved by her loyal Emperor,
Austria did not forget the advantages with all the
consequent duties that had accrued from her union
with the Western Powers. Far from imitating
the defection of Prussia, she armed at great cost
for a war, and—though slowly-drew nearer and
nearer to her Western Allies. Having previously
declared, as we saw, her full, unreserved approval
of the warlike course they were taking, she, in Au-
gust, went on to record her concurrence in those
four stated demands which, as France and England
announced, they would peremptorily force on the
Czar.*
* Protocol of the 8th of August 1854. The purport of the Four
Conditions will be shown post, p. 317 et seq.
ན
THE CZAR NICHOLAS SEEKING PEACE.
309
СНАР.
XII.
II.
Step taken
which
by Austria
made a
of her
By way of warning to Russia, and therefore in the
interest of peace, the Austrian Cabinet imparted to
that of St Petersburg the Protocol of the 8th of August beginning
with its statement of the Four Demands, and so not mediation.
only made a beginning of that exceptional kind of
mediation between the belligerents which she after-
wards pursued, but also laid the foundation of what
became after a while the 'Conferences held at Vienna
for putting an end to the war.'
Course
taken at
first by
the Czar
wards.
The Czar at first did not deign to heed the warn-
ing from Austria, nor to act in any way on her state-
ment of the Four Conditions which his adversaries Nicholas;
meant to impose; and seeing this she drew nearer
to the Western Powers. She negotiated with them and after-
a Treaty, engaging for herself that, if peace upon the
basis of the Four Conditions should not be assured
before the end of the year, she, in concert with Eng-
land and France, would go on to devise measures
fitted for attaining the objects of the alliance.
But since August, the months had been passing;
and meanwhile, the once haughty Czar had listened
with so much attention to the arguments adduced
on the Alma, and afterwards repeated at Inkerman,
that in a communication to the Austrian Govern-
ment on the 28th of November, he all at once an-
nounced his acceptance of the Four Conditions'
as a starting-point on which to negotiate for putting
an end to the war. He thus in effect sued for peace,
His ac-
ceptance
of the
Four Con-
ditions.
310
ARRANGEMENTS FOR A CONFERENCE
CHAP. and even undertook to accept it on the basis imposed.
by his enemies.
XII.
Treaty of
the 2d of
1854.
This step on the part of the Czar did not hinder
December the Austrian Government from proceeding with the
Treaty we saw them negotiate. It was ratified by
the contracting Powers, and bears date the 2d of
December 1854.*
Prelimi-
nary nego-
tiations
for the
Confer-
ence.
Prince Alexander Gortchakoff was sent by Russia
to the Austrian Court as Minister Plenipotentiary;
and in the last month of the year, France and Eng-
land instructed their representatives at Vienna to
confer with the prince on the subject of the basis
proposed for peace negotiations. An informal meet-
ing between Gortchakoff and the representatives of
the three allied Powers took place on the 16th of
December. The Allies, however, declared that they
must be explicit in showing the interpretation they
put upon the Four Points as drafted in the Protocol
of the 8th of August, and—substantially-insisted
that the conditions as there stated must be recast in
the way they proposed. Accordingly in a Memoran-
dum of the 28th of December 1854, communicated
to Prince Gortchakoff by the Plenipotentiaries of
Austria, France, and Great Britain, the Allies newly
formulated their Four Conditions; but reserved to
themselves a power to insist upon any other con-
ditions that might afterwards seem to be required
by the general interests of Europe.
It must be owned that this peremptory demand
* When yielding on the 28th of November, the Czar had probably
learnt that the Treaty of the 2d of December was impending.
EXCLUDING PRUSSIA.
311
XII.
on the part of the Allies was exasperating, if not un- CHAP.
fair, and the Russian negotiators appealed for guid-
ance to St Petersburg; but whether really craving
for peace, or for some other reason determined to let
the Conference meet-the Czar at once fully acceded
to the new formulation required by the Allies, and
Prince Gortchakoff announced the decision at a
meeting held for the purpose on the 7th of January
1855.
Great efforts were made by Russia and the small
German States to obtain the admission of Prussia to
the now approaching Conferences; but the Allies
would only consent to these prayers upon condition
that Prussia should engage to take part in the war
if the negotiations for peace should fail.
6
of Prussia
Confer-
The king would give no such pledge; and accord- Exclusion
ingly, to the horror and indignation of his relatives, from the
and of numbers whose interests were closely bound up ences.
with his monarchy, he remained excluded from the
Conferences.* His realm ceased in effect for the
time to be one of the five Great Powers' not
because it had lost any part of its physical strength,
but rather owing to failings which brought its king
into discredit. So low indeed had he fallen or
seemed to fall that there was even a question of
calling upon him to agree that as a pledge for his
future conduct he should suffer one of his fortresses
* For the diatribes levelled against him by his friends and connec-
tions at this cruel time, see Sir Theodore Martin's Life of Prince
Albert.' There virtually sat on the king what the French call a
‘conseil de famille,' and the tribunal, it seems, was not merciful.
312
BEARING OF CZAR'S DEATH ON THE PROSPECT.
CHAP. to be occupied by Austria, another by France, and
another again by England.*
XII.
Question
as to the
effect of
Nicholas's
death on
the pros-
pects of
peace.
When Nicholas died, many thought that the pass-
ing away of a sovereign who had personally brought
on the war would be likely to accelerate its end;
but some of those who had means of forming a judg-
ment believed that the late Czar-well schooled by
adversity—had not only resolved to make peace, if
attainable on terms not derogatory to his sense of
honour, but also-thanks to his habit of long-sus-
tained absolute rule and to the dominating strength
of his character-would have been perfectly able to
enforce his will on all Russia against what might be
the desire of many of his more warlike subjects; and
again, as already we have seen, there was room for
believing that the task thus regarded as feasible
when undertaken by Nicholas, might be one beyond
the strength of his son. Madame Lieven for in-
stance pronounced that Alexander could not open
his reign with an act of surrender or, as she fiercely
worded it, cowardice.
The new Czar began his State utterances by
making two public statements which violently clashed
with each other. In a high-flying, loud manifesto
he told his people that he was going in the glorious
steps of Peter and Catherine. In another and
* England was to be asked to occupy Dantsic. Our Government
instantly rejected the suggestion; but it was one submitted for con-
sideration on very high authority.
OPENING OF THE CONFERENCE.
313
XII.
quite sober statement, meant rather for non-Russian CHA P.
Europe, he through his Minister Nesselrode remind-
ed mankind that his father had begun to negotiate
for peace upon a basis then already accepted, and
announced that he himself too would march in the
path thus laid open before him.
III.
Negotia-
tions at
Vienna.
Pursuant to this declaration and to the concur- The Peace
ring assent of France, England, Turkey, and Austria,
a formal Conference was opened at Vienna on the
15th of March, under the presidency of Count Buol,
the Austrian Minister of Foreign Affairs, and at its
first meeting, there were present for Austria, Count
de Buol and Baron Prokesch; for France, Baron
Bourqueny; for England, Lord John Russell and
Lord Westmoreland; for Russia, Prince Alexander
Gortchakoff and M. Titoff; for Turkey, Aarif Effendi.
The Conference was afterwards joined by, for
France, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, her Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and for Turkey, by Aali Pasha, the
Reis Effendi.
Of Count Buol I already have spoken.
Russell.
As conceived at the time when Lord Clarendon Lord John
gave him his instructions on the 22d of February,
the mission entrusted to Lord John Russell-an
illustrious name in England was a charge of
vast scope; * for along with the task of negoti-
* He did not at that time hold office. It was during the course of
his mission that Lord John became Secretary of State for the Colonies.
314
THE MISSION OF
XII.
CHAP. ating a peace, he, to meet the event of its proving
that the war must go on, was to endeavour to
strengthen the existing armed league against Russia
by obtaining further accessions, and to concur in
providing for what, as confidentially indicated, was
made to seem nothing less than a fearless resettle-
ment of Europe, thus ostensibly lending the sanction
of our own Foreign Office to the dreams of Louis.
Napoleon.
Lord John first went to Paris without, it seems,
gathering there any aid towards the objects in view.
On reaching Berlin, he learnt that a bye-negotiation
for a treaty between France and Prussia was then
in progress; and, although nothing treacherous was
intended by either State against England, the cir-
cumstance seems to show that both she and her
French ally were wasting their strength in cross
purposes.
The personal reception accorded to their illustrious
guest by the king and his Government was most cor-
dial; but Lord John soon perceived that at Berlin
there were none of the ingredients needed for forming
a league. Concurrently with a professed willingness
on the part of the king to concede the supremacy of
Germany to Austria, the feeling against her of both
the sovereign and his minister appeared to be one of
bitter and deep animosity. The king wished, Lord
John saw, to avoid a war with either Russia or the
Allies, and was so anxious to abstain from acts tend-
ing to commit him to the Western Powers, that,
although resenting his exclusion from the Conference,
LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
315
XII.
he would not purchase his readmission by engaging CHAP.
himself to any definite course of action. The king
declared that admission to the Conference was hist
right, and that those who had excluded him would
repent of it. The king said he was not the adherent
but the friend of the Czar, and that as his friend'
he had frequently given him unpalatable advice.
He said he believed in the bottom of his heart that
the Czar sincerely desired peace, and would make
any sacrifice for it compatible with the dignity of his
On the whole, Lord John Russell thus wrote
of the Prussian king - While pursuing a policy to
'the last degree selfish, he gives himself the air of
6
C
crown.
an injured prince, and assumes for his State a
position ambiguous rather than dignified. His
object evidently is to restrain Austria from acting
' on behalf of the Allies, and perhaps to induce the
Western Powers to accede to such terms of
peace
as may be compatible with the interests of Russia."
The manful Prince of Prussia (now Emperor of the
great united Germany) was strongly opposed to the
adopted policy, and tersely expressed his opinion of
its banefulness by saying that, if Prussia were to
join the Allies, there would be peace in a fortnight;
but the fainter heart, and the weaker mind of the
king remained in the state we have seen.
Under conditions thus adverse, Lord John did not
choose to present his credentials at the Prussian
Court; and bidding farewell to the prospect of a
general League, soon went from Berlin to Vienna.*
* Lord John Russell to Lord Clarendon, March 1, 1855.
316
PRINCE A. GORTCHAKOFF.
СНАР.
XII.
His task was thenceforth only twofold, that is,
to negotiate for England in the approaching Con-
ference, and meanwhile, if he could, to bring Austria
into the war.
Prince
Alexander
Gortcha-
koff.
On Prince Alexander Gortchakoff as extant in the
Conferences of 1855 one can hardly cast even a
glance without more or less using the light which
he many years afterwards threw on his own much
exhibited character; and since it therefore seems
necessary to make the allusion, one perhaps ought
to add that despite what he had counselled and done,
the man always remained in high favour with his
sovereign and his country, thus acquiring some right
to protest that, except for being the foremost in a
public declaration of ill faith, he was not more dis-
honoured than the Czar, nor more dishonest than
Russia.
Committed in 1870, his offence does not fall
within the range of this narrative.
It is with the negotiations of 1855 that I have to
deal; and in those, so far as I see, the prince was
not guilty of acting with falseness or undue craft;
and his faults, as displayed in the Conference, were
not even cognate to deceptiveness, being rather what
seemed want of skill, want of mental resource, want
of power to persuade or conciliate, want of even the
much-needed power to keep his temper under con-
trol. A main part of his duty, of course, was to
draw Austria towards the Czar, and detach her from
DEBATES IN THE CONFERENCE.
317
XII.
the Western States; yet the process of exchanging CHAP.
ideas with an Austrian negotiator was the very one
that more than all others provoked his ill-humour.
His subsequent career seems to prove that he
needs must have had more capacity than he showed
in the Conference-room.
uyn de
M. Drouyn de Lhuys was a man of ability and M. Dro-
very high personal character. Before traversing the Lhuys.
Continent on his way to Vienna he had gone to
London, and there exchanged ideas with our Govern-
ment. From the first he proved anxious to frame
such conditions as might either lead to a peace or
bring Austria into the war.
in the
ence.
Count Buol ably opened the Conference by a brief, Debates
compact speech well designed for its object, and in Confer-
words approved by all present, set forth the Four
Conditions imposed by the Allies, and (in principle)
accepted by Russia :-
6
1. The Protectorate exercised by Russia over
Moldavia and Wallachia shall cease, and the privi-
leges conferred by the Sultans on these Principali-
'ties, as well as on Servia, shall henceforward be
placed under the collective guarantee of the Con-
tracting Powers.
6
6
6
C
2. The freedom of the navigation of the Danube
shall be completely secured by effectual means,
and under the control of a permanent syndical
authority.
318
THE MAIN QUESTION
CHAP.
XII.
6
3. The Treaty of July 13, 1841, shall be revised,
with the double object of connecting more com-
pletely the existence of the Ottoman Empire with
the European equilibrium, and of putting an end
'to the preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea.
.
4. Russia abandons the principle of covering
' with an official Protectorate the Christian subjects
' of the Sultan of the Oriental ritual; but the Chris-
'tian Powers will lend each other their mutual
assistance, in order to obtain from the initiative
' of the Ottoman Government the confirmation and
'the observance of the religious rights of the Chris-
tian communities subject to the Porte, without
distinction of ritual.
6
'
The development of these principles will form the
object of our negotiations.'*
*
After a labour of several days, means of giving
effect to both the First and the Second Conditions
were agreed to by all the plenipotentiaries, and there
seemed to be a fair prospect of their proving able to
deal no less happily with the Fourth Condition (if
ever, indeed, they should reach it), whilst also they
were able to come to terms upon the first part of even
the Third Condition; but its latter words plainly
ordained that means should be found for 'putting
an end to the preponderance of Russia in the
Black Sea;' and this was the matter that prom-
ised to be the subject of lasting contention. By
6
?
* Eastern Papers, xiii. I have preferred Count Buol's concise
statement of the Four Points to the more wordy exposition furnished
by the Memorandum of the 28th of December.
AT ISSUE.
319
XII.
accepting the Four Points, Russia had committed CHAP.
herself to the principle of submitting to be deprived
by some means or other of her preponderance in the
Black Sea. What, however, those means should be
had not been determined, and was the question to
be taken in hand.
The Allies with a thoughtful regard for the feel-
ings of Russia proposed that she herself should
suggest the means of reducing her naval 'preponder-
'ance' in the Black Sea; but Prince Gortchakoff
suspected a snare; and (after a reference to St Peters-
burg) she declined to take any such step.
6
There of course are two ways in which prepon-
derance' can be terminated-by either taking
weight from the heavier scale, or adding weight to
the lighter one. The Allies proposed that the object
should be attained by either entirely neutralising
the Black Sea that is, ridding it of all ships of
war, except a few mere Police vessels or else
limiting the number of war-ships that Russia should
there keep afloat. On the other hand, Russia
objected with great energy to both those plans, and
then no longer refusing to make suggestions her-
self-she offered some plans based on counterpoise'
-one for instance proposing to open the Darda-
nelles and the Bosphorus to all nations; * another
enabling the Sultan to open the Straits whenever
he might find himself menaced, and to reverse the
* Annexes A and B to 12th Protocol. This plan was inadmissible;
and, amongst other reasons, because it was wholly inconsistent with
the Sultan's ancient and most cherished rights.
320
THE MAIN QUESTION AT ISSUE.
XII.
CHAP. preponderance' complained of by calling up to
support him the ships of any allies who might
choose to answer his prayer.
The Allies not accepting any plan of that kind,
their difference with the Czar became sharply pro-
nounced. Limitation or no Limitation of his Black
Sea fleet was seen to be the question in hand.
Baron Bourqueny showed very ably that the plan
of Limitation was only, after all, one providing that
a fleet maintained on a closed inland sea should be
on a peace footing.
Prince Gortchakoff of course, if so minded, might
have declared the resolve of his Court with a digni-
fied sparseness of words, and need not have sought
to uphold it by any assignment of reasons; but-
somewhat rashly-he urged (as if he were talking at
Moscow) that to engage to limit the strength of the
Russian fleet in the Euxine would be submitting to
an infringement of the Czar's 'sovereign rights,' and
thus subjected himself to the answer relentlessly
inflicted upon him by M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who
took care to remind the negotiator that that very
Sea on which he claimed 'sovereign rights' had as
matter of fact been swept clear of the Russian flag,
and brought under the full control of Powers at war
with the Czar.† M. Drouyn de Lhuys might have
added that, even when Russia was at peace with the
Western Powers (though subject indeed to their
anger) they had forbidden her the use of those very
'sovereign rights,' had ordered her war-ships into
* Annex to 13th Protocol.
+ Eastern Papers, xiii. p. 58.
CONTINUING DEBATES.
321
XII.
port, had taken good care to see the order obeyed, CHA P.
and had done all these things without provoking her
Czar a man not thought much wanting in pride-
to meet their repressive authority with any Declara-
tion of War.*
Lord John Russell gave point to his French col-
league's argument by alluding to the future, and
saying that the resistance of Russia on the question
of Limitation would be obliging England and France
to find the guarantees they required in a continued
occupation of the Black Sea and the Baltic.t
To oppose that Russian contention which ascribed
a kind of dishonour to the surrender of any sove-
reign rights,' Lord John Russell referred more than
once to the lessons of History, submitting for in-
stance that Louis Quatorze had consented to the
demolition of Dunquerque without its having been
thought that in making the sacrifice for the sake of
peace he descended from high estate; but Prince
Gortchakoff was ready, this time, with an adequate
reply. He acknowledged that a sovereign might be
driven to such a concession after meeting an un-
broken series of military disasters, but denied, as
he had a full right to do, that Russia at the time
of the Conference had been brought into any such
* So that the Czar if asserting in conference what his people called
'sovereign rights,' must have owned, when pressed to be accurate, that
he referred to his former possessions. He could neither have appealed
to the principle of the 'uti possidetis,' nor to that of the status quo ante
bellum. Neither at the time of the Conference, nor in the winter pre-
ceding the declaration of war, was he master of the Black Sea.
+ Eastern Papers, xiii. p. 67.
VOL. VII.
X
322
THE BEARING OF THE WAR
XII.
CHAP. plight.
plight. She had been vanquished in each of the
battles; but her great Engineer had done much
towards redressing the balance thus swayed.
Compared
with the
mere ad-
duced
' reasons,'
the actual
The Western Powers maintained that, to content
themselves with the counterpoise' plan would be
in effect to postpone the deliverance of the Sultan's
dominions from the danger of Russian aggression,
and would leave it to be achieved, if at all, in a more
or less distant future, by other, if any, men and by
other, if any, alliances.
*
6
In the face of even that argument, there is
ground for maintaining that the counterpoise' plan
on the whole would have formed the best sort of pro-
tection to the Sultan's dominions; but against the
idea of substituting it, as the Russians desired, for a
plan of Limitation there existed at the time of the
Conference one fatal objection. The counterpoise'
plan was not one that imposed grave restraint on
the Czar, was not one that penally humbled him,
and for that very reason of course would not fasten
upon him the badge of acknowledged defeat, nor
serve the Allies-like a trophy-to show abroad
amongst men instead of a captured Sebastopol.
The Conference being one carried on simultane-
ously with the strife on the Chersonese, it followed
of course that the reasons' adduced on each side
by the disputants were only as chaff to the grain
6
* The Porte seems to have so judged in 1871, for it assented with
apparent willingness to the change then made; and indeed so early as
1867 Fuad Pasha was willing that the Neutrality principle should be
given up. Beust, ii. p. 106.
ON THE CONFERENCE.
323
XII.
stress of
the 'mo-
when compared with the weight of the motives-the CHA P.
motives derived from stern war-which, although
not acknowledged in words spoken out between foes to
at a table, were still swaying every man in the Con-
ference-room at Vienna.
There was one-only one-tract of ground (and
this a tract not more extensive than many an
English estate') where the actual condition of
things was such as to give the Czar strength in
negotiating with his Western assailants. What
humiliations by sea and by land he or rather his
sire had been suffering one after another until the
25th of September 1854 we know and need not
repeat; but then-as though heaven were granting
that sagacious, old prayer which besought it to
darken the minds of her enemies *_she saw her
invaders abandon their conquests made on the
Alma, saw them slowly descend from the vantage-
ground of the Mackenzie Heights, saw them coldly
'lay siege' to the more than half-open town left
deserted (as they themselves saw) by Mentschikoff's
fugitive army, and then day by day, week by week,
saw the genius of Todleben forcing them to expiate
their hapless resolves; so that having first utterly
wasted the precious fruit of their victories, they now,
after six months of trench-work, stood faltering and
baffled before him.
But this was not all, was not even perhaps the
worst part of that distressing predicament in which
the Allies had contrived to plant their now powerful
* Quoted ante, vol. ii. p. 484 in 5th edition.
'tives.'
324
THE BEARING OF THE WAR
CHAP. armies; for, whilst failing to carry Sebastopol, and
XII. even losing ground in their efforts, they also, we
know, were so circumstanced as to be unable to raise
the siege. They, or more strictly speaking a part of
them, which was not to have a less strength than
90,000 men,* stood picketed fast in the front of an
uninvested fortress drawing men and supplies with-
out stint from the powerful Empire of Russia, and
held fast too on ground which no man, if he could
help it, would ever choose as a battle-field. With
forces thus not only baffled, but held in strict,
perilous durance, the Western Powers of course were
under strong, tempting motives, which, unless coun-
terbalanced by any opposing reasons, might well
make them look somewhat wistfully at a prospect of
peace; and especially might this be the case with
Louis Napoleon in those hours when he was not
intending to lead his army in person; for his power
of weighing on the Continent by means of an army
in readiness for strife on ground nearer his frontiers
was suspended, or immensely impaired by the exer-
tions of power he had made and was making in a
distant part of the world.
So far, therefore, the condition of things gave
strength to the Russian negotiators; but on the other
hand, it must be remembered that-because un-
acquainted with that Mission' of General Niel which
was sheltering the Sebastopol garrison from all de-
cisive attacks—they believed the Flagstaff Bastion,
and with it the Fortress itself, to be in closely im-
* See ante, cap. xi.
ON THE CONFERENCE.
325
*
XII.
minent danger; whilst also, we know, they were CHAP.
pressed by the grave, disheartening care of which I
am going to speak. The effort required for sus-
taining this defence of Sebastopol by aid of troops
marched from vast distances was one of a cruelly
exhausting kind. The stress of the marches alone
inflicted losses believed to have reached enormous
proportions, and seemed destined to be always con-
tinuing until the siege should end; so that Russia
from that point of view might seem to be driven
towards peace by painfully cogent motives; and,
when known in St Petersburg, the losses sustained
by the Russians under the April bombardment would
tend to load the same scale; but then again it ap-
peared that the very excellence of the Sebastopol
defence (which seemed of course even more admirable
than it really was to those who believed that since
February the place had been sincerely besieged †)
put an obstacle in the way of her yielding; for how
to agree that the prowess which had hitherto saved,
and still was maintaining the Fortress, nay, making
it perform the exploit of holding its besiegers in
duress, should so far, after all, go for nothing, as not
to afford a good warrant for refusing consent to harsh
terms?
*The late Duke of Newcastle (who, however, since February 1855
had ceased to be War Minister) once imparted to me his estimate of
the losses which the Russians by their marches alone had sustained.
His estimate was so vast that I am unwilling to reproduce it.
+ General Niel landed in the last week of January; but the effect
of his paralysing mission may roughly be said to have commenced
with the month of February.
326
THE BEARING OF THE WAR
CHAP.
XII.
The Allies having hitherto failed in their tedious
siege, and being moreover entangled by their own
hapless policy between the seas and the Fortress,
might well be under strong motives inclining them
to obtain a peace, if only they could do this on
terms not offensive to their own self-respect; but
considering all that had passed-the armies, the
fleets, the great united armadas, despatched to far-
distant shores in the face of a gazing world— it
would hardly be possible for them to escape public
ridicule if they were to end the war without either
taking Sebastopol, or winning instead some advan-
tage that could be shown to the scorners as a
worthy equivalent for the fortress they had striven
and failed to reduce.
On the whole, one may say that what seemed
likely to govern the balance between peace and war
were not material interests, but-questions of war-
like 'honour.'
Of course, the resolves of Diplomatists engaged
in the Conference-room might well be from time to
time swaying beneath the impulsion of tidings
fresh come from the seat of war; but it so hap-
pened that the period occupied by the critical part
of the negotiation (from the 26th of March to
the 21st of April), was not one in which events
greater than a prolonged bombardment were oc-
curring on the Chersonese Heights. On the other
hand, it is true that during several months, the
general tenor of the strife for Sebastopol had
been bitterly disappointing to the Allies. Their
ON THE CONFERENCE.
327
XII.
armies-unaware of the cause-had long been CHA P.
under the palsy inflicted by General Niel's Mission,
and their claims to dictate a peace ran counter,
one cannot deny, to the almost ridiculous fact that
(in the matter of gaining or losing ground) an as-
cendancy at the seat of war had been maintained-
not, this time, by aggressive besiegers, but instead
by an audacious garrison; for Canrobert, ever since
February, had been more or less patiently submit-
ting to the enemy's counter-approaches.
The Powers in arms against Russia could of course
rest high hopes on the forces, now great in numbers,
with which they were preparing to operate at the
seat of war; but the critical period of the peace
negotiations included a time when it seemed to be
only too certain that the French Emperor, going out
to the Crimea, would there command his forces in
person. This measure for two sets of reasons,
some based on his absence from France, others
drawn from the idea of his presence at the head of
an army—was regarded as one of ill omen.
The young Czar desired peace; but in the face of
Opinion at home growing up more and more into
strength since the death of his sire, he did not
venture to purchase the blessing he sought by any
too obvious surrender of what-inopportunely-his
envoys were pleased to call 'sovereign rights.'
Failure of
On the 21st of April, Prince Gortchakoff declared
in Conference the persistent refusal of the Czar to negotia
the Peace
328
FAILING PROSPECTS OF PEACE.
CHAP. limit his number of war-ships in the Black Sea; and
XII.
tions car-
ried on
between
the bellig-
erents.
thereupon Lord John Russell and M. Drouyn de
Lhuys announcing that their instructions were ex-
hausted, the negotiations directly maintained be-
tween Russia and the other belligerents fell into a
state of abeyance, though the actual close of the
Conference was delayed during several weeks.
C
Writing to Lord Raglan from Vienna on the 23d
of April, Lord John Russell said :- I hope you may
'succeed better in making war than I have in making
peace. The Russians have rejected our propositions,
and we would not hear of theirs. There remains
C
6
C
one faint hope from a proposition to be made to
our Governments by Austria, and it is but a faint
one, so we must look to your sword to cut the way
'to peace.'
The Aus-
trian pro-
IV.
Anticipating that failure of the direct peace nego-
posals. tiations which took place on the 21st of April, Count
Buol some three days before had been submitting for
the consideration of the Western Powers three separ-
ate plans, all intended to meet the exigency of the
Third Condition; and it was from the last of these
plans one originated by M. Drouyn de Lhuys-
that Lord John derived the faint hope' which we
saw him impart to Lord Raglan.
Allusions
to a sub-
sequent
Months later, when under the reign of a new
French Commander the prospects of the war had
LORD JOHN RUSSELL ATTACKED.
329
XII.
attack
John
Russell.
been changed, and when none without study and CHAP.
access to much of what was then secret knowledge
could acquire a true idea of the questions encoun- on Lord
tered in the previous April, a sudden disclosure of
the reception accorded to Count Buol's proposals
roused in England an outburst of anger against
Lord John Russell-an outburst that sprang from
the notion of his having tried to make peace on
terms not sufficiently honourable to the Western
Allies; and accordingly, whilst in close union with
the rest of the Cabinet, and no less determined than
they were to press on the war with due vigour, he all
at once found himself marked, and singled out as
the object of a great House of Commons attack-an
attack by a concourse of men rightly eager to de-
nounce any symptom of unworthy flinching in war-
time, but ill supplied with the knowledge required
for sitting in judgment on him whom they fiercely
arraigned.
Compelled by reasons of State to observe on some
subjects a well-guarded reticence, whilst also deeply
moved at the sight of a planned insurrection against
him led on by men prized as his friends,* Lord John
met the storm of disfavour by resigning his office,
and giving in the House what of course could be
only an imperfect account of the grounds on which
he and his colleague, M. Drouyn de Lhuys, had
judged it their duty to act.
* Those members of the Government in the House of Commons
who were not members of the Cabinet-i.e., those who did not know
the truth-acquainted Lord John that they could not support him
against the coming attack.
330
THE ATTACK ON
XII.
CHAP. I am happily absolved from the task of examining
the debate of the 16th of July, because it took place
at a time beyond the set bounds of my narrative;
but no such excuse can relieve me from the task of
dealing with facts which occurred in the April before;
and a feeling against injustice (whether caused by ill
design or mistake), with besides, I may own, a regard
for the memory of Lord John Russell, has made me
imagine it right-not indeed to controvert his
assailants but-to show the true import and bearing
of the measure which gained his support, leaving
others intent on the 'Life' of a high-hearted English
statesman to contrast the attack made against him
in the House of Commons with what, as I say, is
the truth.
The Third
of the
three
Austrian
plans.
The third of the three proposed plans which Count
Buol had submitted was so far entertained by both
the First French and the First English Plenipoten-
tiary that Lord John Russell on the 18th of April was
able to speak of it thus:- M. Drouyn de Lhuys
'called upon me in the evening [the evening of the
17th], and we drew up. together a rough outline of
'the proposals to be made.
6
'It will be seen that, supposing the second propo-
'sition to be rejected as well as the first, the value of
the third depends on three things:
1. Guarantee by all the contracting Powers of
the territory of Turkey.
2. A system of counterpoise in the Black Sea.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
331
'3. The limitation of the Russian fleet in the Black CHAP.
XII.
'Sea to the number of ships maintained before the
war, under pain of war with the Allies. I confess
'it appears to me that if this third system can be
'made an ultimatum by Austria, it ought to be ac-
6
6
'
6
cepted by the Western Powers. In saying this I
may seem to contradict my former opinions. But
in fact I do not retract those opinions. The system
' of limitation I believe to be far better than that of
'counterpoise. But the question is between an im-
perfect security for Turkey and for Europe and the
' continuance of the war.
6
'Should the Government of her Majesty in con-
cert with that of France be of opinion that such a
peace can be accepted they will instruct Lord West-
' moreland accordingly. If not, I hope to be allowed
to be heard personally before a final decision is
made.”*
6
At a later hour on the same day Lord John men-
tioned the reserve of Count Buol on the question
which asked what Austria would do, if all her pro-
posals should be rejected by Russia, and then added:
6
'If her Majesty's Government should decide to
accept any one of the three systems which the Con-
'ference can agree upon, I think they should insist
'that Austria should make the rejection of all three
'a casus belli with Russia.' +
It was only on that condition (which Austria, al-
though at first hesitating, soon resolved, it appears,
* Lord John Russell to the Earl of Clarendon, 18th April 1855.
† A second despatch of same date from same to same.
332
THE ATTACK ON
CHAP. to accept*) that Lord John entertained the proposal;
XII.
The dead-
lock in
front of
Sebasto-
pol.
and accordingly in weighing the measure, we must
treat it as a scheme which, if leading under one sup-
position to peace, had also its warlike aspect.
6
The plan was one resting in part upon the prin-
ciple of Limitation,' and in part upon the principle
of 'Counterpoise.' For the avowed object of shield-
ing the Sultan's dominions from Russian aggression,
it was perhaps on the whole more effective than the
plans which the Western Powers had put forward in
the Conference - room; † and even as regarded the
object of publicly humbling Russia, and winning in
that way atrophy' to show in lieu of Sebastopol, it
was not altogether deficient; for, to prohibit the Czar
from increasing the number and weight of his ships
of war in the Euxine beyond a given fixed limit, was
in principle nearly the same as forcing him to lessen
their strength.
With respect to its bearing on the more imme-
diate course of events, the plan showed alternative
prospects—it would either drive the Czar to make
peace on the terms we have seen, or compel him to
face a new enemy already in arms on his frontier.
To understand the bitter need that there was for
bringing about some sharp change in the existing
condition of things, one must turn from Vienna to
* 'En nous engagement à la soutenir au besoin par les armes une
'solution,' &c. Count Buol to Count Colloredo, 20th May 1855, com-
municated to Lord Clarendon, and not by him on that point ques-
tioned. Eastern Papers, No. xv. p. 21.
+ The experience of 1877 has a close bearing on every such question
LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
333
XII.
the Chersonese, and recall some idea of the state of CHA P.
the war at the time. When Lord John Russell
penned his despatches of the 18th of April, the pros-
pect of taking Sebastopol by dint of the siege as then
constituted was judged to be beyond measure dis-
mal. *
General Canrobert, as ever since February,
was still enduring the conquests wrested from him
one after the other by Todleben's counter-approaches.
It is true the great April Bombardment was day by
day going on; but, there being, as we have seen, no
resolve to follow it up by assault, the bark portended
no bite. There was not at the time any prospect
that (except by the coming of Louis Napoleon to the
Crimea) General Canrobert would be superseded in
the command of the French army.
The French Emperor and the English Government
agreed in believing that Sebastopol would never be
taken by means of the siege then on foot against the
South Side of the place. They hoped indeed that
its ulterior fall might be compassed by successful
operations in the field; but even over that prospect
(which was only, after all, one dependent on the
issue of a future campaign) there hung a dim, lower-
ing cloud; for the command of the French army,
and with it a dominant voice in the ordering of the
intended campaign was, as then understood, to be
exercised by Louis Napoleon personally; and this
with a plan in his head which our War Minister
pronounced to be 'wild' and 'visionary.' What
* See ante, caps. vi. vii. viii.
+ See ante, cap. ix.
See ante, ibid.
334
THE ATTACK ON
XII.
CHAP. brightened this part of the prospect was only the
gleam of a hope that plans which seemed absurd in
design might perhaps be transformed into measures
of wholesome strategy when encountering the test of
real war.
The Allies, we know, were so circum-
stanced that, whilst thus unable to carry the Fortress,
they could not, if they would, raise the siege. What
on earth could they do? Must they go on without
any hope except the one based on a future campaign
under Louis Napoleon's strategy, or else on the
chance of a battle, if the enemy should be pleased
to attack them in the execrable position they occu-
pied with their backs to the cliffs and the sea? It
may seem to be almost incredible, but still is strictly
true, that powerful and victorious armies had come
to be thus strangely hampered. The predicament
was one that appealed-not surely for any weak
yielding on a question of honour or principle but-
for such a new move against Russia as might either
untie or cut through the hard Sebastopol knot by a
fresh exertion of power.
The need
that there
was for
effecting
a new
move
against
Russia,
Knowing well that their armies lay thus strangely
tethered and hampered in front of Sebastopol, the
Governments of Paris and London were bound of
course, if they could, to find and bring into play
some new, some extrinsic force calculated to work
the needed change; but either they did not observe
the path of duty before them, or did not see how to
The lever pursue it. Yet the lever was ready, and only await-
ing their touch. Far from having declared that
they would not negotiate without first taking
to be
found at
Vienna.
LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
335
XII.
Sebastopol, they had chosen to say the contrary, CHAP.
and for weeks, as we have seen, had been busily
treating with Russia in the Conference - room at
Vienna on the basis of the accepted Four Points;
whilst also and still in Vienna-they had at their
side an Ally not yet plunged in the physical strife,
but acknowledging his obligations under the Treaty
of the 2d of December, and not only willing, but
even indeed almost eager to fix the easy conditions
on which he would take the field. Yet with these
means of action at their command, the Rulers in
Paris and London did not even make any endeavour
to use the power they held; and were so far from
helping by statesmanship to ease the dead-lock on
the Chersonese that they wilfully matched it by
causing another dead-lock at Vienna.
Neglect
of this by
the Rulers
in Paris
and Lon-
don;
by De
Lhuys and
Lord John.
The First French and First English negotiators but not
engaged in the Conference were, however, more alive
than their Governments to the exigencies of the
military predicament. M. Drouyn de Lhuys had the
merit of conceiving and maturing the plan which—
unless forcing peace on the Czar-would effectuate
a mighty diversion in favour of the hampered be-
siegers; but Lord John also-always eager and
strenuous—was not the man to stand idle, and see
the Conference fail, without anxiously turning his
thoughts to the armies besieging Sebastopol, and
trying by a stroke of diplomacy to help them in
what at the time seemed painfully difficult straits.
336
THE ATTACK ON LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
XII.
CHAP. In the effort to achieve this great good, he found
himself able to act in close, friendly concert with
M. Drouyn de Lhuys, and to agree with him in
believing that for the objects they both had in view
the Proposal in question was apt. What concession
it exacted from the Western Powers was not so
much concession to the enemy, but rather conces-
sion to Austria-concession made at her instance,
and of that honourable sort which a belligerent may
of course rightly make to a great independent Power
when persuading it to join in a war.
The ten-
dency and
value of
the meas-
ure.
Irresistibly cogent in either one or the other of
the opened alternatives, this measure was
so far
from erring in the direction of weakness that it
rather perhaps might be censured as offering too
strong a remedy; for, supposing the Czar to
resist this new pressure, the whole empire of the
Danube would be brought at once into the strife;
and, considering the defection of Prussia, there was
some ground for saying that, to compass the armed
intervention of such a Power as Austria, with its con-
sequent extension of the area of the war, would be
almost a ruthless act.* Be that as it may, the whole.
measure was at all events one which would either
force peace on the Czar by the leverage of an Austrian
ultimatum, or else, if he still should resist, bring
Austria against him in arms.
On the question that asked which alternative would
be the more likely to follow, opinions were not agreed.
* This, e.g., was the idea of Sir Edward Lytton-Bulwer, expressed
in the debate of July 1855.
RESOLVE OF THE ENGLISH CABINET.
337
XII.
M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord John were both CHAP.
strongly inclined to believe that this measure, be-
cause sharply barbed with the Austrian ultimatum,
would force a peace on the Czar; whilst Count Buol,
with perhaps better means of forming a judgment,
was rather disposed to conclude that the Czar would
hold out, and bring Austria into the war; but in
one way or other the plan could not fail to take effect
with great cogency.
*
If, instead of displaying this cogency, the measure
had really been one which people understanding its
import could honestly censure for weakness or undue
concession to the enemy, it would not have found
any favour with M. Drouyn de Lhuys, the French De Lhuys.
Minister of Foreign Affairs, and would never have
been harboured a moment in the mind of Lord John
Russell.
6
Russell.
Lord John, as all knew in his day, was a man of Lord John
great intrepidity, was even from time to time rash,
and prone to spring into action under simply spon-
taneous impulses that often enraged and distracted
the anxious drill-sergeants of Party,' yet endeared
him to those of our people who prefer, after all, a
true man to any disciplined aggregate. He was
capable of now and then coming to a bold, abrupt,
hasty decision not duly concerted with men whose
opinions he ought to have weighed; but for cour-
age, for high public spirit, no statesman in Europe
surpassed him.
VOL. VII.
* Eastern Papers, xv. p. 30.
Y
338
COURSE TAKEN
СНАР.
XII.
Reception
of this
plan by
Lord Pal
merston's
Cabinet;
and by
the French
Emperor.
When Lord John returned to England on the
Sunday, the 29th of April, he found his colleagues
wholly unwilling to resume the negotiations for
peace; and at a Cabinet held the next day, they
avowed an unqualified reluctance to accept the Aus-
trian plan; but it was necessary of course that our
Government, though desiring to act in that sense,
should first take counsel with France.
And it proved that Louis Napoleon disagreed with
the English Cabinet. On the 27th of April at the
latest, and possibly two or three days before, he had
found himself obliged to abandon his idea of going
out to the Crimea; and thenceforth, it would seem,
for a time he was anxious that the war should cease.
'I don't know,' he said to Lord Cowley, 'what is
I thought of the English generals, but ours seem to
know little of European war, and this double com-
mand is fatal.'*
6
6
Accordingly, on the last day of April, the Emperor
was in a good mood for listening with favour to his
Minister M. Drouyn de Lhuys, who had brought him
back from Vienna what was called the Third Austrian
Proposal, and now advised its acceptance as a meas-
ure that would secure what he judged to be a safe
and honourable peace. The Emperor and his Min-
ister examined the project together, made in it some
changes which were afterwards pronounced to be
wholesome, and determined that in this matured
state it might be imparted to our Government as a
measure approved by France.
*Senior's Conversations, vol. i. p. 338 et seq.
BY LOUIS NAPOLEON.
339
XII.
Lord John Russell apprised of all this wrote CHAP.
from London to M. Drouyn de Lhuys:-
C
'MY DEAR COLLEAGUE, -I congratulate you on
the successful interview you had with the Emperor.
The plan has been made much more simple and
'less objectionable.
We shall, however,
'deliberate and decide to-day upon the propositions
your Government.
It is the highest satisfaction
to me that we have agreed, and, I trust, shall con-
tinue to agree, on the great principles upon which
'the future system of Europe is to be established.'*
6
6
of
nounced
in the
of the
Powers.
There was now therefore rife a clearly pronounced Pro-
division in the counsels of the Western Powers; for, difference
excepting its powerful member newly come from counsels
Vienna, the whole of Lord Palmerston's Cabinet Western
was still as before keenly anxious to abstain from
further negotiations, and firmly go on with the war;
whilst-intent on an opposite policy-not only the
French Emperor himself, but also his Minister for
Foreign Affairs, and with them Lord John Russell,
were, all three, desiring to accept the Austrian pro-
posal, and make it the basis of peace.
French
and Lord
After having matured the proposal in the way The
we observed, the French Emperor intimated his Emperor
wish to see the English ambassador. Lord Cowley Cowley.
found the Emperor smoking in the garden, and was
asked by him to walk up and down with him, and
'talk the matter over.'
‘
* 4th May 1855.
340
COURSE TAKEN
CHAP.
XII.
Marshal
Vaillant :
.
'I think,' the Emperor said, 'that it is a good
arrangement. What think you?'
Desiring of course to support the opposite opinion,
as the one entertained by his Government, Lord
Cowley answered: 'Well, it does not appear to me
that the Russian preponderance in the Black Sea
'will be materially affected.'
Not,' replied the Emperor, by our having now
a right to keep an equal force there?'
Lord Cowley briefly and ably adduced for his
answer some arguments like those we heard used
at Vienna against the 'counterpoise' plan.
'
The Emperor replied: 'I will talk the matter over
again with Drouyn de Lhuys.'
Speaking then from a sudden impulse, Lord Cow-
ley made what was certainly a very abnormal sug-
gestion, saying, Would there be any objection to
'my being present?'
.
:
The Emperor looked a little surprised, and then
said, "Certainly not;" and he appointed an hour
for the next day.'
A soldier of other days, a survivor of the Moscow
campaign, now a Minister wielding the regathered
power of France in another war against Russia,
Marshal Vaillant was destined to utter the few magic
words which would shape the then course of her
history, overrule a new 'Emperor Napoleon,' and
govern the march of events.
BY LOUIS NAPOLEON.
341
6
'When I arrived,' says Lord Cowley, 'Vaillant CHA P.
was in the antechamber, and Drouyn de Lhuys
with the Emperor.'
The Marshal and Lord Cowley were soon intro-
duced, and the Emperor begged Drouyn de Lhuys to
explain the grounds of his arrangement.
6
Drouyn de Lhuys did so at considerable length.
'I think,' said Lord Cowley, that he talked nearly
half an hour. The Emperor seemed to go along
'with him, and, when he had finished, said to me,
'Are you not satisfied?'
G
6
6
My only answer,' said Lord Cowley, is to beg
your Majesty to ask Marshal Vaillant whether he
thinks that this arrangement will really effect the
purpose of the war-the putting an end to the
'preponderance of Russia in the Black Sea and the
'Bosphorus.'
C
6.66
6
6
66
66
6
66
XII.
The Emperor turned to Vaillant. I am not a his words;
politician," said Vaillant, "but I know the feel-
ings of the army. I am sure that if, after having
spent months in the siege of Sebastopol, we re-
"turn unsuccessful, the army will not be satisfied."'
<
The Emperor then turned to Drouyn de Lhuys their sud-
and said: "Write to Vienna and break off the
CC
negotiation."
و
Thus in less then a minute the Emperor reversed
his decision.
6
All turned,' said Lord Cowley, 'upon Vaillant's
presence. Louis Napoleon was pleased with the
* Senior's Conversations, vol. i.
den effect.
342
THE COUNSELS
СНАР.
XII.
Resigna-
tion of De
Lhuys.
Unaccept-
ed resig-
Lord John
Russell.
Unanim-
ity after
May of the
English
Cabinet.
peace, and would have adhered to it, if Vaillant
'had not frightened him.'*
M. Drouyn de Lhuys from the first had been
closely identified with the measure thus suddenly
discarded; and before the evening closed, he sent
in his resignation. The Emperor wrote to his
Minister, and asked him to reconsider this step;
but M. Drouyn de Lhuys replied somewhat drily,
and repeated his determination to quit the Govern-
ment. t
Because finding himself at variance with the rest
nations of of the Cabinet on the question of the Austrian
proposal, Lord John Russell twice tendered his
resignation to Lord Palmerston; but when the
the 5th of Emperor's second decision was imparted to our
Ministers, there remained, of course, no room for
difference about the course to be taken by the then
reunited Governments of France and England. Ab-
staining from further negotiations, they could not,
as all saw, do otherwise than vigorously go on with
the war; and, since Lord John agreed with his col-
leagues in the conclusion thus reached, he was left
without a ground for insisting that his last resigna-
tion should be accepted. He continued to be a mem-
ber of the Government, and of what from the 5th of
May downwards was a closely united Cabinet.
*Senior's Conversations, vol. i.
+ Both these notes were shown by the Emperor to Lord Cowley.—
Ibid.
‡ Lord Palmerston in House of Commons, 16th July 1855.
OF VAILLANT.
343
XII.
The Gov-
of France
and Eng-
land once
The Emperor's new and sudden decision brought CHA P.
him back all at once into what was substantial accord
with the bulk of the English Cabinet; for, although ernments
he might thenceforth be fighting on the ground pressed
upon him by Vaillant, whilst the English might hold
that their object was still that of forcing on Russia substantial
the hated principle of Limitation,' the immediate
resolve of both Governments was in each case the
same. Both resolved to go on with the war.
(
more in
accord.
Opening
for the new
policy sug-
gested by
Vaillant.
Taking place, as we saw, on the 21st of April, the
suspension and virtual rupture of all direct negotia-
tions with Russia had set free the Western Powers
from their engagements to treat for peace on the basis
assigned at Vienna. There accordingly was room for
advice that tended to shape a new policy-a policy
based in great part upon the feeling of soldiers; and
perhaps one may own that of all the public men
seeking to guide the two Western Powers at this con-
juncture the most clear-sighted was he who declared
himself no politician. Inspired by his knowledge of The sound-
what the soldiers were thinking, and not borne down Vaillant's
by the cares of over-anxious diplomatists, Marshal sion.
Vaillant proved able to see that due warlike per-
sistency in a long-pursued enterprise was the Greater,
the true Essential, and that clearly the lesser object-
to be afterwards, however, attained by first attaining
the greater was that of contriving a shield for the
imagined Turks of the future by dint of parchments
and words. He saw that France and England-
France and England allied and in arms could
not meet the vast exigency of their repute among
I
ness of
conclu-
344
DROUYN DE LHUYS
XII.
CHAP. nations, or, as Frenchmen would say, of their
'honour,' by coming home in the face of a bitterly
scornful world with all their mighty armada, and a
bundle of mere Russian promises to show abroad
among men instead of a captured Sebastopol.
The course
of duty
In effect, Marshal Vaillant's words prayed that
the war should go on, without offering any new aid,
as the Austrian proposals had done, towards the ob-
ject of making it prosper; but the value of his
counsel depended on reasons more lofty, more
general than those which only point to 'expediency'
of the humbler and narrower sort.
It was otherwise of course with diplomatists dis-
When consider-
prescribed charging fixed, ascertained duties.
to D. de
Lord John.
Lhuys and ing the Austrian proposal on the evening of the
17th of April, M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord John
Russell were not free to harbour a thought of taking
the soldier-like course which we heard Vaillant after-
wards counsel. Far from having any shadow of
warrant to act in such a direction, they had come
to Vienna instructed to negotiate a peace on the
basis then already laid down, and to bring Austria
under engagements for joining at once in the war, if
peace should not so be attained. Some may think,
as I do, that for Powers like France and England,
the simple, the manful insistence recommended by
Vaillant was better than all the best meshes con-
trived by diplomatists; but we must remember that
speaking in Paris after the virtual rupture of the
negotiations, and only professing to breathe the
sentiment of the army as distinguished from the
AND LORD JOHN RUSSELL.
345
XII.
opinions of politicians, the Marshal was free to ad- CHAP.
vise on large and paramount grounds not open to
men at Vienna in the middle of April who, like
Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord John, had had laid
upon them the task of negotiating a peace, without
either awaiting the fall of Sebastopol, or insisting
on its surrender by Russia as one of the terms to
be dictated.
Men plainly forbidden by Duty from acting on
Vaillant's principle, and obliged to observe what I
have called a 'humbler' sort of 'expediency,' could
not well fail to see the advantages of that Third
Austrian plan' which would either have forced on
the Czar a better peace than the one for which
France and England had toiled in the Conference-
room at Vienna, or else would have brought against
him-brought against him in arms on his frontier-
a new and powerful enemy; but obeying the letter What they
of their instructions which pointed exclusively to
'Limitation' in exclusion of the 'Counterpoise' prin-
ciple, M. Drouyn de Lhuys and Lord John took care
to keep themselves free from any approach to en-
tanglement with the Austrian Government; and did
no more, after all, than impart and recommend the
proposal to their respective Governments.*
In what did they err? The mistake of that count-
less multitude which long afterwards brought down
storms of wrath on the head of Lord John was
caused, it would seem, in great part by the oddly
* Lord John even, it seems, abstained from telling the Austrian
Government that he would take that last step.
did.
346
THE HOUSE OF COMMONS.
XII.
CHAP. refracting way, and wrong, inverted order in which
events became known; for the rupture of the direct
negotiations with Russia was soon after disclosed;
whilst the Austrian overture of the 17th of April
was-rightly-kept secret. The secrecy had lasted
some weeks, and our Government and our people
alike had gladly bidden farewell to all negotiations,
and were simply intent on the strife, when an in-
discreet statesman-not English-revealed the Aus-
trian overture, affecting moreover to show, though
not doing this at all perfectly, the action thereupon
taken by Lord John Russell. The
The secrecy main-
tained by our Cabinet was wholly State secrecy,'
altogether disjoined from any personal wish for its
concealment entertained by Lord John; but people
not seeing this fancied that they had made a discov-
ery, proving him to have flinched at Vienna from
what was the plainly right course.
How far this was
6
from the truth we have been able to see.
The chief cause of the mistake was, however, a
sheer want of knowledge. In that time of war,
ample reasons of State forbade the disclosures re-
quired for showing the truth, the whole truth.*
Of course, the same valid State reasons which
enforced silence on the Cabinet sealed also the lips
of Lord John; and accordingly his resignation did
nothing towards giving him freedom of speech.
* No one, for instance, could discuss the policy of accepting the
Austrian proposal without laying stress on the prospects of the Sebas-
topol siege; and this, of course, was not a subject with which to enter-
tain the public—a public that included the enemy.
J
CHANGE WROUGHT BY THE COURSE TAKEN.
347
XII.
The House of Commons on the 24th of May CHAP.
entered upon a great debate on the subject of the
war, including the Conferences, and (refusing to say
with Mr Gladstone that it still cherished hopes of
peace founded on parleys open through Austria)
came after many days to a vote which expressed its
regret for the failure of the negotiations carried on
at Vienna, and declared that it would continue to
give every support to her Majesty in the prosecution
of the war until a safe and honourable peace should
be attained.
Vote of
the House
of Com-
mons.
ference
4th of
June;
From the day, the 21st of April, when France The Con-
and England declared their instructions exhausted, kept for
mally open
no real negotiation took place in the Conference- until the
room; but allocutions intended to operate upon the
opinion of Europe were there made on the 26th of
April and on the 4th of June. Prince Gortchakoff
on that last day made speeches which tended to show
that his Government, though approving in the main
of the Austrian proposal, would still always refuse
to accept that part of its terms which sought-in a
measure to limit his master's 'sovereign rights.' *
If this were true it would follow (as Count Buol
had said he believed) that the acceptance of the
Austrian proposal by the Western Powers would
have drawn Austria into the war.
On the 4th of June 1855, this long open Con- and then
ference closed.
closed.
* Eastern Papers, xiv.
348
THE COURSE RIGHTLY
CHAP.
XII.
Change
brought
V.
When rejecting all the proposals put forward by
Austria, France and England did more than forego
tion of the the powerful aid she had proffered. They at once.
about by
the rejec-
Austrian
Austria
set free
her course.
proposals. set her free to abandon that attitude of menace—
armed menace by which-without going to war-
to change she long had been pressing on Russia. It then
became plain to Austria that the Western Powers
were going beyond what she had pronounced to be
the just exigencies of the Four Points, and (by virtue
of that discretion which they had taken good care
to reserve) were continuing their war with a mind
to either capture Sebastopol or else wring from the
Czar such a cession of what his men called 'sovereign
rights,' as might serve like a 'conquest' to show in-
The course stead of the untaken fortress. Austria judged that
she rightly
took. under these conditions the responsibility,' as she
C
called it, of going on with the war no longer attached
on the Russians. She did not deny-no one did-
that upon this matter, the question which asked how
the Western Powers should deal with the obstinate
fact that they still were defied by Sebastopol, France
and England must judge for themselves of the course
which their self-respect dictated, and go on with the
strife, if convinced that this was what Honour re-
quired; but Count Buol rightly judged that, to aid
them in the pursuit of an object so peculiarly their
own, he ought not to involve his own country and
bring it into a war-a war that must needs have
TAKEN BY AUSTRIA.
349
XII.
been formidable even when she began to arm in CHAP.
the previous year, but had since been rendered trebly
embarrassing by the defection of Prussia, by the
ceasing of those Russian encroachments of 1853
which had given offence to Germany, and besides
by the fact that, with mighty forces entangled in
a far distant region, France was hardly for the
moment so able as she might otherwise be to sup-
port the Empire of Austria against encompassing
enemies.
God
What defeated the efforts of diplomacy to end the
war at this time was, in short, a point of soldierly
honour arising from the frustration of efforts to carry
Sebastopol; and the notion of assuming that Austria,
who had had nothing to do with the siege, should be
expected to act as a Power affected by this special
exigency, was of course altogether untenable.
Consistently with the new determination, Austria
hastened to relieve her Exchequer from any further
continuance of the burthensome sacrifices she had
been making in preparation for war, and abandoned
that attitude of armed menace which she long had
maintained against Russia.
It was natural that this course of action, though
no less right than wise, should provoke great im-
patience in England, and the more so perhaps since
it happened that Lord Palmerston, then our Prime
Minister, had long shown towards the much-chal-
lenged Empire of Francis Joseph a curious, persist-
ent antipathy. With, however, a store of good
humour which seemed inexhaustible, the now dis-
350
COURSE TAKEN BY AUSTRIA.
XII.
CHAP. arming Austria clung fast to the notion of her being
joined to the Western Powers by some gentle sort of
Alliance. Not fearing the High Court of Ridicule,
she even gave them her blessing, and, whilst calmly
receding herself from the perilous brink on which
she had long been standing, she expressed a wish
that kind Fortune might smile on her friends in
the field.
The steady, the accurate righteousness with which
Count Buol steered his way through the sea of
troubles he crossed was nothing less than a feat
marked by wisdom, by skill, by a never-ceasing
adherence to the dictates of honour; but, of course,
proved immensely exasperating--for so human nature
commands to the belligerent powers; and besides,
there was theme for the satirists-intent on their
laugh-who could say what they liked of the
'blessing,' the moral support,' quaintly offered to
eager combatants by a friend keeping clear of the
strife; but it still remains true that the course of
action taken by Austria in all these transactions was
thoroughly loyal and right.
* Eastern Papers, No. xv. p. 22.
APPENDIX.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I.
NOTE 1.—Outnumbered by tens of thousands.-Including
their field-army outside (which could freely either enter or
quit the fortress at the will of the commander), the Russians
had, at this time, a strength of about 108,000; whilst unless
there were counted some 11,000 Turks (whom Canrobert and
Lord Raglan had not learnt how to use with effect)-the
French and the English together were only about 61,000
strong.
NOTE 2.-On General Bosquet's front.—Of the defensive
works on Mount Inkerman, some were constructed by the
French, some by the English, and full accounts of them will
be found in the French and English Official Narratives, in
Niel, p. 150, and in the Journal of the Royal Engineers, p. 50
et seq. For account of the works of countervallation on the
French left, see Niel, pp. 98, 99. My reason for avoiding
details on these matters is that the works were not destined
to be put to the proof by attacks.
NOTE 3.-Only by hundreds.—The average number of work-
men kept employed by the French was in November only
693 by day, and 475 by night; in December only 835 by day,
and 628 by night; and in January only 417 by day, and 192
352
APPENDIX.
by night.-Niel, pp. 105, 123, 133. The numbers of English-
men whom our people proved able to keep employed at
their works was far, far more scant, as will be seen by the
Trench Journal' appended to the Journal of the Royal
Engineers, p. 159 et seq.; and although it is true, as shown.
by the same Journal, that small bodies of Turks were also
employed, these unhappily had suffered so cruelly from
privation and hardship as to be unfit for much work. See
the 'Remarks' column in the above-mentioned Trench
Journal.
NOTE 4.—Of the Flagstaff Bastion. The policy followed
by Todleben when thus closing the gorges of his defensive
works was at one time much questioned by scientific critics;
but on the other hand, was defended by the great engineer
with brilliant clearness and vigour. It was my good fortune
in 1869 to be with him on the site of the Malakoff, and to
learn from him there his full reasons for having closed its
gorge.
NOTE 5.-Minor pieces of ordnance.-Three small mortars.
The French military authorities at the time endeavoured to
keep this loss a secret.-Lord Raglan to Duke of Newcastle,
Private, December 13, 1854.
NOTE 6.-Only 290 men.-Journal Royal Engineers, Part
I., p. 82. And see the note, from which it results that, to
meet the requirement of a calculation' universally admitted
as just, the guards of the English trenches should have had
a strength of not less than three-fourths of 18,000—i.e., not
less than 13,500 men.
NOTE 7.—At the object kept always in sight.-Journal Royal
Engineers, Part I., pp. 51, 52, 56, 57, 62, 70, 71, 71-2, 85, 128,
136-7-8, 138-9, 139, 140-1 141-2, 143-4, 144-5.
I believe I might add largely to the number of these
references by citing the very numerous papers in the hand-
writing of Sir John Burgoyne which I have before me.
APPENDIX.
353
NOTE 8. Against the Malakoff front.-Journal Royal En-
gineers, p. 72; Niel, p. 139. The more recent of the coun-
sels thus tendered by Burgoyne and resisted by the French
were submitted in Memoranda dated respectively the 11th
and 20th of December.
NOTE 9.—Happily able to accept the condition imposed.—
Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, January 2, 1855. There
is no mention of this agreement in either of the Official
Narratives, the Siége de Sebastopol by Niel, or the Journal
of the Royal Engineers. Both the compilers date the
new departure the new resolve of the French to operate
against the Malakoff-from the 1st of February (when the
French Council sat), or the 2d of the same month, when the
decisions of the previous day were put into the form of
written Instructions. By happening to remain unacquainted
with the arrangement of the 1st of January, General Niel
was of course dispensed from the obligation of explaining the
delay which extended from the 1st of January to the 1st of
the following month.
Though not based on any actual reopening of the question
already decided, the unanimous vote of the Council of the 1st
of February was a little bewildering; and coupled with the
whole month's inaction which had followed the New Year's
Day, it had the effect of bringing a curious error into the
official narratives of two great nations. Any reader of either
the Official Siége de Sebastopol or of the Official Journal of
the Royal Engineers, would imagine that the decision was on
the 1st of February, whereas it was really on the 1st of
January. The error was not of the kind termed 'clerical,'
but one such as might have been committed by some simple
village chronicler who on learning the date of a mere corona-
tion had given it as the date of the accession. I suppose that
one of the great Official Narratives must on this point have
copied from the other; for otherwise, there would be some-
thing wonderful in such a coincidence as that of the two
great records making, each of them, so big an error as that of
striking a whole month out of the calendar. M. Rousset, I
VOL. VII.
Z
354
APPENDIX.
see, is aware that the engagements took place in January,
and he cites for proof Bizot's letter of the 12th of that month,
vol. ii. p. 31.
NOTE 10.-Till the latter part of the month.—Ante, vol. vi.
pp. 388, 389. It was only on the 21st of January that-thread-
ing his way at last between two of the most ugly perils that
well could beset a commander-Lord Raglan obtained the aid
of French troops in relief of our overtasked soldiery.
C
NOTE 11.-Words described as 'Instructions.'-The Official
compiler of the Journal of the Royal Engineers stated (p.
85) that the Council of the 1st of February was a ‘General
Council of War'; but that was not the case. The Council
had before it Burgoyne's suggestions in writing, and amal-
gamated some of them with the project approved, but was
exclusively French. The decisions of the Council embraced
the whole plan of operations then adopted by the French,
and were recorded in a paper dated the next day-the 2d
of February. A copy of this paper is given in the Journal,'
P. 148.
NOTE 12. Other mortal then living.-General de Todleben
once did me the honour to speak to me of the zeal with
which at one period of his life he had devoted himself to
the science of mining, and I remember how greatly he aston-
ished me by speaking of the enormous proportion of his time
which he then used to spend underground.
NOTE 13.-Spreading system of countermines. In antici-
pation of what the French might attempt underground, the
Russians began countermining in the beginning of November;
but it was only at the close of the month (when they had
had time to draw the inference stated in the text) that their
system of countermines began to assume 'vast' proportions.
-Todleben, p. 596.
NOTE 14-Unleashed a camouflet.-For want of any true
APPENDIX.
355
English word sufficing to express what is meant, the word
'camouflet'-the war-miner's whiff'-has been received into.
the vocabulary of our military engineers. It means an explo-
sion which the miner or counterminer drives into his antag-
onist's galleries without disturbing the surface of the ground
above.
NOTE 15.-The intervening Mamelon.-The English began
their new (8-gun) battery No. 9 (the 'King Battery') on the
13th of February (Royal Engineers, Part II., p. 34); and
soon afterwards received admirably efficient aid from the
French, who also at about the same time, if not earlier, began
toiling at the 15-gun battery No. 1 (the Artilleur Battery')
which was to be constructed on a western slope of Mount
Inkerman.
NOTE 16.-Did the work.-After showing how the French.
entered upon the work, the Official Journal of the Royal En-
gineers says: The order, silence, and regularity with which
the work was conducted under the superintendence of a cap-
tain of the French Engineers was very remarkable.'-Journal
of Royal Engineers, Part II., p. 34.
C
NOTE 17.-Destroying the Inkerman Bridge.-Niel, p. 104.
This act of Mentschikoff's was not one that relieved the
Allies from any apprehension they might have of another
Inkerman'; for the bridge (as was proved on the morning
of the great battle) could be restored in a few hours.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV.
NOTE 1.-With their blows.-Todleben did not consider that
the artillery of the enceinte defending the Faubourg could
usefully interpose; and the fire from that quarter-more
356
APPENDIX.
dangerous perhaps to the Russians than to the French-took
place without his sanction. The ships were to fire, but only
up the ravine; so that, if the French, inclining towards their
right, should dip down into St George's Ravine they might
incur fire, whilst the Russians, if duly cautioned against the
dangers, might of course take care to avoid it.
NOTE 2.—Lost their way in the darkness.-Niel states that
a part of the attacking force lost its way; and uses language
which seems to show that the Zouaves on the flanks did not
do so, thus showing apparently that the centre column must
have been the part of the force from which the lost troops had
separated themselves.-P. 155.
NOTE 3.-Had been victoriously achieved. Having been
authentically, though erroneously informed of these good tid-
ings by direction of General Canrobert, Lord Raglan imparted
them to the Secretary of State in a despatch of the 24th
February 1855, which has been published.-Sayer's Collection,
pp. 100-1.
After having been undeceived himself, Lord Rag-
lan undeceived his Government. Private Letters to Lord
Panmure, 24th and 27th February 1855, and Despatch to
Secretary of State, March 31, 1855. Before sending off his
despatch of the 24th February, Lord Raglan saw General
Canrobert, and was by him assured that up to that time, he
had received no further report.
NOTE 4. Without a simultaneous advance on the Malakoff
front. Even in the absence of that extraneous information
which we owe to recent disclosures it would hardly be
possible to imagine that this proposal was made seriously.
The proposal was so extravagant that its rejection, or
rather its non-acceptance, seems not to have been thought
worth recording.
NOTE 5.-Not again to attempt to drive the enemy from their
new works. Considering that the French had been so lately
accepting the guidance of Burgoyne in the most momentous
APPENDIX.
357
of questions, an English reader will observe with surprise the
tone thus adopted towards him in council by French Generals.
There was apparently a feeling on the part of the French
(see the words of Bizot quoted elsewhere) that Burgoyne had
persuaded them into dangerous ventures, and it would seem
that they therefore felt angrily towards him; but I imagine
that their peremptory manner of treating his counsels on
the 6th of March might be traced in great measure to his
loss of official status. They knew that he had been recalled;
and being great respecters of official, as distinguished from
personal authority, may have thought that they owed less
deference than before to one who, in literal strictness, was
now only a skilled amateur.
NOTE 6.—For which he was yearning.—General Canrobert
is living, and entitled, of course, in all fairness, to command
full attention if inclined to controvert the authorities on which
I base my statements, or to show that in the interval of
eleven days, between the 30th of March (when Lord Raglan
wrote) and the 10th of April (when Canrobert expressed
himself as anxious to be attacked by the enemy), there had
occurred such a change of circumstances as to account for the
actual inversion of his opinions and feelings on the subject
of another Inkerman.' It is true that in the interval,
Omer Pasha, with from 15,000 to 18,000 men had come up
to the Chersonese, but it is hardly imaginable that the
accession of that force alone would account for so enormous a
change as the spring from despondency to a warlike longing
for the advantage of being brought to battle by the enemy.
NOTE 7.-With grossly inadequate means. With most
'inefficient means in men and material '-words written under
the sanction of Sir John Burgoyne himself, if not with his
own hand. Journal of Royal Engineers, Part I., p. 87.
NOTE 8.- Were 'postulates' rather than facts.—Sir John
Burgoyne's military status in the Crimea was that of a
Lieutenant-General on the Staff of Lord Raglan's army,
358
APPENDIX.
with orders to advise respecting the conduct of engineering
operations; and, though not in terms constituted the Com-
mander of the Engineer force, he was practically armed
well enough with all a Commander's authority. Accord-
ingly the arrangement making him an adviser instead of
a Commander did not stint him in power; but apparently
it much influenced his habits of thought and action. There
is, after all, something in words; and plainly a request from
the Chief saying, 'What do you advise?' is not quite the
same as one saying, 'What do you offer to do?' In the
first case, the officer consulted would be almost led into the
practice of treating the question of 'means' hypothetically,
saying virtually, 'If the army can afford strength enough for
'the purpose, I advise such and such a course;' whereas, if
asked to say what, as a Commander of Engineers, he would
offer to do, his mind would be turned more distinctly to the
question of 'means.' I owe my perception of this difference
to the tenor of Burgoyne's written counsels taken in con-
junction with the afterwards disclosed want of means for
giving effect to them. Thus, for instance, on the 23d of
November he writes an elaborate and most able memoran-
dum, given in the Journal of the Royal Engineers (Appendix,
No. 34), and after mentioning the suggestion, the Journal
adds, The additional means that would be required for this
'operation appeared to be the only impediment to its adoption.'
This sample-and it is quite a fair sample-shows that,
in Sir John Burgoyne's mind, the all-important question of
'means' was not so determined beforehand as to secure a
basis for his opinion, but left to be dealt with afterwards.
NOTES TO CHAPTER V.
NOTE 1.—14th February 1855.—This letter was printed by
Niel in his 'Siége de Sebastopol' (p. 478 et seq.), but rele-
APPENDIX.
359
gated to the cold shade of the Appendix, and not shown by
the writer to be anything more than one of the numberless
documents by which able men in those days were prone to
record their opinions, it seemed to have no more than an
'academical' importance until the recent disclosures by M.
Rousset invested it with a new significance, and showed it
indeed to have been something very real indeed—to have
been, in short (when approved), a full Memorandum of the
principles on which Niel conducted his mission.
NOTE 2.-Begun and continued.-The brief, though valiant
night-attack of the 24th of February, under General Monet
and Colonel Cler was arrested in mid-course by the hand of
authority, and was never renewed; so that taken as a whole,
it can hardly be treated as a substantial exception to the
statement in the text, and may rather perhaps be regarded as
confirmatory of the general rule then repressing the enter-
prise of the French army.
NOTE 3.-Lasting success.-We may take it for granted, I
trust, that the disloyal expedient of maintaining secrecy
against Lord Raglan must have been distressing to General
Canrobert as well as to General Niel; and it seems probable
that if Lord Raglan, when sounded on the question of invest-
ing Sebastopol,* had proved to be of the same opinion as
Niel, all further concealment on the part of the French would
have been gladly abandoned, so that thenceforth the Allies
might have been frankly acting together with the same imme-
diate objects. Lord Raglan, however, showing no such in-
clination, the French still went on concealing from him their
adoption of the Emperor's plan the plan on which they were
acting!
4.—
(
NOTE 4. By approaches.'-That the arrangements re-
corded on the 2d of February were, as I have called them,
a 'retreat' on the part of the French from the engagements
of the 1st of January, and that Niel caused the change is
* At the Conference of the 4th of March. See ante, pp. 74, 75.
360
APPENDIX.
'
shown by General Bizot, who wrote to Vaillant, 8th Febru-
ary 1855 The Général [Niel] a jugé trop aventurée l'attaque
'de vive force à faire immediatement sur la tour Malakof,
'et à la suite d'un conseil tenu en sa présence chez le Général
Canrobert, il a été décidé que nous allions entreprendre de
'ce côté les travaux d'une attaque plus rapprochée.'-Quoted
Rousset, vol. ii. pp. 32, 33.
NOTE 5.-To Vaillant, 8th February 1855.- Writing on
the 8th of February (when it was understood that Niel was
on the point of returning to France), Bizot says to Vaillant,
the Minister of War: 'Le Général Niel qui doit s'embarquer
'sur le prochain courrier va vous arriver parfaitement édifié
'sur nos travaux, sur nos chances de succés comme sur les
'chances contraires, et sur les difficultés de la position que
'nous ont faite nos alliés. Il a essayé vainement de galvan-
'iser leur inertie, et il a reconnu que si nous voulions ar-
'river, il faillait marcher pour eux, et pour nous.'-Quoted
Rousset, vol. ii. p. 32.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VI.
NOTE 1.-Grave affair.-General Niel regards it [the
opening of the fire] as a grave affair, and so in truth it is.'
—Lord Raglan to Secretary of State, Secret, March 31, 1855.
It may be asked why, if the French commander was privately
resolved to abstain from assaults, either he or his messenger
Niel should regard the bombardment as a 'grave affair';
but to those who have read the foregoing fourth chapter
the answer will readily occur. General Canrobert was pos-
sessed with a notion-not shared, I believe, with Lord Raglan
-that the bombardment would or might provoke a second
and more terrible Inkerman.’ Thus, when he and Lord
Raglan concurred in regarding the intended bombardment
as a 'grave affair,' they concurred on different grounds-
APPENDIX.
361
General Canrobert concurring on the ground last stated, and
Lord Raglan concurring because he took it for granted that
the bombardment would be followed by assaults.
Niel personally, as was afterwards known, strongly objected
to the bombardment; but mainly, it would seem, on the
ground that it might draw on the Allies into acts of vigour
which he thought would prove vain.
Then again it perhaps may be asked why the French ex-
pended time and resources on this immense cannonade with-
out meaning to follow it up. They may possibly have
cherished some hope that the mighty fire brought to bear
on the enemy's earthen defences would either force the
enemy to capitulate, or retreat from the place without fight-
ing; but another and yet stronger motive for resorting to
this cannonade was the evident necessity which forced Niel
and Canrobert to cover the state of abeyance in which they
were keeping the siege by seeming to do something great.
Considering the unmeasured pretension of superiority that
is made by belligerents who go and lay siege to a fortress,
it was all but impossible for the French, under the eyes of
deriding Europe and angry France, to go on presenting the
spectacle of continued impotence without at least trying to
mask it by something like a semblance of action; so that
even if Lord Melbourne himself had been associated with
Niel in his 'mission,' he could hardly have made good his
stand against the remonstrant declaring that 'something ought
to be done.'
The necessity of veiling a plot which enjoined long delays
must of course have been seen from the first; and, unless I
mistake, the expedient of using bombardments as sedatives
to allay the very natural impatience of angry observers was
in the mind of General Niel on even that early day when he
wrote to the Emperor his letter of the 14th of February.*
NOTE 2. See Appendix, Note (2).-The battery was one
pierced for six guns, and six guns accordingly—each a 32-
* Printed in Niel's Siége de Sebastopol, p. 478 et seq.; and see ante,
P. 118.
362
APPENDIX.
pounder-had been placed in readiness to be taken down ;
but during the delays above spoken of, one of the guns was
removed from its fellows, and planted in another battery: so
that the number destined to be actually taken down was five.
-Journal Royal Engineers, vol. ii. p. 129.
NOTE 3.-Enthusiasm.-Shortly before the first bombard-
ment—the one of the 17th of October '54-I was (with two
or three others) on the heights overlooking Sebastopol, when
we saw a small trading-vessel approach from the north and
draw nearer and nearer to the batteries of the Severnaya.
These at length opened upon her, but-under very light
breezes she steadily pursued her course, drawing gradually
nearer and nearer to the mighty sea-forts. Those of the
Severnaya soon opened upon the little vessel with a vast
prodigality of power, and we saw the shots dropping around
her, but all apparently failing to strike her, for there was
no sign of displacement in her rigging or otherwise. She
seemed to have a charmed life.
Her course had brought her very near to the batteries of
the Severnaya, but was bringing her very much nearer to
the even more powerful sea-forts on the south side; and the
incident then became highly exciting to the people of Sebas-
topol. We saw them assemble in numbers on the top of one
of the forts with the evident intention to give themselves
the amusement of seeing the little vessel surrender, or else.
undergo her fate, and be sunk by the mighty artillery of the
Alexander and Nicholas Forts.
The vessel however glided on, and the great South Forts
opened upon her, making havoc with the waters surrounding
her, and most markedly with the sea in her wake, but still
failing (like the North Forts before) to touch the charmed life.
The wonderful calmness with which she held on her
course seemed beyond measure admirable to all, but espe-
cially so to a French officer at my side, who supposed the
little vessel to be English, and was thrown into a frenzy of
enthusiasm. Accosting me impetuously, he declared that
the Queen of England was bound to bestow the very highest
APPENDIX.
363
of all her Orders on the heroic commander of the little sail-
ing-vessel.
The vessel escaped all the wrath of the Sebastopol sea-
forts, and was ultimately brought into one of the Allied
ports by a steamer sent out to aid her. It turned out that
she was an Austrian vessel laden with hay for the use of the
Allies; but a derelict not having a single human being on
board her.
Her captain and crew finding that they could not get an
offing, had abandoned the vessel, first setting her sails and
her rudder in such way as to give her any chance there
might be of sailing past the entrance of the Sebastopol Road-
stead, so that the instance as stated in the text became an
example of composition of forces' so closely resembling a
human resolve as to be actually mistaken for heroism.
But an even better sample of the 'resemblance' I speak
of may be found nearer home-may be found in a little
child's boat when sailing close-hauled,' and 'beating up'
against adverse breezes. She seems to have volition, to have
resource in emergency, to be angry if 'taken aback' or allowed
to 'fall off,' to be swift in repairing the fault, and to show
something like manful pride when again she comes up to the
'wind.'
NOTE 4.-Camel.—Every child that has twirled a teetotum,
or driven a top, is familiar with the vigorous leap that his
toy will suddenly take if he touches it whilst spinning round.
NOTE 5.-Battery.-I suppose that the sobriquet must have
been meant to indicate that Captain Oldershaw, like the ideal
Zouave, was eager and resolute in fighting; but what other
resemblance could have been traced by the inventor of the
nickname one does not easily see.
That abstinence from self-celebration which I have ascribed
to Captain Oldershaw was not characteristic of the Zouave.
เ
NOTE 6. To retire.'-Except Captain Shaw, who thus
came down towards the close of the five hours, and put an
364
APPENDIX.
end to the fight, no officer of rank superior to that of Captain
Oldershaw was present in the battery from first to last on
the 13th of April. Nor did Oldershaw from first to last
receive any orders except those given him the night before
by Captain Oldfield, and the above-mentioned order from
Captain Shaw.
NOTE 7.-To Oldershaw.-Captain Oldfield, it seems, took
pains to inform himself of the tenor of the fight to which
his order had given rise, and addressed to Captain Oldershaw
on the subject a letter which commemorated his fight in
terms of high praise.
That letter has been mislaid; but I am not without hope
that it will be found. Captain Oldfield was killed on the
17th of August 1855.
NOTE S.-Came to an end.-If a man, although wounded,
is still not so gravely disabled as to be prevented from ap-
pearing on parade the next day, there is never a certainty
that he will be included in the Returns of casualties,'
and indeed, as is commonly known, the question whether, in
such a case, he will be returned' or not, is often a matter of
accident or even a matter of choice. Thus, for instance, Lord
Cardigan, who had received the thrust of a lance at the battle
of Balaclava, did not choose at the time to have it returned'
as a wound,' and accordingly his name did not figure in the
list of wounded.' He used afterwards to express his regret
that he had not taken the opposite course, and caused his
name to appear in the 'Return' of officers wounded.
'
Thus it may and does constantly happen that the number
of men really wounded exceeds the number of wounded'
appearing in the official Return; but in this peculiar fight
where 'assaults,' if so one may call them, were being cease-
lessly made by cumbersome sand-bags sent flying under the
impact of cannon-balls, it was plainly to be expected that the
difference between the facts and the figures would be abnor-
mally great; for there was many a man who, when felled
by the blows thus delivered, lay prostrate under the shock in
APPENDIX.
365
an utterly helpless state, yet so free, all the while, from any
injury of a lasting kind as to be able to appear the next day
on parade, and avoid being ever put down in any Return of
the wounded.
The number of gunners thus stricken without being there-
fore returned' was rendered so much the greater by the
feeling which animated them. Every man in those days of
keen expectation strove his best to keep out of hospital,
being not only willing but eager to remain with the force
under arms.
NOTE 9.—Strength of only three men.-Not going with any
minuteness, or even any aim at strict accuracy, into the
painful reckoning of his killed and wounded, Captain Older-
shaw (in a letter written on the day of the fight) said only
that 'half' his men were hors de combat, and Sir Gerald
Graham, as we saw, accepted the same rough estimate. It
is to the kindness of Mr De Vine (whose bravery, as we saw,
was so conspicuous on the day of the fight) that I not only
owe the far more complete statement contained in the text,
but also other careful details which give it additional weight.
In considering Mr De Vine's statement, it should be re-
membered that reinforcements had come down, and that
therefore, when showing the unstricken remnant of the orig-
inal combatants present in the battery to have been reduced
at the last to three, he did not thereby represent the battery
to have been at any time manned by a force so diminutive.
Mr De Vine is now one of our public servants, holding
responsible office in India.
NOTE 10. Any less formal document.-Without using the
language of positive assertion about matters of official busi-
ness occurring in times now long past, I may say what I
understand to have been the mischances from which there
resulted this chasm in the Headquarter records. Lord
Raglan, it seems, had determined that reports on the subject
of these fights in the batteries should be made to him-not
by any artillery officer, but-by a field officer of the Royal
366
APPENDIX.
Engineers, and this special duty was judged to be one of so
much importance that no less a man than Major Gordon,
R.E. (the commander of the Right Attack) was charged with
the task. He, however, whilst repelling the sortie of the
22d of March, was wounded in the right arm, and for that
reason, though not quite at first, it was ultimately found
necessary to relieve him from the duty and to appoint a
successor. His successor was Major Bent, R.E. (one of the
heroes of the battle of Giurgevo), who, entering upon his new
duty on the 14th of April, made that Report of the fights of
that day in the No. VII. and the No. VIII. batteries, which,
as is shown in the text, was warmly approved by Lord Raglan.
But between the time when the state of Major Gordon's wound
prevented his performing the task, and the time when his
successor (Major Bent) entered upon his new function, there
was an interval, which included the 13th of April-the day
of Oldershaw's fight; and thus it resulted that Major Gordon's
wound was the first of the mischances which led to there
being this chasm in the Headquarter records.
With his admirable clearness and mastery of military busi-
ness, reinforced by the knowledge he had in a general way of
the fights maintained in the English batteries, Lord Raglan,
in all probability, would have discovered the error and
hastened to repair it; but then, on the part of the artillery
authorities, there occurred those official mistakes (shown post,
in the sub-notes to Note 15) which made it appear (though
erroneously) that Lord Raglan's commendations applied to
the fight of the 13th as well as to that of the 14th. The
last and clenching mischance (if so one may call it) was the
resolute silence of Captain Oldershaw, who persevered, as we
saw, in abstaining from any attempt to set the authorities right.
NOTE 11. Under him.-I don't except Captain Shaw,
who came down at the close of the fight; because what he
witnessed was-not the struggle itself, but-the havoc it had
wrought.
NOTE 12. To make the truth known.-Considering what I
APPENDIX.
367
have above written on the subject of General Oldershaw's long-
maintained abstinence from self-assertion, it may fairly be
asked whether his reticence has been continued down to this
time, and whether I have been honoured by communications
from him on the subject of his fight of the 13th of April in
the advanced No. VII.'?
The circumstances are these: I some time ago received a
letter from the Provost of Worcester College, Oxford-a gen-
tleman then wholly a stranger to me-in which he did me
the honour to suggest that the fight maintained by his cousin
Captain (now General) Oldershaw on that 13th April 1855
might deserve my attention; and he kindly enclosed to me
copies of two interesting letters on the subject.
When afterwards bending my mind to the period in
question, I became persuaded that it would be right for me
not only to speak of the fight in question, but even to lay
some stress upon it; and-preparing a series of questions-
I ventured to ask that the Provost would have the kindness
to submit these to his gallant relative.
I suppose that the administration of those questions may
have caused the General to reconsider his old determination ;
or indeed he may well have judged that whilst still persever-
ing in his resolve to avoid all complaint, he was not therefore
bound to withhold information from one who was only a
writer endeavouring to learn the truth.
Be that as it may, the General (who had been previously
an entire stranger to me) was so kind as to give me either
orally or in writing all the information I from time to time
demanded from him; and it need hardly be said that the
knowledge I was thus allowed to acquire extended beyond the
mere 'points' on which I assailed him with questions. All
these communications passed between us in the summer and
autumn of the present year 1883; for it happily chanced that
the General was then 'home on leave.'
From the only other combatant officer taking part in the
fight, that is Lieutenant, now Major-General Simpson, I have
also had the advantage of receiving indirect communications
through General Oldershaw. My great obligations to Gen-
368
APPENDIX.
eral Sir Gerald Graham, R.E., V.C., K.C.B., who (then a
Lieutenant) was present and wounded in the battery, are so
amply made evident in the foregoing narrative that I here
need hardly do more than repeat to him my cordial thanks.
NOTE 13.-Engaged under them.-In the teeth of official
documents, I am able to say this with certainty because
having before me the report of Major (now Lieutenant-Gen-
eral) Bent, R.E., with the words appended to it by Lord
Raglan-words showing that he warmly adopted the Major's
account, and made it the basis of the thanks and the praises
next about to be mentioned.
<
<
On the 15th of April, Lord Raglan wrote: 'Colonel Dacres
'will be so good as to communicate to Captains Henry and
Walcott and express to them not only my approbation of
'their conduct and that of the officers and men under them,
but my warmest thanks for their gallantry and steady per-
'severance in discharge of their duty; '* and on the 17th
wrote thus in a despatch addressed to the Secretary of
State:The guns of the Russians have been turned upon
some of our advanced works in vast numbers, and in [one
* In the Official Memorandum of the 28th of April which promul-
gated these thanks and praises to the army, the Brigadier-General
'commanding' the Artillery stated that they were 'Remarks made by
'Field-Marshal Lord Raglan on the conduct of Captains Henry and
• Walcott and the officers and men under their command whilst manning
the guns in Nos. VII. and VIII. Batteries, Left Attack, on the morn-
ings of the 13th and 14th April;' and, since neither Captain Henry
nor Captain Walcott was engaged in either of the advanced batteries on
the 13th, there must have been an official imbroglio. The Memorandum
also promulgated officially a list of 'the officers referred to;' and at the
head of it, as if he were an officer under Captain Henry or Captain
Walcott, whom Lord Raglan had (by reference) thanked, there appears
the name of-of all people in the world!—the name of Captain Older-
shaw, who was not engaged in either of the advanced batteries on the
14th, but was engaged—and, as we have seen, to some purpose-in the
'advanced No. VII.' on the 13th of April.
The Memorandum is a singularly compact little parcel of official mis-
takes. I count eight of them—and all of a seriously misleading sort
-compressed with much neatness into the space of only an inch
or two.
APPENDIX.
369
C
(
particular instance the injury sustained by a particular bat-
tery] was so great that the unremitting exertions of Captains
Henry and Walcott, and the gallantry and determination of
'the artillerymen under their orders, alone enabled them to
'keep up the fire, and to maintain themselves in it.'*
NOTE 14.—The fire of the two ‘advanced batteries.'—The after-
noon reliefs passed through these ordeals with the same valor-
ous persistency as the detachments which they had replaced;
and this was well manifested by the continuance—until after
dark—of the fire maintained by our people; but, so far as I
know, the particulars of those struggles were not recorded
and I must own myself to be as yet unacquainted with even
the names of the officers who (along with the men they had
under them) proved able to keep the advanced batteries un-
silenced from half-past one until nightfall.
NOTE 15.-Defence of Sebastopol.-That General Todleben
was likely to be free from all bias tending to warp his judg-
ment in the direction it took may, I think, be inferred from
the circumstances under which he had acted. By the almost
sudden creation of stupendous batteries the great Engineer
had undertaken to do battle with the siege-guns of the West-
ern Powers; and it would obviously have been delightful to
him to be able to say that he had succeeded. Accordingly,
where he could with truth say so, he did, and with evident
joy. Thus in his pardonable exultation at the ascendant
which his great Redan had obtained over our English bat-
teries, he used even the largish word victory.' What obliged
him to say-to confess that he had failed to prevent the
French from opening a fit path for assault of the Flagstaff
Bastion was plainly his knowledge of the truth.
C
* Upon the supposition that Lord Raglan must have been adverting
to the combats of the 14th, the words I have placed within brackets.
should have been altered by making them plural. Captain Henry and
Captain Walcott did not fight together in any 'one' battery.
VOL. VII.
2 A
370
APPENDIX.
NOTES TO CHAPTER VII.
·
NOTE 1.-Might not after all be unwise.-Niel, p. 239. Le
'front Malakoff étant dévenu le véritable point d'attaque,' p.
213; and elsewhere, p. 239, he speaks of the siege against the
Town front as if it were 'secondaire.' With our knowledge
of the 'motive' there was for keeping French enterprise down
in a state of abeyance (see ante, cap. v.), we of course must
naturally yield less attention than might be otherwise right
to any reason' assigned for taking the preordained course.
Niel (who does not always so frame his language as to make
it clear whether he is expressing the view of the French
military authorities generally, or simply his own personal
opinion) can hardly have meant to say that the siege against
the Town front had become so decisively 'secondary' as to
warrant acquiescence under the enemy's encroachments in
that part of the field.
1
I have myself, it is true, represented that, considering the
immense value of the Malakoff position, an earnest conflict
maintained in that part of the field would more and more
draw to itself the energies of both the besiegers and the
besieged; but this was not originally the idea entertained by
the French themselves, and the paper they framed on the 2d
of February 1855 was so worded as to exclude with great care
any notion that the siege against the Town front was to lose
any part of its importance. From that day, accordingly, until
after the opening of this period, the siege against the Town
front (which was conducted by the formidable Pélissier) con-
tinued to be pressed on with vigour, whilst the new siege-
the one against the Malakoff-was maintained, as we have
seen, with so little resolution that-far from advancing-it
retrograded.
NOTE 2. Somewhat unscrupulous. - The Czar naturally
protested against this unprovoked Declaration of War by
Sardinia; but except on the principle that sanction for any
APPENDIX.
371
opinion can be gathered from the teachers of International
'Law,' a denouncer, treating Cavour's intervention as 'un-
'scrupulous,' could hardly be recommended to look for sup-
port in his Grotius.
When once war is constituted between two or more Powers,
the quaint, old, unheeded admonitions against 'unjust wars
don't aim, I think, even in theory at the conscience of any
other Power disposed to join in the fray.
NOTE 3.-Always thoroughly cordial.-I had the honour at
one time of being acquainted with the late Count Genoa de
Revel,* the Sardinian officer acting at the English Headquar-
ters as an organ of communication with General la Marmora,
and it was always in terms of devoted, enthusiastic attach-
ment that the Count used to speak of Lord Raglan.
NOTE TO CHAPTER VIII.
NOTE 1.-To be attempted. It must not be supposed that a
note of this kind was based upon that general opinion which in
terms it might seem to express; for the English on such occa-
sions did not sit in judgment on the opportunities of assault
which the French might really have before them, nor vice
versa. The French would simply say, 'we don't yet see our
'way to assaulting those defences which we confront,' and
their announcement would be treated as conclusive; as (re-
ciprocally) would be that of the English, who at their huge
distance from the Redan, had of course no intention of sending
infantry against it otherwise than in concert with assaults
simultaneously undertaken by the French.
Lord Raglan, I believe, had no independent means of be-
* A brother of the late Count Adrian de Revel, long the Sardinian
Minister at the Court of St James's, and greatly loved and esteemed in
this country.
372
APPENDIX.
coming acquainted with the full extent of the havoc wrought
on those Works which were attacked by the French siege-
guns, and he almost necessarily-received his impressions
on that subject from General Canrobert. Of course Canro-
bert's representations as to the failure of the bombardment
seemed to be every day receiving confirmation, because (owing
to the repairs every night) the enemy's defences each morning
seemed as strong as they had been at the first.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IX.
NOTE 1.- This part of the plan.-Lord Panmure afterwards
learnt that Sir Colin Campbell had pronounced the Mackenzie
Heights to be virtually impregnable, and became very angry
with Lord Ellenborough, through whom Sir Colin's opinion
had been made known in London.
NOTE 2.—Take effect by surprise.-Speaking of the force he
had meant to lead up from Aloushta, the Emperor wrote that
it was sufficient 'pour détruire toute l'armée Russe qui pouvait
'être surprise, et prise à revers avant d'avoir par réuner toutes
ses forces.'
<
6
It is hard to see how the Emperor (in the then listening
state of the world) could have hoped to see his plan take effect
by way of surprise like that famous Marengo campaign which
he seems to have had in his mind.
NOTE 3.-Or otherwise into the sea.-After speaking of what
was to be first achieved by his Army of Diversion, and of its
capture of Simferopol, the Emperor says: 'On s'empare de
'cette ville, et on y laisse une garnison suffisante, ou bien on
occupe sur la route que nous venons de parcourir une bonne
'position qui assure les derrières de l'armée. Maintenant de
deux choses l'une; ou l'armée Russe qui est en position de-
APPENDIX.
373
1
6
vant Sébastopol abandonne cette formidable position pour
venir à la rencontre de l'armée qui s'avance du coté de
Batchi Seräi, et alors la première armée d'opérations sous
'les ordres de Lord Raglan la pousse l'épée dans les reins, et
s'empare de la position d'Inkerman;* ou bien les Russes at-
'tendent dans leur lignes l'arrivée de l'armée qui vient de
Simféropol, et alors celle-çi s'avance de Batchi Seräi sur Sé-
bastopol en appuyant toujours sa gauche aux montagnes,
fait sa jonction avec l'armée du Maréchal Raglan qui s'est
'avancé de Baidar sur Alhat, repousse l'armée Russe, et la re-
'jette dans Sébastopol, ou dans la mer.'
6
I make this extract from the Emperor's later exposition of
his plan; but nearly, if not quite the same words are con-
tained in his Letter of the 27th of April.
NOTE 4. To avert the catastrophe.-As regards the siege-
army, this is amply shown by the statements contained in
Cap. XI.
As regards the force invading from Aloushta, we may say
that (unless upon the improbable supposition of the enemy's
being taken by surprise) the Army of Diversion' would
have to do what is commonly understood to be all but impos-
sible, that is, to debouch from mountain-passes in the face of
an enemy both powerful and fully prepared.
As regards the 1st Army of Operation' confided to the
English Commander, we must see that the more deeply Lord
Raglan might become engaged in trying to execute the Em-
peror's plan, the more impossible he would find it to come in
good time to the rescue of either the 'Siege Army,' or 'the
'Army of Diversion.'
* The Emperor, adopting Russian nomenclature, means the Heights
on the right bank of the river, which I call the 'Old City Heights.'
374
APPENDIX.
NOTES TO CHAPTER X.
NOTE 1.—Into full play.—The laying down of the cable
had been completed a week before; but till afterwards, the
appliances needed for making it carry a message were not
brought into due order.
From the beginning of the War, land-service wires of the
electric telegraph had been occasionally used; but till after
the laying down of the submarine cable, they did no more than
reduce the transit by about three days-i.e. for example from
about thirteen days to ten.
NOTE 2.-Could not divine. A note accompanying Can-
robert's communication of the telegram said: 'Les deux
chiffres conservés sont faux, et n'ont pû être traduits.' One
learns from the Emperor's letter of the 7th of May to Lord
Cowley that by '45' was meant 'defensive position,' and by
450,'attack the Russian army.'
NOTE 3.—In their rear.-Under many conditions not hard
to imagine, the howl of the Imperial City might have pre-
saged grave troubles for the Allies; and it was well that the
puissant Ambassador, after an absence of several days, oppor-
tunely returned to his charge. Lord Stratford de Redcliffe
had been visiting the Crimea. He landed there on the 26th
of April, and left its shore in the evening of the 3d of May.
NOTES TO CHAPTER XI.
NOTE 1.—Campaigning Plan.—This Paper describing itself
as Le Plan de Campagne élaboré par S.M. L'Empereur Na-
'poléon III.' is marked 'Très secret,' but not dated, and was
handed by Canrobert to Lord Raglan on the 14th of May. It
APPENDIX.
375
is much more compressed than the Letter of the 27th of April,
and Canrobert, I see, in his note, calls it the 'résumé of the
Plan.' It purports, I see, to assign 70,000 instead of 60,000
men for the defence of the siege-works; but the larger figure
was meant, I believe, to include the 10,000 'indisponibles'
mentioned in the previous exposition, and did not therefore
import any change. This last Exposition discards the words
which had described Lord Raglan's Army of Operation' as
'destined to seize the Mackenzie Heights,' but in other respects
it does not differ very materially from the Letter of the 27th
of April. Both these Papers were frankly imparted to our
people the first one of the 27th of April to our Government,
and the second, as we saw, to Lord Raglan. One or other of
the two Papers was brought out by Colonel Favé.
NOTE 2.- To act in the field. Canrobert seems to have
understood-but I am sure erroneously-that Lord Raglan
whilst in the Conference was willing to split his force into
two armies, and did not until the next day refuse to do so.
NOTE 3.-The hopes he had entertained of being attacked by
the enemy on the reopening of the bombardment.-His words
were:- La non-attaque de nos lignes extérieure par l'ennemi
' a la réouverture du feu, attaque qui paraissait très-probable,
' et sur laquelle j'avais fondé des espérances d'un succès plus
· décisif que celui d'Inkerman.' To learn how conspicuously
this disappointment at not being attacked contrasted with
Canrobert's former moods, see ante, p. 84.
END OF VOL. VII.
PRINTED BY WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS.
E.
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