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THE ANGLO-AMERICAN
AGREEMENT OF 1817
FOR DISARMAMENT ON THE GREAT LAKES
gc
13%‘?
CHARLES HEEEVERMORE
PUBLISHED MONTHLY BY THE
WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
40 MT. VERNON STREET, BOSTON

June, 1914
Vol. IV. No. 4

Entered as second-class matter January 15, 1913, at the t-oﬁice at Boston, Mass.,
under the Act of August 24, 19


“SW”
Fir-2%
AHUA
THE PERMANENT PRESERVATION OF PEACE.
It is the sincere Wish and, so far as depends upon them, the deter-
mined intention of the American Government that the peace, so
happily restored between the two countries, should be cemented by
every suitable measure of conciliation and by that mutual reliance
upon good faith, far better adapted to the maintenance of national
harmony than the jealous and exasperating deﬁance of complete
armor. The undersigned mentioned to his lordship the incident of
an American merchant vessel having been ﬁred upon by a British
armed vessel upon Lake Erie. The increase of naval armaments on
one side upon the Lakes during peace Will necessitate the like increase
on the other and, besides causing an aggravation of useless expense
to both parties, must operate as a continual stimulus of suspicion and
of ill-will upon the inhabitants and local authorities of the borders
against those of their neighbors.
The moral and political tendency of such a system must be to War
and not to peace. The American Government proposes mutually
to reduce to the same extent all naval armaments upon those Lakes.
The degree to Which they shall be reduced is left at the option of
Great Britain. The greater the reduction the more acceptable it
Will be to the President of the United States; and most acceptable
of all should it be agreed to maintain on either side during the peace
no other force than such as may be necessary for the collection of the
revenue. . . . The undersigned may conﬁdently hope that this proposal
mutually and equally to disarm upon the American Lakes Will be
received and entertained in the same spirit in Which it Was made,
as a pledge of intentions sincerely friendly and earnestly bent upon
the permanent preservation of peace—Extract from John Quincy
Adams’s letter to Lord Castlereagh, M aroh 21, 1816, containing a
reiteration of the proposal for disarmament on the Great Lakes, ﬁrst
made by Mr. Adams, January 2 5, I816.
THE ANGLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF
1817 FOR DISARMAMENT.
The armed peace in which the great powers now live is based upon
a tacit or expressed acceptance of these propositions:
r. The surest way to maintain peace is to be always well prepared
for war;
2. In order to be well prepared for war a nation must increase its
armaments annually if necessary in order to equal or surpass the cor-
responding force of any and all neighbors who might become aggres-
s1ve.
The latter doctrine stimulates a universal competition in arma-
ments which absorbs vast revenues but does not change the relative
military and naval strength of the competitors. This is the belief
which has produced an armed peace almost as demoralizing as the
“organized insanity of war” itself. Imperial chancellors and ﬁnan-
cial ministers introduce military and naval budgets each year with
pious expressions of regret that it is not yet safe to diminish such
expenditures. ,Leaders of the people like Mr. Asquith express the
hope that the people will at some time insist upon better methods
of insuring the peace of the world, and such a statesman as Sir Edward
Grey is conﬁdent that the ratio of the English ﬂeet to that of its
chief rival must not fall below 16 to 10, though he is willing to
predict that the time will come when nations will run together to
stop a war as readily and naturally as neighbors now run to put
out a ﬁre.
If these statesmen and leaders of the people would study the
history of Anglo-American relations along our northern boundary
since 1814, they would ﬁnd a perfect object lesson in the methods
by which international peace may be secured and maintained, even
though many provocations to dissension be not lacking. More
particularly they would ﬁnd in the Agreement of 1817 concern-
ing armaments on the Great Lakes a perfect illustration of the politi-
cal wisdom that has created a transcontinental boundary nearly
4,000 miles long without in these latter days a single need of a fort,
a cannon, or a soldier.
4 THE ANGLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817
The uninterrupted peace of that boundary rests on the accept-
ance of these propositions:
I. The surest way to maintain peace is to prepare deliberately for
permanent peace;
2. The permanence of peace will be insured by discarding the ap-
paratus of war, and providing other means of settling controversies.
These ideas were adopted by English and American statesmen at
the end of a sharp and bitter war wherein the lower Lakes and their
shores and the upper St. Lawrence valley had been the scene of most
of the military operations. It would have been natural to suppose
that our northern border from Champlain to Superior would have
become the breeding-place of enmities and fears like those which have
existed for forty years between Metz and Belfort. Forts, soldiers
and ships of war were still facing each other in hostile array along
that border, and many under the Union Jack burned to wipe out
what they considered the stain of defeats by Perry and Macdonough.
Canadians were keenly aware that our war party had expected to
annex all that colony, and both Canadians and Englishmen arose to
demand that the Lakes must be all British, and that an Indian terri-
tory under English protection, including the lands south and west of
the upper Lakes, must be interposed between Canada and its restless
neighbor. Such was the ﬁrst demand of the English commissioners
who negotiated the treaty of Ghent. England then felt burdened
with the responsibility of defending in Canada a weak colonial frontier
exposed to the ill-will or envy of an aggressive neighbor. The United
States, on the other hand, looked with apprehension at the Canadian
line, behind which one of the greatest powers in the world could at
any time prepare an attack.
The idea of disarmament as a prevention of war was embodied in
the instructions sent by Edmund Randolph, Washington’s secretary
of state, to John Jay in 1794.I Twenty years later Lord Castlereagh 2
placed among his instructions to the English commissioners at Ghent
the following paragraph, later marked “N 015 used”:
N .B. In order to put an end to the jealousies which may arise by the construc-
tion of ships of war on the Lakes, it should be proposed that the two contracting
parties should reciprocally bind themselves not to construct any ships of war on
'{lmm'mn Slate Pagers, Foreign Relations, I, 473. This is the seventeenth item among the in-
structlons for a commercial treaty.
‘Robert Stewart, Viscount Castlereagh, second Marquis of Londonderry (1769-1822), from 1790
to the time of his death a leader of the Tory party, and in the period from 1812 to 1816 (he was secre-
for foreign aﬁalrs from 1812 to 182 2) he was the most inﬂuential statesman and diplomat
1n urope.
THE AN GLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817 5
any of the Lakes; and should entirely dismantle those which are now in commis-
sion, or are preparing for service}
Mr. Gallatin also suggested to his colleagues in private conference
the possibility of a mutual disarmament upon the Lakes, and wrote
about it to Secretary Monroe,4 but the subject was not broached in
the ofﬁcial discussions at Ghent, except in the form of a British de-
mand, soon dropped, that the United States alone should withdraw
all force from the Great Lakes.5
When the war ceased our treasury was empty, and the military
and naval expenditures on the Lakes, including the construction of
two frigates on Lake Ontario, were practically suspended. By act of
Congress, February 27, 1815, the President was authorized to sell
or put out of commission all armed vessels on the Lakes except such
as might be necessary for the enforcement of the revenue laws.
The British on the other hand had begun the construction of a
frigate on Lake Champlain, and it was declared both in Canada and
in England that the defenses and armaments in Canada would be
steadily strengthened. In the spring and summer of 1815 complaints
came that British armed vessels on the Lakes were exercising the
right of search, English oﬂicers were accused of pursuing oﬁenders
into American territory, and on the other hand American oﬁicers
were charged with inciting British soldiers to desert.
Meanwhile President Madison and his secretary examined some
English newspapers sent in August by Minister Adams. These
journals contained announcements that the Cabinet had determined
to augment the naval force on the Great Lakes. The result was
this letter of instruction to John Quincy Adams, now American min-
ister to England:
The information you give of orders having been issued by the British Govem-
ment to increase its naval force on the Lakes is conﬁrmed by intelligence from
that quarter of measures having been actually adopted for the purpose.
It is evident, if each party augments its force there, with a view to obtain the
ascendancy over the other, that vast expense will be incurred and the danger
8 See I. M. Callahan, The Neutrality of the American Lakes, Baltimore, ohns Hopkins University,
1898, p. 61, quoting from “America,” Vol. 128, Public Record Oﬁice,Lon on.
4 I. Q. Adams: Memoirs, III, 51; and H. Adams: Writings of Gallatin, I, 640.
5 Memoirs and Correspondence of Lord Castlereagh, Vol. X, 67-72, 86-91; American State Papers,
Foreign Relations, III, 717, 718. That the question of armaments on the Great Lakes continued to
cause disquietude in the minds of the British ministers is shown in the correspondence between Lord
Liverpool and the Duke of Wellington in October and November, 1814, when the former was trying
to persuade the Duke to go to America with full powers to make either peace or war. Under date of
November 13, Lord Liverpool suggests that the American control of Lake Champlain might be con-
ceded, but that British superiority on Lake Ontario ought to be established and maintained. See
Wellington: Supplementary Despatehes, IX, 405, 424, 430.
6 THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817
of collision augmented in like degree. The President is sincerely desirous to
prevent an evil which, it is presumed, is equally to be deprecated by both Gov-
ernments. He, therefore, authorizes you to propose to the British Government
such an arrangement respecting the naval force to be kept on the Lakes by both
Governments as will demonstrate their paciﬁc policy and secure their peace. He
is willing to conﬁne it on each side to a certain moderate number of armed vessels,
and the smaller the number the more agreeable to him; or to abstain altogether
from an armed force beyond that used for the revenue. You will bring this sub-
ject under the consideration of the British Government immediately after the
receipt of this letter.6
Before Mr. Adams had an opportunity to present the subject to
Lord Castlereagh, he held an interesting conversation with his friend,
Alexander Baring, in the counting-house of Baring Bros. and Com-
pany, and among many topics of interest that were discussed was
that of Canada and its defenses.
“I said that the disposition on both sides seemed at present so
paciﬁc that I hoped we should have a long and quiet peace. I was
sorry, however, to hear that they were increasing their armaments
on the Lakes of Canada, because arming on one side would make it
of course necessary to arm on the other, and we had been disposed,
on the contrary, to disarm there.
“He said their arming was the foolishest thing in the world, ‘for,’
said he, ‘we are “the lamb ” in Canada; it is in vain for us to think of
growing strong there in the same proportion as America. But surely
our ministers will consent to disarm there on both sides.’
“I said they had always a suﬂicient security against a sudden
attack upon Canada, by the exposed state of our commerce. He
replied that he wished the British Government would give us Canada
at once. It was not worth Sir James Yeo’s hundred-gun ship] and
was ﬁt for nothing but to breed quarrels.n8
About a fortnight later, January 25, 1816, Mr. Adams met Lord
Castlereagh by appointment. The best report of the conference
is that which Adams conﬁded to his journal:
Mr. Adams said: “A circumstance of still more importance is the
increase of the British armaments, since the peace, on the Canadian
Lakes. Such armaments on one side render similar and counter-
armaments indispensable on the other. Both Governments must
‘ MS. Instructions to U. S. Ministers, VIII, 3; H. Doc. 471, 56 Cong. 1 sess. 5; Moore, Digest
of International Law, I, 691-692.
_ 1 Sir ames Lucas Yeo (1782-1818) was British naval commander on the Lakes during the war,
with hea quarters at Kingston, on Lake Ontario.
‘Adams: Memoirs, III, 279.
THE ANGLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817 7
thus be subjected to a heavy and in time of peace a useless expense,
and every additional armament creates new and very dangerous
incitements to irritation and acts of hostility. The American
Government, anxious above all for the preservation of peace, has
authorized me to propose a reduction of the armaments upon the
Lakes on both sides. The extent of the reduction the President
leaves at the pleasure of Great Britain, observing that the greater
it is the more it will conform to his preference, and that it would
best of all suit the United States if the armaments should be con-
ﬁned to What is necessary for the protection of the revenue.”
Lord Castlereagh replied: “Does your Government mean to in-
clude in this proposition the destruction of the ships already exist-
ing there? As to keeping a number of armed vessels parading about
the Lakes in time of peace, it would be absurd. There can be no
motive for it, and everything beyond what is necessary to guard
against smuggling is calculated only to produce mischief. The prop-
osition you make is very fair, and, so far as it manifests paciﬁc
dispositions, I assure you, will meet with the sincerest reciprocal
dispositions of this Government. I will submit the proposal to their
consideration. But you know we are the weaker part there. There-
fore it was that we proposed at Ghent that the whole Lakes should
belong to one party—all the shores; for then armaments would not
have been necessary. Then there would have been a large and wide
natural separation between the two territories; and those, I think, are
the best and most effectual to preserve peace.”
Mr. Adams rejoined: “But the proposition at Ghent to which we
objected was that the disarming should be all on one side. There
was indeed afterward intimated to us by the British Plenipotentiaries
an intention to make us a proposal so fair and reasonable, that it
was thought no objection could be made against it. We did suppose
that it was this identical proposition which I am now authorized to
make. It was not, however, brought forward, nor was any explana-
tion given by the British Plenipotentiaries of what they had intended
by their offer. My instructions now do not explicitly authorize me
to include in the agreement to keep up no armaments the destruction
of the vessels already there; but, if this Government assents to the
principle, there will be ample time to concert mutually all the details.
What I could now agree to would be to have no armed force actually
out upon the Lakes, and to build no new vessels.”
Lord Castlereagh: “It so happened that just at the close of
8 THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817
the war we were obliged to make extraordinary exertions there,
and to build a number of new vessels to maintain our footing
there.”
Mr. Adams: “But it is the new armaments since the peace which
have necessarily drawn the attention of my Government.”
Lord Castlereagh: “You have so much the advantage of us by
being there, immediately on the spot, that you can always, even in
a shorter time than we can, be prepared for defense.”
Mr. Adams: “The stipulation to keep or build no new armed force
during the peace would therefore be in favor of Great Britain,
because the very act of arming would then be an act of hostility.”
Lord Castlereagh: “That is, there could be no arming until the
war actually commenced, and then you would have such an advance
of time upon us by your position that we should not stand upon an
equal footing for defense.”
Mr. Adams: “Still the operation of the engagement would be in
favor of Great Britain. We should have our hands tied until the
movement of actual war, a state which it is impossible should suddenly
arise on our part. It is impossible that war should be commenced
by us without a previous state of things which would give ample
notice to this country to be prepared. She might then have every-
thing in readiness to commence her armament upon the Lakes at the
same moment with us, and we should be deprived of the advantage
arising from our local position.”
Lord Castlereagh: “Well, I will propose it to the Government for
consideration.”9
Mr. Adams heard nothing further from his Lordship about this
subject, so on March 21 he formally renewed the proposal. During
the last week of that month and the ﬁrst week in April, the topic of
Canada and its relations to the United States and England was
threshed out in the debates in the House of Commons on the navy
estimates. Jingo speakers were in evidence 1° and Adams thought
that the proposal was doomed. On April 9 he was perhaps agreeably
surprised to learn from Lord Castlereagh that the British Govern-
ment would accept the “proposal of the American Government that
there might be no unnecessary naval force upon the Lakes in active
service or in commission, so that there would be nothing like the
v Adams: Memoirs, III, 287-288.
1° Hansard: Ifarl Debates, Vol. 33, pp. 376-378, 567-591. Sir Joseph Yorke (p. 581) declared that
the growing and gigantic naval power _of America must not be overlooked. “She was no longer to
contended against by bumboat expeditions; her three-deckers now sailed upon fresh water,” etc.
THE AN GLO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817 9
appearance of a dispute which side should have the strongest force
there. The armed vessels might be laid up, as they called it here,
in ordinary. It was in short the disposition of the British Govern-
ment fully to meet the proposition made to them, and the only armed
force which they should want to have in service might be vessels for
conveying troops occasionally from one station to another.”
Mr. Adams said that he had neither special instructions nor powers
to conclude any ﬁnal agreement on the subject, and now that the
principle was mutually accepted that no new armaments should be
made by either side, he suggested that it would save time and be
perhaps most advisable that the proposal should be made imme-
diately to the Government of the United States and through the
British minister at Washington.II
The British minister at Washington was now Charles Bagot.1E2
He received from Lord Castlereagh instructions, under date of April
.23, 1816, empowering him to negotiate with our Government con-
cerning armaments on the Lakes. Eight days before, Mr. Adams had
written to inform Secretary Monroe concerning the agreement be-
tween the two ministers on April 9. Mr. Bagot, moving leisurely
in the diplomatic manner, addressed his ﬁrst formal message on this
topic to Mr. Monroe on July 26, as follows:
Sir: Mr. Adams having intimated to His Majesty’s Government that it was
the wish of the Government of the United States that some understanding should
be had, or agreement entered into, between the two countries in regard to their
naval armaments upon the Lakes, which, while it tended to diminish the expenses
of each country, might diminish also the chances of collision and prevent any
feelings of jealousy, I have the honor to acquaint you that I have received Lord
Castlereagh’s instructions to assure you that His Royal Highness the Prince
Regent will cheerfully adopt, in the spirit of Mr. Adams’s suggestion, any reason-
able system which may contribute to the attainment of objects so desirable to
both states.
Mr. Adams not having entered into any detailed explanation of the precise
views of his Government for giving effect to the principle which he had oﬁered for
consideration, the British Government is unacquainted with the particular arrange-
ments which the Government of the United States would propose to make for
this purpose; but I have been instructed to assure you of the general disposi-
tion of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent to listen with satisfaction to any
proposal which may secure such ends, and of his readiness to act in a spirit
11 Adams: Memoirs, III, 329.
" Sir Charles Bagot (1781-1843), close friend of George Canning, British minister to the United
States from 1815 to 1820, and after various other diplomatic services, governongeneral of_tl_1e united
provinces of Canada, 1841-1843. He aided in the establishment of the ﬁrst responsible mlnlstry in a
purely parliamentary government in Canada, much to the dlstress of 1118 superior oﬁicers 111 the
British ministry, whose severe censure virtually killed him
IO THE AN GLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817
of the most entire conﬁdence upon the principle which has been suggested by
Mr. Adams.
I have the honor to be, with the highest consideration, Sir, your most obedient
humble servant,
(Signed) CHARLES BAGOT."
The answer from Mr. Monroe was dated August 2, 1816. The
ﬁrst two paragraphs rehearse, according to custom, the substance of
Mr. Bagot’s letter, and then Mr. Monroe continues as follows:
I infer from your letter that you are desirous of obtaining a precise project,
either for the purpose of acting on it here immediately, in conformity with the
powers already given you, or of transmitting it to your Government for its con—
sideration. Whether it be for the one or the other purpose, I am instructed to
afford all the facility that I may be able; though it would, undoubtedly, be more
agreeable to the President that the arrangement should be made and executed
with the least delay possible
I have the honor now to state that the President is willing, in the spirit of the
peace which so happily exists between the two nations, and until the proposed
arrangement shall be canceled, in the manner hereinafter suggested, to conﬁne
the naval force to be maintained on the Lakes, on each side, to the following
vessels, i.e., on Lake Ontario, to one vessel not exceeding 100 tons burden and
one 18-lb. cannon; and on the upper Lakes to two vessels of like burden and force;
and on the waters of Lake Champlain, to one vessel not exceeding the like burden
and force; and that all other armed vessels on those Lakes shall be forthwith dis-
mantled; and likewise that neither party shall build or arm any other vessel on
the shores of those Lakes.
That the naval force thus retained by each party on the Lakes shall be re-
stricted in its duty to the protection of its revenue laws, the transportation of
troops and goods, and to such other services as will in no respect interfere with
the armed vessels of the other party.
That should either of the parties be of opinion, hereafter, that this arrange-
ment did not accomplish the object intended by it, and be desirous of annulling
it, and give notice thereof, it shall be void and of no effect after the expiration of
— months from the date of such notice.
If this project corresponds with the views of your Government, and you are
authorized to accede to it, under any modiﬁcations which you may propose, and
in which we can agree, I am instructed to give it immediate effect, either by con-
vention, the interchange of notes, or in any form which may be thought best
adapted to the ends proposed.
If, on the other hand, you consider it your duty to submit this project to your
Government for consideration, and to wait its sanction before you can adopt it,
and have power to make, ad interim, any provisional reciprocal arrangement, having
the same objects in view, I shall be happy to digest with you such provisional
arrangement, and to carry it reciprocally into effect, for such time and in such
manner, as may be agreed on; or should your powers be adequate, I am ready to
xIAmerioart State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 202—207.
THE ANGLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817 II
concur in an immediate suspension of any further construction or equipment of
armed vessels for any of the waters above named.
I have the honor to be, etc.,
(Signed) JAMES MONROE.
The Right Hon. CHARLES BAGOT.
Mr. Bagot replied, August 6, that he was not authorized to con-
clude deﬁnitively any agreement as to details, but he adds:
I shall therefore immediately forward for consideration the proposal contained
in your letter, but I shall in the meantime willingly take upon myself to give effect
to any arrangement upon which we may mutually agree for the purpose of sus-
pending the further construction and equipment of armed vessels upon the Lakes
and of generally abstaining from exertion in those quarters.
Mr. Monroe, under date of August 12, 1816, answered thus:
To this delay no objection is entertained, provided such a provisional arrange-
ment is made as may accomplish the just objects which our Governments have
in view. This arrangement, however like the other, should be equal. In the
same spirit, therefore, I now propose the regulations stated in my former note to
be adopted as a provisional arrangement. If your powers authorize and you ap-
prove those regulations, on being assured that you will adopt a similar measure,
an order will be immediately issued by this Government for carrying them fully
into effect.
If your powers do not extend to this object, but are conﬁned exclusively to the
suspension of the further augmentation of the naval force on the Lakes, I have
then to observe, that on receiving from you a statement of the force which your
Government now has on the Lakes, with an assurance that its further augmenta-
tion shall be suspended, an order will be immediately issued by this Government
for conﬁning the naval force of the United States there strictly within the same
limit.
Mr. Bagot replied the next day, August 13 , that he was not author-
ized to make even provisionally any precise agreement concerning
the limitation of the respective naval forces upon the Lakes; “ . . .
in any such agreement, whether permanent or provisional, reference
must equally be had to the arrangements of a peace establishment and
the ordinary administration of his Majesty’s provinces. I am not
in possession of a correct statement of his Majesty’s naval force now
in commission upon the Lakes, but I will take the earliest means of
procuring and communicating to you the most accessible information
upon this point; and I can in the meantime give you the assurance
that all further augmentation of it will be immediately suspended.”
On receiving Monroe’s note of August 2, I816, Bagot wrote to
Castlereagh on August 1 2:
I2 THE AN GLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817
I found that besides a proposal for a much larger reduction of the Naval Force
than seemed compatible with the ordinary business of a Peace Establishment, it
contained certain restrictions as to the employment of the Vessels to be retained
which appeared to me to have some object in view beyond the principal one . . .
professed by the American Government. I therefore in returning the draft to
Mr. Monroe, carefully avoided entering into any discussion whatever of the
terms. . . . It is distinctly understood between Mr. Monroe and myself, that if,
upon the receipt of my letter by the Commander of His Majesty’s Naval Forces,
any of the armed vessels now building shall be in that state of progress in which
they cannot be laid up or dismantled without injury to the materials, it shall be
permitted to complete them so far as is necessary for their preservation.
When Mr. Bagot referred the matter back to Lord Castlereagh,
Secretary Monroe thought that Minister Adams would conclude the
negotiations. Mr. Adams believed that the British ministry were
merely playing with the proposal and seeking to gain time while
they increased and perfected their armaments in North America.
September 27, 1816, he wrote to Secretary Monroe:
While Mr. Bagot was negotiating and receiving your speciﬁc proposition to be
transmitted here, 52,000 tons of ordnance stores have been dispatched to Canada
with the avowed purpose of arming their new-constructed forts and new-built
ships upon the Lakes.
Mr. Adams’s doubts may have been strengthened by the news
of events in Canada. The commander of the British ship Tecumseh
on Lake Erie had boarded several United States vessels. Of this Mr.
Adams complained to Lord Castlereagh on August 29. Similar com-
plaints were made in July at Washington about a right of search ex-
ercised by the British ship Huron near Malden. Lord Castlereagh
immediately issued orders to discourage such proceedings. Mr. Bagot
also communicated with the governor of Canada and others, and the
provocations ended.
Nearly three months later, under date of November 4, 1816, Mr.
Bagot sent to Mr. Monroe a list of the British naval forces on the
Lakes. He also wrote that the proposals made on August 2 had been
submitted to Lord Castlereagh, and that all increase of the aforesaid
naval force on the Lakes had been suspended until the decision of
his Majesty’s Government should be known. The following was the
list submitted:M
Statement of his Majesty’s naval force on the Lakes of Canada,
September 1, 1816.
"American State Papers, Foreign Relations, IV, 208.
THE AN GLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817 13
ON LAKE ONTARIO.
St. Lawrence, can carry 110 guns, laid up in ordinary.
Psyche, can carry 50 guns, laid up in ordinary.
Princess Charlotte, can carry 40 guns, laid up in ordinary.
Niagara, can carry 20 guns, condemned as unﬁt for service.
Charwell, can carry 14 guns, hauled up in the mud; condemned likewise.
Prince Regent, can carry 60 guns, in commission, but unequipped, being merely
used as a barrack or receiving ship, and the commander-in-chief’s head-
quarters.
Montreal, in commission, carrying 6 guns; used merely as a transport for the
service of His Majesty.
Star, carrying 4 guns; used for current duties only, and unﬁt for actual service.
N etley, schooner, carrying no guns; attached for the most part to the surveyors,
and conveying His Majesty’s servants from port to port. There are, besides
the above, some row-boats, capable of carrying long guns; two 74 gun ships
on the stocks, and one transport of 400 tons, used for conveying His Majesty’s
stores from port to port.
ON LAKE ERIE.
Tecumseh and Newark, carrying 4 guns each; and Huron and Sank, which can
carry 1 gun each. These vessels are used principally to convey His Majesty’s
servants and stores from port to port.
ON LAKE Honors.
The Conﬁance and Surprise, schooners, which may carry 1 gun each, and are
used for purposes of transport only.
ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN.
12 gunboats; IO of which are laid up in ordinary, and the other 2 (one of which
mounts 4 guns, and the other 3 guns) used as guard-boats. Besides the
above there are some small row-boats, which are laid up as unﬁt for service.
Keel, stem, and stern-post of a frigate laid down at the Isle aux Noix.
(Signed) ]. BAUMGARDT.
Capt. of His M ajesty’s ship, Prince Regent,
and senior oﬂicer.
Secretary Monroe furnished Mr. Bagot November 7, 1816, with a
similar statement of the American naval forces:15
ON LAKE ONTARIO.
Brig Jones (18 guns). Retained for occasional service. Schooner, Lady of the
Lake (1 gun). Employed in aid of the revenue laws.
Ship New Orleans (74 guns). On the stocks, building suspended.
Ship Chippewa (74 guns). On the stocks, building suspended.
Ships, Superior (44 guns), Mohawk (32 guns), General Pike (24 guns), Madison
(18 guns); and the brigs Jefferson (18 guns), Sylph (16 guns), and Oneida
(18 guns). Dismantled.
Schooner Raven. Receiving vessel.
15 barges (each 1 gun). Laid up for preservation.
*5 Quoted by Callahan from “America,” Vol. 142, Public Records Oﬂice.
14 THE AN GLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817
ON LAKE Em.
Schooners Porcupine and Ghent (each 1 gun). Employed in transporting stores.
Ship Detroit (18 guns), and brigs Lawrence (20 guns) and Queen Charlotte (14 guns).
Sunk at Erie.
Brig Niagara (18 guns). Dismantled at Erie.
ON LAKE CHAMPLAIN.
Ships Conﬁance (32 guns) and Saratoga (22 guns); brigs Eagle (12 guns) and
Sinnet (16 guns); the schooner Ticonderoga (14 guns); and 6 galleys (each
1 gun). All laid up at Whitehall.
To this list of the naval forces of the United States Secretary
Monroe added the announcement that “orders will be immediately
given by this Government to prevent any augmentation of it beyond
the limit of the British naval force on those waters.”
The next day, November 8, Mr. Monroe notiﬁed Mr. Bagot that
such orders had been issued. On the same day Mr. Bagot wrote
to say that the American list made no return of any force upon the
upper Lakes. He inquired whether the force upon those Lakes was
included in the list of force on Lake Erie. Mr. Monroe promptly
replied in the affirmative.
Not until April 28, 1817, when Mr. Monroe had become President
and his secretary of state was Richard Rush did the oﬁicial answer
to Mr. Monroe’s project of August 2, 1816, come from England. No
changes in the terms were proposed and the interval of notice of
annulment was ﬁxed at six months. Mr. Bagot further informed the
secretary that orders to British oﬁicers on the Lakes to abide by this
Agreement had already been issued. The next day, Mr. Rush ac-
knowledged Mr. Bagot’s note, formally accepted the Agreement, and
promised that the necessary orders to American oﬂicers would be
issued at once. ~
Mr. Rush, the next day, sent a copy of the Agreement to the
secretary of the navy, B. W. Crowninshield, and asked that the neces-
sary orders be given, “in conformity with the President’s desire.”
May 2, Secretary Crowninshield sent the terms of the Agreement to
the American oﬂicers in command on the Lakes, with orders concerning
the boat to be kept in commission on each Lake, and warning against
any kind of interference with the proper duties of the corresponding
British force.
Capt. D. S. Dexter at Erie, Penn., was told that the schooners
Porcupine, armed with an 18-pounder, and Ghent, with a 12- or 18-
pounder, would be retained for occasional service upon the upper
THE AN GLO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817 15
Lakes. On Lake Ontario, Capt. M. T. Woolsey at Sackett’s Harbor,
N .Y., was to keep the schooner Lady of the Lake, with one 18-pounder;
and Capt. J. T. Leonard at Whitehall, N .Y., was to have on Lake
Champlain the galley Allen, with one 12— or I8-pounder.
N 0 official proclamation of this Agreement was made in 1817,
other than the summary of it contained in President Monroe’s ﬁrst
message to the 15th Congress, December 2, 1817. In that message
this Agreement held the place of honor, being the ﬁrst thing referred
to. Mr. Bagot, the British minister, who had been here long enough
to appreciate the danger of Congressional disagreement or interference
with the diplomatic policies of an Administration, met John Quincy
Adams, already in the ofﬁce of secretary of state, on January 14, 1818,
and took occasion to ask whether it was the intention of the President
to acquaint Congress with the correspondence of the previous year
concerning the arrangement about armaments on the Lakes. He
told Mr. Adams that that Agreement “was a sort of treaty.” Mr.
Adams reported the conversation to President Monroe, who did not
think it necessary to communicate those letters to Congress.16
Later he thought better of the suggestion, and under date of April
6, 1818, sent all the correspondence to the Senate with the following
message:
To the Senate of the United States:
An Arrangement having been made and concluded between this Government
and that of Great Britain, with respect to the naval armament of the two Gov-
ernments, respectively, on the Lakes, I lay before the Senate a copy of the cor-
respondence upon that subject, including the stipulations mutually agreed upon
by the two parties.
I submit it to the consideration of the Senate whether this is such an arrange-
ment as the Executive is competent to enter into by the powers vested in it by
the Constitution, or is such a one as requires the advice and consent of the Senate,
and, in the latter case, for this advice and consent, should it be approved.
(Signed) JAMES MONROE.
The Senate approved with no dissenting vote, April 16. The
President then made formal proclamation of the original Agreement
in these terms:
*5 Adams: Memoirs, IV, 41, 42.
I6 THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A PROCLAMATION.
Whereas, an arrangement was entered into at the city of Wash-
ington in the month of April, in the year of our Lord, 1817, between
Richard Rush, esquire, at that time acting as Secretary for the De-
partment of State of the United States, for and in behalf of the govern-
ment of the United States, and the Right Honorable Charles Bagot,
His Britannic Majesty’s Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Pleni-
potentiary, for and in behalf of His Britannic Majesty, which ar-
rangement is in the words following, to wit:
“The naval force to be maintained upon the American lakes by
His Majesty and the Government of the United States shall hence-
forth be conﬁned to the following vessels on each side, that is,—
“On Lake Ontario to one vessel, not exceeding to 100 tons burden,
and armed with one 18-lb. cannon;
“On the Upper Lakes to 2 vessels, not exceeding like burden, each
armed with like force;
“On the waters of Lake Champlain, to one vessel, not exceeding
like burden, and armed with like force;
“All other armed vessels on those lakes shall be forthwith dis-
mantled, and no other vessels of war shall be there built or armed.
“If either party should be hereafter desirous of annulling this
stipulation, and should give notice to that effect to the other party,
it shall cease to be binding after the expiration of six months from
the date of such notice.
“The naval force so to be limited shall be restricted to such service
as will in no respect interfere with the proper duties of the armed
vessels of the other party.”
And whereas the Senate of the United States have approved of
the said arrangement, and recommended that it should be carried
into effect, the same having also received the sanction of His Royal
Highness the Prince Regent, acting in the name and on the behalf
of His Britannic Majesty,
Now, therefore, I, james Monroe, President of the United States,
do, by this my proclamation, make known and declare that the
arrangement aforesaid, and every stipulation thereof, has been duly
entered into, concluded and conﬁrmed, and is of full force and effect.
Given under my hand, at the city of Washington, this 28th day of
April, in the year of our Lord, 1818, and of the independence of the
United States the forty—second. 17
By the President: JAMES MONROE
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, Secretary of State.
"Malloy: Treaties and Conventions. I, 6 30.
THE ANGLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817 I7
The mad desire to set up barriers between the United States and
Canada for the defense of the latter led the English cabinet to sup—
pose that a wilderness might be created for that purpose between
Lake Champlain and Montreal. Lord Bathurst sent out from the
colonial office in London, July 1, 1816, to the new governor of Canada,
Sir John Sherbrooke, a letter instructing him to abstain from issuing
any more grants of land in the districts along that frontier, and, if
possible, to induce those who already had grants there “to accept
uncleared lands in other districts more distant from the frontier
of the United States. . . . It is also very desirable that you should,
as far as lies in your power, prevent the extension of roads in the
direction of those particular districts . . . ; and if any means should
present themselves of letting those which have been already made fall
into decay, you will best comply with the views of His Majesty’s
Government, and materially contribute to the future security of
the Province by their adoption.”
What an illustration of the fatuity of colonial government by a
few ill-informed politicians three thousand miles away! With the
map before them, they proposed to decree that a twenty-mile strip
of wilderness should be maintained against the northern boundaries
of Vermont and New York, as a protection to Canadians. Five
years later, 1821, the Earl of Dalhousie 18 reported to Lord Bathurst
that the strip in question contained a considerable and increasing
population, who were offering protection to all criminals escaping
from either Canada or the United States, and that American lumber-
men were settling where they pleased and taking what they pleased.
He therefore requested authority to grant again those fertile lands
to loyal subjects for immediate settlement.1E9
Up to 1846-47 the Mississippi River remained the principal thor-
oughfare of western trade, but after that time the Lakes became the
main avenue. The change began in the decade 1836—1846. The
event which ﬁrst drew general attention to the increased importance
of the lake route was the disturbance on our frontiers there in con-
nection with the Canadian rebellion, which broke out in 18 37.
The counties in our States adjoining the Lakes contained many
sympathizers with the insurgents. Secret societies of such sympa-
thizers, called “Hunter” lodges, were founded in Vermont in May,
1838, and a Grand Lodge, assembled at Cleveland, December 16—22,
)8 George Ramsay, ninth Earl of Dalhousie (1770—1838), governor-in-chief of Canada and the
maritime provinces from 1819 to 1828.
*9 Cf. the letters in Kingsford’s History of Canada, IX, pp. 40-42 and notes.
I8 THE ANGLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817
proposed to establish a republican government in Upper Canada,
and with it a republican bank to issue paper money. There was
much incendiary talk in the local newspapers throughout the region
of the Lakes. Buffalo was a chief center of sentiment in favor of
the insurgents, and William Lyon Mackenzie}0 the leader of the
rebels, was the chief ﬁgure in a public demonstration there, Decem-
ber 10, 1837.
A number of Americans joined the insurgents, who in January,
1838, formed a camp on Navy Island on the Canadian side of the
Niagara River above the falls. Mackenzie issued proclamations
from this island as his seat of government for Upper Canada and the
lieutenant-governor of Upper Canada, Sir Francis Bond Head (183 5-
1838), called for troops.
Mackenzie secured supplies from the United States and chartered
an American-owned steamer, the Caroline, to bring such supplies
from Schlosser, across the Niagara River. December 29, 1837, a
Canadian force came in boats to Schlosser, captured the Caroline,
took her into midstream, set her on ﬁre, and sank her. During the
mélée an American citizen, Amos Durfee, was killed. A ﬂame of
excitement swept along the frontier and from Buffalo to Detroit the
activity of the friends of the insurgents increased. Their leaders
collected supplies and some boats, and issued proclamations. On
both sides of the boundary alarming and extravagant stories were
repeated and believed. The United States military oﬁicers along
the Lakes acted promptly and properly. General Scott came to
assume command and Buffalo became a military post. The insur-
gents and their friends were prevented from chartering steamers,
and from any further organization on the American side.
=0 Cf. Kingsford: History_of Canada, IX, 343-533; X, 456, 457. William Lyon Mackenzie
(1795-1861), born at Dundee in Scotland, emigrated to Canada in 1820. In May, 1824, he started
at Toronto 2. paper called The COlOﬂZdl Advocate, to plead for popular government in Canada.
His printing office was destroyed by a Tory mob June 8, 1826, and Mackenzie obtained £625 damages.
Elected to the Assembly of Upper Canada in 1826, he was expelled in 1830 for describing the
ministers as “sycophants ﬁt only to register the decrees of arbitrary power.” Twice re-elected and
twice re-expelled he was ﬁnally excluded by the arbitrary disfranchisement of the county (York)
which returned him. By 1834 he was recognized as the popular leader in Upper Canada, was elected
Mayor of Toronto, and re-entered the Assembly.
Defeated at the election of 1836 by the strenuous efforts of the government, Mackenzie determined,
in connection with the disaffected Frenchmen of Quebec led by Nelson and Papineau, to resort to armed
resistance. The plan was to establish democratic control of the provincial governments, including
an elected instead of appointed Council, or Up r House. Mackenzie proclaimed a provisional
government, November 25, 1837, and unfurled a ag with two stars, representing the two provinces,
Ontario and Quebec. His army of 800 men was defeated at Montgomery’s Tavern on December 7,
and Mackenzie then established himself on Navy Island in the Niagara River. In 1839 he was
arrested and imprisoned by the United States government for breaking the neutrality laws. He
remained in the United States until 1849, when the proclamation of amnesty enabled him to return to
Canada, where he re-entered the Assembly, 1850-1858. His last days were marred by poverty.
Lindsey: Life of W. L. Mackenzie.
THE ANGLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817 19
But the British Government showed no disposition to heed the ﬁrm,
though friendly, demands from Washington that reparation must
be made for the destruction of the Caroline and the death of Durfee.
Lieutenant-Governor Head believed that ﬁlibustering expeditions
were coming toward Canada from all parts of the American border,
that the project of Texas was to be duplicated (which was indeed the
hope of his insurgent subjects), and that Canada must increase its
defenses at once. During the spring and summer of 1838 several
steamers were hired by the British authorities and equipped with
troops and munitions of war to cruise on Lake Erie, Lake Ontario
and in the St. Lawrence River, in order to prevent invasion and to
overawe the Canadian insurgents. On our side President Van Buren
authorized the hiring or otherwise procuring of a steamer for Lake
Erie, and another for Ontario, “to be so manned and equipped as
not to interfere with existing treaties.” 2‘
November 11, 1838, a steamer left Oswego, New York, with many
ﬁlibuster passengers aboard, bound for Ogdensburg, and towing
two schooners intended for the use of the Canadian insurgents.
Colonel Worth of the United States army promptly followed in an-
other steamboat and seized all three boats. Some of the passengers
who reached Canada were speedily captured by the Canadian forces.
In December armed men from Detroit set ﬁre to a steamer at Wind—
sor, on the Canadian side. Both of these outbreaks were the work
of the “Hunter” lodges. Several of the raiders were captured and
executed by the Canadians. Mr. Fox,22 the British minister at Wash-
ington, notiﬁed our secretary of state, Mr. Forsyth, November 25,
1838, that a temporary increase of naval force upon the boundary
Lakes and rivers above what was permitted by the Agreement of 1817,
was necessary in order to guard against unlawful and piratical acts of
hostility. He assured the secretary that this armament would be dis—
continued as soon as possible after the sources of danger were removed.
Our Government made no objection, and Congress authorized
the President, March 3, 1839, to provide such force and armament
on our northern Lakes and rivers as he should deem necessary to
protect the United States from invasion from that quarter.” This
=1 Callahan, p. 98—quoting from records of House Committee on Naval Affairs.
" Henry Stephen Fox (1791-1846), British minister at Washington, from 1835 to 1843. The
successful completion of the_Webster-Ashburton treaty in 1841 was largely due to the tact and knowl-
edge of Mr. Fox. Concerning the two “Hunter” raids, c ._Kingsford: History 0f Canada, X, 493—
500.. The Fox-Forsyth and F ox-Webster correspondence is m H. R. Doc. No. 471, 56th Cong. Ist
Session, pp. 19, 20, 23, 34, 40.
=1 Cong. Globe, March 1, 1839, Appendix, p. 282.
20 THE ANGLO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817
act was passed on the day after news came of a clash on the disputed
frontier between Maine and New Brunswick which had resulted in
bloodshed.
The increase in the British armaments on the Lakes and along the
frontier, and its continuance during the years 1839—40, was a cause
of apprehension on this side of the border. It caused also many ex-
travagant rumors concerning the nature, extent and ultimate pur-
pose of the British armaments.
March 9, 1840, the House of Representatives asked the President
whether Great Britain had expressed a wish to annul the Agreement
of 1817, and, if not, whether that Agreement had been violated by
Great Britain.24 Alarmist congressmen during the next few weeks
gave voice to their fears that Great Britain, while “amusing us with
negotiations as Philip amused the Athenians, was making quiet and
Steady progress in preparing for offensive and defensive operations
along our undefended frontier from Maine to Lake Superior.”25 It
was afﬁrmed that military works were being constructed opposite
Detroit from which that city could in one hour be laid in ashes.
March 28, 1840, the President informed the House that the British
Government had not manifested any wish to abrogate the Agree-
ment of 1817. He also forwarded reports from General Scott and
other ofﬁcers stationed along the Lakes which showed that the tem-
porary increase of armed vessels on the Canadian side had been in-
signiﬁcant. A subsequent report (June 29) showed that the strength-
ening of the forts and garrisons in Canada had been only such as was
inevitable for the suppression of an insurrection. In the autumn of
1840, there was a recrudescence of ill-feeling and of war talk in this
country, due chieﬂy to the prolonged dispute about the Caroline
affair and to the arrest in New York State in November of a Canadian
constable, named Alexander McLeod, who had boasted that he was
the slayer of Amos Durfee.
In the United States Senate, August 3, 1841, Mr. Allen of Ohio
had understood that the British had two armed steamers on Lake
Erie and thought that armed steamers were necessary to watch armed
steamers. On September 9 Congress agreed to appropriate $100,000
“for the construction and armament of armed steamers or other vessels
on the northwestern Lakes, as the President might think most proper,
and as might be permitted under the terms of the treaty with the
=4 Cong. Globe, 26th Cong. rst Sess., p. 254, resolution offered by Mr. Crary of Michigan.
‘5 Callahan, pp. 103-4, 100.
THE ANGLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817 2 I
British Government.”26 Our Government at this time had only one
revenue cutter on Lake Erie and was hiring the use of two steamers
on Lake Ontario, the Oneida and the Telegraph. The frigate New
Orleans, begun in 1814 at Sackett’s Harbor, was now rotting there
on the stocks. From that point to Mackinaw we had no fort that
had been kept in repair.
Meanwhile Governor Seward of New York was much troubled
by reports of renewed activities of secret associations on our side of
the Lakes that were collecting arms and ammunition for a rebellion
in Canada. In September, 1841, he informed Mr. Webster, secre—
tary of state, that the British then had on Lake Erie two warships
of goo tons each, and each ﬁt to carry a battery of 18 guns. In the
same month these ships were ﬁred upon from Navy Island by per-
sons who had brought a cannon from the United States for that pur-
pose. Almost simultaneously an attempt was made to blow up the
Welland Canal at Allanburg, Canada. Governor Seward asked Mr.
Webster to ﬁnd out whether England intended to annul the Agree-
ment of 1817 and urged the necessity of an increase in our armament
so as to provide defense if not to resist aggression.
Mr. Webster and the British minister, Mr. Fox, discussed the
bearings of the situation upon the Agreement during the fall and
winter of 1841-2. The former observed that “the United States
cannot consent to any inequality in regard to the strictness with
which the convention of 1817 is to be observed.” The latter de~
clared that Canada was still threatened with invasion and that “the
efforts of the United States Government, though directed in good
faith to suppress those unlawful combinations, are not attended with
the wished-for success.” The question of continuance or annul-
ment was referred by Mr. Fox to the cabinet at home, and assur-
ance came in March, 1842, that the British Government intended to
abide faithfully by the Agreement of 1817 as soon as it could be done
with safety to Canada.27
During the winter of 1841-2, Secretary of the Navy Upshur au-
thorized the construction of one steamship under the terms of the act
of September 9, 1841. It was built at Pittsburg in 1842, named the
Michigan, taken across the country in sections in 1843 and launched
in Lake Erie in the summer of 1844. This ship was heavier and
carried more armament than the Agreement of 1817 permitted to all
'6 5 Stat. 458, 460; Moore: Digest, I, 693. Note the careless and inexact reference to the
Agreement as a “treaty.”
I? As above, H. R. Doc. No. 471.
22 THE AN GLO-AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817
four of the vessels allowed, but it was no larger than either of the two
British vessels already in Lake Erie. Since 1817 steam had been
substituted for sail power and no steam warship could have been
made effective if it were smaller than the Michigan.
While the Michigan was under construction, Mr. Webster and
Lord Ashburton concluded the treaty that bears their joint names
and dissipated the war cloud that had gathered over the Maine
boundary. McLeod was acquitted and sent home and the rumors
of war and invasion' died away.
In July, 1844, the British minister at Washington queried whether
the size and armament of the Michigan did not constitute an infrac-
tion of the Agreement. The secretary of the navy gathered some
unveriﬁed information about a half dozen British armed vessels said
to be still on the Lakes, pointed out the change in conditions of navi-
gation since 1817, and suggested a revision of the Agreement, but the
incident had no other result than an exchange of notes. The war
scare was over, despite the Democratic slogan of “F ifty-four forty
or ﬁght” in the Presidential campaign of 1844. By 1852 the British
Government had ordered all its warships on the Lakes to be
dismantled.
The Lakes had now become the main highway of commerce, and
the reciprocity treaty of 1854 admitted the Canadians to a proﬁtable
share in that commerce. Friendly sentiment on both sides was in-
creasing, and each government desired to maintain the Agreement of
1817. The Michigan and some revenue cutters were our only force
upon the Lakes. There was no pretense of keeping up any of our
forts. In 1856-7 the British Government inquired of George M.
Dallas, the American minister in London, whether the building of
six new revenue cutters for our service on the Lakes was not an in-
fringement of the Agreement of 1817, and called attention again to
the fact that the tonnage of the Michigan was larger than that Agree-
ment warranted. The inquiries were renewed in 18 58, and our
Government had meanwhile made inquiries concerning the presence
of a British ﬂeet among the West India islands. These events were
related in time to the discussions over a Central American canal
and practically amounted to nothing more than a reminder that each
government was “waiting watchfully.”
The conditions upon the lake frontiers in 1836-1842 were repeated
during the time of the Civil War, except that the boot was on the
other foot. It was now Uncle Sam’s turn to face a rebellion with
THE ANGLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817 23
which many English subjects on both sides of the ocean sympathized,
and to complain of organized efforts within the Canadian lines to aid
the insurrection and to invade our territory.
At the outbreak of the war the British had no naval force on the
Lakes. The United States had only the M tehigan and one revenue
cutter, the ﬁve other new cutters being taken to our Atlantic coast
in 1861. The predominant sympathy of the Canadians was with
the North rather than the South, and many British subjects were in
the Federal armies.
But the Trent affair in November, 1861, and the increasing and
indubitable evidence that the ruling class in England were strong
partisans of the Confederacy, induced something like panic in this
country concerning the defenseless state of our northern boundary
and of our great lake commerce. The ﬁrst steamer which was thought
to mask, under British papers and ﬂag, an intention to attack our
commerce in the guise of a Confederate cruiser, went out of Lake
Ontario in April, 1861. The fears were not lessened by the fact
that Canada possessed canals around the Falls of Niagara and the
rapids in the St. Lawrence, and could therefore bring light gunboats
from the ocean to the Lakes. By 1863 the presence of a large and
growing colony of Confederate refugees and adherents in Canada
began to contribute a substantial basis to the suspicions and fears
on our side of the border.
Feeling in the United States against England was at a white heat
on account of the destruction of our commerce by ships ﬁtted out in
English ports. The air was full of stories and rumors, like those of
twenty-ﬁve years before, about plots hatched in Canada to attack
Buffalo, and to capture our ships on the Lakes. The Confederates
were believed to have two ships of their own, equipped for war,
although the Canadian government searched for such vessels and
could not ﬁnd them. Our Government gave notice that the reci—
procity treaty with Canada would come to an end in 1866, and on
June 18, 1864, the House of Representatives approved of a joint
resolution calling upon the President to give to Great Britain a six
months’ notice of the termination of the Agreement of 1817.28 The
action of the House was based chieﬂy upon the assertions that our
lake commerce and lake ports needed more protection, and that the
Canadian canals gave England an unfair advantage over us upon
1' The bill terminating the reciprocity treaty passed the House, December 15, 1864. For the
movements to abrogate the Agreement in 1864, with the Seward-Adams~Russell correspondence,
of. H. R. Doc. No. 471, 56th Cong. rst Sess., pp. 47-52, 56—58.
24 THE AN GLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817
the Lakes. This resolution died in the Senate. Lord Lyons, noting
the progress of this resolution, wrote to Secretary Seward, August 4,
1864, that her Majesty’s Government would view the abrogation of the
Agreement “with great regret and no little alarm.” Next day, Mr.
Seward denied any intention to abrogate it. But events moved rapidly.
In September long-expected outbreaks came. Confederate refugees
from Canada captured the steamer Philo Parsons when on its way
from Detroit to Sandusky, ran up the Confederate ﬂag and started
to attack the Michigan, to release the Southern prisoners kept on
Johnson’s Island near Sandusky, and then to raid the Lakes and the
lake cities. The career of the Parsons was quickly stopped, but im-
mediately there followed the news that twenty-ﬁve raiders from
Canada had attacked and looted the village of St. Albans, Vermont,
and returned to Canada, where they were arrested by the local
authorities. Secretary Seward then notiﬁed the British Govern-
ment through Minister Adams that after six months the Agreement,
which he describes as “the informal arrangement,” would be ter-
minated, and that the United States would then make such additions
to its naval armament upon the Lakes as might seem necessary. This
notice was delivered to Earl Russell on November 2 3, 1864, so that
the date thus ﬁxed for the end of the Agreement was May 23, 1865.
Earl Russell, in reply, hoped that after the restoration of peace the
Agreement would be renewed.
In Detroit, on a Sunday at the end of October, 1864, bells rang an
alarm, and congregations were dismissed in order to repel the attack
of an armed band from Toronto, which never arrived. Moreover it
was reported that there was a conspiracy in Canada to set ﬁreoto all
the chief cities in the North on the approaching election day. Two
generals, Butler and Hawley, and seven thousand men were on lake
steamers on election day in order to intercept raids, but there were
none. Under stress of these excitements Congress met in December,
1864. Secretary Welles asked for two or three additional vessels
upon the Lakes. The Department of State established a requirement
that all travelers from Canada into the United States except bona
ﬁde immigrants must show passports obtained from United States
consuls. Senator Sumner introduced a resolution calling for infor-
mation about the Agreement of 1817, and characterized it as an
“anomalous, abnormal, . . . small-type arrangement,” which could
be easily abrogated. In February, 1865,29 both houses of Congress
=9 A joint resolution, approved February 9.
THE ANGLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817 2 5'
voted to ratify the notice previously given by the Department of
State that the Agreement would be set aside.
Meanwhile the Canadian people had voted down in 1861 the recom-
mendation of a military commission that a large militia organization
should be maintained. A civilian commission, headed by Sir John A.
Macdonald, conferred with the British Government in 1865 concern-
ing the defense of Canada, and rendered in July a report which became
one of the foundations of the modern Canadian Dominion. One of
the most pregnant paragraphs of this report follows, embodying its
principle, Not a penny for soldiers and armaments, but generous sup-
port of transcontinental railways and other internal improvements:
“While fully recognizing the necessity of—and while prepared to
provide for—such a system of defense as would restore conﬁdence in
our future at home and abroad, the best ultimate defense for British
America is to be found in the increase of her population as rapidly as
possible and the husbanding of our resources to that end; and without
claiming it as aright, we venture to suggest that by enabling us to throw
open the Northwest Territory to free settlement, and by aiding us in
enlarging our canals and prosecuting internal productive works, and
by promoting an extensive plan of emigration from Europe into the
unsettled portions of our domain, permanent security will be more
quickly and economically achieved than by any other means.”3°
In the United States the alarm over the Confederates in Canada
died away as rapidly as it had arisen. While the British cabinet was
saying by the mouth of Lord Palmerston (February 11, 186 5) that
our measures for defense were all justiﬁablef'I Sherman’s march was
proving that the Confederacy was near collapse. On March 8, Sec-
retary Seward announced that Canadian passports would no longer
be required, and withdrew the notice of abrogation of the Agreement
of 1817, saying, “we are quite willing that the convention should
remain practically in force.” A formal exchange of notes during the
summer and fall of 1865 veriﬁed the renewal of the Agreement,~’~2 and
apparently determined that it does not include revenue cutters.33
After the death of the Confederacy in 1865, the war clouds shifted
again on the Lakes from the Canadian to the American frontiers.
1° Cf. Christopher West: The Defense of Canada in the Light of Canadian History. London and
Toronto, J. M. Dent & Sons, 1914. The documents are to be found in Parliamentary Papers 1865,
3434 and 3535, Vol. XXXVII, 429-36 and 437-49.
8* Hansard: Parl. Debates, Vol. CLXXVII, 149, 150.
8' H. R. Doc. No. 471, pp. 60-62.
31 Mr. Seward advised the secretary of the treasury, Salmon P. Chase, May 7, 1864, that he would
not_ admit that the Agreement of 1817 was intended to restrict the armament or tonnage of vessels
designed exclusively for the revenue service. Cf. Moore: Digest, I, 696
26 THE ANGLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817
Across the ocean a faction of violence developed in the Irish home-
rule party, and the Fenian organization on both sides of the Atlantic
hoped that the dispute between England and the United States
over the depredations of the Alabama and other cruisers would
involve the two countries in war. The Fenian leaders in this coun-
try were reckless enough to declare war on their own account. In
June, 1866, about two hundred of them invaded the province of
Ontario from a point near Buffalo, and killed some Canadians before
they were overwhelmed. The United States Government sent the
Michigan and a revenue cutter, and General Berry with thirteen
companies of soldiers to patrol the threatened waters and boundaries,
and the Canadian government chartered a ﬂeet of steamers, and re-
ceived some aid also from the British ﬂeet at Montreal. N o more
overt acts were committed until the spring of 1870, when, in May,
ﬁve hundred Fenians tried to invade Canada from Vermont. This
attempt and several others made during the next year were frustrated
by Canadian troops, and the Treaty of Washington in 1871 and the
Geneva arbitration, which followed, effectively laid the Fenian ghost.
Since then there have been no serious controversies along the lake
boundaries other than those due to the transgressions of ﬁshermen
and to the follies of a war of tariffs,”4 or canal tolls. For such reasons
the oﬂicial relations between Canada and the United States have at
times assumed a slightly controversial hue, but despite these differ-
ences the industrial and social ties between the two peoples have
been constantly multiplied and strengthened, and there has been
among them no serious demand for a renewal of armaments on the
Lakes. In 1878 and again in 1892 the attention of Congress was
called to the dilapidated condition of the Michigan, but no new lake
vessel was provided by us.
The Agreement of 1817 survived this long succession of public con-
troversies, and then surmounted a ﬁnal danger arising from the am-
bitions of business. In 1890 the United States Government was
receiving bids for the construction of a practice ship for the use of the
Naval Academy at Annapolis. The lowest bid was presented by
F. W. Wheeler and Company of West Bay City, Michigan, but it
could not be considered. The Agreement binds both parties not
to build any vessel of war upon the Lakes except as speciﬁed for
lake service. The result was that our lake shipbuilding interests
34 The policy of protection triumphed in_Canada in 1878, when Canada was forced to abandon
all hope of securing a renewal of reciprocity with us, or any agreement for freedom of trade.
THE AN GLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817 27
organized a demand for the abrogation of the Agreement, and this
request came before the Senate, April 8, 1892, in the form of a petition
presented by Senator McMillan of Michigan. The Deep Water-
ways Association and the Lake Carriers Association promoted an
agitation of the subject. The question was raised whether the Agree-
ment of 1817 could be in force since the action of Congress in ratifying
the notice of abrogation, February 9, 186 5. Secretary of State
John W. Foster decided that the Agreement was still in force, but
called it obsolete, and asserted that it ought to be modiﬁed to suit
modern conditions. In the ensuing discussions the prevalent opin-
ion was adverse to abrogating or changing the Agreement, and by
December, 1892, the agitation seemed to be ended. It was revived
in all its original acrimony in October, 1895, when Secretary of the
Navy Hilary A. Herbert in President Cleveland’s cabinet refused
to give to the Detroit Dry Dock Company, the lowest bidder, the
contract to build two twin-screw gunboats. In November the mayor
and city council of Detroit circularized other municipalities around
the Lakes inviting them to join in a movement against the restric-
tions which the Agreement of 1817 imposed on shipbuilders in the
lake regions.
“If a navy is to be maintained at all,” wrote the Detroit mayor,
“ there is as good reason for maintaining a ﬂeet upon the Great Lakes
as upon the eastern coast of the United States, and far greater reason,
in view of the relative importance of the commercial vessel interest,
than to maintain it on the Chinese or Japanese coast.”5
President Cleveland approved of the action of Secretary Herbert
in terms that seemed to indicate his opinion that modern conditions
might justify the annulment of the Agreement “in the manner pro-
vided in the contract.”
A month later, December, 1895, President Cleveland’s adminis-
tration stepped to the edge of war with England over the Venezuela
boundary. For a few days there was alarm and consternation in
both nations, and the Canadian government began to look up lake
vessels that could be converted into cruisers. Speedily it became
evident that the English cabinet intended to leave to the United
States the right to interpret the Monroe Doctrine and its corollaries,
and forthwith the talk of defenses and invasions disappeared, let us
hope forever.
Surely hostilities in 1895 would have been far more imminent if
18 Callahan, p. 186.
28 THE ANGLO—AMERICAN AGREEMENT OF 1817
the Great Lakes had held powerful British and American war ﬂeets
patrolling the waters and watching each other suspiciously, and if
there had been garrisoned forts along the shores and along the con—
tinental boundary as well, reproducing the conditions so unhappily
familiar in Europe.
The Agreement was challenged again in 1898 (April 16) not through
any revival of war scares, but because Secretary of the Navy John D.
Long raised again the question about construction in lake shipyards.
This inquiry was referred, with many others, to a Joint High
Anglo-American Commission, which met in the summer and fall of
1898. Our commissioners were instructed to propose a revision of
the Agreement of 1817, so that war vessels might be constructed on
the Lakes provided that they were not retained there after construc-
tion, and secondly so that it might be permissible to keep training
ships in service on the Lakes. The Commission ﬁnally adjourned
after a fruitless debate over reciprocity, ﬁsheries and the Alaskan
boundary. The Agreement was not considered at all, and the pro—
posal for its revision has not been renewed.
The whole history of international relations upon the Lakes, as
here recited, shows clearly the overwhelming power of a peaceful
purpose. The Agreement of 1817 was a revulsion from opposing
plans of aggression and enmity. Our statesmen, not only the effer-
vescent Clay, but even the paciﬁc Jefferson, had dreamed of over-
running and annexing Canada. Our friends the enemy, on the other
hand, had hoped to shut the United States forever away from the
control at least of the upper Lakes. But the indwelling Spirit of
Grace made even the wrath of man to praise Him. Out of the fric-
tions at Ghent and the natural enmities that followed the war along
the border, there came forth, instead of the customary competition
in armaments and the display of all the pomp and circumstance of
war, the marvelously wise determination to have virtually no arma-
ments at all, and 10! it was done. The two nations, almost without
their knowledge, at ﬁrst by executive order only, were committed to a
unique experiment in international relations, viz.: that neighbor
nations should do what neighbor citizens had learned to do some cen-
turies earlier, stop fortifying their houses against each other and stop
carrying weapons for use in a common highway. All honor to Mon-
roe and Adams and Castlereagh, who ﬁrst among statesmen at least
partially committed two great and discordant nations to the doctrine,
“In time of Peace prepare to make Peace permanent”!

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