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THE
POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY
OF THE
(AMPAIGN OF WATERIOO.
TRANSLATED FROM THE FRENCH OF
f
| jºy.”
GENERAL BARON DE JOMINI,
BY CAPT. S. V. BENET,
O R D N AN OF D EP A R T MENT, U. S. A. R. M. Y.
TEIIRD EDITION.
NEW YORK :
D. WAN NOSTRAND, 192 BROADWAY.
1864.
\DC
2 * J.
J 75 3
| 3 & #
ENTERED according to Act of Congress, in the year eighteen hundred
and fifty-three, by J. S. REDFIELD, in the Clerk’s Office of the
District Uourt of the United States, for the Southern District of New
York.
i
TO T H E G R A D U A. T E S
OF
THIE UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
OF 1849
THIS TRANSI/ATION IS RESPECTFULLY INSCRIBED
B Y T H E I R C L A S S M A. T E .
P R E F A C E.
THIS volume” was the last of a work, published some twelve years
since; out as the manuscript of this campaign had unfortunately been
mislaid, the editor was compelled to supply its place hastily and
somewhat incompletely. Having, by an unforeseen event, recovered
the original manuscript, I hasten to restore it in its integrity, with
this difference, that I present it in my name, instead of causing the
recital to be made by Napoleon. A powerful motive has induced me
to act thus, and change the form employed in the rest of the work: it
is, that the rapidity of the emperor's fall, and his exile, preventing
him from procuring accurate information of what had occurred, not
only in his army, but also in that of his adversaries, he had at St.
Helena composed narratives, with which a disinterested historian could
not entirely concur, so that it would have been necessary to make him
utter things, of which he had judged altogether differently.
The censures that Napoleon has cast on Ney and Grouchy, and which
these have returned with interest, have all, more or less, something
specious in them. I have sought to be impartial in presenting them.
Napoleon did not always give his orders in an irreproachable manner;
these orders were not always well executed or properly interpreted,
and his lieutenants knew not how to supply the deficiency in what .
they had received incompletely and vaguely. If I reproach Napoleon
for any faults on the mornings of the 16th and 17th June, no one would
* General Jomini calls this, the 22d chapter of his great work enti-
tled “Vie Politique et Militaire de Napoleon,” though it is an unit in
itself, and forms a complete summary of the campaign of 1815.--THE
TR ANSLATOR.
6 PREFACE.
suspect me, of wishing to cast the slightest cloud over his immense
genius and glory, which, more loudly than any other, I have proclaimed
in all my works. But the more laurels he has gathered, the less should
his brow be adorned at the expense of his lieutenants.
As regards his political course, it is not so easy to judge between
his system and that of his detractors; in the first rank of these, figured
all the ultra-liberal utopianists, professing the strange doctrine that
power in a government and despotism are the same thing, and that,
under pretence of producing liberalism, it was necessary, at any price,
to curb the authority charged with directing the destinies of a nation
It is evident that Napoleon thought otherwise, and the belief is admis-
sible, that in principle he was right; perhaps he erred in exaggerating
his doctrine of power; but it is very difficult to establish the just me-
dium between nullity of power and the slightly arbitrary. The future
will undoubtedly prove, that between two dangers, the emperor de-
sired to choose the lesser, because the abasement of executive power,
will always be the least equivocal signal of the decay of a nation;
this decay, indeed, may not always be sudden, and sensible to the eyes
of the vulgar, but will be the work of time, unless a powerful hand
applies a prompt remedy in seizing the helm. As for the rest, my task
is not to condemn or absolve: posterity will decide.
I will close by observing, that the ideas which prevail in this little
work, being those recognized in all the acts of Napoleon, the Author
found himself under the double necessity of adopting them and writing
on the side of his interests, that is to say, by placing himself at the
head-quarters of the hero of this history, and not at that of his
antagonists. J.
1838.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERL00,
Condition of France after the departure of Napoleon for the Island of
Elba ; he decides on returning; descends to Cannes with a thousand
men, marches in triumph to Paris, and remounts the throne. Gen-
eral coalition of Europe against him. Campaign of 1815. Battles of
Ligny and Waterloo. Second abdication. End of Napoleon's career.
FILLED for twenty years with the victories and
gigantic enterprises of Napoleon, all Europe still
gazed with astonishment at the sudden fall of an em-
pire, whose power, till recently, menaced universal
independence. It could not be conceived that six
months had sufficed, for leading the allies from the
Elbe to the Seine, and dictating to France the terri-
ble treaties of Paris. The congress of all the powers,
assembled at Vienna, was endeavoring to conciliate
the numerous claims arriving from all parts, for shares
of the spoils of this audacious conqueror who, two
years previously, had dared to place one foot on Cadiz,
the other on Moscow. The task was a difficult one,
because this grand diplomatic act should accomplish
the double purpose, of establishing the political equi-
librium so severely shaken, and regulating for the
8 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
future the European public right, utterly overthrown,
by the storms of the revolution.
Fallen from the throne of the most powerful em-
pire to the ridiculous sovereignty of the Isle of Elba,
by reason of his abdication at Fontainbleau; separated
from his wife and son in an almost humiliating manner,
and for which history will one day justly reproach his
enemies; Napoleon retired to Porto-Ferrajo, like Sci-
pio in his retreat at Liternum, to some degree exiled,
and more discontented at the desertion of his compa-
triots than the persecution of his adversaries.
Condemned by destiny to be but a passive spectator
of the grand affairs of the world, which for fifteen
years, he had directed by the ascendency of his genius,
he yet bore within himself the secret presentiment of
being called, soon or late, to reappear on the scene.
He was too familiar with men and affairs, to feign ig-
norance of the full extent of the difficulties that would
harass the Bourbons, in the governing of a country that
had become changed since their departure, and felt
profoundly humiliated by the disastrous circumstances
that had brought them back. Napoleon was then well
aware that, after the first infatuation occasioned by the
general peace, immerse interests and violent passions
would come in conflict, so that the most energetic por-
tion of the French nation would soon regret the ter-
mination of his reign and desire his return.
However, the uncertainty as to the time when this
would take place, and his inability to give birth to the
occasion, preventing him from forming his plans, the
ex-emperor found comfort in the occupation of tracing
the history of his life, and feeding the sacred flame in
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 0
the bosoms of his partisans; while the progress of
events was precipitated to such a point, that he was
torn from his retreat much earlier than he anticipated.
Independent of the special advices he received from
Queen Hortense and some faithful friends, the jour-
nals would have sufficiently instructed him in the state
of affairs; for, notwithstanding the censure that weigh-
ed upon them, and notwithstanding their falsehoods,
the divers passions they interpreted were visible to the
least clear-sighted, and exposed the agitation that
reigned throughout the kingdom.
Indeed, Louis XVIII. seemed at first to have per-
fectly appreciated the spirit of the age, in the convic-
tion, that the majority of France desired to consolidate
the results of the revolution. After twenty years of
experience, this prince had concluded, that his party
was too weak to resist the wishes of the immense ma-
jority of the middle classes, who, in a country stripped
of aristocratic institutions, always finally dictated the
law.” He felt that to maintain himself on the throne,
it was necessary to reign with this majority, that is,
with the interests of the revolution. Henry IV. had
* The opinion here expressed appears to have suggested to Napoleon
his famous decrees from Lyons; but throughout the rest of his career, he
seems to have labored under the conviction, that if it be always well to act
on the spirit of the masses, it is no less true, that majorities, or masses
are rather disposed to be constrained and led, than to influence the direc-
tion of affairs. On great political questions votes should be weighed, not
counted; because we know how ignorant the masses are upon such sub-
jects, even among people who pretend to the highest civilization.
What can be expected from the political ability of the multitude, when
in an assembly of four or five hundred deputies representing the notables
of a country, it is nigh impossible to find fifty statesmen worthy the name
—happy, indeed, if among them there be two or three politicians of the
first order.
1%
1() POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
said that Paris was well worth a mass, Louis XVIII.
thought that the crown of France was well worth a
constitution.
It was evident he could not govern through the an-
cient magistracy of the kingdom, of which not a ves-
tige remained; nor was it with the deceased states of
Brittany, nor with those of Languedoc and Burgundy,
that it would be possible to lead the France of 1814.
It was necessary then, to re-create the entire machine
on new bases, and in order not to submit to the revo-
lutionary principles, it behooved the king to revive the
work of the revolution by virtue of the divine right,
upon which he founded his own ; he, therefore, grant-
ed a charter.”
Many publicists have blamed Louis XVIII. for
this important measure; and in judging it by the
results it produced, we are constrained to admit that
it accomplished its end badly. If it had been possible
to seize the dictatorship with a vigorous hand, and
govern through royal ordinances, it is incontestable
that this had been the surest plan ; but we are led
to the belief that it was impracticable; the king had
then but to decide, what governmental machine would
* Many writers have affirmed that Louis XVIII, only concluded on giving
a charter, at the reiterated instances of the Emperor Alexander. We are
certain that the Russian Monarch did, indeed, give this advice to the French
King at Compiègne ; but it is not very probable that the charter of 1814
was the improvisation of a few days; everything leads to the presumption,
that the opinions of the two sovereigns accorded on this occasion, and
that the king had meditated on his course while in exile.
However, his declaration from St. Ouen of the 2d May, was followed
by a compact, the provisions of which, agreed upon by Ferrand, Montes-
quieu and Dambray, were drawn up by Beugnot, and afterwards discussed
with a commission taken from among the authorities established by the
Empire.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 11
be a proper substitute for that, which had just sunk
under the blows of the allied powers. To reëstablish
the Assemblies or the states of the provinces, had
been impossible, as we have just remarked; this had,
moreover, clashed with too many long-lived interests
and opinions to make the attempt possible. To sub-
stitute for the glorious and energetic empire of
Napoleon, the absolute power of a camarilla of emi-
grants, was the dream of a visionary: if acted upon,
the restoration had not lasted six months.
A woman, endowed with a superior mind when she
spoke not of politics, has pretended, that the Bourbons
Ought to have taken the empire as they found it:—
“The bed was so well made,” she said, “that they had
but to lie in it.” This phrase of Madame de Staël,
that met with so much success in the frivolous saloons
of Paris, was but nonsense. How would the brother
and successor of Louis XVI. have been able to recog-
nize a Senate, that no people in Europe had acknowl-
edged, after the conductit had held towards its founder,
and which, twice in ten years, had disposed of the
throne? -
As to the mute legislative body which has subjected
the Emperor to so much censure, which had not dared
to raise its voice, but at the moment when a million of
enemies were on the point of invading France, that
is to say, at the moment when it was necessary to be
silent and rally around the Chief of the State, and
which had thus forced Napoleon to dissolve it;--it is
certain, that it would have favored the reëstablishment
of the royal authority better than the public tribune,
which is ever ready to serve as an arena for the pas.
12 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
sions. But it is doubtful whether it would have been
welcome to France. Moreover, the imperial institu-
tions favored the opinions of liberalism so little, that
the leading doctrinaires of the senate, who had over-
thrown Napoleon, were eager to frame a charter to
please themselves and to be imposed on the Bourbons;
but Louis XVIII., decided in repelling this illegal act,
should, according to the prevailing opinion, have pro-
mulgated another, reassuring the threatened interests.
The king had then but the choice of two courses:
the first was to grant a charter, as he did ; the second
was to govern provisionally as dictator, while convok-
ing a constitutional assembly to work in concert with
his ministers, in the framing of a national compact
which, sanctioned by the notables of France, would
become irrevocable, and thus offer the double advan-
tage of guaranteeing the interests of the throne, as
well as those of the nation.
The first of these appeared to him the most pru-
dent : first, because it was a voluntary concession, and
did not implicate the recognition of the principle of
national sovereignty, as the second would have done :
Louis XVIII. should, therefore oppose all his power
to this principle, so specious in theory, as it might
easily degenerate into a system of elective monarchy.
Then, it was at least doubtful whether a well finished,
well matured and very solid compact, could emanate
from a constituent assembly, however restricted might
be the number of its members. And if instead of
an elective assembly, they were satisfied with a com-
mission of forty or fifty members appointed by the
provisional government, to which would be given the
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 13
initiative in all the combinations of the compact, as
was done after the 18th Brumaire, what guaranty
had such authority presented ? What power would
a compact thus fabricated have had ' A king has
always the right to establish institutions where none
exist; but by what right would an assembly of fifty
counsellors shipped of all legitimate power, impose
a contract on royalty on the one side, and on the
entire nation on the other, without submitting it, if
not to the primary assemblies, at least to those of the
notables specially nominated for this purpose by the
country? But these two means were equally incom-
patible with the antecedents of the monarch and the
true interests of his crown.”
The formality of submitting constitutions to the so-
called popular voice, had actually become, since the re-
volution, a veritable comedy ; for, from the famous
ochlocratical constitution of Héraut de Séchelles in
1793, to the vote on the hereditary empire of 1815,
every compact, however worthless, had received from
two to three millions of votes:—all know of what
value are the suffrages of the multitude in such mat-
ters, which the loftiest minds have such difficulty in
understanding. The institutions of a great country
should emanate from her chiefs, or, in their failing,
from her notables; and if these are not capable of
digesting them properly, the masses, far' from im-
proving them, would be incompetent to judge of
* I should state in this place, once for al', that the principles put forth
in this volume, apply only to France and otl.er so called constitutional mon-
archies; these forms of government would not suit all countries—no more
suit the United States of America than Russia or Austria.
14 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
their merits; as a consequence, would not be qualified
to approve or reject them. If Napoleon had often re-
course to it himself, it was because he held all his
power by election, and was unable to give it any
other basis.
Finally, the most important of all problems of high
internal politics will always be, the proper determina-
tion of the kind and limits of a national intervention
in monarchical institutions: the intervention of the
country in the administration of ordinary affairs, is a
point which it would be unreasonable to contest,
though to render it useful, it must be wisely regulated;
but with respect to fundamental laws above all, the
initiative should not appertain to it; for if ever the
deputies have the right to patch up charters and elect
kings, then the monarchy becomes purely elective,
and the fate of all states governed by this deplorable
system, is sufficiently well known.
Louis XVIII. was too well convinced of these truths,
not to deem a charter carefully drawn up by the coun-
sellors of the throne as the wisest course, since he
would equally avoid the danger to which he would be
exposed in wishing to govern through royal ordinances,
and the still more serious one, of abandoning the forma-
tion of this compact to an assembly of legislators, ani-
mated with the most hostile passions and doctrines.
Placed thus with the alternative, of disregarding all
the traditions of a monarchy of fourteen centuries, by
renouncing all the rights which constituted at once the
splendor and the solidity of the throne, and in per-
mitting troublesome laws to be imposed upon him, or
of displeasing the nation, by acting according to his
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 15
own good pleasure without consulting the country,
Louis XVIII. sought to conciliate as much as possible
the rights of the past and the opinions of the present,
with a proper foresight to the future. He flattered
himself to attain this end, by having his compact sanc-
tioned by a commission, composed of an equal number
of senators and members of the legislative body,
chosen from those who had acquired an ephemeral
popularity, by the loudest declamations against the
imperial power. This measure with its good intention,
served, however, but to introduce two or three deplor-
able amendments in the royal project, and did not
prevent the Utopianists of all shades from proclaim-
ing the scandal, because, said they, the fundamental
law being the work of a small number of the prince's
favorites, can only be an act outrageous to the sov-
ereignty of the people or the nation.
As the personal position of Napoleon placed him
under the necessity of making frequent allusions to
this sovereignty, which was really the only founda-
tion of his right to exercise the supreme authority, it
will not be out of place here to expose the manner in
which all wise statesmen should regard it, and in
which without doubt he also viewed it.”
Now-a-days, speculative politics have produced a
veritable confusion of tongues, and to make myself
properly understood, I feel the necessity of renewing
here a species of profession of faith. In internal poli-
* There are contradictions between these principles and many acts of
Napoleon ; but it must not be forgotten, that his position imposed upon him
many deviations from his true principles, which otherwise, mai ifest them."
selves in all the grand measures of his governument.
16 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
tics there are four things essentially different: theory
and practice, men and systems. I will forbear from
speaking of the different species of men thinking
themselves political, and I will treat only of things,
that is to say, of systems and doctrines. I will only
observe, in passing, that the men called on to govern
a state, are often under the necessity of adopting sys-
tems, which are not according to their principles: a
legislator and a publicist are, on this account, in a
more independent situation; but a prince, a chief of
state, a prime minister, being obliged to put into opera-
tion the elements they have at their disposal, find
themselves thus acting according to certain dogmas
not their own; and this was especially Napoleon's
case in 1815.
Some very ingenuous publicists have imagined in
good faith, that in point of political combinations,
all was new under the sun since 1789. However,
to my knowledge, there are but five forms of gov-
ernment that ever existed, and to which little has been
added in our day; these are: absolute hereditary
monarchy; hereditary monarchy limited by institu-
tions ; elective monarchy; aristocratic republic or
oligarchy; lastly, democratic republic. I have been
explicit on these different forms of government (chap.
VII., vol. II). Some have many advantages, mixed
with some defects; others have grave defects, tem-
pered by feeble advantages. I have described both.
When we attempt to give a government to a coun-
try, that finds itself momentarily deprived of the same
through certain catastrophes, it is necessary to choose
aright one of the five forms indicated. Whichever
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 17
be our choice, we should be deeply impressed with
the fact—that no nation is strong, puissant and formida-
ble, without a government that is vigorous and re-
spected at home.—That no government is capable of
leading a people to high destinies, when the authority
is humiliated by those, who should make it their duty
to elevate it to the highest degree of consideration.—
Finally, that liberty and order are impossible, without
due respect for the princes, the chiefs, or the magis-
trateS.
If it be acknowledged that in our day, republican-
ism would be an absurdity in a great European state,
with old communities scarcely free from the swaddling
clothes of feudalism ; if monarchy be the only form
that can be proposed, then a choice must be had be-
tween the elective and the hereditary, between the
absolute and the limited.
Though I have already commented on the dangers
of all elective governments, especially when applied
to monarchy, I must recall here what Ihave said con-
cerning it. In consulting appearances only, this sys-
tem would undoubtedly seem the most founded in
reason; still nothing is more opposed to the solidity,
grandeur, and even the preservation of states, for it is
little else than anarchy and civil war legally intro-
duced into the country at the death of each king. The
visionaries who extol it unceasingly, are unaware, that
no elective monarchy would exist a century in the
midst of powerful neighbors, jealous and interested in
intervening at each succession to the throne, in order
to excite a civil war, or cause the election of a king
suited to their wishes. They forget that Poland per-
18 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
ished, solely because she was an elective monarchy,
endowed with citizen-kings; that Hungary and Bohe-
mia have been swallowed up for the same reason.
We know what ruptures the federative and elective
empire has produced in Germany. The Grand-dukes
of Moscow, and the Arch-dukes of Austria, heredi-
tary possessors of feeble provinces, have, on the con-
trary, founded the two most powerful monarchies of
modern times, at the expense of the republics and
elective monarchies by which they were surrounded.
If France, when tired of the despotism of Louis XI.,
(which nevertheless gained her so much power,) had
thought of seeking for a remedy in an elective govern-
ment, she would have long ago been effaced from the
map of Europe as a political power. The greatest
service Napoleon has rendered her, is most certainly
that of having abolished her elective government, to
lead her back to wiser institutions.
It was after having recognized these incontestible
facts, that all wise legislators adopted, from age to
age, the principle of legitimacy, or the order of he
reditary succession, as the true safeguard of monarchi-
cal states.” But, one fact that has been too much
forgotten by our modern Solons is, that the principle
was established much more for the interest of the state
than for that of any one dynasty whatever; and that
consequently, the slightest blow given to its funda-
mental laws would lead to great future disorders.
* The good is often confounded with the bad, legitimacy with absolute
government ; the liberals honor them with one and the same anathema,
and nothing is more absurd, because, since the law of the country estab-
lishes hereditary monarchy, each one should be a legitimist as a matter of
duty, which does not at all prevent his being a constitutionalist.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 19
An elective monarchy not being then more suita-
ble than a republic, there remains but to choose
between an absolute hereditary monarchy and one
limited by institutions: each has its good features as
well as its inconveniences. If the prince was always
a just, firm man, and a great statesman, or if deficient
in either of these qualities, was always surrounded
by honest and able ministers, an absolute monarchy
would certainly be the government par excellence.
If the chambers of a constitutional country were all
composed of true statesmen, incorruptible and impar-
tial, without vanity or ambition, without spirit of
party or association, dreaming but of the country’s
grandeur and of respect for the dynasty; in one
word, sacrificing but to one divinity, the public good,
they might perhaps be able to dispute the palm with
a wise absolute royalty, and offer the perfection of
social institutions. But it is impossible to find such
chambers in any country. Thus, every system having
its inconveniences and its dangers, the aim and end
of all fundamental law should be to diminish them
as much as possible, and the institutions that will
permit the least to exist, will evidently be the best.
In order to compensate for the dangerous acci-
dents which the exclusive principle of legitimacy
and inheritance offers in sometimes leading bad
princes to the throne, some have imagined a constitu-
tional government, others the principle of national
sovereignty; high-sounding terms, that often conceal
many deceptions, and the meaning and application of
which are not often well defined or well established.
To this system some legislators of great foresight have
20 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
preferred the divine right, seeing that all power hav-
ing necessarily a source and Origin, it was very neces-
sary to ascribe one to royalty; but, if national sov-
ereignty is cast aside as evidently dangerous, nothing
is more rational than the recognition of royalty as
coming from God, since his providence guides the
destinies of nations as well as of individuals.
Between these two systems that appear reciprocally
to exclude each other, there perhaps exists a middle
course; undoubtedly sought for but not yet found, or
at least it still remains unfixed. Little has resulted
from this attempt, but an unconnected system, with
which they have thought to reconcile the elective
principle to the hereditary, by uniting them under
the head of national sovereignty, a kind of bastard
legitimacy, consisting of an order of succession without
strength, as it would be actually revocable by a vote
of the country more or less properly ascertained.
Others, more bold, or less satisfied with this vague
sovereignty, have believed it possible to appeal to that
of the people as the most positive and most powerful.
These terms, sovereignty of the people and national
sovereignty, have unfortunately been very often con-
founded, though they signify very different things.
The sovereignty of the people or of the multitude, is
an absurdity that no reasonable man can sustain, un-
less a totally different signification is given to it from
that which it is generally supposed to have. If it is
imagined that the multitude reigns because it nomi-
nates delegates direct, as it was pretended to establish
under the national convention, a great mistake is com-
mitted, because the people never were less the sover.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERT, OO. 21
eign than under this deplorable system. If classes
of notables are created, and the right of choosing
delegates conferred upon them, the people, no longer
nominating their proxy, are then no longer the sover-
eign. Besides, did there ever exist a people truly
capable of exercising even the most indirect sover-
eignty ? This has never occurred even in the small
cantons of Switzerland.
Under all constitutional monarchies, national sover-
eignty expresses, according to all reasonable statesmen,
the sovereignty of three powers, that have authority to
govern the affairs of the country: one only of these .
powers, then, is never but a fraction of the sovereignty.
Now, a nation delegating but one of these powers, is
not, properly speaking, sovereign, because if so, the
power of its delegates would rule alone, and would
annihilate the other two.
We see by this exposé, that national sovereignty has
not yet been generally well defined nor well understood.
The intervention of a nation in the administration of
public affairs, is not only a desirable fact, as has been al-
ready stated, but is a universal fact that exists even
in absolute monarchies, as the sovereign cannot govern
without being surrounded with men of merit designated
by public opinion, and who, under some title or other,
frame into ordinances the wishes of the nation, indi-
cated by the provincial states or the municipal admin-
istrations. This intervention of the country in the
management of affairs, is naturally clearer and stronger
under a constitutional government, where there exists
an elective chamber called to discuss and approve the
laws; but there is an immense distance between this
22 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
&ntervention in affairs, and the sovereignty. And it is
very necessary that it should be so, for it would be a
strange play upon words, to pretend to establish an
hereditary monarchy side by side with a national sov-
ereignty, so understood, that the nation being sovereign,
her delegates would have the right to make and to
destroy the government. -
It is true, that after the grand political deluges that
have occasionally engulfed some old, rotten, and
powerless governments, or after the total extinction
of some dynasty, it has been very necessary that the
notables of a nation should provide for the rebuilding
of the state, by confiding the reins to the prince judged
most worthy and apt, or to him who had the most di-
rect right. But this act of election being an exception
to the fundamental principles of inheritance, and not
being justifiable but under imperious circumstances,
is far from constituting a sovereign right; it should be
considered only as a revolution, and the compact re-
Sulting from it proclaiming the heirship to the throne,
becomes by this fact a distinct reparation of the vio-
lation of the principle, and a positive abdication of this
pretended right of national sovereignty. If it were
otherwise, a monarchy would be only elective, as has
been already stated.
It results from this, that in a hereditary monarchy,
not absolute, but limited by fundamental laws, the
throne is the legitimate property of the dynasty, the same
as that the portion of sovereignty that consists in taking
part in the framing of laws, is the imprescriptible
property of the nation. The nation should then be
powerless in disposing of the throne as long as there
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLC)(). 23
is an heir direct or indirect to it, as the throne cannot
deprive the nation from participating in the adminis-
tration of affairs; a concurrence that it exercises not
only through an elective chamber, but also through a
chamber of peers or senate chosen from the notabilités
of the country, and which, although nominated by the
king, would not the less represent an active and power-
ful fraction of the general interests of the country.
The equilibrium of, and the putting in practice these
two portions of sovereignty, is the delicate problem
that all wise statesmen should seek to reduce to a fun-
damental law. There are but few of our modern legis-
lators who have properly comprehended this problem,
or at least, who have given it a satisfactory solution.
If they have not perfectly understood national sov-
ereignty, neither have they properly appreciated and
defined divine right. The most ardent innovators have
endeavored to exhibit it as a right at once obscure and
arbitrary, which in distant times, some sovereign fami-
lies had arrogated to themselves, over the property of
a country. Louis XIV. especially, in his strange in-
structions to his grandson, had in some manner given
the weight of authority to this erroneous opinion. But
far from its being an abuse sanctioned by time, the
divine right had a more noble and more solemn origin,
because it was indisputably the most sublime institution
that legislators could devise, for giving to a state the
stability which constitutes strength, power, and pros-
perity, and delivering it from civil discord, by having
the throne protected from ambitious individuals.
It thus became an article of faith, among learned men
through profound reasoning, and among the masses
24 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
through tradition, not for the interest of one family,
but for the very safety of the state and the greatest
advantage to national power. Happy the people who
are sufficiently wise to know how to enjoy the benefits
of an advanced civilization, by appreciating the ad-
vantages of such an institution, and seeking to fulfil
the duties it imposes. -
After the English and French revolutions, the di-
vine right was exposed to the attacks of that multitude
of writers who thought themselves born to shape the
destiny of nations. Even among statesmen of sufficient
learning to discern all its merits, there were found some
who considered its action insufficient for a society
shaken to its foundation, and in which religious belief
had given place to a spirit of skepticism and contro-
versy that pretended to make every thing pass through
the crucible of philosophy. These bold writers thought
that a right which latitudinarians and even all the in-
telligent classes called a precedent, a right, according
to them, that lost itself 'mid the clouds of fanaticism,
could not have as solid an origin as one proclaimed
and consecrated by the interests of all, one, in a word,
founded on the institutions judged to be indispensable
by the most eminent men, and upheld by the experi-
ence of fifty centuries. In their opinion, the question,
in point, was to draw up the fundamental law in such
a manner as to place legitimacy under protection
from all storms. -
To this reasoning, not devoid of some justice, the
defenders of the divine right answer, that human in-
stitutions being unstable by their nature, and sanc-
tioned by men only, can of course be revoked by men,
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 25
so that they would be necessarily subjected to all the
storms of an elective monarchy, from which the di-
vine right alone could entirely exempt them.
We have not decided here between the two systems
of legitimacy, which will be equally indispensable ac-
cording to the country where they are to be applied,
and which at bottom rest on the same thought, be-
cause in either, the throne and the supreme power
properly appertains by right to the family in the es-
tablished order of succession; the only difference ex-
isting between them is, that in the latter the necessity
of this order, that cannot be at all assailed, is recog-
nized by human laws, which can be applied equally
to an absolute as to a limited monarchy.
This human institution of legitimacy is the more
admirable, as it has been necessarily sanctioned in its
origin by the proudest families of a country, by those
even who, having the chance of reaching the throne
in their turn, would be supposed inimical to a stable
institution that interdicted their ever having access to
it. Well, by a very extraordinary conversion, those
who have shown the greatest attachment to legiti-
macy, are the haughtiest families of England and
France, while it has been the object of the sarcasm
and hate of all demagogues who have nothing to gail
by an elective system of monarchy.
Be that as it may, Louis XVIII. and his ministers,
could with difficulty change of their own free will,
the essence of this right, placed above mortal combi-
nations, which had given fourteen centuries of con-
tinued existence to the monarchy of the Franks; they
should naturally have made it the lever of the new
2
26 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
public right, that dating from 1814, was to constitute
for the future, that of the throne and of France, by
binding them together in an indissoluble manner. All
that could be demanded of them was, to establish for
ever, this alliance of divine inheritance with human
institutions: the one deciding on the ownership of the
crown, the other admitting and limiting at the same
time, the rights of the nation, thus rendering this
double basis unassailable, as well on the part of the
throne as of its adversaries.
If the entire ancient nobility and all the members
of the royal family had shared these sentiments, that
were certainly entertained by the King personally, and
his ministers, we must admit that the charter would
have given satisfaction ; because, if it imposed some
slight trammels on monarchy, it shackled anarchy so
much the more ; but we should not ignore the fact
that the successors of Louis XVIII. did not consider
themselves at all bound by this contract, and claimed
the divine right to the fullest extent, under the idea
that it was attributed to them of old, especially under
Louis XIV. Moreover, if the intimate counsellors of
the King, Ferrand, Dambray, Montesquieu, Beugnot,
had exhibited an enlarged sagacity in the framing
and the discussion of this charter, the first two es:
pecially would have abolished from emigration, the
exaggerated prejudices on the means of applying
their doctrines to the French nation, usually little dis-
posed to comprehend their abstractions; besides, the
reactionary passions of some of these ministers and of
other confidants of the monarch, were more dreadful
even than their dogmas. -
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO, 27
Their task was the more difficult from having to
struggle against the Utopias of Benjamin Constant,
Lanjuínais and Lafayette, and there was none, even to
Delge Lanbrechts, appointed senator by Napoleon,
who did not consider himself as well qualified as Louis
XVIII. to give France a charter of his own fashioning.
He deigned his consent to call this prince and his
dynasty to the throne they had occupied for ten cen-
turies, on condition that he should resume all the
chains imposed by the National Assembly on Louis
XVI. This flaming legist pushed his monomania so
far, as to insert an article in his compact, prohibiting
the king from making propositions under the form of
laws, permitting him solely to pray the chambers for
the passage of a law on a subject, upon which the
prince would be satisfied in submitting an abstract.
What perfect folly to put the base of the edifice at
the summit, and the summit at the base, and which
gave ample reason, why the King should refuse to
such minds, the initiative of the compact.
After having demonstrated that the granted charter
had a double necessity, I should remark that its
arrangements were not faultless. As it was a sort of
indissoluble contract, binding at the same time the
throne and the nation, it should have been as brief as
possible, and should have contained but one species
of declaration of rights. Exception then can be
taken, to its extending with too much complaisance
over certain details of legislation, which it had been
more proper to deliberate upon and modify afterwards
with the aid of the chambers and the sanction of ex-
perience; the prerogatives conferred on the elective
28 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
chamber were not so stipulated, that the equilibrium
of the three powers so much desired, could never be
broken by this last, and not become a vain word
through its encroachments; by permitting an absolute
liberty to the press, it left an opening to its misrule.
I am ever ready to avow, that this last fault was the
work of the legislative commission associated in the
discussion of the charter, and not an act of the king,
who had wisely stipulated, that the laws upon this sub-
ject should have the power to prevent the often dan-
gerous errors of the journals, which by exciting the
worse passions would be itself capable of shaking the
most strongly constituted governments. Finally, the
most grave fault with which it can be charged is, that
it was accompanied by circumstances and restrictions
that caused its sincerity, and consequently, its duration,
to be doubted. -
If Louis XVIII. had not, with some reason, feared
to establish grievous precedents in admitting dogmas,
that might insensibly lead to the elective system, it is
certain that he would have given more stability to his
new edifice, by securing it at least the sanction of the
new chambers if not of the country. It would have
sufficed for this to have ordered a royal sitting, at
which he had declared the compact obligatory on
himself and his descendants, as well as on the nation
and its deputies, each within the limits fixed by the
charter. After which declaration, himself and all the
members of his family, as well as all the deputies and
peers, should have sworn to maintain in its integrity, a
charter that was henceforth a contract binding on all,
and the basis of an entirely new public right.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 29
Far from acting with this frankness and this pro-
found consciousness of the general interest of parties,
they affected to permit the belief that they submitted
to a necessity, but that this course would not be long
followed. To this error the restoration added the no
less grave one of changing the flag, and proscribing
that which had been, during twenty years of triumphs,
the pride of the present generation, instead of unre-
servedly adopting the national colors, which Louis
XVI. and Louis XVIII. himself, had borne for two
years. The white flag not only humiliated the army,
but also became the emblem of a reactionary will that
alarmed the best minds. Even Count Montlosier,
whose pure royalty was well tested, protested, by his
wise counsels, against an imprudence that placed the
throne at the mercy of a banner. The king yielded
to the excitations of his orthodox advisers, and be-
lieved he had accomplished sufficient in giving such
liberal institutions, the principles of which, were far
from obtaining the assent of the ultra-royalist party
that surrounded him.
Be that as it may, Louis XVIII. hoped to be able,
through this grand act, to bring together the Bour-
bons and the party that repulsed them, and render the
revolutionists partisans of royalty, by maintaining their
interests and admitting a portion of their system.
They imagined then, that there was but one heart
and one mind in the entire nation ; they affected to
repeat it, but this was not true. There was, however,
so much felicity in this combination, that under this
régime France would have flourished in a few years,
if parties would have reasoned: if pride, interest and
30 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
the passions could have been annulled by some statute :
lastly, if the errors we have just pointed out had not
rekindled all the most opposite political passions. The
king, by a dash of his pen, should have solved the
problem struggled for, for twenty years, since he had
established the new political doctrine in France, and
caused it to be recognized without dispute by entire
Europe. To succeed, it was only necessary for him
to know how to be master at home; but this was the
difficult point.
In fact, no chief magistrate was ever placed in a
more vexatious position. Surrounded by twenty
thousand emigrants who wanted situations, old impe-
rial employés who wished to preserve theirs, Jacobins
who also demanded a share of them, theorists who
pretended to be alone capable of conducting a consti-
tutional state, ancient royalists and a haughty clergy,
who wished neither a constitution nor those charged
with executing its requirements; Louis XVIII. had
been an angel, a genius, to have succeeded in uniting
the parties. This truth once acknowledged, he should,
at least, have striven to fix insuperable bounds, and
walked through these dangers with a free and firm
Stép.
A prince who disposes of a thousand millions a year,
besides all the employments in the administration and
the army, eventually succeeds in every thing, when he
has eaclusively the initiative of the laws, and knows
how to employ wisdom and vigor by turns. To place
the moderate royalists side by side with the constitu-
tionalists and the statesmen moulded under the empire,
to reject the ultras of all classes, to express his
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 31
wishes haughtily and frankly, was the only course to
be pursued; perhaps it had not sufficed to consolidate
a restoration, following immediately a foreign invasion
and the military humiliation of the country; but at
last, this was the only means of maintaining his posi-
tion; vigor founded on justice, is the best subtlety
of kings.
Louis XVIII. wished it too well done ; he flattered
the two factions too much, hoping to attach their
chiefs to himself; he favored Carnot and Fouché
while protecting those who treated them as brigands;
at the instigation of his counsellors, he promised the
emigrants what the charter never allowed them. In-
stead of being the sole and vigorous chief of the state,
he seemed but as the victim offered as a sacrifice to
the animosity of both parties; a secret power protected
by his brother, and which pretended to more royalism.
than the king, had established itself at his very side in
the palace of the Tuileries. To increase his misfor-
tune, authority was given to disreputable ministers,
who were influenced by the coteries that disquieted
the court. From that time there was nothing but in-
consistency and contradiction in the system of govern-
ment; words were never followed by deeds, as at
heart they desired something different from what was
promised in writing.
Louis XVIII. had given the charter to prevent any
other from being thrust upon him ; but it was evident
that, the first moment passed, the orthodox royalists
expected it to be withdrawn piece-meal, as the com-
pact did not suit them. They openly proclaimed that
this was but an act of transition between the revolu-
32 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
tion and legitimacy. The emigrants wanted an easy
master, as was asked by the Spanish priest, one who
would permit them to govern without contradiction.
They saw in the return of the Bourbons, but a means
of indemnifying themselves for their losses and recov-
ering their privileges. They had caused their own
ruin, and presented themselves as victims of their de-
votion to the royal family. They boldly asked if
there was but one legitimacy, and if the rights of the
nobility were not as sacred as those of the house of
Bourbon.
To calm these pretensions, they promised to satisfy
them in the course of time ; but the charter was far
from furnishing the means. In fact, the nobility was
established, but it had neither prerogative nor power;
it was not democratic, as it had exclusive pretensions;
it was not aristocratic, as it did not constitute a body
in the state, and to which the peerage itself was not
exclusively reserved.
The clergy also preached against the charter, be-
cause they expected to reclaim their property and re-
sume their ancient influence, which was positively
impossible under the empire of the constitution. Rome
also urged them in this course through an interest
that had nothing in common with christian morals, or
with the well-being of the French church.
It was then evident that the entire structure reposed
on insecure foundations. To consolidate it, required
the strong will of Richelieu, joined to the principles
of Henry IV. to put in practice what had been so
wisely promised: Union and oblivion. Everything
leads to the belief that this was the design of the princes;
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 33
but as each one arrives, after protracted discords.
nothing is thought of till interest and self-love have
been extinguished or satisfied.
Instead of proceeding with this end in view, they
did as in 1789, placed their self-love and interest at
variance; those who had delivered Toulon to the Eng-
lish, appeared at the Tuileries side by side with those
who had retaken it, and even dared to brave them with
their raileries. The king should have sent them en
surveillance, a hundred leagues from the capital.” To
gain the general confidence, it was indispensable to
expose, in a solemn proclamation, the principles of his
government, and to assure their triumph in spite of all
petty resistance. •
Far from strengthening all acquired rights, and
crushing all pretensions, the reverse was done, preten-
sions were caressed, and interests were injured. Al-
ready alarming reports, threatened all purchasers of
national property with projects of restitution ; pamph-
lets attributed to Chancellor Dambray, attacked the
legality of the sales, and demonstrated the justice of
restitution.
The soldiers of the empire were kept because feared,
or rather because there were none others; and in re-
viewing them they affected to enhance the glory of
their enemies. Crowds of emigrant or Vendean offi-
cers claimed, with perhaps some justice, the confir-
mation of their grades, thus encumbering the rolls
of the army and staff, and depriving the officers,
* We do not here mean that the king should prove ungrateful towards
his faithful servitors. He ought to provide for and cmploy those who
were moderate and wise; and exile from the court the over-excited and
the firebrands who preached but reaction.
2 *
34 IPOLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
already too numerous for the army, reduced three-
fourths, of all hopes of advancement. As a conse,
quence, many military conspiracies had burst forth in
the army through dissatisfaction.
Under the sway of circumstances such as these, no
one could feel a confidence in the existing state of
things, as they saw no point of support anywhere,
and, at the head of affairs, neither power or will.
Carnot, whose rough character was ever consistent,
dared to weigh the weakness of this government in
addressing the king; he afterwards published a me-
moir, in which, amid many truths, he feared not to
apologize for the regicides, as well as for the sover-
eignty of the people. By the side of this memoir, the
emigrants published pamphlets no less threatening.
They had not delayed till then, their conviction, that
the establishment of a rostrum and the liberty of the
press, were sad means for operating the fusion of par-
ties, as these institutions would be more effectual in
dividing the most united nation, than in rallying those
who were divided and irritated by the most violent
revolution recorded in history. In fact, interest and
self-love, wounded by the discourses from the tribune,
as by the virulent polemics and personal attacks of
the journals, revived all the passions, excited the hate
that time and forgetfulness might have extinguished,
and thus succeeded in creating factions even where
none existed. It was indeed with this object—to al-
lay all party feeling of resentment, and to merge all
in the same interest for his empire, and not for the
interest of his personal power, that Napoleon had
established a censorship, whose unsatisfactory results
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATRRLOO. 35
were caused by deficient regulations. As the ministry
of Louis XVIII. had felt, from the beginning, the ne-
cessity of establishing it over all works under twenty
printed sheets, and especially over daily and periodi-
cal journals: this was one of the first laws submitted
to the newly instituted chambers; and as it appeared
to be contrary to the promises of the declaration of
Saint Ouen and to the spirit of the modified charter,
the liberals, republicans and doctrinaires raised inces-
sant clamors: they shouted despotism deception lº
To these general causes of agitation, it is necessary
still to add, the dissatisfaction which the onerous
treaties entered into with foreigners had produced.
All who bore a true French heart, all who had a spark
of national pride and patriotism, were indignant at
* In the project of the charter emanating from the king's council, free-
dom of the press was declared, in conforming to the laws which would be
restored for preventing or restraining its abuse; the legislative commission
had objected to the word preventing and had obtained its erasure; the
ministers afterwards decided that for restraining this abuse, it was neces-
sary not to wait until the evil was without remedy and all its bad effects
produced. Besides, all former censorship had been more or less illy-con-
trived. That of the empire confided solely to two or three mercenary
censors, and extending to the most voluminous scientific works, was
abused ; years would be required to cull from the manuscripts accumula-
ted there : the works in one volume, even the periodical reviews and
pamphlets of ten sheets, should never be subjected but to good repressive
laws clearly expressed. As regards the daily press, whose action is such
as to be able to subvert the best constituted state, it should be subjected
to a previous censorship, but instead of confiding this to complaisant
clerks, it would be necessary, as I have stated in a previous volume, to in-
stitute a special tribunal of irremovable judges, that would both decide on
offences committed by uncensured works and regulate the censorship of
the daily press. This was the only mode admissible in France, where
She press has become a power sufficiently formidable to require particular
judges, impartial by their position and capable of appreciating the good
as well as the bad.
36 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF-
the ease with which the Count d'Artois had signed
the order for restoring a hundred fortified places still
occupied by French troops, before having even stipu-
lated for any of the conditions for peace. The trea-
ties of Paris traced out at the point of the sword with
a rigor, undoubtedly justifiable as reprisals, but per-
haps imprudent for the interest even of some of the
powers that imposed them,--these treaties, I say, had
left a deep-seated rancor in the hearts of all the par-
tisans of the empire and revolution. Each one per-
suaded himself, right or wrong, that the Bourbons
could have preserved at least a portion of Belgium
and the line of the Rhine as far as Coblentz, as well
as Savoy, if they had not been so eager to occupy
the Tuileries. We do not intend to discuss here the
validity of these censures, nor the possibility there
may have existed on the part of the ministry of Louis
XVIII. to obtain less harsh conditions; we only state
the moral effect their eagerness had produced.
The result of so much conflict could not be long
awaited. An absurd discourse of the minister Fer-
rand increased the irritation to the utmost, by classing
all the French people in two categories: those who
had followed the right line ; that is to say, who had
struggled in connection with the Bourbons or in la
Vendée; and those who had pursued the crooked line,
or who had admitted the Revolution and the Empire.
A strange apostrophe to the entire nation, and a sin-
gular means of supporting a projected law, tending to
the restitution of all the property of emigrants, not dis.
posed of. Henceforth the parties, daily, appeared
more hostile, and this shock might yet render Napo
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 37
... leon once more the arbiter of the destinies of
France.
If the state of affairs in this country were of a na-
ture to inspire him with the hope and the desire of
returning, he was not the less stimulated by the intelli-
gence of what was being enacted at the Congress of
Vienna, where the division of the spoils had led to great
dissensions. Already, were Austria, France and Eng-
land bound by eventual treaties, to guarantee Saxony
against the pretensions of Prussia backed by Russia, so
that the not-over-satisfied sovereigns of these two coun-
tries, spoke of returning to their capitals that demanded
their presence. Their reported departure was fixed
for the 5th March.
As a compensation for the support that the Bour-
bons promised to Austria and England, they demanded
the expulsion of Murat from the throne of Naples, to
be replaced by that branch of their family that for-
merly reigned there ; a very natural step, truly, as it
was a means of leading the peninsular to the interest
of France. Besides, the venal and interested heart of
Talleyrand attached a double importance to this pro-
ject; since, to secure the preservation of his princi-
pality of Benevento and the revenues attached thereto,
it behooved him to have it recognized by the legiti-
mate government of the two Sicilies, to the restoration
of which he inserted this condition. The Bourbons
proposed to take upon themselves the expulsion of
Murat, and with this object the assembling of troops
in Dauphiny was taking place.
From another quarter Napoleon was timely informed
that the ministers of Louis XVIII. were proposing to
the Congress his removal from Elba, to exile him to
38 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
another hemisphere; this was a gratuitous violation
of the treaty of Fontainbleau, as up to this time he
was chargeable with nothing that could provoke the
anger of the sovereigns.”
Unable to resist such an attempt, because of his
limited means of defence, and determined not to await
the event, Napoleon conceived the audacious design
of re-mounting the French throne. Though his forces
consisted but of a thousand soldiers, they were, never-
theless, superior to those of the Bourbons, allied, as
he was, to the honor of the country, which some-
times slumbers, but never dies in the heart of a war-
like nation. Full of confidence in this support, he
passed in review the small band, which was to second
him in so hazardous an enterprise. These soldiers
were ill equipped, but their martial forms denoted in-
trepid spirits. The preparations were not long, as these
brave men carried nothing but their swords. Favored
by the fortuitous absence of the English commissioner
and the vessels that watched over the Island of Elba,
the small flotilla that bore them, met with no accident,
and crossed over in three days. Napoleon again beheld
the coast of France at Cannes on the 1st of March,
near the very shore of Fréjus where he had landed
fifteen years before, on his return from Egypt. For-
tune seemed as then to smile upon him, as he returned
to this land, again to unfurl her standards, and restore
her independence.
* The French government did not pay the two millions granted annu-
ally by the treaty of Fontainbleau, and, it is said, inserted the condition
that Bonaparte should be exiled out of Europe. Napoleon was informed
of this fact by the Empress Maria-Louisa; and this circumstance, together
with the false report of the dissolution of the Congress of Vienna, decided
his return.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 39
The landing was effected without opposition, but in
finding himself once more on the soil of France, Na-
poleon must have experienced the liveliest emotions,
for the nature of this enterprise might hold in reserve
for him a most deplorable end. It appeared difficult
to form a well digested plan, because of the want of
information sufficiently detailed on the state of affairs
in the south, all knowledge being gathered from the
reports of prejudiced agents; he must have been
satisfied with deciding on a course answering to the
most probable case.
One of the first steps taken, to secure Antibe, failed
completely, as General Corsin, who commanded, refu-
sed to receive the imperial troops. This first check
seemed to augur badly, and it was the more grievous,
being the act of a captain of the guard, who had taken
the responsibility of trying this plan without orders.
On the other hand, Toulon and Marseilles were not too
well disposed. However, as it was important to strike
with promptness, Napoleon was not long doubtful as
to the course to be pursued, because a point d'appui
in the interior was indispensable, and Grenoble was
the nearest stronghold. He therefore marched upon
this city as speedily as possible, the success of the en-
terprise depending on its occupation. The slender
column that he called his army, arrived after having
travelled eighty-four leagues in six days.
The welcome received from the population on the
route, responded to his wishes, and doubled his chances
of success, as he was satisfied that the portion of the
people who were not corrupted by passion or interest,
preserved a manly character, that the national humili-
40 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
ation had wounded. Reaching Vizille on the 6th of
March, Napoleon at last met the first body of troops
sent to oppose him, and who refused to parley with his
officers. Aware that everything depended on the first
rencontre, and accustomed to resolve with rapidity and
decision, he fearlessly advanced to meet them, his
breast laid bare, confident that they would not fire
upon him. They were deeply affected by this act of
recklessness and confidence; far from seeing in him
an audacious promoter of civil war, as he was described,
they recognized but their emperor marching at the
head of his old warriors, who had so often led them on
the road to victory; their hesitation was not of long
duration. This was a detachment of the fifth regi-
ment of infantry, soon followed by the entire seventh,
under Labédoyère, who voluntarily hurried to his
presence. The people and the soldiers having received
him with similar exclamations of joy, Grenoble open-
ed her gates, and he advanced upon Lyons with five
thousand men.
At the news of his landing, the Bourbons, though
struck with astonishment, yet flattered themselves
with resistance. They put a price upon his head, and
ordered him to be hunted down as an adventurer who,
by force of arms, was attempting the well-being of the
State. The Count d’Artois departed for Lyons with
Macdonald ; the Duke d’Angoulême, who was at
Bordeaux, hastened into Languedoc, to establish the
centre of a royal authority at Toulouse; Ney, summon-
ed to Paris, was sent to the East; finally, an extra ses-
sion of the chambers was called in all haste. Some
have even pretended that the most fiery of the minis.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 41
ters of the restoration, M. de Blacas, wished to have
recourse to a surer means than that of the sword, and
charged a man named B “ ” * to assassinate the em-
peror.” Though an individual of this name has
boasted, in a pamphlet, of having accepted this mis-
sion, we prefer suspecting this miserable man of mad-
ness, to giving credit to such an assertion. However,
Napoleon affected the greatest tranquillity, feeling
that he had glory and France on his side.
On the 10th March, and at the gates of Lyons, the
royal troops were no sooner in the presence of his
own, than they mingled with and embraced each
other with cries of Vive l'Empereur. Macdonald
barely escaped, and the Count d'Artois had just time
to take post and return to Paris.
The Lyonese received the happy conqueror with
still more enthusiasm than on his return from Ma-
rengo. This welcome, that deeply moved him, was
an apology for his enterprise, and at once redou-
bled his courage and confidence in the future.
Although quite certain of the reception awaiting
him at the capital, Napoleon issued many decrees at
Lyons tending to affect public opinion. The greatest
censures cast upon him by the ambitious party of the
tiers-État, were for having re-established the nobility,
enchained the press, and rendered the tribune mute.
Notwithstanding he had acted only for the interest of
public tranquillity, and in consequence of the grave
circumstances under which an unexampled revolution
had placed the country, he did not hesitate in retra-
*See the pamphlet published by Moronval, quai des Augustins, in 1816,
in which this B # * * gives an account of his exploits.
42 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
cing his steps, proclaiming the abolition of all privi-
leged nobility, promising to govern conjointly with
the deputies of the nation, and decreeing the re-esta-
blishment of the liberty of the press.”
The two chambers which Louis XVIII. had con-
ferred on France, found generally more partisans than
the mute legislative body instituted in the year VIII.
Athenians in more than one point of resemblance, the
French wished, at any price, to shine in the tribune,
not dreaming that Demosthenes’ are rare, and that
for one statesman, a hundred ambitious, indifferent
as well as interested declaimers, are found. Napoleon
appreciated the advantages of the tribune, but was
always aware of its disadvantages and dangers, and
must have had at heart that France should enjoy the
one without falling into the other. He however sac-
rificed his principles to the spirit of the age, well
convinced that after the storm, they would feel the
necessity of modifying anew, institutions that suited
neither every circumstance nor every people; but the
elements of which it is, however, proper that an en-
lightened nation should preserve, to be put into
action, when a weak and incapable government
or a dangerous minority set adrift the vessel of
state.t.
* The re-establishment of the unlimited liberty of the daily press was
an error of which Napoleon became the first victim. The periodical press
and works, may be exempt from censure, but the daily journals cannot be
with impunity, at least during political storms.
+ This phrase will perhaps be thought ambiguous and little conclusive.
It should be thus interpreted. Napoleon was convinced that the govern-
ment with two chambers and a public tribune, offered real advantages in
peaceable times, when the wheels of government are well established by wise
fundamental laws, and especially when there exists but one interest, that
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 43
It would have been very remarkable, had Napoleon
been able to forget the unheard of advantages that
legitimacy gives, and the extreme facility with which
Louis XVIII. had installed himself in his place in
1814; but being unable to invoke this principle in favor
of his return, he was forced to oppose it with the prin-
ciple of national sovereignty through its whole extent,
as the best means of flattering the opinion. Persua-
ded, also, that in order to act sensibly on the impres-
sible spirit of the French, it was necessary to refrain
from following in the usual routine of the assemblies,
with which the country had been disgusted, under
every denomination, from that of the notables to the
factious Senate he had dethroned, Napoleon conceived
the idea of re-uniting all the electors, not in their de-
partments for the election of deputies, but at Paris, to
form, under the solemn title of the Assembly of the
champ de Mai, an actual re-union of all the national
hotabilités, who would nominate commissioners to
consult with him in the reconstruction of the State on
future immovable bases. This august assembly, which
would recall to mind the epoch when the Franks
themselves raised their kings on the shield, also re-
called the first federation of 1790, which, from its
of the state, closely bound to that of its chief, or, as well, under a feeble
government whose chief is himself little capable of piloting the vessel of
state. But he thought that after a revolution that has divided the nation
into two hostile masses, when great interests, both injured and acquired,
are avºc prises, when there exists one government de facto and another de
jure supported by foreigners, to deliver elements so combustible to public
discussion, was to expose himself to inevitable troubles. This opinion
can be shared with hinn without, as a consequence, being an apostle of
despotism. I say farther, no one can think otherwise and be a statesman.
44 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
having been followed by the bloodiest catastrophies,
was not the less one of the most imposing ceremonies
to which history points. This Assembly of the Champ
de Mai would charm, because of ancient and illustrious
souvenirs ; it would offer, he thought, a striking con-
trast to the manner in which the Bourbons had im-
posed a charter on the French, wounding the pride of
the constitutional party, while the emperor strove to
flatter the nation by affecting to render homage to her
rights and her notables, with whom he was to confer
respecting the new institutions to be given to the em-
pire, for securing her internal happiness, consolidating
her glory, and protecting her institutions from fac-
tions.
Napoleon did not entirely conceal from himself the
danger that might some day result from such a pre-
cedent and the embarrassments under which his suc-
cessors would labor, to whom he would bequeath all
the vicissitudes of an elective monarchy. But having
nothing upon which to act but the elective principle,
it behooved him to make use of it for drawing to-
gether the greatest possible party, against the legiti-
macy of his enemies and the foolish pretensions of the
Jacobins. Besides, he understood very well how, in
time, to render all possible aid to the principle of he-
reditary succession ; because this principle forming
in fact the basis of the new public right, to secure its
maintenance would be included in his duties.
Preceded by these memorable decrees, Napoleon
continued his advance upon Châlons, where he was
joined by the troops that Ney had at first assembled
with the intention to combat him. This marshal was
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 45
no statesman, and the sum of his political creed con-
sisted in not causing civil war for private interests.
This was the motive that guided him at Fontainbleau,
when he contributed to promoting the first abdication.
“Mothing for one man—all for France,” was his
motto ; a very respectable dogma, apparently, but
which, when pushed too far, might cause the commis-
sion of grave errors, and lead to the forgetfulness of
the most sacred duties.
At the report of the Emperor's return, Ney at first
only saw the injury he had done him at Fontainbleau,
and the dangers of a civil war with which his return
menaced the country. He accepted in good faith the
mission to repulse him by force of arms, and even
gave vent to imprudent and improper threats against
his ancient chief. But soon convinced, in his journey
through Burgundy and Franche-Comté, of the una-
nimity of feeling among the people, and his very
soldiers, who raised the national colors in his presence,
and influenced by two officers who had been secretly
sent him from Lyons, to guaranty to him oblivion of
the past, the marshal repented of his first reso-
lution, and trembled at fme idea of giving the signal
for civil war which he detested.
Placed in the same alternative as Marlborough be-
tween James II. and William, he did not hesitate to
throw himself in the ranks he had rendered illustrious
by so many brilliant feats of arms. He acted by im-
pulse, and yielded to the idea that governed him,
without reflecting that he offended against sacred
propriety, which he could have easily avoided by re-
.46 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
tiring to Besançon until the entrance of Napoleon
into the capital.
The contrast between his proclamation from Lonsle-
Saulnier, and his promises to Louis XVIII., will re-
main an unfortunate stain in the history of his glorious
career, because it gives a false idea of his character,
by offering all the appearances of premeditated trea-
son, of which he was incapable.
After his junction, nothing could arrest the happy
conqueror, who pursued his triumphal march at the
head of ten thousand men. He left to his adversaries
but the resource of a camp, hastily assembled at Me-
lun; but the soldiers of this camp, brothers to those of
Grenoble, Lyons and Chalons, were more disposed to
join their eagles than oppose them.
Stupefied by the rapidity of his progress, the royal
government knew not where to show front; it would
be difficult to picture the agitation and confusion that
reigned at the palace of the Tuileries, as well as in
Paris. Louis XVIII. had alone preserved that calm
and that resignation that had never abandoned him.
Yielding however to the unreasonableness of those
around him, he permitted himself to adopt the most
opposite resolutions. On the one side, he threw himself
into the arms of publicistes doctrinaires, and confided
to Benjamin Constant the drafting of proclamations
that were to gain him the confidence and love of the
French. He placed himself under the aegis of the
national guards, and of the partisans of revolutions,
while on the other hand he appealed to all the loyal
royalists, and to the fidelity of the military, whom he
had so seriously injured. Fouché was at one time at
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 47
the point of being sent for at the palace and consulted,
then they decided to arrest him; but the crafty syco-
phant decamped from his hotel in time, and found
fefuge in that of Queen Hortense, which he reached
through a garden.
A few changes in the ministry; the police entrusted
to Bourienne, who, from being Napoleon's confidential
secretary and his friend from infancy, had become his
open enemy ; caresses and promises to all parties; ap-
peals to the national guards and the royal volunteers;
such were the sad measures with which Messrs. de
Blacas, Ferrand, and Dambray counted upon fright-
ening or capturing the conqueror of so many nations.
The chambers that had been so suddenly convoked,
succeeded only in giving to the world the spectacle of
nought from a deliberative assembly in presence of a
real danger, and proved to entire Europe that the time
when senators awaited death in their seats, had passed
away forever. Moreover, this meeting resulted but
in allowing some orators the pleasure of repeating the
declamations inserted by Benjamin Constant in the
Journal des Débats against the imperial despotism, in
furnishing the ministry a pretext for avowing that
errors had been committed; lastly, in giving the king
an opportunity for appearing with solemnity before
the chambers, accompanied by his brother and nephew,
in order to take the oath of fidelity to the charter,
which had been in better taste at the time of its pro-
mulgation ; an oath, which on the part of the Count
d’Artois, was ever suspected of little sincerity. Two
days after this sentimental but tardy homily, the troops
of the camp of Melun went over en masse to those
48 4'OLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
of the Emperor, who the next day, March 20th, made
his entrée at the Tuileries. The Bourbons had but
time to take shelter in Belgium; the Duke d'Angou-
lème alone, skirmished a few days in the South. Never
had such an apparently reckless enterprise cost less in
its execution. As an explanation, some have pretend-
ed that it was conformable to general opinion, which
renders all things easy when floating with it. If the
principle is true, its application in this case is at least
doubtful; because, if we reflect on the state of opinion
at the time of Napoleon's first abdication, the belief
is permissible, that France was much divided in feeling
towards him, and that the number of his enemies
equalled that of his partisans. In fact the former
composed the most energetic portion of the nation.
Besides, if it is certain that popular opinion be the
most powerful of levers and supports, it is also neces-
sary to keep in mind that it is no less fickle in its na-
ture than difficult to establish, and that it is much more
profitable to be its arbiter and director than be led a
slave in its train; finally, if it be prudent at times to
submit to its demands, it is well at a later period to
get the mastery of it. -
Be that as it may, this astounding revolution was
terminated in twenty days without costing a single
drop of blood; France had changed her aspect, the
nation restored to herself, recovered her pride; she was
free from the yoke imposed by strangers, having
accomplished the greatest act of free-will of which a
people are susceptible. The grandeur of the enterprise
effaced the recollection of defeat, and Napoleon was
again the man of her choice. w -
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 49
While awaiting the definitive institutions he had
promised the country, the Emperor's first care was
naturally to organize a temporary administration, and
to place capable men in charge of the different offi-
ces.—That of war was given to Davoust, of the navy
to Descrès, of finance to Gaudin: the port-folio of
foreign affairs was restored to Caulincourt, whose
pacific dispositions were known to the allies; Camba-
céres accepted the seals after reiterated instances;
Fouché took the ministry of the police, which was his
element. Lastly, Napoleon confided that of the in-
terior to that haughty republican, Carnot, who had re-
fused to award him the Empire, in 1804, and who ac-
cepted the title of Count from that very Empire in 1811.
The choice of these two old adepts of Jacobinism,
was at once, a pledge the Emperor intended giving
to the public, against the errors of his so-called des-
potism, and a means of uniting in his defence that
energetic portion of the people who served under their
banners. He thoroughly appreciated the compass of
Carnot's military genius, who, after having by instinct
ordered certain passable operations in 1793 and 1794,
had ordered very defective ones in 1796. But he had
an energetic will and supported popular Utopias ; he
might be very useful in the ministry of the in-
terior, to which appertained the duty of exciting
the masses for the national defence, and organ-
izing them accordingly. His character though much
extolled, was impressed with a kind of probity
and uprightness that had survived the revolution-
ary turmoils; this character, joined to talents for
defending the country, we will admit, had made
50 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
him a modern Cato in the eyes of the multitude: they
thought, and with truth, that he would never be a
servile agent of the imperial will; but they knew not
how much good his inflexibility and his inclination to
opposition might prevent.
As to Fouché, his character for intrigue is so well
known that I can dispense with enlarging upon it.
This man, who had a vast mind, though often false, con-
sidered cunning and actions of a roué, as the true
genius for affairs. His great experience, while de-
monstrating to him the emptiness of the Utopias of dem-
agogues, had not however succeeded in eradicating
his doctrinaire ideas of 1791. He wanted strength in
the administrative measures of the government, with-
out comprehending that before every thing else, this
was necessary in the institutions.
Napoleon knew Fouché too well to confide in him ;
but if the latter treasured any resentment for the hon-
orable exile the Emperor had imposed upon him in
1810, he had also to dread the Bourbons, who wished
him arrested four days previous to his entrance into
Paris, and who had great wrongs to complain of
against him. A man of such a stamp, who had been
stranger to no plot since 1792, who had planned, pro-
tected, or baffled them, could not stand with folded
arms 'midst the grand conflict that was brewing.
They had to resolve on using him by flattering his
ambition, or placing him where he could do no injury.
To confine him at Vincennes, or exile him without trial,
would have caused much scandal at a time when they
loudly exclaimed against arbitrary power. Napoleon
preferred to employ him at all hazards, and paid dearly
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 51
for this error. The numerous and audacious depend-
ants who were grouped about these two ex-conven-
tionals, and those ranged under the banners of La-
fayette, Lanjuinais, and Benjamin Constant, signalized
but too well the rude assaults which the new chief of
the government would have to sustain unless he bound
them to his cause. Experience had not as yet shown
that they were no less dangerous as friends than as
enemies.
Having thus attended to the formation of his cabinet,
Napoleon felt it incumbent upon him to turn his at-
tention towards Europe: the great Captain had refu-
sed the peace offered him at Châtillon, with the boun-
daries of 1792, because he then found himself on the
throne of France, and it would have been too much
condescension ; but nothing prevented him from ac-
cepting the one imposed on the Bourbons, because he
came from the Isle of Elba, and the responsibility did
not weigh much upon him, neither in the eyes of
France, nor in the eyes of posterity. While fore-
warning Murat of his departure, the Emperor had
charged him to dispatch a courier to Vienna, bearing
his pledge to adhere to the treaties of Paris, with the
promise to confine his exertions to the internal happi-
ness of France. Unfortunately he had not a man of
sufficient skill about him whom he might send to the
Emperor Alexander, to demonstrate to this prince how
much English rivalry would one day bear upon him,
and how much value Russia should attach to the fact
that France had a strong and national government,
inimical to England. As his ancient projects on the
Vistula could not again recur, and as from this time
52 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
no rivalry ought to exist between the two countries, it
would be very difficult to affirm what effect such a
mission would have produced on the mind of this
monarch; but unfortunately this attempt could not
be made.
In either case it was natural to believe that the posi-
tive assurances given by Napoleon to the sovereigns,
would have had their due effect; because Europe, as-
tounded by his return, and by the energy of the French
people, must have dreaded the repetition of the scenes
of the revolution, by provoking the display of all the
resources of propagandism. The success of this step
would not have been doubtful, if the Congress had
been dissolved, as was assured him, and if the Em-
peror had treated with the cabinets singly.”
But the sovereigns being present, their pride was
roused ; their interests, divided since the fall of the
Empire, to a degree difficult to reconcile through ne-
gotiations, could in twenty-four hours be rallied with
a common object, that of consolidating the division
of the rich spoils which Napoleon’s return had ren-
dered problematical. It was useless to protest his ad-
hesion to the treaties, they wished to believe nothing;
the coalition was renewed even before his protesta-
tions reached Vienna. All the governments that had
placed arms in the hands of their people, only saw in
his return a military revolt, capable of reviving the
deplorable epochs when the Roman legions disposed
* This was written in 1828, and the conduct of Europe in 1830, proves
the truth of the assertion. Napoleon departed, believing in the truth of
the articles written from Vienna by Latour Dupin, and inserted in the
Joſ, rnal des Debats. They announced the departure of the king of Prussia
and the Elmperor Alexander as certain.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 53
of the Empire at the will of their ambitious com-
manders; each of the sovereigns was fearful then,
right or wrong, of seeing his throne exposed to the
same dangers. Moreover, Austria trembled lest Italy
should be snatched from her, forgetting altogether the
ties which the events of 1814 had broken asunder.
Russia, convinced that she could not preserve Warsaw,
but in allying with her most natural rivals, sacrificed
everything to this end: Prussia, that solicited at Wi-
enna for the dependency of Saxony, accepted the
other enlargements that were assured her, fearful of
not getting either. England, led by inferior men,
thought she foresaw a second time the imperial eagles
floating at Boulogne, at Antwerp, and in Egypt, and
lavished her subsidies to escape an imaginary danger,
or at least, one very exaggerated.
Thus were all interests at variance with the existence
of Napoleon. The declaration of the 13th March,
which placed him in a certain manner without the
pale of the laws of nations, sufficiently proves the
fears he inspired. If to all these motives, we add the
dread felt by Talleyrand of this return, the result of
which was to sequestrate the ten millions of bernois
funds he had in England, at the same time that his
fortune would be compromised in France through his
banishment, the violence of this famous declaration
will be easily understood, as the wording of the same
has been generally attributed to him.
In order to appease the powers, it would have been
necessary for the Emperor to have time to ensure
the Duchy of Warsaw to Russia, and the cession of
Italy to Austria. It would perhaps have been attended
54 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
with success, had the negotiations been transferred
singly to St. Petersburg and Vienna. But the decla-
ration of the 13 March, made at an European Congress,
left but little hope of success to these propositions for
preserving peace.
However, Napoleon at first thought that this decla-
ration had been prompted by the desire to second the
resistance which the Bourbons might oppose to him,
as well as by an exaggerated distrust of his ulterior
projects towards Europe. Nothing was more natural
than that the monarchs whose victories had reseated
Louis XVIII. upon his throne, should seek to maintain
him there ; but when the prince had been so easily
forced to another emigration, the question changed
its aspect. The Emperor had then reason to flatter
himself that the cabinets would retrace their steps,
when informed of the rapidity of his triumph, and of
the unheard of success of his enterprise, as well as of
his pacific intentions. Unfortunately, the treaty of
alliance, offensive and defensive, signed the 25th March
between the great powers, very soon destroyed this
illusion.*
We are not certain that this resolution of the sov-
ereigns was really suggested by the general interest
of thrones, and that under this supposition it was best
because more expedient. The dynasty of Napoleon
had been gloriously inaugurated by victory, into the
* Some rather credulous publicists have attributed an essential part in
these important resolutions of Congress, to the intrigues of Fauche Borel,
a secret agent of the Bourbons; it requires an astonishing quantity of
simplicity to believe that the cabinets of the great powers could listen to
the insinuations of such agents, in order to regulate their conduct under
such grave and important circumstances.
'THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 55
number of those who reigned in Europe, and his
alliance with the daughter of the Caesars had doubly
enfeoffed him. Besides, it had perhaps been wiser to
have left him on the throne, than have him re-
placed by a government which being imposed through
violence, could with difficulty secure the repose of
France and of Europe.
It can scarcely be credited, that the fear of behold-
ing in this country the triumph of the elective prin-
ciple and that of national sovereignty, a sufficient
motive for so extraordinary a coalition; because this
solutive principle could not gain ground in Europe
through its partial application in any one country
whatever; and if the ambition of France was dreaded,
nothing better could be done, than endowing her with
future ruptures by permitting her this elective gov-
ernment. Besides, when a principle is considered
fatal to states, it should not be resisted with cannon,
but by sage discussions, with experience and in time.
Napoleon, by accepting the treaties of Paris, and
maintained on his throne, would have strengthened
the governments generally, suppressed revolutionary
ideas and averted the crisis which has well nigh over-
thrown Europe two or three times since his fall; the
volcano that still smokes more threateningly than we
imagine, had been extinct or smothered for an indefi-
nite period, and the European equilibrium had been
more firmly reëstablished.
In fact, it was difficult to suppose that Napoleon
would long maintain the stipulations of the treaties of
Paris; the indignation excited throughout the country
by these treaties had been one of the causes ºf the ex-
56 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
pulsion of the Bourbons. Would he have dared to
regard them as an eternal engagement 2 The nation,
above all the army, whose strength placed on a war
footing had roused ambition, would they not have
impelled the Chief of State to seize the first occasion
to recover, at least, the line of the Rhine and the
Alps ?
In weighing these divers considerations we can
easily conceive the double perplexity in which his
return had plunged the coalesced powers, and the res.
olutions that were the natural consequences of it. The
conviction that the army alone had caused this revolu-
tion, and the fear of seeing the thrones at the mercy
of military chieftains, joined to a desire of consolida-
ting the shares of the conquests made from the
empire; such were certainly the true incentives of
the monarchs; either was sufficiently powerful to
determine them; but it appeared very difficult to
decide, whether the danger of substituting for Napo-
leon a government feeble in itself, and imposed upon
them, was not greater than the ill effects of his return
in assuring new revolutions.
The external embarrassments resulting from the
acts of the Congress of Vienna, were not the only ones
felt by Napoleon, because the Duke d’Angoulême
being at Bordeaux at the time of his landing, had
taken immediate measures for disputing the empire
with him. Louis XVIII. had ordered this prince to
establish at Toulouse the seat of a royal govern-
ment, and had appointed him his Lieutenant in the
south of France. From Toulouse, where he had
rapidly organized resistance in concert with M. de Wi-
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 57
trolles and the Count de Damas, the Duke had repair-
ed to Marseilles, where he had met with similar ova-
tions on the part of this parasitical population, whose
first wishes are mercantile wealth and substantial in-
terest. Through the aid of a few regiments that
remained faithful, and especially of the fanatical in-
habitants of Languedoc, where religious dissensions
were blended with the political quarrels, the Duke
organized three columns with which he ascended the
Rhone to retake Lyons and Grenoble ; but defection
also began in this body; two regiments declared for
Napoleon, and the 10th of the line alone preserved a
thousand soldiers for the prince, who here joined from
six to seven thousands national guards. After having
beaten General Debelle at Loriol on the Drôme, he
advanced on Valence; but the imperial officers sent
to Toulouse and Montpelier, had succeeded in having
the tri-colored flag displayed in these two cities, and
their garrisons, to declare for the Emperor. Mean-
while, Dauphiny also pronounced against the Bour-
bons, and Grouchy, ordered to Lyons, was preparing
the means for smothering this feeble spark of civil
war, by sending many small columns on Valence.
The prince, closely pressed by General Gilley, and
learning that the departments in his rear had recog-
nized the imperial government, signed on the 9th
April, at Pont-Saint-Esprit, a convention by which he
consented to evacuate France and embark. Grouchy,
in obedience to his orders, refused at first to rat-
ify this act, which Napoleon however hastened to
sanction.
Meanwhile, vexatious troubles breaking out in
3%
58 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
la Vendée, had forced fifteen thousand veterans to be
detached thither under General Lamarque; this offi-
cer, previously distinguished for his activity, together
with that of General Fravot, had suppressed the fire
of civil war, the more formidable in this section of the
country than in the rest of France, as much because
of its locality as of the obstinate and devoted charac-
ter of the inhabitants. Notwithstanding, however,
the death of Larochejacquelin, killed in the battle of
Mathes, and the successes obtained at Saint-Giles and
Roche-Servières, hostilities did not actually cease till
after the battle of Waterloo.
While these things were happening in France, and
at the Congress of Vienna, Murat still chanced to
complicate his brother-in-law's position, by rising in
arms in a way well worthy his eccentric and adven-
turous character. Informed of the negotiations that
had taken place between France and Austria to depose
him, he demanded of the latter a passage into Italy to
reap vengeance for the threats of the ministry of Louis
XVIII. : he might have well known that this would
be refused him. At the news of Napoleon's landing,
Murat at once hoped to make amends for his defection
in 1814. He was persuaded that the time had arriv-
ed for him to play a grand part, and that in promising
the people of Italy a national insurrection, he might
yet render himself the arbiter of great events. On the
22d of March, he debouched from Ancona with forty
thousand men, drove the Austrians from Césène, and
favored by the population of Bologna and Modena,
rapidly invaded the states situated on the Po, up to
the gates of Placentia, while another column invaded
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 59
the Roman states and Tuscany. He everywhere circu-
lated proclamations announcing that his object was to
reunite the Italians under one banner, and in its name
to take possession of the provinces he traversed: he even
meditated the invasion of Lombardy through Pied-
mont, when his progress was arrested by the declarations
of the English minister who menaced him with war.
The Austrians soon reassembled and hurled against
him General Bianchi, with twenty-five or thirty thou-
sand men. Leaving Florence with a majority of his
forces, this general marched by Foligno, so as to cut
off Murat’s retreat, while Neipperg threatened him by
the route of Ancona. The king of Naples was obliged
to retire precipitately to avoid this untoward result;
the decisive rencontre took place at Tolentino, on the
2d of May; the Neapolitans, completely routed, dis-
persed in all directions. Murat, who has regained his
capital with a slender escort, abandoned even by his
warmest partisans, is constrained to fly from Naples
and seek refuge in France; he lands at Toulon. A
compact signed at Capua, by his Lieutenants, on the
20th of May, leads back Ferdinand IV. to the throne
of the two Sicilies.
Nothing was ever more ill-timed than this affray.
If Austria had had the least inclination to retrace her
steps regarding the declarations of the 13th of March,
this rendered it impossible; and in even supposing
that the cabinet of Vienna was resolved to persist,
everything should be avoided that tended to bind
closer the ties of the coalition. In a military point of
view, this was taking the initiative much too soon,
because hostilities were commenced even before
6(). POLITICAL AND MILFTARY HISTORY OF
Napoleon's entrée into Paris was known, so that he
was far from being able to second him. As a diver-
sion, the king of Naples could do much, but the desire
to act a principal part in the war was an absurdity.”
Thus, on two occasions did Murat compromise the
Empire, the first by declaring for its enemies; the
second in arming himself mal a propos. He expiated
by a chivalric death, the two faults that had precipi-
tated him from his throne; as a soldier, his will be a
glorious memory.
Meanwhile, the sad result of this strange attempt,
the success of the Austrians, and the advices that
reached France of what was happening at Wi-
enna, and in all the rest of Europe, was of a
nature to inspire just fears in the least prejudiced
minds. A formidable war threatened anew the na-
tional existence, and all hope of diverting the storm
by concessions had vanished; Napoleon had to decide
either to brave it, or to shun it most cowardly : be-
tween two such resolutions could a man of his charac-
ter hesitate? If his personal honor had alone been at
stake, he had had the power to sacrifice it to the fu-
ture of France; but was not the honor of the nation
more involved even than his own 3 A population of
, thirty millions, who had just elevated the greatest
citizen to the throne, could not, because of a diplomatic
declaration emanating from a foreign congress, drive
* Many persons think that Murat was prompted by Napoleon to invade
Italy, thus facilitating his enterprise by giving occupation to the Austrians.
This had been well after he saw the impossibility of maintaining peace;
but if he nourished a hope, this was most imprudent, and in either case the
time was very ill chosen. It is then more than probable, that he was ax-
ceedingly annoyed by it,
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 6i
away this adopted chief, and submit to the yoke they
wished to impose !
Some mighty voices have however been raised, re-
proaching Napoleon for having continued on the
throne after the reception of these declarations from
Vienna. According to their views, he should have
frankly exposed to the French people the position he
held in the eyes of Europe, now alarmed and in arms
against him, then have proposed to the nation the
three following propositions for its decision:
1st, To place itself without delay at the mercy of
Louis XVIII. .
2d, To proclaim on the contrary Napoleon II., with
a regency, or any other government that seemed
preferable.
3d or lastly, To declare the nullity of the abdication
at Fontainbleau, in again awarding the Empire to Na-
poleon himself.
If the nation had adopted this last, then the fate of
France had been irrevocably bound to his own, and
any abandonment had been cowardice and felony.
The fervent and thoughtless apostles of national
sovereighty might find something specious in these
ideas, but at bottom they were devoid of all wisdom.
In the first place, Napoleon did not immediately des-
pair of leading Austria, and perhaps Russia, to more
favorable views of his cause; he renewed his attempts,
and even sent General Flahaut to Vienna with this
intention. Subsequently, he had too much pride to
submit thus to a sort of proscription that would have
wounded a prince least capable of reigning, and which
must have seemed doubly humiliating to a Captain as
62 FOLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
illustrious as himself. Finally, it is probable that he
still loved power too much, to follow the example of
Charles W. and Victor Armédée, and seek repose in a
cloister. Besides, could he entertain the idea of flying
from France as proscribed, where Louis XVIII. had
not failed to return, accompanied by a portion of the
coalition ? Would this not be delivering all those who
were devoted to his cause, to the fury of a re-action?
Moreover, in abdicating early in April, to whom
would he have intrusted his power, there being
then no constituted authority? A beautiful conception
truly, that of leaving France for three months without
a government, at a time when eight hundred thousand
men were bursting in upon her There was no choice
in the case; he had to fly while supplicating Louis
XVIII. to re-enter his capital, or he had to fight. The
alternative was a painful one, the chances were fright-
ful, but alas! he had none other: and if well seconded,
Napoleon felt the deep conviction of triumphing over
his enemies.
Other Aristarchus’, as reckless as those were timid,
have pretended that far from yielding to the storm,
the Emperor should have anticipated it, and at once
availing himself of the first enthusiasm of the people,
had shown to what extent he was yet formidable, by
invading Belgium, and proclaiming liberty throughout
Europe; whereas his pacific attitude lulled the nation
into fancied security. Pitiable declamation 1 A people
in blouses, and armed with pikes, cannot be hurled
against the warlike legions of entire Europe. A grand
army was necessary, and to obtain one, it was all im-
portant sacredly to preserve the nucleus that existed,
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERF,OO. 63 V
to be increased by means of this very population that
was being levied and organized. To this end, nothing
had been effected, and the pacific attitude charged to
Napoleon, consisted in sixteen hours daily labor for
three months, to create this army. He increased the
regiments of the line from two to five battalions, and
reinforced those of cavalry with two squadrons; he
ordered the organizing of 200 battalions of national
gardes mobiles, 40 battalions of the old and new guard,
and 20 regiments of marines. The old disbanded sol-
diers were all recalled to their standards, the con-
scriptions of 1814 and 1815 were levied ; even the re-
tired officers and soldiers were induced to join. By
the 1st of June, that is, in two months, the effective
strength of the French army had been augmented
from 200,000 to 414,000: by the month of September,
he could have counted on 700,000 men, but time failed
him.
It would be absurd to believe that in the midst of
these preparations Napoleon had not thought of the
invasion of Belgium, to secure the defensive line of
the Rhine. From the day after his arrival at Paris,
this question had been debated, but more than one
obstacle had to be surmounted.
At first, there were in hand but 40,000 men, la Ven-
dée had revolted, the Duke of Angoulême was march-
ing on Lyons, and the Marseillese on Grenoble. It
behoved him to be master at home before wishing to
be master abroad. A still stronger reason hindered this
invasion. How was such a step to be reconciled to
the letter, in which the Emperor offered the sovereigns
a sincere and durable peace? If he had been rash in
64 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
calculating on the friendliness of all, there were still
some motives for relying on the good-will of his father-
in-law. The Emperor of Austria had sought to pre-
vent his dethronement in 1814; at the time of his re-
turn, the discussion with Russia grew warm respecting
the division of Gallicia, and the fate of Saxony. There
was every reason to hope that the cabinet of Vienna
would consent in 1815, to what its negotiator had
himself proposed in 1814: to uphold the Emperor on
the throne, if he consented to abandon Italy. Napoleon
made this proposition, and notwithstanding the famous
declaration of the 13th March, they still hoped to see
the father of Maria Louisa returu to his first views.
Nevertheless, the French have censured Napoleon
with an inclination for war; public opinion having
declared for peace, repelled all idea of aggression, be-
fore knowing whether the maintenance of this peace
was possible.
Even admitting that it was easy to foresee the issue
of these pacific measures, little could be gained by
hastening to Brussels, yet guarded by an army of occu-
pation of the Germanic Confederation: Luxemburg
and Mentz no longer belonged to France, and these
places, as well as Holland, giving the allies many dé-
bouchés on the left of the Rhine, it is not certain that
any benefit had accrued from this invasion; the fight-
ing would have commenced on the Meuse and Moselle,
instead of on the Sambre, that is all. Taking the least
probable supposition, their succeeding in subjecting
Antwerp and Luxemburg without a siege, it would be
necessary to throw into them strong garrisons, and the
French were not at all in condition to do so. If, on
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 65
the contrary, these important places continued in the
power of the enemy, of what use was Brussels, sur-
rounded by Maestricht, Luxemburg, Bergen-on-Zoom,
and Antwerp 2 Was it not wiser to hold the skeletons
of the old regiments in hand, in order to double the
number of effectives by a new organization, than to
scatter them through Belgium ?
It has been said that it would have been necessary
for him to commence anew a complete revolution, ta-
king advantage of all the arbitrary resources ºf cre-
ates, and to rouse all the passions, profiting by their
blind devotion, as without it France could not be
saved. This was Fouché's advice, and especially Car-
not's, who remained a thorough Jacobin under the
cloak of Count. Many causes prevented Napoleon
from having recourse to these means; the first was
that he dreaded popular commotions, and with reason
too, as he had no rein by which to guide them, and
they consume those by whom excited ; the second was
that he was not at all convinced that anarchy and the
overthrow of all social order were infallible means of
saving a nation: these succeeded in 1793, through a
concurrence of unexampled circumstances, that will
probably never again recur.
Besides, whatever fear the Emperor had of these
popular storms, he believed it necessary to excite
the masses to a certain degree, not however without
fixing it within certain limits; the task is difficult
and the path a slippery one. To unchain the revo-
lutionary tiger with a deliberate purpose, comes
within the province only of such madmen as Marat
and Robespierre, or of extravagant men devoid of
66 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
all experience. After having authorized federated
societies, destined to rouse the public mind for the
defence of the country, he was active in preventing
them from extending their action to affect the so-
cial order; to accomplish this, a suitable strength in
the administration, and forecast in the institutions, were
requisite; but it was very difficult to sustain this
double-faced performance.
Because of the new elections, Napoleon was actu-
ally to find himself in presence of republicans con-
quered the 18th Brumaire, of royalists who did not
desire his empire, and of anarchists who wanted no
government at all. But by flattering the hopes of the
first two, and the follies of the last, he counted on
their influence and patriotic declamations to excite
the people to arms. While setting at work these
revolutionary elements, the chief of State hoped to
direct the employment of a power sufficiently firm to
repress anarchy. Unfortunately, those over-excited
soon perceived that the reign of clubs had passed
forever, and held forth his caution as a proof of his
thirst for power, while they constituted the sole guar-
anty for social order and for those who were to guide
the vessel of State amidst the frightful tempests by
which it was threatened.
The assembly of the Champ de Mai was at hand;
it was necessary at once, to explain frankly the
changes that should be made in the institutions of the
empire. Napoleon had announced his intention of
concerting these changes with the deputies of the na-
tion which would be delegated for this purpose; but
the declarations of the Congress of Vienna, and the
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 67
preparations of the new coalition leaving little doubt
of an impending war, he had to choose between the
necessity of sending the electors back to their homes,
so as to seize an indefinite dictatorial power, or to
present, himself, the modifications which he was dis-
posed to make in the exercise of this power, knowing
that it would be imprudent to depart for the army,
leaving France without a legal government, a prey
to dogmatical disputes, and to the shocks of factions.
It is probable, however, that Napoleon was not sorry
in having this plausible pretext for consolidating his
power; because, if dogmatical discussions on consti-
tutions are always stormy in an assembly of four or
five hundred persons, and usually result in the tri-
umph of doctrines the least calculated for securing
the necessary strength and stability to the govern-
ment, how could such a discussion be carried on, even
through delegates, in the presence of a hundred thou-
sand electors ?
The emperor judged it, then, indispensable to take
the initiative, in the modifications necessary for
blending harmoniously the ancient institutions of the
empire, with the liberal opinions with which they
had clashed. These modifications were discussed in
a council composed of ministers and the council of
state, to which was invited Benjamin Constant, the
most influential of those theoretical publicists, who
were so noisy in the tribune and such poor actors
when governing.
Desirous of gaining over the ex-tribune, who was
constantly at the head of all the doctrinaires opposi-
tion, Napoleon had him called the 14th April, for
68 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
particular consultation on these important measures,
before submitting them to the council. He exposed
his views with a frankness, a coolness, and an impar-
tiality, for which Benjamin Constant had the kind-
ness seriously to reproach him after his fall; as if
‘such questions should ever be treated with passion,
impulse or dissimulation. His letters on the hundred
days in which he gives an account of this interview,
are not the least curious among the writings published
by Napoleon’s adversaries for their own justification
“The nation,” said he to him, “has reposed free
from all political agitation for twelve years; the past
year she has been without war; this double repose
has rendered her in need of activity. She wishes or
believes she wishes a public tribune and assemblies :
she has not always wanted them; she cast herself at
my feet when I reached the capital. You, who at-
tempted an opposition, should remember it : where
was your support, your strength ? Nowhere. I have
taken less authority than I have been invited to as-
SUIDO €.
“Now, everything is changed; the taste for consti-
tutions, debates and harangues appear to have re-
turned. Nevertheless, be not deceived, it is but the
minority who wish it. The people only want me:
have you not seen them, pressing upon my steps, pre-
cipitating themselves from the mountains, seeking
me, saluting me. . . . . . But a signal from me is ne-
cessary, for them to fall upon the royalists and nobles.
. . . . But I do not wish to be the king of a Jacquerie.
. . . If there be a means of governing with a con.
stitution, at the proper time I demand nothing better,
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 69
º
though this be not so easy as it is thought. . . . . I
have desired the empire of the world, and to secure
it unlimited power was necessary; solely to govern
France, a constitution may do better. . . . . Although
this is still a problem, it can be tried. I have wished
the empire of the world : who, in my place, had not
wished it? The world invited me to govern it. . . . .
people and governors, in emulation of each other,
cast themselves under my sceptre. . . Let me then see
the system that will seem to you possible; give me
your thoughts. Public discussions, free elections, re-
sponsible ministers, liberty of the press—I am willing
for all this; I am convinced on this subject.*
“I am the man of the people: if they really wish
liberty, I owe it to them. . . . . I have never dream-
ed of oppressing them to please myself. . . . . I had
grand designs, fate has decided upon them. I am no
longer a conqueror, I can no longer be one. . . . . I
have but one mission, that of lifting up France and
giving her a suitable government. I am not willing
to raise false hopes. I permit it to be said that nego-
tiations are pending, there are none. I foresee a diffi-
cult struggle, a protracted war; though I desire peace
I will be unable to obtain it but by force of victories;
the nation must support me. In exchange she will
want liberty: she has as much of it as it is possible to
give her without falling into anarchy. The situation
is a new one; I demand but to be enlightened. I am
* Napoleon might have told the truth when he expressed this idea;
but he was soon convinced that he had erred, or at least that he inter ded
this liberty with all the means for repressing license.
70 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
growing old ; the repose of a constitutional king
might suit me; it will suit my son still better.”
We perceive from these words, that Napoleon felt
the delicacy of the task imposed on him. Those, in-
imical to all power, who have accused him of dupli-
city during this short reign of a hundred days, because
he did not wish a return of the régime of 1793 or
1799, can rest assured on the very assertions of Benj.
Constant, that he frankly adopted the deliberative
assemblies and the public tribune, as a necessity of
the epoch, while far from partaking of the universal
infatuation on the subject. Nevertheless, they sus-
pect and accuse him, as they did Louis XVIII., of in-
sincerity in this species of political conversion. If the
principles that were in full force at the establishment
of the empire, proved that experience in affairs had
very much modified the liberal ideas he had professed
during the first years of the revolution, everything
bears us out in the belief that he would have respect.
ed the new institutions promised, had the other estab-
lished powers sincerely desired to remain within their
limits, and been well satisfied that their true constitu-
tional mission is to second the government and not to
restrain or annul its action. -
We have already stated, that Napoleon did not fail
to recognize the advantages that might be expected
from assemblies; but he also appreciated the immense
dangers they present, when prudent and strong insti-
tutions do not sufficiently regulate their influence and
procedure: he thought that modern charters and
the political education of the French had not as yet
reached this point. Experience will prove if he was
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. . 71
wrong : meanwhile, I will be permitted to present
some observations drawn from more recent events,
and which, on the contrary, bear us out in believing
that he was perfectly right.
The dogmas on liberty that have created so much
sensation in our day, and, which he, with many others,
had professed in good faith, are certainly of the most
alluring nature if applied to man individually ; but
when applied collectively, to societies called nations,
and to governmental ideas, we acknowledge that this
term is often greatly abused. The result is a sort of
confusion in constitutional language, an obscure meta-
physics that have produced the strangest political
creeds.
Men of weight and learning have laid down as a
principle, that authority, that is to say government,
being an encroacher by nature, finds itself as a conse-
quence the natural enemy of liberty. With such a
beautiful system as a starting point, it is very plain
that all men calling themselves friends of liberty, must
be regarded as born enemies to authority, whether
it emanates from a consul, a prefect, an emperor, or a
king. Thus has it resulted that administrations,
whether public, royal, imperial, or otherwise, estab-
lished for the protection of public interests and private
rights; functionaries who should administer justice,
protect the lives and property of the citizens, organize
fleets and armies, promote and regulate public instruc-
tion, conduct wars, deliberate upon and conclude
alliances, negotiate treaties, dig canals, construct for-
tresses, prepare and develop the national strength :
these authorities in a word, who should be the pride
72 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
*
of every well-organized nation, have been transformed
by these strange doctrines into public enemies . . . . ,
into objects of suspicion and hate.
Let me not be accused of exaggeration : I appeal to
all those who have occupied a position of any emi-
nence in France ; there is not one of them who does
not to-day include a good portion of those he govern-
ed, among the number of his adversaries or detractors.
It is necessary to state that the apostles of these sin-
gular maxims, have not always been hair-brained
youths just from college, or proletarians without name,
and without existence. The most ardent have been
found among the writers who have acquired celebrity
or popularity ; among grave magistrates; in the high-
est grades of the army; finally, among the legislators
who have reechoed them from the tribune, amid the
acclamations of all the adepts; so that a good number
of deputies, led by these utopianists, were persuaded
that the chambers also were in duty bound to enchain
and obstruct authority, whenever an occasion offered.
With such ideas a nation becomes ungovernable
and rushes to inevitable ruin, unless a violent catas-
trophe, or a great man gives renewed vigor to social
order by placing it on surer bases; the bloody lessons
of experience are the sole remedies or an evil so
deeply rooted. Struck with these inconveniences,
Napoleon was convinced that to govern well with
such elements, there was no institution that could give
too much strength to the public administration, and it
should be acknowledged to his glory that all he did
in a contrary sense was forced upon him by circum.
stances. It should also be acknowledged that he
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. wº 73
always rendered justice to those estimable men, free
from all feeling of personal ambition, who in good
faith professed these exaggerated doctrines of liberty,
such as Lanjuinais, Benj. Constant, Lafayette, &c., &c.
As private individuals, or as philosophers, civic crowns
perhaps should be awarded them ; but as politicians
and founders of fundamental institutions, they were
in his eyes, but apostles of crude theories, more fatal
than useful ; because, by substituting unceasingly
declamations and phrases in place of true genius and
the art of governing, they will always put a nation at
the mercy of the most rash and most crafty rhetori-
cian, and lead to eternal conflicts between the execu-
tive power and those by whom it is so much coveted.
Undoubtedly, what is called public liberty, consti-
tutional government, equilibrium of the three powers
are very beautiful things, seductive theories, perhaps
very good with the counterpoise of a powerful aristo-
cracy.* I think, too, that they might agree with
absolute democracy in a new and isolated nation like
the United States of America, in the midst of a vast
continent, with no neighbors but settlements of Sav-
ages without power, or without ambition, because in
such a case internal commotions would be devoid of
danger to the political powers of the country; but
with a nation surrounded by formidable and jealous
neighbors, with a nation whose old social body is
composed of ancient feudal nobility, young war-like
* If by public liberty, we understand individual liberty, equality in the
eye of the law, and the concurrence of the nation, to a rational extent, in
the framing of laws, nothing undoubtedly is more desirable. Even the
liberty of the press confined within just bounds, may also be added.
Everything beyond this, leads to * and anarchy. -
74 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
nobility, proud and turbulent tiers État and inflamma-
ble minds, it is altogether otherwise, or it would at
least be necessary to rest the institutions on more solid
bases than our modern charters have done.
So far, we will be permitted to believe with Napo-
leon, that positively the institution of three powers in
equilibrio, has been but a beautiful fiction, the appli-
cation of which does not correspond with the seductive
theory. To be as admirable as it is thought, this polit-
ical trinity should have that unity of faith and action
belonging to the religious trinity; for say and do what
we may, the action of a government should never be
but one and indivisible. Whether it represents the
nation among strangers, or dispenses justice at home,
or organizes and disposes of the land and naval forces,
which are the symbols of national power, its system
and its progress should be uniform ; there cannot be
two in one state. Now, if three independent powers,
ever jealous of their influence and authority, are
established, what means will you have of establishing
this unity, indispensable in the direction of the grand
affairs of the country All assemblies in the world
when adorned, right or wrong, with the title of repre-
sentatives of the nation,” will be cavilling and usurp-
ing by their nature, especially if they have the initia-
tive in the laws; because with this initiative they will
be able to guide the vessel of state if they will, and
they will wish it whenever they can. The evil would
be without danger, if it were possible for an assembly,
* Elective chambers are far from being always the faithful representa-
tions of the interests and wishes of the country: they often represent but
a small fraction, perhaps, the most selfish and the least national.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 75
composed of small specialités meeting now and then,
to be qualified of itself to rule a great nation ; but as
the impossibility of it is acknowledged, it forcibly
results therefrom, that by according the initiative to
this assembly, you give it all the means of perplexing
the administration and rendering the same impossible,
without giving it the means of governing.
Nothing could flow from such a state of things but
endless uncertainty, an unheard-of distress in the
direction of affairs, and the impossibility of the gov-
ernment's determining on a stable system of foreign
policy, that which is always the most decisive for the
maintenance of a country’s greatness. To this impos-
sibility should be added that of fixing on a good sys-
tem of military organization, from nothing previously
prepared, for the contingent events that menaced the
most important future interests of the state.
This perpetual clashing of the government and the
elective chambers, deprived of an aristocratic counter-
poise, will be not only difficult to avoid or modify, a
dreadful instability in the personnel of the ministry will
also result as a consequence ; an inconsistency not the
less hurtful to a state than the most threatening inva-
sion, in producing but a phantasmagorical magistracy,
to which might be applied the famous verse of Cor-
neille:
“Ces petits souverains qu'on fait pour une année,
Voyant d'un temps si court leur puissance bornée,
Des plus heuleux desseins font avorter le fruit,
De Heur de le laisser a celui quiles suit:
Comme ils ont peu de part au bien dont ils ordonnent,
Dans le champ du public largement ils moissonnent,
Assurés que chacun leur pardonne aisément,
Espérant à son tour un pareil traitement.”—CINNA.
76 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
In fact, what country could prosper, at home or
abroad, with apprenticed ministers, succeeding each
other every six months, and who are superseded before
concluding their novitiate?
A man may be endowed with brilliant genius, and
still require time in which to learn the duties of his
department, and reflect on systems that might ame-
liorate its progress; and in foreign policy especially,
what confidence can be inspired in her neighbors,
her natural allies, by such instability? It were bet-
ter if each minister were allowed a permanent under-
secretary of state, who would at least preserve the
tradition of all that would be beneficial and useful to
the department; but far from recurring to these wise
means, these innovators have labored to abolish a por-
tion of those that existed. Such a state of things,
deplorable under an able king, would become mortal
under a feeble prince or during a minority.
It will be said that the enmity of one of the three
powers could be counterbalanced by the united will
of the other two. This would be true, if we enter-
tained at least the thought of establishing, in the
fundamental law, that the union of two of these pow-
ers, twice ascertained, and in two different sessions,
would suffice to sanction a law or any act whatever,
notwithstanding the opposition of the third ; but it
has never been done; and this may perchance be un-
wise, because, since you desire an equilibrium between
three authorities, it would be well to admit that two
of them represent the majority, and that it is absurd
to desire that one alone have the power of annihilating
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 77
the wishes of the other two : in such a case, the mi-
nority makes the law.
It will be answered that the charter might provide
for this, in giving royalty the right of dissolution, and
that of nominating new peers, and giving the cham-
bers the right of rejecting proposed laws and refusing
taxation. These means are at once violent and in-
efficacious remedies, because, in order that the disso-
lution of the chambers be of any service, it would be
necessary to admit that all the electors were consum-
mate politicians, and capable of deciding on the dif-
ferences that had caused it. But such electors will
never exist. In fact, if it be true that this measure is
often the result of miserable personal intrigues and
of a deplorable party spirit, on the merits of which
an elector would be much perplexed to pass any judg-
ment whatever, how can a favorable result be ex-
pected? How would a new election condemn an
intrigue, the plot of which had been contrived by the
very men who declare themselves the directors of
public opinion ?
Let us even take things like true optimists, and
suppose, as these things should be, that the dissolution
was only the result of a serious struggle between two
systems of politics strongly opposed to each other,
and not that of ambitious individuals. In this case,
is it not evident that the electors would be unable to
decide which of the two systems would best suit the
country 2 Questions present themselves, not only in
internal politics, but still more in foreign policy, which,
though enveloped in appearances the most seductive,
contain elements of life and death to the power of a
78 IPOLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
state. Will these questions be wisely settled by the
licensed dealers and small land-holders, when the
greatest intellects of the nation are perplexed and di-
vided as to the system to be followed ? And then, is
it not known how electors choose their local deputies,
who perhaps represent very well their arrondisse-
ments, but often ill-understand the general interests of
France? Is it not known, what part intrigue and
camaraderie play in this choice? Are we ignorant of
the influence exercised by the journals at the capital,
and of the spirit in which they are edited; what their
candor, their impartiality, their wisdom, the profun-
dity of their views, their pretended patriotism . With
such elements, what can be the result of a dissolution ?
Will they dare say that the re-election will present
the real wishes of France, when twenty or thirty votes,
perhaps the most indifferent in the country, exacted
through intrigue and party spirit, will have been ac-
quired by the opposition and secured its triumph :
Is it not frightful to think, that by the aid of a facti-
tious majority, certain ambitious men, without pru-
dence or depth of thought, will be able to secure the
adoption of a principle anarchical in its character
and destructive of all national greatness; a principle
which would not only disturb the state internally,
but would remove the means of waging war at once
useful and of a result almost certain, to be followed
by foolish and desperate struggles, to sustain utopian
ideas and flatter popular passions 2 A singular equi-
librium this, that will give to twenty deputies the
power of annulling a good system, adopted by the
king, the ministers, the chamber of peers, the council
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 79
of state, and even half of the elective chamber, less
these twenty votes And such institutions will be
called the perfectibility of the human mind, the
chef-d'oeuvre of a progressive age ' '
The appointment of the new peers, conceded to roy-
alty, has not, perhaps, the same inconveniences as the
dissolution, but it has some others. When made in
small numbers, the spirit of the chamber may not be
changed ; made inconsiderately, and in larger num-
bers, it debases this precious institution, the sole bar-
rier against levelling demagogism. A wise govern-
ment should not have recourse to such measures
merely to maintain a ministry, but only when the ves-
sel of state is in imminent danger.
We thus see that the trinitarian system actually of
fers more chances of rupture, than of efficacious
means for securing a useful and advantageous equili-
brium ; since royalty, in striking the elective cham-
bers, strikes falsely, and nothing usually remains but
wounds.
The means possessed by the elective chambers for
opposing a project or a system approved by royalty
and the peers, are still worse, because the refusal of
any particular law would be insignificant if it was
not at times a question of existence; the refusal of
the budget alone, could overthrow the ministry. This
presents the gravest of constitutional questions. To
what extent would an assembly actually in a minority
in the trinitarian government, have the right to disor-
ganize the state throughout, by refusing to levy the
necessary taxes for settling the accounts of the army
and navy, and securing the payment of magistrates
80 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
and the public debt? And this, perhaps, to gratify
a miserable party rancor, a rancor actually arising
from the fact, that the monarch or the ministry enjoy
a transcendent capacity of which the proud medioc-
rity are jealous.* No, such a charter is not perfec-
tion; as it gives all power for evil without giving an
equal measure of power for good.
I do not pretend to deduce from this that all consti-
tutional charters are deceptions, and that all govern-
ments with chambers are impossible; I only wish to
say, that the combinations adopted up to this time
have not fulfilled the object for which they were in-
tended, and that to be successful, recourse to other
methods is necessary.
The proposition is a simple one; for a representa-
tive government to be a good one, and able to proceed
successfully, the constitution must be a good One:
when the institutions are perverted, the representative
government is the most deplorable of all. Now, to
base a constitutional monarchy on proper foundations
and to frame a good charter, it is necessary, above all
things, firmly to establish the fundamental truths upon
which it should rest, namely: .
1st. That the popular masses are, by their nature,
called upon to be governed, not to govern ; that it is
the province of the middle classes to represent the
democratic interests of the country, and to discharge
* If a refusal of the budget was voted by a majority of twenty votes, the
consequence would be, that twenty deputies would have had a power su-
perior to that of the king, peers, ministers, and two hundred deputies
who voted with the government. These twenty men would proclaim
themselves the voice of France, and would, through self-love or ambition,
disorganize the country.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 81
the duties appertaining thereto in a just and equita-
ble manner. -
2d. That the chamber of peers should represent the
national notabilités of all kinds that exist, and the in-
terests connected with them.
3d. That the executive power, that is, the throne,
represents the nation and all its interests among for-
eign powers; it also represents the interests of all
classes of citizens among each other, since it is by na-
ture, as it is its duty to conciliate the interests of all,
not desiring the good of one to the detriment of
others, except in a very few cases where the general
interest of the country imperiously demands this ex-
ception.
4th. That the democratic elective chamber, not
representing the entire nation, but only a portion of
the middle classes, will be powerless in any case to
arrogate to itself the sovereignty, without committing
a signal and criminal usurpation.
These are grand and incontestible truths, though
sad prejudices, bad passions, and sometimes bad gov-
ernments, appear at times to have given them the lie.
When perfectly convinced of these truths, which
will not be the less real for having remained unac-
knowledged by the present generation, then you may
perhaps be able to establish good institutions; but as
long as you proclaim popular sovereignty, the sover-
eignty of an elective chamber; as long as you boldly
profess dogmas tending to treat as an enemy this exe-
cutive power, designed to conciliate, defend, and unite
into one, these interests of your different classes and
different localities; finally, as long as your laws and
4.
82 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
your discourses tend to debase and annul this power
which is the true guaranty of national greatness, then
you may attempt a thousand theories, establish a thou-
sand charters: they will always prove to be works of
deception, without consistency, and fatal to the
country.
If a purely democratic elective chamber without an
aristocratic counterpoise, and in session only during
certain months of the year, wishes to rule the state,
anarchy is inevitable; because, in order that the
wheels of government possess the necessary action, it
is indispensable that the elective chamber be an in-
strument and not an obstacle. In a word, it is neces-
sary in a monarchy that the king be king and the
deputies be his best counsellors. . . . If you insist on
being governed by chambers, or by one chamber, then
have a senate for life, which is recruited through its
own proper choice, and not by department elections,
—an aristocratic senate, like that of Rome and Berne;
otherwise, every act will be of short duration, and
the state becoming the prey of intrigue, will be con-
sumed or fall into endless revolutions.
We can conclude from the preceding:—
1st. That if the equilibrium of the constitutional
powers is the most important and most desirable end
to which a fundamental charter can aspire, this equi-
librium must be real and perfectly poised, or the
entire governmental edifice will be found falsified and
compromised.
2d. That it is dangerous to accord the initiative of
the laws to the chambers, it being sufficient to give
them the right of demanding from the ministry, a
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 83
law on a determined object that these may have lost
sight of.
3d. That the pure and simple dissolution of the
elective chambers is a work of deception, of which
intrigue will generally gather all the fruits, if an
appeal can be had to the electors themselves, or if
the law does not interdict the re-election of the
same deputies; because, to make a true appeal to
the French nation, it would be necessary to appoint
beforehand a certain number of extra deputies, or
require the election of an entirely new deputation,
to ascertain the opinion of the electoral body on the
system that may have led to the dissolution.*
4th. That the usual budget should be voted at
least for three or four years, and that extraordinary
expenses or additional taxes should alone be voted
annually.
5th. Lastly, that it would be necessary to find
means for preventing party intrigues from paralyzing
two of the powers, and a large portion of the third,
otherwise, the equilibrium of the powers and the
government of the majority will be a double illusion.
Without these precautions, the governing of a great
nation through elective assemblies, meeting tempora-
*ily, and composed of purely democratic elements, will
be as painful a task as that of rolling the rock of
Sisyphus. If examples from the Romans be cited in
opposition, I will answer those who understand the
* The extra deputies could be appointed beforehand, so that in case
of a dissolution, there would be a new vote more generally authenticated.
This is merely indicating a defect in the equilibrium of the powers, with-
out pretending to state the means of correcting it,
84 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
º
institutions of this great people so superficially, that
their government was not an elective democracy,
and that the aristocratic senate appointed for life, or
hereditary patricians, are the only assemblies that
have ever properly directed the policy of a country;
again, those which history recalls, were always forced
to recognize the supremacy of an executive power,
either under the name of consul or under the title of
Doge and the council of ten, whose powers were any-
thing but liberal. Not that I prefer aristocratic or
patrician republics, they are the most exclusive and
most tyrannical governments. I have already given
my views in a previous volume, where I have proved
that hereditary monarchy, tempered by wise laws, and
not a debased and impotent monarchy, was the most
rational form for a great civilized nation.
I perceive that I am led away by my theme, and
that it is time to return to Napoleon, whose views
rather than mine own must be explained. Whatever
might be his maxims on the inconveniences of assem-
blies, the circumstances under which he found him-
self were still of a nature to double his fears, and the
following passage that we borrow from one of his
addresses, leaves no doubt as to his views on this sub-
ject: “In time of war, if you succeed in electrifying
deliberative assemblies, they may become centres of en-
thusiasm and of devotion to the country, but they
have also more than one dangerous aspect. If a divi-
sion takes place between them and the executive
power, then the government is impossible, there is no
longer strength in the conduct of affairs; victory is
necessary to them at any cost; because, at the least
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 85
reverse, terror takes possession of the timid and mod-
erate, who ordinarily constitute the greatest number;
we do not always find assemblies as furious as the
convention, placed by the regicide between victory
and the scaffold, and forced to conquer or display a
frightful energy. These examples are exceptions.
Under ordinary circumstances, and especially in as-
semblies of peaceable proprietors, the least reverse
strikes the timid with fear of perils, and awakens all
pretensions in the breast of the ambitious. Those
eager for celebrity, popularity and domination, set
themselves up from their proper sphere into counsel-
lors to the prince ; they pretend to know and decide
all things; if their advice is rejected, from counsellors
they become factious; then, finally, after having un-
dermined all the elements of confidence and power,
they preach a revolt in the name of a public good of
their own fashioning, the source of which is entirely
in their imaginations. Then the prince must submit
to their yoke or break it; and in either case, he is
obliged to peril the government and the state, at a
moment when he should triple his force to resist the
foreigner.”
Napoleon performed, then, a great act of self-de-
nial, in deciding to proclaim the establishment of two
chambers, with public tribunes; still he preferred
this course to the chance of a single constituent as-
sembly, that had raised controversies in the presence
of formidable enemies, and whose powers being al-
most unlimited, had entirely annulled his own. More-
over, by reserving to himself the initiative of the
laws, after the example of Louis XVIII., he calculated
86 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
on confining their action within just bounds. Such
was the dominant idea while drawing up the addi-
tional act.
Benjamin Constant was charged with draughting
the imperial thoughts, modified by some of his own;
this work, submitted to the council composed of the
ministers and the council of state, did not fail to find
censors; the majority of the members would have
preferred an entirely new constitution, deliberated
upon by a national assembly, not only because for-
mally announced in the decrees of Lyons, but it being
important not to expose it to the same reflections that
had destroyed the granted chärter.
Fouché himself raised many other objections to
the debated project. This political Proteus, ever ready
to embrace the opinion he judged to be in the ascen-
dant, wished to give the chambers the initiative of
the laws, and to make Napoleon a veto king like that
of 1791.*
He also wished the different statutes of the empire,
that would remain in the new fundamental law, to be
discussed by the chambers, and disposed of according
to their good pleasure. Lastly, he demanded a new
assembly of the Champ de Mai for the following year,
that the same deputies might return to discuss the
proposed compact, and again surrender everything in
question.
* We are aware that the populace gave no other name to Louis XVI.
than Monsieur Veto, because he was only invested with the power of op-
posing everything, while the first attribute of the administration that
knows the wants of the country, is to prepare and contrive everything and
submit the same to the chambers. This was reversing the governmental
edifice.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 87
From the principles I have frequently exposed, it
was difficult for the objections of the members of the
council to shake the emperor's convictions; on the
contrary, he depicted his fears so eloquently, that he
succeeded in pursuading them that the supreme law
of threatened public safety, and the possibility of
modifying the institutions at a later period, with the
legal concurrence of the two chambers, militated
strongly in favor of his project.
He consequently proclaimed, on the 22d April, an
additional act to the constitutions of the empire. This
act established a chamber of hereditary peers, a cham-
ber of elective deputies of six hundred and twenty-
nine members; granted a special deputation to com-
merce and industry; proclaimed the liberty of the
press, the responsibility of ministers, the independence
and irremovability of judges, trial by jury, even for
offences by the press, and personal and religious
liberty.*
However, to relieve this act from the semblance of
illegality that might be alleged against it, it should
have been sent to the departments, as well as to the
army and navy, for the sanction of a national vote,
the result of which would be proclaimed to the as-
sembly of the Champ de Mai, whose meeting was ad-
journed for this purpose, to the 1st June.
Such institutions were certainly more than sufficient
* Each arrondissement had a deputy direct, but in addition, the depart-
ments had also their deputies; so that there were 238 deputies of depart-
ments, 368 of arrondissements, and 23 of manufactures and commerce. In
1830, the department deputies were suppressed, leaving but those of the
vrrondissements, and this is the greatest error that has been committed.
88 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
for governing a nation the most sensitive on the sub-
ject of its liberties, especially after the decree of
Lyons abolishing the feudal and privileged nobility.
And, in fact, liberty was so enlarged, that Chateau-
briand, with a correctness of judgment that was not
always his most characteristic trait, thus wrote to
Louis XVIII. : “Napoleon is caught in his own net ;
the additional act will be fatal to him ; if observed,
there is in the main sufficient liberty to overthrow
the usurper.” And Benjamin Constant himself boast-
ed of this decision, to prove the excellence of the
doctrines introduced by himself and friends ! Sin-
gular eulogy to deliver on these doctrines, that of
proving that they could destroy the political edifice,
whose stability and solidity should have been their
work |
However, though this compact was adopted by two
millions of voters, it became the subject of all criti-
cism—all parties judged it most unmercifully through
the medium of their passions and interests. The in-
corrigible speculators of republican theories censured
Napoleon for not having been satisfied with the con-
sulate for life, and attributed to a miserable spirit of
nepotism, the wise foresight which had decided him
in re-establishing hereditary succession in the supreme
magistracy, as being theonly safeguard for the exist-
ence of great nations.
Other ideologists, less insane, however, than the re-
publicans, wished to accord the initiative of the laws
to the chambers, a dogma incompatible with the
interests of the state, and with the regular functions
of the wheels of government.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 89
Demagogues wanted the régime of the forum or of
popular societies. The royalists were dissatisfied with
the abolition of feudal distinctions; the levellers, with
their having preserved the titles given under the em-
pire as a recompense for signal services, and more
so with their having maintained a chamber of he-
reditary peers that wounded their pride or their fool-
ish pretensions, and which Napoleon wished to up-
hold, precisely with the hope of leading, in time, to
a non-feudal aristocracy, sufficiently powerful to serve
as an equilibrium to royalty, on the one hand, and
the multitude on the other.
Finally, a last class of opponents to the additional
act, without blaming its source, presented it as a
capital blunder, an act of deception the more deplora-
ble, as it would offend all the electors of the nation
and the deputies of the land and naval forces, con-
voked at Paris to effect, through their delegates, these
very changes, in which Napoleon had singly taken
the initiative. They pretended, moreover, that the
time was not opportune for such a measure, when
even the institutions promulgated were indispensa-
ble for preserving to the throne the strength that
constituted its eclat as well as its guaranty, or giving
the state that vigor, without which it could not attain
its highest destiny. But none of these critics wished
to take into consideration, the imperious circumstances
under which France was to be thrown, by reason of
the general league that menaced her, and this act,
far from having been violent, was actually justified
by the necessities of the times.
Fouché himself did not spare him his censure:
90 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
covetous of power and influence, he was prompted
on one side by what remained him of revolutionary
doctrines, on the other by the desire of fixing bounds
to the imperial power, either to render his own more
necessary or prevent the emperor from ordering him
into a species of exile, as in 1810, as soon as he could
dispense with his services. At the news of the de
claration of the 13th March, he judged, from all ap:
pearances, that the new throne was not the most
stable, and with his habitual cunning, he in a measure
intrigued at Vienna, to secure a reconciliation with
the allies, and render himself useful to the govern-
ment that would succeed Napoleon, should he be
overcome.*
The services that this minister of police had ren-
* There are different versions of this subject. The memoirs of General
Lamarque, and the History of the Restoration, by C. . . have formally
accused Fouché of having betrayed Napoleon. . . . Lucien Bonaparte
seeks to justify him, at least as to his connexion with Austria. It seems
certain that the declaration of the Congress of Vienna unsettled Fouché
exceedingly, and that he conceived, from that time, that the emperor's
power was unsteady ; he judged, that he would either be forced to recur
to the revolutionary propaganda of 1793, or would fall. Anxious to ac-
quire sufficient influence on the future of France, to prevent the return of
the Bourbons, or at least to render himself necessary to a second con-
ditional restoration, he was no longer a devoted minister, and while
rendering to Napoleon an account of his relations with Metternich, he
could very well give them a clandestine turn that would eventually
serve other ends. -
The additional act displeased him the more as Napoleon took no no-
tice of his objections: hence everything bears us out in the belief that
he served him indifferently, and we are even assured that he corres-
ponded with Wellington before the battle of Waterloo. However, it is
certain, that immediately after this battle, he assumed an attitude for
throwing off Napoleon, if not by a crime, at least by a forced abdica-
tion, and even by an exile concerted with the allies.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 91
dered Metternich in 1809, facilitated the establish-
ment of these clandestine connexions, of which he
was too crafty to make a mystery, firmly convinced,
moreover, of giving them the direction that would
best answer his views. Now, these views consisted
either in restraining the emperor's authority by means
of powerful assemblies, influenced by himself and
friends, or even in replacing his government by that
of his son, the regency to be directed by himself;
finally, as a last resource, he hoped to become the in-
strument and arbiter of a second restoration. Napo-
leon was on the eve of discovering these plots, when
Fouché adroitly submitted to him the communications
he had just received from the allies through the me-
diation of the Austrian minister, and the answer he
thought of returning. -
Excited by the astonishing success of the new revo-
lution that had just taken place, and by the prepara-
tions ordered for arming the nation, the sovereigns
had no doubt purposely decided to separate the cause
of Napoleon from that of France, so as to effect a di-
vision between the nation and his partisans, or even
to obtain his voluntary retirement, by allowing him
to conceive the possibility of placing his son on the
throne with a regency. They consequently declared
that they did not desire to interfere in the internal
affairs of France, provided she procured another
chief. They left to the nation the choice of a form
of government, even a republic; but did not wish the
emperor at any price. Either he had provoked these
measures by his first overtures, or Metternich had
himself taken the initiative. Fouché had not dared to
92 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
conceal such an incident. He knew that to quiet Na-
poleon, it was easy for him to make an ostensible
answer, so disposed by devious ways, as to be the
means of entering into other combinations.
This ostensible answer, given the 8th May, could
not be doubted. “In endeavoring to review all the
expedients upon which the country could rest, Fouché
sought to demonstrate that the maintenance of the
emperer offered the greatest security to Europe. The
restoration of Louis XVIII. would be an act of hu-
miliation to France, and would never be upheld even
with the aid of foreign bayonets. His being replaced
by the younger branch of the family presented but
little more stability, because the Duke d’Orleans would
always have arrayed against him the royalists, repub-
licans, and the party still more to be dreaded, the Bo-
napartists.” The prince offering a guaranty only to
the doctrinaires of the revolution, would be forced to
submit to their laws, which would insensibly lead to
anarchy, confusion, and finally another revolution.
The regency of Maria-Louisa with Napoleon II. would
have the inconvenience of being influenced by Napo-
leon in the important foreign policy, without having
those elements of internal strength which his single
name would have secured against demagogues. The
maintenance of his authority, tempered by constitu-
tions that would prevent wars of ambition, and those
gigantic levies of men that had rendered him so terri-
ble to his neighbors, was then the sole means of se-
* It must not be forgotten that Fouché wrote this in 1815, Napoleon
being not only alive but in power.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 93
curing to Europe the repose of which she stood so
much in need.” -
Moreover, Fouché was right, in pointing out the
unusual manner of proclaiming the intention not to
dictate laws to France, while imposing upon her the
formal exclusion of the chief of her choice. He de-
monstrated that the independence of a great nation
is one and indivisible, that it exists absolute and intact
or does not exist at all; in a word, that it was no
more a disgrace to have a government imposed than
permitting a prohibition in the choice determined on.
In fact, the recent publication of the additional
act, did no longer permit either France or Napoleon
to return a different answer to the course of the cabi-
net at Vienna and of the allies; if this course had
been taken at the place and time of the famous decla-
ration of the 13th March, the emperor might have
decided in favor of his son and of France, a sacrifice
claimed by the sovereigns; it would have given it
the appearance of a voluntary and spontaneous initia-
tive in a generous action ;” but after this solemn
declaration, and after the additional act, nothing was
left him but to reign and fight, or seek a coward's
safety in flight. Convinced that the national honor
was closely bound to his own, he redoubled his prepa-
rations to wage the war thrust upon him to the death,
and all his efforts were exerted in exciting the same
devotion and energy in the new authorities who were
* This sacrifice was not at all to his character, and we doubt if he
would have submitted to it; but after all, this was only feasible pre-
vious to the declaration. But in the month of May, after the addi
tional act, it was impossible.
94. POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
to share with him the burden of the government, and
among the deputies of the Champ de Mai, convoked
for the end of this month : perfectly persuaded that
if he found this support, the legions of Europe would
be crushed in their attacks upon France.
It must be acknowledged that the nation was too
divided in opinion to permit Napoleon to rally it, en
tire; it was broken up into four portions of very dif-
ferent strengths:
1st. The partisans of fallen royalty, who were still
numerous, and counted in their ranks the greater por-
tion of the constitutional doctrinaires.
2d. The revolutionists, more formidable through
their audacity and passions than by their numbers.
3d. The imperialists or Bonapartists, numbering all
those who had borne arms or held offices during
twenty years.
4th. The indifferent, who asked but for peace, and
formed the great mass of the middle classes; these
constitute the most considerable portion of the nation,
The facility of Napoleon's triumph arose from the
fact, that the last three classes had declared in his fa-
vor; but the masses only act through passion or inter-
est: as soon as it was evident that the sole fact of his
presence was to lead to a general war, the numerous
classes of the indifferent rose up against him, while
political acts cooled the energetic party of the revolu-
tion : henceforward the chances were not the same.
He did every thing in his power in the position where
fate had placed him. Convinced that a Cincinnatus
or a Washington could not conduct France, and fully
decided on reconstituting a strong and durable gov-
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 95
ernment, he displeased the aspirants for the tribune
and the clubs, and through them the revolutionary
masses. The royalist party, increased by many of the
partisans for peace at any price; and his, diminished
daily by these defections.
The only resource left to the emperor, was to per-
suade the patriots and authorities that their cause was
inseparable from his own. He could boldly tell them
so, for if the nation had thought otherwise, she should
have rejected the new institutions awarding him the
empire, and have openly treated with Europe for the
recognition of his son, or for any other government.
This was the end he struggled to attain at the Champ
de Mai. The solemn acts published at this epoch,
and at the opening of the chambers, are effectively
the best answers that his partisans can make to his
detractors: and although details of this nature enter
but little in the course of this summary, we will give
a few words.
The convocation of the Champ de Mai, awaited
with so much impatience, had certainly lost a portion
of the charm with which imagination clothed it, since
the additional act had provided, in rather an unex-
pected manner, for the most important object of this
reunion. Up to that time, a semi-mythologic cere-
mony was anticipated, the result of which would be
a return of the golden age. The multitude undoubt-
edly thought, that each one would have the power to
furnish his article to the compact thus fabricated in
open air, within this new forum.
What would be done at this assembly 7 was asked
upon all sides: some said that the emperor would
96 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
present the empress and her son, as a pledge of his
reconciliation with Europe and of the duration of his
dynasty; others expected wonders, at the expense of
their imagination. At last, the first of June, so anx-
iously awaited, arrived : the ceremony took place with
all possible pomp in the Champ de Mars. Napoleon,
clothed in the imperial mantle, and surrounded by his
dethroned brothers, and the doctrinaire Lucien, by
grand functionaries, marshals, and many prelates, was
seated on a superb throne erected near the military
school, Twenty thousand electors seated on benches,
forming an amphitheatre, constituted the first circle;
farther off, were the deputies from the army: then
fifty thousand soldiers, in full dress, placed behind
them, and an immense population of the curious, gave
a magnificent aspect to this solemnity. Divine ser-
vice having been performed, M. Dubois d’Angers
pronounced an elegant address in the name of the
electors of France, and proclaimed the acceptance of
the additional act. Napoleon, having responded to
this discourse in a firm and energetic tone, took the
oath of fidelity to this charter for himself and his
own ; and Cambacérès, on the part of the electors,
swore, in the name of France, fidelity of the French
people to his new government. This oath was repeat-
ed spontaneously by all the electors and army depu-
ties, in which even a large portion of the spectators
joined; then followed a distribution of flags to the
deputations from the army, to the troops present, and
to the national guard. -
However imposing this ceremony, the ideologists,
political adversaries of Napoleon, saw in it but the-
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 37
atrical pomp ; they demanded if this was the national
Congress, announced with so much emphasis to give
laws to the country, and if this formal preparation
was necessary, in order to attend a mass, deliver a
discourse, take an oath, and distribute flags. So fash-
ionable had the spirit of defamation become, that
they even ventured to say that France, tired of coups
de théâtre, demanded things of a more serious nature.
Napoleon had however given in his address, the
explanation of his conduct, in these words: “Em-
peror, consul, soldier, I hold all from the French peo-
ple. In prosperity, in adversity, on the battle-field,
in council, on the throne, in exile, France has been the
sole and constant object of my thoughts and my ac-
tions. Like the king of Athens,” I sacrificed myself
at Fontainbleau for my people, in the hope of seeing
the realization of the promise given, to preserve to
France the natural integrity of her territory, her
honor and her rights. The indignation at seeing these
sacred rights, acquired by twenty-five years of victo-
ries, disregarded and lost for ever; the cry of French
honor tarnished; the wishes of the nation have recalled
me to the throne, which is dear to me as being the
palladium of the independence, the honor, and the
rights of the people.
“Frenchmen in traversing the provinces of the
empire through the midst of public rejoicing, I had
* Codrus saved Athens from Heraclides, not by relinquishing his
crown, but by throwing himself disguised in the midst of the enemy,
in order to accomplish the sacrifice demanded by an oracle. An exile
on the Isle of Elba was a sacrifice quite equivalent to an honorable
death, but it was not voluntary.
\,, 5
98 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
reason to calculate on a long peace, because nations
are bound by the treaties concluded by their govern-
ments. My thoughts were then entirely bent on the
means of establishing our liberties, through a consti-
tution conformable to the will and interest of the na-
tion. With this object, I have convoked the Champ
de Mai. I soon learned, however, that the kings, so
often combined against us, desired to make war upon
us; they think of augmenting the kingdom of the
Netherlands and giving it as barriers, all our northern
strong-holds ; and to conciliate the differences that
still exist, they speak of sharing Lorraine and Alsace
among themselves: it is then necessary to prepare
for war.
“Before personally encountering the dangers of the
battlefield, my first solicitude has been to give formal
easistence to the nation. The people have accepted the
act with which I have presented them.
“ When we have repelled these unjust aggressions,
and Europe shall be convinced of what is due to the
rights of twenty-eight millions of Frenchmen, then a
solemn law, drawn up according to the forms required
by the constitutional act, will unite the different dispo-
sitions of our constitutions, at present dispersed.*
* This speech of Napoleon was wise and noble ; it nevertheless dis-
pleased on account of this reticence; it held out, on the one side, the
revision of the constitution as necessary, and on the other, that this re.
vision would be in fact but a union of dispositions already existing,
though scattered among many acts. Thereafter, the emperor's sincere
conversion was not credited, although his language was, notwithstand-
ing, that of a statesman, who knows how to appreciate good institutions,
but who is also aware of the demands exacted by emergencies, in which
a nation may be placed.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 99
“You are about returning to your departments: say
to the citizens that circumstances are of a serious na
ture, but that with union, energy and perseverance,
we will issue victorious, from this struggle of a great
people. . . . . Tell them that the kings who hereto-
fore sought my alliance, are now directing all their
blows against my person. If I did not see that they
aim at injuring the country, I would place at their
mercy, this existence, against which they are so exas-
perated. But say to them also, that as long as they
entertain for me sentiments of love, of which they
have given me so many proofs, this hate of our ene-
mies will be impotent.
“Frenchmen my will is that of the nation, my
rights are hers; my honor, my glory, my happiness,
cannot be but the honor, the glory, and the happiness
of France.” -
This discourse, delivered in a firm and animated
voice, excited the liveliest enthusiasm.
A few days afterwards, the electors left for their
departments, after having proclaimed the acceptance
of the additional act, and nominated deputies to the
new assembly. -
On the 7th June, the emperor convened the two
chambers with the following address:
“Three months ago, circumstances and the confi-
dence of the French people clothed me with unlimited
power. The most urgent desire of my heart is accom-
plished to-day ; I perform the first act of the consti-
tutional monarchy. Men are too powerless to secure
the future, institutions alone fix the destinies of na-
tions. Monarchy is necessary in France, to guaranty
:
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100 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
the liberty, the independence, and the rights of the
people.
“Our constitutions are dispersed: one of our most
important occupations will be to reunite them in one
body, and to arrange them with one mind. This work
will recommend the present epoch to future genera-
tions. I am ambitious to see France in the enjoyment
of all possible liberty: I say possible, because it is
necessary to avoid anarchy, leading, as it ever does,
to absolute power.
“A formidable coalition of kings have a design
upon our independence, her armies are on our fron-
tier. Our enemies count on our intestine divisions. . .
Some legislative measures are indispensable for the
future. I confide unreservedly in your intelligence,
patriotism, and attachment. The liberty of the press
is inherent in our present constitution, nothing there
can be altered without changing our political system ;
but good laws for restraining it are necessary, espe-
cially in the present condition of the nation: I recom-
mend this important object to your consideration.
“The first duty of a prince will soon call me to
head the children of France. . . . . The army and
myself will do our duty. Do you, peers and repre-
sentatives, give the nation an example of confidence,
energy and patriotism. Like the senate of the great
people of antiquity, resolve to die rather than sur-
vive the dishonor and the degradation of France:
the holy cause of the country will be triumphant.”
The chambers voted separate addresses: both
dwelt on the necessity of subjecting absolute power
to constitutional forms and rules. They moreover
:
:
*
:
:
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 101
promised, in the event of a reverse, to exhibit perse-
verance, and redouble their attachment to the impe-
rial cause, which was the cause of France. The
peers assured Europe, that with the new institutions,
the allurements of victory would not lead the chief
of state beyond the bounds of prudence. This was
a recrimination on the past, to which Napoleon an-
swered :
“The struggle in which we are engaged is a serious
one; the temptation of prosperity is not the danger
which now threatens us; foreigners wish to force us
under the Caudine forks. The justice of our cause,
the public spirit of the nation, and the courage of the
army, are powerful reasons for our hoping success.
But if we experience reverses, it is then especially
that I should love to see all the energy of this great
people displayed. Then it is that I should find in the
chamber of peers, proofs of attachment to the country
and her chief. It is in trying times that great nations,
like great individuals, show forth all the energy of
their character, and become objects of admiration to
posterity.”
This posterity will acknowledge, while perusing
these words, that the emperor neglected nothing in
his power, to raise France to a level with the dan-
gers that threatened her, and all of which he had
foreseen. IIis answer to the chamber of deputies
proves it still more conclusively.
This chamber, resting on the promise of properly
arranging the constitutional laws, did not dissimulate
its impatience to leap at once into this slippery arena.
“Faithful to its mission, it will fulfil (it said) the task
102 PoliticAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
devolved upon it in this noble work: it demands that,
in order to satisfy the public wishes, the national de-
liberation shall rectify, without delay, what the
urgency of our situation has produced defective or
left imperfect in the ensemble of our institutions.
And while your majesty opposes the honor of our na-
tional arms and the power of your genius to this most
wnjust aggression, the chamber of representatives will
endeavor to attain the same end, by laboring without
relaa’ation on the compact, the perfection of which
should continue to cemant the union of the people and
the throne, and by the amelioration of our institutions,
strengthen in the eyes of Europe the guaranty of our
engagements.”
This plainly announced the idea of taking advan-
tage of the emperor's absence, for publicly establish-
ing constitutional controversies, without awaiting the
initiative of the government, which, nevertheless,
constituted the fundamental basis of the national ex-
istence. This was going back to the constituent assem-
bly of 1789, under still more dangerous circumstances:
this was, in a word, a revolutionary act, since by one
single stroke it changed the face of the gºvernment.
These discourses attest, on the one side, that the
additional act was not considered the last say of Na-
poleon ; but they also proved that he would undoubt-
edly have to sustain more than one assault from these
men, who persisted in viewing the government as a
public enemy, unceasingly thinking on the means of
chaining its authority, so as to reduce its sphere of
action to the most perfect nullity possible. A fright-
ful misconception, which will forever be a certain
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 103
index of the decay of a state, or the signal of an-
archy.
Though Napoleon appreciated these phrases to their
just value, he exhibited moderation in applauding
the intentions of doctrinaires, and limiting himself to
calling their attention to the dangers of untimely con-
troversies. His answer should find a place here, as it
completes the picture of his position and that of his
antagonists. “Under these painful circumstances,
my mind is absorbed by the imminent war, to the suc-
cess of which are attached the honor and independ-
ence of France. To-night I will depart to place my-
self at the head of my armies. . . . . During my
absence, I will take pleasure in seeing a commission,
appointed by each chamber, maturely deliberating on
our institutions: the constitution is our rallying point,
it should be our polar star in these stormy times. But
all possible discussion, tending to diminish, directly or
indirectly, the confidence that should be reposed in
the government and its dispositions, would be a mis-
fortune to the state : we would find ourselves in the
midst of dangers, without guide and without direc-
tion. The crisis at which we have arrived is a peril-
ous one : let us not imitate the example of the Lower
Empire, which, when pressed on all sides by the bar-
barians, rendered herself the laughing-stock of pos-
terity, by attending to abstract discussions, at the very
moment the enemy's battering-ram burst open the
gates of the capital.”
Prophetic words, and well calculated to confound
all those declaimers who, forgetful of the emperor's
104 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
principles at this memorable epoch, have levelled so
many blows against him. - - -
Napoleon thus plainly perceived, that the measures
to which he had to a certain extent been compelled to
have recourse, so as to satisfy public opinion, were
producing a deplorable effect: they soon aimed at
words instead of things, at stormy discussions instead
of calm and quiet administration, and at a later pe-
riod, led to divisions in the state, through authority
arrogated to themselves by the chambers. It was al-
ready perceived that the concessions, however ex-
tended, still found detractors. At a moment, when
the liberty of the press should have been deferred till
the country was free from danger, the emperor was
obliged to solicit restraining laws for diminishing its
abuse, and even this step was presented as a tendency
to despotism. Pamphlets of every hue, written by
demagogues, others by emigrants, attacked all the
measures of government, and impaired that confi-
dence by which it was more than ever necessary it
should be encircled. License was carried to such ex-
cess, that sheets recommending the attempt and
promising deification to those who would, by any
means whatever, deliver France from the yoke of
Napoleon, did not find juries to condemn them. $
Scarcely was he seated on the throne, when he was
forced to regret not having simply seized a discre-
tionary power, by proclaiming himself dictator of the
French empire, and abolishing all organic laws as
well as the new investiture of the imperial title, until
peace had been restored.
Nevertheless, if these concessions, far from satisfy-
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 105
ing the factions, clothed them with more importance,
we must own that the enthusiasm excited by his
promises to the party of the revolution, was not with-
out its advantages; for, besides the national guards,
whose levying it facilitated, it gave means for arming
the people of the principal cities. Those of Paris
alone formed twenty battalions of tirailleurs féderés,
troops undoubtedly not very formidable in an open
field, but which, when distributed in garrisons, might
in case of need serve as a lever for the government in
the execution of great national measures, and also
contribute in the defence of cities. Fouché and
Carnot, who in concert directed all the affairs of the
interior, exhibited, perhaps with a different object,
great ardor in the organization of these patriotic fed-
erations; both saw in them a means of counteracting
the influence of the army, and consequently the au-
thority of its chief. With the power of disposing of
all the interior forces, they would be more powerful
than he during the war, and would not much fear
him after the peace. The first especially, who had
more address and greater grasp of mind, saw in these
elements a means of getting rid of Napoleon without
welcoming the Bourbons, as little as the success of the
struggle with Europe seemed doubtful.
Napoleon was too clear-sighted and distrustful not
to suspect these projects; but he was obliged to sub-
mit to the best circumstances.
While these cares of internal policy painfully oc-
cupied his thoughts, he had redoubled his activity in
his military preparations, so as to place himself in a
condition to resist all Europe, should the nation,
5%
106 Polr11CAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
º
\
seriously appreciating her position, desire to make
every sacrifice for the maintenance of her independ-
ence. The armories, abandoned under his predecessor,
resumed such activity, that they succeeded in fabri-
cating four thousand muskets per day. The national
guards mobile were organized throughout the empire,
at the same time that the conscription was levied. I
have already stated that the line of the army had been
doubled in two months, (from 1st April to the 1st
June), and that a vast system of defence would per-
mit its increase to 700,000 men by the 1st September.
The problem of French independence depended,
then, on the possibility of delaying hostilities till the
beginning of August. Far from allowing him this
time, the allies, profiting by his example, hastened
with all speed towards the Rhine and the Meuse. The
English and Prussians showed unheard of activity in
their preparations, and the Russians reached the
banks of the Rhine from the depths of Poland, in
two months. The allies who were contending for
Saxony and Cracow had remained under arms with a
war complement, they had lighted matches, and
twenty minutes' time, with four orders for the march
dispatched from Vienna the same day, were only
necessary to place the whole of Europe in motion.
France was far from presenting the formidable atti-
tude that Europe had preserved ; every thing was in
confusion ; on the arrival of Napoleon, she was with-
out arms and without soldiers. They have tried to
establish a parallel between her efforts in 1793 and
those in 1815: in less time, Napoleon had accom-
plished as much as the committee of public safety,
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 107
without having recourse to the revolutionary army,
nor to a dozen guillotines that followed: but the
members of the coalition of 1815 acted very differently
from those of the first invasion; they did not spend
three months in besieging Valenciennes, as Mack and
Cobourg did; times were very much changed. The
sea was covered with English convoys bearing troops
and siege equipages. The riches of Hindostan, se-
conded by proficiency in the arts and manufactures,
had transformed England into an immense arsenal,
that fabricated, with terrible activity, the artillery,
munitions and trains necessary to the armies of the
coalition. Nothing in the most distant times resem-
bled this epoch. -
Since the last of May, Wellington and Blucher had
assembled 220,000 English, Prussians, Belgians, Hano-
verians and Brunswickers, between Liège and Cour-
tray. The troops of Bavaria, Wirtemburg and Baden
assembled in the Black Forest and in the Palatinate.
The Austrians hastened to join them : their army of
Italy was re-united at Sardes, on the Alps. The Rus-
sians, by forced marches, were already traversing
* Franconia and Saxony. A million of men, in short,
were preparing to rush upon France: it may be said,
that the coalition had the secret of Cadmus, for
making soldiers spring forth from the bowels of the
earth.
Whatever might be the activity employed in re-or-
ganizing the army, and in the defence of the frontier,
Napoleon must have feared that the armies of Europe
would be much greater than his own, should hostilities
commence before the month of August. It was then
108 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
under the walls of Paris and Lyons, that the destinies
of the empire were to be decided. -
More than once he had had the idea of fortifying
the heights of Paris; but was prevented by the fear
of alarming the country and by the emergencies that
were thickening around him. There were two me-
thods of effecting this; the first was by constructing
seven or eight large forts on the principal points of
this enceinte; if these forts did not absolutely prevent
their penetrating to the walls, and even forcing an en-
trance into the city, it would require a very consider-
able force to make the attempt, for fear there still
existed a nucleus of a French army that might take
part in the defence. Besides this, by commanding
the navigation of the Seine and closing the principal
avenues, they would render the provisioning of Paris
by the enemy who dared to hold it, a very difficult
matter. Lastly, these forts might be connected by
communicating intrenchments.
The other method was to place the entire encernte
under protection from a coup de main, by means of
field works. The emperor gave this the preference
because it required less time. He thought “that a
great capital contains the élite of the nation, that it
is the centre of opinion, the dépot of every thing, and
that it is the greatest inconsistency to leave so im-
portant a point without immediate defence. In times
of misfortunes and great calamities, states are often
in want of actual soldiers, but never in want of men
for the defence of their walls. Fifty thousand na-
tional guards with two or three thousand cannoniers,
will defend a fortified capital against an army of
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 109
200,000 men. These 50,000 men in an open field, if
not disciplined soldiers and commanded by experi-
enged officers, will be routed by a charge of a few thou-
sand horse. Paris has often owed her safety to her
walls; if in 1814 she had been in condition to resist
but for eight days, what influence would this not have
had on the events of the world? If in 1805, Vienna
had been well armed and better defended, the battle
of Ulm had not decided the war; Austerlitz had
never been fought. If in 1806, Berlin had been for-
tified, the army beaten at Jéna had rallied, and the
Russian army would have joined it. If in 1808,
Madrid had been fortified, the French army after the
victories of Espinosa, Tudela, Burgos, and Sommo-
Sierra, had not dared to march on this capital, leaving
the English and Spanish armies behind them, towards
Salamanca and Valladolid. Lastly, it was the fortifi-
cations of Vienna, that on two occasions saved Europe
from the sabre of the Mussulman.
General Haxo was consequently charged with for-
tifying Paris. This skillful engineer, intrenched the
heights situated on the north from Montmartre to
Charonne, and completed the Ourcq canal, so as to
cover the plain between La-Villette and St. Denis.
This village was to be intrenched and protected by
the inundations of the Rouillon and the Crou. From
the western foot of Montmartre ran a line of intrench-
ments that rested on the Seine above Clichy: at the
eastern extremity, the Bercy park and the space be-
tween Vincennes and Charonne were equally covered.
The works were armed with 700 pieces of ordnance.
On the south, the faubourgs between the upper Seine
110 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
and la Bièvre and between la Bièvre and the lower
Seine, were not to remain without defence; their en-
ceinte had been already traced out when the enemy
appeared before Paris.
General Léry presided over the defensive works at
Lyons; they were pushed with vigor: 450 iron pieces
of heavy calibre brought from Toulon, and 250 bronze
pieces, armed the ramparts or were kept in reserve.
Every thing led to the belief that the inhabitants of
this city, whose patriotism equals their courage, sup-
ported by a corps d'armée, would give the enemy a task.
While these great works were being executed, re-
cruiting was carried on with all the possible activity
that circumstances would permit. It will be remem-
bered that by the 1st June the effectives of the line of
the army had been increased from 200,000 to 400,000
men ; but in this number must be included the sol-
diers who were still at the regimental dépots, as well
as the forces required in the west, on the southern
frontier, and in the most important fortresses of the
empire. Napoleon had then 180,000 disposable men
for the campaign on the Rhine and in Belgium. By
the middle of July, he would have had 300,000; all
the forts would, moreover, have had garrisons of
national guards, dépots for the line, and some good
regiments.”
* The troops of the line had been augmented in two months, from
200,000 to 360,000 men ; but 150,000 were not yet disposable, being in
dépots. Besides these, there were 200,000 complete, comprising the na-
tional guard mobile, which would not be fit for service before the end of
July, though by the middle of June they might be already assembled in
the fortresses. By the end of August Napoleon expected to have from
seven to eight hundred thousand defenders at his disposal. Immonse
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 111
All the efforts to enter upon negotiations having
been vain, Napoleon had the option to pursue one of
two courses; the first, to meet the Anglo-Prussians at
Brussels or Namur, about the middle of June ; the
second, to await the allies at Paris and Lyons. The
latter had the inconvenience of delivering half of
France to the ravages of the enemy; but it offered the
advantage of gaining until the month of August to
finish recruiting and complete the preparations, then
of fighting with all his means combined while the
allies were weakened by many corps of observation.
On the contrary, by transporting the theatre of hostili-
ties into Belgium, France was perhaps saved from
invasion; but in case of reverse the allies would be
drawn on by the 1st July, six weeks earlier than
they would have come of their own accord.* The
armée d'élite, shaken by a reverse, would no longer be
able to sustain so unequal a struggle, and the recruiting
might not be completed. On the other hand, this
course offered the hope of taking the enemy unawares;
it was more conformable with the spirit of the nation
that does not comprehend Fabius. This method can
be acted upon by an emperor of Russia, with an end-
less empire; or by a Wellington on the territory of
another beyond the sea; but in a country like France
works were ordered for putting in order all the frontier places, for a long
time neglected, and especially to fortify Paris, Lyons, Laone, Soissons,
and the mountain passes.
* This calculation, that might very naturally enter into Napoleon's
thoughts, being based on the march of the Russian armies, the farthest
off of all, was not exact, as to time, because the coalesced power had
taken measures for entering France at all points on the 1st July. This
was, besides, an additional motive for anticipating them in Belgium, if in
coudition to do so.
112 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
\
whose capital is seventy leagues from the Belgian
frontier, and in the position which the emperor was
personally placed, the idea of permitting Europe in
arms to reach the base of Montmartre, would have
terrified the most determined. Undoubtedly, if France
had had but one feeling and one will, that of rallying
around the chief of state and conquering with him, it
would perhaps have been better to await the enemy.
But with existing divisions in political interests, opin-
ions, and passions, everything was to be dreaded while
awaiting an invasion; because with the impossibility of
making head at all points at once, he would have been
constrained to deliver half of the provinces to the rav-
ages of war, and the chamber of deputies, already so
hostile to his power, would not have spared him. A
victory beyond, would procure him the necessary time,
and would impose silence on his political enemies in the
interior: it would thus suit him in every respect; for
in beating Wellington and Blucher separately, he
delivered himself from the dangers he foresaw on
the part of Fouché and Carnot. Moreover, he has
unevasively avowed that he believed himself certain
of this victory, while perceiving the enthusiasm of the
soldiers and recurring to the souvenirs of the past.
All these motives determined him then to take the
initiative, not to occupy Brussels, but to destroy the
opposing masses in succession. If he succeeded, the
defeat of Wellington and Blucher ought to be followed
by important consequences; this great blow struck
à propos at the opening of the campaign, might dissolve
the coalition. Meanwhile, it was impossible to garri-
son the other points of the frontier: it was necessary
POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF 113
to leave small bodies at Bordeaux, Toulouse, on the
War, in Savoy, at Béfort, and Strasbourg. These
bodies, too feeble to resist in front of an enemy, were
to serve at least for awing and harassing him on the
march : moreover these were points d'appui, valuable
for levying the national guards, and for the rising of
the country which they were to organize.
To increase the misfortune, la Vendée was not
quieted, notwithstanding the success of the movable
columns. Civil war is a political cancer which should
be destroyed in its germ, under pain of compromising
the safety of the state; even a portion of the young
guard had to be sent to re-enforce the corps of General
Lamarque. All these detachments reduced the strength
of the main army to 120,000 combatants, which were
to assemble between the Meuse and the Sambre, from
Philippeville to Maubeuge. -
/ Although the enemy had at least 200,000 men in
f Belgium, Napoleon did not hesitate; it was important
not to lose time, so as to avoid having on his hands all
the hostile armies at once. Leaving Paris on the
12th June, he inspected the armament of Soissons and
Laon the next day, and on the 14th removed his
head-quarters to Beaumont.
The organization of the army underwent great
modifications: the emperor gave the command of corps
to young generals who, called upon to win their
marshal's baton on the battle-field, would exhibit
more enthusiasm for the triumph of his cause. This
baton was conferred on Grouchy, who had shown
talent and vigor in the campaign of 1814, and in his
expedition against the Duke d’Angoulême. Soult
114 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
was appointed major-general in place of Berthier, who
had forsaken his flag to follow the Bourbons, and who
it is said, threw himself from the casement of the
palace of Bamberg, ashamed of finding himself in the
midst of the enemy's columns that defiled before him
en route for the frontier of France.” Davoust re-
mained as minister of war, Mortier was to command
the guard; but his health did not permit it. Ney and
Grouchy were to conduct the wings of the main army,
in the quality of lieutenants. Suchet commanded the
army of Italy, Rapp on the Rhine, Brune on the War,
Clausel and Decaen watched the Pyrenees.
Napoleon had four lines of operation from which to
choose; he could reunite his masses on the left towards
Valenciennes, pounce by Mons, on Brussels, fall upon
the English army and overthrow it on Antwerp. By
the centre he could act on Charleroi, through Mau-
beuge, between the Sambre and the Meuse, and fall
on the point of junction of the two armies of Blucher
and Wellington. On the right he could descend the
Meuse towards Namur, fall on the left of the Prussians,
cutting them off from Coblentz and Cologne. Lastly,
it was possible to make a descent between the Meuse
and the Moselle, or between the Meuse and the Rhine,
fall on the corps of Kleist that covered the Ardennes,
and the communications of the Prussians with the
Rhine. \
* Berthier's death is still covered by a veil of mystery; the fact is, he
foll from the balcony on to the pavement. Some say he was thrown by the
son of a bookseller of Nuremberg, who had been condemned to death
under the empire; others think, that the spectacle of the Russian army
defiling on their way to enter France, made him regret his having
emigrated.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 115
This last course led only to threatenings, that would
have resulted in nothing with a man of Blucher's cha-
racter. Besides, it led too far from the end intended.
An attack on the Meuse was most wise, but it would
have thrown Blucher on Wellington, and effected the
junction that should be prevented. The inverse
manoeuvre by Mons against Wellington’s army, might
have produced in an opposite manner the same
dreaded junction, by throwing the right of the allies
upon the left. The emperor at last determined on
falling upon the central point, where he might take
Blucher en flagrant délit, and defeat him before he
could receive the support of Wellington.
In order properly to appreciate its merit, it must be
remembered that Napoleon had not to oppose only
one army, under the same chief, and having but one
interest, but on the contrary, two armies independent
of each other, having two bases of operations entirely
diverging : that of the English being based on Ostend,
or Antwerp, and that of the Prussians on the Rhine
and Cologne; decisive circumstances, and which
secured great success to all central operations, tending
to separate them and fight them successively.
Napoleon's taking the field, and his first plan, may
be regarded as among the most remarkable operations
of his life: nine corps of infantry or cavalry cantoned
from Lille to Metz, were, by marches skillfully con-
cealed, to concentrate in front of Charleroi, at the
same moment with the guard’s arrival there from Paris.
These movements were combined with so much pre-
cision, that 120,000 men were assembled on the
ambre, as by enchantment, on the 14th June. Wel-
116 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
lington, occupied in giving fêtes at Brussels, believed
Napoleon still in Paris, when his columns presented
themselves on the morning of the 15th to cross this
river. The French troops occupied over night the
following positions:–the right, 16,000 strong, under
Count Gérard, at Philippeville; the centre, nearly
60,000 strong, under Napoleon, towards Beaumont;
and the left, 45,000 strong, at Ham-sur-Eur and
Solre-sur-Sambre. -
The enemy had such slight idea of these movements
that their armies were not concentrated. Blucher had
the first of his corps at Charleroi, the second at
Namur, the third at Dinant, and the fourth under
Bulow, at Liège; the fifth under Kleist, covered
Luxembourg. Meanwhile, Napoleon learned on join-
ing his army, that General Bourmont had deserted on
the 14th, from Philippeville, to join Louis XVIII. and
the allies. However censurable this step might be, it
may be believed, that it was not aggravated, by giving
the enemy such information as a soldier should con-
ceal even in such a case. At all events, under the
circumstances, when endeavoring to surprise them in
their cantonments, the mere knowledge of the em-
peror's arrival and the assembling of his army, was a
serious matter; this information sufficed for Blucher
to order the concentration of his corps, and thus
counteracting all plans for a surprise. We are, how-
ever, assured that he had already ordered this as-
sembling, on previous advices received through a
drummer of the old guard who had deserted that
night; the presence of the old guard was a certain
index, and sufficient to warn the enemy.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 117
As to Wellington's army, it had not yet stirred
from the cantonments it occupied from Oudinarde, on
l’Escaut to Nivelle: but it had been apprised and
was ready to do so at the first signal.
The events were so important and so hurried in this
campaign of four days, that I will be obliged to enter
into details to have it understood, and to insert in this
place, a table of the situations of the respective armies
on the morning of the 15th, to accomplish the same
object. If Napoleon did not then know precisely the
composition and position of all the enemy's corps, he
at least knew that in general terms, the Prussians
cantoned from Charleroi to Liège, and that the Anglo-
Belgians were distributed between Ath and Brussels,
with advanced guards towards Mons and Tournay.
The point of junction of these two armies, was then
on the causeway leading from Charleroi to Brussels,
and it was there also that he directed his blows, with
the greater hope of being able to profit thus by the
dissemination of the enemy's forces, and overthrow
them separately.
As success depended on celerity, the French army
crossed the frontier on the 15th at dawn, and took the
direction of Charleroi. The corps of General Reille,
that bivouacked at Ham-sur-Eur, being nearest the
enemy, was to cross the Sambre at Marchiennes, and
march on Gosselies: that of d'Erlon which was farther
to the rear at Solre-sur-Sambre, was to follow the
same direction. The centre or main body, with the
cavalry reserves under Grouchy,” marched from
* Under this first organization, Grouchy commanded all the cavalry ; it
was only on the morrow, the 16th June, that the army was organized into
two wings, and that he took command of the right.
SITUATION OF THE FRENCH ARMY, JUNE 14th, 1815
1st Corps.
Count d'Erlom.
2d Corps.
Count Reille.
3d Corps.
Count Vandamme. 1 Cavalry
4th Corps.
Count Gérard.
6th Corps.
Count Lubaw.
Guard.
ist Light Corps.
Gen. Pujol.
2d Corps.
Ea:celmans.
3d Corps.
JMilhaud.
4th Corps.
Count de Valmy.
Rapp, commanding the army of the Rhine.
Béliard, commanding one corps at Metz.
ARMY ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN BELGIU M. Str'gth. Position.
tº "ºº":::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: nasºn, sm.
tº ſº. Hºº:::::::::::::::::::::::::::} ºn mºureur
#º ſº. ººlºº....::::::::::::::::::::: 1600lbeaumont.
łgº; ; Nº.::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::} isºphilippeville.
jº º jº.:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::::} isºpeaumon.
2 divisions: the Old Guard, Friant & Morand. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tº gº a s e g º e º 'º t e º s e º ſº º $ $ 8,000
ſ
I do. Young Guard, Duhesme. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tº tº $ tº e º e º is tº ſº e g º e º a º f = ′ e º a $ tº # * 4,000 18,400 do
Cavalry of the Guard, 19 squadrons of light, and 13 of heavy cavalry. . . . . 4,000 y *
Artillery, Sappers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . tº e º e º e º e º 'º º sº e g º ºs e º 'º e ... . . . . . . .2,400
CAVALRY RESERVES.
}soul's & Subervic's divisions of Hussars and Chasseurs. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2,800 do.
}Divisions of Dragoons, Sproly & Chastel. tº t e º º - e e s e e e º e º e a e º e e º e º e º 'º e º ºs e e º o e º e º a 6 tº e º 'º º $ tº 8 º' 3,000 do.
Divisions of Cuirassiers, Watier & Delort. ........ e tº e º 'º e º 'º e e e º e º e º e s e e º e e o e º e º 'º e º e º º ºs e º a tº e 3,600 do.
Divisions of Cuirassiers, Sheritier & Roussel. ............ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3,700 do."
Total, 167 small battalions, 166 squadrons, 346 cannon. .................... . . . . . . . . . . . 120,300|Combatants.
OTHER TROOPS.
Brune, the corps of observation on the War.
Decaen and Clausel, the corps of observation of the
J.ecourbe, a small corps of observation at Béfort. Pyrenees.
Suchet, the army of Italy in Savoy.
Lamarque, the corps of La Vendee.
:
SITUATION OF THE ALLIED ARMIES IN BELGIUM, JUNE 14th, 1815.
1st. Prussians, under MARs HAL, BLUCHER. Str'gth.
Position.
1st Corps. { 4 divisions of Infantry (*): Steinmetz, Pirch, 2d, Jagow and Henkel. ...................... , 39.800
Ziethem. Roder's Cavalry, 3,900 . . . . . . . . . . . . ºn tº E & © tº e tº tº gº is e º e s tº e º ºs º ºs º is ſº & tº e * tº e º 'º e s e º 'º $ tº $ tº £ tº g tº s & ** {
2d Corps. 4 divisions of Infantry: Tippels, Kirch, Krafft, Brause and Langen. ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31,800
Pirch. Jurgas' Cavalry, 4,000 ... is ſ “.
3d Corps. 4 divisions of Infantry : Borcke, Kempfen, Luck and Stulpnagel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24,000
Thielmann. Hobe's Cavalry, 2.500 5 |
} J
l
* * * * * * * * * * e º e º e s e s is tº e s ∈ s º e º e º e º e a e º is e º º e a e º & 4 & & 8 º' e º & © tº e º sº * * *
4th Corps.
On the Sambre, bt.
Thuin & Auveloy.
About Nannur.
About Ciney and
Dinant.
4 divisions of Infantry : Ila+cke, Ryssel, Lostyn and Hiller. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . * *
Bulow. Prince William of Prussia's Cavalry, 3,000. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . } 30,300 | Near Liege.
5th Corps. ** * * * * Luxembourg, Bas-
Kleist. Nearly 30,000... . . . . . . . . . . . . e s a e º 'º e º sº e º ºs º is a e º e º ºs e º e e º 'º at tº e s is e e º is e º ºs e is a s a º 'º $ & © e º 'º s º º ſº tº * * * * togne.
Total, not including Kleist, 136 battalions, 135 squadrons, 320 cannon, ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l 18,900 Combatants.
2d. Army of Anglo-JWetherlanders, under the DUKE of WELLING'ron. y Enghien, Subise
C (2 English divisions, the Guards and Alten's. .......... © tº g tº º is 4 & 6 e º 'º e e 10,800. 10,800) and environs,
1st Corps. º i. ...,,. ) The Indian Brigade, Stedman's division } Oudinarde and Ni-
Prince of * Dutch-Belgian Army | Perponcher's and Chaseč's divisions, * 24,300. 24.300) velle.
General Collapri's Cavalry, ..... e e e s tº e º is e º e º e e e º s º e s m e º e º e . . . 4,600. 4,600 | Braine-le-Comte.
2d Corps ſ, 5 divisions Anglo-Ilanoverians, Clinton, Coleville, Picton, Lambert and Decken, without th : 34,600 à...".
General Hill. { Artillery, e e º 'º & º is tº e º e º & º & tº * * * * * * e tº a s e s ſº s e s e s s a tº s s s is a tº e º e º 'º e º s is is tº t t t e º sº e s tº ſº tº tº y Brussels. w
Cavalry of Lord Uxbridge, ........ * e º is tº e º e º e g º * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * g is s tº ſº ºn tº $ tº dº º ºs º o g 9,850 Gand and Mons.
Corps of Brunswick: Infantry and Cavalry, ....... • * g º ºs e s e e º e º 'º e º is tº dº sº e º e o e e e < e < e º 'º gº tº $ tº $ tº º º ſº tº tº e º e ........ 6.750 || Brussels, Malines.
Contingent from JVassaw, . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 g is º º e º e º 'º e s tº gº tº $ & º ſº a tº & e º ſº º 'º " is s s a tº tº • * * g º g º & tº is º is is a e e e g g tº s & e e º s s e is 3,000 do. Genape.
Artillery, ... . . . tº s a t e º e º is e º º s • s e º 'º e º e º 'º e º 'º a e is e s e º a s is a s g º e º ſº e º e º is tº e º e º 'º e e © tº º ºs e º & e g tº 6000
Total, 123 battalions, 114 squadrons, 240 cannon, ... . . . . • a s g g g e s is s sº e e º ºs e s is e º ºs s e º a s is tº e & 90,000 TCºmbatants.
Total of the two armies, not including Kleist and some garrisons, 560 cannon, .......... 218,800 Combatants.
OTHER TROOPS.
The Grand Austro-Russian armv, under Barclay de Tolly and Schwarzenberg, were assembling on the Rhine
with the Bavarians and Wirtembergeans, upwards of . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 350,000
The Austro-Sardinians in Italy. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100,000
The Swiss, Spaniards and small German contingents increased the allied forces to 800,000 or 900,000 men.
©ll ºl āYêYºC),
*The Prussians called these brigades, but they were stronger than the French divisions: they had 40 batteries and Wellington had 31. I have estimated them at 8 pieces each,
:
120 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
Beaumont on Charleroi, and the right from Philippe-
ville upon Catelet, where it was to cross the Sambre,
cutting off the Prussian division that held Charleroi,
from its retreat on Namur.
These movements though partly unforeseen by the
enemy, did not entirely attain their object. Reille's
corps actually crossed the Sambre successfully, and
gained the route to Gosselies, preceded by the light
cavalry of the guard ; but Gérard’s leaving Philippe-
ville, having a much longer march to execute, and
over detestable roads, arrived at Catelet too late to
gain the road to Gilly, and fulfil its destination.
The centre had, also, very execrable roads to
traverse, in running over from Beaumont to Charleroi,
and Vandamme, who should have formed the head of
this column, was rather late in leaving his camp.”
. The Prussian generals, whose divisions were parceled
out on the line, had thus more leisure in assembling
them and evacuating Charleroi, this being in their
plan of concentration; only two or three battalions
were cut to pieces in the partial combats. The first
division of Ziethen’s corps, wishing to retreat from
Piéton through Gosselies, and finding this point al-
ready occupied by Reille's advanced guard, had to
force its way in order to reach Heppignies. The
second division re-assembled at Gilly on the Namur
road. Reille's corps having driven the Prussian divi-
sion from Gosselies, and perceiving it continuing the
* General Gourgaud will have it thus; but we have reason to believe that
an error was committed in transmitting the orders, for Vandamme was
not one of those men whose activity must be stimulated; he was but
too ardent, unless some personal jealousy had excited his displeasure.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 121
retreat by Heppignies upon Fleurus, Girard's division
was ordered to follow, while the other three divisions
continued their march upon Frasne. The light
cavalry of the guard that preceded it, drove from this
borough the advanced guard of Prince Weimar, who
concentrated his brigade on Quatre-Bras.
Grouchy's light cavalry having debouched from
Charleroi upon Gilly, found there Ziethen’s two divi-
sions, and was obliged to halt and await Vandamme's
infantry, who were advancing with difficulty by the
bridge of this city. In this position the two parties
exchanged a few cannon shot.
While these French columns debouched by the
bridges on the Sambre and sought the enemy,
Napoleon established himself in front of Charleroi at
the fork of the roads leading to Gosselies and Fleurus,
where he awaited reports, and meditated on the
employment to be given to the masses he had assem-
bled with so much skill, and on the direction necessary
to assign them.
Before proceeding further, it will be well to cast a
coup d’oeil on the preventive measures the allies had
taken against the storm that was bursting upon them.
If their generals were caught at fault at the instant
of the irruption, it must be acknowledged that they
were actually well prepared for whatever might
happen. The Anglo-Prussians desired to assume the
offensive on the 1st July; during the interval they
had adopted all the precautions necessary, in case
they were anticipated. All the partial and general
concentrations were properly indicated. They under-
stood Napoleon’s system of piercing divided centres
6
122 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
too well, not to foresee that he would manoeuvre in
order to separate the two armies. Under this hypo-
thesis, Blucher had chosen the position in rear of
Ligny for assembling on his right, and Wellington
had selected Quartre-Bras for concentrating on his
left; meanwhile he had reconnoitred the position be-
tween Hall and Mont-Saint-Jean (or Waterloo,) for
covering Brussels, and there to accept battle, if the
French either debouched by Valenciennes and Mons,
or arrived by Charleroi.
These dispositions were incontestably wise, but with
the impetuosity and ordinary vivacity of the enter-
prises and the movements of the emperor of the
French, they might yet fail in accomplishing their
object and be separated. -
After what had been agreed upon, as soon as
Blucher heard at Namur of the approach of the impe-
rial army, he dispatched at midnight of the 14th,
f
orders to Ziethen to fall back, fighting on Fleurus;
prescribed at the same time the assembling of Pirch's
corps at Sombref; ordered Thielmann to march in all
haste from Dinant to Namur, while Bulow should
concentrate on Hanut. These measures, evidently
suggested by the reports of deserters, denoted how-
ever that Blucher calculated on a hasty crossing of the
Sambre, and on a decisive battle for the morrow.
Napoleon could not as yet understand all these cir-
cumstances; but after the varied information he had
received, and from the direction of the retreat of the
Prussian forces, he perceived that their army sought to
assemble between Namur and the causeway leading
from Charleroi to Brussels, as it was by this route that
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 123
the English would come to their assistance: now, under
this supposition the emperor had but one wise course to
follow ; the most simple glance at the map would suffi-
ciently indicate, that it was essential to seize upon Som-
bref on the one side, and the central point of Quatre-
Bras on the other. (A village that took its name from
the intersection of two roads, forming four branches,
leading to Namur, Charleroi, Brussels and Nivelles.)
Because, once master of these two points, he was in po-
sition to act at will on either of the opposing armies, and
prevent their junction.) Consequently, Napoleon gave
Grouchy a verbal order, to push as far as Sombref
that very evening, if possible: Marshal Ney, who had
just arrived by post from Paris, was ordered to assume.
command of the left wing, composed of Reille's and
Erlon's corps, to take at once the Brussels road, in the
direction of Quatre-Bras, and push forward advanced
guards on the three branches that parted from that
point, to gather every information.*
Having learned at that moment, that Grouchy’s
cavalry had been arrested near Gilly by a portion of
Ziethen’s corps, Napoleon hastened there to order an at-
* This fact, asserted in Gourgaud's account, is contested by Ney's defen-
ders. It is certain that in the orders written by Soult, no trace of this
movement is found till the morning of the 16th; but it is also certain that
Napoleon gave Ney, on the night of the 15th, all the instructions verbally,
as well as to Grouchy, whom he ordered to push on as far as Sombref if
possible. It is then more than probable that he gave Ney, by word of
mouth, the order cited by Gourgaud with circumstances that do not per-
mit a doubt. IIow, in fact, would he have pushed his right as far as Som-
bref, leaving his left in rear at Gosselies, when this wing had less distance
to traverse, even if it had advanced as far as Quatre-Bras ? Besides, if
the execution of the movement seemed difficult on the night of the 15th,
it is evident that it was indispensable to march on this important point at
6 the next morning.
124 I’OIITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
tack; the enemy observing the arrival of Vandamme's
infantry, retired, fighting, and after quite a brisk can-
nonade, Excelmans and Vandamme dislodged him from
the woods of Soleilmont and Lambusart, where Zie-
then’s third division had collected.
While this was taking place, Marshal Ney arrived
between Gosselies and Frasne, and hearing the boom-
ing of cannon in the direction of Gilly during the at-
tack of Ziethen’s second division by Vandamme and
Grouchy, believed that this engagement might modify
the emperor's designs, and therefore, instead of briskly
pushing forward as far as Quatre-Bras, he established
himself in front of Gosselies. This contre-temps was
the more grievous, as in admitting that Ney had not
received a formal order, he should have felt the impor-
tance of this occupation. ſit has been said in his jus-
tification, that his troops, especially those of d'Erlon's
corps that had advanced from Solre over frightful
roads, were still scattered between Gosselies and Mar-
chiennes; it has been added that the roar of artillery
in rear of his right flank, induced the belief that his
recall might become necessary, and that his march
should not be continued for fear of having too much
road to travel in retracing his steps*:) Bachelu's divi-
*We should observe, once for all, that without wishing to prejudice in
the slightest degree, the faults imputed to his lieutenants, by Napoleon, we
should recall his exact words used at the very moment of the catastrophe.
Ney was less active and less impetuous during the 15th and 16th June than
he had been at Elchingen, Jena and Friedland ; but we must take into
consideration the circumstances of the case. He arrived at Charleroi by
post from Paris, without equipage and even without horses, when he was
immediately ordered to take command of eight divisions of infantry he
had never seen, of which he scarcely knew any of the chiefs, and the po-
sitions of which were a mystery to him. Had Ney's wing have been un-
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 125
sion, that had been thrown forward as far as Frasne,
was even ordered to fall back.
Be this as it may, night having set in before the
right could reach Sombref, as he had desired, Napo-
leon probably attached less importance to the delays
experienced by his left, and returned to Charleroi
about 10 o’clock that night, where Ney repaired at a
later hour, undoubtedly by invitation, to determine on
the operations for the morrow. The troops of the
main body and the cavalry, bivouacked between the
woods of Lambusart and the village of Heppignies,
now held by Girard’s division of Reille's corps: the
guard and Lobau's corps, in reserve, about Charleroi,
where were fixed the imperial quarters. The corps
of Count Gérard remained in the vicinity of Catelet:
that of d'Erlon did not go beyond Jumet.
From all that has been stated, we see that Napoleon
had to renounce the idea of pushing, on the 15th, as
far as Sombref and Quatre-Bras, which were to be the
pivots of all his after movements. But to secure the
success of his wisely combined plan, it behooved him
to repair with activity and promptness, at day-break
on the 16th, what had been left incomplete the night
previous; unfortunately for him, this was not execu-
ted with that uncommon activity that ordinarily dis-
tinguished him. We are forced to avow that the man-
ner in which he employed this morning of the 16th,
will ever remain a problem for those who best under-
stand it : did he calculate that Ney and Grouchy
der his orders a few days, and had their anterior movements been directed
by him, it is probable that he would have reached Quatre-Bras on the
night of the 15th.
126 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
would themselves execute at sunrise, the verbal orders
received, to advance upon Sombref and Quatre-Bras,
and did he believe in his power of employing this
time, in arranging the numberless affairs that besieged
him at his head-quarters? We can suppose so, as the
emperor that morning resolved on the definite organi-
zation of his army into two principal masses and a
reserve: Grouchy had the command of the right wing,
composed of Wandamme's and Gérard’s corps, with
Pajol’s, Excelmans’ and Milhaud's corps of cavalry.
Ney commanded the left wing, composed of Reille's
and d'Erlon’s corps, with the cavalry of Count de Valmy
and Lefèbre Desnouettes. Lobau's corps and the guards
formed a reserve of nearly 28,000 men.”
We can also suppose, that on hearing of Blucher's
presence at Namur, where he had spent the 15th, the
emperor concluded that he would concentrate his dif-
ferent corps about that city, as it was the central point
of their cantonments. He could then naturally infer,
that but a portion of this army would oppose him on
the 16th, and that it would suffice to take an earnest
step after mid-day : all the measures prescribed evi-
dently prove it; for he informed Ney in the morning
*This organization has had its critics, because, in truth, the army had no
centre; they have thought that it had been preferable to draw the fourth
division of the two corps of Reille and d'Erlon, and join them to Lobäu's
corps, thus forming a centre and two wings independently of the reserves;
this would have facilitated the movements, and perhaps avoided the false
employment of too great detachments during the 16th and 18th June.
Napoleon was undoubtedly determined by the reason, that having to en-
counter two armies quite distinct, it behooved him to have a certain mass
ready to oppose to each of them, besides the reserve to reinforce the point
where he would desire to strike a blow ; a result he would have attained
better, by having had three masses beside the reserve.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 127
that he would not resolve on a definite course till three
o'clock that afternoon.*
Nevertheless, Napoleon resolved about 8 A. M., on
sending his aid-de-camp, Flahaut, to Marshal Ney, to
reiterate the formal order for him to march hastily on
Quatre-Bras, to take up a strong position there, to re-
connoitre the three roads, and to detach from thence
a strong infantry division with the light cavalry of
the guard, on Marbais ; lastly, to form a connection
with Grouchy, who, with the right wing, was advanc-
ing to take possession of Sombref. This dispatch,
written by Flahaut himself under Napoleon's dictation,
left by 9 o'clock, and should have been preceded by
a like order given by the Major General: these orders
reached Gosselies only towards 11 o'clock, and as the
Marshal had already left to join the advance guard of
Reille's corps, near Frasne, he did not immediately
receive them.
While these things were happening at the imperial
quarters, Grouchy’s troops advanced to drive Ziethen’s
rear-guard from Fleurus. The latter made no opposi-
tion, but assembled on the main body, formed on the
heights between Ligny and Saint Amand, in presence
of which the French found themselves about eleven
o'clock. -
*This circumstance is so much the more surprising, as Grouchy had
transmitted a report, at 6 A. M., announcing that the Prussians were de-
bouching from Sombref on St. Amand in considerable forces. As this did
not at all accord with the information received of Blucher's presence at
Namur, Napoleon seems not to have credited it; besides, he was pained
and much disturbed at the turn taken at Paris by the Chambers and Jaco-
bins. It was not till three o'clock that he determined on a course then
inexecutable.
128 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
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A few moments afterwards Napoleon arrived on the
Spot, proceeded to reconnoitre the position, when he was
informed that Ney still thought it his duty to slacken
his march on Quatre-Bras, for many reasons: first,
d'Erlon’s corps was still very far to the rear; second,
false reports that the junction of the enemy’s armies
had already taken place, and that therefore, the move-
ment prescribed, far from being useful, would only
prove adventurous: the marshal, therefore, awaited
the emperor's decision after the receipt of this infor-
mation, before seriously engaging.”
While this remissness threatened the success of this
beautiful plan of Napoleon, the allies displayed an
\_2 uncommon activity, and the Prussians especially, re-
assembled with rare celerity. Being informed at Na-
mur, at 10 A. M. of the 15th, of the passage of the
Sambre and the danger that menaced Ziethen, Blucher
had ordered Thielmann and Bulow to march immedi-
ately on Sombref. Pirch's corps had left Namur on
the 15th for this destination, and marched part of the
night; Thielmann's, on their way from Dinant, had
made but one halt of three hours, at Namur, to rest
the troops, and had filed off the entire night towards
Sombref, where the rear battalions arrived between
nine and ten in the morning. Bulow, coming from
Liege, could not reach Gembloux before the night of
*These delays are contested by Ney's vindicators, who wish to prove
that the order borne by Flahaut, not reaching Gosselies before 11 o'clock
and Frasne towards noon, could not be executed before two, and that much
he did. But the orders given verbally on the 15th and 16th at 1 A. M.,
cannot be doubted, without accusing Napoleon of incapacity. Besides,
how could Ney excuse himself at nine in the morning for not having yet
advanced on Quatre-I}ras, if he had not previously received verbal orders.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 129
the 16th and 17th. The main body of the Prussian
army (three corps, together 90,000 men) thus found
itself in position between Bry and Tongrines, at ten
o'clock on the morning of the 16th.
/ Wellington, who believed Napoleon still at Paris,
was not aware of his army's approach, until the news
of the passage of the Sambre received at 5 P.M., on
the 15th at Brussels, while at a dinner; but the duke
had forewarned his troops to hold themselves in readi-
ness for the first signal, and he sent officers in all
directions to put them in motion. His left under the
Prince of Orange, was in cantonments between Mons
and Nivelles, and with its head-quarters at Braine le
Comte ; his right under General Hill, extended to-
wards Ath. It was then only by a prodigy of activity
that this extended line could be concentrated on his
left by the evening of the 16th or the morning of the
17th, and it was evident that a connection with the
Prussians could be effected by the road from Nivelles
to Quatre-Bras. After having dispatched these orders,
Wellington repaired to Quatre-Bras, where on the
morning of the 16th he found a portion of Per-
poucher's Belgian division just from Nivelles, and the
brigade of the Prince of Saxe-Weimar. While await-
ing the columns from Brussels and Braine, the duke
galloped over to Bry, where, about noon, he held an
interview with Blucher; finding the Prussian army
disposed to give battle, he promised to collect thirty
or thirty-five thousand men during the night, to Sup-
port his right, and with this object returned to Quatre-
Dras, where he arrived after two o'clock.
To conquer an enemy that made such wise disposi-
6%
130 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
tions, it would have required the ancient impetuosity
of the conqueror of Italy, Ulm, Jéna, and Ratisbonne;
but his warmest admirers would not recognize it here.
As we have already observed, he undoubtedly trusted
to the alacrity of his lieutenants themselves, to recover
the time lost, and to execute in the morning the verbal
orders he had given them the previous evening, for
the occupation of two points, without which he could
not reckon on the success of his project. Neverthe-
less this hope did not suffice, and the emperor of 1809
would not have failed being in person at Fleurus by
8 o’clock in the morning, to judge of the state of
things, and to verify the report Grouchy had sent him
at 6 o'clock, announcing the presence of strong
Prussian columns that were debouching from Sombref
on St. Amand.
Be that as it may, as we have seen above, Napoleon
arrived near Fleurus at 11 o’clock, and there received
information of the new delay caused in the movement
on Quatre-Bras. To counteract this deplorable inci-
dent, the emperor reiterated the order to Ney, to push
vigorously on Quatre-Bras, with the understanding
that 8,000 men should be detached on Marbais, as
soon as he received the command through General
Flahaut. This new order at the same time informed
him that as Grouchy was to occupy Sombref, he
would certainly have to oppose but the troops hasten-
ing from Brussels. Waleski, a polish officer, was the
bearer of this letter. -
While the latter proceeded at a gallop on the
Gosselies road, Napoleon about noon ascended the
mills at Fleurus, to reconnoitre the Prussian corps
THE CAMPAIGN OF waterLoo. 131
whose presence had been signaled. On his front, the
position was covered with difficulties that bordered
the rivulet of Ligny; the left extended to the environs
of Sombref and Tongrines, the centre about Ligny;
the right in rear of St. Amand. This large borough,
formed of three distinct villages (that bear the names
of St. Amand le Chateau, St. Amand la Haie, and
St. Amand le Hameau,) protected the right wing
whose flank rested on Wagnèle. The second line and
the reserves were between Sombref and Bry. Thus
six large villages, four of which were difficult of
access on account of the rivulet, covered the line of
the enemy, like so many bastions; his reserves and
his second line posted in columns of attack by bat-
talions between Sombref and Bry, could support all
points of it.*
After this reconnoissance, it became still more
manifest that Napoleon's heaviest blow should be
struck at Blucher's right; because this wing was
already turned by Ney’s march, and it was the only
point of junction with Wellington. It is said that the
emperor felt some surprise in seeing this position; all
reports agreed in stating that Blucher had passed the
15th at Namur, where his army was not as yet con-
centrated. Though Napoleon was aware of all the
interest the allies had in effecting a junction, he did
not think that Blucher would thus abandon his com-
* The four divisions of Ziethen’s corps formed in the front line defended
Ligny and St. Amand ; those of Pirch's corps forming the second line,
came into line successively. The left under Thielmann, only arrived at 9
A.M., were towards Tongrines. Gourgaud's narrative states that Napo-
leon made this reconnoissance at 10 o'clock, while Soult, no earlier than 2
P.M., informs Ney that a Prussian corps has just been discovered.
132 . POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
munications with Liége and Aix-la-Chapelle, as he
believed his army to be less numerous, and would
have moreover expected to find it in the beautiful
defensive position between Sombref and Tongrines, at
the fork on the causeway from Namur. The line he
had selected suited the French perfectly, but it was
necessary to profit by it without delay, and too much
time had already been lost.
Although this procrastination in the design on
Quatre-Bras appeared vexatious, since the occupation
of this point in the morning had been an important
matter, we must acknowledge that after the reconnois-
sance just made, the emperor had cause for gratula-
tion, as it resulted that Ney would be yet disposable
in seconding his attack of the Prussians.
This reconnoissance having been completed in an
hour, Napoleon had actually one of three courses to
pursue :
1st. To arrest the march of Ney’s column at once;
order Kellermann's cavalry to take up position at
Frasne, to cover the route from Charleroi, this being
the line of retreat; then to throw the seven divisions of
Reille's and d'Erlon’s corps on Mablais, by the Roman
causeway, in order to turn Blucher's right and fall
upon his rear, while Napoleon attacked him in front.
2d. To prescribe this movement for d'Erlon's corps
alone, leaving Reille's corps with Kellermann's cavalry
on the defensive, towards Frasne and Quatre-Bras, to
watch the enemy and cover the road to Charleroi.
3d. To direct Ney, on the contrary, to fall impetu-
ously on all forces at Quatre-Bras, force them on
Genape, in the direction of Brussels, then immediately
THE CVMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 133
to turn towards Bry, in the direction of Namur, and
co-operate in the attack on Blucher.
In a tactical point of view, the first of these, incon-
testably offered the greatest results; but Napoleon had
actually pushed Ney on Quatre-Bras, as much to
prevent the Anglo-Belgian troops from taking the
Namur road to support the Prussian army, as to
cover his natural line of retreat by the road to
Charleroi, and by leaving it to the protection of the
cavalry alone, he relinquished this double advantage.
by delivering this important route to the mercy of the
enemy. Under this supposition he might have adopted
the second, which had the advantage of sufficiently
covering the retreat, while allowing forces sufficient
to outflank Blucher's right. Napoleon preferred the
third, undoubtedly with the hope that the order sent
by Flahaut before 9 o'clock, would be executed at
the moment this reconnoissance had been completed,
and that Ney, once master of Quatre-Bras, could with
so much greater security, assist in the defeat of
Blucher, after having beaten the Anglo-Belgians that.
opposed him. However, it is probable there was
some uncertainty in the emperor's resolutions, as it
was not until two o'clock that the following order was
sent to Ney:—
“In bivouac in front of Fleurus, 2 P. M.
“MARSHAL:—The emperor instructs me to inform
you, that the enemy has concentrated a corps of troops
between Sombref and Bry, and that at half past two,
Marshal Grouchy with the third and fourth corps will
attack it. His majesty's intention is, that you also
134 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
attack those in your front; that after having pressea.
them vigorously, you turn in this direction, and aid in
enveloping the corps of which I have just spoken.
If this corps is first routed, his majesty will then
manoeuvre in your direction, to facilitate in a like
manner your operations. You will immediately inform
the emperor of your dispositions, and of what is
happening in your front.” -
All the expressions of this dispatch seem to attest,
that Napoleon was but imperfectly aware of the
Prussian force, as he speaks but of one corps, and
supposes he might be overthrown without the aid of
the left wing: this last circumstance naturally ex-
plains the double interest, the French general had
attached to the previous occupation of Quatre-Bras,
so that Ney should not be withdrawn until free from
all anxiety on that point.
While these resolutions, rather tardy and based on
incomplete information, were borne to the left wing,
Napoleon was making his preparations for attacking
the Prussians. The corps of Count Lobau, left at first,
at too great a distance towards Charleroi, was ordered
to hasten to Fleurus. The left of the corps de bataille
under Vandamme, was drawn up fronting the village
of St. Amand ; the centre under Count Gérard, took
up its ground facing Ligny; the guard was posted in
rear of these two attacking portions; Grouchy’s cavalry
was deployed on the right, to keep in check the
Prussian left, that had just been reinforced by the
arrival of Thielmann's entire corps.
The attack commenced between two and three
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. l
3
5
o'clock at St. Amand, which was at first seized by Wan-
damme, notwithstanding a vigorous resistance; but the . . .
Prussians, favored by the village of La Haie, and by the
heights that command it, having advancá their second
line, soon retook it. Count Gérard met with similar op-
position at Ligny,only a portion of which he was able
to hold.
This resistance proving that the enemy mustered
stronger than was supposed, Napoleon, at a quarter
past three, unfortunately rather late, caused a formal
order to be dispatched to Marshal Ney, ordering him
to manoeuvre with his forces on Bry and St. Amand ;”
fearing that even this order might suffer some hin-
drance, and knowing that d'Erlon’s corps had not
reached beyond Frasne, General Labédoyère was sent
to communicate to this general the order given to
Marshal Ney, with instructions at once to commence
its execution.
While this was taking place, the engagement along
the whole line continued raging. A second attack by
* The following are the very words of this last order, which had been
decisive at one o'clock, but which, it will be seen, was productive of more
harum than good :
“In bivouac at Fleurus,
between 3% and 3% o'clock.
To MARSHAL NEY. --
I wrote you an hour ago, that the emperor would attack
the enemy in the position he has taken up, between the villages of St.
Amand and Bry; at this moment the engagement is most decisive. His
majesty instructs me to say, that you should at once manoeuvre in such a
mauner as to envelope the enemy's right, and fall with might and main on
lis rear; if you act with vigor this army is lost. The fate of France is
in your hands; so do not hesitate in executing the movement ordered by
the emperor, and move forward upon the heights of Bry and St. Amand,
to concur in perhaps a decisive victory: the enemy is taken en flagrant
delit, at the moment he seeks to join the English.
THE DUKE of DALMATIA.”
ſº
*-*
136 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
Vandamme on St. Amand, favored by Girard’s divi-
sion, that had crossed the ravine and out-flanked the
enemy, placed the French in possession of that village :
but the brave Girard paid with his life, for a success
of short duration; because Blucher, having thrown
forward a portion of his reserves, the village of St.
Amand was retaken and disputed with desperation.
The battle raged more furiously still at Ligny, which
Gérard had frequently seized, without the power of
preserving : forced to leave Hulot's division in obser-
vation on his right, and thus reduced to 10,000 com-
batants, he maintained his position with the most bril-
liant valor against more than 25,000 Prussians, in the
lower portion of the village, even up to the rivulet
that cuts it in two.
The guard, posted in the centre, in rear of these
two attacking portions, was prepared to sustain either.
On the extreme right, Excelmans manoeuvered skill-
fully to prevent the left of the Prussians from debouch-
ing from Tongrenelle, while Pajol watched Boignée,
and Milhaud's cuirassiers supported Gérard’s right.
Things were in this state about half past five, and
Napoleon awaited with a just impatience, to learn
what was to be hoped from the movement prescribed
for Ney, as the wind and the roar of a violent cannon-
ade prevented his hearing the attack at Quatre
Bras. The emperor was preparing to bring forward
his guard, when a report from General Vandamme
.nformed him, it is said, that a strong column was
visible in the direction of Wagnèle, and that Girard’s
division, deprived of its general and attacked at the
same time by superior forces, had been forced to retire
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 137
towards St. Amand-le-Hameau. General Vandamme
announced, that he had at first taken this column for
the detachment that Ney was to send on Marbaix;
but as it was much too considerable, and as the scouts
had recognized it as of the enemy, it threatened to
drive him back if not promptly supported.
Though difficult to comprehend how a column could
glide between Ney and Napoleon, this might, how-
ever, be a reinforcement sent to Blucher from Quatre-
Bras, or probably, a corps of his own army that, hav-
ing executed a movement by the ancient Roman
causeway beyond Wagnèle, was in the act of turning
Wandamme's left.* Prior to any farther action, Na-
poleon thought it his duty to be sure of it. The nar-
rative from St. Helena, in exposing these facts, affirms
that the emperor suspended his grand attack on this
account, and sent his aid-decamp, Dejean, to recon-
noitre and discover who they were. We are assured
that this officer, at the expiration of only one hour, re-
ported that this was Count Erlon’s corps, who, instead
of marching in a northerly direction towards Bry or
Marbaix, had turned too much to the south, towards
Villers-Peruin, attracted, undoubtedly, by the roar of
two or three hundred pieces of ordnance, that thun-
dered in the direction of St. Amand. These assertions
have been somewhat contested, and as an impartial
historian, I must avow, that respecting this matter,
* This Roman causeway, that intersects the two from Brussels and Na-
mur, leaves the latter between Bry and Marbaix, passes half a league to the
north of Wagnèle, and attains the former between Frasne and Gosselies.
+ In a letter addressed to Marshal Ney's family, General Dejean denies
having had such a mission; perhaps it was confided to some other aid-de-
camp, though this it is impossible to confirm.
138 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
there is nothing but doubt and confusion. As Napo-
leon had ordered a movement turning his left wing
from the Brussels road into the direction of Bry, it
was evident that this column should have been the
one expected : the surprise manifested on this subject
should then appear rather extraordinary. However,
if it be true that Wandamme actually took this column
for the enemy’s, it was at least prudent to be made
certain of it, and therefore the contested mission of
General Dejean would have been the most natural
one; but it is necessary at least to add, that no posi-
tive order directing these troops on Bry had been
given. This forgetfulness, though it might be alleged,
was a manifest fault. It will be said, that Napoleon
might have seen in the presence of Erlon’s corps, a
sufficient indication of the near arrival of Marshal
Ney, to whom he undoubtedly desired to leave the
task of directing his own columns: this, if admitted,
does not entirely justify him ; because the false direc-
tion just taken by these forces, demanded of the em-
peror, in every case, to state precisely what should be
done to accomplish his views. We will see farther
on, the sad part played by these four fine divisions.
However, about half-past six, Napoleon advanced
upon Ligny with his guard, to strike the Prussians a
vigorous blow, which, three hours previously, would
have had more chances of success. The great confi-
dence with which he made this splendid attack, au-
thorizes us, moreover, in believing, that in ordering
it, he firmly expected that a concurrence of a large
portion of Ney's troops would not fail him, and that
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 139
the column that had given Vandamme so much uneasi
ness was soon to cause Blucher greater anxiety.
After seven o'clock in the evening, Napoleon de-
bouched with impetuosity through the village of Lig-
ny with a division of the guard, seconded by Gérard's
infantry, the mounted guard and Milhaud's cuirassiers:
the enemy's centre was broken and thrown partly on
Sombref, and partly on Bry.
The Prussians fought excellently well during the
whole day; but Blucher, deprived of a general re-
serve of cavalry, had but his infantry with which to
oppose this torrent: because, seeing the guard leave
the environs of St. Amand, and taking this movement
as the commencement of the retreat, he had advanced
with the few that yet remained on St. Amand, with
the hope of pursuing the French. Very soon unde-
ceived, he hurried back with the few cavalry he could
hastily collect. But of what service is courage to a
general-in-chief, in such a mêlée ' His horse, killed
by a shot, fell upon him at the instant of the disorder;
the marshal remained ten minutes in the power of
the French cuirassiers without their suspecting it, and
succeeded, through the presence of mind of Nostitz,
his aid-de-camp, in regaining Bry on a lancer's horse.
It was unfortunate for some, and fortunate for others,
that he was not recognized; his capture might, per-
haps, have influenced the battles that followed.
Besides, this brilliant blow, struck, unfortunately,
rather late, was partially arrested by the approaching
night, partially by the movement which Blucher's
entire left executed about Sombref, and lastly by the
140 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
excellent stand made by the remains of Ziethen's and
Pirch's forces between Sombref and Bry.
While the imperial troops issued so gloriously from
a difficult and perilous attack, Ney proved less fortu-
nate at Quatre-Bras. Arriving in front of this posi-
tion, at two o'clock, with the three feeble divisions of
Reille's corps, Piré's light cavalry division and a bri-
gade of cuirassiers led by Kellermann, the marshal
skirmished with the enemy until three o'clock, when
the sound of the cannonade at St. Amand resolved
him, boldly to attack the allies. But the state of
things had greatly changed since the morning. Gen-
eral Perponcher, perceiving the great importance of
Quartre-Bras, in securing the concentration of the
different corps of the Anglo-Netherlanders, and after-
wards in facilitating their junction with the Prussians,
had taken up a position there with his own division
and the brigade of the Prince of Weimar—in all,
9,000 men. These forces, the command of which
was assumed by the Prince of Orange, might have
been very easily overthrown, if attacked in the morn-
ing, by two corps d'armée. Wellington, on reaching
this spot at eleven o'clock, had ordered that the ad-
vanced posts engaged with those of Ney towards
Frasne, should be recalled, so as not to be drawn into
an unequal combat, previous to the arrival of rein-
forcements that were hurrying in from every quarter.
The duke then repaired to Bry, to have an interview
with Blucher, and returned between two and three
o'clock. At the moment that Ney launched IReille's
divisions on the enemy, Picton's English division ar-
rived on the field of battle, and was soon followed by
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 141
that under the Duke of Brunswick. Nevertheless,
Ney fell upon the allies with his accustomed vigor.
Foy's division, on the left, advanced on Quatre-Bras
and Germioncourt, while Bachelu's attacked the vil-
lage of Piermont. Prince Jerome's entered later into
action, by attacking the woods of Bossut on the ex-
treme left. The French troops vigorously pressed the
enemy at all points.
Certain of the near arrival of his reinforcements,
Wellington received these attacks with his usual sang-
froid, which did not prevent the troops of the Prince
of Orange and of Picton, from yielding their posi-
tions after considerable loss. The arrival of Bruns-
wick’s corps soon restored the balance; the battle.
field was disputed with fury, and the Duke of Bruns-
wick himself fell, pierced with balls, in the midst of
his efforts to preserve it.
Things were in this condition, when Ney received
the major-general's order, and the intelligence, that
d'Erlon’s corps was advancing directly on Bry. The
marshal had not a single infantry soldier in reserve ;
he saw the masses of the enemy incessantly augment-
ºng; nothing was left him but to charge with his
cuirassiers, and the greater portion of them had been
left with d'Erlon’s, near Frasne. The marshal hastening
however to the Duke de Valmy, exclaimed: “My
dear general, the safety of France is in danger; an
extraordinary effort must be made; break into the
English army with your cavalry; I will order Piré to p
support you.” Without hesitation, Kellermann at
once charged at the head of this brigade of brave
men, overthrew the 69th regiment, captured the bat-
142 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
teries, and pierced through two lines up to the farm
of Quatre-Bras, where the reserve of English, Hano-
verian and Belgian infantry welcomed him with such
a murderous fire, that his men were forced to make a
large circuit in seeking to withdraw from this danger-
ous place. Kellermann, having had his horse killed
under him, remained dismounted in the midst of the
English, and with great difficulty regained his com-
mand. -
Excited by this splendid charge, the French infantry
renewed its efforts on Quatre-Bras and the woods of
Bossut, the greater portion of which last had been
occupied by Prince Jerome's division. But at this
critical moment, the division of English guards and
that of General Alten, coming into action after a
forced march, gave Wellington such superiority,
that he had nothing more to hope for. Ney had
in fact sent d'Erlon imperative orders, to hasten to
his succor instead of bearing on Bry: but this corps
that had well nigh reached St. Amand, was too far
off to arrive in time, so that the marshal was obliged
to fall back on Frasne to meet him, after having
lost 4,000 men hors de combat: the allies having
entered the action successively, had lost 5,000. Wel-
lington at first ordered a vigorous pursuit, but the
retreat was protected by Roussel's division of cui-
rassiers. -
. In following attentively the successive train of
movements that I have just pointed out, the reader
will judge with what fatality d'Erlon’s corps paraded
uselessly along the whole line, neither reaching Bry,
where it would have rendered the victory complete,
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 143
nor Quatre-Bras, where it would have prevented
Ney's defeat. - .
It will also be noticed, what strange destiny pre-
sided over all the operations of this left wing, whose
march was by turns too slow or too hasty. If it
had advanced on Quatre-Bras, on the evening of the
15th, or at least at dawn of the 16th, it would
have arrived in time to crush Perponcher's division,
then isolated, and to detach two divisions on Mar-
baix and Bry, in order to accomplish Blucher's de-
feat. But when, three hours later, Marshal Ney
was instructed to march towards Bry himself, in
order to envelop the Prussians, the thing was im-
possible, as he was an hour afterwards engaged
at Quatre-Bras: so that it had been preferable for
these two corps to have remained at Frasne, in-
stead of pushing on so far. Much fatality and
loss of time was occasioned by the faults of every
one.*
Before passing to the events that followed, I
should here observe that though Erlon had already
reached beyond Willers-Peruin, yet at the earnest re-
call of Ney, he marched to join him with three di-
visions and the light cavalry of the guard, leaving
Durutte's division between Villers-Peruin and St.
* Napoleon could have pushed as far as Fleurus on the 15th, or have
taken possession of it at 6 A.M., on the 16th; he would have thus dis-
covered Blucher's position before sending Flahaut to Marshal Ney. To
obtain a complete victory on the 16th, it would have been necessary to
have had the concurrence of Lobau and d'Erlon's corps, and to have led
but one corps of infantry and one of cavalry on Quatre-Bras. To accom-
plish this, the reconnoissance made by the emperor at mid-day, should
have been made at 8 o'clock.
144 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
Amand, in case Napoleon required anew a co-opera-
tion on Bry. This division remained there all night
perfectly inactive, on the flank of the rear-guard
left by Blucher in this village, which it occupied
until one o’clock in the morning, while Ziethen's
corps retired under cover of the night on Gilly,
Pirch's on Gentinne, and the left under Thielmann's
orders took the direction of Gembloux.
At day-break, Blucher's rear-guard had disappeared
from Bry; Thielmann's was seen by the scouts, on
the road from Sombref to Corroy le Château, towards
Gembloux, intermediate between the road from Na-
mur and that from Brussels by Wavre. Blucher, who
had perhaps been wrong in accepting battle when
isolated, after three o’clock, instead of then retiring
beyond the Dyle by Bousseval and Cour-St.-Guibert,
in order to place himself in a line with the English
forces that were concentrating at Genape, felt that it
was necessary promptly to repair the misfortune in
the partial defeat of his army, and no longer hoping
to gain Bousseval direct, resolved to rally his forces
on Bulow's entire corps, which must have arrived at
Gembloux during the night, and proceed by Wavre
to join the English. Consequently, Thielmann was
ordered to proceed to Gembloux and assemble on
Bulow; the corps of Ziethen and Pirch fell back by
Mont-St.-Guibert on Bierge and Aisemont.
"On the 17th, the Prussian Marshal dispatched the
chief of his staff to the Duke of Wellington, to con-
cert measures for securing the junction so much de-
sired, either in front or in rear of the forest of Soignes.
The victory just gained by the French at Ligny
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 145
was a glorious one, as they had fought 60,000 men
against 90,000. This success was, however, due in ''
part to two incidents, of which the emperor was not
aware: the first was, that the presence of Grouchy’s
cavalry on his right towards Boignée, had paralyzed
Thielmann's 25,000 men posted near Tongrines and
Mont-Potriaux, who were no doubt fearful of his
seizing the road to Namur, thus cutting off Bulow's
corps from the army, and this from its natural line of
operations. The second incident was, as I have al-
ready stated, the movement of the guard, executed
from St. Amand towards Ligny, at the moment when
Blucher had nearly forty battalions engaged at St.
Amand, causing this general to suppose that Napo-
leon, disheartened at not being able to force any
point of his position, had commenced to beat a re-
treat. With this idea, the Prussian marshal resolved
to advance in person, with what remained of his re-
serves, in order to penetrate between St. Amand and
Wagnèle, at the very instant when the imperial re-
serves were hurled on Ligny; so that his centre was
found stripped of all support, at the moment the
storm burst upon him. A chassé croisé was the re-
sult, bearing the main portion of the Prussian forces
on St. Amand, at the decisive moment when the em-
peror launched his own upon Ligny, and which
secured him the victory.
The French army had just obtained an advantage
which, under any other circumstances, would have
proved a signal one; the enemy had had, in the two
battles, from eighteen to twenty thousand men killed,
wounded and made prisoners; had lost forty pieces
7
146 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
of cannon; and notwithstanding the check at Quatre-
Bras, the army, full of enthusiasm and confidence,
would have rushed on to new victories. They should
have profited by this success, and actively pursued
the enemy. Napoleon had been ignorant of Durutte's
passing the night on the flank of their line of retreat,
and that his advance posts might have heard, very
distinctly, the uproar which such an unforeseen retreat
occasioned, by the march of an immense materiel and
the confusion of the columns; otherwise it is pre-
sumable that he would have taken measures for press-
ing them closer. Yet, if the darkness contributed in
arresting the pursuit that very night, it ought to have
contributed also in augmenting the disorder in the
retreat of the enemy's right wing, and had they acted
on this occasion as the Prussians did two days after
wards at Waterloo, we rest assured that the trophies
would have been greater, and that the blunders com-
mitted on the two following days would have been
avoided.* Napoleon had, during his career, given
them many lessons; but they, in their turn, taught
him, that a night pursuit, notwithstanding its incon-
veniences, might have great advantages.
On the morning of the 17th, Napoleon awaited with
...;;. of what Ney had
accomplished at Quatre-Bras, and the news from
Paris, where the hostile disposition of the chambers
did not cause him less concern, than the revolutionary

* The Prussian troops that held Bry on their right and Sombref on
their left were in good order, and sufficient to arrest too bold a pursuit;
nevertheless, it would have been wise to have attempted a slight attack at
nightfall ; no risk could be run.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 147
ardor of the federated societies. While waiting for
exact information on what was happening on the
English side, he ordered Pajol’s cavalry to follow the
Prussians on the Namur causeway, which was their
natural line of operations, at the same time that Ex-
celmans made a reconnoissance of the road to Gem-
bloux. The narrative from St. Helena adds, that
General Monthion was charged with the pursuit on
the left, that is, in the direction of Tilly and Mont-
St.-Guibert. The emperor then turned his attention
to the administration, reviewed the troops and the
field of battle, in order to administer to the comfort
of the multitude of wounded, of both parties, with
which it was strewed, and who were the more in need,
as the ambulances had not been able to follow the ar-
my in its forced marches.
To those who can recall the astonishing activity
that presided over the events of Ratisbonne in 1809,
of Dresden in 1813, and of Champ-Aubert and Mont-
mirail in 1814, this time lost, will always remain
inexplicable on the part of Napoleon. After a suc-
cess, such as he had just achieved, it seems that, at
six in the morning, he should have placed himself on
the heels of the Prussians, or, as well, have fallen,
with all his forces, upon Wellington, whose cavalry
reserve, artillery and portion of his infantry, had only
arrived that night, excessively fatigued. The neces-
sity for not leaving his line of retreat on Charleroi to
the mercy of the English general, was an imperative
reason why he should have proceeded against him in
preference.
It should not be supposed, that the emperor was
148 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
entirely unaware of the check experienced by Ney
at Quatre-Bras; because if the marshal had not had
time to make a detailed report of it, he had not surely
forgotten his duty, so far as to permit him to be igno-
rant of the fact. This was, moreover, a greater rea-
son for marching there without delay. However, it
was well known that Ney could not obtain a great
success, nor experience a great reverse, on account of
the dispersed state of the Anglo-Netherland army,
and of the double movement of d'Erlon's corps. Giving
Wellington the morning of the 17th, in which to re-
cover himself, was then a fault more real, perhaps,
than allowing that of the 16th to Blucher. We will
state further on what was the result of it. Undoubt-
edly the emperor had powerful motives for resigning
himself to such inactivity; but these motives have
never reached us.
Napoleon, having at last received, through his aid-
de-camp Flahaut, the details of the unfortunate com-
º, bat at Quatre-Bras, at the same time that Pajol re-
ported the capture of some Prussian artillery at Mazy
on the Namur road, resolved, about eleven o’clock, to
march against the English with his reserve and Ney’s
command, while Grouchy, with his seven infantry di-
visions and his two gavalry corps, should vigorously
pursue the º This presents one of the most
serious circumstances of this campaign, and which it
is my duty to expose, with all the frankness and im-
partiality professed by a conscientious historian.
The narrative from St. Helena affirms, that Grouchy,
in receiving verbally the order to pursue the Prus-
sians, without losing sight of them, received also that
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 149
of holding himself constantly between their army and
the route to Brussels, which was to be taken by Mapo-
Čeon—that is to say, in such a manner that the two
French masses might form between them, two interior
or central lines, that could assist each other, while
separating and dividing the two armies of the enemy.
Marshal Grouchy, in a pamphlet for his own justifica-
tion, declares, “that nothing of the kind was said to
him ; that on the contrary, he received, without other
comment, the order to direct his pursuit on Namur
and the Meuse: finally, that having indicated the de-
sire of not withdrawing to such a distance from the
main body of the army, Napoleon humorously asked
him, if he pretended to give him a lesson.” The mar-
shal cites General Baudran, as a witness ready to
attest these facts.
It would be very difficult to decide between such
contradictory assertions; all that I can add is, that
Major General Soult, writing on the morning of the
17th to Marshal Ney, informed him that Grouchy
was to pursue the Prussians on Namur and the Meuse.
Nevertheless, a little later, General Bertrand sent him
a positive order to march on Gembloux. Grouchy
exculpates himself equally, by reproaching the em-
peror for the long hours employed in reviewing the
battle-field, and pending which the traces of Blucher's
army were lost, and subsequently, only partially found.
He also observes that the emperor, having re-
served to himself the right of disposing of the
troops at all points, the marshal was unable, of his
own accord, to prescribe any disposition for this pur-
150 POIITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
suit, and that he frequently asked for orders which
were not given him.* -
After having exposed all the facts alleged on both
sides, it is my duty to observe, without any pretence
to judging, that the order mentioned in the narrative
from St. Helena, was so conformable to the system of
interior lines, to which Napoleon owed so great a num-
ber of his victories, that his having really given it
should not be doubted ; but it must also be admitted,
that it would have been better, in every possible case,
to have positively assigned to Grouchy, the direction
intermediate between Liége and Brussels, as the one
he desired his right wing to follow. It was evident
that Blucher had one of three courses to pursue,
namely: to fall back on Liége, to gain Maëstricht, or
seek to join Wellington and resume the offensive, to
avenge himself for the affront received at Ligny. The
last was certainly the most skillful, the most daring,
and the most conformable to the character of the
Prussian general; but in order to execute it, it was
necessary to renounce, somewhat, his line of retreat
on the Rhine. Besides this, as Blucher had taken the
road to Wavre, he could not effect the junction at all,
but in rear of the forest of Soignes: because, by
marching in front of it, he would be compelled to
skirt its whole length, exposing his flank to the French.
Napoleon must have believed, that the enemy would
* It seems certain, that the orders given on the morning of the 17th to
the different corps of cavalry for the pursuit, were addressed by the em-
peror direct to Pajol, Excelmans and Monthion. This last was adjutant-
general, and made his reports directly to the emperor; he had reconnoi-
tred in the direction of Tilly and Mont-St.-Guibert.
THE OAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 151
not dare undertake so hazardous a movement with
Grouchy in close pursuit; he must have supposed,
then, that if Blucher sought not to gain Maés-
tricht or Liége, he would march from Wavre on
Brussels, a movement, that would force Wellington
also to fall back on this capital or fight alone at
Waterloo.
Under all these hypotheses, it was advisable to di-
rect Grouchy on Mont-St.-Guibert and Moustier, the
morning of the 17th, because the valley of the Dyle
being the most favorable line for covering Napoleon's
right flank, Grouchy could have crossed this river at
Moustier; from thence it had been easy to draw him
on to Waterloo to take part in the battle, or cause
him to advance on Wavre, flanked towards St. Lam-
bert, by Excelmans’ dragoons and an infantry divi-
sion. By this means, the emperor would have been
certain of his power to collect all his right wing
about him, if Wellington accepted battle on the 18th
in front of the forest of Soignes, and could have
counted on the impossibility of the Prussians’ co-
operating.
Be that as it may, the two fractions of the impe-
rial army should have moved at the same time, in
proceeding to their respective destinations. The re-
serve, led by Napoleon, left however first, to join
Ney and the left wing at Quatre-Bras, in order to at-
tack the English if they stood their ground; his ad-
vanced guard moved at ten o’clock; the guard follow-
ing at eleven. The right wing moved later still;
Vandamme, who formed the advance, proceeded at
152 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
first to Point-du-Jour (an inn situated at the fork of
the roads to Gembloux and Namur); Gerard's corps
did not leave Sombref till after three o’clock. Mar-
shal Grouchy, having received orders to march on
Gembloux, of which we have spoken above, and the
intelligence that General Excelmans was in pre-
sence of the Prussians near this city, hastened there
in person, directing Vandamme and Gérard on the same
point. Pajol alone patrolled with his hussars and
Teste's division, in the direction of Mazy and Tem-
ploux. We leave them there, in order to follow the
operations of the imperial army.
-----Napoleon, on arriving near Genape, met the Eng-
lish rear-guard. The weather was frightful, the win-
dows of heaven seemed to be opened, and yet the
troops did not the less exhibit an extreme ardor in
the pursuit of the enemy. The Duke of Wellington
did not hear, until eight o'clock on the morning of
the 17th, and that by accident, of Blucher's defeat
(the officer who was bearer of the news losing his way
in the dark, had been killed). We can judge what
would have been his embarrassment, had Napoleon
marched against him at day-break. The English
general hastened to place his impedimenta in retreat,
while his exhausted cavalry took some repose. At
ten o’clock, his columns were in march on the Brus-
sels' causeway, protected by all the cavalry concen-
trated under the orders of Lord Uxbridge, who took
position at Genape behind the Dyle, to allow the army
time to gain ground. This general officer displayed,
on this occasion, the same aplomb of which he had
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 153
given proof in Spain,” by charging with his English
guards, those who were rash enough to dare attempt
the passage of the defile in his presence. The French
followed him, step by step, as far as Maison du Roi,
on the heights of Planchenois, where the army arrived
at night-fall.
The enemy manifested his intention to maintain
the position in front of the forest of Soignes. At
first, it was thought, that this was but a strong rear-
guard covering the march of columns through the
forest; it was very soon perceived that the entire
army was present; but as it was too late in the day
to commence an action, the different corps bivouacked
near Planchenois. The rain continued to fall in tor-
rents till the next morning.
At three o’clock in the morning, Napoleon went
the rounds of the posts, and assured himself that the
army had not stirred; Wellington had then decided
on accepting battle; he was delighted, regarding it
as a stroke of fortune that the two hostile armies thus
appeared in the lists, isolated, each in its turn.
Meanwhile, to profit by this happy chance with
security, it behooved him to be assured, that no junc-
tion of the two armies could however take place. To
this effect, it is affirmed that Napoleon had, about
dusk, sent a courier to Grouchy with orders to occupy
the defile of St. Lambert immediately, so that, if he
took no active part in the fête by falling on the Eng.
* Lord Uxbridge is the same personage, who rendered himself so illus-
trious in Spain under the name of Sir Arthur Paget, and who now bears
the title of Marquis d’Anglesey. He distinguished himself at Benevento,
and in many other rencontres.
154 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
lish left, he could at least cover the right flank and
give them some uneasiness. This order, the existence
of which has been denied, was addressed to Wavre,
under the conviction that the marshal had reached
this city during the 17th, having but seven or eight
leagues to pass over from Sombref.” About mid-
night, the emperor received this marshal's report,
stating that he had reached Gembloux at five in the
afternoon, and would spend the night there, although
he had travelled but two leagues; from this it was
evident that he would not receive the order directed
to Wavre. If we would credit the same narrative,
the confirmation was forwarded by the Gembloux
road, hoping that he would receive it in time.
The rain, bad roads, and forced marches had worn
out the French army. Napoleon might have found
it somewhat to his interest, to have given it repose,
and then to have dislodged Wellington by manoeu-
* Some persons have been astonished at Napoleon's supposition, that
Grouchy had, on the 17th, already reached Wavre, as they had only sep-
arated towards mid-day, and two hours were necessary for the troops,
altogether unprepared, to set out on the march. There is something for
and against, in these statements ; Napoleon, departing from Ligny, push-
ed on as far as La Belle Alliance; now, Grouchy, having but one league
more to pass over to gain Wavre, could, strictly speaking, very well have
accomplished it. What should be a matter of astonishment is, that of
supposing Grouchy at Wavre, if he had at first been directed on Namur,
as the major-general's correspondence would make us believe ; then af-
terwards on Gembloux, as General Bertrand's letter proves. Be that as it
may, the order cited is not found among the records of the staff; and be-
sides, it did not reach its destination, the officer having fallen at night in
the midst of the Prussian posts and been killed. . . . . As to the con-
firmation of this order, no trace of it has been found, unless the question
in point be a letter of the major-general, written at 10 A.M., to Gros-
Caillou, and which Grouchy “eceived at four in the afternoon, in front of
Wavre.
THE GAMPAIGN OF WATERLoo. 155
\
vring, but 300,000 of the enemy were on their way
to invade 13 Lorraine, and required the chief of state
with his principal forces on the Moselle; on the other
hand, Blucher would soon rally and be re-inforced,
and thus every thing demanded that he should finish
with the English as soon as possible.
The emperor had reconnoitred their position; they
occupied, in front of Mont-St.-Jean, a beautiful pla-
teau, the slope of whose sides was favorable for firing,
and from which all the movements of the French
could be discovered. The right extended to the rear
of Braine la Leud, and a corps of Netherlanders of
15,000 men were besides detached as far as Hall, to
cover the causeway from Mons to Brussels. The po-
sition in itself had great defensive advantages, be-
cause the villages of Braine and de Merbes, the
chateau of Hougomont, la Haie Sainte, la Haie and
Frischermont formed so many advanced bastions, that
prevented any approach to the line; but it rested
back against the vast forest of Soignes: now Napo-
leon thought, that if it be an advantage for a rear-
guard to be thus posted, considering that the defile
protects its retreat, it is not so for a large army with
its immense materiel and its numerous cavalry, having
as communications but a narrow causeway and two
cross-roads, encumbered with parks, the wounded,
etc. etc.” He therefore believed that all the chances
were in his favor. -
The opportunity of giving battle being acknow-
* This is one of the gravest questions of the grand tactics of battles.
General Jomini has discussed it in his last Precis de l'Art de la Guerre,
and inclines to Wellington's opinion in opposition to Napoleon's,
I56 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
ledged, it remained to decide what system would be
most expedient for attacking the English. To manoeu-
vre by the left, in order to overthrow their right, was
a difficult matter, and led to nothing decisive; this
was not a good strategic direction, as it would be en-
tirely removed from the centre of operations, which
was naturally connected by the right, with Grouchy,
and with the road to Lorraine: besides this, the ene-
my's right wing was protected by the farm of Hougo-
mont, and by the two large boroughs of Braine la
Leud and Merbe-Braine.
To attack with the right, in order to crush the Eng-
lish left, was much more preferable, as this would
maintain a direct relation, or an interior line with
Grouchy, and would prevent the junction of the two
hostile armies: but to gain, en masse, this extreme
left, it would be necessary to extend beyond Frischer-
mont, leaving open the line of retreat, and venturing
into the obstructed country of St. Lambert, where a
defeat had been without remedy. -
It remained for Napoleon to take a middle course,
that of renewing the manoeuvre executed at Wagram
and Moscowa, (Borodino,) that is, to assail the left at
the same time that he drove in the centre. It was
the best plan of battle he could have adopted, and
with him, it had often proved successful. To force
the centre only is difficult and dangerous, unless it
happens to be a weak and unfurnished point, as at
Austerlitz, Rivoli, and Montenotte; but we do not
always find an enemy sufficiently complaisant, as to
allow us such an advantage, and it would be absurd
to expect it from an army following a good system,
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 157
or, rather, that understands the principles of war.
But to make an attack upon a wing, overthrow it, and
at the same time fall upon the point, where this wing
joins the centre, with a large force, is an operation
always advantageous when well executed.
Napoleon resolved, then, to attempt it. However,
instead of concentrating the bulk of his masses against
the left, as at Borodino, he directed them on the cen-
tre; the extreme left was not to be assailed, but by
the division forming the right of Erlon’s corps, which
would attack Papelotte and la Haie ; Ney was to
lead the three other divisions on the right of la Haie
Sainte;” Reille's corps would support this movement
on the left of the Mont-St.-Jean causeway; Bachelu's
and Foy's divisions, between this causeway and the
farm of Hougomont; Jerome's, led in fact by Guil-
leminot, was to attack this farm, the salient point of
the enemy’s line, the chateau and park wall of which,
Wellington had crenelled, and where he had posted
the English guards. Count Lobau, with the 6th corps
and a mass of cavalry, would follow the centre in a
third and fourth line, on the right and left of the
causeway, to support Ney's attack on la Haie Sainte :
lastly, twenty-four battalions of guards and de Valmy's
cuirassiers, were to second the decisive shock, wherever
needed, in a fifth and sixth line.
Such was the plan that many incidents deranged,
and which Napoleon can leave, without fear, to the
scrutiny of the masters of the art. It could not be
bettered, unless moving his reserves a little nearer
* It is necessary not to confound la Haie Sainte, on the centre, with la
Haie on the left wing of the allies.
158 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
his right, thus giving more vigor to the effort between
Papelotte and the Charleroi causeway.
It would have signified much for the success of this
project, had a sudden attack been made in the morn-
ing, but torrents of rain had fallen all night; the
weather was beginning to clear; it required some
hours to give a little consistency to the soft ground,
and this time was employed in forming the army ir
position.*
The cannonade and musketry commenced, at 11
o'clock, against the farm of Hougomont, which Je-
rome sought to carry; it pleased the emperor to open
the battle at this point. A few moments after, Ney's
light cavalry appeared towards Frischermont, at the
opposite extremity, where were exchanged a few
cannon shot. It was then found that the rivulet,
though narrow and slightly embanked, was very
miry, and that it would be necessary to turn it by
the west of Smouhen, as it would prove troublesome
to cross it lower down, in face of the enemy's bat-
teries. Compelled thus to turn a portion of his right
upon their centre, Ney succeeded finally in forming
his four divisions of d'Erlon’s corps, and his artillery
only succeeded, after incredible efforts, in taking
* We cannot share this opinion, which has been set forth by Napoleon,
in Book IX. from St. Helena; when, even had a splendid sun succeeded
the rain, four hours would not have sufficed to dry such a ground ; be-
sides, this sun did not appear; misty weather followed the storm ; no-
thing then prevented him from making the new effort at 9 A.M.; it could
have been done as well as at one, and the Prussians would have arrived
after the blow had been struck. In the then state of affairs, this delay
of four hours was a blunder; but the arrival of Blucher was not expected,
and the troops required rest.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. . . 159
position in the muddy ground, with their pieces sunk
to the naves of their wheels.
The marshal immediately opened a heavy fire upon
the enemy’s left, and only waited for the signal, to
burst upon it. Napoleon was about giving it, after
mid-day, when rather strong columns were discovered
on the right in the direction of Lasne and St. Lam-
bert; this might be the enemy, or the detachment
demanded of Grouchy. The emperor immediately
pushed forward 3,000 horse under General d'Homond
towards Pajeau, at once to reconnoitre the state of
things; cover the flank, if needed, were it the enemy,
or effect a junction with Grouchy, if he it was who
had arrived.” It behooved him to undertake nothing,
before receiving a report of this reconnoissance.
Very shortly afterwards, a Prussian hussar was
brought with an intercepted letter; he announced
the approach of Bulow's corps, which he estimated
at 30,000 men.
Notwithstanding this serious contre-temps, nothing
seemed desperate. Under all other circumstances, it
had perhaps been better to have deferred the battle;
but what could be done 3—shot had been exchanged;
it was necessary to continue the fight, or shamefully
decamp before Wellington, with whom Napoleon
measured himself for the first time. Apart from the
* It was hard to believe that this was Grouchy, after the reports received
from him during the night. However, had he taken, on the morning of
the 18th, the road to Moustier instead of that to Wavre, by Sart à Valain,
the case was not an impossible one. Besides, this column discovered
about twelve, was only Bulow's advance guard; the corps did not arrive
till four, on account of a violent conflagration that had prevented it from
defiling through Wavre. -
160 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
point of honor, what moral effect would this retreat
produce, if he fled without unsheathing his sword
against the English? What could he hope for his
cause, when the Russians, Austrians and the whole
Germanic empire, should burst upon Lorraine, the
Austro-Sardinians upon Dauphiny, the Swiss upon
Franche-Comté, and the Spaniards upon Languedoc'
If Bulow came with a score of thousands, the belief
should be that he was closely followed by Grouchy,
and in that case, the arrival of this new enemy would
not change the chances of the battle.
The emperor then ordered Ney to commence the
attack, and in order to secure the threatened flank, he
moved Count Lobau's two divisions, en potence, to-
wards Planchenois, where they could, if needed, serve
as reserves to Ney, or otherwise, in a measure, oppose
Bulow. If this latter was closely pursued by Grou-
chy, the Prussian corps would thus find itself be-
tween two fires, in a cut-throat position, and would
become an additional trophy for the conqueror.
Nearly one hundred pieces of ordnance open upon
the enemy’s centre, to the right and left of la Haie
Sainte; it is there that the great effort is to be made,
and if Ney, seconded by Lobau and the guard, suc-
ceeds in penetrating here, as he did at Friedland, they
will seize on the point where the causeway enters the
forest of Soignes, which is the sole retreat for the ene-
my. But Count Lobau's support is soon to fail him in
this vigorous effort, and render success doubtful.
About one o’clock, Ney marched forward at the
head of d'Erlon’s corps, which was formed of the divi-
sions in separate columns, so as to cross with more
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 161
rapidity the space that separated it from the enemy.*
This movement, executed in very deep columns, closed
in mass, under a murderous fire, and through a terri-
ble mud, was accomplished without much wavering ;
a portion of his artillery remained in rear, and con-
tinued to counter-batter that of the enemy from a dis-
tance, while the infantry effected the passage of the
ravine. Though the formation in columns had left
between the divisions very considerable intervals, they
were not, however, sufficiently great for deploying
them. The different narratives heretofore published,
differ materially as to the manner in which this first
attack was executed: some have it, that the four divi-
sions of d'Erlon’s corps, thus formed into as many
masses, in echelon, the left in front, were directed
against the position of the allies' left wing, slighting
the post of la Haie-Sainte, which was left behind
them. Others have the 2d division of d'Erlon’s corps
marching on this post, and the 4th on that of Smou-
hen, nearly simultaneous with the attack of the po-
sition.
Nevertheless, I have every reason to believe, that,
in fact, these divisions, in deep columns, moved to-
gether to attack the position, the front line of which
was composed of General Perponcher’s Belgians, on
the right of the Mont-St.-Jean causeway, while Du-
rutte's division advanced on Smouhen, or at least in
*It appears that each division formed a single mass of eight or ten
battalions, marching in rear of each other. It is uncertain, whether all
these battalions were formed in columns of attack, or deployed into
eight or ten lines, but they formed a very deep mass. It also appears
that Marcognet's division made a flank movement to draw nearer the
centre, and that the English took advantage of its waverings.
162 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
conjunction with Jaquinot's light cavalry, kept in
check the enemy’s extreme left.*
Braving all the difficulties, which the soft ground
offered to the movements of masses thus agglome-
rated, together with the fire of a formidable artillery,
the 1st and 3d divisions reach the front line of the
enemy at the point held by General Bylandt's Belgian
brigade, (Perponcher's division,) which they drive in
after a vigorous onset. But, far from having accom-
plished their task, they are suddenly assailed by Pic-
ton's English division, posted in a second line, and
lying behind a ridge that favors them. Here a fu-
rious combat takes place; the English infantry de-
ployed in line, envelop with its concentrated fire the
head and flank of this heavy mass, which can oppose
but a few musket shots, more calculated to diminish
its enthusiasm than cause the enemy any loss. Gen-
eral Picton falls dead; but his troops stand firm, and
the French column, arrested by their murderous fire,
turns and gives way. At this moment, Lord Uxbridge
lets loose General Ponsonby’s English cavalry, to
* Great confusion reigns in all the narratives, published up to this time,
on the battle of Waterloo. Some have the left of the position attacked
by the four divisions farthest off; others say that Durutte's advanced on
Smouhen, and Quiot's on la Haie Sainte. The Victoires et Conquetes
speak of a grand column formed of the 2d and 3d divisions, (Donzeiot's
and Marcognet's). This would then be Quiot's—the first that must have
attacked la Haie Sainte. Nevertheless, German authors have as many
columns as divisions; they speak of a brigade of cuirassiers, Valmy's or
Milhaud's, seconding this first attack, and French narrators say not a
word about it. They state that the eagles of the 45th and 105th regiments
were captured in the grand column; but, one of these regiments belonged
to the 1st division and the other to the 3d. Lastly, other versions would
make us believe, that Durutte did not advance on Smouhen till 4 P. M. It
it is impossible to make out any thing from such a chaos.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 163
charge them in flank and spread the disorder: em-
boldened by this success, the English squadrons throw
themselves into the interval between the 2d and 3d
columns, where they gain the same advantage; finally,
carried away by their ardor, these squadrons rush on
Ney's reserve artillery, a portion of which remained
in rear on account of the mire; they sabre the sol-
diers of the train and the cannoniers, lead away the
horses, and thus deprive the infantry of part of its
ordnance. Napoleon launches Milhaud's cuirassiers,
supported by a brigade of lancers, against these reck-
less fellows; in a few moments this cavalry of the
enemy is destroyed, and Ponsonby killed; but the
French infantry has been shaken and a portion of the
artillery rendered immovable. Meanwhile, Ney has
ordered the attack of the farm of la Haie-Sainte by
a brigade of d'Erlon’s corps, which at first experiences
an active resistance and serious loss.
While these things were taking place against the
left of the allies, and on the point where this wing
joined the centre, Jerome Bonaparte, seconded by
Foy, had with difficulty dislodged the enemy from
the park of Hougomont; but all efforts proved fruit-
less against the chateau and the crenelated farm,
where Wellington himself led reinforcements to the
English guards, who defended this important post
with admirable valor. --
The Duke of Wellington, certain of the near arrival
of Blucher's entire army, and too happy at having
gained half the day by the delay of the attack, had
determined to conquer or to die. Seeing that all
efforts were directed against his centre and left, he
164 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
hastened to shorten his line, by withdrawing from
Braine-la-Leud and Merbes twenty battalions of Bel-
gians and Brunswickers, which he placed successively
in reserve, in rear of the right and centre. Then, he
in person, conducted reinforcements to the English
guards, now at the point of succumbing at Hougo-
mont, and re-animated their ardor.
General Foy, on his side, wishing to second the at-
tacks which Jerome's division (led by General Guille.
minot) was making on the chateau, sought to pass
this post and fall upon Lord Hill's line and the Bruns-
wickers, formed behind an excavated road that ran
along a great portion of the enemy's front, from the
chateau of Nivelle to the vicinity of Papelotte. But
struck by a ball in the shoulder, and seeing his troops
mowed down by a murderous fire, without hope of
dislodging the enemy, Foy had to give up this design;
the combat at this point degenerated to a cannonade
and a scattering fire, without reciprocal advantages.
During this interval, Ney had put to the test all
his energy and presence of mind, in recovering from
the checks received in his first attacks; his right in
possession of Smouhen, debouched on Papelotte, and
the marshal himself led a second assault on la Haie
Sainte. Donzelot's division, supported on The TSTOf
the causeway by a brigade of the Duke de Valmy's
cuirassiers, and on the right by a brigade of General
Quiot's infantry, succeeded finally in expelling the
Scotch and Hanoverian battalions from it: at four
o'clock these troops were masters of these two points,
after efforts the most glorious.
Pending this struggle, the emperor passed down
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 165
Ney's line and that of Milhaud's cavalry, through a
storm of bullets; General Devaux, commanding the
artillery of the guard and reserve, was killed at his
side; a sad loss, at a moment when he was to be
called upon, to renew the splendid manoeuvre of Wa-
gram.
The simultaneous capture of la Haie Sainte and
Papelotte, about four o’clock, still continued all the
chances in favor of the assailants. But at the time
that Wellington was accumulating his forces on the
centre, Napoleon was compelled to withdraw his own,
because of the information that Bulow was at last
debouching from the woods of Frischermont on Plan-
chenois. If we would wish to follow exactly the
chronological order of the enemy's movements, we
would have to recall here the doings of the Prussian
army since the previous evening, but it seems more
advisable to narrate the events, in the same order in
which they came to Napoleon's knowledge. We will
then return, farther on, to Blucher's operations, limit-
ing ourselves to pointing out, here, the successive ar-
rivals of his corps.
At the moment of Ney's success in carrying la Haie
Sainte, Bulow, having debouched from the woods of
Frischermont, attacked the Count de Lobau, and,
thanks to his superiority, drove him on Planchenois,
by overthrowing his right. Napoleon then learned
with certainty, that Grouchy was not following this
Prussian column; it was no longer possible to labor
under the slightest illusion; all that could be done
was to dispute the honor of this fatal battle-field, in
wbich his line was out-flanked to such an extent, that
166 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
the Prussian bullets nearly reached the Charleroi
causeway in rear of his centre. Success was not at
all possible, but by dint of perseverance he might
force the enemy to retreat. He resolved then, about
five o'clock, to get rid of Bulow by a vigorous coup
de main, in directing against him the young guard,
under the brave Duhesme, supported by General Mo-
rand with a portion of the old guard, then immedi-
ately to attempt a last effort against Wellington, with
his entire reserves. While awaiting the issue of this
manoeuvre, Ney should have been satisfied with hold-
ing la Haie Sainte and Papelotte.
Meanwhile, the marshal, finding himself isolated
by the direction of the attacks of Reille's corps, about
the chateau of Hougomont, earnestly asked for rein-
forcements. For want of infantry the emperor as-
signed him Milhaud's cuirassiers. Wellington, on his
part, encouraged by Bulow's attack, and strengthened
by the troops from his extreme right, had conceived
the hope of again taking possession of the park of
Hougomont and the farm of la Haie Sainte. With
this object, he had, at five o’clock, launched the Han-
overians, on this last post, simultaneously with Lord
Hill's English on the first. At this very instant, Ney,
whose troops suffered terribly from the enemy's fire,
seeing the light cavalry of his right driven back by
that of the English, sought to seize, at all hazards,
the plateau of Mont-St.-Jean, by casting his brave
cuirassiers upon the centre of the allies. Unfortu-
nately, his infantry was so shaken, that it could offer
but feeble succor. However, these squadrons meeting
the Hanoverians marching on la Haie Sainte, fell upon
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 167
them, Sabring one regiment, carrying off the artillery
posted on the enemy's front, breaking a square of the
German legion, but attempting the same upon others
without success; the enemy formed in squares by
regiments, sheltered the cannoniers and artillery
horses, and by a well sustained fire baffled the efforts
of this heroic cavalry,” which, charged in its turn by
Lord Somerset's English cavalry, was forced to rally,
and effected it with audacity under the very fire of
the enemy’s line. -
Undoubtedly, it had been preferable had this charge
been executed a little earlier, in conjunction with d’Er-
lon’s first attack, or had been deferred until the return
of the young guard from extricating Count Lobau,
so as to make a combined effort of the three arms
re-united. But the plateau was crowned, it was ne-
cessary to sustain what was already accomplished, or
look upon the loss of Ney's troops. Napoleon then,
after six o'clock, orders Kellermann (Valmy) to ad-
vance with his cuirassiers on the left of la Haie Sainte
causeway, and overthrow every thing in his path; the
heavy cavalry of the guard follow this movement,
and engage the enemy, it is said, contrary to the
emperor's intentions. At the sight of all these rein-
forcements, Milhaud also renews his attacks. These
10,000 horse make terrible havoc in the enemy’s line,
carrying off sixty pieces of cannon from the front of
*The Duke of Wellington himself assured me, at the Congress of Vero-
na, that he had never seen any thing more admirable in war, than the ten
or twelve reiterated charges of the French cuirassiers upon the troops of
all arms. -
+ Napoleon might have intended to preserve this precious nucleus in
reserve, but assuredly he had placed it at Ney's disposal. -
168 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
their position, and breaking two squares; but the
rest of the English infantry oppose an admirable
front; the fire of the 2d line, destroys the French
squadrons that have become scattered in their charges;
lastly, the English, Belgian, Hanoverian and Bruns-
wickerian cavalry, led by Lord Uxbridge, form in
fine order to charge in their turn,-success cannot
fail them. To remain in such a situation is impossi-
ble; it is then necessary to sound the rally at some
distance, abandon the captured artillery, in fact give
the English cannoniers the liberty of returning to
their guns and crush anew this body of cavalry. It
nevertheless turns about and drives back Lord Ux-
bridge's squadrons upon their infantry.” It would
be necessary to borrow the most poetic forms and
expressions of an epic, to depict with any truthful-
ness the glorious efforts of this cavalry, and the im-
passive perseverance of its adversaries. We can
besides judge, what would have been the result of
these brilliant charges, had Lobau's corps and the
young guard been able to follow the cuirassiers in
their course, instead of being engaged towards Plan-
chenois, making head against the Prussians. Eye-
witnesses have attested to the disorder that was appa-
rent among a portion of the allied troops, and to the
alarm that spread as far as Brussels, where the French
were momentarily expected.
Napoleon had greater hopes of obtaining the vic-
tory, as, in the interval, Bulow, attacked by Lobau
* Lord Uxbridge (Marquis d’Anglesey,) had his leg taken off by a
shot; I ain uncertain whether it happened at the instant of this attack,
or later. - gº
THE CHAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 169
and Dushesme, supported by a detachment of the old
guard, under General Morand, had just been driven
on to the Pajeau road, and the booming of Grouchy’s
cannon being heard on the Dyle, it could be supposed
that he would at least hold in check the surplus of .
Blucher's army. Undoubtedly this victory had not
led to immense results, but it was already more than/
won : to decide it finally, the emperor, at half-past
seven o’clock, ordered the entire guard to be concen:
trated, in order to carry the position of Mont-St-J ean.
The illusion was not of long duration; the French
cavalry had scarcely rallied its victorious squadrons,
when new hostile columns from Ohain, were disco-
vered from the plateau: this was Blucher himself,
who arrived with Ziethen’s corps in the direction of
Papelotte. At the same time, Pirch's corps having
debouched from Lasne, had already come into action,
to second Bulow at Planchenois. •
Though difficult for Napoleon to estimate he
strength of all these forces, they were more than
sufficient to snatch victory from him. It is said, how-
ever, that he flattered himself with leading fortune
under his banner, by refusing his right threatened by
very strong forces, in order to bring all his efforts to
bear through his left on Hougomont and Mont-St.-
Jean; a rash change of front, that necessarily aban-
doned the line of retreat to Charleroi, to follow a new
one on the Nivelle causeway, and which, moreover,
destroyed all communication with Grouchy. Had
the success of this measure been in the least proble-
matical, its execution had become impossible; even
the assembling of the entire guard could not be
8
170 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
effected: disorder began to infect the cavalry, and
Durutte's division, menaced by three times their num-
ber on the plateau, between Smouhen and the cause-
way; it was necessary to fly to d'Erlon’s support, with-
out even waiting for the return of the guard com-
manded by Morand, as well as other detachments.
Napoleon placed himself at the head of Friant's di-
vision, the only disposable body, and conducted it to
la Haie Sainte, at the same time that he ordered Reille
to make dispositions for another attack on Hougomont.
This reinforcement, led by Napoleon, gave courage to
the French cavalry, and to the débris of d'Erlon’s corps;
if Morand’s entire division had been there, an attack
might have been made with some chances of success;
but forced to hold some battalions in hand towards
la Belle Alliance, Napoleon was unable to assemble
but four, on the summit of the plateau in front of la
Haie Sainte. Ney, sword in hand, led them against
the enemy.
Meanwhile, Wellington, certain of the near arrival
of Blucher on his left, thought of retaking the park
of Hougomont and la Haie Sainte ; he had drawn
|Brunswick’s division and a Belgian brigade on the lat-
ter point, at the moment when this handful of the
brave guard proceeded to attack, with levelled bayo-
nets, the broken line of the Anglo-Hanoverians.
Aware of the importance of this movement, the
Prince of Orange quickly throws himself before them
at the head of a Nassau regiment, while Brunswick’s
division attacks them from another quarter; but the
Prince falls, wounded by a shot, while pointing out
to them the road to victory. The brave soldiers of
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 171
the old guard, at first repel the shock, but, deprived
of support, in the midst of the enemy, which is being
reinforced by a Belgian brigade de chassé, surrounded
by a sheet of fire that consumes them, they feel the
moment is at hand when their cause will be lost for-
ever, and with difficulty retire to the foot of the pla-
teau, that had cost so much blood. Napoleon having,
meanwhile, re-assembled the six other battalions of
the old guard, that had been detached on different
points, is in the act of seconding these efforts on Mont-
St.-Jean, when the disorder which begins to be mani-
fest on the right of d'Erlon’s corps, forces him to form
these battalions into squares, on the right of la Haie
Sainte. - -
While these things are passing on the front of the
French army, between eight and nine o'clock, the
young guard and Lobau struggle with rare bravery
against the constantly increasing forces of the Prus-
sians. Strengthened by the arrival of Pirch's corps,
Bulow finishes the overwhelming of the remainder of
these braves, whose distress is redoubled by the de-
parture of the old guard, and by the entrance into
action of Blucher and Ziethen on their left flank. On
the arrival of this last, the cavalry of Wellington's
left wing, (Vivian's and Vandeleur's brigades,) that
had suffered least of all, gallop to the centre to his
support. Ziethen, who, at eight o’clock, had de-
bouched at the vertex of the angle formed by the
French line towards Frischermont, easily overthrows
Durutte, at the same time that he out-flanks the left
of the crotchet formed by Lobau and the young
guard. Pirch turns Planchenois, which Bulow
172 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
attacks in front. All this portion of the imperial ar-
my, crushed, overrun and surrounded by quadruple
numbers, crowd upon each other and seek safety in
flight. Duhesme and Barrois are severely wounded;
Lobau, in endeavoring to rally his men, falls into the
hands of the enemy; Pelet shows front with a hand-
ful of heroes, about whom crowd a scattered few.
The very report of General Gnisenau on this cele-
brated battle, will ever remain the most splendid tes-
timony to the heroic defense of these twelve or fifteen
thousand French against sixty thousand Prussians,
favored, moreover, by the nature of the battle-field,
which, rising on their side into an amphitheatre, gave
to their numerous artillery a terrible ascendency over
that of their adversaries.
Judging from the continuance of the fire, that Blu-
cher and Bulow were giving the finishing stroke, Wel-
lington on his part assembles all the best troops possi-
ble, retakes the park of Hougomont, and about nine
o'clock bursts on the old guard with an overwhelming
superiority, at the same time that Blucher's Prussian
cavalry outflanks Durutte, and thus gets in rear of
the line. A furious combat takes places; Generals
Friant and Michel are seriously wounded; all that
remain of the cuirassiers and cavalry of the guard
perform wonders; but their position is no longer ten-
able. Assailed by sixty-thousand Prussians concen-
ſtrated on Wellington's left, the whole French right
flows back, in the greatest disorder, on la Belle Alli-
|ance; the guard that shows front to the English is
also forced to give way; Wellington's cavalry profits
by the disorder, and introduces itself between Reille's
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 173
corps and the guard, formed into different squares, at
the same time that Blucher takes the line in reverse.
These masses of cavalry, render the rallying of d’Er-
lon's and Reille’s corps impossible.
For a long time the Prussian artillery ploughs with
its shot the Charleroi causeway, quite far in rear of
the line, and contributes not a little in redoubling the
disorder, which night, in spreading her wings, succeeds
in completing. The infantry, cavalry and artillery
take, pell-mell, the road to Genape, and some even
endeavor to gain the Neville route, being less molested
than that to Charleroi.
Dragged far from the last gallant few, who, under
Cambronne, show front to the enemy, Napoleon finds
himself separated from them, and reduced to the al-
ternative of regaining the Genape route across the
country, accompanied by his staff, having no longer
in hand even a single battalion, at the head of which
he might seek death in the ranks of the foe.
Wellington, who with impetuosity has changed
from the defensive to the offensive, meets Blucher at
la Belle Alliance, (the name of a farm, to which the
events gave a whimsical pertinency). This meeting,
which many have wished to attribute to chance, had
been skilfully planned; it is time to say by what con-
current circumstances it was effected.
We left Grouchy departing for Gembloux, at
noon of the 17th. We remember that Thielmann's
corps had withdrawn from Sombref in this very di-
rection, undoubtedly, in order to rally on Bulow, who
had just arrived after a forced march of twelve leagues,
while the right of Blucher's army, composed of Zie-
174 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
then’s and Pirch's corps, retired by Mont-St.-Guibert
on Bierge and Aisemont. Be that as it may, Grouchy
reached Gembloux, and was informed during the
evening that Bulow and Thielmann had re-united
there in the morning, and had then taken the direction
of Wavre. These two corps formed a mass of 52,000
IſleI]. w -
Gérard’s corps not arriving at Gembloux till eleven
o'clock at night, in consequence of a violent storm
that had destroyed the roads and jaded his troops,
Grouchy resolved to advance on Wavre the next
morning at six, with Vandamme's corps, Gérard to fol-
low alone at eight o'clock. This resolution, howsoever
much it seemed in conformity with the orders Napo-
leon had given him, to follow on the heels of the
Prussians, was an actual blunder. In fact, from the
time that Blucher relinquished the natural base of the
Meuse, it was evident that he thought only of uniting
with Wellington, retaking the offensive and revenge
himself for the affront he had just received : from
that moment, even admitting that Napoleon had at
first indicated the pursuit on Namur, Grouchy being
aware that this order could not possibly be executed,
became again master of his actions, according to his
own inspirations; moreover, the order transmitted af.
terwards, through General Bertrand, to proceed on
Gembloux, had sufficiently indicated the end the mar-
shal was to attain. To pursue the Prussians was his
duty, but he had many ways of performing it. One
consisted in merely following the trail of the retreat-
ing columns, the other in alone harassing the rear-
guard by means of light bodies, directing his princi-
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 175
pal forces on the flanks of the columns, to attack
them in earnest, as the Russians did in 1812 at
Wiasma, Krasnoe, and at the Bérésina.”
Under the circumstances in which Grouchy was
placed, it was more than ever his duty to follow this
plan ; because his first mission was to prevent the
Prussians from turning back against Napoleon, and
the second point alone was to harass him in his retreat.
Now, by marching along the Prussian columns with
his infantry, while his light cavalry harassed his rear,
he would have had the double advantage of opposing
all attempts at a junction with the English, and avoid-
ing the battle in the defile, which otherwise he would
be constrained to give at Wavre. -
"Three principal roads were open to him : that on
the right by Sart à Valain, which had been followed
by Bulow ; that on the left by Mont-St. Guibert, from
whence he could advance on Wavre, either by follow-
ing the right bank of the Dyle, or crossing this river
at Moustier, and reaching Wavre by the left bank,
thus avoiding a horrible combat in a defile. All
were equally long, but that on the left approached
within two leagues of Napoleon's army, and on the
contrary, that on the right deviated as much farther
from it. Nearly a day's march was gained by the
first, without considering that he interposed between
the two allied armies.
The marshal should not, then, have hesitated; he
should at day-break, on the 18th, have marched with
all speed on Moustier, with Excelmans, Vandamme and
* See what General Jomini says on the subject of lateral pursuits, in
his las Précis de l'Art de la Guerre–2 vol. ; published by Anselin.
176. IPOLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
Gérard, directing Pajol's cavalry and Teste's division
on Wavre, in pursuit of the enemy's rear-guard.”
Being able to reach Moustier by ten o’clock, he could
have then forwarded his infantry on Wavre by Limale,
pushing Excelmans’ dragoons on St. Lambert, or else
have marched to Lasne himself, from which place he
would have heard, at noon, the violent cannonade at
Waterloo. - -
Instead of taking this wise resolution, Grouchy,
undoubtedly desirous of following to the letter, on
the heels of the Prussians as ordered, and deceived
by reports that still signalled Prussian columns in the
direction of Pervez, directed his own on Sart à Valain,
this being the route Bulow had taken. The marshai
decided thus, the more so as he was perfectly ignorant
that half the Prussian army had passed by Gentines
and Mont-St. Guibert, the reconnoissance made in this
direction on the 17th, having been reported to Napo-
leon and not to him. To this fault, that of starting
at too late an hour, can be added; and as a conse-
quence, towards noon only Vandamme had got beyond
Sart à Valain, and the head of Gérard's column had
but reached this village. -
Grouchy had just been rejoined by this general,
when the sound of a cannonade, hollow and distant,
but lively and well sustained, announced an important
battle: Count Gérard then proposed to the marshal,
* This strategic movement would have been one of those, that build up
the reputation of a great captain. It is probable tº it Napoleon, placed at
Gembloux, in Grouchy's situation, would have e cuted it; however, he
made no mention of it, and prescribed nothing o the kind: he even ap-
proved the movement on Wavre: the fact is, he never believed in the
daring flank movement executed by Blucher. -
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 177
to take that direction immediately, persuaded that in
marching au canon, as Ney did at Eylau, he might
decide the victory.*
However wise this advice might have been in itself,
we must avow that the same advantages would not
have accrued, as if this movement had been operated
from Gembloux at day-break, and that his arrival
would have been too late to prove decisive; because,
supposing that Vandamme, whose corps was in advance,
could commence moving at one o'clock, and this on
the heights of St. Martin, it is probable he would not
have reached Moustier before four. (Now the fright-
ful state of the roads, the bad condition of the bridges,
the boggy defiles of the Dyle, and above all, the pre-
sence of Thielmann's corps, which extended from the
heights of Bierge to Limale, opposing his crossing,
authorize us in believing, that Grouchy would not
have reached Lasne or St. Lambert before seven or
eight in the evening. ) Then, Thielmann's and Pirch's
corps, formed in rear of the rivulet of Lasne, pre-
venting him from pushing on farther, Bulow and Zie-
then would not the less have decided the battle of
Waterloo; it certainly would have proved less dis-
astrous for the conquered, but there was not the
slightest possibility of gaining it.
Great controversy has arisen on this point; each
one has interpreted in his own way and according to
* The maxim to march au canon is generally a very wise one, as it is at
bottom but a concentric manoeuvre, the effect of which is nearly always
certain; under particular circumstances, there are exceptions; the battle
of Bautzen is one of the most striking examples of it. (See a former
volume.) - *
S*
178 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
his own views, the results that would have followed
this movement advised by Gérard. To judge properly
of the consequences that might have been expected
from it, it must not be forgotten, that Thielmann's
corps, posted on the heights of Bierge, with in-
formation as far as Limale, had orders to follow
that of Pirch on St. Lambert, in case Grouchy did
not make his appearance towards Wavre, and that
one of his divisions had already marched to this
effect. If it be true that Grouchy’s troops, taking
at noon the Nil-St. Martin route on Moustier, would
have arrived there between three and four o’clock,
they would certainly have been immediately engaged
with Thielmann's 20,000 men, forcibly suspending,
and perhaps stopping his march. If they had wished
to debouch by Limale, this force of the enemy
would have been met earlier. On the other hand,
Pirch's columns, that at this moment were advancing
on Lasne, would have probably halted, seeing them-
selves thus menaced in reverse; even admitting that
they had retrograded in order to support Thielmann;
but then Bulow had already concentrated his four
divisions to attack Planchenois, and Ziethen was ad-
vancing with Blucher towards Ohain, along the vast
forest of Soignes, where there existed no possible
route, by which to turn on Brussels in case of a re-
VGI’Se.
What resolution would Blucher and his counsellors
have taken, if the alarming reports of Grouchy’s ar.
tillery had, about five o'clock, thundered between
Moustier and St. Lambertº That is the question.
(To halt and receive an attack, in a position at once
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 179
open and dangerous, would have been not only to
lose all the fruits of a skillful and bold manoeuvre,
but a piece of folly that would have compromitted
the Prussian army in a perfect cut-throat position.
Blucher had, then, but three courses to choose from :
1st. To retrogade without delay on the road that leads
from Wavre to Brussels; 2d. To halt his columns and
at once direct them on the Dyle, to dispute Grouchy’s
passage; 3d. To precipitate his movement on Ohain
and Planchenois, so as to hasten the so much desired
junction with Wellington's army, a union that was
his first aim, and became his only safe course, when
once he found himself engaged in such a situation.)
Notwithstanding the manifest advantages of this
last, it appears that Blucher, informed of the appear-
ance of the heads of Excelmans’ and Vandamme's col-
umns on the heights of Corbaix, and fearing to see
them debouch by Mousfier, decided on the second ;
as he suspended Pirch's march, and ordered Ziethen
to fall back on the Dyle. It is even asserted, that
these troops did not commence their movement till
after a report from Thielmann, announcing that the
French columns were extending themselves towards
Wavre.
We will be permitted to believe, however, that in
either case, the Prussian marshal, after having recon-
noitred Grouchy's force, had judged the eight divi-
sions of Pirch and Thielmann sufficient to hold it in
check, while with the eight divisions of Ziethen and
Bulow he would aid Wellington in obtaining the
victory. *
Be that as it may, it is evident, that the sole ap-
180 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
pearance of Grouchy towards Moustier had placed
the Prussian generals in a really embarrassing posi-
tion, upon the consequences and gravity of which no
one can decide; because all the reasoning that can
be brought to bear on this subject, is limited to
vague conjectures, for judging of the moral effect
which this event had produced on the Prussian gen-
erals and their troops.
We cannot deny, however, that if General Gérard's
advice was not entirely equivalent to the resolution
of advancing on Moustier at day-break, Marshal
Grouchy ought to regret his not deciding on follow-
ing it. He would have done at least all that it was
possible for man to do, to prevent a catastrophe
which has unhappily been imputed to him. His
bravery and zeal had been tested, he had often given
proofs of talent, but he here lost the opportunity of
placing his name among the number of most able
generals, by laboring to follow strictly the orders
that had been given him, it is said, with a little bit-
terness, and the letter of which he endeavored to
execute, instead of interpreting the spirit of it. In
fact, means for his justification are not wanting; the
most important and the best established of all is, that
unable to divine Blucher's intentions, and supposing
him concentrated in front of Wavre towards Dion le
Mont, Grouchy might fear to lay entirely open the
communications of the army, by thus throwing him.
self into the environs of St. Lambert, leaving all the
Prussian army behind him. The over-excited parti-
sans of Napoleon have judged his lieutenant with
extreme rigor, not dreaming that a portion of the
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 181
blame should fall on their hero, who had not given
him orders entirely satisfactory; and it must be ad-
mitted, that there exist but few generals who would
have resolved to throw themselves thus on St. Lam-
bert, without knowing what Blucher's main force
would undertake. -
While the French were committing these faults,
their adversaries executed one of the most wise and
daring manoeuvres. *-
The Prussian marshal, who had bivouacked with
all his forces about Wavre, on the night of the 17th,
had sent, as has been already stated, his chief of
staff, Gneisenau, to the Duke of Wellington, to con-
trive their ulterior operations. It was agreed, that if
Napoleon burst upon the English, these should give
him battle in front of Waterloo, in the position
which their general had reconnoitred eight days pre-
viously, in order to cover Brussels if necessary; in
this case, Blucher, favored by the Dyle and the di-
rection of its course, should join him and take part in
the battle, by falling on the French right; under the
contrary supposition, that is to say, if Napoleon
marched on the Prussians to attack them at Wavre,
is was agreed that Wellington should act on the same
concentric principle, and fall on their left.
º by the false direction of Grouchy’s
march, and by the reports of his flankers, that Napo-
leon was bearing against the English, and that he
could without fear fly to his assistance, Blucher
caused the corps of Bulow and Pirch to depart for
St. Lambert at four o'clock on the morning of the
18th, and himself with Ziethen’s, marched on Ohain
182 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
in order to join the left of the English general. Thiel-
mann was left with 25,000 men at Wavre to defend
the Dyle, with instructions to follow the other corps,
if Grouchy did not make his appearance) This plan
was very well conceived, and it is necessary to say,
in praise of the allied generals, that in these combi-
nations is recognized, all the progress they had made
in the art of war.
In conformity with these wise dispositions, Bulow
was proceeding through Wavre, between seven and
eight o'clock in the morning, when a violent confla-
gration burst forth in the principal street of this city,
which was the only passage-way; the advanced-guard
having already cleared this burning defile, continued
on its route ; but his artillery not being able to fol-
low, the column busied itself in extinguishing the
flames. About noon, the advanced-guard formed at
St. Lambert, and awaited the arrival of the corps,
that debouched between three and four o'clock from
the environs of Pijeau; Pirch's corps had reached
beyond Lasne, between five and six o'clock; Blucher,
advancing with Ziethen, had made several counter-
marches, which prevented him from attaining Ohain
before seven o'clock in the evening. We are already
aware of the part which these 65,000 Prussians took
in the battle of Waterloo, while Thielmann's Corps,
posted on the heights of Bierge, overlooking Wavre,
and the whole valley of the Dyle, was making his
dispositions for opposing Grouchy with a wall of
brass, when he should make his appearance.
Arriving in front of Wavre, at four o'clock, this
marshal formed his troops to attack the forces left to

THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 183
dispute with him the crossing of the Dyle, which
presented a very difficult defile at this point. At five
o'clock, he received the orders directed to him that
morning at Gembloux; Grouchy then sent Pajol with
8,000 men on Limale, attacked Thielmann's detach-
ment with the remainder of his forces, and debouched,
after a very brisk combat, which extended beyond
Wavre and the mills of Bierge.) The details of this
combat, very honorable to both parties, and in which
Gérard was wounded, should not form part of our
summary.
What was taking place at Mont-St.-Jean rendered,
moreover, this success more hurtful than useful. The
débris of Napoleon's army regained Genape in hor-
rible disorder; in vain did the staff strive to form it
into corps; every thing was pell-mell. It would be
unjust to reproach the troops for this; never had they
fought with more valor, and the cavalry especially
had surpassed itself; but, little habituated to seeing
themselves thus turned and nigh being enveloped;
having exhausted all their munitions and forces, they
thought it their duty to seek safety in the most pre-
cipitous retreat. Each one wishing to retake the road
he had previously followed, they crossed each other
in different directions, some to reach the road to
Charleroi, others to secure that leading to Nivelle, and
escape from the enemy that already appeared on the
former ; the confusion was complete. The chief of
Blucher's staff, a man of head and heart, was, not-
withstanding the night, ordered in pursuit of this tu-
multuous crowd with the Prussian cavalry that had
been less engaged ; he appeared unexpectedly before
184 T*OIITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
Genape, into which he threw a few shot and shell,
and this gave the finishing stroke to the rout.
The disorder was so much the greater, as the avenues
of this defile had been barricaded to cover the parks
that had remained there; and this precaution, so often
neglected by the French, turned, under these circum-
stances, against them, by encumbering the only re-
maining passage-way ; this augmented the confusion
and doubled the loss of materiel. Grouchy, on his
part, being compromised beyond the Dyle, by the
very success he had just gained, had only time to
throw himself in all haste on Namur, in order to se-
cure the route to Givet and Mézières, and the Prus-
sians failed to prevent him.
The vanquished army had lost 200 pieces of ord-
nance, and 30,000 men hors de combat or prisoners;
as many more remained, independently of Grouchy’s
35,000 men; but the difficulty was to rally them in
presence of an enemy, that had taken lessons in au-
dacity and activity from Napoleon himself. The loss
of the allies was not less considerable, but there re-
mained to them 150,000 men,” the confidence of vic-
tory, and the certainty of being seconded by 300,000
allies, who were crossing the Rhine from Mentz to
Băle. -
Such was the issue of this struggle, commenced
under such happy auspices, and which resulted more
fatal to France than the battles of Poitiers and Azin-
* Besides the troops engaged at Waterloo, the allies had a splendid
English division advancing from Ostend, a division encamped at Hall, and
Kleist's Prussian corps, that had taken no part in the battle, without men
tioning other armies.
THE CAMPAIGN. OF WATERLOO. 185
court. It must be admitted, that this disaster was
the work of a multitude of unheard-of circumstances:
if Napoleon can be reproached for certain faults, it
must be allowed that fortune dealt cruelly with him
in the lesser details, and that his enemies in return,
were as fortunate as they showed themselves skillful.
However unjust be the spirit of party, we are forced
to render homage to the merits of two generals, who,
unexpectedly attacked in their cantonments extending
from Dinant and Liège to Renaix, near Tournay, had
taken such wise measures, as to be in condition next
morning for giving battle to equal forces, and for af- --
terwards conquering by an able concentration of the
two armies. Y
As to Napoleon, we have already pointed out the /\

'A
faults in execution, committed the 16th and 17th, as x
well by himself as by his lieutenants. In the very ºf \
battle of Waterloo, the French might be censured for
having attempted the first attack in masses too deep.
This system was never successful against the murder-
ous fire of English infantry and artillery.* I have
already stated, on the subject of the battle of Esling,
(in a former volume,) all that can be said in this re-
spect; but even supposing that this system be suitable
on a dry and an open field, easy of access, and with
equal artillery force, it is certain, that infantry masses,
hurled over muddy ground, from which it is difficult
* It is probable that this kind of formation had not been ordered by
Napoleon; we have never learned, that he concerned bimself about pre-
scribing the manner in which his lieutenants should form their troops, to
lead them to an attack. In 1813 alone, he prescribed the columns of bat-
talions by divisions in two ranks, very different from these heavy masses,
and such that General Jomini has proposed it in his different works.
186 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
to emerge, with an insufficient concurrence of other
arms,” attacking troops posted in excellent positions,
have many chances against them. Besides, they
might also be blamed for not having sufficiently sup-
ported this first effort, which, executed without the
assistance of the cavalry and reserves, became a par-
tial and isolated movement, and consequently without
rºl.
There were likewise extraordinary charges of cav-
alry, which being devoid of support, became heroic
but useless struggles. Notwithstanding all this, it is
almost certain that Napoleon would have remained
master of the field of battle, but for the arrival of
65,000 Prussians on his rear; a decisive and disastrous
circumstance, that to prevent was not entirely in his
power.) As soon as the enemy led 130,000 men on
the battle-field, with scarcely 50,000 to oppose them,
all was lost.
It is time, however, to quit the field of conjecture,
and return to the débris of Napoleon's army.
The appearance of the Prussian cavalry, and the
cannonade with which it opened on Genape, in the
middle of the night, was a circumstance altogether
novel in war, where night ordinarily puts a stop to
carnage and pursuit. General Gneisenau thought this
innovation without danger, against a disbanded army,
and was not mistaken, as all took the Charleroi road
* The French had numerous batteries on their front, but they battered
the enemy's lines from a distance, and vaguely, and could not easily follow
the assailing troops; while the English artillery remaining in position
fired muzzle to muzzle, against the columns advancing upon them, and
which offered themselves victims to a concentric fire, directed on a single
point.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 187
in great disorder, without waiting for day; and it was
only under the guns of Avesnes, that it became pos-
sible to rally the battalions and re-organize them a
little.
Napoleon had but one course left him, which was
to direct Grouchy through the Ardennes on Laon, to
collect at this point all that could be drawn from the
interior, from Metz and from Rapp's corps, leaving
but garrisons in Lorraine and Alsace. The imperial
cause was very much shaken, but not entirely lost;
should all Frenchmen determine on opposing Europe
with the courage of the Spartans of Leonidas, the
energy of the Russians in 1812, or of the Spaniards
of Palafox. Unfortunately for them, as for Napoleon,
opinion was very much divided on this subject, and
the majority still believing that the struggle interested
only the power of the emperor and his family, the
fate of the country seemed of little consequence.
Prince Jerome had collected 25,000 men in rear of
Avesnes: he was ordered to lead them to Laon ; there
remained 200 pieces of artillery, beside those of
Grouchy.
It required eight days for this marshal to reach
Laon : the emperor repaired to that city to await
him, persuaded that Wellington, prudent as he had
been in Spain, would fear to involve himself, in the
midst of so many strong fortresses, and would advance
with caution on the Somme.
Napoleon did not admire what are called counsels
of war; but under serious circumstances, he loved to
reason with some of his familiars for and against the
different plans he should follow, and after having
188 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
listened to all their advice, usually formed his resolu-
tion, without even communicating it to those he had
called together.
Reaching Laon on the 19th, where he had at first
resolved to await the junction of Grouchy and Jerome,
the emperor discussed, with the small number of the
trustworthy who had followed him, the course he
should adopt after this frightful disaster. Should he
repair to Paris, and concert with the chambers and
his ministers, or else remain with the army, demand-
ing of the chambers to invest him with dictatorial
power and an unlimited confidence, under the convic-
tion, that he would obtain from them the most ener-
getic measures, for saving France and conquering her
independence, on heaps of ruins?
As it always happens, his generals were divided in
opinion ; some wished him to proceed to Paris, and
deposit the crown into the hands of the nation’s dele-
gates, or receive it from them a second time, with the
means of defending it. Others, with a better appre-
ciation of the views of the deputies, affirmed, that
far from sympathizing with Napoleon, and seconding
him, they would accuse him of having lost France,
and would endeavor to save the country by losing the
emperor. A grave circumstance gave weight to this
opinion ; it was, that on the very day when he tri-
umphed at Ligny, the elective chamber factiously
usurped the initiative right, by adopting a law, order-
ing the re-union of the institutions scattered through
the different constitutions of the consulate and em.
pire. Lastly, the most prudent thought, that Napoleon
should not go to Paris, but remain at the head of the
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOo. 189
army, in order to treat with the sovereigns himself,
by offering to abdicate in favor of his son.
It is said, that Napoleon inclined to the idea of re-
maining at Laon with the army ; but the advice of
the greatest number determined him, and he departed
for Paris. In fact, this was certainly the most effica-
cious means for concerting with all the authorities,
ministers and administrations, on the prompt and vig-
orous measures necessary to be adopted, in order to
organize a grand national resistance ; because the Em-
peror could accomplish more in a few hours himself,
than by a hundred despatches. But to succeed, he
had to find more ability, disinterestedness and devo-
tion in the chambers than they had yet exhibited.
However, his departure being decided upon, Napo-
leon repaired to Paris during the night of the 21st
June. This, so natural a return, was ill-interpreted;
his defeat had lessened him in the eyes of the multi-
tude, who so rarely view things in their true light:
they considered his departure from the army as an
act of weakness. He had proved, at Arcola, Eylau,
Ratisbonne, Arcis, and also at Waterloo, that he was
not afraid of bullets; and had he not believed in the
resources of France, he would have died at the head
of the remains of his army: he quitted them, because
he had not a general of his rear-guard who could not
lead them to Laon as well as himself, while no one
could replace him at the helm of the vessel of state,
which, for the instant, was not at his head-quarters,
but at the Tuileries. -
In eight or ten days, he hoped to be on his return
to Laon, at the head of 100,000 men, with 400 pieces
190 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
of artillery, and chastise the Anglo-Prussians for their
invasion. Undoubtedly this would not have rid him
of the grand armies, which the allied sovereigns were
leading by the Vosges: nevertheless, he would have
gained time; and if 300,000 men were assembled on
the Loire during July, France might yet conquer her
independence, and preserve her glory, for many na-
tions have lifted themselves up from a lower depth.
The following picture of his situation, traced by Na-
poleon himself, proves that he was far from despair-
ing: “So far, Pâris could finish her preparations for
defence, those at Lyons were completed. The prin-
cipal fortresses were commanded by chosen officers,
and guarded by faithful troops. All could be re-
trieved, but it required character, energy and absolute
devotion on the part of the government, the chambers
and the entire nation. It was necessary, that she
should be animated by the sole sentiment of national
honor, glory and independence; she should fix her
eyes on Rome after the battle of Cannae, and not on
Carthage after that of Zamal France once assuming
this lofty stand, is invincible.”
Without recurring to the age of the Scipios, it
sufficed to recall the example of Spain in 1808, when
the French held her places and her capital, and that
of Russia setting Moscow on fire, to escape the con-
sequences of the bloody field of Borodino. It will
be asserted, undoubtedly, that the circumstances were
very different, and that France was too much ex-
hausted of men, to hope for such a result. Such
reasons merit no reply : pusillanimous souls never
lack pretexts for immediately submitting, when
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 191
placed under obligation to conquer or to die. It is
not allotted to every one to feel like the Spartans, and
sacrifice all to national glory.
Throwing aside this point of patriotic honor, it was
not difficult for the political adversaries of Napoleon
to prove, even to his partisans, that the cause of France
was for the first time separate from his own. To lis-
ten to them, “it would only be at the price of seas
of blood and of the most dreadful ravages, that you
could clear the soil invaded by 500,000 men, and se-
cure her independence. By submitting to the Bour-
bons, the same result could be obtained, in a manner
less Roman, truly, but more certain, and less cruel to
France, already worn out by so many wars.”
This language was not heroic, but it was conclusive,
and calculated to lead all weak minds. The army
and the revolutionary party were inclined to resist.
ance, without being alarmed at the sacrifices it de-
manded; but the party wished for resistance, for the
benefit of demagogism, and not for the interest of
the imperial authority. The leaders were deluded into
believing, that they could resist Europe by means of
decrees, as in 1793. Tafayette, especially, was of a
provoking good nature; he flattered himself, that Eu-
rope made war only against the ambition of one man,
and that the arms of the sovereigns were harmless in
presence of his Gallo-American doctrines; he did not
perceive that the days of Mack and Cobourg were in
the distant past, and that these were precisely the
doctrines upon which the sovereigns had designs.
Great disasters, like volcanoes, are announced by a
hollow noise which precedes the explosion. Paris
192 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
had been agitated, since the 20th June, by most alarm-
ing reports that bewildered every one. At the first
news of the catastrophe, Fouché had his friends of
the two chambers assembled at his house,” at the
same time that his secret agents noised it throughout
Paris, that the abdication of Napoleon could alone
save the country. -
The leaders of the utopianist party dreaded, un-
doubtedly with reason, the dissolution of the chambers,
because, after the course which some of the deputies
had adopted, they felt that the emperor would regard
them more as obstacles, than as means of government.
It was then agreed, in this secret assembly, to forestall
the danger; Lafayette was to bell the cat, by propos-
ing to the chamber, on the next day, to declare itself
permanent, and proclaim him a traitor to the country,
who would dare to order its dissolution. As a remu-
neration for this act, qualify it as you will, the great
citizen, who had accompanied the people from Paris
to Versailles in 1789, would be newly honored with
his favorite title of Commanding General of the Na-
tional Guards of the Kingdom.
While Fouché and his friends were thus plotting
Napoleon's overthrow, he, at four o’clock on the morn-
ing of the 21st, arrived at the Elysée-Bourbon, where
Caulaincourt awaited him with just impatience. Far
from speaking of a dissolution, the first words uttered
by the emperor announced his idea of convening the
two chambers in extraordinary session, in order to
depict to them the misfortunes of Waterloo, and de-
* Lafayette, Manuel, Dupont de l'Eure, Flauguergues, Dupin the elder,
and Henry Lacoste.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 193
mand of them the means for saving France; after
which he would hasten to rejoin the army.
It is said, that Caulaincourt expressed his regrets
on his leaving it, and his fears that the chambers were
little disposed to second him. The ministers, sum-
moned immediately after by the emperor, were invi-
ted to give their opinions on the measures to be taken.
Napoleon imparted to them his views, his resources,
and the need he had of the dictatorship in order to
save France; he could seize upon it himself, or receive
it from the chambers; this latter would be more legal
and more efficacious; but was there a certainty of his
obtaining it? The greater number of the ministers
thought, that every thing depended on the harmonious
action of the chambers. Caulaincourt cited the for-
lorn condition of the country in 1814, as a frightful
example of the consequences of a dissolution. Fouché
also rested all his hopes on an unreserved confidence
in these assemblies, in the bosom of which he wielded
an active influence. Decrès thought, on the contrary,
that it was not necessary to depend upon them.
Régnaut de Saint-Jean d’Angely himself, this obse-
quious and complaisant orator, dared to add to the
opinion of the minister of marine, that the chambers
would undoubtedly exact a new abdication ; he even
carried his boldness so far as to insinuate, that if not
offered, they ought to exact it. Justly indignant at
this, and recalling to mind the 18th Brumaire, Lucien
demanded that the emperor should dispense with the
chambers, and save France by himself alone. Lastly,
and it should be said to his praise, Carnot entered
more largely into the viºs of a desperate defence,
194 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
and of the dictatorship that would furnish the means;
he considered it necessary to redeem the soil of France
at any cost, and to renew, if needed, all the energy
of the committee of public safety of 1793. If he
never ranked as a great politician, he at least showed
the energy of a Roman.
While these grave questions were discussed at the
Elysée, the resolutions, adopted the night before in
Fouché's secret assembly, bore their fruit in the cham-
bers; the rumors of a dissolution, perfidiously spread
long before the subject had been agitated, and at the
very moment when, on the contrary, they were pro-
posing proper harmony with the chambers as the only
means of safety, had produced the effect intended by
the conspirators. Lafayette had just made the sortie
agreed upon with success, and had carried, either
through jealousy or the weakness of the deputies, the
decree declaring as traitors to the country all those
who would dare pronounce a dissolution, though this
act was nevertheless one of the constitutional rights
of the emperor. Singular mania of these pretended
apostles of legality, immolating the chief of state
for wishing to execute the law
This decree, that was, by itself alone, an entire re-
volution, was transmitted to the assembly of the min-
isters engaged with Napoleon : henceforth there was
nothing more to hope for; in vain did Lucien, accom.
panied by the ministers, demand of the chambers, in
the name of the emperor, to appoint a commission to
contrive measures of public safety, indispensable un-
der the circumstances: his abdication was the sole
aim of the conspirators. The commission was in
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 195
truth appointed, but was composed of the warmest
enemies of the emperor, Laujuinais, Lafayette, Gre-
nier, Flauguergues, and Dupont de l'Eure; the ma-
jority only proposed a foolish and vain negotiation
with the powers. At the reading of the report a
crowd of deputies, and Lafayette, especially, cried
out that this would be insufficient without the abdi-
cation; that this abdication or its forfeiture, was neces-
sary within the hour.
While these vociferations of mediocrity and of ha-
tred, staggered moderate minds, Napoleon was at
the Elysée, a prey to the most violent agitation. The
people assembled about this palace, made the air re-
sound with cries of vive l'empereur / and asked for
arms. Lucien urged his brother to profit by this en-
thusiasm, and enact an 18th Brumaire, more legal
than the first, because, in ordering the dissolution ac-
cording to the prescribed forms, he had a right to
require it and have it executed.
The idea of saving the country by arming the lower
classes against the highest magistracy, must have been
revolting to the judicious and lofty spirit of Napoleon.
Besides, discord, already so potent in France, would
not fail to redouble after a coup d'etat, which would
recall rather that of May 31st, 1793, than that of the
18th Brumaire. The sacred union of the nation and
its chief, could alone repair the cruel effects of these
bloody disasters; it was then by closing around the
celebrated conqueror, that France could still issue
gloriously from a gigantic struggle. From the mo-
ment the nation divided itself into three hostile camps,
and the authorities gave the example of defection, all
196 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
was lost, because Napoleon could not himself alone,
save the independence of the country, as well as his
throne. The ideologists and the factious, who were
so senseless as to imagine, that Europe would be eager
to lay down her arms before their decrees, and who
thought of causing the triumph of their utopias by
sacrificing a great man, will alone have to answer for
the humiliation they were preparing for themselves.
Repelling, then, the suggestions of his brother, Na-
poleon preferred to resign, and dictated to Lucien the
following abdication in favor of his son :
“Frenchmen in commencing the war for uphold-
ing the national independence, I calculated on the
union of all efforts, of all wills, and on the concur-
rence of all the national authorities; I had reason to
hope for success, and I braved all the declarations of
the powers against me. Circumstances appear to me
changed. I offer myself a sacrifice to the hatred of
the enemies of France. May they prove sincere in
their declarations, and have really no design but upon
my person. My political life is ended, and I pro-
claim my son, under the title of Napoleon II., em-
peror of the French. The present ministers will
compose the council of the government. The interest
I take in my son induces me to invite the chambers,
immediately, to pass a law organizing the regency.
Let all unite for the public safety, and to continue an
independent nation l’ g
We are assured, that the emperor at first intended
to send a pure and simple abdication, but that Lucien
and Carnot determined him to stipulate in favor of
his son. Be that as it may, many have blamed him
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 197
for this resolution as a weakness. If he had only
consulted his own character, he would have buried
himself beneath his country’s ruins, sooner than have
so easily yielded ; the long series of combats sustained,
after his departure from Moscow, even to the very
foot of Montmartre, sufficiently proves it. But how
could he share his sentiments with entire France,
when the very government had just declared that a
second abdication was necessary 7 Without the con-
currence of the country, what could he do? If Na-
poleon had made the sacrifice of his throne at Fon-
tainbleau, when he had greater titles to the devotion
of the nation, and when the enemy were less formi-
dable, could he refuse now, when himself and his
private interests were alone concerned? Could he
consent to a social subversion, and to France being
laid waste, in order to satisfy his military vanity?
No. . . . His resignation, far from being an act of
discouragement, was worthy the rest of his life.
Having decided on going to America, Napoleon
hoped that the allies would rest satisfied with the
hostage he placed at their discretion, and would leave
the crown on the head of the son of Maria Louisa.
IIe thought this was the best means, of effecting the
fusion of ancient interests with the new, and preventing
a civil war which might again run over the entire
circle from 1789 to 1804; but the solemn engage-
ments entered into at Vienna, between the sovereigns
and Louis XVIII., did little permit them to consent to
such a transaction, which at best had then been ex-
cusable, as their object was to prevent the grand
struggle that was expected, and the issue of which
198 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
was not considered so certain or so speedy. Before
the war, the sovereigns might have hesitated in effect-
ing the triumph of the principle of legitimacy, by
the doubtful force of arms; but once conquerors, how
were they to repel it? By what right could they
prevent their ally, Louis XVIII., from entering the
capital, and resuming the crown Besides, Napo-
leon's precaution in stipulating for his son, remained
without result through the singular pre-occupation of
the leaders of the chamber, who flattered themselves,
with yet dictating laws to France, and having them
accepted by Europe. Not wishing to admit Napoleon
II., nor establish the regency, they hastened to form a
provisional government, in the hope of seizing the
helm of state, treating with the allied sovereigns for
their existence, and not resuming the government of
the Bourbons, but with conditions imposed by the
chambers. How absurd a dream in the actual state
of affairs! and which would suit neither Louis XVIII.,
nor the sovereigns armed in the cause of thrones.
Here the task of the historian, who attaches great
value to impartiality, becomes not less embarrassing
than painful. Indeed, how will he portion out to each
one, the meed of blame or praise that pertains to
him, in these great political conflicts? Will he treat
all the adversaries of Napoleon as sycophants and
revolutionists? Will he compare Fouché to Catiline,
and will he regard the utopianist deputies, on whom
he relied, as so many of the Gracchi; or rather, fol-
lowing in the footsteps of the ignoble Abbé of Mont-
gaillard, will he treat Napoleon and all his partisans
as blood-thirsty ogres, dreaming but of devastation
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 199
and pillage? Will he, like this pamphleteer, raise to
the rank of demi-gods, all those who contributed to
the ruin of the imperial system?
Without thus pushing things to extremes, it will
ever be a perplexing matter to qualify Fouché's in-
trigues; some will state that they were the result of
a wise foresight of the ills that threatened France,
after the declarations of the Congress at Vienna, as
well as a worthy desire of preserving her from too
une] ºial a contest; others will attribute them solely
to the ambitious and seditious tendency of his mind,
as well as to his still somewhat revolutionary doc-
trilies. Should a minister be stamped as a traitor or
receive commendations, who, while preserving his
official position towards the chief of state, corre-
sponded and treated clandestinely with his enemies,
without authority ?
Who will dare award civic crowns to the influential
members of the chambers, for their conduct, both be-
fore and after the news of the disaster at Waterloo !
Will it be credited, that they preserved France from
utter ruin, by usurping an authority which the consti-
tution did not give them ; or else, will they be ac-
cused of having added to the military humiliation of
the country, by cowardly abandoning the only cap-
tain who was still able to heighten the brightness of
her standards, and preserve her independence 2
In recapitulating all the disasters that might befall
France, by prolonging a struggle d outrance, we can-
not deny that it was a frightful alternative, and that
the result of the course adopted would sufficiently
justify the conduct of the chambers, had they always
200 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
been inspired solely by the interest of the country.
However, who can also say, that Napoleon would not
have cleared French soil of her enemies, had he been
powerfully and freely supported ? Who can affirm,
that the expenses of the occupation, and the two
thousand millions imposed by the allies or paid to the
emigrants, had not exceeded, by far, the monetary
and transient ravages, the consequences of a few
months' struggle 2 Though, perhaps, despairing too
soon of the public safety, had the chambers at least
appreciated the only remedy for the evils that threat-
ened the country, and had boldly proclaimed the re-
call of the legitimate government, soliciting from the
king the proclamation of certain fundamental princi-
ples, requisite to re-assure minds against a violent
reaction, we would have been able to acknowledge
some political foresight on the part of their leaders;
but all their measures, on the contrary, attest a mis-
erable spirit of mediocrity, of hatred towards the
powers of the government, and a liberalism ridicu-
lously vain, which destroyed even the garb of patri-
otism with which they clothed their declamations?
These are grave and immense questions, upon which
I do not feel myself called upon to pass judgment,
and which I hasten to leave, and return to the em-
peror. -
Still full of the souvenirs of 1813 and 1814, Europe
did not at all comprehend the rapidity of this second
fall. The empire of Carthage, likewise crumbled at
Zama; because the Carthagenian hero had, like Na-
poleon, lost his influence in the heart of the country.
The monarchy of Frederic the Great fell as rapidly
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLoo. 201
at Jéna, but owed her existence to the principle of
legitimacy, so ill appreciated by declaimers; Frederic
William, happier than Hannibal and Napoleon, had
left his nation in mourning and preserved the love of
his people. In this great wreck, Napoleon could,
nevertheless, exclaim, with Francis I. : All is lost,
save honor. e *
Napoleon did not quit France, till the enemy neared
his retreat at Malmaison. Informed of his abdication,
and of the anarchy that had succeeded him, and even
prompted, as it is asserted, by Fouché, the Anglo-
Prussians had advanced rapidly on Paris; they could
have outstripped Grouchy, but they followed closely
on his steps. Wellington had carried Péronne and
Cambrai at the first onset, where pitiable citizens
ignominiously aided him. The rapidity of this inva-
sion fully proved, that Europe had not forgotten the
lessons given by Napoleon himself.
Meanwhile, the Prussians made a hazardous move-
ment, in seeking to turn the works erected to the
north of Paris; they alone crossed the Seine near
Pecq, while Wellington remained on the right bank,
and, from his position, unable to support them. The
army, then commanded by Davoust, and encamped
in the vicinity, might have fallen upon them with
70,000 brave men, and annihilated them by tumbling
them into the Seine. Napoleon proposed to the pro-
visional government, to take command of the army,
and resign the same after having conquered. Wile
intrigues prevented him from washing out the stain
of Waterloo, and taking leave of France after a vic-
tory, that had permitted him to treat honorably with
9% &
202 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
the allied sovereigns, instead of surrendering at dis-
cretion to an English general and a Prussian marshal,
as was done by the provisional government. Far
from accepting his proposition, Fouché, who was al-
ready corresponding with Wellington, had even
resolved, for fear he would of his own accord put
himself at the head of the army, to secure his person
and place him in a species of captivity, by confiding
him to the guard of General Becker.
Nevertheless, the enthusiasm of the troops was still
so great, that this deplorable government had great
difficulty in causing a suspension of hostilities, and
General Excelmans even destroyed an entire brigade
near Wille-d'Avray, at the moment when they were
enchaining the courage of his comrades.
The emperor left for Rochefort immediately after-
wards. Decrés the minister, proposed to him to leave
from Havre, on an American vessel ready to set sail;
but this was too near the English coast, and he was
also rather late. He could also have embarked at
Bordeaux, on the one chartered by Joseph : the ob-
jections to a disagreeable counsellor diverted him
from it; fearing to fall into the hands of his enemies
in a commercial port, he determined to go aboard a
public ship, but some of the factious had time to
forewarn the English of the fact.” Joseph embarked
alone at Bordeaux, and reached America without inter-
ruption, on the vessel which he had offered to his
brother. The latter was less fortunate: closely pressed
* The History of the Restoration asserts positively, that Fouché in-
formed Wellington of this embarkation, and so contrived it, that the em-
peror should not escape.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 203
- *
by the English cruiser on his leaving Rochefort, and
seeing that it would be difficult to escape, heapushed
directly for her, hoping to place himself under the
safeguard of British honor and British laws. He
wrote the following letter to the prince regent:
“Your royal highness: exposed to the factions that
divide my country, and to the enmity of the greatest
European powers, I have terminated my political ca-
reer. Like Themistocles, I come to sit at the hearth
of the British people. I place myself under the pro-
tection of their laws, which I demand of your royal
highness, as from the most powerful, the most con-
stant, and the most generous of my adversaries.”
This letter, remarkable for the simplicity of its
style, and for the just comparison established, between
the position of Napoleon and that of the illustrious
Athenian, could not disarm the hatred of his enemies.
His was a cruel disappointment. It has been thought,
that he would have been treated very differently, had he
presented himself at the head-quarters of the emperor
Alexander, trusting his fate to the magnanimity of
his sentiments. Had this monarch considered it
necessary, for the repose of Europe, to confine his
formidable antagonist in one of his palaces, he
would have treated him, at least, with all the con-
sideration that was due him, and not with the bar-
barity of the unworthy jailor, that England gave
him. 2
Posterity will judge of the treatment he suffered.
Prisoner in another hemisphere, nothing was left
him, but to defend the reputation that history was
preparing for him, and which was still being per-
204 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
verted according to the passions of parties. Death
surprised him while writing his commentaries, which
have remained imperfect, and this was, no doubt, one
of his greatest regrets. However, he can repose in
peace ; pigmies cannot obscure his glory; he has
gathered, in the victories of Montenotte, Castiglione,
Arcola, Rivoli, the Pyramids, as well as in those of
Marengo, Ulm, Austerlitz, Jéna, Friedland, Abens
burg, Ratisbonne, Wagram, Borodino, Bautzen, Dres-
den, Champ-Aubert, Montmirail, and Ligny, laurels
sufficient to efface the disaster of Waterloo; his five
codes will be titles not less honorable, to the suffrages
of posterity. The monuments erected in France and
in Italy, will attest his greatness to the remotest ages.
His adversaries have reproached him with a ten-
dency to an oriental despotism, and I shared this
opinion with them for a long time: only true states-
men should judge him in this respect; what seemed
a crime to the eyes of utopianists, will some day be-
come, to the eyes of enlightened men, his most glo-
rious title to wisdom and foresight. With hollow and
abstract ideas, or a philanthropic sentimentality, a
great nation will never march on to high destinies, or
even, be able victoriously to defend herself, against
formidable neighbors.
The great European communities, whatever be said
by all the Don Quixottes of governmental metaphy-
sics, will never be but egotistical and rival communi-
ties.* Therefore, all well-ordered communities should
* This truth, which appears simple by being evident, has very singu-
larly been unrecognized in these latter times, because the celebrated
author of the Letters on the hundred days, in speaking of Napoleon's fall,
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLoo. 205
invest their chiefs with all the power indispensable
for rendering them formidable abroad and respected
at home. Without these conditions, there will exist
in his government but anarchy, demagogism or weak-
ness. According to the utopias of Lafayette, Lanjui-
nais, and B. Constant, we should only make citizen
Kings, without dignity and without power, like those
of Poland or Hungary; or else anarchical republics,
like those of the year IV. and the year V. All subtle
declamations could not weaken this great truth.-
That with the license of the press and popular elec-
tions, no continental power would exist fifty years;
and France less than any other, thanks to the passion-
ate and impetuous spirit of the nation. Experience
will finally prove who best understood his true inter-
ests, Napoleon or the doctrinaires who undermined
his power.
Some men, blinded by their utopias, have pretended
“that he had alienated from himself the enlightened
classes of Frenchmen, by smothering thought ; that
he had, by striking it with a magic sceptre, arrested
the moral and political progress of the human species,
which was compressed under an enormous weight, and
retained in woeful immobility.” These grand phrases
have fascinated little minds; but the suffrages of sen-
sible men will remain to him, and the next generation
has attributed it to the hatred that commerce bore him, which, according
to the publicist, tends to efface rivalry between nations, and to draw to-
gether individuals as well as nations: strange doctrine, that denotes an
inconceivable ignorance of the history of all ages, as if the great strug-
gles of Carthage and Rome, as well as those between England, France,
and Holland, only sprung from the rivalry of merchants, more tenacious
even than feudal or national rivalry.
206 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
will justly appreciate, whether the shamelessness of
thought, and the press is not more to be dreaded, for
a nation like the French, than the bounds he wished
to place to their license;” they will see whether the
public morals and the national character, will have
gained much by the rupture of all checks; whether
the right to say every thing, print every thing, and
villify eve: y thing, will form great men, and will
cause real progress in human reason, or rather,
whether the result of this pretended golden age be
not all the reverse.
As to the charge of unbridled and unbounded am-
bition, which we ourselves have not spared him, it
must be admitted that appearances at least con-
demned him ; however, we have not sufficiently con-
sidered the necessities of his position, as well towards
England as towards the other European powers, and
especially towards the emigrant princes of the revolu-
tion. Many invasions and aggressions were dictated
by these necessities. -
The idea of a grand European domination, in oppo-
sition to the English power, certainly led him beyond
all bounds of wisdom and moderation, and powerfully
contributed to his fall; but if this idea was a lofty
one, and worthy of him, it is just to say that the
means he employed for accomplishing his ends, were
revolting to his allies, and did him more injury than
the projects themselves.
* We cannot too often repeat that the imperial censorship, absurd in
its regulating dispositions, would have been good in itself, if it had ex-
tended only over the periodical press, and had been confided to men more
independent by their position.
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO. 207
Here ends our task; this small work having for its
object, but the completion of the life of Napoleon,
related by himself, we have not considered it our
duty to narrate the sequel of the invasion, which
followed the battle of Waterloo, and the depart-
ure of the emperor. Everybody is aware of the
convention concluded on the 3d July, by Davoust
and the delegates of the provisional government, for
the evacuation of Paris and the retreat of the army
behind the Loire. We cannot, however, refrain from
citing the heroic defence of Huningue, by General
Barbanégre with a handful of mutilated veterans, and
the glorious combat sustained in Savoy, by Colonel
Bujeaud, with his single regiment, against an entire
division of the Austrians, in which he made more
prisoners than he had soldiers; an isolated feat of
arms, but which attested the spirit which animated
the army.
Lastly, we will also recall the fact, that the cham-
bers received the reward of their deplorable conduct.
The commissioners they sent to the sovereigns were
scarcely admitted at head-quarters, and after certain
conferences, were informed, that there was no occa-
sion for treating with them : finally, a picket of Prus-
sian landwehrs, posted one beautiful morning at the
door of their chamber to prevent their assembling,
taught the deputies the vanity and puerility of their
pretensions. -
A few days subsequently, Louis XVIII. quietly
entered the Tuileries; prompted by the most excited
royalists, he at first yielded to the most violent re-ac-
tionary ideas; but France and Europe did not delay
A
|
208 IPOTITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY OF
in raising their voices against the folly of this exag-
gerated course. The world knows what took place
after the death of this sage and paternal monarch,
and how the revolution of 1830 proved, that the re-
turn from Elba was not so extravagant as had been
imagined. In truth, the results to the country were
frightful; the foreign occupation continued to 1818,
the loss of many important fortresses, the two thou-
sand millions paid to the allies and emigrants, the
military humiliation, worse, perhaps, than all these,
such were the sad results of a resolution which Na-
poleon would have abstained from taking, had he
been able to have foreseen the consequences. The
reports that the allied sovereigns had quitted Vienna,
little satisfied with the proceedings of the congress,
the rumor of a project on foot for removing him from
Elba, and exiling him far from Europe, lastly, the
famous discourse of Ferrand, of which we have spo-
ken, were the three grand motives that led him to
this bold attempt; if the departure of the sovereigns
had been confirmed, every thing leads us to the belief
that he would have succeeded; because he would
have had time to negotiate, on the one hand, and on
the other, to place the entire nation under arms.
Such is the weakness of human calculations, that
the most astounding enterprise that has ever been
conceived, succeeded, at first, against all probabilities
and appearances, then miscarried in another which,
proving false, destroyed all chances of success. We
are undoubtedly authorized in believing, that victory
at the battle of Waterloo by Napoleon, would have
rendered the struggle still long and terrible; but it
THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLoo. 209
would require a great share of credulity to be per-
suaded, that he could have prevented the 350,000
allies that crossed the Rhine between Bâle and Man-
heim, from pushing forward to Paris; because Napo-
leon, being compelled to leave from sixty to eighty
thousand men in Belgium, against Blucher and Wel-
lington, could not have assembled 100,000 on the
Moselle or the Vosges. Now, Paris being occupied,
what course would France have pursued, thus divided
in opinion, and placed between two chiefs, dethroned
in fact? Would she have imitated Spain, and con-
tinued a national war d outrance, as desired by Napo-
leon and Carnot?
If the coalition had had to open partial negotiations
between London, Berlin, Petersburg and Vienna, Na-
poleon would have had four months more in which to
arm, and without doubt would have succeeded in de-
taching one or other of the powers. This was then
his principal chance of success.
As to the chances of war, we have seen that Ney’s
delay on the 15th and 16th June; that caused by Na-
poleon in the reconnoissance made and in the mea-
sures adopted for attacking Blucher's army; the
vague and tardy direction assigned to Grouchy;
finally, the false route taken by the latter, on the
morning of the 18th, were the leading causes of the
disaster at Waterloo. Some military men have also
thought, that Napoleon would have succeeded better
by not throwing himself between the allied armies,
as this gave to each the possibility of assembling com-
pletely ; they believe that he should have fallen either
on Blucher's centre, by Namur, or on Wellington's,
210 POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY, &c.
by Ath or Mons. It is certain that by this means, he
would have cut off one or other of these enemies; if ..
he had beaten the centre and left of Wellington's
cantonments, the right would have retreated in the
direction of Ostend or Antwerp ; had he overthrown
the centre of Blucher's cantonments, the left would
have been forced on Liége, and hence the junction of
these disjointed parts had been quite impossible. But
both of these projects offered difficulties; to fall by
Florette, between Charleroi and Namur, that is to
say, between the corps of Ziethen and Pirch, there
was the very difficult ground situated at the mouth of
the Sambre ; besides, the troops arriving from French
Flanders would have to defile during more than one
day, in front of the enemy’s cantonments. By falling
on Braine, or Ath, the centre of the English can-
tonments, the corps of the Prince of Orange could
not be prevented from joining Blucher with all the
troops on the left; now, 120,000 Prussians, increased
to 180,000 by the half of Wellington's army and a
portion of Kleist's corps, might still be in condition
to dispute the Meuse against 120,000 French. Chances
multiply ad infinitum, when we abandon ourselves to
gratuitous suppositions, in the field. The plan of
operations adopted was so much the most favorable,
that without the time lost, on the 16th and the morn-
ing of the 17th, he would have succeeded completely,
and that even this loss of time would have been re-
gained on the 18th, had the right wing taken the
direction of Moustier.
A PP E N D IX.
The Duke of Elchingen, son of Marshal Ney, having made
certain observations on the faults imputed to his father, in this
campaign of Waterloo, the Author has replied in the following let-
ter, that throws a new light on these important events:
Monsieur LE DUC, -
I have carefuily read and considered the obser-
vations you have done me the honor of addressing me, on my
political and military summary of the campaign of 1815, printed
two years since, but not yet published.
While I render full justice to the filial sentiments that prompt
you, to remove the reproaches heaped on your father, for the de-
lays in occupying Quatre-Bras, during the 15th and 16th June, I
ought also to render justice to the frankness and impartiality that
prevail in all your researches, and to the convictions that animate
you.
You must have noticed in my narrative, that I expressed real
doubts as to what occurred relative to Quatre-Bras, up to nine
o'clock on the morning of the 16th, the hour when, it is said, Gen-
eral Flahaut left Charleroi with written orders for him to take
possession of it. These doubts have not appeared entirely satis-
factory to you, and you would wish me to share all your convic-
tions, which, in view of the numerous contradictions that are
evident from the published documents, is not without difficulty.
Napoleon and General Gourgaud affirm, under circumstances,
212 APPENDIX.
that seem by their nature to merit confidence, that a previous order
to occupy this important position, had been given verbally to the
commander of the left wing, on the night of the 15th.
To these assertions, you oppose :
1st. A letter from the major-general, that speaks of Gosselies,
and not of Quatre-Bras;
2d. The expressions and date of the letter dictated to General
Flahaut, on the 16th ;
3d. Your conversation with Marshal Soult in 1829 ;
4th. The declaration of General Heymès, an eye-witness;
5th. A declaration of General Reille, setting forth, that at seven
o'clock on the morning of the 16th, Marshal Ney had said to him,
that he was awaiting orders; from which you conclude that he
had not yet received any.
Your reasons are powerful, Monsieur le Duc ; however, the last
one especially, might also be differently explained ; the marshal
could very well have received verbal orders during the night, and
yet say to General Reille that he still awaited them, because he
might suppose, that important modifications would occur in the
emperor's combination, in consequence of reports he had just made
him, according to his own statement.
My great familiarity with war operations and the duties of the
staff, induces me to give you a sketch of the manner in which, it
seems to me, these things must have happened, without pretending,
however, to set myself up as judge in this great debate, and with-
out renewing the recital of operations already to be found in my
volume.
Debouching from Charleroi, with his whole army, Napoleon had
before him, two causeways, forming nearly a right angle, that is
to say, going in directions entirely divergent, one to the north on
Brussels, and the other to the east on Namur, Wellington being at
the former and Blucher at the latter. The route from Charleroi
to Brussels, being at once on the extreme left of the cantonments
of the Anglo-Netherlanders, and on the extreme right of the Prºs-
sian cantonments, was evidently the point where the junction of
the two armies should take place. A cross-road that conner's
these two causeways, runs directly from Namur to Brussels, and
APPENDIX. 213
into Hainault; it passes through Sombref, joins the Brussels' cause-
way at Quatre-Bras, and thus forms the base of a triangle, of
which Charleroi is the vertex.
With the slightest glance at the map, you perceive that in occu-
pying Sombref, the Prussians from Namur are prevented from
joining the English, the same as in occupying Quatre-Bras, you
prevent the English from Nivelles and Brussels from joining the
Prussians. This double combination could not escape the eagle
eye of Napoleon : it is also averred, that he gave Grouchy a ver-
bal order to push, if possible, as far as Sombref on the 15th.
Should we not conclude from this, that he must also have made
known to the commander of the left wing, his desire that he should
push on to Quatre-Bras, this decisive point being nearer Reille's
corps than Sombref was to Grouchy’s troops ?
As for myself, I think I am too well aware of Napoleon's ge-
nius, to doubt his conceiving, on the 15th June, the idea of having
Quatre-Bras occupied, and even previous to the assertions from
St. Helena, I could not express the least thought to the contrary,
though the declaration of the Duke of Dalmatia, cited in your
pamphlet, has raised doubts in my mind.*
Admitting, then, the existence of this verbal order of the 15th,
the main point would still be to know, in what terms it was couched.
Did he prescribe to the marshal, to rush headlong upon all he
should find in this direction, as is affirmed in book IX. from St.
Helena 3 or else, limit himself to recommending, as he did to
Grouchy, as rapid a march as possible on the route to Brussels,
taking care to throw forward his advance-guard on Quatre-Bras?
The order having been given verbally, it would be very difficult to
decide between these two hypotheses; but all the information given
in your pamphlet, and all that took place on the 16th, authorize us
in admitting the second version. In that case, I believe we would
be justified in drawing from this fact, different conclusions from
* The Duke of Dalmatia declares, in this conversation, that the order
for the occupation of Quatre-Bras was not issued on the night of the 15th,
but only on the 16th, after the emperor had breakfasted. It could be,
however, possible, that a verbal order had been given on the 15th, with-
out the major-general's presence, and even without his knowledge.
214 APPENDIX.
those that have been admitted heretofore ; the following are the
Tea,SOIl S :
Vandamme's and Gerard’s infantry, having been retarded on the
15th, by incidents unnecessary to recall, and Grouchy having only
cavalry with him, was stopped towards Gilly by two divisions of
Prussian infantry, so that instead of advancing as far as Sombref,
he was not even able to occupy Fleurus, held by Ziethen's troops.
Marshal Ney, finding himself, then, with Reille's corps, beyond
Gosselies, ought, very naturally, to hesitate in throwing himself
on Quatre-Bras, with three divisions, before being joined by d'Er-
lon's corps, that was with difficulty debouching from Marchiennes ;
because the cannonade of the combat at Gilly, that thundered au-
dibly in his rear, might render this movement dangerous. In truth,
decisive circumstances sometimes present themselves in war, when
it is not necessary to be too much alarmed at what is passing in
the rear, (witness the little importance attached by the French, to
Lusignan’s column, debouching in their rear at the battle of Ri-
voli); but these cases are exceptions, and as a general rule, we
cannot devote too much attention to what the enemy may under-
take on our line of retreat. Moreover, Reille threw Girard's
division to the right on Heppignies, to cover himself in the direc-
tion of Fleurus, where Ziethen concentrated his four infantry divi-
sions, to await Pirch's four divisions, that were to arrive that
night.
Certainly, if Marshal Ney had had his seven divisions in hand,
he could very well have led four on Frasne, and three on Quatre-
Bras; but knowing that he could not calculate on d'Erlon’s corps
that day, and being absolutely ignorant of the position of Welling-
ton's forces, can he be blamed for having hesitated to execute this
partial and somewhat eccentric movement, in the midst of two ar-
mies, that numbered not less than 220,000 combatants For my
own part, I do not think so, unless the order to rush headlong on
Quatre-Bras, had been eagressed in a formal manner.” I go far.
* Napoleon wrote at St. Helena from recollection, having no written
documents : his memory was a good one, it is true, but when verbal or-
ders, given amid the confusion of an operation such as the passage of the
Sambre, are at issue, he may, three years afterwards, have been deceived
as to the expressions employed.
APPENDIX. 215
ther, I even believe that Napoleon, on his return to Charleroi,
after the combat at Gilly, ought to have congratulated himself, on
his left remaining & la hauteur of the rest of the army, that bivou-
acked about Lambusart ; because, thus situated, this wing ran no
risk, and could, at five o' loºk in the morning, depart for Quatre-
Bras, while Grouchy lapidly advanced on Sombref.
This, so palpable a fact, bears me out in the belief, that in his
interview with Marshal Ney, the night of the 15th and 16th, Na-
poleon expressed himself to that effect.* It is at least quite cer-
tain, that among the first words they interchanged, the emperor
must have entertained the marshal with what had been done, and
what was necessary still to do ; now, if the former expressed more
or less regret that the left had halted between Frasne and Gosse-
lies, the right being towards Lambusart, he must necessarily have
added, either that this delay should be repaired newt morning, or
that at day-break he should receive further wmstructions, such as
the reports of the night would demand.
In fact, if Marshal Ney had not again seen the emperor after
the receipt of the order of the 15th, it is clear, that it would have
been his duty, at day-break, to resume its execution, deferred the
previous night ; because, when operations are carried on at the
distance of a march from head-quarters, and when a prescribed
movement is delayed by certain incidents, it ought, as a matter of
course, to be executed as soon as possible, so long as it is not re-
voked. But as the generals had conferred a long time together,
the night subsequent to the non-execution of the order, it was alto-
gether otherwise, and the marshal could regard this anterior order
as null and void, if not formally confirmed. We see, then, that
the intention manifested by the emperor at this interview, consti-
tutes the knot in the enigma. Which of the two intentions above
mentioned, did he express There lies the whole question ; and,
if there was no witness to this conference, God alone can decide.
* This is so true, that in book IX. the emperor formally states, that on
the night of the 15th, every thing had succeeded to his wishes, and that
his operation promised a certain success; an unaffected avowal of the
little value he attached, to the partial and isolated occupation of Quatre-
Bras, for that day.
216 APPENDIX.
For myself, I can only form an opinion from appearances, or on
conjectures: now notice what to my eyes are these appearances,
should I properly retrace the emperor's state of mind and the data
from which he judged.
Napoleon did not certainly calculate on surprising the allied ar-
mies, asleep in their cantonments, that extended from Liege to
Malines; but he counted on taking the initiative, and beating them
separately, while endeavoring to concentrate. Rapidity was then
the first of the elements of victory, but the rapidity of Rivoli, Cas-
tiglioni, and especially of Abensburg and Dresden.
The Prussians were the first to be encountered, and their resist-
ance at Gilly intimated, that the main body of their forces was not
very distant. This might have determined the emperor not to re-
new the formal order to march on Quatre-Bras at day-break, be-
fore having received the morning reports. Grouchy wrote on the
16th, at six o'clock, that large Prussian columns arriving by the
Namur road, were forming towards Ligny; his report, which I
have seen, could have arrived at seven ; but things do not always
move as rapidly as they should, and it is probable that this dispatch
did not arrive before nine o'clock. Napoleon had just dictated to
General Flahaut, the order to advance on Quatre-Bras, and he
stated in this communication, that a similar order had been previ-
ously sent by Marshal Soult, but that he dispatched his aid-de-
camp Flahaut, because he was better mounted than the staff offi-
cers, and would reach him sooner.
These precautions certainly attest, that at this moment, the em-
peror attached great value to the prompt execution of this move-
ment, and authorize the belief that he had conceived the idea at
day-light, because he had already prescribed to the Duke of Dal-
matia to expedite it, and dictated, at eight o'clock, the confirmation
of a previous order. JBut all this appears, also, to indicate, that
in the night conference no similar order had been given to Mar-
shal Ney ; if this had happened, so much care would not have
been taken to send him a triple order, after eight o'clock in the
morning, when he could have already reached Quatre-Bras, had
the order been issued at midnight.
This reasoning leads me to the conclusion, that if a first order
APPENDIX. 217
had actually been given him on the evening of the 15th, the
emperor had announced, in the night conference, that he would
issue him others the next day; the entire purport cf General
Flahaut’s letter, as well as the saying of Reille, conduces to the
belief.
After having done all in my power to clear up the events of
the day and night of the 15th, it remains for me to penetrate the
mysteries of whe morning of the 16th, and at the very outset, I
find myself in presence of a very grave circumstance.
Book IX. from St. Helena pretends, that Marshal Ney re-
ceived during the night, the order to advance rapidly on Quatre-
Bras, and at the same time declares, that this order was carried
by the aid-de-camp, General Flahaut. Now, your pamphlet gives
a letter from this general, affirming, that the order in question
was dictated to him between eight and nine o'clock in the morning,
which, in the month of June, is some hours after dawn. In fact,
General Flahaut also says that this dictation occurred at an early
hour, an expression that astonishes me, as at this period of the
year, eight and nine o'clock are not early hours.
I have explained above, how the inference might be drawn,
from the very expressions of this dispatch, that it contained the
first formal order to occupy Quatre-Bras. One single circum-
stance, might cause a different interpretation of the facts I have
just cited ; it is thus stated in the writings from St. Helena,
(Book IX): “Marshal Ney must have suspended his movement
on Quatre-Bras a second time, because he had learned that the
junction of the two armies was taking place, and thought this
might change the determinations of the emperor, from whom he
demanded orders.”
We indeed find in your pamphlet, that General Reille called
on the marshal at seven in the morning, and that the latter in-
formed him, that he was awaiting the emperor's orders, to whom
he had reported his position.
It is probable that this fact is the same that is mentioned above ;
but it is expressed in such a manner, that we cannot conclude in
favor or against the marshal, as the report appears to have been
made verbally by an officer of the staff, long after the departure of
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2iS APPENDIX.
General Flahaut. The orders, dictated first to Marshal Soult, and
later to this general, were not then occasioned by this report; and
the inferences you can draw from these reiterated dispatches, to
prove, that no confirmation of the verbal order of the 15th had
been given at night, remain in their full force.
After all, great obscurity prevails over this report of the max-
shal, as over many other points; book IX. speaks of the arrival
of this officer towards Fleurus, just as the Prussian army had been
reconnoitred, that is, about noon. Now, the marshal had already
stated to Reille, at Gosselies, about seven, that he had rendered an
account of his position, and had asked for orders. The officer
charged with it had been sent to Charleroi: how was it, that he
did not arrive before the emperor's departure ?
On the other hand, I find in General Reille's letter, that at nine
o'clock he received and expedited directly to the emperor, an officer
sent by General Girard, announcing that the entire Prussian army
was forming in rear of Fleurus. One hour afterwards, Marshal
Soult writes from Charleroi to the commander of the left wing,
that an officer of lancers has just reported, that large masses of
the enemy appear in the direction of Quatre-Bras. This last was
written at ten o’clock, and coincides with the sending of the officer
from Girard. This, perhaps, might be the suspending report,
mentioned in page 90. On the other hand, how could the emperor
conſound Quatre-Bras and Fleurus, while answering the report of
the officer sent by Reille 7" And when he had inserted in the
same dispatch, that Blucher having passed the night at Namur, his
army could detach no portion on Quatre-Bras, was Napoleon igno-
rant of what Grouchy, Girard and Reille had reported, or else,
placed he more faith in his secret agents who gave him contrary
information ? This is what the most skilful would be unable to
explain. Finally, it is unfortunate, that this report attributed to the
marshal, has not come down to us in manuscript ; it would
* This may seen strange, but is not at all impossible : pre-occupied
with the thought, that Reille was advancing towards Quatre-Bras against
the English, Napoleon perhaps imagined, that the assembling of the aimy
reported by the officer sent by this generai, was only a portion of the
English army, that was to cover Quatre-Bras.
APPENDIX. 219
have cleared up many doubts respecting the orders previously
given.
But let us throw aside all the suppositions to which these divers
incidents would give rise, and return to facts. General Reille
writes from Gosselies, at a quarter after ten o’clock, that General
Flahaut has communicated to him the orders with which he was
charged for the marshal, which presupposes that these orders passed
Gosselies about ten, and reached Frasne about eleven, as Colonel
Heymès states. General Reille adds, “that in the absence of
Ney, he suspends his march on Quatre-Bras, because very recent
information, as to the arrival of great Prussian masses, appears to
him of a nature to change the emperor's dispositions; he therefore
awaits a positive order from the marshal.”
This incident, which was certainly a misfortune, occasioned a
new delay, but this was not a decisive event, after what had taken
place at Fleurus and Ligny. In fact, it is evident, that if the mar-
shal did not receive the order at Frasne, before eleven o'clock, and
if Reille awaited the result of it before placing himself in motion,
he could not well move before noon ; therefore, there was no pos-
sibility of commencing the attack at Quatre-Bras before two, as it
actually happened. Now, at noon, the Prussian army in rear of
Ligny had just been reconnoitred, and it was rather late to advance
on Genape, when it had become necessary to march on Bry: it
would have been better, to have established the half of the left in
position in front of the Prince of Orange, to mask this corps, and
disposed of the other half for completing the defeat of the Prus-
sians, a manoeuvre that the previous delays did not prevent them
from executing.
We indeed know, that if the first and most important of the
principles of war is, to concentrate the main body of the forces to
strike a decisive blow on a portion of the enemy’s line, there is a
second which is the complement of it : it is, not to compromise
the weak wing, on the contrary, to refuse it in such a manner, that
it cannot engage in an unequal struggle. A serious engagement at
Quatre-Bras, was then a real misfortune at that hour.
For the rest, Monsieur le Duc, I refer you to my work, where I
have frankly stated what I thought of this uncertainty, that has
220 APPENDIX.
reigned throughout the morning of the 16th ; and as I perceive
that I have already written to too great a length, I will endeavor,
as well as in me iies, to recapitulate amid so many contradictions.
1st. It appears to me evident, that from the 15th, Napoleon ex-
pressed the desire that Quatre-Bras, as well as Sombref, should
be occupied. But as the right could not advance beyond Lambu-
sart, the night of the 15th, it is probable, that he was satisfied
with the left remaining between Frasne and Gosselies.
2d. In every state of the case, the delay caused to this occupa-
tion on the 15th, was of no consequence, as it sufficed that it should
take place on the 16th, towards eight or nine in the morning. If
the left was then required to move with this object at day-break, it
was necessary to reiterate the order during the night, as a verbal
order, the execution of which was annulled by the very events of
the previous night, could be very properly considered by the mar-
shal as not to be carried out, with the very probable idea that the
events would lead to new combinations the next day. Besides, to
concentrate the somewhat scattered troops of the left, it was very
necessary that d'Erlon's corps should receive orders before day.
Every thing, then, depends on knowing, what was said and done
at the night conference.
3d. As to the day of the 16th, the two orders expedited from
Charleroi, between seven and nine o'clock—one by Marshal Soult,
the other by Napoleon himself—appear to have been, in fact, the
first confirmation of the movement said to have been prescribed on
the evening of the 15th. Both of these dispatches, seem to have
preceded the reception of the information given by Grouchy, on
the arrival of grand Prussian masses towards Ligny. What seems
astonishing, is that an order, undoubtedly conceived by Napoleon
towards six in the morning, should not have reached Frasne before
eleven, and its execution not commenced till after mid-day.”
* In order to admit all the accounts from St. Helena, and properly un-
derstand them, it would be necessary, 1st. That Marshal Ney had received
the verbal order, urging him to advance on Quatre-Bras on the evening of
the 15th; 2d. That he had received anew the formal order during the
night, that is, at the interview ; 3d. That he had at seven declared in his
report, that he had again suspended its execution because of the junction
APPENDIX. - 221
4th. It is then incontestable, that the whole time from five
o'clock in the morning until noon, was not profited by in any
suitable manner, and to my view, every one contributed somewhat
to this blunder ; because there was delay in the final resolution,
and slowness in the transmission of orders, as well as in their exe-
cution.
5th. Be that as it may, at noon, the question entirely changed
its aspect; he found himself in presence of 90,000 Prussians; the
interest, wholly strategic, of the occupation of Quatre-Bras, then
became but of secondary importance, compared with the tactical
advantage of having Ney nearer to him, in hand, so as to have the
power of at once casting one of his two corps of infantry and his hea-
vy cavalry on the Prussians’ right flank, which could be executed
from Frasne as well as from Quatre-Bras. Undoubtedly, it had
been desirable that this central point of Quatre-Bras, should be
previously occupied by Reille's corps, and the light cavalry of
Colbert and Lefèbre-Desnouettes; but this was no longer a
decisive question, because, definitively, the route from Brussels
could be covered by leaving these corps in front of Frasne, to
mask that of the Prince of Orange, and nothing opposed the
throwing of d'Erlon and Valmy on Bry, with 20,000 men, as
became necessary when too late.
6th. This truth, that no enlightened military man will contest,
proves that the non-occupation of Quatre-Bras on the 16th,
though unfortunate, would not have had, in fact, the consequences
attributed to it, had orders been issued in time for the best possi-
ble employment of the left, which was not done till three hours
after mid-day.
This is, Monsieur le Duc, what seems to me to result, from
all the minute investigations in which I have indulged. Conse-
quently, I rest convinced, that if Marshal Ney received the verbal
order of the evening of the 15th, and took upon himself to defer
its execution, it was but a slight misfortune, very easily repaired
the next morning. As to this day of the 16th June, I also believe
of the two hostile armies; but the contents of the letters borne by Fla-
haut, or sent by Marshal Soult, really accord but slightly with this Sup-
position.
222 APPENDIX.
that no blame should attach to him, provided the formal injunc-
tion to advance at day-break on Quatre-Bras, was not verbally
retterated ºn the night conference at Charleroi, an uncertain
thing, quite Impossible to establish, if it be true that Marshal Soult
was not present at the interview.”
Undoubtedly, Marshal Ney would have acted skilfully, by
marching at all hazards on this important point, on the morning
of the 16th ; but a hesitation induced by a just prudence, and
the non-execution of orders formally received, differ widely ;
and to blame this prudence, it would be necessary still to know,
whether at the night conference, the emperor gave him to under-
stand that he would send him further instructions at day-break, a
circumstance that would have shackled the marshal's movements.
In all that has preceded, I have admitted the existence of the
verbal order of the evening of the 15th. If you succeed in de-
monstrating that the order written and borne by Flahaut, on the
morning of the 16th, was the first and only one prescribing the
occupation of Quatre-Bras, then the marshal would certainly be
acquitted of all blame, and sheltered from all criticism. This
frank and sincere expression will prove to you, to what extent I
am disposed to render justice to your father, while preserving my
impartiality as a historian. This impartiality is, I trust, suffi-
ciently well established, for any one to dream of reproaching me
with wishing to impair, in the slightest degree, the immense glory
of Napoleon, as no one has proclaimed it louder than myself. A
great captain may be induced, through false information, to make
incorrect suppositions concerning the intentions of the enemy, and
find himself led by it into committing actual faults, which would
not be such had his suppositions been well founded. The emperor
had, undoubtedly, powerful inducements for not taking a decisive
course before three o'clock; and these were probably the same
hat determined him not to dispatch Flahaut till nine, to pre-
* The declaration of Marshal Soult, mentioned in your pamphlet, states
that the emperor did not issue orders for the occupation of Quatre-Bras,
ill after breakfast on the 16th , but it does not positively deny, what may
laave been said verbally, and does not indicate that the major-general as-
sisted at the night conference.
APPENDIX. 223
scribe a movement which at that hour should have been already
executed.
I have not considered it my duty to raise the charge made by
many military men, on the marshal's recalling d'Erlon on the
night of the 16th, though he perceived Reille's corps overwhelmed .
by superior forces. : this was indeed an unfortunate incident, but
most generals in his position would have undoubtedly acted in the
same manner. Appreciating the importance of the route from
Brussels to Charleroi, which was the line of the army's retreat,
the marshal judged it necessary not to counterbalance, by a disas-
ter at this point, the partial success the emperor might obtain at
Ligny; such a resolution is of that number, that may not be op-
portune because of the turn of affairs, but which no enlightened
military man would condemn. Besides, on the next day—June
17th–the emperor only blamed him for having divided the left;
he must have then wished, either that the two corps had come to
Bry, or else had fought united at Quatre-Bras; now, as they were
already engaged at the latter point, by his orders, how could Reille
be withdrawn from the fight, and sent with d'Erlon upon Bry It
will, then, be objected, that it was not necessary to detach the latter
alone. But we are well aware that he received, through Labé-
doyère, a direct order to march on Bry; a movement that would
have certainly obtained an immense victory, had it been car-
ried out.
I will terminate my lóng epistle with a few words on the battle
of Waterloo, in which your father displayed such brilliant valor.
What has been said or printed, relative to the premature em-
ployment of cavalry, has appeared to me a puerile excuse; the
real misfortune was, in not having it properly supported by in-
fantry. - -
In my opinion, four principal causes led to this disaster:
The first, and most influential, was the arrival, skilfully com-
bined, of Blucher, and the false movement that favored this ar-
rival ; -
The second, was the admirable firmness of the British infantry,
joined to the sang-froid and aplomb of its chiefs:
The third, was the horrible weather, that had softened the
224. APPENDIX. -
ground, and rendered the offensive movements so toilsome, and re-
tarded till one o'clock the attack that should have been made in
the morning ;
The fourth, was the inconceivable formation of the first corps,
in masses very much too deep for the first grand attack.
The formation of masses, so unweildy and so exposed to the
ravages of the enemy's fire, was an incontestable error. . . . . .
To whom should it be imputed ? This will remain a problem for
a long time to come.
Was it a mistake, caused by the double signification of the
term columns by divisions, which applies indiscriminately, to the
divisions of four regiments or to divisions of two platoons. A
fatal confusion of terms, of which no one has yet dreamt of purging
the military technology.
On the contrary, was it the intention of the chiefs of the French
army, to form the troops in such a manner, that the divisions of
four regiments should form but a single column ! It would be in-
teresting to know this, but it will no doubt ever remain a mystery.
However, these causes, as I have stated, were only secondary,
and the most decisive was the arrival of Blucher with 65,000
Prussians, on the flank and rear of the French line; it was one
of those events that human prudence cannot always avert.
You will perhaps find my letter full of repetitions, they were
indispensable to give more clearness to my reasoning : as to my
conclusions, if they are but eventual, it is, that far from pretend-
ing to be the judge, I should be borne on the list of simple
reporters.
Accept the assurance of all my sentiments,
GENERAL J # * * *
PARIs, September 1st, 1841.
P. S. I send you here annexed, a printed copy of the letter I
purpose adding, at the end of my Political and Military Summary
of 1815. In attentively re-perusing this letter, I perceive that
three essential observations have escaped me, and I think it my
duty to notice them.
The first, tends to fortify the opinion, that Napoleon should not
APPENDIX. 225
have attached any value to the isolated occupation of Quatre-
Bras by the left wing, since the right could not press on as far
as Sombref. In fact, it is evident that if the two points were
occupied simultaneously, the position then offered the Imost bril-
liant advantages, united to perfect security, because the right
would be covered from the English, while the left remained with-
out the slightest uneasiness from the Prussians, who could no
longer reach it through Sombref. Thus the two masses of the
army not only reciprocally supported each other, but were free
from all anxiety of being taken in flank or in rear, and had, besides,
a reserve of 40,000 of the elite to march in the intermediate
space, and support both.
On the contrary, let us suppose the left of these masses pushed
alone on Quatre-Bras, Sombref not being strongly occupied ; then
this body would be in manifest danger, thus venturing between
two great armies, as it might be assailed on all sides ; from
Brussels by the English, from Nivelles by the Belgians, and from
Sombref by the whole Prussian army.
It would be the same with the right wing, if pushed, on the
evening of the 15th, as far as Sombref, the left not occupying
Quatre-Bras. It is thus incontestable, that the simultaneous ac-
cupation of the two points was necessary, in order to constitute a
skilful manoeuvre, and prove important in its results.
Another reflection has occurred to me, relative to the orders of
the 15th June : it is, that on that day, Marshal Grouchy com-
manded only the cavalry reserves, and had not an infantry soldier
at his disposal, as it was only on the morning of the 16th, that
the command of the right wing was conferred upon him. It could,
then, be very possible, that Napoleon had ordered the chief of his
cavalry to press forward with his numerous squadrons to Sombref,
not in order to take up a position for battle, but solely as a strong
reconnoitering party, with the double object of gathering reliable
information, and annoying the movements of the allies, while
concentrating their forces by this cross-road. Then on the morn-
ing of the 16th, the two masses of infantry should have been re-
quired to occupy, militarily and simultaneously, the two decisive
10%
226 APPENDIX.
points of the whole operation, thus rendering the junction of the
enemy's armies impossible.
This circumstance of the cavalry command, to which I have
not given sufficient attention, world authcrize us in believing, that
Napoleon might order Grouchy, during the 15th, to press forward
to Sombref, without dreaming of advancing infantry masses
separately on Quatre-Bras. The encumbrances existing at the
different bridges on the Sambre, and the delays experienced by
the infantry, still strengthen this opinion. Besides, I believe
have demonstrated, that it was more prudent, and at the same time
sufficient, to take possession of Quatre-Bras on the morning of
the 16th.
The last observation I think it proper to make, relates to the
resolution taken by General Reille, not to put his corps on the
march at ten o’clock on the morning of the 16th, after General
Flahaut had communicated to him the orders he was bearing to
Marshal Ney. I do not think, that he is deserving of the least
censure on this account: we must not forget, that General Reille
had just sent—nine o’clock—the positive information of the re-
sence of the entire Prussian army towards Ligny: he must nave
concluded from this, that the left would be called upon to take part
in the attack of this army, and that it would be unfortunate if, after
such information, he took the Genape route, when it would be ne-
cessary to turn to the right towards Bry. This reasoning was
more than logical, it was based on the laws of la grande tactique,
and the emperor himself, had he been present at Gosselies, at the
reception of the information given by General Girard, would not
have acted differently from Reille. We must also add, that the
emperor's orders were addressed to Marshal Ney, and that it was
from him that he should expect the final decision, as to the move-
ment to be made.
However, this delay had little influence on the course of affairs;
nothing would have resulted from it, except at the commencement
of the battle of Quatre-Bras, between two and four o’clock. If
Reille, followed later by d'Erlon had reached this point at mid-
day, it is probable that the Prince of Orange would have been dis-
lodged, before the arrival of Wellington, and of the Fnglish
APPENDIX. 227
coming from Brussels and Nivelles: Marshal Ney, instead of being
repulsed and forced to retreat on Frasr 2, would have maintained
his position, but this was all that could be expected from him, as
towards evening he would have had over 40,000 men against him.
He could not have even held this post, but under the supposition
that d'Erlon had been with him ; so that this would not have given
one man the more, to fight the Prussians : the marshal would
have repulsed Wellington, instead of being repulsed by him—that
is all.
The battle of Ligny could not then have produced decisive re-
sults, but with the co-operation of the whole or half of the left
wing ; and to effect this, the surest means were to do what was
undoubtedly Reille's wish : to halt the left in rear of the rivulet
of Pont-à-Miqueloup, between Gosselies and Frasne, in order to
detach from it a strong portion upon Bry, on the Prussian flank.
I think, Monsieur le Duc, that all learned military men will up-
hold me in my opinion.
Accept the renewed expressions of all my sentiments,
GENERAL J # * * * *
£ ARIs, Cºctober 18th, 1841.
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JUDGE-Advocate GENEnAL's OFFICE,
October 13, 1862. }
* * * So far as I have been enabled to examine this volume, it seems to me carefully
and accurately prepared, and I am satisfied that you have rendered an acceptable service to
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to the interest and usefulness of the volume. Very respectfully,
Your obedient servant, J. HOLT.
D. van Nostrand's PUBLICATIONs.
LEMENTS OF MILITARY ART AND HISTORY.
By EDwARD DE LA BARRE DUPARcQ, Chef de Bataillon of Engineers in
the Army of France; and Professor of the Military Art in the
Imperial School of St. Cyr. Translated by Brig-Gen. Geo. W.
CULLUM, U. S. A., Chief of the Staff of Major-Gen. H. W. HAL-
LECK, General-in-Chief U. S. Army. 1 vol., octavo, cloth. $4.
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*ENTON'S ORDNANCE AND GUNNERY.
A Course of Instruction in Ordnance and Gunnery; compiled for
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Principal Assistant to Chief of Ordnance, U. S. A. Second
Edition, revised and enlarged. l vol., 8vo, half morocco, cuts.
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D. VAN NoSTRAND’s PUBLICATIONs.
HE ARTILLERIST's MANUAL:
Compiled from various Sources, and adapted to the Service of the
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vol., 8vo, half roan. $5.
This book is now considered the standard authority for that particular branch of the
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AND-BOOK OF ARTILLERY,
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* * * “In the opinion of your Committee, the arrangement of the subjects and the
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(Signed.) I. WOGDES, Capt. 1st Artillery.
(Signed.) E. O. C. ORD, Capt. 3d Artillery.
(Signed.) J. A. HASKIN, Bot. Maj. and Capt. 1st Artillery,
D. VAN NOSTRAND’s PUBLICATIONS.
UTHORIZED U. S. INFANTRY TACTICs.
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- WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, August 11, 1862.
The System of Infantry Tactics prepared by Brig.-Gen. Silas Casey, U. S. A., having
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First, That portion which requires that two companies shall be permanently detached
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“A regiment is composed of ten companies, which will be habitually posted from right
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second, according to the rank of Captain.” EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of Wor.
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º G. W. CULLUM, Brigadier-General U. S. A.
Chief of General Halleck's Staff, Chief Engineer Department Mississippi.
f :5
M ANUAL FOR ENGINEER TROOPS.
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Part I. Ponton Drill.
II. Practical Operations of a Siege.
III. School of the Sap.
IV. Military Mining.
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'IELE's HAND-Book.
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D. VAN NOSTRAND’s PUBLICATIONs.
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student with a perfect miniature regiment, in which the position in the battalion of each
company, and of every officer and man in each division, company, platoon, and section, is
clearly indicated. It supplies the studious soldier with the means whereby he can con-
sult his “ tactics,” and at the same time join practice to theory by manoeuvring a mimic
regiment.
T}epartment of the South,
Beaufort, South Carolina, ()ct. 21st, 1862.
I hereby certify that I have examined the “Automaton Regiment,” invented by G.
Douglas Brewerton, late of the U. S. Regular Army, and now serving as a Volunteer Aide
upon my military staff, and believe that his invention will prove a useful and valuable
assistant to every student of military tactics. I take pleasure in recommending it accord-
ingly. R. SAXTON,
ISrºg.-General Volunteers.
IIEAD-QUARTERs, MILITARY ...}
YHE AUTOMATON COMPANY ; OR, INFAN-
TRY SOLDIERS! PRACTICAL INSTRUCTOR.
For all Company Movements in the Field. By G. Douglas BREwBR-
ToN, U. S. A. Price in boxes, $1.25; when sent by mail, $1.95.
HE AUTOMATON BATTERY, OR, ARTIL-
LERISTS PRACTICAL INSTRUCTOR.
For all Mounted Artillery Manoeuvres in the Field. By G. Douglas
BREweRTON, U. S. A. Price in boxes, $1; when sent by
mail, $1. 40.

D. VAN NOSTRAND's PUBLICATIONs.
YSTEMS OF MILITARY BRIDGES,
In Use by the United States Army; those adopted by the Great Eu-
ropean Powers; and such as are employed in British India. With
Directions for the Preservation, Destruction, and Re-establish-
ment of Bridges. By Brig.-General GeoRGE W. CULLUM, Lieut.-
Col. Corps of Engineers, United States Army. 1 vol., octavo.
With numerous Illustrations. $3.5o.
“It is a trite remark that of all the operations of war none is more difficult and hazard-
ous than the passage of a large river in the presence of a bold and active enemy. The
importance to this country of such a work as the present, when our armies have to pass
So many great rivers, cannot be over-estimated. We have no man more competent to pre-
pare such a work than Brigadier-General Cullum, who had the almost exclusive Supervi-
Sion, devising, building, and preparing for service of the various bridge-trains sent to our
armies in Mexico during our war with that country. The treatise before us is very com-
plete, and has evidently been prepared with scrupulous care. The descriptions of the
various systems of military bridges adopted by nearly all civilized nations are very inte-
resting even to the non-professional reader, and to those specially interested in such subjects
must be very instructive, for they are evidently the work of a master of the art of military
bridge-building.”– Washington Chronicle.
ILITARY AND POLITICAL LIFE OF THE
* EMPEROR NAPOLEON.
By BARON Jomini, General-in-Chief and Aide-de-camp to the Emperor
of Russia. Translated from the French, with notes, by H. W.
HALLECK, LL. D., Major-General U. S. Army. 4 vols., Royal
octavo. Fully Illustrated by Maps and Plans. In press
\ELAFIELD's REPORT.
Report on the Art of War in Europe in 1854, 1855, and 1856. By
Col. R. DELAFIELD, Corps of Engineers U. S. A. 1 vol. folio,
cloth. With maps and views. $5.


D. VAN NOSTRAND’s PUBLICATIONs.
HE “C. S. A.,” AND THE BATTLE of
BULL RUN.
(A Letter to an English friend), by J. G. BARNARD, Lt.-Col. of Engi-
neers, U. S. A., Brigadier-General and Chief Engineer, Army
of the Potomac. With five maps. 1 vol., 8vo, cloth. $1 50.
“This book was begun by the author as a letter to a friend in England, but as he pro-
ceeded and his MSS. increased in magnitude, he changed his original plan, and the book
is the result. General Barnard gives by far the best, most comprehensible, and complete
account of the Battle of Bull Run we have seen. It is illustrated by some beautifull y drawn
maps, prepared for the War Department by the topographical engineers. He demonstrates
to a certainty that but for the causeless panic the day might not have been lost. The
author writes with vigor and earnestness, and has contributed one of the most valuable re-
cords yet published of the history of the war.”—Boston Commercial Bulletin.
“The work is clearly written, and can but leave the impression upon every reader's
mind that it is truth. We commend it to the perusal of every one who wants an intelli-
gent, truthful, and graphic description of the ‘C. S.A., and the Battle of Bull Run.”—New
York: Observer.
HE POLITICAL AND MILITARY HISTORY
OF THE CAMPAIGN OF WATERLOO.
*Translated from the French of General BARON DE Jomini. By
Capt. S. V. BENET, U. S. Ordnance. 1 vol., 12mo, cloth, sec-
ond edition. 75 cents,
“Baron Jomini has the reputation of being one of the greatest military historians and
critics of the century. His merits have been recognized by the highest military authori-
ties in Europe, and were rewarded in a conspicuous manner by the greatest military power
in Christendom. He learned the art of war in the school of experience, the best and only
finishing School of the Soldier. He served with distinction in nearly all the campaigns of
Napoleon, and it was mainly from the gigantic military operations of this matchless mas-
ter of the art that he was enabled to discover its true principles, and to ascertain the best
means of their application to the infinity of combinations which actual war presents.
Jomini criticises the details of Waterloo with great science, and yet in a manner that
interests the general reader as well as the professional.”—New York World.
“This book by Jomini, though forming the twenty-second chapter of his ‘Life of Na-
poleon,’ is really a unit in itself, and forms a complete summary of the campaign. It is
an interesting volume, and deserves a place in the affections of all who would be accom-
plished military men.”—New York Times.
“The present volume is the concluding portion of his great work, ‘Wie Politique et
Militaire de Napoleon,’ published in 1826. Capt. Benet's translation of it has been for
some time before the public, and has now reached a second edition; it is very ably exe-
cuted, and forms a work which will always be interesting, especially so at a time when
military affairs are uppermost in the public mind.—Philadelphia North American.
D. VAN NosTRAND’s PUBLICATIONs.
A TREATISE ON THE CAMP AND MARCH.
With which is connected the Construction of Field Works and Mili-
tary Bridges; with an Appendix of Artillery Ranges, &c. For
the use of Volunteers and Militia in the United States. By
Captain HENRY D. GRAFTON, U. S. A. 1 vol., 12mo, cloth.
75 cents.
Gussºry IN 1858.
A Treatise on Rifles, Cannon, and Sporting Arms. By W.M. GREENER,
C. E. 1 vol., 8vo, cloth. $3. Full calf, $4 50.
|ANUAL OF HEAVY ARTILLERY.
%
g
Fº
º
For the use of Volunteers. 1 vol., 12mo, red cloth. 75 cents.'
“Should be in the hands of every Artillerist.”—N. Y. Illustrated Mezcs,
“This is a concise and well-prepared Manual, adapted to the wants of Volunteers. The
instruction, which is of an important nature, is presented in a simple and clear style, such ,
as will be easily understood. The volume is also illustrated with explanatory cuts and
drawings. It is a work of practical value, and one needed at the present time in the ser-
vice.”—Boston Commercial Bulletén.
; INTs To CoMPANY OFFICERS ON THEIR
* MILITARY DUTIES.
By Capt. C. C. ANDREws, 3d Regt. Minnesota Vols. 1 vol., 18mo,
cloth. 50 cents.
“This is a hand-book of good practical advice, which officers of all ranks may study with
advantage."—Philadelphia Press,
“This little volume contains many valuable suggestions, and conveys not a little im-
portant practical information to military men. It should be read and its precepts remem-
bered by every young officer.”—Cincinnati Daily Gazette.
“We wish it could be read and studied by all having men under their command,”-
A. Y. Commercial Advertiser.




D. VAN NOSTRAND’s PUBLICATIONS.
Rºles AND RIFLE PRACTICE.
An Elementary Treatise on the Theory of Rifle Firing; explaining
the causes of Inaccuracy of Fire and the manner of correcting it;
with descriptions of the Infantry Rifles of Europe and the Uni-
ted States, their Balls and Cartridges. By Capt. C. M. WIL-
Cox, U. S. A. New edition, with engravings and cuts. Green
cloth. $1.75.
“Although eminently a scientific work, special care seems to have been taken to avoid
the use of technical terms, and to make the whole subject readily comprehensible to the
practical enquirer. It was designed chiefly for the use of Volunteers and the Militia; but
the War Department has evinced its approval of its merits by ordering from the pub-
lisher one thousand copies for the use of the United States Army.”—Louisville Journal.
“The book will be found intensely interesting to all who are watching the changes in the
art of war arising from the introduction of the new rifled arms. We recommend to our
readers to buy the book.”—Military Gazette.
“A most valuable treatise.”—New York IIerald. -
“This book is quite original in its character. That character is completeness. It ren-
ders a study of most of the works on the rifle that have been published quite unnecessary,
We cordially recommend the book.”—United Service Gazette, London.
“The work being in all its parts derived from the best sources, is of the highest author-
ity, and will be accepted as the standard on the subject of which it treats.”—New Yorker.
New BAYONET ExERCISE.
A New Manual of the Bayonet, for the Army and Militia of the
United States. By Colonel J. C. KELTon, U. S. A. With
thirty beautifully-engraved plates. Red cloth. $1.75.
This Manual was prepared for the use of the Corps of Cadets, and has been introduced
at the Military Academy with satisfactory results. It is simply the theory of the attack
and defence of the Sword applied to the bayonet, on the authority of men skilled in the
use of arms.
The Manual contains practical lessons in Fencing, and prescribes the defence against
Cavalry, and the manner of conducting a contest with a Swordsman.
“This work merits a favorable reception at the hands of all military men. It contains
all the instruction necessary to enable an officer to drill his men in the use of this weapon.
The introduction of the Sabre Bayonet in our army renders a knowledge of the exercise .
more imperative.”—New York Times.
Ew MANUAL OF Sword AND SABRE Ex-
ERCISE.
By Colonel J. C. KELTON, U. S. A. Thirty plates. In press.
D. VAN NOSTRAND’s PUBLICATIONs.
ANUAL FOR QUARTERMASTERS AND COM-
MISSARIES.
Containing Instructions in the Preparation of Vouchers, Abstracts,
Returns, &c., embracing all the recent changes in the Army
Regulations, together with instructions respecting Taxation of
Salaries, etc. By Captain R. F. HUNTER, late of the U. S.
Army. 12mo, cloth. $1.
“This is a compendious volume of 119 pages, containing a large amount of useful infor-
mation in a small compass. The directions for making up the abstracts and returns of the
Quartermaster's and Commissary's departments will afford great facilities to persons charg-
ed with those duties; and as this is the only work in existence which is devoted to these
particular objects, and as the accounts of Quartermasters and Commissaries are subjected
to the most rigid scrutiny, this Manual supplies a want which has long been experienced
and sensibly felt by those for whose use and particular benefit the book is intended. The
arrangement of the matter is extremely perspicuous, and the explanations are complete and
easily understood.”—Army and Navy Gazette.
“This is the only work of the kind extant. It is based on the latest regulations of the
War Department, and will be regarded as authority by those officers for whose use it is
designed.”—Saturday Evening Gazette,
RMY PAY DIGEST, AND READY CALCULA-
TOR, OR, REGIMENTAL PAY TABLE.
Compiled by Major EzRA WEBB. Octavo, cloth. $2.
“A complete condensation of the military laws and general army orders, as relates to pay
emoluments, &c., in the United States Army, from the commencement of the Itebellion ió
the present time—an invaluable companion to paymasters as well as to all officers and sol-
diers in our armies. It is desirable to every one interested in the pay of the army or seek-
ing information on the subject (including pensions, claims against the United States and
mode of procedure), Saving, as it will, a great amount of research, putting very desirable
information within the reach of every one. All may see at a glance the pay of officers (in-
cluding subsistence, forage, servants and their clothing, transportation, fuel, and quarters)
and men of all arms and grades per day or days, month or months; the organization of the
army, from ‘the company’ to the ‘corps d'armée.” Indeed, it is emphatically the book
for the times; and a copy should be in the hands of every man in the army, as also bank-
ers, contractors, claim agents, &c.”—Wew York. Herald,
D. VAN NOSTRAND’s PUC.I.C.A.T.:ox3.
RACTICAL TREATISE ON LIMES, HYDRAU-
LIC CEMENTS, AND MORTARS.
Papers on Practical Engineering, U. S. Engineer Department, No
9, containing Reports of numerous experiments conducted in
New York City, during the years 1858 to 1861 inclusive. By
Q. A. GILLMoRE, Brig.-General U. S. Volunteers, and Major
U. S. Corps of Engineers. With numerous illustrations. One
volume octavo. $3.50.
*
/ | "HE CONTRACTORs' MANUAL AND BUILD-
ERs’ PRICE-BOOK.
By A. B. CLough, Architect. 1 vol., 18mo. 50 cents.
Pºisºries AND PRACTICE OF EMBANKING
LANDS FROM RIVER FLOODs,
As applied to the Levees of the Mississippi. By WILLIAM Hewson,
Civil Engineer. I vol., 8vo, cloth. $2.o.o.
Woodbury ON THE ARCH.
Treatise on the various Elements of Stability in the well-proportioned
Arch. With numerous Tables of the Ultimate and Actual
Thrust. By Captain D. P. WooDBURY, U. S. Corps of Engi-
neers. 1 vol., 8vo. Engravings. Cloth, $2.50.
Souadron TACTIcs UNDER STEAM.
Bv FoxHALL A. PARKER, Commander U. S. Navy. Published by
- authority of the Navy Department. 1 vol., 8vo., with numer-
ous Plates. In press.
D. VAN NoSTRAND’s PUBLICATIONS.
l | |REATISE ON GRAND MILITARY OPERATIONS.
Illustrated by a Critical and Military History of the Wars, of Frederick
the Great. With a summary of the most important principles
of the Art of War. By BARON DE Jomini. Illustrated by Maps
and Plans. Translated from the French, by Col. S. B. HoLA-
BIRD, A. D. C., U. S. Army. In two vols., octavo. In press.
History OF WEST POINT.
And its Military Importance during the American Revolution; and the
Origin and Progress of the United States Military Academy. By
Captain EDw ARD C. BoxRTON, A. M., Adjutant of the Military
Academy. With numerous Maps and Engravings. 1 vol., octavo.
Blue cloth, $5.00.
Murray BRIDGES,
For the Passage of Infantry, Artillery, and Baggage-Trains; with sug-
gestions of many new expedients and constructions for crossing
streams and chasms; designed to utilize the resources ordinarily
at command and reduce the amount and cost of army transporta-
tion. Including also designs for Trestle and Truss Bridges for
Military Railroads, adapted especially to the wants of the Ser-
vice of the United States. By Her MAN HAUPT, Brig.-Gen. in
charge of the construction and operation of the U. S. Military
Railways, Author of “General Theory of Bridge Construction,
&c.” With 3oo Plates and Illustrations. Octavo. Inpress.
EPORT OF THE ENGINEER AND ARTILLERY
OPERATIONS OF THE ARMY OF THE PO-
TOMAC,
From its Organization to the close of the Peninsular Campaign. By
Brig.-Gen. J. G. BARNARD, and other Engineer Officers, and
Brig.-Gen. W. F. BARRY, Chief of Artillery. Illustrated by
numerous Maps, Plans, &c. Octavo. $3.50.
D. VAN NOSTRAND’s PUBLICATIONs.
EAVY ARTILLERY TACTICs.--1863.
Instruction for Heavy Artillery; prepared by a Board of Officers, for
the use of the Army of the United States. With service of a
gun mounted on an iron carriage. In one volume, 12mo, with
numerous illustrations. Price $2.
“WAR DEPARTMENT,
“WASHINGTON, D.C., Oct. 20, 1862.
“This system of Heavy Artillery Tactics, prepared under direction of the War Depart-
ment, having been approved by the President, is adopted for the instruction of troops
when acting as heavy artillery.”
EDWIN M. STANTON,
Secretary of War.
“We presume that this is the most complete treatise on Heavy Artillery that has ever been
published in this or any other country. It seems to take in every thing bearing on the
subject, and its instructions are ample and exceedingly clear. Some forty illustrative
plates are given, and the text is clearly and legibly printed.”—N. Y. Commercial Adver-
tiser.
“This volume, prepared under the direction of the War Department and officially adopt-
ed as the code of artillery instruction for the public Service, like all Van Nostrand's mil-
itary publications, is got up in the most substantial and elegant style both of printing and
binding. Its contents are evidently the work of thorough practical and scientific military
engineers, and embrace all the important as well as minute details of heavy artillery prac-
tice.
“The First Part consists of sixteen lessons relating to the service of the single piece, in
cluding the gun, howitzer, mortar, and columbiad; also the formation of batteries, the art
of aiming pieces and firing hot-shot. Part Second relates entirely to mechanical manoeu-
vres and appliances, for handling, mounting, dismounting, and transporting heavy pieces.
Part Third is of a miscellaneous character, containing directions for embarking and disem-
barking artillery and ordnance stores; also, tables of dimensions and weights of guns, car-
iages, shot, shell, machines, and implements, with charges for and ranges of heavy artil-
lery. These instructions are not only copious in detail, but aptly illustrated with thirty-
nine elegant steel-plate engravings.”—Bulletiºn. -
| S. TACTICs FOR COLORED TROOPS.
U. S. Infantry Tactics, for the Instruction, Exercise, and Manoeuvres
of the Soldier, a Company, Line of Skirmishers, and Battalion,
for the use of the Colored TRoops of the United States Infantry.
Prepared under the direction of the War Department. I volume,
plates, $1.5o. .
“WAR DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, March 9, 1863.
“This system of United States Infantry Tactics, prepared under the direction of the War
Department, for the use of the Colored Troops of the United States Infantry, having been
approved by the President, is adopted for the instruction of such troops.”
EDWIN M, STANTON, Secretary of War.

D. VAN NOSTRAND’s PUBLICATIONs.
Sword-Pay. f
The Militiaman's Manual and Sword-Play without a Master. – Rapier
and Broad-Sword Exercises copiously Explained and Illustrated;
Small-Arm Light Infantry Drill of the United States Army;
Infantry Manual of Percussion Muskets; Company Drill of the
United States Cavalry. By Major M. W. BERRIMAN, engaged
for the last thirty years in the practical instruction of Military
Students. Second edition. 1 vol., 12mo, red cloth. $1.
“Captain Berriman has had thirty years' experience in teaching military students, and
his work is written in a simple, clear, and soldierly style. It is illustrated with twelve
plates, and is one of the cheapest and most complete works of the kind published in this
country.”—New York World.
“This work will be found very valuable to all persons seeking military instruction; but
it recommends itself most especially to officers, and those who have to use the sword or
sabre. We believe it is the only work on the use of the sword published in this country.”
—Wew York: Tablet.
“It is a work of obvious merit and value.”—Boston Traveller.
A SYSTEM OF TARGET PRACTICE.
For the use of Troops when armed with the Musket, Rifle-Musket,
Rifle, or Carbine. Prepared, principally from the French, by
Captain HENRY HETH, 1 oth Infantry, U. S. A. 18mo, cloth.
50 CentS.
“WAR DEPARTMENT,
“WASHINGTON, March 1st, 1858.
“The System of Target Practice, prepared under direction of the War Department by
Captain Henry Heth, 10th Infantry, having been approved, is adopted for the instruction
of troops when armed with the musket, rifle-musket, rifle, or carbine.”
JoHN B. FLOYD, Secretary of War.
School OF THE GUIDES.
Designed for the use of the Militia of the United States. Flexible
cloth. 50 cents.
“This excellent compilation condenses into a compass of less than sixty pages all the
instruction necessary for the guides, and the information being disconnected with other
matters, is more readily referred to and more easily acquired.”—Louisville Journal.
“It has received high praise, and will prove of great service in perfecting the drill of our
Militia.”—W. American and U. S. Gazette, Phil.
D. VAN NoSTRAND's PUBLICATIONS.,
ANUAL OF INSTRUCTIONS FOR MILITARY
SURGEONS,
In the Examination of Recruits and Discharge of Soldiers. With an
Appendix containing the Official Regulations of the Provost Mar-
shai General’s Bureau, and those for the formation of the Invalid
Corps, &c., &c. Prepared at the request of the United States
Sanitary Commission. By John ORDRONAux, M. D., Professor
of Medical Jurisprudence in Columbia College, New York.
12mo. Half morocco. $1.50. -
“The author has drawn his materials from the best accredited Sources of information
and the highest authorities in both hemispheres. IIe selects France and Prussia, as the
representative military nations of Europe, and he has adopted as closely as possible their
order of instruction on the subjects of the enlistments and discharges of soldiers; and, in
the form of an Appendix, he has embodied the Code of Instructions relating to the U. S.
Army, adopted by the Board of Medical Officers, convened at Washington for that purpose,
on the 15th of April, 1863, to which are also added the Regulations governing the forma-
tion of our Invalid Corps. Nothing of importance to army surgeons has been omitted.”—
Army and Navy Gazette.
“In a condensed form it is an admirable treatise on the important subjects of which it
treats. The author has aimed to be brief without being obscure, to omit nothing of real
importance, and to draw his materials from the best sources. He treats of the physical dis-
abilities which have relation to the military Service, and of these alone. Medical Exami-
ners are instructed in their duties, and the method of discovering feigned, artificially pro-
duced, and concealed diseases is pointed out. The book will prove valuable to all who are
concerned in the manipulation of recruits or conscripts. An Appendix contains official
regulations and instructions relative to the Provost-Marshal's office, the Invalid Corps,
&c.”—Commercial Advertiser.
INTs ON THE PRESERVATION OF HEALTH
IN ARMIRs.
For the use of Volunteer Officers and Soldiers. By John ORDRONAux,
M. D. New edition, 18mo, cloth. 50 cents.
D. v.AN NOSTRAND’s PUBLICATIONS.
TREATISE ON ORDNANCE AND NAVAL
GUNNERY.
Compiled and arranged as a Text-Book for the U. S. Naval Acade-
my, by Lieutenant Edward SIMPson, U. S. N. Third edi-
tion, revised and enlarged. 1 vol., 8vo, plates and cuts, half
morocco. $4.
“As the compiler has charge of the instruction in Naval Gunnery at the Naval Acad-
emy, his work, in the compilation of which he has consulted a large number of eminent
authorities, is probably well suited for the purpose designed by it—namely, the circulation
of information which many officers, owing to constant service afloat, may not have been
able to collect. In simple and plain language it gives instruction as to cannon, gun-car-
riages, gunpowder, projectiles, fuzes, locks, and primers; the theory of pointing guns, rifles,
the practice of gunnery, and a great variety of other similar matters, interesting to fight-
ing men on Sea and land.”— Washington Daily Globe.
“A vast amount of information is conveyed in a readable and familiar form. The illustra-
tions are excellent, and many of them unique, being colored or bronzed so as to represent
various military arms, &c., with more than photographic literalness.”— Washington Star.
“It is scarcely necessary for us to say, that a work prepared by a writer so practically
conversant with all the subjects of which he treats, and who has such a reputation for
scientific ability, eannot fail to take at once a high place among the text-books of our naval
service. It has been approved by the Secretary of the Navy, and will henceforth be one of
the standard authorities on all matters connected with Naval Gunnery.”—New York:
IIerot!d.
UCE's SEAMANSHIP :
Compiled from various authorities, and Illustrated with numerous
Original and Selected Designs. For the use of the United States
Naval Academy. By S. B. LUCE, Lieut.-Commander U. S. N.
In two parts. Second Edition. One royal octavo volume,
cloth, $1 o.oo
D. VAN NOSTRAND’s PUBLICATIONs.
LEMENTARY INSTRUCTION IN NAVAL ORD.
NANCE AND GUNNERY. -
By JAMEs H. WARD, Commander U.S. Navy, Author of “ Naval
Tactics,” and “Steam for the Million.” New Edition, revised
and enlarged. 8vo, cloth. $2.
“It conveys an amount of information in the same space to be found nowhere else, and
given with a clearness which renders it useful as well to the general as the professional
inquirer.”—N. Y. Evening Post.
Nautical RouTINE AND STOWAGE.
With Short Rules in Navigation. By John McLeoD MURPHY and
WM. N. JEFFERs, Jr., U. S. N. 1 vol., 8vo, blue cloth.
$2 50.
/ | \OTTEN's NAVAL TEXT-Book.
Naval Text-Book and Dictionary, compiled for the use of the Mid-
shipmen of the U. S. Navy. By Commander B. J. ToTTEN,
U. S. N. Second and revised edition. 1 vol., 12mo. $2 5o.
“This work is prepared for the Midshipmen of the United States Navy. It is a complete
manual of instructions as to the duties which pertain to their office, and appears to have
been prepared with great care, avoiding errors and inaccuracies which had crept into a
former edition of the work, and embracing valuable additional matter. It is a book which
should be in the hands of every midshipman, and officers of high rank in the navy would
often find it a useful companion.”—Boston Journal.
( | UNNERY INSTRUCTIONS.
Simplified for the Volunteer Officers of the U. S. Navy, with hints
to Executive and other Officers. By Lieut. Edward BARRETT,
U. S. N., Instructor of Gunnery, Navy Yard, Brooklyn. I
vol., 12mo, cloth. $1 25.
“It is a thorough work, treating plainly on its subject, and contains also some valuable
hints to executive officers. No officer in the volunteer navy should be without a copy.”—
Boston Evening Traveller.
D. VAN NOSTRAND’s PUBLICATIONS.
HE WAR IN THE UNITED STATES.
A Report to the Swiss Military Department. Preceded by a Dis-
course to the Federal Military Society assembled at Berne, Aug.
18, 1862. By FERDINAND LEcoMTE, Lieut.-Col. Swiss Confed-
eration. Author of “Relation Historique et Critique de la Cam-
pagne d’Italie en 1859,” “L’Italie en 1860,” and “Le Gé-
néral Jomini, sa Vie, et ses Ecrits,” etc., etc. Translated from
the French by a Staff Officer. 1 vol., 12mo, $1.
“Returning to Switzerland from a campaign authorized by the Swiss Military Depart-
ment, Col. Lecomte addressed a discourse to the Federal Military Society, at Berne, in
which he stated very clearly and concisely the circumstances leading to the present war,
the situation of the country at the time of the commencement of the troubles, and the
progress of events up very nearly to the present time.
“In his quality of a Swiss federal officer, Col. Lecomte, bearing the recommendations of
the Federal Military Department of Switzerland, of Mr. Fogg, Ambassador of the U. S. at
Berne, and of others, was well received by Mr. Seward, Secretary of State, and by General
McClellan, and by the Swiss Consul at New York. General McClellan, at Washington
attached him to his staff as a voluntary aide-de-camp, he retaining his Swiss rank of Major,
and with the condition of being able at any time to return to his country, should he be
called thither by his government. He met on that staff with other European officers, oc-
cupying that position on the Same terms with himself. So that he had good opportunities
of being informed on the merits of the war, and the manner of its conduct, and being an
intelligent man, as this report demonstrates, he made the most of that opportunity.
“He very lucidly describes the theatre of the war, statistically and geographically, the
parties in the strife and their relations to each other; the causes of the war; the earliest
hostilities; the relative strength of the armies; the principal military acts, from Big Bethel
onwards; the armament, equipment, clothing, materials, subsistence, &c., of the service;
armored vessels and their transactions; his own personal impressions in regard to the de-
fects of the American Army, &c. Then there is a supplementary report of great interest,
describing the later events of the author's observation and experience: the whole making
one of the most valuable contributions to the literary history of the war we have had.”—
JºaºpreSS.
HE LAW OF FREEDOM AND BONDAGE IN
THE UNITED STATES.
By John CodMAN HURD, Counsellor at Law. 2 vols., octavo. Price,
bound in cloth, $7. Law sheep, $8.
“Mr. Hurd has completed a work which must take its place as the standard authority in
the branch of Law to which it relates. It is strictly a legal work, committed to no theory,
designed to sustain no individual phase of opinion, but comprising an outline of the entire
legislation, constitutional and statutory of the general government and the individual states
on the subject of slavery, with an analysis of all the legal decisions and judicial dicta grow-
in : out of such legislation.”—Worth American Review.
D. VAN NOSTRAND's PUBLICATIONS.
Histº OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL
ACADEMY.
With Biographical Sketches, and the names of all the Superintend-
ents, Professors and Graduates; to which is added a Record of
some of the earliest votes by Congress, of Thanks, Medals and
Swords to Naval Officers. By Edward CHAUNCEY MARSHAll,
A. M. 1 vol., 12mo, cloth, plates. $1.
“Every naval man will find it not only a pleasant companion, but an invaluable book of
reference. It is seldom that So much information is made accessible in so agreeable
a manner in so small a space.”—New York Times.
Masºn OF INTERNAL RULES AND REG-
ULATIONS FOR MEN-OF-WAR.
By Commodore U. P. Levy, U. S. N., late Flag Officer commanding
U. S. Naval Force in the Mediterranean, &c. Flexible blue
cloth. Third edition, revised and enlarged. 50 cents.
“Among the professional publications for which we are indebted to the war, we willing-
ly give a prominent place to this useful little Manual of Rules and Regulations to be
observed on board of ships of war. Its authorship is a sufficient guarantee for its accuracy
and practical value; and as a guide to young officers in providing for the discipline,
police, and sanitary government of the vessels under their command, we know of nothing
superior.”—W. Y. Herald,
Naval LIGHT ARTILLERY.
Instructions for Naval Light Artillery, afloat and ashore, prepared
and arranged for the U. S. Naval Academy, by Lieutenant W.
H. PARKER, U. S. N. Second edition, revised by Lieut. S. B.
Luce, U. S. N., Assistant Inſtructor of Gunnery and Tactics at
the United States Naval Academy. 1 vol., 8vo, cloth, with 22
plates. $1.50.
“The service for which this is the text-book of instruction is of special importance in
the present war. The use of light boat-pieces is constant and important, and young offi-
cers are frequently obliged to leave their boats, take their pieces ashore, and manoeuvre
them as field artillery. Not unfrequently, also, they are incorporated, when ashore, with
troops, and must handle their guns like the artillery soldiers of a battery. ' The Exercise
of the Howitzer Afloat was prepared and arranged by Captain Dahlgren, whose name
gives additional sanction and value to the book. A manual for the Sword and Pistol is
also given. The plates are numerous and exceedingly clear, and the whole typography
excellent.”—Philadelphia Inquirer.
D. VAN NoSTRAND’s PUBLICATIONs.
| ESSONS AND PRACTICAL NoTES ON STEAM,
The Steam-Engine, Propellers, &c., &c., for Young Marine Engi-
neers, Students, and others. By the late W. R. KING, U. S. N.
Revised by Chief-Engineer J. W. KING, U. S. Navy. Fourth
edition, enlarged. 8vo, cloth. $2 oo.
“This is the second edition of a valuable work of the late W. R. KING, U. S. N. It con-
tains lessons and practical notes on Steam and the Steam-Engine, Propellers, &c. It is
calculated to be of great use to young marine engineers, students, and others. The text is
illustrated and explained by numerous diagrams and representations of machinery. This
new edition has been revised and enlarged by Chief Engineer J. W. KING, U. S. N.,
brother to the deceased author of the work.”—Boston Daily Advertiser.
“This is one of the best, because eminently plain and practical, treatises on the Steam-
Engine ever published.”—Philadelphia Press.
“Its republication at this time, when so many young men are entering the Service as
naval engineers, is most opportune. Each of them ought to have a copy.”—Philadelphia
Evening Bulletin.
TEAM FOR THE MILLION.
A Popular Treatise on Steam and its Application to the Useful Arts,
especially to Navigation. By J. H. WARD, Commander U. S.
Navy. New and revised edition. I vol., 8vo, cloth. $1.
“A most excellent work for the young engineer and general reader. Many facts rela-
ting to the management of the boiler and engine are set forth with a simplicity of lan-
guage, and perfection of detail, that brings the subject home to the reader. Mr. Ward is
also peculiarly happy in his illustrations.”—American Engineer.
Screw PROPULSION.
Notes on Screw Propulsion, its Rise and History. By Capt. W. H.
WALKER, U. S. Navy. 1 vol., 8vo, cloth. 75 cents.
“Some interesting notes on Screw propulsion, its rise and progress, have just been issued
by Commander W. H. WALKER, U. S. N., from which all that is likely to be desired on
the subject may be readily acquired. * * * * After thoroughly demonstrating the
efficiency of the screw, Mr. Walker proceeds to point out the various other points to be
attended to in order to Secure an efficient man-of-war, and eulogizes throughout the readi-
ness of the British Admiralty to test every novelty calculated to give satisfactory results.
* * * * Commander Walker's book contains an immense amount of concise practical
data, and every item of information recorded fully proves that the various points bearing
upon it have been well considered previously to expressing an opinion.”—London Mining
Journal.
“Every engineer should have it in his library.”—American Engineer,
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CopyRight 1894 by FRANK c. CLARK.






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































( ***C. º.o. 20
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ſº IV. OF MICH,
AUG 11 1908
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