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PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAYS
Ο Ν
Various SUBJECTS,
VIZ.
Space, Subftance, Body, Spirit, the Operati-
ons of the Soul in Union with the Body,
Innate Ideas, perpetual Conſciouſneſs, Place
and Motion of Spirits, the departing Soul,
the Reſurrection of the Body, the Producti-
on and Operations of Plants and Animals
With fome REMARKS On Mr. Locke's Effay on the
Human Underſtanding.
To which is fubjoined
A brief Scheme of ONTOLOGY,
OR
The Science of BEING in general
with its Affections.
By I. W.
Watts bancs!
LONDON:
Printed for RICHARD FORD at the Angel, and
RICHARD HETT at the Bible and Crown
in the Poultry. MDCCXXXIII,
J 3
:
B
1394
W23
P.5
Libr.
07-11-45M BL
Halework
7-5-45
5 2419
(iii)
THE
PREFAC E.
MONG the various Philofophical
Enquiries which my younger Studies had
committed to Writing, thefe few have
eſcaped the Injuries of Time and other Accidents,
and by the Perfuafion of a learned Friend, are
now offer'd to the publick View. Some of them
may date their O iginal at the Distance of thirty
Years: Many new Books have fince appear'd in
the World, and new Converfations have arifen,
which have ſometimes given occafion for the fresh
Exercife of my Thoughts on thefe Subjects. And
fince my more important Duties have allowed
me fome Hours of Leifure and Amuſement, I
have now and then added to theſe Papers, which
are now grown up to this Bulk and Form.
A Enquiries which
The Subjects treated of in the two first Efays,
(viz.) Space, Subftance, Body and Spirit, have
no inconfiderable Influence in adjusting our Ideas
of God and Creatures, animate and inanimate
Beings. It is ftrange that Philofophers even in
this inlightned Age, this Age of jufter reafoning,
fhould run into fuch wide Extremes in their
Opinions concerning Space; that while fome de-
prefs it below all real Being, and fuppoſe it to be
meer nothing, others fhould exalt it to the Na-
A 2 #3 B
ture
iv
The PREFACE.
་
ture and Dignity of Godhead. It would be a
great Happiness, if we could all unite in fome
fettled and undoubted Opinion of this Subject.
The Unlearned may ridicule the Controverfy;
but Men of Science know the Difficulties that
attend it. I make no Pretence to have clear'd
them all away; but if I have faid any thing
here that may ftrike a Glimpfe of Light into this
obfcure Queſtion, I shall acknowledge my Felicity.
Body and Spirit are the two only proper Sub-
ftances that we know of; and if their diftinct
Effences can be limited and adjusted in clear
Ideas, it will be a happy Clew to lead us into
Some further Knowledge of the vifible and invi-
fible World, and will give us a more particular
and diftinct Acquaintance with human Na-
ture, which is compounded of Matter and
Mind. ·
There are few Studies fo worthy of Man as
the Knowledge of himself. Many Advantages
in moral Sciences attend a right Notion of the
Union of Soul and Body, the Senfations, the
Appetites, the Paffions, and various Operations
which are derived thence. This hath been, I
confefs, a favourite Employment of my Thoughts:
whether I have fucceeded in any of my Medi-
tations or Sentiments on this Subject, I muſt
leave the Reader to judge.
I cannot pretend that all my Opinions in theſe
Matters are exactly Squared to any publick Hy-
pothefis. From the Infancy of my Studies I
"began to be of the Eclectick Sect. Some of
thefe
•
The PREFACE.
V
1
thefe Effays are founded on the Cartefian Doc-
trine of Spirits, tho' feveral Principles in his
Syftem of the material World could never pre-
vail upon any Affent; and what other Opinions
of that Philofophy relating to the Phænomena
of Heaven and Earth I had imbibed in the
Academy, I have ſeen reaſon to refign long ago
at the foot of Sir Ifaac Newton. But as the
two Worlds of Matter and Mind ftand at an
utter and extreme Distance from each
other, fo the
Weakness of the Cartefian Hypothefis of Bodies
and its utter Demolition does by no means draw
with it the Ruin of his Doctrine of Spirits.
I am not fo attach'd to this Scheme, nor do I
plead for it as a Doctrine full of Light and
Evidence, and which hath no Doubts and Diffi-
culties attending it: After all my ftudious Enqui
ries into this noble Subject, I am far from being ar-
rived at an Affurance of the Truth of theſe Opini-
ons. The speediest way to full Affurance in any
Point, is to read only one Side of a Contro-
verfy: Thefe are generally the confident and in-
fallible Dictators to Mankind; they fee no Dif
ficulty, and admit no Doubt. I must confess I
have follow'd a different Method of Study, and
therefore I have jo few Indubitabies among my
philofophical Acquirements. But tho' I cannot
pronounce Certainty on my Sentiments on this
Argument, yet I have been loth to renounce and
obliterate them at once, and to leave so vast a
Vacancy among my intellectual Ideas, unless I
could have found fome tolerable System of the
A 3
Nature
vi The PREFACE.
Nature and Operations of our Souls to put
in the room of it, which was attended with leſs
or fewer Difficulties: But this I have fought
in vain both in my own Meditations, and among
the Works of the Learned. An inextended Spi-
rit, without proper Proximity to Place or Body,
is a hard Idea to us, while we dwell in this in-
carnate State among Shapes and Matter, Place
and Motion: but a Spirit that is extended, or
a thinking Power with Dimenfions and Shape,
with local Parts and Motion, appears to me ftill
a harder Idea, and gives greater Pain and
Difficulty to the Mind that will purfue any Po-
fition through all its train of Confequences.
I think I have no Partiality for the Name
of the French Philofopher: But let every Man
who has fent any new Beams of Light into the
World of Nature, and taught us better to un-
derftand the Works of God, have the juſt Debt
of Honours paid to his Memory. Let the illuf-
trious Name of Newton ftand highest in that
Sphere, and without a Rival. But let thofe
also who have open'd the Way for fo great a
Light to fhine, by removing the Rubbish and
Darkness of former Ages, have their proper Mo-
numents of Praife. Had not a Des-Cartes
rifen up in the World, and trac'd his Way be-
fore, I much question whether Sir Ifaac New-
ton had ever made fo vaft and fublime a Pro-
grefs in the Diſcovery of his Wonders to this en-
lighten'd Age. If I can pretend to any Free-
dom of Thought in my little Sphere of Inquiry
after
The PRE FACE.
vii
after Truth, I must afcribe the Original of it
to my reading the first Book of Des-Cartes's
Principles in the very Beginning of my Studies,
and the familiar Comments which I heard on
: that Work. That great Man in ſome of his
Writings pointed out the Road to true Philofo-
phy by Reafon and Experiment and mathemati-
cal Science, tho' be did not fteadily purſue that
Track himſelf in his own philofophifing on corpo-
real Things. Gaffendus and the Lord Bacon
went a little before him, Mr. Boyle followed
after; and they all carried on the noble Design
of freeing the World from the long Slavery of
Ariftotle and fubftantial Forms, of occult Quali-
ties and Words without Ideas. They taught
Mankind to trace out Truth by Reafoning and
Experiment, and they agreed to leave her to
Stand on her own Foundations, without the Sup-
port of an ipfe dixit. The prefent Age in
all their boafted and glorious Accquifitions of
Knowledge, owe more to these Gentlemen, than
I have found ſome of them willing to pay.
Mr. Locke is another illuftrious Name. He
has proceeded to break our philofophical Fetters,
and to give us further Releafe from the Bondage
of ancient Authorities and Maxims. I ac-
knowledge the Light and Satisfaction which I
have derived from many of his Works. His ad-
mirable Letter of Toleration led me as it were
into a new Region of Thought, wherein I found
myſelf furprized and charm'd with Truth.
There was no Room to doubt in the midst of
A 4
Sun-
viii
The PREFACE.
Sun-Beams. Thefe Leaves triumph'd over all
the Remnant of my Prejudices on the fide of Bi-
gotry, and taught me to allow all Men the fame
Freedom to chufe their Religion as I claim to
chufe my own. Bleſſed be God that this Doc-
trine has now taken fuch Root in Great Britain,
that I truſt neither the Powers nor the Frauds
of Rome, nor the Malice, Pride and Dark-
nefs of Mankind, nor the Rage of Hell fhall
ever prevail againſt it.
His Treatifes of the Original of Government,
and of Education, have laid the Foundations
of true Liberty, and the Rules of just Restraint
for the younger and elder Years of Man. His
Writings relating to Chriftianity, bave ſome ex-
cellent Thoughts in them, tho' I fear he has funk
Jome of the divine Themes and Glories of that
Difpenfation too much below their original
Defign.
His Effay on the human Underſtanding
has diffufed fairer Light through the World in
numerous Affairs of Science and of buman Life.
There are many admirable Chapters in that
Book, and many Truths in them, which are
worthy of Letters of Gold. But there are fome
Opinions in his Philofophy, especially relating to
intellectual Beings, their Powers and Opera-
tions which have not gain'd my Affent. The
Man who bath labour'd to lead the World
into freedom of Thought, has thereby given a
large Permiffion to his Readers to propose what
Doubts, Difficulties cr Remarks have arifen in
their
2
The PREFACE.
ix
their Minds, while they perufe what he has writ-
ten. And indeed feveral of the Effays which
are publish'd (befides the XIIth, which bears
that Title) are the Fruits of fuch Remarks as
will be easily obferved in the perufal of them.
The Effays on the various Works of Nature
in the upper and lower Parts of the Creation, in
the Sun and Stars, in Plants and Animals,
were written at firft with a Defign to entertain
the politer part of Mankind, whofe Circumftan-
tes of Life indulge them much Leifure and Eafe,
and who fearch not very far into the hidden
Principles of Nature and their abftrufe Springs
of Operation. I know the Philofophers of the
prefent Age have carried their Enquiries to
great Lengths, beyond any of my Meditations:
yet perhaps thefe may be fo happy as to lead thofe
Perfons who know them not, and who fearch no
further than I do, into an exalted Idea of the
Wonders of divine Wisdom in the Heavens and
the Earth, the vegetable and the animal World.
Perhaps also they may serve to give no unprofi
table Amuſement to their leifure Hours, as the
Compofure of them hath given to me.
If I were to make Apologies for publiſhing
any thing of this kind to the World, I would
fay that the chief part of thefe Subjects are not
beneath the Notice and Enquiry of any Profeffion
and Character whatfoever. If I am charged
with repeating the fame thing feveral times, I
would reply, that it is perhaps introduced on
different Occafions, or fet in a different Light,
or
X
The PREFA C´E.
or at leaſt, to ſpeak plainly, when I had wrote one,
I had forgot the other, thefe Papers being written
at many Years Diftance. And this may ferve
alfo among Perfons of Temper and Candor to
apologize for Small Miftakes, if there should be
any appearing Oppofition between my Expreffions
in different Effays, which were written in dif
tant parts of Life. I hope none will be found
So gross but may be well reconciled by a candid
Reader.
Shall I be told that other Writers have faid
the very fame things which I have done, and in
a much better manner? I confess I know it not;
for tho' I now and then look into modern Books
of Philofophy, yet there are many which I have
never feen, having not fufficient Time to peruſe
them; and I am perfuaded fome of theſe Eſſays
were framed long before thofe very Works,
whence fome Perfons may imagine I have bor-
rowed feveral of my Reaſonings.
If there be any Hint of Thought amongst
them all that may affift the Reader in his Con-
ceptions of God or of himself, of natural or di-
vine Things, let him correct or retrench, let him
refine, let him alter or improve it as he pleaſe,
and make it his own, that I may thank him for
it as a new Acquifition: And let him renounce
whatſoever he finds difagreeable to Truth, Reafon ·
or Religion; always remembring that the fureft
way to find out Truth, is not by a difputing Spirit,
and feeking out all poffible Objections, but by
an inward Love of Truth, by impartial Medi
tation and Search after clear Ideas.
Per
ار
The PREFACE. xi
Perhaps I might be a little pleafed with fome
of thefe Philofophemes in the warmer Years of
Life; but I look upon them now with much In-
difference, as Things afar off, and which have
paffed in another Century. I review them as
it were with the Eye of a Stranger, rather
than with the Fondness of a young Author.
What Darkneffes hang about them, I fhould be
glad to fee ſcatter'd by the Rays of Truth, or to
hear of a much clearer and fairer Hypothefis of
the World of Spirits fubftituted in the room of
all that I have written, and I fhould embrace.
it with new and fincere Delight.
But if we can know nothing further of our
Souls, i. e. of our felves, in this embodied and
obfcure State, than meerly to say we are think-
ing Beings, if it is not allow'd us to be further
acquainted with our own Effence or our natural
Powers, if we can never find out how our Spi-
rits form their Ideas, or exert their Freedom of
Will, how we move our Bodies or change our
Relations to Place, it becomes us to lye humble at
the Foot of our Maker the Infinite and Almighty
Spirit, and to content ourſelves under our prefent
Ignorance. 'Tis happy for us, that this does
not affect our moral and more important Con-
cerns: This does not alter our Relations or our
Duties to God or our Neighbour, nor make any
Inroad upon our divine and everlafting Interefts.
It would be very pleafing indeed to walk onward
through this dark World, with fome clear Noti-
ons of what we our felves are and ſhall be, as
2
well
xii The 爨
​P REFAC E.
་
1
well as of the Power that made us; but our in-
¨cureable Defects in this fort of Science, ſhall ne
ver feclude us from his Favour. We may learn
to know the only true God fo far as to adore
and obey him, without pronouncing concerning
the Effence of the Great Unfearchable. We may
know him and love him as the Original Father
of all, and his Son Jefus whom he has ſent.
This is Life eternal. And when we shall have
travel'd over the Stage of Time, by the Light
and Influence of this Knowledge, we shall for-
fake at once thefe Scenes of Mortality and Sha-
dows, we fhall change this dusky Region for a
brighter. Farewell Books, and Difputes, and
dark Notions, and lame Hypothefes! We enter
into the State of unbodied Minds, we are fur-
rounded with the Light of Paradife, we behold
a prefent God, and in that exuberant and un-
deceiving Light, we shall fee our felves and our
fellow Spirits; there we shall commence our ·
happy Immortality in those pure and exquifite
Delights of unerring Contemplation, and undecay-
ing Love.
Jan. 17th, 1733.
1
1
•
THE
THE
TABLE
OF THE
E SSAYS.
ESSAY I.
A Fair Enquiry and Debate con-
cerning Space
Sect. 1. The Subject explained in general
2. Is Space fomething or nothing?
3. Is Space a Subftance?
4. Is Space created or increated?
5. Space cannot be God
Page 1
I
3
m'too
4
8
II
6. A Review and Recollection of the Ar-
gument.
7.
20
The Original of our Idea of Space, and
our Danger of a Miftake.
23
8. Space compared to Shadow or Dark-
ness
9. Space unactive and impaſſive
25-
28
10. A Re-examination whether Space has
any real Properties
3 I
11. An Objection against the Nibility of
Space anfwer'd
39-
12. Space nothing real and exifting, but a
meer abftract Idea
43
ESSAY H. Of Subftance and of folid Extenfion,
and a thinking Power, as the two only
original Substances.
47
Sect.
The TABLE
Sect. 1. Mr. Locke's Notion of Subftance con-
Page 47
fider'd
2. The plain Idea or Notion of Subftance
applied to Mind and Body
50
3. Confiderations to fupport the Applica-
tion of the Name of Subftance to folid
Extenfion, and a thinking Power 54
4. The Occafions of Miftake on this Sub-
ject
63
ESSAY III. Of the Original of our Perceptions
and Ideas
73
98
ESSAY IV. Of innate Ideas, and Propofitions
natural and moral
Sect. 1. The common Opinion well refuted by
Mr. Locke
ibid.
2. In what Senfe many Ideas are innate 100
In what Senfe fome Truths may be in-
3.
nate
104
106
108
114
4. In what Senſe fome Rules of Duty may
be innate
5. Of the Foundations of moral Virtue,
and of a moral Senfe or Inftinct
ESSAY V. An Enquiry whether the Soul thinks
always
Sect.1. Confiderations towards the Proof of it ibid.
2. Of Dreams, why not remember'd 119
3. Mr. Locke's Objections answered 124
ESSAY VI. Of the Power of Spirits to move
Bodies, of their Being in a Place, and
removing from it
132
Sect. 1. Of the Power of a Spirit to move Mat-
ter
ibid.
Sect.
of the ESSAYS.
Sect. 2. Of Spirits being in a Place, and re-
+
moving from it
Page 146
3. The first Question about the Locality of
Spirits anfwer'd
152
4. Other Objections anfwer'd against the
Locality of Spirits
161
171
5. The Ubi or Whereness of Spirit 165
ESSAY VII. The departing Soul
ESSAY VIII. The Refurrection of the fame Bo-
dy
ESSAY IX. Of the Production, Nourishment,
and Operations of Plants and Ani-
182
195
mals
Seat, 1. Creatures produce their own Kind ibid.
2. The Laws of Nature fufficient for the
Production of Animals and Vegetables
201
Appendix to this fecond Section, or an
Objection anfwered
397
3. Of the Nourishment and Growth of
208
Plants
4. Of the Nouriſhment of Animals 214
5. An amufing Digreffion
221
6. The fimilar Operations of Plants and
Animals
229
7. The Principles of Operation in Brutes
and Men
233
ESSAY X. On Sun-Beams and Star-Beams 242
Sect, 1. Is the Æther à meer void Space? ibid.
2. Does the Univerfe increase or decreaſe,
or the World grow bigger or lefs? 247
ESSAY
The TABLE, &c.
1
{
ESSAY XI. On fome metaphyfical Subjects 254
Sect. 1. Of the Effence or Nature of Things 254
2. Of Matter and Form
260
3. Different Senfes of the Word Nature
•
265
267
4. Of Creation and Confervation
ESSAY XII. Remarks on fome Chapters of Mr.
Locke's Eſſay on the human Understand-
ing
J
Sect. 1. Of fenfible Qualities, and particularly
of Colour
2. Of Succeffion and Duration
3. Of Infinity
4. Of Power
5:
1269
-269
273
276
I 277
Can Liberty be ascribed to the Will?
279
6. Of complex Ideas and mixed Modes 283
Of Identity and Diversity
?
287
The Candid Reader is defired to correct theſe
few Miſtakes which injure the Senfe.
Page 81. 1. 24. meer Senfations, p. 97. 7. the firft fort of
Abſtract. p. 217. 1. 27. fpecifick Parts. p. 257. 1. 2. f. Gar
ments r. Coverings. p. 324. Marg. l. z. f. were r. was.' p. 344.
£ 16. Animals, or artificial in Men are. p. 346. 7. 17. be-
tween Root. 4, 28. between Husband. p. 350. 1. 2. f. thefer.
natural and revealed Religion. T. 20. of mòral Good, tho' it
promotes natural. p. 361. 1. 10. f. direttive r. inftructive. p.
365. 1. 15. F. Acts r. operates. p. 366. 7. 5. f. paſſiver. un-
active. p. 383. l. 11. f. Quality f. Quantity.
1505
t
}
'
PHI
(1)
PHILOSOPHICAL
ESSAY S, &c.
↓
ESSAY I.
A fair Enquiry and Debate concern-
ing SPACE, whether it be Something
Nothing, God or a Creature.
SECT. I,
The Subject explained in general.
W
OULD any one imagine, that fo
familiar an Idea as that which we
have of Space, ſhould be fo ab-
ſtruſe and myſterious, fo difficult and unac-
countable a Thing, as that it fhould be
doubtful and undetermined to this Day, a-
mong the Philofophers even of this knowing
Age, what Space is; whether it be a Sub-
ſtance or Mode, God or a Creature, Some-
thing or Nothing?
B
The
2
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
The common Idea which all Mankind has
of it, ſeems to be much the fame, viz. Ex-
tenfion void of Matter or Body, and capable of
receiving or containing Matter or Body. This
Space, when 'tis thus confider'd as empty,
by the Learned is ufually called Vacuum or
void; when 'tis confider'd as filled with Body,
the Learned have fuppofed it to be Space
Rtill, and then it is called Plenum or full.
Whether there be Vacuum or void Space
is now no longer doubted among Philofo-
phers, it having been proved by Sir Ifaac
Newton, and others, beyond all Contradicti-
on, and every one agrees to it. Whether it
ſhould be called Space when 'tis full, fhall
be afterwards confidered.
Void Space is conceived by us as ſcatter'd
thro' all the World between Bodiès, as in-
terfperfed thro' all the Pores of Bodies, and
as reaching alfo beyond all the Worlds that
God has made and extended on all Sides with-
out Bounds. And as thefe Ideas ſeem plain
and eafy, fo there is no Difference between
the Philofopher and the Ploughman in this
their general and common Conception or Idea
of it. But the grand Enquiry is, What is
this Space? Let us fearch the Subject a
little.
Space is either Something or Nothing:
If Something, it is either a meer Idea in the
Mind, or fomething exiſting without. If it
exiſt without us, 'tis a Subftance or a Mode: If
a
SECT. II. concerning SPACE.
3
a Subſtance, 'tis created or increated. Let
us examine all theſe by Parts diftinctly.
SE C T. II.
Is Space Something or Nothing?
"Urely one would fuppofe that Space can-
Sure
not be a meer Nothing; for it is one
of the moſt fundamental Axioms of Science,
that what has no Being, can have no Pro-
perties or Powers; but SPACE feems to have
Powers and Properties; 'tis long, broad and
deep: Can there be any meer Nothing that
has three Dimenfions? Space feems to have
meaſurable Diſtances contained in it, viz. An
Inch, an Ell, a Mile, a League, a Diameter
of the Earth, or a thouſand fuch Diameters.
Is it poffible that a meer Nothing fhould
reach to fuch an Extent? It appears to have
real Capacity, or à Power to receive and con-
tain Bodies; now if this Capacity be not a
meer Nothing, one would conclude Space
muſt be Something real and exifting, which
has fuch a real Capacity.
Befides, if two Bodies were placed at twen-
ty Miles Diſtance from each other, and all
the Univerſe beſides were annihilated, would
not this Space be really twenty Miles long?
and would not this Space be call'd Some-
thing, which is of fuch a Length? Or if
Space be not Something, then there is Nothing
В 2
between
4
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
between theſe two Bodies; and muſt they
not therefore lye cloſe together, and touch
one another, if there be nothing between
them? Does not this plainly prove Space
to be Something?
Well, if Space be any fort of Something,
it muſt either have its Being only in our
Minds as a meer Idea, or it muſt have an Ex-
iftence without us.
That it cannot be a meer Idea of the Mind,
is proved by Dr. Clarke, becauſe no Ideas of
Space can poffibly be framed greater than
finite; yet Reafon fhews that Space muft
be infinite. See his Letters to Leibnitz.
To which I might add, Space feems to
have fuch an Exiſtence as it hath, and to
maintain it, whether there were any Mind
to conceive it or no; and therefore it ſeems
not to be a meer Idea.
This leads us to think therefore, that if
Space hath any Exiſtence, it cannot be
meerly an Exiſtence in the Mind, but it muſt
be fomething without us.
I
SECT. III.
Is Space a Subftance?
Space be fomething which has an Ex-
iftence without us, it must be either a
Subſtance itſelf, or a Mode or Property of ſome
Subſtance; for it is most evident, that it muft
either
SECT. III. concerning SPACE.
5
either fubfift by itſelf, or it muſt ſubfiſt in or
by fome other Thing which does ſubſiſt by
itſelf. There can be no Medium between
Subſiſtence in and by itſelf, and Subfiſtence
in and by another.
Now that Space cannot be a Mode or
Property, I prove thus. If it be a Mode,
where is the Subftance in which it is, or by
which it fubfifts, or to which it belongs?
Doth not the Subſtance exift wherefoever the
Mode is? Did we ever hear of a Mode ten
thouſand Miles long, and no Subſtance in all
that Length to uphold it?
Or if the Subftance be co-extended with
it, as it muſt be, wherein does this long Sub-
ſtance differ from this Property and Mode?
Have not this Subftance and Mode one and
the fame Idea? Are they not the very fame
individual Entity or Being? Have they not
the fame individual Extenfion? and equal-
ly ſelf-fubfifting, equally real or unreal? If
Space be any thing real, and yet a Mode, it
looks fo much like the very Subſtance itſelf
by the Properties attributed to it, that I think
no Man fhould ever take it for a meer Mode,
unleſs he can tell us how it differs from the
Subſtance which fupports it, and how it de-
pends for Exiſtence on that Subſtance.
O, fay our Opponents, Space is a meer
Mode, but the Subftance that fupports it is ut-
terly unknown, as all Subftances are. Happy
Afylum for the Learned to retreat to! This
Shelter
B 3
6
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
Shelter of Darkneſs! this invented Idea of an
unknown and unknowable Thing called Sub-
Stance! how well does it fkreen and hide a
modern Diſputant from Light and Argument
when they purſue him fo clofe, that he has
no other Refuge! yet even this dark Shelter
I have endeavoured to break open and de-
moliſh in the next Effay. But let us proceed
now in the fair Enquiry, whether Space be
a Subſtance or a Mode.
Some Philofophers, particularly Mr. Leib-
nitz, have fancied Space to be a fort of
relative Mode, and call it the Order of Co-ex-
iftent Beings or Bodies, which Order is their
general Situation or Distance: As Place is the
Relation which one particular Body has to the
Situation of others, fo Space is that Order of
Situation which refults from all Places taken
together. Thus after a manner which is un-
intelligible to me, they go on to explain
their Idea of Space. But how can Space be
a meer Order or Mode of Bodies, when
itſelf ſeems to have Parts extraneous to all
Bodies, both as it is interfpers'd among them
in the World, and reaches beyond the Li-
mits of this World alfo? Can Space be the
Order of Bodies, when Space is where Bo-
dies are not? And when Space does not
depend for its Exiſtence on the Exiſtence
of Bodies, can Space be a Relation of
Bodies, when it is, and ever would be the
fame Idea if no Body ever had been, or if
all Bodies ceaſed to be?
Or
SECT. III. concerning SPACE.
7
Or let us put the Argument thus: Space,
if it be a Mode of Being, must be either an
abfolute, or a relative Mode; but it cannot be
either of theſe. For all abfolute Modes want
fome Subject proper for them to inhere in, or
to ſupport them in Being: All relative Modes
or Relations require fome other Being, or
fome Subject to which they muſt relate: But
Space neither wants any Subject to inhere
in, or relate to: It wants no other Being that
we can conceive to make it exift. Try to
fuppofe all Beings annihilated, yet you cannot
conceive Space to be annihilated: It feems
to be obftinately exiftent and felf-fubfifting:
You cannot nullify it, even in Thought, tho'
you ſhould nullify all other Subftances, Body
and Mind, with all their Modes. Surely this can
never be a Mode of Being, for if it has any real
Subfiftence at all, it fubfifis of itſelf, which is the
firſt Character and Property of a Subſtance.
Befides, it ſeems to have the other Cha-
racter of Subftance alfo; for as it fubfifts of
itſelf, i. e. it wants no created Being to fup-
port its Existence, fo itſelf feems to be the pro-
per Subject of many Properties, Modes or
Accidents, fuchas were juft mention'd before,
viz. Length, Breadth, Capacity, &c. nor do
they need any other Subftratum to uphold
them: Now thefe are the known and agreed
Characters of Subftance among the Learned,
viz. Subftantia eft quod per fe fubfiftit, (i. e.
nullá rẻ Creata indiget ad fubfiftendum) &
fubftat accidentibus.
B 4
Even
8
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
1
Even a very learned Writer in his Dif
courſes on this Subject, in his Letters to
Leibnitz, ufes but feeble Reafoning to prove
that Space is not a Subftance, (viz.) "That
"infinite Space is Immenfitas, not Immen-
"fum, whereas an infinite Subftance is Im-
<<
menfum, not Immenfitas: therefore Space
"muſt be a Property." Now I might uſe this
very Language to prove that Space is a
Subftance, and fay, Is not Space the Im-
menfum itſelf, if it has any thing real in it?
We have only a meer Denial of it, without
any Argument. Do we not generally fay,
Space is immenfe, or Space has Immen-
fity belonging to it? Space is properly the Im-
menfum, and what forbids it to be a Sub-
ſtance? And indeed if Space has any thing of
a real and pofitive Exiſtence without us, all the
Arguments that ever I read to difprove it to be
a Subſtance, carry no Force at all with them,
and feem to be meer Affertions, not only
without Reafon, but contrary to it.
I
SECT. IV.
Is SPACE created or increated?
F it be allow'd then that Space is a Sub-
ftance, 'tis either created or increated.
Surely it cannot be a created Subſtance, be-
cauſe we cannot conceive it poffible to be
created, fince we cannot conceive it as non-
exiftent
SECT. IV. concerning SPACE.
9.
exiſtent and creable, which may be conceiv-
ed concerning every created Being. Nor can
we conceive it properly as annihilated or an-
nihilable, which we may fuppofe of every
Creature. In fhort, if it be a Subftance,
fhall I dare venture to fpeak it? it appears.
to be God himſelf. Mr. Raphson a great
Mathematician has written a Book on this
Theme, De Spacio Reali, wherein he labours
to prove that this Space is God himſelf,
going all along upon this Suppofition, that
Space is and muſt be fomething real; and
then his Reaſon cannot find an Idea for it be-
low Godhead. And indeed if Space be a
real Thing exiſtent without us, it appears to
bid fair for Deity, for the fuppofed Perfecti-
ons and Properties of it are fuch as feem to
be infinite and divine; as for Inftance;
If Space has Length, Breadth, Depth,
'tis infinite Length, Breadth and Depth. If
it has Capacity, 'tis an unbounded or an infi-
nite Capacity: Nor can we poffibly conceive
of it beyond the Univerſe, but as immenfe or
unmeafurable; it feems to be Omniprefent,
if it penetrate all Things, and it has feveral
other appearing Properties of Godhead.
We have alfo an Idea of it as Eternal,
and Unchangeable, for we cannot conceive
that it began to be, fince we cannot conceive
it as having ever been non-exiſtent: or any
otherwiſe than now it is: It cannot be created
nor annihilated: It feems to contain what Ex-
iftence
C
10
ESSAY I
An Enquiry
iſtence it has in the very Idea, Nature or
Effence of it (which is one Attribute of GoD,
whereby we prove his Exiſtence.) It appears
therefore in this View to be a neceſſary Be-
ing, and has a fort of Self-existence, for we
cannot tell how to conceive it not to be.
It ſeems to be an impafible, indivifible, and
immutable Effence; it looks like an all-per-
vading, all-containing Nature, an all-compre-
hending Being. What are all theſe but At-
tributes of Godhead? and what can this be
but God himſelf?
And how agreeable are theſe Properties of
Space (fay fome Perfons) to the Attri-
butes of God in Scripture, taken in the moſt
vulgar and literal Senfe? It has a Being like
God in Heaven, Earth and Hell, diffufed
thro' all, as Pfal. cxxxix. deſcribes the Om-
niprefence of God: And as the Prophet
repreſents God ſpeaking, Do not I fill Hea-
ven and Earth, faith the LORD? Jer. xxiii. 24.
Heaven, and even the Heavens of Heavens,
faith Solomon, cannot contain him. 2 Chron.
vi. 18. Nor does the Idea of Space difagree
with St. Paul's Account of God, Acts xvii. 28.
He is not far from every one of us, for in him
we live and move and have our Being. And
accordingly fome Philofophers (as is before
mentioned) have written to prove that Space
is a real Being, and that this Space is
God.
SECT.
SECT. V. concerning SPACE.
I I
SECT.
V.
Space cannot be God.
UT is not this too grofs an Idea of the
B Deity, and unworthy of him? I and
am
afraid of thofe natural and neceffary Confe-
quences which feem to arife from the Idea of
real Extenfion attributed to God, becauſe they
ſeem ſo very frightful and abfurd. We can
hardly mention them indeed with a Prefer-
vation of that Reverence of Language, and
that facred Veneration of Soul that is due to
the Majefty of Heaven and Earth; and this
is a fort of prefumptive Argument againft
them, viz. That if they are Truths, they are
fuch a kind of horrendous Truths, that a
devout Creature fhudders to hear them in a
literal manner attributed to his Maker. Yet
if we will manifeft their Abfurdities, we are
forced to pronounce a few of them.
1. If Space be God himſelf, then all Bo-
dies are fituated in God, as in their proper
Place; then every fingle Body exifts in part of
God, and occupies fo much of the Dimen-
fions of Godhead, as it fills of Space; then
an Elephant or a Mountain, a Whale, or a
wicked Giant, have more of the Effence or
Prefence and Goodneſs of God with them,
than the holiest or beft Man in the World,
unleſs he be of equal Size.
3
ר
2. If
12
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
2. If Space were God, then the Divine
Being, tho' in its whole it be unmeaſurable,
yet hath Millions of Parts of itſelf, really
diſtinct from each other, meaſurable by Feet,
Inches, Yards, and Miles, even as the Bodies
are which are contained in it: And according
to this Notion it may be moft properly ſaid,
that one Part of God is longer than ano-
ther Part of him, and that twenty five In-
ches of the Divine Nature long, broad, and
deep, will contain above two Foot of folid
Body, &c. which Predications ſeem at leaſt
very harsh, they grate with Pain upon the
Ear, and are even offenfive to the Under-
ſtanding, if they be not abfolutely abfurd
and impoffible in the Nature of Things.
Nor is it to any purpoſe for an Objector to
fay, that Space or infinite Extenfion has
properly no Parts; for we have as clear an
Idea, and indeed much clearer, of the ſeveral
Parts of Space near us and round about us,
than we have or can have of the whole po-
fitively infinite Space, if I may fo expreſs it,
of which we finite Creatures have no proper
Idea: Our Idea of infinite Space, fuch as it
is, is made of finite Spaces, or Parts of
Space in a perpetual Addition.
Nor can it be deny'd that Space has
Parts, on a Pretence that theſe Parts are not
actually feparable; for even in a Body we
conceive clearly of the feveral diftinct Parts
of it, without confidering whether they be
fepa-
2
SECT. V. concerning SPACE.
13
feparable or no: Suppofe Body to be infinite,
and fuppofe it to be perfectly folid, and as
uniform as Space is, yet 'tis very evident
that we can conceive diftinct Parts in it,
without conceiving them feparated or fepa-
rable. The Ideas of Separation or Separability
are not neceffary to the Idea of the Parts of
Space, which are conceived as feveral leffer
Spaces or Extenfions co-exiftent in Time,
but really diſtinct from each other, whether
adjacent or diſtant.
3. Another hard Confequence of fuppofing
Space to be God is this. Then every Part
of this Divine Space will contain Divine
Perfections in it compleat, or only fome Part
of each of them; if only fome Part of each
of them, then each Part of the Space
whether an Inch or a Mile fquare, has a
Degree or Share of Wiſdom and Power,
Holiness and Goodneſs in Proportion to its
Dimenfions, which Pofition is too abfurd to
be allowed. We muſt allow then that every
Part of Space contains all thefe Divine
Attributes or Perfections in it compleatly;
and if it be fo, then not only every Mile, but
every Yard and Ell, and every Inch of Space
is Áll-wife and All-holy, Almighty and
Gracious; for every Inch of Space is a
Part of the Subftance or Effence of God, if
Space be God himſelf. Befides, if every
Inch of Space contain compleatly thefe
Divine Perfections, then there feem to be fo
many
14
ESSAY L
An Enquiry
f
many compleat Wifdoms and Powers, i. e. in
reality fo many All-wife and Almighty Beings,
as there are Inches or minuteft Parts of Space;
for every Part of Space feems to be as much
independent on any other Part, as one Part of
Matter is independent on another Part: And
if fo, then every Part of Space is an Inde-
pendent, All-wife and Almighty Being; and
inſtead of one God we ſhall have Millions.
To conclude, if Space be a Subſtance,
it must be the one Divine Subftance of in-
finitely long and broad Perfections; or elſe
all the Parts of it muſt be leffer Divine Sub-
ſtances united in one: What manifold and
ftrange. Abfurdities, or at leaft feeming Ab-
furdities, and frightful Propofitions will ariſe
from this Notion of the Divine Being?
Object. Perhaps it will be faid, that this
Space is not God himself, but only his Immen-
fity; now his Immenfity is not properly faid to be
All-wife and Holy and Mighty, tho' God himself
be fo.
Anf. We have already proved that Space
cannot be a Mode or Property, but that if it
be any thing, it must be a Subftance. There-
fore, if it be any thing Divine, 'tis not meer-
the Divine Immenfity, or an Attribute of
God, but 'tis his Effence or Subftance, 'tis
the real Immenfum, 'tis God himſelf.
This appears further evident, if we con-
fider, that we muſt neceffarily fuppoſe the
All wife and Almighty Subftance or Effence of
2
God
SECT. V. concerning SPACE.
15
God to be co-extended with his Immenfity,
otherwiſe you make infinite Extenfion, which
you call a Property or a Mode, to exiſt be-
yond and without the Subject of it, which is
abfurd enough. And therefore Sir Isaac New-
ton in his famous Scholium, at the end of his
Mathematical Principles, where he fuppofes
God to be extended, is conſtrain'd to allow, that
God is prefent every where by his Subſtance; for,
faith be, Power without Subftance cannot fub-
fift; and I am fure then 'tis fufficiently evi-
dent that Immenfity or Space extended be-
yond the Subſtance, can have no Subfift-
ence.
Befides, is not this Immenfity or Space
the very Thing you conceive of as the Sub-
ject of the Modes of Eternity, Capacity,
Comprehenfion, Self-exiſtence, Unchangeable-
nefs, &c. i. e. as the Subftance itself? Is it not
this Space which you conceive of as a ſelf-
fubfifting and unannihilable Being, and
what is that but a moſt ſubſtantial Idea?
Tho' fome of our modern Philofophers re-
nounce all Knowledge of Subftances, while
they maintain the Neceffity of them, as a
Subftratum for Modes, yet it feems to me
that this is one chief Reafon which has
tempted many of them to fuppofe both God
and all other Spirits to be extended, that they
may have a fort of Subftratum or Subject for
the Powers of thinking and willing, or the
Modes of Knowledge and Volition to fub-
fift in.
Thus
16
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
Thus it appears, fo far as I can fee, that if
Space be any thing in or of God, 'tis the
very Subſtance of God. However, even upon
the Suppofition of this laft Objector, we may
at leaft infer thus much, that if Space be but
the Immenfity of God, then God is where-
foever Space is: And his Effence confifts partly/
at leaſt in this immenfe Space; and moſt of
the Inferences which I drew from the Sup-
pofition of Space being God, are juft and Na-
tural, if Space be God's Immenfity, how-
ever harſh and abfurd they may be. Let
me juſt mention another Argument to prove
that Space is not God.
4. It hath been proved by fome Philofo-
phers, Des Cartes, Dr. Cudworth, Mr. Norris,
and others, and that with a good Degree of
Evidence, that a Spirit is not extended; and
then God, who is the moft perfect Spirit,
includes no Idea of Extenfion in the Notion
of him; the moſt effential, obvious, and
prime Ideas of God, are of a fpiritual Kind,
(vis.) Conſciouſneſs, Thought, Wiſdom,
Knowledge, Will, active Power, Goodness,
the firſt Cauſe of all, &c. Now none of
theſe imply Extenfion, or have any need of
Parts extraneous to each other. Yet if this
extended Space be the Divine Subſtance,
'tis very amazing, that the Properties of Dei-
ty ſhould have no apparent Need of ſuch a
Subftance, and that this Subſtance ſhould
have no conceivable Connexion with its moſt
effential
SECT. V. concerning SPACE.
17
effential and neceffary Properties and Powers.
Who can point out to us any Influence that
Extenfion or Space can have towards Think-
ing? toward Wiſdom or Power? towards
Holiness, Goodneſs or Faithfulneſs? There
is no conceivable Connexion in the Ideas.
They are not only diftinct but feparable. Ba-
niſh perfect Wiſdom and Power from your
Thoughts, and if poffible, annihilate them
in Thought; yet Space or Extenfion remains:
Barish Extenfion from your Thoughts, yet per-
fect Wiſdom and Power remain. We cannot
conceive of Wiſdom, Goodneſs, Power, as
inherent in Space; nor can we conceive of
Space as being wife, holy, powerful and
good. There doth not feem to be any pof-
fible Connexion in our Ideas of thefe diffe-
rent Extremes, nor any real Union or Con-
nexion in the Nature of Things, fince we can
baniſh either of them in our Thoughts,
and yet the other remains in the full Idea of
it. Can one then be a Property of the other?
Let us enquire again, If God be infinite
Space, what can this Space do toward his
Creation or Government of the Univerſe ?
Does Proximity enable him to know or to
move the corporeal World? He cannot touch
nor be touched. He is fuppofed to penetrate
all Bodies, but this very Penetration does
nothing toward his Conſciouſneſs, or his
movement of them. His Knowledge and
Power do not act toward Bodies by Penetra-
tion,
C
18
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
tion, but by fome fuch fuperior and unknown
Influence, as belongs to Deity.
Again: Does every Act of God, every
Thought, and every Volition about an Atom
or a Fly employ the whole immenfe Exten-
fion of Space? Doth a Thought of the pur-
eft, the moſt ſpiritual and abftracted Objects,
imply or require any Uſe of Length and
Breadth in it? Does the whole infinite Ex-
tenfion work in every Thought? Or indeed,
what has immenfe Length and Breadth to do
at all toward Thinking or Willing? Let us
firft find what the fuppofed finite Length and
Breadth of a common Spirit can do towards
its Ideas and Volitions, and then I fhall be
more eaſily perfuaded that infinite Length
and Breadth have a proportionable Influence
upon infinite or divine Thinking *
To
* It would be endlefs to run over the Arguments
which have been brought by many Writers, againſt the
Power of Extenfion, as well as againſt the Power of
Matter to think. I would only mention here what
feems to be the Refult of Dr. Clarke's long Conteſt
with Mr. Collins to prove that Matter cannot think
and apply it more effectually to Extenfion. If Exten-
fion has the Property of thinking, every Part of Exten-
fion muft either have that Property in itſelf, or muſt do
fomething towards it in the whole: As for inftance, If
Body has Motion, every Part of that Body has Mo-
tion in itſelf; or if a Surface be round, every Part of
that Surface doth contribute fomething toward that
roundness: But every Part of Extenfion or Space doth
not think; this would make innumerable Spirits; nor
doth every Part do any thing toward it; for Thought
is
SECT. V. concerning SPACE.
19
To fum up the whole Matter; we have
endeavour'd by reafoning to trace out what
is Space, and we feem to have found it can-
not be a meer Nothing, becauſe it appears to
have real Properties; it cannot be a Mode of
Being, becauſe it feems to carry in it an Idea
that ſubfifts of itſelf, tho' we ſhould nullify
all other Beings in our Thoughts; and there-
fore it muſt be a Subftance: And yet if it be
a Subftance, it cannot be a created Subftance;
becauſe we cannot conceive it creable or an-
nihilable; and therefore it carries with it an
Idea of neceffary Exiftence; and befides this
Idea of neceflary Exiftence, it ſeems to have
feveral other Properties of Godhead, viz. Im-
menfity or Omniprefence, Eternity, &c.
And yet fo great is the Abfurdity of mak-
ing the Bleſſed God a Being of infinite Length,
Breadth, and Depth, and of afcribing to him
Parts of this Nature, meafurable by Inches,
Yards and Miles, and commenfurate to all
particular Bodies in the Univerfe, with other
unhappy Confequences, that I cannot ſuffer
my felf to affent to this Notion, that Space
is God: And yet the ſtrongeſt Arguments
ſeem to evince this, that it muſt be God, or
it muſt be Nothing.
is fimple, and not made up of Parts; and therefore a
Spirit must be quite another Thing, even a Being which
has no Parts, no Extenfion.
C 2
SECT.
20
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
VI.
SECT.
A Review and Recollection of the Argument.
UT whither has this Track of Reaſon-
BULT
ing led me? What is this moſt common
and moſt ſtrange Thing which we call Space
at laft? This Wonder of Nature, or this
imaginary Being? this real Myftery, which is fo
univerfally known, and fo utterly unknowable?
Is it neither Nothing nor Something? is it
neither Mode nor Subſtance? is it neither a
Creature nor God? That's impoffible: Surely
it muſt be ranked under one of thefe Names:
All theſe can never be renounced and denied
concerning Space: That would be moft ab-
furd indeed. What have we learnt then by
all this Train and Labour of Argument, but
the Weakneſs of our own Reaſoning? We
ſeem to be urged on every Side with huge
Improbabilities, or glaring Inconfiftencies:
We are loft and confounded in the moſt fa-
miliar and common Things we can ſpeak of:
There is ſcarce any Idea more univerſal and
familiar than that of empty Space; all Man-
kind ſeem to agree in their Idea of it: And
yet after all our Philofophy and Toil of Rea-
foning, fhall it be faid that we know not
whether it be a meer Nothing, or whether it
be the true and eternal God? Fruitlefs Toil
indeed, and aftonishing Ignorance! Puzzling
Difficulties attend the Argument on every
Side,
SECT. VI. concerning SPACE.
21
Side, and a ſhameful Perplexity and Dark-
neſs hangs heavy upon the boaſted Reafon
of Man, while he is labouring with all the
Powers of his Soul to refolve this entangled
Theme. We enter into the Abyfs of Space,
infinite and eternal Space, and our Thoughts
are loft and drown'd in it.
Let us lye ftill here and mufe a little, and
give a Looſe to our Wonder and our Shame.
Are the eternal God and a meer empty No-
thing fo near akin to one another, that we
cannot fee the Difference between them?
That we are not able to tell whether Space
be God, or whether Space be Nothing?
This we know and are fure of upon the
moſt ſubſtantial and uncontroulable Proofs
and Evidences, that there is a firſt Cauſe and
Mover of all Things; there is a felf-exiſtent
Being which needs no Caufe; and there is an
eternal and All-wife Mind: There is a Con-
fcious and Almighty Power which made all
Things; There is a God: He is the Supreme
Subſtance, the moſt neceſſary and fubftantial
of all Beings, as being at the greateſt Dif
tance from Nibility or Nothing. Our Belief
of this Doctrine is too well founded, and
too ſtrongly ſupported to be ever weaken'd by
any airy Debates about empty Space. And
yet has this empty Thing, or rather this
empty Nothing, furnamed Space, fuch fort of
Properties and Powers as to refemble God-
head? are the wideſt Extremes fo near to-
gether?
C 3
22
An Enquiry ESSAY I.
2
gether? Is a meer Non-entity fo like the infi-
nite Being, the most perfect Subftance, in any
Properties, that we cannot diftinguish the
one from the other? Can the Abfence of all
Things, or an empty Nothing ever look like
fo fubftantial a Being, as to be mistaken for
God? Or can the great God in any Views or
Afpects, ever appear to be fo thin, fo fubtle,
fo empty and unfubftantial a Thing as to look
like Nothing? What ſurpriſing Shame ſhould
feize upon our Underſtandings, our vain
and conceited Underſtandings, at fuch a
Thought as this, that even Philofophers can-
not agree and inform us certainly whether
Space be God or Nothing? Tho' we are af
certained by many Demonftrations, that the
Great God has a moft fubftantial and eternal
Exiſtence, yet we feem at a Lofs to deter-
mine whether this empty thing called Space be
not this God.
Let our Reafon bluſh and hide his Head,
and lye abaſed for ever at the Foot of the Di-
vine Majefty. This ftrange Theatre of Ar-
gument, this endleſs War of Words and
Ideas, throws a World of Confufion and
Abaſement upon the proudest Powers of
Mankind. It ſeems to fpread a Scene of Tri-
umph for God over the vain Creature Man,
and all his boafted Acquifitions of Know-
ledge, that he hardly knows the higheſt and
the beſt of Beings from an imaginary Sha-
dow of Being, an empty Nothing; that tho'
in
SECT. VII. concerning SPACE.
23
in ſome Views he is abfolutely certain that
God is the fupreme Subftance, and has the
higheſt and ſtrongeſt Title to Exiſtence and
Being; yet in other Views and Enquiries he
cannot ftrongly and boldly diftinguish the
Creator of all Things from a meer Non-en-
tity, which in fome Senfe is infinitely below
the Character or Idea of the meanest Duft or
Atom of the Creation. Bleffed God, forgive
all the Vanity and Conceit of our reafoning
Powers, all our fooliſh and unworthy Appre-
henfions concerning thy Majefty. Scatter
theſe Shadows of thick Darkneſs, lead us out
of this Labyrinth of grofs Ignorance and
Miſtake, and help us to make our Way thro?
this Abyſs of Night, thro' this endlefs Cir-
cle of Perplexity. Shew us thy felf, O God
our Maker, and teach us what thou art, that
we may adore thee better, nor fuffer us to
wander in this thick Mift, wherein we can
ſcarce diſtinguiſh thee from that which has
no Being.
SECT. VII.
The Original of our Idea of Space, and our
Danger of a Miftake.
C
OME then, my Soul, let us make one
Effort more, and try to recover our
felves. May we not fuppofe, that in this
imperfect State wherein the Soul is united to
a Body, it is too ready to be impoſed upon
thereby
C 4
24
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
thereby many ways? Under the Influence of
this Union to Matter, 'tis eafily perfuaded to
attribute corporeal Ideas, fuch as Length and
Breadth to a Spirit, and even to God the In-
finite Spirit, becauſe the Soul is continually
converfant with them; it is beſt acquainted
with theſe bodily Ideas, and is tempted to
imagine, that no real Being can exist without
them.
Sometimes the Soul dwelling in Animal
Nature, and under the Power of Imagina-
tion, miſtakes a Subftantial Being for meer
Nothing, and fometimes it miſtakes Nothing
for a Subftantial Being: And indeed this is the
very firft Way whereby all Men gain the Idea
of Space, the Subject of our preſent Debate.
We ſee a Room which is full of Light and
Air, which are real Bodies or Subftances, and
we imagine there is Nothing in it; and then
we call this Nothing void or empty Space, and
fancy this empty Space to be broad and long,
and deep, to reach from Wall to Wall, and
from the Floor to the Ceiling: Thence comes
our firft Conception of Space with its Pro-
perties of Length, Breadth and Depth; and
thus it is ufhered into our Minds at first by
a grofs Miſtake of Light and Air, which are
Something, for meer Nothing. Then our Ima-
gination changes the Scene, and turns this
Nothing into Something again, by leaving out
the Idea of Void or Emptiness, giving it a po-
fitive Name, and calling it Space.
Alas!
SECT. VIII. concerning SPACE.
25
Alas! how prone are we to Error in taking
Things that are not for Things that are, and
of miſtaking meer imaginary Beings for real
ones, by fuppofing real Properties to belong
to them. Perhaps this may be the very Cafe,
when we imagine Space (which in itſelf may
be a meer Non-entity or Nothing) to have
any real Powers or Properties, and our
Thoughts may be grofly deluded in this Mat-
ter, tho' it may not be eaſy to find always
where the Delufion lies.
I
SECT. VIII.
Space compared to Shadow or Darkneſs.
Am fure there is a very great Inftance or
Example of the like Kind of Delufion in
our Ideas of Shadow or Darkness *. May we
not as well fay, that a Shadow or Darkness
has fome real Powers and Properties? May
we not fay, that it hath the Property of
Length, and Breadth, and Depth, and Distance
* The chief, if not the only Difference between our
Ideas of Shadow and Darkness is this, that Darkness is a
general Term, fignifying the Abſence of Light; but the
Word Shadow ufually fignifies that Abfence of Light
from any Place, which is caufed by the Interpofition
of an opacous Body between fome lucid Body and that
Place. Such are the Shadows of Men, Beaſts and
Trees upon a Field, in a fhining Day. Night itſelf in
proper Speech is the Shadow of the Earth interpofed
between the Sun and the oppofite Part of the Air or
Sky: And all Darkness, as far as our Senfes reach, is
really but a Shadow.
contained
26
ESSAY I
An Enquiry
contained in it? That it has Power to con-
ceal Men and Houfes from our Sight, to
ſpread Darkneſs and Inviſibility over a Gar-
den of Flowers, or a Room of Pictures, and
yet
that it hath a Power to render Stars and
Glow-worms more vifible? Does not a Sha-
dow fhew us the Hour on a Sun-Dial? Does
it not refreſh Man and Beaſt in a fultry Day?
and help to ſpread Slumber over the Eyes at
Night? Are not thefe confiderable and real
Powers?
Again, a Shadow ſeems to have Motion: If
a Cloud move acroſs the Sky and hide the
Sun, do we not fay, the Shadow moves ei-
ther flowly or ſwiftly acroſs the Field or the
Chamber?
Hath it not alſo ten thouſand Shapes or
Figures? Let me hold up my Hand, or any
other Object between the Sun and the Wall,
hath not the Shadow what Shape I pleafe
to give it, and what Motion I pleafe to ex-
cite in the Thing which is reprefented by
the Shadow? Now 'tis plain, that all theſe
feem to be real Properties and the Powers
of a real Being.
And as it has theſe ſeeming Properties
and Powers, which make Mankind ready to
fancy it a real Being, fo fome of the Proper-
ties of it feem to be infinite alfo. Is not
Darkness extended beyond the utmoſt Bounds
of the material Creation? Is there not fome
real Limit to the Flight of the utmoſt wan-
dring
SECT. VIII. concerning SPACE.
27
dring Star-Beam? If not, then the material
World is infinite; for Star-Beams and Light
are Matter: If there be a Limit to Light,
then all beyond this Limit, and theſe wan-
dring Beams is pure Darkneſs, and this Dark-
nefs is unlimited and infinite. May not a
thoufand new Lights, new Stars, or planetary
Worlds be created in this immenſe Darkneſs?
has it not Capacity to contain them all, and
yet again to ftretch itſelf infinitely, beyond
the Bounds of this new Creation? We can
no more affign the Limits of it, than we
can the Limits of Space *. Again, As Dark-
neys hath a feeming Immenfity belonging to
it, has it not an Eternity alfo? Was not Dark-
nefs eternal before Light was ever formed,
or the firſt Beam of it created?
And yet after all theſe Sportings of the
Imagination, which feem to affign real Pro-
perties and Powers to Shadows and Darkness,
and even to ſtretch them to an infinite Ex-
tent, we know and are fure that Darkness or
a Shadow is a meer Nothing: 'tis only a Pri-
vation or Abſence of Light: In proper Speech
it has no Being: And Philofophers are able
* I am fenfible it will be objected here, that 'tis Space,
not Darkness, that has the Capacity of receiving or ad-
mitting Light or Sun-Beams. But it may be reply'd,
that tho' 'tis Space that admits new Body to exift there,
yet 'tis Darkneſs that does as it were join with Space,
to admit the firſt Beams of Light there: Darkness gives
it a Capacity of admitting that particular Body called
Light.
to
28
ESSAY I:
An Enquiry
to give an exact and rational Account how
all theſe Appearances are made by the Prefence
or Abſence of Light, without allowing a
Shadow to be a real Being, or to have in re-
ality any Powers or Properties at all. And
perhaps in this prefent State we are deluded
with the feeming Properties of Space, as much
as we are with the feeming Properties of
Shadow: And tho' I grant the Parallel be not
perfectly exact in all Reſpects, yet in ſeveral
Reſpects they are fo much akin, that in Re-
ality Space may be nothing but the Abſence
of Body, as Shade is the Abfence of Light:
And both may be capable of Explication by
Philofophy, without fuppofing the one or the
other of them to be real Beings.
L
SECT. IX.
Space unactive and impaffive,
ET us try now whether we may not take
Courage from this Hint, and raiſe fome
Efforts of Reaſoning, in order to prove Space
to be nothing real, or no real Being: Surely
there is no real Being whatſoever, but has
fome Capacity either of Action or Paffion, of
putting forth fome fort of Act, or of being act-
ed upon: But Space is utterly uncapable of all
real active or paffive Power: It can neither
be an Agent nor a Recipient of Action. It
cannot act upon Body neither as Body does,
i.e. by touching; nor as Spirit does, i. e. by
Volition
SECT. IX. concerning SPACE.
29
Volition; for it cannot touch nor will. Nor
can Space receive any Actions or Impreffions
of any kind from Body or from Spirit: Now,
fince no manner of Agency can belong to it,
nor any Operation of any Being be received
by it, furely fuch an inactive Thing cannot
be God, nor can fuch an impaffive Thing bet
a Creature: Therefore it muſt be a meer
Non-entity or Nothing.
1. Such an impaffive Thing cannot be a
Creature: There is no created Being but is
capable of being acted upon by another Be-
ing, at leaft by God himſelf, and thereby re-
ceiving fome Change: But Space cannot be
acted upon; no, not by the Great God the
Maker of all, nor can it receive any real and
proper Alteration in itſelf, nor fuffer any
manner of Change, but what a meer No-
thing may receive; i. e. Being may be put
where Nothing was before: So Body may be
put where before there was empty Space.
Thus Space in itſelf is really an impaf-
five Thing, and therefore it is no created
Being.
2. Such an inactive Being cannot be God,
for the living and true God cannot be con-
ceived otherwiſe than as a moſt active Being,
a Being of neceſſary and everlaſting Activity:
This belongs to the very Idea and Effence
of Godhead. But Space, empty Space, i. e.
Extenfion without Solidity is the moſt unactive
Idea you can frame, and indeed utterly un-
capable
2
30
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
3
capable of all Action, either as an Inftru-
ment, or as a prime Agent.
You cannot add the leaft Degree of Soli
dity to the Idea of Space, in order to render
it capable of acting as a Body does, for that
would turn it into the Idea of Body or Mat-
ter, and it would be Space no longer.
You cannot make Space think, or will, or
act as a Spirit does; for join Thinking and
Space, which are two diftinct Ideas, as near as
poffible in your Mind, yet you cannot unite
them into one Being, nor conceive of Space
as having any Share in thinking, or as exert-
ing a Thought. So you may join Iron and
Joy together in your Mind as two neighbour-
ing Ideas, but they will be two Ideas for
ever diftinct: No force can fqueeze, melt or
weld them together, and make them unite
in one: You can never make Iron become
joyful: There is an utter Inconfiftency in
their Ideas, and they are eternally incompa-
tible. Space can no more exert a Thought
than Iron can exert Joy.
Thus Space can never act as a Body or as
a Mind. Space and Action are two incom-
patible Ideas. Meer Extenfion is not only
unactive in itſelf, but cannot poffibly have
Activity given to it by any means; for it con-
tains an Idea of everlafting Inactivity, and
an Impoffibility of Action: Wherefover there
is Action there is fomething befides Space,
even ſome other Being: Space therefore can
never
SECT. X. concerning SPACE.
3I
never be the Idea of the Nature or Subftance
of God, whofe Nature is neceffarily and for-
ever active,, and whofe Exiſtence ceaſes when
his Activity ceaſes.
SECT.
X.
A Re-examination whether Space has any
real Properties.
ET us examin yet further the fuppofed
L Properties and p fiets
Properties and Powers of Space, and
confider whether they be real or no.
The first fuppofed Property of Space is
Extenfion, or Length, Breadth and Depth:
But let us remember what is our original Idea
of Space, and how we came by it. Have we
not found that our firſt Idea of it is Empti-
ness, or Abſence of Body or Matter in a Room
or Veffel, whofe Sides are diftant? then we
call this Abſence of Matter, or this Empti-
nefs, long, broad and deep, i. e. there is no
Matter or Body there. And when we fay,
that fome part of Space is a Yard or a Mile
long, we mean only that Body is abſent for a
Yard or a Mile, or there is Emptineſs for a Yard
or a Mile together, or that Emptineſs reaches
a Mile, or ten thouſand Miles beyond the Uni-
verſe; that is, there is no Matter or Body
there: This is the common Idea of Man-
kind. And thus we come to aſcribe the Pro-
perties of Being to a meer Nothing; and let
this be well obferved, that if we were never
2
fo
32
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
fo fure that there were no Being at all there,
as we are fure there is no Body, yet we
fhould have the very fame Idea of Space as
we have now, i. e. a long, broad and deep
Emptiness, or Abfence of Being, and that
Body which is long, broad and deep, might
be placed there. But this leads our Thoughts
to the next Particular.
The Second ſuppoſed Property of Space is
a Capacity to receive Bodies into it. But if
this Matter be fearched to the Bottom, per-
haps it will be found that Space is no other-
wife capable of receiving Body înto it, than
as the Emptiness of a Veffel makes it capable
of receiving Liquor, as Darkness is capable
of receiving Light, or than as Sound may be
admitted where before was Silence; that is,
that Something may be introduced or received
where there was Nothing before. And 'tis
much in the fame manner that Privation is
exalted to be one of the three famous Prin-
ciples of Being among the Ariftotelian Philo-
fophers, viz. Matter, Form and Privation.
Ridiculous Principle indeed! which fignifies
no more than that where any new Form or
Quality is introduced into Matter, there muſt
be an Abfence of that very Quality or Form
before 'tis introduced: So when Body is ad-
mitted or introduced into Space, 'tis neceffary
there muſt be no Body there before; and
where the firft Light is introduced there
muſt be antecedent Darkneſs.
I grant
SECT. X. concerning SPACE.
33
I grant the Modes of ſpeaking concerning
the Capacity of Space to receive Body are more
familiar to our Ears than the Capacity of
Darkness to receive Light; but perhaps in truth
both thoſe Expreffions fignify no more, than
that Body or Light may be brought in where
there was Space or Darkneſs before.
In the third place, we have been ready to
fay, that Space penetrates all Body, and is itself
penetrable by Body, that is, that Bodies can
exift where Space is, and fill up the ſelf-fame
room, as tho' Body and Space were two co-
extended and co-exiftent Beings. But perhaps
it is a very improper thing to fay Space pene-
trates Body or Matter, for we might as well
fay Light penetrates Shadow; whereas in truth,
where Light comes Shadow ceafes, and is no
more, for Light excludes it. May it not be
as natural and just therefore to fuppofe that
Space can never penetrate Matter, but that
wherefoever Matter is there Space is not? Doth
not Space vaniſh or ceafe utterly when and
where Body comes? I am fure Empty Space
ceaſes, and does not penetrate Matter, and I
know of no Space but Empty Space.
And here by the way I might obferve, that
for this very Reafon Space cannot be God: for
Space is really nullify'd where Body comes.
But no part of God can be nullify'd. To talk
of mutual Penetration of Matter and Space is
a mere Term of Art invented to maintain the
Exiſtence of Space, where Senſe and Reaſon
D
join
34
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
join to declare there is none. For in truth,
where Body exifts, Space is not; and it only then
appears to be what it really was before, that is,
an empty Nothing. Space is no more, and is
intirely loft, when Body is placed in the room
of Emptiness. Thus Space and Emptiness are
all one, and perhaps are as meer a Nothing
as Shadow or Darkneſs.
A fourth Attribute or Property allow'd to
Space is Immenfity or Infinity: but tho' Space
feem to be infinite or immenfe, yet 'tis not
really and pofitively fo.
This may be proved feveral Ways.
(1.) Whatſoever is infinite cannot be made
up by the Repetition of any thing finite; for
then finite things would be fuch proper Parts
of the infinite, that there would be an infinite
Number of thefe Parts, and then there would
alſo be twice an infinite Number of theſe
Parts when divided in halves; which is ab-
furd. If Space be ſuppoſed to be a poſitive
infinite Being, it all actually exifts together in
the fame Moment; and 'tis certain that in it
there are Yards, Feet and Inches; but 'tis
made up of no finite Number of Yards, or
Parts of a Yard, yet it contains in it an infinite
Number of Yards, and three times an infinite
Number of Feet, that is, thirty fix times an
infinite Number of Inches, which appear to
be fo many Abfurdities. Whereas if we fup-
pofe Space to be a meer Nothing, then our
Conception or Menfuration of ſuppoſed Dif-
tances
SECT. X. concerning SPACE.
35
*
tances beyond the Univerfe is but an ever-
growing Idea, and has no fuch Abfurdity at-
tending it for an ever-growing Idea may ftill
admit of Increaſe or Addition, but a poſitive
infinite cannot.
(2.) Space is not infinite, for wherefoever
Body is, there Space is not; and therefore
Space is not every where, and then it can-
not be infinite. Wherefoever this material
World is, Space is excluded, is as it were
nullify'd, and is not: Now it would be a mar-
vellous Idea indeed to fuppofe Space all round
beyond this World to be a real, pofitive, im-
menſe or infinite Being, and yet to have fuch
vaft Nullities of Space in the very Centre and
Bofom of it where this World lies: This
would deſtroy the complete Infinity of it, and
feclude it far from the Idea of a God, as be-
ing utterly unworthy of him.
And yet further, If this World, or any Part
of it were annihilated, then Space or Empti-
nefs would be larger than it was before; that
is, Emptiness would be increaſed: but this
is too mean and too changeable an Idea to
make any Pretences to Godhead.
Again, a fifth fuppofed Attribute of Space
is Indivifibility: It feems to be indivifible in-
deed, but 'tis not fo, if it does not penetrate
Matter; for put a Body into the middle of an
empty Space, and it really divides it, i.e. the
middle Part ceafes to be empty Space, be-
cauſe it is filled with Body, and Space re-
mains
D
2
36
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
mains on both Sides; even as a Streak of
Light or Sunſhine coming from the South de-
ftroys Darkneſs or Shade fo far as it comes,
and thus divides the two Parts of remaining
Darkneſs, the Eaft from the Weft.
A fixth Attribute or Property afcribed to
Space is Self-Existence, or that it wants no
Cauſe. But perhaps the true Reaſon why it
appears to want no Cauſe, is not that it has
fuch a real and' fubftantial Effence as is too
big to be produced by any Caufe, but that it
is fuch a fubtil, tenuious, uneffential- or ima-
ginary thing, that has not Effence, nor Ex-
iſtence, nor Reality enough to want a Cauſe,
or to be produced or caufed: Now this is
vaftly different from the Idea of God's Self-
existence, or his Self-fufficiency to exift without
a Caufe. Univerfal Darkneſs wanted no Cauſe
before the Creation of Light.
There is yet another fuppofed Property of
Space, and that is neceffary Existence, and that
it cannot be annihilated, nor can it begin to exist.
But here alfo Light and Shade are happy Il-
luftrations of this Debate about Body and
Space. Darknefs and Space are not neceffarily
exiftent, for where Light comes Shadow is
annihilated and gone; where Body comes
Space is vanifhed and annihilated.
When
that Body is removed, Space begins to exiſt
there again, as much as Shadow does when
Light departs: But in truth it fhould rather
be faid in both Cafes, Where Something was
before,
SECT. X. concerning SPACE.
3.7
before, now there is Nothing, and when Some-
thing returns, the Non-entity or Nothingneſs
ceafes. Body and Space mutually exclude one
another as Light and Shade, as Something and
Nothing. And we are too ready to apply the
Words Exiſtence and Annihilation to Shade and
Space which are Non-enties, as well as to
Light and Body which are real Beings.
Pofitive Terms tend to give us pofitive and
delufive Ideas of Non-entity. If in our Sur-
vey of all theſe fuppofed Properties of Space
we uſed the Word Emptiness or Void inſtead of
the pofitive Term Space, we fhould perhaps
arrive at jufter Ideas of all this Matter. Let
us take the Pains then briefly to run over them
again in this manner.
Is Emptiness long, broad and deep? Is Empti-
nefs extended? Has Emptinefs a Capacity to
receive Body? Is Emptiness penetrable by Mat-
ter? What do we mean by all this? Does it
fignify any thing more than that Matter or
Body is abfent thence, and it may be brought
in there where Emptiness was before? This
does not render Emptiness a Subſtance, or real
Being, or make it the Support or Subftratum
of real Properties.
Is Emptiness immenfe or infinite beyond the
Limits of the Univerfe? What do we intend
by it, but that beyond this World of Bodies
there is no Matter or Body exifting; yet Mat-
ter or Body may be introduced where there
is an Emptiness or Abfence of it.
D 3
Is
38
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
Is Emptiness indivifible? By no means; for
a Wall or Curtain hung up in an empty Room
divides it into two leffer Voids or Emptineffes,
i.e. there is an Emptineſs or Abſence of Body
on both Sides of the Partition.
Is Emptiness Self-exiſtent? Not at all; for
it hath no real Exiftence: it is rather a Ne-
gation of Being. Is it neceffarily exiftent? No
furely; for it lofes what Exiſtence it is fup-
poſed to have when Body or Matter is intro-
duced, as Shade or Darkneſs lofes what Ex-
iſtence it appeared to have when Light breaks
in.
Yet a little further may this Parallel be il-
luftrated, in order to fhew how much Ana-
logy there is between Space and Shade. Take
a hollow Sphere of Lead, out of which all
Air is fuppofed to be excluded; place it on
a bright Day in the midſt of Sun-beams: here
is a Globe of Space, and a Globe of Shade or
Darkness commenfurate, and if you pleaſe,
coextended with each other, and both included
in this Sphere: Move it fwiftly, the Shade and
the Space move with the fame Swiftneſs:
Stop the Sphere, and the Space and Shade are
at reft: Bruiſe it inwardly, and you alter the
Figure both of the Shade and the Space in-
cluded; for you annihilate a Segment both
of Space and Shade: Break a Hole into this
Globe, and immediately you admit both Light
and Air which are Bodies, to fill up the whole
room of Space and Shade; and thus both
the
SECT. XI. concerning SPACE.
39
the Shade and the Space are annihilated or
nullify'd together. Here are then, or here
appear to be, two co-extended and commen-
furate Globes of figured and moveable I know
not what's, abfolutely deftroy'd and nullify'd
in a moment: But perhaps the whole Myf-
tery of it is no more than this, that the Non-
entity of each of them ceaſes by the Intro-
duction of real Being or Matter.
SECT. XI.
An Objection against the Nibility of Space
anfwered.
A
FTER all fome Perfon may fay, But
how will you anſwer that great Objec-
tion, (viz.) Space cannot be meer Nothing,
for two Bodies may have twenty Miles of
Space between them, and yet if all this Space
be Nothing, then there is Nothing between
theſe two Bodies, and therefore they are cloſe
together or touch one another, and yet are
twenty Miles diftant, which is impoffible?
But may not this be anfwered by a round
Denial of this Propofition, If there be Nothing
between them, then they touch or are close toge-
ther? Why may not two Bodies be created or
placed at twenty Miles diftance, and yet no-
thing but Emptineſs, i. e. no real Being be-
tween them? However harth and uncouth it
may found to learned Ears, that thefe two
Bodies are twenty Miles afunder, and they do
D 4
not
40
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
not touch tho' there be nothing between them, yet
the Vulgar World, who very much deter-
mine the common Senfe of Words, will al-
low this Language to be good; for they ge-
nerally fuppofe Space to be Emptiness, that is,
to be Nothing. And if the Learned are of
fended with this Language, 'tis becauſe they
have, of late Years at leaft, run into this Sup-
pofition, that Space is a real Something; and
'tis meerly their own efpoufed Opinion that
makes this Expreffion offenfive to them which
the Vulgar Part of Mankind generally approve
of, if you give them leave to think a little.
Befides, by the former Debates it plainly
appears, that if Space be a Real Something
it muſt be a Subſtance, it muſt be Deity; for
the Reaſons ſeem to be unanfwerably ftrong,
that Space cannot be a Mode, nor a Creature.
Now is it not quite as abfurd to fay, There are
twenty Miles of Deity between two fuch diftant
Bodies, as to fay, they are created or placed at
fuch a Distance, and yet there is Nothing be-
tween them, i. e. there is no Real Being, or
between them is all Emptiness?
I grant it hardly poffible to fpeak on this
Subject of Non-entities or Nothings, without
ufing the Terms that reprefent pofitive Beings
and real Properties: But as we are thus im-
pofed upon by Words and by our common
Ideas in treating of Shadows, which we know
are nothing but the Abfence of Light, i.e. a
meer Non-entity, Why may not the fame be
true
SECT. XI.
concerning SPACE.
4I
true alſo with regard to Space or Emptiness,
which is the meer Abfence of Body? And if
we are in this Point impofed upon to take
Space or Emptiness for a real Something by fome
Forms of Speech we have been taught to uſe
concerning it, and fome appearing or imagi-
nary Properties that we afcribe to it, we fee
plainly 'tis not the firft nor the only Inftance
wherein Mankind have been deluded by the
common Ways and Manners of ſpeaking, and
impoſed upon to take Words for Things, and
to miſtake Appearances for Realities.
In order to confirm this Thought, I may
cite Mr. Locke himſelf, however pofitive an
Idea he may fuppofe Space to be in fome
Parts of his Writings. His eighth Chapter of
the ſecond Book of his Essay allows pofitive
Ideas of meer privative Things or Privations.
See §. 3, 4, 5.
"The Idea of Black is no lefs
pofitive in the Mind of a Painter than that
" of White, however the Cauſe of that Co-
"lour in the external Object may be only
"Privation."
<<
"Sect. 4. If it were the Deſign of my pre-
" fent Undertaking to enquire into the na-
"tural Cauſes and manner of Perception, I
"ſhould offer this as a Reaſon why a priva-
"tive Caufe might in fome Cafes at leaſt
"produce a Pofitive Idea, (viz.) That all
"Senfation being produced in us only by dif-
"ferent Degrees and Modes of Motion in
our animal Spirits, variouſly agitated by
(c
"external
42
ESSAY I.
An Enquiry
'ત
any for-
"external Objects, the Abatement of
mer Motion muft as neceffarily produce a
new Senſation as the Variation and Increaſe
"of it, and fo introduce a new Idea which
depends only on a different Motion of the
"animal Spirits in that Organ."
66
"Sect. 5. But whether this be fo or no, I
"will not here determine; but I appeal to
every one's own Experience, whether the
"Shadow of a Man, tho' it confifts in nothing
"but the Abfence of Light, (and the more the
"Abfence of Light is, the more diſcernible
"is the Shadow) does not when a Man looks
"on it caufe as clear and pofitive an Idea in
"his Mind as a Man himſelf, tho' cover'd
over with clear Sunſhine? And the Picture
"of a Shadow is a pofitive Thing.
pofitive Thing. Indeed
"we have negative Names which ſtand not
directly for pofitive Ideas, but for their Ab-
fence, fuch as Infipid, Silence, Nihil, &c.
" which Words denote (or refer to) pofitive
Ideas, i. e. Tafte, Sound, Being, with a Sig-
"nification of their Abſence."
<<
<<
ce
"Sect. 6. And thus one may truly be faid
"to fee Darkneſs. For fuppofe a Hole per-
fectly dark from whence no Light is re-
"flected, 'tis certain one may fee the Figure
"of it, or it may be painted." Thus far
Mr. Locke: And I ask leave to add to this
Diſcourſe, that I have found a late ingenious
Writer in his Notes on the English Tranflation
of Biſhop King's Treatife De Origine Mali,
published
SECT. XII. concerning SPACE.
43
publiſhed in 173.1. well fupport fuch fort of
Sentiments as I have here advanced concern-
ing Space, (viz.) that it is rather a Negation
of Being than any thing real and pofitive,
however our common Ideas and Language
may lead us into Miftakes about it. See
Chap. I. Sect. I. Note 5 and 11, and 13. Whe-
ther the learned Author of the Defence of
Dr. Clarke's Demonftration of the Being of
God, has effectually anfwered all this, the
Reader muft judge.
SECT. XII.
Space nothing real, but a meer abftract Idea.
A
FTER all theſe Debates wherein we
have been endeavouring to prove Space
to be nothing real without us, yet perhaps we
may allow it to be an abſtracted Idea of the
Mind: and it may poffibly be form'd by ab-
ftracting the Length, Breadth and Depth of
Matter, i. e. the Extenfion from the Solidity
of it: for fince we frame an Idea of Length
without Breadth, and call it a Line when we
know there is no fuch thing really exiftent,
and we form Ideas of united Length and
Breadth without Depth, and call this a Sur-
face, tho' we know alfo this cannot exiſt, ſo
why may we not frame an Idea of Extenfion
or Space, i. e. Length, Breadth and Depth
without
44
ESSAY I
An Enquiry
without Solidity*, and yet allow that it hath
no proper Exiſtence but in our Ideas?
The Arguments uſed in the beginning of
this Effay to difprove Space to be a meer Idea,
may be repeated and anſwered thus.
It is faid, We cannot have an Idea of what
is truly infinite; but our Reafon affures us
Space is infinite or without Bounds, and there-
fore it is not a meer Idea. I anfwer, Tho'
we do not form an Idea of Space actually and
pofitively infinite, yet we can form an Idea
of infinite Space of the ever-growing kind,
and it may be a meer Idea ftill. Our Idea
indeed is not actually infinite, we cannot grafp
the Infinity of Space beyond the World, for
that would be to bound or limit Emptiness:
And fo we may have an ever-growing Idea of
infinite Number as well as infinite Space or
Emptiness, yet it is a meer Idea, and hath no
real Exiſtence without us.
Again, It is faid, Space cannot be a meer
Idea, becauſe it ſeems to have a neceffary and
obftinate Exiſtence, whether there were any
Mind or no to form an Idea of it. I answer,
Such are the eternal Truths, (viz.) Three and
three make fix, The Whole is bigger than à
Part, &c. and yet what are thefe befides
Ideas? have they any real Exiſtence extraneous
to the Minds that conceive them? and yet
*Solid here is taken in the Phyfical Senfe for what
refifts Matter, and not in the Geometrical Senſe for the
three Dimenſions united.
perhaps
SECT. XII. concerning SPACE.
45
perhaps Space has hardly fo much Exiſtence
as theſe.
And it is certain, if Space or Emptineſs be
nothing but the meer Abfence of Being, then
the Idea of it is only a Conception of No-
thing after the manner of Something, and
that muſt be a meer Idea.
To conclude, after the laborious Searches
of Thought, Reaſoning and Reading in ſeve-
ral Stages of my Life paft, theſe are the beſt
Conceptions and Sentiments that I can frame
of Space. I grant there may be fome Diffi-
culties yet remaining, and fome Darkneffes
which yet may hang over this Subject. Learned
Men have laboured hard to ſcatter them in
former Ages, and in the preſent too without
full Succeſs; yet perhaps in future time there
may be a Way found out for adjuſting all
thefe Difficulties to the more complete Satif-
faction of fome following Age. But in every
Age of this mortal and imperfect State there
will be fome Unknowables and Infolvables:
Many of the Themes and Enquiries relating
to Infinites and Incommenfurables, both in Mag-
nitude and Number, and Eternals in Dura-
tion and abſtracted Truths are of this kind:
And if we ſhould agree to throw in Space
and Atoms or Indivifibles into this Heap, we
ſhould but enlarge the Number of thoſe
perplexing Arguments, whereby perhaps the
Great God our Maker defigns to maintain a
perpetual
46
An Enquiry, &c. ESSAY I.
perpetual Check upon our proudeft Powers
of Reaſoning, to plunge us now and then
into Darkneſs and endleſs Confuſion, to hum-
ble us under a Senfe of the narrow Limits
of Human Knowledge, and teach us to pay
all due Veneration to his Underſtanding which
is unfearchable.
1
1
ESSAY
(47)
ESSAY II.
Of Subftance: and of Solid Extenfion
and a Thinking Power as the two
only Original Subftances.
1
SECT. I.
Mr. Locke's Notion of Subftance confidered.
S
UBSTANCE is another of thoſe Myf-
teries wherein we bewilder and lofe our-
ſelves by attempting to make Something
out of Nothing. Mr. Locke has happily re-
futed that unreaſonable Notion of Subftance in
general, which makes it to be fome real thing
in Nature, different from all the united Qua-
lities, the ſuppoſed Properties and Powers of
Body or Spirit, and he has expoſed it to juſt
Ridicule, as in Book 2. Chap. 13. §. 18, 19, 20.
In Chap. 23. §. 2, 3 and 6. and in other Places
he tells us, Whatever be the fecret and abſtract
Nature of Substance in general, all the Ideas
we have of particular diſtinct fort of Subftances
are nothing but feveral Combinations of fimple
Ideas co-exiftent in fuch (tho' unknown) Caufe
I
of
48
ESSAY II.
Of Subftance,
of their Union, as makes the whole fubfift of it
Jelf: And he often fpeaks of this fame un-
known Caufe of the Union of Properties both in
corporeal and ſpiritual Subſtances, as in §. 15,
37. Now I acknowledge I have very little
to fay againſt Mr. Locke's Repreſentation of
the Notion which he has of particular Sub-
ftances, if this unknown Something, which he
fuppofes to be the Caufe of the Union of their
Properties, were not fo much infifted on, as
to lead his Readers into a Belief, that there
is ſuch a ſort of unknown real Being call'd
Subftance in general, which fupports all the
Properties that we obferve in particular diffe-
rent Beings, and which he before had refuted
and ridiculed with fo much Juſtice and Ele-
gance.
I confess I fee no fufficient Reaſon why we
may not content ourfelves with the Notion
and Deſcription of Subftance in the main which
the Schools give us, (viz.) Subftantia eft Ens
per fe fubfiftens et fubftans accidentibus; in
English thus, (1.) It is that which fupports
Accidents or Qualities in Being, which could
have no Being or Exiſtence at all without ſuch
a Support or fuch a Subject in which to exiſt.
(2.) It is that which can exift, or which fub-
fifts by itfelf, without Dependance on any
Created Being. All this is not at all diſagree-
able to Mr. Locke's Sentiment: for when we
obferve any Being whofe feveral Modes we
perceive inhering and united in it as in one
common
SECT. Í.
Body and Spirit.
49
common Subject or Bond of their Union, this
we call a Subſtance: and this Name of Sub-
ftance we alfo attribute to this Being from a
further Confideration that it ſubſiſts of itſelf,
i. e. independent upon any other created Being.
But tho' Mr. Locke would feem to exclude
and abandon any general Notion of Subſtance,
as another real phyfical diftinct Being, pro-
vided to fupport all its real or ſuppoſed Ac-
cidents or Qualities, and feems to banter it by
the Indians unknown Something, which Support's
the Tortoife, which fupports the Elephant, which
Supports the World; yet, as I intimated, he too
often reprefents this Notion of Subſtance as
fome real unknown Thing or Being, which
holds the Properties in Union, and which is
different from all thofe things which he calls
Qualities or Properties, and which ſupports
them all in Exiſtence, tho' he owns, we know
it not, and have no Idea of it: and thus he
feems to build again and maintain the very
Notion which he before deſtroy'd.
Truly if there were any fuch real Being in
Nature as Substance in general, or a common
Subſtance which fupports all the Properties
of things, and this Being were utterly un-
known to us, then I think it might be granted,
that all Beings are, or at leaſt might be the
fame in Subſtance, and are or may be diver-
fify'd only by their Properties or Accidents:
for if we know nothing of this Being call'd
Subftance, we can deny nothing of it: And then
perhaps
E
50
ESSAY II.
Of Subftance,
perhaps it might be ſaid, that God and the
Creature, that Body and Mind, are the fame
in Subſtance, even the fame individual Sub-
ftance, and that they differ only in certain
Properties: But this is a moft palpable Falfe-
hood, which I fhall take fome further notice
of by and by: for God and the Creature dif-
fer from each other in their very Effence, in
their fubftantial Nature or phyfical Being, tho'
the Logical or generick Idea of Substance may
be apply'd to them both, as felf fubfifting Be-
ings. So Matter and Mind, or Body and Spirit
have a real, effential and unchangeable Dif-
ference in the very Subftance of them, i.e. in
what they are in Nature, tho' the Name Sub-
Stance be attributed to both, and that even in
the fame Senfe, becauſe they both agree fo
far, that they both fubfift by themſelves.
SECT. II.
The plain Idea or Notion of Subftance applied
to Mind and Body.
ET us try now whether we cannot trace
L'
out and reprefent with Clearneſs and Evi-
dence fome better and more fatisfactory Idea
of this Matter, than to fuppofe the Subftance.
of all things to be fo much unknown, or
that there is any fuch real Being as Subftance
diftinct from all that we ufually call Properties.
Subftance in the proper Notion of it is a
certain Idea or Character which our Minds
3
affix
SECT. II. Body and Spirit.
5 I
affix to Beings from a Confideration that they
depend upon no created Being for their Sub-
fiftence; and therefore are faid to fubfift by
themselves; and from this further Confidera-
tion alfo, that they appear to be the Subjects
of various Modes or Qualities. Not that there
is or can be any fuch thing in Nature as Sub-
ftance, pure Subftance, exifting abftracted from
all Qualities, any more than there can be
what the Schools call Materia prima or firft
Matter abftracted from all Forms, or than
there can be pure Qualities exifting abſtracted
from all Subftances. Who can tell what is
Motion or Refiftance, without including the
Idea of fome Subftance moved or refifting? Nor
can any one have the Idea of Subftance in
Bodies without the Idea of folid Extenfion ;
nor in Minds without the Idea of Cogitation
or a Cogitative Power.
But to proceed further in this Enquiry about
Subſtance. Body and Spirit are the two moſt
general and diſtinct, if not the only Ideas we
have of Substances, i. e. of fuch Things or
Beings which we conceive as the Subjects or
Supporters of diftinct Qualities, and which
fubfift of themſelves without Dependance up-
on any Creature. Now let us for the prefent
fuppofe Body to be folid Extenfion, and Spirit
to be a Power of Cogitation or Thinking, or
at leaſt that theſe are the prime diftinguiſhing
Properties of theſe two Beings, and we will
enquire whether there be need of any further
E 2
Idea
”。
52
Of Subftance,
ESSAY II.
Idea of fome Subſtance to ſupport them.
Theſe two (viz.) Body and Spirit, ſeem to
be fufficient Supports for all the Qualities or
Modes that we can have any Idea of, fince
they are all either Senfible, Intellectual or
Abſtracted, as we fhall-fhew afterward. Bo-
dy or folid Extenfion is a fufficient Subject
or Support for any other corporeal or fenfible
Qualities, whether it be Figure, Size, Colour,
Motion, Reft, Reſiſtance, Situation, &c. they
all plainly fubfift in folid Extenfion as in their
Subject: Think of Yellownefs, Roundneſs,
Hardness, Swiftnefs, Touching, Refiftance, or
any other bodily Qualities, they all want folid
Extenfion in order to fubfift, and they want
nothing elſe. So Spirit, or a Power of Think-
ing, is a fufficient Subject or Support for any
intellectual Qualities, whether it be Confciouf-
nefs, Knowing, Reafoning, Doubting, Fearing,
Hoping, Withing, Willing, Refolving, Chu-
fing, Refufing, &c. all thefe fubfift plainly in
a Cogitative Nature or Power as in their Sub-
ject, eſpecially fuppofing this Power to be al-
ways in Act. As for fuch abstracted Ideas or
Modes, as Caufe, Effect, Likeneſs, Difference,
&c. they belong fometimes to Bodies, fome-
times to Spirits, but they need nothing to fup-
port them as their Subject, beſides a Thinking
Power or folid Extenfion.
And as folid Extenfion and a Power of Think-
ing have this one Character of Subftance, that
they are fufficient Supports for Qualities,
Modes
་
SECT. II Body and Spirit.
53
Modes or Accidents, ſo they have the other
Property of Subſtance alfo, (viz.) that they
fubfift of themſelves independent of any Cre-
ated Being: No Creature can give Being to
one Particle of folid Extenfion, or the meaneſt
Thinking Power, or can annihilate and deſtroy
either of them and put them out of Being:
Not the feebleft Spirit, or the leaft Particle
of Matter or Body can be utterly deſtroy'd and
annihilated by the moft powerful Creature.
I might add yet further, that fince Mr.
Locke declares our Idea of particular diſtinct
Subſtances to be feveral Combinations of fimple
Ideas co-exiftent in fome unknown Cauſe of their
Union, and which makes the whole fubfift by
itſelf, why may not a Power of Thinking be
this ſuppoſed unknown Cauſe and Subject of
the Combination of the feveral Properties of
Spirits? And why may not folid Extenfion be
the Cauſe of the Union of the feveral Pro-
perties and Qualities of Body? What is there
neceffary to unite all the Properties of Matter
beyond folid Extenfion? Make a Trial of all
the Modes that can belong to any material
Being: What do they want but folid Exten-
fion to unite them? Make the fame Trial by
taking a Survey of the Properties of a Spirit?
Will not the Idea of a Thinking Power unite
them all?
Why then may we not fuppofe that folid
Extenfion and a Thinking Power may be the
very Subſtances themſelves, tho' the Names
E 3
gram-
54
Of Subftance, ESSAY II.
grammatically taken may ſeem to denote Pro-
perty and Quality?
The following Confiderations may perhaps
lead the Mind into a favourable Difpofition
toward this Opinion, or at leaſt relieve the
ſeeming Strangeness of it from the Charge of
Abfurd and Impoffible.
SECT. III.
Confiderations to fupport the Application of the
Name of Subftance to Solid Extenfion and a
Thinking Power.
FIR
IRST, Since our moft piercing Thoughts
cannot reach deep enough to find out,
to know or conceive of any Subject or Sub-
ftratum that upholds this Power of Cogitation
in Spirits, or this Idea of folid Extenfion in
Bodies, why fhould we imagine there is any
fuch unknown and unknowable Being? May
we not fufpect that learned and logical Forms
of ſpeaking have introduced this fort of No-
tion into our Minds rather than any phyfical
Neceffity could introduce it into the Nature
of Things? And why fhould we fuppofe
and multiply real Beings without Neceffity?
Why may not theſe very Ideas of folid Ex-
tenfion and a Thinking Power be ſuppoſed
to be the Subftrata or Subftances themſelves
fince we have no Idea of any other?
Second Confideration. If we can lay afide all
our Prejudices in this Point, I am perfuaded
Solid
SECT. III. Body and Spirit.
55
folid Extenfion would appear fubftantial enough
to be called a Substance, fince even mere empty
Space, or Extenfion without Solidity, hath been
by fome Philofophers efteem'd fubftantial e-
nough to fubfift by itſelf, and to deferve the
Honour of this Name? And why may not a
Spirit or Mind be a Power and yet a Sub-
ftance, a felf-fubfiftent Power in perpetual Act?
Do we not know that the acute and laborious
Schoolmen among their deep Reafonings tell
us, that God is an Eternal Self-Exiftent Act,
or Almighty Power in Eternal Act? And this
certainly inheres in no Subject: God is a Sub-
ftance or Subject himſelf: In their Way of
fpeaking they call God the most actual Act,
and yet that does not hinder them from cal-
ling him alſo the most fubftantial Subftance,
And what nobler or more grand and illuf-
trious Idea can we frame of the bleffed God,
than to conceive of him as an unlimited
Power of Conſciouſneſs and Volition in the
moſt Conſtant and Univerfal Activity?
Note, In this Cafe I may fo far agree with
the Schoolmen as not to make very much
Diſtinction between a Power of Cogitation or
Thinking, and that Actual Cogitation or Thought
which is confidered in the general and per-
manent Idea of it, as ever exifting and as de-
termined to particular Objects fimultaneous
or fucceffive. And this I may venture to ſay,
becauſe I ſuppoſe this Power to be in con-
ſtant and perpetual Act, and neceffarily fo
E 4
even
1
5.6
Of Subftance,
3/
ESSAY II.
even in Created Spirits when once they are
created; and herein they are a bright Emblem
of the bleffed God, all Conſciouſneſs and Acti-
vity. 'Tis the very Nature of God to be
conſcious and active: If he ceaſes to be con-
ſcious and active he ceaſes to be: Conſcious
Activity is alfo the Effence of every Spirit!
A noble Rank of Beings we are, the living
and lively Offspring and Image of that intel-
lectual and vital Power who gave us Being.
Tõ yag n yévos éoμev, faid Aratus and St. Paul.
γὰρ γένος εσμεν,
Thirdly, Confider that if folid Extenfion and
a Thinking Power are but meer Modes or
Qualities, and not Subftances, then I enquire,
May not the Subftances remain if thefe Modes
were deftroy'd? But deftroy folid Extenfion,
and in the room of it there will remain a
meer Nothing. Deftroy Thinking Power, and
there remains Nothing in its room. We have
no Idea left. All Ideas are utterly banished
out of the Mind, and all Beings are baniſhed
out of the World at once by this Suppofition,
Therefore it ſeems to me that folid Extenfion
and a Cogitative Power are real Subftances,
for if you nullify them they leave meer No-
thing behind them. If you fuppofe Space to
be fomething remaining behind, I have ac-
counted for that in another Eſſay.
Perhaps you will answer, that the effential
Modes or Properties of a Being cannot be de-
ftroy'd without deftroying the Subſtance alfo,
tho' the accidental Modes or Qualities may be
deſtroy'a
SECT. III. Body and Spirit.
57
deſtroy'd while the Subftance remains; fo
Roundneſs in a Bowl is an effential Mode or
Property, and if you deſtroy Roundneſs, the
Bowl is deſtroy'd: it is a Bowl no longer.
And fo folid Extenfion and thinking Power
may be effential Modes or Properties of cer-
tain Subftances to which they belong, and
therefore they cannot be deſtroy'd without
deſtroying the Subſtance.
To this I reply, that what is only and meerly
a Mode or Property (even tho' it be an effen-
tial Mode) of any particular Being, whether
Body or Spirit, may be deftroy'd, and yet
fome Subftance, fome real Being will remain;
tho' its effential Mode being deſtroy'd, it will
not have the fame Form or Name as it had
before; Deſtroy Roundness and the Body ceaſes
to be a Bowl, but 'tis Body or Matter ftill:
Deſtroy the peculiar effential Mode (whatever
it be) that diſtinguiſhes a Human Spirit from
all other Spirits, and yet 'tis a Spirit ftill, tho'
it ceaſes to be a human Spirit; but the Caſe
is not fo with folid Extenfion and a thinking
Power; for if you deftroy thefe there is no-
thing at all remains, not fo much as an Idea;
and therefore I think they are not ſo properly
meer effential Modes, but they are Subſtances
themſelves.
I know it will be objected here, that tho'
we ſhould grant folid Extenfion to be a Sub-
ſtance, yet we cannot fuppofe a thinking Power
to be a Subſtance alfo: a Power muſt have
fome
t
58
Of Subftance, ESSAY II.
fome Subftance to inhere in, and Extenfion
or Expanſion belongs to all Subſtances what-
foever; and it is probable that Extenfion void
of Solidity is the Subftratum of the thinking
Powers of a Spirit.
But may it not be reply'd, that we have
ufed ourſelves ſo much in Logick to conceive
Power as a Mode or Property, that it is harder
perhaps for Scholars than it is for others to
drop this Prejudice. Yet in common Lan-
guage among Heathens or Chriftians, the bea-
venly Powers, or the Powers above, fignify
God, or Gods, or Angels, and the Scripture
ufes this Language, for it often calls Angels
Principalities and Powers; Eph. vi. 12. Col.i.
16. and ii. 16. 1 Pet. iii. 22.
And as for fuppofing fome Extenſion to be
the Subſtance or Subftratum of every thinking
Power, I grant we are fo ty'd down by con-
ftant and familiar Ideas of Body to Length,
Breadth and Depth, that we are ready to
imagine there can be no Being without it.
We may allow therefore, fay the Cartefians, we
may allow young Philofophers to keep their
Ideas of Extenfion together with their Ideas of
a thinking Power, 'till they have proceeded to
fearch farther into the Nature and Actions of
a Spirit, and to converfe about the Under-
ftanding and Will, and their Operations; and
they will find by degrees that this Extenfion
can do nothing toward thinking, nor is of any
Ufe in all their Reſearches into the World of
Spirits:
SECT. III. Body and Spirit.
59
Spirits: they will find that it is a foreign Idea
ty'd on to a thinking Power by meer Custom,
and they will perhaps infenfibly drop it by
degrees when they find no Ufe of it in Phi-
lofophizing upon Spirits.
I fay, this Idea of Extenfion is ty'd on to
the Idea of a Soul by Custom rather than by
pure Nature. A poor young Creature in the
loweft Rank of Life being once asked, What
ſhe ſuppoſed her Soul to be, after a little
mufing reply'd, My Soul is my Think; whereby
it is plain the meant her Power of Thinking.
And I believe the greateſt Part of Mankind,
if they were asked the fame Queftion, would
fooner and more readily reply, that it is fome-
thing in them that enables them to think,
ſpeak, move, and gives them the Power of
Thought and Action, than they would fay,
'Twas any thing, long, broad or deep.
Another Objection against a Spirit being a
thinking Power is this, That a Spirit itſelf
has ſeveral Powers, (viz.) Judging, Reaſoning,
Wiſhing, Willing, Fearing, &c. Now how
can one Power have other Powers? I answer,
Voice is a Power in Man, and yet a human
Voice has the Power of Singing or Mufick:
Again, Singing has a Power of gladdening
the Heart. Why then may not a Spirit which
is a ſubſtantial Power have ſeveral other modal
Powers and Properties in it?
But I proceed to the next Confideration to
ſhew that ſolid Extenfion and a thinking Power
may be Subſtances.
Fourth
60
ESSAY II.
Of Subftance,
Fourth Confideration. If we will but allow
theſe two (viz.) folid Extenfion and the Power
of Cogitation to be Subſtances, we are then
furniſhed with all the Ideas of Substance that
are neceffary for all the Millions of fimple
and complex Ideas of all the different Beings,
Natures, Properties, Actions and Powers that
we have; for we may refer them all to one
or other of theſe two Subſtances, and con-
ceive them as inhering therein; and we ſhall-
not be forced to fearch further, nor run to
ſome other unknown and unconceivable Being
called Substance, of which we have no Idea,
to fupport any of the Modes or Qualities of
Mind or Body, i. e. of the whole Univerſe of
real Beings. Allow but theſe two to be Sub-
ſtances, and there is no need of framing any
other Idea of Subftance to accommodate all
the Beings in the Univerſe with ſomething
ſufficient to uphold all the infinite Variety of
their Properties, or to be the Cauſe of the
Union of theſe Properties. Solid Extenfion
and Thinking Power will ſuſtain all the Modes
which we can conceive: Now all the Sub-
ſtances that we know are Body and Spirit,
and all the Modes that we know belong to
one of theſe.
Fifth Confideration. Let it be confidered alfo
that the Suppofition of fome utterly unknown
Being called Substance to be the Subftratum
or Subject of all the Properties of Body, and
ſuch an unknown Being alſo to be the Subject
of
SECT. III. Body and Spirit.
61
f
of all the Properties of Mind or Spirit, is a
Notion that carries with it fome dangerous
Confequences, and therefore ought not to be
too eafily embraced. For if the Subſtance of
Body and the Subftance of Mind be fo much
unknown, then the Subftance of Body (as I
have hinted already) may be the fame with
the Subſtance of Mind for ought we know
to the contrary. If we know nothing of this
Subſtance, but that it is fomething that ſub-
fifts by itſelf and upholds and unites Proper-
ties, how can we tell but that the very fame
individual Subſtance may be the Subftratum
or Subject both of folid Extenfion with all its
Modes, and of Thinking with all its Modes,
and may unite the Modes or Properties of
Body and Mind together? And thus Matter
may be made able to think or may have the
Power of Thinking put into it, and which
may inhere in it together with folid Extenfion.
And indeed Mr. Locke was very fenfible that
his Opinion had this Tendency, and he even
allows the Confequence of it, which I call
dangerous: for Book IV. Chap. 3. Sect. 6. he
ſeems to fuppofe that Matter may Think; for
he fpeaks thus, We have the Ideas of Matter
and Thinking; but poſſibly ſhall never be able
to know whether any meer material Being thinks
or no; it being impoffible for us by the Contem-
plation of our own Ideas without Revelation to
difcover whether Omnipotency has not given to
Some Systems of Matter fitly diſpoſed a Power
3
to
62
Of Subftance, ESSAY II.
to Perceive and Think, or as he expreffes it af
terward, to fuperadd to Matter a Faculty of
Thinking: and he goes on in that Section to
confirm this his Suppofition. In his Letter
to Biſhop Stilling fleet he fuppofes it poffible
for the Subftance of Body to be the fame
with the Subftance of Mind, in theſe Words.
"The general Idea of Subftance being the
"fame every where, the Modification of
cr
Thinking or the Power of Thinking join'd
"to it makes it a Spirit, without confidering
"what other Modifications it has, as whether
"it has the Modification of Solidity or no:
"As on the other fide Subftance that has
"the Modification of Solidity is Matter,
"whether it has the Modification of Think-
"ing or no." Letter 1ft to the Bishop of
Worcester, p. 66. Thus we fee he maintains
his Notion of a general Subftance which he
had before ridiculed. And we may obſerve,
that when he afferts that Matter cannot think,
he uſes ſome of thefe Epithets, meer, bare,
pure, incogitative, infenfible Matter, B. 2. c. 23.
§. 15. and B. 4. c. 10. §. 10, 11, 16. Now
why ſhould an Author uſe ſuch limitative
Terms as bare, pure &c. incogitative Matter,
if he did not fuppofe fome Matter might be
Cogitative ?
But if this be true, that Matter can have
a Power of Thinking given it, then our own
Souls may be material Beings for ought we
know, and conſequently diviſible and mortal.
And
SECT. IV. Body and Spirit.
63
And yet further I add, If this Opinion
ſhould be true, then how can we tell bur
God himfelf, even the Infinite Mind, may
have alſo the Property of Solid Extenfion, that
is, may alſo be Matter or Body; and then he
may be the fame with the Univerſe of Beings,
as Spinoza fancied; and thus the whole Uni-
verfe, God and this World, may be the fame
individual Subſtance, which Spinoza main-
tains with Subtilty; for if there be fuch a
Thing as an univerfal ulterior Subftratum ne-
ceffary to fupport Solid Extenfion, and to fup-
port the Power of Thinking, and this Sub-
ſtance or Subftratum be fo unknown a Thing
as Mr. Locke fuppofes, how can I deny any
thing concerning it? Or at leaſt how can I
be fure that God and the material World have
not one common Subſtance? In that Section
indeed Mr. Locke endeavours to guard his
Principles or Doctrines from the Danger of
this Objection, which he ſuppoſes very natu-
rally to ariſe from his Principles and Concef-
fions; but I think he neither does, nor per-
haps could he effectually fecure them from
fuch unhappy Confequences.
SECT. IV.
The Occafions of Miſtake on this Subject.
IN
N the last place let us confider how it comes
to paſs that the learned World might hap-
pen to miſtake in this Matter, and why they
feem
64
ESSAY II.
Of Subftance,
{
feem fo unwilling to admit this Doctrine of
Solid Extenfion and of a Power of Thinking tỏ
be two real Subftances, or fufficient Substrata
or Subjects for all the Qualities of Matter
and Mind.
The firft Occafion of Miftake may be this.
In our daily Obfervation of what paffes in
the Material World we find many of the
Qualities or Properties of Bodies continually
alter'd, and new Qualities or Properties per-
petually fucceeding the old ones which are
loft or deftroy'd, but the Subftance remains
ftill the fame: And therefore we fuppofe, and
very juftly, that there muſt be fome certain
thing called Substance which ſupports all theſe
changing Properties or Qualities in their fuc-
ceffive Exiſtence. So a Piece of Wood put
into the Fire lofes moft of the Properties or
Qualities of Wood, and becomes Fire itſelf
or a burning Coal; its Colour and Hardneſs
or Firmneſs are loft, it has acquired a new
Colour, (viz.) Rednefs, and new Powers (viz.)
of heating Water, of melting Metal and burn-
ing combuftible things, &c. In an Hour's
time this fame Matter turns into Aſhes, and
then its Colour is changed again into a dusky
white or grey, the Coheſion of its Parts or
Confiftency is quite loft, and it becomes quite
another fort of Body, a million of ſmall Atoms,
a Heap of Corpufcles or Sands: yet we ſuppoſe
the Subftance which once had the Qualities
of Wood, ſtill continues, as indeed it does
;
and
SECT. IV. Body and Spirit.
65
and that is, I fay, folid Extenfion or Matter,
tho' 'tis broke into many little Subſtances or
folid Extenfions. And in the fame manner,
becauſe we ſometimes call Solidity and Exten-
fon two Properties or Qualities of Body, we
are too ready to imagine they may be ranked
among thoſe many Qualities which
may be
changed or removed and loft, while yet the
Subſtance remains; whereas this is impoſ
fible. And yet perhaps this Imagination may
be one of the Springs of our Miftake.
So in a Spirit or Soul, we find infinite Va-
rieties of Thoughts, Wiſhes, Defires, per-
petually altering and fucceeding one another,
and fometimes contrary to one another;
and yet we ſuppoſe, (and juſtly too), that the
Subſtance of the Spirit remains the fame.
But fince we fometimes call a Power of
thinking a Property of a Spirit, we are too
eafily led to rank this alſo among thofe many
Qualities and Properties, which may be al-
tered while the Subftance of the Soul re-
mains; which perhaps is impoffible; and yet
this may be the firft Occafion of our Mif-
take here,
Secondly, Another Spring or Ground of
Miſtake may be this: Moft of thefe Things
which are thus alter'd, while the Subſtance
remains, as in a Logical View they are called
Qualities, fo in a Grammatical View, the
Names of them end in fion or tion, or ness or
ing or ity, &c. Hence it comes to pafs, that
F
when-
66
ESSAY II
Of Subftance,
whenfoever we fpeak of a Thing, which by
a Grammatical Termination founds like a
Quality, (and is fometimes logically reprefent-
ed as a Quality) we fuppofe it lofeable while
the Subftance remains; and we fancy it to
require ſome Subject in which it inheres, or
fome Subftratum or Subftance to fupport it:
thus for Inftance; When we fpeak of Mo-
tion, or when we fpeak of Gravity, we mean
a Quality or Property, which requires fome-
thing diftinct from itfelf, and more fubftan-
tial than itſelf, to fupport this Quality;
there muſt be ſome Subſtance which
may be
moved, or which may be heavy; and on this
Account, when we ſpeak of Extenfion and So-
lidity, we are ready to infer the fame as we
do concerning Motion or Gravity, i. e. that
there must be fome Being diftinct from Ex-
tenfion and Solidity to uphold thefe Qualities:
But this is an Inference made without juft
Reaſon, and by meer Similarity of Sound
and Termination.
1
•
I might repreſent this Matter even by thoſe
Qualities of Body, which are called by the
very Names of Extenfion and Solidity taken
in another Senſe. We uſe the Word Exten-
fion, when we ſee a Piece of Cloth or Spunge
may be extended or ftretch'd to a larger Size,
or fhrunk and contracted to a narrower; and
this Extenfion or Stretching, as well as Con
traction or Shrinking, being alterable while
the Cloth remains the fame, we form an
univerfal
SECT. IV. Body and Spirit.
6%
univerfal Idea of Extenfion as a meer Quality;
and indeed it is fo when we ufe the Word to
fignify Stretching. So when we feel a Piece
of Wax hard to the Touch, we call it ſolid:
We melt it, and find it has loft its Hardneſs
or Solidity, and thence we come to call So-
lidity univerfally a Quality; and indeed it is
fo in this Senfe, when it fignifies Hardness:
But it does not at all follow, that Extenfion,
when it fignifies Length, Breadth and Depth,
and is joined as it were in one Idea with So-
lidity, as that fignifies Impenetrability, ſhould
be a meer Quality, tho' Extenfion and Solidity
are meer Qualities, when one fignifies Stretch-
ing, and the other fignifies Hardness. When
therefore Solid Extenfion is reprefented in our
way of ſpeaking as the primary Idea of Mat-
ter; furely it is fomething more than a meer
Quality: For the Senfe in which the Words
are uſed when applied to Body in general is
very different from the former Signification,
when applied to Cloth or Wax.
And if we will judge here rationally, ac-
cording to the Rule by which we judge of
Qualities and Subftances at other Times, fo
lid Extenfion may be properly a Subftance;
for whatſoever Qualities in Bodies are chang-
ed, this has the Character of Subftance, for
it is immutably the fame. Matter is folid
Extenfion, and the fame folid Extenfion too,
through all the infinite Varieties of change
of its other Properties: This can never be
F 2
loft,
6 gai
ESSAY II.
Of Substance,
loft, till the Matter itſelf be deftroyed or an-
nihilated; nor can this be diminished or in-
creaſed, but by diminiſhing or increafing the
Matter.
In the fame manner, when we think of a
Man that has a Power of remembring, of
inventing, or of compofing well, or of mov-
ing his Limbs, we call theſe Powers Modes,
Properties or Qualities; we obferve that in
Sickness and Diſorders of animal Nature, a
Man may in a great meafure loſe theſe Pow-
ers, and yet his Soul or Spirit continue the
fame in Subſtance ſtill; and therefore we fup-
pofe the Powers of a Soul univerſally to be
all Qualities; whereas in Truth the Power of
thinking, i. e. of perceiving and willing, is
never lofeable; it remains as long as the Soul
continues a Soul; and therefore this Powegi
of thinking may be the very Subject or Sub-
ftance of the Soul in which all other Powers
of the Soul inhere.
There is yet a third Reaſon why we are fo
ready to make folid Extenfion to be two meer
Qualities of Body or Matter, rather than the
Subftance of it, and that is that we fancy
them to be two very different Things in the
Effence of Body; and that Solidity may be
deſtroy'd, and yet the Extenfion remain, and
become empty Space: So that Solidity looks
like a fort of Quality, which may be, or may
not be added to the fame individual Portion
of Extenfion: Whereas in Truth Solidity and
Extenfion
SECT. IV. Body and Spirit.
69
Extenfion confidered in Body, are but as one
Thing; for if you take away the Extenfion,
I am fure Solidity is entirely loft: and if you
deſtroy the Solidity, that very Extenfion and
Dimenſion of that Body is alſo deſtroyed and
loft, and there remains nothing but Empti-
nefs and void Space, which according to my
beft Opinion is a meer nothing, or an abſtract
Idea. When therefore you ſpeak of fuperadding
Solidity to Extenfion, or making Body of it
inftead of Space, you do really in your Ideas
only introduce the Subſtance of Body, where
before there was meer Emptineſs or nothing
at all. Solidity in its own Nature, howfo-
ever the Name of it may found, is really a
Thing too folid and fubftantial to be fuperad-
ded as a meer Quality to the Extenfion of
Space; for the Solid itfelf has an individual
Extenfion or Dimenfions of its own, very dif-
ferent from the ſuppoſed Extenſion of Space.
Nor can this fuperadded Quality of Solidity
turn Space into Body in any other Senfe, than
by bringing in a real Subftance in the Room
of a meer Nothing.
Thus I have pointed out fome of the Cauſes
and Springs of our Miſtake in this Matter.
Now let it be obſerved, that having been
wont to conceive thefe Ideas of thinking
Power and of folid Extenfion in our common
and familiar way of Diſcourſe, under the
Form of Qualities, when we grow learned,
we range them under the Head of Qualities,
F 3
Modes
70
Of Subftance, ESSAY II.
:
Modés or Properties in Logick; which want
Subſtances to fupport them; and thereby we are
more confirm'd in fuppofing there muſt be ſome
other Subftratum or Subftance, or Support to
uphold them as all other Qualities require.
And this Miſtake may partly arife, as I
hinted before from the found of the Termi-
nations ity in Solidity, and fion in Extenfion,
which are the ufual Terminations of the
Names of Qualities, which Names arecalled
Abstracts; and this perfuades us that there
are fome Concretes belonging to them, i. e,
fome different Subjects or Subftances uphold-
ing and fupporting theſe Abſtract Names of
Qualities: Thus by Grammatical Names
and Terminations, and by Logical Methods
of ranging them, we are led infenfibly to fup-
pofe folid Extenfion, and a Power of Cogita-
tion to be meer Qualities, and that there is
or muſt be ſome unknown fort of Thing cal-
led Substance to uphold them: And thus per-
* Note, The Name of Abſtract is given to a Word
that fignifies a Quality, as Whiteness, without includ-
ing the Subſtance, or the Thing that is white; whereas
the Word White is a Concrete, becauſe it denotes the
Thing or Subitance together with the Quality. And
by theſe Diſtinctions of Words we are too often
drawn into Miftakes, and imagine all abstract Words,
and all concrete Words, to confine their Ideas to the
fame Limits and Regulations. But we ought to re-
member that Things are made by God and Nature;
Words are made by Man, and fometimes applied in a
way not exactly agreeable to what Things and Ideas
require.
haps
SECT. IV. Body and Spirit.
71
haps Men frame to themſelves new and ima-
ginary Beings, which have no Exiſtence in
Nature; and at the fame time confefs they
are unknown and unknowable, and that they
have no Ideas of them, and know not what
they are; and I think I have fhewn that Na-
ture has no need of them, and therefore
Fancy need not give them an Exiſtence.
To conclude, I have reafon here again to
repeat the judicious Remark of Mr. Locke,
That we ought to put Things together as well
as we can; but after all, there are feveral
Things which will not be bundled up together
under our ways of speaking. We have uſually
ranged Solidity and Extenfion, and a Power
of Thinking, under the general Head of Qua-
lities or Properties; and becauſe we have
not ſo many Words as we have Ideas, nor
particular Words for Things in the various
Relations in which we furvey them, we feem
to have Occaſion ſometimes to ſpeak of theſe
Things as Properties or Qualities, and fome-
times as Substances. We fpeak of them as
Qualities or Properties, when we call Matter
and Spirit two Subftances, which are dif
tinguiſhed by their primary Qualities or Pro-
perties of folid Extenfion and of Cogitation:
But this fhould not forbid us to range them in
another View, under the general Head of
Subſtance alfo, fince they are two general Sub-
trata or Subjects of all other imaginable Quali-
ties that can belong to Body or Mind. And if
F 4
We
72
Of Subftance, &c. ESSAY II.
we will but allow theſe two to be real Sub-
Atances, we are furniſhed with Subftrata or
Subjects fufficient for all our modal or quali-
tative Ideas to inhere in; and we need no
further Debate about this range Thing
Subftance.
If after all, we find Difficulties in adjuſting
theſe Speculations with a perfect Accuracy,
let us remember, that our Underſtandings are
very imperfect Powers, that Forms of Learn-
ing as well as unlearned Prejudices fome-
times lead us into Miftakes, and that all
Things will not be eafily collected and bound
up under our Grammatical and Logical ways
of ſpeaking, and confin'd to them only.
1
$
ESSAY
1
2
>
(73)
ESSAY
III.
Of the Original of our Perceptions
F
and Ideas.
ATHER Malebranche, who was an
admirable Writer in the laſt Age, and
has many excellent Chapters in his
Treatife of The Search after Truth, yet has
vented a ſtrange Opinion, that we fee all our
Ideas in God. 'Tis the known and diſtinguiſh-
ing Character of this rational Author, that
he falls into a fort of Enthuſiaſm in his Doc-
trine concerning our Ideas of Things, and
their Original He fuppofes God to contain
in himſelf all material Beings in a ſpiritual
manner, which he calls the intelligible Sun,
Moon, Trees, and Stars, the intelligible
World, and intelligible Extenfion: And that
created Minds receive all their Ideas of ex-
ternal Objects, by contemplating this intel-
ligible World which exifts in God, which he
explains, and attempts to prove at large in
the fixth Chapter of the third Book, Part II.
and to prepare the Way, he labours to refute
all other Opinions in the five Chapters pre-
ceding. But among all thefe Opinions of
the original Ideas, he has neither exactly pro-
poſed nor refuted the true Cartefian Doctrine,
which
74
The Original ESSAY III.
which with a little Alteration, feems the
moft evident and moſt defenfible of all: And
this I fhall endeavour to deſcribe in ſeveral
Theſes in a diftinct manner, wherein we fhall
fee how far God concurs in the Ideas formed
by the Mind.
I. The Soul of Man is a thinking Being,
created and preferved with all its Capacities
by God the Almighty Spirit. The Carte-
fian Writers make felf-fubfiftent and perpe-
tual Cogitation to be the intimate Effence
and Nature of it: But I had rather ſay, It is
a Power of Thinking, i. e. of Perceiving and
Willing in continual Act; and confequently
'tis created capable of forming or receiving
Ideas in the Mind, as well as of exerting Vo-
litions, or Acts of the Will; and as 'tis
brought into Being by the creative Power of
God, fo 'tis the Almighty conferving Power
of God that maintains its Being, with this
Capacity of Perception; and it is his com-
mon providential Concourfe that continues it
in conſtant Act: By which I mean no more
than the fame creating, conferving and con-
curring Influence of God, whereby all Bodies
were produced at first, whereby they perfift
now in Being, and act or are acted according
to their Natures, and the Laws given them
by the Creator.
II. How the Soul of Man forms or acquires
fpiritual or intellectual Ideas, i. e. the Ideas of
itſelf, of its own Actions, and the Ideas of other
Minds
of our Ideas.
75
Minds or Spirits, we cannot conceive any
otherwiſe than by its own immediate Confci-
oufneſs of itſelf and its Actions, by turning
its Thoughts inward upon its own Exiſtence,
Nature, Perceptions and Volitions, Operati-
ons and Affections, and by the Remembrance
of, and Reflections upon its own Modifica-
tions, as well as by its own Confciouſneſs of
them at firft: This is what Mr. Locke calls
the Knowledge of Things, or gaining Ideas
by Reflection. 'Tis by this means we form or
acquire all our Ideas of Understanding, Will,
Spirit, Affent, Diffent, Fear, Hope, &c.
III. How the Soul gains any new Ideas of
bodily Things, when it is in a ſeparate State,
we are not fo well capable of determining,
till we arrive at that State ourſelves. But in
this prefent State of Union with a Body, we
may give fome happy Gueffes how we come
to form corporeal Ideas, or to acquire Senfa-
tions of what relates to the Body. This is
what Mr. Locke chiefly calls gaining Ideas by
Senfation. And in order to this we muſt
firſt confider, whether a Spirit could receive
any Senfations from Matter, without a ſpe-
cial Union to fome particular Body, and then
what is meant by the Union of a Spirit to a
Body.
IV. As to the First, we cannot conceive
how a Spirit can receive any Senfations or
Ideas from corporeal Objects, without its
particular Union to fome certain Body by that
God
76
The Original ESSAY III.
God who created it. Since Body and Spirit
are of fuch widely different Natures, that it
is impoffible they fhould touch one another,
a Body cannot give notice to a Soul to raiſe
any Idea or Perception in it by a Jog or Shake
of
any kind.
means.
"
Befides, when any particular Body moves,
can all Spirits perceive it? No furely. Or can
any one Spirit receive Senfations from the
Motions of all Bodies in the World? By no
Either of theſe is a moſt extravagant
Fancy, contrary to all Experience. It is
evident, that one particular Soul receives
Senſations immediately from one particular
animal Body, and from that alone: Other
Bodies can imprefs no immediate Senſations
or Ideas on that Spirit *. Now, why is it
only from this one Body, that this one Spirit
can receive Impreffions or Senfations? The
Soul did not chufe this Body to make itſelf
confcious of its Motions: much lefs could
the Body chufe this Soul, to imprefs Senfa-
• I do not pretend to determine here, that it is not
poffible in the Nature of Things, for one Soul to be con-
fcious of the Motions of two, or of twenty Bodies; nor
do I know that the Nature of Things forbids two or more
Souls to receive Senfations from one Body. Either of
thefe, for ought I know, is very poffible, if God pleaſe
to appoint it. All that I maintain here is, that this is
not the prefent courfe of Nature or fettled Order of
Things in our World; and much lefs have Souls of
Bodies any fuch Original innate Power in themſelves
to hold immediate or reciprocal Communications with
Multitudes.
3
tions
of our Ideas.
77
1
tions on it: Nor can it be refolved into any
thing but the Will and Appointment of the
great God their common Creator, who made
this Soul and this Body, and united them
into-a-Man.
V. We are in the next Place then to en-
quire what is meant by the Union of a
Spirit to a particular Body, or wherein doth
it confift.
When we ſay a Spirit is united to an ani-
mal Body, this doth not mean mutual touch-
ing of each other; for as we faid before, this
is impoffible. Tangere vel tangi nifi corpus
nulla poteft res. Lucretius is here in the right:
But the chief thing wherein this Union be-
tween an individual human Body, and an in-
dividual Spirit conſiſts, ſo far as we can find
it, lies in theſe two Laws or Appointments
of God our Creator.
1. That when fome particular Impreffions
are made, or particular Motions are excited
in that part of that individual Body which
is called the Senſory, whether they ariſe with-
in itſelf, or are convey'd from the outward
Organs of Senſe, or any other Parts of Body
by means of the Nerves, God hath Power?
fully ordained that that individual Spirit fhall
have fuch particular Perceptions or Senfati-
ons, or fuch Ideas of outward Objects.
2. That when that Spirit wills to raiſe ſuch
a particular Motion in the Limbs, or in fuch
Parts of the Body as God hath ſubjected to
voluntary
78
The Original ESSAY III.
voluntary Motion, he hath powerfully or-
dain'd that fuch a Motion fhall be preſently
excited by the Means of the Nerves or
Muſcles in thoſe Limbs or thofe Parts, upon
the meer Volition of the Soul; for we have
no Knowledge of any other executive Power
that does this: All that we are conſcious of
is, that the Soul wills, and the Body moves,
In theſe two things chiefly confifts the
Union of Soul and Body,
VI. Here it may be proper to obſerve, that
there is fome particular part of that Body,
which may be called as it were the common
Senſory, or the Palace of the Soul; not
where the refides, as in a proper Place, (as
will appear hereafter) but where the receives
immediate Notices of Things that relate
to the Body, and where the hath more im-
mediate Influence in moving the Nerves and
Muſcles, which ferve to move the Limbs
and moveable Parts of the Body *. Now,
this is evidently the Brain, or fome fpecial
part of the Brain, which appears from theſe
three things eminently.
ift. Becauſe all the Nerves, whofe Extre
mities are wrought into the feveral Organs
of Senfe, (viz.) the Eye, the Ear, the Noſe,
*Des-Cartes and his Followers fuppofed this com-
mon Senſory was the Pineal-Gland, which is fituated
almoft in the middle of the Brain; and fome of their
Reaſons for it are not contemptible, tho' I can by no
means confine the Senſory to fuch narrow Limits.
3
the
of our Ideas.
79
the Tongue and Palate, have their Spring or
Origin in the Brain; and the Nerves which
fubferve the general Senſe of feeling, and
which are fpread through all the Body, have
their Origin there alfo: And thus when the
outward Extremity, or other end of thoſe
Nerves is moved or affected any way, the
Motion is communicated immediately to the
inward Origin of them in the Brain, to give
notice of all things that affect the outward,
or any diſtant Parts of the Body, whether
they be Shapes, Motions, Colours, Sounds,
Taftes, Smells, Heats, Colds, &c. And
it is by means of thefe Nerves alfo which
have their Origin in the Brain, that every
extreme Part of the Body is put into Motion
at the Will or Command of the Soul. It
feems proper therefore to fuppofe the Soul
to have its more immediate Government and
Operations near the Origin of the Nerves,
which are ſo much the Inftruments of its
Perceptions and Operations. Now, to con-
firm this by Experiment, I add,
2dly, If any of the Limbs are cut or
bruiſed, while there is a Ligament tied fo
hard round the Limb, that there can be no
Communication of that Motion by the Nerves
to the Brain, the Soul feels it not, the
Man hath no Perception or Senfation of it.
And if the Nerves which go from the Brain
to any Limb are cut, the Will cannot make
that Limb move,
3dly,
80
The Original ESSAY III
3dly, When we fet our felves to think or
ftudy, we feel and are conſcious that we em-
ploy fome operative Power or Powers with-
in the Scull, and perhaps generally a little
within the forehead: And the Reaſon why
we feel it there is, becauſe the corporeal
Motions and Traces are there formed and
preferved and renewed, which ferve to raiſe
or awaken Ideas in the Mind, and which are
ordained to miniſter to the Soul in its intel-
lectual or fenfitive Operations while 'tis in
this united State.
VII. The Perceptions which a Spirit has
by means of its Union with the Body in this
prefent State, are chiefly of theſe three kinds.
1. Such as have no external Objects for
their Exemplar, nor do they ſo much as feem
to want any; for they are not Repreſentati-
ons of Objects, but meer Senfations of the
Soul: Such are Hunger, Thirst, Pleaſure,
Eafe, Pain, and in general our Appetites and
Paffions. Tho' fome of thefe, (viz.) Eafe,
Pain, &c. may be occafioned by outward
Objects, yet we are in no great Danger here
of making a falſe Judgment about them, and
of imagining that theſe Perceptions have any
reſemblance to thoſe outward Objects which
are the Cauſes or Occafions of them.
Man thinks there is Pain in the Sword that
wounds him and gives him Pain. Pleaſure
and Pain appear to be meer Senfations, rather
than proper Ideas; yet 'tis granted we can
No
form
of our Ideas.
81
form an Idea of them afterward, by confi
dering what thoſe Senfations are, or by re
flecting on what we feel, and thence w
gain the Ideas of Hunger, Thirst, Pain, Plea
fure, &c. which very Senfations are the Ex-
émplat or Patterns of thoſe Ideas.
2. Another fort of Perceptions which we
obtain by Union with the Body, are fuch as
ſeem to be proper Ideas, rather than meer
Senfations, yet they have no real Objects with-
out which are the proper Exemplars of thofe
Ideas; there is no outward Being which thoſe
Ideas are like, and yet they feem to repreſent
ſome outward Originals or Exemplars, and
we are ready to ſuppoſe they have ſomething
from without that refembles them: Such are
the fecondary and fenfible Qualities of Bodies,
(viz.) Colours, Sounds, Taftes, Smells, Cold,
Heat, &c. Thefe have been abundantly prov
ed by Philofophers not to have any rèal Ex-
iftence in outward Objects, fuch as we per-
ceive them; and tho' we generally call them
Ideas becauſe they ſeem to reprefent outward
Objects, yet they are rather Senfations which the
God of Nature has ordain'd to arife in us on
occafion of fome Motions, Strokes and Impref-
fions, which outward Objects raife or form
upon our Organs of Senfe, and which are
thence convey'd to the Brain or common
Senſory. See Mr. Locke's excellent Difcourfe
on that Subject, Eſſay, Bock II. Chap. 8.
G
It
8.2
ESSAY III
The Original
;
It is granted here, that the Bulk, or vul-
gar Part of Mankind, are deceived in paffing
a rafh Judgment, that there are fuch Quali-
ties in outward Objects as refemble thefe
Ideas in the Mind; yet there is no Inconve-
nience to human Life arifing from this Mif
take; for all the valuable Purpoſes in Life
are anſwer'd by theſe Senfations, fince we
have fufficient notice thereby what Objects
are the Cauſes of them, whether thefe Ob-
jects are real outward Exemplars of them,
and do reſemble them or not. If I know
that Wormwood will give me a bitter Taſte,
and a Bell will make a tinkling Sound, I can
judge as well how or when to ufe Worm-
wood or a Bell, while Ilye under this Miſtake,
and while I fuppofe the Wormwood itſelf to
have the Bitterneſs in it, and the Bell itſelf
to have the Sound in it, as if I believed this
Sound and this Bitterneſs to be only Senfa-
tions in my Mind, of which the Bell and the
Wormwood are the Caufes or Occafions. And
as for Perfons of Science and Enquiry, there
are Ways and Means of Experiment and
Reaſoning, whereby they may find out, and
have actually found out this vulgar Miſtake;
and they are or may be convinced and af-
fured that theſe Ideas of fenfible Qualities have
no external Refemblances to the Objects
which excite them, and thus they may un-
deceive themſelves.
Now
:
P
of our Ideas.
83
1
A
Now in forming theſe Ideas of fecondary
or fenfible Qualities, there is no need that
the Traces upon the Brain, which are the
more immediate Occafion of them, ſhould
any way reſemble the Ideas, fince there is no
real Refemblance in the outward Objects
themſelves, which are the prime or remote
Occafions of them: But God has ordained,
that whenfoever fuch Motions and Traces are
form'd in the Brain, the Soul fhould imme-
diately form fuch Ideas, or have fuch Per-
ceptions raiſed in it.
3. The laft fort of Perceptions which the
Soul acquires by its Union to the Body, are
fuch as have real proper Objects without itſelf,
which are the true Originals and Exemplars
of theſe Ideas or Perceptions, as well as the
Caufes or Occafions of them; fuch are the
Ideas of Extenfion, Solidity, Body, with all
the primary Qualities of it, fuch as Shape,
Reft, Motion, Size and Situation.
'Tis moft highly probable, if not fuffici-
ently evident, that thefe do exift without us.
in fuch a manner as we perceive them; and
that for this Reafon among others, that we
have notice of them by the Touch, as well as
by the Sight, and we cannot fuppofe that
God has fo formed our Natures, that two
Senfes fhould join to deceive us, when we
have no way left to undeceive our felves.
Now in theſe laft Ideas, we may fuppofe,
that the Strokes or Traces which are formed
G 2
on
84
The Original ESSAY III
on the Organs of Senfe, and which are con-
veyed thence to the Brain, may in the Shapes
or Motions thereof have fome Refemblance
to the external Objects which are the Occa--
fions of them. So the very Figures of a
Triangle or Square, of a Houſe or Tree, of
a flying Bird or falling Hail, are traced upon
the Retina or inward Net-work of the Eye,
and perhaps convey'd thence to the common
Senfory in fimilar or correfpondent Figures.
VIII. Tho' the Traces and Impreffions
which are made on the Brain fhould ne-
ver ſo much reſemble the external Objects
that ſtrike and imprefs them there, that is,
tho' a Triangle drawn in a Paper ſhould
form a Triangle in the Eye, and imprefs
or convey the fame Figure to the common
Senſory, yet thefe Impreffions cannot of
themſelves have an efficacious and immedi-
ate Influence upon a Mind or Spirit, to ex-
cite or form fimilar Ideas in it: For fince
Mind and Body are two diftinct Beings fo
intirely different in their whole Nature, fince
all contact between Mind and Body is im-
poffible, we cannot conceive; how any cor-
poreal Motions or Figures impreft or traced
in the Brain, fhould have an efficacious Pow-
er in and of themſelves, to give any notices
to the Soul, or to raife Perceptions or Ideas
in a Mind or Spirit.
'Tis not therefore any corporeal Traces,
Motions or Impreffions in the Brain, whether
fimilar
of our Ideas
85
fimilar or diffimilar to the Objects or Things
which occafion them, that can be in a moſt
proper Senſe the felf-fufficient and effective
Cauſes of thoſe ſpecial Ideas or Perceptions
in the Soul, which are occafion'd by them.
IX. Yet fince it appears by univerfal Ex-
perience, that whenfoever theſe particular
Motions or Traces are impreft by outward
Objects on the Senfes, and by them convey'd
to the Brain, fuitable and peculiar Ideas are
alfo raiſed or form'd in the Mind, we have
reaſon to ſuppoſe that God the Creator or-
dained by an Almighty Volition, that this
ſhould be the way whereby the Mind ſhould
acquire or form thefe Ideas: And 'tis God
alſo who ordain'd, that whenfoever the Soul
wills to move the Limbs of the Body
the Body ſhould exert thoſe particular Moti-
ons.
And indeed it is in this divine Decree or
Law of Creation, which runs through all
Ages, and exerts its perpetual Influence in all
Mankind, that the Union, or rather Unition
of a particular Soul and particular Body con-
fifts. When a human Body is fo far formed
as to be fit to receive fuch Impreffions on the
Brain, and fit to exert fuch Motions of the
Limbs, then it may be probably ſuppoſed the
creating Influence of God exerts itſelf in
caufing a Spirit to exiſt, and in this manner
to be united to this human Body.
G 3
Then
86
ESSAY III,
The Original
}
Then begins the Communication between
Soul and Body, which continues during the
Life of this animal Nature: Then the Tra-
ces in the Brain, that are form'd by fome pe-
culiar Difpofitions or Irritations of the Fibres
in the Stomach or Throat, occafion the firſt
fort of Senfation, (viz.) Hunger or Thirſt,
Pleaſure or Pain; Then thofe peculiar Im-
preffions in the Brain, which are raised by
the fecondary or fenfible Qualities of Body,
produce in the Soul a ſecond fort of Percep-
tions, which are alfo called Ideas, fuch as
the Perception of particular Colours, Taſtes
and Smells: And then alfo thefe fpecial Mo-
tions or Traces on the Brain, which are
raiſed by the primary Qualities of corporeal
Objects, fuch as Shape, Motion, Size, &c.
raife in the Soul the third fort of Perceptions,
or thoſe proper Ideas which are fimilar to,
and correfpondent with the outward Objects
which are the Occafion of thofe Impreffions:
Thus the Mind gains theſe three forts of
Perceptions; but all theſe are originally
owing to the powerful Appointment of God
uniting a Soul and Body according to theſe
Laws.
Thus perhaps in the moſt ſtrict and phi-
lofophical manner of fpeaking, neither the
external Objects, nor the Impreffions made
by them on the Brain, are fufficient to be the
real proper producing, or efficient Cauſes of
the Ideas in the Mind, fince Body cannot af
fect
of our Ideas.
87
fect Spirit by any Properties that we know in
it. Nor is the Mind itfelf a proper, imme-
diate, fole or fovereign Caufe of her own
Senfations, or corporeal Ideas; for how
ſhould the Mind know what Senfations or
Ideas to förm or excite, when any particular
Strokes are form'd in the Brain, fince the can
perceive no real and natural Jogg or Admo-
nition from any corporeal Impreffions, Traces
or Imagès? Beſides, if the Mind has any Hint
what Ideas to form or excite, then it already
perceives thoſe Objects, or it has thofe Per-
ceptions, and it is ufelefs to form a new one.
X. It follows then, that the original, true
and proper Cauſe of thoſe Ideas is the prime
Almighty Volition of God, as Creator and
Preferver of all Things, which in itſelf be-
ing fimple and eternal, produces all manner
of fimple and complex, modal and ſubſtan-
tial Beings, in their various determined Sea-
fons, by thofe Mediums, and according to
that Order and Connexion of Things which
itſelf firſt eſtabliſhed in the Creation: And
the Production of all Things in this manner
may be properly called, The Order or Law
of Nature.
XI. Therefore we may be juftly allowed to
uſe the common Methods of Expreffion in
this Cafe, (viz.) that the Soul itſelf has thefe
Perceptions naturally, and that fhe naturally
forms thefe Ideas of corporeal Beings; and
that the corporeal Objects impreffing parti-
G 4
cular
88
The Original ESSAY III,
cular Traces and Images on the Brain, are
the occafional and natural Caufes of thefe
Perceptions or Ideas.
t
Thus we muſt grant alfo, that the Voli-
tion of the Mind to move the Arm or the
Tongue, may be called the natural Caufe of
the Motion of thofe Members, for 'tis ac-
cording to a Law of Nature, which God the
Creator has appointed; tho' the Influence
which that Volition has on that Motion, be
not ſo properly natural and efficacious, as to
be fufficient in and of itſelf; but the Effica-
cy rather proceeds from the Almighty Voli-
tion of God thus uniting the Soul to an ani-
mal Body, according to theſe Laws of his
own Appointment . Of which fee more
†.
afterwards.
XII. 'Tis no difficult Matter to allow this
Account of Things to be true. concerning
the Influence that Mind has on Body, or Bo-
dy has on Mind, and to afcribe it all to the
fupreme and efficacious Appointment or Will
of God, when great Philofophers now adays
† Note, The Words Nature and natural may be taken
in two Senfes, Firft, They may denote an original
Power in Matter and Mind, fufficient mutually to in-
fluence each other, arifing from their very Nature or
Effence and Conftitution: Now fuch a native or na-
tural Power is deny'd: and yet this Power may be called
natural, with Regard to the Conftitution of Man, as
confifting' of a Soul and Body united; becauſe God has
appointed them by his Almighty Will to act in this
manner mutually on each other in their State of Uni-
, and thus he has made it a Law of their Nature.
fuppofe
of our Ideas.
89
ſuppoſe the mutual Influence of Bodies mov-
ing each other not to be fo evidently the
proper, native, and neceffary Effect of thoſe
material Beings on each other, but ra-
ther of fome divine Appointment, or cer
tain Laws of Nature which God has made.
Thus we fay, that the Bowl A in Motion
ftriking the Bowl B at Reft, naturally cauſes
it to move, or produces Motion in it; al-
though perhaps the Motion of the Bowl B
more properly proceeds from the efficacious
and original Appointment of the Creator,
who wills that one Body ſhould move when
another ftrikes againſt it.
Mr. Locke in Book IId of his Efay, Chap
23. Sect. 28. ſuppoſes the Communication of
Motion from one Body to another by impulfe to
be as hard to be accounted for as the Com
munication of Motion to a Body, by any
Thoughts or Volitions of the Mind: And
it is ſtill more juſtly fuppofed, that Sir Iſaac
Newton's Doctrine of the Influences of At-
traction or Gravitation which the Planets
have upon each other at ſuch immenſe Dif-
tances of empty Space, muſt be refolved into
fuch a Law of Nature or efficacious divinę
Appointment.
And yet we ſtill uſe the common Methods
of Speech, and fay, that the Bowl A ftriking
the Bowl B, naturally makes it move; that
the Sun naturally caufes the Planets to move
or tend towards itſelf, and thereby keeps
them
90
The Original ESSAY III.
them in their feveral Orbits. And in the
fame manner we fay, the Soul forms Ideas
naturally by its Underſtanding or perceptive
Power, and it moves the Limbs of the Body-
naturally by its Will: And unless we continue
to ufe fuch Forms of Expreffion, which are
the conftant Language of God and Men in
Scripture, and in all natural and civil Affairs,
we fhall almoft deftroy the very Notion of
Cause and Effect among created Beings, and
by introducing the Divine Agency immediately
into all particular Effects, and forming our
Expreffions according to it, we fhall exclude
all Dependency of created Beings upon each
other, and their feveral Connexions which
the God of Nature and of Order has ordain'd
among them.
The Laws therefore, or Appointments
which God has made, whereby Body moves
Body, or whereby a Spirit moves a Body, or
whereby a Body excites Ideas in a Spirit, may
all be called natural, becauſe Nature is that
Order which God the Creator has appointed
among the Creatures he has made.
XIII. When thefe Traces or Impreffions
are once formed in the Brain, to which fuch
particular Senfations or corporeal Ideas are
attach'd by divine Appointment, it muſt be
obſerved that whenever theſe Traces or Im-
preffions are repeated or awaken'd in the Brain
again, tho' there be no fuch outward Object
preſent, nor any fuch outward Cauſe to excite
them,
of our Ideas.
91
是
​them, yet the Soul hath the fame Ideas or
Senfations raiſed, repeated or awakened in it;
becauſe theſe Ideas or Senfations are imme-
diately attached to thoſe particular Motions
in the Brain, and not to the outward Objects,
or to the firft Caufes of them.
·
Hence proceed the Powers of Imagination,
and Memory, and Dreaming, &c. and for this
Reaſon we may feel Hunger and Thirſt, Plea-
fure and Pain, even in Dreams, tho' there be
no external Cauſes to excite them; and when
we are awake we may raiſe Ideas of ten
thouſand Shapes and Colours of fenfible and
bodily Objects which are abfent, when they
have once formed their peculiar and proper
Traces on the Brain before.
When the fame Ideas or Perceptions which
we had before are again excited in the Soul,
without the Preſence of the fame Object or
the fame Occafion, this is called Memory,
fuppofing that we have a Conſciouſneſs that
we had this Perception or this Idea before ;
eſpecially when the fame Ideas have the fame
Qualities, and are joined or fituated in the
fame manner as before. But if the Ideas are
varied, inlarged, diminiſhed, multiplied, or
joined and mingled in Forms and Qualities
different from what we had in our firft Per-
ceptions of them, this is called Imagination
or the Power of Fancy.
XIV. Tho' our intellectual Ideas, fuch as
the Idea of Thought, Knowledge, Will, Rea-
4
Son
}
The Original ESSAY III.
92
fon, Spirit, &c. are not originally formed in
us by Impreffions, or Traces made on the Brain,
but by a Conſciouſneſs of and Reflection upon
the Powers and Operations of our own Souls,
as was faid before, yet while we are in this State
of Union with the Body, it is highly probable
that theſe very Ideas are quickly attached to
fome Words or Sounds which make their
Impreffions on the Brain; and therefore when
thefe Impreffions in the Brain are again re-
peated or thefe Traces awakened by theſe
Words or Sounds, the Soul has theſe intel-
lectual Ideas which are attached to them, re-
peated or raiſed afreſh, and become actually
preſent to the Mind: and thus we are affift-
ed in the Memory or Recollection even of
intellectual Things by animal Nature in this
prefent State: for tho' our intellectual Ideas
themſelves cannot be traced, nor drawn, nor
painted on the Brain, and confequently can
have no fimilar Impreffions made there, yet
they may be clofely connected or attached
by Cuſtom to certain corporeal Motions, Fi-
gures, Strokes or Traces which may be ex-
cited or delineated there; which Traces or
Motions were firft raiſed by the reading or
hearing Words written or fpoken, which were
defigned to fignify thofe incorporeal Ideas or
Objects.
XV. When the Soul fets itſelf by an Act of
its Will to recollect any former Ideas, cor-
poreal or Intellectual, it is very probable that
it
of our Ideas.
93
it employs fome finer or fpirituous Parts of ani-
mal Nature to open all the kindred Traces that
lye in that part of the Brain, till at laft it lights
upon that particular Trace which is connected
with the defired Idea, and immediately the
Soul perceives and acknowledges it: 'Tis in
this manner that we hunt after a Name that
we have almoſt forgotten, as for inftance,
fuppofe the Name be Tomkins, we think of all
the Names that end in kins (viz.) Wilkins,
Watkins, Jenkins, Hopkins, &c. till at last we
light upon the Name Tomkins which we
fought; or ſuppoſe we ſeek after the Name
or Idea of a Temple, we rummage over the
Traces of House, Building, Palace, Church,
till we light on the Idea and Word Temple.
•
Thus we have ſeen the Way and Manner
whereby the Soul of Man comes to acquire
its Ideas at firft both of corporeal and intel-
lectual Objects, and that is, by Senfation and
Reflection; we have alfo made a probable gueſs
how theſe Ideas are treaſured up and recollect-
ed while the Mind is united to the Body.
XVI. But befides theſe two forts of Ideas
there is a third fort which are properly called
abstracted Ideas, fuch as are not the exprefs
Repreſentations of any corporeal or ſpiritual
Beings just as they exift, but are as it were a
Part of our Ideas of fome fpiritual or corpo-
real things abſtracted from the other parts; or
at leaſt they are Ideas drawn from their real
or fuppofed Properties abſtracted from the Be-
ings
94
The Original ESSAY ÏIÏ.
ings themſelves, or from fome Modes or Af
fections of theſe corporeal or ſpiritual Beings,
or fometimes from the meer Relations that
feveral Beings bear to one another. Of theſe
Abſtractions there are feveral forts and Degrees,
and confequently there are Ideas which are
more or less abſtracted.
The first fort of theſe Ideas, which are leaſt
abſtracted, are Ideas of common and general kinds
of Being drawn from Particulars or Individuals;
fuch as, a Man, a Bird, a Flower, a Pigeon,
a Spirit, &c. Now theſe abſtract Ideas are
formed in this manner. I fee feveral Pigeons,
I obferve they are Birds of ſuch a Shape, and
Size, and Motion; one is of a dark brown
Colour, a ſecond is white, a third is ſpeckled:
but I omit or leave out thefe particular Co-
lours and all other Peculiarities in which they
differ, and abſtracting from them the Things
in which they agree, I keep thofe only in
mind (viz.) a Bird of fuch a Shape, Size, and
Motion, and I call this a Pigeon: now this is
a general Name for all the Birds of that
Kind, and this we call an abſtracted Idea. So
we form the general Idea of a Spirit, by con-
fidering the Soul of Peter, Thomas, George,
&c. and leaving out their different perfonal
Properties and individual Circumſtances, we
retain only thoſe Ideas wherein they all agree,
and call that a Spirit.
Note, This first fort of abftract Ideas may..
ftill be called corporeal or intellectual Ideas,
according
of our Ideas.
95
according to the Nature of the Objects whence
we derive them, tho' they are not completely
like thofe Objects.
Now theſe abſtracted Ideas evidently ariſe
from a Power that is in the Mind itſelf to ab-
ftract or divide one part of an Idea from the o-
ther, or to ſeparate mingled Ideas and con-
ceive them apart.
Another fort of abftracted Ideas, and which
indeed are more properly called by that Name,
are general Relations which arife from com-
paring one thing with another, and from ob-
ferving the Relations that one thing bears to
another and then the Mind abſtracts thoſe
Relations from the Things which are related,
and treaſures up thofe Relations as à diſtinct
Sett of Ideas, even while the Things which
are related are neglected or forgotten; fuch
are, Caufe, Effect, Likeness, Difference, Whole,
Part, &c. I might give an Inftance thus;
when I fee a Sword wound a Man, or when
I am confcious that my Soul forms an Ar-
gument, I conceive the Sword to be the Caufe,
and the Wound is the Effect; or I conceive
the Soul is the Caufe, and the Argument is
the Effect: Then I referve theſe Ideas of
Cause and Effect for general Ufe, and apply
them very properly to a hundred other Cafes
when I have no further thought of a Sword
or a Soul, which occafioned my firft Ideas of
Caufality. Theſe are pure abstract Ideas.
Some abfolute Modes, Properties or Affections
:
bor-
96
The Original ESSAY ÍIÍ.
borrowed from individual Beings as well as
their relative Modes, or Relations, will alfo
afford us fuch kind of pure abſtracted Ideas,
fuch are the Ideas of Effence, Existence, Dura-
tion, Subftance, Mode, &c. which are formed in
this manner. Suppoſe I think of a Bowl as
fubfifting by itſelf, and that it is both round
and heavy: I conceive of the Bowl as a Sub-
ftance, and of Roundnefs and Heaviness as
Modes belonging to it: So when I think of a
Spirit as a thing that fubfifts of its felf, and that
this Spirit is grieved or joyful, I infer that
Spirit is a Subſtance, and Joy and Grief are
Modes of that Subftance. Then I abſtract
the Ideas of Subftance and Mode both from
the corporeal and the fpiritual Ideas which
firft occafioned them; and tho' I think nơ
more of a Bowl, or a Spirit, of Roundness or
Heaviness, of Joy or Grief, yet I retain the
abſtracted Ideas of Subftance and Mode, and
apply them to a thoufand things befides.
As the Ideas of Caufe, and Subftance, and
Mode may be properly called pure abſtracted
Ideas, fo the Caufality or the Subftantiality of a
Thing or its Modality are yet more abstracted
Ideas, or have another Degree of Abſtraction,
for thefe Words fignify only the View or
Confideration of a Thing as a Caufe, as a Sub-
ftance, or as a Mode. Such alfo are the
Ideas of Genus and Species, of Noun, Verb,
&c. and a Multitude of fuch abſtracted Ideas
belong to common Speech as well a sto learn-
ed Writings.
Here
of our Ideas.
97
་
Here let it be noted that the Ideas of Caufe,
Effect, Subftance, Mode, Likeness, Difference,
and many other abftracted Ideas of this fort
are preciſely the fame Ideas, whether they are
drawn originally from corporéal or from in-
tellectual Beings, and therefore they are plain-
ly different even from the abftract Ideas which
are either intellectual or corporeal; nor can'
theſe be ranked under either of thoſe two
Claffes, for they are Ideas of another diftinct
kind, and make a Claſs of their own, i.e. Pure
abftract Ideas.
1
t sort of
If therefore we confine our felves ftrictly
and intirely to thofe two things which Mr.
Lock afferts to be the Springs and Cauſes of
all our Ideas (viz.) Senfation and Reflection
without admitting this third Principle (viz.)
the Soul's Power of comparing Ideas and ab-
ftracting one from another, we ſhall hardly
account for the numerous abftracted Ideas
which we have, whereof many are neither
intellectual nor corporeal, tho' they are all evi-
dently at firft deriv'd from corporeal or from
Spiritual Objects and Ideas: and the original
remote Springs of them may be Senſation or
Reflection, tho' thefe are not the immediate
Caufes of them. See more in the Treatife of
Logick, Part I. Chap. III. Sect. I.
H
ESSAY
98
An Enquiry
ESSAY IV.
Of innate Ideas.
SECT. I.
The common Opinion well refuted by Mr. Lock.
T
HE common Opinion of innate No-
tions and innate Ideas, againſt which
Mr. Lock ſo earneſtly contends, I take
to be this, (viz.) that there are ſome certain
Ideas of Things, and fome certain Propofi-
tions both of Speculation and Practice, or of
Truth and Duty, which are explicitely wrought
into the very Nature of Man, and are born
with all Mankind: which Ideas and Propo-
fitions are ſuppoſed to be the firſt Principles
of our Knowledge, and original Rules of all
our Judgments and Reafonings about natu-
ral or moral Subjects; that they ſtand in the
Soul as Axioms or Maxims, and are the propo-
fitional Principles of our Religion and Virtue,
of our Duty both to God and Man, tho' they
lie hid, and we are not actually confcious of
them till ſome ſpecial Occafion calls them forth
to fight.
The Propofitions are reckon'd fuch as theſe,
1. Of
SECT. I. about innate Ideas.
99
1. Of the natural kind, (viz.) What has
no Being has no real Properties: Whatfoever
acts, is, or exifts: One thing cannot be the Caufe
of itſelf: 'Tis impoffible for a thing to be and not
to be in the fame Senfe and at the fame time:
The whole is greater than each part, &c.
2. Of the moral kind, (viz.) Parents must
be honoured: Falfhood must not be practifed to
our Neighbour: Injury must not be done: Con-
tracts fhould be fulfilled, &c.
3. Of the religious kind, (viz.) There is a
God: God is to be worshipped: God will approve
Virtue; he will puniſh Vice, &c.
Theſe have been ſuppoſed to be actual in-
nate Propofitions: And all the Ideas of which
theſe are compofed muft certainly then be in-
nate Ideas, if they are actually exiſtent in the
Mind as ſoon as it begins to be; however, nei-
ther the Propofitions nor Ideas may actually
appear there to our felves till fome Occafion
call them forth.
Now thoſe Writers who hold innate Ideas
in this Senſe ſeem to lye under a great Mi-
ftake.
Mr. Lock has ingenioufly and fufficiently
refuted this fort of Doctrine of innate Ideas,
and innaté Propofitions in his Difcourſe on that
Subject: wherein he diſcovers that there is no
Neceffity from Reafon, or from Religion, to
admit them; becauſe God having given the
Mind of Man a Capacity of forming Ideas of
natural and moral things, and of comparing and
H 2
joining
100
An Enquiry ESSAY IV.
joining or disjoining them by Judgment, has
fufficiently furniſhed Men with Neceffaries for
Knowledge: And God having given us a
Power of Reaſoning, we are able from the
moſt common and obvious Things to infer
both his own Being and our Duty confidered
merely as Creatures; and there is no fuch Ne-
ceffity of his actual implanting in the Mind
all thoſe Ideas and long Trains of Propofiti-
ons whether natural or moral, which fome
Men have fuppofed to be innate. Thus far
I think we may fafely agree with Mr. Lock,
who reaſons exceeding well on this Subject,
and moſt of his Arguments, I think, are juſt
and convincing.
And yet I believe ftill that many fimple
Ideas are innate in fome Senfe, tho' not actu-
ally formed in the Mind at the Birth; and
perhaps alfo fome general Principles both of
Truth and Duty may be called in fome Senſe
innate, tho' not in the explicite Form of
Propofitions. Let us confider things in the
following manner.
F
SECT. II.
In what Senfe many Ideas are innate.
Erft, The fimple Ideas of Light, and Co-
lours, Sounds, Taftes and Smells, (viz.)
Red, Blue, Sweet, Bitter, Loud, Shrill, Cold,
Hot, &c. even all the fenfible Qualities (which
are called the fecondary Qualities of Bodies)
with
3.
SECT. II. about innate Ideas.
ΙΟΙ
with all the infinite Variety of their Mixtures,
tho' they are not immediately, actually and
explicitely given at once to the Mind at its firſt
Union to the Body; yet they may be called
in fome Senſe innate, for they feem to be im-
preſt on the Mind by a divine Energy or Law
of Union between Soul and Body appointed
in the first Creation of Man: and this Law
operates or begins its Efficacy in all particular
Inftances when thoſe fenfible Objects occur
which give occafion to theſe fenfible Quali-
ties and Ideas to be firſt perceived by the Mind.
The Reaſon why I think fo is this: The
Millions of Impreffions that are made upon
the Senfes by outward Objects do neceffarily
excite nothing but an equal Variety of Im-
preffions or Motions of certain Fibres in the
Brain, and form perhaps certain Courſes or
Traces of fome fine Fluid, called the animal
Spirits, there. But among this infinite Va-
riety of fibrous Motions in the Brain, or Lines
and Strokes which are drawn there, or Tra-
ces of the animal Spirits; none of them do
neceffarily and in their own Nature raiſe in
the Soul the Senſations of theſe ſecondary Qua-
lities as they are called, (viz.) Colours, Taftes,
Smells, Feeling, Sound, &c. fuch as Green,
Blue, Red, Sweet, Sour, Stinking, Cold,
Warm, Shrill, Loud, &c. Senfation is a very
different thing from Motion: 'Tis only God the
Author of our Nature who really forms or
creates theſe Senfations and all theſe Ideas of
fenfible
H 3
{
102
ESSAY IV.
An Enquiry
fenfible Qualities in a' Soul, united to a Bo-
dy, and he has appointed theſe Ideas to ariſe,
when fuch particular Impreffions fhall be
made on the Brain by fenfible Objects. And
yet Man may be faid to form them, becauſe
what hand foever God has in it, 'tis by one
uniform Law of Creation or original Appoint-
ment, which has a lafting Efficacy thro' all
Generations of Men; and on this Account
theſe Ideas may be fo far called innate; fince
'tis not all the Impreffions of Objects on the
Organs of Senſe, nor the Conveyance of theſe
Impreffions to the Brain, could raife or form
theſe Ideas in the Soul, but only the divine
Appointment of fuch Effects, according to
Laws of Union which he has eſtabliſhed, be-
tween the Souls and Bodies of all Mankind.
I will not add any thing here concerning
our Ideas of thofe Qualities of Bodies which
are called Primary, fuch as the Figure, or
Shape, Size, Motion and Reft, and Situation
of the Parts of Matter; becauſe the Strokes
which are formed on the Brain by theſe Ob-
jects or thefe Properties of Matter may per-
haps refemble the Objects themſelves; for fuch
kind of Lines, and Figures, Motions, &c,
may be formed on the Brain itſelf; And per-
haps fome Perfons may imagine that the Ideas
of theſe corporeal primary Qualities in the
Mind are raiſed naturally and intirely from the
meer outward Impreffions on the Senfes, be-
cauſe theſe Impreffions are like their Objects:
tho'
SECT. II. about innate Ideas.
103
tho' I think there muſt be an Almighty Voli-
tion of the Creator to give the Soul even theſe
Ideas alfo: for the Soul has not proper Eyes
to ſee theſe Figures and Motions on the Brain,
tho' they may never fo much reſemble theſe
primary Qualities, i. e. thofe Motions and Fi-
gures which are found in the Objects without
us. And a Soul being immaterial can receive
of itſelf no natural Impreffions from Matter
or Body.
But when we turn our Thoughts to the
fecondary fenfible Qualities of Body, we are
Lure that all poffible Figures, Stamps, Moti-
ons, Alterations, Traces, which are made by
theſe ſenſible Objects on the Brain, are but pri-
mary Qualities ftill they are nothing but
Shapes, Motions, &c. and they do not at all
reſemble theſe Ideas, Senfations, Thoughts
or Perceptions of fenfible or fecondary Qualities
that are occafioned by fuch corporeal Moti-
ons. What poffible Refemblance is there
between the Motion of a Fibre of the Brain
raiſed by the Grass or the Sky, and the Idea
of green or blue? between the Figures or
Traces impreft on the Brain by Sugar or
Wormwood touching the Tongue, and the
Ideas of fweet and bitter, which are occafion-
ed by that Touch? Yet God our Creator hath
by an original Almighty Volition ordained
that whenfoever fuch Motions or Traces are
made in the Brain, the Soul by the Occafion
thereof, fhall have fuch a Perception of fweet
H 4
or
104
An Enquiry ESSAY IV.
or bitter, or form fuch an Idea as green or
blue: and this Almighty Will of God, where-
by the Soul comes to have fuch Perceptions
or to form fuch Ideas is an uniform Law of
Creation as I before expreft it: 'tis one lafting
Appointment, and may be called the implant-
ing or inftamping thefe Ideas upon the Mind,
fince no manner of corporeal Motions can have
any neceſſary and effectual Influence of them-
felves to excite thefe Perceptions in the Mind,
becauſe it is a Being incorporeal, intangible
and immovable; and indeed this fort of in-
nate Ideas, and in this Senfe Mr. Lock himfelf
ſeems to own, Book II. Chap. 8. Sect. 13.
SECT. III.
In what Senfe fome Truths may be innate.
SEC
*
Econdly, as theſe Ideas may in this Senfe
be called innate, fo fome Principles of
Knowledge (tho' not explicite Propofitions)
may be in a Senfe innate alfo. It is fully
granted that fuch Axioms as thefe, What foever
acteth hath a Being, the whole is greater than a
Part, nothing can be the Caufe of itself, &c.
are not actually infcribed on the Mind of
Man in its first Formation; yet the very Na-
ture, Make and Frame of a rational Mind
is fuch, that it cannot but judge according to
fuch Axioms as thefe: and whatſoever parti-
cular Judgments or Propofitions it forms (tho'
★ does not deduce them from fuch explicite
general
SECT. III. about innate Ideas.
105
::
general Axioms written within itſelf, yet)
it always judges and reaſons according to theſe
Axioms, and cannot judge contrary to them
They are fo interwoven with the very Con-
ftitution and Nature of a Reaſoning Being,
that they are the conftant Principles of all its
Affent or Diffent in particular Enquiries:
And in this Senſe perhaps they may be cal-
led Innate. They are, (as Mr. Glanvill calls
them in his Vanity of Dogmatizing, 8vo p. 81.)
"The very Effentials of Rationality, and if
"any ask how the Soul came by them, I
“return, as Quantity did by Length, Breadth
" and Depth:
To determine how great is the Number of
thefe Propofitions is impoffible, for they are
not in the Soul as propofitions; but 'tis an
undoubted Truth, that a Mind awaking out
of Nothing into Being, and prefented with
particular Objects, would not fail at once to
judge concerning them, according to and by
the force of fome fuch innate Principles as
theſe, or juſt as a Man would judge who had
learnt theſe explicite Propofitions, which in-
deed are fo nearly allied to its own Nature,
that they may be called almoſt a part of it
felf; they are in fome Senſe the very Nature
of the Mind confidered as judging or as reafo-
ning; nor is it poffible for a reaſoning Fa-
culty to exift without them.
Therefore I take the Mind or Soul of
Man not to be fo perfectly indifferent to re-
ceive
106
An Enquiry Essay IV.
ceive all Impreffions, as a Rafa Tabula, or
white Paper; and 'tis fo framed by its Maker
as not to be equally difpofed to all forts of
Perceptions, nor to embrace all Propofitions,
with an Indifferency to judge them true or
falſe; but that antecedently to all the Effects
of Cuſtom, Experience, Education, or any
other contingent Cauſes, as the Mind is necef-
farily ordained and limited by its Créator to
have fuch and fuch appointed Senfations or
Ideas raiſed in it by certain external Motions
of the Matter or Body to which it's united,
and that while the Organs are good and found,
it cannot have others, fo 'tis alſo inclined, and
almoſt determined by fuch Principles as are
wrought into it by the Creator, to believe
fome Propofitions true, others falſe; and per-
haps alfo fome Actions good, others evil.
Therefore I might add,
SECT. IV.
In what Senfe fome Rules of Duty may be
TH
innate.
HIRDLY, There may be fome prac-
tical Principles alfo innate in the fore-
going Senfe, tho' not in the Form of Propofi-
tions: I mean thus; that in the moulding of
Qur Souls God has given us Faculties to dif
cern the Juftneſs or Fitneſs of fuch and fuch
Actions, and together with this Diſcernment
he has alfo inwrought into our Souls fome
conco-
SECT. IV. about innate Ideas.
107
concomitant Movements to judge aright, at
leaſt concerning the more general and obvi-
ous Inftances of Virtue and Vice, Religion
and Morality, fuch as, Contracts are to be
kept; Truth and Veracity fhould be practifed;
Murder ought not to be committed; God muft
be honoured, or he that made us has a Right to
govern us, &c. tho' thefe are acknowledged
to be much fainter and feebler than fpecula-
tive Principles, becauſe they have been more
corrupted by Men, as more frequently con-
tradicting their fenfual Inclinations and vi-
cious Paffions; whereas in Matters of Spe-
culation there is no fuch Oppofition in our
Natures.
Yet it muſt be confeft, that at the very firſt
propofal, when the Terms are underſtood, a
rational Being cannot but affent to this Pro-
pofition, He that made me fhould govern me;
tis right and fit that Contracts fhould be kept.
He cannot but fee the Fitneſs of theſe moral
Propofitions, as he cannot but fee the Juft-
nefs or Truth of this natural one, that all the
Parts taken together are equal to the whole. It
feems to me to be the very Nature of his
Reaſon fo to judge: His Soul is not therefore
equally indifferent to thefe Propofitions, and
to the Reverſe or Contraries of them.
SECT.
108
An Enquiry ESSAY IV,
SECT.
V.
Of the Foundations of moral Virtue, and of a
moral Senfe or Inftinet.
HERE has a Controverfy rifen long
TH
fince theſe Papers were written, be-
tween two confiderable Authors, Whether the
Soul of Man judges of moral Good and Evil,
by an inward Principle or Instinct, which is
called the Moral Senfe, antecedent to all Rea-
fonings, or whether it is by its Survey of the
moral Propofitions offered to the Understanding,
and feeing the rational Fitness and Unfitness of
Things that it judges of them by Reasoning. Me-
thinks we need not be much at a Lofs to an-
fwer this Queſtion. It is plain to me when-
foever fuch moral Propofitions are offered to
the Mind, it judges, or ought to judge of
them by furveying the Fitneſs and Unfitneſs
of Things, the Right and the Wrong, by
the Light of Reaſon: But then if you come
to afk, Why does Reafon judge that this is fit
and right, the other is wrong or unfit, (viz.)
that Contracts are to be kept rather than bro-
ken? &c. I fay, it is the very Nature of an
intelligent Being to perceive this Fitneſs, and
'tis the Nature of a reafoning Mind to judge
fo, and it cannot judge otherwiſe, when free
from all evil Biaffes: Juft as when the Eye fees
a round Globe put up into a neat, round, hol-
low Cafe, it fees the Fitnefs of theſe two
Things
SECT. V. about innate Ideas.
109
Things to each other, and the Soul judges,
and cannot but judge, that there is a mutual
Fitneſs between the Globe and the round
Cafe, and that there is a mutual Unfitneſs
between fuch a Globe and a ſquare Cafe.
I allow therefore, that there is fuch a fort of
Natural Senfe in the Mind (if it may be called
fo) which beholds thefe Congruities and Fit-
neffes of natural Things, and their Relation
to each other, and which inclines and deter-
mines it to judge thus concerning natural
Propofitions or Axioms of Truth; fo that in
more open and obvious Inftances, the weak-
eft Mind can ſcarce judge otherwife. The Un-
derſtanding is like the Eye of the Soul, it fees
the Fitneſs of the Subject and Predicate to
each other, and in fuch Propofitions it can-
not but fee it; and thus it judges, that they
muſt be joined together. It is fo much the
very Nature and Make of the Soul, to fee
and judge of Things in this manner, that
I take it to be a part of Reafon itſelf,
which, as it were, implicitly contains in it
theſe natural Axioms of Truth or Principles
of Judgment inwrought by the Creator of
Souls; not in the explicit Form of Propofi-
tions, but as Principles and Springs of Judg
ment and Reaſoning.
I allow alſo in the fame manner, that there
is fuch a Thing which may be called a Mo-
ral Senfe in the Mind, which inclines the
Man to judge right, and efpecially in the
more
I10
An Enquiry ESSAY IV:
}
more general, plain and obvious Queries
about Virtue and Vice: But this Moral Senfe
is ftill the fame thing, it is the very Nature
and Make of the Mind; 'tis Intelligence or
Reaſon it itſelf confider'd as capable of dif-
cerning, difcourfing or judging about moral
Subjects. And it contains in it theſe plain
and general Principles of Morality, not ex-
plicitly as Propofitions, but only as native
Principles, by which it judges, and cannot
but judge Virtue to be fit, and Vice unfit,
for intelligent and focial Creatures which God
has made.
As for the Word Moral Senfe, if it be ta-
ken to mean any fort of pathetick Instinct or
Difpofition toward Goodness, I think it may be
allow'd, that in human Nature there are
fome few Inftances of it in moft Perfons,
which appear chiefly in the Workings of Be-
nevolence, and Compaffion in us towards fen-
fible Creatures, with fome inward Aver-
fions to Cruelty, and perhaps alfo fome fort
of natural Reverence toward the Almighty
Power, whom we call God, when we come
to know him. Thefe Things are ſome rui-
nous Remains of that Goodnefs, Virtue or
Piety which was natural to innocent Man,
and are partly wrought perhaps into his ani-
mal Nature, as well as in his Soul: Theſe
Inſtincts are certain Relicts of a Spur to Duty,
and a Bridle to reftrain from Vice, and many
times become an Auxiliary or ready Help to
the
SECT. V. about innate Ideas.
III
the Practice of Virtue: But,'tis ftill Reaſon
exercifing itſelf, and judging of the Fitneſs
and Unfitneſs of Things, by and according
to theſe native and effential Principles of
Reaſoning which I have ſpoke of, that is the
only Rule or Teft of what is Vice and what
is Virtue, fo far as the Light of Nature
can certainly diſcover it; for if it fhould be
left to meer Inftinct to be a general Teft or
Rule to judge of Vice and Virtue, without
the Superintendency of Reaſon, or the final
Determination of the Fitneſs and Unfitnefs of
Things thereby, the Concerns of Morality and
Religion would be left at a very great Uncer-
tainty. This has been well argued and de-
termined by an excellent Writer on the
Foundations of moral Goodness, in a ſmall
Pamphlet. 1728.
Now I don't think any of Mr. Locke's
Arguments againſt innate Ideas, or Propofiti-
ons have Force enough in them to difprove
the Account I have here given of the Mind's
judging of natural and moral Truths, by
fuch fort of native Principles. Nor do I ima-
gine Mr. Locke himſelf would oppofe this
Account: For he owns that there are fuch
things as innate Principles, fee Chap. 3.§3.
He calls the Defire of Happiness, and the Aver-
fion to Mifery that is in all Men, innate
practical Principles, and feems to prove them
fuch, becauſe they continue conſtantly to
operate and influence all our Actions; and
4
adds,
112
An Enquiry ESSAY IV.
adds, "That if we had any innate Truths
" in the Mind, we fhould always feel them
influencing our Knowledge.
.
And I beg Leave to add by way of Reply,
And ſo we do always feel theſe Principles
which I have ſpoken of influencing our Judg-
ment whenfoever we judge; therefore accor-
ding to his own Argument, they are in fomè
fort innate or wrought in us by Nature, tho
(as I have often faid) not in the Form of
Propofitions. Thefe are the Springs of our
Judgment on natural and moral Subjects:
And if any fhould ask why I judge fo or fo,
even in felf-evident fpeculative Principles,
why I decide a Cafe thus or thus in moral
Enquiries, which are equally evident, I an-
fwer, becauſe it is the Make of my Mind,
'tis its very Conftitution, and it cannot judge
otherwife: And in particular Propofitions,
whether fpeculative or practical, the Mind is
influenced to affent or diffent by theſe innate
Principles, tho' without exprefs Reflexion ont
them. Now thefe Principles influence the
Mind in the fame manner, tho' not as ftrong-
ly in all Things, as the Defire of Happiness
or Averfion to Mifery, which are allowed to
be innate practical Principles.
After all, it muſt be confeft with Lamen
tation, to the Shame and Reproach of hu-
man Nature, that tho' thefe moral Principles
of Judgment in the Mind of Man, if they
were well improved, would lead us in the moft
common
SECT. V. about innate Ideas.
113
common Caſes to difcern and judge what is
our Duty, and what is Sin; yet the Prejudi-
ces of evil Education, Cuſtoms of Iniquity,
worldly Intereft, our fenfual Appetites, and
many other evil Influences have fo perverted
and abuſed this Principle of Reafon in the
Mind of Man, that now a days the Mind
often goes aftray from the Truth; and in-
ſtead of directing us to Virtue, hath fometimes
been led into grofs Abominations. The Eye of
the Underſtanding is ftrangely blinded, and
the Judgment ftrangely perverted by the Fall
of Man; we are led to falfe Judgments of
Things by the Corruptions of our Minds,
by the unhappy Influence that preſent fen-
fible Things have over our whole Nature,
and the Empire which Appetite and evil
Paffions have gotten over our fuperior Facul-
ties. Bleffed be God for Scripture and the
Goſpel, wherein there is a plain Revelation
made of our Duty to God and Man; where-
in the Method of Divine Grace and Salva-
tion is ſet before us, and whereby even in
this World we are fenfibly relieved from the
Darkneſs and Error, the Miſtakes and Miſe-
ries, which are the Effects of our Fall, and
fhall be raiſed to perfect Deliverance, to
Light, Truth, and Happineſs in the other
World, if we fincerely comply with the
Propoſals of Grace and Peace.
I
ESSAY
(114)
ESSAY V.
An Enquiry whether the Soul thinks
always.
SECT. I.
Confiderations toward the Proof of it.
W
HEN this great Author Mr. Locke
had prov'd that we are not born
with actual Ideas and Propofiti-
ons in our Mind, he comes, Book II. Chap. 1.
to enquire whence we obtain our Ideas: And
he wifely and evidently derives them origi-
nally from theſe two fruitful and general
Springs, (viz.) Senfation and Reflection. Ex-
ternal Objects furnish the Mind with the
Ideas of fenfible Things by Senſation; and
the Mind or Soul itfelf, by Reflexion on itſelf,
furniſhes the Underſtanding with Ideas of its
own Powers and Operations: But ftill let the
Power which the Soul has of abstracting one
Idea from another be allowed to be the Foun-
tain of our Abſtract and general Ideas, i. e.
the immediate Caufe of them.
Then he proceeds to enquire whether the
Soul thinks always, and he will by no means
allow
SECT. I. The Soul never fleeps.
115
allow the Soul to be always thinking. I
have no mind to enter into a full Debate of
this Matter, yet in a few Words I would take
leave to mention a Reaſon or two, why I
am rather inclined to believe the Soul al-
ways thinks.
But, first, I fuppofe it to be granted by
the Perfons whom I diſpute with, that Body
cannot think, or that the Soul is not Matter:
For as the very Nature of Matter or Body is
folid Extenfion, fo I can have no poffible Con-
ception what Extenfion or Solidity can do
towards thinking, judging, reaſoning, wiſh-
ing, willing, &c. The Ideas are fo intirely
different, that they feem to be Things as ut-
terly diſtinct as any two Things we can name
or mention, not Heaven and Earth are fo
different from each other as Thought and
Matter. I can no more conceive what Affi-
nity there is between folid Extenfion and Think-
ing, than I can conceive any Affinity between
Green and the Sound of a Violin, or Red and
the Taste of a Cucumber. The Ideas of a
bitter Colour, a blue Smell, or a Purple Sound,
are as clear Ideas in my Conception, and as in-
telligible Things, as Thinking Body, confcious
Matter, judging Extenfion, or reafoning Quan
tity: But this Point, (viz.) that Matter can-
not think, has been proved fo largely by
many learned Writers, particularly by Dr.
Clarke, Dr. Bentley, Mr. Grove, and Mr. Dit-
ton, that I fay no more on this head.
I 2
Now
116
ESSAY V.
The Soul
Now to propoſe my Argument for the
Soul's perpetual thinking. Since the Soul is
not Matter or folid Extenfion, if the Soul
ceaſes to think what is it of the Soul that
then remains exifting? I confess I have no
Idea of any thing that remains. 'Tis not fo-
lid Extenfion, for that is Body or Matter,
and that is already excluded by Conceffion.
'Tis not empty or unfolid Extenfion, for that
is pure Space, which in my Efteem is meer
Nothing, or at beſt an abſtract Idea of the Mind.
If you ſuppoſe a Soul to be in the leaſt De-
gree more denſe or more folid than empty
Space, that is the very Idea which I have of
Body or Matter, let it be never fo tenuious or
fubtil: So that as far as my Ideas reach, a
Soul ceaſes to be, if it ceaſes to think.
Or if you ſhould reply, that there is a
Power of thinking remaining, I afk, Is this
Power of thinking the Subſtance of the Soul
or not? If it be not the Subftance of the
Soul, then there is another Subftance, in
which this Power of thinking inheres. And
what is that befides meer Space? or if this Pow-
er of thinking be the very Subſtance of the
Soul, that is the Opinion I am fupporting ;
only I ſuppoſe, that it never ceafes from ac-
tual Exercife; for if fuch a Power of think-
ing be the Subftance of the Soul, and yet fall
afleep, or be unconfcious, I have no Idea of
what remains: Nor can I guess how it can
awake itſelf again into actual Thought.
Befides,
SECT. I.
never fleeps.
117
Befides, if a Soul be extended, be it never
fo thin and fubtil an Extenfion, it has Limits,
or it has not: If it has no Limits, every Soul
is infinitely extended, or really infinite: If the
Soul has Limits, then it has a Figure or
Shape; for Shape is nothing elſe but the meer
Limits of Extenfion: And if it has a Shape,
is not this Shape minuable, or may it not be
maimed by loſing a part?
I would fain know wherein does this Bulk
or Subftance of the Soul thus limited or fi-
gured, differ from fo much meer Space, if
it ceafe to think and be not more folid or
denfe than Space is? And again, what Influ-
ence can this extended empty Figure or Shape
have upon our thinking any more than folid
Matter has? If folid Extenfion or Matter
cannot think, as feveral modern Philofophers
have undertaken to prove, how can unfolid
Extenfion be capable of thinking? If any Ex-
tenfion could think, I do not fee how Solidity
could hinder its thinking. Perhaps the ſtrong-
eft Arguments againſt the Power of Matter to
think arife from the Extenfion of Matter,
(viz.) that it hath Parts exterior to one ano-
ther; now this belongs to all Extenfion, whe-
ther folid or unfolid: And therefore I can-
not but wonder a little at thofe Gentlemen
who pretend to prove ftrongly that Matter
cannot think, and yet allow a Soul to be ex-
tended, i. e. allow unfolid Extenfion to have
a thinking Power. Such fort of Thoughts
I 3
as
118
ESSAY V.
The Sout
as thefe, with fome others, have enclined me
rather to ſuppoſe the Nature and Effence of
the Soul to confift in thinking.
I own this fort of Doctrine concerning the
Soul is not only out of the way of vulgar
Opinion, but 'tis now alfo in a great Meaſure
banished from the Schools and Sentiments of
learned Men, fince the Cartefian Philofophy
loft its Ground in the World. Now tho' I
never was, nor could perfuade my ſelf to be a
Diſciple of Des-Cartes in his Doctrine of the
Nature of Matter, or of Vacuum, or of Ple-
num, &c. and I have many Years ago given
up his Opinions as to the chief Phænomena
of the corporeal World, yet I have never feen
fufficient Ground to abandon all his Scheme
of Sentiments of the Nature of Mind or Spi-
rit, becauſe I could not find a better in the
Room of it that should be more free from
Objections and Difficulties.
The large and powerful Influence that the
Name and Authority of Mr. Locke has in the
World, has carried away Multitudes into the
Suppofition that Extenfion or Expanfion as
well as Duration are the Properties of all
Beings whatſoever; and that therefore Spirits
as well as Bodies are expanded or extended,
which are but two Words for the fame Idea ;
tho' it muſt be owned Mr. Locke himſelf is fo
cautious, that I think he doth not any where
pofitively affert it, not even in Book II. Chap.
15. Sect. 11. where he thinks it is near as
2
þard
SECT. II.
119
never fleeps.
hard to conceive any real Being without Expan
fion as without Duration.
SECT.
II.
Of Dreams, why not remembered.
UT my deſign in this Place being chief-
BUT
ly to take notice of the Sentiments of
this great Philofopher, I fhall proceed to an-
fwer the chief Objections which he raiſes a-
gainſt thoſe who fuppofe that the Soul always
thinks.
His grand Argument is, that the Soul fleeps
as well as the Body, and has no thought when it
has no Dream: Now there are fome Perfons
(fays he) who never dream, and others that
fleep fometimes for feveral Hours without
dreaming, therefore it is plain to him that
all this while the Soul has been or exiſted
without thinking.
Mr. Locke's chief Objection againſt the Soul's
thinking in fleep may be anſwered by an Ex-
plication of what we mean by Dreams, of
which Dreams the Body by the animal Spi-
rits (whatever they be) is the Occafion, and
of which the Soul is conſcious.
Note, by Animal Spirits I mean thoſe ſub-
tile Corpufcles, whatfoever they are, whereby
fuch Traces or Impreffions are formed or re-
vived on the Brain which correſpond to our
Senſations or Ideas, and which are uſually the
Occafion of them.
I 4
Firſt
120
ESSAY V.
The Soul
First then, there are fome Impreffions made
upon the Brain by the animal Spirits, which
are ſo ſoft and gentle, that there are no Tra-
ces, no Footſtep of any fuch Motions left
upon the Brain: Yet the Soul might be juſt
ſlightly conſcious of them at that moment, and
form correfpondent Ideas, tho' both the Tra-
ces and the Ideas vaniſh almoſt as faft as they
are formed. Thefe might be called Dreams;
but they being all forgotten as tho' they had
not been, this is not ufually called Dreaming.
Secondly, there are fome Impreffions which
do more ſtrongly than the former, affect the
Brain and occafion Ideas in the Soul, and
yet do not with an over-vigorous Tide of
Impreffions deluge and confound one another;
this is ufually called Dreaming Sleep, and
thefe Dreams we remember and can relate;
becauſe the Soul was ftrongly and diſtinctly
conſcious of them thro' their ſtrong diſtinct
Traces on the Brain which were then made,
and in a great Meaſure remain.
Thirdly, there are fome Impreffions which
by a too impetuous Flux and too violent a
Throng of animal Spirits crowding thro' the
Pores and Paffages of the Brain altogether.
mingle, confound, and deftroy the perpetual
Traces which are made; hereby the Thoughts
or Ideas are all confounded and mutually de-
ftroy one another, fo that we are rendered in-
capable of recollecting them,
The
SECT. II.
121
never fleeps.
The first of thefe is like a foft touch of a
Şeal upon melted Wax which fcarce makes
any Image, or at leaſt ſuch as is loft again as
foon as made, by the meer Softneſs of the
Wax itſelf, not retaining the Impreffion.
The ſecond of theſe is like deep and diſtinct
Impreffions of the Seal upon Wax, yet not
fo immoderate either in Violence or Number
as to confound and deſtroy one another;
therefore they remain and we remember them.
The Third is like a Multitude of violent
Impreffions on the Wax, which perpetually
mingle and confound one another, and leave
no perfect Image of any thing.
Thus the faint Impreffions of the firſt
kind have much the fame Effect as the ex-
ceffive Numbers and Violence of the third
kind, i. e. they leave no diftin&t Traces or
Memorials.
The first is our common and moſt re-
freſhing Sleep, which is ufually called Sleep
without dreaming, and very much reſembles
what is often called Brown Study, while we
are awake; that is, when after feveral Mi-
nutes of muſing Thoughtfulneſs, if we are
ſpoken to or rouſed out of it on a fudden, we
can ſcarce recollect one Thought paft, or at
leaſt only the very laſt thought we had: be-
cauſe the Traces on the Brain that excited
thoſe flighty and paffing Thoughts were ve-
ry faint and fuperficial. They produce but
feeble and indiſtinct Images like the Sight of
a Land-
122
ESSAY V.
The Soul
a Landſkip in the Twilight, which foon
vaniſhes becauſe the Impreffions were ſo
feeble.
The Second more reſembles our common
wakeful Thoughts and Actions of Life of
which we can recollect many at leaſt a little
after we have finiſhed them: and theſe are the
Dreams which we more diſtinctly remember
in the Morning. The Images are fuch as
when we ſee a Profpect in common Daylight,
and which abide on the Memory.
The Third is like the Deliriums of a Fea-
ver, or the ftrong and wild Imaginations of
a Frenzy, when either fome violent Impreffi-
ons in an endleſs Variety of Figures and Tra-
ces croud upon the Brain, and are impos'd
upon the Mind, and fo far confound one an-
other that before fuch diftemper'd Perfons
can give an Anſwer to any Queſtion ask'd
them, they have twenty other Images which
confound the Ideas of that Queftion; and
therefore the Anfwer is abfurd and nothing
to the Purpoſe: Now in this kind of Dreams
all the Scenes quickly vaniſh by mutual De-
ftruction of each other. Theſe are like Mil-
lions of Objects feen at once in a dazling
Sun-fhine, all indiftinct and very confuſed.
In the first when we awake we think we
have not dreamed at all; juſt as when a
Man falls into a Swoon, the faint and irre-
gular Motions of the animal Spirits together
with the languid State of the Brain at that
time
SECT. II.
123
never fleeps.
time permit not any one Trace to be ſtrong
enough to produce any diſtinct Idea in the
Mind; and when we awake out of a Swoon
wè conclude we had no Thought or Percep-
tion all the while. Juft thus it is when we
fall aſleep at Night, when we awake out of
it forgetful of what has paft, and when we
conclude we have not thought at all.
In the Second, when we awake we remem-
ber both that we did dream, and what the
Dream was, either more or lefs. And theſe
Dreams look moft like the Thoughts and
Actions of common Life, for in theſe our
Reaſon has fome little Power, tho' not its
complete Government.
In the Third we remember, perhaps, that
we did dream, but we can feldom recollect
what we dreamt of. Often have I awoke
from a Dream, wherein a Multitude of Scenes
have been impreft on the Mind for an Hour
or two together, yet with utmoft Labour I
could not recollect enough to fill up one Mi-
nute, but only fhort broken Hints of the
dreaming Scene, which very Hints have alfo
in a little time vaniſh'd; for the Images and
Ideas being joined without any Conduct of
Reaſon, but by mechanical and more vehe-
ment Motions of the Brain and Spirits, over-
ruled the reaſoning Powers, and cannot be
remembered by the intelligent Mind; and
the Images themſelves or Traces of the Brain
are fhattered, confounded and loft by the fud-
den
I 24
ESSAY V.
The Soul
den Hurry and vaft Diverſity of Motions of
the Spirits, when upon waking they fly to the
Limbs and Organs of Senſe, to perform the
wakeful Functions of Nature.
SECT. III.
Mr. Locke's Objections answered.
FROM
'ROM what is faid in the foregoing Pa-
the Objections of Mr. Locke are ea-
fily anſwered; I fhall fet the chief of them
in order here from Book II. Chap. 1.
I. Mr. Locke fuppofes, Sect. 11, 12, that if
the Soul thinks while the Body is fleeping,
then it has its own Concerns, Pleaſures, Pains,
apart from the Body, and Socrates afleep and
awake are two diftinct Perfons.
To this I anſwer (1) that 'tis ftill the ſame
Perfon for both the Soul and Body of So-
crates are employed in theſe Ideas, and that
whether fleeping or waking. The Ideas of
his Dreams and of his waking Thoughts,
tho' they both exift in the Mind, yet both of
them may be occafioned by the Motions of
his Blood and Spirits, and they are the Acts
or Effects of the Soul and Body united, i. e.
of both the conftituent Parts of Socrates.
Or (2) if it were not fo, and if the Soul
alone were employed in Sleep, yet Mr. Locke's
Objection might be anfwered, by fhewing
that the Actions of Life which belong only
to the Body as their proper Principle, or on-
ly
SECT. III
125
never fleeps.
ly to the Soul, are generally attributed to the
whole Man; 'tis the Soul of Socrates that
philoſophiz'd, and his Body wore a Gown,
and yet we fay 'tis the fame Perfon, 'tis So-
crates did them both: fo that there is no manner
of Reaſon to fuppofe Socrates afleep to be a
diftinct Perfon from Socrates when he is awake,
tho' the Soul alone were engaged in thinking
while he was afleep without any Operations of
the Brain.
II. Mr. Locke, §. 13, 14, 18, 19, fuppofes
no body can be convinced that they have been
thinking for four Hours together and not
know it, &c.
But, it plainly appears by the foregoing
Pages that we may know or be confcious of
fleeping Thoughts at that Moment, when
they arife, and not retain them the next Mo-
ment: fo that the Forgetfulneſs of our Dreams
never fo foon is no Proof that we did not
dream, or had no Conſciouſneſs of thinking
in Sleep.
III. §. 16. Mr. Locke would infinuate that
if the Soul thinks while the Body is afleep,
and unactive, thofe Thoughts ſhould be more
purely the Soul's own Operations, and confe-
quently more rational.
But it appears from what has been faid
that the fleeping Thoughts of a Man being
the Effects of the various and ungoverned
Rovings of the animal Spirits in the Brain,
impofing Images on the Soul, are not more
2
regular
126
The Soul
ESSAY V.
regular or rational than thofe of a waking
Man, but far leſs: and therefore they are leſs
worth our Remembrance: and 'tis no Incon-
venience to us nor Diſhonour to our Nature
that we are ſo made, as to forget fuch rov-
ing and irregular Exerciſes fo eaſily and fo
foon.
IV. Another Objection of Mr. Locke's is
this; §. 15. that 'tis not agreeable to the
Wiſdom of our Creator to make fo admira-
ble a Faculty as the Power of thinking to be
fo idly and uſeleſsly imployed all our fleeping
Hours, i. e. at leaſt one quarter of our time,
as not to be able to recollect, to treaſure
up or
uſe any of thoſe Thoughts for our own or
others Advantage.
To this 'tis anfwered (1. that there are
but few even of our waking Thoughts which
moft Men can recollect for particular Ufes
of Life, in compariſon of thofe Multitudes
and Millions which vaniſh and are for ever
loft as foon as they are form'd; yet this is
not eſteem'd to reflect upon the Wiſdom of
our Creator, who (at least in this preſent
State) hath thus conftituted us. Let a Man
who has been awake 17 Hours or a whole
Day try in the 18th to recollect what he can
of what has paft in his Mind: and he fhall
hardly be able to fill up one Hour with ſuch
recollected Thoughts from which he can draw
any proper Inferences, Experiences, or Obfer-
vations, for the Ufe of Life; and it
and it may be
as
SECT. III.
127
never fleeps.
as well infer'd that we have not thought ten
Hours of that ſeventeen, as that we did not
think the foregoing Night in our Sleep, meer-
ly upon this Suppofition that God would not
make us fuch Creatures as to think ſo many
Hours to fo little Purpoſe.
(2. Why may not a thinking Being be fuf-
fered to think fome Hours every Night to lit-
tle Purpoſe, as well as to exift without think-
ing, i. e. to no purpoſe at all. Ufelefs Ideas
are at least as good as no Ideas, and a Soul
thinking idly is as good as a Soul fleeping.
(3. What if we ſhould fay, that as the ir-
regular and exorbitant Power of Senſe and
Imagination, and its Ungovernablenefs by
reaſon when we are awake in many Inftances
is owing to our fallen State, fo our unrecol-
lected and uſeleſs Dreams may poſſibly be af-
cribed in fome Meaſure to the fame Caufe?
Perhaps innocent Man could manage his fleep-
ing Ideas better by reafon, and make them
fome way ſerviceable to his wakeful Actions.
Or we may borrow from Mr. Lee a fourth
Anſwer (viz.)
(4. There feems to be a conftant Senſe of
Pleaſure in found Sleep which appears by a
Reluctancy to be difturbed in that Pleafure,
and ſtrong Tendencies to re-enjoy it when we
are fuddenly awaken'd; this is at leaſt as de-
monftrable as that we have no Conſciouſneſs
at all.
And if it be fo, then (1.) here's fomething
we
128
The Soul
ESSAY V.
we are conſcious of when fleeping, and (2.)
'tis not unworthy the wife Contriver of Na-
ture to beſtow an innocent Pleaſure on the
Act of fleeping which himſelf has made ne-
ceffary to preferve Life, and improve the
Comforts of it.
V. Another Objection of Mr. Locke againſt
the Conftancy of thinking in the Soul of Man is
his Suppofition that the greateſt Part of the
Time of Infants both before and after their
Birth is ſpent without thinking, and yet 'tis
not fuppofed they are without a Soul. See
§. 21.
I anſwer, as for the Time before the Birth,
it is a great doubt with me whether the ratio-
nal Mind be united fo foon as moſt People
imagine, fince there is no need of it to give
or preſerve the meer animal Life. What if
the rational Soul be not united to the Body
till the Birth, I fee no great Inconvenience in
it. But, be it when it will, 'tis moft reafon-
able to believe that Infants have Multitudes
of their moſt early Ideas, if not all, from Senfa-
tion: Before, at and after the Soul's Forma-
tion and Union to the Body, 'tis natural to
fuppofe that there are numberlefs Impreffions
made on the foft and fluid Brain, and why
ſhould not theſe convey Senfations of Eafe or
Uneafinefs, Pleaſure, or Pain to the Soul, as
foon as 'tis united, perhaps according to the
Supply or Defect of proper or improper Nou-
rifhment? &c.
And
SECT. III.
129
never fleeps.
And that 'tis alfo affected with various
Senfations from the Brain of the Mother, (if
the Soul be united before the Birth) as well
as from the various Motions of its own and
its Mother's Body, cannot be reaſonably
doubted, tho' the manner of the Communi-
cation is beyond our ſkill to trace. If there
be any Impreffions made on the Nerves, and
convey'd to the Brain of the Infant, which
are fit to excite Senfations, and the Soul be
then united, I cannot fee why thofe Senfa-
tions ſhould not arife in the Soul of the In-
fant. If they be ſtrong enough to mark the
Infant's Body in a very fenfible manner, as is
generally agreed, furely they are ftrong enough
to excite Ideas.
After its Birth 'tis ftill impofed upon by
the animal Spirits in the Brain, with new
Senfations and Imaginations; but the only
Reaſon why we ſee fo little Evidence of think-
ing in Infants, is not only for want of Speech
or Signs to manifeft Thought, but becauſe
their Experience is fo fmall, their Judgment
fo weak, and the Memory fo fhort and im-
perfect, by reafon of the exceeding Softneſs
of the Brain, which can hardly retain any
Traces: Nor can the Soul in any rational
manner connect many of its Ideas, which for
the moſt part mutually confound one ano-
ther, and ſuffer it to have but very few clear
and diſtinct Perceptions. Now thefe Ideas
being all confuſed, are quickly loft, and va-
K
niſh.
130
ESSAY V.
The Soul
niſh. As the Brain grows harder, and more
capable of retaining Traces, fo the Memory
is confirmed, whence Experience arifes, Judg-
ment is ftrengthen'd and taught to act, and
the Efforts of a thinking and a reaſoning
Nature appear.
From this I infer and agree herein with
Mr. Locke, (tho' not upon the fame Grounds
and Reaſons) that the Soul of Infants hath
very few, or ſcarce any Ideas refin'd or in-
tellectual, or which come by Reflexion; not
for that it does not think, but becauſe its
Thoughts are ftill imployed and impoſed
upon by the Brain in Senfations, as the Brain is
imployed continually by crouding Impreffi-
ons from the Objects of Senfe and Feeling
from within or without.
Thus I have endeavoured to anſwer the
chief Objections of this great Writer, againſt
the conftant Conſciouſneſs of the Soul. And
indeed fo far as my Ideas reach, or my Rea-
foning Powers will help me, conftant or per-
petual Cogitation feems to belong to the very
Nature, Effence and Subſtance of a Spirit, and
that when it ceaſes to think it ceafes to be.
And herein it bears a very near Reſemblance
to God, and is the fairest Image of its
Maker, whofe very Being admits of no Sleep
nor Quiefcence, but is all confcious Activity.
COROL
SECT. III.
never fleeps.
COROLLARIÉS.
1. Hence it will follow, that the Soul is
in its own Nature immortal; for nothing
but the Power which hath given it this
active Life and Being can deftroy it. It is
entirely out of the reach of all the material
World to hurt it: It cannot lay afide its own
thinking, it cannot put itſelf out of Being:
Nor can we conceive how any other Spirit
can make it ceaſe to act, i. e. ceaſe to be.
Such an active Being as a Spirit cannot be
deſtroy'd, but by Annihilation; and furely
God, whofe Right and Prerogative it is to
create or give Being to a Creature, hath not
put it into the Power of any Creature to an-
nihilate his Works, or take away their Being:
2. Hence it will follow alfo, that when
the human Body dies, the Soul exifts and
continues to think and act in a feparate State :
And when it is freed from all the Avocation
of Senſations and fenfible Things, it will live
more entirely in the Reflexion on its own
Operations, and will commence a State of
Happineſs or Mifery, according to its own
former Conduct; either rejoicing in the Tef
timony of a good Confcience, or under in-
ward Anguiſh and bitter Self-reproaches from
the Conſciouſneſs of its own Guilt.
K
N...
ESSAY
132
ESSAY VI.
Of the Place
ESSAY VI
Of the Power of Spirits to move Bo-
dies, of their Being in a Place and
removing from it.
W
HEN the ingenious Director of
modern Philoſophy treats on this
Subject, in his Eſſay on human Un-
derftanding, Book II. Chap. 23. § 18, 19,
20. he uſes the Word Motivity to fignify a
Power to move Bodies, and by Mobility he
means the Power of a Being to change its own.
Place; and makes both theſe to be Properties
belonging to Spirits: But let us confider a
little, and enquire whether either of them are
the proper native Powers of a Spirit or a
thinking Being.
SECT I.
Of the Power of a Spirit to move Matter.
TH
HAT Spirits do continually put Bo-
dies into Motion, is evident from the
conftant Experience of our own Souls mov-
ing our Limbs, and the various Parts of the
Body, which are fubjected to voluntary Mo-
tion: And that Angels have many a time
excited Motion in feveral Parts of the cor-
3
poreal
SECT. I. and Motion of Spirits. 133
poreal World, is manifeft to thoſe who be-
lieve the Scripture: It is alfo clear, beyond
all Difpute, that God the Infinite and Al-
mighty Spirit hath created the material Uni-
verſe, and has put the feveral Parts of it into
Motion as he pleaſes. But the Queſtion is,
Whether any created Spirit hath any native
or innate Power in its felf to move any part of
Matter? Whether this Power be effential, and
belong to its Nature? Whether its Thought
or Will can effect any Change whatſoever in
material Beings? or whether the World of
Bodies and the World of Minds are not fo en-
tirely different and feparate in their whole
Nature, Subftance and fpecial Properties,
that they cannot poffibly have any Commu-
nication with each other, except by a parti-
cular Appointment and Commiffion from
God their common Creator and Sovereign.
In the third Effay, which treats of the
Original of our Perceptions and Ideas, we have
found, that neither the Motions which are
raiſed within in a human Body, nor the Im-
preffions which are made on the Organs of
Senfe, or on the Brain, by outward fenfible
Objects, are of themfelves, and in their own
Nature fufficient to raife any Ideas or Senfati-
ons in a Spirit: But that all the whole Train of
Senfations and corporeal Ideas, which belong
to human Nature, are originally owing to
Divine Appointment, uniting one particular
Spirit to one particular Animal Body, accor-
K 3
ding
734
Of the Place ESSAY VI.
ding to certain Laws of his own Preſcription,
And perhaps a few more Confiderations may
incline us to believe, that all the native Pow-
ers of a Spirit are not fufficient in them-
felves to move any part of Matter whatfo-
ever, without the fame Divine Appointment.
Confideration I. If Spirit be entirely void of
all Solidity, that is, if a Spirit be not Mat-
ter, 'tis hard to conceive how it should ori-
ginally, or in its own Nature have a Power
of itſelf to move Matter. It cannot do it
by Impulse, for there can be no Contact,
whether immediate or mediate. Nor hath
it originally a Power to move Bodies by Voli
tion, for there is no natural connexion be-
twixt my willing a Stone to move, and its
Motion: I may will it ten thousand times,
and it lies quiefcent ftill: Nay, tho' it be
but a Feather, or a Grain of Duft, I can-
not conceive how my own Volition, or even
the ſtrongeſt Volition of an Angel, fhould
excite Motion in it, unleſs he has a particu-
lar Commiffion from the Almighty Spirit;
And if it be fo, thence it will follow, that
the Motion of the Stone or Feather, which
is owing to fuch a Divine Commiffion, de-
pends not fo ftrictly and properly on any ef
fential Power or Influence of the Angel's
own Volition, but rather on the Divine Vo-
lition as the prime or efficacious Caufe.
And this perhaps is the true Reafon why
our animal Spirits, Nerves, Mufcles and
Limbs
SECT. I. and Motion of Spirits.
135
Limbs are moved at the Command of our
Thoughts or Will, (viz.) becauſe God the
Creator has efficaciouſly decreed or willed from
the Beginning, and appointed it now as a
Law of Nature, that fuch a particular Ma-
chine of Matter or Flefh, or any of the
Limbs of it ſhould move, when fuch a par-
ticular Spirit willed it: And if we add here,
that God has alſo appointed that this Spirit
fhould have fuch fpecial Ideas or Conſciouf-
neffes according to fuch peculiar Motions or
Impreffions on this animal Body, we have
the chief Part, if not the whole Union be-
tween Soul and Body defcribed, as I have
ſhewn in a foregoing Effay.
Confid. II. That a Spirit cannot of itſelf
originally move any part of Matter, will ap-
pear more probable, if we enquire of our
Opponents, what Quantity of Matter, or what
particular Parts of Matter any Spirit can bè
fuppofed to move. Surely a created Spirit of
itſelf, and by its own effential or native Pow-
ers, cannot move all Matter, or the whole
material World; that would put the Uni-
verfe of Bodies into the Power of every fingle
Spirit, which is very abfurd, and contrary
to all Experience and Reaſon.
If its Power of Motion be confined to a
limited Quantity of Matter, what is it that
limits this Quantity? It cannot be the Di-
menfions or Shape of the Soul; for a Soul is
not ſuppoſed to have any Shape, Dimenſions
K 4
or
136
Of the Place
ESSAY VI.
or Magnitude: Or if it had, I have fhewn
already, and fhall fhew further, that this
cannot give any Power to move Matter, be-
cauſe theſe Dimenſions have no Solidity, and
cannot touch or impel a Body. What is it
then but the Will of God that determines
what Quantity of Matter every Spirit fhall
have Power to move? And this is the very
Point which we are proving.
Well, but let us imagine, that a common
human Soul had a native Power to move
fome Quantity, fuppofe fix Foot of Matter
indefinitely; yet till it be united particularly
by the Will of God to a certain individual
Body, this individual Quantity of Matter is
not particularly determined: Then every Spi-
rit has the Liberty of a wide Range indeed
and may move indifferently fix Foot of Mat-
ter any where through the World, or what
fix Foot of Matter it pleaſes; it may rove
from Place to Place through the Earth, and
by moving fo much Matter fucceffively may
cauſe ſtrange Alterations in the material Syf-
tem, and diſtribute Bleffings or Miſchiefs
through the Univerſe.
Again, Is it reaſonable for us to ſuppoſe,
that any Spirit, as Adam's for Inftance,
ſhould be effentially, naturally, and of itſelf
able to move any fix Foot of Matter in the
Univerſe, where it pleaſes, and yet that it
fhould from the very Moment of its Exift-
ence be confin'd and reftrain'd to move only
the
SECT. I. and Motion of Spirits. 137
the Body of Adam? and that as foon as it is
created, and come into Being, it should be
cut off from its own proper effential Power
and Liberty of moving any thing indefinitely
of fix fquare Feet, and be limited only to
move that very fix Foot of Flesh and Blood?
Can we fuppofe the Spirit of Man, even
innocent Man, in the Glory of his Creation-
State, fhould be formed in fuch Bondage, and
brought into Being under ſuch a narrow Re-
ſtraint of its natural Powers? Was Man,
who was made after the Image of God, cre-
ated in a State of fuch Impriſonment, with
his native Faculties fo far cramped and
confined?
Or if we ſhould fo far confent, that the
Platonick Philofophy is true, as to fuppofe
that a Spirit, which was naturally able to
move any Parts of Matter before, is thruſt
down into this Body of fix Foot, and confin-
ed to it as a Prifon, wherein it can move
only its own Houſe as a Snail does; then a
Difmiffion from the Body would furely re-
ftore it to its native Power of moving fix
Foot of Matter any where: And why then
might it not by its own Will and Power af-
fume another Body, or why may it not re-
affume its own Body again, and fet the Muf-
cles, Blood and Juices into all their proper
vital Motions? or if it could not do that for
want of Skill in the Conftruction of ani-
mal Nature, yet why may it not put the
dead
138
Of the Place
ESSAY VI.
dead Body in the grofs into Motion, and be-
come a Ghoſt with a moving Carcaſs, and
fright the World? and yet it might fecure
itfelf from the Affaults of Men, by raifing
the Body into the Air when it pleafes, upon
the firft View of Danger.
Befides, would not this Opinion give to a
wicked Spirit fuch a Releaſe at the Death of
the Body, by reſtoring it to its native Power
of moving fix Foot of Matter, as to enable
it to do an unknown Quantity of Miſchief
in the World? How many Spirits go out of
the Body full of Rage and Revenge, and
what Murthers would they commit?
A good Spirit indeed, when releafed from
the Body, would have the fame Liberty and
Range to do extenfive good Offices to Men;
But what a Theater of Conteft and Com-
bat would this habitable World be between
the pious and the wicked Spirits, according
to their different and contrary Inclinations
and Deſigns of Good and Evil, if Spirits of
themſelves could move indefinitely fix Foot,
or even but fix Inches of folid Matter?
Again, If a good Spirit departed from the
Body had Power to move any ſmall Portions
of Matter indefinitely, would not its Re-uni-
on to one particular Body at the Reſurrection
be a fore and unhappy Retrenchment of its
native Liberty, and a Confinement to a Priſon
again? And is this fort of Philofophy ſuited
to the bleffed Idea, which the Scriptures give
US
SECT. I. and Motion of Spirits.
139
us of the Reſurrection of good Men? Is not
the Refurrection of the Body defigned for
their greater Advantage and Happineſs, And
it is not more reaſonable to believe, that it
fhall render them capable of more extenſive
Service, by enabling them to have fome
Communications with the material World
again, from which they had been cut off by
the death of the Body?
Upon the whole therefore is it not far more
agreeable to the Rules of Reaſon and Religi-
on to ſuppoſe that a Spirit can of itſelf move
no part of Matter, nor hath any Power over
it but by the particular Appointment of God?
And doth not this better account for the firſt
Union of each particular Spirit to its own
Body, as a Part of the providential Govern-
ment of the World by the Will of God?
Doth it not alſo better adjuſt the Powers of
departed Spirits by reducing them to their
native Impotence of moving Matter? and give
a better Repreſentation of the Refurrection
and the Re-union of each Spirit to its own
Body?
Confid. III. The Argument will ftill grow
upon us, and carry further Force in it to prove
that a Spirit has not in itſelf a native Power
to move Matter, when we confider how ex-
ceeding limited is the Power that a human
Spirit hath over its own Body to which 'tis
united; and thence it will appear, that this
Power with its ſpecial Limitations was given
३
140
ESSAY VI.
Of the Place
it meerly by ſpecial Commiffion from God
himſelf. This Spirit by all its Volitions can
move nothing but thoſe particular Parts of the
Body which God has fubjected to voluntary
Motion, and for which proper Muſcles are
provided, together with the nervous Powers
which are neceffary to move thoſe muſcular
Parts. It cannot make the Pulfe of the Heart,
which is a great Muſcle, beat quicker or flow-
er; it cannot accelerate the Motion of any of
the Juices (viz.) Blood or Lymph, &c. in
any of the containing Veffels; it cannot al-
ter the Shape or Situation of any Atoms of
which the Fleſh, Blood and Bones are com-
poſed by an immediate Act of the Will upon
them; nor can it move any Member except
only in that Way of muſcular Motion which
God has appointed in the Engine of the hu-
man Body.
In this View of Things there are ten thou-
fand times more Motions of which the ſeve-
ral Parts and Particles of a human Body are
capable than thoſe few which the Soul has
any immediate Power to produce. Now if
the Soul had an innate or native Power to
move Matter, might it not chuſe which part
of its own Body it would move, and in what
manner it would move it? If it muſt be con-
fin'd to one Body, yet how comes it to be fo
wretchedly reſtrained from moving the ſmal-
ler Parts of Nature, and from rectifying any
of the Diſorders of the Solids or Fluids in
that
SECT. I. and Motion of Spirits. 141
that Body by an Act of its Will? Why is it
fo poorly limited to a few groffer Motions of
the Members? I confefs in the main theſe
groffer Motions ferve the common Purpoſes
of animal Life in this World, but this cannot
preſerve the Body in a State of Health, or fe-
cure its Eafe and Activity: What? could a
Spirit move any Matter indefinitely before
Union, and can it not move any Parts of that
Matter to which it is particularly united?
Can it by its native Power move the whole
Bulk of the Body, or the larger Parts of it,
and yet not put the minute Parts of it in
Motion? Doth not this Confinement and Li-
mitation of its Powers fufficiently fhew whence
all this Power comes, and that 'tis not effen-
tial to its Nature, but all owing to the ſpecial
Ordination and Will of God in uniting fuch
a Body to fuch a Spirit according to certain
Rules of his own preſcribing?
If we fuppofe a Spirit to have no Power of
itſelf to move an Atom of Matter except by
particular divine Commiffion, then it is eafy
to conceive that God in great Wiſdom and
Goodneſs, when he united the human Mind
to the Body, has given it a Commiffion, to
move fuch parts as are fitted in the main to
ferve the Uſes of animal Life, and no more.
In this Cafe it is a Bounty and Benefit, to have
the Government over fome part of the mate-
rial Creation; but in the other cafe 'tis a Re-
Araint and cutting fhort of natural Power:
And
142
Of the Place ESSAY VI
And if that were true, then we might infer
with Juftice that grofs Abfurdity (vi) that
if a Soul in its own Nature hath Power to
move matter indefinitely, but by Union 'tis
reftrain'd, then a Spirit not united to a Body
would have Power to move all the Parts of
that fame Body more univerfally than the Spi-
rit which is united to it; and that confequent-
ly Milo's Spirit when his Body is dead, and it
felf difunited from it, can move and change
thoſe very Parts and Atoms of it which it
could not move or change when the Body
was living; and if it had Skill enough to
know which parts to move, it might reftore
the Body of Milo to Motion and Life again,
as was intimated before.
Confid. IV. Another Argument to prove
that Spirits have no effential or native Power
to move Matter is this, that the evil Angels
would be always making wretched Miſchief
in this material World, and over-ſpreading it
with Calamities and Defolations, with Plagues
and Fire, with Earthquakes and Mifery and
Death, if they had an innate and natural
Power to move Bodies. One Foot or two of
folid Matter divided by an evil Angel into
Millions of Particles, and fhaped and mov-
ed as he pleaſed, perhaps would form Pefti-
lences enough to give Difeafe and Death to
Millions of Men, would taint and corrupt the
Air thro' many Regions, and kill a great Part
of the animal World. How ſmall and ſub-
pil
SECT. I. and Motion of Spirits. 143
til are the Particles of Matter which the Sting
of a Wafp infufes into the Body, the biting
of the Spider called Tarantula, or the fharp
Tooth of a Viper? And yet what diſmal Ef
fects have been fometimes produced in the
Body of Man thereby? And furely evil An-
gels by their long Acquaintance with our
World know thefe Secrets in Nature: And
what horrible Tortures, what lingering or
fudden Deaths might they inject into the hu
man Race by forming fuch poiſonous Atoms
and difperfing them among Mankind.
But on the contrary we find that a Legion
of Devils could not enter into a Herd of
Swine, nor drown them till the Son of God
gave Commiffion, Matt. viii. 31, 32. And I
think it is a much more probable way of ac-
counting for all the Miſchief that is done by
evil Angels in the material World, to fuppofe
that they have no natural or innate Power of
themſelves to move Matter, but as they have
fuch and fuch a Proportion of Air or Water,
or other Bodies put under their Power by the
Will of God; or as fuch particular Men or
other Animals are given up to their Influence
by a limited Commiffion upon juſt Reaſons
and for ſpecial Purpoſes in Providence. Satan
the Prince of the Power of the Air could not
raiſe a Tempeſt to blow down the Houſe
where Job's Children were feafting till God'
God gave him Power and Leave to do it; and
you
fee with what a Limitation God lets him
afflict
144
Of the Place ESSAY VI.
afflict the Body of Job; Touch not his Life,
Job ii. 6. nor could the Rage of that mali-
cious Spirit exceed thefe Bounds: and doubt-
lefs his Dominion in the Air, and the Re-
gion of Meteors is limited alſo, tho' he be call-
ed the Prince of it.
In the fame manner we may argue, how
many of the prefent Calamities and Mischiefs
in this lower World would the Benevolence
and Compaffion of good Angels prevent, if
they had Power to move Matter when and
how they pleaſed? But we find in Scripture
when they do any ſpecial Services in this low-
er World 'tis God that gives them a particu-
lar Commiffion.
Object. Perhaps it will be faid here, that
God is a Spirit, and he has Power, even a
natural and unlimited Power, to move the
whole Univerſe of Matter or any particular
Parts of it as he pleafes, why then may not
other Spirits which are form'd after his natu-
ral Image, and are faid to be his Offspring,
have a native Power to move Matter alfo, in
certain Proportions according to their Order
or Rank in the fpiritual World.
To this I anfwer, that the great God has a
natural effential and felf-fufficient Power to
create Matter and make it exift with all its
Modes of Figure and Motion; no wonder
then that he fhould have a natural Power to
move it: but no fuch Powers or Properties of
creating Matter feem to belong to any created
Spirits,
SECT. I. and Motion of Spirits.
145
Spirits, tho' in many other Inſtances they are
made like himfelf: Tho' God has an unlimit-
ed Influence over the Worlds of Matter and
Mind, yet created Spirits may have no Pow-
er in a World fo foreign to their Natures as
this material World is. The two Worlds of
Matter and Mind are not within each other's
Reach or Influence till God their common
Maker appoint it.
Befides, why may we not fuppofe it to be
a peculiar Prerogative of the great God to
move all or any Matter, that fo the material
World may be more entirely under the Go-
vernment of his Will, and not be ſubjected
to the capricious or malignant Inclinations and
Volition of any of his intelligent Creatures, and
that he may maintain his Sovereignty in a more
immediate manner over all the Worlds which
he has made? Is it not more proper to fup-
pofe that God has the Power of commiffion
ing fuch a particular Spirit to move ſuch an
animal Body, and to appoint what particular
Matter any Spirit fhall move, and what Parts
of Matter fhall have Power to imprefs Sen-
fations on any particular Spirit?
If Spirits could move Matter without his
Commiffion, why might not Spirits receive
Impreffions alfo from Matter without his fpe-
cial Appointment? And if theſe mutual In-
fluences might be without his Order, what
infinite and perpetual Tempeſt and Tumult
would be raiſed thro' the Univerſe by the ever-
L
lafting
146
Of the Place ESSAY VI.
lafting and promifcuous mutual Agencies of
Bodies and Spirits upon one another, which
the Creator and Governor of the World had
never united by any Appointment of his? One
might form a Scheme of immenſe Confufion
and Millions of jarring Events, of Milton's
War of Angels in Heaven renewed daily on
the Earth, of Mountains torn up by the Roots
with all their Woods and Foreſts, and whirl'd
into the Air, and of Oceans rais'd high and
whelm'd over whole Nations by the fingle or
united Force of the Legions of Hell? What
extenfive Defolation and ruinous Mifchief
would overſpread the Face of the whole Crea-
tion, if the two different Worlds of Bodies and
Spirits had a natural and mutual Agency or
Power of acting upon each other. Two Co-
mets, or two Planets with all their Contents
and all their Inhabitants, encountering with
full force in the Mid-heaven, would not raiſe
ſuch a tremendous Storm nor ſpread ſuch a
Scene of multiply'd Confufions, Terrors and
Devaſtations, as thefe two Worlds of Mind
and Matter, upon Suppofition of their natu-
ral and unlimited reciprocal Agencies and In-
fluences.
SECT. II.
Of Spirits being in a Place, and removing thence.
L'
ET us now proceed to the next general
Head (viz.) the Mobility of Spirits.
As this Author Mr. Locke has afcribed Moti-
2
vity
SECT. II. and Motion of Spirits. 147
vity to Spirits or a Power to move Body, fo
he has afcribed Mobility to them alfo, or a
Power to move themfelves from place to place.
Now if Mobility be afcribed to Spirits or a
Power to change their Place, then it necef-
farily follows that they are in a Place, and have
a proper Relation to Place. And if we will
feek after and follow clear and diftinct Ideas,
this Locality will be much the fame as Bodies
have, for Mr. Locke himſelf juftly ridicules the
Diſtinction between Locus or Place as apply'd
to Bodies and Ubiety or Wherenefs which is
aſcribed to Spirits, as 'tis explained by ſome
Philofophers.
It is evident that if Souls have a Ubi as it
is called, or a Place in which they are fo
as to be included within it, or to have a real
and
proper Situation or Refidence in it, they
are certainly circumfcribed in that Ubi, and
are limited to a certain Quantity of Space,
and muft have certain meafurable Diſtances
from the Bodies round about; and this I think
is proper Existence in a Place: So that Place or
Locality, and Whereness or Ubiety, as thus ex-
plain'd, are really the fame Things if we
ftrictly confider the Ideas of them: "And tho'
I ſhall endeavour to give another fort of No-
tion of the Ubiety of Spirits in this Eſſay, yet
in this Notion of it 'tis the fame with Place.
Now if Souls or Spirits are properly in a
Place, I will prove first that they muſt be ex-
tended, they muſt be Long, Broad and Deep;
L 2
and
148
Of the Place ESSAY VI.
and then they muſt be of fome Shape or Fi-
gure, or be liable to all the Inconvenience to
which Dimenſion and Shape expoſe them.
First, If a Spirit is in a Place (fuppofe a
Parlour) it has a meaſurable Diſtance from
the North Wall and from the South: if theſe
two Diſtances added together make not up the
whole Length of the Parlour, then the Soul
is plainly extended, and its Extent is equal to
that Defect or Difference of Meaſure. But
if thoſe two added Diſtances do make up the
whole Length, then the Soul is excluded, and
it is not in a Place: Quod erat demonftrandum.
Secondly, If the North and South Walls of
this Parlour by fome mighty Force be mov'd
uniformly towards one another, they will at
laſt meet and be contiguous or touch each o-
ther, or elſe the Soul will hinder their touch-
ing; if it does hinder their Touch, then 'tis
folid as well as extended, and you make a Bo-
dy of it; if it doth not hinder their touch-
ing, then it muſt be unfolid Extenfion, and muft
penetrate the two contiguous Walls, and muſt
have one part of it penetrating one Wall (fup-
pofe an Inch or two) and the other the other;
and thus 'tis extended alſo: or elſe it muſt be
acknowledged to be excluded from all Place,
which is the thing that was to be proved.
But if a Soul be extended, it has Dimenfi-
ons, 'tis certainly fhaped or figured; for fince
'tis not infinite, this Extenfion has Limits on
all Sides, and, as has been elſewhere menti-
oned,
SECT. II. and Motion of Spirits. 149
oned, the Limit of all Extenfion whatſoever
is Figure or Shape.
But if a Spirit has any Shape or Figure, I
would ask whether it could not lofe part
of this Shape? I am fure our Ideas will al-
low it. Our cleareſt Ideas muſt allow poffi-
ble Divifion to every extended figured Being:
Whether it will continue after Divifion to be a
Soul and to think or no, is another Queſtion;
but what is actually a long and broad and deep
Subſtance, and does not fill all Place, doth
certainly allow one part of this Subftance to fill
one Place, and another another; and why may
not the two Parts of this Subſtance be divid-
ed, and thus fill two diftant Places as well as
two adjacent Places? 'Tis in vain to talk of
its being one Continuum and being indiſcerpi-
ble, fince 'tis plain we may conceive of any
extended finite Subftance as divided, and as
exifting in two Places when divided. Surely
Divifion does not nullify either part of what
was before an extended and ſubſtantial Being.
This may be faid indeed, but 'tis faid not on-
ly without Ideas, but contrary to them.
Again, If my Spirit has any Shape, 'tis
furely commenfurate and correfpondent to my
whole Body, or to fome part of it. Then I
would enquire whether the Soul may not be
maimed by the fudden Stroke of a Sword or
Bullet which carries off that part of the Body?
or whether it contracts or fhrinks up itself
to avoid the Wound, and thus grows denfer
L 3
in
150
ESSAY VI.
Of the Place
in that part than it was before? But ſuch a
Suppofition would imply a Degree of Solidi-
ty and reduce it into Body. In fhort, if its
Extenfion be any thing different from empty
Space, and if it has a Shape, then according
to our cleareft Ideas it muſt be diviſible in its
own Nature, even tho' it ſhould be never fo
nimble and watchful to avoid any corporeal
Weapons, or tho' it ſhould be fubtil enough
to penetrate them; for if it be a finite figured
Being it muſt be divifible.
Again, I would query, whether or no the
one whole Power of Cogitation be extended
thro' the whole Shape and Bulk of the Soul, or
whether a diſtinct leffer Power belongs to every
part of it? If Cogitation belong to every part
of it, there are fo many cogitative Beings or
fo many thinking Powers in it as there are parts
of Extenfion: If the whole is one cogitative
Power, then I would inquire, is the Power of
thinking as long and broad and deep as the
whole Soul is? Does the whole Dimenſion of
the Soul operate in every Thought, or a part
only? Is the whole length of the Soul engag-
ed in the ſhorteſt and ſlighteſt Thought? Or
does one part of the Soul perceive one part of a
large Object and another another? Then a ſmall
part of the Soul would perceive a ſmall Ob-
ject, and every part of the Soul would be a
diftinct confcious Being. Again, if part of
the Soul were ſeparated, whether the fame
Power of Cogitation would remain entire in
the
SECT. II. and Motion of Spirits.
151
the other part, or would this Power be any
way impaired or maim'd *? In fhort it ſeems
to me that thofe who fuppofe a Spirit or
thinking Subſtance to be extended do firſt con-
ceive of the Power of thinking, and then con-
ceive of an extended Being, and join theſe in
their Minds, tho' the things themſelves have
no Cognation.
Upon the whole, as it cannot be conceived
how a Power of thinking can have any Con-
tact with Body, fo neither can I conceive in
* Theſe fort of Queſtions are by no means fo ridi-
culous and of fo little Weight in this Argument as fome
Perfons would pronounce them. The learned Dr.
Samuel Clarke is known to favour and ſuppoſe the Ex-
tenfion or Expanfion of the Soul, and yet he confeffes
the Queries about the Extenfion and the Divifibility of
a confcious Being or Spirit to have confiderable Diffi-
culty in them. Thefe are his Words, as they are cited
in a Defence of his Demonftration of the Being of God.
P. 43. "The only Properties we certainly and indifpu-
"tably know of Spirits, namely, Consciousness, and its
"Modes, do prove that they muſt neceffarily be indifcer-
"pible Beings. And as evidently as the known Pro-
"perties of Matter prove it to be certainly a difcerpible
"(or divisible) Subftance, whatever unknown Properties
"it may be endued with; fo evidently the known and
"confefs'd Properties of immaterial Beings prove them
"to be indifcerpible, whatever unknown Property they
"likewife may be endued with. How far fuch Indifcer
pibility can be reconciled and be confiftent with fome
"kind of Expanfion, that is, what unknown Proper-
"ties are joined together with thefe known ones of
"Conſciouſneſs and Indifcerpibility is another Queſtion
"of confiderable Difficulty". 'Tis plain by this Con-
feffion that that great Philofopher was much more fure
the Soul was confcious, indivifible and immortal than he
was or could be that the Soul was extended.
(c
L 4
proper
152
ESSAY VI.
Of the Place
proper Speech how a Being whoſe Nature
confifts in Confciouſneſs and Activity with-
out Extenfion or Shape can have any Nearness
or juxta-pofition to Body: for if it be near a
Body then it may be yet nearer and nearer till
at laſt it touches, or till the Surfaces of Body
and Spirit unite: But I can have no Idea of
a Soul's touching a Body, any more than how
a Thought can touch or lye near to a Piece
of Fleſh or a Bone: for the very Idea of a
thinking Power as well as of a Thought is
utterly and intirely diftinct from the Idea of
Body as any two Ideas can be, and I think
Mr. Locke feems to allow it, § 32. and in o-
ther Places.
SECT. III.
The first Objection against the Locality of Spi-
rits anfwered.
You
OU will immediately exclaim then, and
with fome Shew of Reaſon too, What?
cannot a Spirit be in a place? Is not your Soul
in your own Body? Surely it cannot be
every
where, for then it would be infinite: It muſt
therefore be fomewhere, and that fomewhere
muſt be your Body, becauſe it acts upon your
Body, for no Being can act upon any thing
at a Diſtance according to the old Maxim,
Nihil agit in diftans.
Anf. 'Tis time, I think, that this Axiom
or Maxim ſhould be now exploded by Men of
Learning,
SECT. III. and Motion of Spirits. 153
Learning, fince the Philofophy of Sir Ifaac
Newton has prevailed in the World. We find in
his Syſtem, the Sun and the Planets, which
are at prodigious Distances, act upon each
other by an attractive Force, which is called
the Law of Gravitation; which Force is in-
ceffantly influencing all parts of Matter to act
upon all other parts of Matter in their Pro-
portions, be they never fo diftant. But what
is this Force of Attraction or Gravitation,
but a powerful Appointment of the Creator?
Now, if Bodies can act upon each other,
without Contact or Proximity of Place, and
that by the powerful and general Volition or
Appointment of God, we may well allow
Spirits to act upon Bodies, without any Prox-
imity to them, by the fame Divine Appoint-
ment or Volition.
It is granted, that the Soul, tho' it be fup-
poſed to have its chief Reſidence in the Brain,
yet moves the Limbs only mediately by Nerves
or Strings which go from the Brain to thofe
Limbs which are moved; but it moves the
Origin or Extremities of thoſe Nerves, or
fome fpirituous parts about them, which are
in the Brain, immediately by its Will; that is,
when the Soul wills to move a Limb, thoſe
Nerves are firſt moved. Now I would en-
quire, Does it move thefe Extremities of
Nerves ever the eaſier for being placed near
them? Not at all; for the Soul of a Plough-
man knows them not, and yet moves them
2
as
154
Of the Place
ESSAY VI.
as regularly and as well as a Philoſopher.
None of our Souls are confcious of theſe
Nerves, or the Extremities of them, thơ
your Philoſophy ſhould place the Soul never
fo cloſe to them; nor does its Power of
Motion extend to any of the Atoms or Fi-
bres which compofe thofe Nerves which
are fo near the Soul, to replace them if dif
compofed: And yet as foon as the Soul wills
to move the diſtant Limbs, according to the
Laws of animal Nature, which God has or-
dain'd, theſe diftant Limbs obey and move,
the Soul being ignorant whether it has any
fuch Nerves or no, tho' it be ſuppoſed to
refide among them, or cloſe to them. You
fee then, this fuppofed Situation or Reſidence
of the Soul in any Part of the Body what-
foever, attains no manner of Advantage to-
wards its putting thofe Parts of the Body into
Motion, nor towards its better Knowledge of
that Part where you fuppofe it to refide, as
ſhall be proved immediately.
But at preſent I would endeavour to make
this Matter yet plainer concerning the Soul's
Power, or rather Impotence, to move Bodies:
And to that end let me put this Queſtion,
(viz.) Whether a feparate Soul or Spirit muſt
be locally and actually fpread through a
whole Mountain, and coextended with it, if
God gave it Commiffion in an immediate
manner to move a Mountain, fince a Moun-
tain is only a Heap of earthy Particles, and
not
SECT III. and Motion of Spirits. 155
not an organized Body, and therefore is not
to be moved by Strings or Springs of Nerves.
and Mufcles, as an animal Body is? and
whether the fame Spirit muſt ſhrink itſelf up
to the Size of a Grain of Wheat, if God
gave it its next Commiffion only to move fo
fmall a Thing? Whether thefe Contractions
or Shrinkings of the Spirit would be per-
form'd by mutual Penetrations of its own
Parts? or rather, whether God's powerful
Appointment both of the Mountain and the
Grain to be moved at the Volition of the
Spirit, be not a fufficient Philoſophical Ac-
count of this Spirit's Power to move the
Mountain or the Grain by its Volition,
without Proximities or Contacts, Diffufions
or Contractions?
I would enquire yet further, whether God
could not appoint my Spirit, while 'tis united
to my Body to exert a Volition, which ſhould
in an immediate way move a Grain of Wheat
placed at two Yards Diſtance from my Bo-
dy? Did he not give the Prophets and Apo-
ftles Power by their Volition to heal the Sick
by a Word, and make happy Changes in fe-
veral fick Bodies which they did not touch?
And whether, if my Soul had fuch a Power
immediately to move a diftant Grain of
Wheat, it muſt be extended through all the
intermediate Space between my Body and
that Grain, that fo it might be nearer to it,
in order to act upon it? and if there be no
Neceffity
156
Of the Place ESSAY VI.
Neceffity of this Extenfion, or ftretching fo
far as the grain of Wheat, in order to move
it, why muſt a Soul or Spirit be ſuppoſed to
have any Proximity to a Body, in order to
move it by a Volition?
May we not conclude from all theſe Con-
fiderations, that the Power of a Spirit to
move a Body, or to move feveral Bodies dif
tant from each other, is not innate in the
Spirit itſelf, but rather feems to depend upon
the fupreme Will of God, and his particular
Appointment or Commiffion? And when this
is done according to the common and uni-
form Courſe of Things which God has eſta-
bliſh'd in the World, it is called Nature, or
the Law of Nature; but when it is not ac-
cording to this natural Courfe of Things,
it is called Miracle: But that all Spirits mov-
ing Matter have this Power only by ſpecial
Divine Appointments.
The great Law of Attraction or Gravita-
tion in the corporeal World has a confider-
able Reſemblance to this Doctrine of a Spirit
moving Bodies. If one Planet act upon ano-
ther at a great Diſtance by way of At-
traction, according to the univerfal and ori-
ginal Laws of Attraction, 'tis ſaid to do it
naturally; but if in any Inftance this Attrac-
tion differ from the Original Law, 'tis called
Miracle; but both the one and the other are
originally the Effects of an Almighty Divine
Volition or Appointment.
Note,
SECT. III. and Motion of Spirits. 157
Note, All the Queries which I have put,
with Regard to a Spirit's moving one or more
Bodies, nearer or more diftant, may be re-
peated in the fame manner, with Regard to
a Spirit's Consciousness or Senfation of the Mo-
tions of one or more Bodies: I have inti-
mated this already, but I will ſpeak of it
now a little more particularly. As I cannot
conceive how Proximity between Spirit and
Body ſhould enable it to excite any Motion
in that Body, fo neither can Proximity give
that Mind any Conſciouſneſs of that Bo-
dy's Motions, and therefore I muſt impute
this alfo to Divine Appointment, and to that
only.
For let us confider a little. Suppofe the
Soul to refide in the Brain, or let it be dif
fuſed through the whole Body, ('tis the fame
thing in my Argument) 'tis ftill fuppofed to
penetrate the Part where it refides, or to be co-
extended with it: But this Co-extenfion with
the Body, or with any Part of it, does by no
means give it a Conſciouſneſs of the Parts
which it penetrates: For if it did, then eve-
ry human Spirit would know preciſely where
it dwells, whether it refided in the whole
Body, or in any particular Part of it. If it
were diffuſed through the whole Body, every
human Soul would be an exquifite Anatomift,
and be conſcious of all its Bowels, Mufcles,
Nerves, Veins, Arteries, &c. and know what
Fibres were diſcompofed when any Animal
Diſorder
158
Of the Place
ESSAY VI.
Diſorder or Pain aroſe in the Body; but this
is contrary to all Experience.
Again, if the Soul refided locally in any
particular Part of the Body, or of the Brain,
and received its Confcioufneffes from its Co-
extenfion with that Part, the Conteſts about
the Common Senſory, whether it be the pineal
Gland, or the extreme Origin of each Nerve,
or the whole Brain, would quickly be de-
cided by every human Spirit, for it would
be conſcious of the Place of its own Refit-
dence. But this alfo is contrary to all Expe-
rience.
Yet 'tis evident, that this Spirit which is
ſuppoſed to refide in the Brain, becauſe we
feel ourſelves think as it were in the Brain, is
much more confcious of other Motions in
diſtant Parts of the Body, than it is of the
Particles in the Brain, which 'tis fuppoſed to
penetrate; it is conſcious not only of Shapes,
Motions and Magnitudes of outward Bodies,
by their Impreffions on the Organs of Senfe,
but it is alfo confcious of fenfible Qualities,
Colours, Sounds, Cold, Heat, &c. which come
from diftant Bodies: 'Tis conſcious of Eaſe,
Appetite, Pain, &c. in Parts diftant from the
Brain; it is in fhort confcious of every Thing
that God has thought fit to make it conſci-
ous of for the Prefervation and uſe of animal
Nature, and for all the Purpoſes of this
pre-
fent life; and yet 'tis not confcious of the
Shape or Motion, or Situation of the fmall
Fibres,
SECT. III. and Motion of Spirits. 159
Fibres, or pulpous or nervous Parts of the
Brain, where 'tis fuppofed to refide, and
which 'tis fuppoſed to penetate; all which is
a plain Proof that 'tis not any Proximity to
the Body in place that gives it thefe Senſa-
tions, and this Conſciouſneſs, but the fove-
reign Will and Appointment of the God of
Nature.
Perhaps you will ask me then, How far
can this Power extend, which God gives a
Spirit to be confcious of Matter, or to move
it? Can a Soul be confcious of Bodies a Mile
long? Can a fingle Spirit remove a great
Mountain by Volition? Can a created Mind
be conſcious of every Atom in a Mountain?
Where does its confcious or its motive Power
end? If theſe Powers arife only from Divine
Appointment, why may it not be conſcious
of every Part of this Globe of Earth, if God
appoint it? Nay, the Enquiry (fay you)
might be enlarged; why may not the fame
Spirit move the Moon, or be confcious of
the other diftant Planets, all at the fame
Time, if God pleaſe?
+
To this I anfwer, That we are utterly igno-
rant of the Limits of the Power of Spirits:
But we know they are not infinite: Tho' Spi-
rits have no natural Conſciouſneſs or Motivity
of Matter, but what God gives them by fpe-
cial Commiffion, yet 'tis poffible that fome
may be capable of receiving more numerous,
more extenſive, more complicated Ideas than
others,
160
Of the Place
ESSAY VI.
others, and confequently may have a larger
Commiffion. Some
Some may have a Capacity of
taking in, and of attending to no more than
one Idea at once, and fome may attend to
ten or ten thouſand. 'Tis faid, that Julius
Cæfar could write himſelf, and dictate to
feveral Clerks at the fame Time. 'Tis pof-
fible, for ought I know, that a Spirit may
be united to the Sun, and be conſcious of
every Ray, and at once take Cognizance of
all the Effects and Influences of thoſe Myri-
ads of Rays on every Planetary World. And
'tis not unlikely that the Motive Power may
keep Pace with fuch an extenſive Conſciouf-
nefs. Surely there may be a vaſt variety in
the native Capacities of intellectual Beings,
and yet none of them have Communicati-
ons with the material World, without the
Appointment of their Maker. "Tis probable,
that according to their native Powers of re-
ceiving a multitude of fimultaneous Ideas,
God may imploy fome in a vaftly larger
Sphere than others.
And yet alfo it muſt be obſerved, that 'tis
poffible the great God may imploy fome
Spirits in a wider Sphere of Confcioufnefs
or Motivity, without being themſelves, and
in their own nature more capacious of Ideas,
or more powerful: Much leſs muſt we ſup-
poſe them to be longer or broader than their
Fellows, or to have any manner of Shape or
Dimenfions at all. The Soul of a Dwarf
may
SECT. IV. and Motion of Spirits 161
may be as potent in itſelf as the Soul of a
Giant, but God has given one a Commiffion
to move a larger Engine of Fleſh than the
other. Neither the intellectual Capacities,
nor the Dimenſions of Souls fhould be mea-
fured by the Bulk or Height of the Animal.
SECT. IV.
Other Objections answered against the Locality
of Spirits.
A
RE not Spirits in fome Place? do they
not fill up fome Space? muft they not
have fome Relation of Situation to Bodies,
as being near or diftant? 'Twill be exceed-
ing ſtrange to ſay, My Spirit is not properly
or locally in my Body; furely you will tell me,
it muſt exiſt ſomewhere or nowhere: If it
exiſt ſomewhere, it muſt either fill all Space,
and exift everywhere, or it must fill a Part
of Space, and that is ſtill ſomewhere: It muſt
either be circumfcribed in fome Part of my
Body, or be diffuſed through the whole of
it; for if it exift nowhere, it has no Exiftence.
Let us confider this Argument in its feveral
Parts. First, 'tis granted, that Spirits do not
exift or refide everywhere, they are not in-
finite And I will grant alfo, that they do
not properly exiſt or refide anywhere, for they
exiſt without any other Relation to Place,
than what arifes from their Powers or Ope-
rations on Matter: They have no fuch Rela-
M
tion
162
Of the Place ESSAY VI.
tion to Place as Bodies have, and therefore
it may be philofophically faid, they exist or
refide nowhere: That is, tho' God has given
human Spirits Commiffion to act immediately
on their own particular Bodies, and on no
other, yet they have no meaſurable Relation
to Place, they have no proper Nearness or
Diſtances to or from thoſe Bodies, altho' they
act upon them by Divine Appointment, and
receive Influences from them; but properly
they belong to another Rank of Natures,
another World of Beings, which require
only Activity and Confcioufnefs, and do not
require any proper Situation to be given them,
any Space to poffefs, or Place to exift or refide
in, tho' the Objects on which they act, or of
which they are confcious have proper Situa-
tion or Place.
And if there be any fort of feparate Spirits
which have nọ Vehicles (as they are called).
and which are not united to Matter, or
which have no Commiffion from God to act
upon any material Being, or to be conſcious
of it, they are moſt properly nowhere in ftrict
Philofophy; that is, they ſeem to ſtand more
free from all Locality or Relation to Place,
fince their Powers and Operations having no
material Objects, give them no Pretences to
Situation or Reſidence in or near any Body
whatſoever; and as there is no part of Mat-
ter which they are related to by mutual Ac-
tion or Paffion, fo, neither by Juxta-pofition
or Contact.
I come
?
SECT. IV. and Motion of Spirits. 163
I come now to anfwer the fecond Part of
the Dilemma, and that is, that if a Spirit
exifts nowhere, it has no Existence. This is a
mighty Cannon play'd upon me from among
the ancient Artillery of Axioms, (viz.) Quod
nullibi eft non eft. That which is nowhere
has no Being. But fince this Axiom is not
evident enough to be granted, I think it can
never be proved; and fince 'tis borrowed
meerly from the World of Senfe and Mat-
ter, it does not affect the Doctrine of Minds
or Spirits, which are thinking Powers, and
whofe Effence and Life confifts in perpetual
confcious Activity. This corporeal Maxim
can do no more Execution here than a Can-
non Ball would do on an Army of Angels.
For tho' a Body cannot be without Being
fomewhere, yet a Spirit which is a conſcious
active Power, may have a real Exiſtence, and
yet have no proper Place; that is, may refide
or be fituated nowhere in the Senfe I have ex-
plain'd it, i.e. have no Proximity of Situa-
tion to Bodies, or fill up no fuppofed Dimen-
fions of Space.
'Tis certain, that the Forms of Speech in
all Languages are drawn from our Converſes
with corporeal and fenfible things round
about us, which require locality or a proper
Place to exift in: And our Words and Phraſes
are not made for the World of Spirits, but
the World of Bodies: Nor can they fo hap-
pily exprefs the Ideas that belong to Spirits,
M 2
29
164
Of the Place ESSAY VÍ.
as if we could ſpeak of intellectual Beings in
their own proper Language. And fince our
Spirits in this prefent State are united to ani-
mal Bodies or act upon them, we borrow
twenty Forms of Expreffion concerning our
Spirits which originally and properly belong
only to Bodies; and being train'd up from our
Infancy to this fort of Language, we are rea-
dy to imagine our Souls to be fome thin airy
fort of Bodies as the Soul is pourtray'd, as I re-
member in Commenius's Pictus Orbis which I
learnt at School. We fuppofe Spirits to have a
fubtil fort of Extenfion and Figure, and to
require a Place to exift in as much as Bodies.
Nor is it poffible, nor is it needful in our way
of common Difcourfe to alter our Language
and change the Form of our Expreffions
concerning Spirits which are borrowed from
corporeal Things, provided when we come
to philofophize more accurately about them,
we do but explain them in a Conſiſtency with
the Nature of Spirits. Let us fee then whe-
ther we cannot in a philoſophical manner de-
clare what is the Ubi or Whereness of a Spi-
rit, and account for the common Expreffions
of a Spirit's Existence in fuch a Place and its
Motion from place to place.
SECT.
SECT. V. and Motion of Spirits. 165
SECT. V.
The Ubi or Whereneſs of a Spirit.
Spirits
Pirits in common and familiar Language
are faid to be, and to have their Exiſtence
or Refidence in or near thoſe Parts of Matter
on which they exert their immediate Activity,
or wherefoever they have an immediate Con-
ſciouſneſs. This is properly their Ubi or
Whereness. So my Soul is faid to be in my
Body, or united to this Body of mine, becauſe
it is confcious of the Motions or Impreffions
made on my Body, and has many Senfations
and Imaginations by the Means or Occafion
of this Flesh and Blood, and becauſe it acts
upon or moves this animal Engine; where-
as it is not confcious of the Motions or Im-
preffions of other Bodies, nor does it act upon
them or move them as it does my own.
And this is the proper Notion of the Spi-
rit's Union to a Body (viz.) that tho' my Soul
has in its own Nature and meerly of itſelf no
Conſciouſneſs of, or Power of Agency upon,
any Particle of Matter, yet the great God the
Father of Spirits has appointed my Soul to be
thus conſcious of fome Motions of my Body
and to have fome Power of Agency upon it:
He has given my Soul this individual animal
Machine, this appointed Sphere or Station of
my Body from which to receive Senfations
and in which to excite Motions.
Now for this Reaſon my Soul is faid to
M 3
move
166
ESSAY VI
Of the Place
move where my Body moves, and to dwell
where my Body dwells, becaufe its Power of
immediate Conſciouſneſs and Activity are
confined to this animal Body of mine. The
Body being the grofs and vifible Engine where-
by all our human Affairs and Tranfactions
are carried on, and the Soul the active Agent
being invifible, we ſpeak of every thing that
the Man does in Language fuited to his Body
rather than to his Soul; Men generally fup-
pofing the Soul to be a kind of Appendix or fu-
peradded Principle to the Body, whereas in phi-
lofophical Truth the Body is rather the Appen-
dix or Inftrument of the Soul. But 'tis proper
for us ftill to conform to the common Language
of the World in fpeaking of thefe Subjects,
juſt as the moſt exquifite Aftronomers ſpeak
of the Sun-rifing and Sun-fetting, and the Mo-
tion of the Sun and the fixed Stars, tho' they
know that the Sun abides in the Centre of the
planetary World, and the fixed Stars have no
Motion, and that the Earth and the other
Planets are the only Bodies that perform theſe
diurnal, menftrual and annual Motions.
For this Reaſon the Soul of Man may be
faid to be in his Brain, becauſe 'tis more im-
mediately conſcious of fome preſent fenfible
Object, when the Motions or Impreffions
made on the outward Parts of the Body or
Organs of Senfe are conveyed to the Brain
by the Nerves: And if this Conveyance be
interrupted between the extreme Parts and the
Brain,
SECT. V. and Motion of Spirits. 167
Brain, the Soul has no Senfation, no Conſci-
oufneſs of what is done to the extreme Parts.
We fay alſo the Soul refides in the Brain, be-
cauſe it more immediately exerts its motive
Power upon fome Parts of the Brain or the
origin of the Nerves there, whenfoever the
Soul defigns to move the Body; and alſo be-
cauſe when we fet ourſelves to think or to
remember any Idea, we do as it were feel the
Soul employing the Brain.
Now in the fame Senſe in which we fay
My Soul or my Spirit is in my Body, we may
fay alſo concerning the great God the infinite
Spirit, that he is preſent every where, i. e. he is
immediately confcious of every Property,
Figure and Motion of every part of Matter
in the Univerſe, and of every Thought of
every created Mind. His Will hath an actu-
al Agency on every created Being, at leaſt ſo
far as to maintain or fupport them in their
Nature and Existence; and he has an imme-
diate and unlimited Power of acting upon
every part of Matter and upon every created
Spirit, and therefore God is faid to be omni-
preſent or prefent with all things, even as my Soul
which hath a limited Conſciouſneſs of feveral
of the Motions and Impreffions cauſed in this
my animal Body, and a limited Power of Agen-
cy upon it, is ſaid to be preſent with my Body.
And if we extend our Thoughts beyond
all the real Creation into the fuppofed Emp-
tineſs or imaginary Space, we may as well af-
M 4
fent,
168
ESSAY VI.
Of the Place
fent, that the Ubiety of God reaches to all
the ſuppoſed Infinity of empty Space; that
is, that his Knowledge extends to all things
that are or ſhall be or can be, and that he has
a Power of immediate Agency, to create what
he pleaſes thro' all the infinite Void or empty
Nothing, or wherefoever there is nothing al-
ready created.
This immediate and univerfal Conſciouſneſs
and Agency of the fupreme Spirit on all things
is the Omniprefence of God, and this perhaps
is the only true Notion of his Immenfity: and
yet this infinite Conſciouſneſs and Activity of
God, which are his very ſelf, have no mea-
furable or unmeafurable Relation either to
Body or to Space, as the Parts of Extenfion
or Quantity have to each other and there-
fore we fay, he is in no place in ſtrict and philo-
fophical Language: tho' in common Speech
and in the Language of Scripture which is
fuited to the Bulk of Mankind, God is faid
to fill all things and to exift every where, in
Heaven, Earth and Hell, becauſe of his im-
mediate Conſcioufnefs of all Beings what and
wherefoever they are, and his Power of im-
mediate Agency upon them. This is infinite
Knowledge and infinite Power. And indeed
this Idea of infinite Power and Knowledge
has no manner of Connection with Extenfi-
on or Space, any more than the Idea of in-
finite Space or Emptinefs has with Knowledge
and Power: They have nothing at all to do
with
SECT. V. and Motion of Spirits. 169
*. 1.
with each other as Attributes of the fame
Subſtance.
But now if we could fuppofe the very Sub-
ftance of the bleffed God to be really long,
broad and deep, and to be actually extended
thro' the whole Univerſe of Matter, and thro';
all imaginary Space, what Advantage would
be gained by it toward the aggrandizing of his
own Majefty, or our Ideas of him? What
could he do more by this fuppofed infinite
Extenfion of his Subſtance than to be imme-
diately conſcious of all Things and to have
an immediate Power and Influence upon all,
to know all Poffibles, and give them Exiſt-
ence when he pleaſe. And this is as fully and
honourably attributed to him in my way of
thinking, without any of thoſe Inconvenien-
cies and thoſe harſh or abfurd Ideas and Speech-
es which ariſe from attributing Extenfion with
all its Confequences to the great and bleffed
God.
CONCLUSION.
But after all our beſt Philofophemes on the
Nature of Spirits we must confefs our great
Ignorance of that more glorious and noble
Part of the Creation. We are immerſed in
the Affairs of Senſe and Matter, and impoſed
upon perpetually by the Prejudices arifing
thence: And when we endeavour to quit our
felves of them and to turn our Backs entire-
ly
170
Of the Place, &c. ESSAY VI.
ly upon fenfible Ideas, we are in danger of
wandering into Darkneſs, and ſometimes per-
haps of going beyond our clear and diſtinct
Perceptions. The beſt thing we can do is to
guard againſt thofe Ideas of Spirits which have
any grofs Abfurdities attending them, and
particularly to ſtand afar off from thoſe Opi-
nions which would bear in any indecent and
diſhonourable Ideas upon God the fupreme
Spirit. I would affert nothing with Confi-
dence on ſo abftrufe a Subject; I would retract
all the Expreffions that favour of too much
Affurance; perhaps I may be miſtaken in this
whole Sett of Sentiments; I am therefore
ready to renounce them all as foon as I can
find another Scheme more juſt and more na-
tural. And if I am forced to retain theſe O-
pinions, 'tis only for want of better till I re-
tire from this World. I hope then to fee as
I am ſeen, and know as I am known, to have
clearer and juſter Ideas of what I am and what
God is; and to join with the holy Millions of
Spirits in the heavenly World, to pay Honours
to my Creator-Spirit more agreeable to the
Dignity of my own Nature, and the incom-
prehenfible Grandeurs of his Majefty. Amen.
ESSAY
( 171 )
S
ESSAY
VII.
The Departing Soul.
OME Perfons have been very follici-
tous to know how the Soul goes out
of the Body when a good Man dies ;
how it paffes through the Air and etherial
Regions, and leaving the Stars behind, how
it foars up to the third Heaven. They are
much at a Lofs to tell how long 'tis a going
this wondrous Journey, and in what Region.
of thoſe upper Worlds its final Manfion is;
eſpecially fince the new Philofophy has found
thoſe Regions to be fo very vaft that a Can-
non Bullet would ſpend many Ages in travel-
ling to the neareſt Star, or from one Star to
another. They are yet further puzzled to
conceive whether a Soul departing from any
Place, v. c. from London at Noon would find
out its Friend who dyed there the following
Midnight, fince a direct Afcent would encreaſe
their Diſtance and Separation far as the Zenith
is from the Nadir, whether the immenſe out-
moft Space be their Dwelling, or fome one part
of it.
I confefs while we confider human Souls
united to Bodies, we are wont to ſpeak of their
Abfence and Prefence, their Places of Refidence
and their Removes, according to the Station,
Place and Motion of thoſe Bodies to which
they
172
ESSAY VII.
The departing
they are united. This is the common Lan-
guage of all Mankind; nor is there
; nor is there any fuf-
ficient Reaſon to alter it. "Tis evident, and
without all Controverfy that Bodies muſt ne-
ceffarily have Relation to Place: And when
Angels affume corporeal Vehicles the Cafe is
the fame with them as with human Souls:
they may therefore be faid to move and fly
from place to place. Gabriel being caufed to
fly fwiftly, Dan. ix. 21. touched Daniel in the
Evening. Angels have their Places of Refi-
dence or Removal in this Reſpect.
There is alſo certainly a local Heaven where
the Body of our Bleffed Saviour is, and Enoch
and Elijah who went from this World and
carried their Bodies with them; and there
are other Saints that were the Companions of
their Lord's Refurrection, who doubtless af-
cended with him into Glory, Matt. xxvii. 52.
Whether this Heaven be one certain deter-
mined Palace amongst the Planets or near
the Stars; or whether it be this folar Syſtem
wherein we dwell, thro' all parts of which they
paſs ſwift as Sun-beams and make this whole
planetary World their Palace, theſe Things
cannot yet be fully determined by us. I con-
fefs I much queftion whether the Range of hu-
man happy Beings extend thro' all the fixed Stars.
That Expreffion of afcending far above all
Heavens which is applied to Chrift, Ephef. iv. 10.
is eafily reconcilable to this Scheme, tho' his
Body rofe no higher than to fome Planet in
our
and Separate Soul.
173
our folar World; fince his defcending into the
lower Parts of the Earth in the fame Text
fignifies no more than his going into a Sepul-
chre, perhaps a Foot or two beneath the
Ground. So that the Expofition of thoſe
Texts is not to be meaſured by Yards or Miles,
but as the one expreffes great Abaſement, ſo
the other great Exaltation in fuch Language
as is fuited to the Apprehenfions of the vul-
gar part of Mankind, which all learned Men
acknowledge to be the common Language
of Scripture.
Now concerning departed Souls, if we al
low them to be immediately furniſhed with
new Vehicles, ſo as never to have any fingle
and ſeparate Exiſtence in their own pure fpi-
ritual Nature, then we may talk of their
rifing, and moving and refiding in all the local
Language that belongs to Bodies; we may
then trace their Afcent thro' the aerial Regi-
ons and follow their Flight thro' the plane-
tary Worlds, if we know where to ftop and
fettle them in a proper Place.
Nor am I fo averfe to this Opinion as to
renounce or diſclaim it utterly. 'Tis poffible
it may be fo appointed by the bleffed God,
the Lord and Ruler of all the Worlds of
Minds and Bodies. I know not of any Per-
fon living who is fo fagacious as to have pry-
ed into all the Secrets of the invifible World,
and to be able to tell us certainly how Spirits
live and act and converſe there: Nor have we
had
174
The departing ESSAY VII.
had any of the departed Souls among Men
who have come back to give us an Account
of theſe Affairs. There's a myfterious Dark-
neſs ſpread over the Face of the unfeen Re-
gions to hide them from mortal View: And
'tis wifely ordained by our Creator that we
ſhould live in this World by Faith and not by
Sight. We are fure we muſt ſhortly put off
thefe Tabernacles, and tho' the Spirits of good
Men ſhall be immediately invefted with a ho-
ly and happy Immortality, yet whether they
fhall be clothed or furniſhed with material
Vehicles of any kind is not fo evident, and
confequently what they fhall have to do with
Place and Motion is not fo eafy to determine.
But when we ſpeak of the Places and Mo-
tions of departed Souls, and yet conceive them
as perfectly ſeparate from all Matter, we talk
perhaps but in a meer vulgar, figurative or
improper Way, and in fuch Language as our
Infancy and Prejudice borrow from fenfible
Objects round us, and not agreeable to the
philofophical Nature and Reaſon of things;
in which reſpect pure Spirits do not ſeem to
be capable of Confinement to a Place, or any
proper local Motion to or from it, becaufe
they have no Figure, Shape nor Dimenfions.
All the foregoing Problems and hard Quef-
tions about the holy Soul's paffing thro' the
airy Regions and getting up above the Planets
and Stars, &c. are therefore eafily anſwer'd,
and all thofe Difficulties removed, if we con-
fider
and feparatè Soul.
175
fider the Soul as a pure intellectual Being, a
fubftantial thinking Power, without any Di-
menfions of Length or Breadth, and confe-
quently without any proper Relation to Place.
Then it will follow that human Spirits which
were united to Bodies, when they enter into
a State of Separation, need not have any thing
to do with a real proper Motion or Flight,
or Change of Places. An imbodyed Soul
(that is, a Soul acting in Concert with an a-
nimal Body) when it becomes a ſeparate Soul
(that is, a Soul acting in its own pure intel-
lectual Capacity without a Body) does not
need properly to alter its Place, but only its
manner of thinking and acting, in order to
be in Heaven and Hell, i. e. happy in the Pre-
fence of God, or miſerable in the midſt of
Devils, acting and thinking without Bodies.
In order to give us fome faint Idea of this
Matter and to help our Conceptions, while
they are fo incumbered with corporeal and
local Images, let us conceive the whole in-
telligent Creation or all created Spirits as one
Sett of Beings acting in different manners (and
if you pleaſe) in one open and infinite Space,
for we cannot utterly throw off all theſe kind
of Ideas in the preſent State.
Some Spirits are ſaid to be united to a Bo-
dy, that is, are influenced in their Actions
by animal Bodies, and 'tis their Buſineſs to
move and manage thofe Engines; but by the
perpetual Agency of animal Nature upon
2
them,
176
ESSAY VII.
The departing
६
them, their Reaction upon it, and their Con-
verſe with the material World by the Means
of that Animal, they are reſtrained from more
immediate Converſe with ſeparate Spirits, or
even with God the infinite Spirit.
Others are free or difengaged from Bodies,
and theſe have a more immediate Perception
of God the infinite Spirit, and converfe with
each other perhaps under no Confinement,
or under fuch leffer Limitations as their Crea-
tor's Will, and their own finite Natures make
neceffary. They become confcious of one an-
other's Thoughts and Volitions by fome un-
known way that God has appointed; for as
an imbodied Spirit is conſcious of the Mo-
tions of that Animal to which 'tis united by
the Appointment of God, as it becomes con-
fcious of the Motions of other Bodies round
about it by the Organs of that particular
Animal, and as it is alfo confcious of the
Thoughts of other imbodied Spirits by the
Motions or Voices of their feveral Engines
or animal Bodies, fo doubtleſs there is a Way
which God the Creator-Spirit has ordained
whereby created Spirits, which are focial Be-
ings, ſhall maintain Society and friendly Com-
munion with other created Spirits when they
are in their native State, feparate from mate-
rial Engines.
Now Death is but the Ceffation of animal
Life in that Body or Engine which is united
to any particular Spirit: That Body then be-
2
comes
and Separate Soul.
177
comes a moveleſs Mafs, and not an Ànimal;
it is no more capable of obeying the Voliti-
ons or Commands of the Soul, nor of com-
municating any external Motions by the
Nerves to the Brain, to give the Soul notice
of any fenfible Object. Thence it follows
by Divine Appointment, that that Spirit is
no more conſcious of what paffes in that Bo-
dy, and no more employ'd in managing it,
or acting upon it, or converfing with the
material Creation by the Organs of that
Engine.
Being therefore unemploy'd and unimpreſt
by the corporeal World, its Thoughts perhaps
are more purely intellectual, or at leaft it has
no new Senſations, but its. Ideas are raiſed in
another manner. It reflects upon its own
Temper and Actions in this Life, 'tis confci-
ous of its Virtues or its Vices; it has an
endleſs Spring of Peace and Joy within flow-
ing from the Senſe of its wife and holy Be-
haviour in the State of Trial, or it is tor-
mented with the bitter Anguiſh of a ſelf-
condemning Confcience in the Reflexion on
its paft Crimes. This is one great part of
Heaven and Hell.
And then with Regard to God and its
Fellow Creatures, if we fpeak of them in
this our incarnate State, we muſt be forced
to uſe Language borrowed from corporeal
Things, and fay, This departed Soul appears
at once in the pure intellectual or feparate
N
World,
178
The departing ESSAY VII.
World, like a Native there; it ftands among
innumerable Millions of Spirits, itſelf a kin-
dred Spirit, gains fwift Acquaintance with
them, grows confcious of their Ideas and
Actions in their own Way and Method,
which God has not yet revealed to us in this
Life: And above all, it has an immediate
Perception of God the infinite Spirit, a Con-
ſciouſneſs of his Power and Prefence, and
an intimate and delightful Taſte of his
Love, or a dreadful Senſe of his Anger; and
thus the Soul feels immediately, and poffef-
fes a fecond Part of its Heaven or its Hell; and
all this without any local Motion, or any Re-
lation to a Place, or change of Diſtances.
I might illuftrate this by two Similes,
and efpecially apply them to the Caſe of
holy Souls departing.
1. Suppoſe a Torch incloſed in a Cell of
Earth, in the midſt of ten thouſand thouſand
Torches that ſhine at large in a fpacious Am-
phitheater. While 'tis incloſed, its Beams
ſtrike only on the Walls of its own Cell, and
it has no Communion with thofe without.
But let this Cell fall down at once, and the
Torch that Moment has full Communion
with all thoſe ten thouſands; it ſhines as freely
as they do, and receives and gives Affiſtance
to all of them, and joins to add Glory to that
illuftrious Place.
2. Or fuppofe a Man born and brought up
in a dark Priſon, in the midſt of a fair and
populous
and Separate Soul.
179
populous City; he lives there in a cloſe Con-
finement, perhaps he enjoys only the twink-
ling Light of a Lamp, with thick Air, and
much Ignorance; tho' he has fome diftant
Hints and Reports of the furrounding City
and its Affairs, yet he fees and knows nothing
immediately, but what is done in his own
Prifon, till in fome happy Minute the Walls
fall down; then he finds himſelf at once in a
large and populous Town, encompaffed with
a thousand Bleffings; with Surprize he be-
holds the King in all his Glory, and holds
Converſe with the fprightly Inhabitants; he
can ſpeak their Language, and finds his Na-
ture fuited to fuch Communion; he breathes
free Air, ſtands in the open Light, he ſhakes
himſelf, and exults in his own Liberty. Such
is a Soul exifting in a Moment in the fepa-
rate World of holy and happy Souls, and be-
fore a prefent God, when the Prifon Walls
of Flesh fall to the Ground.
Perhaps it will be objected here, that holy
Souls, when they are abfent from the Body,
are encouraged to expect they fhall be prefent
with the Lord Jefus, and then it ſeems necef-
fary they ſhould be in the Place where his
Body is. They hope to be with Chriſt, and
behold him in the Glories of his exalted
human Nature, when they depart from the
Fleſh, 2 Cor. v. 8. Phil. i. 23. Now in all
this Philofophical Account of the feparate
State of the Souls of good Men, there is no
N 2
Provi-
180 The departing ESSAY VII.
Provifion made for this part of our promifed
Bleffedneſs.
To this I answer, That if the Souls of
good Men at their Death be admitted to a
more intimate Converſe with the Deity itſelf,
and with the human Soul of Chrift Jefus,
there is no neceffity of any Communication
with his glorified Body, till their Bodies alſo
are raiſed at the laft Day. Now the human
Soul of Christ, eſpecially in its exalted State,
has an extenfive Power to converſe with
pure Spirits, whether Angels or human Souls,
to impreſs his facred Influences of Authority
or Love upon them, by Command or Con-
folation, and enable them to exercife and
maintain mutual Converſe with himſelf.
Doubtlefs our bleffed Lord has all the Free-
doms, Powers and Prerogatives of a pure
ſeparate Spirit in his State of bodily Re-
furrection, Exaltation and Glory, and he
can make the Spirits of his faithful Fol-
lowers as happy in his own Prefence as
is proper for their State of Separation from
the Body; and he can alfo make the Souls of
impenitent Sinners, as well as evil Angels,
fenfible of hisRefentments againſt their Crimes.
His raiſed and exalted Body is no Hindrance
to his Influences on unbodied Spirits. If in
his incarnate State and Humiliation, when
his Body was meer Fleſh and Blood, he had
converſe with good Angels, and Power over
Devils, we may well fuppofe, that in his
exalted
and feparate Soul.
181
exalted State of Union to a glorified Body, he
can converſe as he pleaſes with the World of
Spirits, and enable them to hold Converſe
with himſelf.
After all, let it be noted, that I have only
repreſented in this Place, how far it is pof-
fible for the Heaven or the Hell of departed
Spirits to commence in this State of Separa-
tion from the Flefh, without a new Union
to any corporeal Vehicle. Yet I affert no-
thing with certainty, I am conſcious of my
Ignorance. Perhaps 'tis probable enough that
there may be fome Vehicles of groffer and
more refined Matter affign'd to every human
Spirit, when the Body of Fleſh expires, and
is no longer capable of maintaining its reci-
procal Communion with the Spirit. What
are the Circumftances, what are the Laws,
what is the Situation, and what is the Lan-
guage of the World of Spirits, muſt and will
be a Matter of Darkness and Myſtery to us,
while we dwell in Flesh and Blood: We
muſt each of us wait our appointed Hour,
and then ſhall our Curiofity be better fatisfied
either in a delightful or in a dreadful man-
ner, according to our Behaviour in the
fent Life.
pre-
ESSAY
N 3
182
The Refurrection ESSAY VIII.
ESSAY
VIII.
The Refurrection of the fame Body.
WHERE has been a warm Diſpute
among Men of Learning, and par-
ticularly betwen Mr. Locke and Bi-
fhop Stilling fleet, whether the fame individual
Body which is buried fhall be raiſed at the
Refurrection of the Dead? or whether it
may not be another new-made Body com-
pofed of any other Atoms, and united to the
fame Soul. Thoſe who with Bishop Stil-
ling fleet affirm the Refurrection of the fame
Body may give fuch Reaſons as thefe for it.
1. 'Tis fit and proper, that the fame Body
which has been a Companion and Inftrument
of the Soul in Duties of Holinefs fhould ariſe
and ſhare with the Soul in the Reward of
Heaven; and that the fame Body, which has
been a Temptation or Inftrument of the Soul
in Sin, ſhould alſo riſe to ſhare the Torment.
I must confefs, I don't think this Argu-
ment has very great Weight in it, becauſe
the Body alone is meer infenfible Matter,
and can neither fhare in Pleaſure or Pain.
'Tis the Soul only that has Senſe of Pain and
Pleaſure, and whatſoever Body 'tis vitally
united to, is ſtill its own Body, and may be
the Medium of Pleaſure or Pain to it.
2. Since
of the fame Body.
183
2. Since Body and Soul united conſtitute
the Man, if it be not the fame Body that
died which is raiſed, then one effential Part
of Man is loft. If it be another Body, 'tis
another Man that is raiſed from the Earth,
and not the fame Man that died.
Befides, the Soul never dies, and if the
fame Animal Body that died be not raiſed to
Life, there is nothing at all raiſed to Life:
There may be another inanimate Body which
has Life given to it indeed, but nothing is
revived. Perhaps this fort of Argumentation
may have ſome Weight in it.
3. Chrift himſelf faith, John v. 28. They
that are in the Graves fhall come forth: This
muſt refer to the fame Body that died; for
'tis not the Soul, nor is it any other Body
that was properly put into the Grave, but
the animal Body of the Man which is now
inanimate and dead.
4. It feems to be the Deſign of the Apoſtle,
to fhew that 'tis the fame Body which died in
fome Reſpects, tho' not in all Reſpects, which
ſhall be raiſed again to Life, 1 Cor. xv. 42.
So is the Refurrection of the Dead. It, i. e. the
Body, is fown in Corruption, it is raiſed in In-
corruption, &c. It, i. e. the Body, is fown a
natural Body, it is raifed a fpiritual Body. It
is the fame human Body ftill, but with dif-
ferent Qualities. So V. 52, 53. The Dead
fhall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be
changed. This corruptible hall put on Incorrup-
№ 4
tion,
184 The Refurrection ESSAY VIII
tion, this mortal shall put on Immortality
which feems to be ſpoken both with regard
to thoſe who ſhall be raiſed from the dead,
as well as thoſe who ſhall be changed at the
coming of Chrift. 'Tis this Mortal and this
Corruptible, that is, this very animal Body,
which was mortal and corruptible, muſt be
raiſed immortal.
To this I might add, that the Apoſtle,
Rom. viii. 11. fpeaks of thefe very mortal Bo-
dies which we now have, and affirms they ſhall
be quickned, &c. and Phil. iii. ult. this Body
of our Vileness or Humiliation is to be chang-
ed, and made like to the glorious Body of Chrift.
Surely fuch Expreffions denote the fame
Body.
But the Subſtance and Strength of all the
Arguments derived from Scripture to prove
the Refurrection of the fame Body, may be
found well put together in Dr. Whitby's Pre-
face to the firft Epiftle to the Corinthians.
Thoſe who with Mr. Locke make the Re-
furrection of the fame individual Body need-
lefs, may alledge fuch Reaſons as theſe.
1. It attains no valuable Purpoſe to confine
the Reſurrection to the fame Atoms of Mat-
ter; for if the fame Soul be united to any
Mafs of the fame fort of Subftance, i. e. to
any Matter, there is a fufficient Provifion for
every thing that regards the Happineſs or Mi-
fery of the rifing Dead: Since the Body itſelf,
or meer Matter has no Senfation, and the
Soul
of the fame Body.
185
Soul will have the fame fort of Senfations,
(whether pleaſant to reward it, or painful to
puniſh it) whatſoever other Particles of Mat-
ter it may be united to, as if it were united
to the fame Particles it had in this World,
and in which it obeyed or finned.
Befides, it is worthy of our Obfervation
what Mr. Locke fays on this Subject, “If it
"ſhould be demanded, what greater Con-
gruity the Soul hath to any Particles of
"Matter which were once vitally united to
"it, but are now ſo no longer, than it hath
to Particles of Matter to which it was
"never united, this would be hard to de-
"termine."
<<
2. The Apoſtle ſhews it ſhall be different
Matter from that which was laid in the
Grave by the very manner of his arguing:
For when he ufes the Simile of a Grain of
Wheat dying in the Ground, he fays, V. 37,
38. Thou foweft not that Body that ſhall be,
but thou foweft a bare Grain; and God giveth
it a Body (i. e. another Body) as pleafeth him.
And then he goes on to fhew what different
forts of Bodies there are, and how different
the Bodies in the Refurrection fhall be from
what was buried.
3. 'Tis hardly poffible that all the very
fame Bodies fhould rife; that is, all the fame
Atoms or Particles that were buried: For
when Bodies turn into Duft, this Duft or
Earth grows up in Vegetation, and becomes
the
186
The Refurrection ESSAY VIII.
the Body of Grafs or Plants; Sheep and
Oxen eat theſe Plants, and other Men eat
the Sheep and Oxen; and thus the Par-
ticles of one Man's Body may frequently
become the Parts of another Man's Body.
And this is more confpicuous in the Country
of Cannibals, where they kill and eat their
Slaves. How then is it poffible that each
human Body ſhould have its own Particles?
4. There is fufficient Ground to fay, the
fame Perfon rifes again from the Dead, tho'
there be not one Atom of the fame Mat-
ter that was buried, which goes to make
up the Body in the Refurrection; for Methu-
felah, when a Child, and when one, two,
three, four or five hundred Years old, and
when he had lived nine hundred and fixty'
Years before his Death, had actually by Per-
ſpiration, and Attrition, &c. changed the A-
toms that compofed his Body perhaps thirty
or forty times over, and yet 'tis the fame
compound Subftance of Soul and Body, the
fame conſcious Being or Perſon ſtill, 'tis Me-
thuselah both at his Birth, at 500 Years old,
and at his Death. Befides, If all the fame
Atoms that ever belonged to Methuselah muſt
be raiſed, what a bulky Man would that be?
And further, what need is there that the laſt
dying withering Particles fhould be raiſed to
make Methuselah again, when any other A-
toms that ever belonged to him, and in which
he practiſed Virtue or Vice, are as much the
fame
t
of the fame Body.
187
fame Methuselah? and yet all of theſe cannot
be crowded into his Body, without making á
Giant of him. So that we fee there is no
need of the fame Atoms or Particles to make
the fame Perfon, if there be but the fame
thinking Mind conſcious of his Actions in this
Life, united to a proper Portion of Matter.
"Tis Confcioufnefs makes the Perfon.
This is the Force of the Arguments of
thoſe who deny the Neceffity of having the
fame Body raiſed. And I think the Argu-
ments on both Sides have fome real Strength
in them.
Now I would humbly enquire, whether
all the Differences of thefe Difputants, which
I have endeavoured briefly to fet in their
ſtrongeſt Light, may not be compromis'd in
this manner.
I. It is granted that it cannot be the very
fame Body in all the Particles or Atoms of
it which were united to the Soul in this
World, that ſhall be raiſed and united to it
in the Refurrection.
(1.) Becauſe all the Atoms that ever be-
longed to the animal Body of Methuselah in
969 Years would make a moft bulky and
difproportionate Figure at the Refurrection:
And for the fame Reaſon all the Antidiluvi-
ans, who lived fo many hundred Years, would
be raiſed as Giants in compariſon of us in
later Days. And on the fame Account alſo,
every Man at the Refurrection would be fo
much
188 The Refurrection ESSAY VIII.
much larger than his Cotemporaries and
Neighbours, as he lived longer on Earth,
which is a vain and groundleſs Conceit.
(2.) All the fame Particles, even of the Bo-
dy when it died and was buried can hardly
be raiſed again and united to the Soul of
any Man, becauſe ſeveral of the Particles that
made one Man's Body at the Time of his
Death are very probably turned to Grafs or
Plants, and fo become Food for Cattel, or
other Men, and are become part of the Bo-
dies of other Men feveral times over.
thus there might be great Confufion, becauſe
the ſelf-fame Particles would belong to the
Bodies of feveral Men.
And
Befides, here's one pious Man perhaps di-
ed of a Dropfy, or exceffive fat and unwiel-
dy; muſt he be raiſed in that unwieldy Bulk
and thoſe extravagant Dimenſions? Another
was worn out to a meer Skeleton by a Con-
ſumption; muſt his raiſed Body be of this flen-
der and withered Shape or Size? Others it may
be from their very Birth were in fome part
defective, or redundant: And in theſe Cafes
muſt not ſome Particles be left out or added
in the Refurrection to form a proper Body
for the glorified Soul? All theſe Confiderati-
ons prove that all the precife Number of A-
toms that ever made up a Man's Body here on
Earth, or even thofe that belonged to it at
the Hour of Death, are not neceffary to be
fummoned together to form the fame Man
at the Reſurrection.
II. It
of the fame Body.
189
1
II. It is alſo granted that it muſt be in ſome
Senſe the ſame Body raiſed which was bury-
ed, in order to anſwer ſeveral Expreffions both
of Jeſus Chriſt and of the Apostle Paul in
their Difcourfes of the Refurrection. And
we may allow without any Difficulty that fo
many of the fame Particles of any Man's Body
which were buried, may go to conftitute the
new raiſed Body, as juftly to denominate it
the fame Body, and which being united to
the fame Soul do render the new-raiſed Man
the fame Man and the fame Perfon who died:
For 'tis evident that a very few of the fame
Atoms or Particles which were laid in the
Grave are fufficient for this Purpoſe if we
confider theſe two things.
I. 'Tis very probable that a new-born In-
fant in its Muſcles and Nerves (and eſpecially
in its Bowels and Bones) has fome original,
effential and conftituent Tubes, Fibres or fta-
minal Particles (if I may fo call them) which
remain the fame and unchanged thro' all the
Stages and Changes of Life in following Years,
how much foever the external and fleshy Parts
may be changed. And fome Philofophers
maintain that the Growth of the animal Bo-
dy is nothing but the Dilatation, Stretching or
Spreading of theſe effential and ftaminal Parts,
thefe Fibres, Tubes or Membranes, by the In-
terpoſition of new additional Particles, which
additional and accidental Particles are the on-
ly things which are in perpetual Flux and al-
2
ways
190
The Refurrection ESSAY VIII.
ways changing. And it may be added alſo,
that perhaps theſe effential ftaminal Particles
are of fuch a Nature as not to join and unite
with other animal or human Bodies, and be-
come an effential conftituent Part of them;
And therefore if Mankind were all Cannibals
and eat one another as well as the Flesh of
Beafts, yet the fame ftaminal or conftituent
Particles cannot belong to the Bodies of two
or more human Perfons. It has been ſaid by
fome Philoſophers that the mere membranace-
ous Parts of an animal Body, tho' eaten by other
Animals, will not be eafily if at all digeſted, and
then they cannot be fanguified or turned into
Blood, nor become nutritive Juices, nor form
the conſtituent and effential Parts of other
Animals: Now a great many of the original
conftituent Parts of human Bodies are mem-
branaceous; for ſome ſuppoſe almoſt the whole
Body to be made of Tubes and Juices, with
little interſperſed Fibres which are added by
Nutrition. And how far the Bones, i, e. the
original meer offeous Subftances may be in-
digeſtible alſo, who can tell?
Upon the whole, it ſeems that theſe effen-
tial, conftituent or ftaminal Particles, whatfo-
ever they be, whether offeous, or membra-
naceous, or of any other Quality, and how
many or how few foever they be, always a-
bide the fame, even when the Body is great-
enlarged by the perpetual new Interpofiti-
on of additional nutritive Particles which are
in
7
of the fame Body.
191
in continual Flux. I fay alſo that it ſeems
that theſe unchanging Parts, whether few or
many, in union with the fame Soul, are a-
bundantly fufficient to denominate Methufe-
lab the Infant, and Methuselah the Aged, the
fame Perfon; and then alfo theſe few effenti-
al conftituent Particles preferved by divine
Providence and raiſed in the Formation of
the new Body and united to the fame Soul
are fufficient to denominate Methuselah dying
and Methuselah rifing the fame Perfon ftill,
both Soul and Body.
Here it may be objected indeed, that there
is no need of running to fuch effential conftituent
Particles of the Body of a Man in order to de-
nominate him the fame Man at fixteen or fixty or
fix hundred Years of Age; for theſe philoſophi-
cal Ideas of conftituent Particles come not
within the Notice of the Bulk of Mankind;
and yet all Mankind agree to call Methuselah
the fame Man, and his Body, the fame Body,
tho' it be maintained by the continual Suc-
ceffion of new Particles of Matter fince they
are united to the fame Soul. This feems to
be fufficient for this Purpoſe.
This Objection may be answered two ways
(1.) that as theſe conftituent and unchangeable
Particles of the Body do not come within the
Notice of the Bulk of Mankind, fo neither
does the continual Change and Succeffion of
new Particles by Perſpiration and Nutrition
come within their Notice: and therefore the
Bulk
192 The Refurrection ESSAY VIII.
Bulk of Mankind call it the fame Body becaufe
it appears in the Grofs to be the fame: But,
if you prove 'tis not the fame by infenfible Al-
terations, I may prove 'tis the fame by theſe
infenfible unchanging Parts. In one cafe the
Alteration is infenfible; and the conftituent
Particles abide unchanged without fenfible no-
tice in the other Cafe: and if one Difputant
borrows his Objection from Philofophical Ideas,
the other may borrow his Solution from Phi-
lofophical Ideas too.
It may be anſwered (2.) that the Language
of Scripture and the Reaſons for the Reſurrec-
tion of the Body in fome Refpects the fame
with that which was buried, are fo ftrong,
that I think they cannot well be anſwered with-
out fuppofing ſo many Particles of the fame
Body which was buried to be raiſed again as
may be fufficient upon fome juſt Principles to
give it the Name of the fame Body, and there
can be no more required.
II. The Similitude which the Apoſtle ufes
in that Diſcourſe concerning a Grain of Wheat,
v. 37, 38. plainly teaches us, that tho' there
ſhould be but a very few of the fame indi-
vidual Particles raifed from the Duft, and
mixed with a Multitude of other new Parti-
cles, yet theſe few are fufficient to denominate
it the fame Body fo far as the Apoſtle's Argu-
ment requires it. For 'tis evident that when
a Grain of Wheat is fown into the Ground,
far the greateſt Part of the Grain quickly dies
and
of the fame Body.
193
and rots in the Earth; and there are but a
very few ſmall Particles of the fame Grain
which compofe the Germen or Bud of the
new Plant, and which do really grow up in-
to, and help to form and compofe the new
Stalk and the Ear of Corn, together with the
Addition of a Multitude of other new Atoms
borrowed from the Earth and Water.
In the fame manner the Apoſtle leads us
to ſuppoſe there may be a few of the fame
original and effential Parts of the Body of a
Man which are buried in the Grave, which
are the Original, the Spring and Foundation of
the new-raiſed Body, tho' there may be thou-
fands of other new Atoms mixt with them.
Now 'tis eaſy to fuppofe, that the Power
and Providence of God may according to this
Suppoſition preferve and raiſe the fame Body
at the Refurrection. For if the new-raiſed
Body has but as many effential Atoms of the
dead Body in it as the new Stalk and Ear of
Wheat has of the Grain that was fowed, 'tis
enough: And the Union of the fame conſci-
ous Mind or Spirit makes it the fame Man:
I would ask leave to conclude this Effay
with this fhort and plain Remark. There
are fome of thoſe who follow Mr. Locke and
his way of thinking in many of thefe Mat-
ters, who alfo go a step further and fup+
pofe the Spirit or confcious Principle in Man
to lofe all Conſciouſnefs when the Body dies,
and that at the Refurrection God fhall give
Q
Confct-
194 The Reſurrection, &c. ESSAY VIII,
Conſciouſneſs to the Perſon again, or make a
conſcious Principle to exiſt in the new-raiſed
Body. Now if this be the Cafe, then 'tis nei-
ther the fame Body nor the fame Spirit that is
raiſed from the Dead, but a new Spirit and a
new Body, which I think muſt neceffarily be
called another Perfon, as well as Mr. Locke
would call it another Man: and I am fure fuch
a new made Creature confifting of another
Mafs of Matter and another confcious Prin-
ciple can never be juſtly rewarded or puniſh-
ed for perfonal Virtues and Vices, good or
evil Actions, done in the former Life by a
different Body and Spirit, i. e. by another
Perfon *
* I have not obſerved any Diftinction here between
the fame Man and the fame Perfon, tho' Mr. Locke makes
a great Difference. Of this Matter fee Efay 12. Sect.
ult.
ESSAY
( 195 )
ESSAY IX.
Of the Production, Nourishment and
Operations of Plants and Animals.
SECT. I.
Creatures produce their own Kind.
W
HENI furvey the Works of Na-
ture with a more attentive Eye, I
am furprized to find with what
marvellous Exactneſs every Creature draws its
own Picture, or propagates its own Likeneſs,
tho' in different Manners of Operation. The
Fox produces a living Fox, the Gooſe drops
her Egg, and hatches the young Goofe, and
the Tulip lets fall its Seed into the Earth,
which ferments and fwells and labours long in
the Ground, till at laft it brings forth a Tulip.
Is it the natural Sagacity of Foxes that ena-
bles them to form their own Image fo accu-
rately? By no means; for the Gooſe and the
Flower do the like: The fprightly and the
ſtupid, the ſenſible and the ſenſeleſs, work this
Wonder with equal Regularity and Perfecti-
on; and the Plant performs as well as the
Animal.
O 2
"Tis
196
ESSAY IX.
Of Plants
'Tis not poffible that any of them ſhould
effect this by any peculiar Rules of Art and
Contrivance, for neither the one nor the o-
ther are at all acquainted with the Compofi-
tion or Progrefs of their Work. The Bird is
entirely ignorant of the wondrous vital Fer-
ment of her own Egg, either in the Formati-
on of it or the Incubation: and the Mother-
Plant knows as much of the Parts of the
young Plant as the Mother-Animal knows of
the inward Springs and Movements of the
young little Animal. There could be no Con-
trivance here, for not any of them had any
Thought or Deſign of the final Production':
They were all moved, both the Beaſt, Bird
and Flower, by the material and mechanical
Springs of their own Nature to continue their
own Species, but without any fuch Intent or
Purpoſe.
Give Souls to all the animal Race, and
make thoſe Souls as immaterial and as intel-
ligent as you can; attribute to them what
good Senfe you pleaſe in other Affairs of their
puny Life; allow the Brutes to be as rational
and as cunning as you could with or fancy,
and to perform a thouſand Tricks by their
own Sagacity; yet in this Matter thofe intel-
lectual Powers must all stand by as uſeleſs;
the fenfeleſs Vegetable has as much Skill here
as the Animal; the Goofe is compleatly as
wife as the Fox or the Grey-hound; they draw
their own Pourtraits with as exquifite Art and
Accura-
SECT. I.
and Animals.
197
Accuracy, and leave as perfect Images behind
them to perpetuate their kind.
Amazing Proof, and inconteftible Argu-
ment of ſome fuperior Wiſdom! Some tranf-
cendent contriving Mind, fome divine Artifi
cer that made all theſe wondrous Machines *
and ſet them at Work! The Animal and the
Vegetable in theſe Productions are but meer
Inſtruments under his fupreme ruling Power;
like artleſs Pencils in a Painter's Hand, to form
the Images that his Thought had before de-
fign'd: And 'tis that God alone who before
all Worlds contrived thefe Models of every
Species in his own original Idea, that appoints
what Under-agents he will employ to copy
them.
In the Week of the Creation he bid the
Earth teem with Beafts and Plants; and the
Earth like a common Mother brought forth
the Lyon, the Fox and the Dog, as well as
the Čedar and the Tulip, Gen. i. 11, 24.
He commanded the Water to produce the firſt
Fiſh and the Fowl; behold the Waters grow
pregnant; the Trout and the Dolphin break
forth into Life, the Goofe and the Sparrow
ariſe and ſhake their Wings, Gen. i. 20, 21.
* Note, I call them all Machines here, not prefuming
to determine that the Nature of Brutes is meer Machi-
nery; but when I fpeak of the natural Production of
their Bodies, I think theſe Bodies as well as the Bodies
of Man, are meer Engines or Machines, whatſoever
Souls may be united to them.
0 3
but
198
Of Plants
•
ESSAY IX.
But two common Parents Earth and Water
to the whole animal and vegetable World! A
God needs no more. And tho' he was pleas'd
to make uſe of the Water and the Earth in
theſe firſt Productions, yet the Power and the
Skill were much the fame as if he had made
them immediately with his own Hands.
Ever fince that Week of creative Wonders
God has ordered all theſe Creatures to fill the
World with Inhabitants of their own kind;
and they have obeyed him in a long Succef-
fion of almoft fix thouſand Years. He has
granted (fhall I fay) a divine Patent to each
Creature for the fole Production of its own
Likeneſs, with an utter Prohibition to all the
reft.
Yet has he kept a Referve of Sovereignty
to himſelf, and has difplayed the Enfigns of
it in fome important Hours. Egypt was once
a glorious and tremendous Scene of this Sove-
reignty: 'Twas there that he ordered the Rod
of Mofes, a dry and lifelefs Vegetable, to raiſe
a Swarm of living Animals, to call up a Brood
of Lice in Millions without a Parent, and to
animate the Duft of the Ground into a noi-
fom Army. 'Twas there he bid Aaron wave
the fame Rod over the Streams and the Ponds,
and the filent Rod under divine Influence could
bring forth croaking Legions out of the Wa-
ters without End or Number.
But theſe are his Works of Miracle and
Aſtoniſhment, when he has a Mind to fhew
himſelf
SECT. I. and Animals.
199
himſelf the Sovereign and the Controller of
Nature: Without his immediate Commiffion
not one Creature can invade the Province of
another, nor perform any thing of this Work
but within its own peculiar Tribe. Even
MAN the Glory of this lower Creation, and
the wiſeſt thing on Earth, would in vain at-
tempt to make one of theſe common Vege-
tables, or theſe curious animated moving Ma-
chines. Not all the united Powers of human
Nature, not a Council or Club of the niceſt
Artificers with all their Enginry and Skill can
form the leaft part of theſe Works, can com-
poſe a Fox's-Tail, a Goofe-quill or a Tulip-
leaf. Nature is the Art of God, and it muſt
for ever be unrival'd by the Sons of Men.
Yet Man can produce a Man: admirable
Effect, but artlefs Caufe! A poor, limited
Under-agent! The Plant and the Brute in
this Matter are his Rivals, and his Equals
too. The human Parent and the Parent
Bird form their own Images with equal Skill,
are both impelled by the fame blind Motives,
and confin'd each to its own Work. So the
Iron Seal transfers its own Figure to the Clay
with as much Exactnefs and Curiofity as the
Golden one: Both can transfer only their own
Figure: The Stamp of the Letter M prints
nothing but M-'s, and Man can write no-
thing but Man.
This appears to me a glorious Inftance
wherein the Wiſdom and Power of God
0 4
maintain
200
ESSAY IX.
Of Plants
maintain their own Supremacy, and triumph
over all the boafted Reaſon and intellectual
Skill of Men; that the wifeft Son of Adam
in this nobleft Work of Nature can do no
more than a Flower or a Fly; and if he would
go out of his own Species and the appointed
Order of Things, he is not able to make a
Fly, nor a Flower; no, not a Worm nor a
fimple Bulruſh. In thofe Productions where-
in Mankind are meerly the Inftruments of
the God of Nature their Work is vital and
divine; but if they would fet up for prime
Artificers, they can do nothing: A dead Sta-
tue, a painted Shadow on a Canvas or perhaps
a little brazen Clock-work is the fupreme Pride
of their Art, their higheſt Excellence and
Perfection.
Let the Atheiſt then exert his utmoft Stretch
of Underſtanding, let him try the Force of all
his mechanical Powers, to compoſe the Wing
of a Butterfly or the meaneft Feather of a
Sparrow: Let him labour, and fweat and faint,
and acknowledge his own Weakness; then let
him turn his Eye and look at thoſe wondrous
Compofures, his Son or his little Daughter:
and when their infant Tongues fhall enquire
of him and ſay, Father, who made us? Let
him not dare affume the Honour of that
Work to himſelf, but teach the
young Crea-
tures that there is a God, and fall down on his
Face and repent and worſhip.
It was God who ſaid at firſt, Let the Earth
bring
SECT. II. and Animals.
201
bring forth Grass, and the Herb yielding Seed--
after his kind---and the living Creature after bis
kind; and when this was done, then with a
creating Voice he bid thoſe Herbs and thoſe
living Creatures, be fruitful and multiply to all
future Generations. Great Things doth be
which we cannot comprehend.But he fealetb
up the Hand of every Man, that all Men may
know his divine Work, Gen. i. 11, 25. Job
xxxvii. 5, 7.
5,7.
SECT. II.
The Laws of Nature fufficient for the Production.
of Animals and Vegetables.
WAS a Work of Wiſdom infinitely
Tw
various to form all the Variety of
Creatures that fwim or fly, that run, creep
or move in the Air, Earth and Water, and to
fit every one of them with Organs and con-
natural Motions fuited to the Purpoſes of
their different Life: And it is the fame Wif
dom which dictated the Laws of Nature and
Motion in the firft Week of the Creation,
that proceeds by the Force of thofe unchang-
ing Dictates to produce all the fucceffive Na-
tions and Ages of the animal and vegetable
Worlds. Thofe great prolific Words, Be ye
fruitful and multiply, have Almighty Power
in them and reach to the End of Time.
But there have been fome Philofophers and
Divines who imagine, that becauſe they can-
not
202
ESSAY IX.
Of Plants
not folve the Production of Plants and Ani-
mals by thoſe obvious Laws of Motion and
Matter which we are acquainted with, there-
fore no Plant or Animal is produc'd without
fome new immediate and prefent interpofure
of the Skill and Power and Agency of God.
Thus the common Laws of Nature which
God has eſtabliſhed being in their Eſteem not
fufficient for this End, they introduce his own
immediate hand in Millions of Inftances to
counterwork thofe Laws, or to affift the Defi-
ciency of them by a creating Power. By
this means God is as it were conftrained to
exert a miraculous Influence at the Generation
and Production of every new Animal through-
out the World, as tho' it were impoffible that
a Mouſe, a Pigeon, or a Butterfly ſhould be
formed without it; and thus his Work of
Creation is never finiſhed, and Miracles are
wrought by Millions every day: for whatfoe-
ver is done by him in the material World not
according to the Laws of Nature is Miracle.
In my Opinion it is a raſh and venturous
Thing to determine that theſe Productions are
impoffible according to the common appoint-
ed Laws of Nature and Motion; and to fet
intellectual Agents at work upon them meerly
becauſe our Knowledge of thefe Laws of
Matter is not yet fufficient to defcribe the
manner how it may be done.
Would it not be a ridiculous and unphilo-
fophical Account of the Motion of all the
Planets
SECT. II.
203
and Animals.
Planets with all their Satellites or Moons in
our Age, to tell the World that fo many dif
tinct Angels roll'd them round the Sun, and gave
us Day and Night, Summer and Winter? Let
us run back to the old folid Spheres and their
Epicycles again, and pleaſe ourſelves and our
Hearers with defcribing, how they are turn-
ed round by angelick Powers with ſweet and
heavenly Mufick, and this is the Harmony
of the Spheres. But is this Philofophy? May
not the original projectile Force propoſed by
Sir Ifaac Newton, which he ſuppoſes reftrain-
ed by the centripetal Force or Gravitation,
compleatly anſwer this End without the in-
ceffant Labours of an Angel? And is not this
a Law of Nature, fuppofing it to be original-
ly appointed and ftill preferved by the Crea-
tor? Is there any need of immediate new In-
terpofitions of his Almighty Influence in any
different manner to keep all the planetary
Worlds in their proper Motions fo long as he
defigns them to move? And does not this fingle
Principle of Gravitation, or the mutual At-
traction of all Matter, perform various Mil-
lions of Effects in this our Globe of Earth
and Water among inanimate as well as ani-
mated Beings?
And what if we ſhould fuppofe there may
be ſome other fuch general Law of Motion
fuperadded to the vegetable World as the pe-
culiar Spring of all Vegetation? How fimple
a Principle is Gravity in itſelf? How multi-
form
204
ESSAY IX.
Of Plants
form and infinite are its Effects? May not all
Plants in their Rife and Growth, their verdant
Foliage, their beautiful Bloom and Seed in
fucceffive Ages, take their Origin from ano-
ther fuch fimple Principle applyed by the
Skill of the divine Artificer, who gave all
theſe vegetable Beauties their firſt Exiſtence?
And what if we ſhould go one Step further?
Perhaps the Laws of Motion which God has
ordained in the animal World may ftill be
fomewhat different from or fuperadded to thoſe
of the Vegetable; and theſe additional Laws may
be fufficient to form all the Eggs and Animals
in the World: And if theſe Laws are ſettled
and conſtant, this is Nature as much as the
other. "Tis very unphilofophical to introduce
the divine Agency, either contrary to, or dif-
ferent from, the fetled Rules of his own Cre-
ation, without a juft apparent Neceffity, or
where the Cafe requires not a proper Miracle
to be wrought. Yet how frequently is this
done? or if God himſelf be not immediately
fet at work, what ſort of ſtrange inferior A-
gents, what Anima Mundi's, what Plaftic Pow-
ers have been invented and employed to mould
and form every Plant and Animal?
And as this fort of Solution of Difficul-
ties is unphilofophical; fo neither is it very
honourable for à Divine to fay concerning
God our Creator, that the Rules of natural
Motion which he hath eſtabliſh'd in the
World, are not fufficient for the hourly and
meceffary
SECT II.
205
and Animals.
neceffary Purpoſes and Effects of Providence.
Let us grant that the Bodies of a Fly or a
Mite, as well as an Ox or an Eagle, contain
in them innumerable Veffels and Humors,
Tubes and Strings through which animal
Life is diffuſed, and reigns there in a thouſand
regular Motions and ſurpriſing Appearances:
Let us alfo allow the Formation of one of
theſe animal Engines by two others, i. e. the
Propagation of their Species is incomparably
the niceſt and moſt furprizing Effect that
thefe Creatures ever perform: What then?
furely you will not fay, that their own Senſe
or Reaſon, or any confcious Powers they may
be endued with, are fufficient for this Pur-
poſe, or are capable of fuch Productions:
You will never grant it is owing to the Skill
of the Parent-Animals, that fuch Swarms of
wondrous young Animals are propagated in
fucceffive Ages: Why then may we not attri-
bute to the all-wife God the Glory of affum-
ing them as his Inftruments into his grand
Scheme of Providence, and employing them
according to the common Laws of Nature
and Motion, which he hath eſtabliſhed,
each to produce his own Image? Why may
not a God have ſuch an all-pervading ſtretch
of Thought, as to fupply the Univerſe with
Inhabitants in a perpetual Succeffion, by the
Rules which he at firft ordained amongſt
them, Rules which he ſtamped with his own
Authority, and pronounced them the Laws
of Nature?
4
Will
•
206
ESSAY IX.
of Plants
Will you fuppofe that it derogates from
the Glory of Divine Providence to repreſent the
great Engine of this vifible World, as moving
onward in its appointed Courfe, without the
continual interpofure of his Hand? 'Tis ra-
ther derogatory to his infinite Wiſdom, to ima-
gine that he could not make the Vegetable
and Animal, as well as the inanimate World
of fuch fort of Workmanſhip, as might re-
gularly move onward for five or fix thouſand
Years, without putting a new Hand to it ten
thouſand times every Hour: I fay ten thousand
times every Hour; for there is not an Hour
nor a Moment paffes, wherein there are not
many Millions of Animals actually forming
in the Southern or Northern Climates.
He that can make a Clock with a great
Variety of Beauties and Motions to go re-
gularly a twelve Month together, is cer-
tainly a ſkilful Artift; but if he muſt put
his own Hand to affift thofe Motions every
Hour, or elſe the Engine will ftand ftill, or
the Wheels move at random, we conceive a
much meaner Opinion of his Performance.
and his Skill. On the other hand, how glo-
rious and divine an Artificer would he be
call'd, that ſhould have made two of theſe
Pieces of Clock-Work above five thoufand
Years ago, and contrived fuch hidden Springs
and Motions within them, that they fhould
have joined together, to perpetuate the Spe-
cies, and thus continue the fame fort of Clocks
in
SECT. I.
207
and Animals.
in more than a hundred Succeffions down to
this Day? Tho' each of their Springs might
fail in forty Years time, and their Motions
ceafe, or their Materials decay, yet that by
the means of theſe two original Engines,
there ſhould be Engines of the fame kind
multiplied upon the Face of the Earth, by
the fame Rules of Motion which the Artiſt
had eſtabliſhed in the Day when he firſt for-
med them.
Such is the Workmanſhip of God; for
Nature is nothing but his Art. Such is the
amazing Penetration of divine Skill, fuch the
long Reach of his Forefight, who has long
ago fet his Inftruments at work, and guarded
againſt all their poffible Deficiencies; who has
provided to repleniſh the World with Plants
and Animals to the End of Time, by the
wondrous Contrivance of his firſt Creation,
and the Laws he then ordain'd.
Thus every Whale and Eagle, every Lion
and Rofe, Fly and Worm in our Age, are
as really the Work of God, as the firſt which
he made of the Kind. 'Tis fo far from be-
ing a Derogation to his Honour, to perpetu-
ate all the Species by fuch Inftruments for
many Ages, that it rather aggrandizes the
Character of the Creator, and gives new
Luftre to Divine Wiſdom: For if any thing
can be faid to be eafier or harder in this fort
of Almighty Work, we may fuppofe it a
more glorious Difficulty for a God to employ
a Spar-
208
ESSAY IX.
Of Plants
a Sparrow of an Oyfter to make a Sparrow
or an Oyſter, than to make one immediately
with his own Hand. Perhaps there is not a
Waſp nor a Butterfly now in the World, but has
gone through almoft fix thouſand Anceſtors,
and yet the Work of the laft Parent is ex-
quifitely perfect in Shape, in Colour, and in
every Perfection of Beauty: But it is all ow
ing to the first Cauſe. This is Wiſdom be
coming a God, and demands. an eternal Tris
bute of Wonder and Worſhip.
SECT. III.
Of the Nourishment and Growth of Plants.
N the beginning of Time and Nature at
IN
the Command of God, the Earth brought
forth Plants and Herbs, and four footed Ani-
mals in their various Kinds; but the Birds of
the Air, as well as the Fiſhes, were produ-
ced by the fame Command out of the Wa-
This was intimated in a former Secti
ters.
on.
The Water and the Earth were the firft
appointed Mothers, if I may fo exprefs it, of
all the Animal and vegetable Creation. Since
that Time they ceaſe to be Parents indeed,
but they are the common Nurfes of all that
breathes, and of all that grows. Nor is the
Wiſdom of God much less confpicuous in
conftituting two ſuch plain and fimple Beings
as the Earth and Water, to be the Springs
of Nouriſhment and Growth to fuch an in-
numerable
SECT. III.
209
and Animals.
1
numerable Variety of Creatures, than it
was in the Formation of them out of two
fuch Materials. Is it not counted an admi-
rable Piece of Divine Contrivance and Wif-
dom, that the fingle Principle of Gravitation
ſhould be employ'd by the Creator, to an-
fwer fo many Millions of Purpoſes among the
heavenly Bodies in their regular Revolutions,
as well as among the Inhabitants, and the Fur-
niture of this earthly Globe where we dwell?
And may it not be eſteemed as aftoniſhing an
Effect of the fame fupreme Wiſdom, that
two fuch fimple things as Water and Earth
fhould be the common Materials out of which
all the ſtanding Ornaments, and the moving
Inhabitants of this our World fhould receive
their continual Suftenance, and their In-
creaſe?
Let us firft confider this as it relates to
the vegetable part of the Creation. What a
Profufion of Beauty and Fragrancy, of Shapes
and Colours, of Smells and Taftes is fcatter-
ed among the Herbs and Flowers of the
Ground, among the Shrubs, the Trees and
the Fruits of the Field! Colouring in its ori-
ginal Glory and Perfection triumphs here;
Red, Yellow, Green, Blue, Purple, with
vaftly more Diverſities than the Rainbow
ever knew, or the Prifm can reprefent, are
diftributed among the Flowers and Bloffoms.
And what Variety of Taftes, both original
and compounded, of Sweet, Bitter, Sharp,
P
with
210
ESSAY IX.
Of Plants
with a thouſand nameleſs Flavours, are found
among the Herbs of the Garden? What an
amazing Difference of Shapes and Sizes ap-
pears amongst the Trees of the Field and
Foreft in their Branches and their Leaves;
and what a luxurious and elegant Diſtinction
in their ſeveral Fruits? How very numerous
are their diſtinct Properties and their Uſes in
human Life? and yet theſe two common Ele-
ments, Earth and Water, are the only Mate-
rials, out of which they are all compofed,
from the Beginning to the End of Nature
and Time.
Let the Gardiner drefs for himſelf one Field
of freſh Earth, and make it as uniform as he
can; then let him plant therein all the Varie-
ties of the vegetable World, in their Roots
or in their Seeds, as he fhall think moſt pro-
per; yet out of this common Earth, under
the Droppings of common Water from Hea-
ven, every one of theſe Plants fhall be nou-
rifh'd, and grow up in their proper Forms;
all the infinite Diverfity of Shapes and Sizes,
Colours, Taftes and Smells, which conftitute
and adorn the vegetable World, (would the
Climate permit) might be produced out of
the fame Clods. What rich and furpriſing
Wiſdom appears in that Almighty Operator,
who out of the fame Matter fhall perfume
the Bofom of the Roſe, and give the Garlick
its offenfive and naufeous Powers? who from
the fame Spot of Ground, ſhall raiſe the Liquo-
rice
SECT. III. and Animals.
211
х
rice and the Wormwood, and drefs the Check
of the Tulip in all its glowing Beauties?
What a Surprize to fee the fame Field furniſh
the Pomegranate and the Orange Tree, with
their juicy Fruit, and the Stalks of Corn with
their dry and huſky Grains? To obſerve the
Oak raiſed from a little Acorn, into its ftately
Growth and folid Timber; and that Pillars for
the Support of future Temples and Palaces
ſhould ſpring out of the fame Bed of Earth,
that fent up the Vine with fuch ſoft and
feeble Limbs as are unable to fupport them-
felves? What a natural kind of Prodigy is it,
that chilling and burning Vegetables fhould
arife out of the fame Spot? that the Fever
and Frenzy ſhould ſtart up from the fame
Bed where the Palfy and the Lethargy lye
dormant in their Seeds? Is it not exceeding
ftrange, that healthful and poiſonous Juices
ſhould riſe up in their proper Plants out of
the fame common Glebe, and that Life and
Death ſhould grow and thrive within an Inch
of each other?
What wondrous and inimitable Skill muft
be attributed to that fupreme Power, that
firſt Cauſe, who can fo infinitely diverfify the
Effects, where the fervile fecond Caufe is fo
uniform, and always the fame *?
P 2
Ic
*Note, I do not pretend that all the Particles of c
which common Earth is compofed, are exactly uniform
and fimilar: It is allowed that there are fome Atoms of
it
212
ESSAY IX.
Of Plants
It is not for me in this Place to enter into
a long Detail of Philofophy, and ſhew how
the minute Fibres and Tubes of the different
Seeds and Roots of Vegetables take hold of,
attract and receive the little Particles of Earth
and Water, proper for their own Growth;
how they form them at first into their own
Shapes, and fend them up afpiring above
Ground by degrees, and mould them fo, as
to frame the Stalks, the Branches, the Leaves
and the Buds of every Flower, Herb and
Tree. But I preſume the World is too weary
of fubftantial Forms and plaftick Powers and
Names without Ideas, to be perfuaded that
that theſe meer Creatures of Fancy ſhould
ever be the Operators in this wondrous
Work. It is much more honourable to at-
tribute all to the Defign. and long Forethought
of God the Creator, who form'd the firft
Vegetables in fuch a manner, and appointed
their little Parts to ferment under the warm
Sun Beams, according to fuch eſtabliſh'd
Laws of Motion, as to mould the Atoms of
Earth and Water which were near them
into their own Figure, to make them grow
it much more fuited to Vegetation than others, and
perhaps to the Nouriſhment of fome Vegetables rather
than others. The fame is granted concerning Water.
But I call thefe Elements, or Materials uniform in this
Refpect, that in every Crumb of Earth, and in every
drop of Water, there is no fuch Variety poffible, as to
contain the proper Parts of every Plant in their own
Form.
up
M
SECT. III.
213
and Animals.
up into Trunk and Branches, which every
Night ſhould harden into Firmneſs and Sta-
bility again; to mould new Atoms of the fame
Element into Leaves and Bloom, Fruit and
Seed, which laſt being dropt into the Earth,
ſhould produce new Plants of the fame Like-
nefs to the End of the World.
If I were to repreſent this Matter to the
unlearned part of Mankind, I might do it
perhaps more intelligibly to them by this rude
and coarfe Simile than by the niceft Accu-
racies of Philofophical Deſcription.
Deſcription. Sup-
poſe a Maſs of uniform green Wax of a very
foft Temperature, and a little mollified by
the Sun Beams, fhould be ftrained through
fmall round Pieces of Cloth of all Varieties
of Texture, fhall I name for Inftance,
Canvas, Sackcloth, Holland, Diaper, Lawn,
&c. in fome of which I will fuppofe the
Threads were fo woven as to make different
Stripes and Figures. Now if the Wax were
forced upwards through all thefe Cloths,
you would fee a vaft Variety, as it were, of
rifing Stamina or Fibres, which fhall be fup-
poſed to conſtitute the different round Stalks of
theſe artificial Vegetables: Thefe would cer-
tainly make a very various Appearance to the
Eye, according to their Shapes and Sizes; and
perhaps alfo, in different Pofitions of Light and
Shade might afford Glimpfes of as different
colouring, as the Verdure of diftinct Plants.
Suppofe yet further, thefe rifing Fibres, or
P 3
Threads
214
Of Plaats
ESSAY IX.
Threads of Wax to be condenſed and harden-
ed by the cool Air of the Night, and conti-
nue in their proper Forms; and the next
Day the fofter Wax fhould be forced up
again, not only through thefe Cloths, but
alſo through the Interftices of theſe hardned
Threads or Fibres: Here would be fome
plain Difference of the next Mould in which
the growing Parts of this Plant would be caft,
in order to give it fome further different
Shapes. Suppofe the Branches and Leaves to
be formed this way: and when theſe are con-
denſed and hardened at Night, then further,
Efforts of ftraining the Wax upward, might
go on to repreſent in a rude manner fome
grofs Idea of Vegetation. But 'tis eaſier for
the Sons of Men to ftand and wonder, and
adore God the Creator, than to imitate, or
even to defcribe his admirable Works.
the beſt of their Defcriptions and their Imi-
tations of this Divine Artifice, they do but
chatter like Hottentots, and paint like Goths
and Vandals.
SECT. IV.
Of the Nouriſhment and Growth of Animals.
L
In
ET us proceed in the next Place to fur-
vey new Wonders. All the Animals of
the Creation, as well as the Plants, have
their Original Nouriſhment from theſe fimple
Materials, Earth and Water. For all the
Animal
SECT. IV. and Animals.
215
Animal Beings which do not live upon other
Animals, or the Produce of them, take fome
of the Vegetables for their Food; and thus
the Brutes of Prey are originally indebted to
the Plants and Herbs, i. e. to the Earth for
their Support, and their Drink is the watery
Element. That all Flesh is Grafs, is true in
the literal as well as the metaphorical Senfe.
Does the Lion eat the Fleſh of the Lamb?
Doth the Lamb fuck the Milk of the Ewe?
But the Ewe is nouriſh'd by the Graſs of the
Field. Does the Kite devour the Chicken,
and the Chicken the little Caterpillars or In-
fects of the Spring? But theſe Infects are ever
feeding on the tender Plants, and the
green
Products of the Ground. The Earth moift-
ned with Water, is the common Nurfe of all.
Even the Fiſhes of the Sea are nouriſhed
with ſome green Vegetables that ſpring up
there, or by preying on leffer Fiſhes which
feed on thefe Vegetables.
But let us give our Meditations a looſe on
this entertaining Subject, and we fhall find
numerous Inftances of Wonder in this Scene
of Divine Contrivance.
I.
1. What very different Animals are nou-
riſh'd by the fame Vegetable Food! The ſelf
fame Herbage or Fruits of the Earth by the
divine Laws of Nature and Providence, are
converted into animated Bodies of very diſtinct
Kinds. Could you imagin that half the Fowls
of the Air, as different as they are, from the
Crow
P 4
216
ESSAY IX.
Of Plants
Crow to the Tit-moufe, fhould derive their
Fleſh and Blood from the Productions of the
fame Tree, where the Swine watches under
the Boughs of it, and is nouriſhed by the
Droppings of the Fruit? Nor need I ſtay to
take notice what numerous Infects find their
Nefts and their Food all the Summer Seaſon
from the fame Apples or Apricocks, Plumbs
or Cherries, which feed Hogs and Crows,
and a hundred fmall Birds.
Birds. Would you
think that the black and the brindled Kine,
with the Horfes both grey and bay, ſhould
clothe themſelves with their hairy Skins of
fo various Colours out of the fame green
Paſture where the Sheep feeds, and covers
himſelf with his white and woolly Fleece?
And at the ſame time the Gooſe is cropping
part of the Grafs to nourish its own Fleſh,
and to array itſelf with Down and Feathers.
Strange and ftupendious Texture of the Bodies.
of theſe Creatures, that fhould convert the
common green Herbage of the Field into
their different Natures, and their more diffe-
rent Clothing! But this leads me to another
Remark.
2. What exceeding great Diverſity is found
in the feveral Parts, Limbs and Coverings
even of the fame Creature! An animated Body
is made up of Flesh and Blood, Bones and
Membranes, long hollow Tubes, with a Va-
riety of Liquors contained in them, together
with many Strings and Tendons, and a thou-
fand
SECT. IV. and Animals.
217
fand other Things which eſcape the naked
Sight, and for which Anatomy has hardly
found a Name: Yet the very fame Food is
by the wondrous Skill and Appointment of
the God of Nature form'd into all theſe amaz-
ing Differences. Let us take an Ox to Pieces,
and furvey the wondrous Compofition. Be-
fides the Fleſh of this huge living Structure,
and the Bones on which it is built, what Va-
riety of tender Coats and Humors belong to
that admirable Organ the Eye? How folid
and hard are the Teeth which grind the
Food? How firm the general Ligaments that
tie the Joints of that Creature together?
what horny Hoofs are his Support, and
with what different fort of horny Weapons
has Nature furniſh'd his Forehead? Yet they
are all fram'd of the fame graffy Materials:
The Calf grazes upon the verdant Paſture,
and all its Limbs and Powers grow up to the
Size and Firmneſs of an Ox. Can it be fup-
pofed, that all thefe Corpufcles, of which
the feveral inward and outward Parts of the
Brute are compofed, are actually found in
their different Forms in the vegetable Food?
Does every Spire of Grafs actually contain
the Parts of the Horn and the Hoof, the
Teeth and the Tendons, the Glands and Mem-
branes, the Humors and Coats of the Eye,
the Liquids and Solids, with all their innu-
merable Varieties? This is a moft unreafo-
nable Suppofition and vain Philoſophy. No,
'tis
218
ESSAY IX
Of Plants
'tis the Wiſdom of the God of Nature, that
diftributes this uniform * Food into the feve-
ral Parts of the Animal by his appointed
Laws, and gives proper Nouriſhment to each
of them.
Again, 3dly, If the Food of which one fin-
gle Animal partakes be never fo various and
different, yet the fame Laws of Motion, which
God has ordained in the animal World, con-
vert them all to the fame Purpoſes of Nou-
riſhment for that Creature. Behold the lit-
tle Bee gathering its Honey from a thouſand
Flowers, and laying up the precious Store for
its Winter Food. Mark how the Crow preys
upon a Carcass, anon it crops a Cherry from
the Tree; and both are changed into the Fleſh
and Feathers of a Crow. Obferve the Kine
in the Meadows feeding on a hundred Varie-
ties of Herbs and Flowers, yet all the differ-
ent Parts of their Bodies are nouriſhed there-
By the Word Uniform here I do not mean, that all
the Parts of each Spire of Grafs, by which Animals are
nouriſhed and increaſed, are perfectly fimilar, any more
than the Parts of Earth and Water, by which Vegetables
are nouriſhed and grow, are all perfectly of one Shape
and Size; but I believe it will be eafily granted me, that
the Parts of every Spire of Grafs are not fo various and
multiform, as to anſwer all the various Parts of the Ani-
mal which are fupported and increaſed by it, as well as
the Fleſh and Limbs, &c. of different Animals. This
will be yet more evident, if we confider that Nature
turns all Food whatſoever into the uniform Subſtance of
Chyle, before the Animal is nouriſhed by it, which ſhall
be ſhewn immediately.
by
SECT. IV. and Animals.
219
by in a proper manner: Every Flower in the
Field is made ufe of to increaſe the Fleſh of
the Heifer and to make Beef for Men: And
out of all theſe Varieties there is a noble mil-
ky Juice flowing to the Udder which provides
Nouriſhment for young Children.
So near akin is Man the Lord of the Crea-
tion, in refpect of his Body, to the Brutes
that are his Slaves, that the very fame Food
will compofe the Fleſh of both of them and
make them grow up to their appointed Sta-
ture. This is evident beyond doubt in daily
and everlaſting Experiments. The fame Bread-
Corn which we eat at our Tables will give
rich Support to Sparrows and Pigeons, to the
Turkey and the Duck and all the Fowls of
the Yard: The Mouſe ſteals it and feeds on it
in his dark Retirements; while the Hog in the
Sty and the Horſe in the Manger would be
glad to partake. When the poor Cottager
has nurfed up a Couple of Geefe, the Fox
feizes one of them for the Support of her
Cubs, and perhaps the Table of the Land-
lord is furniſhed with the other to regale his
Friends. Nor is it an uncommon thing to
fee the favourite Lap-dog fed out of the fame
Bowl of Milk which is prepared for the Heir
of a wealthy Family, but which Nature had
originally defigned to nouriſh a Calf. The
fame milky Material will make Calves, Lap-
dogs, and human Bodies.
How various are our Dishes at an Enter-
2
tainment?
220
ESSAY IX.
Of Plants
!
tainment? how has Luxury even tired itſelf
in the Invention of Meats and Drinks in an
exceffive and endleſs Variety? Yet when they
pafs into the common Boyler of the Stomach,
and are carried thence thro' the Inteftines,
there is a white Juice ftrained out of the
ftrange Mixture called Chyle, which from the
lacteal Veffels is conveyed into the Blood, and
by the Laws of Nature is converted into the
fame crimſon Liquor. This being diſtribut-
ed thro' all the Body by the Arteries is farther
ſtrain'd again thro' proper Veffels and becomes
the Spring of Nouriſhment to every different
Part of the Animal. Thus the God of Na-
ture has ordained that how diverſe foever our
Meats are, they fhall firft be reduced to a uni-
form Liquid, that by new Contrivances and
divine Art it may be again diverfify'd into
Fleſh and Bones, Nerves and Membranes.
How confpicuous and yet how admirable
are the Operations of divine Wiſdom in this
fingle Inftance of Nouriſhment! But it is no
wonder that a God who could create fuch af-
toniſhing and exquifite Pieces of Machinery
as Plants and Animals, could prefcribe fuch
Laws to Matter and Motion as to nourish and
preſerve the Individuals as well as to propa-
gate the Species thro' all Ages to the End of
Time.
SECT.
SECT. V. and Animals.
221
PE
SECT. V.
An amufing Digreffion.
Erhaps it may not be amifs to follow a
Track of pleafing Amuſement which by
a very eaſy and natural Inference ariſes from
the Subject in hand, and which was very hap-
pily reprefented in a late Converfation among
fome of the Great and the Wife. Theron a
Man of Wealth and Figure, but unacquaint-
ed with philofophick Science, fat in the midft
of his Friends of both Sexes in a ſtately Room
with rich Variety of Furniture. Among o-
ther Converſation Theron was complaining,
that he had heard it often faid, how much we
were all indebted to the Country and the Plough;
but for his part he knew no Obligation that we
had to that low Rank of Mankind, whofe
Life is taken up in the Fields, the Woods and
the Meadows, but that they paid their Rents
well that the Gentlemen might live at their
Eafe. Crito was pleaſed to feize the Occaſion,
and entertained the gay Audience with a fur-
prizing Lecture of Philofophy.
up a
Permit me, Theron, faid he, to be an Ad-
vocate for the Peafant, and I can draw
long Account of Particulars for which you
are indebted to the Field and the Foreft, and
to the Men that cultivate the Ground and are
ingaged in rural Bufinefs. Look around you
on all the elegant Furniture of the Room, fur-
vey.
222
ESSAY IX.
Of Plants
vey your own Cloathing, caft your Eyes on
all the fplendid Array of Therina and Perfis
and the other Ladies near them, and you will
find that except a few glittering Stones, and
a little Gold and Silver which was dug out of
the Bowels of the Earth, you can ſcarce fee
any thing that was not once growing green
upon the Ground, thro' the various Labours
of the Planter and the Plowman. Whence
came the Floor you tread on, part whereof
is inlaid with Wood of different Colours?
Whence theſe fair Pannels of Wainfcott and
the Corniſh that encompaffes and adorns the
Room? Whence this lofty Roof of Cedar
and the carved Ornaments of it? Are they not
all the Spoils of the Trees of the Foreſt?
Were not theſe once the verdant Standards of
the Grove or the Mountain? What are your
Hangings of gay Tapeſtry? Are they not ow-
ing to the Fleece of the Sheep which bor-
rowed their Nouriſhment from the Grafs of
the Meadows? Thus the Finery of your Par-
lor once was Grafs; and fhould you favour me
with a Turn into your Bed-chamber I could
ſhew you that the Curtains and the Linen and
the coſtly Coverings where you take your night-
ly Repoſe was ſome Years ago all growing in
the Field.
But I need not retire from the Room where
we are feated to give you abundant Diſcove-
ries of this Truth. Is not the Hair of Camels
a part of the Materials which compoſe thoſe
rich
SECT. V. and Animals.
223
{
go
rich Curtains which hang down by the Win-
dow, and the eafy Chairs which accommodate
your Friends? and if you think a little you
will find that Camels with their Hair were
made of Graſs as well as the Sheep and their
Wool. I confeſs the Chimney and the Coals
with the Implements of the Hearth, the Braſs
and Iron were dug out of the Ground from
their Beds of different kinds, and
you muſt
below the Surface of the Earth to fetch them:
but what think you of thoſe nice Tables of
Mofaic Work? They confefs the Foreſt their
Parent. What are the Books which lye in
the Window, and the little Implements of
Paper and Wax, Pens and Wafers, which I
prefume may be found in the Scritore? they
have all the fame Original, they were once
mere Vegetables. Paper and Books owe their
being to the Tatters of Linnen which was
woven of the Threads of Flax or Hemp: The
Paſt-board Covers are compoſed of Paper, and
the Leather is the Skin of the Calf, that drew
its Life and Suftenance from the Meadows.
The Pen that you write with was plucked
from the Wings of the Gooſe which lives up-
on the Grafs of the Common: the Inkhorn
was borrowed from the Front of the grazing
Ox; the Wafer is made of the Paſte of Bread-
Corn, and the Wax is originally plundered
from the Bee who ftole it out of a thouſand
Flowers.
Permit me, Ladies, faid the Philofopher,
to
}
ESSAY IX.
224
Of Plants
to mention your Drefs: Too nice a Subject in-
deed for a Scholar to pretend any Skill in it:
But I perfuade my felf your Candor will not
refent my naming the rich Materials, fince I
leave thoſe more important Points the Faſhion
and the Air to be decided entirely by your
fuperior Skill. Shall I enquire then, who
gave Perfis the filken Habit which ſhe wears?
Did the not borrow it from the Worm that
fpun thofe fhining Threads? And whence
did the Worm borrow it but from the Leaves
of the Mulberry-tree which was planted and
nouriſhed for this Purpoſe by the Country
Swain? May I ask again, how came Therina
by the fine Linnen which the is pleaſed to
appear in, and the coftly Lace of Flanders
that furrounds it? Was it not all made of the
Stalks of Flax that grew up in the Field like
other Vegetables? and are not the fineſt of
your Mullins owing to the Indian Cotton-
tree. Nor can you tell me Theron, one upper
Garment you have, whether Coat, Cloak or
Night-Gown, from your Shoulders to your
very Feet, as rich and as new as you think
it, which the Sheep or the poor Silk-worm
had not worn before you. 'Tis certain the
Beaver bore your Hatt on his Skin: that
foft Fur was his Covering before 'twas yours;
and the Materials of your very Shoes, both
the upper part and the Soles of them, cover-
ed the Calf or the Heifer before they were
put on your Feet: all this was Grafs at firſt,
2
for
SECT. V.
225
and Animals.
for we have ſeen that all the animal World
owes its Being to Vegetables.
The Company ſeemed ftrangely furprized,
and thought they had been led into fairy
Land; they imagined themſelves decoy'd into
the midſt of Inchantments, while their Fancy
roved thro' all theſe Transformations. Yet
the Diſcourſe ſeemed to carry fuch Evidence
and Conviction with it, that tho' they retain-
ed their Wonder they could not with-hold
their Affent.
When Crito had given them leave to muſe a
little he took up the Argument again. Give me
leave, Madam, faid he to Therina, without
Offence, to lead you into further Wonders.
You have ſeen that the Furniture of the Place
where we are, as well as the precious Attire
in which you are dreft, were lately the Pro-
duction, and the Ornaments of the Foreft,
the Meadow or the Garden. But could you
forgive me, if I fhould attempt to perfuade
you, that that beautiful Body of yours, thoſe
lovely Features and thofe Limbs, were once
growing alſo in the Fields and the Meadows?
I fee, Lady, you are a little ſhocked and fur-
prized at the Thought. I confefs the Ideas
and Sentiments of Philofophy are not always
fo courtly and fo favourable to human Na-
ture as to be addreft to the tender Sex: But
pardon me, Therina, if I enquire, was not
your Infancy nurfed with Milk and Bread-
Corn? Have you not been fed with Wheat,
е
tho*
226
ESSAY IX.
Of Plants
131
tho' 'twas of the fineſt kind? And your
Drink, what has it been but either the In-
fufion of Barley, or the Juice of the Grape,
or for Variety perhaps the Cyder-grove has
fupplied you? The Flesh with which you
have been nouriſhed to fuch a well-proporti-
oned Stature belonged to four-footed Animals,
or to the Fowls of the Air; and each of theſe
have either been fed with Corn or Graſs :
Whence then, Madam, has your own Body
been fupported, and what do you think 'tis
made of?
But 'tis fafer to transfer the Argument to my
felf. Theſe Limbs of mine, Therina, owe
themſelves entirely to the animal or vegetable
Food, to the Roots or the Stalks, to the Leaves
or the Fruit of Plants, or to the Flefh of brute
Creatures which have past thro' my Mouth
for theſe fifty Years, or the Mouths of my
Parents before me: This Hand would have
been worn to a mere Skeleton, my Arms had
been dry Bones, and my Trunk and Ribs the
Statue of Death, had they not all received
perpetual Recruits from the Field. Thefe
Lips which now addrefs you are of the fame
Materials, and they were once growing like
the Grafs of the Earth. This very Flefh
which I call mine now, did belong to the
Sheep or the Ox before it was a Part of me;
and it ferved to cloath their Bones before it
covered mine. You know, Theron, you are
a Gentleman who delight in rural Sports when
you
+
SECT. V. and Animals.
227
you refide at your Country-Seat, and you love
to feaſt on the Game that you have purfued.
Did you ever fuppofe that any part of your
felf was once hurried thro' the Air in the
Breaſt of a frighted Partridge, which came
before Night into your Net? Or that any
Piece of you was ever driven thro' the Fields
before the full mouth'd Hounds on the Legs
of a hunted Hare, which was the next Day
prepared for your Table? Had you ever fo
ftrange a Thought as this is? And can you
believe it now? Or upon a Survey of my Ar
gument can you tell how to deny it? And
what are Hares and Partridges made of but
growing Herbage or fhattered Corn?
'Tis true, you have fometimes tafted of
Fiſh, either from the Sea or the Rivers, but
even theſe in their Original alfo are a fort of
Grafs; they have been fed partly by Sea-
weeds, and partly by leffer Fifh which they
have devoured, whoſe prime and natural Nou-
riſhment was from fome vegetable Matter in
the watry World. In fhort, Sir, I am free to
declare that whether I have eaten Cheeſe or
Butter, Bread or Milk, whether I have fed on
the Ox or the Sheep, or the Fowls of the
Air, I am certain that this Body and theſe
Limbs of mine, even to my Teeth and Nails
and the Hairs of my Head are all borrowed
originally from the vegetable Creation. Every
thing of me that is not a thinking Power, that
is not Mind or Spirit, was once growing like
Q 3
Grafs
228
ESSAY IX.
Of Plamts
Grafs on the Ground, or was made of the
Roots which fupported fome green Herbage.
And now, Theron, what think you of all
thefe Paradoxes? Which of them do you ca-
vil at? Which leaves you room for Doubt or
Queſtion? Is not Philofophy an entertaining
Study, that teaches us our Original and theſe
aftoniſhing Operations of divine Wiſdom and
Providence? But it teaches us alfo to have
humble Thoughts of ourſelves, and to re-
member whence we came. Theron to con-
clude the Diſcourſe confeft his Surprize and
Conviction; he acknowledged the Juftice of
Crito's whole Argument, gave him hearty
Thanks for his inftructive Lecture, and re-
folved to remember theſe amazing Scenes of
the Operations of Nature and the adorable
Wiſdom of God his Maker. Nor fhall I ever
forget, faid he, the ftrange and unſuſpected
Dependance of Man on all the meaner Parts
of the Creation. I am convinced that Pride
was never made for Man, when I ſee how much
akin his Body is to the Fowls of the Air and
Brutes of the Earth. And I think, faid he,
I am more indebted to my Tenants than ever
I could have imagined, nor will I caſt ſuch a
fcornful Eye again on the Grafier and the
Farmer, fince this Flesh and Blood of mine,
as well as the Furniture of my Houſe and
the Cloaths I wear, were once growing in the
Fields or the Woods under their Care or Cul-
tivation; and I find I am nearer akin to them
3
fince
SECT. VI.
229
and Animals.
fince this Self of mine with all the Finery that
covers it was made originally of the fame Ma-
terials with them and their coarfer Coverings.
SECT. VI.
The fimilar Operations of Plants and Animals
TTS
IS with Admiration and Pleaſure we
take notice of the regular Actions of
Animals, even in their earlieſt Hours of Life,
before they can poffibly be taught any thing
by Remark or Imagination. Obferve the
young Sparrows in the Neft, fee how the lit-
tle naked Creatures open their Mouths wide
to their Dam as tho' they were fenfible of
their Dependance on her Care for Food and
Nouriſhment: But the Chicken juſt releaſed
from the Priſon of the Shell can pick up its
Food with its own Bill, and therefore it doth
not open its Mouth to beg Food of the Hen
that hatched it. Yet the Chicken feems to
ſhew its Dependance too, for when the firſt
Danger appears you fee it run and fly to the
Wing of its Dam for Protection; as tho' it
knew that tho' it could feed it felf, yet it was
not able to defend itſelf, but muft truft to bet-
ter Security and a Parent's Wing. We admire
theſe little Creatures and their remarkable Sa-
gacity; we are furprized to find that they dif-
tinguiſh ſo happily and purſue their proper
Intereft; that they are fo foon acquainted
with their Abilities and their Wants, and come
Q 3
to
230
ESSAY IX.
Of Plants
to uſe their Underſtanding ſo very early: for
'tis evident that the meer Faculty of Senfe,
that is, the paffive Reception of Images or
Ideas, can never be fufficient to account for
theſe wondrous Imitations of Reafon; Senfe
has nothing to do but with the prefent Im-
preffion, and includes no Reflection or Prof
pect of the paft or the future, no Contrivance
of Means to an End, nor any Action in order
to obtain it.
But what ſhall we fay, or how ſhall we
account for it, if we are told, there are In-
ftances almoft as admirable as theſe to be found
in the vegetable World where we never fufpect
Senfe or Reafon? The Vine, as tho' it were
fenfible of its own Weakneſs, thrufts forth
its long Tendrills, which curl round the
Branches of any ſtronger Tree that ſtands
near, and thus it hangs its weighty Cluſters
upon the Arms of the Elm that fupport it.
Nay, every Cluſter has a Tendrill belongs to
it, and if any stronger Twig of its own be
within its Reach, it hangs itſelf there by this
Tendrill for ſupport. The Hop and the Lu-
pin or French Bean, as tho' they knew they
could not ſtand by themſelves, find another
way to raiſe their Heads on high; they twine
the whole Length of their Bodies round the
Poles or the Rods which are planted near-
them; and thus their Growth and their Fruit
are upheld from rotting upon the Ground,
The Ivy for the fame Reafon but by another
Contrivance
SECT. VI.
231
and Animals.
Contrivance climbs up the Oak, and ſticks
clofe to its Sides: and the feeble Plant which
we vulgarly call the Creeper, that can hardly
raiſe itſelf three Foot high alone, thrufts out
its Claws at proper Diſtances, fixes them faft
in the neighbouring Wall or Building, and
mounts by this Means to the Tops of higheſt
Houſes. What Variety of Artifice is found
here among theſe feeble Vegetables to fupport
themſelves!
Yet we believe thefe Plants have no Under-
ftanding, and Mankind are all agreed they have
no fuch thing as Senfe belonging to them; and
we immediately recur to the Wiſdom of God
the Creator, and afcribe the Contrivance and
the Honour of it to him alone. It was he (we
fay) who gave the Vine its curling Tendrills, and
the Creeper its hooky Claws: it was he inftruct-
ed the one to bind itſelf with natural winding
Cords to the Boughs of a ſtronger Tree, and he
taught the other as it were to nail itſelf a-
gainſt the Wall. It was he fhewed the Ivy
to aſcend ſtraight up the Oak; and the Hop
and the Lupin in long ſpiral Lines to twine
round their proper Supporters.
Let us enquire now, what do we mean by
fuch Expreffions as theſe? Truly nothing but
this; that God formed the Natures of thefe
Vegetables in fuch a manner, as that by cer-
tain and appointed Rules of mechanical Mo-
tion they ſhould grow up and move their Bo-
dies and their Branches fo as to raiſe and to
Q 4
uphold
1
232
ESSAY IX.
Of Plants
uphold themſelves and their Fruit. Thus the
Wiſdom of God the great Artificer is glorified
in the vegetable World.
And why ſhould we not give God the Crea-
tor the fame Honour of his Wiſdom in the
animal World alfo? Why may we not fup-
poſe that he has formed the Bodies of brute
Creatures and all their inward Springs of Mo-
tion with fuch exquifite Art, as even in their
youngeſt Hours without Reaſoning and with-
out Imitation to purfue thofe Methods as regu-
larly which are neceffary for their Life and their
Defence by the fame Laws of Motion and the
fame unthinking Powers? This is Nature
when God has appointed it. This ſeems to
be the true Idea and the cleareft Explication
of that obfcure Word Inftinct.
If we allow theſe young Animals to per-
form all their Affairs by their own Contrivance
and Sagacity, why don't we afcribe the fame
Sagacity and Artifice to Vines and Ivy that we
do to young Sparrows or Chickens? The Mo-
tions of the Plants are flower indeed, but as
regular and rational as thoſe of the Animals;
they fhew as much Deſign and Contrivance, and
are as neceffary and proper to attain their End.
Befides, if we imagine theſe little young
Birds to practiſe their different Forms of Mo-
tion for their Nouriſhment or Defence by any
Springs of Reafon or Thought, Meaning or
Deſign in themſelves, do we not aſcribe Un-
derſtanding to them a little too foon, and con-
fefs
1
SECT. VII.
233
and Animals.
feſs their Knowledge is much fuperior to our
own, and their Reaſon of more early Growth?
Do we not make Men or rather Angels of them
inſtead of brute Creatures? But if we fuppofe
them to be acted by the peculiar Laws of ani-
mal Motion which God the Creator by a long
Forefight has eſtabliſhed amongſt his Works,
we give him the Honour of that early and
fuperior Reaſon, and we adore the divine Ar-
tificer, Pfal. cxlv. 10. All thy Works fhall praife
thee, O Lord.
But we are loft among theſe Wonders of
thy Wiſdom, we are ignorant of thy divine
and inimitable Contrivances. What ſhall we
fay to thee thou Allwife creating Power! Thy
Works furprize us; the Plants and the Brutes
puzzle and confound our Reafonings: We
gaze at thy Workmanſhip with facred Amaze-
ment, thy Ways in the Kingdom of Nature
are untraceable, and thy Wonders paſt find-
ing out.
SECT.
VII.
Of the Principles of Action in Brutes and Men.
UT what will fome Readers fay when
Buthe
they peruſe theſe Diſcourſes? Are Plants
and Brutes fo very near akin to each other,
Creatures which we have always diftinguiſhed
into the Senfible and the Senfelefs? Have Birds
and Beaſts no more Perception or Feeling,
Knowledge or Confcioufnefs, Underſtanding
or
}
234
Of Plants
ESSAY IX.
or Will than the Herbs, the Trees and the
Flowers? Is the Grafs of the Field as wife a
thing as the Animal which eats it? Excuſe
me here, my Friends; I dare affert no ſuch
Paradoxes. What if ſome of the early Ac-
tions of brute Creatures are merely the Effects
of fuch Machinery and Inftinct as I before
defcribed? It does not follow thence that all
the Actions and Operations of their Lives muft
be afcribed to fuch a mechanical Principle.
Even in human Nature, where there is an un-
doubted Principle of Senfe and Reaſoning,
there are ſome early Actions which feem to
be the proper Effects of fuch Instinct or Me-
chaniſm, and are owing to the wondrous di-
vine Artifice in the Contrivance of their ani-
mal Bodies, and not to any Exerciſe of their
own reafoning Powers. How doth the Infant
hunt after the Breaft, and take it into its
Mouth, moving the Lips, Tongue and Palate
in the moſt proper Forms for fucking in the
Milk to nouriſh it? How does it readily fhut
the Eyes to cover them from any Danger near?
How does it raiſe its Cries and Wailings aloud
for help when it is hurt? Theſe are certain-
ly the Effects of Inftinct in their outward
Members, as much as the Circulation of their
Blood and Digeftion of their Food in their
Bowels and inward Parts.
"Tis certain there are ſeveral Operations in
the Lives of brute Creatures which feem to
be more perfect Imitations of Reaſon, and
bid
SECT. VII. and Animals.
235
bid fairer for the real Effects of a reaſoning
Principle within them than thefe early Actions
which I have mentioned. What ſtrange Sub-
tilty and Contrivance feem to be found in the
Actions of Dogs and Foxes? What Artifices
appear to be uſed both by Birds and Beafts of
Prey in order to feize the Animals which were
appointed for their Food, as well as in the
weaker Creatures to avoid and eſcape the De-
vourer? How few are there of the Paffions
as well as the Appetites of human Nature
which are not found among ſeveral of the
brute Creatures? What Refentment and Rage
do they diſcover? What Jealouſy and Fear,
what Hope and Defire, what wondrous In-
ftances of Love and Joy, of Gratitude and
Revenge? What amazing Appearances of this
Nature are obſerved in Birds and Beafts of the
more docile and domeſtic kind, that they ut-
terly puzzle and pofe the wifeft of Philofo-
phers to give a plain, fair and fatisfactory Ac-
count how all thefe Things can be perform'd
by Mechanifm or the meer Laws of Matter
and Motion? I confefs it is impoffible for us
to determine with any Certainty how far the
Powers of Mechanifm can go, when under
the Direction of infinite Wiſdom in the ori-
ginal Formation of thefe Engines: and how
far certain general Laws of animal Motion
may be at first appointed by God the Crea-
for which may reach to perform all the vi-
fible Appearances in the brutal Creation for
4
fix
236
Of Plants
ESSAY IX.
fix thouſand Years together. But if this be
Machinery contrived by an all pervading Mind,
it is certain that it is not to be explained by
all the preſent Sciences and Reaſonings of
Men.
*
I confefs alſo on the other hand I am not
very fond of allowing to Brutes fuch an im-
material Soul, fuch a thinking and reaſoning
Power, which in its own Nature muft car-
ry Immortality with it. Every Emmet upon
a Mole-hill, and every Bee in a Swarm lays
as juſt a Claim to fuch a Spirit as an Ox or an
Elephant. The amazing Inſtances of
appear-
ing Sagacity and Reaſoning, Deſign and Choice,
which diſcover themſelves in theſe little Crea-
tures make as good Pretence to fuch a fub-
lime Principle of Conſciouſneſs, Judgment
and Liberty. And why may not the Millions
of Mites in a Cheeſe, and the Nations of o-
ther Animalcules which fwarm invifible to
the naked Eye, be entitled to the fame reafon-
ing Powers or Spirits, fince their Motions, fo
far as Glaffes diſcover them, are as happily
fuited to the Ends of animal Life? "Tis diffi-
cult to bring ones felf to believe that an im-
material Spirit is prepared for each of thefe
minute Creatures fo foon as their Body is
form'd, and that at the Death of the Body it
ceaſes to exiſt, or that it paffes by divine Ap-
pointment from one Animal to another by
certain unknown Laws of Tranfmigration.
The late Bishop Burnet, who was no indi-
ligent
SECT. VII. and Animals.
237
ligent Enquirer into various Knowledge, feems
to determine in his Expofition of the first Ar-
ticle of the Church of England, Ed. 3. Page
34. that one of theſe two Opinions is now the
Reſult of the Thoughts of the Learned (viz.)
that either Brutes are meer Machines or that
they have reaſonable Souls. It is certain, ſays
he, that either Beafts have no Thought or Liberty
at all, and are only Pieces of finely organized
Matter, capable of many fubtile Motions that
come to them from Objects without them; but
that they have no Senfation nor Thought at all
about them: But he fuppofes that human Na-
ture can hardly receive or bear this Notion, be-
cauſe there are fuch evident Indications of even
high Degrees of Reafon among the Beafts; he
concludes therefore, It is more reaſonable to
imagine, that there may be Spirits of a lower Or-
der in Beafts, that have in them a Capacity of
thinking and chufing; but that'tis fo entirely un-
der the Impreffions of Matter, that they are not
capable of that Largenefs either of Thought or
Liberty, that is neceffary to make them capable
of Good or Evil, of Rewards and Punishments;
and that therefore they may be perpetually rolling
about from one Body to another, i. e. by perpe-
tual Tranſmigrations from Body to Body.
1
It is far beyond all my Skill in Philofophy
to adjuſt and determine thefe Differences and
to decide this Queftion. Sometimes I think
'tis hard to allow even Senfation to Brutes, or
to imagine that their Creator, who is perfect
Equity
238
Of Plants
ESSAY IX.
Equity and Goodneſs, ſhould expofe Creatures,
who are innocent and could never fin, to ſuch
a Life of intenſe Toil, Anguiſh and Mifery,
as fome of them ſuſtain. At other Times I
can hardly avoid afcribing Reafon to them,
when I obferve fo many Signatures of all
the violent and the tender Paffions, both in
their Motions, their Eyes, and their Counte-
nance, and ſo many Appearances of Thought,
Contrivance and Defign. Every Ant and
Worm puzzles my Reaſonings and Baffles all
my Science.
But on which Side foever this Queſtion be
determined, I defire to lay down this Bar
or Caution againſt the Inference that Atheiſts
or Materialifts would make on this Subject;
and that is, that how many Actions foever
may be perform'd by Brute Creatures, without
any Principle of Senfe or Conſciouſneſs, Rea-
fon or Reflexion, yet theſe things can never
be applied to human Nature. It can never
be faid, that Man may be an Engine too, that
Man may be only a finer fort of Machine,
without a rational and immortal Spirit. And
the Reaſon is this. Each of us feel and are
conſcious within our felves, that we think,
that we reaſon, that we reflect, that we con-
trive and defign, that we judge and chufe with
Freedom, and determine our own Actions:
We can have no ftronger Principle of Affent to
any thing than prefent, immediate, intellectual
Confcioufnefs. If I am affured of the Truth
of
SECT VII.
239
and Animals.
\
of any Inference whatſoever, 'tis becauſe I
am fure of my Conſciouſneſs of the Pre-
mifes, and of my Conſciouſneſs that I derive
this Inference from them. My Conſciouſ
neſs of theſe Premiſes therefore is a prior
Ground of Affurance, and the Foundation of
all my Certainty of the Inferences. Let a
thouſand Reaſons therefore be laid before me,
to prove that I am nothing but an Engine,
my own inward prefent Conſciouſneſs of this
Propofition, that I have Thoughts, that I have
reaſoning Powers, and that I have a Will and
free Choice, is a full Evidence to me that
theſe are falſe Reaſonings and deceitful Argu-
ments: I know and am affured, by what I
feel every Moment, that I have a Spirit with-
in me capable of knowing God, and of honour-
ing or diſhonouring my Maker, of chafing
Good or Evil, of practifing Vice or Virtue;
and that I hereby am bound to approve my-
felf to the Almighty Being that made and
governs me, who will reward me in fome fu-
ture State or other, according to my Behavi-
our in this.
And as I can certainly determine this
Truth, with Regard to my own Nature,
fo when I fee Creatures round about me of
the very fame Species with my felf, I juftly
infer the fame Truth concerning them alfo;
I conclude with Affurance, that they are not
meer Engines, but have fuch reaſonable and
immortal Spirits in them, as I find in my felf.
"Tis
240
ESSAY IX
Of Plants
'Tis this Inference of fimilar and equal Cau-
ſes from fimilar and equal Effects that makes
a great Part of the Science of Mankind.
Befides, I daily hear Men difcourfing with
me on any Subject, and giving as regular and
reaſonable Anſwers to my Enquiries, as I do
to theirs; I feel within my ſelf, 'tis impof-
fible for me to do this without thinking, with-
out the careful Exerciſe of my intellectual
and reaſoning Faculties fuperior to all the
Powers of Mechaniſm; and thence I infer 'tis
as impoffible for them to practiſe the fame
Diſcourſe or Converfation, without the Pow-
ers of a rational and intelligent Spirit, which
in its own Nature is neither material nor
mortal.
Let the Queſtion therefore which relates to
Brute Creatures be determined on any Side,
it does not at all affect the Nature, the Rea-
fon, or the Religion of Mankind. 'Tis be-
yond all doubt that Man is a Creature which
has an intelligent Mind to govern the Machine
of his Body, that Man has Knowledge and
Judgment and free Choice; and unleſs he ap-
prove his Conduct to the Eyes of his Crea-
tor and his Judge in this State of Mortality
and Trial, he expofes himſelf to the juſt
Vengeance of God in his future and immor-
tal State.
"Tis certain, that the Alwife and Alrighteous
Governour of intelligent Creatures, will not
appoint the very fame Fate and Period to the
Pious
SECT. VII.
and Animals.
241
Pious and the Profane; neither his Wiſdom,
his Equity, nor his Goodneſs, will fuffer him
to deal out the fame Bleffings and the fame
Events in every State of Exiſtence, to thoſe
who have loved him with all their Souls, and
thoſe who have hated and blafphemed his
Name. It is the Glory and the Intereſt of
the Supreme Ruler of the Univerſe, to make
a confpicuous and awful Diftinction in one
World or another, between thoſe who have
endeavoured to ferve him, and to render his
Majeſty honourable among Men, and thoſe
who have impiouſly abuſed all his Favours,
ridicul'd his Thunder, and robb'd him of his
choiceft Honours. But if Philofophy ſhould
fail us here, if it were poffible for Creatures
of fuch different Characters to have nothing
in their own Natures which was immortal,
yet 'tis a very reaſonable thing, that the
great
Judge of all ſhould prolong their Beings be-
yond this mortal State, that the Sons of Vice
might not go triumphant off the Stage of Ex-
iſtence, and that the Men of Virtue might
not be always oppreft, nor come to a Period
of their Being, without fome Teſtimony
of the Approbation of the God that made
them.
R
ESSAY
242
ESSAY X.
Of Sun Beams
ESSAY X.
Of Sun Beams and Star Beams.
SECT. I.
Is the Ether beyond our Atmosphere a meer
Anfw.
N
Vacuity.
O; by no means: For there is
not one minute Spot in all
the folar Syſtem, where the
Pupil of an Eye might not be placed, and
fee a Hemiſphere of Stars. Suppoſe the vi-
fible Stars to be no more in Number than the
Ancients counted them: viz. a thouſand and
twenty fix, or for the fake of a round Num-
ber, one thouſand only; yet the other Stars
viſible to the naked Eye, together with thoſe
which are visible by a Teleſcope, would
amount at leaſt to many thouſand more.
Suppoſe between the leaſt of theſe Teleſco-
pical Stars, and the viſible Stars of the firſt
Magnitude, the apparent Difference be no
greater than that of one to a hundred: Sup-
pofe again, that from the leaft of thefe Stars
but one fingle Ray came to one Eye, then
from the biggeſt Star there muft proceed a
hundred
SECT. I. and Star Beams.
243
hundred Rays: This would multiply the
Rays of all the Stars in a Hemifphere, which
came to each Eye with fenfible Notice, by
the Affiftance of a Teleſcope, at leaſt to a hun-
dred thouſand, without ftanding to make a nice
Computation. What Millions of Millions of
Star-Beams then muſt be for ever paffing
through the ethereal Space, to be able to
meet every Eye placed in any Part of this
vaft Sphere of our World, if there be not a
Spot upon it fo big as the pupil of an Eye,
but must admit of fo many thouſand Beams?
What infinite Rencounters and Decuffations,
Meetings and Croffings through all the Parts
of our folar Systém ?
Next, let us fuppofe each of thefe Pupils
were turned inward toward the Sun: each
will meet with a far greater Number of
Beams of Light from the Sun, in fuch a Prc-
portion as the full Blaze of Day is fuperior
to the glimmering Light of the Star-Beams.
The vaſt Addition of Rays from the Sun does
almoſt infinitely increaſe the Rencounters and
Decuffations: Sun-Beams and Star-Beams,
ever meeting in innumerable Myriads through-
out the Ether of our folar World; fince we
have allow'd that there is not a Spot in it
whence a Hemiſphere of Stars might not be
feen, and whence alfo we may not fee a He-
miſphere of blazing Day-Light.
Let it be remembred alfo, that thefe Mo-
tions of the Particles of Light both from the
R 2
Sun
{
244
ESSAY X.
Of Sun-Beams
Sun and Stars, are and have been inceffant
ever fince the Creation, both by Night and
Day: For our Night and Day are only dif
tinguiſh'd by the little Globe of our Earth
turning its different Sides toward the Sun,
which is an inconfiderable thing in the vaſt
folar World, or planetary Syftem. The Rea-
ſon why we do not difcern the Stars by Day,
being only the fuperior Quantity and Force
of the Sun-Beams ftriking the Eye, where-
as the Star-Beams ftrike alfo conftantly,
but fo feebly, as not to be noticed: And
the Reaſon why we do not ſee the Sun
by Night, being the Interpofition of the
Earth; and the Sun-Beams that go befide the
Earth, fly from our Eyes, and not toward
them: But the fame Quantity of Sun and
Star-Beams are perpetually flowing through
the Ether in every minute Part of it, except
only thoſe few Places where the Planets or
their Satellites intercept them and ſtop their
Motion.
Now the Corollaries that may be drawn
from theſe Suppofitions are,
1. That fince Light is a Body, which has
been fufficiently proved by its Reflexions and
Refractions, &c. the Ether is not fo void a
Space as perhaps fome have been ready to
imagine, fince there is not a minute Spot in
it, wherein there are not many thouſand Bo-
dies always moving with prodigious Swiftneſs
all manner of Ways. And it may be enquir-
ed,
SECT. I. and Star-Beams.
245
ed, whether the Planets moving through
fuch a Fluid, would not by Degrees be re-
tarded in their Courfes; but the next Corol-
lary perhaps may anſwer it.
2. How amazing muſt be the Subtilty and
Smalness of thefe Rays, which have been
fhooting from the Sun and Stars for almoſt
fix thouſand Years, and yet no fenfible Addi-
tion is made to the Bulk of our Globe where
they ſeem to be all loft, nor any fenfible Di-
minution of the Sun or Stars whence they
all proceed? And if theſe Corpuſcles which
compofe this wondrous Thing called Light,
are ſo inconceivably ſmall, and the Body be
fo rare, perhaps the Planets may pafs through
it without fenfible Retardation. But Query,
Can the Body of Light be fo rare, when there
is ſo aſtoniſhing a Plenitude of Rays in every
part of Ether?
3. What a furprizing Work of God is
Viſion, that notwithſtanding all thefe infinite
Meetings and Croffings of Star-Beams and
Sun-Beams Night and Day, through all our
folar World, there fhould be fuch a regular
Conveyance of Light to every Eye, as to dif-
cern each Star fo diftinctly by Night, as well
as all other Objects on Earth by Day? And
this Difficulty and Wonder will be greatly
increaſed by confidering the innumerable
double, treble, and ten-fold Reflexions and
Refractions of Sun-Beams or Day Light near
our Earth, and among the various Bodies on
R 3
the
246
Of Sun Beams
ESSAY X.
the Surface of it. Let ten thouſand Men
ſtand round a large elevated Amphitheatre;
in the Middle of it, on a black Plain, let ten
thouſand white round Plates be placed, of
two Inches Diameter, and at two Inches
Diſtance; every Eye must receive many
Rays of Light reflected from every Plate, in
order to perceive its Shape and Colour. Now
if there were but one Ray of Light came
from each Plate, here would be ten thou-
fand Rays falling on every fingle Eye,
which would make twenty thousand times ten
thouſand, that is two hundred Millions of Rays
croffing each other in direct Lines, in order
to make every Plate vifible to every Man. But if
we fuppofe that each Plate reflected one hun-
dred Rays, which is no unreaſonable Suppo-
fition, this would rife to twenty thousand Mil-
lions. What an amazing thing is the diſtinct
Viſion of the Shape and Colour of each Plate
by every Eye, notwithſtanding theſe confuſed
Croffings of Rays? What an aftoniſhing
Compoſition is the Eye in all the Coats and
all the Humors of it, to convey thofe ten
thouſand white Images, or thoſe Millions
of Rays ſo diſtinct to the Retina, and to im-
prefs or paint them all there? And what
further Amazement attends us, if we follow
the Image on the Retina conveying itſelf by
the optick Nerves into the common Senſory
without Confufion? Can a rational Being
furvey this Scene, and fay there is no God?
Can
SECT. II. and Star Beams.
247
Can a Mind think on this ftupendious bodily
Organ the Eye, and not adore the Wiſdom
that contriv'd it?
SECT. II.
Doth the World grow bigger or leſs?
ET us fuppofe, according to modern
Philoſophy, that the Univerſe is of vaſtly
larger Extent and Compaſs than ever our
Anceſtors imagined, and that each of the in-
numerable Multitude of Stars is a Sun to
fome Syſtem of Planetary Worlds, which are
continually rolling round it: Yet I now take
it for granted, that the Number of theſe
Stars is not actually infinite: For the Number
of the Star-Beams would then be almoſt in-
finitely greater than infinite; befides other
Abfurdities, which I think would follow from
the fuppofed Infinity of the Univerfe. We
will determine therefore at preſent without
further Debate, that it muſt have fome Li-
mit: Now this Limit muſt be either fome
hard and capacious Body including the whole
world, as in a Box or a hollow Sphere, re-
ftraining the Particles of Light from a fur-
ther Progreſs, or elſe it muſt be the actual
Agency of the Power of God confining the
utmoft Star-Beams in their Flight, and ſay-
ing, Hitherto fhall ye go, and no further.
The Reaſon I give for it is this, (viz.) If a
Star-beam, or the Light of one of the outer-
moft
R 4
248
Of Sun-Beams ESSAY X.
moft Stars continues its Motion in a direct
Line from the Star to the preſent Limit of
the Univerſe, and be not powerfully ftop'd
and confin'd there by fome folid Body, or
the Almighty Will of God, it will move on-
ward infinitely in the void Space in a direct
Line, according to the firſt Law of Motion,
(viz.) That a Body moving will ever move
in a direct Line onward, unleſs ſome other
Being divert or reftrain it. Thus the Uni-
verſe would be for ever enlarging its Bounds,
as the Light proceeds further in its Progreſs,
and gains upon the void Space: The World
would be for ever growing and encreafing its
Extent without End. And what is faid here
concerning one Star, may be afferted concern-
ing our Sun and every Star, and the greateſt
part of the Rays they ſend förth.
And if Light move fo fwiftly, as to paſs
through one hundred and fourſcore thouſand
Miles in the Second of a Minute, as modern
Philofophy afferts, with what a prodigious
Speed muft this World increaſe its Extent,
and be for ever increafing it? efpecially if
we confider that Light moves this Number
of Miles in a Second from the Body of the
Sun, or perhaps of Jupiter to our Earth,
where there are fuch denſe Mediums as the
Atmoſpheres of the one and the other to re-
tard its Motion: But thofe Sun-Beams and
Star-Beams must move perhaps with a much
greater Swiftneſs, which fly far befide or be-
yond
SECT. II. and Star-Beams.
249
yond the planetary Worlds and their Atmo-
ſpheres, and have no other hindrance but
their Kindred Rays from Sun or Stars. Now
the Number of the Star-Beams or Sun-
Beams, which being fent from the Centre,
move far befide and beyond the planetary
Worlds, are almoft infinitely more than thofe
which come directly to them or near them,
becauſe the Planets are but ſmall and incon-
fiderable Globes or Balls, when compar'd
with the prodigious Vaftneſs of the Expanfe
in which they move.
Now if theſe Star-Beams have been mov-
ing thro' the infinite Void with fuch an aſto-
niſhing Swiftnefs, ever fince the World has
been created, i. e. at the Rate of one hun-
dred and fourfcore thouſand Miles in the
Second of a Minute, what prodigious Ex-
panfion has the Univerſe arrived at, if accor-
ding to Mofes, we count the Beginning of all
Things to have been but fix thousand Years
ago? But if the Mofaick Hiftory of the Cre-
ation has Regard only to our Earth, or to the
planetary Syftem of our Sun, then, for ought
we know, the Univerfe might be created fixty
thouſand or fix hundred thouſand Years
ago; and how amazingly muſt it be dilated
by ſuch a Suppofition, yet continually enlarg-
ing its Bounds, and gaining upon the boundleſs
Void?
As the Univerſe upon this Suppofition will
be for ever inlarging its Limits, fo it will be
for
250
Of Sun Beams ESSAY X.
1
for ever diminiſhing its folid Subſtance, till
in time the lucid Bodies are in a great Mea-
fure wafted away, or at leaft till the lumi-
nous Atoms are all fled away and gone: And
then, not only the Planets, but whatſoever
more of folid Matter remains in the Stars,
alfo will be buried in eternal Darkneſs: And
if the World had been eternal, as fome Per-
fons have imagined it, it muſt have been long
ago reduced by this means to univerſal Mid-
night and Defolation.
I can think but of one Objection to be
raiſed againſt this way of reafoning, and that is
that Gravitation toward the Stars or their Pla-
nets, would withhold thefe Atoms of Light,
theſe luminous Rays, from fuch a prodigious
and eternal Excurfion into the infinite Void.
But may it not be anſwered, that fince
Gravitation could not fo reftrain the Motion
of theſe bright Atoms, thefe Star Beams when
they were much nearer to the Star and its
Planetary Worlds, but that Light when 'twas
emitted from the Star, fled with fuch a pro-
digious Swiftneſs, even to fo vaft a Diſtance,
can it be ſuppoſed, that Gravitation will have
fo much Influence as to ftop its Motion, when
it is arrived at this vaft Diftance from the
Star, and all its Planets?
Yet after all, I know it may be reply'd
again, that Gravitation is a Power which is
not limited in its Agency by any conceivable
Diſtances whatfoever; and therefore when
theſe
SECT. II.
251
and Star Beams.
thefe Star-Beams are run out never fo far into
the infinite Void by the Force of their first
Emiffion from the Star, yet their Gravitation
towards the Star (or fome of the Planetary
Worlds, which fometimes perhaps may be
nearer to it) has perpetual Influence to retard
their Motion by Degrees; even as the Mo-
tion of a Comet is retarded by its Gravita-
tion towards the Sun, tho' it flies to fuch a
prodigious Diſtance from the Sun; and in
time 'tis ftop'd and drawn back again, and
made to return towards its Center. And juſt
fo
ſo may we ſuppoſe all the Sun-Beams and Star-
Beams that ever were emitted, even to the
Borders of the Creation, to have been re-
ſtrained by Degrees by this Principle of Gra-
vitation, till moving flower and flower, at
laft they are ſtop'd in their Progrefs, and made
to return towards their own or fome other
Planetary Syſtem. And if fo, then there is
a perpetual Return of the Beams of Light
towards fome or other of their bright Origi-
nals, an everlaſting Circulation of theſe lucid
Atoms, which will hinder this eternal Dila-
tation of the Bounds of the Univerfe, and at
the fame time will equally prevent the waft-
ing of the Subſtance of the lucid Bodies, the
Sun or Stars.
Well, but if this Power of reſtraining and
reducing the Flight of Star-Beams be af-
cribed to this Principle of Gravitation, let us
enquire what is this Gravitation, which pre-
vents
252
Of Sun-Beams ESSAY X.
vents the Univerſe from fuch a perpetual
waſte of Light? It cannot be ſuppoſed to be
any real Property or natural Power inhering
in Matter or Body, which exerts its Influence
at fo prodigious a Diſtance. I think therefore
'tis generally agreed and with great Reaſon,
that it is properly the Influence of a Divine
Power upon every Atom of Matter, which
in a moſt exact Proportion to its Bulk and
Diſtance, cauſes it to gravitate towards all
other material Beings, and which makes all the
bulky Beings in the Univerfe, (viz.) the Sun,
Planets and Stars attract the Bodies that are
near them towards themfelves. Now this
Law of Nature being fettled at firſt by God
the Creator, and being conftantly maintained
in the Courſe of his Providence, it is eſteem-
ed as an Effect of Nature, and as a Property
of Matter, tho' in Truth it is owing to the
Almighty and All-pervading Power of God
exerting its inceffant Dominion and Influence
through the whole material Creation, pro-
ducing an infinite Variety of Changes which
we obferve among Bodies, confining the Uni-
verſe to its appointed Limits, reftraining the
fwift Motion of the Beams of Light, and
preferving this vaft Syftem of Beings from
Waſte and Ruin, from Defolation and Dark-
nefs. If there be a World there is a God:
If there be a Sun or Stars, every Ray points
to their Creator; not a Beam of Light from
all the lucid Globes, but acknowledges its
Miffion
SECT. II. and Star-Beams.
253
Miffion from the Wiſdom and Will of God,
and feels the Reftraint of his Laws, that it
may not be an eternal Wanderer.
But I call my Thoughts to retire from
theſe extravagant Rovings, beyond the Limits
of Creation. What do theſe Amuſements
teach us, but the inconceivable Grandeur,
Extent and Magnificence of the Works and
the Power of God, the aſtoniſhing Contriv-
ances of his Wiſdom, and the Poverty, the
Weakneſs and Narrowness of our own Un-
derſtandings, all which are Leffons well be-
coming a Creature?
{
ESSAY
254
ESSAY XI.
On Some
-
ESSAY
On Jome Metaphyfical Subjects.
XI.
T
SECT. I.
Of Nature and Eſſence *.
HE Nature or Effence of any Being
confifts in a Union of all thofe Things,
whether Subftances or Modes and
Properties which are neceffary to make that
Thing be what it is. So it is the Nature of
a Triangle to have three Lines fo joined as to
make three Angles; and the Nature of a Spi-
rit to be a thinking ſelf-ſubſiſting Being; even
as extended folid Subftance is the Nature of
Body: 'Tis the Nature or Effence of a Grove
to be a Spot of Ground thick fet with Trees,
and the Nature of Man to be a Spirit united/
to an Animal of fuch a particular Shape;
and 'tis the Effence or Nature of a Rofe to
be a Flower whofe Leaves are of ſuch a ſpe-
cial Figure and ſuch a beautiful faint reddiſh
Note, This Effay is little more than an Amplification
of the fecond Chapter of the following Sketch of Ontolo-
gy, written when the Author had fome Thoughts of
compofing a larger Syſtem of that Science.
Colour,
SECT. I. Metaphyfical Subjects. 255
Colour, with fuch a peculiar Smell as are all
united in the Plant to which we give that
Name.
The Nature of a Thing by Philofophers
is called its Effence: and a Thing may be faid
to have an Effence or Nature when it is not
actually in Being, if the Mind of Man can
clearly conceive it as poffible to be; fo an Eng-
lifh Rofe in January, Snow in Guinea, or an
innocent Man on Earth, may be faid to have
an Effence among the Nature of Things, tho'
perhaps there are not fuch Things actually in
Being.
Note, The Effence of mathematical Beings,
which are but a fort of abftract Ideas, are e-
ternal and immutable, and may be faid in the
Language of the Schools to confiſt in an indi-
vifible Point; for if a Square, a Triangle, or
a Circle, want the leaft Part or Degree of its
Perfection, it fails of fome of the Proper-
ties of that Figure, it lofes its Nature, and
ceaſes to be that Figure.
But the Effences of natural Beings as well as,
artificial or moral, are not fo immutable as
Philofophers have formerly thought 'em ; nor
do they confift in an indiviſible Point; for
natural Beings are not ranged by God or Man
into diftinct Species or Kinds fo very exactly,
that if any of the Ideas which go to compoſe
the Effence of any particular kind of Being
be never fo little varied by Addition, Dimi-
nution, or Alteration, it deftroys that Kind,
and makes it ſomething elſe.
Ancient
256
On fome
ESSAY XI.
Ancient fcholaftick Writers indeed were al-
'moſt univerſally agreed, that all natural Be-
ings are thus exactly diſtributed into diſtinct
Species, and that each hath its own indivifible
and unchangeable Effence: But in our Age we
are taught to philofophize with more Caution
on this Subject; and that great Genius Mr.
Locke has done much toward teaching us.
We uſe the Word Species to fignify a Rank
of Beings, in each of which we find a Col-
lection of thofe Ideas united which we call its
Nature or Effence, and which we ufually join
together under one Name, and make that
ftand for the Name of a Species; fo we call
one Sett of Creatures Men, another Monkeys;
fome are named Beaſts and others Birds; this
Metal is Gold, that is Silver, and the other
is Lead, according to the different Ideas which
each of
we have joined together to make
thefe Species or Kinds in our way of thinking
and ſpeaking.
up
Now in many things it is evident that by
dropping or diminiſhing fome of thoſe Ideas
which are uſually called effential, and by add-
ing or altering others, there may be a confi-
derable Change made in fome individual Be-
ing, and yet we range it ſtill in the fame Spe-
cies, and give it the fame Name. We uſually
fuppofe four Feet and a Tail and a Power of
barking to be effential to a Dog; but fuppofe
a Dog bad ne'er a Tail or a Tongue, do we not
call it a Dog ftill? Or if the Beaſt ſhould be
a little
I
SECT. I. Metaphyfical Subjects. 257
a little monstrous and fhould have five Feet,
would it ceaſe to be a Dog?
a
But if theſe Ideas which we uſually call
eſſential ſhould be very greatly changed, thence
there would arife fo great a Variation from
what we call one kind of Beings, and ſuch an
Approximation towards another, that it may
fometimes be very hard to know under what
Kind or Species to rank the Being in Queſtion,
and what general Name to give it. This is
very eaſy to conceive in Things moral or arti-
ficial (1) in moral Ideas: The Will of a Pa-
rent may be manifefted to à Son in fuch foft
and perfuafive fort of Language, that 'tis hard
to fay whether it muſt be called a Counsel or
a Command. A voluntary Action may have
fo many Circumſtances in it both good and
bad, that it may be a Difficulty to determine
whether 'tis virtuous or vicious, lawful or un-
lawful. (2.) In Things artificial: A Hat
and a Cap are different kinds of Garments for
the Head: A Hat has brims all round
Cap has not yet the Brims of the Hat may
be fo leffened by degrees or cut into fuch a
Shape, that you would not know whether to
call it a Cap or a Hat. The fame gradual
Change may be made in a Chair or Stool by
leffening or enlarging the Back of it. And ſo in
a Garden or Orchard by multiplying or dimi-
niſhing the Number of Fruit-trees.
; a
And why may we not ſuppoſe that Natu-
ral Beings are in fome Meaſure at leaſt left
ន
under
258
On Some
ESSAY XI.
under the fame fort of Uncertainty? A Tinc-
ture of Gambogia is yellow: add a fmall Tinc-
ture of Ultramarine to it, and it becomes doubt-
ful whether it is yellow or green: Put in fe-
veral more Degrees of Ultramarine fo as to
overwhelm the Gambogia, and the Yellow is
quite loft; 'tis a Doubt then whether it be
green
or blue. The Gold of Africa and that of
the East-Indies ufually differ in their Colour,
one being more ruddy than the other: perhaps
a few more Degrees of Redness with a ſmall
Alteration of the Weight, might make a Chy-
mift doubt whether it were Gold or no. Sil-
ver and bafer Metal are fometimes ſo inter-
mingled in the Mines that 'tis hard to fay whe-
ther this Clod be true Silver Oar. So by dif
ferent Graftings and artful Unions of different
kinds of Trees the Fruit thereof may ſo much
fo
change its Qualities as to be ranked under a
new kind, whether of Pears or Apples, &c.
nor are Inftances wanting amongst animal Be-
ings: A Creature may be born ſo monstrous
with fo many Parts or Properties like a Man
and ſo many like a Monkey, that we may be
at a lofs whether to call it a Monkey or a Man:
and much more may fuch a Thing happen
in the Species of Horfes and Affes, Dogs and
Foxes: and there is a Creature which we call
a Batt which we doubt whether to place a-
mong the Species of Birds or Beafts.
Yet it muſt be granted that natural Beings
which are the Works of God have or ſeem
to
SECT. I. Metaphyfical Subjects.
259
to have ſomething more of a regular and con-
ftant Limitation of their Effences than moral
or artificial Beings which are the Works of
Man. God the Creator in the Courfe of his
Providence generally keeps up the fucceffive
Production of natural Beings, whether Me-
teors, Metals, Plants or Animals, in fuch a
regular Uniformity, as to eſtabliſh and main-
tain ſuch conſtant and real Boundaries of their
different Species as are fufficient for all the
Uſes of the natural World, and for the Pur-
poſes of human Life; and therefore in all or-
dinary Cafes we may fay, that God has given
Boundaries to the different Species of natural
Things; but the Hints which have here been
given do alfo fufficiently prove the Falfhood
of that Axiom of the Schools (viz.) that all
Natures or Effences of Things are unchangeable,
or that they confift in an indivifible Point, and
that other Axiom alfo, that in Effences there
are no Degrees. See what is written on this
Subject in Logick, Part 1ft. Chap. 6. Sect. 6.
And Mr. Locke has difcourfed on this Subject
very copiouſly in his Treatife of the human
Understanding, Book III. Chap. 3, 4, 5 and 6.
where he ſeems to make the ranging of all
Beings into different Species to be only the
Work of the Mind of Man, and that the Ef
fences of all Things, as we diſtinguiſh them,
are meer nominal Effences. So far as I can re-
collect his Sentiments, he fcarce allows any
more real and establish'd Bounds of Diſtinc-
}
S $ 2
tion
›
笑
​254
t
260
ESSAY XI.
On fome
tion between the Effences of different kinds
of natural Beings which God has made (viz.)
Lions, Snakes, Apples, Roſes or Sun-Beams,
than there are between the Effences of moral
Beings or Ideas which the Minds of Men
form, fuch as Murther, Theft, Idolatry, Go-
vernment, or the artificial Beings which their
Hands produce, fuch as Houfes, Pins and
Paper. Whether fome of his Expreffions on
this Subject be not a little too ſtrong, let the
Learned inquire and determine, fince 'tis grant-
ed that the Effences and Species of natural
Beings are generally kept fufficiently diſtinct
by the God of Nature.
TH
SECT. II.
Of Matter and Form.
'HE Nature of every particular Body
confifts of Matter and Form. We need
not change the Terms of the old Philoſophy,
but there is great need of mending the Senſe
of them.
The Matter of Body is the folid extended
5 Subftance of which it is made, which feems
to be uniform, and the fame in all Bodies. If
the Ariftotelians meant nothing elſe by their
Materia Prima, they have dreſt up their Sen-
timents very odly.
The Form of each particular Body is the
Combination either of thofe primary and real
Qualities, or of thoſe ſecondary and ſenſible
Qualities,
SECT. II. Metaphyfical Subjects. 261
Qualities, or of both together which belong
to that Body, and make it be what it is: and
thus far we may agree with the Definition of
the Schools, Forma eft id per quod res eft id
quod eft.
The primary or real Qualities are that
par-
ticular Shape or Figure, and that Size or
Quantity, with thofe Degrees of Motion or
Reft, and that Situation, both of the ſenſible
and imperceptible Parts of it as is proper on-
ly to that kind of Body, and belongs to no
other.
The ſecondary or fenfible Qualities of a Bo-
dy are its particular Colour, Tafte, Smell,
Coldneſs, Heat, Hardness, &c. 'Tis from the
different Modifications and Difpofitions of theſe
primary Qualities (viz.) Shape, Motion, Quan-
tity, Situation, &c. that all the fecondary or
fenfible Qualities arife, fuch as Colour, Tafte,
Weight, Hardness, &c. whereby we commonly
diſtinguiſh moſt Bodies of different kinds from
one another.
In fome Bodies indeed any fort of Matter
with ſuch a particular and determined outward
and viſible Shape and Size is fufficient to make
up the Nature and Effence of them, or to
make thofe Bodies be what they are: as for
inftance, any fort of folid extended Subſtance
with a Figure every way round is the Matter
and Form of a Ball or Globe, without regard
to its fenfible Qualities of Colour, Hardness,
&c.
c. Any Building of whatfoever Materials, if
S 3
it
262
ESSAY XI.
On Some
it be framed and fitted for Men to dwell in is
called a Houſe: Any long Piece of Matter
bent round like a Hoop may be called a Ring,
and any ſmall open hollow Veffel to wash our
Hands in may be called a Bafon.
In other Bodies there muſt be fuch a par-
ticular inward Contexture of the Parts, that
is, fuch a peculiar Shape and Situation and
inteftine Motion or Reft of the fmall invifi-
ble and imperceptible Particles of Matter of
which it is compofed, to compleat the Nature
of them, and to give them thoſe ſenſible Qua-
lities of Colour, Hardness, &c. and to make
them be what they are. This is required in
the Bodies which we call Water, Quick-filver,
Gold, Wood or Clay; but it is no Matter what
the outward and grofs Shape of them is, for
that makes no Difference nor belongs to the
Nature of them.
But in other Bodies there muſt be both the
outward vifible Figure as well as the inward
Shape, Situation, Reft or Motion, and Fer-
mentation of the imperceptible folid or fluid
Parts to compofe the Nature of it or make it
be what it is; this is evident in a Gold Ring,
a Rope, an Egg: and the fame is true of
all Plants and Animals, as a Roſe, an Qak, a
Horſe, an Eagle.
It is granted that the ſharpeſt Underſtanding
can penetrate but a very little way into the
Natures or Effences of natural Beings and the
ſpecial Forms of them, in the prefent State;
3
we
SECT. II. Metaphyfical Subjects. 263
we know and diſtinguiſh the Bodies that are
round about us by their outward Figures and
Sizes, and by their fenfible Qualities, by their
Effects upon our Senfes and their fenfible O-
perations upon one another, much more than
we do by any of the Figures or inteſtine Mo-
tions of thofe little imperceptible Atoms and
Particles of which they are compofed, for
thefe being invifible to us for the moſt part
lye out of the Reach of our Knowledge. And
therefore our Deſcription of natural Bodies is
much more drawn from their fenfible Qua-
lities.
The Matter of which a Body is made is ei-
ther proxime or remote: the proxime Matter
of which a Houfe is made is Bricks, Tiles and
Mortar, Beams and Rafters, Boards and Nails.
The remote Matter is Clay, Sand and Lyme,
Trees and Iron; and they are called remote:
Becauſe Bricks and Tiles are made of Clay,
Mortar is made of Sand and Lyme: Beams,
Rafters and Planks are cut out of Trees, and
Nails are formed of Iron. The proxime
Matter of a Book is its Leaves printed with
Words, bound up in Covers: but Paper and
Printer's Ink are the remote Matter of it, to-
gether with Paftboard and Leather,
Note, Matter and Form have been by the
Ariftotelian Philofophers generally ranked a-
mongſt the Caufes, and treated of there, but
without any juſt Reafon: yet they may
be juftly called the conftituent Principles
S 4
of
264
ESSAY XI.
On Some
of Things, tho' they are not proper Caufes.
Note, Matter and Form are Words which
have been transfer'd from corporeal Beings to
feveral other Things which relate to the in-
tellectual World, with fome analogous or
kindred Signification: The Matter of the Sci-
ence of Anatomy or that about which it
converfes is the Body of Man: The Form
is a skilful Diffection and Knowledge or De+
ſcription of the feveral Parts of the Body,
their proper Figure, Situation and Defign.
The Matter of a Sermon is any Theme in Di-
vinity, fuppofe it be the Worſhip of God, or
Love to Man, the Evil of Sin, the Redemp-
tion of Chrift, or the Glory of Heaven: the
Form of the Sermon is that particular manner,
both in regard to Senfe, Order, and Style in
which the Preacher treats of thofe Subjects,
whether it be in Propofitions, Doctrines, Rea-
fons, Inferences; whether it be in a Way of
Argument or Harangue; whether in rude or
polite Language.
From the various Application of theſe
Terms, Matter and Form, proceeds that old
and famous Diſtinction of material and for-
mal which is uſefully applied to a thoufand
various Subjects; thus the River of Thames
is formally the fame as it was in our Grandfa-
thers Days, becauſe it runs between the fame
Banks, but materially 'tis very different, for
perhaps there is not a Drop of the fame Wa-
ter. Thus Dryden's and Ogilby's Virgil are
materially
SECT. III. Metaphyfical Subjects. 265
materially the fame becauſe they are English
Tranflations of the fame Latin Poet; but con-
fidered formally they are exceeding different,
i. e. as to the Elegance of the Verfe,
SECT. III.
Of the different Senfes of the Word Nature.
HA
Aving ſpoken of the Nature of particu-
lar Beings which confifts in a Collection
of thofe Things which make it be what it is, 'tis
proper alſo to obferve that the Word Nature
fometimes is fo limited as to fignify any one
particular Attribute or Property of a Being,
as it is the Nature of a Dog to bark, and of
Fire to burn.
Sometimes 'tis fo far enlarged as to denote
the whole World or the Univerſe of Things;
as, when we ſpeak of a Centaur or Griffon,
and ſay there is no fuch Thing in Nature.
Sometimes alfo the Word Nature is taken
for the neceffary and eternal Order and Con-
nection of Things in Idea, and the unchange-
able Relations of them to each other. So we
fay, 'tis according to the Nature of Things,
that Creatures are mutable, that three and three
make Six; or that two mathematical Circles
can touch each other but in a Point.
We call alſo thofe Laws which God the
Creator has eſtabliſhed in the World for the
Management of the grand Scheme of his Pro-
vidence by the Term of Nature; and indeed
many
266
ESSAY XI.
On fome
many times we do not enough diſtinguiſh them
from the abftracted Reafon of Things and
their neceſſary and eternal Relations. In this
Senſe we fay 'tis natural for a Stone thrown up
to fall back towards the Earth again, for Cork
to float in Water, and for Gold to fink: 'tis
natural for the Earth to be carried round the
Sun in 365 Days, and for the Sun to enliven
the vegetable and animal World. We fay al-
fo, 'tis natural for the Soul of Man to move
his Limbs by a Volition, or to have a Percep-
tion of White when he turns his Eyes towards
the Snow. In all thefe Things we uſe the
Word Nature for thoſe ſettled Rules by which
the powerful Will of God governs his Crea-
tures: And 'tis only in this Senfe Nature
ftands in oppofition to Miracle, for 'tis in this
Senſe only that God can change the natural
Courſe of Things by miraculous Influence.
The Term Nature ſtands alfo for the Prin-
ciples of Reafon within us. By Nature we
learn that there is a God, and that Man is
not his own Maker. The fame Word Nature
alfo fignifies the eternal Fitneſs or Unfitneſs of
Things, and their moral Relations as well as
natural and in general it means the Spring
and Foundation of all thofe Duties which
Reafon teaches us; fo we ſay, 'tis a Law of
Nature that God muſt be honoured, Con-
tracts ought to be kept, Gratitude is due to
Benefactors, and Compaffion muſt be ſhewn
to the Diftreft.
"Tis
SECT. IV. Metaphyfical Subjects. 267
"Tis in this Senfe that Nature is uſually dif
tinguiſhed from Revelation, as when we ſay,
Man by Nature may be taught to worship
God, but 'tis only Revelation teaches him that
God will be worſhiped by a Mediator.
IT
SECT. IV.
Of Creation or Confervation.
T has been a very famous Queſtion in the
Schools whether Confervation be a continual
Creation, i. e. whether that Action whereby
God preferves all Creatures in their feveral
Ranks and Orders of Being is not one conti-
nued Act of his creating Power or Influence,
as it were, giving Being to them every Mo-
ment: Whether Creatures being formed out
of nothing would relapſe again into their firſt
State of Non-entity, if they were not, as it
were, particularly reproduced by a creating
Act of God: Now there is one plain and eaſy
Argument whereby perhaps this Controverfy
may be determined, and it may be propofed
in this manner.
In whatſoever Moment God creates a Sub-
ſtance he muſt create with it all the Proper-
ties, Modes and Accidents which belong to it
in that Moment; for in the very Moment of
Creation the Creature is all paffive and cannot
give itſelf thoſe Modes. Now if God every
Moment create wicked Men and Devils, and
cauſe them to exiſt ſuch as they are by a con-
tinued
268
On fome, &c.
ង
ESSAY XI.
tinued Act of Creation, muft he not at the
fame time create or give being to all their fin-
ful Thoughts and Inclinations, and even their
moft criminal and abominable Actions? Muft
he not create Devils together with the Rage
and Pride, the Malice, Envy and Blafphemy
of their Thoughts? Muft he not create fin-
ful Men in the very Acts of Lying, Perjury,
Stealing and Adultery, Rapine, Cruelty and
Murther? Muft he not form one Man with
Malice in his Heart? another with a falſe
Oath on the Tongue? a third with a Sword
in his Hand plunging it into his Neighbour's
Bofom? Would not thefe formidable Confe-
quences follow from the Suppofition of God's
conferving Providence being a continual Act of
Creation? But furely thefe Ideas feem to be
fhocking Abfurdities. We must always invio-
lably maintain it for the Honour of the Bleſs-
ed God, that all Spirits as they come out of
his Hand are created pure and innocent: Eve-
ry finful Act proceeds from themſelves, by an
Abuſe of their own Freedom of Will, and
by a voluntary Compliance with the corrupt.
Appetites and Inclinations of Fleſh and Blood.
We must find fome better Way therefore to
explain God's providential Confervation of
Things than by repreſenting it as an Act of
continual Creation, left we impute all the Ini-.
quities of all Men and Devils in all Ages to
the pure and holy God who is bleffed for
evermore. Amen.
3
ESSAY
(269)
ESSAY XII.
1
Remarks on fome Chapters of Mr.
Locke's Effay on the human Un-
derstanding.
SECT. I.
Of Senfible Qualities, and particularly of
"T
Colour.
IS now univerfally agreed among
all Men of Reaſoning and Philo-
ſophy, that the fenfible Qualities,
fuch as Colours, Sounds, Smells, &c. are not
really inherent in the Bodies themſelves, fuch
as we perceive them, but are meer Ideas
arifing in the Mind from the different Im-
preffions made on the Senfes. This is excel-
lently explained and proved beyond Contra-
diction by Mr. Locke in his fecond Book,
eighth Chap. But I have found one Ar-
gument more for the fame Truth which I
think is equally ftrong, and yet different
from all his.
One confiderable Reaſon that will prove
Colour, as well as other fenfible Qualities, not
to
270 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII.
to be really inherent in the Bodies them-
felves, is this; that in order to the Percepti-
on of different Objects, or their different
fenfible Qualities, the external Organs of
Senſe muſt be ftruck or mov'd in a different
manner by thofe Objects. The
The way where-
by we perceive variety of diſtinct Colours, is
by the Variety of Impreffions that are made
upon our optic Nerves by the Rays of Light
reflected from coloured Bodies; thefe Rays
of Light being reflected in various and dif-
ferent manners, require that the Surfaces of
thefe Bodies which reflect them ſhould be really
different from each other, and be compofed
of Particles of divers Figures or Sizes, Situ-
ations or Motions, for otherwife they could
not reflect the Rays of Light in different man-
ners; nor can any Diſtinction be made in
the feveral Impreffions of red and green Ob-
jects on the Eye, through the common Me-
dium of Air, but what arifes from the vari-
ous Shapes and Sizes, and Diſpoſitions of the
Particles that compofe the Surface of a red
or green Body; becauſe theſe little Particles
muſt variouſly reflect the various and different
Rays of Light to our Eyes. If therefore Bodies
of divers Colours be diftinguifh'd by our
Sight, it muſt be by the diftinct Impreffions
their Surfaces make by the Rays of Light on
the Eye; for a meer inherent Quality, or a
fuppofed Teint or Dye in the Bodies them-
felves would not diverfify the Reflexions of
Light,
SECT. I. of Mr. Locke's Effay 271
Light, nor do any thing towards it, if the
Surface, of thofe Bodies were of the fame
Configuration of Particles. It is plain that
we might have the fame Impreffions made
on our optic Nerves, by various coloured
Bodies, if theſe Colours were only inherent
Teints, and had no other Difference in their
Surfaces. The like may be faid of all other
fenfible Qualities, (viz.) the Variety of O-
dors, Sapors, Sounds. For if all theſe were
only a fort of inherent Qualities, ſuch as we
perceive them, the Surfaces of theſe feveral
Bodies might be the fame as to the Figure,
Size and Texture of the faid Particles that
compoſe them, and confequently they would
make the fame uniform Impreffions on our
Organs of Senſe, and raife the fame uni-
form Senfations; and we could never diftin-
guiſh theſe things which we call fenfible Qua-
lities, (viz.) the different Taftes, Smells, &c.
of different Bodies. All theſe therefore muft
arife from the different Configurations, &c. of
the Particles of thefe different Bodies; for
nothing elſe can excite different Impreffions
on our Senfes.
Shall it be objected here, that Sir Ifaac
Newton has found by Experiment, that the
Rays of Light themſelves are different, ac-
cording to the various Colours which the
Eye perceives? what need is there then of
any Difference in the Surfaces of Objects ?
I an-
272 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII.
I answer, That the Rays of Light differ
according to Sir Ifaac Newton, in the Degrees
of their Refrangibility; and Objects of all
Colours, would reflect the fame Rays, and
in the fame manner, if the Surfaces of all
coloured Objects were the fame: There muft
be fomething therefore in the Surface of diffe-
rent-coloured Objects, more fuited to reflect
thefe different Rays to the Eye; and that
Object is called Red, which reflects the red-
making Rays, others blue, others yellow, &c.
'Tis confefs'd indeed, where a Priſm ſepa-
rates the different forts of Rays, and throws,
for Inſtance, only the red-making Rays upon
a yellow Body very plentifully, and ſtrongly,
this yellow Body in fuch a Situation will ap-
pear red, becauſe there are few other Rays for
it to reflect: But when Red, Blue, Yellow,
Green and Purple Bodies are placed in com-
mon Light, the Surfaces of each of them
will reflect to the Eye only, or chiefly, their
own fort of Rays, by virtue of their own
different Surfaces, and thus diftinguiſh their
own Colours.
Another Argument which Mr. Lee ufes in
his Notes on Mr. Locke, is this, that there
are many things which appear of different
Colours at the fame time only by their dif
ferent Situation to the Light, or the different
Pofition of the Eye. So Glaffes, cut Dia-
monds, Bubbles, Silks, Pictures, &c. which
prove that Colour is not a Tincture really
inherent
SECT. II. of Mr. Locke's Eſſay. 273
inherent in them; but fo far as 'tis in the
Bodies, 'tis only a particular Texture or Dif
pofition of the Particles of the Surface fuited
to make different Reflexions of Light to the
Eye, according to its various Pofitions in re-
lation to the coloured Body.
But it muſt be confefs'd, Mr. Locke's Chap-
ter on this Subject, is admirably well written,
and worthy of diligent Perufal and Study by
every young Philofopher.
MR
SECT. II.
Of Succeffion and Duration.
R. Locke's Doctrine of Succeffion and
Duration proceeding from the Train
of Ideas in our Minds is new and ingenious;
but his fecond Argument for it, contained
in the beginning of the fourth, Section, and
taken from that Opinion of his, that the
Mind doth not think in Sleep, I cannot apprové
of; and I think that the middle of that
Section does rather effectually prove the
contrary Pofition: For while a Man is very
intent upon one Idea, he difcerns not the
Succeffion of fo many Moments, as if his
Ideas had been often varied; and fince it
comes to paſs that in Sleep we cannot recol-
fect our Ideas, but they vanish for the moſt
part as foon as they are form'd, it follows,
that our Ideas of that Duration muſt be very
fhort, fince we are fo far from recollecting
T
any
274 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII.
any Variety of Ideas in that Seaſon, that we
can ſcarce believe by meer Recollection, that
we had any Ideas at all at that Time: And I
am perfuaded, ſhould a Man all at once lofe
the Memory of what he had done this laft
Week or Month, fo that the Ideas which
he had a Month paſt, or the Actions that he
then did, were the freſheft in the Recollection,
it would ſcarce appear to him that thoſe laſt
Actions or Ideas were above a few Days old:
fo that the immediate vaniſhing and difap-
pearance of our fleeping Ideas may be as
much to the Purpoſe in this Sentiment about
Duration, as though our Sleep had no Ideas
at all.
Mr. Locke's Conjecture, that the Train of
Ideas do fucceed one another at certain Dif-
tances of Succeffion, which cannot be much
delay'd or haften'd, I must acknowledge to
be an ingenious Thought, and a pretty Me-
thod of accounting for the Original of our
Notions of Duration and Succeffion: and per-
haps it may be the Reaſon why Motions ex-
ceeding fwift or exceeding flow, are not per-
ceived by our Senfes, of which Mr. Locke ſpeaks,
Book II. Ch. 14. §. 9, 10, 11. But here (as in
many other Places) he avoids diftinguiſhing
what part the animal Spirits or bodily Pow-
ers may have, and what the Mind, in this Suc-
ceffion of Ideas, which perhaps might folve
this Queſtion with more Evidence.
What if we ſhould conceive thus, (viz.)
that
SECT. II. of Mr. Locke's Eſſay. 275
that it may be poffible for å Mind to have
ten fucceffive Ideas in a feparate State in the
time wherein it hath but one, when 'tis in
Union with this Body? The Fibres of the
Brain, which fubferve any of the Operations
of the Soul, and the Filaments of the Nerves,
which reach to the outward Organs of Senfe,
lying betwixt other Fibres or Filaments, or
fleſhy Parts, can be mov'd but to a certain
limited Degree of Swiftnefs; and confequent-
ly thoſe Motions of Bodies which are fwifter
than 'tis poffible for thefe Fibres to be
mov'd, can't be difcern'd or diſtinguiſh'd:
But they appear like a long Line quiefcent,
rather than a fhort Body mov'd as a ſwift Ar-
row or the Fly of a Jack. And as for exceeding
flow Motions, as the Hand of a Watch, it
makes no Impreffion of its Motion at all
upon the outward Organs of Senfe, or at
leaft fo very weak an Impreffion, as that 'tis
not communicated diftinctly to the inward
Fibres of the Brain, or common Senforium,
wherefoever that be; and confequently the
Soul can have no Senfation or Idea of it:
Thus the Motions, which are exceeding ſwift,
or exceeding flow, are not diftinctly difcern'd.
But in a ſeparate Spirit, or in a Spirit united
to ſuch Matter whoſe Motions might be much
fwifter than the Fibres of our Nerves or
Brain, it may be poffible for us to have many
fucceffive Ideas in the Time wherein now we
have but one. And then the Duration or Time
T 2
might
?
}
276 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII
might be meaſured by thofe Spirits, by the
ufual Swiftnefs of the Succeffion of their
Ideas, as well as ours are now, where the
ufual Succeffion is more flow.
SECT. III.
Of Infinity.
N this feventeenth Chapter of Infinity,
Mr. Locke is exceeding large, becaufe 'tis
a Notion that has been the Spring of fo many
long and endleſs Debates among the Learned,
and therefore he is pardonable, if by a Repe-
tition of the fame Things in copious Lan-
guage, he endeavours to imprefs his Thoughts
upon our Minds: his Notions of Infinite as
an ever-growing and not a pofitive complete
Idea, are of admirable Uſe to ſtop and put
an End to thofe Wranglings about Infinity in
Time, Extenfion, fwift and flow Motion, Divi-
fion, Number, &c. which have abounded a
mong fome Writers. And let us chiefly make
this Uſe of this Confideration of Infinity (viz.)
to fhew us how very narrow and bounded
our Underſtandings are, and with what an
awful Senfe of the Weakneſs and Frailty of our
own Thoughts and Judgments we ſhould reafon
about an infinite God and his infinite Affairs.
We finite limited Beings foon loſe our felves
among Infinites whether great or fmall, till
we retreat within our own Bounds and rea-
fon upon Things which are made for our
3.
Grafp
SECT. IV. of Mr. Locke's Effay. 277
Grasp of Thought. The great incomprehen-
fible Being has referved perfect pofitive Infini-
ty to himſelf, and tho' there may be fome
Pofitions determined with Juftice and Certain-
ty about it, yet the lefs we mingle it with our
Arguments we are perhaps the more ſecure
from Error.
SECT. IV.
Of Power. Book II. Chap. 21.
MR
R Locke in his 21ft Chapter of the 2d
Book concerning Power, Sect. 4. fup-
poſes that the Idea of active Power is much
more borrowed from Spirits than from Bodies;
and is far better derived from the Mind's Re-
flection on its own Operations, and its Com-
mand over the Body to put the Limbs of it
in Motion, than it can be from any external
Senſation whereby we behold one Body having
peculiar Influences over other Bodies, to make
Changes in them or to put them into Motion:
and one Reaſon that he gives for it, is “that
"when one Body (viz.) a Ball puts another
"Ball into Motion, it only communicates to
"it the Motion it had received itſelf from
"fome prior moving Body, and loſes in itſelf
"fo much as the other received; which thing
gives us, fays he, but a very obſcure Idea
"of an active Power in Body, whilft we ob-
"ferve it only to transfer, but not to produce
any Motion."
(C
I 3
I will
278 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII.
I will not here ftand to conteft it whether
the cleareft Idea of active Power be de-
rived to Men and Philofophers from Bo-
dies or from Spirits: but I am very apt to
think in Children it may be derived much more
from their Senſations of Bodies moving Bo-
dies, than from their Reflection of any Act of
their Spirits for when they fee a Fire burn
Wood, or their own Hands put a Ball into
Motion, or the Wind ſhake the Trees, they
have as eafie and as clear an Idea of a Power
in the Wind to ſhake Trees, in their Hand to
move a Ball, or in the Fire to burn Wood, as
any Ideas of active Power which they derive
from the Agency of their own Wills upon
their own Limbs.
The Query which I beg leave to put in
this Place, is, Whether that Opinion be true
which Mr. Locke here fuppofes, and which
is a famous Principle in the Cartefian Phi-
lofophy, (viz.) That one Body can com-
municate no more Motion to another, than
that which is in its felf? The Difficulty I
would propofe is plainly repreſented in this
Inftance: Suppofe a Town built with many
fair Houfes and Churches, each of them
adorn'd with Spires and many Ornaments,
ſhould be undermined, or have the Cellars of
it filled with Barrels of Gunpowder, which
have a mutual Communication with each
other through all the Town; and ſuppoſe a
fingle Spark of Fire fhould fall into one of
thoſe
!
SECT. V. of Mr. Locke's Eſſay. 279
thofe Barrels, the Queſtion is, Whether all the
dreadful Convulfion and Ruin of thoſe Build-
ings, together with the thundering Sound.
that ſhall be heard for twenty or thirty Miles
round, be not a Proof of a prodigious Quan-
tity of Motion communicated to the Stones,
Timber, Tiles, Bricks, and all the Materials
of thoſe Edifices, and to the furrounding Air,
by that Spark of Fire, more than could poſ-
'fibly be contained in that fingle Spark? And
how can this Problem be folved upon this
Principle? or rather does not this Inftance
prove the Falfhood of that Cartefian Opinion?
SECT. V.
Whether Liberty can be ascribed to the Will.
HE Author in the 6th, 17th, 19th and
T¹
20th Sections, ingeniouſly declares and
proves the Understanding and Will not to be two
Beings diſtinct from the Mind or Soul itſelf, tho'
they are uſually called two diftinct Powers or
Faculties; which manner of fpeaking, tho' it
be almoſt neceffary in fome Cafes, and has
great Conveniency in it, yet I cannot but af
fent to Mr. Locke's Complaint, that it has
perhaps been one Occafion of leading Man-
kind into fome Miftaken Conceptions about
the feveral Actings of the Mind of Man.
But amongst the reft, he fuppofes this alfo
to be a Miſtake, that we afcribe· Liberty to
the Will; for fince (argues he) the Will is a
Power
I 4
ગ
280 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII.
Power of the Man to determine his own Acti-
ons, and Liberty is alſo a Power of the Man to
act or not to act, &c. both theſe are properly
Powers of the Man, and one Power cannot
be ascribed to another, nor Liberty aſcribed
to the Will.
And he fuppofes us guilty of the fame Mif-
take, when we fay, the Understanding directs
the Will, or the Will obeys the Understanding,
for they are two Powers of the Man, which
have not an Agency or Operation upon each
other, fince Operation, faith he, belongs only
to Agents, or real Beings, and not to Pow-
ers. All theſe Agencies of Powers on each
other therefore he roundly denies, §. 17,
18, 19. and fays, that the Power of Think-
ing, operates not on the Power of Chufing,
nor the Power of Chufing on the Power of
Thinking.
But I beg leave to obferve, that this Ope-
ration of one Power on another, is the com-
mon way of thinking and fpeaking amongſt
Men, with Regard to the Powers of the Bo-
dy as well as thofe of the Mind, nor do I
know any Impropriety in it, nor any Reafon
why it ſhould be alter'd. When the Author
fpeaks of the Faculties of the Body, he names
the digeftive and expulfive Faculty; and is it
not proper to ſay, that in an Animal the di-
geftive Power operates upon the expulfive, and
affifts it in its Operation? May we not fay
alfo, that the mafticative or chewing Facul
ty
SECT. IV. of Mr. Locke's Effay. 281
ty operates upon the digeftive, and accele-
rates it in Digeſtion, without fuppofing theſe
Faculties to be real and diſtinct Beings, dif-
ferent from the Body? fo in his other In-
ſtance of Singing and Dancing; why may we
not ſay, that Apollo's Power of Singing or
Mufick operates on Lesbia's Power of Dan-
cing, fince the dances according to his Notes
of Mufick? and is it not proper to ſay, that
the Power of Thinking, whereby I perceive
a Thing to be good, operates upon the Power
of Chufing it? or the Power of Chufing or Wil-
ling operates on the Power of Thinking, when
I fet my felf to think on any particular Subject by
my Volition or Choice for an Hour together?
Now Mr. Locke's Deſign in all this Denial
of fuch Attributions to a Power, is, as I
hinted before, to fupport his Affertion, that
Liberty or Freedom belongs not to the Will; and
therefore he ſuppoſes 'tis an unreaſonable and
unintelligible Queſtion to afk, whether a Man's
Will be free or not, as 'tis to afk, whether his
Sleep be ſwift, or his Virtue fquare; for Li-
berty, which in his Senſe is but a Power to
act or not to act, belongs only to Agents, and
cannot be an Attribute or Modification or
Power of the Will, which is alſo but a Power.
But in anſwer to this I would ſay, that
perhaps in ſtrict and philofophick Speech it
may be better to fay, The Man or the Soul
is free; yet fince this is the common Lan-
guage of Men, and the ufual way of ſpeak-
ing
282 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII.
ing on this Subject, and fince this way of
fpeaking, (viz.) afcribing Liberty to the Will,
has no fuch Tendency to lead one to mif-
taken Ideas, (if the Nature of the Soul be
but a little explain'd, and the Powers of it
proved not to be two diftinct Beings or Sub-
ſtances) I can fee no Neceffity that a Philo-
fopher ſhould change the common Forms of
Speech: And notwithſtanding all that Mr.
Locke has faid, I fee no Impropriety in aſk-
ing, whether the Will be free or no, or in at-
tributing Liberty to the Will, fince it figni-
fies no more than if we inquired, Whether
the Mind in its Volitions is free to Will, or not?
and to will this or that? Common Forms of
Speech fhould not be renounced and aban-
don'd without evident Neceffity, and Mr.
Locke owns this is the meaning of the Que-
ftion in the latter end of Section 22.
There is another Objection which Mr.
Locke raiſes againſt the afcribing Freedom to
the Will, (viz.) That a Man in respect of the
Act of Volition, when any Action in his Power
is once propofed to his Thoughts, as a Thing pre-
fently to be done, cannot be free; for he muſt
will to do it or to neglect and omit it: and
being under this Neceffity to exert fome Voli-
tion about it, the Will is not free, i. e. the
Man is not free whether to will or not.
But I think this is a meer Fallacy, for the
Queſtion is not whether the Man can abſtain
from all Volitions in general, but whether the
5
Will
SECT. V. of Mr Locke's Effay. 283
Will can determine itfelf to chooſe or refufe
this or that Object or Act propoſed. 'Tis not
whether he can neither chooſe nor refuſe, but
whether he can either chooſe or refuſe :
For 'tis this that fhews the Freedom of the
Will: And, I would remark here, as I have
found fometimes Occafion to do, that 'tis pof-
fible for a vaſt and fagacious Genius to be
not always the faireſt Diſputant; the raiſing a
Cloud of Duft will fometimes evade the true
Queſtion, and appear to gain the Victory when
the Difputant only hides himſelf.
The Debates of Mr. Locke relating to the
Principle or Cauſe which determines the Will
to act, and other Things relating to that im-
portant Queſtion are fet, I think, in fo clear a
Light in a late Effay of the Freedom of Will
in God and Man, that I chooſe to remit my
Reader to that little Book.
IN
SECT. VI.
Of Complex Ideas, and mixed Modes.
N the 12th Chapter of the ſecond Book of
Mr. Locke's Eſſay on the Understanding, in
the 18th, 24th and feveral other Parts of his
Work, this Author ſpeaks in fuch a manner as
tho' all our complex Ideas of Subftances and
mixed or complex Modes were formed by
taking feveral fimple Ideas and joining them
in one Compofition, to make a complex or
compound Idea; and tho' Mr. Locke might
not
284 Remarks on Jome Parts ESSAY XII,
not actually advert to it in thoſe Paragraphs
yet he muſt certainly grant that we do as of-
ten obtain a clear Knowledge of fome Com-
pound or complex Beings by receiving them at
firft into the Mind in all their complex Na-
ture, and afterward feparating them one from
another. Let me give an Inftance of both
Ways of acquiring complex Ideas. If a Child
who is unacquainted with Gold fee a Guinea
at fome Diſtance, he receives perhaps only
the Idea of Extenfion and Yellownefs; bring
it nearer to the Light it appears round
and ſhining; nearer yet, and he beholds the
Stamp of the Coin, then touching it he finds
'tis hard, and taking it in his Hand 'tis heavy:
thus by degrees he joins the Ideas of extended
yellow, round, fhining, the Figure of a Head,
and Hardneſs all together, and learns what a
Guinea is; this is the Way of Compofition.
But if a Guinea be given at firſt into the Hand
of this Child in a bright Place, his Ideas of
Extenfion, yellow, round, fhining, hard, hea-
vy, &c. are imprefs'd all at once as one com-
plex Idea on the Mind; and by Separation
of them and confidering them diftinct, he
may come to clearer Notions of ſome of thoſe
fingle Ideas; and by Reaſon, Qbſervation and
Compariſon he finds what Gold is, and what
is a Guinea: This is the Method of Learning
by Divifion. The fame Thought may be
applied to a City, a Fleet, a Swarm, a Heap,
a Conftellation, &c. fuppofing that the firft
Idea
.
SECT. VI. of Mr. Locke's Effay.
285
Idea the Child has of a House, Ship, Ant, Grain,
Star, be received in this complex manner by
feeing many of them together. Thus Com-
pofition of fimple Ideas and Diviſion of com-
plex ones feem both to be uſed in the obtain-
ing and encreafing our Knowledge of Things
and enlarging our Number of Ideas.
And it muſt be acknowledged that Mr. Locké
allows this way of coming by fome of our
complex Ideas (viz.) by Senſation or Obferva-
tion of the feveral Ideas at once in their complex
State or Union, when he fays, Chap. 22. Sect.
2. Several of them might be taken from Obfer-
vation and the Existence of feveral fimple Ideas
fo combined. And in Sect. 9. Thus by ſeeing
two Men wrestle or fence we get the Ideas of
Wrestling and Fencing, which are very complex
Modes.
The Author in his 18th Chapter, Sect.
2. gives us feveral Inftances of our Ideas of
fimple Modes, ſuch as ſliding, creeping, running,
dancing, &c. which perhaps may be as well
called mixed Modes as fome which he menti-
ons in his 22d Chapter; for even there, at the
End of the 10th Section, I think he makes
running and speaking to be mixed Modes:
he calls them Collections of fimple Ideas; and
indeed 'tis fometimes very difficult to diſtin-
guiſh Ideas fimple from complex, whether they
be Ideas of Subftances or Ideas of Modes,
partly becauſe the Acts of the Mind perceiv
ing feveral Ideas and uniting them in one com-
plex
286 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII.
plex one are fo fwift and undiftinguishable,
that they feem to be one Act, forming one
fimple Idea; and partly becaufe Language
hath appointed fometimes a fingle Word to
fignify a very complex Idea, and fometimes an
Idea much more fimple needs many Words to
exprefs it. Thus thro' the Mixture and Con-
fufion of Ideas by Words, 'tis hard to diftin-
guiſh always which are the fimple ones and
which the complex, or which are the pure and
which the mixed.
Here I might enquire, what Difference doth
Mr. Locke make between complex Modes and
mixed Modes? Would it not be better to dif
tinguiſh them thus? If we apply the Term
fimple Mode to the fimple Ideas of Modes got-
ten by Senfation only, as White, Black, Mo-
tion, Figure, or to thoſe gotten only by Re-
flection, as a Thought, a Defire, &c. and if
feveral fimple Ideas combined, whether fenfible
or intellectual, or both, were called in general
complex Modes; and the Term mixed Mode were
confined only to thoſe Ideas which include both
fenfible and intellectual Ideas, fuch as Speech,
Converfation, Witness, Theft, &c. we might
perhaps diſcourſe more diftinctly of theſe Sub-
jects: But as this Author himſelf ſays in ano-
ther Place, We ought to put things together, as
well as we can but after all fome Things will
not be bundled up together under our Terms and
Ways of Speaking.
SECT.
SECT. VII. of Mr. Locke's Effay. 287
T
SECT. VII.
Of Identity and Diverfity.
"HE moft familiar and common Objects
of Knowledge are often found the moſt
difficult to explain by Principles of Philofo-
phy in clear and diftinct Ideas: Time, Place,
and Motion, the Fluidity, and the Hardneſs
of Bodies, the Coherence of the Parts of
Matter, and the Principle of Gravitation are
convincing Inſtances hereof. The Doctrine of
Identity and Diverfity is as hard to be explain-
ed; and while every Child pretends to know
what 'tis for one thing to be the fame with
itſelf and not another Thing, Philofophers are
deeply intangled in the Search thereof, and
frequently confounded in their Thoughts.
This Author, Mr. Locke, has given us in his
27th Chapter an ingenious Attempt to un-
fold the Mystery of Sameness, or wherein the
Principium Individuationis confifts: and he
deſcribes it, Exiſtence itſelf which determines a
Being of any fort to a particular Time and
Place incommunicable to two Beings of the
Jame Kind. Which Definition, tho' 'tis hard
to underſtand in theſe Words, yet he makes
much clearer by large Inftances in the fol-
lowing Sections. His Meaning is, that Iden-
tity may have various Ideas according as 'tis
applied to various forts of Beings; ſo the
Sameness of an Atom is diftinct from the
Sameness
•
1
288 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII.
Sameness of a Mafs of Atoms; and that is dif
ferent from the Sameness of Vegetables, of
Animals, of Spirits, of Men. The Identity
of Modes, Actions and Relations, and thofe
Things whoſe Exiſtence confifts in Succeffion,
is pretty clearly determined in his 2d Section,
and the Identity of complex Beings in his 28th
and 29th.
But this Author having written more in-
telligibly on this Subject than preceding Phi-
lofophers, grows bold, and afferts, that the
Difficulty of this Subject arifes from Names
ill-uſed, rather than from any Obſcurity in
the Thing itſelf; and that 'tis Want of Care
and Attention that has clouded and confound-
ed the Thoughts of Men. I take leave hum-
bly to remark, that tho' in his general Scheme
of Identity and Diversity, as well as in his
particular Application hereof to Body, Mind,
Plant, Animal, &c. he has performed with
great Ingenuity, yet there remain fome Dif-
ficulties which want farther Care, Attention
and Affiftance to remove.
First, In his 2d Section he afferts that there
could be no Diſtinction of Subſtances or any
thing elſe one from another; if we do not
fuppofe Minds as well as Bodies to exclude
any of the fame kind out of the fame Place:
Which is not only oppofed by the vulgar Phi-
lofophers, which fuppofe a thouſand Minds
may be in the fame Ubi, but 'tis very difad
greeable alfo with the juſter Notion of a Mind,
which
SECT. VII. of Mr. Locke's Effay. 289
which being not extended and having no Re-
lation to place, can neither be faid to admit or
exclude Fellow-minds from the ſame place;
but that every Spirit is fufficiently diftinguiſh-
ed from all others by its particular Cogitations
and Confciouſneſs.
;
And befides, if Minds were extended, why
may not two created Minds be in the fame
Place, and penetrate each other as well as
he fuppofes God the infinite Mind to pene-
trate all Minds and all Bodies whatſoever?
Muft God be the fame with all Minds, be-
cauſe he penetrates all Minds? If a Spirit be
never fo little denfer than Space, 'tis Matter
and if Spirits be no denfer than Space is, why
may they not penetrate each other as well as
both Space and Spirit are fuppofed to pene-
trate Matter? I thought it had been a pecu-
liar Property of Matter to be impenetrable
by a Being of its own kind. What? is Spirit
impenetrable by Spirit too? Can a Spirit pene-
trate the groffeft Matter, and yet not pene-
trate that thin Extenfion of a fellow Spirit,
which is finer than the moft refined Matter,
and as tenuious and unfolid as Space itſelf, as
meer Emptiness?
Secondly, In the 4th, 5th and 6th Articles
he makes the Identity of vegetable and animal ·
Beings to confift in a Participation of the fame
continued Life by conftantly fleeting Particles
of Matter in Succeffion vitally united to the
fame organized Body.
U
ift, Per-
290 Remarks on fome Parts Essay XII.
ift, Perhaps it would be too hard to ask
this Author to explain with great Exactneſs
what he means here by Life and Vitally; the
fame Life in a Plant cannot fignify the fame
Juice or nutritive Particles; for it may be
tranfplanted from Clay to Chalk, or from a
Bed of Earth to a Bottle of Water, and ſtill
'tis the fame Plant. Nor can Life mean the
fame Tubes or the fame Channels betwixt
the Fibres, for they may by degrees be ob-
ftructed, and new ones found or formed till
the old are narrowed, withered, and grown
impervious to the Juice. Nor can Life mean
the fame Method of Motion of that Juice thro'
the Plant; for if you bend the Head of a
Plant down to the Earth, and let its Top take
Root, as may be done to Vines or Brambles,
then cut off the old Stalk near its firft Root,
and the Paffage of the nouriſhing Juice will
be juſt contrary, and yet perhaps 'tis the fame
Plant ftill. I would ask further when the
Graft of a Pearmain has grown three Months or
ſeven Years upon the Stock of a Crab, is it the
fame Tree? has it the fame Life, or has it not?
I might ſay the like concerning the Life of
Animals. It can't be the fame Blood that is
the fame Life; for in a few Months perhaps
we have few of the fame Particles of Blood
as before; however by Dr. Lower's Experi-
ment of Transfusion it may be all changed in
an Hour. Nor can the fame Veins or Vef-
fels make the fame Life, for they are the fame
when
SECT. VII. of Mr. Locke's Eſſay. 291
when the Animal is dead, or they may be
changed in Life-time. Nor is it the fame
Motion of the Blood and Juices, that makes
the fame Life; for individual Motion can't be
communicated to fucceffive Parts of Matter,
fince 'tis periſhing every Moment as his 2d
Section affures us.
Befides
2dly, If a Tree or Animal be dead for fome
time, and by Almighty Power new Life and
vital Motion be given to the fame Matter, 'tis
a different Life according to this Author; for
'tis not the fame continued Life, yet it ſeems
to be the fame Plant and the fame Animal.
3dly, In the End of his 8th Section the
Author afferts that the fame fucceffive Body
not ſhifted all at once, and the fame imma-
terial Spirit united to it goes to make the fame
Man. Here I would ask whether it would
be the fame Man if it were fhifted all at
once? If Goliah at a Month old ſhould have
all at once received that vaft Addition to his
Bulk which increaſed by degrees in forty or
fifty Years, 'tis a doubt whether he would
have been the fame Man or no: and yet why
ſhould the whole Change in one Moment
hinder that to be the fame thing which the
Diſtance of forty Years would neceffarily make
the fame? and generally Nearneſs to the fame
Time and Place makes more toward the Same-
nefs of a Thing than Diſtance of Place and
Time. Yet upon the Whole I think Mr.
Locke is in the right, tho' the Point has Dif-
ficulties.
U 2
And
292 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII.
And perhaps this is the true Notion of
the Sameness of Man as relating to this World
only; (viz.) that the fame fucceffive Body
changing itſelf by degrees according to the
Laws of animal Life, and united to the fame
confcious Mind, muft make the fame Man.
How far the Doctrine of the Refurrection
requires the fame Body, fee Eſſay 8th fore-
going.
Thirdly, He comes to enquire in his 9th
Section, wherein the Sameness of a Perfon
confifts, or perfonal Identity. Here he firſt
informs us, that he ſuppoſes, "A Perfon is a
"thinking intelligent Being, which has Rea-
fon and Reflexion, and can confider itſelf
<<
<<
as itſelf, i. e. as the fame thinking Thing
"in different Times and Places, which it
"does only by that Consciousness, which is
infeparable from thinking.' Now I que-
ftion, whether we may fo eafily agree with
him in this, as a fufficient Account of what a
Perfon is.
Let us confider a little. The Words Self
and Consciousness of Self refer only to the
Pronoun I; but are not the Pronouns Thou
and He perfonal Pronouns as well as I? Sup-
pofe Armando has flain his Neighbour in the
fight of Martys and Criton, and ſhould be
feized with fuch a Lofs of Memory after-
ward, or ſuch Diſtraction, as to blot out the
Conſciouſneſs of this Action from the Mind:
Armando then would ſay, It was not I: But
may
SECT. VII. of Mr. Locke's Effay. 293
may not Martys and Criton ftill charge him,
Thou art the Murderer? May they not juftly
fay, That He is guilty, and He fhould be put
to Death? Are they not as good Judges of
the fame Perfon as Armando is himself? What
if Armando fhould deny the Fact, as having
really loft all Conſciouſneſs of it? Is he not
ftill the fame Perfon that flew his Neighbour?
Does not the Witnefs of Martys and Criton
declare him to be the fame Perfon? They
know his Body to be the fame; and according
to the Laws of Nature, they juftly infer
his Soul must be the fame alfo, whatfoever
Armando's Diſtraction might dictate concern-
ing himself: I think therefore, that the Word
Perfon implies one thinking Being, one in-
telligent Subſtance, which is always the fame,
whether it be or be not confcious and mind-
ful of its own Actions in different Times and
Places *
But Mr. Locke ſeems to be of another Mind;
for he adds, "By this Conſciouſneſs every one
"is to himſelf that which he calls Self; it
<c
not being confider'd in this Cafe, whether
"the fame Self be continued in the fame or
"divers Subftances. In this alone confifts
perfonal Identity, that is, the Sameneſs of a
"rational Being' And in Section 10th,
the Queſtion is, "What makes the fame
*This Difcourfe is intirely confined to Perfonality
among Creatures, and has no Reference to Divine Per-
fonality here.
U 3
<< Perfon,
294 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII,
"Perfon, and not whether it be the fame
"identical Subſtance which always thinks in
"the fame Perfon, which in this Cafe mat-
st
ters not at all. Different Subſtances by the
"fame Conſcioufnefs (where they do partake
"in it) being united into one Perfon, as well
re
as different Bodies by the fame Life are
"united into one Animal, whoſe Identity is
"preferved in the change of Subftances by
"the Unity of one continued Life: For it
"being the fame Conſciouſneſs that makes a
"Man be himſelf to himſelf, perfonal Iden-
<<
tity depends on that only, whether it be
"annexed only to one individual Subſtance,
or can be continued in a Succeffion of feve-
"ral Subſtances. The fame Conſciouſneſs
uniting thofe different Actions into the
"fame Perſon, whatever Subſtances contri-
"buted to their Production.
(6
-
Any Man that reads this, and knows that
the Author is in doubt whether Matter may
not think, would be ready to ſuſpect, that
he is ſo very follicitous to make the fame Sub-
france unneceffary to Perfonal Identity, that ſo
he may maintain his fuppofed Poffibility of
Matter being made capable of thinking; and
that it may be poffible that Thinking may
inhere in animal Nature, whoſe conftituent
Particles of Flesh and Blood
may be
perpe
tually changed, and yet the Animal remain
the fame, and be the fame Perfon too.
}
{
But
SECT. VII. of Mr. Locke's Effay. 295
<<
But to indulge no further Sufpicions, let
us confider what he affirms plainly, (viz.)
that perſonal Identity confifts only in Confcious-
ness; for, fays he, Section 10th, "As far as
ແ any intelligent Being can repeat the Idea
"of any paft Action, with the fame Confci-
oufnefs it had of it at firft, or that it has
"of any preſent Action, fo far it is the fame
perfonal Self; for it is by the Conſciouſneſs
it has of its preſent Thoughts and Actions
"that it is Self to it Self now; and fo it will
"be the fame Self as far as the fame Conſci-
oufneſs can extend to Actions paft or to
come: And he puts thefe Questions, Section
12th, Whether if the fame Subſtance which
"thinks be changed, it can be the fame Per-
"fon? or whether if it remain the fame, it
" can be different Perfons?
<<
<<
<c
cc
To this he answers, This muſt be allow'd
to thoſe who place Thought in a purely
material animal Conftitution, void of any
immaterial Subſtance, becauſe the Subftances
are perpetually changing in animal Nature:
But fuppofing immaterial Subftances only
to think, yet he feems to think it hard to
fhew why perfonal Identity cannot be pre-
ferved in the Change or Variety of immate-
rial Subſtances, as well as animal Identity is
preferved in the Change of material Sub-
ſtances. Thus it is evident, that by his Rea-
fonings, he makes the Sameness of a Perfon to
confift entirely, and only in Conſciouſneſs,
U 4
which
296 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII.
which he had before plainly and ſtrongly
afferted.
I acknowledge he has offered fome plau-
fible Arguments for it, and he has alfo men-
tioned fome formidable Objections againſt his
own Opinion; but I question whether he has
fo well refuted thofe Objections, as to render
that Opinion of his certain and evident,
(viz.) that the Sameness of Perfons confiſts not
in the Sameness of Subftances, either Ma-
terial or Thinking, i. e. either Body or Mind,
but meerly in a Conſciouſneſs of the fame
Thoughts or Actions.
There is no need of debating the Point
about a Man's being the fame Perfon with
himſelf at the prefent Time, becauſe a Man's
own preſent Conſciouſneſs will ſecure to him
his own perfonal Identity, tho' perhaps it will
not confine it to himſelf alone. But the chief
Difficulty relates to his being the fame with
himſelf at diftant Times. And here let us
confider fome of the Difficulties he propoſes
againſt his own Sentiments.
1. He feems to allow, that according to
his Defcription of perfonal Identity two dif
ferent Men may be one and the fame Perfon;
for in his 13th and 14th Sections, as well as
in other Parts of this Chapter, he grants
that a different Spirit created long after may
poffibly have the Conſciouſneſs of Actions
done by a Spirit exiftent many Ages before,
impreftupon it; by this means the Mayor of
Queen-
SECT. VII. of Mr. Locke's Eſſay. 297
Queenborough might fuppofe his Soul had been
the Soul of Socrates, as Section 19, and then
this latter Soul or Spirit, or this Man, be-
comes the fame Perfon with the former, and
thus Socrates and the Mayor of Queenborough
become one Perſon.
But I deny this to be proper conſcious Re-
membrance: 'Tis only a delufive Impreffion
on the Mind or Fancy imitating the Act of
Memory; 'tis a ſtrong Belief of what is falſe.
And can fuch a Frenzy be fufficient to turn
two Men into one Perfon? Muft Domitian
be really the fame Perfon with Romulus, if
his Pride could fo far imprefs his Imagina-
tion, and impofe upon his Memory, as to
perfuade him that he built Rome? Is not this
contrary to all the Senfe and Reaſon, as well
as the Language of Mankind? And might
not Domitian by the fame Madneſs become
Ninus, and Darius and Plato, and twenty
Perfons as well as two?
2dly, He feems to fuppofe, that real For-
getfulneſs may make a diftinct Perfon as well
as fancied Memory may make the fame;
and thus Domitian was not the fame Perfon
that killed Fleas, if ftanding at the Head of
his Army his Pride fhould fo far overpower
his Memory, as to blot out all the Traces of
that contemptible Imployment of his for-
mer Hours.
And ſuppoſe that one of his Soldiers ſhould
by a Diſorder of his Brain imagine, that he
4.
was
298 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII
was confcious that he himſelf had thus been
employed in the Palace of Domitian, and
that he was then the Emperor; would this
Forgetfulneſs of the one, and Frenzy of the
other, make two Domitians upon the Spot,
or two Perfons of Domitian?
Doth not this Author allow in Sect. 19.
that if Socrates aſleep puts forth any Actions,
and is not conſcious of it when he awakes,
fleeping and waking Socrates is not the fame
Perfon? and are they not two Perfons accord-
ing to his Notion? His 20th and 21ft Secti-
ons feem to ſpeak the fame thing.
The chief anſwer that he gives hereto, is
his Diſtinction betwixt Man and Perfon, he
may
allow that Socrates is the fame Man ftill,
i. e. the fame Spirit united to the fame ani-
mal Body; but he doth not allow him to
be the fame Perfon, becauſe not conſcious by
remembrance of his own paft Thoughts or
Actions. And fo I may be the ſame Man that
performed a hundred former Actions of Life,
tho' I have entirely forgot them all; but I
am not the fame Perfon that perform'd Mil-
lions of thoſe Actions, fince I have entirely
forgotten a far larger Number of my Thoughts
than I can recollect. Now, I would only
enquire whether fuch a Diftinction between
Man and Perfon, is either correfpondent with
the Nature and Reaſon of Things, or with
the common Language of all Men, or the
accurate Expreffions of true Philofophy?
In
SECT. VII. of Mr. Locke's Effay. 299
In ſhort, according to this Doctrine of
perfonal Identity, many Men may fucceffively
or fimultaneously be one Perfon; and thus
every private Soldier in the Army of Lewis
the XIVth may become the fame Perfon as
Alexander the Great, if a general Frenzy
ſhould ſeize them, and make a ftrong Im-
preffion upon their Minds, that they fought
the Battle at us, and beat Darius there.
And ſo any one Man may become many Per-
fons: For if Mr. N. Lee the Tragedian hath
a ftrong Impreffion on his Fancy, that he
taught Plato Philoſophy, then he is the fame
Perfon with Socrates; or that he pleaded in
the Roman Senate againſt Mark Antony, then
he is Cicero; or that he fubdued Gaul, and
made himſelf Maſter of Rome, then he is
Julius Cæfar; that he wrote the Eneid, then
he is Virgil; that he began the Reformation
from Popery, then he is Martin Luther; and
that he reign'd in England at the latter End
of the fixteenth Century, and then he is the
fame Perfon with Queen Elizabeth.
On the other hand, this Doctrine feems
to allow us to believe, that if St. Paul ſhould
irretrievably forget all the Labours and Suf-
ferings that he underwent for the fake of the
Gofpel, he would not be the fame Perfon that
fulfill'd his Apoſtleſhip fo glorioufly: And if
Judas fhould never think again through all
his future Exiſtence, that he betray'd the Sa-
yiour of the World, he would not be the
Perfon
!
300 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII.
Perfon that committed that heinous Wic-
kedneſs.
<
The way Mr. Locke comes off from any
terrible Confequences of thefe Poffibilities in
his 26th Section, is by applying the Word
Perſon to Man only in a forenfic Senfe, as
he is the Subject of Happineſs or Mifery, and
is an Object of Rewards or Puniſhments: And
in Section 13, he fuppofes the Goodneſs and
Juftice of God will not fuffer fuch extrava-
gant Poffibilities to come to país, which may
affect the Rewards or Puniſhments of Men;
but his Equity and Truth, will diſcover them-
felves in attributing proper Recompences to
Men or Spirits, confider'd only as Perſons, or
in their perfonal Identity, i. e. as confcious
of their own former Actions of Vice or
Virtue.
But without running to a forenfic Senfe,
there are ſo many Inconveniencies that may
arife from fuch a Notion of perfonal Sameness,
even in the common Affairs of human Life, as
well as in Philofophical Science, as may ut-
terly diſcourage our Affent to this Notion.
The Word Perfon is often uſed, if not moſt
frequently, without any forenfic Senfe: We
fay, There were five Perfons prefent in the
Room at fuch a Time; or I had but one Per-
fon with me, &c. and how can we tell how
many Perfons were or were not prefent, if
the fuppofed Conſciouſneſs of five other Per-
fons fhould place them there at that Time,
and
SECT. VII. of Mr. Locke's Eſſay. 301
and render them the fame Perfons? or if the
fuppofed Forgetfulneſs of the Perfons really
preſent ſhould take away their perfonal Iden-
tity? I fear this Opinion, if univerfally re-
ceived, would bring in endleſs Confufions,
wherefoever the Word Perfon was introduced.
Well, if Mr. Locke's Opinion will not ſtand,
the remaining Queſtion will be then, What
is perfonal Identity, or wherein does it really
confift?
Firft, I would here obferve and allow, that
we are now confidering the Word Perfon ra-
ther in a philofophical than a meer vulgar
Senfe: For I grant there are fome Modes of vul-
gar Expreffion, wherein the Idea of Perſonality
feems confin'd to the Body of Man: And
thus we fay, A very tall Perfon, or a very
comely Perfon: Or when a Confumption has
made a Man lean and pale, or the fmall Pox
has altered the Countenance, we are ready to
fay, That our Friend is not the fame Perfon
that he was before. "Tis plain, that theſe
Phraſes relate purely to the Qualities of the
Body. And ſometimes the fame Mode of
ſpeaking is uſed, with regard meerly to the
Qualities of the Mind in Union with the
Body, as when by long Sickneſs or old Age
the Memory or reafoning Powers are impair'd,
we fay of our Neighbour, He is quite another
Perfon than once he was. But our Buſineſs
here is to confider Perfonality rather in its
philofophical Signification, which yet is by
no
302 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII.
no means fo very different from the more
ufual Meaning of it in common Life, as
Mr. Locke's Account of it is.
I anſwer therefore fecondly, that with Re-
gard to Mankind, which is the only thing we
are now concerned about, the fame Perfon in
an incompleat Senfe, is the fame intelligent
Subſtance, or the fame confcious Mind or Spi-
rit; but in a compleat Senfe, 'tis the fame Spi-
rit united to the fame Body, that is in fhort the
fame Man; Perfon and Man are here the fame.
Nor is this perfonal Sameness altered or abo-
lifhed, tho' the Man fhould fometimes be fo
impofed upon by Frenzy, as to fuppoſe him-
ſelf to have a conſcious Memory of Actions
which were not his own; or tho' he ſhould
be utterly forgetful of his own proper Ac-
tions. Here are four Queſtions then arif-
fing.
I. Quest. How can the fame Body be ſe-
cured to make a part of this fame Perfon,
fince the Parts of an Animal are in continual
Flux and Change? I answer, 'tis moſt highly
probable, that there are fome original Par-
ticles of an animal Body, which continue
from its Birth to its Death, through all the
gradual and fucceffive Changes of other Par-
ticles, which may be fufficient to pronounce
it the fame Body; and theſe may probably con-
tinue the fame even till the great Refurrection.
See Eſſay 8. on that Subject. An univerſal
Change of all the Particles of the Body at
once
SECT. VII. of Mr. Locke's Effay. 303
once will hardly allow us to call it the fame Body-
But if there ſhould be no fuch unchang-
ing Particles in the Body of Man, yet in the
fame current Courſe of animal Life the Body
may be called the fame, according to the
common Laws of Nature, continuing the
fame animal Life under flow and fucceffive
Changes of the Particles of Matter, while
Man abides in this World: And whether any
Particle be the fame or no in diſtant Years,
perhaps 'tis not of ſo much Importance in any
thing that relates to proper Perfonality in this
Life, fince theſe Particles have nothing to do in
Thinking or Conſciouſneſs.
II. Quest. How is the Sameness of the con-
fcious Mind or Spirit fecur'd to make the
other and moft confiderable part of the fame
Perfon? How can we be fure that it is the
very fame Spirit or thinking Subſtance? I
anfwer, that fuppofing a Mind or Spirit, or
any conſcious Being to be intirely immaterial,
and (as I think) inextended alſo, it is impof-
fible that any Part of the Subftance of it can
be changed or diminiſhed, without deſtroy-
ing the whole; becauſe 'tis fo uniform and
fimple a Being, 'tis a confcious and active
Power fubfifting by itſelf. It has no Parts,
and cannot but exift or ceaſe to exift in the
whole or at once. Any new Subſtance there-
fore coming in the room of this makes it pro-
perly a different Perfon, it is another felf, an-
other intelligent Mind or confcious Being
and
304 Remarks on fome Parts ESSAY XII.
and to do Mr. Locke Juftice, he acknowledges
in Section 25th that the more probable Opinion
is that this Conſcioufnefs (in which he ſuppoſes
perfonal Identity to confift) is annexed to one
individual immaterial Subftance.
III. Quest. But fuppofing that Frenzy ſhould
fo far impofe upon one Man as to make him
fancy himſelf confcious of the former Actions
of another Man, or that Forgetfulness ſhould
make him unconſcious of his own paſt Acti-
ons; how could he know and be affured that
he was the fame Perfon who performed his own
Actions, or that he was not the fame Perfon
who perform'd the Actions of another? To this
I answer, that for the common Affairs of human
Life God has in general ordained that Perfons
fhould be fufficiently confcious of their own Per-
fonality and Sameneſs with themſelves: Or if
thro' any Diſorder of Nature a Man ſhould lofe
or change the true Idea of himself and his own
Actions, or falfely aſcribe the Actions and Per-
fonality of another Man to himſelf, and ſhould
fay, I did this, or I did not that, contrary to
plain Truth and Fact, there are generally Wit-
neffes enough among his fellow Creatures who
are not thus difordered in their Minds, to af-
fure him Thou didst not, or Thou didst, accord-
ing to plain Fact and the Truth of Things;
and they are able to make effectual Proof to
him, if he be capable of receiving it, that He
is the fame Perfon with his former felf, and
that He is not another Perfon, or that He is the
fame
SECT. II. of Mr. Locke's Eſſay. 305
fame Man and not another. By their Senfes
they know his Body is the fame; and they
know that without a Miracle his Soul must
be the fame too, becaufe 'tis contrary to the
Laws of Nature for a new Soul to be united to
that Body.
In Matters of great or final Importance the
Equity and Goodnefs of God will take care to
prevent that one Man fhall not be rewarded for
Actions which he never did, and which he has
no Pretence to but by his own Frenzy and dif
ordered Imagination: And alfo that one Man
fhall not ordinarily fuffer any Puniſhment,
without reducing to his Mind a Conſciouſ-
nefs of thoſe Actions for which he is puniſh-
ed. God the Judge of all will effectually
fecure this Matter in all his final Recompen-
ces of Mankind. If it be lawful for Mr. Locke
to have Recourfe to the Equity and Goodneſs
of God to guard against any unhappy Confe-
quences which may attend his ftrange and no-
vel Opinion, it is as lawful for a meaner Wri
ter to have recourfe to the fame Perfections
of God to guard againſt any ill Confequence.
that may attend an Opinion which is fo`much
plainer in itſelf, and fo much more agreeable
to the common Senfe of Mankind.
IV. Quest. If you enquire further concerning
the ſeparate State of human Souls, what makes
the perfonal Identity of Man there, 'tis fuffi-
cient to fay, that 'tis the fame individual Spi-
rit which was once united to a certain animal
Body,
X
306
Remarks &c.
ESSAY XII.
Body, and performed good or evil Actions
therein, and which has now commenced its
State of Recompence feparate from the Body;
and there is and will be a fufficient Evidence
of the Sameness of Perfonality for every fepa-
rate Soul during that time, in its real Confci-
ouſneſs of its own former Actions without
Forgetfulness or Delufion, tho' its Perfonali-
ty may not be counted fo compleat till the Re-
furrection of the Body and its Re-union to it.
Then ſhall the whole Man receive Recompen-
ces according to his former Behaviour in his
compleat Perfon both Soul and Body. Perfo-
nality and Sameness of Perfons either in this
World or the other muft not ftand upon fuch
a fhifting and changeable Principle, as may
allow either one Man to be two Perfons, or
two Men to be one Perfon, or any one Man
or Perfon to become another, or to be really
any thing but himſelf.
The End of the Eſſays.
Appendix
(307)
APPENDIX
I
то
Effay IX. Sect. 2.
know fome modern Philofophers have fup-
poſed that the Formation of Plants and
Animals is beyond the Reach and Power
of the Laws of Nature, and therefore they
conceive that the Creator himſelf in the firft
Individual of every Kind, actually form'd all
the future Plants and Animals that ſhould
ever proceed from them compleat in all their
Parts: and theſe were contain'd in their dif
tinct Seeds, decreafing in bulk fucceffively in
Proportion almoſt infinitely leſs and lefs as
the Seed is lefs than the Plant or Animal,
and as each Animal and Plant in this Minia-
ture or minute Form is lefs than the fame
Plant and Animal full grown: And they ſup-
pofe that the daily Productions of Nature
are nothing elſe but the unvailing of theſe
little Plants and Animals in continual Suc-
ceffion, bringing them forth into light, and
ftretching and enlarging their Parts by new
interwoven Fibres, &c.
One great Reaſon they give for this is, that
in the minute Bud of a Plant, fuppofe a Tu-
lip even in the Winter, they can by a Mi-
croſcope
X &
308 APPENDIX
croſcope diſcern the little Stalk and Leaves of
the Flower, and the fmall triangular Pod of
Seed in it: And fince Matter is infinitely di-
vifible, fay they, why may not this minute
Tulip contain another, and that contain a
third, and that a fourth, even to the Num-
ber of many Thouſands in their diminiſh'd
Proportions?
To this I answer, 1. That from this one
Pofition, (viz.) that the Microſcope fhews
the Formation of a Plant in its Bud a few
Months before the Time of its Appearance
in full Growth, 'tis a vaft leap to the Con-
clufion, that therefore it may contain Thou-
fands and Millions in their infinitely decreaſ
ing Proportions.
2. Arguments drawn meerly from Infini-
ties lead our finite reafoning Powers fo far
out of their own Depth that we are loft
in them, and can hardly ever be well af
fured that our Arguments are effectually con-
clufive, or our Inferences well drawn. See
Eſſay 12. Sect. 3.
3. Suppofe every Acorn that grew on the
firft Oak fhould contain in the little Germ or
Bud of it (which is a very ſmall part of the
Acorn itſelf) all the Oaks that might be pro-
duced from thence even to the End of the
World in one fingle Line of direct Succeffion,
this is prodigious and aſtoniſhing beyond
all reafonable Belief: but according to
this Hypothefis, we muft fuppofe, that the
Germs
to Eſſay IX. Sect. 2.
309
Germs or Buds in each of theſe Acorns do
actually contain alfo all the Acorns that thoſe
Oaks might annually produce, together with
all their annual Leaves; and again all the
younger Oaks which might be produced from
each of theſe Acorns in ten thouſand collate-
ral Succeffions: now this raiſes the Number
to fuch Millions of Millions, that nothing but
the incomprehenfible Idea of Infinite can
ever be ſuppoſed to anſwer; and at beſt in°
this Controverfy it ſeems rather to be a Re-
fuge of Darkneſs to hide in, than a clear
Explication.
4. We find many Plants may be produc'd by
Slips or Twigs of the fame Plant, and that
of Trees as well as Herbs and Flowers, fuch
as the Vine, the Willow, &c. And it is not
to be ſuppoſed that each Twig or Slip have
all theſe future Seeds and Trees actually form'd
in it, together with all their Leaves and Fruits
the firſt Week of the Creation, tho' every
Seed fhould be fuppofed to contain all theſe
infinite Succeffions of their Species.
5. Have we not reafon to conceive that
every
Seed of a Plant is formed alike? has
not then every Acorn and every Bean that is
devour'd by Animals for their Food, and
every Grain of Corn as well as all the Fruits
of the Trees and their Seeds which are eaten
by Men and Birds, the fame Millions of
theſe compleat Trees or Plants, Corn or
Herbage contain'd in them in Miniaturę
X 3
which
310
APPENDIX
which are aſcribed to thofe other Seeds and
Fruits which are fown or planted out in or-
der to produce new Vegetables of their own
Kind? Now if it be ſo, what an infinite
Number of compleat Trees, Flowers, Plants
and Herbs would be made by the exquifite
Artifice of the Creator to no Purpofe? And
thus a vastly greater part of the Divine Work-
manſhip would be labouting in vain, fince
none of it attains its proper End, but only
in thoſe few Seeds and Fruits which af
terwards grow up into compleat Plants or
Trees.
6. When a Limb of an Animal or fome
neceffary Part of a Plant has been broken off,
what powerful Efforts has fometimes been
obferved in the Operations of Nature to-
wards the Formation of a new Limb or
Part of the fame Kind? I have ſeen the Claw
of a Crab rifing up in a lefs Form in the
Room of one which the Creature feems to
have been deprived of by fome injurious Acci-
dent: And in the vegetable World this is
much more common. Now I would inquire
whether this Creature was formed at first in
its minute Original with three Claws? or
whether there was a Provifion made for every
fuch Accident in the firſt Week of the Crea-
tion? But on the other hand if the natural
Laws of Motion are left to form the Limb of
an Animal, or part of a Vegetable, why
may not the fame Divine Wiſdom contrive
5
Laws
to Effay IX. Sect. 2.
311
Laws which might form the whole in its
appointed Succeffion.
7. In the Formation of Infects, and efpe-
cially of larger Animals, daily Experiment de-
ftroys this Hypothefis, by fhewing us, that
the Animal in feveral Parts and Members of
it is imperfect and defective in the Embryo,
the Work is unfiniſh'd, and the Laws of Na-
ture finiſh it by Degrees, till it becomes ripe
for Production *.
I think this Argument is conclufive alone,
but all theſe Confiderations put together give
us abundant Reafon to believe, that 'tis by
certain Laws of Matter and Motion which
God has appointed in the vegetable and ani-
mal World, that there is a continual Succef-
fion of Plants and Animals maintain'd through
all Ages, and the Honour of fuch a wondrous
Contrivance is due to the great Creator.
* This Account ſeems more exactly conformable to the
Words of Scripture, Pfal. cxxxix. 16. Thine Eyes did fee
my Subftance yet being imperfect, and in thy Book my Members
were written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as
yet there was none of them.
X 4
A
A
BRIEF SCHEME
O F
ONTOLOGY:
OR THE
SCIENCE OF BEING in general;
Wherein all the
Various AFFECTIONS, or Properties, Adjuncts
and Relations of it are contracted into
a comprehenfive View, and ranged
in a natural and eafy Method.
By I. W. ›
LONDON:
Printed for RICHARD FORD at the Angel, and
RICHARD HETT at the Bible and Crown
in the Poultry. MDCCXXXIII.
( 315 )
1
THE
PREFAC E.
FI
Ε
Very Man who employs himself in thinking
endeavours to difpofe his Ideas in fuch an
Order as appears to him most comprehen-
five and perfpicuous in itself, and most obvious to
his own Survey, as well as eafieft for his Recol-
lection. If I could have met with any fuch fhort
and plain Scheme of Ontology as I wished, among
the Authors whence I learnt that Science, I had
never taken pains to form this Model or draw the
prefent Sketch. I am not confcious that I have
admitted into it any of those barren and perplex-
ing Subtilties which have over-run this Branch
of Learning, as it has been cultivated in the
Schools under the Title of Metaphyficks.
In our Days indeed that Name is dropt, and
with much better Reafon it is term'd Ontology,
or the Knowledge of Being in general with its
various Affections, i. e. the Properties, Adjuncts
and Relations that belong to it. It is an uſeful
Science in itſelf which teaches us to place every
Being and every Thought and Idea in its proper
Order in our Minds, and gives us an extenſive
and regular Survey of Things; and I am fure
may be exhibited in fuch a manner as to fecure
it effectually from that juſt Cenfure, and that
it
forbid-
316 The PREFACE.
forbidding Character which the learned Profeffor
De Vries gives to the Metaphyficks of the Schools
in former Ages. His Satyr on it may be thus
express'd in Engliſh. "This Science, faith be,
t
<<
<<
was treated of by the Sophifters in fuch a
"Way, that one would fwear they aim'd at no-
thing else but to vex and torture the Under-
Standing with difficult Trifles, and to infect all
Language with blundering Nonfenfe, and with
"the grating Horror of barbarous Sounds which
"have no Meaning. Thefe were Men of empty
"and vain Subtilty, who built up huge Volumes
'
of worthless Words and Difputes about nothing,
"whofe Leaves if they were not divided by the
"Grocers to wrap up Spice and Sugar, would
now lye for ever in Heaps to feed Moths and
"Bookworms. This is fo far from deferving
"the Title of Wiſdom or prime Philofophy,
« that 'tis rather the extreme Folly of Monkish
" Dreams and Dotages".
Such juſt and ſevere Satyr as this being Spread
abroad in fome modern Schools, and in the polite
World, bath tempted our Youth to run to another
Extreme: many of them will fneer at the Name
of Metaphyficks, and pass a fcornful Cenfure
on all the Science of Ontology at once: they
are aſhamed of knowing it and therefore renounce
all Pretence to it with Pride and Pleafure. The
endless Multitudes of fenfelefs and empty Diſtinc-
tions of the Ancients, their useless and thorny
Questions and Difputes introduced into this
Science, and the many odd and abfurd Canons
and
The PREFACE.
317
and Axioms which they were wont to place among
thofe Principles which they called the prime Foun-
dations of all Learning, have appeared to our
Age in fo ridiculous a Light, that we have been
too ready to throw away this ufeful Part of Phi-
lofophy, becauſe of the Follies which have been
blended with it. But it becomes a Philofopher to
diftinguish between the Gold and the Drofs, and
not to renounce and abandon a rich Mine becaufe
the Oar is not refined, or perhaps has been debaf
ed with vile Mixtures by fome foolish Labourers
and Melters.
If we would not fuffer ourselves to be impofed
upon by a little empty Raillery, but take a just
View of Things in order to pass a right Fudg-
ment, we ſhould find this Part of Philofophy is
very neceſſary and of admirable Ufe to all Men
of Science, and that in every Branch of the
learned Profeffions: To have all the vaft Multi-
tude of Themes and Ideas about which we have
Occafion to think, Speak or write, ranged in a
Sett of regular Claffes, fo that we know where
to find and place them all, is of unspeakable Ad-
vantage in explaining, defining, dividing, diftin-
guishing, illuftrating and arguing upon every
Subject we take in hand. Nor does this ferve
only the Purpoſes of the College, and direct, af-
fift and facilitate the Labours of Students and
the learned World, but Gentlemen and Perfons in
every Degree of common Life might be taught
to enlarge the Number of their Ideas, to extend
their Reafonings far wider, and difpofe their
5
Thoughts
318 The PREFACE.
Thoughts in more ufeful Order by the Affiftance
of this part of Knowledge, if it were difplay'd
in a happy and perfpicuous manner, with the Ex-
clufion of Thorns and Straws and all the perplex-
ing Trifles that had over-run the Academies of
former Ages.
I wish fome skilful hand would undertake this
Work: If I was ever able to perform it accord-
ing to my own Idea, yet it is too late in Life for
me now to return to thefe Studies. What I have
bere written has in part lain long by me: It
pretends to nothing more than a brief and com-
pendious Sketch of Notions that relate to this Sci-
ence, and a mere Arrangement of the moſt uſe-
ful Themes which should here be treated of, in
a contracted View: and tho' it may be of chief
Advantage for the Recollection of those who have
been acquainted with thefe Matters, yet I hope it
will not be unferviceable for the Inftruction of
fuch as have known nothing of them if they
will read with Attention and Care. In fome
Places I define not only the general Theme but
the particular kinds of it alfo; in a few others I
only just mention the Terms of the particular
Diftinctions, and neither add any Definitions or
Examples to them, where the very Terms are fo
plain that a common Reader may know the Mean-
ing of them without Explication; but in moſt
Places I give fuch Examples as may fufficiently ex-
plain and illuftrate the Subject and the feveral
Divifions and Branches of it without laborious
and difputable Definitions.
What
The PREFACE. 319
What the metaphyfical Writers have called
Axioms or Canons are very numerous almoſt un-
der every Head or Theme of Difcourſe; but
many of them are fo falfe in the most obvious
Senfe of them, and want fuch a Number of Li-
mitations and learned Diftinctions to reduce them
to Truth, that I thought it needless to fluff this
Epitome with them. Many others are fo ufe-
lefs to any valuable Purposes that they deferve
no room in the Mind or Memory. Those few
which are uſeful I have placed in their proper
Chapters as Notes, and feveral others I have
added which feem'd to me not unprofitable.
'Tis not often that I divert out of my way to
tell the World particularly what the Moderns or
the Ancients have faid on thefe Subjects, nor how
far I agree with them or differ from them; but
in the main I directly pursue my own Track of
Thoughts, and range this infinite Variety of Ideas
collected from the Univerfe of Beings in fuch a
Method as appears to me the most comprehenfive
and natural, plain and eafy.
A BRIEF
(320)
A BRIEF
SCHEME
O F
ONTOLOGY.
CHAP. I.
Of Being and Not-being, with a general Scheme
of the Affections of Being.
O
NTOLOGY is a Difcourfe of Be-
ing in general, and the various and
moſt univerſal Modes or Affections, as
well as the feveral Kinds or Divifions of it.
The Word Being here includes not only
whatſoever actually is, but whatſoever can be.
Being is the firſt and moſt obvious, the
moſt fimple and natural Conception that we
can frame of any thing which we fee, hear,
feel, or know. 'Tis in fome Senfe included
in all our other Conceptions of Things, and
is therefore the moſt general or univerfal of
all our Ideas.
O
By
CHAP. I. of Ontology.
321
By the Affections of Being are meant all
Powers, Properties, Accidents, Relations, Ac-
tions, Paffions, Difpofitions, internal Quali-
ties, external Adjuncts, Confiderations, Con-
ditions or Circumftances whatſoever; in a
word, all thofe Modes which belong to things,
either as they are in themſelves, or as they
ſtand in relation to other things, or as they
are repreſented or modified by our Ideas and
Conceptions.
Since every Thing may be greatly diſtin-
guiſhed and illuftrated by its Oppofites, e're
we begin to treat of the Affections of Being
in general, we may confider very briefly what
fort of Notions we may frame of Not-being
or Nothing.
Not-being as it excludes all Subſtances and
Modes whatſoever is Nihility or mere Nothing.
Not-being as it excludes particular Modes
or Manners of being out of any Subſtance
may be confidered, either as a mere Negati-
on, fuch is Blindneſs or Want of Sight in a
Stone; or as a Privation, fuch is Blindneſs or
Want of Sight in a Man; of which ſee Lo-
gick, Part ift, Chap. II. Sect. 6.
Note, 1. Pure Nothing confidered meerly in
itſelf has no proper Affections belonging to
it; tho' our Imagination fometimes may fo
far abuſe us as to miſtake Nothing for Some-
thing, as in the Cafe of Shadows: and at other
times we miſtake Something for Nothing,
and ſuppoſe a Room full of Light and Air to
Y
have
322 A brief Scheme
CHAP. I.
have Nothing in it. So weak and imperfect
is our prefent State of Knowledge.
Note 2. Tho' a Non-entity or Not-being is
really nothing in itſelf, yet as it is introduced
by fome relation to Being it may afford Foun-
dation for fome fort of Thoughts or Concep-
tions, or fome relative Affections which here-
after will be defcribed. On this Account
Non-entity has been uſually diſtinguiſhed from
mere Nibility or pure Nothing.
Note 3. Hence it follows that that old Axi-
om of the Schools Non-entis nulla eft Scientia,
or what has no Being cannot be known, muſt
be underſtood with fome Limitation: For (1.)
we may know things poffible tho' they have no
actual Being: (2.) We may know Things paft
and future which have no prefent Being: (3.)
We may alſo form a fort of Idea of Non-en-
tities or Not-beings from their Relation to Be-
ings; we can ſee a Shadow and talk of Silence:
And even when we fpeak of pure Nibility or
Nothing, we are ready to frame fome fort of
Notion or Idea of it fince we reaſon and dif-
courſe about it. Perhaps this may ariſe from
the Imperfection of our prefent State.
Note 4. Tho' pure Nothing is that which in
Truth neither has a Being nor Affections, nor
can be properly made the Meaſure of any Be-
ing, yet Negative Quantities, which (as Mathe-
maticians generally fay) are Marks and Mea-
fures of what is less than Nothing, are of great
Ufe and Neceflity in Algebra; becaufe this
Science,
9.
CHAP. I.
323
of Ontology.
1
Science teaches us to form our Ideas of all
real and positive Quantities as ſo much more
than Nothing.
Having diftinguiſhed Being from its Oppo-
fites, let us proceed now to lay down a gene-
ral Scheme of the Affections of Being.
The moſt general and extenfive Diftributi-
on of the Affections of Being is into abfolute
and relative.
Abfolute Affections belong to each Being con-
fidered in itſelf, and thefe are Nature or Ef
fence and Existence, Duration and Unity, Pow-
er and Act.
Relative Affections or Relations arife from
fome Reſpect which diftinct Beings bear to one
another, or at leaft to fome Part or Property
of themſelves: Now theſe are real or mental.
Real Relations are thofe which arife from
the Conſtitution of any Being among others
in the Univerſe to which it has a real Refer-
ence whether we think of it or no. Such
are, Whole and Part, Caufe and Effect, Sub-
ject and Adjunct, Time and Place, Agreement
and Difference, Number and Order, to which
may be added Truth and Goodness, left the Me-
taphyficians fhould complain of this Omiffion.
Mental Relations are fuch as ariſe not from
Things themſelves, but only from our man-
ner of conceiving them and referring one thing
to another: Such are abftracted or fecond No-
tions, Signs, Language, and particularly all Ex-
trinfic Denominations and Terms of Art.
Y 2
Note,
324
A brief Scheme CHAP. II.
Note, All Affections of Being are not pofi-
tive, but they may be fometimes negative.
Some Men are knowing, fome are ignorant or
without Knowledge.
CHA P. II.
Of Effence or Nature, Matter and Form *.
A Mong the abfolute Affections of Being the
firſt that offers itfelf is Effence or Na-
ture; and it confifts in an Union of all thoſe
Things, whether Subftances or Modes, which
are neceffary to make that Thing be what it
is;
folid Extenfion is the Effence of Matter;
an animal Body and Soul united are the Eſ-
fence of a Man; and many Flowers bound to-
gether are the Effence of a Nofegay.
Note 1. Whatſoever is clearly contained in
the Nature or Effence of a Thing, may be
affirmed of that thing: Contingence is contain-
ed in the Nature of a Creature, and we may
fay of every Creature, it is contingent or may
not be. Existence is contained in the Nature
or Effence of God, and we may therefore
affirm that God has Exiftence, or God exifts.
Note 2. The Effences of Mathematical Be-
ings are immutable; never fo little an Altera-
tion deſtroys the Effence of a Circle or a
* See this Chapter explained more at large in the ele-
venth Efay foregoing, which were written when I de-
figned to have drawn out this Ontology into a more com-
pleat Form,
Square:
ན་
CHAP. II.
of Ontology.
325
Square: But the Effences of natural Beings
are not fo, nor do they confift in an indivifi-
ble Point, but admit of Degrees. A Rofe with
more or fewer Leaves may be a Rofe ftill.
Marble is ftill Marble whether it be tinged
Yellow or Gray, or made a little harder or a
little fofter. But when the Alteration or Dif-
ference is very great 'tis fometimes hard to
fay whether it retain the fame Effence fo as
to deſerve the fame Name: Is a Bat a Bird
or a Beaſt? Is every Monſter to be called
Man which is born of a Woman?
Query, When Mr. Locke infers from hence,
that the Effences of natural Beings are but
meer nominal Effences, does he carry this
Matter too far, or not?
Tho' we do not fo well know the diftinct
Effences and Natures of particular kinds of
Spirits, as to fay certainly what they confiſt
in, yet the Effence of every particular kind
of Body certainly confifts of Matter and Form.
Matter is the folid extended Subftance which
is common to all Bodies: The Form includes
and implies thofe peculiar Qualities both real
and fenfible, which make any particular Bo-
dy be what it is, and diſtinguiſh it from all
other Bodies.
Note, Shape or Figure, Size or Quantity,
Situation or Place, together with Motion and
Reſt are called the real or primary Qualities
of Matter, becauſe they do and would belong
to Bodies whether there were any fenfible Be-
ing
Y 3
326
A brief Scheme
CHAP. II.
ing to take notice of them or no. But Co-
lour, Sound, Tafte, Heat, Cold, &c. are call-
ed fenfible Qualities, becauſe they are Ideas or
Modes which we attribute to Things meerly as
they affect ourſelves or any fenfitive Beings.
They are called alfo fecondary Qualities, becauſe
they ariſe from the different Combinations and
Difpofitions of thoſe real and primary Qualities
before named, and their Power to impreſs
our Senfes in different manners.
The Matter of a Body is either proxime or
remote; the proxime Matter of a Ship is Tim-
ber, the remote is Trees.
Note 1. Matter and Form have been im-
properly ranked among the Cauſes, yet they
may be called conftituent Principles of Things,
Note 2. Matter and Form have been tranf-
ferr'd from Things corporeal to intellectual:
So we fpeak of the Matter of a Sermon or
Treatife, which is the Theme of Diſcourſe;
and the Form of it, which is the Manner in
which the Speaker or Writer treats of it.
Hence arifes the famous Diftinction of ma-
terial and formal ufually and pertinently ap-
ply'd to Subjects of various kinds, whether
intellectual or corporeal. Wheat is Bread
materially, and Ideas or Terms are materially
a Propofition; but neither one nor the other
are formally fo.
Having ſpoken of the Nature of Things
in this Chapter, it may not be amifs to take
notice of a few Diftinctions relating to it.
The
1
CHAP. II. of Ontology.
327
The Term Nature is fometimes taken for
the eternal and unchangeable Reaſon of
Things; fo it is neceffary in the Nature of
Things that three and four fhould make fe-
ven; and that the three Angles of a Triangle
ſhould be equal to two right Angles.
Sometimes it fignifies the Courfe and Order
of fecond Cauſes, whether Minds or Bodies,
together with the Laws of Matter and Mo-
tion which God the firft Cáufe has ordained
in this World; in this Senfe 'tis natural for
the Limbs to move when the Soul wills, and
that the four Seafons of the Year fhould fuc-
ceed each other in Europe.
In this latter Signification of the Word
fome Things are faid to be according to Na-
ture, as when an Oak brings forth Acorns.
Some are befide Nature, as when an Animal
brings forth a Monſter. Some
Some may be called
contrary to Nature, as when the Stock of an
Apple-tree brings forth Pears by virtue of the
Twig of a Pear-tree grafted into it, Rom. xi.
24. Other Things are above Nature, as are
all the Inftances of divine and miraculous O-
peration: tho' thefe are fometimes called con-
trary to Nature too, as when the Streams of
Jordan ran backward, or the Sun ftood ftill.
Y A
CHAP.
328
CHAP. III,
A brief Scheme
CHA P. III.
Of Existence, whether actual, poffible, or im-
poffible, neceffary or contingent, dependent or
independent.
Xiftence is diftinguiſhed from Effence as the
actual Being of a Thing is diſtinguiſhed
from its meer Nature confidered as poſſible.
A Being is poffible when the Ideas which are
ſuppoſed to make up its Nature may be actu-
ally united and have no Inconfiftency, as a Gol-
den Mountain or a River of Wine: But where
the Ideas are inconfiftent it is called an Impof-
fible, as an Iron Animal or filent Thunder,
This has neither Effence nor Exiſtence.
Impoffibles may be diftinguiſhed into four
forts; fome Things are metaphyfically or ab-
folutely impoffible in the abſtracted Reaſon and
Nature of Things, as a cubical Circle, a
thinking Statue, a purple Smell, or a Bufhel
of Souls. Others may be called phyfically or
naturally impoffible, i. e. according to the pre-
fent Laws of Nature, fuch are three Eclipfes of
the Sun in a Month, or that a full Moon
ſhould always laſt. Others are morally impoffible,
that is improbable in the higheſt Degree; fo we
may venture to fay that 'tis impoffible for an
Atheist to be strictly virtuous, or for a Hottentot
to form a Syftem of Religion or Mathema-
ticks: And fuch are many of the Legends of the
Popish Saints. Other Things are faid to be con-
ditionally
CHAP. III.
of Ontology.
329
ditionally impoffible, i. e. when fuch a Condition
is put as makes that Thing impoffible, which
otherwife would not be fo, as a Tree bearing
Fruit on Suppofition it has no Bloom.
Note 1. It is abfolutely impoffible that the
fame Thing ſhould both be and not-be in the
fame Senſe, and at the fame Time, and in the
fame Refpect.
Note 2. When we pronounce any thing ab-
folutely or naturally poffible or impoffible, we
fhould do it with great Caution, fince we
know fo little what Ideas are or are not mutu-
ally confiftent, either in abſtracted Reaſon, or
according to the prefent Laws of Nature.
Note 3. God is the only Being that carries
actual Exiſtence in his very Nature and Ef
fence, and therefore we may fay with Affur-
ance God exifts.
Note 4. Proper Exiſtence belongs only to
Individuals, for all general Natures, i. e. Ge-
nus, Species, &c. are but abftracted Ideas of
the Mind, and never exift alone, but only in
individual Beings.
But let us proceed to the Ideas of Neceffity
and Contingency, which in this Chapter re-
late to the Existence of Things, in the fixth
Chapter to Actions.
All Things which exiſt have either a ne-
ceffary Exiſtence, i. e. they are becauſe they
muft be; or they have a contingent Exiſtence,
i. e. they are, tho' they might not have been,
and may ceafe to be.
A
330
CHAP. III.
A brief Scheme
1
A neceffary Being wants no Cauſe and is
independent: but a contingent Being is depen-
dent, becauſe it wants a Cauſe to make it exiſt,
This Dependance is either total or partial;
conftant or occafional; for Existence or for Du-
ration, or for Operation, &c. fee more in Chap,
4. and in Chap. 10.
Note, Independence in the higheſt Senſe
belongs only to God, and is the fame with
Self-Existence, and near akin to the Idea of
neceffary Exiftence.
Neceffity of Existence may be diſtinguiſhed
into abfolute or conditional: God alone is ab-
folutely neceffary, for he muſt exift whether
any other thing be or be not: but as for Crea-
tures, tho' they are properly contingent Be-
ings, yet a conditional Neceffity may belong
to them, i. e. fuch a Creature or fuch an E-
vent muſt exiſt if the Caufes are put which
will certainly and neceffarily produce it: If a
Hen's Egg be hatched it will produce a Chick-
en: If the Sun rife there will be day-light;
If a Man will leap down a vaft Precipice, he
muſt be deftroyed.
"Tis called alfo fometimes a conditional Ne-
ceffity, when fuch Premiſes or Conditions are
from whence an Event may be certainly
put
inferred, tho' they have no manner of caufal
Influence on this Event: So we may ſay, that
it was neceffary Antichrift fhould arife, becauſe
the God of Truth had foretold it.
Neceflity
CHAP. III,
331
of Ontology.
i
Neceffity may be divided into natural, lo-
gical, and moral: By natural Neceffity Fire
burns, and Snow melts in the Sun-beams. By
logical Neceffity the Conclufion of a Syllogiſm
follows from the Premifes. By moral Necef-
fity intelligent Creatures are obliged to wor-
hip God, and Virtue will be finally reward-
ed: tho' I know fome Writers take the Term
moral Neceffity in another Senfe.
Both Neceffity and Contingence are Ideas fre-
quently apply'd to the Events which ariſe in
the natural World, i. e. the World of Bodies,
whether animate or inanimate : but the Events
in the moral World are more ufually called con-
tingent, i. e. the voluntary Actions of intelligent Beings.
Creatures; tho' Neceffity may in fome Cafes
be ascribed to them too, as the bleffed God
neceffarily acts agreeably to his own Perfecti-
ons: A rational and fenfible Being neceffarily
hates Pain' and Mifery.
Events in the natural World are faid to be
neceſſary, or to arife from natural Neceffity,
when they are derived from the Connexion
of fecond Cauſes, and thoſe Laws of Motion
which God eſtabliſhed in the World at the
Creation, and which he continues by his Pro-
vidence. This is the chief and moft ufual
Meaning of the Word Nature: and indeed
Fate in its Derivation and original Senfe fig-
nifies but the Dictate or Decree of God. But
if the Appointment of God be left quite out
of our Thoughts, then Fate is a Heathenish
Term
LA
332 A brief Scheme CHAP. III.
{
Term to denote a fort of eternal neceffary
Connexion of Caufes, without regard to the
firft Cauſe; and fome of the Heathens have
exalted this Fate above the Gods themselves.
Events in the natural World are faid to be
contingent, or to arife from Chance when they
are different from what is uſual in the Courfe
of Nature, and utterly unexpected, tho' indeed
the Courſe of Nature really produces them by
the Interpofition of fome Caufes imperceptible
to us. Yet the Heathens have made this
Chance and Fortune a fort of Deities too, for
want of their Knowledge of the Train of ſe-
cond Cauſes and a due regard to the firſt Cauſe.
Events in the moral World which ariſe from
the meer free Will and Choice of intelligent
Beings, are called contingent, becauſe they are
not brought into Exiſtence in a neceffary man-
ner by any natural Connexion of Cauſes: Yet
they are never afcribed to Chance, for Chance
ftands as much in oppofition to Deſign and
Freedom as it doth to Fate and Neceffity.
We might here juſt take occafion to ob-
ferve, that not only with regard to Existence
are Beings faid to be neceflary or contingent,
but with regard to the manner of their Exif-
tence alfo. God is neceffary in this refpect as
well as in the other, and therefore his Being
and his Attributes are unchangeable. But Crea-
tures are changeable Things, becauſe their
manner of Existence is contingent, as well as
their Exiftence itſelf.
Note
CHAP. IV.
of Ontology.
333
Note 1. All the future Events which arife
from natural and neceffary Caufes will not only
certainly but neceſſarily exift; and tho' we call
many of them Contingencies becauſe they are
uncertain to us, yet they are not fo to God
who knows all Things. So we fay, It may or
it may not rain to morrow.
Note 2. All the future Actions of free A-
gents and the Events arifing thence (both
which are properly contingent) may be cer-
tainly foreknown by God; and therefore we
may ſay, they will certainly exist, tho' there be
no fuch Determination of them as to make
them properly neceffary; for the great and un-
fearchable God, who has foretold many free
Actions of Men, may have ways of knowing
Things certainly which we cannot ſo much as
guefs at. 'Tis too audacious for Man to af-
fert that God cannot know Things, meerly
becauſe we cannot find out a Medium for his
Knowledge of them.
See fome further Confiderations of Neceffity
in Chap. VI, where we treat of Freedom.
CHA P. IV.
Of Duration, Creation and Confervation.
Dr
Uration is meerly a Continuance in Being:
and this has commonly been divided
into permanent and fucceffive.
Permanent Duration belongs to God alone,
and implies not only his Continuance in Ex-
iſtence,
334
A brief Scheme CHAP. IV.
i
iftence, but an univerfal, fimultaneous and end-
lefs Poffeffion of all the fame Properties and
Powers without Change,
Succeffive Duration belongs to Creatures,
and implies the Continuance of the fame Be-
ing with changeable and changing Modes,
Powers, Properties and Actions one after an-
other.
It is only fucceffive Duration which is moſt
properly divided into past, present and fu-
ture. The preſent taken in a ſtrict Senfe is
only the Moment that now exifts, and divides
the Hours or Ages paft from thoſe which are
to come.
It is very hard for us to conceive of any
Duration without Succeffion: But this perma-
nent Duration of God is his Eternity, which
carries fome things in it above our preſent
Ideas. See more in the Chapters of Time and
Infinites.
As Creation gives Exiſtence to all created
Subftances, fo Confervation is faid to give
Duration, i. e. Continuance in Exiſtence to
all Creatures.
Tho' the moſt proper Idea of Creation is
the cauſing a Subſtance to exiſt which had no
Exiſtence, yet the Word is alſo us'd in a leſs
proper Senſe, when any particular Bodies are
formed out of fuch a Mafs of Matter as ſeems
utterly unfit for that End; when fuch Changes
are made in any Subftance as are generally fup-
poſed to be above the Power of Creatures and
belong
CHAP. IV.
335
of Ontology.
belong to God alone: So God created Fiſh
and Fowls out of the Water, and Man and
Beaſts out of the Earth; tho' the Creation of
the Subſtance of Water or Earth, or the Mat-
ter out of which they were made, is the ori-
ginal Senfe of the Word.
Confervation here refers to the fame Things
which are the Objects of Creation, and on
which God is fuppofed to exerciſe his Almigh-
ty Power.
/
Queries. Enquire then, how far do Creati-
on and Confervation differ? Is Confervation a
continued Creation? fee Eſſay XI. Sect. ult. If a
Creature be once formed would it not continue
to exiſt without any divine conferving Act? Is it
poffible the Creator ſhould exift without will-
ing or nilling the continued Exiſtence of his
Creatures?
Note, Subftances being once made,. a Crea-
ture cannot of himſelf deſtroy them, or make
their Duration to ceafe, any more than he
could of himſelf create them: But Multitudes
of Modes are made and deftroyed perpetual-
ly at the Will of Creatures, and are placed
within their Power.
Note, Tho' Time, Place, Ubiety, might be
introduced here and connected with Durati-
on, yet they are all plainly relative Affections,
and therefore I refer them to their more pro-
per place.
?
CHAP.
336
A brief Scheme CHAP. V.
t
T
CHAP. V.
Of Unity and Union.
HE next abfolute Affection to be confider
ed is Unity, which perhaps had never
had the Honour to make a Chapter in Meta-
phyficks, if it had not been coupled with Ve-
rity and Bonity; which three Properties being
aſcribed by Plato to God the great and eternal
Being, Ariftotle his Scholar afcribes them all to
the Idea of Being in general, and thence came
theſe Ideas to make fuch a Figure in Ontolo-
gy; tho' it muſt be confeft that ſeveral Things
have been faid on theſe Subjects which furniſh
the Mind with uſeful Diftinctions.
Unity is that whereby a Thing ftands as it
were divided in our Conceptions from all o-
ther Things: and this Unity is either fimple
or compounded; we fay one Nofegay as well as
one Flower, and one Family as well as one Per-
Jon, and one Univerſe as well as one Creature
or one Atom. See fomething further concern-
ing Unity, Simplicity, and Multiplicity in Chap-
ter 14. of Number.
Here we take Occafion to treat of the Doc-
trine of Union, tho' perhaps fome may call it
a relative Idea. 'Tis that whereby two or
more Things either really become one Thing
or are confidered as one: This diftinguiſhes
Union into real and mental.
5
Real
CHAP. V. of Ontology.
337
Real Union is either natural and neceſſary,
as between the Root and the Tree; or fortui-
tous and accidental, as between two Apples
making a twin; or defigned and artificial, as
between the Graff and the Stock, or Drugs
united to compound a Medicine.
Again, real Union is corporeal, fpiritual or
buman.
First, confider corporeal Union or Union of
Bodies, whether dry or liquid, which is made by
blending, mixing, compounding, by Contact
Aggregation, Colligation, &c. Under this Head
we may alſo treat of vital and of inanimate
Unions of corporeal Beings. Some of theſe
corporeal Unions may communicate Proper-
ties, as Fire joined to Wood, a Graft joined
to a Stock, Perfume to Garments. Others do
not, as a Bundle of dry Sticks, or a Heap of
Stónes.
Secondly, Confider fpiritual Union or Union
of Minds: which may be called either intel-
lectual, by mutual Confcioufnefs of each o-
ther's Thoughts, or by Agreement in Opinion:
or it is moral, by Friendſhip or mutual Love;
or fupernatural, as it may relate to God and
the facred Themes of revealed Religion.
Query, How far an Union of Spirits may
arife from a fuperior Spirit affuming an infe-
rior to act by it in the manner of an Inftru-
ment, or Under-agent? In this there is no real
Communication of Properties; yet the ſame
Actions may be afcribed to both or to either
Z
when
>
338
A brief Scheme CHAP. V.
when united, and the fame Properties too by
common Figures of Speeeh. But this I leave
to theological Debate.
In the laſt Place confider human Union,
i. e. the Union of animal Body with a Spirit
to make a Man; and what are the Effects of
this Union (viz.) Senfation, Imagination, Paſ-
fion, &c. voluntary Motions of the Body,
&c. And let it be noted, that tho' there be no
real Communication of Properties here, yet
there may be a nominal Communication of
them; as a wife Head-piece, a meagre Soul,
a prudent Body, a heavy Genius.
Mental Union is when feveral Things really
diftinct and different are confider'd as one:
There are no two Beings, nor any Multitude
of Things fo different and diftinct, but may by
their Likeneſs or Agreement, Situation or other
Circumſtances, come to be confider'd as one
Thing, and come under one Name. Air,
Water, Earth, and all the infinite Variety of
Creatures make one Univerfe: All Individuals
are united in one Species, and all Species
under one Genus; all Subftances, whether
Minds or Bodies, come under one general
Name of Being; and all the Ideas and Col-
lection of Thoughts as well as Words in this
Book make one Treatife of Ontology. Note,
in all theſe Inftances there is a real Founda-
tion for this mental Union.
In many Unions we have Occafion to con-
fider not only the Terms which are the things
united,
5
CHAP. VI.
339
of Ontology.
united, but alſo the Means or Bond of Union
between theſe Terms. In a Nofegay the Bond
of Union is a Thread: in Metals 'tis Sodder:
in a Heap of Stones 'tis Juxta-pofition and
Gravitation: between Friends the Bond. of
Union is Love: between Kindred 'tis Birth:
between Maſter and Servant 'tis Contract,
&c. But there are many Things united where
the Bond of Union is unknown, or must be
refolved into the Appointment of God. What
is it unites the Parts of Matter in a hard Bo-
dy? What is it unites the Flefh and Spirit in
Man?
1
Union and Compofition may give Occafion
alſo to ſpeak of Abstraction, Divifion, Diffo-
lution, Separation, &c. which ftand in oppo-
fition to Union.
CHAP. VI.
Of Act and Power, Action and Paffion, Ne
ceffity and Liberty.
TH
HE next abfolute Affections of Being are
Act and Power; tho' it may be a little
doubtful whether there is not enough of Re-
lation between theſe two Ideas to throw them
into the Rank of Relative Affections.
Each of thefe (viz.) Act and Power may
be diſtinguiſhed three ways.
1. As Actual Being or Existence is diftinguiſh-
ed from Potential, or a Power to be: So a
Book already written differs from a Book which
Z 2
may
1
340
A brief Scheme CHAP. VI.
may be written, or that is meerly poffible.
2. As Actual Doing or Action is diftinguiſh-
ed from a Power to do: So the actual putting
Bodies in Motion differs from Motivity or a
Power to move them: So the Act of Think-
ing in Spirits has fome fort of Difference from
the thinking Power.
3. As Actual Suffering or Paffion is diftin-
guiſhed from a Power to fuffer: So actual Di-
vifion in Matter differs from mere Divifibili-
ty: or the paffive Motion of a Body is different
from Mobility or a Power to be moved.
Here we treat of Action which is the Ex-
erciſe of a Power to do, and Paffion which is
the Exercife of a Power to fuffer. Note, Paf
fion and Suffering in this Philofophical Senfe
fignifies only receiving the Act of the Agent
or Doer by the Patient or Sufferer. When
Hailftones fmite upon a Rock, the Hailftones.
are the Agents, the Rock is the Patient: 'tis
no matter whether any Impreffion be made
or no; or when a Child honours his Father,
the Father is the Patient in a philofophical
Senfe, and the Child the Agent.
Here 'tis proper to introduce all the need-
ful Diftinctions of Action.
1. Immanent Action has no different Pati-
ent, but continues in the Agent; fo a Man
forms Ideas, or he loves himſelf. Tranfient
-Action paffes over to fome other Object as a
Patient: So a Man draws a Picture on a Can-
vas: So a Father loves his Son, and feeds or
clothes him.
2. Natu-
1
}
1
CHAP. VI. of Ontology.
341
督
​2. Natural Action: So the Fire hardens
Clay: Supernatural Action, fo Elisha made
Iron ſwim by cafting a Stick into the Water.
Voluntary Action; fo the Potter moulds his
Clay into a Veffel. Accidental Action; ſo a
Servant heedleſsly lets fall a Glafs and breaks.
it.
3. Neceffary Action; fo the Sun warms the
Earth: Free Action; fo Man chufes what Food;
he likes and eats it when he pleaſes.
Note, Neceffary Agents act always, and that
to the utmoſt of their, Power, i. e. when
Things requifite to their Agency are preſent;
But Free Agents act what and when and as far
as they will.
Perhaps the Doctrine of Liberty and Ne-
ceffity might be here properly inferted. We
have already ſpoken of Neceffity of Existence
as it is oppoſed to Contingency: Here Necef-
fity of Action ftands rather diftinguiſhed from
Freedom or Liberty, yet is not univerfally and
utterly inconfiftent with it, as will
appear in
what follows.
Neceffity has been before diſtinguiſhed into
natural, moral and logical. See Chap. iii. Na-
tural Neceffity is either internal or external.
Internal Neceffity is that which ariſes from
the very Nature of the Thing itſelf, ſo a ſen-
fible Being feeks its own Prefervation, a Fiſh
avoids dry Land, and a Fox the Water, and
Lead finks in the Sea: That Neceffity is ex-
ternal which arifes from fome outward Force
I
Z3
of
342
A brief Scheme CHAP. VI.
of Reſtraint or Conftraint; fo Lead is upheld
on the Surface of the Water; fo a Fox is dri-
ven into the Sea, or a Fifh drawn in a Net
to Land, and foa. Man is conſtrained to wound.
himſelf. This is fometimes called a forcible
Neceffity.
Liberty is applied to the Will, or to the
inferior and executive Powers. The Will is
always free in its Choice of what it likes:
The lower Powers are not always free to act
or do what the Will chufes. A Man cloſe-
fettered cannot walk, nor can he fight when
his Hands are tyed, tho' he may will or chufe
to do it. On this Account Freedom is better
defcribed by chufing than by acting.
Again, Liberty of the Will is always a Li-
berty of Spontaneity or Voluntariness, without
confidering whether it can do otherwiſe or not:
So when an intelligent Being wills and pur-
fues its own fuppofed Satisfaction or Happi-
nefs, this Being is called free herein, tho' this
Action be neceffary, and it cannot do other-
wife. The Liberty of the Will is fometimes
a Liberty of Choice and Indifference, a Freedom
or Power to chufe or not to chufe among two
or more Things propofed: So a Man chufes to
fpeak or to be filent. This Freedom is in-
confiftent with Neceffity; and this is called by
many Writers Liberty in the moft proper Senfe:
and perhaps it had not been amifs if the Term
Liberty had been always confined to this
Senfe only, but Mankind have not always done
ſe.
There
CHAP. VI. of Ontology.
343
There may be alfo an abfolute or perfect
Freedom, as when a hungry Man wills to go
to Dinner; or a comparative Freedom, when
a. fick Man wills or confents to take fome nau-
feous Phyfick rather than continue in Pain.
Let this fuffice for the Diftinction of free
and neceſſary Actions. See fomething more re-
lating to this Subject in the Chap. of Caufe
and Effect.
Some Philofophers fuppofe nothing worthy
of the Name of Agent or Action but the Will
and its Exerciſes; and they call all other Be-
ings and their Powers and Operations meerly
paffive but this perhaps is too great a Vio-
lence offered to the common Senfe of Words,
tho' there may be fome Appearance of Reaſon
for it in the Nature of Things.
Having ſpoken particularly of Act and
Action; let us now fay fomething more of
Power.
We may diftinguiſh feveral Powers with
the Degrees and Kinds of them. First, Dif
pofition which is an imperfect Power of per-
forming any thing, and but the loweſt Degree:
Next to this is meer Ability to perform, i. e.
with Difficulty and Care; and then a ftrong
Habit, i.e. to perform with Eafe and Certainty.
Among Powers, fome are meerly corporeal
and inanimate, as the Power of the Sun to
melt Snow, and to draw up Vapor: Some are
vegetative, as Nouriſhment, Growth; Some
are animal Powers, as eating, fwallowing, di-
gefting,
Z 4
}
344
A brief Scheme CHAP. VI,
gefting, moving, waking, fleeping, &c. Some
are fpiritual, as meditating, reaſoning, reflect-
ing; chufing, refufing, &c. Some are humane,
arifing from the Union of Mind and Body, as
Senfation, Imagination, Language. Of the
Paffions of Man and what fort of Powers they
are, fee the Doctrine of the Paffions explained
and improved. Edit. 2d, 1932.
1
Again, Of Powers fome are natural, as a
Man's Power to form a Voice: fome acquired,
as Mufick, Ploughing, Language learned by
Degrees; and fome are infuſed, as the Power
of the Apoftles to fpeak many Languages.
Powers acquired by Exercife are moſt pro-
perly called Habits. All Powers of natural Ac-
tion in Animals are called Faculties, as a Power
of Painting, Singing: in inanimate Beings they
are Principles. Powers of moral Action are called
Principles or Habits, as Temperance, Juftice.
Note 1. Tho' we can draw no Inferences
from the Power to the Act, or that any thing
is becauſe it can be; yet Inferences may be juſt-
ly drawn from the Act to the Power, or that
fuch a thing can be becauſe it is.
Note 2. Whatſoever Power the Agent has
to act, yet the Action can be received by the
Patient no further than the Power of the Pa-
tient reaches. This is expreft in fcholaftick Lan-
guage, Quicquid recipitur, recipitur ad modum
recipientis. A Gallon may pour out its Liquor
into a Pint Bottle, but the Bottle can receive
but a Pint: And if the Neck be narrow it
can
CHAP. VII. of Ontology.
345
can receive Liquor but flowly how faft foever
the larger Veffel may pour it. A Tutor may
teach a Child all the Rules of reading in a
Day, but a Child cannot learn them in a
Month.
Note 3. Neither the Power of Creatures
nor of God himſelf extends to things which
are inconfiftent in Nature and Self-contradic-
tory: What his infinite Wiſdom cannot join
his Power cannot produce. Nor does this
Impoffibility in things argue any Impotence
in the Bleffed God. Yet let it be obſerved,
that it is a much more modeſt way of ſpeak-
ing generally, to ſay fuch things cannot be
done, than that God cannot do them.
1
'CHAP. VII.
Of relative Affections or Relations,
Relative Affection is the fame with a Re-
A lation: This arifes from the Reſpect
that one thing bears to fome other Thing or
Things in the Univerſe, or to fome part or
Parts, Property or Properties of itſelf. The
fame Relation is not confined to two Things,
but it may belong to many. Paternity and
Sonship, Greatness and Smallness, are relative
Ideas; and fo are a Part and a Whole; a King
and his Subjects: Beginning, Middle and End.
In Relations we confider firft the Subject of
them, that is the Thing of which we are
ſpeaking; this is called the Relate; and then the
Term
346.
A brief Scheme CHAP. VII.
Term to which this Thing is related, which
is called the Correlate. So if we ſpeak of a
Father, that is the Subject of the Relation
and the Term or Correlate is the Son: But if
we are firſt ſpeaking of the Son, then the Son
is the Relate or Subject of the Relation, and
the Father is the Term or Correlate.
Some Relations ariſe from the meer Exift-
ence of the two Beings, fo the Likeness of troo
Eggs. Others require a Foundation of the Re-
lation diſtinct from the meer Exiſtence of the
Relate and Correlate; as, in Mafter and Scho-
lar, Inftruction is the Foundation: In Buyer
and Seller, the Foundation is compact.
Relations are of feveral Kinds.
1. They are natural or moral, accidental or
voluntary. Natural Relations are Root and
Branches, Father and Children, Kindred by
Birth, &c. Moral are thofe Relations which
the Actions of Men bear to a Law, and thus
they are good or evil, rewardable or puniſhable:
this Law is either human or divine, &c. Ac-
cidental Relations are between feveral. Perfons
happening to become Neighbours, or between
a Company of Soldiers determined by lot out
of a whole Army to fome dangerous Poſt.
Relations are inftituted and voluntary and free-
ly chofen, as Husband and Wife, two or three
Friends, &c. fometimes they are chofen or vo-
luntary only on one Side, as a Carter chooſes
what Horfes fhall make up his Team as well
as the particular Place of each Horſe.
2. Relations
;
CHAP. VIII. of Ontology's
347
L
2. Relations may be termed reciprocal or
not reciprocal. Reciprocal Relations are Part-
ners, Coufins, Neighbours, Balances, &c. Re-
lations, Not-reciprocal, are Caufe and Effect,
Father and Son, Uncle and Nephew, King
and Subjects. The firſt indeed are more u-
fually called fynonymous Relatives, or of the
fame Name; the others we call Heteronymous
or of a different Name. ·
3.
Relations are divided into real or men-
tal: the real Relations ariſe evidently from the
Nature of Things. Theſe are the Whole and
Part, Caufe and Effect, Truth and Goodness,
&c. as before recited. Mental Relations are
made only by the Mind; theſe will follow in
their due Order.
L'
१.
CHA P. VIII.
L
Of Truth, Goodness and Perfection.
EST the Metaphyſicians ſhould take it ill
to have theſe two Affections of Being
(viz.) Truth and Goodness fo much poſtpon-
ed, let us namé them in the firft Rank of
Relative Affections or Relations which are real.
Truth and Goodness are plainly ranked among
relative Ideas, for they confift in a Conformi-
ty to fome thing as their Rule and Standard.
And first let us difcourfe of Truth.
There are various Senfes wherein the Term
Truth is ufed.
+
1. A
348
A brief Scheme CHAP. VIII.
i. A Being is faid to be true in a metaphy-
fical Senfe, when it is agreeable to the divine
Idea, which is the grand Pattern of all crea-
ted Beings..
2. Things may be faid, to have a phyfical or
natural Truth, as, that is true Gold which has
all the neceffary Properties which are uſually
united in the Idea fignify'd by that Word.
3. Some Things are called true in Reprefen-
tation, as when à Picture well reprefents, the
Original, or when an Idea. in our Minds is
really conformable to the Object of it.
4. Things are faid to be true in Signification
when the Thing fignify'd, anfwers the Sign;
as when the proper Words are uſed which
commonly fignify fuch an Idea.
5. There is alfo logical Truth when the Pro-
poſition or Affertion is conformable to Things.
And indeed this I think is the moſt common
Senfe wherein this Word is ufed. The Pro-
pofitions, themſelves are frequently called
Truths. Some of theſe are called probable,
fome improbable, fome certain, i. e. according
to our Knowledge of them. Again, fome
Truths are neceffary, fuch as, There is a God,
the whole is bigger than a part, two and two
make four; thefe are called eternal and un-
changeable: Other Truths are contingent, as,
The Sun fhone bright to Day, Plato was a Phi-
lofopher.
6. There is alfo ethical or moral Truth, when
our Words or Actions agree to our Thoughts,
+
5
and
CHAP. VIII. `of Ontology.
349
4
and our Deeds to our Words, i. e. when we
ſpeak or act as we think, or when we believe
and practiſe what we profefs and promife.
Sincerity is the Truth of the Heart, and Ve-
racity the Truth of the Lips.
After Truth comes Goodness.
1 Goodness is fometimes ufed in a Senfe near a-
kin to Truth: So the Works of God are me-
taphyfically good when they are agreeable to
his Will and anfwer his Defign: When God
furvey'd all Things that he had made, behold
they were very good.
Things alfo are phyfically or naturally good,
when they come up to any fuppofed Standard,
or are fitted to anſwer their End, as good
Wheat, good Gold, a good Air:
: Artificial Things are alfo good in this Senfe,
as good writing, a good Picture, a good Clock.
There is another Senfe of natural Good which
is uſed only with relation to fenfible or to ra-
tional and intelligent Beings, and that is, what
is pleafant, or which tends to procure Plea-
fure or Happineſs.
There is alfo Moral Good, which relates on-
ly to intelligent Creatures, and that is called
Virtue when it regards our Neighbours or
our ſelves; or 'tis called Religion when it has
a Regard to God. Moral Good in general is
when the voluntary Thoughts, Words or Ac-
tions of Creatures are conformable to the Rea-
fon of Things, and to the Law of God. Which
of theſe two are the chief or original Rules
of Goodness may be debated.
The
350
A brief Scheme CHAP. VIII
Note, It ſeems moſt proper to call both
thefe, the Law or Will of God, tho' one is ma
nifeſted to us by the Exerciſe of our reaſon-
ing Powers, the other by divine Revelation.
The Good of Mankind or of rational Beings
is wont to be diftinguished into the fupreme
or chief Good, and the fubordinate Good: it is
either real or apparent: it is preſent or fu
ture: it is alfo divided into Bonum jucundum,
utile, and boneftum, i. e. pleaſant, profitable
and honourable. The two firft of theſe come
under the Idea of natural Good, the laſt is
near akin to moral Good, tho' perhaps not
exactly the fame.
Note, the Word Goodness is alſo uſed in
fomewhat a different Senfe when it fignifies
wiſhing or doing good to others; then 'tis call-
ed Kindness or Benevolence. This belongs ei-
ther to God or Creatures: It comes neareſt to
the Idea of Natural Good as it is that which
sends to procure the Pleaſure or Happineſs of
other Beings.
Any thing that is excellent in its kind is vul-
garly called Good, whether it be natural, ar-
tificial or moral.
Note, What Truth is to the Mind that is
good to the Will, i. e. its moſt proper Object.
According to fome of thefe Divifions of
Truth and Goodness it may be proper alfo to
fhew what is Falfhood, and what is Evil,
which are their Contraries: and here the mo-
ral Ideas of Vice and Sin may be introduced,
which
1
CHAP. VIII. of Ontology:
351
which is the Unconformity of our voluntary
Thoughts, Words, or Actions, to the Laws of
Reafon, or to the revealed Will of God.
Here we might fay, as Duties and Virtues
confift either in Action or in Abftinence, fo
Sins are diftinguiſhed into thoſe of Omiffion
or thofe of Commiffion.
We might remark alfo concerning Good and
Evil, that of feveral good Things the great-
eft is to be chofen, and of feveral Evils the
leaft. But theſe Thoughts belong rather to
moral Science.
Let us proceed now to confider what is the
true Idea of Perfection.
When metaphyfical or phyfical Truth and
Goodness are united in any Being it is called
Perfect, i. e. it contains all the Parts and Pro-
perties which belong to the Effence or Nature
of that Thing, without Defect or Blemish, it
comes up to its Standard, and it is fitted to
anfwer all its defigned or proper Ends.
Where any of theſe are wanting the Being
is called imperfect.
A Being may be called perfect abfolutely in all
Refpects and that belongs to God alone? It
may be faid to be perfect in its own kind as a
perfect Cube or Triangle, or Circle; that is a
perfect Rainbow, which has all its Colours
and reaches from fide to fide of the Hori-
zon: Or it may be called perfect comparative-
ly; that is a perfect Image, Statue or Picture,
which has no fenfible Defects or Unlikeneſs
to
352
A brief Scheme CHAP. VIII.
to the Original, and is fuperior to all others:
So eſtabliſhed and knowing Chriftians are
called perfect in Scripture in compariſon of
Novices.
Again, A Being is perfect either as to Parts
or as to Degrees; an Infant is a perfect Man as
to his Parts, but his Degrees of Growth, or of
Power to ftand, to walk, to reafon, &c. are
imperfect.
Yet further, a thing may be perfect as to
Quantity and Meaſure, as a Horfe of full grown
Stature; but this Horfe may not be perfect as
to the Qualities and Powers of Beauty, or
Swiftnefs. So Fruit may be perfect as to its
Size, but not as to its Ripeneſs.
In the laft Place, Things are yet faid to be
perfect with regard to all their Effentials (viz.)
the natural Parts and Properties which make
the Thing be what it is, as a Garden juft laid
out and planted; or it may be perfect with
regard to all Circumftantials alfo, which give
that Thing Beauty, Ornament, Honour, Con-
veniency, &c. fuch as well-grown Fruit-trees,
fhady Walks, Summer-Houfes, Green-Hou-
fes, &c. make a perfect Garden.
The Word Perfect is fometimes uſed for
Excellent, as when we fay, Beaſts and Birds
are more perfect than Fishes; Spirits are more
perfect than Bodies, and Men more perfect
than Brutes.
CHAP.
1
CHAP. IX. of Ontology.
353
1
CHA P. IX.
Of the Whole and Parts.
Being is faid to be a Whole, when it is
A confidered as confifting of the ſeveral
And
Parts of it united in a proper manner.
confequently Parts are Beings, which united,
conftitute the Whole.
There are four kinds of Whole reckon❜d up
by Writers on this Subject, (viz.) Formal or
Metaphyfical, Eſſential or Phyfical, Integral of
Mathematical, and Univerfal or Logical. See
Logic, Part I. Chap. 6. Sect. 7. Theſe are the
Terms in which the Schools have expreffed
theſe Diſtinctions; and fince moſt of the Di-
ftinctions are ufèful, it is not neceffary to
change the Terms, tho' fome of them may
be applied in a little more proper and perfpi-
cuous manner.
A Formal or Metaphyfical Whole, is the De
finition of a Thing, whereof the Genus and
the Difference are the two conftituent Parts.
See Logic, Part I. Ch. 5. §. 4. I think this is
no uſeleſs Diſtinction.
An Effential or Phyfical Whole, is wont to
be apply'd to natural Beings, all which were
fuppofed to confift of Matter and Form: And
thence it is apply'd to Man confifting of Body
and Soul, which the Peripateticks called the
Matter and Form of Man. But I think the
Senſe of it may be better changed or enlarged
A a
to
354 A brief Scheme CHAP. IX.
to include the Subftance, with all the ef
fential Properties of a Thing; which joyn'd
together make
up the whole Effence of it.
An Integral Whole, is when any Thing is
made up of feveral Parts, which have a real
and proper Exiſtence in Nature, and are
quite diftinct from each other; as the Body
of Man is made up of Trunk, Head and
Limbs: An Army is made up of Soldiers:
Number is made up of Units, and a Day of
Hours: A Book is made up of Pages, a Page
of Words, a Word of Letters; and Speech
is made up of articulate Sounds.
Note, This is called a Mathematical Whole,
when it is apply'd to Number, Time, Di-
menfion, Body, or any Thing that hath pro-
per Quantity, but the Term Integral may
have a wider Extent.
An Univerfal Whole, is a Genus which in-
cludes feveral Species, or a Species which
includes feveral Individuals. This belongs
chiefly to Logick; and therefore 'tis called a
Logical Whole.
Tho' Spirits have properly no quantitative
Parts, and therefore cannot be called a Whole
of the Mathematical kind, yet the Terms
Whole and Parts may be apply'd to them in
all the other Senfes: As for Example, (1.) Me-
taphyfical; fo a thinking Subftance is the
whole Definition of a Spirit; Subſtance is the
Genus, and Thinking the Difference. (2.) Phy-
fical or effential; fo a Spirit is a Whole, and
Percep-
1
CHAP. IX. of Ontology.
355
Perception, Judgment, Reafon, and Will,
may be called its effential Parts or Powers,
without excluding Immateriality and Immor-
tality, as its Properties. (3.) Integral, fo
we fay a whole Army of Angels, a whole
Heaven of bleſſed Spirits. (4.) Univerfal or
Logical; fo a Spirit is a Genus or generic
Whole, human Souls and Angels are the Spe-
cies, or fpecial Parts.
J
As for Man, who is a compound Being
made up of Body and Soul, I think he may
be called as properly an Integral Whole, and
then we leave the Term Effential Whole to
fignify only a Subftance with all its effential
Properties.i
Query. When we fay, One of Tully's Ora
tions is made up of happy: Thoughts, juft
Reaſonings; warm Perfuafives, beautiful
Tranfitions, pure Language, and well-found-
ing Periods, are theſe integral or effential
Parts, and how is the Whole to be denomi
nated? But let us proceed.
Parts are either homogeneous, i. e. of the
fame Kind, as Branches are Parts of a Tree;
or heterogeneous,. i. e. of different Kinds, as the
ſeveral Limbs and Bowels are Parts of an
Animal. And even homogeneous Parts may be
fimilar or diffimilar in feveral Circumftances,
as the Branches of a Tree may be fruitful or
unfruitful, long or fhort, vigorous or wither
ing.
1
A a 2
1
A
Note
3.5:6
A brief Scheme CHAP. X.
A
Note. That which is a Whole in one
Senfe, may be a Part in another. This
whole Globe of Earth is a Part of the Uni-
verſe.
Note 2. The Whole is bigger than each
Part taken feparately, and equal¨ to~ all the
Parts taken conjunctly.
..
Note: 3. The Part of a Part is alſo a Part
of the Whole. A Finger is a Part of the
Body, becauſe 'tis a Part of the Hand.
Lax
A
Jacki
CHA P. X.
Of Principles, Caufes and Effects.
+
Principle may be with fufficient Pro-
priety diftinguish'd from a Cauſe, as a
general Nature from one fpecial Kind. Prin-
ciples are any fort of Springs whatſoever,
either of Effence or Exiſtence, of Knowledge,
or of Operations
?
-ickPrinciples of Effence or Existence are either,
(1.) Continent, as. Herbs, Minerals, Metals
are Principles of Medicines, for they contain in
them the Juices, Oils, Spirits and Salts, and
medicinal Extracts which are drawn from
them by the Chymifts. Or, (2.) Principles
are Conflituents as compound Medicines are
made of feveral Simples, as their Principles;
or as Matter and Form are the conftituent
Principles of particular Bodies; or as Stone
and Timber of a Houſe, or as any Parts of a
Thing are Conftituents of the Whole. Or,
(3.) Prin-
!
CHAP. X. of Ontology.
357
(3.) Principles are Caufal, fuch are all the
Tribes of Cauſes to be mentioned hereafter.
II. Principles of Knowledge are either more
fimple, as Ideas, or Words, or Letters; or
they are more complex, as Propofitions, and
particularly fuch as are felf-evident, as Axi-
oms, or fuch as contain the chief Truths or
Rules of any Doctrine, Art or Science.
III. Principles of Operation may fometimes
include the Beings themſelves, which
which ope-
rate as Writers, Warriors, &c. as well as
their Natural Powers, (viz.) Hands, Strength,
Skill, &c. and their moral Powers, (viz.) Law,
Authority, &c. And fupernatural Principles,
(viz.) Revelation and divine Influences. Al-
moſt all Principles, except the Constituent and
Continent, may be reduced to fome or other of
the Kinds of Caufes.
A Caufe in general is a Principle diſtinct
from the Thing itſelf, and hath ſome real
and proper Influence on the Exiſtence of
that Thing. An Effect is that which is pro-
duced, done or obtained by the Influence of
fome other Being, which is called the Cauſe.
1. Note, No Being can properly be the
Cauſe of itſelf: Yet a Fountain may be the
Cauſe of a River, tho' the Water in both
may be the fame materially, but not formally;
for a Fountain fprings out of the Earth, a
River runs along on the Earth, between a
Length of Banks.
J
2. Note, Every Being, befides the firft Be-
A a 3
ing,
.
A brief Scheme CHAP. X.
358
•
ing, wants a Caufe: God the firſt Being, is
ſelf-exiſtent or independent, and has no Cauſe:
He exifts from a Neceffity of Nature and
Self-ſufficience, yet not properly as the Cauſe
of his own Being; but all other real Beings
are derived from him as from their Cauſe.
3. Note, The fame thing in different Re-
ſpects may be both a Cauſe and an Effect.
Clouds and Vapours are the Effects of the
Sun, but the Caufe of Rain.
4. Note, A Caufe is in Order of Nature
before its Effect, but not always in time.
For a Fire gives Heat, and a Star gives Light
as foon as they exiſt.
Cauſes in general may be divided many
ways.
1. Into univerfal and particular: The
Sun, Earth, Rain, are all univerfal Caufes of
Plants, Herbs and Flowers; for by the fame
fort of Influences each of them produce
various and different Effects: But the parti-
cular Seeds are the particular Cauſes of each
different Herb and Flower. Common and
proper Caufes are very near akin to the for-
mer Diſtinction.
2. Cauſes may be divided into remote and
proxime; as an infectious Air or Eaft Wind
may be the remote Caufe of the Death of
Men; but the feveral Diſeaſes arifing thence
are the proxime Caufes. A Father is the
proxime Cauſe of his Son, a Grandfather the
remote Cauſe.
1
3. Cauſes
CHAP. X.
359
of Ontology.
3. Cauſes are univocal, as when a Lion
produces a young Lion; when a Fountain of
Water fends forth a Stream of Water; or
when Money being lent, gains Money by In-
tereſt: But they are equivocal when a Man
writes a Book, when a Root produces a Stalk
and Leaves, or when Money buys Land. In
the three firft the Effect is of the fame Na-
ture with the Caufe; in the three laft it is
different.
4. Again, Cauſes are fole or folitary, as
when a Horſe alone eats up a Gallon of Corn;
or focial, when a Hen and Chickens ſhare it
among them. So a Peftilence is a folitary
Cauſe when it deftroys a City; but when an
Army made up of Officers and Soldiers con-
quer it, theſe are focial Cauſes.
Social Cauſes are either co-ordinate, as com-
mon Soldiers fight a Battle, or fubordinate,
as the feveral Degrees of Officers, (viz.) Co-
lonels, Captains, Lieutenants, and the com-
mon Soldiers under them. Among fubordi-
nate Cauſes we fometimes confider the firſt,
the laſt, and the intermediate; whether one
or more.
Note, In Cauſes acting by a neceſſary Sub-
ordination the Cauſe of a Cauſe may be juftly
deemed the Caufe of the Effect. The Man
who throws in the Fireband, which kindles
the Gun-powder, which blows up a Ship, is
the Cauſe of the Death of the Sailors.
Note, In fubordinate Cauſes you muſt at
A a 4
laft
360 A brief Scheme
CHAP. X.
laft come to a firſt Cauſe, for there is no in-
finite or endlefs Subordination of Caufes.
Query. If a round Chain of many Links
were uſed to bind a Veffel of Liquor inſtead
of a Hoop, is not each Link fubordinate to
its Neighbour in their Influence? And which
of all theſe is the firſt Cauſe? Anfw. Theſe
are all co-ordinate and not fubordinate Cau-
fes; tho' they are dependent, yet it is on each
other mutually, and they are all equally de-
pendent.
5. Yet further, Caufes in general may be
divided into total and partial. An abfolutely
total Cauſe is much the fame as a fole Caufe:
But a Cauſe may be total in its own Kind, tho'
many other Cauſes concur to produce the Ef-
fect. Alexander the King, Apelles the Painter,
his Idea, his Hand, and his Pencil, are each a
total Cauſe of Alexander's Picture, for each of
thefe is fingle and alone in their diſtinct Influ-
ences: But the Colours are partial Cauſes, for
they have all the fame Influence; and fo are the
Fingers of the Painter, for they all join their
Service in guiding his Pencil.
6. Cauſes are alſo diſtinguiſh'd into Phyfi
cal, which work by natural Influence, and
Moral, which work by Perfuafion.
7. A Caufe is called Ordinary, when it
works according to the ufual Courſe of Na-
ture, as when Animals produce their own
Kind: 'Tis extraordinary or miraculous, as
when the Rod of Mofes produced fwarms of
Lice in Egypt.
After
CHAP. X. of Ontology.
361
After all theſe Diftinctions of Caufes in
general, let us now come to diftribute Ćaufes
into their chief particular Kinds. Inftead of
dividing them into thofe common Branches of
Material and Formal, Efficient and Final, it
may be much more proper to leave out
Matter and Form, as not being properly
Cauſes, and then we may diftribute the reft
into four Kinds, (viz.) Emanative, Efficient,
Directive and Suafive: and as I think none of
theſe are included properly in each other, fo
theſe include all the various Ideas of pofitive
proper Caufes in the moft natural and eafy
View and Order.
I. An Emanative Caufe is, when the Ef-
fect flows from it without any Action to pro-
duce it, fuppofing only that all Obftructions
be removed. So Water flows from a Spring;
fo Heat from the Fire, or a fragrant Scent from
Spices. This might perhaps be reduced to
the Rank of continent Principles whence any
thing proceeds, tho' it much better deferves
the Name of a Cauſe than Matter and Form,
which are only Conftituents, and are the Ef-
fect itſelf. It belongs chiefly to natural and ne-
ceffary Cauſes to have the Title of Emanative.
Sometimes the Effect is co-eval with the
emanative Cauſe, as Light and Heat flowing
from the Sun, or a fweet Smell from a Vio-
let. Sometimes the Caufe is prior to the
Effect, as when a Plant fprings from the
Seed, or Leaves and Fruit from a Tree, or a
long River from a diſtant Fountain. Query,
362
CHAP. X.
A brief Scheme
Query, Whether fome of thoſe which are
ufually called emanative Caufes, becauſe their
Agency is more infenfible and unnoticed, bet
not as properly rank'd among the efficient
Cauſes? Such as, the Sun in emitting its
Rays, which give both Light and Heat,
and produce innumerable Effects throughout
the Earth and all the planetary Worlds; Is it
a meer emanative Caufe of Light and Heat?
Anf. This may be debated in Phyfiology if it be
worth a Debate.
II. An Efficient Caufe moft properly de-
ferves the Name of a Caufe, becauſe it pro-
duces the Effect by fome fort of active Power
or natural Agency; as when an Archer bends.
his Bow, or when the Bow gives Flight to
an Arrow, or when an Arrow ftrikes the
Mark. All theſe three are diftinct efficient
Cauſes with their diftinct Effects.
Efficient Cauſes have many Divifions.
1. Efficient Cauſes are either first or fecond.
The firſt Cauſe is either abfolutely fo, which
is God alone, and all Creatures are but fe-
cond Cauſes: Or 'tis firft in its own Kind; fo
a Gardener is the firft Caufe of the Growth
of Trees in the Garden which he hath plan-
ted; all his under Agents, whether Diggers or
Waterers or Weeders, are fecond Caufes.
2. The next Divifion near akin to the for-
mer is when efficient Cauſes are diſtinguiſhed
into Principal, lefs Principal and Inftrumental.
The principal Cauſe of building a Houſe is
3
the
CHAP. X. of Ontology
363
the Architect; the lefs Principal are adjuvant
or affiftant Cauſes, fuch are Bricklayers, Car-
penters, Labourers, &c. the inftrumental Cau-
fes are Hammers, Axes, Trowels, &c.
3. Efficient internal Cauſes are diſtinguiſh'd
from external: when the inward Humours of
the Body produce Pain or Death, 'tis differ-
ent from the Cafe when outward Wounds and
Bruiſes produce the fame Effects.
4. Efficient Cauſes may be exciting and dif-
pofing, as when Hunger excites a Horfe to
eat, or a Farmer holds Hay to his Mouth:
But when a Farrier conſtrains him to take a
Drench, this is a compelling and constraining
Cauſe.
5. A Caufe is forced, as when a Man dri-
ven by Robbers runs in at his Neighbour's
Window by Night for Shelter; or 'tis free, as
when a Robber breaks into the Houfe to
plunder it.
6. Yet further, efficient Cauſes may be
neceſſary, as when the Sea drowns a Child who
falls into it; or Contingent, as when a Tile
falls from a Houſe and kills a Child; where-
as it might only have wounded him, or per-
haps not hurt him, or never touched him.
7. Again, Cauſes may be accidental, as when
a Boy throws a Stone at a Bird and breaks a
Window: But when he doth this Miſchief on
purpoſe, the Caufe is defigning and the Effect
is defigned. When a Groom leads a lame
Horfe to Water, the Groom is the defigning
Caufe
364 A brief Scheme
CHAP. X.
{
Cauſe of the Horfe's walking, but he is only
the accidental Caufe of his halting. The fa-
mous Pair of Caufes which in the Schools is
called Caufa per Accidens and Caufa per fe may
be applied to theſe two or three laſt Diſtinc-
tions of efficient Caufes *.
8. Again, Efficient Caufes may be either
procuring or confirming, preventing or removing.
So Medicines confirm or procure Health, and
prevent or remove Diſeaſes.
9. Efficient Cauſes may be creative, confer-
vative, alterative or deftructive. The very
Names of theſe deſcribe them fufficiently.
Note, Here might be introduced that famous
Axiom of the Schools that every Caufe contains
its Effect, or that there is nothing in the Effect
which was not in the Caufe: but this muſt not
be underſtood always formally as a Fountain
contains Water, but fometimes, only eminent-
ly, i. e. as the Root of a Tree contains Leaves
and Fruit, becauſe it can produce them; and
indeed when we fearch this Axiom to the
Bottom it means nothing more than that
every Caufe can produce its Effect, which is
a very dilute and infipid Canon, becauſe 'tis
contained in the very Definition of a Cauſe.
* I know accidental and contingent Cauſes are much the fame;
but I thought it more proper here to multiply the Divifions
of Cauſe than to crowd all theſe Caufes, (viz.) Forced, Free,
Defigning, Contingent and Neceſſary into one Diviſion, becauſe
fome of them have two or three Oppofites, and have their
Ideas a little diftinct, which beſt appears in diſtinct Pairs. See
more in the Chap. of Act and Power, Neceffity and Freedom.
Befides
CHAP. X.
365
· of Ontology.
Befides 'tis a very odd and uncouth manner
of ſpeaking, to ſay, that a Whetſtone con-
tains in it the Sharpneſs of a Scythe, not for-
mally but eminently, becauſe it can make a
Scythe ſharp. Yet this is the Cafe in a Mul-
titude of theſe metaphyfical Axioms; I men-
tion this only as an Inftance at preſent, and
as a Reaſon why I have paſt ſo many of them
over in Silence.
III. The third kind of Cauſes is an inftruc-
tive Caufe. This works either by way of
Manifeſtation of Truth or Direction in Prac-
tice.
+
1. In the Manifestation of Truth this Cauſe
fometimes acts in Silence; as a Book, or Dia-
gram, a Picture, à Map, a Mariner's Compaſs,
or magnetick Needle: Sometimes 'tis vocal;
as a Tutor, or a Watchman in the Night, or
perhaps a Cuckow giving notice of the Spring,
or a crowing Cock of the Morning.
<
2. In the Direction of Practice this Caufe
is either a Rule which teaches us to act whe-
ther by Speech or Writing; or 'tis a Pattern
or Example for us to imitate and copy after.
Sometimes this is a living Example which by
acting fhews us to act the fame; or 'tis a
Guide which feems to include both the former
(viz.) teaching and fhewing, or Rule and
Example.
Many times the inftructive Caufes which
primarily manifeſt Truth are defigned alſo ul-
imately to direct our Practice, fo a Mariner's
Needle
3
366
A brief Scheme CHAP. X.
1
Needle pointing where the North lies directs
the Pilot to ſteer the Ship.
Note, Active inſtructive Caufes approach
toward the Idea of an efficient Caufe; the
Paffive are quite diſtinct.
Note, All this fort of Caufality works its
Effect chiefly in intellectual Agents.
Query, But may not an inftructive Cauſe
fometimes be attributed to Brutes? Dogs or
Horfes will teach one another what Man has
taught them.
When a Pilot or Steers-man guides a Ship
by the Rudder, or when a Tube or Ring
guides an Arrow to the Mark, when a Ca-
nal conveys Water to a Ciftern, or when any
hard Body by repelling or reflecting determines
any moving Body to a particular Point, all
theſe perhaps are more properly ranked under
efficient Cauſes than directive, becauſe they do
it by meer Mechaniſm, without fo much as
the Appearance of any intellectual Influence
upon the Thing directed, and can never be
called inftructive.
Query, When a Sun-dial fhews the Hour,
the Sun and the Style of the Dial ſeem to be
focial efficient Cauſes; the Sun by giving Light
the Style by limiting it with Shade: But
what fort of Caufe is the Dial-plane? Is it not
inſtructive ?
IV. A Suafive Caufe is that which works
either by Entreaty or Authority, by Commands
or Counfels, by Promifing or Threatning, by
Rewards
CHAP. X.
of Ontology.
367
Rewards or Puniſhments, by Fear or Hope,
or any other Motives, all which are called
moral Agency or Influence.
Suafive Cauſes are either perfonal or real.
Perfonal are chiefly ſuch as theſe (viz.) Au-
thor or Perſuader, Commander, Encourager
c. Real fuafive Caufes are the End or De-
fign, the Object, Occaſion, Opportunity, Me-
rit or Demerit. Any Being, Appearance or
Circumftance whatſoever, that tends to influ-
ence the Agent in a moral way, i. e. to affect
and perfuade the Will, may be properly call-
ed a fuafive Cauſe,
This fort of Caufes belongs alſo chiefly if
not only to intellectual and voluntary Agents.
•
Yet it may be query'd whether a Pond
inviting a Horfe to drink be a fuafive or an
efficient Cauſe? Is the Influence of this Ob-
ject on the Animal properly natural or moral?
Food inviting a hungry Man to eat has cer-
tainly both a natural and a moral Influence,
becauſe he has both animal Nature and rea-
foning Powers.
The End or Defign is one of the chief of
fuafive Caufes. An Artificer labours hard;
his End is to procure Bread; his Labour is
called the Means. The End is the Cauſe, the
Means the Effe&t.
Under the Idea of an End all the Doctrine
of final Caufes with all their Diviſions ſhould
be introduced.
1. Here therefore comes in first the Diſtinc-
1
tion
368
A brief Scheme
CHAP. X.
tion of ultimate Énd or fubordinate: An ul-
timate End is either abfolutely fo, fuch is or
ſhould be the End of all our Actions (viz.)
the Glory of God and our own final Happi-
nefs; or it is ultimate in its own kind; fo
Learning or Knowledge is the chief End of
Reading. Subordinate Ends are ſuch as tend
to fome further End, as Knowledge is fought
in order to practiſe; Practice in order to Pro-
fit and Pleaſure in this Life, or Preparation
for the Life to come.
Note, There may be many co-ordinate Ends
of the fame Action which are not fubordinated
to one another. A Man rides on Horfe-back
for his Pleaſure, for his Health, and for a
Vifit to his Friend. If one of theſe Ends
be much fuperior in his Eye to the others,
that is called the primary End, others are but
fecondary, tho' not fubordinate.
2. The End is confider'd as in the Intention
of the prime Efficient, or in the Execution.
In the Intention it moves or excites the effi-
cient Cauſe to act by a moral Influence, and
'tis in this View it properly comes in among
fuafive Caufes. But in the Execution it becomes
the Effect of the prime Agent by a natural
Influence or Caufality.
3. Another manifeſt Diſtinction of final
Caufes is into fuch as are private and con-
cealed, or fuch as are publick and avow'd.
4. There is another Diſtinction which the
Schools call Finis cujus, i. e. the End or De-
fign
CHAP. X. of Ontology...
369
fign of the Workman, and Finis cui which
is the End or Deſign of the Work. A Clock-
maker's Defign is Gain, but the Defign of
the Clock is to fhew the Hour.
1. Query, Are Brutes influenced by final
Caufes? Their Actions look very like it. But
doth not acting for fome Defign or End im-
ply Reaſoning?
2. Query, Is it not an evident Truth that all
Caufes muſt have a Being before they can act,
at leaſt in order of Nature tho' not always in
Time? But may not many fuafive Caufes act
before they exift? as for inftance; a Thief is
tempted to provide a Ladder to Day becauſe
there will be an Opportunity at Night to come
over the Garden Wall: And do not final Cau-
fes always act before they exiſt, fince the Action
of the Efficient is defign'd to produce their Ex-
iftence as the Effect? Anf. All fuafive Caufes
act by the Idea of them exifting in the Mind,
whether the Things themſelves exift or no.
1ft Note, The End and the Means are mutu-
ally Cauſe and Effect to each other. When the
End is confider'd as a fuafive Cauſe, the Means
are the Effect; but when the End is confider-
ed as the Effect, the Means are an inftrumen-
tal or fubordinate efficient Caufe under the In-
fluence of the principal Efficient.
2d Note, The End reconciles the Agent to
thofe Means which may be painful and unplea-
fant, and it regulates and limits the Ufe of
Means. A fick Man who feeks Health is
perfunded
B b
370 A brief Scheme CHAP. X.
perfuaded to uſe Bliſters or bitter Potions, and
his Ufe of them is regulated and limited by
the View of Health.
3. Note, In the Series of final Cauſes ſub-
ordinate to each other, that which is laft in Exe-
cution is generally firft or chief in the Inten-
tion; but 'tis not always fo; for when the
chief End is obtained leffer Ends
may be fome-
times purfued. I retire into the Country
chiefly for my Health; but when I am well
I defign alfo to vifit my Friends there, and I
feek my Health partly with that Defign.
upon
Befides theſe four kinds of Caufes which
have a plain, a pofitive and direct Influence
the Effect, there are ſome other Princi-
ples which alſo have their diſtinct forts of In-
fluence, tho' not in fo pofitive and direct a
manner: Yet they have been dignify'd with
the Title of Caufes for want of a fitter Name.
The chief of them are, a deficient Cauſe, a
permiffive Caufe, and a Condition.
1
1. A deficient Cauſe is when the Effect owes
its Existence in a great Meaſure to the Abfence
of fomething which would have prevented
it; fo that this may be reckoned a negative
rather than a pofitive Caufe: The Negligence
of a Gardener or the Want of Rain are the de-
ficient Cauſes of the withering of Plants;
and the Careleſsnefs of the Pilot or the fink-
ing of the Tide is the Caufe of a Ship's ſplit-
ting on a Rock: The Forgetfulneſs of a Mef-
fage is the Caufe of a Quarrel among Friends,
or
CHAP. X. of Ontology.
371
Or of the Puniſhment of Servants: The not-
bringing a Reprieve in time is the Cauſe of a
Criminal's being executed, and the Want of
Education is the Caufe why many a Child runs
headlong into Vice and Mifchief: The Blind-
nefs of a Man or the Darkness of the Night are
the Cauſes of ftumbling: A Leak in a Boat is
a-deficient Cauſe why the Water runs in and the
Boat finks; and a Hole in a Veffel is called the
deficient Cauſe why the Liquor runs out and is
loft. Man is the deficient Caufe of all his Sins
of Omiffion, and many of theſe carry great
Guilt in them.
3
II. A Permiffive Caufe is that which actually
removes Impediments, and thus it lets the
proper Caufes operate. Now this fort of Cauſe
is either natural or moral.
A natural permiffive Caufe* removes natu-
ral Impediments, or Obftructions, and this
may be called a deobftruent Caufe. So open-
ing the Window-Shutters is the Cauſe of Light
entering into a Room: Cleanfing the Ear may
be the Cauſe of a Man's hearing Mufick who
was deaf before: Breaking down a Dam is the
Caufe of the overflowing of Water and drown-
ing a Town: Letting looſe a Rope is the Cauſe
of a Ship's running a-drift: Leaving off a Gar-
ment is the Caufe of a Cold and a Cough;
-
* If the Word De-obftruent were always uſed to denote a
Cauſe removing natural Obſtructions, then we might leave the
Term Permiffive only to fignify moral Caufes of this kind.
B b 2
and
}
372
CHAP. X.
A brief Scheme
and cutting the Bridle of the Tongue may
the Caufe of Speech to the Dumb.
be
Note, The Caufe which removes natural
Impediments may be a
a proper efficient Cauſe
with regard to that Removal, yet it is not pro-
perly efficient, but meerly permiffive with re-
gard to the Confequences of that Removal.
A moral permiffive Caufe removes moral Im-
pediments, or takes away Prohibitions, and
gives leave to act: So a Maſter is the permif-
five Cauſe of his Scholars going to play; a
General is the fame Cauſe of his Soldiers plun-
dering a City; and the repeal of a Law a-
gainſt foreign Silks is the permiffive Cauſe why
they are worn.
Query, Was not God's Permiffion of Satan
to afflict Job rather natural than moral, fince
his mifchievous Actions did not become lawful
thereby, and fince it is now become his Nature
to do Miſchief, where he has no natural Re-
ftraint?
III. A Condition hath been uſually called
Caufa fine quâ non, or a Cauſe without which
the Effect is not produced. It is generally
apply'd to fomething which is requifite in or-
der to the Effect, tho' it hath not a proper
actual Influence in producing that Effect.
Day-light is a Condition of Ploughing, Sow-
ing and Reaping: Darkneſs is a Condition of
our feeing Stars and Glow-worms: Clearnefs
of the Stream is the Condition of our ſpying
Sand and Pebbles at the Bottom of it: Being well
dreft
CHAP. XI.
373
of Ontology.
dreft with a Head uncovered is a Condition
of a Man's coming into the Preſence of the
King: And paying a Pepper-corn yearly is the
Condition of enjoying an Eftate. How far
the perfect Idea of the Word Condition in the
civil Law may differ from this Repreſentation
is not my preſent Work to determine.
Note, Thefe three laſt Cauſes may poffibly
be all ranked under the general Name of Con-
ditions; but I think it is more proper to dif
tinguiſh them into their different Kinds of
Caufality.
TH
CHAP. XI.
Of Subject and Adjunct.
'HE greateſt part of what is neceffary to
be faid on this Theme may be found in
Logick, where it treats of Subftances and Modes:
But in this Place the Word Subject is more
uſually confidered as having accidental Modes
relating to it than thoſe which are eſſential,
for fo the Word Adjunct means here.
As a Being or Subſtance may be a Subject
of Inhefion, Adheſion or of Denomination,
fo Adjuncts may perhaps fometimes be uſed in
a large Senfe to include fome internal Quali-
ties which may inhere in the Subject; but the
Word more generally ſtands diſtinguiſh'd from
inherent Qualities, and fignifies more properly
external Additions or Appendices, which adhere
to the Subject, or Names and Denominations,
by which it is called.
Bb 3
The
374
A brief Scheme CHAP. XI.
The moſt confiderable Adjuncts of all Ap-
pearances or Actions are what we call Circum-
ftances, which include Time, Place, Light,
Darknefs, Clothing, the furrounding Situati-
on of Things, or Perfons, and the concomi-
tant, antecedent, or confequent Events.
When the Word Subject fignifies a Subject
either of Occupation, of Operation, of Thought
or Difcourfe, it may be properly alfo called an
Object; as a Houſe or Timber are Subjects or
Objects on which a Carpenter works, about
which he is occupied, or of which he thinks
or diſcourſes.
Objects are either immediate and proxime,
or mediate and remote. The Pages and Words
of a Book are the immediate Object of a Stu-
dent's Occupation; Notions and Opinions, Arts
and Sciences are the remote Object, becauſe
they are taught by thefe Pages. So a difpleaf-
ed Superior is the remote Object of my Ad-
dreffes, but the Mediator by whom I hope for
Reconciliation is my more immediate Object.
I fend Letters to my Friend remotely, but I de-
liver them immediately to the Poft:
Again, Objects are either common or proper.
The Shape, and Motion, and Size of Bodies
are common Objects of two different Senfes,
(viz.) of Sight and Feeling: Colour is the
proper Object of Sight alone; Sound of hear-
ing, and Cold of feeling.
The Subjects of which feveral Sciences treat
are called their Objects: Theſe are either ma-
4
terial
1
:
CHAP. XII,
of Ontology.
375
terial or formal: The Body of Man is the
common material Object both of Anatomy and
Medicine; tho' one confiders it as a curious
Engine whofe Parts are to be diffected and
known, the other views it as capable of Dif
eaſes and Healing; which two Confiderations
added to the human Body conftitute the proper
and formal Objects of thofe two Sciences,
T
CHAP. XII.
Of Time and Place and Ubiety..
1.
Ime is eſteemed a relative Affection, for
it commonly refers to fomething that
meaſures it.
Time is finite and fucceffive Duration, and
'tis diftinguifhed (as I have before obſerved)
into past, present and future; 'tis ufually mea-
fured by the Motion of fome Bodies, whofe
Motions are fuppofed to be moft regular, uni-
form and certain. And for this Reafon Man-
kind have generally agreed to meaſure Time
by the Revolution of the heavenly Bodies,
Sun, Moon, and Stars; and God himſelf ap-
pointed them for this End: Thence Centu-
ries, Years, Months, Weeks, Days, Hours
and Minutes have their Rife.
But amongst the ruder and more untaught
Parts of the World both in ancient and later
Ages, Time has fometimes been meaſured by
any of thofe Things which are fuppofed to
keep their regular returning Periods and Sea-
B b 4
fons,
376
A brief Scheme CHAP. XII.
fons, as Cold and Heat, Snow and Ice, pe-
riodical Rains or Winds, particular Fruits,
Corn, Harveſt, the Coming or Departure of
certain Birds to particular Countries, or Fiſh
to particular Coafts.
All the Things before mentioned are a
fort of natural Meaſures or Determinations
of Times and Seafons: But Hour-Glaffes, by
Sand or Water, Clocks, Watches, &c. are
Artificial Meaſurers of Time, and fome of
them perform it with greater Exactneſs even
than the Motions of the heavenly Bodies, at
leaſt in their Appearances to us on the Earth.
As for the Time or Duration of Spirits
while they are united to human Bodies, or
Vehicles, or make their Appearances on
Earth, it is meaſured by fome of the Things
we have mention'd: But the Duration or
Time of thofe Spirits which have no Re-
lation to our World, muſt be meaſured in
fome other manner which at prefent we
know not.
Here is a famous Queftion, whether God's
Duration or Eternity be not coexiſtent with
our Time, and the Duration of the World,
and whether fuch a part of Eternity be not
commenfurate therewith? "Tis evident this is
our common Idea of it. But 'tis hardly juft,
for in Truth Eternity is an Idea above our
preſent Reach, and we lofe our felves in an
Abyfs, when we wander into it.' See the
Chapter of Duration, and the Chapter of
Infinites.
A
CHAP. XII. of Ontology.
377
A Moment is called the leaft Part of Time:
So an Atom is the leaft Part of Matter: But
modern Philofophers fuppofe all fort of Quan-
tity to be infinitely divifible, whether it be Mag-
nitude, which is called permanent Quality, or
Time which is called flowing Quantity; and
then there is properly no Atom, no Moment.
Place or Situation is a relative Idea: for it
is generally defcribed as that Relation of Prox-
imity or Diſtance which one Being bears to
the viſible Bodies that are round about it, and
are uſually eſteem'd quiefcent, or at reſt.
Place is diftinguifh'd indeed by many Mo-
dern Philofophers into Abfolute and Relative:
Abfolute Place is made to fignify that Part of
the fuppofed infinite Void or Space, which
any Being fills up and poffeffes. And Rela-
tive Place is the Situation of a Being among
other Bodies, which are look'd upon as qui-
eſcent; and it must be granted we ufually
conceive Things in this manner: But if Space
be a Creature of the Imagination, and a meer
Idea or nothing real, then all Place is pro-
perly relative, and a Body exiſting alone has
no Place.
The Place of a Spirit has been often call'd
Ubiety, which may moft properly refer to ſo
much of the material World, of which it has
a more evident Conſciouſneſs, and on which
it can act: In God the infinite Spirit, his
Ubiety is wherefoever there are Objects for
his Conſciouſneſs and Activity: And you may
extend
378
A brief Scheme CHAP. XII,
extend this to all poffible as well as real and
actual Worlds, if you pleaſe; for he knows
and he can do whatfoever can be known or
can be done, and therefore he is faid to be
every where. But with Regard to conſci-
ous Beings, whether created or increated, I
confeſs I have no clear Idea how they can
have any proper Locality, Refidence, Situa-
tion, Nearneſs, or Juxta-pofition among Bo-
dies, without changing the very Effence or
Nature of them into extended Beings, and
making them quite other things than they are.
When we fay God the infinite Spirit is
every where, let it be underſtood therefore,
that in a strict philofophical Senfe, we mean
that he has an immediate and unlimited Con-
fciouſneſs of, and Agency upon all Things,
and that his Knowledge and Power reach alfo
to all Poffibles, as well as to all actual Be-
ings. When we fay the Soul of Man is in his
Body, we mean, it has a Conſciouſneſs of
certain Motions and Impreffions made on
that particular animal Engine, and can ex-
cite particular Motions in it at Pleaſure.
What further Ideas are contained in the
Ubiety of Spirits, I know not.
a
When we confider Bodies as preſent in
Place by their proper Situation, this may be
called a Circumfcriptive Prefence: A Spirit's
Prefence in a Place by Confcioufneſs or Ope-
ration hath been called a definitive or limit-
ed Prefence; becauſe its Confciouſneſs and
Opera-
1
CHAP. XIII. of Ontology.
379
Operation are not univerfal or infinite: God's
Omniprefence, or his being every where, hath
been termed his repletive Prefence, becauſe the
Scripture fays, God fills Heaven and Earth;
tho' this Term perhaps does not properly an-
fwer the philofophical Idea, yet it may be uſed
in a vulgar and figurative way of fpeaking,
which is perfectly agreeable to the Language
and Defign of the facred Writers.
J
A
CHA P. XIII.
Of Agreement and Difference, of Sameness, and
the Doctrine of Oppofites.
TH
HE Agreement and Difference of Things
are found out by that Act of the Mind
which we call Comparison, wherein we com-
pare one thing with another; but we ſome-
times alſo compare the fame thing with it-
felf at different Times or Places, or as vefted
with different Qualities, or under different
Circumſtances, or Confiderations, and in dif-
ferent Refpects, and fo we fay a thing agrees
with, or differs from itſelf.
Agreement is either real, that is in Sub-
ftance, or modal, that is in Modes, Proper-
ties or Accidents, or 'tis mental, i. e. fuch as
is made only by our Conceptions.
Again, Agreement is either internal, i. e.
in Effence, in Quantity, or in Quality; or
'tis external, that is in Caufes, Effects, Ad-
juncts, Circumſtances and Names.
Yet
380
A brief Scheme CHAP. XIII.
Yet further, Agreement is either total and
perfect, when there is no manner of Diffe-
rence, or partial, which admits a Difference
in fome Reſpect. Perfect Agreement in the
higheſt Degree is ufually called Sameness, yet
this Word is fometimes uſed alfo to fignify
lower Degrees of it.
Sameness or Identity is attributed to Things
which agree in Effence, or have an effential
Agreement; but Agreement in Quality is
properly called Likeneſs.
An Agreement in Quantity, if it be per-
fect, is fometimes called Sameness, but more
properly Equality. Agreement in Value re-
quires an Agreement in Quantity, where the
Quality is the fame; fo five Shillings is the
fame with a Crown, or equal to it, i. e. it
is the fame Quantity of Silver. But fome-
times Agreement in Value arifes from the
Difference of Quality compenfating the Ex-
cefs or Defect in Quantity; fo a Guinea of
Gold is equal to twenty one Shillings in
Silver.
But if the Agreement in Quantity be not
abfolute and perfect Sameness, it is called
Proportion: So we fay there is a Proportion
between 16 and 24, for one is two thirds of
the other: And fo there is between three fives
and fifteen, for they are equal.
Agreement in Shape or Figure is uſually
called Similarity, fo two equilateral Triangles
are fimilar Figures.
Two
រ
CHAP. XIII. of Ontology.
381.
Two or more things may be faid to have
the fame general Effence or Nature, fo Beaſts,
Birds, Fiſhes agree in that they are Animals:
or they are faid to have the fame Special Nature;
fo Hounds and Spaniels agree in that they
are Dogs; Peter and Paul agree in that they are
Men. But 'tis only one thing has the fame indi-
vidual Nature or Effence with itfelf, as Methu-
felah when a Boy, a Youth, and an old Man is
the fame. Hence arife the Ideas of generical,fpe-
cifical, and numerical or individual Sameness.
Again, Sameness is either material or for-
mal. Wheat is the fame Body materially
when it is a Heap of Grains, as when it is
ground and moulded into Bread, but 'tis not
formally the fame.
One would think it a very eafy Queſtion,
Whether a Thing be the fame with itself or no?
But whofoever will read what Mr. Locke has
written upon Identity in Chap. 27. Book II. of
his Eſſay, will think it a fort of infolvable
Difficulty in fome Cafes, and almoſt an im-
poffible thing to anſwer that Query in fome
particular Inftances, eſpecially relating to Men,
Animals, &c. This Queſtion in the Lan-
guage of the Schools is, What is the Principle
of Individuation? i. e. what is neceffary to
make a Thing the fame with itſelf?
Here we may confider the Sameness of fingle
Bodies as a Grain of Wheat; of Aggregates,
as a Heap of Sand; of Compounds, as a Houſe,
a Garden: Here enquire how ſmall or how
great
382
A brief Scheme CHAP. XIH.
great a Difference will hinder thefe from be-
ing called the fame.
Again, Let us confider the Sameness of
Rivers, Vegetables and Animals, each of which
Sameneffes confifts in very different Ideas, and
fome are difficult to adjuſt.
Confider yet further the Sameness of Spi-
rits, which confiſts in the fame thinking Pow-
er or Subftance; and the Sameness of Per-
fons, which confifts chiefly in the very fame
Conſciouſneſs, the fame felf, or rather in the
fame fingle confcious Principle.
Confider here alſo the Sameness of Man-
kind, when Body and Soul are united, or
when divided; when fat and lean; when In-
fants or in old Age; and the Sameness of
our Bodies in the Refurrection with what we
now have. All theſe will afford ſufficient
Labour for Philofophy and Reafon to, hunt
after the clear and diftinct Ideas of them.
Mr. Locke in this Chapter has fome excel-
lent Reaſonings, tho' I cannot affent to all
his Sentiments entirely. See. Efay XII. Sect.
ult.
Similitude or Likeness is an Agreement
chiefly in Qualities, tho' fometimes it relates
alfo to Effences, Natures and Substances.
This may be total and complete, or partial
or gradual. There is alfo Likeneſs, in the
Jame Kind, as one Picture is like to another:
And Likeneſs in. a different Kind, as a Picture
to a Statue; or Poely to Painting; or Verfe
to
CHAP. XIII. of Ontology. ·
38:3
'to 'Mufick; 'which fort of 'Likenéſs is ſome- ·
times called Cognation or Análogy.
་
The Word Analogy at other Times ftands
for 'Proportion; our Idea whereof chiefly
arifes from our Compariſon of two `Quanti-
ties together, and confidering the Relation
they bear to each other: Now this is pro-
perly a Relation of Agreement, and not of
Difference; and I think we may 'fay, that
·Proportion includes every fort of Agreement
in Quality, befides perfect and individual
Sameness, whether this Quantity be Magni-
tude, or Number, or Time. Hence arife the
Ideas and Terms, equal and unequal, greater
and less, more or fewer, &c. but it is not ne-
ceffary for us here to enter into the Mathe-
"matical Diſtinctions of Proportion, whether
Arithmetical or Geometrical, whether direct or
inverſe, which belong only to thofe Sciences.
The Idea of Proportion may alfo be ap-
plied to any "Qualities whatfoever, which
admit of gradual Differences, and to which
the Ideas of more or less may be attributed,
as Whiteness, Cold, Good, "Evil, &c. This
Proportion is either Equality, Excefs or Defect;
fignified v. c. by the Words, as white, whiter
or less white. Herein the Science of Gram-
"mar uſes its pofitive and comparative Names.
Where the Excefs or Defect is extreme, as in
"whiteft or leaft white, tis all the Superlative.
f
Having fpoken fo much of Agreement, we
frould fay fomething of Difagreement or Dif-
ference
384
A brief Scheme CHAP. XIII.
ference too. Obferve, that Difference in this
Place is not the fame Idea with that which
is mentioned in Logick as the primary effential
Mode of any Being, and which is join'd to
the Genus to make a Definition. See Logic,
Part I. Chap. 6. Sect. 4. But Difference here
includes every Diſtinction of one thing from
another.
And this alfo is either real, i. e. fubftan-
tial, as one Subftance differs from another:
or 'tis modal, as Modes, Properties or Quali-
ties differ from the Subftance, or from one
another: or 'tis mental, which is made only
by the Mind of Man. And indeed Difference
or Difagreement may admit of moft or all the
fame Diviſions which belong to the Idea of
Agreement, which we need not ftand to
repeat.
Note, Things which really differ may ex-
ift ſeparate, but modal or mental Difference
is not fufficient for the ſeparate Exiſtence of
both.
Note, the Difference between Modes or
Properties is fometimes called a real Differ-
ence, becauſe it is founded in the real Nature of
Things, and fo it ftands in Oppofition to
mental, which is meerly the Work of the
Mind of Man making Diſtinctions, where
Things are really the fame.
Diſagreement in Subſtance or Effence is pro-
perly called Diverſity: in Quality, 'tis Dif-
fimilitude: in Quantity it ſtands in Oppofiti-
4
on
CHAP. XIII. of Ontology.
385
on to Sameness, and then it is peculiarly cal-
led Difference; or it may fometimes ftand in
Oppofition to Proportion, and then it may bé
called Difproportion, as, there is a Difpropor
tion between Finites and Infinites, i. e. there
is no Proportion between them.
The pointing out the Difference of two
Things, is properly called Diftinction. The
Word Difproportion is generally uſed in a more
vulgar Senfe; it fignifies fometimes a very
great Difference between two Quantities or
Numbers, as two is difproportionate to two
thouſand: Sometimes it means, that one
Part or Adjunct of a Thing is too big or too
little for the others: So we fay that the large
Noſe of Nafo was difproportionate to his
Face, or the fmall Garden of Dioclefian was
difproportionate to his former Palace.
Thefe two following Notes concerning
Agreement and Difference, belong eminently,
to Logic, and fhew the Reaſon of ufing a
middle Term in Ratiocination.
1. In what foever two Things agree to a:
third, they alſo agree, fo far among them-
felves. This is the Foundation of affirma-
tive Syllogifms.
2. In two Things whereof one differs from
a third, while the other agrees to it, theſe two-
differ fo far among themſelves. This is the
Foundation of negative Syllogifms.
}
Let us proceed now to confider Oppofition
which is counted one of the chief or higheſt
kinds of Difference or Difagreement.
C c
There
386 A brief Scheme CHAP. XIII.
There are five forts of Oppofites, which are
generally mentioned here, (viz.) Difparates,
as Green, Yellow, &c. Contraries, as White and
Black: Relative Oppofites, as Father and Son:
Privative Oppofites, as Sight and Blindneſs:
And Negative Oppofites, i. e. Contradictories,
as Power and Impotence, perfect and imper-
fect, or ſeeing and not ſeeing.
But of theſe five perhaps three are ſuffici-
cient: For Difparates ſhould not be proper-
ly call'd Oppofites, fince they are any different
Species under the fame Genus. Nor can all
Relatives be properly called Oppofites, as when
two Eggs are faid to be like each other, or
two Friends, who are intirely unanimous and
agreeing in their Humours.
We may obferve here, that among Contra-
dictories fome are exprefs, others are implied.
'Tis an exprefs Contradiction to talk of a
godly Atheist, tho' one Expreffion be English and
the other Greek; for it fignifies a Man that
owns no God, and yet owns and honours
him. But a godly Hypocrite is but an implicit
Contradiction, and fo is a religious Villain,
one who owns God in Words, but in Works
denies him.
It may be worth while alfo to take notice
of two forts of Contraries, (viz.) They are
termed mediate where there is fome mid-
dle Being or Quality that partakes of both
the Extremes, as lukewarm between Hot and
Cold: and Gray between Black and White.
They
3
CHAP. XIV. of Ontology.
387
They are immediate where there is no fuch
middle Being or Quality, as freight and
crooked.
Note 1. Contraries mutually abate or de-
ſtroy one another. Black and White mingled,
do by Degrees take away the Whiteness, or
Blackneſs of the Object: fo Heat and Cold:
fo Virtue and Vice.
Note 2. Contradictories can have no proper
Medium; a Chamber is fquare or it is not
fquare; a Man can fee or he cannot ſee.
Note 3. All Oppofites placed near one
another give a mutual Illuftration to each
other, and make their diftinct Characters
appear plainer.
CHA P. XIV.
Of Number and Order.
Number
Umber and Order are the laft among
the real relative Affections.
Number is a manner of Conception, by
which we reckon Things together, and con-
fider them as more or fewer.
Every thing indeed exifts fingularly, or as
an Unit; and fo it may be an abfolute Idea;
But as One or Unit is part of a Number, fo it
is relative; and fince many Units do really ex-
iſt, ſo the Idea of Number is a real Idea, or a
real Relation derived from their being more
than one.
Cc 2
Number
}
388
A brief Scheme CHAP. XIV
put to-
Number is made
up of
many Units
gether, and therefore fome Ontologifts may
chufe to treat of it in the Chapter of Unity;
but it plainly denotes a Relation between two
or more Beings or Ideas.
Number by the Schools is called diferete
Quantity, as a Heap of Acorns, a Row of
Trees: whereas Magnitude is called continual
Quantity, whether it be in a Rock or a
River, tho' one be fluid, the other ſolid.
a
Note 1. Number is needlefs where Unity
is fufficient for the fame Ends; and a greater
Number is needlefs where a lefs is fufficient.
Nature generally is obferved to work in the
moſt fimple Ways and Manners. What in
finitely various Purpoſes in the whole Uni-
verfe of Bodies does that one fimple Principle
of Gravitation ferve to execute.
Note 2. Therefore in our folving any
dif.
ficult Appearances, we ſhould not multiply
Beings without Neceflity. This has been the
unhappy Cauſe of introducing into the Schools
of Science fo many Principles which have no
being in Nature; fuch as fubftantial Forms;
occult Qualities, Materia prima, real Space,
Subſtance in general, that is capable either
of Cogitation or Solidity, &c.
Now let us proceed to ſpeak of Order:
The Idea of Order is derived from the
Confideration of one Thing as being before
another, or after another, or together with
it. The Terms uſed on this Occafion are
prior, pofterior and fimultaneous.
Order'
CHAP. XV. of Ontology.
389
Order is five fold. There is the Order of
Time, of Nature, of Place, of Dignity, and
of Knowledge. A Man is before his Son in
Time: the Sun before Light in Nature; the
Horſes before the Cart in Place: A King be-
fore a Duke in Dignity: And a-Line muſt be
known before an Angle.
Things are faid to be together in Time, ei-
ther which begin at the fame Time, as the
Sun and Light, Fire and Heat; or which in
fome part of their Being, Life or Time co-
exiſted with each other; as Plato and Ariftotle
may be called Contemporaries, tho' the Maſter
was much elder than the Scholar.
CHA P. XV.
Of Mental Relations, (viz.) abftract Notions,
Signs, Words, Terms of Art, &c.
T
HUS we have finished all the real Re-
lations, and proceed to thoſe that are
mental.
Mental Relations are fuch as belong not to
Beings as ftanding in any real Relation to each
other, but they are made meerly by our
Minds, and arife only from our manner of
conceiving things, or from Modes which our
Minds affix to them. They are known by
this Mark, (viz.) that if there were no in-
telligent Beings to conceive of them, thefe
mental Relations could never have been.
Cc3
The
390
A brief Scheme CHAP. XV.
The chief of this Kind are pure abstracted
Notions, Signs, Words, Terms of Art, and ex-
ternal Denominations.
Pure abftract Notions are what the Schools
call fecond Notions, fecond Intentions, or in
Latin entia rationis, i. e. meer Creatures of´
the Mind.
*
Yet 'tis not every fort or Degree of Ab-
fraction that properly makes a mental Rela-
tion: When we firft abftract the Idea of any
fpecial Nature from its individual Circum-
ftances, v. c. the common Idea of a Man or
Humanity from the particular Ideas that dif
tinguiſh Peter and Paul, this is not a meer
mental Affection or Relation, tho' 'tis an Ab-
ftract Idea, for it is part of the real and ab-
folute Idea of Peter or Paul; becaufe all
things contain'd in the general Idea of a Man
have a real Being in Nature; tho' not really
ſeparate from fome Individual.
But when I abſtract this common Idea of
Humanity yet further in my Mind by confider-
ing it as a ſpecial Nature or Notion that agrees
to feveral Individuals, and under this precife
Confideration I call it a Species; this is a men-
tal Relation: Or in like manner, when I call
the abſtract Idea of Animal a Genus; theſe
and the like are more properly termed pure
abstracted Notions, or (if I may uſe the Word)
they are fecond Notions, becauſe they are made
by a fecond Abstraction, and fo they are at leaſt
one Remove farther diftant from real Beings.
The
CHAP. XV.
of Ontology.
391
The Idea of Predicaments or, Predicables in
Logic are of the ſame Kind; and I think we
may rank the Ideas of Noun and Verb, Cafe
and Declenfion in Grammar under the fame
Clafs.
The general Ideas of Subftance and Mode,
Cause and Effect, are abſtract Ideas alſo, tho'
they are not abftracted to that Degree, as to
make meer mental Relations, or fecond Notions
of them, fince they have a Reality and Ex-
iſtence in things themselves.
It is granted, that fome of theſe Abſtractions
are neceffary and uſeful in the Sciences; yet Lo-
gic and Metaphyfics, as they have been taught
in the Schools, have been too much overrun
with theſe ſecond Notions, thefe more refined
Abſtractions, which have expoſed them to the
Contempt and Ridicule of the more judici-
ous and polite part of Mankind.
A Sign is another mental Relation: It is
that which being apprehended gives notice to
the Mind of fomething befides itſelf, and
that is called the Thing fignified.
The Schools generally make a Sign to be
fomething fenfible; but I think there is no
Neceffity for that; for Ideas that arife within
the Mind, are Signs of outward real Beings:
And fome Thoughts may be fo connected
with other Thoughts or Actions of the Man
as to become Signs of them. The Memory
of a Sermon is a good Sign of Attention; and
Pity is a Sign of Benevolence.
Cc 4
1. Signs
392
A brief Scheme CHAP. XV.
1. Signs are either natural or inftituted.
Smoke is a natural Sign of Fire. Inftituted
Signs are either divine, as Baptifm is a Sign
of washing away Sin; or human, as a white
Staff is. a Sign of an Officer at Court. Infti-
tured Signs are often called arbitrary.
2. Again, Signs are either meer Tokens or
they are both Token's and Images: Thoſe are
meer Tokens which do not repreſent the Thing
fignify'd, as a Rainbow is a Token' the Earth
fhall not be drowned again. Thofe are Ima
ges as well as Tokens, which do more or leſs
reprefent the Thing fignify'd, fuch are Pic-
tures drawn to the Life, fuch alfo are Bap-
tiſm and the Lord's Supper in the Chriſtian
Religion.
3. Signs are diflinguifh'd into Antecedent,
as the gathering of thick Clouds is a Sign of
Rain: Confequent, as a Funeral is á Sign of
Death: And Concomitant, as fhivering is the
Sign of an Ague; and a high Pulfe, with a
thirſty Palate, and Fleſh very hot, 'arë com-
mon Indications of a Fever.
4. That other Diftinction of Prognoftick,
Memorial. and Commonftrative Signs in many
Cafes is pretty much akin to the former. A
Hiccup with an intermitting Pulſe and Limbs
growing cold and ftiff, are Prognofticks of
Death; A Funeral Ring is the Memorial of a
Friend departed: And a Tomb is the Com-
monftrative Sign of a Perfon buried there.,
•
5. Signs
1
1
CHAP. XV. of Ontology.
393
5. Signs are appointed to put us in mind of
our Intereft, to admonish us of our Duty, to
warn us of the Danger of fome Evil, or to
encourage our Hope of fome Good.
Yet further, 6thly, Signs are either Seals
to fignify and confirm what has been done,'
or Pledges to denote and affure what is to be
done; or Indications and Evidences of what
is doing.
In the laſt Place, Signs are fometimes ne-
ceſſary and certain, as the Morning Star fore-
tels the approaching Sun-riſe with Affurance;
and fometimes contingent, or only probable, as
à very dark Sky in cold Weather is a Sign of
Show a coming, but 'tis a doubtful one.
Note 1. Tho' there are many Cafes where-
in a Sign is really, naturally and neceffarily
connected with the Thing fignified, yet it
acquires the proper Character of a Sign only
by the Work of the Mind, which makes one
Thing to fignify another; and therefore it is
properly a mental Relation.
Note 2. There are ſcarce any two Things
in the World fo exceeding diftant and diffe-
rent from each other, but they may become
Signs of each other by a voluntary or an ac-
cidental Affociation of their Ideas in the
Mind. If a Man ſhould happen to ſee an
Eclipſe of the Sun in the Water when he was
fishing for Salmon, he may perhaps never
fee a Salmon, but he may think of an E-
clipfe.
3
1
Among
394 A brief Scheme CHAP. XV.
Among all the Signs that are uſeful to
Men, the chief are Words, which are the
moſt univerſal Signs of our Thoughts or Ideas:
But theſe arife only from the Appointment
and Agreement of Men. See a larger Ac-
count of this in Logic.
Tho' all Words and Names are Signs found
out by the Mind of Man, and ſtand to figni-
fy Things by the meer Agreement of Men,
yet those are more eminently mental Relati-
ons which are called external Denominations,
that is Names given to Things, upon the
Account of fome Conception which the Mind
affixes to them rather than for any thing that
really belongs to them: as when we fay,
Germany lies on the right Side of England
and Ireland on its left: This is a meer exter-
nal or outward Denomination drawn from
our uſual manner of infpecting a Map with
our Face toward the North part of it:
but if we look on it with our Face to the
South, Ireland will lye on the Right, and Ger-
many on the Left.
Many Terms of Art which are called
Technical Words, are a fort of outward Deno-
minations which are ufed in various Sciences
to fignify the manner of our Conception of
Things. If I fay a Dog is a Species of Beafts,
the Word Species may be called a logical Term
of Art: Or when I fay the Name Dog is a
Monofyllable, or it is made up of one Vowel
and two Confonants, I think theſe are gram-
matical
CHAP. XVI. of Ontology.
395
matical Terms of Art, and may be called
mental Relations. Fa, Sol, La, Mi, are the
fame in Mufick.
Thus far of the Affections of Being.
A
CHA P. XVI.
The chief Kinds or Divifions of Being.
Fter we have gone through the various
Affections of Being, we come now to con-
fider what ſeveral Kinds of Being there are:
And 'tis certain they may be diftinguiſh'd
by the Mind of Man in very various Ways,
and caft into feveral Kinds or Species: But
thoſe which are most common in this Science,
and indeed not unuſeful, are theſe three Divi-
fions of them. Beings are either Substances
or Modes, finite or infinite, and natural, arti-
ficial or moral.
The firſt and moſt general Divifion of Be-
ing is into Subſtance and Mode.
Every Being is confider'd either as ſubſiſt-
ing of itſelf, without the Support of any
Creature, and then it is called Substance, as
an Egg, a Tree, Air, Water, a Man, an
Angel; or it is confidered as fubfifting by
virtue of ſome other Being in which it is, or
to which it belongs; and then it is call'd a
Mode, as Length, Motion, Shape, Colour, Soft-
neſs, Wiſdom, Knowledge.
Note, When we ſpeak of Beings, we do
more uſually underſtand Substances, becauſe
1
they
396
A brief Scheme CHAP. XVI.
1
they ſeem to have a more confiderable ſort of
Nature and Existence: But fince many Modes,
Properties and Qualities have alfo a real Ex-
iftence in Nature, and fometimes have other
Modes and Affections belonging to them, be-
fides vaft Powers and Influences in the Uni-
verfe, I think they cannot well be excluded
from the comprehenfive Idea of Being.
Thoſe Philofophers who are of this Opinion,
are called the Realifts; whereas the Writers
who allow only Substances to have a real Ex-
iſtence, and deny Qualities, Properties, Rela-
tions, or any fort of Modes really to exift,
becauſe they do not fubfift by themselves,
theſe are called Nominalifts or Nominals.
"Tis granted indeed that meer relative
Modes or Relations of Things one to another,
fuch as Likeneſs, Order, Place, &c. feem
till to partake lefs of the Nature of Beings
than fuch real Modes, as Motion, Figure and
Quantity do; yet many of thefe Relations
have a real Foundation in Nature, and a fort
of Reality in things as well as in our Concep-
tions, Query, Muft we take them out of all
the Ranks of Being, when the Word is taken
in its very largeſt Senſe?
Tho' there have been fierce Contentions on
this Subject between the Nominals and Realiſts,
yet the Controverfy is not worthy of any warm
Debate: For while it may be allow'd on both
fides, that Being does not in fo full and ſtrong
a Senfe belong to Modes, as it does to Sub-
Stances,
1
}
CHAP. XVI. of Ontology.
397
ftances, the Difputants may agree by ſaying,
that felf-fubfifting Beings have a fubftantial
Effence and Existence, whereas the Effence or
Exiſtence of Modes is but modal. Why ſhould
Names provoke Difputes, where our Ideas
agree?
All Substances that we know are either Ma-
terial or Intelligent, i. e. Bodies or Spirits.
Man indeed is compounded of both of them;
but as for Space, which is neither Body nor
Spirit, I take it to be a Nonentity or nothing
real, but a meer Idea of the Mind, which we
are wont to confider, under the Form of
fomething long, broad and deep, without So-
lidity. Perhaps thefe pofitive Conceptions
arife by our abftracting fome Properties
of Matter from the reft, or only from a
Prejudice of Senſe and Imagination, juſt as
we conceive of Darkneſs or a Shadow to have
the Dimenſions of Length and Breadth, and
fancy it to have Shape and Motion too, tho'
we know 'tis properly Not-being, or a'meer
abfence of Light.
1
After Subftances, we come to confider
Modes of Being, and thefe have alſo their va-
rious Kinds into which they are diftributed,
(viz.) effential and accidental, primary and
fecondary, inherent and adherent, i. e.
Qualities and Adjuncts, and many others.
But in Logic they are treated of largely; and
therefore I diſmiſs the Reader to Log. Part I.
Chap. 2. Sect. 3-and 4.
CHAP
i
398
A brief Scheme CHAP. XVII.
}
Τ'
CHA P. XVII.
Of Finite and Infinite.
HE Ideas of Finite and Infinite come
next to be confidered by us.
Finite Beings are thoſe which are limited
or bounded in their Natures, their Parts,
their Quantity, their Qualities, their Powers
and Operations, or their Duration. Infinite is
that which is unlimited, and hath no Bounds.
When Substances are called finite or in-
finite, 'tis chiefly in refpect of their Quantity, or
in refpect of their Powers. All Subſtances are
in this Senfe finite or infinite: But as there are
fome Qualities or Modes of Being which are
called infinite or finite, fo there are fome to
which neither finite nor infinite can properly
agree: We fpeak of Knowledge, Goodneſs, Pa-
tience, Length, Breadth, &c. as finite or infinite:
But there is no fuch Thing as a finite or infi-
nite Blue, Red or Green; no finite or infinite
Likeneſs between two Drops of Rain: There
is no finite or infinite Truth in a Propofition,
nor finite or infinite Crookedneſs in a Stick.
The Univerſe of Bodies is finite in its Di-
menfions or Quantity, as well as every fingle
Body. I have elſewhere fhewn, that the
ſuppoſed Space beyond the World is probably
nothing at all, and therefore not properly
infinite or finite; tho' we often ſpeak of the
infinite Void, i. e. Emptiness or Abfence of Be-
ing
CHAP. XVII. of Ontology.
399
}
ing every where beyond the Creation, un-
bounded by any real Being: For as Nibility
may be called the Limit of Being, fo Being
may be faid to limit Nihility.
The Idea of finite belongs to created Spi-
rits as well as Bodies: not in Regard of Quan-
tity, if they have no Dimenſions; bur in re-
gard of their Qualities, their Knowledge, and
Power, and Goodneſs, and all their Operati-
ons, for all theſe are confined to certain Li-
mits. Yet they are allow'd to have an ever-
lafting or unlimited Duration, i. e. with re-
gard to the future, or a parte poft, tho' not
with regard to the paft, or a parte antè, as
the Schools fpeak; that is, tho' they may
have no End, yet they had a Beginning.
This unlimited Duration of Spirits has
been called ufually Immortality or Eviternity.
And indeed this Property doth really. belong
alfo to Matter confider'd in general as well as
to Mind; for however variable and mortal
the particular Forms and Compoſitions of
Bodies may be, yet as for Body or Matter it
felf nothing can deftroy or annihilate it but
the God that created it.
We have little to do with the Ideas of in-
finite, but in our Conceptions of the everlaſt-
ing Duration of our Natures, and in our
Contemplations of God, or, of Mathematical
Quantities.
How far the Duration of our Souls is in-
finite, has been expreft.
The
400 A brief Scheme CHAP. XVII.
The Infinity of God has been uſually dif
tinguiſh'd into the Infinity of his Effence, or
his Duration, or his Attributes.
1. The Infinity of his Effence or Prefence
is his Immenfity or Omniprefence: How this
is to be underſtood concerning his Conſciouf-
nefs and Power or Influence rather than Ex-
tenfion, fee thé Chapter of Time and Place.
2. The Infinity of his Duration is his Eter-
nity, without Beginning and without End, a
parte antè as well as a parte pòft. See the
Chapter of Duration.
3. The Infinity of his Attributes implies
that his Knowledge and his Power have no
Bounds; or that his Power, Knowledge, Ho-
linefs, Wiſdom, Goodneſs, are infinite, &c. i. e.
every way perfect in the moſt abfolute Senfe.
When we confider an Infinite under this
Idea of actual abfolute Perfection, it may be
counted a pofitive Idea; but if we confider it
as without Limit, 'tis negative: Yet ſome refine
further, and make the Word Limit a negative
Term, becauſe it denies Progrefs or Increaſe,
and thus Infinite becomes a fort of pofitive
Idea again.
Mr. Locke teaches us, that our Idea of In-
finite is not a compleat Idea, but rather an
Idea ever growing and receiving Additions;
and for the moſt part this is a juſt Idea of it,
for it is certain, that this is the way we come
by this Idea at firft. Yet the Idea of an
actual pofitive Infinite directly contradicts this.
grow.
CHAP. XVIII. of Ontology.
401
growing Idea, for it fuppofes all Addition im-
poffible. We are finite Creatures, and we
foon loſe ourſelves among Infinites.
Indefinite is not a Medium between Finite
and Infinite, for they are two contradicto-
ry Ideas; Indefinite therefore only denotes our
Ignorance of the Limits of a Thing.
No actual Infinite can confift of finite
Parts, for there is fome Proportion between
the Parts and a Whole, but between Finite
and Infinite there is no Proportion.
Yet Mathematicians oftentimes deal in
Infinites, both with regard to Magnitude and
Number: and tho' there be not in Nature any
actual infinite Quantity of either Kind, for
there is no Magnitude, there is no Number,
which cannot receive Addition, yet they
form a fort of abftracted Notion of infinite
Length, Breadth, Depth, of infinite Exten-
fion and Divifibility, and reafon upon them.
There is alfo infinite Difproportion when
they treat of infinite fmall Quantities, i. e. fuch
as bear no finite Proportion to one another.
Their infinite Approximations may be juftly
ranked among the ever-growing Ideas.
CHA P. XVIII.
Of natural, moral and artificial Beings and
T
Ideas.
HE laft Diſtribution of Beings which
I fhall take notice of is into natural,
moral and artificial.
Dd
Natural
402
A brief Scheme CHAP, XVIII.
Natural Beings are all thofe Things that
have a real and proper Exiſtence in the Uni-
verſe, and are confider'd as formed and or-
dain'd by God the Creator; fuch are Bodies,
Spirits, Men, Beafts, Trees, Fruit, Strength,
Knowledge, Countenance, Senfe, Reaſon, Fire,
Air, Light, &c.
Tho' fome of thefe are produced by others,
as Eggs by a Hen, and Fruit from a Tree,
yet God is generally confider'd as the Au-
thor of all natural Beings; and indeed he is
fo either immediately by himſelf, or by the
Laws of Nature, which he has ordain'd.
Artificial Beings are made by the Contriv-
ance or Operations of Men, whether they
are of a meer corporeal Nature, fuch as
Houſes, Windows, Pictures, Statues, Arms,
Garments, Writing, Mufick, and the various
Utenfils of Life; or whether they relate more
to intellectual Matters, as Words, Sciences,
Rules, Arguments, Propofitions, Verfe, Profe,
&c.
Note, Tho' in fome natural Beings Man
is faid to be the more immediate Author or
Cauſe of them, fuch as a Father of his Son,
&c. and in all artificial Beings whatſoever,
yet the Power of Man reaches only to what
is modal in them: "Tis God alone can make
Subſtances, for that is moft properly a Cre-
ation.
Moral Beings are thofe which belong to
the Behaviour, Conduct and Government of
3
intel-
CHAP. XVIII. of Ontology.
403
intelligent Creatures, or Creatures endued
with Freedom of Will, confider'd as lying
under Obligations to particular Actions or
Abftinences: And thefe confider'd as moral
are only modal; fuch are Law, Duty, Virtue,
Vice, Sin, Righteoufnefs, Judgment, Con-
demnation, Pardon, Reward, Puniſhment.
As Beings have been thus divided into na-
tural, artificial and moral, I think we might
almoſt in the fame manner run through all
the Sciences, and give new Names to diffe-
rent Beings, by calling them Logical, Mathe-
matical, Political, &c. applying theſe Names
to the Subjects which thefe Sciences treat of
I confess I ſhould chuſe rather to call them
different Ideas than different Beings, and under
this Confideration we may fay logical Ideas
are fuch as Genus and Species, Definition and
Syllogifm: Mathematical Ideas are Length,
Breadth, a Cube, a Circle, Multiplication,
Proportion, &c. Our Ideas are called Medi-
cinal, when we difcourfe of Sudorificks and
Bolus's: And when we ſpeak of Kings, Sub-
jects, Laws, Rebellion, Allegiance, Treaſon,
&c. theſe are political Ideas; but God, Holi-
nefs, Chriſtianity, Repentance, Goſpel and
Salvation are Theological, and of higheſt Im-
portance above all other kind of Ideas.
The End.
THE
1
k
THE
:
CONTENTS
OF
This Scheme of Ontology.
CHAP. I. Oral Scheme of the Affections of Be-
F Being and not Being, with a gene-
s
ing
Page 320
CH. II. Of Effence or Nature, Matter and Form 324
CH. III. Of Existence, whether actual, poffible or
impoffible; neceffary or contingent; dependent or
independent
CH. IV. Of Duration, Creation and Confervation 333
321
CH. V. Of Unity and Union
336
CH. VI. Of Art and Power, Ation and Paffion,
Neceffity and Liberty
389
CH. VII. Of relative Affections or Relations
CH. VIII. Of Truth, Goodness and Perfection
CH. IX. Of the Whole and Parts
345
347
353
CH. X. Of Principles, Caufes and Effects
356
CH. XI. Of Subject and Adjunct
373
CH. XII. Of Time and Place and Ubiety
375
CH. XIII. Of Agreement and Difference of Sameness,
and the Doctrine of Oppofites
379
387
CH. XIV. Of Number and Order
CH. XV. Of Mental Relation, (viz.) Abftra&t No-
tions, Signs, Words, Terms of Art, &c. 389
CH. XVI. The chief Kinds or Divifions of Being 393
CH. XVII. Of Finite and Infinite
398
CH. XVIII. Of Natural, Moral and Artificial Be-
ings and Ideas.
401
The End.
Sinull,
InAuvir s
Berita 1910
of thinking To 175
UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN
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