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AN O U TLINE
OF
| LOCKES ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY,
INAUGURAL DISSERTATION
ressiºn TO THE
UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZIG
. For
THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF philosophy
BY
MATToon Monroe Curtis, M. A.
- - - - - -- - - - - - >{3}< ---------- - - - - - - - --- - - -

I_EII*ZIG -
G U STAV F O C K.
- I890. . J
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WENLEY
LIBRARY
AN O U TLINE Q a
OF
L0(KE'S ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY,
INAUG URAL DISSERTATION
- PRESENTED TO THE
UNIVERSITY OF LEIPZ IG
FOR
THE DE GREE OF I) O C T OR OF PHILOSOPHY
BY
MATTOON MONROE CURTIS. M. A.
LEIPZIG
G USTAV F O CK
1890.
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Preface.
Our purpose, in the following pages, is, to discover the
features of Locke's Ethical Philosophy. Although his writings
abound in ethical observation, and severally took their rise
from ethical considerations, he has nowhere given a system-
atic statement of his moral doctrines. His proposed treat-
ise on Ethics was probably never written, certainly no
trace of it has been discovered. We are credibly informed that
among Locke's unpublished papers, in the British Museum
and in private hands, there is nothing of ethical importance.
So far as we can learn, no monograph on Locke's ethical
philosophy has yet appeared. The histories of Ethics, for
the most part, refer to Locke, but make no attempt to
give a complete view of his system. Mackintosh, in his
celebrated “Dissertation on Ethical Philosophy” gives Locke
no place. We cannot suppose that the most Roman, as
well as the most practical of modern philosophers, has left
barren the great field in which Stoicism worked with such
great and valuable results. Locke adopted the Stoic division
of Philosophy into Physics, Ethics, and Logic. “Ethics”, says
Locke, “is the Seeking out of those rules and measures of
human actions, which lead to happiness, and the means to
practise them. The end of this, is not bare speculation,
and the knowledge of truth; but righ/, and a conduct
suitable to it." (Essay, IV. 21. 3.) It is important to ascertain . . .
) l
S./
— [W —
an author's views before one begins to critiscise them. The
reverse of this principle has often been practised upon Locke,
and he has been sharply assailed on doctrines that he not
only does not hold, but vigorously combats. Especially is
this true with reference to his ethical views. We have
endeavored to discover Locke's position by considering his
entire works in connection with the circumstances under which
they were produced. This, with the prescribed limits of our
task, has excluded for the most part what is ordinarily called
Critiscism. We have used what Lownde and Fraser regard as
the best edition of Locke's works, viz, that edited by Bishop
Edmund Law, 4 vols. Folio, London, 1777. Among Locke's
works, the most important for our enquiry, are: “An Essay
concerning Human Understanding", 1690; “Two Treatises of
Government", 1690; “Some Thoughts concerning Education",
I693; Locke's Replies to the Bishop of Worcester, Works I.
458–775; “Of the Conduct of the Understanding", (post-
humous, 17O6); Four “Letters concerning Toleration”, 1685,
I690, 1692, 17O4, and, finally, “The Reasonableness of
Christianity as delivered in the Scriptures", 1695. The most
important aids to our study have been, Lord King's Life of
Locke. Ueberweg-Heinze's “Gesch. der Philos.”, 3 Bände,
7te Auflage. Fox Bourne's Life of Locke, 2 vols. Hallam's
“Intro. to the Literature of Europe", 4 vols., and “Marginalia,
Locke-a-na". Ed. by Noah Porter, in “New Englander and,
Yale Review", July 1887. Perhaps too much attention has
been given to Hobbes. But it is to be remembered that
Hobbes furnished employment to English moralists for about
a century. He cast a spell over the English mind that
was difficult to resist; a spell which Locke did not fully
succeed in breaking, except in its political bearing. As
Hobbes did not believe in ghosts, but was afraid of them,
— W —
so, after the time of Locke, Hobbes was not believed in,
although there was much anxiety because of him. Again,
Locke's views have carried us into fields that are not
generally regarded as belonging to ethics. Locke maintains
that the institutions of government, religion and education
are, in essence, ethical and that all are parts of a system
which must be based upon, and be in harmony, with the
fundamental physiological and psychological principles of
human nature. In so far as Locke has succeeded in relating
and connecting these institutions with his first principles, he
presents a general scheme of sociology.
April 15th 1890.
- Notice of Contents.
Chapter I. A Sketch of Moral Philosophy in England from 1650–1690.
The chaotic condition of the age and its causes, I —2. The Žhilosophy
of ZZoëóes, and its relation to Church and State, 2–8. His conception
of man and the state, general effect of his philosophy, 8–9. Mažňa/zze/
Czz/vezzve/ combats Hobbes, makes reason the ethical faculty, anticipates
Locke's theory of knowledge and the Common Sense philosophy, and indi-
cates the course of the reaction against Hobbes, 9–13. Czzºzóez-Zazed a
fruitful source of modern English ethics. He attacks the psychology of
Hobbes, views man as a rational, social, and benevolent being, an-
nounces an experimental method, gives an analysis of human nature, and
formulates the law of benevolence, but fails to depose the Leviathan,
13–17. Note on the Camzóridge Schoo/, 17–18. The task left for
Locke was to replace the dogmatic materialism of Hobbes with a com-
plete system based upon the social and rational nature of man. Professor
Paulsen on Hobbes and Locke, 18–22.
Chapter II. The Ethical Faculty or Criterion. The motive and method
of Ilocke's investigation. His moral purpose, and conception of man
as a rational and social being. Psychological, empirical, critical, and
historical features of his method. The divisãozzs of Żhe Æssay con-
cerning Human Understanding, 22–27. The meaning of Začzz/a zaša,
of ideas in the mind, definition of “idea”, capacities and powers of the
mind, 27–29. In what sense Locke and Aristotle reject innate ideas,
and the force of Locke's polemic, 29–32. The chrozzo/ogica/ order of
ideas; how ideas come into the mind, what is experience? Its three
stages. The three sources of ideas; sensation, reflection, and intellect,
defined, related, and illustrated, 32—37. The Zogica/ order of Azzozwſ-
edge. Difference between ideas and knowledge, 38–39. Intuition, the
foundation of all knowledge and certainty. Demonstration, the only
means of increasing our knowledge. Sensitive knowledge is problematic.
The value of the three forms of knowledge, 41–42. Of Azzozwſedge
azzd 7zedgºſzezzz. [Locke explains his theory with reference to Aristotle,
43–44. Judgment, or practical reason, as distinguished from knowledge
or certainty. The effºca/ /ac2//#y as practical reason, compared with
conscience, 44–48.
º — VII —.
Chapter III. The Foundations of Ethics. Constructive morality demands
a lawgiver, a known law, and rational sanctions. The existence and
nature of God, and the relation of Theism to politics and ethics, 49–54.
7% załzéze of maora/ /azv is eternal and immutable; review of criticism,
54–58. Natural law and supernaturalism, the conception of a Zazy of
zzałzºre in history and in Locke's system, 58–63. The Arizcińſes of
7załętra/ mºora/ity or law defined as duties. Piety, prudence, benev-
olence, equity, are comprehended in the law of love, or the Golden
Rule, as an imperative, 63—88. The possibility of a scieſzce of effzcs
illustrated by synthesis and analysis. Locke's view of the difficulties
in the way of a Science of ethics; language and signs, complexity of
moral ideas, prejudice and self-interest, Locke holds to the possibility
of a science of ethics, but thinks it would have little practical value,
68–74. The Sazzczioſes of 7,207-a/İzy, relation of theory and practise,
universal morality demands rewards and punishments. Revelation in
Jesus Christ as moral philosophy. The force, extent, and relations
of reason and revelation in moral obligations. Locke and Aristotle,
74–81.
Chapter IV. The Ethical Life. Pleasure and pain are not principles
of knowledge, but inclinations of the appetite common to all sensitive
beings, Reason must make the idea of happiness moral. A/aft-
Žižess, as an ethical end is, under a rational and moral government,
identical with virtue, 81–85. The possàz/ºy of v2z/zle; the antin-
omy between freedom and necessity, insoluble by the speculative reason,
but relieved by the practical reason. “Moral actions are only those
that depend upon the choice of an understanding and free agent”, 85–88.
The doc/rize of freedom2. Freedom belongs, not to the will, but to
the man. Man has the power to follow what reason dictates as best,
though the appetite lean the other way. True freedom is the freedom
of self-determination, 98–94. Doctrifee of educatioſe, its ethical
bearing, character and end. Education rather than instruction, 94–98.
Education as a means to virtue and happiness as ends. Natural parts
and disposition, 99—IO2. Precepts and instruction, IO2–IO4. Use,
practise, and habit, IO4—IO6.
Chapter V. Institutional Ethics. Locke opposes Filmer and Hobbes.
Politics a part of ethics, Io9 – Io8. The state of nature one of peace,
equality, and liberty under the law of nature; a postulate of political
philosophy. Idea of law, IOS—IO9. How a state of war arises. Locke's
extreme view of natural law, Io9—I Io. ZDoc/rāze of Profezžy. Prop-
erty antedates civil society, and is founded in Labor. Labor as a
measure of values. Property rights and limits. Slavery, I IO-I I4. The
origin of money, the growth of possessions, the law of inheritance and
of conquest. Influence of Locke 3 doctrine, and its ethical force, I I4— I I6.
AJocłrizze of the Słaże, political power, its nature and extent; the origin
–– VIII —
of political Societ compact or consent of the people, Hobbes, Locke,
and Rousseau, 116-1299 The three-fold division of political power, the
*-*-
legislative, judiciáſ, and executive functions, 120–122. The dissolution
of government; conditions and objections considered, I22–123. Doctrine
of punishment, and personal identity, I23–125; Doc????ze of the Chaerch.
Religion is a part of ethics. Three phases of the Church constitution.
Credenda, I25–129. Cultus religiosus, I29–13 I. Moralia, I 3 I–I 32.
Chapter VI. conclusion. The unity of Locke's ethical system, I33–136.
The relation of Locke's work to ethical speculation in England in the
early part of the Eighteenth Century. Clarke, Shaftesbury, Butler, and Price,
I36–145.

Chapter I.
A Sketch of Moral Philosophy in England from
I650–1690.
I. Chaoſzc Condºñoſ. The England of the seventeenth
century is unique both in its men and events. The civil
wars which began in 1642, and brought on revolution after
revolution until the settlements in 1689, mark the most tur-
bulent period in England's history. In this period were born
the parties and policies, constitutional and commercial forms,
which have played the leading part in the political move-
ments of the last two centuries. This period is not less
significant in its influence upon religious and philosophic
thought. Perhaps never, before or since, has a single nation
in One century known so many illustrious men. Such were,
Shakespeare, Milton, and Dryden; Bacon, Hobbes and Locke;
Newton, Boyle, Harvey and Huygens; Baxter, Bunyan, Taylor
and Tillotson. Yet, however brilliant this century may ap-
pear as we look back upon it, and think of its vast fruitage
for later times, it appeared to its great men as dark, chaotic,
and disheartening. Milton thought that “all the winds of
heaven were let loose to play upon the earth'. The better
part of the clergy recognised ‘an age wherein men talked
of religion most, and lived it least'. In 1660 Locke wrote,
“I no sooner perceived myself in the world, but I found
myself in a storm which has lasted almost hitherto." After
the Restoration, Locke seriously contemplated joining his
Countrymen in America. Later, he was compelled by the
Stuart to seek refuge in Holland. It was the open, flagrant
immorality of the age that caused the deepest concern for
the nation. This moral havoc was, in part, the natural
Curtis, Locke’s Ethical Philosophy. I
— 2 —
accompaniment of the political revolutions; in part a result
of the writings of Hobbes. Speaking of the condition of
society in this period, Macaulay says, “Ethical philosophy
had recently taken a form well suited to please a generation
equally devoted to monarchy and to vice. Thos. Hobbes
had, in language more precise and luminous than has ever
been employed by any other metaphysical writer maintained,
that the will of the Prince was the standard of right and
wrong, and that every subject Ought to be ready to pro-
fess Popery, Mohammedanism, or Paganism at the royal
command. Thousands who were really incompetent to ap-
preciate what was really valuable in his speculations eagerly
welcomed a theory which, while it exalted the kingly office,
relaxed the obligations of morality, and degraded religion
into a mere affair of state. Hobbism soon became an
almost essential part of the character of the fine gentleman.
Scarcely any rank or profession escaped the infection of the
prevailing immorality, but those persons who made politics
their business were perhaps the most corrupt part of the
corrupt society.”)
II. Hoðóes. 4568–1679. In the summer of 1651 ap-
peared the “Leviathan". It bore a striking frontispiece.
Towering above the mountains, and overlooking the country
with its cities and villages, is a crowned giant, grasping a
sword in h right hand, and a crozier in his left. His vast
body is de up of miniature people, representing the
different rofessions and classes of men, all bending the
knee, ar. facing the crowned head. Above all is the in-
scription “Non est potestas Super Terram, quae Comparetur
ei.” This is the Civitas of Hobbes. We may regard it as
one man, or as an assembly of men. What is strictly de-
manded is one crowned head, governing all. Here is the
formal philosophy of Hobbes; here is the political philos-
ophy of the houses of Stuart and Bourbon in the Seventeenth
Century. “L’Etat, c'est moi." The Leviathan comprehends
*) Hist. of England. Vol. I. ch. 2.
— 3 —
the substance of the entire philosophy of Hobbes.") In
center and circumference his work is political. It is in part
a result of his convictions, in part of his devotion to abso-
lute monarchy. Even his translation of Thucydides was
designed to show the evils of popular government. His
aim in the Leviathan is to crystallize the prevailing politico-
religious dogmas into a consistent and popular philosophy.
These dogmas were ready at hand. They lay close to the
hearts of the Stuarts; they were woven into the polity of
the Church. The Clergy had always been the only author-
ised teachers of public morality. But from the time of
Henry VIII the Church was more and more identified with
the interests of the Crown. As early as I 530, the Bishop
of Chichester wrote a work defending Henry VIII, and ex-
horting all to reverence the King as the “Supreme head
of the Church and the nation.” One year later Henry im-
posed his supremacy on the Clergy. James I was able to
proclaim the divinity of his office, and define the duties of
his subjects. The thought of the politic Bacon was the
conviction of many. “Kings are mortal Gods on earth, unto
whom the living God has lent his own name as a great
honour.” For more than a century the Church had been
rendering unto Caesar the things that were God's, and had
come upon many of the elements of Hobbism. The view
of the natural man was not better than that of Hobbes,
while some of the consequences of this view had been put
into dogmatic form. If the Church held that all government
–—---v ---— —
*) Leviathan, or, the Matter, Forme, and Power of a Commonwealth,
Ecclesiastical and Civil. By Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, London.
Printed for Andrew Clarke, 1651. The dedication is dated Paris, Apr.
. I65 I. Early in 1640 Hobbes had sketched his political system on
paper. Hobbes, in his dedication to the King of the “Seven Philosophical
Problems”, 1662, indicates the purpose of his Leviathan. He declares;
“There is nothing in it against Episcopacy. Why am I called an Atheist,
or a man of no religion, unless it is for making the authority of the
Church depend wholly upon the royal power, which I hope your Majesty
will think neither atheism nor heresy, . . . . snatching up all the weapons
to fight against your enernies.”
j%
— 4 —
is of divine origin and appointment, as against Hobbes, it
held with him that the King is the Viceregent of God,
with divine right of administering government, and that the
duties of subjects are comprehended in passive obedience
and non-resistance. The Church sanctioned Cranmer's Hom-
ily, which declared it to be “the calling of God's people
to render obedience to governors, although they were
wicked and wrongdoers, and in no case to resist." Throughout
the stormy times of this period such doctrines were pro-
mulgated in sermons, pamphlets and treatises. Locke speaks
of the prevalence of these doctrines in the introduction to
his “Two Treatises on Government"; the first of which is a
reply to the posthumous work “Patriarcha" by Sir Robert
Filmer. The first edition of Filmer's work appeared in 1680,
defending the most extreme doctrine of divine rights and
absolutism. It was popular enough to come to a new edition
in 1685. Preparatory to demolishing the argument of
Filmer, Locke remarks, “I should not speak so plainly of a
gentleman long since past answering, had not the pulpit of
late years publicly owned his doctrine, and made it the
current divinity of the times. . . . . I should not have taken the
pains to show his mistakes, inconsistencies, and want of
proofs, were there not men amongst us, who, by crying up
his books, and espousing his doctrine, save me against the
reproach of writing against a dead adversary.”
That a Church depending on the State, and regarding
the Crown as the State, should, in revolutionary times, be-
come a mere political faction, seems to be unavoidable.")
*) It has been computed that within the twenty years from 1640–1660,
not less than thirty thousand pamphlets and treatises issued from the press
on the subject of ecclesiastical and civil government. In the reign of
James II there were published one thousand dissertations for and against
Popery, and developing the general principles of toleration. For the
relations of Church and State during this period, see, Blakey, History
of Political Literature Vol. II. 141. Makintosh Hist. of the Revolution in
England. I688. Vol. II. 43. Dr. Samuel Parker, Ecclesiastical Polity I670.
South, Peculiar Care and Concern of Providence for the Protection and
Defence of Kings, 1675. Hallam, Literature of Europe. Vol. III. 206. etc.
— 5 -—
This condition of affairs throws some light upon Locke's
failure to take orders. It is clear that his father intended
him for the Church, that many of his friends expected and
urged him to take orders, that he held offices in Christ
Church, Oxford, as lecturer on Greek and Rhetoric, and
Censor of moral philosophy which were generally assigned
to clergymen. It is also clear that by 1666 he had aban-
doned the idea. In view of Locke's letters and works we
suggest that his feeling on the subject was not very different
from that of his great contemporaory, Milton. “The Church",
says Milton, “to whose service, by the intention of my pa-
rents and friends, I was destined of a child, and in mine own
resolutions, till coming to Some maturity of years, and per-
ceiving what tyranny had pervaded in the Church, that he
who could take orders must subscribe slave, and take an
oath withal, which, unless he took with a conscience that
would retch, he must either straight perjure or split his faith,
I thought it better to preserve a blameless silence before
the sacred office of speaking bought and begun with servi-
tude and foreswearing".")
The doctrine by which the Leviathan is supported is
of the most vigorous and trenchant character. Its fundament
is the conception of man as organized material endowed
with sense and selfishness.”) No Calvinist ever thought less
of the natural man than Hobbes or preached with more
power the unalterable decrees. With him, man is by nature
selfish, brutal, violent, controlled only by fear and self-interest.
Right and might are identical, “homo homini lupus". Thus
his state of nature is a state of war, “bellum omnium contra
omnes". All men are by nature equal, but this equality
is a condition for war. Being equal, in the faculties of the
body and mind, insures the general havoc to that point
where compact is possible. Natural inequality would insure
the survival of the strongest, and instead of compact, we
*) Milton. “The Reason of Church Government”.
*) Human Nature. XI. 5. compare Lev III. 34. and Lev I. I
* &
— 6 —
would have conquest. Man has no higher criterion of truth
than his senses. To seek pleasure and avoid pain is the
only clear rule of his conduct. The picture is dismal in the
extreme. “In such a condition", says Hobbes, “there is no
place for industry, no culture of the earth, no navigation,
no knowledge of the face of the earth, no account of time,
no arts, no letters, no Society, and, which is worse of all,
continual fear and danger of violent death, and the life of
man Solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short". Lev. XIII.
This wretched state of nature, this mutual annihilation, gives
rise to the Social compact. Each man wishing to annihilate
every other, yet afraid of being annihilated himself, consents
to abide by the prescriptions of a ruler, and forfeit his
pleasure in destroying others for the pleasure of not being
destroyed himself. It is clear that the ruler to whom this
right is Surrendered, must be absolute, must be the Leviathan.
This is the demand in view of the nature of man, and thus
Hobbes holds that the King whose power is limited is no
King. All the powers of government must rest in the Levia-
than. He is at once law maker, judge, and hangman. The
Leviathan is now given sword and crozier, and the advice
that a ruler, to govern well, should adopt the Roman maxim,
“Salus populi suprema lex”. The connection of politics, relig-
ion, and ethics, is absolute in the person of the Leviathan.
What he commands is right, what he prohibits, is wrong.
The greatest crime is rebellion, the greatest virtue is passive
obedience. None ever proclaimed with greater effect, “the
powers that be are ordained of God". Hobbes simply trans-
ferred the crown from the head of Hildebrand the Pope, to
the head of Leviathan the King. The State, not the Church,
is the power ordained of God. Religion is only fear of power
invisible, Lev. I. 6, but Leviathan may be seen and heard
and felt. Thus the practical philosophy of Hobbes termi-
nates in the Leviathan who furnishes both its standard and
sanction. The existence of the Leviathan is a necessity
arising from his analysis of human nature. This analysis
fails to reveal a social or moral element in man. Every
— 7 —
virtue or moral sentiment is coldly resolved into selfishness,
which, in the state of nature and out of it, is the ruling
power of the soul. But this ugly skeleton, which is at once
the centre and strength of the Leviathan, is clothed with
a splendid paraphernalia, which, though having all the appear-
ance of true royalty, has little in common with the wretched
framework within. Hobbes formulates a natural law code
of nineteen articles. These articles are suggested by the
reason, and are regarded as laws of nature. The entire
code is comprehended in a positive and a negative form;
“whatsoever you require that others should do to you, that
you do to them. And that law of all men, ,,Guod tibi fieri
non vis, alterine feceris". Lev. XIV. But if all this is of the
natural reason, what becomes of his conception of man and
the Leviathan; if all this is not of the reason, how is the
social contract and the wise Leviathan possible. Although
we are told of these laws of nature, “what they forbid can
never be lawful", De Cive III, 29, and what they order can
never be unlawful, we are always led back to the funda-
mental position, that the laws of nature are the laws of the
Leviathan, that his voice is the supreme authority, that what
he commands or forbids is the sole moral imperative. Lev.
XXVI. 6. This background of natural law, this prospect
of shrubbery and blue sky, is wrought into the picture only
for effect, only to give a pleasing perspective and promi-
nence to the man with sword, crozier, and crown. In last
analysis his natural law is natural lawlessness.
From the standpoint of the Crown and the Church,
and from his abundant quotation of “Holy writ", we may
agree with Priestley and Blakey, that Hobbes was a sincere
and most orthodox Churchman. But the way in which
Hobbes handled his subject, spread consternation among his
friends as well as his enemies, and it has come to pass that
he has been made the scapegoat for most of the ills of
his unhappy age. Charles II. was offended because not
enough was made of the divinity of kings, but, on closer
inspection, finding Hobbes quite as zealous as Salmasius and
— 8 ––
Filmer, he gave him a pension, and hung his portrait in the
royal study. The whole Church Established was alarmed
at Seeing its political dogmas in such abominable nakedness
standing on so mean a foundation.") Liberal Churchmen
and Dissenters hurled their strong anathemas and weak ar-
guments against what they regarded as the subversion of
both religion and morality. The friends of constitutional
government condemned and burned the Leviathan, and the
vicious multitude excused their profligacy at its threshold.
The Royal Society, founded in 1662, excluded Hobbes from
membership and ignored his methods, to which he replied,
“If they are not wise enough to begin where I left off, their
work will come to nought". The House of Commons, after
the great Fire of 1666, expressed public feeling in a bill
against Atheism and Profaneness, wherein the name of Hobbes
appeared. He burned his papers, and again declared himself
Orthodox. Though timid and arrogant, Hobbes was a man
of untarnished personal character, and unimpeachable motives.
He was the last and most brilliant product of the old order
of things. We may denominate the ethical system of Hobbes
by what name we please, personal or public utility, fear or
respect for a law. Apart from the state, man is the slave
of his desires. Here we might find egoistic Hedonism, but
Hobbes would condemn it, and demand the Leviathan,
without which there is no system, no society at all. He was
indeed “the terror of the age". In the words of Mackintosh,
his was ‘the stroke of a vigorous arm which seemed to shake
ethics to its foundation'. It was the philosophy of Hobbes,
its Seusualism, materialism, and absolutism, that aroused the
moral consciousness of England and formed the point of
departure of modern ethical speculation. * ...,
*) It is noticeable that the opposition to Hobbes arose not from the
party of the Crown and the Church, but from the Constitutional party, the
Dissenters, and the Catholic Church which Hobbes had lampooned with
great severity in that part of the Leviathan which treats ‘of the Kingdom
of Darkness'. -
— 9 —
III. AWathanae/ Cu/verwe/ 1615–1654. *) One year after
the publication of the Leviathan, appeared a “Discourse of
the Light of Nature”, which placed reason on the throne,
and supported it by a psychology both rational and semi-
critical. The work is of the greatest importance for English
ethics, as it anticipates Cumberland's attempt to establish
morality upon a basis independent of Revelation; Locke's
origin of knowledge and place of reason in ethical theory;
Cudworth’s “Eternal and Immutable Morality” and Clarke's
theory of “Eternal fitness of things.” With not less learning
than Cudworth, and even more literary brilliancy than Taylor,
Culverwel seeks to show the Supremacy of reason in matters
of religion, and at the same time “chastise those dogmatic,
arrogant, rationalists who limit and measure all reason by
their own.” (Preface XXIII, compare 231.) In the view of
Culverwel, “The Light of Nature,” “The Candle of the Lord,”
and “Reason," are synonymous terms. Faith cannot contra-
dict reason: it may be above reason, but not contrary to
reason. (229.) “I shall always reverence a greyheaded truth;
yet prefer reason, a daughter of eternity, before antiquity,
which is the offspring of time.” We will notice briefly two
features of his philosophy; his theory of knowledge and
theory of ethics. .
“There are”, says Culverwel, “stamped and printed
upon the being of man, some clear and indelible principles,
Some first and alphabetical notions, by putting together of
which it can spell out the law of nature.” p. 81. These
first and radical principles are such as, “Bonum est appe-
- *) “An Elegant and Learned Discourse of the Light of Nature with
several other Treatises” etc. By Nathaniel Culverwel, Master of Arts, and
lately Fellow of Emanuel College in Cambridge. Imprimatur Edm.
Calamy 4to, I652. The work written about I646 and passed through four
Editions' viz. 1652. 1654. 1661 and 1669. The “Discourse of the Light of
Nature” is ably edited by John Brown, D. D. Edinburgh, 1857, to whose
edition our references are made. Culverwel has been curiously overlooked
by Bibliographers and Historians of English Philosophy. We know of no
history of ethics that so much as mentions his name.
— 10 —
tendum, malum est fugiendum.” “Beatitudo est quaerenda."
“Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris.” “Reason, by
warming and brooding upon these first and Oval principles
of her own laying, being itself quickened with a heavenly
vigour, does thus hatch the law of nature.” (82–83). Ba-
con's observation, “All morality is nothing but a collecting
and building up of natural principles" is quoted with ap-
proval. But on the other hand, Culverwel rejects the doc-
trine of innate ideas and principles with as much vigour as
does Locke. “Had you such notions at the first opening
of the soul's eye. Had you these connate species in the
cradle, and were they rocked to sleep with you, or did you
then meditate upon these principles, “Totum est majus parte,
and ‘Nihil potest esse, et non esse simul'. Never tell us
that you wanted organical dispositions, for you plainly have
recourse to the sensitive powers, and must needs subscribe
to this, that all knowledge comes flourishing in at these
lattices.” (125–6)"). Thus Culverwel prefers Aristotle to
*) Richard Hooker, 1553–16oo, was the first English philosopher
who, while assuming tabula rasa for the mind, laid great stress on the
law of nature. “The soul of man being therefore at the first as a book
wherein nothing is, and yet all things may be imprinted, we are to search
by what steps and degrees it riseth unto perfection of knowledge” etc.
“God is a law, both to Himself, and to all things besides.” “Obedience
of creatures to the law of nature is the stay of the whole world.” “The
general and perpetual voice of men is as the sentence of God Himself.”
“Whether the law is revealed in Scripture, or in the rational constitution
of human nature, makes no difference. Its sacredness is the same, as
springing out of the same Eountain of light and order. This unity of
nature and life and Scripture, as all equally true, if not all equally impor-
tant revelations of the Divine will, lies at the foundation of Hooker's whole
argument”. Tulloch, Rational Theology in England in the XVIIth Cen-
tury. Vol. I. pp 51–52. The first two books, “of the Laws of Eccle-
siastical Polity” I 594, treating of the fundamental principles of theology,
law, and morality, exercised a remarkable influence upon the thought of
the seventeenth century. It anticipated most of the principles which for
the next two centuries controlled ethico-political speculation. Locke held
this work in high estimation, and frequently speaks of Hooker as “the judicious
Hooker”, “the learned and judicious Hooker”.
— 11 —
Plato. “For Aristotle perceiving the proud emptiness and
swelling frothiness of such Platonic bubbles, he was fain to
search for certainty somewhere else; and casting his eye
upon the ground, he spied the bottom of it laying in sense,
and laid there by the wise dispensation of God Himself:
from thence he looked up to the highest top and pinnacle
of certainty placed in the understanding. Sense is but the
gate of certainty; the understanding is the throne of it.
First principles and common notions, with those demonstra-
tions that stream from them, only remain as the basis of
certainty, and he that will not cast anchor upon these, con-
demns himself to perpetual scepticism." (2O2–2O3). Here
is not only an anticipation of Locke, but a formal state-
ment of the fundamental principle of the Scottish philosophy.
Culverwel thinks the Platonists were right in regarding the
spirit of a man as the “Candle of the Lord” “though they
were deceived in the time when it was lighted". (I 32).
Culverwel holds that without sensation the mind could never
rise to any knowledge at all, as the Soul is endowed with
“no other innate light but only the power and principle of
knowing and reasoning". (I28). This power of knowing and
reasoning comes, through experience, upon knowledge and
common principles of morality.
Culverwel's theory of ethics is but an extension of his
theory of knowledge. It shows many points in common
with Aristotle and the Stoics a well as with modern intui-
tionalism. His conception of law and liberty is striking.
“Law is founded in intellectuals, in the reason, not in the
sensitive principle. It supposes a noble and free-born crea-
ture, for where there is no liberty there is no law, a law
being nothing else but a rational restraint and limitation
of absolute liberty. Now all liberty is radically in the in-
tellect; and such creatures as have no light, have no choice,
no moral variety.” (62). To him a natural law was as
real as to any seventeenth century writer. This law is grasped
by the reason, or revealed in the reason. It is common
and universal among men. Culverwel lays great stress upon
— 12 —
universal consent, and declaims with warmth against those
who attribute universal agreement to a revelation to the
Jews, which spread itself into Greece. “Surely, Aristotle
never thought that his sheet of blank paper could have
nothing printed upon it, till a Jew gave it an imprimatur.”
(95). He holds that common notions are the common prop-
erty of man, as man. Should new nations or worlds ap-
pear, every rational nature in them would comply with and
embrace the several branches of this law; and as they
would not differ in those things that are intrinsical to sense,
so neither in those that are essential to the understanding'.
(II6. I I 3. 93.) Culverwel makes use of the inductive method,
both in his theology and ethics. “As we ascend to
the first and Supreme Being by the steps of second causes,
we may climb up to a sight of this eternal law by these
fruitful branches of secondary laws, which seem to have
their root in earth, when, in reality, it is in heaven.” (5 I.)
Basing certainty of moral truth upon universal reason, he
founds its nature and sanction in the Divine Will. “Now
this eternal law is not distinguished from God himself, for
nothing exists from eternity but God himself.” “God being
truth itself, eternal immutable truth. Wisdom and power
which are the chief ingredients of law, can only dwell in
Deity.” Here Culverwel distinguishes between law and its
obligation. Natural law has its seat in the understanding
of God, and is made known to man by the voice of reason.
But it is only the will of God, willing natural law to be
moral law, that gives it life, vigor, Sanction, and places
men under obligation. “Not the understanding, but the will
of a lawgiver makes a law." (45–55). Culverwel argues
with great force that reason cannot bind in its own name,
but only in the name of its supreme Lord and Sov-
ereign. No naked essence though never so pure and
noble can lay a moral engagement upon its own self, or
bind its own being; for this would make the very same
being superior to itself as it gives a law, and inferior to
itself, as it must obey it. In the commonwealth of human
nature that proportion which actions bear to reason is in-
deed a sufficient foundation for a law to build upon, but it
is not the law itself, nor a formal obligation. For the per-
fection of a law “there must come a command from some
superior power, from whence will spring a moral obligation
also, and make up the formality of a law.” (74–77). Thus
Culverwel holds that natural law, which the reason recognises,
is imposed by God as a revelation in the reason, and as
such, has its source, obligation, and sanction in the Supreme
Being. Culverwel also holds it to be express blasphemy
to say that either God, or the word of God, ever did or
ever will, oppose right reason. (218). If Hobbes represents
the stationary point of departure, Culverwel represents and
indicates the line of departure which has guided the course
of the most influential schools of English ethics till our own
day. Although Culverwel's treatise was not a professed
reply to Hobbes, it yet attacks the Leviathan in its chief
strongholds, not only in affirming the rational, Social, and
moral nature of man, but also by maintaining that moral
“law is born from the brain of Jove, and it is not the sec-
ular arm, but the heavenly, that must maintain it.” (52).
IV. Cumber/azed. 1632–1778.") The ,,Light of Nature”
had inaugurated a new movement in ethical philosophy,
alongside of the Leviathan. The work of Culverwel was
carried on by Cumberland, Cudworth, and Locke, open an-
*) De legibus naturae disquisitis philosophica contra Hobbium insti-
tuta. London. I672. Done into English by T. Maxwell. London I727
French by Barbeyrac, Amst. I 744. The work consists of a Prolegomena
and nine chapters. Appended to the treatise are two dissertations: a) The
City of God, or the Defects of Heathen Deism, b) The Imperfections of
Heathen Morality, which is an interesting discussion of the ethical doctrines
of the Stoics and Epicureans. Sidgwick; ‘History of Ethics’. p. 172, re-
marks that Cumberland “has furnished material to more than one better
known moralist”; while Remusat, in his “Philosophie en Angleterre”, II. 56,
regards Cumberland’s work as “le premier traité philosophique, qui, en
Angleterre, ait été dictó purement par l'esprit moderne”. These judgments
may be equally true of Culverwel.
tagonists of the philosophy of Hobbes. Cumberland, like
Culverwel repudiated the doctrine of innate ideas, insisted
upon the harmony of faith and knowledge, declared moral
principles eternal and unchangeable in their nature, and
endeavoured to establish ethical philosophy on a psycho-
logical basis, independent of Revelation. But Cumberland
went far beyond Culverwel in anticipating modern ethical
theory, as well as in prescribing the method of philosophical
investigation. Cumberland promises “to avoid the sure
and easy expedient of the Platonists . . . . not being so for-
tunate as to posess innate ideas." He hopes to show against
Hobbes that man is a rational, social, and benevolent being,
capable of disinterested action, and that morality is not a
mere matter of conventionalism and the State, but inherent
in human nature. The Prolegomena gives the outline of
his system. He defines the law of nature to be; “Certain
propositions of unchangeable truth which direct our volun-
tary actions about choosing good and refusing evil; and
impose an obligation to external actions even without civil
laws, and laying aside all considerations of those compacts
which constitute civil government. That some such truths
are, from the nature of things and of men, necessarily sug-
gested to the minds of men, and by them understood and
remembered whilst the faculties of their minds continue un-
hurt, and that therefore they really exist there. This is
what we affirm, and our said adversaries as expressly deny."
But how do we know that there are any such laws or
truths? The answer to this question shows the advance
which was made by Cumberland. He agrees with Grotius
and Culverwel that there is much force in an appeal to
history and literature, as showing the universality of these
laws, but this is not his method. He would show that man
is constituted in harmony with the laws of nature, which
are the universal laws of right reason. He announces an
experimental method. We must prosecute moral Science as
we do natural science, “by direct and well conducted obser-
vations and experiments." He makes a study of the intel-
— 15 —
;
.*
lectual, moral, and religious capacities of man, views him in
his different relations, and seeks to analyze the nature and
constitution of both man and the world. Natural good is
defined to be that which preserves, enlarges, or perfects
the powers of an intelligent being. He maintains that the
growth and existence of the institutions of property, with
its rights in labor and things, and of the family with love
and benevolence between parent and child, not only prove
the social nature of man, but insure its perpetuity. The
reason is the faculty which apprehends moral distinctions.
In his system, conscience is the reason concerned about
right and wrong. It is sometimes called the practical reason.
“The dictates of practical reason are propositions which
point out the end, or means thereto, in every man's power.”
y Again, it means right reason, “whoever determines his judg-
ment and his will by right reason must agree with all others
who judge according to right reason in the same matter.”
(II. 8.) We come to moral knowledge just as we come to
any other kind of knowledge. Some actions have evil re-
sults, others good results. By experience we come to a
knowledge of these two classes. Virtue carries with it true
happiness, and vice, misery. Morality is capable of mathe
matical certainty. (Proleg. XII. II, 9.) Cumberland, from
his analysis of human nature, seeks one general law of na-
ture from which all other particular laws are deduced. This
is found in the law of benevolence. “The greatest possible
benevolence of every rational agent toward all the rest,
constitutes the happiest state of each and all, so far as de-
pends on their own power, and is necessarily required for
their happiness; therefore the common good is the Supreme
law.” (Proleg. IX. cf. I. 4–12.) In his second chapter
Cumberland defends the law of benevolence, as a law of hu-
man nature and right reason, and shows that the highest
good of one and all can only be realized in the living
energetic benevolence of each and all. No action is “mor-
ally good that does not in its own nature contribute
somewhat to the happiness of men.” On such grounds
— 16 —
Cumberland holds the identity of general and individual
interests. The greatest good of the individual cannot, by
the nature of things, be in conflict with the common good.
Here he carries out more fully his remark (I. 22.) “One's
Own happiness is an extremely small part of the end which
a truly rational man pursues; and bears only that proportion
to the whole end . . . which one man bears to the collec-
tive body of all rational beings.” This remark was of great
importance in the hands of Bentham and Mils. About the
liberty of each one to act according to right reason, Cumber-
land finds no serious difficulty; “we have the same proof of
liberty that we have of our own consciousness.” This po-
sition was taken up by Locke and Reid. In treating of
the Sanctions of morality Cumberland makes use both of
reason and revelation. In the third chapter his definition of
natural law embraces both the ground and sanction of
morality. The will of the First Cause of all, points out
through human experience the consequences of conduct on
happiness, and makes known rewards and punishments. The
Sanction is twofold, punishment within and punishment
without. It is a striking feature of his work that, unlike
Hobbes, he makes no appeal to “Scripture" as authority,
but on the other hand, holds with Culverwel that reason
must support and defend revelation, and that it is by reason
only that we can be convinced of the veracity of God. He
holds with Descartes that the certainty of all that we
rationally possess is grounded on God's veracity. God is,
to him, the maximum of all excellency and power, the
author of every true proposition, and has ever in view the
happiness and perfection of his creatures. (Proleg. XII, comp.
V, 19.) We are assured both by reason and experience that
happiness flows from obedience, and misery from disobe-
dience to these natural laws, not only in this world, but
probably in the next. Cumberland's reply to Hobbes is
restricted almost entirely to his psychology. While the im-
portance of Cumberland's work is great, both as a rebuff
to the sensualism and materialism of Hobbes, and as an
— 17 —
anticipation of the more thorough exposition of Locke, we
must recognise that he has only indirectly weakened the
power of the Leviathan. When Cumberland comes to the
relations of politics and ethics, he leaves Leviathan with as
much authority as Hobbes had endowed him. He holds
with Hobbes that the laws of nature are prior to civil laws,
and that the monarch should govern in harmony with na-
tural laws, but he offers no redress against the despotism of
the Leviathan. Culverwel and Cumberland, although strong
in battle, and fruitful sources of subsequent speculation, had
little effect upon the bold dogmatism of Hobbes which allied
itself with selfishness.
V. The Camzórzdge Schoo/, though it falls within our
period, is, for our purpose, of little importance. More's En-
chiridion Ethicum, 1669, is the single exception. The most A
striking features of his system are his declaration of a spe- \
cial ethical faculty, in boniformi animae facultate; his argu- ~ \
ment for the existence of God from the moral nature of )
man, and his theory of virtue and happiness as identical, iſ
morality being with him, as with Locke, “the art of living"
well and happily." Shaftesbury significantly remarks that
More's work “is a right good piece of sound morals.” (Let-
ters to a Student. No. IX.)
Cudworth's “Treatise concerning Eternal and Immutable
Morality", although written in this period, was first
published in 1731. The essence of his theory is given
in his own words; “Now all that we have hitherto said
amounts to no more than this, that it is impossible
that anything should be by will only, that is, without
a nature or entity, or that the nature and essence of
anything should be arbitrary.” The effective check which
Cudworth put upon the theory of Hobbes is expressed in
language more precise than is furnished by Locke. “Sup- -
pose such a law to be established, it must be either right
to obey it, and wrong to disobey it, or, indifferent whether |
we obey it or disobey it. But a law which it is indifferent
whether we obey or not, cannot, it is evident, be the source
Curtis, Locke's Ethical Philosophy. 2
— 18 —
of moral distinctions; and on the contrary supposition, if it
is right to obey the law, and wrong to disobey it, these
distinctions must have had an existence antecedent to the
law.") The points of agreement between Locke and Cud-
worth are many and striking, so much so that we may
suppose them to have exchanged thought on the general
subject of ethics. Cudworth's ‘Intellectual System’ is no-
ticed by Locke in complimentary terms, in “Thoughts con-
cerning Education." (§ 193.) Certainly there is no ground for
seeing with Professor Jodl “eine eigenthiimliche Ironie des
Schicksals”), in the fact that, for twelve years Locke made
his home in the family of Sir Francis Masham, and that
Lady Masham, the daughter of Cudworth, a woman of re-
markable talents, should have been a most earnest disciple
of Locke's views.
VI. Zocke, 1632–1704. The year 1632 is marked by
the birth of illustrious men, Locke, Spinoza, Cumberland,
Pufendorf, Bourdaloue, Mabillon, Pepys, and Sir Christopher
Wren. Of these, Locke and Bourdaloue died in 1704. It
remained for Locke to review the entire philosophy of Hobbes,
and assail it in each of its ethico-political strongholds. In
this task the way had been prepared for him on the one
hand by Culverwel and Cumberland, and on the other by
the Revolution of 1688. Hobbes is the philosopher of the
Restoration, Locke of the Revolution. They represent two
distinct and opposing lines of thought not only in politics,
but in morality and religion. The judgment of Professor
Blackie, by no means partial to Locke, may represent the
general judgment of the historical significance of these two
widely divergent systems. In introducing his study on
Utilitarianism, he remarks, “we must therefore start from
Mr. Locke, the acknowledged father of whatever school of
British thinking deserves the name of a philosophy. No doubt
1) “Immutable Morality”. Book I. ch. I. compare Maine: Early
Law and Custom. p. 388.
*) “Geschichte der Ethik”. Band I. 127.
before him came Hobbes, but this man stands alone, like a
huge trap rock bolt up in a flat country".") Locke entered
the lists against all dogmatism and mechanism in philosophy,
religion and politics. In each of these departments he opposes
the teaching of Hobbes. He saw clearly where the strength
of the Leviathan lay, and thus he wrote his essays on Go-
vernment, and his works on Toleration, and the Reasona-
bleness of Christianity, to supplement his “Essay concerning
Human Understanding” Hobbes had formed a consistent
philosophy of persecution, and Locke was logically correct
in attacking its two phases, the political and ecclesiastical.
We are aware that our general position, that Hobbes and
Locke represent opposing systems of thought, is contested,
but, we think, on inadequate grounds. No one has associated
Locke more intimately with Hobbes than has Professor.
Paulsen.”) He remarks, “Wenn aus der Åhnlichkeit der Ge-
danken eines jüngeren Schriftstellers mit denen eines ālteren,
die Abhängigkeit jenes von diesem gefolgert werden darf,
so muss Locke den erheblichsten Einfluss von Hobbes er-
fahren haben. Dasser ihn, so viel ich weiss, nie und nirgend
nennt, steht dieser Annahme nicht im Wege” (587). It is
clear that Locke had no intercourse with Hobbes although
they were contemporaries for about forty years. There is,
however, in the works of Locke, no lack of reference to
Hobbes. Generally, his name is coupled with that of Spinoza,
and both are spoken of as “those justly decried names".
(Works I, 76O.) Locke's indignation is never more aroused
against Stillingfleet than when the latter suggests a flavor
of Hobbes and Spinoza in Locke's treatment of spirit and
*) Four Phases of Morals, Second Edition, p. 272. Essentially the
same view must be maintained from the political side. “Wie Hobbes mehr
der letzte edle Ausdruck eines im Verschwinden begriffenen Systems, so ist
Locke der erhebenste erste Träger des neuen Princips, welches in England
lāngst vorbereitet, durch ihn erst recht zu nationalem Bewusstsein gebracht
worden ist.” (Das Staats-Lexicon von Rotteck und Welcher. 3. Aufl.
Bd. IX.)
*) Vierteljahrsschrift für wissenschaftliche Philosophie. Erster Band.
Pp. 580–587.
2*
— 20 —
matter. Locke regards this imputation as bordering upon
insult, and charges the Bishop with bringing them into the
discussion irrelevantly, and “by their names skillfully to give
that character to my book with which you would recom-
mend it to the world". (Works I. 757.) Again Locke repu-
diates the foundations of the religion of Hobbes and Spinoza,
and declares that it resolves all, even the thoughts and will
of men, into an irresistible, fatal necessity. (Works IV. 577.)
Once again, Locke repudiates the ethical doctrines of Hobbes.
“An Hobbist, with his principle of self preservation, where-
of himself is to be judge, will not easily admit a great many
plain duties of morality." (King. Life of Locke. p. 103.) Pro-
fessor Fraser is certainly correct in saying, “Hobbes did not,
like Descartes and Locke, make consciousness his starting
point and deepest fact, but treated “minds' as visible orga-
nisms" etc. (“Selections from Berkeley." Intro. XVI.) It is
clear from Locke's inference and classification that he had
a general idea, at least, of the systems of Hobbes and
Spinoza, and that he considered himself out of harmony with
their doctrines. In the copious lists of books which Locke
recommends for study, no work of Hobbes is mentioned.
The names most in favour with Locke, are, Cicero, Hooker,
Aristotle, Bacon, Tillotson, Chillingworth and Pufendorf.
After remarking that Hobbes “ist ein unendlich viel bedeu-
tender Denker als Bacon", and declaring that the foundations
of Locke's ethics are essentially the same with those of
Hobbes, Professor Paulsen remarks, “Das Dogma von der
freien Kirche im freien Staat wirde Locke keineswegs unter-
schrieben haben . . . . Er giebt mit Hobbes dem Staat die
höchste Autorität in Sachen des Kultus und der Predigt;
sein Ideal ist offenbar eine Nationale- oder Staatskirche". (591.)
This, certainly, is the reverse of Locke's view. In his first
letter on Toleration in speaking of church and state, he
says; “The church itself is a thing absolutely seperate and
distinct from the commonwealth. The boundaries on both
sides are fixed and immovable. He jumbles Heaven and earth
together, the things most remote and opposite, who mixes
these societies, which are in their original, end, business, and
in everything, perfectly distinct and infinitely different from
each other.” (Works II. 326.) There can be no doubt of
Locke's position on this question, Article 96 of the Consti-
tution of Carolina, I66g, which provides that the Church of
England is to be regarded as the Church of State and be
Supported by the State as a national institution, was inserted
against the protest of Locke. *) Professor Paulsen continues,
“Als Denker hat er weder grosse Originalität noch Tiefe;
mit Hobbes oder Spinoza ist er nicht zu vergleichen. Aber
er steht dem Common Seuse am náchsten, und dieser ver-
steht inn". (596.) To the first sentence we have nothing to
remark; but the last sentence is suggestive. It is a serious
reflection upon two centuries of Locke's critics. Perhaps
no modern system has met with more various and conflict-
ing judgments than that of Locke. What is his theory of
knowledge? Bald sensationalism, says Cousin; intellectualism
like that of Kant, says Webb; Locke is a disciple of Hobbes,
says Paulsen; “he roots in Bacon", says Kuno Fischer; he
“relies exclusively on Gassendi" says Sir Wm. Hamilton; he
builds on Descartes, thinks Reid; “My theories are spun out
of my own thoughts and are not derived from any other
Original", says Locke, and Lewes remarks, “there is scarcely
a writer we could name whose works bear such an indis-
putable impress of his having raised himself above the alms
basket, and, not content to live lazily on the scraps of begged
opinions set his own thoughts to work to find out and follow
truth.” This diversity of opinion extends itself to the par-
ticulars of Locke's philosophy. What is his doctrine of free-
dom? Green and Kirchmann place him with the libertarians;
Professor Webb and Dr. Münz with the determinists or
necessitarians; Priestly and Hamilton think that while oppos-
ing necessity verbally, he adopted it substantially without
being aware of it, while Henry Rogers thinks that he left
*) Bourne's Life of Locke, Vol. I. p. 240. King. Life of Locke.
p. 300–306. “On the difference between civil and ecclesiastical power.”
— 22 —
no verdict on the question. Locke has been called realist,
nominalist, conceptualist, but it is useless to carry the re-
proach further. We are reminded of the exclamation of
Socrates when he heard Plato read the Lysis. “O Hercules,
what a number of lies the young man has told about me".
(Diog. Laert. III. 24.) In estimating the influence of one
writer upon another, one should either follow the main lines
of thought, or confine one's-self to such particulars in the
writings of the latter as had their inception in the writings
of the former, and are not derived by both, the earlier and
the later writer, from a common source. Observing this
rule, we may say that in neither instance is there a trace
of indebtedness of Locke to Hobbes. On the main lines
Locke opposes Hobbes throughout, while agreements in par-
ticulars are the agreements of both with others who went
before. Notwithstanding the difficulties of Locke's system,
and they are many, his works still remain the most impor-
tant Source of a knowledge of his doctrines. Although we
do not subscribe to the Lockian scheme we take advantage
of the diversity of opinion to excuse ourselves for drawing
Our views of Locke's ethics solely from Locke's writings, for
Quoting his Own language somewhat fully, and as an appeal
for charity from those who differ from our judgment of his
ethical doctrines.
Chapter II.
Ethical Faculty or Criterion.
The purpose of this chapter is to discover the ethical
faculty, and the ground of certainty. It is in no respect a
discussion of Locke's work, other than to make clear these
two important factors of his ethical theory.
I. 7%e Motive and Method of Zocke’s “Essay concerning
A/zzzzzazz Cºaderszazzdºg". Locke, in his controversies with the
critics of his essay, often refers to the Epistle to the Reader
— 23 —
as a thorough explanation of the occasion and design of his
book. (Works I. 749.) It is therefore of primary importance
that we give attention to this letter. We may also consider
in this connection the first chapter of his Essay, as it is
included in the general introduction.
VThe occasion of the Essay was threefold, firstly, a
discussion held in his chamber, with five or six friends “dis-
coursing on a subject very remote from this". One of Locke's
friends, James Tyrell, remarks, “I remember, myself, being
one of the number that met there when the discussion began
about the principles of morality and revealed religion".")
The Essay, then, is not to be regarded as fully representing
Lockes ethical views. Secondly, the conviction that philo-
Sophical enquiry “begins at the wrong end, takes a wrong
course; that instead of letting loose our thoughts into the
vast ocean of being to wander in those depths where they
can find no sure footing, we should take a survey of our
own understandings, examine our own powers, and see to
what things they are adapted. Till this is done we seek in
vain for satisfaction in a quiet and sure possession of truths.”
Thirdly, the chaotic condition of the thought of his age led
many to think “either there is no such thing as truth at all,
or that mankind hath no sufficient means to attain a certain
knowledge of it.” Locke thinks this is refusing to walk be-
cause one has no wings to fly, or neglecting duties by
candlelight because we have not the full blaze of the sun.
He hopes to show that “the candle that is set up in us shines
bright enough for all our purposes”. Locke would distin-
guish, with the Stoics, things within our reach, rö, äp’īuiv,
from those beyond our reach, td. oëx eq’īuiv. (Intro. Sec. 4, 6.)
The entire writings of Locke bear a practical and ethical
impress. “It is not our business to know all things, but only
those that concern our conduct.” “Whatsoever is necessary
for the conveniences of life and the information of virtue is
*) Bourne. Life of Locke. I. 248.
within our reach.” “It is rational to conclude that our proper
employment lies in those enquiries, and in that sort of knowl-
edge which is most suited to our natural capacities, and
carries in it our greatest interest, i.e., the condition of our
eternal estate; hence I think I may condude that morality
is the proper science and business of mankind in general,
who are both concerned and fitted to search out their sum-
num bonum." ") Added to this, was the great attraction of
the subject itself. “Since it is the understanding that sets
man above the rest of sensible beings, and gives him all
the advantage and dominion that he has over them, it is
certainly a subject even for its nobleness worth our labour
to enquire into.” (I. I; I.) This is significant, in the begin-
ning, as indicating Locke's concept of man as a rational
being, and as distinguishing his view from that of Hobbes
and Spinoza. This is further seen in his remark, “God
having designed man for a social creature, made him not
only with an inclination and under a necessity to have
fellowship with those of his own kind; but furnished him
also with language which was to be the great instru-
ment and common tie of society.” (III. I; I.) Thus, in the
two parts of the Essay we have placed in the foreground
a strong optimistic concept of man as a rational and social
being.
The purpose of the essay, is, “to enquire into the origi-
nal, certainty, and extent of human knowledge; together
with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent".”)
*) Introduction. Sec. 7. 5. H. U. IV. 12; II. King. Life of Locke.
p. 3 IO.
*) The title of Locke's essay is not concerning knowledge, but con-
cerning the Human Üzdez'szazzdźzºg, voijg, meezzs, zerszazzd, ezafezzdemeezet.
Locke here uses Understanding for “the discerning faculties of a man”, all
the faculties which have to do with knowledge. Again, the term is
equivalent to reason, Aóyog, ratio, raison, Vernunſ. The terms
understanding, mind, and reason, are not clearly discriminated in Locke's
writings. In his doctrine of ideas, the understanding or mind, is prominent;
in his doctrine of knowledge, the reason is fundamental.
— 25 —
Again, it is, “to clear my way", says Locke, “to those foun-
dations which I conceive are the only true ones, to give an
account of the reasons that I had to doubt of innate prin-
ciples and to raise an edifice uniform and consistent with
itself as far as my own observation and experience will
assist me". Again, his purpose is indicated as twofold,
“to show how our understandings come to attain those
notions of things we have, and to set down the measures
of the certainty of our knowledge”. This last indication of
his purpose is perhaps the most significant. It suggests the
twofold division of his work.
The features of Locke's method are sufficiently clear.
They are psychological, empirical, critical. The human un-
derstanding is objectified for analysis. The conscious mind
is at Once the observing subject and the object observed.
The extensive force of this introspective method is indica-
ted in Locke's remark about his book, “It is a copy of my
own mind in its several ways of operation. And all I can
say for the publishing of it, is, that I think the intellectual
faculties are made and operate alike in most men”. (Works I.
749.) Locke's method is the opposite to that of Descartes.
Descartes postulated existence and ideas, and enquired for
knowledge; Locke postulates the same, and enquired into the
Origin of ideas before discussing the problem of knowledge.
From the same position the one takes a deductive, the
Other an inductive course. Locke also calls his method an
“historical plain method”. This he proposes to follow, and
at the end of his enquiry concerning ideas he declares;
“I have given a short, and, I think, true history of the first
beginnings of human knowledge, whence the mind has its
first objects, and by what steps it makes its progress.” What
are called the comparative and historical methods are
strongly suggested by Locke, and much used in the first
book of his Essay, as well as in his political writings. With
such data, induding his frequent appeals to observation
and experience, and the absence of dogmatism from his
work, Locke may be justly called the father of the
— 26 —
modern inductive and critical methods in philosophy.") Yet
his failure to adhere strictly to his purpose of limiting the
investigation to the discerning faculties of a man as they
are employed about the objects with which they have to
do, carefully excluding ontological and physiological con-
siderations of the mind, has involved his system in some
confusion, and afforded opportunity to hostile critiscism.
The division of Locke's work is not to be overlooked,
especially in reference to his theory of ideas and knowledge.
The first book is no part of his constructive theory. (I. 4; 25.)
It does not appear in the abstract of his Essay, which was
prepared for University use, under Locke's supervision. It
is a refutation of innate ideas and principles, which Locke
represents as an “established opinion", and “received doctrine”
in his day. The second book inquires into the original of
our ideas, and the ways whereby the understanding comes
to be furnished with them. The third book was no part
of the original plan, but was afterward introduced as a pre-
liminary treatise to the fourth book, on discovering that a
treatise on the nature, use, and signification of language was
necessary before proceeding to make enquiries respecting
our knowledge. The fourth book shows what knowledge
the understanding has by its ideas; the certainty, evidence,
and extent of such knowledge, as well as the nature and
grounds of faith and opinion. Thus, the second book con-
tains the theory of ideas; the fourth, the theory of know-
ledge. The one shows how the materials of knowledge are
furnished to the mind; the other, how the mind orders or
arranges this material into knowledge. This is evidently
Locke's view in the following passage; “I must confess then,
that when I first began this discourse of the understanding,
and a good while after, I had not the least thought that
any consideration of words was at all necessary to it. Bºtz
*) H. U. I. I; 2. 8. II. I I; 15. II. I; 4. I. 4; 25. II. I; I. II.
II; I5. I. I; 2. Locke's method and spirit is well shwn in his fragment
“De Arte Medica” 1668. Fox Bourne. Life of Locke. I. 222. etc.
z0/em, having /assed over Zhe orºgºza/ and composzłoſz of
ozºr 2deas, / begazz ſo eacazzzzzze the eaczeſzz and cezzazzáy of
ozºr Azzozo/edge, I found it had so near a connection with
words, that unless the force and manner of signification were
first well observed, there could be very little said clearly
and pertinently concerning knowledge; which, being conver-
Sant about truth, had constantly to do with propositions.”
(III. 9; 21. III. 5; I6.) This is a clear statement that Locke's
doctrine of knowledge is not his doctrine of ideas. It is
from this point of view that the apparent contradiction be-
tween the second and fourth books of the Essay is to
be explained. In II. I; 2, Locke says, “in experience all
our knowledge is founded, and from that it ultimately
derives itself, but in IV. 2; I., we read”, it is on intuition
that depends all the certainty and evidence of all our know-
ledge.” The distinction between knowledge as material or
ideas, and knowledge as form or proposition we shall find
maintained by Locke in treating of the origin of ideas and
of knowledge, and again in the last division of the present
chapter in speaking of ideas and propositions. One of the
chief sources of confusion concerning Locke's theory of know-
ledge is in supposing it to be contained in the first and
second books of his Essay. .
Locke also calls attention to the fact that the Essay,
“begun by chance, was continued by entreaty; written by
incoherent parcels; and after long intervals of neglect, resu-
med again, as humor or occasions permitted". (Epistle to
the Reader.) This will explain much of the confusion, both
in arrangement and in the use of terms in the four books.
II. Zhe Sagzagſ.ca/ece of Začzz/a A'asa. Locke assumes
the existence of ideas in men's minds. “I presume", he says,
“it will be granted me that there are such ideas in men's
minds; every one is conscious of them in himself, and men's
words and actions will satisfy him that they are in others.
Our first enquiry shall be, how they come into the mind".
(I. I. 8.) It is clear that Locke is here speaking, not of the
mind, but of the ideas in the mind, ideas which the mind
— 28 —
is conscious of possessing, and that his enquiry is not con.
cerning the origin of either mind or knowledge, but of the
origin of ideas. But what does Locke mean by the term
idea? After apologising for the frequent use of the term and
its vagueness, he defines it to be “that which serves best
to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding
when a man thinks", or, “whatsoever the mind perceives in
itself or is the immediate object of perception, thought or
understanding". (I. I; 8. II. 8; 8.) *) These definitions of the
term Idea come nearest to its general use in Locke's system.
It is allowed a very broad meaning. It may stand for con-
cepts and propositions, or whatever the mind is conscious
of, and uses as material of knowledge. These materials of
knowledge are simple or complex, or the result of an em-
pirical and rational process, as in the case of the idea of
power. As with Descartes, so with Locke, it is impossible
to hold the term to any one meaning.
In answer to the question, how ideas come into the
mind, Locke postulates the mind, originally, as “white paper”,
or “an empty cabinet". (I. 2; I 5, I. 3; 22. II. I; 2.) But these,
like Aristotle's tabula rasa, are mere figures of speech, and
cannot be fixed upon solely as a centre of interpretation.
It is evident from the above definitions that the understan-
ding and its ideas are different; that the one is subject with
percipient powers, and the others the objects of these powers.
When Locke postulates ideas as being in the mind, he postu-
lates capacity for the mind; when he defines his term idea,
he gives to the understanding the two powers of perceiving
and thinking; and when he postulates a tabula rasa, he only
declares that before the mind has something to think upon
or perceive, it thinks upon and perceives nothing, although
*) The definition of Idea as “the immediate object of the mind in
thinking” is defended by Locke in his controversy with Stillingfleet.
Works I. 687. Locke's “idea” appears to be a modification of mental
energy which has no existence apart from consciousness. H. U. II. Io; 2
and 7. I. 4; 20. III. Io; I4. III. 9; 18. IV. 44. For the history of this
word, see Hamilton's Reid, note G. p. 925.
– 29 —
it has the innate powers of thinking and perceiving. “Truly
before ideas are known, there is nothing of them in the mind
but the capacity to know them.” (II. 28; II. note.) This
capacity of the understanding is nowhere denied, but every-
where affirmed by Locke. “The first capacity of the human
intellect is that the mind is fitted to receive the impressions
made on it, either through the senses by outward objects,
or by its own operations when it reflects on them.” (II.
I; 24.) But this is clearly a receiving or passive power of
the mind. Does Locke admit power as passive? This is
one of the fundamental positions of his entire theory, yet its
significance is generally overlooked. “Power is twofold,
viz, as able to make or able to receive any change; the
one may be called active, the other, passive power.” (II.
2 I ; 2.)*) The mind in sensation and reflection is receptive,
an empty cabinet, fitted to receive the impressions of sen-
sation and reflection, and for the most part passive. But
has the mind no active power, or powers? Locke replies,
“The mind has powers intrinsical and proper to itself.”
(II. I; 24.)
Locke denies with Aristotle, Culverwel, and Cumber-
land, that moral ideas and principles are innate. His polemic
against innate ideas has become classic. The ground of it
is threefold. First, the supposition of innate ideas cannot
be sustained by observation and history. Here he had been
preceded by Aristotle, Montaigne and Pascal. Secondly, if
certain ideas and principles were universal, this would not
prove them innate, but only support a law of the mind.
(I. 2; 3, 14.) This was essentially the ground of Culverwel
and Cumberland. Thirdly, in his second book, “it is un-
philosophical to multiply principles without necessity". (II. I; I.)
*) Sir Wm. Hamilton combats Locke's theory of active and passive
powers, holding that there is no pure activity or passivity in creation but
that they are always conjoined. Lectures on Metaphysics. Vol. I. p. 3 Io.
Locke would not insist on the purity of either power, but holds the
distinction to be real, as well as necessary for clearness in psychological
discussion.
— 30 —
This is the Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessi-
tatem of Occam applied to the subject in hand. The general
position of Locke on innate ideas and principles is not much
removed from that of Aristotle. Leibniz, (Noveaux Essais;
Avant-Propos,) was right in placing Locke and Aristotle side
by side on this question.") The tabula rasa, or book in
which nothing is written, of Aristotle, is the empty cabinet,
or white paper, of Locke. With Aristotle the mind has no
ełón womtö antecedent to experience. The same position is
taken by Locke against the zouvci évvouca. Neither Aristotle
nor Locke denied innate powers or capacities to the mind.
Aristotle, in his Ethics, argues in the Lockian spirit, “not
one of the moral virtues are in us by nature. . . . . The
virtues come then to be in us neither by nature nor con-
trary to nature; but we are furnished by nature with a
capacity for receiving them, and are perfected in them through
the influence of habit.”*) Aristotle also maintains that “such
things as exist by nature cannot be changed by custom". The
parallel between Locke and Aristotle extends still further.
In the first part of his treatise Aristotle seems to stumble
at the great variety and uncertainty of opinions respecting
virtue, and is almost led to think virtue a matter of civil
law or custom. But in V. Io, he assails the view of the
Sophists that virtue is a mere matter of legal enactment,
and declares a natural, eternal, and unchangeable law, inde-
pendant of human conventionality.
The force of Locke's polemic against the theory of
innate ideas and principles is not difficult to discover. He
held that so called innate ideas are to be accounted for,
and that they may be accounted for by giving attention to
experience. This theory of innate ideas was a part of the
dogmatism of the age, and Locke held that it gave an un-
*) De Anima III. 4. II. Compare Analyt. Post. II. I5. 2. 5. Heinze:
Zur Erkenntnisslehre der Stoiker. pp. 7. I6. I7.
*) Nic. Eth. II. I compare I. 3. de Anima III. 7. II, 5. Locke, H. U.
I. 3; 9 and I7.
— 31 —
fair advantage to religous and political leaders, by taking
men from the use of their own reason and judgment.
(I. 4; 24. 25.) There is not a scrap of direct evidence that
Locke had Descartes in mind when he wrote his first book.
If we take Descartes expositions of his own theory as given
in his remarks on the Programme of Regius (XII—XIV) there
is no essential disagreement between Descartes and Locke.”)
What then, did Locke have in mind? He had in mind the
empty verbalism and arrogant authority of the Schools; the
Deism of Lord Herbert and his disciples, grounded upon
innate principles, pretentious as the Athanasian Creed; the
dogmatism of Hobbes, crystallizing the principles of politics
into commands of God through the Leviathan; the common
pulpit and political oratory declaring prejudices in the terms
of immutable truth. Well might Locke speak of this theory
as an “established opinion” and “received doctrine” in his
day. Speaking of the first book of Locke's essay, Professor
Fraser says, “It has been criticised as a metaphysical dis-
cussion about the existence of transcendental elements in
human knowledge, like that at issue at the present day
between empiricism and intellectualism. ... It is really to be
read as an energetic argumentative protest against any-
thing in human knowledge being supposed to be in-
dependant of rational criticism”) That Locke was fighting
the wind in this attack upon Scolasticism, and Dogmatism
*) The remark of Sir Wm. Hamilton. (Reid. p. 785.) is significant
“Had Descartes and Locke expressed themselves on the subject of innate
ideas and principles with due precision, both would have been found in
harmony with each other, and with truth.” -
*) Ency. Brit. IX. Ed. Article, Locke. That Locke's emphasis at
certain points is misleading is scarcely to be denied. He would probably
say of the first book of his Essay what Malthus said of his own work on
population, “It is probable that, having, found the bow too much bent
one way, I was induced to bend it too much the other in order to make
it straight.” Professor Webb, “Intellectualism of Locke”, p. 33, holds that
Locke's “whole polemic against Innate Ideas, in fact, is a polemic against
the doctrine that the existence of Ideas can be latent. “This expresses but
as Small part of the purpose of Locke's polemic.
in their political, ecclesiastical, and philosophical aspects,
can only be maintained by those who are unacquainted
with the age in which Locke lived. If this polemic had
no meaning, it is difficult to explain why the storm of op-
position centerd upon this one point. But, as we have
already remarked, this book is no part of Locke's con-
structive system to which we now turn.
III. 7%e Chromoſogzca/ Order of Ideas. Locke postu-
lates the mind as tabula rasa, in the sense that anterior to
experience, or to consciousness, it has no materials of
knowledge, no ideas to think upon, (II, 9; 6, II. I; 20, I.
4; 20.) “Our first enquiry then shall be, how ideas come
into the mind. Whence has the mind all the materials
of reason and of knowledge? All the materials of thinking
and knowledge? I answer in one word, from experience."
(I. I; 8. II. I; 2.) But what is experience? This is the dif-
ficult term in Locke's philosophy. In respect to the mind
it seems to follow the analogy of power as active and
passive. The mind is, for the most part, passive in sensation
and reflection. It is active “in the natural exercise of our
faculties”. (Works I. 465.) Viewed as a process in respect
to ideas, experience shows three successive stages in time.
“The senses first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet
empty cabinet; and the mind by degrees growing familiar
with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and
names got to them. Afterward, the mind proceeding further,
abstracts them, and by degrees learns the use of general
names. In this manner the mind comes to be furnished with
ideas and language, the materials about which to exercise
its discursive faculty.”*) This is rough chronology, but it
may serve for an introduction to the three stages in Locke's
theory of the origin of ideas.
Sensation is the primary, and most fruitful source of
*) I, 2, 15, cf. IV, 17. 2. Compare the opening sentence of Kant's
“Kritik der reinen Vernunft”. Kant here follows Locke but falls into some
obscurity by using the term ‘Erfahrung' in two senses in the same sentence.
— 33 —
our ideas. It is that primitive capacity, or passive power
of the mind, whereby the mind is fitted to receive the ideas
or impressions made upon the senses by exterior objects.
Such impressions are conducted through the nerves or ani-
mal spirits to the brain, and produce ideas. “I think that
those things which we call sensible qualities are the simplest
ideas we have, and the first objects of our understandings.")
Through sensation, the mind, receives the ideas of all sen-
sible qualities, such as heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet,
extension, figure, motion, and rest. Consciousness synchro-
nates with the first sensations, and is ante-natal. In this
sense consciousness and sensation are identical and insepa-
rable.”)
A'effectºo?? is the second distinct source of our ideas;
a source which “every man has wholly within himself” and
which “furnishes us with another set of ideas that could not
be had from things without". Reflection is a capacity of the
mind “to receive the impressions made on it by its own ope-
rations, when it reflects on them". Such ideas are, perception,
thinking, doubting, believing, willing, reasoning, and knowing.
This seems to be the extent of reflection in Locke's system.
He calls it an inner or internal sense. (II. I; 4. 24. II. I I; 17.)
The ideas of reflection are later than those of sensation;
“it is pretty late before most children get ideas of the ope-
rations of their own minds". (II. I; 8.) In reflection as in
sensation the understanding is passive, or, for the most part
passive. “Whether or no it will have these ideas or mate-
rials of knowledge, is not in its own power; for the objects
of our senses do many of them obtrude their particular
ideas upon our minds whether we will or no; and the ope-
rations of our minds will not let us be without some ob-
served notions of them.” (II. I; 25.) From these two dis-
tinct sources, sensation and reflection, the understanding
receives all the “materials of thinking" or “the materials
*) II. I ; 24. II. 8; 12. II. I; 3. 9. 23. Common place Book. I67 I.
*) II. I; 20. 25, II. 9; 5. II. 27; 9.
Curtis, Locke’s Ethical Philosophy. 3
— 34 —
about which to exercise its discursive faculty". Sensation and
reflection account for all ideas received by the mind. They
indicate the receptive power of the mind, which is “for the
most part passive". To identify Locke with the sensational
School would exclude this second independent source of
ideas. This was recognised by Hartley, who followed Hobbes
in the sensational theory. Hartley says, “All our most com-
plex ideas arise from sensation, and reflection is not a dis-
tinct source, as Mr. Locke makes it.”*) Yet Schwegler cre-
dits Locke's system with materialism, declaring also, “Nihil
est in intellectu quod non fuerit in sensu”, to be the watch-
word of Locke's position. His English translator, instead of
correcting this patent error, only finds an Opportunity to
defend Hegel against Ueberweg. *) Leibniz, we believe, was
the first to foist this scholastic phrase upon Locke, and
volunteer its correction by “nisi ipse intellectus”. We re-
mark first, the phrase is entirely irrelevant to Locke's doc-
trine; secondly, were it relevant, the restriction is meaning-
less. If the restriction be allowed any meaning, it means.
what Locke maintains, that sensation is not the source of
all our ideas. Leibniz, after all, supposes that there is no
radical disagreement between Locke and himself. “Ainsije
Suis porté a croire que, dans le fonde, Son Sentiment Sur ce
point n'est pas different du mien ou plutót du sentiment
commun d'autant qu'il reconnait deux sources de nos con-
naissances, les Sens et la Reflexion.” (Nouveaux Essais.
Avant Propos.) But Leibniz lays the foundation of a new
Source of error, namely, that of making Reflection, in
Locke's system, take the place of the Intellect, which Locke's
use of Reflection by no means allows. The attempt to
*) Observations on Man I. 360. Edition I 749. -
*) Schwegler. Hist, of Philosophy transl. and annotated by
J. H. Stirling 7th Ed. pp. 181. 144. Kirchner, correctly remarks of Locke;
“Es ist nicht Seine Schuld, dass die französischen Encyclopädisten seine
Lehre zum Ausgangspunkt inres Materialismus nahmen.” Wörterbuch der.
Philos. Grundbegriffe. p. 32 I.
– 35 —
make Locke an advocate of sensationalism by resolving
Reflection into sensation, as well as the attempt to enlarge
the sphere of reflection so as to include the ideas of cause
and effect, and all other relations are alike to be resisted.
ZzZe/ec/ is the third source of ideas recognised
by Locke. The objectification of the ideas furnished by
sensation and reflection is complete. The mind is for
the most part passive. It observes these ideas, it perceives
two distinct classes of ideas, one from without, the other
from within. This observing subject having its operations
from “powers intrinsical and proper to itself”, (II. I; 24.)
becomes in its activity a source of a new series of ideas
which belong neither to sensation nor to reflection, but stand
in certain relations to them. Thus Reid observes, “I think
Mr. Locke, when he comes to speak of the ideas of rela-
tion, does not say that they are ideas of sensation and re-
flection, but only that they terminate in, and are concerned
about, ideas of sensation and reflection.” (Reid, Essay. VI.)
Of what Reid here thinks, every student of Locke must be
persuaded. Locke shows that sensation, reflection and rela-
tion stand for three different classes of ideas, and declares
against his Critics, “I never denied that the mind could frame
to itself ideas of relation, but have showed the quite contary
in my chapters about relation." (Works I. 469.) Again, in
replying to the strictures of the Bishop of Worcester, that
if the idea of substance be grounded upon plain and evident
reason, then we must allow an idea of substance that comes
not in by sensation and reflection, Locke remarks; “I never
said that the general idea of substance comes in by Sensa-
tion and reflection, or that it is a simple idea of Sensation ,
or reflection, . . . for general ideas come not into the mind (
by sensation or reflection, but are ſhe creatzºres or 2%zeſzłońs
of the zºnders/aſadeng, as / Zhzm/* / /have Shozozz." ") Again
he asserts, “We must conceive a substratum. . . . . The
*) First Letter to Stillingfleet, Works I. 468. cf. H. U. III, 3. I.
4; 18. II. 23; 2 and 4. - * . -
3%

— 36 —
mind frames the idea of a support." (Works I. 469.) Such
also are the ideas of unity or oneness, (II. I.3; 26) and of
finiteness. (II. I7; 2. cf. II. 7; 7. II. 24; 2.) To make clear
the general chronology, and to show how the mind of its
own native power frames a new yet related idea, we may
adduce as an example the idea of power. “The mind being
every day informed by the senses of the alteration of those
simple ideas it observes in things without; and taking no-
tice how one comes to an end and ceases to be, and another
begins to exist which was not before; reflecting also on
what passes within itself, and observing a constant change
of its ideas, sometimes by the impression of outward objects
on the senses and sometimes by the determination of its
own choice; and concluding from what it has so constantly
observed to have been, that the like changes will, for the
future be made in the same things by like agents, and by
like ways, considers in one thing the possibility of having
any of its simple ideas changed, and in another the possibi-
lity of making that change; and so comes by that idea
which we call power.” (II. 2 I; I. II. 23; 7.) Here is an idea
which can neither be resolved into sensation and reflec-
tion, nor be had by sensation and reflection alone. The
mind completes the idea by Superadding to the materials
furnished by sensation and reflection, an idea of its own
making, viz, the idea of cause and effect. But Locke
regards this idea of power as a simple idea, although it
is, Žer Se, a complex idea. In regarding it as a simple
idea, Locke admits that there is a simple idea which is not
furnished by sensation and reflection, although it terminates
in ideas of sensation and reflection. The illustration of power
may stand in general for all the ideas of relation, such as
cause and effect, time and space, identity and diversity,
equality and excess, right and wrong.") These are by no
means pure a priori notions, but contain an intellectual ele-
ment, independent of both sensation and reflection, without
*) II. 25; I I, 26; 3–5. 27; 1. 28; I. 28; 4.
— 37 —
which they could have no existence in the mind. This
position involves much of the so called Scottish philosophy.
We may quote the words of President Porter, “a more
careful study of the doctrines of Locke reveals the fact that
in the latter part of the essay, when he came to analyze
and account for the ideas of relation, particularly of such
primitive relations as of substance, cause, and adaptation, he
departs from the doctrines he was supposed to have laid
down in the preceding chapters. He certainly did not place
that construction upon them which many of his disciples
imposed after his time. In accounting for these original ideas,
he seems to ascribe them directly to the intellect itself, and
to an original power to discern and an original necessity to
receive them as true. In short, without asserting in form
any new source of ideas, and without in the least aban-
doning his previous teachings, while in reply to the objec-
tions which were brought against him for inconsistency,
he earnestly defends his own consistency with himself; he
does in fact take the same ground with Reid and the Scot-
tish school.”)
*) Noah Porter. Human Intellect. 4th Ed. p. 521. Dr. Mc Cosh,
‘The Scottish Philosophy', p. 295, 303, finds a strong intellectual element
running throughout Locke's entire philosophy. If our judgement of Locke's
theory of ideas is correct it would seem that he is no less indebted to
Augustine than was Descartes. Augustine laid down the fundamental cer-
tainty of both Descartes and Locke, viz “thought, and therefore the
existence of the thinker, are the most certain of all things”. (Soliloquia
II. I.) But more striking is Augustine's recognition of an “inner sense”.
“When we reflect upon ourselves, we find in ourselves not only sensations,
but also an inner sense, which makes the former its objects, for we have
knowledge of our sensations, but the external senses are unable to perceive
their own sensations, and finally, reason which knows both the internal
sense and itself.” (De Lib. Arb. II. etc.) This as well as Augustine's con-
cept of God as the “unchangeable truth, wisdom, blessedness, justice, and
the moral law”, is strictly Lockean. (Überweg-Heinze, Geschichte der Philo-
sophie. Band II. Ioš–Io'7. See Barth, Die Geschichtsphilosophie Hegels
und der Hegelianer. p. I I. for the same three fold origin of ideas in
in Hegel’s “Phänomenologie des Geistes”.)
IV. 7%e /log.ca/ Order of Know/edge. Locke's theory
of ideas is not his theory of knowledge. He speaks of ideas
as the materials of knowledge, as only the materials of know-
ledge. Ideas in themselves no more constitute knowledge
than bricks constitute a building, and as the latter might
exist for ever without coming into the form of a palace, so
ideas are nothing more than so much material, which with-
out the active intellect, would never rise above material,
into knowledge. Knowledge presupposes ideas. Ideas do
not necessarily imply knowledge. Our knowledge can never
exceed our ideas, nor extend to all of them. When Stilling-
fleet remarked that Locke had founded demonstration on
self evident ideas, Locke replied, “Self evident ideas are
wholly unknown to me, and are nowhere in my book, nor
were ever in my thoughts.” (Works. I. 712.) Knowledge
is no more to be accounted for by ideas alone, than is the
universe by atoms alone. Ideas are the material, knowledge
the final form, and the percipient mind the architect and
builder. “Ideas", says Locke, “are not moral entities, they
are neither true nor false. Truth and error belong, not to
ideas, but only to propositions.” (II.3.2; 26 II. 33; 19) Burnet
complained that Locke demanded propositions for truth or
falsehood. Locke answered, “As odd as it is, it is true that
there is no truth or falsehood but in a verbal or mental
proposition.” (Marginalia. p. 4I.) Thus, when Locke comes
to treat of the origin of knowledge, he reverses the order
which he uses in the origin of ideas. Instead of sensation,
reflection, and (reason, as producing ideas or the material
of knowledge, we-have intuitive reason, demonstrative reason,
and sensation, as representing in order of value, the three
phases of knowledge or certainty. The general position of
reason in Locke's system with reference to ideas, or the
materials of knowledge, may be indicated in his own words.
“The understanding has a native faculty to perceive the
coherence or incoherence of its ideas.” (IV. 17. 4.) Stilling-
fleet objected that Locke had not treated of reason in all
the senses which he had assigned to it. Locke answers,
— 39 —
“The understanding as a faculty being the subject of my
essay, it carried me to treat directly of reason no otherwise
than as a faculty. But yet, reason as standing for true
and clear principles, and also as standing for clear and fair
deductions from these principles, I have not wholly omitted
as is manifest from what I have said of self evident pro-
positions, intuitive knowledge, and demonstration, in other
parts of my essay.” (Works I. 726.) Here again, Locke
announces the fundamental doctrine of the Scottish School.
Jazzezžoſe ſurmzshes ſ.rs/ ????cº/es. “It consists in the
mind's perception of the agreement or disagreement of two
ideas, immediately by themselves without the intervention
of any other. In this the mind is at no pains in proving
or examiming, but perceives the truth as the eye does the
light, only by being directed towards it. This kind of
knowledge is the clearest and most certain that human
frailty is capable of. It is on this intuition that depends
the certainty and evidence of all our knowledge. Intuitive
knowledge neither requires nor admits any proof, one part
of it more than another. He that will suppose it does,
takes away the foundation of all knowledge and certainty.”*)
Again Locke emphasizes his position, “I make self evident
propositions necessary to certainty, and found all certainty
only in them. Whether they come into view of the mind
earlier or later, this is true of them, that they are all known
by their native evidence, are wholly independent, receive no
light, nor are capable of any proof, one from another.”
1) Carlyle, in 1827, speaking of the difference of the Kantean and
English schools, says, “The Germans take up the matter differently and
would assail Hume, not at his outworks, but in his citadel, They deny
his first principle, that sense is the only inlet of knowledge, that experience
is the primary ground of belief. This pure truth, however, they seek, not
historically, and by experiment, in the universal persuasions of men, but
by intuition, in the deepest and purest nature of man.” : Miscell., State of
German Lit. This is a statement of Locke's position, IV. 2; I. IV. 3; 18.
IV. 7; I4. IV. 7; 19. IV. 8; 1. IV. Io; I. IV. 17; 14. IV. I2; 7. IV.
7; Io. IV. 3; 31. Works I. 71 I–712. Elements of Nat. Philosophy. Ch.
XII. or, Works IV. 578.
— 40 —
The marks of the certainty of our primary knowledge
are, according to Locke, self-evidence, necessary relation,
the contrary of which is unthinkable, (IV. 3; 29.) and uni-
versality, or universal recognition of truth, as soon as pre-
sented. “In these only are we capable of certain and uni-
versal knowledge”. We have an intuitive knowledge of our
own existence, of the axioms of mathematics, of the prin-
ciples of contradiction and identity, and of causality.
“Everything that has a beginning, must have a cause, is a
true principle of reason, or a proposition certainly true.”
Locke assumes this principle in his demonstrations.") Again,
Locke declares, “He would be thought void of common
sense who asked on the one side, or, on the other, went
to give a reason why it is impossible for the same thing
to be and not to be." (I. 3; 4.) All these are fundamental
principles of knowledge, principles of common reason,
guaranteed by common sense. To deprive Locke's doctrine
of knowledge of intuition, would be as fatal as to deprive
his doctrine of ideas of sensation. There can be no ideas
prior to sensation; there can be no knowledge at all
without intuition. But Locke holds that our knowledge is
neither increased by self-evident propositions nor by the
use of the syllogism. These can “help no one to an acquaint-
ance with ethics, or instruct him, or others, in the know-
ledge of morality". The mind may play forever upon self
evident propositions, without ever increasing its stock of
knowledge. “It is but like a monkey shifting his oyster
from one hand to the other; and had he but words might
no doubt have said; oyster in right hand is subject, oyster
in left hand is predicate; and so might have made a self
evident proposition of oyster, i. e. Oyster is oyster; and yet
with all this, not have been one whit the wiser, or more
knowing.” (IV. 8; 1–3.) Locke holds that the syllogism
cannot increase our knowledge, because we have, in the
premises, an implicit knowledge of the conclusion. With
*) Works III. 60–61, H. U. IV. Io; I —5. II. 21; 4. I. 4; Io.
him, the syllogism is a true touchstone of right arguing but
it can pretend to nothing more than being a test of knowl-
edge. While the intuitive reason, grasping propositions
immediately, furnishes the foundation of all knowledge and
certainty, it is incapable of building knowledge beyond, or
higher than, itself. This function can be performed only by
the Demonstrative Reason which ſurmishes the next degree
of AEmozwledge. “The mind perceives the agreement or disagree-
ment of any ideas, not immediately, but by the intervention
of other ideas, and this is that which we call reasoning."
(IV. 2; 2.) Demonstrative knowledge depends upon intuitive
knowledge in every step of correct reasoning. The mind must
carry exactly this intuitive certainty, and see that no part
of it is left out. (IV. 2. 7.) Thus we have a demonstrative
knowledge of the existence of God. Demonstration depends
upon proofs, i.e. intermediate ideas introduced by the reason,
to show the agreement or disagreement of any couplet of
ideas or propositions. This is the sphere of the reason
alone, but, says Locke, as if anticipating objections, “if gen-
eral knowledge consist in the perception of the agreement
or disagreement of our ideas, and the knowledge of the
existence of all things without us, be had only by our
senses, what room is there for the exercise of any other
faculty but outward sense and inward perception? What
need is there of reason? Very much; both for the enlarge-
ment of our knowledge, and regulating our assent. For it
hath to do both in knowledge and opinion, and is necessary
and assisting to all our other intellectual faculties, and in-
deed contains two of them, Sagacity and illation, or logical
inference. . . . . Sense and intuition reach but a very little
way. The greatest part of our knowledge depends upon
deduction and intermediate ideas, . . . . the faculty which
finds out the means and rightly applies them to discover
certainty in the one, and probability in the other, is what
we call reason." (IV. I7; 2. cf. IV. 2; 3. 4.) -
. “Senszłºve Amozwſedge", says Locke, “is the perception
of the mind employed about the particular existence of finite
being without us; which, going beyond bare probability,
and yet not reaching to either of the foregoing degrees of
certainty, passes under the name of knowledge.” (IV; 2. 14.)
Although Locke reduces sensitive knowledge to a minimum,
and is inclined to regard it as mere “faith or opinion,
but not knowledge, at least in all general truths”; although
he holds that “our ideas are not always proof of the exis-
tence of things", he yet admits the external world into the
sphere of knowledge, on the principles of causality and com-
mon Sense, and on such considerations as our consciousness
of the difference in looking on the sun by day, and thinking
on it by night. (II. I 7; 4. II. 7; 7. IV. I I; 3–9.) Locke
defends his moderate realism, his very moderate realism,
(IV. I I; 3–9), with sufficient clearness, and concludes that
the reality of the external world is as great as our happiness
or misery, and sufficient to enable us to attain the good, and
avoid the evil caused by external objects, “which is the im-
portant concernment we have in being made acquainted with
them". (IV. 2; 8.)*) Thus, says Locke, “we may allow these
three degrees of knowledge, viz, intuitive, demonstrative, and
sensitive". We have three fundamental certainties corres-
ponding to these three classes, ſhe eaczsſence of Se//, of God,
and of the world. The illustrative force of Locke's doc-
trine of knowledge, is this. While sensation is chronologi-
cally first in the origin of ideas, and logically the last in
the doctrine of knowledge, intuition is logically the origin
of all knowledge, and chronologically the last in the forma-
tion of ideas. Thus, we have in Locke the maxim, ‘what
is psychologically last, is first in logic and in reason'.
*) The grounds of the belief in the existence of the external world,
were left by the Scottish School exactly where Locke placed them, and
where Hume tacitly recognized them to lay. Brown agreed with Mackintosh,
that the difference between Hume and Reid was simply verbal. “Hume,”
he said, “shouted, we can give no reason for our belief in an external
world, but whispered, we cannot help believing; Reid, on the other hand,
shouted, we cannot help believing in an external world, but whispered,
we can give no reason in support of our belief.' Webb. The Veil of Isis.
p. I6 I. . *
— 43 —
V. Of Azzow/edge and judgmenz. Locke's definition of
knowledge as “the perception of the agreement or disagree-
ment of Our ideas" has been sharply criticised, but his ex-
planation of it in his controversy with the Bishop of Wor-
cester seems to be, on the whole, satisfactory. “Nobody",
says Locke, “who reads my essay with that indifferency
which is proper to a lover of truth can avoid feeling that
what I say of certainty, was not to teach the world a new
way of certainty, but to endeavour to show wherein the
old, and only true way of certainty consists.” (Works. I. 749.)
“I have said that demonstration consists in the agreement
or disagreement of the intermediate idea, with those whose
agreement or disagreement it is to show in each step of
the demonstration.” (Works I. 725.) “And so far as Aris-
totle goes in his method that what things agree in the third
agree among themselves, he and I agree. I presume to say
that if Aristotle had gone forth in this matter, he would
have placed our knowledge or certainty of the agreement
of any two things in the perception of their agreement.”)
Locke thus illustrates his method of certainty. The pro-
position, “Everything that has a beginning must have a
cause, is a true principle of reason". But the proposition
“Everything must have a cause, is a false proposition”, for
while the idea of the existence of something and the idea
of eternity do agree, the idea of existence from eternity
and having a cause, do not agree, or are inconsistent with
the same thing. (Works I. 495.) Throughout Locke's dis-
cussion with Stillingfleet he insists there is no difference
between the Bishop's certainty of reason and his own by
ideas.”) When we take into consideration Locke's position
*) Works I. 701. Both hold that ideas begin with sensation, without
which, thought and knowledge are impossible. Both are also agreed that
intuition is the ground of all certainty, and that “reason must be the basis
or beginning of science” or of all formal knowledge. Analyt. Post. II. I 5.
I. 3. and 23. , ºr
*) Works I. 608. 610. 627. 690. 725. H. U. II. 32; 1. IV. 5; 2.
IV. 2; I. IV. 4; 5. In Inductive method Locke seems to have advanced
— 44 —
that “the understanding has a native faculty to perceive
the coherence or incoherence of its ideas", (IV. I 7; 4) that
the mind has no other immediate objects but its own ideas,
(IV. I; 1) that by intuition we are furnished with the fun-
damental principles of all certainty and knowledge, (IV. 7;
19.) that the reason alone by finding intermediate ideas
increases our knowledge, (IV. 3; 18), we cannot object that
the percipient mind or reason should be regarded as the
sole umpire in the field of knowledge and probability. The
Reason is, according to Locke, the sole organ of certainty
in every department of knowledge, and the assurance we
have that the Reason is fitted to be a guide in universal
morality, is the conviction grounded on observation and ex-
perience that “the intellectual faculties are made, and ope-
rate alike in most men". (Works I. 544.)
Locke proceeds from this point to develop a theory of
judgment or practical reason, which is distinguished from
knowledge by a want of absolute certainty. “Man" says
Locke, “is by nature a rational being. God has not made
men barely twoleged creatures, and left it to Aristotle to
make them rational. Reason is natural revelation, and it
must be our last guide in everything.”). “Reason constitutes
man a moral being and were not the Candle of the Lord
set up by himself in men's minds, which it is impossible for
the breath or power of man wholly to extinguish, we might
despair of any progress in the moral sciences, and look for
Egyptian darkness and bondage.”*) But in what sense does
beyond Aristotle, and to have anticipated the present logical forms. Prof.
J. P. Mahaffy show how Mill's theory of syllogism was clearly and explic-
itly laid down by Locke”. Mind. Vol. I. 287.
*) IV. 19; 4 and 14. IV. 17; 4. IV. 17; 23–24. C. U, III. 3.
*) The Candle of the Lord is a phrase taken from Proverbs xx. 27.
“The spirit of man is the Candle of the Lord, searching all the inward
parts.” This was a favourite text of the Cambridge preachers, especialy
of Culverwel and Whichcote. Culverwel makes the phrase equivalent to
the “Light of Reason”, and says, “God hath breathed into all the sons
of men reasonable souls, which may serve as so many candles to enlighten
e < gº *- - - -
Reason constitute man a moral being? £he mind" says
Locke, “has two faculties conversant about truth and false-
hood, first, knowledge, whereby it certainly perceives and
is undoubtedly satisfied of the agreement or disagreement
of any ideas.” Knowledge, as here used, includes the results
of the intuitive and demonstrative reason, and, as allowed
by Locke, the reality of the external world. Knowledge
and certainty are identical, what is less than certain is not
knowledge. The truth which we cannot doubt, and the
things which we can prove, are the known, the certain.
& Secondly, the faculty that God has given to man to
supply the want of clear and certain knowledge, is judgment:
whereby the mind takes its ideas to agree or disagree, or,
which is the same, any proposition to be true or false,
without perceiving a demonstrative evidence in the proofs.
jºr (IV. I.4) *Judgment then is common sense, or practical
reason. It plays a leading part in Locke's ethical philosophy.
It has to do with all those ideas and propositions, the truth
of which is not made certain by intuition or demonstration.
The moment a proposition cannot be doubted, or can be
proved, it becomes a part of knowledge. But the sphere
left for judgment or the practical reason, is coextensive
with human life. The grounds of probability are twofold,
first, the conformity of anything with our own knowledge,
observation, and experience; secondly, the testimony of
others vouching their observation and experience. In the
testimony of others are to be considered the number, integ-
rity, and skill of the witnesses; the design of the author,
where it is the testimony out of a book cited, the con-
sistency of the parts and circumstances of the relation and
contrary testimonies. These grounds, as they are the
foundation on which our assent is built, so are they also
the measure whereby its several degrees are, or ought to
and direct them in searching out their Creator, in discovering of inferior
beings and themselves also.” (Light of Nature. p. 29.) It is in this sense
that Locke uses the expression. IV. 3; 21. IV. I2; 8. -
— 46 —
be, regulated. In regard to matters of fact, the concurrent
observation and experience of all other men produce an
assurance which approaches to knowledge. Concerning
matters of opinion or speculation, analogy is the only help
we have, and it is from that alone we draw all Our grounds
of probability. After making some striking remarks on ana-
logy Locke concludes: “This sort of probabili ty, which is
the best conduct of rational experiments, and the rise of
hypotheses, has also its use and influence; and a wary
reasoning from analogy leads us often into the discovery
of truths and useful productions which would otherwise lie
concealed.” (IV. Chs. I4. I 5. I6.) As knowledge, or cer-
tainty, is to be had only by visible and certain truth, so
error is not a fault of our knowledge, but a mistake of Our
judgment, giving assent to that which is not true. “There
is but probability grounded upon experience or analological
reasoning, but no certain knowledge, or demonstration.”)
But if assent be grounded on probability, how come
men to give their assent contrary to probability, and hold
so great a variety of opinions? The reasons may be reduced
to these four; “want of proofs, want of ability to use them,
want of will to use them, and wrong measures of proba-
bility”. These wants and wrong measures have no foundation
or justification in man's rational nature. “Every man", says
Locke, “carries about him a touchstone if he will make use
of it, to distinguish substantial gold from superficial glittering,
truth from appearances. And indeed, this touchstone, which
is natural reason, is spoiled and lost only by assumed preju-
dices, overweening presumption, and narrowing our minds."
(C. U. Sect. III.) The reason, as an ethical faculty, is
neither the moral law nor the lawgiver, but simply the
faculty which discovers, grasps, and interprets a law. In
the following chapter of our essay, we shall see first, an
effort on the part of Locke to state the ethics of natural
law; Secondly, an attempt to bring ethics into the sphere
*) King, Life of Locke. p. 122.
of knowledge or certainty by a mathematical method, and
thirdly, the admission of a transcendental factor to complete
the demands of an universal morality. In all this, the
reason alone is concerned. Here we need only call attention
to the fact that Locke does not allow a special faculty set
apart to the particular department of ethical knowledge.
As he rejected innate ideas, so he rejects that doctrine of
conscience which, in modern moral philosophy is the repre-
sentative of innate ideas. Locke's whole aim is, to bring
all the departments of faith and knowledge within the sphere
of reason. When Locke defines conscience as “our own
opinion of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own
actions", he is identifying conscience with judgment, making
it a part of the practical reason, and to this position he
holds throughout. “Conscience" he says, “is the judge, not
the law. It is not the law of nature, but judging by that
which is taken to be the law, and which acquits Or Con-
demns.” (Marginalia pp. 38. 40.) Conscience may be used
in two senses, first, as standing for judgment passed upon
conduct proposed, or accomplished, approving or condemning,
as the case may be. This assumes a law, according to
which the judgment takes place. This law is grasped by
reason, mediately or immediately. That conscience sits in
judgment upon our actions, and judges according to a law,
Locke most earnestly maintains. Secondly, conscience may
be regarded as standing for a law written in the mind, in-
dependent of reason, and antecedent to all experience, not
Only accusing and acquitting, but informing and directing
conduct by its own independent authority. Thus it becomes
lawgiver, law, and judge. As such, it must be a permanent
and an unalterable element in character. This form of
doctrine Locke repudiates. Thus he expresses himself;
“Natural powers may be improved by exercise, and after-
wards weakened by neglect, and so, all the knowledge got
by the exercise of those powers. But innate ideas, or
propositions imprinted on the mind, I do not see how they
can be improved or effaced.” (Marginalia. 43. 44.) What
— 48 —
Locke could not see, is that which is maintained by the
consistent defenders of innate ideas. Professor Calderwood,
says of conscience, “From its nature it follows that cons-
cience cannot be educated. Education, whether in the sense
of instruction or training, is impossible.”) He who maintains
the doctrine of innate ideas which Locke assailed, must also
in strict consistency, maintain the autocratic and independent
nature of conscience, which he also assailed. They stand
on exactly the same basis. Professor Calderwood is the
only present day philosopher, so far as we know, who
sqarely accepts Locke's challenge, and maintains, against
him, innate ideas and a moral sense independent of the
reason, and incapable either of development or of degene-
ration. Here the difference between these two theories is
clearly defined. But when we come to the authority of
conscience, Locke takes the highest grounds. The laws
about which conscience is conversant are to be obeyed
before any human laws.”) The doctrine of conscience, which
will be further noticed in considering Natural Law, is the
basis of his entire argument against the union of Church
and State, and against persecution, while the uniform voice
of conscience respecting fundamental moral principles is the
foundation of his doctrine of civil society. Neither Clarke,
Butler, nor Shaftesbury, although they speak in large sen-
tences of moral sense or conscience, have given it a higher
place and a more authoritative voice in ethics. What Locke
maintains, is, that concience does not act without ratiocination,
that conscience is the judge, not the law; that conscience
does not create distinctions of good and evil, but simply
judges by a rule: and that it is to be confounded neither
with practical principles, nor with the law of nature. (Margin-
alia. 35–43.)
') Handbook of Moral Philosophy, 14th Ed. p. 69.
*) Works II. 34o. 341. 406. 407. -
Chapter III.
The Foundations of Ethics.
I. Aegzzszzes for a yozzzzdazzouz of effizcs. By his psy-
chology Locke commits himself to a purely rational moral-
ity which involves a rational theology. To ascertain in
what sense morality involves theology, in Locke's view,
will reveal the foundations of his ethical system. We have
seen that Locke founds all certainty on intuition, on those
“propositions that nobody has any doubt about", and that
he makes the practical reason the ethical faculty; the fac-
ulty which must be employed in establishing an ethical
basis. We have also seen that the fundamental certainty of
intuition is the knowledge of our own existence, and that
the fundamental certainty of the demonstrative reason is
the knowledge of the existence of God. These two cer-
tainties seem to Locke a sufficient starting point for his
ethical speculations, and in these two points his ethical spe-
culations center. &
Locke holds that the demands of a constructive moral-
ity are for a known or supposed lawmaker, a known law
and its sanction. “What duty is cannot be understood
without a law, nor a law be known or supposed without a
lawmaker, or without reward or punishment.” (I. 3; 12.) To
establish morality upon its proper basis, we must first prove
a law, which always supposes a lawmaker. This sovereign
lawmaker, who has set rules and bounds to the actions of
men, is God their Maker. (Lord King. Life of Locke. 3 13.)
But as any system of morality that involves the notion of
|-
God takes its coloring from its conception of God, we
must enquire into the nature of this fundamental certainty
in Locke's ethical system.
II. 7%e exisſezzce and conce/Z of God. The existence
of God belongs to demonstrative knowledge, because some
Curtis, Locke's Ethical Philosophy. 4
— 50 —
who never use their reason, or never turn their thoughts
this way, deny His existence. Yet “it is as certain that
there is a God as that the opposite angles made by
the intersection of two straight lines are equal, . . . . the
knowledge of God is the most natural discovery of the hu-
man reason." (I. 4; 16. 17.) Locke, with his friend Newton,
makes use of the teleological argument, and finds in the
structure of the eye “sufficient to convince us of an All-
wise Contriver”. (Gov. I. 53.) But the proof which he em-
phasizes most is the psychological. He objects to the proof
offered by Descartes, on the ground that “by it senseless
matter might be the first Eternal Being and cause of all
things, as well as an immaterial intelligent spirit; this, joined
to his shutting out the consideration of final causes from
his philosophy, and his laboring to invalidate all proofs of
a God but his own, does unavoidably draw upon him some
suspicion.”*) This dogmatism was quite foreign to Locke's
view of the rules of philosophizing. (IV. IO. 7.) Descartes
“deduces his proof of a God from the idea of God which we
have in us".|Locke takes the position; “Real existence can be
proved only by real existence; our own existence is real;
it is the highest certainty, from whence, therefore, may be
drawn, by a train of ideas, the surest and most incontestable
proofs of the existence of a God.” First, is the intuitive cer-
tainty one has of his own personal existence, that he exists,
that he is something. Secondly, man knows by an intuitive
certainty, that bare nothing can no more produce any real
being than it can be equal to two right angles, hence it is
clear that from eternity there has been something. Thirdly,
it is evident, that what had its being and beginning from
*) Lord King. Life of Locke. 31.4—316. The relations of Locke
and Descartes have recently excited attention in Germany. See Dr. Sommer,
Locke's Verhältniss zu Descartes. 1887. Dr. Geil, Ueber die Abh. Locke's
von Descartes, 1887. Bruno Erdmann, Descartes und Locke, Archiv für
Gesch. d. Philos. Bd. II. 99–122. Dr. Geil, Die Gottesidee bei Locke
und dessen Gottesbeweis, Archiv für Gesch. d. Philos. Bd. III. 579–596.
1890. -

— 51 —
another, must also have all that which is in, and belongs
to its being, from another too. This eternal source of all
being must also be the eternal source and origin of all
power; and so this Eternal Being must be also the most
powerful. From this point Locke turns the mind upon itself,
and finding perception and knowledge, can account for them
only by some knowing intelligent Being. “Thus, from a
consideration of ourselves, and what we infallibly find in our
own constitutions, our reason leads us to the knowledge of
this certain and evident truth, that there is an Eternal, most
powerful, and most knowing º -
ſ With the exception of the teleoſogical, Locke's argu-
ment for the existence of God is perhaps as unobjectionable
as any. Although Locke recognises the teleological argu-
ment, it is not so agreeable to the letter of his system as
the psychological, inasmuch as the former rises from the
outer world, and gathers its force by impressions through
the senses, while the latter is amost completely subjective,
taking its rise in reflection, and gathering its force through
the reason. This view is also involved in placing the idea
of God under the demonstrative reason. The Anthro-
pomorphism which is involved in giving content to the idea
of the existence of God, in the psychological proof, is more
apparent, but not less real, than that involved in other
proofs. “The idea of God", says Max Müller, “comes to us,
not as the result of reasoning and generalising, but as an
intuition as irresistible as the impression of our senses.”)
*) IV. Io. 6. Works I. 488. 496. II. 15.12. King: Life of Locke
I 24. The following judgment by one of Locke's editors, is clearly er-
roneous. “Being intent on overthrowing the doctrine of inmate ideas, he
argues that even the idea of God is obtained through the medium of sen-
sation and reflection.” (Locke's works, edited by J. A. St. John. Prelim-
inary discourse. p. 5.) Locke's proof is closely followed throughout by
Dr. Samuel Clarke. “Since something now is, it is manifest that some-
thing always was; otherwise the things that now are must have arisen out
of nothing, absolutely and without cause, which is a plain contradiction.
in terms.” On the Attributes. Prop. I. § 1.
* | *) Science of Language. 2d series p. 479. 7th Ed.
4%
— 52 —
This we take to be essentially true. When the light which
comes to us is decomposed by the mental prism into its
various colours, we find it impossible to discover in the
spectrum any one color, or any mechanical combination
of colors that corresponds exactly to the light which we
intuitively received. Locke's refusal to admit the idea of
the existence of God among primary thruths, is neither
demanded by his constructive system, nor in strict harmony
with its spirit. -
The concept of God attaches itself to the demonstration
of His existence. The mind, finding within itself certain
powers and excellences, these are enlarged, perfected, ob-
jectified, and attributed to the Deity. “The idea with him",
says Professor Greene, “is the idea which each man has of
the thinking thing within him, enlarged to infinity.” (Int,
to Hume, I. I 16.) But it is far more than this. Although
Locke says “this eternal thinking thing I call God”, this
does not give the content of his conception of God.
“Whatsoever carries any excellency with it, and includes
not imperfection” says Locke, “must needs make a part of
the idea we have of God. So that with being and the
continuation of it, or perpetual duration, power, wisdom and
goodness, must be the ingredients of the perfect or super
excellent Being which we call God, and that in the utmost
or infinite degree. But yet that unlimited power cannot be
excellency, without it be regulated by wisdom and goodness.
Thus justice is regarded as only a branch of God's good-
ness, and as extending no further than infinite goodness
shall find it necessary for the preservation of His works.
We cannot imagine that God has made anything with a
design that it should be miserable, or that He inflicts
punishment for any other end than the preservation of His
creatures.”)
*) Lord King. Life of Locke. Pp. I23–124. Comp. H. U. II. 23;
33–35. Works III. 83. IV. 3.18. Mr. Austin, one of the greatest and most
learned of English jurists, who speaks of Locke as “that incomparable man
The concept of God as eternal and infinite wisdom and
goodness is supplemented with immutability of will, as against
the Absolute Will held by some of the Scholastics, and
apparently by Descartes. God cannot act against His own
nature, nor can he alter the nature or essence of things
i which He has established. God is an eternal and unchan-
geable law unto Himself and to all rational beings. God is
| not a religious, but a moral Being. “If it were fit", says
Locke, “for such poor finite creatures as we are to pronounce
what Infinite Wisdom and Goodness can do, I think, I might
say that God Himself cannot choose what is not good.
The freedom of the Almighty hinders not His being deter-
mined by what is best.” (II. 21; 49.) This is the freedom
of perfection. God cannot act contrary to His own nature.
(IV. 3; 6)*) But with Locke, this belief in God is not only
the fundamental article in religion and morality; it is
likewise the foundation stone of political science. .
As from a consideration of ourselves, and what we
infallibly find in our own constitutions, we are led to the
knowledge of the existence of God, so in our conception of
God, lie the roots, the first principles, of religion, morality,
who emancipated human reason from the yoke of mystery and jargon”,
voices the sentiments of Locke. “It is enough for us, he says”, to know
that the Deity is perfectly good; and that since He is perfectly good, He
wills the happiness of His creatures. This is a truth of the greatest
practical moment. For the cast of the affections which we attribute to
the Deity, determines, for the most part, the cast of our moral sentiments.”
Province of Jurisprudence Determined. Vol. I. 93. 50.
*) Locke attaches the utmost importance to a belief in the existence
of God. “This being so fundamental a truth, and of that consequence,
that all religion and genuine morality depend thereon.” It is his conviction
that confirmation in the belief of God is enough to preserve in man true
sentiments of religion and morality. Thus, in his theory of education,
while placing virtue as the chief end, he holds that for its foundation there
ought very early to be implanted in the mind of the child a true notion
of God, as the Independent, Supreme Being, Author and Maker of all
things, from whom we receive all our good, Who loves us and gives us
all things. (H. U. IV. Io; 7. Works I. 490. Ed. 135–6.)
and politics. It is idle to discuss the question whether
religion is founded on morality, or morality, on religion, as
both are founded in our belief and conception of God.
Eliminate this, and the foundations of morality and reli
gion are removed. Locke would apply the same doctrine
to politics. He was, confessedly, the most liberal minded
philosopher of the seventeenth century, yet he excludes
atheists from toleration. “Those are not at all to be
tolerated, who deny the Being of God. Promises and
Covenants, and Oathes, which are the bonds of human
society, can have no hold upon an Atheist. The taking
away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all. . . .
Atheism is a crime, which, for its madness as well as guilt,
ought to shut a man out of all sober and civil society.”)
Whether this position breaks the force of his argument, in
his Letters concerning Toleration, is not the point. It shows
the force of his conviction that there can be no permanence
and security in practical matters like those of religion,
morality, and politics without the recognition of the Being
of God. It is, in his view, the only rational basis of toleration.
With Locke, atheism is first, mental imbecility, then nihilism.
There are physical, mental and moral monstrosities among
men, but these do not invalidate the normal laws of life.
This introduces us to one of the fundamental questions of
ethics, and one upon which Locke's position has been
generally misunderstood.
*. III. The Wature of Morality. Locke, as an observer
of men and societies, remarks that the “laws to which men
generally refer, and by which they judge of the rectitude
*) Epistola de Tolerantia. I685. Works III. Iog. Fox Bourne,
Life of Locke II. I4 I. Constitution of Carolina. Art 95. Locke holds
with Cudworth “It is not possible that there should be any such thing as
morality unless there be a God, - that is, an Infinite Eternal mind that
is the first original and source of all things, whose nature is the first rule
and exemplar of all morality, for otherwise it is not conceivable whence
any such thing should be derived to particular intellectual beings.” Im-
mutable Morality. IV. 6. 13.
or pravity of their actions, seem to be three sorts with
their different enforcements, or rewards, and punishments".
(II. 28; 6.) These three laws are, the Divine, the Civil, and
the law of Opinion. In another place he denominates them
the law of God, the law of politic societies, and the law
of fashion or private censure. (II. 28; 13.) Again, to distinguish
these schools, Locke puts the question. “Why should a
man keep his word or contract?” The Christian replies,
because God requires it, and will punish the failure; the
Hobbist answers, because the public requires it, and the
Leviathan will punish the omission; the Heathen philosopher
declares, the violation of it would spoil one's personal
character, dignity, and reputation. (I. 3. 5.)
The above remarks have been curiously interpreted.
Locke has been identified with Occam and Descartes, who
make virtue depend solely on the arbitrary will of God;
with Hobbes, who made morality the will of the Leviathan,
and again, with “the Heathen” who makes public opinion or
fashion the measure of morality. Mr. Lowde and Thomas
Burnet were the first to charge Locke with making “virtue
vice, and vice virtue". This severe criticism on Locke's
view of the nature of virtue has been industriously propa-
gated. Shaftesbury's judgment of Locke, like that of Cousin,
represents two extremes; the height of eulogy, and the depth
of detraction. On the one hand he acknowledges the greatest
obligation to Locke as the manager of his education, and
says, “Locke's Essay of human understanding may as well
qualify for business and the world, as for the sciences and
the university. No one has done more towards the recalling
of philosophy from barbarity into use and practise of the
world, and into the company of the better and politer sort,
who might well be ashamed of it in its other dress. No
one has opened a better or a clearer way to reasoning.
And, above all, I wonder to hear him censured so much
by any Church-of-England men, for advancing reason, and
bringing the use of it so much into religion; when it is by
this only that we fight against the enthusiasts, and repel
— 56 —
the great enemies of our Church.”) But Shaftesbury's judg-
ment' undergoes a violent change, his moral sentiments are
suddenly convulsed with horror. “It was Mr. Locke”, he ex-
claims, “that struck at all fundamentals, threw all order and
virtue out of the world, and made the very ideas of these,
which are the same as those of God, unnatural and without
foundation in our minds. Thus virtue, according to Mr.
Locke, has no other measure, law, or rule, than fashion or
custom".”) That this twofold judgment throws more light
on Shaftesbury's temperament than on Locke's doctrine will
appear presently. Shaftesbury's disciples in criticism, have
been numerous. Leslie Stephen, after remarking that Mande-
ville, in his denial of the real existence of virtue, “simply
carried Locke's method one step farther", says, “No con-
clusion, of course, could be more repulsive to Locke him-
self, and it is curious that he did not perceive the appli-
cation which might be made of his doctrine.” It would,
indeed, have been curious if Locke had perceived such an
application of his doctrine. That Locke was mistaken as
to his own view of the question we cannot admit. The
error so generously attributed to him, may turn out to be-
long to his critics.
These judgments of Locke's doctrine of the nature of
virtue are erroneous. In the first place, he repudiates them
with the contempt they deserve; in the second place, he
rejects all three of the forms attributed to him, and pro-
pounds the doctrine of the eternal and immutable nature
of moral distinctions. *. His reply to Burnet's imputation is
sharp with indignation. “A man that insinuates, as he does,
as if I held the distinction of virtue and vice was to be
picked up by our eyes, or ears, or nostrils; shows so much
ignorance or so much malice that he deserves no other
answer but pity.” (Works I. 576.) To the charge of Lowde,
*) Characteristics. Vol. I. 31.6. first letter to a student.
*) Characteristics. Vol. I. 344–347.
*) English Thought in the Eighteenth Century. Vol. II. 83.
Locke replies: “If he had been at pains to reflect on what
I had said, he would have known what I think of the eternal
and unalterable nature of right and wrong, and what I call
virtue and vice, and if he had observed that in the place
he quotes, I only report as matters of fact what others
call virtue and vice, he would not have found it liable to
any great exception.”*) In a letter to Tyrell, Aug. 4. I690,
speaking of this matter, Locke says, that in the passages
in question he is not treating of the grounds of true mo-
rality, but only showing the different ways in which men
regard moral law, and the different standards they take,
without any reference to whether they are true or not.”)
Locke's critics, then, have supposed him to be enunciating
his theory of virtue when he is only describing popular
hases of morals. Now let us put the same question to
Locke which Locke put to the Christian, the Hobbist, and
the Heathen. “Why should a man keep his word or con-
tract.” Locke answers, “Truth, and keeping of faith belong
to men as men, and not as members of Society". (Gov. II. I.4.)
“Truth, whether in, or out, of fashion, is the measure of
knowledge and the business of the understanding; whatever is,
beside that, however authorized by consent or recommended
f by rarity, is nothing but ignorance or something worse . . .
And it is true that it is every man's duty to be just,
whether there is any such thing as a just man in the world
or no.”) | He appeals to the law of nature as that standing
ſand unalterable rule of moral rectitude and pravity, and
vj declares that human laws are only so far right as they are
se founded on the law of nature, by which they are to be
| regulated and interpreted.") Moreover, Locke treats with
sarcasm the very theory attributed to him. “This cuts out
the dresses for the women, and makes the fashions for the
:

*) II. 28; I I. note.
*) Lord King, Life of Locke. Pp. 200. 20.
°) Conduct of the Understanding, $ 24. King, Life of Locke, p. 122.
*) II. 28. 2 note. Gov. II. I2. -
— 58 —
men. This makes men drunkards and sober, thieves and
honest, and robbers themselves true to one another.” He
ridicules those who make custom serve for reason, and com-
plains to Collins that “to be rational is so glorious a thing,
that twolegged creatures generally content themselves with
the title".") According to Locke, moral distinctions rest not
upon the arbitrary will of the Deity; not upon the will of
the Leviathan, not upon human custom and fashion. Moral
distinctions rest in eternal and immutable law; a law which
neither God, nor the state nor public opinion can alter.
On this question Locke stands in line with Culverwel, Cumber-
land, Cudworth and Clarke.
IV. Ayazz/ra/ Zazy. We have seen that Locke places
the conception of God and the nature of virtue in very
close relations. His idea of God is his idea of virtue, and
the nature of the one is the nature of the other. God, from
his nature, can will only that which is best. Thus, when
Locke speaks of the will or commands of God, he has in
view that which is in essence the best, and in its nature
unchangeable. “But”, says Locke, “we may know that
virtue is conformity to the law of God, which is the true
and only measure of virtue", we may know that virtue is
that “which is, in its own nature, right and good”, we may
know that virtue is the best worship of God, and yet be
far from knowing what the true principles of virtue are.
We must “prove a law”, we must show how “God hath
declared His will and law". We must show that there are
certain rules, certain dictates, which it is His will all men
should conform their actions to, and that this will of His
is sufficiently promulgated, and made known to all mankind.
Locke argues that this requirement cannot be met by either
“the Mosaic or Evangelical law of God. For neither of
those, as I take it, was given to mankind; which is a term,
which in my sense, includes all men. It is plain that the
*) King, Life of Locke, p. 109. Education $ 164. Letters to
Collins, Jan. 24 and Feb. 28. I704.
Mosaical law was not given to mankind, for it was “Hear,
O Israel', and I never yet met with any one who said
the laws of Moses were the laws of mankind, and as for
the revealed will of God in the New Testament, which was
a revelation made to the children of men 2000 years after
Moses, and 4000 years after the Creation, how that can be
called a law given to mankind is hard to conceive, unless
that men born before the time of the Gospel were no part
of mankind, or the Gospel was revealed before it was
revealed.”) Locke is far from making Revelation the source
of his moral precepts. This would contradict his concep-
tion of man and the first certainty of the demonstrative
reason, by postulating for man an unsocial, irrational, im-
moral nature, as well as atheism of the reason.*) The 7
faculty which must prove this law is the reason. Instead |
of fixing upon revelation as the source of our knowledge |
of the principles of virtue, he fixes upon natural reason.
“Reason is natural revelation, whereby the eternal Father
{.
f
of light and fountain of all knowledge, communicates to man
that portion of truth which he has laid within the reach of
their natural faculties." (IV. 19. 4.) This expression of the
eternal reason in the nature and through the experiences of .
humanity, reveals moral principles, and makes known aº
• *
$
natural law among men.
The conception of a law of nature, comprehending all
morality, public and private, having God for its author, and
the common or natural reason for its interpreter, appears
with Heraclitus. For him, “the only piece of real wisdom
is to know that principle which by itself will govern every-
thing on every occasion".”) This principle is the universal
and divine reason which is participated in by man, and, in
him, is the criterion of truth. That which appears common
to all, is true and certain. “Understanding is common to
*) King, Life of Locke, p. 178.
*) King, Liſe of Locke, p. 312–3 13. I, 3; I2.
*) Diog. Laert. IX. 2.
— 60 —
all. When we speak with reason, we must hold fast to
that which is common, even as a city holds fast to the law,
yea, and far more strongly; for all human laws are fixed
by one law, that of God, which prevails wherever it will,
and is sufficient for all, and in all prevailing.”*) These ideas,
represented by Heraclitus were taken up by later philo-
sophers, and finally, by the Stoics and Roman lawyers; by
the one, raised into a system of philosophy, by the other,
into a system of law. Thus it is that Stoicism and Roman
law have played a most important part in the history of
moral and political philosophy. It was among the Roman
lawyers that jus naturale and lex naturalis received a full
exposition under the term jus gentium. This term denoted
those principles of justice which were common both to
Rome and her conquered peoples, and which Rome made
use of in administering justice in and among her colonies.
The lawyers entertained the belief that the jus gentium was
the foundation of all positive law; that it was indeed the lost
code of nature, and that in building their laws upon it and
following its outlines, they were restoring a type, from which
law had only departed to deteriorate. As in Greece, so in
Rome, this law was regarded as being so clear and uni-
versal in its principles that it came to be regarded as divine
law.”) This conception of a law eternal and divine, superior
*) Stob. Serm. III. 84. Ueberweg-Heinze. I. 52. Sext. Emp. Adv. M. VII.
I29—133. Similar views were common among Greek philosophers and
poets. “Auf den Willen der Götter wurden bei den Griechen, wie überall
auch die allgemein anerkannten sittlichen Gebote zurückgeführt, und die
Unverletzlichkeit derselben mit dem Glauben an die vergeltende Gerechtig-
keit der Götter begründet.” Zeller: Grundriss, p. 22.
*) Cicero makes the law of nature and the law of nations identical,
“Lege naturae id est gentium.” De Off. I. 23. see Dante; De Monarchia
II. 2. Jeremy Taylor. Duct. Dub. II. I; 1. Cumberland, De Leg. Nat. V. I.
Ahrens, Cours de droit naturel. I. I. says, “The philosophy of law, or
natural law, is the science which discourses of the first principles of right,
conceived by reason, and founded on the nature of man, considered in
itself, and in its relations to the universal order of things.” The Roman
law is elaborated in M. Demangeat's Cours de Droit romain. Aristotle
— 61 —
to all political Societies, and the measure of all true govern-
ment, a law binding upon men as rational beings, finds its
most illustrious exponent in Cicero. “Law”, says Cicero,
“did not begin to be when it was put into writing, but when
it arose, that is to say, at the same moment with the mind
of God!” (De Leg. II. 4.) He defines law as “the highest
reason implanted in nature, which commands those things
which ought to be done, and prohibits the reverse".") When
we remember that the works of Cicero were more prized
and recommended by Locke than those of any other author,
we may suppose that Locke's views on natural law were
in general accord with those of Tully. And this we find
to be the case, although Locke differs with Cicero on many
questions of civil government, and gives to the truth con-
tained in “the law of nature” a more rational statement.
“I would not be misunderstood,” says Locke, “as if,
because I deny an innate law, I thought there were none
but positive laws. 7%ere 2s a great dead of difference
&ezzweeza azz 272/2aſe Zazº, and a Zazo, o/, 72azzare, between
something printed on Our minds in their very original, and
something we, being ignorant of, may attain to the knowl-
edge of, by the use and due application of our natural fac-
ulties. And I think they equally forsake the truth, who,
running into contrary extremes, either affirm an innate law,”
or deny that there is a law knowable by the light of na-
ture, i. e. without the help of positive revelation." (I. 3; I 3. Gov.
II. 6.) “This unchangeable rule of right and wrong, which
God hath established", is fundamental, “there being nothing
that so distinctly secures and advances the general good
of mankind in this world, as obedience to the laws which
he hath set them, and nothing that breeds such mischief
defines natural law as “that which has every where the same force”. Nic.
Eth. V. Io. Grotius, De Jure Belli et Pacis, I. I. Io. An excellent historical
and critical exposition of the principles which lie at the foundation of the
doctrine of the Law of Nature, is given by Dr. Max Heinze, “Die Lehre
vom Logos in der Griechischen Philosophie”.
*) De Leg. I. 6, comp. Rep., Bk. III.
— 62 —
and confusion as the neglect of them.” (II. 28. 2.) Natural
law, according to Locke, is the expression of the eternal
reason and goodwill, in the life and experiences of humanity.
It is evident that Locke is here proceeding upon principles
which have commonly been regarded as most foreign to
his system. The natural and rational conception of right
and wrong, of merit and demerit, and of duty, are announc-
ed with as much composure as by the most radical 4-
tuitionalist Locke continues, “There is no nation of men
who do not acknowledge right and wrong in men's actions,
as well as truth and falsehood in their sayings, no people
who do not distinguish between virtue and vice; some kind
of morality is to be found everywhere received. Even when
politics, Societies, and magistrates are silent, men yet are
under some laws to which they owe obedience. Were there
no human law, nor punishment, nor obligation of civil and
divine Sanctions, there would be distinct notions of virtues
and vices.”*) Locke finds, “even in the corruption of manners,
the true boundary of the law of nature, which ought to be
the rule of virtue and vice, pretty well preserved. So
that even the exhortations of inspired teachers have not
feared to appeal to common repute. Whatever is lovely,
whatever is of good report, if there be any virtue and if
there be any praise, think on these things.” (Phil. 4. 8. II.
28; I I.) There is, in Locke's view, a secret apprehension
among men of another rule of action than that given by
priests and lawyers, and he regards “the great failure of
both priests and lawyers to be that they failed to grasp
these common notions and derive them from God, and argue
them as the commands of the great God of heaven and
earth.” | Thus, with Locke, the laws of nature are the laws
of God as apprehended by the natural faculties, or, more
logically expressed, they are laws discovered by the human
reason and atributed to God as their necessary author and
*) King, Life of Locke, p. 3O8–9.
#

— 63 —
support. They do not place man under necessity as do
physical laws but under moral obligation.) . .
V. Pºzzucºſes of Mazura/ Mora/#y. What are these
laws of nature, these principles of morality, that are eternal
and unchangeable rules of conduct, and are grasped by right
reason? In answering this question, we must distinguish be-
tween Locke's doctrine of duties and his doctrine of rights.
According to him, duties are the foundation of rights. The
latter will be noticed in the chapter on Institutional Ethics.
Here we have to do only with the principles of duty, the
laws binding upon right reason in the various human re-
lations.-- -
(Piety towards God is one of the most natural and
fundamental elements in morality. As atheism is a violation
of the rational nature of man, so the belief in God, love
and reverence to God, are not only rules of right reason,
but, as principles, sufficient to preserve in man a true sense
of religion and morality. Not to love and reverence the
“Author and Maker of all things, from whom we receive all
our good, who loves us and gives us all things", appears to
Locke unnatural- - -
7%e 77//e of Prº is a natural suggestion of the
reason. That all the powers or faculties with which the in-
dividual is endowed, should be regarded as trusts to be
preserved and enlarged, is a principle of common sense.
He who acts contrary to this rule, not only acts against
right reason, but “will never be happy in himself, nor useful
to others". Locke holds that rational creatures are under
obligations to develop the physical, mental and Social powers.
No man has a right to destroy his own life or liberty. The
capital phrase of his “Thoughts concerning Education,” is,
“Mens sana in corpore sano." “Our main care,” he says,
“should be about the inside, yet the clay cottage is not to
be neglected.” Prudence also turns attention to reputation.
No man, wisely, may be unmindful of what others think of
him. Locke bases this upon practical and moral grounds.
“Esteem and reputation are a sort of moral strength, whereby

— 64 —
a man is able to do, as it were, by an augmented force,
that which others, of equal natural parts and natural power,
cannot do without it." Locke complains that writers on
prudence too often over emphasize convenience, thus, losing
sight of virtue, fail to keep clear from the borders of dis-
honesty.") -
The rule of Benevolence is, with Locke, a law of nature.
It is suggested in the conditions under which Locke has
represented prudence. “The fundamental law of nature being
the preservation of mankind, every one is commissioned by
the law of nature to do good.” Locke places the greatest
emphasis upon this law of benevolence. “Truly, if the pre-
servation of all mankind, as much as in him lies, were every
one's persuasion, as it is every one's duty, and the true
principle to regulate our religion, politics, and morality by,
the world would be much quieter and better natured than
it is.” This doctrine is fundamental to his entire system, and
we find it expressed in every form, from self-regard through
the most refined sentiment to the baldest form of obligation.
Locke's benevolence has an egoistic tinge which arises, from
his conception of the union of Virtue and Happiness. With
Locke, morality is something to be practised by the men
of this world, and he failed to rise to the refinement of
eliminating the personal element. He thus presents the
matter in his Thoughts concerning Education. ,Covetousness,
and the desire of having in our possession, and under our
dominion, more than we have need of, being the root of
all evil, should be early and carefully weeded out, and the
contrary quality of a readiness to impart to others, implanted.
Let the child sensibly perceive that the kindness he shows
to others is no ill husbandry for himself, but that it brings
a return of kindness, both from those that receive it, and
those who look on. Thus may be settled the habit of being
kind, liberal, and civil to others.” Locke palliates this
-------
*) King, Life of Locke. 97. 293. Gov. II. 6. Education §§ I. 61.
Letter to Richard King. August 25. I 703. Works IV. 639. -
— 65 —
presentation by saying that the first actions of children are
guided more by self-love than by reason and reflection.
His presentation is more agreeable in the following passage.
“The perfumes I smelt yesterday now no more affect me
with pleasure, but the good turn I did yesterday, a year,
seven years since, continues still to please and delight me
as often as I reflect on it,” and again, “every one, according
to what way Providence has placed him, is bound to labor
for the public good, as far as he is able, or else he has no
right to eat.".") -
7%e ſaw of Egzzzły is founded on the natural equality
of men. “Reason teaches all mankind who will but consult
it, that being all equal and independent, being furnished
with like faculties, sharing all in one community of nature,
the workmanship and property of one omnipotent and in-
finitely wise Maker, no one ought to harm another in his
life, liberty, and possessions.”*) Locke agrees with the
“judicious Hooker” that this equality of man by nature is
a foundation of mutual love and obligation among men,
and a source from whence may be derived the great maxims
*) Third letter on Tol. ch. II. Gov. II.4.5. I82. 183. Education, I Io. 116.
King. Life of Locke. 307. Locke to Molyneux. Jan 19. 1694.
*) Throughout his work Locke attaches great importence to the ‘Unity
of the Human Race'. His theory is substantiated by the most learned
Anthropologists. Dr. Theo. Waitz: Anthropologie der Naturvâlker, says,
“we are irresistibly led to the conclusion that there are no specific differences
among mankind with regard to their psychical life”. Eng. Tr. p. 327.
J. C. Pritchard: Natural History of Man. Vol. II. 714. says, “we are enabled
to draw confidently the conclusion that all human races are of one species
and of one family”. M. de Qatrefages; “The Human Species” p. 88.
testifies to the same conclusion, “These human groups, however different
they may be, or appear to be, are races of one and the same species, and
not distinct species.” The doctrine of natural freedom and equality was
made the foundation of the American Declaration of Independence. “There
cannot be any question”, says Maine, “that to the assumption of a Law
Natural we owe the doctrine af the fundamental equality of human beings.
... The Roman juris consults of the Antonine era lay down that omnes
homines natura aequales sunt” Ancient Law. p. 92.
º
Curtis, Locke’s Ethical Philosophy. {)
— 66 —
of justice and charity. Truth, keeping of contracts, love,
sympathy, equity, belong to men as men. The violation of
this principle of equity, is iniquity. “It is always a sin in
any man of estate to let his brother perish for want of
affording him relief out of his plenty. As justice gives every
man a title to the product of his honest industry, and the fair
acquisitions of his ancestors descended to him, so charity
gives every man a title to so much of another's plenty as
will keep him from extreme want, when he has no means
to subsist otherwise; and a man can no more justly make
use of another's necessity to force him to become his vassal,
by withholding that relief God requires him to afford to the
wants of his brother, than he that has more strength can
seize upon a weaker, master him to his obedience and with
a dagger at his throat offer him death or slavery.” Equity
is a Sacred principle with Locke in his Thoughts concerning
Education. “The least slip in this great social virtue is to
be taken notice of, and, if there be an occasion of it,
severely rebuked.” Every effort is to be brought to the
support of equity, as injustice is in danger of ending in
“downright hardened dishonesty”.") - -
Zaw of Zoze. If we look for a comprehensive, regu-\
lative principle of human conduct, Locke refers us to “that
most unshaken rule of morality, and foundation of all social
virtue . . . that one should do as he would be done unto".
This rule, though not innate, is, with Locke, an imperative
of right reason. Thus, “a part of the eternal and immutable
law, is, that a man should forgive, not only his children,
but his enemies, upon their repentance, asking pardon and
amendment.” (Works III. 83.) In speaking of “fundamental
virtues”, Locke declares; “Our Saviour's great rule, that we
should love our neighbour as ourselves, is such a fundamental
truth for the regulating of human society, that I think by that
alone, one might without difficulty determine all the cases
and doubts in social morality." In his fragment, “Of Ethics
*) Gov. II. 5. 6. I. 42. Education $$ 1 Io. I 3 I. I 32.
— 67 —
in General", Locke holds that the law, Thou shalt love
thy neighbour as thyself, is a comprehensive principle, and
that “the relations of our actions to it, i. e. the agree-
ment or disagreement of any thing we do, with that rule,
is as easy and clearly known as any other relation”. This
Law of Love is a law of right reason, a law of God, and
thus as moral imperative; and actions, “as they agree or
disagree with this law, so are they good or bad, virtues or
vices”. This rule, is regarded strictly as a law of nature,
of God, of right reason, and as obligatory at all times and
every where. “Love to God, and charity to ourselves and
neighbours are, at all times, indispensably necessary.” This
fundamental rule is to regulate not only our affections and
conduct, but also our language. “Do not hear yourself say
to another what you would not have another hear from
him.”*) It is in this sense that Locke's definition of virtue
is to be understood. “Virtue, as in its obligation it is the
will of God, discerned by natural reason, and thus has the
force of a law, so, in the matter of it, it is nothing else
but doing of good, either to one's-self or others, and the
contrary there unto, vice, is nothing else but doing of
harm.”*)
It is evident that the above principles are not bare
suppositions of what ought to be, nor cold declarations of
what is, in human Society. (T hey are, to Locke, laws that
are grasped by the rational nature of man, and objectified
by right reason as principles of conduct.) They rest funda-
mentally upon his conception of man as a sociable and
rational being, and his conception of God as infinite Wis-
*) H. U. I. 3; 4. C. U. Sec. 43. King. Life of Locke. 312. 313. 9o:
III. 286. Had Locke carried out his project of a system of ethics on
mathematical principles, he would probably have derived his table of vir-
tues from some form of the Golden Rule as a common principle. He
makes no further attempt than is here indicated, but, as we have seen;
takes up his principles of virtue out of common sense or the law of
Inature.
*) Extract from Common place book. I661. King, Life of Locke. p. 292.
5*

— 68 —
dom, Power, and Goodness.") Locke believes that natural
reason discovers a moral code apart from the assistance
of revelation, and he goes beyond Cicero and Grotius by
supposing that this code may be made out with mathe-
matical certainty; that a science of ethics is possible.”)
( VI. 7,Že posszózžy of a science of eZhzcs. Locke illustrates
his supposition by two striking examples. “It has been gen-
erally taken for granted", he says, “that mathematics alone
are capable of demonstrative certainty, but to have such
an agreement or disagreement as may intuitively be per-
ceived, being, as I imagine, not the privilege of the ideas
of number, extension, and figure alone, it may possibly be
the want of due method and application in us, and not of
sufficient evidence in things, that demonstration has been
thought to have so little to do in other parts of knowledge."
(IV. 2; 9). Locke would apply his method of certainty,
which he also regards as the mathematical method, to the
questions of morals. The illustration which is adduced, in-
volves the fundamental certainties of his intuitive and demon-
strative reason, enlarged into concepts, and made the prem-
ises of synthetic judgments.
“The idea of a Supreme Being, infinite in power, good-
ness, and wisdom, whose workmanship we are, and on
*) We are renimded here of Locke's examination of Lord Herberts
innate principles. I. 3. I5. These principles are, (I) Esse aliquod Supremum
numen. (2) Numen illud coli debere. (3.) Virtutem cum pietate conjunctam
optimam esse rationem cultus divini. (4.) Resipiscendum esse a peccatis.
(5.) Dari praemium vel poenam post hanc vitam transactam. Locke re-
marks: “I allow these to be clear truths, and such as, if rightly explained,
a rational creature can hardly avoid giving his consent to : yet I think he
is far from proving them innate impressions ‘in foro interiori descriptae.”
The difference between Herbert and Locke is this: Herbert held these
principles as innate, “in foro interiori descriptae” whilst Locke held that
although the power of the mind which grasps these principles is innate,
the principles themselves are not in the mind antecedent to experience and
the activity of the intellectual powers.
*) I. 3; I. III. 2; 16. IV. 3; 18. IV. 4; 6–9. IV. 12; 8. III. II.
17. IV. 2. 9. III. 5. I2. Works I, 576. These are the chief references
to his supposition of a mathematical morality.
— 69 —
whom we depend, and the idea of ourselves, as under-
standing rational beings, being such as are clear in us, would,
I suppose, if duly considered and pursued, afford such foun-
dations of our duty; and rules of action, as might place
morality among the sciences capable of demonstration.”
(IV. 3; 18.) Here are two ideas that are “clear in us": the
idea of God as infinite in power, goodness, and wisdom, and
the idea of man as an understanding, rational being, the
creation and property of God. From these two ideas one
“will certainly know that man is to honour, fear, and obey
God as that the sun shines when he sees it. For he that
hath but the ideas of two such beings in his mind, and will
but move his thoughts that way, and consider them, he
will as certainly find that the inferior, finite, and dependent
is under obligation to obey the supreme and infinite, as he
is certain to find that three, four, and seven, are less than
fifteen.” (IV. I 3; 3.) In this way Locke deduces the pro-
position; It is the duty of every rational creature to obey
God. Such a proposition is as evident as any proposition
in mathematics. This is moral knowledge in that an authority
is indicated, and if we accept Locke's code of natural law
as argued up to God, as its author, then we not only have
whom to obey, but what to do. As a matter of fact, the
whole of Locke's natural code falls under the ideas con-
tained in the above two premises. And admitting these
premises to be incontestably true, or hypothetically assum-
able, we cannot deny that morality is a science of mathe-
matical certainty, take what view of mathematics we may.")
Although Locke holds that he has proved the truth of these
two premises, he does not liken them to mathematical axioms.
What he holds, is, that the principles derived from these
two premises are mathematically derived, and, as derived,
are certain as any mathematical demonstration.
*) J. Stuart Mill: System of Logic. Book II. ch. 5. maintains
the hypothetical character of mathematical axioms. But Locke regards
mathematics as a pure product of the Intellect as is evident from TV.
4; 6–7.
— 70 —
Locke presents the supposition in another form. “All
our complex ideas, except those of substances, bring arche-
types of the mind's own making, not intended to be the
copies of any thing, but themselves are considered as the
archetypes, and things no otherwise regarded but as they
are conformable to them; so that we cannot but be in-
fallibly certain that all the knowledge we attain concerning
these ideas is real, and reaches things themselves, it follows
that moral knowledge is as capable of real certainty as
mathematics. For certainty being but the perception of the
agreement or disagreement of our ideas; and demonstration
nothing but the perception of such agreement, by the in-
tervention of other ideas or mediums, our moral ideas, as
well as mathematical, being archetypes themselves, and so
adequate and complete ideas; all the agreement or disagree-
ment which we shall find in them, will produce real know-
ledge, as well as the mathematical figures.” Locke gives
two illustrations of this procedure. “Where there is no
property, there is no injustice", is a proposition as certain
as any demonstration in Euclid. The consideration of the
two complex ideas contained in the words property and
injustice, establish the truth of the proposition. For the
idea of property being the right to anything; and the idea
to which the name injustice is given, being the invasion or
violation of that right; it is evident that these ideas being
thus established, and these names annexed to them, I can
as certainly know this proposition to be true as that a
triangle is equal to two right ones. Again, “no govern-
ment allows absolute liberty": the idea of government being
the establishment of society upon certain rules or laws,
which require conformity to them; and the idea of absolute
liberty being for any one to do whatever he pleases, I am
as capable of being certain of the truth of this proposition, as
of any in the mathematics.")
*) IV. 4; 5–7. IV. 3; 18. IV. I2; 6–8. IV. 17; 4. Works I. 495.
— 71 —
The second form given above cannot be identified with
the first. The two forms represent two different applications
of Locke's method, the first furnishing synthetical, or new
knowledge, the second analytical, or ' tests of the validity
of propositions.") The difference between the two aspects
of the same subject, is this; whereas the first gives the
data from which moral truths or rules of action may be
deduced, the second furnishes a test of moral truths or rules
of action already at hand. They both agree in the method
of aiming at certainty or true knowledge, viz, by percep-
tion of agreement or disagreement of ideas; but the one
is deduction, the other, induction. The one starts with two
ideas, and makes the synthetical judgment; we ought to
obey God; the other starts with the proposition, where
there is no property there is no injustice, and by analysis
establishes the truth of the proposition. These two illus.
trations suggest to us all that Locke has to offer for a
constructive science of ethics.
Locke is by no means blind to the difficulties in the way
of an exact science of ethics. In stating these hindrances he
seems to remove the foundations of his supposition. (III. 2; I 5.)
Aºsſ, while mathematics has a universal sign language in its
figures and diagrams; moral philosophy is obliged to use words
which are neither precise nor invariable in their significations.
Diagrams drawn on paper are copies of ideas in the mind,
and are not liable to the uncertainty that words carry in
their significations. Thus, when ideas are the same in two
men, the words which represent these ideas may vary, so
that disputations come to be more in words than in ideas.
The rule of propriety is utterly incapable of establishing
*) “We can know the truth of two sorts of propositions with perfect
certainty; the one is, of those trifling propositions which have a certainty
in them, but it is only a verbal certainty, but not instructive; and secondly,
we can know the truth and so may be certain, in propositions which affirm
something of another which is a necessary consequence of its precise
complex idea, but not contained in it: . . . this is a real truth, and conveys
with it instructive, real knowledge.” IV. 8, 8.
— 72 —
the use and signification of language for any other purpose
than conversation. It cannot adjust and establish them for
philosophical discourse.") Second/y, moral ideas are more
complex than those of the figures ordinarily used in mathe-
matics. This complexity not only makes the language more
uncertain, but the mind cannot easily retain those precise
combinations, through long deductions, which involve the
intervention of several other complex ideas, to show the
agreement or disagreement of the remote ones. Moreover,
the names of mixed modes are of such uncertainty in their
signification that they not only often excite in the mind of
the hearer a different idea from that in the mind of the
speaker, but may be, in the speaker, different to day from
what they will be to-morrow. (IV. 3; 19. III. 9; 6.) 7%zzd/y,
Locke notices a more practical difficulty in the way of a
science of ethics, arising from the self-interests and prej-
udices of men. While mathematics has to do with quan-
tities, ethics has to do with conduct in all the relations of
life. Locke holds that a science of ethics “is not to be
expected while the desire of esteem, riches, or power, makes
men espouse the well endowed opinions of fashion, and then
seeks arguments either to make good their beauty, or to
cover their deformity. Whilst the parties of men cram
their tenets down all men's throats whom they can get into
their power, without permitting them to examine their truth
or falsehood, and will not let truth have fair play in the
world, nor men the liberty to search after it, what improve-
ment can be expected of this kind". (IV. 3; 20.) These
three difficulties, of language, of the nature of moral ideas,
and of the stress of policy and prejudice in human relations,
constitute the main obstacles to a Science of ethics which
is to resemble that of mathematics. Yet Locke holds to
his original supposition. “Confident I am, that if men would,
in the same method, and with the same indifferency, Search
after moral, as they do after mathematical truths, they
1) III. 9; 6; 8. IV. 3; 19.
— 73 —
would find them to have a stronger connection one with
another, and a more necessary consequence from Our clear
and distinct ideas, and to come nearer perfect demonstra-
tion than is commonly imagined.”
The last analysis of Locke's position on this mooted
question may be indicated in two points; Fºzsä, the de-
monstrability of ethics is a possibility, not of the present,
but of the future. That it remained, at the last, only as a
supposition with Locke is evident, not only from the Essay,
but from his correspondence. Molyneux begged him to
carry out his suggestion, and Locke replied that he was
doubtful as to his ability, but would, at his “first leisure,
employ some thoughts that way". Later, he writes, “I every
now and then lay aside some materials for it, as they oc-
casionally occur in the rovings of my mind". But Locke
finally dismisses the subject by saying that he must employ
the little time and strength he has in other researches,
wherein he finds himself more in the dark. So far as we
can discover, Locke held that the only hope of a scientific
morality is in making words as definite and universal in their
signification as are mathematical diagrams and figures. Rigid
definition, and a universal philosophic language would do
much towards a scientific treatment of ethics. He turns
towards Algebra with some expectation of assistance. “What
methods Algebra, or something of that kind, may hereafter
suggest, to remove other difficulties, it is not easy to foretell."
Here his position seems to be much the same as that of
Leibniz and Kant.*) Second/y, Locke maintained that prac-
*) See letters from Molyneux to Locke. Aug. 27, 1692. Dec. 22.
I692. Mar. 2. I693. Sept. I6. I693. Letters from Locke to Molyneux.
Sept. 20. I692. Jan 19. I694. March 30. I696. H. U. IV. 3; IQ–2O.
III. 9; 6. 8. Cumberland “De Legibus Naturae” etc. ch. I. §§ 7–8.
II. 3. holds that the verities of morality may be known as certainly as
those of mathematics, and, IV. 4, according to the method of Algebra.
Leibniz, in his “Noveaux Essais”, says to Locke, “Je crois que vous avez
raison, Monsieur, et je suis disposé depuis longtemps a me mettre endevoir
d’accomplir vos predictions.” Erdmann's Ed. p. 382. 2. Kant saw a
– 74 –
tical morality would not be much served even if its prin-
ciples were made out with mathematical certainty. Thus,
he writes to Molyneux, “Did the world want a rule, I confess
there could be no work so necessary, nor so commendable”.
(Mar. 30. I696.) Locke maintains that if the principles of
morality were made out by mathematical demonstration,
the vast majority of men would not be able to understand
the demonstration and its force any more than they are
able to understand and appreciate the Prºzcºza of Newton.
f He even maintains that men are better acquainted with
| moral truth through reason, common sense, and revelation,
Sthan they are with mathematics. Not only so, but “the
greatest part of mankind want leisure or capacity for de-
monstration; nor can carry a train of proofs, which in that
way they must always depend upon for conviction, and
cannot be required to consent to, till they see the demon-
stration. . . . . You may as soon hope to have all the day-
laborers and tradesmen, the spinsters and dairymaids, per-
fect mathematicians, as to have them perfect in ethics in
this way." (Works III. 91.) Locke nowhere intimates that
demonstrative ethics would be of any practical value and,
handing the problem on to the future, falls back upon the
morality of right reason, “the candle of the Lord set up by
Himself in men's minds, which it is impossible for the breath
or power of man wholly to extinguish". (IV. 3; 20.)
VII. 7%e Sazzczzozes of Moza/#y. We have seen that
the moral lawgiver is God, and that His law is like unto
Himself; eternal and immutable wisdom, power, and good-
ness. We have also seen how the reason of man grasps
this law of human conduct in the form of a law of nature,
and how Locke made the attempt to bring the whole of
prospect of applying mathematics to metaphysics, when analysis has helped
us to clear and definite conceptions. Works, Ed., Rosenkranz. I. 97. The
need of some assistance in philosophy from the mathematical method
is expressed in Fischer's “Grundriss des Systems der Phil, als Bestim-
mungslehre”. -

– 75 –
morality within the sphere of science, apart from the assistance
of revelation. While Locke by no means surrenders his
supposition that morality may be established as a science,
he does not find in human life, with its disturbing factors,
a sufficient basis for the enforcement of morality. Yet Locke
moves steadily upon the assumption that the main principles
of morality are evident to right reason, or easily discernible
by common sense. Here he differs from the Socratic view
that “knowledge is virtue", holding with Aristotle that virtue
is not, in its essence, knowing but doing. He differs radi-
cally from the Utilitarianism of Bentham and Mill, which
proceeds upon the assumption that men would practise the
precepts of morality if they were only acquainted with them;
that doing would follow knowing in logical sequence. None
of the Roman Emperors was more illiterate than Trajan, none
more learned than Nero. Locke does not disparage knowl-
edge; “I think learning a great help to well disposed minds;
but yet it must be confessed also, that in others not so
disposed, it helps them only to be more foolish or worse
men.” (Ed. S. I.47.) To bare knowledge, in itself, Locke does
not attach the slightest ethical importance. Knowledge is
neither wisdom nor virtue. “I imagine you would think him
a very foolish fellow that should not value a virtuous or
wise man infinitely before a great scholar.”*) Without
encroaching upon the function of knowledge in ethics, or
overlooking the confusion in the doctrines of moralists, Locke
holds that men are much clearer about the principles of
ethics than about the force of their sanctions or imperatives.
Thus we have in Locke's work a more satisfactory and ex-
plicit treatment of the sanctions of morality than in any f
modern English moralist. While he recognised that natural |
law, grasped by the reason, contains in itself a sufficientſ
sanction for men of right reason, he was not content with
a moral system made only for those who did not need it,
but had in view all mankind, and recognised only that code
*) Ning, Life of Locke, p. 90.
— 76 —
that had a sanction and a practical force for all classes and
conditions of men. WThe end and use of morality being to
direct our lives, and by showing us what actions are good,
and what bad, prepare us to do the one and avoid the
other; those that pretend to teach morals mistake their
business, and become only language masters when they do
not do this: when they teach us to talk and dispute and
call actions by the names they prescribe, when they do not
show the inferments that may draw us to virtue, and deter us
from vice.") Reason, according to Locke, finds the Law-
giver, and grasps, by the light of nature, the cardinal, prin-
ciples of morality. Reason argues these principles up to
God, and makes them, like Him, eternal and immutable.
But what does reason say of the “inferments that draw to
virtue, and deter from vice", what content does it give to
such terms as duty, right, and obligation? Immortality, re-
wards, and punishments are suggested to the reason by our
constitutions and by analogies. But natural reason does not
lay an obligation upon itself of sufficient weight to insure
what Ought to be done against the encroachments of what
we would like to do. Men applaud the “Golden Rule", and
freely accord it the validity of a mathematical axiom without
any corresponding conviction that its violation will be attended
with punishment. Such considerations led Locke to show
that the Cºrzsázazz A'eze/azzone supports rational and real
sanctions of morality.
“Revelation", says Locke, “is natural reason, enlarged
by a new set of discoveries communicated by God im-
mediately, which reason vouches the truth of, by the testi-
mony and proofs it gives, that they come from God.”)
Speaking of Locke and Wolff, Pfleiderer says, “Locke also
considers a supernatural revelation to be possible, and to
have actually taken place in Christianity, but he insits as
strongly as Wolff does, and even more logically, that this
*) King's Life of Locke. 310.
*) IV. 19.; 4. I4. IV. 17; 23. IV. 18; 5.
— 77 —
revelation must not in anyway contradict the natural reve-
lation given us by God in our reason." ") Locke maintains
that we have such a revelation in Christianity, and puts the
question, “What advantage have we by Jesus Christ?" He
enumerates this advantage in five points, which at once
embody the substance of his religious views, and suggest
the bearing of Christianity upon ethics. *) Fºsſ, although
the knowledge of God was always in the world, the world
made little use of its reason. Reason “speaking ever SO
clearly to the wise and virtuous, had never authority enough
to prevail on the multitude.” But Christ made known the
one invisible and true God with such evidence and energy,
that Polytheism and idolatry were obliged to give way to
Monotheism. “We see, that since our Saviour's time, the
belieſ of one God has prevailed and spread itself over the
face of the earth.” Second/y, “A clear knowledge of their
duty was wanting to mankind.” Here Locke becomes elo-
quent in his descriptions of moral philosophy and its in-
fluence in the world before Christ. The body of “the law
of nature" is not entire; the moral rules of the philosophers
are not complete; priests taught ritualism instead of virtue;
there was no comprehensive moral system. “But such a
body of ethics, proved to be the law of nature, and teaching
all the duties of life; I think nobody will say the world had
before our Saviour's time." Locke argues here that “there
is a law of nature”, that this law depends upon “principles
of reason, self evident in themselves, and the clear and
evident deductions from the same; and that Christ was the
first to give us this code all entire as a law; no more, no
less, than, what was contained in, and had the obligation of
that law”. This perfect code, says Locke was given by
revelation, but it is conformable to reason, Reason and
revelation are one; “the reason 2's natural revelation, . . . .
revelation 2's natural reason enlarged". (IV. I9; 4) Locke
*) The Philos. of Religion. Vol. I. p. 114.
*) The Reasonableness of Christianity. Works III. 84–89.
— 78 —
repudiates the theory of his countrymen Occam, Scotus
and Bacon, that reason and revelation are two #7///s, though
antagonistic, and maintains that truth is one in essence, and
indivisible.") 7%ird/y, the outward forms of worshipping the
Deity wanted a reformation. Ritualism was thought the
principal part, if not the whole of religion. Our Saviour
supplanted “the numerous huddle of pompous fantastical,
cumbersome ceremonies with a plain spiritual and suitable
worship. . . . Praises and prayers humbly offered up to the
Deity, was the worship he now demanded, and in these,
every one was to look after his own heart, and to know
that it was that alone that God had regard to, and accepted.”
Locke's individualism and inner laws of reason appear in
religion, as in government. Zºozzzz//y, “Another great ad-
vantage received by our Saviour, is, the great encourage-
ment he brought to a pious and virtuous life.” Men spend
much time in praising virtue, but very little time in practising
her principles. Before our Saviour's time the doctrine of a
future state though it was not wholly hid, yet it was not
clearly known to the world; the rewards were doubtful and
at a distance, the evidence and security were imperfect.
But Christ brought life and immortality to light, He opened
the future to the eyes of men, “He threw into the scale of
virtue an exceeding and immortal weight of glory", He
showed that virtue and true happiness were really one, and
that in faithfully following what right reason approves and
praises, lies the only course of rational conduct. Here is
something “solid and powerful to move men. . . . Upon this
foundation, and this only, morality stands firm. ... This makes
it more than a name, a substantial good, worth all our aims
and endeavors.” Locke held that immortality, a truth of
*) The position of Reid is the same as that of Locke. “Corruptions
in religion and in morals had spread so wide among mankind and were
so confirmed by custom, as to require a light from Heaven to correct them.
Revelation was not intended to supersede, but to aid the use of our natural
faculties.” Works III. 38o.
— 79 —
nature half hidden to man through his corruption, is a
positive demand of morality. “When the belief of another
life leaves a man, virtue seldom stays with him. . . . For if
there be no prospect beyond the grave, the inference is
certainly right, ‘Let us eat and drink, for to-morow we die'.
The rewards and punishments of another life, which the
Almighty has established with enforcements of his law, are
of weight enough to determine their choice against whatever
pleasure or pain this life can show, when the eternal state
is considered but in its bare possibility, of which nobody
can make any doubt.”*) Fºſh/y, “to these I must add one
advantage more by Jesus Christ, and that is, the promise
of assistance. If we do what we can, He will give us His
Spirit to help us to do what and how we should."
In view of the above, and what has already been no-
ticed in II. 4., the place of revelation in the ethical system
of Locke is not difficult to determine. The revelation in
Jesus Christ deepens, strengthens, and vivifies in all men
those eternal principles of right and wrong which the natural
reason is able to grasp, but not fully to appropriate. This
revelation, in Locke's view, is a bringing into full light and
recognition that which already was, but which had been
partially lost through “the corruption of manners". Christ
was the only true moral philosopher. He alone is the true
teacher who brings the whole law into the light, who inter-
prets the whole law, in language and in life, who connects
all its parts, and impresses the whole upon the conscious-
ness of man. If we ask whether God gives the whole code
of conduct through the “light of nature” or through reve-
lation, Locke answers, through both. In speaking of moral
law, he says, “I mean that law which God hath set to the
actions of men, whether promulgated to them by the light
of reason, or by the voice of revelation.” (II. 28; 8.) The
law thus promulgated is one and the same law. If we ask,
') King, Life of Locke. p. 160. H. U, II, 21; 25, 21; ſo.
— 80 —
\3.f$
\
which is º holds uniformly to the light of nature,
as mankind were in existence before Moses and the New
Testament, and before anything was revealed to them.
Revelation is not the law of nature, but a second revelation
of the law of nature, a promulgation of “morality which is
the proper concern and business of all mankind".
The moral law is rational, and is executed through
rewards and punishments. As rational, it appeals to the
wise man, and men of right reason follow it simply because
it is in harmony with their higher nature, and carries with
it the imperative of truth, as well as true happiness. He
will agree with Locke, that it is “every man's duty to be
just, whether there be any such thing as a just man in the
world or no".") Both he and Locke would agree with
Aristippos, that “the manner of the life of the wise would
experience no change, though all existing laws were abro-
gated". Locke by no means excludes disinterested conduct
from his moral scheme. He makes it the objective point
of all morality. The truly rational man will always conform
his conduct to moral rules without regard to rewards and
punishments. On the other hand, rewards and punishments
do not infringe upon rational morality, as it cannot be con-
ceived that it is irrational to punish immoral acts, or that
the end of morality is theory of morality and not moral
conduct. No philosopher of his century expressed more
confidence in human nature than Locke; none advocated
with more earnestness than he, a high place for individual
honor in all the concerns of practical life. (Ed. §§ 54. 56.)
But he was too close an observer of men not to be con-
vinced that morality, to have any practical effect upon the
rank and file of life, must have a more practical sanction
than that of merely being rational. Thus he remarks,
“Reason, speaking, ever so clearly to the wise and virtuous,
had never authority enought to prevail on the multitude
*) King, Life of Locke. p. 122.
— 81 —
(Works III. 85.), and again, “fear of punishment often does
what virtue should do”. (Fox Bourne, II. 322.) That which
has moral authority over the multitudes is the doctrine
of immortality with future rewards and punishments. This
we may know by revelation, and it is not contradictory
to reason. Locke's general position here is not different
from that of Aristotle (Nic. Eth. X. 8.) where he argues that
practise, not speculation, is the end of ethical enquiry, and
that while reason is sufficient for the virtuous, penalties must
be relied upon for influencing the great majority of men.
But Locke holds that by a right conduct of the understand-
ing, by a correct system of education, the number of those
who order their lives by the principles of virtue, irrespective
of rewards and punishments, may be mightily increased.
Chapter IV.
The Ethical Life.
I. Aſap/272ess and v2z/zle. Locke has treated extensively
of the ethical end, its possibility for man, and the method
of its attainment. “Nature, I confess, has put into man a
desire of happiness, and an aversion to misery; these indeed
are innate practical principles, which, as practical principles
ought, do continue constantly to operate, and influence all
our actions without ceasing; these may be observed in all
persons and in all ages, steady and universal; but these are
inclinations of the appetite to good, not impressions of truth
on the understanding. I deny not that there are natural
tendencies imprinted on the minds of men, and that from
the very first instances of sense and perception there are
some things that are grateful and others unwelcome to
them: some things that they incline to and others that
they fly, but this makes nothing for innate character on
the mind, which are to be the principles of knowledge,
Curtis, Locke’s Ethical Philosophy. . 6
— 82 —
regulating our practise.” ‘) It is evident from this statement
that pleasure and pain, though regarded as innate practical
principles, are excluded, in Locke's view, from “the principles
of knowledge, regulating our practise"; they are only “in-
clinations of the appetite". They are the common proper.
ties of all sensitive beings. Thus, pleasure and pain, in Locke's
scheme, are indescribable and indefinable, known only by
experience, and are relegated to the department of simple
ideas.”) But ‘pleasure and pain' give Locke an opportunity
of discussing the question of happiness inductively, begin-
ning with the most common and universal phenomena of
all sensible bodies. All life struggles towards happiness
men and brutes alike seek to avoid pain and win pleasure.
“Things are good, or evil, only in reference to pleasure or
pain. That we call good which is apt to cause or increase
pleasure, or diminish pain in us; or else to procure or
preserve us the possession of any other good, or absence
of any evil. And, on the contrary, we name that evil, which
is apt to produce or increase any pain, or diminish any
pleasure in us, or else to procure us any evil, or deprive us
of any good." The passions are simple modes of pleasure
and pain resulting from varions considerations of good and
evil. Locke allows no division of mental and bodily pleasure
and pain, but speaks of them together as being derived
solely from sensation and reflection. (H. U. II. 20.) All this,
as we have remarked, is common to the whole animal
kingdom, and is, mainly, foreign to Locke's ethical specu-
lation. Reason is the great differential between man and
the animal kingdom, and that power alone, which is con-
cerned with moral relations, and determines wherein true
happiness consists. Here Locke takes the position which
Plato announced in his Laws, viz., “Pleasure and Pain are
two fountains set flowing by nature, and according to the
degree of prudence and moderation with which men draw
*) I. 3; 3. It is seen in such passages as this how Locke guards
himself continually against any overture to the defenders if innate ideas.
*) II. 20; I. III. 4. 5. 7. II.
from them, men are happy or otherwise". The only idea
which reason takes up out of the sphere of pleasure and
pain, is the idea of Happiness, and it remains for the reason
to make the idea moral.
Concerning the value of happiness as an end there can
be no question. “The highest perfection of intellectual na-
ture lies in a careful and constant pursuit of true and solid.
happiness . . . But", says Locke, “if we aim directly at hap-
piness, we shall miss it . . . . I must have a care I mistake
not, for if I prefer a short pleasure to a lasting one, it is plain
I cross my own happiness". Both 'Scripture' and reason
condemn men, not for seeking pleasure, but for preferring
momentary pleasures to permanent ones. We are to watch
and examine that we be not deceived by present pleasures.
On the question of “true and solid happiness", Locke takes
his stand on clean rational grounds, as expressed in his code
of natural law or right reason. Here the ethical end is
happiness. Where he makes Physics, Ethics and Logic
the divisions of philosophy, he defines Ethics to be “the
seeking Out of those rules and measures of human actions
which lead to happiness and the means to practise them.
The end of this is not bare speculation, and the knowledge
of truth; but right, and a conduct suitable to it”. In his
“Thoughts concerning Education", the ethical end is virtue;
but happiness and virtue, according to Locke, are one. “For
God, having by an inseparable connection, joined virtue and
public happiness together; and made the practise thereof
necessary to the preservation of society, and visibly bene-
ficial to all with whom the virtuous man has to do; it is
no wonder, that every one should not only allow, but recom-
mend and magnify these rules to others, from whose observ-
ance of them, he is sure to reap an advantage to himself.
He may, out of interest, as well as conviction, cry up that
for sacred, which, if once trampled on and profaned, he him-
self cannot be safe nor secure.”*) The joining of true and
*) King, Life of Locke. Pp. 308. I 16. H. U. I. 3; 6.
6%
solid virtue and happiness, interest and conviction, in the
workings of a true ethical system, is, with Locke, one of
the demands of right reason, as well as the true expression
of his principles of prudence and benevolence. Moreover,
the assumption of a moral government by Infinite Wisdom
and Goodness harmonizes Virtue and Happiness, by placing
Happiness in the practise of Virtue, and in the discharge
of duty. “Even in this life", says Locke, “all things rightly
considered, the virtuous man is the happiest, and the wicked
have the worst part". Add to this the bare possibilities
of a future life, and the virtuous man alone can be called
happy. (II. 20; 7O.) If we ask what is the ethical end, Locke
would certainly answer, Virtue; virtue not barely as the
science of happiness, but as involving happiness. This is
the answer given in his “Thoughts concerning Education",
and the only one which his ethical system will allow.
Virtue is the science and practise of duty. The practise
of virtue is indispensable to happiness, whether public or
private. While he who follows the precepts of virtue
can make no mistake, and will always be the happiest
and most useful member of society, he who pursues im-
mediate happiness not only misses it through errors of
judgment, but is in a good way to find misery instead.
Happiness must be defined in the terms of virtue. Virtue
is the highest good; conduct in harmony with nature or
right reason in the Stoical sense. Conformity to the law of
God, which is comprehended in, Do unto others as you
would that men should do unto you, this is virtue, this
is happiness, and this is law. Rational prudence and be-
nevolence can never conflict with public or private hap-
piness, without loosing the element of rationality, which
is only another form of saying that eternal and immutable
principles of virtue cannot annihilate themselves. If we ask
Locke what the individual is to do in a supposed or an
apparent conflict between his own happiness and that of
the public; he would tell us that the lower must give way
to the higher, that it is irrational that the evident interests
of the many should be sacrificed to the apparent interests
of the one.") This brings us to the fundamental question
of virtue, or “true and solid happiness". -
II. The amžnomy befºween Freedom and Mecessºzy.
If, thus far, we have rightly understood Locke, his ethical
system is not “plunging down the slope of motives into
the chasm of necessity", as Professor Webb supposes, but
rather, moving in the open plain of rational self government.
It is in this plane alone that ethics are possible, for, says
Locke, “Moral actions are only those that depend upon the
choice of an understanding and free agent”. The under-
standing and free agent which Locke here contemplates,
and which is held in view throughout, is not the will, but
the man. Locke's view of morality in its relation to free-
dom finds its echo in Mr. Sidgwick's definition of “ethics as
the Science or study of what ought to be, so far as this
depends upon the voluntary actions of individuals". But he
who adopts the terminology of what ought to be, as do
Locke and all intuitionalists, must develop a doctrine of an
understanding and free agent, or fall back upon the term-
inology of what must be, and encamp with Hobbes and
Spinoza, and Miss Martineau who says. “I feel that I am
as completely the result of my own nature, and compelled
to do what I do, as the needle to point to the north, or
the puppet to move according as the string is pulled."
“The doctrine of necessity, whether supported by theological,
philosophical, or scientific considerations", says Dr. Hartley,
“has a tendency to abate all resentment against men. Since
all they do against us is by appointment of God, it is re-
bellion against Him to be offended with them". The feeling
of Miss Martineau, and the conclusion of Dr. Hartley are sup-
ported by Mr. Buckle, who teaches that all is inflexible
necessity, that criminals are in no way responsible for their
crimes, and that ethics have no place in the progress of
*) King, Life of Locke, 308. I 16. H. U. I. 3. 6.
— 86 —
Society.") Although the entire question is clouded with meta-
physical speculations and dubious terminology, it practically
presents two phases; man is either an understanding and
free agent morally responsible for his personal conduct, or,
he is like the puppet, unable to do other than what he
does, being governed by a fatal, irresistible necessity. If the
latter view is correct, it is difficult to find any rational
ground for the existence of ethics and jurisprudence or to
make any reply to the transgressor who declares the
criminal law to be in itself criminal, and himself innocent,
So far as regulative or corrective institutions have any
rational grounds for their existence they are comprehended
in the nature of man as an understanding and free agent.
This seems to be the point of view from which Locke re-
garded the question of freedom. With him, the question is
one between liberty and necessity. His ethical doctrine
must fall under one of these two terms. (II. 21; 71, 8.) This
is in agreement with his definition, and also with his charge
against the doctrine of occasional causes, as presented by
Mr. Morris: “This is the hypothesis", says Locke, “that clears
doubts and brings us at last to the religion of Hobbes and
Spinoza, by revolving all, even the thoughts and will of
men, into an irresistible fatal necessity.”
Although Locke uniformly proceeds upon the assumption
of moral freedom and responsibility, he is fully alive to the
metaphysical difficulties which lie at the bottom of the
two conflicting views which have so perplexed morality and
divinity, “the parts of knowledge that men are most con-
cerned to be clear in". Locke's most significant expression
upon this subject is found in one of his letters to Molyneux.
“If you will argue for, or against liberty from consequences,
I will not undertake to answer you. For I own freely to
*) King, Life of Locke. 3 Io. Sidgwick, “The Methods of Ethics”,
p. 4. 3d. ed. Quar. Rev. Vol. 195. p. 161. Hartley, “Observations on
Man” conclusion of Part. I. Buckle: Hist. of Civ. Vol. I. 9. and 163.
Locke, Works IY. 577.
— 87 —
you the weakness of my understanding, that though it be
unquestionable that there is omnipotence and omniscience
in God our Maker, yet I cannot make feedom in man con-
sistent with omnipotence and omniscience in God, though
I am as fully persuaded of both as of any truths I most
firmly assent to; and therefore I have long left off the con-
sideration of that question, resolving all into this short con-
clusion; that if it be possible for God to make a free agent,
then man is free, though I see not the way of it.” Again,
he remarks, “God having revealed that there shall be a day
of judgment, I think that foundation enough to conclude
men are free enough to be made answerable for their
actions, and to receive according to what they have done;
though how man is a free agent, surpasses my explication
and comprehension.” Here is a veritable antinomy as old
as Solomon and the Stoics. “A man's heart deviseth his
way, but the Lord directeth his steps." It is the old con-
flict between the speculative and practical reason; between
metaphysics and common sense.") Locke cannot make his
theology and physics agree with what he finds in his own
consciousness; in the evident demands of morality and in
the rational prospect of a future judgment declared by
Revelation. But it is clear that Locke holds to both his
theology and his morality: he holds as strongly to human
freedom as to Divine Omnipotence and omniscience, and to
the principle of causality. He places himself on the side of
freedom though he could see no metaphysical ground for
it. Like the Stoics, he holds to moral freedom, in spite of
his inability to answer all the objections that might be
raised against it. His difficulties are simply metaphysical,
and in this aspect he abandons the question of speculative
*) Locke to Molyneux. Jan. 20. 1693. Works IV. 278. I. 770
H. U. Epistle to the Reader. This antinomy was first clearly stated
and discussed by the Stoics. See Heinze: Die Lehre vom Logos.
pp. I53–172.
— 88 —
harmony with the remark that he would “be glad to get
some light upon the subject". But he holds that the dilemma
of the speculative reason is relieved by the practical reason.
Locke's constant appeal is to experience and common Sense.
It is here that he constructs an argument for liberty, in
harmony with his system, by placing it in a power of the
mind to rule over desires on the one hand, and the will on
the other.
III. Doc/rºle of Freedom. We have seen that pleasure
and pain are, with Locke, “innate practical principles",
operating continually in all sensitive organisms, and that the
passions or desires being simple modes of pleasure and pain
are indefinable. That which moves desire is happiness, and
in all mere sensitive beings desire tends to pass directly
into conduct, carrying all before it. In unreasoning, non-
reflecting beings the desire determines both mind and will, in
its effort for present happiness. But Locke holds that hap-
piness may be true or false, and that he who is guided by
passion or desire generally falls upon the latter, and thus
entails upon himself misery and disappointment. This mode
of conduct does not belong to rational beings; here is no
room for morality, no ground for the doctrine of “an
understanding and free agent”. The whole question, with
Locke, resolves itself into rational choice, “a forbearance of
a too hasty compliance with our desires, the moderation
and restraint of our passions, so that our understandings
may be free to examine, and reason unbiassed give its
judgment. On this, a right direction of our conduct to true
happiness depends; it is in this that we should employ our
chief care and endeavours.” (II. 21; 53.)
As on the question of moral distinctions Locke endeav-
ored to avoid their association with the absolute will of
the Deity, so, on the question of moral freedom he attempts
to escape the Serbonian Bog known as the “Freedom of the
Will”. “We find in ourselves", says Locke, “a power to
begin or forbear, continue or end, several actions of our
minds, and motions of our bodies, barely by a thought or
— 89 —
preference of the mind ordering. This power of Ordering
which the mind has, is called the Will.” (II. 2 I ; 5.) Although
Locke admits that the terms power, ability, and faculty, are
synonymous, he objects to the term “faculties", as misleading
one into thinking of real beings or distinct agents in the
soul which perform the actions of the understanding and
volition. It is an occasion for wrangling and obscurity to
speak of the will as a commanding and superior faculty of
the soul, or, as determining the inferior faculties. But, we
ask, is the will free? “I think the question is not proper",
says Locke, “whether the will be free, but whether the man
be free.” The question is unreasonable, because unintelligible.
The phrase “freedom of the Will" is altogether improper,
because freedom and will are both powers of mind “and to
ask whether the will has freedom, is to ask whether one
power has another power, one ability another ability. It
is as insignificant to ask whether a man's will he free, as
to ask whether his sleep be swift or his virtue square;
liberty being as little applicable to the will, as swiftness of
motion is to sleep, or squareness to virtue. Will is nothing
but the power of prefering to do, or not to do, while
Liberty is the power of doing or not doing that which is
prefered by the mind, or a power to act, or not to act,
according as the mind directs.” The ideas of liberty and
necessity arise from the consideration of the extent of the
power of the mind over the actions of the man. The two
powers, will and liberty, belong to the man, they can be
attributed only to a person. By “person", Locke understands
a thinking, intelligent being, that has reason and reflection,
and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing, in
different times and places. It is a forensic term, appropriating
actions and their merit, and so belongs only to intelligent
agents capable of law, and of happiness and misery. Here,
in the person, all questions center, all powers have their
rise. The question of liberty is not a question of the will,
but of the man. If we ask what determines the will, Locke
replies, “The true and proper answer, is, the mind”. If
— 90 —
this were not so, man would not be an understanding and
free agent.")
Locke dismisses the phrase “freedom of will” as idle
and meaningless, holding the will to be but a power of the
mind, and determined by the rational reflecting person. But
what determines the mind? Is the person free? “Concerning
a man's liberty, there yet therefore is raised this further
Question, whether a man be free to will? which I think is
what is meant, when it is disputed whether the will be free.”
In the Second edition of his essay Locke changes “the
greatest apparent good" for “desire or uneasiness”, as that
which works most constantly upon the mind to set it on
action. But this is a change of phraseology without a
change of position, for Locke still holds that the object of
uneasiness is happiness or absent good. We are cautioned
against confounding will and desire. “It is evident that
desiring and willing are two distinct acts of the mind, and
consequently that the will, which is but the power of
volition, is much more distinct from desire.” But Locke
confuses his discussion by making a concession to popular
phraseology. “Uneasiness”, he remarks “is the great motive
which works upon the mind to put it in action, which, for
shortness sake we will call determining of the will.” (II. 21; 29.)
What is here done for “shortness sake”, must be kept in
mind for consistency's sake. Locke has already maintained,
on the one hand, that the mind determines the will, and is
*) II. 2 I ; 5. 8. I4–16, 21, 27, 7 I, II. 27; 9. 26. C. U. Sec I,
“The will itself, how absolute and uncontrollable soever it may be thought,
never fails in its obedience to the dictates of the understanding.” Cousin
is indignant with Locke's position. Locke a donc supprimé la liberté en
la refusant à la volonté, et la cherchant ou dans la pensée ou dans la
force motrice; il la détruit, et il croit avoir détruit la question même de
la liberté. Mais la croyance du genre humain proteste contre l'abolition
de la question. Philosophie de Lockc. p. 38o. The absurdities of M.
Cousin's criticism of Locke have been well handled by Henry Rogers,
John Locke, his Character and Philosophy. Edinburgh Review. April 1853.
p. 383—454, and Thos. E. Webb, The Intellectualism of Locke. Dublin.
1857.
— 91 —
about to maintain, on the other hand, that the mind has
the power of ruling over and determining all motives, all
uneasiness, all desire. There is confusion, but no contradiction
arising from what he does for shortness' sake. “Although
desire bring nothing but an uneasiness in the want of an
absent good, absent good may be looked on and considered
without desire.” (II. 21. 31.) The thought of Locke upon the
subject seems to be comprehended in the following passage.
“There being in us a great many uneasinesses always so-
liciting, and ready to determine the will, it is natural, as I
have said, that the greatest and most pressing should deter-
mine the will to the next action; and so it does for the
most part, but not always. For the mind having in the
most cases, as is evident in experience, a power to suspend
the execution and satisfaction of any of its desires, and so
all, one after another; is at liberty to consider the objects
of them, examine them on all sides, and weigh them with
others. In this lies the liberty a man has: and from the
not using of it right comes all that variety of mistakes, er-
rors, and the faults which we run into, in the conduct of
our lives and our endeavours after happiness; whilst we
precipitate the determination of our wills, and engage too
soon before due examination. To prevent this, we have a
power to suspend the prosecution of this or that desire, as
every one daily may experiment in himself. This seems to
me the source of all liberty; in this seems to consist that
which is, as I think, improperly, called free will.” (II. 21.47.)
Liberty, then, rests in a power of the person to suspend
his desires, check the passions, examine all motives with
reference to a standard, and determine the will to rational
conduct. Here is at once the foundation of freedom, virtue,
and happiness; this gives a rational basis to morality and
jurisprudence by fixing responsibility in the rational nature
of man. Locke holds to this position consistently throughout
the entire range of his writings. It is a vital principle in
his “Thoughts concerning Education". “The great principle and
foundation of all virtue and worth is placed in this, that a
— 92 —
man is able to deny himself his own desires, cross his own
inclinations, and purely follow what reason dictates as best,
though the appetite lean the other way. He who does not
do this, wants the true principle of virtue and industry, and
is in danger of never being good for anything. This is not
always easy to do, I own, but I am not enquiring the easy
way to opinion, but the right way to truth, which they
must follow who will deal plainly with their own understandings
and their own Souls. . . . . Nor let anyone say he cannot
govern his passions, nor hinder them from breaking out and
carrying him into action, for what he can do before a prince
or a great man, he can do alone, or in the presence of
God, if he will." Locke thus sums up his thought on the
question. “Though this general desire of happiness operates
constantly and invariably in us, yet the satisfaction of any
particular desire can be suspended from determining the will
to any subservient action, till we have maturely examined
whether the particular offered good we then desire, make
a part of our real happiness, or be consistent or inconsistent
with it. The result of Our judgment, upon examination, is
what ultimately determines the man, who could not be free,
if his will were determined by anything but his own desire,
guided by his own judgment. This, in short, is what I think
of this matter.”)
What, then, is this liberty of Locke's? Is it liberty at
all? Locke does not call it a liberty of indifference or of
self suspense, but regards it as the liberty of self-deter-
mination. This is the appellation given where he is showing
*) “Thoughts concerning Education”, $$ 33. 31. 38.45. I 36. “Conduct
of the Understanding”, Sec. I I. I2, 35. H. U. II. 2 I ; 53. 56. Locke to Moly-
neux. Aug. 23. I693. Works IV. 292. Letter to Limbourg. July 19, 17O I.
Lionel S. Beale, one of the foremost physiologists of the present age, says,
“It cannot be too distinctly stated that the strictest temperance and purity
is as much in accordance with physiological as moral law, and that the
yielding to desire, appetite, and passion, is no more to be justified upon
physiological and physical than upon moral and religious grounds.” The
Moral Question. p. 47.
the relations of punishment, freedom, and responsibility.
(IV. I 7; 4.) And this accords with his position throughout,
for liberty belongs not to will, but to man, to the rational
man alone. One “could not be free if his will were deter-
mined by anything, but his own desire guided by his own
judgment.” (II. 2 I; 71.) As every rational man has the
power of suspending his desires to examine the good and
his judgment, volition, and conduct harmonize with right
reason, he is an understanding and free agent. . . . For though
his will be always determined by that which is judged good
by his understanding, yet it excuses him not; because, by
a too hasty choice of his own making, he has imposed on
himself wrong measures of good and evil; . . . The eternal
law and nature of things must not be altered to comply
with his ill ordered choice.' (II. 21 ; 56.) “It is not a fault,
but the perfection of our nature to desire, will, and act ac-
cording to the last result of a fair examination.” (II. 2 I; 47.)
“Is it worth the name of freedom to be at liberty to play
the fool, and draw shame and misery upon the man's self?
If to break loose from the conduct of reason be liberty,
true liberty, madmen and fools are the only free men; but
yet, I think, that nobody would choose to be mad for the
sake of such liberty, but he that is mad already." (II.
2 I ; 50.) Locke allows a large place for the rational exer-
cise of the imagination in his doctrine of happiness and
liberty. In judging of the good or the evil of what we are
about to do, and in the choosing of a remote good as an
end to be pursued, the future, as well as the immediate
present, is to be within our view. Good intention cannot
alter the effects of a false judgment. He only is truly ra-
tional who projects his examination into the future along the
line of proposed action, to seek the results of such conduct.
Immediate and remote consequences are to be considered
in the examination. “Objects near our view are apt to be
thought greater than those of a larger size that are more
remote; yet that which is future will certainly come to be
— 94 —
present.” (II. 21; 63.) Such is Locke's doctrine of liberty;
such is the support which he furnishes to his proposition;
“Moral actions are only those which depend upon the choice
of an understanding and free agent". This is neither the
argument of the sensualists nor of the necessitarians. Neither
the one nor the other can interpose an umpire of such
moment between desire and action. These phases of thought
must maintain some such position as that held by Hume;
“Reason is, and Ought only to be, the slave of the passions,
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve
and obey them".") But Locke's position is diametrically
opposed to this; that which Hume makes slave, Locke
makes ruler, and that which Hume makes ruler, Locke
makes slave. Locke's position here, is that of Plato and
Kant. “Reason is given as the governor of the will, by
its Sway to constitute it good", or, taking the words of
Locke himself, “The freedom of man, and liberty of acting
according to his own will, is grounded on his having reason,
which is able to instruct him in that law, by which he is
to govern himself”. (Gov. II. 63.)
IV. Doc/r272e of Educazzozz. Locke's doctrine of educa-
tion has an intimate relation with his theory of happiness,
virtue, and freedom. The ethical end, and the subjective
possibility of its realization, are supplemented by the means
to be employed in its attainment. Locke's theory of educa-
tion is based on his theory of virtue. His fundamental
thought concerning virtue, happiness, freedom and educa-
tion, is definitely expressed. “Every man”, he says “must
some day or other be trusted to himself, and his own con-
duct; and he that is a good, a virtuous, and an able man,
must be made so within. For he that hath not a mastery
over his own inclinations, he that knows not how to resist
the importunity of present pleasure and pain, for the sake
of what reason tells him is fit to be done, wants the true
principle of virtue and industry, and is in danger never to
be good for anything". (Ed. §§ 42. 45.)
*) Treatise of Human nature. II. 3; 3. compare. III. I; 1.
— 95 —
When Locke places true and solid happiness as well
as true and rational liberty in the power of the person to
rule over his desires and determine his will to rational ends,
he opens up to education, a definite and important mission.
The need of a rational system of education was forced upon
Locke, not only by his own moral and political theory, but
by the wretched condition into which education had fallen
in his day. Locke's view of the prevailing education is
almost as dismal as Hobbes' view of human nature. The
bare communication of knowledge and the logic of the
Schools had no moral value. It was supposed that manners
could be corrected by Logic; “The remedy reached not
the evil but became a part of it". Education, instead of
forming men, deformed them. “By ignoring the true and
rational foundations of virtue, happiness, and liberty, it comes
to pass that we see men abandon themselves to the most
brutish, vile, irrational, exorbitant actions, during the whole
Current of a wild or dissolute life, without any check, or
the least appearance of any reflection". Children are not
taught to reflect, their minds are not duly opened; they
are from infancy let loose to sensual pleasures until they
lose the use and exercise of reflection. They come to
manhood as servants, not of their rational, but of their ani-
mal natures. Careless parents, and negligent inspectors of
the education of children, have much to answer for in these
cases. Thus men come to love darkness rather than light,
because their deeds are evil, or they applaud virtue with
all men of right reason, while they themselves follow the
vicious and irrational. “Fashion, and the common opinion
having settled wrong notions, and education and custom ill
habits, the just values of things are misplaced, and the pal-
ates of men corrupted.” But can such a general condition
of society be remedied? Can a nation return to the prin-
ciples of virtue which are those of right reason? Locke
answers in the affirmative. “Bad systems may be supplanted
by good systems; bad habits by good habits. Pains should
be taken to rectify abuses; and contrary habits change our
— 96 —
pleasures, and give a relish to that which is necessary or
conducive to our happiness. This, every one must confess
he can do, and when happiness is lost and misery over-
takes him, he will confess that he did amiss in neglecting
it, and condemn himself for it." The general principle upon
which Locke argues is the same as that accredited to
Pythagoras; “Choose that course of action which is best,
and custom will soon render it the most agreeable.” The
reverse of this principle is what Locke attacks.")
The purpose of the publication of his “Thoughts con-
cerning Education", is clearly indicated. Recognising the
prevalence of the early corruption of youth, and how the
errors of education propagate themselves through all the
parts and stations of life, Locke makes his special appeal to
the higher classes, and for this reason; “if those of that rank
are once set right, they will quickly bring all the rest into
order”. “It is a shame", he says, “for those that have time
and the means to attain knowledge, to want any helps or
assistance for the improvement of the understanding that
are to be got.”*) Locke had a profound faith in the power
of moral earnestness. “Believe it", he says, “the labours of
not many persons of understanding, dilligence, and dis-
interestedness, backed by the laws, may stem the current
of the most potent wickedness." (Fox Bourne. II. 32 I.) He
endeavors to impress upon all, that the education of children
is so much the duty and concern of parents, and the wel-
fare and prosperity of the nation is so dependent upon it,
that it becomes the duty of each to set his helping hand
*) Education $$ 42. 45. King, Life of Locke, p. 356. 360, Ad-
ditions intended to have been made to the Essay concerning Human Under-
standing. II. 21. Compare II. 2 I ; 69. and C. U. Sec. I.
*) C. U. XII. For a stronger statement see Essay concering Human
Understanding. IV. 20; 6. The common objection ‘that ‘Locke was interested
in the education of Gentlemen only, must be dismissed. In 1697 he ad-
dressed a remarkable document to the English Government on founding
working schools for the children of the poor. This, he thought would aid
in stemming the rising tide of pauperism and immorality. Locke urged his
scheme in behalf of religion, morality and industry. Fox Bourne. II. 383.
– 97 —
to promote every where that way of training the youth
that is likeliest to produce virtuous, useful, and able men in
their distinct callings. “Every gentleman may be supposed
to desire for his son these four things, Virtue, Wisdom,
Breeding, and Learning." These, according to Locke, are
placed in their order of value, and represent the results
which he hoped might be attained by education. The
simplest elements of virtue, are piety, truth, and good na-
ture. Here virtue takes its true position in Locke's system:
“I place virtue as the first and most necessary of those
endowments that belong to a man or a gentleman, as ab-
solutely requisite to make him valued and beloved by others,
acceptable or tolerable to himself. Without that, I think
he will be happy neither in this nor the other world. As
the foundation of this, there ought very early to be im-
printed on his mind a true notion of God. . . . T'is Virtue
then, direct virtue", says Locke, “which is the hard and
valuable part to be aimed at in Education. All other con-
siderations and accomplishments should give way and be
postponed to this". Here we come upon ground already
discussed under the conception of a law of man's rational
nature. The whole force of Locke's work on education is
to fix the principles of morality in the minds and lives of
the young. Piety, prudence, benevolence, equity, and love,
are the five principles upon which Locke's education and
instruction center, and which he seeks to develop and
strengthen in the mind Locke differs radically from Bacon,
and all who hold that the main purpose of education is in-
struction or information. He takes his stand upon the So-
cratic basis, and maintains that the chief purpose in edu-
cation is the training and discipline of the mind. To make
a whole man, developed in all his parts, fitted for self-
control, “loving all the forms of virtue", this is the aim
of Locke's education. The leading thought of Locke's
system, is of the man, not of the scholar, education before
instruction, utility conditioned by virtue and wisdom. Thus
Locke replies to the Earl of Peterborough, “I must beg
Curtis, Locke’s Ethical Philosophy. 7
— 98 —
leave to own that I differ from your Lordship in what you
propose; your Lordship would have a thorough scholar, and
I think it not much matter whether he be a great scholar
or no; if he but understand Latin well, and have a general
scheme of the sciences, I think that enough; but I would
have him well bred, well tempered, a man that having been
conversant with the world and amongst men, would have
great application in observing the humor and genius of your
son, and omit nothing that might help to form his mind,
and dispose him to virtue, knowledge, and industry. This
I look upon as the great business of a tutor; this is put-
ting life into his pupil, which, when he has got, masters of
all kinds are easily to be had.”*) Locke's conception of
Education as the development of the powers of the under-
standing is in strict consistency with his theory of knowl-
edge as the mind's perception of the agreement or disagree-
ment of its ideas, and bears with special force upon his
theory of judgment. It is the percipient mind that is to
be educated and developed in all its powers. It is the
mind that is to determine all, and this again is in harmony
with his doctrine of freedom. Therefore the main thing in
education is an increase of the powers and activity of the
mind, not an enlargement of its possessions. It is to this end
that Locke attaches great value to the study of mathematics.
V. Educaſion as a means to Vºrſue and HaAſzzless
as ends. “To make a man virtuous", says Locke, “three
*) “Thoughts concerning Education”. Dedication and §§ 134—6. 70.
45. 75. 90. Conduct of the Understanding. Sec. XIX. XII. VII. XX.
King, Life of Locke. p. 4. compare Ed. §§ 75. I47. The following
quotation fairly represents the misrepresentation which Locke has received
at the hands of many of his critics. In speaking of Alexander Bain
M. Compayré says; “For him, as for Locke, there are not, properly
speaking, intellectual forces indepentent of the facts which succeed one
another in the consciousness. Consequently there is not an education of
the faculties. . . . For Mr. Bain, as for Locke, the best education is that
which places items of knowledge side by side in the mind, which accu-
mulates facts there, but not that which seeks to enkindle in the soul a
flame of intelligence”. Hist. of Pedagogy. p. 561. Eng. Tr.
things are necessary. I st. Natural parts and disposition.
2 d. Precepts and Instruction. 3d. Use and Practise, which is
able better to correct the first, and improve the latter.
(King, Life of Locke p. I 16.) This appears to be a correct
division of Locke's Thoughts concerning Education.
The first division, “Aſaſzera/ Zaz7s azed disposazzozz”, in-
troduces the question of the place of education in morals.
The extraordinary power which the Jesuits attributed to
education was taken up, generally, by the philosophers of
the seventeenth century. Bacon essentially endorsed their
method and conceded their claims. In his Mozzºz Orgazzozz
Lib. I. Aphor. CXXII, he says of his own method “Our
method of scientific discovery almost equalizes intellects,
and does not leave much to their peculiar excellence, since
it accomplishes everything by means of most sure rules and
demonstrations". Descartes seems to have a double ground
for equalising the intellectual world. In his “Discours sur
/a Mežhode”, Part I, he holds that “the power of judging
aright, and of distinguishing truth from error, which is, pro-
perly, what is called good sense or reason, is, by nature,
equal in all men. In the “A'ég/es four /a direction de
Z'Es????", Cousin's Ed. Vol. XI, 248, we read, “Now, throughout
this treatise, we shall endeavor to trace with accuracy and
to smooth the road which shall conduct man to the dis-
covery of truth, so that the most ordinary mind, provided
it is profoundly penetrated with this method, shall see that
truth is no more denied to it than to any other, and that
if it is ignorant of anything it is from no want either of
sense or capacity”. Comenius, in the Pazºsophzae Prodromeus,
is equally sanguine concerning his own method. “There-
fore”, he says “after many workings and tossings of my
thoughts, by reducing everything to the immoveable laws
of nature, I lighted upon my Didacázca Magºza, which shows
the art of readily and solidly teaching all men all things”.
But Leibniz, according to M. Compayré, (Hist. of Ped.
p. I 36), caps the climax of enthusiasm, “Give me for a
few years the direction of education, and I agree to trans-
7%
— 100 —
form the world”. So far as we have observed, Locke has
been regarded as among those who overestimate the power
and value of education, by making it omnipotent in shaping
knowledge and conduct. But, in appealing to Locke him-
self we find that this judgment must undergo important
modifications. As in his Essay, Locke starts out with ex-
pressions apparently out of harmony with other parts of
his work, so here, in the first paragraphs of his Thoughts
concerning Education, we find a position seemingly in-
consistent with its later development. Wherein, upon last
analysis, consists the difference between men. Is it in na-
tural parts and disposition, or in education? If education can
account for the differences among men, we may depend
upon education for the elimination of them. Locke seems
to maintain this doctrine in the following positions. “Men's
happiness, or misery, is for the most part, of their own
making.” “I confess there are some men's constitutions of
body and mind so vigorous and so well framed by nature
that they need not much assistance from others; but by
the strength of their natural genius they are, from their
cradles, carried towards what is excellent, and, by the priv-
ilege of this happy constitution, are able to do wonders.
But examples of this kind are but few; and I think I may
say of all the men one meets with, nine parts of ten are
what they are, good or evil, useful or not, by their edu-
cation. T'is that which makes the great difference in
mankind. I imagine the minds of children as easily turned
this way or that way as water itself, and a little child is
only as white paper or wax to be moulded and fashioned
as one pleases. Thus the difference found in the manners
and abilities of men is owing more to their education than
to anything else.”*) This seems to overrule natural parts
and disposition as a first consideration in education. But
Locke none the less emphasizes the necessity of taking
account of the great differences in the natural parts and
*) Education. §§ 1. 2. 32. 217. H. U. II. 21 ; 69.
— 101 —
dispositions of children. “We must grant that there will be
children found of all tempers, some are confident, others
modest, tractable, or obstinate, curious or careless, quick or
slow. There are not more differences in men's faces, and
the outward lineaments of their bodies, than there are in
the makes and tempers of their minds. The peculiar physiog-
nomy of the mind is most discernible in children, and its
natural make and prevailing inclinations are to be considered.
We must not hope wholly to change their original tempers
without spoiling them.... God has stamped certain characters
upon men's minds, which, like their shapes, may perhaps be
a little mended; but can hardly be totally altered and trans-
formed into the contrary. But of this be sure, after all is
done, the bias will always hang on that side that nature
first placed it.” Locke does not think of virtue, wisdom
and breeding as artificial elements inculcated into the mind
of the young. These parts and dispositions are in the mind
as innate powers, to be developed by exercise. Here Locke
differs from Comenius, who declared, “Now it is certain that
there is nothing in the understanding that was not first in
the senses. Consequently, children need examples and things
which they can see. Our effort should be to correctly represent
objects to the senses.”*) Comenius encamps with Bacon, Locke
with the Greeks, yet there is no moral difference between
Locke and Comenius, as both aim at producing the virtuous
man. The root difference is, that while Comenius is inclined to
make virtue an addition by education, Locke, like Pestalozzi,
finds the seeds of virtue in the soul, and would arrange the
conditions under which they are to unfold, and to reach their
end.”) There is no conflict between these two views. Locke
is dogmatic, neither in his claims for education nor for nature.
He is simply recognizing the true places of the two great
powers which operate in the formation of character; natural
parts and disposition, on the one hand, and education, in
*) Compayré Hist, of Ped. p. 133. Eng. Trans.
*) Education. §§ 87. IoI. Io2. 66.
— 102 —
its broadest sense, on the other. There are these two points
of view, and both are to be recognised. If we examine
Locke carefully on the natural differences of men we shall
find them to be relatively unimportant by nature, and that
education, used in its broadest sense, explains most of the
variations. In this he agrees with Descartes. But Locke
has no such faith in education or method as that expressed
by Leibniz. Locke centers his faith in education primarily
in this; man is endowed with a power of acting according
to the dictates of right reason, and a correct system of
education will have as an end the preservation, development,
and enthronement of this power in man, through precept
and practise. The result of Locke's thought upon this
question of relative values is well expressed in the following.
“Among men of equal education there is a great inequality
of parts, and the woods of America as well as the schools
of Athens produce men of several abilities in the same kind.
Though this be so, yet I imagine most men come very
short of what they might attain unto in their several degrees,
by a neglect of their understandings. . . . The difference so
observable in men's understandings and parts does not arise
so much from the natural faculties as acquired habits. . . .
Nature gives us but the seeds, education must do the rest.”*)
Precep/s azed ſizsärzeczzoz. It would be irrelevant to
the work in hand to enter upon an analysis of Locke's
scheme of instruction, or to catalogue the subject-matter of
teaching. So much as immediately concerns our subject has
been given. (II.5.) The scheme of virtue which Locke pre-
sents in his five rules is faithfully adhered to and enforced
in his educational system. All children are to learn by heart
the Lord's Prayer, the Creed, the Ten Commandments and
the Catechism. After this, the remaining moral rules of the
Bible may be learned. (Ed. § I 59.) “The gentleman's proper
calling, is, the service of his country, and so is most properly
concerned in moral and political knowledge; and thus the
*) Conduct of the Understanding. Secs. II. IV. VI.
—- 103 —
studies which more immediately belong to his calling are
those which treat of virtues and vices, of civil Society and
the arts of government, and will take in also law and
history.” (Works IV. 600.) We may notice here what has
often been regarded as a serious defect in Locke's System
of education. We refer to the meagre value which Locke
placed upon poetry and music. Mr. St. John complains that
Locke “knows nothing of that visionary sweetness which
descends like dew through the periods of Plato, and literally
ravishes the imagination".") The poetic vein is to be sup-
pressed. “It is very seldom seen that any one discovers
mines of gold or silver in Parnassus. It is a pleasant air,
but a barren soil.” (Ed. § 174.) Of music, Locke says “It
wastes so much of a young man's time to gain but a mod-
erate skill in it, and engages often in such odd company,
that amongst all those things that ever came into the list
of accomplishments I think I may give it the last place".
(Ed. § 197.) Fénélon condemned music because it “furnishes
diversions that are poisonous”. While we recognzie that
Locke's ethics, like his system of education, upon which he
depended largely for practical support, does not give a
leading place to the emotions, we believe that the chilliness
of his system has been overrated. It is to be remembered
that in his doctrine of virtue the law of love is the vital
principle, and that while Locke develops this law through
the intellectual nature of man, the rational sphere of senti-
ment is preserved, while sentimentalism is rigidly excluded.
We may also notice that although Shakespeare and Milton
belong to the century of Locke, this century was not the
century of Shakespeare and Milton. It was an age of petty
rhymers, of political satires and lampoons; an age in which
Dryden, Cowley, Waller and Butler were the most con-
spicuous of their class. Nor was music in a better condition
in this period. Poetry and music occupy a very different
position in England to-day than in the seventheenth century.
*) Locke's Philosophical Works Edited by St. John. Vol. I. p. 19.
— 104 —-
It is not to be overlooked that in the paragraph which
counsels death to the poetic vein, Locke recommends reading
“the excellent Greek and Roman poets”. In his “Thoughts
concerning Reading and Study" he takes the same ground
with Plato, Aristotle and Quintilian, commending the reading of
poetical writings, especially dramatic, if they be free from
profanity, obscenity, and what corrupts good manners.
(Works IV. 604) -
CŞe azed Pºacázse. These are fundamental terms in
practical education. Through them we come to habit, the
stronghold of the moral life of man. The use which Locke
makes of habit is to establish the subjective principle of all
virtue. What is this principle? Locke replies, “The great
principle and foundation of all virtue and worth is placed
in this: That a man is able to deny himself his own desires,
cross his own inclinations, and purely follow what reason
directs, as best, though the appetite lean the other way.”
(Ed. 333. 338.) This, as we have seen, is to be gained
in part by a development of the intellectual nature. But
here Locke brings in a new power, the power of habit,
which is to assist to the same end. “Habits work more
constantly, and with greater facility than reason, which when
we have most need of it, is seldom fairly consulted, and
more rarely obeyed.” (Ed. I IO.) Habits, then, are prescribed
by the rational mind in self defence; a result of the knowl-
edge which a man has of himself; a device for the preser-
vation of liberty and happiness. The principles of virtue
are to be made habits woven into the very principles of
one's nature. (Ed. 142.) These principles of conduct which
are to be made habits by exercise, extend to the whole
man, and include all that is necessary to insure his true
happiness and freedom in life. “We are born with faculties
and powers capable of almost anything, such at least as
would carry us farther than can be easily imagined, but it
is only the exercise of these powers that gives us ability
and skill in anything, and leads us towards perfection.
Witness the legs of a dancing master, the fingers of a musi-
— 105 —
cian, the astonishing actions of rope dancers and tumblers.
As with the body, so with the mind, practise makes it what
it is. It is practise alone that brings the powers of the
mind, as well as those of the body, to their perfection.”
(C. U. IV.) True education consists in repressing the evil,
and stimulating the virtuous tendencies of the child's nature.
The latter are to be drawn out into the principles of virtue,
and by exercise fixed into habits of thought and conduct.
How is all this to be accomplished? We must keep children
to the practise Óf those principles which are to become
habits, by kind words and gentle admonitions, rather than
by harsh rebukes and chidings. Care must also be taken not to
endeavor to settle too many habits at once, and so perfect
none (Ed. 66.) But it is to example and authority that Locke
looks for the wise direction of education. Of all the ways
whereby children are to be instructed and their manners
formed, the easiest and most efficacious is example. Nothing
sinks so gently and so deep into men's minds. Children
are good observers, and fair reasoners. They are never to
be given deceitful and eluding answers. They easily per-
ceive when they are slighted or deceived, and quickly learn
the trick of neglect, dissimulation, and falsehood. Truth
should never be encroached upon. “They are travellers newly
arrived in a strange country, of which they know nothing;
we should therefore make conscience not to mislead them.
. . . This is not alone for children, but is to be made use
of so long as the child is under tuition. Character, and
common sense are the first requisites in a teacher. En-
courage curiosity and enquiry. . . . Curiosity in children is but
an appetite after knowledge, the great instrument nature has
provided to remove that ignorance which they were born
with.”) Character furnishes a basis of authority. In its last
analysis character is true authority, for it alone gives rise to
reverence in the minds of children. The two elements of
reverence are love and fear, “the great principles whereby.
one may always have hold upon the child to turn his mind
*) Education. §§ 82. I 18. I2O. I31. I 52. I22.
— 106 —
to the ways of virtue and honor.” Love is to be the com-
prehensive and controlling principle in education. The father
is to be the companion of his children, and make them sen-
sible of his care and love. Teachers are to be thoroughly
devoted to their work and pupils, making their interest felt.
Locke abolishes the rod from education, declaring that “such
a slavish discipline makes a slavish temper.” Punishment is
to be held as a last resort, and, even as such, is of doubt-
ful value. To govern a child by corporal pleasure and
pain is immoral. Locke is indignant with this method.
“What is it, to govern his actions, and direct his conduct
by such motives as these? What is it, I say, but to cherish
that principle in him which it is our business to root out
and destroy. To make a good, a wise, and a virtuous man,
it is fit he should learn to cross his appetite, and deny his
inclination, whenever his zeason advises the contrary and
his duty requires it". In this way Locke points out how
parents and teachers lay the foundations of those future
vices which cannot be avoided but by curbing desires and
accustoming children early to submit to reason. Corporal
rewards and punishments are to give place to esteem and
disgrace, a sense of honour, out of which come courage and
fortitude, “the quiet possession of a man's self, and an un-
disturbed doing his duty, whatever evil besets or danger
lies in his way.”*)
Chapter V.
Institutional Ethics.”)
I. The centre of Locke's institutional theory is found
in his two Essays on Government. These Essays are in
reply to the patriarchal theory of Filmer, and the absolute
*) Education. §§ 56–58. 99. 48. 50. Ioo. 115. I 19.
*) “The Constitution of Carolina”, 1669, is not here considered. The
points of disagreement between it and Locke's political essays are so nume-
rous and striking as to suggest that Locke’s part in its composition was
simply that of an amanuensis. That Locke's political and religious views
— 107 —
theory of Hobbes. Locke opposes Filmer and Hobbes in
two different ways, first by showing their theories to be
both unreasonable and unhistorical; secondly, by construct-
ing a theory of government upon the cardinal principles
of freedom and equality. His conception of politics is thus
expressed, “True politics I look on as a part of mora! ?/.2/.
osophy, which is nothing but the art of conducting men
right in society, and supporting a community among its
neighbours".”) He agrees with Augustine that whatever
is just, equitable, and truly obligatory in the lex temporalis,
or civil law, is that part of lex aeterna, or ethics, which,
for the public good, is enforced by penalties. Thus the
state is itself, under law eternal. It is an institution of
trust, not an absolutism. By acting against, or refusing to
act with lex aeterna, it annihilates itself. “Hence, it is evi-
dent,” says Locke, “that absolute monarchy, which by some
underwent a violent change, or even an important modification, after the year
1660, is untenable in view of his “Reflections on the Roman Commonwealth”,
1660, and “Essay on Toleration 1666. In the “Constitution of Carolina”,
Articles 23. 62. 68. 7o. 72. 78. 79.8o. 77. and 55. are more or less in conflict
with his political doctrine. The entire document is cramped and impractical.
*) King, Life of Locke, p. 8. It is noticeable that Locke holds with
Plato and Aristotle that politics are but a branch of ethics. It is often
held that “Aristotle made the capital advance of separating ethics from
politics”; so says F. Pollock in his History of the Science of Politics, p. 7.
But this is certainly a two-fold error. First, the separation of ethics and
politics may be regarded as a retreat, rather than as an advance. Secondly,
Aristotle by no means allowed the separation of ethics and politics. Zellcr
says, “er hâlt an der Verbindung der Ethik mit der Politik”. (Grund. d.
Gesch. d. Griech. Phil. p. 26.) Aristotle is in essential agreement with
Plato in making ethics the foundation of politics. J. C. Bluntschli is cer-
tainly right in saying, “Machiavelli was the first to separate politics from
morals, and to proclaim political practise independent of moral prescription”.
(Lalor's Cyclopedia of Political Science, Art. Politics.) It is difficult to
understand how, according to common sense, a separation of politics and
ethics is to be effected, for, as Professor Sidgwick remarks, “We cannot
determine what government ought to do, without considering what private
persons may be expected to do, and what they may be expected to do, will,
to some extent at least, depend on what it is thought to be their duty to .
do.” (Princip. of Polit. Econ. 2d. Ed. p. 583. * . . . . .
— 108 —
men is accounted the only government in the world, is in-
deed inconsistent with civil society; and so can be no form
of civil government at all.”
II. 7%e Sãaſe of ZaaZZze. Locke's doctrine of the state
of nature stands in striking contrast to that of Hobbes.
It is a state, not of fear, but of peace, of equality, and of
liberty. Freedom and equality are cardinal principles in
Locke's political philosophy. The social life of man is
placed in the foreground. God made man a social being,
and put him under strong obligations of necessity, con-,
venience, and inclination, to drive him into society, as well,
as fitted him with understanding and language to continue
and enjoy society. Men are the workmanship and the
servants of a common Master who is infinitely wise. They
are furnished with common faculties, and sharing one com-
munity of nature they are all equal. Locke explains that
by his doctrine of equality he has respect only to the
jurisdiction of one man over another, and that every man
has an equal right to his freedom. Children are not born
in this state of equality, but they are born to it.")
“But", says Locke, “the state of nature is not a state
of license; the state of nature has a law of nature to govern
it, which obliges every one, and reason, which is that law,
teaches all mankind that no one ought to harm another in
his life, health, liberty, or possessions.” This law of reason
is no limitation of personal liberty, for “law, in its true
notion, is not so much the limitation, as the direction of a
free intelligent agent to his proper interest, and prescribes
no further than is for the public good. That ill deserves
the name of confinement which hedges us in only from bogs
and precipices. So that, however it may be mistaken, the
*) Gov. II. 5. 6. 77. 54–55. H. U. III. I; 1. “Kein Mensch wird
“frei geboren’, Sondern nur mit einer Anlage zur Freiheit, diese Anlage
will aber entwickelt sein. Jene Kenntniss und Achtung des Gesetzes, jene
Selbstbeherrschung welche die wahre Freiheit bedingen, sind nie ohne
Mühe, selten ohne Fehlgriffe, und stets nur durch Uebung zu erlangen.”
Roscher, Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie, p. 163. *
— 109 —
end of law is, not to abolish or restrain, but to preserve
and enlarge freedom”. If this law teaches that God gave
the earth to man, and that in the beginning the goods of
the earth were common to all, it also teaches that every
man is under obligations to assist every other man so far
as his own safety is not involved. In the state of nature,
all having equal rights and equal duties, what one may do
lawfully, every one has a right to do. (Gov. II. 6, 57.)
A state of war arises, when one, transgressing the law
of nature, thereby declares himself to live by another rule
than that of common reason and equality. In this case,
and upon this ground, every man hath a right to punish
the offender, and to be the executor of the law of nature.
He who violently threatens one's life or invades one's prop-
erty, puts himself into a state of war, acts by another
rule than that of reason, and may be killed as a wild beast.
Whether one is in a state of nature, or a member of polit-
ical Society, if there is no opportunity to appeal to a
common judge, he has a right to execute the law of na-
ture upon those who put themselves in a state of war against
him. Locke is careful to emphasize the distinction between
the state of nature and the state of war. “They are”, he
says, “as distinct as a state of peace, goodwill, mutual as-
sistance and preservation, and a state of enmity, malice,
violence, and mutual destruction." (Gov. II. 8. I6–19.)
Locke's view of human nature and the state of nature does
homage to the Golden Age of the Greeks, and the Paradise
of the Book of Genesis.
It is in this connection that the strength of Locke's
“Natural Law” fully reveals itself, and it is here that the
overestimate becomes most apparent. It is maintained by
Locke that the law of nature is so evident and universal
that a system of punishment may be built directly upon
it, and that the violation of one of its precepts is equal to
a violation of positive law. “The law of nature is as in-
telligible and plain to a rational creature, and studier of
that law as the positive laws of commonwealths, nay, pos-
— 110 —
sibly plainer, as much as reason is easier to be understood
than the fancies and intricate contrivances of men put into
words.” (Gov. II. I2.) In speaking of “that great law of
nature; Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by him shall man's
blood be shed", Locke remarks, “Cain was so fully convinced
that every one had a right to destroy such a criminal,
that after the murder of his brother he cried out, “Every
one that findeth me shall slay me', so plain was it writ in
the hearts of all mankind”. (Gov. II. I. I.) In such passages
as these Locke advocates a doctrine hardly distinguishable
from that which he so strenuously opposes in the first book
of his Essay concerning Human Understanding. The force
of Locke's reasoning in this connection is not easily resisted,
nor has political philosophy ever succeeded in explaining
away the hypothesis of a state and law of nature antecedent
to the positive laws of civil society. The separation of legal
and illegal from right and wrong, is a separation in words,
not in fundamental ideas; and the crotchet of the lawyers
that in instituting government and laws right and wrong
are created and defined is as pure a piece of artifice as
was ever nursed by the Ancient Priesthood. “The law
of nature" is by no means an idle phrase with Locke. He
would apply its principles rigidly to the problems of life,
and establish through it the institution of property, inde-
pendent of any action of the state. It is in the state of
nature, and under the laws of nature that property has its
origin, and property rights are defined. -
III. Doctrine of property. Property in things is founded
in Labor. Every man by nature has property in his own
person, and a right to life and liberty within the law of
nature. Property rights are inherent in persons. God gave
the earth to man in common, and commanded labour. Sub-
duing or cultivating the earth, and having dominion over
it, are joined together; labour is man's only title to the
earth. The labour of his body, the work of his hands, are
his. Whatsoever he removes out of the state that nature
hath provided and left it in he hath mixed his labour with,
— 111 —
and joined it to something of his own, and thereby makes
it his property, and excludes the rights of others therein,
where there is enough and as good left for others. (II. 27.)
This evidently does not mean that there was an original
community of property, for, in the Lockeian sense, property
has no existence antecedent to its acquisition by human
labor. In Locke's view, bare occupation gives no title to
property. Labour alone can give the title. “He who with
the power to labour, finds himself upon the earth, has
thereby no right to anything upon the earth except through
labour.” But, if labor gives property rights, it also gives
property limits. “As much land as a man tills, plants, im-
proves, cultivates, and can use the product of, so much is
his property.” (II. 32. 38.) “It is easy to understand", says
Locke, “how labour could at first begin a title of property
in the common things of nature, and how the spending of
it upon one's uses bound it.” (II.5 I.) Property in things
is limited by use, or the capacity of the individual as a
social and intellectual being. Locke lays great stress upon
the loss and robbery implied in waste. Nature has set the
measure of property by the extent of men's labour and the
conveniences of life. (II. 36.) He holds that if this is observed,
the rights of individuals cannot conflict, as the labor and
necessities of each can demand but a small fraction of the
whole. With Locke, labor is not only the foundation of
property rights, and the measure of rightful possession, it
is also the source of all values. “It is not strange that the
property of labour should be able to overbalance the com-
munity of land, for it is labour, indeed, that puts the differ-
ence of value on everything. . . . . Consider the difference
between an acre of land planted with tobacco or sugar,
sown with wheat or barley, and an acre of the same land
lying in common without any husbandry upon it, and one
will find that the improvement of labour makes the far
greater part of the value. I think it will be but a very
modest computation to say, that of the products of the
earth useful to the lives of men, nine tenths are the effects
of labour. For whatever bread is worth more than acorns,
wine than water, and cloth or silk than leaves, skins, or
moss, that is wholly owing to labour and industry. From
all which it is evident, that though the things of nature are
given in common, yet man, by being master of himself,
and proprietor of his own person, and the actions or labour
of it, had still in himself the great foundation of property.”
(II. 40. 45.) -
But man may not hold property in man. Slavery is
excluded by the law of nature. No man may dispose of
his freedom to another, nor subject another to his own ab-'
solute will. “Slavery is so vile and miserable an estate of
man, and so directly opposite to the generous temper and
courage of our nation, that it is hardly to be conceived
that an Englishman, much less a gentleman, should plead
for it.” (Gov. I. I.) Locke was the first Englishman who
struck directly at the foundations of slavery, and it is note-
worthy that his spirit of argument was taken up more than
one hundred years later in abolishing property in man in
the British Empire. -
Locke finds in the natural limitations of property rights,
by labor and use, a place for the origin of money, and the
extension of personal possessions beyond personal needs.
The cardinal evil with Locke is in allowing anything to go
to waste, or to be uselessly expended. He who barters
plums that would soon rot for nuts which would last for a
year, or the nuts for a piece of metall, or a shell, or a
diamond, invades not the rights of others, nor wastes the
common bounty. The execeding of the bounds of just
property do not lie in the largeness of one's possessions,
but in the perishing of anything uselessly in it. Thus came
in the use of money, some lasting thing that men might *
keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent men
would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perisable
supports of life. (II. 46.47.) Thus men, finding out some-
thing which had the value and use of money among their
neighbours, began at once to enlarge their possessions. In
this way, measured for the most part by labor, was tacitly
recognized, and in this recognition was also included, the
inequality of possessions both in land and goods. -
The next stage in the development of the doctrine of
property involves its transmission. The social relations, in
a state of nature, are those between man and wife, parent
and child, master and servant. The duties and rights are
here prescribed by the law of nature. Locke objects to
Filmer's term, “paternal power", and substitutes for it “parental
power", declaring that the father, according to reason and
the positive law of God, has no more right over the children
than the mother. Children are to honor both father and
mother as parents by whom they were begotten, nurtured,
and defended. By their dependence upon their parents, and
the right they have to be maintained and provided for by
the parents, children have a right of inheritance to the
property of their parents. It is natural law that all the
children share equally in the inheritance. Locke attacks the
law of primogeniture, which still obtains in England. The
first-born has not a sole or peculiar right by any law of
God and nature, the younger children having an equal title
with him, founded on the right that they all have to main-
tenance, support, and comfort from their parents, and on
nothing else. On the other hand, if a son die without is-
Sue, the father has a right in nature to possess his goods,
and inherit his estate.")
In natural law, unjust force or conquest gives no right,
places the conquered under no moral obligation. No prom-
ise, obtained by force or fraud is binding. “Who doubts,
but the Grecian Christians, descendants of the ancient pos-
sessors of that country, may justly cast off the Turkish
yoke, which they have so long groaned under, whenever
they have an opportunity to do it.” Locke argues that in
a case of just war, though the power of the conqueror ex-
tends to absolute possession over the persons of those who
*) Gov. I. 88. 95. 62. II. 190.
Curtis, Locke's Ethical Philosophy. 8
— 114 —
put themselves in a state of war, it does not extend beyond
these persons to their estates. The reason is, that the in-
nocent are not to be made to suffer with the guilty. A vio-
lent father may forfeit his own life, but that does not in-
volve his children in his guilt or destruction. The case
comes to this; “The conqueror has a title to reparation for
damages received; the children have a title to their father's
estate for subsistence, the wife also may have a title either
by labour or compact. What must be done in this case?
I answer, the fundamental law of nature being, that all, as
much as may be, should be preserved, it follows that if
there be not enough fully to satisfy both, viz, for the con-
querors, losses, and the children's maintenance, he that hath
and to spare, must remit something of his full satisfaction,
and give way to the pressing and preferable title of those
who are in danger to perish without it.” (Gov. II. 176.
186—192. 207.)
In the year 1776, two events brought Locke's political
doctrines into prominence. The one was the founding of
the American Republic upon the cardinal principles of free-
dom, equality, and inalienable rights; the other was the
publication of the “Wealth of Nations”, which made the
doctrine of Labor its basal principle, and demanded, in the
interests of all, the free economic action of each. Hallam,
(Lit. of Eu. IV. 37 I.), says, “the chapter on property would
be sufficient, if all Locke's other writings had perished, to
leave him a high name in philosophy". Hobbes had indeed
suggested that labor is the foundation of property, but Locke
was the first to place the doctrine in a clear light.*) It
*) De Cive XIII. I.4. Lev. II. 24. “plenty dependeth, next to God's fa-
vour, merely on the labor and industrie of men”. See also Roscher:
Grundlagen der Nationalökonomie. I8te Auflage. p. I Io. Note (6). Sir
William Petty: “On Taxes”, 1679, says, “Labor is the father and active
principle of wealth, as lands are the mother. Land and labor together
are the sources of all wealth”. Roscher says of Locke, “Er ist der Gegner
alles volkswirthschaftlichen Aberglaubens! Während aber die meisten früheren
Nationalökonomen nur ganz einzelne, praktische Fragen erörterten, warf sich
— 115 —
has been questioned by James Mill whether Adam Smith had
as correct an understanding of the doctrine as did Locke, and
M’Culloch asserts, “he all but established the fundamental
principle which lies at the bottom of the science of wealth".
While Grotius and Pufendorf based property upon occupa-
tion, Locke held that labor only, gives a just title. Later,
Montesquieu and Bentham declared property to be a crea
tion of civil law, failing to distinguish between the creation
of a thing and its protection. Locke declared the whole
institution of property to be antecedent to, and independent
of, civil society, and that civil law can no more create prop-
erty than it can create a loaf of bread, land or labor.
While holding that it is the function of government to
protect property, he holds that government is so far from
originating property, that it is itself the creation of property
and for property. If civil law can create property, and
property rights, then it can dispense with them, can deprive
individuals of them with the same freedom that it created
them. “Private property is goods acquired by virtue of the
laws: the law alone constitutes property”, cried Mirabeau
to the Constituent Assembly, and Robespierre echoed,
“Property is the right that each citizen has to the enjoy-
ment of that portion of goods guaranteed to him by the
laws". But this was corrected by the Constitutional As-
sembly, in 1793, in the famous Declaration of Rights, which
propounds the rational guarantee of property, as well as a
just recognition of its existence, independent of civil society.
Article 16 declares, “The right of property is the right be-
longing to every citizen of using and disposing as he likes
of his goods, his revenues, of the fruits of his labor and his
industry", and Article 19, “No one shall be deprived of the
Locke mit besonderem Interesse auf die allgemeinsten theoretischen Grund-
lagen der Wissenschaft, auf diejenigen Theile der Nationalókonomie, welche
zunachst an das Gebiet der Psychologie angrenzen, und er behandelt sie
mit tiberraschender Vollständigkeit. Locke ist der früheste grosse Systema-
tiker der Volkswirthschaft, und insofern ein wirdiger Worläufer von Adam.
Smith.” Zur Gesch. der englischen Volkswirthschaftslehre. p. 93.
8%
— 116 —
least portion of his property without his consent, except
when public necessity, legally proven, evidently demands it,
and then only on condition of just compensation previously
made". This is Locke's doctrine. It rests upon a two-fold
basis, first, that every man has property in his person and
faculties, and secondly, that every man has property in the
product of his faculties, whether mental or physical. Such
rights, every legitimate government must guarantee. The
ethical force of Locke's doctrine of property is also two-
fold; first, property rights are natural rights, moral rights
which are not to be interfered with by government, secondly,
that these property rights are conditioned only by the pos-
itive duties which each man owes to every other man,
2S Iſla [l.
IV. Doc/rºne of the Stafe. “Political power I take to
be the right of making laws with penalties of death, and
consequently all less penalties for the regulating and pre-
serving of property, and of employing the force of the
community in the execution of such laws, and in the defence
of the commonwealth from foreign injury, and all this only
for the public good.” (II. 3.) Locke, here, uses the term
Żroperty in a broad sense. “Lives, liberties, and estates, I
call by the general name property.” (II. I23.) Thus Locke
holds that government has no other end than the preserva-
tion of property. (II. 94.) The only reason for leaving the
state of nature and entering into political Society, is, for the
mutual preservation of life, liberty, and estates. (II. I23–13 I.)
The extent of the functions of government under this de-
finition may be seen by a reference to Locke's “Poor Law
Reform Bill”. The increase of pauperism during the seven
barren years, 1692–99, demanded relief. “The cause of
this increase in pauperism”, says Locke, “is neither scarcity
of provisions, nor want of employment, but the relaxation
of discipline, and the corruption of manners. The first step
in assisting the poor ought to be a restraint of their de-
bauchery by the suppression of superfluous brandy shops
and unnescessary alehouses”. Locke here strikes at the root
– 117 –
evil in society, and the main cause of pauperism. He con-
siders the suppression of any traffic which becomes a public
evil, whether it be a brandy shop, or a monopoly, within
the jurisdiction of the state. “Enjoyers of monopolies", he
says, “are no better than harpies and horse leeches (i. e.),
devourers of the people's properties, and ravishers of their
liberties.” Locke would extend the functions of govern-
ment as far as his definition of property and the end Salus
populi suprema lex, demand.") We have seen that in a
state of nature every one has a right to punish the breach
of its law. The state of nature is a sort of Theocracy, as
each man is to execute the law as he is answerable to the
Judge of all men. Locke says, “I easily grant that civil
government is the proper remedy for the inconveniences of
the state of nature, which must certainly be great." But
he maintains that “a state of nature is preferable to abso-
lute monarchy, where one man has the liberty to be judge
in his own case, and may do to all his subjects whatever
he pleases”. (II. I3. 21.) In reply to the question, when
was there ever such a state of nature, Locke has several
answers, and finally affirms that all men are naturally in that
state, and remain so till, by their own consent, they make
themselves members of some politic society. (II. I5.)
The origin of every legitimate political society, according
*) Fox Bourne. Life of Locke. II. 378. 319. Locke's contribution
to Political Science, so far as we know, has not received special treatment.
If he anticipated Adam Smith in the true doctrine of wealth, he also antic-
ipated Bentham by announcing the correct nature of interest. The moral
'bearings of political questions, were carefully estimated by Locke. Take,
for instance, the question of establishing the rate of Interest by law. Locke
declares such an attempt both fruitless and demoralizing. You may as
rationally hope to to set a fixed rate upon the hire of houses or ships, as
of money. Such a measure is immoral, because it refuses to the borrower
the right of protecting his property, and encourages perjury in the lender.
As an illustration of the vicious results of unjust interference on the part
of government in free contract and exchange, Locke cites the remark of a
member of an honest, sober class of men, “God forbid that a custom-house
oath should be a sin.” Works II. 48.
...tº
— 1 18 —
• ?
$
\ to Locke, is by compact.") Every man, by consenting with
others to make one body politic, under one government,
puts himself under an obligation to every-one of that society
to submit to the determination of the majority, and to be
\concluded by it. (II. 97.) The difference between the com-
pact of Hobbes and of Locke is the difference between ab-
Solute monarchy and popular government. It is the object
of Locke to preserve the individual; that of Hobbes to ex-
tinguish him. On the other hand, Locke differs as widely
from the Cozz/raž Socia/ of Rousseau, which endeavors to
extend the will of the majority to the actual will of all, a
doctrine which Locke repudiated, and is, as Locke remarks,
“like Cato's coming into the theatre only to go out again.”
“Chacun se donnant à tous, ne se donne a personne,” said
Rousseau. Not so, said Locke. For the consent of the
majority, shall, in reason, be received as the act of the whole,
and conclude every individual. (II. 98.) It is a capital error
to associate the compact of Locke with that of either
Hobbes or Rousseau. Locke did not confuse the law of
nature with the Contract Relation, as did Rousseau, nor did
he fall into the error of Hobbes, by maintaining that law had
*) In treating of the family, Locke shows how, from the authority
of fathers, different forms of monarchy might naturally arise. Parents are
under an obligation to preserve, nourish and educate their children, and
children are under obligations to honor their parents. “We are born
free, as we are born rational, not that we have actually the exercise of
either. Age, which brings one, brings with it the other, too. And thus
we see how natural freedom, and subjection to parents, may consist together,
and are both founded on the same principle.” Locke also recognizes the
strong hold the father has upon his children through his power of distributing
his property as he pleases. ,Thus, the natural fathers of families, by an
insensible change, become the politic monarchs of them too; and as they
chanced to live long and leave able and worthy heirs, for several suc-
cessions, or otherwise; so they laid the foundations for hereditary or elective
kingdoms under several constitutions or manners, according as chance, con-
tinuance, or occasions happened to mould them.” Locke finds here a sort
of compact. “Thus it was easy and almost natural for children, by a tacit
and scarce avoidable consent, to make way for the father's authority and
government.” Gov. II. 55. 56.
— 119 —
its origin in contract. He combats both these theories by
maintaining that Contract is the beginning of Political
Society, and that the positive laws of political society are
only so far just as they conform to natural laws, which are
in their nature eternal and immutable. In matter of fact,
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau represent three distinct
theories, while that of Locke alone, is undogmatic, and .
guarded by many judicious observations. Hobbes founds |
his entire system upon a contract, without giving any reason J
why man, as man, should keep the contract, or any contract.
There is absolutely no basis in human nature given by
Hobbes, for either his Natural Law or his Leviathan.
“Government”, says Locke, “is everywhere antecedent to
records, and letters seldom come in amongst a people till
a long continuation of civil society. But to deny a state
of nature is like denying that the armies of Salmanasser and
Xerxes were ever children because we hear little of them
till they were men, and embodied in armies.” The point
upon which Locke here insists, is this; That which º)
and actually constitutes any political Society, is nothing but
the consent of any number of free men capable, of a ma-
jority, to unite, and incorporate into a society. And this
is that, and that only, which did, or could, give a beginning
to any lawful government in the world. (II. 29.) “As far as
we have any light from history", says Locke, “we have a
right to conclude that all peaceful beginnings of government
have been laid in the consent of the people.” He argues
his position at length, illustrating from Israel, Rome, Venice,
Peru, Mexico, and the North American Indians.") Locke's
*) The doctrine maintained by Locke on the origin of civil society,
the position of the family, and the nature of contract, is, in substance Sup-
ported by Sir Henry Maine, in his “Early Law and Customs”, chap. VII.
on the family side, and in his “Ancient Law”, chap V. on the contract
side. Both Locke and Maine agree, that the verdict of a careful investi-
gation of history, , is, that “It is Contract”, which, lies at the foundation of
civil Society, and that all “social, order arises from the free agreement of
Individuals". “Neither Ancient Law, nor any other source of evidence”,
says Maine, “discloses to us society entirely destitute of the conception
— 120 —
doctrine of contract is not that mechanical and unhistoric
form that is so often credited to him. He argues it on the
grounds of history and reason. Locke assumes a state of
nature as a necessary postulate for political speculation, and
he argues that men in this state are rational and social,
free and equal beings. He also maintains that antecedent
2-ſto the institution of political society and the framing of its
i | code, there existed these same powers potentially in man;
* that a natural code is given in the natural reason of man
h to govern his conduct, and that no institution of civil
| isociety can lawfully disturb, or be framed apart from this
ſ natural and eternal code, but must, in reason and in justice,
\be founded upon it. The principles which fall under this
view are few and simple, and although they are the basal
elements in any civil society, and the regulative principles
of all just legislation, they leave room for the greatest divers-
ity of form, as they manifest themselves in different times
and peoples. Civil governments have their origin and
existence only in the human will, they are the products of
men, and like all human products they may be well or
ill constructed.
The constitution of government, as given by Locke,
differs radically from that of Hobbes on the one hand, and
Rousseau on the other. The government is placed in the
hands of the majority, and its divisions are three-fold. This
three-fold division of government, hinted at by Aristotle, but
generally credited to Montesquieu, was worked out for
modern politics by Locke. That this division of political
power stands in strict consistency with his doctrine of the
state of nature, and is suggested by it, is evident from the
following passage. “In the state of nature there are many
things wanting. Fºrsſøy, there wants an established, settled,
of Contract.” Ancient Law. p. 312. It is strange that Locke should be
regarded as in harmony with those who make the origins of religon, law
and language, artificial and arbitrary. He declares; “Languages were made
not by rules of art; but by accident and the common use of the people.”
Ed. 168. Religion, language and law are natural, not artificial products.
— 121 —
known law, Secondly, a known and indifferent judge. Thºrd/y,
there often wants a power to back and support the sentence
when right, and to give it due execution.” (II. I24. I26.)
Here we have the prospect of the Legislative, Judicial, and
Executive functions of Government.(Let us notice also, that
Locke declares these to be the conditions of the full pro-
tection of the lives, liberties, and estates of the citizens
of a commonwealth, and that Chapter VII of his second
Essay on Government bears the title, “Of the Legislative,
Executive, and Federative Power of the Commonwealth.”
The legislative is the supreme power. The people alone
can appoint the form of the Commonwealth, which is by
constituting the legislative, and appointing in whose hands
it shall be. (II. I.4.1.) The executive and federative powers
are ministerial, and subordinate to the legislative. (II. I 53.)
But the legislative or supreme power is bound to govern
by established standing laws, promulgated and known to
the people, and not by extemporary decrees; by indifferent
and upright judges who are to decide controversies by those
laws; and to employ the force of the community at home
only in the execution of such laws, or abroad, to prevent
or redress foreign injuries and secure the community from
inroad or invasion. (II. I 3 I.) The power of the legislative is
limited in every commonwealth, and in every form of govern-
ment by the appointing Society, and the laws of God and
nature. The laws of commonwealths are only so far right
as they are founded on the law of nature, by which they
are to be regulated and interpreted. (II. 12.) The legislature
is to govern equitably by promulgated, established laws,
which are designed for no other end than the good of the
people. It must not raise taxes on the property of the
people, without the consent of the people, or transfer the
power of making laws to anybody else, or place it any-
where but where the people have placed it. (II. I.42.) The
executive and federative powers, although subordinate to
the legislative, are distinct powers with different functions.
Though these two powers be distinct in themselves, they
— 122 —
are hardly to be separated absolutely in practise, inasmuch
as both rest ultimately upon the force of the community
for their exercise, and because an absolute separation might,
under certain circumstances, cause disorder and ruin. There
must be a basis of harmony, as well as of responsibility,
and these are found in Society at large and in the common
good. (II. I.45–148.) But in all moderate and well framed
governments the legislative and executive powers must be
in distinct hands. (II. I 59. I 5 I. I 52.)
ſ The dissolution of government occurs whenever the ends
+ of government are betrayed by those to whom these trusts
have been committed. When a prince sets up his own ar.
bitrary will in the place of the laws, hinders the work of
the legislature, changes electors or ways of election, brings
the people into subjection to a foreign power, neglects or
abandons his duty, or, when the legislative acts contrary to
its trusts, there real government ends, and the people are
at liberty to provide for themselves by erecting a new leg-
islative and appointing a new executive. Who are to be
the judges of these breaches of trust? Locke replies; the
feoff/e. To the objection that this would make govern-
ments of short duration, and lay a ferment for rebellion,
Locke replies that the effect is quite the contrary. “People
are not so easily got out of their old forms, as some are
apt to suggest." In view of the history of governments the
trouble is, to remedy abuses when they are publicly known,
and an occasion is offered for their correction. In such a
supposition Locke has been justified by the subsequent
history of his country, where many of the abuses, such as
those touching parliamentary reform, representation, laws,
finances, and racial disabilities, have been only partly ad-
justed in the present century. Bacon was no visionary when
he thought he saw, “Nolumus leges Angliae mutari, imprinted
in the hearts of all the people”. (Advice to Villars. II. 2.)
Locke, continues his defence, smiting Hobbism with vigorous
blows. “When a people are made miserable, and find
themselves exposed to the ill-usage of arbitrary power, cry
— 123 —
up their governors as much as you will for sons of Jupiter,
let them be sacred and divine, descended or authorized from
heaven, give them out for whom or what you please, the
same will happen. The people, generally ill-treated and
contrary to right, will be ready upon any occasion to ease
themselves of a burden that sits heavy upon them.” (II. 224.)
In support of this, Locke makes an appeal to the histories
of all sorts of government. So far from being a cause of
ferment and rebellion, this doctrine of the right of resistance
is the greatest preventative of it, since it holds princes and
legislators to their duty, as the people have always the
power of deposing them and electing their successors. The/
question whether civil disorders oftenest arise from the wan-
tonness and disobedience of the people, or from the insolence
of rulers, desiring to get and exercise absolute power over
their people, Locke leaves to impartial history to determine.
But Locke does not view civil questions solely from the
stand-point of the people. Government, in its various de-
partments, is not to be interfered with in the discharge of
its duty. The person or faction which invades the rights
of just governments or seeks to overthrow them is to be:
regarded as “the common enemy and pest of mankind, and \
is to be treated accordingly". Considering, especially the i
histories of England, France, and the United States, we )
may concur in the judgment of Blakey that no treatise
ancient or modern, has had so great an influence on civil-
lized states.")
V. Doctrzne of Pumzshment. Locke's doctrine of punish-
ment, both in the state of nature and in political Society,
is, “each transgression may be punished to that degree,
and with so much severity as will suffice to make it an ill
bargain to the offender, give him cause to repent, and ter-
rify others from doing the like".”) Here Locke is in har-
mony with the best thought on the subject. The ends of
*) History of Political Literature. Vol. II. 17o.
*) Gov. II. 12. Compare, King. Life of Locke. 302. 303.
— 124 —
punishment are, the reformation of the criminal, and the
preservation of others from the commission of crime. But,
in Book II. 28; 8–29 of his Essay concerning Human
Understanding, Locke has entered into the philosophy of
punishment in such a way that his doctrine of Personal
Identity has been often classed among the vagaries of meta-
physicians. M. Cousin, as usual, thinks Locke is annihil-
ating the foundations of morality.") Locke's treatment of
the subject is certainly far from being luminous, but his
main thought seems sufficiently clear. It has been generally
overlooked that Locke is here speaking of the moral per-
Sonality, and discussing it under the general subject of re-
lations. The essence of his doctrine is contained in this;
“punishment is annexed to personality, and personality to
consciousness", by which Locke means that the only moral
object of reward and punishment is a conscious personality.
But what is the relation between consciousness and per-
sonality? The answer to this question will give Locke's
position. “Person", says Locke, “is a thinking, intelligent
being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself
as itself, as the same thinking thing, in different times and
places, which it does only by that consciousness which is
inseparable from thinking”. (II. 27; 9.) Again, and in this
lies the real force of his position, “Person is a forensic term,
appropriating actions and their merit, and so belongs only
to intelligent agents capable of a law". (II. 27; 6.) “Person",
is to be taken strictly in a forensic sense, as indicating that
element in man which constitutes him a moral, responsible
being, amenable to law. It is that which appropriates ac-
tions and their merit, that which makes man a true object
of rewards and punishments. How an unconscious being
can be a responsible subject of moral or civil law, and an
object of rewards and punishments for actions committed,
of which he has no knowledge, we, with Locke, fail to
understand. But notice the cautious application which Locke
*) “Philosophie de Locke”. p. 144—149.
makes of his doctrine. “For though punishment be annexed
to personality, and personality to consciousness, and the
drunkard perhaps be not conscious of what he did, yet
human judicatures justly punish him, because the fact is
proved against him, but want of consciousness cannot be
proved for him. But in the great day, wherein the secrets
of all hearts shall be laid open, it may be reasonable to
think no one shall be made to answer for what he knows
nothing of, but shall receive his doom, his conscience ac-
cusing or excusing him." (II. 27; 22.) Locke afterwards
explains that drunkenness being a voluntary defect, want
of consciousness ought not to be presented in favor of the
drunkard; but frenzy and insanity being involuntary, and
misfortunes, not faults, have a right to that plea when they
are real. All that human justice can do, says Locke, is to
distinguish between what is real and what is counterfeit in
such cases.") Locke's position on the question is that of ra-
tional Jurisprudence. “Human laws do not punish the mad-
man for the sober man's actions, nor the sober man for
what the mad-man did.” (II. 27. I 3.) Thus we find in the
German Penal Code; “An act is not punishable, when the
person, at the time of doing it, was in a state of uncon-
sciousness or disease of mind by which a free determination
of the will was excluded." The same position is maintained
by Dr. Mandsley, in his “Responsibility in Mental Disease”.
(3d. Ed. p. I IO.) This seems to be the substance of Locke's
doctrine of personal identity. Considering the place in which
it appears, the use of Żerson as a mere forensic term, and
the application which Locke makes of his theory, it seems
strange that, it should ever have been regarded as any
other than a legal or moral doctrine of responsibilty.
VI. Doc/rzzze of the Church. According to Locke, re-
ligion, like politics, is a part of ethics. “Moral philosophy
in my sense", he says, “comprehends religion too, or a man's
whole duty”. Christ is, to Locke, not only the greatest moral
*) Letters, Locke to Molyneux. Dec. 23. I693. May 26. 1694.
— 126 —
philosopher the world has known, but also the greatest re-
ligious teacher. Locke finds in Him morality and religion
made one. “Jesus Christ, bringing by revelation from heaven
the true religion to mankind, reunited these two again, re-
ligion and morality, as the inseparable parts of the worship.
of God.”") We have already referred to Locke's Theology
and Christology in our chapter on the foundations of Ethics.
Here we need only speak of the Church as an institution.
Locke tells us that the proper matter of the laws of this
Society are of three sorts, credenda, cultus religiosus, and
moralia.”)
Cºedemda, or matters of faith and opinion, which ter-
minate in the understanding, are affairs of private judgment.
Each one has the Supreme and absolute authority of judging
for himself.”) Christ appealed to individuals, not to Churches.
We have the example of Christ, the Scriptures, and Reason;
thus each individual is responsible for his own opinions re-
specting Christianity. Reason and faith are not to be sep-
arated. Hume remarks, “Locke seems to have been the
first Christian who ventured openly to assert that faith was
nothing but a species of reason, that religion was only a
branch of philosophy, and that a chain of arguments similar
to that which established any truth in politics, morals, and
physics, was always employed in discovering all the prin-
ciples of theology, natural and revealed.”) Locke holds
there is nothing in Christianity contrary to reason, although
there are some things above reason, such as the resurrection
of the dead. Concerning miracles, Locke does not deny
that God can, or hath, performed them, but he holds, that
reason must be the judge of what is a miracle, and what
not; that miracles are to be judged by the doctrine, and
not the doctrine by the miracles, and that ‘it will always
*) King, Life of Locke, pp. IOT. 5. 287.
*) King, Life of Locke. p. 301. -
8) Letter on Toleration. I. Letter to Collins. Oct. 1, 1703 to R. King.
Sept. 27. I704.
*) Treatise of Human Nature. Vol. II. 388. Ed. by Green.
— 127 —
be a great miracle that God should alter the course of nat-
ural things, to overthrow the principles of knowledge and
understanding in a man, by setting up anything to be re-
ceived by him as a truth to which his own reason cannot
assent.”) “Had God intended that none but the learned
scribe, the disputer or wise of this world should be Christians,
or be saved, their religion should have been prepared for
them, filled with speculations and niceties, obscure terms
and abstract notions.” Articles of faith should be few, and
comprehensive. Many articles of faith create heresies and
schisms in the Church, and end in the ruin of religion; if
Schisms and heresies were traced up to their original causes,
it would be found that they have sprung chiefly from multi-
plying articles of faith, and narrowing the bottom of religion
by clogging it with creeds, and catechisms, and endless
niceties.*) The purpose of Locke’s “Reasonableness of Chris-
tianity” seems to be two-fold. Fºsſ, to shew that the entire
system is a rational system, as against the Deism of Her-
bert, Hobbes, and Blount. Second/y, to show what consti-
tutes a rational and saving faith, as against the interminable
catechisms and creeds of the various sects. The question
of Justification is reduced to this. “Faith only, and inward
sincerity, are the things that procure acceptance with God... .
All who believe that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah, the
Son of God, are saved.”*) This belief involves, or assumes,
repentance. The heathen may be saved by repentance and
by following the light or law of nature. Without faith,
repentance, and obedience, there is no salvation. We do
not know that Locke was ever branded as an Atheist, but
Mr. Edwards, one of Locke's critics, thought a Socinian an
Atheist, or one that ſavors the cause of Atheism, and that
Locke was “all over Socinianized”. Kuno Fischer comes
*) Fox Bourne, Life of Locke. I. 463—464. This appears to be the
text of Hume's Essay on Miracles.
*) Essay concerning Toleration. Fox Bourne, Life of Locke. I. 168.
*) First Letter concerning Toleration.
— 128 —
almost as near giving Locke the character of a Materialist
and Deist. “In der Psychologie wird er nahezu ein Materialist;
in der Theologie ein Deist. Er legt dort den Keim der
materialistischen Seelenlehre, den die französische Philosophie
aufnimmt, er bildet hier den Baconischen Deismus fort, und
eröffnet die Reihe der englischen Deisten.” (Franz Baco.
p. 418.) The materialism of Locke hangs upon a very
slender thread. His position is thus stated by himself;
“Though it be most highly probable that the soul is im-
material, yet, upon my principles, it cannot be demonstra-
ted; because it is not impossible to God's omnipotency, if
he pleases, to bestow upon some parcels of matter, disposed
as he sees fit, the faculty of thinking.”") Locke maintains
that “All the great ends of morality and religion are well
enough secured without philosophical proof of the soul's
immateriality". He denies to philosophy the right to dog-
matize on the essence of the soul, unless it can furnish evi-
dence that produces knowledge. “We know there is some-
thing in us that has the power to think, but we know not
wherein thinking consists, nor to what kind of substance the
Almighty has been pleased to give that power.””) Mate-
rialism, with Locke, is not so much as a probability. Of
his Deism little need be said. The only ground for the
charge, is, that he maintained the Reasonableness of Christian-
ity.”) Deism, in England, took its rise in Hobbes and
Herbert, and was placed in open antagonism to Christianity
*) Works I. 758. H. U. IV. 3. 6. II. 23. 15.
*) H. U. II. I. Io. II. 23. 5. II, 27. 27.
*) Tholuck remarks that the English and Hollandish Aufklärung
shows the following fundamental ideas. I. Der gesunde Menschenverstand
(die Vernunft), die hôchste Norm der Entscheidung in Glaubenssachen.
2. Die natürliche Religion, der wesentliche Inhalt aller Religionen, auch
der christlichen. 3. Die Moral, der wesentliche Inhalt der natürlichen
Religion. 4. Die Schrift, eine historische, unzuverlässige Quelle, und die
Inspiration der Schrift eine grundlose Woraussetzung. (Gesch. des Rationalis-
mus. Erste Abtheilung, p. 98.) In our view Locke holds to the first three
points, but rejects and combats the last, which is really the distinguishing
feature of Deism.
— 129 —
by Charles Blount. The five innate principles of Herbert,
which were taken up by Blount and others to show the
uselessness of Christianity, if contrasted with Locke's five
principles, which show the usefulness of Christianity, will
place the matter in the clearest light. Moreover, it is to
be remarked, that the arguments and the method with which
Locke assailed the Deism of the seventeenth century, were
taken up by Bishop Butler with great effect in the Deistic
controversy of the eighteenth century. Butler settled the
Deistic controversy, says Mill, by proving conclusively that
whatever arguments are used against the Scriptures as a
Divine Revelation, applied still more sharply against the
Deistis, or, that the difficulties of Deism were greater than
those of Christianity.") If we remember that the vital issue
in the Deistic controversy was respecting the reasonableness
of Christianity, we may easily estimate the contribution of
Locke from his Essay on this subject. Yet, to deny that
much of Locke's writing stimulated the movement, would
be to overlook a part, at least, of his service to a truly
rational religious belief.
Chaſ/?as reſigzoszás. Locke's polity is as simple as his
creed. Hobbes pleaded for his Leviathan that there was
nothing in it against Episcopacy. In the work of Locke
there is nothing for Episcopacy. In his “Defence of Noncon-
formity", Locke reviews the pretensions of the Church of
England as voiced by Stillingfleet in 1680. Locke denies
the right to coin opinions into truth, and make them cur-
rent by authority; he holds that Anabaptists and Quakers
have as much Divine authority as the Church of England,
and he shows, by a review of Ecclesiastical history that the
polity and ritualism of the Established Church have no
foundation in the times of the Apostles and Evangelists.”)
No man is born a member of any Church. He is always at
liberty to quietly withdraw from any communion into which
*) Autobiography. p. 38–40.
*) King, Life of Locke. 346—358.
Curtis, Locke’s Ethical Philosophy. 9
— 130 —
he has entered. A Church is defined to be “a voluntary
society of men, joining themselves together of their own
accord in order to the public worshipping of God in such
a manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and effectual
to the salvation of their souls.” (1st Tol.) A Church is
not instituted for the exercising of an external pomp, nor
for the obtaining of ecclesiastical dominion, nor for the exer-
cising of compulsive force, but for the regulating of men's
lives according to the rules of virtue or piety. Yet the
Church must have a government, or certain rules, to
regulate the society. The making of these rules belongs to
the members of the Church itself. Locke endorses the
Independent or Congregational system of government, and
limits the authority of the Church to the enforcement of
the few simple rules which are necessary to preserve the
life and peace of this society. The execution of these laws
may be delegated to a few of the oldest, wisest, and most
upright men in the society. Any member of the Society
who, after repeated admonitions, continues to violate its
rules, may be expelled from the communion. “This, I think,
is the whole end, latitude, and extent of ecclesiastical power
and religious society.”*) The separation of Church and
State is absolute. The only possible ground of the inter-
ference of the State in matters of religion, is, when public
peace and order are assailed. A religion that teaches im-
morality, slavery of mind and body, opposes itself to the
public good, to the foundations of Society and religion, and
must be regulated by the people in the interests of all.
That a Church should ever become a persecuting power,
or even a civil power, is contrary to the teaching of Christ.
Locke has written upon these questions with tiresome full-
ness. Logically expressed, the sum of his argument against
persecutions, is this; “Grant that innocent error in religious
matters is possible; grant that a man is bound to speak
the truth as to his religious beliefs; it follows that perse-
*) King, Life of Locke. p. 3OI.
cution implies punishment of men for an action which the
punisher admits to be virtuous.” Locke would abolish perse-
cution from both civil and ecclesiastical polity. According
to his view it has no place whatever among rational beings.
The jurisdiction of a State extends no further than the
preservation of the lives, liberties, and estates of its citizens,
through the working of a rational system of prosecution and
punishment of crimes and misdemeanors.
A/oza/a, or the right management of our actions in re-
spect to ourselves and others, is the third and most impor-
tant function of the Church. Locke's ethical conception of
religion was early developed. In his “Reflections on the Roman
Commonweath", written not later than 1660, he admires
the wisdom of Numa, who prevented all factions and divisions
in the Church by the institution of only two articles of
faith; the first, that the Gods were the authors of all good
to mankind; and the second, that to merit this good the
Gods were to be worshipped, in which worship, the chief of
all was to be innocent, good, and just") As morality is the
proper concern and business of all mankind, so is it of the
Church in particular. Here the interest of Church and State
are One. ‘A good life, in which consists, not the least part
of religion and true piety, concerns also the civil govern-
ment, and in it lies the safety, both of men's souls, and of
the commonwealth. The practise of principles which in-
fluence the will and manners of men, are best stated in the
Gospel of Christ, and it is the mission of His Church to
follow its Master by promulgating and practising these
principles'. Locke does not reduce religion to ethics, but
raises ethics to the dignity and obligation of a religion
which is at once rational and beneficial to all. “The
Christian religion which we profess”, says Locke, “is not a
rational science to furnish speculation to the brain, or dis-
course to the tongue, but a rule of righteousness to influence
our lives. We hold it to be an indispensable duty for all
*) Fox Bourne, Life of Locke. Vol. I. p. 149.
Christians to maintain love and charity in the diversity of
contrary opinions. We each of us think it our duty to prop-
agate the doctrine and practise of universal good will and
obedience, in all places and on all occasions, as God shall
give us opportunity.") With Locke, both religion and
morality center in the one imperative principle, love. “Love
of man, and love of truth for truth's sake, are the roots
which support all true religion and morality.” Thus, in the
“Rules of a Society for improvement in useful knowledge,
and for the promoting of Truth and Christian Charity", the
conditions of membership are affirmative answers to the
following: “Whether he loves all men, of what profession
or religion soever. Whether he thinks no person ought to
be harmed in his body, name or goods, for mere specula-
tive opinions, or his external way of worship. Whether he
loves and seeks truth for truth's sake, and will endeavour
impartially to find and receive it himself, and to communi-
cate it to others." With Locke, religion is a reasonable
and practical matter, and the Church an organisation of
earnest religious men, practising and promulgating the pre-
cepts of Christianity. The aim of the Church is, to realise
the kingdom of God among men as it is manifested in the
person and doctrine of Jesus Christ. His creed was Christo-
centric, and he followed it through his long life with
unswerving devotion. He saw in Christ, the Saviour of men,
and he strove to draw attention from the pompous and
empty ritualism, the narrow and exclusive doctrines of the
Church of England, to Him “who went about doing good",
and whose gospel, unhampered by ecclesiastical trappings,
is the wisdom and power of God.
*) , Idea of a Pure Christian Community.” King, Life of Locke.
276–278. “I lay it down as a principle of Christianity, that the right
and only way to Saving orthodoxy, is the sincere and steady purpose of a
good life” p. 284.
Chapter VI.
C on clusion.
I. Locke's system has been charged with glaring con-
tradictions and his institutionalism with ultra-individualism.
We have endeavored to point out some misconceptions of
Locke's doctrine on which such charges rest, and to indicate
the trend of his thought on the main questions of ethics.
His Essay has been called ‘the Philosopher's Bible'. This is
true, not only in the sense that subsequent philosophy has
been very largely drawn from it, but also, that the most
divergent and extraordinary theories have claimed its support.
That Locke's terminology is often obscure, that his phraseology
is sometimes misleading, that the division of his work is
not strictly systematic and that he now and then introduces
matter apparently irrelevant to his main positions, we think
no one can deny. But such blemishes are by no means
peculiar to the work of Locke. They belong to all great
speculative systems, or at least are accredited to them by
those who feel and know more or less than their authors.
Locke's genius was, not of system and dogmatism like that
of Hobbes and Kant, but of observation and investigation
like that of Aristotle and Bacon. It has often been re-
marked that no philosopher since Aristotle has made and
recorded so many valuable observations, or given so great
a stimulus to human thought. But more remarkable still
seem the diversity of his gifts, and the many departments
of knowledge in which he gained distinction. As a philos-
opher, represented by his Essay concerning Human Under-
standing, he stands in the foremost rank of the few who
are recognised as master minds. As an Educationalist, both
practical and theoretical, his position is not less eminent and
influential. As a Theologian, his numerous works on religion
give him a high place, and his commentaries on the Epist-
— 134 —
les of Paul, though Watts represents Locke in Heaven
repenting of his work, were regarded by Bishop Law as
introducing a new method, by which Biblical Science was
greatly advanced. As a Physician, he won the highest
praise of the “great Sydenham", who dedicated to Locke
his work on the “History and Cure of Acute Diseases”. He
was consulted by the King, and he saved the life of the
first Lord Shaftesbury, by performing a difficult operation.
As a Political Economist, he anticipated Adam Smith, and
advanced the Science, then in its cradle, more than any other
writer of his century. As a Financier his writings upon
money won the highest praise from Leibniz, and another
declares; “He cleared the subject of trade and commerce,
and the uses of money, from mystery". In 1695 he was
foremost in placing the credit and coinage of England upon
a solid basis, and in saving the country from grave troubles.
As a Publicist, his second Treatise of Government probably
had more influence on succeeding political history than any
other one work. This, in connection with his labor on the
Act of Toleration of 1689, and against the Censorship of
the Press, places him in the foremost rank of the defenders
of political liberty. As a Philologist, “the immortal third
book” of his Essay gives him the title, “father of the
modern science of language". Indeed, there was scarcely
any department of life and knowledge to which Locke did
not contribute. He was one of the founders of the Royal
Society; one of the original proprietors of the Bank of Eng-
land, and for twenty four years Commissioner of Appeals.
Perhaps no philosopher could more truly say, “Humani nil
a me alienum puto".
In this diversity of gifts and services we discover a unity
of thought and purpose. The same consistency may be
claimed for his ethical doctrines that all recognize in his life,
although it would be hard to give a satisfactory solution
to all difficulties presented in his writings. As with the
Stoics, there is a certain fondness of placing opposites Over
against each other. But if we take Ueberweg's advice
— 135 —
concerning Aristotle's principle of Excluded Middle to avoid
confusing the terms contrary and contradictory, the contra-
dictions in Locke's system, for the most part at least, dis-
appear. It would to difficult to give a Key to Locke's entire
system, but we may suggest that a correct understanding
of his Złºdzøza'ºza/?sº reveals the unity of his moral teaching.
Locke is undoubtedly correct in finding the unit of society,
and consequently of all sociology, in the Individual rather
than in the Family. In this he places his system squarely
upon a psychological basis, first of all giving attention to
the nature and limitations of the human mind. In the in-
dividyal is contained, potentially, all institutionalism. Man is
a rational, social, religious and political being. School and
Family, Church and State, are the institutional expressions of
human nature and are not artificial products. Locke views
man in these different relations, but never allows one to
forget that they are only various aspects of one and the
same subject and are all comprehended in one moral system.
Here he may be compared with the Stoics, and be con-
trasted with Adam Smith, who, taking the same comprehen-
sive view of moral philosophy developed a political system
of Selfishness, apparently in conflict with his ethical system of
sympathy. But these results are merely statical. As in the
analysis of human nature we come upon the kernel which
contains potentially all institutionalism, so we come upon
that thought which alone is able to unify and vitalize all.
The concept of God is the moral dynamic in human
society. In God, Locke finds with the Stoics the A6/ot
07teguctuxoi. He regards the thought of God as a natural,
formal, necessary and transcendental principle at the root
of human nature and institutions, and consistently declares
that the denial of it dissolves all. This fundamental certainty
of the reason, alone gives a sufficient explanation and sanction
to the principles of morality.
The objections urged against Locke's Individualism, are
for the most part removed by his psychological standpoint,
and particularly by his doctrine of education which he every-
— 136 —
where considers of primary importance to national welfare,
the object of education being to make the individual a moral
force in society. The chief weakness of modern democracy,
is, that it has no sound, vigorous, educational system at its
basis. The constant danger in the rule of all, is, that none
is able to rule himself. The moral and intellectual training
which Locke placed at the bottom of his institutionalism,
has been left, in most cases, to take care of itself, while an
effort has been made to realize his superstructure apart
from its natural and necessary foundations. Locke, like
Fichte, looked for the moral regeneration of his country,
primarily, neither through politics nor religion, but through
education.
II. To trace the influence of Locke on the ethical
philosophy since his time would be to write the greater
part of the history of English ethics for the last two hun-
dred years. We can here only indicate two or three direc-
tions that were taken by ethical speculation immediately
succeeding Locke. Locke's relation to Utilitarian and AS-
sociational Ethics is not so close as has generally been
supposed. Locke did not advance a step beyond Hobbes
in the Association theory. His exposition of this phenomenon
of the mind is perhaps inferior to that given by Hobbes.
Locke regards Association as a “disease of the mind", and
a fruitful source of mistake and error. “By this one easy
and unheeded miscarriage of the understanding, sandy and
loose foundations become infallible principles, that will not
suffer themselves to be touched or questioned; such unnat-
ural connections become by custom as natural to the mind
as sun and light.” Locke sees nothing more in the as-
sociation of ideas than the confusion of ideas which fills
men's “heads with false views, and their reasonings with false
consequences".") According to Locke, one might as well
*) Conduct of the Understanding, See. XLI. H. U. II. 33. Louis
Ferri. “La Psychologie de l'Association depuis Hobbes jusqu'a nos jours"
holds that “Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley made little advance on Aristotle
explore Bedlam, for laws of the sound mind, as the pheno-
mena of the Association of ideas. Nor does Locke appear
to make any use of principles peculiar to Evolutional ethics,
although he anticipates Darwinian views by holding that
the boundaries of species are not immovable; that nature
does not keep the supposed and real species distinct and
entire but occasionally produces objects which fall into no
recognized class.")
With regard to Utilitarianism it is difficult to define
Locke's position, simply because it is hard to say just what
is Utilitarianism. The general end, happiness, Locke accepts,
but he insists on defining happiness in the terms of virtue.
The gross egoistic hedonism of Hobbes, and the basing of
moral distinctions on the utility of actions to produce hap-
piness, Locke sharply repudiates. It is well known that
Paley drew very largely upon Locke in constructing his
system. But so far as he is Utilitarian, he leaves Locke,
and anticipates Bentham, whose moral theory is the farthest
removed from that of Locke. On the other hand, when
Paley says, “Virtue is doing good to mankind, in obedience
to the will of God, and for the sake of everlasting hap-
piness", he makes a concession to scholastic forms, which
Locke combatted. The form of Utilitarianism which Mill
took up from Cumberland and made current, while it em-
phasized universal benevolence, and the greatest good of
the greatest number involving the greatest good of the in-
dividual, made no advance upon the theories of Cumber-
land and Locke, and really failed to recognize the funda-
mental optimism which gives the strong support to the
and Augustine, and that Hartley and Hume are the real fathers of the
modern doctrine”. Although Locke was the first to invent the term
“Association of Ideas”, making it the title of one of his chapters, H. U.
II. 33, he did not, as do all Associationalists or those who reduce all
knowledge to experience, make the association of ideas the means of devel-
oping the higher powers, but, regarded it as a disease of the mind to be
remedied.
*) H. U. III. 6; 23. 27. 30. 36. 9; I I. I I ; 24.
— 138 —
benevolent theory. Locke's connection with Utilitarianism
is exceedingly meager, and to place him in its ranks, requires
a very vigorous misinterpretation of his doctrine. In his
discussions of natural laws and precepts, the appeal is never
to utility, but always to the imperative rule of right, although
Locke recognises that obedience to the rule of right involves
happiness, public and private. Even Locke's essays on
money, are based, not on utility, but on the abstract idea
that robbery is wrong. -
The fifth chapter of Professor Jodl's excellent “Ge-
schichte der Ethik” bears the title: “Locke, and his oppo-
nents, Clarke and Shaftesbury". This seems to us to be
an error, as neither Clarke nor Shaftesbury, so far as we
know, defined his positions with relation to Locke, but, on
the other hand, both argue, to a considerable extent, on
the lines laid down by Locke. Although Shaftesbury, in
one place, assails what he supposes to be Locke's doctrine
of virtue, his assault, as we have shown, is quite unintel-
ligible and misdirected.") Both Clarke and Shaftesbury are
to be classed with Locke as opponents of Hobbes. Clarke
took up Locke's supposition of making ethics a science like
that of mathematics, and carried the supposition into ab-
surdities from which Locke is free. The lines followed show
Clarke to be strongly under the influence of Locke, as viz,
in the demonstration of the existence of God; reason as
ethical faculty; the immutability of moral distinctions; the
reasonableness of Christianity; the obligations of rules of
righteousness, independent of rewards and punishments, Piety,
Equity, Benevolence, and Sobriety. While Locke sums up
all in the law of Love, Clarke comprehends them under the
*) In speaking of Locke's successors we do not mean to imply either
that they were, or were not, consciously, his disciples, but that they
worked, more or less, upon those lines which we conceive to have been
laid down by Locke. We maintain that the objections urged against
Locke by Butler on Identity, Shaftesbury on Virtue, and Price on Locke's
failure to account for all our ideas by sensation and reflection, are ob-
jections which have no valid foundation, as we think we have shown.
— 139 —
principle of Equity. “Whatever I judge reasonable or un-
reasonable for another to do for me, that, by the same
judgment I declare reasonable or unreasonable that I, in the
ilke case, should do for him.” It is evident that this is no
improvement upon what Locke had laid down in his prin-
ciple of Love, while it introduces a difficulty which Locke
escaped, viz, the difficulty contained in the words, “that I,
in the like case, should do for him”. This principle destroys
itself, and demonstrative morality along with it, for until
we are as much informed of the character and circumstances
of another as we are of our own, however much we may
applaud the rule as rational, or self evident, it remains a
dead law in the code of practical morality. This constitutes
one of Locke's objections to mathematical morality, and
indicates a point where Locke demands the assistance of
common sense, or practical judgment. In other main points
Clarke stands in essential harmony with Locke. His “fitness
and unfitness of the application of different things or differ-
ent relations, one to another", fall under Locke's relations,
and agreement or disagreement of ideas or propositions.
ŽHe maintains, with Locke, that it is as natural, and morally
/
speaking, as necessary, that the will should be determined
in every action by the reason of the thing and the right
of the case, as it is natural, and, absolutely speaking, neces-
sary, that the understanding should submit to a demon-
strative truth.
Dugald Stewart, in his “Dissertation", has associated
Shaftesbury with Locke, and, we believe, with justice, at
least in the main features of his practical philosophy. Cer-
tainly he showed the generous spirit and love of liberty of
his master. The doctrines of a moral sense and benevolence
were taken up by Shafteshury with less vigor than they
had been presented by More and Cumberland, while the
system which is generally ascribed to him was first put in
form by Hutcheson. The special service rendered by Shaftes-
bury was in the field of aesthetics. Although Shaftesbury
seems to draw on More and Cumberland more abundantly
— 140 —
than on any other of his predecessors, he agrees with Locke
on many important points. With Locke, he makes psycho-
logical experience the basis of ethics, and his psychology
is not different from that of Locke, though, on the whole,
less clear. For instance, where Locke recognises two classes
of affections, natural and unnatural, Shaftesbury illogically
makes three, natural, self, and unnatural affections, as if self
affections were not natural. He more than agrees with
Locke in the following statement, “The height of virtue
must be owing to the belief of a God", but he fails to
make any ethical use of this position in his doctrine of
obligation, as does Locke. The result is, that while he
agrees with Locke that happiness and virtue are one, and
that there can be no conflict between self-interest and the
public interest, his system presents no other obligation than
self-interest, and no other end than individual happiness.
Again, while languidly agreeing with Locke that moral
distinctions have their foundations in nature; that the rational
affections must triumph over the sensual, in order to virtue,
and that moral principles may be mathematically demon-
strated, he does not follow any one of these points with
vigour. Shaftesbury's theory of conscience is the same as
that presented by Locke. He makes no claim for an inde-
pendent or distinct faculty. His “moral sense” is a reflex
of experience which seems to correspond with Locke's
moral or rational judgment, yet has less force as it receives
no strength from the rational nature. But the Lockeian
spirit broods upon the pages of Shaftesbury, and we find
the latter in full agreement with the former in thinking that
to love one another is the fulfilment of the moral law, the
sum of all morality, the essence of religion, and the ground
of all human advancement. Both see in future rewards and
punishments inferior motives to a moral life, but a powerful
means of arousing men from their lethargy, and, rightly
understood, a reasonable stimulant to the hope and expec-
tations of virtue. The political ethics of Shaftesbury, so
far as he has suggested them, seem to be in strict agree-
– 141 —
ment with the views expressed in Locke's second Essay on
Government, and he makes use of the arguments of Locke
in combatting Hobbes.
In passing from Shaftesbury to Butler we enter a more
vigorous, but a less delightful atmosphere. Butler begins
where Locke began, holding it to be of prime importance
to investigate the nature of man, and see for what it is
adapted. Butler does not present a systematic psychology,
but he seems to pursue the general scheme of Locke. His
conception of man, like that of Locke and Shaftesbury, is
the reverse of that of Hobbes, and he holds with Locke,
against Shaftesbury, that the Reason is the sole umpire in
every department of knowledge. Here Butler is far more
confusing than Locke, as he speaks alternately of “Reason",
“Conscience”, “Principle of Reflection", and “Reflex Appro-
bation", but his position is given almost in the words of
Locke; “Reason is the only faculty which we have where-
with to judge concerning anything, even Revelation itself."
(Analogy II. 3.) He attempts, with Hobbes, Locke, and
Clarke, to state one general principle which may be taken
as a moral imperative. In his Sermon on Se!/- Deceſ? he
holds that a constant check to self-partiality, and a rule of
conduct, is found in the practical rule of Our Saviour;
whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even
so do unto them. This rule should be made our way of
thinking. The rule, he says, “consists of two parts. One
is, to substitute another for yourself when you take a
survey of any part of your behaviour, or consider what
is proper, fit, and reasonable for you to do on any oc-
casion; the other part is that you substitute yourself in
the room of another, consider yourself as the person affected
by such behaviour, or toward whom such an action is
done, and then you would not only see, but likewise feel
the reasonableness or unreasonableness of such an action or
behaviour.” Happiness is the only rational end, but this
happiness may not be immediate, but mediate. Happiness
results only when the rational end is attained. It is also
— 142 —
identical with virtue. Here again, Butler is a disciple of
Locke. Professor Sidgwick well says, “The aim of his
teaching is, not to induce men to choose duty rather than
interest, but to convince them that there is no inconsistency
between the two, that self-love and conscience lead to one
and the same course of life.”*) Butler maintains in more
chilly language than we find anywhere in Locke: “Though
virtue or moral rectitude does indeed consist in affection
to, and pursuit of, what is right and good, as such; yet
when we sit down in a cool hour, we can neither justify
to ourselves this or any other pursuit, till we are convinced
that it will be for our happiness, or at least; not contrary
to it.”*) In the scheme of Butler, benevolence holds a small
and cramped position compared to that of Locke. It is
confined to the family circle, and does not go out to man
as man. (Desser/aſion.) This diminution of benevolence, and
the constant tendency to bring obligation to virtue to a
level with self-interest, weakens his theory of virtue on the
One hand, and subtracts from the value of conscience on
the other. Butler agrees with Locke in holding there can
be no conflict between conscience and self-interest, but differs
radically, when, supposing a conflict, he holds that conscience
will and ought, to give way to self-interest. (Sermon XI.)
But he is firmly convinced, with Locke, that mankind is a
community, that we all stand in a relation with each other,
that there is a public end and interest of society which
each particular is obliged to promote, is the sum of morals.
(Sermon IX.)
The conflict between the moral reason and self-interest
which appears in the writings of Clarke, Shaftesbury, and
Butler, is recognised by Locke, but always as under wrong
measures of good and evil, or wrong judgments. Locke
allows no concession to self-interest as against virtue, and
to eliminate the causes of conflict, he has characteristically
*) The Methods of Ethics. 3d. Ed. p. 203.
*) Sermon XI, compare Analogy. I. 2.
— 143 —
sought out the remedy in a practical and effectual method
of education. If we ask Locke, How is it possible for a
conflict to arise between conscience and self-interest, he
would reply, only when the tastes and manners of men
are corrupted and they do not follow their real interests,
which are those of virtue. But neither Clarke, Shaftesbury,
nor Butler, take up ethical questions with the same breadth
and fullness as does Locke. Nor does Price, who, more than
they, represents the general tenor of Locke's system. Price
takes Lockian ground on psychology, and accepts Locke's
position that we know immediately that some actions are
good, and that others are evil, and that our conceptions of
right and wrong, of fitness and unfitness, are immediate to
common sense. He repudiates, with Locke, the doctrine
that the moral sense is independent, or different from the
reason and the judging power. “It is the intellect that
examines and compares, and is capable of discerning general
truths". (Review. p. 19.) The ethical end is happiness, and
his general conception of God, with the relation of theology
to ethics is essentially that of Locke. Such attributes of
Deity as justice, veracity, and goodness, are cardinal prin-
ciples of virtue, and right and wrong are distinctions eternal
and immutable in their nature. (Review. p. 432. 440.) It is
also maintained that future rewards and punishments are a
demand of morality, or of the moral government of God.
(Review. p. 453.) Reason is, with Price, the ethical faculty,
but, as with Locke, comes to the place of practical reason,
or common sense. From this point we need not advance,
for here, we come, in the line of Locke's successors, directly
upon Kant and the Scottish School. The latter drew largely
upon Locke, indeed, the majority of its members were edu-
cated in the Lockeian atmosphere. The former, Kant, stands
upon German soil, yet perhaps, with both Scottish and
English parentage. It is no part of our task to point out
the relations of his ethical speculations to those of Locke
however Small or great they may be. Enough has been
said to indicate our view as to the direction taken by
— 144 —
Locke's ethical doctrine. No English moralist of the eighteenth
century discussed the whole subject of ethics. The ques-
tions of moral obligation, freedom, and responsibility are
scarcely touched upon. The century was involved in the
Deistic controversy, and it evolved an enormous literature,
which, so far as practical philosophy is concerned, might
be lost with advantage. Remembering that Shaftesbury's
“Inquiry concerning Virtue and Merit” was first published
in 1699, we may reasonably question whether a single ray
of light, or step in advance, is shewn by the Eighteenth
Century over the Seventeenth, previous to the writings of
Hume and his critics. Hobbes, Culverwel, Cumberland,
More, Cudworth, Locke, and Shaftesbury, represent a period
in ethical speculation, which, for strength, diversity, and
comprehensiveness has not yet been surpassed. That which
the strongest men of that age recognised as the most nec-
essary and practical direction for the observer, investigator,
and thinker, is forcing itself upon the attention of our own
age. “Das sittliche Problem”, says Professor Wundt, “drängt
sich heute immer mâchtiger in den Vordergrund. Die Fragen
ūber den Ursprung des Sittlichen, tiber das Verhältniss des
Einzelnen zur Gemeinschaft, tiber die Bedeutung von Recht
und Pflicht, sind als die wichtigsten Fragen der gegen-
wärtigen Philosophie anerkannt.” (Rectoratsrede 1889, p. 47.)
To these questions a score of philosophers have given an-
Swer. To these questions Locke gave answer. * That man
is a rational and social being, an understanding and free
agent; that there is a Moral Government of the world
evinced in power, wisdom, and goodness; that the reason,
or rational power of the soul is the ethical faculty or cri-
terion; that man has the ability to govern and subdue his
desires and passions, and conform himself to the precepts
of virtue; that virtue is formally comprehended in the Golden
Rule, its essence love, and its fulfilment public and private
happiness; that the nature of the moral law is eternal, un-
changeable, one with God, and unalterable by any power
in Heaven or on Earth; that it is the standard to which
— 145 —
both individuals and communities are to refer their actions
and institutions; that its obligations spring primarily out of
its reasonableness, and secondarily, out of its eternal na-
ture, involving punishments and rewards, here and hereafter;
that the first function of education is rational self-control,
so that each may discharge his obligations as a member
of Society; that no government is just that does not aim
at the “true and solid happiness” of all its peoples, and that
no government is strong that does not serve the moral
law, and regard its precepts as imperative, – these are some
of the principles and propositions which Locke holds to have
their origin in the rational and social nature of man, and
their support in universal observation and experience.
© END ©
Curtis, Locke's Ethical Philosophy. 10
Life.
I was born in Westmoreland, N.Y., U. S. A., Oct. 19th.
1858; educated in Whitestown Seminary, Hamilton College,
and Union Theological Seminary, 1873 — 1883; Pastor
of the Dutch-Reformed Church at Hastings-on-Hudson,
1883–1885; married in 1884; Pastor of Beckwith Memorial
Presbyterian Church, Cleveland, Ohio, 1885–April 1888, in
which month I came to Leipzig and have since studied
Philosophy under Professors Heinze and Wundt, Political
Economy under Professors Roscher and Brentano, History
under Professors Maurenbrecher and Arndt, and Pedagogy
under Professor Masius.
Mattoon Monroe Curtis.
Hesse & Becker, Leipzig.
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