il'l^l^ .^0^™^^.^. '^% :MR 1 1921 BT 75 .J6 1895 Johnson, E. H. 18A1-1906 An outline of systematic theology SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY nSna ioxifidZere, to xaXdv xarej^ert. AN OUTLINE OF SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY E. H. JOHNSON, D. D. Proftssor in Crozer Theological Seminary [fifth xdition] AND OF ECCLESIOLOGY HENRY G. WESTON, D. D. Frtiidtnt of Crozer Theological Seminary PHILADSLPHIA AMERICAN BAPTIST PUBLICATION SOCIETY Copyright 1895 by the AusiuCAN Baptist Publication Socibti PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION A LARGE part of the second edition having been destroyed by fire, an opportunity is afforded in this third edition to cor- rect certain errors, retouch the text, and add a second index. THE AUTHORS. PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION In this edition, besides many emendations, some enlarge- ment, and the addition of a few footnotes, a section has been added on the Limitations of Systematic Theology ; the section on Conservation has been recast to meet the demands of re- cent discussions, and that on Election and Calling revised with careful regard to the distinction between express teach- ings of Scripture and inference from various sources ; Presi- dent Weston has contributed an outline of Ecclesiology, and Indexes have been provided for the whole. New Testament quotations are mostly from the version of Drs. Hovey, Broadus, and Weston. E. H. JOHNSON. Ckozer Thbological Seminary, June, 1895. PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION This book is the basis of lecture-room expositions and discussions which extend through the Middle and Senior years of the regular course in the Crozer Theological Semi- nary. Its statements have therefore been made as succinct as possible. IV PREFACE Except in the case of one or two important quotations, and the recommendation in a footnote to Section First of works for general consultation, references to theological literature are reserved for the class-room, and would hardly be looked for in a book so small as this. I cannot too heartily acknowledge my obligations to my own revered theological teacher, Dr. E. G. Robinson. The stimulus received from him, as he meant should be the case, is not the less marked at points where I have reached an independent conclusion. The emphatic counsel to his stu- dents, to eschew speculation and hold to facts, indicates at once the path of safety and the method of real progress. No one who follows this advice can escape a certain individ- uality of view, especially as Systematic Theology affords room for diversity of judgment within the limits of denom- inational accord. I have followed the natural and logical plan of Dr. Robin- son in placing the doctrine of Inspiration in the Introduction, and in deferring that of the Trinity to Soteriology. For rea- sons given at the proper point, I have quite departed from the customary order in treating "the doctrines of grace." The doctrine of the church and its ordinances is not pre- sented in this work, because it belongs to another department of instruction, that of Practical Theology. For my views on baptism and communion, I beg leave to refer to a tract of eighty-eight pages lately issued by the Publication Society under the title " Uses and Abuses of the Ordinances." E. H. JOHNSON. Crozbr Theological Sbminarv, May la, 1891. CONTENTS SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY PART FIRST INTRODUCTION SECT. PAGE 1. — Definition 1 General 1 Special 1 Title- 1 2. — Rdaiion to Religion 2-4 Practical 2 Theoretical 2 Conclusion 3 3. — Possibility of Knovdng God... 4-7 I. Agnostic Positions 4 II. Keplies to Agnosticism.^... 5 1. General Refutation 5 2. Special Replies 5 III. Cautions 7 4. — Sources of Theology 7-9 1. Bible..'. 7 2. Church 8 3. Man 8 4. World 9 5. — Relations of Sources 9-19 I. World and Mind 9 First Truths and Em- piricism 9 (a) Origin of First Truths conjectural 10 (b) Validity recognizable 10 (c) Faculty of Intuition orig- inal 10 {d) Faculty developed 10 SECT. PAOB II. Science and Bible 1 The Issue 1 1. Subject to Evidence 1 2. Authority of Science 1 3. Work and Word of God. 1 4. Evolution not Origina- tion 12 III. Intuition and Bible 12 1. Schleiermacher 12 2. Ne^v Theology 12 3. Conservative Orthodoxy. 12 4. Mediating View 12 Issue stated 13 Standards compared 13 1. In Intrinsic Worth 13 2. In Intelligibility 15 3. In History 16 Conclusions 17 IV. Church and Bible 18 1. As to Priority 18 2. As to Canon 19 3. As to Clerical Authority. 19 6. — Relations of Theological Sci- ences 19-21 1. Apologetics 20 2. Isagogics 20 3. Exegesis 20 4. Biblical Theology 20 5. Historical Theology 20 \i CONTENTS ■■CT. PAOS 6. Systematic Theology 21 7. Practical Theology 21 7— Aims 21-22 1. Direct 21 2. Incidental 22 8. — Limitations 22-23 1. Finiteness 22 2. Excgeeie 22 3. Fads 23 9.— Methods 23 10. — Inspiration 24-35 I. Definitions 24 II. Evidences 24 1. Revelation 24 2. Illumination 24 3. Inspiration 25 Non-prophetic and non- apostolic Writers 25 III. Phenomena of Inspiration. 26 1. Diversity of efiects 26 2. Relations of Offices 27 SECT. rA»m IV. Divine and Human Ele- ments 28 1. Divine Element 28 2. Human Element 29 (o) Avowed in Phrases 29 (6) Secular Sources 29 (c) Personal Idiosyncra- sies 29 (d) Characteristics of Race and Time 29 A Caution 30 V. Authority of Bible 31 1. Bible Infallible 31 2. Needs Interpretation 31 VI. Theories of Inspiration 31 1. Naturalistic 31 2. Partial 32 3. Plenary 33 A. Verbal 33 B. Dynamical 33 Remarks 34 PART SECOND THEOLOGY PROPER ■BCr. PAGE U.—ExiMence of God 36-59 Present State of A rgument.. 36 Existence of God not First Truth 36 (o) Not Self-evident 36 (b) Not General Principle... 37 (c) Not Logical Correlate.... 37 (d) Inferable from First Truths 37 Results of Discussion 38 (a) Empiricism discredited... 38 (b) Evolutionism neutral 38 (c) Philosophy friendly 38 r. PAGE (rf) Eiemity assumable 38 (e) Scope of Arguments 39 I. Cosmological Argument ."^O 1. Physical Phase 39 A. Process of Nature 39 B. Changes and Time 40 Theory of Cycles 41 2. Metaphysical Phase 42 (1) Questions 42 A. As to Force and Matter 42 B. As to Divinity of Force 42 CONTENTS Vll SKCr. PAGE (2) Objections 43 A. Makes God change- able 43 B. No proper Moment for Creation 43 C. Causal judgment em- pirical 44 II. Eutaxiological Argument.. 45 (a) From Organic Types 45 (6) From Universal Laws.... 45 Refutation of Material- ism 45 Relations to Causal Ar- gument 46 III. Teleological Argument 47 Objections 47 (1) Maker not infinite 47 (2) Design artificial 48 (3) Evolution natural 49 rV. Ontological Argument 50 1 . Idea of Perfection 50 A. Anselm 50 B. Descartes 50 2. Idea of Necessary Being.. 51 A. Cudworth 51 B. Clarke 51 V. Moral Argument 52 1. Conscience 53 2. Esthetic Sensibility 53 3. Love 54 4. Trust 54 Objections 55 (1) Desire not a Proof. ... 55 (2) Moral Faculties evolved 55 VI. Historical Argument 56 1. God in History 56 2. Theism universal 57 3. Theism beneficial 57 4. Christianity historical... 57 A. Human 58 SECT. PAGB B. Divine 58 C. Divine-human 59 Remarks on theistic Ar- guments 59 1 2.— Personality of God 59-61 Definition 59 Evidence 60 Objections 60 1. Consciousness impossible. 60 2. Limitation involved 60 3. God responsible for Evil. 60 13.— Unity of God 61-63 1. Proved by theistic Argu- ment 62 2. Proved from Omnipo- tence 62 3. Self-commended 62 4. Proved from Relation of Physical to Moral 63 li.— Attributes of God 63-76 I. Related to Duration 64 1. Eternity 64 2. Immutability 64 3. Spirituality 65 II. Related to Physical Uni- verse 66 1. Omnipotence 66 2. Omniscience 67 3. Omnipresence 69 III. Related to Moral Beings... 70 1. Holiness 7r 2. Benevolence " '• 3. Justice 73 4. Minor Moral Attributes.. 75 Primacy among Moral Attributes 75 15. — Divine Decrees 76-83 I. Evidences 77 1. From Natural Theology. 77 2. From Scripture 78 II. Safeguards against Miscon- ception 80 Vlll CONTENTS ■KCr. PAGE 1. Decree not Fate 80 2. Decree not Necessity 80 3. Decree but one Aspect of Truth 80 III. Theories 82 1. Hyper-calvinistic 82 2. Moderate Calvinistic 82 3. Pelagian 82 4. Moderate Arminian 83 16.— Creation 83-93 I. Testimony of Scriptures.... 84 II. Testimony of Metaphysics.. 85 III. Testimony of Natural Sci- ence 86 1. As to Eternity of Matter. 86 2. As to Abiogenesis 88 3. As to Evolution 89 A. For Scriptural View... 90 B. Against Unscriptural View 91 17. — Final Cause in Creation 93-95 1. Blessedness and Glory of God 94 2. Well-being of Creature 94 18. — Conservation 95-101 I. Monistic Theories 95 1. Typical Pantheism 95 2. Christian Pantheism 96 A. Philosophical Evi- dence 96 Replies 97 B. Scientific Evidence 97 Replies 98 C. Theological J>idence.. 98 Replies 98 II. Dualistic Theories 99 1. Semi-pantheism 99 2. Deism 100 3. Concursus 100 19.— Providence 101-105 I. General Providence 101 SECT. 9k9M 1. Scripture 101 2. History 101 3. Patriotism 101 II. Particular Providence 102 1. Scripture 102 2. General Providence 102 3. Christian Experience 103 III. Theories 103 1. Deistic 103 2. Pantheistic 103 3. Creatio continuata 103 4. Concursus 103 5. Psychical 104 Conclusion 105 20.— Prayer 105-108 I. Spiritual Benefits 106 II. Temporal Benefits 107 21.— Miracles 108-114 I. Their Nature 108 n. Credibility 109 1. Possible 109 2. Probable 109 3. Unmistakable to Wit- nesses 109 4. Witnesses trustworthy... 110 5. Christ is risen 110 6. Miracles congruous with Doctrine 110 m. Office Ill 1. Direct Ill 2. Indirect 112 IV. Congruity with Doctrine... 113 1. Substantiates Miracles... 113 2. Substantiates Doctrine... 113 3. Explains Cessation 114 22.— Angeh 115-119 I. Good Angels 115 1. Perceived 115 2. Notable Occasions 115 3. Real to Christ 116 4. Relation to his Doctrine. 1 1 6 CONTENTS IX PAGE SECT. 5. Office to Saints 116 6. Place in Creation 117 7. Attested by Polytheism.. 117 11. Evil Spirits 118 1. Origin 118 2. Chief. 118 3. Activity 118 PART THIRD ANTHROPOLOGY SKCT. PAGE 23.— Nature of Man 1 20-121 (a) Human Reason 120 (b) Capacity of Progress 121 2i.— Creation of Man 121-124 1. According to Bible 121 2. According to Science _. 122 (a) No known Ancestor 122 (6) Peculiar Anatomy 122 (c) Brain Capacity 122 (d) Faculty of Reason 123 Conclusion 123 25.— Unity of Race 124 According to Scripture 124 According to Science 124 2Q.—Constiiution of Man 124-127 I. Theories 124 1. Dichotomous 124 2. Trichotomous 125 II. Evidence for Dichotomy.... 125 1. Bible's Psychology 125 2. Paul's various Meanings. 125 3. Uniformity erroneous... 126 4. Functions not trichot- omic 126 5. Consciousness not tri- chotomic 126 V— Origin of Souls 127-129 Pre-existence 127 Traducianism preferred to Crcationism 127 1. Scriptures 127 2. Heredity 128 3. Psycho-physics 128 4. Burden of Proof 128 Objections answered 128 28.— Ivmge of God in Man 129-130 1. Personality 129 2. Original Innocence 129 3. Dominion over Beasts 130 29. — Original C ondition of Man 130-131 1. Bible 130 2. Archaeology 130 3. History 130 30.— Low of God 131-135 I. Idea of Law 131 1. Definition 131 2. Distinctions 131 3. Inferences 132 II. Source of Law 133 1. The Creator 133 2. His Nature 133 III. Obligation of Law 134 1. Moral 134 2. Religious 134 Remarks 134 Sl.-Sin 135-138 L Definition 135 1. Act 135 2. Principle 136 CONTENTS 8»CT. PAGE 3. State 136 11. Essence 136 1. Sensuality? 136 2. Evolution? 136 3. Finiteness? 137 4. Selfishness? 137 5. Abnormality? 138 32.—FallofMan 138-141 I. Biblical Account 139 II. Problem of Fall 139 (o) Ethical Difficulty 139 (6) Theological Difficulty.... 39 III. Theories of Fall 140 1. Ethical Necessity 140 2. Divine Causation 141 33. — Penal Consequences of Fall.l il-153 Proposed Distinction 141 I. Death 141 1. Spiritual 142 2. Physical 142 II. Native Depravity 143 1. Extent 143 2. Theories 144 A. Pelagian 144 B. Semi-pelagian, etc.... 144 C. Federalist 145 D. Realistic 146 III. Loss of Moral Freedom .... 146 1. Theories 147 1. Of Will 147 2. Of Freedom 147 A. Self-determination of Will 147 SECT. p^ei B. Self-determination of Ego 147 2. Objections 148 A. Necessitarian 148 B. Libertarian 150 3. Conclusions 161 A. Ego chooses 151 B. Ego conditioned 151 C. Freedom and Neces- sity Coincide 151 D. Present Freedom formal 151 E. Future Freedom real 152 IV. Derangement of Conscience 152 34. — Inability and Responsibil- ity 153-155 I. Inability 153 1. Error as to Ability 153 2. Error as to Choice 154 II. Responsibility 154 1. Choice actual 154 2. Represents character 154 3. Even with God 154 4. Penalty inevitable 154 5. Ethically justifiable 155 6. Theologically inexplic- able 156 35. — Salvation of Infants 156 1. Infants morally incom- petent 156 2. Blessed by Christ 156 3. Christ parallel to Adam ... 156 4. Vision of Christ at Death ... 156 PART FOURTH SOTERIOLOGY 3ft. — Preparation for Coming of Christ 157-158 I. Preparation to accept Gos- pel .„„.,.....,........ 157 CONTENTS XI «CT. PAGE 1. Judaism 157 2. Heathenism 157 II. Provision to extend Gospel. 158 1. Roman Empire 158 2. Greek Language 168 3. Oppositions 158 37. — Humanity of Christ 158-159 38.— Divinity of Christ 159-166 I. Methods of Inquiry 159 1. Textual 159 2. Historical 159 II. Evidence 160 (I) To Mary 160 (II) To Disciples 161 1. What they saw 161 2. What Jesus said 162 (III) To Apostolic Church... 163 1. From Holy Spirit 163 2. From Offices of Christ 163 3. From Old Testament. 164 Resultant Titles 164 (IV) To Post-apostolic Church 165 1. Offices received from Christ 165 2. Response of Christian Piety 165 (V) The Christ of History... 165 III. Theories as to Nature of Christ 165 1. Docetism 166 2. Humanitarianism 166 3. Subordinationism 166 39. — Relation of Two Natures in Christ 167-178 1. Apollinarism 167 2. Nestorianism 168 3. Eutychianism 168 4. Chalcedon - Constanti- nople 168 6. Realism 169 SECT. PAOK 6. Kenotism 170 7. Progressive Incarnation.. 171 8. Physiological Theory 172 (1) One Person 172 (2) One Species 173 (3) One Soul 174 Cautions 177 iO.—Two States of Christ 178-180 I. Humiliation 178 1. Limitations 178 2. Discipline 179 3. Rejection 179 IL Exaltation 179 1. Basis 179 2. Relation to Humanity.... 179 3. Offices 180 il.—Holy Spirit 181-183 L Divinity 181 1. Divine Name 181 2. Divine Attributes 181 3. Divine Prerogatives 181 4. Christian Consciousness... 181 IL Personality 181 1. Earlier Biblical Usage... 181 2. Later Biblical Usage 182 42.— Offices of Holy Spirit 184-188 I. Dispensation of the Spirit... 184 IL General Office 185 in. Offices under Old Covenant 185 1. Symbols 185 2. Prophecy 186 3. Regeneration 186 IV. Offices under the New Covenant 186 1. Attest Claims of Christ... 186 2. Unfold his Mission 187 3. Renew and sanctify 187 4. Organize Church 187 5. Make it Temple of God... 187 6. Assure the Inheritance... 188 4S.— Trinity 188-196 Xll CONTENTS 8BCT. PAOB I. Definition 189 II. Evidence 189 1. From New Testament... 189 2. From Old Testament 191 3. P'rom Psychology 191 III. Relations of Persons 192 1. Sabellian 193 2. Nicene 194 3. Biblical 195 U.-Offieee of Christ 196-197 1. TheOflSces 196 2. Interdependence 196 3. Doctrines classi6ed by Offices 197 45. — Atonement 197-236 Part First: Historical Survey.. 198 I. Patristic Theory 198 II, Satisfaction Theory 198 Anselm 198 Scholastics 199 Roman Church 199 Reformers 200 Federalists 200 (I) Defects of Anselmic Form 201 (II) Objections to Federalist Form 201 1. Unbiblical 201 2. Factitious 201 3. Morally insufficient 202 4. Morally objectionable... 203 m. Morallnfluence Theory 203 Earlier Form 203 Later Forms. 203 The Issue 204 1. Requirement of Con- science 204 2. Requirement of God 205 3. Christian Experience 205 4. Moral Penalties 206 IV. Governmental Theory 206 1. Typical Form 206 SKCT. TAmn 2. Arminian Form... 207 3. Objections 208 (o) Against divine Nature 208 (b) Against Law 208 (c) Histrionic 208 (d) Utilitarian 208 (e) Political 208 V. Realistic Theories 208 1. Pantheistic 209 2. Man ward Efficiency 209 3. God ward Efficiency 209 A. Merits 210 B. Defects 210 VI. Conclusions 211 1. Effects of Philosophies... 211 2. Truths and Errors 211 3. False Exclusiveness 212 Part Second : Biblical Statement. 213 I. Christ a Gift of Love 213 n. Crucifixion expiatory 213 1. Sacrifices 213 2. Prophecy 214 3. Doctrine of Jesus 214 4. Doctrine of Apostles 215 III. Resurrection piacular 216 1. Acts 216 2. Epistles 217 IV. Atonement morally Effica- cious 218 1. Sacrifices 218 2. Required Repentance 219 3. Words of Christ 219 4. Cross of Christ 220 5. Resurrection of Christ... 223 Summary of Biblical Teaching 223 Part Third : Theoretical State- ment 223 Postulates 224 I. Christ a Representative 224 1. Of God 224 CONTENTS Xlll *SCT. PAGB 2. Of Man 224 A. In his divinity 225 B. In his humanity 227 11. The Representative a Sin- bearer 229 1. Historically 229 2. Ethically 229 III. The Sin-bearer expiates. ... 231 1. Sin-bearing expiatory. .. . 232 2. Expiation adequate. 232 IV. The Expiation Regener- ates 234 1. By Teaching 234 2. By Lordship 234 3. By Crucifixion 235 4. By Resurrection 235 Theoretic Conclusions 235 (1) Objective Efficacy 235 (2) Subjective Efficacy 236 (3) Counter Efiects recon- ciled 236 46. — Necessity of A tonement . . . 236-239 Why the Incarnation ? 236 I. Necessary to God? 237 1. According to his Nature.. 237 2. Limits of Knowledge 237 n. Necessary to Man? 238 1. Fact of Atonement 238 2. Demand of Justice 238 3. Needs of Government.... 238 4. Means of Moral Re- newal 238 5. Fitness to Ancient Worthies 239 47. —Extent of A tonement 239-240 1. In Respect of Purpose... 239 2. In Respect of Provision.. 240 48. — Intercession of Christ 241-242 49.— Ordo Scdutis 242-243 50.— Election and Calling 243-251 The Controversy 243 SBCT. PAOB L Fact of Election 244 1. The Elect 244 2. The non-elect 245 n. Conditions of Election 247 1. Foreknowledge 247 2. Not Merit 248 3. Not Caprice 248 4. Faith? 248 III. Execution of Election — the Divine Calling 249 The Problem 249 Solution unnecessary 250 51. — Repentance and Faith.... 251-260 I. Repentance 252 1. New View 252 2. New Feeling 252 3. New Life 253 IL Faith 253 1. Nature of Faith 253 A. Discerning 254 B. Realizing 255 C. Trusting 256 2. Offices of Faith 256 (1) As Discernment 256 (2) As Realization 257 (3) As Trust 258 A. Objective Office 258 B. Subjective Office 258 52. —Justification 260-265 I. Nature of Justification 260 II. Evidence of Justification..., 260 in. Difficulties in Doctrine 261 1. Acquittal of Guilty 261 2. Acceptance of Wicked... 262 IV. Relation to Regeneration... 262 L As Fiat 262 2. As Forgiveness 263 3. As Adoption 263 4. As procured by Atone- ment 263 5. As conditioned by Faith. 263 XIV CONTENTS ■BCr. FAQE 6. As reconciling Texts 263 Conclusion 264 53.— Regeneration 265-272 I. Nature of Regeneration.... 265 1. Scriptural View 266 2. Errors 266 A. Of Sacramentalists 266 B. Of Annihilationists 267 C. Of Plymouth Breth- ren 267 n. Agent and Means of Re- generation 268 1. Agent 268 2. Means 269 in. Necessity of Regeneration.. 270 1. Relation to Atonement... 270 2. Importance of Result 270 rV. Evidences of Regeneration. 270 1. As to Father 270 ■■or. tA9t 2. As to Son 270 3. As to Spirit 271 4. Dutifulness 271 5. Love 271 6. Understanding 272 M.—Sanctificati John 13-16, pas- sim) always understood the revelations which they received ; but to confer understanding is precisely the function of illu- mination. IV. DIVINE AND HUMAN ELEMENTS. Inquiry whether the Bible corresponds to its claims has brought to light its dual nature. The Bible exhibits marks of its dual origin. I. T/tc divine element is perhaps to be found in the very words reported by a prophet, notably in the Decalogue. It may safely be credited with the general style of psalmists, prophets, and apostles, at once full, free, and elevated, sober, simple, and precise. It is certainly recognizable in the sus- tained superiority of the Bible in respect of contents over the sacred literature of other peoples, especially over Jewish and INSPIRATION 29 Christian writings near its own period ; in a unity of concep- tion and aim which covers documents strongly individualized and produced centuries apart ; above all, in adequately pre- senting the matchless character, teachings, and career of Jesus. 2. The human element would be taken for granted in docu- ments that bear the names of human writers. But — (a) It is sometimes avowed in such phrases as " David himself saith in the book of Psalms " (Luke 20 : 42), " the book of the words of Isaiah the prophet " (Luke 3 : 4), " I Paul say unto you" (Gal. 5 : 2), "we also believe, and there- fore speak" (2 Cor. 4 : 13), "I speak as a man" (Rom. 3 : 5), •' I speak not after the Lord," " I speak as a fool " (2 Cor. II : 17, 23). (b) It acknowledges human sources of information, such as the poetic book of Jasher (Josh. 10 : 13), the royal records cited by the books of the Kings and Chronicles, and Luke's "eye-witnesses" (i : 2). These citations are appeals to au- thority. That the Bible depends upon official records or popu- lar poetry, for none of which inspiration was claimed, does not exclude the divine element from the Book ; but it shows how noteworthy is the human element in its historical portions. {c) The human element is manifest in the rhetorical style peculiar to each writer ; also in the color imparted by per- sonal idiosyncrasy to the contents of ancient hymns and prophecies, to apostolic doctrine, and to the choice and ar- rangement of historical materials, notably in the case of the Gospel narratives. {d) Characteristics of an Oriental people and a former age appear in the references of the Old Testament to physical phenomena (Gen. i : 7 ; 7 : 1 1 ; Ps. 50 : i ; 93 : i), and to movements of the Divine mind (Gen. 6 '.6; Exod. 32 : 14, cf. 30 INSPIRATION Num. 23 : 19 ; also cf. i Sam. i 5 : 29 with ver. 35 and Rom. 1 1 : 29) ; in the application of round numbers to historical periods {e. g., of forty years, Deut. 2:7; Judg. 3:11; 5 : 3 1 ; 8 : 28 ; 13:1; i Sam. 4:18; i Kings 2 : 1 1 ; 1 1 : 42 ; 2 Chron. 24 : i) ; to armies and battles (2 Chron. 13:3, 17), and to the genealogy of our Lord, which Matthew gives in three divisions, each alleged to consist of just fourteen generations (Matt, i : 17); in the freedom of New Testa- ment quotations from the elder Scriptures (cf. Matt. 27 : 9 with Zech. 11 : 12, 13 ; Acts 7 : 16 with Gen. 23 : 17-20 ; 33 : 18, 19; 50 : 13; also cf. i Cor. 10 : 8 with Num. 25 : 9; and Heb. 10 : 5 with Ps. 40 : 6); in the familiar diffi- culty of harmonizing various accounts of the sayings or acts of Christ ; in the use of arguments which, however convincing in their day, can hardly be as effective now (Gal. 3 : 16; 4 : 24-26) ; in the Oriental and antique hyperbole which charac- terizes not a few of our Lord's own precepts (Matt. 5 : 39-42 ; Luke 6 : 30 ; 14 : 12, 13 ; cf. John 5:31 with 8 : 14) ; finally, in the imperfect morality of the Old Testament, as explained in a typical case by Christ himself (Matt. 19 : 3-9), and as rebuked by him when it reappeared in a venge- ful plan quite of the old type, proposed by two among his own disciples (Luke 9 : 54-56 ; cf. Ps, 69 : 21-28 with Luke 23 : 34)- In attempting to distinguish between the divine and the human elements in Scripture, reverent caution is imperative. It is a grave error, on the one hand, to attribute to express dictation by the Holy Spirit those forms of conception and statement which supplied the divine message with a vehicle more serviceable in a former age than now ; or, on the other hand, hastily to set down as human errors statements which INSPIRATION 31 may yet signally evince the care of the All-knowing Spirit. The one course would furnish weapons against the Bible ; the other, would throw away a weapon for its defense. V. AUTHORITY OF THE BIBLE. 1. When we consider the aid of every sort which the Holy Spirit afforded for the writing of the Bible, the endorsement of the Old Testament by our Lord and his pledge to the writers of the New, we conclude that, to those who accept the claims of the Scriptures in their own behalf, they infallibly ex- press what it was the will of God to declare (i Thess. 2:13). 2. On the other hand, when we recognize, without being able to separate, elements divine and human, we see that the use of a medium available for ancient peoples requires a his- torical and critical, because reverent, study, in order to its correct interpretation. To distinguish the divine from the human, the substance from the form, is only a matter of in- terpretation, requires only the approved canons of interpreta- tion, and is rarely a difficult task. VI. THEORIES OF INSPIRATION. The most important of these are : I. The Naturalistic, or the theory of Intuition; namely, that God dwells in all men, and reveals the truth to all in proportion to their character and genius. This theory is favored especially by pantheists and anti-Christian students of Comparative Theology. Obviously, this is not the Bible's account of its own in- spiration. The Bible does not admit that pagan teachings bring, like its own, a divine endorsement. It admits, how- ever, that the heathen have the light of nature (Ps. 19 : 1-6; Rom. 1:19, 20), and allows us to believe that they are not 32 INSPIRATION altogether without supernatural enlightenment (Num. 22-24; Matt. 2 : I, 2, 12). 2. The theory of Illumination, or Partial Inspiration ; namely, that, while God is revealed in nature, in man, and especially in Jesus Christ, direct impressions of truth upon the mind must be rejected as magical ; that illumination, or insight into objective revelation, is the only form of inspira- tion ; and that, since illumination varies with the enlighten- ment and piety of the person inspired, not only the histori- cal, but also the moral and religious teachings of Scripture are encumbered with errors. This theory is expressed in the formula : ** The Bible is not the word of God, but contains the word of God." It is the theory of Broad Churchmen and " New Theolo- gians " generally. In the hands of some it can hardly be dis- tinguished from the theory of Intuition, while as held by others it claims almost entire inerrancy for the religious teachings of the Bible. In all its forms it is open to the objections : {a) The testimony for revelation above presented shows that illumination is not the only means by which the Holy Spirit makes the truth known. {b) The same testimony shows that knowledge of truth by inspired men was not always proportioned to their moral and religious character. {c) Divine authority is often claimed by the Scriptures, and a failure of it never acknowledged on matters that re- quired authoritative teaching. In support of this statement we may appeal to certain texts often quoted against it ; namely, i Cor. 7:25, 40, in which Paul contrasts his own spiritually guided judgment (illumination) with an express commandment (revelation) from Christ. But in disclaiming INSPIRATION 33 authority in this instance he assumes that, without this dis- claimer, his words would be taken as authoritative (i Cor. 7 : 17; 14 :37; 2 Cor. 13 : 3). {d) The errors alleged by this theory have in many cases proved to be correct statements. At the most, they are to be regarded as belonging merely to the form in which the truth was cast for the people of an ancient day. But, if errors in form only, they are not to be regarded as errors at all. Of this sort are the statements that the sun rises, and that God repents. 3. The theory of Plenary Inspiration, namely, that the writers of Scripture were held by the Holy Spirit to absolute accuracy in every respect. This theory has taken two forms : A. Verbal Inspiratio7i, according to which every word was selected by the Holy Spirit, or even dictated through a human amanuensis. Once a favorite theory of English, Scotch, and American theologians, it has now generally suc- cumbed to the convincing array of human elements in Script- ure. For example, the style of many books in the Bible is as characteristic of their several writers as is the style of any secular author ; and to ascribe this fact to the Holy Spirit's selection of precisely the words which the writer would have chosen is so violent a conjecture, and so mani- festly forbidden by the "law of parsimony," that the verbal theory has naturally yielded, with advocates of plenary in- spiration, to — B. The theory of Dynamical Inspiration; namely, that the thought, not the language, of the Bible was inspired ; or, more broadly stated, that the Holy Spirit enabled the writers to declare the truth free from error, while allowing them to choose their own methods of statement. 34 INSPIRATION Although thus capable of various interpretations, this theory accords to the Bible full authority, and is objection- able only in so far as it pretends to describe the process of inspiration, concerning which the writers of the Scripture say but little, and perhaps knew no more. Any attempted rationale of the action of the Divine mind upon the human tempts its advocate to a violent treatment of the objections which it is certain to encounter. REMARKS. It is of no small moment that we should avoid the com- mon error of attaching undue importance to the theories about inspiration. It is a matter of speculative rather than of practical interest. The issue among Christians involves little but inspiration in the narrower sense. It is admitted that complete revelation was afforded in the person of Jesus Christ ; that the Holy Spirit conferred on the apostles in- sight sufficient to acquaint them with all either they or we need to know concerning Christ ; and that such aid as this qualified them to tell what they knew. If then, the writers of the New Testament had no special gift of inspiration, we should be in the position of jurors listening to witnesses, the competence of whose knowledge and the integrity of whose intentions were assured. Like such witnesses, the writers of the New Testament might fail to agree in minor particulars, and as to such particulars we should not know, as on any other theory we do not now know, exactly what to believe ; but they would still be in agreement about everything of highest moment, for it is admitted that their revelations and insight were adequate as to the substance of the gospel. Such a view has the advantage of accounting for apparent discrepancies without imperilling the INSPIRATION 35 claims of the record, as is the case when the discrepancies have to be reconciled with inspiration in the narrow sense. To claim too much is to risk even more. But, as on many other topics, an easy solution of difficul- ties involves greater difficulties. The evidence is sufficient for inspiration in every sense ; so that while the harm of re- nouncing it in the narrower sense ought not to be exagger- ated, we are entitled to believe that the accuracy of the writers was secured by all necessary guidance in recording the message of God to man. PART II THEOLOGY PROPER § II. The Existence of God. Present State of the Theistic Argument. Since Hume led the empirical philosophy into thorough- going scepticism, and the critical method induced Kant to discard all testimony to the existence of God but that of conscience, the standard arguments for his existence, without exception, have been persistently and unsparingly attacked not only by opponents, but also by defenders of theism. Some theists renounce the possibility of demonstrating that there is a God, but assume it as a first truth. That is, they hold that God can be known at first hand as an object of rational intuition, as a logical prms of all other knowledge. Thus he may be intuited as infinite Being correlative to finite ; as absolute Being correlative to dependent ; as creative Reason guaranteeing the veracity of human reason ; and as a holy Law-giver, recognized in the very idea of law. The position thus taken is open to the objections that — (a) First truths are self-evident ; but self-evident ideas are insusceptible of analysis, or of demonstration by any logi- cally prior idea. The idea of God, on the contrary, is highly complex. It can be resolved into its elements ; these can be separately tested ; when tested, they must be proved capable of synthesis ; and when harmoniously synthetized, they must be shown to stand for a Being that exists. The existence of God may be inferable from intuitions, but is not itself intuited. 36 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 37 {b) The authority of a rational intuition, or logical priority to all other knowledge, can be claimed only for those general principles, the truth of which is assumed in all particular cases ; e. g., that a particular act is wrong involves the gen- eral truth that there is difference between right and wrong. Now the existence of God is not a general principle to be intuited, but a particular fact to be proved. {c) Knowledge of an object may logically involve the idea without involving the existence of another object. The existence of the second object is logically inferable only when the first is known to be in nature inseparable from the second. For example, knowledge of an object limited in ex- tension logically involves the idea, but not the occupancy, of unlimited extension. On the other hand, an object limited in duration certifies the existence of some being unlimited in duration to which its own existence is due ; but it remains to be proved that the universe is not that eternal, self-existent, absolute being. (d) Knowledge of the Divine existence rests upon the very ideas which it is said to support. For example, the trust- worthiness of human logic is already taken for granted when it is argued that this trustworthiness requires the existence of creative Reason as its own logical prius. Or, if it be replied that the existence of God is a first truth, not a fact assured by argument, then the competence of the human mind to know first truth intuitively is already assumed in one case ; but if in one case, why not in all cases .-' Again, if the idea of right and duty is not intrinsically valid, it cannot be known that right is real in the case of God, or duty an actuality when imposed by his will. In other words, to urge that the validity of human reason and the reality of moral distinctions require the idea of God P 38 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD as a first truth for their support is to say that first truth must lie back of first truth — a contradiction of terms. Knowledge of the Divine existence, therefore, instead of being logically prior, is logically sequent to our valid primary beliefs. Although the protracted debate has not yet secured agree- j ment among theists concerning the relative worth of the '■ standard arguments, yet certain important results are becom- ing manifest. Among these may be mentioned : {(i) Since it is the business of philosophy to account for the hold of primary beliefs upon the mind, reaction has set in against the negative, and therefore inadequate, results of the old empirical philosophy and of its modern kindred. Posi- tivism. {b) Evolutionism, whether or not true as a universal phi- losophy, is synthetic and constructive, not analytic and destructive. It deals with processes, not with origins ; for that alone can be unfolded which is already enfolded. It is now plain that Evolutionism need not, and cannot, under- mine faith in God as the Creator and Ruler of the world. ic) Until recently the influence of Kant had won for the moral argument exceptional favor. Of late, sounder theories of knowledge and of causation, together with the ever-widen- ing discovery of order and adaptation in the world, have secured a restatement and a renewed confidence in the argu- ments from nature. But it is still sometimes objected that — {d) The infinite cannot be inferred from the finite. It is enough to reply that the infinite in duration, at least, must be taken for granted. It is certain that something has ex- isted from eternity, and the arguments from nature need only show, to begin with, that the universe itself cannot have been THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 39 eternal. If it is proved that some other being than the uni- verse is from eternity, the theistic argument has gained a firm foothold. (e) The limits of criticism having apparently been reached, the standard arguments, with a single exception to be presently noted, find their data extended and their conclu- sions limited, but complementary and confirmed. I. THE COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. This name has been conventionally adopted, because the argument accounts for the cosmos, or universe. It is more strictly etiological or causal, an argument from the contin- gency of phenomena to a First Cause. The argument takes one of two forms, physical or metaphysical, according as it relies upon analysis of physical facts, or interprets them by the metaphysical notion of causation, or efficient force. I . The Physical P \a^i . In this forrr ':he argument makes use of but two indisput- able facts in nature ; namely, matter and motion. It is certain that something has existed from eternity. But matter cannot have been eternally existent, because — A. The present state of the material universe is a product of evolution from simplicity to complexity. The process may as certainly be traced back from complexity to sifnplicity. But absolute simplicity excludes antecedent change, for any change would be a step in the development which has taken place. And since it is an axiom of physics that matter in a state of quietude cannot spontaneously move, we have reached a point when a Being independent of the universe initiates its processes. Thus, if the supposition of matter in a state of absolute simplicity were admissible we should now 40 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD have found in the beginner of cosmic motion the self-moved Architect of materials already in existence. But the materials of the universe can never have been in a state of absolute simplicity before which there was no motion. Whatever view be taken of the constitution of matter, it is certain that extension is one of its essential properties, and that extension is proportioned to density. But any degree of density or tenuity which has ever belonged to any one of the great masses or systems of matter now in existence, was a result of those " stresses " in opposite di- rections which are usually called, on the one hand, the " at- tractions " of gravitation and cohesion; on the other hand, the molecular or intra-molar "repulsion" of heat. Matter, therefore, without active properties would be without proper ties essential to its existence. Rigorous physical analysis leads to no possible state of things prior to the one which the first motion in the universe produced, but plainly teaches that, before that moment, the universe could not have existed. The absolute beginning of motion was the absolute begin- ning of matter. The Architect was the Creator.^ B. Measurable changes admit only measurable time. A series of such changes from eternity ought already to have reached any assignable stage. In other words, in an eternal 1 It is generally regarded as settled that all bodies are made up of molecules with intermolecular spaces (Cooke, "The New Chemistry," p. 37 f; Clerk Max- well on Constitution of Bodies, in " Encyclopsedia Britannica"). According to the prevailing theory of atoms, the properties of different substances are due to their different atomic motions (Art. Atoms, by Clerk Maxwell, in " Encyclopedia Britannica"; Stallo, " Concepts of Modem Physics," p. 28). Clerk Maxwell de- clares the existence of atoms or molecules prior to motion " sheer delusion ' ' (" Matter and Motion," p. 156, note). But appeal is not made to these doctrines of modem physics, because they are more or less speculative ; whereas, the data on which the argument in the text is based seem to be beyond question. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 41 series of changes every moment is the wrong moment for any given change. The idea of such a series is therefore self- contradictory, and the universe, because it is changing, can- not be the result of an eternal process. To deny this is but to affirm that finite duration is infinite duration, since the ratio between changes and time is indissoluble. But, as matter, because it is mutable, cannot be eternal, so the Creator, because he is eternal, cannot be either mutable or material. From the point of view of physics we are shut up to belief in a self-existent, spiritual Creator, These conclusions are not avoided by substituting an infi- nite succession of cycles for an unbroken progress from eter- nity. Because — A, The same thing may be said of any cycle which was said of any given stage in a progressive development from eternity ; namely, it ought to have been reached long ago, and all eternity does not furnish the right time for it. B. Cosmic changes involve enormous and ceaseless dissipa- tion of energy in the form of heat. This fact encumbers the theory of an eternal series of cycles with the following difficulties : {a) Each cycle begins with an immensely greater evolu- tion of heat than that with which it passes into the cycle next following ; therefore, its primeval nebula is correspond- ingly expanded, and its history lengthened in the same ratio. It follows that, an eternity ago, some cycle must have been eternally long, hence is not ended yet. The theory of an infinite series of cycles is therefore self-contradictory, and resolves into the theory of uninterrupted development, already discussed, {b) Ceaseless dissipation of energy from eternity wouM 42 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD require an infinite store of potential energy in the past. But an infinite store of energy is disproved by the fact that — An exhaustion of energy is impending, upon which the solar system, for instance, will become an inert mass. But the infinite is inexhaustible, A process from eternity must endure unto eternity. 2. The Metaphysical Phase. , Every change must have a cause ; but the only real cause is a first cause ; therefore, the ever-changing universe must have had a First Cause. Furthermore, the idea of causation arises in the mind upon the exercise of will. We have a conception of cause only by virtue of the fact that, in forming volitions, we our- selves are consciously causes. The First Cause must there- fore be conceived by us to be a Will, that is, a Person. (i) Questions arise as to the scope of this argument. A. Does the origination of force involve the origination of matter ? Yes, because all properties of matter which give evidence that it does, ever did, or ever could exist, are due to force. For example, integration, or the production of mass, density, and form, is by energy ; so are texture, temperature, and color. B, Since all forces are convertible into each other, while the sum of force is never increased, does it not follow that all the operations of nature are continuous manifestations of an originating divine energy } No, because physical and mental states or acts are not mutually convertible. Volition releases, but does not pass into, muscular energy ; while impact upon the body awakens, but does not pass into, thought. Cause and force, then, are not equivalent terms. The former includes the latter. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 43 Causation occurs in the realms of both mind and matter ; force belongs only to physical objects. (2) Metaphysical and psychological objections may be raised against this phase of the argument : A. It seems to make God changeable. If the mutability of matter forbids us to consider it eternal, the immutability of the eternal Spirit forbids us to regard him as the Creator, since creation would be a change both for him and in him. We reply — (ci) We may consistently refer the beginning of temporal events to a Being who alone is able to institute those events, without pretending to explain what took place in the eternal mind before time began. {b) A posteriori conclusions are as valid against a priori deductions in theology as in natural science, if from the nature of the case, as when we aeal with the Infinite, the a priori method is obviously inapplicable. {c) The divine Spirit might be active from eternity to eternity and yet undergo no change. This will be shown when the spirituality of God is considered. B. No motive can be imagined for selecting any moment for the creative act. It is as difificult to conceive the divine Spirit, after the lapse of an eternity, and subject to no im- pulse from without, determining to create the world at any given moment, as to conceive of an infinite succession of finite phenomena. We reply — id) It is not merely difficult but impossible to conceive of any real cause which is not a first cause. {b) While matter cannot conceivably find the cause of its first movement in itself, the infinite Mind cannot conceivably find a determining motive outside itself. In other words, the 44 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD supposition of a self-moved, spiritual Creator is psychologi- cally consistent, but the opposite supposition is unthinkable, C. The validity of our idea of cause is denied on the ground that it is a habit, not a necessity of thought ; that ex- perience gives us only phenomenal succession, and that our notion of cause or force is derived from fancying our own will to be an originating cause, a producer of force. This purely empirical but thorough-going objection may be met by the following considerations. {a) Whatever the origin of the idea of causation may be, it is now impossible to think the contrary of that idea, that is, to reduce cause and effect to a succession of phenomena unproducing and unproduced. We are compelled to accept the causal judgment as valid. {b) No fact in experience is more certain than that in the process of forming a volition, every person, whatever be the range of motives which he is capable of taking into account, is self-determined. We know that we "create" our own volitions. {c) Although volition does not originate but only releases physical energy, it is equally certain that volition absolutely causes the release. How this effort of the will escapes being the creation of a releasing force we cannot understand ; but its analogy to creation of force justifies ascribing the creation of force to that Being whom the necessity for a real cause obliges us to accept as the First Cause. Uniting the results afforded by both phases of the cosmo- logical argument, we find that the phenomena of the physical universe and the laws of the human mind substantiate the belief that a self-existent, personal Spirit is the Creator of all. Whether we may call him God remains for other forms THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 45 of the theistic arguments to show. It is enough if they find a firm basis laid for them in the etiology of the cosmos. II. THE EUTAXIOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. The argument from order has but lately received a dis- tinctive name. Independent treatment of the argument is also of comparatively recent date. It has usually been re- garded as part of the teleological argument. Uniform order in any sphere is a mark of controlling in- telligence. Th6 universe is pervaded by laws which only extreme rigor and refinement of intellectual processes can ascertain and state, and thus discloses an Intelligence to human conception infinite. How widely order, or law, pre- vails may be gathered from the facts : (a) All living things may be classified under various types ; while the production of these classes in, upon the whole, an ascending series exhibits an order inclusive of all organisms. (b) It is yet more remarkable \}c\3X the highest physical laws tnay be reduced to mathematical formulas. This is the case, for example, with celestial and terrestrial mechanics, with the laws of heat and electricity, light and sound, even to some extent with chemistry, botany, and zoology. These formulas are not the fruit of observation, but of the strictest processes of abstract reasoning. They signalize the correspondence of the order of nature with the order of thought. What the laws of mind require us to ascribe to matter is found to be true of matter. Such a correspondence of thought to things needs no explanation on any theory of monism. If materialism is true, then the laws of matter include the laws of what is called mind ; or, if idealism is true, then the laws of mind 46 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD are those also of what passes for matter. But on the theory of dualism the only possible explanation is that matter and mind have a common origin. Nevertheless, the eutaxiological argument is a heavy blow at materialism. It compels this philosophy to testify against itself. Materialism might account for the accord between the two realms of matter and mind ; but how could it account for the two realms } Attributing all phenomena, even the human mind, to evolution from a primordial nebula, material- ism forbids us to ascribe to an originating Mind those orderly processes which, it declares, have produced finite minds. But if organism could produce mind, the original capabilities of matter would all the more need accounting for. Furthermore, atomic properties, however potent, would be without effect unless the atoms were fitly combined. The primal combination must have provided for every detail at every instant since time began. Any slip in the process might have wrecked the whole scheme of nature. Whence the original collocation competent to secure cosmos instead of chaos ? It could not be by chance; it must have been by Intelligence. The relations of the argument from contingency and the argument from order are noteworthy and important. '^ (i) Eiitaxiology supports etiology : (a) In the metaphysical form of the cosmological argu- ment. This argument ascribes the universe to a creative Will on the ground that causation is conceived of only through the exercise of volition. But this is to assume that what is necessary in thought is necessary in nature. The argument from order justifies this assumption by showing that the highest inductions of physical science THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 47 are expressed in the purely mental deductions of mathe- matics. [b) In the physical form of the cosmological argument. The order or law which characterizes any object is due to its qualities. But its qualities are grounded in its constitution ; and, since things without constitution do not and cannot ex- ist, therefore, to confer upon things their constitution, quali- ties, and order, is to create them. (2) Etiology supports eutaxiology : The argument which ascribes the universe to a personal Will prepares us for evidences of Intelligence. Volition itself includes foresight of ends. (3) While both arguments lead back to creation, they dijfer in basis. The argument for creative Will appeals to the element of change in nature ; the argument for creative Intelligence appeals to the element of fixity — the one to the fact of motion, the other to the fact of law. (4) Furthermore, the will and the intelligence thus far testified to by nature, tmite to form purpose, and thus lay a foundation for — III. THE TELEOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. This argument finds evidences of a Designer in the num- berless adaptations in nature to rational ends. But the conclusiveness of the argument has been denied on various grounds : (i) That adaptations indicate the existence, not of God, but only of a demiurge, whose ability, though large enough for the purposes actually achieved, is infinitely short of infi- nite. And this because — (A) Infinite power would not employ adaptations, or means, but would go straight to its ends. 48 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD (B) The abilities of the Designer have not sufficed to pre- vent the intrusion of evil in the world. We reply that — (a) In a scheme of finite objects, on no matter how vast a scale, adaptation of means to ends is indispensable, and plainly indicative of intelligent purpose. (d) We do not ask from the teleological argument evi- dences of infinite, but only of immense, power and wisdom. An inductive argument is limited by its nature to less than an infinite number of data, and its conclusion must be cor- respondingly limited. Nevertheless — (c) The exhibition of wisdom and power by the uni- verse is so varied and so vast as to justify the positions that— (aa) The destructive processes of nature do not indicate any deficiency in the Designer, but prove the incomprehensi- bility of his design, (dd) Whether the universe is boundless or not, the re- sources of its Designer are without known limit. The data which the teleologist adduces prepare us at least to accept testimony from some other quarter that the skill competent for all things actual is equal to all things possible. (2) Adaptation to rational ends is known to zm/>/y design only in the case of artificial objects ; but since we do not know that the world was made, it is unwarrantable to infer that it was designed. The answer to this objection varies with the position claimed for the teleological argument. {a) If the arguments from contingency and order are either or both accepted, then the world is to be regarded as a manufactured article ; and, as such, not only warrants, but requires us to construe its adaptations to ends, however ob- THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 49 fCure, as evidences of design. Final cause must be ascribed to personal cause. {b) If an independent position is sought for the argument, it then becomes an estimate of probabilities. This, how- ever, does not seriously, if even perceptibly, weaken its force. Modern jurisprudence teaches that the most conclusive testi- mony as to events can claim only a higher or lower degree of probability ; and yet events may be proved beyond reasonable doubt. And so the teleological argument legitimately im- parts to most minds a firm assurance that the numberless interdependences in nature, complex yet congruous, cannot be accidental, but are due to Divine forethought and control. (3) Not a few evolutionists, regarding adaptations in nature as the fruit of a purely natural process due to the properties of matter, refuse to see in them any indication of design. Other advocates of evolution admit that rational adaptations, whatever the process through which they arise, are unequiv- ocally significant of purpose and plan. From this point of view Janet's analysis is ingenious and impressive. For the most part following Janet, we observe : When a coincidence of phenomena constantly recurs, ex- planation is needed, not only of the phenomena, but of the coincidence. When such a coincidence tends regularly to- ward a distinct end, the end must be regarded as ideally present in the production of the coincidence ; that is, the co- incidence is for the sake of the end, and finality is a law of nature. This being admitted, the question arises whether finality is immanent or transcendent, whether nature is self- led, after the analogy of automatic nerve-action and of in- stinct, or follows the design of an intelligent Will which is above nature. It may be answered : («) That immanent finality does not exclude transcendent E 50 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD finality, while transcendent would naturally include immanent. An intelligent contriver, if he could, would fit his invention to work out his plan. {b) To ascribe to nature automatic choice, or even instinct, is to state the problem, not to solve it. Intelligent purpose alone can explain the convergence of natural processes on a vast scale toward rational ends. In a word, modern science may change our conception of the method of nature, but in so doing affords the more mul- tiform and impressive evidence of controlling design. The present tendency of theistic evolutionists is very marked to- ward ascribing the entire course of nature to the constant, rather than to a merely original, activity of God. IV. THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT. This is a deduction of the existence of God from the idea of him as perfect or as necessary. The following are typical forms of the argument : I. From the Idea of Petfection. A. Anselm argued that we have the idea of a Being than whom a more perfect cannot exist. But unless we have an idea of him as existing, then we can have an idea of a Being more perfect than he. We are therefore compelled to think of the all-perfect Being as existing. B. Descartes held that not mere existence, but necessary existence, is a perfection, and the argument as thus amended he accepted. But he used an argument drawn from his own postulate that the existence of God must be assumed as a guarantee of human reason : our conception of an all-perfect Being is innate, and could be implanted only by such a Being. Every argument drawn from the idea of perfection is re- THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 51 ducible to the identical proposition that, if we think of an all- perfect Being at all, we must think of him as possessing every perfection ; that is, if God exists, he is self-existent. It con- founds a definition with a demonstration. 2. From the Idea of Necessary Existence. A. Cudworth rejected all the earlier forms of the argu- ment as involving a petitio principii, but considered his own statement of it valid : A necessary Being is possible ; a nec- essary Being is impossible unless he exists now. Therefore, a necessary Being exists now. That is, if he can be, he must be. But this is only an appeal to ignorance. More fully stated it would run : A necessary Being may or may not exist ; I do not know which. If he ever existed or is to exist, he must now exist. Therefore, I do not know whether a neces- sary Being ^ ever did, does, or will exist. B. Samuel Clarke mingled parts of the cosmological and ontological arguments. Justly assuming that something has existed from eternity, he asserted that the eternally or neces- sarily existent Being could be recognized by the impossibility of denying its existence without self-contradiction ; and in this way he sought to identify God as the eternal and neces- sary being. Infinite space and infinite duration, he said, could not be denied. But these are only qualities, and there- fore imply an eternal and omnipresent substance, that is, God. Two errors may be detected in Clarke's argument : {a) Infinitely extended substance cannot be inferred from localized substance. The proper conclusion is the identical ^ The existence of anything involves the necessary existence of something. Cudworth' s argument is not needed to prore this, and does not prove that the necessary Being is other than the universe. 52 The existence of god proposition that infinite space affords room for infinitely ex- tended substance. {b) Necessary being and being which cannot without self- contradiction be denied are not interchangeable expressions. The former certainly includes the latter, but may include more. What the laws of mind forbid us to conceive as non- existent, they obviously require us to conceive as existing. But a being possessed of necessary existence may be un- known to us ; or, if known, its self-existence may not be rec- ognizable. Clarke, therefore, was not justified in deciding against the eternity of matter merely because it could without self-contradiction be thought of as not existing. Concerning the various forms of the ontological argument, it may be observed that its error is not in assuming that what is necessary in thought must exist in fact, but in virtually as- suming what it purports to prove ; namely, that the existence of God is necessary in thought. It mistakes a thought about God as necessarily existing for a necessary thought of him as necessarily existing. On the other hand, while the existence of God cannot be dialectically deduced from the idea of perfect being, no being less than perfect can be accepted as God by a mind which already entertains the idea of perfection. And further, the response of our moral sensibilities to this idea supplies what many regard as the only secure basis for theistic belief; to wit — V. THE MORAL ARGUMENT. In this argument we reach the first assurance that the creator is God. As its evidence is found in the nature of man, it is sometimes called the Anthropological argument, THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 53 but is distinctively moral or religious. As sometimes stated it virtually claims for man an intuition, or immediate knowl- edge, of God. For example, conscience testifies to the exist- ence of moral law ; but recognition of law is said to be recognition of a Lawgiver — a claim already commented upon. It is safer to regard the moral argument as a rational infer- ence of the Divine existence from moral intuitions, or from the response of what may be regarded as our moral faculties to the idea of an all-perfect Being. This response is mani- fold and clear, or confused and weak, according to the degree of our moral development and moral sensibility. Appeal to the following facts would perhaps be most generally ap- preciable : 1. Man intuitively knows that there is a distinction be- tween right and wrong. In recognizing this distinction he becomes aware of unqualified obligation to adhere to the one and shun the other. But — {a) The existence of conscience is first understood when the idea is presented of an all-holy Creator who demands that we shall be like himself, and who has implanted in our nature the sense of obligation as a security for the fulfillment of his will. {b) Conscience finds in an infinitely holy Person a needed moral Archetype for man, an impressive measure of the ob- ligation to be holy (cf. i Peter i : i6), and so the counter- part of conscience. If this is not a revelation of God in conscience, the thought of him is responded to by conscience with a distinctness pro- portioned to the vigor of our moral health. 2. The (Esthetic sensibility is capable of worshiping tran- scendent beauty and sublimity, and desires to know that it may worship them. When the exaltation of God is appre- hended, admiration deepens into awe, and the demand of 54 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD the aesthetic sensibility is fully met.' At such a moment it is impossible to doubt the existence of the all-perfect One. This phase of the argument is allied to that from con- science in two particulars : (a) It is in his moral attributes that God is most exalted. But while conscience defers to these as morally perfect, the ccsthetic sensibility adores them as infinitely beautiful and sublime (Ps. 29 : 2). (d) Precisely as it would be impossible to look upon an all-holy Being as one with whom we have nothing to do, so the thought of an all-glorious Being is not only poetical but practical. The whole energy of our aesthetic appreciation, or worship, claims relations with such a Being as real. 3. T/ie hiivian heart, with love as its normal function, yearns for an object worthy to employ its utmost vigor. When God is so loved, our healthful affections recognize him as the One for whom they exist, and insist on his reality with a con- fidence entire as their devotion to him. 4. A Being who meets so varied and urgent moral needs is an object of corresponding trust. The sense of dependence, beginning with experience of physical limitations, and ac- knowledged even by the agnostic in regard to the Unknown, grows as our higher powers turn toward God, and can be felt most profoundly when most amply satisfied. In general, the demand of every moral faculty for full exercise is a normal appetency ; and the satisfaction which ' Worship is distinctively the religious function of the aesthetic faculty. It con- templates God as exalted and offers homage. It is admiration, that is, aesthetic appreciation. But inasmuch as there is no physical beauty or sublimity in God, worship recognizes his transcendent glory as a spirit, and is expressed in praises of attributes that appeal also to the conscience and the heart. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 55 these appetencies find in the idea of God gives moral assur- ance that he exists. Their testimony is not to the satisfac- toriness of abstract ideals, but of a Person who embodies ideals. So exclusively personal are the longings and the gratifications of our moral faculties, that they certify either the existence of an all-perfect Deity, or to the boundless self- delusion of man. Objections to the Moral Argument. (i) Precisely this self-delusion is what some find in the moral argument. They reduce it to an affirmation that a thing exists merely because we wish it to exist. But those things do exist which our organization demands. Hunger notifies us of a physiological want, justifies belief that nature makes provision to meet that want, and largely guides us in the choice of food. The appetite for knowledge urges the mind to search for truth, and is rewarded by the progressive discovery of truth. Confidence may reasonably be felt that the physiology of our moral powers is not in hopeless and grotesque contradiction to the laws of body and mind. (2) Nor is the authority of our moral convictions shaken by the evolutionist theory of their development from a non-moral sentiment of caution, of submission to the chief of a tribe, or of parental concern for offspring during the long period of human infancy and childhood, or from the observed fitness of conduct to natural ends. On the contrary — {a) The demands of our moral sensibilities are more urgent and their authority more fully recognized with every advance in moral development. {I)) That development may have proceeded under discipline of the experience which the evolutionist cites, and the dis- cipline may have been able to awaken and train the con- 56 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD science without being able to produce conscience. It must be borne in mind that evolution is a process, not a creating. Only what is involved can be evolved. In point of fact — {c) Whatever the experience in the course of which the moral quality in conduct becomes known, that moral quality is not inferred from any objective fact, nor from any non- moral sentiment. It is intuited in every instance, (aa) The evolutionist has yet to show how experience of pain or pleasure can evolve a sense of duty which overrides all consideration of pleasure or pain ; especially, since it may well be doubted whether the simple virtues of a savage would not cause him, apart from the verdict of his conscience, more inconvenience than his simple vices. {bb) The evolutionist would have to show that a moral estimate of a chieftain's orders as just or unjust would not be already present when the sense of moral obligation to obey arose. {cc) Parental care, instead of suggesting the idea of duty, would have no moral quality to suggest until the indispensa- ble condition of moral quality, namely, the capacity of moral discrimination, had already been developed. " I fear to " is not " I ought not " ; and " I must " is not " I ought." (dd) Fitness to normal ends is an objective fact ; its moral quality exists only in personal beings, and is intuited by rea- son, or not recognized at all. VI. THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT. The experience of the human race, especially the history of Christianity, testifies to the existence of a God. This argu- ment is closely related to the teleological and moral argu- ments. I. The teleological argument is corroborated by the move- THE EXISTENCE OF GOD 57 ment of history toward ends presumably consonant with the will of an over-ruling Deity. A large perspective is ordinarily needed to bring this fact into full relief ; but sometimes events, each intrinsically significant, and all of them indis- pensable to momentous results, arise independently, yet so concurrently as to signalize the timing of them by divine plan. ' Such was the provision within seventy years of the four chief agencies in the intellectual, political, and religious progress of the modern world. To wit : Printing with movable types was introduced about the year 1450 ; Constantinople fell, and Greek learning was broadcast over Europe in 1453 ; Colum- bus discovered a new hemisphere for the new age in 1492; Luther broke the spell of superstition, emancipated faith, and provided the religious element of modern life by publishing his theses at Wittenberg in i 5 1 7. A little reflection will show how each of these epoch-making events played its part at the right date for fullest co-operation toward the best that has come from them all. 2. The moral argument is illustrated by the alleged uni- versal belief in a God. Though the fact has been challenged, more exact inquiry goes to establish it, with the possible ex- ception, in a few cases, of extreme and unmistakable degen- eracy. 3. Both the teleological and moral arguments find his- torical attestation in the benefits which accrue from relig- ious belief. 4. Christianity is a factor in history which must be accounted for. And since its prevalence among the most enlightened and progressive peoples is due, not to argumenta- tion, but to evidence of various sorts which it offers in its own behalf, Christianity, wherever it prevails, is the chief assurance of the existence of that Being whom and whose 58 THE EXISTENCE OF GOD ways it declares to men. In other words, the only adequate account of Christianity as a historical phenomenon is that it is true. Christianity presents itself in different phases : A. As huvian. {a) Christianity is a tradition competent to testify to the fact that Jesus once lived, and, in no small extent, to the view which his disciples took of him from the earliest times. {h) A system of external institutions. An event of so unparalleled moment as the resurrection of our Lord ought to have produced corresponding effects. And the church, in respect of the age it has attained and may look for, in extent of territory, in the scope and penetration of its requirements, is by far the most important organization of men. But the church and its observances, the Lord's Day, Baptism, and the Communion, are distinctly monuments to the resurrection of our Lord, and to the acceptance from the first of those dis- tinctive articles of Christian belief, redemption by Jesus Christ and regeneration by the Holy Spirit. B. As divine. (a) Christianity is a Book, and as such has been unal- terably set forth alike for the disciple and the critic. But this Book has withstood remorseless criticism from every quarter, and is established in the reverence of the civilized world. {p) A scheme of doctrines, which unfold their own mean- ing, evince their own truth, and to a large extent guard their own purity. {c) A life, at once so strong, so beneficent, and so unique, both in its confession of weakness and in its reliance upon God, as to argue persuasively that its origin and support are from God (2 Cor. 12 : 5, 9, 10; Phil. 3 : 8), and thus to testify to his existence. THE PERSONALITY OF GOD 59 C. As divine-hmnan. The personal Christ claimed to be himself Christianity, "the Way, the Truth, the Life." He is at once the sub- stance and the support of Christianity ; that which is to be proved, and the proof. All Christian traditions, institutions, sacred writings, and doctrines, center in him, and are an in- soluble enigma, if he was not what the church has always held him to be. Christianity as a life shows the present part which Christ takes in history. His influence is not mainly that of his ideas, but that of a living person. As such it is probably more commanding continually than the influence which any other person has exercised over his im- mediate followers. In appealing to Christianity for evidence that there is a God, care must be taken to rest only on historically attested facts. Otherwise the argument proceeds in a circle, from an assumed to an inferred existence, proving nothing. Remarks on the Theistic Arguments. Finally, as to all the theistic arguments it may be noted : A. If the first be accepted, the others are conclusive. B. Taken together, they have a cumulative force due to the rapidly increasing ratio of improbability that so many kinds of evidence, with so innumerable details in favor of some of them, can be fallacious and misleading. C. Our relations to God are so largely a matter for heart and conscience that, when these are unresponsive, arguments valid to the understanding fail to impart a feeling of assurance. § 12. The Personality of God. Personality consists essentially in the capacity of conscious self-determination, or will. But will implies ability to dis- 6o THE PERSONALITY OF GOD criminate, not only within the narrow range of brute intelli- gence, but with the broad scope of reason ; that is, capacity to recognize considerations of every kind pertaining to con- duct. Thus, since moral considerations are among these, personality includes reason, and culminates in the capacity for ethical self -judgment, or conscience. That God is a person is assured by all the testimony to his existence. The causal argument ascribes to him will ; the argument from order asserts his intelligence ; these views united testify to rational purpose ; the moral argument expressly alleges the moral powers of God ; a divine person- ality is manifested in the history of God's relations to men. Philosophers and even theologians have sometimes at- tempted to raise God above personality, chiefly on the grounds that — 1. The condition of self-consciousness — namely, a dis- tinction between self and not-self — did not exist prior to the creation. 2. Personality involves limitation. One person cannot be also another person ; but the Infinite is the all-inclusive. 3. A personal God would have been aware that he was admitting evil into the universe, and must thus have made himself responsible for evil. Conscious purpose in man is, therefore, only a symbol of something impersonal in God. To these objections it may be replied in turn: I. We are not bound to conjecture the mode of the Divine existence prior to that period which gave the first intimation that a divine Being existed. Every such intimation is of a personal God, and the difficulty of framing a divine psychol- THE UNITY OF GOD 6l cgy does not justify any inference against that which all the facts go to show. Some would avoid the difficulty by affirming the eternal tri-personality of the Godhead. This no doubt answers such a purpose, and is a doctrine warranted, as we shall see, by Scripture ; but to the monotheist it is an attempt to clear up an obscure doctrine by one still more obscure, and is apt to turn out a mere begging of the question, an attempt to prove the Trinity by the personal consciousness of God, and the personal consciousness by the Trinity. Others suggest that God might find the condition of self- consciousness in distinguishing between his attributes ; or, since there never was a moment when the Eternal did not contemplate creating the universe, that he always had the idea of a distinction between himself and his works. 2. The personality of God excludes no attribute which would not itself be a limitation of the Divine perfections ; and if it excludes an identification of his substance and will with those of created beings, this is a result of voluntary self-limitation in the act of creating. 3. The reduction of personal attributes to a symbol of what is real in God either virtually admits his personality, or involves a pantheistic degradation of him below personality. In the latter case, the irresponsibility of God for evil is se- cured only by relieving man also of his responsibility ; for with the pantheist, moral distinctions vanish into grades of development, human personality becomes an illusion, and, in brief, the common consciousness of mankind is defied. § 13. The Unity of God. The effort of philosophy to unify all knowledge has often proved favorable to monotheism. That effort never, perhaps, F 62 THE UNITY OF GOD seemed so near success as to-day. Unity of the divine es- sence is now part of every conception of God, whether theis- tic or pantheistic. At the same time, it was never more certain that duaHsm could not be fused into monism. The material cannot be converted into the spiritual, nor the spir- itual into the material ; therefore pantheism makes but an illusory show of success. 1. All evidence for the Divine existence points to one God; no evidence to more than one. {a) God is the origin of all forces ; but the doctrine of correlation and conservation of force resolves all forces into one, and only one Originator is needed for one force. (^) Universal order indicates one presiding Intelligence. (c) Adaptations in nature do not, it is true, in all cases reveal the Designer's aim, but neither do they indicate a con- flict of designs. As has been well indicated by Martineau, dissonances " arise upon the line of the very same law which also yields the greatest harmonies " (" Study of Religion," Vol. I., p. 379). {d) The moral consciousness of the race recognizes one scheme of moral law and one moral Governor. ((?) The history of mankind exhibits one overruling Will. 2. Resistless power is a primary attribute of God alike with rude and with cultured minds ; but two infinities of power would equal each other, and then neither would be re- sistless. They cannot co-exist. It is not plain that two in- finities of any other kind would be mutually exclusive. 3. The unity of God is self-coynmended. In Christian lands the objection to polytheism virtually has the force of a nec- essary conviction. We may believe in no God, but not in many gods. Nor is this phenomenon exclusively Christian. THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 63 Notwithstanding the frequent lapses of the Hebrew people into idolatry, monotheism, once clearly conceived, has ever shown an inherent force capable of overthrowing the polythe- istic superstition. The more intelligent heathen opponents of our missionaries protest that their doctrine is fundamen- tally monotheistic. This invincible sentiment may not with certainty be traced to a source in either empirical inference or native intuition. But even if it be a product of advanced civilization and re- fined religious training, it is not therefore factitious, but all the more evidently suitable to man. Whatever the origin of monotheistic belief, it is fully sup- ported by the conception of God as all-perfect. The senti- ments which testify to the existence of such a Being require that every perfection of which there is evidence shall be as- cribed to him. The moral impossibility of accepting any in- ferior being as God would thus appear to be the source of the repugnance felt toward polytheism. The self-evidence of monotheism is accordingly plainest to those who hold in view the moral excellencies of God. 4. The evidences from the physical and the moral spheres unite in the coincidence of physical with moral laws. To re- spect the laws of our bodies is a large part of virtue, and moral law receives a not insignificant sanction in the physical good or ill that waits upon the doing of right or wrong. § 14. The Attributes of God. Regarded as conceptions in the human mind, the attributes of God are the qualities which we attribute to him ; but con- sidered with respect to the divine essence, they are so much as we learn concerning its kind through the relations of God to dependent beings. 64 THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD Various methods of classifying the attributes have been employed, and even urged as alone suitable ; but simple and satisfactory as any is that classification which follows the re- lations through which the attributes become known.' I. ATTRIBUTES RELATED TO DURATION. 1. The eternity of God. By this is meant that the exist- ence of God is without beginning or end. Infinite recession of existence into the past and infinite procession into the future utterly baffle the imagination, but reason exacts belief in them. Eternal existence must be as- cribed to the self-existing Being. As he never began, so he can never cease to be. The Scriptures often refer to the eternally pre-existent as that which " was in the beginning," or by equivalent phrases (Ps. I02 : 25 ; cf. Heb. i : 10 ; John i : i, 2 ; i John i : i ; Rev. I : 8). The Hebrew conception evidently was that he who already existed when the worlds began was himself with- out beginning. 2. Immutability was shown by the cosmological argument to be a necessary attribute of the Eternal. More fully stated the relation of these attributes is as follows : No pro- cess of change can have taken place from eternity, because no assignable stage can have an assignable date in such a process. But neither can that which is liable to change be eternal ; for the eternal is self-existent, or necessarily exist- ent, while the changeable is essentially contingent, or de- pendent. The eternity of God therefore involves his im- mutability. * This admirable principle of classification was worked out by the late Dr. E. G. Robinson. Its application in the text is somewhat different from his. THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 65 But the question arises whether immutability belongs to the divine essence, or to the modes of the divine Being, or to both. Certainly it belongs to the essence of God, and ap- parently to his mode of existence. But if a changeless essence would seem to preclude changing modes, on the other hand a uniform mode of existence would preclude the act of creating, as well as the variety of sentiment which is involved in care for the varying states of all dependent creatures, and partic- ularly in concern for the diverse characters of moral beings. We are certain that the divine perfection excludes immobility or impassivity, so that God is active although changeless. Perhaps the paradox is not to be entirely resolved, yet the following considerations may be taken into account : {a) The infinite always involves the incomprehensible. {b) In the act of creating, God voluntarily accepted limi- tations. {c) The attribute of spirituality will throw some light upon this problem. 3. Spirituality. That God is in part a spirit is assured by his personality ; but that he is without body is an immedi- ate inference from his eternity and immutability. The im- material alone is exempt from change. {a) There is scientific justification for believing that spirit is capable of ceaseless activity without undergoing change. Motion involves change in material agents because they were integrated by the expenditure of energy, and this energy can be recovered only through their disintegration. But spirit is not an aggregate of molecules ; it is a monad, and therefore essentially indivisible and unchangeable. What we call growth of the human mind may be but development of the organism in which the mind is lodged, particularly of the brain. 66 THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD {b) The declaration of Christ that '• God is Spirit " (John 4 : 24) means that he is without body ; otherwise true worship might turn on form and place (ver. 20-23 > cf. Luke 24 : 39). An attribute so essential to the idea of God as spirituality must be taken into account in dealing with all the mysteries of his nature. II. ATTRIBUTES RELATED TO THE PHYSICAL UNIVERSE. I. Omnipotence is power to do all things not contrary to the divine perfections. The possibility of ceasing to be perfect would be a present imperfection. To purpose doing self- contradictory things would be an absurdity, and God cannot be absurd. Different sources of knowledge concerning God present different views of his omnipotence. A. The physical universe — {a) By its creation reveals power without known limit. But— (^) It does not reveal unlimited power, unless itself limit- less ; as to which nothing is known. {c) Yet, while suggesting no bound to the power of its Maker, the universe lays bounds upon the activity of its Ruler. While he keeps it in existence, he must deal with it according to its nature. Even miracles, as we shall see, are not an infraction of this self-imposed rule. B. The moral sentiments of mankind assure us of what the physical universe cannot prove, the limitlessness of the divine perfection in respect of power. To the enlightened worshiper, if the maker is not almighty, he is only the highest of known beings — a demhirge, not the Deity. C. The Scriptures throughout attribute all power to God ; though what this means may have been less patent to the THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 67 patriarchs than to the apostles. While any trace remained of the belief that Jehovah was but the God of the Hebrews, and that other gods might exist for other peoples, a corre- sponding defect would linger in the popular conception as to his attributes, particularly as to that of omnipotence. And when this ancient fancy of ethnic deities was outgrown by the Hebrews is not entirely clear ; therefore we do not know whether the almightiness declared by the Bible meant to its first readers all that it means to us. 2. Omniscience is knowledge of all things actual and possible. A. To create the universe shows how much God needed to know. The actual extent of his knowledge may be inferred from the marks of foresight and reason. B. That what may seem to us defects in the plan do not prove ignorance in the Maker is assured by resort to the moral argument for the reality of a Being who possesses all perfections. C. The Scriptures assert the knowledge of God in regard to matters that bewilder us (Ps. 1 39 : 6 ; 147 : 4, 5). Abstruse questions are suggested by the doctrine of divine omniscience : (A) By what method does God know all things actual and possible, past, present, and future } It is safe to say that he knows the essence and the totality of everything, and consequently sees its past and future in its present. But the answer is often given that to God eternity is an ever-present Now ; that, therefore, all events are to the Divine mind without succession, and his knowledge of them 68 THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD without contingency. This view is thought to have scrip- tural support in what Christ said of himself, " Before Abra- ham was I am " ; and in what the Apocalypse wrote of Christ, "The Lamb who is slain from the foundation of the world" (Rev. 13 : 8). But— {a) If absoluteness and infinity both of being and of knowledge necessitate this conclusion, as they seem to, we face here an antinomy in the idea of God as at once the absolute and infinite, and yet the creator and ruler. For causal relation and succession of events are facts, therefore must be facts to the Divine mind. (b) So to interpret the Scriptures quoted is contrary to Scripture ; for then the slaying of the Lamb from eternity must go on through eternity ; even more, Christ is just now being born, doing the work which centuries ago he declared to be finished, is rising, and is pronouncing final judgment on men to human view yet unborn ; indeed, what he said of himself must be true also of us — when Abraham was we are. In brief, if the speculative conclusion that to God, who knows things as they are, eternity excludes temporal suc- cession, be not absurdly audacious, then it is impossible to show the absurdity of any speculation whatever. An ever- present is a never-present Now. Perhaps the nearest approach to a solution is that to create anything is to accept limitations. Whenever a perplexity can be traced to the infinite, we know how much, in knowing how little, can be known. (B) If God foreknows all events as certain, how can man be free } It has been replied that, while God knows all possibilities and provides for them, yet, in making man free, he set limits not only to the fruition of his own will, but also to his THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 69 knowledge of what free agents will do. But confessedly the more scriptural, and at the same time the likelier, reply would be, that God knows in advance what men will do, be- cause he fully knows what men are. The divine wisdom is the knowledge of God guiding his acts. Complete knowledge includes knowledge what to do. 3. Omnipresence is the presence of the personal God in all his works. The undivided Godhead is everywhere. The mystical formula for this doctrine was : " God is a circle whose center is everywhere, and whose circumference is nowhere." Omnipresence is possible only because, being a spirit, God is without parts, divisibility, or subjection to any spatial limitations. With no unreal correspondence to the divine omnipresence, the indivisible human spirit is everywhere in the human body. Its function in one part is not the same as in another part, except that it is the vitalizing principle of the whole. Being immaterial and unlimited by the laws of matter, the personal God not only pervades all physical objects, but is immanent in all spirits. His presence with us is not figura- tive, a presence merely of sympathy and help, but is mysteri- ous and real. If thought can reach the boundaries of the material uni- verse, God must then be conceived as extending on through infinite space. Omnipresence there merges into immensity. The scriptural argument for the omnipresence and immen- sity of God is familiar, and is confirmed by the argument for the existence of an all-perfect Being. 70 THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD III. ATTRIBUTES REVEALED THROUGH MORAL RELATIONS. I. Holiness. One feature is common to all views of the Supreme Being which are attained through moral relations, namely, his moral excellence. The usual and best name for this attribute is holiness. Holiness can properly be ascribed to any being only when moral excellence is maintained by him with all the energy of which he is capable. Theholi-'- ness of God is his moral excellence maintaining itself with infinite energy as of infinite worth. It is purity become power. Or, since both of these descriptions are figurative, the divine holiness may be defined as infinite and unchange- able moral excellence. Holiness has sometimes been defined as the sum of the divine perfections, or as the sum of the moral attributes. Either definition is unsatisfactory. {(i) Holiness is not the sum of all perfections ; because, whatever moral quality may attach to the acts and states of a moral agent, there is much besides moral quality in them ; and the moral quality of holiness cannot be the sum of non-moral qualities, such as eternity, omnipresence, and re- sistless power. {b) Neither is holiness the sum of the moral perfections of God ; because holiness belongs to the nature of God as such, while most of his other moral attributes concern his relations to his creatures. An inherent quality may control active qualities, but is no more the sum of them than a being is the sum of its actions or relations. But it should not be overlooked that to allow any of the divine perfections to be impaired would be the greatest im- aginable evil. It would be a crime against the nature of God, and fatal to his deity. Holiness, then, though not the sujh THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 71 total of divine attributes, is a defense of them all, and being itself unchangeable, serves as a complete safeguard to the divine immutability. In its relation to the other attributes, holiness in God might be defined as his moral instinct of self-preservation. 2. Benevolence is that attribute in God which leads him to desire the well-being of others, that is, to love them. By many benevolence is now regarded as, in the last analysis, best descriptive of the moral excellence of God. Scriptural support is thought to be found in the statements that "God is love" (i John 4 : 16), and that "love is the fulfilling of the law" (Rom, 13 : 10; cf. Matt. 22 : 36-40). But— {a) God is not literally love ; nor, as the words are some- times paraphrased, is his nature love. A being is not a feel- ing. God is a being who naturally loves. Whether this is the deepest moral reality in him remains to be considered. {b) To say that love fulfills the law is not to say that love and obedience are identical. Love is the sufficient motive to obey, and it is this fact which justifies the terse language of Paul. But the motive to a deed ought not to be confounded with the deed, nor with the quality of goodness in the motive or in the deed. At another extreme, many object to resolving holiness into love, because, as they allege, these attributes are in effect antithetic. Contrariety of view so pronounced ought to dis- appear upon careful consideration of the nature of love and of its effects. Once more, love is commonly supposed to be incapable of analysis, and therefore to have indefinable merit. Neither the supposition nor the inference from it is well grounded. 72 THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD The questions before us are : What is love ? what is the merit of love ? and, how is love related to holiness ? (i) JV/ia^ is love? Love, or liking, is a native impulse in sentient beings to fulfill their functions. In the case of bodily organs, that impulsion is appetite ; with the faculties of mind, it is appetency. For example, the appetite for food is a natural longing of the digestive apparatus to do its office ; while curiosity and zeal in study are the natural appetency of the mind for knowledge. In general, we normally like or love most that which is fittest to our faculties, and which most fully employs without straining them. Our faculties are either self-regarding or social. Correspondingly — (A) Self-love is the impulse to fulfill functions which con- cern one's self. (B) Social love is the impulse to fulfill social functions. Of these the following may be distinguished : {a) Ability on the part of rational beings to recognize the existence of both self-regarding and social faculties in others. Now it is the immediate dictate of nature to discharge self- regarding offices, therefore social love normally desires that others should do the same. For this reason a wise benevo- lence dictates that every man should rely upon his own exer- tions, and loyal devotion to God would first of all have him exist and act in his own behalf. {b) Our social faculties are largely faculties of self-imparta- tion ; therefore love to others impels us to give ourselves to them. Such a faculty is pre-eminently that of speech. For the same reason the pious offer themselves and all they have to God. (c) Some of our social faculties are faculties of acquisition. Seeing and hearing are of this sort. Hence it is that social love longs to possess its object. Hence also jealousy. Th^ THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 73 craving to use one's faculties of giving and of getting is further stimulated by the desire that one's friend should use his faculties of getting and of giving ; hence love longs for love, for both acceptance of one's self and possession of one's friend. The devout long to be assured that even God him- self discharges his social office, that he accepts the worship- ers and gives himself to them. It should not be overlooked that, inasmuch as the social faculties are the noblest faculties in man, the impulse to use these might well be regarded as an impulse of the highest self- interest, while to neglect or to misuse them is the deepest possible injury to one's self. "Whosoever will save his life shall lose it ; and whosoever will lose his life for my sake," said Christ, "shall find it" (Matt. 16 : 25). (2) W/iat is the merit of love f This is to be found partly in the fact that to love is one among many normal functions, but pre-eminently in the fact that love is the incentive to all other normal functions, that is, to the true ends of being, as these ends are determined by the natures of the beings concerned. (3) But this conclusion not only declines to resolve holi- ness into benevolence ; it also sets aside the supposed anti- thesis of these attributes. The moral persistence of God in being what he is cannot lessen his desire that his creatures should be and act according to what he made them ; and this, we have seen, is precisely the aim of love. 3. Justice is the impartial award to every one of that which is suitable to him, the rendering of his own to every man. What is due is determined by what a man is ; and G 74 THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD what he is includes his capacity to become better. Conduct is both an exposition of what one already is, and an intensifi- cation of the same. The real relations of justice to benevolence now appear. The distinction between these attributes in the divine Being is solely one of form. Strict justice cannot render to any one less than that which is appropriate to him ; but neither can benevolence ask any more. Benevolence intends what is well for the creature ; justice insists on what is fit. But the well-for-us and the fit-for-us precisely coincide. The only thing well for us is the normal employment of our powers and the development of our potentialities, including rela- tions to ourselves, to creatures, and to God ; but to provide for this is precisely what is fitting, and therefore due to us. In the divine nature " mercy and truth are met together ; righteousness and peace have kissed each other " (Ps. 85 : 10). To our limited understanding these attributes often set up contrary demands ; while, as a rule for our own guidance, 'mercy should rejoice against judgment' (James 2 : 13). It is much easier to see what is well for another than what is due to him, and far safer to follow the suggestions of benevo- lence than of justice, for even revenge claims to be but just. If there is no essential antagonism between the benevo- lence and the justice of God, no ground exists for that dis- tinction among different kinds of justice which has played an important part in the theology of New England. This theology taught that distributive justice, or justice proper, apportions rewards and penalties — in the latter case appear- ing as vindictive or punitive justice ; that commutative jus- tice is equitable barter or exchange; while public justice is THE ATTRIBUTES OF GOD 75 not justice at all, but is benevolence administering govern- ment wisely in the interests of the governed. These distinc- tions are sometimes convenient in form, but, if supposed to involve distinctions in substance, they are misleading. (a) Justice is in each case a rendering of what is fit and due. (d) Justice is a requirement of holiness, not a contrived policy in government. 4. Tke remaining moral attributes need no detailed discus- sion. Mercy and grace are phases of benevolence — toward the wretched, mercy ; toward the undeserving, grace. Verac- ity is conformity of statement to fact — a conformity simply normal in a Being who knows all reality. Blessedness is the joy which God finds in being infinitely good, and in using his powers according to the dictates of his perfect nature. His glory is the dignity and splendor of his nature in itself (es- sential glory), or as revealed in his works to rational beings (declarative glory). The Primacy Among Moral Attributes. It should not now be difficult to show that holiness takes precedence among the moral attributes of God. (i) As between holiness and benevolence holiness is to be regarded as primary ; because — {a) Holiness is itself moral excellence, while the moral excellence of benevolence can be explained. {V) Holiness is an attribute of being, while benevolence is an attribute of action ; but action presupposes and is con- trolled by being. {c) Benevolence must take counsel of holiness, since to de- sire for a being aught contrary to holiness would be to wish 76 THE DIVINE DECREES him harm ; while that which holiness leads God to seek, be- nevolence finds best for the creature. {d) The Mosaic Dispensation elaborately symbolized, and the Christian Dispensation makes provision to meet, the re- quirements of holiness as supreme. " First pure, then [by consequence] peaceable" (James 3 : 17). (2) As between holiness and Justice it is obvious that, since holiness is the moral quality which, for rational creatures, in- heres in normal being, while justice is normal action toward sentient beings, justice is per se subordinate to holiness. In the relations of God to moral beings, whether good or bad, justice is the exponent of his holiness. (3) As between benevolence and justice the definitions show such entire correspondence in nature and concurrence in aim that precedence cannot be claimed for either. It is only to our ignorance that either one can seem imperative and the other voluntary ; for both are secure if either wins. To human view, while probation lasts grace reigns, yet justice is not defrauded ; and if any suffer eternally for sin, benevo- lence must acquiesce. Whatever is precisely suited to any one cannot be other than the best possible for him. It must be so, although his plight may be so wretched that the only thing in it which seems well is that the case is no worse. § 1 5. The Divine Decrees. The decrees of God are the eternal and sovereign pur- poses for which he created all things. They embrace not only the universe as a whole, but every object in it ; not only consummations, but every subsidiary event ; not only the active furtherance of good, but the incidental permis- sion of evil. the; divine decrees 77 The mention of decrees at once puts theology on the de- fensive. But this is a false, and emphatically unscriptural attitude. The Scriptures present this doctrine solely as a ground for hope, even when it threatens the foes of Israel or of the church. In truth, it affords the only assurance of good to the good, the sole bond that the promises of God can, and will, be kept. I. EVIDENCES OF DECREES. I. From Natural Theology. Natural Theology presents the most uncompromising as- pect of decrees. They cannot be dissociated from the idea of God which nature furnishes. Every argument for the Di- vine existence is virtually an argument for the eternal pur- poses of God. Proceeding from the most complex argument to the simplest, we notice : {a) History viewed at large testifies to a divine Over-ruler. But history assures us that his purposes have been accom- plished, not solely by the overthrow, but in part through the agency of evil. Pre-eminently, what Christ as a historical personage achieved is due more to the ills he bore than to the good he wrought. The greater part of his influence upon history he owes to a crime of the human race against himself. {b) Our moral faculties testify to the existence of an All- perfect Being, whose sovereignty is so absolute that all events, however revolting, must be regarded as, in some way above our understanding, appointed by his authority and permitted by his goodness. It may be objected that, as the moral argument reaches the idea of sovereignty through the idea of perfection, the 78 THE DIVINE DECREES latter must condition the former, and forbid us to believe that evil is in any sense included in the decree. But the proper inference is that evil must not be charged upon the All-perfect, although his sovereignty in the matter is com- plete. The moral argument teaches us that his sovereignty is as complete as his perfection, and as blameless, (c) The teleological argument expressly declares the reign of design or purpose. But adaptations to ends exhibit an in- tention that some creatures shall prey upon others. The evo- lutionist doctrine of progress through struggle for existence intimates that physical evil was introduced that good might come. The whole teaching of nature is that God entertains a plan wider and farther-reaching than we can pretend to know. (^) Order or law indicates presiding intelligence ; but it is an intelligence which has incorporated in the universe, as in a complex mechanism, a destiny which it must work out. Laws discovered or formulated by modern science, like the law of heredity, outdo in harshness the most austere theology. A pantheistic view of nature is not less necessitarian than a positivistic, and is optimistic only at cost of belittling evil. (e) The proof that God is the First Cause is proof that he is a Will. But he is eternal and unchangeable ; therefore his purposes are changeless and eternal. Uniting the argument for Will with the argument for In- telligence, we have the most startling view of decrees. The All-knowing knew in advance what would occur if he made the world. To decide on creating was virtually to decide on all that has followed. 2. Evidence from Scripture, {a) A few texts expressly declare the existence of decrees; e. £■., Isa 14 : 24 ; 46 : lo ; cf. Dan. 4:35; Eph. i : 11. THE DIVINE DECREES 79 {b) Prophecy represents future events, not only as foreseen, but as in large part predetermined. (t) The predestination of some men to salvation is an illus- tration of decrees. But the fuller statement of this phase of the doctrine belongs to soteriology, {d) The doctrine, however, is not to be looked for so much in single texts of the Bible as in its prevailing concep- tion of the supremacy of the divine will. This appears in — (aa) The acceptance of the will of God as the standard of right. Acts otherwise abhorrent were performed without scruple when God required them. Thus Abraham felt no compunctions about offering Isaac ; no hint is given that Jephthah thought himself exempt from fulfilling his rash vow ; nor did the command to extirpate the Canaanites seem to require any vindication at the period when either Testa- ment was written. {bb) The declaration that God instigated wicked men to deeds confessedly wrong. For example, the Lord is repre- sented by a prophet as sending a lying spirit to deceive Ahab (i Kings 22 : 22, 23) ; as intending to send a strong delusion upon the wicked that they may believe a lie (2 Thess. 2:11); as hardening Pharaoh's heart that the divine name might be declared in the earth (Rom. 9 : 17) ; as determining the very things that should be done to Christ (Acts 4 : 28), and deliv- ering him by determinate counsel and foreknowledge into the wicked hands that would crucify and slay him (Acts 2 : 23) ; possibly even as fitting some vessels of wrath for destruction (Rom. 9 : 22), and appointing that some should stumble at the gospel (i Peter 2 : 8); while, in reply to an objector, Paul claims for God the right to do as he pleases with his own (Rom. 9 : 19-24). The entire artlessness of these statements, the evident un- 8o THE DIVINE DECREES consciousness of any need to justify God, — except in the case of Paul, whose attempt at justification is but the widest assertion of sovereign rights, — shows as plainly as express statements could that the sovereignty of God's purpose un- derlay the entire biblical conception of his relations to things and men. But while the Bible does not lower the conception of the divine sovereignty which may be derived from nature, it never- theless provides — II. SAFEGUARDS AGAINST MISCONCEPTION OF DECREES. 1. The doctrine of decrees should not be mistaken for the ancient doctrine of fate. Fate was believed to be an im- personal destiny ruling men and gods. But the Scriptures represent decrees as turning on the most personal element in God — his will. 2. Decrees should not be mistaken for the modern doctrine of necessity. Not a few physiologists urge that men are under an essentially mechanical necessity of yielding to im- pulses received from without. But the Bible addresses man as free. What he does, he himself knows that he does be- cause he chooses so to do. 3. The doctrine of decrees offers but a single aspect of the case, presented for practical ends, and ought not to be ac- cepted as a theoretical exposition of the whole matter. (a) A secondary truth is misleading when mistaken for a primary truth. It is true that the will of God is the proxi- mate standard of right ; but the ultimate standard is the holi- ness of God. (6) God is sometimes represented as directly doing what the course of his providence brings about as part of the es- tablished system for correcting great evils and bestowing THE DIVINE DECREES 8l great good. Reformers are wisely eager to see the harvest of evil and good ripen, that they may separate the tares from the wheat. It was thus that the heart of Pharaoh was hardened, and thus that his wickedness could be defeated. He hardened his own heart, and it was respite from severity that led him so to do (Exod. 8 : 15, 31, 32 ; 9 : 34). Even Christ could say to Judas, after Satan entered into him, . •* That thou doest, do quickly" (John 13 : 27). (c) This method of governing the world is not arbitrary, but is in strict accord with the laws of the human mind. The greater part of the events described in the startling texts above referred to come about through the agency of habit. Habit is the momentum of the mind. It is therefore econ- omy of effort. We would be incapable of doing at the cost of overcoming moral inertia in each instance, what we readily do by habit. But it is incident to this advantage that habit- ual evil also is easy and can be overcome only by what may seem disproportionate violence. For this reason, to him who looks for God's part in history, the human element may some- times appear unimportant, while the divine is conspicuous and alone significant. (d) More than all, while the Bible casts no doubt upon the supremacy of the Divine will, it lays emphasis alike upon the holiness and benevolence of God, and upon the responsibility 5 and convertibility of man. Paul repels the notion that the non-elect have " stumbled in order that they might fall " (Rom. II : 11), and assures Timothy that God "would have all men to be saved" (i Tim. 2:4); while Peter explains the delay of vengeance by the long-suffering of God, who does not wish " that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance" (2 Peter 3 : 9). We know that the decree can- not be capricious, for God is wise ; that it cannot be evil, for 82 THE DIVINE DECREES he is holy ; and that it cannot be unkind, for he is good. Without knowing what the decree is, we might fitly entrust ourselves to it and say, " It is Jehovah ; let him do what seemeth him good " (i Sam. 3 : 18). We conclude that, although the Bible does not, and per- haps could not, show us how the sovereignty squares with the goodness or even the holiness of God, it insists upon all the divine perfections, traces the prerogatives of God to these, and thus guards against one-sidedness and extrava- gance of view. III. THEORIES OF DECREES. 1. The hyper-CalvinistiCy that God eternally purposed to bring about all things, including sin, by his own direct or in- direct efficiency. But to intend evil, either directly or indirectly, would be incompatible with holiness and grace. There is no tenable objection to believing that God directly and indirectly pro- motes the good. 2. The moderate Calvinistic view, that God permitted evil either — {a) That good might come ; which is open to the same objection as the preceding theory ; or — {U) As incidental to creation. Indeed, any scheme which included free moral agents would seemingly include a possi- bility of sin. But since, to the foreknowledge of God, the plan adopted included the certainty of sin, the difficulty remains that a decree to create apparently involved respon- sibility for all the consequences. 3. The Pelagian view,' which, starting with an extreme doctrine of human freedom, affirms that the Divine will is always conditioned by the freedom of man, and on that CREATION 83 ground denies decrees. But the present advocates of this opinion in some cases admit it to be unscriptural, and make little account of this fact. 4. The 7noderate Arminian insistence on human freedom and admission of divine sovereignty, with a denial of decrees on the grounds : {a) That the relation of the Divine and the human wills is too profound a mystery to warrant the affirmation of decrees. But it is not unwarrantable to regard the sovereignty of a person as the sovereignty of his will, or purpose. This is but to push back as far as possible the frontier of impene- trable mystery. Decrees expose, but do not cause, the dif- ficulty. {h) The holiness and benevolence of God forbid him to de- cree even permissively the existence of evil. But he has decreed the existence of a world to which evil was a foreseen incident. {c) The doctrine of decrees is incompatible with freedom of the will in man. But God, foreknowing what free wills would do, must be regarded as including their free determination in his plan. {d^ The doctrine of decrees leads the wicked to charge upon God the responsibility for their conduct and fate. But what God destines for any man he brings about through that man's volition. God absolutely decrees a con- ditional universe. His decree is as absolute as though there were no freedom ; freedom is as complete as though there were no decree. § 16. Creation. Creation may mean either the origination of spirit and matter by fiat of God, or the formation by divine interven- ^4 CREATION tion of things living and non-living out of substance which has existed from eternity. The Bible alone directly testifies, or could directly testify to creation in either sense. I. TESTIMONY OF THE SCRIPTURES. That the Bible teaches the introduction of at least some new species by special act of God, no one denies. Most per- sons have also understood it to teach the absolute origination of matter. The texts which may be quoted for this view are not numerous, and some of them at least are capable of a different interpretation. Yet no other interpretation was or is natural to the reader who exalts the Almighty above the universe as the Bible has taught man to do. The following passages may be referred to : (a) Gen. i : i. The Hebrew word Bard in the Kal form is never used except of an act of God, and never with an accusa- tive of material employed. The phrase " in the beginning " would indicate, according to Hebrew idiom, that nothing but God had existed before the event spoken of as " the begin- ning." And the second verse represents chaos as following, not as preceding the first creative act. Grammatically in- deed, but not rhetorically, the first verse might be accepted as a very curt epitome of the entire process about to be de- tailed, and the second verse as describing a state of chaos which had existed from eternity ; but this is an interpretation which only necessity or adventurous ingenuity would be likely to propose. (d) Rom. 4:17 tells us that the faith of Abraham, to whom God had promised a son, grasped the fact that God calls into existence the things that are not. This may be accepted as Paul's interpretation of the first verse in the Bible. CREATION 85 (c) I Cor. 8 : 6 teaches that God is the source of all things, as Christ is the agent in their creation. (d) In form, Heb. 11:3 merely denies that visible things were made out of visible materials ; but in substance, it tells what the faith of the Hebrews could grasp as to origins. Three alternatives are possible : visible things were made out of visible ; out of invisible ; or " out of nothing." The first is expressly denied by the text ; we have no reason to suppose the second was the belief of the Hebrews ; therefore this text in effect declares, with all the energy of understatement, that, in the view of true faith, "the word of God" made the worlds "out of nothing." II. TESTIMONY OF METAPHYSICS. Appeal to the necessities of thought confirms the doctrine of the Bible. It may be regarded as an illegitimate method of seeking the truth about physical things. But it would be to the confusion of science and philosophy alike to admit that the laws of mind are out of harmony with those of matter. That absolute reliance upon the conclusions of physical science which is now the chief stimulus to its pursuit would be at an end. A. Negatively ; the most careful observations and most obvious conclusions would be unworthy of acceptance, be- cause reached by the use of untrustworthy faculties. {a) Induction rests upon specimen facts, and appeals to the uniformity of nature as its warrant. But the uniformity of nature rests in turn upon the necessary metaphysical as- sumption that objects of the same class have and must con- tinue to have the same common properties ; because properties inhere in substance, and so to suffer a change of properties would be to become an object of another class. 86 CREATION (d) The deductions of pure mathematics would have to be rejected, because its conclusions rest solely upon the validity of the laws of thought. But mathematics is an indispens- able organ of physical investigation ; the law of gravitation, for instance, was worked out by its means. But — B. Positively ; the progress of knowledge in all spheres, while utterly failing to reduce matter and mind to one sub- stance, shows with startling distinctness their intimate rela- tions and the delicate harmony of their laws. It is not then superfluous to recall the metaphysical phase of the cosmologi- cal argument ; to wit — It is inconceivable that a process of finite causes and effects can have existed from eternity. The only real cause is a first cause. There must be one absolute Being. It is idle to imagine the contrary of so self-evident a fact. If it be objected — That we are unable to conceive the creation of things out of nothing, — ex nihilo nihil fit, — it may be replied that the doctrine of creation assumes the existence of a Power compe- tent to do all things which are not contrary to his perfections ; and that, although we are unable to represent in imagination the absolute beginning of things, we have no difficulty in con- ceiving that God could effect it — the only sense of the word " conceive " pertinent to this discussion. HI, TESTIMONY OF NATURAL SCIENCE. Natural Science is now known to be not unfavorable to a theistic view of the world, but probably a majority of eminent naturalists repudiate the biblical doctrine of creation. This is done on various grounds. I. Naturalists are disposed to assume tke eternity of mat- CREATION 87 ter: and for the reasons that science cannot know aught of a creation ; it finds matter indestructible ; it refuses to concede any addition to the forces of the universe ; it interprets caus- ation by the law of continuity, as the extension and unfold- ing of the cause in the effect, thus precluding an absolute beginning of the universe. But, on the other hand — A. Scientists, of all men, should not " beg the question." If Science cannot know a Creator, it cannot know there was none, until it has at least shown matter to be eternal — the very point at issue. B. To say that indestructibility proves eternal pre-existence is again to beg the question ; because indestructibility may be due, not to capacity of self-existence, but to support by the power of a Creator. C. To deny that the sum of forces has been increased is to deny what there is no need to affirm. The doctrine of the convertibility of force, in the name of which the denial is made, cannot be urged against an addition to the sum of forces, because before the creation there were no forces. D. The law of continuity holds in an already existing uni- verse, but is manifestly inapplicable to its origination. Be- cause — {a) If matter consists of solid atoms, it cannot have taken eternity to reach its present state. ip) If it consists of atomic energies, universal order proves that intelligence has been associated with energy from a defi- nite beginning of motion within the mass. ic) If, in order to escape these objections, matter is re- garded as a temporal form of one eternal substance having two aspects, intelligence and energy, which find their unity in will, the insuperable difficulty arises that the law of con- tinuity cannot apply to the direction of energy by intelligence 88 CREATION without conversion of a mental state into a physical ; but such a conversion is admitted to be impossible. 2. Many biologists hold to the spontaneous generation of life on the ground that mechanical and chemical forces must be considered adequate to effect all that has taken place in the world. It may be replied — A. This general assumption would carry with it the anti- creationist doctrine a priori. But no account of the origin of life can be accepted without proof. The origination of life, either creatively or spontaneously, is a departure from the observed course of nature. It is unscientific to insist on the one or on the other of these marvels without conclusive evi- dence, and the naturalist is no more at liberty than the theo- logian to beg the question, B. The presumption is strong against the identity of the vital principle and inorganic force. This presumption is due to the facts that — {a) Spontaneous generation, or abiogenesis, has never been artificially secured, although artifice can provide favorable conditions with far greater readiness than nature could. {b) The vital principle is plainly distinguishable from chemical and mechanical forces throughout the entire life- history of an organism. The vital principle constrains phys- ical forces into the service of building or restoring organic tissues ; but when the vital principle declines and is finally lost, physical forces begin to tear apart what they had put together. {c) The vital principle is not itself a force, although it controls forces. In this respect the vital are like the volun- tary functions of a sentient being : in neither case is there any evidence that the psychical is convertible with the phys- CREATION 8g ical. The same law extends to the vital principle in plants : it is not convertible with physical energy, and therefore is not a physical energy. We conclude then that, while the presumption is against supernatural interventions in our day, it is against sponta- neous generation formerly ; and if it does not tell against descent of species, it is because in this case, as we shall see, the process of evolution has left its traces. C. If abiogenesis were proved, creation would not be dis- proved. The inorganic would then be known to possess that power of begetting the organic which organisms themselves exhibit in the ordinary propagation of individuals, creation would be mediate instead of immediate, in the one case as it is in the other ; but in both cases alike involution must pre- cede evolution. 3. Evolutionists of all schools reject the doctrine that every species was produced by a special creative interposi- tion. The account given in Genesis is thought by respect- able exegetes not to require this interpretation, but to be even better understood as teaching that the four creations of living things produced but the earliest members of a class, and laid upon nature the charge of evolving all the included species. The biblical cosmogony so far accords with evolution that it needs no hardihood to accept the agreement as inten- tional. Evolution has not been proved ; but the tendency is very marked among scientific men to accept it as an article of scientific faith ; and, thus far, the not unscriptural derivation of species by descent from forms introduced through a few divine interpositions has more evidence in its favor, and is freer from difficulties than any other view. 90 CREATION A. Evidence in favor of a not unscriptural doctrine of Evolution is — (a) The correspondence of embryonic to race development, of ontogenesis to phylogenesis. The embryo of an individual takes successive forms characteristic of simpler types, and which possibly sketch the descent of its type from other types. (d) The existence of homologues, or anatomical identity with functional difference ; for instance, as found in the pec- toral fin of a fish, the wing of a bird, the pastern and hoof of a horse, and the hand of a man. (c) The significant occurrence of rudimentary or abortive organs. These organs were once useful to an earlier and presumably ancestral species, but have become atrophied through disuse by the species in which they appear as rudi- mentary. (d) The geographical distribution of related species over related territory. Notably the restriction of the sloths to South America, and of the singular duck-bill or ornithorhyn- chus to Australia. (e) The geological succession in isolated territories, like New Zealand, of existing species to related but not identical fossil species ; e. g:, the allied apteryx and dinornis. (/) The enormous presumption that nature has done what- ever has occurred within her realm. This presumption makes miracles in our day well-nigh incredible, and weighs almost equally against miracles and supernatural creations in any former period. To deny them on this account would be, as above urged, to beg the question ; but cogent testimony is needed in order to overcome this negative evidence. All the foregoing evidence is prima facie favorable to various theories of evolution. That it is available only for a CREATION 91 theory not out of harmony with the Scriptures may be seen from — B. The Evidence against theories of Evolution, which are less accordant with Scripture. {a) Especially unthinkable is a purely natural transition from insensible plants feeding on inorganic matter to sentient animals feeding on organic matter. Nor is the difficulty set aside by the fact that the mechanical movements of some "sensitive plants" are not distinguishable from those of some animals which lack a nervous system ; nor by the further fact that the fungi constitute a class of vegetables which, like animals, feed on organisms. To natural science the origin of animal life is still a matter of speculation, not of knowl- edge. {b) The Darwinian theory of Natural Selection is based on the observed tendency of species to variation. It is claimed that, during the struggle for existence in former ages, those varieties survived which were fittest to their environment, and that the slow accumulation of differences produced new species. This theory is widely felt to be open to the ob- jections : [aa) The tendency to variation has not produced a clearly new animal species since man appeared upon the earth. {bb) Few variations afford any advantage in the struggle for existence. {cc) Varieties show a tendency to infertility as departure from the type of their species becomes marked. The actual tendency is to revert to type. {dd) Persistence of type is further illustrated by the ina- bility of animal hybrids to perpetuate a breach in species. {c) The theory of Gradual Evolution self-guided, upon the 92 CREATION whole, toward improvement of species is liable in common with the theory of Natural Selection, to the objections : (aa) Sudden changes in the earth's crust have destroyed many forms of life and been followed by long periods of quiet, during which species at first rapidly multiplied and afterward gradually became fewer. {bb) The want of transitional forms is too marked to war- rant in all cases the hypothesis of a gradual evolution. This want is greater among fossils than at present, when new spe- cies are not beyond question formed. For example, the am- phioxus or lancelet is a living form intermediate between ver- tebrates and mollusks, and the ornithorhynchus, or duck-bill, is a link between saurians and mammals ; but neither of these, nor any other transitional form leading up either to vertebrates or to mammals, is found among fossils. To escape these objections, the theory has been proposed of— {d) Heterogenesis, or descent of species by sudden leaps, or modifications in embryo, somewhat after the analogy of certain lower orders of animals, like the tape-worm or the plant-louse. But facts cannot be quoted for the possibility of such changes ; because — {aa) In all existing cases heterogenesis proceeds in a circle, always reproducing the original parental form. {bb) The arrest of the series at one of the intermediate points would be a degradation of species ; whereas, the pro- traction of embryological life until a higher species than that of the parents is formed is wholly without example or any- thing analogous to example. (e) The theory of Primitive Generation, denying all deri- vation of species from species, whether slowly or suddenly, affirms that primitive germs developed indifferently into forms THE FINAL CAUSE IN CREATION 93 which had only the characteristics common both to plants and animals ; that from these were evolved forms representa- tive in turn of the larger divisions in each kingdom, of classes, orders, genera, and that these last produced the various and unalterable species. But this bold theory has little in its favor except its boldness. The difficulties attending a naturalistic evolution of man are deferred to the doctrine of his creation. Meantime it is distinctly probable that, while the greater number of species have been developed from other species. Divine interposition was required at the opening of the several periods when the most important transitions took place. § 17. The Final Cause in Creation. It is necessary to believe that God, as a rational Being, had some ultimate purpose in creation. That all-inclusive pur- pose must comply with an important moral condition : it must be wide enough to cover the counter-processes of good and evil ; it must be intimately connected with what passes under our view, and yet, like the sun amid its planets, remote enough to serve as a common center for these apparently erratic movements. We are met also by a metaphysical condition, the singular paradox that the self-sufficiency of the all-perfect One would bar every motive for the creation which makes him known. We find a universe demanding a Cause, a Cause precluding a universe. The only end which seems not wholly incom- patible with the divine perfectness is the normal desire of God to employ his powers and to see a reflection of himself in his works. But the activity of God constitutes in large part his blessedness, and the reflection of his attributes is his 94 I^E FINAt CAUSE IN CREATION declarative, as distinguished from his essential, glory. So that we conclude — 1. The final cause of the creation is the blessedness and glory of God. Uniting these two ends we may say that God made all things primarily for himself. This is distinctly the teaching of the Bible. God cared for his ancient people "for his own sake" (Isa. 37 : 35 ; 43 : 25 ; Ezek. 20 : 9) ; he teaches inspired men to ask blessings " for his name's sake " (Ps. 2 5 : 1 1 ; 3 1 : 3 ; Dan. 9 : 19), and makes even the wrath of his enemies to praise him (Ps. 76 : 10 ; 46 : 10 ; Rom. 9 : 17). The glory of the Father was the aim of Christ (John 12: 28; 17: i, 4); and Paul taught Christians, " whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God " (i Cor. 10 : 31). If it be objected that all-engrossing selfishness is thus at- tributed to God, we reply — {a) The objector needs to exalt his conception of God until the Supreme Being attains in his view a worth so high that he cannot fitly make any object other than his own glory his end, or any criterion except his own preference his guide. (^) The blessedness and glory of God are the only com- plete security for the well-being of the creature. We there- fore notice — 2. The secondary object of God in creation is to confer benefits on sentient beings, in particular upon man. This is assured by the facts : {a) If the Creator seeks blessedness in normal activity, he must find exercise for his justice and benevolence ; but these contemplate what is suitable and beneficial to his creatures. . CONSERVATION 95 {b) The full glory of God is reflected in rational beings only when they are most like himself ; and thus to secure his own glory is to provide for their highest advantage. {c) The song of the angels at the birth of our Lord an- nounced the union of glory to God with blessing to men (Luke 2 : 14). § 18. Conservation. The Bible teaches that the source of existence is also its supporter. In some passages creation and conservation are so closely associated as to intimate that the latter office is involved in the former (Acts 17 : 28 ; cf. Neh. 9:6;! Cor. ^:6\ Col. I : 16, 17 ; Heb. i : 2, 3 ; 2 Peter 3 : 5, 7). It is easy to believe that to keep things from lapsing into nothing is akin to bringing them into being out of nothing. The nature of the relation by virtue of which God main- tains all being and forces has not been revealed and is not to be discovered. Opinion always tends either to a pantheistic identification, or to a deistic isolation, of the Creator and creation. At present the movement is strongly toward a pantheistic or semi-pantheistic account. Theories of conser- vation may be classed as monistic and dualistic. I. MONISTIC THEORIES. These teach that there is but one substance in the uni- verse ; accordingly, matter and mind are essentially identical, and unless the existence of God is denied, this one substance is divine. I. The typical Pantheistic theory, denying any real per- sonality in God, regards all the processes of nature and of human history as a self-evolution of the One who is the all. That all-embracing Being is conceived either as absolute Idea, which ultimately comes to light as reason knowing itself, or 96 CONSERVATION as indeterminate Substance, a " two-faced entity " which, in exhibiting the property of extension, appears as matter, or, in exhibiting the property of thought, appears as mind ; which in man first attains to consciousness, and in Christ, as some pantheists admit, first knows itself as God. This theory cannot claim to be scriptural. It decidedly antagonizes the scriptural doctrines of the true personality of God and man, of God's priority to his works and of his dis- tinctness from them. That God is distinct from the world and that he is a person are the warp and the woof of bibli- cal theology. The Bible makes the universe depend upon God ; pantheism makes God depend upon the universe. 2. A patitheisni zvhich claims to be Christian and has gained some degree of credence, insists that God is the only sub- stance in the universe, but affirms his personality. The chief grounds on which it is maintained are — A. Philosophical. {a) Reason demands unity in the substance, that there may be unity in the system, of the universe. {b) Things become known only through force resident in them ; therefore, we know only force, and matter is presum- ably only a congeries of atomic forces ; but force is spiritual, so that matter and spirit are essentially one. {c) There is unbroken continuity between cause and effect ; therefore matter and mind, which constantly produce effects on each other, must be one continuous substance, and the First Cause must be identical with the universe. To causa- tion without us corresponds — {d) The causal process within us. The mind creates its own volitions, and these direct the body. In thus e.xerting its own energy the mind discovers a type of all energy, and necessarily refers all efficient cause to will. All that occurs CONSERVATION 97 in nature is therefore the direct result of divine volition be- come habitual. But monism secures unity of system at cost of the facts. For — (i) To say that, because we know matter only through its forces therefore we know only force, is to overlook that we know force only through the motions of matter/ This is true alike of masses and of atoms. (2) If matter and mind were but different forms of one substance, they might conceivably be converted into each other ; whereas physicists admit that not even their energies are interconvertible. Now, since convertibility prevails be- tween all energies, it is certain that the mind is not the seat of energy, but of a wholly incomprehensible ability to control the body's energy. We have no reason to believe that a dif- ferent relation exists between God and the universe ; in whatever way he maintains it, neither its substance nor its energy is divine. B. Scientific. (a) Science has vindicated, and unhesitatingly builds upon, that unity in the system of the universe which reason tries to make out by aid of philosophy ; the laws of matter and of mind are in strictest accord. Monism infers that matter and mind are of one substance. (d) All monistic schemes are thoroughly evolutionistic ; hence monism claims the support that science now accords to evolution. The creation and conservation of the universe ^ We are acquainted with matter only as that which may have energy com- municated to it from other matter, and which may, in its turn, communicate energy to other matter. Energy, on the other hand, we know only as that which, in all natural phenomena, is continually passing from one portion of matter to another. . . . Energy cannot exist except in connection with matter. — ■_/. C/eri Max- well, " Matter and Motion^' pp. 164-5. I 98 CONSERVATION thus become at once natural and supernatural. To these arguments we reply — (i) The unity of the universe is in its source. That matter and mind have one Creator fully accounts for the accord of their laws ; and this explanation is free from the insurmount- able objection to monism ; namely, that matter and mind have not a single property in common, and can be described only by denying of one everything, except that they exist. To act is not the same in both. (2) The evidence is against a spontaneous origination of life, and against the evolution of all organic species without any special divine intervention. C. Theological. A theological rather than a biblical support is claimed for monism in the improvement which it is thought to make in Christian doctrine. Thus to monism creation did not take place " out of nothing," but was God's presentation of him- self in new form ; conservation becomes a phase of the Di- vine self-existence, instead of the support of alien substances ; incarnation was a full revelation of the essential divinity of all things ; atonement was a provision, justification and re- generation an achievement, within the Godhead in its own behalf ; while belief that three divine persons are one God forbids the trinitarian to deny the possibility of innumerable human personalities in God. Objections to the theology of monism are — (1) In effect, it makes matter essentially divine and there- fore eternal, which is counter to the intimations of both science and Scripture. (2) Against monism as a theory of conservation the script- ural objection to typical pantheism here recurs : the Bible does not represent the Supporter as the supported. CONSERVATION 99 (3) The ego is too well assured of its substantiality, its dis- tinctness from the non-ego, its freedom and its sinfulness, to accept a resolution, in any sense or degree, of its substance and its self-determinations into those of God.' (4) Postponing discussion of soteriological doctrines, we may here remind the trinitarian monist that, in order to meet unitarian objections, orthodoxy has always had to take the ground that more than one person in one substance is possible to the Infinite alone ; and we cannot now apply to our own experience that which is admissible only because its sphere is outside our experience. II. DUALISTIC THEORIES. These teach that matter and mind are essentially different, but that God made and upholds them both. I. A kind of dynamic pantheism is proposed by some who shrink from declaring the substance of the universe divine. In its scholastic form it was a doctrine of creatio co7itinnata, that God supports the universe by a continual exercise of cre- ative energy. In its modern form it is a theory of the di- vine immanence, and holds either that the whole energy of the universe is divine, or that all physical motion is directly due to divine activity, while the spirit of man is self- moved. {a) To continuous creation the objection holds that it denies all causal relation between successive states of things. To ^ Monism shows opposite tendencies ; it tends to exalt the nature, but also to de- preciate the personality of man ; it makes him divine in essence, yet less important as an individual. One of these tendencies may prevail against the other. Thus the theology which regards all force as divine has not infrequently, both in ancient and modern times, set up high claims for freedom of the human will. In such cases it is more concerned to emphasize the divinity of man's nature than to make light, as quite as logically it might, of his personality; metaphysical consistency is sacrificed to a theological interest. 100 CONSERVATION refer these states to divine causation is to set aside the dis- tinct testimony of self-consciousness and observation that the causal nexus binds together the successive states them- selves ; and thus our belief in causation itself would be re- duced to a delusion. (b) Dynamic resolves into substantive pantheism. To re gard all force as divine is to make all substance divine. On the one hand, all cognizable properties of matter are due to force ; if then force is divine, matter has the property of di- vinity. On the other hand, since force has no known or con- ceivable existence apart from matter, then matter, on the ex- istence of which divine force is dependent, cannot itself be less than divine. This objection applies, whether or not man is regarded as self-moved. 2. Deism taught that God, in creating the universe, en- dowed it with self-maintaining substance, forces, and laws ; hence all events in the history of things and men have come about without divine interference. Natural science cannot raise any conclusive objection to this theory, but — {a) The theistic student of nature finds a weighty pre- sumption against it in the mysterious and apparently spirit- ual nature of force, and is predisposed rather to a panthe- istic view. {b) The deistic theory virtually denies that God preserves the universe, and it could not be mistaken for a scriptural representation of this divine office. 3. Conciirsns of divine energy with natural forces, in the sense that the former perpetuates and directs the latter, represents God as immanent and active in all things, but identified with none. This was a favorite explanation of scholastics, and is probably the popular view. Indeed, if th* toregoing theories are rejected, conservation must be repre- PROVIDENCE lOI sented under the form of a concursns, or not at all. It is wisest to frame no theory as to a matter on which both the Bible and science are silent. It is worthy of note that, while the autonomy of nature is so analogous to the freedom of human will as to commend the deistic theory to some early Arminians, monism, on the contrary, logically involves a necessitarianism more rigorous than any surviving Calvinistic scheme, § 19. Providence. God not only maintains all things in existence, but he di- rects all things toward the ends for which he made them. And, since his own glory and blessedness are secured through the well-being of his creatures, the divine providence is not improperly conceived as in effect his care for his creatures, in particular for man. Providence is distinguished as Gen- eral and Particular. I. GENERAL PROVIDENCE. The provision which God in his government of the world makes for the human race as a whole, or for nations and com- munities, is his general providence. Evidence of general providence is furnished — 1. By the Old Testament expressions of interest in the Hebrew people, and by the New Testament account of what God has done, yet does, and will do in behalf of his church and of mankind. 2. Events which history adduces in proof of the existence of God equally attest his general providence. 3. To patriotism public interests so transcend private that it is frequently attended by solemn and religious exaltation of feeling, and those who do not pray for themselves invoke the I02 PROVIDENCE intervention of the Almighty for a cause which seems to them not unworthy of his care. II. PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE. Particular or special providence is the divine care over in- dividuals. It covers all our personal interests, as well as those of God's own kingdom so far as the individual can affect these, and has regard to the minutest conditions involved, physical as well as spiritual. The name of " special provi- dence " is restricted to a conspicuous show of divine care, but represents no distinction except of impressiveness. Proof of particular providence may be found in — 1. The Scriptures. These testify that — (a) The favor of God toward the Hebrew people was largely due to his love for an individual patriarch, judge, or king. {b) The New Testament characteristically assures every man that he enjoys continually the special care of God. (c) Certain texts explicitly state that God attends to the smallest details (Ps. 37 : 23-25 ; Prov. 16 19, 33 ; Matt. 10 : 29-31 ; Luke 12 : 22-30 ; Rom. 8 : 28). 2. General providence includes many particulars. It is true that the interests of some individuals might conceivably be disregarded, as soldiers must perish if victory is to be won ; but an abundant compensation is assured to every right- eous man for any sacrifice which God exacts for the com- mon weal (Mark 8:35; 10 : 29, 30). It is especially noteworthy that movements of the highest importance in history turn on the training and fortunes of individuals. The names of Moses and Paul, of Luther and Judson in the Church, of Charlemagne and Mirabeau, of Washington and Lincoln in the State, suggest that, whatever PROVIDENCE 103 might have been accomplished apart from these men, momen- tous issues hung upon their life or death, 3. If general providence is the more credible to the irreli- gious, to the believer particular providence is a matter of experience. A wise and trustful spirit recognizes continually the guiding hand of a Heavenly Father. III. THEORIES OF PROVIDENCE. These are closely related to those of conservation, and are not more satisfactory. 1. A modification of the Deistic theory is that God provided in the original constitution of things for every contingency which would arise. But — ia) The constitution of the universe could not furnish either the Holy Spirit or divine forgiveness, in answer to prayer. These gifts are always special interventions. {b) Nor is it easy to believe that God has placed the uni- verse beyond his own reach. 2. Pantheism really excludes divine providence, for it regards all processes as an unforeseen and necessary develop- ment. Or, if any unconscious bent of nature toward progress is affirmed, this is but a blind sort of general providence, which subordinates each stage of the process to the stages that fol- low, and in a manner cares for the whole at cost of the parts. 3. Creatio continnata, or an extreme theory of divine im- manence, theoretically involves incessant direction of nature ; but— {a) In effect it acknowledges only natural processes, for it identifies the divine activity with the natural. Hence — ip) This theory, like that of predestinated provision, fur- nishes no basis for an adequate account of prayer. 4. Coneursus, or co-operation of divine with natural forces, I04 PROVIDENCE also looks to steady intervention. Thus God makes natme do continually what it would not. But the objection to it is the reverse of that to continuous creation — (a) It leaves no place for the regular exhibition of natural law. This objection does not lie against it as a theory of conservation, but as a theory of providence, that is, as an ac- count of God's direction of all natural events to the service of his will. Observation does not tolerate an account of the course of nature which requires it to be deflected as continu- ously as would be necessary if all special providences were special interruptions. It might, indeed, be alleged that God would rule over nature and man according to an order prescribed by the con- stitution of his own mind. But — (i>) Such is the order of nature itself. The theory on this supposition is embarrassed by ascribing to divine overruling precisely what it needs no overruling to bring to pass. This is, of course, prohibited by the law of parsimony. 5. So large a proportion of human events is determined by the will of man, that the range of divine providence has been restricted by another theory to the injliience of the Holy Spirit upon the human viind and heart. It is certain that the Christian has been taught to look for such guidance ; but as a rationale of divine providence this theory docs not provide for the facts : {a) Mind is so related to matter that, in order to control over either, the other must be controlled. {b) While the Divine Spirit certainly introduces order into the moral sphere, and does this through the instrumentality of ideas, it is impossible to understand how he could bring anything but confusion into the mental sphere if he interferes with the natural movement of thought to the extent which PRAYER 105 this theory asserts as to mind, but denies to be admissible as to matter. Assuredly it cannot be admitted that the laws of thought are less inviolable than the laws of things. Without venturing a theory about matters clearly beyond explication, it may be possible to find in each theory as much to approve as to condemn. With the deist we can believe that most events which the providence of God brings about might be assured by pre-arrangement ; with the pantheist and the semi-pantheist we may well refuse to accept the isolation of God from his works ; with the believer in concursus we may recognize the reality of natural substances and forces without debarring the Maker from control over them ; and with the advocate of a spiritual interpretation of events, we may welcome the agency of the Holy Spirit at large in the affairs of men. But it is impossible to account for all provi- dential aids in any one of these ways, or to accept either of them as a clear path through the mystery of God's dealings with the world and with its inhabitants. § 20. Prayer. Prayer asks the favor and help of God in the spiritual and in the secular concerns of man. In addition to the difficulties met in the doctrine of provi- dence, the doctrine of prayer faces the further question how an all-wise and unchangeable Sovereign can be affected by the petitions of men. Taking for granted as too familiar to need proof that the Scriptures encourage men at all times to pray, and postpon- ing to another division of theology inquiry as to the inter- cession of Christ and the office of faith for those who pray, we notice here : I06 PRAYER I. THE RELATION OF PRAYER TO SPIRITUAL BENEFITS. No reason can be given for supposing that this relation is outside the domain of law. The contrary is shown by the scriptural warnings : " If I regard iniquity in my heart, the Lord will not hear me" (Ps. 66 : i8); "Ye ask and receive not, because ye ask amiss" (James 4 : 3). Clearly, the effi- cacy of prayer is limited by moral propriety, ' The most general law of prayer was stated by our Lord : "Every one that asketh receiveth " (Matt. 7 : 8). That this is not an arbitrary appointment but is an indispensable condi- tion of receiving spiritual benefits, is plain. (a) Spiritual benefits must at least be desired, or they can- not be accepted when offered ; and desire for benefits from God is the essence of prayer. A prayer is revoked by a changing desire. [d) The normal relation to God involves consciousness of dependence upon him. The more he is to us, the deeper our felt need of him. To lack the sense of dependence is of itself to repel spiritual good. (r) Our Lord teaches us that the heart of God is amen- able to the appeal of trust (Luke 11 : 5-13 ; cf. Matt. 7 : 11). Neither articulate nor even self-understood longing is requi- site. Though " we know not what to pray for as we ought, the Spirit itself maketh intercession for us with groanings which cannot be uttered. And he that searcheth the hearts knoweth what is the mind of the Spirit, because he maketh intercession for the saints according to the will of God " (Rom. 8 : 26, 27). Indeed, so obvious is the connection between asking and obtaining spiritual good, that the benefits of prayer are by some ascribed solely to its reflex influence. PRAYER 107 But this extreme attempt to remove God from our reach, and us from the reach of God, is warranted neither by Script- ure nor by Christian experience. The moral re-action of prayer may be one of the means, yet is not the only means, employed in answering prayer. Forgiveness, adoption, re- generation, are not the accumulated results made upon the petitioner by a series of his own prayers ; they are distinctly acts of God. II. THE RELATION OF PRAYER TO TEMPORAL BENEFITS. This relation is too obscure to be explained. So far as the interests of the body and estate are promoted by peace of mind, by purity, and by moral vigor, the utility of prayer for temporal good is as clear as that of prayer for spiritual good. But so far as benefits can reach us only through providential furtherance, the utility of prayer for temporal blessings is obscure as the method of divine providence. Many have urged that the Creator provided some unknown natural agents as his own means of directing nature, just as the use of other natural agents is open to man. Others have preferred the supposition that in the original ordering of the universe the temporal good we desire was timed to arrive just when we should ask for it. But while neither of these pro- visions is impossible, neither can be certified, and the second is of the mechanical, deistical sort which finds little favor in any quarter to-day. But we need not doubt that God has an indulgent regard for the desires of those who love him. It is right to lay all our innocent wishes before God, without feeling bound to decide for him whether it would be well to gratify us (Phil. 4 : 6). We may and should accept the assurance of Christ, " If ye abide in me, and my words abide in you, ye shall ask what I08 MIRACLES ye will and it shall be done unto you " (John 15 : 7), with such limitation only as he laid upon his own petition, " Not my will but thine be done " (Matt. 26 : 39, 42, 44 ; cf. Heb. 5:7; Luke 11:2). § 21. Miracles. God has seen fit from time to time to claim the attention of men by those extraordinary manifestations of his power and purpose generally called Miracles. L THEIR NATURE. A miracle is a phenomenon apart from the ordinary course of nature and unmistakably due to superhuman power. A divine miracle is manifestly wrought by God. Unless an ex- traordinary event can with certainty be referred to a power above man's, it cannot be distinguished from a prodigy or from jugglery, and its miraculous character must be denied. Although a miracle is such an event as natural agencies could not of themselves produce, it does not follow that it is either a violation or a suspension of the laws of nature. We have no reason to doubt that all the forces which are con- cerned with the object upon which a miracle is wrought are operative according to their several laws ; and, if the usual effect is not seen, this is because those normally working forces are counteracted by some other force, either natural or supernatural, applied by a superhuman will, precisely as when artificial results are wrought by man. Miracle is divine arti- fice. But while the properties and forces characteristic of an object are always a factor in the result, the miracle itself may or may not be due to the use of natural means. When a wind swept the Red Sea from its bed and back again for the rescue of the children of Israel, the obvious MIRACLES 109 miracle was that the wind obeyed Moses ; but no known natural agency made the Jordan part at the touch of the priests' feet. So to the notice of a passer-by the miraculous drafts of fishes might be the gift of chance, for the only certain supernatural element in the case was the Lord's knowledge that the fish would be caught ; while, on the con- trary, the multiplication of the loaves and fishes was appar- ently due to creative power alone. It follows that a miracle can be distinguished from a special providence, not by the absence of natural agencies, but only by the indubitable presence of divine agency. II. CREDIBILITY OF MIRACLES. If miracles are credible it is because — 1. Miracles are /^j-i-/^^/^. Two conditions must be met : (a) Power capable of working miracles must be possible. So far, miracles are possible if the existence of God is pos- sible. Were his existence in question, the occurrence of miracles would set that question at rest. {b) There must be a course of nature. Without a rule there can be no exceptions, without a natural order no miracles. Otherwise, supernatural would be indistinguish- able from natural phenomena. 2. Miracles were probable when God had sufficient reason for revealing himself by their means. Whether they are probable now can better be considered after determining their office. 3. Biblical miracles were unmistakable to their witjiesses. It can never be demonstrated that the unknown forces of nature are incapable of working any result, however pro- digious. But for a witness of the Bible miracles to explain them in this way would be the infatuation of unbelief. In no MIRACLES such cases scepticism would be credulity. It is possible to give a superstitious credit to nature. 4. The trustworthiness of the witnesses to miracles is as- sured by the genuineness and authenticity of the Bible. That records, which we have sufficient reason to accept as written at the time and by the persons alleged, could be false is rendered incredible by — {a) The notable sobriety, simplicity, and candor which guar- antee to literary criticism the honesty of the writers ; and it is impossible, if they were spectators, as some of them claim to have been, that they could merely fancy they had seen such marvels as they describe. (b) The absurdity of such tales in the face of a generation which knew them to be untrue. {c) The fact that no other great religious teacher has pre- tended to miracles. How then does it happen that Moses, Jesus, and Paul, confessedly the chief among the world's religious guides, claim or were credited with wonders which they did not perform .-' But the burden of proof does not rest on the Bible alone. Extra-biblical evidence is not wanting. For example — 5. The resurrection of Christ is at once the best attested and the all-attesting miracle of Christianity. Its occurrence is proved by the existence of the church, of its ordinances, and its beliefs. But in accepting the resurrection of our Lord we accept his divinity ; and with his divinity all the miracles of the New Testament become not only credible, but indispensable. If he is the Son of God, he must prove it beyond reasonable doubt. 6. The congruity of the miracles with the teachings of Jesus lends support to both. But this theme must be postponed until we have determined what is — ' MIRACI,ES III III. THE OFFICE OF MIRACLES. This is indicated by their nature. Unmistakably wrought by God, miracles necessarily call attention to him, and tend to an all-inclusive end — namely, to establish his kingdom among men. As to how they serve this purpose, there has been and is no little dispute. The exegete naturally looks for a deep and varied significance in the miracles ; whereas, the expounder of Christian Evidences, finding miracles a stumbling-block rather than an aid to faith for the modern sceptic, seeks to show that the truth of doctrine does not turn on the acceptance of miracles, and that their office was to certify a messenger to earlier days, not to intimate nor vindicate his message to our day. But these offices are not mutually exclusive. A miracle may attest a messenger and also convey a message of its own ; it may be in itself profoundly significant, yet not lose its validity as a credential. That these two offices are in thor- ough accord is assured by the fact that they are but direct and indirect methods of approaching the same end. Under the Old Dispensation the method of miracles was for the most part, but not solely, direct ; under the New Dispensa- tion it was chiefly, yet far from exclusively, indirect. I. The theocracy was a kingdom of this world, and its miracles in large part did directly the work of carnal weapons. The plagues which compelled Pharaoh to let the Hebrews go, the engulfing of their pursuers, the pillar of cloud and fire to guide them, the bread from heaven on which they fed, the public giving of the law, the crossing of the Jordan, the fall of the walls of Jericho, the series of miraculous victories by which the land of promise was won, or in after centuries 112 MIRACLES held, the fire from heaven upon Elijah's sacrifice to convince the people anew that Jehovah was God — all these served the theocracy in the directest way. Under the New Dispensation the kingdom is spiritual, and such was the intended effect of its miracles. By displaying the kindness of God in the healing of disease and the feed- ing of the hungry ; by drawing faith to Jesus as the Son of God in the stilling of the tempest ; by proving his right to forgive sins in the healing of a palsied man ; by revealing him as the source of life in the raising of Lazarus ; finally, by establishing his own divinity and assuring our justification in the miracle of his rising, miracles were so far a direct exposi- tion of the gospel, and contributed immediately to the reign of grace among men. 2. But they also fulfilled their office indirectly by certify- ing or by preserving a messenger of God. The burning bush, the change of Moses' rod into a serpent, the budding of Aaron's rod, the test of a wet and a dry fleece granted to Gideon, the security of Daniel in the lions' den — these mira- cles either furnished the times with a prophet or served as his credentials. In the gospel age, so far as miracles attested that Christ and his apostles bore a divine commission, so far they con- tributed but mediately to the new kingdom. This is all that miracles meant to Nicodemus (John 3 : 2), and was the utmost that Jesus for some time expected the Jews to learn from them (John 5 : 36). Testimony of the same kind was afforded to the apostles (Acts 15 : 12; Heb. 2 : 4). In some cases the same miracle served both directly and indirectly. All Israel was the prophet of God, and every conspicuous miracle in its favor claimed a hearing for its testi- mony to the true God. Similarly our Lord summoned his MIRACLES 113 friend from the grave in order to reveal himself to Martha as the ruler of life, but with a view to win from the Jews merely an admission that God had sent him and would hear him when he prayed (John 11 : 25, 42). IV. CONGRUITY OF MIRACLES WITH DOCTRINE. Miracles, whether pretended or real, always correspond to the doctrine of those who perform them. This is because the words and the works of men alike represent their char- acter. It is a fact of high importance in studying the mira- cles of Jesus. 1 . It greatly enhances the credibility of his iniracles alike for his age and for ours ; because it sharply distinguishes them from diabolical miracles, from magic,' and from jugglery. Mischief or moral emptiness marks the latter ; dignity and deep significance characterize the former. Revealing at once divine goodness and power, the miracles of Jesus illustrate the good tidings which he brought. If this correspondence were lacking, miracles would be a burden to faith ; its pres- ence adapts them to win the trust of both simple and wise. 2. Conversely, this congruity substafitiates the truth of our Lord's teachings; and it does this while turning away the reproach that Christian doctrine is too unreasonable to be accepted without pretence of miracles. It is not unreason- able to believe that God is willing to save men by the sacri- fice of his Son ; we can even find something becoming to God in such a sacrifice (Heb. 2 : 10) ; but it would be un- reasonable to believe that Jesus was the Son of God, unless > Magic pretended to be both science and art : as science, it claimed occult knowledge ; as art, it claimed to control preternatural beings. Miracle is neither science nor art. It is wholly superhuman, for it is granted by a Being superior to man. Spiritualistic " manifestations," if superhuman, are magic, not miracles. 114 MIRACLES he wrought miracles significant of his nature and mission (John 5:31, 36). The supernatural basis of Christianity re- quired a supernatural attestation (John 20 : 30, 31). Argument from correspondence of miracles to doctrine is not arguing in a circle, but appeals to a mark of genuineness without which neither miracles nor doctrines would be credible. 3. This correspondence throws light on the question whether miracles may be expected in the present age. (a) It shows why they have ceased. Having certified the claims of Jesus, miracles may well leave his grace to com- mend itself to our needs. If long continued, miracles would have ceased to be signs (John 6 : 26), and have proved a dis- turbance and a demoralization ; the spiritual aims of Christi- anity would have been sacrificed to the degrading hope of leading an idle life, and our religion itself have become a gazing-stock. The evils inseparable from wonder-working often led our Lord to conceal his miracles as far as possible, and furnished reason enough why he should not again show himself to the world after his resurrection. The same grave consideration led Paul to turn the desires of the Corinthians away from the startling gift of tongues to the edifying office of prophecy. There is no reason to suppose that miracles continued longer than necessary, but the history of the church shows that they ceased none too soon, and that their return is not to be desired while the present order of things endures. (^) On the other hand, when the personal reappearing of our Lord is near, signs and wonders are again to be looked for. It is natural that belief in "faith cures " as supernatural interpositions should often be associated with expectation of the early coming of Christ, ANGELS 115 § 22. Angels. The Bible makes known the existence of a class of beings superior to man (Ps. 103 : 20 ; Matt. 24 : 36); in essence spiritual (Heb. i : 14) ; in origin severally created, not gen- erated (Matt. 22 : 30; Col. i : 16); immortal, and either holy and happy, or wicked and miserable forever. Both angels and demons (or devils) are clothed with a mys- tery so stimulating to imagination that they became in for- mer times a theme of fantastic speculation, but for the same reason are now regarded with sceptical indifference. Neither kind of treatment is warranted by the Scriptures, which are the only trustworthy source of information. I. GOOD ANGELS. So far from exhibiting Oriental fancifulness when treating of angels, the Bible shows in connection with no other topic a more veracious simplicity, or more divinely guarded reserve. 1. Although sometimes appearing in visions, they were re- peatedly presented to the senses, and not infrequently to more than one person at once. Angels were seen and heard by Abraham and Sarah, by Lot and the men of Sodom (Gen. 18, 19); an angel withstood Balaam, first invisibly, then vis- ibly and audibly (Num. 22 : 22-35); the angel which released Peter from prison was expressly distinguished by him from a vision (Acts 12 19, 11). 2. Ordinarily they are represented as sent only to some fiotable person, or oti some momentous errand. Thus, at the burning bush the angel of Jehovah revealed the divine name to Moses, and commissioned him to undertake the exodus (Exod. 3); the law was ordained by angels (Gal. 3 : 19; cf. Acts 7 : 53 ; Heb. 2:2); the Angel of the Covenant an- nounced himself as captain of the Lord's host when Joshua no ANGELS led the tribes into Canaan (Josh. 5 : 13-15), and reappeared at various emergencies in the history of Israel (Judg. 6 : 11- 23; 13 : 3-20; 2 Sam. 24 : 16; 2 Kings 19 : 35 ; Dan 3 ; 28 ; 6 : 22). Angels repeatedly interposed during the in- fancy of the church (Acts 5 : 19 ; 8 : 26; 10 : 3-7 ; 12:7- II, 23. 3. Angels were 7'eal beings to Christ. They were sent on frequent messages in connection with the birth of our Lord (Matt. I : 20-24 ; 2 : 1 3, 19 ; Luke i : 1 1-20, 26-38 ; 2 : 9-1 5) ; they ministered to Jesus after the temptation (Matt. 4:11), and during the agony in Gethsemane (Luke 22 : 43) ; at- tended his resurrection (Matt. 28 : 2 ; Luke 24 : 4, 23 ; John 20 : 12); and his ascension (Acts i : 10). 4. The references of our Lord to them are peculiarly sig- nificant. His protest against contempt for lowly disciples (or possibly children) was, " Their angels do always behold the face of my Father" (Matt. 18 : 10). In order to correct gross views of the future life he said, they that " rise from the dead are . . . as the angels" (Matt. 22 : 30). Inquisitive- ness about the day and hour of his own second coming is checked by the statement that no man knows it, " no, not the angels of heaven " (Matt. 24 : 36). How great its glory shall be we learn from this, that " all the holy angels shall be with him" (Matt. 25 : 31). And how willingly he gave himself for us is plain when he says that, if he prays now, the Father will give him " more than twelve legions of angels " (Matt. 26 : 53)- 5. Disregard and unbelief as to these pure and exalted beings are revolting when we reflect that they are " all minis- tering spirits, sent forth to minister for them who shall be heirs of salvation" (Heb. i : 14) How they exercise their ministry, whether by unaccountable persuasions to righteous- ANGELS 117 1 ness, or warnings against what proves to be a mortal peril, as some think, is a matter on which too little has been revealed to support a confident assertion, and too much has been inti- mated to justify a sweeping denial. 6. Angels fill a wide gap between man and his Maker in the ever-ascending hierarchy of being. Rising from inor- ganic matter through all grades of living things, the rational and impressive order of nature, if there are no angels, breaks off at man. But a race of beings allied to us by the posses- sion of rational spirits, while above us in their independence of bodies, and themselves, according to Scripture, holding various ranks (Col. i : 16; i Thess. 4 : 16; Jude 9; Rev. 12:7), meets the demand of analogy — an analogy singularly enough emphasized by the modern naturalistic account of the close relation of species. 7. The proneness of most peoples to multiply divinities, demi- gods, and lesser superhuman beings, upon the whole corrob- orates, rather than puts under suspicion, the doctrine of an- gels. It is true that opinions differ on this point. As Com- parative Theology brings into view correspondences of relig- ious belief among diverse and widely separated races, some find in this a proof of universal superstition ; others welcome it as an evidence that the Spirit of God, or the tradition of a primitive revelation, or the sure intuition of the religious nature in man, or even in some degree each of these, has led men in all lands and ages into partial knowledge of the highest things. Those who reverence the Bible should not be dismayed to find that it embraces every universal, perhaps every deeply rooted ethnic belief. But if the polytheistic tendency is not regarded as nor- mal enough to strengthen the Christian belief in angels, it has sometimes proved strong enough to convert angels into Il8 ANGELS objects of unlawful worship (Col. 2 : 18); and this result has had not a little to do with the neglect into which the doctrine on this subject has fallen among strict Protestants. II. EVIL SPIRITS, DEVILS OR DEMONS. These are as plainly revealed in the Bible, and as widely testified to by the belief of mankind, as are good angels. 1. Concerning /'//T^/rc'r/^/;/ little is known. It seems to be understood by inspired men that God would not create any evil being, and that therefore the demons, or devils, are " the angels that sinned," of whom Peter writes (2 Peter 2 : 4), " the angels who kept not their first estate," according to Jude (Jude 6). 2. Their chief is Satan. Although many hold him to be a copy of the Persian Ahriman, he is at least abundantly recognized in the Bible. Others suppose him to be a person- ification of the principle of wickedness ; but this does violence to the uniformity of the Scripture's representation of him as a being with the attributes and names of personality, such as "the adversary," "the tempter," "the accuser" ; it gives quite too little weight to the Saviour's recognition and re- jection of him in the wilderness, and to the terrifying desig- nation of him as lord over the region to which all the wicked shall be consigned. 3. Concerning the activities of the devil we know that — {a) The most formidable is his opposition to the truth (Matt. 13 : 19, 25, 39; 2 Cor. 4 : 4), and his effort to entice men into sin (Luke 22 131; Acts 5:3; Eph. 6:11; i Peter 5 : 8) {B) He had some not clearly defined " power of death," now destroyed through the part which our Lord took in flesh and blood (Heb. 2:14). ANGELS 119 (c) Some even suggest that, as demoniacal possessions were once allowed in punishment of gross sin, suffering of the same kind may not be unknown to our times. It is an opin- ion equally difficult to substantiate or disprove. (d) Jesus predicted that false Christs and false prophets would " show great signs and wonders ; insomuch that, if it were possible, they should deceive the very elect " (Matt. 24 : 24). Paul, having apparently the same events in mind, ascribes to the "working of Satan" the "lying wonders" which were to appear (2 Thess. 2 : 9). Accordingly, the practice of magic and witchcraft was formerly attributed to alliance with Satan, and not a few are satisfied that the mys- tifying and mischievous performances of modern " mediums " are due to a power not less hostile to man than that of the " Evil One." It is wise to suspend judgment so long as the alternatives of expert trickery, or of some obscure but not superhuman means of communication between the spirits of living persons, remain a possible explanation of these equiv- ocal doings. PART III ANTHROPOLOGY § 23. The Nature of Man. An account of the powers which distinguish man from the brute will be of service in the further study of anthropology. Of the many definitions which have been proposed, perhaps the best is that man is a rational animal. Reason includes or involves all which sets up an ineffaceable distinction between man and other animals. [a) Reason is the faculty of knowing abstract truth. By memory and comparison a brute is able to recognize that a sensible object is like other objects of the same class, as a man, a dog, a whip ; but there is no sufficient evidence that a brute can carry about a general notion of the class itself, for example, man, dog, whip ; even less can it abstract from con- crete instances the qualities of which it has had experience, such as cruelty, kindness, courage ; less still have any idea of moral difference ; least of all, can it rise to a synthesis of ideals in God. Man, on the contrary, can mentally analyze and synthetize ; can test his results inductively by comparison with single in- stances, or deductively by reference to still more general notions ; among these he can intuitively know first principles as true ; among first principles he can use for self-judgment the idea of moral distinctions ; finally, he can ascribe all infi- nite excellencies to a Person of whose existence he is assured as the moral complement of himself, and whom, therefore, he 120 THE CREATION OF MAN 121 feels bound to worship and serve as his own Archetype and Lord. {b) The possession of reason excludes all limit to the pos- sible improvement of the human mind short of the infinite; but, however surprising the tricks or the service which beasts can be trained to perform, their intelligence never passes "from reasoning into reason, nor their susceptibility to fear and shame into a sense of moral wrong. The three pre-eminent faculties, or powers, which man is seen to possess, reason, will, and conscience, are all mutually inclusive. If asked what is highest in man, we must assign this rank to the capacity of moral self -judgment and its at- tendant sense of obligation to obey an all-holy God ; if sen- tient creatures, which lack consciousness of self, are to be distinguished, quoad hoc, from man, we adduce his personal- ity, of which will, or the faculty of conscious self-determina- tion, is the nucleating element ; but if his claim to supremacy over animate and inanimate nature is demanded, this preroga- tive can be found in the generic faculty of reason. The question of the elements in his constitution is quite distinct from that concerning his powers, and will be sepa- rately considered. § 24. The Creation of Man. I. The Scriptures accord to man a different origin from that of the beasts. The waters and the earth were called upon to bring forth all living creatures below man ; but man was made by a special act of the Creator. Of the two passages in Genesis which give an account of the creation of man, i : 26, 27 states after what pattern he was made, and gives his rank among creatures : he was made L 122 THE CREATION OF MAN in the image of God, and set as lord over all earthly beings. Genesis 2 : 7 intimates in part the method of his creation : taking care not to import into this simple story distinctively modern ideas, we find in it the primitive notion that God molded the human body from earthly materials and then caused it to live. That the soul, or immortal principle, was thought of by the writer (cf. " breath of life," in 7 : 22), or that he regarded it as an efflux from the Godhead, are com- mon but doubtful interpretations. 2, Natural Science has not only failed to make out a purely natural origin for man, but is really favorable to his special creation, for it is unable otherwise to account for him. {ci) No trace is found of an ancestor for man among living or extinct species of simians.^ (^) The differences in the bony framework of these types are marked. In man the posture is erect, in the extant apes it is prone. The arm of man is not adapted to locomotion, nor has his foot a thumb, like the ape's. Even admitting that these and other differences might be gradually produced by evolution, there is no sufficient evidence that this has taken place. {c) It does not seem possible that a human brain could be developed from the simian. The largest measured cranial capacity in the skull of living apes is thirty-four cubic inches ; the least in a human idiot is forty-six inches ; that of the low- est type of man is sixty-eight inches ; while the largest known is one hundred and eighteen inches. That is, a brain ample enough for the formidable gorilla, or for the amiable * This may still be affirmed, notwithstanding the recent discovery in Java of re- mains which belonged to an ape of erect posture and somewhat larger brain than any heretofore known. This creature was unmistakably a simian, not a human, nor half-himian. THE CREATION OF MAN 123 and clever chimpanzee, is one quarter too small for a human idiot, and one-half too small for the most degraded savage/ It is unthinkable that nature could protect an imbecile tran- sition-race through ages of struggle for existence. (d) The development of brute intelligence into reason is not alone without any facts to support it, but is really incon- ceivable. How serious this difficulty is felt to be finds illustration in the plausible but unscientific conjecture that nature produced the brain, while God bestowed the soul of man. When nature furnishes an organ we must ascribe to her the functions which the organ is fitted to perform. Especially ought the evolutionist to acknowledge the force of this objection, since he holds that organs rise to higher functions by the exercise of the highest they are capable of. If then nature evolved the human brain, it evolved the thinking inhabitant of that brain. The considerations which favor the descent of species from species, with the exceptions above noted, are applicable to man. Especially indicative of a genetic relation to some unknown simian is the general correspondence of the human body to that of apes, and the presence in it of many abortive organs.^ It is probable that God specially guided the rapid ^ The brain of Cuvier weighed 65 ounces, and had a bulk of 108 cubic inches, with cranial capacity of 1 1 8. In comparing averages, the brain of the gorilla weighs only one-third, of the orang and chimpanzee only one-fourth, that of man ; while in these apes the ratio of brain-weight to body-weight is i to 100, and in man i to 40 or 50. — V. art. "Physiology,'' End. Brit. ^ That the human race is subject to the alleged law of evolution is intimated by the fact that variation has already gone far enough to approximate specific differ- ence. Thus half-breeds are comparatively sterile, while the persistence of exist- ing types is shown by the occasional birth of a very dark child to parents nearly white, or of a very white child to parents nearly black. 124 UNITY — CONSTITUTION transformation of some humbler animal's body, and at th* same time lodged in it a human soul. This probable con- jecture does not antagonize the biblical account of our origin, providing that we accept the account as pictorial and primi- tive. Such a view is perhaps generally taken of the whole biblical cosmogony ; thus, for instance (Gen. 2 : 7), God has no breath to impart nor mouth to breathe from, § 25. The Unity of the Human Race. The book of Genesis seems to teach that the entire race is descended from one pair. Paul declared to the race-proud Athenians that God had made of one every nation (Acts 17 : 26). He also traces sin and death to Adam as the common father of all men (Rom. 5 : 12-19; ^ Cor. 15 : 21, 22). Natural science has as yet found no means of determining whether the race is of dual or plural origin ; yet it does not accept the existence of varieties in the human species as dis- proof of a common parentage. On the other hand, anatomy, physiology, psychology, philology, and comparative theology, demonstrate that men are of one species, and raise a strong presumption in favor of descent from one pair. § 26. Constitution of Man. The Scriptures ordinarily represent man as consisting of soul and body ; but Paul and Luke together with the Pauline writer to the Hebrews, distinguish in man spirit, soul, and body (nveufia, (/fvxij, ffw/io). What is meant by the threefold distinction ? And is man dichotomous or trichotomous ? I, what is the difference between spirit and soul } I. T/ie titc/iotomous view is ordma.n\y accepted in our day. According to this view a human soul i? the spirit regarded as dwelling in a body ; a human spirit is the soul not contem- CONSTITUTION OF MAN 125 plated in its relations to a body. Accordingly, when the words soul and spirit {^psyche and pneuma) occur together, either in the Scriptures or elsewhere, soul is the immaterial part of man engaged in those offices to which the body intro- duces it ; while spirit is the same immaterial part concerned with realities which are beyond the reach of sense ; such as God, heaven, and holiness. Thus Luke i : 46, 47 ; i Thess. 5 : 23 ; Heb. 4:12, include both our lower and higher powers, and so give a comprehensive view of man. 2. According to trichotomists, the soul, or psyche, is the seat of animal life, intelligence, and feeling ; while the spirit, or pneiima, is a distinct immaterial substance, to which alone all the higher and Godward functions of man pertain. As to the relations between the soul and spirit, trichot- omists differ. According to some the psyche is the prin- ciple of animal life, and perishes at death ; while the pneuma is the rational principle, and will be reunited with the body at the resurrection. Others take the psyche to be a product of the pneuma s union with the body ; and Delitzsch holds that the psyche is the forth-breathing of the pneuma, as the Holy Spirit is breathed forth by the Father. II. IS MAN DICHOTOMOUS OR TRICHOTOMOUS } In favor of the dichotomic view we notice : 1. The few New Testament writers who use trichotomic language do not necessarily intend to teach an authoritative psychology different frtfm that common to other writers of Scripture, and to the greater part of mankind. 2. Paul does not use soul and spirit, psychical and pneu- matic, with uniform meanings. In i Cor. 2 : 14 the psych- ical is the unregenerate, the pneumatic the regenerate ; but in 1 5 : 46 the psychical is the mortal, the pneumatic the im- 126 CONSTITUTION OF MAN mortal. Or if, in order to secure uniformity of meaning, we identify the unregenerate with the mortal and the regener- ate with the immortal, then — 3. We must accept an unscriptural view concerning the nature of regeneration ; namely, that this change consists either in imparting or in awakening the immortal spirit. That is, either man is not immortal until after regenera- tion, or the very part of his nature which deals with God needs not to be purified, but only aroused — precisely the reverse of the scriptural teaching (Eph. 2:3). A still more startling result should be, that the body of the regener- ate would at once become spiritual and deathless. 4. Man's God ward functions cannot be ascribed exclu- sively to the pnenvia. Understanding and affection, psych- ical powers which we share with the beasts, are directly en- gaged in our relations to God. The beasts themselves show to a master the reverence and fidelity which men owe to their Maker. In Luke i : 46, 47, Mary's psyche magnifies the Lord, as her pneuma rejoices in God ; and in 2 Cor. 12:15 Paul declares his willingness to spend and be spent for the psyches of the Corinthians (b-Kzp xibv 4v viiaiv), assuredly not for the animal in them, but for the religious part, if for any mere part. That distribution of offices which is indispensable to the trichotomous theory cannot be made out. 5. Consciousness notifies us of the absolute unity and indivisibility of the personal self. Psychological analysis detects no trace of a duality in the immaterial part of man. Nor does the consciousness of the biblical writers contra- dict ours. If we are to take literally Paul's statement in Rom. 7:17 (cf. ver, 25), "It is no more I that do it, but sin that dwelleth in me," if we are to accept this as affirming a partition in the immaterial part of Paul, then we must take THE ORIGIN OF SOULS 1 27 literally his other saying in Gal. 2 : 20, — " I have been cruci- fied with Christ ; and I no longer live, but Christ liveth in me," — and must hold it to teach that the personal Paul had been destroyed and his body occupied by the personal Christ. But this view, to which some devout people make a near approach, is a doctrine of the annihilation of Chris- tian souls, and a panchristic conception of the regenerate, which has all the faults without any of the recommendations of pantheism, § 27. The Origin of Souls. Three views are held concerning the origin of the soul ; namely, that it enters the body from a pre-existent state ; that it is specially created in the case of every person ; that it is propagated together with the body. It is admitted that no direct scriptural evidence can be cited for the theory of pre-existence. It is advocated as the only solution of the paradox that man is sinful by inheritance, and yet responsible, and is further recommended on the ground that it secures a probation in time for spirits that fell in a timeless state. But the advantage to a fallen spirit of subjection to the temptations of sense is not obvious. The theory of propagation of souls, or traducianism, is pref- erable to creationism for the following reasons : I. It is more scriptural. While mediate creation through traduction will justify the title "Father of spirits" (Heb. 12 19), immediate creation of individual souls is excluded by the statements that God finished his creative work in six days (Gen. 2:2; Exod. 20 : 11); that the unregenerate state of man is something propagated (John 3:6); that all men actually, not virtually, sinned in Adam (Rom. 5 : 12); that 128 THE ORIGIN OF SOULS in Adam all die (i Cor. 15 : 22) ; and that Levi, while in the loins of Abraham, paid tithes to Melchisedec (Heb. 7 : 9). 2. The mental and moral characteristics of men as a race, as tribes, and as families, indicate propagation of souls as un- equivocally as physical characteristics indicate propagation of bodies. 3. Psycho-physics is demonstrating with ever-increasing distinctness the close connection of soul and body, A man is the synthesis of both. Because the body is indispen- sable to the soul's full equipment, it will be restored at the resurrection ; and because the soul is the animating principle of the body, to propagate the body alive is to propagate the vitalizing soul. 4. The presumption is in favor of traducianism. An event is to be regarded as purely natural unless there is irresistible evidence of divine intervention. The burden of proof there- fore rests upon the theory that every soul is specially created. But it is objected to traducianism that it seems to imply a materialistic division of soul, and that, according to this theory, the children of regenerate parents should not require a "new birth." A. To the first objection it may be replied — (a) Since the soul is so exempt from the limitations of matter that it can act without change in substance, it can also be propagated without partition. {b) The same objection would hold against the propagation of animals and vegetables. The vital principle in these is im- material, and yet it will scarcely be pretended that it must be specially created in the case of every beast and plant. B. To the second objection it may be replied — {a) If our first parents had not sinned, their children would IMAGE OF GOD IN MAN 129 have been innocent by birth ; and if the children of regen- erate parents need the new birth, what follows is that regen- eration does not restore the original innocence of man. {b) An even more weighty rejoinder is that, according to creationism, the souls of men, being severally created, had no connection with the primal sin, and yet they are natu- rally depraved. C. To all objections it may be responded, the propagation of the species is so mysterious that the evident facts with re- gard to it ought not to be denied on the ground that they are not understood. § 28. Image of God in Man. Different theologies find this in human personality, in orig- inal holiness, in dominion over the beasts. Neither view taken alone is satisfactory ; for something of likeness to God can be found in each of the alleged particulars, 1. The image of God in which man was made was nothing less than a fundamental distinction between the natures of men and beasts. That fundamental distinction is personality. Accordingly, that the divine image survived the fall is taught not only by Gen. 5 : 1-3, as interpreted by 9 : 6, but also by I Cor. 11:7 and James 3 : 9. Therefore — 2. The original moral excellence of man did not constitute the image of God in him. It was, however, a particular in which man was made like his Maker. The likeness was de- faced though not effaced, by the fall. A sinful person is a marred image of the Creator. But the original innocence of man must not be mistaken for an original holiness. Holiness is positive, innocence is negative. And while we may ascribe to the unfallen Adam positive moral excellence, holiness involves devotion to right- 130 ORIGINAL CONDITION OF MAN eousness of the whole moral energy, and is a condition of fixity which, even in the faultless, only trial can bring about (John 17 : 19; Heb. 2 : 10; cf. Matt. 4 : i). 3. Man's dominion over the beasts is a faint copy of the divine lordship (Gen. i : 26). But since the ascendency of man is due to the powers which distinguish him from mere animals, it is a product and sign of the divine image, rather than itself that very image. § 29. Original Condition of Man. The elder theologians taught that man possessed before the fall the highest refinement and an ideal civilization. Evo- lutionists, on the contrary, generally insist that our race has painfully struggled upward from a state of brutal savagery. Neither view is supported by conclusive evidence. 1. The testimony of Scripture is that Adam was neither a savage nor highly civilized. The practice of husbandry, which he followed in Eden, is neither the lowest nor the highest of occupations (Gen. 2 : 15, 19, 20). 2. The earliest fossil remains indicate a development of body and of mind decidedly above the most degraded type of savages. These latter then are probably degenerate wan- derers, not aborigines. But although the earliest men, as judged by their known remains, were above the lowest, they were below the highest of the historic races. 3. The history of civilization is of the same purport. On the one hand, civilization is not indigenous, but is borrowed, at least in germ. This process may be traced back with con- siderable certainty to the not ignoble arts of Western Asia, the earliest known habitat of man within historic time. On the other hand, culture is a product of cultivation. the: law of god 131 The beginnings of a civilization may be traceable to an earlier people until the earliest traditional peoples are reached ; but ^ high state of civilization is the elaborated product of the society in which it is found. It is not then conceivable that modern knowledge and modern arts belonged to our first parents ; while it is equally improbable that God created the primal pair but little above the brutes. § 30. The Law of God. i. the idea of law. 1. Definition. Law was originally a political term, and meant a rule of conduct prescribed by authority. To modern science, law is an order of facts determined by their nature. 2. Distinctions. A true idea and correct use of the term are secured only by careful discrimination in several particu- lars. {a) Law is an order of facts, not efficient force, nor a force regulative of efficient forces. {b) Law is an existing, not merely an observed order, for order or law existed before it was observed. Nor is law, strictly speaking, the statement of an order which has be- come known ; the statement is one thing, the fact stated is another. {c) Law belongs to the nature of facts, and is not imposed on them by a restraining will. Hence — id) Law is fixed, for to change the nature of a thing is to make it something else. The observed order may change ; but this only reveals more fully the nature of the thing ob- served. It is a further discovery, not a repeal of its law. For instance, the successive modes of existence in a but- terfly. {e) Sentient beings normally exhibit a varying order ; be- 132 THE LAW OF GOD cause their bodily, mental, and volitional powers contain a structural provision for more or less choice of action. (J') Sentient beings may violate law, for their organs are not perfectly co-ordinated ; and each, while acting according to its own form, may either repress or strain other organs, or disturb their normal relations, and thus impair the or- ganism. This solves the problem how physical law can be inviolable and moral law violable, although law in both cases is a con- stituent principle. Physical law cannot be broken, because to break a physical law would be to change the nature of a physical object, that is, to put it out of existence; while organic law, of which moral law is a variety, can be broken, because organisms as such are destructible. [g) It is the office of reason to recognize the proper rela- tion of organic functions, and to preside over their exercise. The lack of structural exclusion of disorder is met in rational beings by a provision for its voluntary exclusion ; so that for reason to rule is still to secure an order of facts prescribed by the nature of the facts. 3. hiferences. The conception of law as determined by the natures of things involves momentous results. {a) To know the laws of things is to know the innermost and the utmost that can be known. (b) The scientific conception of law is applicable to all spheres, for all things possess some definite nature, some essential constitution. In geometry the facts are continuous, and their law is the constant ratio between them ; for exam- ple, between the angles and sides of a triangle. In mechanics and chemistry the facts may be successive, and their law is the method of the force which produces the changes observed. THE LAW OF GOD 1 33 In organisms, or living things, a law is that order of pro- cesses, whether vital or voluntary, which the structure of the organism prescribes. Social laws are the constitutive methods of the social faculties. Statutes or positive laws, whether of divine or human government, are, if just, merely a publication of laws grounded in the nature of man at a given stage of development. Ceremonial requirements in religion represent either a transient state of pupilage which looks toward its own termination, as in the case of Levitical rites, or a permanent dependence of mind upon the suggestions of sense, as in case of the Christian institutions and ordinances. Even God is under the law of his own nature, so that what- ever he does for us must be done in harmony with law, or it is a violation both of our nature and his own. Even to for- give infractions of law is according to law, because grace is a normal divine function, and repentance a normal human con- dition of forgiveness. How atonement is according to law will be hereafter considered. If any theological theory fails to illustrate law in the simple but searching idea of it com- mon to all sciences, then the theory is inadequate or even false, and the nature of the case but meagerly understood. II. THE SOURCE OF LAW. 1. Since law is a constituent of forces and things, its origin is in their Creator. In appointing their natures he fixed their laws. 2. But in what sense is God the source of law ? May it be traced to his will, to his benevolence, or to his nature .'' Un- doubtedly to his nature. His will is the immediate source of law, and benevolence certainly guided his will ; but both will and benevolence belong to his nature, must be exer- cised in harmony with his entire nature, and therefore the M 134 THE LAW OF GOD primary and determinative source of law is the perfect nature of God. All laws then which God has instituted are " transcripts of the divine nature " — moral laws, of its moral aspects ; mental laws, of its intellectual aspect ; physical laws, of the wisdom of God in creating physical objects fitted to his designs. III. THE OBLIGATION OF LAW. { e 1. T/ie moral obligation. This is found in the fact that laws are the normal mode of action. For a rational being to use his powers in harmony with their norm is to attain the true end of his existence. This is the ultimate obligation in ethics, an obligation due even from the divine Being to him- self. Conversely, for a rational being to violate his norm is a crime against nature, an ultimate evil, requiring no analysis, and admitting of none. 2. The religions obligation. Since the all-perfect Being is per se the ultimate standard of right, the ethical obligation to normality, which our own nature prescribes, rises into the religious obligation to normality, in order that we may con- form to the divine nature. In accepting the holy nature of God as the supreme stand- ard of right we have not rendered the antithesis between right and wrong more complete ; right is not more certainly that which ought to be done, nor wrong more essentially that which ought not to be done. No right deed can be cited on the part of man or of God which is not a normal deed, or which is right for any other reason than that it is normal ; no wrong can be found which is not abnormal, or which is wrong for any other reason than that it is abnormal. To question the intrinsic Tightness of the normal in man would be to SIN 135 raise the same question against the intrinsic moral excellence of God, whose changeless normality is his holy perfection. What we have gained in accepting the divine as the cri- terion of human goodness is the impressiveness of the obli- gation to be good. The high worth of moral excellence is felt when it is witnessed in a good man ; its boundless im- portance is felt when it is witnessed in an infinitely holy God. It is the function of reason to know the truth of the abstract idea of right ; but it is the function of moral sensibility to be stirred by the concrete exhibition of righteousness in a person. § 31- Sin. i. definition. We have seen that any violation of the constitutive laws of a rational being in the view of ethics is wrong, and in the view of religion is wicked. The word sin belongs to the ter- minology of religion, and the usual definition of it may be accepted : Sin is want of conformity to the law of God. If this definition, as interpreted by the idea of law, seems inapplicable to violations of ceremonial or merely positive requirements, it should be borne in mind that it is normal to obey God, and that these requirements are fitly ordained by God because they are suitable to man as they find him, and therefore to break them \%per se sinful. Since the law of God corresponds to the constitution of the ideal man, sin takes as many phases as there are forms of departure from that ideal. Consequently, to begin with the concrete, sin is — I. An act of disobedience to the law (i John 3:4; d.vo[i(a, lawlessness, iniquity, either of disposition or acts). But an act of transgression is the fruit of a bad ruling principle ; hence sin is — 136 SIN 2. A principle of self-willed opposition to God (John 8 ; 34; Rom. 6 : 12-14; 7 passim ; Eph. 2 : 3). But a control- ling principle of conduct reveals a corresponding moral state ; hence sin is — 3. A state of moral unlikeness to God (Matt. 15 : 18; Luke 6 : 44, 45 ; Rom. 7 : 14; Eph. 2 : 3).' II. THE ESSENCE OF SIN. Various theories have been proposed and are still current upon this subject. The more important are — 1. The essence of sin is sensuality. But — [a) The normal indulgence of appetites is not sinful ; while the abnormal, ascetic restraint of them is certainly a blunder and of doubtful morality. (b) Sensuality does not account for vices of the mind either in men or demons. {c) Paul cannot be quoted in support of this theory ; for, although he uses the word " flesh " as a bold symbol for sin, he includes among its works witchcraft, hatred, etc., offenses not distinctly sensual (Gal. 5 : 20 ; cf. " desires of the flesh and of the mind," Eph. 2 : 3). 2. The evolutionist view is that we inherit from brute progenitors not only vices of sense, but those of the mind, such as vanity, deceitfulness, malice, revenge. These pro- pensities are regarded as immoral in man, because experience shows him that they are injurious alike to himself and to others. Evolutionism thus declares the essence by account- ing for the origin of sin. Both phases of the theory must be considered, if either. A. As an account of the origin of sin we note that — > This distinction is accepted from Dr. E. G. Robinson, and will be found a key to many difficult problems. SIN 137 (a) The evolution of man from the beasts is an unproved speculation ; but a divinely guided evolution is a probable speculation. (d) The theory can relieve the problem of the fall only by modifying the current doctrine of original innocence. But, at the same time, if the Scriptures teach that man was originally good, they teach that the beasts also, with their rudimentary vices, were "good." And since the beasts could become human only as changed by the Creator, it is not cer- tain that the first men would inherit any further proclivity to sin than they unquestionably possessed in desires which could be solicited to evil. B. As a theory of the essence of sin evolutionism is open to the more serious objection that misconduct is not wrong be- cause it is injurious, but is both injurious and wrong because it is abnormal. What is normal in a brute may be abnormal in a rational being. 3. Finiteiiess or limitation is said to be the essence of sin, because the Infinite alone is perfect. (a) But it is not the privilege of the Infinite alone to be good, A finite being that spontaneously fulfills the ends for which he was created is without fault. {B) Sins are not mere limitations, but the active expres- sions of a perverse nature. ic) This is essentially the pantheistic doctrine that " evil is good in the making," that the distinction between good and bad is one of quantity rather than quality, and hence, as pantheists show a marked disposition to hold, that might makes right. 4. Selfishness is the essence of sin. This is probably the most widely accepted theory. It is, however, open to the objections ; 138 THE FALL OF MAN (a) It is maintained on the ground that love is the essence of obedience, as well as a motive to it, and is subject to the criticisms which hold against resolving holiness into benevo- lence. (p) Selfishness is a principle of conduct, and cannot be the essence of sin as a state. (c) Even as a principle of conduct selfishness is not an un- resolvable essence, but may be further analyzed. Selfishness ' is excessive self-love. The wrong element in it is its excess. But self-love is excessive only when it goes beyond the bounds set for it in the constitution of man as a being fitted for social relations. Or, since enlightened self-love would lead one to exercise his high social faculties, selfishness might be defined as a misdirected self-love, and the evil element in it would be its irrationality. Self-interest is in being unselfish. From either point of view the evil in selfishness is seen to be its want of conformity to the law, or method of conduct, prescribed by the constitution of the ideal or typical man. Hence we conclude that — 5. The essence of sin is its abnor>nality . It is essentially a violation of the nature which God gave to man and of the divine nature after which man was patterned. In the case of rational beings, capable of recognizing the relations of con- duct to constitutive law, moral quality, good or bad, inheres in such relations. This we know by intuition, and there- fore cannot, and need not, prove. The enormity of sin is its abnormity. § 32. The Fall of Man. God made man faultless (Gen. 1:31; Eccl. 7 : 29 ; Rom. 5 : 12). He was spontaneously correct in all relations. Toward God his natural relation was one of reverence, sub- THE FALL OF MAN 139 mission, trust, and love ; toward human beings it was one of love, respect, and helpfulness ; toward inferior creatures one of kindness and authority ; for himself it was the propor- tionate exercise of all his powers, and distaste for excess in the use of any. Deliberate and repeated choice of right would have tended to fixity in righteousness ; but, when subjected to the inevi- table test, he fell. I. THE SCRIPTURAL ACCOUNT OF THE FALL. The account given in Gen. 3 : 1-6, whether taken literally or symbolically, is luminous and intrinsically probable. The tempter suggested that there was a conflict between the natural demands of human nature and the known inhibition of God. The lower appetites of the palate and the eye, with the higher longings of the mind (3 : 6), were incited against fidelity to the highest function of man, confiding submission to God ; self-will was provoked ; distrust of God followed ; and sin was outwardly consummated in an act of disobedience. n. THE PROBLEM OF THE FALL. The scriptural account of the process through which man was led into sin does not make it possible to understand how a rational and upright being could do himself the extreme violence of setting his will against the will of God. Nor does it make it plain how God could permit the fall. (a) The ethical difficulty is that every determination of the will actually and, so far as we can see, necessarily corresponds to character. The dilemma is obvious : either the primal sin shows that Adam was sinful before the fall ; or his previous innocence shows that the fall was innocent. (d) The theological difficulty is that God foreknew what 140 THE FALL OF MAN man would do. He knew that the entire human race would fall victim to the evil which he most compassionates and most abhors. The problem of the fall is insoluble. III. THEORIES OF THE FALL. But the insolubility of the problem has not deterred either philosophers or theologians from renewed attempts upon it. The objections to ascribing the fall to carnal appetites, to bestial inheritance, or to finiteness, were involved in the dis- cussion of corresponding theories as to the essence of sin. It remains to notice the following proposed solutions : I. In morals as in physics nothing is achieved except by overcoming resistance. Sin is thus contemplated as a kind of moral inertia. Without actual sin, therefore, there could be no positive righteousness. {a) But moral acts would necessarily meet with moral re- sistance only in case they constituted a class distinct and apart from acts of intellect, sensibility, and will ; whereas moral excellence is but a quality inherent in all normal con- duct of a rational being. Whatever, therefore, the resistance to any normal function, the moral excellence of the function could not increase the resistance, but would be supremely at- tractive to an unfallen being. (p) The only condition precedent of moral choice before the fall was an idea of something that ought to be avoided ; and this idea was provided by the law of the forbidden fruit. It is true that full knowledge of either good or evil can be obtained only by experience of its opposite, so that the " tree of knowledge " stands for something ethically real. But, what- ever it stands for, it cannot mean that our first parents had no knowledge at all of good or evil until they fell ; for they knew that divine commands ought to be obeyed, and to have PENAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL I4I an idea of duty is to have an idea of the right and of its op- posite. 2. The Calvinistic theory that God decreed sin either effi- ciently or permissively. But the moral perfections of God forbid us to believe that he actively caused sin (James i : 13); while to say that he permitted it, is still to leave open the question how it was efficiently caused. § 33. Penal Consequences of the Fall. Some theologians distinguish between the natural conse- quences and the penalties of the fall. They may be distin- guished in idea, but are not distinct in fact. {a) All penalties are natural consequences. The wrath of God is as natural as the reproaches of conscience ; and the suffering which he inflicts is as natural a result of his wrath as any harm which the sinner does to himself. {V) All the natural consequences of the fall are penalties. They are the sanctions which belong to law as an element in the constitution of moral beings ; so that inwrought evils are as manifest agencies of the divine government as are statutory punishments. Indeed, law appears all the more sacred, and penalty the more solemn, when we consider that sin inevitably draws a penalty upon itself from every source, and that such penalties are in no case arbitrarily imposed. Of the penal consequences of the primal sin the following are the more important : I. death. This was the penalty expressly threatened for disobedience 142 PENAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL of the sole restraint imposed in Eden (Gen. 2 : 17). Death as a consequence of the fall is both physical and spiritual, but pre-eminently spiritual. 1. Spiritual death is loss of harmony with God. That man was naturally mortal and death chiefly spiritual is assured by the facts : {a) The tree of life was provided in order to secure the unfallen Adam from physical death. (b) Christ removes the penalty of sin. In so doing he re- stores the soul to union with God (Eph, 2 : 4-6), but does not prevent its severance from the body. {c) The New Testament characteristically represents life and death as spiritual. {d) Geology teaches that physical death long preceded the creation of man, and physiology affords no reason for suppos- ing that the body of man was ever deathless. 2. Physical death, or separation of the soul from the body, is also a penalty of the fall. {a) Access to the tree of life was cut off in consequence of the fall. . (b) The sting of physical death is sin ; and so far as this is removed, the penalty of physical death is removed (i Cor. 15 : 55-57)- {c) In the end, Christ will deliver his people from physical 'death (i Cor. 15 : 22). As man is dual, so life in Christ is dual. The resurrection of the body is peculiarly associated with a vital relation to Christ (Rom. 8:11; Phil. 3:11, 12). If it be objected that physical death cannot be a penalty of sin, for the reason that the threatened penalty was to be suffered on the day when the forbidden fruit was eaten ; we reply — Death is twofold. Spiritual death was suffered at once^ PENAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL 14^ physical death was at once made certain ; precisely as life is twofold, and the promise of Christ, '• Whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die " (John 1 1 : 26), is fulfilled at once for the spirit, but is not yet applicable to the body (i Cor. 1 5 : 54). II. NATIVE DEPRAVITY, OR ORIGINAL SIN. Recalling the distinction between sin as a state, principle, and act, we may define Native Depravity as (a) an inborn state of moral debasement, marked by (d) an irresistible proneness to (^) acts of sin. Because this debasement be- longs to every man from the beginning of his individual ex- istence, it is not improperly called Original Sin. It is an inherited penalty of the fall. I. Extent of Depravity. Is native depravity partial or is it total ? The doctrine of Total Depravity is often understood to be that there is only wickedness in man. It has even been argued that he is con- tinually as wicked as possible. But such opinions defy the common conscience, and the doctrine which they misrepre- sent shares their disrepute. It is not true that all the mo- tives and acts of the unregenerate are entirely wrong. Pos- sibly no act or motive is utterly wrong. Conscience approves in one's self, and the noblest sentiment of mankind un- stintedly lauds many of the acts and, so far as they appear, the motives of men whom no one regards as regenerate. We must not conclude that the common conscience is in error, or that God entirely condemns what men thus unite to honor and love. At the same time a defensible meaning can be found for the conventional title, Total Depravity to wit — 144 PENAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL (a) No unconverted man loves God supremely, and his motives are always wrong by defect. But he loves his own way supremely, and when the law of God demands the sur- render of his will he finds his will perverse (Rom. 7 : 7-24). (d) All his powers are disordered by sin. This is so familiarly true of the appetites that " tJie flesW in scriptural and in popular language is used concretely for sin. The " understanding also is darkened," men are •' alienated from the life of God because of the ignorance that is in them " (Eph. 4 : 18), "the things of the Spirit of God . . . are foolishness unto them" (i Cor. 2 : 14); and the judgment against them is that they even " loved the darkness rather than the light " (John 3 : 19). 2. Theories of Native Depravity. Sharp conflict of opinion has long prevailed over this theme. The following views require notice : A. The Pelagian, that the posterity of Adam are born as he was created, neither good nor bad, that they severally de- termine their own moral state and receive from the fall of Adam no other injury than the influence of an evil example. But this theory is openly opposed to the teaching of Script- ure that we are " by nature," that is by birth, " the children of wrath" (Eph. 2 : 3 ; cf. Rom. 5 : 12, 19). B. Semi-pelagian, Arminian and New School theologians agree that men inherit a bias toward sin, but deny that Adam's sin is imputed, that depravity is a penalty of the fall, or that it is reckoned as sin until the will yields to the propensity sinward. To the Semi-pelagian, depravity is a sickness, not a sinful- ness. To the evangelical Arminian or Wesleyan, it is a cor ruption or vitiosity, and disables man from turning to right- PENAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALL I45 eousness ; but, on the other hand, it is not punishable, and the disability it causes is corrected through the atonement by the restoration of the Holy Spirit to all men. To the New School theologian, the vitiosity is sinful because it leads to sin, but is not itself sin, for sin is a voluntary violation of a known law ; sin consists in sinning. Against these kindred views it must be urged that — (a) An inborn state which turns our wills against God is itself a state of sin. (d) Our consciences condemn what we are as well as what we do. We repent, not indeed of Adam's sin, but of the moral condition into which it brought us. (c) That condition is not only a penal consequence of the fall, but itself offensive to God — a penalty all the more gre\ ous because itself punishable. The mischiefs wrought by sin increase by multiplication into themselves. C. T/ie Federalist theory that a covenant of works was formed with Adam, according to which he was appointed fed- eral head of the race, and the race was granted a probation in him. The covenant stipulated that, if Adam continued in obedience, the race should be maintained in righteousness ; whereas if he fell, his sin should be imputed immediately to his posterity, and as a consequence they should be born de- praved. Sufficient objections to this view are : {a) It necessitates the creationist theory concerning the origin of souls. (^) The Scriptures say nothing of such a covenant. {c) They do not reveal so violent and entirely arbitrary an arrangement as that God by sheer exercise of sovereignty im- putes to Adam's posterity an act in which, as the theory in- sists, they had no share. {d) Nor do the Scriptures warrant the harsh idea that wc 146 PENAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE FALI, are punished with depravity in consequence of the imputation by legal fiction of another's sin. The texts quoted for the federalist view more readily suggest another : D. The theory of Natural Headship in Adam. All hu- man nature was in our first parents when they fell, and was subsequently propagated in the state to which they had brought it. This view involves the traducianist theory as to the origin of souls. That native depravity is a consequence of the natural headship of Adam is supported by — {a) The Scriptures. It was in consequence of the ger- minal inclusion of the race in its natural head that Paul could say, in Rom. 5 : 1 2, " By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin," adding at once the explanatory statement, "And so death passed upon all men because (^0' '