.h^ ^^ John Andrews. ^ K\\ .5' PKESENTED TO THE LIBRARY OF PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL SEMINHRY BY |VIrs. fllexandef Ppoadfit. sec A DEFENCE of NATURAL arid REVEALED RELIGION: BEING AN ABRIDGMENT O F T H E SERMONS Preached at the L e c t u r e founded by // The Hon'^^ Robert Bo^le, Efq; VOL. III. LONDON: Printed for A R T H u R Be ttes worth and Charles Hitch, at the Red-Lion in Pater-nopr Row. Mpccxxxvn. T O R ichardDuCane, Efq; SIR, THE many Favours I have re- ceiv'd from you, ever fmce I had the Honour and Happinefs of being efteemed one of your Friends, make me take this Opportunity of a pubUc Acknowledgment. And if this Way of expreffing my Gratitude be not difagreeable to you, who take more Pleafure in doing Good, than in having it known ; I am under no Apprehenfion, that I need make any Apology, for placing your Name in a Defence of Chrifti- anity : For you are not become fo fafhionable as to be afhamed of the Reli- 'DE'DICATION. Religion you profefs, but look upon the Knowledge of it as the trueft Learning, and its Pradice as the greateft Accompliflhment. / amy SIRy Tour Mojl Obedienty Obligedy Humble Servant y GfLBEjRT Burnet.- y Dr. I B B 0 r's Boyle's Lectures A B R I D G ' D. Vol. III. 6 The true No t i o n of the EXERCISE o F Private Judgment, O R FREE-THINKING. Th ess. v. 21. Prove all Things j hold f aft that which is good. N profecuting this Subjed, I fhall obfervc the following Method : I. To enquire what the Apoftle here means ^ by proving all Things : To ftate the true Notion of Private Judgment or Freedom of Thought. II. To confider what that Free-thinking is, which is falfeiy fo called. III. To prove that Free-thinking, properly fo called, is every Man's Right and Duty. IV. To Ihew what Cautions are neceflary to be obferved in the Ufe of it. V. Shew that true Religion is not an Enemy to true Free-thinking. B 2 VI. Shew 4 ^he true Notion of the Exercife of VI. Shew the Dangers which Men expofe themfelves to, by indulging that Humour which they falfely call Free-thinking,^ I. I fhall enquire what the Apoftle here means by proving all Things : To ftate the true Notion of that Private Judgment, or Freedom of Thought, which every Man ought to exercife in religious Matters ; and to fhow wherein it confifts. The Apoftle's Precept is diredled to all Perfons i and the Trial, which every Man is to make, is to be extended to all Points, both of Dodrine and Practice ; for the Matters of Religion, of all others, ought not to be taken on Truft ; there is nothing wherein we are more concern'd to exercife our Reafon and Underftanding, becaufe our greateft Intereft lies at ftake -, if through a wilful Negled of ufing our own Judgment, we fall into a wrong Way, it may -lead us to our eternal Ruin. Now when the Apoftle bids us prove all Things, he plainly fuppofes, that there is fome Rule in Being, whereby we may judge of what is thus proppfed to us. This Rule can be no other than Reafon or Re- velation. And even when there is a Revelation, we are to judge of its Meanings and Proofs by Reafon. That we think, and that we have not the Li- berty to do otherwife, is evident ; but to think on this or that Subje(5t, as long or as attent as we pleafe, is alio in our Power. And this Liberty we are enjoined to ufe in re- ligious Matters to make them the frequent Sub- ject of our Thoughts, and to reafon with our- felves about them. Without this it is impoffible for us to know any thing, but in Matters of Senft and Intuition. . Ala Iters of Senfe are out of the prefent Queftion. And Matters of Intuition^ where the Agree- jnent and Dtfagreement between two Ideas are im-: Private Judgment, or Free-thinking. 5 Immediately vifible, without the Intervention of others, in Religion are very few. So that in religious Matters we ought to exer- cife our rational Faculties, where the Agreement or Difagreement of our Ideas cannot be found out without the Help of other immediate Ideas, and difpofing them in a proper Order, in which the Faculty of Reafoning confifts. In this Proceeding feVeral Rules are to be ob- ferved, without which we cannot think jujily or freely upon any Subjed. I . We muft have a fmcere Love of Truth for its own Sake. This Love of Truth very few have, as may appear more efpecially in religious Matters, where they will not be fatisfied with fuch Proofs as the Nature of the Thing is capable of, and make thofe Objedions they would be afhamed of in other Cafes. Indeed the Evidence which we have for the Truth of any thing is alv/ays to be the Meafure of our Aflent •, and whoever goes beyond this Meafure, does not fo much believe any thing to be true, becaufe it is fo, as becaufe he is willing to have it fo. But as our Aflent is not to rife higher than the Proofs, fo neither ought it to fall lower. And therefore whenever any thing has all the Proofs of its being true, which it could have, were it aftually true, we ought to give it our Aflent ; and if we do not, we have not a general Love for Truth, but are prejudiced ; and then our Enquiries will be cool or partial, and our Examinations will be made with little Care. To avoid which Inconveniences we fhould learn to love Truth for itfelf. We fhould confider that 'tis what we were made to difcover and entertain j that it perfeds our Na- ture, and *t)ll we are biafs'd by fome inordinate PalTion, 'tis the moft grateful Thing to the Mind. B 3 WcL 6 ^e true Notion of the Exercife of We fhould make it our Bufinefs to renew this Love for Truth, and never to depart from it. 2. If we be thus in Love with Truth, our Fears will never hinder us in oyr Enquiries after it i for nothing can follow from Truth but Truth, and the more we fhall have of it, we fhall be the better able to difcern and purfue our true Intereft. Let us therefore never decline this Trial, nor dread any Confequences of any Truth, but pufh it as far as it will go. As Things will not comply with our Opinions^ our Opinions fhould comply with them. For great is "Truth. Tho* fhe is not always welcome, 'tis always wife to hearken to her, be- caufe fhe is faithful and impartial in her Counfels, and will give us Warning that we may take Care to prevent our Danger. We often build upon a falfe Foundation, we receive many Things fot true without examining them ; and then we dare not examine them, for fear we fhould find our Miftake -, but this is pre-- pofterous. We fhould receive nothing for Truth but what we have found to be fo ; or if we have taken Things for true, without examining them, this fhould not make us afraid to fearch into them afterwards ; becaufe Things will be juft what they are, and we fhall find them fo, however we may think of them at prefent ; and tho' we may re- ceive Mifchief from Error, we cannot be hurt by Truth. 3. This being the Cafe of Truth, we muft ex- amine into it with the utmoft Sincerity and Impar- tiality ; we mufl divefl ourfelves of Prejudice j we mufl lay afide all received Hypothefes, and Opi- nions^ and Pqfjions ; we mufl not wijh one Side fhould be more true than the other, but only that' we might find on which Side Truth lies, and have no other Ends in View but that. And Private Judgment, or Free-thinkbig. y And in our Enquiries after Truth, we fhould proceed upon Principles of Reafon, coolly and fairly debate the Matter, and give all the Proofs the Weight they are capable of, and deal with all the Objedions in the fame Manner. We ihould have no Regard to Party or Pajfion ; hot regard Men but 'Truth •, we fhould not rait, but reafon -, and when our Arguments are at an End we fhould fubmit, 4. In trying religious Matters^ we fhould make ufe of all the Helps God has given us. If we enjoy the Benefit of Revelation, and the Queftion be concerning a Truth contain'd in any particular Place of Scripture ; or whether the Collection of thofe 'Truths propofed to us for di- vine Truths be contained in Scripture, we are not to think ourfelves obliged to interpret Scripture according to what fome Men call the Analogy of Faith^ which is only their own particular Syllem of Chriflian Doftrines : Nor are we to imagine that our own natural ■Reafon, without other Helps, will find out the true Senfe of Scripture. No, we mufu make ufe of other Helps, fiich as the Languages the Scrip- tures v/ere wrote in, the Idioms thereof -, and of every particular Writer, the Manners, and Cuftoms, and Opinions of thofe People they were writ to. Thefe are neceflary Helps to a right Underflanding of Scripture ; and without thefe whoever pretends to understand and criticife upon the Scriptures is a Fool. Where Men have no other Guide but Reafon, they muft make the beft Ufe of it, and free themfelves from what- ever might hinder it from exerting its Force. And whatever appears upon a due Examination of their rational Faculties to be true, they muft believe \ and whatever appears fitteft to be done, they are bound to pradife. B 4 5. The 8 The true Notion of the Exercife of 5. The laft Thing neceflary in our Enquiries after Truth, is a firm Refolution to embrace it, whenever it is found, and to be governed by it. If this is not our Defign, our Enquiries will want that Sincerity and Induftry which is abfo- lutely necefiary to find out Truth. There are fome Truths that ferve only for Amufement -, but the Truths I am now fpeaking of muft influence our Pracflice, and if we are not refolved to be governed by them, we fhall never be defirous to know them. Any religious Truth v/ill make us uneafy as long as we hold it in Un- righteoufnefs -, and this will make us fhun the Knowledge of it, or endeavour to be of a con- trary Opinion. The Confequence of our Unwillingnefs to obey the Truth will be, that we fliall require ftrider Proofs of the Truth than are poflible to be had, which will lead us to Sceptictfm, and fo to Infi- delity. The Apoflle fuppofes, and all Men generally agree, that there is Truth and Faljhood, Right and Wrong, Good and Evil. Now that which after our beft Enquiries appears to us to be the Right and Good, we are to fubmit to it, and to be govern'd by it. This may fuffice for the firft Thing propofed, 'vi%. to inquire what is meant by proving all Things. I proceed, II. To confider what that Free-thinking is> which is falfely fo called. The prefent Free- thinking differs widely from what is properly fo called, vix. from fair Exa- mination 'SivAjuft Reafoniyig, And as a Man is never the more a Free- Agent, becaufe he can break loofe from the Conduct of Reafon, fo no Man is ever the more a Free- Thinhrj,^ 2 Private yudgmenfy or Free-thlnkhig, 9 linker, becaufe in thinking he is under no Rule and Order. As *tis no Reftraint, but the true Ufe of our Liberty to determine our Choice by wife Motives ; fo it is no Reftraint of our Freedom of think- ing to think juftly, and not to deny and affirm any thing at Pleafure. But the prefent Freedom which fome have ufed in their Thoughts and Writings is not Freedom, but a Licentioufnefs of Thought ; 'tis babbling and prating againji Religion with malicious Words^ more than making any fober Enquiries about it. 'Tis an unaccountable Medley of Humour and Fancy, Mirth and Malice ; it confifts in Boldnefs and Prefumption, and is full of Prejudices and Miftakes. This feems to be the Free-thinking fb much boafted of, and this I will make good by feveral undeniable Inftances. But becaufe the great Defeat of the prefent Free-Thinkers is a Negledt of the proper Rules of true Free-thinking and fair Examination^ and be- caufe I have laid down fome of thefe Rules, I Ihall now apply them to the prefent Free-thinking in order to lay open the Falfenefs of it. The firit of thefe Rules was this. That every one who fe- rioufly fets upon the Search of Truth, ought to prepare his Mind with a Love of Truth for its own Sake. Whether we thus love Truth, we may know, by our entertaining, or not entertaining, any Pro- pofition with greater or lefs AfTurance than the Proofs it is built upon will warrant. The Strength of the Proofs of any Propofition is always to be the Meafure of our Aflent to it. . And therefore if our prefent Free-Thinkers do either refufe to give that Credit to fotne Things^ which the Proofs they are built upon will war- rant I i^ ^e true Notion of the Exefcife of rant •, or give It to others^ which have lefs Evi- dence, they have not a Love for Truth. And this will lead me to examine fome of their chief Arguments. Now fuppofe there was a Queftion ftarted, whether God did afford Men any other Light than that of Nature, any other Means of coming to the Knowledge of the Truth than their own Reafon ? Let us think freely upon it, and try which Way we can determine it. Here, I prefume, no Free-Thinker will affirm that God has tied up his Hands from affording us the Light of Revelation, in thofe Things which we could not otherwife know -, he cannot deny the Poffibillty of It. But it is not only poffible, but highly probable, as I fhall fhow hereafter. Therefore If God may reveal his Will to any one, he certainly can Impower that Perfon to communicate it to others, and enable him to do fuch wonderful Things, as are fufficlent to con- vince Men that what he delivers is from God. This being the Cafe It is by no Means juft Reafoning to Infer that becaufe there have been: falfe Pretences to Revelation, that therefore there is no fuch Thing -, on the contrary, if any Ar- gument can be drawn from hence it is this, viz. becaufe there have been many Pretences to Reve- lation, that therefore this is a Proof of the Rea- lity of the Thing. How then fhall we know the Pretence from the Reality ? I anfwer, by fome external Sign ; becaufe, without this, the Revelation would never convince others, . or be farisfadlory to whom it was reveal'd. Accordingly we find that God obferv'd this Method in Scripture, with thofe who were fent with Revelations from him to other People: Thus we read of Mofes^ Exod. iii. that he faw the Bujh burn iisithout confuming, and heard a Voice Prlmte Judgment, or Free-thinkhig. i i Voice out of it. Which Miracle, tho' fufficlent to fatisfy him, yet he could not look upon it as fufficient to authorize him to go upon that Mef- fage, till God, by turning his Rod into a Serpent, aflhred him thereby of a Power to fatisfy his Miflion, by the fame Miracle repeated before them. From the Conlideration of the Poflibility of a divine Revelation in general, let us, in particu- lar, examine whether the Chriftian Religion is founded on divine Revelation. How ihall we be refolved in this important Point ? The Way to do this, a Free-Thinker tells us, is to renounce all Guides, and to think freely for ourfelves about this Matter *.. , _ . But if by Free-thinking be meant hare Reajon^ and metaphyfical Speculations, 'tis impoffible for us this Way to come to any Certainty in this prefent Cafe ; for Revelation in general, and that which Chriftianity is founded upon, does refolve itfelf into plain Matter of Faft : Whence the Evidence of the Truth of the Chriftian Revelation can be only a moral Evidence, arifing from ancient Te/li- tnonies and authentick Hiftory of plain Matter of Fa6t. So that if I fhould propofe to inform myfelf whether the Chriftian Revelation be true, I muft enquire whether the Hiftory of the Gofpel be true i for if that be true, the Chriftian Revelation is fo too. Now 'tis impoflible to determine this in our Thoughts only, we muft take in the Witnefs of others, who lived at, or near thofe Times -, and examine all the Evidences and Monuments of An- tiquity relating to thefe Fi^tls, And whoever takes this Pains, will find the Hiftory of the Gofpel ftands upon a firmer Bot- tom than any other Hiftory. And * See D'ifcourfe of Free-thinking, pag. 24. 12 T%e true JSIotion of the Exercife of And therefore whoever rejeds the Hiftory of the Gofpel, and yet gives Credit to other Hifto- ries, discovers grofs Partiality. But if the Facfts recorded in the Gofpel be true, then Chriftianity is founded on divine Revelation ; then our Saviour had Authority from God to declare his Will -, then he had Power to commiflion others to teach in his Name, and tranfmit his Dodlrines to Pofterity ; then he did aflift them to do this with Certainty ; and then we may fuppofe thefe Writings freer from EfFefts of human Weaknefs. The Free-Thinkers pretend to own the divine Authority of thefe Books in fome Refpeds, and yet take away the Authority of them again, by levelling them with pretended Scriptures ; but I fhall vindicate the divine Authority of thefe Books, which we receive and believe to be the Word of God. In aflerting the Authority of thefe Books, I fiiall, 1. Confider the Matter contained in thefe Books. And, 2. The Books themfelves. The Authority of thefe Books, is that peculiar Right they have to be received and regarded by us as true. The immediate Foundation of which Authority is this, that they have God for their Author ; whofe Veracity demands to be credited in what it fays or foretels ; whofe Power commands Obe- dience, and whofe immutable Fidelity and Juftice exa6ls Belief in what is promifed or threatned. The remote Foundation of this Authority is the Matter contained ' in thefe Books, which proves them to be from God. Now the Contents of thefe Books may be- ranked under three Heads. 1. There Private 'Judgment^ or Frec-thmking. 13 1 . There are fome Things which Man could never have thought on. 2. There are other Things, which tho' not beyond the Reach of human Parts or Induftry, yet cannot be fuppofed to proceed from Men, becaufe no Reafon can be afligned why Men fhould invent fuch Things •, but on the contrary, there is good Reafon why they fhould not invent them. 3. There are other Things, which tho' Men could invent, yet they would not believe they fhould ever come to pafs. 1. Under the firfl Head, I reckon all the Mira- cles and Predidlions of our Saviour and his Apoflles. 2. Under the fecond Head, I rank the Precepts of Chriflianity as they are laid down in the New Tejlament •, where, i/?, we may confider the Things themfelves, or Adions which are enjoined us •, many of which, according to Man's Judg- ment, are ridiculous as believmg in Chrijl cruci- fied ', or, they are contrary to the common Affec- tions of human Nature, as Mortificationy and loving our Enemies, and parting with Life for the Sake of Chrift or our Brethren : Or, 2dly, we may confider the Perfons themfelves, who are enjoin'd thefe Precepts, who are all Mankind. Or, 3^/y, the Manner wherein thefe Duties are to be perform'd, which is with all our Hearty and with a good Qonfcience^ and faith unfeigned. 3. Under the third Head, I place the Rewards and Punifhments propofed to us in thefe Books, which relate to another Life. Now fuch Things as thefe muft have God for their Author. For what Man would perfuade himfelf, or at- tempt to perfuade others, that a Virgin fhould have a Son: that this Perfon fhould perform Miracles o^ ;all Kinds, and enable others to do the like. Such Things 14 ^he true Notion of the Exercife of Things as thefe would pafs all Belief, if the Re* yelation of them was not fupported by undenia- ble Examples. Again, What Man would enjoin, if he could, fuch a Religion as commands Things ungrateful to Flefh and Blood, and contrary to the common Senfe of Mankind, and which, whether we per- form them fincerely or no, *tis impoffible to tell. This Religion cannot be of human Invention. For Men would never deal fo feverely by them- felves, as to lay themfelves under fuch ftridt J^aws : Nor could any Man be fo foolifh as to think he could fucceed in an Attempt to impofe fuch Laws upon others : Or fo arrogant and con- ceited as to imagine he could oblige Mens Con- iciences, by a feigned Authority of thefe PrC" cepts ; much lefs could he encourage Men to un- dergo the Hardiliips of obeying thefe Precepts, by proposing fuch a Reward as is plainly be- yond the Defert of the beft of Men, and fo far beyond our Thoughts, and Reach, that we can never hope to attain it, unlefs it was reveal'd by him, who is able to perform it. Nor can it be looked upon to be a diabolical Invention. For that Spirit is too wife to invent a Religion, fuch as the Chriftian Religion is, fo contrary to his Nature^ and fo ^eftruftiye of his Kingdom. If it be objeded here, that this would be the Cafe, if thefe Promifes were true, and thefe Pre- cepts were given with a Defign to be pradtifed ; I anfwer, 'tis no Matter whether the Promifes are true, if they make Mert endeavour to obey thefe Precepts, which they certainly do. So that the Devil, by framing fuch a Religion as this, would. . even againft his Will be the Occafion of pro- moting Piety, which would be to deftroy his owa Kinf^dom. If Private Judgmenty or Free-thinking 15 If it be replied, That he knew the Precepts tq be fo difficult, that Men would defpair of ful- filling them, and therefore never attempt it, and fo come over to his Kingdom -, I anfwer, that he knew the Promifes to be fuch as to enable them to overcome thefe Difficulties. The Hopes of eternal Happinefs would foon enable us to un- dergo all the Miferies of this Life. But if it be laid, that thefe Hopes are groundlcfs •, then, I fay, that it was abfurd to make thefe Promifes. But why fhould thefe Promifes be thought incre- dible ? As they are propofed in thefe Books, they are worthy of all Acceptation. For thefe Books give us an Example of the Certainty of the Things promifed in our Saviour's Refurredion from the Dead. And we cannot fuppofe this was done by the Devil, the more effed:ually to excite Men to the Pradlice of Righteoufnefs. I conclude, therefore, that the Subje6l Matter of thefe Books prove them to be of divine Au- thority, fince neither Men, nor Devils, could be the original Authors of them. But when they are afcrrbed to God^ they ap- pear highly worthy of God ; who by his infinite Power can eafily perform all thofe Miracles re- lated in the Gofpels •, and by his fupreme Autho- rity can enjoin fuch Things as are ungrateful to our corrupt Nature, and try our Obedience. His Holinefs would prompt him to give us pure Jlules ; and his being a Difcerner of our Thoughts, gives him a Right to require the Obedience of the Heart. And *tis fuitable to his divine Ma- jefty, and infinite Goodnefs, to promife a Reward that exceeds our beft Performances. I proceed now from the Matter, 2. To confider the Books themfelves. And, if I can fhow, that there is no Reafon to doubt of the Authority of thefe, it will fol- low. 'l6 ne true Notion of the Eocercife of low, that they ought to be received for the ge- nuine Records of the Chriftian Religion. Now the principal Reafons Men have to doubt of the Authority of any Book, are fuch as thefe. 1 . That the Writer is a Man of no Credit. 2. That we cannot know certainly who the Writer was. 3. That it is to be fufpeded, that the Book has been corrupted. 4. That upon other Accounts the Book was not to be credited. I. Then, One Reafon to induce us to doubt of the Authority of any Book, is, that the Writer is not to be credited. But this cannot be alledged againft the Writers of the New 'Tefiament. For either thefe Books were wrote by thofe, whofe Names they bear, or by others. If by others, it is to be Ihewn, who they were, that we may fee whether they be Perfons fit to be credited. For if it be faid, it is fufficient to overthrow that Authority of the New Tejia- 9nentj that it cannot be proved that the Books were wrote by thofe whofe Names they bear : I anfwer, that this does not afFed the Truth of the Relation. It is fufficient to eftablifh the Credit of the Books themfelves, that they were wrote by Perfons who liv'd at, or near the Time and Place where the Things were tranfaded •, that their Re- lations were confirmed by contemporary Writers, and not contradided by the bittereft Enemies of Chriftianity. All which is true of the Writers qf the New Teftamenf, whoever they were. At prefent, therefore, let us fuppofe, for Ar- gument's Sake, that the reputed are the real^ Writers of thefe Books; and let us examine, whether there be any Ground to fufped them, cither of Ignorance or Infidelity. St, Private Judgment, or Free-thinking, ij St. Matthew, and St. John, were both con- ftant Followers of Chrift, fo that they could not be ignorant of what they wrote about. St Mark, and St. Luke^ who like wife wrote the Hiftory of Chrlft's Life, lived at the fame Time, and at the fame Place with our Saviour. St. Mark was a Companion of St. Paul, who was miraculoufly called to be an Apoftle, and was afterwards a Difciple of St. Peter, who was preient when Chrift worked his Miracles. Nay, St. Mark may be fuppofed to have wrote nothing but what was in a Manner dilated by St. Peter. St. Luke received from St. Paul every Thing that could give him a perfed Knowledge of the Hiftory he wrote. And the greateft Part of the Adions mentioned in the A^s of the Apof- ties, which he alfo compiled, he was prefent at ; and might be informed of the reft by St. Paul-, fo that he could not be ignorant of what he wrote. Next to the Gofpels, and the A^s of the A- poftles, the Epiftles of St. Paul make the moft confiderable Part of the New Teftament. 'i^The Doftrinal Part of which can never be queftioned, upon Account of his natural Abilities, and his miraculous Call to be an Apoftle. What was Hijlorical, we have obferved he could not be ig- norant of; and the prophetical Part may juftly be fuppofed equally known to him, who was fo near to our Saviour, and who could not pretend to know thofe future Events which were never difcovered to him. Beftdes St. Paul, St. James, Peter, John, and Jude, wrote Epiftles, who, as they were Chrift*s Difciples, could not be ignorant of what they wrote. The Book of the Revelations, which were difcover*d to the Author in a Vifion, is of the fame Authority with the reft ; becaufe whoever Vol. III. C was 1 8 The true Notion of the Exercife of was the Author, he tells us when and where the Vifion befel him, fo that he muft know he had fuch a Vifion, and what the Vifion was. If, therefore, the feveral Books were wrote by thofe whofe Names they bear, we cannot doubt of their Knowledge of what they deliver'd. Let us, in the next Place, fee whether they were unfaithful in their Relations. And here, perhaps, fome will fufpcdl that they deviated from Truth, in order to make their Story good. But when we confider, that thefe Writers were not only Chriftians, but conftant Companions of Chrift, there is no Room for this Sufpicion, fines we know how ftridly Chrift, and his Religion, commanded every Man to fpeak Truth. And, therefore, it will add much to the Au- thority of thefe Books, if it appears, that they were v/rote by thofe, whofe Names they bear, or by any other Perfons in the fame Circumftances. They were no otherwife concern'd in the Things tlie>^ related, than as they valued Chrift i and the^ore it was inconfiftent with their Defign to impofe upon the World. So that if we confider the Qualifications of thefe Writers, there is no Ground to fufpedt ei- ther that they knew not the Truth, or have not faithfully related it. As to the different and contradi6lory Accounts which thefe Books are fuppofed to contain, there are many Things that feem to differ, tho' they really do not fo ; and whenever this hap- pens, 'tis in Things of little Moment. So that this Difference is a Proof of the Truth of what they wrote, that there was no Fraud, no con- fulting together to deceive ; and that it was only Truth that produced this Agreement in their Hiftory, tho* fome of them retaining Circum- ftances the other forgot, might differ from others in their Account of the fame Things. In Private judgment ^ or Free-thinki?ig. 19 In the do(5lrinal Part of thefe Books, there is fuch a Harmony as advances the Credit of thefe Books above any other that delivers the Doc- trines of any particular Stdi. As for Things that are in themfelves ablurd, there are none fuch in the New I'efiajnent, and where-ever any feem fo, they are in fuch fmall Matters, as cannot weaken the Credit of the Book. We cannot doubt, for the Reafons ailedged, but that the Doftrines of Chriftianity are truly deliver'd to us in the Books of the New Tejlament. 1. I proceed to confider the fecond Ground of doubting of the Authority of any Book, vi'z. our not knowing the true Writer of that Book. For if it be objedted by thofe who in other Re- fpeds own the Truth of Chriftianity, that if it appears not who wrote thefe Books, we have no Reafon to believe either the do^rinal^ or hiftcrical Parts of them. The Credit of any hiftorical Book depending upon our knowing v/ho the Au- thor was, whether he was acquainted v/ith the Fads, and would not falfify them -, and that he was thoroughly acquainted with the Doftrine he pretends to deliver ; but without knowing the Author, we cannot know this. In anfwer to this, I obferve, there are two Things taken for granted, neither of which are true. One is. That we don't know any Thing of the Writers of the New Tejlament. The other \Sy That where we don't know the Writer of any Book, we cannot ground our Belief either of the do^rinal or hiftorical Part of that Book. I. That we know nothing of the Writers of the New Tejlament. I anfwer, that if we know who was the Writer of any antient Book, we know who were the Writers of the New Teftament \ and if Nobody doubts of the Author of any antient C 2 Book, 20 T'he true Notion of the Exerctfe of Book, to whom It has conftantly been afcribed ; we ought not to doubt of the Authors of the New Ttjiament for the fame Reafon. Blut we have lefs Reafon to doubt of the Au- thors of the New 'Tefiament^ than of the Author -of any other antlent Book. For fince our Know- ledge of the Author of any antient Book, de- pends more upon the Teftimony of thofe who lived when that Book was wrote -, and the Agree- ment of learned Men, In that Point, than any other y what Book, fo antlent as the New T^efia- ment^ has fo many Teftimonles of this Kind ? Eufebius fays, that for above two hundred and fifty Years, there was no Doubt who were the Authors of the feveral Books of the New 'Tejlament, excepting that to the Hebrews^ the firft Epiftle of St. Peter^ and the firft of St. John ; and Jujiin Martyr^ Iren^us, and Clemens Alexan- drinus aflert the fame. After thefe fucceeded a great Number of wife Men, who all agreed In the Authors of thefe Books. If It be objedled, that we may juftly queftlon who were the Authors of the Epiftle of St. James -, the fecond of St. Peter \ the fecond and third of St. John •, that of St. Jude^ and the Book of the Revelations. I anfwer, tho' It has been doubted who were the Authors of thefe Books by fome, they were upon Enquiry fatlsfied about their Authors -, and therefore there Is now as much. If not more Credit diie to them, than to thofe that had never been queftloned, becaufe they have had ftrlder Examination. But, 2. Tho' we were ignorant of the .true Author of any Book, It does not follow from hence, that the Book Is of no Authority, either in Point of Hiftory\ or Do5frine^ or of lefs Au- thority than it would be, if we knew the Author. For Private Judgment, or Free-thinking, 2 1 For if the Fa^s, which it relates, be confirm- ed by contemporary Writers, and its Dodrmes be attefted for the Dodrines of Chrift^anity, by other Chriftian Writers of the fame, or the fuc- eeedina Acre-, if the Books are conftantly appeal- ed to," thfs is enough to eftablilh their Credit, without knowing their Authors. And this is the Cafe of the Books of the ^ew 'Teft anient ; they were looked upon as containing true and genuine Accounts of Chriftianity, and always ap- pealed to as fuch. _ r 1 A 0 Another Ground of doubting of the Au- thority of any Book, is, when it appears, or when there is juft Grounds to fufpeft it corrupted. Now this Depravation muft be either in Part, or univerfal. If this Depravation be only of Part of the Hiftory and Dodrine of the New Teftament, this would quickly appear from the Difagreement of thefe Parts with others. But the perfeft Harmony of the feveral Writers ot the New 1'ejlameni will highly advance the Au- thority of the Book. . . , . That the Depravation fhould be muverjai, is inconfiftent with what has been already proved, that the feveral Books were wrote by thole whofe Names they bear. , , . r i. 4. The fourth Ground of doubting of the Authority of any Book, is, that upon other Accounts there are good Reafons why the Books fliould not be credited. , i r i But no fuch Reafons can be produced •, tor the Books of the New Teftament have had the Ap- probation of wife and good Men, from the firft Ages to the prefent Times •, and therefore there can be no Grounds for doubting. But fince there are Objeftions againft the Books, it will be proper, in the n?xt Place, to.anfwer thofe Objsdigns. ^ , 22 ^he true Notion of the Exercife of And here we are told, that the prefent Samari- tan Rabbies receive the five Books of Mofes (the Copy whereof is different from ours) as their en- tire Scripture \ which is very true, and their Schifm^ and idolatrous Worfhip, may be affign'd as the Reafon of it *. This Pentateuch they received from the Jews, and had they made any great Alteration in it, the Jews would have laid it to their Charge, which we do not find they did. And it appears from the Collation of the Book itfelf, with the Hebrew, that it has little or no Difference. There are, indeed, fome Variations, and fome wilful Corruptions in it, as that in particular about Mount Gerizim : But there is no Foundation in the Difference there is between the Samaritan and the Hebrew, to infinuate they are not the fame Books i and that confequently it cannot be known, whether they are not both equally falfe. Some of the moft material Corruptions of the Samaritans Pentateuch feem to have been occa- fioned by their Controverfies with the Jews. But the fmall Variation of the Samaritan Pentateuch from the Hebrew for above 2000 Years, whilft thefe Nations were Enemies, is a moft convincing Proof, that the Jewifio Bibles have been preferved with great Exadnefs. To proceed to what is next objedlcd We are told, that the Rabbies receive for Scripture the twenty-four Books of the Old 'Tcftament ; and that to thefe the Priefts of the Ro?nan Church, and the Froteftants add all the New ; but the Church of Rome receives the Apocrypha, which all Proteftant Churches rejeft, but the Church of England, whuh pays fome Regard to them. - But I will fhe^v, that thofe Controverfies, which * Vide Pioleg. II. in Bibl Polyglott. SeSl. 9. Private 'judgment ^ or Free-thinking. 2 3 which are among Chriftian«, are no juft Objedion againft Chriftianity itfelf. Are we, becaufe there are fome Difficulties iw determining the Number of the Scripture Books, fome rejedling thofe as fpurious, which others re- ceive as genuine, to rejed all, and conclude that there is no Book at all which has any juft Pre- tence to divine Authority ? This feems to be the Drift of thefe Men •, and yet it was never looked upon as any Ar- gument, that no Books were wrote by thofe, whofe Names they bear, becaufe fome has been falfely afcribed to them. But, fuppofing thefe Matters were more un- certain, the Truth of Chriftianity does not de- pend upon the Time when thefe Books Vv^ere for- mally put into one Body, and univerfally re- ceiv'd ; but upon the Fads related in thofe JjBooks, which, if true, as we have proved, Chrif- tianity is eftablifhed, and true. And the Gof- pels, and St. Faufs Epiftles, which give us a full View of Chriftianity, were received from the Beginning. But, fuppofing we are agreed about what Books are to be received for Scripture ; yet we differ, it feems, about the Authority of Saipture, and the Degrees of Infpiration v/ith which thefe Books are penn'd. So that we know not what Credit, or whether any is due. Now, I cannot fee, that the Truth of Chrifti. anity will fuffer, if we allow no more than this, that the Authors of the Books were Men of Honefty and common Abilities. For why might they not tranfmit down the Life and Dodtrine of Chrift, whom they conftantly follow'd, and faw all his Works, as v/ell as other Hiftorians, what they relate. There was nothing they could pro- pofe to themfdves by falfifying their Accounts -, C 4 and. 24 ^ke true Notion of the Exercife of and, if they had attempted it, they would have been difcovered^ fince the Things were then publickly known. Their Writings have all the Marks of Sincerity that can be defired ; and, if we give Credit to any Hiftory, we cannot deny it to the Gofpel ; and, if the Hiftory of the Gofpel be true, the Chriftian Religion is founded on divine Reve- lation, and demands our Aflent, as coming from God. But admitting the Scriptures are of undoubt- ed Authority ; How fhall we know that they are not alter'd from what they were when they were firft written? Several Doubts are raifed upon this Head. Wc are told of a Defign in the fixth Century of Anajiafuis the Emperor, of making a general Alteration of the four Gofpels. This is recordr ed by Vi^or TuniinenfiSj who lived at that Time. His Words are --— at Conftantinople in the Con- fulfhip of Mejfalla^ at the Command of the Em- peror Anajiafius^ the Holy Gofpels, as written by plain, unartful Evangelifts, are correded, and amended. In anfwer to this Objection, I obferve, 1 . That the Truth of this Hiftory refts upon the fole Credit of one Author. For IJidorus Hifpdenfis^ in his Chronicon, has only tranfcribed Vi^ofs Words. 2. It does not appear, from Victor's Words, that it was any Thing elfe than a Defign of new publiftiing the Gofpels in a more pure and polite Language : And this might be done without any Detriment to the Gofpel, the Originals of which might remain in their native Plainnefs. Of this Nature are the Verfions and Paraphrafes made on the New Teftament^ and are of great Ufe for the anderftanding the Text, 2. Wlmt^ Private Judgment, or Free-thinking. 25 3. Whatever this Defign upon the Gofpels was, it does not appear it was put in Execution. For if it had been publifhed, it would have fet the Eaft in a Flame, as much lefs Matters fre- quently did, and endangered the Emperor himfelf. 4. Had this been a Defign to corrupt the Pu- rity of the Gofpel, the Hiftorians of that Time, who are fo particular in defcribing the other Vil- knies of AmftafiuSy would have left this upon Record, as a ftandin^ Monument of his Infamy. But no Mention is made of this by them. 5. Befides the Silence of Hiftory, we have another more convincing Argument, that no fuch Gofpel did ever appear. For the Greek and La- tin Writers before Anajlajius^s Time are full of Citations out of the New Teftament^ and yet their Citations agree with the prefent MSS. which is a Demonftration that the whole New Tefiament has continued the fame, fince Anajiajius''s Time, as before. The fame appears from the entire Commenta- ries, and Verfions which were made of the New 'Tefiament before Anaftajius^^ Time, which all ar gree with the prefent Copies. Lafily, The Gofpels do not appear like a Book mended, and poliihed by a Scholar ; the Style is plain, and fimple, and unaffeded : There is no Rhetoric in it, but the Narration is carried on in the moft common and vulgar Expreffions. The Writers profefs only to deliver plain Matters of Fa6ls, and this ought to confirm our Belief of the Truth of them. And thus I have fully confuted this pretended Alteration of the Gofpels under Anafiafius. But this is no new Device of the Enemies of Chriftianity, to charge the Scriptures with being forged, when they had no other Way to con- fute them. "^ Thus 26 I'he true "Notion of the Exercije of Thus Porphyry^ v/hen he was prefTed with fome of Daniel'^ Prophecies, as undeniable Proofs of the prophetic Spirit in the holy Writers, pre- tends they were forged by fome Jew after the Times of Alexander and Antiochus. But he of- fers no Proof; and Jofephus fays, that the Jews received no Writing into their Canon, that was compofed after the finifhing of the fecond Temple. Which therefore is to be believed ? Jofephus^ who fpeaks of his own Knowledge, or Por- phyry^ who was a Stranger to the Jewijh Books ? 'Tis impoffible to prove any Fad if a bare, pofitive Alteration, or an obfcure Paflage fhall be allowed to out-weigh the Records of a Nation, and the Authority of the beft Hiftorians. This is the true State of the Cafe, and all the Force of fuch Arguments as thefe \ and whether this be Free-thinking and fair Examination, or falfe Reafoning and Thinking with Prejudice, I leave to any one to judge. There is, therefore, no Reafon from any Thing which has as yet been urged, why we fhould look upon the Gofpel as a cunningly devifed Fable. But further, tho' the Gofpel be not totally al- ter'd, yet it is faid, that it has been corrupted, and fuffer'd more from various Readings than any other Book. But whoever confiders this clofely, will find, that no Author has fuffer'd fo little. I might argue, that fince God defigned it for a Rule of Life, his Goodnefs would not fufFer it to be corrupted in any efTential Points, wherein the Salvation of Men was concerned. This general Argument ought to fatisfy any reafonable Perfon, that the Alterations and various Readings do none of them affed; the main De- fign of thefe Writings, which was to convey I down Private Judgment^ or Free-thinking ij down to us the true Religion. The Compilers of thefe Writings were divine Perfons, endued with miraculous Gifts, or direded by fuch. And tho' there is no Occafion to fuppofe the Writers infpired in every Thought and Word, yet 'tis reafonable to fuppofe they were hindred from falling into any grofs Errors ; and that they were kept from omitting any neceilary Point which our Saviour taught them, and from adding any Thing as neceflary which he did not make fo : And that they did not pervert his Mean- ing, but deliver'd it in their Writings the fame which he taught. In like Manner, tho' there be no Occafion to fuppofe that God fhould work a Miracle to pre- ferve their Writings from all Manner of Change, yet we may reafonably fuppofe, that if a parti- cular Providence was neceflary to preferve them from any material Corruption, they have been providentially fo preferved : And if this be ad- mitted, which cannot be faid of any other Writ- ings, the Scriptures have fuffer'd lefs than other Writings. But let us, for the prefent, put the Scriptures upon the fame Foot with other Writings, and I doubt not but they will appear freer from Cor- ruptions than them. The Argument that is brought to prove the Spurioufnefs of our prefent Bibles is this — That all Copies differ more or lefs from one another ; that the various Readings amount to above thirty thoufand ; and that if all Copies could be collated, the Number of various Readings would be much increafed. All thefe various Readings are falfely repre- fented, as fb many Corruptions of the original Text. Now in Vindication of the Purity of the Scrip- tures, 28 ^he true Notion of the Exercife of tures, and of the Labours of thofe who have colledled thefe various Readings, feveral Things are to be confider'd. 1 . That fince the Originals have been loft, the real Text itfelf of the facred Writings, does not lie in any fingle Copy, but is difperfed in them all, and that it cannot be retriev'd without col- lating them all. Tho' the moft faulty Copy is capable of anfwering the End for which Scripture was given. 2. Thefe various Readings were impoflible to be avoided, being the neceflary Confequence of taking Tranfcripts from the firft Originals, and afterwards from thofe Tranfcripts, and fo on. 'Tis probable, indeed, that thofe Copies which were lodged in particular Churches, were collated with great Care, and as exactly agreed with the Originals as poffible ; but then thefe, in Tradt of Time, were loft, and fupply'd by others lefs perfed. 3. Hence it appears how falfely they are charged with corrupting the Text, who have la- bour'd in colleding thefe various Readings •, for thefe were in Being before they were colledled, and if Religion was then true, it is the fame now thefe various Readings are coUedled. 4. Since the Originals are loft, the more Copies we' have, the more likely we ftiali be of arriving at the very Words of the original Text. But the more Copies we have, the more will the va- rious Readings be increafed. And therefore, 5. The various Readings are fo far from cor- rupting the Text, that they fix the true Reading, and explain obfcure Pafiages. The great Number of different Copies of the ancient Authors has always been efteem'd a Ser- vice in fetting forth a correft Edition ; and the Reafon why fome of thofe Authors are fo corrupt, I is. Private Judgmeiify or Free-thinking. 29 is, that there are few Copies to corredl their Faults. 'And the Reafon why the New Teftament is in a better Condition than any other ancient Book, Is upon Account of the great Number of Copies, and various Reading thence arifing. And If all the Copies wete got together, and accurately col- lated, our Bibles would be ftUl more corre6t. We fee then, that as the Cafe now ftands with the Scriptures, and fmce the Originals are long fmce loft, what Is complaln'd of as a Prejudice, is rather an Advantage. 6. The various Readings in other ancient Au- thors do In Proportion far exceed thofe of the New 'Teftament *. To which, I believe, we may add, that there have been more Copies of the New Tejiament than of any other Book, and fo more various Readings. And then It will follow, that the New Teftaraent has fuifer'd lefs than any other Book. 7. From the great Number of Copies of the New Tejlament, which have been difperfed,_ the Book has been preferv'd from being abolifhed or corrupted ; whereas, had there been but fome few fingle Copies of thefe _ Books lodged in fome private Hands, this. Indeed, would have made Room for Fraud, and given juft Sufpicion. But as long as the Copies were difperfed thro' all Hands, they made all At- tempts of this Nature impoffible. The Ene- mies of Chriftianity could not corrupt the Scrip- tures themfelves, nor charge the Friends of Chriftianity with any fuch Thing. And who- ever did this, was fure to be quickly difcovered and complain'd of. 8. After all, the various Readings are rather a Matter of Curiofity than real Ufe •, and there are * Fide PkUeluthmis Lipfienfis, in his Remarks upon Free- thinking, fag. 64. 30 The true Notion of the Exercife of are very few Places where there are any confider- able Alterations made in the Senfe of them by the various Readings. But if there fhould be ^ny Paflage of a Book corrupted beyond Retrieve, or a whole Book en- tirely loft, the Wifdom of God has fo ordered the Scriptures, that we may hnd the Matters of great Moment in the feveral other Books. Upon the Whole, therefore, we may juftly conclude, that the original Texts are not corrupted either by Jews, Chriftians, or others. I come now to anfwer another Objection of the Free-'Thinkers, 'viz. that the Scriptures are dark and obfcure •, and that we are deftitute of fufficient Means to underftand them. " The Priefts, fay they, not only of every " different Se6t, but even of the fame, dif- *' fer endlefly in Opinion about the Senfe and " Meaning of thefe Books." This, indeed, is a good Reafon why every Man fhould ftudy the Scriptures with great Care ; but 'tis no Argument that there is nothing cer- tainly laid down for Truth in Scripture, or that 'tis impoffible for us to know what is fo. For Priefts no more differ about the Senfe of Scripture, than learned Men do about the Senfe of other ancient Writings. But was it ever thought a good Reafon not to ftudy Antiquity, becaufe fome who have made it their Study, have differ'd in their Explications of fome Things. The more Explications the better ; and yet there will be a greater Variety of Opinion for this Reafon. The Cafe is the fame with Refpedl: to the Scrip- tures, which as they have been more ftudied and commented upon than any other Book, fo there have been more Variety of Interpretations put upon feveral Paffages upon them. But for this Rea- Private yudgmejifj or Free-fhijiking 3 i Reafon we are better furnlfhed with Helps to un- derftand them, than aay other Book. Several excellent Treatifes have been written upon this Subjedt, containing general Rules for the inter- preting of Scripture, befides numberlefs ufeful Commentaries upon each Book, adapted to the meaneft Capacities. The Scriptures, in the main, are to be inter- preted by the fame Rules which we obferve in ftudying other Books. Thus far the Scriptures ftand upon the fame Bottom with other Writings ; and whatever Reafon can be urged to diffwade us from attempting to read them, will hold as ftrongly againft reading and ftudying any ancient Author whatfoever. But the Scriptures have the Advantage of all other Writings in Point of Plainnefs, in that they were written by God's Appointment and Diredlion to inftruft Man in all Things neceflary to Salva- tion. From whence we may conclude, that the Scriptures, in all neceffary Points, are plain to every impartial and diligent Enquirer. That God can fpeak his Mind plainly is cer- tain ; and that he has done fo in thofe Things we are to believe is equally certain. So that thofe Places of Scripture, where God would have his Meaning known, are fo plain, that all Men of common Capacities may underftand them. For it is inconfiftent with his Reafon to fpeak obfcurely upon thofe Pleads where he would be underftood : And 'tis repugnant to his Juftice to require Men to know what he has not plainly reveal'd. Now, that there are many Things in Scripture very plain is undeniable •, fuch are thefe. That God is a Spirit, a Being of all Perfedions ; Infinite, Eternal, Omniprefent, the Governor of the World, All Knowing, All Mighty, Infinitely Holy, Pure, Juft, Good, and Merciful •, a Friend 32 I'he true Notion of the Exercife oj Friend to Piety, and Virtue, an Enemy to all Wickednefs, a Rewarder of them that ferve him, and a Punifher of thofe who offend him ; that jefus Chrift is the Son of God, the Meffiah, and Saviour of the World ; that he was born in a miraculous Manner -, that he was put to Death, and rofe again ; that he afcended into Heaven, and fitteth at the Right Hand of God •, that he has all Power given him in Heaven and in Earth ; that he is to be Judge of Mankind j that all Men . fliall rife again at the laft Day •, that they who believe and obey the Gofpel fhall be faved ; and they who rejedt and difobey it (hall be damned. And then as to the Matters of Sin and Duty, they are fo plain, that Men of ordinary Capaci- ties, by their own Care, in Conjundion with other Helps which are in their Power, may come to the Knowledge of them. If therefore the Gofpel be hid, it Is to fuch as are blinded by the Devil and their Lufts. If Men ftudy the Scriptures with a fincere De- fire to know the Truth, and to pradife whatever they find to be their Duty, God would never leave them deftitute of Means fufficient for the luiderftanding all Things neceflary to Salvation. The Scriptures were defigned to influence Men's iHearts and Affedions •, and therefore fuch moral Qualifications as I have mention*d, are neceflary to prepare Men for a right underftanding of them. Men never difbelieve the Scriptures, but by thofe Sins, and unlawful Pleafures-, which that Book condemns ; thefe are the great Impediments to the Underfbanding •, remove but thefe out of the Way, and we fhall foon difcover Truth, and find it agreeable to us. If we refolve to make the Scriptures the Rule' of Life, tho' there may remain, after all our Study, fome Things we fhall never fully under- ftand. Private yudgmenf, or Free-thinking. 33 ftand, yet we fhall not fail of underftanding fo much as will make us wife unto Salvation. But if Men come to read the Scriptures with corrupt Paffions, and Averfions to Truth, they will neither be diligent in fearching for it, nor be willing to receive it, if they fhould find it. Thofe Things which are plain, will be obfcure to them, and while they have another Intereft on Foot, different from the Truth, either their Eyes will be blinded, or elfe they will handle the Word of God deceitfully^ and pervert the meaning of the Text into the Service of that Caufe which they have already efpoufed. Befides, where Men read the Scriptures not to find the Meaning of the Holy Spirit, but to raife groundleis Objedlions, God does often not only fuffer fuch Perfons to be taken in their own Craf- tinefs.) but does moreover fmite them with a y'a- dicial Blindnefs^ and Hardnefs of Heart. Whether the Free-Thinkers ftudy the Scrip- tures with thefe ill Defigns they beft know. But I fhall fhow hereafter, that there feems to be fome Infatuation in thofe grofs Miftakes they have committed in interpreting Scripture. To clofe this Point : Notwirhftanding all the DiiSculties there are in the Bible, there are an hundred plain Texts for one that is obfcure ; and all Things either ufeful or rieceiTiiry to Salvation, are clearly delivered, and eaiily underftood by every one, who is v/illing to learn. I grant, as Matters now ftand in the World, 'tis neceffary that the publick Teachers fnould be com- petently fkili'd in human Learning, in order to de- fend the Truth of their Religion againft its Oppo- fers: But this is a confequential Necefiity, and does not diredly follow from the inherent Difficulty of underftanding the Bible, which, in the main, lies level to the common Capacities of men. Vol. III. D But 34 ^^^ ^^^^ Notion of the Exercije of But if the Scriptures be thus plain, how comest it to pafs that the World is fo full of Controver- fies about religious Matters, and of fo many dif- ferent Opinions fo hotly maintain'd ? To which I anfwer, this is eafily accounted for from the Nature of Things. Is there any thing about which there have not been a Variety of Opinions ? And is not this as evident in other Profeflions as well as Divinity ? But this was never efteem'd an Argument, that there was nothing to be depended upon ill thefe Matters. On the contrary, notwithftanding the Variety of Opinions in every Art and Profeffion,. there are many Things wherein all are agreed. And {o it is in Religion, where, tho' there be many Dif- putes, yet the moft material Things have never been denied, but by weak Heads or wicked Hearts. Religion, however, has the Advantage in this Refped above all other Parts of Knowledge, fmce we have a more certain Way of ending all Controverfies in Religion necefTary to be ended, than in ending Controverfies about any other Sub- ieil, as appears, from what has been faid, if Men v/ould read the Scriptures with honeft Hearts, and beg the Affiftance of God's holy Spirit. But let us enquire more particularly what thefe Controverfies are, and how they affedl Religion, A lid here feveral Things are to be obferved. I. There being no more Difputes about Reli- gion than about other Subjects, they can afFe<5t Religion no more than they do other Subjefts. In every Thing that is controverted fomething muft be taken to be true •, even the Sceptic mulb aliov/ this at leaft, that fhere is notbif^g certain m order to juilify liis Condudl •, and by the fame 2 Means Private yudgment, dr 'Free-thinking, 3^; Means that they come to the Knowledge of this Truth, they may come to the Knowledge of others, which is fufHcIent to deftroy the Founda- tion of univerfal Scepticifm. 2. The Difputes about Religion are not about the Foundation of Religion, therefore do not de- ftroy it. The general Principles of Religion are the iame with the Principles of Reafon, by which we are able to judge of the Truth or Falihood of any thing proposed to us. When any thing is propofed to us which we can difcern no Foundation in Reafon to affirm or deny, we ought to leave it in Doubt ; but this is not the Cafe of the Principles of natural Religion, fuch as, the Being and Providence of God ; the Difference of Good and Evil ; the Diftiudlion of Matter and Spirit ; which refult from the moft evident Principles - . Subjedls as v/e are capable o^ being Mailers of. Tho'' there be many Things wherein every pri- vate Perfon is uncapablc .of judging ; yet, in the great Points of Religions he can, and ought to judge for himfelf. Becaufe thefe Things being the Rule, by which Men of all Capacities mufl: finally be judged, are clearly made known to the Capacities of all Men. Every private Perfon is not capable of laying at once before his Mi?id all the Proofs of all the Religions in tJie World, and examining them in order to choofe the true one for himfelf. But every private Man may judge in genejal of the- Ti'uth of any RcHgion. Thus, for Inftance, every Man of common Stnk Private Judgment ^ or Free-thinMng. 6 i Senfe may judge that that Religion could not come from God, which teaches unworthy Notions of him, and enjoins fuch Things as Reafon foV- bids, and has nothing but Miracles not well at- tefted, to vouch for it. On the contrary, a Religion that teaches wor- thy Notions of God ; that enjoins Piety and Vir- tue i that made its Way in the World by its own Excellency ; that had publick and great Miracles wrought for the Confirmation of it, muft be own'd to be from God. Such general Proofs of the Truth of any Reli- gion Men ifi general may underftandj- and by thefe Rules difcerri the true from the falfe, and determine their Choice. If they find that this Charader belongs to no other but the Chriftiaii Religion, which will appear, this muft incline them to Chriftianity. And then as to "the neceflary Articles and Dodrines of Chriftianity, they are fo plainly laid down in the New 'Tefiament^ that I cannot but be- lieve them to be the Dodrines of Scripture, who- ever ftiould affirm the contrary. If any one fhould tell me that Murder and Lying are lawful I cannot beheve him, becaufe Reafon teljs me they are Sins, and Chrift has plainly forbid them. In fuch evident Cafes every Man ought to judge for himfelf. I confefs, indeed, if we confider Chriftianity under the different Syftems into which different Se6ts have moulded it, few People will be allowed to be Judges of it. But if we confult the Nc-j} ^eftament^ and confider the Do6trines which our Saviour has made necefliiry to be believed by all, we fhall find them fewer and plainer than thofe which the different SeCls of Chriftians have eftablifh'd. And therefore private Perfons are not to be debarr'd the Liberty of judging for themfelves, be- 62 7he true Notion of the Exercije of becaufe they cannot underftand every Thing which has been malntain'd under the Name of Religion. 5. Tho' every private Perfon is thus to judge forhimfelf in Matters of Religion, yet every private Perfon is not to fet up for a Difputant. This is a Province which belongs to the Paftors of the Church. 'Tis true, every Man is obliged, as far as he is able, to forward the Salvation of his Neighbour. But Difputation, ^s 'tis commonly managed, is an Art which cannot be acquir'd without much Study, and he that is not well verfed in it, if he be not careful, will be baffled in the plaineft Truths. Unlearned Men may have clear Perceptions of the Truths they believe, and yet not be able to explain them clearly -, much lefs to anfwer all the fophiftical Arguments which may be urged againft them. And if this fhould happen, we muft call In the Afliftance of others, who are better fkill'd in the Art of difputing, and rely upon their Judgment. Thus I have fhewn that this private Judgment, tho' it be free in itfelf, ought to be under fome Regulation, and have laid down fome Cautions neceffary to be obferved in the Ufe of it. And if Men would ufe thefe Cautions, this would obviate moft of thofe Objedions which are made againft it -, and fhew the Weaknefs of thofe Reafons which are urged to deprive Men of it. The moft material of which I fhall now, in the Fifth Place, confider, in order to the further eftablifhing this Right and Liberty of private Judgment. I. Then, 'tis objedted, that if every one fol- lows his own private Judgment, this will multi- ply different Religions, and give l^fe to many Herefies. They private 'Judgment^ or Free^thinking. 6 j' They who are for thus diveftfng Men of this Liberty, for fear Men fhould fall away from true Religion, have a very mean Opinion of it. Falfe iReligions may fuffer by being examined -, but the true loves Light, and invites Men to look into it ; and the oftner we examine it, we are the more confirm'd in the Belief of it. Other Religions force Men to be Followers of it by Violence ; but 'tis for the Honour of Chri- ftianity, that where Men have the greateft Liberty to examine into the Reafdn of it, there fhould be fuch Multitudes who agree in the main Articles of it. But fuppofing that fome Men do, by indulging their private Judgment, too much fall into dam- nable Errors ; is this a Reafon why Men fhould be deprived of this, and believe nothing but what their Teachers impofe upon them '^. No, by no Means, becaufe Men cannot believe any thing, but upon what they think lufiicient Evidence ; and cannot be of any Opinion meerly becaufe o- thers are {o. Further ; if it were poffible to deprive Men of this Right, it would be unjuft, becaufe it belongs to them. But to this *tis replied, that the Inconveniences arifmg from the Exercife of private Judgment, are fufficient to juftify Men's being deprived of it. But tho' the Inconveniences are ever fo great, yet if God has invefted Men with this Liberty, no accidental Inconveniences will warrant us to give it up. Do not Sin and Mifery, and almoft all the Mif- chiefs of the World, arife from our being free Agents ? But to avoid thefe Inconveniences, would any one fay, it is better to be without Freedom ? This, indeed, would remedy all thefe Evils ; but it would 6^. ^he true Notion of the Exercife of would deftroy all Virtue ; and as bad would bd the Confequence of depriving Men of the free Ufe of their Reafon. So that we may as well deprive Men of the Freedom of their Adions, which would deftroy all Virtue, as diveft them of the Liberty of their Judgment, which would undermine all Religion. Since, therefore, God has not thought fit to provide an infallible Remedy againft Vice, why Ihould we think he has againft Errors ? Men may prevent both if they pleafe -, and if they do not, 'tis their own Fault. In both thefe Cafes God has left Men to their Liberty ; he has not commanded us, nor put it in our Power, to give up bur Reafons to others ; or if he had, this Method would not prevent Di- verfity of Opinions. Every Man will differ from another -, unlefsGod fhould work a perpetual Miracle in preferving any Men,- or Succeflion of Men, from Errors, in order to be infallible Guides to others. This is what there is no Occafion for, becaufe Men, by the Ufe of their Reafon, and the Helps God has given them, may come to the Know- ledge of all neceflary Points of Religion, without an infallible Guide. The Mifchiefs which are fo much complain'd of, as arifing from this Liberty of private Judg- ment, would not be remedy'd if this Liberty could be reftrain*d •, and therefore are no Objec- tion againft it. For where this Liberty is denied, and a pretended Infallibility fet up, there are as many different Opinions, as where this Liberty is exercifed. And *tis i]o Wonder that a pretended Infallibility itfelf cannot do that, which the real Infallibility of the Apoftles could not do. We know there were Difputes in their Time, and even among themfelves •, and there will be Errors and Controverfies to the End of the World. And^ Private Judgment, or Free-thinking. 65 And therefore, fmce no Man can fecure his Bro- ther'from Error, 'tis fit Men ihould judge for themfelves •, for then if they be in an Error, they may recover themfelves out of it by thinking better of the Matter ; but if this is deny'd them, whatever Errors they (hall fall into, they mud live and die in them. 2. It will, perhaps, be objeded, that if every Man be left to judge for himfelf in religious Mat- ters, it will follow, that there may be Fundamen- tals'reveal'd by God, which many People are not obliged to believe. , I have often obferved, that the neceflary Foints of Religion are fo plainly laid down in Scripture, that an honeft and induftrious Man cannot fail of underftanding them ; and, confequently, whatfo- ever is not fo plainly laid down, but that wife and good Men have differ'd about it, is not ne- cefTary for them to know. The only general Duty, in this Cafe, is not to be negligently, wilfully, or malicioufly ignorant of any Part of God's Word. But it does not from hence follow, that every Man is obliged to ftudy every Particular contain'd in Scripture •, be- caufe fome Things in Scripture a Man may be fafely ignorant of. Since, therefore, neceflary Things are always plain, there is no Danger that Men fhould believe lefs than God has required of them. But if they are determin'd by the Judgment of others, they will be in Danger of believing more than God has requir'd, and more than is true. And yet after all. Men cannot be properly faid to believe more than what they are able to under- ftand •, and therefore if Men cannot, by diligent Attention and Inftrudion, arrive at the Know- ledge of what is neceflary to be believed, their giving themfelves up to the Dilates of others Vol. III. F will 66 l^he true Notion of the Exercife of will be no Service to them : They may confefs with their Mouths, but they cannot believe with their Hearts, unlefs they are competent Judges of what they are told is the true Faith. 3 . It is further objeded, that if every Man is to judge for himfelf in religious Matters, and every Man's Religion be true to himfelf; this brings all Religions upon a Level. But this Objedion is of no Force, becaufe it fuppofes the Truth of any Religion to depend upon our Belief of it •, whereas, the Truth of Religion depends upon its Proofs ; which are the fame whether we confider them or not. If, in- deed, the Proofs of all Religions were equal, this would put all Religions upon a Level ; but as long as Chriftianity has ftronger Proofs than any other Religion, Chriftianity cannot be upon a Le- vel with other Religions by our believing thofe as much as we do Chriftianity. So that tho' every Man's Religion be true to himfelf, yet it does not follow that it is true in itfelf He may have made a wrong Choice, which is a good Reafon why he ftiould examine it, but no Reafon why he ibould not be left to judge for himfelf of its Truth and Falftiood ; becaufe there are good general Arguments of the Truth or Falftiood of any Religion, whereby pri- vate Perfons may be convinced that all Religions are not equal, fince it will appear there is an evi- dent Difference between them. But this Objection of bringing all Religions upon a Level, may be more juftly charged upon thofe who will not permit Men to choofe their Religion for themfelves. Becaufe if we are to be of the Religion of our Country, becaufe it is there eftablifbed, 'tis plain all Religions are alike ; and the Reafon why we are of one Religion ra- ther than another, is not any other Thing than what Private Judgmenf, or Free-thinking. 67 what might as well have determin'd us to be of any other Religion as well as that which we are of. Whereas he that chufes a Religion for himfelf, according to the befl: of his Judgment, makes his Religion his own •, and tho' this will not make it true, yet the Man, who is thus deceived, may hope, thro' God's Mercy, to be recover'd out of his Error, or be faved in it. 4. If every Man is to judge for himfelf, it may be objeded, this will confound the Diftindlion of Virtue and Vice. But this Objedion fuppofes the Truth of Things to depend upon our Opinions of them ; whereas the Nature of Things is immutable, and one of thofe Rules by which we are to diredt our Judgment, and then no ill Confequences will fol- low the freed Ufe of it. In leffer Matters Men may judge that to be Good which is Evil. But in greater, the Diiference between Virtue and Vice is {q plain, that Men cannot be miftaken. Again ; Tho' Men in leffer Matters may judge that acceptable to God, which is no Part of Re- ligion -, yet they cannot introduce the Practice of any real Impiety under the Pretence of judging it acceptable to God, becaufe they have the Reafon of Things, and the reveai'd Will of God, as a plain Rule to go by, which will fecure them from miftaking Impiety for Religion. But if it be left to publick Authority to deter- mine what is, or is not acceptable to God ; tho' the real Difference between Things cannot be de- ftroy'd, yet the Weight of fuch Authority, join'd to the Prohibition of private Judgment, does, in Fa6l, make Men miflake Vice for Virtue, and think that true Religion confifls in the mofl ab- furd Adions, and confiflent with the mofl fla- grant Impieties ; and that they pleafe God by be- ing inhuman to Men. F 2 5. It 68 I'he true Notion of the Exercife of 5. It may be further objeded, that this pri- vate Judgment will make Men proud and con- ceited, and negled the neceflary Means of In- ftru6lion, upon a Prefumption that they are wife enough of themfelves. This is a manifeft Abufe of this Liberty of private Judgment ; and Men may be as proud of other Things as well as their Judgment. And 'tis altogether as lawful to plunder every rich Man, for fear he fhould be proud, as to de- bar private Perfons the Exercife of their own Reafon, to keep them obedient to their Superiors. But if Men, in judging for themfelves, would obferve thofe Cautions which have been laid down, all thefe Inconveniences would be avoided -, and yet, if it appears that private Perfons have a Right to judge for themfelves in religious Matters^ it Signifies nothing whether the Mifchiefs, or the Benefits, arifing from this Liberty of private Judgment, preponderate. For 'tis a Queftion of Right, and not of Conveniency. However, fince I have confider'd the Mifchiefs which arife from private Judgment, it will not be improper to take a View of the Benefits of it. Next to our Lufts there is no greater Hindrance to the Belief of the Truths of Religion, than the Want of weighing the Proofs upon which they are eftablifhed. Our Knowledge is not born with us, but is acquired, and is more or lefs improved ac- cording as we employ our Talents. Hence we may, in great Meafure, account for that furprizing Difference which we find among Men as to their intelledual Abilities. Whilft fome Men, by a right Ufe of their Faculties, have acquir'd a clear Knowledge of the moft diffi- cult Things 5 others, thro' their Lazinefs, know little or nothing at all, TJiere is no Truth more clear than the Ex- 3 iftence Private yudgmenf, or Free-fhinkmg. 6g iftence of a God ; and yet he that fets down v/ith Things as he finds them, without ever reflecting upon their Caufes and Ends, or enquiring into him- felf may live long without any fuch Notion of a God, as will influence his Pradice. This is evident in the meaner People, who are always at Labour, who have fuch grofs Notions of God, as are next to no Knowledge of him at all. The Lives of many others, who, tho' in better Circumftances, have yet made as little Ufe of their Reafon, give us Caufe to fear, that they have no clear Impreflions of a Deity, Now this can be afcribed to nothing but want of confidering thefe Matters. 'Tis obfervable that Atheifm and Irreligion prevail mofl: where Men have made the leafl: Ufe of their Reafon, as it is plain in thofe Countries where Men are prohibited the Ufe of their Reafon -, and that Re- ligion prevails every where in Proportion to the Improvement of Men's private Reafon and Judg- ment. For tho' a fuperficial Enquiry is not fufficient to efl:ablifli Men in the Belief of the Truths of Religion ; yet if they go to the Bottom of Things they will be fatisfied. 'Tis impoflible for any Man, who judges im- partially for himfelf, to be of the Side of Atheifm. Their mofl: celebrated Books confifl: of low Wit, inftead of Argument ; and when they pretend to Reafon, they betray the Weaknefs of their Caufe. The Difiiculties rais'd againft Religion have no- thing in them, when they come to be examin'd : The Objedions are fuch as are in common to Re- ligion with other Things ; fo that either there is no fuch Thing as Truth, or Religion has as .good a Pretence to it as any Thing elfe. This will appear to any one who will but make the f^me Ufe of his Reafon in Religion as he does F 3 ill JO 'the true Notion of the Exercife of m other Matters, and go over in his Mind the feveral Proofs of it, and examine them himfelf : But if Men will not do this, if they will take Things upon Truft from others, and greedily hearken to their Obje6lions, without ever examin- ing whether they be well grounded, they may fet up for Infidelity, for want of Confideration. But if Men would carefully examine thefe Points, if Men would ferioufly examine into the Atheift's Hypothefis, they could never fwallow the Difficulty which it is clog'd with. A brief View of the common Principles of Atheifm will fuffice to fhow the Abfurdities of it. That the World was from Eternity ; or that it was made by Chance : That Matter is endued with a Power of Thought and felf Motion ; that we are nothing but meer Mechanifm ; that there is no moral Difference between Good and Evil j that there is no future State : Thefe are the Priciples of Atheifm. But cannot any Man, who will examine Things himfelf, difcover the contrary Scheme to be better Grounds .'' There are fuch vifible Marks of Wifdqm and Power, in the Works of the Qeation, that we cannot but difcover the Author. And he mufi: be a very carelefs Spectator of human Affairs, who does not obferve, that the World is govern'd by the fame Pov/er and Wifdom that made it. If he turns his Eye inwardly upon himfelf, and ob- ferves the Springs of his own Adlions, he can never believe himfelf a Piece of Clockwork ; but muft be convinc'd that he is a free Agent, and, confequently, he is an .accountable Creature. *Tis needlefs to go thro' all thefe Principles. The more Men think for themfelves, the more they will be perfuaded of the Truth pf the Prin- ciples of natural Religion. Re- Private Judgment, or Free-thinking, j i Revealed Religion will alfo gain the more Be- lief the more we examine it. For tho* this was more than we could juftly ex- ped, after God had made fufficient Provifion for knowing and obeying his Will in the Principles of our Creation, by that Reafon he had given us ; yet, lince human Nature was fo much degenerated, it muft be owned highly agreeable to the divine Good- nefs not to leave us in this State of Darknefs, but to vouchfafe fuch frail Creatures fome fupernatural Light, fome farther AfTiftance to obey and know his Will. That fuch a Revelation as this, is poflible, none can deny. And that God made fuch a Revelation, has been already proved. If we confider the Chriftian Revelation, it will appear, in every Branch of it, highly reafonable ; and becoming the Wifdom and Goodnefs of God : Nothing being more proper to promote Piety. The Proofs of this Revelation muft fatisfy every in- quiiitive Man ; Chrift's Miracles were undeniable. His Difciples were unfit to propagate his Religion, had it been an Impofture. Their Behaviour de- clared they believ'd the Truth of it ; and they could not have prevail'd with others to have re- ceived it, had they not worked Miracles. Thefe Refledions are fufficient, if Men would but examine Things for themfelves, to make them believe the Principles both of natural and reveal'd Religion •, nay, they could not but be Chriftians if they calmly confider'd Chriftianity, It there are any^ who do not believe thefe Things, 'tis for Want of examining into them ; or from an Affedation of Novelty •, or from their Lufts. 2. Conftancy and Stedfaftnefs, in the ProfefTicn of the true Religion, is another Advantage of the Exercife of this private Judgment, in exa- mining into the Grounds of our Faith. F 4 Fie 72 The true Notion of the Exercife of He that takes up his Religion with little Rea- fon, will part with it eafily. If I am of any Re- ligion, becaufe 'tis my Intereft, I fhall change it when it fhall be my Intereft to do fo. In thefe and all others Cafes, where Men's Re- ligion is not their own Choice, they will be in- conftant in the Profeffion of it. And therefore if we would hold faft the Profeffion of our Faith without wavering, we muft fearch into the Grounds of it. And he that is a Chriftian, upon a full Convi6lion of the Truth of Chriftianity, his Belief will be Proof againft all Temptations and Dangers. But the Man, whofe Religion is not rooted in his Underftanding, will readily part with it when it is likely to bring him any Trouble. And, therefore, if it be our Duty to be con- ftant in the Profeffion of Chriftianity, and if we are obliged to fuffer even Death itfelf, rather than renounce it, 'tis neceflary to be perfuaded of the Truth of -it. For if we do not fee fiifficient Rea- fon to believe it, we fhall never fuffer for the- Sake of it. And if any Man fhould be fo far in- fiuenc'd by the Example of others, as to fuffer becraife they do, he fuffers like a Fool, and not as a Chriftian, becaufe God is not glorified on this Behalf. If, therefore. Men ought to be ftedfaft in the Profeflion of the true Faith, if they ought to endure Grief, and expe* w, upon which this Opinion is here grounded, may be more truly render'd, as it is in our Tranflation, for that, all Men have finned, without any Reference to Adam. This Interpretation makes the j^poftle's Dif- courfe very clear •, whereas if l(|)* oj be referr'd to Adam, it affords a very forc'd ConitrucStion. Befides, in the next Verfe but one, it is faid, that Death reigned from Adam to Mofes, even over them that had not finned after the Simili- tude of Tranfgreffton, i. e. who had not finned fo capitally as he had ; which as it implies that all Men had adually finned, fo it confirms the foregoing Interpretation, and fhews that thefe Words need not relate to Adam^s Sin, but to the adual Sins of every Man. And fince all Men were Sinners, this jufcl- fies Private "Judgment^ or Free-thinking. 85 fies that unlverfal Death which pafTed upon all Men, and which all Men, as they were Sinners, deferved ; tho' all Men, *tis probable, would not have fuffer'd, if Adarn's Sin had not intro- duced it into the World. By this we may underftand thofe Words, ver. 19. That by one Man's Difobedience many were made Sinners^ which do not mean that we finn'd in Adam, but that we fell into an evil State, upon Occafion of Adam^s Sin. He brought Death and Mifery into the World, which tho' they might befal us as Men, and juftly as Sinners j yet it is upon Account of Adam's Sin, that our Sins are fo far imputed to us as to bring thefe Things upon us ; tho*, at the fame Time, we contrad: no Guilt, nor fuffer any Punifhment from Adam*s Sin, but only from our own. Again •, Rom. vil. 23. The Apoftle fays, / fee another Law in my Members warring againji the Law of my Mind., and bringing me into Captivity, to the Law of Sin, which is in my Members. Now befides other Interpretations, which may fairly be put upon this Chapter, 'tis evident, fince the Apoftle nowhere fays that this Laiv in his Members came by Nature, or was de- rived from Adam, there is nothing in all this which concerns the prefent Queftion. Men may bring fuch a Law, as the Apoftle here fpeaks of, by vicious Habits ; and this Chapter contains a very lively Defcription of the great Power of evil Cuftoms. But if we fjppofe that the Apoftle places the Prevalency of this carnal Law in his Members, in his being under the Law of Mofes, which difco- ver'd the Sinfulnefs of feveral Adions, without aifording Helps to overcom.e them ; I fay, what- G 3 ever 86 I'he true Notion of the Exercife of ever Interpretations we put upon this Chapter, there is nothing in it which favours the Opinion of original Corruption. There is another Pafiage, Ephef. ii. 3. alledged in Favour of this original Corruption, viz. That we isjere^ by Nature^ the Children ofWrath^ e-ven as others. Bat thefe Words refer to an acquir'd Corruption from our own Sins ; and in this Senfe the Word Nature is often ufed. But if the Apoftle, by Nature, meant what is ufually meant by that Word in a ftrid Senfe j this was not the Epheftans Fault, but the Fault of him who made them fuch. Or, by Nature^ may be meant, that they were really obnoxious to the divine Difpleafure upon Account of their Sins. Thus the Words is ufed, Gal. iv. 8. But in whatever Senfe we take the Words, we cannot think we are fit for nothing but Hell the Moment we are born. The Scripture gives a better Account of Children ; and our Saviour tells us, that unlefs we become little Children, we jhall not enter into the Kingdom of Heaven. Thefe are the chief PafTages of Scripture which are produced to prove the original Corruption of human Nature ; and if they fhould prove that there is in Man an Inclination to Vice, they do not prove our Reafon fo corrupted as to be una- ble to judge of religious Matters. It does not appear that Adam had lefs Knowledge after the Fall than before •, and therefore, notwithftanding any Thing which we derived from him, we ought to make ufe of cur Reafon, efpecially in religious Matters, which are of the greateft Moment. But againft this Ufe of Reafon, in religious Matters, there are other PafTages of Scripture urg'd. . Thus, for Inftance, Rom. viii. 7. 'tis faid, 2 That Private yudgment, or Free-thinking, 87 ^hat the carnal Mind is Enmity againft God. But the Apoftle fpeaks here not againft Reafon^ but againft fulfilling the Lufts of the Flefti, which is to be carnally minded. This proceeds from the Devil, and is Enmity againfi God ; but our Rea- fon proceeds from God, and to be govern'd by that, is agreeable unto him. Our rational Facul- ties conftitute us Men, and to employ them right is to adt like them : But our fenfual Appetites, when nouriftied, degrade us into Brutes. So that when our Reafon is fwallowed up by the brutal Part of us, then, indeed, Reafon is no longer that Reafon which is capable of judging. Another Paftage to fhew the Weaknefs of hu- man Reafon to judge of religious Matters, is, i Cor. I. 19, 20. But the Apoftle's Defign here is to take off the Corinthians from glorying in thofe falfe Apoftles which oppofed him. To which Purpofe he tells them, that neither Skill, nor Learning, nor Eloquence, (Qualifications of the the falfe Apoftles) was that, for which God chofe Men to be Preachers of the Gofpel, but thofe, whom he made choice of for over-turning the Learned, were plain and illiterate Men. So that the Apoftle's reafoning amounts to this, That fince the World, by their natural and ac- quired Parts, did not^ttain to a right Knowledge of God, God by the Preaching of the Gofpel, which feem'd at firft Fooliflonefs to them, was pleas'd to communicate that Knowledge to thofe who were willing to receive it. So that the moft that can be inferr'd, is, that the Gofpel Difpenfation was not difcoverable by Reafon j but it does not follow, that when it is reveal'd, that we are not to ufe our Reafon in examining it. Again \ i Cor. xi. 14. The Apoftle tell us, ^hat the natural Man receive th not the Things of G 4 the 8 8 T'he true Notion of the Exerctfe of the Spirit of God: For they are Foolijhnefs unto him •, neither can he know them^ becaufe they are fpiritually difcern\i. But, by the natural Man, he means only, that a Man, who has no other Help but his own na- tural Faculties, cannot receive the Truths of the Gofpel, which are made known by the Spirit of God revealing them, and therefore they fecm ab- furd to fuch a Man -, nor can he, by the bare Ufe of his Reafon, ever come t3 the Knowledge of them, becaufe it is by Rudying divine Re- velation that wc attain this Knowledge. But it does not follow from hence., that all Ufe of Reafon is to be laid afide in tbofe Things which Revelation difcovers, for Revelation al- lows us to exercife our Reafon about them. But if by natural Man we understand an ani- mal Man^ in a vicious Stn^o.^ that is, one who re- lilTics nothing but the- Pleafures of the Body ; the Truths of the Gofpel will be Foolifhnefs to fuch a one. But even he is capable of reafoning, other wife the Things of the Gofpel could not be faid to be FooliJJjnefs unto him. He, indeed, judges wrong, and for that is juftly blameable, but not for making ufe of his Reafon. In I Cor. ill. i8, 19, 20. the Apoftle purfues the fame Defign, viz. to firaw the Corinthians off from their Leader, who had fet himfelf up in Oppofition to the Apoftle •, and 'tis cunning Craftinefs, not private Judgment, which he there fpeaks again ft. Again ; in 2 Cor. x. 4, 5, ^c. The Apoftle oppofes his own Simplicity to the artful Eloquence of his Adverfary. He does not fpeak of bringing his own Reafon into Captivity, but of fubduing his Adverfary's, v/hich could not be done with- out ftiewing better Arguments on his Side than he that oppofed him. Befides, Private Judgment, or Free-thinking. 89 Befides, the Apoftle does not blame the Ufe of Reafbn in his Adverfary, but the Abufe of it, in that it exalted itfelf againji the Knowledge of God. Thefe are the chief Texts to fhew how unfit Reafon is to be fet up as a Judge in religious Matters. But there are other Texts alledged againft the Ufe of Reafon in interpreting Scripture for our- felves. As, 2 Peter i. 20, 21. Knowing thisfirjl, that no Prophecy of the Scripture is of any private Interpretation. For Prophecy came not in old Time by the Will of Man : But holy Men of God fpake as they were moved by the Holy Ghofi. From whence fome would infer, that we can- not underftand the Scripture without the Afliftance of the Holy Ghoft. And that the Holy Ghoft excludes all Ufe of our own Reafon in this Matter. But neither of thefe Points are conclufive. For the Apoftle does not here fpeak of all Scripture, but only of the Prophecies of the Old T'ejiament. So that the private Interpretation of Prophecy here mention'd, by v/hich is meant the Prophets Interpretation of their own Prophecies, is not op- pofed to the Illumination of the Spirit, but to the Underftandings of other Men, efpecially thofe who lived under the Gofpel, who might under- ftand the Meaning of thofe Prophecies, tho' the Prophets did not, who utter*d them. Neither is all Interpretation, and all Under- ftanding, of the Scripture, here denied to the Prophets themfelves, but only a thorough Know- ledge of the myftical Scnit of it, as it related to the Gofpel Covenant. But tho' we ftiould fuppofe the Apoftle to rea- fon here as fome would have him, it does not follow that we can underftand nothing of Scrip- ture 90 The true Notion of the Exercife oj ture wiciiout the particular Help of the Holy Chofl, but only that we cannot underftand fome Things fo perfectly without it. Nor does it fol- low, that in thofe Inftances, where the AfTiftance of the Holy Spirit is neceflary, all Ufe of Reafon is to be laid afide. But that Reafon is not fuffici- ent in its bare natural State, but muft be enlight- en'd by the Spirit of God. And yet, after all this, thefe Words are capa- ble of another Senfe. And when the Apoftle fays, that no Prophecy of the Scripture is of any private Interpretation^ he may mean no more than this, that the Prophets were infpired by the Floly Ghoft, and that their Prophecies are to be looked upon as the Voice of that Holy Ghoft, and not as any human private Conception. Frov. XXV. 27. has been alledged againft En- quiries into religious Matters, as apt to blind thofe who fixed their Eyes attentively upon them. For fo this Paflage runs in the vulgar Tranflation, Scrutator Majejiatis opprimetur a Gloria^ He that endeavours to take a near View of the Majefty of God fhall be oppreffed v/ith his Glory. But, i/?. This Mifchief can only befal the Imprudent. If we contemplate Things divine, and endeavour after the Knowledge of them, in the Ufe of thofe Means, which both Reafon and Revelation prefcribe, there can be no Danger in fuch Enquires. What is there in divine Matters, as far as we are concern'd in them, which is too hard for our Reafon -, if we inftance in the incomprehenfible Nature of God, this is nothing to the Purpofe ; For tho' it be required of us, as the Condition of eternal Life, to hiow God, and his Son Jcfus Chrift, yet we are not obliged to a perfed: Knowr- ledge of him, but only to know the Relation he bears to us as our Creator, Governor, and Lord. Sq Private Jtidgmenf, or Free-thhiking. 9 1 So much Knowledge as will help forward this End is necefTary, and fo much we may learn from Scripture •, and this will not prejudice, but com- pleat our Reafon. If any one fhould endeavour to know more of him than is reveal'd, he may experience the Truth of what Solomon fays in this Senfe, and be op- prefTed with the Glory he endeavours to fee through. But, ^dly. The Words in the Original have quite another Senfe, and only reprove Men for fearching out, and proclaiming their own Glory ; for fo the Verfe runs in our Tranflation, // is not good to eat much Honey ; fo for Men to fearch their own Glory^ is not Glory. This, indeed, is interpreted by the Rahhies of the Study of divine Things. We muft not be too minute in our En- quiries into the Nature of thefe Things, becaufe they are beyond the Reach of human Under- flanding. But if we take the Words in this Senfe, they do not forbid that Ufe of Reafon, in religious Matters, which I have been aflerting. I have already examin'd feveral Railages in St, PauPs Epiftles, which have been urged againft the Ufe of Reafon in religious Matters, and have fhewn, that they mean no more than this, that Man could never, by the bare Ufe of his Reafon, arrive at thofe Difcoveries which the Gofpel has made. This alfo is his Defign, i Cor. ii. where he dilxinguifhes the Wifdom of this World from the TVifdora of God : Meaning by the one, fuch Knowledge as is attainable by Men's natural Abi- lities J by the other, fuch Knowledge as was built on the Authority of God alone, and is de- rived from Scripture. This is what he alfo means, Fe-rfe 10. of this Chapter, where fpeaking of thofe Things which |:he Gofpel has made known to us, he fays, That God 92 ^e true Notion of the Exercife of God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit — For what Man doth knozv the Things of a Man, fave the Spirit of a Man which is in him ? Even fo the Tljii'gs of God knoweth no Man^ hut the Spirit of God. I. Bat when the Spirit of God hath revealed thefe Things; they are revealed to our Underftand- ings, and become Objedls of our Examination : And this the Apoftle intimates, Ver. 15. He that is fpiritual judgeth all Things. There are other PalTages of Scripture produced againft the Ufe of Reafon, which, when they are examin'd, will be found not to be againft fuch Ufe of Reafon, but only againft reafoning from fuch Principles as belong only to natural Things, and applying them to divine Matters. Thus, for Inftance, when God promifed Abra- ham a Son, as that Promife was to be fulfill'd in an extraordinary Manner, fo the Objedion which ^arah made againft it, from the common Courfe of Nature, was of no Force, and fhe was reproved for it. Gen. xviii. 10, 11, 12, But Abraham reafon'd better in this Cafe, and the Scripture gives us the higheft Commendation of his Faith, upon Account of the Reafonable- nefs of it. (See Rom. iv. 18, l£c.) Again, Numb. xi. 18, i^c. when God promis'd the Children of Ifrael Flefh to the full, Mofes was guilty of the fame wrong Reafoning, who thought that to be brought about by common Means, which God defign'd to do after a miracu- lous Manner. Another Inftance of .this Nature we meet with in Chap. XX. 11, 12. when Mofes fetched Water of the ftony Rock to fupply the People with Prink. The Miftake alfo of Naaman lay in this, that he thought that Cure muft be perform'd by na- tural Prhateyiidgmentj or Free-thinking. 93 tural Means, which was to be eifedled in a mira- culous Manner, 2 Kings v. 11, &c. The fame falfe Way of Reafoning the Jews run into with Repjard to our Saviour's Under- ftanding, Matt. xiii. 54, &c. they knew his E- ducation to be fuch, as made it impoffible for him to acquire thofe Talents, in an ordinary- Way, they found him pofTefs'd of; and their Error confifted in this, that they took him to be a mere Man, and that he had no other than human Means to make ufe of. His Difciples were often fo deceived when he propos'd to feed the Multitudes, Matt. xv. 32, i^c. This falfe Reafoning occafion'd the Objedlion which xhtSadducees made againft the Refurredion, Matt. xxii. 23. They thought we fhould be in the fame Circumftances in the other World, which we are in here. Whereas, if they had confider'd how different our future State will be, there would have been no Ground for any fuch Objedion. The fame wrong Reafoning appears in the Objedlions which were made againft the Concep- tion and Birth of John Baptiji', and our Saviour, which as they were promis'd immediately by God, fo it was no juft Exception againft them, that they were beyond the common Courfe of Nature. Such Inftances as thefe are brought by fome to weaken the Authority of Reafon. But this is not a right Ufe of Reafon, which condfts in judging of every Thing by its proper Principles, or at leaft by fuch general Principles as include thefe. The not obferving of this Rule was the Occa- fion of that Fault in reafoning, which Logicians call fKiT»^A then it is no Way inconfiftent with divine Goodnefs to fuf- fer fuch Difiindion to have its due Effedl here- after. This is reafonable to be expeded -, but how it muft be done particularly, we muft either be ig- norant till that Time comes •, when the Diftinc- tion fhall be finally made •■, or we muft in the mean Time, learn it from the divine Being him- felf, fome Way difcovering his Defign or Will to us in this Matter. And this will naturally lead. us to confider whe- ther he has made any particular Revelation of his Will to Man. And I obferve, I. I'hat every rational Man, who believes a God and a Providence, is under a natural Obliga- tion to enquire whether God has made any parti- cular Revelation of his Will to Men, which they are concern'd to take Notice of. II. That the Principles of Religion, 6cc. 165 II. That whoever ferioufly makes this Enquiry, -will find It reafonable to conclude, that feme Re- velation may juftly be expeded from God, confi- derlng the general State of Mankind. III. That If this be fo, then it is every Man's Duty to find out what is true Revelation, and what is only pretended, I. That every rational Man, who believes a God and a Providence, Is under a natural Obliga- tion to enquire, whether God has made any parti- cular Revelation of his Will to Men, which they are any Way concern'd to take Notice of. This Propofition may perhaps, at firft Sight, feem to be ufelefs, containing only an AfTertion, which no one ferioufly will deny. But I am afraid that Deifm may juftly be counted a virtual Denial of this AfTertion, or what will, in the End, revert to downright Atheifm •, that is, that fuch Men, who afFed the Name of Beijls^ either mean no more than meer Atheifm by It ; or elfe if they do believe God's Being, and yet make no Enquiry after his Will, they mufl then believe his Exiftence only as a fpeculative Point -, which, they think, does not put them under any Obli- gation of a6ling one Way or other in Confequence of it. This Kind of Deifm is but one Remove from Atheifm itfelf. Becaufe tho' it owns a God, yet at the fame Time It confiders him as having no Concern for the moral World, or the A6lions of Men, confider'd as moral Agents ; which is, in Confequence, a denying of his moral Attributes. To convince therefore fuch Men of their Obli- gation to enquire after the W'ill of God, we mufl firft defire them to confider, that Juflice^ Good- nefs^ 'Truths and all moral Perfedllons, are as ef- fential to the Notion of God, as Wifdom and Power ; for they are, indeed, the neceflary Con- fequences of infinite Wifdom and Power. It can- M 3 not 1 66 Natural Obligations to believe not be denied, but that there are different Things in the World, which have different Properties, and Degrees of Perfedlions. And from hence arife different Relations of one Thing to another, and a Fitnefs or Unfitnefs, according as different Things are applied or mifapplied to one another. And there is the fame natural Difference, and na- tural Confequence of that Difference, Fitnefs or Unfitnefs, in all Anions of every Being which can properly be called an Agent. Now an infinitely wife Being, certainly, knows all thefe different Relations of Things and Ac- tions, with their refpedtive Fitneffes and Confe- quences ; or 6lfe his Underflanding would be finite. And he does as evidently will that they fhould be as they are, becaufe he preferves them in their Beings •, and his Will cannot be influenced by any wrong Affedion, raifed by any Tempta- tion from without, to do otherwife than what is befl to be done, becaufe he is independent and omnipotent •, fo that Goodnefs, Jujiice and Truth, and all moral Perfedions, mufl be in the divine Nature ; unlefs we can fuppofe that he wills the Natures of Things to be as they are, and not to be as they are at the fame Time, which is abfurd. Again •, Goodnefs, in a free or rational Being, is nothing €i{Q but a Will to communicate Happi- nefs to other Beings, according to their Capacities. Now to communicate Being itfelf, and a Ca- pacity of enjoying Happinefs, according to that Variety of Natures, which infinite Wifdom thouglit fit to make, is the Foundation of all Goodnefs ; and to communicate this further, ac- cording to thofe dif^rent Improvements, which intelligent Beings make, by Virtue of that Liber- ty of a6Hng, which is effential to their Nature, is a Continuation of that Goodnefs. So that in Comparifon of all other Beings, which are called good^ the Principles of Religion, &c. 167 good, we may truly fay, ihere is none good hut God. Juftice and Equity are nothing but a willing that the original and eflential Differences of Things and Adlions, and their Relations, and FitnefTes one to another, fhould be entirely preferred throughout. Now the fupreme Being, who knows all Things, and underftands all Adtions, will adt accordingly, without refpedt of Pcrfons : His infinite Wifdom and Power fetting him above any PoiTibility of being deceived or over-ruled in his Ac5ling. And for the fame Reafon 'Truth and FaithfuU nefs are necefTarily Attributes of the fame divine Being, who cannot be miflaken in his Defigns, nor hinder'd from doing v/hat he intends. And the like may be faid of all other moral Perfedlions. For the Want of any moral Perfedlion, mufl proceed from apprehending Things to be other- wife than they are ; or from a Want of Power to a6t according to the Nature of Things ; or from a Perverfenefs of Will, difpofing him to adl con- trary to the true Reafon of Things ; but an eter- nal, intelligent, independent Being, infinitely wife and powerful, can be liable to none of thefe. For the two firft Cafes are diredly, and the lafl, by neceffary Confequence, a Contradidion to infi- nite Power and Wifdom. From hence it follows, that the moral Perfec- tions of all Creatures muft be finite -, but the mo- ral PerfeAions of the fupreme Being muil: be infi- nite. But then it does not follow, that Goodnefs, Juftice, Truths and other m.oral Perfections, are in Nature quite different Things in the divine Being, from what they are in other rational Be- ings, but only in Degree. And this ought to be obferved carefully, becaufe, if Goodnefs, Truth y and Juftice^ and the like moral Attributes, which M 4 we 1 68 Natural Obligatiojts to believe we afcrlbe to God, be not the fame for Kind as they are in us, then 'tis in vain to reafon about them. Since, upon fuch Suppofition, when we fay, God is juji^ or good^ or true^ we can have no Meaning, becaufe we have no Idea anfwering to the Words we utter ; and this would effedu- ally deftroy the Foundation both of Religion and Morality. And all Manner of Reafoning about the divine Nature is taken away. For the Un- derftanding and Power of God are as much above us as his moral Attributes, and our Ideas of them as imperfect -, fo that if we cannot reafon from the one, we cannot from the other. Thofe Men, therefore, who pretend to magni- fy Reafon, fhould confider that fuch a Suppofi- tion deftroys all Ufe of Reafon itfelf. For if true Reafon be nothing elfe but the real Nature of Things, and their Relations to one another, truly apprehended in the Mind, to be as they are in themfelves, then it muft be the fame for Kind in all intelligent Beings ; or elfe the fame will be true, and not true, at the fame Time, which is a Con- tradidion. But if moral Perfeftions do necefiarily belong to the fupreme Being -, and if we can have any true Notion of fuch Perfections, we may then juftly argue that God does always ad: according to thofe Perfections ; and, confequently, that he confiders the Adions of rational and free Agents, according to their moral Nature -, and that he will make llich a Diftindion between the Good and Evil, as will fufficiently vindicate his own moral PerfedionG. For if he is the Governor of the rational as well as natural World, he will go- vern it according to thefe Perfedions, which are infeparable from an infinitely, perfed, reafonable Being. But then we muft not conclude, that he does not govern the World, only becaufe we do not the Principles of Religwt^ Sec. 169 not fee immediate Rewards and Punifhments in Proportion to the Behaviour of every rational and free Agent. For we cannot fee the full Extent of his Government ; and therefore tho' we may be fure that he will treat Righteoufnefs and Wicked- nefs in a different Manner, yet the Revelation of his righteous Judgment is not confined to fo fhort a Time as human Juftice muft be, which is li- mited by Time and Place. And from hence it happens that Jujike, Goodnefs^ and other moral Excellencies in Men, do often intrench upon, and limit one another, fo that they cannot all fully be exercifed for Want of fufficient Compafs to exert themfelves altogether, and for Want of Power and Knowledge in the Agent •, but God's Go- vernment is not limited by Time or Place, but is infinite and eternal, fo that all his Perfe(5lions may have their full Exercife, and the due Effedls of his Juftice^ Goodnefs^ 8zc. may take Place in fach Seafon as infinite Wifdom fees proper. Therefore, before we can pafs an exaft Judg- ment upon the Juftice and Goodnefs of God's Government, we muft fee the whole Scene of Providence unfolded, and all the various Depen- dence of Things upon one another, fet in a true Light. When the final Iftiie of Things is come, we may depend upon it, that the whole Manage- rrient will appear juft and good. Upon which Foundation we may juftly build that natural Obligation which every rational Man is under, to enquire whether God has made any particular Revelation of his Will, which Men are concern'd to take Notice of. For if we are perfuaded, by the Light of Na- ture and Reafon, that there is a fupreme Being, who made and preferves us, the fame Light will convince us that we ftiould be grateful to him. But now, fince the divine Nature is Infinitely per- 170 Natural Obligations to believe perfed and happy in itfelf, wherein can any Gra- titude towards him approve itfelf? Why, in a juft Acknowledgment of his infinite Perfe6lIons, and in worthily receiving and ufing what his Goodnefs gives us. And fmce from the Confi- deration of the moral Perfedions of his Nature, we are afllired, that he ads according to the higheft Reafon, and fmce 'tis his Will that we Zhou Id do fo ; upon thefe Confiderations we are certainly obliged to be as much acquainted with the Will of God as we can, and to confider of every poffible Way whereby we may come to the Knowledge of it. For thus we may argue : A conftant Difpofi- tion to do according to the Will of God, upon whom v/e depend for our Being, is an abfolutely reafonable Inftance of our Gratitude towards him. This we may call Jiifttce towards God, fince it is nothing elfe but afcribing to him that Honour of his infinite Perfediiohs, which is juftly due to him. Now this Difpofiticn to conform ourfelves conftantly to the Will of God, mufl: neceflarily include an Endeavour to know what his Will is, and what Way he has thought fit to make it known to us (unlefs we know it to be impoflible for him to difcover it any other Way, but this one, which we call the Way of Nature, which I fhall fhew hereafter v/e cannot do.) For tho' we may depend upon it, as his Will, that he fnould never adl contrary to the Rules of Goodnefs, ^c. becaufe whatever contradicts thefe, contradids his Nature, and cannot be his Will. And tho' he has given us the Faculty of Rea- fon, whereby to diftinguifh Good from Evil, and a Liberty to chufe according to that Diftindlion, yet becaufe our Underftandings are limited, and are apt to miftake Appearances for Truth, and to aft accordingly (efpecially in Matters of Religion) we the Principles of Religion, &c. 171 we cannot but think It reafonable to defire a more perfed Diredion from that Being itfelf, who cannot be miftaken. And this, at leaft, ought to make us enquire, whether this Being has made any fuch Difcovery as will give us greater Light into our Duty, or dire But as this Objedion would deftroy the original Liberty of human Adions, and take away the Foundation of all Virtue, as well as Vice : So it is not leveled only againft the Wifdom of God in Man's Redemption, but againft his Providence in general, of which, in the prefent Cafe, I fup- poie Men to be already convinced •, and, there- fore, fhall not refume the Arguments for it, which are common to all who believe a wife and good Providence governing the World. But befides the Prejudices which Men take at the Perfon of Chrift, the Time, Place, and Man- ner of his appearing in the World ; they like wife take Offence at his Do^rine. I. It is accufed of too great Plainnefs and Simplicity. The Greeks fought after Wifdom ; they expefted Things fhould be proved to them in a philofophical Way, and deliver'd with all the Advantages of Eloquence ; but inftead of this, they met with a plain and artlefs Narration of the Life and Miracles, the Death and Suffer- ings, and Refurredion of Jefus Chrifi^ and Di- reSions to obey his Precepts, and to believe in liim as the Author of Life, and Judge of the World. This to them feems Foolifhnefs : But is not this a Commendation of this Dodrine, that it Ibould prove a Matter of fuch high Importance, by an Argument fo level to all Capacities, as that of Chrift's Refurredion, for proving the Truth of what he taught. Their Way of teaching, looked as if they thought only Men of Learn- ing worth taking Notice of; but divine Good- nefs refpeds not Mens outward Advantages. And tho' the preceptive Part of the Dodrine be plain, yet it is deliver'd in Terms of Authority, giving . jnoft excellent Rules of Life, and adding the greateft Sandion to them, by fetting before Men I the the Principles of Religion y Sec. 213 the higheft Rewards and Punifhments. What can be more worthy of God, than a Dodrine fo plain, and yet fo full and perfed, reaching to the very Intentions of the Heart ? And, I am afraid. Men's Prejudice to this Plainnefs, is, that it a- wakens their own Confciences againft them ; that it would be the moft effedual Means of reform- ing them, but that they hafe to he reformed. 2 . Others objed againft the Dodrine of Chrlf- tianity as too fublime, and myfterious : To which I anfwer, that if a Revelation from God is necef- fary to teach us any Thing, concerning the divine Nature, more than we could naturally know be- fore, it muft, of Neceflity, be fomething which our Reafon could not difcover ; and as far as an infinite Being is concern'd in it, it muft exceed our finite Capacities. And yet the Belief of it, when reveal'd, may be very reafonable. And, indeed, it would be a much greater Prejudice againft a Revelation's being from God, if it had no Marks in it of any Thing, but what human Reafon could have difcover'd without it. 3 . Some have objeded againft the Morality of the Chriftian Dodrine as deficient -, that fome of the moft heroic Virtues, particularly that private Friendjhip and Zecd for the Public and our Coun- try^ are Virtues -purely voluntary in a Chriftian : They are jio ejfential Parts of his Charity. By Friendft)ip, they tell us, is not meant that common Benevolence and Charity^ which every Chriftian is obliged to fhew towards all Men \ but that pecu- liar Relation^ which is formed by Confent and Harmony of Minds, by mutual Efteem^ and Ten- dernefs, and Affe5fion, and which we emphatically call Friendfhip. But now, is fuch a Relation, in itfelf, abftra,(5led from thofe mutual good Offices, by which it is cultivated, any Virtue ? Surely no more than Brotherhood or Acquaintance, or a Si^ P 3 milituds. 214 Natural Obligations to ielieve militude of Studies, which are not always in our Power. But thofe Offices, which are, the Virtues of this Relation, are commanded, by the Chrif- tian Law, which obliges us to every Thing that is virtuous, and praife -worthy, or even of good Report, and to do Good where we hope for no Return, and to perform all Offices of mutual Af- fe^ion and Benevolence. And when this hap- pens to be more remarkably done between a few, then it is called Friend/hip. But then it is only limiting thofe Expreffions of Kindnefs to fome Particulars, which the Chriftian Dodrine com- mands to every one who is capable of receiving them. There is not any particular Office of this admir'd Friend/hip, but what is more eminently contain'd in St. Paul*s Charader of Charity. And whoever reads the New 'Tejtament will fee, that a Love of our Neighbour comprehends all the Offices of Kindnefs, which one Man can owe to another in any Relation. A Friendfhip built upon any, but fuch Principles, as Chriftian Cha- rity recommends, is nothing elfe but a Want of focial Affe^ion to the reft of Mankind. And the like may be faid for the Love of our Country^ which can never be a Virtue, but when it pro- ceeds upon a Principle of univerfal Benevolence, and a Zeal to do the greateft Good to Men. 4. On the other Hand, fome are offended, becaufe the Precepts of the Chriftian Dodrine are too fevere. To which, I anfwer, that they are fuch as will approve themfelves to be juft and right to the calmeft Reafon of Mankind. And there is no Duty of Life enjoin'd in the Gofpel, but what fome of the beft heathen Philofophers have commended as moft noble, and beft becom- ing a virtuous Mind. As to the Obligation of fuffering for the Sake of Chrift, it is abundantly compcnfutcd by the Promife of Grace and Affif- I tance. the Principles of Religion, &c. 215 tance, and by the clear Difcovery of a future Reward. This makes it highly reafonable in re- fped of our Lawgiver, who has provided fuch a Reward-, and it may iikewife be the moft generous Way of doing Good to Mankind, thus to offer up our Lives to maintain the Truth of that Revela- tion, which \sfo worthy of all Men to be received. 5. It is farther objeded, that theDodrineof the Gofpel has not proved fo effedlual as it ought to have done, if it had been from God. ChriftianSj fay they, are greatly divided •, they are corrupt in their Lives, tho' they afHrm., it affords much greater AiTiflances towards Holinefs of Life, than any other Inftitution. But tho' this is too true, yet, I hope, it is no juft Objedion againfl the IVuth of that Doc- trine which fo entirely forbids it. For, if it were, it would be an Objection againfl all good Dodrine whatever, and even againfl Reafon it- felf, which all allow is as much contradided by the vicious Lives of thofe who profefs to be go- vern'd by it. The Gofpel was not intended to force Men to be good, but to give them the beil Motives, and then leave them to their Choice. The Gofpel had this good Effed upon the Lives of the firfl Chriflians, fo the like EfFed; would appear again, if thofe who believe it, upon a fmcere Convidion of its Truth, could be fepa- rated from the nominal ProfefTors of it. And even as the Cafe now flands, if a Chriilian Coun- try were compared with any others, that have never heard of the Name of Chrifl, an impartial Man would find a very confiderable Difference in the Lives and Manners of Men to the Advantage of the Chriflian Caufe, even tho' it were allowed, that the Corruption of Chriflianity may have made fome Men worfe, than they would other- wife have been. P 4 Thefe 2 1 6 Natural Obligations^ &c. Thefe are fome of the Prejudices of Men a- gainft the Chriftian Revelation ; and from the Nature of thefe, we may be able to form a Judg- ment of the reft, and fee that they proceed not from any real Defed in the Gofpel, which can make an unprejudiced Man think it lefs worthy of God : And, therefore, fince it has all the E- vidence which I have mention'd before, that any Revelation can have, of its being from God, we can have no juft Reafon to refufe our Aflent to it. Dr. ^ Dr. JOHN CLJRKEs Boyle's Lectures A B R I D G ' D. Mana^MMH A N ENQUIRY INTO THE CAUSE and ORIGIN O F Moral EVIL. WHAT is the Caufe of Evil is a yery important and antient Queftion ; every Man's Experience of what befals himfelf, and a fmall Obferva- tion of the Condition of others, fufficiently teaches him how imperfed: Things are, and what Confu- fion they are liable to. Our natural Powers are very weak ; our Underftandings are capable of knowing but a few Truths ; our Judgment un- fettled ; and our Pradtice irregular. And with Refpeft to our Bodies, the Materials they are compofed of, the Manner in which they are framed, and the Laws they are fubjed to render them frail, and of ihort Duration. And the fame may be affirm'd of the whole material Worlds which is conftantly liable to Changes and Dif 220 An 'Enquiry into the Cauje Diforder, This we obferve In Things coniider*d fingly in themfelves : But if we apply them to each other, the Diforder will appear greater. From the Union of Soul and Body arifes War within us. And our Reafon and PafTions are at continual Difcord. To thefe we may add the natural Evils of Life, fuch as Pain^ Sieknefs^ and Death. And to compleat the whole, we may take in the moral Evils., under which are comprehended all Kinds of Wickednefs. Such a Kind of Survey, as this, of the Condi- tions of Things, hath led Men to enquire into the Caufe of them ; which has produced different EfFedls, Good Men have been fhocked with fuch Ob- fervations, and have fometimes complain'd of Providence. (See Pfalm Ixxiii. i6. Jer. xii. i.) On the other Hand, bad Men have from hence taken Occafion to deny that God either made the World, or has any Hand in the Go- vernment of it. [Lucret. Eib. li. v. i8o, &c. Dr. Cudworth'j Intellectual Syjtem, Page 78. ^ La^an. de Ira Dei. Cap. 13.] And that if the divine Providence concerned itfelf in the World, it would appear in human Affairs, in protedling the Innocent and Virtuous, and in difcouraging the Wicked ; but it does not. And therefore there is no Providence. [See Cicero, de Nat. Lib. III. §. 26, 1,^.'] After this Manner have atheiftical Men treated this SubjeA of the Original of Evil., fo as to colled from the Obfervation of Fads, either that there is no God, that at iirft created all Things,' or that they are not under his Care. The Magians have been more modefl: in handling this Subjec51: ; they admitted two Prin- ciples or Caufes of all Things ; the one good, and the other bad. [Prideaux*s Conned. Vol. I. Page 169.] Thefe and Origin of Moral Evil. 221 Thefe firfl Caufes or Principles of Good and Evil were by the Perfians called Oromafdes and Arimanius •,, by the Egyptians Ofiris and Typhon ; by the Chaldeans good and bad Planets ; by the Grecians Jupiter and P/a/o -, and the good Prin- ciple was alfo called God ; and the bad Principle the Devil. In the third Centviry, one Manes, a Perjian, introduced this Notion into the Chrlftian Religion, and formed ihe Sedl of the Manidhvans. [See Eufebii Ecclef. Hijl. Lib. VII. Cap. 25. & So- cratis Ecclef. Hift. Lib. I. Cap. 17. See Bayle, under the Word Manichasans, and under the Word Paulicians.] Which in the feventh Century was fo increafed that a 100,000 of them were mafla- cred in 'Thrace and Bulgaria. Which did not yet extinguifh them ; but in Time their Abfurdities were fo grofs, that it came to nothing. But it has been revived by the learned Mr. Bayle, \^fee his Dictionary under the Word Manichasans,] who pretends to affirm, that there is no Way of ac- counting for the prefent Matters of Fa6l, and that the Phc-enomena of Nature cannot be ex- plained, but by having Recourfe to two necefiary, independent, eternal Principles, diredtly oppofite to each other. Thus we fee profane and atheiftical Men in every Age employing all their Wit to find out Hypothefes to fubvert Religion, and to encourage Men to Iniquity. For to this End all their Dif- courfes end ; either to deftroy the Exiftence of God, or his Providence j or to introduce a Plura- lity of Gods, whereby all religious Worfhip is confounded ; or elfe to make God the Author of all Evil, and confequently Men to be mere Ma- chines, and fo not accountable Creatures ; which deftroys the eflential Difference between Good and Evil, and takes away the Foundation of Re- wards and Puniftunents. They 222 An Enquiry into the Caufe They take Principles for granted, which they cannot prove, nor ought others to allow ; and then draw fuch Concluiions from them as contra- did every one's Experience. In Enquiries of this Nature we ought to con- fider, Firjl^ The Dignity and Weight of the Sub- je6t. What Kind of Proofs may be expeded, and the Manner in which it ought to be treated . Men's Underftanding was given them, that they might fearch after Truth. And the Creation is a proper Objedl for them to excercife their Facul- ties upon. But that which relates more immedi- ately to the Happinefs of Mankind fhould be their principal Enquiry, and they fhould endea- vour to gain the greateft Satisfaction it it. The Queftion before us is of the highefl Concern ; for if we conceive ourfelves to be in a natural and moral State of Evil^^ and know not what to afcribe it to, or hov/ to get out of it, we fhall be much confounded. Hence have arifen the extra- vagant Opinions of Fate and Chance, and other numberlefs incoherent Notions. Hence alfo have arifen the Worfhip of dead Heroes ; and of mere Names or partial Confiderations of the Deity. And from hence Men have been led into all Man- ner of Profanenefs and Wickednefs. As there- fore we have any Regard for the Honour of God, as we have any Efteem for Virtue and Truth, and as we have any Efteem for our own Hap- nefs, we ought diligently to fearch into the Caufe and Foundation of all the Evils incident to Man- kind, that we may know what a Hand we have in bringing them upon ourfelves, and haw we ought to ad under them. Secondly, In fuch Enquiries we ought to confi- der what Kind of Proofs are to be expeded. In fome Things they are Demonftrations, and in others and Origin of Moral EviL 223 others they are only greater or lefs Degrees of Probability. Of Demonftrations they are two Sorts ; De- monftrations a priori, when we argue from the Caufe to the Effe6l ; and a pofieriori, when we argue from the EfFe6l to the Caufe. Thus when we argue from the Ideas we have of Immenfity, Eternity, and neceflary Existence, that fuch Perfe6lions can reiide but in one Being, and thence conclude there can be but one God, and therefore it is contradictory to fuppofe two neceflary independent Principles ; this is an Ar- gument a priori. Again -, When the Manich^ans from the many natural Evils which they fee in the World, and the many moral Wickednefles Men commit, con- clude, there muft be two different Principles from whence thefe proceed, this is arguing a pojieriori. Mr. Bayle fays, 'That nothing can be more ab- furd, if we confult our own moji clear Ideas, than the Hypothjis of two eternal Principles indepen- dent on one another, whereof the one has no Good- nefs, and puts a Stop to the Dejigns of the other. But this feems to be faid, becaufe he thinks fuch Ideas are only mere Imaginations of the Mind, and have nothing to anfwer to them without. And that therefore the certaineft Way is to argue a pojieriori, by explaining the Fhanomena, and accounting for Fads, which he affirms the ad- mitting of two Principles does-, and, therefore, his Method of arguing exceeds the other, notwithjland- ing the Beauty of Ideas and Reafons. Yet the Ideas of Neceflity, Unity, Immenfity, i^c. are as clear, and the Exiftence of a Being to whom they belong, does as certainly follow, as we are certain of our own Exiftence, and as we are of thofe Fads he calls Phenomena. So that the Rea- foning 224 -^^ Enquiry into the Caufi foning a 'priori^ is, in itfelf, as ftrong and con- clufive as that a pfleriori \ for by the Obferva- tion of the Fads we get an Idea, and from the Nature of the Cailfe, we judge concerning the Fa6ts. Lajily^ The Manner of treating this Subjed, ought to be fuch as the Dignity of it requires. Such Perfons only, who have a Love for Truth, and are diligent in the Purfuit of it, are able to find it out. It is therefore our Part to enquire into the Truth and Reafon of Things with Sin- cerity and Integrity, to lay a Foundation in what cannot deceive us -, in the eflential Difference be- twixt Virtue and Vice, Right and Wrong, Good and Evil ; and whatever we build upon this Foundation, will be unfhaken by the Attacks of wicked and profane Men. Had thefe Rules been obferved^ there would have been no Occafion for inventing abfurd Hy- pothefes to explain any of the Phaenomena of Nature. The Syftem of the World may be fafely committed to the moft curious Examina- tion, without Fear that any Part of it ftiould difgrace the Creator. Nothing more is requir'd, but to judge of it by the unerring Rules of Rea- fon and Knowledge, and the more it is view'd, the more beautiful it will appear. It is for want of underftanding the general Laws^ by which the Syftem of the World is govern'd, that has occafion'd all thofe Objedions againft It. This was the Cafe of the Epicureans^ as is ma- nifeft by the Inftances they gave. Their princi- pal Objedion of the Obliquity of the Ecliptic to the Equator^ whereby the torrid Zone is rendred too hot, and the frigid Zone too cold for Men to inhabit, was owing to their Ignorance of thofe Places, both which are habitable. And if they had confider*d the Effeds of the Pofition of the Ecliptic and Origin of Moral Evil. 225 Ecliptic and Equator in any other Obliquity, they would have found greater Inconveniencies arifing from the unequal Diftribution of Light and Darknefs, Heat and Cold : Had the Obliquity been more than it is now, the Heat of the torrid Zone had been too great for Plants and Animals under the Line -, and while the Sun approach'd to one Pole^ the other would have been left in greater Darknefs, and longer cold than now. And had the Obliquity been lefs, it would have deftroy'd the Agreeablenefs of the different Sea- fons. If, therefore, we take in the whole Globe of the Earth, and confider it in its prefent State, we fhall find, that the Heat and Light is moft e- qually difpenfed that could be. The Inftances of the Ufeleflhefs of a great Part of the Earth, as Seas, Rocks, Heaths, I fhall fhew, in its pro- per Place, to be only the Ignorance of the Ob- jedors. At prefent this is fufficient to fhew how weakly they 'argued againfl the Maker and Go- vernor of the World, by firfl fuppofing thofe Things to be evil or ufelefs which are of the greatefl Benefit, and then unjuflly inferring, that they could not be created by a good Being. Thus it was with the Epicurean Atheifls of old; and thus it is with thofe of later Ages. The profane Saying of Alphonfus, King of Leon and Cafiile, that had he been with God when he made the JVorld, he could have taught him, how to have made it better, was owing to his Ignorance of the true Syflem of the World ; and has been fully anfwer'd fince to a Demonflration. The apparent Motions and Bigneffes of the Planets are very different from the true ones. Upon the former, the antient Aflronomers" built their Syf- tems, which are fo perplexed and confufed, that they are fcarce intelligible. They obferved^ the Planets fometimes to be nearer, and fometimes Q^ farther 226 An "Enquiry into the Caufe fartlicr off, to have different Phafes^ to be fome- times progrej/ive, {ometimts Jlaiwnary, and feme- times retrograde. To folve thefe, they invented different Hypothefes. Some made the Earth the Centre, and the Sun, and Planets, and fixed Stars revolved round it. Others would ha.vQfome of the Planets move round the Sun, which fhould carry them along with it round the Earth. To account for all thefe feeming Irregularities, they were forced to have Recourfe to Excentrics^ Epi- cycles., and Epicycles upon Epicycles. And had thefe been the true Syftcm of the World, it would have been difficult to ihev/ the Wifdom or Contrivance of it. For according to them, there was no Proportion obferved, no Adjuftment of the Magnitude, and Diftance of the refpedive Bodies, nor any regular Curves in which they moved. "Whereas the Diftance of all the hea- venly Bodies from their refpe5five Centers of Gravity, and from the common Centre of Gra- vity of them all, are exadly in reciprocal Pro- portion to the ^lantity of Matter contain'd in each of them, whence they are in perfed Equili- brium, and confequently, by the mere Continu- ance of the general Laws of Nature, when once put in Motion, they will revolve in regular fi- gures about their Centre of Gravity, and about each other. From hence arife their different Ap- pearances. Thus, when any Planet feems to be ftationary.^ or retrograde, it does, in Reality, pro- ceed in its Orbit, and it is owing to our Pofition only, that it appears otherwife,. as fhall be fhewn hereafter. And the feveral Parts of the moral World is as exactly, proportion'd to each other, as thofe of the natural World ; and we fhall find, that there is no Need of Hypothefes to account for the Irregularities and moral Evils of Maft- kind. God will juftify himfelf in this Refped, I and and Origin of Moral Evil. 227 and that the Wickednefs of Men can be no Way- charged upon him. But before I come to explain this in Particu-- lars, I will Ihew the Weaknefs of the Hypothe- fes of two original Principles. And this I will do by examining, Firjl^ What Sort of an Idea that is, of an in- finite, independent, neceflliry evil Being. And then. Secondly, I will fhew the very Supposition of the Exiftence of fuch a Being, is a dired Contra- didion to the Exiftence of an infinite good Being. I . If there is an evil Principle, it muft be (ti^- exiftent, and independent of the good Principle : Becaufe, 'tis fuppofed, that they equally fhare in the Government of the World, and becaufe, if they were not equal, the Superior would hinder the other from adling. Wherefore, the Defen- ders of this Scheme are fo far confiftent as to aftert, that the evil Principle is infinite and inde- pendent. But they do not tell us, what Sort of an Idea that of infinite Evil is. All Evil fup- pofes Underjianding, and Power, and Liberty of adling, becaufe it is the Confcquence, either of the Negle^i or Abiife of one or more of thefe. For in the Imperfe^ion or Want of them it cannot con- fift, becaufe an Underftanding infinitely imperfeEi, is no Underfianding at all ; and the fame may be affirmed of Power and Liberty . Their firft Principle, therefore, muft be en-, dued with infinite Knowledge, and Power, and Liberty of ading •, and how can this agree to the Notion of an infinite evil Being? Can infinite Knowledge, Power, and Liberty be called evil ? With refpedl to thefe, therefore, abfolutely confi- der'd, fuch a Being cannot be ftiled evil, becaufe he is endued with fuch Powers, as are not evil in' themielves. The Evil, therefore, muft confift C^2 in i28 Afi Enquiry into the Cauje in the Abufe of thefe Powers, which proceeds ei- ther in not knowing what is beft to be done, or in not being able to do it, or in having fome Temptation or Interejl to the contrary. Let us fee how thefe will agree with an infinitely evil Principle. Can we imagine, that infinite Know- ledge iliould not be intimately acquainted with the Natures, and Reafons, and Differences of all Things, and what the Confequences and Effeds of the divers Applications of them will be, what they are in different Circum fiances capable of, and what are the proper Means to obtain their re- fpeclive Ends ? So that in this Particular there is^ no Room for Evil ; for Knowledge and Wifdom are the moft perfed: in fuch a Being. If to this we add infinite Power, it cannot be but that the Being in whom thefe refide, muft exercife this Power, according to the unerring Rules of per- fect Knowledge. Again -, with Regard to Liberty, there can be nothing from ivithin^ or from without, to induce fuch a Being to ad contrary to Goodnefs and Truth, no evil Difpofition, becaufe the neceflary Refult of his own Perfedions is infinite Happi- ncfs to himfelf, a perfed Redlitude of Will, and confequently no Motive either to make any Crea- tures that are evil^^ or to commit Evil towards them •, neither can he have any Temptation from other Beings to do Evil, becaufe all fuch Temp- tations arife from JVeaknefs, or Depravation, which are contradictory to All-fufficiency. Whether, therefore, we confider the firjl Prin- ciple, with Regard to its natural, or moral Pow- ers, the Abfurdity of its being infinitely evil evi- dently appears. But that which fhews the Abfurdity of this Hypothefis ftill farther, is the ImpofTibility ' of conceiving two neceilary independent Beings at all. I The a7td Origin of Moral Evil. 229 The Idea of Necejftty is an uniform Idea^ which fuppofes Unity, Immenfity, Eternity ; and if we attempt any Way to diverfify it, it immediately vanifhes. Thus, for Inftance, to fuppofe two necefTary independent Beings, is to fuppofe neither of them to be neceflary, becaufe either of them being abfolutely independent on the other, might have exifted without that other, and confequent- ly we can conceive either of them to be abfent, which is contradidory to the firft Suppofition of its being neceflarily exifting. So alfo witli Regard to the eflential Properties of fuch a Being ; for Inftance Immenfity, the ne- ceflary exifting Being muft be every where ; for if we can fuppofe him not to be in any particular Place, we may fuppofe him not to be in any. So as to Duration -, whatever can be fuppofe i not to exift at any one Time, may, by the fame Reafbn, be fuppofed not to exift at all, which is a Contra- di<5lion to the Idea of neceflary Exiftence. There pan therefore be but one firft Caufe of all Things, a felf-exiftent, eternal, immenfe, all-wife, all- powerful Being, who is infinitely good and happy. The World was created at firft, and -is ftill go- vern'd by this Being. So that if we would judge aright concerning any Part of the Crea- tiion, we ought to do it by fuch Rules as are con- fiftent with the known Perfedions of the Deity. And fince it is demonftrable, that it is the Effed of Wifdom and Goodnefs, we ftiould endeavour tp reconcile it to them. Thus, In the prefent Enquiry concerning the Original of Evil, we ought firft to confider, what it i§ we call Evil, which, perhaps, may be improperly (o called ; whether it does not arife from the Imperfedion of our own Underftandings, who prefume to. condemn what we have not a perfed Knowledge of. To be able to pronounce peremptorily con^ 0^3 cernJag 630 An E?iquiry into the Caufe cerning fuch a Syftem as this, requires us to be every where prefent in it, to be able to under- Hand and conneft every Part of it, and to fee the Fitnefs and Adjujlrnent of the Whole, which the wifeft Men are far from being able to do. But tho' we do not underftand the Whole of the Creation, yet we may know enough of it, to judge in general of the W'ifdom and Goodnefs of the Maker and Governor of it, and how we ought to behave towards him and or.,' another. By the little we know, we ought to dccermine of what we do not know, and not condemn them as ufelefs, becaufe we are ignorant of the Good they do. We know that an infinitely wife, and powerful, and good Being, cannot be the Author of any Thing but what is good, that is, fit for the Ends it was defigned for ; and, there- fore, we fhould not be rafh in giving Judgment before we have fl:ri61:ly examin'd Things. It is, therefore, a t^ery good Argument a pri- cri, the Force of which no Fatalift can avoid ; that as fure as we are of infinite Intelligence, Power, and Goodnefs, and that the Univerfe could not be the EfFed of mere Chance, and Ne- ceffity, fo fure are we, that every Thing created by fuch a Bting, mufl be worthy of thofe Per- fedions, and that all Arguments to the contrary", drawn from the feeming Evil^ or Irregularity of feme Parts fingly confider'd, are Arguments ad Ignorantiam. But this hinders not, but that we may with Modefty enquire into, and examine thofe Parts of the Creation, which feem to eclipfe the Beauty of it, and we fhall find,, that fuch Enquiries will ei- ther vindicate the Laws of the Creation, or €i{^ convince us, that the Defed: lies in our Under- ftandings. Wherefore, before we can pronounce, tjhat any Thing is really evily we ought to confi- der and Origi?i of Moral Evil. 231 der what we mean by Evil^ and wherein it confifts. Evil is a relative Term, and either regards the Being itfelf^ or it refers to fome other Beings^ with whom it is connefled ; or elfe it refpeds the Author by whom it is made. With Regard to the Being itfelf, there is a private Ufe^ or Goody fome End^ or Aim to be ferved by it. If there- be any Thing in fuch a Being, which is not con- ducive to this End, but, on the contrary, hin- ders the attaining it, fuch a Bei7ig is fo far ill to itfelf, is in an uneafy State. And becaufe no finite Being can exift indepen- dent on all others, but there is a Relation which they have to each other, whereby a Syftem is compofed, which has a general End or Good to which every one of the Parts has a natural Ten- dency in its proper Place ; whatever Being dif- turbs the Order of fuch a Syftem, that Being is evil with refpe6t to others. With Regard to the Author of fuch a Syftem, it cannot be ftiled evil in any other Senfe, than as it is unworthy of fuch an Author to create it. For the Syftem is fuppofed to be as compleat as in the Nature of Things it can be, and to have no Reference to any Thing elfe ; and there is really no fuch Thing as Evil at all ahftra^ly con- fider'd. Having thus ftxewn what is evil^ all the E/uils that are, may be diftinguifti'd into three Sorts, Firji, A 11 Wants and Imperfe^ions in ourfelves, or the Things without us. Secondly, All natural Evils, as Difeafes and Death, which Men and other Creatures are liable to, and Storms and Tempefts, (^c. m the Things without us. And, Thirdly, Moral Evil. Firji, I fhall confider thofe Wants and Imper- 0^4 fedions 232 An Enquiry ijito the Caufe fedions within ourfelves, and fhow, that there is no juft Ground of Complaint in thefe Refpefts. Before we can form any Judgment of the Per- fe^ion or Imperfe^lion of any Part of the Crea- tion, whether animate or inanimate^ we muft un- derstand what Powers it is endued with, what Laws it is fubje6l to, and what is the EfFe<5t of the right Application of them -, otherwife, we can have no juft Idea of the Being itfelf, of what life it is in the World, nor wherein the Good or E'vil of it confifts. Thus, if we would judge of the Excellency of th& Planetary Syjiem, we ought to have a particular Knowledge of the Conftitu- tion and Laws of it -, the Bignefs, Diftance, and Situation of thofe Bodies, with refpedt to one another-, the Laws of Motion, and the Curves in which they are direfted *, from the due Com- paring of all which, it will be manifeft, whether there be any Order obferved among them or not. Thus, if we would judge of the Earth, we muft be acquainted with its Diftance from the Sun, the Obliquity of its Axis to the Plane of the Ecliptic, the Properties of the annual Orb in which it moves, and its Rotation about its own Axis, in order to fee the Contrivance of it, by which are produced the feveral Climates, and the Succeffion of Day and Night, Summer and Winter, Seed Time and Harveft. And fo likewife muft we proceed in the Confideration of the particular Parts of it, and its feveral Inhabitants •, particu- larly of Man, who, as he is compofed of an im- material Soul, and a material Body, fo it is ne- ceflary to have a diftinft Knowledge of the Na- ture and Extent of tipefe, and their Influence on each other, before we can tell wherein the Perfec- tion of Man confifts, or wherein he may be faid to be defective. The true Method of fuch Enquiry is the Ana- lytic^ and Origin of Moral Evil. 233 ,/y//ON's Boyle's Lectures A B R I D G ' D. THE ^ Pretended DIFFICULTIES In Natural or Revealed RELIGION No EXCUSE for INFIDELITY. TH E Subjed, which I propofe to treat on, is of the lall Importance for us to be fatisfied in, viz. I. Whether Men at firft grew out of the Earth as Trees j or that there has been an eternal Succeflion of Men and Women, propa- gated after the fame Manner as at prefent -, or whether we were made by God. II. Whether we ceafe to be when we die ; or whether there be another State after this. If any Prejudices were allowable, they would certainly be on this Side of Religion ; 1 . Becaufe nothing but fuch a Belief can carry fuch a Man thro' the Miferies that Life is fub- je6l to, 2. Becaufe the Belief of religious Principles re- ftrains 314 'T'h^ pretended Difficulties in natural or ftrains a Man from no Enjoyments, but fuch as are hurtful to him. 3. Becaufe living under a Senfe of religious Principles, will make a Man's Mind eafy with Regard to any Apprehenfions of a future State. I. Becaufe nothing but fuch a Belief can carry a Man thro' the Miferies of Life. If a Man makes the leaft Refledlion upon the State of his Life, he will prefently fee that he has not fufficient Power of himfelf to procure his own Piappinefs : There are many Evils he is ob- noxious to. Now if there was no God to have Recourfe to, the Brutes would have the Advan- tage of us •, for as they have no Forefight of fu- ture Evils, fo they could not be tormented, as we fhould be, with the Fears of what may be hereafter. But the Belief of a God and Provi- dence will give us Fortitude and Patience in Ad- verlity, while the Atheift is raging under the Cir- cumftances of a calarriitous Fortune, and curfing both himfelf and others. \Enqiiiry concerning Virtue^ Page 70, 71, 73, '](y^^^ Epicurus himfelf could not but own, that he thought it better to believe the Fable of the Hea- then Gods, than to fubmit to blind Neceffity ; be- caufe the Gods, he fays, may be prevall'd upon by Prayer, but Neceiiity is inexorable to all Ap- plications, that is, that it would be even better to embrace Superftition than to be tied down to the Laws of Neceffity, The Atheift, in his Account of the general Con- fent of Mankind In the Belief of a God, is forced to affign fuch Reafons for it, as ftiew him very fenfible of the Profitablenefs of religious Principles. When he fays that Fear introduced it, he muft own, that it would be for the Benefit of Mankind that fome Being fhould exift, who could proted: them againft every Accident. Whereas the Fear about re'Vealed Religioji no E^cufefor Infidelity. 31^ about future Events, which they fuppofe natural to us, would encreafe, were we perfuaded that fu- ture Events were under no Diredion : Or what is as bad, under the unalterable Laws of blind Ne- cefTity. In order to amend this ill State of Things^ the Atheift tells us. Mankind made themfelves believe that there muft be fome Agent, befides the material World, v/hich they were fure could not help them ; and tho' they could not fee him doing any Thing, that yet he did all, and was able to relieve his Creatures when they call'd upon him. By which the Atheift allows the Advan- tages of religious Principles for fupporting Men againft the Fears of future Evils, and confequently the Being of a God is to be wifh'd for by us all. Another Account they give of the general Con- fent of Mankind in the Belief of a God, is, that Politicians perfuaded Men there was a God, to keep them obedient to the Laws : By which they allow the Profitablenefs of religious Principles to the Peace of Society. Having {^^n the Advantages of religious Prin- ciples for our Support in the uneafy Parts of Life ; let us fee what the Advantages are, which the Atheift propofes by his Scheme as an Equivalent, for what he confefles he muft deprive himfelf of by his Dift)elief of a God. Plutarch tells us, his Defign is to free himfelf from Fear, and to be at Liberty to do what he pleafed : This leads me to ftiew, 2. That the Belief of religious Principles re- ftrains a Man from no Enjoyments, but fuch as would be hurtful to him. The Atheift's Unwillingnefs to admit a God, arlfes from a frightful Notion he has of him. And Lucretius fays, that Epicurus, by curing Men of the Fear of a God, did the moft fignal Service to Men that ever was done. But 3 1 6 T'he pretended Difficulties in natural or But nothing can be more falfe than t]ils Repre- fentarion cf God and Religion. 'Tis true, indeed, that the Scripture fpeaks of Religion under the Phrafe of the Fear of God. But then this is not the Fear of an arbitrary, omnipotent Tyrant, but the Fear of a wife and good Being, fuch a Fear as keeps Men from unwarrantable Things, from violating the Laws of Reafon, and confounding the moral Differences of Things. Such a Fear, as tends to keep the World in Peace, and hinder Men from injuring one another. 'Tis the Fear of n juft Beings who threatens to punifli us, when we do fuch Things as would hurt us. 'Tis the Fear of a kind Father, who keeps us from harm- ing ourfelves by the Fear of offending him. This is the genuine Fear of God, which is confiftent with the trucft Liberty, and the beft Prefervative of it, and witliout It, It would not be poffible to fecure the Freedom of our Thoughts and Adlions. Whenever this Fear Is attended with Sufpicions of the Deity, as an imperious Being, it ceafes to be a religious, and commences a vicious Fear or Su- perftition, 'Tis againft this lad Sort of Fear that the Ar- guments of Atheifis are diredled. For they affert - ing, that there are no moral Differences of Things, no Right or Wrong, feparate from Pleafure and Pain, It would then indeed follow, that If there was a God, he could have no moral Qualifications. And then what fhould we be the better for fuch a Being } or rather fhould we not fare better. If we were without fuch a Governor as ads by his mere Will ? Thus do the Atheifts paint God, that they may have the better Colour for denying his Ex- iftence : But I have fnewn this to be a falfe R_e- prefentation of God ; and that when we reprefent him revealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity . 3 1 7 him as he really is, that he is the the moft amia- ble Being in the World. But if after all the Pains they take to difown him, they cannot fet their Minds eafy from the Fears of him, the Benefit of living under a Senfe of religious Principles will receive a new Degree of Evidence, which was the third Ad- vantage of religious Principles, viz. 3. That the Belief of them will fet the religi- ous Man's Mind at Eafe, with Refped to any Apprehenfions of an after State. The Hiftories of all Countries inform us, that there constantly has been a Belief of fome future State, in which Men were to be accountable for their Behaviour in this. And I think it muft be granted me, that whilft Men have fuch Appre- henfions, they cannot be unconcern'd wliat is to become of them in this after State. And, there- fore, unlefs the Atheift can give us a fure Method, by which we may get fhut of thcfe Fears, he muft acknowledge his Scheme to be neither calcu- lated for the Good of himfelf, nor any Body elfe : For I have fhewn the Advantages of a true Fear of God, for the better Condud of our Lives ; and if the Atheifi is willing to give up thofe Ad- vantages, fo as he might free himfelf from the Fears of an After-reckoning, we might exped he was fure of this Point ; but the Apprehenfions of a future State are not to be overturn'd by fuch trifling Reafonings as the Atheift's Scheme is built upon \ nor can the Atheift himfelf infure himfelf for Life againft the Fears of a future State, be- caufe he cannot prove it impolTible that fuch a Being as God, in a religious Senfe of the Word, fhould exiil: : For if he cannot be certain of that, he cannot have any of the other. 'Tis certain, therefore, that the Principles of Religion are bet- ter calculated, for the Eafe of Men's Minds, than thofe 3 1 8 7he pretended 'Difficulties in natural or thofe of the Atheift. For the religious Man has a comfortable Profped ; if his Apprehenfions are juft, he is made for ever : And if he is miftaken, yet this Belief of a future State made him pafs jiis 1-ife with more Satisfadlion than Atheifm can afford a Man. And, at laft, it cannot be worfe with him than the other. But the Suppofition of the bare Poflibility of a future State muft give the Atheift, now and then, an uneafy Thought ; and when he is uneafy, I know of no Way he can take to make himfelf eafy, but by perfuading himfelf either, ly?. That no Man is under any Obligation of honouring God, tho' there fliould be one : Or elfe, ai/y. That he is under no Obligation, becaufe not believing there is a God, he cannot pay any Reverence to him. As to the firfl of thefe Excufes, I believe the Atheift will find it difficult to perfuade himfelf, that no Man is under an Obligation of honouring God, if there be one j for if there be fuch a Be- ing, our Relation to him, and the Obligations we receive from him, will make it fit for us to thank him. I am fenfible Unbelievers do not allow what we call moral Diiferences •, but then this is upon Sup- pofition, that their material Scheme is the true one ; and that there is no fupreme Being endued v/ith moral Perfed:ions. But if there fhould be fuch a Being, the Atheift may be, for any Thing he knows, anfwerable for denying his Exiftence ; and for paying him no Acknowledgments for Fa- vours recelv'd. For if there are moral Differences \\\ the Nature of Things, and they are to be judged of by the fupreme Underftanding, fuch as by other underftanding Beings, making only an Abatement for the Difference between a finite and infinite Underftanding ; that is, fuppofe we know what Juftice is in God, we niuft believe, that revealed Religion no 'Excufefor Infidelity. 319 that it is injuft to deny Reverence to the fupreme Being, as well as it would be Injuftice to refufe our Thanks to any Friend for Favours receiv'd. And it can't be thought but that the fupreme, as well as other Beings, muft make a Difference be- tween thofe that honour him, and thofe that deny his Being. For if God has conftituted any moral Differences in Things, he has thereby fufficiently declared, that it is his Intention to a6l fuitably to thofe Differences. Before I proceed any further, I cannot forbear making one Remark ; which is this. That fup- pofing there are Perfons of fo perverfe an Under- ftanding, as cannot perfuade themfelves of a God and a Providence^ they ought not to endeavour to draw Men off from fuch a Belief, becaufe by their own Confeffion, Mankind was brought into this Belief for their own Good. They can lie under no Obligations o^ Confcience, becaufe they deny all moral Differences. And therefore if they were not ill-natur'd, they would leave the Reft of Mankind in the quiet Poffeffion of fo agreeable a Delufion as that of a God, and a future State. If they fay, that tho* a right Notion of Religion would be beneficial to Mankind, yet Superftition is more deftrudive of the publick as well as pri- vate Quiet of every Man, than Atheifm itfelf ; And that the Hiftories of all Ages have convinced them, that Mankind is more apt to be influenced by Superftition, than by a religious Fear •, and tiherefore the Odds in human Nature being on the Side oi Superftition, that 'tis not fafe trufting it with any Religion \ I anfwer, that if the Fears of Superftition are the only Reafon for rejecting religious Principles, then inftead of fetting them- felves againft all Religion, let them endeavour to fet the World right in their Notions of Religion, 2 and 320 'The pretended Difficulties in natural or and we will join with them in fo laudable an Un- dertaking. But to proceed. Another Evafion of the Atheifi to avoid the Apprehenfions of a future State, is, that he cannot deferve Blame or Punilhment for not honouring God, becaufe he does not believe there is one. If this Excufe be a good one, one of thefe two Things muft be true, either, i/?, that a Man cannot deferve Blame for ading according to his Opinions, how groundlefs foever they be ; or, idly^ becaufe he had made a due Examination, and could find no Evidence for a God. As to the firfi^ viz. that a Man cannot deferve Blame for ading agreeably to his Opinions, can- not be relied upon ; becaufe a Man may deferve Blame for his Opinions, if he has not duly quali- fied himfelf for Evidence, when 'tis offer'd him. As, i/?. If when he is enquiring after Truth, he fuffers himfelf to be biafs'd by any predominant Paifion j or, 2^/y, If thro' Lazinefs he declines a full Exa- mination of any Queftion in which he is much concern'd. That thefe may be the true Caufes of many Perfon's Infidelity will appear probable, by confidering fome of the Motives, which too often govern Men, with Regard to the Perfuafions held by them. The Prejudices, which I fhall at prefent confider, are thefe -, 1 . An Affedation of Singularity. 2. An Averfion to the Errors that have crept into true Religion. 3 . A Defire of being independent and uncon- trollable by any one, I. An Affedlation of Singularity is a ftrong Temptation to Infidelity. The linking out into a different Way of Thinking from the Reft- or Mankind, flatters the Vanity of a proud Man with revealed Religion no Excufefcr Infidelity. 321 with this pleafing Imagination ; that he fliall be thought to fee more than the reft of the V/oHd -, and the more generally received the Opinions are, which he oppofes, the greater Credit he hopes to gain by it ; and therefore Religion having been the general Perfuafion of Mankind, is, for that Reafon, the fitteft Mark for the proud Man to point his Arguments againft : And the fewer he has on his Side, the more he hopes to fhine. 2. An Averfion to the Errors that have crept into true Religion, has infenfibly led many Per- fons into a Diibelief of all Religion. But this is an unjuftifiable Proceeding in any one that pretends to be a Lover of Truth ; be- caufe it fuppofes, that where there are Errors, there can be no Truth : For they might with as much Juftice argue, that becaufe there is a Wrong, there can be no fuch Thing as a Right. But they are not only unjuftifiable, when they have no better Reafon for leaving us, but alfo they fhew great Weaknefs : For when Men take Refuge in Atheifm, out of Hatred to Superfti- tion, the Reafon muft be, becaufe they know not hov/ to diftinguidi what is true from v/hat is falfe. Therefore finding they muft take all or none, the Hatred they conceived againft the Errors they have deteded, prompts tliem to quit Religion en- tirely, as the only Way for fuch poor Reafoners to be fecure againft Errors in religious Matters. 3. A Defire of being uncontrcll'd and unac- countable, as to their Thoughts and Behaviour, tempts fome Perfons to deny a God. And there- fore they are fond of the material Scheme, as it fets them at full Liberty from all Obligations •, for no one can think himfelf obliged to any Being, merely for doing for him what it cannot help doing. But if a Man ftiould acknowledge an in- telligent Being for hie Creator, and the Author Vol. hi. Y cf 322 ^he pretended Difficulties in natural or of all his Comforts, he cannot forbear thinking fometimes that fome fuch Submiffion may be due to him, as may reftrain his Fulnefs of Freedom in Thinking and A6ling. The Defire of being in a State of Independence, induced many Perfons to enter themfelves into the School of Epicurus. And the fame Caufe now works in thofe, who are Libertines in Adion as well as Thought, who defire to gratify every irregular Appetite ; 'tis their Intereft to throw off the Belief of a God ; they muft, for Quietnefs fake, endeavour to pcr- fuade themfelves, that there is no fuperior Under- ftanding to animadvert upon them, for acfling agai nft the Senfe of their own Minds, I would now advife the Atheijt, that fince there are confefledly vicious Motives, that have led Men into their Opinions, that he would examine, whether none of thofe I have m.ention'd, had de- termin'd him to turn Aiheifi ; for if he has left his Religion without fufHcient Reafon, his plead- ing that he ads according to his Opinion, will not excufe him from Blame and Punifhment. And whatever he may think while he is in Health, he cannot fecure himfelf againft the Apprehenfions of Punifhment, if he has wantonly taken up the Caufe of Infidelity. But fome one may fay, that this Way of ar- gumg againffe Atheijis is an unfair Proceeding with them, becaufe it is taking for granted, that a Man muft be influenced by fome Prejudice when- ever he embraces Atheifm. That it might be re- torted upon the Believer, that he is prejudiced in. liis Belief of a God, becaufe he wifhes there was one. And therefore, the Argument drawn from Prejudices fhould be omitted by both Sides. The Anfwer is, that I ought to fliew, that other Motives, befides Evidence, might influence Men in their Opinions j that fuch Motives v/ere 2 vicious rewaled Religion no Excvfefor hifidelify. 323. vicious and punifhable, if there fhould be a God ; And this in order to engage the Atheift to exa- mine carefully upon what Motives he took up his Opinion. If the Religious is prejudiced in his Belief of a Gcd, his Miftake cannot be hurtful to him. I ought alfo not to have omitted thefe Pre- judices, as probable Motives to Infidelity ; becaufe many Atheifts have been influenced by fome or other of them. If there are any who have feiioufly wrought themfelves into a Belief of Atheifm, they are not concerned with what has been faid under the Head of Prejudices, and fhall be confider'd by them-_ felves, v/hen I come to confider this Evafion of the Atheifis, viz. That after the beft Enquiry, he could find no Evidence for a God, and there- fore could deferve no Punifhment for not believ- ing one. Having confider'd certain Prejudices, which might be'^fuppofed to have determined many to Atheifm, I will put them in Mind, that the anci- ent Atheifis fupported their Principles by Reafons, which the modern Atheifis muft own to be fahe, and therefore were to blam.e in concluding againft a God upon falfe Reafonings. This fhould dif- tourage the modern Alheifi from being over confi- dent, lefl further Difcoveries fliould make his Caufe lefs defcnfible, and himfelf capable of de- termining haf^i'y againfl a God •■, which brings me to confider another Defed in trying any Queftion, viz. 2. That we deferve Blame, if thro' Lazinefs we decline a thorough Examination, before we take up our OpinlonG. In a Matter of fo great Concern, as that of a God and Providence, the Unbeliever fnould fuf- fer himfelf to be perfuaded to re-examine his Conclufions, and fee whether he has not bsen_ de- y 2 ceived 324 ^he pretended Difficulties in natural or ceived in any of his Premifes. He muft allow his Predcccflors in Infidelity to have been carelefs Examiners into Nature, when they aflerted equi- vocal Generation, and taught, that nothing could a(5t upon Matter but by Contaft ; and hov/ can he be fure that farther Enquiries into Nature may not ftill weaken his Caufe ? And if thro' Lazinefs he fhould decline fuch Enquiries, and his Opini- ons fliould at lad prove fr.lfe, his Negk(5t will be criminal, and hinifelf anfAverable for not taking due Informa*"ion. I cjme now to confider the other Excufe of the Atheifi^ viz. That he has nade the beft Enquiry he can, without being able to difcover any Evidence for a God. But before I confider what thefe Atheifts have to fay for themf^lves, I muil infift, that they ought not to bring againft us any fuch Objedions, whofe Strength arifes fro.n our Incapacity of con- ceiving the Nature of God ; becaufe 'tis agreed that we are finite Beings, and therefore muft have finite Underil-andings •, but that the neceffarily exifting Being, v/hoever he is, muft be infinite and eternal. For fomething muft have been eter- nal, otherwife fomethinp; muft have arifen out of notJiinp:, which is impoili.ble. And yet we can form no Notion of an eternal Duration already pall ; an Argument therefore drav/n from our In- ability to conceive the Nature of an infinite Being, ought to have no Weight with us, nor be urg'd by tlie Athcijl^ becaufe his material God would be equally af^-eded by it. If then he would juflify himfelf, the only rational Inducements to Infide- lity muft be one or other of thefe. Either for the avoiding fome particular Diffi- culties, v/hich he thinks may be proved to amount to Imponibiiities in our Notion of God j which his material Scheme is not attended with •, 'or clfe, becaufe in general tliere are far lefs Difficul- ties 7rveakd Religion no Excitfefor Infidelity. 325 ties in accounting for Appearances by the material Scheme, than there would be, fhould we once admit a God and a Providence. As to the firft of thefe InducemcnTs, I will ihew, That it can never juftify him in rejefling Religion. i/i, Becaufe he can never prove, that the parti- cular Difficulties do amount to a Contradidlion, idly^ Becaufe his material Scheme is attended with inSniteiy greater ones, than thofe he finds Fault with in our Notion of God. And then as to the other Inducement, viz. That in general, there are fewer Difficulties in accounting for Things by a material Principle -, I will ffiew, that fome of the moft confiderable Fh^nomena in Nature cannot he accounted for by fuch a Principle only. i/?. The Diffixulties he complains of, in our Notion of a God, do not amount to a Contra- diclicn. The chief Difficulties are thefe : I,//-, That we afcrlbe Immateriality to God. idly^ That we allow him a Power of making fomething out of nothing. And, 3^/)', That we make Goodnefs a Part of his Ch'iracler, which the many natural and monii Evils, that appear in his Wcrkmanfhip, con- tradi<5t. \fi^ We afcrlbe Immateriality to God. If the Aiheifi would prove an immaterial Subiisnce to be impoffible, he muil prove that whatever is imma- terial is nothing •, and he mull prove this one of thefe two V/ays •, either, that what we have no Idea of, is nothing •, that we have no Idea of an im- material Subftauce, therefore there can be no fuch Thing s or elfe he muft affirm, that the only fub- ftantial Thing in the World is Matter. To which Objedions I anfwer, i/. That it is not true, that we have no Conception of an im- Y 3 material 326 ^he pretended Difficulties in iiatural or material Subftance. ldl}\ That if it were true, it could not be a good Proof of the Impoiribility of its Exiilence. We as certainly know fome of the Properties of immaterial, as we do thofe of material Sub- ftance. Percep)t:on, Underftanding, and a Power of beginning Motion, are as certainly the Proper- ties of an immaterial Subftance, as Solidity, and a Capacity of receiving and communicating Motion are Properties of Matter. And if we can form no Idea of the Subftance itfelf of an immaterial Being •, neither do we know any thing of the Subftance of Matter. But fuppofing that v/e could form no Idea of an immaterial Being, this would not prove the Impoffibility of its Exiftence ; unlefs 'twas certain, that no Poftibiiity of Being could efcape the Searches of our Underftanding. Whereas what- ever we know of external Objeds, muft be de- rived to us thro' out Senfes ; and which Way VN^ill the Arheift take to convince us, that our five Senfes are all the pcflible Ways of receiving In- formation concerning external Objeds. Reafoii v/culd rather tell us, that this particular Number v/as calculated for cur prefent State ; and that probably there may be m.ore Channels of Know- ledges than Vv-e are capable of in our prefent Con- dition. It is certain we can form no Idea of Eternity ; and yet the Atheift, as well as we, is forced to allow fomething to be eternal. And the very fam.e Reafon, which obliges the Atheift to admit fomething eternal, tho' he lias no Idea of Eter- nity, will equally hold in the Cafe of immaterial Subftance, if there are, as I fhall afterwards prove, certain Appearances in the World, which cannot be accounted for, by tlie mere mechanical Lav.s of Matter in Motion. For as he allows fome- revealed Religion 7io Excufefor Infidelity. § 2 7 fomething to be eternal, that he may avoid the Abfurdity of acknowledging that any thing canrc from nothing, fo if he cannot make it probable, that certain Powers, I lately mentioned, may arife purely from Matter •, he muft either own thefe Powers to have exifted without any Caufe of their Exijlence ; or elfe, with us, he muft admit immaterial Subftance. The other Argument againft immaterial Sub- dance, vix. T'hat there is nothing fubftantial but , Matter; is begging the Queftion. For how fhould the Atheiji prove this ? Why thus Spinofa does it ; he gives us a Definition of Subftance, that '/zV fomething independent of every other 'Things and exifiing by a Ncceffity of Nature. From thence he infers, that fince there can be but one felf-exiftent Being, and Matter is confefTed to be a fubftantial Being, therefore there can be no Sub- ftance but Matter. But all this amounts to no more, than if he had told us there is nothing but Matter \ therefore no immaterial Being. He knows we deny Matter to be a felf-exiftent Being ; and, therefore, that if his Definition of Subftance vv^as a good one, that we ftiould deny it belong'd to Matter : And then how will his Definition prove to us the Impoftibility of immaterial Sub- ftance ? Thus far we go then in Defence of a God, that, his Immateriality cannot be proved to imply a Contradidion. 2<^/>', Another Difficulty which the Atheift raifes againft our Notion of a God, is. That Power we afcribe to him of making fomething out of nothing •, becaufe we do not now fee Na- ture producing any Subftances, but only different Modes of Being •, becaufe all the Works of Art are only the Management of pre-exiftent Matter, and fit It for particular Ufes ; therefore God, as v/ell as every other Artift, muft have a Subje(5t y 4 pre- 328 'T'he pretended Difficulties in statural cr prepared to his Hands to work upon. But this Way of Reafoning will never prove what ought to be proved, viz. That it is impoffible that there fhould be any fuch Power. For this Power of making fomething out of nothing, or of creating a Subftance, is no more than the bringing fome- thing into Being, which before had none ; but this is not to affirm, that a Thing may be, and not be at the fame Time, which is a Contradic- tion •, but only that fomething, v/hich once had no Bdng, may be brought into Being. If we cannot conceive how this may be done, this ca:i be no good Argument againft the PofTibillty of its being done by an infinite Power. But, 3^/)', Another Impoffibility the Atheiji is wont to charge upon our Notion of a God, is on Ac- count of our afcribing Goodnefs to him ; which, they fay, is contradided by the natural and moral Evil, which appears in his Workmanfhip. But before the Atheift can prove that thefe could not proceed from a good Being, he fl-;ould fhew it to be inconfiftent with the jNature of Goodrefs, to make Beings with different Degrees of Perfedion. If he cannot do that, then certainly every Degree of Imperfedion, makes an Abatement of the Hap- pinefs of the Creature ; and fuch an Abatement conflitutes what we call natural or phyfical Evil. Thus, for Inftance, 'tis an Imperfedion In us Men that we want fuch a perfed Knowledge of oar own Frame and Conftimtion, antecedently to Experience, as would enable us to find out what would be good for us, and what would be prejudicial. To fupply the Want of this Know- ledge, God has affixed the Idea of Pain to our Natures, which is to warn us of any Thing that might hurt us. Pain is own'd to be a real Evil •, and yet if we were not admonifh'd by' it, to avoid hurtful Things, what thro' Ignorance 2 and revealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity. 329 and Inadvertency of our own Frame, we fhould never know when it was out of Order, till it was too late. If therefore it be not repugnant to the Idea of Goodnefs to create a Being of a lim-ted Knowledge, neither would it be confiftent with the fame Goodnefs to make him capable of re- ceiving painful Ideas, v^hen fuch a Conftitution was fitted for the Ufe and Benefit of fuch a Creature. AvA thus for moral Evil s the Atheift can ne- ver fliew its Exiftence to be a Contradi6tion to the Idea of Goodnefs, till he can fully fatisfy us, that there can be no fuch Being as a Creature endued with a Power over its own Adlions ; becaufe if that is poiTible, which the Atheift cannot difprove, fuch a Creature may inoffc certainly make an ill Ufe of that Pov/er, and involve itfelf in moral Evil. _ ^ Having fliewn, that the Atheijl cannot prove a Contradiction upon our Notion of a God ; I pro- ceed to confider tlie Difficulties attending his Scheme •, and iliew, that he is forced to take Re- fuge in fuch Explications of Things as are falfe and impofTible. Spinofe is the only Perfon, among the modern Atheift s^ that has pretended to give us a regular Scheme ci Atbeifra \ and by fhewing his Faults, I will prove the Weaknefs and Abfurdities of the atheiftic Scheme ^ tho' I fhall not fo confine niy felf to the Examination of his Scheme, as not to ihew 'occafionally, that every other Scheme, that I-aves out the religious Notion of a God, will be liable to great Abfurdities. Spinofa fuppofes with us, " That fomething' *"- muft neceffai-ily have exifted from all Eternity." He fuppofes further, " That there is no real *' Being befides this one neceflarily exifi:enL Being ; *' and fince the Exiftence of material Subftance is "- mo ft 330 T^he pretended Difficulties in natural or " mofl: evident, that this muft be the one felf- " exiftent Being, and all other Beings nothing *' but different Modifications of this one material " Subftance. He fuppcfes this Subftance to be " infinite, and to have an infinite Number of " Attributes, two of which he fuppofes to be " Thought and Extenfion •, he then affirms, in *-^ Confequence of this, that all Bodies are Modi- " fications of this one Subftance, confider'd as *' extended; as all Souls or thinking Beings are *' the Modifications of this one Subftance, conn- " der'd under the Notion of Thought. So that *^ God, the neceffarily-exiftent Being, and en- '' dued with infinite Perfeftions, is the Caufe *' of all Things that exift, tho', at the fame *' Time, he differs not really from thofe Things *' that exift. He is at the fame Time Agent and *' Patient, Caufe and Effed, and every Thing he " produces is only pradifing upon himfelf, and *' generating a new Appearance of himfelf. " From this Account of his Syftem, 'tis evident, that tho' Spmofa and we differ as to the Subjed: of the felf-exiftent Nature, yet we both agree in afterting, F/r/, The Unity of the felf-exiftent Being ; and, fecondly., its Immutability ^ for whatever Changes there may feem to be of Things, yet all this pafles with him for nothing, fo long as 'tis the fame numerical Being appearing in different DreiTes. Thus far being agreed, we are to en- quire, How far he has mended the religious Scheme by rejeding immaterial Subftance ? And whether his material Scheme can poffibly anfwer the above-mention'd Gharadlers ? The infuperable Difficulties Men found in re- conciling thefe Attributes with material Exten- fion, inclin'd them to admit, that there might be in Nature fome more perfed Manner of Exiftence than revealed Religion no Excufifor Infidelity. 331 than the material one, and this they called imma- terial Subftance. Spincfa, well aware of the Dif- ficulties that would difturb his material Scheme, gives us a new Notion of Matter. Matter had always been thought capable of Divifion into numberlefs Parts, each of which might exift fe- parately from the "Whole ; and, confequently, if Matter was the felf-exiftent Being, there muft have been as many felf-exiftent Beings, as Parts of Matter. But Spmofa was fenfible, that the, necefiarily exiftent Being could be but one ; he, therefore, aflerts, " That there is no more than. *' one material Subftance." But that what we call diftind Subftances, are nothing with him more than different Modes of the fame Being. But if M^e know any Thing at all, we know this to be falfe and impoffible. And, therefore, Spinofa, by fubftituting Matter in the Room of immaterial Subftance, has avoided a Difficulty, and taken up with an Impoflihility : For the only Difficulty againft immaterial Subftance is this, that our Senfes give us no Account of any fuch Exif- tences ; but as for Matter, there is nothing plain- er than that this is a compound Being, and there- fore can never be made confiftent with that Unity ?.nd Simplicity, which are neceftary Confequences of that Onenefs of Subftance, which Spi'nofa a- fcribes to the necefCirily exifting Being. The on- ly Subterfuge he has is this, that there is no fuch Thing as a Vacuum^ and, therefore, there can be no Separation of Matter. And fuppofing there is no Vacuum., yet thofe who maintain'd an Infi- nity of Matter, did acknov/ledge, that the Parts of fvlatter were really divifible, and, confequent- ly, did not think void Spaces neceflary in making a Separation of one particular Part of Matter from another, however neceiTary they might be to make a total Separation from all Matter in ge- neral. 332 'fhe pretended Difficulties in natural or neral. For who will not fay, that two Perfons are as really feparated from one another, tho' the Space that feparates them fhould be filled with other Perfons, as if it were taken up by any Thing elfe? Indeed, Spinofa fays, that he does not know whether he attributes any Thing to God that is unworthy of him, if he fhould grant, that he was divifible. And the Reafon he gives, why Divifibility fhould not be an Iniperfedlion in God, is, " Becaufe if he is divifible, he is divided " by himfelf, and not by any external Caufe.'* But this Anfwer leaves the Difficulty in all its Strength : For let the Divifibility be caufed by what it will, the Difficulty remains, how a fepa- rable Nature can be an uncornpounded Being. Secondly^ Another Difficulty which the Atheift brings upon himfelf, is, to make Provifion for the Immutability of his felf-exiftent Beings v/hile he makes Matter to be the Subjedl of it. We know the Difference between a Being that always continues the fame, and a Being that is perpe- tually changing the Manner of its Exigence : That a Being, who is, v/hat it is by a Neceffity of Nature, cannot be fabjed to Change or Cor- ruption j we are alfo afllired, that material Beings are fubjed to all Tvlanner of Alterations. Now, Mutability has fo plain a Mark of Im- perfedion in it, and is fo inconfiftent with necef- fary Exiftence, thqit it gives Spinofa no fmall Trouble to clear his neccfiary Being from any fuch Imputation •, and the only Way he could think of was this : Tho' the Manner of Being was always changing, yet the Subftance always continued the fame. Buc to deny the Mutability of any Beino;, merely becaufe the Subftance re- mains the fame, is to give a new Sigiiification to the Word : For in every mutable Being 'twas always underftood, that the Subftance remain'd what revealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity, 333 what it was, only the Mode of its Exiftence was alter'd i otherwife there would be no Difference between the Change and the Annihilation of a Being. And yet the Poets, as well as Philofo- phers, have always fuppofed a Diiference between thefe two Ideas. And, therefore, Spinofa's Ar- gument will only prove the Immortality, not the Immutability, of his felf-exiftent Being. Befides, this Argument of the Spinq/ijls proves too much : For it would prove not only that the felf-exiftent Bdng was not a mutable Being, but alfo that there could not be any mutable Being in the World. For if the felf-exiftent Being could be an immutable one, amidft all the Changes he v/ent thro*, only becaufe his Subftance was not deftroy'd, then what could hinder Man from be- ing an immutable Being, altho' he ftiould change his Opinions every Day ? For amidft all thefe Changes, he is ftill the fame Perfon ; and, there- fore, by the Reafoning of the Spi?ioftfts^ he v/ould be a moft fteady Being, tho' his Thoughts, and Purpofes, were unfteady enough. Thefe Difiiculties, or rather Impoftibilities, muil: affedl every Scheme that the Atheijl can raife upon the Foot of a material God. But, Secondly^ I am now to confider, how he has mended the Matter, by rcjedling a Power of making fomething from nothing. As he allows no fuch Power, he is forced to derive all the Powers of Nature from the Sub- ftance of Matter, as from an emanarive Caufe, producing them by ading upon itfelf. And thus Thought, Senfc, and Life, as v/ell as mate- rial Extenfion, is drawn out of the Subftance of Matter. As there are thinking, as well as unthinking Beings, the DifHculty is, how to derive both of thera from one ftngle Principle. We account for it. 334 ^^^ preietided Difficulties in natural or it, by fuppofing an omnipotent, fubftantial Intel- ligence to have given Being to Matter, not as an emanative Caufe, by producing it out of its own Subftance, for we do not fee how material Exten- fion fhould flow from the Subftance of a thought- ful Being, any more than how Thought fhould arife from Matter, but from nothings or when it had no Exiftence previoufly to the Exercife cf this Power of his. TheAtheift, that he may avoid afcribing this Power of producing Subftances from nothing, is forced to have Recourfe to material Subftance, as the only Source from whence muft arife both Thought and Extenfion : And then he muft fay, that Senfe and Infenfibility are the Attributes of the fame fimple Subftance of God ; and yet he, nor no Man elfe, can tell how the fame fimple Subftance could be both fenfible and infenfible^ thoughtful and thoughtlefs. To avoid this Abfurdity, he muft then fay, that there is no real Diiference between Thought and Extenfion : And this Spincfa fays, tho' every Body eife fees a manifcft Difference between them. Whatever Difficulty then there may be i:i con- ceiving it poftible, that fomething ftiould be made from nothing •, yet, I hope, there is a great deal of Difi^erence between our not conceiving the Fdji- bility of a Thing, and the concelmng it impqfjihie to be. That Thought and Extenfion ftiould be really the fame Thing, we fee to be impcfiible ; becaufe our Ideas of them are evidently tlie Ideas of dift^erent Things •, and v/e can never know one Thing from another, if fuch Marks of Diftlnd^ion in our Ideas will not prove a Dif- ference in the Thing. idly. If there be no creative Power, there will be no other Way in accounting for the Lxiftence of Things, but by deriving them from the Sub- ftance revealed Religion no Exct/fefor Lifidelity. 33^ ftance of the felf-exiftent Being. But all fuch Derivations as Spinofa fays, can be nothing but Modes of the divine Subftance •, and, confe- quently, the Souls of Men will be only different Modes of the divine Being; and, therefore, it will be God, and not the Man, that thinks, af- firms, denies, loves, or hates. And as one Man, at the fame Time, and In the fame Refped, af- firms what another denies, and loves what another hates, according to this Account of Things, God muft, at the fame Time, and in the fame Refpedt affirm, and not affirm, love, and not love, which are palpable Contradictions •, yet thefe, or as great Abfurdlties, will ftick faft to all the Deniers of creative Power. For either they muft affirm, that all the feveral Beings are only Modes of the felf-exiftent Being, which is abfurd •, or if they affirm thefe Modes of Spinofa to be real Beings, they muft admit what is equally abfurd, an infinite Number of neceffa- rily exiftent Beings, as many as there are real Be- ings in the World; or elfe they muft allov/, however difficult to conceive, that there muft be a creative Power. For if there be no fuch Thing as a Power of making real Exiftences, all parti- cular Beings, fuppofmg them to be real, muft exift neceffarlly, which is abfurd. I come now to confider another Difficulty, which the Atheijt makes in Excufe for not be- lieving a God, which Is, that It would oblige him to beTleve that Evil m.ay be reconciled with the Suppofal of a good Beln^. And am to fhew, that' all the Ways the Athelft takes to account for Good and Evil, are impoffible to be true. _ And, therefore, he is an unfair Examiner in rejefting Religion for the Sake of this Difficulty. And, I will begin with Spinofa' s Account, from whence he is to draw both Good and Evil. 336 T^he pretended Difficulties in natural or If there was in the World nothing but natural and moral Good, or nothing but natural and mo- ral Evil, there would be no Difficulty in deriving either of them from one iingle Principle ; but as there is an evident Mixture of both in the World, Spinofa judged it to be impofTible, that fuch a Mixture fhould arife from a good Principle, and, therefore, ereds a new Syftem with a material God at the Head of it, that fhould neither be good nor evil, but in its own Nature indifferent to both, fuch a Being then ading neceflarily ac^ cording to its Nature, whkh Nature is fuppofed to be perfedly indifferent as Good and Evil, and ading by an infinite Power, mufl produce all the PofTibilities of Being. And, therefore, fince Er- rors and Crimes, Grief and Pain, are as real Mo- difications of Being, as Truth and Virtue, Plea- fure and Happinefs, confequently one, as well as the other, muft have a Place in the Univerfe. For this Principle being in its own Nature in- different, either to Good or Evil, and producing all that is poflible to be produc'd, it mufl, of Courfe, produce Evil as well as Good. We will fee now, whether it was worth Spina- fa's while to quit Religion to get rid of that Quefcion, If a good God, 7roS;v ra y-aKoc ? I own his infinite Being fhould produce all Poffibilities of Being •, but it looks like a Contradidion to draw out of the fame fimple uncompounded Subftance, both Wifdom and Folly, Virtue and Vice, Hap- pinefs and Mifery. And yet, if this Account could be true, thefe muft all flow from the Ef- fence of the felf-exifient Being. But this is not all -, here is not only a Difiiculty of giving Birth to both Good and Evi', from fuch a fingle Principle, but alfo of freeing fuch a Principle from the Contradidion of being at the fame Time happy and miferable, as often as Men, or re-vealed Religion no Exctifefor hifidelity 337 or any other Beings, are in thefe Circumftances ; which is always the Cafe of fome or other of them J or if th.ey are only Modes of the divine Being, differing only in the Manner of its Ex- iftence, the divine Being muft be at kaft equally affedled in the one as in the other Gafe. There is alfo another Abfurdity chargeable up- on Spinofa^^ Syftem, viz. that all the foolifh and wicked Thoughts of Men, as well as thofe that are good, mufl be the Thoughts of the felf- exiftent Being. But fo long as we fee a real Dif- ference between good Senfe and Foolifhnefs, Vir- tue and Vicej we can never fee how fuch incom- patible Properties can flow from the fame Principle. For this would be to make a moft fimple Being, to be compounded of fuch inconfiflent Ingredi- ents, as could never be united together. But thenj it may be faid, why may not this be true, as well as what the Chriftian Religion fup- pofes to be true, viz. that the fame Perfon may be the Subjedh of both human and divine Attri- butes ? For human Wifdom, when compar'd with divine Wifdom, is no better than Folly : And, if this be true, then the Subjcd of both Natures muft be, at the fame Time, divinely and humanly wife^ that is, wife and not wife •, and if thefe Things can be fuppofed by the reli- gious Man to exift in God, why not by the Spt- nq/iji in his felf-exiftent Being. To which I anfwer, That when God took upon him human Nature, that human Nature was per- fedly fubmitted to the divine, no contrary Voli- tions, no Confli(5t between God and Man, but the Word direded, and the Man followed -, there was no Clafhing between the divine and human Nature : If the Wifdom of the latter was lefs extenfive, yet it was without any Mixture of Folly. Whereas, I objeded againft Spinofa*s Z Syftem, 338 T'he pretended Diffculties in natural &r Syftem, becaufe it introduced a Nature which was a perfedt Scene of Contention and Incon- fiftency, as it was evident from the many rational and foolijh Thoughts of Men, which are a Con- tradidion, when they are made to be at the fame Time the Thoughts of the fame Being. And yet his felf-exiftent Being, fo long as he fuppofes him to be the only Being in the World, muft be chargeable with all the foolifh as well as rational Thoughts of Men. Having fhewn, that Spimfa's Hypothefis is ^o far from giving a better Account of that Mixture of Good and Evil in the World, than the religi- ous Scheme, that it by no Means introduces any fuch Mixture into the World •, I come now to fhew, that no other Atheiftic Scheme ought to be taken up by any impartial Examiner, becaufe every other Atheiftic Scheme, different from that of Spinofa, will fuppofe more than one neceflary exiftent Principle •, but a Plu- rality of felf-exiftent Beings is contradictory to the cleareft Ideas we have of the Order of Things. All the real Perfeftions that Men have ever had any Notion of, they have been wont to give to the felf- exiftent Being ; they were fure that fomething muft. be infinite and eternal, and thefe Perfe6lions they conftantly afcribed to the felf-exiftent Being •, fot- the Excellency of fuch a Nature muft be, according to our Conceptions, if any Thing be fo, entitled to all pofTible Perfections i but then, 'tis very hard to conceive two fuch Beings with all thefe Powers, Till then the Atheift can tell us how to pro- vide a Reception for a fecond Infinite, we muft beg Leave to affirm," that he has a greater Diffi- culty upon his Hands, than the religious Man has, when he is called upon to account for Good and Evil upon the Foot of a good God. But farther. The Idea of Power flicks clofe td I our revealed Religion no Excufefof Infidelity. 339 our Idea of tlie felf-exiftent Being, and yet our Ideas will not allow of dividing the Power be- tween two, becaufe this would be to adrdit two Powers that could control one another, which gives us a faint Idea of Power, too limited to be given to a neceflarily exiftent, and infinite Being. For, in this Cafe, neither of the felf-exillent Be- ings would be able to produce any one Thing without the Interpofition of the other. Andj therefore, every Being in the World would be the EfFeft of their oppofing one another, and fo re- ceive its Nature from both. Some have difcovered a Fondnefs for two con- trary and independent Principles, hoping by them to account for the Mixture of Good and Evil in the World. But, however fond they may be of this Way of folving the DifFxulty, they may do well to confider, whether the afcribihg to' tlie ne- ceflarily-exiftent Being, fuch a limited Power, as contradidls our cleareft Ideas, be not a better Proof of the Falfhood of this Hypothrfis^ than any Arguments they can bring againft the Bein^ of a God from their Thx'nomenon of Good and Evil. The firft I have fliewn cannot be true; the laft may poflibly be true, tho' we cannot clear the DifRculties that attend it. But, idl)\ I will now fhew, that fuppofmg there are two fuch independent Principles, yet they would not, any more than Spinofa's Syftem, account for the Appearances of Good and Evil in the World. Suppofing then thefe two independent Princi- ples, they muft either have an equal or unequal Force. If they were unequal Powers, then the fuperior Power adling neceflarily, and to the ut- moft of its Power, muft, in an eternal Duration, have deftroyed all the Effeds of the weaker Power-, and then, if the fuperior Power were good, there could be no fuch Thing as Evil ; or if evil, no fuch Thing as Good. But, Z 2 idly. 3 40 T'he pretended Difficulties i?t 7iatural or 2dl)\ If we take two contrary Principles of e- qual Force to account for Good and Evil, then, as they ad neceflarily, and to the utmoft of their Powers, their continual Oppofition muft either produce nothing but Confufion, and deftroy the Operations of each other •, or elfe an equal Mix- ture of Good and Evil muft run thro' all Things, as the necefiary Refult of the Equality of their Oppofition : And, if this were the Cafe, there muft be an invariable and uniform Appearance of Good and Evil •, the Mixture of Good and Evil muft be the fame in every Part of Space, as well as every Part of Time, becaufe it proceeds from two contrary Caufes ading necefTarily, and to the utmoft of their Pov/ers. But if the fame Quantity of Good and Evil had been blended to- gether from Eternity, and uniformly diffufed thro' the infinite Extenfion, there could have been no fuch Thing as human Condud or Wif- dom, no Poftibility of choofing the lefs Evils to avoid greater, becaufe the Inconveniencies muft be equal, which Way foever we ad, if the Evil be equal, or as much in every Part of infinite Space as the Good is. But if the real State of Things proves, that there is more Evil in one Way of ading, than in another, this ftiews, that the Mixture of Good and Evil did not proceed from two contrary Prin- ciples ading neceflarily, but from one free and in- telligent Being, that has judicioufly annex'd dif- ferent Degrees of Evil, to different Ways of ad- ing, in order to make a Trial of our good Senfe in choofing the leaft Inconveniencies. In this Way of accounting for Good and Evil, we can fup- pofe them mixed together, and yet leave Room for the Exercife of good Senfe : Becaufe a Being that ads with every Degree of Liberty, which is confiftent with ading wifely, may fo order Things, revealed Religion no Excujefor Infidelity, 341 Things, as to leave it in the Power of fome Be- ings, if not entirely to feparate the Evil from the Good ; yet, at leaft, when there are different Degrees of Evil, to take the lefler : Whereas, if Good and Evil proceeded from two different and contrary Caufes, adling neceffarily with all their Force, it could never be in the Power of any particular Beings, fuch as Men, to alter fo far the original Conftitution of Things, as to take Good without taking an equal Portion of Evil ; becaufe it cannot be fuppofed, that what has been joined together by two infinite Powers, can pofTibly be feparated by Man. But fince all allow a Difference between wife and foolifh Condudl, the Appear- ance of Good and Evil, fuch as it really is, can- not pofTibly be reconciled by an Hypothejis of two contrary Principles a6ling neceflarily. Again, The unequal Allotment of Good and Evil to fome Sorts of Men cannot receive a Solu- tion from two contrary Principles •, for Beings that aft neceffarily, it mufi be granted, cannot be Re- fpeders of Perfons, but muft difperfe their Fa- vours or Refentments promifcuoufly. This La- cretins^ Lib. V. could not deny -, and, therefore, when he comes to that Part of Nature, which relates to the Difpenfation of Good and Evil, he acknowledges, that this was not to be accounted for by any Laws of Matter and Motion ; he dropt his Atoms when he fpeaks of the Misfor- tunes of great Men, and has Recourfe to I know not what hidden Power, that took a Delight in making a Jefl of all human Grandeur. \JLucret, Lib. V. V, 12^2.] If the religious Man meets with fome Difficul- ty in reconciling the Misfortunes of great and good Men with a good Being, yet nothing has been thought clearer, than that fomething, befides the neceffary Laws of Matter and Motion, rnufl Z 3 have 342 l^he pretended Difficulties in Jiatiiral or have had a Pland in human Affairs. There were always fo many unaccountable Changes in the Hiftory of great and good Men, that it has been thought ncceffary to have Recourfe to fome free Agent that governs all Events : For 'twas eafily feen, that the Workings ofnecefiary Agents muft be as unchangeable as their Natures. And, therefore, a more regular Courfe of human Af- fairs, than the prefent, muft have arifen from the Adlion of a Being, or Beings, that brought Things fi-om a Neceffity of Nature. Having confider'd fome of the moft material Objections againft the Being of a God, and fhewn, that they cannot be a good Reafon for denying him, becaufe the Appearance of Things will ne- cefiarily require the Exiftence of fuch Powers and Properties, as we afcribe to him ; I am now to reprefent fome of the Arguments on which the religious Man grounds his Belief of a God, drawn from the moft' confiderable Phenomena in Nature, fuch as Motion, Thought, and the Or- der of Things. Firjiy Motion, for the Exiftence of which there is no poftible Way to account, unlefs we will admit of a God, or which is the fame Thing to the Atheifi^ a Being diftindt from Matter. There are but three Ways of accounting for Motion. 1 . Either by fuppofing, that there has been ari infinite Succeffion of Impulfcs communicated from QWQ Body to another from Eternity, without any adtive Principle either in Matter or without it. Or, 2. That Motion is eftential to Matter ; or elfe, 3. That there is fome Being diftindl from Mat- ter, that is the Caufe of its Motion. But, I. An infinite Succeffion of Impulfes, without a moving Principle, v/ill never give Birth to Mo- tion, becaufe this would be to bring an Effect upon revealed Religion no Excpjefor hijidelity. 343 upon the Stage without the Help of a Caufe. Nor, 2. Is Motion eflential to Matter. Mr. Toland\ Arguments to prove the Adivity of Matter are thefe : (i.) " Becaufe, fays he, Motion, as well as " Extenfion and Solidity, is included in our Idea *' of Matter, that whenever we feparate Motion ." from Matter in our Idea of it, 'tis only a par- '* tial Confideration of it, or an abflradled No- " tion of the Mind ; and, therefore, no Proof *' that Matter can exift without Motion." (2.) Another Reafon he urges for the Adlivity of Matter, is, " Becaufe in Fad: all Matter is in " Motion." (3.) A third Reafon is this: " That tho' there " ihould be fome Objedlion againft it, that much ^' greater ones would lie againft an external Mover " of Matter." In Anfwer to thefe Arguments, I will fhew, ly?. That our Idea of Matter, when we leave Motion out of it, is no abftraded Notion of the Mind, but a compleat Idea of it. idl)\ That tho' all Parts of Matter were in Motion, it would not follow, that Motion was effential to Matter. 3^/)', That the Adlivity of Matter is inconfif- tent with fome Appearances in Nature, Afthly^ That the Objedlions againft God's being the Author of Motion, are not fuch as fhould difcourage any rational Perfon from acknowledg- ing, that 'tis in God we live. I/?, I am to fhew, that our Idea of Matter, without Motion, is not a partial Confideration of Matter, but a compleat Idea of it. The Reafon which has always determin'd the World to look out for a Caufe of Motion extrin- fical to Matter, was this, tho' they could eafily conceive it capable of being moved and divided, Z 4 yet, 3 44 ^^^ pretended Difficulties in natural or yet the conceiving it to be undivided and un- moved, was a more fimple Notion of Matter, than the conceiving it divided and moved. This being firft in Order of Nature, and an ad- equate Conception of it too, they thought it necefiary to enquire, how it came out of this State, and by what Caufes Motion, from whence this Diverfity in Matter arofe, could come into the World. And they could not account for it any other Way than by introducing another infinite Being, ^'/2;. a God, to rouze it out of its inadlive State. But tho' the Evidence againil the Adi- vity of Matter, from its Idea, is fo clear, yet Mr. "Toland has attempted to prove Matter an ac- tive Being from its Idea. As, Firft^ " From the Divifibility of Matter, *' which always makes a Part of our Idea of " it." And, 7.dly, " Becaufe our Idea of Matter always *' contains fome Quality, which necefiarily fup- " pofes Motion." Firft, From the Divifibility of Matter. His Argument from hence is founded upon this ; becaufe, as he fuppofes, we cannot con- ceive Divifibility without Motion ; therefore, we cannot conceive Matter, "^vhich is always con- ceived as divifible, without conceiving Motion as infeparable from Matter. But this is to make a Capacity of receiving Motion, and Motion itfelf to be the fame Ideas. For tho- we cannot con- ceive Matter to be actually divided v.'ithout add- ing Motion to our Idea of Matter •, yet nothing more than a Capacity of receiving Motion is ne^ ceflary to the making ijp our Idea of Divifibility. For we can conceive a Thing to be divifible, tho* it fhould never be adually divided ; and, there- fore, Motion is not necefTarily included in our Idea of Divifibility of Matter. And, confe- quently. revealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity. 345 quently, to fay, that Divifibillty makes a Part of our Idea of Matter, would be no Proof that Mo- tion too muft belong to our Idea of It. But Mr. Poland goes further, and would prove, that Motion muft neceflarlly be Included In the Divifibillty of Matter, becaufe whatever Is divi- sible, muft have within Itfelf a Power of dividing itfelf. " If there was, fays he, no internal E- " nergy, Matter would be incapable of Divl- " fion," But this cannot be proved, unlefs he takes it for granted, that there' is nothing but Matter In the World, which would be begging the Queftion In Difpute. For If any Thing be- fides Matter had an Exiftence, he might have conceived Matter to be divlfible, without think- ing of an internal Energy of Matter, becaufe it would be as truly divlfible, tho' divided by fome- thing elfe, as if we fuppofe it divided by itfelf, and the Idea of Dlvifibility would be juft the fame, as to what he fays, " That Motion Is ^' contain'd In our Idea^ of Matter." Becaufe, 2dl)\ " Our Idea of Matter always contains ^' fome Quality, which neceflarlly fuppofes Mo- " tion." If by an Idea, he means an Image, or what may be an Objedl of our Senfes, 'tis agreed, we can form no Idea of Matter divefted of all Qaa- lities •, but this is only to fay, that we can't form an Image of a Thing, which has no Image ; but ftill the Idea of folld Extenfion remains a diftind Idea from that of Motion, and, therefore, from all the Qualities that are a Confequence of Mo- tion ; which Ihews, that there Is nothing In the Nature of the Thing that fhould have hinder'd Matter from exifting without Motion. Mr. 'To- land himfelf acknowledges, " That Motion is ^' not included in the Idea of Extenfion." And therefore if we can have any Idea of Solidity, a folid 3 4^ ^he pretended Diffictdtiei in natural or JToIid extended Subftance may be conceived to ex- ift without Motion, or without any Qualities that fhall afFedt our Senfes. Whereas there is no con- ceiving Matter to exifl without Solidity and Ex- tenfion, which fhews them to be eflential to Mat- ter, and at the fame I'ime fhews Motion not to be efTential. And therefore he has begged the Queftion in difpute, in adding to the Idea of Matter a new Attribute, without any Proof that it is one. But, ^dly^ Another Argument he brings for the Ac- tivity of Matter is, " That in Faft all Matter is " in Motion." And fuppofing it true, it would not prove that Motion is an efTential Attribute of Matter : For if Motion is not included in our Idea of Matter, as I have fhewn, but we can as well conceive it at Reft, tho' there fhould be no Bodies at Reft, it would not follow, that Motion is efiential to Matter, but, on the contrary,* we ought to look fome where elfe, than in Matter, for a Caufe of its Motion : And as 'tis proved to be foreign to our Idea to look abroad for a powerful Caufe, fuch as God, that had imprefs'd Motion upon Matter. But Mr. T'oland fays further, " Seeing every Part *' of Matter is in Motion, you ftiould conclude, " that Motion is eflential to the Whole, for the " fame Reafon, that you think Extenfion to be " fo, becaufe every Part is extended." But the Cafe is different, becaufe Extenfion is confeftedly included in our Idea of Matter, whereas Motion is not fo. Befides, if Mr. Poland reafons juftly, the Univerfality of Motion can be no Proof of its being eflential to Matter, becaufe he allows centripetal Force to be univerfal -, and yet he does not allow that particular Determination which we call Gravity to be efTential to Matter; and, there- fore. Motion may beloi>g to every Part of Matter, and revealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity. 347 and not be eflential to it : It may be univerfal, and yet proceed from an external Caufe. But, 3^/)'» Motion cannot be eflential to Matter, for thefe three Reafons. Firji^ Becaufe there could be no fuch Thing as Bodies, or any Concretions of Matter. 2dly, Becaufe there could be no Variation as to the Quantity of Motion, if all Matter was felf- adl.ive. ■^dly, Becaufe Bodies of equal Bulk do yet weigh unequally. Firjiy Becaufe there could be no fuch Thing as Concretions of Matter, if Matter was felf-adive. The prefent State of Matter appears to us to be divided into Mther^ and an infinite Number of large Combinations of Matter floating in that Mther ; whereas, if Matter had been felf-at^live, it could never have concreted fuch Globes, as the Stars and Planets, but mufl: have every where appeared in the highefl: State of Fluidity, as fine as the prefent Mther in which they fwim. For if Motion were eflential to Matter, it mufl: be- long to the fmalleft: Part of it, and, confequent- ly, mufl: be equally fpread thro* the whole Mafs of Matter, and then no pofllble Reafon is to be given why fome Parts of Matter fliould be more divided than others, fince every Atom muft e- qually partake of the dividing Principle. But, zdly^ Matter cannot be felf-adlive, becaufe there could be no Variation of Motion : For if Motion be eflTential to every Particle of Matter, no one Particle of Matter can any otherwife lofe its Motion, but by lofing its Being ; and yet, *tis evident, as Sir Ifaac Newton fays, that, " What " by the Tenacity of fluid Bodies, the wearing " of their Parts, and the neceflary impairing of " the elaftic Force in folid Bodies, the Quantity " of Motion muft 4imiai(h rather than increafe, " unlefs 3 4^ The pretended Difficulties in natural or ■•' unlefs the Lofs of Motion be repaired by an *' adtive Being, that can fupply thofe Lofles." And he is fupported in his Perfuafion by Matter of Faft, as in the Cafe of two hard Bodies of equal Force, that are not elafticaJ ; when fuch Bodies meet they lofe all their Motion, which cannot be difperfed among the Parts of fuch Bo- dies, becaufe the Parts of fuch Bodies are incapable of any tremulous Motion for Want of Elafticity^ And if it (hould be denied that the Parts of thofe Bodies would lofe the Motion of their Wholes, there is this Argument againft it. That it would then follow that Bodies perfe6lly hard and elaftical would refled with a double Force, w'z. the Force arifing from the Elafticity, and moreover all, or at leaft. Part of the original and dired Force, which is contrary to Experience. [See Clarke's Letters to Leibnitz.'] And I cannot but obferve, frgm the Lofs of in- animate Motion, that as the original Laws of Motion could never have taken Place, unlefs there did exift fomething fuperior to Matter, that had impreffed thofe Laws of Motion upon it ; fo thofe Laws could never have continued, unlefs there were an adive Being in Nature, that was always ready to exert upon Matter a certain Force or Activity, in Proportion as the Motion was dimi- nifh'd i which proves the Exiftence of a Being, that not only gave Motion to Matter, but alfo of a Being, that ftill continues to repair the Weak- ning by Time of the firft Impreffion of Motion -, and this fhews the Neceffity of admitting a Go- vernor of the World, who by his Providence may interpofe to preferve it, as well as of an ori- ginal Author of Motion, and of this World, which is an EfFedl of a wonderful Diredion of that Motion. From whence it follows, that that Notion that God had imprefled a certain Quantity of repealed Religmi no Excufefor Itifideliiy. 3 ^g of Motion upon Matter at the Creation, and then left it to fhift for itielf, cannot be true •, becaufe we have fhewn, that the Quantity of Motion mufl; diminifh, unlefs there was fome a(5tive Being that could keep it up in the fame State. And if the inanimate Part of the World could not have been preferved in Motion, without the continued Adion of fome Being putting forth its Force ac- cording to thofe original Laws of Motion, much lefs could the Bodies of Plants and Animals be form'd and preferved by Matter diredled at firfb according to any whatever Laws of Motion. From hence too it appears that God does not a6t as an Anima Mundi^ nor as a Part, but as Gover- nor of this World ; becaufe fuch a Being would be nothing but Fate and Nature, which can never be reconciled with the apparent Diminution of the Quantity of Motion in the Univerfe : As Fate or Nature mufl always ad to the utmoft of their Powers -, and therefore if the Effed of their Adivity could be at any Time abated, it could never be repaired again. But, 3ifficultt:s in natural or even Epicurus himfelf own'd, that there could be no fuch Thing as Pleafure (in which he made the Happinefs of human Life to confift) with- out Virtue. [See Laertius^s Life of Epicurus^ Sed. 138.] So far was Epicurus from denying moral Differences, which ought to fhame our A- theijis^ who would fubvert the original Nature of Things, in order to gratify their bafe Appetites. 2(^/y, I am to fhew, That all Legifiatcrs, or Founders of free States^ have fuppofed the Obli- gation to be juft and honeft, as the Foundation of their feveral Conftitutions, and the beft Sup- ports of them. It cannot be denied, that Legiflators were Per- fons fufficiently qualified for deciding this Quefli- on, as they are fuppofed to have been acquainted with the Springs of human A6lions. That they believed there was fuch a Thing as moral Ho- nefty, and thought that the World believed fo too, is evident from hence, that they depended more upon the Confent of the People, than Force for the Prefervation of their Eflablifhments : But the Confent of the People could never be a Foun- dation for a durable Society, unlefs they fuppofed the People prepoffefled with an Opinion, that this Confent laid them under an Obligation of continuing it j which they could have no Reafon to believe, unlefs they fuppofed them under an Obligation of keeping their Word, before they had given their Confent. The Hobbifi fuppofes them obliged by Virtue of their Compad , but that antecedently to this, there .was no Obligation upon any of them to be faithful and juft, becaufe there v/as no fuch Thing as Faith and Juftice in Nature. But fuppofing the antient Founders of States to be perfuaded, that there was no fuch Thing as Faith or Juflice, before the Laws of Society had made fuch a Diflindlion in human Adions, revealed "Religion no Exciifefor Lifidelify. 381 A6licns, they muft fee that Men would be no more obliged by any Confent given, either to continue their Confent, or to make good their Promifss, than if they had done nothing at all of either •, for it would be impoflible, that they fhould lay themftlves under an Obligation, be- caufe fuch an Ad would be made in a State of Nature, when there was no Difference between Faithfulnefs and Unfaithfuhiefs : And, therefore, their Confent being given at a Time, when they were not obliged to keep their Word, they could not be obliged to do it. But as we are lure that the Founders of free States thought the Peo- ple's Promifes the beft Security of their Eftabliih- menrs, they certainly acknowledged moral Dif- ferences obligatory, before pofitive Conftitutions were made. But it may be faid, that fome of the antient Legiflators could not believe that there was any Juftice independent of pofitive Conftitutions, be- caufe they gave Impunity to the Breach of fome moral Laws, particularly Lyciirgus gave a Licence to fteal, that the Spartan Youth might learn to out- wit their Neighbours. But in Anfwer to this, we fay, that the m.ak- ing Laws concerning Property, is making Laws concerning a Thing of a changeable and pofitive Nature ; and as No-body doubts, that a Legifla- tor may take av/ay Part of a Man*s Property for the Support of the Publick, fo Lycurgus might fubjccl the Properties of particular Perfons to fuch an Inconvenience as this, without offending againft the eternal Rules of Right and "Wrong, as he thought it for a publick Good, But, idly^ Unlefs Lycurgus was perfuaded of the Obligation of performing a religious Fromife, he never would have perfuaded the People to bind themfelves by Oath not to alter his Laws, till he return*d. 382 T'he pretended Difficulties in natural or return'd, which he never intended. He could not have been fo weak, as to believe, they would obferve their Oaths when he was gone, if he had not known they univerfally believed there was fuch a Thing as Faith and Honour, antecedent to his Laws. 3^/y, Thofe who leaft of all obferve moral Differences in their Pradice, and refer all to Plea- fure or Profit, cannot but confefs a Difference in fome Cafes : For if they can have their Pleafure and Profit as well by obferving the Rules of E- quity, as otherwife, there are few that v/ould not choofe them in an honeft Way. If at any Time there have been particular Perfons that have wan- tonly injured their Fellow-Creatures, they would have been wont to pafs under the Charadler of Mon- fters. The Unbeliever ought to affign fome Rea- fon of this conftant Appearance in Behalf of what we call Virtue : For if the Reafon of this IPha- nomenon is to be drawn from hence, either that the Reafon of Man difcovers, even to the moft vicious Perfons, a Fitnefs and Unfitnefs of Things j abftraded from Pleafure and Profit ; or that there is an Inclination in the human Species, which moves it to Adrs of Benevolence and good Na- ture, when not checked by private Intereft, it will ftill be a ftrong Proof of a Difference in the Nature of Things. For if rational Creatures, in Virtue of their Reafon, difcover any fuch Things, they muft have as good a Foundation in Nature, as the Reafon of rational Agents ; or if Inclina- tion leads them to fuch a Behaviour, fo long as this Inclination appears almoft to be univerfal, no- thing lefs than the Nature of Things can be a Caufe fufficient of fo regular an Effed. There is one other Difficulty raifed againft the. Proof of moral Differences, which is, that let it be never fo certain that fome Things appear to us morally revealed Religion no ^xaifefor Injidelity. 383 morally good, others evil j yet they may not ap- pear fo to God, whofe Nature and Perfedlions are incomprehenfible, and till it appears that God judges of them, as we do, we may ftill be fafe, tho' we do not pracftife agreeably to thofe Dif- ferences : And fome Men pretend to be confirm'd in this Belief, becaufe they cannot fee God mak- ing any vifible Diftindion between good and bad Men. In Anfwer to the firft Part of the Objedlion, we fay, that how incomprehenfible foever the Nature of the fupreme Being, and his Manner of Thinking may be to us -, yet as we have proved, that the Morality of human Adlions is founded upon the Nature of Things, if we could be fup- pofed to miftake, when we judge according to fuch Evidence, and that Things appear quite dif- ferent to God, than they did to us, it would be beft for us to leave off reafoning upon any Kind of Truth whatfoever. But let there be never fo much Difference between the Perfedion of God's Knowledge, and that of ours, yet, 'tis plain, our Knowledge, as far as it reaches, is real. As to the fecond Part of the Objedion, that God ■makes no vifible Diftindlion of good and bad Men, which they think a Proof, that he does not judge of Good and Evil as we do •, I will fhew, idly.^ That God may have fuch Apprehenfions of Virtue and Vice as we have, and yet not make any greater Diftinftion between the Good and the Bad, than v/hat we fee at prefent. The Infidel cannot be fure he fhall not live in a future State ; and, therefore, he cannot be fure, that this Life is not a State of Probation for another : For it is not at all inconfiftent with the Notions we have of Holinefs, that a holy Being fhould permit Wickednefs to thrive for a Time, and Goodnefs to 3 84 '^he pretended Difficidties in natural or to be the Sufferer, fuppofing a Time to come, when the Good and Bad fhall be vifibly diftin- guifh'd by Rewards and Punifhments, unlefs any Man could prove it inconfiftent with Goodnefs to make a Trial of the Behaviour of free Agents : For, 'tis certain, an exad Difcrimination of the Good and Bad, by Rewards and Punifhments, would not be confident with any State of Proba- tion ; which is Reafon enough for a good Being's not making any fuch Difference, altho' there be a real Difference between Virtue and Vice, and altho' this Difference appears fuch to the fupreme Being as it does to us : But that when this State of Trial fhall be over, which will be when we die, that then Virtue fhould meet that Happinefs that naturally belongs to it, and Vice, that Evil and Mifery which are its proper Portion. Thefe are fuch neceflary Confequences from the different Natures of Good and Evil, and from their being apprehended as fuch by the fupreme Being, that 'tis impoffible to be otherwife. And, therefore, God's Forbearance of Sinners, at prefent, is no reafonable Ground for the Atheift to fancy it fhall always fare as well with him, as it does now. Having proved, that the Behaviour of fuch a moral A gent as Man, could not be indifferent in the Sight of God, it concerns every Man to in- form himfelf what Behaviour will be moll agree- able to him. And as he has heard of m.any Per- fons who pretend to have received Inftrudlions from Heaven, in order to tell Men what Beha- viour God would require at their Hands, to exa- mine whether there be not Truth in the Preten- fions of fome or other of them. In Anfwer to this, the Infidel fays, he has no Reafon to concern himfelf in any Pretenflons to Revelation •, becaufc he is perfuaded, >/. revealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity. 385 i/?, That there can be no rational Proof given of any Revelation. idly^ That if there were any Means of prov- ■ ing, that a Perfon had received Authority from God to difcover fome Truths to Mankind, that all fuch Difcoveries would be ufelefs, and there- fore cannot come from God, becaufe he does nothing in vain. '^fdly^ Becaufe there have been fo many Pre- tences to Revelation, that there is no finding out which is the true one, if any were fuch. i/?. That there can be no rational Proof made of any Revelation. In Anfwer to which, I will fhew, 1. That the extraordinary Works related in the Gofpels^ fuppofing them, for the prefent, to have been really performed, would be a fufficient Proof of a divine Miffion. 2. That the Difciples of our Lord were well qualified for judging whether fome of thefe Works were really done ; and, confequently, their Teftimony concerning fuch miraculous Facfts would be as credible a Teftimony as it would have been concerning any other Matters of Faft, and then a Revelation may be made credible to Men. But before I proceed, it may not be amifs to Ihew the PoiTibility of fuch Works being done, and yet of not being the Effects of fome Powers of Nature, as Spinofa thought. For thofe who deny the Authority of Miracles do even deny ^.e Poffibility of them, when confider'd as per- form'd by fome Power fuperior to Nature, and acting freely upon Nature. But the Reafon of their denying them is built upon a Sappofition, "which is a begging the Queftion in Difpute, viz^ That God is a necefiary Agent, and, therefore, the Laws of Motion muft be neceflarily what t^ Vol. III. Cc they 3^6 'The pretended Difficulties in fiafural or they are ; for then it would be true, that all the Effe(5ls of thofe Laws would be equally natural, tho' not equally common, and be as much the Effe(5ls of the Pov/ers of Nature, as any of thofa that are common. But we have already proved, that the Motions of Matter depend upon a free Being, who moved Matter as he thought fit : And tho' he choofes an uniform Manner of a6l- ing upon Matter, which we call the Laws of Matter in Motion, yet we may conceive that he may adil otherwife, as well as we can conceive that he might have imprefs'd different Powers upon it from the prefent ones : And then there can be no Difficulty in conceiving that God may change them for a Jhort Time, as well as for a long one, v/hich makes all the Difference between Miracles, and fuch Works as are the Effeds of the fettled Courfe of Nature ; it being then not im- poiTible that fuch Works fhould have been per- form'd, as are related in the Gofpels, altho' they were not an Effecl of any natural Powers of Matter in Motion, I come now to fhew, I. That fuch extraordinary Works, fuupofing them to have been perform'd, will be a fufficient Proof of a divine MiiTion, for thefe two Reafons. ifi, Becaufe they could not be the natural Ef- feds of any Laws of Nature whatever. 2^/y, Becaufe they could not be done by any inferior Agents independently of God. For the only Reafons given, why the Miracles related in the Gofpels fhould not prove the Perfon was fent by God, mufl be, either becaufe thefe Works were as much the Effeds of natural Caufes, as thofe which are common ; or that they might be perform'd by fome invifible Agents fuperior in Power to Man, tho' vaftly inferior to God. i/?. There is no Ground to believe our Savi- our's Miracles were the natural Effeds of any 2 Law* revealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity. 387 Laws of Nature unknown to Men, becaufe if* they were fuch, no Reafon can be given, 1. Why no more of them are produced. And, 2. Becaufe fuppofmg them to be fo. How could our Saviour know them ? fnice they are fuppofed to be unknown to Men. i/. There is no Ground to believe cur Sa- viour's Miracles were the natural Effe6LS of any Laws of Nature, becaufe no Reafon can be given, why no more of them are produced. That Nature fhould be many thoufand Years in bringing forth the Refurre6lion of a dead Man, and yet that this fhould be as natural a Produ6t of hers, as the Birth of a Man, v/hich happens every Day, is what No- body fure can believe. 'Tis not doubted, that a real Cauf^ may be defeated fometimes by the contrary Aftings of other Caufes, but that it fliould be always fo, is not to be reconcil'd with thofe Marks of Wifdam which appear in tliofc Parts of Nature v/e are ac- quainted with. I do not deny, that many natural Effects have pafTed upon the World for Prodigies j particu- larly in illiterate Ages, which are now accounted for by the ordinary Laws of Nature : But then, 'tis to be confider'd, that it has not been for want of cbferving the Nature of dead Bodies, that the Refurredion of fjch Bodies has pailcd for a Pro- digy, but becaufe Men were ailured, by conti- nual Obfervation, that it v/as not the Nature of fuch Bodies to fpring out of their Graves \ and, therefore, rightly judged it fupernatural. But, idly^ Suppofing our Saviour's infiantaneous Cures of blind, lame, and fick People, to have been mere Efteds of fome fecret Laws or Powers in Nature, there flill remains a great Difficulty in finding out, how our Saviour could know, when thefe unkngv/n Powers would exert themfelves ? C c 2 How 388 The pretended Difficulties in natural or How lie could be poflefs'd of a Piece of Know- ledge which No -body ever had before his Time, the Atheift ought to account for. Till fuch Time we have a Right to inlift upon it, that our Savi- our's miraculous Cures ihould be taken for fome uncommon Exercifes of the Power of God, and not for any natural Effeds of certain Powers of Nature. Nor, Qclly^ Could fuch Works be perform*d by any Agents inferior to God, becaufc the railing a Body to Life requires as great a Power as giv- ing Life at firft to it. But whatever extraordi- nary Works may be done, whether really, or in Appearance by any invifible Agents inferior to the fupreme Being ; yet fo long as the Deiji be- lieves him to be the Maker of the World, he cannot believe any inferior Beings to have a natu- ral Power, or a Power independent upon God, of making any new Species of Animals, or of forming any Individuals "out of lifelefs Matter, of the fame Species of the prefent ones of God*s making ; becaufe a Power lodged in any Hands different from thofe of the Creator, of increafing the Number of Animals in any other Way, than of his Appointment, would be inconfiftent with the Oeconomy of the World, and the Fitnefs of Provifions, both with Regard to the Quantity and Quality of them, for the Ufe of fuch Ani- mals. And it cannot be fuppofed, that God v/ould furnifh any of his Creatures with a Power of didurbing his own Plan, and making it unbe- coming his V/ifdom to execute. As to the Miracles which the Egyptian Magi- cians perform.'d, there is no Evidence that they were more than delufory. For as to the Con- veriion of their Rods into Serpents, we have no', Reafon to think this was a real Change into a living Creature j becaufe we find, that Aaron^s Rod, revealed Religion no Exciifefor Infidelity. 389 Rod, after it had been twice converted into a Serpent, called afterwards a Rod or Wand : It refumed its primitive Nature, and this too with- out the Help of any miraculous Change, as far as appears by the Hiftory. But however it might have been with Aaron^s Rod, yet had the Magi- ciayis Converfion of their Rod been a real Change into a Serpent, it would be hard to give a Rea- fon, why they were not able to form Lice out of the Duft, as well as a Serpent out of the wooden Wand. And the Scriptures fay nothing of Frogs be- ing made by the Incantations of the Magicians^ but only that they brought them out of the Wa- ter upon the Land, which might be done with- out the Power of forming fuch Animals as Frogs. As to Apollonhis of Ty ana's raifing a Lady to Life •, the Account which Philojiratus gives of it, fhews it to be very doubtful, whether the Lady was really dead, or only in a Trance. [See Philofi. de vita Apollonii Tyan. Lib. IV. Cap. 45.] And, therefore, this Inftance will never prove, that any inferior Agents have a Power indepen- dent of God, of giving Life, or making new In- dividuals. Confequently, it cannot invalidate my Proof of a divine MifTion, drawn from the Ex- ercife of fuch a Pov/er, as that of giving Life to a dead Body. Having (hewn, that fome of the Works of our Saviour could not be the Ef- feds of any Powers of Nature, nor of any A- gent inferior to God. I am to fhew, 2. That the Difciples were qualiiied for judging, whether fuch Works were done or not ; particularly with Regard to Chrift's Refurredion, that they were able to judge, whether it was real^ or only in Appearance. It muft be obferved, from the Account v/hich the Evangel ijis give of this Matter, that they C c 3 wer& 390 ^^ pretended Difficulties in natural or were not credulous •, tliat they reje6ted the Story of the Women concerning his being rifen •, they might, therefore, be capable of being good Wit- nefies, v/hen they witnefTed agaiuft their Preju- dices. They [aw him feveral Times, knew that he was exaftly like that Perfon, who was cru- cified : They heard him talk with them after he was dead^ as they had done when he was alive : And Tho?nas was convinced, that his Maf- ter was truly raifed to Life again, by even put- ting his Fingers into his Wounds. He did not appear once or twice, but feveral Times, fb they had many Opportunities to fatisfy themfelves, whether it was he or not : And at laft they faw him afcend up into Heaven. If after all this Evidence thefe WitnefTes were deceived, we mufb give up the Tcftimony of cur Senfes, as not to be depended upon in any Cafe whatever. It will not be fufficient to fay, that I have al- lov/ed the Magicians Rods to be only in Appear- ance turned into Serpents, and yet no Doubt but the Standers by were as fully perfuaded that the Rods were really become Serpents, as the Apof- tles were that they fav/ their Lord, when they faw his Apparition : Becaufe we don't find the E- gyptians were difficult in believing the Converfion of the Magicians Rods, and therefore did not ex- amine whether it was really fo or not. Where- as the Difciples were averfe to believing the ReT fairedlion, and were therefore nice in their Exa- mination ; and had feveral Opportunities of fee- ing him. Vyliercas the Converfion of the Ma- gicians R.od was but once made, and quickly deftroyed by Aaron^s Rod, fo that there was not much Time ailow'd for examining the Truth of that Appearance : And there was no Neceffity for ^ofes to difcover the Change was not real ; be- caufe their R,od? being made to difappear by Aaronh revealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity. 3 9 1 Aaro:4*s Rod, v/as a fufficient Confutation of the Power by which they a6led, altho' the Conver- afion, in both Cafes, had been only in Appearance. If it be faid, that had our Saviour really rifen with the fame Body he laid down in the Grave, the two Difciples who travel I'd with him from Emmaus, muft have known him : Our Anfwer is, that our Saviour appear'd in a different Drefs ; and *tis very poffible they might entertain no Sufpicion of his being their Mafter, whom they did not believe to be alive, tho' the Perfon they ■converfed v/ith might very much refemble him in his Afpe<5l, and his Voice, And, therefore, no- thing can be inferr'd from this Fa6l, to the Pre- judice of a real Refurredtion. Having confider'd the firft Difficulty of the Infidel^ 'uiz. that there can be no rational Proof given of any Revelation from Heaven, and proved it to be falfe, I come now to confider his fecond Difficulty, idly^ That if there were any Means of prov- ing that a Perfon had received Authority from God to difcover fome Truths to Mankind, that all fuch Difcoveries would be ufelefs, and, there- fore, cannot have God for its Author, who does iiothing in vain, or without good Reafon. Which they fupport by thefe two Reafons, 1. Becaufe Authority cannot be a fufficient Ground to form a rational AfTent upon. 2. Becaufe what- ever is needful to be known in religious Matters, may be found out by Reafon and Difcourfe. I fhall therefore fhew, firfi^ That Authority may be a good Reafon for giving our AfTent to a Propofitlon. idly. That a Revelation Is better fitted on ma- ny Accounts for teaching Men their Duty, than Reafon or Philofophy : And, therefore, 'tis not unbecoming the Wifdom of God to make one. C c 4 i/. 392 T^he pretended Difficulties in natural or i/?, That Authority may be a good Reafon for giving our Aflent to a Propofition. By an Aflent formed upon Faith or Authorityy in Diftinflion from an Aflent that refts upon Reafon only, I mean, an Aflent, that a Propo- iition is true, tho' our Reafon cannot difcover any neceflary Agreement between the Parts of the Propofitlon ; but believes them to be truly connefted, becaufe we are told as much, fo as if God reveals a Propofition to us, which natural Reafon difcovers to be neceflarily true ; as he has done in the moral Law ; all fuch as do evidently perceive it to be true, can't properly be faid to take it for a Truth upon Faith, or the Authority of God, but upon the Reafon and Evidence of the Thing ; becaufe where the Proof is evident, the Reafon of Aflent will be refolved into its Evidence, not into the Authority of the Perfon who relates it for a Truth. God had left Mankind, except the Jews^ al- moft without any Diredions, than what natural Reafon could furniifh them with. For excepting a few Traditions, (which they had confounded with Fable and Story) whatever they found out, was in a Way of Reafon and Philofophy, by fuch Inferences as Reafon was able to draw from its own Principles, God fent no Prophets among them. Not but he raifed up great Men in the feveral Seds of Philofophy to be the Inftruders of the People, and perhaps afllfted them in their great Difcoveries they made concerning himfelf, and their Duty to him ; but then God did all this in a Way of Reafon and human Wifdom. Yet notwithftanding ^\\ their wife Inftru(5bions, and the Difcoveries made by them, concerning the Obje(5l of Worfhip, the Bulk of Mankind made fo fnmll Improvement under them, as not to know the true God. And therefore God ob- Z ferving revealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity. 393 ferving the fmall Proficiency Men made under this Sort of Teachers, was pleafed to teach Man- kind himfelf, that they fhould rely upon his Cre- dit for fuch Truths as they wanted to be fatisfied. in -, that they fhould have his Authority inftead of tedious Inferences from Reafon, or uncertain Traditions. One would have thought, that Men v/ould have received God's Inftrudions with a due Senfe of Gratitude -, that his Veracity fhould have re- moved all Objedlions againfl fuch a Method- And yet fome pretend to affure us, that Aflent given to what we don't underftand, tho' fupported by the greatest Authority, is repugnant to the Nature of a rational Being •, and confequently, that the Obedience of Faith, and a Refignation of Underflanding, are a perfe(5t Contradidion to the Nature of an human Mind. That all AfTent mufl be grounded on fomc Kind of Evidence or other, is very certain j and alCo, that a Man mufl have a clear Perception of the Senfe of a Propofition, before he can give any Affent to it ; otherwife he would aflent to he knows not what : But then it does not follow, that a Man can't give his AfTent, till he is able to find out thofe Proofs, which fhew the Connexion and Agreement between the Parts of the Propofi- tion •, for why may not Authority, affirming the Truth of a Propofition, be a fufficient Evidence to warrant our AfTent ? 'Tis true. Authority, as fuch^ does not help us to underftand the Propofi- tion better than we did before ; and yet the Opi- nion we have of the Skill and Veracity of the Perfon, who tells us the Propofition is true, may be to 'us, a probable Evidence of its Truth, and a rational Ground of Perfuafion. And therefore a clear Underflanding of a Truth, cannot be previoufly 394 ^^^ pretended Difficulties in natural or previoufiy neceiiary to every Afleiit of the Mind of Man. If we alfo confider the limited Nature of our Faculties, that there are few Things about which we can certainly determine •, that there are many im- portant Truths for which we want ratiojial Proofs ; that there are many more, which the Generality of Mankind would fcarce be capable of under- flanding, for Want of Skill to ufe fuch Proofs as Keafon difcovers •, one might think it no Injury- done to any Man's Understanding, if he received thefe Truths in a more certain Way, from the eternal Fountain of Knowledge. But, 2dl)\ I proceed to fliew fome of the Advan- tages of this Way of teaching the World by Faith, above that of Reafon. i/?. Upon Account of its Certainty. Whilft Mankind was left to the Diredlioii of natural Reafon, we meet with nothing but Uncertainty and Irrefolution about Truths of the higheft Concern, viz. concerning the Origin^o? the World : Whether there were any fupreme in- telligent Being, that took Notice of the Actions and Behaviour of Men : And whether fuppofing fuch a one, he would forgive Men's voluntary Miftakes, upon their being fincerely concerned for them, and refolving to do fo no more for the fu- ture : And whether there was a future State, in v^hich God would reward or punifh Men for their Behaviour here. Whereas when God himfelf un- dertook to teach the World in a Way of Faith,. ?ill Wavering, concerning his Nature and Will, quickly vanifh'd. The Apoftles were well agreed in publifhing the fame Dodlrines, and propos'd them to their Hearers as certain Truths ; and their Converts left off all Difputes of this Kind,. and adher'd to what the Apoftles taught them. The good Effedls of this Agreement quickly ap- pear'd revealed Religion no Excujefor Infidelity. 395 pear*d in the wonderful Succefs of Chriftianity. Polytheifm and Idolatry gave Way to the Worfhip of the one true God. And tho' the Preachers of it were illiterate Men, yet when the World came to coniider the Strength of that Evidence, which they brought in Proof of the Dodrines they taught, and from thence faw plainly, that Truth was to be found among them, they quickly quitted their old Engagements in Favour of the Religion of their Country, and fubmitted them- felves to their Inftruftions •, which was more than, the Philofophers, thofe great Mailers of Reafon, and who To well underftood the Art of managing Men's Paflions, could ever tff^^k. For whatever Repute their Schools might have as fit Places for teaching Men the Rules of human Wifdom ; yet it is plain, from the Multitude of their Oracles, that the World did not think their Reafonings, in Matters of Religion, were fo much to be de- pended upon -, and that Faith was a much more certain Principle of Truth. If it be faid, it does not appear that there ever has been any better Agreement in Opinions among Chriftians, than there was among Heathens -, and therefore if the great Diverfity of Opinions amono- them be a good Argument to prove the Uncer- tainty they were in, then as great a Difference am.ong the Chriftians, ought in all Reafon to in- fer as great an Uncertainty. That tho' the Au- thority of Scripture be granted, yet the World is never the nearer to an Agreement in the Articles of Religion, as is plain by the infinite Number of Commentaries upon the fame Scriptures, and the conftant Appeal of all Sefts of Chriftians to the fame holy Writings -, and therefore the Way of Faith feems not to have any great Advantage ^bove that of Reafon on the Score of Certainty. I anfwer^ that ^s to the Catalogue of Herefies, given 396 T'he pretended Difficulties in natural or given us by the Antients, they were not much to be relied on ; that many of them were of fmall Confequence ; and the Writers of thofe Times obferve, that People were then very forward in calling every Opinion that differ'd from their own, by the odious Name of Herefy ; that if Chriftians differ about fome important Places of Scripture, fuch as thofe which concern'd the In- carnation^ a 'Trinity in Unity\ and fome other difficult Do6trines •, yet Heathens were very much divided concerning the Maker and Governor of the World ; whether there v^as any one intelligent Beings to whom thefe Titles did belong ; if there was, whether he had made any Provifion in fome other State for fuch as ferved him faithfully in this. As to any of thefe Articles, the Difputes among Chriftians, were exceeding few, if com- par'd with thofe among the Heathens. That thefe are of all other Truths of the greateft Con- cern, as without which there could be no fuffici- ent Reafon for ferving God at all ; for he that Cometh to God, muft firft believe that he is., and that he is a Re-warder of them that feek him. That the Belief of other Dodrines is required, that our Faith in thefe might be better grounded -, and therefore fuch an Agreement among Chriftians, fo much wanted among fuch as were under the Gui- dance of natural Light., tho' it were to be found only in thefe Truths, yet if we confider the Im- portance of them to Religion, would fufficiently prove a Revelation to be better qualified for teaching Mankind the Principles and Motives to Duty, than Reafon and Philofophy. However, fuppofing that by Dedudlions made from Principles of Reafon, the wifer Part of the World could have arrived at as great Certainty^ in the aforemention'd Articles, as we Chriftians are by the Help of Revelation i yet the Way of Faith i-evealed Religio?i no Excufefor Infidelity. 3 97 Faith would be more effedtual to inftrudl the World. I/?, Becaufe its Way of Teaching is more com- pendious than that of Reafon. 2 J/y, Becaufe 'tis more eafy and intelligible. 17?, Becaufe its Method of Teaching is fhorter. The greateft Part of Mankind having almod all their Time laid out in making the neceflary Provifions for Life, the beft Method to teach them their Duty is the fhorteft. But any Truth is fooner learnt, when it is proved by an Argu- ment drawn from Faith, than the fame Truth, would be by Reafon. As for Inftance, if I would underftand whether I am obliged to be juft in my Dealings, Reafon would difcover it to be fo, be- caufe Man is made for Society, and can't live with tolerable Comfort without it ; and the World is fo order'd, that unlefs fair Dealings were ob- ferv'd, every Thing would be in Confufion. From thence I would conclude, that God intended Men fhould pradlife this Virtue. To underftand this Duty or any other, in a Way of Faith, no- thing more is neceffary than to fee what the Scrip- tures determine in this Matter •, and there we may difcover at one View our Duty, what Reafon can- not make evident to us, till it has put us to the Trouble of ranging our Thoughts, and obferving the Relation they have one to another. idljy As Faith teaches us the fhorteft Way, fo it does in a more intelligible one. 'Tis eafy to obferve that the Generality of Men are hardly ca- pable of any other Notices of Tnings, than what are impreffed by the Objeds of Senfe ; they have not Skill enough to compare fimple Terms fo exactly with one another, as to compound them into Propofitions, and then to infer from every Propofition its natural Confequences ; nor when they are made for them to fee the Connection and Force 39^ ^^^ pretended DiffiaiJties in natural or^ Force of the Argument. An Argument that ftrikes their Senfes fhall convince more than the mod elaborate Reafonings. And therefore our Saviour's Miracles made more Difciples than the abftrufe Speculations of the Philofophers ever had done before. For every Man is able to judge whether a blind Man is reftor'd to Sight or not ; and when he had feen fuch Things, he would na- turally draw this Conclufion, If this Man "were not of God, he could do nothing. Thus far every Man will be able to reafon, let his Underftanding be never fo fhallow. I am now further to prove the Ufefulnefs of a Revelation, by one Method of teaching Men their Duty peculiar to it -, which is, by preaching that Religion in mixed Afiemblies to the People. The Excellency of this Inftitution will eafily appear, if we confider it as inviting all Sorts of People to come and . be Hearers ; and alfo the Number of Places, which have been ufually fet apart for the Performraice of this religious Ex- ercife. If the Schools of the Philofophers had m.ade their Le^tires as intelligible as our Sermons j yet it muft be confider'd, that their Difccurfes, fo far as Religion was concern'd in them, was merely ethical^ without concerning themfelves to tell the People the Manner of Worfhip that would be moft agreeable to the fupreme Being •, they none of them approved of the eftablifh'd Worfhip, yet had not Courage enough to teach their Scholars any other, only in general Tetms, that the bed "Way of worfliipping him, was to imitate him, and that they told them was befl done by ftudy- ing and obfcrving his Laws ; which was in other Words, nothing more than perfuading them to obferve moral Duties, on Account of their Beauty and ExceUenc)\ as being a Tranfcript of the di- vine revealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity. 3 9^ vine Nature -, without preffing upon their Difci- ples the Pradice of Morality upon any religious Motives, fuch as the Hopes of God's Favour, and the Fear of his Difpleafure ; without telling them, they muft pradlife Virtue, becaufe God would reward them for fo doing, and puniih them if they did otherwife. So that had their Lectures been more intelligible than our Sermons^ yet this Infiituiion would have been inferior to our Preaching •, as one great Branch of Religion, vix. a religious Fear of the Deity, were not taught by them. And, as to the heathen Priefts, whofe peculiar Bufinefs it was to teach the People, they made no Difcourfes to them concerning their Duty to their Neighbour •, they taught Men no Rules of Vir- tue, but fpent their Time in performing Sacrifices, and certain Ceremonies of Religion, and in in- ftru6ling People to follow their prefcribed Formu- lary of external Devotion. [Vide LaSiant. Injli- tut. Lib. IV. Cap. 3.] Nor could they, with any Decency, pretend to have given the People any Leflbns of Mora- lity j becaufe they were obliged, if they v/ould talk confiftently with the Principles of their Reli- gion, to give fuch frightful Ideas of the Divinity, afcribe to it fo many grofs Imperfedions, Weak- nefies, and even Vices, as would be abhorred by any Man that had but a moderate Senfe of Honeily. But farther, if we confider the Number of Places, fet a-part for the Performance of this re- ligious Exercife, we (hall {lill find the Advantages to lye on the Side of a Revelation. The Schools of the Pfiilofcphcrs v/ere very few, and thofe only in Places of Refort : They were not enougii difperfed, as our Churclies have been from the Beginning of Chriflianity, for the general Inilruc- tion 400 T'he pretended Difficulties in natural or tion of Mankind ; fo that had their Ledures been as plain as our Sermons, the greatefl: Part of the World could not have reforted to them, by Reafon of their Diftance *, whereas Chriftian Churches were both in Cities and Villages. [See Prideaux^s Conned. Part I. Page 309.] But then, if a Revelation be of fuch Ufe to Mankind, it may be alked, why was it not com- municated all over the World ? The Want of fuch Univerfality has been urg'd as a fufficient Reafon for rejedting any Revelation, tho' it comes recommended by every other Proof that can be defired. I have already fhewn, that a Revelation v/as wanting on feveral Accounts ; and, therefore, am only obliged to fee, whether a partial Revelation be as good an Argument to prove that fuch a Re- ligion cannot come from God, as any Miracles would be to prove that it muft come from him. That the firft cannot be fo good an Argument to invalidate a Revelation, as the latter is to confirm it, is evident, becaufe we are fure 'tis inconfiftent with the Nature of God to exercife his Power in fo extraordinary a Manner, as is that of a Mira- cle, in Behalf of a Fallhood, as 'tis impoflible that a God of Truth fhould countenance an Im- poilure. Whereas, we are (o far from feeing any Inconfiftence with the Nature of God, altho' a Religion fhould be communicated to fomc, and not to otiiers, that fuch Communications appear to be mere Matters of Favour, which may be granted or refufed, without affecting any moral Attribute of God : And then the Argument drawn from the former cannot be depended up- on ; becaufe there is nothing for it, but the Will and Pleafure of a Being, who was not reftrain'd from ading either Way ; whereas the latter de- pends upon his Nature, which is necefTarily what it; revealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity. 40 1 it is ; and, therefore, the A6ls flowing from it as incapable of Change, as the Nature itfelf from which they flow. But, idly^ Suppofing it was not a Matter of mere Favour •, yet, if it was to be communicated at fome Time or other to all Nations, and any Rea- fon could be given, why not to all at the fame Time, then no Argument could be drawn from the partial Preaching of the Chriftian Religion, which would afi^ed its Divinity. But, I. Altho' when we confider the Uncertainty Mankind was in with Regard to the Will of God, we might have believed, that God of his Goodnefs would, fome Time or other, make himfelf better known to us -, yet it would be a Favour in him to go out of the common Courfe of his Providence for any of our Advantages. The Light of Reafon he had given us for our Guide, and if that fnone but darkly^ yet if God would be merciful to fuch as made the befl Ufe of it, neither his Juftice or Goodnefs could be called in Queftion, tho' he had not made any ex- traordinary Communications of his Will. We Chriftians can gratefully own the Advantages we enjoy above Heathens, without prefuming to fay, that God could confiilently, with his Attributes, have remitted our Offences, and will ftill forgive thofe, who never had the Gofpel preached to them, without the Knowledge of Chrifc's Atone- ment. We freely own the Advantages of Faith for a general Inftrudion of the World, and yet will not fay, that God has left himfelf without Wit- nefs in the heathen World ; that it was poflible for Men to find out .the main Strokes of their Duty, and to hope that God would pardon their Sins upon Repentance, is evident from the moral Writers among the Heathens. If others of meaner Capacities could not ftrike out their Dutv D d ia 402 ^oe pretended 'Difficulties in natural or in a Way of Reafon, this plainly fhows, that God was not obliged to give all Men equal A- bilities for underftanding natural Religion \ and, therefore, it can never be a good Argument a- gainfl a revealed Religion^ fhould any one argue, tljat 'tis not from God, becaufe not equally given to all. Since no Reafon can be given, why God fliould be at Liberty in diftributing natural Light in various Degrees, which will not equally hold with Regard to fupernaturai Light, in the Way of a Revelation. But, 2. Suppofing it was not a Matter of Favour in God to make a Revelation of our Duty -, yet, if our Revelation fhall be communicated to all at fome Time or other, and fome Reafons might be affign'd why it fhould be communicated to fome^ and not to others ; then its Want of Univerfality would not affe6t its Divinity, for thofe who lay a Strefs upon this Argument, muft take thefe two Things for granted, ^iz. That the Gofpel will never be univerfally propagated ; and that no poilible Reafons can be aftign'd, v/hy all Nations have not the Gofpel communicated to them at the fame Time : But if there is no Reafon for taking either of thefe for granted, tlien the whole Sup- port of this Objedion is taken away. As to the firft of thefe, St. Paul tells us, that the Time will come, when the Fulnefs of the Gentiles fhall be brought into the Church of Chrift, and that then the Jews too fhall be con- verted : And, therefore, no Deijl can with Rea- fon objed, that becaufe the Time is not yet come, it will never come. But then,, it may be faid, that if Revelation is a great Benefit, it cannot be thought, that a good God would have left fo many Parts of the Earth in Darknefs to this Time. Our Anfwer is, that tho' we do not pre- tend to tell the particular Reafons which deter- min'd revealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity. 403 min'd God not to fend his Apoflles into China., Tartary, or America^ when they pubhfh'd the Chriftian Religion in the Roman Empire ; yet, if we can affign a Reafon, why it was not preached to them, it will be enough to deftroy the Force of this Objedion. One Reafon why the Gofpel was not preached every where, at the fame Time, might be, that fuch Nations were not qualified to receive it. They were ignorant of the firft Rudiments of Religion, and, therefore, for want of improving their Minds, would have been incapable of relifh- ing a Religion fo perfedly rational as our Chriftian. As to the Americans., we know not when that Country was firft peopled ; and as to the Tartars^ as we have none of their Hiftories to inform us of them, we are at Liberty to fuppofe them as unqualified for receiving Chriftianity as we pleafe. The only Nation which could pretend to any Degree of Politenefs at that Time, and which had not the Gofpel preached to them, were the Chinefe. And yet how much foever the Litera- ture of thefe People have been cried up, 'tis cer- tain they v/ere poorly fliilled in Metaphyficks^ not having any Notion, nor even any Name for the fupreme Being. [See Martini Hiftoria Sinica^ Lib. 1. China Illufcrata Kircheri, pag. 22.] And, therefore, if any People v/ere difqualified for re- ceiving fo excellent an Inftitution as our Chriftian, the Chinefe muft be of that Number, being igno- rant of that which is pre-fuppofed to every Re- velation, the Being of a God. Whereas the Greek Philofophy being fpread over all the Ro~ man Empire, had formed Men's Minds into a truer Way of Thinking, and from thence infenfi- bly led them into jufter Notions of Religion, than were to be met with in thofe Places where it Wf^s not known, and made them ready to em- D d 2 brace 404 ^£ pretended Difficulties in natural or brace a rational Religion, as foon as it was pro- pofed to them, which would be a fufficient Rea- fon why the Gofpel fhould be preached to them, and not to the Chineje, and other barbarous Na- tions. And, therefore, for all this terrible Ob- jeftion, a Revelation might have God for its Au- thor, and be of Ufe to Mankind, tho' all Na- tions were not at the fame Time favour'd with it. I come now to confider the third Reafon by which the Deiji defends himfelf, in not examining into the Merits of any Revelation, viz. Becaufe there are fo many Pretences to Revela- tion, all of them pretending to be fupported by the extraordinary Power of God, that there is no difcovering, which of them is the true one, if any fuch were, from Impoftures. In Anfwer to which, I will fhew, that the Chriftian Revelation is fupported with fuch Evi- dence as ought to fatisfy every reafonable En- quirer of its being from God. I have already ihew'd, that if fuch uncommon "Works, as are related in our GofpeL, had been done by Chrid:, they would have been a good Proof of his Miflion, and that the Religion he taught was from God : We have alfo feen, that our Lord's Difciples could not be impofed upon in the Account they have left us of thofe Mira- cles. The only remaining Difficulty, is to fatisfy the Unbeliever, that the Apoftles were honeft Men. That the Apoftles, as Things then were, could lie under no Temptation of forging Miracles, is evident, becaufe they could have no Inducement for making a Profellion of the Chriilian Reli- gion, fuppofing their Account of our Saviour's Miracles to be a falfe one. For, I. The Apoftles could not poflibly expedl to live eafy, unlefs they could reconcile the greateft Part repealed Religion no Exciifefor Infidelity. 40 5 Part of thofe, with whom they lived, to a Liking of the Gofpeh 2 . That there was no Probability that the Gof- pel would have any Succefs, at leaft in their own Time, and v/ho could care to be deftroy'd for the Benefit of others, that might fucceed them. I. The Apoftles could not expecfc to live ea- fy, iSc. The World was then divided Into Jews and Gentiles. With Regard to the Jews^ the Apoftles were to expeft the worft Ufage, as they were obliged to fpeak in the beft Manner of that Per- fon, whom the whole Nation of the Jews had treated as a Malefadlor. They could not but know alfo, that the Jews were very tenacious of their religious Ceremonies, and, therefore, might eafily guefs what Sort of Entertainment they were to exped. And tho' the Apoftles at firft allow'd Converts from Judaifm to retain ma- ny of the Ceremonies of their Religion together with Chriftianity, and were fo complaifant to them as to oblige the Gentile Converts to abftaiii from fome Things, that were moft difagreeable to the Jews, yet there was no Reafon to think, that thefe Allowances would fatisfy the Jews, be- caufe they muft fee, that their Religion muft fmk, if Chriftianity prevail'd. Neither could the Apoftles expedl any better Quarter from the Gentiles, Reafons of State, as well as thofe of Religion, would oblige every heathen Government to de- ftroy them, for endeavouring to carry off Men's Minds from the Government Worftiip. And we find, in Fa<5l, the firft Chriftians were generally hated. [See i'acit. Annal. Lib. XV.] And, there- fore, 'tis plain, while this Averfion lafted, there could be no Hopes for the Apoftles of living to- lerably eafy with them. But, D d. 2 2.A 40 6 ^oe pretended Difficulties in natural or 2. I am now to confider, whether they had any Probability of converting fuch a Number of Jezvs and Gentiles, as would fecure them from the Malice of the reft, and reward them for con- verting them. But the Improbability of fuch quick Converfions will eafily appear, if we con- iider, (i.) The Nature of the Religion to which they were to convert them, together with the State of Virtue and Vice, as it was, when they began to preach the Gofpel. And, (2.) The Difficulty of impofing upon the World at thai Time, when they began to preach the Gofpel, by falfe Miracles, and a fuppofititious Refurre6lion. (i.) Let us confider the Nature of the Religion to which they v/ere to convert them, and how both Jew and Gentile were difpofed at that Time for receiving fuch a Religion. Every one knows the Difficulty of perfuading Men to quit their religious Principles, how weak foever, if they have been the Religion of their Country for a long Time. But the Difficulty will be greater, if that Religion, to which they are to be converted, flatters none of their Vices ; and the Difficulty increafes, when the Perfbns to be converted, are wicked Men. The Apoftles then could not flatter themfelves with the Hopes of many Converts •, their Do6trine indulg'd no Man in any irregular Behaviour j the Gofpel re- quires the Pradice of every Thing that deferves the Name of Virtue, and forbids' every Paffion of corrupted Nature, fo far, as fuch Appetite and Paffion *are Efteds of tlie Corruption of our Na- tures. It allows no Man to commute for internal Goodjiefs by external Performances •, it propofea no Advantage upon any better Terms, than thofe of parting with every vicious Inclination, and be- coming good Perfons. The revealed Religwt no Excufefor Infidelity. 407 The Jews^ of that Time, were fo attach'd to the Outfide of their Religion, that there would be fmall Hopes of perfuading them to receive a Religion that required an unaiFeded Goodnefs ; and the Gentiles were fo corrupted, that the A- poftles could not expedt to make but few Con- verts among them. But it may be faid, that tho' the Nature of the Religion was forbidding enough to a bad Liver, yet they might hope for Succefs by the Weight of the Miracles, which they pretended vv^ere per- formed by the Author of it, as they knew Man- kind in general are affedled with marvellous Rela- tions. I will therefore fhew, (2.) The Difficulties which the Apoftles muft have met with, had they intended to impofe upon the World by falfe Miracles, or a fuppofititious Refurreftion, which will appear by coniidering, 1 . The Circumftances of the Perfons that were to carry on the Cheat. 2. The People that were to be cheated. I . The Perfons that were to carry on the Cheat. They were twelve in Number, which were too jnany to carry on a Cheat, v/hen any of them might make his Fortune by betraying it, and had Reafon to fear a Gibbet for keeping it. And yet had any one difcover'd it, the Dsfign had been ruin'd beyond Recovery. The Apoftles, there- fore, muft have been weak Men, had they built their Hopes upon fuch a Foundation. Efpecially too if we conftder, that they all forfook, or de- nied their Mafter, when he was feized by the Sol- diers, fuch Perfons cannot be fuppofed fit Inftru- ments for carrying on a Cheat, for certain they never could have trufted one another, after fuch a notorious Proof of their Unfaithfulnefs to their Mafter, For why fhould they fuppofe they could ftand more courageoufly by one another, D d 4 than 4o8 Tloe pretended Difficulties in natural or than they had done by their Mafter ? And No- body could believe, that they would have given fo bad an Account of their own Behaviour, had it not been true. Whereas thofe who afterwards counterfeited Miracles, in the fixth and following Centuries, if they had been difcover'd ran no Hazard either of Life or Fortune. The Government was then Chriftian, and, therefore, whatever was done in Favour of it, would pafs for a pious Zeal for the Service of God and Chrift. Thofe who were in the Cheat, would make no Difcovery, becaufe it would not be their Interefl to betray one another ; for if the Miracle fucceeded, they might hope to be Gainers by it ♦, and if it was difcover'd, Peo- ple would only fay, they had more Tjeal than XJndcrjlanding : And, therefore, it is a groundlefs Suspicion which is drawn from thofe counterfeit Miracles to the Miracles of our Saviour and his Apoftles. But, 2. If we confider the People that were to be cheated, the Cafe of the Apoftles, and their Succeflbrs, was very different. \fty As the Perfons that were to believe their Account of Miracles, were Enemies to the Chrif- tian Religion. a^/Zy, As they were better able in their Time to diftinguiih fidlitious from real Miracles. i/?. As the Perfons that were to believe their Account of Miracles, were Enemies to the Chrif- tian Religion, and as fiich would not eafily give Credit to thofe Miracles which were to be the chief Support of that Religion. It is natural to believe, that thofe who liatcd the Religion, would be no Friends X.i:i Miracles, becaufe thefe would give it a Reputation in the World \ and, there- fore, the Apoftles could have but fmall Hopes that their Miracles, if counterfeit^ would pafs the Examination of fuch prejudiced Perfons. '2.dly^ revealed Religion no Uxcufe for Infidelity. 409 2^/7, Men were better able In the Apoftles Time to diftinguifh fiditious from real Miracles. "When the Apoftles began to preach the Gofpel, moft Parts of Learning were in as great a Degree of Perfcftion as they had been ever before. The feveral Powers of Nature were carried to a great Height, when compar'd with fome fucceeding Ages : And, therefore, the World would be better qualified for diftinguifhing the natural from the 7iiarvellous. The Apoftles, conftdering their Education, could not hope to impofe upon fuch a People •, or, if they attempted it, muft have been found out. If it be faid, that the Apoftles made Converts only of the loweft Part of the World •, I anfwer, that fuppofing It true, it can- not be fuppofed, that the upper Part of the World would fat idle, and let them carry away the People off from the eftablifti'd Worftiip, had they been able to have dete6led them of any Fraud. If the Apoftles had been Men of fa much Cunning as the Objedion fuppofes, they would have been difcouraged from undertaking a Cheat In fo unfeafonable a Time. The proper Times for Impofture, are Times of Ignorance, when any Thing unufual may be made to pafs for a true Miracle : Such are the Times In which Fraud and Ignorance are wont to thrive ; and fuch were the Times, when to the Shame of Chrlftlans, counterfeit Miracles crept Into the Church of God : And the Hiftories of thofe Times fhew that the Pretences to Miracles were multiplied in Proportion as the Ignorance of the People Increafed. And, therefore, tho* latter Ages might carry on Cheats fuccefsfully. It does not follow, that the Apoftles could hope to do fo. If it be faid, that the Apoftles might pleafe themfelves with being Heads of a Party. This is fuch thin Diet, as would never fupport a Man 2 againft 410 T'he pretended Difficulties in natural or againft the Difficulties which the Apoftles exped:ed, and adually met v/ith. Had the Defire of Glory been their Motive for preaching the Gofpel, they muft quickly have been difcouraged, when they faw themfelves treated with greater Contempt than any other Sort of Men, and aftually put to Death, merely for preaching it. Thofe who can believe, that any Perfons can be tickled with fuch Sort of Fame, may believe any Thing. And there- fore the Deijl labours in vain, whilft he endea- vours to perfuade himfelf and others, that the Apoftles were Deceivers. The only Refuge left him would be this : That the Apoftles preached no fuch Religion at the Time fet down in the Writings of the New Tejiament. But 'tis impoflible this ftiould be true, becaufe if the ftrft Publication of the Religion had been fom.e Years after that Time which the Scriptures mention, every one muft prefently have found it to be a Cheat, be- caufe the y^'^S among whom it is faid to be preach'd, could have told them, they had never before heard of any fuch Religion preach'd in their Country ; but the Jews own the Fad, and Tacitus mentions the exa(5t Time fet down in the Neiv I'ejiament. [See Annal. Lib. XV,] Having ftiewn that the Apoftles were not De- ceivers ', I come now to ftiew what A flu ranee we have, that the Writings of the New Tejlament, or the four Gofpels, do contain a true Account of the Chriftian Religion, fuch as it v/as at firft preach'd by the Apoftles ; and that there have been no confiderable Alterations made In them. 1 . We have good Reafon to believe, that the received Go/pels were either writ or allowed of by fome Apoftle. 2. That there is no good Evidence that any of the Apocryphal Gofpels^ were writ by that Apoftle or Apoftles, whole Name they bear ; and how it might revealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity, 411 might come to pafs, that they were received by fome^ as the Writings of an Apoftle, and yet be afterwards rejeded. I. I am to fhew, that we have good Reafon. for believing that the received Gofpels were either writ or allow'd of by fome Apoftle. In proving this Propofition, I will fhew, i/, That there were Gofpels written from the Beginning of Chriftianity, by the Perfons, whofe Names we have at the Head of them. idly^ That thofe of them which bear not the Name of an Apoftle, as Mark, and Luke, were always fuppofed to have been feen and allowed of by fome Apoftle. ^dly. That the Gofpels which are come down to cur Times were theirs, and not any Apocryphal Gofpels. \ft. That there were Gofpels written from the JBeginning of Chriftianity, i^c. This is Matter of Fa6l ; and allow'd both by orthodox and heretical Chriftians, who lived neareft the Times of their being firft publifti*d. Irenaus^ who lived in the fecond Century, fays, 'That St. Matthew put cut a Gofpel -, after him St. Mark, then St. Luke, and lafi cf all St. John. And Eufebius tells us, that the four Gofpels were among fuch Books as were on all Hands allowed to be writ by thofe Perfons whofe Names they bear. And Iren^us tells us, that the earlieft Heretics found it neceflary, upon Account of the great Efteem the Gofpels were in, to have Recourfe to them, and to defend their Opinions by the Au- thority of thefe Gofpels. [See Iren. Page 190.] 2dly, I am to ftiew now, that fuch of the Gof- pels, as bear not the Name of an Apoftle, viz. Mark, and Luke, were always fuppofed to have been (ttn and allowed of by fome Apoftle. To be- gin with St. Mark J Irena^us fays, he was a Follower 2 of 412 The pretended Difficulties in natural or of St. Peter. Clemens Alexandriniis tells us, that he followed St. Peter., and put into Writing the Gofpel which St. Peter preach'd, at the Requeft of the Faithful, and that this Gofpel was ap- proved by St. Peter. [Vide Eufeb. H. Ecc. Lib. II. Cap. 14.] If Eiifehius in his Vlth Book quotes the fame Clemens for faying, that Peter neither approved nor difallow*d of St. Mark^s Gofpel'., Valefiiis., in his Notes upon the Place, tells us, that this is eafily reconcil'd, becaufe in the Vlth Book, he fpeaks only of a publick Ap- probation of this Gofpel ; and in the lid Book, of what Encouragement St. Peter gave to it in private. As for St. Luke., we find by Origen and Eiifehius., that it was the general Opinion of Chriftians, that St. Paul meant his Gofpel., when he faid of him, " Luke the beloved Phyjician, '* whofe Praife is in the Gofpel.''^ If this were true, we have the Approbation of an Apoftle given to his Gofpel. So Eufehius tells us, that 'twas commonly believed. \Euf. Lib. III. Cap. 24. ^. 95.] St. John look'd over the three Gofpels of Matthew., Mark and Luke., and approved them ; which cannot be pretended for the Epijiles of Barnabas and Clemens ; who are by fome thought not to have been the Authors ot thofe Epiftles which now bear their Names. And therefore the Church might have good Reafon for receiving Mark and Luke., and not Clemens and Barnabas, into the Canon. 3^/y, We are now to fee, whether the Gofpels, which are come down to us, are really the Gof- pels writ by them, or only Apocryphal Writings, with their Names to them. The Reafon of fuch a Sufpicion is grounded upon this, that if the Hebrew Gofpel o^ St. Matthew could be alter'd to fuch a Degree, and fo foon after its Publifhing, that in the Time of Eufehius it was become doubt- ful, revealed Reltgwt no Excufefor InJideUfy. 41^ ful, whether it was his Gofpel or not ; what Se- curity can we, who live at fo great a Diftance, have, that our Gofpels are not as much alter'd ? Our Anfwer is, That Books, in the Hands of the Gentile Chriftians could not be fo eafi- ly alter'd, as thofe that were only in the Hands of the converted Syrian Jews^ for they only made Ufe of the Hebrew Gofpel of St. Matthew. "Whereas thofe who read the Gofpel in Greeks were difperfed over the World ; confequently a Multitude of Copies in Places at the greateft Diftance. And therefore if any confiderable Al- terations had been made in one Place, they muft have been detefted in another. Beiides the Num- ber of Greek Copies, there have been from the Beginning a great Number of Tranflations into different Languages. If there had been many Alterations in our Greek Copies, they muft have been difcover'd by fome or other of the old Ver- ftons, as the Hebrew Copy of St, Matthew was found greatly altered by comparing it with the Greek Verlion ; whereas the Greek Copies agree, for the moft Part, with all the Verfions that have been made from the Greek ; and therefore we can- not doubt that the Gofpels, which we receive as canonical^ were the Gofpels of Matthew^ Mark^ Luke and John. I proceed, 2. To ftiew, that there is no Evidence, that any of the Apocryphal Gofpels were writ by that Apoftle or Apoftles, whofe Names they bear . And therefore when they give different Accounts from the received Gofpels, they are not to be re- garded. For, ly?. They were not taken Notice of till many Years after that Apoftle's Time, whofe Writing they pretend to be •, or, idly^ That if they were quoted by fome early Writers, they were not quoted as the Writings of an Apoftle. Thus the Gofpel of Barnabas v/as not 414 ^^^ pretended Difficulties in natural or not difcover*d till above four hundred Years after it muft have been writ, fappofing St. Barnabas to be the Author of it. And I believe it will fcarce be thought probable, that a Gofpel, writ by fo celebrated a Perfon as St. Barnabas^ could have lain hid for fo long a Time, efpecially when we are told, that Chriftians were very inquifitive to learn any Particulars relating to the Words and Adlions of our Saviour. *Twas this ftrong De- iire that encouraged Deceivers to put out Ji^iitious Accounts of our Saviour's Words and Adions, under the Name of fome Apoftles ; and the fame Defire would never have fuifer'd a Gofpe], writ by a Companion of an Apoftle, to have lain in Obfcurity for fo long a Time. But, 2dly^ As to tho^tApocryphal Go/pels^ which were quoted by early Writers, there is no Evidence that they were writ by thofe Apoftles, whofe Names they bear -, becaufe, when they quote any PafTage out of them, they either fpeak of them as Gofpels forged by Hereticks ; or elfe of Books whofe real Authors were unknown, altho' the Title of an Apoftle was prefixed to them. Thus Origen tells us in his firft Homily on St. Luke's Gofpel, " That the Church has four Gofpels, but " heretical Chriftians many more •, " among which are reckoned by him the Gofpel according to St. Thomas^ the Gofpel by St. Matthias : To thefe Eufebius adds that of St. Peter and St. Andrew. The Gofpel intitled St. Peter's Gofpel, is alfo mention'd by Origen^ but rejedted by him, as the Work of fome other Author. [See 'Tom. xi. Comment, in Matth.'] Having fhewn that the canonical Gofpels, re- ceived by us, were the Gofpels of Matthe-w, Mark^ Luke and John ; nothing m.ore can be ne- ceffary for fettling a Man's Faith in the Chriftian Religion, but to ihew, that notwithftanding the Originals repealed Religion no Excufefor Infidelity. 4 1 5 Originals are loft, and the Copies that have been tranfcribed from them do differ in many Particu- lars j yet the Variations either do not affed any Thing neceffary to be believ'd or pradifed -, or if they do, the true Reading is ftill preferved In fome Copy or other. 'Tis evident, that a great Part of various Readings are mere Trifles. That many of thofe, which are fuppofed to have been alter'd by De- fign, had only a Relation to Mifquotations of the Old Teftament^ or to reconciling one Evangelift with another ; or to leaving out fome PafTages which they thought might be, or were perverted and mifunderftood ; or fubftituting others, lefs li- able to Exception, in the Room of them \ or elfe the Alteration might effed: fome necejfary Dodrine of Faith. An Inftance of the firft Sort is fuppofed to be found in Mat. xiii. 35. T^hat it might be fulfilled by the Prophet .^ I will open my Mouth in Parables. Porphyry read It In the Copy he ufed, the Prophet Ifaiah^ and made It an Objedlion agalnft the Evangelift. And St. "Jerome owns he found in fome Copies, the Prophet Ifaiah ; but not In the greateft Part ; becaufe no fuch Quotation was to be found in Ifaiah. Another Inftance of altering, to reconcile one Evangelift with another, is given In the Time of our Saviour's Crucifixion, which St. Mark fays was about the third Hour, and St. Johyi about ihtjixth ; and yet 'tis obferv'd, that fome Copies of St. John had the third Hour ; as fome of St. Mark had the Jixth ; juft as the Tranfcriber was inclined either to bring St. John to St. Mark^ or St. Mark to St. John. Of Omiftions, and of fubftituting one Word for another, the Inftances are, Luke xix. 41. and John vii. 8. The firft is Chrift's weeping over 7'- 4 1 6 The pretended Difficulties i?i natural or Jerufakin : This was thought a PafTion unbecom- ing our Saviour •, and therefore, as Epiphanius fays, was left out in moft Copies. In John vii. 8, 'tis thought, that one Word is fubftituted in the Place of another. Our Saviour had told his Difciples he would not go to the Pafibver, and yet he aftually did go. And therefore that the 8H was changed into ^Vo, to avoid the Force of this Objection. Our Anfwer to all this is, That no Body ever denied there have been fuch weak Chriftians, as might alter their Copies of the Gofpels in fuch Places, as they found themfelves unable to defend againft the Obje6lions of the Heathens. But fuch Alterations could not throw out the true Reading in all the Copies, becaufe all the different Copies were at too great a Diftance to be alter'd. And we find it true, that in thefe which are fup- pofed to be alter'd, the true Reading is preferv'd in fome Copy or other ; and in more than thofe that want it. I will next confider the Inftances of defign'd Alterations in a Point of Faith, as concerning the Divinity of the Son. *Tis thought, that the Difpute between the Orthodox and Arians was carried on with fo much Warmth, that the Arians alter'd their Copies in fuch Places where Chrift was God, as i Tim. iii. i6. God manifefted in the Fkjh. This, fome fay, was changed into, ivhich inas nmnifejied in the Flejh, to avoid the Force of the Word God. 'Tis certain, both Readings were fupported by a great Number of Copies ; which fhews the In- duftry of one of the Parties to fupport its Opi- nion. And the famous Text, i John v. 7. is fuppofed to have been put into this Epiftle to ferve Purpofes. Tho' revealed Religion no Exciifefor Infidelity, ^jy Tho' thefe Inftances are not in the Gofpels, but in the Epiftles, yet as the Gofpels might have been as eafily alter'd as any of the Epiftles at thai Time, I think, myfelf obliged to fhew, that a Chri- ftian has lefs Reafon to fear finding the true Read- ing in thefe Inftances of deftgn'd Alterations than in the former ones •, becaufe the Alterations afore- mention'd were made, wheu there were fewer Copies of the Gofpels than there were of thefe Epiftles in the Time of Jrius ; there were then many Copies of the New Tejiament, and it was the Intereft of either Side to watch one another ; and therefore it was not eafy to alter fuch Paflages as related to this Controverfy. Confequently, every Chriftian may have enough to build his Faith upon in the New Tefi anient. If fometimes there be a Diffi- culty in determining which is the true Reading of a PafTage, and we know not whether fome necef- fary Dodrine be not treated of, we need not be folicitous, we may find it in other Places, where there is no Difficulty in fettling the Text j becaufe the neceffary Dodrines of the Chriftian Religion are fo often repeated in the Neiv 1'ejiament, fach as we have it, and fo clofely woven into the Body of it, that there would be no removing any one of them out of every Place of the New 'Tefta- ment, without fubftituting another Set of Gofpels and Epiftles. But we have fhewn it impoftible, that our Gofpels fhould be, as to the main Part of them, any other than thofe which were v/rit by Matthew, Mark, Luke and John \ and the fame Reafon v/ill hold as to the Epiftles, which were more univerfally fpread in the Time of Arius, than the Gofpels, when fome of the Alterations beforemention'd were made. Thus I have fhewn, that there is no Ground for fufpe6ting that the Chriftian Religion was a cunningly devifed Fable ; and that it will appear Vol. III. E e to 4i8 'The pretended Difficulties, &c. to all impartial Enquirers to be no lefs than % Meflage from Heaven. And now I hope to have fully fhewn the dangerous State of Infidelity ; or that all the Difficulties the Unbeliever pretends to raife againft religious Principles, cannot fecure him againft the Apprehenfions of Punifhment in % future State. Dr. Dr. BU R N E T's Boyle's Lectures A B R I D G ' D. E e a DEMONSTRATION O F True RELIGION. N order to demonftrate true Religion, it will be neceflary, in the firft Place, to explain what is meant by Religion. Religion is a Chain of Principles^ which being received as true, are the Reafons obliging us to the Performance or Non-performance of fuch and fuch A6lions, And, therefore, in treating upon true Religion, it would be proper to demonftrate the Truth of thofe feveral Principles, with the Obligations that refult from them. But as they all depend upon the Being of a God, it will be neceflary firft to prove his Being, and then to ftiew what religious Obligation arifes from it. And here, I. I will demonftrate, that there is a God ; or in other Words, that there muft be fome M^- exiftent Being. II. That this Being muft be abfolutely perfed, III. That this Being was the Creator of the World. And, IV. That he is the Governor of it. E 2 I. That 422 A Demonjlration of true "Religion, I. That there is fome felf-exiftent Being. By a felf-exiftent Being, I mean, a Being that ex'iTts by his Nature, or becaufe it is his Nature to exift. That there is fuch a Being, I thus prove. Becaufe without fuch a Being, not any Thing could have been. For if there was not fome Being without Begin- ning ; there was a Time when there was no Being ; and if fo, it muft have been impoffible for any Thing ever to have come into Being. From hence it will follow, that 'lere cannot but be fome in- dependent, eternal, neceftary, everlafting, immu- table, omniprefent Being. For whatever exifts without a Caufe, is inde- pendent J and to exift without Beginning, is to exift eternally ; and to exift naturally, is to exift neceftarily, or becaufe it is impoffible not to exift. For that a Thing be pofTible, it muft'be the Objed: of fome Power, and therefore if we can conceive it poffible for a Being, that exifts of his own Na- ture, not to exift •, we muft conceive fome Power that can make it not exift ; and if there be any fuch Power conceivable, it muft be either fome- thing in its own Nature, or fomething without : But 'tis a Contradiction in Terms, that a Being, "whofe very Nature is to be, ftiould have a Nature not to be \ and 'tis no lefs a Contradidlion to fup- pofe an independent Being, fubjed to any other Power. A felf-exiftent therefore is a neceflary Being, and muft confequently exift everlaftingly and im- mutably. For whatever cannot but be, muft 'be eternal i fo whatever a necefiary Being is, he muft be alv/ays fo. And whatever is all this, muft be omniprefent. For y^hatfoever is felf-exiftent by his Nature, it is ' A Bemonftration of true Religion, 423 is equally In its Nature to be In one Place as ano- ther ; and as Its Nature is the Realbn ot its Being, there is, by Confequence, the fame Rea- fon for its being every where. And as a lelt- exlftent neceflary Being cannot but be, fo it cannot but be whatever it is its Nature to be, and there- fore it muft be in all Places. And if it might be abfent from one Place, it might by the fame Rea- fon be abfent from another, and by Confequence would not be necefiarily in any Place. A felf-exiftent Being therefore muft be omni- II. This felf-exiftent Being is abfolutelyperfedt. This is plain ; for as we have fliewn, a felf- exiftent Being exifts by his Nature, neceffarily, independently, and immutably, without any Pof- fibility of Limitation or Addition, and therefore muft be all that is poflible for it to be. So we have likewife ftiewn, that nothmg could have come into Being, without allowing fome- 'thing felf-exiftent •, and if this be true. As it will hence follow on the one Hand, that nothing does exift but what is felf-exiftent, or had its Being originally from fomething felf-exiftent, and by Confequence, whatever Perfedion any Being has, a felf-exiftent Being muft have, be- caufe their whole Being is derived from him •, So it will likewife follow, that what a felf- exiftent Being has not, cannot come into Being •, and therefore is impoffible to be. And from hence it appears, that a felf-exiftent Being muft have all poffible Degrees of Being. And thus, a Being perfeft, immutable, eternal, neceflary, omniprefent, I call an infinite Being. From hence I Infer, I. Since there is a felf-exiftent Being, as it will hence follow, that whatever he is, he is by his Nature •, and by Confequence, whatever we E 4 co^- 424 A Demojifiration of true Religion. conceive to be in God, is his very Eflence, and really God : So on the other Hand, fince his Nature is in- dependent, eternal, neceflary, everlafting, immu- table and omniprefent, it will likewife follow, that whatever he is, he is every where, independently, eternally, neceflarily, everlaftingly, and immutably. 2. Since whatever is felf-exiftent, is abfolutely perfect ; then, fince every Thing we conceive God to be, is his very EfTence, and therefore felf-exiftent, it will follow, that every Perfection, we conceive to be in God, muft be abfolutely perfedt, becaufe felf-exiftent. And by Confe- quence, when we fpeak of God's Perfections, we muft not be fuppofed to mean, that thefe Perfec- tions are diftinil from the divine Eflence -, becaufe there is nothing in God, but what is his Eflence ; or that they are diftind: from each other. For then there muft be as many Gods as Perfedlions ; and if fo, it will follow, 3. That the Nature of God is flrnple and indi- vifible. 4. Since whatfoever is felf-exiftent, is abfolutely perfedl ; and whatever is in God, is God : From hence it will follow, that there can be but one God. III. This one felf-exiftent Being was the Creator of the World. Having proved, that nothing could come into Being without fomething felf-exiftent ; either the World was felf-exiftent, or it had its Being from fome other that is felf-exiftent. All that is in the World is either Matter or Spirit ; neither of which I will prove to be felf- exiftent. I . The Matter •, which cannot be felf-exiftent. For fince we have ftiewn, that whatfoever is felf-exiftent is immutable. 2 Since 'A Demonjlratlon of true Religion. 425 Since we have likewlfe fhewn, that whatfoever is felf-exiftent, is fimple and indivifible. And lince we have farther Ihewn, that what- ever is felf-exiftent, is omniprefent and perfed ; thefe Arguments demonftrate, that Matter cannot be felf-exiftent, which is evidently mutable, di- vifible, finite, and imperfed. And if fo, 5. From hence v^e muft infer, that whatfoever is {elf-exiftent is immaterial. And this brings me, 2. To enquire, whether there be any Thing immaterial in the World, without fuppofing a God, that can be felf-exiftent. Human Souls are the only immaterial Beings ; but they cannot be felf-exiftent. For if every Man has a diftind Soul ; and if every Man's Soul be exiftent ; then fince it does already ap- pear, that whatever is felf-exiftent is abfolutely perfed ; it will follow, 1 . That there are as many felf-exiftent Beings, as there are human Souls j whereas we have ftiewn there can be but one. 2. That every Soul is perfedl, which is con- trary to Experience, and therefore not felf-exiftent. And if fo, it will follow, that the World was made by fome other Caufe, which is felf-exiftent ; which was to be demonftrated. IV. This felf-exiftent Being is the Governor of the World. To prove this we may obferve, what we have already ftiewn, that whatever is felf-exiftent is omniprefent, and we ftiall hereafter ftiew, that whatever is abfolutely perfe6t, muft be abfolutely powerful, wife, and good ; and if fo. Then iince it does appear, that whatfoever is in God, is God ; and by Confequence, v/hat- ever he is, he is every where •, it will follow. That as God is omniprefent, fo he muft be prefent in. the Perfedion of Power, Wifdom, and Good- 426 A 'Demonjiratlon of true "Religion, Goodnefs ; and by Confequence muft govern all Things. For by Power, I mean an Ability to ad ; and by Goodnefs, an Inclination to do Good ; and by Wifdom, a Faculty of Underftanding ; that has Relation to Means and Ends. And the Perfec- tion of every powerful, wife, and good Being, is to be exercis'd in doing all that Good, that Wif- dom direds to be done. And as it is evident, that that is the moft per- fect Wifdom, that propofes the beft Ends, and profecutes them by the beft Means, and in the beft Manner. So fince God is neceflarily In every Place in the Perfedion of Power, Wifdom, and Goodnefs, he muft neceftlirily be every where doing fuch Ads of Goodnefs, as his abfolute Wifdom judges beft. And in this the whole Notion of Govern- ment is abfolved, in whatfoever ^&ci{Q we under- ftand it, in Refped as well of the Confervation as the Difpofal of all Things. From all which it appears, that there is a felf- exiftent, abfolutely perfed Being, that made and governs the World. But as we have no Notion of the Perfedion of this Being, but under particular and diftind Ideas ; this will not be a fufticient Foundation for true Religion, unlefs we can be aflured thofe Ideas are right. 1. I will therefore enquire what thofe Ideas are under which God Is to be conceived -, and 2. Enquire v/hat Notions we are to form of the Creation and Government of the World, con- fidering it as made and govern'd by -a Being, to whom thefe Ideas belong. Of the Perfe5tions or Attributes of God. As to the Ideas, under which the divine Na- ture is to be conceived, as God is an abfolutely per- A Bemonftratlon of true Religion. 427 perfed Being, we are to recoiled, that by abfo- lute Perfeftion is to be meant all Degrees of Being, And, therefore, the moft natural Way to dif- cover the particular Ideas of the divine Nature, is, to enquire what Degrees of Being are poffible, and to attribute them to God in the higheft Degree. Now there are four Degrees of Being. Some Beings are mere Subftance •, fome have Life, fome have^Life and Senfej and fome have Life, Senfe, and Reafon. If God has all poffible Degrees of Being, we muft conceive him under the Notion of a'Subftance, indued with the higheft Degrees of Life, Stnk^ and Reafon. The Perfe^lions of God conftdefd as a Subftance, By a Subftance, I mean a losing in Oppofitioii to a Mode or Manner of Being. Now as to the Perfeftions of Subftance, all Mankind conceive it a higher Degree of Being to be without Beginning, than to be made ; to be independent, than dependent > to be eternal, than momentary ; to be infinite, than finite ; to be im- material, than corporeal. And, therefore, when Vv'e conceive God to be an abfolutely perfed Sub- ftance. v/e muft conceive him to be an eternal, independent, neceffary, immutable, fpiritual, om- niprefent, everlafting Being. The 'Perfections of God confidefd as a living Subjiance. By Life is meant a Principle of Adivity. Now Men conceive it a more excellent Degree of Adivity to be able to do all Things, than only fome, to do in an Inftant v/ithout Difficulty and Oppofition, than other wife -, to have this ac- tive Capacity all at once -, to have it laft for ever, than for a Time. Ancl, therefore, while we conceive God as ab- folutely' perfed: in Life, we afcribe to him the ut- moft Degrees poffible of Power. 'The '428 A T>emonJlratlon of true Religion, I'he PerfeSfions of God^ conJider*d as a Being in^ dued with the highejl Pcrfc5iion of Senfe. By Stn(Q, I mean, here, a Senfation or Percep- tion of Pleafure and Pain. And as a Life of Pleafure is more excellent than Pain, and as it is more eligible to be fenfible of Pleafure, than only capable of it ; and as it is better to have been always in Pleafure, thail otherwife ; fo in afcribing to God the Perfection of Senfe, we muft conceive him to be indued with the moft exquifite and adual Perception of all poffible Degrees of Pleafure, without Pain : And this we call the Happinefs of God. Ihe PerfeBions of God, conftder'd as a Being in- dued with the highefi Degrees of Reafon. By Reafon we ufually mean a Principle of Thought, which, as it exerts itfelf differently, is conceived under the different Names of Under- ftanding and Will. By the Underftanding, is meant the Operation of the Mind, by which we not only fimply ap- prehend Objeds, but alfo can compare and judge of their feveral Relations ; and from hence draw Inferences and Obfervations, and provide for the Confequences of them. But that Part of it more particularly, which relates to the apprehending and judging of the Natures and Reafons of Things, we call Know- ledge. And that by which we propound Defigns, and find out proper Means for the Attainment of them, we call fpeculative Wifdom. So that if we are to conceive of God as abfo- lutely perfect in Reafon, we muft conceive him to have all poffible Degrees of Knowledge and Wifdom, without any Degree of Imperfeftion. And, therefore, whereas 'tis an Imperfe(51:ion of Knowledge to know but in Part, or by De- grees, ^A Demonfiratlon of true Religion. 429 grees, by Time and Obfervatioii : To be liable to Error, or Forgetfulnefs : And as it is a Defe6t of Wifdom to propofe no End, or to aim at a foolifli End, or to pro- fecute a right End improperly : So if we would rightly conceive of God, we muft feperate all thefe Imperfedions from him. The Perfe^ions of the Will, That which we call the Will, is that by which we determine our Operations in the Way of Choice. But then as it is fuppofed to be a Faculty of Reafon, fo it is by Confequence to be fuppofed, that it muft naturally choofe and determine upon Reafon. And tho* 'tis certain, that Men do not always follow the belt Reafon -, yet the Will is never determined without fome Reafon or other. And as the Reafons that incline the Will may be various, we muft therefore conceive it to be fuch a Faculty, by which we can choofe various- ly, according to the various Reafons offered to us ; and therefore it is faid to be free. And, if this be true, that the Nature of the Will, and of that Freedom we afcribe to Man, in refpedl of it, confifts in chuling upon Reafon ; it will follow, that the more we chufe upon Rea- fon, as our Choice is the more rational and per- fedl, fo it is likewife the more free. And, by Confequence, when our Wills always chufe the moft reafonable Things, and our A6lions are con- formable to them, then we are in a true State of rational and perfed: Freedom. This is the higheft Perfedion of Freedom, confider'd in itfelf ; and tho' this be an eligible State of Being, yet it would be more fo, to be fure of its Continuance. And, therefore, if we would conceive of God rightly, in afcribing to him the Perfedlions of Reafon, 430 A Dejnonjlration of true Religion. Reafon, we muft conceive him to be indued with an abfolute Freedom of Self-determination upon Principles of Reafon, and can adl varioufly, as he has Reafon for it. And this we call the Freedom of God. But then, 2. As he has a Power of Determining his O- perations, according as his Reafon diredls, fo we muft conceive he has this in the higheft Degree poiTible, and therefore cannot determine contrary to that Meafure of Reafon he has for his Ope- rations, And by Confequence muft incline to the moft reafonable Things, and that without any Poflibility of the Difcontinuance of this, or of its Alteration or Decay, or any other Defedt or Imperfedlion. This is the Perfedion of rational Freedom ; and this Perfection of Freedom we call Holinefs. But yet here it is to be obferved, that as Rea- fon has different Names, according to its different Objeds, and that which is in general called Un- derftanding, is, at other Times, called Wifdom, when confider'd as having Relation to Ends and Means ; fo it is here. And, therefore, tho* this perfedl Conformity of the Will, to the Diftates of Reafon, be in general called Holinefs ; yet when Reafon is con- fider'd, as directing any Thing, as a Means to an End, and the Will is determined to purfue that End, by thofe Means -, then the Conformity of the Will, in this Cafe, may be called the Wifdom of the Will. And as that Wifdom which confiders only the Natures and Relations of Things, without any Determination towards them, is therefore called fpeculative Wifdom -, fo this Wifdom, which is here faid to be an Ad gf the Will, may be called pradical Wifdom. 2 AncJ A Demonjlration of true Religion. 43 1 And as this Determination of the Will in God is invariable, fo this is fometimes called, when fpoken of the divine Nature, the Immutability of God. But neverthelefs, when we confider the Will only as ading in Conformity to the Dictates of Reafon, it is then properly called Holinefs. And as the Will of God is always invariably determined by Reafon, and the Reafon of God is always right, fo this invariable Determination of the divine Will, according to the Dictates of his Reafon, is what we mean by the Holinefs of God. Corollaries from the Holinefs of God. From this Notion of the Holinefs of God, Se- veral Things will follow. I . He cannot ad or will any Thing contrary to his Knowledge. By Knowledge is meant the Perception of Things, as they are ; and, by Confequence, Knowledge fuppofes the Exiftence of the Thing known, fo far as it is known. And, therefore, as that which has no Being cannot be perceived, or known ; fo it is certain, that thofe Things which have a Being, cannot be perceived, or known, what they really are not ; becaufe this is to perceive and know what is not, which is nothing. And, therefore, as God knows all Things, he muft know them only as they really are. And if fo, then, if^his Will and Operations be always conformable to his Knowledge, they muft be always conformable to the Reality of Things, as they are. And if fo, fince the Reality of Things, as they are in their Natures and Relations, is the very Notion of Truth ; it will follow, that he cannot will, or ad any Thing contrary to Truth ; id 432 A Demonjiration of true Religion. fo that if Xjod be holy, he muft be immutably true. 2. God cannot will or ad any Thing contrary to his Wifdom. Wifdom fuppofes an End, and an End implies fome Good. And, therefore, if God cannot will or. ad any Thing, but what is agreeable to his Wifdom, he muft always will, and ad with an Intention of fome Good ; and as an abfolutely perfed Being can want no Good to himfelf ; it muft foilow, therefore, that it muft be f"^ "" Good to his Creatures. So tiica ft-om the Holinefs of God, we are af- fured of his Goodnefs, that he never wills, or ads any Thing, but for the Good of his Crea- tiires. But then, as Wifdom fuppofes an End, fo does it a Vv'ife End. And, therefore, tho' God be im- mutably difpofed to do Good to his Creatures, yet as his Goodnefs is a wife Goodnefs, he cannot be fuppofcd to will, or do Good to His Creatures, but in fuch a Way as Ihall beft anfwer the End of doing Good. So that when we fpeak of the Goodnefs of God, we muft mean an immutable Difpofition in him to do Good to his Creatures, according to their Natures and Capacities, which, as they are different, fo this Attribute is diftinguifh'd by dif- ferent Names. When it relates to Punifhment, we call it Juf- tice ; to Pardon, Mercy j to Moderation in Pu- niftiment. Equity ; to Slownefs, Patience . But all thefe are but fo many feveral Ways of doing Good. And as Goodnefs is the neceifary Refult of Holinefs, and thefe feveral Operations the natural Refult of Goodnefs ; fo we muft as neceflarily conceive the divine Nature to be difpofed to Juf- tice, Mercy, ^c. as we conceive him to be holy and good. But A Demonjlration of true 'Religion. 433 But then, as Hollnefs always ads according to Reafon, and Goodnefs difpofes God to do Good in fuch a Manner to his Creatures, as they are capable ; fo tho' God be difpofed to punifh or pardon, yet it muft be only in fuch Manner, Meafure and Seafon, as his Wifdom fees befl for his Creatures. And if fo, we fee the Abfurdity of thofe No- tions, that are drawn from the abfolute Sove- reignty of God, denoting a Power of dealing with his Creatures as he pleafes. For according to thefe Reafonings, we fee there is no fuch Attribute belonging to the divine Nature. Sovereignty properly fignifies no more than a Right of Dominion \ which, as God is holy, can only be a Right of dealing with his Creatures ac- cording to his infallible Reafon •, that is, accord- ing to his Knowledge of the Natures and Capa- cities of his Creatures, and as his Wifdom judges beft for them. Thus we are to conceive of the Perfecflions of the divine Will. And from hence we may explain the true Ex- tent of God's Power ; for as whatever he does, he does by his Will, and can, therefore, do what he will : So, on the other Hand, we may fay, that what he cannot will, he cannot do, becaufe it is contrary to his Reafon to will it. And, therefore, 1 . As God cannot will any Thing contrary to his Knowledge ; fo he cannot make Good, Evil, nor Evil, Good : In a Word, he cannot make a Thing to be, and not to be, which is a Contra- diftion. 2. As he cannot will any Thing contrary to Truth, fo it is impofiible for God to do or fay any Thing that is falfe. 3. As he cannot will any Thing contrary to Vol. III. F f Wifdom, 434 -^ Demonjlration of true Religion. Wirdom, and therefore to Goodnefs ; fo 'tis im~ pofTible for God to make any Creature, that it Ihould be miferable, merely for the Sake of Mi- fery. Thus much might fuffice upon the Perfedions. of the rational Will, and how far they belong to God: But becaufe the various Operations are called Paffions, I will enquire a little into the Nature of thefe Faffions, and how far they ought to be afcribed to God. Of the Faffions. Tho' thefe Operations, which we call Paffiona, are the Motions of the rational Will, yet they chiefly fliew themfelves in the fenfitive Part. And they are called PafTions, either becaufe they are Effeds excited in the Mind by the Ope- ration of the Blood and Spirits ; or becaufe there is ufually a Commotion excited in the Blood and Spirits by thefe inward Operations of the Mind. Now becaufe thefe PafTions are very often oc- cafion'd by, or attended with thefe bodily Com- motions, Men are cautious how they afcribe them to God, as feeming to imply fome Imperfedions. Whereas, as they are real Motions of the ra- tional Soul, there muft be fomething in the Na- ture of God confider'd as a perfe6lly rational Be- ing, analogous to thefe Affe6lions in us, tho' in- finitely removed from thofe Imperfedions, with which they are attended in us : And we may as well deny that God knows, becaufe we know by Ratiocination, as deny all rational Affedions to him, becaufe they are excited in us by Paflion r They are but fo many various Ways of repre- lenting the Operations of the Will, in the Pur- fuit of Good, and avoiding Evil •, for according as any Obje6l appears to the Underftanding to be Good or Evil j fo the Will is inclined or averfe 2 to A DemonJIration of true Religion. 43 5 to it. And this Inclination of the Will to Gud, we call Love ; and the Averfion to Evil, Hatred. If the Good or Evil be confider'd as prefeut, becaufe the Will cannot but embrace what the Underftanding approves, without fome Compla- cency in it, nor fhew its Averfion to a prefent E- vil, without fome Difturbance at it ; therefore, that general Inclination of the Will to Good, which is called Love, is then called Delight and Joy ; and that general Averfion to Evil, which is called Hatred, is then diftinguilh'd by Grief or Anger. If the Good or Evil be confider'd as future, then the Love is called Defire and Hope j and the Hatred, Fear and the like. But then, as there is nothing future to God, ib Hope, Defire, or Fear, that arife from the Good or Evil, confider'd as future, cannot be afcribed to him any otherwife than in Condefcenfion to our Weaknefs. But as for Grief or Anger, Defire or Joy, that relate to a prefent Good or Evil ; there is fcms- thing analogous in God to thefe, tho' without our Imperfedions. And, therefore, as we love what appears good to us with a fenfitive Complacency, fo God has fuch a Difpofition for Good, as to take a rational Pleafure in it. And tho' God cannot be iaid to be angry or grieve, as they imply a Difturbance in us, yet there is fuch an Averfion to all Evil in God, as to produce in him fuch Eifeds as are the Tokens of thofe Paffions in us. Thus far we may afcribe thofe Affedions to God. But then thefe AfFedions are but the various Motions of the Will •, and, by Confequence, as it is the Perfedion of the divine Will, to be im- F f 2 mutably 43 6 A Demonjlration of true "Religion, mutably conformable to the DIdates of Reafon ; fo muft thefe Affeftions in God be always con- ceived to be : And, therefore, 1. As God cannot will, fo he cannot love without Reafon ; and, therefore, as he cannot be faid to love himfelf, merely becaufe he will, but becaufe he has Reafon for it, as being perfedt ; fo he muft love himfelf infinitely, becaufe he is in- finitely perfed ; and every Thing elfe in fuch De- gree, as it comes nearer to his Perfe6bion. And thus he hates, not becaufe he will, but becaufe the Thing he hates is evil, and he hates it in fuch Degree as it is fo. 2. As his Will, fo we muft conceive his Love and Hatred to be immutably conformable to his Knowledge and Wifdom, and, by Confequence, to Truth and Goodnefs, fo far as to love and hate every Thing, fo far as it is agreeable or difagree- able to Truth. And thus we are to conceive of God, with refpe6l to the Affedions or Paflions. And if all thefe Conclufions be true, from hence I draw this general Corollary, viz. Cor diary. That whatever Notions of God are contrary to thefe, fo far they are contrary to Truth. And if fo, from hence it will follow, that fince we have a Book, we call the Scriptures, wherein God is reprefented, of all Perfedions, agreeable to thefe Notions here demonftrated •, fo far it is worthy to be received as true. Thus I have difpatch'd the firft Thing to be confider'd, ^7'2. how we are to conceive of God, as an abfolutely perfed Nature or Being, And whereas I have ftiewn, that this Being, to whom thefe Perfedions belong, is the Creator and Governor of the World, I will enquire, II. What Notions we are to form of the Crea- tion A Dem-onftratton of true Religion. 437 tion and Goyernment of the World, confidering it as made and governed by this abfoktely perfed Being. Of the Creation of the World. By the World is meant all Things vifible and Invifible, except God. And by the Creation of the World is meant, that all Things are from God. Now fince God muft do every Thing fuita- bly to his own infinite Perfedions •, if we do but reflect upon thefe Perfeclions, and confider him as ading according to them in the Creation of the World, this will bring us to the Difcovery and Eftabliihment of true Religion, And, therefore, I. As the World was made by the Power of God ; and if we look back, and confider what the Notion of this Power is, it will furnifh us with feveral Obfervations. By the Power of God is meant, his being able to do all Things by his bare Will, and that as he can do, whatever he can will ; fo what he cannot will, he cannot do. And if fo, then, as nothing could come into Being, without his Will, fo all Things muft have been produced, fo foon as he willed they fhould be. And, therefore, as the World was by the Will of God, fo it required nothing but his bare Will to rife into Being. When the World was made, is only knowable by Tradition or Revelation. We can only fay, that the Novelty of Hifto- ry, the Rife of Arts and Sciences, the late Cul- tivation and Civilizing of Nations, and the fmall Increafe of Mankind, are certain Proofs, that it hath not been of long Continuance : But how lately foever it might have been made, there is no Point of Time, beyond which it might not have F f 3 been 43 S ^ Dcmonjlration of true Religion, been made, if God pleafed. And as all Things are equally eafy to God, that he can will ; fo he could as eaiily have made ten thoufand Worlds, as one. And as there can be no certain Bounds aflign'd, beyond which his Works might not have extended ; fo 'tis very reafonable to think, that God has made more W^orlds than ours •, and as here, fo has filled them with Creatures fuitable to thofe Syftems. And thus we may reafon from the Power of God. But when we fay the World was made by the bare Power and Will of God, we muft not con- ceive, that it was the Effed; of mere "Will with- out Reafon. No, as God is abfolutely holy, we muft conclude he was guided by Reafon in the Creation of the World. And, therefore, that he made the World no fooner, was not without F^eafon j and -that he made it as it is, was becaufe he faw it moft reafonable to be made fo. Reafon is the Rule of all his Operations ; and if v/e confider God, as afting always according to this Rule, which is the Notion we have before given of his Holinefs ; fmce we have before fhewn, that under this is comprehended, and by this it is implied, that he muft always be direded in all his Operations by his Knowledge, Wifdom, Truth and Goodnefs •, as we muft conceive him afting in the Creation, according to thefe feveral Perfedlions, as his Rules ; fo thefe feveral Per- fedlons are the natural Rules to us to form our Notion oi his Creation by. And, therefore, firft, let us confider God as afting in the Creation, according to his Know- ledge ; and if this be allow'd, that his Know- ledge is infinite, from hence it will follow, that he made nothing by Chance, but that every Thing was A Demonjlrathn of true "Religion. 439 was made according to thofe eternal and perfed: Ideas of his infinite Mind. And if fo, from hence we may conclude, that €very Thing mud have been made perfedl in its Kind. This muft be true of all the Creatures in the "World j and if we apply this to Man, we muft conceive, that he was made a perfedl Man, not wanting in any Thing that the Perfedion of his Nature and Species requir'd. And, by Confequence, fince the human Na- ture is compounded of a reafonable and fenfitive Principle, which we call Soul and Body, he muft have been made perfedl in both thefe. 1. As Man is indued with a reafonable Princi- ple, or Soul, he muft be made perfedly reafona- ble ; that is, his Underftanding muft have been informed, or at leaft capable of knowing by Rea- fon every Thing neceflary to be known, fo far as Reafon can difcover it, and as foon as his Occa- fions required it : And his Will and Affe6lions muft have been in a regular Subordination to his Underftanding, fo as not to choofe, or rged: any Thing, but as Reafon ftiould dired and approve; this being the Perfeftion of the rational Nature, which we call Holinefs. 2. As the Body is made up of feveral Parts in a certain Number, Order, and Proportion, with feveral Powers adapted to feveral Ends, all which are put in Conjundion with, and under the Di- redlion and Government of Reafon ; fo it muft have been made perfedt in thefe Refpe6ls : And, therefore, the Body of the firft Man muft have been made perfedl, not only in its integrant Parts, as to their Number, Order, and Ufe, which I call the natural Perfedtion of the Body : But it muft have alfo been perfe6lly fabjedt to the Soul, which I call the moral Perfedion of the Body. F f 4 This 440 A Demonftration of true 'Religion, This muft be fo, if the divine Operations are agreeable to his Knowledge -, for otherwife he muft have had an imperfed: Idea of his Works. But further, if God made all Things according to his Knowledge, fince he cannot begin to know any Thing, he made every Thing with a certain Foreknowledge, how it would ad, and what the Event of its Adions would be. And as 'tis evident, that he made all material Things mutable, and all living Things mortal, and all rational Creatures fallible, and all free Creatures liable to Sin -, fo he muft have forefeen all the Changes of the former, and all the Deaths, Errors, and Sins of the latter, with the Caufe, Manner, and Circumftances of them, and all the poftible EfFeds that thofe Changes, Deaths, and Errors would produce for ever : And if all Things were made according to this Idea, he muft have order'd all Things fo, as to anfwer all the feveral Events for ever, that his Work fhould not be diforder'd, nor his Delign defeated by them. 2. As the World was made according to the Knowledge, fo muft it likewife be according to the Wifdom of God. And, therefore, as Wifdom has Relation to Ends and Means, and he is only truly wife, that propofes the beft Ends, and purfues them by the propereft Means ; fo in making the World, we muft conclude, that God made every Thing for fome End, and that he indued all his Creatures with fuch Natures, as were beft fuited to, and moft proper to attain that End. And if fo, when we fee God has made various Species of Creatures in the World ; if that was done according to our Notion of Wifdom, he muft not only have fuited their Natures, Organs, and Difpofitions to this Earth, but alfo have made the Earth fo, as was beft for their Reception j fo 2 as A Demonflration of true Religion. 441 as there fhould not be more Creatures than it fhould be capable of receiving, nor any natural NecefTity, but what it fliould be capable of fup- plying. And as 'tis evident, that God Intended that thefe Creatures fhould come upon the Earth by Degrees, he muft not only have given them fuch natural Difpofitions and Powers, as were adapted to that End, but likewlfe fuch as were necefTary for the Prefervatlon of their Offspring. And as thefe various Species of Creatures were to be dlf- perfed Into different Parts of the Earth, fo he muft have fuited the feveral Natures of his Crea- tures to their different Situations, and furnilh'd all fuch NecefTarles, as thofe different Climates fhould require. And If among thefe we confider Mankind as foclable Creatures, fo they mufl likewlfe be form- ed with proper Organs of Speech, by which they might communicate their Thoughts to each other, and with fuch DIftindlon of Faces, by which they might know one another. And, Iqjlly^ as this Earth, and the various In- habitants of It, have fo manlfeft a Dependence on the heavenly Bodies ; fo we muft conceive, that the Nature he has given, and the Pofitlon, Or- der, and Motion, that he has placed thofe heaven- ly Bodies in. Is beft for the Earth, and its feveral Inhabitants. And by Confequence, as the Heat, and Light of the heavenly Bodies, is communicated diffe- rently, to the different Parts of the Earth, we muft conclude, that this is beft for thofe Places, to have no more Light and Heat than is now im- parted to them. We come now, 3. To confider what Notions we are to form of the Creation of the World, as it was made by a God of Truth. By 442 A Demonjlration of true Religiojt, By Truth is meant the Reality of Things as they are, either in themfelves, or as they ftand related to one another. And if all Things muft have been made ac- cording to Truth, fince there is a natural Relation between the Idea of all Things in the divine Mind, and the Things to be formed by it, we muft conceive, that all Things were made accord- ingly ; and by Confequence, as God could not have an imperfed Idea of his Works ; fo all Things mull: be made perfed in their Kinds, as I faid before. And fo likewife, fince there is a manifeft Rela- tion between the Things themfelves, we muft conceive, that nothing v/as made of this Nature, but what was agreeable to thefe Relations. And therefjre, i. As whatfoever natural End God made any Thing for, he muft have provided Means for attaining it ; and there muft have been a neceflary Agreement, between thofe Means, and that Ertd, that the End ftiould be attain'd by thofe Means. And as every Thing had its Nature in order to an End, and therefore by ading according to its Nature muft attain its End ; fo it will follow, that fo far as we know the Natures of Things, fo far we may be able to judge of their Ends : And on the contrary, fo far as we can find the End of any Thing, fo far we may certainly conclude, as to its Nature, if we are able to difcover what Nature is neceffary to that End. As there muft be this Agreement between natural Means and their Ends •, fo, 2. There muft likewife be between natural Caufes and EfFec5ls : And, therefore, as no Efl^ed: can be produced without a Caufe, nor Caufe without an Effed ; fo whatever natural Effects there are, they muft have A "Demonfiratlon of true "Religion, 443 fiave a Caufe proportion'd to them ; and thofe Effedls muft be fuch, as are fuitable to the Nature and Power of their Caufes. And as nothing can give what it has not in its Nature to give ; and therefore no Caufe can pro- duce any natural EfFed contrary to, or above its Nature -, fo no natural EfFed can receive what the Caufe has not. And therefore Reft: cannot naturally produce Motion ; nor Motion Reft ; and Matter can pro- duce nothing but Matter •, and Motion nothing but Motion. And fo by the fame Reafon, a Subftance with- out Life, ^tn{^ or Reafon, cannot produce a liv- ing, fenfible, or rational Creature. And if this be true, no living, fenfible, much lefs rational Agent, can be produced by mere Matter and Motion ; for as Matter cannot move itfelf, fo it cannot give a Principle of Self-motion or Life to another. And as neither Matter nor Motion feparately or conjundly, do in their own Nature imply, or are indued with Senfe or Reafon ; fo neither can they produce Senfe or Reafon. And if fo, then every rational, fenfible, and living Creature, muft be endued with fome im- material Principle, which is the Caufe of their rational, ^c. Operations. If any^ one fhould afk, what the Nature of that immaterial Principle is, and what becomes of it, when it dies ? We anfwer, we cannot tell. But thus much we may fay, that it is not in- confiftent with Reafon, that there may be feveral Degrees and Orders of immaterial Beings, and that fuch of thefe, as are made to actuate Bodies, may be put into different Bodies, according to their different Capacities •, and when thofe Bodies are dead, they may poflibly tranfmigrate into others j 444 -^ 'Demojifiratton of true "Religion, others •, and when they have finilh*d their Courfe, they were made for, may either be annihilated, or be rewarded by God, according to their feveral Natures and Capacities. 3. As there is fuch a neceflary Relation between natural Caufes and their EfFeds \ fo there is like- wife betv/een their natural Faculties and their Objeds. From hence it will follow, that whatever Fa- culty God made, he muft have provided a fuitable Objed for it, and for every Objed a fuitable Fa- culty, and there muft be a natural Agreement between them. And if fo, we may conclude, that whatever Objed he faw neceflary by any Creature to be de- iired, in order to the Enjoyment of it ; or feared in order to the fhunning it ; he muft have given his Creatures fuitable Appetites to defire, and fuitable Fears to fhun : And whatever is necef- lary to be perceived or underftood, he muft have given them Faculties to perceive and underftand. So, on the other Hand, we may conclude, that whatever our natural Appetites crave, or our Fears fuggeft, are alfo proper to be defired and fear'd. And that whatever the Senfes of all fenfible Beings perceive, and the Underftandings of all reafonable Beings didate at all Times, muft not only be, but be, as they are perceived. And if fo, then an uniform Confent of all Mankind, concerning any Thing, -which is the Objed of their Faculties, muft be a certain Ar- gument of the Truth of that Thing. Thus we fee in general what Notions we are to conceive of the Creation of the World, confider- mo it, as made by a God of Truth. We come nov/, 4. To confider the Creation, as the Effed of the Goodnefs of God. The Goodnefs of God confifts in an immutable Dif- A DemonJIration of true Religion. 44^ Difpofition to do Good to his Creatures -, from whence we conclude, that he made every Creature to do them Good, according as their feveral Na- tures are capable of it ; and if fo, then, I . Since there are feveral Kinds and Degrees of Creatures, it will follow, that they muft be made for feveral Kinds of Happinefs ; and, therefore, as there are fome Kinds of Creatures, that for Want of Life, are not capable of Happinefs themfelves, fo they muft be intended for the Happinefs of others. Again -, As there are other Creatures, which, tho* they are endued with Life and Senfe, yet feem abfolutely neceffary for the Happinefs of Man -, fo we muft conclude, that fuch Creatures were fo far intended for this Ufe. But as they are capable of fome Degree of Happinefs themfelves, we muft conclude, that God defigned them to be happy fo far as ftiould confift with their being ufeful to the Happinefs of Men. And as there is nothing made of this Kind, but was made of fuch a Nature, and provided with fuch Means, and placed in fuch a State, as was fuitable to its End ; fo every Thing, by ad:- ing according to its Nature, would not only attain its own Happinefs, but alfo by being ufed by Man, it muft contribute to the Happinefs of Man. A gain -, As Man is compofed of a fenfitiveBody, and a rational Soul joined together -, fo we muft conclude, that God made Man, that he fhould be happy, both in Body and Soul ; and if fo, then, firft, as 'tis evident, that the rational Nature has a Faculty, by which it can confider and apprehend the Natures and Reafons of Things ; and another Faculty of chufing and ading according as Reafon judges any Thing fit to be chofen or done •, fo it will follow, that Mankind, as being rational Crea- 44^ A Demonflrafion of true Religion] Creatures, and made in a State of Perfedion, muft not only have been provided, with all ne- cefiiary Means of every Thing neceflary to be known, and furnifh*d with fufficient Power to do what Reafon Ihould dire6l to be done ; but alfo by confidering and acting accordingly, they muft have been as happy in their rational Nature, as fuch a Nature is capable of. And fo, 2. As the bodily Nature of Man is compofed of feveral Paculties and Pov/ers, having Senfes and Appetites fuited to, and carried towards cer- tain Objedls -, fo it will follow, that God made proper Objeds for thofe Powers, ^c. and put Man in fuch a State, as was moft proper for the Enjoyment of them •, and that, in the Enjoy- jnent of thofe Objeds, he muft have been as happy, as his bodily Nature is capable of being. But as Man's two Natures were fo united, that the Powers and Operations of the. Body were placed under the Diredion of the Mind, which. is the moral Perfedion of his Nature ; fo it will follow. That Man could not be happy, but by ading according to that Subordination ; but on the con- trary, fo far as this moral Perfedion of his Facul- ties fhould be wanting, fo far he mufc be want- ing of perfed Happinefs. Lafily^ If Mankind were made to be happy both in Soul and Body ; And if it be true, that Mankind were made in fuch a State, and furnifhed with fuch Means, as were moft proper for their Happinefs -, then if it fhall appear hereafter, that this Happinefs was to be everlafting ; then it will follow, that Man was not only immortal as to his Soul, but as to his Body alfo. Thefe are the Notions we cannot but receive, whilft A Demonjlration of true Religion, 447 whilft we confider the Happinefs of human Na- ture in itfelf. But, 2. As Man was made for Society, and without it he cannot be happy, fo we muft conclude, that he was provided with fuch Society, as his Happinefs required. And if fo, then fince Mankind were not only made with Faculties of Speech ; but alfo with another Faculty of multiplying their Species, and therefore muft be fupplied with proper Means for this : From hence we muft conclude, that at the Creation, the firft Society was not of Man with Man, but of Man with Woman, and in fuch Proportion as was beft for incrcafing the Species, and moft for the Happinefs of Society. And as no Society can be happy without mu- tual Benevolence j fo we muft conceive, that Mankind was not only made with this natural Difpolition, but alfo placed in a State fuitable to it. And therefore, fince Mankind were originally made of the fame Nature, with the fame Deiires and Neceflities, and might want the fame Things at the fame Time, from whence might arife Con- tention -, fo from hence we muft conclude, that whatever Number of Men and Women were made, as they were made for fecial Happinefsy there muft have been enough of every Thing made to fatisfy their Wants. But then, as Man is a rational Creature, and, by Confequence, his Happinefs, fuch as depends upon a due Subordination of his Appetites to Keafon ; fo tho* God made enough of every Thing for him, yet this would not make him happy, unlefs his Defires and NecelTities ftiould be regulated by Reafon. And if fo, then as every Thing has a Nature fuited to its End, we muft conclude, that Man- kind were fo made, as not to defire any Thing, but 448 A Demonfiration of true Religion, but what they wanted ; nor any Thing any other- wife than fhould be confiftent with mutual Bene- volence. From hence, it will follow, that the natural State of Man, tho' all Things were in common, could not be a State of War. For if Want was to be the Rule of their Defires, fince there was enough of every Thing, there could be no Reafon for Strife •, and as every one had a natural Love to every one, there could be no Inclination to it. This doubtlefs muft have been the natural State of Mankind, fuppofing there were ever fo many made ; but it is very natural to conceive, that there was but one Man and Woman originally made. For fince Mankind were to be placed in fuch a State of Life as was beft for the Preferva- tion of mutual Benevolence ; it feems moft natu- ral for this Purpofe, that Mankind fhould pro- ceed from one Man and Woman, that as they were undivided in their Original, fo they fhould be undivided in their AfFedions. Thus we fee how we are to conceive of the Creation of the World, confidering it as made by the Goodnefs of God : And fuppofing thefe De- duftions to be true, we will infer. That fo far as we have any Hiflory of the Creation, which is foimd to agree with thefe Con- clufions, fo far we have Reafon to conclude it true. Now the Old Teftament is the only Book that gives us any Account of this •, and here, every Thing was made, as we have before fhewn it ought to be, by the bare Aft of the divine Will : Let fuch a Thing be, and it was fo. And that he made every Thing every Way fuited to its End, and naturally capable of attain- ing it. And that when he made Man, he not only made A Dcmonjlration of true 'Religion. 44^ made him good, but after his own Image, un- der which is comprehended all, that can be meant by Perfedion and Happinefs. And as this Happinefs was to be a Happine/s of Soul and Body for ever ; and, therefore, there was a Neceffity by which the Body might be pre- ferved in Being; ; fo we are told of a Tree of Life, whicli might be intended, as a Prefervative againft all Decays of Nature, and a Remedy for all accidental Injuries. And as it was necefTary that Man, as a fociable Creature, fo foon as he fhould be made, fliould be provided with Society, and that of Man with Woman, fo we are told it was accordingly. And, therefore, this Account being agreeable to our foregoing Reafonings, which appear to be demon- ftratively true ; fo far we have Reafon to con- clude this Account of the Old 'Tejlament to be true. Having fnewn the abfolute Perfedlion of God, and the Relation he bears to the World, as its Creator, I proceed to fhew what Obligations of Duty arife from hence ; and how thefe two Con- iiderations will bring us to the Law of Nature, which is fo much fought after. For, 1. As God is abfolutely perfedt, and loves every Thing in fuch Degree, as it comes nearer to his Perfecflion •, fo, by Confequence, the only Way to pleafe God, is to be like him ; and, therefore, we muft endeavour to be perfed, as he is perfed. And as his imitable Perfed:ions are his Wifdom, Holinefs, Truth and Goodnefs, it is a natural Duty to endeavour to be wife and holy, true and good j and, by Confequence, whatever is implied in thefe Perfedions in God, which are imitable by us, is our Duty to imitate, and will be pleafing to him. So, 2. As God Is the Creator of the World, I In- VoL. III. G g fer, 450 -^ Demonjiration of true Religion. fer, that all the Powers God has given us, fhould be imployed in fuch a Way, as is fuitable to the JEnd they were given for : And as they were made in due Subjedlion to Reafon, fo from hence it will follow, that our Faculties fhould be exer- cifed as Reafon approves •, and when we find any Tendencies in us to the Contrary, it muft be our Duty to fubdue them. So, 3. As God has put in us feveral Relations, it is his Will that we fhould behave ourfelves fuit- ably to thofe Relations •, So that if we do but confider what the feveral Relations we bear to 'one another, are, and what A6tions arife from thofe Relations, this will give us a View into thofe Laws, which Nature obliges us to in this Refpedt. This is a natural Proceeding on this Subjedl ; but this will not anfwer my Defign j and there- fore I go, 1'hirdly^ To enquire what Notions we are to form of the Government of the World, confider- ing it as governed by an abfolutely perfedl Being. And fince God, as an abfolutely perfed: Being, cannot a6l contrary to his Nature and Perfedions, we mufl here again confider his Perfedlions, as fo many Rules, by which to form our Notions of his Operations in the Government, as we have al- ready done in the Creation of the World •, and this will afford us as clear a Notion of it as R-ea- fon alone can furnifh us withal. Of the Government of the World. ■ I will begin my Obfervations from his Know- ledge and Wifdom ; and if we reflect, as we have fliewn, that he cannot begin to know any Thing, and can never ceafe to know every Thing j and that he cannot do any Thing weakly, or er- roneoufly, in refpeft either of the End, the Means, the Manner, or Seafon of ading i From A Dermnfiration of true Religion. 451 From hence we muft conclude, that nothing can happen in the World without his Knowledo-e forefeeing it, and his Wifdcm difpofing it for fome End -, and always for the beft, but alfo in refped of the Suitablenefs of the Means, and the Seafonablenefs of the Time. For he who knows the Natures and Ends of Things, as perfe<5i:ly as he knows any Thing, and cannot poffibly be miftaken, is equally capable of governing all Things, as any Thing. 2. As God is fhewn to be in his Nature true, fo muft he be alfo in his Government, fo as not to do any Thing contrary to Truth. And, therefore, as Truth is the Reality of Things, as they are, or as they ftand related to one another, we muft conceive, that in the Go- vernment of the World, he will not a6t contrary to the Natures and Relations of Things. As, therefore, there is a natural Relation of Agreement between Means and Ends, EiFedis and Caufes, Faculties and Obje<5ls ; fo he muft be conceived to govern the World according tQ thefe natural Relations, fo as that there fhould be a natural Agreement between them. And, therefore, as we muft conceive, that he will not produce natural Efte6ls by fupernatural Caufes, when natural Caufes Vv'ill do -, fo on the other Fland, we muft conceive, that the Relation between Faculties and their Objeds fliall be main- tained i And, therefore, as God made various living Creatures with natural Appetites to preferve the Individuum^ and made fui table Proviiion for them ; fo we muft conceive in the Government of the World, that there Ihall be always a like fjitable Provifion continued, fo as that nothing ihall want any Thing to its neceflary Prefervation. ' As all living Creatures are likewife made with G s 2 natural 452 A Demonjlration of true Religidn. natural Appetites and Faculties for the Prefefva- tion of their Species : As it does follow, that as tliere muft have been an equal Number of Males and Females, that there might be an Objed fuita- ble to every Faculty •, fo we muft conceive, that there fhall always be an equal Number of every Species continued : And fince the Males fif we apply this to Man- kind) are expofed to greater Danger than the Fe- males ; from hence we muft conclude, that in the Government of the "World there ftiall be more Males born into the World, than Females, to an- fwer this Defeft. And as there are Relations of Agreement and Difagreement of one Thing to another in Na- ture ; fo there are likewife inftituted Relations of one Thing to another in Society ; and, by Con* fequence, as God is true, we muft conceive, that if he ftiall think fit to condefcend to- treat with us in our own Way, he will ad fuitably to thefe Relations. And, therefore, as there are certain Signs and Words, that are agreed upon by every Society to be the outward ExprefiTions of our inward Thoughts : From hence we muft conclude, that if God ftiall treat with Mankind, and for that Purpofe ftiall make ufe of any Sign, or Word, or Adion, either to exprefs his own Will, or re- prefent any other Thing by •, that Sign, Word, or Adion is a certain Declaration of his Will, and a certain Reprefentation of the Thing. . And whatever he delivers to be believed, is really as he declares it ; and whatever he exprefles a Defire of, he does really defire it. This muft be fo, if God be true. 3. As God is true, fo is he good in the Go- vernment of the World. He orders every Thing as ftiall be beft for the Happinefs of his Creatures, ancj A 'Demonjlratlon of true 'Religion. 453 and all his Methods are fuited to that End. And if fo, fince there are fome Creatures not capable of Happinefs themfelves, they muft be fo order'd as is beft for the Happinefs of others. And fince there are other Creatures capable of Happinefs in fome Degrees, and yet are neceflary to the Happinefs of Man ; it will follow, that their Happinefs fhall only be provided for in fuch Degree, as is conflftent with their Subordination to Man. From hence it will follow, that as all Things were at firft put in fuch a State, as was fuitable to the End they were made for ; fo all Things that are neceflary to the Happinefs of Man, were ori-- ginally put in Subjection to Man. And, Lajily, As the Happinefs of Man does not only require a fuitable Enjoyment of Objedts, but like wife the Affiftance of one another in Society i fo in the Government of the World God has pro- vided not only for his Happinefs in his private, but alfo in his focial Capacity. But the Method of doing this will be beft un- derftood by confidering the Holinefs of God. 4. The Holinefs of God confifts in an immu- table Conformity of his Will and Operations to the Didates of his infallible Reafon ; and as the natural Rule of Reafon ia the Natures and Rea- fons of Things ; fo this muft likewife be the Rule of his Operations to do nothing but what the Natures and Reafon of Things dire<5t. And if fo, then as God cannot will or ad any Xhing but what is moft reafonable ; fo that when we refolve Things into the fole Pleafure of God, we muft not underftand them as Ads of mere Will, but as Ads he had an infallible Reafon for ; and whatever he wills had a natural Goodnefs in it, in the Order of Conception antecedent to his Will, otherwife he would not have willed it : G g 3 And, 454 -^ Demojtftration of true Religion. And, therefore, whatever he does, he does it becaufe it is reafonable to be done -, and whatever he commands, he commands it, becaufe it is, in its own Nature good, either fimply, or relatively confider'd, as good, in order to an End ; and fo far as the End is good, fo far the Means are good, and fit to be commanded. And, therefore, as God cannot act without an End, nor command any Thing, but as a Means to an End j fo whenever he commands indiffe- rent Things, the Reafon muft be, that they are naturally fitted to attain fome End, which that Command is intended for, tho' we may not be able to find it out. 2. As God cannot aft without, fo neither can he ad contrary to Reafon •, and, therefore, not aft otherwife than as the Natures and Reafons of Things direft. And if fo, then, I . We mufl conceive, that he v/ill govern na- tural Things in a natural Way. And, therefore, tho' the Goodnefs of God or- ders all Things fo, as fhall be mofl for the Hap- pinefs of his Creatures ; yet fo far as this Happi- nefs depends upon the Ufe of natural Means, it cannot naturally be attained without them. And by Confequence, tho' Man, in his rational Capacity, ihall be provided with all Things ne- ceffary to his Happinefs, in refpeft of the Means of knowing whatever is neceflary to be known ; as likewife in refpeft of a fuitable Power, with fuitable Rules and Motives, to do whatever is necefTary to be done ; yet as it is neceffary in the Nature of the Thing, that thofe Means of Know- ledge, and thofe Rules and Motives of Praftice fhould be confider'd, and that Power be put forth into Adion, before any Thing can be known or done -, fo we cannot expeft any Happinefs fliould I arife A 'Demonftration of true Religion, 455 arife from any Provifion of Means, and Rules, and Motives, unlefs we will confider and aft ac- cordingly. And fo, 2. Tho' Man be furnifh'd with all Things ne- ceflary to his Happinefs, in due Provifion of pro- per Objefts fuited to its feveral Faculties, yet fince there is a Neceffity that we apply ourfelves to fuch Means, as are proper for this End, or elfe we (hall never be the Happier. So, in the Government of the World, we muft expedl no Happinefs will arife from this, unlefs we fhall do accordingly. And if Mankind do I'hings contrary to their Happinefs, they will be made unhappy by them. And fo likev/ife, 3. As the Happinefs of Man muft he a rational Happinefs, and muft confift in a rational Enjoy- ment of fuch Things as are fuited to his Facul- ties •, fo there can be no Happinefs expeded from them in the Government of the World, unlefs we will ufe and enjoy them accordingly : But on the contrary, fuch Mifchiefs will infue, as the Nature of Things fo abufed will produce ; and alfo fuch as v/ill arife from their Contrariety to Reafon, in guilty Reiiedions of the Mind. And fo again, 4. Tho' God provides all Things, that may be for the Happinefs of Society, yet fince Men can- not be happy without one another, fo they may be the Occafion of one another's Mifery, accord- ing as their Adions are •■, therefore the Happinefs of Mankind muft depend upon their Adions ; and if we can do all Things that our Happinefs requires to be done ; . this is all that can be re- quired on God's Part \ and there can be no Hap- pinefs expeded by us, unlefs we will do accord- ingly. And fo, 2. As God governs natural Things in a natural G g 4 Way, 456 A Demonjlratton of true Religion, Way, fo we muft conceive, that he will govern rational A gents in fuch a Way, as is fuitable to a rational Nature. And, therefore, as Man is an underflanding and free Creature •, if fuch a Creature be govern'd ac- cording to its Nature, it muft be in fuch a Way, as is fuitable both to his Underftanding and Freedom. And by Confequence, as God governs Man for his Happinefs, and will provide him fuch Means, as are nccefiary to inform his Knowledge ; and fuch Rules and Motives as are neceflary to diredt his Will to Pradice •, yet thofe Means will be fuch as his Underftanding can apprehend ; and thofe Rules muft be poftible and reafonable to be obferved, and thofe Motives fufficient to incline his Will to obferve them •, and fuch as ftiall make it more for his Happinefs to obferve, than not obferve them. And then, as he is a free Ageni^, he muft chufe or refufe, as he fees it, and by Confequence, wJiether he will be happy in himfelf, or in Society. And according to the good or ill Ufe that Mankind are fuppofed to make of their Liberty ; fo we muft form different Notions of the divine Government. And, therefore, as every Thing, by ading ac- cording to its Nature, will attain the End it was made for ; fo Men, by adling according to their Reafon, will attain both their own private Happi- nefs, and the Happinefs of Society. So fhould we fuppofe Mankind always afting according to Reafon, no other Government could be neceflary to the Happinefs of the World, but to preferve Things in their proper Orders, and enable them to exert their Faculties, according to their feveral Ends and Ufes •, and if fo. Then as there is the fame Reafon for their Pre- I fervation A Demonfiration of true 'Religion. 4^7- fervatlon as there was for their Creation, fo long as tliey a6t according to their Natures ; fo we muft conclude, that till Mankind a<5b contrary to their Nature or Reafon, which we call Sin, they would be preferved in that State in which they were created ; and by Confequence, be immortally and, everlaftingly perfeft and happy, both in Soul and Body, in this World. From hence it will follow, that the Unhappi- nefs, Imperfedlion, and Mortality of Mankind, and the Expectation of a future State, muft have rifen from Sin. This is the only Notion we can form of the divine Government, whilft we confider Mankind as a<5ling according to their Reafon. But if Mankind be confider'd as ading contrary to Reafon, and therefore contrary to their own Happinefs, and the Happinefs of others ; then as they ad: contrary to the End of their Crea- tion and Prefervation, fo it may be natural to conceive, that fuch Perfons fhould not be preferved. And if fo, then as the Reafon of their fup- pofed Deftru6tion is their Sin ; fo we may con- clude, that Mankind muft be liable to Deftrudion upon the very firft Ad of Sin. But as God made Mankind for fuch Degrees of Happinefs, as their Nature is capable of, fo we may conclude, that fo long as they are capable of Happinefs, fo long they are capable of Prefervation. And fince every one is capable of Happinefs, that ads according to his Reafon j it will follow, that tho* a Man has aded contrary to his Reafon once, he ftiall be capable of Prefervation fo far, as it may be prevented for the future : And if fo, then whatfoever is neceflary to pre- vent the firft Sinner's Difobedience for the future, feems neceflary to the Government of the World. But fince Men were made for the Happinefs of others, 45 8 A "Demonfiration of true "Religion, others, as well as themfelves ; it is reafonable to conceive, that in the Prefervation of a Sinner, God would provide for the Happinefs of Society : And, therefore, tho' the Sinner is prefer ved, that he may a6l according to Reafon for the fu- ture, and by doing fo, will contribute to his own and the Happinefs of Society j yet as the prefer- ving the firft Sinner, might tend to make others fin, and fo tend to the Unhappinefs of Society, by making them think God regardlefs of their Adions j there feems a NecefTity, that in the Prefervation of the firft Sinner, fome Method fhould be taken to prevent the ill Confequences of that Prefervation. So that here are two Things to be provided for upon the firft A6t of Sin in the World ; what Methods are moft proper for thefe Purpofes, God beft knows. But if we might be permitted to conjedure, we might conclude, I . That the moft rational Way to make a Sin- ner ad otherwife, is, to convince him he is in the Wrong •, and the Way to do this, is, to let the Sinner feel fome ill EfFedt of his Sin. And the Way to ftiew that God is not regard- lefs of the Adions of Men, is, to ftiew fome Token of Difpleafure when they fin, by inflidling fome fuitable Puniftiment for it, that other Sinners might be difcouraged from following the Example. And, therefore, from thefe Confiderations we muft conceive, that tho' God fiiould not deftroy the firft Sinner, upon the very firft Ad of Sin, yet that he would punifli him fo, as to convince Mankind, that they fliould have no Encourage-^ ment to tread in his Steps. This is the firft Notion we can form of God's Government of the World, confider'd as a Thing diftind from Prefervation. And A Demonjlration of true Religion. 459 And this, as it owes its Original to Sin, fo we 'Imiift conceive it would ceafe with it. And, therefore, could we fuppofe Maiikind, after the firft Sin, adling according to their Reafon for the future, we can fuppofe no Reafon for any- other Sort of Government for the future, but Prefervation. Becaufe every Thing has a Nature fuited to its End, and by afting according to its Nature, muft attain its End ; and fince nothing has a na- tural Power, of adling contrary to its Nature, but Man ; it will follow, that if Man ihall a6t agreeably to his Reafon, the End of all Things \vill be naturally attained : And by Confequence, there can be no Need of any other Government, than to let Things ad: according to their Natures. But then as Mankind muft be left to their own Freedom, and may adl contrary to their Reafon, and thereby difturb the Order of Nature -, fo if they are fuppofed to have done thus after the firft Sin, as there muft arife new Occafion ; fo we muft fuppofe new Methods of Government, in iiich Manner as Mankind were capable of, and as God faw neceftary for their Happinefs, according to their Circumftances. And tho* whilft Things ad according to their Natures, we can fee no Reafon why God ftiould, or would ad contrary to the Natures of Things ; yet when Things are fallen into a contrary State to that they were created in ; then. As there may be Reafons for contrary Methods of Government ; fo, 5. As God is free, he may ad according to thofe contrary Reafons ; and by Confequence may ad contrary to the Natures of Things, as he has Reafon for it. And if fo, then tho' God governs natural Things, 460 A Jjemonjlration of true Religion, Things in a natural Way and Order, as being the moil natm-al Method to attain their End ; yet when Things are fo alter'd, as that it fhall beft ferve the Ends, for which they were made, to aft contrary to their primitive Nature and Order j he may do it in fuch Manner as he fees fit : And fo like wife, 2. Tho' he ordinarily governs rational Creatures in a rational Way j yet when he fees fit, he can fupernaturally inform, or infatuate their Under- ftandings ; and he can determine their Wills, and either afluate or reftrain tlieir PafTions fo, as to make them do thtit they would not have done ; and keep them from doing that Evil they would have done. And fo again, 3. Tho' God be difpofed to do Good to his Creatures, according to their Natures and Capaci- ties ; yet when the Natures and Capacities he gave them are alter'd, or when they a-61 contrary to them, he may then alter his Methods of doing Good : He may do either by Profperity or Ad- verfity, by Pleafure or Pain, as he fees fit : And fo, Lafily^ Tho' God be abfolutely true, and can declare nothing but what is real *, yet when the Rcafon of fuch Declaration is alter'd, he may a6b other v/ife than he declared. But then we mufl remember, that this Freedom is both a wife and holy Freedom ; and by Confe- quence, as Wifdom will do nothing by extraordi- nary, when natural Means will do •■, So Holinefs will do nothing contrary to the Natures and Reafons of Things any farther than as their Natures and Reafons are alter'd ; nor any farther than that Alteration does require it. And by Confequence, fo far as the Wifdom of God fhall fee, that by ading according to the Na- tures of Things, the End of the Creation may be equally attained i fo, tho' the Natures of Things are ^ alter'd. A Demonjlration of true Religion. 46 1 alter'd, fo far we may reafonably conceive, he will not ad contrary to their Natures. And, therefore, i. We may conclude, that tho' he may aft contrary to the Nature of natu- ml Caufes and rational Agents •, and tho' he may fufpend, or over-rule the Powers of the former ; and he may fupernaturally inform, or infatuate the Underftandings, or aduate or reftrain the Wills of the latter ; yet he will never do it, but where there is a Neceffity, and where the Happi- nefs of the World cannot be attained without it. And fo, tho' God may do Good in what Man- ner he fees fit, yet, as Pleafure is moft agreeable to the Natures of Mankind, fo far as they are capable of Happinefs by Pleafure, fo far we muft conceive, he will not give them Pain. And, lajlly^ Tho' God may revoke and alter his Declarations, or, as he fees fit, may a6t con- trary to them, yet it muft be only fo far as the Natures and Reafons of Things are alter'd. And, therefore, when God promifes a Favour, or threat- ens a Punifhment upon a certain Reafon ; tho' God cannot be obliged, when that Reafon is ceafed, to perform his Promife, or inflidl the Pu- nifhment. And tho', when God gives Laws of a mutable Nature for mutable Reafons ; when the Reafons of fuch Laws are altered, he may alter his De- clarations concerning them ; yet fo long as the Natures and Reafons are the fame, fo long his Declarations and Operations will be the fame. And, by Confequence, when God commands any Thing to be obferved or avoided, or de- nounces any Thing to be inflidled ; the Reafon of which is founded in the Nature of Things, fuch Laws, and Threatnings cannot be difannull'd, fo long as the Nature of Things continue •■> and we- muft 462 A Demonjlration of true 'Religion. muft conceive, that in fucli Cafes God will nei- ther revoke, nor adl contrary to them. Thus far then have we difcover'd the Nature of God, both in his Perfedions in themfelves, and the outward Manifeftation of them in Adls of Creation and Government. "Which being granted, I fhall endeavour to demonftrate the ge- neral Body of all Religion •, but that we may do this more clearly, I will look back a little, and refled upon what we have before proved. What is the true State of Nature. Firji^ We muft remember that the original State of Mankind is a State of Perfedion. From whence we may be able to form a right Notion of a true State of Natui"e ; for as it is felf-evident, that that muft be the true Nature of Things, which they received when they were made ; So, by Confequence, nothing can • be properly faid to be in a State of Nature, any further than it can be faid to be in a State of Perfedion : And, therefore, fo far as Mankind are fallen from Per- fedtion, fo far they are in an unnatural State. And if we call this a State of Nature, we ought to call it an imperfed; State, in Oppofition to the true primitive State of Nature, which was a State of Perfedlion. And without this Diftindion we ftiall not fpeak of this Matter without Confufion. IVhat Mankind flood in need of in a State of pure Nature. Secondly^ As we have ftiewn, that Mankind were made in a State of Perfedion : So 'tis neceflary to be obferved, as we have proved, that they were made by the Wifdom of God for fome End, and by the Goodnefs of God for Happinefs ; and that they were put in fuch a State as was proper for the Attainment of it. And, A Demonft ration of true Religion. 46 j And, by Confequence, they muft be provided with the neceffary Means of Knowledge of every Thing neceflary to be known -, and furnifh'd with fufficient Power to do v/hatever was neceflary to be done. And if fo, then, 1 . Since the End and Happinefs of Man con- fifts in being Partaker of the divine Nature -, it will follow, that if there be a Neceffity, that Man fhould be informed of his End and Hap- pinefs, there is the fame Neceffity that he fhould be informed of the Nature of God, in which his End and Happinefs confifts. And if fo, then, 2. As the Reafon of his being informed of his End and Happinefs, and the Means of attaining them, with the neceflary Rules and Motives of Adion, is, that thefe Motives fliould be complied with, and thofe Rules be followed, and thofe Means employed in the Attainment of this End and Happinefs •, from hence it will follow^, That fo foon as Mankind were capable of un- derfl;anding and enjoying Happinefs, fo foon muft they have had this Information given them. And if fo, then, 3 . Since Mankind were created perfed in their Nature, and, therefore, capable of all this, fo foon as they were made -, it will follow, that they mufl: have had this Information, fo foon as they were made. 'The Means of Knowledge In a State of fur e Na- 'ture. As to this, we mufl: conceive, from the Holi- nefs of God, that as he always a6ls according to the Natures and Reafons of Things. So the Means of Information mufl; be fuch, as the Nature of Things to be known, and the Reafon of the Knowledge of them requir'd. And, by Confequence, as thofe Things tlmt are neceflary, but cannot be known in a natural Way, 464 -^ Demonjlration of true Religion. Way, do require a fupernatural : And as thofe Things that can be known in a natural Way, do require no more than natural Means : So we muft conclude, i . That if there was any Thing neceflary to be known, which our firft Pa- rents could not know by Reafon in a natural Way, fo foon as their Occaiions requir'd the Knowledge of it, it was certainly made known by a fupernatural Revelation : But, 'The Rule of Reafon. 1. As thofe Things that lay within the Compafs of Reafon, were to be known in the Ufe of fuch natural Means of Knowledge as were afforded them. So we muft conclude, they had no Revelation concerning them. By natural Means of Knowledge, I mean the Natures and Reafons of Things : For Knowledge is the Perception of Things as they are in their own Natures, or as they are re- lated to each other. And as thofe Things, which we apprehend to agree or difagree, we therefore judge to be fit, or unfit for fuch Purpofes : So that Fitnefs or Unfitnefs, for fuch Purpofes, is a Reafon arifing from the Natures of Things for the Fitnefs and Unfitnefs of fuch and fuch Operations. And when we make a right Judgment of Things, as we are then faid to know thefe Things, and as our Reafon is then faid to be right : So, by Confequence, if we would form a right Knowledge of Things, the natural Rules to form our Notions by, is, to confider the Natures and Reafons of them. And, if fo. Then as every Thing had its Nature from God, fo whatever Means of Information our Reafon finds out by confidering the feveral Natures which God A Demonjiration of true Religion. 465 God has made Things of, and the Relations he has placed them in -, this we may call the natural Re- velation of God ; and the Matter of fuch Reve-- lation, natural Religion. 'The Subjiance of natural Religion. Since we have proved the Neceffity of Man's being informed, fo foon as he was made, Firfi^ Of the Nature of God, and his own Happinefs. Secondly, Of the Means and Rules to attain this Happinefs by. Thirdly, Of the Motives to inforce the Obfer- vation of thofe Means and Rules. It will be proper to enquire how far the Know- ledge of thefe feveral Particulars is capable of be- ing difcovered by Reafon; and whether there was any Thing further neceflary to be known, which our firft Parents, in a State of Purity, could not know but by Revelation. Firft, Of the Nature of God, how far it is difcoverable by Reafon. What Reafon may find out concerning this, I have already confider'd ; if there be any Thing neceflary to be added, it can be only to enquire, whether it can be fuppofed, that Man, at his Creation, could be capable of finding out all thofe Speculations, that we have deliver'd concerning God. In Anfwer to which it is certain, that his Reafon was either capable of finding it out, or it was revealed to him. And therefore I will pro- ceed to enquire. Secondly, What Notions Reafon would furnifli him v/ithal, concerning the true End and Hap- pinefs of Man. The End for which God made all Things, was the Good of his Creatures -, and by Confequence, that which is the true Good, muft be the true End of Man. Vol. III. H h Now 466 A "Demonflration of true Religion. Now the only Good that God could aim at in the Creation, was himfelf •, for fince he is the fole Fountain of Being, and Perfeftion of all Good ; fo before the Creation he was the only Being and Good •, and by Confequence the only End, and the only Good, he could intend in the Creation, muft be himfelf. But yet, as he could not want, and, therefore, could not aim at the receiving any Good to himfelf; fo it will follow, that it muft be fome Good to be imparted to his Crea- tures, and, by Confequence, the Good that he intended for Man in the Creation, was the im- parting of himfelf, or his Perfeftions to him. And if fo, then, fince Happinefs is nothing but the Enjoyment of Good, as God is the high- eft Good, it muft be the higheft Happinefs of Man, to have the divine Nature and Perfe6lions communicated to him in the higheft Degree he is capable of. Here then we muft confider what Degrees of God's Perfed'ions the State and Condition of Man is capable of. Now as to the Independency, Neceffity, Immu- tability, Omniprefence, and Infinity of God, thefe only belong to a felf-exiftent Being. But to be fpiri- tual and everlafting, may be imparted to a Creature. And as we may from thence infer, that we have, fo we are generally fuppofed, upon very good Reafon, to have fuch a fpiritual and everlafting Nature, which we call the Soul, imparted to us. So iikewife, as for the Perfedtions of Life, Senfe and Reafon, thefe are not only communica- ble to a Creature, but we find we have them in fome Degree. If then the Happinefs of Man confifts in being like God in thefe Perfedions, we muft form our Conceptions of this Happinefs of Man according as we conceive of thefe Perfedions in God. And, A Demonjiration of true Religion. 467 And, therefore, as the Perfedtion of Life in God conlifts in doing all that is poffible for him to will ; and the Perfedlion of Senfe, in enjoying all the Pleafure that is poffible for him to enjoy ; and the Perfeftion of Reafon in the abfolute Com- prehenfion of the Natures and Reafons of Things; and fuch an immutable Holinefs of Will, as ne- ver to choofe or ad any Thing, but according to the Natures and Reafons of Things : So the Happlnefs of Man muft confift in the higheft Degree of thefe Perfections, that his Na- ture is capable of. And, therefore, when Man in refped of his rational Nature knows the Natures and Reafons of Things, as fully as he is capable of, and his Will is governed by his Reafon : And when in refped of his bodily Nature, he has his Faculties of Operation perfedt, and regu- larly employ'd upon proper Objedls, then he is in a true State of natural and perfed: Happinefs. So that in one Word, the chief Happinefs of a rational Nature confifts in right Reafon and Ho- linefs : For the clear Knowledge,' and true Judg- ment of the Nature and Reafons of Things, we call right Reafon ; and the Government of our Wills by right Reafon, we call Holinefs. And as we are the moft like God when our Knowledge and Holinefs are in the greatefl Per- fedion -, fo when we fpeak of the Happinefe of Man, as confifting in the Perfedion of his Na- ture, or in right Reafon and Holinefs, or in the Enjoyment of God j thefe are but different Names of the fame Thing. The Notion of Happinefs being thus explain- ed, we may the better difcover. How Happinefs is to be attained. Thirdly^ What thofe Means, or Rules, or Laws are, by which this Happinefs is to be attained. H h 2 By 468 A Demonjlraflon of true Religion. By Means, or Rules, or Laws, the fame Thing is to be meant : For whatfoever is a neceflary Means to an End, the fame is a neceflary Rule to be obferved to attain that End : And whatfoever God has made neceflary to be obferved, as a Rule, it is his Will we fhould obferve it s and whatfo- ever it his Will we fliould obferve as a Rule, that is certainly a Law, by which v/e are to adt. And, therefore, the Means that are neceflary to the Attainment of this Happinefs, may like- wife be called the Laws of our Happinefs : The Neceflity of which being founded in the Natures of Things, and thereby fignified to be the Will of him, who is the Author of that Nature and Neceflity j they are likewife called the Laws of Nature. But then, as the Means that are neceflary to the Happinefs of Mankind are difi^erent, accord- ing as they are conflder'd in a State of Purity, or Corruption : So in treating upon the Laws of Nature, it will be proper to carry this Difl:indion along with us. The Laws, which obliged in a State of Purity, we will call primary Laws of Nature. And thofe whofe Obligation arofe from our Corruption, we will call the fecondary Laws. The Laws of Nature are the Means that are neceflary to our Happinefs, in the very Natures of Things i and, therefore, to find out thefe Laws, we mufl: fee what the Nature of our Hap- pinefs requires. Our Happinefs then confifl:s in a right Appre- henflon and Judgment of the Natures and Reafons of Things, which is calPd right Reafon ; and in being govern'd both in our Will and Operations, by right Reafon. And from thence it is eafy to difcover, what are the natural Means to this Hap- 2 pinefs j A Demonftration of true Religion. 469 pinefs •, and what are the natural Rules by which Man was to aft in a State of Nature. ^he Laws of Nature. For, i/, If Man cannot be happy without right Reafon, or a right Apprehenfion of the Natures and Reafons of Things, whatfoever is a neceflary Means to right Reafon, muft be a ne- ceflary Means to Happinefs ; and by Confequence, the firft Thing neceflary to be done, in order to a right Apprehenfion of Things, muft be the firfl: Law of Nature •, and that is. To confider the Nature and Reafon of Things, how far they are fit to be chofen or done, before we pretend to chufe or aft. 2. If Man cannot be happy without chufing and afting, according as his Reafon apprehends Things worthy to be chofen or done \ then as it is another necefliiry Means to our Happinefs, fo it is another general Law of Nature, Not to chufe or aft any Thing without, or contrary to Reafon. On thefe two general Laws of Nature the whole Body of natural Law is comprehended. As for Inftance ; i/, If we muft not chufe, or aft without Rea- fon, we are hereby obliged not to aft without fome End. And fince that which Reafon approves to be done, is the very Notion of Good, and by Con- fequence whatever Reafon propofes, as an End, muft be fome Good : As we are hereby obliged not to aft without an End, fo we are by Confe- quence obliged not to aft without an Intention of fome Good, either to ourfelves or others. And as the Rule of Reafon is the Natures and Reafons of Things ; fo we are obliged to do no- thing, but with an Intention of fuch Goud, as H Ji 3 our 470 -^ Demonflration of true Religion. our Reafon apprehends the Natures and Reafona of Things require. So that by this we are obliged to the genera! Laws of Prudence and Goodnefs. 2. If we muft not chufe, or a6t contrary to Reafon, by this we are taught the great Laws of Truth and Sincerity. 3. If we muft not ad, but as our Reafon ap- prehends the Natures and Reafons of Things re- quire i here we have the great Laws of Modera- tion and Fortitude. And therefore to apply this \ I. As there are many Things made of the fame Nature, and for the fame End, which we therefore call Equals : So it will follow, that we muft behave ourfelves towards them equally alike : And by Confequence, as all Mankind, by being made for the fame End, and of the fame Nature, are fo far naturally Equals : They muft be dealt with equally ; and whatfoever Reafon directs to be done to any one, in refpeil to his Nature, the fame it muft direct to be done to all. And, therefore, if our own Nature be worthy our Love, fo likewife is the Nature of every other Man. If our Nature, as fuch, requires good Offices from others •, the fame Nature in others, requires the like good Oftices from us. And if by our Nature we have fuch Relations to others, as require, that they be true to us ; the fame Relation in them to us, requires the fame from us to them. 2. As there are fome Things more perfedl than others in themfelves, fome more conducive to our Happinefs than others, which we call good. By this general Law we are not only obliged to prefer thofe Things in our Aixedions, which our Reafon pre- A "Demoyifiration of true 'Religion. 471 prefers in its Judgment ; but alfo in flich Propor- tion as it judges them worthy to be preferred. And, therefore, as the beft Things are more worthy to be known, and to be loved than others ; So we are obliged to knov/ and love thofe Things above others j and alfo fo far, as they are worthy of it. And by Confequence, as God is the moid per- fedt Being in himfelf, and the greateft Good we are capable of ; fo it will follow, that we muft not only endeavour to know and love him above all ; but alfo, that we muft know him with all poflible Degrees of Knowledge -, and love him with all poffible Degrees of Love ; thus we are taught how to regulate thofe Paffions that we commonly call concupifcible, which Virtue we call Moderation. By the fame Rule we are taught to manage our Hatred and Fear, Grief and Anger ; the Regu- lation of which is called Fortitude. But as in a State of pure Nature, Mankind muft have been entirely governed by their Reafon, and been happy fo long as they continued to adl according to Reafon ; therefore, as there could be no Manner of Reafon for Hatred or Fear, or Grief, or Anger \ fo we muft conclude, they arofe from Sin, And when Sin came into the World, there was {bon Reafon enough for them all ; and by this Rule we are taught how to regulate them all, vix. That thefe Paffions be diredled towards their re- fpedlive Objedts in fuch Manner, as our Realbn apprehends they are worthy of our Hatred or Fear, our Grief or Anger. Thus we are taught to regulate our Paffions. 4. If we muft not chufe or ad any Thing, but as Reafon directs \ here we have a general Law of Juftice and Equity. H h 4 As, 472 A Demonft ration of true Religion. As, r. Since there are fome Beings mere Sub- fiance, and incapable of Happinefs themfelves, and therefore made for the Happinefs of others ; if we muft a6t rationally, we are obliged to ufe thefe in no other Meafure, than is neceffary to the End they were made for : And by Confecjuence, fo far as they were made for the Happinefs of Man, they muft be ufed in fuch Degree as his Happinefs requires : So that here we have a Law againft Excefs in the Ufe of inanimate Creatures. 2. As there are other Beings that have Life and Senfe, which tho' made for the Happinefs of others, are yet capable of fome Degrees of Hap- pinefs themfelves, if we muft adt juftly -, we muft not deprive them of their Lives, Senfes, or Plea- fures, ?A\y further than is neceftary for the Hap- pinefs of thofe they were made for. So that here we have a Law againft .all Cruelty in the needlefs Deftrudion of fuch Creatures. And from hence we muft conclude, that in a State of pure Nature, where IVlen were entirely govern'd by the Natures and Reafons of Things, they never ate Flefh, till there were no other Things that were fit to be eaten ; becaufe the Ne- ceffity of killing them for the Happinefs of Man, could be the only natural Reaion of doing it. And by Confequence, the firft kill- ing of Beafts muft have arifen from a Senfe of fuch a Neceftity, or from Revelation. 3. Man being compofed of a fenfitive Body and a rational Soul, each capable of a dift'erent Happinefs, if we muft a6V juftly, we are obliged to ad according to the Nature both of Soul and Body. And therefore, I . As it is the Nature of the rational Soul, fo it is the Duty of every Man to chufc and ad ac- cording to his Reafon. And A Demonjlratlon of true Religion. 473 And as every one has a rational Soul of his own, it muft be the Duty of every one, not only to ad and chufe according to his Nature, but alfo to confider and chufe for himfelf. 2 . As the Body is compofed of a certain Num- ber of Parts, endued with a Principle of Life, we are obliged not to deprive ourfelves, or others, of any Part of the Body ; much lefe, take away our own, or any other's Life. And as the Body has feveral Powers fuited to feveral Objedls, fo if we muft ad: according to the Nature of the Body, it is neceffary to our Happinefs, and by Confequence, a natural Law ; that we may apply ourfelves to fuch Objeds, and fuch Operations, as our Powers and Faculties require. But then as all the Powers and Faculties of hu- man Nature were made in a natural Subjedion to Reafon •, fo they muft not be gratified in any other Manner, than Reafon fhall allow to be con- iiftent with the Natures and Reafons of Things ; that is, with the Nature of thofe feveral Facul- ties, and the Reafon of the Exercife and Gratifi- cation of them. As we have Appetites, which tend to Eating and Drinking, tho' our Happinefs requires, that thefe Appetites be gratified, yet we muft not gra- tify them any further than is confiftent with Reafon. And, therefore, as the natural Reafon of Eating and Drinking is Hunger, and Thirft -, fo in a State of pure Nature, Men were obliged not to eat and drink longer than till their Thirft and Hunger fhould be allay'd ; So that here we have a general Rule of Teni^. perance. And fo likewife, 2. As we have feveral Faculties that cannot be exercifed but in Society j and there are many Things 474 ^ Demonjlration of true Keliglon, Things our Faculties require, which cannot be had but in Society : So we are obh'ged to enter into fuch Society as our Faculties require •, and to exercife thofe Facul - ties, in fuch Of»erations, as the Nature and Rea- fon of 'Things require. So that here we have the great Law of Hu- manity. Now thofe natural Faculties and NeceffitieSj upon which, the Neceffity of Society is founded , are three ; The Faculty of Speech, of multiplying our Species, and that of mutual Affiftance : And as thefe Things made Society always ne- ceflary to the Happinefs of Mankind : So 'twas always equally neceflary to the Hap- pinefs of Society, that thefe Faculties fhould be exercifed on their proper Objeds ; and iuch Af- iiftance afforded as thofe Neceilities require. But then as all our Faculties and Operations were to be regulated by Reafon, according to the Natures and Reafons of Things ; therefore, 1. As our Converlation muft be regulated according to the Natures and Reafons of Things : So it will follow, that it muft be not only agreeable to the Nature and Reafon, and End of Speech : And by Coniequence, fuch as fhaJl truly exprefs our Thoughts, but alfo fuch as is agreea- ble to the Nature of fuch Things as we have to fpeak on, fo as to talk with one another, of the moft worthy Things, and moft conducive to our Happinefs ; and by Confequence, that our Dif- courfes be chiefly upon God. This was the Rule, and this was the, Pradlce undoubtedly in a State of Purity. 2. As to Multiplication, if our Faculties muft be regulated according to the Natures and Reafons of Things, it will follow, I. That A Demonjlration of true Religmt. 475 1. That our natural Powers of Multiplication jnuft not be ufed in any other Manner than is fuitable to the Nature of Man. 2. That they muft be ufed for no other End but Multiplication : And by Confequence, no longer than till Reafon apprehends this End is attained. And if fo, we may conclude, that in a State of Purity, our firft Parents had no other Appetites one to another in this Kind, but what were agreeable to thefe Laws. And by Confequence, that had they continued in that State, there muft have been fome certain Times and Seafons for carnal Familiarity among Mankind then, as we fee in other Creatures now. 3. As the Faculties of Multiplication ought only to be ufed but for Mulplication •, fo it will follow, that Multiplica,tIon ought not to be endea- vour'd, but for the attaining the End of Multi- plication. And by Confequence, as the End of Multiplication is the Happlnefs of Society, it ought to be endeavour'd no otherwife than the Happinefs of Society will allow : And if fo, then from hence we may conclude, that as every Thing was made of fuch a Nature, and put in fuch a State, as was beft for the End it was made for j and by Confequence, fince Mankind were not only made with Faculties of Multiplication, for the Happinefs of Society, but provided with fuch Objefts as were moft fuitable to the Nature and End of thofe Faculties •, it will follow, that whatever Provifion was made for Multiplication at the Creation, the fame muft be the beft Way for the Happinefs of the World : And therefore, if it can be made appear, that there was at firft but one Man and Woman made, and appropriated to each other in the Way of Marriage, this muft be beft for the Happinefs of the World. I 3. As 47^ ^ Demon/lration of true 'Religion. 3. As to mutual AfTiftance, if this muft be regulated by the Natures and Reafons of Things \ it will follow, that it muft be not only fuch as is agreeable to the Nature of Man, but alfo in fuch Manner, as is moft for the Happinefs of thofe that need it. Thefe are the general Laws of Society, and are fuch as came in with our very Natures ; and fuch, therefore, I call primary Laws of Nature, But there are other Things equally neceflary to the Support and Happinefs of Society, which came in only with what we call the Fall ; and which, tho' we are obliged to obferve -, yet the Obliga- tion arifes only from the Corruption of our Na- ture, viz. the Determination of Property, the Settlement of coercive Government, and all thofe Laws which are neceflary to the Security of Pro- perty and Government. And tho' thefe are all truly Laws of Nature, as being neceflary to the prefent Happinefs of Mankind ; yet as this was not the firft State of Mankind, fo I call the{Q fecondary Laws of Nature, I . As for Property. By this is meant fome peculiar Right one, or more Perfons have to any Thing, exchifive of all others Pretences to it. By Right is meant a Power of having any Thing granted by a Law. And, therefore, as where there is no Law, there is no Right -, and by Confequence, no Property •, fo if there were any fuch Thing as na- tural Property, there muft be fome natural Law, ■which gives the Perfon the Privilege of enjoying the Thing he has a Property in, excluftve.of any other's Pretences to it. But as no Man, in a State of Purity, hath any natural Right to any Thing further than he wants it : And as all Men were originally made of the fame A Demonftratton of true Religion. 477 fame Nature, and liable to the fame Wants j fo by Confequence, they muft all be made with the fame natural Right to every Thing they wanted ; and therefore could not juftly exclude one another from enjoying any Thing they had, fo foon as their own natural Wants were fupplied : And, therefore, in a pure State of Nature, there could be no fuch Thing as Property, The fame will likewife appear concerning coer- cive Government, if we confider, that the State of Man's Innocence was a State of Perfedion, wherein as Reafon was to be his Guide ; fo his rational Will, and bodily Operations, were fub- jecl to its Diredlions •, So that whatever Reafon required, or forbid, every one muft naturally have obferved of his own voluntary Motion ; and no fooner would the Underftanding have approved any Thing, but his Will would have prompted him to A6tion. And in fuch a State as this, all other Governments would have been ufelefs, but that in our own Boloms. And as there could be no Need of any other Laws, than thofe our Reafon would dired us to ; fo there can be no Reafon to think, there would have been any other Laws but thefe. If there were, it muft be either from God, or from Man ; the former cannot be fuppofed, un- lefs the Wifdom of God can be thought to do that by extraordinary, which may be done as well by ordinary Means : Neither can it be the latter, unlefs the Reafon of Man, which was then govern'd by the Natures and Reafon of Things, can be fuppofed to diredt them to the making of fuch Laws, as there was no Need of, and no Reafon for. Thus we fee what Laws we are diredled to, by the Confideration of the Natures of the feveral .Orders of Beings in the World thus far : But, 4. There 478 A bemonfiration of true Religion. 4. There is another Being above all thefe, who is abfolutely perfed, who is the Creator and Go- vernor of the World, which Being we call God : And if we are to ad according to the Natures and Reafons of Things ; and by Confequence, muft behave ourfelves in refpeft of God, fo, as is agreeable to the Nature of his Perfedlions, and our Dependence upon him ; here we have a new Scene of Laws open'd to us, which we call the Duties towards God. And therefore, I . As God is abfolutely perfedt, it is a natural Duty to know the Nature of God, and to love him, as much as we are capable of. And, 1. As our Happinefs confifts in being like God ; and the more we are like God, the more happy we muft be *, fo it will follow. That if we would attain that Happinefs we were made for, we ought to endeavour to be as like God as our Nature is capable of being ; and if foj from hence it will folloWj C5. That as it is our Duty to know and love God, fo our Aftions muft be fuch, as our Reafon apprehends are fuitable to our Knowledge of him ; and to that Efteem which is implied in the very- Nature of loving him. 4. As God is a Being on whom we abfolutely depend j fo if we would a6t according to the Natures of Things, we muft in all Refpeds be obedient to his Will, whenfoever, or howfoever^ made known to us. Andj 5. As the natural Reafon of this moral Obedl- dience to his Will, is, that we are naturally fub- je6l to his Will ; fo if we will ad according to the Reafons of Things, it muft be our Duty, not only to a6l according to his Will, but the Reafon of doing it muft be a Senfe of our Subjedion to him. And if fo, then, 6. Since it was the Will of God to make us, thaC A Demo^ijlraflon of true Religion. 479 that we might be iuppy, not only in ourfeivcs, but in one another, it iiinH be his Will, and our^ Duty, to do thofe Things that are neceilary to the Happinefs of ourfeivcs, and othei-s *, and to do it out of a Senfe of our Duty, and out of Obedience to his Will Thefe are the Duties Mankind were obliged to even in a State of Purity : But as for thofe Duties to God, that arife from a Senfe of Want, Weaknefs, or Afflidion, and the like ; thefe came in only with the Fail. For in a State of Purity, as Mankind were per- fea in their Natures, and, therefore, without Weaknefs, fo they were provided with every Thing necef^ry to their Happinefs, and with proper Powers to enjoy them, and, therefore, without Want. And as they were fure, fo long as they afted according to their Natures, of the Continuance of this Perfedlion and Plappinefs to them, fo they could have no Reafon to fear either Danger, or Afflidion. And, therefore, fuch Duties as Prayer, which betokens Want and Patience, which implies Suf- fering, were not Duties belonging to a State of Purity. And tho' they are properly Law^s of Nature, and neceifary to the Happinefs of Mankind, as they are at prefent, yet they are fuch, as muft be called fecondary Laws, which we fhould not have been obliged to in a State of Purity ; which, as it was a State of Perfedion, feems capable of no other Ad of Devotion towards God, but Praife. Thefe Things being thus clear'd, we have a perfed View of the Foundations of the civil Law, and may be able from hence, to fix the juft Bounds of natural Right and Wrong. For, By Right is meant a Power or Privilege of ad- ing, or enjoying any Thing granted bv a Law : And, 480 A Demonjlratmt of true "Religion. And, therefore, whatfoever the Laws of Na- ture oblige Men to aft, or enjoy, in order Xo their Happinefs, the fame do they give them a natural Right to a6l and enjoy. And, therefore, as by the Knowledge of the Laws and Obligations of Nature, we muft fo far underftand the Rights of Nature ; fo by ading contrary to thofe natural Laws and Obligations, as we fhall a6l contrary to natural Right, and, therefore, muft neceflarily do wrong -, fo this Wrong muft be differently aggravated, according to the Nature and Obligations of thofe Laws. And if fo, we fee the Abfurdity of thefe fol- lowing Propofitions, viz. That there are no Laws In a State of Nature. That the Obligation to moral Duties is owing to the Scriptures. That the Rules Mankind had to walk by be- fore the Scriptures, were alterable at the Will of the civil Sovereign. That Man can do no Injury In fuch a State : That this State Is a State of War. All which are falfe, if the foregoing Reafon- ings are true ; For, If that, by which God fignifies his Will to us, is a Law ; and If the Nature and End of every Thing be a Signification of God's Will, as to that Thing ; then, we have ftiewn, there are Laws of Nature. And, If the Natures, ^c, of Things were deter- mined before the Scriptures were revealed -, then the Obligation to moral Duties does not depend upon the Scriptures : And unlefs the civil Sove- reign can caufe, that Happinefs ftiall nof be the End of our Creation, and that fuch and fuch Ac- tions ftiall not be the neceflary Means to our Hap- pinefs \ he cannot alter the Rules Men are natu- rally obliged to walk by. And,. If A Demonjiration of true Religmt. 48 1 If what God has made neceflary to our Hap- plnefs be a Good to us, and the contrary an Evil ; then 'tis plain, that there are many Things good and evil. And, If what God has made neceflary to our Hap- pinefs we have a Right to ; and to deprive us of this, be to do a Wrong ; then every Man in a State of Nature is capable of Injury. And,* If we are obliged in a State of Nature, to Love and Goodnefs, Jullice and Truth ; then a State of Nature cannot be a State of War •, nor can mutual Compads of Fidelity be void in it, unlefs War be reconcileable with Love, and Un- faithfulnefs with Juftice and Truth. We come now to confider the next Thing to be enquired into, viz. Motives to enforce the Law of Nature. Lafily., The Motives, by which the Obferva- tion of thefe Laws were enforced. Now, that there are fuch Motives, is evident; For fince Mankind were made for everlaftings: Happinefs •, and thefe Laws are nothing but the neceflary Means for the Attainment of that Hap- pinefs, then here is a fuitable Motive annexed to thefe Laws, to inforce the Obfervation of them. For that I call a fuitable Motive, which is fuf- ficient to incline a reafonable Will to chufe one Thing rather than another ; and as the Objedt of a reafonable Choice is good ; fo that only can be fuflicient to incline a reafonable Will to chufe O- bedience, which makes it more for our Intereft to obey than difobey. Now fuch a Motive we have in this Cafe. For to be happy everlafl:ingly, as it is the utmofl End, fo it is the utmoft Defi.re of all Mankind ; and to be excluded from Happinefs, as it is con- trary to the End, fo 'tis contrary to the Delire of Mankii;d. I i And, 482 A 'Demonfiration of true Religion. And, therefore, fince we are afTured, that we can only attain this Plappinefs by the Obfervatloa of thefe Laws; our Reafon muft necefiarily be convinced, that it is more for our Intereft to obey, than difobey them. And, by Confequence, here is a fufficient Mo- tive to enforce the Obfervation of thefe Laws. But if to this we add what we have already urged, that a Sinner fhould, upon the firft Tranf- greflion, either be deftroyed, or fuffer fuch Things as are proper to bring him to Repentance -, and to deter others from following his Example ; then here was a farther Motive to Obedience. Thefe are the main Body of natural Religion ;. and fo far as it appears they are difcoverable by Reafon, fo far we muft conclude, that our firft Parents, in a State of pure Nature, had no other Revelation concerning them. We ccme, fecondly^ to enquire, whether there was any Thing further neceflary to be known in a State of Purity, which our firft Parents could not know by Reafon ; and, therefore, required a fupernatural Revelation. Several Revelations necejfary in a State of Purity. Now there were three Things of this Kind which required a Revelation : One concerning Food, another concerning Marriage, the third con- cerning Language. I . A Revelation was neceflary concerning Food. Indeed, as for Drinking, as there was nothing to be drank but Water, it wanted no great Strength of Reafon to infer, that as that muft neceflarily be the Thing defign'd, fo it muft be proper to be drunk. And, therefore, there could be no Need of a Revelation, as to that. But as there was a great Variety of Food ; tho* it was certain, fomething muft be eaten, yet Rea- fon could not poftibly judge fo foon as was necef- I fary A Demonftration of true Religion. 4S3 fary to know it, whether all thefe Things were good for Food, or not. For tho' Reafon might conclude in general, that whatever God made was good in fome Re- fped, or for fome Creature or other ; yet it could not be rationally infer'd, that it was good for Food, or good for Man ; neither could it be dif- cOver'd in a natural Way without long Obferva- tion and Experience. And, therefore, there muft have been fome extraordinary Revelation to diredl him in the Choice of proper Food. But then, again, it might be argued, that fince. he required a Supply of Food, he might thence conclude, that whatever his Appetites carried him to, muft be proper to be enjoy 'd. And tho' he could not find out by Reafon, what was fit to be eaten, and what was not ; yet fince there was a NecefTity of eating fomething, if there was any Thing unfit to be eaten, his Happinefs required fome Revelation of it. And, therefore, if there was no fuch Revela- tion given, Reafon would conclude, that Man might lawfully and fafely eat of every Thing his Appetite inclined him to. And, by Confequence, tho* according to our former Argument, we inferr'd a NecefTity of fome Revelation to dire6t our firft Parents in the Choice of proper Food •, yet according to the latter Way of arguing, there feems to be no Revelation ne- ceflary, unlefs there was fomething dangerous to be eaten. And if fo, from hence we muft conclude, that either there was no Revelation given to them con- cerning Food ; Or if there was, there was fomething bad for Food. Now whether there was any fuch Revelation,, I i 2 cannot 4^4 -^ Demonjtration of true Religion, cannot be known, but by Hiftory or Tradition. And, therefore, If any fuch Hiftory or Tradition fiiould be found that gives us any Account of this Matter, fo far as it agrees with the foregoing Reafonings, fo far we muft conclude it true. Now fuch a Hiftory we have in the firft Book of Mofes. Where we are no fooner told of the Creation of Man, and of his being placed in a Garden, the Fruits of which were to be his Food ; but God is reprefented as giving him Inftrudlions, of which of thofe Fruits he might fafely eat. 2. Another Thing necefTary to be known in a State of Purity, was that concerning Marriage, or the Multiplication of his Species. Now there are but two Ways poflible for the Multiplication of Mankind, viz. either by fuch an Appropriation of Perfons to Perfons, as we call Marriage ; Ot elfe by an undetermin'd Liberty of all to all. And, therefore, if one of thefe Ways would be more for the Happinefs of Society, than the other, it is neceflary Mankind ftiould be informed of it. And whether Reafon is capable of difcovering this, is the Queftion. Now for a Light into this Matter, we will en- quire what Number of Perfons might be origi- nally created, for the Increafe of Mankind, In order to which it may be obferved, that whatever Number was made, they were all made perfedl, as we have fhewn : And, therefore, as they were all equal in their natural Faculties, fo they were all equally capable of increafing their Species. And as we have ftiewn, that they muft have had Objeds fuited to their Faculties, fo they muft be equally provided with fuch Objeds. And if fo, as there muft then have been an equal A Demonflration of true Religion. 485 equal Number of Men and Women •, fo we muft conclude, that Mankind was originally increafed by Pairs •, by which, I mean, that either they muft have been born two at a Time, or elfe a Male iirft, and then a Female. And fince we obferve in Nature a Power in the Female Sex, by which they are capaces generatio- nis, & Speciei propagandas^ fooner than the Males by a Year at leaft •, we may conclude, that the Iirft Child was a Male. But tho* every Perfon had a natural Right to one, it does not from hence follow, that they had any natural Right to any particular one, or that they muft be confined to the fame one. Indeed, if we fuppofe only two Perfons, they had a natural Right' the one to the other, as being under a neceflary Confinement to each other. But as the Reafon of their Confinement to each other, was, that there were no other Perfons to multiply by, but themfelves-, fo Reafon could not from thence conclude, that they fhould con- tinue under fuch Confinement, when there fhould come to be more Perfons capable befides them- felves. But much lefs could it conclude, that their Pofterity fhould be fo confined, who were under no fuch NeceiTity. All that the Nature, ^c. of Things requires, is, that every one have fuch an Object fuited to his Faculties, as to anfv/er the End and Reafon of thofe Faculties, which is the Increafe of the Species i and fo long as it is thus, the Natur^ and Reafon of Things is fo far anfwer'd, whether by one Obje<5t or another. No, on the contrary, we have fhewn, that in the firft State of Mankind, all Things were com- mon •, and that no one could have any natural Right to any Thing, any longer than he wanted it. lis ^^^* 4o6 A 'Demonftration of true Religion, And, therefore, Mankind, as having natural Faculties and Appetites for the Increafe of the Species, had a natural Right to one another's Af- fiftance, in the Gratification of thofe Appetites for that End •, yet it could be no longer, tharfc thofe Appetites continued, or that End was at- tained. And, therefore, fince we have fhewn, that they had no Appetites to one another any longer, than till Generation was effeded •, it will follow, that after that, as they could in this Refped have no further Want of one another, fo neither could they have any further Right to one another ; and, by Confequence, muft be naturally free and unconfined to one another. *Tis true, we have fhewn, that as every one has a rational Principle of his own, fo every one mufl choofe for himfelf j and what any Man is obliged to do, fo far we have ihewn, he has a Right to do. And, by Confequence, any two Perfons, as having that Right, might agree to appropriate themfelves to each other. But then, as Reafon is the Guide of a rational Choice, fo the Natures and Reafons of Things are the Guide of Reafon -, and, therefore, unlefs we can conceive fomething in the Nature of Things to determine Mankind in a State of Puri- ty, to choofe always the fame Perfon for the In- creafe of the Species, any more than the fame Food to eat, when all Things appeared perfetfl: and agreeable. And unlefs we can firtd out fomething, that might determine them to think, that it would be more for the Happinefs of Society for one to be appropriated to one, than for all to have a Li- berty ; we mufl conclude, that in fuch a State, they could not incline to fuch a Choice : Now, A Demonjlratlon of true Religmi. 487 Now, that it would prejudice Society, fliould Mankind be permitted to multiply without Con- finement, is owned by all civilized Nations. But whether this was difcoverable by natural Reafon, in a State of pure Nature, is a Matter of Difpute. For tho' they knew more by Reafon, than we are capable of attaining to ; yet that we know this is not owing to our Reafon, but Experience. We do not difcover, that this Liberty is pre- judicial to Society, or inconfiftent with the Nature of Things, or the Happinefs of Mankind in their original State. For the Happinefs of Mankind then conlifted in being governed by right Reafon, and had they continued in their primitive State, all their Facul- ties had been fubje6l to Reafon -, and, by Confe- quence, as this could not be naturally prejudicial to Mankind, fo Reafon could not poffibly think fo ; becaufe the Exercifes of our Faculties, upon their proper Objects in Subjedion to Reafon, falls \n with the Notion of Happinefs. And fince it was not naturally prejudicial to Society, if it be enquir'd, how it comes to be fo now ; it is becaufe we are not in our natural State. That was a State of Perfedion •, this a State of Corruption. And, As that was a State, wherein all the Operations of Nature were govern'd by Reafon ; fo this is a State where ourPaffions are too ftrong for Reafon: So that if they were not confin'd by what we call Marriage, Society muft fink into Confufion. This we know by Experience ; and 'tis by this only, that we are capable of knowing it. And fince 'tis evident, that in a State of Puri- ty, Mankind could not poffibly have this Expe- rience ; and, therefore, could not know the Ne- ceflity of fuch Marriages -, it will follow, there- I i 4 fore. 488 A Demonjlratlon of true Religionl forC) it ought to be made known by Revelation. And, therefore, here Is fome Revelation ne- ceflary to the Inftitution of Marriage. And if fo, then as the Reafon of the Inftitution of Mar- riage is to prevent the ill Confequences, that the Want of fuch an Inllitution muft bring upon So- ciety, upon the Corruption of Mankind •, it will follow, that this Inftitution ihould be eftabliihed before that Corruption. Now whether there was any fuch Revelation, is again a Matter of Fad, and can only be known by Hiftory ; and if we have any fuch Hiftory of the firft State of Mankind, which agrees with the foregoing Reafonings, it muft be true. In this then likewife the Hiftory of Mofes a- grees, where we are no fooner told of the Crea- tion of Man, but there was an Helpmate made tor him ; and as it was neceftary, that there fhould be an equal Number of Men and Women made •, fo here we are told of only two Perfons made. And as it was necellary to the Happiness of the World, that the Species fhould be increafed in the Way of Marriage, and that too of one to one : So here, as we are told but of two Perfons made, we are likewife told of a divine Appoint- ment, that they ftiould be appropriated to one another. And, That whoever fhould from thenceforth take to himfelf a Wife, he fhould cleave unto her. And thus far right Reafon and Scripture agree. 3. Another Thing neceflary to be made known to Man by a fupernatural Revelation, even in a State of Purity, .was Language. For as every Thing was put in fuch a State, at the Creation, as was fuitable to its Nature and End. And, therefore, as Mankind was made with a I natural A Bemojijlration of true Religion. 489 natural Faculty of Speech, fo they muft have been placed in fuch a State of Society, as was fuit- able to that Faculty •, And fince this Faculty was made perfedt in its Kind, and, therefore, capable of being exercifed in Converfation, fo foon as they were made -, it will follow, that if they were put in fuch a State, as was fuitable to their Faculties, it muft be fuch a State as they could converfe together in, fo foon as they were made. But this could not be without a Language, and they could not naturally come by a Language, fo foon as they were made. And, therefore, we muft conclude, they had it in a fupernatural Way, Now whether it was thus, no Hiftory does in- form us. The Hiftory of Mofes tells us they had a Lan- guage : And, 'tis more than probable, it was by Revelation. Corollary. And from hence we may infer, that a State of Nature, was not a State without a Re- velation. If indeed, by Revelation be underftood, what we call the Holy Scriptures-, and if by being without a Revelation, be meant only, a being under the Government of Reafon, this may in- deed, in a limited Senfe, be called a State of Na- ture, as it agrees with the true Notion of a State of Nature, in this particular Refped. But it would be plainer to call it a State of Reafon. From what has been faid, vv^e may be able to form a more perfedl Idea of the divine Govern- ment, in refped not only of its natural, but cor- rupted State. A further View into the Government of the World., confiderhig it, as in a State of Corruption, Government is nothing elfe but the Diredlon of Things to their End, And 4^0 A Demonji ration of true Religion. And as the End of all Things is the Happinefs of the World, fo the Way, by which God guides the World to Plappinefs, is the true Notion of the Government of it : And if fo, then, as that v/hich is neceflary to the Happinefs of the World, is neceflary to the Government of it. So if we would form a perfecfl Notion of the Government of the World, we muft confider what we can conceive neceflary to the Happinefs of it. Now this we have done., fo far as relates to a State of Nature, in which, as the Happinefs of the W'orld confifl:s in being govern'd according to the Natures of Things -, fo this may be called the natural Government of God. But then, as a State of Nature was fuch a State, wherein every Thing had a Nature fuited to its End, and was provided with Means for the Attainment of it : So we have fliewn, that by ading according to their Nature, all Things mufl: cerrainly have at- tained their Ends. And, by Confequence, there could be no other Operation of God, but Prefervation, neceflary to the everlafl:ing Happinefs of the World in a State of Nature. And, therefore, if we fuppofe any further O- peration of God neceflary to the Happinefs of the World now, than what was done at the Cre- ation •, we mufl: neceflarily fuppofe,. that the' World is not now in its original State of Nature ; and if fo, then if we would form a rational View of the Nature and Necefllty of the Government of the World, we mufl: confider, 1 . How far Things are fallen from that origi- nal State. 2. What we can conceive neceflliry in the Na- ture A "Demonfiration of true Religion. 49 1 tute of Things to the Plappinefs of the World, confiderlng the Circumftances they are fallen into. Of the Fall of Man. As to the firft of thefe, tliat all Things are not in that original State, in which they were created, is as certain, as 'tis evident, that all Things are not now fo perfed in their Kind, as their feveral Kinds were originally made. We find ourfelves vaftly different from our Originals, that is, from the Perfe6lion of our firfl Parents : We find a great Weaknefs in our Underfland- ings, and a Diforder in our Wills ; we fee a wo- ful Corruption of our bodily Faculties, both as to their moral and natural Perfection \ both which our firft Parents were originally created with. We find a haw in our Members waging War againji the Law in our Minds ; and our Bodies liable tQ Sicknefs, Pain, and Death. This Change and Imperfedliorijof human Na- ture, I call the Corruption of it. And if fo, then fince the human Nature was created in a perfe(5b State, as being neceflary to a perfedl Happmefs ; from hence it will follow, that fo far as we are wanting of that original Per- fedion, fo far we are wanting of the Means that are necefTary to our Happinefs \ and there mufl be more required to make us happy, fince this Alteration of our Nature ; and by Confequence, another Method of Government neceflary to the World, than there was at firfl, before that Altera- tion happen'd. And fince the Reafon of this Government is, that Things are alter'd from what they were ; it will follow, that according to the different Degrees of this Alteration, fo mufl there be different Methods of Government. And fmce Goverument is nothing t>wt the or- dering 492 A Demonjiration of true Religion. dering of Things to their Ends, fo as fhall be moft for their Happinefs ; if we can difcover from the Circumftances, the World is fallen into, what Means may be neceflary to the Happinefs of the World, we fhall be fo far able to form a right Notion of the Means, that are neceflary to the Government of it. Now this we may be able to do in fome De- gree: For fince the Happinefs of Mankind requires the Perfedion of the Faculties both of Soul and Body -, and that not only in refpeft of the Facul- ties themfelves, but likewife of their moral Sub- jedion to right Reafon. And fince we have likewife fhewn, that Man- kind were originally, not only made for this happy State, but made in fuch Perfedion, as was fuitable to it. As it will follow hence on the one Hand -, that fo far as they are fallen from this State 'of original Perfedion, fo far they are fallen from Happinefs, and by Confequence, can never be capable of per- feft Happinefs, without being reftored to this original Perfedlion, So it will follow on the other Hand ; that this Reftoration muft be the great End of that Go- vernment that defigns our Happinefs. And by Confequence, that whatever is a ne- ceflary Means to this Refl;oration, is a necefl!ary Means of the Government of the World : And if fo, then fince Mankind are fo far fallen from their original State, that, I. Infl:ead of the Perfedion, and Immortality of their bodily Nature, they are now become corrupted and mortal •■, it will follow. That if this natural Perfedion of our bodily Faculties be neceflary to our Happinefs, it muft be the Defign of that Government to reftore us to fuch a natural Perfedion again. 2. Since A Demonjiration of true Religion. 493 2. Since Mankind are fo far fallen from the moral Perfection of their Nature, that the infe- rior Faculties are now no longer in their primitive Subjection to the Mind ; it will follow, That as this Subjedion is neceffary to our Hap- pinefs, fo it mufl be the Defign of that Govern- ment, that orders all Things for the Happinefs of the World, that our Faculties be reftored to their Subjedion again. But if we further confider, that God governs all Things according to their Natures, from hence we may difcover the general Methods that appear neceflary for comparing of thefe general Defigns. And therefore, 1. Tho' it is the general Defign of Providence, that Mankind fhould be reftored to a State of Immortality, yet fince the Nature of Man is be- come mortal, we muft conceive, that the general Method of reftoring Mankind to Immortality, will be fuch as conilfts with this natural Neceflity of Death. And if fo, then fince the Reftoration of Man- kind to Life, is the very Notion of a Refurrec- tion ; it will follow. That the general Method of reftoring Mankind to Immortality will be a Refurredion from the Dead. 2 . Tho' It Is the general Defign of Providence, that Mankind be reftored to the Perfedion of their moral Nature •, yet as God governs rational Creatures in a rational Way -, fo we muft conclude, that the general Method of doing this, will be fuch as ftiall confift with their rational Nature •, and ftiall ordinarily be affeded, 1. By furniftiing the Underftanding with necef- fary Knowledge, and by direding it to Means, for the Attainment of that End it aims at. 2. By influencing the Will to determine itfelf to 494 ^ T)emonjtratio7i of true Religion, to them by fultable Motives, and leaving it to chufe according to Reafon. And if, notwithftanding all thefe Methods on God's Part, and the ftri6left Endeavours and Compliance on ours, it fhall be found to be naturally impoffible to attain that Perfedlion iii this Life ; we may conclude, 3. That God will beftow what Men cannot attain : For fince this Perfe6lion is necefTary to our Happinefs, and is the End of that Providence, which intends our Happinefs ; it will follow. That fo far as it is beyond the natural Power of Man, fo far it is necefTary to be fupplied by the fupernatural Operation of God. And, by Confequence, If there be any Thing neceflary to be done> which exceeds our Power to do, in order to attain this Perfeftion -, we muft conclude, he will fup- ply us with fupernatural AfTiftance here : And, 2. If when we have done our beft, we fhalt fall Ihort of that entire Perfedion which is necef- fary to our Happinefs ; we muft then conclude. That at the raifmg the Dead, he will fill up what is wanting of Perfedion hereafter. But then, as the natural Reafon of thefe Ope- rations is, their being necefTary to the Happinefs of the World •, we may conclude, that he, who governs all Things according to their Natures, will proportion thefe feveral Operations according to the Nature and Reafon of them. And, therefore, tho' God will fupply us with fupernatural AfTiftance, where it is wanted, yet this AfTiftance will be given only in that Degree, as is fuitable to that Weaknefs or Want, that makes it necefTary. And by Confequence, if Men will not do that for themfelves, which they have a Power to do, and is necefTiry to their Happinefs and Perfedion, as we may conclude, that A Demonjlration of true Religion. 495^ that they fhall be left without a fupernatural Affiftance here •, fo they fhall be in a State of Imperfedion and Unhappinefs hereafter. And as this Unhappinefs is the Confequence of their Imperfedion, and the Imperfedlion is \\\ their very Nature, fo this Unhappinefs muft be as everlafting as their Nature •, and, therefore, if the one be immortal, the other muft be everlafting. And fo, 2. Tho' God will give the World fuch Means of Knowledge, and fuch fuitable Motives to Pradice, as are neceflary to their Circumftances ; yet we muft conceive, that this will be done in Proportion to their Neceflity. And, therefore, according to the different Cir- cumftances of Mankind, we may conclude, there have been, or will be, different Methods of divine Providence. And if fo, then, as we may conclude on the one Hand, that if ever Mankind wanted a Reve- lation, there has been fome fuch Revelation made ; fo on the other Hand, fince the NecefTities of different Ages and Nations may be different ; nay fince even in the fame Age and Nation, fome Things may be neceflary at one Time more than at another, we may hence conclude, that if there has been any Revelation, there may, for ought we know, have been many ; and that what God has reveal'd, has not been deliver'd all at once : But yet we can never be fure by bare Reafon, that there have ; becaufe we can never be fure what is abfolutely neceflary. Befides, tho' from the NecefTity of any Thing to the Happinefs of Mankind in fuch and fuch Circumftances, we may conclude, that God in his Goodnefs, is difpofed to ad accordingly, yet as the Reafon of his Inclination to do fo, is their Happinefs -, fo we muft cpnceive he will do, or will 49 6 ^ Tiemonfi ration of true Keligion. will not do it, according as he fees it will contri- bute to their Happinefs. His Goodnefs difpofes him to do Good to his Creatures only according to their Capacities ; and if his Wifdom fees they are not capable of vvhat he is difpofed to do for thern •, becaufe they will receive Evil by it ; he may eafily forbear the (joing it, even for the Sake of Goodnefs. And, therefore, as the End of God's Reve- lation is the Inftrudlion of Mankind, 'tis the greateft Wifdom to make his Revelations in fuch Time and Manner, as ihall bell anfwer this Defign. And, therefore, tho' in many Cafes we may think there is Reafon to exped: fuch and fuch Difpenfations of Providence, as being fuitable to fuch particular Necefiities ; yet if Things do not fall out according to our Expectations, we muft not fay, that God's Operations are not right -, be- caufe his 'Thoughts are above our 'Thoughts, But, however, tho* we cannot make a certain Judgment in this Cafe ; yet as we are fure, that in the general God will fuit the Difpenfations of his Providence fo, as fhall be moft neceflary to our Happinefs ; fo if we can by any Means dif- cover what Neceffities Mankind may have been undei* in Time paft, and what Means might be neceffary to their Happinefs in thofe Neceffities ; this is a good Foundation to build our Notions of Providence upon. But then, as we can know nothing of former Times, but by Hiflory, fo we muft have Re- courfe to this to fatisfy us, as to what God has done in this Paiticular : And if we have any cre- dible Hiftory, that gives an Account of the di- vine Providence, we fhall have as much AfTurance in this Matter, as the Nature of the Thing will bear. .... - Now A Demonjlration of true Religion. 497 Now that I call a credible Hiftory in its own Nature, which relates Matters of Fad, agreeing with the Natures and Reafons of Things : And as the Natures and Reafons of Things have been the Rule, by which we have here form'd our Notions of Providence ; fo far aS any Hiftory of Providence agrees with thofe Notions, fo far we muft eftecm it a credible Hiftory. The general Credihtlity of the Scripture Hijiory proved. Now fuch a Hiftory we have in the holy Scriptures. The Account it gives us of a State of Purity, has been already confider'd ; and as for what it fays of Mankind after their Depravation, we find it correfpond in every Inftance. For fince we have fhewn, that it was Sin that gave Occafion for all the various Difpenfations of Providence ; we have here not only an Account of the Rife and Progrefs of Sin, the various Me- thods ufed to ftop the Increafe and Repair of the Inconveniences of it ; but we are here told, tha;t it is the whole Defign of Providence to make Mankind happy, and that by this only Means of making them holy. And as this Holinefs cannot be attained with- out proper Rules to walk by, and proper Means to prevent Sin ; fo in this Book we have L^ws prefcribed, fuch as, in their own Nature, tend to Holinefs •, and likewife fuch Motives offer'd, as are naturally fitted to prevail upon every reafona- bie Man. And as the Happinefs of Mankind cannot be attain'd in this State of Imperfedion and Morta- lity ; fo 'tis here fet forth as the general Defign of Providence to bring them to a State of Perfec- tion and Immortality in another World. And as the particular End of all God's Dif- VoL. Ill, K k penfations. 49 S -^ Dejitoriftration of true Religion. penfations, is before fhewn, to be the Happliiefs of thofe particular Perfons they are intended for, and vouchfafed to, according as their particular Neceflities call for them. And as the particular Circumftances of People muft be different at different Times : And there- fore muft require different Difpenfations -, fo we have here an Account of various Methods taken at different Times : And as we have ihewn, that Mankind might have wanted a Revelation ; and therefore, God niight vouch fafe fome Revelation to them ; and as there may be different Reafons for different llevelations at different Times : So we have an Account in this Book, not only of various Reve- lations, and at different Times, according to the different Occafions and Capacities of thofe whom they have been given to. And upon this Account it feems to carry a ftrong Evidence of the Credibility of the Hiftory itfelf, and the Revelations contained in it. But becaufe the Credibility of this Book is of the laft Importance to Religion, I will examine it diftindlly. But I beg Leave to poftpone it awhile, till I have made fome Obfervation from what I have before faid, relating to the Chriftian Religion. For as I have deduced, from the foregoing Rea- fonings, the Credibility of the Scripture Hiftory in general ; fo they afford us an evident Proof of the Chriftian Religion in particular. For, if as I have ftiewn, that God is difpofed to do Good to his Creatures, according as their Keceftities require •, and by Confequence, when they are under a Neceffity of a Revelation, will grant them one : Then it will follow, that if the World was fallen into fuch a Condition before our Saviour Game, as they could not be happy in, nor be de- liver'd A DemonJiratiGn of true Religion. 499 liver'd from, by the Power of natural Reafon only -, and therefore wanted a Revelation, there has been fome fuitable Revelation given. And if Chriftianity came to afTift the World in this, and has furnifli'd Mankind with all Things neceflary ; there can be no ftronger Proof than this, that this is the Revelation of God. Now whether the World was in fuch Circum- ftances, as to need a Revelation, and whether Chriftianity is fuch a one, is our next Bufinefs to confider. T^he Necejfity of a Revelation before the Coming of Jefus Chrijl. What Circumftances the World was in can only be known by Hiftory ; and as 'tis a particular Providence of God to us, to preferve many anti- ent Books, which are allowed to be written about that Time : So we are informed from them of fuch a deplorable State of Mankind, as they could not deliver themfelves from ; and yet could not be happy in. The World was then divided into Jew and Gentile. As for the Jews., I ftiall confider them hereafter. The Necefllty of a Revelation to the heathen World, I will here confider. And this will fufficiently appear, if the Want of almoft every Thing neceflary to the Happinefs of Mankind, as rational Creatures, will be a fufli- cient Proof of it. 5t^f State of the heathen World confider^ d. The firft Thing neceflary to the Happinefs of the World was to know, wherein Happinefs lies, and the proper Means to attain it : But this the Hea- thens fo little underftood, that St. Auflin tells us, out of Varro., that they had two hundred and eighty eight different Opinions concerning it. And whereas the ultimate Happinefs of K k 2 Man 50d A Tiemonfiration of true Religion'. Man confifts in the Enjoyment of God, and th& Way to enjoy God, is to be like him j and this Likenefs is to be attained only by Virtue and Ho- linefs ; it is neceflary that Mankind fhould not only be informed of the true Nature of God, with the true Notion of Virtue and Holinefsj. but alfo be encouraged in the Pradice of them. And whereas, in order to this End, 'tis necef^ fary, that a due Senfe of God and our Depen- dence on him be firmly fettled in our Minds, by proper Adts of outward Worfhip : So 'tis equally neceflary, that the World fhould be informed of this, fo as always, to do it acceptably. But of thefe Things the Heathens knew little. What Notions they had of the divine Nature, we may judge of by that Rabble of Deities, they paid their Adorations to ; and thofe abfurd Su- perftitions, and fometimes cruel and inhuman Rites, that they pradifed and approved of. And under fuch Ideas of the divine Nature, and his Worfhip, what can we exped their MtJ- rals to have been ? 'Tis no Wonder to find what we read of them', that t'hey were univerfally funk into the Very Dregs of Corruption and Debauchery. [.S't'^ i Cor. vi. o^ _io. Epb, iv. 17, 18", 19. Rom. i.] And whilft we confider this wretched State of Mankind, fo ignorant both of the Nature of God, and themfelves ; and fo depraved both in Mind and Manners ; how was it pofiible for them to attain true Happinefs ? There could be no Poflibility of it, but by a ■Reformation, and hov/ this could be efFeded, is the Queftion : It muft either be by Reafon, or Revelation. But Reafon alone was not fuffieient to reform the World, before Chrifliianity appeared. But here I would have you obferve, that by Reafon> A Demmjlration of true Religion. 50 1 Reafon, I do not mean what Reafon could do of its own Nature, but what it could do for the World in the Circumftances they were fallen into, towards their Recovery out of them. Now to fhew, that the World could notTe- cover themfelves out of thofe fad Circumftances, by the bare Ufe of their Reafon ; we may firft confider, that whatever the natural Power of Reafon was in a State of Purity, there was little remaining of it in that degenerate State of Man- kind we fpeak of: If there had been any fuch Power among them-, one would have thought that fome Body would have drawn out fome in- tire Scheme of Religion and Morality, from the Natures. and Reafons of Things, to be a Guide to the People in thofe Days. But nothing of this Kind has yet appeved in the World. 'Tis indeed eafy for Chriftians, with the Light of Revelation, to ftiew how they agree with Rea- fon -, but it would not have been fo eafy to difco- ver thofe Things by Reafon only, without that Light. But fuppofe fome lucky Thinkers have hit up- on it •, this is an Argument to ftiew, that Man- kind in general are not able to do, what either has not been done at all in any Age ; or if at all, it may be by very few. But whatever has been done by any under the Influence of Chriftianity, *tis certain, there was nothing like this before it ; and whatever bright Genius's might do, Reafoning is not the Talent of the common Herd. They who are moft likely to find out Truth and Error, muft be Men of Speculation, and Learning : And there were many of this Sort in thofe Days. But even thefe Men were able to do little. They were not only but few in Comparifon of K k 3 the 502 A Demonjlratioji of true Religion. the whole heathen World, but they alfo, after all their nice Enquiries after Truth, were ignorant of it. They did not agree about the Summum Bonum, or Happinefs of Man : They were uncertain about the Nature of God, as we may read in Diogenes Laerlitis^ and Cicero. And tho* fome of them hit upon the Truth in feme Refpe6ls, and had jufter Notions of God than others ; yet they were all mere Conjedlures at the beft, fuch as they themfelves could not de- pend upon. So that Reafon could do little here. And as to the Worfliip of God, tho* many of the Philofophers faw the Folly of the cuftomary Superilitions, and feverely inveighed againll them ; yet it does not appear that they condemned Ido- latry, for they were Idolaters in Pra6lice •, and even gave it out, as a ftanding Rule, that all Peo- ple ought to be fo. Thus it was with the Philofophers as to Idola- try •, which, as it was evident, they had no De- fire to reform ♦, fo it does not appear they knew how to do it. But fuppofe they had been informed of the true Worfhip of God, and had been ever fo zealous for the Reformation of the falfe one -, yet there was no moral PoiTibility of fucceeding in it, by the Power of Reafon only. For the Worfhip then in ufe had not only been eftablifhed by Law, and confirmed by Oracles ; but it was what had been long received, and what the People had been bred up in, and was juftified by univerfal Pradice. And can we think, that all this could; in the Nature of the Things, be fet afide by the bare Speculations of a few thinking Men, without any Authority, but bare Argument to fupport them ? We all know the Power of Education : We all know A Demonjiration of true Religion. 503 know what natural AfFedion all People have to the Cuftoms of their Country, and what Regard to the Judgment of their Anceftors : And, by Confequence, what Weight a Religion eftablifhed muft carry with it : And what Hopes could the wifeft Men have, even of being fo much as heard againft this ? But when this was confirm'd by their Oracles, which they efteem'd the Voice of God, what rould all the Reafon in the World fignify againft this ? • , 1 TT And, therefore, nothing but an undeniable E~ vidence of a divine Authority, and fuch as was fufficient to overthrow the Authority of their O- racles, could poffibly convince them of their Er- ror. So that there was a Neceffity of a divine Revelation, for the Reformation of Idolatry \ and that this Revelation fhould be confirmed by God in proper Tokens of his Almighty Power : And as Miracles are allow'd to be proper Evidences of fuch a Power ; there was, by Confequence, fuch a Neceffity of Miracles, that no Revelation could have been fufficient without them. And fince the Philofophers pretended to no fuch Thing, there could be no Reformation ex- pelled from them. Befides, Idolatry was fupported by public and private Intereft ; it was the Invention of Priefts and Politicians. The deifying of famous Men was invented for the raifing up a Spirit of Ambi- tion for the Good of the Commonwealth.^ And whatever was the Origin of their Auguries and Oracles, yet, 'tis certain, they were made ufe of to ferve the Occafions of the Public. [Vide Cic, de Divin. Lib. II.] And if this was the Reafon for the retaining them fo long, the fame Reafon will hold for the continuing of them. „ K k 4, 2^t 504 A Demonjlration of true Religion. But as this Religion was calculated for the Ser- vice of the Public ; fo was it no lefs for the In- tereft of particular Perfons. 'Tis certain the whole Priefthood fubfifted by it, and innumera- ble Families of trading People. And confidering this, we cannot think It could be eafy for bare Reafon to abolilh this Religion : We cannot fuppofe the State would be patient un- der the Oppofition •, much lefs the Priefts and People who had their Subfiftence from it. And as there were known Laws againft Innovations in Religion, we may be fure, that they would not be wanting to put them in Execution, Socrates was an Inftance of this, who, tho' he oppofed only fome of their more ridiculous SuperftitionSj, fell a Sacrifice to their Fury. And as this was the Cafe, it required more Zeal, Courage, and Patience to undertake fuch Difficulties, to go thro' fuch Dangers, • and un- dergo fuch Perfscutions, than the Phllofophers were indued with. Had they feen the Truth perfedily themfelves, yet few have fuch a Love for it, as to venture their Lives for the Sake of it ; efpecially when they have no AfHirance of a better World. But if fome might have been fo hardy, thejr Number would not have been fufficient for an u- niverfal Reformation: And if we fuppofe them to efcape all Danger, and have free Liberty to fpeak their Sentiments i yet it muft be an incre- dible Strength of Reafon, that muft not only prevail upon all the World, but alfo infpire Men with fuch a Love of Truth, as to be content to llarve for the Sake of it. And yet thus it muft have been with vaft Crovvds of Families, and all the Priefthood upon the Reformation of Religion •, fo that there could be 1.V0 Probability of any fuch Thing. An4 /f Detnonjiration of true Religion, 505 And if there was no Probability, when we fuppofe the beft ; what PofTibility could there be of it under the utmoft Danger and Oppofition, when the wifeft of them could be fure of no- thing, and were fo far from oppofing the errone-- pus Worfhip, that they aftually conformed to it and encouraged it ? From thefe Confiderations the Neceflity of a Revelation is plain for the Reformation of the heathen World, as to their Minds and Notions in refpedt of the Nature of God and his Worfhip, and the Nature and Means of their own Hap- plnefs. And from all thefe Things put together, we .hence are taught what Kind of Revelation that muft be, which fhould be given to reform the World at that Time, viz. I , That it inform Mankind of the true Notiorj of Happinefs, and how to attain it ; of the Na- ture of God, and how to worfhip him as God \ and likewife that it be fuited to the efFedual O- yer throw of Idolatry. %. That it be fupported by the Power of fuch Miracles, as fhould be fitted to copvinqc the World of the Fallhood of their Oracles. 3. That it be deliver'd by proper Perfons, with fultable Zeal to undertake all Difficulties, fuitable Courage and Refolution to difregard all Dangers, and fuitable Patience to endure all Perfecutions. *The ISfe^eJfity of a Revelation to the Reformation ff the Manners of the World. We come now to confider how far Reafon was papable of doing this. And here I will prove, that Reafon was nqt capable of it. The firft Thing neceflary for the Reformation of the World, was a Rule of Life, by which fhey might be taught what to do, and avoid, 2 and 5o6 A Demonjtration of true Religion, and how to amend what was amifs : Otherwife the World would grow worfe and worfe, becaufe they muft be governed only by Example ; and in a World abounding with bad Examples, Vice muft every where increafe j and as they could not know what was amifs, they could not know what to amend. Now whether Reafon could difcover fuch a Rule of Life in that State of the World, is the Queftion. And in Anfwer to it, 'tis certain, that there are fome Things fo apparently good and evil, that there needs no other Light but Reafon to difcover them. But this could be a Rule no far- ther than it went ; and whereas Morality is ne- ceflary to the compleat and perfed: Happinefs of Man, in order to this Happinefs, the Rule of Morality ought to be compleat. Now if Reafon could have difcover'd.this, we may exped to find fomething of it in the Re- mains of their learned Men. But there is no fuch Thing ; nor can the wifeft Man now pick up an entire and perfe6l Syftem of Morality from them altogether. But fuppofe fome few of them had hit upon the Truth, and could have reduced it into a re- gular Syftem ; yet this never could have reformed the World, till it was received as a ftandingRule, and People were convinced it was the Truth. Yet even the Philofophers were fo far from any Probability of this, that they were greatly divided in their Notions, even of Good and Evil. And if the Learned could not find out this, what could Reafon do in vulgar People? The Philofophers could not teach them, what they were ignorant of themfelves, and their Difputes would rather perplex than fatisfy. And tho' fome of them ftiould have happened to A Dejnonfiration of true 'Religion. 507 to have hit the Point ; yet how fliould the Vul- gar know how to find it out among fo many di- vided Se6ts ? if they could not choofe what Se6t to be of by their Reafon -, the Confequence would be, that every one would choofe thofe Notions which would make them moft eafy in their Vices, and beft ferve their worldly Ends. But fuppofe all the Piiilofophers had agreed in their Opinions, and fixed upon a certain Rule of Life; to make it fufficient to the End of Re- formation, 'twas necefTary the World fhould fub- mit to it, as fuch ; but how could they poffibly compafs this ? They could but reafon with the World at beft ; but Reafon will do but httle a- gainft Inclination, Luft and Intereft. There is no reforming the World but by fuch Authority as can govern and influence the World. Human Governors may do much to prevent the outward Praftice of Vice ; but they cannot reform their Minds, nor plant good Difpofitions in the Heart ; without which there can be no true Virtue. Nothing could do this but the Authority of God : And, therefore, nothing can be a fufficient Rule of Life, but what is founded upon this Au- thority. This all the Lawgivers of the Antients were fo fenfible of, that they all pretended to have re- ceived their Laws from Heaven : Which tho* only Pretence to delude the People into Obe- dience j^ yet this plainly fhews, that they thought the Belief of a divine Authority the only proper Means for this. And if this was necelTary to the Reformation of the World, there could be no fuch Authority \ and, therefore, no Reformation poffible without a Revelation. 'Tis true, it may be faid, that the Laws of Natui-e are the Laws of God i and as thefe Laws are '508 A "Demmjlratlon of true Religion, are difcoverable by the Light of Reafon, fo foon as they are difcovered to the World,, they carry their own Authority and Obligation along with them \ axid there needs no other Revelation to inforce them. 'Tis very right : But they muft be fii-ft diico- ver'd to the World, and that too to be the Laws of God, before they ought to be received as fuch j and irj. what Method could the Philofophers do this ? Tho' the Laws of Nature are difcoverable by Reafon, yet the antient Philofophers could not difcovcr this, becaufe they v/ere ignorant of the Nature of God, which is the Meafure of all Per- fedlion •, and the right Notion of the Happineis of Man, which is the End, to which all our Ac- tions ought to be direded, and by which they are to be adjufted. And tho* many of them talked excelleritly well of Virtue, and advanced Morality to a great Pitch, yet they did it chiefly upon Principles of Honour, and Generofity, and Conveniency to the Welfare of civil Life. They never urged the Pradice of them out of Duty to God, or for his Glory : They confider'd them only as fit and rea- fonable to be obferved ; but we never find them preOing any Duty as a natural Law, to be ob- ferved in Obedience to God, and in the Nature of Things neceffary to Happinefs in the Enjoyment of him. But fuppofe they could have drawn out a Syf- tem of moral Laws upon this Foot, how' was it pofTible to make the World fubmit to them as the Laws of God ? This could only be done by Reafon ; and yet Reafon could not do this. The Subjed is dark and intricate, and requires a long Train of clofe Reafoning to make it out •; which A Tiemonftration of true Religwt, ^o^ "vt^fiich lower Underftandings are not Judges of, and, therefore, not affefted with. And if they had Capacity to underftand this, they cannot be fuppofed to have had any Inclina- tion to attend to it : And, confidering how de- praved the World was, we cannot think the moft prevailing Reafons would be regarded, which came to difturb them in their darling Vices, and teach them what they defired not to know. But fuppofe the People had been ever fo well difpofed to hearken to Inftrudion ; and ever fo deiirous of doing their Duty ; yet the wife Men of thofe Times were not equal to the Work. It was a Work of inconceivable Difficulty, and vaft Extent, that required many Hands, and great Zeal and Application. All the Prejudices of the World were to be rooted out, their Errors correfted, their Paffions* fiibdued, and their evil Habits conquered : There alfo muft have been a great Number of Perfona employed to efFedl all this : Whereas the Philofo- fophers were very few, and they fcatter'd up and down in Places only of great Refort for Learning. Bat had they travell'd up and down to teaeh the World their Duty, yet this would have done but little to the bettering Mankind, without a conftant Attendance, and a continual SuccefTion : For many Things would be wanted, which could not be provided for at once ; many Errors would arife, that muft be corrected ; many Doubts, that muft be fatisfied ; and many would waver, that muft be reduced. And yet there could be no Probability of any fuch Thing, unlefs the Philofophers would under- take it of themfelves. And no Man can fuppofej that they could all agree to leave their Habitations and worldly Affairs, upon their own mere Motioti Siud pure Zeal ; if we reflecit, that they confider'd Things 510 A "Demonfiratlon of true Religion. Things rather out of a Regard to Wifdom and Fame, than Virtue, or the Love of Mankind. {A£ls xvii. 21.) But fuppofe they had been intent upon Refor- mation, yet the World would not have eafdy be- lieved what they faid, unlefs they had hved fuita- bly to what they taught ; which they did not ; many of them leading very fcandalous Lives. But fuppofe they had been ever fo zealous for the Reformation of the World, and ever fo ex- emplary in their Lives -, yet as all the World Ayas to be reformed, they could not do this, without firft learning the Languages of every different Country. But this, in the Nature of Things, requires more Time than any Man can poflibl)r find. So that could we fuppofe all the Philofophers of the learned Nations refolved to tranfplant themfelves into the feveral Corners of the World \ and that there was a fufficient Number of them for the Purpofe ; that they had Zeal and Patience enough to apply themfelves to the Learning of the feveral Languages ; yet unlefs we can fuppofe, that they could attain to fuch Perfedlion in them, as to be able to carry on their Undertaking rea- dily, no Benefit could be expedled from them. But this cannot reafonably be fuppofed. But fuppofe fl:ill further, that there was no Want of Language, nor any of the forementioned Qualifications j yet the World could not be re- formed while the efl:ablifhed idolatrous Religion continued in Force. And yet this Religion was fo far from being oppofed by the Philofophers, that they encou- raged it. So that from all thefe Things confider'd toge- ther, there could be no Reformation, as the World then was, by the bare Power of Reafon only j A DemoJiftration of true Religion. 5 1 1 only ; and by Confequence, as we are hence aflured of the NecefTity of a Revelation j fo we are further taught, what Kind of Revelation it muft be, viz. 2/, That it offer to the World a perfed Rule of Life, built upon the Authority of God. And as nothing ought to be received, as com- ing from God, without a proper Evidence of his Authority ; fo, 2. It was neceflary, that this Rule of Life fhould be attended with, and confirmed by fome fuch proper Tokens of a divine Atteftation, as that it might be known to come from God. And as the End of all this muft be naturally defeated, by the ill Lives of thofe who deliver it to the World •, fo, 3 . There is a Neceflity, that they who fhould be chofen for this Work, fhould be Perfons of exemplary Holinef^. ■ And, as the Gift of Languages is neceflary to fit them for the Undertaking -, fo we may expe(5l, 4. In a general Revelation, that thefe Things be found attending it. And thus have I done with the firft Confidera- tion, viz. the Neceility of a fufHcient Rule of Life, in order to a general Reformation of Man- ners, and the Invalidity of Reafon to difcover this : idly. Another Thing neceflary for the fame End was, an AfTufance, that God would pardon Sin. For when the Will of God fhould be known in a ftanding Rule of Life •, and when, by comparing their Lives with that Rule, they fhould fee how they had offended God ; it would be in vain for them to reform themfelves, urrlefs they could be afllired of a Reconciliation : And yet, whether God would be reconciPd, or not, and what mufl be the Means of Reconciliation, was impofhble for bare Reafon, at that Time, to .know ; f^r I this 5^2 A Demonjiration of true Religion, this muft depend upon the Will of God, and can only be known by Revelation. Reafon would tell them, that God was good : The fame Reafon would tell them, he is good to Sinners in his wonderful Patience towards them, under the multiplied Provocations they are every Day guilty of. But this would not fiiew them how long this Patience would laft, nor how far this Goodnefs would go. The fame Reafon, that would afTure them of God's Goodnefs and Patience, would likewife in- form them of his Wifdom and Holinefs ; and as thefe muft agree in the fame perfe<5l Nature, Rea- fon can admit of no other Notion of his Good- nefs, but fuch as is confiftent with his Wifdom and Holinefs : And confequently, that God will ihew himfelf as good to Sinners, as his Wifdom and Holinefs ihall diredl. And who can tell when the Wifdom and Holinefs^ef God Ihall call for harfher Methods of Dealing ? It may be faid, indeed, that the Reafon of God*s Difpleafure againft Sinners is their Sin, and the Way to prevent that Difpleafure, is to repent. And, doubtlefs, to repent, is the beft Thing a Sinner can do ; but ftill, this will not make the Sinner innocent; and, therefore, cannot be (ure of Pardon : And, then, if Repentance be not al- ways fure of Pardon, how can it be depended on ? The Heathens never did depend upon it ; nay, they had no Notion of it : Their chief Depen- dence was upon Sacrifices of Expiation, which would have been needlefs, if Repentance had been thought of, or had been thought fufficient. And yet, even in thefe, their Reaibn was at a Lofs, how far they would be accepted. And, therefore, as we may conclude on the one Hand, that fo far as it was necefiary to be in- A Demonjlration of true Ueitgton. 5 13 informed of this, fo far there was a Neceffity of a Re- velation: So likewife it will follow, that if God fhould vouchfafe a Revelation for the Reformation of the World, this muft be another Qualification of it. 3^/)', Another Thing neceflary to the Reformation of the World, which Reafon could not difcover, was to be aflured, they fhould be able to do their Duty ac- ceptably ; fo that if they had a Rule to walk by, and the Means of Pardon made known to them, they might be encouraged to adl accordingly : But without fuch an Aflurance, 'twould be in vain. For what fignifies aRuIe, if we cannot follow it ? and to be fure of Pardon, if we repent and reform, if it be not in our Power to do it ? and yet the World had Reafon to fufpedl this, Fo» confidering the difmal Depravation of Mankind, Re- formation was the hardeft Thing in the World. *Tis difficult to bring a harden'd Sinner, even buf to refolve to part with his Sins : And when he comes to try the Experiment, he will find fo many Rubs and Temptations in his Way, that it will be no eafy Matter to refift them. And as 'tis natural to conceive he will be often overcome •, thefe Inftances of his Weaknefs, will be apt to incline him to fufped his Strength, and prompt him to quit what he has begun, as a Thing he is not able to go thro' with : And, therefore, there feems to be a Neceffity of fome Hope of Affiftance in this Cafe to be given. Or if he fhould refolve to go on as well as he can ; yet his beft Obedience will be fo imperfe<5t, that if he were to attend to Reafon only, he could take but fmall Comfort in it, as being a juft Doubt, whether God would accept it. For if God be a holy Being, as every one mud believe, before he will part with his Sins ; how can any Man think, that this holy Being will accept fuch impure Services, mixt with fo much Sin ? It may be faid, indeed, we do our beft ; and this is as much as any Man can do i but we ought to be fure Vol. III. L 1 of 514 -^ Demonjlration of true Religion. of this, before this can be of any Comfort to us. But fuppofing we can do no better; yet who is the Caiife of this Inability but ourfelves ? If God has a Right to all we can do, and we have made ourfelves incapable of doing what he had given us Power to do, our own Mifmanagement will deferve his Refentment, as much as our Weaknefs may call for his Mercy. And which of thefe muft fall to our Lot, depends upon the Will of God, which he alone can make known to us. And if there was a Neceflity of knowing this, in order to the Reformation of the World, as there is a Neceffity of a Revelation of it j fo this likewife muft be another Charadler of that Revelation, that it give Sinners fome Hope of Affiftance and Acceptance. 4//'/)', Another Thing neceflary to the Reformation of the World was, to be affured of a future State of Rewards and Punifhments, according to their Beha- viour here. For if there be no future State, we cannot think, that a diflblute World would have any other Concern upon them, but only to make Provifton for the Flejh, to fiilfil the Luffs thereof. So that without the AfTurance of another World, there could be no Reformation expeded. But how neceffary foever the Knowledge of thi^ was, Reafon was not able to attain to it. Indeed there was fome Imperfedt Notion of it all the World over, but they could never come to any fuch Certainty about it, as to make it of any Ufe tq the Condu6l of human Life. And, therefore, fo far as it was neceflary to the Reformation of the World, that Mankind be in- formed of a future Srate, as there was a Neceflity of a Revelation ; fo z:.'.? likewife rnuil be another Charac- ter of that Revelation that comes to reform the World. So that from thefe Confiderations, we are further informed of thefe three Qualifications of a divine Re- velation, njiz. The Aflurance of Pardon of Sin ; of the A Demonjiration of true 'Religion, 515 the Acceptance of honeft, tho' imperfedl Endeavours j and of a future State of Rewards and Punifhments. And whereas all thefe depend on the Will of God, which can only be known by Revelation ; from hence we have a further Proof of the Neceflity of fome fuch Proofs to attend this Revelation, as are a fufficient Evidence of its coming from God. And fince Miracles are univerfally look'd upon, as fuch an Evidence, we have here a Reafon in the Nature of Things, that this Revelation fhould be confirmed by Miracles, and that Miracles in this Cafe, are not arbitrary A6ls of God, but are Ac5i:s {o necefTary to the Reformation of the World, that no RevelatioH for that End, could be depended upon without them. And as we have thus feen what Men flood in Need of for the Reformation of their Minds and Manners ; the next Thing to be confider'd is, whether Chriilia- nity anfwers to all this, and may be eileem'd a di- vine Revelation. 'That Chrifiianity is a divine Revelation. The firfl Thing that I fhewed was necefTary to a Revelation, is, that it teach Mankind a true No- tion of Happinefs, and how to attain it ; as likev/ife a true Notion of God, and how to worfliip him as God ; and that it be fitted for the Overthrow of Idolatry. And this is apparent in the Chriftian Religion. As for the Happinefs of Mankind, every one mufl know, that it is not to be had in this World, where we are liable to fo many Imperfeftions. The Gofpel, therefore, has placed our Happi- nefs beyond the Grave, where all Imperfedion fhall be done away. And as our Happinefs confifls, as I have fhewn, in the Perfe6lion of our Faculties, and in a due Ex- ercife of them on their proper Objeds \ and fmce we are endued with the Faculties of Underflanding, the Objed of which is Truth -, and of Will, the Objed X)f which is Good : And by Confequence, it mufl be L 1 2 our 5 1 6 A Demonfiration of true 'Religion. our higheft Happlnefs to have our Underftandings exercifed on the higheft Truth, and our Wills upon the higheft Good, which is God \ fo the Gofpel places our ultimate Happinefs in him. And as we are to expect this Happinefs beyond the Grave, fo it is to he in a Place, where we ftiall be admitted to all the Delights, that the Knowledge of him, and all thofe Comforts we are capable of receiving from him, can afford us. And as it is impoihble to be happy, and take Pleafure in God, or to b: admitted to dwell with him, without being like him *, and, therefore, in order to our Happinefs in God, we muft be holy, true, good, and merciful, as he is -, fo the Gofpel requires all this of us ; and alfo, has given us fuch Rules to walk by, as, if we will but ad; accordingly, will work this divine Likenefs in us, and make us Partakers of the divine Nature. And as the Gofpel thus provides for our Happinefs in another World •, fo it has not been wanting to us, even here : For the very Things that are prefcribed us, as the neceflary Condition, and preparatory Qua- liiication for the Glory above, are abfolutely necef- fary for our Welfare here. So that if v/e will but follow the Gofpel Rules, we muft be as happy as we are capable of being. And whereas there are feveral Misfortunes, which we cannot be deliver'd from j Chriftianity has like- wife provided for us in this Refpedl, and has fur- iiilhed us with fuch Confiderations, as are fufficient to fupport us under them. And as it has thus provided for the Happinefs of Man ; fo has it likewife inftrufted us in the true Nature of God j whom it reprefents as a. Being of all Perfeflions, and as Maker and Governor of the World ; who, as a Father, is defirous of the Good of all his Creatures -, but more efpecially the Saviour of Men, if they will but behave themfelves to him, as obedient Children. Andj A Demonjlration of true Religion. 5 17- And, with all this, he is reprefented to us as a Judge to whom we muft give an Account of all we have, and all we do, whether it be Good or Evil. This is the general Notion of the God of the Chriftians : And fuch a one as this, is not only agree- able to Reafon, and fuitable to the Nature and Ne- ceflity of Man, but produdive of the higheft Ho- nour and Efteem of God, the only true Foundation of Worfhip and Obedience. And with this likewife agrees the Chriftian Worfhip. As God is our Creator and Governor, the Giver of all Things, and the Difpofer of all Events ; {o the Chrlftian Religion requires, as in the Natures of Things we ought, that we come to him for what we want, and acknowledge his Bounty in what we have. And this in fuch a Way as is fuitable to his Nature : And, therefore, as he is a Spirit^ it muft be done in Spirit^ and in Truth : And thus we are to do to him only, without any corporeal Image or Similitude of him, without Rival or Co-partner with him. But to make this truly Chriftian, it muft be done in the Name, and thro* the Mediation of Jefus Chrifiy, becaufe it is thro' him alone, that we hope to be accepted. For as we are all Sinners, and are therefore un- worthy to offer any Sacrifice to God •, fo to keep up a Senfe of our Unworthinefs in our Minds, and of the heinous Nature of Sin, God Vv'ill not admit us to approach his Prefence, to prefent any Petitions to him, but what are brought by a holy and undefiled Hand. And, therefore, he has appointed an Advocate for us, Jefus Chriji the righteous^ who as he came into the World for our Salvation, and died for our Redemp- tion ; fo he now fits at the Right Hand of God, and ever lives to make Interceffion for us. This is the only Article that diftinguifhes the Chri- ftian from a pure natural Worfliip. And tho' this is Matter of mere Revelation, yet it is fuch an Inftitu- tion, as Reafon not only approves of, as worthy of God to appoint \ as being ufeful to Religion in geperal, L 1 3 as 5 1 8 A Demonftratio7t of true Religion, as it tends to preferve in us a due Senfe of our Un- worthinefs, as Sinners ; and of the Holinefs of that God we fin againft -, and, at the fame Time, to comfort us in the AfTurance of his Mercy thro' the Interceflion of a holy Saviour ; but alfo as it was particularly neceflary at the Time of its Appointment to the Reformation of the Idolatry of the World. For a great deal of this was evidently owing to a Want of fome Revelation of this Kind -, for all Mankind have had a Notion of the NecefTity of a Mediator. And having no certain Guide to direct their Rea- fon in the Choice of proper Perfons for this Office, they fet up to themfelves various Interceffors, ac- cording to their bewilder'd Fancies •, to prevent which there was a Neceffity of a Revelation in this Cafe. 'Tis, therefore, a particular Mark of the Divi- nity of this Revelation, relating to the Worfhip of God, that it is appointed to be oiFer'd up thro' fuch a Mediator as is fufficient for us, who is not only the beloved Son of God^ and our Friend and Brother; but is fuch a one, as we know by fufficient Evi- dence, is not only willing, but able to do the utter- mojl for all //?^ that come unto God by him. So that after this Revelation, there was no longer Need of that Crowd of Mediators, which the Hea- thens fought out for themfelves, having one, who was all-fufficient for them. And, therefore, this is a moil effedual Way of rooting out that Idolatry which had prevailed among them ; and was, by Confequence, a wife and reafonable Inftitution of Worfliip, had it ferved no other End, but this. If it be any Objedlion to this Chriflian Scheme of Worfhip, that Jefus Chrift^ the Son of God, is com- manded to be honoured, as we honour the Father ; we muft confider, that this makes no real Difference. For the Son is reprefented, as having the Godhead dwelling in him, fo that when he is v/orfliipped, it is the Godhead that is worfhipped in him, or thro' him. 2 And ^A Demonjlration of true Religion, 519 And as the New Teftament fays, that there is hut cue God, and that God the Father ; and fince our Saviour fays, that the Godhead which dwelt in him^ was the Father, it will follow, that that which is worfliipped in the Worfl^ip of the Son, muft be the Father, who in other Places is faid to be ma-nifejled in the Flejh, and to be In Chriji Jefus reconciling the IVorld unto himfelf. In this View of that Matter deliver'd In plain Scripture Words, the Difficulty ceafes -, and it is fo far from favouring Idolatry in itfelf, that this feems to have been appointed for the Deftrudllon of It. For as God is an invifible Being, 'tis hard for Men who are Inured to material Objeds, to addrefs themfelves to him, but under fome material Phan- tafm : And this, as it is In itfelf an Idolatry of the Mind, fo it was probably the Origin of the more re- fin'd Idolatries of the Heathens, who, perhaps, might worfhip at firft the true God only, but under vifible Reprefentatlons : And by this they might be led, by Degrees, to think, that God was in him- felf, v/hat thofe Images reprefented him to be : And thus by being carried from one Thing to another, they came to fuch a degenerate State, that the true Notion of God was quite loft. Now as Chrifdanlty came to reform the World, and to root out Idolatry, It was neceffary to that End, that this fhould be prevented : And this might be one Reafon, why God was pleafed to exhibit himfelf under the Veil of human Nature, viz. to fix their Thoughts upon, and determine their Wor- fhip to himfelf alone. If this be fa, we muft conceive Jefus Chrift, ' not only as a Mediator ; but God feems to have confe- crated to himfelf his very Flefti, as the Medium whereby v/e muft come to him i as if he Intended thereby to be diftinguiilied by the Character of God in Chrifi Jefus ; to whom, as he Is fo united, as to become one with him, fo he will be worftiipped thro* him. L 1 4 If 520 A Demonjlration of true Religion. If any think it difficult to conceive how Jefus- Chrifi can be fo united to the Godhead, and yet a(5t as a Mediator \ we muft confider his Mediation is founded in Scripture on his being a Propitiation for our Sins ; and his Intercejfion is reprefented to us by his going to Heaven to prefent the Blood of his Sa- crifice before God, who, tho' he dwells in Jefus C/6r//? bodily, and a6ls in him, yet he difplays his majeftic Prefence there. So that his Interceffion is his prefenting that Body before the Throne of God, which God had pre- pared for him, whereby to make an Atonement for Mankind. And, therefore, when we pray to God, thro* the Mediation of Chrift, we muft mean thro* the Merits of that Expiation he has made for us ; and in this Senfe it will eafily appear, how he may be a Mediator and Interceflbr for us, tho' he is one with God. Thus we fee how Chriftianity anfwers to this firft Character of fuch a Revelation, as was necefiary to reform the idolatrous World, in giving them right Notions of the Happinefs of Man, and the Means of attaining it ; and the true Notions of the Na- ture of God and his Worihip. But as this would fignify little, whilft they be- lieved theii- own Way of Worihip was divine. So, The next Thing neceflary to a Revelation, was fuch an apparent Evidence of a divine Authority accompanying the firft Preachers of it, as was fuffi- cient to convince the World, that the Gods they worfhipped were no Gods. And this is fuch a Charader, that fo evidently agrees to Chriftianity, that it cannot be doubted by any one, that confiders that wonderful Series of mi- raculous Works which were wrought by our Savi- our and his Apoftles, and their SuccelTors, in the firft Ages of the Church -, which were fo apparent, that even the wifeft Adverfaries of Chriftianity acknow- ledged the Fa(^s as true. But A Demonjlration of true Religion, 52 1 But whatever Evidence the Chriftian Revelation received from thefe Works •, yet there feems to be fomething more required in this Cafe, than bare Mi- racles in general : For as the Oracles were efteem'd by the People, as the Voice of God •, there feems to be a NecefTity of fome fuch Works, as were fitted to convince them of their miftaken Notion. And this Charader remarkably fhewed itfelf in the firft Beginnings of Chriftianity : For no fooner was this Revelation open'd to the Gentiles^ but where-ever it came, it filenced their Oracles, and forced their Gods from their Temples : And this it did in fo remarkable a Manner, that their own Writers acknowledge and wonder at it. \^f^ide Eti- feb. Pr^p. Evang. Lib. V. Cap. i, Cypr. Epijl. ad Demet. Se^. 12. La^an. Lib. IV. Cap. 27.] And if thefe Things were fo, as Fllftory reports them, what greater Proof could there be given of the Faljfhood of the heathen Gods, and the Oracles that fupported them ? And what greater Proof could there be of the Authority of the Chriftian Revela- tion } One would think, that all People fhould im- mediately have fubmitted to fuch an Evidence. But, however reafonable it may be to expert this Efre(5t, yet confidering the Prejudices of Education, and the Arts of cunning Men, the Power of In- tereft, and the Force of Punifhments to difcover In- novations, this muft meet with great Difficulties at firft, and it would require, as I faid before, an un- common Zeal in the firft Preachers of this new Re- ligion, to undertake fo hard a Work, and undaunted Courage, and unparallel'd Patience, to bear up a- gainft fo much Oppofition that would be made a- gainft them, and the Puniftiment that would be in- flidled on them. This I obferved already was another Qualification of fuch a Revelation, as ftiould come to reform the World, and root out Idolatry. And this likewife was (b remarkable in the firft Preachers §22 A DemoTtftration of true Religion] Preachers of Chriftianlty, that they feem'd rep^rct- lefs of every Thing, but the Glory of Godj'^and the Salvation of Mankind. And tho' they kn-w before-hand what Treatment they fhould meet v/ith, yet they were not dif- couraged by this Profpe<5t. And tho* they found all this true by Experience every Day, yet they behaved themfelves with Pa- tience under it. Nay, they rejoiced that they wen thought worthy to fuffer for the Name of Chrifi. Such were the firft Preachers of the Gofpel Re- velation, and fuch the noble Spirit by which it was carried on ; a Spirit that feems to have fomething more than human in it. And if fuch a Spirit was fo neceflary to the Re- formation of Idolatry, that it could not be expedled without it, it is a ftrong Confirmation of the Divi- nity of the Chriftian Revelation, that this Spirit at- tended it in fo eminent a Degree, that it cannot rea- fonably be imputed to any other Caufe, but a divine Power, and Affiftance only. Thus have I demonftrated the Agreement of the Chriftian Religion with all thofe foremention'd Cha- racters of a divine Revelation, which were necefiary for the Reformation of the Notions of Mankind. I come now to confider the next Thing to be re- form'd, v/hi h could not be done without a Revela- tion, viz. their Manners : And as I have before ihew'd, what Charaders were neceffary to fuch a Fvcvelation •, if thefe likewife agree to the Chriftian Religion, this muft be the Revelation we enquire after. Now the firft Charader of fuch a Revelation, as was neceflary to reform the Manners of the World, is, that it give them a perfeft Rule of Life, built upon the Authority of God, and enforced by the Example of the Teachers of it. And this appears very evidently in the Gofpel, and that not only, as it propofes to us the pure and hoVj Nature of God, as the Rule of our Imitation, direding. A Demonjiratlon of true Religion. 523 direding us to be holy, as he is Ijoly -, but alfo as it prefcribes the beft Method to make us fo -, teaching us not only to live faberly^ righteoujly^ and godlily -, but to deny all Ungodliness and worldly Lufis^ and to cleanfe ourfehes from all Filthinefs, both of Flejh and Spirit. And in order to this, as it gives us a general Tran- fcript of our Duty to God, our Neighbour, and our- felves ; fo it forbids us every irregular Paffion. 'Tis true, indeed, we have not every Duty, and every Sin particularly named to us ; but we are taught fuch Topics to reafon from, by which we may be led to the Knowledge of them. For as we are commanded to love God with all our Heart, we are hereby commanded every Thing that is a natural Expreflion of this Love. So likewife, as we are commanded to love one ano- ther, as we love ourfelves, fo this muft fhew itfelf differently, according to our different Relations : And with all this 'tis required of us, that whatfo- ever 'Things are honefi, &c. thefe we fhould fludy and endeavour after. But to carry this ftill higher, we are further taught to do every Thing in the moft exeraplaiy Manner, that as we know better than other People, we fhould do more than they. Nay, we are not only required to exceed others, Vv-ho have not the fame Light with us, but we are to fiudy to excel even one ano- ther : So that as we ftand in various Relations, which naturally require various Duties of us ; fo v/e muft endeavour to excel one another in thofe Duties. And to make this flill the more perfeft, whatever is prefTed upon us, as a Duty, is not, as the hea- then Morality was, from a Coniideration of Conve- nience, Pleafure, or Reputation, but as the Will of God. For tho' 'tis true, there is no Duty commanded in the Gofpel, but what is for our Advantage, and no Sin forbid, but what is hurtful to us \ yet this is not '524 -^ 'D^monjlration of true Religion. not to be. the prime Motive of our Obedience, not is tliis to be the Foot upon which we are to adt, but we are to do all for the Love, and to the Glory of God, and in Obedience to his Will, This is the Gofpel Rule of Life, than which no- thing can be conceived more full in all Refpeds. But how perfed foever this Rule of the Chriftian Life is, it was not likely to gain upon a wicked .World, unlefs inforced by the Examples of thofe that taught it. And, therefore, as an exemplary Life was a Cir- cumftance necefTary to the Reformation of the World ; fo this was what Chrift and the firft Preachers of the Gofpel were particularly diftingufhed by, as even the Adverfaries of Chriftianity have acknowledged. And whilft Chriftianity was thus recommended by fuch Examples, this muft neceflarily tend to the Reformation of the World, fo far as their Influence could reach ; for by this they demonftrated, that the Things they taught, were not mere fpeculative, but pradlical Truths, intended to regulate and amend our Lives ; and that they were not beyond the Reach of human Nature, when they themfelves led the Way before them ; and that too in the moft exalted Degrees even of the moft difficult Du- ties. And this muft naturally fhew, that their In- tention was only to make Men good and happy. But whatever Advantage Chriftianity might re- ceive from the exemplary Lives of the firft Teachers of it, yet as they preached to a very wicked World, there could be no Hopes of Reformation, without fome AfTurance of Pardon. And this is another Charader of a divine Revelation fo remarkable in Chriftianity, that the very End of our Saviour's coming into the World, was to fave Sinners^ and the whole Gofpel is nothing but a De- claration of the Mercy of God to them, and the Means by which it was to be attained by them. And as the Reformation of the World is the Defign of the A "Demonfiratton of true Religion, 525 the Revelation •, and, therefore, we mull in Reafon exped, that the Mercy offer'd in fuch a Revelation muft be in fuch a Way, as is fuitable to this End ; and, by Confequence, not to give the leaft En- couragement to Sin -, fo we find this particularly- taken Care of in the Christian Method of Reconcilia- tion with God ; For it teaches us that God is a holy Being •, but neverthelefs, that he is not willing that any Sinner ihould perilh. And, to prevent this, he offers them Pardon, upon Condition that they part with their Sins, and become good. Men. And tho' God is reprefented upon fuch a Repen-7 tance, to be as ready to forgive us, as a tender Fa- ther is to forgive his penitent Son. Yet we are taught, that this Repentance fhall not be accepted, .-but thro' the Sacrifice of the Death of Chrifl, there- by to convince us of the NecefHty of forfaking all Sin, when the Pardon of it could not be prociwed, but at fo great a Price. This Sacrifice Jefus Chriji has offered for us vo- luntarily, which, tho' it was in one Refpedl a Con- firmation of his Million, yet it was alfo done, as an Expiation for us. And as God laid on him the Ini- quities of us all, fo he has declared the Acceptance of his Blood, as a Propitiation for the Sins of the whole World : So that if they will turn from their Wickednefs, they fhall fave their Souls alive. And to alllire us of his Acceptance of the Death of Chrift, he not only raifed him from the Dead, and has given us a Privilege upon our Repentance to plead the Merit of his Sacrifice for us ; but he has alfo taken him into Heaven, and has given hirri all Power, that we may reft fatisfied, that he is able to fave to the uttermoji thofe that come unto God by him. This is the Gofpel Scheme of Reconciliation -, and the Wifdom of this Contrivance will be more re- markable, if we add one Confideration more, viz. that this Method of Reconciliation was particularly fuited 526 A Demonfirafion of true Religion. fuited to the Notions of Mankind ; and was fitted not only to the Reformation of their Manners, but alfo idolatrous Worfhip. All the World had a Notion of the Neceffity of an Expiation by Sacrifice : And as they knew no Rule to regulate their Expiations by, but the Nature of their Sins, which might reafonably be fuppofed to require greater Atonements according to their diffe- rent Degrees of Guilt -, fo this begot not only a very coftly Worfliip, but alfo produced a favage Pradice of facrificing Men, and Women, and Children, imagining that the Dignity of human Nature, and the Innocency of Children, would be of fo much the greater Efficacy to their Purpofe. Now as we are convinced of the Barbarity, and of the Neceffity of the Abolition of it : It is a great Inftance of the Wifdom of this Scheme of Reconci- liation, that it not only propofes Pardon in fuch a "Way, as is agreeable to this general Notion of the World, by a Sacrifice of Expiation for their Sins ; but alfo fuch a Sacrifice, as renders all others need- lefs : This Expiation being wrought by a Perfon of fuch Purity and Dignity, as to be fufficient for the Sins of the whole World. If this Scheme be liable to Objedion, that this Expiation is wrought by the Sacrifice of the Son of God, and that 'tis flrange, that God fhould fuffer his Son to die. This, we mufl confefs, is a great Myftery : But the Difficulty of this does not feem to lie in the Death, fo much as in the Incarnation of the Son : For if we can conceive, that God might condefcend to have a Perfon born in our Nature in fuch a Man- ner, as to be his own Produ6lion, and properly his Son : And if there be any Reafon, that we can dif- cover why he fhould live in a human Way j there is no Difficulty in fuppofing, that God might per- rfiit him to be put to Death ; and that not only be- caufe this likewife might ferve many wife Ends, but be- A Demonjlration of true Religion. 527 becaufe he might be capable of a Recompence for it. And if there might be wife Reafons for his Death, it is eafily conceivable, that he might voluntarily choofe this, in order to thofe Ends to be ferved by it : And that God might accept of the voluntary Suffering, as a Sacrifice for the Sins of the World. This is the Gofpel Notion of it : For the New ^Tejiament feems to fet it forth, as the Contrivance of God the Father, declared to his Son, in his prae* exiftent State ; that in order to the Redemption of Mankind, he fhould take human Nature upon him. And the Son is reprefented, as voluntarily fubmitting to his Father's Will. [See Heb. x. 5.] And as in the Body he came, and died the Death of a Slave ; fo God has highly exalted him in that very Nature, in which he fuffer'd : And has not only declared, that he will accept of his Death, as a Price paid for our Redemption ; but that no one Ihall be accepted by him, but in and thro* his Inter- ceflion for us. Thus I have done with this Charadler of a divine Revelation, relating to the Declaration of Pardon of Sin. The next Thing required in a divine Revelation, is the AfTurance of Afliftance and Acceptance : And this is fo evident, that he that runs may read it. We have the Promife of the divine Affiftance of God's holy Spirit, upon the eafy Condition of afking it with an honeft Deiire to make a due Improve- ment of it. And when this holy Spirit is fet forth as a divine Perfon, this is a vaft Encouragement to fet about to reform, when we know, we may be more than Con-, qiierors thro' him that Jlrengthens us, if we will, at the fame Time, improve the Aid he gives us. This is the Gofpel Promife of Affiftance. . But yet becaufe thro' the Weaknefs of our mortal Nature we cannot always ftand upright, that we fliould not be difhearten'd, we have a further graci- ous 5 2$ A Demonjiration of true Religion. ous AfTurance given us, that God will not be ex^ treme to mark what is done amifs. And what can be wanting in this Refpeft to Invite a wicked People to repent and amend, that the Chri- ilian Revelation has not here propofed to them ? But yet, that nothing might be omitted, whereby it was poflible to work upon them : We have, Laftly^ Another Confideration added ; which is, another Chara6ter of a divine Revelation, the AfTu- rance of a future State : And that too laid open in the plaineft and the fulleft Manner, with fuch parti- cular Circumftances, and under fuch afFefting Repre- fentations, as are beft fitted to the End of Reformation. The Reward that good Men are to receive then, is fet forth to us, under fuch Ideas as are moft likely to invite our Hope, and excite us to endeavour after it, viz. a Crown, a Kingdom, a Treafure, and Inheri- tance that fadeth not away, and a State of ever- lafting Pleafare. ^ . And whereas our Bodies fhall be raifed again ; even thefe ihall be changed into fpiritual, incorrupti- ble, and immortal Bodies. The Mifery, on the other Hand, which wicked Men fhall endure in this State, that it might work more eiFedually upon us, is reprefented under fuch Repre- fentations, as are moft terrible to human Nature. By a Worm that Jhall never die -, by a Fire that will ne- ver he quenched \ by a 'Thirji that never will be allayed. And left all this Ihould be imagined only an art- ful Contrivance to awe Men into Obedience •, 'tis worth our Obfervation, that the Mifery here threat- ned is founded in Nature, and thefe Similitudes have a natural Suitablenefs in them to the Thing they are intended to reprefent. As for the Mifery here threatned to Sin, 'tis fuch as naturally arifes from it: For as our Happinefs conftfts in the Enjoyment of God ; fo by being ba- nifh'd from God, we muft be miferable : And yet this is the natural Confequence of Sin j for Sin is s Con- A Demonjlration of true Religion. 529 Contradidion to Holinefs •, and a finful Nature, and a holy God, are irreconcileable : And whilft a Sinner continues in this Opposition to God, there muft be a perpetual Separation between them, and 'tis im- pofTible but he muft be miferable. And when he comes to find himfelf irrecoverably loft, as his Confcience will gaul him with bitter Re- flexions i this is lively exprefted by the Similitude of a Worm that dieth not. And as we all have a natural Defire of Happinefs i fo when the Sinner ftiall find himfelf in Mifery, im- patiently defiring Happinefs, and yet under an Inca- pacity of attaining it : This is very naturally repre- fented by a Fire, tormenting him with burning Heat. If any Difficulty arifes in our Minds, that this Puniftiment is faid to be everlafting, as feeming in- confiftent with God's Goodnefs and Juftice to punifti finite Sins with everlafting Sufferings ; we may confider, i/?, That this Suffering is not properly an A(5t of God, but the natural Effedl of a natural Caufe ; and when this Suffering is threaten'd by God, as a Punifhment, 'tis nothing more than a Forewarning to Sinners of what will be the Confequence of their Folly : This he does out of mere Goodnefs to pre- vent their Ruin. And if Men will, in Spite of all this, purfue their own Wills, they muft be miferable. And we have no more Reafon to expe6t, that the Goodnefs of God fhould work Miracles, to prevent our Mifery in this Cafe, than that he fhould prevent all the Effeds of other natural Caufes, that are hurtful to us. But, 2^/y, If we confider this Suffering as a Punifli- ment, there is nothing confiftent with the Good- nefs or Juftice of God in it ; for as Man is capable of Laws, we may exped: from the Good- nefs of God, that he will give us fuch Laws, as are for our Happinefs : And as Laws muft Vol. IIL Mm be 530 A Demonfiration of true Religion. be inforced by Rewards and Punifhments ; thore Puniihments are moft fuitable to the Goodnefs of God, as a wife and holy Lawgiver, which are beft fitted to produce Obedience, and thereby to make us happy : And, therefore, the juft Propor- tion of Punifhment to be annex'd to Laws, is not to be meafured by the Nature of Sin, but by the Suitablenefs of it to the End it is intended for, which is the Prevention of Sin •, and by Confe- quence, that muft be a juft Meafure of Punifhment, which is beft fitted for this Purpofe. And fince 'tis plain, that the threatning of ever- lafting Mifery is not more than enough for this Purpofe ; it will hence follow, that the Goodnefs of God, confider'd under the Direction of Wifdom and Holinefs, could not have appeared fo confpicuoufly in any lefs Punifliment. A nd if it be Goodnefs in God to threaten fuch Pu- niftiments thereby to affright Men into Happinefs ; it cannot be inconfiftent with his Goodnefs or Juftice to execute thofe Puniftiments, fo long as there are any Beings capable of finning : And fince the Gofpel tells us, that Angels, and good Men, {bA\ live for ever •, who as they are free Beings, will, as fuch, be capable of Sinning -, and, therefore, ftand in Need of proper Motives to Obedience, to preferve them innocent and happy : It will follow, that there will always be Reafon for the Execution of thefe Punifiiments, becaufe there will be always free Agents to be terrified from Sin. Thefe Reafonings feem plainly to demonftrate to us the Necefiity of everlafting Puniihments.' But how credible foever this may be, with refpe^t to the Chriftian Revelation, yet all this would fig- nify but little, unlefs it v/ere attended with another Character of a divine Revelation, and that is. Miracles. Chrift and his Apoftles, I have obferv'd, did fuch Miracles as were abundantly fufficient to demonftrate to the World, that they were fent from God : And, by A Demonjiration of true Religion, 531 by Confequence, the Rules they prefcribed were the Will of God. But that there might be nothing wanting to give us the utmoft Satisfadion, we read of fome particular Miracles wrought for the Confir- mation of fome of the more important Articles. Thus for Inftance -, As our Saviour came into the World, to reform the World 5 and as the firft Step to a Reformation is Repentance, and the firft Motive to Repentance, Hope of Pardon •, fo he was not content to put the Belief and Afiurance of this Pardon, upon the ge- neral Credit of his other Miracles only, but he wrought a particular Miracle to fhew that he had Power upon Earth to forgive Sins. And as he died to redeem us, fo that we might be aflured of it, he rofe from the Dead as a Tefti- mony of it. And as he had afllired us, that our Bodies fhould rife again, he /hewed the Certainty of it by the Re- furredlion of his own. But becaufe his Refurredion was only a Rifing in this World, and becaufe the Happinefs of a Chrif- tian is to be in Heaven, that we might be fure of this, he miraculoufly afcended thither ; and that his Difciples might not doubt of his being in Heaven ; he fent down his Holy Ghoft to fhew his high Power there : That whereas they were chofen to preach the Gofpel to all Nations., they might be endued with the Gift of Languages to qualify them for it. And with thefe Gifts, thofe poor ignorant Men baffled the Wifdom of the Learned, and defeated the Oppofition of the Mighty. They did what a Revelation was wanted for, and what the Chriftian Revelation was intended for, they reformed Man- kind where-ever they came. Thus we fee the Nature and Evidence, the De- fign and NecelTity of Chriftianity, in order to the Reformation and Flappinefs of the Vv^orld : And 2 how '^32 A Demonjlration of true Religion. how it furnifhes us with all Things necefTary for this Reformation, and agrees with all the Charafters of fuch a Revelation, as might reafonably be expeded from God, And here, I muft obferve, that it is the very Scheme of Providence before demonftrated, from the Natures and Reafons of Things. If there ihould be any Objedions raifed from the Relation that Chriftianity bears to the Old Tefiamenty and the DifBculty that fome pretend there is in un- derftanding the Prophecies, and making out the Corrcfpondence of Chriftianity with them, they are not to be regarded -, Chriftianity will ftand by its own internal Evidence, without Regard to the Old ^eflament. But, however, I will demonftrate, that Chriftia- nity has fufficient Evidence of its Truth, from the Relation it bears to that Book. ^he End of the Third Volume, ,".:- -^ DATE DUE S^jfh^^ 4a2R DEMCO 38-297 -• .^''<*'^ j4.-.- w-V '-jl'