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WILLIAMS AND NORGATE, 14, HENRIETTA .STREET, COVENT GARDEN, LONDON; AND 20, SOUTH FREDERICK STREET, EDINBURGH. 18 72. HERTFORD : PRINTED BY STEPHEN AVSTIN AND SONS C0NTEI!^TS. ESSAY PAGE 1. Darwinism in Morals. {Theological Review, April, 1S71.) 1 2. Hereditary Piety. {Theological Review, April, 1870.) ... 35 3. The Religion op Childhood. {Theological Review, July, 1866.) 65 4. An English Broad Churchman. {Theological Review, January, 1866.) 95 5. A French Theist. {Theological Review, May, 1865.) ... 129 6. The Devil. {Fortnightly Revieio, August, 1871.) 147 7. A Pre-historic Religion. {Fraser^s Magazine, April, 1869.) 175 8. The Religions of the World. {Fraser's Magazine, June, 1868.) 203 9. The Religions of the East. {Fraser's Magazine, Februaiy, 1868.) 235 10. The Religion and Literature of India. {Fraserh Magazine, March, 1870.) 269 11. Unconscious Cerebration. {Macmillan^s Magazine, 'Sovera- ber, 1870.) 305 12. Dreams, as Illustrations op Involuntary Cerebration. {Macmillan's Magazine, April, 1871.) ... ... ... 335 13. Auricular Confession in the Church op England. {Theological Review, January, 1872.) 363 14. The Evolution of Morals and Religion. {Manchester Friend, January 15, 1872.) 391 DARWINISM IlSr MORALS, AND OTHER ESSAYS. JESS AY I. DARWINISM IN MORALS. ^ It is a singular fact that whenever we find out how any- thing is done, our first conclusion seems to be that God did not do it. No matter how wonderful, how beautiful, how infinitely complex and delicate, has been the machinery which has worked, perhaps for centviries, perhaps for millions of ages, to bring about some beneficent result — if we can but catch a glimpse of the wheels, its divine character dis- appears. The machinery did it all. It would be altogether superfluous to look further. The olive has been commonly called the Phoenix of trees, because when it is cut down it springs to life again. The notion that God is only discernible in the miraculous and the inexplicable, may likewise be called the Phoenix of ideas ; for again and again it has been exploded, and yet it re-appears with the utmost regularity whenever a new step is made in the march of Science. The explanation of each phenomenon is still first angrily disputed and then mournfully accepted by the majority of pious people, just 1 The Descent of Ma». By Charles Darwin, M.A., F.R.S. Two vols. 8vo. London: Murray. 1871. 2 DARWINISM IN MORALS. as if finding out the waj^s of God were not necessarily bringing ourselves nearer to the knowledge of Him, and the highest bound of the human intellect were not to be able to say, like Kepler, "0 God, I think Thy thoughts after Thee." That the doctrine of the descent of man from the lower animals, of which Mr. Darwin has been the great teacher, should be looked on as well nigh impious by men not men- tally chained to the Hebrew cosmogony, has always appeared to me surprising. Of course, in so far as it disturbs the roots of the old theology and dispels the golden haze which hung in poetic fancy over the morning garden of the world, it may prove a rude and painful innovation. A Calvin, a Milton, and a Fra Angelico, may be excused if they recalcitrate against it. Doubtless, also, the special Semitic contempt for the brutes which has unhappily passed with our religion into so many of our graver views, adds its quota to the common sentiment of repugnance ; and we stupidly imagine that to trace Man to the Ape is to degrade the progeny, and not (as a Chinese would justly hold) to ennoble the ancestry. But that, beyond all these prejudices, there should lurk in any free mind a dislike to Darwinism on religious grounds, is wholly beyond comprehension. Surely, were any one to come to us now in these days for the first time with the story that the eternal God produced all His greatest works by fits and starts ; that just 6000 years ago He suddenly brought out of nothing the sun, moon, and stars ; and finally as the climax of six days of such labour, " made man of the dust of the ground," we should be inclined to say that this was the derogatory and insufferable doctrine of creation ; and that when we compared it with that of the slow evolu- tion of order, beauty, life, joy, and intelligence, from the immeasurable past of the primal nebula's " fiery cloud," we DARWIA'ISJI IN MORALS. had no language to express how infinitely more religious is the story of modern science than that of ancient tradition ? IsTor are we alarmed or disturbed because the same hand which has opened for us these grand vistas of physical development has now touched the phenomena of the moral world, and sought to apply the same method of investigation to its most sacred mysteries. The only question we can ask is, whether the method has been as successful in the one case as (we learn from competent judges) it may be accounted in the other, and whether the proffered explanation of moral facts really suffices to explain them. Should it prove so successful and sufficient, we can but accept it, even as we welcomed the discovery of the physical laws of evolution as a step towards a more just conception than we had hitherto possessed of the order of things ; and therefore — if God be their Orderer — a step towards a better knowledge of Him. The book before us is doubtless one whose issue will make an era in the history of modern thought. Of its wealth of classified anecdotes of animal peculiarities and instincts, and its wide sweep of cumulative argument in favour of the author's various deductions, it would be almost useless to speak, seeing that before these pages are printed the reading public of England will have spent many happy hours over these " fairy tales of science." Of the inexpres- sible charm of the author's manner, the straightforwardness of every argument he employs, and the simplicity of every sketch and recital, it is still less needful to write, when years have elapsed since Mr. Darwin took his place in the literature of England and the philosojjhy of the world- Very soon that delightful pen will have made famihar to thousands the pictures of which the book is a gallery. Every one will know that our first human parents, far from resembling Milton's glorious couple, were hideous beings covered with hair, with pointed and movable ears, beards, DARWINISM IN MORALS. tusks, and tails, — the very Devils of mediaeval fancy. And behind these we shall dimly behold yet earlier and lower ancestors, receding through the ages till we reach a period before even the vertebrate rank was attained, and when the creature whose descendants were to be heroes and sages swam about in the waters in likeness between an eel and a worm. At every dinner-table will be told the story of the brave ape which came down amid its dreaded human foes to redeem a young one of its species ; and of the saga- cious baboon which, Bismarck-like, finding itself scratched by a cat, deliberately bit ofi" its enemy's claws. Satirists will note the description of the seals which, in wooing, bow to the females and coax them gently till they get them fairly landed ; then, " with a changed manner and a harsh growl," drive the poor wedded creatures home to their holes. The suggestion that animals love beauty of colour and of song, and even (in the case of the bower-bird) build halls of pleasure distinct from their nests for purposes of amusement only, will be commented on, and aiford suggestive talk wherever books of such a class are read in England. Few students, we think, will pass over without respectful pause the passage ^ where Mr. Darwin with so much candour explains that he " now admits that in the earlier editions of his Origin of Species he probably attributed too much to the action of natural selection," nor that ^ where he calls attention to Sir J. Lubbock's "most just remark," that " Mr. Wallace, with characteristic unselfishness, ascribes the idea of natural selection unreservedly to Mr. Darwin, although, as is well known, he struck out the idea inde- pendently, and published it, though not with the same elaboration, at the same time." Whatever doubt any reader may entertain of the philosophy of Evolution, it is quite 1 Vol. i., page 152. 2 page 137, note. DARWINISM IiY MOEALS. impossible that, after perusing such pages, he can have any hesitation about the philosophic spirit of its author. But we must turn from these topics, which properly con- cern the journals of physical science, to the one whose treat- ment by Mr. Darwin gives to a Theological Review the right to criticize the present volume. Mr. Darwin's theories have hitherto chiefly invaded the precincts of traditional Theology. We have now to regard him as crowning the edifice of Utilitarian ethics by certain doctrines respecting the nature and origin of the Moral Sense, which, if permanently allowed to rest upon it, will, we fear, go far to crush the idea of Duty level with the least hallowed of natural instincts. It is needless to say that Mr. Darwin puts forth his views on this, as on all other topics, with perfect moderation and simplicity, and that the reader of his book has no diificulty whatever in comprehending the full bearing of the facts he cites and the conclusions he di'aws from them. In the present volume he has followed out to their results certain hints given in his "Origin of Species" and "Animals under Domestication," and has, as it seems, given Mr. Herbert Spencer's abstract view of the origin of the moral sense its concrete application. Mr. Spencer broached the doctrine that our moral sense is nothing but the " expe- riences of utility organized and consolidated through all past generations." Mr. Darwin has afforded a sketch of how such experiences of utility, beginning in the ape, might (as he thinks) consolidate into the virtue of a saint ; and adds some important and quite harmonious remarks, tending to show that the Virtue so learned is somewhat accidental, and might perhaps have been what we now call Vice. To mark his position fairly, it will be necessary to glance at the recent history of ethical philosophy. Independent or Intuitive Morality has of course always taught that there is a supreme and necessary moral law 6 DARWINISM IN MORALS. common to all free agents in the universe, and known to man by means of a transcendental reason or divine voice of conscience. Dependent or Utilitarian Morality has equally steadily rejected the idea of a law other than the law of utility ; but its teachers have differed exceedingly amongst themselves as to the existence or non-existence of a specific sense in man, requiring him to perform actions whose utility constitutes them duties ; and among those who have admitted that such a sense exists, there still appear wide variations in the explanations they offer of the nature and origin of such a sense. The older English Utilitarians, such as Mandeville, Hobbes, Pale}'- and Waterland, denied vigor- ously that man had any spring of action but self-interest. Hume, Hartley, and Bentham advanced a step further; Hartley thinking it just possible to love virtue "as a form of happiness," and Bentham being kind enough elaborately to explain that we may truly sympathize with the woes of our friends. Finally, when the coldest of philosophies passed into one of the loftiest of minds and warmest of hearts, Utilitarianism in the school of Mr. Mill underwent a sort of divine travesty. Starting from the principle that "actions are only virtuous because they promote another end than virtue," he attained the conclusion, that sooner than flatter a cruel Almighty Being he would go to hell. As Mr. Mill thinks such a decision morally right, he would of course desire that all men should follow his example ; and thus we should behold the apostle of Utility conducting the whole human race to eternal perdition for the sake of — shall we say — " the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number " ? At this stage, the motive-power on which Utilitarianism must rely for the support of virtue is obviously complex, if not rather unstable. So long as the old teachers appealed simply to the interest of the individual, here or hereafter, DARWINISM IN MORALS. the argument was clear enougli, however absurd a misuse of language it seems to make Virtue and Vice the names respectively of a systematized and an unsystematized rule of selfishness. But when we begin to speak of the happiness of others as our aim, we necessarily shift our ground, and appeal to sympathy, to social instincts, or to the disinterested pleasures of benevolence, till finally, when we are bid to relinquish self altogether in behalf of the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number, we have left the Utilitarian ground ■ so far away, that we find ourselves on the proper territories of the Intuitionist, and he turns round with the question, " AVhy should I sacrifice myself for the happiness of man- kind, if I have no intuitions of duty compelling me to do so ? " The result has practically been, that the Social Instincts to which Utilitai'ians in such straits were forced to appeal, as the springs of action in lieu of the Intuitions of duty, have been gradually raised by them to the rank of a distinct element of our nature, to be treated now (as self-interest was treated by their predecessors) as the admitted motives of virtue. They agree with Intuitionists that man has* a Conscience ; they only differ from them on the two points of how he comes by it ; and whether its office be supreme and legislative, or merely subsidiary and supplemental. It is the problem of. How we come by a conscience, which Mr. Darwin applies himself to solve, and with which we shall be now concerned. Needless to say that the Kantian doctrine of a Pure Reason, giving us transcendental know- ledge of necessary truths, is not entertained by the school of thinkers to which he belongs ; and that as for the notion of all the old teachers of the world, that the voice of Conscience is the voice of God, — the doctrine of Job and Zoroaster, Menu and Pythagoras, Plato and Antoninus, Chrysostom and Gregory, Fenelon and Jeremy Taylor, — it can have no place in their science. As Comte would say, 8 DARWINISM IN MORALS. we have passed the theologic stage, and must not think of running to a First Cause to explain phenomena. After all (they seem to say), cannot we easily suggest how man might acquire a conscience from causes obviously at work around him ? Education, fear of penalties, sympathy, desire of approval, with imaginary religious sanctions, would alto- gether, well mixed and supporting one another, afford suffi- cient explanation of feelings, acquired, as Mr. Bain thinks, by each individual in his lifetime, and, as Mr. Mill justly says, not the less natural for being acquired and not innate. At this point of the history, the gradual extension of the Darwinian theory of Evolution brought it into contact with the s23eculations of moralists, and the result was a new hypothesis, which has greatly altered the character of the whole controversy. The doctrine of the transmission by hereditary descent of all mental and moral qualities, of which Mr. Gralton's book is the chief exponent,^ received, in 1868, from Mr. Herbert Spencer the following definition, as applied to the moral sentiments : ^ " I believe that the experiences of utility, organized and consolidated through all past generations of the human race, have been producing corresponding modifications, which by continued transmis- sion and accumulation have become in us certain faculties ' Reviewed in the next essay. * Letter to Mr. Mill, in Bain's " Mental and Moral Science," p. 722 ; quoted in "Descent of Man," p. 101. On the day of the original publication of this essay there appeared in the Fort nightly Review an article by Mr. Spencer, designed to rectify the misapprehension of his doctrine into which Mr. Hutton, Sir John Lubbock, Mr. Mivart, Sir Alexander Grant, and, as it proved, my humble self, had all fallen regarding the point in question. "If," says Mr. Spencer very pertinently, " a general doctrine concerning a highly involved class of phenomena could be adequately presented in a single paragraph of a letter, the writing of books would be superfluous." I may add that as it would be equally impossible for me adequately to present Mr. Spencer's rectifications and modifications in a single paragraph of an essay, I must, while apologizing to him for my involuntary errors, refer the reader to his own article {Fortnightly Review, April 1, 1871) for better comprehension of the subject. DARWINISM IN MORALS. of moral intuition, certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which, have no apparent basis in the individual experiences of utility." This doctrine (which received a very remarkable answer in an article by Mr. R. H. Hutton, Macmillan's Magazine, July, 1869) may be considered as the basis on which Mr. Darwin proceeds, approaching the subject, as he modestly says, "exclusively from the side of natural history," and " attempting to see how far the study of the lower animals can throw light on one of the highest psychical faculties of man," His results, as fairly as I can state them, are as follows : If we assume an animal to possess social instincts (such, I suppose, as those of rooks, for example), and also to acquire some degree of intelligence corresponding to that of man, it would inevitably acquire contemporaneously a moral sense of a certain kind. In the first place, its social instincts would cause it to take pleasure in the societ}^ of its fellows, to feel a certain amount of sympathy with them, and to per- form various services for them. After this, the next step in mental advance would cause certain phenomena of re- gretful sentiments (hereafter to be more fully analyzed) to ensue on the commission of anti- social acts, which obey a transient impulse at the cost of a permanent social instinct. Thirdly, the approval expressed by the members of the community for acts tending to the general welfare, and disapproval for those of a contrary nature, would greatly strengthen and guide the original instincts as Language came into full play. Lastly, habit in each individual would gradually perform an important part in the regulation of conduct. If these positions be all granted, the problem of the origin of the moral sense seems to be solved. It is found to be an instinct in favour of the social virtues which has grown up in mankind, and would have grown up in any animal similarly endowed and situated ; and it 10 DARWINISM IN I/ORALS. does not involve any higher, agency for its production than that of the play of common human life, nor indicate any higher nature for its seat than the further developed in- telligence of any gregarious brute. So far, Mr. Darwin's view seems only to give to those he has quoted from Mr. Spencer their full expansion. The points on which he appears to break fresh ground from this starting-place are these two : 1st, his theory of the nature of conscientious Repentance, which represents it as solely the triumph of a permanent over a transient impulse ; 2nd, his frank ad- mission, that though another animal, if it became intelligent, would acquire a moral sense, yet that he sees no reason why its moral sense should be the same as ours, or lead it to attach the idea of right or wrong to the same actions. In extreme cases (such as that of bees), the moral sense, de- veloped under the conditions of the hive, would, he thinks, impress it as a duty on sisters to murder their brothers. It must be admitted that these two doctrines between them effectively revolutionize Morals, as they have been hitherto commonly understood. The first dethrones the moral sense from that place of mysterious supremacy w^hich Butler considered its grand characteristic. Mr. Darwin's Moral Sense is simply an instinct originated, like a dozen others, by the conditions under which we live, but which happens, in the struggle for existence among all our instincts, to resume the upper hand when no other chances to be in the ascendant. And the second theory aims a still more deadly blow at ethics, by affirming that, not only has our moral sense come to us from a source commanding no special respect, but that it answers to nO external or durable, not to say universal or eternal, reality, and is merely tentative and provisional, the provincial prejudice, as we may de- scribe it, of this little world and its temporary inhabitants, which would be looked on with a smile of derision by DARWINISM IN MORALS. U better-informed people now residing in Mars, or hereafter to be developed on earth, and who in their turn may be considered as walking in a vain shadow by other races. Instead of Montesquieu's grand aphorism, "La justice est un rapport de convenance qui se trouve reelleraent entre deux choses ; ce rapport est toujours le memo quelque etre qui le considere, soit que ce soit Dieu, soit que ce soit un homme," Mr. Darwin will leave us only the sad assu- rance that our idea of Justice is all our own, and may mean nothing to any other intelligent being in the uni- verse. It is not even, as Dean Mansel has told us, given us by our Creator as a representative truth, intended at least to indicate some actual transcendent verity behind it. We have now neither Yeil nor Revelation, but only an earth-born instinct, carrying with it no authority what- ever beyond the limits of our race and special social state, nor within them further than we choose to permit it to weigh on our minds. Let me say it at once. These doctrines appear to me simply the most dangerous which have ever been set forth since the days of Mandeville. Of course, if science can really show good cause for accepting them, their conse- quences must be frankly faced. But it is at least fitting to come to the examination of them, conscious that it is no ordinary problems we are criticizing, but theories whose validity must involve the invalidity of all the sanctions which morality has hitherto received from powers beyond those of the penal laws. As a matter of practice, no doubt men act in nine cases out of ten with very small regard to their theories of ethics, even when they are thoughtful enough to have grasped any theory at all ; and generations might elapse after the universal acceptance of these new views by philosophers, before they would sensibly influence the con- duct of the masses of mankind. But however slowly they 12 DARWINISM IN MORALS. might work, I cannot but believe that in the hour of their triumph would be sounded the knell of the virtue of man- kind. It has been hard enough for tempted men and women heretofore to be honest, true, unselfish, chaste, or sober, while passion was clamouring for gratification, or want pining for relief. The strength of the fulcrum on which has rested the virtue of many a martyr and saint, must have been vast as the Law of the Universe could make it. But where will that fulcrum be found hereafter, if men con- sciously recognize that what they have dreamed to be " The unwritten law divine, Immutable, eternal, not like those of yesterday, But made ere Time began," ' — the law by which " the most ancient heavens are fresh and strong," — is, in truth, after all, neither durable nor even general among intelligent beings, but simply consists of those rules of conduct which, among many that might have been adopted, have proved themsebes on experiment to be most convenient ; and which, in the lapse of ages, through hereditary transmission, legislation, education, and such methods, have got woven into the texture of our brains ? What will be the power of such a law as this to enable it to contend for mastery in the soul with any passion capable of rousing the most languid impulse ? Hitherto good men have looked on Eepentance as the most sacred of all sentiments, and have measured the nearness of the soul to God by the depth of its sense of the shame .and heinousness of sin. The boldest of criminals have betrayed at intervals their terror of the Erinnyes of Remorse, against whose scourges all religions have presented themselves as protectors, with their devices of expiations, sacrifices, pen- ances, and atonements. From Orestes at the foot of the ' Sophoc. Antig. 454. DARWINISM IN MORALS. 13 altar of Phoebus, to the Anglican in his new confessional to-day; from the Aztec eating the heart of the victim slain in propitiation for sin, to the Hindoo obeying the law of Menu, and voluntarily starving himself to death as an exjaiation of his offences, history bears testimony again and again to the power of this tremendous sentiment ; and if it have driven mankind into numberless superstitions, it has, beyond a doubt, also served as a threat more effec- tive against crime than all the penalties ever enacted by legislators. But where is Repentance to find place here- aftef , if Mr. Darwin's view of its nature be received ? Will any man allow himself to attend to the reproaches of Conscience, and bow his head to her rebukes, when he clearly understands that it is only his more durable Social Instinct which is re-asserting itself, because the more variable instinct which has caused him to disregard it is temporarily asleep ? Such a Physiology of Repentance reduces its claims on our attention to the level of those of our bodily wants ; and our grief for a past crime assumes the same aspect as our regret that we yesterday unadvisedly preferred the temporary enjoyment of conversation to the permanent benefit of a long night's rest, or the flavour of an indiges- tible dish to the wholesomeness of our habitual food. "We may regret our imprudence ; but it is quite impossible we should ever again feel penitence for a sin. But is this all true ? Can such a view of the moral nature of man be sustained? Mr. Darwin says that he has arrived at it by approaching the subject from the side of natural history ; and we may therefore, without dis- respect, accept it as the best which the study of man simply as a highly developed animal can afford. That glimmering of something resembling our moral sense often observable in brutes, which Mr. Darwin has admirably described, may (we will assume) be so accounted for. But viewing human 14 DARWINISM IN MORALS. nature from other sides besides that of its animal origin, studying the mind from within rather than from without, and taking into consideration the whole phenomenon pre- sented by such a department of creation as the Human Hace, must we not hold that this Siraious Theory of Morals is wholly inadequate and unsatisfactory? Probably Mr. Darwin himself would say that he does not pretend to claim for it the power to explain exhaustively all the mys- teries of our moral nature, but only to afford such a clue to them as ought to -satisfy us that, if pursued further, they might be so revealed ; and to render, by its obvious sim- plicity, other and more transcendent theories superfluous. The matter to be decided (and it is almost impossible, I think, to overrate its importance) is : Does it give such an explanation of the facts as to justify us in accepting it, pro- visionally, as an hypothesis of the origin of Morals ? It is hard to know how to approach properly the later developments of a doctrine like that of Utilitarian Morality, which we conceive to be founded on a radically false basis. If we begin at the beginning, and dispute its primary positions, we shift the controversy in hand to the intermina- ble wastes of metaphysical discussion, where few readers will follow, and where the wanderer may truly say that doubts, " immeasurably spread, Seem lengthening as I go." All the time which is wanted to argue the last link of the system, is lost in seeking some common ground to stand upon with our opponent, who probably will end by disputing the firmness of whatever islet of granite we have chosen in the bog ; and will tell us that the greatest modern thinkers are doubtful whether twice two will make four in all worlds, or whether Space may not have more than three dimensions. Yet to grant the premisses of Utilitarian DARWINISM IN MORALS. 15 ethics, and then attempt to dispute one by one the chain of doctrines which has been unrolling from them during the last century, and which has now reached, as it would seem, its ultimate, and perhaps logical, development, is to place our arguments at an unfair disadvantage. To treat scientificall}^ the theories of Mr. Darwin, we ought to commence by an inquiry into the validity of the human consciousness ; into the respective value of our various faculties, the senses, the intellect, the moral, religious and aesthetic sentiments, as witnesses of external truths ; and, finally, into the justice or fallacy of attaching belief exclu- sively to facts of which we have cognizance through one faculty — let us say the intellect ; and denying those which we observe by another — say the gesthetic taste or the reli- gious or moral sentiments. He who will concede that the intellect is not the organ through which we appreciate a song or a picture, and that it would be absurd to test songs and pictures by inductive reasoning and not by the specific sense of the beautiful, is obviously bound to show cause Vfh.j, if — after making such admission in the case of our cesthetic faculties — he refuse to concede to the religious and moral faculties the same right to have their testimony admitted in their own domain. Proceeding to our next step, if we are to do justice to our cause, we must dispute the Utilitarian's first assump- tion on his proper ground. AV^e must question whether the Right and the Useful are really synonymous, and whether Self-interest and Virtue can be made convertible terms even by such stringent methods as those of extending the meaning of " Self-interest " to signify a devotion to the " Grreatest Happiness of the Greatest Number " (always inclusive of Number One), and of curtailing that of Virtue to signify the fulfilment of Social, irrespective of Personal and E/eliffious oblio:ations. That the common sentiment 16 DARWINISM IN MORALS. of mankind looks to something diJSerent from Utility in the actions to which it pays the tribute of its highest reverence, and to something different from noxiousness in those which it most profoundly abhors, is a fact so obvious, that modern Utilitarians have recognized the im- possibility of ignoring it after the manner of their pre- decessors ; and Mr. Herbert Spencer has fully admitted that the ideas of the Right and the Useful are now entirely different, although they had once, he thinks, the same origin. But that the idea of the Right was ever potentially enwrapped or latent in the idea of the Useful, we entirely deny, seeing that it not only overlaps it alto- gether, and goes far bej^ond it in the direction of the Noble and the Holy, but that it is continually in direct antithesis to it ; and acts of generosity and courage (such as Mr. Mill's resolution to go to hell rather than say an untruth) com- mand from us admiration, not only apart from their utility, but because they set at defiance every principle of utility, and make us feel that to such men there are things dearer than eternal joy. As Mr. Mivart says well, the sentiment of all ages which has found expression in the cry, " Fiat Justitia ruat coslum," could never have sprung from the same root as our sense of Utility. Proceeding a step farther downwards to the point where- with alone Mr. Darwin concerns himself — the origin of such moral sense as recent Utilitarians grant that we possess — we come again on a huge field of controversy. Are our intuitions of all kinds, those, for instance, regarding space, numbers and moral distinctions, ultimate data of our men- tal constitution, ideas obtained by the d-^jriori action of the normally developed mind ; or are they merely, as Mr. Hutton has paraphrased Mr. Spencer's theor}^, " a special susceptibility in our nerves produced by a vast number of homogeneous ancestral experiences agglutinated into a DARWINISM m MORALS. 17 single intellectual tendency " ? Is our sense of the necessity and universality of a truth {e.g., that the three sides of all triangles in the universe are equal to two right angles), and the unhesitating certainty with which we affirm such univer- sality, over and above any possible experience of generality, — is this sense we say, the expression of pure Reason, or is it nothing but a blind incapacity for imagining as altered that which we have never seen or heard of as changed ? Volumes deep and long as Kant's Kritik or Mr. Spencer's " Principles " are needed, if this question is to receive any justice at our hands. All that it is possible to do in passing onward to our remarks on Mr. Darwin's views, is to enter our protest against the admission of any such parentage either for mathematical or moral intuitions. No event in a man's mental development is, I think, more startling than his first clear apprehension of the nature of a geometrical demonstration, and of the immutable nature of the truth he has acquired, against which a thousand miracles would not avail to shake his faith. The hypothesis of the inheritance of space-intuitions through numberless ancestral experiments, leaves this marvellous sense of cer- tainty absolutely inexplicable. And when we ajpply the same hypothesis of inheritance to moral intuitions, it appears to me to break down still more completely ; supplying us at the utmost with a plausible theory for the explanation of our preference for some acts as more useful than others, but utterly failing to suggest a reason for that which is the real phenomenon to be accounted for, namely, our sense of the sacred obligation of Rightfulness, over and above or apart from Utility. Nay, what Mr. Mill calls the " mystical extension " of the idea of Utility into the idea of Right is not only left wholly unexplained, but the explanation offered points, not to any such mystical extension, but quite the other way. The waters of our moral life cannot possibly 2 18 DARWINISM IN MOEALS. rise above their source ; and if Utility be that source, they ought by this time to have settled into a dead pond of plain and acknowledged self-interestedness. As Mr. Hutton ob- serves : " Mr. Spencer's theory appears to find the feeling of moral obligation at its maximum, when the perception of the quality which ultimately produces that feeling is at its minimum." But we must now do Mr. Darwin the justice to let him speak for himself, and for the only part of the Utilitarian theory for which he has made himself directly responsible ; though his whole argument is so obviously founded solely on an Utilitarian basis, that we are tempted to doubt whether a mind so large, so just and so candid, can have ever added to its treasures of physical science the thorough mastery of any of the great works in which the opposite system of ethics have been set forth. Animals display affection, fidelity and sympathy. Man when he first rose above the Ape was probably of a social disposition, and lived in herds. Mr. Darwin adds that he would probably inherit a tendenc}' to be faithful to his com- rades, and have also some capacity for self-command, and a readiness to aid and defend his fellow-men.^ These latter qualities, we must observe, do not agree very well M'ith what Mr. Gralton recently' told us'^ of the result of his in- teresting studies of the cattle of South Africa, and at all events need that we should suppose the forefathers of our race to have united all the best moral as well as physical qualities of other animals. But assuming that so it may have been, Mr. Darwin says, Man's next motive, acquired by sympathy, would be the love of praise and horror of infamy. After this, as such feelings became clearer and reason ad- vanced, he would " feel himself impelled, independently of any pleasure or pain felt at the moment, to certain lines of 1 Page 85. - Macniilluii' s Magazine, February, 1871. DARWINISM IN 2WRALS. 19 conduct. He may then say : I am the supreme judge of my own conduct ; and in the words of Kant, I will not in my own person violate the dignity of humanity."^ That any savage or half-civilized man ever felt anything like this, or that the •' dignity of humanity " could come in sight for endless generations of progress, conducted only in such ways as Mr. Darwin has suggested, nay, that it could ever occur at all to a creature who had not some higher conception of the nature of that Virtue in which man's only " dignity " consists, than Mr. Darwin has hinted, — is a matter, I venture to think, of gravest doubt. But again passing onward, we reach the first of our author's special theories ; his doctrine of the nature of E,e- pentance. Earnestly I wish to do it justice ; for upon it hinges our theory of the nature of the moral sense. As our bodily sense of feeling can best be studied when we touch hard objects or shrink from a burn or a blow, so our spiritual sense of feeling becomes most evident when it comes in con- tact with wrong, or recoils in the agony of remorse from a crime. " Why " — it is Mr. Darwin who asks the question — " why should a man feel that he ought to obey one instinctive feeling rather than another ? Why does he bitterly regret if he has yielded to the strong sense of self-preservation, and has not risked his life to save that of a fellow-creature ? " The answer is, that in some cases the social or maternal instincts will always spur generous natures to unselfish deeds. But where such social instincts are less strong than the instincts of self-preservation, hunger, vengeance, etc., then these last are naturally paramount, and the question is pressed, " Why does man regret, even though he may endeavour to banish any such regret, that he has followed the one natural impulse rather than the other? and why 1 Pacre S6. 20 DARWINISM IN 3I0RALS. does lie further feel that he ouo^ht to reg-ret his conduct?" Man in this respect differs, Mr. Darwin admits, profoundly from the lower animals, but he thinks he sees the reason of the difference. It is this : Man has reflection. From the activity of his mental qualities, he cannot help past impres- sions incessantly passing through his mind. The animals have no need to reflect ; for those who have social instincts never quit the herd, and never fail to obey their kindly impulses. But man, though he has the same or stronger social impulses, has other, though more, temporary passions, such as hunger, vengeance, and the like, which obtain tran- sient indulgence often at the expense of his kind. These, however, are all temjsorar}^ in their nature. When hunger, vengeance, covetousness, or the desire for preservation, has been satisfied, such feelings not only fade, but it is impos- sible to recall their full vividness by an act of memory. " Thus as man cannot prevent old impressions from passing througli his mind, he will be compelled to compare the weaker impression of, for instance, jDast hunger, or of vengeance satisfied, with the instinct of sympathy and goodwill to his fellows which is still present, and ever in some degree active in his mind. He will then feel in his imagination that a stronger instinct has yielded to one which now seems comparatively weak, and then that sense of dissatisfaction will inevitably be felt with which man is endowed, like every other animal, in order that his instincts may be obeyed." ' Leaving out for the present the last singular clause' of this paragraph, which appears to point to a Cause altogether outside of the range of phenomena we are considering, — a Cause which, if it (or He ?) exist at all, may well " endow " human hearts more directly than through such dim animal instincts as are in question, — leaving out of view this hint of a Creator, we ask : Is this physiology of Repentance true to fact ? It would be hard, I venture to think, to describe one more at variance with it. The reader might be excused 1 Page 90. DARWINISM IN MORALS. 21 who should figure to himself the author as a man who has never in his lifetime had cause seriously to regret a single unkindly or ignoble deed, and who has unconsciously attri- buted his own abnormally generous and placable nature to the rest of his species, and then theorized as if the world were made of Darwins. Where (we ask in bewilderment), where are the people to be found in whom " sympathy and goodwill" to all their neighbours exist in the state of perma- nent instincts, and whose resentful feelings, as a matter of course, die out after every little temporary exhibition, and leave them in charity with their enemies, not as the result of repentance, but as its preliminary ? Where, where may we find the population for whom the precept, "Love your enemies," is altogether superfluous, and who always revert to afiection as soon as they have gratified any tran- sient sentiment of an opposite tendency ? Hitherto we have been accustomed to believe that (as Buddhists are wont to insist) a kind action done to a foe is the surest way to enable ourselves to return to charitable feelings, and that, in like manner, doing him an ill- turn is calculated to exasperate our own rancour. We have held it as axiomatic that "revenge and wrong bring forth their kind j" and that we hate those whom we have injured with an ever-growing spite and cruelty as we continue to give our malice head- way. But instead of agreeing with Tacitus that " Humani generis proprium est odisse quern Iceseris," Mr. Darwin ac- tually supposes that as soon as ever we have delivered our blow it is customary for us immediately to wish to wipe it ofi" with a kiss ! In what Island of the Blessed do people love all the way round their social circles, the mean and the vulgar, the disgusting, and the tiresome, not excepted ? If such beings are entirely exceptional now, when the care- ful husbandry of Christianity has been employed for eighteen centuries in cultivating that virtue of mansuetude, of which 22 BARWimSII IN MORALS. the ancient world produced so limited a crop, how is it to be supposed that our hirsute and tusky progenitors of the Palgeolithic or yet remoter age, were thoroughly imbued with such gentle sentiments ? Let it be borne in mind that, unless the great majority of men, after injuring their neighbours, spontaneousl}^ turned to sympathize with them, there could not possibly be a chance for the foundation of a general sentiment such as Mr, Darwin supposes to grow up in the community. The natural historj^ (so to speak) of Repentance seems to indicate almost a converse process to that assumed b}^ Mr. Darwin. Having done a wrong in word or deed to our neighbour, the first sentiment we distinguish afterwards is usually, I conceive, an accession of dislike towards him. Then after a time we become conscious of uneasiness, but rather in the way of feeling that we have broken the law in our own breasts and are ashamed of it, than that we pity the person we have injured or are sorry for him. On the contrary, if I am not mistaken, we are ver}^ apt to comfort ourselves at this stage of the proceedings hj reflecting that he is a ver}^ odious person, who well deserves all he has got and worse ; and we are even tempted to add to our offence a little further evil speaking. Then comes the sense that we have really done wrong in the sight of God ; and last of all (as it seems to me), as the final climax, not the first step of repentance, we first undo or apologize for our wrong act, and then, and only then, return to the feeling of love and charity. This whole theory, then, of the origin of Repentance, namely, that it is the "innings" of our permanent social instincts M'hen the transient selfish ones have played out their game, seems to be without basis on any known con- dition of human nature. Ostensibly raised on induction, it lacks the primary facts from which its inductions profess DARWINISM IN MORALS. 23 to be drawn ; and Mr. Darwin, in offering it to us as the result of his studies in Natural History, seems to have betrayed that he has observed other species of animals more accurately than his own ; and that he has overlooked the vast class of intelligences which lie between baboons and philoso23hers. The theory of the 'nature of Repentance which we have been considering, is a characteristic improvement on the current Utilitarian doctrine, in so far that it suggests a cause for the human tenderness, if I may so describe it, which forms one element in true repentance. If it were true of mankind in general (as it may be true of the most gentle individuals) that a return to sympathy and goodwill spontaneously follows, sooner or later, every unkind act, then Mr. Darwin's account of the case would supply us with an explanation of that side of the sentiment of repentance which is turned towards the person injured. It would still, I think, fail altogether to render an account of the mys- terious awe and horror which the greater crimes have in all ages left on the minds of their perpetrators, far beyond any feelings of pity for the sufferers, and quite irrespective of fear of human justice or retaliation. This tremendous senti- ment of Remorse, though it allies itself with religious fears, seems to me not so much to be derived from religious con- siderations as to be in itself one of the roots of religion. The typical Orestes does not feel horror because he fears the Erinnyes, but he has called up the phantoms of the Erinnyes in the nightmare of his horror. Nothing which Mr. Darwin, or any other writer on his side, so far as I am aware, has ever suggested as the origin of the moral sense, has supplied us with a plausible explanation of either such Remorse or of ordinary Repentance. In the former case, we have soul-shaking terrors to be accounted for, either (according to Mr. Darwin) by mere pity and sympathy, or 24 DARWINISM IN MORALS. (according to the old Utilitarians) by fear of retaliation or disgrace, such as the sufferer often notoriously defies or even courts. In the case of ordinary Repentance, we have a feel- ing infinitely sacred and tender, capable of transforming our whole nature as by an enchanter's wand, softening and re- freshing our hearts as the dry and dusty earth is quickened by an April shower, but yet (we are asked to believe) caused by no higher sorcery, fallen from no loftier sky, than our own every-day instincts, one hour selfish and the next social, asserting themselves in wearisome alternation ! What is the right of one of these instincts as against the other, that its resumption of its temporary supremacy should be accom- panied by such portents of solemn augury ? Why, when we return to love our neighbour, do we at the same time hate ourselves, and tvish to do so still more ? Why, instead of shrinking from punishment, do men, under such impres- sions, always desire to expiate their offences so fervently, that with the smallest sanction from their religious teachers they rush to the cloister or seize the scourge ? Why, above all, do we look inevitably beyond the fellow-creature whom we have injured up to God, and repeat the cry which has burst from every penitent heart for millenniums back, "Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned ! " Putting aside the obvious fact that the alleged cause of repentance could, at the utmost, onl}'' explain repentance for social wrong-doing, and leave inexplicable the equally bitter grief for personal ofiences, we find, then, that it fails even on its own ground. To make it meet approximately the facts of the case, we want something altogether different. We want to be told, not only why we feel sorry for our neighbour when we have wronged him, but how we come by the profound sense of a Justice which our wrong has infringed, and Avhich we yet revere so humbly, that we often prefer to suffer that it may be vindicated. Of all this, the DARWimS2f IN MORALS. 25 Utilitarian scheme, with. Mr. Darwin's additions, aflPords not the vaguest indication. I cannot but think that, had any professed psychologist dealt thus with the mental phenomena which it was his business to explain, had he first assumed that we returned spontaneously to benevolent feelings after injuring our neighbours, and then presented such relenting as the essence of repentance, few readers would have failed to notice the disproportion between the unquestionable facts and their alleged cause. But when a great natural philosopher weaves mental phenomena into his general theory of physical de- velopment, it is to be feared that many a student will hastily accept a doctrine which seems to fit neatly enough into the system which he adopts as a whole ; even though it could find on its own merits no admission into a scheme of psychology. The theory of Morals which alone ought to com- mand our adhesion must surely be one, not like this harmo- nizing only with one side of our philosophy, but equally true to all the facts of the case, whether we regard them from without or from within, whether we study Man, ab extra, as one animal amongst all the tribes of zoology, or from within by the experience of our own hearts. From the outside, it is obvious that the two human sentiments of Regret and Repentance may very easily be confounded. A theory which should account for Regret might be sup- posed to cover the facts of Repentance, did no inward experience of the difierence forbid us to accept it. But since Coleridge pointed out this loose link in the chain of Utilitarian argument, no disciple of the school has been able to mend it ; and even Mr. Darwin's theory only sup- plies an hypothesis for the origin of relenting Pity, not one for Penitence. Let us suppose two simple cases : first, that in an accident at sea, while striving eagerly to help a friend, we had unfortunately caused his death ; 26 DARWINISM ly MORALS. second, that in the same contingency, an impulse of jealousy or anger had induced us purposely to withhold from him the means of safety. What would be our feelings in the two cases ? In the first, we should feel Regret which, how- ever deep and poignant, would never be anything else than simple E-egret, and which, if it assumed the slightest tinge of self-reproach, would be instantly rebuked by every sound- minded spectator as morbid and unhealthy. In the second case (assvxming that we had perfect security against dis- covery of our crime), we should feel, perhaps, very little Regret, but we should endure Remorse to the end of our days ; we should carry about in our inner hearts a shadow of fear and misery and self-reproach which would make us evermore alone amid our fellows. Now, will Mr. Darwin, or any other thinker who traces the origin of the Moral Sense to the " agglutinated " experience of utility of a hundred generations, point out to us how that experience can possibly have bequeathed to us the latter sentiment of Remorse for a crime, as contra-distinguished from that of Regret for having unintentionally caused a mis- fortune ? But if the origin of repentance, in the case of obvious capital injuries to our neighbour, cannot be accounted for merely as the result of ancestral experience, it appears still more impossible to account in the same way for the moral shame which attaches to many lesser offences, whose noxiousness is by no means self-evident, which no legis- lation has ever made penal, and which few religions have condemned. Mr. Wallace, in his Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, appears to me to sum up this argument admirably. ^ After explaining how very inadequate are the Utilitarian sanctions for Truthfulness, and observing how many savages 3^et make veracity a point ^ Page 355. DARWINISM IN MORALS. 27 of honour, he says, " It is difficult to conceive that such an intense and mystical feeling of right and wrong (so intense as to overcome all ideas of personal advantage or utility) could have been developed out of accumulated ancestral experiences of utilit}^ ; but still more difficult to understand how feelings developed by one set of utilities could be transferred to acts of which the utility was partial, imaginary or absent," — or (as he might justly have added) so remote as to be quite beyond the ken of uncivilized or semi- civilized man. It is no doubt a fact that, in the long run, Truthfulness contributes more than Lying to the Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number. But to discover that fact needs a philosopher, not a savage. Other virtues, such as that of care for the weak and aged, seem still less capable, as Mr. Mivart has admirably shown, ^ of being evolved out of a sense of utility, seeing that savages and animals find it much the most useful practice to kill and devour such sufferers, and by the law of the Survival of the Fittest, all nature below civilized man is arranged on the plan of so doing. Mr. W. R. Greg's very clever paper in Fraser's Magazine, pointing out how Natural Selection fails in the case of Man in consequence of our feelings of pity for the weak, afibrds incidentally the best possible proof that human society is based on an element which has no counterpart in the utilit}'' which rules the animal world. It would be doing Mr. Darwin injustice if we were to quit the consideration of his observations on the nature of Repentance, leaving on the reader's mind the impression that he has put them forward formally as delineating an ex- haustive theory of the matter, or that he has denied, other- wise than by implication, the doctrine that higher and more spiritual influences enter into the phenomena of the moral 1 Genesis of Species, page 192. 28 DARWINISM IN MORALS. life. The absence of the slightest allusion to any such higher sources of moral sentiment leaves, however, on the reader's mind a very strong impression that here we are supposed to rest. The developed Ape has acquired a moral sense by adaptive changes of mental structure precisely analogous to those adaptive changes of bodily structure which have altered his foot and rolled up his ear. To seek for a more recondite source for the one class of changes than for the other would be arbitrary and imjohilosophical. But now we come to the last, and, as it seems to me, the saddest doctrine of all. Our moral sense, however acquired, does not, it is asserted, correspond to anything real outside of itself, to any law which must be the same for all Intelli- gences, mundane or supernal. It merely affords us a sort of Ready Reckoner for our particular wages, a Rule of Thumb for our special work, in the position in which we find ourselves just at present. That I may do Mr. Darwin no injustice, I shall quote his observations on this point in his own words : " It may be well first to iM'emise that I do not wish to maintain that any strictly social animal, if its intellectual faculties were to become as active and as highly developed as in man, would acquire exactly the same moral sense as ours. ... If, for instance, to take an extreme case, men were reared precisely under the same conditions as hive-bees, there can hardly be a doubt that our unmarried females would, like the worker-bees, think it a sacred duty to kill their brothers, and mothers would strive to kill their fertile daughters, and no one would think of intei'fering. Nevertheless, the bee, or any other social animal, would in our sup2>osed case gain, as it appears to me, some feeling of right and wrong, or a conscience. For each individual would have an inward sense of possessing certain stronger or more enduring instincts, and others less strong or enduring ; so that there would often be a struggle which impulse should be followed, and satisfaction or dissatis- faction would be felt as past impressions were compared during their incessant passage through the mind. In this case, an inward monitor would tell the animal that it would have been better to have followed DARWINISMS IN MORALS. 29 the one impulse rather than the other. The one course ought to have been followed. The one would have been right and the other wrong." ^ Now it is a little difficult to clear our minds on this subject of the mutable or immutable in morals. No believer in the immutability of morality holds that it is any i:)hymal act itself which is immutably right, but only the principles of Benevolence, Truth, and so on, by which such acts must be judged. The parallel between Ethics and Geometry here holds strictly true. The axioms of both sciences are neces- sary truths known to us as facts of consciousness. The subordinate propositions are deduced from such axioms by reflection. The application of the propositions to the actual circumstances of life is effected by a process (sometimes called " traduction ") by which all applied sciences become practically available. For example. Geometry teaches us that a triangle is equal to half a rectangle upon the same base and with the same altitude, but no geometry can teach us whether a certain field be a triangle with equal base and altitude to the adjoining rectangle. To know this we must measure both, and then we shall know that if such be their propor- tions, the one will contain half as much space as the other. Similarly in morals. Intuition teaches us to " Love our Neighbour," and reflection will thence deduce that we ought to relieve the wants of the suffering. But no ethics can teach A what are the special wants of B, or how they can best be supplied. According, then, to the doctrines of In- tuitive Morality, considerations of Utility have a most important, though altogether subordinate, place in ethics. It is the office of experience to show us Jiow to put the mandates of intuition into execution, though not to originate our moral code, — hoic to fulfil the duty of conferring Happi- ness, though not to set up Happiness as the sole end and aim of Morality. 1 Descent of Man, pp. 33, 3i. 30 DARWINISM IN MORALS. Now if Mr. Darwin had simply said tliat under totally diflPereut conditions of life many of the existing human duties would have been altered, we could have no possible fault to find with his remarks. In a world where nobody, needed food there could be no duty of feeding the hungry ; in a world of immortals there could be no such crime as murder. Every alteration in circumstance produces a cer- tain variation in moral obligation, for the plain reason (as above stated) that Morals only supply abstract principles, and, according to the circumstances of each case, their application must necessarily vary. If the triangular field have a rood cut ofi" it, or a rood added on, it will no longer be the half of the rectangle beside it. It would not be difficult to imagine a state of existence in which the im- mutable principles of Benevolence would require quite a different set of actions from those which they now demand ; in fact, no one supposes that among the Blessed, where they will rule all hearts, they will inspire the same manifes- tations which they call for on earth. But Mr. Darwin's doctrine seems to imply something very different indeed from this. He thinks (if I do not mistake linn) that, under altered circumstances, human beings would have acquired consciences in which not only the acts of social duty would have been different, but its princijjies would have been transformed or reversed. It is obviously impossible to stretch our conception of the prin- ciple of Benevolence far enough to enable us to include under its possible manifestations the conduct of the worker bees to the drones ; and I suppose few of us have hitherto reflected on this and similar strange phenomena of natural history, without falling back with relief on the reflection , that the animal, devoid of moral sense, does its destructive work as guiltlessly as the storm or the flood. On Mr, Darwin's system, the developed bee would have DARWINISM IN MORALS. 31 an " inward monitor " actually prompting the murderous sting, and telling her that such a course ''ought to have been followed." The Danai'des of the hive, instead of the eternal nightmare to which Greek imagination consigned them, would thus receive the reward of their assassinations in the delights of the mens conscia recti ; or, as Mr. Darwin expresses it, by the satisfaction of " the stronger and more enduring instinct." Hitherto we have believed that the human moral sense, though of slow and gradual development and liable to sad oscillations under the influence of false reli- gion and education, yet points normally to one true Pole. Now we are called on to think there is no pole at all, and that it may swing all round the circle of crimes and virtues, and be equall}^ trustworthy whether it point north, south, east or west. In brief, there are no such things really as Right and Wrong ; and our idea that they have existence outside of our own poor little minds is pure delusion. The bearings of this doctrine on Morality and on Religion seem to be equally fatal. The all-embracing Law which alone could command our reverence has disappeared from the universe ; and God, if He exist, may, for aught we can surmise, have for Himself a code of Right in which every cruelty and every injustice may form a part, quite as pro- bably as the opposite principles. Does such an hypothesis actually fit any of the known facts of human consciousness ? Is there anywhere to be found an indication of the supposed possibility of acquir- ing a conscience in Avhich the principles of R,ight and Wrong should be transformed, as well as their application altered ? It would seem (as already mentioned) that, as a matter of fact, the utility of destroying old people and female infants has actually appeared so great to many savage and semi-civilized people, as to have caused them to practise such murders in a systematic way for thousands of 32 DARWINISM IN MORALS. years. But we have never been told that the Fuegians made it more than a matter of good sense to eat their grand- fathers, or that the Chinese, when they deposited their drowned babies in the public receptacles labelled "For Toothless Infants," did so with the proud consciousness of fulfilling one of those time-hallowed Rites of which they are so fond. The transition from a sense of Utility to a sense of Moral Obligation seems to be one which has never yet been observed in human history. Mr. Darwin himself, with his unvarying candour, remarks that no instance is known of an arbitrary or superstitious practice, though pursued for ages, leaving hereditary tendencies of the nature of a moral sense. Of course where a religious sanction is believed to elevate any special act (such as Sabbath- keeping) into an express tribute of homage to God, it justly assumes in the conscience precisely the place such homage should occupy. But even here the world-old dis- tinction between offences against such arbitrary laws, mala prohihita, and those against the eternal laws of morals, mala in se, has never been wholly overlooked. I think, then, we are justified in concluding that the moral history of mankind, so far as we know it, gives no countenance to the hypothesis that Conscience is the result of certain contingencies in our development, and that it might at an earlier stage have been moulded into qviite another form, causing Good to appear to us Evil, and Evil Good. I think we have a right to say that the suggestions offered by the highest scientific intellects of our time, to account for its existence on principles which shall leave it on the level of other instincts, have failed to approve them- selves as true to the facts of the case. And I think, there- fore, that we are called on to believe still in the validity of our own moral consciousness, even as we believe in the validity of our other faculties, and to rest in the faith DARWINISM IX MORALS. 33 (well-nigli universal) of the liuraan race, in a fixed and supreme Law of which the will of God is the embodiment, and Conscience the Divine transcript. I think that we may still repeat the hymn of Cleanthes : " That our wills blended into Thine, Concurrent in the Law divine, Eternal, universal, just and good. Honouring and honoured in our servitude, Creation's Ptean march may swell, The march of Law immutable. Wherein, as to its noblest end. All being doth for ever tend." JSS8AT IL HEREDITARY PIETY.* The history of Public Opinion, during the last half century may be not inaptly compared to that of a well-fed, steady- going old roadster, long cherished by a respectable elderly squire, but imluckily transferred at his demise to his wild young heir. Accustomed to all the neighbouring highways, and trained to jog along them at five miles an hour, the poor beast suddenly found itself lashed by "the discipline of facts" and sundry new and cruel spurs, to get over the ground at double its wonted pace, and at last to leave the beaten tracks altogether and cut across country, over walls and hedges which it never so much as peeped over before. Under this altered regime it would appear that Public Opinion at first behaved with the restiveness which was to be expected. On some occasions he stood stock-still like a donkey, with his feet stretched out, refusing to budge an inch ; and anon he bolted and shied and took buck leaps into the air, rather than go the way which stern destiny ordained. But as time went on, such resistance naturally grew less violent. The plungings and roarings subsided by degrees,, and anybody who now pays attention to the animal will probably be only led to observe that he is a little hard in the mouth and apt to refuse his fences till he has been brought 1 Hereditary Genius. An Inquiry into its Laws and Consequences. By Francis Galton, F.R.S. 1 vol. 8vo. pp. 390. Macmillan. 1869. Psychologie Naturelle. Etude sur les Facultes Intellectuelles at Morales. Par Prosper Despine, 3 vols. Svo. Paris: F. Savy. 1868. 36 HEREDITARY PIETY. up to them two or three times. In his equine way he finds each new discovery first "false" and then "against reli- gion;" but at last he always makes a spring over it and knocks off the top stone with his hind feet : " Everybody knew it before ! " Had not this process of accustoming Public Opinion to a sharp pace and difiicult leaps been going on for some time, it is to be believed that Mr. Gralton's book would have produced considerably more dismay and called forth more virtuous indignation than under present training has actually greeted it. We have had to modify our ideas of all things in heaven and earth so fast, that another shock even to our conceptions of the nature of our own individual minds and faculties, is not so terrible as it would once have been. We used first to think (or our fathers and grandfathers thought for us) that each of us, so far as our mental and moral parts were con- cerned, were wholly fresh, isolated specimens of creative Power, " trailing clouds of glory," straight out of heaven. Then came the generation which believed in the omnipotence of education. Its creed was, that you had only to " catch your hare " or your child, and were he or she born bright or dull-witted, the offspring of two drunken tramps, or of a philosopher married to a poetess, it was all the same. It depended only on the care with which you trained it and crammed it with " useful knowledge" to make it a Cato and a Plato rolled into one. Grrapes were to be had off thorns and figs off thistles with the utmost facility in the forcing- houses of Edgeworthian schools. It had, of course, been a hard matter to bring Public Opinion up to this point. The worthy old beast recalcitrated long, and when London University reared its head, the trophy of the First Educa- tional Crusade, all the waggery left in England was thought to be displayed by dubbing it " Stinkomalee." But univer- sity in town, and schools all over the country were over- HEREDITARY PIETY. 37 leaped at last, and nobody for years afterwards so much as whis^Dered a doubt that the Three Learned R's were sign- posts on the high road to Utopia. Then arose the brothers Combe to put in some wise words about physical, over and above mental, education. xlnd somehow talking of physical education led to discussing hereditarj^ physical qualities, and the " Constitution of Man" was admitted to be influenced in a certain measure by the heritage of his bodily organization. Children born of diseased and vicious parents, the philosopher insisted, ran a double chance of being themselves diseased and vicious, or even idiotic ; and sound conditions in father, mother, and nurse, had much to do, he thought, with similar good condi- tions in their offspring and nursling. Strange to remember ! Ideas obvious and undeniable, as these appear to us, seemed nothing short of revolutionary when they first were pub- lished ; and Public Opinion put back its ears and plunged and snorted at a terrible rate, ere, as usual, it went over them and " knew it all before." Nevertheless the inalienable right of diseased, deformed, and semi-idiotic married people to bring as many miserable children into the world as they please, is yet an article of national faith, which to question is the most direful of all heresies. But these three jioctrines of mental and moral develop- ment, — the doctrines, namely, 1st, that we came straight down from heaven ; 2nd, that we could be educated into anything ; 3rd, that some of our physical peculiarities might be traced to inheritance, — were all three kept pretty clear of meddlings with the Religious part of man. Experience, no doubt, showed sufficiently decisively that Piety was not a thing to be made to order, and that (at all events under the existing dispensation) there was no bespeaking little Samuels. The mysterious proclivity of children intended for such a vocation to turn out pickles, luckily coincided with — or 38 HEREDITARY PIETY. possibly had a share in originating — the Calvinistic views of Arbitrary Election ; while even the Arminians of those days would have vehemently repudiated either the notion that a man might inherit a pious disposition just as well as a tendency to the gout, or that he would be likely to find the true route to Paradise among other items of Useful Know- ledge in the Penny Magazine. I^ow it seems we are trotting up to another fence, vide- licet, the doctrine that all man's faculties and qualities, physical, mental, moral and religious, have a certain given relation to the conditions of his birth. The hereditary element in him, — that element of which we have hitherto entertained the vaguest ideas, admitting it in his features and diseases, and ignoring it in his genius and his passions ; recognizing it in noble races as a source of pride, and for- getting it as the extenuation of the faults of degraded ones, — this mysterious element must, we are told, henceforth challenge a place in all our calculations. AYe must learn to trace it equally in every department of our nature ; and no analysis of character can be held valid which has not weighed it with such accuracy as may be attainable. Our gauge of moral responsibility must make large allowance for the good or evil tendencies inherited by saint or sinner, and our whole theory of the meaning and scope of Education must rise from the crude delusion that it is in our power wholly to transform any individual child, to embrace the vaster but remoter possibilities of gradually training suc- cessive generations into higher intelligence and more com- plete self-control, till the tendencies towards brute vice grow weaker and expire, and " the heir of all the ages " shall be born with only healthful instincts and lofty aspirations. As always happens when a new truth is to be discovered, there have been foreshadowings of this doctrine for some years back. The hereditary qualities of Eaces of men have HEREDITARY PIETY. 39 occupied large room in our discussions. The awful phe- nomena of inherited criminal propensities have interested not only physicians (like the writer of the second book at the head of our paper), but philosophic novelists like the author of " Elsie Venner." Under the enormous impetus given to all speculations concerning descent by Mr. Darwin, some aj)plications of the doctrine of development to the mind as well as body of man became inevitable, and a most remarkable article in Fraser's Magazine, Oct. 1868, brought to light a variety of unobserved facts regarding the " Failure of Natural Selection in the case of Man," due to the special tendencies of our civilization. Mr. Galton himself, five or six years ago, published in Macmillan'' s Magazine the results of his preliminary inquiries as to inherited ability in the legal profession ; and Professor Tyndall perhaps gave the most remarkable hint of all, by ascribing the " baby-love " of women to the " set of the molecules of the brain " through a thousand generations of mothers exercised in the same functions. But the work which has finally afforded fixed ground to these floating speculations, and, in the humble judgment of the present writer, inaugurated a new science with a great future before it, is Mr. Galton's " Essay on Hereditary Genius." The few errors of detail into which the author has fallen in the wide and untrodden field he has attempted to map out, and his easily explicable tendency to give undue weight to disputable indications, and to treat a man's attain- ment of high ofiice as equivalent to proof of his fitness for it, — these weak points, on which the reviewers have fastened with their usual bull-dog tenacity, cannot eventually influence the acceptance of the immense mass of evidence adduced to prove the main theses of the work, or bar our admira- tion of its great originality. I do not propose in the ensuing pages to give a general notice of the work, or to mark 40 HEREDITARY PIETY. either all the principles which I conceive Mr. Galton has established, nor those others on which I should venture to diiFer from him. His main doctrine he has, I believe, demonstrated with mathematical certainty, viz., that all mental faculties, from the most ordinary to the highest and apparently most erratic forms of genius, the various gifts of the statesman, soldier, artist and man of letters, are distributed according to conditions among which inheritance by descent of blood occupies the foremost place ; and that there is no such thing in the order of nature as a mighty genius who should be an intellectual Melchisedek. The further deductions which Mr. Galton draws appear to me curious and suggestive in the extreme ; as, for ex- ample, the calculation of the proportion now obtaining in Europe of Eminent Men to the general population ; and, again, of the far rarer Illustrious Men to those of ordinary eminence. Based on this calculation, the number of both illustrious and eminent men who flourished among the 135,000 free citizens of Attica during the age of Pericles, is so nearly miraculous, that we find it hard to picture such an intellectual feast as life must then have offered. Society at Athens in those days must have surpassed that of the choicest circles of Paris and London now, as these are superior to the ale-house gossipings of George Eliot's rustics. That populace for whose eye Phidias chiselled, iliose play-goers for whose taste Sophocles and Aristophanes provided entertainment, that "jeunesse doree" Avhose daily lounge involved an argument with Socrates — what were they all ? What rain of heaven had watered the human tree when it bore such fruit in such profusion ? And what hope may remain that it will ever bring them forth in such clusters once more ? Again, a flood of light is poured on the degeneracy of mediaeval Europe by Mr. Galton's observations concerning HEREDITARY PIETY. 41 the celibacy of the clergy and the monastic orders. The moment when, as Mr. Lecky shows, chastity (understood to mean celibacy) was elevated into the sublimest of Chris- tian virtues, that moment the chance that any man should perpetuate his race became calculable in the mverse ratio of his piety and goodness. Archbishop "Whately long ago exposed the absurdity of the common boast of Catholics concerning the learnins: and virtue hidden in the monasteries during the Dark Ages. It would be equally reasonable to take the lamps and candles out of every room in a house and deposit them in the coal-cellar, and then call the passers-by to remark how gloomy were the library and drawing-room, how beautifully illuminated the coal-hole ! But Mr. Galton points out that the evil of the ascetic system was immeasurably wider and more enduring in its results even than the subtraction for generation after generation of the brightest minds and gentlest hearts from the world which so grievously needed them. Ac- cording to the laws of hereditary descent, it was the whole future human race which was being cruelly spoiled of its fairest hopes, its best chances of enjoying the services of genius and of true saintship. Some of those who read these pages may remember in the first Great Exhibition a set of samples of what was called " Pedigree Wheat." The gigantic ears, loaded with double-sized seeds, were simply the result of ten years' successive selection of the finest ears, and again the finest in each crop. The process which Romanism efiected for the human race was precisely and accurately the converse of that by which this Pedigree Wheat was obtained. It simply cut off each stem which rose above the average in mental or moral gifts. The moment a man or a woman showed signs of being some- thing better than a clod, a little more disposed for learning, a little more gentle -natured, more pious or more charitable, 42 HEREDITARY PIETY. instantly he or she was induced to take the vow never to become a parent ; and only by the infraction of such vows was there a chance for the world of an heir to his or her virtues. The best-born man among us now living, if he could trace out the million or so of his ancestors contemporary twenty generations ago, would hardly find among them a single person mentally distinguished in any way. ^Ye are all the de scendants of the caterans and hunters, the serfs and boors of a thousand years. The better and greater men born in the same ages hid their light under a bushel while they lived, and took care that it should not be rekindled after their death. When the Heformation came, the case was even worse ; for then the ablest, the bravest and the truest- hearted, were picked out for slaughter. The human tares were left to flourish and reproduce their kind abundantly, but the wheat was gathered in bundles to be burnt. To this hour France feels the loss of Huguenot blood (so strangely vigorous wherever it has been scattered !), and Spain halts for ever under the paralysis of half her motor nerves, cut off by the Inquisition. Besides these discussions, Mr. Galton's book is full of suggestive and original ideas concerning the results of mar- riages with heiresses, — concerning the influence of able mothers on their sons, — concerning the choice of «