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 S A M U E I. A G N E W , 
 
 
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DISCO LI USE, 
 
 IN WHICH IS SHOMTN . 
 
 THAT THE STATE OF MAN WAS ORIGINALLY NE- 
 CESSARILY MUTABLE, AND THEREFORE IMPERFECT; 
 THAT THIS IMPERFECTION NEVERTHELESS LE.\DS 
 TO A STATE WHICH WILL BE PERFECT AND 
 IMMUTABLE. 
 
 " Mutability is the attribute of imptrfcction ; immutability must there 
 fore be the attribute of perfection, whether in God or man." 
 
 Sumner's Records of Creation, V»i. i. p. 4£ 
 Be ye perfect, even as your Father in heaven is perfect. Matthew, v. 4 8 
 
 IN TWO PARTS. 
 
 TO WHICH ARE ADDED, 
 
 TWO DISCOURSES; 
 
 ONE 
 
 ON THE DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY, 
 
 AND THE OTHER 
 
 ON THE DOCTRINE OF CHRIST'S DIVINITY'. 
 
 A NEW EDITION, CORRECTED AND El^LARGED. 
 
 BY THOMAS BABER, ESQ. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 PRINTED BY S. GOSNELL, LITTLE QUEEN STREET. 
 1822. 
 
DEDICATION. 
 
 TO HIS GRACE THE 
 
 DUKE OF ROXBRUGHE. 
 
 MV LORD DUKE, 
 
 As there has been a similitude 
 between Your Grace and myself in respect of 
 the pursuits in which much of our time was 
 spent, and which were our delight in the 
 earlier part of our lives, I venture to suppose 
 that there has been a similitude likewise be- 
 tween us in respect of better pursuits, and 
 such as are suited to our present time of life. 
 Should this have been the case, the subject of 
 the following Discourse will be a pleasing one 
 to Your Grace: although the Discourse itself 
 will have little else to recommend it either 
 a2 
 
IV DEDICATION. 
 
 to Your Grace's attention, or to that of any 
 other person who may peruse it, than the 
 novelty of many thoughts which it contains. 
 It is not, however, upon this ground so much 
 as on that of the friendship which Your Grace 
 formerly had, and, as I have reason to be- 
 lieve, continues to have towards me, that I 
 presume to dedicate this work to you. 
 
 It is a singular circumstance, that the 
 writer, who in the preface is mentioned as 
 having suggested the plan of this work to 
 me, was patronized by a predecessor of 
 Your Grace's in the honours which you are 
 now in the possession of; his being so at least 
 may be supposed, from his dedicating another 
 work of his to the aforesaid predecessor of 
 Your Grace's ; and as I doubt not that this 
 work of his was favourably received by the 
 then Duke of Roxbrughe, I flatter myself 
 that this of mine will meet with a like favour- 
 able reception from Your Grace, notwith- 
 standing the greater excellency of this writer's 
 work, as compared to this of mine. My 
 
DEDICATION. V 
 
 consciousness indeed of its defects in point 
 of composition has been a reason with me 
 for not publishing it; this defect, however, 
 I trust will be overlooked by Your Grace, as 
 well as by such other friends as I may send 
 a copy to, and who may be as partially in- 
 clined towards me, as I persuade myself 
 your Grace is. 
 
 I have the honour to be 
 
 Your Grace's very faithful 
 And obliged humble Servant, 
 
 THOMAS BASER. 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 i HE plan of the following Discourse was first 
 suggested to me by Dr. Cheyne, in a work 
 of his, entitled, " Philosophical Conjectures^ 
 The subject came afterwards recommended 
 to my notice by what has fallen from the pen 
 of Bishop Butler, in his very excellent dis- 
 course "on the Analog^/ of Religion ^ and 
 there is reason to suppose the learned author 
 was not unacquainted with the aforesaid 
 work of Dr. Cheyne, which, when the Bishop 
 wrote, had been recently published : on the 
 contrary, that the plan of the Bishop's dis- 
 course had been suggested to him by the afore- 
 said work of Dr. Cheyne likewise ; for what 
 the Bishop undertakes to shew is, that " our 
 moral state and condition in this world is, by 
 reason of the afflictions, the dangers, and dif- 
 ficulties to which we are subject, so well cal- 
 culated for our improvement in virtue, as that 
 without these we could not be virtuous ; and 
 as without virtue we cannot be qualified for 
 that happiness for which we were originally 
 
Vin PREFACE. 
 
 intended, so is our having this qualification 
 the great purpose for which we have our 
 abode in this world." 
 
 Such is the plan of the Bishop's work, such 
 is the plan of Dr. Cheyne's, and such (in 
 part) is the plan of the following Discourse : — 
 I say in part ; for mine, in other part, pro- 
 ceeds on the mutability of our present state, 
 necessarily preceding a state which will be 
 immutable ; and on a state of imperfection 
 necessarily preceding a state of perfection. 
 Now, as Bishop Butler (upon the supposition 
 of his being acquainted with Dr. Cheyne's 
 book) would have thought, not only that the 
 subject on which he himself has written was 
 a very important one, but that neither Dr. 
 Cheyne nor any other writer would have said 
 so much thereon, as not to have left room for 
 much more being said ; I, in my turn, have 
 thought so likewise, notwithstanding the ad- 
 ditional knowledge which I have gained on 
 the subject from what the Bishop has said 
 thereon. 
 
 To show a further resemblance which there 
 is between the opinions which have been 
 adopted by Bishop Butler and Dri Cheyne, 
 
 ) 
 
PREFACE. IX 
 
 on this subject, it is observable, that the for- 
 mer of these supposes " the constitution of 
 human, and of all creatures which come 
 under our notice, to be such, as that they are 
 capable of naturally becoming qualified for 
 states of life, for which they were once wholly 
 unqualified; — that the faculties of every spe- 
 cies are made for enlargement, — for acquire- 
 ments of experience, and for habits;" that 
 the end, however, for which matters are thus 
 ordered of Providence, is our future happi- 
 ness, is a notion which runs throughout the 
 whole of the Author's discourse. 
 
 Now, when on the one hand, the Bishop 
 says, " that our improvement in virtue and 
 piety, as the requisite qualification for a 
 future state of happiness and security, is the 
 end (or reason) why we are placed in a state 
 of so much afiliction, hazard, and difliculty;'* 
 and Dr. Cheyne, on the other, says, " that 
 it is by a gradual progress, viz. by, experience, 
 and many appropriate trials, that this quali- 
 fication (and which he had before mentioned) 
 is to be attained," there can scarcely be said 
 to be any difference at all between them. 
 
X PREFACE. 
 
 There is a notion, however, which has been 
 adopted by Dr. Cheyne, which in a peculiar 
 manner distinguishes his system from that of 
 Bishop Butler, and is as follows:— supposing 
 a perfection of moral character to be the 
 end for which we have our being in this 
 world, he considers life to be too short, in 
 the case of any one, for this purpose; and 
 that, in the case of many thousands of men, 
 no moral character at all is acquired ; for in- 
 stance, in the case of infants, dying before 
 they arrive at an age to distinguish between 
 good and evil, and idiots ; his notion accord- 
 ingly is, that all men, as they shall have de- 
 parted this life, will pass through various 
 states ; that their being disposed of, in each 
 new state, will be suitable to their condition 
 as moral beings; that they, in short, who 
 have attained to no moral character in this 
 life, may have this defect supplied in an- 
 other; whilst they who have made advances 
 in goodness, may in another state make 
 still farther advances, and so on, until the 
 purpose for which their passing through these 
 various states shall have been answered, so 
 far as is consistent with the freedom of will 
 in the case of each man; and which pur- 
 pose is, as hath been said, their attaining to 
 
PREFACE. XI 
 
 a perfection of moral character; and when, 
 as he supposes, they will pass into a state 
 that will be permanent, and endure for ever. 
 
 Bishop Butler mentions a notion of this 
 kind, as having obtained with some ancient 
 moralists and poets ; " Reason,'* he says, " did, 
 as well it might, conclude, that it should 
 finally, and upon the whole, be well with 
 the righteous, - and ill with the wicked. But 
 it could not be determined upon any prin- 
 ciple of reason, whether human creatures 
 might not have been appointed to pass through 
 other states of life and being, before distri- 
 butive justice should finally and effectually 
 take place." Where it was that the learned 
 Bishop found these notions of ancient moral- 
 ists and poets mentioned, he does not say; 
 certain however it is, and as since his time it 
 has been found, that the notion of various 
 states to be passed through by men, if not 
 by superior beings, has obtained for many ages 
 back, and still obtains in the Eastern parts 
 of the world, and particularly with the Hin- 
 doos: they do not however suppose, as Dr. 
 Cheyne does, that this passing of men through 
 various states, is in order to their arriving 
 at a state that will be permanent, and endure 
 b2 
 
XU PREFACE. 
 
 for ever; but that men will for ever be pass- 
 ing through various purifying states, and be 
 always approaching in purity to the Deity, 
 but without any possibility of their ever at- 
 taining to his purity and perfection. 
 
 Now, to return to Dr. Cheyne's system, 
 it is observable, that he supposes it to be 
 suitable only to the divine wisdom and good- 
 ness that all men should finally attain to 
 everlasting life; and that it is for this pur- 
 pose that they will pass through the above- 
 mentioned different states. Our author, how- 
 ever, is not the first writer that has adopted 
 the notion of a general redemption, and to 
 which the above notions of his evidently 
 lead, and as in the Second Part of this Dis- 
 course will more fully be shown. On the 
 present occasion, however, I shall observe, 
 that the doctrine of a general redemption 
 was, as I have learnt, first adopted by 
 Origen, and afterwards by some of the la|ter 
 Fathers. The opposition, however, which a 
 doctrine, apparently contradictory to the 
 Scriptures, met with from divines, school- 
 men, and commentators, whenever it was 
 publicly avowed, did not, it seems, deter our 
 author (Dr. Cheyne) from adopting it; the 
 
PREFACE. XUl 
 
 same may be said of Dr. Burnet, and Mr. 
 Wra. Whiston, both of whom published trea- 
 tises in defence of it. The latter of these 
 treatises was so ably replied to by Mr. Matthew 
 Horbery, as that my labour in the same 
 walk might well have been spared, and would 
 accordingly have been so, had I not in the 
 course of my reading met with a tract, the 
 secret purpose of which, as it appeared to 
 me, was to establish the doctrine of a gene- 
 ral redemption, although no such doctrine is 
 mentioned in it. The thoughts contained in 
 this tract were, it seems, communicated to 
 Dr. Gregory, with the expectation, probably, 
 of their being published ; and they are ac- 
 cordingly given in his Letters published in 
 1815. Some mention of these thoughts (so 
 far as they agree with what has been said 
 upon very respectable authority) is made in 
 Section V. of this Discourse ; and what is there 
 said cannot, in my humble opinion, be denied 
 by thy one who shall think seriously on the 
 subject; and neither indeed can any good 
 objection be made to the remaining part of 
 them, except as they shall be considered as 
 the ground on which the doctrine which I 
 have mentioned may be built. As introduc- 
 b3 
 
xiv PREFACE. 
 
 tory, however, to some thoughts of my own on 
 the subject of a general redemption, a tran- 
 script of them from Dr. G.'s book will be 
 given in Section I. of the Second Part of this 
 Discourse. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PART I. 
 SECTION I. 
 
 THAT man was originally neither mortal 
 nor immortal, hut conditionally only either 
 the one or the other. — That besides the im- 
 mortality which he is capable of as a being 
 consisting of a body and a soul united, there 
 is an immortality which he may have that 
 is peculiar to the soul ; for, that the soul 
 has a life as well as the body, a life with 
 which the soul was endowed when it was 
 breathed into the body, and ivhich may be 
 lost without the union of the soul and body 
 being dissolved. — 31ans state And condition 
 shown to have been originally mutable. • , 
 
 SECTION II. 
 
 That as mans natural state and condition were 
 originally mutable, so are his moral state 
 b4 
 
XVI CONTENTS. 
 
 and condition likewise. — That as Adams 
 dyingj or becoming mortal in consequence 
 of his disobedience to God, implies that he 
 ivould have lived and been immortal as he 
 shall be supposed to have been obedient, he 
 ivould have owed life and immortality to 
 himself rather than to God. — That had there 
 not been a life left to man notwithstanding 
 his having been disobedient, he could not 
 have been redeemed; that if all who died in 
 Adam are made alive in Christ, all have a 
 Ife different from that which they derive 
 from Adain ; for, although they will die^ 
 they nevertheless will rise again. — That life 
 and death will be set before every one who is 
 of an age to distinguish between good and 
 evil: it will be different, however, from the 
 life and death which were set before Adam ; 
 for it was temporal life and death that were 
 set before him, but it is eternal life and 
 death that are set before these. — An obser- 
 vation suitable to the nature of this Dis- 
 course. — That the mutability of mans moral 
 or spiritual state and condition, and its tend- 
 ency to a state that will be immutable, has 
 its analogy in nature. 
 
CONTENTS. XV 11 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 Remarks of Dr. Adam Clarke on the muta- 
 bility to which the things of nature are sub- 
 ject; that their renovation is effected by 
 their decay, and their destruction thus pre- 
 vented by their renovation ; that they there- 
 fore have a tendency to a state which will 
 endure for ever ; that we accordingly look 
 for new heavens, and a new earth. — Objec- 
 tions to this account, as being faulty in the 
 detail, although right as to the principle. — 
 T'he system of Aristotle shown to have been 
 adopted by St. Austin, and to be conform^ 
 able to the account which Moses gives of 
 the origin of all things, but which is in- 
 consistent with Dr. Clarke s account. — That 
 the change which arises as we become rege- 
 nerate is analogous to that to which the 
 things of nature are subject, and hath a like 
 tendency to a state which will be immutable, 
 and endure for ever. — That the perfection 
 to which, as regenerate, we are destined to 
 attain, is similar to that to which the things 
 of nature are destined to attain ; and that 
 this perfect state will, with both alike, be 
 necessarily preceded by a state which is im- 
 perfect. A quotation from Mede appro- 
 priate to this subject. 
 
XVlll CONTENTS. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 That the natural perfection in which man ori- 
 ginally came out of the hands of his Maker, 
 is the ground of a moral perfection; that 
 although a perfection of moral character 
 could alone qualify him for any greater 
 happiness than what he could enjoy on earth, 
 his attaining to this perfection would depend 
 on himself, and that it ivas with a view to 
 this that God had originally endued him 
 ivith the graces mentioned in the first sec- 
 tion; that there are reasons, however, why 
 man could not in a state of innocence have 
 aspired to a greater happiness than that of a 
 terrestrial Paradise; that there are divines 
 who deny this, and say that a man, by the 
 assistance of divine grace, might have at- 
 tained to a righteousness the same as that 
 which the regenerate at this time have ; 
 this these divines assert, notwithstanding 
 they admit regeneration supposes man to 
 have fallen from the divine image, and to 
 have recovered it; for they say he might 
 have had faith, continence, and charity, — 
 That to judge of the propriety of these no- 
 tions, it is necessary to know in what the 
 
CONTENTS. XIX 
 
 divine image may properly be said to consist. 
 — Dr. Cheynes notions on this subject stated. 
 — That the natural perfections of mans na- 
 ture might have expanded in a state of in- 
 nocence, but that his moral powers could 
 not. — That as any perfection ivhich comes 
 short of a moral one cannot qualify man for 
 the happiness of a heavenly Paradise, they 
 who with the aforesaid divines shall say that 
 man, in a state of innocence, might have 
 qualified himself for that state, (undeniable 
 as it is that he might have been obedient), 
 will find themselves involved in inextricable 
 difficulties. — A reason given why all such 
 conclusions as we shall draw from Adam's 
 supposed obedience ivill proceed on a false 
 ground; that there may be properties in the 
 divine nature of which we are ignorant. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 That it is supposed by Bishop Brown, that we 
 can know nothing of the nature of angels 
 but by analogy ; i. e. as ive suppose them to 
 be endowed with properties similar to those 
 which ive possess. — That the common notion 
 is, that angels are beings superior in rank 
 to man ; the contrary of this shown to be the 
 
XX CONTENTS. 
 
 case. — That ive learn from Scripture, that 
 Christ took not on him the nature of angels, 
 hut that of man ; that as Christ derived his 
 human nature from his mother, he would 
 not have taken our nature upon him ac- 
 cording to the perfection in which it origi- 
 nally existed. — That as Christ, hy reason of 
 his ascension, became exalted far above an- 
 gels, the human nature would then exist in 
 him according to its greatest excellence. — 
 That by the fall of a part of the angels ive 
 may know them to have been free and in- 
 telligent beings, and capable of the passion 
 of love. — That angels are incapable of any 
 greater happiness than that in which they 
 were first created; that those of them that 
 fell are incapable of being redeemed ; that 
 the 7'everse of this is the case of man, as he 
 fell. — That the intent of this statement of 
 the case of angels is to show the power of 
 contrast; that mention is made of this power 
 in the text of Ecclesiasticus, Good is set 
 against evil, ^c; that in agreement with 
 the rule contained in this text, evil must 
 have existed before good could have existed; 
 and that death rnust have made its entrance 
 into the world, in order that eternal life 
 should exist: the truth of this remark illus- 
 
CONTENTS. XXI 
 
 traled hy the case of Christ; that all true 
 life springs from him. — That a notion has 
 obtained, and has been adopted by three very 
 respectable writers, that a created intelligent 
 being must be lapsible, and, being lapsible, 
 must fall; that as every such intelligent be- 
 ing must have been a free being, the neces- 
 sity of his falling, except as supernaturally 
 upheld in his being, is an apparent contra- 
 diction ; an argument to prove that this 
 necessity of falling is compatible with free- 
 dom. 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 That mans original natural mortality is the 
 ground of a notion ivhich has been adopted 
 by Dr. Kennicott with respect to the tree of 
 life ; and who supposes that this tree, as it 
 should have been eaten of from time to time, 
 zvould have counteracted even that mortality 
 which came by mans having eaten of the tree 
 of knowledge. — That marCs dying in conse- 
 quence of his disobedience was not by reason 
 of any deadly quality of the forbidden fruit, 
 but by reason of sin. — That by the tree of 
 life, those trees are meant which are said to 
 have been for food ; that, therefore, had 
 Adam not been driven out of Paradise, he 
 
XXll CONTENTS. 
 
 might have lived for ever ; that in conse- 
 quence, however, of the curse which God 
 had 'pronounced on the earth, all vegetable 
 food came to he of a deleterious nature; that 
 as this was the only food which Adam had to 
 eat after he had been driven out of Paradise, 
 disease and death were the consequence. — 
 That labour, sorrow, and pain in child-bear- 
 ing, were further consequences of Adams 
 having been driven out of Paradise. — That 
 all this was permitted of God, in order to 
 mans happiness in a future life; ivhich hap- 
 piness he could not be sensible of, but for 
 that contrast which it ivould have had in the 
 misery of the present life. 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 That man, previously to his having fallen, 
 misht have had that virtue which is com- 
 monly considered as constituting moral vir- 
 tue; but that he could not, until after he 
 had fallen, have had that virtue which is 
 properly called moral. — That a temporal 
 good only can be sought by a virtue of the 
 former kind, but that a good ivhich is eternal 
 will necessarily be sought by a virtue of the 
 latter kind. — That, as we have faith, a tern- 
 
CONTENTS. XXlll 
 
 poral good may lawfully he sought hy us, 
 in subservience to a good which is eternal; 
 compared, however, to a good which is eter- 
 nal, tJiat which is of' a temporal nature is 
 no good at all. — Of the origin of that virtue 
 which is properly to be called moral. — That 
 the life which man lives in this world, as well 
 as that ivhich he will live hereafter, he owes 
 to Christ; but whether the latter of these will 
 he a happy or miserable one, will depend on 
 himself — That good and evil are set before 
 us, in like manner as they were originally set 
 before Adam; ivith this difference, that natu- 
 ral good and evil were set before him, but spi- 
 i^itual good and evil before us: the truth 
 hereof shown. — That works of love or cha- 
 rity done in this world can alone qualify us 
 for the happiness of that which is to come. 
 — The case of a late, i. e. of a death-bed 
 repentance, considered; the opinions of a 
 learned divine on this subject; my own 
 as opposed to these. — The nature of charity ; 
 that it consists of a love the reverse of that 
 which was shown by Adam ivhen he trans- 
 gressed; that had he not transgressed, the 
 love of God could not have been shown to- 
 wards us, nor the power of God to bring 
 good out of evil have been shown. — The 
 
XXIV CONTENTS. 
 
 consequence of Adam's choosing evil with 
 respect to us, stated ; a remark of a learn- 
 ed divine on this subject. 
 
 SECTION VIII. 
 
 Malhranche' s notion of the love of God, as 
 distinguishable from the love which is called 
 self-love. — That, unassisted by grace, self- 
 love is necessarily a 'principle from which all 
 our actions will proceed ; and that, in our 
 state of nature, any other love is inconceiv- 
 able by us; and that it is only as we are in 
 a state of grace that it is or can be other- 
 wise. To the contrary of this, some of our 
 English moralists contend, that even as a 
 man shall be in a state of grace, his own 
 happiness will necessarily be at the bottom 
 of all his actions. Mr. Norris and St. 
 Austin, exceptions to this rule ; and who 
 suppose, that even in a state of nature God 
 may be loved with a disinterested love. — 
 That it is to the same purpose contended by 
 a celebrated writer, that benevolence implies 
 disinterestedness, and that the contrary no- 
 tion arises from prejudice. That benevo- 
 lence is not, as this writer supposes, a prin- 
 ciple ingrafted in that nature, according to 
 
CONTENTS. XXV 
 
 which man at present exists ; a proof of this 
 given. — That our nature must be renewed 
 before we can act from a disinterested prin- 
 ciple. — Another observation on this subject 
 by Hooker. — That the criterion of a disin- 
 terested love can be learnt only in the Gospel, 
 and that self-denial is the only true crite- 
 rion ;for that we can make a sacrifice of our- 
 selves only as we believe in a future life, all 
 other proofs of disinterestedness being falla- 
 cious. — Of the virtues which are akin to self- 
 denial, contrasted by what is usually es- 
 teemed as being true virtue, 
 
 SECTION IX. 
 
 That self-denial is not contrary to the dictates 
 of nature. — That the word self implies an 
 individual of the human species ; that Adam, 
 therefore, as he first came out of the hands 
 of his Maker, could have had no self, not 
 even when Eve had been formed; that it 
 would have been otherwise when ft multipli- 
 cation of the species had taken place. — That 
 besides this natural, there may be a moral 
 distinction between men ; that men are one 
 as they do either good or evil, but that a 
 distinction between them arises as they do 
 the things which are either s;ood or evil; 
 
XX^^ CONTENTS. 
 
 for, that every man is conscious to himself 
 that it is he his self that does those things; 
 an identity/ in the case of each man stated, 
 as demonstrated by Bishop Butler. — That a 
 man, acting in his moral capacity, may 
 have a self at one time, different from the 
 self which he before had, — That a man, 
 when he repents of his sins, is not the same 
 man that he was before ; this shown by a 
 learned commentator to be the case. — That 
 remorse of conscience, when a man ivilfully 
 does any evil thing, testifies to him that it 
 was he his self that did it; that when by 
 faith and repentance this evil shall have been 
 done away, he will not be the same man, 
 morally considered, that did it. — That a 
 man who has committed any great sin, can- 
 not but remember it during the remainder 
 of his life; but if God will not remember it, 
 and which will be the case as this man shall 
 repent, his own remembering it ivill serve 
 only for his further repenting of it. — That 
 self-denial is of the essence of virtue ; that 
 as we practise virtue, we deny that sinful 
 self which we derive from our parents; that 
 were this corrupt self the only self we had, 
 it would be impossible, because contrary to 
 nature, wilfully to act for its destruction. — 
 
CONTENTS. XXVI 1 
 
 That in consequence of the curse which 
 came upon the earth, the food which Adam 
 would eat ivould have a tendency to destroy 
 rather than nourish his body : that this is the 
 case ichen a man denies himself, as ivell when 
 he eats as when he abstains from eating. — 
 That in consequence of our having been re- 
 deemed, the foundation of a new nature 
 was laid in its; ivhich being the case, every 
 one that denies himself will be acting for the 
 destruction of the old, but for the preserva- 
 tion and growth of the new nature; and thus 
 will be acting in violation of the law of his 
 old nature, but in agreement with that of his 
 new nature. 
 
 SECTION X. 
 
 That goodness is conducive to a happiness 
 ivhich is of this, as well as that which is of 
 another life; that no happiness but that which 
 is of the present life can be sought on any 
 other religious system than that of the Gos- 
 pel. — That St. Paul, in his bidding us to 
 eat and to drink freely, and Solomon in his 
 saying the same thing, had respect to the 
 system of Epicurus. — That the moral prin- 
 ciples of Epicurus are at the bottom of those 
 c2 
 
XXVIU CONTENTS. 
 
 of the rest of the ancient philosophers ; that 
 these, perceiving a general depravity to ob- 
 tain with men, supposed an original integrity 
 to have been departed from, and conceiving 
 true happiness to rise from a virtuous life 
 only, with much benevolence as well as in- 
 genuity composed their different systems of 
 ethics.— That there are men who have had 
 the light of the Gospel, and who profess to 
 believe therein, but who, on the subject of the 
 aforesaid depravity, deny that it originates 
 in any sinfulness, or evil inclination, which 
 men derive from Adam, but in the free de- 
 termination of their own wills. — They far- 
 ther say, that God, foreseeing this depravity, 
 had provided a remedy against this evil : and 
 that a man, not supernaturally begotten, but 
 created and born of Mary, and supernatu- 
 rally enlightened, should teach a purer mo- 
 rality than what men, without any other 
 light than that of nature, could do ; and 
 that, to enforce his doctrines, he had the 
 power given him of working miracles. — 
 They farther say, that as a man shall 
 have sinned wilfully, and shall have re- 
 pented, God in his mercy will forgive 
 him ; and they accordingly deny any satis- 
 faction for sin to have been made. — For the 
 
CONTENTS. XXIX 
 
 establishment of the doctrine of original 
 sin, which these men deny, it is contended, 
 that if the sinfulness of each man originate 
 with himself, the death of each man, contra- 
 rily to what the Scriptures say, will originate 
 with himself; that if infants, who are inca- 
 pable of sinning, die, their dying will have 
 no preternatural cause; that these infants 
 therefore will be punished without their 
 having done any thing to deserve it. — The 
 justice of God in this respect, vindicated: 
 for that Christ was punished; that in con- 
 sequence thereof he was free to sJmw mercy, 
 and to forgive men their sins, as they should 
 in sincerity repent. — 2'hat this is a denial of 
 the doctrine of atonement ; a farther argu- 
 ment to show this. 
 
 SECTION XI. 
 
 That although the purpose of the Gospel is to 
 show us the way in which we fire to walk 
 as we would attain to everlasting life, it 
 nevertheless has not left us in the dark as to 
 the possibility of that life being attained to 
 by those who have no other light than that 
 of nature to direct them: that Cornelius is 
 an example of the truth of this remark; 
 c3 
 
XXX CONTENTS. 
 
 for that Cornelius, although a heathen, had 
 a righteousness by reason of ivhich he ivas 
 accepted of God, St. Peter, to luhom this 
 revelation was made, testifies. — That, ac- 
 cording to a learned Commentator, who ac- 
 knowledges this truth, rnore is required of 
 those for their salvation who have the light 
 of the Gospel, than of those ivho have only 
 the light of nature: a reason given ivhy 
 this notion is not a just one, notwithstand- 
 ing the seeming repugnance ivhich' it has 
 to what has been said in a former section. — 
 That when the covenant which God made 
 ivith the Israelites had been broken, God said, 
 " I will put my laws into their mind, and write 
 them in their hearts:" that this new covenant 
 was not confined to the Jews ; but, on. the 
 supposition of all men liaving God^s laws 
 ivritten in their hearts, all are free to per- 
 form this covenant. — That St. Paul accord- 
 ingly says of the heathens, that they (i. e, 
 some of them) do the things contained in 
 the law, and that this shows the law to 
 have been written in their hearts. — That the 
 truth of God's existence was at all times to 
 be known by men who had no other light than 
 that of nature, is testified by St. Paul. — 
 That God's laws may have been written in 
 
CONTENTS. XXXI 
 
 the hearts of those ivho have the light of the 
 Gospel; that it may not however he for any 
 eternal purpose that this will have been the 
 case; that our praying that God ivould 
 wiite his laws in our hearts, is a proof there- 
 of: for that we pray for is, that it may be 
 for an eternal purpose that these laws are 
 written in our hearts ; and from whence it 
 is evident, that it may be for a temporal pur- 
 pose only that they are so written. — That 
 although they ivho having had no other light 
 than that rf nature to direct them, will, as 
 they shall have been obedient to this light, 
 necessarily have sought a good which is of 
 this world; being ignorant, nevertheless, of 
 any greater good ; it may he presumed, that, 
 had a good which is of another ivorld been 
 revealed to them, they would have sought it, 
 in preference to that which is of this world. 
 Bishop Sherlock's notions on this subject. — 
 That it is probable that many who were con- 
 verted by the preaching of the Apostles, had 
 been men of good lives, and therefore in a 
 state of salvation ; that had these refused to 
 believe, they would no longer have been in a 
 state of salvation.— That had they who be- 
 lieved died before they were baptized, and 
 who therefore ivould not have been regene- 
 c4 
 
XXXll CONTENTS. 
 
 rate; that the faith of these nevertheless 
 would have saved them. 
 
 SECTION XII. 
 
 That no such perfection as might qualify men 
 for future happiness could have been at- 
 tained to under the Jewish dispensation. — 
 That a happiness may arise from the practice 
 of moral virtue, which will be greater than 
 any which can arise from setisual gratifica- 
 tions; that these, however, are at the bottom 
 of any virtue which the light of nature is 
 equal to. — That to suppose happiness to be 
 the end for which true moral virtue is prac- 
 tised, would reduce it to the standard of that 
 virtue which proceeds from the light of 
 nature. — That the exaltation of our nature 
 to its greatest capacity, is the real end for 
 which true moral virtue is practised. — Bishop 
 Horsleys notions with respect to moral vir- 
 tue shown to be erroneous. — That if mxyral 
 virtue might be practised in a future state 
 on any principle, that state, like this, would 
 be an imperfect one. — That the disposition of 
 mind which arises from the practice of virtue 
 in this life, may remain in a future life; 
 but that the nature of moral virtue ivill not 
 admit of its being practised in a future life. — 
 That the Authors notion of the capacity of 
 
CONTENTS. XXXlll 
 
 the mind being boundless, is not objection- 
 able; nor as to that of the mm^al capacity, 
 as the principle shall be considered in which 
 moral virtue originates ; and that this notion 
 has been adopted by Mr. Norris, ivho sup- 
 poses every man to have a principle of love 
 implanted in him, whereby he continually as- 
 pires to something more excellent than him- 
 self, with a design to perfect his being. — 
 That his love as to particular objects may 
 increase or decrease according to their excel- 
 lences; but that, upon the whole, it tvill be 
 the same with respect to these. — That love 
 must needs have an object, and that if this 
 object be not a satisfying one, it will be a tor- 
 ment; that God therefore can alone be its 
 proper object; that to be a satisfying object, 
 however, we must love him with all our heart, 
 and with all our soul. — That such an entire 
 dedication of our affections to God is not 
 possible in this life; that we may neverthe- 
 less arrive to many degrees of it. — That no- 
 tions similar to these, have been expressed 
 by St. Austin, an example of which is given 
 by an extract from his works. — That these 
 two writers concur in obviating the objections 
 ivhich have been made to Bishop Horsleys 
 notions. — That Dr. Cheyne, in his " Phi- 
 
XXXI V CONTENTS. 
 
 losophical Principles of Religion,''' has ex- 
 pressed sentiments similar to those of Mr. 
 Norris : he says, that there is in all intel- 
 ligent beings a restless desire of happiness ; 
 that as the supreme hifinite Being is the ob- 
 ject, the happiness, as this desire shall be 
 satisfied, will be infinite. — That there are 
 observations in this work of Dr. Cheynes 
 Wihich confirm the moral notions expressed in 
 former sections of the present Discourse ; he 
 supposes that there is a principle of action 
 in all intelligent beings, analogous to that 
 of attraction in material bodies : in agree- 
 ment herewith, God, by the discoveries which 
 he makes of his attributes, may be said to 
 draw all men to himself; and that their 
 seeking him as their chief good is necessary, 
 and independent on their will: for that they 
 seek him, even when they err as to their 
 object. — The author supposes the aforesaid 
 beings to have an ardent desire of r-e-union 
 with God; and that Christian charity is 
 peculiarly calculated to promote this end. — 
 Of the end for which the author supposes 
 rewards and punishments are established 
 under the Gospel dispensation; that in a 
 fallen state, this is necessary : for that it is 
 by degrees that men must rise to a state of 
 
CONTENTS. XXXV 
 
 perfection. — For the refutation of these no- 
 tions it is observed, that a reward, considered 
 in itself, consists in some pleasure ivhich 
 cannot be expected in future, but as it will 
 be anticipated, and be felt at present. — 
 This shown to be the case when we pray to 
 God for any blessing ; that as we pray in 
 faith, the happiness which ive conceive will 
 arise front our prayer being granted, will be 
 anticipated, and in some measure be ex- 
 perienced, at the present time. — That prayer 
 to God is another instance of this notion: 
 for that the pleasure which ice receive 
 as ive pray in faith will be an anticipation 
 of that happhiess which we expect to arise 
 from the thing ivkich we pray for. — That 
 this is the case as we do good; that the 
 happiness which ive feel as we do good, 
 will be a foretaste of that which we look to 
 as our reward hereafter ; that tlie hajjpiness, 
 however, which we feel will not be any re- 
 ward: for that a reward implies something 
 that is future, and, the happiness which we 
 feel is present. — That the notion above ex- 
 pressed has occurred to the author of '^ the 
 Origin of Evil." — That as the happiness 
 which arises from virtuous actions is a spur 
 to virtue, the strength of the moral capacity 
 
XXXVl CONTENTS. 
 
 will depend cm. that happiness. — That al- 
 though the happiness which in a future life 
 will he experienced, will depend on such 
 virtuous attainments as are made in the 
 present life, the measure of the moral capa- 
 city will not depend thereon. — Of the hap- 
 piness which the saints will enjoy in a state 
 of glory. — Dr. Ad. Clarke's notions on this 
 subject; that in contradiction to what he 
 supposes, grace is given to make men good, 
 and not to make them wise. — That the de- 
 gree of happiness hereafter, will be in pro- 
 portion to the good which men will have 
 done in this life; and as some will have done 
 more good than others, the happiness of some 
 in their glorified state, ivill be greater than 
 that of others; that the good ivhich some 
 will have done will be as much as there was 
 any possibility of their doing; that although 
 some icill have done less good than others, 
 their future happiness nevertheless will be as 
 great as their capacity will admit of. — That 
 although some saints hereafter will he less 
 happy than others, they nevertheless ivill not 
 know that this is the case: for that if a 
 saint hereafter will be as happy as he can 
 he, it would he a contradiction to say, that 
 he might have a conception of any greater 
 
CONTENTS. XXXVU 
 
 happiness. — That the lowest of the saints 
 ivUl have an eternal tveight of glory, no less 
 than the highest. 
 
 PART II. 
 
 SECTION I. 
 
 Thoughts on the notion of a general redemption. 
 
 SECTION II. 
 On motion. 
 
 SECTION III. 
 
 The notion of vaiious states through which, 
 according to Dr. Cheyne, angels, as well as 
 men, will pass, previously to their arriving 
 at a state which will he permanent, and 
 endure for ever, explained. 
 
 SECTION IV. 
 
 That brute creatures, as making a part of a 
 cone which has vegetative life for its basis, 
 
XXXVlll CONTENTS. 
 
 and the highest created intelligences for its 
 vertex, are, according to Dr. Cheyne, capable 
 of a progressive procedure to perfection 
 and happiness. 
 
 SECTION V. 
 
 Farther thoughts on brutes. 
 
 SECTION VI. 
 
 On the same subject. 
 
 SECTION VII. 
 
 On the same subject. 
 
 SECTION VIII. 
 
 On the doctrine of analogy. 
 
 SECTION IX. 
 
 On the body, soul, and spirit, as these three 
 principles in the human constitution are 
 spoken of in 1 Thess. v. 3. 
 
CONTENTS. XXXIX 
 
 SECTION X. 
 
 The drffer-ence between men in respect of men- 
 tal cupaciti/, accounted for on philosophical 
 principles ; to which are added some remarks 
 on the doctrine of emanations. 
 
 SECTION XI. 
 
 On the will. 
 
 SECTION XII. 
 
 On the Millennium. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 TWO DISCOURSES: 
 
 /. On the Doctrine of the Holy Trinity, 
 II. On the Doctrine of Christ's Divinity. 
 
SECTION i 
 
 That man was originally neither mortal nor 
 immortal absolutely, but conditionally only 
 the one, or the other, is an opinion which 
 has not only obtained with some of the an- 
 cient Fathers, but has, in later times, been 
 adopted by some of the most learned of our 
 Divines; and of the number of these is Dr. 
 Kennicott, who, in one of his two celebrated 
 Dissertations, argues as follows: — '' Adam 
 was created either absolutely immortal, abso- 
 lutely mortal, or conditionally immortal. If 
 he was created absolutely immortal, he could 
 not have died; but die he did. If he was 
 created absolutely mortal, he could not but 
 die; and therefore was not a candidate for 
 immortality*." To the same purpose Bishop 
 Bull, speaking of the command which God 
 gave unto Adam, with respect to the tree of 
 the knowledge of good and evil, says, " God 
 promised life, as Adam should abstain from 
 
 ♦ Dissertation oii tlie Tree ol Life, p. 11. 
 B 
 
2 [part I. 
 
 eating of that tree ; but t hreatened death, as 
 he should eat thereof*." Now, as these words 
 of this Prelate imply a possibility only of 
 Adam's either living or dying, he must have 
 thought, with Dr. Kennicott, that Adam ori- 
 ginally was neither mortal nor immortal abso- 
 lutely, but conditionally only either the one 
 or the other: and he accordingly supposes 
 the aforesaid command to have had the na- 
 ture of the covenant between God and man. 
 In farther and more direct proof, however, 
 that this was the opinion of the learned Bi- 
 shop, he, in a farther part of this Discourse 
 of his, produces various testimonies of its 
 having been adopted by several of the ancient 
 Fathers, and in particular by Theophilus, 
 who writes as follows: — " God made Adam 
 neither immortal nor mortal, but capable of 
 either state : " it thus (by the bye) appears, 
 that this notion which I have stated, and 
 which has been adopted by these two very 
 respectable writers, was not new when either 
 of them wrote. 
 
 There is an immortality, however, which 
 man had when God first made him, which is 
 
 * Bull's Serra. vol. iii. p. 1097. 
 
SECT. I.] *i 
 
 different and distinct from tli;it which 1 have 
 above mentioned: for the immortality which I 
 have mentioned, is an immortality whicli was 
 set before man wtien God gave him tlie com- 
 mand with respect to the tree of knowledge ; 
 an immortality, therefore, which, as I have 
 said, it was then possible only for him to 
 have, and thai, as a being consisting of a 
 body and a soul united; whereas the immor- 
 tality of which I am now speaking, is an im- 
 mortality that is proper to the soul: " for the 
 body wherein man was first made (as St. Aus- 
 tin observes) was not made immortal ; but yet 
 it was made so as that it should not have died, 
 unless man had offended *." Now, although 
 the soul, by reason of its natural immor- 
 tality, cannot die, as the body may, it has a 
 life, nevertheless, which it may lose, and so 
 be, in the sight of God, dead; and if all men 
 will have sinned in Adam, all men will 
 come into the world destitute of this life 
 of the soul; and this life is nleant by that 
 immortalizing spirlFj whioH^ihan biiL-n ihou- 
 ^vhicii ^ishop Bull, anc 
 
 with whicii ^ishop Bull, and 
 others, suppose man to have been originally 
 endowed, which he lost when he sinned, and 
 which he recovers, as he has faitli in Christ. 
 
 ' CiU ot Cod, IJ. Xm. i-.. wiv. p Ada. 
 
4 [part I. 
 
 It is in agreement witU these notions, that 
 5t ii as very properly been observed by a 
 learned divine, that " the good only, in whom 
 the spiritual life was never extinguished, are 
 to be called, in the truest and highest sense, 
 the living, and most properly styled immortals, 
 as the second death has no power over them*." 
 
 To return, however, to the opinions which 
 have been adopted by Bishop Bull, and others, 
 with respect to man's original state and con- 
 dition, it is farther observable, that they 
 suppose, that " although man, as he came 
 out of the hands of his Maker, was furnished 
 with powers by the exercise of which the pur- 
 poses of an earthly life might have been an- 
 swered ; that nevertheless being designed ft)r a 
 heavenly life, it would be necessary, in order 
 to his attainment to that life, that he should 
 be furnished with powers which, as these like- 
 wise should be exercised for tlie purpose for 
 which they were given, would qualify him for 
 that life: for that man's powers, and fa- 
 culties, even as they were before the fall 
 entire, were not sufficient, or able of them- 
 selves to reach such a supernatural end-|-.' 
 
 * Hodges's Elihu, n. *, 304. 
 
 t See Bull's Serm. vol. iii. Disc. v. p. 1120. 
 
SECT. I.] .** 
 
 They accordingly suppose, " that when God 
 breathed into man the breath of life, he at 
 the same time, and with a view to the coeles- 
 tial life for which lie intended him, endowed 
 him, not only with supernatural gifts and 
 graces, but with a divine Spirit, by means of 
 which his mind might be raised to heaven, 
 and he might aspire to the happiness of a 
 heavenly life *." They farther say, " that when 
 Adam brake the first covenant which God en- 
 tered into with him, and which was the case 
 when he disobeyed the command which God 
 gave him with respect to the tree of know- 
 ledge, God, by the mercy of the second co- 
 venant which he established in Christ the 
 Mediator, restored to him the divine Spirit 
 which he had lost by the breach of the first 
 covenant, and for the same purpose as that for 
 which he had originally endowed him with 
 it-}-." These divines must accordingly (i. e. 
 
 * See Bull's Serm. vol. iii. Disc. v. p. 1120. 
 
 t Ibid. p. 1100. This notion has been adopted by Arch- 
 bishop King. See his Origin of Evil, vol. i. p. 169. What 
 in our text has been said with respect to a divine Spirit, 
 >vith which Bishop Bull, adopting the opinion of some of 
 the ancient Fathers, supposes man to have been endowed 
 when God breathed into his nostrils the breath of life, 
 has in fact been said by a celebrated Commentator of the 
 present day (Dr. Adam Clarke) in a note on the following 
 B 3 . 
 
f> I PART 1. 
 
 as tliey should speak coiisisteutiy) be sup- 
 posed to say, that the gifts and graces which 
 
 text of Job, There is a spirit in man, and the inspiration of 
 the Almightij giveth them under standing, chap, xxxii. ver, 8. 
 Our author takes no nolice of what the above divines have 
 said on this subject; he nevertheless differs from them only 
 in respect of the terms in which he has expressed his own 
 notions, and as in the sequel of tliis note will appear. In a 
 former note, our author had observed, that, " by the breath of 
 lives (according to the Hebrew version) which God is by Moses 
 said to have breathed into man's nostrils, that principle is 
 meant from wliich animal and spiritual life proceeds" (chap, 
 xxvii. ver. 3). In the present note he repeats this, and says of 
 this Spirit, that " in man it is the fountain of his animal ex- 
 istence ; and that by the afflatus of this Spirit, they (i. e. as I 
 suppose, Adam and Eve) became capable of understanding 
 and reason, and, consequently, discerning divine truth." 
 Having premised thus much, he says, that, " when man fell 
 from God, the Spirit of God Avas grieved, and departed from 
 him ; but was restored as the Enlightener, Corrector, in virtue 
 of the proposed incarnation and atonement of our Lord Jesus : 
 hence He is the true light that lightetli every man that 
 cometh into the world. That afflatus is, therefore, still con- 
 tinued to man in his wretched fallen state ; and it is by that 
 Spirit that we have any conscience, knowledge of good and 
 evil, judgment of divine things, and, in a word, capability of 
 being saved; and when, through the light of that Spirit con- 
 vincing us of sin, righteousness, and judgment, the sinner 
 turns to God through Christ, and finds redemption in his 
 blood, the remission of sins; then it is the office of the same 
 Spirit to give him the understanding of the great work that 
 has been done in and for him : for the Spirit of God beareth 
 witness with his spirit that he is a child of God. It is the 
 same Spirit which sanctifies, the same that seals, and the 
 ^arae that live;, and works in the believer, guiding him by its 
 
SECT. I. I / 
 
 were bestowed on the Apostles, and which in 
 all ages of the chinch have been bestowed on 
 believers, are the same in kind, as those with 
 M'hich Adam, as they say, was endowed. 
 
 Now, if God restored this divine Spirit 
 whicii Adam had lost by his breach of the 
 first covenant, it could only have been as he 
 (Adam) was under the second covenant, that 
 this could have been the case ; and as Adam 
 shall be supposed not only to have understood 
 the prophecy which was contained under the 
 words which God spake unto Eve, namely, 
 that her seed should bruise the serpent's head, 
 but to have believed in the truth thereof 
 (both which are by divines supposed to have 
 been the case), he would have been under the 
 second covenant, notwithstanding that this 
 covenant supposes Christ to have died, and to 
 have risen again, and his dying, and rising 
 again, were posterior to the time of Adam. 
 
 counsel, till it leads him to glory." Now, whatever com- 
 mendation may be due to the learned commentator for this 
 account, I nevertheless say it is so little different from that 
 which is given in our text, as that he may well be supposed 
 to have drawn from the same source as I have; and as, by 
 comparing these (allowing for the different terms, or words, 
 in which these notions are expressed by these writers respec- 
 tively), will, as I conceive, be evident. 
 
 b4 
 
 N 
 
H [PAKT T 
 
 To I'etiini to my .subject, I say, that when 
 Theophiliis says of luau that he was origin- 
 ally neither mortal, nor immortal, bnt ca- 
 pable of either state; and Dr. Kennicott to 
 the same purpose, that he was neither mortal 
 nor immortal absohitely, but conditionally 
 only either the one or the other; they must 
 suppose his state and condition to be such 
 as it was when God had given him the com- 
 mand with respect to the tree of the know- 
 ledge of good and evil ; and when, as the 
 son of Sirach says, he was left in the hands of 
 his own counsel*: for man as. he came out of 
 the hands of God, was, no doubt, naturally 
 mortal. " God (as Bishop King-j- has ob- 
 served) can preserve man from actual death;" 
 and this (as in a former part of this section has 
 been supposed) he did in the case of Adam, 
 by endowing him with a divine Spirit ; and by 
 virtue of which he would, so long as he 
 should have preserved it, have been immor- 
 tal ; " but (as the above writer adds) that a 
 machine consisting of heterogeneous parts, 
 such as the human body is, should not be 
 naturally mortal, is impossible J." 
 
 • * Eccles. XV. 14. 
 
 t See King's Origin of Evil, vol. i. p. 169. 
 t This notion of man's natural mortality i.s not only in agree- 
 ment with, but ronhrms tliat of man's having originally been 
 
SECT. 1.] 9 
 
 It remains only tor mc to iiiiike some such 
 observations on what has now been said, as 
 are suitable to the subject of this discourse; 
 I accordingly say, that aiau s stale and con- 
 dition will evidently have been mutable from 
 the time that there was any possibility of his 
 acting- from that freedom of will with which 
 
 endowed with a divine and immortalizinjj spirit; and which, 
 so long as he should have kept it, would have preserved liini 
 from death. When St. Paul then says, iy mayi (i. e. by the 
 sin of man) came death, we are not to suppose the Apostle to 
 mean that death could only have come by sin: for so would 
 not man have been originally mortal. The death which came 
 by sin, was, and continues to be, the punishment of sin ; if 
 man then might have died, and death not have been felt as a 
 punishment, it might, and in agreement with the above no- 
 tion, would have come, though man had not sinned. Now, 
 all living creatures have a natural desire to preserve their 
 lives; brute creatures have this desire, no less than men; 
 seeing, however, the death of the body in the case of man, 
 arises from the sin of his soul, and is, in his case, the punish- 
 ment of sin ; death with brutes, who have no soul, can be no 
 punishment. As death then shall be supposed to have cor^o 
 upon man without his having sinned, his case would have 
 been like that of brutes ; i. e. death with hiip would not have 
 been a punishment, any more than it is with brutes. In con- 
 sequence, however, of man's being an intelligent being, he may 
 have, and in his present stalt-v ..aturally has, a dread of death: 
 as man then shall be supposed to have died gradually by de- 
 cay, and without pain (and which, as I suppose, would have 
 been the case had he been left to his natural mortality), he 
 would, as I likewise suppose, have died without any appre- 
 hension, or fear of death, and as is the case with brutes. 
 
in [parti. 
 
 God held endowed him, and whicli was when 
 the command was given him with respect to 
 the tree of the knowledge of good and evil: 
 for, when good and evil were set before him, 
 life and death would have been set before 
 him, and he would have been under the ne- 
 cessity of choosing either the one or the 
 other. As he shall be supposed to have 
 chosen death (and which he really did), from 
 his having been neither absolutely mortal, nor 
 immortal, but capable nevertheless of either 
 state, he would have become mortal, and he 
 would surely die ; his state and condition in 
 consequence of his having chosen death, 
 would, of course, have become immutable ; 
 for, having chosen death, the freedom of his 
 will would be at an end; and although he 
 might continue to live, he nevertheless, as 
 well as his posterity, would be dying daily, 
 so long as he, or they, continued to be inha- 
 bitants of this earth. 
 
SECTION II 
 
 Having in the preceding section, by an ar- 
 gument grounded on the freedom of the hu- 
 man will, shown that the mutability of man's 
 natural state and condition hath a tendency 
 to a state which will be immutable, and en- 
 dure for ever ; I propose, in the present sec- 
 tion, by an argument likewise grounded on 
 the freedom of the will, to show that this 
 rule will likewise hold good, as man shall 
 be considered in his moral capacity; and for 
 ^his purpose I observe as follows: — 
 
 As death was threatened in case of Adam's 
 disobedience to the command which God 
 had given him, with respect to 'the tree of 
 the knowledge of good and evil, life would 
 virtually have been promised him in case of 
 his obedience; the life, then, which was pro- 
 mised in case of his obedience, would be a 
 life, which, although he would have owed it 
 ultimately to Him who is the fountain of life. 
 
1*2 [part 1. 
 
 he, iievertlieless, would immediately owe to 
 himself : for otherwise he would not be re- 
 sponsible for those actions on which spiritual 
 life or death depend. 
 
 Seeing, however, man could not have 
 known evil (i. e. death) to have been of his 
 own free choice, had there not been a life 
 which might, consistently with God's threat- 
 enings, be left to him; I suppose it to 
 have been with a view to this life, thcit the 
 words by which this threatening is expressed 
 are, in the Hebrew, dying thou shalt die, i. e. 
 thou shalt be subject to all those evils which 
 lead to, and which end in death. I scarce 
 need to add, that the life with which every 
 one now comes, or ever has, or ever will come 
 into the world, is the same life in kind, as 
 that which, as I have said, was left to Adam 
 when he had sinned. 
 
 Now it is evident, that had there not been 
 a life remaining to man, which would be con- 
 sistent with the death which God had threat- 
 ened, and which man, by his disobedience, 
 had incurred, he could not have been re- 
 deemed. I accordingly suppose it to have 
 been as God foresaw that man would sin. 
 
SECT. II. J i:i 
 
 that Christ is in Scripture said to be the Lamb 
 slain from the foundation of the world*. 
 Adam, it is true, could not, after he had 
 sinned, have had any notion of a Redeemer 
 (and, before, he would not have stood in 
 need of one) until it had been told Eve, that 
 her seed would bruise the serpent's head; if 
 Christ, however, was the Lamb slain (in the 
 sight of God) from the foundation of the 
 world, the virtue of this sacrifice would, as I 
 conceive, have taken place from the moment 
 of Adam's sinning. But if so, it will have 
 taken place in the case of every man that 
 Cometh into the world, for every man that 
 Cometh into the world will have sinned in 
 Adam . 
 
 Now the life which, as I have said, was 
 left to Adam after he had sinned, would, be- 
 cause of the certainty of his dying-, be death 
 rather than life; and such is the life which 
 
 * Rev. xiii. 8. — By the foundation of the world, it is-ob- 
 served by a learned Commentator, the foundation of the 
 Christian world is commonly understood ; he nevertheless 
 adds, " as Jesus Christ was in the divine purpose appointed 
 from the foundation of the world to redeem man by his blood 
 he therefore is, in an eminent sense, the Lamb slain from the 
 foundation of the world, i. e. from the creation." — Ad. Clarke 
 in loc. 
 
14 [part t. 
 
 we have in this world. If all men then, be- 
 cause of their having sinned, will die; all 
 men, nevertheless, because of their having 
 been redeemed, will rise again. Some how- 
 ever, we are told, will rise to everlasting life, 
 and some to everlasting death ; that they 
 who, in this life, shall have done good will 
 be of the number of the former of these ; and 
 they who have done evil, of the number of 
 the latter. 
 
 Now I say, that if they who have done 
 good will rise to the resurrection of life, and 
 they who have done evil to the resurrection of 
 death, moral good and evil will in this life 
 have been set before every one who shall have 
 attained to an age to distinguish between 
 these, in like manner as natural good and 
 evil were set before Adam. If, then, the free- 
 dom of will with which man was originally 
 endowed, and in consequence of which good 
 and evil were set before him, was at an end 
 when he chose evil, and dying he would, or 
 might, in his posterity, have died to all eter- 
 nity; nevertheless, having been redeemed, 
 the freedom of his will would have been re- 
 stored ; and as it would be in vain that any 
 created being should have a fieedom of will, 
 
SECT, ir.] 15 
 
 except as good and evil were set befoie him*; 
 good and evil would be set before every man 
 in the manner which I have mentioned, from 
 a like necessity, if I may so say, that good 
 and evil were set before Adam ; with this 
 difference however, that it is moral good and 
 evil that would be set before every one that 
 now Cometh into the world, and not natural 
 good and evil, as was the case with Adam. 
 
 Now, if (and as in the preceding section 
 I have shown) the state and condition of man 
 were mutable, as natural good and evil were 
 
 * As the attaining to a moral perfection is the purpose for 
 which man hath his abode on this earth, and everlastinpj hap- 
 piness the end of his attaining to this perfection, it is evident 
 that this perfection must be different from that with which he 
 came out of the hands of his Maker : for, as this perfection 
 shall be supposed to be a moral perfection, man could not 
 have been, as he now is, a candidate for heaven, had he come 
 morally perfect out of the hands of God. Man's present im- 
 perfection, it is true, was the consequence of the fall; having 
 however been redeemed, the foundation was laid for that per- 
 fection which I have mentioned, i. e. a mora"! perfection. 
 
 There is an imperfection, however, which not only man, but 
 every created intelligent being, must necessarily have, as com- 
 pared to the perfection of Him that created them : a perfection 
 of which man as well as the most exalted of intelligent beings, 
 must so evidently be incapable, as that I should not on the 
 present occasion have mentioned it, but that it will prepare 
 the way for the use that will be made of it in the secqnd part 
 of this discourse. 
 
16 [part I. 
 
 set before iiiiii; mntahk- likewise will be his 
 state and condition, as moral good and evil 
 shall be set before him : for, in both cases 
 alike, he will be under the necessity of 
 choosing- either the one, or the other ; and 
 as Adam, and, in him, all men became mor- 
 tal, as he chose evil ; so will every one, now 
 that the door of everlasting life has been 
 opened by Christ, be immortal, whether he 
 shall choose good or evil : for the death which 
 the Scriptures mean, when they say that some 
 will rise to the resurrection of death, is spi- 
 ritual, and not natural death. The muta- 
 bility of the condition of man as he in now 
 in a state of grace, may thus be seen to lead 
 to a state which will be immutable, in like 
 manner as was the case, when he was in a 
 state of nature. 
 
 The condition of man, whether considered 
 in his natural or moral capacity, is analogous 
 to that of the things of nature ; for that 
 these are fluctuating, and continually chang- 
 ing, our senses may witness to us. Now, 
 that the mutability of the state of the things 
 of nature hath this further analogy to that 
 of things spiritual, namely, that it hath a 
 tendency to a state which will be immutable. 
 
SKCT. 11. I 17 
 
 lias been remarked by a learned Commenta- 
 tor ; and that they have this tendency is 
 implied by the words of the Psalmist, He 
 (God) hath established them for ever * . That 
 the learned Commentator however has not 
 had a right conception of this matter, will 
 be shown in the following section, where 
 the words by which he has expressed this 
 mutability to which all things are subject, 
 are stated. 
 
 * Ps. cx-lviii. ver, G, 
 
SECTION 111. 
 
 I HE words to which I have, at the con- 
 clusion of the last section, alluded, are as 
 follows : — " Nature herself is subject to mu- 
 tability; though by her secret and inscru- 
 table exertions, she effects her renovation 
 from her decay, and thus change is prevented 
 from terminating in destruction. Yet nature 
 herself is tending, by continual mutations, 
 to a final destruction, or rather to a fixed 
 state, when time, the place, and sphere of 
 mutability, shall be absorbed in eternity. 
 Time and nature are coe^-al ; they began, 
 and must terminate together. All changes 
 are efforts to arrive at destruction, or reno- 
 vation ; and destruction must be the term or 
 bound of all created things, had the Creator 
 not purposed that his works should endure 
 for ever. According to his promise, we look 
 for a new heaven, and a new earth ; a fixed, 
 permanent, and endless state of things ; an 
 everlasting Sabbath to all the works of God*." 
 
 * Ad. Clarke on James, i. 27 
 
SECT. Hi.] 19 
 
 On this I observe, in the first place, that the 
 author supposes, that all things are subject 
 to decay ; and that they are, at the same time, 
 subject to mutation; but which, if mutation 
 be compatible with decay, is a contradiction ; 
 for, when a thing is changed, it exists (accord- 
 ing to the philosophy which I have adopted) 
 under some form different from that under 
 which it before existed ; but which is not the 
 case when a thing decays ; when a thing de- 
 cays, it will be less perfect that it originally 
 was; it nevertheless will be the same thing 
 that it originally was ; but which, as I have 
 said, is not the case when it is changed. In 
 the second place, it is observable, that our 
 author, on the ground of a thing being sub- 
 ject to decay, supposes that there is a reno- 
 vating power in nature ; and, upon the ground 
 of decay having a tendency to destruction, 
 he says, that nature, by her secret exertions, 
 effects her renovation by her decay. Now 
 renovation implies, as change does, a thing 
 to exist under some form different from that 
 under which it before existed ; except, then, by 
 destruction our author be supposed to mean 
 the destruction of some particular form, and 
 which will not be inconsistent with its exist- 
 ing afterwards under some new form, there 
 
20 [part I. 
 
 can be no renovation; renovation may thus 
 be conceived to arise from decay, but cannot 
 with propriety be said to be effected by it. 
 Destruction likewise may be said to arise 
 from decay, as the destruction of form shall 
 be supposed to be meant; there is a necessity, 
 however, of things existing under some form, 
 or they could not endure for ever; but, un- 
 der what form soever a thing exists, decay 
 cannot be said to effect, or be the cause of, 
 that change which it will have undergone. 
 
 Now, when our author, supposing, as he 
 does, all changes to be efforts to arrive at 
 destruction, or renovation, says upon the 
 supposition of the term destruction being 
 synonimous with the term renovation (for he 
 would not otherwise speak intelligibly), that 
 destruction must, or would be the term, or 
 bound of all created things, had not the Cre- 
 ator purposed that all his works should en- 
 dure for ever, he evidently supposes destruc- 
 tion to have a natural tendency to inexist- 
 ence, or annihilation*; and our author is 
 
 * Drew, in his Essay on the Immortality of the human 
 Soul, supposes that annihilation is a thing impossible ; and 
 to show this, he argues as follows: — " Annihilation is not only 
 inconceivable, but utterly impossible ; because annihilation is 
 an exchange of entity for nonentity. And if this nonentity 
 
SECT. in. I 21 
 
 not the first writer who has supposed that 
 all created things have naturally this tend- 
 ency; and would return to their original 
 nothing, were they not continually upheld 
 in tlieir existence by Him who first caused 
 them to exist : a notion wliich, as I conceive. 
 
 cannot be ascertained with as much precision as entity itself, 
 it is impossible to say where the former begins, or where the 
 latter ends. But in supposing this strange point to be ascer- 
 tained, where entity ends, and where nonentity begins, which 
 must be admitted, if annihilation be supposed possible, we 
 give a begiimiug to what we cannot admit to have any kind of 
 possible existence. To suppose a nonentity to have no begin- 
 ning, is to suppose an entity to have no end ; and what has 
 no end, instead of being annihilated, must be immortal. To 
 give a begiiming to a nonentity, is a contradiction, and to 
 deprive it of it, is to make the soul immortal. Annihilation 
 is therefore impossible in the nature of things. To reduce 
 entity to nonentity, is to reduce that which is, to that which 
 is not; it is to make entity and nonentity to meet together, 
 and entity and nonentity can then be extremes no longer. 
 But if the physical distance which is between all natura] 
 existences be done away, entity and nonentity must be the 
 same thing; for that which is separated by notliing, must 
 necessarily be the same; and if that which is, can be the 
 same with that which is not, we are brought to this naked 
 contradiction — that the soul may be annihilated, and not be 
 annihilated at the same time." Another writer observes — 
 " To make a thing to be, is an act of power; but to make it 
 not to be, at one and the same time, would reverse this 
 act. Such conceptions are nonentities, and the supposition 
 of producing them is the supposition that power is no power." 
 — Brown's Essay, p. 193. 
 
 f 3 
 
•22 [part I. 
 
 is completely refuted by the arguments con- 
 tained in the note here referred to. 
 
 To return to my subject, 1 say, that things 
 cannot be changed as to their forms, or 
 modes of existence, but as they will exist, 
 their existence merely being considered; but 
 our author evidently denies this, in his say- 
 ing, as is above stated, that destruction 
 would be the term, &c. And here I shall 
 observe by the way, and in favour of the 
 notions which I have adopted, that as they 
 suppose the everlasting endurance of all 
 things, to have been provided for in their 
 very nature (i. e. in the necessity of their 
 existing under some form), the necessity of 
 their being continually upheld in their exist- 
 ence by the power of God, is superseded; 
 whereas our author, supposing the everlast- 
 ing endurance of things to have originated 
 in the divine purpose, or intention, supposes 
 their everlasting endurance to have origin- 
 ated in arbitrary appointment; consequently, 
 that things originally, might have been of a 
 nature either to endure for ever, or not to 
 endure for ever; but which, upon my sys- 
 tem, is impossible. The system which I 
 have adopted, I scarce need to say, is that 
 of Aristotle, or, as it is commonly railed, 
 
SECT. III.] 2.3 
 
 the Peripatetic philosophy; and which (if it 
 be, and as in a farther part of this section 
 it will be shown to be, in perfect agreement 
 with what the Holy Scriptures teach on this 
 subject) may not improperly be made use of 
 in confirmation, as well as illustration, of 
 the truth of my notions, on the present occa- 
 sion. Now, according to this philosophy, all 
 things consist of matter, form, and privation; 
 i. e. these are the principles of all things. I 
 accordingly say of all earthly things, that 
 whilst, by reason of matter, they will be per- 
 manent and imperishable, by reason of form 
 they will be changeable and perishable ; for, 
 if a thing be changeable, as it may exist un- 
 der some form different from that under 
 which it before existed, that under which it 
 before existed will have perished ; as matter, 
 however, will have constitued the substratum, 
 or support of both these forms alike, matter, 
 as I have said, will be something permanent 
 and imperishable. Now, although matter, 
 as I suppose it to be thus evident, will con- 
 stitute the real essence of things, form How- 
 ever will be necessary in order for our know- 
 ing that they have a real existence; and St. 
 Augustine accordingly says, " As I would 
 imagine a thing, the earth for instance, or the 
 c4 
 
24 [part I. 
 
 materia prima, to be wholly devoid of form, 
 this I cannot do: seeing it is easier to be- 
 lieve that a thing which has not any form 
 exists not at all, than that it is wholly devoid 
 of form*." Such is the philosophy of Ari- 
 stotle; so much of it, at least, as is neces- 
 san' for its showing the truth of my notions, 
 as they stand opposed to those which are 
 contained in the above quotation from Clarke's 
 Commentaries. 
 
 Having supposed of this philosophy, that 
 itis in perfect agreement with what the Scrip- 
 tures teach so far as they relate to the present 
 subject of my discourse, 1 shall in the re- 
 maining part of this section, apply it to a doc- 
 trine which peculiarly distinguishes the reli- 
 gion of Christ from all religions which have 
 been of human invention ; I mean the doc- 
 trine of regeneration. Now, regeneration 
 supposes a man to have ceased to exist accord- 
 ing to an old nature, and to exist according 
 to a new one ; a man, however, cannot (as 
 the Scriptures give us to understand), in this 
 life exist according to a new nature, in other 
 words, be regenerate, but as there will be 
 
 * St. Austin's Confessions. The words xcithout form, as 
 thev occur in the English Bible, in the Sept. rer. are exprew- , 
 ed by the word "fr-S invisibilis 
 
SECT, in.] 25 
 
 something of the old nature remaining in the 
 case of this man ; and, if so, he may fall 
 back into his unregenerate state* : for we are 
 to consider, that faith is the ground of rege- 
 neration ; and I suppose, that no man can in 
 such manner believe, as that his belief, or 
 faith, will not be mingled with unbelief, or 
 a want of faith. I accordingly say, that a 
 believer not only may, but necessarily will be 
 in part regenerate, and in part unregenerate ; 
 his faith will, it is true, have failed, as it shall 
 be supposed that he has knowingly and wil- 
 fully fallen back into his unregenerate state ; 
 seeing, however, he may by faith, and repent- 
 ance, recover, and be restored to his regene- 
 rate state, the faith of this man, it is evident, 
 will not wholly have failed ; but which, how- 
 ever, may be the case with a man, as his foith 
 shall in such manner ha.\e failed, as that his 
 renewal, hi/ repentance, shall have become im~ 
 possible: for, as this man will have tasted the 
 heavenly gift, and have been made a partaker of 
 the Holy Ghost -f-, this, as I suppose, will argue 
 his having become regenerate ; and if his faith 
 will in such manner have failed, as that it 
 
 * See Dr. Waterland's discourse on Reg'eneration. See 
 also Bishop Pearson's Preface to the Sept. ver. of the Old 
 Testament, 8vo. Lond. 1653. 
 
 t Hcb. vi. 4. 
 
^ [part I. 
 
 cannot by repentance be renewed, this will 
 argue his being in a state of unregeneration, 
 and in this state he will necessarily remain ; 
 for, according to the above Scripture, he 
 cannot by repentance be renewed. 
 
 Now it is generally supposed by divines, 
 and as, in the concluding part of the preced- 
 ing section, has been observed, that there is 
 an analogy between things spiritual and 
 things natural; I accordingly suppose the 
 doctrine which I have been considering, and 
 which for this purpose I have endeavoured to 
 explain, that namely of regeneration, as 
 being a very remarkable example of this 
 analogy. Regeneration, as I have said, sup- 
 poses a man to have ceased from an existence 
 according to one nature, or birth, and to 
 exist according to another, and different 
 nature or birth; the nature or birth from 
 which he will have ceased to exist, may pro- 
 perly be said to constitute what St. Paul calls 
 the outivard man, i. e. the earthly nature; 
 and the nature or birth, according to which 
 he will exist, will constitute the inward man, 
 i. e. the spiritual nature. Now, if regenera- 
 tion be, as I have said, by degrees only ; and 
 the Apostle accordingly says of the outward 
 
SECT. III. I 'li 
 
 man, that he is daily perishing, and of the 
 inward man, that he is daily renewing; there 
 will be something in the state and condition 
 of every believer, which will continually be 
 perishing, and something which will continu- 
 ally be renewing; and so says the Apostle, 
 Though our outward man perish, yet the 
 inward man is renewed day by day"". To 
 show, then, the analogy which, as I suppose, 
 there is between things spiritual and things 
 natural, I say of the former of these, that, ac- 
 cording to the philosophy which I have adopt- 
 ed, they are changeable by reason of form ; 
 but, by reason of matter, unchangeable; for, 
 although in the case of things natural, it be 
 as I have said, and as St. Austin has said, by 
 reason of form, that we can know any natural 
 thing to exist; there nevertheless must be a 
 substratum, or something substantial to be the 
 support of form, in order for its having a real 
 existence; and this, as I contend, is in fact 
 said of spiritual things in the above text of 
 the Epistle to the Corinthians. Having sup- 
 posed the things of nature to be changeable, 
 and that they cannot, according to our con- 
 ceptions, exist without form, their mutability 
 
 • 2 Cor. iv. 16. 
 
28 [part 1. 
 
 will be the cause of their continually ceasing 
 from an existence according to one form, and 
 of their being continually existing de novo 
 under some other form; there will there- 
 fore, in their case, be something by reason 
 of which they will be continually renewing, 
 or existing de novo. Now, as by the term 
 decay, which the learned Commentator in 
 the above extract makes use of, we shall 
 suppose a perishing form to be meant; al- 
 though the renovation of things, or their 
 existing under some new form, will not be, 
 as the author supposes, the effect of their 
 decay; it nevertheless will be the sine qud 
 non thereof. 
 
 In farther proof of the analogy, which has 
 been mentioned, and in conclusion of the pre- 
 sent section, I observe as follows: — It will 
 appear from what has above been said, that 
 every believer has a two-fold existence ; an 
 existence according to an old and evil nature, 
 and an existence according to a new and good 
 one*; but if (and as hath likewise been sup- 
 
 ♦ " The corrupt nature of Adam still remains, even in the 
 regenerate, and as long as they dwell in this fleshly tabernacle, 
 will ever be at war with the spirit." — Coppleston's Inquiry, 
 &c. p. 163. 
 
sKCT. in. J 29 
 
 posed) he will (except as he shall fall away 
 from his faith) be continually perishing in re- 
 spect of the one of these natures, or modes 
 of existence, and be continually renewing, 
 or reviving, in respect of the other ; it will be 
 evident, that his existence according to both 
 these natures, will be imperfect. But so it is 
 with the things of nature ; they are continu- 
 ally perishing in respect of some old form, 
 but continually existing anew in respect of 
 some other, and different form ; their existence 
 of course, like that of things spiritual, will be 
 an imperfect one. Now, if both these will 
 ever attain to a perfection of existence (and 
 which the Scriptures, in their speaking of a 
 restitution of all things*, give us reason to 
 suppose will be the case), the mutability to 
 which things spiritual, as well as natural, are 
 in this world subject, will have a tendency to 
 that immutability, or everlasting endurance, 
 which they will have hereafter; and if, when 
 that which is perfect is come, that,which is in 
 part (i. e. that which is imperfect) ivill be done 
 aioay; the present imperfection of the exist- 
 ence of things natural as well as spiritual, 
 will have a tendency to a state, or existence, 
 
 • Acts, iii, 21. 
 
30 [part I. 
 
 which will be perfect. And so says Tertul- 
 lian, as quoted by Mede, " Videtur rationi 
 consentaneum, ut corruptio, mutabilitas 
 et peccatum (quibus subjicitur totus mun- 
 dus) aliquando cessarent. Coeli procellse 
 in morem transibunt, elementa aestuantia sol- 
 ventur, terra, et quae in ea sunt opera, exu- 
 rentur ; quasi diceret (Apostolus) mundus 
 (uti in auro fieri videmus) totus igne repurga- 
 bitur, atque ad ultimam suam perfectionem 
 reduceter, quern minor ille mundus, nimi- 
 rum homo, imitatus, a corruptione, itidem 
 et mutatione, liberabitur. Itaque hominis 
 causa (in cujus gratiam major hie mundus 
 creabatur primum) renovatus tandem, faciem 
 induef multo ctim jucundiorem, et pulchri- 
 orem *." 
 
 * Mede's Works, p. 816. 
 
SKCTION IV 
 
 Having in the preceding sections shown 
 that the mutability of man's present moral 
 state and condition has a tendency to a 
 state which will be immutable, I proceed to 
 the consideration of the other branch of the 
 subject of my discourse; and shall endea- 
 vour to show, that although the natural state 
 and condition of man as he came out of the 
 hands of his Maker, was perfect, and might 
 serve as the ground of a moral perfection ; — 
 that this moral perfection nevertheless must 
 necessarily have been preceded by a state im- 
 perfect, morally considered ; for this purpose I 
 observe as follows — 
 
 God made man upright, i. e. perfect as to 
 his moral capacity ; " and whereby," as by a 
 learned Prelate* is observed, " he might ar- 
 
 * Bull's Serm. Dis. v. p. 1098. 
 
32 [part I. 
 
 rive to perfect virtue, and so to that eternal 
 salvation which accompanies it ; " but if so, 
 his attaining to a perfection of moral cha- 
 racter, would evidently depend on himself; 
 and if a moral perfection will qualify man 
 for that happiness for which he was originally 
 intended, his attaining to it will likewise de- 
 pend oii himself ; not, however, but as he shall 
 have made a due use of those divine gifts, or 
 graces, which in my first section have been 
 mentioned, and with which I suppose eveiy 
 regenerate man to be endued. 
 
 Now, the purpose for which man was ori- 
 ginally endowed with these gifts and graces 
 was, according to the befoi-e-mentioned di- 
 vines, his being qualified for a heavenly 
 state; and this, they suppose might have been 
 the case, although he had not been disobedient 
 to the command which God gave him with 
 respect to the tree of knowledge; there are, 
 however, very cogent reasons to be given why 
 this could not have been the case. I agree 
 with these divines in supposing, that Adam's 
 earthly was in order to a heavenly state, in 
 like manner as is the case with us ; seeing, 
 however, without holiness no man can see God^ 
 and the immediate purpose for which we 
 
have our present eartlily abode is, tluit \V(* 
 may attain to this holiness, or righteousness, 
 in order to our being duly qualified for a hea- 
 venly state, so must it have been (as, at least, 
 we would argue from our own case) in the 
 case of Adam. It is accordingly supposed 
 by the learned Prelate, whose thoughts on 
 this subject I had occasion to mention in my 
 first section, " that Adam might have had a 
 righteousness like unto that which arises in 
 the case of the regenerate at this time * :" for 
 what he, as well as other divines suppose is, 
 that man, as he was redeemed by Christ, 
 would have recovered only that righteousness 
 which he lost as he sinned ; and our Author 
 accordingly, and in support of this opinion, 
 cites the words of one of the ancient Fathers, 
 who says, " that Adam, previously to his 
 having sinned, would not have stood in need of 
 the grace of a Saviour; for that the virtues 
 which men, as Christians, have, namely, faith, 
 continence, and charity-, would bave dwelt in 
 him and his posterity-)-." Now, seeing it is 
 by these divines said, " that what man lost 
 in Adam, to wit, the divine image, and si- 
 militude, thdf he receives again in Jesus 
 
 * Bull's Serm. vol. Hi. p. U70. t Ibid. 1155. 
 
 D 
 
34 [part I# 
 
 Christ*;" the having the divine image, will 
 (according to this notion) be one and the 
 same thing as the having faith, continence, 
 and charity. In order, then, to our judging 
 of the orthodoxy of the aforesaid opinions, it 
 will be necessary that we should know in 
 what the divine image may properly be said 
 to consist; and for this purpose I observe 
 as follows: — 
 
 What we call the divine attributes I sup- 
 pose to be meant by St. Paul, by what he 
 calls the invisible things of God, which he 
 says, are clearly seen, being understood by the 
 things that are made. On these words of the 
 Apostle it is observed by a learned Commen- 
 tator as follows: — " The invisible perfections 
 of the Deity are manifested by his visible 
 works, and may be apprehended by what 
 he has made; their immensity showing omni- 
 potence; their vast variety and contrivance, 
 his omniscience; and their adaptation to 
 the most beneficent purposes, his infinite 
 goodness, and philanthropy -f-." It thus ap- 
 pears, that not only the attributes which, in 
 contradistinction to those which are of a 
 
 * Bull's Sermons, vol. iii. p. 1172. 
 t Adam Clarke on Rom. i. 20. 
 
SECT. IV. J 3.) 
 
 moral kind, are by divines called natural, 
 such as power, wisdom, and goodness, obtain 
 in God, but those likewise which are of a 
 moral kind, such as justice, mercy, and 
 truth; and if there are properties, or excel- 
 lencies in man, corresponding to those which 
 we suppose to be in God, man, as possessing 
 these, will be the image of God. It is ac- 
 cordingly, and in agreement with the above 
 notions, observed by Dr. Cheyne, that what- 
 ever natural powers, qualities, or faculties, 
 we find in our own souls, we may safely con- 
 clude there are powers, qualities, or faculties, 
 eminently corresponding, and analogous to 
 them in the divine nature; with the differ- 
 ence that absolute infinitude has to the lowest 
 finite*." 
 
 * Philosophical Conjectures on spiritual Nature, Sect. 33. 
 It is contended by a learned Prelate (Browne on Divine Ana- 
 logy), upon the supposition of our being wholly ignorant of the 
 divine nature, and of there being an impossibilily of our hav- 
 ing any conception, or idea at all of that great Being whom 
 we call God, that our supposing powers or excellencies to 
 reside in him the same in kind as those which reside in us, 
 leads to atheism. The doctrine of analogy has likewise 
 been adopted by Archbishop King, in a Sermon on Predesti- 
 nation annexed to his Origin of Evil ; and it has since been 
 adopted by the ingenious author (Copleston) of an Inquiry into 
 the Doctrine of Necessity and Predestination, p. 88. n. c. 
 
 d2 
 
36 [part I. 
 
 NoWj I have supposed that man's having 
 been made in the image of God, is the ground 
 of a moral perfection to which he may at- 
 tain, and which will qualify him for a hea- 
 venly life. Although, then, his possessing these 
 properties, or qualities, which are called na- 
 tural, would not, in his case, be in vain : for, 
 on the contrary, I suppose them to be the 
 ground of those which are called moral, in 
 like manner as the natural man is the ground 
 of the spiritual man; it nevertheless would 
 evidently have been in vain, for any eternal 
 purpose at least, that man had been made in 
 the image of God, except as a due expansion 
 should be given to those virtues, or excellen- 
 cies, in which, I have supposed that image to 
 consist. 
 
 The properties, or qualities, which, ac- 
 cording to the above distinction, are called 
 natural, such as power and wisdom, might, 
 in the case of Adam, have been, and were 
 called forth into action; and of this the 
 Scriptures aflford us an example, when they 
 tell us, that the Lord God brought unto Adam 
 every beast of thejield, and every fowl of the 
 air, to .see what names Adam would give unto 
 them; and as these names (as by the best 
 
SECT. IV.] 37 
 
 Commentators is supposed) were suitable to 
 the nature of these animals*, this circum- 
 stance would have been a proof of Adam's 
 being endowed with wisdom; and God's 
 having given him dominion, not only over all 
 living creatures, hut over all the earth, may 
 serve to show, that God had endowed him 
 with power -f*. 
 
 Now, as the properties or qualities which 
 are called moral must, in some way or other, 
 have been drawn forth, in order for Adam's 
 knowing that God had endowed him with 
 them, in like manner as he would have known 
 that God had endowed him with those which 
 are called natural ; I say, that, in a state of 
 innocence, no such proof could have been 
 given by Adam, as that he might know that 
 God had endowed him with the former of 
 these, as they shall be supposed to consist of 
 justice, mercy, and truth: for justice implies 
 sin, and consists in the punishment of sins; and 
 
 * See Browne's Essay, vol. ii. p, 140. 
 
 t With respect to Adam's knowledge, it is supposed by a 
 learned divine, " that created, as Adam would have been, 
 with the full vigour of his faculties, he would have received 
 immediately from God the knowledge necessary to his state, 
 and have been directed by him in regard to the right applica- 
 tion of his powers." — Browne, 141. 
 
 d3 
 
3,8 [part I. 
 
 I say the same of mercy: I say that mercy 
 implies sin, and consists in the forgiveness of 
 sins; and if the being true and just in our 
 dealings one toward another, be a right no- 
 tion of truth, truth would have been a virtue, 
 which would have been equally unknown in 
 a state of innocence, as justice and mercy. 
 Had man not fallen, no such virtue as tem- 
 perance could have been exercised: for tem- 
 perance consists in moderating our inordinate 
 desires ; and, in a state of innocence, no in- 
 ordinate desire could have been felt. I say 
 the same of the virtues of forbearance and 
 forgiveness : for these suppose wrongs and in- 
 juries, and no such could have been done in 
 a state of innocence. Lastly I say, that had 
 man not fallen, self-denial, the greatest of all 
 virtues, could not have been exercised: for it 
 consists in the sacrifice of a self, which could 
 not have arisen in a state of innocence. 
 
 For these, as well as for many other rea- 
 sons which might be given, it would not, as 
 I humbly conceive, have been the divine in- 
 tention to have translated man from an 
 earthly to a heavenly Paradise in the manner 
 supposed by the aforesaid divines. The life 
 of a heavenly Paradise, I suppose, as these 
 
SBCT. IV.] 39 
 
 divines do, depended on man's obedience; 
 but not on his obedience to the command 
 which God gave him with respect to the 
 tree of knowledge ; his living the life of an 
 earthly Paradise depended on his obedi- 
 ence to this command: for so much do the 
 words, on the day that thou eat est thereof 
 thou shalt surely die, imply. There was a 
 command, however, which grew out of the 
 breach of this first command, which is posi- 
 tive, and not negative as this first command 
 was, for the terms of this second command 
 were. This do, and thou shalt live: i. e. al- 
 though thou wilt die, yet, dying voluntarily, 
 thou shalt live again, not a life of this, but 
 of another world. 
 
 To return, however, from this digression, 
 I suppose love to be the root from which the 
 moral virtues spring ; and I further suppose 
 it to be, as this passion is a property which 
 was originally interwoven in the nature of 
 man, that he is the image of his Maker. In 
 vain, nevertheless, according to our concep- 
 tions, would this have been the case, if man 
 had not fallen: for, although God might, and 
 did, show his love towards man in his having 
 created him; in comparison, nevertheless, of 
 d4 
 
40 [part I. 
 
 the love whicli he showed towards man in 
 his redeeming* him when he hiid fallen, the 
 love which he showed towards him in his 
 having created him, would have been no 
 love at all. As man's apostacy, however, 
 gave occasion for a love being shown on the 
 part of God, which was the greater in pro- 
 portion as it was undeserved on the part of 
 man; so did the various evils to which men 
 in general became subject by the sin of Adam, 
 give occasion for a love being shown by men, 
 i. e. one towards another, as their various 
 wants and distresses should render them ob- 
 jects of compassion, which would be like unto 
 that which God showed towards men, when, 
 taking compassion oh the deplorable state to 
 which, by the sin of Adam, they were re- 
 duced, he redeemed them. If man then, by 
 his apostacy, fell from that divine image in 
 which he was made, he would, as by such 
 works of charity, as his having fallen would 
 give rise to, he should show himself to be 
 like unto God, not only recover that image 
 which he had lost, but exist in a brighter 
 image than that which he had lost. 
 
 The fall of man has thus, eventually, 
 shown the great power of God of bringing 
 
SECT. IV.] 41 
 
 good out of evil, or converting evil into 
 good; it nevertheless is certain, that man 
 might, like the angels, at the great apostacy 
 of these ccelestial beings, have kept his first 
 estate; i. e. he might have been obedient to 
 the command which God gave him with re- 
 spect to the tree of good and evil. Now, 
 there is no ground in Scripture on which we 
 can with any certainty say what Mould have 
 been the consequence of Adam's obedience; 
 all is uncertainty and conjecture. Adam's 
 state, as it seems to me, could not have been 
 a probationary one, as ours may be, and that 
 for this reason, namely, that it could have 
 been a passive obedience only, and not an 
 active one, that he could have shown ; and if 
 so, his innocence only could have entitled 
 him to a reward ; seeing, however, he could 
 not have been more innocent after an obe- 
 dience of a thousand years, than he would 
 have been after an obedience of a day, an 
 hour, or even a moment, when or how God 
 would have rewarded him (and as the afore- 
 said divines suppose he would), I am wholly 
 at a loss to know. 
 
 The happiness of the angels, who, when 
 a great part of tliem fell, are said to have 
 
42 [part I. 
 
 kept their first estate, would, as we may sup- 
 pose, have been as great as their capacity 
 would admit of; this however could not have 
 been the case with a being whose only re- 
 ward could have been his innocence; and 
 consequently, whose greatest happiness would 
 have consisted in the consciousness of his be- 
 ing innocent; but the capacity of happi- 
 ness in the case of man, would have been 
 greater, as he shall be supposed to have 
 fallen, than it could in the nature of things 
 have been, had he, like a part of the angels, 
 kept his first estate: for man, having fallen, 
 might be redeemed; and being redeemed, a 
 love might spring up in his heart, from 
 whence a happiness might arise which would 
 be greater than angels are capable of; and 
 greater of course than that of which man, 
 as he shall be supposed not to have fallen, 
 would have been capable of. A farther reason 
 however may be given in proof of the truth of 
 this proposition. That the happiness of man 
 was the end for which God made him, I sup- 
 pose to be perfectly consistent with the notion 
 of the glory of God constituting that end. 
 I accordingly farther suppose, that man, 
 when God had made him, and placed him in 
 Paradise, was as happy as his capacity, under 
 
spcT. IV.] 43 
 
 these circumstances, would admit of. Seeing 
 however this happiness would arise from sen- 
 sual enjoyments, it would not be different in 
 kind from that which brutes may be supposed 
 to enjoy. But man, it may be said, being an 
 intelligent, as well as a sensitive cieature, 
 is capable of a happiness which may arise 
 from heavenly contemplations. To this I an- 
 swer, that as these contemplations would ne- 
 cessarily be grounded in sensible perception, 
 for, nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuit 
 in sensu, no happiness could arise from these 
 contemplations, which would not partake of 
 the nature of the things on which they would 
 have been grounded. Now it is supposed by 
 divines, that by virtue of the promise which 
 God made after man had fallen, that the seed 
 of the woman should bruise the head of the 
 serpent, a covenant was made between God 
 and man, different from that which originally 
 subsisted between them, and which the afore- 
 said promise supposes to have been broken. 
 As this shall be supposed, it will be evident, 
 that good and evil are again set before man ; 
 not the good and evil which were originally 
 set before him, and which were a good and 
 evil that are of this world, but a good and 
 evil that are of another world. This being 
 
44 [part f. 
 
 the case, it is farther evident, that the hap- 
 piness which will arise as a man shall choose 
 good, in other words as he shall perform his 
 part in the covenant which he will have en- 
 tered into with God, will be a happiness of 
 which he himself will be the author; as he 
 will likewise be of the misery which will arise 
 as he shall choose evil, i. e. as he shall 
 break the covenant which he will have en- 
 tered into with God. As this happiness how- 
 ever, and this miseiy, will not be of this 
 life, neither the one nor the other can be 
 experienced any otherwise than by anticipa- 
 tion, in this life. Although man then is a 
 being capable of a happiness, in comparison 
 of which that which is of this world is no 
 happiness at all ; and if he is a free being, he 
 cannot be capable of this happiness, but as he 
 will be capable of a misery which will be its 
 proper contrary; I say, that, whatever may 
 be the case with superior created beings, 
 man's having originally been made capable 
 of happiness would have been in vain, except 
 as he himself might be the author of that 
 happiness; this however he could not have 
 enjoyed had he not fallen: for as to the hap- 
 piness which he enjoyed, and which he might 
 for ever have continued to enjoy in Paradise, 
 
SECT. IV.] 45 
 
 I say, that he would not more have owed it 
 to liiiiisell", than a brute owes to itself that 
 happiness which is like unto it. See n. [*] in 
 Sect. IX. 
 
 These, and many more, are the difficulties 
 which arise, as man shall be supposed not to 
 have fallen ; and yet certain it is, as I before 
 observed, that man might not have fallen, in 
 other words, that he might have been obedient 
 to the command which God gave him with 
 respect to the tree of the knowledge of good 
 and evil; the difficulties*, in short, are such 
 as we shall suppose Adam to have been obe- 
 dient, as that it exceeds, as I suppose, the 
 human capacity to solve them. 
 
 I shall conclude this section with an ac- 
 count which is given of this matter by a 
 learned writer, and which account, although 
 it does not solve the difficulty which t have 
 mentioned, is nevertheless as ingenious as it 
 is (to me at least) new. The original possi- 
 bility of man's falling, our author, in agree- 
 ment with the Archbishop, on a part of whose 
 treatise these thoughts of his are given as a 
 
 * See Annotation at the end of this section. 
 E 
 
46 [part I. 
 
 note, attributes to a circumstance which, ac- 
 cording to the order of our conceptions, hath 
 a priority to the freedom of man's will ; i. e. 
 it is attributed to an imperfection which every 
 created being must necessarily have, as he 
 shall be compared with Him who created 
 him. Wlien, however, our author supposes, 
 as he does, that the end for which God per- 
 mitted man to fall was, that he might be duly 
 sensible of good and evil; however true this 
 may be, it nevertheless is not consistent with 
 his having attributed man's falling to the im- 
 perfection of his nature ; for although, by rea- 
 son of this natural imperfection, man might 
 fall, he nevertheless would not, by reason 
 thereof, necessarily fall: for this the freedom 
 of his will would forbid; but, therefore, would 
 his falling, as this shall be supposed to have 
 happened, have been independent on any per- 
 mission on God's part ; and we cannot go far- 
 ther back than man's creation for the origin 
 of this permission, because we can have no 
 idea of any thing that is prior to creation. 
 When, however, our author, after his having 
 supposed the fall of man to have been by the 
 divine permission, and given a reason for it, 
 adds (not literally, but in so many words), 
 that the moral perfections of the Deity could 
 
SECT. IV. I 47 
 
 not have been known by man had he not 
 fallen, I cannot object to this notion, having 
 myself, in a former part of this section, adopt- 
 ed it. For the moral perfections of the Deity 
 could not have been known by man, had 
 not God created him in his own image; and 
 not even then, had not expansion been given 
 to certain properties, or virtues in himself, 
 corresponding with the moral perfections of 
 the Deity; by this expansion, or outgoing, I 
 say, he would know the moral perfections of 
 the Deity, because he would know, that it 
 must be by reason of these, as they existed in 
 himself, if by reason of any thing, that he was 
 the image of God; but in all this, the fall of 
 man is supposed by our author*, as it is 
 likewise by me. 
 
 To the account which I have now detailed 
 are added by our author some thoughts which, 
 although very appropriate to the subject on 
 which he had been treating, cannot, however, 
 with propriety, make a part of our text; I 
 shall, therefore, give it in the note here re- 
 ferred to-f. 
 
 * See King's Origin of Evil, vol. ii. p. 466, n. 85. 
 + " Man is a very imperfect compound being, who, bjr 
 the con.stitution of his nature, seems to be incapable of beinf 
 E 2 
 
48 [part I. 
 
 made traly wise and virtuous, or, which is the same thing, 
 morally happy on a sudden, and must, therefore, receive im- 
 provement gradually; and as he is to complete his good habits 
 by a series of virtuous acts, so it seems proper for him to be 
 trained up by various dispensations, and a series of events 
 adapted to the several faculties of his body and mind, the 
 constituent parts of liis nature, and diflerent sources of his 
 happiness; accordingly we find that the happiness of man in 
 his first estate was chiefly animal, to which an earthly para- 
 dise was exquisitely fitted; a change in this was probably re- 
 quisite to introduce the rational or moral kind (of happiness) 
 into the world, and to make him direct his thoughts to some- 
 thing higher than mere sensitive delights. This, we are told, 
 was the method of the divine Providence with the Jewish na- 
 tion in particular, who had a law of carnal ordinances to ex- 
 ercise them for a while, and lead them on to the expectation 
 of better things ; to spiritualize their notions by degrees, and 
 prepare them for the heavenly doctrines of Messiah, And 
 why might not the like method be made use of in the govern- 
 ment of mankind in general, or even all rational beings ? 
 What if God, willing to make known the greater riches of his 
 glory, suffered our first parents to fall from that condition 
 wherein he created them at first, in order to raise them and 
 their posterity to a much higher state of glory and true happi- 
 ness hereafter? and who can prove that the former was not 
 conducive to the latter? We believe that the bliss of heaven 
 will infinitely exceed the pleasures of a terrestrial Eden; why 
 then should we not suppose that the less might be in some 
 manner useful and introductory to the greater? Why might 
 not a short life in Paradise be as proper a state of probation 
 for the virtues of this present world, as this world is for the 
 glories of another?" This last notion, I confess, is above my 
 oomprehension. 
 
SECT. IV. j 49 
 
 Annotation rrferrcd to in Page 45 of the 
 preceding Section. 
 
 Amongst the many difficulties which, in the text, 
 are said to arise upon the supposition of Adam's obe- 
 dience to the command which God gave him with re- 
 spect to the tree of knowledge, there is one which, 
 as being foreign to the subject of this section, and a 
 difficulty at the same time of no small magnitude, I 
 have thought it proper to mention and consider in the 
 present Annotation. 
 
 It was, no doubt, with a view to the multiplica- 
 tion of the human species, and that the earth might 
 be replenished, i. e. stocked with inhabitants, that 
 God, soon after he had created man, said unto them, 
 Be Jruitful^ and multiply. The question, however, 
 which arises is. Whether Adam, previously to his 
 disobedience to the command which God gave him 
 with respect to the tree of knowledge, and which was 
 after he had given him the command to multiply, 
 could act in obedience to this last-mentioned command, 
 had there been time and opportunity for his so doing? 
 Of this divines in general seem to have had no doubt ; 
 and it is accordingly observed by a diviYie of some 
 note, that " Adam, when God had given him the com- 
 mand with respect to the tree of knowledge, co- 
 venanted not only for himself, but for his offspring ; 
 and which indeed is evident from the circumstance of 
 our mortality ; and as we, in consequence of Adam's 
 breach of this covenant, are mortal, so any such chil- 
 E 3 
 
50 [part i. 
 
 dren as Adam shall be supposed to have had pre- 
 viously to his breaking this covenant (i. e. in a state 
 of innocence), would have been immortal *. But 
 here the great difficulty arises which I have alluded to: 
 for, if these children would have been immortal abso- 
 lutely, and which the learned writer supposes, they coidd 
 not sin; if conditionally so, on what conditions, I ask, 
 would their immortality depend? Not on the same as 
 those on which Adam's immortality depended, for various 
 reasons that might be given. The conditions on which 
 our immortality depends arise from the sin of Adam ; 
 and such abode as we have here on earth, is for the 
 purpose of our performing these conditions, and, by so 
 doing, of our being qualified for heaven ; but no pur- 
 pose that we can conceive could be answered by the 
 innocent children of innocent parents being on earth, 
 and who, being, as I have said, absolutely immortal, 
 would be fit for being inhabitants of heaven. It is 
 not, however, because these or any other difficulties 
 which might be mentioned upon the supposition of 
 Adam's obedience are insurmountable, that I suppose 
 Adam would not have had children, had he continued 
 to be innocent long enough for this purpose ; there 
 are, as I conceive, and shall endeavour to show, 
 physical as well as metaphysical reasons to be given 
 why he could not have had children ; I accordingly 
 observe as follows : 
 
 The command. Be fruitful^ and multiply, I sup- 
 pose it will be gi-anted me, not only supppses, but re- 
 :quire^, a peculiar desire in order fof its being possible 
 
 * Turner's Boyle's Lect. p. 230, 
 
SECT. IV.] 51 
 
 for its being fulfilled : a desire, the impurity of which 
 would, as I suppose, have forbidden its being felt, as 
 man came out of the hands of his Maker; for, if it be 
 an impure desire now, it always would have been so ; 
 and that it is an impure desire, its requiring to be 
 sanctified as is the case now, evidently shows. But 
 if so, with what propriety, it may be asked, could 
 God have given our first parents a command which 
 would require an impure desire in order for its being 
 obeyed? My answer is, that this command was, as I 
 suppose, given with a foresight of Adam's disobedi- 
 ence to the command which was afterwards given with 
 respect to the tree of knowledge, and as a remedy 
 against the extinction of the human species, which 
 would have been the natural consequence of that dis- 
 obedience ; the giving this command therefore, as I 
 contend, could only have been meant to sanctify that 
 desire, when its being felt would not only be possible, 
 but inevitable ; and this desire, as I suppose, requires 
 no other sanctification at the present day. Now, to 
 show that our first parents could not until after they had 
 sinned have felt the desire in question, ofid that after 
 they had sinned they would naturally have felt it, 
 I observe as follows : 
 
 Man, as in a preceding part of this discourse has 
 been supposed, would have died by decay, although 
 he had not sinned; the law, however, which God gave 
 him with respect to the tree of knowledge, made it 
 impossible that any thing but sin should be the cause 
 of death; sin accordingly is the ultimate and moral 
 cause of death, but disease is the immediate and na- 
 
 b4 
 
52 [part 1. 
 
 tural cause. Now disease, as I have likewise on a for- 
 mer occasion supposed, originates in the inflammatory 
 quaUty which all food, in consequence of the curse 
 which the sin of Adam brought upon the earth, has ; 
 and this inflammatory quality of food originates, as I 
 suppose, not only in the disposition to corruption which 
 all flesh has, but, in man, its sinful lusts : sinful be- 
 cause rebelling against the spirit, and incontroUable by 
 reason*. ' The desire of perpetuity," as by a sensible 
 writer is observed, " is common to all living creatures; 
 and into this desire is that of generating sibi simile 
 resolvable; a desire which," as the author farther says, 
 ** revenges itself, as it were, on the law of corruption ; 
 and that immortality which man, as an individual, can- 
 not retain, he procures, by deriving his continual na- 
 ture to a continued off^spring-f-." Having thus proved 
 the truth of my proposition upon natural principles, I 
 proceed to a like proof on moral principles. 
 
 In the first chapter of Genesis we are told, that 
 man was made in the image and likeness of God; and 
 in the fifth chapter we are told that Adam begat Seth 
 in his own likeness. Now, if Seth was begotten in the 
 likeness of Adam, Cain, who was Adam'ti first son, 
 
 * It is not at all inconsistent with this account, that the 
 Egyptian philosophers of old, supposing the fruitfulness which 
 all things are seen to have to be like unto, and to flow from 
 that fruitfulness which God showed when he created all things, 
 say of the love of procreation, that it was given" and permitted 
 in imitation of the divine fruitfulness. See Hermes Trisme- 
 gistus, Book ii. ch, viii. 
 
 + Hales on the Corruptions of Man's Nature, p. 127. 
 
SBCT. IV.] 53 
 
 would likewise have been begotten in the hkeness of 
 Adam. But in what did this likeness consist? It con- 
 sisted, as Adam's likeness to God did, in a moral 
 likeness; and as Adam was like unto God as being 
 righteous, and immortal, until by a free act of his 
 will he became sinful and mortal, any son which Adam 
 shall be supposed to have begotten previously to his 
 having lost the divine image and likeness, would like- 
 wise have been in the divine image and Hkeness, and 
 that by the same rule that Seth and Cain were in the 
 likeness of Adam; i. e. they were sinful, and mortal, 
 as Adam was when he begat them. Now, if it be by a 
 iupematural power only that any man can at this day 
 exist in the divine image and likeness, and which is 
 the case with every one that is regenerated, it evidently 
 is a contradiction to say, that the divine image and 
 likeness might, under any circumstances, have been 
 transmitted by human generation. 
 
SECTION V. 
 
 It is said by the author of Divine Analogy*, 
 that we can have, not only no true idea, but 
 no idea at all, of spiritual beings; we may 
 know upon divine authority that there are 
 such beings, and may accordingly believe it ; 
 we nevertheless, according to our author, can 
 know nothing of the nature of these beings, 
 but by analogy; i. e. as we suppose them to 
 possess certain properties, or excellencies, 
 which have a resemblance to those with 
 which we are endowed. 
 
 Now, exclusively of this analogical way of 
 reasoning, it is commonly supposed (upon 
 the ground that there are such beings as we 
 call angels), that they are superior, in the 
 rank of created beings, to man; to show, 
 however, that this is not so, it is argued by 
 a learned writer as follows; — " The angels 
 we know to be ministering spirits ; but which 
 
 ♦ Bishop Brown^i 
 
SECT, v.] 55 
 
 is inconsistent with the notion which is coni- 
 monly entertained of tlieir havin«^ originally 
 been superior to man; they however may 
 well be so in our present fallen state, who 
 stand in need of some such supernatural as- 
 sistance to keep us in all our ways*." 
 
 • Gregory's Letters, vol. i. p. 238. 
 
 Sir Matthew Hale, on the ground of angels being said in 
 Scripture to be ministering spirits, supposes the will of God 
 to be done, in many things, through the medium of angels. 
 Our author might have given, as an instance of the truth of 
 this observation, the command which God gave to his angels, 
 to keep Christ in all his ways ; as well as that Scripture where 
 we are cautioned not to despise those little ones who believe m 
 Christ : for that i/i heaven their angels do always behold the face 
 of their Father which is in heaven. This text is, by Dr. Adam 
 Clarke, thought to be in favour of the notion of every one 
 having a guardian angel, and he adopts it accordingly ; as to 
 this matter, however, I have my doubts ; but I agree with 
 him when, in a farther part of this amiotation, he says of 
 this text, " that it gives us to understand, that humble- 
 hearted child-like disciples are objects of Christ's peculiar 
 care and attention." 
 
 The author of Transnatural Philosophy, page 330, agrees 
 with Sir M. Hale in supposing many other things beside 
 those which the Scriptures mention as being doq^ through the 
 medium of angels ; but over and above these, he supposes of 
 all motion whatever, " that it is begun and continued at the 
 will of angels, sulyect nevertheless to the divine will:" and 
 this, according to our author, would be the case as the sea 
 ebbs and flows ; although in the Scripture it is said that God 
 Mid to the sea, Thus far shah thou go and no farther. 
 
56 [part I. 
 
 In confirmation of this reasoning, but 
 more particularly, however, for the purpose 
 of establishing an hypothesis which I have 
 adopted, I observe as follows: — 
 
 We are told by the author of the Epistle 
 to the Hebrews, that Christ took not on him 
 the nature of angeU, hut he took on him the 
 seed of Abraham* ; i. e. he took on him the 
 nature of man. In regard, however, Christ 
 derived his human nature from his mother, 
 he would not have taken it upon him accord- 
 ing to the perfection, or excellence, in which 
 it was created ; but according to the imper- 
 fection, or weakness, which had come upon 
 it by the fall. 
 
 Now Christ, as he sliall be supposed after 
 his. having risen from the dead, to have as- 
 cended into heaven, would, by reason of that 
 ascension, have had an exaltation which was 
 equal to his abasement, as he took our cor- 
 rupt nature upon him-}-. But if Christ, by 
 
 * Heb. ii. 16. 
 
 t Christ was the son of Mary, as his body was flesh of 
 her flesh ; but he was the Son of God, as Mary's conceiving 
 him was by the power of the Holy Ghost. In agreement 
 herewith it has been said by Vincentius, that " in Christ 
 
SECT, v.] 57 
 
 reason of his ascension, became exalted far 
 above all principalities and powers, and liis 
 
 there are two substances, the one divine, and the other human ; 
 the one from God the Father, the other from the Virgin 
 mother. As man, he had a complete humanit} , as contain- 
 ing in it both soul and flesh, real flesh of the same kind with 
 ours, derived from his mother." (See Reeve's Apol. p. 300, 
 vol. ii.) The same in substance is said in the Athanasian 
 Creed. Hence I conclude, that the conception which Christ 
 had in the womb of his mother, would have been no other- 
 wise different from common conceptions, than that the one 
 was supernatural, whereas the other was natural. In con- 
 tradiction to this, however, it is contended by a learned 
 commentator, " that the rudiments of Christ's human nature 
 was a real creation in the womb of the Virgin by the energy 
 of the Spirit of God." (Adam Clarke on Luke, i. 35.) Now, 
 the rudiments of Christ's human nature was his body, in like 
 manner as it is with us : for the body exists before the soul 
 does; and this body was supplied by his mother: for he was 
 flesh of her flesh. The seed of a man is by naturalists con- 
 sidered as being of an impregnating nature; and as the womb 
 of the mother is impregnated by this seed being received into 
 it, a mansion for the soul exists in the seed of the woman, 
 which constitutes the body of the child. The child, however, 
 ii not conceived until it has life ; and this life, as naturalists 
 likewise suppose, it owes to the prolific virtue of the seed of 
 the man. Now, in the case of Christ, whose* conception was 
 supernatural, the life would have been received from ■ the 
 Holy Ghost ; and the soul, whenever that was joined to the 
 body, in his case, would have been anew creation. As this 
 account shall be admitted, it will be evident that Christ, in 
 respect of his body, which was supplied by his mother, would 
 have descended from David, and so from Adam, as his mo- 
 ther did ; but which would not have been the case had his 
 human nature been a new creation. 
 
 I here 
 
58 [part I. 
 
 human nature would then exist according 
 to the prefection, or excellence, in which it 
 was created, he would, as respect shall be had 
 to the original perfection or excellence there- 
 of, have been superior to angels; and if he 
 was, in respect of his human nature, con- 
 sidered in its perfection, or excellence, supe- 
 rior to angels, such would man be under like 
 circumstances *. 
 
 Now, we may know something more with 
 respect to angels, than what relates to their 
 rank in the scale of intelligent beings, by 
 our knowing that a considerable part of 
 them fell from their first estate; and as they 
 did not this, but as they might have kept it, 
 we reasonably conclude, that they are not 
 only intelligent, but free beings. From a part 
 of them having fallen, we may know, that 
 
 I here take occasion to observe, that a learned Prelate, 
 who has no doubt at all with respect to Christ's divinity, 
 nevertheless thinks that his miraculous conception does not, 
 in itself, amount to an adequate proof of his divinity, but is 
 fully so of his superhumanity. It serves, he says, as an im- 
 portant link in the chain of argument for the divinity of 
 Christ; for, though it does not itself prove this, it does in 
 connexion with prophecy, by determining the event and ap- 
 plication of certain predictions, and with our Saviour's de- 
 clarations of himself.— Bp. Hodgson on 1 John, iii. 12. p. 12. 
 
 * See Adam Clarke on Heb. ii. ver. 16. 
 
SECT, v.] 59 
 
 they are capable of the passion of love : for, 
 as man's falling- was as he loved himself 
 more -than God, such must have been the 
 case with the angels that fell ; and such 
 might have been the case with those that did 
 not fall; but who, as St. Jude says, kept 
 their first estate. 
 
 Now, it has in a former section been 
 supposed, that man, in consequence of his 
 having fallen, may rise tb' a greater degree 
 of happiness than could have been the case 
 had he not fallen. As this shall be admitted, 
 it will be evident with respect to angels, that 
 they are incapable of any greater happiness 
 than that in which they were created; and 
 this, by the way, may be the reason why 
 those who fell were incapable of being re- 
 deemed; for, were it otherwise, and those 
 that fell had been redeemed, their happiness 
 would have been greater than that of those 
 that kept their first estate. Althcfugh angels 
 then may love God as the author of their 
 being, the love nevertheless of men towards 
 God, will as far exceed that of angels, as 
 redemption is a greater blessing than crea- 
 tion. 
 
60 [part I. 
 
 Upon the supposition of the angels being 
 incapable of being redeemed, the love of which 
 man is capable will, and may for this rea- 
 son, be greater than that of which angels are 
 capable, namely, that it may be in proportion 
 to the goodness which God has shown to 
 man in his having redeemed him, and which 
 is far greater than any which can arise from 
 any other consideration ; and as the happiness 
 which any intelligent being can experience 
 will be in proportion to his love of God, the 
 happiness of which man is capable will be 
 greater than that of which the angels are ca- 
 pable, in proportion as the love of which man 
 is capable, is greater than that of which the 
 angels are capable*. 
 
 * The services which good angels are destined to do us, I 
 suppose to be equally balanced by the dis-service, or barm, 
 which the evil angels are permitted to attempt to do us. (See 
 John, xiii. 2.) The fall of angels may thus be seen to have 
 been providentially intended for the benefit of man; notwith- 
 standing their having been free not to fall, equally as was the 
 case with man ; for, if even the malice of Satan be at any time 
 not for our benefit, the fault will be our own. 
 
 I shall here take occasion to mention some singular notions 
 which, in a late publication, appear to have been adopted by 
 a learned German divine, on the subject of the power of evil 
 angels with respect to men. Satan is in the Scriptures spoken 
 of as being the prince of this world; and as Christ's kingdom 
 was to be built on the ruins of that which Satan had gained, 
 Christ's taking our nature upon him, is accordingly very pro- 
 perly by this writer considered as being for the purpose of 
 
SECT. V."| t>^ 
 
 These tlu)ug;lits wiiicli have occurred to 
 me with respect to angels, are not wholly 
 
 destroying his (Satan's) kingdom. Christ's kingdom, as the 
 origin of it shall be considered, the author supposes to be 
 grounded on that which is mentioned in the Old Testament, 
 and where God is very properly represented as being the sole 
 and rightful governor of all men ; but where he is at the same 
 time considered as more especially governing those who, by 
 reason of their piety, may be said to be united to him. To 
 this kingdom men who exercised themselves in works of piety, 
 without having any mercenary views, were, under the old 
 dispensation, considered as properly belonging ; so, even un- 
 der this dispensation, a power, or kingdom, is supposed to 
 which men of a contrary character, and who by reason of their 
 multitude are called the world, would properly belong ; and 
 as none could reign in this kingdom, but he who is the author 
 of all evil, so, even under the old dispensation, there would 
 be a world of which Satan may properly be said to have been 
 the prince. Now this, the author observes, is exactly the case 
 under the new dispensation; for, under this dispensation there 
 is apeculium, or select people, who have Christ for their king : 
 for, because of their faith, and the purity of their lives, Christ 
 will be their proper head, and they, by baptism, be properly 
 his body. They, on the contrary, whose minds are abhorrent 
 to the laws of Christ's kingdom, will as properly constitute 
 the body of which Satan is the head, as the believers in Christ, 
 as hath been said, constitute the body of which he is the head. 
 The author supposes the kingdom of Christ will in some mea- 
 sure have had an establishment in the hearts of all believers: 
 in regard however there will be a degree of unbelief even in 
 the case of the truest believer, two opposite kingdoms will, of 
 course, obtain in the heart of each believer, the one that of 
 Christ, and the other that of Satan. 
 
 There are various instances in the Scriptures of the power 
 of Satan being visibly exercised over the bodies of m^n, as well 
 F 
 
62 [part I. 
 
 foreign to the subject of this section, which 
 is to show the power of contrast ; and as this 
 
 as invisibly over their minds. The author, however, supposes 
 that Satan has no power at all of this kind, but by God's per- 
 mission (see Reeve's Apol. of Tertullian, ch. ii.) ; and that, 
 although from a malignancy that is natural to this evil spirit, 
 some harm is always meant by him to these; their spiritual 
 good nevertheless is meant by God, as he at any time delivers 
 men into the hands of Satan. The author, however, goes a 
 step farther; he denies that any evil motions are ever stirred 
 up in the minds of men by any power which Satan has ; but 
 that these motions always originate with men themselves ; he 
 mentions Eve as an example of the truth of this observation ; 
 whose eating of the forbidden fruit the author supposes to have 
 been as she was stirred up by her own desires, although it 
 was at the suggestion of Satan under the form of a serpent ; 
 that this likewise was the case with Adam, when, at the sug- 
 gestion of Eve, he likewise ate of the fruit of which God com- 
 manded him that he should not eat : for the same evil spirit 
 which spake in the serpent when Eve transgressed, would have 
 spoken in Eve when Adam transgressed. The lesson which 
 we are taught by the sequel of this story of Adam and Eve, as 
 the author's hypothesis shall be supposed to be true, is, that 
 we know not our own hearts. Eve supposed the serpent to 
 be the cause of her eating of the forbidden fruit, and she ac- 
 cordingly laid the blame thereof on the serpent ; and Adam in 
 like manner supposed Eve to be the cause of his eating, and 
 he accordingly laid the blame thereof on Eve. The author, 
 having observed thus much, addresses himself to the reader 
 and says, " Do not thou, as thou wouldst wash thyself of thy 
 sins, after Eve's example, blacken the devil ; and, by so doing, 
 act injuriously not only to this evil spirit, but to God." (Doe- 
 derlein Opusc. Theol.) 
 
 The dominion by reason of which Satan is, in the Scrip- 
 tures, called the Prince of this world, according to a learned 
 
SBCT. v.] .fi3 
 
 contrast arises from man's being by nature 
 in the scale of intelligent beings, of a rank 
 
 Prelate, originates in purchase; for this he has the authority 
 of St. Paul, who, speaking of himself, says, lam sold under 
 sin. (Rom. vii.) The Apostle, and every man that has sinned 
 as Adam did, will have sold himself to Satan, as Adam 
 did when he renounced the sovereignty of his Maker. — See 
 Bp. Sanderson's 7th Serm. ad Aulam. 
 
 It is supposed by the author, that when Christ was tempted 
 of Satan in the wilderness, Satan did not know who Christ 
 was ; for not having had it revealed to him that the person 
 whom he saw, and whom he addressed, was God under the 
 |prm of a man, he would naturally suppose him to have been a 
 mere man. Knowing, however, that Christ pretended to be 
 the Son of God, he took occasion from hence, not so much as 
 he would know whether he really was the Son of God, as by 
 way of ensnaring him ; he bad him, supposing him to be an 
 hungered, to command stones to become bread : for although 
 the stones becoming bread at Christ's command, would have 
 showp him to have been really the Son of God, seeing, how- 
 ever, it would have been in obedience to Satan, Christ would 
 have shown himself to be a subject of Satan's kingdom. The 
 same would have been the case, as Christ, in obedience to 
 Satan, should have cast himself dovra from a pinnacle of the 
 temple ; but much more so would it have been the case, as 
 accepting of the offer which Satan made him of the king- 
 doms of the world, he should have fallen down, and have 
 worshipped him. This offer of Satan's, by th*e bye, shows, 
 that he considered himself as being the prince of this world ; 
 and that this sovereignty arose from his having been success- 
 ful in his tempting our first parents, and when they abjured 
 the sovereignty of their Maker. 
 
 The notion expressed in the latter part of this extract, viz. 
 Satan's not knowing who Christ was, is the author's, but the 
 conclusions drawn therefrom, are, I confess, ray own. 
 
 f2 
 
64 [part i. 
 
 superior to angels, this account of this order 
 of intelligent beings, such as it is, will not 
 have been beside my purpose. I accordingly 
 say, that in the abasement which Christ 
 showed as he took our fallen nature upon 
 him, as it stands opposed to his exaltation as 
 he ascended into heaven, we have an eminent 
 example of this power: for it is as the one of 
 these has its contrast in the other, that the 
 greatness of his abasement, as well as that of 
 his exaltation, are chiefly conspicuous. 
 
 The power of contrast may be seen in 
 many other examples which may be given *, 
 although it will per eminentiam be to be seen 
 in that which I have now given. It will ne- 
 vertheless be to be seen in all the works of 
 God; and for the truth of this observation 
 we have the testimony of the son of Sirach, 
 
 * Among these examples I shall here give a very remark- 
 able one which the text of 2 Cor. xii. 7, as it is interpreted by 
 a learned divine, affords. 
 
 The thorn in the flesh, which in this text is said to have 
 been given to the Apostle, means, according to a learned 
 writer (Kennicott's Dissertations, p. 99), '* some bodily infir- 
 mity;" and the purpose for which this thorn in the flesh was 
 given, our author supposes to be, " that the greatness of the 
 Divine power might be the more illustrious in the weakness 
 of the instrument." 
 
SECT, v.] 65 
 
 who writes as follows; — " Good is set against ^ 
 evil, life against death ; so look upon all the 
 works of the Most High, and there are two and 
 two, one against another *." 
 
 Now, seeing evil must have made its en- 
 trance into the world in order that good 
 should be set against it; good, from the want 
 of its proper contrast, could not have existed 
 previously to the existence of evil ; any more 
 than light, which in the beginning existed, 
 could have existed, had not darkness first 
 prevailed: and I say the same of that life 
 which I suppose to be meant in the above 
 scripture, namely, eternal life; I say that it 
 could not have existed until death had made 
 its entrance into the world; and that because 
 death is the proper contrast of this life-f-. 
 
 Hence it is evident, that life may spring 
 from death; and life accordingly (i.e. eternal 
 
 * Eccles. XXX. 14, 15. 
 
 t This notion of the power of contrast is (as, since tliis . 
 section was written, I have found) not new; it is expressed by 
 the author of a learned work lately published, as follows: — 
 " Much of our enjoyments proceeds from our experience of 
 pain, and is heightened by the contrast." Our author pro- 
 ceeds to give various examples of the truth of this observation. 
 (Browne's Essay, vol. ii. p. 67.) 
 
66 [part 1. 
 
 life) arose from the death which Christ suf- 
 fered; and hence the necessity of Christ's 
 dying in order, not that he, but we, who were 
 already dead in trespasses and sins, might 
 live. Christ, however, could have been un- 
 der no necessity of dying in order that he 
 himself might live, and that because, as God, 
 he had plready life in him ; and which shows, 
 that although, as being a man, he might die, 
 his actual dying nevertheless was because he 
 would die; but which, as being contrary to 
 nature, must have been by a power that is 
 above nature. We, in our present fallen 
 state, must necessarily die; I nevertheless 
 say, that if our dying may be voluntary, and 
 as Christ's dying was, our living again will 
 not be because our dying was voluntaiy, but 
 because Christ's djdng was so; for if he, as 
 himself said, was the resurrection and the life, 
 all true life must spring from him. I sup- 
 pose it to be evident from what I have now 
 said, that although good (i. e. life) might 
 have been chosen by Adam when good and 
 evil were set before him, he nevertheless must 
 have chosen evil, and that/ree/^, in order that 
 life should spring from death; this I say would 
 have been necessary; but how this could 
 have been consistently with the freedom of 
 2 
 
SECT, v.] 67 
 
 Adam's will, is to us an impenetrable mystery 
 except as it may be explained by an argument 
 which, in a farther part of this section, will be 
 given on the subject of the divine influence, 
 as being reconcilable with the freedom of 
 the human will. Be this, however, as it will, 
 I say that if good require to be contrasted 
 by evil in order for it to exist, the same 
 may be said of liappiness : for, good and hap- 
 piness (whether it be a happiness which is of 
 this world, or a happiness which is of the 
 world to come) are inseparable; it may be 
 said, that misery must first be experienced, 
 before happiness can be experienced; and 
 from whence, by the way, it will follow, that 
 how happy soever the state of man in Para- 
 dise may be supposed to have been, he never- 
 theless could not have known that he was 
 happy, until he had experienced the misery 
 which was the consequence of his being driven 
 out of Paradise *. 
 
 * " The removal of pain," says a celebrated writer (Es- 
 say on the Nature of the Passions, p. 11), " has always the 
 notion of good;" but that this, arises from the power of con- 
 trast, is a notion which does not appear to have occurred to 
 the author. Dr. Hartley, speaking: of music, says, " Dis- 
 cords are originally unpleasant, and therefore, as in other 
 cases, may be made use of to heighten our pleasures, by 
 being properly and sparingly used in musical compositions, 
 
 f4 
 
68 [part I. 
 
 There is a notion, which has obtained, 
 and which I conceive the present to be a fit 
 opportunity of mentioning; it is a notion 
 which has been adopted by three different 
 very respectable writers, the first of whom I 
 have aheady had, and whom I shall, in the 
 course of this work, again have occasion 
 to mention, and which is expressed by him 
 as follows:--" As none but God is a pure 
 spirit by nature, none but hhn is infallible; 
 but, therefore, any created being must neces- 
 sarily be fallible, and consequently lapsible*." 
 To the same purpose it has, by the second 
 of these writers, been said, " All creatures 
 must necessarily come short of the perfection 
 of their Creator; they are therefore fallible; 
 and being fallible, must fall, unless their de- 
 
 so as to make a strong contrast." Theory, published by 
 Dr. Priestley, p. 260, It is upon the same principle that the 
 diamond appears the more brilliant from the foil. 
 
 There is an observation which has been made by an in- 
 genious w riter, which, although not made with any view to 
 the case of Adam, may nevertheless serve to confirm the truth 
 of the notions expressed in our text. " That series of calm 
 and regular enjoyment which pervades life, and renders it 
 desirable, passes so unobserved, that we seldom, or never, 
 allow it any degree of estimation, till it is interrupted by 
 unexpected disease, or affliction." Brown on the Existence 
 of a Supreme Creator, P. i. vol. ii. 
 
 * Cheyne's Philosophical Conjectures, p. 140. 
 
SECT, v.j 69 
 
 fects are supplied by the aid of a nature more 
 perfect than their own *." Lastly, it has by 
 the third of these writers been said, " As all 
 derivative perfection is finite, it must be at- 
 tended by some degree of imperfection ; and 
 what is in some degree imperfect, nmst be 
 capable of miscarrying-}-." 
 
 Now, all these writers agree in supposing 
 that all intelligent created beings are lap- 
 sible ; and which indeed must be the case, if 
 they are free beings. They nevertheless may 
 be kept from fallmg, according to the second 
 of these writers, as their defects shall be sup- 
 plied by the aid of a nature more perfect than 
 their own; i. e. (as I suppose our author to 
 mean) by their being supernaturally sup- 
 ported. Seeing, however, these are suppos- 
 ed to be free beings, there is a difficulty 
 in conceiving how these beings may be en- 
 abled to stand, consistently with their being 
 free to fall. This difficulty, however, in the 
 case of men, is not, in my humble opinion, 
 insuperable ; and for the solution of it, I ob- 
 serve as follows: 
 
 * Gregory's Letters, p. 301. 
 
 t Kennicott's Dissertation, p. 33. 
 
70 [part I. 
 
 All the operations and influences of the 
 divine Spirit are, on ordinary occasions, se- 
 cret and unknown to us: for, although God 
 may, and does on extraordinary occasions, 
 speak to us in a loud voice, and so as that 
 we cannot but know that it is He that is 
 speaking to us; he nevertheless, on ordinaiy 
 occasions, speaks to us in a still small (and 
 therefore a secret) voice * ; and so as that we 
 neither do nor can know that it is He that 
 is speaking to us; and from hence it will 
 follow, as our minds shall be supposed at 
 any time to be influenced by the divine Spirit, 
 that their being so influenced may, and, if it 
 be in a secret and still voice that God speaks 
 to us will be influenced, without our know- 
 ing it ; but, whether it be in a loud or in a 
 small voice that God at any time speaks to 
 us, it will necessarily appear to us that we 
 are acting freely, as we shall be supposed to 
 be influenced thereby, notwithstanding our 
 minds are in reality influenced by the divine 
 Spirit: for, if we cannot at any time know 
 that our minds are influenced, it will be the 
 same thing to us as if they were not influ- 
 enced ; but, therefore, as I have said, it will 
 
 * See 1 Kings, xix. 12. 
 
SECT, v.] 71 
 
 appear to us as if we were acting freely ; and 
 we shall feel ourselves to have that respon- 
 sibility which is the consequence of acting 
 freely*. 
 
 ♦ The following is another, and perhaps better solution of 
 the difficulty mentioned in our text. 
 
 When the will of a man is induenced, in whatever way it 
 may be supposed to be so, this man will have a more ardent 
 desire for something, be it what it will, than he had before his 
 will was influenced. Seeing, however, it is the same will 
 after its being influenced that it was before, it will be as truly 
 this man's will after, as it was before it was influenced. As 
 an example of the truth of this propo.sition, I say of a stick 
 that has been bent, that it will be the same stick, that it was 
 before it was bent. 
 
 Now, a man may know that he has a greater desire for a 
 thing than he had, and he may know the reason thereof; let 
 it be supposed, however, that he has a greater desire for 
 something (for instance, for the things which concern his 
 eternal welfare) than he ever before had; and without his 
 knowing any reason for this (and which is the case when a 
 man's mind, or will, is supematurally influenced, it will not 
 only seem to him that he is acting freely, as he shall be sup- 
 posed more eagerly to pursue the thing which he is supposed 
 to desire), but he really will be acting freely; and that for the 
 reason which I have given, namely, that the will with which 
 be does this, will be his own will; and his wilh, will in this 
 case co-operate with the divine will; but this will be un- 
 known to him, except as he may find it afterwards to be so, 
 from what the written word of God may tell him. Now, I 
 say the same thing of God's working in us to will and to do of 
 his good pleasure, that I have said of the co-operation of the 
 divine will with our will. I say we may be conscious to our- 
 selves, that we are both willing and doing of God's good 
 pleasure, in the true sense of these words ; but, true as it is 
 
72 [part 1/ 
 
 Now, I suppose it to have been made evi- 
 dent by the above argument, that the falling- 
 
 that this is the work of God, we neither do, nor can know 
 that it is so ; and were it not we ourselves that are, as I have 
 said, willing and doing (and which our conscience will tell us), 
 we should be mere machines. 
 
 The consistency of the divine influence with the freedom 
 of the human will, has, I find, of late been shown by a learn- 
 ed writer, in a way difl'eient from the above ; and is substan- 
 tially as follows — " When men experience the evil conse- 
 quences of their own misconduct, they naturally act more 
 prudently for the future; but so likewise, agreeably to the 
 rule, Felix quern faciunt aliena pericula cautum, as they see 
 others sufi'ering from a like cause, they naturally act more cau- 
 tiously, than they otherwise would have done." Now, in 
 either of these cases, our author supposes the will to have 
 been influenced by the divine will ; not arbitrarily exerted, but 
 from its being of the divine appointment, that natural evil 
 should be the constant eff"ect of moral evil. — Copleston's In- 
 quiry, &c. p. 52. 
 
 As it will not be inapposite to the above subject, I shall 
 endeavour to show, that necessity may not be incompatible 
 with free will ; and for this purpose I observe as follows : — 
 As a man shall be supposed to have been in a long habit of 
 either virtue or vice, he will no longer have that freedom of 
 will with which the habit, whether of virtue or vice, was be- 
 gun ; he will of course necessarily do either good or evil ; 
 i. e. the general tenour of his actions will be either good or 
 evil. Seeing, however, the habit, whether good or evil, will 
 have originated in a free choice, the necessity from wliich he 
 will act, will be, if I may so say, a willing necessity ; it will, 
 in short, be a necessity of his own creating ; and he will 
 therefore justly be punished hereafter, as, in this world, he 
 shall have done evil; although, by the mercy of God only, b© 
 rewarded as he shall have done good. 
 
sEcr. v.] 7: J 
 
 of created intelligent beings may be free, 
 consistently with the necessity of their falling 
 in consequence of their original lapsibility ; 
 and such I suppose to have been the case of 
 man. Man, it is true, fell by his disobedi- 
 ence to the command which God gave him 
 with respect to the tree of knowledge ; except, 
 however, he had originally been lapsible, he 
 could not have fallen ; and if he was origin- 
 ally lapsible, and (as one of the above writers 
 says) would necessarily fall, he would have 
 fallen, though God had given him no com- 
 mand at all ; how he would in this case have 
 fallen, I leave it to this writer to say ; I 
 nevertheless say, that a part of the angels 
 fell, and they might all of thejn have fallen ; 
 and we know of no command that God gave 
 them, and by breaking of which they might 
 have fallen. Man had a command given 
 him ; and it was as he brake this command 
 that he fell. 
 
SECTION VI. 
 
 Man's mortality by nature, as it stands op- 
 posed to the immortality which came by 
 Jesus Christ, might have served as another 
 example of the power of contrast which has 
 been the subject of the last section ; it is for 
 a different purpose, however, that I now sup- 
 pose man to have been originally by nature 
 mortal: for that he was so, has in my first 
 section been shown to have been the opinion 
 of some of the best divines ; and indeed it is 
 the ground of the different systems which in 
 the course of this work have been mentioned; 
 it is the ground likewise of some notions 
 which have been adopted by a learned divine ♦ 
 on the subject of the tree of life ; and which, 
 as they differ from those which by other 
 writers in general (so far at least as I know 
 any thing to the contrary) have been adopted, 
 and lead to some conclusions which are appo- 
 
 * Sec Dr. Kennicott's Dissertations. 
 
SECT. VI.] 75 
 
 site to the subject of this discourse, I the 
 more \villingly make these notions of his the 
 subject of the present section. 
 
 Our author so far agrees with the afore- 
 said divines, as to suppose with them, that 
 the tree of life had a virtue which, as it 
 should from time to time be eaten of, would 
 have counteracted that mortality to which 
 man became subject by his eating of the 
 forbidden fruit ; I say that mortality : for 
 although man would not have died, had he 
 refrained from eating of that fruit ; seeing, 
 however, he would not have lived had he not 
 made use of such food as is conducive to 
 life, and God had accordingly provided 
 against his dying by the trees which he had 
 caused to grow in the garden of Eden ; and 
 had moreover given him that law which is 
 called the law of nature, and which forcibly 
 impels all animated beings to seek the pre- 
 servation of that life which God Jias given 
 them ; there evidently must have been ori^ 
 ginally the same possibility of man's dying, 
 as there is of a brute's dying; and as this is 
 the mortality to which man was originally 
 by nature subject, so is it different from that 
 to which lie became subject by his eating of 
 
76 [part I. 
 
 the forbidden fruit ; and if the former of these 
 was natural, the latter may not improperly 
 be said to be preternatural. The mortality 
 which, in the case of man, came by his dis- 
 obedience, affected, it is true, his soul as 
 well as his body: for, that the soul has a life 
 no less than the body, has in a former sec- 
 tion been shown ; and I accordingly suppose 
 the death of the soul to be principally meant 
 by the Apostle, when he says, by man (i. e. 
 by the sin of man) came death : for the soul 
 does not die because the body dies ; to the 
 contrary of this we may know from the case 
 of Adam, that the soul may be dead consist- 
 ently with the body's being alive. The sin of 
 the soul is the ultimate cause of the death of 
 the body; but the immediate cause, in the 
 case of Adam, was (as Dr. Kennicott very 
 rightly, in my humble opinion, says) the de- 
 leterious quality of the food of which, in 
 consequence of his being driven out of Para- 
 dise, he was under the necessity of eating; 
 and as in the sequel of this section will more 
 particularly be shown *. 
 
 * The writers who suppose the tree of life to have had a 
 virtue which would have counteracted the internal cause of 
 death, say, " that the external cause of death (commonly 
 ealled accidental death) would have been prevented three 
 
SECT, vr.] 77 
 
 Now, to return from this digression, I say 
 that our author, contrarily to the notions of 
 divines in general, ancient as well as modem, 
 supposes, that the tree of life had a virtue 
 which the rest of the trees that were growing 
 in Eden, and which in the sacred account 
 are said to have been for food^ had not ; but 
 these trees were, according to our author, the 
 tree of life ; and in support of this opinion 
 he in a very learned manner shows the pro- 
 priety with which the word trees (as it stands 
 in the Greek) is, in our English version, 
 rendered tree ; although, as being for food, 
 the word might more properly have been ren- 
 dered trees in the English, as it is in the 
 Greek ; not however, as the author observes, 
 that it is improperly rendered tree in tlie 
 English *. 
 
 ways ; first, by human providence, which, in that state, would 
 have been most perfect ; secondly, by divine providence, 
 which, for that state, would have been greater, and extra- 
 ordinary ; thirdly, by the protection of angels.i' (See Matt, 
 iv. 6.) St. Augustine supposes the tree of life to have had 
 the reason of a sacrament (Airis, p. 42); he accordingly says 
 (as I find it reported), " The tree of life in the corporal Paradise 
 may be construed to be like the wisdom of God in the spiri- 
 tual, i. e. in the intelligible Paradise ; whereof it is written. 
 She is a tree of life to them tliat lay hold of her; Prov, iii." — 
 AiKis on the Tree of Life, p. 30, 
 
 * See Kennicott's Dissert, on the Tree of Life, p. 81. 
 G 
 
78 [part I. 
 
 Now, as these trees, which in the sacred 
 account are said to have been given for food 
 (and therefore, as our author observes, were 
 properly trees of life), would have continued 
 to be Adam's food, had he not been driven 
 out of Paradise; so, had he not been driven 
 out of Paradise, he might have lived for ever. 
 As God, however, had threatened Adam, that, 
 in case of his eating of the tree of which he 
 had forbidden him to eat, he should surely 
 die ; the reason for God's driving Adam out 
 of Paradise, would, as our author observes, 
 eventually have been the execution of the 
 aforesaid threatening; for God, foreseeing 
 that Adam would sin, had cursed the earth ; 
 i. e. that part of the globe which would 
 properly be called the earth, as contradis- 
 tinguishable from that which was called Para- 
 dise*; the consequence of which was, that 
 the food which the earth would produce 
 would be of a deleterious quality, but which, 
 however, hunger-}- would have constrained 
 
 * See Kennicott, p. 87. 
 
 t Hunger would have equally constrained Adam to use 
 the only food which there would have been for him when 
 he was driven out of Paradise, although of a deleterious 
 quality, as it would have constrained him to use such 
 wholesome food as God had provided for the support of his 
 life in Paradise, and for this reason, as I conceive, because 
 
SECT. VI.] 79 
 
 Adam to use, even as he siiall be supposed to 
 have known it to be unwholesome: but which 
 he probably would not*. Hence would arise 
 
 hanger is a painful sensation, and all bodily pain is a symp- 
 tom of death ; it is the love of life, therefore, that excites 
 men, as well as brutes, to satisfy their hunger ; because, by 
 their so doing;, unconscious as even men are thereof, they act 
 for their relief under a painful sensation ; and as a pleasurable 
 sensation naturally arises when a painful one ceases, there is 
 in this farther provision made, in the wisdom and goodness of 
 God, for the preservation of the lives of brutes as well as of 
 men. 
 
 * I here take occasion to observe further on this subject as 
 follows : — No believer will deny, that the death to which all 
 that are descended from Adam are liable, originates in the sin 
 of Adam ; and the account which in our text has been given 
 supposes this to have been the case; it nevertheless, in con- 
 tradiction to the notion which generally obtains, supposes the 
 food which Adam was reduced to the necessity of eating, for 
 the preservation of his life after he had been driven out of 
 Paradise, was the immediate cause of that mortality which 
 would end in death: whereas, according to some writers, the 
 deleterious or poisonous quality of the forbidden fruit was the 
 cause. There are, however, as I find, some divines whose 
 notions of this matter, although they differ from those which 
 in our text have been adopted, nevertheless come nearer to 
 them than that which has before been mentioned. These divines 
 suppose the forbidden fruit no otherwise to have had a delete- 
 rious than as it had an inflammatory quality with respect to 
 the blood: the consequence of which, in the case of Adam, 
 would, as they suppose, have been, that his appetite, which 
 before was moderate, and suited to the wants of his body, 
 would have become inordinate and unruly ; that, by the in- 
 dulgence of this appetite, the blood and juices would have 
 been disposed to corrupt, and so be ultimately the cause of 
 G 2 
 
80 [part I. 
 
 pain and disease ; and pain and disease would 
 in Adam's case, as it does in ours, end in 
 death; and thus would God, as our author 
 observes, in a natural way bring to pass the 
 death which he had threatened our first pa- 
 rent in case of his eating of the forbidden 
 fruit*. 
 
 death ; that, as a disposition of the blood to corruption would 
 thus have been transmitted by Adam to his posterity, it would 
 have a like effect with them, notwithstanding any temperance 
 or abstinence which they might use. — Burnett on Art IX. 
 p. 111. 
 
 * As this account shall be admitted, it will be evident, that 
 as Adam shall be supposed to have been suffered to continue 
 in Paradise, he might have lived for ever ; his life, however, 
 as Dr. Kennicott (who supposes this) observes, would have 
 been a life of misery ; because (as I suppose him to mean) of 
 that anguish of mind with which a consciousness of sin is al- 
 ways accompanied. To this account I shall add, that seeing 
 there would have been a necessity of Adam's dying, in con- 
 sequence of his having sinned, there would have been a ne- 
 cessity, if I may so say, of his being driven out of Paradise; 
 and this exclusively of the reason given above for his being 
 driven from thence. 
 
 Upon the supposition of the curse which God pronounced 
 on the earth not having extended to Paradise, the following 
 reason may be given why Adam would necessarily have been 
 driven out from thence. It is reasonable to suppose that, in 
 consequence of the curse which has above been mentioned, 
 a change would have taken place, not only in the earth, but in 
 the air, which would have been suitable to that which, in my 
 text, is supposed to have taken place with respect to its pro- 
 ductions : for plants require a soil and atmosphere suitable 
 to their nature, no less than animals. Now if Adam became 
 
SECT. VI. J 81 
 
 There is an effect, liowever, tliat the curse 
 which God pronounced on the eartli or 
 ground had, which is different from that 
 which hcis above been mentioned ; and which 
 is, that it became not only barren, but, what 
 is woi'se than barrenness, naturally produc- 
 tive of tlionis and thistles, the consequence 
 of which was, that man, in the sweat of his 
 brow, was to eat bread; bread, which at 
 best would be calculated only to prolong a 
 life, which would more properly be to be 
 called death than life: and besides these 
 evils to which man was more peculiarly 
 doomed, God said unto the woman, / ivill 
 greatly multiply thy sorrow and thy concep- 
 tion; in sorrow shall thou bring forth children; 
 and thy desire shall he unto thy husband, and 
 he shall rule over thee. 
 
 mortal when he bad sinned, a change would have taken place 
 in his body similar to that which I have supposed to have taken 
 place in the earth, and the air, in consequence of the ' curse ; 
 and the earth, and the air, would now be equally suitable to 
 the nature of man, as I have supposed it to have been to that 
 of the vegetables which the earth would now produce. Noi^ 
 as, under these circumstances, Adam could not have lived in 
 Paradise (unaflFected as I have supposed it to have been by 
 the curse) any more than a fish can live in the air, or a fowl 
 for any length of time in the water, be would, as I have said, 
 necessarily have been driven out from thence. 
 G 3 
 
82 [part I. 
 
 Now, the system which I have adopted 
 supposes (and the truth of it is grounded on 
 the text which I have quoted from the Book 
 of Ecclesiasticus), that without misery to serve 
 as a contrast, happiness cannot be experi- 
 enced; and this rule, as every man's expe- 
 rience may teach him, is verified, even in 
 sensible pleasure, as it has its contrast in 
 pain. In the miseiy, however, from which 
 no son of Adam is wholly exempt, God will 
 abundantly have provided for that contrast 
 which, if it be necessary in order that an 
 earthly happiness should be experienced, will 
 be as much more so in order that an hea- 
 venly happiness should be experienced, as an 
 heavenly is beyond all comparison greater 
 than an earthly happiness*. 
 
 * There is a reason given why God cursed the earth, which, 
 although different from, is not inconsistent with that which has 
 been given in our text ; and it Las this at the same time to re- 
 commend it, that it is very beautifully expressed. " God 
 made the earth amiable and sweet, and the world a scene of 
 happiness to a creature that was to continue in it ; but when 
 sin introduced death, God in his goodness cursed the earth 
 by a diminution of its excellence, to make the world less de- 
 sirable to a creature who was now so soon to leave it." — De- 
 laney's Revelation examined, vol. i. p. 77. 
 
 Dr. Kennicott says nothing on the subject of the flaming 
 sword which was to keep the way of the tree of life (Gen. iii. 
 24), by way of explanation of (his text. '* By the flaming 
 
SECT. VI.] gS 
 
 sword," according to a learned annolator, " is meant th« Gros- 
 pel, called b}' St. Paul a ttco-cdffed tword : this,<''he says, " waa 
 to deter man from attemptinnj to re-enter Paradise, and to 
 drive him to Christ." (Ainsworth in loc.) " Man," according 
 to another learned commentator, *' was to learn by this guard- 
 ing of the entrance into Paradise, that he was no longer to be 
 immortal by eating of the (reo of life, but was to seek that 
 life and immortality which came by Jesus Christ." (Adam 
 Clarke in loc.) Now every man, in whatever way it may be 
 that he is seeking happiness (and happiness is sought by bad, 
 no less than by good men), may be said to be attempting to re- 
 gain that Paradise, which, from liis having sinned in Adam, 
 he will have lost: but the flaming sword mentioned in the 
 above text, would, rightly understood, teach every man the 
 vanity of this attempt ; it would teach them, that, by the sin 
 of the first Adam, the door of an earthly Paradise became for 
 ever shut; and that, by therighteou.sness of the second Adam, 
 the door of a heavenly Paradise became opened. 
 
 It is observed by a learned Prelate, that " it may seem 
 strange, that of so great a multitude of men, so few should 
 attainhappiness."— King, Origin of Evil, vol. ii. 450. Now, 
 there is no happiness to which men can attain in this world, 
 that will not be the same in kind as that which Adam may 
 be supposed to have enjoyed in Paradise. As all men seek 
 happiness, although few, as our author rightly observes, 
 find it, all men may be said to be attempting to regain 
 Paradise; but the door of an earthly Paradise became, 
 as we learn from the Scriptures, everlastingly shut, when 
 Adam was once driven out from thence; and as this is 
 the happiness which is meant by our author (if at least he 
 knows his own meaning) when he says but few attain 
 it, he ought (if my notions on tliis subject arc true) rather 
 to have said, none attain it. Now, let it be said (and as 
 it truly may be), that there is a happiness with which the 
 practice of the social virtues is always accompanied in 
 generous minds ; seeing, however, the ♦'vils of f hi? life 
 G 4 
 
84 [part I. 
 
 constitute the ground of these \irtues, and that we cannot 
 be disposed to relieve our afflicted brethren, but as we feel 
 for them, and so partake with them in their distress ; our 
 happiness, although it will perhaps be the greatest which we 
 can experience in this world, from the alloy nevertheless 
 which it will have in the aforesaid evils, will fall short of 
 being true happiness. 
 
SECTION VII. 
 
 It has in a former section been supposed 
 that, except as man had sinned, his having 
 originally been endowed with those properties 
 or qualities, which in contradistinction of 
 those which are called natural, are called 
 moral, would, according to our conceptions, 
 have been in vain; but which, however, 
 would not be the case, as what is commonly 
 called moral virtue shall be supposed to be 
 a true notion thereof: for, in this case, there 
 would have been nothing to have hindered 
 man's being virtuous in a state of innocence ; 
 and it has accordingly been asserted by di- 
 vines, as in our fourth section has been ob- 
 served, not only that man might, in his state 
 of innocence, have been virtuous, but that he 
 might have had that virtue, or righteousness, 
 which would have qualified him for a hea- 
 venly Paradise. In addition to the reasons 
 which in that section have been given for a 
 contrary opinion, and for showing at the same 
 
86 [part i= 
 
 time what I conceive to be the true notion of 
 moral virtue*, I observe as follows: 
 
 An end, or good, is ever necessarily 
 sought in all human actions ; no good, how- 
 ever, can naturally be sought by man, in his 
 present fallen state, but that which is of this 
 world; for, naturally, man can have no no- 
 tion of any other life than that which is of 
 this world: if a good, then, which is future, 
 and of another world, may be sought by us 
 (and which, in consequence of our having 
 been redeemed, is the case), it will be differ- 
 ent from that which is of this world; so dif- 
 ferent indeed, that, in comparison of a good 
 that is of the world to come, a good which 
 is of this world will be no good at all. So 
 long, however, as we are in this world, some 
 good will necessarily be sought by us; it ne- 
 vertheless, as we have faith, will be sought 
 in subservience to that which is of another 
 world. As we have faith, a good which is of 
 this world will be sought by us as it is by 
 inferior animals, i. e. without any anxious 
 
 * For the different principles from which moral virtue, ac- 
 cording to the common notions thereof, proceeds, see a very 
 ingenious Essay on ihe Nature and Conduct of the Pastiotu, 
 page 2. 
 
SBCT. VII.] 87 
 
 care ; for so much our Saviour saith when he 
 says, Seek yejirst (i. e. principally) the king- 
 dom of God, and his righteousness, and all 
 these things (meaning a good which is of this 
 life) shall he added unto i/ou*. Now, as we 
 have faith, we shall have charity ; and, hav- 
 ing charity, we shall have that virtue for 
 which I contend, but which, cus the end there- 
 of shall be considered, is essentially different 
 from any virtue, the end of which is a good 
 which is of this life: for, as a good which is 
 of this life is, as I have said, no good at all, 
 in comparison of that which is of another 
 and future life; so that virtue, the end of 
 which is a good that is of this transitoiy life, 
 is no virtue at all, in comparison of that, the 
 end of which is everlasting life, 
 
 Having observed thus much on the sub- 
 ject of moral virtue, I proceed to show the 
 nature and origin thereof. When God com- 
 manded Adam, that of the tree of the know- 
 ledge of good and evil he should not eat, not 
 only good and evil, but life and death, were 
 set before him; or, as it may rather be said, 
 life was set before him in good having been 
 set before him, and evil, in death having been 
 
 • Matt, vi, 33. 
 
88 [part I. 
 
 set before him ; for, as death is naturally 
 considered as being the greatest evil that can 
 befall us, and is accordingly by every means 
 avoided by us, so is life considered as the 
 greatest good we can enjoy, and by every 
 means sought to be preserved. 
 
 Now Adam was disobedient to the com- 
 mand which God gave him * ; he nevertheless 
 
 * I take occasion here to observe, that it has been sup- 
 posed by a learned divine, and who I find is not singular in 
 bis opinion on the subject, that Adam's disobedience to the 
 command which God gave him with respect to the tree of the 
 knowledge of good and evil, proceeded from a rebellious sense 
 of independence, and that it amounted to a complete abjura- 
 tion of his allegiance to God. (Browne's Essay, vol. ii.p. 171.) 
 Now, I grant that this was in fact the case ; I nevertheless, 
 with submission, think, that a different interpretation may be 
 given of this Scripture ; and I accordingly observe as follows : 
 — God's commanding Adam to abstain from eating of the fruit 
 of the aforesaid tree, supposes that he might have a desire to 
 eat of it ; for, according to a learned interpreter, it was one 
 of the trees which were made to grow in the garden of Eden for 
 food to Adam. Adam's supposed obedience to this command 
 would, as I venture to suppose, have amounted to a renuncia- 
 tion of the pleasures of sense, as being the summum bonum ; 
 for, although it was with respect to a particular tree only that 
 God had enjoined abstinence, seeing, however, this tree was, 
 as has been observed, one of those trees which were given for 
 food, the command, according to its hidden meaning, woald 
 amount to self-denial ; for obedience could not have been due 
 from Adam with respect to one of the trees which were given 
 
SECT. VII.] 89 
 
 did not actually die, but became mortal only; 
 i. e. he became subject to those evils which 
 lead to, and which end in death; and thus 
 much is implied by the words of his sentence 
 (as it stands in the Hebrew), dying thou shalt 
 die. As Christ, however, was the lamh slain 
 (in the purpose of God) from the foundation 
 of the world, the virtue of his death would 
 apply from the moment of Adam's sinning: 
 although Adam then, and all men that should 
 descend from him, would die ; by reason ne- 
 vertheless of their having been redeemed by 
 Christ, they would certainly rise again; as 
 death will thus evidently be a sleep merely, 
 and no real interruption of life, the death to 
 which Adam, and to which all men, by his 
 sinning, became subject, will be death in ap- 
 pearance only, so far, I mean, as the death of 
 the body shall be considered ; for it may be 
 otherwise as respect shall be had to the soul. 
 
 It will, as I conceive, be evident from 
 what has now last been said, that all such 
 life as men have in this world, or as they will 
 
 as food, but as a like obedience would have been due from 
 Adam had God forbidden him to eat of any of these trees. 
 The trial which Adam was put to, may thus be seen to be the 
 same, in fact, as that to which we under the Gospel are put. 
 
9<V [part I. 
 
 have in the world to come, they ultimately 
 owe to Christ ; nevertheless, whether that life 
 which they will have in the world to come 
 will be a happy or a miserable one (or, to 
 use the language of Scripture, whether their 
 rising again will be unto everlasting life, or 
 unto everlasting death), will depend on them- 
 selves, i. e. it will depend on the things which 
 they will have done in this life; and we are 
 accordingly told by our Saviour, that ^Aey 
 that have done good shall rise unto the resur- 
 rection of life; hut they that have done evil, 
 unto the resurrection of damnation. 
 
 As the above shall be supposed to be a 
 true statement, it will be evident, that, in 
 consequence of man's redemption by Christ, 
 good and evil are as necessarily set before 
 every man that is of an age and capacity to 
 distinguish between these, as they were set 
 before Adam ; and that this necessity arises 
 from the freedom of man's will : for it would 
 be in vain that any created being should be 
 endowed with a freedom of will, except as he 
 might make use of it*; there nevertheless 
 
 * It is said in the text, that " it would be in vain that any 
 created being should have a freedom of will, except as good 
 and evil should beset before him;" and good and evil were 
 
SBCT. VH.J ^ 91 
 
 will be this difference between the good and evil 
 ^hich were set before Adam, and the good 
 
 accordli^Iy set before man soon after God had made turn. Bat 
 
 why, it may: be asked, was not man left to the determination of 
 
 his will without Satan's being permitted to tempt him to choose 
 
 evil? for, although it was Eve that tliis evil spirit, under the 
 
 form of a serpent, tempted ; it nevertheless was as this evil 
 
 spirit had got a footing in her, that she-tempted Adam; and 
 
 so, in fact, would Satan have tempted >Adam, not less than 
 
 he did^ve. Now in this, as I conceive, there is contained 
 
 a great mystery. It is by philosophers supposed, that God 
 
 would that there should be a gradation of beings, from the 
 
 lowest to the highest created being: but in this they argue o 
 
 posteriori ; they see (as they borrow their notions as to this 
 
 matter from divine revelation) that it is so ; and, upon this 
 
 ground, they conclude, that it was from all eternity fit, and 
 
 proper, that it should be so. I nevertheless suppose, that 
 
 those beings, which, in this supposed scale of beings, are 
 
 above man, were created, not so much because of any service 
 
 which these angelical beings might do us here on earth, as 
 
 on another reason, and which is as follows. Man, as I conceive, 
 
 could not have sinned, had a created being superior to him in 
 
 the rank or scale of created beings, not first have sinned. 
 
 How it was possible that this supposed being might sin, I 
 
 pretend not to say ; it is sufficient for my purpose that it be 
 
 granted, that a being of this description did sin ; and that this 
 
 was the case, we know from divine revelation. Now it is 
 
 certain, that the possibility of our sinning, in this our fallen 
 
 state, arises, not from the freedom of the will, and as was . 
 
 the case with Adam (for this freedom we lost, as, in him, 
 
 we sinned), but from those lusts, or evil desires, which, in 
 
 consequence of the sin of Adam, obtain in us; insomuch 
 
 that now we cannot but sin in -all we either do, or think. 
 
 As we shall be supposed however to be taken out of this our 
 
 state of nature, and to be placed in a state of grace (and 
 
92 [part I. 
 
 and evil whicli are set before us, namely, that 
 it was natural good and evil that were set 
 
 which we are as we have been redeemed by Christ), the 
 freedom of our wills will be restored, and our sinning will be 
 after the similitude of Adam's sin. As no lusting of the flesh 
 however could have tempted Adam to sin, when good and 
 evil were set before him, his sinning (i. e. of his choosing 
 evil) would have arisen from another cause ; and that cause I 
 have supposed to have been, immediately, his having been 
 tempted of Eve, but ultimately of Satan. Seeing however 
 Adam was under no necessity of sinning, because tempted of 
 Eve, and so, in fact, tempted of Satan, his sinning would 
 have been as our sinning is who have been redeemed by 
 Christ, i. e. because he would sin ; and no other reason can 
 be given for our sinning. Now it is certain, that we cannot 
 choose good, rather than evil, as these shall be supposed to 
 be at any time set before us, except as we are supernaturally 
 influenced : for the good and evil which are set before us as we 
 are in a state of grace, are a good and evil which are not of this, 
 but of a future life ; and, as in our first section has been said, 
 " man's powers and faculties, even as they were, before the fall, 
 entire, are not able of themselves to reach such a supernatural 
 end." If then we shall choose good rather than evil, as these 
 shall be supposed to be set before us, we shall be acting freely, 
 notwithstanding our being supernaturally influenced : for our 
 being supernaturally influenced supposes the will from the 
 energy of which we act, to be our own, and as it in reality 
 will be. This good, however, neither would, nor could have 
 been chosen, had we not been supernaturally influenced; and 
 that for the reason above given. Good may appear to us to be 
 freely chosen, and truly so appear ; except however we are 
 supernaturally influenced, it will, as I have before said, be a 
 good that is of this life ; but which nevertheless, in compari- 
 son of that which is of another life, will be evil, rather than 
 good. But so exactly I suppose it to have been when Adam, 
 or rather, when Eve was tempted of Satan ; Eve, I suppose. 
 
SECT. VII.] 93 
 
 before him: but with us, moral or spiritual 
 good and evil. It is not indeed possible that 
 natural good and evil should be set before us : 
 for, if the freedom of Adam's will became de- 
 termined, as he chose evil, i. e. death, and we 
 in consequence of this choice of his are born 
 mortal, by what power that will be remain- 
 ing to us shall we choose that which may 
 properly be called life? For this purpose that 
 freedom which we lost in Adam must be re- 
 stored ; and this, as I have said, is the case, 
 as by Christ we have been redeemed, and that 
 independently of our believing in him; and 
 if so, good and evil will, as I have said, ne- 
 cessarily be set before every man; seeing, 
 however, death has been abolished by Christ's 
 
 would have been supernaturally influenced ; and which would 
 have been the case, as by the enticing words, or glozing of 
 the serpent, her will consented to the eating of the forbidden 
 fruit; and the act, as we know, followed. It is not certain, 
 however, that she would thus have transgressed, had she 
 been left to herself, any more than Adam, as we may reason- 
 ably suppose, would. Now, admitting what 1 haVc supposed, 
 i. e. that a supernatural influence was no less necessary for evij 
 being chosen, when good and evil were set before our first 
 parents, th^n a like influence is for our choosing good, as 
 good and evil shall be supposed to be at any time set before 
 us; we may, as I conceive, understand, why man's being 
 tempted of Satan to choose evil, when good and evil were 
 set before him (man), was permitted of God. 
 
 H 
 
94 [part I. 
 
 having voluntarily suffered death, natural 
 good and evil, as I have before said, neither 
 will, nor, in the nature of things, can be set 
 before any man ; the conclusion from the 
 premises is, that moral or spiritual good and 
 evil will be set before every man : and that 
 this is the case, the conscience of every man, 
 who is of an age and capacity to distinguish 
 between good and evil, will testify to him. 
 Now, if, when all men shall have arisen from 
 the dead, they that have done good will go 
 into everlasting life, it will be evident, as I 
 have before said, that works of love or cha- 
 rity will, and alone can qualify us for the 
 happiness of that life; which (as Christian 
 charity, and moral virtue, shall be supposed 
 to be one and the same thing; for they both 
 equally consist in doing good) it has been the 
 purpose of this discourse chiefly to show. 
 
 It appears from the above Scripture, that 
 the going into everlasting life depends on the 
 good which we shall have done in this life; 
 and it is for this reason that the present is 
 very properly to be considered as beihg a state 
 of probation : a doubt, however, has arisen 
 with divines, which it will not be foreign to 
 
SECT, vn.] 95 
 
 the subject of this section to consider ; which 
 doubt has respect to a late repentance, and 
 where there has not been any such time as is 
 necessary to show the sincerity of a man's re- 
 pentance; and it has accordingly been ob- 
 served by a learned divine on this subject, 
 that '' where conversion (and which supposes 
 repentance) has not been the mere effect of 
 terror, where the heart has been moved, as 
 well as the conscience; where repentance has 
 been such as that it would have been followed 
 by a change of life, were opportunity of trial 
 given, there is room not only for hope, but 
 for confidence*:" from the impossibility, 
 however, of a man's knowing his own heart 
 (and which the author tacitly confesses when 
 he says afterwards, " God alone can know 
 the sincerity of such a conversion"), no hope, 
 I conceive, can in this case arise, but what 
 will be mingled with much fear, nor any con- 
 fidence that will not be mingled with much 
 distrust. That a man then may have such a 
 hope as will be inconsistent with fear, and, 
 such a confidence as will be inconsistent with 
 diffidence, he must, as I conceive, in such 
 manner have persevered in a virtuous life, as 
 
 * Sumner on Apostolical Preaching, p. 206. 
 
 h2 
 
S>6 [part I. 
 
 that the doing good shall have become so na- 
 tural to him, as that it should seem to him as 
 if he could not do evil; and from whence it 
 will appear, that it is the habit of doing good, 
 rather than the mere doing good, that will 
 qualify us for heaven. The power of habit is 
 indeed wonderful, of whatever kind the habit 
 shall be; in the case under consideration, 
 however, I venture to say, that a more mi- 
 raculous change did not take place in the 
 water which, at the supper of Cana, became 
 wine, than that which is wrought in a man 
 who, from his having been sunk in the dregs 
 of profligacy and vice, becomes confirmed in 
 virtue and all goodness ; and of this change 
 we have, in St. Augustin, as in his Confessions 
 may be seen, an illustrious example *. 
 
 * If every one that comes into the world, be (as in one 
 of the Articles of our religion is said) far gone from righteous- 
 ness, and of his own nature inclined to evil, there will be a 
 change to be undergone in the case of any man that would be 
 saved. This change every one that is baptized undergoes; 
 no such a change however takes place in the baptism of in- 
 fants, as that, when they have arrived at an age to take upon 
 them the vows which will have been made for them by their 
 sponsors, they may not fall back into their natural, or unre- 
 generate state ; and this may be supposed to be the case with 
 those that are mentioned in our text; I need not however 
 add, that, in the case of these, faith is supposed. 
 
SECT, vn.] 97 
 
 To return from this digression to the pro- 
 per subject of this section (and to which, as 
 I have said, the foregoing remarks are not 
 wholly foreign), it is observable, that it is 
 only as the evils to which we are subject in 
 this life lose the reason or nature of evil (but 
 which can be the case only as we have faith in 
 Christ), that they may voluntarily be chosen; 
 and, except as they are so, we cannot have 
 charity: for charity consists in love; and if 
 Christ, by his offering himself up for us, 
 showed his love for us in an eminent degree, 
 there will be a like sacrifice to be made by us, 
 as we would, in obedience to his commands, 
 and after his example, love one another; 
 if a love then such as Christ's was, be in- 
 compatible with the love of ourselves, evil will 
 evidently be chosen, as we at any time show 
 this love. 
 
 There was something the reverse of this in 
 the onginal choice of evil which was made by 
 our first parent ; for he, by this choice of evil, 
 showed that he loved himself more than God. 
 Had Adam, however, not thus loved himself, 
 God could not so have loved us, as to give 
 his only Son to die for us. Had the evils to 
 which we, in consequence of this original 
 h3 
 
98 [part I. 
 
 choice of evil, became subject, not been 
 suffered to have their entrance into the world, 
 the great power which God has of bring- 
 ing good out of evil could not have been 
 known. Had Adam chosen good rather than 
 evil, when good and evil were set before him, 
 an earthly happiness would have been chosen 
 by himj instead of that misery which he in 
 reality chose. The happiness, however, of 
 which God is the author, as he brings good 
 out of evil, is as much greater than that of 
 which man, had he chosen good, would, in 
 a manner, have been the author, as the soul 
 is of greater value than the body; and as this 
 good is set before us, the happiness to which 
 we shall attain, as we make a sacrifice of 
 that which is of this life, is greater than that 
 happiness which Adam would have enjoyed, 
 had he chosen good rather than evil. 
 
 The sin of Adam, as it will have appeared, 
 was the prolific source of the various evils to 
 which, in this mortal life, we are subject; 
 our happiness, however, and not our misery, 
 was intended of God, as he permitted these 
 evils to befall us: but if the evils, in general, 
 to which we are subject were the natural 
 effect of the sin of Adam, the sins which we 
 
SECT. VII.] 99 
 
 personally commit must Iiave a like effect; 
 and, in this case, the evils which we bring on 
 ourselves will be added to those to which, in 
 our general capacity, we are liable. But if these 
 evils, which in general befall us, are calcu- 
 lated to cause a detestation of sin, much more 
 will those be so which arise from our own 
 perverseness. Now, we cannot hate vice, but 
 as we shall love virtue; for, the deformity 
 and unloveliness of vice implies a beauty and 
 loveliness in virtue. The loveliness of virtue 
 consists in nothing more than in this, namely, 
 that when a virtuous man has departed this 
 life, his virtue will survive him : for it will live 
 in the memories of those who will have pro- 
 fited by it ; his death will be a gain to him- 
 self, but it will be accounted as a loss by his 
 relations and friends. And although, as loving 
 virtue and embracing it, we shall still be li- 
 able not only to the evils to which, in com- 
 mon with others, we are subject, but to the 
 scorn and malice of wicked men; in regard, 
 however, our virtue will be more exalted, in 
 proportion to our patience and resignation 
 under these evils, the satisfaction which will 
 arise in our minds will be a happiness which 
 will be, as I may so say, a foretaste of that 
 which we may expect hereafter; and this is 
 h4 
 
100 [part I. 
 
 a reason, in addition to that which has above 
 been given, for God's permitting Adam to 
 sin. 
 
 I shall conclude this section with the 
 following remarks of a learned divine, whose 
 notions of moral virtue I have had the plea- 
 sure, since this section was written, to find 
 have coincided with mine. " The belief and 
 energy of the Gospel, remedies every temporal 
 evil, as far as it can be remedied in consist- 
 ence with our present state. It shows the 
 evils of this life to be our appointed course of 
 probation, and intended to prepare us for a 
 better. It assures us of the divine support 
 and favour, if we submit with resignation to 
 the divine will. It informs us that these very 
 trials work out for us afar more exceeding and 
 eternal weight of glory. It teaches us, that 
 as the Captain of our salvation ivas made per- 
 fect through sufferings, so mani/ sons must thus 
 be brought into glory ; and that, after we have 
 suffered awhile, we may hope, as the Apostle 
 prays, that God will make us perfect, establish, 
 strengthen, settle us*" 
 
 * Browne's Essay, vol. ii. p. 244. 
 
SECTION VIII. 
 
 It has been observed by a celebrated French 
 philosopher, " that God loves all his works, 
 and that it is only his love that preserves 
 them in their being. He supposes it to be 
 God's will that all created spirits should have 
 the same inclination (or love) with his own ; 
 and this will of God's (he says) has its ful- 
 filling in the love which they have for them- 
 selves, or that desire for their preservation of 
 which self-love properly consists. As God, 
 however, is infinitely more lovely than man, 
 or any created being is, it is reasonable only 
 (he says) that man should love God more 
 than himself; and which (he adds) would be. 
 the case, as we should place our ultimate end 
 in ourselves, and centre our love there, with- 
 out reference to God: for, as man has no 
 real goodness «or subsistence of himself, but 
 only in the participation and being of Go^J, he 
 
102 [part I. 
 
 is no farther lovely than as he is related to 
 God*." 
 
 " The love of God (our author, in another 
 chapter, observes) was lost by the fall; and 
 the love which man now has, is a love for 
 himself without any reference to God; the 
 consequence of which is, that the inclination 
 or desire which we naturally have for our 
 preservation (i. e. our self-love) is so mightily 
 increased, that it is become the absolute mas- 
 ter of our will; it has ever converted the 
 love of God, or love which we have for good 
 in general, and that which is due to other 
 men, into its own nature: for it may be said, 
 that the love of ourselves at present ingrosses 
 all, because we love all things, but with re- 
 lation to ourselves ; whereas we should love 
 God only first, and all things after as related 
 to himf." 
 
 Such, according to our author, is the case 
 of man in a state of nature, i. e. in his pre- 
 sent fallen state ; and this account, it must 
 be confessed, is not materially different from 
 
 * Malbranche, Search of Truth, Book IV. chap. viii. 
 t Ibid. Book V. chap. ix. p. 27. 
 
SECT. VIII.] 103 
 
 what the Scriptures say, when they tell us, 
 that the wickedness of man (after his having 
 sinned) was great on the earth; and that every 
 Imagination of the thoughts of his heart was 
 onlif evil continually *. In a state of grace, 
 however, it is otherwise; and our author ac- 
 cordingly observes, that " wlien faith and 
 reason certify to us, God is tiie sovereign 
 good, and that he can fill us with pleasure, 
 we easily conceive it our duty to love him, 
 and readily afford him our affections; but, 
 unassisted by grace, self-love is always the 
 first mover. All pure and defecate charity is 
 above the strength of our corrupt nature; 
 and so far are we from loving God for him- 
 self, that human reason cannot comprehend 
 how it is possible to love him without re- 
 ference to ourselves, and making our own 
 satisfaction our ultimate end." Here our au- 
 thor supposes that we may love God without 
 any reference to ourselves: but which we 
 certainly do not, if our own happiness be the 
 end for which we love him ; and it is equally 
 certain, that our love will then only be dis- 
 interested when we do so : for, if we love God 
 
 • Gen. vi. 6. 
 
104 [part I. 
 
 with a reference to ourselves, our own satis- 
 faction or happiness will (as Malbranche 
 rightly says) be the ultimate end of our love ; 
 and such, as I conceive, is the notion which 
 commonly obtains with modern moralists; a 
 proof of which will appear from the following- 
 extracts from writers who, from their emi- 
 nence as moral writers, may be supposed to 
 speak for the rest. " Self-love is a disposition 
 that is essential to our nature, and inseparable 
 from our being, by which we desire to be 
 happy — ^by which we seek the happiness which 
 we have not, and rejoice in it when we pos- 
 sess it:" to this he adds, " The object which 
 I love, I love not for its own sake, but for 
 the sake of the happiness which I enjoy 
 through it *." To the same purpose it is ob- 
 served by a learned prelate as follows: — 
 " Though happiness, private happiness, is the 
 proper or ultimate end of all our actions 
 whatever, yet that particular means of hap- 
 piness which any particular action is chiefly 
 adapted to procure, or the thing chiefly 
 aimed at by that action; the thing which, 
 if possessed, we would not undertake that 
 
 * Adam Clarke on Matt. ix. 19. 
 
SECT. VIII.] 105 
 
 action, may, and generally is, called the end 
 of that action*." 
 
 There is a notion, however, which has been 
 adopted by an ingenious writer of the last 
 century, which, to say the least of it, is more 
 scriptural than those which are above men- 
 tioned appear to me to be, wherein a very 
 judicious distinction is made between the love 
 of God, and the love of our neighbour. " The 
 word love (says our author), as applied to 
 God, and as it is in the first of the two great 
 commandments, signifies the desiring him as 
 a good ; but when, in the second, it is applied 
 to our neighbour, it signifies, not desiring 
 him (our neighbour) as a good, but desiring 
 good to him-J-." There is a selfishness in be- 
 nevolence, even as we shall be supposed to 
 show it as it is spoken of by a judicious 
 writer, as follows : " As to love them of whom 
 we receive good things is duty, because they 
 satisfy our desire in that which we want ; so 
 to love them on whom we bestow, is nature, 
 because in them we behold the effects of our 
 own virtue J." We love ourselves in this case 
 
 * Preliminary dissertation to King's Origin of Evil, Ixvi. 
 
 t Norris's Letters, p. 104. 
 
 I Hooker, Eccles. Polity, B. I. p. 78. 
 
106 [part I. 
 
 as seeing ourselves in others as in a mirror. 
 The following is a notion of St. Bernard's on 
 this subject: — "Duo sunt prsecepta a Deo 
 nobis data, dilectio Dei, et dilectio proximi ; 
 at licet sint duo prsecepta, unus tamen est 
 amor; quia alius amor non est quo quis 
 diligit proximum, sed quo diligit Deum. 
 Amando igitur proximum eodem amore quo 
 Deum amamus, proximum amamus propter 
 Deum ; quia ut ametur, creatus est proximus 
 a Deo*." 
 
 The last opinion on this subject which I 
 shall mention, previously to that which I 
 have adopted, is that of a writer, who, in 
 abilities perhaps, is exceeded by no moral 
 writer that has gone before him ; whose opi- 
 nion, however, as the truth of it shall be 
 admitted, steers clearer of the disinterested- 
 ness of our love, as our neighbour is the ob- 
 ject of our love, than those which I have 
 mentioned (Mr. Norris's excepted) seem to 
 do. Upon the supposition of love being a 
 principle of action ingrafted in man, as a 
 social being, he contends, " that disinterest- 
 edness is, in its very notion, implied in bene- 
 
 • Medit. Idiotae, c. xxix. 
 
SECT. VIII.] 107 
 
 vOlence; and that it would be impossible 
 that we should have any notion of our being 
 interested, but from a preconceived opinion 
 of its being so. Benevolence, or compassion 
 towards others," he says, " presupposes some 
 knowledge of what is good or evil to them ; " 
 he denies, however, with respect to our be- 
 nevolence and compassion, that, " in their 
 true nature, they arise from any previous 
 opinion, that the good of others tends to the 
 good of the agent; they are," he says, " the 
 determinations of our nature previous to our 
 choice from interest, which excite us to action 
 as soon as we know other sensitive or rational 
 beings, and have any apprehension of their 
 happiness or misery*." Now I suppose that 
 it would be granted to me by our author, 
 that as any one shall be persuaded that his 
 benevolence is disinterested (and I agree 
 with him that it commonly seems to us to be 
 so), it will be the same thing, as to any 
 such purpose as it may be intended to an- 
 swer, as if it really was so; i.e. as if self- 
 love was not at the bottom ; but which, how- 
 ever, as I conceive, will necessarily be the 
 case with men in a state of nature. Having 
 
 • Nature and Conduct of the Passions, p. 19. 
 
108 [part 1. 
 
 premised thus much, I observe, that our au- 
 thor supposes benevolence to be a principle 
 that is ingrafted in the nature of man, as a 
 social being; but if so, eveiy man will come 
 into the world actuated by two principles, the 
 one contrary to the other: for, the actions of 
 a child as evidently proceed from a principle 
 of self-love as those of a brute do ; and self- 
 preservation, which is a dictate of nature, is 
 at the bottom of this love with both alike; 
 but true benevolence implies self-denial: for 
 we never act for the good of others, but as 
 we make a sacrifice of some good of our own. 
 When reason, which distinguishes us from 
 brutes, begins to dawn, we find ourselves, by 
 degrees, not only inclined, but forcibly im- 
 pelled to seek the good of others : for we then 
 find ourselves in a great measure dependent 
 on others for our preservation and well- 
 being; and there is no way so well calcu- 
 lated to conciliate the affections of others, as 
 to do them all the good we can. This I sup- 
 pose to be the case of men as they are in a 
 state of nature; a state of grace, however, 
 does not in such manner take us out of our 
 state of nature, as that we are not still liable 
 to the various evils which originate in the sin 
 of Adam: for, it is only as we are liable to 
 
SECT. VIII.] 109 
 
 these evils that we can, upon the system 
 which I have adopted, act witli benevolence ; 
 and our author* himself supposes true moral 
 virtue to consist in acts of benevolence. 
 Seeing, however, it is only as a man is in a 
 state of grace, that he can, according to my 
 notions, act with disinterested benevolence, 
 it will follow, that self-love will be at the 
 bottom of all such kindness and benevolence 
 as he may show towards others, notwith- 
 standing that it will necessarily seem to him 
 to be otherwise: for a brother cannot be the 
 object of a man's love, and he himself con- 
 stitute that object at the same time; self-love 
 nevertheless not only may, but, as I have said, 
 necessarily will be at the bottom of a man's 
 benevolence, as he shall be supposed to be in 
 a state of nature, even when another is the 
 object of his benevolence. Having now 
 proved, as I conceive, against this writer, 
 that self-love not only may be, but, in some 
 cases, necessarily is the spring from which 
 our benevolent and most virtuous actions 
 arise, notwithstanding its seeming to us to be 
 otherwise; I shall take my leave of our au- 
 thor, and conclude this section with some 
 
 - Paj?e 115. 
 
 I 
 
 
Mb [part I. 
 
 remarks which are suitable to the proper 
 subject thereof. 
 
 The purpose for which we have, in the 
 divine intention, our being- in this world, I 
 have supposed to be our being qualified for 
 that happiness which is suitable to our im- 
 mortal nature; and the longing which we 
 have for it will show that it is a happiness 
 which is not of this world, and must there- 
 fore be of another. In regard, however, a 
 qualification for future happiness arises as we 
 do good ; and no good which we may do can 
 avail us for any eternal purpose, except as 
 it shall be done in obedience to Christ's com- 
 mands, and after the example which he has 
 set us, it will be evident, that no good works 
 will qualify us for future happiness, but such 
 as spring from faith in Christ. Seeing, how- 
 ever, the good works which we do, as we act 
 from natural benevolence, may be the same 
 in appearance as those which spring from 
 faith; and we cannot, as St. Austin well ob- 
 serves, know, " an sit radix dulcis, an sit 
 amara," i. e. as hath been said above, whe- 
 ther our benevolence be disinterested, or in- 
 terested; the question which arises is, whe- 
 ther there is any criterion by which the dis- 
 
SECT. VIII.] Ill 
 
 iiiterestedness of our benevolence may be 
 known: for if, as I have said, self-love may 
 be at the bottom of our benevolence, not- 
 withstanding its seeming to us, as we do any 
 act of kindness to others, that it is their good 
 or benefit that we intend, and not our own, 
 its merely seeming to us that our benevo- 
 lence is disinterested, will be no true criterion 
 at all. Now, I say that the Gospel will, 
 and that no other moral system can afford 
 this criterion ; and to show this, I observe as 
 follows : — The sum of the answer which Christ 
 gave to one who came to him to know what 
 good thing he should do to have eternal life) 
 was. Keep the moral law; this, he answered, 
 he had kept from his youth up, and asked, 
 what lack he had yet 9 Christ replied. If thou 
 wilt he perfect, go sell that thou hast, and give 
 to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in hea- 
 ven, and come and follow me*. When the 
 young man had heard that saying, we are told, 
 he went away sorrowful ; and from whence it 
 may be supposed, that he took not the ad- 
 vice which had been given him ; had it beeii 
 otherwise, however, and which might have 
 been the case, he would have given an un- 
 
 * Matt. xix. 16, «t seq. 
 I 2 
 
1*15 [part I. 
 
 equivocal proof not only of the sincerity of 
 his belief in a future state, but likewise of the 
 disinterestedness of his benevolence; for he 
 would have given a proof of that self-denial 
 which is inconsistent with self-love; self- 
 denial, therefore, is the proper criterion of the 
 disinterestedness of benevolence; and as it 
 can arise only from a belief in a future state, 
 it is a criterion which the Gospel alone can 
 afford: for it is from divine revelation only 
 that we can have any assurance of a future 
 life; hence the necessity, if I may so say, 
 arises of future rewards and punishments, not 
 so much that we may be encouraged to pur- 
 sue the path of virtue, or be deterred from 
 that of vice, as that we may have an as- 
 surance of a future life, and may thereby be 
 enabled to make a willing sacrifice of a life 
 which is of this world. 
 
 Now, this sacrifice we make, as we deny 
 ourselves; we give the most unequivocal 
 proof of our belief in a future life. The same 
 thing may be said of meekness, patience, and 
 humility, and which are a species of self- 
 denial; and which, like self-denial, are in- 
 compatible with any hope that is of this life. 
 If these virtues are condemned, and even 
 
SECT. VIII.] 113 
 
 held in contempt upon principles of philoso 
 phy, it is because a future life ever was, and 
 ever will be, unknown to philosophy. With 
 the ancient philosophers, who had no notion 
 of any good or happiness but what is of this 
 world, fortitude, prudence, temperance, and 
 justice, were in esteem, as being virtues by 
 which that good or happiness could only be 
 enjoyed; and they to whom revelation has 
 since their time, in vain, proposed a higher 
 good and greater happiness, of course think 
 as the aforesaid philosophers did, and endea- 
 vour to follow their steps. 
 
SECTION IX. 
 
 Self-denial has, in the preceding section, 
 been shown to be the criterion of disinterested 
 benevolence. As self-denial, however (such, 
 I mean, as it must be in order for its consti- 
 tuting the aforesaid criterion), would, under 
 any other system than that of the Gospel, be 
 contrary to the dictates of nature; I shall 
 endeavour in the present section to show, 
 that self-denial is not only reconcilable with 
 the law of nature, but that human nature 
 can only be restored to that purity which it 
 lost by the fall, as this virtue shall be prac- 
 tised. 
 
 The word self, as applicable to an indivi- 
 dual of the human species, implies the ex- 
 istence of some one, or more, other indivi- 
 duals: for, like the word person, it distin- 
 guishes each individual from all other indi- 
 viduals; with this difference, however, that 
 the word person distinguishes them exter- 
 
SECT. IX.] 115 
 
 nally, and as each individual may be known 
 by other individuals; but the word self, in- 
 ternally, i. e. as each individual may be con- 
 scious to himself that he has an existence se- 
 parate and distinct from that of othei-s. On 
 this ground I say, that as man first came out 
 of the hands of his Maker, he cannot pro- 
 perly be said to have had either a self, or a 
 person ; and that because of the want of any 
 other man from whom he was distinguishable. 
 Adam can scarce indeed be said to have 
 been a being distinct from Eve when she had 
 been made; for, whatever distinction there 
 might have been between them in respect of 
 sex, there would, as I suppose, have been 
 none between them with respect to a self; for, 
 as Adam and Eve shall be supposed to have 
 been so united in will, as that what Adam 
 willed Eve would have willed, and what Eve 
 willed Adam would have willed, they would 
 mutually have seen a self in each other; and 
 if so, Adam in his loving Eve, would have 
 loved himself, and Eve in her loving Adam, 
 would have loved herself; and which, ^s I 
 conceive, would have been inconsistent with 
 any gross or carnal love. Things, however, 
 would have been otherwise when the multi- 
 plication of the species had once taken place: 
 i4 
 
 \ 
 
Il6 [pAr.T I. 
 
 for, a son of Adam's, how like soever he 
 might have been to Adam, would have been 
 not less distinguishable from Adam, than the 
 son of a man at the present time is from his 
 father. 
 
 Now, besides this distinction which arises 
 with respect to the individuals of the human 
 race, and which I call natural, there is a dis- 
 tinction which, in consequence of the free- 
 dom of the will, may arise, and which may 
 properly be called moral ; there is a same- 
 ness, it is true, between men as they are 
 either good or evil ; a diversity, or distinc- 
 tion, nevertheless, arises, as they do those 
 things by which they show themselves to be 
 either the one or the other. By way of illus- 
 tration of my meaning, and in confirmation 
 of the truth of this remark, I observe as fol- 
 lows : — A man, as he shall be supposed to act 
 in his natural capacity, will no doubt be the 
 same man at one time as he was at any 
 former time ; and it is accordingly contended 
 by the learned author of the Analogy of 
 Nature, against those who, because men are 
 continually undergoing a change with re- 
 spect to their bodies, suppose them to be con- 
 
SECT. IX. J 117 
 
 tinually undergoing a like change with re- 
 spect to their persons, as follows : — " Eveiy 
 man is conscious that he is the same pei-son, 
 or self, he was, as far back as his remem- 
 brance reaches; since, when any one reflects 
 upon a past action of his own, he is just as 
 certain of the person who did that action, 
 namely, himself, the person who now reflects 
 upon it, as he is certain that the act was at 
 all done. It is a man's consciousness," as 
 our author adds, " that is an assurance to 
 him of his being the same person he was at 
 any former time: for," as he further observes, 
 " although the consciousness of man's exist- 
 ence in any two successive moments is not 
 the same consciousness, but different con- 
 sciousnesses, the person nevertheless that is 
 conscious at these different times, is the same 
 person*." Now, all this, as I have said, may 
 be very true, as a man shall be considered in 
 his natural capacity; as he shall be consi- 
 dered in his moral capacity, however, it may 
 be otherwise; i. e. considered in the latter of 
 these capacities, he may be a different man at 
 one time from what he was at another, con- 
 
 * Bishop Butler on Personal Identity, p. 307. 
 
119 [part I. 
 
 sistently with his being the same man at all 
 times, considered in the former : for instance ; 
 when a man repents of the evil which he is 
 conscious to himself of his having done, he 
 becomes, morally considered, a different man 
 from what he was before "J-; and it is accord- 
 ingly observed by a commentator of no mean 
 abilities, paradoxical as it may seem to be, 
 " that every man is (or at least may be) two 
 men ;" and, as this shall be supposed, he will 
 have two selfs, as a moral personality or cha- 
 racter shall be supposed to arise, as men do 
 either good or evil; and, in confirmation of 
 the truth of this observation, our author 
 quotes the following words of St. Bernard : — 
 " Domine, libera me de malo homine meip- 
 so[*]." Now, seeing the word me in this 
 
 t Trapp on Rom. viii. 20. 
 
 [*] Wc stand not in need of a divine revelation for our 
 knowing that man is in a fallen state ; for I suppose that there 
 is no man, how virtuous soever he may be, who may not find 
 something in himself that will witness to the truth thereof; 
 but much more will he know this, when he sees in how dread- 
 ful a state of depravity and wretchedness a very considerable 
 part of mankind are immersed ; and it is by the grace of God 
 only that any man in particular is not of the number of these ; 
 and we have the truth of this observation witnessed to us by 
 St. John, when he says. We know (i. e. naturally and not su- 
 pernaturally) that the whole world lieth in wickedness. (1 John, 
 v. 19.) Now, seeing man was perfect, or upright, as he came 
 out of the hands of his Maker, and this perfection or upright- 
 
SECT. IX.] 119 
 
 prayer of Saint Bernard, implies a self, 
 equally as the word inelpao, it will be evident 
 
 ness was of a moral kind, lie would, as he cahic out of the 
 hands of God, be united in will with him ; and so much I sup- 
 pose to be meant by the word upright. Havings, however, a 
 freedom of will, he mij^hl fall from this original uprightness; 
 and as his falling shall be supposed, the union which I have 
 mentioned would be dissolved. If man, however, was in- 
 tended for a greater happiness, than any which he could have 
 enjoyed in an earthly Paradise, and the divine intention could 
 not be frustrated by man's perversity, his being reunited in 
 will to God, in other words, his being restored to his original 
 perfection, or uprightness, must have been possible. Now, 
 of what kind soever the happiness which Adam enjoyed in 
 Paradise, and which he might have continued to enjoy, may be 
 supposed to have been, it evidently would have been a happi- 
 ness that he would have owed wholly to God, and in no part 
 to himself; there is sometliing, however, in the happiness for 
 which man, as I have supposed, was originally intended, that 
 is the reverse of this ; i. c. it is a happiness which man must 
 so necessarily owe to himself, as that, except as this was the 
 case, he could know himself to be happy ; for it would not 
 only arise from a consciousness of his owing it to himself, but 
 consist in that consciousness. It may, perhaps, be said, in 
 objection to tliis notion, that had God not set this good, or 
 happiness, before man, man could not have chosen it, and 
 therefore he would have owed it to God ; to which I answer, 
 God did not set good or happiness before man, but as he, at 
 the same time, set evil or misery before him; and as the 
 choosing either the one or the other of these would depend 
 upon man himself, so the satisfaction which he would feel as 
 he shall be supposed to choose happiness, would constitute 
 that happiness ; and the remorse which he would feel as he 
 shall be supposed to choose evil or misery, would constitute 
 Ihat misery. The good and evil which are now set before us, 
 
120 [part I. 
 
 not only that the self from which it was his 
 desire to be delivered, was a different self 
 from that which he had as he prayed, and 
 that both these selfs existed at the same time. 
 
 It will be in agreement with the above- 
 mentioned reasoning of Bishop Butler to say, 
 that a man cannot wilfully do any evil thing, 
 but as he will be conscious that he himself 
 did that thing; and the truth of this will be 
 further testified to him by the remorse, or 
 
 suppose an original choice of evil; and the very wretched 
 state which in a former part of this note has been mentioned, 
 we know to have been the consequence of that sad choice; 
 seeing, however, that by faith in Christ who has redeemed us, 
 a greater happiness may be enjoyed than any which man, as I 
 have shown, could have experienced had he not fallen, we 
 know not which of these two things most to admire and 
 wonder at, namely, the great power of faith, or the great 
 power of God, by which good has been brought out of evil ; 
 a change such as that which is mentioned in our text, must 
 take place in each man, or he cannot be saved. Now if, as I 
 have said, it be not necessary that we should see the very 
 wretched state of depravity into which a very considerable 
 part of mankind are fallen, in order to our knowing man to be 
 in a fallen state ; for that there is something, even in the best 
 and most virtuous, that may witness this truth to them ; it 
 will be evident, that no greater faith will be necessary in order 
 that the change which I have mentioned should be wrought in 
 the caset)f the worst, than in that of the best and most virtuous 
 among men ; great then must b&4|ie power of faith, in whom- 
 soever this change shall be wrought. See n. * p. 96. 
 
Sect, ix.] J 21 
 
 anguish of mind, with which the remem- 
 brance of the evil which we have done is usu- 
 ally attended: I say usually; for a man's con- 
 science may, by repeated acts of sin, become 
 seared, as if by a red-hot iron. Seeing, how- 
 ever, the conscience of every true believer will 
 have been purged of deadwovTis*, i. e. of "the 
 sins which he has committed; a man, with 
 whom this shall be supposed to be the case, 
 will evidently, morally considered, be a dif- 
 ferent man from what he was before: at the 
 same time th^it, naturally considered, he will 
 continue to be the same man as he always 
 was. Let it, however, be said (for this has 
 been said in objection to this doctrine-}-), that 
 a man cannot but remember the evil which he 
 has done ; a man cannot, I admit, well forget, 
 during his abode in this life, the evil which he 
 has done in any former part thereof, neither 
 is it fit that he should : for, if an amendment 
 of life be necessary in order for a man's know- 
 ing the sincerity of his repentance, he, to 
 whom God grants time and gives grace for 
 this purpose, will, as he shall make a due use 
 of these, have no reason to regret his remem- 
 bering his past sins; for he must remember 
 
 * Heb. ix. 14 f Balguy. 
 
122 [part I, 
 
 them, in order for his repenting of them. If 
 tlie peace of mind, however, which he from 
 time to time will experience who lives accord- 
 ing to a newness of life, will testify to him 
 that God remembers his sins no more, this 
 man will have reason to bless God that he 
 himself has not forgotten them * ; " ut mala 
 mea non obliviscar, aliena non requiram," 
 was accordingly a prayer of St. Austin's. 
 
 Now, if a newness of life be one and the 
 same thing with a virtuous life, and which I 
 suppose it to be, the above remarks, were it 
 
 * The observation of Archbishop King, that " the remem- 
 brance of any wickedness which we have committed will sting 
 us, and we cannot forgive ourselves, though we were secure 
 both from human punishment, and the divine wrath" (Origin 
 of Evil, vol. ii. p. 325), is a notion which is not peculiar to 
 him. There is, however, a fault in it, and which is as follows : 
 So long as the remembrance of any sin stings us, we are not 
 forgiven of God ; and we cannot be secure from his wrath, 
 either in this world, or in that which is to come, except as 
 we are forgiven all such sins as we may have committed. We 
 may remember the sins we have committed for the whole of 
 our life, and, perhaps, in a future life (in order, as the Psalm- 
 ist, in his own case, said, that the bones which thou hast broken 
 may rejoice); but if this remembrance docs not sting us, and 
 which it will not do, if we have faith in Christ, their being 
 remembered by us, will, as in our text is said, be of no con- 
 sequence : except as the purpose which I have mentioned, and 
 which we may suppose was answered in David's case, may 
 be answered in ours. 
 
SECT. IX.] 123 
 
 for this reason only, will not have been fo* 
 reign to the subject of the present section : 
 for, in a former section it has been shown, 
 that self-denial is (upon the Christian system 
 at least) the very essence of moral virtue. 
 In consideration, however, of there being 
 something in self-denial which may seem to 
 be contrary to nature, my more particular in- 
 tention has been to show, that as this virtue 
 shall be well understood, the very reverse of 
 this will appear to be the case: this indeed 
 has in a great measure already been shown ; 
 for, what we deny, or devote to destruction, 
 as we practise this virtue, is that corrupt and 
 sinful nature, or self, which we derive from 
 our parents; and which we cherish as we 
 gratify those inordinate lusts, to which, as I 
 suppose, the veiy corruption of that nature 
 incites us ; and which therefore could not, in 
 a state of innocence, have been felt. 
 
 It has in a former section been supposed, 
 that, in consequence of the curse which came 
 upon the earth when Adam had sinned, all 
 food came to be of a deleterious quality; and 
 that it was thus in a natural way that God's 
 threatenings were carried into execution. 
 Hence it will be evident, that Adam's satis- 
 
124 [part I. 
 
 fying his hunger would have an effect the re- 
 verse of that which would have been intended 
 by him, ignorant as he may be supposed to 
 have been of the unwholesomeness of such 
 food as he would have been under the neces- 
 sity of making use of; i. e. instead of acting 
 for the preservation of life, he would in reality 
 be acting for its destruction ; and as this was 
 the case with Adam, so will it have been the 
 case with all men ever since. Now, this we 
 do when we deny ourselves; i. e. we act for 
 the destruction rather than for the preserva- 
 tion of life; and that, whether we eat or 
 whether we abstain from eating; with this 
 difference, however, that in the one case we 
 deny ourselves ignorantly, but in the other 
 knowingly. 
 
 Now, seeing that, in consequence of our 
 having been redeemed by Christ, the founda- 
 tion of a new nature will have been laid in 
 every man; every man, as he denies himself, 
 whether it be by eating, or by abstaining from 
 eating, will be acting for the support or che- 
 rishing of that nature, and for the destruc- 
 tion of an old and corrupt nature, according 
 to which lie will be existing at the same time. 
 Although, then, a man, as he shall deny him- 
 
SKCT. IX. I 125 
 
 self*, in whatever way he does this, will be 
 acting in violation of the law of his old and 
 corrupt nature, — he nevertheless will be act- 
 ing agreeably to the law of his new and un- 
 corrupt nature, as any such nature shall be 
 supposed to have been formed in him, and 
 which is the case with every one that is rege- 
 nerate; and which is the thing that was to be 
 proved. 
 
 * To deny ourselves, and to take up our cross, are, in a 
 Gospel sense, synonymous terms. Now there is a cross that 
 is to be taken up in the case of every one that would be saved. 
 For there is in every one an evil nature, or self, which, as he 
 would be saved, he must devote to destruction ; and as a man 
 shall do this, he will be taking up his cross. Hence it is that 
 the taking up the cross is the great stumbling-block as Christ 
 is preached to us. For, if every man naturally loves himself, 
 how shall any man do those things, which show that he hates 
 himself? As St. Paul however found, that, as strengthened by 
 Christ, he could do all things, of course, that he was able to 
 take up his cross ; we, as we have a like faith with the Apo- 
 stle, shall be able to take up our cross, in whatever it may 
 please God that this shall consist. 
 
SECTION X. 
 
 (jroDLixKss, St. Paul tells us, is profitable 
 unto all things: having promise unto the life 
 that now is, and of that which is to come*. 
 Now, as, by the promise unto the life which 
 now is shall be supposed to be meant (and 
 which evidently is meant) a good, or happi- 
 ness, which is of this life; a good, or happi- 
 ness, which is of another life, will of course 
 be meant by the promise of that which is to 
 come; and if so, it will, as I conceive, be 
 evident, that as any one shall be supposed to 
 be living a godly life (i. e. as he shall be 
 living in obedience, for the most part, to the 
 precepts of the Gospel), he will not only be 
 seeking a good which is of this life, but a 
 good likewise which is of the life to come; the 
 good, however, which is of this life will, in 
 this case, be sought in subservience to that 
 which is of another. 
 
 * 1 Tim. iv. 8. 
 
SECT. X.J 127 
 
 Having premised thus much, I tliiuk my- 
 self well warranted in saying, that if upon 
 any supposed religious system a good which 
 is of a future life be not principally sought, 
 and, in which case, a good which is of this 
 life will only be sought, that system will be 
 a system which may upon the principles of 
 philosophy be established, and where there 
 can be no certainty as to a future life, but 
 which cannot stand on the ground of religion : 
 for religion proceeds upon the certainty of 
 there being a future life, however mistaken 
 men's notions may be (and except as they are 
 supernaturally enlightened, will necessarily 
 be), with respect to the true nature of that 
 life. 
 
 St. Paul, upon the supposition of there 
 being no future life, says, Let us eat and 
 drink; i. e. let us freely enjoy the good things 
 which are of this life ; and Solomon had be- 
 fore, and upon the like supposition, said the 
 same thing: for in the book of Ecclesiastes 
 we find it written as follows: — Thereis nothing 
 better for a man, than that he should eat and 
 drink; and that he should make his soul enjoy 
 good in his labour*. 
 
 * Chap. ii. 24. See Mevcerus in loc. 
 K 2 
 
128 [part I. 
 
 Now, I scarce need say, that this is the 
 system of Epicurus ; I am bold, however, to 
 say, that although others of the ancient phi- 
 losophers differ from Epicurus in many points, 
 their moral principles, nevertheless, as these 
 shall be traced to their source, will be found 
 to agree with the system of Epicurus: that 
 even of Aristotle not excepted. And as we 
 shall further suppose, that the present will 
 not be succeeded by a future life, the notions 
 of these ancient heathen philosophers, with 
 respect to the smmnum bonum, will certainly 
 have been well grounded; and that they were 
 so, we have the testimony of St. Paul, in the 
 above text, Let us eat, drink, ^c. 
 
 It is further observable, however, with re- 
 spect to these ancient philosophers, that they 
 perceiving a general depravity of manners to 
 prevail amongst men, concluded (from some 
 acquaintance which they probably had with 
 the writings of Moses), that as man was made 
 by God, so would this depravity consist in a 
 departure' from that righteousness, or up- 
 rightness, in which he must have been origi- 
 nally created; they therefore, upon the 
 ground of there being no true happiness but 
 what arises from the practice of moral virtue, 
 
 2 
 
SECT. X.] 121) 
 
 and confirnied in this opinion by their per- 
 ceiving that the misery of these men was^ 
 for the most part, in proportion to the de- 
 gree of their wickedness, benevolently thought 
 they could not perform a kinder office to their 
 fellow-creatures, than by endeavouring to re- 
 claim them from their evil ways, and so, by 
 degrees, bring them back to that integrity 
 and uprightness, from which they supposed 
 them to have fallen; and it was with this 
 intent, as I suppose, that their different sys- 
 tems of ethics were composed. 
 
 As these men, however, had no other light 
 than that of nature to direct them, and could 
 therefore have no notion of any happiness 
 but what is of this world, they could have 
 been equal to no virtue, the end of which 
 would not be sensual gratifications; and, 
 in agreement herewith, Aristotle (whose 
 ethics are esteemed as being the nearest of 
 any others to those of the Gospel) says, *' All 
 moral virtue is conversant about those plea- 
 sures and pains which the body feels, and is 
 founded on them * : " these notions differ not 
 from those of Epicurus -)-, and to whose phi- 
 
 * De Moribus, lib. ii. cap. 13. 
 
 t It has been spoken of as being something strange, tha; 
 
 k3 
 
l.'^O [part I. 
 
 losophy I have supposed the before-mentioned 
 text of Solomon, as well as that of St. Paul, 
 to refer. In justice, however, to these men, 
 who, as I have said, had no other light than 
 that of nature * to direct them, I shall add, 
 
 although Epicurus placed the happiness of man in sensual 
 pleasure, no man was more abstemious than he was. This, 
 however, might have been perfectly consistent with what he 
 taught: for no man, as I have reason to think, hath so much 
 pleasure in eating and drinking, as he who is abstemious ; 
 i. e. as he who eats not more, or drinks not more, than M'hat 
 the refection of the body requires ; and as to the quality of 
 foods and drinks, it is a rule with physicians, that the natural 
 and genuine appetency for these will be the best direction as 
 to the choice of them. 
 
 * As Plato is generally supposed to have been acquainted 
 with the writings of Moses, he is to be excepted as being of 
 the number of those philosophers who, in my text, are said 
 to have had no other light than that of nature. I take this 
 opportunity of observing, that Plato's writings so plainly show 
 him to have been acquainted with those of Moses, as that it 
 has been said of him, that " he was Moses speaking Greek." 
 It has likewise been observed, " that in Plato's second Alci- 
 biades Christ is plainly foretold: for that Plato (at least So- 
 crates, whose scholar Plato was, and whose philosophy is con- 
 tained in the writings of Plato), like the high priest, unknow- 
 ingly pointed at that divine Teacher who was to come into the 
 world some ages after him," — Addison. 
 
 In another part, however, of Plato's works it appears (if 
 at least M. Dacier's translation may be depended on), that 
 Plato has prophesied of Christ more distinctly than what is the 
 case in the instance which Mr. Addison has given. " Plato 
 (Dacier says) had so great and true an idea of perfect righte- 
 ousness, and was so thoroughly acquainted with the corruption 
 
SECT. X.] ]'M 
 
 that as the benevolence of their intentions in 
 composing their different systems shall be 
 considered, they deserve our commendation; 
 and as the genius which some of them, but 
 Aristotle in particular, has displayed, they 
 excite our admiration. 
 
 There are men, however, of the present 
 day, who have not only the light of revela- 
 tion to enlighten them, but who profess to 
 believe in the truth of that light, who never- 
 theless have in fact shut their eyes against 
 this light; for they say of the depravity 
 which now obtains, or which at any time 
 since the fall has obtained amongst men, 
 that it originates, not in any sinfulness or 
 evil inclination which is derived from a sin- 
 ning parent, but that it begins with each 
 man by a free determination of the will, and 
 that this determination of the will is com- 
 monly owing to a bad education, or bad ex- 
 amples; and thus, according to these men, 
 
 of mankind, that he makes it appear, in the second book of 
 his Commonwealth, that if a man perfectly righteous sbonid 
 come upon earth, he would find so much qpposition in the 
 world, that he would be imprisoned, reviled, scourged, and 
 in fine crucified, by such who, though they were extremely 
 wicked, would yet pass for righteous men." — Disc. p. 5. 
 
 K 4 
 
 ' H 
 
132 [part 1. 
 
 the sinfulness of every son of Adam is no 
 otherwise different from that which Adam's 
 was (as education and example shall be put 
 out of the case), than as the temptations to 
 sin are different ; for that with both it con- 
 sists in the prevalence of the sensitive over 
 the intellectual nature, i. e. of the passions 
 over reason. They further say, that God, 
 foreseeing this general depravity which would 
 obtain amongst men, and that the wisdom 
 of philosophers would in vain be used to 
 prevail on them to quit those gross pleasures 
 to which they would have been devoted, and 
 to tread the arduous path of virtue, for any 
 eternal purpose at least, had, in his wisdom, 
 provided a remedy for this evil ; that he ne- 
 vertheless chose that men should first see that 
 human wisdom, although exemplified in the 
 lives of philosophers, and taught by their 
 precepts, was an ineffectual remedy ; that the 
 remedy, however, which God had provided, 
 required, in order for its reaching the evil 
 which it was intended to correct, that vice 
 should have arrived at its greatest height*; 
 
 * The very deplorable state which the world was in, with 
 respect to religion and morals, at the time of Christ's ap- 
 pearance on earth, and for a considerable time had been in 
 previously thereto, has been the subject of Chap. XIX. of 
 
SECT. X.] 133 
 
 and this, they say, was the case when Christ 
 was born; that Christ, however, had no ex- 
 istence until he was created in the womb of 
 the virgin Mary, and of whom he was ac- 
 cordingly born ; that being supernaturally 
 enlightened, he would be enabled to teach a 
 purer morality than any of which men, who 
 had the light of nature only to direct them, 
 could have any notion, should come into the 
 world; and that the truth of his doctrines, 
 as well as of his divine mission, was witness- 
 ed by the power which he had of working 
 miracles. 
 
 Now, these men (and that by these I 
 mean the followers of Socinus will readily 
 be understood), denying original sin, as this 
 doctrine is taught by our church, suppose, 
 that there is no obstacle in the way of any 
 one, as he shall have become acquainted with 
 the Gospel, to practise its moral precepts, so 
 far as they should be found to .square with 
 
 Leiand's Necessity of a Divine Revelation, Such, indeed, 
 was the state of things, that had not the power of original 
 sin, and which I suppose to have been the cause thereof 
 been counteracted by the preaching of the Gospel, it evi- 
 dently would have desolated the earth, and brought all things 
 to ruin. 
 
134 [part I. 
 
 his reason*; and they say, that if this man 
 be conscious of his having done any thing 
 which his conscience tells iiiin he ought not 
 to have done, as God is merciful, he will, 
 upon this man's repentance, forgive him; 
 and so likewise, as he shall afterwards fall 
 into any sins. Thus these men deny that 
 Christ either did, or could, make any satis- 
 faction to the divine justice; and they say, 
 that any such notion is inconsistent with for- 
 giveness of sins. 
 
 These false notions, however, of these men, 
 in their denial of Christ's divine nature, and 
 the necessity of the satisfaction which he 
 made for the sins of the whole world, in 
 
 * " We cannot appeal to any natural power of man, as 
 an ultimate test of merit or demerit, without assuming that 
 human corruption has not affected that natural power." — 
 (Sumner on Apostolical Preaching, p. 118.) Now, the Soci- 
 nians, as in our text has been observed, deny that any cor- 
 ruption has come upon the human nature ; they accordingly 
 say, that the dignity of our nature requires it of us to sup- 
 pose that reason is as good a judge of the truth of any doc- 
 trine now as it ever was. The pride, which the above writer 
 supposes to be at the bottom of all these high notions which 
 men have of human reason (see p. 210), their pride, I say, 
 confutes them, for it argues the corruption of their nature ; 
 the corruption of our nature being the source of pride, as well 
 as of every vicious propensity. 
 
SECT. X.] 135 
 
 order that the sins of any one man should be 
 forg;iven, has been so clearly shown by many 
 learned men, as to supersede the necessity of 
 my adding any thing in confirmation of their 
 arguments; it would likewise be foreign to 
 the purpose of the present section, which has 
 been to show, that the morality of the Soci- 
 nians as little accords with that of the Gos- 
 pel as the morality of the heathen philoso- 
 phers does. 
 
 The same thing may be said of tlie doctrine 
 of original sin ; it may be said, that it has 
 been so well established by the labours of 
 many eminent divines, and in particular by 
 Bishop Burnett, as that my labour in support 
 of this doctrine might well have been spared, 
 had not an argument occurred to me, which 
 has not, to my knowledge, been made use of 
 by any writer for the like purpose, and which 
 argument is as follows:— If the sinfulness of 
 each man originates, as these men say (and 
 as in the above statement of their opinions 
 it may be seen they do), with himself, they 
 will virtually say, that the death of each man 
 originates with himself: for death must, like 
 all other things, have a cause, and sin, as 
 the Scriptures say, was the cause ; for St. Paul 
 
I.'i6 [PAKT U 
 
 says, By tnun (i. e. by the sin of man) came 
 death; and upon this ground he, in the fol- 
 lowing verse, says, In Adam all die; i.e. all 
 men became subject to death. Now, if in- 
 fants, who are incapable of sinning, die no 
 less than adults, and actual sin cannot in 
 their case be the cause of tlieir dying, either 
 the sin of Adam will be the cause of their 
 dying, or their dying will, contrarily to what 
 has been supposed, have no cause at all. If 
 they say, that their dying is owing to the 
 natural corruption of their nature, they in 
 fact say, that Adam would have died, even 
 though he had not sinned : for if corruption be 
 natural to the flesh, it would have been as 
 natural to Adam, as it is to us; and, in 
 which case, God's threatening with death 
 would have been nugatory. Seeing, how- 
 ever, these men say, not only that sin, but an 
 evil inclination, originates, in the case of 
 each man, with himself, I say, in objection 
 to this notion of theirs, that, as sin is an 
 act of the soul, and the body dies, not by 
 reason of any mortality to which it was 
 originally by nature subject, and which may 
 be supposed to be the case with brutes*, but 
 
 * Solomon says, " As a beast dieth, so dieth a man ; " 
 fallen man, however, is here spoken of, and not man as he 
 
SKtT. X.] 137 
 
 hy reason of the sin of the soul*; the soul 
 of Adam will have been sinful; and as a 
 clean cannot come out of an unclean thing, 
 nor the stream be pure when the fountain 
 from which it flows is foul, the soul of every 
 one descended from Adam will be sinful ; 
 and if so, every one that cometh into the 
 world will be inclined to evil, and that con- 
 tinually ; and so say the Scriptures ; for they 
 say. And God saw that the wickedness of man 
 was great on the earth, and that every ima- 
 gination of the thoughts of his heart was only 
 evil continually -j^. 
 
 came out of the hands of liis Maker ; and what but sin could 
 have thus brought man to be upon a level with a brute beast? 
 
 * Except as we suppose natural evil to originate with man, 
 it must originate with God, but which is impossible; death, 
 then, which is the greatest of all evils, must have originated 
 with man. Now, if all men will have been contained in 
 Adam (arid which, if all men spring from Adam, must have 
 been the case), all men will have sinned in Adam ; and if 
 all men will have sinned in Adam, the death to which each 
 man is born subject, may be said to originate with each man, 
 because each man will have partaken of the sin of Adam. 
 * Adam," says a learned divine, " was our federal head,- in 
 whom we covenanted, and in whom we sinned." — Hopkins, 
 p. 112. 
 
 t Gen. vi. 5. 
 
 The Gospel goes further back than the outward or sen- 
 sible act for the sinfulness of that act; the truth of which 
 remark is witnessed by the text, Whosoever looketh on a 
 
138 [part I. 
 
 These men, however (viz. the Socinians), 
 as a learned prelate observes, say, " that 
 as Adam was made mortal, and had died 
 whether he had sinned or not, so they think, 
 that the liberty of nature is still entire, and 
 that every man is punished for his own sins, 
 and not for the sins of others : and to do 
 otherwise, they say, seems contrary to jus- 
 tice, if not to goodness *." In answer to which 
 I say, that if death originate in the sin of 
 
 woman to lust after her, hath committed adultery with her 
 already. Now, we must suppose every imagination of the 
 thoughts of men's hearts to be only evil continually ; for our 
 knowing the truth of the above words of our Saviour, or even 
 for their being intelligible, I say the same of anger, as I have 
 said of lusting after a woman; I say, it is a sin of our na- 
 ture, i. e. of our depraved nature, and what no man can help ; 
 if then it be a sin, on account of which, as our Saviour has 
 told us, we are in danger of the judgment, i. e. for which we 
 are responsible to God, it must be a sin of which we may be 
 guilty in our personal capacity : for, it is in our general ca- 
 pacity, or that capacity by reason of which we are one with 
 all men, that we are guilty of a sin which I have called the 
 sin of our nature, and what we cannot but be continually 
 committing. When St. Paul then, in his Epistle to the Ephe- 
 sians, says, Be ye angry, he does not speak in contradiction 
 to the above words of our Saviour : for, these words of the 
 Apostle I suppose to have respect to our general capacity ; but 
 those of our Saviour, to our private or personal capacity; and 
 to this capacity I suppose the Apostle to have respect, when 
 to the words, Be ye angry, he adds, and sin not. 
 * Burnett on Art. IX. 
 
SECT. X.] 139 
 
 Adam (and wliicli these men cannot^ consist- 
 ently with tliat belief which they jprofess to 
 have in the truth of the Scriptures, deny), 
 the various evils to which, in this transitoiy 
 life, we are subject, will likewise originate in 
 the sin of Adam : for, these not only lead to 
 death, but may be said to be death, as the 
 Apostle witnesseth, when, with a reference 
 to the various hardships which he had en- 
 dured for the sake of Christ, he says. In 
 death often; and if death be a punishment 
 (and which these men, if they believe in the 
 truth of the Scriptures, must likewise con- 
 fess), the evils which I have mentioned, must 
 likewise be a punishment ; but if so, every 
 man that cometh into the world will be pu- 
 nished before there is any possibility of his 
 having done any thing for which he may 
 deserve to be punished: for, the experience 
 of pain and misery is coeval with the first 
 breath which a child draws when it comes 
 into the world; and as its crying (which is 
 commonly the case with a child as soon as it 
 is born) may serve to show ; for its crying is 
 a plain indication of its feeling pain. 
 
 Having thus, by an argument which I defy 
 these men to refute, proved that death, and 
 
140 [part I. 
 
 the whole train of evils that lead to deatli , 
 originate in the sin of Adam, it will be evi- 
 dent, in contradiction to what they assert, 
 that men may justly be punished for sins of 
 which they have not been personally guilty ; 
 and that this may be the case, even where 
 the sin of Adam is actually the cause of his 
 posterity being punished, God's visiting the 
 sins of fathers on their innocent children is 
 a proof*. Now these men, as hath been 
 stated, say, that every man that is punished, 
 is punished for his own sins, and not for the 
 sins of others ; and in support of this posi- 
 tion of theirs, they say, that it being other- 
 wise would be inconsistent with the divine 
 justice and goodness : the very reverse, how- 
 ever, of this is the case, as the Scriptures 
 account for these things ; for if, as we learn 
 from these sacred writings, Christ was pu- 
 nished for the sin of which all men, as being 
 virtually contained in Adam, were guilty, 
 the divine justice will have been satisfied ; 
 and if we, notwithstanding, die, from the cer- 
 tainty nevertheless of our rising again, death 
 
 * When God inflicts calamities on the children of vicious 
 parents, these children will be innocent of the particular 
 crimes of their parents ; they nevertheless will have been 
 criminal as ha> ing^ sinned in Adam. 
 
SECT. X.] 141 
 
 will be as a sleep only : and if, by virtue of 
 the second covenant, the sins of which we 
 are personally g^uilty will, as the conditions 
 of that covenant shall duly be performed, be 
 forgiven, the goodness and mercy of God will 
 be manifest. 
 
 There is however a stronger argument 
 even than this which I, or than any which 
 divines, to my knowledge, have made use of, 
 to refute the Socinian notion of sins being 
 forgiven without an atonement ; and which is 
 as follows. — If God had not sanctioned the 
 command which he gave to Adam with re- 
 spect to the tree of knowledge by a penalty, 
 he would have had no tie upon him for his 
 obedience; for Adam, having a freedom of 
 will, might have disobeyed God, and in which 
 case it would have been to no purpose that the 
 aforesaid command would have been given. 
 Adam accordingly did disobey God; and al- 
 though he did not immediately die, he never- 
 theless became mortal, and as he Vould most 
 assuredly die, God's threatenings would have 
 been put into execution. This being the case, 
 it is evident that no repentance for the sin 
 which he had committed, could have availed 
 him for its being forgiven : for if he would in- 
 
142 [part I. 
 
 evitably die, there would be something in any 
 repentance which he shall be supposed to have 
 had that would contradict it ; Adam no doubt 
 saw this, and he accordingly did not (so far 
 as we may judge from the silence of the Scrip- 
 tures) repent. Now every man that has 
 sinned after the similitude of Adam's trans- 
 gression, will be situated exactly as Adam 
 was: for although no such command will 
 have been given him, as was given unto 
 Adam, there nevertheless is in every man's 
 conscience a command which is sanctioned 
 by the same penalty as that by which the 
 command given unto Adam was ; and if so, 
 though a man were not mortal in conse- 
 quence of the sin of Adam (and which, by 
 the way, the Socinians say that no man is : 
 for they say, that every man will be punished 
 for his own sin), he would become mortal by 
 reason of his own sin, as Adam did, and 
 would as assuredly die as Adam did. And 
 as Adam's repentance could not in the nature 
 of things have availed him for his sin being 
 forgiven, so neither can repentance avail any 
 man for a like purpose who shall have sinned 
 after the similitude of Adam's transgression, 
 except as he shall plead that atonement which 
 the Socinians say Christ neither did make, nor 
 could have made. 
 
SECT. X.] 143 
 
 What then shall we say of these men, 
 who, professing to believe the Scriptures, 
 nevertheless see not the truth of these things, 
 but that God hath (judicially) blinded their 
 ei/es, and hardened their heart, that they 
 should not see with their eyes, nor understand 
 with their heart, and he converted, and that 
 he should heal them * 9 
 
 * John, xii. 40. 
 
 l2 
 
SECTION XL 
 
 \'y'-\.\\\\S) ,\vVr. V- ■■■: -A ^ 
 
 As one great purpose of the Gospel is to 
 reveal a life by which the present will be suc- 
 ceeded, more clearly than what had been 
 done by former revelations, and to show us 
 the way in which this life is to be attained 
 to ; it evidently would have been foreign to 
 this purpose, that any thing decisive should 
 have been said by the sacred writers with 
 respect to the state of the souls of those 
 who, having had no other light than that of 
 nature to direct them, shall nevertheless have 
 acted in conformity to that light. It has, 
 however, been thought proper by the holy 
 Spirit, by which the pens of those writers 
 were directed, that we to whom the truth of 
 the Scriptures has been revealed, should not 
 be wholly in the dark as to this matter. The 
 first instance which I shall give of the truth 
 of this remark is a revelation which was made 
 to St. Peter, and which is contained in the 
 following text of Scripture : Of a truth I 
 
SECT. XI.] l45 
 
 perceive that God is no respecter of persons, 
 but that in every nation he that feareth God, 
 and worketh righteousness, is accepted with 
 him *. It is observable, however, in the case 
 of Cornelius, that, after his having prayed to 
 God (according to his usual custom, as it may 
 be supposed), he is directed by an angel to go 
 to Simon, surnamed Peter; and it was after he 
 had so done, and after Peter had spoken the 
 above words, that he (Peter) preached Christ 
 to Cornelius; which shows, that, although 
 Cornelius might have heard of Christ, he 
 nevertheless did not believe in him; for so 
 would Peter's preaching Christ have been 
 useless; Cornelius's being accepted of God 
 must therefore have been exclusive of any 
 faith which he had; and, in which case, the 
 righteousness of Cornelius would have been 
 accepted in lieu of faith. This, however, 
 would not have superseded the necessity of 
 Christ being preached to Cornelius ; for, hav- 
 ing Christ preached unto him, he would 
 
 * Acts, X. 34.' — The meaning of the word accepted, aa the 
 same word is made use of by St. Paul, and in the same sense, 
 in his second Epistle to the Corinthians, chap. v. ver, 9, is, 
 according to a learned commentator, " the being received 
 into divine favour here, and into glory hereafter." — Adam 
 CkARKE in loc. 
 
 l3 
 
146 [part I. 
 
 know that, however acceptable his former 
 righteousness was, no such righteousness 
 would be acceptable for salvation in future; 
 and that a righteousness which should spring 
 from faith, would for the future be to be de- 
 pended on for salvation. It was for this 
 purpose, as I conceive, that Cornelius was 
 directed to go to Peter; it nevertheless is 
 evident, that Cornelius might have been 
 saved without actual faith; for, he might 
 have died, as many thousands of men do, 
 without having ever heard of Christ. If Cor- 
 nelius then was in a state of salvation pre- 
 viously to Peters preaching Christ to him, 
 and God be no respecter of persons, every one 
 that is in the predicament of Cornelius will 
 be in a state of salvation. 
 
 Not contenting myself, however, with this 
 example of Cornelius in proof of the salva- 
 bility of the heathens, I shall show that the 
 Scriptures afford other proofs of the truth of 
 this doctrine ; and for this purpose I observe, 
 that, in consequence of the covenant which 
 God entered into with the people of Israel 
 having been broken on their part*, God is 
 
 * This covenant, it has been observed by divines, was 
 broken by the Israelites not by their non-performance of it, 
 
SECT. XI.] 147 
 
 said to have made a new covenant with them, 
 and which, as this covenant is, in the Epistle 
 to the Hebrews, spoken of, was as follows — 
 / will put my laws into their hearts, and in 
 their minds I will write them*: in regard, 
 however, it is in the following verse said, and 
 all shall hnow me ; it would from these words 
 alone, be evident, that this covenant was not 
 meant to be confined to the Jews, did we not 
 know, from its being the covenant of the New 
 Testament, that all men are free to enter into 
 it. Now, it should seem from hence, that 
 although all men are free to enter into this 
 covenant with God, they nevertheless must 
 know of this covenant, and have it offered 
 to them, in order for their entering freely 
 into it ; St. Paul, however, speaking of the 
 Gentiles, says. These do by nature the things 
 contained in the law (i. e. the moral part of 
 the law of Moses), which shoivs the work of 
 the law to he ivritten in their hearts, their con- 
 science also bearing witness, and their thoughts 
 
 but by their considering the works which it required as being 
 justifying: for tlie true Israelites, such as Moses, Samuel, 
 David, &c. stopped not at works, but considered these as 
 leading to Christ, who was the end of the law, and thus de- 
 pended on faith for their justification. 
 * Heb. X. 16. 
 
 l4 
 
148 [part I. 
 
 the mean ivhile accusing , or eicimng one an- 
 other*. Now, if these men did by nature 
 the things contained in the law, and their 
 doing so showed the law to have been written 
 in their hearts; and if the law mentioned in 
 the above text of Hebrews, and which God 
 says he will write in the hearts and in the 
 minds of all men, can be no other law than 
 that which is mentioned in the aforesaid text 
 of Romans; God will have already written 
 this law in the hearts and minds of these 
 men, although his doing so is here spoken of 
 as a thing that he will in future do; and 
 which will be evident from the Apostle's say- 
 ing, that their doing the things of the law 
 showed the law to have been written in their 
 hearts; and their doing these things was as 
 they were Gentiles, and not as being converts 
 to Christianity. But neither would God's ex- 
 istence have been any thing which they would 
 have had to learn; notwithstanding that in 
 the text of Hebrews it is said, that they should 
 hnoiv him ; and as if this would have been in 
 consequence of God's writing his law into 
 their hearts; for, as it is observed by a learn- 
 ed commentator, on Romans, i. 20, " those 
 
 * Rom. ii. 14, 16. 
 
se<!t. XI.] 149 
 
 common notices and principles, concerning 
 the nature of God, and obedience to him, and 
 just dealings with others, are imprinted on 
 the hearts of men by nature*." 
 
 Now, although we who have had the Gos- 
 pel preached to us have no advantage over 
 those on whom this light hath not shone, as 
 to those common notices, &c. above men- 
 tioned, there nevertheless must be some be- 
 
 • Adam Clarke in loc. " God," sajs another learned 
 divine, " never intended to exclude the Gentiles from the be- 
 nefits their souls might receive by our Saviour's incarnation ; 
 not even those who were not then incorporated into the Jewish 
 nation by a carnal circumcision : which being supposed, the 
 assertion of Saint Clement cannot be thought strange, that 
 philosophy might perform the same office for the Gentiles, 
 which the law of Moses did for the Jews, in preparing them 
 for the Spirit, which neither of them could receive, as an im- 
 mortalizing principle, but by the Gospel. What is this phi- 
 losophy but the moral duties of the Mosaic law being owned as 
 reasonable and obliging, by the philosophers who were the 
 guides of those Gentiles who knew nothing of the law of 
 Moses ? and what is this but the law written in their hearts, 
 which the Apostle owns as sufficient to make, it law to those 
 who find it so? This doing the things prescribed in the law, 
 under the sense of an inward conviction that they were 'ob- 
 liged to do so, seems to be what God himself calls having his 
 law written in their hearts, and wishes earnestly that it were 
 his people's case ; why then should we wonder if it should 
 prove acceptable to him in the Gentiles also?" — Dod well's 
 Distinction between Soul and Spirit, p. 211. 
 
150 [part I. 
 
 nefit which we derive from God's putting his 
 laws into our mind and writing them in our 
 hearts, as we enter into the new covenant 
 with him, and which they who have not had 
 the Gospel preached to them cannot have: 
 upon this presumption, I observe, that al- 
 though when we enter into covenant with 
 God, his laws, as I have supposed, will al- 
 ready have been put into our minds, and 
 have been written in our hearts, it never- 
 theless will not have been for any eternal 
 purpose (that we can know of at least) that 
 this will have been the case ; for, if it may, 
 why is it that, notwithstanding this writing 
 of God's laws in our hearts, which we have 
 in common with all men, we pray, that " God 
 would write his laws in our hearts * ?" What 
 we virtually pray God (according to my ap- 
 prehension) is, that our obedience may pro- 
 ceed with the assistance of his grace, or holy 
 Spirit. Now, if the end for which we shall 
 act, as we shall be supernaturally influenced 
 as to such obedience as we shall be sup- 
 posed to show to God's laws, will be differ- 
 ent from that which we may show as we 
 shall act from the dictates of conscience 
 
 * Liturgy. 
 
SECT. XI.] 151 
 
 merely (and if it be not, our asking for the 
 divine grace would be nugatory), it will fol- 
 low, that it will be for temporal ends only 
 that we either shall or can be acting, as our 
 obedience shall be such, in its principle, as 
 that of the Gentiles, mentioned in the afore- 
 said text of Romans, must needs have been*. 
 
 Now, I am aware that I shall be treading 
 on very tender ground in what I am about to 
 add on the, state of the souls of those who 
 have been the subject of the present section, 
 i. e. who having had no other light than that 
 of nature to direct them, have nevertheless 
 showed obedience to that light: for, admit- 
 ting that they will necessarily have sought 
 a good, or happiness, which is of this world, 
 
 * That the words of the Athanasian creed, Whosoever 
 will be saved must thus think of the Trinitij, do not exclude 
 the Gentiles from salvation, it is argued by a learned prelate 
 as follows: — " As we are authorized by St. Paul, when he says, 
 What the law saith it saith to those that are utider the law, to 
 make a distinction between those who perish under the law, 
 and without the law, to deny the possibility of salvation to 
 those whose conduct has been conformable to the knowledge 
 of duty which they actually possessed, would be a rigorous 
 determination, and to which the above words of the Creed in 
 no degree point." — Bp, Cleaver's Scrm. on 2 Tim. i. 13. 
 p. 12. 
 
152 [part I. 
 
 their seeking it nevertheless will have been 
 on the presumption of its being the highest 
 good that can be sought by any man; and 
 as it will have been in ignorance of any 
 higher good, that they will have sought that 
 which is of this world, nevertheless, having 
 sought it by a strict obedience to such light 
 as they had, their not seeking a higher good 
 will have been from no fault of theirs; and 
 it may be presumed, that as a supernatural 
 light should have been vouchsafed to them, 
 and a higher good have been revealed to 
 them, they would have sought it, whatever 
 the conditions might be on which alone it was 
 to be attained to, as ardently as they did that 
 which is of this world; and which, as I have 
 said, they would have sought on the pre- 
 sumption of its being the highest good, and 
 in ignorance of there being a higher*. 
 
 * The salvability of the heathens is asserted by Justin 
 Martyr, on the ground of Christ's being the eternal Xo<yoj, or 
 wisdom, of his Father: for, as such, he supposes him " to 
 " be the fountain of reason, as the sun is the fountain of 
 " light; and that from him there was a Xo<yof, or reason, na- 
 " turally derived into every man, as a beam and emanation of 
 " light from that sun." He accordingly supposes, " the rea- 
 " son with which every man is endued, to be a light kindled 
 " from Him who is the y-h"', or wisdom, of his Father, and may 
 *' so far be said to partake of Christ, the original wisdom ; and 
 
SECT, xr.] 153 
 
 Much the same thing is said by a learned 
 prelate, and who writes as follows : " Heaven 
 is the reward of good men, who live in the 
 exercise of all Christian graces and virtues; 
 good men, therefore, must be judged by their 
 works; they nevertheless nmst, at the same 
 time, be judged by grace, because of the ne- 
 cessary imperfection of even our best works. 
 Now, although Christ," as the learned author, 
 in a farther part of his discourse, says, " has 
 not been preached to all ages, nor to all parts 
 of the world, yet he is the judge of all men, 
 and therefore will judge all mankind, not by 
 the rules of strict and rigorous justice, but by 
 
 " so far as they live after the image of Him that created them, 
 " they may be said xara xo<y«» giSy, and in this sense be called 
 " Christians." — Reeve's Apol. 83, n. o. There is, however, 
 a better reason given by Dean Stanhope for the salvability of 
 heathens, and which is as follows : — " Except as there shall be 
 a preparation of the heart to receive the ingrafted word, he 
 supposes that no one can be a believer, as that word shall be 
 externally preached to him ; and this preparation of the heart 
 he supposes to consist in a disposition inclined to acts of 
 kindness and compassion. Now, as heathens «iay have this 
 disposition, there will evidently be nothing wanting in their 
 case in order for their being believers, but that the word should 
 be preached to them ; and this preaching he supposes they 
 will have by anticipation in this very disposition of theirs ; 
 these he likewise supposes to be meant by those other slieep 
 which Christ says be has, and which are not of this fold." 
 Comment on the Gospel for the 2d Sunday after Easter. 
 
154 [part I. 
 
 the mercy and equity of the Gospel ; no man," 
 he adds, " shall perish merely for the misfor- 
 tune of his birth; no man that lived before 
 Christ was preached to the world, or in such 
 countries where he was never preached, after 
 he had come into the world ; but though the 
 Gospel was never preached to him, yet he shall 
 be judged by Gospel grace ; and if he were a 
 true penitent, and a sincere worshipper of 
 God, he shall have liberty to plead his repent- 
 ance, and the sincerity of his obedience, at the 
 tribunal of Christ, when he comes to judg- 
 ment; which will be so undeniable a justifica- 
 tion of the righteousness of the last judgment, 
 that, were there no other reason for it, it 
 would mightily incline any man who thinks 
 honourably of God, to believe it*." 
 
 Sufficient, as I conceive, will now have 
 been said in proof of the truth of my proposi- 
 tion, namely, that heathens may be in a state 
 of salvation ; and here I might very well have 
 ended this section, had not some observations 
 been made by the learned writer whom I have 
 last quoted, which might more properly per- 
 haps have been noticed in a former section of 
 
 * Sherlock on Judgment, p. 364. 
 
SECT. XI.J 155 
 
 tilis discourse; but which nevertheless are so 
 connected with what has above been said on 
 the subject of works, as they will not impro- 
 perly have a place in the present section. The 
 observations which I have alluded to are in 
 substance as follows. 
 
 Though we shall be judged for all the 
 good and evil which we have done, yet our 
 Saviour, in describing the process of the last 
 judgment, mentions nothing else but acts of 
 charity ; for instance, he says, / was an hun- 
 gr-edf and ye gave me no meat ; thirsty^ and ye 
 gave me no drink, &c. All mankind, says our 
 author, have a natural sense of the great evil 
 of rapine, and injustice, and murder, &c.; 
 their consciences terrify and scare them with 
 such guilt; but they have but little sense of 
 the obligations of charity : all this is veiy 
 true ; the reason of the thing, however, as I 
 conceive, is this : men naturally shrink from 
 the idea of committing theft, murder, &c. 
 because they naturally love thems'elves; and 
 their own happiness, and even their life would, 
 as they know, be in danger by their commit- 
 ting them ; so true is the aphorism, Oderunt 
 peccare mali formidine poenw. This love, 
 however, must be gotten the better of, as 
 
150 [part I. 
 
 charity, or the love of God, should be a prin- 
 ciple of action; for so much is implied by 
 the words of our Saviour, when he says, If a 
 man hate not his father and mother, and sister 
 and brother, and his own self he cannot he my 
 disciple. Self-denial has, in a former section, 
 been said to be the criterion of virtue; and 
 what has above been said confirms this notion, 
 so far as charity may be said to comprehend 
 in it all virtues*. 
 
 Many of those, no doubt, who were con- 
 verted to the faith of Christ by the preaching 
 of the Apostles, were men who, having lived 
 good lives, would, as I suppose, have been 
 in a state of salvation ; had these men, how- 
 
 * In Section VIII. it is said, that had the young man 
 whom our Saviour bad to sell all he had and give to the poor, 
 done so, he would have showed that charity which consists in 
 self-denial; and yet St, Paul, in seeming contradiction to 
 this, says, that a man may bestow all his goods oh the poor, and 
 not have charity (1 Cor. xiii. 4). A learned commentator, per- 
 ceiving a contradiction in this text, as it is rendered in Eng- 
 lish, says, " Supposing the giving to the poor to be a chari- 
 table act, this text would in fact say, that a man may have 
 charity, and not have charity; and for which reason the word 
 ayairo should have been rendered love : for such is charity ; 
 i. e. such a love as a man hath when he loveth God with all 
 his heart, with all his soul, with all his mind, and with all his 
 strength." 
 
SECT. XI.] 157 
 
 ever, not believed (if such a thing may be 
 supposed) when the Gospel was preached to 
 them, they would no longer have been in a 
 state of salvation ; and that because of their 
 unbelief. A question, however, may arise 
 with respect to those who were converted, 
 and as any among these shall be supposed to 
 have died before they were baptized, whether, 
 not being regenerate by baptism, they would 
 have died in a state of salvation? In answer 
 to which I say, that having been converted, 
 they would, by reason of their faith, have 
 been in a state of salvation ; and seeing their 
 want of baptism, and, of course, of regene-r 
 ration, would have been through no fault of 
 theirs, these would have been in a state of 
 salvation, for a reason as much greater than 
 that which, in a former part of this section, 
 has been given why a heathen may be so, as 
 faith is more saving than obedience to the 
 light of nature can be; the faith of these, I 
 say, would save them, notwithstanding that 
 their being saved would not be by reason of 
 their performance of any covenant which they 
 had entered into. 
 
SECTION XIl. 
 
 As the Jewish was in order to the Christian 
 dispensation, there was no perfection to which 
 the Jews might have attained by any strict 
 observance of the law, but what wpuld be to 
 be renounced, as they should become enlight- 
 ened by the Gospel ; it is accordingly argued 
 by the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews, 
 that if perfection were hy the Levitical priest- 
 hood (far under it the people received the law), 
 it would not have been necessary that anothei^ 
 priest should rise after the order of Melchise- 
 dech; and by which priest Christ is evidently 
 meant. Now, the same thing may be said 
 with respect to the light of nature ; it may be 
 said, that if perfection might have arisen from 
 any obedience which men might show to this 
 light, the necessity of a divine revelation 
 would have been superseded, and the reason 
 of the thing would, as I conceive, have been 
 the same in both cases ; for, although Christ 
 was shadowed under the ceremonial part of 
 
SECT. XII.] 150 
 
 the Jewisli religion, unci the moral purt was 
 the ground of the uiorulily ol" the Gospel, I 
 nevertheless say, that no perfection at all 
 could have arisen from any performance of 
 the former of these ; and no such perfection 
 from tlie performance of the latter, as would 
 have qualified men for any greater happiness 
 than that which is of this world, until the 
 spiritual meaning of the moral law was un- 
 derstood ; and although the spiritual meaning 
 of the law is supposed to have been under- 
 stood by some who were under it, and who 
 might have had faith in Him who was figured 
 under it, it nevertheless would have been 
 darkly only understood, until He, who was 
 figured under it, should have appeared, and 
 have shown an obedience to it, that men 
 might follow his steps. As the present is in 
 the divine intention in order to a future state; 
 and its being a probationary one implies its 
 being an imperfect state ; I have thought it 
 proper to observe thus much on the subject 
 of perfection, as introductory to \Vhat I have 
 to say in the present section. 
 
 A happiness may, and, with every gene- 
 rous mind, will arise from the practice of 
 moral virtue (i, e. from doing good), whicJi 
 M 2 
 
 V 
 
1^0 [part I. 
 
 will be greater than any which can arise from 
 those sensual pleasures which men naturally 
 seek, and which, as in a former section has 
 been shown, are ever at the bottom of any 
 virtue which men, who have no other light 
 than that of nature to direct them, are equal 
 to. The exalting our nature to its utmost 
 capacity, to a capacity greater even than that 
 which man had as he came out of the hands 
 of his Maker, I consider as being the great 
 purpose which will be answered by the prac- 
 tice of moral virtue in this life ; it cannot, 
 however, be the end intentionally for which it 
 is practised. The capacity of happiness may 
 likewise increase with an increase of virtue in 
 this life; the experience of this happiness, 
 however, will be reserved for another and 
 future life, and will constitute the reward of 
 that virtue which has been practised in this 
 life. To the contrary of these notions, it has 
 been said by a learned prelate, now no more, 
 that " a habit of virtue, begun in this life, 
 may, by virtue of the same principle with 
 which it was begun, gradually advance be- 
 yond any limit that may be assigned, in 
 quickness of perception and truth of judg- 
 ment ; and, as the will's alacrity to conform 
 to the dictates of conscience, and the decrees 
 
cCT. XII.] 161 
 
 of reason, will be gradually heightened, the 
 virtuous habit will correspond, in some de- 
 gree, in proportion with the growth of in- 
 tellect." Again — " In a future state, the 
 capacity of the mind will be enlarged, in 
 proportion to the acquisitions already made, 
 and may correspond with the increase of the 
 capacity, in every stage of a progressive vir- 
 tue, in every period of an endless duration*." 
 Now, on this I obsei*ve, that seeing it is here 
 supposed that a habit of virtue is begun in 
 this life, as men act in conformity to the 
 dictates of conscience and to the decrees of 
 reason, conscience and reason will, according 
 to our author, constitute the principle of 
 moral virtue, or spring from which it arises 
 in a future life, in like manner as it does 
 (according to our author) in this life. 
 
 Now, if advances in virtue cannot be 
 made in this life, as a pure and genuine love 
 shall be supposed to be the principle in which 
 our actions originate, and the fountain from 
 which they flow, such likewise will be the 
 principle or fountain from which these will 
 flow, as we shall suppose, with the learned 
 
 * Bishop Horsley's Sermons. 
 
 m3 
 
162 [part I. 
 
 writer, that advances in virtue not only may, 
 but will be made in a future life. The ques- 
 tion, however, is, whether it will be possible 
 for moral virtue to be practised at all in a 
 future life ? And if it will not, no advance in 
 virtue can be made in that life : for, if ad- 
 vances in virtue might be made in a future 
 state, that state would evidently not be a 
 state of perfection ; so far, at least, as a 
 moral perfection shall be supposed to be 
 meant. The disposition of mind which will 
 arise from the practice of those virtues which 
 the miseries to which we are subject in this 
 life are well calculated to call forth (and it 
 is for this purpose, as in a former section has 
 been observed, that these miseries have been 
 suffered to arise) ; this disposition, I say, 
 may, and no doubt will, remain in a future 
 life; but how should these virtues be prac- 
 tised in a life where all misery will be ex- 
 cluded, or, as St. John in the Revelations 
 expresses it, where all tears will he wiped 
 away * 9 
 
 * " Religion," says a learned prelate, " will survive all 
 virtues of which it is the source ; for (in heaven) we shall 
 be living in the noblest exercises of piety, when we shall 
 have no objects on which to exercise many (if any) hu- 
 man virtues. "When there will be no distress to be re- 
 
SECT. XII.] 163 
 
 Now, I have in former sections of this 
 discourse supposed, that advances in good- 
 ness and virtue are made in this life, as, after 
 Christ's example, we do good; and that the 
 end for which we persevere in doing good is 
 (although we are not conscious of it), that 
 we may attain to that perfection of moral 
 character which will qualify us for that hap- 
 piness for which we were originally intended ; 
 and for which we may know ourselves to have 
 been originally intended, by the longing de- 
 sire which (as by an ingenious writer* it has 
 been said) every man has for it; from these 
 considerations, that^ in the first place, of the 
 impossibility of our doing good in a future, 
 as we may in the present life; and that, in 
 the second, of the end for which we do so-f-; 
 
 lieved, no injuries to be forgiven, no evil habits to be sub- 
 dued, there will be a Creator to be blessed and adored, a 
 Redeemer to be loved and praised." — Bp. Hodgson on 
 1 John, iii. 12. p. 50. These notions of the learned Biishop evi- 
 dently coincide with those that are expressed in our text. 
 
 * Norris. 
 
 t A learned divine, speaking of a state of glory, supposes 
 that " the ties of civil society vrill then be dissolved, and that 
 all the duties arising from them will then fail of course ; that 
 several new engagements, founded on the then stat« of things, 
 must succeed, of which we have now no distinct conceptions ; 
 and whether men may not advance infinitely in degrees of 
 perfection, be always acquiring new relations, and still en- 
 
 M 4 
 
164 [part I. 
 
 I with submission say, that the learned pre- 
 late's notions, admirably as they are ex- 
 pressed, are nevertheless not well grounded. 
 When, however, our author says, that the 
 capacity of the mind will be enlarged here- 
 after, and that a virtuous habit will be 
 strengthened and increase, so as to correspond 
 with the increase of intellect, as well as of 
 the moral capacity, in every period of an 
 endless duration; I agree with him with re- 
 spect to the moral capacity, so far as the 
 principle of virtue shall be considered, and 
 which I have supposed to be that love which 
 was originally implanted in our nature; this 
 love I say, as God shall be supposed to be 
 the immediate object, may, to use the words 
 of our author, increase in every period of 
 an endless duration; and in this my notions 
 will be the same as those of a writer whom 
 I have mentioned; but who, I vvas pleased 
 to find, had been beforehand with me as to 
 some other notions which I have adopted, 
 and which are expressed in former parts of 
 this discourse; and to show this sameness 
 
 larging their duties to all eternity, is a point which, as it 
 cannot be certainly evinced on the one hand, so neither can it 
 be clearly disproved on the other." — Coneybear's Defence, 
 &c. p. 152. 
 
SECT, xn.] 165 
 
 of opinion between us, I tiaiisciibe ironi a 
 work of his as follows: — " Every man has 
 a restless principle of love implanted in his 
 nature, whereby he continually aspires to 
 something more excellent than himself, either 
 really or apparently, with a design and in- 
 clination to perfect his being. This affection 
 and disposition of mind all m^n have, and 
 at all times. Our other passions ebb and 
 flow like the tide, and have tlieir seiisons 
 and periods like intermitting fevers. But 
 this of love is as constant as our radical heat, 
 as inseparable as thought, as even and equal 
 as the motions of time ; for no man does or 
 can desire to be happy more at one time than 
 at another, because he desires it always in 
 the highest degree possible. It is true, his 
 love, as to particular objects, may increase 
 or decrease, according to the various appre- 
 hensions he has as to their excellencies; but 
 then, like motion in the universe, or water in 
 the sea, what it loses in one part it gains in 
 another; so that in the whole It remains 
 alike, and the same. Now, this amorous 
 principle, which every man receives with his 
 soul, and which is breathed into him with 
 the breath of life, must necessarily have an 
 object about which it may exercise itself, 
 
166 [part I. 
 
 there being no such thing- in love (if in na- 
 ture) as an element of self-sufficient fire; 
 for, though we may easily and truly frame an 
 abstract notion of love, or desire in general, 
 yet, if we respect its real existence, we shall 
 as soon find first matter without form, as 
 love without a particular object : and as it is 
 necessary to the very being of love, that it 
 have an object, so is it to our content and 
 happiness that it be a proportionate and sa- 
 tisfying one; for otherwise that passion 
 which was intended as an instrument of hap- 
 piness, will prove an affliction and torment 
 to us. Now, there is but one such object to 
 be found, and that is God; we must needs, 
 therefore, be miserable in our love, unless 
 God be the object of it. But neither is our 
 happiness sufficiently secure by making God 
 the object of our love, unless we can centre our 
 whole affections on him, and (in the strictest 
 sense of the phrase) love him with all our 
 heart, and with all our soul: for, otherwise, 
 whatever portion of our love does not run in 
 this channel, must necessarily fix upon dis- 
 proportinate and unsatisfying objects; and 
 consequently be an instrument of discontent 
 to us. It is necessary, therefore, to the com- 
 pleting our happiness, that the object should 
 
SECT. XII.] 167 
 
 engross all our affections to itself, vvliich 
 only can satisfy them; and that our minds 
 should have the same habitude to God, that 
 the eye has to light. Now, as the eye does 
 not only love light above all other things, 
 but delights in no other thing, I confess 
 such an absolute and entire dedication of our 
 love to God is not always practicable in this 
 life; it is the privilege and happiness of tliose 
 confirmed spirits, who are so swallowed up 
 in the comprehensions of eternity, and so per- 
 petually ravished with the glories of the di- 
 vine beauty, that they have not the power to 
 turn aside to any other object. But, though 
 this superlative excellency of divine love be 
 not attainable on this side of the thick dark- 
 ness, it being the proper effect of open vision, 
 and not of contemplation : yet, however, by 
 the help of this latter, we may arrive to many 
 degrees of it; and the more entire and undi- 
 vided our love is to God, the fewer disap- 
 pointments and dissatisfactions we shall meet 
 with in the world*." 
 
 * Norris's Miscellany, p. 103. — The senliments expressed 
 in this extract arc too Platonic to be practicable ; they are in 
 agreement, however, with the character of this writer, and 
 who is generally considered as having been a Platonist. 
 As the subject affords an opportunity for my availing myself 
 
168 [part I. 
 
 I say not that tliis admirable writer has 
 borrowed the notions expressed in the latter 
 
 of notions which, as being more philosophical, are more to 
 the purpose of the text, I gladly make use of it, and tran- 
 scribe from the author of these notions as follows : — " The 
 love of God, with its associates, gratitude, confidence, and 
 resignation, is generated by the contemplation of his bounty 
 and benignity to us, and to all his creatures, as these appear 
 from the view of the natural world, the declarations of the 
 Scriptures, or a man's own observation and experience in re- 
 spect of the events of life. It is supported and much in- 
 creased by the consciousness of upright intentions and sincere 
 endeavours, with the consequent hope of a future reward, and 
 by prayer ; inasmuch as this (i. e. prayer) gives a reality and 
 force to all the secondary ideas before spoken of. Frequent 
 conversation with devout persons, and frequent reading of 
 devout books, have great efficacy likewise, from the infec- 
 tiousness of our tempers and dispositions. The contemplation 
 of the rest of the divine attributes, his omnipotence, omni- 
 science, eternity, ubiquity, &c. have also a tendency to sup- 
 port and augment the love of God, when this is so far ad- 
 vanced as to be superior to the fear of him; till that time, these 
 wonderful attributes enhance the fear of God so much, as to 
 check the rise and growth of the love of him for a time. Even 
 the fear itself contributes to the generation and augmentation 
 of the love in an eminent degree, and in a manner analogous 
 to the production of other pleasures from pains: and indeed it 
 seems, that, notwithstanding the varieties of the ways above 
 mentioned, in which the love of God is generated, and the 
 consequent variety of the intellectual aggregates and second- 
 ary ideas, there must be so great a resemblance amongst 
 them, that they cannot but languish by frequent recurrency, 
 till such time as ideas of an opposite nature, by intervening 
 at eertain seasons, give them new life.— The love of God, as 
 our author further observes, is, according to this theory, evi- 
 
SECT. XII.] 169 
 
 part of the above extract from ISt. Austin; 
 there nevertheless is so remarkable a coin- 
 cidence of sentiments in what has been said 
 on the above subject by both, that I with 
 much pleasure transcribe from this ancient 
 father as follows: — " Quando (anima) te 
 (Deum) habet, plenum est desiderium ejus: 
 et jam nihil aliud quod desideretur exterius 
 restat. Dum autem aliquid exterius desi- 
 derat, manifestum est quod te non habet in- 
 terins: quo habitu, nihil est quod ultra de- 
 sideret. Cum enim sis summum et omne 
 bonum, non habet quod desideret amplius, 
 sed possidet te omne bonum. Quod si non 
 
 dently deduced in part from interested motives directly, viz. 
 from the hopes of a future reward ; and those motives to it, or 
 sources of it, in which direct explicit self-interest does not 
 appear, may yet be analyzed up to it ultimately. However, 
 after all the several sources of the love of God have coalesced 
 together, this affection becomes as disinterested as any other ; 
 as the pleasure we take in any natural or artificial beauty, in 
 the esteem of others, or even in sensual gratifications. It ap- 
 pears also, that this pure disinterested love of God may, by 
 the concurrence of a sufficient number of sufficiently strong 
 associations, arise to such an height, as to prevail over any 
 of the other desires, interested or disinterested: for all, except 
 the sensual ones, are of a factitious nature, as well as the love 
 of God ; and the sensual ones arc, in our progress through 
 life, overpowered by them in all their respective turns." — 
 Hartley's Theory of the human Mind (by Priestley), p. 
 .32.3. 
 
170 I PART I. 
 
 desiderat omue bonum, restat, ut desideret 
 aliquid quod non est oiiiiie bonum, ergo nee 
 sumnium bonum : ergo nee Deum, sed po- 
 tius creaturam. Cum autem creaturam de- 
 siderat, continuam famem habet; quia licet 
 quid consideret de creaturis adipiscatur, va- 
 cua tamen remanet: quia nihil est quod eam 
 impleat, nisi tu, ad cujus imaginem est 
 creata. Imples autem tu eos qui nihil aliud 
 desiderant praiter te ; et facis eos dignos te, 
 sanctos, beatos, immaculatos, et amicos Dei, 
 qui omnia reputant, ut stercora, ut lucri fa- 
 ciant te solum. Haec est enim beatitudo, &c. 
 &c.*" 
 
 Now, if the sentiments which are con- 
 tained in the former of these extracts are in- 
 consistent with Bishop Horsley's notions, and 
 those which I have adopted are conformable 
 to those which are contained in this extract, 
 I shall have the authority of this writer at 
 least for opposing my notions to those of 
 the learned bishop. As it is necessary, how- 
 ever, that I should show that there is no 
 material difference between Mr. Norris's no- 
 tions and those which have been expressed 
 
 * Soliloquia, cap. 30. 
 
SECT. XII.] 171 
 
 in former sections of tiiis discourse, I ob- 
 serve as follows: — Our author supposes the 
 perfection of our beings to be the end for 
 which the passion of love is a principle im- 
 planted in our nature; and which, so far as 
 it implies an imperfection previously to have 
 subsisted, is in agreement with the doctrine 
 which it is the purpose in part of this dis- 
 course to establish. Now, it would evidently 
 be in vain that love should be a principle im- 
 planted in the nature of any being, except 
 as it might have an outgoing; and this out- 
 going it will have, if, as our author supposes, 
 a man, by reason of this principle, is con- 
 tinually aspiring to something more excel- 
 lent than himself, and by which he can mean 
 God only: seeing, however, our happiness, 
 as our author supposes, will depend on these 
 objects being proportionate to the love or 
 desire with which it is sought; so he rightly 
 concludes, that in order for this desire to be 
 satisfied, God must be the object *. 
 
 * The learued Mr. Boyle, who, in his admirable treatise on 
 Seraphic Love, lias expressed sentiments similar to those of 
 our author, supposes the love or desire which we have to- 
 wards God to be something similar to that which the magnetic 
 needle shows in its tendency to the north pole. As there is 
 something curious, however, in his thoughts on this subject, 
 
172 [part I. 
 
 Now, it may iiave been by accident, it 
 nevertiieless seems rather to have been in- 
 tentionally, that the author of Philosophical 
 Principles of Religion*, published a very few 
 years only after Mr. Norris wrote, expresses 
 himself on this subject as follows : — " There 
 is in all intellectual beings a restless appetite 
 or desire of happiness : from the moment of 
 their being, through all the ages of eternity, 
 all their labour and travail is for this pur- 
 pose ; nor are they devoid of it, either imme- 
 diately in the end, or mediately in the means, 
 for one instant of time, in their endless du- 
 ration. This," as our author adds, " is the ne- 
 cessary effect of the faculty of desire, namely, 
 
 I transcribe from this work of his as follows : — " The trem- 
 bling restlessness of the needle in any but the north point of 
 the compass, proceeds from, and manifests its inclination to 
 the pole ; its passion for which both its wavering and its rest 
 bear witness to. The unsatisfiedness which transitory fruitions 
 that men deplore as the unhappiness of their nature, is indeed 
 the privilege of it ; as it is the prerogative of men not to care 
 for, or be capable of being pleased with such fond toys as 
 children doat upon, and make the sole objects of their desires 
 and joys : and by this we may in some degree imagine the 
 unimaginable suavity that the fixing our love on God is able 
 to bless the soul with ; insomuch, that the decreed uncon- 
 tentedness of all other goods is richly repaired, in its 
 being but an aptness to prove a rise to our love's settling 
 there." P. 52. 
 * Dr. Cheync, 
 
SECT. XII.] 173 
 
 that no object less than infinite can satisfjr 
 it: for, let it be supposed to have come to 
 the possession of any object less than infinite, 
 it is plain it can desire yet a greater and 
 greater, without bounds or limits; i. e. the 
 desire itself is infinite in its capacity; its 
 acts are instantaneous, and its enjoyments, 
 or disappointments, for the time, swallow up 
 the acts of all the other faculties ; and there- 
 fore it is the most quick and sensible ; it sets 
 all the powers of the whole composition on 
 action to obtain its ends, and therefore it is 
 the most active, and upon all these ac- 
 counts, the most cardinal faculty of the 
 mind: choosing or refusing, i. e. willing, is 
 but the desire applied to a particular object; 
 the affections are but the complexions of the 
 desire applied to this particular object; and 
 therefore are both but particular modifica- 
 tions of the desire." Again — " As the desire 
 is infinite, when it is filled and satisfied with 
 its proper object, it must be infinitely happy. 
 The supreme and uncreated infinite Being, 
 the only proper object (since the supreme 
 infinite is one), it must be the congruous 
 object; and so, the faculty being infinite, 
 the object infinite, and they infinitely con- 
 gruous to one another, the desire, in the pos- 
 
 N 
 
174 [part I. 
 
 session or enjoyment of this object, must of 
 necessity be infinitely happy *." Such is the 
 coincidence of sentiments between this writer 
 and Mr. Norris; and which is a more re- 
 markable one than that which I have men- 
 tioned, and which, as I have shown, there is 
 between Mr. Norris and St. Austin: whilst 
 the different extracts which I have made 
 from the works of both these writers, will, as 
 I conceive, alike answer my purpose in 
 making them. 
 
 There are, however, some remarks which 
 Dr. Cheyne has made, and which follow 
 those which I have above transcribed, and 
 which, from an analogical reasoning which 
 he makes use of, are peculiarly calculated to 
 confirm the moral notions which have been 
 expressed in former sections of this discourse. 
 Our author supposes, '' that there is a prin- 
 ciple of action in all intelligent beings, ana- 
 logous to that of attraction in the material 
 system; that all bodies, by reason of this 
 principle of action, mutually draw one an- 
 other to themselves : whilst they are all alike 
 
 * Philosophical Principles of Religion, part ii. prop. xv. 
 For the like sentiments, see his Conject. on Nat. Analogy, § 7. 
 
SECT. XII.] 176 
 
 dmwn to one common centre; and that so it 
 is in spiritual matters." Now, when to this 
 our author adds, " that the end for which 
 God draws men is, the making them as happy 
 as their different capacities will admit of," I 
 cannot object to these notions, but lament 
 only that these gracious ends are not oftener 
 answered. 
 
 Our author, in continuation of the above 
 sentiments, says, that " the Autlior of our 
 being, who loves all his creatures better than 
 they can love themselves, uses all motives 
 that are honest, laudable, and just, to gain 
 them; he knows perfectly the frame and 
 original complexion of all his creatures, and 
 that, in their lapsed state, they must ascend 
 to perfection by steps and degrees ; and, con- 
 sequently, some are to be wrought upon by 
 one motive, others by another, and that ge- 
 nerally the first steps are mounted by the 
 force of the terrors of the Lord, before the 
 love of God is shed in their hearty that there 
 are babes in Christ, as well as grown and 
 perfect men; and their food (or motives of 
 charity) must be as their years and strength. 
 But our Saviour tells us, we must love the 
 Lord our God with all our heart, with all our 
 N 2 
 
176 [part I. 
 
 soulj with all our strength, and with all our 
 mind; and if so, we shall have very little 
 love left behind for ourselves ; and St. John 
 tells us, that perfect love casteth out fear, 
 and consequently hope, i. e. rewards and pu- 
 nishments =»f." In these last-mentioned no- 
 tions, I confess, I agree not with our author. 
 Moses, we are told, refused to be called the 
 son of Pharaoh's daughter (i. e. he refused 
 the splendour and delights of a court), choos- 
 ing rather to suffer affliction with the people 
 of God, than to enjoy the pleasures of sin 
 for a season ; for that he had respect to the 
 recompense of reward -f-. Now, whether this 
 
 * Philosophical Principles of Religion, p. 94. 
 
 t '* They understand not the nature of the reward promised 
 to us in the Gospel, who think thatthe intention of the reward, 
 in order to our progress in holiness and virtue, is acting upon 
 mercenary principles : for glory, blessedness, and felicity, are 
 not other things from piety and holiness, but the consummation 
 and perfection of that divine nature whose efformation is 
 begujti in this life. Grace and holiness is but happiness 
 wrapped up and closed, and glory is nothing but holiness 
 explicated and unfolded to its due latitude and dimensions. 
 Piety is heaven masked with a cloud of flesh, and begirt with 
 sorrow ; and heaven is virtue shining in its native brightness. 
 And that Bethereal and paradisaical body with which all be- 
 lievers shall be arrayed through the gracious bounty of the 
 Lord Jesus at the resurrection of the just, is the necessary 
 appendage of our felicity, and by its easy and obsequious 
 motions, will raise in the exalted powers of tbceoul, the high- 
 
SECT. XII.] 177 
 
 reward were an earthly or a heavenly one, 
 this example equally contradicts the above 
 notions: it must, however, have been the 
 latter ; for, if the land of Canaan was the 
 reward or recompense which Moses had an 
 eye to, he was disappointed, having never set 
 his foot on that land. A reward, in short, 
 must necessarily be a motive of obedience to 
 God in this life, even as we seek a good 
 which is of another; and a pure and disin- 
 terested love may, as we have faith, be a 
 principle of obedience to God, although not 
 without the hope of a reward*; for, a future 
 reward is the very ground of those virtues 
 which distinguish the morality of the Gospel 
 from all other moral systems, and without 
 the hope of a reward those virtues, such as 
 meekness, patience, the bearing of injuries, 
 &c. could not be exercised. 
 
 Now, a reward, considered in itself, and 
 exclusively of any service which has been per- 
 
 est sense of love and joy, and delig'htful enravishments of 
 spirit." — Cudworth's God's Love vindicated, p. 144. 
 
 * The hope of a future reward, in contradiction to the 
 notions of Dr. Cheyue, is by Dr. Hartley considered as being 
 consistent with a pure and disinterested love ; and as may be 
 seen in an extract from his Theory, contained in n *, p. 167, 
 of this section. 
 
 n3 
 
178 [part 1. 
 
 formed, and which is rewardable, consists in 
 some pleasure or delight, either sensible or 
 intellectual, which cannot reasonably be ex- 
 pected in future, but as it will be anticipated 
 and be experienced in some measure at the 
 present time ; and the measure or degree in 
 which this pleasure or delight, which is at 
 present experienced, will always be in pro- 
 portion to the certainty with which that 
 which is future is expected : for instance, 
 when we pray to God for some blessing, this 
 blessing, of whatever kind it may be, will be 
 prayed for only, because of the happiness 
 which we conceive will arise from the pos- 
 isession of it ; I accordingly say, that our pe- 
 titions, of whatever kind they may be, will 
 (if we pray in faith) in some measure be 
 granted at the very time of our making them : 
 for, whatever the thing which we pray for 
 may be, our future happiness, as we pray in 
 faith, will (unconscious as we may be thereof) 
 be the ultimate end of our prayer ; and the 
 happiness which we shall experience at the 
 time of our praying, will not only be an anti- 
 cipation of that happiness which constitutes 
 the end of all prayer to God, but will be in 
 proportion to the strength of our faith, and 
 
SECT. XII.] 179 
 
 the fervency of our devotion *. The incense 
 of prayers and praises continually ascending 
 to the throne of grace, we know from the 
 
 * The happiness which is spokeu of in the text, is sup- 
 posed to depend on the strength of our faith, and to arise 
 from the fervency of our devotion : as neither the strength 
 of our faith, however, nor the fervency of our devotion, are 
 at all times the same, but may be greater at one time than 
 they are at another, the happiness or gladness of heart which 
 has been mentioned, will of course be greater at one time 
 than it is at another : if, however, there be, and as I conceive 
 there is, a physical reason to be given for this, no one will 
 have just cause of being disheartened if, at any time, his 
 devotions should be colder than usual, nor have reason to 
 suppose himself deserted of the divine Spirit. It is well 
 known, and every one will have experienced it, that in ge- 
 neral we are in better spirits when we are well, than when we 
 are sick ; the fervency of our devotion will of course be in 
 proportion to the degree of health we enjoy. Now, such is 
 the dependence of the state of the mind on that of the body, 
 as that the spirits of a man can at no time be so low and de- 
 pressed by sickness, or any other cause, as that they may not 
 be raised by art, for instance, by wine, opium, or tobacco ; 
 of course, the fervency of our devotion, and the happiness 
 which will accompany it, will be greater, as a recourse shall 
 have been had to any of these artificial means, and as any one 
 that shallhave recourse to this expedient will finc^: an expedient 
 which will be an innocent one, if used with moderation, and 
 not to any injury of the constitution. If a man be depressed 
 in his mind from any consciousness of sin, let him confess, 
 and be sorry for, his sins, and implore the divine mercy ; but 
 if from any natural cause, let him not scruple to use any such 
 means as God may, for any thing that he knows to the con- 
 trary, have intended as an antidote to the poison. 
 N 4 
 
180 [part I. 
 
 Scriptures to be pleasing to God; and, in 
 proportion as we feel a pleasui'e in offering 
 them, our souls will be in unison with him. 
 But this will in some measure be the case as 
 we do good; i. e. as we act from a principle 
 of love towards our fellow-creatures ; a hap- 
 piness will be experienced as we perform acts 
 of benevolence, which will be the same in 
 kind, although not perhaps in degree, as 
 when we offer up our prayers, our praises, and 
 our thanksgivings, to God ; and of this hap- 
 piness I say, that it will be an anticipation 
 of that which we shall experience in heaven, 
 and which, as I have said, will be the re- 
 ward of the good which we shall have done 
 on earth. 
 
 Of the satisfaction which arises from the 
 performance of virtuous (i. e. benevolent) ac- 
 tions, it has been observed by a learned pre- 
 late, " that it is a good spur and incitement 
 to many noble actions here, and will be part 
 of the crown and reward of them hereafter*:" 
 as this shall be supposed, the strength of the 
 moral capacity will not so much depend on 
 its being exercised, as on the happiness with 
 
 * King's Orig. ot Evil, vol. ii. n. 70, p. 414. 
 
SECT. Xll.] 181 
 
 which the exercise of it has been attended at 
 some former time ; and thus an increase of 
 moral capacity will (or at least may) go 
 hand in hand with an increase of happiness, 
 in the case of any one so long as he shall be 
 an inhabitant of this earth. Seeing, how- 
 ever, there will be no room (as in a former 
 part of this section has been supposed) for 
 the exercise of moral virtue in a future state ; 
 and that the happiness which will be enjoyed 
 in a future life will depend on such virtuous 
 attainments as .shall have been made in this 
 life ; it will follow, that the measure of the 
 moral capacity, as any one shall depart this 
 life, will be the measure of his happiness in 
 a future life. It is by divines supposed, that 
 " a happiness may arise in a future life from 
 the remembrance of virtuous actions perform- 
 ed in this ; and this happiness will (as they 
 likewise suppose) constitute, in no small de- 
 gree, that which the saints will hereafter 
 enjoy ; although (as they further suppose) a 
 far greater degree of happiness will be ex- 
 perienced by them from the reflection of their 
 having escaped hell, and of their being in 
 the possession of a heavenly state (not by 
 virtue of any thing which they have done, 
 but) by the free mercy and goodness of 
 
182 [iPART I. 
 
 God, and by the death of his Son. These 
 (says the writer from whom I am now quoting) 
 are thou^^hts which must create a new heaven, 
 as it were, in heaven itself; I mean (says our 
 author) they will enlarge our souls to the 
 utmost capacity of our natures, and fill and 
 actuate them with such divine ardours of 
 love, as it would, as it will seem to us, have 
 been impossible should have been raised in 
 us, had we been necessarily kept from all 
 sin *." 
 
 Having mentioned the happiness which 
 the saints will enjoy in a state of glory, I 
 shall take occasion from hence to make some 
 observations on this subject, which, although 
 they have been suggested to my mind by 
 what has fallen from the pen of a learned 
 commentator -J-, nevertheless do not wholly 
 coincide with his notions. With these obser- 
 vations I shall conclude this section, and 
 the discourse at the same time of which it is 
 a part. The learned writer, on the ground 
 of the text, There is one glory of the sun, and 
 another glory of the moon, and another glory 
 
 * Jenkin, vol. ii. ch. xii. p. 244. See also King's Origin, 
 &c. vol. ii. subject vii. 
 t Dr. Adam Clarke. 
 
SECT. XII.] 183 
 
 of the stars *, very rightly concludes, " that 
 all glorified spirits will not have the same 
 degree of glory." When, however, he says 
 " that the glory of each saint will depend on 
 the quantum of mind and the quantum of 
 grace which God will liave given him -(-," I 
 do not, I confess, agree with him : for, ad- 
 mitting that a difference between the saints 
 hereafter will arise by reason of a greater 
 quantum of mind (as our author expresses 
 himself) which some, tlian what others will 
 have; seeing, however, grace, in whatev^er 
 degree it is given, is not given to make men 
 wise, but to make them good; grace will 
 be wholly out of the case as tlie glory of the 
 saints hereafter is in question ; it will be 
 otherwise, however, as their happiness is in 
 question. 
 
 Now, I suppose, in agreement with the 
 system which I have adopted, that happiness 
 is so intimately connected with goodness, 
 or virtue, that a man cannot be* good, or 
 virtuous, and not be happy ; and from hence 
 it will follow, that the quantum of happiness 
 
 * 1 Cor. XV. 41. 
 
 t See Remarks at the end of the above chapter. 
 
184 [part t. 
 
 (to use the language of the above writer) 
 will, in the case of any one, be as the quan- 
 tum of his goodness. Seeing, however, it 
 happens, from various causes, that some de- 
 part this life with having done less good 
 than what will have been the case with others 
 (and this indeed is supposed, when, in the 
 Scriptures, it is said, that each man will be 
 rewarded in heaven according to the works 
 which he will have done on earth), it may 
 reasonably be supposed, that there will be 
 a difference between the saints hereafter in 
 point of happiness, as well as in point of 
 glory *. In regard, however, some, as I have 
 
 * The Tuture happiness of the righteous is spoken of in 
 the Gospel under the name of a reward ; and the future mi- 
 sery of the wicked under the name of punishment : and as 
 the rewards of the righteous hereafter will be in proportion 
 to the good which they shall have done in this life, and as is 
 supposed in our text, there is reason to suppose that the pu- 
 nishment of the wicked hereafter will be in proportion to the 
 evil which they will have done in this life ; and indeed the 
 Gospel says as much ; for it says. The servant which knew his 
 lord's will, and prepared not himself, neither did according to 
 his will, shall he beaten with many stripes ; but he that knew 
 not, and did things worthy of stripes, shall be beaten with few 
 stripes. Luke, xii. 47, 48. It thus appears, that rewards 
 and punishments hereafter will be in proportion to the good 
 or evil which men will have done here ; with respect, how- 
 ever, to the eternity of these rewards and punishments, as 
 from the same Gospel we likewise learn, there will be no 
 
 2 
 
SECT. XII.] 185 
 
 said, will have done more good than others, 
 I say of these, that whether they shall have 
 done much or little good, it will eventually 
 be true, that they will alike have done as 
 much good as there was any possibility of 
 
 diflFerence between these men ; he that has done good, how 
 little soever that good may have been, will be eternally re- 
 warded ; and he that has done evil, how little soever that evil 
 may have been, will be eternally punished. Now, as there is 
 no man so good, as that he will not have done evU, i. e. will 
 not be conscious of his having committed some sin, it will be 
 necessary, as he would not be punished for that sin. hereafter, 
 that he should repent of it ; for otherwise, the good which he 
 has done will be forgotten of God, and it will be the same 
 thing as if he had done no good at all. Now, seeing the 
 punishment of a man hereafter cannot be so light, as that it 
 will aporoach to the nature of a reward ; for these are con- 
 trarit, , and between contraries there is no medium ; so cannot 
 the condition of a man supposed to be in hell, approach to the 
 condition of a man supposed to be in heaven ; and so much 
 is expressed in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, where it 
 is said by the former, there is a great gulf fixed between us, 
 &c. The reason why the diflerent conditions which have been 
 mentioned caimot approach each other, as we shall judge of 
 this matter by the light of Revelation, is this : — If there is 
 no man so good as that he will not have done evil, there is no 
 man that will hereafter be in heaven, who will *not have re- 
 pented of the evil he has done on earth. But if he has repented 
 of the evil he hath done, he will have been born again ; and in 
 which case he will be a different man from what he was pre- 
 viously to his repentance. To say , then, that his condition 
 might approach that of one who has not repented, would be 
 to deny that a man who has repented is not the same man he 
 was before he repented. 
 
186 [part I. 
 
 their doing. If the happiness, then, of those 
 who have done little good only, will be less 
 than that of those who have done much good, 
 it nevertheless will be as great as their ca- 
 pacity will admit of : for, if happiness arises 
 from doing good, the capacity of happiness * 
 in the case of the saints in heaven will even- 
 tually have been bounded by the good which 
 they will have done on earth ; but if so, the 
 happiness of the saints in heaven will, in the 
 case of each saint, be as great as their capa- 
 city of happiness will admit of. Although 
 then, as I have said, a saint supposed to be 
 in heaven, may believe that some of his 
 brother-saints enjoy a greater degree of hap- 
 piness than he does, he nevertheless cannot 
 knov^f this ; for, if he himself enjoys as great a 
 
 * It has been supposed by a learned divine (Brooke) in a 
 discourse on this subject, that the happiness of the saints 
 hereafter will arise from the glory which will be given them ; 
 and he accordingly says, that he that hath the least glory 
 there, shall have enough to make him unspeakably and incon- 
 ceivably happy. Seeing, however, he further says, every 
 vessel of glory shall be full, but some shall have more of it 
 than others, as being more capacitated to receive it, and that 
 the glory of each saint will be a reward proportioned to his 
 works done here on earth, there will be no material difference 
 between what is here said, and what is expressed in our text ; 
 and if so, I shall have the support of this writer's opinion in 
 favour of my own against Dr. Clarke's notion. 
 
SECT. XII.] 187 
 
 degree of happiness as liis capacity will ad*- 
 mit of, it would evidently be a contradiction 
 to say, that he might have a conception of a 
 greater happiness ; and what we can h^ye no 
 conception of, we cannot know ; the truth 
 of which proposition is witnessed to us by 
 the following observation of Mr. Norris ;tt* 
 " Heaven were not heaven, if we knew what 
 it is." Although, then, there will be a dif- 
 ference between the saints hereafter in point 
 of happiness, if they nevertheless cannot know 
 this, it will be the same thing £is if there was 
 no ^uch difference. Now, I say the same; 
 as with the aforesaid writer we shall sup- 
 pose, that the gloiy of each glorified saint 
 will depend on the quantum of mind which 
 God will have given him, I say, that although 
 a saint may have reason to believe another 
 saint to have a better understanding than 
 himself, it nevertheless would amount to a 
 contradiction to say that he might know this; 
 for, to know it, his understanding must be 
 equal to that of the other saint. If one glo- 
 rified saint then cannot know that another 
 has a greater quantum of mind than an- 
 other, it will be the same thing as if there 
 was no such inequality between them either 
 in point of knowledge, or in point of happi- 
 
188 [parti. 
 
 ness : for, by the same rule that a glorified 
 saint cannot know that another has more 
 knowledge, he cannot know that such other 
 saint is happier than himself ; and therefore 
 there can be no room, in his case, for either 
 envy or discontent, and which might occa- 
 sion a diminution of happiness ; and so says 
 a pious writer : he says, in agreement with 
 what I have supposed, that " if, in a future 
 state of glory, every vessel will have its ca- 
 pacity enlarged, and every vessel completely 
 filled, and feel itself for ever full, and for 
 ever happy," and which he supposes will be 
 the case, *' there will not be found the shadow 
 of envy amongst them*." 
 
 To conclude. — The glory of the saints 
 hereafter, it must be confessed, will be dif- 
 ferent ; for some, as the Apostle tells us, will 
 have more glory than others. I nevertheless, 
 in confirmation of the above notions, sup- 
 pose, that the glory which the lowest of the 
 saints will hereafter have, will not less truly 
 be, what the Apostle emphatically calls an 
 eternal weight of glory, than that which the 
 highest of them will have. 
 
 * Watts's Essays, p. 265. 
 
SECT. XII.] 189 
 
 The attention which in this section has 
 been paid to the opinions of Dr. Cheyne has 
 arisen, not so much from their agreement with 
 those of Mr. Norris, as from the principal 
 subject of this discourse having been sug- 
 gested to me by him ; and from my conceiv- 
 ing, as in the Preface has been observed, that 
 much more may be said thereon, than what 
 has been said either by him or by Bishop 
 Butler. As various important observations, 
 however, may be made on the subject of this 
 last section, which have been suggested to 
 my mind from what has fallen from the pens 
 of other writers, it is my intention to resume 
 the subject in the Second Part of this Dis- 
 course. 
 
 THE END OF PART 1. 
 
PART II 
 
\ 
 
SECTION 1. 
 
 In the concluding part of my Preface to this 
 Discourse, it will appear to have been my 
 intention, in this second part thereof, to take 
 into consideration a notion which Dr. Cheyne, 
 in his Philosophical Conjectures, has adopted 
 with respect to various purgative states, 
 through which, as he supposes, men will 
 pass, as they shall have departed this life, 
 previously, and in order to that which will be 
 permanent, and endure for ever: a notion 
 which, as he contends, is not without some 
 support in divine revelation. 
 
 That the soul, as it shall have quitted its 
 earthly mansion, will pass into an inter- 
 mediate state, is a notion which has been 
 adopted by all that believe in its immortality; 
 but the passing of a man (a being consisting 
 of a body united to a soul) into an inter- 
 mediate state, is a notion which, if not pe- 
 culiar to our author, has nevertheless been 
 adopted by him, and will accordingly be more 
 o3 
 
194 [part fi. 
 
 particularly explained, as well as the purpose 
 for which men, according to our author, will 
 pass through these intermediate states, be 
 shown in the course of this section. As this 
 notion of our author's should be admitted, 
 it would have this at least to recommend it 
 to our adoption, namely, that it would render 
 vain the various vague conjectures which 
 have been made with respect to the soul's 
 separate state. 
 
 Having premised thus much on the sub- 
 ject of various intermediate states through 
 which all men, as our author supposes, will 
 pass previously to their arriving at a state 
 which will endure for ever, the reason why 
 this will be so, in the opinion of our author, 
 might very properly here be given ; but that 
 it cannot well, so well at least, be under- 
 stood, till the whole of our author's system 
 shall be explained, the present, of course, 
 becomes a fit opportunity for my endeavour- 
 ing to do so; I accordingly observe as fol- 
 lows: — 
 
 The great number of stars which are vi- 
 sible, and the still greater number that are 
 invisible, except with the help of glasses, are 
 
SECT. I.] iy5' 
 
 not uncommonly supposed by philosophers 
 to be inhabited; our author, however, sup- 
 poses of these, of that part of them at least 
 which are not inhabited by angelical beings 
 (for he supposes them to serve as habitations 
 for these heavenly hierarchies, as he calls 
 them), that they will be places of abode, not 
 only for men, but for angels, as tliey shall be 
 supposed to pass through the aforesaid inter- 
 mediate state. Having said thus much on 
 the subject of these states, I proceed to the 
 purpose which, according to our author, will 
 be answered tliereby, and which is as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 By way of introduction to his notion of 
 the necessity of the aforesaid states being 
 passed through in the case of men, our au- 
 thor observes, that as a great part of the 
 misery which men experience is owing to 
 their own imprudence, whilst that to which 
 all men are subject is owing to the sin of 
 Adam ; he further observes, that the natural 
 consequence of a man's having suffered 
 through his own fault, is his abstaining for 
 the future from doing those things which 
 have been the cause of his sufferings. This 
 reasoning of our author's, as it shall be coa- 
 o4 
 
196 [part II. 
 
 sidered unconnectedly with his system, would 
 be of no great consequence: connectedly how- 
 ever therewith, it may be found to be well 
 calculated to establish it; for his notion is, 
 that all pain and suffering are of a purging 
 and purifying nature, and this may be seen 
 to have been so, in some measure, in the 
 case which has been mentioned ; for this man 
 is supposed to have suffered from something 
 which he has done, but which he ought not 
 to have done; but if the effect has been his 
 never doing the like again (for this must be 
 supposed), he will have been purged of the 
 sin of which he will have been guilty*. Now, 
 
 * This would not be true upon principles of religion : for 
 religion (the Christian religion at least) teaches, that all such 
 sins as are committed in this life, will, if not repented of, be 
 punished in a future life ; and whether we are punished for 
 our sins, or purged of the foulness contracted by them, it 
 amounts to the same thing. Our author's reasoning, however, 
 proceeds upon principles of philosophy, and as such I see no 
 fault in it; but neither do I see any fault in his notion of va- 
 rious states to be passed through by men hereafter, consider- 
 ed as a philosophical conjecture; nor indeed should I object 
 to the purgatory of the church of Rome (and which is of near 
 akin to our author's notion of various states to be passed 
 through hereafter), considered as a philosophical conjecture. 
 But the church of Rome considers this doctrine as being 
 grounded in the Scriptures. Now the Scriptures speak of no 
 punishment, but that which will take place after the general 
 judgment ; and that punishment will be only for sins that will 
 
SECT. I.] 197 
 
 as this reasoning shall be supposed to apply 
 t«r the sins in general which men commit, and 
 on account of which they have suffered in 
 this life, in mind as well as body, but of which 
 they shall have repented, our author's fur- 
 ther notion is (i. e. as we should judge from 
 human reason), that it cannot stand with the 
 divine justice that they should be punished in 
 another life. These notions of our author 
 proceed, as I have said, on natural principles ; 
 they nevertheless may be true on divine prin- 
 ciples, he supposes them however to be not 
 inconsistent with those that are divine. 
 
 If the sacrifice which Christ made be 
 available for the blotting out of original sin, 
 and as by divines is generally supposed, his 
 sufferings will have had the effect for which 
 our author contends; i. e. they will have 
 purged the human nature of that foulness and 
 sinfulness which it contracted by the sin of 
 Adam. Seeing, however, mei\ cannot, in 
 their individual capacity, be conscious of. the 
 sin of Adam, and may, as they shall have 
 
 have been unrepented of in this life ; for, as to all other sins, 
 they will have been done away by Christ's death and suffer- 
 ings, but which the church of Rome, by the doctrine of pur- 
 gatory, virtually denies. 
 
198 [part II. 
 
 arrived at an age to disting-uish between good 
 and evil, commit sins of which they will be 
 conscious, it will follow, that except as their 
 own sufferings may be available for the blot- 
 ting out of these personal sins, in like man- 
 ner as the sufferings of Christ have been 
 supposed to be for the blotting out the sin of 
 their nature, it will be the same thing with 
 respect to them, considered as individuals, as 
 if Christ had not suffered at all. Christ's 
 sufferings, it is true, will have been the effi- 
 cient cause of these sins of theirs being blot- 
 ted out ; seeing, however, this will not have 
 been without their sufferings, these sufferings 
 of theirs will have been the causa sine qua 
 nm of their sins being blotted out. 
 
 Having thus given an account of our au- 
 thor's system, so far as, by a careful perusal 
 of his book, I have been able to comprehend 
 it ; for, it is not given in a connected man- 
 ner, but is intermixed with other subjects, 
 which, although not foreign to his principal 
 subject, nevertheless make a clear account of 
 his chief subject very difficult ; I proceed to 
 the consideration of a doctrine wliich our 
 author has had principally in view in the 
 
SECT. I.] 199 
 
 aforesaid work, that, namely, of a general 
 redemption. 
 
 This notion, I find, obtained not long after 
 our Saviour's time ; for, it was adopted by 
 Origen, as well as by some of the early Fa- 
 thers ; and has likewise, in modern times, 
 been adopted by Dr. Burnet, by Mr. Whis- 
 ton, and of late by a Mr. Winchester, under 
 the title of a general restoration. 
 
 This doctrine, however, has, as in my 
 preface has been mentioned, been adopted 
 secretly, although not avowedly, by a man 
 of learning, who, in the first part of my Dis- 
 course has been mentioned*, not as having 
 himself published any thing on this subject, 
 but as having communicated his thoughts, 
 thereon to a learned writer -J-, and who has 
 accordingly transcribed them without giving 
 any opinion of his own upon them ; but 
 leaving it to those who may read them to 
 think, every one as he pleases, about them. 
 These thoughts are as follows : 
 
 * Section V. f Df' Gregory. 
 
200 [part II. 
 
 " From what is known by sensible expe- 
 liinent of the world we live in, it is reason- 
 able to infer, that in space there must be 
 contained a multitude of similar worlds, so 
 great, that, with respect to our limited facul- 
 ties, it may be termed infinite. We may 
 conclude upon similar grounds, that in each 
 of these worlds there exists a race of animals 
 endued with reason. Now, all creatures must 
 necessarily come short of the perfection of 
 their Creator ; they are, therefore, , fallible, 
 and, being fallible, must fall, unless their 
 defects are supplied by the aid of a nature 
 more perfect than their own. Those who 
 stray into a road leading away from the ob- 
 ject at which they should arrive, must con- 
 tinually increase their distance ; the natural 
 consequence of falling is, therefore, continual 
 deterioration. There is only one species of 
 rational creatures which God has permitted 
 to exist within the scope of our observation ; 
 we know that they have fallen, and we also 
 know that it has pleased God, in his infinite 
 goodness, to prepare for them a way of sal- 
 vation, and to restore them by his power. 
 Since all the counsels of God are perfect, and 
 therefore uniform, eternal, and immutable. 
 
SECT. I.] 201 
 
 we may always conclude, with tolerable 
 safety, from what we know in one instance 
 to have been the law of his working*, that 
 such it has been, and will be in every similar 
 instance. We may therefore assume as cer- 
 tain, that there is a way of salvation for each 
 of the mighty multitude of rational species 
 which exist in space and eternity, and that 
 the provision for their restoration, as far as 
 their case corresponds with ours, resembles 
 that which has been made for us. Now, 
 where the cases are the same, the same means 
 will have been pursued. But those who take 
 what by many is regartled as the narrowest 
 view of the subject, and consider the suffer- 
 ing of Christ as a price paid to cancel guilt, 
 and to redeem mankind, need not surely be 
 under any embarrassment in admitting that a 
 similar sacrifice may have been offered when- 
 ever a similar occasion has occurred. Christ 
 will still have laid down his life for men ; that 
 cue oblation will have completed their re- 
 demption, and it is not in the least more de- 
 rogatoi-y from the infinite dignity and the 
 infinite beatitude whioii we attribute to him, 
 that he should have suffered a million of 
 times, than that he should have suffered once." 
 Our author proceeds to show, that although 
 
202 [part 11. 
 
 we may collect something witli respect to the 
 attributes of God from his works, and more 
 from revelation, we nevertheless are wholly 
 ignorant of his substance. As this, however, 
 is not material to the elucidation of our au- 
 thor's notions with respect to a general re- 
 demption, I content myself with having 
 barely mentioned the above circumstance, 
 and proceed to the concluding part of his 
 discourse. 
 
 " It is sufficient that we know that we 
 are created in a rational and fallible na- 
 ture ; that without the continual support of 
 God we must fall ; that by leaning on our 
 own powers and our own understanding, we 
 all have fallen ; that the consequences of the 
 fall must be perpetual deterioration ; that we 
 cannot be restored but by the grace and 
 power of God ; that it hath pleased God in 
 his mercy and goodness, through his wisdom, 
 and by his power, to decree that he will par- 
 don and restore the penitent and the faithful, 
 through the mediation of Jesus Christ, and 
 the operation of the Holy Spirit ; and to give 
 us by the incarnation, death, resurrection, and 
 ascension of Christ, sensible evidence of this 
 his merciful dispensation, and an example of 
 
SECT. I.] 203 
 
 the obedience he requires ; promising that he 
 will give, by the intercession, and for the 
 merit of his Son Jesus Christ, his holy Spirit 
 to those who turn to him with all their liearts; 
 and lead them finally to peace and salvation, 
 of which, by any other means, they must 
 have despaired. God has been pleased to 
 reveal to us fully the plan of salvation ; and 
 this (with regard to such subjects) is not 
 only all that it concerns us to know, but pro- 
 bably all that our nature is capable of com- 
 prehending *." 
 
 Among the different modern writers who 
 have adopted the notion of a general re- 
 demption, or restoration, and with whose 
 works I have been acquainted, I have men- 
 tioned a Mr. Winchester as being one : vari- 
 ous objections, liowever, to his notions occur- 
 red to me in the course of my reading his 
 book ; and as these will equally apply to the 
 like notions, as they have been adopted by 
 other writers, it will be suitable only to the 
 purpose and plan of the present section, to 
 propose them to the consideration of those 
 who may be inclined to adopt the like no- 
 
 * Gregory's Letters, vol. i. p. 300. 
 
204 [part II. 
 
 tions; and of the number of these, as I un- 
 derstand, are the sect called Anabaptists. It 
 is observed by our author, that of " the great 
 number of heathens that die without their 
 having been favoured with the light of the 
 Gospel ; the many that die in a state of inno- 
 cence, together with the instances of idiots, 
 and persons born deaf; all convince me more 
 than any other logical arguments, that God 
 has many ways of instructing and redeeming 
 his creatures in another state*." I mention 
 this not as being objectionable, but merely as 
 a preliminary observation ; it is foreign indeed 
 to the subject of a general redemption, which 
 supposes the fate of those whom I have above 
 mentioned to have been determined; its sup- 
 posing, however, that they who will rise unto 
 death, will not rise unto death eternal, as 
 the words of Scripture, literally understood, 
 import, is a notion which, by divines in ge- 
 neral, is considered as being not only objec- 
 
 * " Untried virtue," says a learned divine, " is the subject 
 of love, esteem, and admiration, rather than of reward " 
 (Sumner's Records of Creation, p. 97); and again, " A virtue 
 which has proved itself to be victorious (after trial), is more 
 properly the subject of reward, than untried innocence, which 
 has never been exposed to danger" (p. 246). These obser- 
 vations seem to be in favour, not only of Mr. Winchester's, 
 but of Dr. Cheync's notions. 
 
SKCT. I. ] 205 
 
 tionable, but unsciiptiiral; and on this sub- 
 ject I observe as follows: — As death was de- 
 stroyed by Christ's having voluntarily suffer- 
 ed death, all men will rise again ; but whe- 
 ther the rising again of men in particular 
 will be unto life and happiness, or unto deatli 
 and misery, the Scriptures tell us, will depend 
 on the things which they shall have done in 
 this life. Now, if it would be to no good 
 purpose that any man in particular should 
 rise again, except as his rising again should 
 be to life and happiness ; for otherwise, bet- 
 ter would it be for that man that he had 
 never been born^^ as this shall be supposed, 
 it will be evident, that the redemption spoken 
 of by our author, can relate only to those 
 whose rising again will be to death and mi- 
 sery, i. e. to the wicked: for, seeing their 
 rising again in common with all men, will be 
 a proof that they, in common with all men, 
 have been redeemed from death, this cannot 
 be the redemption contended for by our au- 
 thor ; and seeing the good will sfand in need 
 of no other redemption than that which 
 Christ purchased for them, i. e. a redemption 
 from the grave, in order that their rising 
 again should be to life and happiness, Christ 
 must die a second time, in order that thev 
 
206 [part II. 
 
 whose evil deeds have consigned them to 
 everlasting misery, should finally, and after 
 their having suffered for any length of time 
 short of eternity, enjoy everlasting happiness ; 
 for, if their length of suffering might com- 
 pensate for the wickedness which they have 
 committed on earth, then could not Christ be 
 the author cf that life and happiness to which 
 these are supposed finally to attain. 
 
 A second objection, on the supposition of 
 the wicked being finally saved, will be 
 grounded on the first; and it consists in this, 
 namely, that their being saved will be with- 
 out their having contracted any such virtuous 
 habit, as is necessary in order for their be- 
 ing qualified for, or indeed even capable of 
 experiencing the happiness of a future state. 
 Now we know that a habit of vice may be 
 counteracted by a habit of virtue ; a habit of 
 virtue however, which has been preceded by 
 a habit of vice, cannot be begun, except as 
 there shall have been a conversion of the 
 heart; and the conversion of the heart sup- 
 poses repentance on account of those sins 
 which a man has committed. This, however, 
 cannot be the case with the men in question, 
 i. e. with the wicked; for, as they are supposed 
 to have been punished for their sins, no such 
 
SECT. I.] 207 
 
 habit of virtue can be begun with them as 
 is grounded on repentance ; and on what 
 other ground it can be begun I am at a loss to 
 know : an objection starts, so far the same as 
 this which I have now mentioned, as that the 
 like reasoning which our author makes use 
 of, might apply to this of mine, equally as 
 to that which our author's friend in this 
 dialogue between them ; for he says that 
 it is only as there shall be supposed to be 
 two eternal principles, viz. a good and a bad 
 one, that his friend's objection and reasoning 
 thereon, can hold good. Now, our author 
 might have known that this Manichean sys- 
 tem is not necessary in order for our knowing 
 that a good and an evil principle may obtain 
 in a man at one and the same time : for St. 
 Paul tells us, that in the case of every man, 
 the Jiesh lusteth against the spirit, and the 
 spirit against the Jiesh ; and these, he says, 
 are contrary the one to the other; and this, 
 by the way, is the case, when a vicious habit 
 is counteracted by a virtuous one. A vicious 
 habit, it is true, may not have been effec- 
 tually counteracted in a man by a virtuous 
 one, or even be at all counteracted to this 
 man's knowledge, as no man, however, wilfully 
 does evil, but as his conscience will witness 
 p2 
 
 •^ 
 
'20S [part ri. 
 
 against hifii ; a good principle will therefore 
 obtain in this man, although it will be for no 
 other purpose than that of tormenting him 
 that this will be the case. 
 
 It was in the course of my reading his 
 first dialogue, that the above-mentioned ob- 
 jections occurred to me; I was then ignorant 
 of any thing that might be said in any of the 
 following dialogues, which might be calcu- 
 lated to obviate any of these objections. I 
 found however, on my reading his third dia- 
 logue, that he had been aware of some such 
 objection as my last has been ; for, upon the 
 supposition that God will finally make all his 
 intelligent creatures happy, he says, and 
 upon the authority of various texts of Scrip- 
 ture endeavours to support the assertion, 
 " that God will make them all his subjects, 
 by destroying their sins, and making them 
 holy in a way perfectly consistent with all 
 his perfections and attributes, without doing 
 the least injury to his character, or render- 
 ing his moral government weak, or making 
 any of his words void, whether threaten- 
 ings or promises, or in the least setting 
 aside the sanctions of his law or gospel, or 
 a future state of rewards and punishments, 
 without derogation at all from the glory of 
 
SECT. I.] 209 
 
 the Mediator, but rather exalting it to the 
 hij2^hest possible pitch." — (P. 99.) Now, 
 how God could destroy the sins of any man 
 I am at loss to know ; for, if a man has 
 sinned, it will be always true that he has 
 sinned. God may blot the sins of men out 
 of his remembrance; he cannot however, at 
 least he will not, if the Gospel be true, do 
 this, except they repent, and believe in 
 Christ ; but which, exclusive of the objection 
 which has above been mentioned, is wholly 
 inconsistent with the notion of men having 
 been punished for their sins. 
 
 Our author, in answer to the objection 
 to his system proposed by his friend to his 
 consideration, says, that sin, being an infi- 
 nite offence, deserves an infinite punishment ; 
 and mentions the case of Jerusalem, Speak ye 
 comfort ahly to Jerusalem ; and cry unto her 
 that her ivarfare is accomplished, and that her 
 iniquity is pardoned: for she has received of 
 her Lord's hands trouble for all her sins. Now, 
 if Jerusalem's sins were pardoned, she was 
 not punished : for her debt was paid by the 
 Lord, i. e. by Christ. 
 
 To return to our author (Dr. Cheyne) : it 
 becomes necessary, as I would farther explain 
 p3 
 
210 [part II. 
 
 the notion which he has adopted, to observe, 
 that as it supposes men to be situated as the 
 fallen angels are, so it relates to the wicked 
 among men, and not to the righteous ; seeing 
 however, that in the case of the righteous, 
 their being cleansed by the blood of Christ, 
 according to our author, is not sufficient for 
 their going into life ; and that, as these must 
 have a righteousness, or holiness, without 
 which no one can see God ; so will a like 
 righteousness or holiness be necessary in the 
 case of those who, having been punished, 
 are supposed to have been cleansed of their 
 sinfulness : it is accordingly supposed by our 
 author, and as from the account of his system 
 which, in a former part of this section, has 
 been given, may be seen, that there will be 
 one or more intermediate states through 
 which all men will pass ; and that the pur- 
 pose which will be answered in the case of 
 the wicked (i. e. of those who having been 
 punished, will have been cleansed of their 
 sinfulness) will be their attaining to that 
 righteousness, or holiness, which has been 
 mentioned, but which, in their case, will have 
 been wholly wanting*. 
 
 * The notion of various states to be passed through by 
 men departed from this life, and previously to their arriving 
 
SECT. I.] 211 
 
 Having now, to the best of my abilities, 
 explained the doctrine of a general redemp- 
 
 at a state which will be permanent, mentioned in our text to have 
 been adopted by Dr. Cheyne, is, I find, new only in respect 
 of the variety of those states : the notion of an intermediate 
 state, dilTerent from the purgatory of the cliurch of Rome, 
 had been adopted by the learned Dr. Cudworth before our 
 author's time, and who writes as follows : — " So far as the light 
 of nature is able to judge, the soul doth not immediately go 
 to heaven, or hell, in their strict significations, upon its sepa- 
 ration from the body ; but there is some middle state of being 
 between death and the resurrection. By this middle state 
 I mean no such condition of being, as that wherein a man 
 from his impious transactions in this life, shall undergo very 
 sharp torments, the protraction or abbreviation of which de- 
 pend upon the will and pleasure of mercenary priests, &c." 
 Again, " He that shall consider that the operations of the 
 Spirit of God upon men's hearts, and that their progress in 
 holiness and virtue, are wrought successively by parts, and 
 that men attain to a glorious crown by patient continuance in 
 well doing, &c, must necessarily conclude, either that the in- 
 finitely far greater part of men are damned, yea those who 
 have had very few opportunities of doing good in this life, or 
 that there is a time and place of bettering themselves, or 
 (as the author in a farther part of his discourse expresses 
 himself), for the recovery of their lapsed souls." Letter to a 
 Friend, pp. 36 and 38. With all due deference to the opi- 
 nions of this very learned man, the objection to them, in my 
 mind, exclusively of their being unscriptural, Is, that they lead 
 to the doctrine of an universal redemption: for, if those, who 
 have made so little progress in a virtuous life, as to be scarcely 
 distinguishable from bad man, will have an opportunity of 
 bettering themselves, as our author calls it, it should seem to 
 be inconsistent with the goodness of God, that bad men should 
 not have some chance of the kind mentioned by our author, 
 
 p4 
 
212 [part II. 
 
 tion, as it has been adopted by our author, 
 as well as by Dr. Burnet, and, long before 
 their time, by Origen, and some of the an- 
 cient fathers, I shall give my opinion on this 
 very important subject. 
 
 As the doctrine of an universal redemp- 
 tion is inconsistent with that of the eternity 
 of future punishments, and the advocates for 
 this doctrine accordingly suppose, that the 
 punishment of the wicked hereafter, will at 
 some time be at an end, it will be evident, 
 that if by any arguments I may show that the 
 punishment of the wicked hereafter will ne- 
 cessarily be eternal, the doctrine of an uni- 
 versal redemption, or restoration, as by some 
 it is called, cannot stand. 
 
 Now, although the main strength of my 
 argument in proof of the eternity of future 
 punishments, lies not in what the Scriptures 
 say on this subject (for they, in various 
 places, so expressly say that these punish- 
 ments will be eternal, as that the sense of 
 these Scriptures is not to be eluded); I never- 
 theless say, that except as this doctrine might 
 
 tor their being saved ; the consequence of which would be 
 the salvation of all men. 
 
SECT. I.] 213 
 
 be supposed to be really contained in the 
 Scriptures, I should not think that it might 
 be established by an argument drawn from 
 any other source. I shall not be contented 
 with such arguments as have been made use 
 of by the advocates for the doctrine of the 
 eternity of future punishments, grounded on 
 sacred authority; but shall, after their t.x 
 ample, produce a text of Scripture, which, 
 although it has escaped the notice of any 
 writer that I am acquainted with, neverthe- 
 less, in my mind, shows more forcibly, if 
 possible, the truth of this doctrine than any 
 one text which they have made use of. 
 
 Saint Paul says, that Christ must reign 
 until he has put all enemies under his feet*; 
 in which words the Apostle alludes to those 
 of the Psalmist-}-, Sit thou on my right hand 
 until I have made thine enemies thy footstool; 
 which text, although the same in sense as that 
 of St. Paul, is the text I have alluded to. 
 For the better comprehending, however, how 
 any proof arises from this text with respect 
 to the point in question, it is obsei-vable, 
 that " the word until,'' according to a learned 
 
 * 1 Cor. XV. 27. t Ps. ex. i. 
 
214 [part n. 
 
 divine, " is inclusive of the time to come, as 
 well as of that which is past : and as it relates 
 to Christ's kingdom, it shows the everlasting 
 nature of that kingdom a parte post, as well 
 as a parte ante^T Our author farther ob- 
 serves on the word footstool, " that it implies 
 a throne; he, then, that sitteth thereon must," 
 as the learned author rightly observes, " be a 
 king;" and he adds, " if Christ, who is this 
 king, will reign for ever, his enemies, who 
 are his footstool, must necessarily continue 
 to be his footstool so long as his kingdom en- 
 dureth; but which, as hath been said, will 
 be for ever-j-." 
 
 I might well rest the proof of the doc- 
 trine for which I contend on the above scrip- 
 ture; there is another however, which has 
 not, to my knowledge, been made use of by 
 any writer for a like purpose, but which like- 
 wise undeniably proves this doctrine. We 
 
 * Berriman's Sermons, vol. i. p. 353. 
 
 t This argument of the learned writer's comes more 
 strongly recommended from its not having been framed by 
 him with any view to the doctrine of a general redemption ; 
 no such doctrine having at the time (as by any thing that 
 appears to the contrary) been thought of by him ; it therefore 
 is an argument that is free from prejudice. 
 
SECT. I.] 215 
 
 are told, that a glory like unto that which 
 was given to Christ of the Father, will be 
 given to those that believe; and that it is by 
 reason of this gloiy that they will be one 
 with the Father, even as the Father and the 
 Son are one. They that believe then, as 
 they shall be supposed to be in heaven, can- 
 not cease to be one with the Father, any 
 more than the Father and the Son can cease to 
 be one. Now, if a glory like unto that which 
 was given to the Son of the Father, never 
 could have been given to those who, whilst 
 on earth, believed not, and who, of course, 
 never were one with the Father, these never 
 can be one with the Father and the Son in 
 heaven. And if they who, by reason of their 
 unbelief, were the enemies of Christ on earth, 
 they will also continue to be his enemies 
 wherever they shall be ; and, as enemies, will to 
 all eternity suffer that punishment to which 
 their wickedness will have consigned them. 
 For the glory which believers will have in 
 heaven, will depend on their having, by rea- 
 son of their faith, been one with Christ on 
 earth. As they then who never did believe, 
 will not have been one with Christ on earth, 
 they neither will, nor can, be one with him 
 and the Father in heaven. 
 
216 [part II. 
 
 Having- thus, by two very remarkable 
 texts, shown, that an universal redemption is 
 a doctrine that has no ground in Scripture, 
 but, on the contrary, is inconsistent with 
 Scripture, I shall conclude this section with an 
 observation which, although it does not prove 
 the truth of the doctrine for which I contend, 
 nevertheless will, duly considered, be found 
 to come in aid of it. 
 
 The necessary imperfection of the most 
 exalted of created intelligences, as compared 
 with the perfection of that Being who created 
 them, has been before mentioned * ; and has 
 likewise been noticed by various writers, mo- 
 ral as well as theological; and the fol- 
 lowing reason for this has been given by a 
 learned prelate who has adopted this notion : 
 — " Created nature implies imperfection in 
 the very terms of its being created: since 
 what is absolutely perfect, is God; either 
 therefore nothing at all must be created, or 
 something imperfect-}-." It has not, however, to 
 my knowledge, been conceived by any, as being 
 a subject which is at all connected with that 
 of future punishments ; it nevertheless consti- 
 
 * Part I. Sect. II. 
 
 + King's Origin of Kvil, vol. ii. p. 380. 
 
SKCT. I.] 217 
 
 tiites tlie ground of my notions on this im- 
 portiint subject, and as in the sequel of this 
 section may be seen. 
 
 On this imperfection, the notion of the na- 
 tural lapsibility of created intelligences, which 
 in the fifth Section of the first Part of this 
 Discourse has been mentioned as having 
 obtained with various eminent writers, is 
 grounded. Man has accordingly, in another 
 section, been mentioned as an example of this 
 natural lapsibility, which is supposed to ob- 
 tain alike in all intelligent and free beings. 
 Now, the freedom of will with which man was 
 endowed shows, that his actual falling was 
 not necessary; we know, however, what the 
 consequences of his falling were; but what 
 the consequences of his not falling, i. e. of 
 his obedience to the command which God 
 gave him with respect to the tree of the 
 knowledge of good and evil, would have 
 been, is (as it shall be considered relatively 
 to man's redemption by Christ) "a mystery; 
 it nevertheless is a greater mysteiy, if I may 
 so say, as it shall be considered relatively to 
 the subject of my present discourse. 
 
 As the fall of angels is another example 
 of the natural lapsibility which I have men- 
 
 x- 
 
218 [part II. 
 
 tioned, this fall of theirs may serve to illus- 
 trate and confirm the notions which I have 
 adopted ; the fall of man, however, as in the 
 sequel will be shown, more fully confirms 
 them. We may know what the case of those 
 angels who, at the great fall of angels, are 
 said to have kept their first estate, is ; this, I 
 say, we may know; and we likewise may 
 know what the case of those angels that fell 
 is : of the former of these we may know, that 
 their falling is now become impossible; and 
 of the latter we may know, that their being 
 restored to their first estate is equally im- 
 possible, but which, however, was not impos- 
 sible in the case of man ; for Christ redeemed 
 him by his taking on him the nature of man ; 
 but not having taken on him the nature of 
 angels, the case of those angels that fell be- 
 came, as I have said, remediless. 
 
 Now, the life which was originally set be- 
 fore man when good and evil were set before 
 him, was natural life; for, although, in con- 
 sequence of his creation, he had life, or, as 
 the Scriptures express it, became a living soul, 
 God nevertheless would that man should, if 
 we may so say, owe this life to himself; i. e. 
 that he should have in himself the principle of 
 his happiness ; but which however he cannot 
 
SECT. I.] 219 
 
 have, but as he will at the same lime have in 
 himself tlie principle of misery; and this was 
 the case likewise, as spiritual life was, after 
 he had chosen death, set before him; for 
 this life was set before him in consequence of 
 Christ's having suffered the death which man 
 had chosen: as Christ, however, is the 
 author of spiritual life, faith, or belief in 
 him, becomes the criterion of man's choosing 
 it ; by his unbelief, therefore, he will, virtu- 
 ally, choose spiritual death, and, having 
 chosen this death, his case will be exactly 
 the same as that of the angels which fell: 
 and as both these will be eternal monuments 
 of the divine justice, so will they to all 
 eternity witness to the necessary imperfec- 
 tion of created intelligences, in comparison 
 of the perfection of Him that created them. 
 
 As this notion shall be admitted, i. e. as 
 the state of the wicked hereafter shall be 
 considered as testifying merely to the truth 
 of the necessary imperfection of all created 
 beings, the reasoning which has been made 
 use of by various writers, as well for as 
 against the doctrine of the eternity of future 
 punishments, becomes wholly excluded. I 
 further suppose with respect to this imper- 
 
220 [part II. 
 
 fection, as it shall be considered in itself, 
 that the reflecting on the misery of the 
 wicked, as they shall be supposed to be suf- 
 fering the punishment which was threatened, 
 and which they will therefore have deserved ; 
 the reflecting, I say, on this misery, will be 
 no diminution of the happiness of the saints, 
 even as some who in this life were most 
 dear to them shall be supposed to be of the 
 number of these wretched men: for in this 
 life for what there is no remedy, we do not 
 trouble ourselves about; and so, as we may 
 reasonably suppose, it will be with the saints 
 in their mansion of bliss. 
 
 Nevertheless, when we consider what sort 
 of men they are, who according to the Scrip- 
 tures (as these are interpreted by divines), 
 will perish everlastingly, it will not be to be 
 wondered at that some, who, in other re- 
 spects, have been true believers, have never- 
 theless found their faith put to too severe a 
 trial with respect to this article, although at 
 the risk of their own salvation. " The de- 
 grees of future punishment," it is said by a 
 learned divine, " will be various, and exactly 
 in proportion to the guilt and demerit of 
 those who are punished; for,^ that the Scrip- 
 
SECT. 1.] 221 
 
 tures say, It ivill be more tolerable for same 
 than for others in the dai/ of Judgment; and 
 that some will receive a greater damnation*.'* 
 But this, as it seems to me, will not mend 
 the matter with respect to those who will 
 suffer less than others, for, as these shall be 
 supposed to know that others suffer more 
 than they do (and by the bye, how they will 
 know this I cannot understand), it will be 
 no alleviation of their sufferings ; it never- 
 theless will be true, that their damnation will 
 not be so great as that of others. Supposing, 
 however, that there will be a difference be- 
 tween the punishment of some and that of 
 others, with respect to their bodies (for, with 
 respect to their minds, they will all alike be 
 conscious of guilt), the dreadful reflection of 
 
 * Mr. Horbery, supposing, with respect to future punish- 
 ments, that each man's punishment will be suited to the de- 
 merit of his sin and the malignity of his temper, scruples not 
 to include infants among the number of those who will perish 
 everlastingly. — P. 174. Dr. Brown, the ingenious author of 
 an Essay on the Existence of a Supreme Creator, falls into the 
 other extreme when he says, "The greater part of men sin 
 more from imprudence and error, than from deliberate and 
 desperate wickedness ; and even crimes which appear to us 
 invested with the most detestable colours, may, to Him who 
 looketh on the heart, and knowelh all its springs, appear 
 more deserving of compassion, than of interminfible, unmiti- 
 gated pnnishmpnt."-7P. 10, vol. ii. " 
 
 Q 
 
'222 [part II. 
 
 there never being au end to their respective 
 punishments, would bring all these wretched 
 men upon an equality*. 
 
 To return from this digression, and to 
 conclude. As the notion of a necessary im- 
 perfection in the case of even the most ex- 
 
 * There are some writers who, because they think it in- 
 consistent with the goodness of the Deity that he should 
 everlastingly punish creatures whom he himself had made, 
 and for whom, according to the words of our Saviour, it 
 would have been better that they had never been born, sup- 
 pose that God, after they had been punished for a certain 
 time, would annihilate them ; this, however, would be im- 
 possible, and which may be shown as follows : — If God can 
 annihilate a single particle of matter, he may annihilate any 
 portion of matter. Supposing him then to annihilate any 
 portion of matter, a general disorder in the mundane system 
 would be the consequence ; for, the order which the heavenly 
 bodies observe in their various motions or rotations, depend- 
 ing upon gravitation, would likewise depend on the quantity 
 of matter contained in each body. If only a single particle of 
 matter then were annihilated, it would cause some disorder in 
 the mundane system: and, if not more than a single particle 
 of matter were annihilated, it would in time cause as much 
 disorder as if any considerable portion of matter were aimi- 
 hilated. Now, seeing the bodies of the wicked will consti- 
 tute a part of that globe of which they will hereafter be the 
 inhabitants, it will be evident that these bodies of theirs can- 
 not be annihilated consistently with that order which the hea- 
 venly bodies now observe, and have from the time of the 
 creation observed (miracles excepted), in their various revo- 
 lutions. 
 
SECT. I.J 2-23 
 
 alted of created intelligences, as compared 
 with the perfection of the Deity, shall be 
 admitted, it will be evident that evil, or mi- 
 sery, must have existed somewhere, either in 
 power or in act, from the time of the crea- 
 tion ; and as it was coeval with the existence 
 of the miiverse, so will it go hand in hand 
 with that existence to all eternity*. 
 
 Had man, or some other intelligent being* 
 not been endowed with a freedom of will, 
 evil could not have existed. But man, no 
 less than every other being, is, as has been 
 said, an imperfect being ; if then there was 
 from all eternity a possibility of evil's exist- 
 ing, it is because there was from all eternity 
 a possibility that such a being as man is 
 should exist. A freedom of will in man 
 would have been supposed, when God gave 
 hini the command with respect to the tree of 
 knowledge ; and no sooner had man disobeyed 
 
 * The church is represented by Solomon as saying to 
 Christ, her spouse, / am black, but comely, or beautiful — 
 (Song, V. 5). This blackness, by which sin is, by a learned 
 annotator (Ainsworth), supposed to be meant, may, as I 
 conceive, not inconsistently with this interpretation, be sup- 
 posed to mean the imperfection mentioned in our text ; for, 
 although the creature be imperfect, it nevertheless is comely, 
 or beautiful. 
 
 q2 
 
•224 [part n. 
 
 this command, but evil, natural, as well as 
 moral, existed ; for natural evil is the effect 
 of moral, and produces it as naturally, as a 
 tree does its fruit ; as moral evil then shall be 
 supposed to have had its full effect in the 
 case of any one (but which must necessarily 
 be in this life), he will be as miserable as there 
 is any possibility of his being; but which 
 must necessarily be in some future life: for, so 
 long as a man is in this world, his wicked- 
 ness cannot be so great, as that it may not be 
 still greater. Now as we shall say, that God 
 may, by any power, mercy, or goodness, put 
 an end to the misery of a man who shall be 
 supposed to be suffering in a future life, for 
 the evil which he has done in this life; we 
 shall deny what was supposed, namely, that 
 this man is as miserable as there is any possi- 
 bility of his being ; he must therefore, as long- 
 as he exists, be miserable; for, if misery Tdc 
 the natural effect of moral evil, it cannot be 
 so now, and not be so a thousand years 
 hence ; this however we deny, as we suppose 
 the misery of any one that has done evil, and 
 is suffering for the evil which he has done, to 
 be, by any power, mercy, or goodness of 
 God, put an end to. But so likewise I say of 
 the righteous as they shall be supposed to be 
 
SECT. 1.] 225 
 
 in heaven ; heaven is in the Scriptures spoken 
 of as being a place where the good will be re- 
 warded ; and the happiness which the good 
 will enjoy in heaven, will, no doubt, be 
 esteemed by them as being a reward ; in like 
 manner as the misery of the wicked will be 
 felt by them as a punishment ; the happiness 
 nevertheless of the former of these, will be as 
 natural an effect of their righteousness, as the 
 misery of the latter will be of their wicked- 
 ness ; and it will be as impossible that there 
 should ever be an end of the happiness of the 
 righteous, as that there should be an end of the 
 misery of the wicked: for this, nature would 
 forbid in both cases alike. " The misery of 
 the wicked (as is rightly observed by Archbi- 
 shop King) arises from the very constitution 
 of the sinner * ; " and the same may be 
 said of the future happiness of the righteous; 
 it therefore will be as impossible, by any sup- 
 posed power to make a wicked man righteous 
 (but which will be necessary in order to his 
 being happy), as it will be to make a righteous 
 man wicked, and, of course, miserable, as 
 these shall respectively be supposed to have 
 departed this life; as well might a tree of a 
 
 * Sec King's Origin of Evil, Appendix XIV. 
 
 g3 
 
226 [part II. 
 
 particular species, be made a tree of a dif- 
 ferent species. 
 
 The doctrine of an universal redemption, 
 and the supposition of there being various 
 intermediate states, through which angels as 
 well as men will pass previously to their ar- 
 riving at a state which will endure for ever, 
 are the subject principally of Dr. Cheyne's 
 Philosophical Cmijectures. There are other 
 subjects, however, of minor consideration^ 
 which, in the course of this work, are treated 
 of, and which, agreeable to my plan, I now 
 proceed to state and discuss. 
 
SECTION II 
 
 Of the number of those subjects which, at 
 the close of the last section, I have mention- 
 ed, and which it is my intention to consider, 
 one, and that of no small importance, is that 
 which hath respect to the origin and cause of 
 motion. It has been contended by a late 
 well-known philosopher, in defence of the 
 doctrine of necessity, " that the conjunction 
 of motives and voluntary actions are as regu- 
 lar and uniform as that betwixt cause and 
 effect in the things of nature: these circum- 
 stances," he says, " form the whole of that ne- 
 cessity which we can conceive in matter ; and, 
 as they are universally acknowledged to take 
 place in the operations of the mind, it must 
 likewise," as he supposes, " be acknowledged 
 that all the operations of the mind proceed 
 from a like necessity*." 
 
 Now, if any actions of ours may proceed 
 voluntarily, and which is here admitted, I 
 
 • Hume's Essay on Liberty and Necessity. 
 
 q4 
 
228 ^ fPART II. 
 
 say, that no proof would arise froiii their pro- 
 ceeding regularly and uniformly, of their pro- 
 ceeding necessarily : for this is not the case 
 with the things of nature ; these for the most 
 part (or perhaps always) proceed regularly 
 and uniformly; it is, however, because it is 
 'the will of God that they should do so, and 
 which, if at any time this has not been the 
 case, i. e. if at any time this regularity and 
 uniformity have been interrupted (a very re- 
 markable instance of which will in the sequel 
 of this section be given), will be evident. 
 
 In agreement with these notions of mine, 
 it is supposed by our author (Dr. Cheyne), 
 " that no material thing can move, but as 
 its motion will originate in the will of some 
 intelligent being: the heavenly orbs, for in- 
 stance, could not first have moved, had it not 
 been the will of that great Being who created 
 them that they should move ; and their con- 
 tinuing to move ever since has been from the 
 same cause." Our author further supposes, 
 with respect to all such motion as arises from 
 the energy of the human will, " that this 
 energy will always be in proportion to the 
 matter contained in the thing intended to be 
 moved :" this I grant, and I say that it re- 
 
SKCT. 11.] « 229 
 
 futes the doctrine of necessity; for, as the 
 will of an intelligent being must needs be 
 free, so the motion in question might not 
 have taken place. 
 
 Our author (Dr. Cheyne) supposes, with 
 philosophers in general, that reaction is ever 
 in proportion to action ; this likewise I grant : 
 upon the supposition, however, of all motion 
 originating in the will of some intelligent 
 being, it will be evident, of the motion which 
 arises from reaction, that it will originate 
 likewise in the will of that Being with whom 
 the motion which arose from action origi- 
 nated. The axiom, that reaction is ever in 
 proportion to action, supposes a resistance 
 on the part of the thing moved ; and this re- 
 sistance arises from that vis inertiw which 
 philosophers ascribe to all inert things : as 
 this resistance, however, implies action, it is 
 this action, rather than any motion which 
 will arise therefrom, of which the reaction, 
 or vis inert ice, of the thing moved will con- 
 sist ; and as this reacting of the thing moved 
 would have been foreign to the intention of 
 him by whose will it was moved, so must it, 
 as I have said, originate in the will of some 
 other being, and that being can only be God. 
 
230 [part II. 
 
 Now, I suppose, with our author, the 
 energy of the will to be ever in proportion 
 to the matter contained in the thing moved ; 
 and I will suppose, as an example of this 
 rule, the thing moved to have been the stone 
 which was rolled from the door of Christ's 
 sepulchre: this, we are given to understand, 
 was done by an angel; as the will of an an- 
 gel, however, can have no greater power 
 naturally than the will of a man, and this 
 stone could not have been moved by any 
 power or energy which the will of a man has, 
 so neither, as I apprehend, could it have been 
 moved by any power or energy which the will 
 of the angel had ; for, to suppose that it 
 might, is to suppose that an angel might 
 move the whole earth, if it was his will so to 
 do : the conclusion is, that this stone was 
 moved because it was the will of God that it 
 should move, although not but as it was the 
 will of the angel at the same time ; and so 
 precisely, as I conceive, is it, when any pon- 
 derous thing is moved by a man; for, if the 
 will of man may, by any power which it has, 
 cause a thing at rest to move, it may cause 
 this thing to be at rest from its having been 
 in motion, but which it cannot, as the power 
 of the will merely is in question, and which 
 
SECT. II.] 231 
 
 is the case in the present argument. My no- 
 tion accordingly is, that God has so ordered, 
 as that, whenever it is the will of a man that 
 a thing shall move, and the supposed power 
 of this man's will shall be in proportion to 
 the matter contained in this thing, it shall 
 move ; this, I say, I suppose to be the case, 
 and not that any power of God is, on any oc- 
 casion of this kind, communicated to men. 
 
 That the will of God is the efficient cause 
 of all motion, is the opinion of a learned 
 writer; what he supposes, however, is, that 
 whenever a thing is moved, in consequence 
 of its being the will either of a man or a spi 
 ritual being, that it should move, it is as the 
 power of God is delegated to that man or 
 spirit; but as to which notion, it will have 
 appeared that I do not agree with him; in 
 other respects there is no material difference 
 between us: for, what he supposes is, that 
 it has been decreed of God, that whenever it 
 is tlie will of man that any material thing 
 shall move, for instance, his own body (to 
 the moving of which the natural strength of 
 this man must by him be supposed to be 
 equal, and which, by the way, is the same 
 thing as <o say, the energy of the will must 
 
232 [part II. 
 
 be proportioned to the matter contained in 
 the thing intended to be moved), it shall be 
 moved accordingly*. Thus, as God is the 
 sole efficient cause of all such changes as 
 material things are subject to, so is he the 
 sole efficient cause of all such motion as they 
 may have-}-." 
 
 Hitherto the motion of things which arises 
 from the will of man, although not inde- 
 pendently of the will of God, has been con- 
 sidered; seeing, however, there are motions 
 incident to things natural, in which the will 
 of man has nothing to do, and which must 
 therefore be wholly dependent on the will of 
 God, I suppose there can be no more eminent 
 an example hereof, than what may happen in 
 the case of miracles. Now, a miracle has, 
 by a learned prelate J, been said to be, in its 
 
 * Watts's Essays, p. 136, 
 
 t In the Old Testament all natural events are ascribed to 
 the will of God as their immediate cause ; and it is accord- 
 ingly observed by a learned divine, that the light of the day is 
 not by Moses attributed to the sun, nor rain to the clouds, nor 
 sight to the eyes, nor hearing to the ears, but all are referred 
 to the Sovereign Head, the creator of substances, the giver 
 of forms, the cause of causes. — Trapp's Marrow, &c. 719. 
 The people of Israel did the same, and it was suitable to the 
 nature of their government, which was a theocracy, that they 
 did so. 
 
 X Butler's Analogy, p. 164. 
 
SECT. H.] 233 
 
 very notion, relative to a course of nature, 
 and to be an interruption of that course; 
 this, however, has, by another vrriter*, been 
 denied, and veiy cogent reasons have by him 
 been given to show, that in a miracle there is 
 no interruption at all of the course of nature : 
 but neither of these two writers, in my 
 humble opinion, is right in his notion of a 
 miracle. Let the standing still of the sun 
 (upon the Ptolemaic -f-, and which is the 
 Mosaic system), when Joshua fought against 
 the Amorites, be propounded as an example ; 
 in this case 1 say, that the sun's standing 
 still was because it was God's will that it 
 
 * Turner's Essays. 
 
 t It has been shown by Sir Matthew Hale, in his 
 Origination of Mankind, upon philosophical principles, and 
 in defence of the Ptolemaic system, that " the heavenly 
 bodies move in liquido athere; which liquid aether he 
 supposes to be so much more rare than the air which we 
 breathe, as that it would retard these bodies much less 
 than the air of a grosser medium." " This," he says, 
 " would in a great measure obviate the objections of astro- 
 nomers to the system of Ptolemy, and which is* in agreement 
 with the Mosaic account ; and which objection is, the incre- 
 dible velocity of the motion of the heavenly bodies upon the 
 Ptolemaic system;" but which is no objection at all, as the 
 system which I have adopted with respect to motion shall be 
 admitted : for, if a body move because it is the will of God 
 that it should move, the motion being quick or slow will make 
 no difference in the case. 
 
234 [part II. 
 
 should do so ; but no other reason, according 
 to my notions, can be given for its moving at 
 any time. The sun's going on in its usual 
 course is only because it is God's will that 
 it should do so ; and neither more nor less 
 can be said of its standing still, and which it 
 did in the instance which has been given. 
 This example is peculiarly calculated to show 
 the truth of my theory, but which, however, 
 will equally apply in the case of all other 
 miracles; the will of God being, as I sup- 
 pose, the cause of all such extraordinary 
 changes as take place in any of these. 
 
SECTION III. 
 
 As man is a being consisting of a body and 
 a soul, his soul is not more essential to his 
 existence as a man, than his body. Angels are 
 generally supposed to be of an uncompounded 
 nature, and to consist wholly of an immate- 
 rial substance; to the contrary of this, how- 
 ever, our author (Dr. Cheyne) thinks it highly 
 probable, and he says that not only Pagan 
 but Christian antiquity agree in the opinion, 
 that all created intelligences have bodies, 
 or vehicles, of some kind fitted to their 
 order or degree of moral purity, habitation, 
 and situation, thereby to enable them to hold 
 communion with one another, to contemplate 
 the material world, and to converse with the 
 lower ranks of intelligences ; as also to 
 enable them to execute the orders of the divine 
 economy and providence, in God's govern- 
 ment of this world of ours. 
 
 Seeing, however, the bodies with which 
 these angelical beings are, according to our 
 
236 [part II. 
 
 author, clothed, are by him supposed to be 
 nothing that is essential to their nature (but 
 which is otherwise with men*), they cannot 
 die as men may : for, as the soul of man was 
 immortal, so would the death which was 
 threatened, and which he incurred by his 
 transgression, have been the death of the 
 body. Bat if angels cannot die from their 
 want of bodies, they cannot, for the same 
 reason, feel pain; and if they cannot feel 
 pain, they cannot know what it is to be 
 hungry or thirsty; for these sensations arise 
 
 * If a man may be defined to be a being consisting of a 
 body in union with a soul, the body will, as in the text is sup- 
 posed, be equally essential to a man, as his soul is. It is ac- 
 cordingly observed by a learned divine, " that though the soul 
 be the prime and chief principle of the individuation of the 
 person, yet it is not the sole and adequate principle thereof; 
 but the soul joined with the body, makes the adequate indivi- 
 duating principle of the person. Nor will any true philosophy 
 allow, that the body was ever intended for the mere garment 
 of the soul, but for an essential constituent part of the man, 
 as really as the soul itself; and the difference of an essential 
 half in any composition, will be sure to make an essential 
 difference in the whole compound." — South's Serm. vol. iv. p. 
 251. To the contrary of this however, I find it asserted by a 
 learned prelate, that the soul, in effect, is the whole man ; the 
 body but the shell of him : the body but the casket, the soul 
 the jewel ; and in support of this notion, he quotes the follow- 
 ing words of ChrysOStom, •» irgoauirliit X"?* '''" »«/** triflxirat, 
 
 on Luke, ix. 25. I pretemd not to decide between these two 
 great authorities. 
 
SKCT. HI.] 237 
 
 from some uneasiness which is feU, and of 
 which we are relieved by food and drink. It 
 is said, indeed, of the manna with which the 
 Israelites were fed in the wilderness, that it 
 was \h& food of angels, or, as the Psalmist calls 
 it, the bread of heaven : these, however, as re- 
 spect shall be had to angels, may be consi- 
 dered as figurative expressions ; it is, for 
 instance, under the notion of bread that 
 righteousness is in the Scriptures said to be 
 hungered after, and men may thirst for living 
 waters; and so, in like manner, angels may 
 be said to be hungry and thirsty. 
 
 Now, whether I have expressed our author's 
 meaning rightly, or not, it will be sufficient 
 for the understanding his hypothesis to sup- 
 pose that angels are capable of pain of mind; 
 for he supposes of the angels that fell, that 
 they w\\\ have contracted a foulness, as well 
 as a sinfulness, of which they will stand in 
 need of being cleansed ; and that these, no 
 less than the wicked among men,* will be re- 
 claimed by the greatness of their sufferings, 
 and will, like men, pass through various 
 states, in order to their attaining to that righ- 
 teousness, which will equally qualify them 
 for heaven, as will the righteousness of the 
 
 R 
 
'2li^ [part II. 
 
 angels that kept Itieir first estate, or that of 
 men vv^iose rising again will be unto life. 
 
 Now, upon the supposition of the bodies 
 with which our author supposes angels to be 
 clothed, not being essential to their existence, 
 they may, and as our author supposes, will be 
 put off, as those angels shall be supposed to 
 pass from one state to another, in order to 
 their being clothed with such bodies as are 
 suitable to the orb into which they will pass, 
 and so on toties quoties; and which will be 
 without any resurrection properly so called ; 
 for a resurrection implies the death of the 
 body, and, of course, its separation from the 
 soul ; and our author accordingly supposes, 
 that there is a separation of the soul from the 
 body when a man dies, i. e. from that body 
 which was taken from the dust of the ground, 
 and which, as such, would have been suit- 
 able to his terrestrial abode : a circumstance 
 which leads to a system which our author has 
 adopted, which, although intricate at best, 
 and not clearly expressed by him, is, as far 
 as I can understand it, as follows. 
 
 He supposes the souls of all men to have 
 been created at the same time, clothed with 
 
SECT. III.] ^39 
 
 bodies of a refined and a^tlieieal substance ; 
 and that these souls, thus clothed, were con 
 tained in Adam*: a notion, he adds, which 
 there will be no difficulty for those to con- 
 ceive who know and understand the infinite 
 divisibility of matter-}-. These bodies he sup- 
 poses to be indissolubly united to their proper 
 souls, and to be imperishable. Hence it 
 should seem to be our author's meaning, that 
 the bodies of all men were created previously 
 to the formation of Adam's body out of the 
 dust of the ground. 
 
 Now, as the soul of Adam must, accord- 
 ing to our author s notions, have been clothed 
 with an sethereal body, no less than the souls 
 of all other men, his soul thus united to a 
 body, would have been contained in that 
 body which was made of the dust of the 
 ground J, no less than the souls and bodies 
 
 » The author, it must be confessed, has the authority of 
 the Scriptures for this notion ; for Levi is said to have paid 
 tithes (i. e. by anticipation) whilst in the loins of his father. 
 Now, if Levi was in the loins of his father before he was be- 
 gotten, Levi's father would have been in the loins of Levi's 
 grandfather, and so on till we come to Adam, in whose 
 loins, of course, all men would have been contained. 
 
 t Phil. Conject. ^ 22 and 24, p. 161. 
 
 t The author of an Essay on the Resurrection of the 
 Body (Drew) supposes, as our author docs. •' that the body 
 
 r2 
 
'240 [part II. 
 
 of all other men ; and this body which was 
 made of the dust of the ground, would have 
 been a receptacle, if I may so say, of the 
 bodies and souls which, according to our 
 author, God had created: that body which 
 would have been indissolubly united to the 
 soul of Adam, not being excepted ; and, in 
 this case, the breath of life which God is 
 said to have breathed into the man which he 
 
 of a man as he shall have died, will return to its parent earth, 
 never to rise again." What he supposes in this case is, 
 •' that the body of each man contains a small material sub- 
 stance which is indissoluble, and which is the germ," as he 
 calls it, " of future life ; that this germ, when disencumbered 
 of all the particles of flesh and blood which now enclose and 
 surround it, vegetates in the grave until the general resurrec- 
 tion." (239.) Now, the body which our author (Dr. Cheyne) 
 supposes to be indissolubly united to the soul, is somewhat 
 like unto this germ of Mr. Drew's : this notion, however, of 
 Mr. D.'s, it must be confessed, is nearer to the description 
 which Saint Paul gives of this matter, and of which matter 
 he gives a very ingenious account. As this notion of a germ, 
 which, as it shall duly have expanded, Mr. D. supposes 
 will constitute the resurrection-body, shall be admitted, the 
 soul may be supposed to be united to it, in like manner as, ac- 
 cording to Dr. Cheyne, it is to that aBthereal body with which he 
 supposes the souls of all men, as they were contained in Adam, 
 were clothed ; and in which case, the necessity of a vestment 
 to serve as a clothing to the departed soul (a notion adopted 
 by Dr. Cudworth, and borrowed from Plato, and by Plato 
 from the ancient Egyptian theology, as may be seen in Hermes 
 Trismegistus, B. iv. ^ 59), would be superseded. 
 
SECT. III.] 241 
 
 had made of the dust of the ground, would 
 be only animal life. 
 
 For a farther explanation of our author's 
 system, so far as I can understand it, I ob- 
 serve as follows : — He supposes of the gethc- 
 real body, to which in the case of each man 
 the soul will be united, as before has been 
 said, that it has all the properties of the body 
 in which it will be contained, and which he 
 calls the adamical body, as being derived, in 
 the case of each man, from Adam. As this 
 notion of our author shall be admitted, it 
 will be evident, that as all such things as a 
 man shall do will be done by means of the 
 outward and gross body, so all such ideas as 
 he will have acquired will have been acquired 
 through the instrumentality of the same body, 
 i. e. according to the common philosophy, 
 by impressions made on the brain, as things 
 sensible are seen, heard, or otherwise sensibly 
 perceived ; and the things to the knowledge 
 of which a man will thus have attained, will, 
 according to the aforesaid philosophy, be re- 
 membered as the aforesaid impressions on 
 the brain shall at any time be viewed by the 
 soul. Now, whether it be in this, or in any 
 other way, that the knowledge of things is 
 
242 [part 11. 
 
 acquired, and these afterwards remembered 
 (for I confess that I do not approve of this 
 philosophy, and as may be seen in Section V.), 
 it will be sufficient for my purpose that this 
 shall be supposed to be a true account of the 
 matter : for, according to our author's no- 
 tions, when a man departs this life, the body, 
 by means of which all his ideas have been 
 acquired, will return to its original dust, 
 never to rise again ; that a body will have 
 been prepared for him in some other orb, 
 equally suitable to the moral condition of his 
 soul, as the body which has been put off was 
 to the soul's then condition ; that with this 
 new body the soul united to its sethereal body 
 will be clothed, but without any remembrance 
 of the things done in the body which has been 
 put off; that with this new body the soul, 
 united to its sethereal vehicle, will be clothed, 
 and so continue to be until the purpose for 
 which his having passed into this new orb 
 shall have been answered ; and he will then 
 pass into some new orb, and so on, till the 
 soul shall have attained to that moral per- 
 fection, which will fit it for a state that will 
 be permanent ; and when the aethereal body, 
 duly expanded, will constitute its only body. 
 
sKCT. in.] 243 
 
 As tlie explanation which 1 liavc now 
 given shall be supposed to express our au- 
 thor's meaning (and if it does not, I confess 
 myself not to understand this philosophical 
 system which he has adopted), it is farther 
 observable, the body and soul of the woman, 
 after her having been made out of one of 
 Adam's ribs, would no longer be contained in 
 his loins, but in this body which would have 
 been prepared for it, i. e. for the soul of the 
 woman ; and the same thing would happen 
 with respect to the children of Adam the 
 moment bodies had, by natural generation, 
 been prepared for those bodies and souls of 
 theirs which had been originally created. 
 
 Now, as Adam's sinning was, as is gene- 
 rally supposed, before he had any carnal 
 knowledge of Eve, the bodies which were 
 contained in his loins would not have been 
 mortal, by reason of this sin of his : but 
 which, however, would be otherwise with re- 
 spect to that body which I have mentioned 
 to have been made out of the dust of the 
 ground ; and as this body would have be- 
 come mortal by sin, so likewise would the 
 bodies be of all men that should descend 
 r4 
 
244 [part II. 
 
 from him : as would likewise be the body of 
 the woman, because of the sameness which 
 her body, as having been made of a rib of 
 Adam's, would (notwithstanding- its having 
 become separate from Adam) continue to 
 have with his body ; and the soul likewise of 
 the woman would, as it may be conceived, 
 have become contaminated and sinful by the 
 sin of Adam, and for a reason like unto that 
 by which I have supposed her body to have 
 become mortal; and which is, the union 
 which the will of Eve would have had with 
 the will of Adam when he ate of the for- 
 bidden tree : for, except as Adam had eaten 
 when Eve liad once eaten, that would have 
 been yut asunder which God had joined toge- 
 ther; and the reverse of this, as I suppose 
 would have been the case, had Adam's eating 
 of the aforesaid tree been antecedent to Eve's 
 eating thereof; i. e. her soul would, by reason 
 of the unity of her will with the will of 
 Adam, have partaken of the sinfulness of 
 his soul ; and seeing a clean cannot come 
 out of an unclean thing, sinful would have 
 been the souls of all that should descend from 
 them, in like manner as their bodies would, 
 as I have supposed, have become mortal. 
 
SECT. III.] 245 
 
 Now, to return to our author's system 
 (supposing what has now last been said to 
 have been his meaning); he supposes the 
 mortal bodies of men to be a covering only 
 to those pure sethereal bodies which are in 
 indissoluble union with their souls ; that this 
 union, however, will be no hinderance to 
 the soul's acting for the good of the gross 
 outward body, and which, unconscious as a 
 man must be of its being united to a pure 
 sethereal body, will naturally be considered 
 by him as being his only body: this I ob- 
 serve by the way only; for it is not material 
 either to what I have said, or may farther 
 say, on our author's system. 
 
 Our author, as in a former part of this 
 section has ])een observed, supposes, that 
 when a man departs this life, the outward 
 body dies, and returns to the dust from 
 which it was taken, never to rise again*; 
 
 * This certainly was not the case with Christ ; our author's 
 notions, nevertheless, may be true as they apply to men in 
 general: for I say, that as Christ's rising again was that 
 men might know that he was risen from the dead, so it was 
 necessary in his case, that the same body that died should 
 have life restored to it ; it was likewise necessary that this 
 body should ascend into some higher region, as otberwigc this 
 
246 [part II. 
 
 and the inward body with the soul to which 
 it is united, passes into some other orb, 
 clothed with another body taken from that 
 orb, in like manner as it had been here, i. e. 
 from the earth; but if so, and this must 
 have been the case with Adam, equally as it 
 has been with all other men who have de- 
 parted this life, the question is, what became 
 of those bodies which, according to our au- 
 thor, would have been contained in Adam's 
 loins, and which during his life would have 
 been unborn? Now, except as these bodies 
 united to their proper souls, may be said to 
 have had a virtual or potential existence 
 instead of an actual existence, as our author 
 supposes, in the loins of Adam ; for, in that 
 case, all that were unborn would have a like 
 existence in the loins of every man that is 
 born ; so long as there should be a man and 
 
 ascent could not have been witnessed by men on earth. Now, 
 upon our author's system, the body which he supposes origin- 
 ally to have been united to the soul in the case of each man, 
 will, as these men shall have passed through various inter- 
 mediate states, constitute their only bodies : all such outward 
 bodies with which they were clothed, and which were fitted to 
 the different orbs which they inhabited, being no longer 
 wanted. As Christ, however, was made perfect by his suf- 
 ferings on earth, that body to which his soul was originally 
 united, and whi<;h died, and rose again, would consfitute his 
 only body for ever afterwards. 
 
SBCT. III.] 247 
 
 a woman* left, there would be a possibility 
 of there being still more; except, I say, 
 as this shall be supposed, I will not say 
 that our author's system is built on no solid 
 foundation, but that I do not fully com- 
 prehend it. 
 
 * " The woman, in the work of generation, or procreation," 
 our author says, " is but a second intention, or buttress for 
 a falling edifice, i. e. that the thing conceived in her womb 
 might be nourished and increased by the juices of the proper 
 female." By which words we are to understand it to have 
 been the author's opinion, not that women have no souls, but 
 that originally there was no sexual distinction ; and which he 
 supposes to have been the case. 
 
SECTION IV. 
 
 Our author supposes '' that the human 
 race was originally made in a scale of intel- 
 ligences, and in that cone of creation which 
 seems to ascend from inert and passive matter 
 through the human species, to the angels; 
 and beyond the cherubim and seraphin, up 
 to the utmost extent to which finite free in- 
 telligence reaches ; that being free, and con- 
 sequently capable of a progressive procedure, 
 they may either go forward to perfection and 
 happiness, to the greatest happiness of which 
 they are capable, or backward to misery. All 
 these intelligences our author considers as 
 being emanations from the First Cause, and 
 that, being impressed with the divine image, 
 they may truly be said to be, what he calls, 
 infinitesimal deities; i. e. they may, in some 
 imperfect and gross manner, be so raised 
 in our minds, as to give a faint idea of the 
 Supreme Being*." 
 
 * Philosophical Conjectures, S ^ ^^^ 39* P- ^^- 
 
SECT. IV,] 249 
 
 This notion of a cone, of which inert 
 matter constitutes the basis, and of which 
 the highest intelligent created beings are the 
 apex, has been adopted by various writers ; 
 with some of these, however, the Deity is the 
 apex of this cone: a notion which is very 
 properly reprobated by a learned prelate ; 
 and who, speaking of a certain celebrated 
 writer* who has adopted this notion of a 
 cone, says, " he (the aforesaid writer) does not 
 expressly say that God is the vertex of his 
 cone; this he knows would have been read 
 with abhorrence ; but he leads you upward 
 through the several contiguous ranks of in- 
 telligences, till he brings you towards the 
 vertex, and there, if you keep to his hypo- 
 thesis, he leaves you to stop short of includ- 
 ing it (i. e. God being the vertex) if you 
 can ; from whence there is but one easy step 
 to infidelity, and another as easy to atheism -}-." 
 " Had Mr. Locke," as the author in another 
 part of his book observes, " left the divine 
 nature out of his cone, it might better have 
 fitted the rest of the universe, and the whole 
 system of created beings: among which it 
 is not improbable there should be many dis- 
 
 * Locke. t Div. Analogy, p. 130. 
 
250 [part II. 
 
 tinct ranks and species, one above another; 
 though not differing by such insensible de- 
 grees only, as we imagine between the conti- 
 guous sections of a cone: for this implies 
 that they are all one common mass, and 
 scarce distinguishable heap of the same uni- 
 versal, similar, and uniform substance, knit 
 together by a kind of fate and necessity, or 
 by some chance or accidental disposition of 
 parts of an eternal and infinite system of 
 matter and endless motion, rather than by 
 the voluntary contrivance of an infinitely 
 wise and powerful Agent, who created all 
 purely spiritual intelligences wholly and es- 
 sentially different from one another*." 
 
 Our author (Dr. Cheyne), in contradiction 
 to these opinions of the learned Bishop, differ- 
 ing however from Mr. Locke, observes as 
 follows: " As under the human species there 
 is an almost infinite variety of the brutal and 
 irrational species; and under these, a like or 
 greater variety of the vegetable kind; and 
 that all the several species, from the highest 
 to the lowest, sink so gradually into one 
 another, as that it is impossible to determine 
 
 • Div. Ajmlog^y, p. 125. 
 
SKCT. IN . 
 
 251 
 
 where one degree ends, and the next begins; 
 so is it also highly probable, that above the 
 human species there are orders of beings 
 rising gradually and insensibly without end; 
 and this, the infinite variety of systems, and 
 fixt stars, and the analogy of things, makes it 
 probable and philosophical to suppose; and 
 that it is agreeable to the notion which we 
 have of a Being of infinite power, wisdom, 
 and goodness, to suppose, that all these 
 were made to be finally happy, in a manner 
 consistent with their natures, and his own *." 
 
 Our author, under the name of those 
 intelligent beings which make a part of his 
 cone, includes brutes; for, although he men- 
 tions not either these, or vegetables, as 
 being parts of his cone, he nevertheless, in 
 express words, supposes the essential differ- 
 ence between the brute and the vegetable 
 creation to consist in the self-motive and 
 self-active powers of the former, and of 
 which the latter are destitute ; that vegeta- 
 tion depends entirely upon the powers of 
 matter; but that animation, in all its degrees, 
 requires a spiritual substance of some rank or 
 
 * Pliil. Conject. ^ 8. 
 
'25'2 [part II. 
 
 other; and here, as he says, the essential 
 difference between vegetable and animal na- 
 ture lies, viz. in the locomotive power of the 
 latter, of which the former is destitute en- 
 tirely, and is merely passive. But, as he 
 farther says, since the brute creation, in 
 some degree, plainly manifests the passions 
 and affections of mind that we of the human 
 race are capable of; since they live, or are 
 actuated by a self-motive, self-active prin- 
 ciple; since they feel pleasure and pain, and 
 may be, at least most of them that fall under 
 our observation, made to learn and under- 
 stand some things, which is a proof that 
 they are endowed, even with intelligence in 
 a low degree; and since all of them suffer, 
 and must necessarily suffer, a million of 
 different ways here, and at last most intense- 
 ly by their death; it is highly probable that 
 they are in a lapsed, expiatory, and progres- 
 sive state of being, and may advance to 
 higher degrees of perfection and happiness*. 
 Our author, it must be confessed, is coun- 
 tenanced in this notion of brutes being en- 
 dowed with intelligence by a celebrated na- 
 turalist of a late date; " the bodies of brutes," 
 
 • Conject, on Nat. Analog. ^ 3. 
 
SECT. IV.] 253 
 
 he says, " are actuated by a principle of a like 
 kind with that which is placed in man, but 
 greatly inferior with regard to the degrees of 
 reason and intelligence which a brute pos- 
 sesses: in the more perfect brutes, this prin- 
 ciple is plainly intelligent as well as sentient : 
 and their actions so evidently show them to 
 be endued not only with a strong memory, 
 but with reflection, and some degrees of rea- 
 son, that it is wonderful to find Descartes and 
 his followers so far imposing on themselves, 
 as seriously to believe these were machines 
 formed entirely of matter, and, as it were, 
 so many curious pieces of clock-work wound 
 up, and set a-going. Nor is it less surprising, 
 that the generality of theological writers 
 should, till of late, have been so far mistaken 
 in this matter, as not to have perceived, that 
 after once admitting all the actions of the 
 most perfect brutes to result from mere me- 
 chanism, their ascribing every thing in man 
 to no higher a principle, would be a natural 
 and easy consequence*." This last 'observa- 
 tion may be a very proper one; but when he 
 ascribes the actions of brutes to the same 
 principle as that from which the voluntary 
 
 * Whytt, Essay on vital Motion, p. 322. 
 
 S 
 
254 [part II. 
 
 actions of men proceed (I say voluntary; 
 for, if it be involuntary actions of men 
 that he means, reason is certainly out of the 
 case in these), his notions are equally ex- 
 ceptionable as those of Dr. Cheyne. 
 
 The notion of actions as proceeding, in 
 the case of brutes, from reason, or intelli- 
 gence, has been rejected by an ingenious 
 writer of a still later date, who nevertheless 
 had not adopted the Cartesian system. " In- 
 stinctive action," he says, " is founded on. 
 impulse, and that which is reasonable on 
 reflection. Whatever being is capable of be- 
 ing irresistibly driven to action by impulse, is 
 so far under the dominion of instinct ; and 
 whatever being is capable of counteracting 
 these impulses, and acting contrary to them, 
 is under the dominion of reason. Impulses 
 which originate in external causes, act 
 through the medium of the senses ; and these 
 causes must be confined within the bounds 
 of corporeal existence, without operating 
 through this medium: but reason originates 
 in another source*." 
 
 * Drew on the Immortality of the Soul, p. 96.— Im- 
 pulse, according to Boerhaave and others, arises from, 
 or rather consists in irritation; and irritation, they say, may 
 
SECT. IV.] 255 
 
 There is another respectable writer, wlio, 
 speaking of brutes, makes no mention at all 
 
 be so great in the case of men, as that action, which otherwise 
 might be voluntary, will be involuntary : for instance, a man 
 may refrain from breathing for some time ; irritation, how- 
 ever, will by degrees become so great, as that he will no longer 
 have a power of holding his breath. In tlie case of brutes, 
 however, Mr. Drew contends, that action in consequence of 
 irritation, always proceeds involuntarily, and never volun- 
 tarily ; it would be to no purpose then that brutes should be 
 endowed with reason as men are, except as, being endowed 
 with this principle, they might act either according or con- 
 trary to its dictates at will. 
 
 Sir M. Hale very properly says, that the actions of brutes 
 originate in reason, but he denies that they are endowed with 
 reason ; and he gives a physical reason in proof of the con- 
 trary, and which is as follows: — '^It has been found by ana- 
 tomists, that there are in the brain, not only of a man but of 
 a brute, certain portions of matter, wliich they call protube- 
 ranticp. annulares ; NATES UT testes, that in brutes their sa- 
 gacity and subtilty are always in proportion to these protu- 
 herantia annulares." The aforesaid anatomists, however, as 
 the author adds, have found, that in brutes the only com- 
 munication of the brain with the heart is by the nervtis parts 
 vagi, derived from the cerebellum, and spreading its branches 
 into the muscle of the heart : whereas in man there is not only 
 the same communication of that nerve, but a ramification of 
 the nervus intercostalis is also inserted into the muscle of the 
 heart, whereby a greater communication between the brain and 
 heart is meiintained in man than in brutes. — Origination of 
 Mankind, p. 65. Now, the above-mentioned ramification of 
 the nervxLs intercostalis certc'nly cannot be the cause of man's 
 being a rational being: a circumstantial proof, however 
 arises from this ramification obtaining in men and not in 
 brutes, that men are endowed with reason, and that brutes, 
 s2 
 
256 [part II 
 
 of instinct as being- a principle of action with 
 them; he nevertheless says, " It is evident 
 they are not machines ; and as material prin- 
 ciples cannot eflfect what we every day ob- 
 serve in them, it is impossible to deny them 
 some degrees of thought or reason; and as, 
 admitting the least degree, we know not 
 where to stop, that which is capable of some 
 reason will be capable of more." Our author 
 further on observes, that " Salmasius and 
 Locke allow that brutes have reason, and 
 that the distinction between their reason and 
 that of men consists in this, that brutes have 
 only particular, but no abstracted general 
 ideas ; and that if their souls do not subsist 
 after death, it is not owing to any imperfec- 
 tion in them, but to the will of Him that 
 created them*." 
 
 The author of a letter on the knowledge 
 of brutes " denies that there is any principle in 
 
 are not. A like reason is by our author given for the 
 affection called laughter being excited in men, and which 
 distinguishes them from brutes no less than reason : — " An- 
 other part of the above-mentioned ramifications of the ner- 
 vus intercostalis, as the aforesaid anatomists have likewise 
 found, are derived into the chest and diaphragma of a man, 
 but not of a brute, whereby principally the aforesaid affection 
 is excited." 
 
 * Ellis on the Knowledge of divine Things, p. 391. 
 
SECT. IV.] 257 
 
 them that is properly to be called a soul : for, 
 as there are only two substances in nature, 
 spiritual and material, the soul, which some 
 attribute to brutes, must, if it be essentially 
 different from the body, partake of the na- 
 ture of the human soul. Our author, deny- 
 ing- that brutes have souls properly so called, 
 denies that they feel, hear, see, or otherwise 
 sensibly perceive; they neither feel heat or 
 cold, pleasure or pain ; it is the soul, accord- 
 ing- to our author, that hath these sensations, 
 but neither doth the soul feel pain immediately 
 in divers parts of the body; for, make a liga- 
 ture between the head and another part of 
 the body, and it will stop all feeling; which, 
 as he says, makes it plain that feeling is not 
 immediately perceived in the parts them- 
 selves." (P. 53.) Our author, however, does 
 not adopt the Cartesian system, which he 
 considers as bordering on infidelity; what he 
 says is, " that the union and correspondence 
 of soul and body mutually acting upon one 
 another, is caused by certain general laws 
 always efficacious, which God has thought 
 fit to establish in regard to the desires of the 
 soul and motion of the body; these then 
 occasionally determine and apply the efficacy 
 of the divine will; but the immediate and 
 s3 
 
258 
 
 PART II, 
 
 efficient cause of all is God himself" (p. 51) ; 
 which, by the bye, is the notion precisely 
 which has been adopted in our second section. 
 
 If brutes, as Drew and other writers con- 
 tend, are wholly devoid of reason, they will 
 be incapable of reflection; admitting then 
 that they feel pain and pleasure as really as 
 they appear to do, not being capable, how- 
 ever, of reflection, it will be the same thing, 
 in point of misery and happiness, as if they 
 felt neither pain nor pleasure ; for misery and 
 happiness depend not on sensible pain and 
 pleasure : a man, for instance, may be happy 
 under painful, and miserable under plea- 
 surable sensations; seeing, however, there 
 must be a cause of his happiness in the one 
 case, and of his misery in the other, he can- 
 not be either happy or miserable, so as to 
 know himself to be so, without reflection. 
 Again I say, that when we are asleep we may 
 feel either pleasure or pain, and not be sen- 
 sible of it; i. e. we shall not be able to reflect 
 on the pleasure which we are here supposed to 
 feel, so as to be conscious to ourselves that 
 we feel pleasure; and I say the same as it 
 shall be pain that we are supposed to feel. 
 Now, such precisely is the case with brutes 
 
SECT. IV.] 259 
 
 when they are awake; and I accordingly say, 
 that not being- conscious to themselves either 
 of the pleasure or pain which they shall be 
 supposed to feelj it will, in the divine inten- 
 tion, be to no purpose of happiness, for the 
 present or the future, that they at any time feel 
 pleasure, and to no purpose of misery that 
 they at any time feel pain. 
 
 That brutes have a life in common with 
 men is witnessed by Solomon when he says, 
 that a man dieth as a beast or brute doth, yea, 
 they have all one breath: but when he adds, 
 the spirit of a man goeth upward, but the spi- 
 rit of a beast downward, he shows, that al- 
 though a man, by reason of a life or spirit 
 which he hath in common with a beast or 
 brute, and which goeth downward as it no 
 longer animates the body, and of course is 
 then no more ; a man, nevertheless, by rea- 
 son of that spirit which the sacred writer 
 describes as going upward, will be essentially 
 different from a brute ; for'a brute, ^ it dies, 
 will die to live no more; but a man, as he. 
 dies, will rise again with respect to his body, 
 and, by reason of his spirit or soul, to which 
 his body will again be united, he will live for 
 ever. 
 
 s4 
 
260 [part II. 
 
 On the ground of what has now been 
 said, I say, that our author's notion of brutes 
 passing into a future state which will be in- 
 termediate, and in order to a state which 
 will be permanent and endure for ever; this 
 notion, I say, proceeds on false grounds with 
 respect to brutes, although it may be other- 
 wise with respect to men. 
 
SECTION V. 
 
 Our author supposes " that all the vital 
 functions are performed by the spirit or soul, 
 by the intermediation of vibrations caused by 
 the action of external objects, or their effluvia, 
 on the brain or retina ; which vibrations the 
 soul naturally knows to denote the presence 
 of such and such bodies, and their actions." 
 Thus " seeing (according to our author) is 
 performed by the impressions of the rays of 
 light, emitted or reflected by the surfaces of 
 bodies, and exciting particular vibrations on 
 the optic nerves, and pointing out to the sa- 
 gacious spirit the presence of such and such 
 bodies ; and in a manner analogous hereto 
 are hearing, feeling, &c. performed*." As 
 these notions differ not materially ^rom the 
 commonly received philosophy, any such ob- 
 jection as will apply to one will likewise 
 apply to the other ; and this objection is, the 
 absurdity of supposing an immaterial to be 
 
 * PhU. CoDJect. ^ 27. 
 
262 [part II. 
 
 capable of being acted on by a material sub- 
 stance ; or, vice versa, a material by an im- 
 material substance : this, as I conceive, is not 
 the case, even when two things are of the 
 same nature. 
 
 My notion, if I may be allowed to have an 
 opinion on this matter, is, that things are in- 
 tellectually perceived, in like manner as they 
 are sensibly perceived; i.e. there is some- 
 thing, as I suppose, by reason whereof they 
 are suited to the intellectual faculty, in like 
 manner as they are to the senses ; insomuch 
 that they cannot be sensibly perceived, and 
 not be intellectually perceived at the same 
 time by us, except as either the intellectual 
 faculty shall not have had its due expansion, 
 as in the case of young children, or as the 
 mind shall be employed on some other thing 
 than that which is sensibly perceived ; and in 
 which case it will amount to the same thing 
 as if they were not sensibly perceived at all. 
 
 In conformity with this notion, it has 
 been supposed by philosophers, that there are 
 two distinct principles in man ; the one of 
 which they call the animus, or mind, and the 
 other the anima, or soul : by the former they 
 
SECT, v.] 263 
 
 understand the intellectual principle, or seat 
 of reason ; and by the other, the principle of 
 life and sense, influencing the vital motions. 
 According- to them, we have the animay or 
 vital sentient principle, in common with 
 brutes ; but the animus, or soul, which is of 
 a more exalted nature, they say, is proper to 
 rational or intelligent creatures only*. Now, 
 the anima, which is here said to be the prin- 
 ciple of life and sense, whether in brutes or 
 in men, is neither more nor less than what is 
 commonly called instinct; and which, as be- 
 ing more properly called the anima, is a prin- 
 ciple from which all vital motions with brutes 
 necessarily proceed ; whilst with men some 
 of these motions, because of the animus which 
 obtains in them, and which is a governing 
 principle, do not necessarily proceed ; for in- 
 stance, breathing, with a man, may be either 
 accelerated or retarded, or it may be wholly 
 withheld ; it can be withheld, however, for a 
 time only ; for when a man finds his life to 
 be in danger, he will necessarily .breathe : 
 whereas with brutes, who are wholly devoid, 
 of the principle called the animus, there is no 
 power of the kind which has been mentioned ; 
 
 * See Wbytt's Essay, p. 301. 
 
y 
 
 264 [part II. 
 
 and which, by the way, is an undeniable 
 proof that they are wholly incapable as well 
 of thought as of reason or intelligence ; for 
 these are properties of the animus, or superior 
 principle, and of which, as I have said, brutes 
 are wholly devoid. Now brutes, consistently 
 with this philosophy (whatever may be the 
 case with a truer philosophy), may as truly 
 be said to feel pleasure and pain as men do ; 
 for, the feeling pain at least, or some uneasy 
 sensation, is indispensably necessary for those 
 motions which are properly called vital, to 
 proceed: hunger, for instance, which arises 
 from an irritation of the nerves of the sto- 
 mach, is always an uneasy, and may be a 
 very painful sensation, forcibly compels a 
 brute, upon the principle of self-preservation, 
 to satisfy his hunger, as an opportunity shall 
 be supposed to offer for his so doing. This, 
 however, is not the case with men ; for, a 
 man being endowed with a power or principle 
 of thought and intelligence, may, as he shall 
 be supposed to be in a situation which has 
 been mentioned with respect to a brute, re- 
 fuse to satisfy his hunger, even though death 
 should be the consequence of his so doing. 
 A man, it is true, cannot, consistently with 
 his duty to God, wilfully destroy himself; and 
 
SECT, v.] 265 
 
 God, as he has implanted in brutes, as well 
 as men, a desire of life, he has, by reason of 
 that desire, given them a law which shall not 
 be broken (i. e. in the case of men) with im- 
 punity; and which shows, that this law 
 which God has given them may be broken, 
 and that because the anima, or principle of 
 life, is the only principle of action which they 
 possess ; whereas, with men, to the anima is 
 added the animus, and which is the proper 
 governing" principle. 
 
 The truth, after all that either has been or 
 may further be said on the subject of brutes, 
 is, that our attributing to them any such pro- 
 perties or qualities as we possess, as, for in- 
 stance, knowledge *, or reason, or foresight, 
 is by a fiction, i. e. not really supposing they 
 possess those ; for so would they be men, and 
 not brutes: but, perceiving effects arising 
 from their actions, similar to those which 
 arise from ours, we, because of this analogy, 
 suppose the cause to be the same-f-; whereas, 
 
 * The Scriptures speak of the ox as knowing his owner, and 
 of the ass as knowing his master's crib; but in this, as in various 
 other instances, they accommodate themselves to our appre- 
 hensions. 
 
 1 1 find this notion has been adopted in a late publication; 
 it is expressed as follows: — " Sagacity, courage, fidelity, love, 
 
266 [part II. 
 
 according to my notions, the will of God is 
 the true cause. In the case of man, the pre- 
 servation of his life depends, in the first 
 place, on that love of life, which is so strong, 
 that, naturally, he cannot act contrarily to 
 it; as the love of life, however, shows that it 
 is the will of God that he should preserve 
 this life, the knowledge, the reason, and the 
 foresight which he possesses, he will know to 
 have been given him, if not wholly, chiefly 
 at least, for this purpose ; and, I may say, 
 as much more for this purpose, as the love of 
 life is more, and greater, than the love of 
 any thing which this world affords. To sup- 
 pose, then, that the actions of brutes proceed 
 from the same love of life in their case as 
 they do in ours, is in fact to suppose that 
 they know, not only that there is a God, but 
 likewise that their being endowed with pro- 
 perties the same as those which obtain in us 
 is for a like purpose. If life then, in the case 
 of brutes, be not preserved in such manner 
 as that they are conscious of it, and which 
 consciousness no advocate for their know- 
 jealousy, revenge, are all predicated of brute animals, not less 
 than of man, although they are not things, or existences, of 
 themselves, but certain attributes, or affections, in them, exhi- 
 biting symptoms, and producing effects corresponding with the 
 symptoms and effects attendant upon those qualities in oar< 
 selves." Coppleston's Inquiry, &c. p. 128, 
 
SECT, v.] 267 
 
 ledge will suppose them to have ; it is by the 
 same fiction (as we would judge rightly of 
 their actions) that we shall attribute to them 
 even the love of life, as that by which, as I 
 have said, we attribute to them knowledge, 
 reason, and even sagacity. 
 
 From what has been said, I may perhaps 
 be thought to incline to the Cartesian philo- 
 sophy ; for, if the will of God be the imme- 
 diate cause of the actions of brutes, they 
 certainly are equally machines, as the earth 
 is a machine, as its diurnal rotation shall be 
 supposed to be performed from the like cause. 
 I nevertheless differ from Cartesius, by sup- 
 posing that brutes feel pleasure and pain no 
 less than we do, and which may be the case 
 consistently with what I have said ; for, with 
 respect to these sensations, they, no less than 
 we, are passive, and not active, and there- 
 fore, in this respect (i. e. as feeling pleasure 
 and pain), not machines. They are active, 
 as those motions, gestures, and Utterance, 
 shall be considered, which show that they 
 feel pleasure or pain, and the divine will may 
 be the cause of these motions, &c. ; but they 
 are passive, as these sensations shall be con- 
 sidered in themselves. 
 
 wt- 
 
SECTION VI. 
 
 The different lives which^ according to 
 bur author, enter into the composition of 
 man, viz. the vegetative, the sensitive, and 
 the rational life, have, in a former section, 
 been stated. Our author however, in the 
 section where he speaks of all intelligent be- 
 ings as constituting a cone ascending from 
 inert matter through the human species up 
 to the highest angelical beings, supposes 
 brutes* as in that section I have said, to 
 make a part of this cone; and that these, in 
 common with man, partake of a vegetative, 
 an animal, and a rational life. Now, the 
 notion Of a cone, such as above has been 
 mentioned, has, as in a* former section has 
 been observed, been adopted by various 
 writers, and, in particular, by Mr. Locke ; 
 and who on the subject of brutes, says, that, 
 " in these the animal and vegetable kingdoms 
 are so nearly joined, that if you take the 
 lowest of the one, and the highest of the 
 
 Q 
 
SECT. VI. I iOO 
 
 otiiei*, there u^ill scarcely be perceivetl any 
 difference between them*:" on which words I 
 observe, that if these t\^^^ngdoins are so 
 joined, as that there is scarce any difference 
 between them, the notiou of-a cone will re- 
 quire that the same slionld be said of each 
 link of the chain by which the different ranks 
 of being's which constitute this cone, are 
 joined together; and in wliich case, there 
 will scarce be any difference between the 
 lowest of the brutal, and the highest of the 
 angelical species of beings; and the author 
 will thus say more of the intelligence of brutes, 
 than any the greatest advocate for this spe- 
 cies of beings have dared to say, namely, 
 that they partake of the intelligence of 
 angels. 
 
 Our author, speaking of the order in 
 which the aforesaid lives obtain in man, says 
 that the first state of a child In the womb 
 is that of an embryo -J-, and which be sup- 
 poses to have a life that is merely vegetative ; 
 that when this embryotic state is at an end, 
 and which he supposes not to be the case 
 until the child is born,, the animal state be- 
 
 • Book iii. chap. xvi. \ 12, p. 262, t ^ 27, p. 167. 
 
270 [part II. 
 
 g-ins ; this he supposes (although he does not 
 directly say so) to be succeeded by the ra- 
 tional. What he says is, that " by the painful 
 sensation which a child feels, and which it 
 expresses by its crying as soon as it is born ; 
 that by these, as well as by the like painful 
 sensations to which it is afterwards exposed, 
 and which it is doomed to suffer in this mi- 
 serable world, it learns by degrees to avoid 
 such evils as may add to those which, in its 
 future life, it cannot avoid." Now I say, in 
 contradiction to our author, that animal life 
 may commence previously to a child's coming 
 into the world: and of the truth of which 
 the Scriptures afford us two examples ; one, 
 in the case of Esau and Jacob, who are said 
 to have struggled together in the womb of 
 Rebekah*, and another in the case of John 
 the Baptist, who is said to have leaped in the 
 womb of Elizabeth -}-. This life I say a child 
 may have, if not in its state as an embryo, 
 as naturalists call its first state, in that at 
 least as a foetus (a distinction, by the way, 
 which our author makes no mention of); and 
 of this life having had a beginning previously 
 to a child's being born, is often, as I under- 
 
 • Genesis, xx\. 22. \ Luke, i, 41. 
 
SECT. VI.] 271 
 
 stand, if not always, witnessed to mothers 
 by feelings like unto tliose whicli 1 have 
 mentioned; and this is accordingly commonly 
 called (although, upon my system, not truly 
 so) the quickemng of a child ; its state of an 
 embryo, according to the aforesaid natural- 
 ists, then ceases, and that of a foetus begins. 
 
 There is reason however to suppose, that 
 animal life may in some small degree have 
 an earlier beginning in these cases than thai 
 which I have mentioned, and to be even co- 
 eval with a child's conception in the womb. 
 The blood, it is true, is in the Scriptures called 
 the life of an animal ; meaning, as I suppose, 
 blood in circulation (for, when the circula- 
 tion hath ceased for a certain time, the body 
 dies) ; and as the circulation of the blood de- 
 pends on the breath, or external air which is 
 drawn into the lungs, and a child cannot 
 breathe until after it is born, so far our au- 
 thor may seem to have the authority of Scrip- 
 ture for his supposing that animal life does 
 not commence in the case of a child until it 
 is born : I suppose, however, in contradic- 
 tion to this notion of our author's, that ani- 
 mal life may, as 1 have said, have an earlier 
 beginning, and be even coeval with a child'? 
 t2 
 
272 [part II. 
 
 conception in the womb, and that without 
 any contradiction to the Scriptures: for, when 
 they call the blood the life, I suppose them 
 to mean such life as a child, or any other 
 animal, may be perceived or known to have, 
 and of which the blood in a state of circu- 
 lation is the cause. Now, if there be a 
 something in the case of any animal, pre- 
 viously to its being born, that may properly 
 be called life, it will or may be so in all 
 animals : and it is well known in the case of 
 a chick, whilst in the egg, that, in conse- 
 quence of incubation, it has life; and this 
 life is by naturalists called a punctum saliens, 
 or small quivering motion, the seat of which, 
 as they have ascertained, is the heart; and 
 if this be so in the case of a chick, it not 
 only may be so, but it is reasonable to sup- 
 pose that it is so, in the case of every other 
 animal at its first conception in the womb, the 
 case of a child not excepted. 
 
 Sir M- Hale says much the same thing 
 when he calls the soul a little spark of life, 
 which at its first appearance might be con- 
 tained in the hollow of a cherry-stone; he 
 adds, however, as follows : " This little active 
 principle increaseth, and dilateth, evolveth, 
 diffuseth, and expandeth, if not its substan- 
 
SECT. VI.] 273 
 
 tial existence, yet its energy and virtue, to 
 the utmost confines of" its little province, 
 and every particle and atom thereof; yea, 
 and it is of that absolute necessity that it 
 should do so, that withoiit it the compositum 
 would be dissolved, and the body dissipated 
 into corruption and its first principles, as we 
 see it falls out suddenly after separation of 
 the soul from the body. As the body could 
 not be reduced into that orderly frame in 
 which it is constituted, without the plastic 
 and formative power of the soul, so it could 
 never be upheld in that state of order and 
 convenience, without the continued influence 
 of the soul*." 
 
 From what has been said I think it con- 
 clusive, that animal life, whether in a man 
 
 * Origination of Mankind, p. 31. This notion of the 
 learned writer cannot apply to brutes, who have no such 
 soul as is here mentioned ; and it is indeed contradicted by 
 our author himself, who, in another part of his book, writes 
 as follows: "The first (brute) animals that were made, and 
 which was when God said. Let the earth bring forth the living 
 creature after his kind, there was no mean portion of time 
 between formation and animation, but both were together. 
 In succeeding times, animals who come to their perfection by 
 degrees, attain to this perfection by the formative power of 
 the soul, or living principle ; but the first formation, and in- 
 formation of them, by the divine fiat." 305. 
 T.'J 
 
274 [pAftT n. 
 
 or a brute, is coeval with conception. The 
 question, however, with respect to man is, 
 when is it that rational life begins? But this 
 our author does not positively say : for, al- 
 though he says that the endeavours of a 
 child to relieve itself of any such pain as. 
 it may feel after its first coming into the 
 world, are the dawnings of reason ; this 
 dawning of reason, nevertheless, must have 
 been preceded by the child's having a soul: 
 for reason, in how small a degree soever it is 
 shown, is an act of the soul; our author 
 therefore must suppose the soul to have been 
 given the child immediately after its having 
 animal life; and, therefore, after its having 
 been born. Now two different opinions have 
 been adopted of old as to the manner in 
 which men come by their souls, and the 
 learned of the present day, as I believe, still 
 continue to be divided about it : the one is, 
 that it is by traduction ; i.e. they that adopt 
 this opinion, suppose the soul to have a pro- 
 lific property, in like manner as the body has; 
 according to which notion, the soul will be 
 received by a child at its conception, and as 
 its body is ; both of which will thus be de- 
 rived from a parent stock, and both properly 
 be said to be propagated. The other opinion 
 
SECT. VI.] 275 
 
 is, that the soul is received by infusion as soon 
 as the body is a fit mansion for it, and wliich 
 will be when it first has animal life*; and in 
 which case the soul would be a new creation ; 
 and as this was the case with Adam, the 
 souls of all liis posterity will, according to 
 the doctrine of ti*aduction, be derived from 
 him, in like manner as their bodies would 
 have been from Eve. 
 
 Having" thus considered the state of men, 
 as ever since the fall they first come into 
 the world, I return from this digression into 
 M'hich I have, insensibly, as it were, been 
 led, to the proper subject of this section, 
 and which is the consideration of the differ- 
 ent lives which obtain in men, viz. the vege- 
 tative, the sensitive, and the rational; but 
 these our author supposes obtain likewise in 
 brutes. Now I admit that brutes have not 
 only a vegetative and a sensitive life, as we 
 
 * This must have been the case with Christ :• for, being 
 supernaturally begotten, his soul could not have been derived 
 to him by traduction, and as I suppose to be the case at pre- 
 sent with us ; in every other respect I suppose the case of 
 Christ to have been the same as that which in the text is de- 
 scribed, and supposed to be the case with every man during 
 the time of gestation in the womb ; and it is so considered in 
 Note t, Section V. Part I. p. 66. 
 T 4 
 
276r [part II. 
 
 have; but that they have, if not a soul pro- 
 perly so called, at least a principle of life ; 
 and which, in conformity with the Scriptures, 
 which speak of brutes, or beasts, as being 
 living souls*, may be called a soul. In re- 
 gard however the spirit, or soul of a brute, 
 when it dies, is by Solomon said to go down- 
 ward, and the spirit-}-, or soul of a man, 
 when he dies, to go upward, there is, as in a 
 former section I have said, an essential differ- 
 ence between these two species of beings. 
 
 Now, seeing brutes, as our author has 
 observed, and as I have admitted, partake 
 with men of a vegetative and animal life, 
 there will be a soul in men of the same kind 
 as that is which obtains in brutes; and this 
 soul will be a principle of life and action with 
 men, in like manner as it is with brutes; in 
 
 * Gen. i. 30. 
 
 t Sir Mat. Hale, speaking of the soul (or what in the book 
 of Ecclesiastes is called a spirit, whether of a man or a beast), 
 says, " In the hunaan fabric there are two kinds of forms ; the 
 one, the/«rma corporis, whereby it has those properties, or 
 operations, which are common to bodies of the like make and 
 composition ; whereby it is weighty, and descends as other 
 bodies ; lastly, whereby it has a tendency to corruption, and 
 dissipation ; nevertheless it is by reason of that form which 
 distinguishes him from a brute, that he has the life of a man 
 and not of brute." — Origination of Mankind. 
 
SECT. vi.J 277 
 
 us, however, it is controlable by that superior 
 principle which is commonly called the soul, 
 and by reason of which we differ essentially 
 from brutes. The principle from which all 
 the actions of brutes proceed is commonly 
 called instinct ; i. e. it is a principle by which, 
 according to the notion which commonly 
 prevails, they are instigated or excited to all 
 such actions as they perform ; and which ac- 
 tions of theirs are so well calculated to pro- 
 mote the end for which they proceed, and 
 which always is the preservation of their 
 lives*, as that it is no wonder that brutes are, 
 by injudicious writers, so commonly supposed 
 to be reasonable creatures ; but which, for 
 reasons that have been given, I scruple not 
 to say, is a prostitution of the term reason- 
 able. Seeing, however, there is no such ne- 
 cessity for the preservation of life in our case, 
 as there is in that of brutes ; for there is a 
 life in our case, for the attaining to wliich 
 we may act, and with which the preservation 
 of that life which we have in common with 
 brutes, may happen to be incompatible ; it 
 
 * Emulation is a property in the case of brutes, which 
 seems to be peculiar to horses (except as birds, who are a 
 species of brutes, may be said to emulate one another in 
 their sinping), and is not easily to be accounted for, as their 
 preservation dof-? not seem in any degree to depend thereon. 
 
278 [part II. 
 
 will be fit that brutes, who have only one 
 ife, should act for the preservation of that 
 life, were it only for this reason, namely, 
 that they were originally intended for the use 
 and service of man. Lastly, with respect to 
 the amends which our author supposes will 
 be made to brutes in some future state, for the 
 sufferings to which they are exposed here, I 
 shall not content myself with saying, as 
 some writers have, that their pains are over- 
 balanced by their pleasures ; what I rather 
 say is, that if the pain of body which we 
 may feel from any cause whatever, v, ill be of 
 no account as the mind shall be supposed to 
 be employed about other things, it will be 
 evident, that brutes will stand in no need of 
 any amends hereafter for any suffering's here : 
 for, being incapable of reflection on any such 
 pain as they may really feel, their case will 
 be the same as ours with respect to any such 
 pain as we may really feel, but not be con- 
 scious of it. 
 
 There is a notion which in the preceding 
 section has been mentioned, relative to the 
 two principles which in the present section 
 have been supposed to obtain with men and 
 brutes, and which would have superseded 
 
SECT. VI. J 279 
 
 the necessity of their being here again men- 
 tioned, but that it has occurred to ine, that 
 there is something farther that may be said 
 on the subject of these two principles, than 
 what in that section has been said. It is 
 supposed by naturalists on the subject of that 
 principle in brutes which is commonly called 
 instinct, that not only all their external ac- 
 tions are regulated by it, and directed to their 
 proper end ; but that all their vital actions 
 and motions, such as respiration, the circula- 
 tion of the blood, ike. are immediately owing 
 to the energy of this principle ; and which, as 
 if these actions of theirs might proceed in- 
 tentionally, the aforesaid naturalists call a 
 mind; but with what propriety, will in a 
 farther part of this section be considered. 
 The external actions and internal motions of 
 brutes, as well as those of men, proceed from 
 a principle which, as in a former section has 
 been observed, may properly be called a 
 sensitive soul, and which naturalists call the 
 anima, in contradistinction to that higher 
 principle which is called the animus, and 
 which, properly considered, distinguishes 
 men from brutes: these actions and motions, 
 they say, are always involuntary in the case 
 of brutes, and that they are, for the most 
 
280 [part ri, 
 
 part, so in the case of men; for, with men, 
 these, some of them at least, may be voluntary: 
 and breathing, which may be either accelera- 
 ted or retarded, or even wholly suspended, 
 has been mentioned as an instance hereof*. 
 Now these actions, as they shall be supposed 
 to be uncontrolled by the animus, or govern- 
 ing principle, may, and usually do proceed 
 instinctively ; in regard, however, these and 
 the like actions may be controlled, there 
 will be a difference between them, and 
 the like actions, as they proceed with brutes ; 
 for, with men they will proceed freely, 
 but with brutes necessarily. I say the same 
 of the external actions to which we may in- 
 stinctively be excited : I say, tliat inasmuch 
 
 * Laughing and crying, whatever the cause of these 
 may happen to be, are with children involuntary motions ; 
 they may, however, in time become voluntary, i. e. they may 
 be moderated, suspended, or even wholly suppressed, "for 
 instance, from a sense of decency, respect, fear, or shame. 
 The cause of laughter however, even with adults, may be so 
 forcible, as that it cannot, from any consideration whatever, 
 be restrained. Crying may likewise, from various consi- 
 derations, be moderated or suppressed ; the cause, however, 
 of crying may be so great, as that a person may have no 
 power either to moderate or suppress it ; it may indeed be 
 either moderated or suppressed, by a contrary passion being 
 excited, i. e. laughter; but tliis can be only for a time; for it 
 will return Avith an increased violence, as the cause of laughter 
 shall no longer be felt. 
 
SECT. VI.] -281 
 
 as they are controlable by the mind, or intel- 
 lectual faculty, they will have the reason of 
 free or voluntary actions : and it is accord- 
 ingly a rule in morals, that a man is respon- 
 sible for what he has involuntarily done, in 
 a case where his not doing it was possible. 
 Again I say of actions which are indifferent 
 either to good or evil, and which proceed 
 instinctively, i. e. without the attention of the 
 mind, and which, among the many instances 
 which may be given, I will mention that 
 of a man's conversing with others whilst he 
 is eating his dinner, I say, that so long as 
 he might have done this with attention, his 
 doing it without attention, will have the rea- 
 son of a voluntary act: for these various rea- 
 sons I am of opinion, that the term instinct 
 cannot properly be applied to man, even be- 
 fore his attaining to an age to make use of 
 his reason : for, as reason, or intelligence, 
 will require time only to expand, in order to 
 its being as truly a reasonable or intelligent 
 principle before as after its due expaYision, so 
 will man's state and condition, even from 
 the time of his conception in the womb, 
 have been essentially different from the state 
 and condition of brutes. 
 
282 [part II. 
 
 I sliall conclude the present section by 
 observing, that as what has been said in the 
 case of men, considered as part of a cone, 
 would apply in the case of brutes, ; and as, 
 upon the notion of a cone, whether as adopted 
 by our author, or by other writers, there is 
 nothing that is true with respect to men, that 
 will not be so with respect to brutes, as 
 these respectively make parts of this cone, 
 others may think as they please of this no- 
 tion, but, as to myself, I utterly reject it : 
 for those who suppose " the supreme Crea- 
 tor of all things, and the whole system of all 
 creatures from the highest seraphim to brute 
 matter, to be, as it were, an infinite cone" 
 (for these are the words of our author), in fact 
 suppose all created things, not merely to 
 resemble, but in some degree to partake of 
 the nature of the Creator; than which nothing 
 can be more absurd; and of which, a learned 
 Prelate * scruples not to say, that it is blas- 
 phemous. 
 
 * Preface to Pbiiosopbical Principles of Religion, p, 2. 
 
SECTION VII. 
 
 I PROBABLY shall be thought to have said full 
 as much, if not more than is sufficient to es- 
 tablish my notion as to the essential differ- 
 ence between men and brutes: there never- 
 theless are some observations on the subject 
 of brutes which have fallen from the pen of 
 a learned Prelate besides those of his which 
 I have already mentioned, and which equally 
 deserve to be noticed. •' Brutes," the learned 
 writer says, " are capable of all the sensations 
 that are in us ; and though the senses in 
 many of them are more acute than those in 
 man, and consequently more susceptible of 
 quick and vigorous impressions from sen- 
 sible objects; yet all this is no more in them, 
 than the striking of one material substance 
 upon another; the effect of which remains 
 just as long as there is a disposition in the 
 animal spirits to retain it. But for want of 
 
284 [part ii. 
 
 an higher and immaterial principle, when the 
 idea is once formed, they can take no after- 
 view, or notion of it, distinct from the sen- 
 sation itself. This is the utmost extent of 
 all that knowledge in brutes, which we call 
 instinct ; and is really no other than a dispo- 
 sition of their senses by the Author of nature, 
 to excel in those particular instances of sen- 
 sation wherein the being or preservation of 
 every species is most concerned. They are 
 never actuated or influenced by more than 
 one simple idea at a time ; nor by that neither 
 but when there is some actual impression of 
 the external object to stir it up within them, 
 or some remains of the impression continuing 
 in the imagination and brain ; and all they 
 perform is at the impulse and instigation of 
 particular ideas of sensation, which is the 
 only direction they have in all their opera- 
 tions *." 
 
 Now there is, it must be confessed, same- 
 thing plausible in this account ; it neverthe- 
 less, as I conceive, is objectionable; it is 
 objectionable, as it supposes brutes to be ca- 
 pable of ideas. Brutes, as hath been said, are 
 
 * Browne's Procedure, &c. C. ii. Sect. 2. . 
 
SKCT. VII.] *285 
 
 usually supposed to see, hear, or otherwise 
 sensibly perceive, and, according to the last- 
 mentioned writer, even to have ideas of things 
 sensible, in like manner as we have. Their 
 actions, it is true, proceed as if this was the 
 case ; it is not however for this reason true 
 that it is the case. It is certain that we see, 
 hear, &c. and may have ideas of such things 
 as we have seen, heard, or have otlierwise 
 sensibly perceived; but it is not certain that 
 it is in the manner after which these things are 
 commonly supposed to happen, that they are so 
 seen, &c. : to show this I observe as follows. 
 
 We cannot conceive how any thing should 
 be seen, but as, according to the common 
 philosophy, we suppose certain effluvia, or 
 films as some call them, are emitted from 
 the visible object, and strike upon the re- 
 tina of the eye; nor how any thing should 
 be heard, but as the sound of an audible 
 thing, and which sound is caused by a commo- 
 tion or undulation of the air, striking upon 
 the tympanum of the ear ; nor can we have any 
 idea of any such thing as we have seen or 
 heard, but as we suppose the aforesaid effluvia 
 to have acted on the brain, or sensorium, and 
 to have made traces thereon ; which traces, 
 
 > 
 
28G 
 
 as tliey are viewed by the soul, give it an idea 
 of these things. These, I say, are the notions 
 which commonly obtain with respect to 
 sensible and intellectual perception *, and I 
 do not pretend to say that we may have better : 
 I deny, however, that these things really take 
 place; I grant that we see, hear, and other- 
 wise sensibly perceive, and that we may 
 have ideas of these things; but I deny that it 
 is in the manner which hath been mentioned 
 (although the only way in which we can ac- 
 count for these things), that they happen ; 
 their happening in the manner which has 
 been mentioned would indeed, should we 
 consider the matter seriously, be found to be 
 
 * When things are intellectually perceived, in the sense 
 intellectaal perception is spoken of in the text, what is meant 
 is, that when things are sensibly perceived, i. e. seen, heard, 
 &c. they are judged of by mind as to what they really are ; this 
 is very commonly expressed by judging from the report of the 
 senses; and this Archbishop King says the vulgar always do. 
 •' There are men however," he says, " who, puffed up with 
 vanity of appearing wiser than the vulgar, leave truth behind 
 them, and are blind in full light. Hence some have denied 
 motion, others space, others all sense in brutes." — Ong. of 
 Evil, vol. ii. p. 326. When our author however, who sap- 
 poses that brutes really feel pain, say's in the next page, that 
 " not being conscious of feeling pain, we feel none," he in 
 fact differs not in opinion from those men who he says deny all 
 sense in brutes : for these certainly are not conscious of their 
 feelign either plea.sure or pain. 
 
sKCT. VII.] 287 
 
 absurd ; the case however, as we would phi- 
 losophize on these matters, is, as I have said, 
 remediless. What may, and all that can 
 be said upon this subject, is this; as the 
 Scriptures accommodate themselves to our 
 weakness, when they represent God as seeing, 
 hearing, &c. and even as having ^eas, the 
 impossibility of our having better notions of 
 things which have been mentioned, imposes 
 the necessity upon us of being contented 
 with such notions only as we may, and as I 
 suppose it to be the will of God that we 
 should have, and so I suppose it to be in the 
 present case. 
 
 Now, I suppose it to be the will of God 
 likewise, that we should believe brutes to feel 
 the pain which they at any time appear to 
 feel, as really as we do ; and we cannot abso- 
 lutely say that they do not ; nay, we cannot, 
 in spite of our philosophy, but believe that 
 they really feel the pain which they at any time 
 appear to feel ; and we do not at ariy time 
 punish them as we would correct them, or 
 pity them as we see them suffering unde- 
 servedly, but as we believe not only that 
 they feel pain, but they are endowed with 
 understanding ; and if at any time we either 
 u 2 
 
 V 
 
288 [part II. 
 
 punish them wantonly, or pity them not 
 when they appear to suffer undeservedly, we 
 shall have to answer for it at God's tribu- 
 nal*. As we then, by the exercise of our be- 
 nevolence towards brutes, may be gainers, 
 but which benevolence supposes them to 
 feel both pleasure and pain, and in some 
 measure to understand, we may be well con- 
 tented to be deceived in this matter ( if we 
 really are deceived), when we consider, that 
 our case, as we should be undeceived, would 
 be like that of the madman who fancied 
 himself to be a king, but who was restored 
 to his right senses, " Pol me occidistis, amici, 
 non salv^stis, mentis gratissimus error." 
 
 * '* If Balaam had done justly, he would have spared his 
 ass, and have corrected himself: but the false Prophet doth 
 the fault, and the poor beast must bear both blame and 
 strokes." — Bp. Sanderson's Sermons, p. 282, fol. ed. 
 
SECTION VIII. 
 
 Our author (Dr. Cheyne), in the thirty-third 
 section of his Philosophical Conjectures, ap- 
 pears to have been well acquainted with the 
 writings of Bishop Browne, on the subject of 
 analogy ; a subject which it seems had been 
 much discussed in this learned Prelate's time, 
 and much has since been written thereon. 
 By some it has been defended ; but by others 
 condemned, as being, in their opinion, not 
 perfectly orthodox : of the former of these is 
 our author, who observes as follows : — " All 
 systems of natural religion are as incompre- 
 hensible and inexplicable as any mystery in 
 revealed, unless it be by analogy." And Bi- 
 shop Browne, in his Procedure of the, hwnan 
 Understanding, to the same purpose, says, 
 " Except as we have recourse to an analogical 
 way of reasoning in support of the mysterious 
 doctrines of our religion, the objections of 
 infidels are unanswerable." 
 u 3 
 
 > 
 
290 [part II. 
 
 Our author's (Dr. Cheyne's) notions on the 
 subject of analogy are as follows : — He sup- 
 poses " that all intelligent beings, as having 
 been impressed with the divine image, are 
 emanations from the First Cause ; that the 
 natural powers, or faculties, which we feel in 
 our own souls, may fairly be carried up to 
 absolute infinitude by analogy, and, in some 
 imperfect and gross manner, be so raised as 
 to give a faint idea of the Supreme Being ; 
 that therefore, whatever natural powers, qua- 
 lities, or faculties, we feel in our own souls, 
 we may safely conclude there are powers, 
 qualities, and faculties, eminently corre- 
 spondent and analogous to them in the divine 
 nature, with the difference that absolute in- 
 finitude has to the lowest finite ; and, on the 
 other hand, that there are minute resem- 
 blances in all finite intelligences, correspond- 
 ent and analogous to the essential and fun- 
 damental attributes in the divine nature, and 
 consequently that we may fairly reason from 
 our own spiritual nature up to the divine, 
 keeping within the bounds and proportions 
 above mentioned." On the subject of the 
 divine image, our author supposes, " that 
 living (or life), understanding, and will, are 
 the three radical powers of which our spi- 
 
SECT. VIII.] 291 
 
 ritual nature consists, and that all our intel- 
 lectual operations are modifications of these ; 
 that in the divine nature, the three analogous 
 and correspondent attributes are self-exist- 
 ence, omniscience, and omnipotence. AH 
 these three natural powers and faculties are 
 comprehended in one spiritual nature in all 
 created intelligences: in them they are mo- 
 dalities only, powers or faculties ; but in the 
 divine nature they are realities, because of the 
 infinite activity of that nature, for nothing 
 is more certain in philosophy than the axiom 
 in divinity, that evet^ thing in God is God*," 
 
 The human nature, these writers say, is so 
 very different from the divine, that there evi- 
 dently could have been no intercourse be- 
 tween God and man, had there not originally 
 been some resemblance between heavenly and 
 earthly things. Now, although man's hav- 
 ing originally been made in the divine image 
 and likeness is no argument to prove that all 
 earthly things were made after the pattern of 
 heavenly things, it nevertheless affords so 
 much presumptive evidence of its having 
 been so, that Plato, who is supposed to have 
 
 Phil. Conjcct. ^ 33. 
 r 4 
 
292 [part II. 
 
 been well acquainted with the writings of 
 Moses, supposed the same. In support of 
 this notion, our author supposes it to be im- 
 possible that infinite power and perfection 
 should bring any being into existence which 
 had not his own stamp or image on it ; and 
 that for this reason, namely, that there would 
 be nothing besides himself whose image it 
 should be ; and that it is absurd to say, that 
 any thing which God had originally made 
 should represent nothing at all that did pre- 
 viously exist — a sentiment which had been 
 before expressed by St. Augustine, who says, 
 " that as the three divine Persons of the holy 
 Trinity concurred in the creation of all things, 
 so do all things bear the stamp of their 
 Maker." In confirmation of this notion, St. 
 Paul tells us, IVe now see things darkly , and 
 as in a glass ; for, by these things the Apo- 
 stle, as commentators in general suppose, 
 means things heavenly ; and by the glass or 
 mirror, in which they are seen, things earth- 
 ly. Now, it is evident, that if heavenly 
 things may as perfectly be seen in things 
 earthly as a man's face may be seen in a glass, 
 there will be the same similitude between 
 h'*- , enly and earthly things, as there is be- 
 tween the face seen in the glass and the face 
 
SECT. VIII.] 293 
 
 of which it is the image : as the face seen in 
 the g^lass, however, will be darkly seen, be- 
 cause it is an image only, and not the face 
 itself; so likewise will it be with heavenly, 
 as they are supposed to be seen in earthly 
 things. 
 
 On the ground of what has been said, the 
 doctrine of analogy may readily be under- 
 stood ; for, if there be an exact resemblance 
 between any two things, it is evidently im- 
 possible that we should know any thing of 
 the nature of the one, and be wholly ignorant 
 of the nature of the other : on the contrary, so 
 much as we know of the nature of the one, so 
 much we shall know of the nature of the other ; 
 for, in this case we shall, without our knowing 
 or being conscious of it, have transferred the 
 ideas which we have of a thing with whose 
 nature we were well acquainted, to a thing 
 with whose nature we neither were nor could 
 have been at all acquainted. Now, such pre- 
 cisely is the doctrine of analogy ; it supposes 
 a resemblance to subsist between two thino-s, 
 of the one of which we have a conception, 
 but of the other no conception at all. As 
 this shall be supposed, it clearly shows, that 
 as we shall substitute the ideas which we have 
 
 > 
 
294 [part n. 
 
 of the one in the place of the other, but of 
 which we have no conception, we shall, as 
 the advocates for this doctrine contend, evi- 
 dently have the same conception of the latter 
 as we have of the former. 
 
 For the refutation, however, of this doc- 
 trine, notwithstanding the support which it 
 may seem to have in the before-mentioned 
 words of St. Paul, I will suppose of the uni- 
 verse, that as it could not have been self- 
 existent, and that it must of course have had 
 a cause of its existence, we may know that 
 nothing less than a power that is infinite 
 could have been the cause of its existence : 
 this power, I grant, we can have no concep- 
 tion of; seeing, however, any property or 
 excellency which we are told we must substi- 
 tute in the room of power must be adequate 
 to the effect, i. e. to the production of the 
 universe, and every effect implies a power in 
 its proper cause, when we ascribe power to 
 God as the creator of the universe, al- 
 though we do no more, in fact, than say that 
 he was the cause of the existence of the uni- 
 verse, we nevertheless, in our ascribing power 
 to God, ascribe something to him of which 
 we have a conception, although not an ade- 
 
 2 
 
SECT. VIII.] 295 
 
 quate one. Again, I say that whether, per- 
 ceiving, as we may do, the admirableness 
 with which the world has been contrived for 
 its answering the purposes for which it was 
 made, we ascribe wisdom to God ; or, expe- 
 riencing the comforts and conveniencies of 
 this life, we ascribe goodness unto him ; we 
 do the same thing as when we ascribe power 
 to him, i. e. we acknowledge him to be the 
 cause of which the admirable contrivance, 
 and the comforts and conveniencies which 
 have been mentioned, are the effects ; and 
 from all which it will be evident, that God 
 may, with the same propriety, be said to be 
 powerful, wise, and good, as that he may be 
 said to be the cause of those things in which 
 power, wisdom, and goodness, are displayed : 
 and if so, the necessity of any transferring 
 of the ideas of things of which we have a 
 conception, in the place of those of which we 
 have no conception, is wholly superseded, 
 and the danger of our doing so avoided ; but 
 if so, the doctrine of analogy cannof stand, 
 and that it cannot stand on any good founda- 
 tion I observe as follows : 
 
 There is a doctrine which is not peculiar 
 to Bishop Browne, but which has been adopt- 
 
296 [part II. 
 
 ed by another writer : they both of them 
 suppose, that there is something in the na- 
 ture of man, by reason whereof he can have 
 no conception at all of a pure spiritual sub- 
 stance: the one of them says, that " it is im- 
 possible for us to have an idea of an active 
 power in any degree, if we must have it only 
 from an immaterial substance, of which we 
 have no idea at all ; nor indeed a conception 
 of any one operation of it independent of 
 matter or material organs, in conjunction 
 with which the spirit of man exerts all its 
 operations*." To the same purpose the other 
 writer says, " If we take a view of our think- 
 ing part in all its operations, we find in all 
 these it is constantly joined and mixed with 
 
 * Browne's Procedure, &c. p. 73. It has been observed, 
 in agreement with these notions of Bishop Browne, by a 
 learned friend of mine, that there is no word, in ours, or 
 any other language, that properly expresses the mind ; that 
 the words which we use to express things of a spiritual na- 
 ture, are taken from things of a material nature; and the 
 word spiritual is an example hereof, which signifies breathing, 
 and which is an act of the body ; that therefore there is no 
 word that properly expresses God ; and that when we say God 
 is a spirit, we make use of a word that signifies breathing ; 
 and this notion of a spiritual thing being necessarily express- 
 ed by a material word, seems to be confirmed by the Scrip-- 
 tures, when they say, that Christ breathed on them (the Apo- 
 stles), and said, Receive ye the Holy Ghoit. John, xx. 22. 
 
SECT, viii.] 297 
 
 the bodily frame; nor can any of these take 
 place unless the bodily system be in a condi- 
 tion to act with it, and assist it in its offices : 
 how then shall we say that this mind of ours 
 is a substance «»,ntirely simple and uncom- 
 pounded, when experience shows that every 
 action of it is from a mixed principle and 
 source * ?" In answer, and for the refuting of 
 these notions, I say, that thinking must be 
 the property either of a material or of an im- 
 material substance ; for, as these are essen- 
 tially different from one another, it cannot be 
 the property of both, either in conjunction or 
 separately. 
 
 The latter of the above writers says, " that 
 it was Mr. Locke's opinion, that God might, 
 if it pleased him, annex thought to a proper 
 system of matter." — (P. 9.) In agreement 
 herewith, he in a further part of his book 
 says, " It seems consonant to reason that the 
 thinking principle should be communicated 
 to an elegant system of matter."— (P. 46.) 
 Now, in answer to this I say, that if 
 thinking be in such manner peculiar to the 
 soul, as that it is properly to be called a 
 
 * Inquiry into the NMare of the ham»n Soul, p. Ht, 
 
29S [part h. 
 
 thinking substance, thought cannot be com- 
 municated to matter, however sublimized or 
 refined, but as its nature will be changed; 
 and from its having been a material, it will 
 become an immaterial substance. This doc- 
 trine, then, is evidently rank materialism ; 
 and the same may be said of it as it has 
 been adopted by Bishop Browne ; for the 
 principle on which it is grounded is the same 
 with both. 
 
 For the reasons which I have given, 
 the advocates for the doctrine of analogy 
 fall into the error of the Epicureans. Epi- 
 curus, perceiving that good and evil fall in- 
 discriminately to the lot of the good and 
 the wicked, concluded that there was no pro- 
 vidential governor of the world ; i. e. he de- 
 nied that the world was governed by any 
 such power, wisdom, or goodness, as by some 
 philosophers was supposed ; for, that good 
 and evil falling indiscriminately to the lot of 
 good and bad men^ was inconsistent with this 
 notion. Now, if it be by reason of the di- 
 vine attributes only that we can know that 
 any such being as God is exists, on whatever 
 ground we shall say that no such properties 
 or excellences, as power, wisdom, and good- 
 
SECT. VIII. ] 299 
 
 ness, are displayed, either in the construction 
 of the world or in the government thereof, we 
 shall deny, as Epicurus did, that there is 
 any such being as God. 
 
 The advocates for the doctrine of analogy 
 say, that because (as they will have it at 
 least) there are no properties in the Deity of 
 which we can have any conception, we, as 
 we would know that any such being as God is 
 exists, must suppose that there are properties 
 or excellences in him of which we can have 
 no conception, but which, however, may have 
 effects similar to tho^e which may obtain in us, 
 such as power, wisdom, and goodness ; that 
 therefore it is only as we shall substitute such 
 properties or excellences as we may have a 
 conception of, in the place of those of which 
 've can have no conception, that we can 
 know that any such being as God is exists *. 
 In answer to which I say, that if there may 
 be any such properties or excellences in the 
 Deity as may have effects similar to those 
 which arise from such properties and excel- 
 lences as we possess, no good reason can be 
 giv^U, why there may not be properties or ex- 
 
 * Sec Archbishop King's Discourse on Predestination, p. 6. 
 
300 [part II. 
 
 cellences in God, the same in kind, although 
 not in degree, as those which are in us. 
 
 The strongest argument, after all that I 
 have said against the doctrine of analogy, is, 
 that it is inconsistent with that of the holy 
 Trinity ; for, according to this doctrine, the 
 properties or excellences which are ascribed 
 unto God, although similar to those which 
 are found in man, are nevertheless different 
 from these in their being essential to the di- 
 vine nature. The power, the wisdom, and 
 the goodness, which we ascribe unto God, 
 are, according to the doctrine of the Trinity, 
 as this doctrine is contained in the Athanasian 
 Creed, three distinct subsistences, or Persons; 
 they nevertheless are one in respect of that 
 substantiality of which they alike partake. 
 As then we shall say, that power, wisdom, 
 and goodness, are in God, as they are analo- 
 gous only to these properties as they obtain 
 in us, we shall deny the truth of the doctrine 
 of the Trinity, as it is contained in the Atha- 
 nasian Creed. This argument, it perhaps 
 will be said by the advocates for the doctrine 
 of analogy, rather proves the falsehood of 
 the doctrine of the Trinity, than that of the 
 
SECT. VIII.] 301 
 
 doctrine of analogy ; the doctrine of the Tri- 
 nity, however, stands on too sure a foniida- 
 tion to be shaken by any thing which the 
 advocates for the doctrine of analogy can say 
 against it ; it is gronnded in the Scriptures, 
 but which their doctrine is not. 
 
 The doctrine which has been discussed in 
 this section has been adopted by Archbishop 
 King, in his Discourse on Predestination: 
 a discourse which has been lately very highly 
 spoken of by a learned divine, as giving sup- 
 port to his arguments on the same subject*. 
 The author, however, was probably not 
 aware, that the learned Dr. Cndworth had 
 long since condemned the doctrine of ana- 
 logy, as being equally false as that of pre- 
 destination, and which is the subject of his 
 (Dr. C.'s) Discourse ; for, had the learned 
 author been aware of tliis, he probably would 
 have thought it a respect due to the memory 
 of this learned divine, to take some notice of 
 this circumstance, but which he has nfot done. 
 Dr. C.'s words are as follows : — " There are 
 some who, by reason of a penury of an uni- 
 versal goodness and love within their own 
 
 * See Coppleston's Inquiry. &,c. p. 116. 
 X 
 
 > 
 
302 [part II. 
 
 breasts, and confining themselves to parti- 
 cular interests, shape the idea of God as 
 suitable to and resembling their own con- 
 tracted spirits as they can, and therefore at- 
 tribute love to him only secundum effectum, 
 and not affectum ; whereby they would make 
 us believe, that there is no such real pro- 
 priety or affection as love existing and living 
 in the Deity, but only a bare indication of it 
 by certain effects, which, because our short 
 and sterile understandings know not how to 
 express otherwise, we give them the denomi- 
 nation of love and goodness. Now, although 
 the Deity be not subject to those variable 
 passions which in ourselves we style love and 
 hatred, and which are seldom grounded but 
 upon humour and fancy; yet to deny that 
 there is any such thing really and formally in 
 God as love and goodness, such a principle 
 as carries him out to the production of all 
 possible beings, and whereby he takes an 
 eternal complacency and delight in whatever 
 acts regularly within its sphere, is in itself 
 but a groundless fancy : for that beloved dis- 
 ciple of the blessed Jesus, St. John, who 
 leaned on a breast never void of love and 
 pity to the sons of men, when he would set 
 out and express the nature of God to us in 
 
SECT, vrn.] 303 
 
 the most significant manner, tells us, that 
 he is love ; which doubtless denotes something 
 real and certain, not a bare notion or airy 
 idea, and fantastic dream known only by 
 some effects, being something only xutu. ^o^ocv, 
 
 not XOiTOi uK'^9stoiv *." 
 
 It appears from the above extract, that 
 the learned author, contrarily to the notion 
 of Dr. Coppleston, thought that there was 
 no danger of his establishing the doctrine of 
 predestination, by his contending against 
 that of analogy. 
 
 I shall conclude this section with observ- 
 ing, that it is somewhat singular, that Archbi- 
 shop King, who, as has been stated, has in his 
 Discourse on Predestination adopted the doc- 
 trine of analogy, although in his preceding 
 Discourse he has not expressly condemned it, 
 it nevertheless has so happened, that he has 
 coincided with me in my notions on this 
 subject ; as will appear from the following 
 extract : — " That God must have the same 
 judgment and approbation of that moral 
 
 • The divine Gooduess vindicated against the Assertors^ 
 of inconditionate Reprobation, p. 88. 
 
 x2 
 
304 [part II. 
 
 good which all rational beings have; and 
 that we must judge of the nature and per- 
 fections of the jL^eity, only by that nature, 
 and those perfections which we derive from 
 him, is, I think, very plain ; I mean, that 
 we must not endeavour to conceive the seve- 
 ral attributes of God by substituting some- 
 thing in him of a quite different kind, and 
 totally diverse from that which we find in 
 ourselves, even though that could be in some 
 respects similar and analogous to this : but 
 we are to suppose somewhat of the very same 
 kind and sort, the same qualities or proper- 
 ties in general to be both in him and us, 
 and then remove all manner of defect or im- 
 perfection which attends the particular modus 
 or degree of their kinds of apparent perfec- 
 tion observable in his creatures, except such 
 as argue at the same time imperfection (v. g 
 motion, which necessarily implies limitation), 
 or are inconsistent with some other and 
 greater perfection (v. g. materiality, which 
 excludes knowledge and liberty). We also 
 remove from him all want, dependence, al- 
 teration, uneasiness, &c. ; in short, all that re- 
 sults either from simple finiteness, or from the 
 mere union of two finite imperfect substances, 
 iuch as constitute man. And when we have 
 
SECT. VIII.] 305 
 
 thus applied every thing in every manner of 
 existence which seems to imply perfection, and 
 /"xclude every thing, in every manner of ex- 
 i^pa?^ '"hich implies or includes the con- 
 trary, we have got our idea of an absolutely 
 perfect Being, which we call God. It is 
 therefore attributing to God some real qua- 
 lities of a certain determinate kind (v. g. 
 knowledge or power, goodness or truth), the 
 nature of which qualities we do perceive, 
 are directly conscious of, and know, which 
 gives us an idea or conception of him, and a 
 proper one too (if any such distinction of 
 ideas were allowed), and not imagining some 
 others we cannot tell of what sort, totally 
 diflferent in nature and kind from any that 
 we ever did perceive or know, which would 
 give us an idea or conception at all of him, 
 either proper or improper *." 
 
 ♦ Origin of Evil, vol. i. p. 88, note R. k. 
 
 x3 
 
SECTION IX. 
 
 Our author, in Proposition XXI. of his Phi- 
 losophical Frindples of Religion, supposes, 
 " that in all intelligent beings there are fa- 
 culties which are fitted to those objects with 
 which they were originally intended to have 
 communion ; and that in man these faculties 
 are of three kinds, viz. body, soul, and spi- 
 rit : that the two former of these have relation 
 to the mundane system, and enable him to 
 have communion with his fellow-creatures 
 and the things of this world; and that the 
 last of them hath relation to the eternal Spi- 
 rit, and enables him to have communion with 
 this Spirit; and that from hence arises the 
 distinction between the outward or natural 
 man, and the inward or spiritual man : that 
 the dictates of the natural man are in Scrip- 
 ture called the law of the members; and 
 those of the spiritual man, the law of the 
 spirit; and that these are in opposition the 
 one to the other." In a Corollary to this 
 
SECT. IX.] 307 
 
 Proposition, our author, in relation to this 
 subject, observes, " that the material system 
 is the proper object of the senses*; that the 
 body is, accordingly^ endowed with outward 
 senses, perception, imagination, understand- 
 ing, and will ; that the rational soul enables 
 him to communicate with the created spi- 
 ritual world, and is accordingly endowed 
 with inward senses, imagination, understand- 
 ing, and will ; and that the third principle, 
 the spirit, enables him to communicate with 
 the supreme uncreated Spirit; and that for 
 this purpose he is endowed with inmost 
 senses, imagination, understanding, and will; 
 and that as these three different principles, 
 in their original constitution, harmonize and 
 agree, so is the discord which at present sub- 
 sists between them a proof of their degene- 
 racy, and the effect of the fall; and that a 
 further consequence has been an usurped 
 government of the natural understanding or 
 rational soul, whereby the spirit is in bond- 
 age, and the things of the spirit, contrarily 
 to nature, are judged of by the natural un- 
 derstanding." Our author, in a subsequent 
 Proposition, to show that the rational soul is 
 
 • Corol. ji. 
 
 X 4 
 
308 [part u. 
 
 not a faculty appropriated to the considera- 
 tion of things of a purely spiritual nature 
 observes, '^ that all its ideas arise from the 
 perception of things sensible, and that they 
 therefore can be such only as have a con- 
 gruity with these; inasmuch, however, as the 
 spiritual world has nothing to do with things 
 sensible, the things of this world cannot be 
 properly considered by this faculty: that 
 things material or corporeal have a contra- 
 riety to things immaterial or spiritual; that, 
 therefore, it is as incongruous that the ra- 
 tional soul should be supposed to be a prin- 
 ciple of communication with both those, as 
 that the eye should be supposed to hear as 
 well as to see." Our author does not attri- 
 bute it to the fall, that the rational soul is 
 not adapted to the consideration of things of 
 a spiritual nature, but contends, " that it 
 must, from its very nature, always have been 
 so ;" the conclusion, according to our author, 
 is, " that as we cannot think on things of a 
 material nature without those ideas which 
 arise from things sensible, so neither can we 
 on things spiritual without ideas which arise 
 from the perception of these ; and that, as 
 the rational soul is a faculty fitted for the 
 perception of the former, so the spirit is a 
 
SKCT. ix.J 309 
 
 faculty fitted for the perception of the latter." 
 In a Corollary to this Proposition, our author 
 observes, " that as the light of the sun is the 
 medium through which things material are 
 seen and perceived, so the divine light, which 
 the Sun of righteousness sends forth, is the 
 proper medium through which things spiritual 
 are seen and perceived; and as the just and 
 the unjust are indiscriminately enlightened by 
 the former, so is the latter a light which 
 lighteth every man that cometh into the 
 world." Our author, in another work of his, 
 confesses, " that human reason may with 
 propriety apply itself to objects to which it is 
 neither adequate nor appropriate, by sup- 
 posing those to which it is adequate and ap- 
 propriate to be images of the former; and 
 il may thus forrfi images of superior objects, 
 from what it knows of the material world ; 
 images, not metaphorical, but real or phy- 
 sical: these images," he saj^s, " will represent 
 superior objects, as a seed does a full-grown 
 plant, or an embryo an adult animal; that 
 further than this reason cannot go in divine 
 matters*." Our author says, of the first of those 
 principles which he supposes to be the con- 
 
 • Phil. Priji. of Religion, part ii. p. 126, 
 
310 [part ii. 
 
 stituent part of man, viz. the body, that it 
 is endued with senses; these, however, can 
 no otherwise properly be said to be outward, 
 as he calls them, than in respect of their ob- 
 jects, viz. the material system: the same 
 would be true of perception, imagination, 
 understanding, and will, were these acts of 
 the body, but which they evidently cannot be 
 unconnectedly with the second of the afore- 
 said principles, namely, the soul, even in the 
 sense in which he understands this principle, 
 and which, in conjunction with the body, he 
 supposes to constitute what the Scriptures 
 call the outward man, and that the inner man 
 consists of the third of our author's supposed 
 constituent parts of man, and which he calls 
 the spirit. I do not, I confess, see any ma- 
 terial objection to these notions; they border 
 upon those of Bishop Browne; but as they 
 agree in a great measure with those of Bishop 
 Bull, and which in the sequel will be stated, 
 I propose in the mean time to compare them 
 with those of a modern learned commentator. 
 
 The learned commentator supposes, that 
 by the word soul, mentioned in Heb. iv. 12, 
 is meant " that inferior faculty by which we 
 think of and desire what concerns our pre- 
 
SKCT. IX.] 31 I 
 
 sent being and welfare:" and that by the 
 word spirit is meant " a superior power, by 
 which we prefer future things to present ; by 
 which we are directed to pursue truth above 
 all things ; and even to despise what is agree- 
 able to our present state, as it stands in com- 
 petition with, or is prejudicial to, our future 
 happiness*." Now, it is observable, that St. 
 Paul, in this text, speaks of two principles 
 only as being essential to man, viz. soul and 
 spirit ; whereas, in 1 Thess. v. 23, he men- 
 tions three, viz. spirit, soul, and body. Our 
 commentator, to reconcile these two texts, 
 says, " We must &:ipr'^:'^ that, by the word 
 soul, as it occurs in the former of these texts, 
 the Apostle means that spiritual principle 
 within us which, in conjunction with the body, 
 constitutes that being which is called man." 
 The text, however, of 1 Thess. v. 23, as hath 
 been said, mentions three different principles 
 as being essential to man, viz. body, soul,^ and 
 spirit ; and Justin Martyr, in a comment on 
 this text, says, " The body is the house of the 
 soul, and the soul the house of the spirit -}-."• 
 In conformity with, and in continuation (as it 
 should seem) of these words of this ancient 
 
 • Dr. Adam Clarke. f Cohort, sect, vii. p. 20. 
 
 > 
 
31*2 [part II. 
 
 fathei-j his scholar Tatian says, " The soul, 
 having obtained a conjunction with the divine 
 Spirit, is not helpless, but ascends to those 
 regions whither it is led by the same Spirit ; 
 for, the seat or habitation of the soul is from 
 above, but the generation of the other (i. e. 
 the body) is from beneath*." In agreement 
 with these notions, the learned Bishop from 
 whom I have quoted, in the first Section of 
 Part I. of this Discourse, supposes the soul, 
 when it was breathed into Adam, to have 
 been supernaturally endowed with a divine 
 spirit, not which would immortalize the soul 
 (for the soul being the breath of life would 
 necessarily be immortal), but the man, con- 
 sisting of a soul united to a body. Seeing, 
 however, as in the above-mentioned Section 
 has been observed, man would be immortal, 
 by virtue of this divine Spirit with which his 
 soul was endowed as is aforesaid, so long only < 
 has he kept this Spirit ; for that, having a 
 freedom of will, he might lose it ; when the 
 learned Bishop calls this divine Spirit " a third 
 essential principle in man's nature*!-," he sup- 
 poses man (as I understand the learned Bi- 
 shop) to have been advanced to some state, in 
 
 • See Bull's Sermons, vol. iii. p. 1093. f P- 1121. 
 
^^ — V 
 
 SK(T. IX. J 313 
 
 which liis losing this Spirit would be irnpos- 
 sible; and this I suppose to be the case with 
 us at the present time, who, having been bap- 
 tized, are endowed with this Spirit, but whose 
 keeping it will depend on our keeping those 
 vows which we made at our baptism ; and as 
 we cannot keep these vows but as God shall 
 give us the grace so to do, the Apostle prays 
 that we may have this grace, when he prays 
 that our whole spirit, and soul, and body, may 
 be preserved blameless unto the coming of our 
 Lord Jesus Christ. 
 
 ^ 
 
SECTION X. 
 
 '* What men usually call a genius, i. e. a 
 man endowed with such an understanding as, 
 when duly cultivated, it will qualify him for 
 being a hero, a statesman, or a philosopher," 
 our author considers as being owing to the 
 perfection of his bodily organs ; for, that the 
 faculties of the mind or soul are, as he sup- 
 poses, alike in all men. To the same cause 
 he attributes the greater sensibility, or quick- 
 ness of the senses, which some men, or even 
 brutes, have, than others ; that it is accord- 
 ingly found, that temperance in diet and bo- 
 dily exercise conduce to this effect *. 
 
 The ingenious author of an Inquiry into 
 the Nature of the human Soul, differs but 
 little from Dr. Cheyne, when he says, " that 
 it is owing to mechanism, or the construction 
 of the brain, that one head shall be clearer, 
 or more capable of masterly reason, that an- 
 other" (p. 7) ; and he agrees with Dr. Cheyne 
 
 * Philos. Conject. § xx\i. 
 
SECT. X.] 315 
 
 in supposing there is no difference in human 
 understandings, except what arises from 
 the connexion which the understanding, 
 or soul, has with the body; and that the 
 variety in the understandings of n.-^n happens 
 from the difference of the organs by which 
 the finer parts are fitted to their service*. 
 This philosophy has been adopted by the au- 
 thors of the Quarterly Review; the effects, how- 
 ever, of orginazation they suppose to 1) j much 
 greater than any which, in our text, is 
 ascribed to it. They suppose, " that the 
 modification of the brain, whatever it may 
 naturally be, is liable to change, in the case 
 of individuals; and that the eflects which it 
 has in the case of nations, is, a change of 
 manners, doctrines, and language." They 
 farther observe, " that the climate inhabited 
 by each nation, chiefly conduces to harden 
 or soften their organs ; and although many 
 changes are gradually effected by time, still 
 that most congenial to the organs of each 
 people always prevails -}-." , > 
 
 It is, I grant, a circumstance in favour of 
 these notions (and as being so, it is men 
 tioned by Dr. C), " that the understanding 
 
 * p. 7 et seq. t No. LIU. p. m. 
 
316 [part ir. 
 
 may be impaired, and even be destroyed, by 
 injuries on the brain." It may be doubted 
 however, whether this was originally so ; i. e. 
 whether the perfection of Adam's understand- 
 ing^ as he came out of the hands of his Maker, 
 depended on the perfection of his bodily 
 frame; and if it did not, the fall of man will 
 make no such difference in the case, as that 
 it should be otherwise with us. The under- 
 standing of Adam became impaired by the 
 fall, and his body became mortal ; the weak- 
 ness, however, of his present, in comparison of 
 his former understanding, had a moral, and 
 not a physical cause ; and so it is with us who 
 are descended from him. 
 
 This, it is true, may be so, consistently 
 with the diversity which we see obtaining 
 among men with respect to their minds or 
 understandings, as well as with respect to 
 their bodies. Now it will be difficult upon 
 any rational grounds to account for the dif- 
 ference between men in the latter of these re- 
 spects, as well as for a sexual difference; we 
 may attempt this, and no harm will be done 
 if we do not succeed. It will be otherwise 
 however, as we would upon rational principles 
 account for the difference between men, 
 
SECT. X.] 317 
 
 generally considered, and as they come into 
 the world, with respect to their intellectual 
 powers ; for we cannot attribute this difference 
 to any other cause that of the divine will, but 
 as we shall fall into materialism: a doctrine 
 which, like that of infidelity, to which it is 
 nearly allied, I am sorry to find, prevails 
 much in this country at this day. 
 
 It is as containing in them the doctrine of 
 materialism, that I have in a former section 
 supposed the notions of Bishop Browne to 
 lead to atheism, although he probably was 
 not aware of this. But not so the author of an 
 Inquiry into the Nature of the human Soul: 
 for, when he asserts, that " neither man nor 
 the universe were made out of nothing, as it 
 is nowadays supposed to be; but out of 
 emanations, very possibly of different kinds 
 and degrees, that flowed from the divine 
 essence*," there can be no doubt with 
 respect to the point which he was driving at. 
 But still less can we doubt of this when he 
 adds as follows : " May we not, from this no- 
 tion of emanations, give a reason why divid- 
 ing and comminuting our blood and fluids, as 
 
 * PaKe5;3. 
 \ 
 
318 [part II. 
 
 it is done and brought about by constant cir- 
 culations, into the most indefinitely fine par- 
 ticles, makes them fit for the reception and 
 embraces of the mind? which seems to be 
 because they are thereby brought nearer their 
 fountain and original; which is no other than 
 the divine emanations; from which, as we 
 are taught by good authority to believe, the 
 whole world of beings, not excepted gross 
 matter itself, are derived ; which matter was 
 brought down into this compressed mass, in 
 order the better to fit it for the wise ends and 
 purposes of the great Creator and Framer of 
 all things*." 
 
 Now, this good authority, on which our 
 author has adopted his notion of emanations, 
 is that of Aristotle and his followers ; and it 
 is not to be wondered at, that men who 
 had no other light than that of nature to di- 
 rect them, should not be able to give a better 
 account of the origin of the world. 
 
 The doctrine of emanations, as constitut- 
 ing the origin of the universe, was, it seems, 
 prevailing much, early in the last century, 
 
 ♦ Page 65. 
 
SECT. X.] 319 
 
 when the subject vras taken up by a pious and 
 learned writer, and who has shown, by an ar- 
 gument that is unanswerable, the impossibility 
 of the world's existence from all eternity; and 
 which must be the case, as it shall be supposed 
 to have emanated from the divine mind or es- 
 sence. This argument is as follows : " All 
 things, as they are in their present state, are 
 concreted of other things, and necessarily, in 
 their own nature, require a pre-existence of 
 those more simple bodies out of which they 
 are concreted, and a pre-existence of some 
 preparatory antecedent motion, for their coa- 
 lition, mixture, and concretion, as animals, 
 vegetables, minerals, and regularly all mixed 
 bodies. These things, constituted and being 
 in that state we find them, cannot be eternal, 
 or without a beginning; or if, gratia argu- 
 menfi, we admit that simple bodies, the four 
 elements for instance, existed eternally, the 
 things of which they are compounded could 
 not have existed at all ; for there could have 
 been no time when they could have begun to 
 exist =*^." This is a very small part of our au- 
 thor's argument; I must therefore, from a 
 want of room in this Discourse, refer those 
 
 * Sir M. Hale's Origination of Mankind, p. 74. 
 
 y2 
 
 ■> 
 
320 - [part II. 
 
 who wish to see it supported by much power- 
 ful reasoning, grounded on the Mosaic ac- 
 count, and answering various objections 
 which the learned author supposes might be 
 made to this argument of his, to chap. iii. of 
 sect. i. of his book. I shall conclude this 
 section with observing, that this notion of 
 emanations is evidently atheistical, and it was 
 so considered by Sir M. Hale; and further 
 proof of its being so \^'ill be given in the en- 
 suing section. Whether or not Dr. Cheyne 
 was aware of this I pretend not to say; but 
 he, as in former sections may be seen, has 
 adopted it with respect to the origin of man. 
 
SECTION XI. 
 
 The will," according to our author, " is 
 the ruling and directing faculty in spiritual 
 nature;" i. e. it rules absolutely and without 
 control, even by the understanding. " Ma- 
 terial objects," he says, " may limit and mo- 
 derate its operations ; it nevertheless may, by 
 its own energy, act beyond matter, at a dis- 
 tance, and without the intervention of a 
 material medium*." The will, according to 
 Mr. Locke, is not properly a faculty, but a 
 power or ability of doing things in such man- 
 ner as that we may be conscious to ourselves 
 that they are of our own doing ; for, as these 
 things shall be supposed to be of a moral na- 
 ture, it is only as we are conscious to our- 
 selves that they are of our own doing that we 
 can be responsible for them ; and this respon- 
 sibility will arise, whether these things are 
 judged of at the bar of our own conscience, 
 
 * Philosopb. Conject. § xxxi. 
 
 v3 
 
322 [part II. 
 
 at that of the public community to which we 
 belong, or at the divine tribunal. 
 
 Man, nevertheless, is free to choose evil, 
 as good and evil shall be supposed to be at 
 any time set before him, notwithstanding his 
 foreseeing what the consequence will be of 
 his so doing. It is, however, by reason of the 
 twofold npture of which he consists that this 
 is the case ; for, as evil cannot be chosen as 
 evil, so, in order to its being chosen, it must 
 have the appearance of good. Now, there is 
 a good which is peculiar to the sensitive na- 
 ture, and there is a good which is peculiar to 
 the spiritual nature ; and of these two natures 
 man consists. The good which is peculiar to 
 the sensitive nature, is a good which is pre- 
 sent and of this world ; whilst that which is 
 peculiar to the spiritual nature, is a good 
 which is future and of another world*. Now, 
 
 * In the tragedy of " Romeo and Juliet," the apothecary, 
 knoM'ing the purpose for which the poisonous drug for which 
 he was applied to was intended, says, " My poverty, but 
 not my will, consents." Now, although his will, i. e. the will 
 of his superior nature, did not consent, but, on the contrary, 
 as we may suppose, revolted at the idea of the thing required 
 of him, the will nevertheless of his inferior nature, signified 
 by the word poverty, consented ; and he accordingly complied 
 with the request that was made to him. The poverty, how- 
 
lECT. XI.] 323 
 
 seeing a good which is of this world has the 
 same contrariety to a good which is of an- 
 other world, as the sensitive nature has to the 
 spiritual, it will be evident, not only that 
 they cannot both be chosen, but that if a 
 good which is of this world be chosen, that 
 which is of another world will virtually be 
 rejected. A good, however, which is of this 
 world, having, as hath been said, a contra- 
 riety to that which is of another, it will be 
 evil as compared to that which is of another 
 world : if any one, then, choose a good which 
 is of this world, in preference to that which 
 is of another, he will in fact be choosing evil. 
 As this shall be supposed to be a true state- 
 ment, the will certainly may truly be said to 
 be, as our author supposes it to be, the ruling 
 and directing faculty in spiritual nature. 
 The question however is, what his meaning 
 
 ever, of this man, how great soever it may be supposed to 
 have been, would not have justified the deed ; for the pro- 
 vince or proper office of the superior nature is to govern and 
 overrule the inferior; and in this his fault consisted. The 
 case seems to have been a hard one, and very trying, as we 
 may suppose, to flesh and blood; he nevertheless certainly 
 ought to have acted from the superior w ill, i. e. from the dic- 
 tates of bis conscience or understanding, whatever might 
 have been the consequence; it nevertheless is, as I believe in 
 the present case, generally understood otherwise. 
 
 y4 
 
324 [part n. 
 
 is when he says that " the will may by its 
 energy act beyond matter, at a distance, 
 and without the intervention of a material 
 medium ; " for the explaining this, so far as I 
 can imderstand his meaning, I observe as 
 follows. 
 
 As a good or happiness which is of a future 
 life can be attained to only as a man shall 
 qualify himself for it in the present life (and 
 which, by the way, is in agreement with the 
 notion of the present being a stat^ of proba- 
 tion), the things which he shall have done 
 in this life will in fact, and as they shall be 
 judged of hereafter, show whether he has 
 chosen a good which is of this world, or that 
 which is of another: this, I say, will in fact 
 be the case, although the question, as the 
 Scriptures express themselves, will be, whether 
 he has done good, or whether he has done 
 evil. Now, as any one shall, by the grace of 
 God, have chosen a good which is future and 
 of another life, he will, although not know- 
 ingly and intentionally, have chosen an evil 
 that is of this life: for it is only as the evils 
 to which we are subject in this life are pa- 
 tiently borne, and so in fact chosen, that we 
 can attain to a good which is of another. 
 
SECT. XI.] 325 
 
 Except, then, the term matter made use of 
 by our autlior, these evils in particular, as we 
 pass through this transitory life, in our way 
 to a life which will endure for ever, may be 
 supposed to be meant, I am at a loss to know 
 what his meaning is. As this shall be sup- 
 posed to be his meaning, the will may very 
 well be said by its energy to act beyond 
 matter; for, as a man shall be supposed hap- 
 pily to have chosen a good that is of another 
 life, his will will continually be carrying him 
 not only beyond the evils which befall him, 
 but beyond the good things which may fall to 
 his lot, in this life, to that good which he 
 will have chosen, and which with the eye of 
 faith he will see. 
 
 Our author, in a further part of his dis- 
 course, says, " that the will is self-active, 
 and consequently that the perfection of the 
 understanding will depend upon it." In a 
 former section our author had supposed the 
 perfection of the understanding to depend 
 on the perfection of the bodily frame ; the 
 goodness of the understanding may be in 
 proportion to the activity of the will, and so 
 vice versa; but I cannot see how the one can 
 in any degree depend on the other. It is 
 
326 [part II. 
 
 not, however, certain that the will is self- 
 active, if, by this term, its acting without a 
 motive be meant. The will, I grant, may 
 act contrarily to the judgment, or dictates 
 of the understanding ; but it is not therefore 
 self-active : for the will, I suppose, never acts 
 contrarily to the dictates of the superior 
 nature, but as it obeys those of the inferior; 
 and this was die case in the tragedy of Me- 
 dea, T^ideo mellora proboque, deteriora se- 
 quor*, 
 
 * There is perhaps no subject on which more has been 
 written, than that of the will; and this subject I believe I may 
 say, has by none been treated of with greater ability, than 
 Archbishop King. If, however, he is right in supposing 
 elections, or determinations of the will, may be made with 
 indifference with respect to the objects (see his Orig. of Evil, 
 eh. V. sect. ii. passim); and in which notion he is not singular; 
 if, I say, he is right in this, I am wrong. In defence, however, 
 of my notions I observe as follows : —If the will hath neces- 
 sarily a reference to good and evil, and which for reasons that 
 will be given, it will be seen to have, it will be evident, that 
 no act of the will can proceed with indifference in respect of 
 these. We naturally desire happiness as earnestly as we do 
 life, and seek the one as necessarily (although often mis- 
 takenly) as we do the other; but if so, there is nothing that 
 we either do or think, hut what, unconscious as we may be of 
 it, will be with a view to these: for, in the case of suicide, 
 and supposing the man to be in his right senses, it is not life 
 that he would get rid of, but some tormenting idea, which 
 makes him miserable instead of happy, and as he would be. 
 If, then, in any other case a man may act with indifference, 
 
SECT. XI.] 327 
 
 Tlie moral inclinations (and which, as Sir 
 M. Hale observes, concern the volitive fa- 
 culty) are, no doubt, as well as the common 
 notions of right and wrong, innate; and 
 which, if duly improved, are well calcu- 
 lated to promote our happiness in this 
 
 and as the above writer supposes, and instances the case of a 
 man doing a thing merely to show the liberty which he has of 
 doing it; what I say in answer is, that he cannot do this, but 
 as he will, eitlier knowingly or unknowingly, have some plea- 
 sure or satisfaction of mind, from the indulging a whim or 
 fancy, in the doing of it; and if so, happiness will equally be 
 sought by this man, asif he was more seriously and wisely em- 
 ployed. Now there is no case in which a man is in a situation 
 to choose between good and evil (and, according to my hypo- 
 thesis, there will be no time in which a man, if he be awake, 
 and in his right senses, will not be in this situation, either in 
 continuance of some former election, or in the beginning of 
 some new one), there will be no time, I say, of this kind, in 
 which he will not he situated as our first parents were, when 
 good and evil were set before them ; and if so, this case of 
 theirs may be considered as being the touchstone by which 
 the truth of any thing that has been written on the subject of 
 elections, or the determinations of the wll, will be to be tried ; 
 if it be in agreement with this case of our first parents, the 
 notion which any such writer shall be found to have adopted, 
 will be a true one, but otherwise a false one; and I suppose 
 that there is no time in which a man can be acting freely, when 
 his case will not have some resemblance, however faint; to 
 this sacred story. Had tliis been duly considered, all the la- 
 bour of the brain, and perplexities of the mind with which 
 disquisitions on the subject of the will have been attended, 
 might have been spared, or, at least, their reasonings have 
 had a sure rule, by which they might have been regulated. 
 
 > 
 
328 [part II. 
 
 world ; being, however, properties of the soul, 
 the due use of them cannot but have a tend- 
 ency to a happiness which, like the soul, 
 will endure for ever; but so likewise will the 
 abuse of them have a natural tendency to a 
 misery which will endure for ever. 
 
SECTION XII. 
 
 It has been thought (and I conceive the notion 
 to agree well with the doctrine of a millen- 
 nium, or reign of Christ on earth for a thousand 
 years, as it is taught in the book of Revelations) 
 that moral depravity has been progressive 
 from the time of the fall of Adam, and that 
 it will continue to be so, until the world 
 shall have arrived at a state when it cannot 
 be worse*; that as this shall be the case, these 
 millennarians suppose, that the moral state of 
 
 * I find that Sir Isaac Newton had a notion of this kind : 
 he supposed that God had so ordered, as that an almost uni- 
 versal prevalence of infidelity would precede the ultimate dif- 
 fusion of truth and righteousness. (Evans' Life of Gibbon, p. 
 71.) This the writer whom I quote, supposes will be brought 
 about by the objections which by infidels are, and will conti- 
 nue to be made to Christianity with the intention of subvert- 
 ing it. As God, however, showed the vanity of a like at- 
 tempt when the Jews were gathered together against the 
 Lord and against his Christ, by the Prophets foretelling this, 
 so hath he done likewise with respect to the like attempts that 
 are making in these days : for, as these attempts of infidels 
 have been foretold, the truth of Christianity is established by 
 the prophecies being thus fulfilled. 
 
330 [part II. 
 
 the world will be retrograde; and that such 
 will be the prevalence of Christianity, as that 
 virtue will, by degrees, be gaining ground 
 of vice, until there is no vice or depravity 
 in the world*. 
 
 Now, if the experience of miseiy be the 
 natural consequence of vice, and the expe- 
 rience of happiness the natural consequence 
 of virtue, vice will be found to be the founda- 
 tion of virtue. In like manner I say of that 
 happiness with which the practice Of virtue is 
 always attended: I say, that except as it 
 had its contrast in misery, we could not be 
 sensible of it. Happiness, it may thus be seen, 
 will have a like foundation in misery, that I 
 have supposed virtue to have in vice. We 
 accordingly find in the case of individuals, 
 
 * It has been observed by a learned divine, that did a real 
 spirit of truth and righteousness prevail in the hearts of men, 
 and they were inoffensive and harmless as the sons of God, 
 laying aside all envy, pride, and self-interest, and expelling 
 the principles of the impious nature, and becoming in all 
 things conformable to the holy Jesus, earth would diflfer but 
 little from heaven." — Cudworth, Letter to a Friend, p. 60. 
 " It is to be hoped therefore that a time will come, before the 
 periods of this world are run out, that the divine life shall have 
 a general conquest over the hearts and minds of men, and a 
 spirit of love and righteousness overspread tHe face of the 
 earth." P. 62. 
 
SECT. XII.] «J31 
 
 that the virtue of those who have had the ex- 
 perience of the misery of vice, will be in less 
 danger of being fallen from, than that of those 
 whose lives have been for the most part vir- 
 tuous; insomuch that the greater the misery 
 which men may have experienced from 
 vicious excesses, the less, as I have said, will 
 be the danger of their falling back into them, 
 as they shall have had the grace to repent. 
 As the world shall thus be supposed, by the 
 prevalence of vice over virtue, to have arrived 
 at its lowest state of depravity and wicked- 
 ness, it will be evident from what has been 
 said, that the evil will cure itself; and that 
 in like manner as vice had by degrees been 
 gaining ground of virtue, so, by a retrograde 
 course, as I have said, virtue will by degrees 
 gain ground of vice ; which being supposed, 
 there evidently, as I have likewise said, would 
 come a time when there would be no such 
 thing as vice in the world. 
 
 On the ground of moral depravity having 
 been progressive from the time of the fall of 
 Adam, it has been observed by our author 
 (Dr. Cheyne), who has adopted this notion, 
 " that it was a noble design for rendering 
 the succeeding generations partakers of all 
 
 > 
 
332 [part II. 
 
 the acquisitions of wisdom, knowledge, and 
 other improvements of their predecessors ; that 
 as, by the lapse, the contrary of all this 
 has happened, and 
 
 ^Etas parentum pejor avis tulit 
 Nos nequiores, mox daturos 
 Progeniem vitiosiorem, — 
 
 so, what infinite love and goodness could not 
 do, i. e. render finite, fallible intelligences 
 fixed, and eternally stable in order and pu- 
 rity, punishment, experience, and trial, may 
 at last effect, though in an unniatural and 
 retrograde manner *." 
 
 Now, as by the wrath which in the book 
 of Revelations is spoken of, and which by the 
 aforesaid millennarians is supposed to be at 
 this time pouring out of the last of the seven 
 vials hy the great dragon, i. e. the devil, under 
 the control and by the direction of the Al- 
 mighty ; as by this wrath, I say; that which 
 the sin of Adam gave occasion to shall be 
 supposed to be meant, the notions above ex- 
 pressed may be seen to be in perfect agree- 
 ment with the account which is contained in 
 the book of Revelations. And when, in fur- 
 
 * Spiritual Natiue. Section 22. 
 
SBCT. XII.] 333 
 
 ther agreement with these notions, we are told, 
 that after the last vial shall have been poured 
 out, the great dragon, or devil, shall be 
 bound, what by a writer * on this subject is 
 supposed to be meant is, that punishment 
 will have had its proper effect ; and which, 
 as I suppose, will appear in the lives of men 
 in general, and, as I have said, virtue will 
 by degrees be gaining ground of vice ; and 
 as the quantum of happiness will be as is the 
 quantum of virtue, so will the happiness of 
 men in time be as great as it can be on this 
 side of heaven. 
 
 As an earthly happiness, however, was 
 not the happiness for which ii^n was ulti- 
 mately intended, when God, after he had 
 made him, placed him in Paradise, so neither 
 is that happiness which has above been men- 
 tioned, and which has been supposed to arise 
 from the prevalence of virtue over vice, the 
 happiness for which man was originally in- 
 tended; it can at best be the forerunner 
 only of that happiness. How true soever, 
 then, it may be, that as the world shall have 
 arrived at a state of the greatest moral 
 
 • The Rev. Wm. Bkheno. 
 Z 
 
334 [part II. 
 
 depravity, the evil will by degrees cure itself; 
 seeing, however, the stream cannot rise 
 higher than the fountain from whence it 
 flows, tlie happiness which will be thus 
 experienced, will be that only which may 
 aitise from earthly enjoyments. The theory 
 which I have now explained, and which 
 I have; adopted, may thus very well be 
 true, as men shall be considered in their 
 general or public capacity; but cannot be 
 so as they shall be considered in their private 
 capacity as individuals ; for, in this latter ca- 
 pacity, every man has a self, of which he 
 may make a sacrifice, as some happiness 
 shall be revealed to him, which is greater 
 than any which he can enjoy in this world. 
 
 Now, as Christ was the Lamh slain from 
 the foundation of the world, and was spoken 
 of to Adam and Eve, when to the woman it 
 was told, that her seed should bruise the ser- 
 pent's head, this light could not have become 
 so obscured by the depravity of succeeding 
 generations, as that some glimmerings 
 thereof did not, as I suppose, prevail in the 
 darkest times, although it was not sufficient 
 to influence men in their conduct so as to 
 prevail with them to make a sacrifice of a 
 
SECT. XII.] 335 
 
 happiness which is of this life to that which 
 is future and of another, until Christ ap- 
 peared in the flesh, and set them an example 
 of so doing ; this example, nevertheless, was 
 followed by his Apostles, and many holy 
 men in succeeding^ times. As the reign of 
 Christ for a thousand years, however, implies 
 the earth to be full of the knowledge of the 
 Lord, so it likewise implies a faith to 
 be generally prevailing amongst men, the 
 sincerity of which would continually be 
 shown by the holiness of their lives. This 
 knowledge of Christ must needs be supposed 
 to be generally prevailing, in order for our 
 accounting for the conversion of the Jews, as 
 a nation or people * ; and who, as St. Paul 
 says, will he provoked to jealousy by the mercy 
 shown to the Gentiles; but which mercy will 
 at no time so eminently appear as when the 
 
 * The learned Mr. Mede is of opinion "■ that the Jews 
 will be converted in a way like unto that in which St. Palil 
 was converted ; " i. e. by " aluminous appearance an<? voice 
 from heaven ; " which luminous appearance acf ompan, ed by 
 a voice, he supposes mil move round the earth ; ano that 
 something of this kind is hinted in Matthew, xxiii. 39:. He 
 speaks of a partial conversion of the Jews having taken place 
 by a supernatural appearance in the year .570 in Arabia Felix. 
 See Mede's Works, p. 761. 
 
^^^ [part 11 
 
 effects of it will be seen in the aforesaid ho- 
 liness of the lives of the Gentiles*. 
 
 Now the theory which, in the first part 
 of my Discourse, has been adopted on the 
 subject of moral virtue, supposes, that unless 
 man had fallen, no such virtue could have 
 obtained amongst men: for, as the very de- 
 plorable state into which man was, by that 
 sad catastrophe, brought, gave occasion for 
 a love being shown on the part of God, 
 greater than any which, according to our 
 conceptions, could have been shown had man 
 not fallen ; so would that love which is called 
 charity, and in the exercise of which moral 
 virtue consists, have been a dormant principle 
 
 * The learned author of a Lecture on the Prophecies, 
 speaking of the Apocalypse, says, " This book contains a 
 detailed account of what would befall mankind under this 
 last, and so much magnified dispensation (Christianity). It 
 foretells all that history has recorded. It sets before us the 
 corrupt state of the Christian world ; but it likewise opens 
 better things to our view. It shows that the end of this dis- 
 pensa'ion is to promote virtue and happiness : and that this 
 end shall finally, but through many and long obstructions, 
 be accomplished. It represents the cause of righteousness 
 as still maintaining itself in all the conflicts to which it is ex- 
 posed ; as gradually gaining ground, and prevailing, through 
 the secret aid of divine Providence, over all opposition ; till 
 it obtains a firm and permanent establishment ; till the $aints 
 reignintht earth.'* HURD on the Prophecies, p. 414. 
 
siCT. XII.] 337 
 
 in man, had he not fallen ; for charity con- 
 sists in the relieving our fellow-creatures, to 
 the best of our abilities, under the various 
 evils to which, whether through infirmity, or 
 any adverse fortunes, they became liable by 
 the sin of Adam. 
 
 Now, charity, in its primary signification, 
 means the love of God ; I accordingly say, 
 that wherever a disposition to charity obtains 
 in any society of men, a disposition to obey God 
 will in proportion obtain in that society; and 
 men in that society will be eminent, not only 
 for works of charity, but for those likewise 
 of piety, as well as for the inferior virtues of 
 sobriety, temperance, frugality, and chastity; 
 and I scarce need to say, that health of body 
 is the natural consequence of these last-men- 
 tioned virtues. This, it is reasonable to sup- 
 pose, will be the state of men in the course 
 of the millennium, or reign of Christ on 
 earth for a thousand years * : my drift accord- 
 ingly, in the above remarks, has . been to 
 show, that, upon the supposition of the mil- 
 lennium being a state where virtue and good- 
 
 * 1000 18 a mystic number among the Jews, and as used 
 in the Revelations is not to be understood literally. — Adam 
 Clarke. 
 
 Z3 
 
338 [part II. 
 
 ness will be progressive, a disposition to do 
 good may in that state increase : the oppor- 
 tunities, nevertheless, of doing good will de- 
 crease ; for, in proportion as men live sober- 
 ly, temperately, frugally, and chastely, they 
 will be less liable to disease, and the provi- 
 dence of God will be a safeguard to them 
 against external injuries. This state, I ac- 
 cordingly say, will be continually approxi- 
 mating in happiness to that which the saints 
 will enjoy hereafter; but which happiness, 
 however, so long as they are on earth, can at 
 best be only hoped for. 
 
 Having now performed the task which I 
 proposed to myself, that, namely, of giving 
 an account of Dr. Cheyne's system, so far as 
 what has fallen from his pen has enabled me 
 so to do ; and made such remarks as occurred 
 to me on various topics, which, in the course 
 of this work of his, he has touched upon ; I 
 put an end to this Second Part of my Dis- 
 course. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 z4 
 
ADVERTISEMENT. 
 
 Thb following Discourse being on a subject 
 which has been touched upon by Dr. Cheyne 
 in his Philosophical Conjectures*, might, 
 agreeably to the plan of this second Part of 
 my Discourse, have made a section thereof, 
 rather than have been added as an Appendix 
 thereto. My reason, however, for making it 
 a separate Discourse, is not only the import- 
 ance of the subject, but that I had found it 
 to have been the ground of some notions 
 which are contained in the first Part of my 
 Discourse, although I was not conscious of 
 this at the time of my composing that Part, 
 the present Discourse having been written 
 some years ago. 
 
 Having observed thus much, I think it 
 proper, by way of preface to the following 
 Discourse, to say, that the doctrine which 
 is the subject thereof, has been borrowed 
 
 * Sect. iii. p. 184. 
 
 > 
 
342 
 
 chiefly from what has fallen from the pen of 
 a writer, the initials of whose name only 
 (viz. J. S.) are given in the title-page of his 
 book, and which he calls Transnatural Phi- 
 losophy. My having found his notions on 
 the doctrine of the Trinity to agree with what 
 I afterwards learnt from the writings of two 
 eminent divines, whose conceptions on this 
 subject are, I believe, generally esteemed as 
 being perfectly orthodox, was a reason with 
 me for adopting them. 
 
 The doctrine of the Trinity, as it has been 
 treated on by J. S. I found to be mingled 
 with various references to the foregoing part 
 of the author s book, which is wholly meta- 
 physical ; it was for this reason that I pro- 
 posed to myself the plan, merely for my own 
 amusement and satisfaction, of writing the 
 following Discourse, and which will be found 
 to be free from all metaphysical reasoning. 
 It was many years ago that I accidentally met 
 with this work, and which, not having since 
 seen it in any collection or catalogue of books, 
 I suppose to be scarce: I may say the same 
 of Dr. South's animadversions on a book of 
 Dr. Sherlock's, and which is referred to in 
 the following Discourse. 
 
DISCOURSE I. 
 
 DOCTRINE OF THE HOLY TRINITY. 
 
 \ HE Scriptures are called a rule of faith, as 
 containing all that is necessary to be believed 
 by those who would be saved ; and a creed is 
 called a summary of faith ; if the Scriptures 
 then are a rule of faith, and contain all that 
 is necessary to be believed, a creed, as being 
 a summary of faith, will likewise contain all 
 that is necessary to be believed; and such I 
 consider the Athanasian Creed to be. 
 
 The Catholic religion requires us to be- 
 lieve that there is but one God ; but»it teaches 
 us at the same time, that there are three di- 
 vine Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, 
 which constitute this one God ; and the Atha- 
 nasian Creed, declaring the unity of the God- 
 head in these three Persons, proceeds to show, 
 
 > 
 
344 [appkn. 
 
 not only the particular character of each of 
 them, but their unity among themselves; it 
 then says, that " he that will be saved must 
 thus think of the Trinity." Now, if the Scrip- 
 tures, as hath been said, are a rule of faith, 
 and if this creed contain nothing but what is 
 contained in the Scriptures, the propriety, and 
 even necessity, as we would be saved, of our 
 thinking of the Trinity as in this creed it is 
 set forth, will be evident. Under this persua- 
 sion myself, what I shall endeavour in the fol- 
 lowing Discourse to show is, that this doctrine 
 has its ground in the nature of man, so far 
 as the difference between the divine and the 
 human nature will admit of it: and indeed, 
 as this foundation shall have been laid, we 
 shall be enabled the better to understand the 
 Christian verity, as it is set forth in this 
 creed; insomuch that, in like manner as a 
 light shall be thrown on the doctrine of the 
 Trinity from what we know of ourselves, a 
 light will be reflected from that doctrine, by 
 which we shall know what God is in himself. 
 Thus much being premised, by way of intro- 
 duction to my Discouree, I observe as follows : 
 
 The different modes according to which 
 God exists are, in the Athanasian Creed, 
 
DISC. I.] • 345 
 
 called Persons; and which mocies, persons, 
 or subsistences, as by divines they are called, 
 are grounded on God's substantial existence; 
 these, although ultimately dependent on 
 God's substantial existence, are nevertheless, 
 and as in the sequel of this Discourse will be 
 shown, mutually dependent on each other 
 for their existence. Now, I have supposed, 
 that from what we may know of ourselves, by 
 the light of nature, we may better understand 
 what God, as he is supernaturally revealed to 
 us, is in himself, or, as by the schools it is 
 called, ad intra ; I accordingly observe, that 
 personality, whether with God or man, is 
 a mode of existence of which substantiality 
 is, with both, the ground or substratum: 
 with God however it is unchangeable, and 
 always the same; whereas with man, depend- 
 ing on certain individuating accidents, it 
 may be different at one time from what it is 
 at another. Number likewise, whether with 
 God or man, is essential to personality, and 
 implies distinction with both ; with njan, then, 
 it would have had a beginning; for, previously 
 to the multiplication of the human species, 
 one man could not have been distinct from 
 any other man that would then have existed : 
 whereas, with God, personality never could 
 
346 [appen. 
 
 have had a beginning, but must have been 
 from all eternity. 
 
 The foundation being thus laid in the na- 
 ture of man, we shall, as I have said, be the 
 better enabled to understand the Christian 
 verity as it is set forth in the Athanasian 
 Creed; and for this purpose I observe as fol- 
 lows: The being of a man depends not on 
 any individuating accidents, and by reason 
 of which, as I have said, he is a person, or 
 particular man, and distinct from all other 
 men: for, exclusively of these accidents, he 
 is a man ; and it is as being so, that he is 
 capable of individuation, or personality; and 
 therefore, as being a person, or particular 
 man, he will be different from himself as 
 being a man merely: for, as being a man 
 merely, he will differ nothing from all other 
 men, considered as such ; whilst, as being a 
 particular man, he will differ from all other 
 men, personally considered. 
 
 Now, it is evident, that personality can- 
 not in like manner be predicated of God, but 
 as we shall virtually be affirming, that there 
 are Gods many ; yea, as many as there may 
 be men : a notion, by the way, which consti- 
 
DISC. I.] 347 
 
 tilted the ground of the idolatry of the hea- 
 thens. The unity of God, it is true, implies 
 the possibility of his plural existence; and, 
 vice versa, his plural existence, the possibility 
 of his existing as one, at the same time: we 
 nevertheless say not of God, that he is one, 
 as if tht. 1 might be niore Gods than he; and 
 it is accordingly in the Athanasian Creed 
 affirmed that there is only one God. If 
 God, then, may exist personally, or according 
 to some particular mode, it must be relatively 
 to some other mode according to which he 
 may exist at the same time, and in respect of 
 which he may be a person ; personal, then, 
 must be essential existence with God, but 
 it is not so with man ; for, take away personal 
 existence from man, and the man will still 
 remain ; but if, as I have said, personal be 
 essential existence with God, take away 
 personal existence from him, and nothing- 
 will remain. Sufficient, I apprehend, will 
 now have been said on the word Person, as, 
 in agreement with the determination of the 
 Council of Nice, it is made use of in the 
 Athanasian Creed, instead of the word Hypo- 
 stasis^ which was found to be exceptionable ; 
 and I accordingly proceed to the considera- 
 
348 [appbn. 
 
 tion of other modes of existence which in 
 that creed are attributed to God. 
 
 God*s knowledge, as it stands opposed to 
 that of the thing which he knows (for, with- 
 out an object there can be no knowledge), 
 implies distinction; and I say the same of 
 his love, as it stands opposed to that which 
 he loves. Hence it follows, that there must 
 be some distinction in the divine nature itself. 
 The sovereign perfection, however, of the 
 divine nature requires, that the object of 
 God's knowledge should be himself; for 
 nothing less than this can fill the divine 
 mind: and as nothing but what is most ami- 
 able can be deserving of his love, so must he 
 himself constitute the object of his love. 
 
 Now, seeing God is spoken of in the 
 aforesaid creed, as being a Father as well as 
 a Son, I say, that if the habitudes, or modes 
 of existence, after which I have supposed God 
 to exist, be relative to each other, he must al- 
 ways have existed as a Father, or that which 
 generates; and the Son, or that which is ge- 
 nerated, must always have existed as a Son. 
 Moreover I say, that as the Father, or that 
 which generates, cannot be a Father without 
 
DISC. I.] .349 
 
 a Son, so must the Father virtually have 
 been contained in the Son. Hut, by the 
 same rule, I say, that the Son, virtually like- 
 wise contained in the Father, as the Father is 
 in the Son, cannot operate as a Son, but 21s 
 supported by the Father; the Son, of course, 
 must be a Son as having the Father, or him 
 by whom he is generated, contained in him; 
 and this is the ground on which the iri'^iyjx- 
 cw'5*, or circumincession, which is attri- 
 buted to the divine Persons of the Trinity, 
 rests. Again, if that which generates, as God's 
 existence after a trinal manner shall be con- 
 sidered, be virtually contained in that which 
 is generated, and thai which is generated, be 
 a self-subsisting substance, a like substantial 
 existence must be attributed to that which is 
 generated; from whence it appears, that the 
 divine Persons of the Trinity cannot exist 
 relatively to each other, but as they are con- 
 substantial, and, in this respect, one, and 
 self-subsisting. As these, however, shall be 
 considered as operating according, to their 
 
 * This word, importing an in-dwelling of each Person of 
 the Holy Trinity, was first used by Damascen, a father of the 
 eighth century ; but the thing meant by it, is contained in the 
 words of our Saviour, Believe me, that I am in tht Father, and 
 the Father in me. 
 
 A A 
 
360 '[.nnn;;,. 
 
 different and distinct modes, and relatively 
 to one another ad intra, it cannot properly 
 be said there is fMt'y. svc-pyc-ia, one act, or ope- 
 ration, as it may when exerting an energy 
 ad extra. As con-substantial and co-existent, 
 or essential, the three Persons of the Trinity 
 are one from the want of difference ; but, as 
 modes, or persons, they are distinct, and 
 different; and if these together make one 
 whole principle of action (and which, as 
 hath been said, is the case in all their opera- 
 tions ad extra), this one being, or nature, 
 which they thus constitute, is not a person, 
 because of the want of individuality, and 
 distinction from some other person. 
 
 The Persons of the Holy Trinity being 
 con-substantial (i. e. equally partaking of the 
 divine nature), are one: whilst, as being sub- 
 sistential (i. e. as being modes of existence of 
 which their divine nature is the substratum), 
 they are many. The separate and distinct 
 natures by reason of which they are subsist- 
 ential and many, are incommunicable to 
 each other; but this will not be the case as 
 they shall be substantially considered: for 
 that which makes a thing incapable of exist- 
 ing in another, must likewise hinder its being 
 
\ 
 
 DISC. 1.] 351 
 
 communicated to another. But if those 
 properties by reason of which the divine na- 
 ture may exist as subsistential, are incom- 
 municable, how that nature can thus exist 
 as many and as one at the same time, is 
 what constitutes the j^reat mystery of tlie 
 Trinity. 
 
 Now, it has been observed, that that 
 which is communicable in the Trinity, is that 
 which is essential to them ; whilst that which 
 is purely relative, namely, their personality, 
 is incommunicable. Paternity, for instance, 
 being purely relative, is incommunicable, and 
 purely personal. The wisdom, nevertheless, of 
 the Father, as being essential to the divine 
 nature, may, notwithstanding its having the 
 reason of subsistentiality, be communicated 
 to the Son ; whilst that by reason of which 
 he is a person, namely, his paternity, is evi- 
 dently not communicable. Thus it may 
 be seen that God, as existing personally, 
 must needs exist relatively ; for a father has a 
 necessary relation to a son, and a son to a 
 father. 
 
 On the supposition of the divine attri- 
 butes being essential to the divine nature, 
 
 > 
 
352 [appen. 
 
 and of wisdom constituting one of these at- 
 tributes, it will be obvious, first, that to be, 
 and to be wise, must, in God, be one and the 
 same thing; secondly, that he cannot be in- 
 finitely as well as eternally wise, but as he 
 must have been infinitely and eternally 
 knowing; and as there can be no knowledge, 
 but as there may be something that is known, 
 so can there be no object adequate to the 
 divine knowledge, but God himself: God, 
 then, must be as truly that which is known, as 
 he is that which knows. Now, although God, 
 as knowing, hath a relation to himself, as 
 that which is known (for, it is God that knows, 
 and he himself that is known) ; God never- 
 theless, as knowing, is not one with himself, 
 as that which is known, different as he that 
 knows is from himself as known: or, vice 
 versa, he that is known, from himself as 
 knowing: whether, then, we consider him in 
 the one, or in the other of these characters, 
 there must be something in him, by reason 
 of which he is one and the same Being: as 
 otherwise it would be one God that knows, 
 and another that is known ; and this some- 
 thing must be the suppositum or support of 
 these different characters; i. e. it must be the 
 divine nature itself. If, then, to know, as well 
 
DISC. 1.] 353 
 
 as to be known, be, as hath been said, essen- 
 tial to God, they are so only in respect of 
 that prior notion which we cannot but have of 
 him, as that only which can have any true 
 and real existence: otherwise, in our ac- 
 knowledging- the Trinity, we should acknow- 
 ledge three divine essences, but which would 
 be inconsistent with the divine nature. 
 
 Now, seeing it is relatively only, and not 
 essentially, that God, as knowing, is distin- 
 guishable from himself as something known ; 
 for, it is the same God, substantially consi- 
 dered, that both knows, and is known; the 
 personality which thus arises in the divine 
 character, although it make a distinction in 
 that character, multiplies not the divine es- 
 sence, or nature: for God is still substantially 
 or essentially one, although many relatively, 
 i. e. as these different characters have a rela- 
 tion to one another, and are personally con- 
 sidered. Now, the personal character which, 
 in our apprehension, arises, as God shall be 
 considered as knowing, is paternity : for, al- 
 though God cannot know, but as something 
 must already exist, which may be the object 
 of his knowledge ; and nothing can already 
 exist, as we thus consider God in himself, 
 
 A A 3 
 
 > 
 
354 [appbn. 
 
 but himself; in consideration nevertheless, 
 that, as knowing he kifows not himself, as 
 such, but as something known, he may thus 
 be seen as existing under two distinct no- 
 tions or characters, and, as knowing, be 
 conceived to be generative of himself as 
 known. For although, as I have said, God 
 himself can be the only object that can fill 
 the divine mind, and so be the only adequate 
 object of his own knowledge: in considera- 
 tion nevertheless, that he cannot exist under 
 the notion or character of something known, 
 but as he shall first be considered as know- 
 ing; the idea or notion which we shall thus 
 have of God, as something known, will be 
 found to spring out of that we shall previously 
 have had of him, as something that knows; 
 and this idea, or notion, which thus arises in 
 our minds, as we consider him as something 
 known, we shall refer to him as the true 
 archetype thereof; as he must also be of that 
 from which it had its rise, the idea, namely, 
 which we must previously have had of him 
 as knowing. And as this latter idea will 
 have been the parent of the former, so will 
 the same relationship be found to arise in the 
 Godhead, as we contemplate God under these 
 two distinct ideas, that there is between a 
 father and a son. 
 
DISC. I.] 355 
 
 Now, with respect to this productive or 
 prolific virtue, to which the character of God, 
 as something knowing, is owing, of this 
 ^drtue I say that we cannot consider it ex- 
 clusively of the thing produced or gene- 
 rated: for as that which is produced, or 
 generated, is God under the character of 
 something known, his being something known 
 may be seen to be the thing itself in which 
 that virtue, and consequently the notion 
 thereof, terminates. All potentiality, then, is 
 to be excluded from our minds, as we would 
 consider God in himself; and therefore, al- 
 though we necessarily ascribe a productive 
 or prolific virtue to God, considered under 
 the notion or character of knowing, we 
 nevertheless cannot properly say of him, that 
 be has the power of knowing himself; for, as 
 he himself did eternally exist as known, 
 equally as he did as knowing, there never 
 could have been a time when he did not exist 
 as something known; but which would be 
 implied as we should ascribe unto him poten- 
 tiality, or the power of knowing himself*. 
 
 * It must be confessed, that seeing the power of God is 
 
 necessarily operative internally, and knowledge is that which 
 
 it is the nature of this power to produce, knowledge will be 
 
 seen to have as necessarily an eternal «xisteuce iu God, and 
 
 A A 4 
 
 > 
 
'>i56 [appen. 
 
 In truth, the notion of that character which 
 we ascribe unto God, considered as something 
 known, can arise in our minds only, as we 
 shall previously have considered him under 
 the notion or character of something know- 
 ing; and it is owing to this successive man- 
 ner in which alone we, from the very neces- 
 sity of our nature, as existing in time, can ar- 
 rive at the knowledge of any speculative 
 truth, that we cannot have any clear con- 
 ception of God, as we attribute to him the two 
 distinct characters of knowing and known. 
 Of these nevertheless we may conceive, that 
 they are correlative; and that the relation 
 between them is, as hath been said, the 
 same as that which there is between father 
 and son. 
 
 to be equally of the essence of his nature, as the power which 
 we thus ascribe unto him. If knowledge, then, be with God a 
 thing produced, it will be such only in respect of that power 
 whose nature it is to produce it. But if that power be neces- 
 sarily operative, and knowledge cannot have a potential ex- 
 istence with God, but will ever be a thing produced, our 
 conceptions will not admit of our considering this knowledge 
 of his, otherwise than as something in fieri, or about to be 
 produced, and whereby we admit, in some sort, a potential 
 existence; at the same time that, being of the essence of 
 God, we necessarily consider it as being ever in esse, i. e. ever 
 actually produced. 
 
DISC. I.] 357 
 
 Now, in human generation there is no- 
 thing that is proper and essential to the cha- 
 racter of a son, but what he will have derived 
 from his father; but God, as hath been said, 
 by reason of the prolific virtue which we 
 ascribe to the act of knowledge whenever 
 it is exerted, will beget something, and that 
 something will be a son ; the wisdom then of 
 God, and which, with him, is of his essence, 
 cannot be ascribed to him, considered under 
 the notion or character of something known, 
 but as it will as properly characterize him, 
 as something knowing. In consideration 
 nevertheless, that God, as known, is distinct, 
 and different from himself, as knowing, there 
 must needs be a corresponding difference 
 and distinction between the wisdom which he 
 possesses as a son, or something that is known, 
 and that which he possesses as a father, or 
 something that knows; but which difference, 
 or distinction, can be no other than that 
 which there is between begotten and unbe- 
 gotten wisdom. Hence, and in consideration 
 of this distinction, although we may say of 
 the Son, that he has his wisdom from the Fa- 
 ther* (and by the way, it is therefore that 
 
 * It is as the wisdom of the Son is derived to bim from 
 the Father, that the Son becomes the proper channel through 
 
 > 
 
358 [appen. 
 
 he is the express image of the person of the 
 Father) ; we nevertheless cannot say of the 
 Father, that he has his wisdom from the Son, 
 for the Son hath his being wholly from the 
 Father, but so hath not the Father from the 
 Son. 
 
 Now, two distinctions have been found to 
 obtain in the divine nature; the one, a some- 
 thing that knows, and the other, a something 
 that is known. As all knowledge, however, is 
 imperfect, the object of which is not a wor- 
 thy one, God himself, as I have already said, 
 must needs be the object of his own know- 
 ledge; because there is no other object so 
 great and so noble as he himself is. But 
 I say of love the same as I have said of know- 
 ledge ; I say, that as no object but himself 
 can be so worthy of God's love, as himself, 
 so he himself must needs be the proper ob- 
 
 which wisdom flows, and is derived to us. That which might 
 be known of God, as the wisdom of God did manifestly appear 
 in the works of creation, was a light which might have an- 
 swered the purpose of man's original creation : whilst that liffht 
 by which alone any saving purpose, can be answered in man's 
 present fallen state, must be that which, shining out of dark- 
 ness, giveth the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the 
 face of him that hath redeemed us, even Jestu Christ. 
 
DISC. I.] 359 
 
 ject of his love. Now, in our case, know- 
 ledge may be acquired, or it may be lost after 
 it has been acquired; and which shows that 
 knowledge with us, is not essential to us, as 
 it is to God. It evidently, then, makes no dif- 
 ference in our case, whether we ourselves are 
 the object of our knowledge, or any external 
 thing, even God himself, so long as the know- 
 ledge we have acquired, is what we did not 
 before possess. For the object, be it what it 
 will, is not affected by its being known by 
 us; it neither gains nor loses any thing by 
 our knowledge of it, but remains the same 
 thing that it was before. Again I say, that 
 the relation which God, as knowing, has to 
 himself as known^ is an essential relation, 
 and not accidental; for, as he himself is ne- 
 cessarily the object of his own knowledge, he, 
 as known, must be essentially related to 
 himself, as knowing : whereas we, as know- 
 ing, have no necessary relation to that which 
 may be the object of our knowledge: for that 
 which is the object of our knowlecjge, may be 
 any external thing, equally as it may be our- 
 selves : and as the object may be any exter- 
 nal thing, it can have no internal relation to 
 us. No distinction, then, that is subsistential 
 or personal, can arise between ourselves 
 
 > 
 
360 [appen. 
 
 who know, and that which we know; as is 
 that where that which knows, is essentially 
 the same as that which is known; and as 
 is the case with God, where that which is 
 known can be no other thing than himself. 
 Now, the love which we feel, be the object 
 what it will, is nothing that is essential to 
 us, as is the faculty by means of which we 
 love, namely, the will : for, by means of this 
 faculty, we may hate, or be averse to any 
 thing, equally as we may love or desire it. 
 There may be a unity of affections between us 
 who love, and those whom we love, but no 
 union of persons : for the object on both sides 
 will be distinct and separate; although the 
 love which unites us, be one and the same; 
 and if the love which unites us, be nothing that 
 is essential to us, as is evident from its being 
 possible that it may be changed into hatred, 
 there can be no union in this case that is 
 personal; because that which is the ground 
 of our personal existence, namely, the faculty 
 by which we love, is alone essential to us. 
 With God, however, it is otherwise ; he alone 
 can be the object of his own love, considered 
 ad intra; as he alone, thus considered, can 
 be the object of his own knowledge ; and 
 
DISC. I.] 361 
 
 if, as hath been said, it be as his knowledge 
 is of his essence, that he knows, it will be 
 as his love is of his essence that he loves. 
 Now, God's love will in this respect be unlike 
 our love, namely, in its being unchangeable: 
 for those whom God once loves he loves unto 
 the end ; nay, he loves them though they love 
 not him; he will love them even when he 
 punishes them ; as they themselves would 
 confess, could they see the end for which he 
 punishes them. 
 
 Now, in regard a distinction that is per- 
 sonal arises, as hath been said, between God 
 considered as knowing, and himself as 
 something known ; and a corresponding dis- 
 tinction arises between himself considered 
 as loving, and as something loved ; a two- 
 fold personality nevertheless arises not in 
 the latter case, as there does in the for- 
 mer, and that for this reason, namely, that 
 as God himself is the only proper and 
 adequate object of his love, in .his loving 
 the Son, whom in his knowing he will have 
 begotten, he will necessarily love himself as 
 seeing himself reflected in the Son; there will 
 not, however, be that mutual relationship 
 between God considered as loving, and him- 
 
 > 
 
362 [appen. 
 
 self as something loved, as is necessary to 
 constitute two distinct personal subsistences ; 
 but which is the case where the Father is that 
 which knows, and the Son that which is 
 known, and in which case the relationship 
 will evidently be mutual. 
 
 Having thus given an account of the rise 
 of the two first Persons of the holy Trinity, 
 the order of my discourse requires that I 
 should give an account of the natural rise of 
 the third Person ; as this subject, however, 
 has been treated of in a well-known w^ork, I 
 shall give the learned author's account of 
 this matter in his own words further on; 
 and in the mean time shall speak to a point 
 which has already been touched upon, the 
 truth of which has been doubted by some, 
 namely, the eternal begetting of Christ ; and 
 which, if the personal or subsistential exist- 
 ence of the Deity be equally eternal as his 
 substantial existence is (however above human 
 comprehension an eternal begetting may be), 
 will undeniably be true. 
 
 Now, seeing, as in a former part of this 
 Discourse has been said, all potentiality, as 
 God's subsistential existence is considered, is 
 
\ 
 
 DISC. I.] 363 
 
 to be excluded from our niinds, as we would 
 consider this existence in itself, the power 
 which, in the Scriptures, is abscribed unto 
 God, must have respect to things external to 
 him, and not to his existence internally con- 
 sidered ; to things which might have a begin- 
 ning of their existence, and not to those 
 which, in their very nature, could have had 
 no such beginning. We accordingly read, 
 that in the beginning God created the . -"uven 
 and the earth, u^ n alike divine authority we 
 are given to understand, that it was hy his 
 Son that he made them, i. e. by the Word 
 which afterwards became incarnate : for, bi/ 
 faith, saith the author of the Epistle to the 
 Hebrews, we understand that the worlds were 
 made by the word of God*; that word which 
 the sacred writer had before spoken of as be- 
 ing the Son of God. This Son is in the follow- 
 ing verse said to be the express image of his 
 person-f-; i. e. of God considered as a father. 
 Now this image he is, as bein^ another sub- 
 sistence like unto that of the Father; " a form, 
 or draught {}cpocTyip), manifesting the* substance 
 from whence it was taken, and in which 
 Christ existed before he took our nature upon 
 
 • Heb. xi. 3. + Heb. i. 2. 
 
 /> 
 
 > 
 
364 [appen. 
 
 him ♦. The existence, then, which Christ had 
 before he took our nature upon him, would 
 have had no beginning ; his filiation, as his 
 generation, would of course have been from 
 all eternity. 
 
 The account which I have alluded to, 
 and which has been given by a learned 
 Prelate, is as follows : " The divine essence 
 which Christ had as the word, before he was 
 conceived by the Virgin Mary, he had not 
 of himself, but by communication from 
 God the Father. For this is not to be de- 
 nied, that there can be but one essence pro- 
 perly divine, and so but one God of infinite 
 wisdom, power, and majesty ; that there can 
 be but one person originally of himself sub- 
 sisting in that infinite Being, because a plu- 
 rality of more persons subsisting would ne- 
 cessarily infer a multiplicity of Gods ; that 
 the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is origi- 
 nally God, as not receiving his eternal being 
 from any other. Wherefore it necessarily 
 follows that Jesus Christ, who is certainly not 
 the Father, cannot be a person subsisting in 
 the divine nature originally of himself; and 
 
 * Whitby in loc. 
 
DISC. I.] 365 
 
 consequently, being, as we have already proved 
 that he is, truly and properly the eternal God, 
 he must be understood to have the Godhead 
 communicated to him by the Father, who is 
 not only eternally but originally God. All 
 things whatsoever the Father hath are mine, 
 saith Christ ; because in him is the same fulness 
 of the Godhead, and more than that the Fa- 
 ther cannot have: but yet in that perfect and 
 absolute equality there is notwithstanding this 
 disparity, that the Father hath ttie Godhead 
 not from the Son, or any other, whereas the 
 Son hath it from the Father : Christ is the 
 true God and eternal life ; but that he is so, 
 is from the Father: For as the Father hath 
 life in himself , so hath he given to the Son to 
 have life in himself, not by participation, 
 but by communication. It is true, our Sa- 
 viour was so in the form of God, that he 
 thought it no robbery to be equal with God ; 
 but when the Jews sought to kill him because 
 he made himself equal with God, he answered 
 them. Verily, verily, I say unto 'you, the 
 Son can do nothing of himself hut ivhat he. 
 seeth the Father do; by that connexion of his 
 operations, showing the reception of his es- 
 sence ; and by the acknowledgment of his 
 power, professing his substance from theFa- 
 
 ^r > 
 
366 [appen. 
 
 ther. From whence he which was eqvLial, even 
 in that equality confesseth a priority, saying. 
 The Father is greater than I: the Son equal 
 in respect of his nature, the Father greater 
 in reference to the communication of the God- 
 head. Ihnow him, saith Christ,ybr / am from 
 him; and because he is from the Father, there- 
 fore he is called by those of the Nicene council, 
 in their Creed, ' God of God, Light of Light, 
 very God of very God.' The Father is God, 
 but not of God ; Light, but not of Light ; 
 Christ is God, but of God; Light, but of Light. 
 There is no difference or inequality in the na- 
 ture or essence, because the same in both ; but 
 the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ hath that 
 essence of himself, from none: Christ hath 
 the same, not of himself, but from him*." 
 
 I shall now show, that, according to the 
 doctrine of the holy Trinity, as it is contained 
 in the Athanasian Creed, there are three Per- 
 sons in one Godhead, and no more ; not, in- 
 deed, as if I had not already shown this, but 
 that I may show this doctrine to have been 
 taught by another divine, who, as well as 
 Bishop Pearson, hath written very learnedly 
 
 ♦ Pearson on the Creed, p. 134, fol. ed. 
 
DISC. I.] 3C7 
 
 on the doctrine which is the subject of this 
 Discourse. 
 
 Our author, speaking of the internal acts 
 on whicli the divine relations are founded, 
 and from which they flow, says, " they are, 
 firet, the eternal act by which the Father 
 communicates the divine nature to the Son, 
 and which accordingly is called generation ; 
 secondly, that by which the Son receives his 
 divine nature from the Father, and which is 
 called filiation; thirdly, the act of spiration, 
 by which the Father and the Son together 
 eternally breathe forth the Holy Ghost ; and 
 lastly, the act of procession, by which the 
 Holy Ghost proceeds, and receives his divine 
 nature jointly from them both. This account 
 (as our author observes) may seem to infer 
 four Persons to be in the Godhead; the reason, 
 however (as he farther observes), why it does 
 not is, because the same person may sustain 
 several personal relations, and exert and re- 
 ceive several personal acts, where those acts, 
 or relations, are not opposite to, or incon- 
 sistent with, one another in the same subject ; 
 as, for instance, the person of the Father may 
 exert both an act of generation and of spira- 
 
 B B 2 
 
368 [appen. 
 
 tion, and sustain the relations resulting from 
 both, without any multiplication of his per- 
 son ; and the Son likewise may receive and 
 sustain the act of filiation, and withal exert 
 an act of spiration, without any multiplica- 
 tion of personality ; and this because neither 
 are the acts of generation and spiration in- 
 consistent in the Father, nor the acts of fili- 
 ation and spiration incompatible in the Son : 
 though, indeed, the acts of generation and 
 filiation, and the relations springing there- 
 from, would be utterly inconsistent, because 
 opposite, in any one person ; as likewise, on 
 the same account, would be the acts of spi- 
 ration and procession. From whence, by 
 plain and undeniable consequence, it follows, 
 that generation and filiation, spiration and 
 procession, constitute only three Persons in 
 the eternal Godhead, and no more : for rela- 
 tions merely disparate, do not constitute se- 
 veral distinct persons, unless they be opposite 
 too; that maxim of the schools being most 
 true. Sola oppositio multipl'icat in divlnis. So 
 that, although filiation and spiration are dis- 
 parate with reference to one another, yet as 
 both of them meet, and are lodged in one 
 and the same subject (viz. the person of the 
 
DISC. I.] 369 
 
 Son), they neither cause nor infer in him 
 any more than one single personality*." 
 
 Now, in agreement with this rule which 
 is mentioned by Dr. South, I say, that the 
 Son, by the acts of filiation and spiration 
 (which are wholly different, but not incom- 
 patible with each other), may sustain several 
 personal relations. But so likewise I say of 
 the Holy Spirit ; I say of this third Person of 
 the holy Trinity, that it cannot proceed from 
 the Father and the Son, but as the divine 
 nature of these will be communicated to him ; 
 and, being so communicated to the Holy 
 Spirit, he will know the Father and the Son, 
 and be known by them, insomuch that, sus- 
 taining his own proper personal subsistence 
 as proceeding from the Father and the Son, 
 he will at the same time sustain those which 
 are proper to the subsistences of the Father 
 and the Son, and from both of whom he 
 proceeds. Now, as knowing and being known, 
 the Holy Spirit will be neither a father nor a 
 son; for it is as proceeding from both the 
 Father and the Son, that he knows and is 
 known. I say moreover, that in like man- 
 
 • South against Sherlock, pp. 243, 244. 
 bb3 
 
 ^ 
 
370 [appen. 
 
 ner as God, as he knows himself, begets the 
 Son, as something known; so, likewise, as he 
 loves himself, and is loved of Him whom, in 
 knowing himself, he will have begotten, doth 
 the Holy Spirit, as something loved by Him, 
 proceed from both these. I further say, that 
 love or goodness being equally essential to 
 the divine nature as knowledge or wisdom, 
 and from which, as hath been said, the per- 
 sonal character of God as a Father arises, 
 this love or goodness, cannot be possessed by 
 the Father but as it will be possessed by the 
 Son likewise; and the divine Person that 
 proceeds from both these will be that love 
 or goodness subsistentially, which is by them 
 substantially or essentially possessed; for, it 
 is as this love or goodness is essential to the 
 divine nature, that it proceeds from the Fa- 
 ther and the Son, and constitutes, as it pro- 
 ceeds, this third Person of the ever blessed 
 Trinity, who in the Athanasian Creed is called 
 the Holy Ghost. 
 
 Now, these attributes, essentially consider- 
 ed, equally belong to the three divine Per- 
 sons of the holy Trinity; not, however, with- 
 out some difference, as this matter was seen 
 by the before-mentioned learned divine, and 
 
DISC. I.] 371 
 
 who writes as follows: — " Wisdom, consi- 
 dered absolutely and essentially in itself, be- 
 longs in common to all the three Persons of 
 the holy Trinity; but with the terms genita, 
 ovhigenita, joined with it, it imports a pecu- 
 liar mode of subsistence, which determines it 
 to a particular personality: so that sapient ia 
 quatemis genita, properly, only denotes the 
 person of the Son. In like manner, when 
 the third Person is called the Spirit, the term 
 Spirit is not here taken essentially for that 
 infinite, immaterial, incorporeal nature, ab- 
 solutely considered (for so it is common to 
 all the three Persons), but for that infinite 
 incorporeal nature, quatemis procedens, aut 
 splrata; and, under that peculiar mode of 
 subsistence, it belongs not to the other two 
 Persons, but stands appropriate only to the 
 third. Nevertheless, this makes them not 
 three distinct infinite Spirits, but only one 
 infinite Spirit under three distinct modalities; 
 so, when the Son is called the wisdom of the 
 Father, that very term (of the Father) im- 
 ports a modification of it peculiar to the Son ; 
 yet this modification does not make it an- 
 other wisdom from that which is in the Fa- 
 ther, since one and the same wisdom may 
 
 BB 4 
 
372 [appen. 
 
 sustain several determining modes*." Hence 
 it is evident, that the three distinct modes 
 according to which God exists, do not mul- 
 tiply the divine essence, or common suppo- 
 situm, of these modes; neither is the com- 
 mon suppositum, or divine essence, any thing 
 which can be conceived as having an exist- 
 ence separately from these modes, there being 
 no opposition between any of these, and the 
 common suppositum, or essence, which sup- 
 ports them ; on the contrary, it is coincident 
 with all, or with each of them ; and indeed, 
 but for the opposition which there is between 
 the modes themselves, they would, in such 
 manner, be one with their common supposi- 
 tum, or essence, as not to be distinguishable' 
 therefrom, or indeed be any modalities at all. 
 
 Having now explained the doctrine of the 
 Trinity as it is taught in the Athanasian 
 Creed, and as this Creed has been explained 
 by various men of learning with whose wri- 
 tings I have become acquainted, I shall con- 
 clude this Discourse with observing, that if 
 it should appear to those that read it, that 
 the same things are said over and over again^ 
 
 * South against Sherlock, p. 160. 
 
DISC. I.] 373 
 
 this, however, I so far deny as to say, that 
 there has been nothhig repeated, throughout 
 this Discourse, the repetition of which has 
 not been necessary, in order that something 
 which has been said before, might the better 
 be understood. 
 
 As the doctrine of the Trinity is taught in 
 the Scriptures, it is not so taught as to be level 
 with a common understanding (and which is 
 the case with respect to the historical and 
 moral parts of them), but requires much pe- 
 netration and labour for the comprehending 
 of them, such, for instance, as are called the 
 TOJ cc7ropp7;Tci of St. Paul. The purpose, how- 
 ever, for which God has endowed some men 
 with great talents would be in vain, had he 
 not afforded them subjects on which they 
 mighl be exercised; and no subject, I may 
 truly say, could have been afforded of more 
 importance than the doctrine of the holy 
 Trinity, inadequately as it has been treated 
 by me. 
 
 ANNOTATION. 
 
 The eternal generation of the Son of God (our 
 Lord Jesus Christ) being a notion which, by a learned 
 
374 [appen. 
 
 commentator, has been asserted to be unscriptural, 
 and who has fi-amed an argument by which he shows it 
 to be absurd likewise, I think it proper, previously to 
 my giving my thoughts on this important doctrine, to 
 transcribe, if not all, so much at least of the aforesaid 
 argument as will answer my purpose. " If Christ be 
 the Son of God, as to his divine nature, then he can- 
 not be eternal; for Son implies a Father, and Father 
 implies, in reference to Son, precedency in time, if 
 not in nature, and time also antecedent to such genera- 
 tion."" Again, " If the divine nature of Christ were 
 begotten of the Father, it must be in time; i. e. there 
 was a period in which it did not exist, and a period 
 in which it began to exist. This destroys the eternity 
 of our blessed Lord, and robs him at once of his God- 
 head*." 
 
 Now, in order, if not to refute, at least to do away 
 the force of this argument, I observe as follows: — 
 " The ancients," says Bishop Bull, " attributed to our 
 Lord a threefold nativity : first, that by which he was 
 born of the eternal mind of the Father; by this nati- 
 vity he was a perfect hypostasis or person, nor did any 
 thing afterwards accrue to him to fill up the measure of 
 this perfection, his other perfections being rather 
 condescensions of his as the Son of God; by this nati- 
 vity he went out, as it were, of the womb of the Fa- 
 ther, and let himself down to build the worlds. The 
 second nativity was tliat when the same word was 
 
 * Dr. Adam Clarke's Comment on Luke, i. 35. 
 
DISC. I.] 375 
 
 made flesh, when, falling from the bosom of the Fa- 
 ther into the womb of the Blessed Virgin, he was 
 born a man, by the overshadowuig of the Holy 
 Spirit; by this lowest condescension he became the 
 perfect Son of God*." Now, seeing Christ, as the 
 wordf was born of the eternal mind of the Father, 
 this nativity would have been prior to that which he 
 had when he was born of the Virgin Mary ; and not 
 being in time, as this last-mentioned nativity was, 
 would of course have been from all eternity. The 
 learned commentator, on the supposition of Christ"'s 
 having been begotten in time, concludes, with respect 
 to this begetting, that it had a beginning. To the con- 
 trary, however, of this, it is in the above extract said, 
 that Christ was born (and which implies a begetting) of 
 the eternal mind of the Father; and if so, it would be a 
 contradiction (however incomprehensible this may be) 
 to say that it might have a beginning. The question 
 then is. Whether the opinion of the learned Commen- 
 tator, supported only as it is by his own authority, 
 shall be preferred to an opinion which has not only the 
 support of the ancient fathers, and the best modern di- 
 vines, but of the Scriptures, and which the quotation 
 from Bishop Pearson in the foregoing discourse, unde- 
 niably shows ? As the matter shall be put upon this 
 issue, no one that believes in the Scriptures can, con- 
 sistently with that belief, determine in favour of the 
 learned Commentator. The notion of an eternal be- 
 getting is, it is true, beyond human comprehension; 
 
 * Defeusio Fidei Nic. scct.iii. cap. x. 
 
 >. 
 
376 [appen. 
 
 but so likewise are other mysteries of our holy religion; 
 it nevertheless is a doctrine which we must as necessa- 
 rily believe, as any other doctrine that is equally in- 
 comprehensible. 
 
 The Greek church professes to believe that the 
 Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father, but denies that 
 he proceeds from the Son * ; the Greek church is ac- 
 cordingly considered as being Arian ; for if this church 
 acknowledged the Holy Ghost to proceed from the Son, 
 as well as from the Father, she would unavoidably be- 
 lieve the eternal begetting of the Son: and except as 
 this were the case, the Holy Ghost would not proceed 
 from the Son. Now, Dr. Adam Clarke, in his denying 
 the eternal begetting of Christ, will virtually deny that 
 the Holy Ghost proceedeth from the Son, as well as 
 from the Father, and will be no less an Arian, than the 
 Greek church is Arian. 
 
 In further support of the doctrine of Christ's eter- 
 nal begetting, I shall add the following short account 
 thereof, which I have met with since the foregoing Ap- 
 pendix was written. 
 
 The sum of the Christian doctrine, according to 
 Tertullian, and as it is received by the church, is, that 
 
 * Brerewood's Enquiries, ch. xviii. 
 
DISC. I.] 377 
 
 the Son, according to substance and hypostasis, eter- 
 nally was, is, and will be in the Father; that when 
 the Father willed, the Son did not then begin to exist 
 substantially, but, as it were, proceeded, and went out 
 of the Father operatively; that is, the Father exerted 
 his strength, power, and almighty virtue, outwardly 
 and creatively, namely, in the things of the universe. 
 The word, then, is the operation only of that sub- 
 stance, or Son, which was eternally with God. We 
 do not arrive at any origin of the Son in any supposed 
 exertion of the divine will : for God willed not but 
 wisely, and therefore as containing the Son in him al- 
 ready. The Son received tlie perfection of his nativity, 
 as the word, when he went out of the Father, when 
 the Father said. Let there he light. The word then 
 received its species and dress. As the reason, or wis- 
 dom of God (and a true Son, as such), the word was 
 from all eternity a perfect Son. As being the reason, 
 or wisdom of God, he was God, and must have been 
 the coeternal progeny of the eternal mind of God ; 
 and this is the procession from whence he derives his 
 filiation, and in which his substantiality consists ; and 
 this procession, generation, and production, must 
 have been from eternity ; Avhilst the other procession, 
 namely, that from which he received the species and 
 dress of the word, was a manifestation only of the former 
 procession, and no new generation. As the Son, or 
 wisdom of God, was made the word, so was the word 
 made flesh. The word was not of itself, or separately 
 from the wisdom which became the word, any tiling 
 
378 [appen, 
 
 substantial, or a Son; so could it not, as the word, 
 give any substantiality to the flesh ; but the substan- 
 tiality of the flesh, at least its divine substantiality, it 
 must derive from the same fountain from which the 
 word which became flesh, drew. [ Vide Bully Defen, 
 Fidei Nic. sect. Hi. ca^. 10.] 
 
DISCOURSE IL 
 
 DOCTRINE OF CHRIST'S DIVINITY. 
 
 The divinity of Christ is a doctrine which is 
 so plainly taught in the holy Scriptures, that 
 the ancient fathers as little thought of set- 
 ting about the proving the truth of this doc- 
 trine from the Scriptures, as they did of 
 proving from these, that such a person as 
 Christ once made his appearance on earth. 
 Such however, unhappily, has been the 
 spread of infidelity (although not unpredicted 
 by those very Scriptures in which these men 
 refuse to believe) since their days, that mo- 
 dern divines, as well as laymen, w\\o at least 
 have been equal to these divines in zeal, have 
 found it necessary to employ their pens in 
 proving what the ancient fathers, as I have 
 said, thought to be as clear as the sun at 
 noon-day. 
 
 > 
 
380 [appen. 
 
 Tlie labour and pains even of men who pro- 
 fess to believe ;n the Scriptures, have not been 
 wanting to discredit the doctrine of Christ's 
 divinity; but, as it is not uncommon for 
 good to come out of evil, so has it already 
 happened in the present case; and so, no 
 doubt, will it continue to happen, so long as 
 so impious a doctrine as that is which denies 
 the divinity of our Saviour, shall continue 
 to be propagated; and which it probably will 
 be, till the earth is full of the knowledge of 
 the Lord. The good which has already 
 arisen, and which, as I have supposed, will 
 farther arise from the labours of these men, is 
 this, that it has given occasion for the Scrip- 
 tures being more critically examined, and 
 more diligently searched, and therefore for 
 their being better understood, than it is rea- 
 
 uld.have be.en, had 
 
 '/^/ifj a/r^^/fi Jo, or. 
 
 _^ — _,^en spread; and as 
 
 there can be no end to this knowledge (for 
 there are things in the Scriptures, the know- 
 ledge of which is inexhaustible), so, probably, 
 will this knowledge increase, and go hand in 
 hand with the spread of infidelity. This I 
 suppose to be the good which has already 
 arisen from the labours of these men, and 
 which, probably, will in future arise from 
 
DISC. II.] 381 
 
 like labours; but, as a learned Prelate on a 
 like occasion said, " no thanks to these men 
 tor this, nor benefit from it*;" except, as 
 he might have added, a benefit which is of 
 this world. 
 
 The divinity of Christ is a doctrine which 
 has been so sufliiciently proved to unprejudiced 
 minds, from various texts of Scripture which 
 have been cited for this purpose by different 
 writers, whose learning enabled them to give 
 the true construction and unsophisticated 
 meaning of those texts, that what either I, 
 or any other person, may have to say on this 
 subject, might well be spared, and this doc- 
 trine be left to stand on the foundation of the 
 aforesaid texts, properly explained, as I have 
 supposed them to have been, by the writers 
 before alluded to. To this foundation the 
 doctrine in question, that, namely, of Christ's 
 divinity, would have been left by me for its 
 standing, had there not been another, no less 
 sure foundation, on which it may be shown 
 to stand, but which however has not, to my 
 knowledge, occurred to any writer, either 
 ancient or modem; i. e. it has not been 
 
 * Sanderson's Sermon.i ad Aulam, p. 178. 
 
 c c 
 
.382 [appen. 
 
 made use of by any such writer, whereon 
 to establish the truth of Christ's divinity. 
 A discourse therefore on the subject of Christ's 
 divinity, as it shall be made to stand on this 
 other foundation which I have mentioned, and 
 which in a farther part of this Discourse will 
 be explained, will have novelty at least to re- 
 commend it, however deficient it may be in 
 point of composition. 
 
 Having- premised thus much with respect 
 to my intention in this discourse, I observe, 
 that, finding that Bishop Bull's Defence of 
 the Nicene Faith contains (and as any one 
 who has read that work, will know) the opi- 
 nions of some of the most respectable of the 
 ancient fathers, mingled with some of his 
 own ; and that, although it has not been the 
 intention of these fathers, nor that of the 
 learned Bishop, to prove the truth of the doc- 
 trine of Christ's divinity; for this doctrine, 
 as I have supposed, is too plainly taught in 
 the Scriptures to stand in need of proving; 
 seeing, however, it is contained in those writ- 
 ings of the fathers of which Bishop Bull has 
 given an account, and which, if this doctrine 
 be contained in the Scriptures, may well be; I 
 thought that all that it would be necessary 
 
DISC. II.] :^8:^ 
 
 for nie to do, as I would establish this doc- 
 trine, was to transcribe from the aforesaid 
 work of Bishop Bull such passages as would 
 best answer uiy purpose; as well as to tran- 
 scribe from the writings of others any such 
 opinions as are in agreement with those of the 
 ancient fatliers, and are of equally respect- 
 able authority as those either of the an- 
 cient fathers, or of Bishop Bull; this, I say, 
 is all that is necessary for me to do, as I 
 would establish the doctrine of Christ's divi- 
 nity. As the doctrines, however, which are 
 contained in Bishop Bull's Defence, &c. in 
 that part thereof at least, which I shall be 
 found to have transcribed, are chiefly upon 
 the subject of the holy Trinity, it will be 
 found, not only that the ground of my notions 
 with respect to Christ's divinity is different 
 from that which the wi-iters I have mentioned, 
 have made the foundation of their reasoning 
 upon this subject, but that it carries us farther 
 back in our conceptions on the subject of 
 Christ's divinity, than that which constitutes 
 the ground of their reasoning; it therefore is 
 a surer, not to say a better, foundation than 
 that which they have laid, for this reason? 
 namely, that if the doctrine of Christ's divinity 
 be not true, that oi t\\e holy Trinity cannot be 
 c c 2 
 
 > 
 
3H4 [appen. 
 
 true ; and so, ^ converse, if the doctrine of the 
 holy Trinity be not true, that of Christ's divi- 
 nity cannot be true: in short, the one of these 
 doctrines will inevitably stand, or fall, as the 
 other will do so. Having- said thus much by 
 way of preface to my discourse, I proceed to 
 give the extracts which I have mentioned, and 
 which, as they suppose Christ's divinity, can- 
 not, as I have before said, have been intend- 
 ed by the authors of them to prove the truth 
 of this doctrine, although they do as fully 
 prove it, as if this purpose had been meant 
 to be answered by these writers. 
 
 " The ancients attributed to our Lord a 
 threefold nativity, and filiation; the first, 
 thai by which, as the word, he was born of 
 the eternal mind of the Father. By this na- 
 tivity he exists as a perfect divine hypostasis; 
 nor did any thing afterwards accrue to him 
 to fill up the measure of this perfection: his 
 other two nativities being rather condescen- 
 sions of his, as the Son of God. The first 
 of these two nativities is that by which the 
 word went out of God the Father according 
 to an out-working, whereby he went out, as 
 it were, from the womb of the Father, and 
 let himself down to build the worlds. The 
 other nativity was that when the same word 
 
DISC. II.] 385 
 
 was made flesh; when, falling from the 
 bosom of the Father into the womb of the 
 blessed Virgin, he was born a man of her, 
 by the overshadowing of the Holy Spirit*. 
 By this lowest condescension he became the 
 perfect Son of God according to an out- 
 working; and thus had performed every kind 
 of filiation. The only begotten word, then, 
 was no otherwise not a perfect Son with- 
 out the flesh, than that, prior to his incar- 
 nation, he would not have discharged every 
 kind of filiation ; in other words, was not 
 yet the Son of God in every manner after 
 
 * There is, according to a learned annotator, a fourth 
 nativity, wliich in the case of Christ was wanting, in order 
 to his becoming the perfect Son of God; thai, namely, which 
 he had when he rose again from the dead. For this nativity 
 is referred to in the Psalms, where it is said, This day have I 
 begotten thee. " These words relate to our Lord's resurrec- 
 tion, by which he is said to be begotten, as being made the 
 first-born from the dead" (Whitby on Acts, xiii. 33); and 
 it is to Ids descent into the lower parts of the earth, which was 
 previous to his resurrection, that his ascent into heaven after 
 his resurrection, stands opposed ; not, howeyer, but as this 
 descent of Christ in respect of his human nature, presupposes, 
 and indeed implies, a previous ascent in respect of his 
 divine nature: for, who is he that ascended up to heaven, 
 but he who came down from heaven, even the Son of man ; as 
 St. John saith. No man hath ascended up into heaven, but he 
 Ihat came down from heaven, even the Son of man. John, iii. 
 13. 
 
 C C 3 
 
386 - [appen. 
 
 which the Father would that he should be 
 such *." 
 
 " When God (as Hyppolitus, as quoted 
 by Bishop Bull, says) was as yet alone, i. e. 
 when as yet nothing external to him existed, 
 and he would make the world, he, by think- 
 ing of it, as he thus willed its existence, did> 
 by a word which he would be speaking, as 
 thought on, and willed its existence, make it. 
 Nothing external to God, then, could ever 
 have been coeval with him. There was no- 
 thing besides himself, and he, although alone, 
 was many: for, although alone, he was not 
 without reason (tw Koyoo), without wisdom, 
 without counsel (reason and wisdom, says 
 our author, the interpreter of these words of 
 Hyppolitus, are the Son, and the Holy Spirit, 
 and both these are a counsellor to the Father: 
 it being the custom of the times in which 
 Hyppolitus wrote, to call the third hypostasis 
 by the name of wisdom). All things were in 
 him ; he was all things -)-. When he willed, 
 
 * Bulli Def. Fid. Nic. Sect. III. c. viii. 
 
 t With this account the ancient Egyptian theology, as it 
 is contained in the book of Hermes Trismegistus, agrees ; 
 and who says, " All things are one, and one all things; all 
 things were in the Creator, before he created all things." 
 Book ii. p. 4. 
 
DISC. 11.] 387 
 
 and in the manner after whicli he willed, he 
 showed his word in tlie times determined by 
 him, by which he made all thing-s; and who, 
 when he wills, makes; when he thinks, 
 finishes; when he speaks, shows; when he 
 forms, utters wisdom. He made it (the 
 world) then as he would: for he was God. 
 Now, in begetting- the word, lie begat a cap- 
 tain, a counsellor, and a workman of those 
 things which were made; which word, when 
 he possessed it in himself, and it was invisible 
 to the created world, he made visible, send- 
 ing forth his former voice, and begetting 
 light of light, he drew forth to the creature 
 itself a Lord, his own sense (or wisdom), 
 and who before was visible only to him, but 
 invisible to the world; Him he makes visible, 
 that the world, when it saw him who ap- 
 peared, might be saved (salvus Jleret) ; and 
 thus another assists him. When I say an- 
 other, I say not two Gods, but light only 
 from light, water from the fountain, or the 
 ray from the sun: for the virtue from the 
 whole, is one ; but the Father, from whom 
 the virtue is, is the whole word. Now this 
 word is the mind, or sense, which, going 
 forth into the world, is shown as the child 
 of God. All things then are made by him, 
 c c 4 
 
 > 
 
 -li- 
 
388 [appen. 
 
 who alone is begotten of the Father." (The 
 generation of which Hyppolitus here speaks, 
 says our author, is the production of the 
 word; but the showing, drawing forth, and 
 manifestation of it, co-existing eternally with 
 the Father; as when David says. This day have 
 I begotten thee; affirms his nativity then to 
 have happened to men, when the same became 
 known to them.) 
 
 " These remarks of Hyppolitus teach us," 
 as our author observes, " that when God sent 
 forth the word, he generated anew: for he 
 sent forth a former voice, or word, which, as 
 having been born of his mind, had been some- 
 thing already generated, containing the rea- 
 son, and whole essence of him, when he 
 thought, or willed that the world should exist ; 
 and that this word, in being sent forth, is 
 enabled to assist him, and so becomes another, 
 or different from the word which was with 
 him, born of his mind ; but which difference 
 arises only from its being sent forth : for al- 
 though the word, so sent forth, became vi- 
 sible, from its having been invisible when the 
 Father possessed it; yet doth this visibility 
 arise from its being sent forth ; and the word, 
 or Son, is accordingly called light of light. 
 
DISC, ir.] 389 
 
 i. e. light generated of light. Now visi- 
 bility," says our author, " although it depend 
 upon the being sent, is not of the essence of 
 the Son, in particular, inasmuch as that 
 which is sent depends upon that which sends ; 
 and nothing can be of the essence of the Son 
 as being sent, which is not of the essence of 
 the Father likewise, as sending; and therefore 
 when Hyppolitus says, that the Father, in 
 sending forth the Son, made him visible, 
 these words imply something external to God, 
 something already made; and this is conso- 
 nant to the Mosaic account, where the hea- 
 vens and the earth are set forth as having been 
 created prior to God's saying, Let there he 
 light; and, by which last words, the sending 
 forth the Son, or begetting light of light, is 
 signified. Now the word, or Son, in going 
 forth from the Father, could not be said to 
 be made visible, unless the world, which had 
 been already made, might see him. But the 
 earth is said to have been without form and 
 void; which words plainly intimate to us 
 (if the subsequent words did not confirm it), 
 that no earthly thing had as yet been 
 awakened into sense, or could perceive at all ; 
 therefore could the word, or Son, have been 
 visible only to the heavenly. Or superior in- 
 
 ■> 
 
390 [api'en. 
 
 telligences, or some universal soul belonging 
 to the whole world ; and that only when God 
 said, Let there he light. The world, according 
 to Saint Hyppolitus, could not be formed in 
 the divine mind, and not be actually made; 
 thinking of it, says he, he made it; but this 
 he did not without the Son, and the Holy 
 Ghost. Now the word, or Son, could not 
 have been concerned in making- the world, 
 and the world not be intelligible ; but if it 
 was intelligible, it was potentially intelligent. 
 Now the world, according to the words of 
 Hyppolitus, was perfected in seeing him who 
 did appear : for it did then only actually exist. 
 Not that a potential existence is no existence 
 at all : it is a defective existence, for there is 
 wanting light, and life ; and therefore was it, 
 that, in seeing him who did appear, it was 
 perfected. The world, in seeing him that 
 did appear, would exist as the image of God: 
 for it knew God ; but it knew not God with- 
 out conceiving him in its mind, and thus 
 knowing his name. For we think not, but 
 something exists in the mind as an object of 
 thought; and if so, something hath already 
 been born of the mind. But we necessarily 
 speak that in our mind, which we think ; and 
 whilst AKe. speak, we have a word speaking 
 
DISC. II.] 391 
 
 within us, in which is contained that reason 
 with which, and by means of which, we speak 
 when we think. Now, the word which the 
 mind thus hath within itself when it speaks 
 (for it thinks not without speaking within 
 itselfj and it speaks not without a word), it 
 generates of its own substance ; and it gene- 
 rates that word of itself, which of itself it 
 will have begotten. Nor hath tlie word which 
 is thus born of the mind, any thing less, or 
 other than the mind hath of which it is born. 
 Nor is the word any thing inferior to the 
 mind of which it is born: because, as great 
 as the mind is which begets the word, so 
 great is the word itself. For, as the word is 
 born of the whole mind, so, when born, it 
 remaineth in the whole mind ; and because, 
 whilst the mind thinks, there is no part of 
 it in which the word is not, therefore is the 
 word as great as the mind itself, of which it 
 is ; and when it is with it, it is in it ; and as 
 great as it is, so gTcat is the word ; because 
 it is of the whole, and in the whole mind. 
 It may thus be seen, that the word is as great 
 as the mind and the word together." To 
 return to the subject from which I liave some- 
 what digressed (althougli I have used no 
 other language than that of our author), I 
 2 
 
392 [appen-. 
 
 transcribe as follows:—" It hath been said, 
 that, in the word which you speak, you have 
 a word speaking within you : for, in the word 
 which you speak when you think, is con- 
 tained the reason with which you think: for, 
 if the reason with which you think, enables 
 you to speak whilst you think, because it con- 
 tains the same reason by means whereof you 
 speak when you think. Thus is there a se- 
 cond word in you by which you speak when 
 you think, and by which you think when you 
 speak : the reason with which you think, and 
 which is contained in the word by which you 
 speak, being the first and original word born 
 in the mind*." 
 
 " So far," says our author, " and with re- 
 spect to a first, and second filiation, does the 
 
 * This reasoning, which is frequently made use of by the 
 fathers, and the analogy which they show things divine to 
 have to those which are human, is in agreement with some 
 notions that are contained in our Discourse on the holy Trinity; 
 particularly where it is said, " the Son is called the word, be- 
 cause in like manner as when a thing is first known, a name 
 proper to it, or word by which that thing may properly be ex- 
 pressed, is conceived in the mind. So, when God knows him- 
 self (as from all eternity he must have done), the name proper 
 to that which is known, or word by which it is properly to be 
 expressed, is a something begotten in the mind, equally as 
 there is something begotten when a man is first conceived in 
 the womb of his mother." 
 
DISC. II.] .393 
 
 mind of the creature appear to be an exact 
 copy of the divine mind. It remains to be 
 considered, whether it may resemble the di- 
 vine mind likewise, with respect to a third 
 filiation. For this pui-pose he observes, that it 
 has been said of the word of God which was 
 made flesh, that, falling from the bosom of 
 the Father into the womb of the blessed Vir- 
 gin, it was born a man of her, by the over- 
 shadowing of the Holy Spirit. In a manner 
 resembling this, says our author, we utter, or 
 speak by a word of mouth that which we think 
 the word which has been born in the mind, 
 and which hath already been spoken in the 
 mind, is sent forth from the bosom of the 
 mind, or heart, and by means of the corpo- 
 real organs, and the spirit, or breath of life, 
 it acquires a sensible clothing, in other words, 
 becomes audible." Again — " As it was for 
 the sake of others, that the word of God 
 was made flesh, so is it ever for the sake, 
 and on the account of others, that the words 
 of a man's mouth are uttered. It is for this 
 reason said by our Saviour, By thy wards 
 thou shalt he justified, and hy thy words thou 
 shalt he condemned; which saying of our Lord*s 
 may, it is true, be construed to extend to 
 the thoughts of our hearts; for Christ, to 
 
394 [appen. 
 
 whom all hearts are open, — to ivhose eyes all 
 things are naked, is he to whom we must give 
 an account ; and if all things are thus open 
 and manifest to him, the word, or account 
 {Koyog) which we must give, is actually given, 
 when he sees, as in reality he does, our hearts. 
 Now it is said, that a good man, out of' the 
 good treasure of the heart, hrmgeth forth good 
 things; and an evil man, out of the evil trea- 
 sure, hringeth forth evil things; and that out 
 of the abundance of the heart the mouth speak- 
 eth. Thus will it appear to be the same thing, 
 whether it be the word of the mind, or that 
 of the moutli, the treasure of the heart, or 
 that which is brought forth out of that trea- 
 sure, by which we are judged. Lastly, as the 
 words of a man's mouth are the index to the 
 mind, or heart, or that by which a man is 
 known by another; so is the word of God 
 which was made flesh, and dwelt among us, 
 a discovery of the mind, and will of God; 
 such knowledge as we may have of God in 
 any other way, being equally inferior to this, 
 as the knowledge which one man can have of 
 another by his looks and appearance, is infe- 
 rior, and more uncertain, than such as may 
 be conveyed by the words of his mouth." 
 
DISC. II.] 395 
 
 Oil I- author, having thus stated the notions 
 of Hyppolitus Math respect to the' :hree differ- 
 ent filiations of Christ, supposes it to be asked, 
 " What it is that is written with respect to the 
 fii-st works of God immediately preceding the 
 formation of the things of the earth ? " He 
 answers in the words of TertuUian (whose 
 notions with respect to the aforesaid three fili- 
 ations, he had stated: the words of Hyppolitus 
 which follow, being illustrations merely of the 
 notions of TertuUian), as follows : — " The Son 
 not yet appearing, God said. Let there he 
 light, and it was made instantly that word 
 which is the true light that enlightens every 
 man coming into the world, and by him the 
 mundane light likewise was made. On this 
 he observes, that when TertuUian says, the 
 word was made when God said. Let there be 
 light, we are to understand, as the light was 
 the word, i. e. as it proceeded with a voice 
 from the Father, God did not say. Let there 
 he light, before the earth was made ; if, there- 
 fore, the word was then first made when God 
 said. Let there he light; i. e. if it began then 
 first to exist substantially, and as a divine Per- 
 son, its existence would be posterior to the 
 materia prima, or earth ; but which TertuUian 
 positively denies. The Son, as the eternal rea- 
 
396 [appen. 
 
 son and wisdom of God, then first began to 
 appear, when he undertook the disposing and 
 adorning matter, which lay uninformed, and in 
 a confused heap. Moses then first makes 
 mention of the word; because the wisdom of 
 which the word consists, was chiefly conspicu- 
 ous in the distinction of things, or order of 
 creation. Not that the Son was excluded 
 from the creation of the earth, any more than 
 the Father was from the disposing, or adorn- 
 ing the things created. The former of these 
 the Father is said to have done by the Son; 
 the latter, with the Son. As the word was 
 with God the Father in the beginning, i. e. 
 when the earth was produced, so was the 
 Father with the word, when it (the earth) 
 was disposed. The sum of Christian doctrine 
 our author observes, and says it was so under- 
 stood by TertuUian, is, that the Son, accord- 
 ing to substance, and hypostasis, eternally 
 was, is, and will be in the Father; that when 
 the Father willed, the Son did not then begin 
 to exist substantially, but, as it were, pro- 
 ceeded, and went out of the Father opera- 
 tively; i. e. the Father exerted his strength, 
 power, and almighty virtue, outwardly, and 
 creatively, namely, in the creation of all 
 things. The word then is the operation only 
 
DISC. II.] 397 
 
 of that substance, or Son, which was eternally 
 with God. We do not arrive at any origin of 
 the Son in any supposed exertion of the will 
 of the Father : for God willed not but wisely, 
 and, therefore, as containing the Son in him 
 already. The Son received the perfection of 
 his nativity, as the word, when he went forth 
 out of the Father; when the Father said, Let 
 there be light. The word, according to Ter- 
 tullian, then received its species and dress. As 
 the reason, or wisdom of God (and a true Son 
 as such), the word was from all eternity a per- 
 fect Son. As being the reason, or wisdom of 
 God, he was of God, and must have been the 
 coeternal progeny of the eternal mind of 
 God; and this is the procession from whence 
 he derives his filiation, and in which his sub- 
 stantiality consists; and this procession, ge- 
 neration, and production, must b'^ve been 
 from all eternity; whilst the other proces- 
 sion, namely, that by which he received the 
 species, and dress of the word, was a mani- 
 festation only of the former procession, and 
 no new generation. As the Son or wisdom of 
 God was made the word, so wa^ the word 
 made Jiesh. The word was not of itself, or 
 separately from the wisdom which became 
 the word, any thing substantial, or a Son; 
 
 D D 
 
398 [appen. 
 
 it could not therefore, as the word, give any 
 substantiality to the flesh ; but the substan- 
 tiality of the flesh (at least, its divine substan- 
 tiality) it must derive from the same fountain 
 from which the word, which became flesh, 
 drew. For the manhood being taken into 
 God, the human nature was worked into the 
 substance of the divine, in the second Adam, 
 in the same manner as the animal nature was 
 contained under the intellectual, in the first 
 Adam ; and as it was in consequence of this 
 union of natures, that the first Adam was in- 
 timately and inseparably united with the exter- 
 nal world, and enabled to subdue it ; so by 
 the union of the divine with the human 
 nature, was Christ, the second Adam, made 
 to have dominion over all things, and to have 
 power in heaven, as well as earth, because of 
 the unity and indivisibility of the intellectual 
 nature, and of the connexion which man, as 
 an intellectual being, had with superior intel- 
 ligences ; by which means Christ is as truly 
 the Lord over all intelligent beings, as the 
 first Adam was over the beasts of the earth 
 and fowls of the air; but with this farther ad- 
 vantage over him (Adam), that in regard the 
 superior nature is, in the case of Christ, di- 
 vine, his dominion must needs be eternal, and 
 
DISC. II.] 399 
 
 his kingdom an everlasting kingdom. Tlie 
 union of the divine and human nature, in 
 Christ, was brought about by the conception 
 of the blessed Virgin; in which conception, 
 the human flesh, derived from Adam, or seed 
 of the woman, was so incorporated with the 
 substance of the word, or Son of God, as to 
 become one substance with it. The human 
 nature was thus taken into a personal union 
 with the divine, in the same manner as tlie 
 animal nature was taken into a personal 
 union with. the intellectual, when Adam first 
 arose to intellectual life; and as the animal, 
 or earthly man, became void of all personal 
 being in himself, when he acquired a subsist- 
 ence with the intellectual nature, so was the 
 manhood, or human nature, void of all per- 
 sonal being in itself when it was taken into 
 God, and had a subsistence with the word, 
 or second Person of the Trinity; so that it 
 would be a nature only, and not a person ; 
 exactly as was the case with the animal, or 
 earthly man. The word then, or SOn of God, 
 did not put off his divine nature when he be- 
 came incarnate, nor was the God transformed, 
 or converted into a man, any more than was 
 the case with the intellectual nature, when 
 it was personally united to the animal, in the 
 DD 2 
 
400 [appen. 
 
 case of Adam : at the same time that huma- 
 nity was not so assumed by Christ, but he had 
 all the essential properties of man's nature*: 
 for, as St. Paul says, it behoved him in all 
 things to be like unto his brethren. In like 
 manner then as the animal, or natural man, in 
 the case of the first Adam, was made intellec- 
 tual, without losing his humanity; and 
 what would have been a person without the 
 divine nature being added to it, but pro- 
 duced by a natural conception, and by the 
 will of man, became a nature only with that 
 union, and produced by a miraculous concep- 
 tion, and by the will of God. Now, although 
 with respect to the divine and human nature 
 
 * To obviate an objection which has been made by the So- 
 cinians with respect to the divine incarnation, and who say it 
 is an absurdity to suppose that the great God might become a 
 man, nay even a child ; I here transcribe from the work of a 
 learned divine as follows — " The whole Godhead was not in- 
 carnate when Christ took our nature upon him, nor any person 
 of the divine Trinity, but the Son: the person of the Son sub- 
 sisting in the Godhead." There was, in this case, no conver- 
 sion of the Godhead into flesh, but a taking of the manhood 
 into God. " That the manhood should in such manner betaken 
 into the Godhead, as that these should be one, consistently 
 with the two natures continuing to be distinct natures, is what 
 we cannot conceive ; and yet this is no greater diflBculty, than 
 that the body and soul make qne man." — Holland on the 
 Creed, 136. 
 
DISC. II.] 401 
 
 of Christ there be a perfect union of these 
 two natures, yet is there no such ir-^ly^oo^wi?} 
 circumincession, or in-being, as there is in 
 the divine Persons of the sacred Trinity : for, 
 as our author Bishop Bull observes, although 
 the divine is in the human nature, yet is not 
 the human, in its turn, in the divine nature ; 
 the human nature being finite, and circum- 
 scribed ; the divine, infinite and immense ; 
 from whence it cannot be this should be 
 wherever the former is. In regard, however, 
 that the divine was, and is, and ever will be 
 in the human nature, in the case of Christ, it 
 is farther observed by our author, that he, 
 at the time that he was conversant amongst 
 men upon earth, must have filled all things 
 with his universal presence ; that he was at 
 the same time with the Father and in the Fa- 
 ther, and had the care of all things in hea- 
 ven as well as in earth ; nor did any thing 
 hinder his being present every where. From 
 whence, by the way, it will appear, that the 
 Father being with the Son, and the Son be- 
 ing with the Father, is to be understood sub- 
 stantially, and not personally: otherwise a 
 confusion of Persons would arise ; and in the 
 union of the divine and human natures, it 
 
 D D 3 
 
402 [appen. 
 
 would not be true, that the Son rather than 
 the Father was incarnate. 
 
 Previously to my proceeding to such ob- 
 servations as, in the sequel of this Discourse, 
 will be made, I think it proper (the nature 
 and drift of it being considered) to observe, 
 that to those who have not made the writings 
 of the ancient Fathers their particular study, 
 and who, of course, will be unaccustomed 
 to the reasonings which they make use of on 
 such deep points of divinity as those are 
 which are treated of in Bishop Bull's De- 
 fence, &c.; that these reasonings, I say, will 
 appear to these men to be an unintelligible 
 jargon; and that they are so far from proving 
 the truth of the doctrine which is the subject 
 of this Discourse, as that they prove nothing 
 at all. To those, however, who are versed 
 in these writings, I venture to say, that there 
 is scarce a sentence in that part of the above 
 extracts which contains the opinions of Hyp- 
 politus, in which the doctrine of Christ's 
 divinity will not be perceived to be asserted. 
 But with respect to the latter part of the 
 above extracts, that, namely, in which the opi- 
 nions of TertuUian are stated, this doctrine 
 
DISC. 11.] 403 
 
 is so plainly asserted, as to be level with the 
 understanding almost of a child. 
 
 In the extract, however, which I have 
 made from Bishop Bull's Defence, &c. and 
 which contains the opinions of Tertullian, I 
 should stand excused in the minds of the 
 learned and ingenuous, for having given 
 it, even though it were foreign to the subject 
 of Christ's divinity (but which, however, it is 
 so far from being, that he that runs may 
 read it), were it only for the beauty of the 
 language, and, as I may add, the philoso- 
 phical spirit, in which these opinions of his 
 are expressed. 
 
 Returning from this digression, I observe, 
 that it has in a former part of this Discoui'se 
 been shown, that it is as there is something 
 in the nature of man analogous to that of 
 the Deity, that we may understand what 
 upon the divine authority Ave are taught, 
 namely, that God created man in his own 
 image. Now, although it cannot properly 
 be said of any being inferior to man, that it 
 was made in the image of God, certain foot- 
 steps nevertheless of the Divinity, similar to 
 those which are in man, are to be traced in 
 
 D D 4 
 
404 [a ppen. 
 
 the inferior parts of the creation ; and thus 
 God hath not left himself wholly without a 
 witness in these. 
 
 " The human soul (says the learned Bi- 
 shop from whose celebrated work I have been 
 all along transcribing) is a faculty by means 
 of which a man may not only know any 
 thing, but may know all things that are 
 within the compass of his knowledge : it can 
 therefore never be satisfied with any such 
 knowledge as it may have attained to, but, 
 as being a power of knowing *=, it will ever be 
 athirst for still farther knowledge. Such 
 likewise, comparatively, is matter; it is a 
 
 * If it be said of this expression, that it conveys no idea 
 at all, and that it cannot therefore be any proper description 
 of the soul, I answer, that the objection would equally hold 
 good, as we should say of the eye of the body, that it is a 
 power of seeing. And yet most certain it is, that except as 
 there was a light which is external, and by which the power 
 that the eye has of seeing may be reduced to act, in vain for 
 any purpose of seeing, would this member of the body be 
 possessed. Now, whether we say, either of the soul or of 
 the eye, that the one is something, having a power of know- 
 ing, and the other a power of seeing, it amounts to the same 
 thing. We have no true idea of the eye, as we say it is some- 
 thing capable of seeing, except as the existence of something 
 external to it, whereby the power which it has may be re- 
 duced to act, is presupposed ; and the same may be said of 
 the soul. 
 
DISC. II.] 405 
 
 power to something which is apt, or fitted, 
 to receive that form which makes a thing 
 something : for the earth, as we are told, was 
 without form, and void, or empty ; and dark- 
 ness prevailed, until the Spirit of God moved 
 upon the face of the waters. The powe r of 
 matter was then determined, and it then 
 received that variety of forms for which it 
 was apt or fitted. The darkness which was 
 upon the face of the deep, is not descriptive 
 only of the darkened state into which man 
 fell as he sinned, but of that likewise in 
 which he originally was by nature, until that 
 knowledge was derived to him, without which 
 both the intellectual and moral powers with 
 which he was endowed would have been given 
 him in vain. The light which God sent 
 forth when he said, Let there he light, decked 
 all things according to their several capa- 
 cities which had been given them, as with a 
 garment ; and thus man became, not alone 
 an image of God, but every creature, ac- 
 cording to its capacity (for such was the will 
 of God), had stamped on it the character of 
 its Maker. The goodness which God saw in 
 the lower orders of creatures was a commu- 
 nicated goodness (as that indeed would be 
 which man, as using a freedom of will, 
 
406 [appen, 
 
 would have, should choose good rather than 
 evil), flowing from the eternal source or 
 spring of goodness. The instinct by which 
 these inferior creatures seek the good of which 
 they are by nature capable, is to them under- 
 standing ; and the appetency with which 
 they unremittingly and unerringly seek it, is 
 to them a will. Thus these three properties, 
 power*, understanding, and will go (and 
 indeed are all that do in fact go) to the con- 
 stitution or essence of any created being or 
 thing whatever. Man, it is true, as that im- 
 mortality shall be considered for which he is 
 peculiarly fitted, may supereminently be said 
 to have been made like unto God ; and it is 
 by reason of this immortal nature by which 
 he is so widely different and distinct from the 
 beasts that perish, that he is said to be an 
 image of GodCs eternity (Wisd. ch. ii. ver. 23). 
 He nevertheless is still but an image ; and, as 
 such, more distant from God than any, even 
 the lowest created thing, is from him." 
 
 Now, the power, the wisdom, and the 
 goodness of God, these being made manifest 
 
 * By power is here meaut that capacity with which each 
 created thing is endued by the constitution of its nature, 
 whereby it seeks to preserve its being. 
 
DISC. II.] 407 
 
 by his works, are all that we naturally know 
 of him : for these are not qualities in God, 
 and as they are in us, but constitute his es- 
 sence, as he stands related to us as our Cre- 
 ator. But although these are qualities merely 
 as they exist in us, yet, flowing from our 
 essence, we may know ourselves to be sub- 
 stantially related to God ; i. e. we may know, 
 that, in respect of essence or substance, we 
 exist in his image, and so are related to him 
 in like manner as an image has a relation to 
 that of which it is an image. It is accord- 
 ingly as these properties are found to obtain 
 in us, that we say, and that most truly, that 
 we exist in his image ; and upon this ground 
 we rightly conclude, that the greater the 
 power, the wisdom, and the goodness which 
 we possess (and of this we judge bj our works, 
 for, being of God's workmanship, we are hy 
 him created unto these), the more perfect will 
 be the image, according to which we shall be 
 like unto him. The more perfect neverthe- 
 less an image shall be supposed to be, it will 
 not approach a whit the nearer towards its 
 being the very thing itself of which it is an 
 image ; for, the more perfect an image is, 
 the more truly will it be an image : in consi- 
 deration nevertheless that an image is, in its 
 
408 [appen. 
 
 veiy nature, distinct from that of which it is 
 an image, it will follow, that the more truly 
 any thing is an image, the more distant will 
 it be from its being that of which it is an 
 image. The more, for instance, we know of 
 God (i. e. the greater the power, the wisdom, 
 and the goodness of ours, by which we re- 
 semble him), the greater will the distance be 
 perceived to be, in respect whereof our power, 
 our wisdom, and our goodness, are from be- 
 ing the power, the wisdom, and the goodness 
 of God. 
 
 Now, Christ, in the Epistle to the He- 
 brews, is said to be the express image of 
 God's person, or, as it is in the Greek, uVo- 
 c-Toui-ig ; what has been said therefore on the 
 subject of man as being the image of God, 
 may be seen to be pertinent to the subject of 
 this Discourse : for Christ likewise, as a man, 
 must be the image of God ; he is, however, 
 something more than an image ; for, in the 
 above Scripture, he is said to be the express 
 image of God's person ; on which words it is, 
 by a learned divine, observed as follows: — 
 " It is true, that in respect of the substance 
 or essence of the Father, Christ is one with 
 the Father, and no image ; but, as a Son, he 
 
DISC. II.] 409 
 
 evidently cannot be one witli the Father. He 
 nevertheless may, as a Son, be the image of 
 tlie Father; although, as a Son (whatever the 
 likeness and even sameness between him and 
 the Father may be), he must ever be infinitely 
 distant from the Father : for so is it in hu- 
 man generation, and where there is no other 
 essential difference between a father and a son, 
 than that the one is a father, and the other 
 a son ; as father and son they are two, but 
 as men one only. In agreement herewith it 
 is said, that if Christ be the express image of 
 God's person, it will not be in respect ^f his 
 humanity, but in respect of his divinity, that 
 he is so ; for, although, in respect of his hu- 
 manity, he is consubstantial with men, and 
 is, or at least may be, an image of God, as 
 they are, being, however, in respect of his 
 divinity, consubstantial with God, he is not an 
 image of God as men may be, but is the express 
 image of God's person, and which no man 
 can be *." In agreement with what has been 
 said, it has been observed by St. Athanasius, 
 that " the Son is not so in the Father, as we 
 ourselves are said to live, and move, and to 
 be in God ; for he (the Son), as being from 
 
 * Cudworth's Intellectual System, p. 619. 
 
410 [appen. 
 
 the fountain of the Father, is that life in 
 whom all things are quickened and consist ; 
 neither does he who is the life live in another 
 life, which were to suppose him not to be the 
 life itself. Nor must it be conceived, that the 
 Father is no otherwise in the Son than he is 
 in holy men, corroborating them; for the 
 Son himself is the power and the wisdom of 
 God, and all created beings are sanctified by 
 a participation of him in the Spirit." 
 
 Sufficient, I apprehend, will now have 
 been said to show what it has been my inten- 
 tion in this Discourse to show, namely, that 
 the doctrine of Christ's divinity hath as good, 
 if not a better, foundation on that of the 
 holy Trinity, than it has on those texts of 
 Scripture which have been made use of by 
 some late writers for a like purpose ; giving 
 them, at the same time, much credit for the 
 learning and ingenuity which they have dis- 
 played in these writings of theirs. 
 
 I shall conclude this Discourse with ob- 
 serving, that there are, to the best of my 
 remembrance, many remarks contained in 
 Bishop Bull's Defence, &c. which prove the 
 truth of Christ's divinity as fully as those do 
 
DISC. 11.] 411 
 
 of which I have made extracts in this Dis- 
 course of mine ; as it would, however, be too 
 great a labour for me again to examine this 
 work of the learned Bishop's, and to draw 
 the like conclusions from such passages 
 thereof as I have supposed might be found, 
 as I have from those of which I have made 
 extracts, I shall content myself with these, 
 conceiving that the purpose for which they 
 have been made will have been fully an- 
 swered. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 S. GwiKll, Printer, Uuie Qneeh StnM, Londoii. 
 
 ^ 
 
XT'^^