1 /. INTRODUCTION. xiii we maintain that the obligations to personal holiness and Christian obedience now acquire additional strength. The va- lueof the sacrifice enhances our conceptionsof the worth of the object for which the sacrifice was offered. The representa- tion which we have given, instead of countenancing any re- laxation in the terms of the law, tends to exalt cur notions of its uncompromising strictness. The requirements of the law are not brought down : Its demands are as high as when it was at first promulgated from the Mount of Sinai : Its sanctions are as stern as when they were first uttered amidst thunders and lightnings and smoke. The law of God is, like himself, immutable. It has indeed received a satisfaction for the sins of the guilty ; but it gives no tolerance to continue in the practice of iniquity; and that man has not read the Bible aright, nor felt upon his heart the influence of its truths, who has not seen in the very message of forgiveness through the blood of Christ, the strongest motive to depart from ini- quity. The Christian feels himself delivered from the penalty of transgression ; but he does not feel himself relieved from the obligation to " do all things to the glory of God." He feels that he is rescued from the bondage of Satan into the glorious liberty of the sons of God ; but he only feels, on that account, a more urgent obligation to adorn tiie doctrine which he professes, by a consistent life and conversation. The love of Christ becomes a constraining principle of new and active obedience ; and that grace which is said to be unfavourable to virtue and morality, alone teaches effectually " to deny all ungodliness of the flesh and the spirit," and to aim at the perfection of " holiness in the fear of God." So far from allowing the promises of the gospel to slacken his exertions in the way of duty, he finds in them an addi- tional motive to perseverance ; and, while he seeks and strives to "work out his own salvation with fear and trem- bling," he knows and feels that it is God who worketh in him, both to will and to do of his own good pleasure.'* In such exercises and under such influences, he advances from one measure of Christian attainment unto another ; and, ever looking unto Jesus as at once the author and the finisher of his faith, he presses on towards the prize of his high calling in Christ Jesus. Firmly persuaded of the existence and power of his divine Redeemer, he knows in whom he has believed, and is assured that lie is able to keep what has been committed to him till the day of retribution, b Xiv INTRODUCTION. when that same Jesus, who once visited our world as a man of sorrows and a companion of grief, shall be manifested in the majesty of his power and in the uncreated splendours of his Godhead. How full of comfort and consolation is the religion of Je- sus Christ, when viewed in this light ! In the hour of trial and temptation, the Christian reposes on the power and faith- fulness of his Saviour, who chastens his people in compas- sion, and who knows the ingredients that are mingled in the cup of their affliction. In the season of perplexity and alarm, he goes to his Father in heaven, through his divine interces- sor, and pleads for the accomplishment of those promises on which his people are invited to rely. And, even in the pros- pect of dissolution, he fears no evil, for his omnipotent Sa- viour is with him ; and, as the shades of the Dark Valley ga- ther around his head, he looks beyond them to that bright and blessed region which is lighted up with the presence of that divine Redeemer whose arm is able to sustain him in his mortal conflict, and whose unveiled glories shall constitute his happiness for ever. P. H. T. Dundee, June 1829. LETTER 1. REVEREND AND DEAR SIR, I have recently perused a sermon delivered by you at the ordination of the Reverend J. Sparks, in Balti- more, with no small degree of interest. The subjects of which it treats must be regarded as highly import- ant, by every intelligent man who is a serious inquirer after revealed truth. And if the views which you have disclosed will stand the test of examination, and shall appear to be those which the Word of God maintains, or which it will justify, it certainly will be the duty of every friend to Christianity to embrace and promote them. It is proper, no doubt, that every one who reads and reflects upon your sermon, should do it without preju- dice or party views. Unless I am deceived as to the state of my own feelings, I have endeavoured impar- tially to weigh the arguments and examine the reason- ings which it presents, with a wish to know and be- lieve the truth. I dare not flatter myself, indeed, that I have perfectly succeeded in doing this ; for every man who is acquainted with his own heart, will find reason to believe that he often has been, and may be again, deceived by it. But, as I am not conscious of party feelings on the present occasion, will you permit me, without apology, to lay before you my thoughts in re- gard to three topics of your discourse that stand in close connexion with each other, and are among the principal points in regard to which I feel myself com- pelled to dissent from your opinions? The points to which I refer are — the principles of in- terpreting Scripture ; the unity of God ; and the divinity and humanity of the Saviour. I limit myself to these three, because it would require more time and labour than I can possibly spare at present, and more health than I enjoy, to express in writing my views of all the statements of doctrines which you have made. I might adduce another reason for confining myself within these A 8 limits. If the principles of reasoning which you adopt, and the results which you deduce from them, in regard to some of the points on which I am about to remark, are untenable or incorrect, the consequence of this must extend itself esseiilially to som* of the remaining and most important topics which you have discussed in your sermon. The general principles of interpreting Scripture you describe in the following manner. "We regard the Scriptures as the records of God's successive revela- tions to mankind, and particularly of the last and most perfect revela- tion of his will by Jesus Christ. Whatever doctrines seem to us to be clearly taught in the Scriptures, we receive without reserve or excep- tion. We do not, however, attach equal importance to all the books in this collection. Our religion, we believe, lies chiefly in the New Testa- ment. The dispensation of Moses, compared with that of Jesus, we consider as imperfect, earthly, obscure, adapted to the childhood of the human race, a preparation for a nobler system, and chiefly useful now as serving to confirm and illustrate the Christian Scriptures. Jesus Christ is the only master of Christians ; and whatever he taught, either during his personal ministry, or by his inspired Apostles, we regard as of di- vine authority, and profess to make the rule of our lives. " This authority which we give to the Scriptures, is a reason, we con- ceive, for studying them with peculiar care, and for inquiring anxiously into the principles of interpretation, by which their true meaning may be ascertained. The principles adopted by the class of Christians in whose name I speak, need to be explained, because they are often mis- understood. We are particularly accused of making an unwarrantable use of reason in the interpretation of Scripture. We are said to exalt reason above revelation, to prefer our own wisdom to God's. Loose and undefined charges of this kind aie circulated so freely and with such injurious intentions, that we think it due to ourselves, and to the cause of truth, to express our views with some particularity. " Our leading principle in interpreting Scripture is this, that the Bible is a book written for men, in the language of men, and that its meaning is to be sought in the same manner as that of other books. We be- lieve that God, when he condescends to speak and write, submits, if we may so say, to the established rules of speaking and writing. How else would the Scriptures avail us, more than if communicated in an unknown tongue ? " Now, all books and all conversation require in the reader or hearer the constant exercise of reason ; or their true import is only to be ob- tained by continual comparison and inference. Human language, you well know, admits various interpretations ; and every word and every sentence must be modified and explained — according to the subject which is discussed — according to the purposes, feelings, circumstances, and principles of the writer, and according to the genius and idioms of the language which he uses. These are acknowledged principles in the in- terpretation of human writings ; and a man whose words we should explain without reference to these principles, would reproach us justly 9 with a criminal want of candour, and an intention of obscuring or dis- torting his meaning. " Were the Bible written in a language and style of its own, did it consist of words which admit but a single sense, and of sentences wholly detached from each other, there would be no place for the principles now laid down. We could not reason about it as about other writings. But such a book would be of little worth ; and perhaps, of all books, the Scriptures correspond least to this description. " The word of God bears the stamp of the same hand which we see in his works. It has infinite connexions and dependencies. Every pro- position is linked with others, and is to be compared with others, that its full and precise import may be understood. Nothing stands alone. The New Testament is built on the Old. The Christian dispensation is a continuation of the Jewish, the completion of a vast scheme of providence, requiring great extent of view in the reader. Still more, the Bible treats of subjects on which we receive ideas from other sources besides itself; such subjects as the nature, passions, relations, and duties of man ; and it expects us to restrain and modify its lan- guage by the known truths which observation and experience furnish on these topics. " We profess not to know a book which demands a more frequent exercise of reason than the Bible. In addition to the remarks now made on its infinite connexions, we may observe that its style nowhere affects the precision of science or the accuracy of definition. Its lan- guage is singularly glowing, bold, and figurative, demanding more fre- quent departures from the literal sense than that of our own age and country, and consequently demands more continual exercise of judg- ment. We find, too, that the different portions of this book, instead of being confined to general truths, refer perpetually to the times when they were written, to states of society, to modes of thinking, to contro- versies in the Church, to feelings and usages which have passed away, and without the knowledge of which we are constantly in danger of ex- tending to all times and places what was of temporary and local appli- cation. We find, too, that some of these books are strongly marked by the genius and character of their respective writers, that the Holy- Spirit did not so guide the Apostles as to suspend the peculiarities of their minds, and that a knowledge of their feelings, and of the influences under which they were placed, is one of the preparations for understand- ing their writings. With these views of the Bible, we feel it our bounden duty to exercise our reason upon it perpetually, to compare, to infer, to look beyond the letter to the spirit, to seek, in the nature of the subject and the aim of the writer, his true meaning ; and, in general, to make use of what is known, for explaining what is difficult, and for discover- ing new truths. " Need I descend to particulars to prove that the Scriptures demand the exercise of reason ? Take, for example, the style in which they ge- nerally speak of God, and observe how habitually they apply to him hu- man passions and organs. Recollect the declarations of Christ, that he came not to send peace, but a sword ; that unless we eat his flesh, and drink his blood, we have no life in us ; that we must hate father and mo- ther ; pluck out the right eye; and a vast number of passages equally bold and unlimited. Recollect the unqualified manner in which it is said of Christians that theypossess all things, know all things, and can do all 10 things. Recollect the verbal contradiction betweeen Paul and James, and the apparent clashing of some parts of Paul's writings, with the ge- neral doctrines and end of Christianity. 1 might extend the enumera- tion indefinitely, and who does not see that we must limit all these pas- sages by the known attributes of God, of Jesus Christ, and of human nature, and by the circumstances under which they were writen, so a3 to give the language a quite different import from what it would require, had it been applied to different beings, or used in different connexions. " Enough has been said to show in what sense we make use of rea- son in interpreting Scripture. From a variety of possible interpretations, we select that which accords with the nature of the subject, and the state of the writer, with the connexion of the passage, with the general strain of Scripture, with the known character and will of God, and with the obvious and acknowleged laws of nature. In other words, we be- lieve that God never contradicts, in one part of Scripture, what he teaches in another, and never contradicts, in revelation, what he teaches in his works and providence ; and we therefore distrust every interpretation which, after deliberate attention, seems repugnant to any established truth. We reason about the Bible precisely as civilians do about the constitution under which we live; who, you know, are accustomed to limit one provision of that venerable instrument by others, and to fix the precise import of its parts by inquiring into its general spirit, into the in- tentions of its authors, and into the prevalent feelings, impressions, and circumstances of the time when it was framed. Without these princi- ples of interpretation, we frankly acknowledge that we cannot defend the divine authority of the Scriptures. Deny us this latitude, and wo must abandon this book to its enemies." pp. 3 — 6 To a great part of these principles I give my cheer- ful and most cordial assent. They are the principles which I apply to the explanation of the Scriptures from day to day, in my private studies and in my public la- bours. They are the principles by which I am led to embrace the opinions that I have espoused, and by which, so far as I am able, I expect to defend these opinions, whenever called in duty to do it. While I thus give my cordial approbation to most of the above extract from your sermon, will you indulge me in expressing a wish that the rank and value of the Old Testament, in the Christian's library, had been de- scribed in somewhat different terms? I do most fully accord with the idea that the gospel, or the New Tes- tament, is more perfect than the Mosaic Law or than the Old Testament. On what other ground can the assertions of Paul, in 2d Corinthians, iii., in Hebrews, vili., and in other places, be believed or justified ? The gospel gives a clearer view than the Jewish Scriptures of our duty and of our destiny — of the objects of our 11 hopes and fears — of the character of God and the way of salvation. I agree fully, that whatever in the Old Testament respects the Jews, simply as Jews, — e. g., their ritual, their food, their dress, their civil polity, their government — in a word, whatever from its nature was national and local,— Is not binding upon us under the Christian dispensation. I am well satisfied, too, that the character of God and the duty of men were, in many respects, less clear- ly revealed under the ancient dispensation than they now are. " The law was given by Moses ;" but "no man hath seen God at any time ; the only-begotten, who dwelleth in the bosom of the Father, he hath re- vealed him" — L e., it was reserved for Christ to make a full display of the divine character ; — no man, no pro- phet who preceded him, ever had such knowledge of God as enabled him to do it. I am aware that many Christians do not seem to understand this passage ; and, with well-meaning but mistaken views, undertake to deduce the character and designs of God as fully and as clearly from the Old Testament as from the New. I must believe, too, that the duties of Christians are, in most respects, more fully and definitely taught in the gospel than in the Old Testament ; and 1 cannot approve of that method of reasoning which deduces our duties principally from texts in the Old Testament that sometimes are less clear, when the Xew Testament presents the same subjects in such characters of light that he who runneth may read. But when you say, " Jesus Christ is the only master of Christians ; and whatever he taught, either during his personal ministry or by his inspired Apostles, we regard as of divine authority, and profess to make the rule of our lives," does not this naturally imply that we are absolved from obligation to receive the Old Testament, in any sense as our guide; and. that what it teaches, we are not bound " to make the rule of our lives?" I do not feel certain that it was your design to affirm this ; but the words in their connexion seem naturally to bear this import. To such a view I should a2 12 object, that those parts of the Old Testament which express the will of God, in reference to the great points of duty, that must, from the nature of moral beings, be for ever the same under every dispensation, may be and ought to be regarded as unrepealed. It is a very sound maxim, in the interpretation of divine as well as human laws, — manente ratione, mauet ipsa lex — a law is wire- ■pealed, while Ihe reason of that law continues. Express repeal only can exempt a law from the application of this maxim. And when our Saviour says, "Till hea- ven and earth pass, one jot or tittle shall in nowise pass from the law till all be fulfilled," he seems to me plain- ly to have declared the immutability of the ancient moral law, in the sense already explained. What shall we say, moreover, of the devotional parts of the Old Testament (the Book of Psalms, for in- stance), or of those numerous prophetical parts which are sermons on the duties and obligations of men, or predictions of a future Messiah, and of the nature and prosperity of his Church ? Are these any more Jewish (except as to the garb in which they are clothed) than Christian ? I admit that they are all less perfect than that which the New Testament furnishes on the same topics ; but I believe them to be sanctioned by the same authority, and to require a similar respect and deference. In regard to what you say respecting the leading principle of interpreting Scripture, I cannot hesitate to declare, that nothing is clearer to my apprehension, than that God, when he speaks to men, speaks in such language as is used by those whom he addresses. Of course, the language of the Bible is to be interpreted by the same laws, so far as philology is concerned, as that of any other book. I ask with you, How else is the Bible a revelation ? How else can men ever come to agree in what manner the Scripture should be inter- preted, or feel any assurance that they understand the meaning of its language? I find little from which I should dissent, in the re- mainder of your observations upon the general princi- ples of interpretation. I might perhaps make some ob- jections to the manner in which the office of reason, in 13 the interpretation of Scripture, is occasionally describ- ed. But I am confident that I admit, as fully as jou do or can do, the proper office of reason in the whole matter of religion, both in regard to doctrine and prac- tice. It is to our reason that the arguments which prove the divine origin of Christianity are addressed ; and it is by reason that we prove, or are led to admit this origin, on general or historical grounds. Reason prescribes, or at any rate developes and sanctions, the laws of interpreting Scripture. The cases mentioned by you, in which reason must be exercised, are in ge- neral striking exemplifications of this. But when rea- son is satisfied that the Bible is the book of God, by proof which she cannot reject, and yet preserve her character — and when she has decided what laws of exe- gesis^ the nature of human language requires — the office that remains for her in regard to the Scripture, is the application of those laws to the actual interpre- tation of the Bible. When by their application, she becomes satisfied with respect to what the sacred wri- ters really meant to declare in any case, she admits it without hesitation, whether it be a doctrine, the rela- tion of a fact, or a precept. It is the highest office of reason to believe doctrines and facts which God has asserted to be true, and to submit to his precepts, — although many things, in regard to the manner in which those facts and doctrines can be explained, or those precepts vindicated, may be beyond her reach. In short, the Scriptures being once admitted to be the Word of God, or of divine authority, the sole office of reason in respect to them is to act as an interpreter of revelation, and not in any case as a legislator. Reason can only judge of the laws of exegesis, and direct the application of them, in order to discover simply what the sacred writers meant to assert. This being disco- vered, it is either to be received as they have asserted it, or their divine authority must be rejected, and our obligation to believe all which they assert, denied. * A term of frequent occurrence with expositors and Biblical critics. It signifies examination or interpretation. 14 There is no other alternative. Philosophy has no right to interfere here. If she ever interferes, it must be when the question is pending, whether the Bible is di- vine. Nor has system, prejudice, sectarian feeling, orthodoxy, or heterodoxy, so called, any right to in- terfere. The claims of the Bible to be authoritative be- ing once admitted, the simple question in respect to it is, What does it teach? In regard to any particular passage, What idea did the original writer mean to con- vey ? When this is ascertained by the legitimate rules of interpretation, it is authoritative, — this is orthodoxy in the highest and best sense of the word ; and every thing which is opposed to it, which modifies it, which fritters its meaning away, is heterodoxy, is heresy, to whatever name or party it is attached. I presume you will agree without hesitation to these remarks. The grand Protestant maxim, that the Bible is our only and sufficient rule of faith and practice, im- plies most clearly the very same principles which I have stated ; and these every man must admit, that ac- knowledges the paramount claims of the Bible to be believed, and has any tolerable acquaintance with the subject of its interpretation. If there be any thing to which I should object in your statement, generally considered, of the laws of inter- pretation, it is rather the colouring which has been given to some of the language in which it is expressed. You commence by saying, that your party are charged with " exalting reason above revelation — with preferring their own wisdom to God's ;" and that these charges are " circulated freely, and with injurious intentions. " You will readily acknowledge, as a general fact, that there is difficulty in giving an impartial statement of opinions, which we thus strongly feel to have been misrepresented. W T e certainly are under temptation, in such cases, to set off our own opinions to the best advantage, and to place those of our opponents in the most repulsive attitude. And although Trinitarians, in fact, differ less from you, in respect to the laws of interpretation, than you seem to have apprehended, 15 the belief, on your part, that a wider difference exist- ed, seems to have given a peculiar cast to some sen- tences which simple discussion would hardly admit. With the two last paragraphs of your sermon that are quoted above, I wish not to be understood as sig- nifying that I entirely agree. It is, however, rather from the application of some exegetical principles which is made in them, than from the principles themselves, that I dissent. I shall have occasion to remark here- after on this subject. I have mentioned it now, mere- Iv to prevent any mistake with regard to the meaning of what I say here upon the laws of interpretation, as exhibited by you. It would have given me pleasure to find you uncon- ditionally admitting that the general principles of inter- pretation which you defend are not original, nor pecu- liar to your party. But you seem to qualify this, by saying that " all Christians OCCASION ALLY adopt them." If I understand you rightly, then, you would concede, that only Unitarians admit substantially the syste?n of exegesis which you have described, and practise upon it. In this, however (if this be your meaning), you are mistaken, — at least it appears plainly so to me, in respect to the divines of New England, who, at the present time are called orthodox. * I doubt whether any man can study the science of interpretation, for a considerable time together, without adopting those principles of it, for substance, which you seem to claim appropriately for Unitarians. How can it be explained, then, supposing you and I are both sincerely seeking after truth, and both adopt, for substance, the same maxims of interpretation, that we should differ so widely in the results that flow from the application of these principles? Perhaps some light may be cast upon this question in the sequel of these Letters. * This remark may be extended so as to include all those writers in this country who are usually denominated orthodox or evangelical, 16 LETTER II. REVEREND AND DEAR SIR, It would be very gratifying to find, in your sermon, as much respecting the doctrine of the Trinity with which I might accord, as in your principles of interpre- tation. My apprehensions respecting this doctrine, however, differ from yours. It is not without exami- nation and reflection that I have embraced my present views of it ; and the perusal of your statement of the doctrine in question, and your arguments against it, have not persuaded me that my views are erroneous. You will not expect me, however, in these Letters, which are intended to be brief, to go into a discussion of this great subject, which shall embrace all the im- portant topics which it presents. I intend to touch on those points only on which the hinge of the contro- versy seems to me to turn ; and on these in a manner as summary as the nature and difficulty of the case will permit. The statement which you make of your own faith in regard to the unity of God, and your account of the doctrine of the Trinity, are as follow. " First. We believe in the doctrine of God's unity, or that there is one God, and one only. To this truth we give infinite importance, and we feel ourselves bound to take heed, lest any man spoil us of it by s'ain philosophy. The proposition, thatthere is one God, seems to us exceed- ingly plain. We understand by it, that there is one being, one mind, one person, one intelligent agent, and one only, to whom underived and Infinite perfection and dominion belong. We conceive that these words could have conveyed no other meaning to the simple and uncultivated people who were set apart to be the depositaries of this great truth, and who were utterly incapable of understanding those hair-breadth distinc- tions between being and person, which the sagacity of latter ages ha9 discovered. We find no intimation that this language was to be taken in an unusual sense, or that God's unity was a quite different thing from the oneness of other intelligent beings. " We object to the doctrine of the Trinity, that it subverts the unity of God. According to this doctrine, there are three infinite and equal persons, possessing supreme divinity, called the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Each of these persons, as described by theologians, has his own particular consciousness, will, and perceptions. They love each other, converse with each other, and delight in each other's society. They perform different parts in man's redemption, each having his ap- propriate office, and neither doing the work of the other. The Son is rngdiator, and not the Father. The Father sends the Son, and is not 17 himself sent ; nor is he conscious, like the Son of taking flesh. Here then we havethr*e intelligent agents, possessed of different conscious- nesses, different wills, and different perceptions, performing different acts, and sustaining different relations ; and if these things do not imply and constitute three minds or heings, we are utterly at a loss to know howthiee minds or beings are to be formed. It is difference of proper- ties, and acts, and consciousness, which leads us to the belief of different intelligent beings, and if this mark fail us, our whole knowledge fails,— we have no proof that all the agents and persons in the universe are not one and the same mind. When we attempt to conceive of three Gods, we can do nothing more than represent to ourselves three agents, dis- tinguished from each other by similar marks and peculiarities to those which separate the persons of theTrinity ; and when common Christians hear these persons spoken of as conversing with each other, loving each other, and performing different acts, how can they help regarding them as different beings, different minds ?" pp. 8, 9. My object in (his letter is not to controvert your creed, but to consider your representation of the doc- trine of the Trinity, as stated, believed, and defended by those with whom I am accustomed to think and act. Admitting that you have given a fair account of our belief, I cannot see, indeed, why we are not virtually guilty of Tritheism,^ or at least of something which ap- proximates so near to it, that I acknowledge myself unable to distinguish it from Tritheism. But 1 cannot help feeling that you have made neither an impartial nor a correct statement of what we believe, and what we are accustomed to teach and defend. It needs but a moderate acquaintance with the his- tory of the doctrine in question to satisfy anyone that a great variety of explanations have been attempted by inquisitive or by adventurous minds. All acknowledge the difficulty of the subject; I regret to say, that some have not refrained from treating it as though it were more within their comprehension than it is. But, among all the different explanations which I have found, I have not met with any one which denied, or at least was designed to deny, the unity of God. All admit this to be a fundamental principle : AH ac- knowledge that it is designated in characters of light, both in the Jewish and Christian revelations; and that * The worship of three Gods. 18 to deny it would be the grossest absurdity, as well as impiety. It may indeed be questioned whether the explana- tions given of the doctrine of the Trinity by some who have speculated on this subject are consistent with the divine unity, when the language which they use is in- terpreted agreeably to the common laws of exegesis. But, that their representations were not designed to call in question the divine unity, is what I think every can- did reader of their works will be disposed to admit. Now, when I consider this fact, so plain and so ea- sily established, and then look at the method in which you state the doctrine of the Trinity, as exhibited a- bove, I confess it gives me pain to think that you have not conceded or even intimated that Trinitarians do or can admit the unity of God. You have a right to say, if you so think, that the doctrine of the Trinity, as they explain and defend it, is at variance with the divine unity, and that these two things are inconsistent with each other. But, to appropriate to those solely, who call themselves Unitarians, the belief that there is but one God — or to construct an account of the Trinitarian creed (as it seems to me you have done in the para- graph on which I am remarking), so as not even to in- timate to your hearers or readers that your opponents admit or advocate the divine unity — is doing that which you would censure in an antagonist, and which cannot well serve the interests of truth. But let us examine your statement of our creed. " We object to the doctrine of the Trinity, that it subverts the unity of God. According to this doctrine, there are three infinite and equal persons, possessing supreme divinity, called the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Each of these persons, as described by theologians, has his own particular consciousness, will, and perceptions. They love each other, converse with each other, and delight in each other's society. They perform different parts in man's redemption, — each having his appropri- ate office, and neither doing the work of the other. The Son is Medi- ator, and not the Father ; the Father sends the Son, and is not himself sent ; nor is he conscious, like the Son, of taking flesh. Here then we have three intelligent agents, possessed of different consciousnesses, dif- ferent wills, and different perceptions, performing different acts and sustaining different relations ; and if these things do not imply and con- stitute three minds or beings, we are utterly at a loss to know how three minds or beings are to be formed." p. 9. 19 Is not this account a very different one, from that which many of your brethren are accustomed to give of us? By them it is said, that there is a great dis- cordance and contradictory statements and explana- tions of the doctrine of the Trinity among those who embrace it. Do not you amalgamate us all together, make us harmonious Tritheists, and then give us over to the reproach of Tritheism, or at least of glaring in- consistency ? After all, the statement which yoU exhibit of our views is very far from that which we (or at least all Trinitarians with whom I am acquainted) make of our belief. I do not deny that some writers have given grounds for a statement not very diverse from yours, as it regards the doctrine of the Trinity. Even some great and good men, in their zeal to defend this doc- trine, have sought to' reduce the whole subject to hu- man comprehension. How vain the attempt, expe^- rience has demonstrated. Efforts of this nature, how- ever Well designed or ably conducted, never yet have led to any thing but greater darkness. " Who can by searching find out God ? Who can find out the Al- mighty to perfection ?" But though I readily admit, that efforts to explain what in the nature of the case is inexplicable, may have misled some in their exertions to acquire religious knowledge, or given occasion to others of stumbling, yet I am not prepared to admit that the great body of Trinitarians have given just occasion to charge them with a denial of the unity of God \ Or with opinions sub- versive of this. You certainly ought not to deny them the same liberty, in the use of terms, which all men take on difficult subjects, for the accurate description of Which language is not framed, perhaps is not in its nature adequate. They must discuss such subjects by using figurative language, by using terms which (if I may be indulged the liberty of speaking thus) ap- proximate as nearly to the expression of the ideas that they mean to convey, as any which they can select. If there is any obscurity in these general observations, B 20 I hope it will be cleared up in the remarks that are to follow. Since I refuse assent to your statement of our be- lief, you will feel a right to inquire what we do believe, that you may compare this with the doctrine of divine unity, and judge for yourself whether it is subversive of it or not. I cannot refuse my assent to a proposal so reasonable ; nor do I feel any inclination to shrink from the task of stating our belief, and then to proffer the excuse, that every thing respecting the subject is too mysterious and recondite to be the object of dis- tinct contemplation. What we do believe can be stat- ed — what we do not profess to define or explain can be stated, and the reasons why we do not attempt de- finition or explanation ; and this is what I shall now attempt. I must not, however, be understood as pledging nry- self that those, in general, with whom I am accustomed to think and act, will adopt my statement, and main- tain that it exhibits the best method of explaining or defending the great doctrine in question. Notwith- standing we are so often charged with adherence to Forms and modes of expression contained in creeds, we use as great a variety of language, in giving in- struction with regard to the doctrine of the Trinity, as with respect to the other doctrines of religion. In re- gard to the statement which I shall make, I can say only, that it is not the result of concert, in any degree, with my clerical brethren, for the purpose of making a statement to which they will adhere. It is the result of investigation, and reflection on the subject, as it ap- pears to be exhibited in the Scriptures, and in the writings of the leading divines whom I have been able to consult. I believe, then, I. That God is one ; numerically one, in essence and attri- butes. In other words, — the infinitely perfect Spirit, the Creator and preserver of all things, the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, has numerically the same essence, and the same perfections, so far as they are known to us. To particularize ; 21 the Son possesses not simply a similar or equal essence and perfections, but numerically the same as the Father, without division, and without multiplication. II. The Son (and also the Holy Spirit), does in some re- spect, truly and really, not merely nominally or logically, dif- fer from the Father. I am aware, as I have hinted above, that you may find writers upon the doctrine of the Trinity, who have stated the subject of my first proposition in a manner somewhat different. But, after making due allowance for inattention to precision of language, the difficulty of the subject, and the various ways which men natu- rally take to illustrate a difficult subject, I am not aware that m^ny of them would dissent substantially from the statement now made. Certain it is, that the Lutheran Confession exhibits the same view. The words are,— -" The divine essence is one, which is called, and js, God, eternal, incorporeal, indivisible, of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the Creator and Preserver of all things visible and invisible." Art. I. The Confession of Helvetia (written a. d. 1566) declares, that " God is one in essence or nature, subsisting by himself, all sufficient in himself, invisible, without a body, infinite, eternal, the Creator of all things visible and invisible," &c. It adds, " We detest the multitude of Gods, because it is ex- pressly written, The Lord thy God is one God," &c. The Confession of Basil (a. d. 1532) declares, that there is " one eternal, almighty God in essence and substance, and not three Gods" The Confession of the Waldenses states, " that the Holy Trinity is, in essence, one only true, alone, eternal, almighty, and incomprehensible God, of one equal indivisible essence." The French Confession (a. d. 1566) says, " We believe and acknowledge one only God, who is one only and simple es- sence, spiritual, eternal, invisible, immutable, infinite." &c. The English Confession (a.d. 1562) states, that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, " be of one power, of oxe ma- jesty, of one eternity, of one godhead, and one substance. And, although these three persons be so divided that neither Ihe Father is the Son, nor the Son is the Holy Ghost nor the Father, yet nevertheless, we believe that there is but one very God." The Confession of Belgia (a. d. 1566) declares, that " there 22 is one only simple and spiritual essence, which we call God, eternal, incomprehensible, invisible, immutable, infinite," &c. The articles of the English Episcopal Church declare, that, "there is but one living and true God, everlasting, without body, parts, or passions," &c. The Confession of the Reformed Churches in the Netherlands, revised at the Synod of Dort (a. d. 1618 — 1619) declares, " We believe that there is one only and simple spiritual Being, which we call God ; and that he is eternal, incompre- hensible, invisible, immutable, infinite," &c. (See Harmony of Confessions.) With these agrees the Westminster Confession, approved by the General Assembly of Divines in a. d. 1647, adopted by all the Presbyterian Churches in Great Britain and Ame- rica, and assented to by a great part of the Congregational Churches in New England. Its words are, " There is but one only living and true God, who is infinite in being and perfection, a pure spirit, invisible, without body, parts, or passions, immutable, immense, eternal, incomprehensible," Sec. West. Con. p. 32. Now, is this the denial of the divine unity with which we are implicitly charged ? Can Unitarians present a more complete assertion of the divine unity, than is presented by these symbols of different denomina- tions of Christians, who admit the doctrine of the Trinity ? But, admitting our statement of the divine unity to be correct, you will aver, probably, that my second proposition is subversive of the first. Whether this be so, or not, is what I now propose to investigate. The common language of the Trinitarian symbols is, " That there are three persons in the Godhead" In your comments upon this, you have all along explain- ed the word person, as though it were a given point, that we use this word here, in its ordinary accepta- tion, as applied to men. But can you satisfy yourself, that this is doing us justice ? Is it not evident from Church history, that the word person was used, in an- cient times, as a term, which would express the dis- agreement of Christians in general, with the reputed errors of the Sabellians, and others of similar senti- ments, who denied the existence of any real distinction in the Godhead, and asserted that Father, Son, and 23 Holy Ghost, were merely attributes of God, or the names of different ways in which he revealed himself to mankind, or of different relations which he bore to them and in which he acted. Some of the principal Fathers and Councils meant to deny the correctness of such assertions, by using the word person to designate some real, not merely nominal distinction in the Godhead — to signify that something more than a diversity of re- lation or action, in respect to us, was intended. They seem to me to have used the word person, because they supposed it to approximate nearer to expressing the existence of a real distinction, than any other which they could choose. We profess to use the word person, merely from the poverty of language — merely to designate our belief of a real distinction in the Godhead ; and not to de- scribe independent, conscious beings, possessing se- parate and equal essences and perfections. Why should we be obliged so often to explain ourselves on this point? Is there any more difficulty here, or any thing more obnoxious, than when you say, u God is angry with the wicked every day?" You defend yourself in the use of such an expression, by saying, that it is only the language of approximation, — i. e. that it is in- tended to describe that, in the mind of the Deity, or in his actions, which corresponds in some measure, or in some respect, to anger in men, — not that he is really affected with the passion of anger. You will permit me then to add, that we speak of person in the God- head to express that, which, in some respect or other, corresponds to persons as applied to men, — i. e. some distinction; not that we attach to it the meaning of three beings, with a separate consciousness, will, om- nipotence, omniscience, &c. Where then is our in- consistency in this, or the absurdity of our language, provided there is a real foundation in the Scriptures, on which may rest the fact of a distinction that we be- lieve to exist? I could heartily wish, indeed, that the word person never had come into the symbols of the Churches, be- cause it has been the occasion of so much unnecessary b2 24 dispute and difficulty. But since it has long been in common use, it is difficult, perhaps inexpedient, or even impossible, altogether to reject it. If it must be retained, I readily concede that the use of it ought to be so explained and guarded, as not to lead Christians into erroneous ideas of the nature of God. Nor can I suppose that the great body of Christians have such ideas, or understand it to mean that which you attri- bute to us as believing. Then, surely, it is not the best mode of convincing your opponents, to take the word in a sense so different from that in which they understand it, and proceed to charge them with ab- surdities, consequent upon the language of their creed. It has always been a conceded point, that, in the statement of difficult subjects, or the discussion of them, terms might be used in a sense somewhat dif- ferent from their ordinary import. And what can de- clare in a plainer manner that Trinitarians do use the word person in this way, as applied to the divine Being, than the agreement among them that God is numerically one, in essence and in attributes ? It might have been justly expected, likewise, that before they were charged with sentiments which sub* vert the divine Unity, the meaning of the word person, in the ancient records which describe its introduction into the technical language of the Church, should have been carefully investigated. One of your rules of exe- gesis, to which 1 have with all my heart assented, de- mands that " every word should be modified and ex- plained, according to the subject which is discussed, according to the purposes, feelings, circumstances , and principles of the writer." Do us the justice to apply this law of interpretation to our language, and the dis- pute between us about the meaning of the word person, is for ever at an end. What then, you doubtless will ask, is that distinc- tion in the Godhead, which the word person is meant to designate ? I answer, without hesitation, that I do not know. The fact that a distinction exists, is w T hat we aver ; the definition of that distinction is what I shall by no means attempt. By what shall I. or can I 25 define it ? What simile drawn from created objects, which are necessarily derived and dependent, can il- lustrate the mode of existence in that Being who is underived, independent, unchangeable, infinite, eter- nal ? I confess myself unable to advance a single step here in explaining what the distinction is. 1 re- ceive (he fact that it exists, simply because 1 believe that the Scriptures reveal the fact. And if the Scriptures do reveal the fact that there are three persons in the Godhead (in the sense explained) ; that there is a dis- tinction which affords ground for the appellations of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost — which lays the foun- dation for the application of the personal pronouns, /, thou, he — which renders it proper to speak of sending and being sent, of Christ being with God, being in his bosom, and other things of the like nature ; and yet that the divine nature belongs to Father, Son, and Holy Ghost ; then it is, like every other fact reveal- ed, to be received simply on the credit of divine reve- lation. Is there any more difficulty in understanding the fact that there is a distinction in the Godhead, than there is in understanding that God possesses an un- derived existence ? With what shall we compare such existence ? All other beings are derived ; and, of course, there is no object in the universe with whose existence it can be compared. To define it then, is beyond our reach. We can approximate towards a conception of it, merely by negatives. We deny that the divine existence has any author or cause ; and, when we have done this, we have not defined it, but simply said that a certain thing does not belong to it. Here we must rest. The boundaries of human know- ledge can never be extended beyond this. The distinction in the Godhead, which I have now mentioned, I ought to say here, we do not, and can- not consider as a mere subject of speculation, which has little or no concern with ardent piety, or the best hopes of the Christian. We believe that some of the most interesting and endearing exhibitions of the di- vine character, are founded upon it and connected with 26 it ; and that corresponding duties are urged upon us, and peculiar hopes excited, and consolations adminis- tered by it. In regard to this distinction, we say, It isnota mere distinction of attributes, of relation to us, of modes of ac- tion, or of relation between attributes and substance or es- sence, so far as they are known to us. We believe the Scriptures justify us in these negations. But here we leave the subject. We undertake (at least the Trinitarians of our country, with whom I am acquaint- ed, undertake) not at all to describe affirmatively the distinction in the Godhead. When you will give me an affirmative description of under ived existence, I may safely engage to furnish you with one of person in the Trinity. You do not reject the belief of self-exist- ence, merely because you cannot affirmatively define it ; neither do we of a distinction in the Godhead, be- cause we cannot affirmatively define it. I may ask, moreover, What is the eternity of God ? You answer by telling me, that there never was a time when he did not exist, and never can be one when he will not exist. True ; but then, what was time before the planetary system, which measures it, had an existence ? And what will time be when these heavens and this earth shall be bloated out? Besides, passing over this difficulty about time, you have only given a negative description of God's eternity ; you deny certain things of him, and then aver that he is eternal. Yet, because you cannot affirmatively de- scribe eternity, you would not refuse to believe that God is eternal. Why, then, should I reject the belief of a distinction in the Godhead, because I cannot af- firmatively define it ? I do not admit, therefore, that we are exposed justly to be taxed with mysticism and absurdity when we aver there is a distinction in the Godhead, which we are utterly unable to define. I am aware, indeed, that a writer, some time since, composed and published, in a periodical work, then edited at Cambridge, a piece in which he laboured, with no small degree of acuteness, to show that no man can believe a proposition, the *7 terms of which are unintelligible, or which he does not understand. His object in doing this appears to have been to fix upon a belief in a doctrine of the Trinity the charge of absurdity. But, it seems to fne, the whole argument of that piece is founded on a con- fusion of two things, which are in themselves very di- verse, — viz. terms which are unintelligible, and things which are undefinable. You believe in the fact, that the divine existence is without cause ; you under- stand the fact, that God exists uncaused ; but you can- not define underived existence. I believe, on the au- thority of the Scriptures, that there is a real distinction in the Godhead ; but I cannot define it. Still the pro- position that there is a real distinction, is just as intel- ligible as the one, that God is self-existent. A multi- tude of propositions, respecting diverse subjects, re- semble these. We affirm, that gravitation brings a body thrown into the air down to the earth.* The fact is perfectly intelligible. The terms are perfectly understood, so far as they are the means of describing this fact. But, then, what is gravitation ? An affir- mative definition cannot be given, which is not a mere exchange of synonymes. Nor can any comparison de- fine it ; for to what shall we liken it ? The mind of every man who is accustomed to think will supply him with a multitude of propositions of this nature ; in all of which, the fact designed to be described is clear. The terms, so far as they describe this fact, are clear ; but the subject of the proposi- tion, — that is, the thing itself, or agent, concerning which the fact is asserted, — is undefinable ; and, ex- cepting in regard to the J act in question, perhaps wholly unknown to us. How easy now to perplex common minds, by calling a proposition unintelligible, the subject of which is unde- finable I In confounding things so very different, con- sists, as I apprehend, the whole ingenuity of the piece in question, — an ingenuity which may excite the ad- * Illustrations might in like manner be drawn from electricity, gal- vanism, magnetism, &c, the existence of which cannot be denied, but the nature of which cannot, in affirmative terms, be defined. — Eo. 28 miration of those who love the subtilties of dispute, but cannot contribute much to illuminate the path of theological science. I have been thus particular in my statement of this very difficult part of the subject, in order to prevent misapprehension. I certainly do not hold myself bound to vindicate any of the definitions of person or of distinction in the Godhead which I have seen, because I do not adopt them. I do not and cannot understand them ; and to a definition I cannot with propriety as- sent (still less can I undertake to defend it), until I do un- derstand what it signifies. It is truly matter of regret that some great and good men have carried their spe- culations on this subject to such a length, that they have bewildered themselves and their readers. I would always speak with respect and tenderness of such men : Still T have no hesitation in saying, that my mind is absolutely unable to elicit any distinct and certain ideas from any of the definitions of person in the Godhead which I have ever examined. A few ex- amples of attempts at definition or illustration will vindicate the correctness of what I have just said. Let me begin with Tertullian, who nourished about A. D. 200. In his book against Praxeas, he says, " This perversity (viz. of Praxeas) thinks itself to be in possession of pure truth, while it supposes that we are to believe in one God, not otherwise than if we make the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, the self same ; as if all were not one, while all are of one, viz. by a unity of substance ; and still the mysterious economy which distributes unity into a Trinity is observed, marking out [distinguishing] Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. There are three, not in condition, but rank ; not in essence, but form ; not in power, but in kind ; but of one substance, one condition, and one power ; for there is one God, from whom all those ranks, and forms, and kinds by the name of Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are reckoned." A little farther on, he says, " Whatever therefore the sub- stance of the Word (Logos) is, I call him a person, and pay him reverence ; and, acknowledging the Son, I maintain that he is second from the Father. " The third is the Spirit from God and the Son, as the 29 fruit from the stalk is the third from the root ; a stream from the river [the third] from the fountain ; the sharp point from a ray [the third] from the sun. So the Trinity proceeds, by interlinked and connected grades, from the Father." (c. 2.) In cap. 9, he says, " They (the Trinity) are not separate from each other, although the Father is said to be diverse from the Son and the Spirit." And again " We are baptized into the persons (of the Trinity) severally, by the use of their several names." It is proper to observe here how plainly and defi- nitely the words person and Trinity are, at this very early age, applied by Tertullian to the Godhead ; which contradicts the confident affirmations of some writers, that these terms were an invention of later ages and of scholastic divinity. I may add, that the familiar and habitual use which Tertullian makes of these terms proves that they were commonly under- stood, or at least used in the Church, at a period so early, and in reference to the very distinction in the Godhead, which is the subject of the present discussion. The object which Tertullian aims at, in predicating person of the Godhead, is, as has been already remark- ed, to oppose the sentiment of Praxeas, who denied that there existed any distinction in the divine nature. But, to explain Tertullian's similitudes, designed to illustrate the nature of this distinction, and so fre- quently copied in after ages, is more than I shall un- dertake. Who does not see that all similitudes drawn from created, limited, dependent beings or things, must be utterly inadequate to illustrate the mode in which an uncreated, infinite, and omnipresent Being exists ? What is the attempt at explanation, but "darkening words without knowledge ?" I believe with Tertullian in a threefold distinction of the Godhead ; but I be- lieve simply the fact of the Trinity, and do not venture to make any- attempt at explanation. The venerable Council of Nice, held A. D. 325, have made an attempt, similar to that of the Father just named, at definition or description. Their words are — " We believe in one God, the Father Almighty, the maker of all things visible and invisible; and in one so Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, the only begotten of the Father, that is, of the substance of the Father ; God of God, light of light, very God of very God, be- gotten, not made, of the same substance with the Fa- ther, by whom all things were made." This Council, like the great body of the ancient Fa- thers, believed in the doctrine of the eter?ial generation of the Son. This generation, from all eternity, appears to have been the distinctive point of difference between the Son and the Father (whom the ancient ecclesiasti- cal writers often describe as wy&/v9ffog, unbegotten), on which they fixed their attention, and which they have plainly laboured in their Creed to describe or illus- trate. As coeternal with the Father, they regarded the Son, — of the same substance, they have asserted him to be. How then could he be begotten, or derived, if he were of the same substance and of the same eternity ? To hold fast both these ideas, they said the Son was •' God of God, light of light, very God of very God, begotten, not made, of the same substance with the Father." They endeavoured to justify such expres- sions, by saying, that the light of the sun is coeval with it, and of the same substance ; and by a multitude of similies of such a nature, drawn from created and material objects. How utterly incompetent all this must be to effect the object intended, is easy of appre- hension, when we once reflect that the divine nature is self-existent, independent, and immutable. The true occasion, however, why the Nicene Fa- thers accumulated so many terms in their creed, must be found in their intention to oppose every form and species of Arianism, although they meant to strike, as has been before observed, at other opinions which they disapproved. A slight consideration of the Nicene Creed might lead one, perhaps, to suppose, that unde- finable or objectionable terms of illustration had been, almost intentionally, accumulated in it. The history of the introduction of these terms, however, may be found in the manner in which the Arians disputed with the Xicene Fathers. "Being asked, whether they ac- knowledged the Son as begotten of the Father, they 31 assented, — meaning that they acknowledged the de- rived existence of the Son from God, as well as that of all other beings. Did they acknowledge the Son as God? — Altogether so. Did they acknowledge him as the f rue God ? — Undoubtedly : He must be the true God, who is constituted God. Was the Son of God a creature ? — By no means (meaning, not a creature in the sense that other things were ; these being medi- ately created by the Logos, but the Logos immediately by the Father). But when the word ifiawttog (omausios, i. e. the same in substance) was proposed, and it was decided that Christ was consubstanfUU with the Father, they never assented to this, as it excluded all hope of evasion." — (Athan. Epis. ad Afric.) A sober inquirer may therefore find, perhaps, more reason to vindicate this term (so much agitated in the churches), as used by the Xicene Fathers, than he might at first suspect. After all, I am unable to conceive of any definite meaning, in the phrase, eternal generation. Generation or production, like creation, necessarily implies in it- self beginning ; and of course contradicts the idea of absolute eternity. In so far as Christ is divine, con- substantial with the Father, he must, for ought that I can see, be necessarily regarded as self-existent, inde- pendent, and eternal. A being to whom these attri- butes do not belong, can never be regarded as God, except he be called so by a figurative use of the term. The generation or production of the Son of God, as di- vine, as really and truly God, seems to be out of ques- tion, therefore, unless it be an express doctrine of re- velation ; which is so far from being the case, that I conceive the contrary is plainly taught. If the phrase eternal generation, then, is to be vindicated, it is only on the ground that it is figuratively used, to describe an indefinable connexion and discrimination between Father and Son, which is from everlasting. It is not well chosen, however, for this purpose, because it ne- cessarily, even in its figurative use, carries along with it an idea which is at variance with the self-existence and independence of Christ, as divine; and of course, c 32 in so far as it does this, it seems to detract from his real divinity. I cannot therefore understand what "God of God, light of light, very God of very God," means ; nor can I think that any definite and positive ideas ever were or could be attached to these phrases. That the Ni- cene Fathers meant to contradict Arius, is sufficiently plain to any one conversant with the history of the Council of Nice. But, that they have made out a po- sitive, or affirmative and intelligible definition of the distinction between Father and Son, I presume no one, at the present day, will hardly venture to assert. The Council of Constantinople (a. d. 381), in their Synodic Epistle to the Western Bishops, have shown the manner in which the doctrine of the Trinity was stated and defended in their day. They adopted and enlarged the Nicene Symbol, so as to strike at the opinions of Macedonius ; and then, in their Synodic Letter, gave the sum of what they had done or what they believed. My objection to their language is, that it is too affirmative. "Three most perfect hypostases, or three perfect persons," though aimed to contradict Sabeliius, Paul of Samosata, and others of like sen- timents, is an attempt to define too far. Hypostases, or persons , in the sense of distinction in the Godhead, may be admissible through the penury of language. But most perfect hypostases, perfect pcrso?is, is attempt- ing to make the distinction more a matter of definition than it can be made. I believe that what they design- ed to assert is substantially true ; but I cannot adopt, because I cannot regard as intelligible, all their lan- guage. Let us leave antiquity now, and glance for a moment at some of the similar attempts at definition or illus- tration in modern times. The celebrated Leibnitz was requested by Loetler, who had undertaken to refute the writings of a certain English Antitrinitarian, to give him an affirmative definition of the persons in the God- head. He sent for answer the following, — "Several persons in an absolute substance numerically the same, signify several, particular, intelligent substances es- sentially related." On farther consideration, he aban- doned this, and sent a second ; which was, " Several persons, in an absolute substance numerically the same, mean relative, incommunicable modes of sub- sisting." If Leibnitz actually understood this, I believe be must have been a better master of metaphysics than any person who has ever read his definition. In fact, he does not himself appear to have been satisfied with it ; for, not long after, he wrote as follows, — "We must say, that there are relations in the divine substance, which distinguish the persons, since these persons can- not be absolute substances. But we must aver, too, that these relations are substantial. At least, we must say that the Divine Persons are not the same Con- crete, under different denominations or relations ; as a man maybe, at the same time, both a poet and an ora- tor. We must say, moreover, that the three persons are not as absolute substances as the whole "# This is somewhat better than either of his former at- tempts, inasmuch as it is confined principally to de- scription of a negative kind. Yet, after all, I obtain by- it no additional light upon the subject, which is import- ant. With quite as little success did that original genius and masterly reasoner the celebrated Toellner of Frankfort, labour to define the subject in question. " It is certain," says he, " that we must conceive, as co- existing in God, three eternal and really different actions, the action of activity, of idea, and of the desire of all pos- sible good within and without him. " Three reaily different actions, coexisting from eternity, necessarily presuppose three really different and operative substrata. It is thus, through the aid of reason illuminated by the Scriptures, we come to know, that the power, the un- derstanding, and the will of God, are not merely three facul- ties, but three distinct energies, that is, three substances." (Vermisch. Aufsatze. B. I. p. 81.) • Remanjues sur le livre d' un Antitrinitaire Anglois, p. 26. 34 Tertullian's explication, or the Nicene Creed is, at least, as intelligible to me as this. I have not produced these instances, in order to sa- tify you that all attempts of this nature are and must he fruitless. You doubtless need no such proof. I have produced them for two reasons, — the first, to jus- tify myself, in some measure, for not attempting a de- finition, in which no one has yet succeeded ; the se- cond, to show that, notwithstanding all the fruitless at- tempts at definition which have been made, and not- withstanding the variety of method in which men have chosen to make these attempts, yet, for substance, there is a far greater unanimity of opinion among Tri- nitarians than you and your friends seem to be willing to concede. I grant freely, that there is a great va- riety in the mode by which an attempt at definition or illustration is made. With my present views, I can never look upon any attempts of this nature but with regret. But I am very far from accusing them gene- rally of any ill design, — much less can I treat them with contempt. Patient investigation and candour will lead one to believe, as it seems to me, that the thing aimed at teas, in substance, to assert the idea of a distinction in the God- head. To do this with the more success, as they ima- gined, they endeavoured to describe affii 7 natively the nature of that distinction. Here they have all failed. But does this prove, that there is actually a great va- riety of opinion among Trinitarians, in regard to the principal thing concerned, merely because endeavours to define this thing have produced a great variety of illustration ? 1 cannot help feeling that this matter is sometimes misrepresented, and very generally but lit- tle understood. And now, can you, by arguing a priori, prove to me that the doctrine of the Trinity is inconsistent with it- self, or " subversive of the doctrine of the divine unity," and therefore untrue ? We say the divine essence and attributes are 7iumericallu one, so far as they are known to us, but that there is in the Godhead a real dustinc 35 Hon between the Father and the Son. (I omit the con- sideration of the Holy Spirit here, because your sermon merely hints at this subject, and because all difficulties, in respect to the doctrine of the Trinity, are essentially connected with proving or disproving the divinity of Christ.) We abjure all attempts to define that distinction —ire admit it simply as ajact, on the authority of divine revelation. Now, how can you prove that a distinction does ?wt exist in the Godhead ? I acknowledge that the want of evidence, in the Scriptures, to establish the fact, would be a sufficient reason for rejecting it. But we are now making out a statement of the subject, and answering objections that are urged a priori, or in- dependently of the Scriptures. The proof, which the New Testament exhibits, we are hereafter to examine. How then, 1 repeat it, are you to show that we believe in a self-contradiction, or in an impossibility? If the distinction in question cannot be proved, independent- ly of the Scriptures (and most freely 1 acknowledge it cannot), it is equally certain that it cannot in this man- ner be disproved. In order to prove that this distinc- tion contradicts the divine unity, must you not be able to tell what it is, and what the divine unity is ? Can you do either ? Allow me for a moment to dwell on the subject now casually introduced. It is a clear point, I think, that the unity of God cannot be proved without revelation. It may perhaps be rendered faintly probable. Then you depend on Scripture proof for the establishment of this doctrine. But have the Scriptures anywhere told us what the divine unity 'is? Will you produce the passage ? The oneness of God they assert : But this they assert always, in opposition to the idols of the Heathen — the poly theism of the Gentiles — the gods su- perior and inferior, which they worshipped. In no other sense have the Scriptures denned the oneness of the Deity. What, then, is oneness, in the uncre- ated, infinite, and eternal Being ? In created and fi- nite objects, we have a distinct perception of what we mean by it; but can created objects be just and ade- quate representatives of the uncreated one ? Familiar c2 36 as the assertion is, in your conversation and in your sermons, that God is one, can you give me any defi- nition of this oneness, except a negative one? That is, you deny plurality of it : You say God is but one, and not two or more. Still, in what, I ask, does the di- vine unity consist? Has not God different and vari- ous faculties and powers ? Is he not almighty, omni- scient, omnipresent, holy, just, and good? Does he not act differently, i. e. variously, in the natural and in the moral world ? Does his unity consist, then, ap- propriately in his essence? But what is the essence of God? And how can you assert that his unity con- sists appropriately in this, unless you know what his essence is, and whether oneness can be any better predicated of this than of his attributes ? Your answer to all this is — "The nature of God i$ beyond my reach : I cannot define it. I approach to a definition of the divine unit) 7 only by negatives." That is, you deny the numerical plurality of God ; or you say there is not two or more essences, omni- sciences, omnipotences, &c. : But here all investiga- tion is at an end. Is it possible to show what consti- tutes the internal nature of the divine essence or attri- butes, or how T they are related to each other, or what internal distinctions exist ? About all this revelation says not one word, — certainly the book of Nature gives no instruction concerning it. The assertion, then, that God is one, can never be fairly understood as meaning any thing more than that he is nume- rically one, — i. e. it simply denies polytheism, and never can reach beyond this. But how does this prove, or how can it prove, that there may not be, or that there are not distinctions in the Godhead, either in regard to attributes or essence, the nature of which is unknown to us, and the existence of which is to "be proved, by the authority of the Scriptures only? When Unitarians, therefore, inquire what that dis- tinction in the Godhead is in which we believe, we an- swer, that we do not profess to understand what it is : We do not undertake to define it affirmatively. We canapproximate to a definition of it only by negatives. 37 We deny that the Father is in all respects the same as the Son ; and that the Holy Spirit is in all respects the same as either the Father or the Son. We rest the tact, that a distinction exists, solely upon the basis of revelation. In principle, then, what more difficulty lies in the way of believing in a threefold distinction of the God- head, than in believing in the divine unity? I am certainly willing to allow, that the evidences of the divine unity in the New Testament are suffi- cient: But 1 may be permitted to suggest here, that in my view, the passages asserting it are J ewer in num- ber, than the passages which assert or imply that Christ is truly divine. I cannot but think that the frequent assertions of your sermon, and of Unitarians in gene- ral, with regard to this subject, are very erroneous ; that they are made at hazard, and without a diligent and faithful comparison of the number of texts that respect the divine unity in the New Testament, and the number of those which concern the divinity of the Saviour. After all, to what purpose is it, that so great a multitude of texts should be required to prove the divinity of Christ, by those who believe, as you do, that the decisions of the Scriptures are of divine authority ? The decision of one text fairly made out by the laws of exegesis, is as authoritative as that of a thousand. Would a law a thousand times repeated have any more authority attached to it for the repeti- tion ? It might be better explained by the repetition in different connexions ; but its authority is uniformly the same. But, to return from this digression, suppose I should affirm that two subjects, A and B, are numerically identical in regard to something called X, but diverse or distinct in regard to something else called Y, is there any absurdity or contradiction in this affirma- tion ? 1 hope I shall not, by making this supposition, be subjected to the imputation of endeavouring to prove the doctrine of the Trinity by the science of Algebra; for my only object in proposing this statement, is to illustrate the answer that we make to a very common 38 question which Unitarians put us — "How can three be one, and one three?" — In no way I necessarily and cheerfully reply. " How, then, is the doctrine of the Trinity in unity to be vindicated?" — In a manner which is not at all embarrassed by these questions. We do not maintain that the Godhead is three in the same respects that it is one, but the reverse. In regard to X, we maintain its numerical unity: In regard to Y, we maintain a threefold distinction. I repeat it : We maintain simply the fact, that there is such a distinction on Scripture authority. We do not profess to under- stand in what it consists. Will you not concede, now, provided the statements made above are correct, that we are not very unrea- sonable, when we complain, that, from the time in which Tertullian maintained the doctrine of the Trinity against Praxeas, down to the present period, the views and statements of Trinitarians, in regard to this sub- ject, should have been so frequently misunderstood or misrepresented ? I have dwelt sufficiently on my statement of the doctrine of the Trinity, and of the difficulties that lie in the way of proving this statement to be erroneous or contradictory. Before I proceed to the next topic, I will merely mention, in a brief way, two of the most formidable objections to our views which I have seen, and which were adduced by two men, who must be reckoned among the most intelligent that have em- braced the cause of Unitarianism. The first is from Faustus Socinus, and runs thus, — " No one is so stupid as not to see that these things are con- tradictory, that our God the creator of heaven and earth, should be one only in number, and yet be three, each of which is our God. For as to what they affirm that our God is one in number, in respect to his essence, but three-fold in regard to persons ; here again they affirm things which are 6elf-contradictory, since two or three persons cannot exist, where there is numerically only one individual essence ; for to constitute more than one person, more than one individual essence is required. For what is person, but a certain indi- vidual intelligent essence ? Or in what way, I pray, does one person diifer from another, unless by the diversity of his 39 individual or numerical essence ? This implies, that the di- vine essence, is numerically one only, yet that there is more than one person ; although the divine essence which is nume- rically one, and divine person are altogether identical." (Opp. torn. i. p. 697.) Here, however, it is obvious that the whole weight of the objection lies in an erroneous use of the words person and essence. Socinus attaches to them a sense, which Trinitarians do not admit. How then can Tri- nitarians be charged with inconsistencies, in proposi- tions which they do not make ? Of the same tenour with the objection of Socinus, is the objection mentioned by the famous Toellner (Theolog. Untersuchungen, B. 1. p. 29), which, to save room, I shall merely translate, without subjoining the original. " The most considerable objection (against the doctrine of the Trinity), is this," says he, " that the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, are each a particular substance endowed with understanding ; and at the same time, neither of them is said to have his separate being, his separate understanding, his separate will, his separate power of action ; but all three together have only one being, one understanding, one will, one power of action. As it appears then, it is affirmed that there are three real beings, truly separate ; each consequently having his own individual power of action, and not having it ; three separate persons, and three persons not separate" All the difficulty, which this masterly writer has, in his usual way, so strikingly pourtrayed, lies merely in the representations of those Trinitarians, who have expressed themselves on this subject so incautiously, as to be understood to affirm that there are three se- parate beings (persons in the common sense of the word), in the Godhead, with distinct powers, volitions, &c. If there be any now, who defend such a state- ment of this subject, I must leave them to compose the difficulty with Toellner as they can. The view of the doctrine of the Trinity given by Toellner, in his statement of the objection, is not that which I have presented, or which I should ever undertake to de- fend. Of course it cannot be adduced as an objection 40 against the statement which I have given, and have undertaken to defend. The second objection appears, at first sight, more formidable and perplexing It comes from Taylor, and was inserted in the English Theological Magazine, Vol. I. No 4, p. 111. 17/0. I have not opportunity of access to the original, and take the ideas from a Latin translation of the piece, which was published in Germany. " There can," says Taylor, "be no real distinction between the Father and the Son, unless they so differ from each other, that what is peculiar to the Father, is wanting in the Son ; and what is peculiar to the Son, is wanting in the Father. Now, that property which helongs exclusively to the Father, or the Son, must be numbered among the perfections of God ; for in the divine nature no imperfections can exist. It fol- lows then, that some perfection is lacking both in the Father and in the Son, so that neither is endowed with infinite per- fection, which is essential to the divine nature. It must be conceded then, that the essence of the Father and the Son is not one and the same." Ingenious and specious as this is, still I am unable to see that it settles the point in debate. The es- sence and attributes of God, so far as they are known to us, are numerically one, as we have already admit- ted. If by i% perfection," Taylor means all which be- longs to the Godhead, then I answer merely by say- ing, It is essential to the perfection of the Godhead, that the distinction between the Father and Son should exist ; for that otherwise there would be imperfection. My right to make such a statement, is just the same as his to make the assertion, that the distinction be- tween Father and Son involved an imperfection in each. The very distinction between Father and Son is essential to complete divinity ; and, did not these exist, something would be wanting to complete the perfection of the Godhead. I acknowledge this is as- sumption ; but so is Taylor's statement ; and an ar- gument which is built on an assumption, may surely be opposed by another argument, which has the same foundation, 41 My object in the present Letter has been, thus far, to compare our views of the Trinity, with those which you have ascribed to us ; to show that we are not ex- posed on account of our belief, to be justly charged with gross and palpable absurdity, or with " subvert- ing the Unity of the Godhead ;" and to prove that the question, after all, whether there is a distinction in the Godhead, must be referred solely to the decision of the Scriptures. To them 1 shall appeal, as soon as I have made a few remarks on the twofold nature, which we ascribe to Christ. You say (p. 11.) " We (Unitarians) believe in the unity of Jesus Christ. We believe that Jesus is one mind, one soul, one being, as truly one as we are, and equally distinct from the one God. We complain of the doctrine of the Trinity, that, not satisfied wiih making God three beings, it makes Jesus Christ two beings, and thus introduces infinite confusion into our conceptions of his character. This corruption of Christianity, alike repugnant to common sense, and to the general strain of Scripture, is n remarkable proof of the power of a false philosophy in disfiguring the simple truth of Jesus." You will admit that this is expressed in terms of severity. Whether we are reall} 7 deserving of it, who hold the doctrine in question, every lover of truth will permit to be brought to the test of fair examina- tion. I am not certain that I have rightly apprehended your meaning, when you say that the twofold nature of Christ is " repugnant to common sense." Do you mean that common sense may determine first, inde- pendently of revelation, that the doctrine cannot be true ; and then maintain the impossibility that revelation should exhibit it? If so, then we are able to decide, a priori, what can be revealed, and what cannot; conse- quently, what we may believe, and what we must dis- believe. It follows, then, that a revelation is unneces- sary, or rather that it is impossible, — at least or.e which shall be obligatory upon our belief; for we have only to say, that our common sense decides against the propriety or the possibility of the things said to be re- vealed, and then we are at liberty to reject them. But is this the proper sphere in which common sense should act ? Is it not true that common sense is li- 42 mited to judging of the evidences that the Bible is of divine origin and authority ; to establishing the rules of exegesis common to all languages and books ; and finally, to directing a fair and impartial application of those rules, to determine what the orginal writer of any portion of the Scriptures designed to inculcate? Having once admitted, as you have, the divine autho- rity of the Scripture in deciding all questions, and your obligation to submit to its decision when you can understand the meaning of it, by using the com- mon rules of interpretation, how is it to be deter- mined by common sense whether Christ has two na- tures or one ? Common sense may investigate the language of the inspired writers, and inquire what they have said ; and if, by the sound rules of inter- pretation, it should appear that they have ascribed two natures to Christ, or asserted that which una- voidably leads to the conclusion that he has two na- tures, then, either it is to be believed, or the authority of the writers is to be cast off. In rejecting any doc- trine which the language of Scripture plainly teaches, common sense must cast off the divine authority of the Bible. To receive the Bible as a revelation from God, and yet to decide, a priori, what the Scriptures can and what they cannot contain, and to make their lan- guage bend until it conform with this decision, cannot surely be a proper part for a sincere lover of truth and sober investigation. In saying, then, that the doctrine which teaches that Christ has two natures, is " repugnant to common sense," I presume you must mean, that the rules of exegesis, applied by common sense, lead unavoidably to the conclusion that Christ has but one nature. If this be your meaning, what I have to say in reply will be contained in my next Letter. In regard to the impossibility that Christ should possess two natures, and the absurdity of such a sup- position, I have not much to say. If the Scriptures are the Word of Gotl, and do contain the doctrine in ques- tion, it is neither impossible nor absurd. Most cer- tainly, if it be a fact that Christ possesses two natures, 43 it is a fact with which natural religion has no concern ; at least, of which it has no knowledge. It can there- fore decide neither for nor against it. It is purely a doctrine of revelation ; and to Scripture only can we look for evidences of it. If the doctrine be palpably absurd and contradictory to reason, and yet it is found in the Bible, then reject the claims of the Bible to in- spiration and truth. But if the laws of interpretation do not permit us to avoid the conclusion that it is found there, we cannot with any consistency admit that the Scriptures are of divine authority, and yet re- ject the doctrine. How shall any man decide, a piori, that the doc- trine cannot be true ? Can we limit the omniscient and omnipotent God, by saying that the Son cannot be so united with human nature, so " become flesh and dwell among us," that we recognize and distinguish, in this complex being, but one person, and therefore speak of but one ? If you ask me how such a union can be effected between natures so infinitely diverse as the divine and human, I answer (as in the case of the distinction in the Godhead), I do not know how this is done ; / do not undertake to define wherein that union consists, nor how it is effected. God cannot divest himself of his essential perfections, — i. e. he is immu- tably perfect ; nor could the human nature of Christ have continued to be human nature, if it had ceased to be subject to the infirmities, and sorrows, and affec- tions of this nature, while he dwelt among men. In whatever way, then, the union of the two natures was effected, it neither destroyed nor essentially changed either the divine or human nature. Hence, at one time, Christ is represented as the Creator of the Universe ; and at another, as a man of sorrows, and of imperfect knowledge, — (John, i. 1 — 18 ; Hebrews, i. 10—12; Luke, xxii. 44, 45 ; ii. 52.) If both these accounts are true, he must, as it seems to me, be God omniscient and omnipotent; and still a feeble man and of imperfect knowledge. It is, indeed, impossible to reconcile these two things without the D 44 supposition of two natures. The simple question then is, Can they be joined or united, so that, in speaking of them, we may say the person is God or man ; or we may call him by one single name, and by this un- derstand, as designated, either or both of these na- tures ? On this subject, the religion of nature says nothing. Reason has nothing to say ; for surely no finite being is competent to decide that the junction of the two natures is impossible or absurd. One person^ in the sense in which each of us is one, Christ could not be. If you make God the soul, and Jesus of Nazareth the body of Christ, then you take away his human nature, and deny the imperfection of his knowledge. But may not God have been, in a manner altogether peculiar and mysterious, united to Jesus, without displaying at once his whole power in him, or necessarily rendering him supremely perfect ? In the act of creation, God does not put forth all his power — nor in preservation — nor in sanctification ; nor does he bring all his knowledge into action when be inspires prophets and apostles. Was it necessary that he should exert it all when in conjunction with the human nature of Christ? In governing the world from day to day, God does not surely exhaust his omnipotence or his wisdom. He employs only so much as is necessary to accomplish the design which he has in view. In his union with Jesus of Nazareth, the divine Logos could not, of course, be necessitated at once to put forth all his energy or exhibit all his knowledge and wisdom. Just so much of it, and no more, was manifested as was requisite to constitute the character of an all-sufficient incarnate Mediator and Redeemer. When necessary, power and autho- rity infinitely above human were displayed ; when otherwise, the human nature sympathized and suffer- ed like that of other men. Is this impossible for God ? Is there any thing in such a doctrine which, if found in the Bible, would af- ford an adequate reason for rejecting its claims to in- spiration? For my own part, I cannot see the impos- 45 sibility or the absurdity of such a thing. How shall we limit the Deity as to the ways in which he is to reveal himself to his creatures? Can we not find mystery within ourselves which is as inexplicable as anything in the doctrine before us? We do not appropriate the affections of our minds to our bodies, nor those of our bodies to our minds : Each class of affections is separate and distinct. Yet we refer either to the whole man. Abraham was mor- tal ; Abraham was immortal ; are both equally true ? He had an immortal and a mortal part; yet both made but one person. How is it a greater mystery if I say Christ was God, and Christ was man ? He had a na- ture human and divine. One person, indeed, in the sense in which Abraham was, he is not. Xor is there any created object to which the union of Godhead with humanity can be compared. But shall we deny the possibility of it on this account ? Or shall we tax with absurdity that which it is utterly beyond our reach to scan ? I shrink from such an undertaking, and place myself in the attitude of listening to what the voice of revelation may dictate in regard to this. It becomes us here to do so — to prostrate ourselves before the Fa- ther of Lights, and say, " Speak, Lord, for thy servants hear. Lord, what wilt thou have us to believe ?" You may indeed find fault with us that we speak of three persons in the Godhead where there is but one nature; and yet of but one person in Christ where there are two natures. I admit that it is an apparent inconsistency in the use of language ; and cannot but wish that it had not, originally, been adopted. Still, it is capable of some explanation. In the first case, person simply designates the idea that there is some real dis- tinction in the Godhead, in opposition to the opinion that it is merely nominal. In the second, it designates Christ as he appears to us in the New Testament, clothed with a human body, and yet acting (as we sup- pose), not only as possessing the attributes of a man, but as also possessing divine power. We see the at- tributes of human nature in such intimate conjunction with those of the divine, that we cannot separate the d2 46 agents ; at least we know not where to draw the line of separation, because we do not know the manner in which the union is effected or continued. We speak therefore of one per son , — i. e., one agent. And when we say that the two natures of Christ are united in one person, we mean to say that divinity and humanity are brought into such a connexion in this case, that we can- not separate them, so as to make two entirely distinct and separate agents. The present generation of Trinitarians, however, do not feel responsible for the introduction of such tech- nical terms, in senses so diverse from the common ideas attached to them. They merely take them as they find them. For my own part, I have no attach- ment to them ; I think them injudiciously chosen ; and heartily wish they were by general consent entirely exploded. They serve, perhaps, in most cases, prin- cipally to keep up the form of words without definite ideas ; and I fear they have been the occasion of many disputes in the Church. The things which are aimed at by these terms, I would strenuously retain ; be- cause I believe in the divine origin and authority of the Bible; and that its language, fairly interpreted, does inculcate these things. And candour, on your part, will certainly admit, that things only are worth any dispute. Logomachy is too trifling for a lover of truth. LETTER III. REVEREND AXD DEAR SIR, My great object hitherto, has been to show that the real question at issue between us, in regard to a dis- tinction in the Godhead and the divinity of the Saviour, cannot be decided independently of the Scriptures. There is no such absurdity or inconsistency in either of these doctrines, as will justify us in rejecting them without investigation. The question whether they are true or not, belongs entirely and purely to revelation. If you admit this, then the simple question between u,s 47 is, what does revelation teach ? We are agreed that the Bible is the Word of God ; that whatever " Christ taught, either during his personal ministry or by his inspired Apostles, is of divine authority." We are agreed as to principles of interpretation, in most things that are of importance. We both concede, that the principles by which all books are to be interpreted, are those which apply to the interpretation of the Bible ; for the very plain reason which you have given, that when God condescends to speak and write for men, it is according to the established rules of human language. What better than an enigma would the Scriptures be, if such were not the fact? An inspired interpreter would be as necessary to explain, as an inspired pro- phet or apostle was to compose, the books of Scrip- ture. From this great and fundamental principle of the Scriptural writings, — viz. that they are composed agreeably to the common laws of human language, it results, that the grammatical analysis of the words of any passage, — i. e. an investigation of their usual and general meaning, of their syntactical connexion, of their idiom 5 and of their relation to the context, must be the essential process, in determining the sense of any text or part of Scripture. On this fundamental process, depends the interpretation of all the classics, and of all other books. In conformity to this process, rules of interpretation are prescribed, which cannot be violated without at once plunging into the dark and boundless field of conjectural exegesis. I may obtain aid from many sources, to throw light upon the mean- ing of words and sentences. From a knowledge of the geography of any country — of its climate, soil, produc- tions, mountains, rivers, and other natural objects, as well as of the manners, customs, laws, history, &c, of its inhabitants — I may obtain assistance to explain its language, and must obtain it, if I mean to make out a satisfactory interpretation. But I can never dispense with the laws of grammatical analysis. These laws are vindicated by the simple fact, that every writer wishes and expects to be understood by his cotempo- »3 48 raries, and therefore maybe expected to use language as they do. We presume this of the sacred writers ; and therefore apply to their productions, as to those of classic authors, the common rules of grammatical in- terpretation. Admitting these rules to be the best and surest guide to the meaning of language, we cannot super- sede them by supposing, or conjecturing, peculiarities in a writer. It is only when these peculiarities are proved, or at least rendered probable, that they can be admitted to influence our interpretation of any pas- sage. Without such proof, we cannot violate the obvious principles of grammatical interpretation, for the sake of vindicating from inconsistency, absur- dity, or contradiction, any author, even a Scriptural one. I must here explain myself, however, in order to prevent mistake in regard to my meaning. The Scrip- tures certainly stand on different ground from that on which any other book rests, on account of their claim to be received as a revelation from God. What other book can plead well-authenticated miracles for its sup- port ; or can produce declarations of a prophetic na- ture that have been fulfilled ; or can glory in such an exhibition of the principles of piety and virtue — of love to God, and of benevolence and beneficence to men ? Just in proportion, then, as these evidences influence my mind to believe that the Bible is of divine origin, in the same proportion it becomes improbable to me that this Bible contains absurdities, errors, or contra- dictions. When any apparent error or contradiction at- tracts my attention, I hesitate to pronounce it such as it appears to be. My reason for doing so is the strength of the evidence in favour of its divine origin ; which is such, that I must do violence to my convic- tions, if I admit that the book contains either what is erroneous or contradictory. I am, then, slow to at- tribute, in any case, such a sense to words in the Scriptures, as would make a passage speak either ab- surdity or contradiction. But if, after all the light which I could gain, it should appear still to be a plain 49 case, that there is either absurdity or contradiction in the sacred text ; then I must find a different reading ■ — or give up the passage — or renounce the whole book. 1 may suspend an opinion, while I live, as to doubtful cases. My convictions respecting the nature and design of the Holy Scriptures, the imperfection of my knowledge, diffidence in myself, all demand that I should act in this manner. But, in any clear case, where the meaning of a sacred writer, or what he ori- ginally designed to say, can be definitely ascertained by the common laws of interpretation, — and it appears plainly that this meaning is erroneous, or contradicts some other passage, — I have no right to put a con- structive sense upon the words, and do violence to the passage, in order to avoid the consequences that may follow. I cannot honestly do it. The same com- mon sense and reason which prescribe the laws of exegesis, decide that the meaning of a writer must be that which those laws determine it to be. Of course, if I put a gloss upon any passage, which represents it as conveying a meaning different from that which the laws of interpretation would assign to it, I may de- ceive others, or I may serve the interests of party ; but I violate the reason which God has given me by so doing, and act a part dishonest, and unworthy of an inquirer after truth. If the fundamental maxims of exegesis lead to the belief that a writer of the New Testament has contra- dicted himself, or another sacred writer, then I must revert at once to the question, Is the book divine ? Can it be so, if there is contradiction ? This question I may settle (on my responsibility to God) as 1 please. But I have no right to violate the fundamental rules of language, by forcing a meaning upon the writer to make him consistent ; which it is obvious, on the uni- versal principles of explaining language, he never de- signed to convey. In determining the question, whether the writers of the New Testament were inspired ? I must always, in attending to the internal evidence of the books, consider whether they have contradicted each other. To determine this question, I cannot violate 50 the simple rules of grammatical exegesis. I must read this book, as I do a!l other books. Then, if there evidently be contradiction, I must reject its claims ; if there be not, and I think the evidence is sufficient that they are well-founded, I must admit them. But, at any period subsequent to this, when I have admitted the book to be inspired, I am not at liberty to aver that the writers could never have taught some particular doctrine w T hich I may dislike ; and therefore to do violence to the rules of grammatical interpretation, in order to explain away a doctrine of this nature, which they seem to inculcate. My simple inquiry must be, what sentiment does the language of this or that passage convey, without violence or per- version of rule ? When this question is settled philo- logically (not philosophically), then I either believe what is taught, or else reject the claim of divine authority. What can my own theories and reasonings about the absurdity or reasonableness of any particular doctrine, avail in determining whether a writer of the new Tes- tament has taught this doctrine or not ? My inves- tigation must be conducted independently of my phi- losophy, by my philology. And, when I have obtained his meaning by the simple and universal rules of ex- pounding language, I choose the course I will take ; 1 must believe his assertion, or reject his authority. If these be not sound maxims of interpretation, I confess myself a stranger to the subject ; nor can I help thinking that you will accord with me at once in the views just expressed. Guided then by these principles, let us now come to the investigation of a few passages in the New Testa- ment, which concern the divine nature of Christ. I take this point because you have dwelt most upon it ; and because very obviously, when this is admitted or rejected, no possible objection can be felt to admit- ting or rejecting the doctrine of the Trinity. You will not require of me, however, to examine at length every text of the New Testament, which I may suppose to have any connexion with the subject in question. I must be permitted, in order to save time, 51 to select only those texts, the language of which ap- pears to be genuine, and above the condemnation of textual criticism ; and such as appear to contain the best and most decisive proof of the point to be dis- cussed. Believing the New Testament to be of di- vine origin and authority, you will permit me to add that I cannot think the decision of this or any other question, depends on the number of times in which the terms of that decision are repeated. I observe, then, I. The A r eiv Testament gives to Christ the appellation of God, in such a manner as thai, according to the fair rules of interpretation, only the supreme God can be meant. A conspicuous passage in proof of this 1 should find in John i. 1 — 3. " In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. The same was in the beginning with God. All things were made by him ; and without him was not any thing made that was made." Verse 10, "and the world was made by him." All known manuscripts agree in the text here. Griesbach has indeed recorded, that, for 6 ©so; (Theos, God) there is a conjectural reading Qtov ; and that for 7.CU Qso; wo Xoyos, there is a conjectural reading of Qso: rp -/.at 6 Xoyog. The first of these conjectures was made by Crellius. (Initium Evang. Johan. restauratum per. L. M. Artemonium, P. i. c. 2.) The reason of making such a conjecture Crellius has given. " The greater Christ is," says he„ " compared with other gods (the Father excepted), the less can he be expressly cal- led God, lest he should be taken for the supreme God the Fa- ther." And again, " If he (Christ) had been expressly called God by the sacred writers, and had not always been distin- guished from God, the sacred writers would have given an oc- casion to unskilful men to regard him as the supreme God."— (Init. Evang. Johan., p. 295.) To liberate John from being taxed with this impru- dence, Crellius proposed to substitute ©sou for ©«&?, in John i. 1 ; so as to say, the Logos was of God , instead of saying, as John has done, that He was God. The second conjectural reading is supported by no 52 better authority. Bahrdt (in Xeuesten Offenbarungen) proposed it as a happy expedient to relieve the text from the difficulty and embarrassment under which he thought it laboured. For, instead of saying, "the Word was with God, and the Word was God," he might then translate it thus, — " The Word was with God. God was, and this Word was in the beginning with God," &e. I have a great regard for the labours and learning of Griesbach; but I am constrained to ask here why he should have condescended to notice conjectures so gratuitous and unfounded as these. I proceed to the explanation of the text. Ey og^j (i. e. in the beginning) corresponds exactly with the Hebrew — Gen. i. 1. .# I cannot embrace the opinion of those critics, who think that the phrase svogxp, °** itself simply signifies from eternity. Although I believe that the Logos did exist from eternity, I do not think it is proved directly by this expression. (Compare Gen. i. 1.) That existence from eternity is implied, however, may be properly admitted. Ey a?yj is equi- valent to ev apyji xoo^pu, in the beginning of the world, i e. before the world was made ; and so agreeing in this particular with the phrase, John xvii. 5, " the glory that I had with thee before the world was ;" and Eph. i. 4, " before the foundation of the world." To say with Crellius, that, by » a-f/j, is meant the commence' ment of preaching the gospel or the beginning of Chris- tian instruction, would be making John gravely tell us, that, before the Logos preached the gospel, he had an existence. Before the world was created, then, the Logos exist- ed. Who or what was this Logos? A real existence, or only an attribute of God ? A real substance, or only the wisdom, or reason, or power of God ? It is of no importance in settling this question that we should know with certainty whence John derived * The Hebrew words are omitted in this and some other passages, partly for want of types for the Hebrew characters, and partly because their insertion would be of little use to the general reader. The bibli- cal student may however consult the original Hebrew. 53 the appellation Logos. In my mind, the most proba- ble account is, that this appellation is bestowed on Christ, in reference to his becoming the instructor or teacher of mankind — the medium of communication between God and them. Be this, however, as it may, the Logos appears to be a real existence, and not merely an attribute. For, first, — The attributes of God are nowhere else personified by the New Testament wri- ters, — i. e. the usage of the Xew Testament authors is against this mode of writing. Secondly, — Logos, if considered as an abstract term, or as merely desig- nating an attribute, must mean either wisdom or word ; and in what intelligible sense can the wis- dom or the word of God, in the abstract sense, be said to have "become flesh and dwelt among ws," v. 14 ; or why should John select either the wisdom or icord of God as any more concerned with the incarnation than the benevolence of God, or the mercy of God, which one might suppose would be the attributes more espe- cially displayed in the incarnation ? Thirdly, — If Lo- gos mean here the power of God, as many assert, the exposition is attended with the same difficulties. Fourthly, — If it mean, as others aver, the power of God putting itself forth, i. e. in creation, it is liable to the same objections. In short, make it any attribute of God thus personified, and you introduce a mode of writing that the New Testament nowhere else dis- plays, and which even the Old Testament exhibits but once, Prov. viii., in a poetic composition of the most animated and exalted nature. Yet this is not the chief difficulty. To what class of men could John address the asseveration, that the Logos {wisdom, word, or power of God) " was with God?'* 5 Where did these singular heretics suppose the power of God was except with him ? Or where his wisdom or his icord? A peculiar pertinacity, too, in their strange opinion they must have had, to have rendered it ne- cessary for the Apostle to repeat, with emphasis, in the second verse, that this Logos was icith God. What would be said of a man who should gravely assert that 54 (i the power of Peter is with Peter, or that his wisdom or his word is so?" And suppose he should add, "the power or wisdom of Peter is Peter" with what class of mystics should we rank him? Yet John adds, " The Logos was God." Until, then, some heretics of the a- postolic age can be discovered who maintained that the attributes of God were not with him, I cannot explain how the Apostle could assert twice successively, and of course emphatically, that his attributes were with him. Equally difficult is it for me to divine how he could sav that any attribute (power or wisdoin) was God — understanding the word God in any sense which you please. If it mean Supreme God, then it reduces itself to this, either that one attribute is the supreme God, or that there are as many Gods as attributes. If it mean an inferior God, then the wisdom of God being an inferior God implies that his other attributes are superior Gods ; or else that his wisdom holds the place of quasi God, while his other attributes occupy a lower place. Suppose that it should be said that Logos or wisdom denotes the essence of God, then how could it be called Qsog, which implies an agent or person — a concrete, as logicians say, and not an ab- stract ? The divine substance or essence is called Onorr,; or ro Quov, not 6 §zog. What could be meant, moreover, by the esse?ice of God becoming incarnate? If, however, it should be said, that to suppose the existence of a sect of heretics, who held that the attri- butes of God were 720/ with him, is unnecessary in or- der to justify the Apostle for having written the first verse of his gospel, and that we may regard this verse as written simply for general instruction, then I would ask, whether it is probable that a revelation from hea- ven is made to inform us that the attributes of a being are with that being ? or what can be thought of the as- sertion, that the wisdom or power of God is God him- self? Let us proceed now to the second clause, " and the Logos was icith God" — i. e. as all agree, with God the Father. CompareversesMand 18; also chapter xvii. 5, 55 and 1 John, i. 1, 2; which make the point clear. Is this expression capable of any tolerable interpreta- tion, without supposing that the Logos, who was with God, was in some respect or other different, or diverse from that God, with whom he was ? This Logos was the same that became incarnate, verse 14; that made the most perfect revelation of the will and character of God to men, verse 18 ; and was called Christ. He was therefore, in some respect, diverse from the Father, and therefore by no means to be confounded with him. " And the Logos was God." It has been proposed (in Impr. Vers, of N. Test.) to render the word ©so;, a god. Does then the Christian Revelation admit of gods superior and inferior? And if so, to what class of inferior gods does the Logos belong? And how much would such a theory of divine natures differ from that which admits a Jupiter Optimus Maximus and gods greater and less ? But it is said, that " ©ho? is destitute of the article, and therefore cannot designate the Divine Being, who is supreme." This observation, however, is far from being justifiable, either by the usage of the sacred wri- ters or the principles of Greek syntax. Among in- stances where the Supreme God is certainly designat- ed, and yet the article is omitted, the inquirer may consult the very chapter in question, ver. 6, 13, 18; also, Mat. xix. 26 ; Luke xvi. 13; John ix. 33 ; xvi. 30; Rom. viii. 8; 1 Cor. i. 3 ; Gal. i. 1; Ephes. ii. 8; Heb. ix. 14. Besides, every reader of Greek knows, that where the subject of a proposition (which in this case is 6 y.oyog) has the article, the predicate (©jo?) omits it. Such is Greek usage ; and from it dissent only propositions of a reciprocating or convertible na- ture, — as in verse 4 of the chapter in question. It may be added, too, that if the writer had said, xa/ 6 Xoyog rjvoQso;, it would have conveyed a very different sense from the proposition as it now stands. He would then have said, the Logos is the God with whom he is; whereas I understand ©so; here to mean divine nature, simply but not abstractly considered, for which it so often stands in other places. Vide Mark viii. 33; x. E 56 27 ; xii. 24 ; Luke iii. 8 ; xi. 20 ; xviii. 4, 19 ; John i. 13 ; iii. 2 ; iv. 24 ; x. 33 ; Acts v. 29 ; vii. 55 ; x. 33 ; xi. 18, &c. I readily acknowledge, that affirmative evidence of the somewhat diverse meaning of ©eo; here, cannot be drawn from the word itself, but must be deduced from the circumstances of the affirmation, united with the supposition that John did assert, and did mean to as- sert, something that is intelligible. There is indeed no very serious difficulty, in taking Qzo? (God) in the same sense in both clauses, provided we understand it to denote the Divinity. To interpret the verse thus, would represent John as saying, that while Christ was God or truly divine, there was at the same time a sense in which he was with God. In order that this should have any possible meaning, a distinction in the God- head must be admitted, — viz. that the Father is not in all respects the same as the Son. For myself, J do not hesitate to understand the word God, in a sense somewhat diverse, in the two clauses of the verse under consideration. Every word takes a sense adapted to its connexion. Such is the rule which must be adopted, after we have once conceded that a writer uses words with propriety, and designs to be understood. So, when our Saviour says, " Let the dead bury, their dead," the connexion requires us to explain it thus, — "Let those who are morally or spiritually dead, bury those who are corporeally so." It were easy to accumulate examples, where the very same word, in the very same verse, has two different shades of sense. The exigency of the passage (exigentia loci) is the rule of interpretation which guides us here : And, guided by this exigency, what difficulty is therein sup- posing that God, as Father, is meant in the first in- stance, and the Divinity, without reference to the pe- culiar distinction of Father, in the second ? I understand John, then, as affirming, that the Logos was God, and yet was with God, — viz. that he was truly divine, but still divine in such a manner that there did exist a distinction between him and the Father. I take the word God, in one case, to mean, as in a great 5 7 . number of cases it does mean, God as Father ; in the other case, I regard it as a description of divine being of the Divinity, without reference to the distinction of Father, — a use which is very common. Least of all have those a right to object to this, who here make the meaning of God, in the second instance, to be infinitely different from its meaning in the first instance, — understanding by the first, the self-existent, independent, and infinite God ; by the second, a creat- ed or derived and finite being. If you ask now, What could be the object of John, in asserting that the Logos was with God ? I answer, that the phrase, to be with one (eimi xeoz nm), indicates conjunction, communion, familiarity, society. See Mark ix. 19. Compare, too, John i. 18, where the only-be- gotten Son is said to be " in the bosom (s? rw xoXxoy) of the Father," which is a phrase of similar import. To illustrate the meaning of the phrase to be with God, it is useful also to compare those cases where Christians are promised, as the summit of their felicity, that they shall be with God and Christ, and be where they are. See among other passages, John xiv. 2, 3 ; xii. 26; xvii. 24; I Thess. iv. \J. Compare Rom. viii. 1/ ; 2 Tim. ii. 11, 12; Coloss. iii. 1—4. In John xvii. 5, Christ speaks of that " glory which he had with the Father, before the world was." From all these passages taken together, it would seem that the phrase, the Logos was with God, amounts to assert- ing that he was (conjunclissimus Deo) most intimately con- nected with him. If you ask me how, I answer freely that I cannot tell. The Evangelist has asserted the fact, but has not added one word to explain the (mo- dus) manner. If I could explain it, then perhaps I might define the distinction which I believe to exist in the Godhead. But why should John assert such a connexion ? — In opposition, I answer, to those in early times who as- serted that Christ was a being not only distinct from God, but an emanation from him. The asseveration, that the Logos was with God — was from the beginning E2 58 most intimately connected with Mm, and was divine — would of course contradict such an opinion. But does the Evangelist here mean to assert of the Logos, that he is God in the true and supreme sense, or not? This is the fundamental question between us. Analogy, drawn from the New Testament usage of the word Oto; (which nowhere else employs this word simply and singly, except to designate the Supreme God) must be admitted strongly to favour the idea, that Christ is here asserted to be truly divine. I rea- dily allow, that, in the Old Testament, the word God has various applications — that it is applied (though only in the plural number) to magistrates — that it is used to designate those who, for a time, stand as it were in the place of God, as Moses was to be for a god to Pharaoh, Exod. vii. 1, and instead of God to Aaron, Exod. iv. 16. But it is not possible, in any instances of this nature, to mistake the meaning. The adjuncts or context always guard effectually against mistake. Men or inferior beings are never called God, or gods simply. We read of a " god to Pharaoh ; we read also, "1 have said ye are gods, but ye shall die like men" The Scriptures speak of the god of Ekron, the god of the Ammonites, the gods of the Heathen, &c. Is a mis- take possible here? But the Logos is called God sim- ply. Nor is this all Admitting that the name of it- self determines nothing (and, for sake of the argument, I am willing to admit it), yet the writer has added ex- planations of his meaning, which seem to place what he intended to assert, by the expression in question, beyond the reach of fair debate. John i. 3. " All things were [made] by him ; and without him was nothing [made] which was [made]. Verse 10. The world was [made] by him. I have excluded the word made, by placing it in brackets, merely to show that the sense is in nowise changed by the version of those critics, who tell us that iyivi7o never means made, but simply was. Yet nothing can be farther from correctness than such an assertion. Accordingly, co/sw and ym^ou are used as 59 synonymeSj-^as in Jamesiii.9; compare Gen. i. 26, in the Septuagint ; Gen. ii. 4 ; Isaiah xlviii. 7- The cases where ytyoftou means to make or produce, are so numerous and ohvious, that a moment's delay in re- spect to this part of the subject would be useless. Schleusner's Lexicon, under the word ymfuu } will fur- nish adequate proof of this. If not, read the commen- tary of Theodoret on the two first chapters of Genesis, which places the question, as to the use of ympau, be- yond debate. But what are the "all things " — the universe (Va xavra} — which the Logos made or created ? — " The moral world — the Christian Church," answers Faustus Soci- nus. To this exposition, however, there are two ob- jections. First, a part of these ra iravra are, in verse 10, represented as (o xotrpos) the world, — a term nowhere in the New Testament applied to the Christian Church, nor to men as morally amended by the gospel. Se- condly, this very world (o xoAo;), which he created, did not know or acknowledge him, awov owe eyvu : Whereas the distinguishing trait of Christians is, that they k?ioio Christ — that they know the only true God and Jesus Christ whom he has sent. Ta iravra, then, which the Logos created, means (as common usage and the exigency of the passage re- quire), the universe — the worlds material and imma- terial. (Ver. 10.) Here, consequently, in the First Chapter of John, is a passage in which, beyond all rea- sonable doubt, Christ is called God ; and where the context, instead of furnishing us with reasons for un- derstanding the word God in an inferior sense (as is usual when this designation is applied to inferior beings) has plainly and unequivocally taught us, that this God (Qbo;), who was the Logos, created the universe. The question, then, is reduced to this simple state, — Is he, who created the universe, truly and properly divine? On this question I shall make a few re- marks, when I have considered some other passages which ascribe the work of creation to Christ. Heb. i. 10 — 12, "And thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth j and the heavens e3 60 are the works of thine hands : They shall^perish, but thou remainest ; and they shall wax old as doth a gar- ment ; and as a vesture shalt thou fold them up, and they shall he changed ; but thou art the same, and thy years shall not fail." These words are spoken of the Son of God ; for they are intimately connected by the conjunction and with ver. 8, where it is written, " But unto the Son he saith," &c. According to the laws of grammar, and most' clearly according to the nature and design of the Apostle's argument, the ellipsis to be supplied, in the beginning of the tenth verse, after and (xa#) is, "And [tolhe Son he tooth], Thou, Lord," &c. No other ex- position can be pointed out, which doth not make a violent divulsion of the passage, from the connexion of the writer's argument. The question still remains, "What is meant by founding the earth, and by the heavens being the work of Christ's hands ?" To answer the first question, and place the answer beyond the possibility of a reason- able doubt, it is necessary only to compare the pas- sages in which Jehovah is said to have founded the earth. By this phrase, the creation of it is indubitably meant. The passages may be found in Ps. xxiv. 2, Ixxxix. 11, civ. 5, cxix. 90; Job, xxxviii. 4; Prov- iii. 19; Is. xlviii. 13, li. 13; Zech. xii. 1; where, if you inspect the Septuagint, you will see the very verb ^iixiXioM {themelio—io found, to establish), employed, which the Apostle uses in our text. In regard to the " heavens being the works of Christ's hands," it is an expression plainly of similar import to the one just examined, and signifies the creation of the heavens. Thus, Ps. viii. 3, 6—" When I consider the heavens, the work of thy hands;" which is parallel with, " The moon and stars which thou hast ordained," (Septuagint, efepehtuaais). So, in verse 6th, " And hast placed him over the works of thy hands ; all things hast thou put under his feet," — i. e. placed him over the creation. To prove that the phrase to create the heavens and the earth, means to create ail things, it is necessary only 61 to consult Gen. i. 1 ; Ex. xx. 11, xxxi. 17 ; Xeh. ix. 6; Ps. cxxi. 2, cxxiv. 8, cxxxiv. 3, and other like pas- sages, which a Concordance will supply. It will be remembered, that the passage in ques- tion (Heb. i. 10 — 12) is a quotation from the Old Tes- tament ; and that to quote the language of the Old Tes- tament, therefore, in order to explain it, is peculiarly appropriate and necessary. Would any one, now, unembarrassed by peculiarity of system, ever suspect that Christ's founding the earth, and the heavens being the works of his hands, could mean any thing less than the creation of the Universe? Yet we have been told, by some distinguished Unitarians, that the heavens mean the Christian state or dispensa- tion, and earth the Jewish one. Bute's/, this is against usage, either in the Old or New Testament, — there being nothing to support such a sense of it. Isaiah indeed speaks of creating a new heaven and a new earth (lxv. 17); and of plant- ing the heavens and the earth (li. 16) in a moral sense, i. e. making a moral change or creation. But then the language itself, in the first case, indicates, that the old creation is not meant ; and, in the second case, the context makes it as clear what kind of heaven and earth is to be planted or established, and what the planting of them means, — viz. the Jewish church and state is to be renewed and established. The meaning, then, as- signed by some Unitarians to the passage in Heb. i. is against the plain and perpetual usage of the Scrip- tures, in regard to such expressions, when they occur in an unlimited form, as they do in the passage under examination. Secondly, — If the Jewish and the Christian states are here meant, in what sense are they to wax old as a garment and to be changed ? Of the Jewish state this might without much difficulty be affirmed. But how the Christian dispensation is to be changed — how that " kingdom w T hich shall have no end" (Luke i. 33) is to " perish," I am unable to explain. " It is a moral creation, of which Christ is the au- thor/' says Artemonius, i. e. Crellius (Init. Evang. Jo- 62 han). This, however, does not explain the matter; for how is it that the moral creation of Christ is to be changed and perish, i. c to be annihilated? Most ob- viously his moral creation is to be eternal. Another method of explaining this subject has been, to aver that the passage here quoted by the Apostle from Ps. cii. 25 — 2/, is, in the original, plainly appli- cable to Jehovah only ; and that none would conjec- ture, from the simple perusal of this Psalm, how Christ could be the subject of it. Conceding that the passage is applicable to Jehovah only (and it would be difficult to show why this is not to be conceded), what is the consequence? — Either that the Apostle has directly, and without qualification, applied to Christ language used by an inspired writer of the Old Testament to de- signate the Creator of the world, with his eternal and immutable nature ; or that he has (in a way singular indeed for a man of piety and honesty) accommodated language descriptive of the infinite Jehovah only, to a created and dependent being. Kug»s (Lord) in the Greek, corresponds to the word Jehovah in the ori- ginal Hebrew, — the Septuagint having commonly ren- dered it in this manner. And though Jehovah is not in the Hebrew text (Ps. cii. 25), yet it is evident, from the preceding context, that it must be understood there as the subject of the verb, thou hast founded. Christ, then, is here called by the Apostle Jehovah ; and eter- nity, immutability, and the creation of the universe, are ascribed to him.* I cannot think that the paraphrase of Grotius, on the passage in question, deserves a serious refutation. * I readily admit, that XVglog- is not always synonymous icith Jehovah : But where the word Jehovah is used in the Hebrew of the Old Testament, KOPtOi stands, in the Septuagint and in the New Testament, as the transla- tion of it. Therefore xupiog in the New Testament must of course, in such cases, have the same meaning as Jehovah in the Old Testament. The rea- son why '/.i/ptog is used by the New Testament writers as the translation of Jehovah in the Hebrew Scriptures, is, that the Jews, in reading their sacred icritings, were not accustomed to pronounce the word Jehovah, but read, for the most part. Lord, xvpws. in the room of it. 63 "Thou wast the cause," says he, "that the earth was founded ; and on thy account the heavens were made." If this be not a different thing from what the language of the Apostle naturally means, or can mean, I confess I know not any bounds which may be set to para- phrastic or mystical exegesis. Suppose now the Gnos- tics, who maintained that evil demons, and not Jeho- vah, created the world, should have paraphrased the first verse in Genesis in this manner, — " Thou, Jeho- vah, wast the cause why the heavens and the earth were created ;" and, when asked how this could con- sist with their sentiments, or what they could mean by it, they should have replied, " Out of enmity to thee the evil demons brought the material creation into existence," then they would have explained away the creative act of Jehovah, exactly as Grotius explains away the evidence that Christ was the Creator. Col. i. 15 — 17. " Who is the image of the invisible God, the head of all creation ; for by him were all things created, both celestial and terrestrial, visible and invisible, of whatever order or rank they are — all things were created by him and for him. Therefore he was before all things, and by him are all things sus- tained." The places in which T have departed from our com- mon version, are not differently rendered in order to make them favour the cause which I have espoused ; for they determine nothing respecting the point now at issue. They are rendered as above, merely to make the meaning of the passage in general as plain as the nature of the case will permit. Because, inverse 20, Christ is said "to reconcile (acroxara/.?.aJa/) all things unto himself," and these are said to be " things in heaven and things on earth ;" and af- terwards, he is represented as breaking down the wall of partition between Jews and Gentiles. Some inge- nious commentators have supposed that " things in hea* ven and things on earth," mean Jews and Gentiles. How very unnatural this explanation is, no one can help feeling who reads the passage in an unbiassed manner. In what tolerable sense can the Jews and 64 Gentiles be called " things visible and invisible?" or how shall we explain the phrase, "things in heaven and things on earth," as applied to them ? By "re- conciling things in heaven and things on earth," seems evidently to be meant, bringing into union, under one great head, t. e. Christ, by a new and special bond of intercommunication, both angels and men. In like manner, the two great parties on earth, Jews and Gen- tiles, are united together. But why Christ should be called " the image of the invisible God," and the " head (xguronxog, the first born) of all creation," because he is merely the instrument of bringing Jews and Gentiles to- gether, is not apparent to me. Yet, to be such an instru- ment, is all that the passage in question ascribes to him, if we are to construe it in the manner above related. But when you understand the words of the Apostle, as de- scribing the creation of the worlds celestial and terres- trial (6/ ovgmvot xat q yr i} compare Heb. i. 10 — 12), and as- cribing it to Christ, then you find sufficient reason for designating him by the exalted appellations in ques- tion. It has also been affirmed that a moral creation only is here ascribed to Christ. But words like these, in such a connexion and with such adjuncts, are nowhere else used in this sense. Moreover, in what sense has the moral creation by Christ affected the angels ? The good ones needed not repentance or pardon ; the bad ones have never sought or obtained either. " Verily, he did not assist the angels {ov yog br^vj wyy&m ravXa/xCavsra/), but the seed of Abraham." — Heb. ii. 16. Until I see different light, therefore, shed over the passage in question, I must regard it as very clearly ascribing the creation of the universe to Christ. But you will say, perhaps, that in John i. 3, "All things are said to be made by Christ, o,a Xphttov, as the instrumental, not the principal cause, — the preposition dia denoting such cause. In Col. i. 16, it is also said that all things were created by Christ (6/' uvrov) ; and in Heb. i. 2, God is said to have created the worlds by his Son, — A/' b'j (sc. wov) xai rov; aiuvag iKGirfis." The allegation, however, that o/a does not designate the principal as well as the instrumental cause, can by no means be supported. In Rom. xi. 36, " All things are said to be of God (eg avrov) and by God (3/ a-jr*), the very form of expression applied to Christ, in Coloss. i. 16—20. So Heb. ii. 10, " For it became him (God the Father), for whom, 8i 6v, are all things, and by whom, bi w, are all things," &c 1 Cor. i. 9, " God is faith- ful, by whom, 8i 6v, ye were called into the fellowship of his Son," &c. Moreover m and dia are sometimes interchanged as equivalents or synonymes. See Rom. iii. 30. So also scant! <5/«, Coloss. i. 16, — ro Kuvra ev avrca r/~«i$r] and bi avrov exnffreu, — i. e. zv and bia, in these two phrases, are of the same import. See Schleusner's Lex. in voc. 8ia. The difficulty remaining is, to explain the phrase " by whom 6/ ov he (the Father) made the worlds ;" Heb. i. 2. The Apostle has added sufficient inverses 10 — 12, as it might seem, to prevent mistake here. If, however, the difficulty seems still to press, it may be compared with Hos. i. J, " I (Jehovah) will have mer- cy upon the house of Judah, and will save them by Jehovah" Is the second Jehovah merely the instru- mental cause in this case ? Of the same nature is the phraseology in Gen. xix. 24, "And Jehovah rained down upon Sodom and Gomorrha fire and brimstone from jekovah out of heaven." Must the last Jeho- vah, in this case, be a being inferior to the first? If not, then the phrase that God made the worlds by his Son, does not imply, of course, that the Son is of an infe- rior nature. It does imply that there is a distinction between the Father and Son ; and this is what we aver to be a Scripture doctrine. It seems to declare, also, that the Godhead, in respect to the distinction of Son, teas in a special manner concerned with the creation of the worlds. What is there impossible or improbable in this ? From the passages of Scripture thus far considered, it appears plain that the Apostles have ascribed the creation of the universe to Christ. And now we come, in order, to the consideration of the simple question, 66 whether he who created the world is really and truly divine. i First, then, permit me to ask, If the act of creation does not prove the being who performs it to be omni- scient, omnipotent, and independent, is it possible for me to conceive of any thing which does or can prove the existence of such a being? To bring this world into existence from nothing — to establish such perfect concord and design through all the operations of nature — to set in motion unnumbered worlds and systems of worlds, and all in the most perfect harmony and order — requires more intelligence, more power, and more wisdom, than ever belonged to any finite being. And if these things do not characterize the infinite being, it seems to me no proof that such a being exists, can be adduced. It is in vain to tell me here that the creation of the universe can be performed by delegation — by an infe- rior and subordinate being. What can be meant by omnipotence and infinite wisdom (all of which must belong to a Creator) being delegated? Can God dele- gate his ])erfeclio?is ? If so, then the Gnostics, when pressed with the argument that Jehovah, the God of the Jews, was the Supreme God, because he created the heavens and the earth, might have replied, that he did this only by delegated power ; and that the act of creation, therefore, proves nothing. You reply to such an allegation, that the act of creating the universe is one which no finite or secondary being can perform ? If this act do not designate the absolute, Supreme, omnipotent, and omniscient Being, then no proof that such a Being exists can possibly be adduced. We use the very same arguments to confute those who maintain that Christ created the world by delegated power. The Apostle having decided the question that Christ did create the world, has decided, consequent- ly, that he must be truly divine. Agreeably to this reasoning, the Bible everywhere appeals to creative power as the peculiar and distin- guishing prerogative of the Supreme God ; and attri- 67 butes it solely to Jehovah. Road Gen. ii. 2, 3; Ex. xx. 11 ; Is. xliv. 24; Jer. x. 12; Ps. viii. 3,4; cii.25, and other passages of the same tenour. Read Is. xl., and onward, where God, by his Prophet, makes a most solemn challenge to all polytheists to bring the objects of their worship into competition with him, anddeclares himself to be distinguished from them all by his being "the Creator of the ends of the earth" (ver. 28), and by his having formed and arranged the heavens (ver. 26). Can it be made plainer than these passages make it that creative power was regarded by the Hebrew Pro- phets as the appropriate and peculiar attribute of the Supreme God ? Need I say, that the Old Testament is filled with passages which ascribe the work of crea- tion to Jehovah alone? Who does not find them every- where intermixed, in the most delightful and affecting manner, with all the instructions of the sacred Hebrew writers ? Now, if a subordinate agent, a finite spirit, did create the universe, why should all the instructions of the Old Testament be so framed as inevitably to lead the Jew- ish nation to disbelieve and reject this fact? Specially so as the Jews were strongly inclined to polytheism, and a plurality of gods would have been very agreeable to their wishes. And why, after a lapse of so many centuries, should the writers of the New Testament overturn all that the Hebrew Scriptures had taught on this subject and lead men to admit that a finite being could and did create the world ? Most of all, how could Paul say (Rom. i. 20) that the Heathen were without excuse for not acknowledging the eternal power and Godhead of the Divinity, from the evidence which his creating power afforded. — fromconsideringtheTHiNGS THAT WERE MADE? And is this truth (that the Deity possesses eternal power and Godhead) so plain, then, and so easily de- duced from creating energy, that the very Heathen are destitute of all excuse for not seeing and admitting it ; and yet, can it be the object of Christianity to bring us back to the very polytheism for which the Apostle condemned them — to bring us to " worship 68 the creature more than the Creator?" Does Chris- tianity contradict 'a truth of natural religion so plain and incontrovertible, that the very Heathen were with* out excuse for not acknowledging it? And after read- ing such a passage in the writings of Paul, can it be possible to suppose, that he ascribed the creation of the world to any thing but the true God only ? Com- pare now Acts xvii. 23 — 26, with John i. 1 — 3, and 10; Heb. i. 10—12; Coloss. i. 14—1/; and then say, is it possible to admit the rules of interpretation which you have laid down, and not admit that the Apostles designed to assert that Christ is the Creator of the Universe? And if he is so, is it possible to deny that he is truly divine? It were easy to produce passages of the New Tes- tament, which ascribe the same works to Christ as to God (as John v. \J — 23 ; xiv. 9, 11). But as the vindica- tion of these would swell these Letters beyond their proper length, I shall not enter into a discussion of them at present. I am not anxious to increase the number of witnesses ; for, acknowledging the New Testament to be of divine authority, I consider what- ever it plainly declares, once to be the truth. The re- levancy and plainness of the testimony, therefore, is more the object of my solicitude, than the number of witnesses, — a point, 1 may add, in which many, who have defended our sentiments, have greatly erred. I shall proceed, therefore, to other texts of Scrip- ture, in which Christ is declared to be God. Rom. ix. b y " Whose are the Fathers ; and from whom, in repect to the flesh (his human nature), Christ (descended), who is the Supreme God, blessed for ever. Amen !" In regard to this text, it may be remaiked,/frs/, that although Griesbach has filled his margin with conjec- tured and other readings, he attributes no considerable weight to any of them ; for all the manuscripts of the Epistle to the Romans, which have been collated, con- tain the text as it stands ; as do all the ancient versions, and nearly all the Fathers. In rendering ro xara caexa, in respect to his human na- 69 lure, I feel supported by corresponding passages, in Rom. i. 3;* Acts, ii. 30. And that h u» en nww Sso^ vSkoyrtToc u; ro-j; aiuvag, is literally translated, z^o is Su- preme God, blessed for ever, may be shown in various ways. 'Oojv is here put, as in common (see John i. 18; iii. 13; 2 Cor. xi. 31), for h &*>, who is. The ground of this lies simply in the nature of Greek usage. Whenever 6 is used for 6;, it takes the participle w in- stead of the verb «o*r/. The Greeks say 6 uv, but ©> igti. Ecr/ rravruv ©go? is, literally, " over-all God," i. e. Su- preme God. Compare with the phraseology here, the word rravra {all), as used in a connexion which re- spects Christ, in Col. i. 1/ ; Eph. i. 19, 23; John iii. 31 ; and 1 Cor. xv. 2/. It is used in such passages as a term of qualification which serves to describe him as the head or r?der of the universe. What, then, can £-/ nww Qiog mean, but Supreme God ? But on no text has greater pains been bestowed, in order to devise an unusual construction and meaning. Schlichting proposed to transpose o w, and read mp o, i. e. of whom (the Jewish Fathers) is God, blessed for ever. But as, in this very Epistle, the Apostle has la- boured to prove that God is as well the God of the Gentiles as the Jews (ch. iii. 29), this expedient would seem to impeach the Apostle's consistency, as well as violate the text. Nor would the text itself, as amend- ed by Schlichting's conjecture, be in any measure ac- cordant with the idiom of the Greek language. If &og has the article (and his transposition makes it o Sso;), then tokoytp-og must of necessity have it too, — inasmuch as an adjective following a noun with an article, and agreeing with it, of necessity takes the article. Wetstein's conjecture, that it should be read 6 an, 6 i-i vaurw Qiog, is not more fortunate. Such a mode of expression as o w 6, all relating to the same subject, is repugnant to Greek usage. Besides, this conjecture_, like that of Schlichting, not only violates the integrity of the text, but assigns the article to Sag, and omits it before Evto/qrof, which is surely inadmissible. * As it stands in the Textus Rjceptus. f2 70 Enough of amending the Apostle's words by con- jecture, without the authority of a single manuscript or version. Critical acumen has also employed itselfin dividing and translating the verse in question, in a manner different from that in our common Testament. The late Professor Justi, at Marburg, a man of great acuteness and fine taste, undertook to defend the in- genious supposition, that the latter part of the verse is a doxology. He renders it, " Whose ancestors were those [renowned] Fathers from whom the Messiah, as to his mortal body, was derived, who is exalted over all [the Fathers]. God be blessd forever!" Thus, by the aid of supplying an idea not contained in the text, and by doing violence to the custom of language, in the doxological part, he has devised a method in which we may avoid the assertion, that Christ is God over all, or Supreme God. But who does not perceive the violence and inaptitude of the divulsion which he makes, by separating the former from the latter part of the verse ? Besides, how would a doxology fit the passage in question ? Crellius (Init. Evang. Johan. p. 230, 237) l° n § a ?° was candid enough to own, that when the Apostle was affected with the greatest sad- ness, on account of the unbelief of his Jewish brethren, and the loss of their privileges, a doxo/ogi/ was not very congruous. A prayer (as in ch. x. 1) would seem, as he thinks, to be much more appropriate. Omitting, however, all this, it may be added, that Greek usage by no possibility admits of the doxologi- cal version of Justi. ©so? tvXoyr,ro? means, God who is blessed, i. e. the proposition in such a case is assumed, not asserted. But s^oyr^og 6 Qic? means, God be blessed; lei God be blessed or praised. In accordance with this Greek usage, we find five instances of doxology in the New Testament, and about forty in the Old, in which vj\oyr,rog is uniformly placed first. The same order is observed in respect to xaraparog (cursed), when an im- precation is uttered. Besides, the text must be changed to make out a doxology ; and we must read 6 Qsog instead of Qsoc ; for universal usage prescribes evXe/^rog 6 ©so?. (The in- n stance Ps. lxvii, 19; Sept., brought by Stolz in his Ertaeuterungen, &c. to support Justi's rendering, de- pends merely on wrong punctuation, and the repetition of a word which does not correspond to the Hebrew text.) Finally, if a doxology to the Father were intended here, it is scarcely possible to suppose that a particle of transition (&, for instance) should not have been in- serted, in order to give notice of so great a change. In any other ca3e, we should expect to find it thus, — 6 fo m ; or if the doxology begin at ©so?, then svXoynro; 6 ©so*-. Xo text, no manuscript, no ancient version, gives us a trace of either of these readings. To invent them, therefore, and force them upon the text, or to substitute a conjecture, which originated from theological specu- lation, against the plain and incontrovertible evidence of the integrity of the text, what is it but to introduce a principle fundamentally subversive of all interpreta- tion and criticism, and give up the Scriptures to be moulded to every man's own wishes ? All conjectures and theories, then, appear to be quite incompetent to explain away the common ren- dering of the verse, and the meaning connected with it. On the other hand, we may ask, How comes it that Christ, according to his human nature {to xara tagxa) is said to have descended from the Fathers ? What if I should affirm that David, as to his human nature, was descended from Jesse ? Would you not of course ask, what other nature had he except human? And such an inquiry, forced upon us by the expression in ques- tion, the Apostle has immediately answered. As to his nature not human, he was "Supreme God, blessed for ever. Amen!" To have produced the human na- ture connected with such an exalted Being, the Apos- tle reckons as one of the special privileges which the Jews had enjoyed. See and compare Rom. ix. 1 — 4. I do not argue that Christ is divine, merely from having the appellation Qso; bestowed upon him. But if o ojv stti rravruv Qbo; be not Supreme God, and if the anti- thesis in. this verse do not require us to understand a divine nature here, then I must despair of discovering F3 72 the sentiment of any text of Scripture, by using any of the rules of exegesis. Heb. i 8, 9. " But unto the Son he saith, Thy throne, O God, is for ever and ever : A sceptre of righteous- ness is the sceptre of thy kingdom. Thou hast loved righteousness and hated iniquity ; therefore God, even thy God, hath anointed thee with the oil of gladness above thy fellows." This passage is quoted from Ps. xlv. 6, *], It has been objected, that b ^so? here should not be translated as the vocative, but nominative, — e. g. " God is thy throne for ever and ever, or thine everlasting throne or eternal support." To this it may be replied, 6 Ssog is the common vocative of the New Testament and Septuagint. Xo objection to the usual rendering of this verse in the vocative case can be made from the form of the word, which is altogether common in Hellenistic Greek.* The At- tics use the same form of the noun, but they write it u %toc and not 6 Ssoj. One needs only to open his Sep- tuagint, in the Book of Psalms, or in almost any other part, to see incontrovertible evidence that o ^so? is the common vocative of the Hellenistic writers. To the translation, " God is thy throne," i. e. thy support, several objections may be made. 1. Greek usage does not permit such a version. The subject and predicate cannot both have the article, un- less in the case of a convertible or reciprocal sentence ; and surely it will not be urged, that such is the present case. 4 ' God is thy throne" would stand in Greek, Roves' gov o ^bo;.-\ For such a change in the text there is no respectable authority. 2. Such a translation would render insipid the ar- gument of the Apostle, in this chapter, to prove the preeminently exalted nature of Christ. To say of this illustrious personage, God is thy throne, i. e. thy sup- * There were several dialects of the Greek language, the Attic, the Doric, &c. The Hellenistic Greek is a mixed dialect, which prevailed in the countries and periods in which the New Testament writers lived— Ed. f See the latter clause of the verse where ?? |a£oo£ is the subject, but gaZoo; the predicate, according to the laws oj the language. 73 port, might excite the persons to whom the epistle was addressed to ask, "And who is not supported by God ? How is Christ entitled, on this account, to claim any preeminence in our regard?" 3. Such a translation contradicts the meaning of the word throne, understood either literally or figuratively. Literally, it is the seat on which kings sit. This sense is here out of the question. Figuratively \ it stands for dominion, e?npire, regal authority ; because it is one of the ensigns of such authority. But there is no such figurative sense to it as that of support. And what sense would it make to say, God is thy dominion, thy regal authority ? If you reply, This may mean God is the cause of thy dominion or regal authority, then I ask again, Of what king's dominion and authority is not God the cause? Is it not the universal doctrine of the Bible that " by hi,n kings reign and princes decree jus- tice?" And how then is Christ entitled to any preemi- nence because God is the cause of his dominion ? Or what advances does the Apostle make in his argument by such an assertion ? To the translation in question there is still another objection, which is drawn from the nature of Hebrew parallelism in poetry. The verse under discussion plainly is one in which the subject is the same in both parts, i. e. it is a synonymous parallelism. Now, the second member of this is, "the sceptre of thy kingdom is a sceptre of righteousness;" in other words, thy do- million is righteous. The first member of the parallel- ism, consequently, is to be explained in a similar way, and evidently means thy dominion (throne) is everlasting. What could be more tasteless or unmeaning here than to say, " God is thy throne," i. e. support, or cause of dominion — when the object of the writer is to show the preeminent dignity of the Son of God ? The proposed mode of rendering, then, violates Greek usage — frustrates the argument of the Apostle — forces an unexampled meaning upon Sftwe — and transgresses the laws of parallelism in the Hebrew original, from which the passage was taken. I am aware of the objections which have been made to understanding the word God, in the passage now under consideration, in its highest sense. For, first, — It is said that the person called God {Elohim) here calls another being his God, and therefore he cannot be Su- preme. To the fact I readily assent ; but the conclusion drawn from it I must be permitted to doubt. If Christ be de- scribed in the Forty-fifth Psalm (and the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews asserts this to be the fact), he is described as a king triumphant over his enemies. As the Messiah, the anointed king, he might, with the greatest propriety, call Jehovah his God — for as Mes- siah he is to be considered as incarnate — and of course subordinate. Is it still a matter of wonder that the same person could at one time be called GWand have everlasting dominion ascribed to him, who, the next moment, calls Jehovah his God ? It is a wonder of the same nature, as that which perplexed the Jews, when Christ asked them how David could call the Messiah Lord, while at the same time he was his Son. It is a wonder which no ground but that of Trinitarians can ever explain. I mean the ground, that the divine and human natures coexisted in Christ, and that in the same sentence he could, with propriety, speak of him- self as human and divine. The sacred writers appear not to take the least pains to separate the two natures in any thing which they say of either. They everwhere speak of Christ (so it appears to me) as either human or divine, or both. They do not seem to apprehend any danger of mistake in regard to the subject, no more than we when we say, Abraham is dead, or Abraham is alive, think it necessary to add, as to his body in one case, or as to his soul in the other. This very negligence (if I may be allowed the ex- pression, saving every thing that would imply impro- per want of care) offers a powerful argument to me, I confess, to prove that the sacred writers regarded the human and divine natures as so intimately connected in Christ, that it was unnecessary and inexpedient to attempt a distinctive separation of them, on every oc- casion which brought to view the person or actions of Christ. A second objection is urged, — viz. that the king, who is the subject ofthe Forty-fifth Psalm, notonly calls God his God, but is said to be "anointed with the oil of gladness, above his fellows." If Christ be truly di- vine, how, it is asked, can he have fallows, L e. equals? The answer to this has, in substance, already been given. Christ is introduced here as the incarnate Mes- siah. To the office of king > God * consecrated him with the oil of gladness," i. e. placed him in a royal station ; he has the "oil of gladness abo % his fellows," or a rank above those who also hold a regal office. Ithas been objected, thirdly, that the Forty -fifth Psalm, from which our text was taken, does not belong to the Messiah, but to David or Solomon. But how is this proved ? " The language," it is said, " is such as to show that it is a mere epithalamium or nuptial ode on the marriage of one of these kings with a foreign prin- cess." I have no time to enter into a discussion of this topic here ; but I am satisfied that the difficulties which press upon such a view ofthe Forty-fifth Psalm are over- whelming. Whatever may be said, moreover, to prove this, unless it be palpable demonstration, cannot weigh much in the minds of those who regard the authority of the writer that composed the Epistle to the Hebrews. He has told us that the passage in question is addres- sed lo the Son, Here, then, if our view be correct, is one instance' more in which Christ is called God, with adjuncts which render it probable that the Supreme God is meant. I should rank the texts which 1 have already pro- duced as the leading ones to establish the divine na- ture of Christ. But there are others which should not be neglected, in an impartial examination of Scripture evidence, on the present topic. 1 John v. 20, " And we know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know him that is true ; and we are in him that is true, 76 even in his Son Jesus Christ. This is the true God and eternal life." There are two reasons here why (<> aXrfaos §so;) the true God may be referred to Christ. 1. The gram- matical construction favours it. Christ is the imme- diate antecedent. I grant that pronouns sometimes relate to a more remote antecedent; but cases of this nature stand on the ground of necessity, not of common grammatical usage. What doubt can there be that John could, without scruple, call the Logos the true God (i ttktfivog Iteos), whom he had before asserted to be God and to have created all things? But, secondly, mj' principal reason for referring the true God (6 aki\6m$ ^so;) to Christ is the other adjunct which stands with it ; " This is the true God — and the eternal LIFE." How* familiar is this language with John, as applied to Christ ! " In him (£ e. Christ) was LIFE, this life was the light of men — giving life to the world — the bread of life — my words are spirit and LIFE — I am the way, the truth, and the life — the Lo- gos of life. This life (Christ) was manifested and we have seen it, and do testify to you and declare the eternal life, which was with the Father, and was manifested to us." 1 John i. 2. Now, as I cannot find any instance in John's writings in which the ap- pellation of life and eternal life is bestowed upon the Father, to designate him as the author of spiritual and eternal life — and as this occurs so frequently in John's writings as applied to Christ — the laws of exe- gesis compel me here to accord in my exposition with the common laws of grammar, and to construe both 6 «Xq 6m$ 3eo$ and *£«jj ouumog (or, as some manuscripts more consonantly with Greekidiom, read h ^r t r, ww*?), both of Christ. If the true God then be not really divine, who is? John xx. 28. " And Thomas answered and said unto him, my Lord and my God." I have three reasons for adducing this text. 1. There is no satisfactory proof that it is an exclama- tion of surprise or astonishment. Xo phrase of this kind, by which the Jews were accustomed to express surprise or astonishment, has yet been produced ; and there is no evidence that such a phrase, with the sense alleged, belongs to this language. 2. The Evangelist tells us, that Thomas addressed himself to Jesus ; said to him, eivev auru ; he did not merely exclaim. 3, The commendation, which the Saviour immediately bestows upon Thomas, serves chiefly to defend the meaning that I attach to the verse. Christ commends him for having seen and believed. The evidence that he believed was contained in the expression under examination ; for, before uttering this expression, he is represented as doubting. On the supposition, then, that the expression was a mere exclamation, what evidence was it to the mind of Jesus, or could it be to the minds of others, that he admitted the claims of the Saviour of men, to the character which was connected with this office ? What more proof of real belief can be found in such an exclamation , if it be truly one, than we can find that men are Christians, when they repeat, as is very common on occasions of surprise or delight, the name of Christ, by way of exclamation ? But if we admit that the words of Thomas were the proper evidence and expression of that belief, for which the Saviour commended him (and 1 do not see how we can fairly avoid this) ; then we must admit that he will commend us, for believing that he is both Lord and God, Kvmg xat 0fo?, unless we adopt the notable expedient of Schlichting, who avers that Lord is to be referred to Christ, and God to the Father : which latter, he thinks, Thomas spoke, after some in- terval of time had elapsed. I pass over several passages, where our common text applies the name of God to Christ ; e. g. Acts xx. 28, and 1 Tim. iii. 16. In regard to this latter text, however, it appears to me a plain case, that the authorities which Griesbach himself has adduced, would fairly lead to a decision different from his own, respecting ihe genuineness of the reading, &m. I will not attempt to weigh them here ; as 1 feel no desire to press into my service, witnesses of a character at 78 all dubious. I admit the great desert of Griesbach, in his critical edition of the New Testament. I be- lieve he was a man who would not willingly or con- sciously misrepresent either facts or arguments, for or against any reading. But the work which he un- dertook was too great to be accomplished by one per- son, or even by one whole generation of critics. Dr Laurence, in his Essay upon the Classification of Ma- nuscripts by Griesbach, has rendered it more than probable that Griesbach's account of facts is not un- frequently vert/ erroneous, not through design, but from human infirmity ; and that the principles by which he estimated the value of manuscripts, and of course the genuineness of particular readings, are fun- damentally erroneous. And, since I am on this sub- ject, I may take the liberty to state, what seems to be so little known among us, that Griesbach is not the only recent editor of a critical Testament, to which the great body of critics attach importance. The ce- lebrated Matthai, whom Middleton calls the best Greek scholar that ever edited a Greek Testament, published at Riga (between A. D. 1 782—1/88) a cri- tical Testament, of twelve volumes, which approaches much nearer to the Textus Receptus, than the edition of Griesbach, with whom he is at variance. Eichhorn (after giving a high character of this edition of Matthai, and noticing that', in his maxims respecting the forma- tion of the Xew Testament text, the editor differs very much from Griesbach and others) says, that " for a long time he had followed the middle path be- tween the two parties." [Bibliothek. Band ii. St. 2. s. 411.1 The whole system of classifying manuscripts, which lies at the very foundation of ail Griesbach's decisions in regard to the text, is rejected by Matthai as worth- less ; and Dr Laurence has, in the Essay above-men- tioned, made an attack upon the same classification, which renders questionable the principles of it ; at least the application of those principles, as made by Griesbach. Professor Knapp, of Halle, has also published a Greek Testament, the text of which is independent of Griesbach's, although it approximates to it. The edition is esteemed for its punctuation, order of words, accentuation, and spirituation ; and has great currency. I acknowledge this is digression. But it may he useful to those who are in the habit of attributing so much weight to Griesbach's decisions, to know that they are far from being uncontroverted by many of the best critics among his own countrymen. I know of no commentator of note who has made Griesbach's text his basis, except Paulus ; and he has reexamined all his decisions. To return, however, to our subject: We do not want, and feel no disposition to use, either of the texts referred to above as proof texts, in the question be- fore us. There is another class of texts, which I have not hi- therto mentioned, because the certainty of their mean- ing is commonly thought to be less capable of demon- stration than that of others which I have produced. I refer to such texts as Ephes. v. 5, "The kingdom of Christ and God;" Titus ii. 13, "Looking for the bles- sed hope and glorious'appearance of our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ;" 2 Tim. iv. 1, "I adjure you before God, even Jesus Christ, who will judge the quick and the dead at his appearance and kingdom;" 2 Pet. i. 1, .... "of our God and Saviour Jesus Christ." The translation of these texts here proposed is al- together in conformity to the Greek idiom. Middle- ton (on the article) thinks it absolutely essential to it : For, although proper names and abstract nouns, in such a connexion as Qsog and Xp/gro?here, may take the article before the first noun, and omit it before the se- cond, and yet designate different things and persons ; yet if words which are attributives omit the article in such a case, they exhibit evidence that they are to be connected with a preceding noun, and are the pre- dicates of it, and not significant of something separate, e. g\, in the first case, Eph. v. 5, " the kingdom of G 80 Christ and God," according to this rule, would mean, of Christ, who is God; in the second instance, Tit. ii. 13, the meaning is, "of the great God, who is our Saviour," &c. Mr Wordsworth, a few years since, instituted a most laborious investigation of the Greek Fathers, to see whether the idiom which respects the article here was prevalent in their writings ; and whether they ever understood more than one person to be designated by such expressions. The result I will give in his own words. (P. 132.) " I have observed more, I am persuaded, than a thousand instances of the form, 6 Xeizro; xa/ 0so? (Christ and God) (Eph. v. 5) ; some hundreds of instances of 6 /.ityag Qsoc xai eurr,? (the great God and Saviour) (Tit. ii. 13) ; and not fewer than several thousands, of the form 6 Qzo? xai auir^o (God and Saviour) (2 Pet. i. 1) ; while in no single case have I seen, where the sense could be determined, any one of them used, but only of one -person." After all, if there were no other evidence of the di- vinity of Christ in the Xew Testament, than what de- pends solely on these texts, one might perhaps hesi- tate concerning the subject. But when I consider that the method of translating here proposed, is perfectly conformable to the Greek idiom, and must be adopted in various other passages (e. g. Rom. xv. 6, Eph. v. 20, James i. 2/) — and if adopted in these, will give them a sense conformable to that of other parts of the sacred volume — I confess the evidence which these passages afford, if not decisive, at least confirms in no small degree the testimony of other texts ; — specially in this case, in regard to the text in Titus ; for where is the appearing of God the Father ever spoken of by the Xew Testament writers ? It is Christ who appear- ed to execute vengeance upon the Jewish nation, — who will appear at the judgment. Yet here, the appearance of the great God is mentioned — of the great God and Saviour ; for so I cannot but believe the text is fairly to be construed. Can this great God be any other than Christ himself? Thus much for the texts which bestow on Christ the 81 appellation of God, with adjuncts that show in what sense the word God must be understood, according to the common rules of interpreting language. I must now II. Examine another class, which attribute to Christ equa- lity with God, or that power and dignity or honour which be- long to God. I use the phrase equality with God, after the example of the Apostle, in the text to be immediately examin- ed. I know, at the same time, it is a phrase that leads, if any are so disposed, to logomachy. What I mean by it is explained by the words which immediately fol- low it. Phil. ii. 5 — 8. "Let the same mind be in you which was in Christ Jesus ; who, being in the condition of God, did not regard his equality with God as an object of solicitous desire, but humbled himself (assumed an inferior or humble station), taking the condition of a Servant, being made after the similitude of men, and being found in fashion as a man, he exhibited his hu- mility by obedience, even to the death of the cross." Such is the rendering which, after laborious exami- nation, I am persuaded the Greek of this passage not only admits, but demands. I will state my reasons for dissenting from the common method in which either Trinitarians or Unitarians have translated it. Our common version runs thus, — " Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but humbled himself,'' &c. This version seems to render nugatory, or at least irrevalent, a part of the Apostle's reasoning in the passage. He is enforcing the principle of Christian humility upon the Philippians. In order to urge this in the most effectual manner, he proposes to them the example of Christ, — " Let the same mind be in you which was in Christ." What was this ? — It was manifested by the fact, that though essentially divine O ftogpq 0£oj), he did not eagerly re- tain his divine condition, but assumed the station or condition of a servant (jm&ip dmkut). Here the rele- vancy of his reasoning is sufficiently plain. But how g2 82 was it any proof or example of humility, that he did not think it robbery to be equal with God? Besides, the Greek will not fairly bear this construc- tion. 'Agray/iog, translated robbery, does not seem here to signify an act of robbery, but res rapta, or rather, fi- guratively resavide diripienda el ' vindicanda ', — i. e. some- thing which is eagerly to be seized and appropriated. (See Schleusner and Storr, in locum.) Moreover, ac-c.y>j.c:, which our translators have placed nest to the verb rr/r,(ra-o, does not, by the rules of syntax, belong there. The Greek syntax would place the words thus, as to their sense, — wx rr/rfiaro to saeu tea S=& [xara] dscray/xcv, literally, " he regarded not the being equal to God (as) igcray^w, as a thing to be greedily sought or appro- priated." For these reasons, I cannot believe that our common version gives the sense of the passage. And, for simi- lar reasons, I feel compelled to reject the version so common among some Unitarians, — " He did not think of the robbery of being equal with God." The objec- tions to it are, that it translates agrayftovheYe, as desig- nating the action of robbery ; and that owe rr/r^aro ro mat ita. Sew uscruy-;.:; can never be proved to mean, " He thought not of the robbery of being equal with God." The verb r t yr,