*» -» COLLECTION OF PURITAN AND ENGLISH THEOLOGICAL LITERATURE I LIBRARY OF THE THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY ^ yjyialXcr m^ sec 7-JiJ^l •^.jir-^. r* /■ / f ' S"^ 1^ '/imx ■* •* •N Solid Philofophy JSSERTED, Againft the FANCIES of the IDEISTS OR, THE Method to Science Farther Illuftrated; WITH Reflexions on Mr. LoCKFs ESS AT concerning Human Under flanding. LONDON, Printed for Roger Clavll at the "PeacGcl^ Ahel Roper at the Black Boy^ both in Fleetfireet^ and Thoma^ Metcalfe over againft Earfs-CoHrt in Drury-Lane^ i6^j. U J '.I J tUI-^-.l- ■ LI / : c^ To the Right Honourable ROBERT. Lord Vifcount Dimhar. My L o R D5 HAD I thought that this Pierre t here Dedicate to Your Lordiliip, was not above Your, or any Man's, Patronage, I had fliewn IcfsRelpeCtsco You in making You fo Mean a Prefent. Were You Monarch of the Univcrfe, TRUTH (which it Defends) could receive no Pro- teuton, from Your Grandeur. Her Genius i5 lb SubUme, and Her felf fo Nobly-born , that, like Him from whom ilic defcends, ih;^ h Benejicialio all, and Incapahle of receiving Advantage from any. All Extrinfccal vSu im- ports, in (lead o{ Honouring her, Dehafe her. Her Well-compacSed and IndifToluble Fa- brick is altogether Divine : Contrary to our Material Strudures, it is Built from 1 he Top ; and, its Foundation laid as high as Heaven? it felf. The GOD of Truth has imprinted all A^j/'/^r^/ Truths in Created Beings, as in the Footfteps of his Infmitc Wifdom ; from whence, by the Vehicles of our Senlcs, A z they The Epijlle Dedicatory. rhey arc Copy*d and Tranfcrib*d into our Mind ; where, without our Labour, they beget all our Natural Notions ; and, as Spe- culation, and even Experience, allures us, they do alio, at the lame time, giveuslbmc Knowledge of the Things tbemjehes ; whicFi ftcadily and dirtindty Reflected on, breed in us that bed Natural Perfed:ion of our Underftanding , SCIENCE; of which thole Notions are, as it were, the SeeJs. Thus was Mankind \mt into a plaia Road- way of gaining Clear Intelkclual Lights by the Common Providence of our Good Creatour. To improve in which, and to keep our Thoughts from wandring into £r- rour, the fame Goodnefs of our Maker en- dowed us with a Faculty of Reflecting on the Operations of our own Mmds; and, on all the Guilded Train of our Spiritual Con- ceptions, and of the ieveral Natures and Manners of them ; by which means tliofc who were addicted to Attentive Reflexion, or: Speculation, invented a Way, and fctled Artificial Rules, how to manage their M?- t ions. Judgments and Dijcourjes, Wliich Rules laid orderly together, and found by Reafon to be Agreeable to the Natures of Things according to the Being they had in the Alinrl, and, therefore. Solid ; did, in time, compofe that excellent and molt ufeful ^ci- w^call'd LOGICh\ But, Tlje EpiJ}/e Dedicatory. But, my Lord, die Crooked Byafs of Men's Wi/Is perverted their Re.ijon , and made them diiregard this Well-grounded and Regular Methorl, given them lb freely by the Author of Nature. The Heathen Philofophers of old, whofe God was Vani- ty» affccfled to fet up feveral Sccls, to pride themfelves with the Empty Honour of be- ing cfleemed their Heads, The Chriflian Schools fucceeded ; who, atfirft, difcours'd gravely on thofe Subjedl:s which were of a higher Nature; but, whether the Circum- fiances did nojc bend their Thoughts that way, or from what other Reafon, they fet- tled no Scieniificai Method to attain Philo- fophical Knowledges. Yet, thofe who fol- low'd Anjlotle's Principles, (as the great Aquinas conftantly endeavoured ) did gene- rally difcourfe even in fuch Subjecfts, when they had occafion, ^cvy jolidly. But, after- wards, when School-difputes grew to be the only failiionable Learning, the Multitudes of Combatants increas'd, and the Contcfts were maintained by feveral Great Bodies ; each of wdiich thought it Creditable to their Party to fet up and follow fome Eminent Man of their own. Hence this Nature? taught Method came to be much neglected ; and he was thought to win the Prize who was the fubtilefl: and acutefl Dijputant, and not he who could mofl folidly Dewonjirare A 3 ' 7 ruth. TJje Epijlle Veciicatory. Truth, Hence, no Exad: and Rational Lo- gick being Icctlcd and agreed on, they were apt to take up oftentimes Wrong Principles ; and the feveral Conceptions of our Mind were miflaken to be fo many feveral Things, DerfWnftratioH was rather taltrl of for FornVs lake, than purfud and praxis' d ; and, the the Ufe of General Maxims, which Ihould cftablifli our Difcourfes, was fcarce once thought on ; without which, Demonftration was Impoffible. New Qiieftions in Philo- Ibphy, of little or no ule, were ftarted ; and bandy'd to and fro by Terms and Words not well underftood ; nor their Senfe agreed on, by the Contending Parties. The Heat of Oppofition fix d Men in their own Opi- nions. Ina'^imerable Qiiaint and Nice, and fometimes Imper'^inent , Diftindtions were invented, to efcane their being Entangled by the Arguments of their Adverfary. Eve- ry man atFedted to be a Proteus , and took jnore Care to elude Oppofition, than to fet* tie and cftabiilb Truth on Imniovable Grounds, The true Senfe of Ariflotles Dodlrinc, not being taken from himfelf or his Fitfl Interpreters, but from fome Modern Mif- underftanders, was loft ; and his Text drawn into feveral Meanings, to abet Contradid:o- ry Tenets. In a Word, nothing was deci- I fti^eiy concluded y nor likely to be fo, by this way of School-Term-Lcarning, as things were The Ej)ijlle DecUcatdry. were managed by Umvetho^izA Difputatiou, Thus ftood the Affair of Philoibphy ac the beginning of this prelcnt Century ; which having been fertile of many Excellent Wits, two of the Chiefeft of them, Carteftus \\\ France^ and our Ingenious Countryman Mr. Locke, having taken Scandal at thclc Milcarriages, and an Averfion againft that Miracle o^ N'MuiQyAriJlotle, whole Dodtrine Schoolmen had ill reprefented ; and being withal Men of Strorig Brairjs, enabling tliein to carry their Conceptions through, and to make them Coherent ; they did, out of their Zeal for Truth, undertake to fet up New Syftems of Philofophy ; tho' Cartefius in fome fort, jurhijV d up, improvrl, and refind up- on the oldCorpulcularian Way o[ Democr/tux and Epicurus ; which I have fully confuted in the Appendix to my Method ; and, I hope, beyond all poflibility of Reply. But, thefe two Gentlemen, being better vcrs'd in the Mathematicks than in Metaphyficks ; and, thence , not apprehending how Corporeal Natures cowldget into the Mind, or he there; nor, reflecting that a Spiritual Nature, being incomparably Superiour in the Rank of Be^ inp to that of C^/^^rf^/ Things, muft, con- fequently, have naturally and nccelTarily a Power to comprehend, after its manner, (om by way of Knowledge) that Inferiour one; they were fore d, thro* their want of Higiicr A 4 Frin- The Epiji/e Dedicatory. Principles, to build all Knowledge, not up-^ on the Thh?gs tbemjelves in their Knowing Power, but upon hlens or Similitudes of them ; tho' neither of them fct themfelves to make out or demonftrate how wc could pofTibly have our Motions , or Firfl Notices of the Things by them. Now, thefe Spiri- tual Ideas being, moft evidently, neither the Thinqs kno\v>y}, nor any Mode or Accident of thofe Objects ; and, confequently, nothing at ^//of the Thing in any fort, were manifcilly convinced not to be the Produd:ions of Crea- tive Wifdom, in which he had imprinted all Natural Truths, but meer Fancies, coin'd by their Imagination. Thele Ideas or Fancies then, and only thcfe, they contemplated, and Grounded all Natural Trutlis, ( which could have no Foundation but only in the Things which the Firft Truth had made) up- on thefe Fantaftick Rejewllances : and, thence, tJiey put all Formal Truths to confill: in the Agreement of thofe Empty Similitudes ; till at length, (as Fancy let loofe to fly at its full Random, and driven forward with a quick Wit, does naturally and genuinly lead) they had introduced a kind of Fanaticifm into Philofophy ; built, in the main, or in great part, on a \)r:Q\ic\\Ac' ther, (the GOD and Author of A/l Truth,) who cannot contradict Himfelf, and therefore thofe two Sorts of Truths cannot hut a^ree ; it will follow, that the Explication of all Re- veal'd Points, made according to True Phi- lofophy, muft needs appear to hitelligenc Men to be moji Rational', and moll Coytfonant, and not Contradkflory ,to Tnie Natural Trin^ ciples : Which will Comfort Faith in thofe who believe already ; Recommend it to all Ingenu- ous and Indifferent Seekers ; help to Convert to Chriflianity thofe, whofe Reafon was for- merly Diflatisfy'd upon fuch Sinifter Mifcon- ceics ; and, Laftly, C^';^/^^^ Adverfaries, by putting them palt Oppofing it by any Princi- ples of True Philofophy, and lea^e nothing for them to objedl againft it, but Id/c and ///- grounded Fancies, whofe weak Attempts are cafily defeated. Whence, I could heartily Wifli, that, were True Philofophy in FafLion, al! Seds (fo the State thought fit) might have Free Liberty to Print the heft Reafons they can mufter up againft Chriftianity ; Refting confident, that (in that Happy State ofScrence; cr The Epijl/e Dedicatory] or True Learning) nothing in the World could gain to Truth a greater Advantage. Till thac Dcfirable Time comes, all I can do, is, to de- clare here publickly, that I fhall take it for a great Favour, if any Learned Soc'tnian^ Deljl^ or Atbeijly would pleafc to fend me thofe Reafons they, or their Leaders, judge oimofl Weighty why they cannot embrace the Do- dlrine of the Trinity j or Chrijlianity ; which they may do privately, and Unnam'd, to the Stationer who publiflies this Treatife ; and I do hereby promife them, I will give their Objediions their Full Force, and publifti an Anfwer to them : Onely, I will expedt, that their Arguments ihall be Intrinfecai ones, or drawn from the Oppofition fuch Revealed Ar- ticles, as they miflike, are conceiv'd by them to have to fome Principles of Logick, Phy- ficks, or Metaphyficks, which are either 6'(?//'- evidenty or which they will undertake to re- duce to Evidence : Thefe onely being fuch Objections as becomes a Chriftian Fbilojo* pher to fpeak to. For, if they be Extrinfecal ones, and built on Hiliories, or on Groundlefs Fancies ; or, if they confift in Glofling iVords, in whofe Senje we arc not Agreed ; it belongs to a Critick, or a Hijlorian, and is not the Proper Employment of a Philofopber. I would not be thought, by what is faid lately, to caft any RcHexions on Cartejius or yii, Locke y (whom I join here equally, and indif- Thi Epijl/e Dedicatory. indifferently, ) as intending any Diskindncfs to Chriftianity by their New Methods of Philolbphy : It appears both by their Wri- tings, and by their particular manner of handling their Subjecfls, that they meant in- genuoufly and fincerely to follow what they conceiv'd to be True. Onely I muft fay of both of them, that, if their IFay of Philofo- phizing, and, therefore, their Philofophy it Jelfy be fliewn to be far from Tn^e and So//r/ ; then, in cafe any Chief ChriftianTenet Ihould come to be Explicated by tbe/r Ways, thofc Sacred Points themjelves muft necedarily, for the Reafon now given, receive feme Tainc and Blcmifh by fuch Ill-qrounAed Explications : And the fame, for the fame Reafon, I muft fay oi School-Fhilojophy too, if it proceeds upon Principles l\\2iX.:iTtnox,We/I'groundecl , ox Solid. It remains, my Lord, to give my Reafons why this Common Duty I here perform to the Learned Part of Mankind who are Can- didates of Science, comes to be particularly addrefs'd to Your Self: Which, in fhort, arc thefe. I was much in Debt ; and it was an Honeft Man's Part to endeavour to discharge it. I ow'd much LO Your Lordlliip's Father, of Honourable and Pious Memory, whob.th encourag'd my firft Endeavours, and favour'd me with a particular Fricndfhip and Corre- fpo.idcnce to His Dying-Day : And, I make account, fuch kind Obligcmcnts, writ in a Great' Tlje Epijlle Dedicatory. Grateful Heart, ought to be as Lafl'ivg, ancf ils Bindings as thoie Obligations drawn on Paper ; and, withal, ought to devolve, by a Hereditary Right, to His Immediate Dcfcen- dcnt. Your Self. I ow'd very much to Your Lordfliip's own Perfon, for the Kind RefpecS with which You have been pleas'd to honour mc. I ow'd much to all Your Lordfhip'^ Neareft and Noblefl: Relations, both in the D/re^y and in all the Co/I^itera/ Lines. And, laftly, fmce every Man who writes for Truth, naturally loves to be Ufiderfloori, I ow'd it to my Self, to prefenc this Treatife particularly toYour Lordfliip; than whom, I know none of our Englifh Nobility more Acutely Intell'i' gent. It is of fuch a Nature, by its laying the Foundation of Philofophy from the deep- ed Bottom-Principles, that, to comprehend and penetrate it thorowly, there was requir'd a Judgment both Solid, and Pointed ; both which Perfecftions meet in Your Lordfliip's Great Genius, in a High Perfection, The Diligent Printer has overtaken my Lazy Pen, and ftays for this hafty Scribble ; which forces mc, with an Unmannerly Ab* ruptncfs, to write my felf. My LO R D, Tour Lordfiyifs Mofi Sincere Hjnnurer^ ^nd ?nofi bamhlj dtvoted Serv^nt-t J. s. THE PREFACE, DIRECTED To thofc Learned Men of both our Univerfitics who have a Due Re- gard for T R LI T H^ and a Sincere Defireof KNOWLEDGE. Gentlemen, I. A Fter ILi^PiMifk'J ivyUEmOD AA to SCIENCE, which I Dedica- •^ ted to your je Ives, I came to receive certain Information that very many Scudents in both the UniverfitieSy and not a few of thjje ■ alfo who were to inftriid: others, ^/V/j//>/y therri- fehes to the Way of Ideas, in hopes to arrive hy that means at Fhi/ofophical Knowledge, My hefl Jurlamenty grounded on very Evident Reajons, ajfur'd me, that that /Method was far from Solid, and utterly Unable to give you the True Knowledge of any thing in Nature ; being i^ f(^ If altogether Groundlci'Sy and meerly Su- perficial. I faw clearly, that to add/ci vour Thoughts to jludy SimiUcudes -w^/Refemblau- The Preface. ces, (which, as will he mo ft evi (lent I) demon' Jlr.itedf could not pojfihly g^ive you any True or Certain Light to k^ow the Things thcmlclves,) was no letter than ( as it is in the Falle ) Vi- trcLim vas lambere, pukem noii accingere. It Jlruck me with auery fenfihle Troulle^ that the precious Time and Pains of fuch great Num^ lers of Men, who were the Flower of our Na- tion, who were hereafter to ^d* Guides to othcfS, and whofe uery Profeffion, and State of Life^ had additled them wholly to the Furfuit of Knowledge, Jkould he imbued with fuch Trin- ciples as render d the Attainment of it ahjo- folutely Impoffihle, I lootd upon my fttf as one who, havin(3^ fpent near half a Century in Spe^ culatize Studies, was capable to avert and re- drefs fo great a Harm ; and, thence^ I cjie€m\l my j elf bound in Duty to make you atvare 'of the Way you have either chofen, or light into for want of a better ; that you might conjiderfe* rioufly whether you ought not to retrieve y/fur Steps ere you had wander' d too far in a Path which could never bring you to the End you air^d at, 71: is Conhderation obli'id me to flrike at tiie Root, and to overthrow the whole Way of proceeding upon Ideas, by whonfoever advan* ced ', and to demon ftracc by many Clear, and, I hope, Una njwer able Arguments, and Alulti' tudes of InjLinces, that it was Superficial, Fruirleis, Infignificant, and meerly Phanta- flual. a. When The Preface. 1. When I had near finij}) d my METHOD, I ga^e a Curfory Look over Mr, hockeys El- lay concerning Humane Undcrflanding; and J hap'd to light on jor,7e places ^ which gave me a high EJleem for it ; injomuch that I began to conceive fome Hopes that his Ingenious Thoughts wight, ivith fome jew Alterations, le reconciled to True Philolbphy : For, I was at that time_ far from intending to make any Reflexions ///)? on it, hut highly extolfd it where^ever I came ^ judging of the Whole, hy the Scantlings I had feen of it ( as it were ) accidentally, But^ th^ lajl September, fetting my f elf to take a nearer and fuller View of the whole Book, I quite lofl the Hopes, I had gladly entertained formerly ^ cf According it with Philojophical Principles ; and became much concern d, that fo Excellent a Wit fhould be half lojl to the Commonwealth of J^earning, ly lighting unfortunately into fuch an Unaccountable Method. For, I jaw evidently^ that ( befides the Oddnefs of the Way he took ) his Fancy, the Vivacity of which was very Ex- traordinary, had, in very many Particulars, got ftich an Afcendent over his Reafon, that, as he was Sceptical in divers Things which were Cleared Truths ; fo he feem'd in very many others to be Pofitive, the Contrary to which ^'a^ plainly Dcmonftrable, and in a manner vSiclf-cvidenC. / was heartily forry, I Jay, to fee fo confid^rahle a Writer, whofe Comprehend fve Gerfius, and Clear F^xpreJHG-n, would ha-je a 2. riade The Preface. 7narle 7 ruth Irrepfiihle, had he taken her part^ r^rj'Ierl fo Jl range ly as /(? /•jyfd' Fancies /f?/* Rea- lities "; a}ir{ to think that Philofophy, which is the Knowledge oj Things, conjijlefi in a per- petiial Contemplation of Empty Ideas, or Re- femblanccs. 3 . This wrought up my Thoughts higher, and made me conceive a greater Indignation again]} this New Way of Phiiofophizing ; and that, zr- 7 V particularly, for his fake ; tho I Jaw the Cartefians as much wanted Re tli tying in their Grounds, as he, or rather more. Wherefore, to gain fuch a powerful Affiftant over to Truth's hdc, (of which, his Sincere Prof ef ions of Inge- nuity would not let me defpair, ) I rejolvd to lay open thofe Blemiflies of Errours I had §1' fervd in his Eflay, retaining fill a due Efeem for the many Beauties it contain d : For, I do affure hinu ^y Nature leads me, as willingly to acknowledge and give their jujl Elogiums to his ^c/L^pSraiJi^x, as to dijccver the I^tTm- y^Tu, he may have fallen into at unawares, as I dcnht not hut my Readers will fee ; and, that ( tho' I declare Open War againjl the Way It felf ) I rather incline to Excule, than to Ag- gravate his Faults or MiJLikcs, Indeed, the Dutj IcnvdtoTruth olligd me to note thofe Latter with fuch a Dijiinclion, as I conceivd they did more or lefs injure that Sacred Concern » And, I was the more willing to enter the Lijls agai nil fuch a Champion ; becaufe^ if Ihofd ta (lam The Preface, 9ain a>jy ArlviVJtage over hirn^ ( I L\irl rather Jajy if I hafi the q^ood V or tune to win him^) 'tis jmpojjille Truth jhould ever oltaJn a yyiore clear Vitlory ; For, no Man, who takes the jujl Ditrer:^ fions of Mr. Locke '.f Great Wit, can think, that any thing hut the Invincille Force r/Truch can foil him. 4. / have good Reafon to fear, that this De- daring againjt whole Bodies of Ideifts, at once^ mil he interpreted by fome to favour of Singu- larity : It will he deem'd ly others, a high Im* prudence to r/iake fuch a Bold Breach with a World of Acute Spcculaters; with whole Scd:s of Modern Philojophers, Loth in two Neighbour- ing Nations, and in our own Univerjities ; and, in many Things y with mcfl of the School-mcil too. Others will think, that I do very unwifcly p re- voke Oppojition ; and, hy fuch a brisk Attack, in a manner Challenge all thofe Great Men who are of a contrary Sentiment. But, what is all this to his purpofe, who has devoted hir/tfcif wholly to promote ..v/^ defend TRUTH ; and, is fure he does, upon Solid Heafons, judge that to he True which he maintains ? This Objeciion feems grounded on this Falfe Maxim, which fome Men have fet up very politickly, to eJLi- blifh their own Reputation with the Vulgar^ as Sacred and Inviolable :, viz. that \fX\iQ, Opi- nion of a Multitude has the Force of a kind of Authority, to bridle the Undcrflandings of Private Men from Setting up a Contrary a 3 Do6trme.| The iPreface. Dodrine. ] Now , whatever feme Men may thhik cf this Tojitiorf, J mufl declare my Sent'i^ ment of it , that it is the mojl pernicious Ma* xim that could he invented, to hinder thepro' qrejs of Rational Nature in that which Jhould moft pcrfedt n ; that it puts a flop to the farther Ufe of then Reafon in all future Mankind ; that it makes all\m'^to\Qxncnx. in Knowledge Impof- fible, and utterly ohjlruch the Advancement of SCIENCE. No Reafoners, how many, or of how Great Name foever they he, have any Au- thoriiy at all hut hy Virtue of the Reafons they produce ; whence , that Single Man, who- ever he he, that /ri^/g J tetter Reafons, /^r the Tenet he advances, than all the former World has done for theirs, ought to have more of this (^mifcall'd) Authority, than that whole World ofOppofers. \ ^ 5. But, this poflponing the Con f deration of the Multitude of Diffenting Speculaters to Evi- dent Reafon, is ten times more Juflifiahle, in cafe that Oppofing Tarty does 'not fo much as pretend to , 7)juch lefs prodUce Self evident PriKciples, nor Demcnflrqiioh', to Ground, or Conclude their Tenets; hut builds oh Volun- tary Suppofitions, and makes ufe of Wit, good Language, and other meerly plaufihle Ways, to recommend their Concluftonsio the Approbation of their Readers, . Tlwje who do hot fo much as pretend to Demonflration and Clear Principles, leing unable to offer any Tiling that is Ctt" tain The Preface. tain, ouojjt mt {i>i my Opinicn) meddle at all tvith Philolbphy ; rwr appear lefore Learned Men with an Expetlation their Doclr'nie jhonld he Embraced ; nor can they, in reajon, Alfcrt any thing, hut only Propofc. ^. But the main Co?iJi deration which takes off all Invidioujnejs from my Carriage in this Tarticidar, is, that in this whole Contejl he- tween the Idcifls ahd me, there is toothing at all that is Pcrlbnal. 'Tis not the Parts or A- hilities of the Contenders^ hut their METHOD which is in Difpute, The Slowejl and Lameji Traveller, who can hutczQC^ jorward in a right Path, fihill Jooner arrive at his Journey s End^ than Another whoje Legs are nimble, and his pace fvvifr, if he takes a wrong Way at his ■fira Jetting out. /lather his greater Strength and Agility do, in Juch a caje, enable him oily to run more widely aftray ; as the Jlrongcjt Soiv Jhoots hxxhcii from the Mark, if the Shaft .he wrong Icvell'd. Let the Talent of Wit in the I de i Its /^ Incomparable , ( as doubt lefs tha t .^Cartefius was, to whom Lmay, with Jujlice^ Join Mr. Locked if the yizx\\o^'^ they take be not proper to attain true Science, their Er- routs, when they rAiJlake, ( as I am Jure .they do in their Principles , and, confejuenily, in ■ mofl of their ConcUifions ) mujl be to thejame Degree more Enormous, a^ their Fancies are more Ingenious. 'Tis their METHOD then, or their Way of Proceeding and Hnildtyjg a 4 !'pon The Preface. upoi Ideas, which I moft llawe and oppofe. Or r^'.-her I deplore the Detriment accruing hence to the Learned Part of the World, that Men^ endoiveA with fuch an Excellent Genius, did unluckily li^ht into fuch an Indiret} and Per- plexed Path ; feeing what vajl Advances Sci- ence wight have made, had fuch Men taken up Right Principles, hit upon the Right Way at fir ft, and apply d their StrongBrains to purfue it , 'Tis not then their Endowments which come in- to Competition, to which I deferr as much as is poffihle : For, I much miore admire the Skill of fuch Architects as can huild a Cajlle in the Air, and make it hang there hy Geometry (as it were) than all thofe com^monfort oj Artifts, who can raife fuch aStrutiure upon Firm Ground. 7. What our fever a I Methods are, the Ti- tle of my Book tells my Reader in fhort, viz. that, (^as I have hinted in my Dedicatory ) Theirs n to ground all their Difcourfes on Ide- as ; that is ( as themf elves exprefs it, and as the Word [ Idea ] declares,) on SimiHtudes or Rcfemblances ; which SimiHtudes, C as is a- hundantly demon ftr at cd in my three firft Prcli - minaries,) are meer Fancies : Mine is to huild ihem fclely and entirely on the Things them- (elve^, in which, as the Footjleps or Effeils of his Effential Verity, the Crc.it ive Wifdom of the God 6/ Truth, has planted and imprinted all Created Truths whatever. This Method I alferve fo txaflly throtfzj.wut my whole M E- THOD, The Prchcc. THOD, au^ thh prefent TrcAtife, that I Jifown and rertcnuce any Difcourjc hi either of thcje Books, which is not built either upon the Things a^ they are in Nature, or accorrlinq^to the Being they Natura/iy have in the Undcr- ftanding : And, I (ha fl owe much to that Man, ivho will (how me th.it I do any where decline from this Jolid and well-grounded iA^xhoA. As for Formal Truths, found in our Judgn^ents or Difcourjes, I build them on moft Evident Prin^ cipleSy or Jlrive to reduce them thither ; and en the Connexion of the Terms found i^i Pro- pofitions, by which only Truth can be exprejs^d ; keepingjlill an Attentive Regard to //'^Things themfelves. And I defire that the Differences between the Id e ids and me may be decided by the Impartial Umpirage of Rigorous Logick. A Ted, which, as I am fare their Cauje cannot bear, fo I am confident they will never accept of or jland to. For, it may eajily be difceryid by any ferious Refle^er, that their Procedure and manner of Difcourfing is not by way of lay- ing Principles, and drawing a Clofe and well- knit Train of Confequences, as I do in all the main Points of my Method, and in this pre- fent Treatife on occafwn ; but, by Unproved Suppofitions, jWLoofe Difcourles made up of well-exprefi^d Wit , Ingenious Remarks , Quaint Novelt'es, Plaujible Explications, and fuch other Superficial ways ; which, thd the^ take with Vulgar Readers, are (Jo Jpeak plainly) more The Preface, i>wre ft for Fhfliy Rhetorical Declamation, than for Manly a>irl Solid PHILOSOPHY. Nor do I thivk it did ever fo much as mice en^ ter into the Thoughts of tlye Idcifls, much lef their Hope, that their Difcoioje could he re- duced to Self-evidence, or to that Artificial Form of Clofe Dijcourfe called a Demonftra- tivc Syllogilhi ; which is the Touchftonc to Aitlingiiijh what Ratiocinations are ir^ily Con- dufive, ir/7i7/Inconchifivc or Fallacious. With- cut which, what do we know ? 8. I am very well aware wha-t Preju/dice I iring upon my feljj ly Addrcffmg you in this Confident manner at the "very firjl Daf) of my Ten ; and fame ive/Umeaning Friends have ad' vertis^d me, that this Carnage of mine has leen refletled on, efpecially by fome meer School-men ; \vohoy tho they in reality know nothing, are wore proud of their ProbabiHties, than the rnofl Scientifical Man living is qf his Demon- flrations ; tho" their utmofl Performances amount to no more than that cf the ridiculous Fortune- tellers of old, ^..* — Auc crir, aut non ; Divinarc ctenim magnus mihi donac Apollo. Whence I do fully espeHy that the Hurtwur of our Modern Spccnlaters will judge this Affured- vefs of mine to he a high rrefumption oj my own Performances ; nay, fotyie will think it a^proud Difregard The Preface. Vtfregard of others even to talk of Dcmon- llration. Indeed ^ I ynuft oiin I have a hi^h Opinion of iny Principles and my Method, whkh Nature a'nd G O D ' s good Providence have laid and eftablifli'd. Euty as for my Conclujiont and DediitiionSy as I will not jufli~ frs them all with il:e fame Firninefi as I did the i)'thers ; fo^ J inuji declare ^ that did I not yeally judge them Demonflrative when I call theM fa, I fhoidd not think I ought to propofe them as iuch ; nor at all to tl.re Learned. 7 he World has heenfitfficrentlyp^fterd already with Boo^ of rhi/ojophy, nay, Volumes, llown up To a vaji Btitk with Windy and Frothy Proba- bilities , and petty Inconcltifive Topicks ; which, like Raiik Weeds, have ^ver-run that Rich S&il ivhere Sdence oiight to have keen SoWti ; and I ejleem it too poor nvid mean a ■Vanity to plant Briar-fields to enlarge a Wil- 'dertefs. If I over we en hi calling my Proofs, Denrrohftr^tions, / am willhtg to take the Shame to 'my J elf, if it deferves Shame ; tho* 'per'haps I had been 'more bbm^e'Worthy, if, re- 'Ally judging them Demonjlrative, I had niin- "Ced the Truth, and out of an Ajfetled Modetiy, or a Diffidence Jor which I Jaw no Ground, I had dimimjV d their Force in the ejleem of my Rrad^rs ; a?id fo hindered the Profit , which, •ftdi^tled at //'f Uncouth Sound of X)Q:\won{[t2i' *tibh, thdy might otherwife have reaf d by look- ingmtothem. /V, DEMONSTRATIONS ave The Preface. (ire Strange Rarities /;; this ScepticalAge ; and ivhen thoje who are to fliow them do proclame to the World where they are to he feen, Curious People will run in Flocks to view the Mon- fter. 9. He that knows what Demonjlration is^ and verily judges his Argument isfuch, and yet, cutofNmienc and Sh^mchi^ncis fays at eve- ry turn, [ / think, it, or Rule, mull be fo : Such an Author may indue J enable a Lejrner to lay as Ik lays, .nirl talk after hnn in imi- tation, {li it fvere; biit he can never injimc} hirr^ to undcrftand xvhafs True, af.'dwhy it utme, ^ or ta demonjtrate bimfelf ; wh'jch mu the wain DeJi^H Qf w)' M E T H O D. IX. BiH my greatejl Complaint a^ainjl o- thcrs, and my hejt Excuje ior putting my Je/f forwards withfuch a Confident Ayr, is, that f fee not that any Learned Men do endeavour ti^- rflake Head a^iaiAJl Sccpticilm ; ivhich, thnJ this Univcrlal Connivence, cr rather Civil a^d AindTolctationj^nd (infomejort) Encou- ragement, creeps by injenfible Degrees into even the mojt Learned Socieiies, infetls the bejlVVits of our Sat ion y threatens to hear down all true VhthJQphy, to extingnifto the Natural Light of Mejf's Underjf an dings, and drown their bejl Fa-- culty [ Reatbn ] in a Deluge of Profound Igno^ ranee, tor, if this Foguefhould obtain Ji ill in. the IVertd to look upon any lode Dilcourfe for brave Senfe, jo it he but Ipruceiy drels'd up in neat Lanquaqe^ and Sauc'd with a little Pi- \ quancy of brisk Wit ; and let it pafi current for True Learning and Knowledge ; Scenticifm ivill not Only infmuate it jelf Jlily into all forts i( &f Men, but be recommended to the World by ^ fuch an Univ erf al Approbation of well-clad gen^ tile Ignorance, Nor does this ?nifchievous Inun* f dativ^Jfop its Career in bereaving us of NsitU' I ral i: The Preface. ral Truths ; hiit^ having once darkened in us the Knowledge of Nature, it difpofes Men to doubt of, and too often to deny the Exifiencs of the Author of Nature himjelf ; who is hefl made known to Mankind by Science, or the Ex- ad: Knowledge of his Creatures ; from which IV e glean a /It he NotionSy and, conjequently^ all ^i'^ Knowledge, we, by Ordinary Means, have, or ought to have. AS theje M/Jchiefs, (I may add, and all Immorality too,) are owing to the Infenfihk Growth of this Lethargy of our Under- fland/nr SCEPTICISM; which benums and chills our Intellectual Faculties ivith a Cold Defpair of ever attaining Evident Knowledge of any thing ; for which, as its Natural Perfe-- tlion, our Soul was fitted and ordain d, I jaw this Gloomy Evening overcaJHng the Clear Sky of Science, and drawing on the Cimmerian Night of Dark Ignorance, and Black Infide- lity ; and thence it was, that, to awaken Mens ^Souls out of this drowzy Sleep and Torpor of their Mind, I did Jo often, boldly and fear lejUy (tho' as I judgd, truly, ) declare and ^tocWxm a- loud, that Demonftration in Philojophy might he had, and that / /u^ adlually Demonftrated in juch and Juch Particulars. 13. Laftly, 'Tis for this Reafon, and to re- fcue a 'I Sincere Lovers of Truth from this [pre ad- ing Contagion re'^ The Preface* cijmprehericl which, whoever Jhall heJioW) half that Tains as Men ujually do who jludy the Mathematkks , ( for juch Connected Dijcourjei are not to he pemjedy with hopes of profiting hy them, with a Curjory Application,) will, I am jure, be able to jet all his Natural Notions in a Right and DiJUntl Order ; know how to connect two of them with one another in a Solid judg- ment ; and both of them with a Third to frame a Qonclufive Difcourfe ; and not only lave the True Nature of Demonjlration know ingJv fix'd in his Mind, by comprehending the Realon of it ; hut, hy having tt there, he himjelf will he en- abled to work according to that Nature, or to Demonjh'ate himfclf ; without Ability to know or do which, none ought to pretend to be a Phi^ lojopher. Laftly, To carry this Good M'h'k for" ward as far as was pnjjil'lc, I have here, as a Supplement to my ME.THOD, and an In* trodutlion to my Reflexions, added Five VrcVx" minary Difcourfes ; fhewing the true and jolid Bottom-Ground on which allExatt Knowledge, or Philojophy, js built ; and, that theThings thcm- lelves, j;/<^;/^^ Ideas, Relemblanccs, ^r Fan^ ciQsXi^'hich can never make us know the Things,) are and mujl be the only Firm Foundation of Truth, and of our Knowledge of allTruths what^ foever, 14. I mufl not pafi ever another Complain r made of me hy fome of f/f Cartefian ^Sc/^W; viz- Tkat in the Preface /i? wjy M E T H O D, I jo b dseplj The Preface. deeply Cerifure Malbranche ai a Phayuitlck in Thuojophy ; na\, the whole Way it Iclf as dij'- poftHg to Enthufiafm. to the Firjl Part of my Charge, I reply, That I cited that Author's own Words ; which are juch Jtrong Proofs of a Fana- tick Genius, that I cannot lelieve any Argw ments of mine can add Weight to the Full Evi^ dence and Force they carry d with them, to ma" nifejt that his Philojophy is built upon Injpira* tion ; or, as himjelf exprejfes it^ comes to him by Revelation. And, for my pretending that the whole Cartefian Way of Philojophizing is of the fame Levcn, I can need no other Compurga^ tour than that French Author, who with much Exatlnefs wrote the Life of Cartefius, and was his good Friend and Follower. The Book is now made Englijh ; where in the 34//' Page he tells us, that To get rid of all his Prejudices, ( that is, to Unlearn, amon^fl other Things , all that the Clear Light ^/Nature had taught him- ) Cartefius did undergo no lefs than to UNMAN himlelf. A pretty Self-deny jng Beginning! AndVzg, 35, 36. that he wea- ried out his Mind to that Degree in his En* quiry after this Happy Means, (viz. that his Imagination fliould reprcfent to him his Un- derflanding quite naked ) thathis Brain took Fire, and he fell into a Spice of Enthufiafm ; V hich difpos'd his Mind , already quite fpent, in fuch a manner, that it was fit to receive Impreffirns of Dreams and Fifwis. Where The Prcf.ice. Where ive fee it confeji\!y that his Methvr! of Unknowing all that Nature /'./^caught hi}>i^ brought him i o Enth u fi al m , and L^itl.Mlufn to Vifions^^/^ Revelations ; /i; that Malbranche rlid hut follow his Mdjlers Example, ^md cnpy'd his Method. The Author proceeds. He (Czr- tefius) acquaints us, that on the icthofAV ■ vemher, 1619. laying himfcif down brimful of Erithujujm, ( which u little better than J t ark mad) and wholly polTefs'd with the Thoughts of having found that day the Foundation of that Wonderful Science, he liad three Drean^s prcfently one after another ; yet, fo extra- ordinary, as to make him fancy they were fcnt hini fom Alove, He fuppofed he dif- cern'd thro' their Shadows, the Tracks of the Paths GOD had chalk' d out to him, m his Enquiry after Truth. And is it not a powerful Motive to make all Wits, ( ejpecially, if they be of a Melancholy Temper ) who are e?i- clind to eynhrace his Doulrine, which wai firjl fent from Heaven, to gape after Revelations tooy as »;(?//^i Malbranche did ^ He goes one But the Divine Spiritual Air which he took a Pride to give to chofe Dreams, was lb near a-kin to that Enthuftafm wliercwirh he be- licv'd himfelf to be warmed , that a Man would have believ'd he had been a little Crack' d'hraind. And, lej} any fhould wrong the Original of his Doctrine ^ ci' degrade it jrom. the Honour of being given hira by Divine Injfira'^ b z tion. The Preface. f'w'fi, this ziiithor takes off any unjavouraLlcCoH- jectHre of oars, that might make it fpring from any Sublunary Caufe, jn thefe l^^oras : One would have believ'd he had drunk a Cup too much that Evening before he went to Bed ; but he adiirVl us he had been very ib- ber all chat Day, and that Evening too, and had not drunk a drop of Wine three Weeks together. This looks a^ // Cartefius himjelf, who jo cautioujly irtforrri d him of this afterwards^ was fond to have it thought that his Do^rine, and efpcciaHy his Method, {which was the Mi- nerva oj which h/s Brain was then in Labour,) had been given him from Above, by Superna- tural means. If. Kowy Gentlemen, I bejeech you, tell me, in good Sober Sadnejs ; Lan you think GOD ever intended that the onely Method for Men to get Knowledge, /hculd be to lofe their Wits firll /;/ looking after it ? That, to Unman cur f elves, fo as tojeem Crack'd-Bram'd, or Drunk, Is the iVay to become Soberly Rational ? Ihat, to reduce our f elves to perfect Ignorance oj all that the Goodnejs of Nature has taught us, {which IS, in plain lerms, to make an Afs of one's fcif,) is the onely Certain iVay to become a Philofopher ? Certainly, unlejs we be all in* fatuated with Enthufiaftick Dreams and Vi- fi ons , made up of Ideas , we fhould rather think that it is a far more Solid, and ynore hJatural Way, to begin our Quejt of Truth from thofe Knoiv-» The Preface. Knowledq^es which are Evident, ayidjuch Grouyids as are Magis Nota, a>ul thence proceed hy our Reajon to Minus Nota, than it is to take our R'lje from ^tfetied \gnor:incQ, j;/^/ Unknowing a^aal iyvoioj , or Conimon Notions, which Right Nature had given us to ground all other Knowledges on. No wonder then, this Frcakifli Method, taken up ly VVliim- fical Fancy, had for its Geiiuin Effed, Fanta- ftick Dreams, Vifionary Madneis, and En- thufiaftick Folly ; which this Writer of his Life (who, doubt lefs, was himfelf a 'Zealous Car- tefian) calls here A Happy Means, the Foun- dation of that Wonderful Science, the Path Chalk'd out by God ; and the Dejcanting on them, to he done ly A Divine Spiritual Air ; tho' he confeffes, at the Jams time, they were Dreams, Vifions, and Fits of Enthufiafm ; and that they made him that had them Jeem Crack'd-Brain'd, or Drunk. All thefe wild Caprichio's ^f Cartefius, fprung naturally from a Lively and Heightened Fancy, Jcrew d up by frequent Sollicitous and Melancholy Though 'id" nejs ; and were the Effecls of his Introverii.xMi upon his Ideas ; which is quiie Qppofiie to h.^ Regarding the Things in Nature, that are without us. Nor do I doubt, hut that all his Followers, did they (as they ought) iwjtate their Mailer, and follow his Example, /;/ Lying afide firft all their former Natural Knowledges, would ^Ijo (as any Man mujl who takes that tlnnatural b 5 Method) ( The Preface. Mctho.^) fall into Fits of Eyithufiafm, Dreams, and Vifw>is, and Run Mad for Company. For, IDEAS, whij^h^ henig Similitudes, are vo wore to Fancies, Appearances, ^w^Rcpre- fentacions, are, confequently, far more Proper Materials for Dreams and Vifions, and juch Roving Flights, than they are for Science, or Solid Phiiolbpliy. . i6. Tho' I for ''flail what cones hereafter ^ I am t em.pt ed to annex here, to this Character of the Cartefian Manner of Spirit in rhilojophy, a jhort Paffage mention d h) A//'. Lccke, Book 4, Chap. 7. S' 17. viz. that he has difcours'd with very Rational Men, who have actually Deny'd they were Men. N^ir, certainly, this is jomething^ beyond Enthufiafm, and Extra- "cagant e^en to Madnefs, that any Man jhould deny himfclf to be what he is : Buty 'tis Prc^ digioiis, that Mr. Locke fhould give Juch Men the Elogium of heing very Rational. Whence ^ fince he cannot hut Jnicerely judge, that the Way he proprfes and maintains in his Eflay, is the in oft Rational of any other ; we are to conclude^ that thoje very Rational Men did follow this Way of his, and were great Idcills; or elfe, that Mr. Locke judges that thofe Men who actually deny*d theni Selves to be Men. might, for all thaty accortung to his Way of Ideas, le very Rational riotwithjlanding. 'tis worth our while to ohjerve the Confonant Effect: of the Ideal Way, ^n the Foflo\vers of Cartcfius and Mr. Locke, and The Preface. iWri (i» fame jort) /V/ hoth the Authors of thofr rh/lojophical Sects thenijelves : Ihe Orie U N- MANS himfelj I a^jrl the Others DQwy ihcm- fclves CO be Men, anri yet arc CharcuierA hy Mr, L. to he, mtmthjhwdinq^, vcry Rational : Which arc jo perfedly Parallel, that J am at a great Lojs which to J r?fer. And, now, do you think. Gentlemen, that, {he fides the Reqard wc owe to Truth,) out of the Common Love ivc ou 17. Far he it frora me to judge, that all, or mod of the Perfor?nances of thoje two admira^ hly-Ingenious Men, are of this Extravagant Nature. 'Tis my fvncere Judgment, that Few Men write Like them ; and, None, Better, where their Ill-grounded Methods do not inter- mingle, and pervert their Rcaibn. And, T freely acknowledge, that Mr, Locke'y ESSAY, on which I make jo many Reflexions, contains many Excellent .7//^ Uncommon Truths /;/ it : Tho I do not think he owes any of them to his Way of Ideas; hut, that he proceeded in fuch b 4 Occa'* The Preface. CccafiortSy upo:i his Natural Notions, in the (ame w:mner the Ariilotclians do ; and^ thence ^ m^de Rigjjt j.dgm^>7ts and Reflexions upon them ly his own Acute Wit. This Unfortunate Choice of their Method did, as I conceive, proceed hence, that fuch Acftivc and Qu\ck Fancies do not patiently hook the Rains of Logick andNLc-^ taphyficks ; ^he Jormer of which ( much againjl the Grain) retrains them jrom taking their iVild Carreer^ ly the Difcipline of its Artificial Rules ; the other keeps them from Roving, ly the Self-evident Maxims 7t forces their Un-^ derflanding to accept of. Whence, if thefe two do not Iridle and keep them in, it is not to le expeBed in Nature that fuch High-mettrd Fancies (ko'Ad le held within ftn^ Bounds, or kept to the Slow <7W Sober Race of Solid Rea- Ion ; lut, that they will take their Vagaries^ and run crvcr Hedge and Ditch, whitherfoever the Spj/ft Career of that N/mlle Faculty hurries them. This D/fcoi^rJe I make the more willingly, that thofe Students who read this, may clearly difcern^ that all their Application to gain Know- ledge will le purely Loft Labour, and Time thrown away, if their Rirfl and Chief Care le not to take a Wife and Solid Method at the Beginnings Having thus finifb'd my long Addrefs, for which I leg your Fardon, I fhall now apply my felf to make fo me feiv Difcourfes, relating to my following^ Book, li.Man The Preface. i8, MAN ^^/;/g One Thing, compomJeJ of a Corporeal and a Spiritual Nature, and every Thing ading as it is, it follows, that both thoje Natures rnujl con cur r to every Operation that flows from him, as he is Man ; and, confequent" ly, he produced by fome Faculty belonging prop tt^ ly to each of thoje rejpcclive Natures : Nor can it he douhted, hut that, as thoje Faculties, or powers, which are peculiar to both thoje Natures, are as different as are the Natures themjelves ; jo the Immediate Obje&s peculiar to thoje Diffe* rent Faculties, mujl likewije be as widely Differ rent from one another, as are thofe Towers to which they belong ; and, confequently, he as vaji^ lyOppofite, as the Natures of Boay and Spirit can dijlance them. It being then agreed to by all Parties, that the Faculties or Powers which join in our Produdion of Knowledge, are thofe ive call the Imagination and the Mind, or the Fancy and the Underftanding, / cannot doubt iut it may he demonflratively concluded, frorr, the known Nature and Conftitution of this Thing called MAN, that, to every Thought or Ail of Knowledge we have, (thoje being fuch Opera- tions as properly and formally belong to us as tve are Men, ) there muft two forts of Interiour Objedls concurr ; whereof, the One is of a Cor- poreal, the Other of a Spiritual Nature ; and that, otherwije, thoje Ails could not he f aid to he Humane Ads, or the Aits of that Suppofi- turn, or Compound Thing, called M^in; hut of pne The Preface. one of thofe N^itures o?fe/y, a-parted from the other as to its Operation, ivirl covjequently, as to its Being. Winch Suppojuiofi is dired^ly con^ traditlory to the Natural Conjlitution of Man ; ^s be is diflin^uifh'd, on one Jide, from a Br^te, rdv has nothing hut Material Phantafms, or Ideas ; on the other, from an Angel, or Intelli- gence ; in whom there is nothing^ of Matter or Fancy, hut all in it is purely Spiritual. 19. The Dijiintlion of thefe two Ohjeds of the Fancy and of the Undcrftanding hein([^ granted, injorne manner, Lj all Sides, I cannot hut wonder how it hapt to ejcape the Thoughts -of all the Fhilofophers both Ancient and Mo- dern, to explicate fully and clearly tf}€ Exact Difference between thoje two Ohjecis of the fan- cy and of the Underjianding ; there heingjcarce* ly any one Point in Philojophy of half that Im-^ for tame for the attaining oj Truth, and avoid- ing of Err our : For both theje being truly in us, Tiihenever we have an AH of Knowledge ; and witkMly being as far Removed from one another in thhr Natures as Body andS^mt are; if Spe- culative Meny either thro' m/Jrake, or thro' In- advertence of this vaft difference between them, or out of Loathnejs to take Fains to look deep into the Intrinfecal Natures of Things, imprinted in their Minds when they have Notions of them, (hall happen to miftake what they find Upper- inofl or mojl Superficial, and therefore is eajuff to their Fancy, (as Phancafms or Material Re- prejentations The Preface. pr^ft:>Jtatioris are ) for Notions ; ir/vr/;, leing of a Spiritual ]>lature^ dv not tnake jo olzious and farr^iiiar a}j Appearance as tkoje Gay Florid F/dures did, lut are to Le gather d ly Heajon, or made Underjlood hy Rtjiexion and Study ; juch Speculaters, I jay, ivi/I he at tbejame loj^, and not much ivijer than thojc Birds were that peck'd at Xcuxis'3" Grapes to jced thernjelves ; mijlaking the Outward Fourtraiture or Idea for the Inward i^aiure of the Thing : For, no Know^ ledge of the Ihings could ever he expctled from Ideas, taken ( as themjehes take them ) J or Similitudes ; Jince thofe Terms or il'i/rds, which we ulc, and niuft uje, when we Jpeak or dif- courfe of any thing whatever, were intended , hy the Agreement oj Mankind, to jignifie //.'("Things thcnifelvcs ahout which we are Dijcourfing, and not to figyiifie meer Likciiefles or Similitudes oj them. However this has hcen neglected hy others, I fee ^tismy Duty to jay jomethtng of this Dijlindion ofFhantafmsjrom Notions. I have in my i^th Reflexion, ffS' 9» and iz. endea^ vourd to /how it. To which I have here thought fit to annex fome few yc^7r^ec,or Diflinguifhing Marks to know one from the other. lo. My firft Criterion P^all he the Scnfiblc- ncfs of the jorrner, and. Infenfiblenefs oj the other. When we fhut our Eyes, or walk in the Dark, we experience we have Ideas or Images of our Way, or of other things we have feen^ in pur Fancy ^ and this, without the lealt Lahoiir "t The Preface. of ours, or any Reflexion : And there ts alfo be- yond that, jomething elfe in the Mind, which tells us ofivhati^SLtiiTQ, or what Things thofe are, which appear d fuperficially to our Fancy; which cofts us Labour and Reflexion to hring it into the view of the Underftanding, fo that we cannot get perfefl Acquaintance with it, unlejs we define it. Nor u this Senfible, oj the other was, hut only Intelligible .• Not fupcrficial or uppermoft; hut hidden, retrufe, and (as we may fay ) ftands behind the Curtain of the Fancy : Nor eafie to comprehend at the fir jl Di- re^ Sight of our Inward Eye, hut cofts iis feme Reflexion, or feme Pains, to know it exprefly and diftintily. Which latter fort, in each of thefe regards, are thofe we call Simple Apprehcnfi- ons. Conceptions, irlfi/l a Clearer one accordiyi^ as they are more GeneraL Wherefore y 'tis like- ivije evident, that our Notions are of a (putc different Nature from Ideas or Similitudes. if. I f) all leave the purjuing this Point any farther, and give the Reader jome 7 a fie lefore^ hand of what (perhaps ) he will he cloy'd with in the following Book ; efpe dally it will he pro* per to fealbn his Underflanding with Jome few Notions concerning the main Qu eft ion hetween the Ideifts and mc, viz. Whether our Know- ledge 15 made hy the Tilings heing in our Mind when we know it, or an Idea t^r Similitude of it only. In order to which I ask the Ideifts, Whe- ther the Modes or Accidents are Diftind; Enti- ties/r^^r/ the Subftance ^/'Tiling ? To which 1 am Jure Mr, Locke will fay. They are not. FJence I argue. Therefore, if the Modes or Ac- cidents he not DiftinCt really from the Sub- dance, the Suhjtance or Thing is not really, (or in re J dijlinguifh'd from the Modes or Acci- dents : Therefore they are (as they are in Na- ture, or HI re) //'defame Thing, or Identify 'd. Therefore they are only difiinguifVd hy the Un- dcrftanding conceiving the fame Thing di- verily ; therefore 'tis onely the Conceptions of our Underfl an dings which are Diflind:. Then- fore taking the word [Conception] objective- ly ; that is, for the Thing Conceiv'd ; all we conceive The Preface. conceive is fti// the Thing. Therefore all our Notions^ loth of the Subftance and of its Acci'^ dents or Modes, that is, all the Notions we can have^they heing the fame with our Conceptions,) are nothing hut the Thing conceivd diverJJy. Therefore y if that Thing he a Body, all our No^ tions of it are meerly that Thing called Body diverjly conceivd. Therefore the putting Space, Succeflion, &c, where there neither is nor can be any Body, is to put Body where there is no Body ; andf is a meer Fancy, and Contradictory. Therefore thofe Philofophers who proceed upon our Grounds, ^(? 7?//7 Conceive, Judge ' hich being io, it follows that, if the fenle of that word be not it felf Cteiu-^ but Efti- t'ocnl I and if, as taken in djk Senfe, it be mani- fellly 7iQthwg at all to Scicjice^ nor can be any Mdterid of it ^ and, as taken in t'^c other, it 77? ay and muft conduce to it, nay, be the Sola ime- diate Ground and Oriein o'c all Science: I cannot but think, that the promifcuous uiage of that Word in fuch Difparate Scnfes, ( it being of fo general Concern, and running through that whole Book ) inuil neceOariiy encumber and per- plex in a high Meafure the way to ScientiHcai knowledge. 3. One of his Secondary Dcfignes w^as(as he exprelTes himfelf in his Epi/lle to PhilofophicnWords the Reader ) to rem eve the Rifhlvjh ^rcneraHy^ifed, vot -^ order to thebuildinir.upScience,. robe laid n tdc , , , \ rr - i without g>-catNc' ^^'<^^ ^"^ beat down the Vmtity and e^jjlty. "^ Jgncrance of thofe who have re- duced Fbllofcfh)\ v-'bic.b is nothing hta the Kftoirkdge ofThi7igi^xo iniignih'cant School- Term.s. This is certainly a very neceffary and a very laudable Defign , it being evident to all in- genuous Lovers of Truth, that never was there more need of a Reformation, than there has been of Philofophy in thefe laft CV^/r/zr/V/^ to' fecond him in which I have not failed on my part to contribute jny endeavours. Yet^ notwithftanding Ido Prelimhiary Firft. 3 I do not think we oiii^ht, without great and ne- cdfary occilion, alter thofc words which have been accepted and ufed by the Learned World ( llich as it was ) liitherto: Efpeciaily liich words as arc ^ro^tr and XJyiivocal^ fuch I take the v.'ord [ l<^ution'\ 10 be 3 much lei's to llib- Ititute another, which I mufl ^^'^^ ^'^\ '^^^''fj ^L- I • / /• ^ J •►I n i'^^ others Jels think IS li'js propt7\ and withall proper. highly Equivocal, or y^lmbi^ucus^ I mean the word {ID KJ. ) 1 know this inge- nuous Author apologizes for his frequent uiing it, and I am apt to think he did this out of Ci- vility towards our Modern Philofophers, who have brought it into falliion: For, he gives no reafon why he did not rather conftantly ufe the word ( Nc/r/cw^) which, importing a pan o^CogTii- t!cn^ does mod certainly better luit with aTreatife about Human Undt:rji'andin^. 4. As for theSenfe in which he takes the word ( IDEA ) he profedes that he ufes it to expxefs whatever is meant by ^^l- ?" ^ ^Tt^/'^'i Fhantajm^ Notion, Species, cr what- ,^,^^ ^wbiguai . e'ver It is that the 7n'md can he e?n- flofd about in thinking. Which manifefe that he ules that word very Ecjunjccnlly : For a Vhantajm, and a Notion, diifer as widely, as Bcdj and Spirit-, the one being a Corporeal, the other a Spiritual Refemblance^ or rather, the one being a Kefem- blance, or a kind of L^age, or i^idlure^ the other the thi7ig Rejonblcd, as' will be fecn hereafter. Again, 'tis agreed to by all the World, that Brutes have L'hantajms, but they can have no Ncticns-j for thefeare ihc El e'^?7c?ns, or M::terialls^ wliole agreeable Connexion families our iV-ind w'lih Science J of which Bcalli^ which have no B z Mlndy 4 Solid Philofcphy JjferteJ. MlrJ, are incapLiblc; and therefore it were both unnatural, and to no purpofe, to put NctioTjs ( which are the Primary Aiicctions of the AL-nd ) in thofe meer j^nim^Js, I am more at a lofs to find, that, in the lafl page but one in his EpiiUe to the Keadcr, he feems to contradi(lingui/h Notions to Idcnsy which how it confifts with the indiiferency he grants the word {Id^a). here to fignify Notions^ I cannot at all comprehend. 5^ 1 mufl conftfs, it is generally a fruitiefs t conteft to dilpute about a IVcrd^. The ^^^y^ty af ^^,^-^^ -. nothing but a Sound, or ■a 7io( clear a by ^.. ex i i i fj:j„^ a Character, were but the deter- minate Meaning of it told us by' the ufer of it: Let it be A, or B, or what he pleafes, provided the dilHndl: Senfe of it be clearly manifellc'd by the Writer, or Speaker, it were, in that cafe. Logomachy, and impertinent Cavil, to except againil it. But, when the Author's ov/n Explication of it does, ( contrary to the Nature of Explications ) declare it is uied ambiguoully^ it laits a force on me to remark it ; lell it may lead the Reader, ( as it infallibly muft ) into great Errors, unlefs it's double Senfe be warily dilHn- guilht in the enfuing difcourfe j which 1 have not obferved to be done any m here by this other- wife accurate Author. 6. From this undiftingui/h'd Ambiguity of the •Vv'ord ( Idea ) it follows naturally, that even his own excellent Judgment, and coniequendy, his lua.def s, muft necelfarily fometimes deviate j and, tho' his general intention was only to pur- iue the Knowledge of Tbivgs^ yet he nuill: needs be lc>metimes milk-d at unawares to entertain luitjcks for Real Knowledges ^ as will occalional- TreUniinary Fir ft. j Jy be fhown hcrcafccr. i-or the prefcnt I cannot omk one particular, it bLin^- of Inch main im- portance. 7. The Author believes all forts cf Ari'.mals to have, in fofne deirrec, Vcrceftit/u Now Perception (as I COnCcive ) 71^- punpnBrmei tiyrm\]^s Knowledge ; for, under ^^ f^^^^^e K.or^^ ivhat ion ot material Adtion to thLrvith ^u^. rank it, I confefs my fclf at a kind, lofs : But, let it be only the />/ jhp n?jd degne towards Knowledge^ and the in-let of all the Materials of it^ dill he fays, the dnhefi cf the faculties of fome Brutes, r/iakcs them remote from that Kyiowledge which is to he fund in feme Men : So that it Iccrns in ether Men there may pollibly be no mere Knowledge ( at leaft in fome things ) than in Brutes • nor does he any more ■tlian -probably conjetture^ that Beails have not the power of comparing^ which may be obferved in Adtn^ belonging to general Ideas, and ufeful to abfiraci ReajoniJigs. Now, this fo jumbles together 5/)/V/- tuai Natures with thofe which are meerly Corpo- real^ that, if this be fo, w^e fhall be at Ibme lofs to know our own Kif/d, to define what Alan is, or to diflinguifh our fdvcs from our younger Bro- thers in knowledge. Brutes^ or cur Souls fi'om theirs: For, if by Ideas there be mjanc Notlcns^ { as his Expreifions leave it indifferent ) and thac a Mans knowledge confifis in having thcfc Ideas in him, and Bruies have alfo fuch Ideas 3 and, that, moreover, they may poJibly have alfo, in fome fort, a power to compare thofe Notions, and both * judo-in^r ' -^^ f:ir,sci.r,c^, J j-r r ,1 -J J <^ '^ B.2.Leil i.§. 12. ana dijcouriing moit evidently con- fill in comparing utr Notions^ 1 fee nO Operations B 3 pccallir 6 Solirl Phitofophy AffertCc^. piailnr ro a. I/.:?:, but what Brutes may perform in a hivcr d.gree , and (incc Degrees do not vary the 5/:ff.'fj ( tor otherwifc ^//r// Alen \\'Ou!d be of another Sj^ecles from thofc who have more wit ) wx- coald, confv'qucntly, never know what 7i/^7w- hnd mvant3 or who is aMav, who w^r, iinleis in outward appea'.arxe ; nor, lailly, how^ our Souls, or yV//?;//.s d ; differ from their Fr.ndes, or 77w^^/- vaucns. /gain, M. L. affirms, i?. i. C^. 1 1. §• 1 1. that it fecjns r.s evident tO him that Eeaft-s do rea- fcv, as that they ha^e Senfe ; than which, certain- Iv, nothijig in the world can be more evident, or undeniable. Kov/, if this be fo, all thofe who hold that ( a Rational A7t':njal) is a proper and a- dequate Definition of ( Adfn ) ought to hold Brutes to be M.n. Air. L. will fay, that Brutes cap, onl7 reafon in Vartlculars, having no General Ideas, bccjufe they cannot AhfiraB ; nor do we fee they make ufe of any Gcmral Slgnes to e.v prefs Univerfal Ideas : Indeed, they have no fuch Signes as Words, to notify they have any fuch Ideas -^ but,.if vv^e mav conclude from their 0:/n -yjjn-d Acilcns ( on w^hich only Mr. L. ieems to ground his good Opinion of them ihat they have Reafcn, ) we may as well gather from the fame grouted that they have General Ideas too. For example , when a 'lorre fees a Man a far off, he can only have an Idea that it is fcmethlng; fyv the Cbix^ cannot, at that diftance, imprint a tnre partlcuLr Idea of it fdf, but that mofr General one, ar.d therefore 'tis evident the Horfe mufl: either have a G.mral Idea of it, or none at all ; whereas yet he mufl have [(me Idea oi" it, becaulc h./f.^. It, though confuftdly. Coming nearer, the pbiLCl imprints a mere dljlincJ Idea of a Man ^ TreUrn'in.ny Fird. 7 yet not fo diflin^]", as to rcprclcnt this Alan in ^^-r- t'tcular. At length coming very near, the iamc Objed: is apt to imprint anLlca o^ this particiiiar Man ; which fhews plainly, that all thofe Ideas the Obict^ gave him before were (icnernl ones : To proceed, we may obfervc, that while it ap- peared only to ht for/jcthiTi^^ which was a very ab- (hnH hlcnl the Horfc carry'd it abfha^lc'dly too, and remaind unconcern'd. When it appear'd to be a Mm, it bcgati to be a littje concern'd, ha- ving to do with luch kind of things as us'd to do it cither Good or Harm ; and tlierefore it flares at it (a common carriage in fheep efpeci- ally) as if it lludy'd, or coplider'd, what to make of it, in order to its own Interefl, or Self-prefer- vation. But, when the Objedt imprints an Idea of this p^r^/V«/^/?- Man, who either us'd to bring him Provender, or come to catch him to make him work, he either comes towards him, or runs away ^ w4iich diiferent behaviour of theirs (if outward Adions were, in this cafe, worth buil- ding on ) is as good a lign that Brutes have Ge7:c-^ ral Ideas, as WT can expert from dumb Animals. Befidcs, when a Cat, or Dog is hungry, and hunts about for Jvkat, how can Mr. L. im.agin they long only for one particular fort of Meat, and not any fort of Meat in common that is agreeable to i their nature? I am fure their indiifcrency to •diwy I fach Food ( in caie they knoiv at all ) gives us as I good ground to think they have a Gemral Lka of luch d.fort, kind, Oi' [pedes of Food, as it does for any Knowledge they have of particulars. Hence is fhown, that Mr. L's Criterion, or diilin- ftive Mark to know them from Mw, ( ^^iz,. the having Gtmral Ideas ) quite failing, we ought to B 4 eileem 8 SoUJ Fhilofophy AJferted. eflreem Horfes, and other Cattle, to be Four-foot- ed Men, or elfe Men muft be two-legg*d Bealls. iVioreover, fince he grants here §. ^. they can comff.re thofe Ideas they have, tho* imperfeB- /)', and but in fome circumfiavces , and all Judging^ and Difcourftng muft, by his Doctrine, conlift in the com far IV g Ideas 3 he muft think there are fome of them who are very judicious Gentlemen, and ufe natural Logick, and, tho' not very ar- tificially, make Syilogifms too. In a word, if we have no pecular Faculties Intrinfecal to our Na- ture, nor any Primary Operation belonging to if, and it onlj^ to diilinguiih us from Brutes but Extrinfecal fliape only, all Beajts might be Men^ and Men Beflfts : And then we ought in duty to confider how to corredt our Carriage towards our dear Brethren in Nature^ Brutes y which will bring in the Turkiflo Charity to Dogs, and twenty other Fooleries : And, 'tis an excellent Argument to prove the Identity of oar Natures, that Mr. L. brings of fome Gentlemen he was acquainted with, who dtnyd themfel'ves to he Men ; and I wonder he would civilly give them the Lye, \^y paiung upon them the Complement that they w^ere notwithftanding 'very Rational Men , for, were it pollible any Man could be a Beaft, 'tis moi^ certain ihefe Men v/ere fuch. But I won- der 1:0c all at fuch extravagant Conceits 3 for as Keafon, grounded on our Natural Notions of the Thing, is reduced, if purfucd home, to Firfl and Self-evident Principles ^^ fo Fancy ^ if follow'd clofe, advances at length to pure Felly ^ and ends finally in ^^ik^ Madnefs. ?. As Preliminary Fir ft. 9 8. As for us Mtn, we can certainly affirm, that lue do truly percei've, or ^?;c9/.', bc- caufe wc knov certainly, by ex- Th^f'f Coriftd^r.,^ perience, or rather by Reflexion, ;;7 r^^^ ^, that we do know j but we do not thi^k tha: Brutes tht4s know that Brutes know 3 know. and whoever thinks he can ga- ther it by Reafon^ ought, 1 conceive, er'e he goe^ about it, to rtudy exactly two previous point^- •Firfl, he ought to coniider very attentively, how, or upon what Grounds he can imagrn Particles of Matter^ tho' never fo fubtil and anificially laid together, can be capable of Perception^ or Knowledge^ or how this Suits with the Nature of meer Body. We can only gather this from Local Motions proceeding from Brutes, with fome kind of Regularity: Now an cxadt Watch (in proportion to its few parts) does, by vertue of a Spring within, which is pait of its felf, afford the fame argument to one that is not aware of its contrivance. For, it fhews us, and regularly too, the Minutes, Quiarters, Half-hours, Hours, Days of the Month, and tells us the time aloud by Striking the Bell : Nay, a Repeatii:g-Clock does, without Milling, or Millake, anjwer the Queftion ( as it were ) which by pulling the String you ask it 3 and, tho' you are never fo importune in repeating your queftion often, yet it ftili anfwers tiuth, v/ith more fteady exadtnefs than Banks his Horfe could, by feeing the Motion of his Mafters Eye. Yet, if i)ny Man had drawn thence a Conclufion that ihofe Engins had perr/ex'V, or kmwn^ we are fatisficd that he had been perfectly millaken. An Italian here had an Engine which would both a wake one at the hour \\^ deligned to rife, and allj I o Solid Thilofophy AJferted. alfo ftrike fire, and light his Candle for him • which I believe is more than the molt docil Brute could ever be taught to perform. The Cafe had been ftill more difecult, had this \A^atch, or En- gine, which fecmcd felf moving, been put into all thefe Motions by Subtil and Indifcernable Agents ; as Iron is by the Effluuhiws of a Load- ftone, or as Memnons Mufical Statue was by the Faves of the Sun 3 for in that Cafe the Vulgar^ difcerning no Material Caufe that fet it on work, would prefently have had rccourfe loioxw^Knoiv- ing fowcr in the Engine j in the fame manner as'wht^n they hear noifes in a Houfe, and can- not find out what caufed them, they imediately conclude 'tis a Spright. Whence refults this plain Rule, that er'e w'e can with rcnfon conclude^ or think any things except our /elves, has Ferceptic^j, cr Knowledge^ by our feeing it perform any Outward y^&ic?ty v>e cught firjh to he certain that ive can com- prehend all the Operations of Bodies^ and all the fe'veral Combinations and Ccnirizia?ices of them -^ and that we fee that thofe j^tHons are impc/JJble to be performed by Bodily parts^ laid together by an infi^ n'ltely wife ytrtifccr , before we fall to imagin that finr weerlj AniT^^l Body is mere than a Natural En- p-in y cr that it does any ?nore percei^ve^ th'ink^ or knoWy than decs /I U\:tch or Clock, 9. The Second thing neceffary to be done er*e WQ ought to think Brutes have itf? SccofidconfTdcr. any knowledge, is, to conlider - jtfi'm prsrequir*i^. exaftly the incredible vard parts of our Body ( only which we experi- ence in Brutes, and ground the conceit of their having Knowledge upon them ) do perform any of their Operations. What Man living, though fuppofed the wifefl ( much lefs the Generality ) knows how^ or hy what paiTages he is to fend A- nimal Spirits into the Mufclcs ( whence all our Motion proceeds ) or into what Mufcles, or what quantity of them is requifit to do fuch an Outward Adlion ? What Feats of Adtivity does a Rope-dancer fhow us ? How many ways does he diftort, wind, turn, poize, llretch, and ply the parts of his Body ? To do which, the Ani- mal Spirits are to be fent -now mxo this^ now in- to that Mufcle, to move this or tlH&s or that Limb, or Joint ^ fometimes great quantity of them to make a vehement, or quick Motion ; fometimes fewer^ to move them more moderately ; fome- times none at all into any of them, when he has a mind to furceafe -ail Motion, and lit flili. Yet he knows, no more than a Brute, or a Stone does, how he is to do any of this, nor can give the lead- account hew it is done. All this is tranfa- (Scd bv the wife Contrivance of the Bodv; which is fo framed as to be fubfcnnent to the Defign the Man, as he is Knowing and Rational, had projected. And the fame is done in Brutes^ when either actual ImpreiTions are made upon them from the Objects ^ or thofe former Imprelfions are again excited in ihe Brain; which done, all the frisking motions of Purfuance and Avoidance which they perform, do follow by a Courfe of Natural Treliminary Firfl. 13 Natural or Material Caufes ^ and, withal, accor- ding to thofe meafures and deo^rccs as art: propor- tioned to the Efficacy of the firfl impellent Caufe, the OhjeH in their Imagination ^ the Agreeabie- nefs or Difagrecablenefs of which, to the Nature of the Animal is that which fcts all the Engine on work at firft. I r . Nor can the Objeftion bear any force that Ibnie Actions of Brutes refemble ReafoTf, even though it feems more ^^•'^ Refemblance thev is found in Men : lince we 'i^.'^Hi'' ^''''' experience that a Watch, which „, jrgumem of is the w^ork of an Artificer, per- /^.-/rKnowledge forms the Operations proper to z>, and tells us the time of the day with more exaft- nefs, than the beft Reajcn we have can do with- out fuch helps. So that the Watches ading ac-^ cording to teafun^ dcmonftrates indeed there was Rcafon in the Framer of it, bnt argues none at all in the Ennne it felf : Wherefore, however the Adlions of lome Brutes may bear a ^ww of Rea- fon, this can only argue that they are the work- manfhip of a Ratio7ial^ or JVife Maker 3 but, not that them.felves at^tcd knovnnglj^ or ratknally^ while they did thele Affions : For my felfi I mufl dtrclare, that I have as much admired the wifdoin fhewn in the Action of a young Vine, exerting and twilling its little Fingers about other things near it, to lupport it fdf as it grew up, as ( all the forementioned Circumflances weighed and abated ) at any Operation of a Brute 5 and I doubt not but a Camfanella (who maintained that every thing in Nature had perception ) or fome fuch other man of fancy, would difcourfe, and delcant on it thus : [ " The poor week limber "Vine 14 Solid Philofophy AjferteJ. ' Vine knew, and was well aware, that, not be- ' ing able to fupport it felf, it would, when it ' increaft in length, fall down flat on the ground, ' and fo be expofed to be trampled under foot, ' and hurt , and, therefore, did 'vtry prudently ' cling about other Vegetables, or Poles near it, ' to luftain it felf, and avoid that inconveni- ' ence. ] And, I dare affirm that we lofe the befl part of our Natural Contemplation, by putting, l^rutes to have Knowledge ^ for, what wonder is there that fuch things as have a knowing Povnr m them fhould know, or, who admires it in a Man ? Whereas, it juftly raifes our mind to high Admiration and Adoration of the Divine Artifi- cer, to fee things which are made of mcer Mat- ter ^ a6r with as much Wifdom and Prudence for their own prefervation, as the wilell Knower can by his befl Wit, of which he is* fo proud, and fometimes with much more. No doubt but the growth and operations of dull Vegetables, do adminifter to devout Reflefters occalions of very high Contemplation j and fhall the Opera- tions of fenjitl^e Beings, which are incomparably wore excellent, and ?rjcre admirable, as being the Top and Mailer-piece of this Material World, af- ford little, or none at all ? Now, if their Nature be to have Knowledge in them, and it be a thing common to all Creatures, and expcfted that GOD ihould give to every thing what is its Nraure, there is little or no particular ground for our wonderment. GOD has giv^n brutes a Kncw'mg Power ^ and that Power niakcs tium kncw^ and there's an end of our Admiration, and confe- quently of our Contemplation, and of that de-- vout Adnuraiion^ to wliicli our Aftoniihment at the Treliminary Firft. i^ the fcvenil AiStions of thofc Natural Automauz would othcrwilc raife us. 12. I beg pardon for this long digrdfion 3 I thought Ht to dilate tluis largdy on this point j both bccaufc it ^rn't: h»viV\\m'' is 11 very conCLrninir and ufeful rarms,^;try in fome few occafions, Pertinently j which none of them ever did defignedly^ and, if they haf to do fo by accident, none thinks they ?tiea7it as t\\QY jpcke^ but all mankind langhi at the odd Chance 1 6 Solid Ph'tlofophy AJferted. Chance, as at a pleafant Jefr. Thofe that teach ihem might point at the things when they pro- nounce their Namts, as N'urfcs do to little Infants ^ and why might not Beads 1 am them, as well as Cliildrcn j at leaft learn as much in many years, as they do in two, or three ? Indeed, fome Words and Sounds, which are very often ufed to come into their Erain, accom.panicd with fome pleafing or harmful Vhantafm^ do, by vertue of that con- comitant Vhantnfm^ affeft them, and make them a6l J not from their knowing what thefe words, or inteijedtions meav^ but by vertue of the Than- tafms^ or Effaroiiims^ that Came ak^ng with them, and moves them; or, becaufe they being lodged together in the Brain, that Word or Sound, or fome other Vehement Motion of ours, excites again the lame Phant^rjm which puts them upon Stating. Nor can we draw any parallel from fom.e wild and Savage Mc??^ feeming as rude as Brutes 'y the Queftion is of their Nature^ not of their Circumjtances, Could it be well proved that thofe Brutifh Savages, tho' inftrudted afterwards, could never be brought to perfom any actions more rationally than Brutes do, nor could ever be taught any Language to a tolerable degree, fo as to aniwer at all Pertinmtly or In- telligeTitly^ the difficulty would be greater? But this 1 never heard, or read, affertcd by any. Or, could it be well atcefted, that Brutes could fancy, or make choil'e of a Female for being more beau- tiful^ or were taken with the t-iArmony of Mufick, or did comport themfelvcs accordingly, I muft ccnfefsl iho aid much wonder. 1 rcriiember that about the year 16^3. viliting my Noble Friend Sir Kcnelm Digby^ he told me lie was much fur^ prized, TreUmtnaryy Firfl:. 17 prized, and uncafy at a Relation made him by a Gentleman, whom he could not fufpc^t guilty of that Vanity, as to tell an untruth to make his Story admired^ which was, that he faw Apes dance the Ropes at Southwark Fair ( which was then held ) and that they framed their Gefture? and Motions exadly according to the Muflck. For ( fays he ) this, if true, fhows they know Troportiorjy wliich argues Reafon^ and will oblige us to feek for new Principles. At his earned intreaty I went to examine the bu finefs, and found it thus. A fellow flood below on the ground with a String ( which was put about the Ape*s Neck ) in one hand, and a Switch in the o- therj who, underftanding the Mudck, made a little twitch with the String, or a menace with the Switch, when he would have the Ape retire, or advance, to keep time with the Fiddles : Nay, far were thofe Mock-men, the poor Apes, from being guilty of any thing that Refembled Re^fov^ that, when they made them dance wiih. a lighted Wax-candle in their hand, neither their Tutor's Inftrudlions, nor their own Docility cojld teach them to hold the lighted end of the Candle up- wards, though they often felt the inconvenience : for, the melted Wax fcalded their Legs, and made them, in the middle of their dance, fteal now and then a little Scratch where it burnt them 5 which they did with fuch a Serious and Inno- cent grace, that it gave much divertifcinent to the Spectators. This Story I relate the more willingly, to warn others not to give eafy credit to particubr Men s Narrations, whether Tra- vellers, or others ; much lefs to fufpeft their own TrincipLf upon fuch Sleight Advcrtifements. I C returned 1 8 Solid Fhilofophy AJfcrtctJ. returned to my Friend, and eafcd him of his Qaandury3 for which he was very thankfui, and blamed himfclf much for giving credit to a Tale, to the prejudice of Evident Re.^jhi, 13. To proceed, and purfue my Theme more clofelv, I would be glad to know, Ut^s if mt Spirit at lead in Common, what kind Inexplicable. of things, in this Author s opi-^ nion, thofe [Jdeas^ are. Are they • CcrvoreaJ^ or are they Spiritual^ or. under what Head fhall we rank them ? If Ccrporeal^ they cannot be in the Mind 3 as Accidents, or Modes of /> 3 the Mind being of a Sfirhual Y\2iurQ. If they be Spiritual^ Brutes, which have ix)t a Spi- ritual Nature, can have no Ideas. Perhaps it will be anfwer'd they are not thhjgs^ but cenain Modes of things : But this fatisHcs not 3 for Modes are AtfeSionsof the Thing, or certain Manner i how it is 3 wherefore they muit be futable to the Nature, of the Thing of which .they are Modes 3 for a Thing cannot he fuch as It cannct bee : And fo the quellion returns, what that 'Thing is of which thofe Ideas are the Modes: Is it Corpo- real, or is it Spiritual? If it be Spiritual, thea again Brutes can have no Lleas^ boomfc they have no Spiritual Natures in them, and fo they can have no Spiritual Modes: IC Corporeal^ then our Mind, which is Spiritual, can have riO Ideas in it 3 Corporeal Ideas being improper Modes for a Spiritual Nature. I do chiefly iniift upon this Objedion, to iliew more manifefily that tiie Wbidldea^ ihould have been Diilingui/ii'd at firil, and Ccunrerpojed tO Phi:ntdJ7?7^ and not £onfounded with it : Beddes, my Cj^nius lead.-, me when I diicourie about any thing, even tho* I oppofe it, to know diltindily wba that thing is, leail- I oppofe Trcltminitry Fird. 19 oppofc ! know not what ; and I niiill: declare that 1 can make no conception of the word Idta by what OLir Moderns, and particularly this Learned Author, has given me concerning it. For, he ab/lra^ts from affording his Reader a (t'lftlncl and clear view of it ^ without which his Book, which nins wholly upon that Word, cannot be perfectly intelligible; nor, oftentimes, his main Difcourfes inferr any cktermjnate Conclufions. 14. It may perhaps be replied, That every Man experiences he has thofe Ideas 3 as alfo that he comes to know^ by Ex>?rience that havino; them in his Mind ; and "^^ ^''''^" ^,^*"' therefore it is a folfy to enquire ^„-,,,,„f ^hac ^^9' fo fcrupulouHy about fuch things are. as are, in fome fort, Self-known * and that it is enough to fay they are Refe^nhUn^ ces of things, made in us by the Objeft without us. To which I reply, that we indeed experi- ence the An eft of fomething in our Mind (and, by the way, of fomething of another nature in our jp^?;c/ too ) by vvliich we know things 3 but, whether it ought to be called an \ldza'\ or fait'? with the proper meaning of this word 3 or, after it ts called fo, the Quid ef of that [ Uca ] or' what it is ( at lead: as to the Common Nodon or Genus of it ) or what to make of it by the light yet given me by this Author, or any orher I have had the good fortune to fee, I mull: profcfs I am not able to difcern. All tlie knowledge I have of it from him, belides that givv:n above which confounds me, is this. That he calls it frequently 2. RcftmhLmcey N>r to fay, they are Fortralntre y Image, Appearanc^ Refo.nbknces, and fuch like j which ftill leave C z me 2,0 Solid Philofophy AJferteJ, tne more dilfatisfied than ever : For, who can hive the firfi knowLdge of a tiling by aPicfure^ ox Reftmhlame of it? Ltt any Man fee the pi- cture of a Tree, or an Apple, who had never fcen rhofe things theinfch'cs, nor ever ^muld fee them any ether ways ; and what knowledge could it give him, but only of things of a far different nature from a Tree, or Apple, ^Iz.. a Cloih, Board, or Paper, thus figured and colour'd ? Or, how can any Man know that fuch things are^ or have any being In nature^ by a bare fimilitude of them. I mav fee the picture of fuch a /hap'd Ahn^ but whether that Man ij, or ever -w^s, the pidure cannot inform me j fo that it might be fome Farir- .cy of the Fainter, for ought I know by the Fidure. Indeed, had I known fuch things for- .nicrly^ then a Refemblance of them might, in that cafe, revive, and call into my mind the know- ledge of them j but, how it fhould beget the /r/ knowledge of them, as our late Philolbphers put ihofe Refemhlances to do, is altogether impollible and inexplicable. 15:. Again, lince Mr. L. affirms that we know nothing, either by DirecSt or Re- u h^^je IJea. ./ ^^^ Knowledges, but by Iiavine or^r orrn Ideas, ^i r • • a r n 1 "^ iv^xpUcM. ^""^'^^ or It j It muft follow, that when by a Reflex Aft I know my frfi Ilea got by a direH Imprcflion, I mud have an Idea of that Dircft Idea^ and another Idea when I know that Reflex one,of /> , and flill ano- ther of that J and fo ftill oji, all the time w'hilc I go on refieding upon my former Knowled- ges. Now, what fenfe can we make of an Idea of an Idea^ or what means a Similitude of a 5;- militude^ or an Image of an Iwage ? Each fuccced- ing 2nakcs neceiii^ry for his Book, iince w^ith- Science;;.;,.cyy/^/.. ^^^ diftinguilhing his Ideas froni Tka?}tafms, and letting us know diftinitly what his / Freiiminary hirlt. aj his Ueas aiv, his whole Ellay is un:nttlligihU\ and 'A\ his Dilcourfcs built on the ambiguous word \ldifa ] arc inconclulive. And, had his pcnecratini^ VVic fcT ir fclf* to that fludy, I doubt not but it would have exceedingly conduced both to clear his cwn thoughts, and to have enlightned ethers. I del ire then it may be undcrftood, that it is not in order to hhn only I have enlarged on this 'point, but to meet with the midakes o^ others alio, who do cuftomarily ufe the word [ /^/^j, ] and y^^z^ as 1 have good reaion to fear, do not perFe6lly iinderftand their own meanings. Laftly, I thought it fit to dilate firll on this point, that I might pre-- pare the way to my next Difcdurfc, to which it naturally leads. F COnOLURL Rom this whole Dilcourfe colie^led into a Summary, I deduce this Corollary, that, fincc the word ID EJ, according to this Au- thor, iigniHes a RefLmblance, Sirrjilltude^ or Image, and, confequently is indifferent to Corporeal and Spiritual Refemblancts, that is, to what's in the M/?;^/, and what's only in the Fa?jcy ; and that, only that which is iii the Mi7jd can be the proper Material of all our Knowledges ; hence that W(3rd is molt improper to be ufed in I^'hilofophy, wliich is ihc Study ofKfwwlcdgc. Alio^ that as talcen thus undifiifiguijht^ it does in another regard iiigh- ly prejudice all true Krwivled^c of Things, or Science'^ in regard ic confounds Corporeal Tind Spiritual Natures, which contain the two Ge- ricralObjeds of all Qur Knowie^Jges j aiid are,, btlides, mojt ^jajtly djp.rratc. Vre- •XA doiia rtojiojop^^y j^uerrea. PRELIMINARY Second. That the Elements^ or Materials, of all our KnowlerJgies are properly to he called^ N O- T I O N $ i and what thoje Notions are. I. TDUT, if the word \^JDEA'\ht Equivo- JLJ cal and Improper to be ufed in Philofophy, as being un- That theEJemmts or fit to flgnify the Hrll Conceptions t^'"''''/'i^' "^ "'*'' of our Mind, ( which are, as Mr. _^,^/^. ^f y, Ju^^ L. fays well, the Materials of Sci- [ NOTIONS.] ence ) and confcquently, are apt to make us entertain Erronccus Fancies for Real Kmwledo-ts : it will be be ask'd what othtr word we can invent which is Unlvccaly Proper, and rot liable to fgnify a Suferfidal Refemhlance^ nor dang rous to k duce us by taking Fantafiical Af^ tcarunces tor the true KnoJukdge of the Thhigs • but is, of its own Nature, fit to exprcfs diflinctly thofc jolid Materials, by the Compofition of which the Strufture of Scle7ice is to be raifcd ? I rep]/, fne word [ Notions ] is [ucL^ and anfwers alJ thef lnte;uions 3 and therefore this is the c^/y word to be made ufe of by Philofophers, who feriouf- ly ar.d l.nccrcly purfue the Knowkdge f Things^ and not their own witry Conceits, or Imr.ginati-- ens. Tis Utiivccfil and Unambiguous, becaufe Men of Art, or Philofophers, who are the bell Refleders Trelimntary occond, ic Rtfledcrs on the Operations of our Mind, and have the rrucft Right to exprefs thofe Thoughts their Arc has given them, have conflantly ulld it hitherto to I'gnify our /Iwple ylppre/ji?i//o?is^ or the firll Operation of our Ijnderitanding j and jf^vever to f:gnity Material Refcmblances, or Fhar.~ ''t-ifms : Wheiice alfo it claiins to be Proper. And, indeed, it has title to be fuch even from its very Or/ghf and Derivation : For, none can doubt, or ever qucftion'd, but that the Compound word [Cog- niticn ] docs properly fignify True [ Knowledge., ] and therefore the Simple word [ Notion ] muft nioft properly fignify thofe fiwple i^arts, Elements, or Materials ; the orderly putting together of which in a Knowing Pow'er does compound, or make ( Ccgnlticn^ ) Whereas the particular Senfe or Meaning of the word [ Idea ] which denotes a Rcfemblance, or Similitude, does not, in its immediate and proper Senfe, in the leaft inti- mate any Order to Knowledge at all j nor any Material, Part, or peculiar Objedt of it. Nor, laflly, does the w^ord [ Notion ] lignify a bare Si- militude, or Refcmblance, which can be, and ufu- ally is, in the Fancy 3 but ( as will be feen Short- ly ) the 'very thing it Jelf exifiing in our Mind , which is moft undoubtedly a Solid Material, or Firm Ground to build the Knowledge oi Things., 01 Science upon it. 2. 1 hope I fhall have candid Readers, and there- fore I am not apprehenfive that any will be fo captious as to ob- The'-a>ord[^ot\on] iea, that I do here ufe an Equi- W [Cognition] * , , ,, , ^t are taken hen . vocal word, as well as others, by objeaively. taking [Cognition] which (ignifies an JH of Knowledge, for the Objc^ of that A6L *Tis 5.6 Sobd Fhilofophy AJjerted. *Tis a Fate, to which all words are obnoxious, to have {owe Ambiguity, or double fcnfe one way or other. Thus we call in our common Speech a Parchment by which we hold our Eftaus [ A rf^Wf/?;^, ] and a Sentence of 5<:;;ffrt', his, [-S^yiw^] ; and fo take thofe words for the thing Written^ orm. Said,-^ tho' they may alfo fignifiy the ABs of writ- ing, or faying. Bur, this is not fuch an Equivo- calnefs as breaks fquares between me and the Ueifts^ or that on which my Exception proceeds. The Univocalnefs which I affert to the word [Cog- nitio7i ] and [ Notion ] is fuch a one as is taken from their RaJix^ [ Nofio ] which, notwithflanding little Gramatical variations, does ftill import fome K?iovjlec!ge^ or an Order to it 3 and the genuin fignifcation of thofe v/ords, thus varied or de- clined, is dill kept within that fame Line. Quite otherwife than is found in the word [ID EA^ Vihich is Indeterminate to thofe vaflly different Lines of Corporeal and Spiritual^ (which makes it highly Equivocal 3 ) belidcs that it has no Rapport at all to the Line of lOjowledge from its Radix^ or Original Senfe. To clear then the meaning of the word [Notion^^ as 'tis ufed here from this Sleight^ and ( in our cafe ) Vnconcirning Am- biguity, I declare, that, there being two Con- siderations in Knowledge^ zflz.. the AH of my Knowing Power, and the ObjeB of that A(S, which, as a kind of Forw^ a6tuates and determins the IndifFerency of my Power, and thence fpecifies my Ad:^ I do not here take the word [Noticn'] for my Acl of Simply Apprehending j but for that O/'/aV in my mind which infer?/?! my Underftand- ing Power, and about which that Power is Em- 'ployed y in which ObjcHivc meaning 1 pa'cdvi» Mr. Trcliminary Second. 27 Mr. Lcckc docs alfo generally take the word {IDEA,'] 3. Since I have formerly blamed the^^nibiguous explication of the word [ IDE.A^ 'tis but jufi it fhould be required W'^^/ffNotlons/rr^ of me to give a more Detcr- A Notion minateand Oillin^l one of the word which I /hall do in blunt Terms thus^ is the 'vcry thiiig it felf exifiing in my underfiandiiig.'^ I expeft at the fivft hearing fuch a monflrous Poiition, which feems to the Antiperipateticks fonuthing above Paradox, and as Myflerious as a Supernatural Poijit of Revealed Faith, it will be entertained by fome of them with a kind ofA- mazcment, by othcTS with a Smile. On the other lide, I am fo little concerned how any re^ ceive it, that I mull refolutely declare that, unlefs this Thcjis be as True as it is Strange^ it is impoiri- ble any Man living fhould k^jow mty thivg at alL By which the Header will fee that the Credits of the Arifiotelidns,, and their Adverfaries, as to their being held Solid Phihfiphers^ does entirely lie at Stake upon the dccifion of this main point. Which therefore mull: crave the Attention, ajid Soberefl: Coniideration ofthofc perions, who take themfelves to be concerned in the alFair of Science^ or in the Search after Truth. 4. Er*e I addrefsmy felf to prove my Pofition, I muft- befpeak my Reader's Con- sideration, that, in a Quoflion of Fancy /; fo hsjve this Nature, which depends up- '"^ ^'/"^' ''' '''^^ „ o • 1 • eoiir inz about on our Reiiexion on what is, or Spiricual Con- is not in our Spntual part, the ce^tions. the Sotd^ he mufu lay alide his pleafing Phantajms^ and all the Iwiigcryy V\lnch with a 8 Solid PhHofophy Ajferted. with fuch a fine Raree-^how ufes to entertain and delight his Fancy. The point is of a higher Nature than to managed by fuch Familiar Apfearances, The Ideas of Figure, Colour, nay, of Quantity it felf muH fit out as Bunglers, when fuch a Game is to be played, in which they have no Skill. This Conteft muft be carried on by Meavs as Sfi- ritual^ as is the SuhjeH of it J that is, by exa^l Rcafon^ Or feverc Connexion of Terms. And, tO think to draw Inrrinfecal Arguments 3 or to frame peninent Anfwers to them, from what we find in M?ffri/?/ Imaginations, when the Queftion belongs to that partof Metaphyficks which treats of Spiritual Natures, and their Operations, is as abfurd, as 'tis to contend that the Knowledge of a Man is Great., or Little., becaufe his Body is ??/^^, or Dwarfijlj 5 or to fancy that Science is to be meafured by Tards., or Inches, And, tho* I cannot fear any fuch Rational kind of attacque as Clofe Connexion of Terms., for the Negative, yet 1 grant my felf obliged to produce no lefs than Cleareft Evidence for the Affirmative 3 provided we rate Evidence, not from what feems eafiefl to Fancy., but from the faid Connexion of Terms 3 only which can eftahliflj our Judgments. 5:. I am to note firil, that, as the Moderns grant we know nothing without The Que (lion about having [Ideas^ of them within Notions Stated, cjfy. minds -J fo 1 willingly acknow- ledge, that we cannot know any thing that is without us, but by having in our underftanding Notions of thofe things. Now, fay J, thofe Net i on snwikh^lh^ very things ihtm- felvcs ( as far as they are known ) in our Souly which they deny, as inci-ediblc and Moiiftrous. I note> T r ell m'l nary Second. ip I note, fccondly, that in my Thefis^ I take the word [ Th\ng\ in the largcft Signification, as it comprehends not only Subfiances^ which only are properly Thinp-^ but alfo all the Modes ^ or Accidents of Siibuance, which are improperly fuch. Thefe Notes premifed, I come to my Proof : 6. Firfi Argument. When I Jimfly apprehend the Thing, or any Mode or Ac- cident of it, this Operaticn of my ^^otion^ is r/v TT J A J- • • ;• Thing It felt Underltanding is withm my -^^ ^°^ Under- Mind, and COmpIeatcd there j ftanding ; therefore the Thing Appre- Proof i. Becaufg hcnded, which is the Ohiea y ^'"^^'^^^ r X ^^ . n •' 1 Immanent yf J- ot that Operation, mult be there likewife : For, otherwife, this Operation of my Mind, it being Immanent, and not Tranfient, or paffing cut of my Mind to the Thing without wf, cannot be employed about that Things con- trary to the Suppoiition. Nor could the Thing be tioily faid lO be Apfrehendad^ unlefs this Ope- ration, called my Apprehenfion, had the Thing for its Objetl j and this -within my Underftanding, it being an Internal Operatlcn. But, that which is within me when I know it, is the Notion of it : Therefore the Notion of it ( taken, as is dtclar'd above, objectively ) is the Thing It [elf in my Un- derfiandlng. 7. Second Argument. I know die "very Thing j therefore the very Thing is in my Ad of Knowledge : But my Ad: Proof 2. Bccaufe of Knowledge is In my Und.r- r/;^Thing Known and.ng^; therefore the Thing Knowing Power, which is in my Knowledge, is alfo in my Underftanding. 8. Tho' JO Solid Fhilofophy Ajferted. 8. Tho' I will not allow it to beany way an an Anfwer to thefe Arguments, proof ^ Bec/iufe. to allcdge, that 'tis fufficient that a Refemblance the [l^ea] Or Refcmblance of the yo: the Objea j^^- ^^ - ^^.^^^1 bccaufe jufcieiit to caufe 1^ docs not in the lealt Ihock the it. Connexion of its Terms, or /hew them Incoherent j but is a mere fhuffling Pretence, throwji '. n to avoid their Force : . Tet 1 fhall condcfcend to /Iil w it impertinent, and I '^rgue againft it thus. 9. T/jird Argument . That only is Known, which I have in my Knowiedge,or /« my othcrwife U^:is UnderftandiniT : for, ' to know ■only coHid bi flid , t / '^ '^ . x^ /ol' known. ^"^^^^ ^ ^^''"^^ ^'^^ /^- my Know- ledge, is a Contradidtion : There- fore, if I have 07%ly the Idea^ and not the Things in my Knowledge or Undcrftanding, I can only know the J.'/^/«, and not the Things and, by Con- fequence, I know nothing without we, or no- thing in Nature. Again, 10. Fourth Argumey^t. Philofophy is l\\QiKno'iiy^ hdze of Things : But if 1 have Proof 4. BecAufe, nothing but the Ideas of Things oth^r^ife,allph^. j^^ ^y jy^jj^J j ^,^^ ^.^y^ KnOV«^ lohphy ■would be \ ^ r - - 1 r 1 r dcjiroyd. ledge ot notnmg but or thole Ideas. Wherefore, either thofe Ideas are the Things the?nfelvcs^ as I put Notions to be, and then I-have gain'd my Point 3 or elfe they are ?iot the Things^ and then we do ?tot know tht nings at all 3 and fo adieu to the Knowledge of Things., or to Philofopliy. II. I Preliminary SCcond. 3 1 1 1 . I exped not any dircdl: Aniwer to thcfc Reafons, ytt I doubt not but Wit and Fancy wilffurni/h a prcjudi- Proofs B:c.%ufe ccd Pcrfon with Evafions ; and f^"'-!jy'^"^''"' the mxt will, pollibly, bL^ this, 7ilvy^l^KnoZ that wc know the Things that are hdge 0/ Things. "iintbout Hs^ hv means ot the Ideas or Rclcmblar.ccs of them which are Within ///. To ovcithrow which Pretence, I argue thus : 12. Fifth jir gum en t. We Cannot have the f;>/^ Knowledge of any thing by a Pi- cture, or Refcmblance, as was y^sxfatpro-J'dfir* fhewn,Prf//w/w^?7 i.§.i4.. Where- ^neriy. fore. Notions, or Siinpk Appre- hcniions being the Firft Notifications of the Things to our Mind, we cannot know the Thing by their means^ as is pretended, were they not mtre than Refcmblances , that is, were they rxOt the i/fr/ Thing. To overthrow this Pretence utterly, and w^ith4 all, to uphold and foriifie this laft Argument, f advance this : 1 3 . Sixth Argument. We Cannot poiTibly know at ail the Things ihemfelvts by ' the Ideas, unLls we know cer- P'^^^^- ^^'f-^' tainJy thole Ideas are Right RejLm- ^^^ j j^.^ refcm- hlances of them. But we can ne- hUs the Trying ver know^ ( by the Prilnciplcs of right , both ^ the Ideip) that their "J^.^i are 'f Vf t' 1" Right ReicmblancLS or the Things • (here Coynpard. therefore . we cannot polLbly know at all the Things by their Ideas. The Mi- nor is proved thus , We cannot know any Idea to be a Right Rejtmb lance or a Thing, ( nor, in- deed, that any thing whatever rejcmbhs another right I) J 3 1 Solid Philofophy Afferted. rightly^ ) unlefs they be both of them in our Com^ faring Powcr j that is, in our Underdanding or Reafon, and there view'd and ccmpard together^ that we may fee whether the one does rightly re- femble the other, or no. But, this neceifitates rhat the Thing It feJf^ as well as the Llca^ muft be in the Underilanding, which is directly contrary to their Principles j therefore by the Principles of the Ideifis, we cannot polTibly know that their Ideas are Right Refemblances of the Thing. Now, if the Thing it felf be in the Underftanding, there needs no Idea of it j for to be there^ or to be in a knowing Voiver^ is to be known. Again, i\,. Seventh Argument. No Relation can be known without Knowing both Proof 7. Becaufe the Correlates : Therefore no ittes 't'^ZTa ^^^^' ^^'^^^*^^^ '^^^"S ^ Refemhlanct thlunTerflaJing. ^^ I'^tThing muft neceOarily be r^- lated to it,can be known without knowing alfo the Thing to which 'tis related as that which is refembled by it. Therefore the Thing refembled muft be known, not only beftdes the /^^^,but by ether means than by it , which can be no way but by the thing it /eZ/^exifting, in the underfuanding. Which Argument Proofs. B^^caufe is enforced by thiiConfidurarion, t'J'lTli^' that when the One of the two h!Ln/ ^ thingsthatare Related, or ^///^e, is the Frototjpe^ the other taken from it, or ( as it were ) drawn by it j thd Prototype miift hcfrfi known ere we can judge that the other is like it. But the Prototype in our Cafe is the Thing without us., therefore the Thing without us muft/r// be in our mind er'e we can judge of the other's refembling it. ly. Nhitb Vrelimbiary Second. ^^ I J. Kmth Argiimc7it. Notions are the A/ r • ^ ^ \ i jr/;,tf vv(yrds an Torc^ whac s Ijgnihcd by them, to ,%w,)ff, hut the mull he for c -hi own to that Agrce- Thlngs only. mt^m. Biit the ideas, or Relcm- blanccs we have, cannot be fere- kncwn to this Agreement, lince they could not be at ail knovv/n, ( being m the Mhul, ) but by the JVords • which, not being yet agreed on, can make known, or fignifie nothing. Therefore the rain that the Words do f-gnilie v^ hat's In the ALtid of the Speaker, or his Not:c?7s^ they muft fignifie t/:e Thing in the Al'.vd -^ and, cojifequLntjy, alfo the 'Very Things \\ hich are v/ithctit US, and which wcx'e knovv'n to us kfore the Agreement about th.e \^''ords> were in our Mind, when we went about to r/aff7e them: And, were not this fo, Words could fignifie ncth'mg, which is a Contradidlion. drdlary I. HcnCc that great ConteR- in the ScliOoIs, whether our Words dc^ lier.ce the ^«r- iwmcdiattly lignife OUr Co?Jcep' fiio>^,ry}jetha'the tic7is, OX the Things i?t re, (as Things, .. our ^. 1 ^.^1'^ . ^ .. r^ ^11 mtdiatdy fgr.i- Dilpute. For, if" the Objecli've fi,d by Words, is Part of our Conceptions, whicli Frivolous, 2XQ our Notions of the Thing, be the ftlf-fame with the Thing ut re^ neither the cnc., nor ihe othtr^ is immediately lig- iiified J f Treliminary Second. 3 5* nificd J bccauft there is no cvc^ and cthe',\ bur die: fame. And if the Q;jeftion be pur of the Thing as m re^ and as In the Utultrftandifjg 3 'ris anfwer'd. This Qiieftion rakcs in rhofe {cvcrA M.nmrs of Exijllfig^ wliich enters nor inro rhe Objective No- tion, nor prejudices rhe Uaiuty of the Thing un- der eithtr Srate 3 and fo rhe Qaeftion is again fri- volous. I S.Tv^dfth Argmmnt. The fame is evinced from the Fen/t-jr/V?/ of our Words ^ as, when I fay {The Glafs is 'm the ^'"^^ '}; ^'''^ irr- J -I u \T7 1 r 7 ^7 n ^Z:':^- Verification IVindow, J rhe Word [ the Ghjs J cf PropjJtiom. niulT: mean rhe very Suhj^ance of that Glafs exiflenc without us, and not the Idea. of that Glafs , for ic would be Falfe to f^y, the 3f Df cl of the Glafs is in the IVindow. Therefore the ^jerj Glafs it feJf which is in the Window, muft be alto in my Mind. 19. Thirteenth Argument. But, becaufe i^f/^w- hlances and Likeneflcs pleafe them fo well, we win try what Proofs P^o,o^/^ ^//^/^ i_ ' J f^ ^ . r. rc>Hi: s perfectly may be drawn from thofj very nke, // r.^aame. Words whkh rhemiclves do moR- aifefl:. They hold, the JDCcI, or Likenef of the Thing is in the Mind. Let us conlider then the Likenefs of 2. Alan in the Underftanding 5 or ra- ther, becaufe we both agree that we have no Com- 1 jleat Ideas or Notions of any Suppcftum^ let us I take one of Mr. Locke's Simple Ideas, v. g. Extent ^ Jjon. I ask, Is the 7^^^ of Extenfion, as to its Re- prefentation, in all Refpe&s like that Mode as ic is in the Thing 3 or is it not? If not, then we can never know that Mode ( at lead, not clearly and fully) by that Wf^ 3 which yet we muft do, ere D X • we ^6 Solid rhilofophy AjferteJ. \vj can difcourfc of it as a Simple Idea. And, if it is j:erficil)\ or in nil rcfpcds, like it j then 'tis in no Refpect unlike it j and, by Conll'qiicnCC, in no Re- ■fpeci Different from it^ (for ihd: Diffirence would be an UnlikcnL'fs • ) and, if it be in no reffetl Different^ it follows, o:it of tlie very Terms, that ir is the ^e- r) fame^ /-^ the Mind, and ow/^ o/^* the Mind, which is fo much boggled at in our Notions : So that, at unawares, the hxplicaters of Ideas by Refemblan- cesy mufl: be forced to come over to our Pofition, cvtn while they would avoid it. rcFourtienth/^rguwent . To make this yet Clear- er, and to fet it above all pollible Proof 14. This Confute, Itr us take the Word, UjlRcajonntain- \ExilhnccA or ACtual Being. tMud by the In. K-i i \ \ it- 1 jiMCj of the No- il^^y l^^now what that Word V/owo/ Exigence means ^ and confequently, they they have an Idea of it in their Underdanding j for 'tis tljis w hich they fay Words f-gnifie. This Idea then mud eitlier be in all re- JpedsWkQ to Exigence, or mjcme vdpc'Sts j that is, in part only : Not in part 3 for Exijlence has no imagiiiable Paits in it, nor any divers Refpcdts or Coni. derations ^ no, not even thofe Parts made by the niceft Mctaphylical Abjhaclicn of our Mind, called Jci and Vower 3 but 'tis One, ?nofi Simpley Indivifible^ and mcft Ahfolute JH j and thence 'tis calLd by the Schools an yl^luality^ as if it were the very Nature of AB it illf, without the leaft Alloy of the more imperfedt Notion of Pctentia- l'!t)\ or Roiver, Wherefore the Idea of Exijtence mufl: either be in afl refpeHs Like Exifl:ence, or not at all Like it 3 if net at all Like it, then, ha- ving no Idea or Refemblance of it, we can never know what the Word Exijhncc mcaiis : If it be in a TreUmhiary ScconJ. 3/ ttllrefpccls LikL'ky then, by our former Difcourlo 'tis if! 7J0 reflect Unlike it j and therefore, in no n- fpect Different from it ^ and therefore 'tis the "onj fa?ne with it. 21. Fifteenth ylrgumcnt. It may, perhaps, look like an Aniufemcnt, or Surprize, to pretend the Thing is the fnme, VroofisThif.,n:e when us fcrfecUy like ; tor I do ,;,, ;;v,,„,,/ 5.;. not expedl: that every Reader will y„^, ^f Mankind. fpcculate fo deep, as to fee that all L'lkenefs is Unity of Form as far as the Likenefs reaches. Wherefore, to put them out of this Mif-conceit, w^ewill endeavour to convince them that this Polition is not a Trick of ^Vr, bur plain honeft Ncititre : It has been ftill my ufual Method to fhew, that the highefl Speculations I advance, are abetted by the natural Noti^jns, Sentiments, and Sayings ot Mankind -^ nor will I decline to bring my prefent Pofltion to be tried by the fame Tefl. Let us take then two Quantities^ (Yards for Example 3) in cafe we find them f)erfecHy Alike under the Notion or Refpeft of Qnantity^ we make account we can in true Speech lay they are the fame Quantity. Or, take two Pieces of Cloth, of fuch a Colour 3 and, if they be exaFily alike in that refpeft, unprejudiced Nature obliges us to fay they are of the fime Colour • and the fame holds in all Subftances and ;-odes whatever. Since then I the Ueifis mud grant that their Ideas are perfcclly like that which they know by them,(as they mull: be, as far as the Thing is known by them, becaufe the Thing is known only by their Refembling, or being like it J it follows from the Cunfent of I 'Mankind, that thofe Ideas mud, confequently, be ihQfame with the Things out of the M^nd which D 3 are 3 8 Solid Philofophy Jfferted. are known by them 3 which is what we put our Notions to be. Wherefore, the Nothn we have of the 7^^/?:^, niuft be the /t'/z^-Z^^^^ with the 7/3;;?^ 12. It may be replied, that the Not'icn of a Thing ( a Sronc, for Example ) Th: D'ffcrtree in haS a Spiritual Manner of Being r/;.^ Manner of in l\\^ IVLnd -^ whereas the Thing, tiicesvo' The Id-n- j ^ ^ -^ r r> • i tity of ThcNovon Ccrfcreal Manner or Being, and find the Thing, therefore 'tis in fome refpedt Dif- ferent from the Thing , and, con- fequently, not ^erftlly the fame with it j and fo can only be bareiy ifke it, or refemble it. I an- fwer, 'Tis granted that it is Unlike it ^ and fo Dlf- f trait from if, and therefore mt the [arm with it, as to the Manner of Exifiing 3 but I deny that ei-« ther its Exi fringe or Manjitr of Exifing do enter into the Notion^ ( except in the Notion of (BoD, to whom Exiiknce is HifentiaL) or do at all be- 1 jng to it^ or the Thing either , but that the No- tion is the Thiijg, precifely according to what is Comr/ion to it both in the Underftanding, and out of it^ abilra^lediy from both thofe Manners of Exifing, To explicate which, we may coniider, I . That no created Thing , nor confequently. Mode or Accident of it, has, of it5 own Nature, any 1 itle to be at all^ ( much Icfs to be after fuch or pich a Ma?mer , ) for then Being w^ould be Ef- fential to them, and not the Gift of their Cura- tor j whofe Prerogative of Seif-hei7ig^ or Effen- tial Being- J is Incommunicable to his Creatures. 1. Hence th-^ Things, and confequently their Modes^ do perfediiy ibih-a'cS from hci^ig^ .and mt helng.^ much more from all Manners of beingc 3. This TreUm'Diary Second. "59 2{. This appears evidently by thofc Words v/liich lignific thcni, the Meaning of which Words is the fame with our Nvtlons. For Example, Take Ga~ hrkl^ Feter, Riicephalns^ an Oak^ a Stc?jc^ a Ttir^^ tVhitcnefs^ or what other Thin^^, or Alode of Thing we pleafe • 'cis evident that the Sarfe of them (which is the fame with our Nutlon of them) docs not at all -nchtde^ hlnt^ or hti'im.ne Ex'iflence, or Nun-ExiJI-ence. Wherefore, 'tis fet above all faither Difpute, and (as far as 1 can fore-fee) b:yond all imaginable Objeftion, that our Kotitn of the Thing is the felf-j'a777C with the Thing in Mature ouhich is coiuei-ved by us. QV,. D. 23. Now, if our Soul, when it hjo-ws any Thing has the very nature of that Thing in it, and therefore is TheE-m^myicyofth: intellectually that thino- ( for to '^' fp^^^i^^lN^- t r 1 1 . • 1^1 ^«'*^ of the Soul, be luCh a thing is nothing but to ^l.^.shcr a Power have the Nature oF fuch a thing to be /r/ZThings •in it ) it follows that, confidering intAUauaily. her precifely as knowing a Stone, a Tree, Fire, &c. fhe is that Stone, Tree and Fire intelLdtually, Whence we may difcover how Rational, and how Nece'Tary and Impoitant a Truth that faying of Arifiule is, that Anima in- tcliigcndo fit omnia. In a word, 'tis due to the Nature of our Soul, as it is Spiritual^ and to the Emincncy of her EiTence, to comprehend after her manner the whole Inferiour Nature of Bodies, ( and much more ) or to be an Intelleclual iVorld^ as foon as fh^ is her] elf ^ and depur'd from her dull Material Compart, as is fliown in my "" Method. Nor can this * B.3. L.4. §14, making the Soul to know fo much ( nay, much mere ) be deemed an Extravagant D 4 Conceit 40 Solid FkHofophy AJferteJ. Conceit, or too high a Privilege for her, by any well inftru6led Chriflian, who refle6ls, ( as is alfo dearly Demondrablc in Metaphyficks ) that fhe is inade for, or is capable of a Knowledge infinitely higher^ ^^iz.. the beatifying Sight of GOD j m com pari fon of which the Knowing the whole Univerfality of Creatures is but a meer Trifle. 24. I much fear that fuch Readers, who are not raifcd above Fancy, and have •^^"^^ ff^^'^l^^ not well refledled how all Truths, Tfferm'mlZ ^"^ ^^^ ^^^^ Judgments and Dif-< ners ofExijlinr, courfes that are rightly made, do Confift in the Connexion of Terms^ will look upon all Efforts oiClofe Reafon, as Chi- merical, and think them to be only a kind of Chiquaning, and little Tricks of Logick. Where- fore, to comfort the uneafy Fancies of fuch weak Speculaters, I defire tliem to confider how nil things were in the Di'^'ine Underilanding before they were Created, and are fiill there j and how their Jdcas^ that is, their EjJ'ences^ had there ano~ thcry ( and that a more incomparable mn-aner of heing ) then they had in themfehes afterwards. From which Divine Archetypes they were copied into Nature, and thence tranfcribtd^ by Impredi- ons on our Senfes, into Human Undcrftandings. This Reflexion will ( 1 hope ) let them fee how it is not impoiiible, but Confonant to Reafon, that the /elf -jame thing may have both a Natural^ and an Intdl.ciual jnanner cf Exifiing. I aiOte by the way, that, whereas I have inf ited fo much on the Impropriety and Novelty of the word [ Idea^ ] our Modern Ideifs will alledge that Fla-^ to did make ufe of that word before them, and that they do but tccho him, while they ufe it af- ter Trelimhiary Second. 41 ter him. Rur, I believe they will find upon Ex- aminaiion, that Ylato ineant by that word the Efftvces, or Natures of Things ^ and, in likelihood, thofe very EHences in tbe Drjlne U7U'!erflandif7g j however fome thought he mifapplied it to 17»/- 'uerpil I^easy Or Ej]lnces^ fubdfling aIo7ic^ and not in the Indrji^uals. Now, did our Moderns take it in the fa7i:c Senfe he did, that is, for Ejfences^ and not for Refemhlances only, I fhould not ex- cept againft them as to that particular 3 but, to ufe his word, and affix another Senfe to it, is, as I con- ceive, to abufe it. -5. Ccrollary U. From this whole ditourle, and the many feveral Arguments in it, it appears evidently, that NoSohdVbUoCcr unlefs the word [ Lie a ] be taken J^^iaeal ^ as we take the word [ Notio^i^ ] that is, unlefs Ideas^ or Notions^ or whatever elfc we pleafe to call them, be the 'very thbjgs in cur under ft iznding^ and not meer Refemhlances of them, they can never reach or engage the Thing it jelf^ or give us K7iowledge of it 3 that is, they can never make us kncii; ayiy th'ivg-^ any more than a Piflure can make us know a iVlan we never /^:?2^ nor ever ^•iaU or can fee but by means of that Fixture j that is, not at all. And therefore, as I cannot hut judge what I here advance to be True^ and withaJl moft necedary to be told, fo I am obliged, without asking leave of any, to do that Right to Truth as to declare that thofe many Schcms of Doctrine, woven upon fach Ideas as their Groundwork, tho' they be never fo Ingenious and coheivnt within themfelves, and may be of fome ufe in Logick to diilinguifh our Notions, are both meer- Jy Superficial, and perfectly ufelefs in Philofophy, which 41 SoU^ rhilofophy AjferteJ. which is the Knowledge of Things ^ aniJ, can only fcrve to pleafc the Dxdalean Fancies of the in- genious Contrivers and witty Defcanters upon them^ but can never bring us to the Solid Kmiv- ledge o^ any one Thing in Nature, nor verify any cm Predication, or Judgment we make , nor en- able us in our Speculative, or even Common, Dif- courfes about any Things to rpeak one word of good Senfe. Kot that I think that Mr. Locke does ftill take the vv^ord [ Idea ] in that unac- countable meaning ; but, that the acutenefs of his Natural Gemiis does generally carry him ( per- haps unreflectingly ) to mean by that word the fame I mean by Notion j tho', to fay the truth, he totally abftradls from meddling dcl^gnedly with this abftrufe point. iG. Ccrcllary III. Hence alfo we may gain fome light Vv'hat Knowledge is. For, it I. r;^^/ Know- has been demondrated that our iedge //. Not} ens ^ on which all our Know- ledges are grounded, and of wWch they are Compounded, are the very Na- tures of the thing known -^ and, confequently, that our Soul, confidered prccilely as knowing thofe Natures, or having them in he\\ as in their Subject, if, '^sftfcb^ thofe very Things which are conftituted by thofe Natures. Wherefore, our knowing that thofe things .^?T, or ai'efucL or fncb (which isCom- pleat Knowledge ) is the hr.'ving thofe things and their Predicates of Ex}(i:e7it, or of their bLing affc^Sled with fuch or fucb Accidents, fo ill the < Judging Power as they are in the things without j that is, the things wiihin her mull he as the things in Nature jr^. Wherefore, when the Son I knows any thing in Nature fhe mud he that thing as it is Trelini'niary Second c .^5 h Another thing diitin^!t from her 3 So thar in a word, To knew is Ejfe allud ut aliud j To be /??;- ether things as it is another. For hx^imple^ To knew the BelJ is in the Steeple, /he inufl: nor only havtf the B'^II cxiftcnt in the Stccplc vhhin her^ but alfo that the Bell in the Steeple is ivlthout her ^ or is in her as atjothcr thiny^y \vhich is neither hcr^ nor anvTliingorMode bclG9igingto her. To expli- cate which hard point aa'c mav reflect, that all the Eilential Kotions of a Thinp; ( were it poliible to comprehend them all ) of a Bodv for example, are Jntrlnfecn 1 10 it j as alio all thofe Aladis or ^'Icci^ dcfits o: it,theC()niplexion of which doQS conuitiite the Eilcnce of tiiar Body y and even taking- them fif^gly, as meer Accidents, they depend for their he/ffg on tliat Body as on their Subtbnce j But it is not fo with thelxaturLS ofthofe Bodies,or their Modes or yVccidents, as they are in the Seal. For, they are no Determinations or Modes fuit^We or belonging to her Nature as 'tis S^iriti(al\ j^,or de- pend Solely on kr 2S On their Stthjecl for their Exi- llence, as all Modes in their Natural Subjeds do. Whence follows, that when fhe knows them, they are purely in her as Extrinfecail to her^ or as other Things j and as halving their genuin ExiHence elfewhere^ Or out of the Mind. And, in tlus coniifts the Excellency of a Spiritual Nature, ( from which we may demonflrate her Immateri- ality, and, by Confequence, her Immortality ) that by reafon of the Superlative Noblenefs of her I'lfence fhe can comprehend the whole Nature of Bodies ( tho' /lie may know other higher Natures alf ) ) all its Accidents, its Exiftence without us, and whatever can belong to it j and yet fo as to frand a-loof frorn it, and prefcrvc her Diftance and 44 Solid Philofophy Afferted. and Height above it 3 andiswithall through the Amplitude of her Nature, able to engraft on her infinitely capacious Stock of Being all other things, and give them, befidcs their own, ( if they be in- feriour Natures or Bodies ) a far Nobler Exi- ftence in her [elf . This Definition oi Knolv'lng^s'■^^ I doubt not, look like GibberiOi to fhort-fighted Speculaters, who have not reflected fteadily on the Souls Spiritual Oftratiom^ and on what Manner th'mgs are in the Mind; But, if each ftep to it be ( as I cannot doubt but it is ) demonftrable, the E'vidence of the TremijJ'es^ and the Neceffitj of the Confeqiience ought to obtain of every Learned Man not be ftartled at the Strangenefs of the Con- cluficn, becaufe Fancy is dilTatisfyed. Tliat Infe- rs our Faculty is to be curb'd and kept within its own narrow Sphere^ and forbid to meddle with Spiritual Subiedts which are beyond its reach and SkilJ y and are only manageable by Reafon ground- ing it felf on fuch Notions as are abo've Matter. And, if it appears by this Rigorous Tell that our Notions are the 'very things as difinB fom us, all the reft of it will follow of Courfe by a Natural and Neceflary Confequence. PRE- 4f PRELIMINARY Thirl That a/I our Science is grounded on the Things themjelves ; and How this is performed. I. TJ U T how can the Things be in our Under- XJft^indinii; ? fince the [Thing^ in irs firft and proper lignifica- >^« objeEiim /r- tion, being an Individual Sub- j''''fl/!l' ^Ti" n • I r u- Q. ri lity o\ the ^\\o\q fiance^ IS the lubiect or Inniimera- 2t;/w^ ^^/;;^ /wow? ble Modes, or Accidents, w hich w/W, cleared, we can never reach, or compre- hend j and therefore it can never be known by us compleatlv, as Mr. Locke has very elaborately demonftrated at large j and, as my felf have alio proved in my '^ Method. This be- ing (b clear and confefs'd a Truth, * b. j. l. 2. § 7. it feems to follow hence againfl: us both, that neither the Iddfis have any 7^/^^ of it Reftmblhig il fully., nor we any Notlcn of it, which is truly and entirely the fame with it intelledlu- ally j and fo neither of us can, properly fpeak- ing, pretend to know any Thing as we ought. 2. To clear this important Difficulty, on which the whole Affair of Science., and the Confutation of Scepticifm, Sme Notes pre. r . , T , ^ . . ' mis a to clear tins' leems mamly to depend, it is to oijeHion. be noted. 3. Firfl, That the Notion of the Individuumy Thing or Suppofitum^ Can never, for the Reafon now given, be Di- ^«; Knowledge fiinci 2nd Comtleat, but Confufed [l/nf///' ' and Impcrfea. For, ki us take any 4^ Solid Fhilrfophy JJferteJ. any Individual thing, i.\g. a Stone, we /Iiall find that ir has in it what anf\ve»s to the Notion of a Things ( or what has Behig ) a.> alfo of Exteijded^ Dc7t(e^ Hard^ Qpacct4s^ Dinted^ c'^X. it is Di'v}fi^ ^/f into innumerable Pairicles, its peculiar M-.v^ ture COnliils of many di-vafe-natured Tarts^ with fuch an Ordtr or Tofinon amongil: them, &c. of all which our Senfes, with their bcft Aififtances, can not aribrd us clear Knowledge 3 nor, ccnfequent- !y, imprint any Clear Noticn of that whole Thing in our Mind. 4. Secondly, Thar, fince to knoii^ 'a Thing, is to have the Notion of it in our fj^e cm have fuch Mind, our Knoiuledge niufl' be fuch abkfion of a p5 ±c jsToticn is : If the Notion be fr^'f.u'^i/t ^^^'^^'^ ^^^^^'^^ ^^^ DifimH, our pr-jivsitfrnn-iill Knowledge too is fuch -^ and, if other things. thc Notion be Ohfcure , Partial and Confuftd^ our Knowledge muft be Obfcurc, Partial, and Confufed like- wife. 5". Thirdly, We can have fuch a Notion of eve- ry Individual thing, if it be not Corifufed No^im ( ^g ^\-^^ fmalkft Atoms are ) too iXg'w!/ ii"^^^ ^C) be perceptible by our Science. Scnfe, as ( iho' it be Confuted as to it felf ) may fervc to dillin- gui Ih it from all other Things, and to make us know it Exiils feparately from all others, and in- dependently on them 3 Moreover, that it is the Suiifoftuwy or SubJLdl:, which has its own Nature or lifltncc in it, and alfo all x\)C Mcdcs oy Accidents belonging to it. Thus, when w^e fee a Bag of Sand, or Wheat, poured out, our Senfes acquaint our IVIind, pre-imbued by fome cjmmon Notions, thar Trelinuthuy Third. 47 that each Grain can exill fcparatc ; and has^ fu- (lains, or gives Iking to irs oivn Accidents, with- out the Allifrancc of any of irs Tdlow-Grains^ Ci. Fourthly, This Confafed Knowledge of the Thing, in grofs, is fuificient for fuch a Degree of Science of it, as oviy Dl{lln£l: or we can have in this State. For Abaraacd y^- tho* we cannot have a Mlnti !•:';•":: 'it^^""; , , . ,i mediate Groumi KmwUdge or it all^ taken in the of Dipvci Kmw^ Lumj)^ and therefore do not pre- ledge or Science, tend to have Science of it thus covfuUredy nor of each Conliderability in it ta- ken by Derail ; yet, we know that Confufcdiy it ccvtniTis in it felf what anfwers to all the many dl^ fi'mH Conceptions we make of it, which are the Ground of nil tlic Science we have j they being all (iored up and amalTed in the Things and apt to be drawn or parcelf d out thence by our Ahjln^.^l've Confide rations of it. 7. Lajily^ That our Di/tinB Knowledge (or Science) is buik on our Difrhi5l Notions of the Thing fram'd in Saeva thus groun* our Minds by ImpreiVions on the f 'f^iV^'i!'^'^ ^^^'' f. r 1 • 1 11 "•'^. The Know- Senles, which are ma7iyy and the jejoe of the Manners of their afteding us alfo Thfr-g. manifold. Hence our Soul, in this State, can have no Dlftinci or Clear Knowledge of the Thingy but by piece-meal^ or by Diflindt,- Ditfcrent, Partial, Inadequate, or ( as they are ge^ nerally and properly called ) Ahftratt Notions ^ as Mr. Locke has frequently and judicioufly exem- plify'd in the feveral Conceptions or Notions we have of Gold , which we may confider, as yel- lowy heavy, folid, malleable, diilblvabie in aqtui Regla^ &G, Whence, iho' it be, perhaps, impof- ijble 48 Solid Ph'ilofophy A(ferted. (HdIc for 11 /- dude or co7motate the Thing or Subject, from all our Ablh-a6l Notions or Ideas, whether they be EfTential, or Accidental. To begin with the for- mer. 10. Jrg. I. 'Tis impoiTible to conceive Huma- nity^ for Example, without conno- tating Homo its Suf}pofitum • there- P'-ov\i,btc.aHfcM' fbre that Abilrad Idea, [ Humavl- ^^^';^::S 0',] muft iignifie the Thmg, or Uentiy include [Homo,] according tO what*S his theTiolng* hilcntial Conftitutive. The Ante- cedent is prov'd. The Notion or Lka of the De- finition is the very Notion or Idi^a of the Thing defined , bur the Definition o( Humanity, 'viz. the Com pleat Ejjt?ice (fa i^ian, includes Ad.m in its No- tion j therefore [ Humanity, ] w^hich is the Thing defined, does alio include the Thing, or [ Man, J in its Notion. Wherefore [ Humanity, ] tho' ex- prefs'd abllradledly, becaufe 'tis but one Tart, as it were, of the Entire Suppofitum, ( though it be the principal part of it, ) does Iignifie the Timjg, or Man, according to his Compleat Ellential Form or Conititutive. The fame Argument may be made of any other Ellential LLa. Let us examine next the Ideas or Notions of the Modes or Acci^ dents of Things, and try whether they exclude the Thing, "or include it. E Z II. Arz* f X So! id Fhilofophy Ajferted, 1 1. Arg. 1. The Idea or Notion of S^Mod^s^ ] is, that they are the Manners htw jawe. i^hat tiicy are thole which do ad~ 'vene to the Things or ( if I may be permitted to ftrain a Word, to exprefs properly and fully my meaning ) Accidents 2Yi:Unejlcnt:al Conceptions of the Thing. Wh.erefore, the Idea of both o^ them do inchuU the Thing in their Exfli- cations^ and confequently in their Notions., and not exclude it. Or thus, There can be no Modes of a Nothing j therefore the Notion or Idea of a Mode involves elTentialiy the Thing of which it is a Mode, and to which, as fuch, it relates. Wherefore, thie Material Part of it is the Thing, the Formal Parr [as thus modify d~\ or \_as ex'/ling th//s'] or (which is the fame) /// thm concei'vd. 12. Arg. 3. This is coniirm'd, becaufc Moda are juflly conceiv'd to have no ^ofM^^n'^'^ Being of their oim, but to Exili by the Exillence of their Subjetl : But, when we have a iN'otion of liny Mode in Na- ture, we conceive it as fomc way or other Ex-ifi- ing y therefore their Notion mufl: connotate the Subjdl or Thing by wliofe Exiflence only they do Exilh 13. It w^ould not be hard to multiply Argu- ments to prove this nice Point, Tio: s makes or jhws fctch'd both from Metaphyiicks, Philofophy to be ^^^^1 ^.j^'^ p^.^j^^ Logick, and the Ve- th' Knowledge ... . r n r^ r - j- j t of Thii)<^s. nhcation or all Propoiitions, did I conceive it to be needful. But, f fee plainly, that all the Arguments in my former Preliminary do confpire with their united Force, to make good this Fundamental Pofition. For, if this rrel/yn'm.iry Third. 5-3 this Truth be once Hrmly cflabli fh'd, that our No- tions arc the Thlna^s thcnifeivcs , is fir as they arc concciv'd by u^, it muJI- follow, that all our Science being built on iliofc Notions, has for its Solid Ba- fis the very Tbhg it fclf\ and nor any ether Things or Nothings, d tfi'niH {vomi\\c Th'mg kmipn -^ fiich as are their pretty Spiritual Lookinjr-Glajfes^ thofc UnaccountabL% Inexplicable, Unncceliary, and UfeJels Things, called Ue^js. And, I hope I may re/1 confident that thofe Proofs of mine will abide the Shock of the mod Strenous Oppoiition ; lince, unlefs that Grand Leading Truth be Certain, 'tis demonflrablc that no Man living can know miy thing at nil. For, 'tis confels'd, that nothing can be known, but by the Means of thofe Ideas or Ivcpre- fentatiojis of it : And thofe Arguments evince, that unlefs the 7/j/w^ ^^ fi^f be in our Mind firfi^ rhofe Idcas^ or Refcjiiblances canr.ot poilibly give us any Notice, or Knowledge of it. 1 4. Note Fir ft. On this Occaiion wt may ro- fle6l on the Sagacity of that great Speculater and Obferver of Na- -f^^w^ An'dotle ture, ^rijtotle j and may gather, '^''^i^',,^!''^'^ at the fame time, his true Senti- Concrete iVorL menrs in this Particular j that, when he came to range all our Natural Notions" into his Ten Common Heads, he did not exprcfs .the Modes or Accidents by Abjlratl Words, but Con- crete ones j left his Scholars fhould hap to think they were certain Kinds of &/-/V/>j Diitinct from theSubjcdt: whereas they were Nothing but the Subject or SubftaiKe it felf, coniidered as thus af- fected, or thus modify d : For, he does not call them TitTim, Titionii Q^ajJtitas^ (^alitas^ as WC do y but 7B in)7vy, 7^ 7nt!^y> Q^/.77;/ww, Q^ale y nor E 3 tiya^or/., <4 ^oliJ Philofophy JJferteJ. ^v±zt^,, 'Relciuc^ but Ttt ^es^ 77, Rehta • or more limply, •yrc?'< 77, ^^ allquid: Which laft is abet- ted by our Common Language j as, when we ask, [ M'ljat zs be to Trie ? ] the Anfwer is, [ Tour Friend,'] ycur F^ther^ &c. Where the \^^ords [ to me^ ] ex- prcfs formally what we call Rchucn ; and the Words [:j /jf,l both fignifie that the Relation is a Mode or Accident intrlnfecal to the Subjed, how- ever it be Conlider'd in ordtr to another , and with- all, that it has no Being, but that of the T^/?7g- or Subject lignify'd by the Pronoun [HI?;] Which amounts to this, that what we call in an Abftra6t Word [^'Relatic7t,'] is nothing in reality, but the Thlvg Conlidered thus, or in order to another Indi^ ^idifuwy which we call to be thus Modified, or con- ceived to be according to fifch a manner Related. The fame is obfcrvable in the reft, 79 ttd/wj/, -n Tmc^iv, iT> ^'iyfiVy Agere, Rati, Habere, tt? ttd'ti, t© t5, tjuando, ubi, which have the Force of Concretes j for 'tis only the Subjedt that can be conceived or faid to Aci, Suffer, be in fuch a Vlace or Time, or bcL^e fuch a kind of Habilim.ent : W^hereas, were ' it not for that reafon, he could have exprdVd them in Abflrad Terms, ( perhaps more handfom- IV j) as, 0 ;^0^'^> 0 TtTWC, M VQf^lf, TV ITtbvf, fl tj/f, W ^^<, Ttn?fm, Lcc7i^, ABio, Habitm, had it not been his Intention to avoid Abftrac^ Terms, led the manner of Expredionfhould reprefen: it as a kind of Things Dillind really from the Subjedt, and fo lead Men to take a Fancy for a Reality, as it happens in the Mif-acception of the W^ord [ Sface,'] which breeds the Conceit o^Vacumn, And, he was lefs follicitous to do this in the firft Predicament,caird by him »^'«» bccaufe there was no Danger Men fhould take the ' Effivcc of the Thing to be a diftindt Thing from the \ Trel'imifiary Third. 5 J the Thing it felf, as there miij,hr be irr the orhers* So that this ought to be embrac'd and eftabliiTi'd) as a mod certain and niod Fundamental Maxim by all who pretend to true Philolophy, that What- cuir Concefticn of curs has not the Things or Rcs^ (ci- ther conflder'd in part, or in whole,) in its Notion, has no Reality m it, and is a njew Fancy, Note Second^ H( nee we may gather the proper wanner of Signif)'ing, found in Abflrat^ and Concrete Words, as tT.. Po/«f .W^- r -I . , 1 /^ XTT 1 tedhy/lbftrac} and luch, 'VIZ.. that the Concrete Vv^ ord coi'.cyctcHlrjs. (Album for Example) lignifics di- rectly the Subject , and indire6lly the Firm or Mode conceived to be in it : And the Abllract Word Albedo (ignifics directly the Form or Mode, and indirectly the Subject 3 w^hich indirect manner of fignifying is properly called Connotating. i^. This uncommon Doctrine might, perhaps, fink better into the Reader's Con- fiderarion, if it were il lull rated Hcw-? -S/*^^'^ »»/>/> by an Inftance. We will take out Body, or Yz.^ L T\fr7>r»r' r T cuum, is a Cot:- then Mr. Lr.cke s Polition or an In- traMciion. finite Imaginary Space^ or Fa cuum. To make good which Tenenr, he imagins that Vacuum lignifies a Space vithcut Body : Which, tO my Judgment, is as much as to fay, it (ignihes a Contradiction^ or Chimera, For, I poiitively deny we can have any Ncticn of Space^ without indudit^g Bcdy^ however we may have a Fancy of it : And i as pofitively alfirm, that Space can lignifie nothing but Body^ according to fuch a Mcde called Space^ or Quantity. For ( to wave my former Proofs ) I ask him whence he had rirfl the Noticn or Idea or Space ? He is too acute to hold Innate Ideas : It ♦vas yic^uird then, or wrought in him ^ And by E 4 wiiat, 5 6 Solid PhHofophy AJferte^, what, biu b\' the T^pjno-. that is, bv the Bo^y ? It was the Body then which he law • it v/as the Body thus moclify'd, that imprinted it fdf thus on his Si:nfcs, and caulld fuch a jnavmr of Uta in his Mind. Wherefore, to conceit that we can have an Jfica of Sfacc ivithcut Bcd)\ whereas he never had an IniprelFion or Idea of Space, but what was in Rody^ and a Mcde of it ; and fo Identify'd w^ith it, is to relinquish our Solid Natural Conceptions^ and run to Fcmcics j to abandon the Firm Ground of all our Knowledge, the Thhio^^ and to purfue inftead of it an Aicry Nothi^io^ • (for Modes or Man- mrs^ withoiit the Thivg of which they are Modes, i^gnifie a meer Nothings and can be Nothing elfe ,) or, ( which is the fame ) 'tis to difcard our well^ grounded Notions^ and to entertain in their Room mcer Vhantaflick Refemhlances. The Notion of Space then bving an ImpreiTion of and from the ThiTjg^ is the Th!7i2^ or the Body conceived according to that abftrafted Refpe6l or Mode, called Sface ? Wherefore, to put Space l;ejo?jd all Bodies, or where there is no Body^ is a plain Trucking our Natural Notions, for Appearances that are Ground-- left, and coined by our Imagination. Perhaps he will fa}^, we can clearly AblYra6l the Idea of Space frv>m that of i?o^ 3 which is fo far true, that our Precifeand Formal Notion of the Body, as itispre- cifely a Thlng^or Capable of Exii]:ing,is not the No- tion of Sj)ace^ which is a Mode of the Thing. But, why muft it therefore be Nothing of Body, when *tis evidently oiie kind of Conception or Confldera- tion of it 5 that is, when 'tis nothing but Body^ as grounding the Notion of Space ? In a word. Since Space is not of it felf yl Thi-ng^ or Rcs^ it muft and can only be Modm Rei 3 anci therefore, to Fancy an Trelhninary Fourch. 5-7 ;in Uea of it, which excludes Body, is to inakc it a Mode of Nothhjg^ and confeqncntly no Mode j which is to dtflroy the Notion of Space, while he goes about to refine it. This for the prcfcnt, till wc come to refled farther upon that 1 enct in its proper Place. PRELIMINARY Fourth. Of ^/'(f Particular Manner how all forts ^/No- tions are bred in us ; and hy ivbat way thoje Elements of Knowledge do firjl come into the SouL I. nr^HE former Grounds being laid, /hewing X ^^^^^^ Know^Iedge is, and in -what It ccnfifis j the next thing jhe state cf the that comes to be confider'd is, U^eflion, to /liew, in particular, the Man- ner hov^ we come to know at fir ft j or, by what Connatural Steps, the Things^ or ( which is the fame) our Notions of them, which are the Ma- terials of Knowledge, are introduced into our Minds. And, let it be noted, that it is not my In- tention here to fhew, what ccm'pleat Knowledges, or Judgments^ are in our Soul hefore others in Pri- ority of Nature j which I have already done in myMethody Book z. LeJJon 4. What 1 aim at here •is, to acquaint the Reader very particularly with my Thoughts how our Mind comes firft to beim- bu'd 58 ^oliff Thilofophy Ajferted, bu'd with both DWeB and Reflex Notions^ which are the Elements or Materials, of which our Com- fleat Knowledges or Judgments are compounded. 1. The Difficulty of conceiving how Corporeal Things ihat are ivithout us^ could Arlftotle negUns get into our Soul which is Sftri- C!{ge Z^rnaT ^1"\^ ^^ ^^^^ Grcatcll Philofophers hitherto, that it has made them rack their befl Wits to invent fome congruous Way how this could be performed. Jriftotk^ who ought to have done this, fince he advanced that Pofition above-mentioned which required it fhould be done, gives us no particular Account of it 5 but being refolved, it feems, to follow the fullen Principle he had taken up, ^Iz,. Jcroafes ita efjc e^enrlas ut mn fint ed'ita^ left it tO Poflerity to find it out. Which affcfted Humour of his^ "whether it proceeded from Envy of Knowledge to the World (an unpardonable Fault in a Pro- feflbr of Knowledge) or from Vanity, or out of Policy to bring more Scholars to his walking Schooly has certainly brought much Difparage- ment to his Do6lrine, hindred its Currency, and help'd forward by the Schools, (^who undertook to explicate him, and did it untowardly) has pe- fter'd the World with divcrfe Schemes of F^hilolb- phy, cither newly invented or furbilli'd Op afre/h. Whether he did explain ailer what maimer we come to know, to his Scholars^ I know not j only it may. feem wonderful, if he had done it, that none of them fhould have delivered it down to us. But, letting Arljtotle. alone with his I-aults, which blemi/h'd ihis other great Vertues, and come to thea/jo-Pliilofopliers lincc hj> lime. 3. Thefc TreVminary Fourth. 5*9 3. Thcfc Learned Men law ckaily, that all Corporeal Ai^cnts work by Local Motlcrt, ar.d^ that no Operation ^'^^''^ P/y/^A^/--^ of theirs could be tranlacted puzzle about it, without dich Motion, at leafl: ac- companying all their Adions, they being all of them SiKceffwe or Qjiipolition ror Rationality: And it, that this cannot be done, but by having a Form in it of a Superior or Sflritual Nature, which Second Caufes camwt produce • it is certain, (Boll will, by himfelf, af- iill it, bv infuling fucb a rurm. I o. There can be fuch a Dilpofition in the Brain of an Embryo to work Compara- There can he f.eh ^;^j ^j^^^ ^5 ^^ j^^^j ^^^^ j^jr Matter. conrje • iince we experience that we do this actually nowy in part, by the means of the Brai?^^ or fomething that's near it, or belongs to it, 1 1 . Where- Trelim'niary Fourth. ^J 1 1 . Wherefore, flnce this cannot be done with- out having thofe Materials in iis, of which, Compounded OXCcm- Thc^-efore^fome Mif- pared, we are lo Jud^re and D'i(~ '"'^^ ^^^^^ ^^ ' / 1.1 . ' \\ c' I * " Tohicj immediate' courff, which we call Simple Ap- ^^ ,^, ^oul ha, prehenfions, or Notions 3 it follows Notions from that there mufl be fuch a Difpo- ^^^^ objecf, fition in fome Bodily Part, as to convey into the Soul fuch Nctlcns, 12. Wherefore, lince Bodies, in their whole Quantity, or Bulk, cannot be con- veyed by the Senfcs into the Brain, Therefore Effluyi- the Author of Nature has order'd ^^^ /?• ^'^''^ rhat all bodies, upon the L^ait that Part. Motion of Natural Caufes, In- ternal or External, (which is never wanting) /hould fend out Effiu^'utms, or moil minute and imperceptible Particles j which may pafs through the Pores o^ thofe Peruious Organs, called the Senfis 3 and fo, be carried to the Brain. I j. This Natural Compound, called [yT^rw,] is truly One Thing, and not aggre- gated of more Things Actually Thei-efore Man // Diftina^ lince the Form, called 'l^l^^'^fc^Tt the Soul^ did (tho' not fo Naturally, reo-SpirituaL * yet) as necejjarlly foUow Out of the Difpofition of the Matter, ( taking it as Se- conded, and its Exigency and Dohciency fupply'd by the Firfi Caufe, ) as the Form of F;re, or of any other Body in Nature, does out of the Difpo- fitions properly Previous to that Form: And, therefore, does as truly (by Informing thatMat^ ter) Make or conllitute the Man O^ie Thing, as any other Ccrpcreal Form does any Body in Na- ture. P 14. There^ 66 Sc^Iicl rhilofophy Ajferte^. 1 4.. Therefore there mull be fome Chief Corpo- real Part in Man, which is im^ therefo'-cforncChicf mediately united With the Soul^2S Part U2 hi VI which thc Matter with its Form, and, :sprh.^-ihCov-- ti^e^efore, is Primarilv Corvoreo^ or has both thoje Spiritual, and mcludcs b:)th Na- Natures in it. turcs. Wlience, when that Part is atfefted, after its peculiar Nature, Corporeally y the Soul is alfcdcd after its Nature, that ij>, Splrlttidly^ or Kmwimjy j which Part Carte/Ins thinks is the n^vdejiQV, or Glandtda Pineal is, 15. Therefore the Manner to;', and the Rea- fon why thofe Corporeal Efflu- H'hich i.r afeEied 'v'.ums do COUIC tO aflecl the Soul, according to both and caufe in her Spiritual Notions thofe Narures, be- ^f ^^^^ jj^j^ j^ beCaufe of the cauje Of their I- . . tit- C ^ dentificatioii /« immediate identipcati07i Or tne that Part, Matter and Form, in that part 3 whence follows, that the ojie can- not be afFcfted, but the other muil be alie6ted too after its Differ mt mariner, proper tO its Difiincl Nature, In thc fame manner ( abating the Diver- fity peculiar to each of thofe Natures ) as, when the MattLY of Wood is wrought upon, the F^rm of it, or the Complexion of Accidents, (making up one Thing with it,) does alfo [iffr Change. Whence, by the w^ay, is fcen the Reafon of tliat received Maxim, that A5Hones & Faffiones fmn Jup- prjitortim : So that 'tis the v^jole Thing which aSh or fuffers, tho' according to this or that Fart of it y and hence it is that the Wjole Thing is concei ..^.. ii«k> Trelimhiary Fourth. Gj I C, Tliis Part immediately in forni'd by the Soul as 'tis SpiriruaJ, (which we will call the Seat of Knowkilge, ) mull, Tfje Pccul/arTcm-^ whatever it is, be of a Temper ^^^rn-'^'i^^^c the molt Indijferent tO all Bodies, fcrcncy. and to their leveral Modes as can be conceived j and (as tar as Matter can bear) Ahjlrntlftom them all ^ both that it may be con- naturally more fenfible of the Dijferent Ejfluvhims by w^hich their fe'veral Natures are to \jt under- ftood j as alfo more fit to beget in the Soul U;;/- "verfal Notions, fuch as are thofe o^ Ens^ or Being • by which all the Negotiation of our Interiour Ads of fudging and Difcourfing is managed. Tho' 1 am apt to judge that thofe General Notions are alfo caus'd when the Impreifion is Co?tfufcd or In- difiwtf^ as thofe of Ens or Be'mg are j and the fame is to be laid of the Reft in proportion. Thus, when we lee a Thing a-for off, and have but a Ccnfufed View of it, it only appears to us to be fomething^ we know not, particularly what^ or \A Th'mg-j without making us know in the leaj% \ ovbat Kind of Thing or Body it is. Afterwards, ; coming nearer, we difcern it mo'ves it felf-^ whence j We gain the Notion of a Lining Thing : Then, ap- I proaching dill nearer, w^e, by a were dijFm^i Im- i preliion, know *£is a Horfe. And, lately, when it is within convenient Diilance to give us a per- fectly Diftinft View of it, w^e know 'tis fuch a I Tarticular Horfe of our own. I . 17. That Part, called the Seat of KncwIedgCy ixnuft, moreover, be the moft 56^;?- fhli', and the moll: Tender that can "^'l^ Z^'* ,:^'''J^ k/a ;,,AM,r;.^M ri ► / r • 1 \ Tender ^2; r!>eQ- be imagin d, that (as was laid) ^^i^^,^ ,.;..; Te- tne lealt EJfitrjjums may atre6l it : nacious. F z And 6 8 Solid Fhilofophy Ajferted. And yet it muft not be of 2l Glutinous Nature, {o as to entangle them, and make them fikk there ; but ihat, Rvcrberatcd thence, they may light in fbme near adjacent place, to ferve, by their re- neived Impulfcs afterwards, for the iTe of Memory^ and to excite again /^rw^r Knowledges 3 as alfo, (as V^'ill be jlicwn,) to caufe Reflex A6ts. That it imift not be in the k2i\:Glutinom^ appears hence evidently, that, did the Effiu^lums (lick there, we fhould, whether we would or no, perpetually contemplate or think of thofe Objedts j which would alfo hinder our Perception of ethers^ by mingling the former Effluviums with thofe which fupervene. 18. The orderly difpofure of the world, bv Gradual fteps arifing from lefs Thtit part th rnoji perfe«5l Naturcs to thofe which Noble of aiihU- ^re morc Noble, and more Per- terial Nature. f^^^ ^^^^^ ^^,.,^^^ ^|^^^ ^|^.^ p^^.^ caird the Seat of Knoivkda-e. is the molr Sufremely Noble production of" Material things, and neareft ally'd ( as it were j to Spiri- tual Nature that can be imagined j fo that all the bed Perfections that are to be found in Corpo- real things, are centered ir. it. X^'hence, tho' it is too rude to affirm with a certain learned Phyfi- cian, that the K^i/ae/or, is a bafer part of Man's Body than the Intefrinum ReHum • yet I cannot approve of Carte/Jus his Conceit, that it is a Glan- dale • which is one of the Ignobleii: parts we havej but iudge it lias a peculiar Temperature of its own^ not only fpLcitically diilindt from other parts, but that they are Icarce in any degree to be parallell'd to it. 19. Whe- Trelimhtary Fourth. ^p rp. Whether amongil: its other Special Qjalr ties it partakes of the Nature of thofe Bodies which in the dark ?crh.ips 'tis Rc» do reflect Light j and that the flex-rve of ughr, GIofTy and Lively Appearances "''Lucid, and Refemblances, which we call Fancies^ or Thantafws^ do fpring thence, I leave to others to determin. I think it is the Intereil of thofe who make the Scptmn Luc'idurn to be the Seat of Knowledge, to embrace that Opi-^ nion. 20. Thofe Efjluvitmis fent out from Bodie?, have the vtry Natures of thofe Bo- dies in them, or rather are them.- The Effluviums felves Lelfer Bodi.s of the Self- ^J'^'' '" f'T n' Jame Nature, ( as the hTiallell: im- ,/y,,, ,,,,^ j,,, ,/,^^ perceptible parts of Bread and arcfent. V\ moreover on the tL' 7 Z Soul ^^'^^'-f ^d^> ^^'hich is the Suhjetl renders thje No- that rcccivcs thofe Impreliions, tcm^ peifeftly another thing liighly conducing diftinft a:id In- J.Q jp^J.^ Q^^j- J^otionS yet f/icrs divilible, ^, Clear Treliminav) Fourth. 71 Char and ferfctlly DifibicJ, wliich ckfervcs our beft Reflexion. 'Tis tliis, that, the K.iturc of our Soul being Indiv'^fible^ it givcs an Indivili- bility to all thofc Notions, or Natures in her; which, as they exilled without her, and were con- vey'd into her by Ejfiin'iums, being Corporeal, were Di^vifibJe, and therefore fomething Indiffinci and Confus d\ This appears clearly in mofl: of the Obje6ts «bout which the Soul is converfanr, perhaps, in all ; ^nz^. in Figures, Points, Lines, Superficies, hidants, Meafures, Comparifons, Pre- dications, Refpe:ts, Negations, Denominations, Relations, &c. For example, There is not, per- haps, in all Nature any Body Perfectly, or Ma- thematically, Ylat, Sfharical or Triangular ; or jufl a yard, nor any Duration mark't out to be juft an H'^ur ; but, by reafon that Bodies arc affecled with ^uantitj^ which is perpetually vari- able by a world of Agents of diverfe Figures affaulting it j as alfo becaufe of the Divi(;bility of Quantity in infinittoyj, it is warpt from thofc Exa6t Figures, or deviates from thofe Juil: Mea- fures : Whereas, on the contrary, thofe things, as they exill in the Soul, are adjufied and Stinted even to an Indi'V'fible j fo that the very leall imaginable Confideration, added or detracted, quite alters the Notion to another Species, Now, nothing can be fo comifdy Dijtinct ti'om another, or more impolfible to be Confounded v;ith it, than what is fo comprized within its own Bounds, as to be This and no other, or fo much and no more, even to znlndivifibk. Whence 'tis demonflrabie that the Thing, as in our Soul, or as Handing under our Notion, or Conception, is a molt Froptr Ground for that DiltinA and Clear Knowledge V 4 called 7x Solid Thilofophy AfferteJ. called Scievce. This is evidently feen throughout the whole Body of the Mathematicks 3 and the fame will be found by Reflexion in iJl other Sciences whatever. I note here on the by, that this Power or Fa- culty of the Soul, which is fo proper and fo na- tun-l to her, of Reducing all things in her from the indiftin^tnefs found in therr, as they ilard in Nature, o^ [YoraDl^'iftbiUty 10 Indi^ifih^it)^ does ground niof]: evident Demonltrations of he * fw- mjuricil'tj^ and confequently, of her Iwmorta/njy were it purfa'dhome. But this is not my bull- nefs at prefcnt. 24. That Part, called the Seat of Knowledge, can be aCedlcd with many co^ Wher.cr Complex k^rcvt Jmpreflions £!t cnce^ which i^otiom come. caufe in the Soul Comfhx^ or Compounded Notiors. This is too evident to need any Dilating on it, I call thofr Imprcffions coherent^ which are caufed by ILffii^Umis making flngly different Impreilions ei- ther from the [aync T!. ^/^, or the fame fort of Thing. But, it is on this occafion to be well noted, that^ left our Knowledges or Difcourfes be loft in a Croud, or run ailray in a pathlefs Wood of Notions diforderly aggregated, the Jn of Lr^/ck is abfolutely neCclfary, to range and di- ilinguifti our Notions into Common Heads, and to defcend from thofe General Heads all along by Irjtr'njftrrj Differences * ; that is, " ^^''^-i '\ ^''" ro divide them bv rmre and hfs of LefT. 3 § 2. ^^"^^ Common Notion, 10 to keep them ftill irithin that Line or Head j without which they muft needs interfere ar.d breed Confufion, This Method of !)///;»- rreliminary Fourth. 73 guijhin^ and heefivgr AiflinH our Notions, is as ne- cellar y for Scicnrihcal Difcoiirfcs, as 'tis for an Army to be Marlhalicd in Rank or File j without which 'tis but a Medly or ConfLifed Multitude. Whence, thofe who ilight this Methodizing their Notions, muft ntcelfarily, in rigorous Keafon, talk Ratnblingly j tho' perhaps ingeniouily, ac- cording to fuch a fort of Wit as Men ufe when they would maintain Paradoxes 3 or, as Emjmus us'd to praife FoHy. i>. It being dcmonftrabk' in Metaphyficks, that whatever is only in Fewer to have a new Adl, cannot of it The Soul cnnmt A- fdf produce that A 61 in it Mf, i°"^ produce a^ry unit Is It be wrought upon firlt by cff feme other Agent which is in AH 3 and much kls can fuch a Power do this, as is of an Indivifible or Spiritual Nature, in regard it has no Farts ^ one whereof being in AO: it felf may produce an A 61 in the reH 3 as it happens in the Wheels of a Watch, or in our Bodies, when one part of them moves another : It follows hence, that our Soul can produce no new Act, either of Memory, or of Reflexion upon her own former Afts, nor of Thinking or Willing, &c. without being frH alfedtcd by fome Obie^t without her, or arew by fome Part or Particle within the Man , which, being in Act it felf, may caufe thofe mv/ Adts of Kn(>wledge in her. ^6. The Efflu^iums^ which, by afFecling the Scat of Knowledge, eave her to know at firft, are tlie proveresi ^"'p '^'' ^':''" Agents to produce connaturally ^/,. ^„^^^ ^ ihefe mw Acts of Refl.xion or Memory^ in cafe it can he found that they a;e duely qualify'd for fuch an Efficiency. 27, 74 Soli J Thtlofophy Aferted. 27. Thofe Efflti'vitims (as was prov'd above) not flicking on that part which is Horo Reminif- InQ Seat of Knowledge ^ do COnfe- cence // macle. quently fall oiF from ir, and are lodged near it ; whence 'tis con- fonant, that That Part alfo having its Effluviums when thus follicited by the Impulfe of thofe A- tomes fent from without y and therefore (all Na- tural ^^/o« caufing Re action j) when they rebound thence, they carry away fome minute Particles of the faid Part. Wherefore tnefe Outward Effln- A4-jj-n,n- n ccvnaturfitly made. And mdeed Pkc flexion on our ffl(t ' thoughts is the fame as Re-memhrance o'i thim^ for we can neither Rifleti on a Thing with- out RcimmhYivg it, nor Remiwher it without Ke- fle(Sing 7 6 Solid Philofoph Ajferterf. fleding on it. Bur this Reflexion, for the reafon lately given, muft proceed from fojne Obje61: or Caufe Extraneous to the SoLil j that is from Efflu^ 'vhims in the Memory thus reexcited. For it is to be noted that as Divines ( or rather Chriflian Faith) tell us, that Chrift: having two difiin^l Na- tures in the fame Supfrfitum^ all his Operations proper to him as fuch^ were therefore Theanthro- pic^y or fuch as were agreeable and belonging CO hth the Divine and Humane Natures : So Many confiding of both a Corporeal and Spiritual Na- ture, and thence being a Corporeo-SpiritualTKingy all his Operations, for the fame Reafon, mufl: be Corporeo-Sfiritual. Wherxe he has no AiS purely Sfiritualy or uncompounded with the Co-opera- tion of that Corporeal Part, which receives thofe Effiuv'ittms ( caird by us Fancy ) or without it's Concurrence. Which gives us farther Light, to lee how our Soul cannot reflect on her own Operations, bur the Fancy mufl go along 3 and, by what's faid, it will be eafie to conclude from which of thofe parts the Operation mull begin anewy ^Iz.. from that part from which it ^'id be- gin at fir ft. ^Tcnce came that Saying of the Schools, That the Soul has Notions, or knows^ Speculamlo Thanti^mata : which arc pr^ tty Fanciful Words ; and, tho' they may pj-rliaps have a good Meaning, yet 'tis very unphilofophically expiefs'd : For it makes the Soul ti Jpecul.:tc^ which ( if ir have any Senfe at all ) fignifies ro know the Phantafms or Idt'^s in the Imagination, wl^.en a: yet /he has no Knowledge in her at ail. Ail her Notion r, which are the fir}} Elements of K»^ow ledge, be- ing caus'd in her by thofe Ffjiu-v'iumsy D.eviouOy to her Knowing either themy or atiy ihJmg el fc. ■ ,0. From 3' thole Prelimhjary Fourth. '77 From what's faid above, 'tis feen tliat DlreH Ncticrjs, which are thus naturally imprinted , are Direft Kotiom , Coni.mn to .// Mankind /« the -^ '; /„« Wiiin, (however they may in each thnr ivords Pro- Man differ in fome Degree) and per ^ Reflex o?w confequentl>s the JVords we agree Improper , W on to exprefs thofe Natural Noti- taphorica/. ^' ons are, for the fame rcafon, Troper Words , wiiereas thofe Notions made by meer Reflexion^ as are thofe of Spiritual Natures^ art then fore Improfer^ as having no f roper Than- t:ilws to imprint them connaturaily on the Mind : whence aJfo the Words that exprefs thcm,are fuch as arc taken or TranjLned from Natural Objedts 3 aid therefore they 'drc Improper or Aletaphcrical. 3 1 . From this exa6l Diftintinefs of our Notions, even to an Indivilibie, or from this, that cm of them is not am- ^j^<^'^^^^^ ^^ym ta t A^- 1 1 A ^^'^'^ Negative t/jery our Mind has an Appen- a^/w/. dage of a Negation tack'd to eve- ry Notion , io that it becomes very familiar to her : whence iViC can have a Negative Notion of every thing ]he conceives, while ihe confiders it as limited^ or reaching thus far^ and no farther j or being 77?/j, and no other. Of which Nature are all the Modes of Ens^ they being limited Con- ceptions of it J no Notion being ptrfeftly Pofitive but that of Ens or Being. 31. Hence the Soul can have alfo the Notions of Indivilibility, Immortality, Im- menllty, and innumerable fuch B«r Negative Nb- like. But, it is Very Ipecially to {/^^^ ^/ '^''y ^'' be remark d, that we can have ab^raa frojn thf noNotionsot thofe Negatives as uby^. taken 7 8 Solid Fhilofophy Jfferted. taken ahfiractedly frcm the Thing or Subjefl;^ for, odierwife, Non Entities (formally as fuch) might be the Object of theUndcrftanding j which is impof- fible^ for \^Nothing\ioxmd[\y as juch (ladd,norr^- cuuTn) can have no Effluviums fcnt from it to the Brain, nor confequently any hitcUiglhiUty • nor can any polFible Notion be fram'd of it. Wherefore B^ldnefs lignifies the Head, quatenus having no Hfl/ir on it j Blimlnefs^ the Eje^ qtiatenus having no Sight 3 Immenfity^ the Things f^uatenus not Ca- pable to be meafured, &c. Hence 3 3 . The Notion we have of [ Nothing ] or Non Ens^ is only that of Ens in it's uo^ v,e come to ^^^ioIq Latitude, with a Neaati- hzive a Notion of i • • i 7? [Nothing] ^'"^ annexed to it ; m the lame manner as in particular Entities, [Jnn>rforeal'] fignificS [ncn Corpus'] 01 ZS^Indivl^ fible ] lignifies [ Non-Quajitum ] &c, 24. Hence it is that we come to conceive, and fometimes exprefs Non Ens as an Eence great Care Ens 3 as Grammarians do when ^ '0 he had, icji they define a Notm to be the Name I^nS cX: f I T^--ir> .and yet make mhil things , for ( whicli lignifies l\otb:ng ) 2. Noun Things. Sitbjetiiue^ ixA put Adjedtives to it. Whence Phiiofophcrs mufl tr^ke very great Care, Iciu, f^duccd by our manner of Conceiving Non-Ens as a Thing , they come to flmcy, or judge it to be formally jomethtng j as do the AiTerters of Vrxuu?^^ and too many others in like Occalions. For then ( 1 beg their Pardon for my Flainnefs) tlicir Difcourfcs upon it can be no wifer than arethofe Ingenious Vcrles, made to ihew liow rare a Thing Nothmg is 3 nor, indeed, fowife: For thofc Poets did this LudicrcuJIjy Prelirnin.iry Fourths 79 Ludicroufly, to fhcw their Wit j but thefc do it Se-^ rioujijy and make account, that, in doing (o, they /hew their Skill and IViJdom j which I mull think is meer Folly. 3 ; . The Notions of Genm^ Species^ Suhje^^ Prc^ Jicare, and generally of all Terms of Art which are not Fantaftick, Logical Fotwjs are . but wifely conducing to clear and ^^^^ °^^^' range our Notions in Order, to gain Science, are Nothing but feverai Abftradl No- tions* of the Thingy precilely confidered according to fome Ma?mer of Being it has in our Under f}and^ ing. For Animal and Homo are evidently Abftradt or hiadequate Notions of Peter^ taking him as he exifts in Nr.ture : But, when we call An'.mal a Gq- nttsy or, Homo a Species • or, when, in this Propo- lition, [ Fetrus efi Homoy ] we fay Vetrm is the Siib^ jecty and Homo the Predicate^ we fpeak of them preci fely, as they exifi in the Underjtanding 3 For, in Nature^ or out of the Underftanding^ there Can be no Univerfals, but only Individuals, none elfe being determin'd to be This or That Ens^ or ca- pable of Exi fling : Nor cr*n Propofticns be any where, but in the Mind. Whereas, in the Undcrfiandingy the Notion of [Animal] is really larger, and that of [ Homo ] narrower 3 which Ar- rifts call Gen/^s and Species. And, in the for^faid Propofitiony Fetrus and Hmo^ which are its Parts, are as truly in cur Mind the Subject and Predicate^ as that Proportion it felf is there 3 or as the Thing, as exifting in Nature, is P^jite or Black. 3 6. This then is the Tefi to try all the Specula- tions made by Logicians, and other Reflefters or Artifts, ^iz,. rh^ pf to try At- to cxamin whether they fuit with, ^*^^^*^ No:ijm. and 8o Solid Phiiofophy AjferteJ. and are built on the Natures of the Things them- fc^ves, as they exifi in our Mind j that they conduce to order our Notions fo, as may cLar the IFay to Science ; and that they be not meerly Impertinent and fhallow grounded Fancies, as they too fre- quently are • particularly, the *see Method to ^ £„^;^ Rationis, which make fuch fT^l \ , rl' a Noife in the Schools. Corollary II. Whence, upon the main, is clearly difcovered, how all true Philofo- tience aU Phi/ofo^ ^^y j^ nothing but the Kncwledo:e thy IS Real V^^, . P^ , , <^ Knowledge. ^/ ^^^^""P 3 either as they have their Being in Nature, wl ich is done by Dlreci Ad:s j or elie in the Undcrjhtndlng cnly^ which are known by Reflex ones. 37. Befides thofe ImprelTions which caufe our Direcl and Reflex Ads, there are Horo our Soul corner Others which breed meer Whim- Jf/Y^^^".^^^"^^' fies coin'd by the Fancy, and are Itick hotiotu^ or , ^, . ^ • 1 T- 1- (^^ we call them) P^^^^^Y Chimerical. For our Fan- Fancies, cy having hinumcrable Kffitivinms, or Atomes in it, of many Sorts, which are oft-times agitated diforderly , lience it comes, that it conioins and imprints Incoherent Phantafms on the Seat of Knowledge, and fo makes Apprehenfions of them in our Iviinds j fuch as are thofe of a Golden Earth, a Hircccerurts, an tlephant fupporting the World, a Chimera, and fuch like. This mod commonly happens in Dreams, conceited Prophelies, and Enthuljaftick Revelations 5 efpecially thofe caufed by the Spleen. Nor is grcundlefs Speculation, exempt from this Enormity. Generally this happens when oup Thoughts Prelimyiary Fourth.' %i Thoughts arc Unatrentive to the Thhgs tn Na- ture^ whofe Direct ImprefTions keep our Fancy Orderly^ and Firm, Now, there is lirtL^ Harm in our af^rcbend'mg thofe extravagant Connexions j the Danger is, Icll Speculaters, feduced by Ima- gination, do come to J»dge that the Things are fo in Nature as they fa7jcy them j which mufl neceilariiy fill their Minds with Caprichio's, ar.d Frantick Conceits. The Ways to avoid thefe Inconveniences, ^J ^'ddM ^t are, Firfi, To attend heedFuIly ]f^^„^ '^ " ^ ^ to the Direct Imfrejjions from the Things without us , and to examine whether the Connexion of thofe Fancies be agreeable to their Natures, or no. Secojjdlj^ To m.ake Right and Strong Judgments concerning thofe cor/jymn Notions we had from Nature, which keep our Thoughts and Difcourfes Steady and Solid 3 efpe- ciaJly, to keep an Attentive Confideration, that, as all thefe Notions came from the Thing, fo they are llill the Thing, conceiv'd according to fomewhat that is in it 3 and to take care we do not make them forget their Original, nor difown the Thing, from whence only, as be- ing Modes meerly depending on it, they had any kind of Being at all 3 nor, confequently. In- telligibility. Thirdly., To obferve the Methodical Rules and Maxims of True Logick, which teach us how to difiingui^i our Notions exactly, and to kec^ them difiin^^ left we blunder ill our Dif- courfes 3 and which do withall lliew us what are the Ways how to frame true Connexions^ or right Judgments and Difcourfes, But, the lall and belt Means to keep us from being mif-led by Emcj^ or following its Vagaries, is, the Study G of 8 z Solid Philofophy Aferted. of Metaphj/icks , which, being built on the Higheft, Steadied and Clearcfl: Principles, ab- ftracl from ^// Fatjcj^ and will fcarce ever per- mit thofe who who are well versd in it, to tall into Errour. And, let it be obferv'd, that nothing in the World more perverts all true Science, than does the admitting thofe ^ifor- derd Fancies bccaufe, being cleanly exfrefs^d^ they have fometimes a Lively Jppearance ^ for Solid Truths y nay, laying them often for Groundsy and Self-evident Principles. This, this, I fay, is the main Source of all Hypothetical Fhilofophy , and of all Erroneous Schemes of Dodtrine, not grounded on the Natures of the Things ; which, therefore, muft needs be, at beft, Shallo7i^^ and Superficial • and, if purlu'd home to their Prin- ciples, plain Ncnfnce^ the ufual and proper Eifet^ of JJngo'vern d Fancy. 38. Of thofe Things that do not come in by our Senfes, as Bodies do, but How toe way dif- are of a different or oppofite Na- courfe evidently i^ixt j of which therefore we can ,f thofe Natto-es, ^^xj^ no Notion but by joining of which we have ^. . 1 -kt • r* 710 Proper AV ^ Negation to the Notion of tions. Body , ( fuch as are Indivifible, Incorporeal, Immaterial, Immor- tal, and, in general, all Spiritual Things, and their proper Modes,) we can have no proper Effluviums^ or Phantalins, as is evident. Where- fore alfo, the Notions we have of them, and^ confequentl;/, the Words by which we exprefs them, are all Improper^ or AletaphoricaTj which, if not reflefted on, will breed Innumerable Er- rours. The belt Notion we can frame of them, is that of Things with a Negation of 25otip, and Prelim'nhiry Fourth. S3 and of all the Modes of Bod) joined to it j which doQS not fo much tc-U us -ivhat it //, as what it is ?wt , or rather, it glv^s us a Blind, but CVr- tam Knowledge cf what kind of Kacure it w/// be^ becaufe it tells us of what kind (;f Nature it cannot be j the Di'Ferenccs which confiicute that Nature, and its Oppofite, being contrndidfo^ ry^ which forces it to be either of the One or of the cf /at. Yet this hinders not, but we may difcourfc confequenti}', or Scientihcaily, of thofe Things that connotate the Negation of Bcd)\ full as well as of the Bodies thcnilelves : For, as we can conclude evidently from the Notion of Bo- dyy that it is Divifible, Changeable, Placeable, Moveable, thus or thus Qualify'd, 6^c, fo we may conclude, with Equal Evidence, from the Notion of a Thing whicli is not a Body, that it is not Divifible, not Extended, not Moveable, not Placeable, 7iot atfeSed with any Phyfical Quali- ties, &c. ^9. Lafily, As for the Notion we have of ^] an- nexed to it, which is not found in Creatures, or which is deimd of them, or is InQcmmnnl- cable I Preliminary Fourth. 8f cable to them. Whence comes t!i:it IVIax'im of the Myfticks, that God is better hicnvn by Nc- g.it'ions, or by affirming he is novs of thofe Po- (irive Perfcftions we find in Creatures, than bv appl^'ino; any of our Fofitlz'c Notions to him. And this is all we can do in this State, till Grace railin;i; us up to Glor}', we come to know his Divine Eifence, /// it is m its Self; (or, us we phrafe it, See him Face to Face • ) in contemplating which, confifts our Eternal Happinefs. 40. Thus much of our Notions, which we call the F'.rfl Opiraticns of our Underftanding, and how they Tk- ^mhor focah are cauRd in our Soul. How ''^^ ^'-^ f^Com- -/ , . J T\r r pilling ^a-^^w/, our judging and D:lcourjmg ^r cf Judg- ( which are the other two ) are ments. inade in it, is fhewn at large in the Second and Third Books of my Adethod to Science, 41. If any Learned Man is dif-fatisiied with this Difcourfe, or has a mind to oppofe it, I think I have Right rhi Author's y^- to require of him two Things : pkgy for this F'nf, That hci would not ob- Difcourfe ; and left his own Fancies or Dif-like "^'f '^' ^ '^' -' ■' ^ ^ only rv,iy to ^9 of it, or think that this is fuf- ahut to anfutc licient to invalidate it , but, that i^. ho would go to work like a Man of , Reafcn^ and fhew that This or That part of it does contradift Such and Such a Trincifle in Logick, Phylicks, or Metaphylicks. This is the only Solid Way of Objecting^ all other bjing but Empty Talk, and Idle Cavil. Next^ I think I have Right to demand, ( (ince G 3 ir 8 g Solid Fhilcfophy JJferteJ. It is fundamentally neceiiary to Philofophy that this Point be clcar'd, ) that he would fet him- ftlf to frame fomc Orderly and Coherent Dif. courfe of his own, built upon Evident Trinci- flcsy hcw^ or by what partiatLr Mcans^ the firfi Knowledge rf the 'Thlvgs w'lthcut Zfs^ comes into cur Scul. In doing which, he will oblige the World very highly, and my fclf very particu^ larly : And, unlcfs he does this, he will be con- vinced to find fcudt ov'ith wh^a hi ml elf cannot wend: Which will maniftft that he either wants true Knowledge^ OX ( wliich is a far greater De~ fedl) Ingenuity, ■,, 'i" ■ ■» . ■■' -.1 m\^m\ 1 »■! II 1*1 i»i I «» PRE- 87 PRELIMINARY Fifth. Of the Proper andGenuine Sign jji cat ion of tboje iVcr^ls ivhkh are of tnojl ufe in Pkilofophy. I . r I 1 H E main Hindrance of Science^ 'vIz,. The JL Miftake of Fancies for Realities^ Or of mecr Similitudes rh-^ Defign of the for Notions , being provided a- : Author here. gainftj the other Grand Impe- diment to true Knowledge, which is the taking Words, iis'd in Philofophy, in an Ambiguous or nroftg Scnfe, is to be our next Care. The In- conveniences which arife hence, and the ways how to detect and avbid Equi- vocation, are in my "" Mi;thoi}(}i\{- * Book i. Lef. ir; cours'd of in common j and I have here in my Second Preliminary cleared alfo in common the Signification of all Abflraci Words, and fliewn, that they mean the thing ir felf, mia- tentis fuch or fucll ; Or, acccrdlno- to fuch or luch a Confideration of it as is exprels'd by that Word. My prefent Bufinefs, to which my Cir- cumftances oblige me, is to clear, in particular^ the Notion or Meaning of thofe moil: Important •Words, which being madj ufe of by Learned Men, and taken by them often-times in diiierent Senfes, do lb diftradt them in their Sentiments ; G 4 and. 8 8 Solid Thilofophy Ajfertel and, by drawing their Intclle(!lual Eye, now to €ne lide, now to the other ^ make them fo frequent- ly mifs the Mark while they aim at true Science. Not that my Intention in this Preliminary is, to purfue the Milkkes oi ethers., but only to fettle the True and Genuine Scnfe of fuch Words, to be applied afterwards to the Mif-accepters of them, as cccafion requires ^ tho' I may hint now and then feme Abufes of them, that fo I may the bet- ter clear their proper Signitication. z. 1 begin with [Exigence'] exprefs'd by the Word [/j] which is the Notion The Meanhg of of the Thing, precifcly confider'd the rvord [ Exi- . • y,^ II n • ^i_- • ftence.] ^^ ^^ ^^ Actually Being, This is the mcB fimple of ail our Noti- * Method. 1. B. I. ons, or rather indeed the * only L. 2. § 14. Simple Notion we have, all the reft being but RefpeBs to it. For, it has no kind of Compolition in it, not even that Metaphylical one, of grounding divers Concep- tions or Coniiderations of it, as all others have- Whence all Notions being, by their Abftraflion, DJfi-if^tl ^iVxd Clear 'j this 777(7// A bftradtcd Notion is fo perfect ly clear and felf-evident, that, as it can- not nec^Jb it cannot adwit any Explication. They who go about to explain it, fhow themfelves Bung- lers,while they ftrive to approve themi'elves Artifts. For, by telling us, that 'tis EJJe contra Caiifas, they put [EJJe^] which is the Notion defined, in the Definition j which is moft abfurd, and againft all Art and Common Scnfe : Nay, they make it more obicure than it was before, by adding [£;ctr^ Cau- fas] to it, which are Itjs clear than it jelf was. By the Word [^Caufes^ I fuppofe, they mean Natu- ral ones 3 and io., tho' it gives no Clearnefs to the Signi- TreUm'nuvi Fifth. 89 Signification of the Vv'ord {y-H^^ yet it may at lead confift with good Scnlc, and may mean, that the Thing was, hcfirc^ or while it was not yet produced, within the Pcwtr of thofe Caules, or in the State of Votentiality j and that Exi/hncc is that Formality, or mod formal Conception, by which tlie Thing is put out of tliat impcrfeft State, of having only ^i Po9;^£r to be^ and is redu- ced to the perfedcr State of AtfiuiUtjy or Atmal Being. 3. As it is impolTible to mifconceive this felf- evident Notion, lb 'tis equally im- poHible to miilake the meaning '^^'' ^f/^"' ^'''' or the word [ Extftence J which ),,^ ^v. properly cxprelTes that Notion 3 for, if they take the word [ is ] to have any meaning, relating any W'ay to the Line of [ Ens^ or any Sigj-iification at all that is, of its Nature, purely Vottvtial ^ they quite deilroy it's No- • tion : And, if they take it, in any Senfe, for an A duality 7iot belonging to the Line of E^r, they mufl: necellarily take it to mean [s vot,] there being no Third or other fuch Notion to take it for ^ in the fame manner, as if one takes not Ens to mean AThivg^ he mull: take it to mean A"^<:- thing. Now, tho' the Goodnefs of Hum.ane Na- ture, which abhors Contradidion, reclaims ve- hemently againft iuch an unnatural Depravation of Common Senfe, as to take LjJ while thusex- prefs'd, for [is net \] yet, taking the meaning of the Word lExifience] as it is difguifed by another Word, which is, by ccnfequence, Ecju^'v^Icnt to it 3 thofe Deferters of Humane Nature, tV.c 5cep~ ticks^ do take occallon from the altering the Ex- prellion, to milapprchend even what is Self-et'i- d^fjt* 90 Solid Philofnphy ^Jferterf. dent. For 'tis the fame Senfe, ( when we fpeak affinnatix'cly ) to fay a thing is True or Certairt, as to fay it is y imce nothing can be True or Certain •that /■/ wof 5 and, therefore, when thef_^ Men talk of Moral and VrohMe Truths and Vrcbable Or A4o- ral Certainty, which mincing Expreifions mean [ pnffihle not to he [o] they in eti'ecl fav, that bvhat //, may^ iphilfi it is^ fcffibly ?iot he j ] Which man- iiers of Exprefilon, tho' they may fcem to fome but a meer Unconcerning School-Speculation , and Unreiie^ting Men may think it deferves no other Note, but that of being Ridlculom 3 yet, I judge my feif obliged to declare, that it is more- over mod enormoufjy Mifchievous , and that it quite perverts and deftroys ( by a very immedi- ate Confequence ) the Nature and Notion of all Certainty 2nd Truth whatfoever, and of 5e/w^ too j •and quite overthrows all poifibility of Knowing any thing at all. Had they faid [ / tfmik it true cr certain ] none would blame them , rather *tis a Credit for fuch Men even to think heartily there is any Truth or Certainty at all in Philofo- phy ; but to joyn ( as they do) Mrral or Vroha- ble^ to Truth and Certainty^ as a kind of Mode alfeft- ing them, is to clap thefe mod unconfociable Things, Light and Darknefs, into one Dusky Com- pound, to abetNonfenfe,and palliate Ignorance. 4. The Notion immediately next in order to Exigence, as that which has the Tf^e yneamna: of Very lealt Porenti.ility that can be {Ens] or [Thing] in the Line of Being, is that of Ensy or Thing. Wherefore the meaning of that word can be no other but that of [ Capable to be] for, nO Created Thing has yltfu- W iuin'g, or Ex'ifience,, in its Eflential-Notion, but of Trel'rmhary Fifth. 91 of its own Nature may he or not bii -^ as, bcfides what's proved in * ^- 3- ^-7- my ^ Method, is ften in the very Notion of Creature 3 which fignifics That -ivhich has its Being />'ow Another j which, therefore, can> cf its fdf\ be only Capable of Be'ivg. That the No- tion of £wj is diftindt from that of Exi/^ence is demoHarated * elfe- * ^^^■^. where, and is farther evident hence, that the Notion of what has Exigence miifl be diiferent from what's ha J by it, or from Exi- ftence it felf All Mankind has this Notion of Thing in them j for they experience that every Thing can exifi, by feeing it does fo , and they know alfo they are not cf themfehes, whether they hold a firfl: Being, or no 3 becaufe they do gene- rally fee that Caufes produced them. Wherefore ail that can be faid, or thought of the \\OYd[Ens ] is, that it signifies the Thing precifely, as 'tis Ca= ja6Ie of setng. ^. Whence follows, that the Abftrafl Terms, [ Entity ] or [ Ejjence ] do proper- ly f^^mfy [ A Cf^city of Being, ^ ^fEnSfEf- which is the AbftracS Term ot fence.] {Capable cf Being.] Tho' Entity is often usM as a Concrete for the Thing it felf Moreover, Ejjtnce is the Total Form of E71S its Suppofitum, or Subject, which adequately and in- tirely conftitutes it fuch ; as Humanitas is the 7c- tal Form of Heme. I call it the Total Form, to dillinguiOi it from the partial Form of Body 3 which, with the Matter, its compart, do com- pouj'id the entire Notion, or Total Form of Cor- -poretty, 6. To 91 Solid Phil ofophy Affertecf. 6. To underftand which more clearly \ve are to Note that the Notion and Sig- 77?? skfimng: of nificatioii of the word [ ']y[nner 1 [ FoX/ ;:/ %f ^^ ^'- ^-^. „«r «-dy pre- [ Power ] and Cllely, aS It IS a Power to he a ( Aft. ] Thing • and Fcrm f jgnifies the lame Thing, according to that in it which determins it to bo a Thing ABually, We are to refled: too, that Vower and^^, coniidercd in the Line of Beings are the fame as Matter and Form j only the Former words are purely IVUta- fhyfical^ becaufe they exprefs the parts of Ens as Ens ; in regard no other conceptions in the Line of Being can polfibly be framed of a Body, but as it is Determinable, or Determinative, which are the very Notions of Tower and Aci , whereas Matter and Form^ tho* in Bodies they fignify the fame as the former, feem rather to incline to the parts of fuch an Ens^ or Body, Vbyfically con- fider'd. 7. To fhow literally what's meant by this fay- ing, that Matter and Form con- Mat's meant lite* fljtute rhe compleat Ens^ or make raUy by the con,. ^^^^ Subiec't capahle of Exifiin^, I vion Uyma- that j.^ ?: - ' xi i • ■ »►• Mmev and Form difcoutle thus. Nothing as tis compound B»/.f, and, fo, makes it Capable of Exifiwg • that is, an Ens or Thing. I enlarge not upon this Point, bccaufe 1 have treated it fo amply in the Appendix to my MetJjcd to Scie7ice. H. Hence is feen what is, or can, with good Senf-, be meant by that Meta- phylical, or Entirative part called ^'-^ ^'^/^^ ^^^-^w bv the Schools, the Snbl^ant'uil or ^^f , °l lfJll^\ Eflential For??: -^ which they lay. Forms. does, with the Matter, make up that compound E«j, call'd Body j and that, m Literal Truth, it Can be nothing elfe but that CompLxion of the Modes^ or Accidents^ which confpire to make that peculiar or primige- nial Conftitution of every Body, at the firft in- ftarjt of its being thus ultimately Determin d to be T/jis. For, this Original Temperature of the Mixt or Animal^ being once Lrtled by the Steady Concurrence of its Caufes 3 -iphate-ver Particles or Ejjluviums.^ or how many foever, which are Agreeable to it, do afterwards accrue to it, are fo di gelled into, or ailimilated, to its Nature, that they conferve, nourifh and di- late, and not deftroy it. Whereas, if they be of an oppo/it Nature, they alter it from its own tempe- rature, and in time quite defiroy and corrupt it. To explicate which more flilly, let us confider /jow the Caufes in Nature, which are many times of a Different^ fometimesof a Contrary Temper to the Compound, do w'ork upon a Body j and how they make (as they needs mud) prcta-natural Dif- pofitions 94 ^oUd Thilofophy Ajferted. pofitions in ir j till, when thofc Difagreeable Al- terations arrive to fuch a pitch, as quite to fer- t'ert x\\Q former Complexion of Accidents, which we call its Form • a new Fonrj, or new Complexion fucceeds, determining the Matter to be Another Things till it felf alfo, wrought upon in the fame Manner, comes to be Corrupted^ and fo makes 'way for a New Olt-fpring. To which, in the very Inftant it is ultimately Determined to be Thiyy the Firfl: Beings whofe overflowing Goodnofs Hands ever ready to give his Creatures all that they are Difiofed or Capable to have, does, with a fteady Emanation of Being, give his Peculiar Ef- fea, (fjcfftetice* Corollary. The Reafon why our Moderns do fo oppofe Subfiantial or EJJential Th Reafiji -why For?ns^ are reduced to two Heads ; ■^r ^'subftaT ^'^-^' Becaufe they conceited the ml or Eflentlal ^o™ ^'^^^ a kind of Difiincl Thing, Forms. or at leaft 2. part of a Thing Super- vening to the Marter, its Com- part, and Compounding the £?;/, after that grofs manner as Two Things in Nature do Compound a Third : Whereas, m 1 .ality, they are nothing but divers Notions or Confiderations of the Thing, formally, as it 7^ a Thing. Wherefore, to fay, a Body is Compounded of Matter and Fortn^ is no more, in Literal Truth, than to fay tl -at there can be no more Coniiderations of a Body, taken for- mially, as it is a Thing j or taking it in the Line of Ens prccifcly, but of a Vowcr to become fuch a Thing 5 and of the Atl or Form , Determining that Power : However the Tiling may have iA it what grounds the Notions of mix\y Modes or Ac- cidents ; Trelim'inary Fifth. 95- ciJentSy which arc alfo the Thing w^terially, tho* noc Form ally according to rheNorion of Ens. Nor let any objc^l, that this is to maintain that Things arc compounded of Notions^ as fomc mav mif-un^ d.rftand us j for, let it be rcmcmbcr'd (as is dc- monftrarcd above,) that the Notio?i is the very Thifjg^^ as it is in our Underftanding, accord'm^^ or as far as it is conceiv'd by us , that is, *Lis the ve- ry Thing, partially Conficic/ri. The Other Reafon which the Moderns had for this Mif-conccit, wa?, becaufe the Schools generally cxplain'd thcmfLlvts very ill, by making a new Entity of every diffe- rent Conception • not comprehending w^cll the Difference betw^x^n Mctapbjfical Comfofnion and Dlvifihility^ and TheM-^iniugofhXQ- Thyfical, or rather Artificial ones ; r^phyfical 0.;x. luch as Apothecaries uie when ryijiymty, they put many Ingredients into a Pill j or Carpenters, when of Many divers Mate- rials they compound a Houfe 3 which is the ap- plying, outwardly Or inivardly^ more Tidings ( pro- perly fo called ) together : Wherea> Metafhyfi^ cat Di'vifibility is never reduced to Acf^ but by our Underftanding framing Diftindl or Abftradt Notions of one and the fame Thing. And Me- taphyfical Comp.fition is no more, but that there is found in the Thing (though Phyllcally and Enti- I tatively one^ and u7icompounded) wh^t grounds thofe I difiincl Notions • which being but divers Rejpeth or Confiderations, it follows, that the Thing in Nature may, without any Con tradition, ( or Toffihly, ) be Chang d according to One of them, and not according to Another, 9, Hence 96 Solid Philofophy ^fferted. 9. Hence, Laftly, is cltrarly feen what is the Vrlnciple of Indi'viduatJ07i^ about What is the Pr:?}' "vvhich thcrchavebccn fuch warm duation. Dilpiues, ^iz,. That 'tis nothing but that Comploxlon of Modes or Accidc?HSy which make up the peculiar Conftitu- tion of a Body at the firfl Inftant of its being fuch an E?!s or 7/3/ j, as is explicated at large, § 8. by which 'tis, confequently, fitted foriuch aparticu^ lar Operation in Nature. 10. Evs or Thing has many other Names, tho' all of them/f/} p-ofer. As, Firft, The McanivfT of [Suhftance^] which, coming from tlZT\ '" ^^The ^^^' ^^^^ ^ Suhjirm-e, ] refpeds on- W Improper' ^Y i^-s Modes and Accidents, and not what concerns its felf^ or its cvm Order or Capacity to Exijhjjce. Wherefore, 'tis very Improper j and, unlefs the common U- fage of it make fome Amends for the Impropriety of the Exprelfion, certainly it is mod highly Un- fit. Ariftotle calls it ««nA, which coming from «iui\ keeps it within the Line of B^lng. As I remem- ber Boetlus was the firft who render'd »)and the'n- Definitions, could they bear any, cannot be divided into more which have the f articular Na'^ cures of Socrates and Tldto in them: And, there- fore they are called Indl'viduuws • that is, fuch as cannot he divided into more, which have the Na- tures fignified by thofe words in them, as could the Generic a I and Specific a I Notions of Animal and Homo 3 whence Individuams are the Lowed and Narrowed Notion that can poilibly be in the Line of Ens. 15:. The Indizfiduum^ is calfd by. the Latin Schools [ Stihfiantia prima ] and Tie Meaning of the Superiour Notions in the [Subftanria Pri- ^^ ^^^ ^^f ^^^^ [Suhfiantia Sec tm dee] ftantiaSecunda] ^hich (ignihcs that Only Indict- duums are in propriety of Speech Entia Or Capable of Exifiing j For, fince, ( as was ifhown above ) nothing that is Common or XJndetcr^ mined can exifi^ none of the others can have any Acittal being at all but in the Indi'Z'idnifm^ZS a kind of Metaphyfical Part of its Intire Notion j and a Part ( in what Senfe foever that word be taken ) can not poilibly be but in the or hole. If this then be their meaning, as I believe it is, nothing can be more true and Solid. Only I mull note that it. is lefs properly and lefs Logically expreft , and that Ariftotk Ijieaks more exactly when he calls the Former w cr£«'7ryf woT'ct, or prim)} Stihfiantia^ and the latter n S^djjiiui iinx, or Secfmdo Suhfiavtia-j ■ which Preliminary Fifth. lor which words denote, rhar tlic former is Ens in irs ' Trlmary and Proper iigniHcation of tliac word, and the latter only yi?} n logic ally , that is in a Secon- dary and improper Senfe^ which prima and .S>- cH7ida Subfia?itia do not exprefs: For, both thefc may be properly Entia ftill, for any thing thofe words teli us, tho' one of them may have an Or- der of Priority to the other as Fr/ma and Sectnula, in fome fuch Senfe as we call (Bod the Vrlmum Ens^ confidering him in order to Creatures. 1 6. From Words ufed by Philofophers which belong to the Line of Fjis, we •* come to thofe which are made '^^'J ^^\'i f^^^'" ufe of to exprefs the Modes or ^^r. Manners how a Thing is j which, i in a generall Appellation, the Schools have call'd I iacctDttltjiJ. This Word is, certainly, very im- proper : For, who can think that Quantity or (as they will needs call it) F.xtenfion^ is AcciAaital to Body, or (as fome may take that Equivocal Word) I that 'tis but by Chance^ Or by Accident^ that Ho- ! dies have any Bignefs in them at all ? The bcft ; Senfe I can give it, in purfuance to my own I Grounds, is this, that [^Accidtntal^'] which is the I Denominative from [y^cc/Wf«/^,] may mean fuch Notions as are Not EJJenrial -, or (which is the fame ) they may mean the Thing confider'd as to that in it which has no ways any Order to Bein^^ nor exprelles any fuch Order by the Word which j (igniiies its Notion. And, were this Senfe ufii- verfally accepted, and attributed to the Wbrd ] [ Accidents^ ] it would be a True and Solid one ': ; For, 'tis evident,'that none of the Words that ilg-. ! nifie any of thofe Accidents, does in the lead im- port in its Signification either Being, or any Rc^ , H 3 fpe(5t »■ I0^ Solid Th'dofophy Ajferted. fpeft or Order to it, as does Ens^ and all thofe Words which do formally and properly exprefs it, or belong to it. Whence the Notions fignify'd by fuch Words, are not EJJential ones, or relating properly and precifelv to the Ejjence • but Modl^i^ fas we may term it,) or cxpreiling fome Manner [How] the Thing is ; which is a quite different Notion from that of Ens^ or Thing, or of what formally is found in that Line. I do believe that divers of the Wifeft, and moft Learned School- men did take the Word [Accidents] in this Senfe, tho' the Propriety of that Word, fetch'd from ics Radix^ did not in^uite^ niuch lefs oblige them to do fo. I doubt alfo, that the UJr^ge of that Word in that warrantable Senfe I have now alTign'd, was not fo Ccnrmc7i^ and univerfally Current, even among the School-men, as to force it to bear that Senfe 3 as appears by their thinking that Acci- dents were certain kinds of little Adventitious En- tities ; much lefs among the Modern Ideifts • who ( through their Shortnefs in Logick and Metaphy- iicks ) do make Q^iantity, or Lxtenfion, the Ejjen- tial Forin of Eodj • which is, to put Eigne fs in the Line of Being • or, to make Eigne fs and Beings or the Mcde and the Thing, to be in the fame Line of Notions, and Irtrinfecal to one another : Where- as, a Thing muil lirft be conc^^iv'd to be, e*er it can \)c after Juch a Mode, or Manner, 17. FcrtheReafon lately given, 1 cannot but judge, that the Word [Mode,] or The Word [NioAt] "(aslbmecall it) [Modification,] Tnore proper. \s h\ more f ro f tr l\\2n the Word [Accidents J to Ugnifie thofe laft Nine Common Heads of our Natural Notions, Which Impartiality of mine, on this, and other Occalions, FrelimiHary Fi fch . i Oj Occafions, giving i()mc Advanrage tvO ihe Carte" ; fians^ and other Moderns, over other Pliilofophcrs* who call themfelves Arijhtelians, uill, I h.ope» obtain their good Opinion of me, that I do lin- cercly fallow my bed Re:iibn, and not Pique or Preiudicc, while I oppofe them in cthtr Things: And I am fure, 'tis my own Reafon I ouglu to follow, till clearer Rcafons of theirs fhew mine to be none j which I have no Reafon to fear j for, I hope, it will appear to every Acute and Ingenuous Examiner, that no Writer ever diftingui.^h'd his Notions more Exaclly and Ckarly^ or Co?inecied them more Clofelj and Ini?>n'cliatcly. 1 8. The Frimary Mode of all thofe Things wc con\'erfe with, or Bodies^ is call'd iauantitp. This Word is very '^''^^[^^^^^ Proper, and fully Significant , for, p/^^-* ^^ "^^'^ all the Bodies in Nature have iome Quantity or Bigncfs in them, more or lefs : Nay, even the lead Atome, or Effluvium^ that can be conceiv'd, has Bigncfs in it, as v^tll as the greatefl: Body, nay, as the whole World • tho' not /o miich^ ox fo great a Degree of it. Where- fore, this Word [Q^antlt)] is Comprehenfive • and fo, fit to fignifie the Cornmomjl; Afie6lion of Body : But, this is not enough • *tis withal, very Simple, or Uncompounded : Moreover, the Word it {^.M has, on its lide, no kind of Equivocalnefs, taking it as it is applied to Body in Ccmmcn ^ which Re- quifites are not found in any othtr W^ord ufed by us, to exprels that Mode. Only we are to note, that Bignefs, or Bulk, is only proper to Body^ as it has in it all the three Dimcniions j where^is, (^tantity reaches to how Long-^ or how Broad^ as well as bow Thick : And theretorc Qimntity is ab- H 4. ioIuLwly J 04 Sol/ J Philofophy AfferteJ. fuIiTtely the prcperefi Word to exprefs this Prima- jy Mode : however, it is much negledlcd by our jkc^trf7s^ who are grown ftrangely fond of Ex- tC?7fi0J7. 19. The Word [ExteKfi w] is very improper to ^ .fr. .rr> fgi.ifieit: For, Ext evficn proper- */n?4"- ^y denoresrhe Aaion of Extend- ^rcper, 3rig ^ to which IS du'ecrly oppolit, in our ufcal Speech, that A8iony caird CoKtraBicn. Or, if it be taken for the hehg Exter^^i^^ ftill its proper Signification muft be a T^fficn caas'd by the Xa/cw of Extending j which cannot fate with that ^'lr?7ple and Primary Mode we call QHf:vt>ty ; which is Naturally Antecedent to, and Indtft7ident of thofe Suhfecjucnt Modes cal- led A^icn, and Vc:JJ:cn. Again, All Intrlnjecal Modes are conceiv'd to be certain kinds of Forms atFeding Body, as their Subject 5 and Fcrms are very ill cxpreis'd by a Subilantive derived fi'om a Verb 3 und by '''ach an 'one efpecially, as muft ne- ceflarily (at I air) O/nnotate Jcticn or P^ffion^ if it does not rather directly, or moft properly f'gni- fie them. Moreover, kt-them take Extenfwn^ Stretching cut ^ or E: porrcBipn how they will, ftiil Common Senfe teaches us, that we may rake Con- tratilon or Strahn'ng in the fame manner as they do It : Whence follows, that if Exten[:on means or implies I;;?pe7ietri.bil}tj cf Parts^ CcvtraHlon muft mt'drLT'J72etrcihdity of Parts: Which Notion none of us v.'ili admit to have any Ground in Nature, tho* the Maxim teiisus, that [Ccntr:ries ure em- Icy d about the [ewe Suhjicl?\ Now, the Word ^ Qj^antity ] is not entangled with my of thefe In- conveniences, but freed from them all^ as will ap- pear to any Sober Refledter. And, on this Occa- fian, f TreUmyiary Fifth. lOj (ion, 1 beg Leve of our M'//?/, to tell them, rbat it is not (aft^ nor prudent ^ to leave off an Old and usd Word, till they are fure they have found An- other which is better^ or were proper, Cartejjui made choice of [ Extevfionl wittily, that he might thus more cleave rly bring all Phy licks to Mathe- maticks ; and others ( perhaps, ut efi Natura bo- mlnis^ fond of a Novelty ) follow'd him unadvi- fedly j tho' they were not guilty of any fuch De^ fjgn of their own, or aware of his. A nd I am forry Mr. Z. affe6lsonly the Improper Word [Eat- tenfmi^ and quite neglects that more Proper Word lo. Many other Names, at lead Attributes, are given to (^ant'ity • fuch as are Di'v'f/ihilitjy Impcnctrah'dltjy Sp^ce, TheSPnmvgofDl" and Meajurahility : the former of ''^^'°i^^^>'.v ^"'• 1 - 1 r T • • /^ J XT • penetrability , which (ignihes it in Order to Na- Space,^.;a Mea- tural Adion and Pailion, and re- furability. fpedts properly the Tarts into which it may be di'vldtd • or, which is the lame, its Potential Parts ^ in which, perhaps, the Nature of Quantity would be found to Confifl:, were I here to treat of the Nature of thofe Modes, and not only of the Karnes us'd in Fhilofophy, Impenetra^ bility properly lignifies fuch an Order or(as it were) Situation of thofe Parts, as that one of them is •without^ and not within another , which grounds that Secondary Notion, which fomc do impro- perly call ExtLvficn ; and Extenlion or Quantity, if of any confidcrable largcnefs in refpec:!; of the Body it contains, is calfd Space j which diiiers from the Notion of Vlace in this, that Place ( if properly fuch ) is juB as much Quantity as con- tains the Thing fUced^ and has a icfpeiSt to fome determinate lo5 Solid Philofophy Afferteff, determinate and known Points : Whereas S^act has not in its Notion to be a^jujied to tht Body that is in it^ not reftrain'd to any ^et Dlftance, So that Sfoce is Vlace at l^rge^ and Place is Space reflrain d, Aienfm-ahiUty grounds the Reckoning or Compu- ting hov many of fuch a Standard ot Quantity as ue had deiign'd in our Thoughts, would, if re- peated, cc^ual the whole of which we intend to take a Survey. 2 1 . Now, Quantity being the mofi: Commcn of all Ccrpcreal Adodes^ and which j9 Short Exi^lua- Antcccdes and grounds all the tij)ij,wh.ttQu2n' others, it cannot, for tliat very Tnd' Reladon R^afon, be properly defind-^ fo Are. that (as Mr. Locke acutely ob- ferv'd ) we know fuch things be- fore wc are ask'd, better than we do after ; for the Asking puzzles our Natural Thoughts, whicli were Clear enough before of themfelves j and Re- jlcxio?i^ which, W'hcn there is occafion, is -yvife^ and rdlghte7is us, does but ferve to blunder us when there is no need or occafion for it. Not- withftanding, I have, in my Method^ endcavour'd to give it fome kind of Explication, by differencing it from all other Imrinfccal Motics, ( which are jts Genus y as it were, or rather, a Travfcendcnt No- tion to all fuch Accidents ) in this, that it tells How the Tiling is, according to ibmc Coinmon Con- fide ration, in which All Things we converfc with do agree. By which 'tis diftinguilh'd from Qnali- 7/, which acquaints us How a Thing is as to what refpects its own peculiar Nature ^ and from Rela- ticny wliich txprelles how one Individuum refpe<3s another Ind'^vidimm, But this (as was faid) is out of my prcfcnt Bufuiefs in this Preliminary, which h Treliminary Fifth. 107 IS only to fhew what Nawes arc Prefer^ or Iw^pro- fer ; and not to treat of the partiCLiiar Nature of each Mode, ()F>Ahich I have, in their due places, fufficiently difcours'd in n:y Method. 11. Thefe, as far as occurrs to ir.y Memory, are the Chiefeft Words ufed by Philofophers , whofe Proper or ^^^-/irfTranfcen- Improper Acception has moftin- dcnrs] are. fluence upon the Advancement or Hindrance of Science. Notwithftanding, there are others far more Equivocal than any of the reft, called ^ranfcCUDcntjJ, or Words Applicable to all, or many of the Comn\on Heads of our Natu- ral Notions j which are hardeft of all to explicate, as wantijig any Common Ge^m^ or any thing like it, to explicate them by. I intended once to di- late upon them in this Preliminary, as being a Subject very worthy of our Reflexion, and yet fcarce treated on by any as they deferve : Bur, feeing, upon Review, how Prolix 1 have been al- ready in my Preliminaries, 1 am forced to content my lelf with Noting them in Ihort 5 leaving it to others to enlarge upon them. They are thefe, diftributed into their feveral Ranks. 23. F;r/, Ens^ taken, in its whole Latitude, for the Things and its Modes, Second- ly^ The Properties of £w/, taken in The five Sorts cf that large Signification j fuch as Tranfcendents. are Unum^ Vtrum^ Bonum ^ and their Oppoiites, Ncn-Unum^ or Di^'fum^ Falfum^ and Malum. For, the Notions of all the Modes being improperly Entiay have, by Confequence, only improper EJJaiccs^ or Entities of their own ; and, confequentiy, Properties of thofe Improper rjujces. Thirdljy Idtm^ Diverfumy and, in gene- lo8 ^olidThilofophy AJferted. ral, Relatum ; taking this laft Word in the largefl Scnfe, for all kinds of ReJpeBs whatfoever. In which Signification, all mno^s, or properly cal- led Entia, do relate to Exifievce-^ and all their Modes or Accidents do re/pect them diver fly, as certain Manners how they are. Of which Nature alfo are the aforefaid Common Words, [ Aiocle^ ] and {Accident^'] which are Tranfcendents in re- fpedt of the Nme lafi Predicaments. Fcwthlj^ Com- 'fletuw^ Inccm^letum^ Partial and Total, Generical and Specifical, Superior and Inferior, Simple and Compound, and fuch like. Moft of which kind of Tranfcendents feem rather to refpedl the Manner of Being which Things have in cur Undcrfiandi?jg, than the Manner of Being they have out of it. Of the laft Sort are, Which, 0hat, That which. Some- thing, Somewhat^ &c, which are the mofi Confufed Words imaginable, and (ignifie any Notion, but that of meer Nothing. By thefe w^e make a Baftard or Illegitimate Pefiniiion of Ens j and fay, that a Thing is [ That which is capable of Exi fling, (ire. ] I call it an Illegitimate or Improper Definition, be- caufe the Notion of the Genm ( which is one part of a proper One) has a Determinate Senfe: Where- as [77j/7f 7Mch,'] which, for want of a better, fup- plies the place of the Genr4s, has none. For, 'Tis to be noted, that in all Tranfcendents, (un- lefs, perhaps, fome of thofe of the Fifth Sort, which have a kind of blind, Cc/;/'//^^/ Senfe,) the. Name only is Ccj"nmon or Applicable to niore, and not the Nction • for, having no one Notion that is Commcn to all thofe Common Heads, they have none till it be F^etcrmin'd ; llnce no Notion can cxift in the Mind, unlefs it be This, or That, or one, any more than a Tbivg can cxilt in Nature, unlefs it Preliminary Fifth. I05> It be detcrmin'd to be fuch a Particular or Indi'vi- dual Thing. Much lets has any of them proper Diff'trtnces, dividing them by were and lefs of the Common Notion, as every Notion that is truly Cvmmon to more^ may, and mull have. 13. Whence extreme Care muft be taken, how Students in Philofophy do ufe thefe Tranfcendent M'ords ; and Great Care to be that they do M'wz^u'ifl^ their Senfc ^;^^'/^^ Tr^"- n o I 1 -^ 1 1 Icendent J^t^ords moll exaaiy, when they have ^, „,, hcldUm^ Occalion to make ufe of them. vocal. For, they having an Indiriferency to many Senfes, and thofe as vaftly difparate as the Common Heads themfelves are 3 that is, (as the Schools properly phrafe it ) Senfes differing toto Gencre^ (I may add, Gcncralijfum) it muft follow, that every time they do ufe them confiifed- ly^ or with a Conceit that they are Univocal^ their Difcourfe muft needs ftraggk widely, now one way, now another, and thence confound all our CommoneH Notions, which, of all others, ought to be kept Diftinci , the want of doing which, hinders all Coherence or Connexion of Terms, in which only Science confifts, and breeds innumerable, and mod Enormous Errours. It would be tedious, 1 doubt, to my Readers, tho* perhaps not hard for me, to fhow what Prodigi- ous Inconveniences do arife from the Mif-accep- tions of one of thofj many Dilterent Senfes fuch Words may bear, for Jncther^ I will only brfcg one Inftance , hoping that by this, as by a Sea- mark, my Readers may avoid the Shoals and Rocks of Errors in other like Occafions. i^The no Soil A Phjiofophy AjferteA. 2^. The Word [Co w/>£?«w^p^] may either mean the Compofition of Matter with yi^hat gre^ B: ' Eilemhl Form ' or, that of the /^anw in the U>h- Ejjence With itS Supfojitum^ which 'vocaUcceptiovof is conccivcd to have the Eflence wcr/7c7^'"^ '" ^^ ■' ^^' ^^ ^^^ Superiour No- pounded j"^" ^'^^"^ of £7;j with the IndMdutiTn'y All which are Compoiitions be- longing to the Line of Ens. Coming next to the Modes or Accidents^ the whole E?js or Suppofitum may be conGdcred as Compounded with its Pri- ?narj Mode calkd Quantity ; or with fome Q^/^^- //r/, or Relation. Or, with fome ^^^j^?;? or Vaijion^ Time^ Place, Situation, or Habit. Whence aCr- crues to the SabjefS the Denominations of Agent, Fatie?it, Li'ving, or being at fuch a time. Or in fuch a Vlace, Sitting, Armed, &c. All which Nine lad Compoiitions are Modifying or Accidental ones, and not Ejjential, or fuch as concern directly and precifely the Notion ofThifig or Being,2s did thofe of the firH fort. Now come Carte fius and his Fol- lowers, who, loath to fay the Body and Soul are two Supfofitums j and, wanting Skill in Metaphy- ficks to comprehend 92^/;^^ the Union of Entitative Parts is, or ho7u made, (which are Points too hard for Mathematicians , and of which de la Forge, iho* he talks prettily, can make nothing at all ) they w^ould have the Soul and Body compound One T:nng, becaufe they Acl; togevhcr, or affisi one an- other mutually to produce fome forts of Acti- ofts. Whereas Acfion being only a Mode, and (o prefuppoling the Res, or Thing, which it modi- fies, can only determin and dd?iominate its Subjec^t to be Acti?ig • and therefore Joint-afting can only conftitute and denominate the Soul and Body Co- Act crs j Frtltnirmry Fifih. r 1 1 ureters:, wiiich is a vaftly dilparatc Noiion from rhc C'onftiriuing and Dcnominaring rhcm (Dxxt ^l)tUg, as common Scnic ii^forms us. We will put an Inlhince : Mv Hund and my I'cn do both of them concur to the Actixtn of Writing, and fo QO\^^^0\}r\A oneyolnt^AcUr -J nay, lY^ty depend mu- tiiiill/ on one another as to the producing this Action : For the Hand cannot write without the Pen, nor the Pen without the Hand : Befides, they are in fome fort fitted to one another, in order to perform this Adion • for, the Tii^gers are fo fram'd, iis to hold and guide the Pen very com- modioufiy ; and the Pen ( taking in its Handle and the Nib-end too) is fitted very commodi- oully to be held and guided by my Hand, fo as to draw the Letters fuch as they ought to be. Laft- Iv, which is much 7nore^ and a Parallel ^ery agree- able to the Co-adion of Soul and Boily, they both of them do modifie c/jf<6 cr/^^rV Adtion. For, the best Scri'verier writes but fcurvily with a B^J Pen^ and the Best Pi?i writes but fcurvily in an unskilful Hand. And }xz tlie Hand and the Pen are nor one Jot the nearer being one Things not with Hand- ing their Concurrence to this Joint-Action • tho' ix be qualify* d with Mutuality, Fitnefs of the Co- Agents, and the Pvlodification which tlie Adion receives from both of them jointly, and each of jj them feverally. Belides, they put the Cart be- fore the Horfe, while they pretend that the Act- ing as one Thing is tO make them one Thing. For fince the Res is, in Priority of Nature and Rea- fon, before Modm rci 3 and Bei77g before Acting j and that nothing can Act otherwile than it is 3 'tis Evident from plaineft Principles, and even from the very T^rms^ tbat they muft lirft Be one Things e'er 1 1 X Solid Philofophy AjferteJ, c er they can Act as one Things or Be flich a Com- pound, before they can Act as fuch a Compound. And fo, the Point (licks where it was, i/iz.. How the Soul and Body come ro be thus Co?vpounded into one Ens • of which I have given fome Ac- count, Preliminary j,. § 8, 9, 10, 13. z6. On this Occafion 1 cannot b.it Reflect, 'that the Cartifums were very 'Jnadvi- r/;^ Cartefians ««- f^^j ^^ m^^ddle With fuch a Point, ultra Crepfdam ^^ puts them quite paft then" Ma- thematicks j as likcwife, that tho* they have fram'd a Logick or Method fuitable to explicate their Mathematical Phibfophy , yet they are but very bad Dift-inguifljcrs of our Natural Notions into Common Heads^ which is one Prin- cipal Part of true Logick • as appears by their ram- bling fo irregularly from one to the other, as has been (hewn elfeivhere^ in their making Extenfwn or Quantity^ which is a Mode^ the Form which is EJJential to their Firfi Matter j and bere^ in put- ting Compofition according to the Notion of Action^ to be Compolition according to the No- tion of Ens, And whoever impartially Examins the Diftribution of their Notions into Heads, will find it not to be fuch as Reafon n^iim'^LWy forced, (as ours is,) but fuch as Defign voluntarily and in- geniouily invented. REFLEX^ "3 I ^ _ _ REFLEXIONS O N Mr. LOCKE s ESSAY CONCERNING Humane Underftanding. — — ' .1. 11. , , ■,■■■■■ REFLEXION Firft, O N ne FIRST BOOK. H I S Book gives me liale Occafion to make any Refle- xions, but fuch as I ^-^^^ Excel/ent Wit, ^^ mull be forced to ""l^^l^^'^fll] make through his ji^hole Ejfy-^ SrV'^Ef- •which is, on the Penetrative and hy ac'/mowUdged. clear Wit, and happy bxpreflion of its Author, in his purfuing the Defign which he had prefix d to himfelf. 1 could wifh, indeed, I that 1 14 Solid Philofophy Afertecf. ^bat he had thought fit to take his Rife higher, or ( to fpeak more propa'ly ) had laid his Grounds deeper. But, it IS to be expefted, that every Au- thor fliould write according to thofe Thoughts or Principles with which tht* Cafual Circumftan- ces of his fore-pad Life had imbu'd him, or as his Natural Gen'im leads him. His fleering fuch an Im- partial Mean between Sccpttcifm and Dcgmatiz^ing^ does certainly argue a very even Temper of Judg- ment, and a Sincere Love of Truth. And, 1 fliall hope, that, whoever perufes attentively my Me- thod^ ( B. I. Leff. 1. from§. ^. to §. ii.j will di- fcern that I have fo exaftly meafurd out the Pitch of Knowledge attainable by us in this State, that I am as little a Friend to Over-TVeeTJwg, as I profefs my felf a Declar'd Enemy to Scepticifm. 2. I am a little apprehend ve , from fome Words in his IntroduSion , ^TlsProbctblehehas expreffuig his Dif-like that IVkn takenaPrcjud-ce /^^ j^^r^ ^/^^;^ Tbotfghts into the ^gainft Meta- n A r n - J 1 • phyficks. '^# ^^^^« ^/ ^^^^r^ > 2nd his Conceit that this brings Men to Dov.hts and Scepticifa^ that he has taken a Prejudice againd ^etaptlpficbfi ; whofe pro- per Objeft is, thofe Noiions of the Thing which abftraft from Matter and Motion, and concern Being only. Were I ailur'd that 1 did not miftake him, I would, for his fake, enlarge on that Point, and difplay fuily the Excellency of that moft Solid, moil: Clenr, and mofl: Imow^m-ahle Science j which I fliali only touch upon at prefent, by giving my Reader a Sumnvary of its Principal Objedts. 3. It Reflexion Firft. ir^ I. It treats of the Formal or Effcmld Tarts of Phylical Entities, or i^odies, in Commov^ and m Specie j Of the Ef- The IncompnrahU fential Unity and D'i(i-inctio7J of F.xceU.ncy of the them, and whence tis taken ; ^,,^^j, f .^„ particularly, ot the hilential Con- y>c7« //:;.• Ob j efts ftituents of Ele?;/i'nrs, Mixts. Veze- '^ ^''^^^^ o/- tables and Animals • and u'/y?;, and /'o?/.', they come to be Eifentially, or Indivi- dually Chung d : Thence, advancing to the Chief Animal, Man^ he treats of his Fonn, the SouU and of its Vroper Action: Of the Superior Part of if, the Afmcl • and, of its Trogrefs tov^'ards its h(t End^ or its Declenjjon from it. Thus far demon- ftrated, it proceeds to treat of the Separation of the Soul from the Body 3 and, to fhew evidently its Immateriality^ and, COnfequently, its Immorta- lity. Of the Science of a Soul feparated, and the Eminency of her Acts in that State, above what fhe had in the Body j and, laftly, of the Felicity and Infelicity connaturally follov^ing out of her Adlions here^ aiid the Good or Bad Difpoiitions j found in her at her Separation ^ as alfo, of the Immutability of her Condition afterwards. It treats of the Notion or Nature of Exijlc77ce^ and how 'tis Accidental or Uneifcntial to the Natures of every Created Being ; and thence demonftrates a Firji Being., Or a ^OD, to whom 'tis Ej]e77tial to h% •, that is, whofe Nature is Self-Exificnce, Whence follows, by nectilary Confequence, that his Nature is Infinitely Pure or Simple, Etcmaly Infinitely Perfect and b-nmiitable. All-know' ',ig., Wil- ling ever what's mofi IVife, and therefore mofl: Tree in all his Actions ^ and that the Divine Ef- fence is Umonceivahk by any Notion we can frame I X or 1 1 6 So/i^ Fhtlofopby AfferteJ, or have of it j and UnexprcJJlble by any Name we Q2n givc it which is F roper y and not mcfi highly ALtaphcrhaL Lalll}', It dcmonftrates, there are Ture Spiritual Bemgs^ which have no Matter or Fotevtlallty in them, CllYCi Intelligences^ OH Angels -y nnd'likcW'ife, (in Cowmen^) of their Number^ Dijl-'mcllon^ and Subordination j as alfo, of their Trofer Operations^ boih Internal and External. 4. Thefe, and fuch as thefe, are the Obje6ls proper to that Supream Science, A.dfrmthmn^ Mttciphjficks '. which any Man ner by vohich it c o r 1 1 ' • 1 1 handles them. ^^ Scnle \\'oiild tnink ouglu to make it delerve the Efteein of the Beft, and mofi: Elevated Portion of Mankind- and not to be ridicul'd by Drollifh Fops, who turn all they underftand not into Buitoonery. All thefe high Subjects it treats of, I fay, if pof- fible, ( as I believe it is, ) with more C/q/^, more Necejjary^ and more ImmcdlateCoiint^xion^ than the Mathematicks can pretend to ^ iince the Evidence and Certainty of the Principles of //:? at Science (as alfo of Logick ) do depend on, are fubordinate to, and are borrow'd from the Principles of the other 3 which is the Sovereign and Mijhejs of all other Sciences whatever. 5. It will, 1 doubt not, be apprehended, that fuch High Knowkdgcs are abo^^e The Knowledge our reach, and Impoilible to be oftheje high ohj attain'd by us, in this State, They jccls attainable • j 1 / i-. j t ^r Natural Rc^- ^l'<-S mdecd, abo've Fancy \^ and, I Ton. • believe, this Objedtion is made by iv7?;9', or by Men attending to the Refcmblances of Fancy, wliich fall fhort of reprefenting to us fuch Sublime Objects. But, why they ihould be above our Rcajon^ I cannot imagin j Reflex'ion Firfl:. 117 imagin , or, wliy they flioiild be deem'd fo My- (Icrious, as not to be Knowable without a Di-- vinc Revelatit^n. It is nianifJl, that we can have Abftradt Notions of Fxiftence, Thing, Ininiaterial, Incorporeal, Kno^^'ledge, Will, Operati(>n, &c. that is, we can Conlider the Common Subjedl: Th'inff ] as Exillent, Capable of Being, and ( if it )e a ^fir'it) as Immaterial, Incorporeal, Know^ ing. Willing, and Operating, &c. as well as Ma- thematicians can a R-dy^ as Extended, Round, or Triangular, &c. And, then, 1 would know why we cannot, by atrcncive Confidv. ration, and due Reflexion on thofe Things, as thm ccncel'vd by us, frame a Science grounded on the Things tb^fi apprebemled^ as well as MatJematicians Can upon a RrJy coniider'd as grounding their proper Ob- jedlsj or, as grounding their Notions of fuch and fuch Modes of Quantity 3 fuch as are the De- grees, Proportions, or Figures of it. Let us not Blafpheme in our Thoughts the Bounty of Infinite Goodnefs. It w^as the Devil's firfl Calumny againft (Bob, that he envfd Mankind Knowledge : Let not us carry it on, by entertaining fuch an un- worthy Conceit of EiTential Goodnefs j but, difpofe our felves by feeking a Right Method to Knowledge, and purfuing it with Induftrious Study, and we may be Certain of Succefs. While I was writing my Method to Sclc?ice, the Attempt to fhew the Re^fon all along, for fuch Notions as were taken from the Thing, according to the manner of Being it had in my U?2derfianding, and, therefore, was to be carried through with per- petual Reflexion on the Things there^ did appear lb dilcouraging, that I was fometimes half forry 1 had undertaken it : But I faw the World needed 1 3 it» 1 1 8 Solid Philofophy JJferted. ir, and knew all Truths were Ccmiecled^ and there- fore was confident of (Bob's Aiiiftance in fuch a necelfary and ufeful Cccaiion. Indeed, Providence has left us no Means to know what is done in the Moon, or other Stars, (tho\ perhaps, they areas bufie there, as we are in this Sublunary Planet, the Earth,) bccaufe it is not to our purpofe to know fuch Things. But, whoever conliders thofe Meta- phyfcal Objedls, will, at firft fight, difcover how TJfeful the Knowledge of then^ is, both in regard of their Influence upon all hfcrior Sciences^ and to raife us to CcntcmpLticn • as alfo, to Explicate, Ellablifh, Defend and Comfort Chrifiian Faiths For, there is a Gradaticn of Truths, as well as a Ccv7texion of one Truth with another. The Natural are Foundation-Stones^ To hep.r the Supernatural cncs -^ Which^ tho they to Heaven'i Tof ajpire^ ^Tts the fame Ground, ra'is d Stories higher. Biffs'* d Soul I which ^ to the Throne Divine ^ Winds it felf up hy its own Line I All thefe high Encomiums of Metaphyficks, if 3t fhall pleafe God to protraft my Span of Life fome few Inches longer, I doubt not but to fhew, are no more but its juft Due ; and, amongft the reft, its Clcareft Demonftrative Evidence and Certainty: Particularly, that the Study of that Science is fo far from increafing Doubts^ or lead- ing 10 Scepticifm^ (as, perhaps, Mr. L, may appre- hend, ) that, on the Contrary, the Knowledge of it is the moft efFedlual iMeans imaginable lo fettle ail DiMhtfulnefs^ and to Convert or Confound the greateft Scepticks. 6, Mr, Reflexion Firft. 119 6, Mr. Locke s Tenet of no Innate Notiojis^ nor> COnfequently , Innate Frinciplcs^ does perfectly agree with my Sen- ^i''- LockeV Tm timents • both as to the Thefls it f. "° \"".^;,^ y ir 11 ^ r r • 1 • t Ideas , ^o.idly idi, and the Reafon for it 3 which cr.tatdcd , ^wi is, that God has laid Connatural Unavfrveral/U, Caufes, to give US our Notions -^ and, therefore, it did not become his Sovereign Wifdom to do fuch a needUfs Ad Ion ^ as to ingraft them by his nm Hand immediately. Belides which, that Judicious Author Accumulates fo many other Pregnant and Sohd Reafons, to fix that Poiition of ours in an Immoveable Ceitain- ty, that I fee not but it may, for the future, de- ferve the Repute of An Efiahli^id and Leading Maxim' in Fbilofop/jj. -«PV>«B>K^MnwaBanaMM aiM«ai«nBawkM_i»^»PMiMMttoi I 4 RE- no Solid Philofophy AJferteJ. / REFLEXIONS ON THE SECOND BOOK. REFLEXION Secondy O N TIjeFirB CHJPTER. t, X Agree perfeftly with this Learned Author, J^ That our Ohfer-vatlcn employ d either about External SeTifible Objects , or a- Jn what the Au- hout the Internal Operations of our thor agrees and ^-^^ percei-ved and reflected on ft ij agrees -with , ^ j - j i • i r i- A/n Locke. v our jel'ves^ ts that which \uppUes our Underfiandings with all theMa^ terials of Thinking. As alfo, that a Man firfi thinks when he begins to have any Senfations. That the Iinpreflions made on the Senfes are the Originals of all Knowledge. That the Mind is of its own Nature fitted to receive rhofe Impreflions. Thar in receiving Ideas or Notions at firft the Mind is Tajfi've, That 'tis all one to fay, the Soul and the ReflexicH vSccond. iii the Ma7i thinks. A n d, La ft ly,T/'jf Mt7i Jo vot ahmys ^h'lnk J which laft T/:c/Is he confutes here very elaborately : But, 1 cannot at all agree to fome Politions he makes ufe of to oppole this Jaft Tt~ net, and, indeed, neeJLjly ^ for he produces goo J (lore of /o//V/ Arguments fufficient to confute it. 2. For Fil*ft, He makes the having Ideas end Perception to be the fariie tL'pi^. 1 apprehend he means, that when ^^'^ '«^;' ^^^ve Ko^ wxha^'e Ideas, we muft perceive ^'ons^^vithoutpn-^ , , 1 /• 1 r ceiv^ng we have we have them ; becaule he lays ,,r^^^. afterwards, that the Scul musi neceffarily he confcious of its owji Vcrcepticfi. Ijl- deed had he faid the Ha'vivg Ideas, when lie is jiivake, and ylttentively refiet/s on thofe Idcas^ , it had been a Certain and Evident Truih : Other- I wife, 'tis manifeft that we retain or ha^ve our Ideas or Notions in OUr Mind W hen we 2iXtfo:^?idIy fijieep, (it being a ftrange and extravagant Para- dox to fay, that we get them all again as foon as ever our Eyes are open ^ ) and yet we ^(? 7Jot thin know them 3 and, to fay we do, is to come over to his Adverfary, and grant the The/is he is Im- i pugning : For, if a Man does think when l.e is ''found afeep, 'tis without Queftion that he may think always. 3. Next, 1 muft utterly deny his Pofition, that We cannot think without being fen- fible or ccnfcicus of it. To dif- ^^ ^^y Think, prove w^hich 1 alledge, that "^'^f. ^'';"» ^ X TiK • ■ \r ' Conlcioiis that when a Man is quite abiorpt in wf Think. a ferious Thought, or ( as we i fay ) in a Brown Study, his Mind is fo totally ta- ken up with i\iQ Object oi^ his pre fen t Contempla- tion ( which perhaps is foinething without him ) that I IX Solid Thilofophy Afferted. that he can have no Thought, at that very In- ftant, of his ow^n Internal Operation, or that he is Thmking^ Or any thing like it. I have been caird fometimes from my Study to Dinner, and anfwered, J am coming. Upon my Delay, they cali'd me again, and ask'd. Why I came not, ha- ving promis'd it ? I deny*d I heard, or faw, or anfwered them ^ yet , upon Recolleftion, I re- member d afterwards that / did. I knciv then that they caird me, fmce I underflood their Words, and ^ntwci'Qd pertinent ly 3 yet, it is moft manifeft, that I did not at the Time of the firfl Call under- ftand that 1 underflood it, or know that I knew it, jince it came only into my Mind afterwards by Reminifcence or Reflexion j which argues I had the Knowledge of it !;efore by a Direct Impreilion, otherwife I could not have remember d it. 4. Tho' this Thefts of Mr. Locke's is mentioned hereafter, it were not amifs to ^Tis impople to he fpeak my Senfe of it where I firfl: Confcious, or j^^gj. -j.^ pjg uid2;es, that w^e know roe knoro. , 'V-i 1 / 1 • 1 icithout a new know our ownThoughts,(whicn j^cl of R^exion. are Spiritual^ by Experience j And I deny we have any Experience but byDireft ImprefTions from fenflble Objedts, either coming from them at firft, or re-excited. He thinks it impoiTible to kno7i^^ but we muft at the fame time be Confcious^ or ( which is the fame ) know we know: And, I iudge it impolfible we /hould know we know at the fame time we have that A61 onlyy till afterwards we come to reflect upon it by a neou A6t j which is to know it, no^ hj Experience^ but by Reflexion. My Keafon why I am to poikive in my Afiertion, is this : Nothing can be kno7Pn by any Ad of Knowledge but the Object Reflexion Second. 123 ■Object of thatAcSt: For the Obiect of Knowing, )and the Thing kfiovn, are the lame ahnoft in the very Terms, and perfectly the fame in Scnfe. Put •cafe then I know by a Direct Imprelfion w hat we dll Extcvficn ; in this cafe ExtenfioniS ihc fo I e Object of that A^t of Knowledge, and nor my Jet of Knowledge it ftif ^ therefore I am not conjcious I know / that is, 1 do not k?7C7i' I hww when I hdMC the A61 of knowing Exte?7jhn : For, were it {Oy Extenfion would nor be the Sole Object of that iAd, but ihtiCcmplcx made up of E.vrdw/Zc;/, and •ih^ Act it Jelfhy which 1 know Extenfion: which f Obied:s being of Difparate Natures, ought to be ! the Objeds of Different A dls. Bei'des, this w ould I hinder any External Cbjed-, or Corporeal Mode ^ to be known Dlflinctly ; for the Lka of it would be Confounded and Mingled with a kind of Spi- \ ritual Compart, 'vlx.. my very Act it felf 3 for (this AcSi: being known ( according to him) at i the fame time with Exteufon, muft needs make up ^^rt of the Object of this Act, Laftly, If we know our own Act Experientially , w^e fhould confound Direct Knowledges with Keflex ones. For ( if I underftand Mr. Locke rightly ) he with good Reafon makes the Inttrnnl Operations of the Mind to be the proper Objects of the Reflex Acts j and, rhar the genuin Difference of thofe two forts of Acts does confifl in this ; that by Direct ones, we know the Cbiects which are in Nature^ or without us • and by Reflex ones, what's in the Souly or htr Operations J and not. the Things in Nuttirey \ Gtherwife than as they are in that Act : But if I be Ccnfciousy or know that I know w hen 1 know^ the Object without we, I muft by the fame Act know what's within me and what's without me both at once 3 I X4 Solid Pbilofophy Ajferted. once ^ and fo my Adt of Dir^i^ Knowledge would be Rtfltx ; or rather, that cm A6t w^oiild be both Diretl and Reflex, which makes it Chimerical. 5- The fame Argument demonftratcs, that w^e cannot be Confcious of our 7?ey?f^' 'Th Un^ojfiuu to be A6ls at the very time we produce cXZZ± L^^^"!- For, myFirdT^e^xAc^ fent Reflex W, h^s for its {ole Obicdt that Ope- ^f^-' h ^nt^- Rc' ration of the Mind, which I had px one. immediately before by a Direfl one • and my Second Reflex AxxS has for its Objea: the Firs} • and in the fame man- ner, each fuccecding Reflexion has for its Objea that JH which immediately preceded. Wherefore, it theFirfl Reflex A61 hadYor its Object at the fame time, both the DireB and it fdfxoo ; that is, did we, when wt firft Refle6led, know by that rvery All it [elf that w^e did thus refledt, then the Second Reflex A61 would be foreftalfd, and have no Proper Objedt left for it. To clear this bet- ter, let us alfign one Reflexion to be the LaH : It were not the LaH Reflexion, unlefs the Objedl- of it were that Reflexion which w^as the laff hut one. Wherefore, unlefs that Reflexion that went laft before was hioivn by that A(5t, and the LH of all remain'd tmhioiim, the Laft w^ould have tv>o Oh- jeBs, 'VIZ,. The Preceding Reflexion and its f If too. This feems to me as plain l^eafon as plain can be , and , I believe, Mr. Locle\ Different Thoughts proceeded, from not advening with w^hat Incre- dible Celerity our Reflex Thoughts do generally fucceed the Dirc(^t ones, and one another. Whence it comes, that, not aware of the imperceptible Time between them, we are apt to conceit, that the Reflex htX is cxfmvnially known by the Reflesion Second. ii^ the very Aft it fclf. Since then, nothing can be known by ayiy Ad but the Oh]dt of that Aft, anc\ (as might calily be niown)it would Confound our Natural Notions ^^"'""^ ^^cann^ flrangelv, to lay, the Ad is its ou>- ha Repx:o^. ovm OhjeH ; it follows, that it can- not be known by its ftlf\ but mud: be known (if at all ) by the m^xt Reflexion. Whence refulrs this Certain and Evident Corollary, that, Itisim- 'poffible we jhonld ever come to know our la si Re^ flexion. 6. Thefe are my Reafons why I recede from Mr. Locke in his Opinion , that A Man cannot think without being ^Tis utterly d:tiyU Confciotis of it. But, the Confe- thatCoy^jUoui^^j, quence he leems to draw thence, ^^n. that therefore COUfciOUfucfjJ is that which cauf^o 31nDiUiCJUation; I mufl: abfo- hitely deny ; and cannot but judge, that it draws after it a Train of taither Confequences, which are altogether Extravagant. Of which more^ when we come to examin his Principle of huh- "vicluation. As for the Pofition, [That Men do always think'] which he impugns, aiid, in my Judgment, quite overthr^vs, I ^'^^ UnreafoiiahU- cannot but wonder what the Af- '^^P "^ f'^- i^/-' r r ' rj.x ^ n:on, toat Men lerters ot it mean. They grant doalways think the Soul has Modes and Alfxfti- ons peculiar to her own Nature; and, confe- quently, of which fhe is properly the Subiecl : Why fhe may not therefore retain them in her ha- bitually (as it were) without exerting OV exerci- fing them, as well as the Body may thole proper to ;>/ Nature, is altogether Unconceivable. li.deed» were Ii6 Soli^ Thilofophy Afferted. were the Soul, in this condition fhe has here, a Ttirc AB^ as Angels are, it would confift with good Reafon ; but being here in a Votmial State, ( as appears by her being CafahU ft ill of Nnv Know- ledges, and her being but a Part of that cneABual Thing call'd Man^ and depending on the Material Compart in her Operations) 1 cannot fee on what Principle, either Phylical or Metaphyseal, they can pretend to ground fuch a Paradox. This makes me fear, that this Tenet favours ftrongly of that odd Opinion, That the Soul here is a Vure AB as the Angels are^ or a Diftindl Thing from the Body • that is, a Forma Ajfifiens^ and not In- formans j tho' they are loath to own it barefacedly, but fhift it off, with witty Explications of their own Dodtiine, which, when brought to the Teft of Clofe Reafon, vanifh into Air j at which ingenious ways of Evafion it muft be confefs'd they are very great Ai'tifts. ^»0mmmmmm^tm -%■ RE 117 REFLEXION Thirl O N The Semi J, 77vr^, j;/^ Foitrth, CHAPTERS. I . T Mufl: except agiiind: his making, or naming X th^' Objcds oF our Scnfcs, /Imple Ideas, having already prov'd ^\ ^"'''''^ simple •^1 I I 1 r I I r ; hur that of Exid" that the only ablolately y7wf/^ ^^^^^ ■' Idta or Notion, is that of £:>://?- ewce: To which are Refpecti've (^which. argues fome Complexion or Compofition ) one way or Other, all our other Notions of the Thing which we have, or can have'^ as is fhown in my A4e- thod,B. I. LejT.z^. from §^14. to § 20. I could wiffi he had talcjn the Dlfiwction and Order o^ his ' Notions from Nature , which Teaches us that the Notion of [ Res ] is before [ Modus Rei-^'l and that the Conlideration or Notion of [ Thing ] is more Knowable than that o( any Mode -^ and the Mode Ot quantity is that which naturally antecedes, and grounds, all the "^^^ ord.r of our other Modes that can be conceiv'd ^"f^'^' ^' ^^/« elonging to Body. Nor will it ju^c. excufe this Deviation from Na- ture, that we have no exa^t Notions of Individu- als • fince we can abftrad the Notion o'c Entity or Capacity of Being from the Thing, as well as we can its Solidity, or any of the reft. And certainly^ that Notion which Expreffcs Reality, or an Order to Being, fhould claim a Right to be confider'd in the /r/ place; 1 cannot but judge that the Mcthodizine T 1 8 SoIU Phtlofophy AfferteJ. Methodizing of his Lkas on this manner, would certainly have made his enfuing Difcourfes more Ordtrlyy and confequently more Clear. But, every Man is Mafter of his ov^^n Thoughts, and of his own Method. Nor did Mr. Locke intend to write an Exa(St Logick, which is what I aym'd at j ajid therefore took that way that heft futed with his own ingenious Conception- which was, that, as all our Notions ( as we both of us hold ) come into our Mind by our Senfcs, fo he apprehended it the propereft way to treat of them as they are the ObjeAs of This or Thr.t, or many different Scn&.tions. z. His 4,th. Chapter of Solidity gives me Oc- cafion of making fome few Reflexions 3 which 1 iliali touch on llightly, or omit, becaufe they rccurr hereafter. Firfi:, His ufmg the word [ Solidity ] in his New Senfe fcems very Improper. For, jheWordlSoYidii' all our Words do either Signify ^iJahuM^lal ^^^ Natural Notions, which are 7nhM.L.'^^^' Common to all Mankind, whofe Meaning therefore is to be taken from the Ufage of the Vulgar 3 or eife Artificial ones, invented by Artifls to exprefs the Notions they are Converfant about : Whereas the Word [ Solidity ] taken as it is here, fecms to agree to neither, I do not remember it is ever us'd in an Artificial Senfe but by Matl:emaricians, who fig- nify by it the Triple Dimcnfion of Quantity* which is quite diifereiit [rom liis Senfe of it : And the Vulgar Underfland and life the Word [ Solid] asoppoiit to [Fluid -j] and fay that the fcarth is Solid, or Firm, and the Water Fluid, or apt to be Dilfus'di both which Scnfes are vMy dirrerenc from Reflexion Third. tl^ from ImpeTjetrahiliiy of the Potential parts of Qiian* tity ; which is the meaning he givcs it : So that, as far as 1 have read, no Man ever iifed the Word [ S oU cl it y\\n his Senfe but himfelf- and it is not at ai! allowable to Him, Me, or any Man, to give a new Senfe to any Word not given it before. For, this difcouifeof mine/hows it can have no Trofer Senfe at all ; and on tlie other lide he does not take it in a Metaphorical Senfe, as w^e ufe to do when we transferr it to Sviritual Things, and call a Notion or a Difcourle Solid. All Words are indeed Ad pLicitum ; but 'tis M.inkind that mud tleafe to agree in their Signification • nor mud they be at the Beneplacittim of Particular Men, or Pri- vate A uthors. 3. He declines, with fome reafon, the Word [ Impenetrability ] becaufe it is Ne- gative : But why might not then ^j! ^^i^^'^. 7' ""^ Extenpon have lerv d , which ^^y^ bears the fame Senfe ? For that, whofe Notion or Nature it is to have its parts without one anotbn\ cannot bear the having cheni ^'ithin one another^ or their being PenLtrated •within themfelves • which is his Notion of the Word [ Solidity. ] He conceives his Solidity to be Waft intimately connected vj it h^ and Ejjential toBodjy a7id no where to be found or imagin d but only i?i Matter^ But why his Solidity fliould be deem'd Ejjential to Body at all, he gives no reafon, and I am well aOui'd no Man living can give any j For it confounds the Line of Subflafjce or Efjs, with that ofQ^fality • which jLunbles all our Com.moneft Notions together, by making the Thing and its Mode to be the lame Eliential Notion. Nor is ic ^lidity only that is nccejfarily found in M.itter j tor K neiilv.i' 130 Solid Philofophy AjferteJ. neither can Extenfion, Divifibility, Meafiirability, Space, Impenetrability, &c. be found any where but in things made of Matter^ But, what I moft wonder at, is, why [ Qu^a7juty ] fhould be totally w^av'd and neglected, That Word having been ufcd by all the Learned World, till of late, is (as has been fhown, Vreliminary :hn Fourth. 135- pacity. Add, that I fee not how, hkas being Re- jemhlances^ an Jden^ covfi.^er d by us as a Po/iti've real Beings Can e\'er refcmble or rcprefent Vrrjations^ they b^-ing of ( at LaR' ) Subconrrary Naruies. What 1 hold, is, that, when we conceive a Thing, as having fome* Privation in if, the Lka of it is partly Pofiti've, pa:\Iy Trlvatrjc ; and the Mate- rial Pait of it is tbeT/j/wg-^ the Formal, as Vri-va- ti've^ or, as thus Modify'd. For, Ideas^ 1 mean. No- tions of Privations, without inckiding the Things are Unconceivable, a«d Impollible^ as whoever looks into their * Definition, will difcern clearly. Of this Nature * See Prelim. ^ (in Common) are all the No- ^9y 10,11. tions we have of the Modes, or Accidents • no Notion being truly or perRftly Vofiti've^ bat that of Ens^ or Thing. I cannot grant that our Ideas., or Notions^ ( or even Phanrafms, ) arc caus'd in us {^ meer MiUons^ continued from ^^'''' , Motions c r ^ f r, • 10 made upon the our Senfes, to the Brain, or the Seat ^^^y;^^ infnffcient cfSenJation-j but mult judge, for to give us Know- tne Reaforrs alledg'd "^ above, that Jedge of the o^- this is performxM by thofe Imfer- ^'■'^^' cepihle Bodies there fpoken of, or vp,,|;^ ^ §,,^^ by the Ejflnvlums rhemfelves con- 27, 28, 6vc. t/efd thither., and afterwards /o/^- ed there. In embracing which Opinion, of our Knowledge being wrought by meer Motions made by the Obie6ls, his Excellent Wit fulFers it felf to be led aftray by our Moderns. His Reafon (which I conceive is alfo theirs ) is, becaufe it is not more impolfihle to conceive., that God jhotdd annex fuch Ideas to fuch Motions., than Vain to a pece of Steel diil^'iding the Body., with vhich that Idea has no Re- K 4 Ccmblancz* 3fe.. 136 Solid Philofophy AJferted. re7nhL>ncc. How Unlike a Reafon this is, appears at fiift fight 3 and^ I am fare this Parall j1 has 710 Refemblance at all with the Thing it is brought for. I know of no Annexhig the Idea of Pain to apiece of Steel; but, mufl: think 'tis a mod high- ly extravagant Conceit. The Bufinefs paiTcs thus in Nature. A piece of Steel being Dcnfa^ and W'ithall /I;/7rp, is a fro^tr Caiife of Dl^id.ng the Bed) ; the Vending of it, is a ^rofer Caufe of its being diforder'd, and rendered unable to affifi the Soul, or the Man, in his neceifary Operations : This breeds naturally a Conception in the Soul, or the Man, that he is hurt ^ which Naturally pro- duces in the Knower, who is highly concerned in it, Grief or ?aln : So that all is here carry' d on by a Train of p-ofcr Caufts^ to f roper Effecls 5 and needs no jlnmxirg by Gcd^ more than to conferve the Order of Second Caufes which himfelf has eflablifli'd. On the other fide, there is no Natu- ral RefcjTibhnce of fuch a Mocion to fuch an Idc^^ as is confefs'd ; nor is the former a Troftr Caufe of the other 3 which puts them to have recourfe to this Voluntary Annexion to them by (Bod* Add, that it is an odd kiiid of Argument, to alledge, that it is not imfilfible to c ncei'vc that CBod fnay do this, or that, without proving he ha^s done it : Nor is it at all allowable in Philofophy, to bring in a Dem e Machinh at every turn, when our felves are at a lofs to give a Reafon ror our Thefts, Nor is it to be expe^t^^d, that drotl will alter the Na- ture of Things, for the Interell of any Man's Te^ net 3 but, fince his Wifdom, in his Ordinary Go- vernment of the World, carries on the Courfe o^ it according to the Nature of Second Caufes, it iniiil full be frovd. that what we maintain, is Agree- Eeflesion Foiirtli. 137 Agreeable to the Courfe of Natural Caufcs, e'er we ought to think or imagin that (BoD will have any hand in it : And, IF wc can p-t-oe this \vc need no hmmdiate or particular Recourfe todrOO's favouring us, by doing This, or That, to make good our Argument. 4. I mull deny too, confequcntly to my former Doctrine, that Sevfibk Qualities are nothing, in the Ohjetts, but >^^'#^^ Qualitiej Towers to produce uario/is c^enations ,, n, - n.^ tn Its \ unlels It be meant, that /, the Mind. they have Powers to fend out fuch Effuvlums into the Brain, by the Senfes, as imprint their very Natures in our Mind j and not barely to produce Motions in our Nerves. Nor can I conceive why the Ideas of the Secondary Q^ialities fhould liave 72otlj'ivg like thcm^ exijl'ing m the Bodies thenjfehes • nor be Refemblanccs ot them. If this be true , why are they cail'd [ Ide.h\ ] which either fignihes Refemblances^ or Nothing ? Again, (ince the Bodies are put to caufe them, how can we think they are nothing like them ? Can any Man think the EffeH is nothing like the Caufe^ when every Elfeft can be nothing but a Participation of the Caufe, or fomething coming into the Subjedl from the Efficient, which was in it fome way or other before ? Laftly, If tlK-fe Se- co7idary Qualities be compounded of the Primary ones, {viz. of Solidity, Extenfion, Figure and Mobility) in our Underftanding^ why rfiould not thofe Primary Qualities in re, as well compound thofe Secondary ones in the Things or out of our ' Underflanding ? And, if they do, (as 'tis evident they mull, iince they are all there,') then, why \ jiXt not thofe Secondary Ideas full as like thofe Secondary 138 Solid Thilofophy Ajferted. Secondary or Compounded Qualities found in the Th'in^^ as the Primar)' Ideas were like the Primary Qualities in the fame Th'mg • and, confequently, rejemble them, as ivell as the others did their pro- per Originals? I much doubt, that the Author rather confulted his Fancy m this particular, than his good Reafon : And, becaufe thofe Ef~ jiuviums^ or the ivVwrf J of Parts, which caufe our Senfations, are too Subtile and Indifcernable to caufe Diliinc!!: Phantafms of thcmfelves, as the Primary ones did, bur are of a Confus'd Uni~ formnefs in Appearance, he judges hence, they are Nothing like the others: Whereas, Reafon will inform Refleders, that, fincc Colour is no- thing but the Surface of a Body^ as 'tis aft to re- fietl Light ^ the manner of Reflexion found in the Surrace of a UVite Thing, which is apt to reflcd]: much Light, is, to our Reafon^ and in our Notion^ fuch as it w^as in the Thing imprinting it j and, confequently, (every thing A ding as it is^) fuch as came from it. Whence, thofe who, by Reflex Thoughts, and ufing their Rea- fon^ do go about to explain or define the Nature or Notion of Whltenefs., do make it conlift in fuch a Reflexion of Light, bringing EfflwviHms with it from a Surface fo advantagioully Figured : And fo, the Notion of VVhitcnels is the fame in tn^ Thing, and in the Unda-ftanding y viz,* thofe Effluviums thus Figur'd, or Modifedy how- ever, the Appearance of it in the Fancy reaches not the true Nature of the Thing, as *tis PFhire ; which, indeed, F'dncy never does. 5. The Reflexion Fourth^ 139 ^. The Rcafon why the Pnin^ which we feel, is nor in the Thintj; that Caused ir, and Senfible Q^ialiiies are fo, is, The pretoice of becaufe thefe lall are Proper, U- ^^^^' n'tmta^ nivocal and Inuncdiatc- Erfcasof •^X::'^:$Z Bodies fending out Ef}lH'vitt?ns ot E'pjj,^ Unphi- their own Natures ; but Va'm^ be- lofophicai. ing an AffecSion of the Soul, fpringing from a Perception that its dear Com- part is hurt, and diforder'd, is an Improper, Re~ motor, and Equivocal Production. The Alter- ing, Difordering, or Spoiling the Temperature or Continuity of the Bodily Parts due to their Nature, is, ( as was fhewn, ) the Immediate and Proper Effect of thofe Otfenlive Agents^ but 'lis , Accidental 'to their manner of Operating, that they caufe Pain^ cr Vleaftirc^ even remotely • and, it lights only, that fometlmes they do this, be- / caufe the SubjeCt, or the Body, in which they produce thefe their proper Etfedls, hcip to be Identified with a Knowing •Nature, only wh.ich 1 is properly capable to Grie've , or be Delighted ' when a Harmful or Pleating Imprcillon is made ' on the Body, which is Part of the A^^m^ and, in 1 fome fort, himfelf. The like is to be faid of Man- , na^ and other fuch Inftances. The Alterations or I Diforder made in the Guts and Stomach, are Na^ j tural, Proper, and Immediate EtFedts of it ; but the Pain enfuing thence, w^hich is a. Spirit n/lDK-^ ij pofition of theMind, v^^ Remote^ Accidental^ and Improftr EtfeCt of it. 1 6. By this Time Mr. Locke fees The Power in the ■ fhat I agree with him, that the ooje^tocaufcSen. . Bodies in Nature have a Power g-; f,,^- m them to cauje onx teveral Sen- perly fuch, fations^ 140 Solid Philofophy AJferted. fations; and, that this Vower is that which we call fuch a Quality of it. But I difagree with him, that they are only Towers to caufe fuch a Motion -y and affirm, it is a Power,' when duly Circumftanced with other Requilites, (as, with Light, to convey Vifibic Qiiahties ; Moifture, Guftable ones, &c,) to fend out Efflwviuws^ of their own Nature, to the Brain 3 ( which, there- fore, are Inherent in, and Proper Parts of thofe Obicdls, ) whether they caufe Actual Senfation, or no. The Sun fends out his Beams, which, fcatter'd thinly, at this remote dillance from the Fountain, are therefore one of Mr. Locke s Secon- dare Qualities, which we call Light , yot, con- trasted by a Burning-Glafs, they perform the Proper Eifeft of Fire, Burning • whence we ought to conclude, they are of the Nature of Fire. Can we then deny, or doubt, but that the Body of the Sun, which communicates, or fends them out, is it felf Fire j or, that, being fuch, thofe Rays, and the Sun. kave no Similitude with one another? Or, that, when they llrike the Eye, they flop there^ and are not carry'd into the Brain ? Hippocrates tells us, that Omnes partes corporis funt permeahiles j meaning, that they are pervious to the Humours • which are grofs Things, in compa- rifon of the Sun-Beams. How can it then be doubted, but that they reach the Fancy ■ and thence, the Soul j and imprint thcnr Notions or Natures there : And, tho' fome may deny they are the fame in the Mind, as they are in Nature j yet can it, with any Shew of Reafon, be deny'd they are at all like the Caufe that produced them ? The like Difcourfe holds in all other Senlible Qua- lifies, to what Senfe focver they belong. 7. To Reflexion Fourth." 141 7. Todofc this Difcourfc, I am apt to think, that Mr. Locke intended to oppofc thole who hold, that the Senfible Qj^ialities are a little kind of Di- flin6l Entities. Next, I declare, that, tho' the Thing has accUentally a Tower in it, to make it felf perceiv'd j yet, taking the Thing as an Object^ (as he does,) it is but Improperly called a Power j and not Properly^ as are our Powers, or Facukies, of Seeing, Hearing, Knowing, &c. are : For, the ^Sf being the End for which the Power was given, the Faculties^ or Powers, are better d^ and perfecledj by being reduced to A61 j and fo there is a real Ground for their being Related to the Object : Whereas, neither the Objecf^ or Things nor any SertfibU Quality in it, is a Jot the better, or any way Aker'd, by being perce'rSd^ or known 3 any more than a Cart rolling through the Street, is ih^ better, or otherwife than it had been, becaufe the Effluviums it fends out do make a Reprcfenta- tionof it in a Shop full of Looking-Glalies, as it paflls by. Whence Logicians fay, .that there is no Real Relation of the Obje^l to the Senfe, or htel- le&: • becaufe there is no Real Ground for fuch a Relation, nor any Dependence of the Object on thofe Powers, in *B. i.L. 7. §.5., any kind j * as is fhewn in my ^o,n. Method. RE r^i Solid Fhilofophy AjferteJ. REFLEXION Fifih^ O N The Tenth CHAPTEU. PAfling over this Ninth Chapter about Percept 't'lon^ I confefs my felf at a great Lofs how to underlland divers Pallages in Ideas or NotioTis his Tenth, which treats of Re- ^re wo^ Aftwal ff;?/^;^;;, or how to make him CO- ^"Z^^lTit hercnt witli hinifelf. For, Firfl, ff/T;V, and du- he tells US OUr Ideas are noth'wg rahly ranainivg. hut Actual Perceptions of the Mind. By which Words he feems to make no kind of Diftinftion between the AB of Perception and the Object of it 3 whereas the A(S is iViQ Exercife of our Poiver of Perceiving, afliuated by the oliect ^bout which it is then employed ^ which Obje<^ determins the Indilferency of the Power to this or that Afl: in particular ^ which the Schools call Specifyiug the AS : But the Ob- jcB is the Thi77g ki^own by the Ad: j and 'tis a ftrange Paradox to fay, that the Act of Kno-wledge and the Objetl or Thing known are the fame j efpe- cially, if the Thing kmvm be fomcthing without us : Next, I cannot reconcile his making our Ideas to be nothing but Actual Perceptions ^ with his making our hleas^ quite through his Book, to be the Object of our Thoughts, and exprelly flating them to be fuch in the beginning of it, Chap. I. § 8. Secondly, he fays, That \\\o{Q.ldea5 ceaje to be any thing-, wbc7i there is no Perception of them. Reflexion Fifth. i^j them. If fo, why docs he put us iohAX a Memory or Retention^ if, after the Ad: is pad, there be no- thing to kee^ in Memory Or Re- tain. Thirdly, in Confequence it dejlms the Na- of this his Ground , he atiirms, ^"'' 'f ^^"^o* that this hytvg up Ideas w the Re- ,,„^^^ y„ ,^^ j^^, ff^fitory of hts Memory., /'Vw/yzVi wo viving Ideas. more., hut that the Aiindhas mma- 7iy Cafes a Power to Rev'fve Perceptions, with a Connotate an?iext., ot ha'viTig had them before. Cer- tainly, this Signification of the word [ Memory ] is peculiar to hinifeJf, ajid contrary to the Senti- ments of all Mankind • who, were they examined by the Poll, would, I believe, unanimoully de- clare, thnt by laying up a Thing /;/ Memory^ they meant, ( as the Words naturally import) the Re- taining fomething which has its beijig yet within usy and may be brought into play again upon oc- cafion. Can the Memory be fliid to Retain what 7s not ? Or can there be a Repofitory of Nothing? Is Re'vi'ving the Notion of Retaining^ they being rather of a Contrary Senfe to one another ? Or can Rememhrinz be Conceived to be the fame No- rion with Reproduction? Tliele icem to me luch imonftrous Abufes ot Words, that I would willing- ly think my lelf mi llaken, railier than to father them on fo Learned an Author, did not my Eyes allure me 1 do not dream or overice. Nor can tlie fame Individual A61 ever be revi^'^d^ it de- pending on many Circumftances, determinable to fuch a Ti?ne or Vlace • the former of which can never r^c/zr, or be reprodixed. Lait- ly. What means this Power in the ^^' ;'^-"'^ ''''""^ ijT' ] ■ 1^ • i -T-L revive PcmV'- Mind to revive Perceptiom < ine ^ .^„^^ M/?;, indeed, has a Power, when re 1 44 Solid Thilofophy Averted. re-excited by outward Objedls like the former, or by PalFion, Difeafe, or by fome other Cafual Circumftances, to rummage the Ueas lodged in the Brain; and, fo, by their new Imprefllon on the Seat of Knowledge, to cauie fuch an A6t, as by it to know the fame Tiling again 3 as alfo to know it was foreknoivn^ as was * Prelim. /^. §26, explicated * above: But to put 27> 28. the Soul to re^jive Ideas, or even to act, fo that the Adlion fhall begin from her peculiar Nature, is Pra:ternatu-. ral to her Condition, to her Manner of Exifl-ivg^ and confequently, to her manner of Operating bere-y which, as it muft be ever vynh the Bodily part or the Fancy, fo it m.uft begin ftill from it, as it did at firll j with this only Dirrerence, that in the firfl: Impreifions made on the Senfe, and thence on the Seat of Knowledge, the Man (and par- ticularly as to his Soul ) is perfectly Vajjive j whereas afterwards by vertueof thofePhantafms, and their former ImpreiHon, which have already afFefted the faid Seat of Knowledge, ( which is partof himfelf) and have been re-ajfecttd by it, the Man is partly Pallive, partly Adlive in remem- bring 3 as Mr. Locke does, I think, alfo acknow- ledge j tho* he explicates it otherwife than I do, T'.':r,. By the Mind's fetting it felf on work, which I iudgc, and have flievvn to be Impoilible, Vreli^ 1. I mull not omit here to remark, that when Mr. Lccke fays, that Ideas fade in Ideis in the Famy the Me??Kr)' ; or, (as he ingeni- j»^/ fade, but oudy cxpreiles it ) that [ the Pi- Notions are vc' ^ , * . , r- ; j ■ J rvcr blotted out of ^^^'^'^^ ''^''^"^'^ '« ^''^' ^'^^^^^ ^^'^ ^^'^^ the Soul. in fading Colours ] hc moft evi- dently Reflex ion Fifth. 161 dcnrly difcovcrs, that by Utfas here be ineans ma- terial Keprefcntations orPlhrntafms, and not tl;iofc Spiritual Ob\(XZs of our Underdandings, Notio-ns. For, there is no doubt but that Phantafms, they being only Imperceptible Particles, of the fame Nature with the Corporeal Agents whence they are fenr, do follow, ( and that very eaiily ) the Fate of their Originals ; and are liable to be de- faced, alt r'd or corrupted, as thefe are : Where- as it is impolfible, that Ideas or Notions^ which have a Spiritual iking in our M■1^d, f]iv)uld be li- able to any fuch Decay, Corruption or Mutation. If any thing could prejudice, deflroy or ettacs them, it muft in all Ueafon 'be thought that their Contraries would do it : Whereas clear Reflexion tells us, that Contraries /« the Mind are (o far from Expelling, blurring, or Altering one ano- ther there, that they not only very Friendly divell together, but moreover that, by their Co-habitation there, they make one another magis elucefcere, and Ellablifn one anothers Natures. Hot and Ccld^ Mo-H and Drj, wiiich are perpetually fighting, and make luch Bufties and Turmoils in the Mate- rial World, are very confiftent, and agree ami- cably in the Soul. The Corporeal Inilruments which brojght our Noticvs thither may perilh ; but when they are once in her, they are as im- mutable and Immortal as her felf So that the Pictures in our Minds are fo far from being drawn in fading Colours^ that they fhould rather be faid (if we would ufe a Metaphor to exprefs their Durablenefs) to be engraved in Brafs, Mar- ble, or Adamant • being as lading 2S Eternity. Which Tenet, were I writing iVletaphylicks , I ihjuidnot doubt but todemoiulraLe • and withal L to X6z Solid Philofophy AferteJ. to Hiow how ufeful it is to explicate Chriftian raiih : Particularly thofe Points of laying optn the Book of Confcicnce at the laft day , whtn, as the Sybil iingS, [ Cunclaque cunBorifm cuKctls arc ana fate hunt. ] And how Infants are connatiirally faved by virtue ofBaptifm, REFLEXION Sixth. O N The Eleventh and Twelfth CHAPTERS. I. rTpHE nth. Chapter gives nic no occafion JL to make any Reflexions, but only on his attiibuting Knowledge to Brutes -^ If Brutes f ^wknow, aboiit which 1 have been too large they may have already. He denies indeed that General Nori- ^^ j^^^^ ^|^^ ^^^^ ^f AbltratU ons, and Ab- . •' c \ - ^ i r i ftraa, ^«^Com- '^g^ or of having Gemral iJeas. pare too. But, if they have true Knowlt^dge, or any more than King Dauid meant, when he fays, The Sm knows his going down^ I fee no reafon why they may not have Gc7ierc7l Notions, and Ahjhatt^ and Compare too. For, if they have any ]3egree of ReafoT?^ as he grants they have, they may do all tbisj and 1 am fare, and have already Oiovvi:, their Outward AHlons do as much countenance their having Reafcny as any figns they give us do fliew that they Cdwnot Ahfirijct, or \\xjufl but 1 deny that, if we conjom ,„;,;; J,,,^ J^,^^ them otherwife than as they are, Thing. or may be, united in External Ob- jects., or in the Thing., w^e can have any Complex Notions^ tho' we may have a Fancy, of them, or a kind of Imitation of fome thing w'hich once af- fected our Senfes. For, fmce I cannot but think I have demonilrated that our Notion is the Thing as conceived by us, or the Thing exilling in the underftanding j If I have any Complexion of more Simple Notions in my Afind., not four.d to be united in the Thing , the Idea m my Mind is L 1 noc J 64 Sol if! Fh'ilofophy JferfeJ. not conformable to the Thing it fclf, nor is it, as I have prov'd it to be, th^t Thing 3 ar.d then to what erd fhould I have fuch an Idta^ as if I come to predicate it of the Thing, the Propoliiion would be Falfe, which conlcquently would fill our mind with Falfhoods. Next, as has been of- ten pro\'d formerly, I deny the Soul can Unite or Ad of her felf, or by her peculiar power (tho* the j\Ln may ) but is oblig d to take what's given her by Imprcllions on the Scat of Knowledge. In which cafe, what the Th:?jg or Ohjccl^ by a Genuin ImpreiFion, gives her, is Ordirlj^ Solid^ and a Seed of true knowledge or Science ^ but that which the Fiincj gives her, otLerwiJe than as the Thing did dircdly imprint it , is Diforderly, Superticial, and a Ground of EnTwr. IndLcd, fhe is (brc'd to appreknd^ whenever the Phantafnis flrikethe Seat of Knowledge, tho' their iMotions and Complexions be never lb Diforderly, or even Monilrous. Now, whenever this is done, JuM^ cioiis Men dire (51 their YyQ to the Things and ex- amine whetlier the Conjundlion of fuch or fuch IdiiU^ is truly found m re • or is agreeable to thofe Direct Impreliions it had received thtnce-^ whith if it be, the Soul en.tertains it, after Lxamination, and \tis> it fink into her j it being the true ?jatuye ^ of the Thing, and fo a Ground to Truths to fee which her Elfence was made j If ic be not, ilie rejefts it j for it grounds a Contradiction to the Nature of the Thing, which is the only Ground of Truth j and makes or counterfeits it to he w hat it is not y and it is directly ^igcmift her Nature to ad- mit Contradictory Judgmients. Now, what Judi-- cifus'Mcn, by their recourfe to the Thing, thus rejectj thofe Unskilful Thinkers^ who arc led by FajKj Reflexion Sixth. \^S Fancy, do a^mit ; and by this means their Soiil^ become hill of Phantaftick Conceits which never can be brought to any Coherence or Connexion of Terms. For no Terms can Cohere, unlefs the Notions meant by each of them be really in the Thing it fdf •, and thofe Coherences made in the Mind by any other way, or of any other Materials, are hxhom Solid or True, as we experience in i^eople that are Splcnetick or Enthu/iaijlck. 4. Wherefore, whenever the Ideas are con- nected otherwife than they are or may be in re, the Obiect of that o-hei^ff^they^ri A 1 ni \. r I Ground. elstan- Act can have no Metaphyiical ^.-^^^ Ferity , Unity, nor confequently EntUy in it : the two former of which, being Properties of Ens, cannot be where Ens or Tjing is not. Whence the Objects of thofe Fanta- flick Acts is fome non-Ens taken for an Ens ; which, if purfu'd home by a good Logician, muft end in a Contradiction. For example, I can have Notions of Hircus and Ceruus aparted from one another- but, if I will unite them in my Mind otherwife than Nature exhibited them, and take them conjoyntlj, ( as Fancy may ) and fi-ame a a Complex Idea of a Hirco-Ceruus, or Goat-Stag, it mud needs be perfectly Fantaftical and Chimericjl. This will farther appear, if we take one of Mr. Vs Complex Ideas, viz. Beauty, conjifiing of a certain Cowfcfition of Figure and Colour, Now, if fuch Figure and Colour had not been found, or wight ?iot U found united by Nature in the fame 77? .W, the Idea of it could not have been conform -ible to what's in Nature, or the Idea of any Reality, but purely Fantaftical and Counterfeit. The fame may oe faid of his Uea of Lead, with its proper Qja- L 3 lilies j 1 66 Solid Philofophy AjferteJ. lines j or of the Ordinary Idea of a Man^ defcrib*d here to be a Suh fiance or Thing with Motion^ Thought and Reafining join d to it : Which Quali- ties, were they not join din the Thing they belong ro, or idenufyd with it, the Complex Ideas of them w juld be nothing but meer Groundlefs Fan^ fies. This Point is fo Important, that it will deferve tob'r cicar'd as perfectly as polTible : I fhall there- fore allow it a more elaborate Explanation, tho* I ^pend lefs Pains and Time in my other Re- flexion^. When I confider an Individual Thing in Na- ture, ( 1^. ^. A Man ) according the Manner how all tO the Notion of Beings I haVC Complex Ideas ^^^ Notions of him, t^iz. That or Notions are , . it r-r- -n- j i. Tna^'e, elaborately ^^ IS capable of Ext[ttng, and that tx^Lnn'd, he atiually Exifis j the former of which he has by means of Se^ cond Caufes, which, by Determining the Matter, gives him his Determinate Nature or Eflence. The orher he has immediately from the Fir ft Being ; and I have a Complex Notion of him accordingly. Next, conddering the fame thing precifely as a hody^ or fuch an Ens as we call by that Name ; I fi'^d in it fomewhat by which it is Corruptible^ or Changeable into another^ and fomewhat by which it is bcttrmind to he This fort of Thing, or Body, or to he what it is : And, I Conceive and call Body according to the former of thefe Confiderations Fuwer or Matter ; and, according to the later, JH or Form j and I frame a Complex Idea of it, as 'tis Si Body accordingly. Hitherto I treat of the Thing ^ a vletaphylician, and regard it only according to fomc Order it has to Beivg, Proceeding fur^ rher Reflex} on Si x th . 167 rher on, and dividing dill the common Line of Erjs^ or ( what I am now arriv'd at) [ Body ] by Intr'mfecal Differences, or by more and hfs of the Generical Notion, of which Qjantity or Divifi- bilitv is the Primary Alfedtion, or that of which 2\[ the other Modes are made • I find that fome Bodies mu ft: be rr?m-e Diviiible ox R^re^ other A/} Divifible or Devfe j and by this means we ap- proach fomething nearer to Natural or Vhyfical Confiderations of that thing as 'tis call'd Body • and the Science that treats of it, as being immedi- ately under Metaphyticks, and immediately ahcue Phyficks, may not unfitly be called Archi-Phyjical ^ as giving the immediate Frinciples to Phylicks. This way of Confidering Body grounds the Notions of Simple Bodies, caUrd Elements j which diifer in Nothing but i^^r/Y^' and Denfity , and alfo, the No- tions of Cow?/>'<:.and fo we are come to that Science call'd Pbjficks or N^tur^.l Vhilcfo- fhy j and my former Complex Notion of fjch an Indi^idmtm^ takes in thefe Second Qu.iaiiries, o- ver and above what it contain d before. Advan- cing farther, we come to conlider this Thirg ov Body with its Pares fo divirfifyd by thole Firft and Second Qualities, or fo Or^aniz!d^ that one part (the common Caufcs of ^ the VA'orld fup- pos'd ) is able to work on another ; which kind of Thing we call Self-mo^i?jg or Living. And, ilill L 4. pro- 1 68 SnUJ Fhilofophy Jferfe^. proceeding on by 2 f rther Complexion of fuch Parrs, we come to a Tiling that is Senfiti^e^ or Moving it felf by the leaii Ejjiu'viH?77s affedting th jfe tender Oigans call'd the Stnfes, All which givcfo many New Additions to my former No^ ti m of that Individuum, and make it more Com- plex. Moreover, we can find in this Senfiti've Thing, or this Animal now fpoken of, both as to its fectdiar A latter and Form, a Difpodtion to work c(Wfarati'uely j that is tO ftidge^ and reafo7i or dfcourje ^ and, confequently, to have in it a Kncwirg Power, which is to be a Man : And, Laflly, Such a peculiar Degree of this Power of Comfi-iring^ which reftrains ihtSfecifick Notion of Man to be this Individual Man. So that, by this rime, fach a Vaft AfTembly of Modes or Accidents (the Croud of which make that moji- Complex Notion, caird the Suppofitum^ {o blindly con fn fed) do meet in my Complex Idea of this Individual Man, that, tho' I fee he is a Thing j and a DifiinU Thing, b^caufe i fee he exijts and operates Inde- pendently of all other Things 3 yet, I can have no Diftinct and Clear Notion of his EJJcncei, but by taking it in pieces, ( as it were, ) both as to thofe feveral Conliderations belonging to him, accord- ing to the Line of Behigy as was now explain'd • and aifo, 1.5 to thofe Conceptions 1. make of him, according to all the Phylical Modes or Accidents which arc in him: Which Mides^ foto gain an exacter Knov^ ledge of him, as Affected with thofe Mod^s, ( and the fame may be faid of all other Things, ) we divide, and lub-divide, as we fee agreeable to their Diftinct Natures or Notions. This Uifcourfe may, if well wtigh'd, be, per- haps ufcful for many Ends. But, to apply it to our Reflexicn Sixth. 169 our prcfent pnrpofc : All this Mukirude of/e'/f Comflex^ or more fim^^le Idnis^ bcl')n;j;ing to the Line of Subftancc, are found Connccrcd in this Indi'viduum ; and, did we add the leaft of them by our M'lnd^ which was not found Conjoin'd in the Things mv Notion or Idea of him w ould, fo far, be Favtaflick^ and Falje • becaufe there was nothing found in the 7/;/??^ tliat anfwers to fuch a Complexion, ( only which can make it Rea/^ ) but only in my F^wcy ^ counterfeiting fuch a Complexirm, and mif-informing my Underfiand- ing j as it happens in the 1 11 ulive Reprefentations, made in thole who are troubled with the Spleen, Melancholy, or Phrenzy j as likewife, in time- rous People, when they think they fee Sprights y or in Horfes, when they boggle. Add, that the Mind cannot, of its fdf\ begin to act, ( as was proved formerly: ) but all New Acts, or Excita- tion of Former Notions in her, are the Acts of the whole Man^ and mufl: naturally arife jirft from the Bodly Part, or the Fancy • either Imprinting Phantafn:s, w hich it receives from the Obiects* ordtrly and ginu'.vly^ On the Seat of Knowledge ^ or Difordit-ly^ as its Irregular and Extravagant Motioi s happen to conjoyn them. Whence we fay that a JVum who does not corre(5t fuch inco- herent Connexions by Judgment^ is led by Fancy^ or CafrichioHS. 6. While we are difcourfing about the manner how we come by all our Ideas whether Simple or Complex^ it Hovp the DoStrim of would not perhaps be im.proper Cartefius, wr. to fet_ before ikc l.eader's vi.vv, ]^':'t^[!-, what is my Tenet, the Curtefians pi-nt. and Mr, Lcckes^ and how we differ, 1 70 Solid Philofophy Ajjerted. differ. The Carte/Lins do not own themfelv'es at all beholding to outward ObjtBs for their IJ€as(2s leaH:, as fome of them fay, for the chiefeft ones ) but they fay they are Innate^ or imprinted on the Soul by Gods immediate hand • tho* fome of them ( which makes the matter much worfe ) chofe rather to fay they are Elicited or produced by the Soul it felf, upon fuch a Motion from without y as alfo, that they are re-excited by fuch Motions • in which laft Tenet Mr. Locke feems to agree with them. But this Learned Author denies all Innate Ideas ; and holds that the Siwple ones ( at leaft ) are caufed by the Objedls, whether they be Internal or External j but, that the Complex Ideas are fram- ed by the Mind, which he conceives to have a vir- tue of Compounding them as fhe pleafes. Where- as, my Principles force me to oppofe them both, and to hold That all Ideas^ whether Simple^ or Complex ( provided that by Ideas be meant Notions^ and not Imaginations ) are to be taken intirely from the Objefts or Things in Nature 3 as alfo that, when we excite them a ne-iv^ fomething that is in AB it felf muft caufe that Action j becaufe a meer Tower to do any Thing, (whether in the Soul or oitt of it) cannot determin it felf to any A6tion in particular. And, if I may freely and impartially pafs my Verdict between them, I fhould frankly declare, that Mr. Locked way has far more of Na^ turemix.^ andconfequently is more Solid than the Cartrfum j in regard he holds all our Ideas are ori- ginally taken from the Outward Obje^s^ cither emmediately^ as to his Simple Ideas ^ or mediately^ as to tho(e which arc compounded of them by the Soul : Whereas the Cartefans cannot pretend to know any thing in Nature, unlefs they can lolidly Reflexion Sixth. 171 folidly prove tbefc three Previous Points : Firsts That their Lkas arc Innate^ or elfe produced by the Soul , neither of wiiich I am certain they can ever prove. Secondly y JVhat thofe Ideas are, or that they are not metr Fancies, Thirdly^ If they put them to be meer Rep-eftntattons^ and not the Things or Obje6t it felf, how we can be certain that we muft by tht-m know the Things without us, notwithftanding all that I have allcdg'd tode- monflrate the contrary in my Second and Third Trdlnf'tnarhs. If thefe Points, which are the main Hinges that open us the way into Philofo- f)hy, or the Knowledge of Things^ be not firH firm- y eftablifh'd, all their Difcourfcs, tho* they be never fo ingenious, mufi: be holloTij and fuferficial for want of Solid Grcu?td. Thefe three Points, I fay, they muft either fhow to be felf-e^ident^ or they muft mrike them Evident by Demonfirating them; orelfe, 1 am fure, 'mmost E^idtnt^ that all their Superftruftures are Ruinous for want of a Firm Foundation. I wouldnot mifunderftand them, when they explain to us what their Ideas are j and yet they have fuch a peculiar Talent of fpeaking Ambiguous Senfe in feemingly plain Words, that I cannot for my Heart comprehend their Mean- ing. They tell us fometimcs they hold the Idea^ confider'd Oh jeBi^vely ^10 be the Res or Thing itfelf ; but when they add, that it is the iv(?j or Thing [ cfuatenm refrefentata] they feem to deny it again -^ for the Words [ ^itatenus repreftntata ] figniiie, in true Logick, the bare Reprefentation of the Thing; as [Paries cjuatenm Alhus^^ means [Albedo f\ the reftridive Word [Qjiatenus^ cutting otF the pre- cife Notion to which it is annex d, from all others. And how odd a piece of Chiquanery it is to fay, that 1 7 i Solid Philofophy AJferteJ. that the TiBure or Rcfemblance of C^j^r, is C^far hinifelf, ^uatenus reprefentatus^ I leave ir tO Others to judge. Befides, if the thing it (df he really - there, or in the Knowing Power, it may be knoii^^n f without more ado, or w ithout needing thofe lit- tle Spiritual Epicycles, ( if I ^nay fo call them ) tho{e ufekfs ^eas. Mr. Locke, I mud confefs, be- gan at firft to build Solidly on thcTbinas • but, he is fo very acutely and fpeculatively attentive to the Lleas in his own Thoughts, and fo w^holly ta- ken up with Contemplation of them, that he feems fometimes to over-run his own Principles, (which only at firft he intended to purfue) and quite to lofe Sight of the Things, Whereas I bend my whole Endeavour to keep my Eye fteadily upon them through the whole Courfe of my Do6lrine, with- out intermingling any gratuitous Suppofitions, ^ or fulfering my felf to be led aftray from the Na~ tures of the Things by any ill-grounded Fancies of my own, which would court and debauch my Reafon, tho' they feem never fo Ingenious. h RE- t »73 REFLEXION Seventh. O N ne Thirteenth CHJPTER. I. TF, as Mr. Locke favs, we get the Simple Idea X o^ Space hy owx Sight and Touchy then Na- ture gives us no Idea of a Space, which is nor VlfihU and Tangible • Extenfion mt weH whence Follows, char the Idea of Explicated. fuch a Space as Factum, which is neither the Object of one of thofe Senfes, nor of the other, \sUn?7aTural2Lnd Fantafilcal. The No- tion of Difiance is well explained j but I cannot difcern why Length , Bre^tdth and Thicknefs fhoald be called Cipacity : For, thefe three Modes (as all Modes do) exprefs the manner hovj they Intrinjecally affedt their Subject, Body j w^hereas. Capacity i.-gnifies the Refpe6l to ibnierhing Extr in- fecal to the ;:;ody thus alFedted, or a Power to co?i- tain Annther Thnv. Much Icfs Can Extenlion be characler'd A Ccpadty of Space ^ with fomething be- tween the ExtrtmitieSn, vjhlch is Solld^ Mc^veable and Tang' bit 3 fjr, tlio' Matter were fuppos'd to have no Lxtv^imiLs at all, but w he Infinite^ it would not be lefs Extended, but more : And were the Air fuppof d to be ncirlier Solid, Moveable or Tan- gible, yvt itiil it might be concciv'd to be ^.v- tended. Again, What means it, that Extcjifwn u a Capacity if Space, whercas Space is raiher a Ca- pacity of v/hat u Extended. I wifh I knew from wliat Rule or Groand Mr. Locke takes the Pro- per 1 74 ^o^'^<^ Phtlofophy JJferted. per Meaning of the Words be ufes 3 for it feenis evident to me, that this Explication of Extenfion is meerly Voluntary and Preternatural j and feems ( tho' perfe6t]y Groundlefs it felf ) to be laid as a Ground for Vacuum j and, therefore, his Confe- quences drawn thence, want Premilks. Nor need w^e take fuch Pains by Repeating Immenfity wr/^. our Ideas^ to gain the Koiion of Irnmenfity 3 it is but putting a Ne- gative to the plain Notion of [ Mcafurjble,] and the Deed is done. Rather, *tis perfectly Demon- ftrable, that the Additjg or Repeating our Idetis^ can- not polFibly give us the Notion of Immenfny 3 for, we have no Ideas^ but of Finite Quantities 3 and the Ni^.mher of the Times we can repeat them, can be but Finite 3 which the very Terms tell us, can never give us a Notion of an Infinite Quantity^ or of Immenfity. When he fays, the Mind can repeat^ dcMe^ or join Ideas^ 1 muft deny it, as impof- fible, unlels, by the W^ord [7l/f/W,] he means the Man. The Mind has no diftinct Shop of her ow^n, 10 work in a-part 3 nor can fhe work without her Tools, or her Conjoin'd Inftrument, the Body, as is prov'd above. 2. Nothing can be more folid, ingenious, or better exprefs'd, than are his Dif- Place i&iU expli' courfes here about Vlace : In *''^'^- which, he, in great part, obferves the Sayings, and Comm.on Lan- guage of the Fulg.'ir 3 which is the moft Natural Way to explain thoie Notions which are Vulgar ones, and Common to all Mankind. Whence, when we will needs affix Significations, to the Words wh.ich are generally uled to exprefs thofe Notions, by our own Conceits, it will moft cer- tainly Reflexion Seventh.' 175^ tainly lead us into veiy great Errours. He only fcems not to reflect upon the Common Saying of the Vul;i;.ir, tliat [Things are in fuch or fuch a Plac:,] which Hiews, that their Notion of P/^ce is to be a Co7U.iiner, and confequently, Exteiidaly the Body Contain d^ to which it is adjufied^ being jiich. 3. He argues 'well nd hom'imm^ againft thofe who make Body and Extenficn the Cam, Thin^ : 1 fupDofe^he and they ^f^ ^«^ Exten- •V , '■^ 1 S- r r r lion mt th: tame both mean, iiic lame Idea j ror, Notion: the latter is not a Thing; diftinct from the Suhfiance in which it is • and the Ideas do moft evidently di'^er, toto genere, Thofe Men's Way of Arguing from Ideas including 07ie another^ is purely Fantaftical, unlet thofe Ideas be Notions^ or the Thing, as thus or thns concei'v d ^ which, like a kind of Parts^ are in the whole Ens^ and fo may be (aid to be in it, or Predicated of it. 4. I have already prov'd, that Sface is ( mate- rially) nothing elfe but Body, confider'd according to its Quan^ ^P^S^ ^'^"^"^ ^' tity ; and thole Prelunmary Oil- f^Qj, courfes, which pretend to de- monflrate it, mull either be confuted, or elfe it muft follow, that (whatever we mzy fancy ) the Parts of Space are both Separable^ Mo^jeahle, and do re/ifi Motion. Farther, to imagine Space^ that is not Extended^ is a perfect Contradiaion, tho* not in the very Terms, yet by an Lafie and Im- mediate Confequence. For, putting a Body to be in fuch a Space, it mull be commenfurate to fuch a Fart of it y otherwife, that Ikxly might take up all Space • and muft do fo, were it not Commenfurate to fome part of it only : And to fancy 176 Solid Thilofophy Afferted, fancy a Thing Commen[i4rate to the Parts of what is extended^ and it fclf not to be Extended I'kev/'.fe^ is a mod extravagant Conceit, and a plain Con- tradiction. Again, If a Body take up but one fart of Space, and not ^wo^/^er part of it, {'v.g, that part which is next it, or in which it is, ) S^ace muft not only have Vcrts^ but aifo one Part w'lth^ out Another j which is the very Nod on of Extejt^ (ton. Laftly, Since Imaginary Space is put tO be Vad, and even Infinite, it cannot conlift in an /;;- Al'V'fihk ; wherefore, it mult neceilariiy be Divi- fible and D'ffufed^ that is, Exte7tded: Whence fol- lows, that, to fancy Body to be put in fuch a Space^ or Tlace^ ( for he grants here, §. 1 1 . that thefe two Ideas dilfer but in a certain Refpect, ) and yet woi^rj'ue aiide or remove thofe Extended Parts out of that Space, is to make the Extend- ed Parts of that Sface^ and of the Body in it, to be within one another^ Or penetrated • which im- plies a Contradiction. Now, if they be not Pe- netrated, one of them mult neceflarily drive the other out of the Space it occupates j and there- fore, the Parts of that Space muil be SeparMe^ Mo-veahle^ and Rcfifient^ as thofe of Body are j they being, in very deed, the [elf-lame, 5:. Hence is feen, that in all this Difcourfe about ?ure Sp.xe^ or Vacuum^ Extmfmiandspsice Mr. Locke confulted his Fancy, differ only For- ^^^ ^ot his good Reafon attend^ Tn:i\\\' , or in 07712 . i ^ 1 nice refpea. i^g to the lijmgs as they are in Nature. That which mif-l^d him feems to be this, becaufe he finds not in his Idea of Space^ formally confider d^ the Nodon of Divili- bility, Separability, nor Refutance • bat that it ahfiratti from them all^ as to the Formal Fart of its Rejiex'ion Seventh. 177 Its Conception, by which 'tis didingui/li'd from thofe others. But, tliis is not peculiar to Space y nor bears it any Shew of bein^i; a folid Ground for the txiflcnce of Sface feparately from Body, For, F/V/o'6 has not, in its Fornial Notion, Q^r.?j- thy j and yet 'tis nothing but Quantity thm ter- minated. How niiny Notions have we of Qnantitj^ and feveral other Modes, formally Di- flin6t, which yet are nothing elle, really and ma~ tn-iallj^ but Quantity it felf. Take Divilibility, Extenfion, IVleafurabilit^', Proportionability, Im- penetrability, Space, Place, &c. They have, all of them, fome nice Formality, or different Rejpefr^ which diftinguilhes them j and makes the Ideas or Notions of them, as Jhch^ to be Formallj Exch/fi-ve of one another. Dl-vifihility fpeaks the U7vty of the Potential Parts of Qj.iantity : Alea fur ability ^ih^ RefpecTI: they have to fome determinate Quanticv ftated by our Mind : TrcfortionabiUty^ fuch a De- gree of Equality or Inequality to another Thing, or to their own Parts : Impenetrability and Exten- fion^ the Order Or Situation of the fame Potential Parts: Spacc^ the fame Quantity, precifely and formally, as it is a Capacity or Pow^r to contain a Mukitude of Things, without any Determina- tion or Adjuilment of the Space, to the Things I contain'd in it 3 fo that the Notion of Space is the felf-fame as that of Room : And Place iigniHcs the fame Quantity, as having a Power to contain them Limttcdiy^ ' formally DifibjB: Nor, confequently, can Space^ for the fame Reafon, exift without Exten- fion and Body j which fcems to be his Ground, built on the diflui6l Formal Idea he has of Space, why he thipiks there may he a Vacuum : Or elle, his Ground is only a roving Imagination of a Vafi Notbhig beyond the Univerfality of Things, fan- cy'd by him to be a Thing he knows not irhat^ nor of w^hat Sort ov Kind. But, enough of this formerly. 6. The Notion of Ext ev [ton ftands in his way, and therefore he endeavours to The comrmuExpl:^ make it Unintelligible, and In- cation of Lxten- i* ii i i u* o. i fion dfeiM. explicable. He objedts, that, to fay that to be Extended is to have fartes extra partes^ is the fame as to fay Extenfion is Ext ev ft on. Firsf^ If it were the fame in Senfi\ Where's the Harm ? fo it be onIymeanr,that it is the fame in re , or in the Formal Notion.^ a? long as the Expreffion is Dilferent, and not formally Identical. At this rate we may ridicule all Definitions : For, to fay, \_Homo efi Jnimal Ratioj^ale^] is the fame in reality^ as to lay, Homo efi Homo. Next, I de- ny they are formally the fame : Dl^iftbility^ wilich is the Notion of Quantity, exprtflls only, that the Body it affects, /j)/// Potential Parts , and Exunfon cxprtlies the Manner boiv it has thofe Parts j ^iz.. not Penetrated, or one ivitbin ajiother^ but v/itljout cne another • which adds a new Formality to the bare Notion of Quantity : And this is a fair Ex- plication for fuch a mod Common and General Notion- which having no Vroper Gen/^s^ but a Traialcendcnt, can bear no cxaU Definitio7u 7. To 1 Reflexion Seventh.' I7(> 7. To our Objection, that if Pare Space or Vacuum be not really a Bo(l)\, it not bcini? pretended to be a Spl-^ ^n^ adecfuauiy di. ^ t\ \ -KT 1 ' •vided into Bodv rit. It mud be a meer Nothing, and spirit. and fo cannot exift 3 he replies, ( if I underftand him, ) that there inay be a Thing that is neither Spirit, nor Body ^ and he asks luho told us there may not be fach a Third Thing ? I anfwer, Our evident Rcafon told it us, by divi- ding Ens into Divifible and Indlvifible -^ which di- viding Members, b^ing Con trad i6tory, allow no Third Thing which is neither the one, nor the other. Since then he muft not fay, that fuch a vaft Expanfion as Vacuum beyond all Bodies is In-^ dl'Vtfihle^ either Alathematicallj, as a Voint is, Or Phj/icalfyy as thofe Things are which are infupara- hlyHard'y it mu[\: he Divi/ihle, and confequently Extended, Separable, &c. as a Body is. But this al- fo he denies it to be • and therefore 'tis evidently concluded, that 'tis a nieer Nothing. 8. Nor will he acquaint us with his Thoughts, whether Vacuum hdzSubfiance, or Accident y tillvje JIkiu him a dijlincl Vacuum w«/? e/- Idea ofSub/la7:ce : Which feems tO ^J-''/' ^^s, or jm a witty avoiding the QLieftion, ,^^^y;,^^^; > ;; rather than a Pertinent Anfwer. have m Notion Indeed, we have no DifiinH and of it. 1 Compleat Notion of a Suppojitum^ f or Indi'vidual Subflance, becaufe it involves 7nany diftin^l Notions or Confiderabiiities in it, as their Ground. But, of Subfiancc it felfi or, which is the fame, of what is meant by the Word [T/jing,] 'tis fcarce pollible to be Ignorant, or to w'ant a Di~ ftindt Idea of it : For, there is nothing from which we need or can d{/i'i?;gHif) the Notion of Suhfiance^ M ^ or 1 8 o Sd'ul rhilofophy Ajferted. or E7js^ and fo ro gain a Diftinft Conception of It, but either No?i-E?js^ or Modm Entts j from both which, honeft Nature, if we attend to It, and not to Preter-natural Fancies, teaches us to diuinguini it. I fliould pin the Argument thus: Vacuum^ if any Thing, mull: be cither Res^ or Modus Rei , for we have no other Notions : But Vacuum is neither ; therefore it is pure Nothing. I believe Mr. Locke had the word of the late School-men in his Eye, W'hen he gave this Anfw^n" \ who, talking Meta- phorically of Standing undcr^ and Inhering^ left their Readers in the dark, as to what they meant Literally, How (EoD is Metaphorically called a St:hfia7icey and how all our Notions and U'ords fall infinitely fhort of concel-vmg * Preliminary 4. liim as he is in himt If, or of ex- §•39- p'i/Ji^'g him Liter ally ^ 1 have dif- couricd * above. 9. 'Tis almofl: infuperabiy hard for thofe who are more vers'd in Mathematicks The Extr^v.^ant ^|^^^^ j^^ Metaphyllcks, to get abo-ve cuum refuted. Fancy., elpecially in this Particular of Vacuum^ or Imaginary Space * becaufe, tho' plain Reafon tells them^ that all Crea- ted Things are limited, both iii their own Naturesy and confequenrly in their Alodes or Jccuhnts • yet, becaufe they can fancy fomething beyond Bodies, they will nQcds conceit there is fome Ultra-mundane kind of Thing exlfient out of the IVcrld., tho' it cofts them that higheft Abfurdity of putting Non-Ens 10 b(^ Ens, 0\: Nothing W hc Something. And the fame Fancy fmniflKS them with plaulible Appre- henfions, which ferve them for Arguments. So, Mr. Locke asks. If God jhould place a Man at the Extremity of Corporeal Bcbigs^ ivbetber he could not, firetch Reflexion Seventh. iSi firetch out his Hdnd beyond his Body ? I anfwcr, tliat, in all Probability, he could neither //nYr/? our his Hand, nor tb niiich as li-ve m a Region fo remote from the Habitation of Mortals : Nor, did he live, how knows he but the OutmofI: Surface of the World is infuperably Solid and Kird j as 'tis likely it is, fo ro keep the World Compacted, Clofe and TiL^ht ? Next, to put (Bo&j at every turn, ( with all Reverence to his Divine Majelly be it fpoken, ) to fijcw Tricks^ meerly for the Interefl of Their Te- net, ( as our Moderns ufe, ) is very IJnphilv^fophi- cal. He will fa}% it is only a Suppofition 3 which, even, tho' impoilible, is fometimes allowable ta put, that we may clear a farther Point. Nor do I look upon it to be any other but a Suppolition y only, 1 judge it to be a very Extravagant one, and Contrary to the Natures of Things. (BdD's hifi- nite Wifdom has fo contriv'd the World, ( * Omnia in fapientia fc- Pfal. 103. v. 24. ci/li Domine^ ) that Created Things fhould be the Ground of Truth ^ theref3re, what- ever Suppolition orPolition draws after it aCon- tradiftion, is as Impoiiible, as that Two and Three fhould not make Five: or that aThini^ can be and not be at once. And, as it has been demon- flrated, that when the Sucker in a Pump is drawn up, the Water muft needs follovv' , becaufe, other- wife, it would violate the Natures or Eifeiices of Things : And therefore, Vacmun^ within the World, is impoilible • fo no Force in Nature caji piake any Protuberancy in the World's Surface, becaufe it would induce 'd fcrwal EjJetJ-^ ^Iz.. Di- fia?)ce^ and yet Nothing to make that Diftance fcr~ tnally, A Pofition as contradi6tory, as 'tis to fay a Thing is round, and yet no Mode or Accident of M 3 Round- 1 8 z Solid Philofophy AJferteJ. F.omuhicfs IS in it^ which is the Formal Caufe of it as 'tis P.ound. 'Tis his Opinion, that they who dcnyV^ictaim^ milfl: bold Body to he Infinite : Where- as, I hold it dcmonftrablc that there is no Vacuuw^ nor hifnity of the World 7ieitber • nor can I fee any Dependence one of thofe Tenets has upon the other. i(j. He conceives, that no Man can^ in his Thoughts^ fet any Bounds to Spacc^ pre- r.r'fet Bounds ?}7ore than to Duration. 1 ask, whe- I '" Space Time, ^^^^^ j^y ]^ j^ Thoup-ht, he means his and to iiu JJura- ^ / ^ ^ „ S • .J 1 tionZ'^^GODV. Judgment^ For, tis evident, that he that can demonfirate^ that the Mode or Accident cannot exiH, where the Body or Thing, of which it is a Mode, tsmt-^ or, that both the Extent of the World has^ and its Dura- tion will hanje an end ; can, and mufl, in his Judg- ment^ [it Bounds to both of them , however his Fancy rambles and roves beyond his Judgment. Or, if he means, he cannot have a Notion of any thing fo great, but a greater maybe ftill con- ceiv'd^ then I anfwer, Firjl^ That our Conception cannot make or prove that to he^ which is not. Se- ccndly^ That none can, indeed, poliibly have fuch a Notion (by his way) oi either of them j but by cur way very eafily 3 for, by adding a Negation to Finite^ as 'tis manifcft we may, we may have a No- tion of Infinite^ which fets Bounds to all Imaginable Quantities, iince none can pretend to imagine any thing beyond Infin't^ . The fame way gives us the plain Notion of Jmmenfity^ by joining a Negation to Meafurubhnef, Indeed, the Notion of Enmity can be explicated neither way j neither by repeat- ing or addirig Idcas^ nor by a Negation of Finite Time, compounding an Infinite Time, to which Reflexion Seven tli . 183 It may beconceiv'd Commenfttrahle : For, to Fji- (Uire^ is to he j and, tho' our Duration, which is accompany'd with perpetual Alterations and Changes, is therefore fuh^eH to Time^ and Coni- menfiirable to fuch and fiich Portions of it; yec (KdD's Duration is of a far more Sovereign Nature. Let us reflecil, when we fa)', God it^as from all Etc- 7i'ity^ what thofe Words can mean. L7fr;}te Tw;s neither was^ nor cj?; he , and therefore, to expli- cate Eternity by what neither u'///, nor ca?i ht^ is to explicate it by an Impollibility, which is to make it Inexplicable. Time ii'as not before the VVorJd, in re -J nor in r;//r Under (landing, for 3;.'^? were not y^i ; nor in cKd&'s, for he, being Truth it felf, cannot know any thing to he aHually^ when as yet it was not. Wherefore, fince Eternity can- not be explicated by any Regard to foffihU Time, it is left that it muft be explicated by what the Word [Duration] imports, 'viz.. by Bei7ig -^ andfoitmufl: conllll in the highefl: ImfoJJihility of Not Beiirg., which naturally follows from the Notion of Self- Exijlence, Tho' I doubt not but thofe who are not got above Fancy, are as hard put to it, not to ima- gine a long Flux of Time hefore the JTorhlj as they are,not to imagine a vail Expanfion of Empty Space beyond the IVcrld. And fo it mul> happen, till Co?/- nexion of Terms (in which only, and not in the Fancy., Truth is to be found) comes to govein Men's Thoughts, andeftablifh their Judgments. I r. But, to leave thefe little Sallies and Inroads into Metaphyficks, and return to j^mihiUtwi im- to our Bulmefs : The next Argu- p'ies a Contradi- liicnt is drawn from God\ Tower ^^''"'' ''''^Jj "?' to Annihilate a Part of Matter, and ;:S,^";^ keep the next Bodies from clo- impoten.cy. ' - ^ M 4 ling i 1 84 ^oIU Fhilofcpky Jferte^. fing ^ in which Cafe, a Vacuum between them is "unavoicl^.bh". In AnRvcr ; F/>/, I ask how he knvows (BoO would keep the next Bodies, in that Cafe, from Clofing ? If it be againfl: the Nature of Things, he will not do ir : And if it be a plain Contrr.didrion, as we contend it is, Mr. L, him- felf will nor fay he can do it. Secondly^ I fear it would look like a wild Paradox, and little Icfs than Blafphemy, if I fhould deny that dBot) can annihi^ late ; and yet, out of the profound and dutiful Re- verence I bear to hisWifdom,Goodnefs and Power, I mud declare, it is my Tenet, that he cannot j any more than he can witnefs a Falfhood, or be liable to any other Imperfection. It will be thought this limits, and confequently takes aw^ay his Om^ nipotcricy : And I, on the contrary, tliink I have far more Reafon to judge, that the other Opinion Jirgues Impotencjy and ours fettles his Omnipotency, Common Senfe feems to tell us, that Omnipoten- Cy is a Vo^ver of doing all thir.gs^ and not of doing Nothi77g. To A6t, IS 10 Ao fomething -^ and there- fore, to do Nctlmtg^ or make a Nothings (w'hich the Senfe of Annihilation, ) is, 7tot to do : And, 'tis a flrange Notion of Omniporency, which puts ittoconfiil (in fuch an Occalion) in not doing, I wonder what Conceit fuch Difcourfers make of t'ne Di^iiiity. What I am forced to conceive of him., as Eilential to him, is, that he is a Vure ABuallty of Beings (as far as is on his part,) aclual- Ij^ and e-ver exercifed j that he has no Power in him Uftdetermin d to aB^ as we have • which ar- gues fome Potentiality, or Tmpcrf Bion in us. Thar, Actual Exiftence being EJJential to him, his Pe- culiar Effect is, to gi^^e Exi/lcnce^ or to Create Things y and to Confervc them in Being, which is Bcflexion Seventh. i8^ Is a ferfetual Creation^ or Creaticti covtlnucd ^ and. Therefore, that 'tis more Diametrically oppolicc to his Nature, to caufe Not hei?/o^, than it is for Liiiht to caufe Darknefs. Whence fallows, that whatever his Creatures are naturally dijpofed for, he is aclually hefioir'mg it upon them. Since then the Elfences of all Creatures xx dipadties of Beings the fame Goodnels that makes the Sim jh'im on the Juft and Unjust^ muft give them Con- tinually to he a^uiillj. The Place is not proper to prove this Point at large j but, were I writing Metaphylicks , and were obliged to handle it throughly, I fliouid not doubt, biit to demon- ftrate from the Natures of Action, Eifedi, Cau- fality, the Specification of Adion, from the Na- tures of Creatures, and almofl: each of God\ Infi- nite Attributes, that Annihilatkn is both Impof- fible, and alfo m.olt unworthy the Divine Nature. Some Witty Men think that Annihilation does beft fute with cIddIi's Juftice ; and thence conceit, that Eternal Damnation is nothing clfe but to be Aitn'ihilated. Whereas, indeed, this Tenet vio- lates that Attribute in the highefl: Degree : For, to fim'i^,) a Sinner without inflicting fomcthing upon him that is ^enal^ is Ncnfe?ife : And, what Pain can a Sinner /ff/ wlien he is Nothings or ts 7iOt ? II. Indeed, 'Nlr. Locke ^ §.12. argues ftrongly, and ( as far as I can iudge ) un- anfwerably, aeainft^ the Cane- ^'; ' Cai-teHans c^;, r 1 II' hardly avQiciVz- fhuis • who matce the mnume- cuum. rable Particles of their ^ytther^ tho' jumbkd together confufedly, ftill light fo exactly, as to fill every little Interllice. Did they put them to hcFln-d^ and of a very jR^r^ Nature, and 1 86 Solid Philofojjhy AJferteJ. and (o^ eafily Tllahle^ they might make fome Senfe of it : But they make them Solid, Dry, and of a Firm Confiftency ; for, otherwife, the Particles of their Elements could not be made by Attrition of other Parts of their Matter , of which, one of them is (as it were ) the Du/L Nor can it avail them to fay, thofe Particles are lefs and lefs inde- terminately '^ for, tvtvy Thing (andA/o^^too) in Nature (efpecially if Confiftent ) is determind to be particularly what it ts^ and as it is. Nor can rhere be any Thing of an Jiidttzrwinate Quantity, any more than there can be a Man in Common^ •who is Indeterminate and Indifferent to be This or That Man. 1 3. 4s for his alledging that Men have an Idta^ of Vacuum^ diftinft from the Idea The having an I- of Vlenum^ 'tis true, indeed • and deao/ Vacuum, it means the fame as NcnCorp/s^ .diflina from that ^^^ confcquently Non Qfmntum, cf Plenum, my^y ,.,. ^r^ 1 y - • r 1 gument to prove ^^^^ Qnale, &c, ^nU IS ot the it, fame Nature as is Chimara^ which means Non Ens, But, how does it foIlow^ hence, that it does or can exiH^ or that (as he phrafes it) there js an Incomfrehe?ifible /?;- ene ; unlefs, wdth the' Vulgar Schools, we will make every Diftinft nice Conception of ours to be a particular Entity^ and capable of Exifiing a-part j which I do not think Mr. L^c^c's good Judgment will allow of. • REFLEX^ l87 REFLEXION Eighth, O N The Fourteenth CHJPTER. THis Chapter affords much Matter for Re- flexion, which to do as briefly as lean, I will put my refpc(51ive Negatives to Mr. Locke's Affirmatives, giving my Reafons for them, and invalidating his. I deny, that the Notion of Time is fo abftrufc as he conceives it. The JVord is ufed commonly by the Vulgar to The plain senfe cf exprefs what they mea?i by it, and ^^' yulgzrgj^.s t • r iTiT • • 1 -vT • us tks true hot I on their ulual Meaning is the Notion of Time, or Nature of it. No Clown can be ignorant of it, if he ever read an Almanack, or fawa Sun-dial • unlefs fome witty Man comes to puzzle him with Doubts and Queflions 3 w hich he may even in things the Vulgar, and all Men living, know very prfe^tly. He knows, tho* not to a Mathematical Exa(^nefs, (which is not re- quifite to our Time, or our \Jk of it ) that the Year begins on New-years Day, and that the Sun's Diurnal Motion, till he returns to the fame Line or Point, makes what we call a Day^ and that a Pay is divided into 24 Hours. He knows how many Days make a Month, how^ many Months a Year, &c. He efteems all thefe, how^ever he di- 'uidcs them into lejjer^ or by Addition augments them vCilogreattr^ to be VartsofTime j and, con- fequently, Parts of the Suns Motion^ as well as he 1 8 8 Solid Thilofophy Ajfertecl. he knew that a Bay was fuch. If then they know that all f articular Parts of the Sun*s Motion are particular Tarts of Time^ let US abftra6l from all thefe Particulars^ and the Motion of the Sun, in Cojnmcn^ is the Common Notion of Time it felf in reality -^ however the Fcrw^/ Notion of Time con- fifts in this, that it be /O;o:}z^w and Regular^ (as the Sun's Motion is,as far as they can difcern,) {o that they can meafureand adjuft all their Adtions by it, which 'tis evident they may. And this For- mality of Time they do know too 3 as appears by ufing or applying Hours, Days, Months, &c. to meafure and adjuft all their Motions or Actions by thcm.So that this whole Difcourfeof mine,An- fwering the Niceties objeded, which efcap'd the Obfervation of the Vulgar, feems to be built on that Solid Maxim, that The true Signification or Senfe of the Words is to he taken from the Common Ufage of them. If Mr. Locke pkafes (as I think he will not) to coin Another Idea of it , and call it Timc^ he may if he pleafes ^ but it will not be the Notion of Time which Men have had hitherto ^ nor will his new Notion fute with the Senfe of Mankind'^ nor is it poilible the Signification he impofcs upon that Word can ever obtain Accep- tation in the World, unlefs fome Supreme Au- thority, which commands all the World, fhould enjoin, under great Penalties, that fuch a Word be taken in that mw Senfe, and no other; and even that will never be 3 for all Mankind will ne- ver be under any fuch Authority. 2. I deny that Duration ought to be caird Sue- Duration is not ^^jfion, unlcfs rcftrain'd to Corfo- Succeflion , lut real Duration, which is the Icafi rather oppofit to it. worthy that Name. For to en- dure Refiexion Eighth. 189 (htre is to he^ which has Steiulimfs and Vermamncy in its Notion \ whereas Succejjlcn is cllcnriallv" Change^ and i*o rather op/?^//^ to Duration or Eelng. Nor is any thinu; laid to Endure becaule it fttcceeds^ but btcaufe it/j- all the while other things ///cr^e^- or rather, while it lelf undergoes ibme^cT/W^^wr^/ CL:nze. Wlience our Reivg- is not Commenfurate to SuCCefTionasic \sReing^ but as it is Changeahh one way or other j which Changes being accom- pany'd with Motion^ muft confequently be Sttccef- fivers it is. Angels and Pure Spirits have Dm-a- ticTj^ tho' they are Uncbavgeahlt'^ and therefore XJn- fuccejji^e • having no Pr.rts or Vicilfitudes in their Natures or Operations, as Material and Q^r.ntlta- ti^e Things, or Bodies, have. Moreover, the No- tion of meer jBf/w^is Indiurfibk, w^hereasthe No- tion oi Sncee lp.cn is elTentially Dii^y//'/^'^ whence they can have no Commenfuration to one ano- ther. For which Reafon, before (as we appre- hend it ) Motion or Succellion begu-n, or after it is ended, the things atibrd us no Ground to con- ceive any thing like before or after, but only one Ever-Jlanding or Unchangeable and Indi-vifible In- fiant j which better exprefles our Eternity, or co?i- fiantly being ever, than any Correfpondence to Succejfion or Motion Can 3 whofe Natures are Finite in Duration, and fo can never reach hi finite Dura- tion, or that e--ver-co?jfiant Being calFd (tttttiXt^. 3. I deny abfolutely. That the Notion of Sue- cef/ion Ought to be taken from the f^„n n Tram of Ideas running in our radox to fay, ths Heads , but from the Things in i^otioji o/Succef- Nature j andMr.Lor/^e, (CWc.) ^'^f^ '' Dumtion makes Motion, which is the fame ;L"^':4?1!;::: With ^HCCeJJlov^ one Ot his S'm^U in our lUa.'i- Ideaf 1 9 o Solid Philofophy AJferteJ. Ideas which comes into the Mind by druers Senfes from Outward OhjeBs. Which how to reconcile with his Doctrine here, I am at a Lofs : Nor can I fee why the Rowling of a Cart-wheel in the Street, or the Flying of a Bird in the Air, fhould nor more naturally and more folidly give us the Idea of SucccJJlon^ than our obferving the Gliding of Ideas in our Fancy, or Mind. 4. I deny that his Argument, drawn from our not perceiviug Duration w^hen Our not Percei'ving we fleep, does conclude that this Dfr£^;>frC^///^ of the Notion '^"^ agahift thi of Succeiiion, or revrJmt it : For ^^-'"''^ f Things, Succeilion or Motion has, iOr it bJancesrco. kl^^ no difiingwjhahle^ much Icfs Atlually difihid Parts, any more than Termanent Quantity, orExtenfion has any Nicks or Notches to butt, bound, determin or diftinguifh it here and there j but they both proceed in one Even, Confus'd and Undiftinguifhable Tenour j where- as in the Train of Ideas ^ each Idea is actually Di^ p^lnci from the other. Whence the Notion of fuch a Succeilion ought to be One continued Idea^ or the Idea of a Continuance^ Or elfe it refemblcs not the Thing as it is in Nature , nor confequently, is it a Similitude or Idea of the Thing, or outward Objed:- that is, 'tis no Idea at all, nor fo much as a good Pl\mtapn 3 much lefs is it a Notion^ or the Thing fo in the Underftanding, as it is out of it. Whence I muft utterly deny what he fays here, §. 6. that Alotion produces in the Mind an Idea of Succijfon^ any Otherwife, than as it produces there a continued train of Dijlinguijlhible Ideas. For, Difijnclicn Can never reprelent that w'hich is cflentially Indifiincl^^zs Succcilion is: Or,if he means the hter'vaTs betwe( n the Appearances of one Idea, and another '"ij IndiHinil and Confufed, it will be ask't by what Idea this hidil\in6t hner'val is made known to us j and why the fame Idea may not as connaturally be imprinted by the Motion of Bodies in Nature- the Succeifion of which our Eyes, Ears, and Touch, do teftify ? -^ I 1 9 X Solid Fhilofophy Jfferted. 7. I mud deny too that Duration ( as he takes it ) and Sncccjjion cannot one of One Motiov^ if thcni bc a Meafure to the other. Known and Re- p^ ^j| j.|^^^ ^,^^ ^^ COnCeiv'd of gular, tnay mid \ \^ • r ^^ • / \. r ^ mujl be a Meafure ^^'^^ NotiOn of Duration ( befides to another. Being ) ticting it to be a Meafure^ is fome Dtfigned Part of Motion or Sticceljion '. And, when two things mo^e^ that which moves more regularly ( provided it be e'vi- ilently htowahle^ and its Quanxity fome way or other De/^erw/V/^/) is in all points fitted to be the Meafure of the Others Motion. Nor is it more difficult to meafure the hf Regular Motion by the More Regular one, if the other requiiites be not wanting, tlian 'tis to meafure the Extended Quantity of a Termanent Body, u. g. a Yard of Cloth ( which as found in the Piece is Undeter- mi?id) by a yard-wand^ whofe Q^iantity is Stated and determind. For Example, when I wiite or w^alk an hour^ the Motion of Sand in an Hour- glafs, whicli is more known and Determinate, mea- Jures the Motions of my Pen or Legs, whofe Sue- ceflive Quantity or Motion is lefs certainly known or Determinate than the other is. And, as that Determinate Motion meafures the otbcr^ fo the Motion of the Sun, which is knowahle to all man- kind ( which the Glafs was not ) and, to their apprehenf on, Regular^ brought to Proportionate and Determinate parts by help of our Under- ftanding, is apt to meafure all our Motions what- ever J which Meafure we call ^XIU^, as 1 think, Mr. L. grants. Whence Ideny that Time is men- furd hy the Motion of the Sun ( as Mr. L. objei^s, and juftly wonders at ) for it Is that 'Very Motion^ fitteci, as is now laid, to bc a Cominoa Meafure to Reflex I on E ig h t It . 19^ to all others. He mentions n^any other Signes or Marks of Periods fiippofed Fquidilhint, as the Returning of Birds at fuch Scafons, the Ripen- ing of Fruir, or Fire lighted up at the [awe dlftnnce of time^ increnfl in Heat^ &c. but what mud: mea- fure the diflance between thofe Periods ? Or, what's this to our Time as it is now, St. Aufiin was puzzled to know, whether, if RctafguH mcveretur^ and all things elfe flood dill, diere would in that Cafe be T'ime or no. But all thefe Extravagant Sup- pofitions are frivolous. Mankind takes their Noti- ons from things as they are, and as they work upon their Senfes • which, in our cafe,is the Regular and Known Motion of the 6'«w; and they take the No- tions of its parts, from the Defignation, Divifion and Mukiplication, made by our Underftanding^ and not from wikl Suppolitions, which neither come home to the Point, nor are, e^er were, orfloall be j nor are. Or could be fo ReguLir and Knowable to all Mankind, as this Motion of the Sun is. 8. I mufl: abfolutely deny, and moreover think it a mod Extraordinary pofition, to affirm that we muft not judge Uereis mjhcTv of that the Periods of Duration are ^^^^h ^^^^^ ^^« equal, by the Motion of the Sun, ^^"^^j'^ fj^' 1^1^, /T- • r T J 1 Periods ot Du- but by the Train of Ideas that ration c^n pof- pafled in Men's minds in the in- fibly h taken tervals ; which, I conceive, is the /''^^ ^^' Train Senfe of his §.21. and §.12. and ^^°^' ^^'''• of the Tenour of his Difcourfe in divers places. For, firft, how does it appear that the ^lotion of the Train of thofe Ideas is ir fclf Equal, or near Equal, in any one or the fhme Man at all times 3 without which we cannot know by their E'^^ual fuccejjicn that the Periods which N I hey 194 ^^^^^^ riilofoph AJferted. ^hcy are to meafure are Equal, When a Man is in a ////?/ ^/HuniOLir, his Thoughts play very little iijid ftovAy 5 when he is found a-J!eep, not at all j when Awake and Brisk, or agitated by fome great PafTion, the}' move i-oy firifrly^ when fedate and coi7ipos'd, more ?no(kratdy ; (b that 'tis impoilible to fix the fucceirion of thofe Ideas in any Kegn- larity, Kcxt, how can we know that thofe Jdaas mo\'e regularly^ and not rather very differently, in dit'crje Men ? Contemplative, Melanch()![y and Dull Men ufe to fix their Mind long upon eve Thought ^ and, confequently, upon cne Object of their Thought, or eve Idea : Whereas thofe who are endow'd with Gayity of IVit^ ( which is de- fined Cchr motiis Tntelhclifs ) and thofe who are pofleft with Phrenzy or Madnefs have their Ideas iucceeding one another ^verj Siviftly : When we Judge^ we /.v our thought j when we 7»i^fK/, we mufter up whole Armies of them en a Suddtn. ^!j^ Let any Alan confalt liis own Interiour, and ex- aminwith the moft exa^l Reflexion, whether his Ideas have mov'd Swiftly, or Slowly, the laft Iiour, he will fijid himfelf at a lofs to give any good account of them ; much more to aflure him- itlf, or afcertain others that tliey moved regularly : Wherefore the Train of Ideas ( and the fame may be faid of his other Imaginary Meafures, §. 19. ) are quite deftitute of that Chief Propeity of a Adeafurc, 'viz.. that it felf be Regular j and, if it con- cerns d\ Mankind, ??7ofi Notorious to all who need it. For want of which, and for the Reafons late- ly given, perhaps no two Men in the World could agree, or come to a right Ihiderftanding with one another, about the lime of their Actions, which would put all the World in Confufion about y Reflex i Or? Eighth. 19^ iibour their Common affairs. Laflly, Mr. Z. af- fignes no Rcafon to cvincc the Rt^ultir faccelliun of his Ideas in his §. 9. which fcems the proper place to alfert tliat Principal Point upon which all his Difcourfe depends 3 and he only fays, that \\Q gttej]ls that the Affeara77ce of the Ideas ^va- ry not -vtry much hi a wakhig Man • and that they feem to have certain Bounds in their Q^xknefs ar.d Slownefs. And the Reafon he gives afterwards, $. 10. for this (as he calls it) odd ccnjeci/o-e^ is cafy to be folv'd by our Principles : For, there is no doubt but that fome /hort time muft be allowed for the coming of Imprcifions from without, for the ferrying them over the Medi- 7/w, and the Re-exciting them in the Fancy, by which Notions are bred in our Mind j which a very quick Motion of the Outward Objeft may prevent, as in a Brand whiri'd round, 6^-c. and there mull: be alfo fome Marks to make us ob- ferve too flow Motions 3 Yet, between thofe two Extremes, there are fo many Degrees, and fucii Variety intervene, that the Succeilion of thofe Ideas may neverthelefs be very Uneven and Irre- gular. Rather, I may with better Reai()n, af- firm that it is impoifible it fhould be any way Regular at all ; fmce their SucceiFion deperjds on the Fancy ( the mod Irregular and 'Jnconftant Faculty w'e have ) applying the Material Ideas or Phantafms a-new to the Seat of Knowledge j which Application thoufands of Caufes may re- tard^ or accelerate. His Objeftions againft the Re- gularity of the Sun's Morion not being Mathe- matically fuch, is of no force. 'Tis fuff.cient that it be fo Regular as ferves our ufe to mea- fure, and adjuft our Adions by ic 3 and the N X fame Tpfi Solid Philofophy AfferfeJ. fame may be Objcded againft one meafunng Cloth by a Yard-wand, whofe length is never Maihematically Exa6l. 9. Wherefore, NIotwith (Ian ding the refpcSl I have for Mr. L. 1 cannot but think This odd Tenet not ^^^^ f^^^ quivering Grounds as i?'y Mr. L. • u\tiQ can never lupport his nioft unaccountable Opinion, §. 12. that The Conflcwt and Regular Succejjlon of Ideas in a Waking^ Man^ are^ as it were^ the Meafure and Standard of all other Succejjions. His OV^'n good Judgment fav^r well the weaknefs of his grounds j wherefore his clear Sincerity, and ulual Mo- defty would not fuffer him to deliver ajjcrti'vcljy and ajfuredlj^ what he faw was Uncertain j and therefore he proposed it rather as a Varadox^ or ( he calls it ) an odd ConjeHure^ than maintained it as a Vofition j however, the Conception being fo ISfew^ he was tempted not to pretermit it wholly : In doing which too, I believe, he not fo much gratify'd himfelf, as the Humor of moft late Phi- lofophers 3 who are far more addicted to value what's Quaint than what's Solid, MK««B<^»aa» tMHaaaatsewatWi RE^ 197 REFLEXION Nimb, O N The Fifteenth CHAPTER^ Of Du- ration and Expanjton conjtderd together. I. TT Have already faid enough of Imagl?7ary Spaccy X Imaginary Time ^ and of the true Notion oF Eternity. Philofophers mu{\. fpeak of Things as they are, if they mean in^agivayyThnehQ-. to fpeak Truth • and, therefore, l^Z^TZi'^'^f the applyijig our /^t'/z of Duration, Fancy, which is a Mode of Ens^ to Ima- ginary Time hefire the Creation, when as yet there was no fuch Ens as was Capable of fuch a Mode, is evidently againfl: the Firft Principles of our Un- derftanding j and the fame Illulion of Fancy that induced Air. L. to put Space ( which is a Mode of that Ens called Body, and neither has, or ever had any Being but its, nor Power to beget any Idea at all in the Mind, but by being It J beyond the World, that is, beyond the Univerfality of Things y where there can only be pure Nothing. When we relinquifh the Things on which only Truths are grounded, all the Ideas we purfue and lubftitute in their Rooms mufl: necellarily be wcer Fancies^ and inevitably plunge us into Contradictions and Abfurdities. Wherefore, I have no Occalion to make any further Reflex jons upon the Grounds of this prcfcnt Dilcourfe, the Foundation of it being, N 3 Ihopc, 1 9 3 Solid rhHofophy AJfet teJ. I hope, overthrown in my Preliminaries, and di- vers other places j yet, upon his Manner, of his carrying it on, 1 muft a little Reflect. As, \, Fn-fi, That they who endeavour to intro- duce Opinions Inconfiftent with They who advance our Natural Notions, muft be Tenets agahifit^ii' forced to change the Common 'tV' ^efnif^^of Signification of Words, left they ^^m^'d^that ci-ofs them in their Difcourfes, txprefs o!tr Natw and in the Explication of their rfilNoiious. Tenet. Hence (as I have noted above) Mr. L. alter'd the Signi- fication of the Word [Soliclaj^] to make \^'ay for an Unfoljd Beings or -^nEmfty Space^ as alio, the mean- ing of theWord[Exfe77//('yw,]which he would confine to Af-^?/-eri/7/ Beings j and chofe to make ufeof the Word [Space^] bccaufe it feem'd lefs to conno- tate the Notion of Body^ than Exte7ifoit did. And, here, he rather chufes to make uie of the Word [^Ex-parifion.,'] as if it were better^ that is, Dljfcren: from Extevfion. The Word is proper enough, for which 1 do not much blame him : Only, I muit affirm, that no Wit, nor even Fancy of Man, can conceive or imagine any thing, exilling any "wlkrc but in the Imrglnatlon^ (or, even fcarcely there^J to be Expended^ but it muft alfo be really Extended ; nor to be Extended^ but it muft be Di- 'v/fhte y and, therefore, its Parts Separable by the intcrvcj jng Body, ( which he denies of his Inane J unlefs we put them to be inluperably Hard, So- lid, or Infradtil, as Epicm//s did hib Atoms ; or that, if they be thushxtended, and yet the Parts of the Inane do not feparate^ aid give way to a new-come Body, there muft not inevitably fol- low a Penetratie»n oi Extended Tarts 3 that is, thofe Parts Reflexion Ninth. 199 Parts that muO: be without o?ie a7iothn\ nnifl 1)^* at the iamc time within one ^fiochcr j which is a di- rect Contiadidion. 3. Sec^7idly^ I Cannot but fpecially remark, to what incredible Hxrravai^ancies Fa7ic)\ if not check'd by Rea(cn^ God'.<- bmnmftty tranlpoits Men, tho' ocherwile '''' CommeniH- ot the grcateit Par£s ; even lofar ,,-,,iy Ex^^Jcd as to conceit that Crob s Immtnfity spncc, coniifts in a kind oF Q^ianritaci\ e Diffufi.n of his lillence, or in the Ccmmsjjfiiraticn of it to an hifinite Expa?iJiori, For, \\hat ^[(c can his Argument here, §. 1. K)i- liis Ir,Hnicely Ex- panded/wjwe mean, couch'd in thefe Words, [Un- lefs he (-viz.. the Denier of fuch a Vaciiiry ) vjHI conf.ric God ivithin the Limits of A^itter.] What, I fay, can this mean, but that he apprehends God's Uncoyifyid or hijinite Being, would be Covfm d^ Fi- nite, and coniequently Loi/-, unlcfs there w^ere an Infinite Quantity of hnagmary Space anfwerable to it in Exte7jt or Expanlion. A Conceit cer- tainly mod unworth)' the Divinity, whofe Ef- fence w^as ecji/ally JTnmcvfe ere any Creatures were inade: Nor can anv of his Ellential Attributes be taken in ord^r to them , for, this would give his Ejjhice ibme kind of Depe7idL'7ice on his Creatures. This is fomeching hke (but much worfe than) the Opinion of thole Ancients, who thought dSoti to be the Soul of * the World. Vi7iitHfejiie i7ifnja per Art m Mc7is ag'itat TnoleTV^ O" mag7io Je corpore 7r/ifcet. Which Whimfy making (So& a kind of Ccrrtpart with Matter, is long lince' exploded out of ihc N 4 Schools 2. CO Solid Pkilofophy /iJJerteJ, Schools by the folid Principles of Chriftian Faith* (Bob is not in his Creatures by any Co-extmfwn to them, or any other way than by giving them Being j and his Immcnfnj^ w'hich is Effential to him, confifts in this, that, did an Infinity of Crea- tures exift, he would be Intrinfecally, and of him- felf, able to give, or rather, actually giving jBe/w^ to than all. Or elfe, [Exifience] being the leaft Improper Notion we can attribute to cBob, he is faid to be Immenfe^ becaufe his Exiftence is llli- mited^ or Infinite* 4. Thirdly^ I much w^onder what thofe Words fliould mean, \^And hc^ I think, IVe can have m j r fj^^gf^ towards it ; it being fetch d rrom our moft Natural Notions, and known to us (as it were ) by a kind of Experi- ence Reflexkn Ninths 103 cnce. Let us take then any Spritual Mode or Ac- cident, a V'lYtue for Example, and let it be that o^Tc?7iperance -^ which done, let us ask oiir Natu- ral Thoughts, how Lo77g^ Broad ^ Or Thick that Virtue is? Is it as little as a Barly-corn, orasb'fg as a Houfe? Is it a Yard in Length, or hut an Inch ? Is it as Thick as a Wall, or as Thin as a Wafer ? &c. And, Honed Nature would anfwer for us, that 'tis Nonfenfe to ask fuch a Qiieflion ; its nature being perfeftly of another kind, and utterly diiagreeable to any of thefe Accidents. A- gain, Let us ask what Colour or Figure it is of? Is it Bleir^ Green^ or Yellow ? Is kRoi/?i(/y Fouy-fcji/ar(\ or Triangular ? Is it Rare or Dcvfe^ Hot^ Cold^ Mii'sl\, or Dr/ ? And we fhall difcover that the Asker, if ferious, would be look'd upon by all Mankind as a Fool or a Mad-man 3 fuch QLialities as thefe being as much Difparate from the Subjeft we are Enquiring about, as Knowledge is to a Beetle, or Science to a Mufhrom. And yet, it v;ould not be wonder'd at, that fuch Queflions as thedcfhould be ask'd of any Bodj whatever. And what does this amount to, but that Nature alTures us, by her free and fober Acknowledgment of it, that this Spiritual Mode , calfd Virtue or Temperance, is quite dirferent from the whole Nature of i/o^//, and from any Corporeal Thing that by our Senles ever enter'd into our Favcy. Since then this Spi- ritual Mode or Accident has nothing at all to do with Body or its Modes^ it is clearly evinced by the Ingenuous Corfellion of Unprejudiced Nature, that the Subject of it, which we call a Spirit^ is fo vallly removed from all we can fay of Body (Being only excepted ) that 'tis perfeft Nonftnie to ar- il ibure any thing to it which we find in Corporeal . ' Natures. 204 Sol} verb" [ Non] to that of [ F'mis : ] . p.^jj^ ^ 5 , ^^ And JVIr.L^f>^<^, Ch. 17. §. 6\ feenis 32. to come over to my Thoughts 3 where he fays, that the Idea of hfn'ity feems to be fretty Clear ^ when we ccmfukr nothing in it but the Negation of an End. Whereas, on the other fide, he grants, that the Idea of an hfnite Sface cr Dtt^ ration is very Oh [cure and Confujcd. Now, if the Clearnefs of an Idea be the greatefl: Perfection ic can have, it follows, even from his ownConccf- fion, that the Idea of Infnity ought rather to be taken from the Negation of Kn'tenef^ than from tliis Confus'd Way of Adding and Repeating more and more of Space or Duration. Add, that (as was faid ) this way can only give us the Idea of a Potential Infnity j nor that neither 7i;ell^ unkfs that Fowcr to be Infinite could ever be reduc'd to jlcly which is impolhble it Zhou Id : Now, ihe iVf- gaticn of Finitenefs {ally reaches an Actual and Ah- folute Infinity 3 and is applicable, and truly to be Predicated of (BoD himfelf, and all his Intrinfe- cal Attributes, as Being, Duration, Power, Wif- dom, &c. without needing any Recourfe to the tranfitory and limited Natures or Modes of Crea- tures to explicate ir. Whereas, Mr. Locke's Idea of Infinite Cannot be predicated of (BoD, or his Attributes,, at all: Nor can we f ly that (idoD ^ In- ^'fnite, in h;s Senfe of that Word j in regard he fays, that cur J^til of Infinity is (as he thinks) an Endlefis Growing Idea -^ For, the Infinity of dfOOj and of all that can becoiiceiv'd to belong O 10 2 1 o Solid Ph'dofophy Afferted. ro him, is incapable of Grc:/'r/:?, Degrees^ or: Aclcli- t'lons • bur is one Indi^ifilk Beings without any poflibility of our conceiving more or Jtfs in it, if we conceive it as we ought. 3. On the other (ide j How facil and natural is my Way of our gaining an Idea ^72d -with -what or Notion of Infinite ? We fee ^^/^- moft Things we converfe with to be Li?nlted^ or Fin:te j wherefore^ the Notion of the Thing as 't/s limited, or (which is the fame) the Notion of L/w/V<^ /•/{>?; or End^ is very familiar a nd obvious to our Thoughts. Since then Experience teaches us that we can very eafi- ly join a Negation to FmitcneJ^ or End when-ever we pleafc, as well as w^e can to any other Notion • and, thence, have a kind of Complex Notion of Infinite^ as w^ell as we can of Immortal, hiimenfe. Immaterial, Incorporeal, Indivifible, &c. We have the Notion of hifinltj given to our hands, without more ado j or without perplexing our felves with making ufe of thofe lame Helps of Ad- ding or Repeating ihok fiinted Aleafures of Corpo- real Modes or Accidents, whofe very Natures (be- fides the Finite Number of Times we can only re- peat them) do make them utterly Incapable ever to reach ylclual, that is, Tme hifinitj. 4. As for the Queftion he introduces here, 'uiz,. Whether the Idea of hfinite be i^jd Notion of [ In- Voptive^ or Necratiir^ or includes finite ] is moft fomcthing of both • my firm Opi- ll^.Q ^ nion is, That, however the Gra- matical way of expreiling that Conception fecms to be Negative^ yet the Notio?t it felf meant by that Word, is altogether Tofiti-ve. My Reafon is, becaufc the Idea or Notion of Finis or Reflexion Tcntli. iii or Limit (in what: kind (()jvci- ir bj) cloc^" formal- ly Ijgnitic \^no farther in thac kind,] which is per- fectly Negiitt've : Wherefore, the Negation adujd to Finite^ in the Word {Infinite^'] CjuitC t.-king off that Negative Scnfe which did before belong to the Word [Fifiite,] gives the Word [Infinite] a Senfe purely Vofiti-ve, Again, wc cun have no DireH ImpreJJlcn from the Thing ; nor, confe- qiiently. Direct Notion of [Infjute^] nor, confc- quently, any Reflex Notion of it ; for, all Rcfl-^>: Notions have for their proper Objcdt, the Direct ones which are already in our Minds : Wherefore, if the Notion o^\_hfin:ty'] can be had any other way than by adding [Non'\ to [Finite^] it mull come from our Reafon finding out by Difiourfej that there is a Firft and Self-exiltent Being, whole Eflence and Attributes are beyond all Limits, or acttuilly hifinite. Whence follows, that, iince clear Reafon demonftrates, that all Created Entities, and confequentlv, all the Aioiks belonging to them, are Finite^ and c7ily (Boti is Infinite in his Eilence, and in all his Intrinfccal Attributes : And Reafon alfo tells us, that all which is in (Boti, ( to whom only the Notion of Infinite can belong,) is molt highly Pofiti've 3 the fame Reafon teaches us to corredt in our Thoughts the Grammatical Nega- livenefsof the Word [hfifiitc^] which can only be apply'd to Him • and to look upon it, and eiteem it, as wvH perfect Ijf Fcfitive. 5. I cannot pals by, unreflefted on, a Paffage^ §. 16. in which Mr. Locke's F All- ey impofes ftrangely upon his ^^'^'''^^,, '^.^-y Realon: He lays, that Nothing is c«; Succefllon. more tmconcei'vahle to him^ than Dnration^ -withnt Succejjwn. What thinks he of O z the ziz ScUd Ph'ilofophy Afferted, ^ - the Durafjon of d^Otl, in * whom James i. 17. . rr- -rr j ci J r IS no Vicijhtude^ cr Shadciu of Change-^ (which Text, 1 bdieve, no Man, atleafl:^ no Chriftian, but holds to be Tlain^ and Literally True J ) whereas, SucceJJlcn is elTL^ntially J>erfetual. Change ? Let him pkaife to refled, that [To (tti^ tiitt fu long^ ] is nothing elfe but [ to fit fo long j ] which done, by cutting off [Jo lo??g] in both thofe Sayings, he will find, that [To Endure,] is ricither more, nor lefs, but fimply [To be.'] Whence his Conceit is fo far from being True, that IvOthing more wrongs Durjticn, or Beh^g, than does SucceJJion, or Met ion. And, therefore, our Duration here, which is Unfteady, Uncon- ilant, and Tranfitory, is iuftly reputed to be the ovorB fort of Duration, or Be'wg • and the next to Nct~Be:77g, or Nct-Endurlng at all. Again, Common Senfe tells us, that nothing moves mQ'<:x\Y for Mitlon s Jake j and, therefore, that all Morion is, to attain fomething which is Ntt- jvictlcn, but the End of it, that is, ReH. VVhere^ fore, EteriJcil Rcsl, or that Duration called Eter- nity, is the End of all the Motion of the ii'Ijcle JVcrld-j conformably to what the Holy Scripture, fpeaking of the State of Eterni- * Apocal. cap. i. ty, tells US, that, * Tc7npts ncn erit ^- 7- an^plim 3 Time ( nor, confequent- ly, SucctfJJcn ) jhall he no more. Wherefore, flnce, taking away Motion and Sue- cejjlon, 'lis impollible to imagin any thing in Du- ration, but only Being 3 iuid Eternity is an infi- nicdy better Duration, or State of Beings than this Tranfitory one, which is Succelfive j it fol- lows, that Eternal Rejt, in which we have all we can ba%'c^ QX cculd acquire by MotioX), ap once^ is the Reflexion Elcventli. z i 3 the only true Duration , and our Dumtion here only the vay to it. So far is Duviiticn Froni be- ini^ Unancei'vable irlthcut: Succejjion^ if We guide our Thoughts by Pj-itjc'-plcs^ arid not by mar Fancy . REFLEXION Ela^emh. O N The Eighteenth^ Nineteenth^ and Twentieth CHAPTERS. I .'ryi H E three next Chapters of Siwple Modes, X are very fuitable to Mr. Lockers Doctrine delivered formerly, and almofl: all of them agreeable to Nature : '^'^^"S'l" ^r. not particularly the 2oth,\vhich gives f^tions. us more gen uin Definitions of the feveral Palfions , and more aptly, in my Judg- ment, exprefles them than Mr. Hohbes has done • tho* he is juRiy held to have a great Talent in de- livering his Conceptions. But, 1 muft deny that the Perception or Thought^ made by ImprcJJicns on the Body^ by Outward OhjecU, is to be Called Sen- sation. For if Thoughts be Senfations^ then the Senfe can Think , which being the proper A6t of ihe ^/«^, I believe none will fay if he reilefts O J that z 1 4 Solid Philofophy Averted. that our Soul is of a Sflrltual Nature. Nor are the Modes oi Tbinlzmg at all proper to the Senfcs. The Truth is, that Man having two Natures in ov\Q SHppcfitim7y all the Iinpreillons upon him as he is an A7ti77:al^ do alfo at the fame time ( I may Hiy the fame Tnilant ) affe(!t him alfo as he is Spi- rit ual 3 wh.cnce they are to be called Senfatioiis^ as they are recciv'd in that material Part called the Seat of Knowledge ^ and the fame Direft Im- preifions, as they proceed farther^ and atfed his Soul, are cali'd Notions^ O): Simple AfpreheTifio7is. Wherefore, as the two Natures in Alim are Di- ftin6l, and have their Diflinft Properties and Modes j fo the Wcrds^ that are to exprefs what*s peculiar to each of thofe Natures, are to be Di- llinguifh'd too, and kept to their proper Signifi- cation 3 which cannot be, if Thought^ which is peculiar to the Mmd^ be confounded with Senfa- tlcfj^ which properly belongs to the Corporeal p2Yt. Burl fufpe6t the Printer may be here in the Fault, and not the Author ; the Senfe in this place being fomething imperftdt. 2. To the Queftion propofed, ( Cap. 19. § 9.) Whether it he not probable , that Thinking is the Thinking is the Aclion^ and not the Aaion, and?:ot ^m^^^^ ^r ^j^„ ^^^i p j ^^ifwCf, tkeElknCQ of the ^i y . ^ j i n c ^.^l That tis more than probable j for 'tis Demonfirable ^ that 'tis only the Aclion^ and not the EJJence of it. For, in fuch Natures as are potential^ or apt to recel've Impref- fions from other things, ( as the Soul is in this Stare j) and therefore their Elfence does not con- fift in bciijg Vure yjcts (as Angels are,) Being mufl neceflariiy be prefuppos'd to Operating j efpeci- ;illy, when their* firlt Operation (as Thinking is to Refle>:io}i Eleventh. 215' to the Soul) is :i inccr VnJJlon^ cius'J by Impref- fions from anotlur tiling 3 which are therefore purely Accidental to the Subject tliat receives them. And I wonder Mr. Locka would even pro- pofe t 'lis as a Qjeftion to be yet d'-cided, or think: it but Probable 3 iince he has formerly maintained al]'ertivd)\ That Men do not alv\iys th'mh, : For if it be not cert am th:it Thinking is not the Ejjence of the SouJ^ it foHows neceilarily, that Aim muH aU ways think 3 lince the Soul can never be without her EjJence^ or what's Eljential to her. 3. His Pofition, that Things are Gcodcr Evil 071- ly in reference to Pleafure or Fain^ however it may hap to be mif- m>: L.'j- poJIHoji, underitood by fome well-mean- ^^'-'^ '^'''\^^ '"'^ ing Bigots, is a mod folid Truth ; f^::^^;': and IS exceedmgly ukiul to ex- pieafmeoPain, plicate Chriftian Principles, and isTrue andsoUd. to fhew (Ko&'s Wifdom and Goodnefs in governing Mankind Connaturally. He propofes to him Fubtcfs cf Joy^ and Pleafrres for evermore j and fuch as, being Spiritual and mofl: Agreeable to the Nature of the Soul, are Fure^ Durable^ and fdihig the whole Capacity of its boundlefs Defire j not Tranfitcry^ Mcaring Good, and the Lii'ely Appearance of thatCiOod is that which makes the Will prv)nipt to af!l cltedtually ^ whence, fince that wj-iich breeds Tlcajure in us, muft needs appear Lively robe a Good to 7ts^ there needs no more but to chufe wifely what is mosi Pleafant, or mof: Agree- able to our True >'ature, Ktafotl \ ( fuch as the bed Spiritual Goods are ; ) arid we may be fure by fuch a weil-made Choice to arrive at that t^efl: , Greateft , and Pureft Fleafure , ' Eternal Qlory. RE- ZI7 REFLEXION Tivc/fth. O N The zuh. CHAPTER. 1. TN this Chapter of Voii^er, I find more to ad- X "lire than confute. The Author always Ingenious, even when he errs, ' has here much out done his former The dve Comwm^ k\'i. Particularly, his Explication ^^^;"/ )^^']l^ of Trenvlli;\^ (generally fpeaking) ^]^'J^^ll ^y-p^^l' both Solid and Acute, and his er. Doctrine that Lihtrty is conliilent with a perfect Determinatio?i to Goodncfs, and Vir- tue is hoz\\ Learned and Vkus. Yet I am forced ro difagree with him in fome particulars : In giv- ing my Thoughts of which I will imitate Mr. Locke's laudable Method ; in making my Difcour- fes Siihfer^ient^ and mfjevuno; them to be ^gttC- dblt, to Chriftian Principles. 2. Tis an excellent Thought, that The Clear efi Idea of Active Power is had from Spirit. For Bodies Can act nO O- T/^'*^ fi^»^ Spiri- therwife, than as they are acted ^^^7''''^^^ on themlelves j nor can the firfi Bodies. mo'vd Body that moves the reft, pufh others forwards /^rr/^er than it felf is moved by fomething that is not Bodj, or by fome Spiritual Agent j which therefore has the ti:ueft Notion of Agtncy^ in it, without any Mixture of Paticncy y btcaufe the Body mov*d cannot react upon it. Tho' therefore we may have by our Senfes the Idea 1 1 8 Solirl ThUofophy AffertetJ. Idea of A(!tion and Palfion, iiom the EfFedts we Ice daily wrought by Natural Caufes on fit Sub- lets j yet the Clearefi Idea of Action, is given US by our Reafofj, finding out that the Beginner of Corpo- real Action is a Separated Sprit, or fure Act j and therefore not at all PaJE'ue from any other Creature, nor from the Body it operates on, by Reaction^ as is found in Corporeal Agents. And, our Reafon gives us this Idea^ ( as it docs many otli^r Reflex ones) by feeing clearly that neither can there poiubly be Procejfus in infinitum amongft Corporeal Agents j nor can they, of themfclves alone, begin to move themfclves, nor move one another Cir- cularly j and therefore the Firfi Corporeal Motion muft ncceflarily be Originiz'd from fome Vure Spi- rit or An^el. Now, Mr. Locke con- The Will camot ccivcs that tlic Soul, according move our Bodies, to her Faculcy call'd [ JViW] mov- ing the Body, gives him this clear eft Idea of Acti've Vower , v/hich Tenet I have in di- verfe places difprov*d * formerly j T'f'^^rRefl' ^"^ fhownthat the Scul, by rea- 5! §. i.^ ' ^^^ ^f ^^^' T^otential State here^ cannot principiate any Bodily A6tion J nor the Man neither, unlefs wrought upon by fome External or Internal Agent, which is in act it felf. 3. He Judges with good reafon, that the Vulgar millake of Philofophers, in mak- The Underftand- in^ cvcry Kiaz/r/ or Powcr a Di- "^g ^i^^^^^ (tmct Entity , has causM much Powers. Oblcurity and Uncertamty in Philofophy j which humour of Multiplying Entities, 1 am {o far from abetting that perhaps he will think me to err on the other hand, Reflexion Twelfth. a 1 9 hand, in making ihc Un^Ierfian^lin^; ^^^ ^^^11 to be 07je and the //.we Powey\ and airiiniini^ that they only differ, formally, in Degree. He fhows clear- ly how, in proper Speech, the Will is not Free but the Man j unlefs it be lignified with a Re- duplication, that by the Word [ JVill ] is meant Man., accordh/g to that Power in him calfd the ll'^ill. For Towers ( as he difcourfes well ) belong only to Jgents^ and are Attributes cnly of Suh- (f-ances^ and not of the Vovnrs tbe?nfehis. Per- haps this reafon of his will abet my polition,that the Underftanding and Will are the pime Power. Thofe w^ho make them two., do thisb.caufe they find in the Notion of [Pt^ill] only a Power of Aclinz^ and not of kmwinq- • and in the Notion of [Unclcrfidf/Jing] Only aPowerof knowhig^ and not of AEiing : but the fame Men m.ake the Un- derftanding direB the Will, which they call a Blind Powder j by w^hich they make one of thofe Powers, formally as fuch, to work upon the other., as if the former were an Agents and the latter a Patients I add, moreover, that they do this with the worft Grace that is poilible j for what avails it the IVill^ to be direBed by the Un- derftanding, if it does not know how the Under- ftanding dire&s it ? And to make the Will to know., is to make it a know^ing Power, which is to make the Pf^ill ( tho' they never meant it ) to be the Under fianding. Not reflecting in the mean time when our Underftanding is /«// of any Apparent Good, the Man purfues it, and fo becomes., or has in him a Principle or Power of A^ingj which is what we call aaifU. 4 Per^ 110 Solid Thilofophy A(ferte(L 4. Perhaps a Philofopbical Difcourfc, beginning from the Principles in this affair, Hnn's Freedom, if expreft: Literally, and purfu'd o.Selfdctermi- home bv Immediate Conlequen-. nation, deduced J ^ , , r r - from Principles. CCS, may kt this whole buln-icls in a Clearer Light j and fhow us very evidently how Man detcrrn'ms hlmfelfto ABlony and therefore is Fne • as alio how he is Tredeter- wind to determin himfelf, than any particular Reflexions on our own Interiour : Which, tho' they may oftentimes have fome Truth in them, yet, not beginning from the bottom-Truths that concern the point in hand, they can never be jtead)\ but are nov/ and then liable to fome Er- rours. 5:. Beginning then with the j^mmalpun in Man, and confidering him barely as an The Dijference be- Animal^ and wrought upon as Tm\^tntZi ''^^''' A"i"^^^ ^^^' I difcourfe thus. D^urLZioTto Particles, agreeable to the Nature j^aio7j. of the Animal., being by the Sen- fes conveyM into the Brain, do, if they be but Few^ lightly affeft it , and work no other cffedl but a kind of fmall Liking of it j If more^ they make it ( as we fay ) be gin to Fancy it : But, if they be 'very many., and fent ti'om an Objed: 'very Agreeable Or Good to fuch a Nature j they will in proportion to their Multitude and Strength, caui^ naturally a Tendency towards it, and pow- erfully excite the Spirits, fo as to make the Animal purfueitj that is, they will become fuchaPr;«* ci^le of AtUon ; which in men- Animals we call Aj>- fetlt.'. To which Aftion that meer Anim,alis not cai'ry*d thro' Choice, or Freely^ but is naturally and a'^cceifarily Determined to AH for the Attaimnent of Reflexion Twclfcch. zii of that Gocxl, in the fame manner as Iron fol- lows the Load -done. But, if we conlider this Animal, as baving now a Ratkmal and Kmnv'ing Cowpiirt join'd to it, things v^ill be ordered after another manner : For, thofe Imprellions are car- ryM farther than the Region of the Brain, even into the Soul it felf, which is endowed with a Fa- culty of Re flecUng upon thofe her Notions, whence fnc gains e.v^i^/er Knowledge of thofe Bodies that imprint' d them. Nor only fo, but fhe can r^/ec^ upon her cirn Operatiofts loo^d.nd know that jhe hwws them • by which means fhe comes acquainted wiih her ovm Nature, and comes to fte that KmwUi^ge and 7?(\?/ow is that Nature of hers 3 which fhe Ends is a Ncbler part of the Man, than is the Body • be- caufe by it fiie excels and governs Beads , and, in great part, under (Bo&, manages Corporeal Na- ture. Moreover, Ihe can dijawfe her Thoughts, compare the Obie^ls, or the Goods they propofe, and gather the Preference fome ought to have above others. 6. Things (landing thus with the Ada?i^ it is evident that he has now not only that Nature called the Bodj^ to M.vmaturaliy pur~ provide for: but another, and f^'^^ ^hat isjiz^ li ^ r • • / J T / cording roRea- that a Spiritual, and much better ^^~^^ ^r Virtu- Nature, to look to, and to pro- ous. cure for it all the Good he can, and fuch Goods as are Jgreeabk to it. He finds evidently, that no Corporeal Things can be its FroperGood, taking it as 'tis Diflinc!^ from the Bo- ^y. He may eaiily difcern, that its Diftind: Na- ture being Knowings or Rational, nothing can per- fect it but what is according to Reafon^ or improves KnowUdge 3 and that the Acqui'iition of $dence does ±^^ Solid Thilofophy Ajferted, does peife6t it in the latter Regard, and Virtue in the Former • Virtue being nothing but a Difpofi- ticn to aH according to Right Reajon in filch and fjch Matters, or in fuch and fuch Occafions. Reafon therefore is the Ground of all true Mora- lity j and, to aft according to Reafcn^ is tO aft Vir- tuoully : Wherefore, to aft FirtuonJIy would be 7/joH Natural to Man, if his True Nature be not depraved , which it cannot, without Impiety, be thought to be, if weconfider it as it came imme- diately from (Bob's Hand. Wherefore, if it be nor fo nov^^ but be blinded and mif-led from Reafon and Virtue^ by VaJJlon and Vice^ (as we ex- perience it is,) it is demonftrable Therefore his Na- hence, a pnfieriori^ that it has been ture k^ been per- fo^^^ ^^y Or Other perverted (ince verted incc his • ^ • i • i /^i -n- Creatimu ^^^ Creation ^ which Chriitianity tells us, has happened thro' Ori-- glnal Sin, transfus'd from Adam. Moreover, as r he Senfe of Corporeal or Senfible Pleafure or Pain invites the Man to purfue what is for the Good of the Body, and makes him tend towards what's Agreeable, and cfchew what's Harmful to it j fo, in Man, as he is Rational, there is, or ought to be, anfwerable to thofe, a Spiritual Pleafure and Pain, 'viz.. the Satisfaftion and Dif-fatisfaftion of Mind, which we call Conjdence, or the Law of Nature, annex'd to all our Aftions j our Tbcughts ( as St. Paul fays ) accujlng cr excujing 07ie a7iotber ^ fo to keep us from Unreafcjtr.hltnefs, Or Vice, and make us more pliable ro follow Reajon or Virtue. For, as Grief or ?'An is caus'd iii us by our Know- ing that our Bodies, tor which we have a great Concern, is Diforder'd • fo the Stings of Confdence (as far as they proceed from Nature) come from our Reflexion Twelfth. 215 our Knowini; that our letter part, our Soitl^ for which we ought to have an incomparably highcr Concern, is wounded or diford'a'd in her Riitio^ mlity, which is her Effjncc. 7. Hence is fecn, that Man is apt to be wrought upon by two feveral forts of Mo- tives, viz.. thofe wliich are futable Therefore Super- to the Good of the Body, and natural Motives thofc wl^jch are agreeable to the ';:„,Xf 1,2 Good Ot the SouL Now, were ncakcn-'d Nature, not Humane Nature (as was faid) o>- Reafon. perverted, thcfe two Could not clijjl) • nor would there be any Inclination in the Man to do any thing which could prejudice his Superior Part, Reajln j to which the Interior, the Body, is muuTidly Suhfa-vient. But, Man's Nature being poifon'd in the Spring-head, the Motives of the Mrd Kind did hazard quite to over-bear the Motives of the Second Sort , and fo Mankind be- came liable to adt, in a manner, perpetually agaMf Reafon, or, ( to exprefs it in Chriftian Language,) all his Adions might have been Sinful, and himfelf a Slave to Sin. Wherefore, to obviate the violent Impulfes of Paflion, and to Rrengthen our Reaicn againft its Afikults, (BoD's Wifdom, Goodnefs and Mercy took care to give us a Doctrine full of 6>- -pernatural Motives, and thofe the moll: powerful ones that could be concciv'd • taught us by a Di- vine Majhr, and afcertain'd after the hesi Manmr • fo to make the Jp-pearance of the Eternal Goods it propofed ( if reflcded on ) Lively • w hich might keep us upright, and move us effectually to follow our true Nature, Reajcn j and fo purfue our true Lad tnd, by the Pradtice of Firtne, S, Now 1 14 Solid Philofophy AJfertecf. 8. Now, there can be no Queflion but rliar, both in the State of Ture and Un- Supernatura! Mo- Corrupted Mature, as alfo in the fives being the Corrupted State of it, thus pOW- nronger.v^Mal. ^^^^y^ afllllcd, the Innate Pro- ro.DS prevail , r r i xt-t-h t rvere they duly P^ndon of the Will tending ApplyM to a flrongly to Good or Hapfmefs ^ SubjeEi difpos'd. and [ Good ] and [Motive] being in our Cafe the fime , Ftcrnal Goods would moft ftrongly carry the Will, and prevail over Temporal ones j as certainly as Heat 7a oBo would prevail over Heat ut dm^ were there the fame Application of one as of the other to the fame Objeft equally well Difpos'd 3 in cafe the . Propofal or Jppeanmce of both thefc Goods were but Efjttal. 9. Both thcfe Motives, Natural and Supema^ tural^ have their feveral Species Why the u^idey- or Phantafms beating upon the jiandtvgandy^iW g^.^^ ^f Kiiowkdee: with this Power fuhftan- dilterence, that the Natural Phan- tiallj. tafms, being direftly imprinted, are Troper ones ; but thofe Reliex ones, being of Spiritual Natures ( as the Words and Language they are cxprefs'd in do teftific ) '^x^ Metaphorical and Improper. As then, wlien in a metr Animal a Scnfation is made by a fmall Number of Agreeable EfiuvUims they make only a flight Fancy, Imagination or Reprefentation of it 3 but when an Impreflion is made by a great Aiultitude of them, the Animal is Naturally npe for Aclicn^ and is Enabled^ or has a Vower to aH^ which Power, thus prompt to a6t, we call Appe- tite : So ( as was faid above ) in a Rational or Knowiiig Animal^ a linall Quantity of Reflex No- tions Rejlex'ioi Twclfch. iij* tions mav feire to give ir a f^eculnlve Knowledge of the ()bic(5t propofcd : Ikir, when \\yo{t Rtjiix Impreirionsare;??//wj, and offLich Objeds as, be- ing iiery Afreeahk or Good to our true Nature, are therefore highly conccrn'm^ us to have them ^ the Appeaviince of them is To Li^cJy^ and the Strength of their Motive Force is fo gre^t^ that the Man becomes fit to nH for the?n • which Frin^ ciple of Action we call CiUiU^ So that Knovjh4ge and JV'ill di Jer but in Degree^ as did Fancy and A^- petite in a meer An'imaL By which Explication are avoided all the Incoherent Portions about this Subject j (uch as are, that the Underftandi ng di- re tts the Will 3 that the Will kjiov^s j that one Power works upon another, &c. Whence is feen, I o. F/V/?, That the way to conquer in our Spi- ritual Warfare, is, to ftrive to Multiply and Strcv^thm thofe Re- ^^"^ ^' conquer ex Thoughts, elpccially thole ^^arfare. given us by Supernatural Motives y and to make their Appearance Lively in the Soul; that fo it may be able to beat down and over- come the oppolite Band of Imprelfions from Ccr- pcreal Obieds which aHauIt it : Which I conceive to be what is Literally meant by a Lively Faith working in us that befl Virtue, Charity. Next, in order to the fame End, we mufl: endeavour, by a cautious and prudent Avoidance, to lejieft and weaken the Impreliions from Corporeal Ob- jects ; which is done by that V^irtue which v/e call Temperance^ or (when 'cis to fome high de- gree) Mortification 'j and, hy that means to d'.m the Appearance thofe Objects would otherwife^ malce 3 left, if it be too Uvely^ they iho aid over*- P cjme ai6 Solid Hilcfifly Ajferted. come rbe Motive Force of thofe Obiefls which are Spirit ual. Bur, it is to be noted, that the w///- tifly}72g^ or frequently repeating thole Reflex Im- prelFions, are not fo ntccirary to e'very Perfon, nor always the bcft. For, a Wife, Judicious Chriftian, who, our ot a Char S'/gLt of Spiritual Motives, has ( by a thorow-Pcnctration of their Excellency and Prcfcrriblencfs ) his Speculative Thoughts (o Lively, that they fix his Interior Pvacl'c:!l Judg- ment to:;v,r>^ (had. I J for the Attainmtnc of Eter- nal Happinefs, is a fir more Manlj and Strong Chrillian, than thofe who arrive at a Ijgh Pitch by the frequent Dints of Praying, or other good Exerciks, almoft hourly continued : For, thofe irell-knit Thcughts^ and Ratiofml Jiidg^'trjis^ are ( as it w^ere) an Impenetrable Fh^ihujx • and being Connatural to our Reafon, no Allault can lliock: or break their Pvanks. Yet, even in thofe firmeft Souls, Cbriftian Difci-pline and V'.glLjice muft be obfciT'd J left, not having thofe (Irong Thoughts or Judgments //"// in rcatl/nef\ they be jur frizzed by their Ghoftlv Enemy 3 which I take to have been King D^xvW's Cafe, when he fuft hnn'd. II. Secondly^ It is feen hence, that Man dtter- m'lms hlwfelf to Aci'ion^ or is $Xtt* 'lis e'vidcvt, thnt p^ 'J.-3 evident, both to Reafon himfelfro.'^/m/, ^"^ Experience, mat all thole Thoughts, Dilcourfes, Judgments and Affections, he had in him before^ naturally^ or fupernatu rally, are the Ciit4fcs of the Deter- -m'lnatlon of his i^'/iL Wherefore, all thefe be- ing Modes or Accidents belonging to him, and Modes not being D (hivti Entities from the Thing 10 which they belong, but the Thing it jelf^ (or, the Mim thus modify'd 3 ) it follows, thac Reflexion Twelfth.' i^j ^9tt determinei hlmfdf to Adlon j Or, is a Free Agent. 12. Thirdly., SIncc Man has neither Ills Being, his Powers, his Anions, nor con- fequently, the Circumftances by ra^ as Prederer- which he came to be imbud with "^"^'^ h C^OD. his good Thoughts(from whence he has the Fropofals of his true Good, and of chofe incomparable Motives to piirfue it ) from Himfelf'^ but had all thefe from the Maker and Order er of the World : And, (ince this Series of Internal and External Caufes (calLd, in Chriilian Language, God's Grace ) did produce this Deter- mination of himfdf^ 'tis manifefl, that he was P/T- determ'ind by (SoD, the Firfi Caufc, thus to De- termine himfelf, as tar as there was Entity or Good^ nefi in his A6tion. 1 3 . Fourthly^ Since all our Towers are, by the Intent of Nature, ordain d to per- fect us, and that Power, called Determination to Freedom, does not pe}fed any Man ^7''^"''"^. ^^^'''' whik he determines hmiielr to ^g, Sejiroy Free- that which will bring him to Eter- dom. nal Mifery y it follows, that the more he is Determin'd to Virtae and true Goodnefs, the more Free he is. Again, Since a Man is Free when he adts according- to the true Inclination of kis ISlature • and the true natural Inclination ot ; a Man is tO a6t according to Right Reafon^ that is, VirtHoufly • it follows, that Freedom is then moft trii^y fuch, and the Man nn-H truly FrcCy when ne is Determjid to Vi:: jous Auiicms. VVhencc Irrational ty., or Sin^ is by the Holy Ghoii Called Sl.'very, which is opp^^iite to Free-- dom* From which Slax'ery, the Mercy d (!5oD, P z mccily XI 8 So!'i^ Philofophy AjferteJ, meerl}' nnd foldy through the Merits of his Son, our [C cdcc nicr, h as freed ms. 1 4.. Fifthly^ We Experience, that the Lively Propoial of Temporal and Eternal Good, ifevUnt^ Goods, whcn it arrives to that /)' Appearing pitch, that there is bic & nunc^ \uch, docs certani' ^ x -r / • 7 / c 1 ■ a- \ '/y d.ttrynine the i'^iO\ d.t'lennude ( ex parte ^uhjetti J Will. of fuch Objccls or Motives, that it hinders the Co-appcarance, Co- exiilence, and mucli more the Competition of the Contrary Motives, docs always carry the IV'iU,, or the A/j;?, along with it. Tor , the Objea of the Wiil being an appearing Gecd^ ard no other GoocI^ in that Jundure, (at lead, Conlidcrably, ) appe^rlrjg^ becaufe the Mind is full of the ctber j it foiiow's, that the Inclination of the Will to Good in Common^ which Man is naturMly determin'd to, muil needs carry the Soul • no other ( as was faid) then A'ppearing, Whence, Mr. Locke's Polition, that IJjieafricfi alone ts prefent j and his Deduction ther.cc, tliat therefore nothing but Unenfnefi de- termines the Will to ad", is fliewn to be Ground- lefs : For, an Appear'wg Good cannot but be always ^ Trcfent to the Soul ^ othcrwife, it could not ap- pear^ or be an Appearing Good. 15. SixtLIjy Hence wrong Judgments arife, ei- ther thro' Want of Information., Horn Wrong as, when Men are not imbu'd Judgments cow;i'. ^^'llh{u{nc\cnt Kriov I edge of Eter- \ nal Goods j or elfe, thro' Want of Ccnf deration y whence, by not perfeftly ■Ji'f/^Z'- ing and comparing both, they come to prefer Tem- poral Goods before Eternal ones. 1 6* Lafily, Reflexion Twelfth.' 219 i^. L^/Zy, 'ris to b.- notui, that Sin do.s not aK\'a\'s fpring IVimti Falfe Specula- ti've ludi^HK-nts, but from their ,Sin _g-rv:r^//y bdne Difvrrporticnare. For, 'tis a ./;>'-^^:/-^'"'rriie Truth that runpjral Goods arc onarc yw/;^ ;;//. in fomt frrt Agreeable to us- nor would they hurt us for loving them as far as they merit to be lov'd, provided we did but love Eternal Goods as much as the^ deferve to be loved too. Sin therefore is hence occafion'd, that thro' too clofe and frec|uent a Converfe with them^ we too much conceit^ and make vaft Judg- ments of thefe Temporal Goods in p-opurtion of what we make of Eternal ones. And, were not this fo, no Sin would remain in a bad Soul \\'hen Separate, or in a Devil • nor, confequenrlv, the proper Punifhment of Sin, Damnation, becaufe they know all Truths Spcculat:^tly. Wherefore, their hjordlnate Practical Judgments ( in which Sin confifts ) fprings hence, that they do not con- ceity or ( as we fay ) lay to heart the Goodnefs of True Felicity, becaufe they o'ver-concelt or make too-great Judgnients of the Goodnefs found in lome Val[e Lafl E?td^ which they had chofen. Ytr ihefe Difproportionate Judgments , tho' SpeculatI'vcly Trtte^ are apt to beget wrcng Vraclical Judgme7itSy and 7^row^ Difcourles or P^r^/r'^^/Ywj in the Soul of a Sinner, to the prejudice of his Reafon • as has been Ihown in my METHOD, Bock 3, L^jj[ lo. §. 18. 1 7. Mr. Locke s Difcourfe about Uneafricfs^ lies fo crofs to fome part of this Do- ^rine, that it obiiees me to exa- ^^ y^;^l''"*^^^r. . . , , J ^ ,, , and Mr. L S dih min it.He endeavours to lliew that ,,^,j^^ ..//^cr,./;^' Ul^eajj7tejs alcne and not Good Or /;. P 3 the i^O Solid Fhihfophy AJferte^l. the Greater Good^ determines the IViU to A6t, His Pofition, tho' new, and FaradoxicaJ, is very plau- iible j and, taking ir in one Scnfc, ( ^Iz,. that there is always fome Uneafinefs when the Will is Al- tered in order to Action,) has much Truth in ir • ar.d it fef ms to have much Weight alfo, by his purfuing itfo ing..nioully : Yet there isfome- 'fhii:g -wanting to render his Difcourfe Conchi- ilve. For, i3. Fir sly If we look into Grounds and Prin- ciples, they will tell us, that 'tis Good M the only t\iQ OhjeB of any Power, which w'r'ZndTo^ /7^/^^?e/, 01 determines \i'^ and the UneaVmefs. ""' ObjeStof the ^// Cannot beUw^ eafinefs : All Uneafinefs being evi- denily a Confequence, following either from the not yet attaining the Good we defire^ and hope far ; or from the Fear of Lofingit. And, if we l^.ould ask whether Uneafmefidocs aifedl the Will, other- v ife than fuh ratione mali , or, becaufe it is a H.irm to the Man 3 and Eafc otherwife aiFedt ir, than {tih rutione Boniy ( that is, becaufe it is Good to him • ) 1 believe it is impoifibJe, with any Shew of Fieafon, to deny it. Now, if this be fo» it will follow, that 'tis Good only which is the For- mal Motive of the Will j and Eafe^ no otherwife than as it is Good, 19. Secondly^ All that we naturally affcSi: being only to hcHappy^ or to be welly ^T^"^ iTr 'Z it follows, that Good only is that Happimfs, which our Rational Appetite, the JVilly Itrivcs to attain j or pur- fucs, and ads for. ao. Thirdly^ Reflexion Twclftli. 231 10. Thirdly, y4pj>ear'iftg G.od being held by all, to be the Object of rhe Will, (for none hold, that Good will tXv Appeannce move it, unleis it appears fucb , ) "/ '^'^oid isof and the Greattr Appearance of- it %^,^ ./^ ^ ^^^J,, ,.; having a greater, and lonictimcs (iifrc7n>-ded by the GreateH Power to move it, I a>*. Locke, obferve, that tho* Ah'. Locke do.s now and then touch llightly at the ^Ijfprr.rance of the Good propofed to the Underllanding ^ yet, he no where gives the full lVe':ght to the In- fluence the feveral Degrees of this Appearance have over the Underflanding, to make the Man ov'ill it j but only denies that Good, or the Gre.ner Good, in it felf, determines the Will. Whereas, even the GreateH Good, di??7ly afpcar'.jtg fach, may not, perhaps, out-w^eigh the leaft Good, if it be 'very U'velj reprefented, or Apply'd ciofe to our view, by a Ftdl Appear ajtce of it. Hence, his Argument, that \^EvtrlnftingUnJj eakahle Goods do not hold the Will • whereas, 'very great XJiieafi- nef does, ] has not the lead Force • becaufe he ftill leavcS out the Decree of their ylpncarino- fuch to us. For, (ince (elpecially in our Cafe) eadem eft ratio non cntium, O' non cpvarent'ium j and no Caufe works its Htted, but as it is Applj d 3 he fhould either have put an E^ual Appe:iram-e oF the two Contcfting Motives, or nothing will fol- low. 21. Fourthly, This Kcjual Appeara?ice put, his Argument is not Conclufive, . but oppofcs himfelf. For, the P/^'^^?^ ' ' •j Ap- prodi^ioiis Torments iniiicted by pearance , hs the Fieathen Perlccuters, upon cmdud^. the Primitive Martyrs , w^ere, P 4 doubc- zi^X Solid rhilofophy AJferterl, daubtledy, the Create ft prefent Uneafinefs FlefTi and Blood could und^Tgo , yet the Li^jely Jp^ penrance ot zhck buernal JHappincfs, (^i\\Q Dijtant^ and yibftntj which their Well-grounded Faith^ and Ere6l.^d Hope aiTur'd them of, after thqfe Short, tho' moft Penal Sufferings ; overcame all that Inconceivable Uneafimfs they fulferd at pre- fcnt, 21. Laflly^ How can it be thought, that the getting rid of Uiuafmefs , or Proved , hecaufe ( which is the fame ) the Ob- Eafe j> uot the t^j^ii^^ ^f ^^,r ^^^ be the For- sJl^ '' vrxcX and Proper Object ot the Will. Powers are ordain'd to perfect the Subjedl to which they belong , and, tlie hater the Object is which they are employed about, [o much^ in proportion, the Man is the TcrfcHcr^ who applies that Power to attain it. It cannot then be doubted, but True Hufpinefs being the Ultimate Pericdion Man can aim or arrive at, which is only attainable by Ads of his IVdl-^ that Power was naturally ordain'd to bring Man to his highcft State of Perfi.dion by juch an Acquifition 5 or, by loving above all rhings,and purfuing that Objedt 3 and, confequently, lince this coniiiis in obtaining his Summum Rovum^ 'tis the Goodnefs of the Obje-f]:, apprehended and ccncelted fuch, which detemiines the Will 3 and, therefore, the Straining after Greater^ and even the Grcatesi Goods, and b-'ing Dctcrmlnd to thay?^ is vThat, by the Deiign of Nature, his Will was giv«.n him for. Now, who can think, that mcerly to h at Eafe^ is this Greatcft Go(.d ^ or th^ Motive, Objeft, Lnd, or Deccnniner of the Will } Eafe^ without any farther Proipe6t, fcems Reflesion Twelfth.* 133 feems rather to be the Objcd of an Idle Drone, who cares not for ftrfetllng binifcif at all j but fits dill, fatisfy'd with his bull and Stupid In- dolencv. If f^cms to dcftroy the Acquilition of all Virtue ; \\ hich is y^'tvliw/^s^ and not pcrforni'd but by Contra frivg with Eafe^ and prcfent Satif- fav^iions. It quite takes away the very Notion of the Hcroick Virtue of FcrtituJe j whofe ve- ry Obiedl is the Overcoming Eafe, and attempt- ing fuch Things as are Difficulty and Inconiiftent with it. I expciSl, Mr. Locke will fay, that all thefe Candidates of Virtue had not a(5led, had they not, according to their prefent Thoughts, found it Unecifie not to a6l as they did. But I reply, that Unc-afinefs was not their Scle Motiue of Ailing, nor the c;;//, or Formal Determiner of their Will : For, in that cafe, if meerly to be r;V/ of UnenJJnefs had mov'd theni to adl", meer Ecje had iatisfy'd them. Whereas, 'tis Evident, they aim'd at a Greater Good than meerly to he at Eaje. In a Word • Eafe bears in its Notion, a Sluggifli, I naftivc, and mod Imperfeft Dif- poi:tion ; It feems to fute only with the i-^^n^ or Infen(:bility of a Stoick. Vleafure and Joy have fome brisknefs in their Signification : De- fire is ABl've^ and implies a Tendency to fome Good we aiFtct : But the meer being at Eafe de- notes no more but a Stupid Indlfturha^ice • which Noble Souls hate, as wea«, and are weary of it : And, if Eafe be the proper Motive and Deter- miner of the IVJl j and the Created Good the Will can have, or wifh, is Eternal GLry ^ it woiild fcliOW, that the Glory of the Saints and Angels in Heaven is nothing but being in the best manner at Eafe j which is far from Lleva- ting 5, 3 4 ^^^'^^ Fhilofophy Afferted. ring the Soul to the Irghesl; Degree of Perfe- ftion, as Glory^ or the Benrifying S'rght of (Bo& does^ and only (ignifies, fhe is, when in Hea- ven, fccurcly out of Harms way^ or free from being difiurh^d ever after : By which, no great G(?o^ accrues to her, but only a kind of Neutral State, in which (he fnall receive ?rj Hurt. 23. The true Point then feems to me to (land thus 3 The Objed of the Will, Tfje Truth of this an u^ppearing Good^ works many Poi7it Jiatcd. Elfeds immediately confequent to one another. Firft, When the Appearance is but flighty it begets a Liking of it y when Lively^ a Lo^e of it, which deter- mines the Will to it ; to which, if Greats fol- lows an EffeBual Tendency towards it, called De-^ fire of it. Dcfire not fatisfy'd, troubles us, or makes us Umafie : Uneafmefs makes us drive to change our Condition, to get Eafe, This makes us to caft about, and Coniidcr how to fnd Means to do it : Means found, we make tife of them, jmd aciuaUy go about to rid our lelves of what was Uneafie to US. Now, tho' fome of thefc are nearer to our Outward A6lion than others, yet the Appearing Good in the Objefl: is the Common Caufe which produces all thofe Orderly Difpo- fitions ; in virtue of which, as the Fn-d Motizfe^ they do all Act, Allift aridConcurr to determine our Will to go about the Outward Adion with Vigour. 14. Ere 1 part with this Chapter of Vcwcr^ I am to obferve, that Mr. Locke M^.h omits here the }^,^^ j^^^j- any wlierc fomuch as Idea of Power /» , , , 1 ,. / ^faThing, f,V touch d at^ the Power to be a tJatwc fnrg,jfis if Thing -^ tho' Nature gives us as Clear Reflexion Twelfth.' 235* Clear a Notion of it, as of any other Fov.^er whatever. For, as oft as we fee one Thing made of Another^ which we know is not Created a~ ?ien\ fo often our Natural l^eafon forces us to acknowkdge ih'^i funHwhat of the former Thing could be made another Things and this, as evident- ly as when we fee a Thing Att^ which did 7jot jici before, w^e mud acknowledge it had ante^ cedenrly a Vower to Act • and thence wx^ frame an Idea or Notion of fuch a Poii^'er accordingly. But of this Fowevy called Matter^ and of its Me- taphyiical Compart, the Form or Jci; 1 have treat- ed lai'gely already in my Appendix to my Me^ thody to which I refer my Reader j as alfo here, Trellminary 5. §. 6, 7, I note, by this Omilfion of the Notion of Metaphyseal Power^ or Matter^ that Mr. L. holds fo rigoroully to his Firft Ground, that all our Notions are got by Senfation and Re- jlexion^ that he feems to make account, that, by working upon thefe^ we do not gain other No- tions by ufmg our Rea[on \ in which Senfe, I mufl: deny that Ground of his. Or elfe, he omits tJm^ and other Notions, ( efpecially Meta^hyfical ones, ) becaufe he finds no Vro^erf or Tormal Similitudes for them in his Fancy j which makes it (till more Evident that he too much confulrs his Imagina- t'vue Facuky, to the Prejudice of his Reafon 3 ' and, too frequently, means by his Ideas^ meer Fancies, Which alfo is the reafon why he bkinders ii) about the Notion oi Suhfiance. RE 136 Solid Thilofcphy Ajferted. REFLEXION Thirteenth^ O N The Twenty Second and Twenty Tinrd CHAPTERS. I. X Find nothing in Cha^. iirh, [Of Mixed X, Modes] to refled on, but what has been fpoke to already. The Author Our Mixture of purfues with much Accuracy his our ^otion^^s Re- ^^^ Method of fhewing how his IrregiiUr''' and ^^^^^^ ^^ Mhx Modes are made up Diforderly. of Simfle ones. Which, in a manner, falls into the fame, as docs our way of ranging all our Notions into the Common Head of Subftance and its Modes ^ and then compounding them as Ufe and Occalion in- vites us, or rather as Nature forces us. Nor do I fee how the Name ties ( as Mr. Locke fancies ) the feveral Ideas together , more than barely by fignif)':ng the Combination of them made before- hand in our Minds. The different Method in this Point, taken by Mr. Locke and us, fccms to be this: That We^ by diilribiuing our Ideas or l>^oti- ons into Ten dmrnon Herds^ do luiow at firft view in which Box to kjok for them j and, thisdifco- ver'd, we find alfo all our [Particular Noiions, that are within the Prtdn^ls of each Head, by Divi- ding the Head it felf by Intr'^n fecal Dljjerences^ or wore '.wvo. lep of u , whicti done, the Mixture of that Compounded Notion is Clofe and Com^aBed • each Rcftes'ion Thirteenth.' 237 each Part of ir, if in the fame Branch of that Di- viilon, be ing E/twr;W to the other. And, iffome Part of the Compound Notion be taken from other Heads, we, by lookini^ into their Notions, and Comparing them by our Reafon, know bow much^ and what Share of that Notion is borrowed from others, and hAongs or not belongs to it j and in wbat manner if bck^ngs tO it : Which teaches us how to predicdtt diverlly j and inftrudts us hovj the Terms of our Proportions are connecled^ and whether they, be connected at all. Which ex- ceedingly Cv)nduces lo Science, and fas we con- ceive ) is hardly performable by b^s way , but rather is Inconlillent with it. Again, while we Dl'vide thofe Common l-kads, in cafe our Divi- fion be rightly made, we, with the fame labour, frame Genuin and Proper Def^n-ticns of each No- tion under Luch refpcvlitive Head. Whereas, we conceive, his way of Mixing his Ideas wants the Beauty of placing their Parts orderly., \A'hich the Pnxefsfrom Supcriour to Inferiour Notions has j and his Mixt Ide.is., if he goes about to explain and compound them, have fo Ragged, Shatter'd, and Difheveird an Appearance, that 'tis hard to determin which of his Simple Ideas that makes this Mixture, (much more which of his Compounded ones) is to be the Firft, Second, Third, &c. So that the Definitions of his Ideas do more refemble a Confufed Heap than a Regular Bufld.ng j as will be obferv'd by any Man who relLds on thofe Definitions and Explications of his Ideas he now and then gives us. In which, however it may be pretended, that Ins Materials are ort -times pr.pcr, and the fame with ours, yet it will be impolfible to (hew, that his 71^ aj of laying thofe Materials to- geth'.T ]y ^ 5 8 Solid Fhilofophy AferteJ. gethcr is Re^ular^ Artificial, or Handfome. He fpeaks of the Combinations, Compoiitions, and Mixtures of bis Ideas • but I do not remember he ever tells us, much lefs maintains, their Regu- Urity^ or the Order in which his feveral Ideas^ of the ^rWj which exprefs them, are to he placed ^ which m ail neceflarily leave his Rcader'sThoughts in much Confufion. Indeed, it feems not to have been his Intention in this Treatife to obferve the Rules cf Jrt^ but only tO give us our Mate- rials • whcref:)re, as I do not objeB^ or much /w- fiite this Deficiency, fo I thought it not amifs to fwte if. r. While I perufed Mr. Locked 25th Chapter, of tlie Idea of Suh fiance , 1 was Without hiowhr heartily grieved to fee the great- ^hat Subfta.ice ^r^ ^Vits, for want of True Lo* or I ning IS, we . , j , » t • i* i ,^vnjr preuvdto %^^^^ ^"^ ^^"^^^^ ^^'^^^^ "^^ ^^g^f- Philofophy. ing On the right way of Philo- fophizing, lay Grounds for Seep- ticifm, to the utter Subverfion of all Science j and this, not dclig7tedly^ h\xiW\l\\ 2k good Intention., and out of their Sincerity and Care not to affrm more than they kiww. He fancies that the Knowledge of Subfiance and Extenfion are abfolutely iJnat- tiiinablc. Now, if we be altogether Ignorant what Subfiance or Tb'mg means, we muft bid A-^ dieu to ;ill Philofophy, which is the Knowledge of lliTigs., and confeis that we talk all the while of vjti khLow7iotii)hat: And, if we be invincibly Ig- norant of w^hat Extevfion is, farewell to all tha Mathematical Sciences j which, ( thofe that treat of Number^ or Arithmetick, excepted ) do all of them prefuppofe our Knowledge of Extenfion y and arc wholly groundU on that Knowledge. Where- Rcflexicn Thirteenth. 139 Wherefore, that I may perioi m tlie^ Duty I owe 10 SaericemiXTruth, 1 judi!;v my fclf obliged firft CO eftublifh the Literal Truth in this Point ; and» next, to iarisfie his Scruple s and Difiicultics. In order to which I diicourfe thus. 3. VVc can havL no Knowledge of 1 Nothings formally as fach ; therefore all our Knowledge mull: be of 77? />^.f one ^^l our Nornm^ XA^av or other : that is, all our ^''^^^^^^^^^^-'^'^ ^r ' \ ^ ii • 1 1 C \ that of hubixznzQ Knowledge mult either be of the j,,. r^s is taken Res or t he Alodm rei j or, (as the from the Thing. Schools exprefs it) of Stthjhmce or Accidtnts • for , other Notions wc cannot have. Again, Since Mr. Lech grants the Accidents or Modes are not d'lfrincl Entitles from the Thitig * they can only diiier from it Kothvall}' j or, as di- vers Notions, Conliderations, Rcfpeds, or Ab- fl:ra6ted Conceptions, which our limited Under- (landing ( not able to comprehend at once the -whole Thing, and all that belongs to it, in the Bulk ) has of the Thifig^ which grounds them all. Hence, all our Knovv'ledge of Quantity ^ ( under what Name, or in whatever Formality we take it) isof theT'/S/w^ ..:<■ 'tisBig, Divilible, or Exten- ded : Our Knowledge of Q^iiality, is of the 77j;?;o; coniider'd according to what renders its f articular Nature Perfect or' hn perfect. Relation is Hill the Tlnng^ according to that in it which grounds our comparing it 10 others. Now^, as we can confi- der the Thine acccrdino- to its Alodcs or Accidents. 10 we can have a?wtLa- Notion or Conl:deranou of the 7hing as to its oivn fdf^ abilraciing from all thefe former Conliderations ^ or a Notion of the Things (not according to any Ahode it has^ but) prccifely according to ixs Thingfljip (as\w may 140 SoH(^ rh'dofophy AjferteJ. may fav ) or Reality j that is, in order to Be'ng'y or (which is the fame ) we can conhder it pre- cifely and formally as an Ewj, Res^ Suhfiance or Thing;; ; and all we can fay of ir, tims confiderd^ is, that 'tis capable to he aBually. For, fmce we fee Created Things have Aclual Be'mg^ yet fo that they can ceafe to he • all that we can fay of chem, (thus confder'd) is, that they are Capable to he, Befides, lince wc f ;e they have Being, were this Aclvial Being Or Exiilence Ejjhitial to them, they would bi of themfd-jes^ and fo could Jtct but he; and, confequently, mufl: ahvays be ; which our common Reafon and Experience contradi6tsj in regard we know them to have been made • and we fee many of them daily Produced^ and others Corrupted. This Difcourfe is built on this Princi- ple, that all our Ideas or Korions ( and amongft: rhem the Notion of Subflance or Thh^g ) are but fo many Conceptions of the Thing j or which ( ta- king the Word [ Conception ] objctlivdy ) is the fame, the Thing thus or whus conccivd j wbJch, befides what's faid here, is prov'd at large in my Second and Third Preliminaries. 4. Novv, according to this Explication, which v;hen we are diilinguifliing the iVe cmimt be igm- Notion of Thi7jg or Subilancc rant of the Notion f^.^^ j^g j^J^^ ( ^g \^,^^\^ ^f ^^5 .^^^ of 5ubltance or ^ n . • i .1 ^ • • r 'Phi^g here) is evidently trucj it is lo far frojn being ImpoiUble to kno-w^ QXi^ndiJlintlly, what the Word [^V^/'/^wct'] or, which is the lame [Thing] means, or what Subltance is, that it is impoilible to be ignorant of it. For, every one mull: needs know what it is to be • (ince without knowing f/?/f, we could not underftand any thing another p//, nor what oar lelves Reflexion Thirteenth 2|i Iclves thhik , tor all this is pciform'd b)^ Afjirm- Ing or TJmjlng , cxprcfi'd bv' [ is ] or [ is jwt ,] which fpcak Adual Beings Or not Being, And 'ris in a manner Equally ImpoiTible noc to Jznow what [Ciipacity'] or [Fowcr^ means; which arc the only Ingredients of [ Caj)ahle to bei] wiiich is the very formal Conception of £?//, as 'tis precifely Ens • or, of the TIjing according to the meer No- tion of Sub fiance^ taking that Word in a Logical Senfe, as 'tis dlflingLiilh'd from Acc'uhnts ^ and not in a Grammatical one (as it were) for a Suvj)orter o'f\\\c Accidents; for, this hi Secondary Senfe of [T/j;>;^,] and does not fignifie what /> 2;> in it felf, or according to its Primary and precife Notion, as is noted above ; but, according to what Re{pe(^ or Confideration it bears to otbers^ or other Notions. 5:. Thus far concerning the Llea or Notion of Stibftance in Common^ or taken as abftradtcd from it!> Modej or Ac- ^'■' ^-"^ '^^^ ^ore c/V/^«rx.De{cending thence to fuch ^f^^^ f 'j'^'^" and fuch forts of Subitances, ar.d perfc6lK^i keeping ftiil in that Line, 'tis plain that there goes ?norc to their Compofltion, than there did to conftitute the bare Notion of Subfia?ice it felf ; and therefore the Modes or Acd- de?its raufl: be taken in (for there is nothing elfi in Nature imaginable) to conftitute ihcm Juch and fuch : Wherefore, the Complexion ofthofe Accidents which cinfiitHtes th.em of fuch or fuch a Nature, and nothing elfe, is (as the Schools phrafe it ) then Subfiantial oi' ElfentirJ For?rj. And, if we go yet lower, there w^ill need ilill a greater Complex- ion, or a Decompolition of Accidents for the lame Reafon , and fo ftill ?m)re^ till we come to an 24- Solid Fhilofophy Affertetf, Ind'rj'ichtal Thing ; Or, as they call it, the Suhflan- fidntia Prima ; which, Only, is in '^:;i, pt '^ir: proper speech, J Thing, hecaufc of i,!i k only I'i Capable of Exijhvg. huty when we are got to this loweft Step in the Climax of Sjib/i-ance, 1 mean to the Indi- 'vidiium Or St^ppofitum., which includes in it all the Modes that conlHtuted the S'lperioar and Inferi- our Natures above it, andthofe innumcr.ible Ac- cidents over and above, wiiich difLinguifh it from 'A\ other hdlviduums of its own kind, and by which it is perfectly dcvermin'd to be This in par- ticular, and 7w other j then, 'ti'> no wonder our bewildcr'd Thoughts are iofl ia a Wood • it be- ' ing impoiTibie for us to conceive, find oiM, much lefs to know diftincfly the confuf^d Mcdky of thofe Numberlefs Accidents or i\lodifiCativ)ns found in the Suppc/itmn, which doc6w^/ of the Accidents ( they nil wanting in their No- tion any Order to Bein^ ) could be conceiv'd to be at all. And this, in Literal Truth, is tiie great IMyftery of thofe Polirions, about which Difpu- rants in the Schools, blinded with their own ill- underftood Metaphors, have fo long, like Anduba- t^e, fought in the d.U'k about fuch Qjcflions as thefe, 'viz,. WJKther the Eljencc (jf the Accidents is their InexijhncL\ or Inherajce in the Sjfh;ta7icc - Whether the Subilance f/fppcrts them in Being: Is their Suhftratum^ or the SubjeB^ in which, thofe Accident.il Forms, do Inhere ? Then, in purfu- ance of their Fanciful Metaphor, fome of them begin to cafl: about how thofe Forn^i are United ro the SithjcH or Subft-ance^ or COnie to be recei- ved in it j in ordv^- to w hich, and that nothing may be wanting to do the work thorowly, they coyn a new connecting little Entity, calfd an Union, to foder them together, and ib, inftead of making it One Hntiry, they very wifcl/ make Tcree. All which Conctits, if we look narrow- ly irito them, have at the botrom this m.iftake, that all our fcveral Conceptions have fo many di- ftin6t Entities in the Thing corre(i:)onding to them. Which vafl hrrour both perverts all true Philofophy, and is againft a Firll Principle in Mctaphy licks, by making Umtm to be Di'vifum in /e, or One Eyitity to be Maiij, Now^ if theic Modes be Things, or ( to fpeak more properly ) if the Notion of every manner of a Thing be the formal Notion of the Thino- it U^. or ofwbat^s Ca^ pable of Exiting y Hrfl:, the Nature of Modes is de- ft roy'd ; for they will be no longer the [ IIov^\ ] but the [ IVhat 'y ] and the Nature or Notion or Subfiartccy or £»/, is loft too 3 for, if all the Modes 0.3 ars z^6 Sditl Philofophy Ajferted, are Diriin^l Entities, or Capable of Exifting^ they mafl ail be Suhjlr.nces ; which blends all the No- tions Mankij:d has, or can have, ( on the perfed: Dljr:ntTwnof\sh\Q\ ^// Science is grounded,) in a pcrr< di Confufion , ard, confcvqiiently, reduces all 'JUr Kiio'ivkdge to a Chaos of Jptorafjce. 8 But 1 wonder n^oft, how this Learned Man can. think none knows what £x- ^Tis jTvtjnjjiy" mt tevfwn is. We Cannot open our to ^770K, Exren- £y^g ^^j- ^-^^y inform US, that lion, itbeiv^. :n i *• J i i-> j* i • i /: • /• Self- ^^'^ -^1^'' ^^^ Other Bodies which evident ' wliich we fee, are nor cramp'd into an Indivifible, but are vaftly Expanded, or ( which is the fame ) Extended, Isi-^y we not as well fay we may fee Light, and y-=t have no Ncuon of it ? And, does not himfelf make Extenfion to be one of his Simple Ideas^ the Knowfcdge of which goes along with all the Kiuwledges we have of Bodies j and, withall, refemhles the Thing • For what, thinks he, ferves an Idea^ but to make Men Know by it what it reprefents 3 or, confequently, an Idea of Exten- fto?i, but to make us know Ext en ji on ? Perhaps he may think we cannot know it, becaufe we can- not define or explicate it, but in Words Equivalent to if. But, iirft, this Objection has no Ground ; becaufe all Definitions and Explications in the World arc the fa?ne Senfe with the Notion they Define and Explicate , and, were it nor fo, they would be no Definitions nor Explications of that NotivJii • . for they do no more but give us all the T^ris of the Entire Notion, and all tbe Farts are th? fame as the H^hole, Next, how^ does it fol- low, that, becaufe we cannot explicate it, we do not knew it ? Whereas, the diretl contrary follows in Reflexion Thirteenth. z.^y in our prefcnt Cafe: Tor, the commonest Notions can the Vforsi be defind, beCaufe they lenfi Jtctdll^ bcini^ Stlf-hiov-'?i^ or Sclf-e\'idenr. Nor all the Wit of Alan can DeHne and Hxplicate what it is to be j and, yet, all Mankind knows it perfccllj^ or clfe it is impoiUbl'^ they, not knowing what the Copu!.^ means, lliould know the Truth or Falf- hood of any Propolition whatever. Thirdly, He feems to think that (as fome of the School-men do imagin) Contradictory Pofitions may follow out of the Notion of Extevfrcn • die, why fhould he imagin the Difficukies concerning it are Inex- tr:cahU : Which I muil: declare againll:, as the the wcrsi piece of Sceptic} f?ny next to the denybig ^\[ rirft Principles. For, if Contradictory Poii- lions may follow out of any Notion taken from the Things then that Notion, and confequently the Thing it felf, woukl not have any MuapJjyfi- cal Verity in />, but be purely Cbi-rfjerical, Add, that the learned Thomas Alhius^ in his Excellent Preface before the Latin Edition of Sir Kendm DighyS Treatife of Bodies^ has Clearly fjlv'd thofe Imaginary Contradictions. 9. To fhew^ the Ditliculty of Knowing Exten- fion^ he objedts, that no Reai'on can be given for the Cobcficn of The Coh-^floj} ofEx- the Parts of Extended Matter. If ^^^^^^ ^^,'^'''! '{ he means, that we can give no ^,^^^.^ ^„;^ ,,„ Thyfical Realon for it, or iuch an f,,,//^,^ kvoivn by one as fetched from the Qi^ialities Metaphy Ticks. or Operations of Bodies, 1 grant it j for all thofe Qiialiries and Operations are fuh- (equeiit to the Notion of Extertji^?;^ and Gnundid on it: But, if he thinks there cannot be a far Better and CUnrcr Reafon given from the Su- CL4" pream 248 Solid Fhilcfophy AJfcrterl. pream Science, Metaphficks^ I deny it. I ex- plain my felf • All Polltions that concern the Ef- fenccs of Things^ or Modes either, (lo belong to the Obje6i: of Metaphyficks ; fo that, whoever makes the Natures or Ejjcnces of any of thefe [not to he 'ivhat the) .?re,] is mofl: clearly convinced, by his violating ttiat Metaphyiical Firft Prirxiple, {A Th'iv^ ts what it Js^^^ to maintain a clear Contra- didliun. If then i3ivilibility be the Ejjence of Qjantity, and Divifibility fignife Unity of the Potential Parts of Quantity 3 and Continuity ( as making thofe Parts formally Indix'ifas in Je ) be evMently the Unity proper to thofe Parts j it fol- lows, that Qjantity being the Common Affe- ction of Body, does formally^ and as T^ceffarily^ make its whole Subje6l, that is, all its parts^ Con- tinu i, or Coherent ; as Diuility does make a Stone and a Tree formally Two ; or Rotundity in a Bo- dy makes it Round , or any other Formal Caufe is e:igag'd by its very Ejjence to put its Formal Ef~ fetl^ which would induce a Clear Contradiftion if it Oiould not. 10. 'Tis not in this Occafion only, but in ma- ny others too, that Great Scho- Whencc'thhivain Jars puzzlc their Wits to find out to feeh for wa:u. Kat?fral Oiuih for divers Etteas feEls that depend ^ Owing to TranJ-natural ones, c?3 formal Cnu- OX from thefe Alti/Jimie Caufc^ f'^' which only Metaphyficks give us ; and it happens alfo, not (cU dom, that Men beat their Brains to find out Ef- ficients for that which depends only on Formal Caufes j whofe moH certain Caufality depends on m Second Caufes, but only on the Firft Caufe, Reflexion Thirteenth. 2^9 (Bob's Creative Wifdom, which cilabli/Vd tlicir Ellcnces to be vdiat they are. Let any One ask a Naturalifl:, why Rotundity dots formally make a Thing Round., and you will fee what a Plunge he will be put to, not finding in all Nature a Proper Reafon for it. The fame, in other Terms, is the Ground of Mr. Locke s Perplexity how tx- tcnded Parts do cohere ^ to which, the propercft and moft Satisfa(ri:ory Anfwer is, becaufe there is Quantity in them, which is Elfentially Conti- nued ^ and, fo dOsTS Formally give Cohtrence of Parts to Bndy^ its Subie^l. By the fame means we have a Clear Reafon a^brded us, why Boaies impell one another- which }^\x,Loche thinks is Inexplicable. For, putting one Body to be ihruft againft another, the Body that is Vulfi've muit ei- ther be fhov'd forwards, or there muft necclfari- Jy be Penetration of Parts ; unlefs, perhaps, at fird, the ImpuKive Force be fo llight and lcilurely» that it is able to caufe only fome Degree of Con- den fation. Every thing therefore acting as it ts., if the Body, or the Quantity of it, be Extended., or have one Part wahtut the other, and, there- fore it be impoliible its Paits fhuuld be penetrated., or be one ivlthin the other, tlie Motion of the PaHTive Body muft necelTarily enfue. 1 1. To proceed : Ah*. Locke makes account we have as clear a Knowledge of Spi- rits, as we hax'e of Bodies j and iVemayhaveCAear then argues, that we ought no i<-oM^e of S pi- more to deny the Lxiitence of Reflexion Thofe, than of Thefe. Which I llioukl like well, did he maintain and prove iirft, that the Nature of Bodily Subftances is clearly In- telligible ' But, to make thcfc Notions w hich are moil ^5'I Solid Philofophy AJferteJ, niofl: ElTcntial and Proper to Bodies, and moft Ob vioiis of all others, 'vlx.. their Ent'ny or Subftamcy and their ExtenfJon^ to be Unintelligible ^ and then to tell us, that Tbe Idea of Spiritual Natures are as Clear as that of Bodily Subfiance^ which he takes fuch pains to fliew is not Clear at all^ is, as I con- ceive, no great Argument for their Cleamef^ nor their Extjluice neither j but rather, a (Irong Ar- gument againft both : The Parallel amounting to this, that we know not what to make either of the one, or of the other. 1 2. As for the Knowledge we have of Spiritual Natures, my Principles oblige me The Reafon VVhy ; ^^ difcourle it thus : We Can have and the Marnier ^ r^« cl x- • c j^Q^ no Proper or Direct Notions or Spiritual Natures, becaufe they can make no Impreifions on our Senfes ; yet, ( as was fhewn * above,) our Refie- * Keflex, p. § 7. xion on the Operations , and Modes which are in our Soul, jnake us acknowledge \.ho(c Adcdes ai'e not Corpo- real ; and therefore, that the Immediate Subjeft of thofe Modes (our Soul) is not a Bod)\, but of another nature, vaftly different, which we call Spi- ritual. Our Reaibn allures us al- *izL^zf'f ^^ fo, * by demonftrating that the C.6!^§.'i8. '^ firft Morion of Bodies could nei- ther proceed immediately from (Bod, nor from our Soul^ ( which prcjuppojh both that, and many other Motions, to her Being,) that there muil be another fort of Spiritual Na- ture, diftint^ from our Soul, from which that Motion proceeds j which therefore being Adlive, and fo in y'lti it felf, is not a i^on/part^ but a Whcle^ and Suhfifitnt alone 3 which we call yingcls : Their Opera- Reflexion Thirteenth. 1^1 Operations prove they have Actual Bthiq:^ and therefore a fortiori they are cafahle to he^ or Things. Whence we mud corred our Negative Expref- fions of them by our Reafon • and hold, they are Vofitlue Thmgs ; all Notions of Thing being Vofi- tivc. Farther, we can as evidently difcourfe of thofe Beings, or Thivgs, tho* Negatively exprefs*d, as we can of any Body : 1/. g. if an Angel be Non- tjuantus., we can demon Urate it is Nov-extenf/f^ Non-locahilis., &c. and, from its having no Mat- ter., ox Tower., which is the Ground of all Poten- tialitj and Cha77gL\ 'tis hence colk6led, that 'tis a Fttre AB 'j and, therefore, th2Z once Dt term:?/ ii^ ic is Immutable, at leaft Naturally. Laftly, I affirm, that, this prefuppoftd, we can difcouri'e far mors clearly of Spirit, than of Bodi^-S: For, there are thoufands of Accidents belonging, intrinfecally or extrinfecally, to every Individual Body, whence all our Confnjion^ and Ignorance of it comes ; whereas, in a Vure Spirit^ there are onl}' three or four Notions, ^jz,. Being, Knov/ledge, Will and Operation, for us to Reflect on, and Manage; and, therefore, the Knowledge of them is ( as far as this Confideration carries ) ?mre Clearly attain- Me^ than is the Knowledge of Bodies. » I ^ I ■■ 1 RE^ 5* I Solid Fhilofophy Ajferted. REFLEXION Fomeemh^ O N The 24//J5 2 5//? 5 26th y and zjth CHJPTERS. I. npHE i^tb Chapter [Of the CoHecIive Ueas 1 of Stih fiance ] gives mc no Occafion to re- flect. Only when he lays ( as it The Mind alone ^^^q \ foj. j^jg Ground, that the does not collect , ,. » t ^i AWct;;, or com- ^'^^^ ^^ ^ ^^^^.^^ ^^ C(7Wp^rf, or ^^?-5 f/?^;». colIeH many Ideas into one^ I am to fuppofe he means, that the Mind does not this of her felf ^/^we, witliour the Joint- afting of the Body, ^s has been often prov'd above ^ for, otherwife, the whoky or the Man^ can- not be faid to be the Author of that Aftion. 2. The 2 5:th Chapter gives us the true Notion of Relation^ and very dearly ex- rcri>al Relations prefs'd j which he feconds with ' come not from Dc- divers Other SoIid Truths, 'uiz, feB in our Lan- ^^ j^ j^ ^jy j^ ^ ^y^ guage , hut for f 1 1 1 / •want of a Real Joltite are Relatives • that Rela^ Ground. tlon can he onlj hetwixt twoThings ^ and that All things are cafahle of Relation. What I refle6l on is, that he gives us not the true Difference between Real and meerly Verbal Relations 3 nor the true Reafon why fomc Relative Terms have^ and others ha^ue not Corre- lates He thinks the Reafon s why we call fome of ihem ExtrinfccalDcnominations (which is the fame Reflexion Fourteenth. 25-5 fame with Verbal Rchulcns) proceed t\om Defeti in our Language, or becaufe wc want a Word to iignific them? Whereas, this matters not a Jotj iince we can have the Lle.i or Noilcn of Relation in our Minds, if we ha\'e good Ground for it, whe- ther w^e have a Word to (ignifie it or no , or ra- ther, if we have a Red Ground for it,we fhall quick- ly invent either fome one Word, or eJfe fome Cir- cumlocution to exprefs if. Let us fee then what our Principles in this Affair fay to us. 3. ReLnion is not here taken fjr our JB of Re- lating, (for then it would belong to another com- mon Head of Notions, CdlYd y'uiion) but for the T/jing as it is referred by our Comparative Power to another jWherefore,there mud be fome Gromtd in the Thing for our thus referring in 3 and,con-' fequently, if the Relatiori be wf?/^ or fuch a one as before was not^ there mud be lome Novelty in the Thing it felf to grcimd it. Whence follows that, if there be fuch a Real Ground on the one fide only, and no Real Ground on the other, there will be a Real Relation on the one fide, and no Real Relation on the other, but only a Verbal one, or 'dnExtr'mftcal Deno?nbiatien J Anlwering, or (as it ' were ) Chiming Grammatically to the Term which is really Relative, 1;.^. Our Powers of Seeing OxUnderfianding2Lr\y thing,have TiReal Re- Lit ion to their proper Objects j both becaufe fuch ! Objedts Spedfie the Power, or make it fuch a I Power, that is, give it its peculiar ord]ftin6t Ef^ fence-, as alfo, becaufe the Power is by the Objeil agitated and detcrmm d to a6t • that is, the Power is intrlnfecally Chang d^ Or otherwife than it was, by means of the Objetl y but the Objed fuHers no kind of Change^ nor is it at all Ahird^ oj- other- ^5*4 ^^//^ Thilofophy AJJerfecf. w'fc than it was bv bein^^i; kvovr/i ox feen. Whence the InttllLc^ive or Viiive Vov^crs arc recUy Rela- ted to the Ohjeci j but the Objects, for want of a*' Keal Ground^AXQ not really Related back to the Pow- ers ; however the Words [ Underfioo^'] or \_fetn^ ] do Verbally anfwer to the A 61s of Underftanding and 5ee;>;^ j which is, therefore, cali'd by the Schools in their barbarous Language [ Relatio de- d'xi'] or an Extrinfccal Denomination. For far- ther Light in this very necefiliry Particular, I re- fer my Reader to my Method^ Bock i. LeJJl 7. Vv'here, if I flatter not my fclf, he will find the Notion of Relation treated of very fully and clear- ly. Efpeciaily I recommend to his Perufal the «;)th, loth, nth, and nth Section, where I dif- courfe of that Lhimutttal Relation of the Meafnre to the Thing mcafured j the exadt Knowledge of which is far more ufeful than any other piece of this Subjed: j however it lay out of Mr. Locke's Road to take notice of fuch Speculations as re- gard, or not regard, ihcThJ?ig as their Ground. 3. Reviewing his?-' Jth Chapter, { ■fCanfc and Effect^ &c. ) 1 foun ihat he ac- ^'.irCaufalityls, quaints US very exarTiy, how we and ^^kat grounds -^^ j.|^^ 7./W of them, by our The Relations of ^ ^ \ \ i ^ Caufe^^.^Eifea Senfes , but he proceeds not to fhow us, ( whicli yet he onjn does in other occafions ) in what the nature of Cciufaliiy confifts, wliicli is of ihc Chiefrft life in Philofophy. For, what is the Learned part of the World the better, foi' having thofe rudejt Draughts^ or(asiVIr. 7.. well calls them ) w^:/enW^, of Knowledge, Ideas ox Kctioijs, or for knowing how we come by thcw, ( in which he very fre- quently termiiiates his linquiries, ) if we do not by Re- I Reflexion Fourteenth. i5'> Reflexion and Kcafon, ^vli\\) and YLfm thcni, aiid . thence attain to true Knowledge of the Thinu^s, 4rom which we glean'd them j or by wliat virtue the)' come to be Caufts of luch Effccls ? What T conceive of Caufullty is, that 'tis the i^owcr of Participating or Communicating lome Things or lome mode of Thing, to the Patient, which was before fome way or other, in the Thing that Lausdxx.: On which point I have no occalion to to dilate here particularly. Only, which con- cerns our prefent purpofe, I am to note, that that which is thus communicated is the Real Grounds on which the Real Relation of the Effecl to its Cau[e is founded. Whence follows, that the Caiife \ alfo, when it has fome Real Change^ by being re- I duced from the /w/j/'r/a^fr State of meer PoTi^^r, to the Per feeler one of ^Y-/, or ( as we fay ) gets feme- thinq^ by producing fuch an Etfedt, will have a Real Ground^ and Confcquently a Real Relation to the F(Fe(5t, and not otherwlfe. And hence it is that (!5D&, our Creatour^ has no Real Relation to his Creatures, tho* they have many tO him • be- caufe her is no otherwlfe, nor better, in the leal!:, by Creating them, than he had been in Cafe he had not Created any thing at all 3 and therefore there is no Ground in Him of a Real Correlation to them. 4. The 27th Chapter ( of Identity and Dlvnfity ) requires a deeper Conlideration. In order to whach, I know no 7'^^AW".^ ^^^ jiiore Compendious way to clear dividuatlon, ^the Point in diipute between us, 7nuj} a^teceede ti.t \ than to fetch my Difcourfe from KmuUdge of l- I thofe Principles that concern it. ^I'^^^'f ^"""^^'^ The Subject dues, indeed, pro- ^«^^^y- perly ^^6 Solid Fh'dofophy AjfcrteJ, pcrly belong ro Meraphyficks ^ but I will en- deavour to do what I can, to avoid thofe Ab- fl: ranted Mediums^ which are made ufe of in that Supreme Science. And, firft, as the Ground w^ork of my Difcourfe, I am to fettle the ?r indole of In- druiduation^ Or how a particular Tlji77g or Subfiance^ Comes to he n^hat it is , for, this done, it will be eafily feen whence we are to take our Aieafures, CO judge when it continues ^(i fame^ and when it is to be another^ or a Diiferent Thing from its former [elf. I difcourfe thus ^ nor will it be Tedi- ous I hope to repeat often, what is fo Vfeful to be remembered, as being the furc Ground o{ aU our Knowledge. 5. All our Conceptions, by which only we can difcourfe of Things, are either fy T^ mimsT' ^^'^ either the Notions of Suh fiance or Thing precifely \ or ^{{^^ the Notions oi' Accidents. Of thefe the Word [ Tiding^ has a very A b/lradled Notion^ and is perfectly In- different and Indeterminate to ail Particulars: Wherefore the Notion of fucb a Species or fin of Thing, being (as was faid above) more Deter- minate^ muft have foniething fipcradded ro it rodetermin ir, and compound or conftitute it of fiich a Species j which can be nothing bat fuch a Complexion of Accidents Or Modes ^ there bdng (as Was faid) nothing elfe imaginable that can be ad- ded ro the Notion of Thing. Now, Philofophers agreeing to call cliat which determ'.ns the common Notion of thijig • and fo, covfl'tutcs fuch and fuch Species or Kinds of Things [ A Siih/lantial or Effen- tial Fcrm-^ hence, i\\t Suhjlimtial Form of all the Sorts^ K:n:h-^ 01 Species of Natural Bodies can be nothing Reflexion Fourtecndi. 15-^ nothing elfe bur fiich a CompLxion of Acci- dents, as fit tilt Thing for fuch a khul o^ Opera- tion in Nature. And, hitherto, if I miftakenot, Mr. Loch and I may agree in the main, how- ever we may differ in the manner of Lxplicating our feh'cs. 6. Dcfcending then to the hdl-vidHjls^ it is evident, that a Greater Comple- xion of Accidents is necelTiry to ^^^^ .c^'^'^^ ^^^ determine and conftiture the fe- GronvdtoourNc^ Veral Indi'V'.duums^ than would vlduum. ferve to conilitutc the Species ; for, the Species or Kinds of Things ai'e but fev^^ but the Indi'viduums under thofe Kinds are Innu- werMe j and, therefore, r/iore goes to diilingui/li thefe from one another, than was needful to di- ftinguifh or determine the other : Whence ic Comes, that we Can never comprehend or reach all that belongs to the Suppo/i^um, or Indi'viduum, Wherefore, it being a certain Maxim, that ■[what diflingui^ies^ does confiitute^] this Medly of Innumerable Accidents, which dijjcrences or di- fiinguijhes each Individuum from all the reft, does alfo intrinfecally confiitnte thofe lnd>j:duHr/!s • or, is the IntrinfeCal or Formal Principle of Individua- tion. Moreover, fince nothing in Com?ncn^ or not ultimately determined to be This or That,, is capable of Exi [ting -^ nor, confcquently, in proper Speech, a Thing • it follows again, that that Com- plexion of Acccidents, which gave the Thing its Primigenial Conflitution in the very firft Intlani: \ it was thus ultimately Determlyi'd to be This^ ( or j Different from all others of the fame Kind, ) did I truly and properly Indl-uidtsate ir. Note, that rhrs 1 Difcourfe holds equally in Eletjicnrary, fvlix d, R Livings X 5 8 Solid Philofophy AJJerted. Living, Vegetable and Animal Individmms ^ al- lowing only for the iinaller or greater Number of Accident!?, which goes to the conflituting each of them refpe6livel}'. Why Mr. Locke^ who al- lows the Complexion of Accidents to conftitiite the Sptclfick Nature, fnould not follow the fame Prin- ciple, in making a greater Complexion of the Modes Intrinfecally di(l*7iguijJj the Indl'vldnidm from ;jll others, and fo conftitute fr, I cannot imagin j it being fo perfedtly Confonant, and ncceflarily Confequent to his own Doftrine, and agreeable to Evident Principles. 7. Applying then this Difcourfe to ALm : Since it is the conftant Method of God's Ho^v Individual wifdom, as he is the Author of Men .ve C'Ji'Jf m ^ ^\ r^ r tuted. Nature, to carry on the Courle of it hy Difpofitions on the Mat- ter's fide ; and, therefore, to adjuft and fit that which Su^ervaies tO what Tre-ex'jfis j and, efpe- cially, to fute the Form to the Adatttr ^ and, fince 'tis evident that the Embrlo frc-exijfs to the Infu- f:on of the Soul, as the peculiar Matter to its Form y it follows, that the Soul is ndjufied to the Bodily or An'.mal Part 3 and, according to the Degree, that part of it, calfd the Fanq^ is better or worfe fitted (as far as is on its fide) to perform fuch Actions, when it is ripe ; or, mor^ or Uj^ 'til to w^ork ccmpcratlvdy^^ ( in w hich all Judging and Dil'courfing " confift^^) there will * M.t!)od rn Sci- }^,. jj^f^^^'j ^ 5^, jj ,^^ ^^ .^^^ ^^^j ence, B. 2. L. I. ,.,- ^ ,- ♦; -^ /^,, §. J Q^ d.'Jcoioje mere ftrjectiyy or Up per- fetitly, according as the Matter requires. And, were it otherwile^ fo that the Soul were apt to work -more perfedllj thaji the Bo- dy were able to go along with it3 firll, that greater Reflexion Fourteenth. z^c) Greater Degree of Rational it)' in the Soul would be losl^ and in -vain y and next, the Md/j, G()d*s Worknianfhip, would be diJpropcrth.n\l, and, in a manner, Monjhom in his moll FJI'ential I'arr^. Putting then thofe I^arts orderly fitted to one an- other/ whicli can only be done ( as was iliewn ) by futing the Suptri'oiivg Parr to that which fre- exiihd, it Follows necvllariiy, that as the Bodily or (meerly) Animal Mutur o'^ Mjii\ the Embryo^ was, in the Inllant before the Soul was infufcd, (and the Man made, ) inJi'rj- dually different from all of the fame Kind, or from all orher Embryo s • and fo, was, confequentl}% jail: to fuch a Degree, fit, by the peculiar Difpofitionof its Brain, ( a'^ its conjoin'd Inifrument, ) ro act with the Soul fof/^paratix'e/y -J fo, it is impolfible (the 5c.v/ being proportion'd to that Matter, as its Form j that any two Souls ffiould be perfectly ^/i/^c, ot Equ.d in Rationality ; or rather, that any Two A-hn^ (lioiild have a Capacity of Knowing, or Reafon - ing, to the fdf-farr.e Degree : For, Were they ttjually Ratio?jaI, thofe f!2'o Men WOuld bc but ana and the fime Man Ejjentlally^ or under the No- ;lion of fuch a Species j in regard that, tho' they 'might have many Accidental Ditferences, yet ihey would have nothing in the Line o': fuch a Rational E;ts^ or M.m, to dillinguilh tliem F.jUn- \tiuHy\ or make and conftitute them formally Two Ifuch lintities, or TuingSy as we ziW Men, oiRr,- \tivnal Anhnals. \ iS. This premised, I come to cxamin I^Ir. L*s Difcourfes upon this Subjed". He inugins Exlftence /.- the Prin^ Exiftence rwito: cipU vf bi(lrj:ditaiicn ; whlCh ^jp.^ ^/ jj^jivi- ^^cm conlift with no Ihow of duatioa. 1< 1 . Reafon. 2. (Jo Solid Philofophy AjferteJ. Keafon. For, lincc Thing in Common cannot cx- iO, and therefore what's Ultimately determhi'd to be this Thing, or an Indi^idtwm^ can cnly be capable oi Ach4cil Being \ 'tis evident that the In- dividual Thing muil:, ( in priority of Nature or Rcafon ) be /r/? conflitutcd fuch, ere it can be capable of Exijhnce, Wherefore 'tis impoJible that Fxiilcnce, conlider it how we will, can be in any manner the Fri7jciple of Jndividucnivfj^ the conllitution of the hidividuum being prefuppo- fed to it. Again, lince, as lias been fliovvn a- bove, the Notion of a Things or an Indi'vinunm^ ( fpeaking of Creatures ) is [ Capable to be ] 'tis impollible that Actuitl Bei?jg^ or Exishnce^ fhould COnftitUte the Totentinlity or Capacity of Beings a- ny more then the mcer Vovnr of walking .can conditute or denominate a Man Actually walk- ing, Belidts, both Logick and Metaphydcks de- monllrate that, Existence^ it being the immedi- ate Elfed: of the firftCaufe, v/ho is ElTentiaLy an Infnitly-Fi^re AHuality of Beings is therefore the mosi Actual of any Notion we have, or can have. Wherefore, lince whatever docs Jiff'tnnce or di- llinguifh Another, miift neceflarily be more Aciual * than the Notion DitVmguilli'd 3 it follows, that Exifl-ence is of its own Nature a moft perfectly uniform and UnJ/ffJ?7gif/jJ)r.bie Elfe6l, that is one and the fame in all Creatures whatfoevcr, as far as concerns its ov^^n prccife Nature or Notion : F6r Reflexion will inform us clearly, that what- . ever Notion is DiHinguijhable is Vuttntial • and that the DiHingu'.flnijg Notion is more Aciual than it. Since then no Notion can be mere Atlual tlian is that of Exigence j it follows, it cannot poilibly be DlHlnguijVd at all. Whence follows tWs Refles'ion Fourteenth. ii^t this Unexpected, tho' Clear, Confcqucnce, thar, if Exigence does conHitute the Indi\iduality, all the Individuums in the world, as having one and the 6'i'//-/jwf Con fii cuter, would be but oiie hull- "vlduHm. 9. Next, Mr. L. fancies, that the Exiding of a Thing in the fame Time and Vlacc^ jit O'ltTa/n-d o>- conftitutes the hkntlty of aThing j ctw.pmes of and the being in ftveral Times Time .vm^co Vlaces COnltltUtCS its Diver- conjlimte rb" In- fity. By which 'tis eafy to difcern, dividual EfTcn- that he diftinguifhes not between ces. the Extrinfecal Alarks 2\\(\ Signes by which we may kmv? the Diftinftion of In Mu'uliu.is, and vfhat hitr'nifccally and EHentially conilirutes or makes them (l.jfereut Things. Who fees not that Time and Vlcice are meerly Extrinfecal to the Notion of Suhfiance^ Or rather toto genere different from it, as belonging to other Common Heads .^ And therefore they are too Superficial Confiderations- for their hientltj and Diver fity ( which are Rela- tions grounded on their Elj'ence ) to confift in them. Belides Time and Vlace arc evidently no more, but Clrcumfiances of the Thing j where- fore, that veiy word ( Circumflance ) fliows plain- ly that they cannot be Jntrinfecal, much lefs Ef- Jential to it j and it evidences moreover that they fiippofe the Thing already conitituted, to which they are annext. Tlio' then VratVical men may have Hght thence todiilinguilh lnd,'Z'l(lHums\ yet, it is very Improper for l^iilofophers, or Spe- culative Refle6ters, to make the Entity o\ Things, which grounds the Relations of Uenllty and Dl- ^jerfity^ to confijt in thcfe Outwavd Sl^ms and C/r- vumfiantlfll Tokens, R J 10. This z6z Sol/rf Thjiofophy A(fert€cL 10. This Learned Gentleman conceives there muft be a Different Reafon for >; Individual ^^^^ Individual Identity of Maji. Man is formniiy To make way to which he pre- /77; ^ indi'-oidunl niifes, and would perfwade us l'!"i:^;.l r-^f", that ,> U one thing to be dividual Ferfon ^he lame Suhfio.nce^ another the rco. fame ykT^w, and a third to be the fame Ferfon. But, 1 muft forC- ftall all his Subfequent Difcourfes by denying this Preliminary to them. For, fpeaking of one and ih(^ fame Individual Man, as he does, I muft affirm that *tis all one, nay, the fame Formal Conception of him, to be the fame Suhflance^ Alan and Ferfon, For Bxample, 'tis evident that Socrates is one Thing under the Common Head of Suhfiance^ or Ens,, defcending by the Geijus of Animal^ and species of Homo ; whence this One Thin<^ or Subfiance is not only Neceflarily, but Formally one Man^ becaufe he is formally a a Thing, or Snhftance^ under the Kind or Specres of Man ',, and 'tis impollible he can be under a- ny other. Again [ Man] bearing in its EiTentiai Notion that he is an Intelligent Being,, he is Ef- fcntially and Formally one Ferfcn too. Nor can we feparate, even by our thought, one of thofe Confd^ rations from another, unlefs we take the word [ Subfrance ] Or [ Man ] in a Generical, or Specilical meaning for Si^bfrance^ and Alan in com- w»7' , v/hich we are forbid to do by our very Subject in hand, which is about the Principle of Indiz>iduaticn y Or elfc, unlefs he rakes Subfiance for Parts of AT^mr, with their Quantity and Fi- gure acceding and deccding to the Indl^iduufn ; which Things arc not Lilential to A'l^w^ nor fit him Reflexion Fourteenth. 263 l)im Tor his Primary Operation , wliicir Pofirion follow'd home, would, perhaps, make the huh- viduality oF Man, and oF all Tliini^s die, alter every Moment. So that Ah". Locke^ led by the ditferem Sound of Words, makes Three Notions of One; and then racks his Wits to iTicw how this One Notion,made into Three,is diftinguifh'd j which we may ealiiy foretell miift: render his Difcourfe very Lxtravagant , as uill be {ccn /hortly. ir. Pcrufing his Sth Section, I much fear that liis Tenet, that Brutes are know- ing and rational^ does influence The Eflence of his Thoughts ftran2;cly on this "^^'^i^ "^^ '<> ^^ Occafion, and make\ him dillike ';^/ -^7% Jt' 1 T^ r • • r ^ r r • Jiiigmcnt of toe the Dehnicjon or Man, iz!:z,. a y*ils, or Engins a6ted and animated by them : So far are fuch wild Suppofitions from giving us the Notions of Things. But the main Point ( in which Mr. Locke frequently miftakes ) is, that it matters not at all what People think of JH'-^gc. We are indeed to take the Meanings of Words which exprefs our Natural Notions, or Simple A pprehenlions, from the Ufers of them, the Populace 5 but, the Applying, or Joining , thofe Words or Notions to one another, in order to the framing Thoughts or Judgments of fuch Connexions, we are to take only from the Learn- ed^ or from the Vnnc'fks belonging to the Sci- ences that treat of fuch Subjects, and not at all from the Vulgar • which if we did, we muft iudge, asmany ot themdoubtkfy do, that the Moon is no bigger than a great Chcjljire Cheefe j nor one of the Fixed Stars fo big as a Brands-end, or a Beacon on Fire. II. The Reflexion Fourteenth. 16^; Ti. The former Diftinclion forclaid, he pro- ceeds to make Vtrfon^l hievtity in Man to coniifl in the Ccvfckufvefs Confcloufners that ve are the jame thmkivgThing p^^^^^^j \^^^^ in different Times and Places. He ^jfy proves ir, becaufe Covfcicufnefs 7s Infefnrable frtm Thinkings and as it fecms to him, EiTential to it. Perhaps he may have had Second Thoughts lince he writ his 1 9th Chapter, where, § 4. he thought it probable that Thinking is but the JBion and not the Ejfence of the Souh His Rea- fon here is, Becaufe ' tts tm^cfjihle for any to percei'vey ovithout fcrcel'vwg that he does fercel've. Which I have fhewn * above to be fo far from Impodlble, that the Con- * Reflex. 2. § 1, trary is fuch. But, to fpeak to 3)4>y- the Point : Confcloufnefs of any j^i;Hon or other Accident we have now, or have had, is nothing but our Knowldge that it belonged to us j and, (ince we both agree that we have no Innate Knowledge s^ it follows, that all both A- . ciual and Habitual Knowledges which we have, are Acejulrdor Accidental to the Subject or Know- er. Wherefore the Man, or thatThing which is to be the Knower^ mufl: have had Individuality or Perfonality from otherVnY\C\\p\^%antecedentlyiO this Knowledge call'd Confcloufnefs -^ and coniequent- ly, he Vv'ill retain his Identity, or continue the Jame Man., or ( vvhich is equivalent ) the fame Perfon., as long as he has thofe Individuating Prln- clples. What thofe Principles are vvhich con ili- tuted this Alan^ or This Knowing Ind.vlduum, I have fhcwn above, §§6,7. It being then moll evi- dent,' that a Man muil be the fame, ere he can know or be Ccnfcious that he is the fame j all his laboriou^^ a6<5 Solid Philofophy AJjerted, Laborious Defcants, and Extravagant Confcquen- ccs, which are built upon this S 11 ppofitions, that Confcicfffnefs ifidi-Xilduates the VerfoTiy Can need no farther Reflexion. . 13. Yet it is a great Truth, that Confcioufnefs of its own A 61 ions is biftparable 7l;.^tCof)fnoftfnesis ftom a Kmwhiz^ Indian dual Sub- infeparMfrow ^^^^ ^^. Per/,;;, and reinairs every Jtuii'via-AaL -' . , \ ^,. ^ , , , . / TVIan. ^vith it eterfiafly • and ( which will juftifie the Forcnfick Confi- deration he mentions) \v\\\ Acquit or Cottdimn him when he appears before God's Dread Tri- bunal j not becaufe it confiimtes its Perfonaliiy, bat becaufe nothing we once k??eiPy or know- ing, r/;r/, is poilible to be ever blotted out of the Soul. Whence it comes, that a Soul not only knows her felf as foon as feparated, ( or rather, is then her own Fir}}^ and moft Iwrnediate^ and E'ver-moH-p-efent Objedl, ) but alfo, becaufe, fhe then knowing all the Courfe of the World, and, confequcmly, all the Adions of her pad Life, both Good and Bad, is difpofed, by the Know- ledge of the former^ and by the Conlequcnces of them, hid by (Bo&'s Mercy or Juftice, to erc6l her fclf by Hope to an Ardent and Over-power- ing Lcroe of her true Lad End, which will faue Irt ; or, by her Knowledge, or the Confciouf- nefs of the Latrevy to fink into De(pah\ which will phinge her into a Hell of fndlefs Mifery. )t is alio true, that we are Confcious here of any perceptible Good or Harm that liappens to our Pcrfon ; becaufe we cannot but RcficEt on what concerns an}' part of our huJividuumy which is our Sdf^ which, yet, is fo far from proving that our Pcrlonality c(.7tf:Jh in this CunfciouCids, tiiat it Reflexion Fourteenth. ^6j it provcsthc dirccl: conrnuy : For, it ilicvv> that our Pcrfon, or Individual Sdj\ afFcvltcd thus agree- ably, or difairrccably, is the Qbjcd ot that Ccji- fciotifhef] • and Objects mull be a7Jtccedtnt and frc- (uppofeel to the ylch whjch arc employed about them, bccaufe the Objeds are the CrJiJc of thoie ^ds. Nor is there anv farther Myftery in the Word [Self;] for it means no more but (lo- ovm [nme Intelligent Indi^^'uluum^ with which we are well acquainted, partly hy Dlrecl^ partly by Re^ flex Knowledges. 14. It looks fo very odly to fay, that one of our own Acls fhould conftitutc our own particular Efjence , Td Anc^els wh ( which it mull: do, if our Per- ^''^ ^'"'^ ^p'' r 1 ri ■ ^ r(L ' ^ are con ft touted yjn (r.nal Identity Conlilts in our Con- ^^^^^ y^ ^y^, ^^ fcioufnefs^ } that I am apt to think of Know: ng tbem-. that Mr. Locke's great Wit aim'd fehes. at Ibme other Truth, th(/ he hap'd to mif-apply it. 1 can but gucfs at it ; and perhaps 'tis this : 'Tis, without doubt, true, that the tillence of Subjifient Spiritual Natures^ which (as having no man7ur of Potentiality in them ) are Pure Ads^ ( I mean yln^els, ) confifts in Atlttal Knowledge j which ylH is firil of tbo.m- fel^es. And, if lo, why may not this Act of the Soul, caird Confcioufnefs, emplov'd about her felf^ or her own Actions conllitute the SoHi\ or the Man's Perjcnal'ny. But, the dirierence lies here, that thofe Pure Spirits having no Mat- ter or Potentiality in them, Afmexd to, much lefs Identify d With their Natures, their Elfencc is formally conftituted by their being in Ad accor- ding to their Natures , that is, by being Atltuilly Knov/ivg : Vv'hereas, the Soul, in this State, be- ing l68 Solid Fhilofophy Averted. ing immeiVd in Matter, and Identify d^ or ma- king One Thing W'ich her Bodily Coinpart, and 7ieeding to ufcit as her Conioin^d hiftrument (as it were ) to attain Knowledge, is therefore in a State of Potentiality ; whence fhe has no Innate Notions^ ( much Icfs Principles^ ) but is meerly TiiJJl^e in acquiring thofe Firft Rudiments of Knowledge : However, after \\it is thus pre- informed, //je ( or rather, the M^nv Foryn^ as makes it liv.-fit for its Primary Operation^ tO which it is grdain'd, as it is a Diliinv^ Part in Nature. Xor CTixx this argue in the leafl:, that Ccjjfdoufmfs con- jhtutcs Verjcnalit)' j bccaufe thjs happens not on- ly in A/t'?/, or Pcrfons^ but alfo in Trees and Dogs • which, if they lofe a Branch, or a Leg, are ftill the fame Subfidnce^ or Thing j that is, the fame Tree^ and the fdme Dog^ as all thiC Workl acknow- ledges. RE- 11 E F L L X I O N Fifurntb^ O N The lith^ '^.gth^ SOthj Sith^ and ^ith CIUPTERS. i.npHE 28th Chapter [Of other Rtlatuns] X is Very Ingenious, and confonani: ro his his own Principles. It mighty indeed, ihock a kfs attentive Rea- ^^' '- '^ "«-> ^^ue dcr to lee Virtue and Fke rated, ^'^'^^.^> ^'^''^-'^^ or even 10 n)uch as named 10, Right Reafon. from the Refpeft they have to the Labian Rule of Repiitatiun or Fafhion, cali'd in Scripture Co7iftittudo S^cull^ which the more Libertine Part of the World would fet up and fftablilh as a kind o't Law. And this, I iuppofe, was the Occalion that made that very Learned and Worthy Perlbn, Mr. Lovde^ except againil it. Ikit the Author has cleared that Point fo perfe6tA \y in his Preface, that none can now remain dif- uiisfy'd : For wlio can hinder Men from/w?;9';;;^ and mmjifjg things as they lift. 1. 1 take leave to difcourfe it thus: The word [I'^irtue ] both from its Etymology and true L'fe, iignih'es ALmly, or btccnjhjg a Ma?;, taking him according to his Genuin and Undeprav'd Isature given him by (SoO ^ that is, Right Reafc?:, This Reafcn, if we ufe it and attend to it, will give \h the Knowledge of u Daty : In Speculative Meri, by X72, Solid Fh'ilofophy AjJerteJ.. by way of Demonp^ratlon ; in others, by a kind of* Traclical E^vUence^ from their obferving the Re- gular and C)ilft:ant Order of the World, efpeci- ally of the Celeftial Bodi'i^s ; as Hkewife by their Scanning, according to their d liferent Pitch, the Solid Grounds of the Chriftian Religion Reveal'd tousbyCBoD, 'vlx.. The certain Tcftimony of the Miracles, and other Supernatural ways by which it was introduced and recommended. This Right Reafon convinces us we are to Adjre this Supreme Being and Great Governour of the World, and to Obey him in thofe things he has manifcfted to us to be his Will. Tins aifures us that he governs his Creatures according to the Natures he has given him ; and, therefore, that he governs Man- kind according to his True Nature, Rio-bt Reafon ; and confequently, that the Rule of Livings or the La-iv he has given us, is abfolutely the Beff for the IJniverfal Good of the World, which Right Reafon teaches us is beobferv'd ahd preferred be- fore the Satisfaction of our own private H'umour or Appetite ; and therefore this Rule, call'd the . Decalogue^ or Ten Commandments^ is moB Rational, Whence, from its being mod Agreeable to Man's true Nature, Reafon, 'tis hence ftvled Jus Divl- num Naturale^ or the LaW lurlt in M:n s H.'arts. This /hews how compleat a Summary of our Com- portment with all orhers of oar own kind, that Incomparable Precept is, [Dj the fam: to others as you irould they jljotild do to you'] and that a Rule fo /hort and plain in Ji^ords, and fo comprehertfive and univerfally Beneficial in Senfe^ could only be di(5tared by a Divine Mailer. Tijis aifures us that, if this Infinitely Great andGiod Governour does, to elevate aaJ perfeS Souls, oblige them to helie've any Reflexion Fifcccnth 2.73 any other and higher Poirirs, efpeciallv fuch a? are Uncouth to the Courle of the World, or to Natural Realbn, he will, our of hisWifdom and Goodnefs,givc us fuch Convincing G rounds foi' our Belief of them, as Ihall overpower the Repugnance of our Fancies, and oblige us according to Princi- ples of Right Rcafon to allent to them as Truths. This tells us alfo, thro* our Reflexion on the Good- nefs,Piety and Peaceablcnefsof Chridian Doftrine, that the Principles of ic ( that is, the Doctrine it id^) are True and Sacred ; and lets us fee how in- finitely we are bound to his Favour, and Merciful Kindnefs, for enlightning us with fo Sacred a Law, and fo every way conformable to Right Reafon. And, if any Company or Sort of Men have, out of the Depravednefs of their Nature, fram'd to themfelves, and introduced any other Rules of Manners, grounded upon Vain-Glory, Falfe Reputation, or any other new-fangl'd Con- ceits of their own Invention 3 v.g. if they would ftrive to Legitimate, and make pafs for Current and Unblameable Morality, Duelling, Exceliive Drinking, Sw^ earing. Whoring, Cheating, &c. This tells us how Unmanly , and far from Right Reafon, thofe A6tions are • and how the World could not long fublifl, did Men take their pri- vate Revenge, befot their Brains continually with txcefs j Blafpheme, or needlelly and careleily (that is, irrevently) (lubber over (SoD'^ Holy Name, which alone gives Majefty and Authority to all thofe Sacred Laws j or, did they live pro- mifcuoully with Women, or take away all they could gee from other Men. Tj:s Right Reafon, abetted by Coftly Experience, ihews us whar per- nicious Cunfequenccs , and Inconveniencies of S many a 74 ^oli^ Philofophy AJferte^. many kinds, do arrcnd the Breach of thofc Laws, inflitured for the Univerfal Good of the World j and, how all the Courfe of our Life is dif-joint- ed, and out of Frame, when we once yiefd the Conduct of it to Pailion and Vice. Laflly, *Tis this Light of True Reafon, which makes thofc who are confcioas to themfelves that they have deviated enormoully from this Rule, look upon themfelves as Debauchtrs and Deferters of their Reafon, which is their Nature ^ as Breakers and Contemners of the Law ( not of the Land, but ) o^i\\t PVcrld^ and Difrtgarders of the Law- giver himfelf 3 as Bale, Mean, Corrupted, and Rotten at the Heart, Degenerate from their own true Na- ture 3 and, therefore, ( nnlefs they reform them- felves,) utterly uncapable of being promoted to that Perfection and Happinefs, to which the ever ready Generofity of their Intinitely-Bountiful (BoD and Maker, would otherwife advance them j ajid, moreover, as Liable to all thofe moft Dreadful Punifhments, which the Anger of fo great a Ma- jefty, juftly provok'd, will certainly inflict on them. Whence enfues Interior Heart-gnawing Sorrow, and Stings of Confcience j and, if they perlift, Defpair and Damnation. Thefe Things coniider'd, and Virtue being Nothing but Rigljt Reafcn (Man's true Nature) employ'd about Fit- ting Objeds, in Fitting Occalions, 1 do not think we are to attend to what hrational Men, Liber- tines, or Humourifts call Virtue or Vice^ and cfteem Laudable or BlameabU ; but tO what Right ReafoVy the only EJlahl/jIid and Impartial Standard in this Cafe, teaches us to be truly fucb : And, L think it had been better, and more unexceptionable, to have called fucb good and bad Difpolitions \^Re-- pitsd ReHexiop? Fifreciith. %y^ puted l^irtues and I'lccs^ ] thin to join thofc Q^j.l- Jitics in an \ 'nivocal Appdlaii.;n with thofc Ratio- nal or irrational Mubirs, which only, in proper Speech, '3i\C truly {\vz\\. II. As to the iprh Chapter, [of Diflind and Conhifed Ideas] I cannot think that the Confuficn -^f Ideas, ts In refe- ^^^ ""' """J- 'J , •/ ' , 1 r ' have Lonraled revce to their hianies 'but IpringS jj^^^^ orNothns. moftly from the Reafons allign'd by himfelf, §. 3. For, what are Names^ but the Words which fignlfii' thofc Ideas ^ The Idea^ then, is in my Mind, ')i>hat it is^ 2,\\di fuch as it is\, inde- pendently of thofe Karnes , as being there before I named it. And tlie fame Reafon holds, for keep- ing up the Didi notion of thofe Ideas • for the No- tions will be (till what they w^ere, whether cm Name or Another be impofed on them : And, I think Mr. Locke agrees with me, that they are like Figures, which, the leaft detraiSed, or added, makes the Idea be quite another. If one talks to me of a Muft'i.^ and 1 take that Word to fignifie 2 Rat-catcher.^ my Idea of a Rat-catcher is the lame aS if the Word [Rat-catcier] had been uf^d, tho' the Reference of the Idea to that Name be as wrong as m.'.y be. Or, if i fpeak of an Indivduum^ cajicd Longinm., and another takes that Word to figniHe ar./rr/j my Idea is confttfed, being of 'dnlndi'vi^ dtiifm • and his DifiinH.tho the (^Ford be the fame. So.'*-' the fame Perfon, re6tify'd as to the Meaning ot any Word, takes it now in a different Senfe than he did formerly., then he has another Idea by it than he had , but yct^ both his former., and his New-got Idea are iliil unalterably and perfedly di- ft-int5t. But, I obferve, that Mr. Locke attributes many Thing; lolTurds and Names y which, Whe- S X ther 276 Sol'irl Vhilofophy AffertcJ. ther it be his Over-acutenefs, or my Dulnefs, I can make" nothing of. What 1 conceive of Ccn- fus d Ideas^ is this : In two Cafcs chieiiy rhey are Confiis\l^ ^uiz: when there is a Confufion in the Things thenifclves from \vhich they are taken, and to which they Correfpond j as, when too ma- ny Confidcrabilitics are blended together ( as it were) in the Lime Suppf/i turn ^ or Ivdi-v/duum j or, that the Object it felf conlifls of ALmy Things y as, a Heap, an Army, a Sack of Wheat, &c. Or elfe, when the Obieft is not well reprefented, ci- ther by Defect: of the Organ, the Diftance of the Objcd^, o]- the ill Difpolirion of the A'led'.um. To this latter fort belongs the ImpcrfccStion of our Undcrftanding • which, notable to comprehend the whole J'ij'ing^ is forced to make many Inad- equate/<^f^/ or Notions of it ; which, not reach- ing to partich'ldvize the Thing, mud therefore be Common, or General, as containiJig more under fhem Indeterminately^ that is, Covfrfedly. In two Cafes alfo. Names ieem to caufe in us Confufed Ideas : One, wlien the W^Ord is perfdtly E^u'rjcealy and ligniiies neither Senfe dxtenmnatdy. The other, when a Multitude of Words are huddled together mart iflc tally. Or (lammer'd out unlntell'i- g:hly • to which we may add, our not underfland- ing the Language thorowly. In which Cafes, we have either no Notion at all, or, if any, a very Confufed onc. And thefe feem to me the only fo- lid Ways to breed Ccnfnfed Ideas, as being taken from the Nature of the 77;/?;!^;, and of their Cir- cumftances j and from the Nature of the JVords^ as Words • that is, from their S/gnificati'vcnejL As for tiie Secret and U77ohJer^jed References, the Author ipeaks 0^^ ifbkh the Mind maka of its Ide^s to fuch Namcs^ Eefle\}o>j Fifteenth. T.jy Names, I mud confcfs, I know not what it means, more than that the Undcrflandinii; knows perfccTt:- \y^ orimpcrfjvitly, what the Word (lands for, of ( which is tlic fame ) what is its true and proper Meanhig. Concernini; hifiyi'ty^ of all Ibrts what- ever, I have faid enoui^h formerly, on divers Oc- calions. 3. The 3cth Chapter needs no A\iy Reflexion. The 31th, [ O/* Ach^uatc and In- adcciuatz ///t'/^f,] has in it much r/;? whole r/Vw^, of true Philofophv; efpecialiy, ^^it^^^^dnm, fa 1 t I :u 7-A c ^' cannot he where he makes the Ejjcnces oi ^.„,^,„ ,/^,^,/^,^ Things conlift in the Complexion of the Modes or Accidents, I grant, that whole Complexion is not knowable by us in this State : But, why have not we as much Knowledge of rhem as is necellary for us ? Or, w^hy muft we think w^e know Nothing of them, unlefs we have ( over and above our Dfe ) all thofe fuperfluous Degrees of the Knowledge of Things, as may fatisfie alfo our Curiofity, or Humour ? By thofe Accidents of Gf/Litnre, and let our Wirs loofc to follow their Burterflv Fiwc'ics • l-or, that Thh^ caird [ Mnv^ J as thus conceived, is ai truly a species, and [ .'hj'nnj! ] a Genus, COn/idcr- inir it us it is in our UruhrshmJino- with inch a de- gixe of Abftiaciion, as an Irjdividual Man, as ex- iltinjGJ in re^ or cut of the Underftanding, is Two- J^gc^'d, or a I-iorfe four-footed. And, for the lame Reafon, 'tis as evident to true Logicians, or rigiu Kctic61:a'S that in the Proportion now mentioned, there are as truly, really, neccllarily and elFcniially thofe Three parts lately fpoken of^ as 'tis to a Mathematician, that there are three Corners in a Triangle : The fame Reafon, I fay, holds for both , for the Soul is as really a Tbl77g^ as the Bodies in Nature j and her Modes, or Ac- cidents, and their Manners of Exifting, are as Real, as thofe of any Bodies are, or can be, per- haps more. Whence 'tis Evident alfo that, in the Propofition now mentioned, the Thing di- verily concciv'd, or its Modes, are trulj and real- ly Subie(S^, Predicate and Copula in the Mind ; and that, tho' they be expreft in Logical Terms, they do not put olF their Natures, or Notions, which were direcily and Naturally imprinted on the Underilanding • but are only fuper-vefted with an Artificial Drefs, thrown over them by our Reflexion : For, otherwife, we could not fay the Thing call'd [ A Stove ] is hard, but we muif I withal mean and fay [ the Subject Is the Predicate ] in cafe not the Natural Notion of the Thing, but only the Logical Notion were predicated ^ Nor could the former of thefe two Propolitions 1 ji be True, the Later, Falje, if the Thing it (df, or its 2 Modes were not the Materials that Compounded ic, c, W'hae- a86 SoUd Fhilofophy Ajferted. 5. Wherefore, this is to be eftablifht as a certain Maxim, and a nccdlary Prclimi- ^Z :l^::; :( r^".'-^ f PMloCopby wbarcver, chiefly ftgnifyd. ^^^^^ US th<:T/j;7lg m our mind lh2it gives Solidity and Steadinefs to all onr Judgments and Difcourfcs j for ail thefe are made up of Notions, that is, of the very Thing it felf in our Mind, hiadequately and Uiverlly conceived : Wherefore That is (till the Ground- work^ however it be wrought upon, order'd and poftur'd by Reflexion and Art. From default of this Confideration fprings all the Wordillmefs, and empty Difputes among trivial Philofophers ^ of which Mr. L. does, with goixi Reafon, fo of- ten Complain. I wi/h he could as well give us an account, that the Idt^s he and others (peak of are the Thing it felf^ inadequately concciv'd by us, and not meer Refrefmtations of it , for, this done, we might hope for true Fhilofophy from the Principles of the Ideifis. Which they cannot pretend to (how, or to give us this Hope, till a Iblid Anfwer be given to what's alledg d againfl: them in my Second and Third Preliminaries j where I undertake to demonftrate that 'tis im- poliible. 6. I am not of Mr. L's mind, that Mctaphyfi- cal Words (however Logical ones Met.iphficalmrds may be ambiguous ) are fo unin- j^.r Unintelligi- t,ii:a-:ble, or in fault. For thofe Die, but molt '^i 1 r -c j^ • 1 (^le^j. w^ords that lignil-y Bemg^ or what nearly relates to it ( which are the Chief Objeds of that Qjeen of Scivrnces) are abfolutely the CJeareft that Mankind ever ules, or can ufe • fo that, whoever abufes or mifaccepts them, mull needs be a Deferter of Common Stnfe^ Noct Reflexion Sixteenth. 187 Not\vithflandin<4, in regard fomc pretended Schollcrs have on diver"; occalions iis'd /^Z;/^/<>;^Z;;- cal^ and c\cn Common Words vaiioull}', 1 have thought fit to add a Fifth Preliminary, to fhow what Senfe the Chijf Words us'd in Philofophy nnifl: have ; and that they ca7i (ignify no other. Laftly, I have iliown at large in my Method^ B. i. LejJ', loth. how Eqiiivocabcfs fprings, and how it may be detected and avoided. 7. This Learned Authour having mofl: elabo- rately, largely and acutely profe- cured in his former Book rhe This Third Book Diftin^ion of his Llais, and the comemi.^Woxds 11 f^ r r/' 7 k • ^ ►. ' j''^^ Unnecel- whole Duty or Hords, bemg to j-^ fignlfy our Thoughts to others, I cannot difcern what need there could be to rake fuch pains about thofe Outward Signes. Many curious Remarks do indeed embellilh his Dif- courfcs, which lliow that his Exuberant Wit, can make good work of the dryefl: Subjedt, and raife elegant Structures out of the Sleighteft Materials: Yet, notwithftanding, I fee not how they conduce to promote the Solid Knowledge of Tblvgs. The very Ejjt7jce^ 1 fay, and the Nature ofM^crds being to ^/j^T?//^) our Notions, or to impart the Know- ledge of the Things in our Mind to Others 5 their Scnle muft either be frppos'd to be Agreed on, and Foreknown to the Speakers and Hearers, or they will fcarce be allow'd worthy to be call'd J fords but rather Empty and Infignificant articulate Sounds. Wherefore, if the Idea or Notion of the Spealcers be Clear, or Obfcure 3 UiftinCt, or Con- fus'd ^ Adequate or Inadequate, &c. The ^W muft either exprefs it actord.?7giy^ or it is not the N^me oiftich an Id^a or Notion, nor a Word Ht for 1 8 8 Solid Fhilofophy Ajferted. for it, and much lefs for any thing elfe • and there- fore 'tis good for nothing at all. This makes me wifh Mr. L. had rather thought fit to take parti- cular Notice of thofe Words, which have been Abus'd or Mifaccepted by Trivial Philofophers • and had clear'd their Ambiguity, rcctify'd their Impropriety, and Subllituted (if need were) others more Proper in their ftead j which muft: certainly have had great Influence upon the Advancement of Science. Nor need he much wonder that Dull or Hady Men, who either are not capable of much Scnfe, or will not take pains to refleH on their Natural Notions^ or ( which is the fame ) on the meanings of their Words, do make ufe of them, and yet talk hy rota all the while • following the Track of others whom they have heard fpeak them, or the Jargon of their Mailers ; who breed their Scholiers to flick to their Words, as unal- terably as if they were Principles 3 tho' perhaps neither of them were fo Wife as to know, or fo Prudent as to regard much their determinate Meaning. 8. Things ftanding thus, and my Intention, in this whole Treatife, being only Wlnnce'S. S. ismt ^^ ^arry on mYM^^thodio Science. much concern d to -. ' j ^ r^ i- i- ^\ r reflea(?w/^ and to reduce to Solidity^ thole Difcourfes which I conceive have too much of Fancy in them, I have no more tcf do, as to this Third Book, but to note by the way fome particulars that occurr, and which, as I judge, do byafs trorn true Philofophy. 9. The Author fecms to diflike Nature teache, ui ^^^. ^^^ of Defining by 2. GifWi to dehne bv a a - ' r^. ,r j i • i Genus^WaDif- ^^^^ ^^^ Difference, and tO think ference. it may be better perform'd by enumerating Reflexion SiKtccnth. 289 tnurrtcrating fomc certain /r/tv//, which, put tojj;e- thcr, do make up the Send- oF the Notion dcfln'd. To abctt which Doftrinc, lie gives us this Defi- nition of a Man^ 'VIZ.. A Solid Extended Suhfinncef hav't7i^^ Life-, Se^jfe^ Sp(?ita7]eo7ts Aiotion^ avd the Fa^ culties of Re.ifunbiq;. I difcouiTe thus : What beft futes with the VuJgm-'is one thing, what becomes Men of Art ^ another. It will ferve the Common People well enough to declare their Thoughts by buddlmg tcgether many particular Conliderations y nay, they will d fine even Indl'viduums (if fuch as thefe may be calfd Definitions ) by this Method, as Homer did Thcrfnes. But the Point is, how Art^ which is to ^crfdl and ^oll{\i the Rudenefs of raw Undifciplin'd Nature, ought to behave it {dL Reflexion^ the Parent of all Arts, teaches even Houfewives and Lawyers, that 'tis ^ery conveni- ent for the one to put fuch and fuch Linnen into diftindt Drawers j and, for the other to diftribute all thofeWritings that concern different Bulineifes intodiflind Boxes : And the fame Faculty teaches Logicians alfo to range all their Notions (the Materials they are employ'd about ) into diflindl Common Heads, fo to gain a Dljl'mtt Knowledge of each ; which, they being innumerable, would otherwifelie mingled confuiedly. This perform'd, what are they to do uext ? Mufi: they hover uill in thefe few common Heads of Notions ? No,cer- ^tainly 3 for, then, they would not have enow of fuch more-particular Notions as are needful for Difcourfe. They mull d_fcend therefore from thoie Common Notions to more-particular ones under each of them , and this , as Plain Reafoa tells us, gradual! )■ : that is, they mull d:z^:de thofe Common H<;ads by Immediate Diftinftive l^o- T lions, Z()0 Solid rhilofophy AJferted, lions, caird Dtffereiues : for, were they not D//^ fereiit^ the Produ6t of that Divifion could not be more Notions • whereas Divifion mufi: ( at leaft ) make 7l?/^o of Owe. And, whence miifl we take thofe Differences ? From fz/j^r Common Heads ? No (lirely • for this'wouki covfcunddW our Noti^ ons again, wliich we had taken fuch Care loji- filngttijh into thofe Heads, in cafe the more "parti- cular ones, or the refpcdive Species^ were made up of one Notion found in c?7e Line, and of another found in another. Thofe Differences then that divide each Common Head, muft be found with- in the fame Head, or ( as we ufe to call them ) muft be htrinfecal j which ( * as * 5. 1. L. 3. § 2. is dcmonftrated in my Method ) can be no other but mere and k(^ of the immediate Supcriour Notions. The Firll two Differences (ofE^w, for Example) join'd with the Common Head it (elf, gives us the Defi- nitkns of the two firft Subaltern Gc?2era ^ and each of thofe two (and of the inferiour) GenMs s be- ing for the fame Reafon d'ru'ided after the fame manner, do iliil give us naturally ( as it were ) the Definitions of the next two Members immedi- ately under them- ; and fo ftiil endwaj's , till we come at the Ind'rdlduums • each of w hich being conitituted by an innumerable Multitude of Acci- dents, we are, when we come there, loft in a path- le(s Wood ^ and can no longer Define or give a clear and LntWe Account of the Intri7jjecal Di6tin(!lion of thofe Particulars, but are forced to content our lelves wiLhfome/t7z^ Notions belonging to them, which diftinguilh them frojn others , or to de- fcribe them by Outward Signs and Circumftances for our UJe and Praciice-y our Speculation being here Nonpluft. i o. When Eeflexiof? Sixteenth. 191 10. Wben iVIr. Lccke HiJl have Icifurcly cj.;fi" dcr'cl each Srep of this fh.)rt Dif- courfc, he will llnd that N.'ture '^'f. '^^f '^P'^' n 1 • n/j 1 1 ri-x this M thai wflf forces US u^.; )n this .\kthod o[ De- ^, r^,,,^^^ ^q./,^ Hning by a Gev^rs and a Diffcrcvce 3 tliat ^//-r, f which is nothing but Nature well re- ficded 00) /hews us it must be f o • and [h^t hi:> own Dchnitlon of M. n will oblige liini, cv(?n while he oppofcs this Method, to have recourfe to it for Refuge. For, when he puts Man to be a Solid Extended SubfiancS^ fliould it be da:y d^ be- caufe there is but one part of Man (his Body) that is Solid and Extended^ and not his Spiritual part, the Scul • his only Defence can be this , that thcjfc Words were meant only for the General No- tion, or what was Common to Man and all other Bodies, (for which Reafon, Suhfiance there is the Higheil: Genus 3 ) and that which follows is meant to difference or dillinguifh him from them. Next, it will be unanfwcrably objedttd, that Man being a Things or (which is the fame) a Subftance^ which IgniiicS meerly whais capable to he^ and a Definition telling us the Elfence of the Notion de- fined, he deviates manifeilly from the Fundam. n- tal Law^s of Art^ by taking in fuch Diiterenc<.s to diftinguifh Subjlrance^ 'viz.. Solid jj and Extent- Jiony which are Foreign to this Common Head of Biing or Things and belong to other Common Heads, which are only Ahdes of Thirg, 'viz. thjfe of Qji.ntitj and QHalitj. Add, That this feemialfo [o contradict his own Doftrin, {B. i. Chap. 1 1. § I I, i 1. and B. 3. Chap 6. § ii.) wh.re he makes Extenficn and fiodj not to be the fame. I fuppole hemjans in parf^ which, were Exten- fmt a Proper and Intrinfecal Diiferenc: of Sub- T 1 Jlancey 2 9 2- Solid Thilofophy AJferteJ. fiavce^ conftiruting die ElTence of Bodj^ could ncc be faid. Now, as was lately fhewn, all thcfe Rubs are avoided if we feparate our Notions in- to Common Heads 3 and, by dividing thofe Heads by Intrinfecal Dilterences, at the fame time make our Definitions of each Inferior Notion. Nor can it be obicdcd, that n^e alfo ufe Extrinfccal Differences, while we divide Subftance by Di%!i- fihk and hjd-v'fihle^ and yet make Divilibility the Notion of Q^a7itity ^ for, all fuch Exceptions are fore-ftalfd in my Afif/^Z^i?^, B.i. Lej]'.-^. and parti- cularly, §§. ^. and 6. f II. The like Errour, and no lefs Fundamental,. is his AiTertion, Chap. 3. L. 11. The Mind does mt that Generals andUni'VcrJals belovg frame Uniwrfal ^^^ fg f/j^ J^^J Exillcnce of Thbtors^ J, , , c DUl are the i7j've77t 1 071S and Lr eat lives ed\y; but as tor- r 1 rr 1 a i- J f - ced to it by Isa^ ^J ^'^^ Underjranajngy wade by tt^ ture. for its own Ufe^ and concern C7tly Signs^ ivhether Words^ cr Ideas. Had he faid, that Unl^erfals belong not to the Exiilence of Things, as they are in Nature j or, that Univerllils, as fuch, are not capable of Exlfi- ing there^ I Could undcrftand him : But, if he means, they do not belong to the Exiflence of Things in the Underfafidifig, or, that thty are de~ fignedly indented ^ or fram'd, or made ufe of by it, j for its own Convenience, I mud: utterly deny it. For, it is as evident that Nature makes them in onr Mind, as it is that becaufe we cannot here comprehend Individuals, therefore Nature, by imprinting Objefts diver ily in us, and by diffe- rent Senfes, forces the Mind to have Partial or hi- adequate Notions of it. Now, every hmd.fjuate Notion, in what Line foever, is an Umvsrfal No- tion ; Rcjkxion Sixteenth. i9j tion ; as will appear to any Man who rcflciSi's up- on the Ideas or Notions of Ijis^ Corp/ts^ Five?/s^ An'rnal^ Homo ^ all which arc hj.ukqunte (and withall, U7iH\r fal ) Kouons^ in rcfpc^t of thv: Z?;- dlzfuluum. When I fee a Thing a-faro!^', fo that I can yet make nothing of it, bur that 'tis fo7y?i'- tbhtg^ or feme Rody^ 'tis evident that 1 have only an Un'.'verfr.l Notion of it, fince 1 know not yet what it is in farticuhr • and, that this General Notion is not Invented or Created by my MhuJ^ but given me by Nature. The like happens when I hear one knock at the Door, without knowing AA'ho it is in particular j and in a Hundred fuch like Occafions. So that the Al'md^ and it cnl)\ is indeed Capable of Univerfal Notions, bur, 'tis only Nature, and not her felf] which l^egets in her thofe Notions. Her only Work is, to Ccmpare^ or Difcern the Identity or Divcrfit)/ of thofe Notions ; but Nature gives her thofe Objects, or Materials^ on which fhe thus w^orks. Thus, w^hen we fee two or many Things agree, 'tis thofe Natural Ob- jeBs, that have in them fomething Agreeing to both, which caufes in me a Ccmmon Notion, cal- led Animal, or Homo j and the mind lends nothing but her Comparing Nature, to make thofe Com- mon Notions , which Artificial Refleflers, delign- edly re-viewing, call them Genits and Species. Let us hold to the Things in Nature. Our jWnd ( as was often faid ) is not here in an J8ual State, but in a Potential One j and, therefore, when we afcribc to her fmgly any ABMty, we make her do what ilie cannot do j and, fo, miifrng the true Caufes of fuch ElFeftSj we fall into great Errours. T 3 II. A^ ^94 ' .S^//^ Fhtlofcphy AJferteti. II. As for that Catachreps o? N(mival EJJe?iceSy which anfwcr to thofe few Ab- Nominal EiTen- ftrac)" Norions we have AciuaJIy of ces Groiiridieis, j-v,^ ThinGjs, whcn wc name them, and Catp.chnfti' , . '^ ' ; t r t j ^^/ -^ making a CcmpLx uLj^ I deny wehaveany fuch Tntenrion as he fp^aks of, in naming any Thing : For, tho' at th^z time we do actually know but Few of rhofe Accidents, Vv^hofe Complexion docs, indcid, go to the 'iubcle EJJij^.ce ; yet, being pre-afibi'd the Thing has ?j^ore Modes in it than w. know or think of, we do not nominate them frec':fely ac- cording to what we do t^.en aElinilly know, exclu- fijjy of all others^ but inclitd-ngX.\~i{im CGnfu[edlj, Ra- ther, otherwife, we cannot know the Thing at all, bccaufe it involves confufcdly all the Modes that are in it. Known or Unknown, as their Sub^ iect : For, tho' we fhould aft rwards difcover more panic alar Accidents in Go:d than we did for- merly, yet, we iTioald not alccr the 'Name which iTgniii'.s its6'?/^//???(rc, or Fllence^ nor would call it any thing bur G-M ftUl ^ however the newly difcovcr'd Mode gave us a new^ Id^a of it felf, Annex'd to that of Subftance. The Ellences are no otherwife InfrcneribL^ but as they are from Eternity in the Divine Idi:as ^ nor Jvcorruft'.hle^ but as thvy art either thtre^ or nK^ in fome Hu- mane or ylngd.cnl 'Jndjrllanding, out of which rhey can never bj effaced. Lailly, What have N^mcs oxlVords, w'jch are nothing but Articu- Litc Air, or Figur'd ink, ( cxcepiing what is An- nexed to them by our Minds, ) to do with the 7w- ^rinjecal Natures of fhings, that they fhould be one Sirt or K.vd of EJJhces, 13. The Reflexion Sixteenth. 295: 13. This Learned Author judly complains that we have fo fnv Definicions ^ and myfelf have both r.fented it in AtiftorlcVD-A- ^ ^ r . r / / 1 ''''^^ <»/ Motion my Preracc to my Ahthod^ and def-nded. have alfo excited and cncoura^^'d Learned Men to make good that Defeat. But, rill the Bed, and only Proper Way ( which I mcn- tion'd lately) 10 make Definitions beallow'd and taken, I am fure there will be no new ones made that will deferve that Name j and thofe Ftw that are already made, will flill be expofed to the baf- flinL^ Attacks of Fancy. Arlft-otU \N:iS^ certainly, the belt Delincr of any Philofopher yci extant j yet, his Definitions are excepted againft by Wit- ty Merij and (which is worfe) for no other Reafon, bur becaufe they are too Learned^ that is, too Good. Mr. Locke expreiles here great Dif-fatif- fadtion at two of them 3 which, to my befl Judg- ment, nor all the Wit of Man can mend. The Firft is. of Motion y which Arifiotle defines to be ABrrs Entis in _potentia^ quatemts in potent ia. I\OW, I wonder not that Mr. Locke^ who, in his large Chapter of Tower., never fo much as mention'd the Idea of 'Paver to he a Things nor the Fewer to ha-ve fitch an Accident^ Or Mode , nor, COnfequent- ly, the Idea of an AH anfwering to fuch a Fewer, fhould conceit this Definition to be Gibberifn. However he came to pretermit them, it is mofi: ma- nifeil that v/e have [Natural Lias or ^sOtions of both thefe. We cannot fee d^Thuvj: ??u7de titJual- iy of Another., or Alter d to be any way ctherwife than it was ; but Nature obliges us to fee, a:.d fay, that that Thing, of which the new one was made, could., or had a Fewer to bi^ It., o: have Another made of it. Or, v/hen V\^e fee 'tis anew made Hot, T 4. Cold, ap^ ^olicl Philofophy AJferteJ. Cold, Round, White, Moved, Placed, &c. but that it cculd^ or had a Power to become fuch, ere it was AtfuaJIy fuch. Thefe Ideas then of JB and Tower are fo Natural, that Common S^^nk forces us to acknowledge them, and Common Language muB ufe them : And 'tis a ft range Faftidioufnefs, not to allow thofe Tranfcendcnt (that is, moft Common, and mofl: Clear) Words in Definitions^ , whofe Notions or Meanings Nature gives us j and whic^i Vv'ords, or Equivalent Exprellions, Common Difcourfe forces us to ufe. Yet, in the Uncouth- ntfs of theje Words to fome Men's Fancies, con- fifts all the Difficulty which they fo boggle at in this Definition. The Ens^ or Body, was only C^- fable^ or had a Tower to be moved ere Motion came 3 and, now, by Motion it is ABmllj moved. It is evident then that Motion is the AB^ or ■ ( which is the fame ) the Formal Caufe^ which re- duced that Tower into A 61, or formally denomi- nated it moved Acfwdly. AB then, was a Proper Geni^Sy as far as thofe moH Common Notions can have one. Now comes the Ditference [in foten- tia^] which is, to determine what kind of A61 Motion is. To underftand which, we may re- fledl, that a Body has many other Afls or (as w^e conceive and call them ) Forms in it, fuch as are Quantity, Figure, and all Qaalities what- ever 3 as, Roundncls, Length, Breadth, Health, &c, hat they are not ACh of that Body, as *tis in pvjer to be othcrwife than it is, but as 'tis actually fuch or fuch : For, they truly deno- minate it to be atiually Round, Long, Health- ful, &c. Whereas, Motioyi^ being formally a meer Tendency to an Elicit not yet froduced^ COn- /litutes and denominates a Body ro be only in fewer Reflexion Sixteenth. Z97 foiver to be what by" that Motion it is to he af- terwards. For, reflecting on all Motions what- ever, 'v. ?^. Generation, Alteration, Augmenta- tion, Sanation, &c. none of them afFed the Sub- ie6l, or Body, in order to what it has already hxedly j but in order to a vevly generated, or rather, froduahk Thing, Qiiality, Qjantity, Dif- pofition, Health, &c. which the Matter or Sub- jedl has only a Pcirer to have or acquire by means of thofe refpedive Motions. The laft Words, \^ouate7jm in pottntui^] fjgnifie, that the Thing, as alFt6ted v^ith Motion, is formally and precifely confidcr'd to be in -paver to be fuch or fuch, and not at all as tuiually fo. Matter has the Notion of Fewer to he another Thing • but in regard it is a kind of Clmfart^ conlli- tuting actually the ftable and entire £«j, the Thing, or Body, which has Matter in it, can- not be faid to be meerly in pwer to ha^ue Mat- ter which it has Already, Whereas, by ha- ving Motion in it, which is only the M^ay or Means to attain what Nature aims to prodftce^ it muft be thus meerly and formally in Fewer to that to which it is Tcndir/g. Wherefore, this Definition mofl appoiitdy tits the Notion of Moticn^ by diftinguil>iing it moil: perfectly from ail other Sorts of Ji^is whatever ; without a Tittle conceivable in it that is Defeftive, Su^ perfluous, or Difparate. Yet, this is here cha- ractered to be Excjuifite J^rgon^ and a Famous Abfurdity, \ fhould bj glad to fee how one of our new Philofophers would define Motion : I doubt he would find it a puzzling Task to ex- plicate its Formal and Proper Nature , in regard that, befides its being very General^ it is the Blindefl, Z9 8 Solid Fhilofophy ^ferfed. * s. Method to . '^'''^f ""'^ * --| ^^P[^M Science B j, f^^^^ion we havc, and moft ap^ L.8. §. 2. '^-oaching to N.n-Emnj -^ be- ing neither the T'ning as it is in it feify nor as it is yet another^ but hovering (as it were ) between both. And I am c.Ttain, it is impollible to perform it, without varying the Words ufed by Jriflctle^ to others of the fame Senfe ; or, even to give^. fome tolerable Ex- plication of it, which can fute with its Formal Notion. The other Definition w^hich Mr. Locke mif- I ^. likes, is, that of Light 3 which Av\{{oi\es Defini^ he fays Arifrctk defines. The A^; tion of Light, r -n n- t^/ • • • rnoft Proper. ^/ ^ PerJ^icuom Toing , as it is Perjpictmts. Now, tho' Light be Flrc^ were the Particles of it contrafted into one clofcr Body, as it is by a Burning-Glafs • y^i^ the Rays of it, thinly fcatter'd, have, like all other Effluviums^ the Notion of a Quality or Mock of the Body they are received in , and Adodes or Accidents have their Analogical E{- fences from the manner they alfed: their Sub- jects, The Q^icllion then is, What is the Pro- per SuhjeB of Light ? Mr. Locke's Principles de- ny the Sun is the Suhjett • and put it to be one- ly the Caufe of it: Nor can an Opacous Body be the Subjeft of it 3 for it affedls not that Body it (df^ but the Surface which reflects it j and then jt has the Notion of Colour, 'Tis left then, that the Proper Subject of Light mufl: be a Med/uw^ which is VerJficuGus^ or which has a To-wer in it to let it pafs through it, to our Eyes 3 and^ therefore, ojiely Light is, properly and formally^ the Act which informs or achates that Power ; which Reflexion Sixteenth. 299 v^'hich cannor podibly be expafs'd better than by the ic Words, The ylti of aVirJfkuorts^Bo^j^ as it is Per/f'ictto/r, For, putting the Air,for the Water, to be that Medium^ thole B(jdies may have ma- ny other ylih or Accidental Forms in them • as, Rariiy, Fluidity, Humidity, Coldnefs, 6^c. yer, according to naie of tl:cfe^ is L^gbt the proper yict of either of thtm • but as they are Pellucid, or rtrf/icucrs • becaufy:, what^'er other Qualities or Fov^a-s they may have, if they had not that called Vc-rljictaufncf^ it could not affect thofe Bo- dies at all. I ubferve by Mr. Lccke's Difcourfe here, that he makes account Definitions are made for the Vulgar: Whereas, they are only fram'd hy Art^ for Men of Art, or Philofophcrs. But, furely he is pleafanr, and cannot mean feriouHy, wlien he fir.ds fault with this Definition, as Ufelefy and Irifigtrficant^ becaufe it will not make 3.Bl'md ALm undtrfiii7id what the Word [ Light ] means. The Meaiilvg of the Word, is the Nakn of it in owx Mind -^ and our Notions, or U^as^ (as both of tis hold,) come in by Imprelfions from the Objed upon our Sen^ts. If, then. Blind Men could have noftnjihle Impreflion of Light, 'tis im- poii.ble they fhould have any Idea or Notion of 11 it, kt the Definition be never fo good. Defini- tions are the Work of Reflexion, and are to fuf~ fife our Natural Notions, which are the Plough Draughts of Knowledge, Comm.on to us, and to the Vulgar: Art is to polifli our Ncticns^ and j bring ihem to Exaftnefs and Concinnity, hy Dcfi^ 1 ning them j and not to iml/ue us with them, when ; Nature never g^i've them : And 'tis a hard Cafe, if Arifiotle s Definiiions muil: be Ufeiefs and Infigni- fiCiint, unlefs they work Miracles. ij. I ^00 Solid Philofophy Afferted, 15:. I agree with him that the Definition of Motion, which he fays is that of T/^. Cartefian D- [VtCarufians, Wiz.. That 'tis the put ion of Moti- <-, iT A 1- ' r T -rt on Faulty bitccejjive y^pplication cf the Vans cf the Superficies of one Body to thofe of another'] is Faulty. Whether it be theirs or no I know not, I think they give another : Yet, I doubt not but Mr. Locke has his Reafons why he dillikcs it. Mine is this , becaufe SucceJJhc Quan- tity and Motion avcihe felf-fi77^e Formal Notion j and, fo, the Definitum is as plain as thv^ Definition which fliould explain it. Be fides that, [ A f plica- tion'] is one fort of Motion^ and therefore is har- der to be underftood than Motion it felf, which is the Genus to it. All which Abfurdities, and others fuch, Arifiotle wifcly avoids, by ufing the Tran- fccmlenr^ or more Common Notions of AB and Power, 16. I pardon Mr. Locke's Opinion, That no- thing is EOential to Indi^iduums • Individuums tm. becaufe this Error is Common, ^..r;;.^.«^Spe. Qj. ^^^i^^j. Epidemical, amongO: x\2\\y'. ibe Modern Schools j and iprings hence, that thofe Authors do not diftinguifh between what ferves for Logical Spe- ctilitions , and what is the Real Confiituticn of Things in Nature : For, what can the word [Ef- fc?jtia ] of which Ejfential is the Denominative, poifibly mean, but that formal Notion <]ua Ens eft Ens. Since then the Notion of Ens or Thing is only Proper to the Indi'vidnal Stthfiance^ as being its FirH Analogate-^ it follows that, iftheybedi- vers Entia or Thi7tgs., they muft have divers For- ma I Confiitnents^ or di'Z'ers E! fences. Nay more, it follows that [Ens] being only properly fpokenof Snl\'h.ntia Reflexion Sixteenth.' 3c r Snhfiant'ui Vrlma or the hidl^idumn^^ and Impro- perly of Suhfta7itii£ Secund,-e^ and much more of the Modes or Acddtms ; therefore, EJence ( the Formal Conftiruent of Ens) can only be properly faid of the EJJenccs of Individuals, and improper- ly of any other EiT^nccs: So that onlj divcis bidl^ nj'iduals^ \n proper Speech, do differ Ejjlnttally^ or have EjJ'cvtial Differences belonging to them. But, of this enough in my * Method. I only remark how odd it is to * b. i. l. 3.§ n. fay, that Two Me?i are Tvw Th'mgs^ and yet do not differ under the Notion of Thinr^^ but only Accidentally 3 or, according to the Noti- ^ on of fonle Mode or Accident 3 which is perhaps as much as my felf wo?;^ do differ from my felf aTd'^?* ago., and yet I am the fame Thing now I was then, . But, I have faid enough above of what Intrinfe- cally Conftitutes divers Entities or Individuums j and how we fufHciently know them, tho' w'e com- prehend not the whole Complexion of Accidents; that conftitutes their Individual Eflences, on which a good part of this ^th Chapter proceeds. 1 7. The two lafi: Chapters contain many variou> Obfervations in them 3 and fuch as may both ^^J/f/^r, and in fome fort whence -^2 wvf? p-oRt inquifitive Wits : Yet thev 'f'°-'" f ^^"''^ touch upon lome diflicult Points, Compound xVc" which are contrary to my Senti- tiov.s. ments, and cannot well be folv'd "without firft laying my Grounds 3 efpecially that J about the Unknowablenefs of Real Eij'cnces. To 1 clear which farther, and withall to meet with i other Difficulties that may occur, it will be ne- , ceilary to lay, or repeat, for the Foundation oi^ \ my future Difcourfes, fooicfew Principles. I \ 30Z So//r/ Fhilofophv ^[ferterJ, I have, I hope, demondrated in xny Prelimi^ naries, that all our Ideas^ or Notions, which are Solid, and not Fantall:ick:, are nothing but fevcral Conceptions ofthe Thmg • or, which is the fame ( taking the Word [ Ccfjctftlm ] for the Ol?ieff^ and not for the yiSl of Conceiving ) t/je Thing A'rjerjly conce'rud. Hence all our Conceptions, or Notions, are Inadt^^juate^ efpecially if they be Difiinct^ and not Co?ifrJed. Hence the moft ab- flra'Sted Notion we have, or can have, let it be Figure, Colour, Exiilence, or what other we pleafc, even tho' (ignify'd by the moil: Abftradl Term, is dill the T/oi77g confider'd precifcly as having thofe Modes in it^ in regard tlw, as thofe Modes, or Accidents, have no E??t/tf ot their nrn^ but meerly that of the T7j/vg which they afFcdl, fo they can have no Intell':g'!bil:ty^ or Knowable- nefs, ( which is the Property of E72t:ty ) but as they are conceived to belong to the Thmg, or to he It: So that, (Hardnefs being that by which a Thing Informally Hard) neither v/ould Hardnefs be Hardnefs, nor would Hxiftence be ExiiT:ence,if they were the Hardnefs or Exifl:ence,of Nothing-^ for No- thing can neither be hard^ nor exifi^ nor have any other Aifeftions belonging to it. yXgain, 'tis evident we can have no d-fimd Notion of the whole Ens^ Or hidivlduu?n j nor confequently of the Eljcnce, ( properly fuch ) V/hich is the Form that Conftitutes the ivhole Ens : For this contains in it what grounds or Correfponds to great multi- tudes of inadequate, or Pariial Notions, and con- tains them ble?idcd ( as it were ) in the 77?;?;^ as in their F.oot j and this fo Coufnfcdly and inlepara- biy, that only that mod acute Divider, calfd Aqks htellechfSy caa take them a fundcr> or fepa- rate Reflexion Sixteenth. 303 rate them. Moreover, there are nor only Con- fas* J And Dift-inB Ideas, as Mr. L. acknovvkdgcs^ bit alfo( which I remember not he takes nocice of,) Motions or Ideas which are more and hfs Con- . fui'ed or i )ilVmcl ; or fartly one, partly the Other, and this with Very great variety j as is feen in his Example o^ Gohly of which ( and the fame may be faid of all other Bodies,) fome Men gain by De- greed more diifind Knowledges than others do. To proceed, 'tis evident that, of all other No- tions, that of Exijhnce has the Icafi: Compoftion in it that can be. Whence all Clcar7ufs of our Notions coming from their Dl(i-inHntJsy and their Diilindnefs Springing from their Si?nflicity^ the formal Notion ofExifie?2ceis the moft Clear ^ that 1% jdf~ev:dt7tt^ zvA i\\(cxt^oiQ InexfUcahk -^ all Ex- plications being of thofe Notions that can r^eed it. The Notion of Ens^ which hgnines Capable to Exifi^ has but a very little Comfofitlon^ and Con- fequently, Confufion in it, as confiding of ABual Behig^ and the Pciver to it, For the lame Reafon Corpus has more of Compoiition or Confufion in it, than £wj ; Vi'vens than Corpus \ Animal than Vi'uens • Homo than Animal • and Socrates^ or the Ind^vidutim^ moil of all ^ There going ftill ( as was fhown above ) more Notions to conftitute and Com.pound each infrlour Notion than there does to conftitute thofe abcve it j whence, flill as they iii'i^ more Compoundtd, they are proportionably wor jjihle to he comprehended all at once. This reflefted on, and it being lliown above, that both i 304 Solid Thilofophy AJferted. both N'ature and Art inftru6l us to divide our Notions into Common Head^, and to proceed thus gradually to Inferiour ones j 'tis moft evident that the only Proper and Natural way of diftinguifhing our Notions into Simfk and Compoundtd^ is to be taken ( not from our Fancy ^ what Ideas feem mod Clear to us ) but from this Gradual Vrogrejjion from Su peri our to Inferiour Notions j in regard there goes (till mere to compound the Inftrlour No- tions, than there do.'S to compound the Super/our. Whence follows out of the very Terms that tbofe mull be more Compounded^ Or lefs Clear, thefe more Simple^ and more Clear. iS, The fame Rule holds, and for the fame Reafon, in all the Cotnmon Heads The fame Rule hold, ^^f j|^^ j^^^^^ ^^ Accidents, The in Accidents as ^ . . - , r 1 <- 7P./y.r/Subftance. ^^otion Or Idea of the Supreme Genus has no Compolition but that noted above, w^iich is common to them nil, of Co7inotating the Suhjech Whence, it is the iS/V^^p/e/'?- or leafl Compounded, as involving both that of the Common Head and that of the Difference., fuperadded to it. Hence neither the Ideas of Motion nor Extenflon., if b/ this Latter be meant (as by diftinguiihing ic from Motion it Ihould feem) Vermancnt Qu-mtity , are Simple Ideas • but the Idea of Qnantity is the Simple one ; and they, being evid en t(yy//f/j /OWi of Qjantity, 'i;;^. Pcr- rnanent., and SuccelJive^ :rre cleaily Compounded Ot Qnintitj Anil of th^ two Different Ide. IS which make them thofe two feveral lorrs o: it. Much Jefs is the Idea or Notion of Nu^nber or F.gure Simple ones j for the form:r is compounded of I he Idea of Meer Quantity and of [Difcretc^ ] and the later of i\\c Idea OiQj.unity^ and offuch or ilich Reflexion Sixteenth 305 fuch a manner ofTtrminatlng it. And, the fame may be eafily fhown of all the reft of his Simple Ideas whatever, excepting only that of Exigence, From thefe Principles I make the following Re- flexions. 19. F:r/^ That the Ideas can never be in fault when we name things wrong, but our own heedlefnels or Difagree- The Idea or av ment about the M^^anings, for ^!°'' ''^ "T'^' ^^ which fuch Words ftand. For,our Name'^'rwT* Common Notions are wrrought wrong. by Natural Caufes upon the fame- natur'd Patients, the Senfes, and thence upon the Soul. Whence Notions are what they are in- ^ariahly^ without their meddling or being con- cern'd with oar Signifying them, or af plying them to thefe or thefe Words. We have them from Nature 3 the Signifying them by fuch and fuch Words, comes from our Voluntary Defignation -^ and that is all can be faid of them 3 as Mr. L. has fhown B. 2,Cb. 31. § 1. 10. Secondly, Confiifed Ideas, they being all Compounded, may have fe-wtr or more Difl-ln^ Ideas annext to their Confufed xW/ow/ Subjea:, according as we gain a "IZHZiri'm^xt farther Diftina: Know'edge of the t^thirsufya! Object, as is exemplified in Mr. i's frequent Inftarcc of Gold, In which cafe, it is not a new sp^c'{ical Notion, nor fo much as a new Nominal Ejjencc, as Mr. L. Calls it : (for, lee us difcover never f j many New Qualities in Gold, every Man will cail that Thing Gold Hill ) but the Additions or Appendages of Htv^' Dlfilncl No- tions, tacK.'t as it were to the Confufed one j or I3iew Lmdt^quan Notions, approaching fo many V lictk 3 o (5 Soli^ Philofophy AjJerteS. licrle (leps nearer to the making it 2in Adequate one. n. Thirdly^ Since weknow before-hand, that every Thing has a Difiinci Nature Covfufed Notion.' do OX Real EJJence peculiar to its felf^ *'Vud^fh%T ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^ Remarkable JhtaeV/tiM Accidents intrinfecally belong- areyetVnd'iCao' i^g to it, to bc that Eflence ^ verM. efpecially if they dj/«^a>7zr/^ di-- fiingu'i^j it from all other Natures j and, when we find they do not, we acknowledge our Judgment may be falfe, we ftrive to correal it, and iufpend till we gain better Light ; yet dill our Notions are inerrably ivhat they are^ and fault- lefs, however it fares with our Judgment. Nor docs our Judgment exclude the yet-undijcoz/erd Modes from the Notion of the Thing j but, we include them allin the Lump or Confuftdly, Whence 'tis the Rer,l Ejfence of the Thing which is known, tho' Imperfectly and Inadequately. Thus we know a Man and a Horfe to be two Things of different Species by divers manifeft Qualities which never agree to hth of them, and therefore diftinguifh them 3 and, tho"tisthe 9///&o/e, or ratheraGre^^fo- CompIexion of Accidents which does conftitute the Specifick Difference ; yet even that is known truly^ (tho' imperfectly) when weknow it but in part, efpecially (as wasfaid) when it is fuffi- cient to diftinguifh one from the other : In the lame manner as when I fee but a Man's Hand or Facey 1 am truly fuid to fee the Man, tho' [ Man'] lignifiesthe iphole, which 1 fee but in part. The folid Reafon of which is this Great Truth, that [ There are no Atlual Parts in any Compound what^ ever^ Whence follows, that every Part is the Whole Reflex'io)! Sixteenth. 30;^ iHok in Fart, or according to fuch a Part , which is one of rhcChicfcft Principles that givesGrounds to the Science of Phylicks iind therefore is De- inonflrable by the Supcriour Science, Metaphy- ficks. 21. Fourthly, Oiir former Difcourfe being well reflected on, which fhews that the iiK^ft folid and Certain way of f^.- mufl not judge Knowing which Notions are.V/^w- vphich ko iom are 1 1 • I ^ ; / /-. Simple , r. h/ch pie, which Compounded or Com- Compouncled , flex, is not to be taken from the froyn the Clearer Eafie A pp. arances to our Fancy, ObfcureAppea- or froin feeminG: Experience, but ranees f/;^'/ vnake r 1 • 1 • / 1 to our t2,\)C\\0ut from thtir bemg more Cjtneral y-,^^ ^^^ ^,^1] ^-^ or more Particular j we may far- 'vjn r^bove, § 18, ther learn what Notions are Clear ^9- and which Ohfcure, and hnu or 'why they are fj. For, 'tis manifeft that all Confufwn and Obfcurtty fprings from Compo- fition, or the Involving n:c:ny Notions, as is evidently feen in V articular or Indiz;idual Bodies y and all Diftindnep or Cleamejs in our Notions from their involving few or none, as is found in the mod General Notions. Add, that, if this Rule be obferv'd, the Order in our Complex Notions will be more Reo-ular. Whereas the other unmethodical way or making lo many Simple Ideas, pLiCes thofe Ideas at raridom, or hap-hazard. Laftly, If our Method be obferv'd. Complex Ideas Cannot be taken for Sin-ipU onesy as has been fhewn Mr. Locke does in moll: or' his. \] ^ 13. Fifrhljy 3o8 Solid Fhilofofhy AJferted. 13. Fifthly^ That the DiftiniStion of Simplc and Complex, Clear and Obfcurc 1::;:. 'Hl' t ^^^o^s, >s not to be taken from conceit that Me- ^ffearanccs to our Fancy, but ts^hyf^calh'otims, fi'om thc folid Grounds now fire Obfcure, fpokcn of, is fccH farther by this vihfreus they are ^ ci ^ j\^ ^ an t-videntlj tL Inftance, that many Men are Cleared. much diflafted at the Notions belonging to Metaphyficks, fuch as are Beings Ens, Ejjtnce^ Acl, Fov^er, and fuch like. The Reafon of which is, that we do cu- llomarily refiec} upon our Notions, and endea- vour to define ox exflain them. Whence, in Me- raphyfcal ones, finding this to be very Difficuk, i?nd in many of them ImpoiVibk^ hence Men fan- cy them to be Inconceivable and Incomprehenfi- b'e 5 and thence they take a Toy at Metaphyficks, and pretend it infuperably bard and myfierious. Now it paiTes witli thefe Refle(5ters, as it does with thofe that would look ftedfailly on the Sun at Noon-day 5 they find a kind of Cloud hover- ing before their Eyes, and fecm bedarken'd with too much Light. The Teft to (tick to in fuch Ca- fes is, to fet themfelves to dcfiie or explicate their Notions y which done, if they find they can in- vent no Notions more Clear than thofe Notions themfelves are, they may be fure they are filf-ex'idc?n , and may fafely look upon them as fuch 5 and, if they find ihey cu?i be dcfind or e^- flaind, they may be fure there will be found in their Definition or Explication more Notions equivalent to that one j ar.d thence they may be aitur'd alfo that^the Notion Defin'd or Explica- ted, has more Farts, or Compofithn in it j and, therefore, is not 5/ w/)/f nor perfectly CW, iince it I Reflexion Sixteenth. 309 it needs to be made Clear by others, wiiich therefore mud be more Simple and Clearer than It. 1 f. Sixthly, It appears from what is faid, thaL 'tis not to a'void different S'lgnifi^ cations of IVords^ that Men ftippofe AV rhe Dejigyi of a Real Ejlence heh^nq-inq- to each ^'^oiJlng dif^ Svecies • but becaule tis impof- ;,f ^y^J ^ ^^,, fible there fhould be any Indi- ^Uin Nature , vidual Thing, but it mtift have forces us to pnt Superior Notions, or ( which is ^^^^ EfTtnces. the fame ) it mud be of fome fort or other in Nature • and, the Notion of tliis Sort^ or Species^ muft be an Eifential and main Vart of the Individual Ejfence, For, *tis evident, that Nature forces us to have both the one, and the other Notion, without any form'd Defign of ours j and JVords have nothing to do but to fig- «//^ethem. 2^. Laftly^ Hence it appears, that Words do not therefore become Arnhigm74s^ hecaufe they have no Settled Stan^ Words are mi Jm* dards in Nature - as Mr. Locke ap- ^FZle^'' stTr prehends in Mixd Modes, efpe- ^ J/'^' ^J^^ cully in Moral ones. For, all Virtues and Vices being nothing but Di/fo/i;ions to aB according to Right Reafon^ or contrary to It, have as fixed Standards in Nature, as Reafon it felf has ; raking [^Nature'] for the Reflexions we naturally have upon the Operations of our Soul, and for what is Agreeable or Difagreeable to its true Nature- as alfo, on the Subieds and Circum- ftances, about which, and in which it is employ'd. Hence, the Words which helnftances in, 1//2:. Sham^ Wheedle^ Banter^ are evidently Deviations U 3 frum 3 T o Snli^ Fhilofophy AjfertceL from Right Reafo'i in our Juft and Civil Com^ portiriCi.rs with other Men 3 and all the Notions that go to their Oefirjtions, are as much Connect- ed as any other Genus and Difference are in any other Definition whattVLT. So likewife, his 'Mix- ed Mod^s, Alurther and Sacrilege^ are defind-^ The Kill':77g a M..n laivLfy^ and the Tnking to our f elves Liwltjlj^ or Jlbujtng H ly Things j and have the fame Solid iConnexion, as any other ^.'otionsj which confi lis in this, that the ^»e of them is Common or Determinable properly by the other^ and ih.Q ether is Particular or Determinative of ir, which makes them Cohere together in good Senfe. As for our SouFs Connecting them at plea/ure, it is quite otherwife : She has >'ori )ns of each Common Head nrturaFj • and Nature and Art do both of thern confpire to oblige us to divide thofe Heads by Intrinfecal Notions, calkd Dfferences y and, it is not at her Picafure and Choice, what Di^Ferenc(-'^ fhall be Tropcr^ what Dijparate, Nature his fettkd the i^gn eablenefs of one of thefe No- tions to ihc oth^r j fo that, fhould vre put a Dif^ ference tO a Generic I Notion, which is Incon- fiilent with it, the Notion thus defined would be Nonftncc^ andCb'mtric^Jy and no Wifcr than Green Scarlet^ OX 2i F^ur-fjuareTri^tngle. ' '"i6. Let the Obfcurity and Amibiguity of Words fpring from what Caufes Mr. L. TheThhigjipiiffd pi^afts, concerning which he is fofhe-Ahiife of very Acute m his loth Chapter, 'li , V ir is I )me very cvidwnt, (hat the j^nr./g'u , , TL-ng Pg^ fyd is njt f) be blam'd cmre^t^o'c , or for the WW^ r/ /^FW.' and, that this Ab'.ae of them mult ipnng from one of thefe three i leads, vix^, Amb gu'ty of Single Reflexion Sixteenth. 3 1 1 Single Words, the ill Co^nexture of them, and their Mif-(ipplinn:ort. yirtific'uil Words are, in- deed, (as wasfaid, ) niore liable to Obfciirity ^ and, perhaps. Logical ones mofl: oF all. But, iince the Ui'ers of thofe Words do pretend ro Learning, let them define their Terms of Art, and it will quickly appear whether they agree in the Notion of thofe Terms, or no ; and, by decla- ring what the Notion meant by that Term is ufeftd for^ it will appear which of the Defini- tions agrees truly to that Notion, and which does not. 27. Tho* then fome Men have the Knowledge of More Accidents in the fame Thing, or in the fame Effence, hnperfe^i Kyiovf^rs than another Man has, yet it ^r/ '" , ^^'^ J r 11 1 • 1 ninp, ana ??o( does not follow they agree m inthc^im<:ori- nothing but the Nciwe^ or that /;'. they fubiiitute the N^we for the Jling • for they do both of them acknowledge ^nd agree that they fpeak of the fame Things or of the farKe Ejlhice^ notwithftanding this more f articular Knowledge which one of them has of it above the other. In the fame manner as di- vers Perfons may know, ordifcourfe of theilime Individual Man, Socrates^ ( tho' the Complexion of Accidents which conftitute the Individuum be far greater tlian that which conftitutcs the Speci- iick Notion , ) noiwithftanding that, one of them Jfetter knQWS his Humour, Itniper, Conilitution, Sci::nce, Virtue, and his Degree of l\arionaiity, (which is moil Lltntial to him, as he \s This Ali^n,) than the of .Vr does. Whence this Poii- tion dojs not only make all Philofophy , or Knowkdge of J'/://^! (which are not fach, bat U 4. • by 1 1 X Solid Philofophy AJferted. hyihdr Re^ I EJJence which formally makes them fuch ) to be impofl^bl' ; but, it makes even our Ordinary Communication amongfl: Men unin- telligible , becaufe we fhould ftill fpeak of D/- *vcrs Things^ and not of the fame : For, Di'vers they muft be, if f ■•ey have Divers Ejjtnces^ which formally ccvfiitutts them fuch. Yet, I muft de- clare, that I vcnly judge this Learned Author d livtrs this Do6lrine out of his Sincerity, with- our intending to do any Favour to the Scepticks ; and that he is not aware how much this leans to that Maxim of the Tyrrhoniansy tt r /i ;• Underfiandhig, Operation of our Underftattdmg, or Simple Jtprehevfion j he advances to the Second [ Jud^meiit^ which is exprefs'd by a Trcp'fition. 'Tis by this that we have Cojn pleat Knowledge or Cognition j which ( as the Word it felf imports ) is the putting together of Notions in the Underftanding after its manner j thai is, in or- der to the feeing themconnei^cd, or knowing they are fo. The F.rH Chapter is both comprehend ve ofhisSubjeft, and has much Truth in it. Whe- ther Reflexion Seventeenth. 317 ther it goes to the bottom, and docs not require fomc Deeper Truths to exphcate the Point fully, is now to be examined. 2. He defines Knowledge to be The Vercepticn of the Connexion and Agraement^ or of the Dlfacrreement and Re vug-nancy ^^"".y^ ^;f^^^'<^ J^ r ^ r J x« in • Of Knowledge /« of any of our Ideas. My hxCeptl- ^.j^ny reffetis ons againft this Definition are: I'aulty. I. That [Verceftioni being the A(S of a Knowing Power, can mean nothing but Knowledge • and , therefore, to define Knowledge by Knowledge (ecms Inaiiificial and Preternatural: For, it will dill be ask'd, what this Knowledge he calls V exception is ? 2. Mr. Lccke granting Per- ception to Brutes^ he muft neceOarily allow them Jdeas^ and chat they can co7ineB them too. Where- fore his Book being Entituled, AnEjjay concerning Hutnane Under it an ding., it is needful we knoW what kind of Ideas l^e have, what Brutei have j and, ( not to fpeak of our or their Perception ) whether thej do connect them as we Men do. For, this Concellion makes Perception to be the Genus in this Definition j and, therefore, to appropriate it to Humane Knowledge, the large Signification of it ought to be rellrain'd to fuch a Perception as is/)c- culiar to Man, But, what I moft dillike is the "word {Ideas ^ incur perceiving the Agreement or Difagreement of which he puts Knowledge to confift. Philofophy is the Knowledge of Thngs • wherefore, unlets thofe Ideas be i\\c Thing It jclf in our Underflanding j or, if they be not, but Shnil.tudc's only (asthe Word imports) unlefs it be well made out that thofe 5;w/7;;«^ej do give us the Knowledge of the 77?;?;^ i^/^lf (which I have ikmonftratcd in my Preliminaries they cannof ) 'tis 3 1 8 Solid Philofophy AJferted. tis impoiTible we fhould ever arrive at true Philo- fopb V, tho* we did perceive the Connexion of all the Utai in the World. Nay, unlefs they be the Thing it felf (in part,) no Predication we make can be True. 3. To fhew this more fally, I inrreat Mr. Loch to confider, that this Comiexion of K>iorcIf^ze cannot Ueaf he fpealcs as nect'lTary to 'Zl\o^t-T>7^ Knowled^^e, is that which is f^g- greement of t "i^/ ^ ^y the Word [E/,] which deas. being fo, in this Propolition, [.S«- gar js fiveet^ the Word [Ejf] mud according to him, if only Ideas muft be connedlcd, naturally and genuinJy affirm, that one of thofe Ideas is the other Idea^ Or that the Idea of Sugar is the Idea of Sweet • which is evidtntly Falfe. For thofe Ideas differ toto genere • the fjrnicr be- longing to the Common Head of Suhftance^ the other ofQ^alitj 3 and bcfides, 'tis perfectly con- tradi'^ory to Mr. Locke's avowed Doftrine, tliat each Idea has its pLCuIiar Metaphyseal Verity, or IS what it felf js^ and is difiinEi from any other Idea^ and therefore is to be Deny d of if. Whence follows, that it is not in fe* ing the Connexion or Difagreement of the Ideas rhemfelves that Know- ledge can confifl: j for they are, as to tbem- felves, always DlftlnB^ and therefore VnconmBed j fo that wc can never fay one of them is the other, which yet we do in all our Affirmative Proporti- ons, whence follows, that all our Affirmati'vs Proportions would be fA\(^. It follows then, that it is the Sub j id or T/ji?7g inadequately conceiv'd by our Under (landing, which is faid by the Copula [Ejf] to be Idencily*d really and Materially with it felf as conceived by another Inadequate Notion ; and Reflexion Seventeenth. 31^ and, that [K/V] fpcaks their being united in the fame Kns^ or ingrafted on the lame Stock of Bt^ ing. And, Certainly, it appears, at firil Sight, to be an odd Explication of Knowledge and Philofophy, to maintain, that they coniilt in fee- ing the Connexion or Difagreement of Sir/iiH-^ ludts. 4. Wherefore, 1 fhould rather think, that, as Notions are defined, The Thing in the Under fl an d':ng inadequately con^ The true Definition cei'vifig ity (ivhich has bee7i ahim^ 0/ Knowledge. dantly frcvd^ • foKnovIcdge ought to be Defin'd, The Inadtquate Notions of the Things exiting in the Under fianding^ fa conneHed there^ ar they are in the Thing in Nature, To make gOod my Definition, 1 difcoarfe thus : F;W7, It has been prov'd by many Arguments, that all our Notions are Partial Conceptions of the Th:7ig • or> which is the fame, (if we take the Word [Cow-^ ception] for the Ohjtcl, and not for thQ^cl of Con- ceiving,) they are the Thing inadequately con- ceived. And, I dare be confident, thofe Argu- ments are unanfwerable j and that no true Rea- fon^ or Connexion of Tcrms^ Can ever fhock them : However, I may expeft much Repugnance of Fancy ^ ere that Point be admitted. Secondly^ All our Diftinci Notions being Inadequate^ and confe- quently, (as it w^ere,) P^zrr/ of the Thing, as 'tis Knowablc bv us , it follows, that (according to our Dodruie) the Immediate Object of all our Knowledge, being fomewhat of the Thing, is w^holly built on the Thing it felf and therefore Solid. Thirdly^ Thofe feveral Notions, however Inadequate taking them Ahfira^edly^ yet they do connotate the n'hok Thlno- : fmce no Pare can be con- 3^0 Solid Fhilofophy AferfeJ. conceived, but in reference to ihQwhole^ or as in it^ it being impoilible the former can be appre- hended to be a Diftin6l Thing from the latter ; becaufe, if it were of it felf a D I firing Tljing^ it would b.^ of it felf a M^ole^ and not a Fart, Fourthly^ The Copula [ E/7] fpeaks the Identity of rhofc Parts with the IVhole j fo-^ they can onely be Identify d, as they are One with the whole Thing r/i.neriaJly -J C\r\QC fornjall)'y as Farts^ thjy are con- tradiilinguilli'd from one another. And, were it not fo, few Propodtions ( as was lately prov*d ) co'.ild be True. Whence, let us take any Propo- iition, x'.^. [Socrates is wife • ] the true Senfe of it is, that the Individual Subftance, called Socra- tes, is ihc fame Things Materially, or Really, with that which is IVife-^ or, that, what anfwers to Socrates^ and to JVife^ are found in the fame Thing. Fifthly^ In regard Parts, as fuch^ are di- ftinguifh'd formally from one another , therefore, we cannot fay that any Partial Notion, exprefs'd formally as a Fart^ is Another. Whence we can- not fay [Fetreitas eft fapientia,] tho* we Can fay [ Fetrus efl fapiens j ] in regard th ofe Abllraft Words do formal!)' iignifie fuch a Fartial Notion of the whole Thing, or a kind of Fart of it. And, tho' each of them does connotate the 'whole Tiling, y^tz, with a Quatenus, ( to which that Ab- Itracl manner of Expreifion is Lquivalent, ) they • cur of fuch a precife Confiderability, or Notion of it, horn, all others J and therefore, fuch Words (Can oncly iignifie that precife Notion^ or ( as it were) Fart^ and no other. Lajlly^ Hence it is, that we cannot predicate a Concrete o^ an Ahftraci, nor an Ahfr.icl of a Concrete ; becaufe the Abflrad fignilies, diftin'SIy and f jrmaliy, only a Fart, and Reflexion Seventeenth. 321 rhe Concrete the whole^ ( tho* confulcdly J and yjct any di(i-incf Vart of ir. Hut I expatiate too inudi into the Siibjedl of Predication, and /lull purfuc it no farther at prefent. f . To come clofcr to the Rufincfs in hand j It appears by what is here faid, that it is not enough for KmwU^e, ^'^ Defin^thv of r • \ Ki • •" r Knowledge r.Trw nor anlwers the true Notion ot ./,.„ „,^ ,,,,,» Thilofoph)\ that Ideas be pred'.catcd of Other /^d*/;/, or Similitudes of Similitudes -^ nor ( which is the fame ) that we fee they ^gree or dif- ^gree with one another ; but it is necelfary, that the Ground of our Knowledge, and of our Predicati- ons, be taken from the Thing it ft If, as is exprefs'd in our Definition. T produce not here the Definition of Knowing which I gave in my PreliJiiinaries, becaufe it is not yet granted by thofe with whom I am difcourfing, that our Notions are the 7/5/?;^x in our Underflanding • tho* (one Confideration, which is brought there, being added ) thefe two Definitions are Co-incident : But I accommodate my felf to Mr. Locke's Words, as far as they will bear, that the DiHference between us may be made more apparent. 6, Hence, whereas Mr. Loch makes Four Sorts of Connexions of our Ideas, in which Knowledge is f jund , I'iz. i . Of H-^cf, there ?v hut Identity, or Di'verfity : 2. Of Re- ^"« ^'''^ 'f ^''"^ /.*•-..- ^' '/i D / n Avere they not fo, they would be unworthy the Name of F'lrfl Princifiles^ nor do us anj Good when ^A e come to redt^ce other Truths into them j which is the bcft Way of Dtmonfirauvg. I o. The Extent of Hiim.:ne Knowledge^ of which he treats in his 3d Chapter, is a Scepricifm and very Lxccllcnt Subject. Science Dogmatifm^r., j.^^ ^^.^ Capital Enemies, Sceptic h prciucHciaT to ^U^^ and Dogmatijm : The one Science. Will aliow Very little^ Or Nothing at all, to be known j the other pretends to know too much. The former, by breed- ing a perfeft Dejpnjr of Knowledge, difcourages the Jnduftry of the bcft Wits j and makes them, fincc Truth cannot be found, to addict themfelves only to Wordifi] Talk and Declamation : To which contributes not a little, that many who have i«- comparable Fanc:es , have oftentimes the ovorB Judgments 3 efpecially, if they have let their W'its Joolc to Raillery, and Drollery : For, fuch Per- fons, proud of their Joking Talent, do think they anjwer a Demonilration, if they can but break a Jeft upon it. And, befides, they have the Fa- Guky of cutting Capers beyond the Moon, and railing Objedtions at random. The Latter does, perhaps, as much Harm, by Vrefutmng to demon- itrate tuery Thing : And the Over- weening of thefe Men is the more pernicious, becaufe they make a Shew of a great FriendOiip and Zeal for Science • and yer, by falling fhort of their Extravagant Pre- teniions, they throw a Scandal upon her , and make weak Diftinguifhcrs apprehend there is no Science Reflexion Seventeenth. 317 Science at all. The One deviates from Zeal for Truth, in Excefs j the Other, in Dcfe6l : And the Judicious Dccilion of this Pcjint, [ Of the Extent of our KnowledgL\ ] fettles the GoUtn Mean between both. I have endeavour'd, in my Mtthod^ B. i. Lejf.i. to §.12. toeftablifh from Clear Grounds, the JuH Pitch of our Knowledge in this State : Mr. Locke does, with his ufual Candour, at- tempt to do the fame in his Way j Concerning which, I am to give him my Thoughts 3 which are thcfe. 1 1 . There is no doubt but we have lefs Know- ledge than we might have had, through our Want of fome No- i^^e have scTifitive tions • as alfo, for want of difcern- Knowledge of other mg the Agreenient or Difagree- Exiftencc. ment of them in the fame Thing. No doubt too, but Intuitive Knowledge, which is only of ^^//-e^/W^^/f Truths, cannot reach to all that belongs to our Notions, or Ide^is • and, that we too often want proper Mediums to conneft thofe Notions, in order to Demonftration : As alfo, that our Senlitive Knowledge (I luppofe he means that which is had by Experiments ) does not reach very far j otherwife, our Senfes giving us ( as we do both of us hold ) all the Firft Natu- ral Notions wc have, I believe it cannot be de- ny'd, but tliat they give us withall the Grtund of all our Knowledge. Whence I cannot lee, why he limits Stnfitl'vc Knowledge to the Notion of Exigence onely • or, that our Senf.s dj make us know onely that a Thing iif : For, certainly, our Senfes do as ..well tell us the IVall is white, as that the ff^all IS y tho', in proper Speech, it does nei- ther^ but by mean^ of our Mind, comparing the X 4 Notions 5 18 Solid PhUofophy JifferteJ. Notions of the two Terms, given us by the Ob- ject, in ord.r to :he feeing their Co-exifience in the Tnjng. All they do, is, to give us our Notions *, 'v\'hich the Soul (that is, the Al-.n^ according to his Spiritual Part ) compv)unds into a Proportion ; and fu frames a Jud^^ment of thefjid Co-exiftence (or Inconliflency) of th(;fe Terms, or (which is the fame) of what isfgnify'd bythtrm, in the fame Thin^-. Kor do 1 think i\h-. Locke will much de- ny any of this, however we may exprefs our fclves diveniy. 1 2, ' Tis very true that our Experience gives us fjme Light to know what Quali- o«/v Princip'es ^^^^ do 'b.long to fuch Subftan- tion.^r/ano.Ex- ^"^ y^^' ^ ^^""^^ f^l"^ 1^ 1^^- periments, can poilibie tO know this ^erjf often f^i -Of us any Intel' a priori^ by Demonfivati've Retifon^ ligible Explica^ ^|^^' ^^,^ ^^ ^^^ j^^^^ ^j^^ ConftitU^ tton of Natural . r 7 ■» ,- -r» 1 • 1 Qual/tics. ^^^^ ^f ^^-^ Minute Parts, on whlCh thofe Qjalities do depend j jnuch lefs do I judge, that, tko' -we did net know them, yet we could not difco'vcr any necelfary Connexion be^ tween them and any of the Secondary Qualities j he means, thofe Qualities which are tlie Objtds of Lttr Sinfes. Nor do I wonder Mr. Locke thinks thus, becaufe he dvocs, all along, pitch his Thoughts on the CirfufctiLrian Hyfcthtjis, as on that which, an fome Men's Opinion, goes fartLeH in an Jntdli- ^ hie Explication cf the QuiJiiits of Bcdy. Now, iny jL:dgment is, that 'tis demonftrable, that the Principks of ihe Corpujcularians cannot poilibiy give Account of the Cun(t:tutiin either of the Mi- yiute Tarts, OX of the kaft Atom, nor, confequently, of any Body in Nature , or ( which is the Proper Work of a Philofopher) n/«w^ any Qjality into its Reflexion Seventeenth. 329 Us Vroper Caufcs ; I mean, fuch Ciufcs as they can frcve to be fiich, or rr^uH be fuch ; however, they may fancy them to be fuch, by allowing to them^ felves Voluntary Suppofttions for Principles. I have fhewn in my Appendix to my Method^ that the mod Celebrated of theCor/)///rw/jr/V7wPhilofophers, the Cartefians^ Cannot k?JOW the Ccnftitntion of the mo ft minute V art of any of their Elemevts^ fince they can never tell us by their Grounds, the Pri- mary Qualities of their Fri? Matter^ of which their three Elements, and. confequently, all Na- tural Bodies are made. To ffiew jj^e can, I will give a fhorr Summ.ary of the Jlrifiottlian Uo- \il;rine in this particular, truly reprefented, and cleared from the Mif-conceits of fome late School- men. i;. 'Tis confefsM, and Evident, that Quantity is the Primary Atfedion of Body • of which, re-modify'd, ( as I ^^''' "''"'^ 'f'J^' may lay, ) ail Qualities are made. crounds. We can ihew, that by it Body is DiV:fible ; and, therefore, Quaittity ( for that, and and many other Reafons) is Di^ifibility^ efpecial- ly^ taking it as confider'd Vhyfically : hov;ever, taking it as capable to be Meafur'd, Proportioned, and Figur'd, ( as Mathematicians do,) it m.ay not very unfitly be Cdikd Ext en/Icn. Lur, take it, (2s I faid,) as atteding Bodies, in order io Natural Action and Fafjlon^ in v hich the Courfe of Na- ture conlifts, ( as a Natural Philofophtr ought to conliderit,) and \\s D.^ji/ibil'ty^ or a Capacity to be divided by thofe Caufes. Nor can the Greatcft Carte fu.n deny this, lince he grants, that the F^rst Operation in Nature, is, the making their three Lie ments, hy Grinding (as it were) or dividing- \ 3 3 O Solid Philofophy Ajferied. AMding their Firfl Matter. Proceeding by im- incdiatc Steps, we are to feek out the/ri? Sons of this DWifihiUty j and this muft be done by find- ing the moH Simple Intrinfecal Differences o( that^ or any other Notion, which can only be more and hp of the Common Notion. Now, more and lefs of Divifibilicy Confider'd, in order to Natural A- gents, is the fame as to be * 7nore * icLfcf'f ? '''^^-^' ^"^ ^'^ '""^'^y Di\ifible by "L.^-^^l^. i\i. by thofe Agents, which we call to be Rare^ and Denfe. Rarity therefore, and Devfity do confticute the SimpUH Sorts or Kinds of Bodies. And, lince it is incon- ceivable that Matter ihould be divided at all by Second Caufes, but the Divider muft be moreDenfe^ or 7nore able to divide, than the Matter that is to be divided by it j it follows, that Rare and Deijfe Bodies were or-^i^mlly^ fuch j or, that there were Created at firfl: (ome lorts of Bodies that are morcy and others that v/ere lefi divifible 3 as is clearly ex- prefs'd in the two firft Verfes of Genefis. And Rcafon abets it ^ for, otherwife, the Courfe of Nature, coniifting in Motion,co\\\d never have been Cowiaturally made j becaufe, had all the Parts of Matter been efially Divifible, there could be no Keafon why ^/wcpart of the Matter fhould be the Divider y rather tlian the other j and fo there could have been no Moticv., nor, conlequently, any Courfe of Nature at all. 14. By the Divilion of Rare Bodies hy Denfe ones, and the Diviiion of their Ho^ aU Secondary ^^^^ Compounds, the Number of Utinlities CQim to ^ . * ,- , ,, be wade, Voins mcreaiing, there naturally foilow'd the various Siz^^ and the GrofsnejS ^ndi Mi7mtene(s oi thofe Parts 3 as alfo, their Reflexion Seventeenth. 3 31 tllfir various Figures^ Situiitions^ &c. All whicli contribute to coinpound the Species and Ivdirui^ Auuws. Of thcle, varioully mingkd and re- mingkd, all the reft arc made. From Simple Di- vifion, n/^o Things are made of pt?^, whence fol- lows the Individual Divcrlity of Bodies, accord- ing to the Notion of Subftance, or Ens. Mor^ Accidents are ( as was faid before) ftill taken in, to make the Subaltern Genera and Species.^ even to the loweft Sort, or Kind 3 and innumerably more of them, to dillinguifh and conftitute Individual Bodies. 15:. To come a little nearer our main Point: unlefs thofe Qualities, Rarity and DenfiTyy which, are the Trimary The Cmrfe of Na- ones, be admitted, the World tmcii fundament could nevir have been forrndcon- ''Jy^"'^ ''I ;f naturally ^ nor the Courle or Na- tity and Den- ture carried on j bccaufe, ( as fity. was now fhewn,) in that Suppo- fition, there would have been no Aloticn, For, Motion of Material Entities is performed by the Intervening of the Parts of the cne between the Parts of the orZ^fr, and, fo. Dividing it 3 which is impodible, unlefs the one had been Rarer., or mere yielding • the Other Denfcr, Or lef yielding. But, this once fettled, 'tis evident from the very Terms, that there are Proper Caufes, both on the Agent's and Patient's Side, for the one's Dividing., and the other's being Divided. For, the Rare being mere Divifible than the Denfe, 'tis dcmonftrable, that the Denfe bting impelled againft the Rare by Mo- tion, ( which comes from a Superior Agent,) the Rare being more Divilible, will give way, and be divided by the Denfe 3 which is clearly impollibie in '332. Soli J Thilofophy Afferted. ill the CorpufculaTian Hjpot be/Is ; which puts all Parts of their Matter to be e^ially Rare, or Denfe j or rather, ( as the Cartefiam do, ) neither Rare, 7tor Denfe ^ all Qualities, according to them, be- ing made by mingling their three Elements j which Elements are themfcha^s made by, and pre- fuppofe , the Motion of their Firft Matter. Whereas, yet, it is impoITiblc to conceive, but thofe Parts of that Matter mufl be either Rare, or elfe Denfe, at leaft to fome Degree. And, as de- nying the Rarity and Denfity in the FirH Bodies docs, by making Motion impollible, put the Courfe of Nature out of Frame, both in its Be- ginning and Progrefs j fo it utterly deftroys all Demonftration in Phylicks, which is grounded on Mediums from Proper Caufes, and Proper Ef-- fcfts. 1 6. Palfmg over many Immediate Steps, which fhew how thofe Four Principal 'iJytt by thcfd Qaalities, Hear, Cold, Mcifture, Qr^unds thesa^ and Drincfs, are made of Rarity ture of Secmdary j t^ /- c-l i i_ 1 ^(aUt'ns is dL ^'''" Denlity, acted upon by the rnofijh-itblc. common Caufes in Nature ; we come to fhew how thefe two Pri- TYiary Qaalities do conflitute many Scco7tdary ones j and how thefc laft are refunded into the other, as theii- Prefer Caufes j and, therefore, are Demonftra- ble by them, as by their Prcjicr Mediums. A few Inilii\ccs may ferve, as Hints, .to explicate others. Thar great Pellucidity in the Air is necellarily, and properly refunded into its exrream Divilibiliry, or Rt.rlty j by which ir becomes ealily penetrable in all its Parts, by thofe Sficula Jgnea^ the Rays of the Sun- and O/^j-c///, for the fame Reafon, is the Proper EltcCt of Dcnihy] which hinders Reflexion Seventeenth. 353 its Subjcft from being pcncrratcd, or Dli/ided by them • whence alio ir is a Proper Caufe of Re- pelling;, or Retiedini^ rhem. Again • Who fees not that Jj^uiJ/ry, which makes its Subject ealily yielding to be flatted evenly^ as we fee in Ponds ; or driven to run into Cavities, by the cojiimon Motion of Gravitation, is a proper Effect of Ra- rity, isCo?jfifief7cy is of Denlity ? SpilFitude is a Con(lipati(jn of Denfe Parts, or the Want of Pores to admit the Inerefs of other Bodies. GroC fuucle is clearly nothing but Denflty, in a hiorgcr Quantity of its Parts. Friability is refunded into great Denfe Parts, and very large Rare ones : Whence, thofe Rare Parts, which, were they lefs, would better cement tliofe Parts together, being now very large, and, withal, very Divifibie, arc eafily divided-^ and, conlequently, the Body is foon /"hatter'd : As we find in Dry Clods, out of which, ( while they w^'re yet IVet Dirt^ ) thofc Parts which were Warry, being drawn by Heat, large Cavities are Jeft, which the Air now pofTeffes. On the other lide, Dutiillty and Malleability are the Effects of the very fmalleft Rare Parts, fine- ly compacted with the minutefl Denfe ones. Thofe Small Denfe Parts, fo clofely w^oven, and, in a manner, Contiguous, keep the Rare from evaporating j and the Rare^ by being fuch, and interwoven with the Denfe all over, make the Compound yield to Expanlion, without Breaking j being x'erj'/wtf//, are not eafily feparable 3 and yet, tho' rarify'd farther by the iubtileft Agent, Fire^ they render it Fufible. 17. U'cre 334 iS*^//^ Fhilofophy Afferted. 17. Were thefe Principles which I rawly and briefly touch on here, purfuM by The true Reafoii Learned Men with Immediate why jome Men Confequences, which, true Lo- think, tioem bieX' . , \-o- - r r • r flicable, gic^ a^iifung, IS tar from impof- lible j the Nature of thofe/r/?- mlxt Qualities , and by their means of many others^ would not be very hard to explicate. But, if Men are refolv'd to negledl all Natural Prin- ciples, and the Intrlnfecal Conftitution of the Fir ft Bodies in Nature, and will needs run upon nothing but Mathematical Notions, which pre- fuppofe thofe Principles ; nor could be found in Nature, unlefs the other be firfl: admitted, or Di- vifion made Polfible j ( for neither Vans, nor con- fequently Figures of Parts, could be made with- out Dl'vlfion, nor Divifion unlefs fome Bodies were naturally a^t to divide, others to he divided, that is, unlefs fome were Rare, others Dcnfe ) or, if, infteadofdemonftrating their Natural Princi- ples by the Superiour Science, they will needs have recourfe to Voluntary Suppo/itions j and violate the Nature of Caufality, and of the Deity it felf, by making him whofe Proper Efe^ ( he being Ef- fentially Self-exiftence ) is to gl'ue Exi/tence, or create, to be the Proper and Immediate Caufe of Motion • and go about to prove Ignotum per Igno- tijjimum, by fuppofmg ( as they fometimes *do ) th'dZ God wills this or that, which is for the Inte- reft of their Tenet, and too hard to prove : If, I (ay. Men are refolv'd to follow fuch Untoward Mjtbods,Ws no Wonder Science does not advance, but the World is decain'd in Ignorance of many things," which otherwife it might know. Did Learned Men fct themfelves to carry forwards the Refiesioj Seventeenth. ;?35' the Grounds of Nature in Eucliilts FbyCicm (where they will fijul Demon ft rations enow ) to huther Conclulions, with the iame Zeal as they do the Mathematicks j I doubt not but the Evident Tiuths, whicli would by Degrees difclofe them- felves, would both encourage, and enable them, to make a farther Progreis in Knowledge ; nor would the Science of Secc?jd Qualities, ( abouc which Phylical Demonft rations ought in great part be employ'd) beheklfo Defperate. But to leave thefe Diicourfc^, and apply my felf toAh-.L. 1 cannot but wonder, that amongft all his Ideas of Qualities, he not fo much as once mentions ( as far as I remember) thofe two ChiefeH ones of Rarity and Denfity • tho' nothing is more obvious in the whole Courfe of Nature than thefe are. Which, with many other Reafons, makes mc think he had not feen, or at leaft well weigh 'd the true Ariftcrdlan Syftem, (wdiich he might have feen in Sir Kenelm DlghfsTreatife of Bodies^ and its Latin Preface j as alio in Injtitutio^jes Feri^ fatetica •) but took it as reprefented by the Mo- dern Schools. For my felf, I muft declare I ve- rily judge, that the Grounds I here infifc on, are the only true ones that a Natural Fhilofopher can ba'ue j that they are Demonjirable j and I do otfer my felf to maintain them to be fucb^ if it fhall pleafe any Learned Objedlor to attempt to Ihow thefe Principles Fauky ^ or that we build on any Suppcjition at all, and not on what's either Sdf-ivldtnt^ or ealily and immediately Reducible to^ Self-evidence. Which, I believe, no other Seft of Philofophcrs did ever fo much as pretend to. fS. To 3 3 <5 So!} J Philofophy Ajferte^. 1 8. To come to thofe Qualities, which are the Formal Object of our Senfes , T'HPojftbilityofdc' called bv Mr. Locke Secondary nwifiratinrthem Q^^ji^j,/ J ^avc fticwn already jhewn by the /«- 7^ j. r \_ r ;;• • Jiance^ Colour. ^^^^ ^^^'^^'s of them are Intelligi^ hie and Explicable by Rarity and T>evfity \ only certain little Refpei^ils are added to them, which too lie in our Ken : Nor do 1 doubt but mod or the others may be clearly and didinft- ly known by the fame Grounds. Indeed, divers of them depend on the Figure and Texture of Parts J which, tho* we can never know with a Mathematical Exa6lnefs, yet I fee not why we may not demonllrate the Natures or Kinds of each Qualitv, fofar as to di/i-inguiJJj them from others^ and refund them into their Pro/)fr Caufes-^ which is enough for our purpofe, and mod proportio- nable to our State. For Example, Light brings from the Wall into the Eye, and fo into our Knowing Power, the Notion of JVhitenefs., and of other Colours from other Objefts. It cannot be doubted then, ( lince Light of its felf is L^ni- form ) but that there is fome Difpofition in the Surface of the Objed", or the Figure of its out- mofl Parts, which reflects Light after a different manner, and affedts the Seer accordingly. Nor is it hard to conceive, but very Evident, that a ve- ry fmooth Surface, as having feweH Pores in it, will reflect mere Light, and fo make it more Vifi- ilc\ efpecially if thofe Outmoft Parts be Round/jJ), which refledl Light every way, or towards all lides. It is manifeft then that, that Quality which is v7os} Vijihle of all Others being that which we call PHite7iefs^ the Proper Caufes of that Quality may b- found out. Which will further appear hence. Reflexjorj Seventeenth 337 hence, that if, on the contrary, the Surface have Small-pointed Parts and Large Pores, much of the Light will be loft in tliofe fhjdvGrotrs, and fcarce any Beam of it re fleeted ; which therefore is the Proper Caufe of that Lightkfs Appearance call'd Blacknefs ; which is the keafon why, when there is no Light at all to be reflected, all things feem Black. Jf we hold a Thoufand Needles Points to- wards our Eye, tliey appear Black, becaufe of the vaftnefs of the Interftices or Cavities in proportion to the extant Parts vvhich fhould have relieved the Light : Whereas, were the Objedl a polifh'd Plate of Steel, the Interftices or Pores being lefs, it ap^ pears more luminous and whitifh j which may give us fome faint, but fure, Light, how this Co- lour is made. The Intermediate Colours are made by the Mixture and Demixrure of thofe Extreams ; whence, out of the Degrees of their partaking thofe. Contrary or Subcontrary Qualities are fra- med, as Blue, Green, Yellow, and all oi\\q\: Co- lours. Nor is this D<^rfc,conftituting each of thofe Species^ Unknowable. A Pifture-drawer can tell us what Proportion of his Paint offuch a Colour he adds to that of another Colour, to make what Third Colour he pleafes. We fee then, that the Se- condary Qi/^aiity of Colour^ may come within the Compafs of our Knowledge. Nor do I fee why the reft- of them may not become ccjua^Jy Intelligible, did we ferioully fet our Reflex Thoughts on work to ftudy them- efpecially Experimental Knowledge adifting, by hinting to us fuch Matters of Fa6t iis give Light to our Reafon, ( when furnidf d with, and attentive to, true Natural Principles) how ic may reduce thofe Qualities unto their Vr.'pcrCau^ [es^ which is the oytly Work of fecicucrt Y RE- 338 Solid Philofnphy Ajferte^. REFLEXION Eighteenth, O N The ^thani ph CHJPTERS. I. X Come now ro a nearer view of the 4/^/7 X Chapter, Of the Reality of KnoivlecJge^ the main point in which the whole The State of the Do6trine of the Idefh is con- Quepon. cern'd. To State it rightly, Ido not doubt ( as I have expreft my fclf formerly ) but that the Idcifs have many true Notions of the Things-^ that is, the Things them- feh'es in their Minds, after a Natural Manner, as well as their Oppofers have, norwithftanding their ill Speculation j and thence oftentimes dif- courfe right j for the lame Reafon that, tho' fome Philofophers held that the Eye fees pr Em'iffonem^ Others pr Receplonem Radiorum^ yet they naturally faw both a Uke^ however their Speculative thoughts, diiferM about the manner how Secmg was made. Wherefore the true State of the Queftion is, whether they can have any Real Knowledge of the things in Nature, according to the Vrincii>les of the Ideifis • or, by their puting our Notions, which are the Ground and Mate- rials of our Knowledge, to be oncly Likenejfefy A^ptir.'inces^ Similitudes^ Rejefnhlnnccs^ Vourtraitures^ or Pichres of the Things, ( which are the nam.cs they give them ) and not the Things themfehes in our minds .- For, if they can have no Real Kmiv^ kdge^ or Knoivledge of the Things by fuch meerly rcpefcnt-* Reflexion Eighteenth. 3^9 repreftfiti??^ Ideas, then ic mud be faid th'it thufe Ideas, being confdr.dly the Firfi and orely ^late- rials of their Knowledge, the Lleifis will become oftentimes liable to deviate from Nature, and fall into Hrrour by adhering to fuch Groundlefs Prin- ciples, as is the Subdituting very often Erf7pry Refewhlances, or Fi ^ve wiU reflea: ncxr Reflexion Eighteenth. 3 4 r next upon the Word [ know ] which Mr. Locke applies ( rho' not fo hnmtdiately^ yet) bid'iffc- rejitly^ to the Tbmg and to the JcUn, Now, if this be fo, and that to to he kjiown agrees to them both j then, as the hUii is in the Mind when it is hw)vn^ fo the To'ivg^ when kmivr:^ ihoLiId be in the Mind top, which is our very Pofition, thoui^ht by the Ualls fo Paradoxi- cal, and yet here forcibly admitted by chcm- felves. And, if neither the Uea brings the Thing into rhe Knowing Power, or ( w^hich is the fame ) into the Mlnd-^ nor the Mind , or Knowing Power goes out of the Soul to it, I know not how they can pretend to Hiow how the Know- ing Tower, and the Thing known, can ever come to meet , as they mud when ever an Ad of K?iowIedge is made. 'Tis to no purpofe then, to ailed ge that the Thing comes into the mind, or is brought thither by means of the Uea j for, if it comes oris brought thither, let it be by what means it will , 'tis mod inconceilably Evident that, after it is come or brought thither, it is there. Nor can all the Wit of Man avoid this Confequence, unlefs plain w^ords mult lofe their Signification. Wherefore Mr. L. in pur- fuance of his own Principles iTiould not have (aid that the Alind dues ?tot knovj T'hino-s imme- diately, but by m ans of the Ideas ; but, that it doeS || not know them at all, neither mediately nor immediately • for il" tlie Thing be ;;/ the Know- ledge at all, they muft be in the Mmd, where onely the KnovAedge is 3 which comcs ovcr ( thus , far ) to our Polition. Y ; 4. It 342^ ^olij Tkikfophy Ajferted. 4. It muft be confcfs'd, that Mr.Lncke has here, §. 3. put the Cbjedtion againft 7he Nccejjity of the the Ideijls as flrQngly, and home, Thng^s b.rng in ^5 it is poiiible : But I muft ftill inforced. pcriilt, and avow, that neither his own excellent Wit, (which, had he light on right Principles, could reach to any thing that is within the Ccjmpafs of Poihbi- lity, ) nor all the World joining in his Airiftance, can clear that Cbjcdlion, fo as to fatisfie any In- telligent Man, who is true to his Ueafon guiding it felt (as it ought) by Ccnnexkn of TIrw/, and not by Fancy , nor fhew, that by his Ideas any Knowledge at all of the Thing can be poiibly hadr F'.rp-^ He allcdges the /agreement cr Ccnfiv- tnlxy of the Things with his SimfL Ideas. And I reply, that he cannot, by the Principles of the Idei/is^ fhcw that the Things do fgrei- or degree with his Simple Ideas at all. To dc monftrate which, I argue thus : Ere he can know that the Repre- fentiit'on and the Thlf^g riprefnted do agree, Com- mon Senfe tells us, he muft have kth ihc Idea 2Lnd the Thing in his Ccmfarivg Vaver., that is, in his Mind j that fo he may take a View of both of them, and confjder them In ordtr to one amther -^ and, by doing this, /t^f whether the one does fr«- ly rejemhle the other, or no. But, this is direft- Jy againft the Principles of the hk:jh^ who do not all jw that the 7/3.>^ can be /w the i\iind, but the 7^^^ only. Kext, he alkdges, that his Complex Ideas 310 Archetypes :j and not CoJifcrmahle to the Th.ngs^ as the others were, but ^- thcmjehcs on- ly., and, therefore, he feys, they cannot lead us into Errour, bccaufe they cun?2ot hut r^prcfait tbemfihes. 1 pafs by the Oddnels of the Poiition, \\vdl ReJIexiol Eighteenth. 3^j^ that thc/7t'/7, which is a Piclurc^ fhoiild he a Pi- dure of it fdf^ or reprefnjt it felf: 1 only note, that this Allcr^arion which fhould char the Poinr» quite /^y^j it, '^n A gives it up. Tor, the Qjcftion is, whctlier his Ideas do give us the Knowledge of the Things in Nature j and *tis evident, andcon- fefs^d they cannot give us this Knowledge oi them, but by rcprefenting tlieni : Now, he tells us, that his Complex Ideas are not Copies of the TbirigSy nor reprefcnt them^ but themfdves C7jly. Whence is evidently concluded, that we are never the nearer to tlie Knowing of Things by them \ no, not obliquely, and at Seccyid hand^ or by the In- tervention of tbofe 7Je///, or Similitudes reprelent- ing them, as was pretended formerly. Whence, for any thing he lias produced, we may judly doubt whether fach Ideas are not Whimfcal Fan- cies^ without any Reality at all • iince he will not allow them even that flighteft Relation to the Things^ of fo mucli as reprefintlng them. But, which is much worfe, he affirms, §.5. i\\2.i thofe Ideas themfelucs are conjiderd as the Archetypes j and the Things no otherwife regarded^ hut as they are con- formable to them. Now, this feems to me a ft range way of proving the Reality of our Knowledge, by Ideas, to affirm, that we are not to regard the Things^ but as confvrmahli to our Ideas. Is not this to make Philofophy not the Knowledge of Thbigs., but of Ideas only j and to pretend, that the Thing niuft only be held True^ if it be Conformable to our Ideas ? He might as well have faid Fa?icies • for, he exprelly fays, thcfe Complex Ideas are made by the Mind., and not taken from the Thing, nor like it : And, whatever is neither the Ris, nor fomuch as/.ie it, can neither have Reality^ nor y 4 Shai) 1 44 Solid Phzlofophy ^JferteJ. Shew of Reality ; and therefore:, mufl be a meer 'Fr.ncy. Now, thef.' Complex Jdcas reach much far- ther than all the ethers do ; 'viz.. to Modes^ Sub- fiances '^nd^ Relations '^ as is fecn, Bouki. Chap, iz. So that this Difcourfe of his deftroys the Reality cf cur Knojphdge in alniofl all the Things we are ro know. He will, perhaps, fay, thofe Complex Ideas arc the Efft^s of certain Tavers to Caufe them, found in the Thing j and, by this Means they bring the Things, as being their Caufes^ into their Mind, But the Argament returns ftill with the fame Force 3 for, if they bring the Thing in- to the Mind, then the Thing is in the Mind when it is brri^^ht thither. Add, that this makes them Refem Glances of iht Thing, which he denies 3 for, the Effefl, being a Participation of the Caufe^ mufl: nrccfrarily nfemble it , efpecialjy, if it be a Natural EiFc6l. Nor can he fay they make us know the Thing, becaufe they are made up of Simple onts'. For, as the Simple Ideas only made us know the Thing by reprefcnting it, fo thefe other not reprefenting It,, have loft the Power of making us know it at all. So that, let them turn which way they will, either the Thing is neuer brought into the Knov/kdge, or the Mind ^ and then it can never be knoivn : Or, it zs brought thither., and then it muil be there • which is our Pofjtion, and deny*d by the Ideifts. 5, I have fhewn above, that all Mathematical Knowkdgcs, tho' they arc ne- mthematical and vcr fo abllractcdly txprefs'd, are MornlKmMges gj-Qunded oxx the Thing, or on are gronndoa on f. . i , ^ r / u • t the Tkins, m the ^^^V J ^^^ ^^^^^'^^ O"^'^' ( ^nich hiind. ^ two he here mentions,) on the Nature of Man., oxReafin-j which, I fup- Reflexion Eighteenth. 345- T fiippofc, none will fay arc Nuthhjgs ; and, therefore, they are, both of them, true K7miJ- ledge of the Things COnfider'd in fart, 01 hiade^ e^uately. 6. In his 8th Sedlion, he defends himfelf for ha'vlnz fo little regard ( aS it may feeni) to the Real Exigence of ^^J f^^^-^ Pre. -' , ..,- r 1 TTT aicates, and ^c* Things. I dllCOUrfe thus : We cidental ones too, have more ReaJ Notions of the are ^ tmly the Thing, than barely Exigence y for, '^l'"^' ''"'' ^^•'^ c^ery Notion that belongs to the J^.f .^j^^jiX Line of Th!rig or Subjnince, whe- jy, ther Inferior or Superior, nay, every Mode or Accident that does belong, or ever did belong to the Thing, either Inrrintccully or Extrinfccally, are all of them Real 3 fo that he needs not be foUicitous any fhould objed", that his Ideas have no Reality in them, becaufe he re- gards not their E^'.^f^c^ onely. And, were fuch an ObieSion made, or had it any force, he might alfo reply, that in every part of his Difcourfe, he does regard Exiftence, and cannot do otherwife ^ unlefs any Objedler fhould be fo weak as to al- ledge, that 7i>hat exifis in the M'.nd, does mt exiH at all. For, if he had once his Notions from the Thing, they would be ftill the Thi7:g in the Aii?id^ and Real, tho* the Individual Objects, whence they were taken, be perifh'd. Nay, more- thofe Things would have a Better, a more Durabk% aiui more Noble Exillence in the Mind, than they had in Nature. 1 fay, [ thofe Things • ] not fearing that any fhould objcft, that fling (ignifics the -whole ; which may feem contrary to my former Doftrine, that the Thing is only in the Mind by Jnadec^uate Notions, or in fart. For, tho' the Fcrmal ^^6 Solid Philofophy AffdrteJ. Formal Conception be oncly of fome Quality of If, exprejly and dillintlly^ yet it implies or conno-- tatesi\\c Knowledge of the whole Thing con fu fed- ly 5 it being mod: clearly demonftrable in Meta- phyficks, that there are no Aclual Parts in any Compound whate^ver : So that 'tis flill the whole Thing that is known, tho' onely a Part (as k were ) of it be known difiinttly. Upon this Evi- dent Principle, that there are no Atlual Parts^ is grounded that Solid and moH approved Maxim, that ABions and PaJJJons are of the Suppofitum^ or Individual Thing. Thus, when the Hand {[nkcs or wounds a Man, 'tis truly faid, that the Mafi (which fignifies the whole Th'uig) did it, and is anfwerable for it • and, if he kills the Perfon he ftruck, the whole Man will he hang d for it, tho' the Hand onely, and not the Legs, Head, Neck, &c. gave the Blow. Now, this could neither be faid with Truth, nor that Punifhment be in- flicted by Juftice, if the Word [Hand] did not Jignifie^ and truly w>ere the whole Man^ according to his Faculty of Handling or Striking^ or accord- ing to that Part which immediately did that Action. The felf-fame is to be faid, and for the felf-fame Reafon, of our 7?MJ^^^^?e Notions j and, that each of them implies, or connotates (that is, materially and entitatively is) the whole Thing,tho' formally or frecifely but a Part of it, aS it were j or the Thing accordi?7g to ftich a particular Con- liderability, found in it, or Identify 'd with it. Whoever fliall weigh attentively the Force and Coherence of this Uifcourfe, will clearly difcern liOW entirely all our Philojophy is huilt on the Things ^ and is ihe Rnovdedge of them ^ and how far thc| Idtijii fall fhort of having that Solid Ground fori the! Rejtexio>i Eighteenth. 347 xh^Bafis of their Difcourlls: Rut, efpccially, this Tenet, which puts their Comphx Ideas not oncly not to be the Things (which it nuift be Ibme Way, or to fome degree or other, if it be not a meer Fancy y ) but, not to be lo much as a Copy or Rejamhlaiicc of it, which (as was faid) is the ilightell and Icaft Relation it can poiiibly have to it. 7. I would have none think, that, by this DiC- courfe I dtt^y Complex Notions, or Ideas, The Ten Common Heads '^'■■''"^ our Com- are the Simpler ones , which when P^'^ f^''''^'" ^'' \ve divide by Di^crences, each In- ground^a-^MrVs, ferior Genns and Species^ ( they be- not fo. ing made up of the Superior No- tions, and thofe Differences, ) are Complex Nc~ tions^ as their Very Definitions tell us. Wlience Mr. La^y^ff's Complex Idea oi Murt her ^ Sacrilege^ Or whatever elfe they be, are given us by the fame Method. And, the difference between him and me in this Point, is this , that we complicate our Ideas regularly^ and according to the exac^ Rules ot Arf^ and hefeems to make \\\s voluntarily^ or elfe by Reflexion on his own Inter! our ^ and what he experiences in himfelf, which 1 take to be a Very fallacious way, becaufe very few can diif in- guifh Well between a Fhantafm in the Imagina- t.cn^ which is a Mattrlal Faculty in us j and a AV tlcn^ which is Spiritual^ tho' they be both of them bfter:our^ or -within us. To fliew the Difference between which, I have given a ihort Hint in my Method^ Book I. LeJJi 1. §,14, and much more here, in my Vreface. 8.1c 348 Solid Ph'ilofophy AJferted. 8. It is very hard, when two Writers go upon different Principles,not to miftake In xvh^t manner ^e j^^^^ ^j^j ^j^^^^ ^^^ ^^^ Olh^XS compound I uchNi" » , • ^ ■, tj 1 1 1 ii^nj^ Meaning j and I would be loath to wrong fo Ingenuous an Au^ thor. Sometimes he feems to mean no more by his Complex Ideas^ but cither thofe Compound No- ti 3ns which are made up of the Simpler Notions of the Genus and Difference^ as we defcend down- wards in the fame Line j or elfe, of thofe in di- vers Lines 3 and, I am fure, let him difcourfe them as he will, they can be compounded of no- thing elfe 3 thofe Common Heads comprizing all the Natural Notions we can have. It is no lefs certain too, that we can put together (as he fays) Simple Notions as we pleafe, which we have not obferv'd thus put together in things that a6tually cxift. But then we mufl be wary, while we do this, that our Reafon joins them by feeing them Confifient and CompoJJibk : For, OUr Fancy \N\\\ put together Ideas which are utterly Repugnant to one another, and are altogether Chimerical. Now^ if the Notions, thus join d by us, be Confident, the Nature or Thing fuppos'd to be the Ground of thofe Notions is fcffible to he j which being the Notion of Ens^ hence they are conceiv'd as a kind of Intelliclual Entity^ Created ( as it were ) by the Mind, and thence have an Inteli-gibiUty^ which is a Property of Ens (Non-Entities and Chimxras be- ing I ninDlligible) and we can have a kind of Ccunterft'if^ or Artificial, Notion of them as En- tities, x\\) Lich a tiling ne'v^r exifled in the World that we kn jvv of j tho \ I believe, *tit hard to conc.ive, that we can trame a Complex Notion of a Nature that is Capabk to bcy but it exifts fome- where / Reflexion Eighteenth. 3-19 W'here in the Univerfaruy of Creatures, here, or elfcwherc. How the Mind, ufing the Fanc)s can do this, cannot, I think, be better elucida- ted , than by reflec'^ing on what thofe, wlio write of the Excellency of Voefte and Voets^ ufe to fiiy in Commendation of thofe Dadalca?^ Arcids. They tell us that a Pott has that Name from the Greek Noun ttc/mtt/^, which lignifies ^ Maker. The Reafon they give for this Appel- lation is, that \vhcrc2S other Artifls have their Ma^ terials given to their Hands to work upon, by fhaping it into an Artificial Form j theP^^-^ alone is the Maker as well of his Matter., as the Contriver of its Form. So that the Ideas he has in his Head of his Heroes, his Lovers, his Ladies, and of Vir- tuous Perfons, are indeed (as Mr. Locke C2.\\s his) Archetypes, and regard not whether fuch Incom- parable Patterns he has invented did ever exift: in Nature, or no j nor is it to his purpofe. Yet dill ( as Mr. Locke fays W^U) that his Complex Ideas are made of Simple ones, fo ( by the leave of thofe Self- magnifiers) the Poet could never have had thofe Excellent Ideas of his Heroes., or their great A(5tions, had he not been pre-imbu*d with JV^- tural Notions j which he pins together ingeni- oufly, and exalts them to a high Pitch, fo to make them Exemplars for others to imitate. Rather, he only adds Super I at hue or Extraordinary Degrees tO what he finds in Nature, Whence 'tis nxinifeft, he regards not what js, huz^wh^t p)ou Id he ^ quite contrary to the Duty of a Philofopher, who is to take his Complex Notions from Things, juft as he finds them complicated in Nature, aixl then dif- courfe upon them by his PvCafon j and not to ftand coining new Complex Ideas which Natuv;^ never 3 JO Solid Phzlofophy AfferfeJ. never gave him. What therefore I moft diflike here in Mr. Locke is, that he fcems not to refledl on what it is which makes feme Ideas or Notions more Simple than other ^ 'viz,. Their being more Abftra6led or Univcrfal j for this frees them from the Partnerfhip of more-compounded Differences, and the Complexion of Mukitudes of Accidents , (which, ftill, as they d^fccnd lower, are reqnifit to diflinguilli the Kinds of Things ;) by which means they become wore Sij^ple or lefs compounded • whence, the Supreme Heads of the Ten Predica- ments are the Simple ff Notions of al( others, ex- cept that of Exifience. Did Mr. Locke rate the Simplicity and Complexion of his Ideas from this certain and well-grounded Kule, there migl^t an eafie Accomodation be made between hisDo6lrin and mine as to this Particular. But his Zeal a- gainfl: the Cobweb Schemes fome Modern School- men had woven, tranfported him to ravel that Excellent Frame of Notions, which both Nature and Art had given usj and, (as Cartifws and others have done ) to model all Philofophy upon a new, tho' lefs Solld^ or rather far from Solid, Foundation. 9. That I mayfoy as much as I c.i^ in behalf of the Idtifis, it may be alledg'd, ^I! Pleas fail the that they find by ExycrienceThmo^s Jdeijts unlefs they ^^^ ^5 .j^^,'^- j^/^ .^^ ^^ repreftnt them, pv//7; Phantafms ^^^^^ ^^^^^ '^^'^^V ^''''''^ ^ ^'^'^ ^Y from Norioiis. means of our hic.':s do Forecafi: them: Therefore Real Kno-wledo-e may be had by means of Ideas. I anfwer, F-rH-^ That this Agreement they have between what's /;/ the Mind and out of it, would equally, nay bet- ter, be explicated, were the Things themfelves in the Reflexion Eighteenth. 55-1 the M'mil^ and not the Lleax \ and, tlieieforc, ic can be no Argument for the Reality of their Knowkd^^e by Ideas only, Beiides,! deny that when their Ideas are not true Natural Notions but Fancies^ they exferieyjce them, or any EfFeft of them j as in Vacuum^ or Duration before or after the World. Secondly^ I anfwer, That Experience only helps them by giving them KmirUdge - and Knovjledgc^ according to them, can only be had by means of Ideas j wherefore they mufl: ei- ther prove, by other Grounds, that Similitudes can give us Knowledge of the Things, or they do fetere Vrincifitim^ beg the Queftion, and prove idem per idem. For,if iWQtX Repreftntaticns can give US no true Knowledge, Experience^ w^hich only aififts US by giving us Ideas^ is quite thrown out of doors, and may all be Fant aft leal. All is wrong and falls fhort, if the First Ground of our Know- ledge be Incompetent and Inlignificant. Beiides, Experience gi^CS US both Thantafms., W^hich are Material Reprcfcntations ^ and our Notions loOy wliich are Spiritual; but Experience is not duely qualify'd to tell us which is the one^ and which is the other • tho* this be of the higheft Concern inourCafe : All ic can do is to inform us, that we are atfe(Sed by Ibme Agent working on our Senfes. Nay, of the two, it more inclines us ta embrace Phantafms for Notions , for thofe do make upon us the more Stnlihle Impreliion, and Caufe a more liojely Reprefentcition. To diflinguifh perfectly between this Falfe and True Ground of Know'kdge, is of the moft weighty Importance of all other Points of Philofophy whatfoever 3 and yet I mull complain, that not the Icaft Care ( as far as I have obierv'd ) is taken any where in this Trcatife 351 Solid Philofophy AjferfeJ. Treatifc to difl-'wgtuflj them j and particularly, not in this Chapter, which had been the proper Place to treat of that Subiefl: : But, on the contrary, (as I have fhewn above) they are carelelly Confounded, And I mull declare, that without fettling this Point well^ we can never have any Certainty what Knowledge is Real^ what Fanta[tick : Or, when we do truly know, when onely feem to know : But, there is not a Word here to that purpofe. 10. As for the Mongers and Changelings h^rc fpoken of, I think Philolbpliers od.iMifcarr'taz,esof /jiQuld have nothing to do with Nature oH^ht mt ^^^^^ Nature, Or ^UAtmuut-rrt 7?^ ro /ho^fe Natural , ' 1 • 1 1 r^ ►u Principles. Body, is a perfect Con- tradition. 2 Ccrcllarj 354 '^'^'^^^ Philofophy JfferteJ. Coralkry II. Hence alfo , tho* the Canefiani could demon ft rate there are In- 7f^€ Cartefians are n^te Ideas^ (which I judge impof- concluded agaitiji ^j^j^ ^ ^ ^^^^f^ '^y^ declarC by \*o. as veil as -, * •' , i • -n • • r i. /ther ideifls,,r ra^ ^nd prove, hy their Tr maples, that ther more, thofe Ideas are the things themfelves in our Underftaftding,and not Re-^ fewh lances onelv, the lame Arguments I have ufed againft others Will have equal, or rather a far greater Force againft them j and conclude, that they cannot, by their Principles, have Knowledge of ^^77 Thing, but that thty know Nothing. And, how they Ihould pretend they are the Things themfelves, if they do not fo much as allow ihem to be taken from the Things^ is altogether In- conceivable. Ur Concerning Truth in General, of which Mr. Locke treats in his 5th Chap- M Truth confifis in ter, no morc can be faid ( fpeak- :}oining or Seps- jng of Natural Truths ) but that ntrm^ Partial -^ • ,^^ ^^ • Exijling fuch in our Conceptjons of the - .. , , '^ -A - i n Things; Wr;or Minds as they exist tn themjel'ves. in Joining or Sc* Fc/r, this put, our Minds will be parating Ideas. Conformable to the Things,whofe Metaphyfical Verity fixes them to he what they are, or ( if w^e fpeak of them as af- fected with any Mode ) as they are : Whence our Judgments concerning them, being thusgroundedy cannot but be True, What Mr. L.*s Joining or Separating of Signs, &c. has tO do With Truth, is beyond my Skill to comprehend j for Signs arc no more Truth, than the Bu^) at the Door is the Wine in the Cellar, 1 have demonftrated over and over Reflexion EigfrtccnthJ Jff fc^vcr, that Lkas^ which he makes here one fort of Sign.<^ and arc mecr Similitudes, can never give us Kno\vkdii;c of Tlnn^s \ rrtuchlcfs cmTrutbi which is the Ot?jecl of Knowledge, conlifl in con- joining dr fep.i rating /Zw; • and, leaft of all, cart Truth confifl in the Joining or Separating the other forts of Sigtify viz. p( IVcrds \\'iLhour the Ideas or Notions j for, thus Ccmfdcr'd, they are no more but Sounds or Charafters. To difcourfc this Point from its Fundamental Grotind, jind declare it Literally : The Metafhyficat Verity of the Thing, which, put into a Propofition, predicated i\\c v bote Thing (or Mode) of if ft Ifi and affirms that the Thing u what it ^, gives us our Fir}l Truths, or FirH Trinciples, And all other TrUths coiiiifts in this, dvAttfjailetjM^te, or Partial Notions or Conceptions of the Thing, cither as to what is Intrinfecal or Lxtrinfrcal to it, are predicated ei- ther of the Thing as in it fclf^ that is, according to tiie Line of SuhfiancCy which are call*d Eiji^^tiai Predicates • as, when we fay, Veirus esl Animal 9 or, as it isaircfl^d with fome Mode confiftent in the fame Subject j as when w^e fay^ VetrUi tH AU hus^ Tatcr^ Locjtns.^ Galeatzis^ Albuni est Dulce^ 6cCv and it is impollible there can be any ?}7. re forts of^ Formal Truths but thefe two : For all Predication is made by fome kind of hhntificatio?:, as is plain- ly fignify/d by ihQ Co-pula [is,] and rhere cannot polhbly be any other forts of Jdcntilication, but I cither in the whole, or not in the whole j that is, in furt, or according xo Variial Conceptions oi* the fame Thing , nor can there b^^ any Idenriika- tion at all of Ideas 3 Mr, Locke confeifing, '.hiit e^h of them is what it [elf is^ and no othi H Yi Z I ii. 1 3 5<^ Solid Philofophy AJferteJ. 1 2. I take it to be a ftrange kind of Catechrefu to make two forts ofTn^t'j^ Movtat The DijlivSiim of and Verbal^ and we may with as Truth ^«^^ Men- ^r^^^ ^^^^ ^.^y ^l^^j- ^ ^avem has- tal and Verbal *^ /- c Trr- • i Extravagant.and ^^^^ I'^il^^ of Wlm • One in thC' the Parts of it Cellar, the otlier in the Bufh at Coincident. the Door j for Words are goo4 for nothing in tlie World butf. meerly and purely to S./^?;/^e : So that when we^ fay a Man fpeaks Triic^ the Senfe of thofe Words' can be only This,' that the Propoiition he fpeaks does,/^7^//^ luch a Thought or Judgment in his IMind as is really Conform Me to the Thing he thought or fpolce of : And I w^onder this Great Man can imagin that, in our more Cc?7?plex Ideas, we put the Name for the Idea it felf • for then that Name would fignifie Nothing at all^ if neither the Tljlng nox the Idea be iigniricd by it, as he feems to hold. Again, Words differ from meer Sounds in thi5, that they have fome Senfe or Meaning in them, and Mea?mjgs are the very Notions we have in our Minds : Wherefore the Parts of this Di- flinftion of his w'ould be coincident^ becaufe all Verbal Truth.s ( w"^ere the Expreilion proper ) would necefiarily. be Mental ones ^ and Mr. Locke feems to fay the fame, § 8. where he makes thofe Truths which are barely Nombud to be Chi- mericaL I grant too, that Truths may be di- ftinguifh*d, according to their feveral Subje^tj, into Moral, Phyiical, Mctaphyfcal , &c. Rut I mufl feverely reflcdl: on his dcfcribing Moral Truths^ § r I . tO be the Sf caking Things accord- ing to the Verfwafion of cur oivn Mlnds^ tho the FrcpcfJtlon we fpcak does not agree to the Reality of Thntgs : For, lincc it is moll Evidently known, that Reflexion Eighteenth. 35-7 that the Perfira/io?is of Mcyi s Minds not oncly wjj , but do frequently co7Jtriu!icf one another 3 by this Definition of Moral Truth both Sides of the CcntradiHloft may be True 3 which cLftroys Truth by confounding it wiili Falfl}ood -^ and makes the Art of Diftin^uifhint^ ridiculous, by making Truth a Gt7iris to fome fort of Faljlwod^ or vot- Truth to be one kind of Truth. 'Tis a Very dan-- gerous thing in Philofophy to bring Didini^i- ons, unlefs each Member of the Notion divi^ ded includes the Notion of tiie Genus. They were invented for clearing Truth , but, if ill made, or ill-manag'd, nothing in the World breeds greater Error and Ccnfuforj. Corrupt to of- limi fcljima. Z j REr 1 0 $ohd Philefij;hj Ajftrtd REFI.EXION Nineuentl 9 O N fbe6th^ 7th^ and ^h CHAPTERS, I . TJ ^ what has been deliver'd in n\y forego- Jj ing Reflexion, my Notes upon his 6th Chapter [ OfUni'verfal Fropcfniom^ IJnivejrfal Prip^- their Truth and Certainty ] will bc ynonsintheMind eafilv underdood. But, I am to /.^/^Antecede^. prcnute, hrfi, That the Qiieftion ly to Words, is not herp, what fro^cs the Truth of fuch PropofitioDS, which is jthe work of Z^^/V>& j but, whether there can be anyTriitb in them, or Certainty of ihcm at all, or ^0. Secondly^ That the Formal Tvuth of Propo- sitions can oncly be in i\\cMindj or, that Mental PropQlitions oncly are capable of Truth or Faljl- hood-^ t\\d Words b;* needful to fgnify them: And, therefore, I muft deny that The Ccnjider- fiticn ifl'/ords is a necejjary fart of the Treatife of Knowledge • meaning by that word, Fhilojophical ICnowkdge, a^ oar Circumfl^nce detcrmin us. Let Logicians but take cai'e that the Words be Uniyocaly and not E^jtuvocal^ or double fcnfcd, and all elft \\ui can be conlidcr'd to belong to Truth^ is to j:^d look'd for in the AUnd^ and can bo no where elfe. Hence, I cannot admit his Pifrinction ofCtrtalpty of Truth, ^nd Certainty of Knowledge in any other fenfe than that Knowledge is the Jil-^ zndTrnth the oncly QbjeSi of that A6t , jipcg figtbing can l^e iw?f'^ to he \v^at /; not ; nor knQ^'fn^ Reflexion Nineteenth. 359 known to he True, whicli is not True. The Ck'nci ic.il Notion[CtTrj/>;/y,]fhoukl iuft have been explicated, ere thole tiro forts of it had been dcHn'd i other- wife both thofe Definitions mud necclfarily re- main UninteUigible. I fhall preiume that I have in my MhTHOD fhown from its C; rounds what Certainty is, ^uixj. The DetcrmincUiryi of our Under- fianding^ or yudgnij^ Power by the Object's a^iuativg^ ity or bein^ fictually in it as it is in its [elf. With which, what his />/rrr/wg- together of IVords in Ver- bal Propofitions has to do, fLirnaifes my under- ftanding. And, *tis as hard to conceive, that General Truths can neuer he well made knoivn^ and are very Seldom apprehended^ hut as conceinj d and exprefid in IVcrds. That General Truths cannot be made known to others without Words, is in a manner, as Evident as *tis that we cannot /^c? one anothcrs Thomhts 3 nor is this peculiar to General Truths, for (carcely can Particular ones be made known any other way : But, that they cannot be known or apprehended by curfehes ( which feems here to be his meaning ) but as concei^ud and exprefsd in IVcrds^ is fo far from Evident, that the Contrary is fuch ^ for, it is impodible to exprefs fbem in Wordsy unlefs we do firfi apprehend and conceive them in our Thoughts • and were not this fo, all the while we ufe JVords in fpeaking of Ge- neral Truths, we fhould do nothing but talk of 'ive knorw not what : For, OUr Thoughts and y^lp- prehenjions are ex Naturarei^ prefuppofed to the IVords by which we exprefs them j and) to do Otherwife is to let our Tongue ran before our Wit. Whence we account them filly and Senfelefs people, and Perverters of Nature, who make ufe q( IVords before they know their Meat^ing, Z 4. 2. 1 360 Solid Philofophy JJferted. z. 1 have iliown above, that it is not necefTary to our hc'wvd, Cert a in of any Pro- •j/V rot 7iecejfnry pofition that wc know the frccife tokvo^ the pre- younds and Extent of the Species it Extent of the P^'^^^fi''"-) ^JUt that tis lufhcienc Species. to kllOW it in fart Diftin6tly j and the reft- of ir, or the irhcle^ Con- fufedlv ; provided that part of it, which we know is fufficient to difiinguijh it froni all ether Species: And, were not this fo, it w^ouid follow that we never could know the Truth of any Univerfal Pro- pofition w hatever 3 efpecially wlien w"e difcourfe of the Species Infiwa^ which requires a. Com- plexion of very many Accidents, v/hofe precife Number and Bounds are utterly unknowable by us. A Pofition which makes Logick ufelefs; fcarce any Conclusion being deducible from Fremiffts, unlefs one of them be an Univerfal -^ and quire ddlroyes . all Scie72ce which is employed ;ibout TJin^erfal or Ge7ieral Truths. He inllances in Man and Cold^ and judges that, for ivant of knowing the Extent cf their Species^ it is impc[fihle ')vith any Certainty to ajfrm that all Men are Rati^ mal^ or all Geld yellow. We cannot indeed know this by confidering e^try Individual Man by the poll: But, if by the word [J\ ; -nn^ Want of it com* U Connexion with a Real EjjQVce^ f laired of. of which we haue no Idea at all • that is, ( according to his Prin- ^Ciples, ) no Knowledge, For, fince a Real Ejjeme i$ that which conftiiutes fuch a kind of Ens^ or Species j and what difiingnijljes an Entity or 5"^^- fles from all others, does alfo make it th/s^ or that Sfecies j that is, does confiitme it , it folio v/s, that ^ fince, by my Difcourfe here, we have fuch a De- gree of Knowledge of that kind of Ens called Gold^ as to difiinguijlj it from all others, we have a Sufficient and True ( tho* not an Adequate an4 Difiin^) Knowledge of its EJfince toOy that con- ftitutes it fuch a kind of Ens, Indeed, if nothing will content us but Superfluous Knowledge, for Curiofity fake, of each particular Mode that be- lonrs to that EiTence, *tis no wonder if we labour in vain \ and, by over-ftraining to go beyond our M'ves in this State, foil fhort of our Aim. I muft confefs, that it would concern us much, as we are, to know whether there be any Quality^ which we do not yet know in the Thing, iiicon- fifient with thofe we do know^ for, this would Jblunder our Notion of it, and make it Chimeric cal. But, as it is impoifible Creative Wifdom fhould lay Grounds for Contradiftion j fo, in cafe thofe Qualities be all Covjifiem^ where is the harm not to know them? And, linceConfiften- py implies fome kind of Agreement or Coiine^t- edncfs of the one with the others, who knows how ftr their Connexign and Dependence may be Reflcs'ion Nineteenth. 315^ be known in time, if right Principles were ta- ken, and "purfu'd ? * Ti^ a ftrange diTfarisfy'd Humour in us, to complain ive knew not all^ when wc know enough : I know no Man is more free from this Fauk than Mr. Locke^ or declares more againft it formerly. \V\\2\. I didike in him in this Point is, that, by iiis too much Introvcrlion, he forfakes Nature j and, by his too nice Spccuh- rion of his Jdeas.^ hazards to breed a Conceit in his Readers, that they know left than they really 4o ; and, that we are mt able to attain half that Knowledge wc, in reality, Wfiy arrive to j which, rho* contrary to his Intention, muft needs incline Men to be Scef ticks as fo EJJh/ces and Stthfiances. 4. The 7th Chapter, [^bf Maxlrm^'] is admira- bly Clear, and, in the grcarf^fl: pait of it, very Solid • abating his Pro- ThetTature andufe ceeding upon Lleas, and applying "> ^"^"^n^, ^J fits Dlicounes to his former Hy- jy/^, Locke, pothefis j to whicii lAx. Locke was obliged, that all the Pans of his Work might be woven of the fame Piece, and Confonant to one another. He explicates very well, how they are Self-evident: Yet, tho* they be fuch, he has three Exceppions againft them, i. As not being Firfi kno-wn j 2. As, in a manner, Ufelefiy and 3. Dan- gerous. He proves the Firft, becaufe Particulars are known before Univerfals, I underftand him not. Knowledge may be either conlider'd, as in- fliTd by infenfible Degrees, into Infants^ or the Ruder Sort j or, as Reducitjle to the cleared Grounds, by Men of Art, Now, I cannot think that Mr. Locke imagins, that we, or any Man^ hold that Maximi were mean|: for Infants^ or the Fulgar j or> that cither of t|iem ought to be taug;ht 3 64 Solid Fhilofophy Ajferted, taught General Principles at firft^ and by them at- tain to Particular Knowledges ; or, that the Ufers of Maxims ever intended them for that end. Wherefore, all his Difcourfcs to prove them not 10 h^ Fir si-know?!^ maybe allow'd to have their full Force, and yet hurt no body, being wrong- leveird. The Point then is, how they may avail Artifts, or Speculators : And this leads to his Se- cond Exception, their pretended Ufelefnefij which he endeavours to fhews by alledging, that 'tis as Evident as any Maxim whatever, that the fame Idea^ is the fame Idea^ and no other j V. g. that the Idea of Tellow is the Idea of Yelloiv^ and not of Blue j and, therefore, that Maxims ferve to little ptirpofe^ and are alfo Innumerable. Now, I grant, indeed, that all fuch particular Propofitions may be Self- e^ndent., and Truths ; as alfo, that Truths of this kind, which exprefs the Metaphyfical Verity and Unity of every Tl/mg^ and of every Mode of Thing, are Innumerable, But, I do not think that any Man living thought thofe to have the Ufeful^ nelsof^^ajcimfl or ^liUCipleS, which are al- ways General^ Or Umuerfal : For, the Notion of [Pr/W/p/a] fuper-adds to their being T^v/r/j/, and Self-evident^ that they influence many other Truths that are (as it were) under them-^ which cannot be faid, or thought, of thofe particular Propofi- tions. For example 3 Should any one go about to refund the Verity of this Truth, Tello7i^ is TeU low, and not Blucy into this, becaufe IVljite is White^ fi7id not nlacky it would look more like a Simili- tude y zhAn a Reafon-^ and be ridiculous to alledge the one to be the Caufe of the other , becaufe 2'i?/- low is not White , nor has the Notion of the ons any J^iiluence upon, nor any thing to do with the Notion ^1 Reflexion Nincrccntli. 3^^ Notion of rhc other -^ in Rgard both of them fland upon the fame Bottom, or on the fame Le- vel. Hut, Oiould any Sceptick ask n^hy the Lka. ofTdlow is the Idea ofTdloiv2 tho' 'tis f)oIi fh to ask it, y -iphat it is. Which fhews to an Acute Refie6ter, that this Uni-verfal has fome kind of Influence up- on the Others^ which their Fellow -TarticuLirs had nor. And, the Reafon is, becaufe Univerfals do cnmfx of Colour, and (according to Mr. Locke $ Grounds) he knows not ihe dijtinti Bounds^ or frecife Extent of neither of them 3 and therefore, fhould he grant it, he muft aflent to he knows not ^ba$. Tell him, Mr, Locke fpeaks of the Ideas of ihofe Reflex hn Nineteenths 367 thofe Colours j he will a^k what an Uea is, and^ doubtlci's, pick new Quarals at the Definition; efpccially, thcfc being the Ideas of Secofulary Qu/i^ lities^ which himfelf lays, have nothing Like them in the7/j;>7^. But, tell him, it cannot be deny'd, but that they are Sowething^ and not meerly No- thivgy in regard w^e experience we have them ^ and^ that Every Thing murt necefjarily he what it isj ( which is one ot the Maxims excepted againft 3 ) he will be put to a Stand, and Nonplufs'd : For» what can he fay ? The Identity of the Jhing with, it felf, whether it be a Subftance, or an Accident, cannot be deny'd j nor can he deny, that the fame is the fime with it felf (which is another Maxim ,) for, the Word Things lignifies, a Supream Generi-* cal Notion y and, the Word Same^ is aTranfcen- dent J which are both of them Clear^ becaufethe Latter has no kind of Compofition in it, the Other as little as is poifible. So that he cannot begin to fhuffle here, or prefs to know the meaning of the Terms, as he did when they were Particulars 3 the Umverfal Terms being far Clearer than thofe Parti- culars are. d. HenCe another Ufefulnefs of Selfzevident Maxims is difcover'd j w hich is, not to deduce Conclufions from Such Generat Ma* - tbem^ as from PremilTes, as Mr. L. '^^^J ^f '^g^'"^'^ (eems to apprehend , but, to re- cenclljions^ frZ duce Inferior Truths, which are they/i, but to rc- lef Clear to thc?n. That, this can the Mouths of Wrangler 5 .^ abets and confirms my late Difcourfes:. 368 So/}rl Fhilofophy AJfertect. Difcourfcs : For, Whence could they have this ftrange Virtue tofio^ the Mouths of fuch Unreafon- able Men, but becaufe tlieir Evidence is Greater than anv others^ or than Particular Self-evident Propofitions are ? Otherwife, why could not thefe do it as well as General Maxims ? Now, if this be fo, why cannot they fatisfie and wftrucl Rational Men, and conduce to quiet and fix their Judg- iVient, as w'ell as to ISloitflMs Wranglers ? 'Tis the Nature ox ^EvldeTice^ to enllghteit and infhrtdB Men ofSenfe^'^nd more Proper to it, than to amufe and furp'rite Sophifters. Let any Learned Man re- fleft on all the Maxims in Euclid's Elements^ in EucUdes Vhyflc/fs and M^taphypcm^ Or any othef Author who pretends to Reafoning with ExaEi Clofenefsy and he will eafily fee for what they are Ufefui, and How. Nay, even Mr. L.'s Identicals, [Tdllow is'Tellow, and not Blue,] are ufefui in their kind, tho* Mr. /.flcy^^ does omit to fhew they are fb: And. this Identical T^ellovj isTdlow, tho' it do tiOt influence Other Particulars, as General Maxims do; (for which Reafon, it does not abfolutely deferve the. Nam? of a Trinc'i^k , ) yet, both It, (and fuch other Particular Identicals,) is a kind of Principle to all that is, or can be, difcourfed about that Particular Colour : For, if any part of that Difcourfc makes Yellow not to he Tclloiv, or (which is all one) violates that Propofiiion, [ Tdlow is Tel- Ipw,] 'tis concluded to be m^d evidently Falfe • or, if it agrees with it, tobeZr//,'. He feems to millike the Procedure by Pr/e:o2;n'ta and Vracon- cejja ; whereas, his Acute Wit will find, upon Re- flexion, that it is impoiTible we can make an Or- dinary, maclilers any Speculative, Difcourfe, but the Difcjurfcrs muft agree in foinethin g that is ^ either Reflexion Niiictccntli 3 6*9 '^\l\\QX Forehnovm^ or ( at kail ) Fore^rafitcd ^ for, if the two Difputants difigree in alUhvix: Princi- ples and Grounds, and one of them i[\\\ denies ^\i the other ^fpn^s, 'tis inipoilible they fhould DiU coLU'fe together 17 1 all. 7. But, paiTing by all tb.at is faid, I alledge far- ther, that ( not to fp jak of o- thers) thefe two' Maxims fo ^'^<-' ^hfoiute Nc* much excepted a^ainft, [ WL^t it ''f.y . f ^'^ • 1 1 f'^- • ml 1 /• Principles u^ferf^ ts J and L lis imfoljihk the jame ^^^ -^ -^ Xhino^ jhoiild be a'rid net be at 07icc^ are of fuch mod NecelTary and Univerfal Ufeful- nefs, that, without them, we could neither indge^ difcourfe^ nor acl. Indeed, thefe Maxims lie W- trufe in the mod Inmoft Recefles of our Judging or Intelleftive Power, and make not their Appea- rance in Formal Propoiitions, but only when we have occafion to produce them 3 tho' they are dill there all the while, and guide all our Thoughts fteadily, nay, all our Adions too. In the lame manner as when a Muiician plays a carekfs Vo- luntary upon a Harpfichord, he guides himfelf all along by the Rules of Mufick lodg'd in his Mind y tho', they being now famUiar to him, he is not fo Senlible of thole Rules as he was when he firfi: learned them. To apprehend more clearly the Ufefulnefs of thefe two I^rinciples, let us fuppofe a Man quite Dcvefied of them, and to have neither of them in his Judgment, and then i*efle61: what he is good for. All our Judgments being made by the Copula [rV,] in cafe b.e have I -not this Firft Principle in his Underftanding, he ; might take [Is] for [is not -^ or elfeindifferent- j iy tor one, and the other too; which, befides the I perverting his Judgment quite, would make iiim A a utterly 3 70 Solid Philofophy Ajferfei. uuterly unfit for the Converfation of Mankind. Again, 'tis impolFible fuch a Man fhould have any Truth at all in his Mind, which is the Natu- ral Perfection of Human Underftanding • but, wanting a fteady Ground to fx his Judgment, he might think all things to be Chimerical, embrace every Fancy, and adhere to any Contradiction, S. To come to the Ufefulnefs of other General Maxims , we may refleft how Hortj other Central Mankind do naturally guide their ^t^Z'^'Zn; A.6tions by them. A Country an^ tayings. ^ Butcher lofes his Knife, and looks all about for it j in which cafe 'tis ufual for fuch Fellows to fay, as the Motive of his continuing to feek it, [ / am jure it muft he fome^ ophere or other,] By which rude Saying *tis evi- dent, that he guides himfelf all the while by this foreknown General Maxim, [ Every f articular Bc^ Ay in the World mufi he in fome place.'] For, had he not had the Knowledge of this Maxim before- hand, that is, did he think it were pofTible it ihould be no -ivhere^ or in no place, he would ne- ver have taken fuch Pains to look for it. We may obferve Hundreds of fuch Natural Maxims as this in the Vulgar, guiding their Actions and Sayings j and perhaps, it would not be unwor- thy Spcculaters to obferve their Behaviour and Words which proceed from Uncorrupted Na- ture, and retrieve the Genuin Principles and Ma- xims that naturally produced tliem. To apply this : The fame we may gather from our Specu- lative Thoughts • and that the fame paifes in us naturally as does in the Vulgar. Our Firf} Prin- ciples lie habitually laid up in the Clofct of our Minds, and govern all our Thoughts as occafion prcfents Reflexion NincrceiuIiJ 371 prefents ; and, tho' \\ ^ do not put them into For- mal Propofitions, till the Circumilancc invites ^ yet they inflmncc all we do^ or [ay^ or think , as was inftanced lately in the imfhaken and unalte- rable Senfe of the Copula [/J,] which verifies all our Propofitions. 9. In a Word, it wereeafc to fhew, that this linadvifed Degrading of General Maxims, making them in a man- ^'•" ^'fi;'''^'^'^ g^* ner Ufelefs for knowledge, does jiroysallSci^nzc, deftroy all Grounds-^ wliich ei^ ther are fuch Maxims, or, at lead, have no force but by virtue of thofe Alaxims, exprefs'd or /w- fl/d • unlefs we will pretend thole are Grounds in any Science that Tvant Proof there ; which makes them Conclujions, and no Grounds. Whence, it does alfo deftroy all Science it felf, which con- fifls in Uni'verfal Knowledges, as Experience does in f articular ones j for fuch Univerfal Truths can- not be had, if General Maxims be difallow*d, as Logick demon- T^ns Errour fpntjgs ftrates. This Ingenious Author from Men' staking thinks the need of fuch Maxims ^7^;^^<«7;-;« nnght be lupply d by havmg f,ons nre Clear, Clear and Dijli?i^ Ideas. Which, ^^hat Confufed. rightly ufiderftood , comes over to us y for Art and Nature both inform us, that the Clearnefs of our Notions confifls in their be- ing more General ^ and as they approach nearer to the Higheft Genus, they are (till Ckarer, Now, the Metaphyfical Verity of a General Idea or No- tion, if put into a Propofition, is perfectly Identi- cal, and a General Maxim. Hence appears, that it is a mod Fundamental Errour in the Ideifts, that they rate the Clearnefs of their Ideas from the A a 1 frelli, 3 7 TL SoIiU Thilofophy Ajferted. frcfh, fair and lively Appearances they roske ta the Fdvcy. Whereas only the Definition, by ex- plicating the true Effence of a Thing, fhews us Diftindtly the true Spntual Notion of it. The former of thefe is chvlous d.nd ferjji hie. and (as I may fay ) lies and appears upper mo ft j and, there- tore, is Super ficialy and a Material Reprcfentation made in the Fancy, The Later is more Retrufe^ it requires more Reflexion and Labour to attain ir, it is Intelligible not Sevfihle j but, once gain'd, it is Solid,, Durable^ and (being indeed the very Na- ture of the Thing,) it is the Ground of all our Dif- courfes about it, and of thofe fcveral Knowledges concerning it. Hence the Follow^ers of Fancy become liable to take Similitudes for Notions^ and Refrejentations io\.Things'^ which makes their Pro- ductions very Plaufible to other Men's Fancies, ( for as they were the Produftions of Fancy^ fa they fute beft with Men of Fancy) but they fall fhort of inftrufting their "judgments. To give an Inftance of thisDiltindtion of Notions from Fhan- tafms : They think that the Idea of a Quadrate ( for Example ) or Circle^ is very Clear and Z)/- fiinSl 3 and that the Idea of Quantity is very Ob- /cure and Confufed : Whereas, to the Notion of the two former, there goes the Notion both* of Qiianthy^ of the Termination of Quantity^ ( or F/- gure y) and, moreover, offucb a Figure 3 all w4iich being Ellentially involved in the Notion of a Qua- drate or Circle, muft needs make their Notions lefs'^hitelligible and hfs Clear than is that of Quantity cnly : However, the fair Pictures of the former, on Paper, or in the Fancy, enveigles them to think otherwife. Let us but refleft how many Truths are deduced by Geometricians our of the Notions Reflexion Ni/ictcciuh. ■^-j Norions of a Qii.idnue or a Circle, and wliat lar^c Treadles of Tnyjnomary are drawn out of rhe ^otlon or Nature of a Trun,z_h ■ and wc ftail di<' cover how Compounded and Confufed tliofe No tionsare /« reality, however we feem, while we mind only the P,f/«w of them, to have verv' clear Conceptions of tlicm, and to comprehend them ^//?/V//r and /«//,. Now, all rhele Truths are ™- ^dv ^conhiied }• in the Notion or Nature of thcfe Figures: hor all Difcourfes concerning any No tion whatever, are nothing but n««.w i);^;^„, ( as we may Hiy ) upon the mture of that O^ Vfl as their CroimJ- and all Defcaiits upon it are meerly that very Notion U^fi/^cJ ^nd LxpJicated at la>-gc andconliderdon aii tides, and through- ly : \\ hich, compnling them ali in its Bowels, is tFierefore not fo cJear and /)///„,? as Fancy makes us imagin Whence is fccn evidentJv^, thati--^«rr ^and the-/.? and obvious .^/./..,„..„,,; is not to be Of oui Notions i but i?.^/.«, reflecting well on ihe6,W;a.7 or Ccmpomd.^nefs of thofe Notions ihemlelves, and on the Reafi„, ^hj they are lo. L^//,. '^is objected, That fuch Maxims are Dangerous ; bvcau'.b, // our No- tions he wrong, loofe, or twfieady, Cenerd Maxims tviU j\r-ve to con- frm m in cur Mifiakes, and to prc-ve ^^''^'' ' ^o'f'' ContradiBions. Now, tho%ur e^'cr"^"" ^judgments may be luch, yet I cannot conceive how our Motions can be Wror. 'ris evident he muft have ^ Notion of it, fince he very Beflexion Nineteenth. '^'jj very well knows the meayi'mg oF thofc Words^ [ A Power to he a Th'nig^ or Matter ; ] which Meaning is the fame with our Ncticn of it. As for Vacuum^ which he again mentions here, my Dcmonftra- tion againft it, is, in /hort, this^ waving many others mention'd above : All our Natural Notions are taken from Body , and, amongfl them, that of Space j therefore they are nothing but Body in- adequately confider'd , and either Body^ or fome Mode of Body : Therefore, whatever our Fancy may fuggeft, it is impoilible there fhould be Space^ where there is no Body • lince the Mode, having no diftin6t Entity of its cwn^ cannot be where the Things which gives it Being, is not: Therefore, to put Sfacc where there is no Bndy^ or a Vacuum^ is a direct Contradidion. Each Part of which Difcourfe has been made good in its proper place. II. In his Second Inftance oi Man^ he feems again, not to diftinguifh between the Fancy and the Notion of a Idelfm is the Ge^ Man , w'hich I have fhewn in my ''^'''\ {''f "^ 'f ^^ J 1 iy 1 T tr K Enthujicjjn in Method^ Book I. Lejj, 2. §.24. phdofobhy. Next, he feems not to reflect, that an Imferfect Conception of the Thing, is of the whole Thing confufedly. Thirdly, 'tis evi- dent, that Men do only err^ or difcourfe wrongy by imperfectly conceiving, thro' this Reafon j be*- caufe they are not fo wife as to coniider that there may be more Modes wTap*d up in the Thing, than we yet diftinclly difco^cr : In which cale, they may err by mif-applying their General Maxims ^ for which they muft blame themfeh'es, and not the Maxim it felf But, I abfolutely deny that ;iny Man can polFibly have the true and dillind Notion 378 Solid Thilofophy AJferteJ. Notion 'of Man^ unlefs he conceives him to be Rational. As for what he tells us, be has difcours'd "V^itb 'Very Rational Men^ who ha've aBually denfd they are Men j 1 can only fay, I wonder how they efcap*d Bedlam ; where, 1 dare fay, there are ina- tiy Men, who are more Rational than they : And, my Opinion is, that thofe 'very Rational Men were very high-flown Ideifis : For, fuch Men, by de- ferting their Natural Notions taken from the Things^ and the ConduS of true Logick, and p- ring perpetually on their o-wn Intericur 3 and being withall unable to fee the Difference between thofe Ideas they find there, or to diftinguifh betwixt Fancies zndi S/)ir/7«^/ Conceptions j are (unlefs they be otherwife Mafters of an Excellent Genius) con- naturally difpofcd by their Principles to be Fana- ticks in Philofophy j and to entertain as wild Fan- cies, as the Deepeft Enthufiafls. Witnefs Cartefius his mad Fit of Enthufiafm, which lafted fome Days, when he was laying his Principles, ( as is writ in his Life ^ ) and thofe Self-fir anger s^ now fpoken of, who actually deny d they were Men : >X^hom, (to requite Mr. Locke with a parallel Sto- ry) I cannot liken fo well to any thing, as to a famous Humourifl, one John Band, who ferv*d my Lady JVootton^ in Kent : This Fellow, in the Heat of Summer, going out in a Cart, drawn by two Horfes, fell aileep in the Cart : The Horfes not hearing any cry Gee, ho., to urge them for- wards, took their Opportunity to reft themfelvcs, and flood ftill : A Companion of his coming by, and feeing how matters ftood, under-propp*d the Cart, took out the Horfes j and, having fet them up, returned, and lay behind the Hedge, to ob- ferve how John would behave himfelf when he mifs'd Refleslon Nineteenth^ 379 riifsM his Horfcs: Who awaking, got up, rub'd his Eyes, and, in the Dawning of his Rcafon^ broke out, (tohimfelf,) in thele Words, Either now I iim John Band, cr I am not John Band : If 1 am John Band, I ba've e en loH two Horjes -^ But^ if I am not John Band, / ha-ve found a Cart, So that all Johns Hopes were, that he was not him- felf'y for then he had been on the better hand. I much doubt, that both he, and Mr. Locke's Ra- tional Meny wanted the help of an Identical Propo- fition ; which ( tho' Mr. Locke holds, they are not in the leaft Inftru^live ) w^ould hav^e made them all fo wife, as to know that E%/ery Thing is what it is, 13. But, to be ferious; I cannot but admire that this Ingenious Author fhould, in his 8th Chapter, fo ridicule ^^'"^^^'^^ ^l^'f'- Jae7itical Fropoftions , or elteem 4/curd. rhem Trifling. He told us in his id Chapter, that that Knowledge he calls Intuit ti've^ is of Self-evident Propolitions ^ and Identi- cal ones are luch. He alTures us, that in e^jcry Step Reafon makes in Demonjlrati-ve Knowledge , there is an Intuitive Knowledge of the Agreement Or Difagreement of our Ideas • Confonantly tO which, 1 have demonftrated in my Method, Book 3 . LiJJ', i . §. 3 . that all the Force of Confe^uence, which gives rhe Nerves to all our Difcourle, muft be an Iden- tical Vrcpofition. Moreover, he fays. Chap, 4. that we know each Idea to be it felf^ and not another ; and, that no Abjlra6l Idea can be the fame with any other^ but with it felf -^ which are perfectly Identi- cal Speeches, and equivalent to thefe. The f;me is the jame with it felf ^ Or, Every Thing is what it is • nay, ;ind General Maxims too, againft which he fliews 380 SoHJ Fhilofophy AJferted. Ihew'd himfelf much offended in that Chapter. Nor, do I doubt, but that he judges, his Know- ledge by Ideas is refunded into thofe Uemlcals^ as its Ground j as will be fhewn fhortly. Now, af- ter all this, to rally Identical Propofitions after fuch a rate, is to me Umntelligihk, But, I /hall be briefer here upon this SubjeA, having demonflra- ted in vc\y Method^ Book 2. LeJJli^ and 3. by ma- ny Arguments, which, 1 am very confident, are Unanfwerable, that all FirB Principles mufl be Identical Fropofitions : Whence, either thofe Argu- ments mufl: be fhewn Invalid, or it mufl- be forci- bly deny'd by him that there are any Firft Prin- ciples at all j which all Mankind, unlefs they be perfedl Scepticks, do grant, and Common Senfe forces us to acknowledge. For, if there be no Supream or VirB Principles, 'tis impolTible there ihould be any Inferior or Subordinate ones , and fo^ Mankind mufl: talk ramblingly, and at random^ all their Lives, without any Principles or Grounds at alL But, waving all the other aforefaid Prooft, 1 would beg of him to conlider this one Argu- ment : We may fpeak of, or ( which is the fame ) put into Propofitions, all other Confiderations or Notions of the Thing, whether they be in the fame Line, or be the divers Modes of it ; wc can fay^ without danger of being reproached, thai Socrates is a Man^ i:r\ Animal^ a T^ard high^ M^hite^ 2: Father^ writings &c. and 'tis a hard Cafe if we may not be allowed to faji fomething of the Meta- fbyfical Verity of the Thing, this being that on whicli all Truth is buik • and without which, all we cgM fay would be Falfe , and all the World, 2 Chaos ofChimccra's. And, if WC may fay any thing of itj 1 dcfie all Mankind to fhcw mc, that ■; -that Reflexion Nineteenth. 381 that Saying Can be any other but an Jchntkal Pro- pofitiov. This being fo, I alledge farther, that as all Truths are /;/W./wewr/?//> built on the Aletaphy- (ical Verity of Things; io all Formal Truths^ or Trne Tro^ojiticns^ inufl: be grounded on juch Pro- poiltions as exprefi or fl^nijie that Metaphyseal Verity, or, fty that a Th'mg is what it is ; andy confequcntly, fuch Propofitions, and onely fuch, can be Firft Frivciples. Now, if Firfi- 'Pri7iciples^ and that which grounds all the Force of Ccw/^- aiience^ may be called Trifling, I delire to be in- form'd what can be called Solid^ Serlom and U/^- 14. I perceive, by Mr. Lodes managing his Difcourfe here, that his Dillike of Identical Propofitions fprings TfjerighiWayho-^ from his Miftake of our ALmmr ^' "-^ ^^'''"L^ ""f cfUfr.gtl.n,. Hcfeemstoima- '^(^^^ , gin that we would place them in muft relj u^oa ' Capite Lihriy ( as it Were, ) and thm, .thence deduce Concluiions from \ them i or el(e, that we confider them in their ' bare felves, without Relation to any thing elfe : Whence he, with good Reafon, affirm.s, they do not injhtttl 7-fs, or teach us any things that there is no Real Knovdedge got by them, &c. But the Bufinefs is quite otherwifc: They are the Fir/l, and moil evident Truths, fix d and rivettcd by Rational Nature, in our Underftanding 3 at the Bottom of which they lie, perhaps Unfeen, and and Unrefle^ted on ^ yet fo, that they give the Ipcrfe6l Light to guide all our Thoughts and Dif- courfes. Whence it comes, that Speculaters do by Art, what the ^'' M^th to 5ci. Vulgar do by. Nature j and make 3 8 ^ Solid Philofophy Aferted. make them the Ultimate Rejfhrt of all their Perfuafions, and endeavour to Rsduce and Re^ fohe all their other Knowledges into tbcm. This will appear evident to any Mph who refleds, that, if thofe be Falfe^ or we be not p-e-imhud Avith them, we could have no Truths nor any Knowledge at all. They are fach deep-laid Foun- dations, that all Science is rals'd upon them, cho* they make no Formal Appearance in the Symmetry or Beauty of that Strudture : Nay, even thofe who rally them as Dr/, and Ufe- /e/, muft be forc'd, for their own Intereft, to liave recourfe to them : For, unlefs Mr. Locke does firft know, that each Idea he has, is It felf^ and not another^ Which is an Identical Propofi^ tion, he muft confefs he could have no Difiin^ Ideas -^ atleaft, no Knowledge that they are Di- flindt J whence, the Fabrick of his whole Book would fall to the Ground. Afcer which Kind- nefs and Support from them, in requital, to call them Triflings is not fo gentile 2. Return. Hence is feen, that we make no other Ufe of them, than himfelf does^ and mufi do, or neither of us can polfibly fpeak one Word of Senfe ; for, nei- ther could he, without them, ( fuppos'd and heU^ at leaft, in his Mind, if not exprefs*d^ ) be cer- tain of any Idea\ nor we, of any Notion we have ; nor, confequetitly, could either of us build any Difcourfe upon them. Mr. Locke acknowledges, Book 1. Chap. 31. that the Me- t.iphyfical Truth of his Ideas do contain a Tacit Vrofofition : Which being fo, what Blame can we dcferve for Speaking ont^ or Writing what is tacitly in our Minds ? The chief Reafon why w^ put thofe Tacit Propofitions into For-^ Reflexion Nineteenth^ 383^ fnal ones, is for the Scepticks fakes j ^^'ho, ha- ving an utter Avcrfion againft Metaphylicks, would not heed the Metaphyseal Verity of Things, unlefs it were produced, and forced upon them, by putting it into fuch an unde- niable Form of Speech as all Mankind ufes, and muff: grant. Whence, as Mr. Locke confefles that they are ^uery ujefid to fiop the Mouths of IVrang-^ lers y {o^ Experience teaches us, they are of no lefs Ufc to convert or confute Scepticks : Nay, abfolutely NeceJJary for that End j becaufe Scep- ticks will not admit any thing to be True, but Identical Trofojitions onely. For which reafon, I have attempted, in my Method^ to give fome Hints how to reduce all others to them. I once thought to have written a particular Treatife on that Subject , but, 1 hope thofe fhort Hints I gave there, may excite fome other Specula- ters to perfe6l what, having a large Field of Matter to pafs thorow, I did there but briefly touch upon. All this while, I am well aware that Mr. Locke^ Bock 4. Chap. 8. mentions other Self-e'vidtnt Trofofitions., which are not Identi- caJ j but then, he acknowledges withall, that unlefs thofe Idea^^ which make the two Terms of thofe Proportions, be fix'd in their own Natures to be fuch^ or to be themfehes onely, and therefore not to he Another^ none of thofe Propofitions could be evident at all. So that No- thing can be known to be True, or be Evident, but by having recourfe, jinMlj-i to Identical Fro- fofnions. i^, Anotlier 3 S 4 Solid Philofophy AJferteJ. 15. Another fort of Trifling Propoftlons, he fiiys, is v^hen a part of the Complex Neither Ideas mr Idea is Predicated of the JSfame of Names c.in be f^g ^^^^/^ . ^\y2t is, the Gemfs Or Predicate Of Siib- t\-il' \^C ^\^^ c^ • t jeSl^butthcTKing P'prence Of the Species. I an^ itfeif,as concei^j- iwcr j What have we to do with edbyuf.mwholQ Ideas when we Predicate? For •/• i'n parr. Predicating is the Saying fome- thing of Another which we calf the Subje6l : If then the Thing it felf be not Pre- dicated, then (to Predicate being to Say^ we do not talk or [peak of It, but perhaps of our own Fancies y efpecially fince Mr. Locke has declared, B. I . Chap. 2. § 8. that he takes Idea indifferently for Jijhat is meant by Phantafm or by Notion. Se- ccndly., What means [ Predicated of the Name of the whole. ] For , if the Name of the Subje6l have not fome Idea, or Notion, or fome Thing for its Signification, 'tis infignfcant, and a meer ufekfs Sound: and, if it have, then the Notion ofxhtSpe^ cies or Genus is that which is Predicated, and not the Name onely. If Things, ( of which cnely, as Philofophers, we ought tofpeak) are turn'd in- to Ji^^j, Realities mioS^\x\VJi2[Refemblanccs, and thofe Empty Refemhlances into Emptier Names, Philofophy will be brought to a ilrange pafs. Thirdly, None ever intended to infrruH Men by this Propofition [ Homo eft Animal ,] becaufe eve- ry Man knows it already, who knows what the Word [Man] means- without knowing which, 'tis inipolfible to know any thing by any Word whatcrv^er 3 nor are fuch Propoiitions as that, which frequently occur in Logicians, meant for any thing but meerly for Examples of fuch and fuch Predications : But yet, Nature tells us how In- ftruiSiv^ Reflexion Nineteenth.' 385' ftfuftive it is on all occafions, to know what Jurt or kind (whether General or Sptcifical) every thing is, and how it dijftrs from orhers of the famt; kind. Now, Mr. Locke^ contrary to Vis E- quity in other occafions, will ncirher allow us to predicate the -whole Definition of the Thing de- fined (as was fcen above in the Definition of Ex~ tenfion^ becaufe 'tis the [awe Notion with that which is Defai'd ; norP^?rf of the Definition, be- caufe 'tis Van of the fame 3 and yet Common Reafon aflures us no Predication is True, unlefs the Subjeft and Predicate be, in part or Tjjhollj' the fame y as theScnfe of the Cc^«/^ [^-^0 tells us. I wifk Mr. Locke would put Mankind into a wifir Method y for they have, it feems, done nothing, but perpetually trifled hitherto. i<5. Upon the main, he would have nothing that is Ejjential predicated of Mafty or any other Species^ (be- M^'- L.V nexo In- caufe the Word iignifies that al-> ll^^'^^Z^'lit ready) but only what's Acddcn- ^^^„7/ ''/'^"'^ tal to him , and he thinks that then a Propofition is hftruBiz'ey wlien it tells us fomething nor c jntain'd in the Idea of Man. He inftances in rhis j [ In whatever Things Scnfe^ Mo- tion^ Reafon^ ^nd Laughter are united^ that TJjing has aElually a Notion of God. ] Now this he con- ceives, does tell us more than barely what the Word [/1/jw] means j and- therefore has [cincwhat of Infrruclion in it. I much approve his Dciiga of bringing Difpar^ie Notions to clofe and con- neft : but yet 1 mail fay, that all he can fay of Man^ or any other thing, mull: either be takm from the Intrinfecal Nature of J^he Thuig it ielf, or it can never be Imtru6live, Solid, or capable of B b iJemon- 386 Solid Philofopljy AJferteJ. Dcmonftration. V, g. It is Effential to Man to have Natural Notions, and to conneB thofe Noti- ons orderly by his Reafon, and by doing this he may attain to the Knowledge there is a - -c taken m divers Significations, it ^^^^^^ ,f ^^^^, Men contentiouily adhere to the /; the Meaning different Senfes themfelves give ^f ^^-^^ ; ^^•''^"* them, it is, as Mr. Locke lays ^^^^^"S ^^ our ,1 V i?- 11 T ^Olion y ami our well, meer rnflmg. But I can-^ f^ocioa is the not grant that all Predications ot Thing. B b X frefh, 388 Solid Philofophy AJferteJ. Abilracl Words are only Verbal and Trifling, He fays, they amciwt to nothing hut Significations of Terms. And is not this enough ? 1 wifh he would confiderhis own Words. By \_Slg7ilfication of Terms'] he means, I fuppofe,the Safe or Mea7U77g of them : Now the Meanings of Words being the lame with our Notions, which as has been demonftrated, are the Things themfches, how can thofe Abftraft Terms be meerly Verbal? Since they as much fig- niiie the Thing as any other Terms whatever • on- ly they fignifie it with a Reftriclion to fuch a pre- clfe Refped or Confiderability found in that whol Ens or Suhfiance. e REFLEXION Twentieth^ O N The c)th^ \Othy I I thy and \Zth CHJPTERS. I. »T^His Excellent Author difcourfes very So- J^ lidly, when he fays, that Unl^crfal Pro- pofiticnsy of which we can ha-ve cer- Uni'verfaJsivvJlre- tain Kncwlcr/irc, do not concem Ex- tenc^'\hey have '^' '''''' ^ ^^^' ^'^^^ ^^^^^* Notions in"the Mmd'' ''^ neither, of which thofe Propo- sitions do confift, ( and much lc(s Proportions that are Uncertain.) For, raking the Notion alone, or according to the direft Signifi- cation Reflexiofi Twentieth. 389 cation of the Terms, ohj .!:iivclv coni]dcr*d, they ah^racl from (that is, are indi lerent to) all kinds of Exiftence, whLther in the Mind or in Nature. But, when he fays that fuch Proportions do not concern Exiftcnce, he means ( 1 fuppofe) Exigence in Nature^ or out of the Adind ^ ( or clle not at nU 3 ) and the Copula \eH'\ mufl: neceilarilv fgn'ifie fome kind of Exijhnce^ as well as Idmt:fie the two Terms in every Propolition j or otherwife it would be a Scimd or no IVord. But this Difcourfe is perhaps needlefs, being, as I think, in great part granted here. All I intend by it, is to clear the Notion of Exiftence in theTitle,and that it means Exifcence out of the Mlndy by which Things or Indlvidiiums are in themfelves, wliether we think of them or no. I grant too, that we have fo certain a Know- ledge of our own Exifience^ that it can need no Troof y but 1 deny we have it by Intuition ; and I affirm we get it^ and haz^e it, by plain Senfation or Experience^ in the fame manner as we know the Exifteiice of other Bodies • as will be fhewn, when we come to refledt on the i ith Chapter. 2. His Demonftration of a Deity, Chap, icth, is very acute, nor does he here affeft ReCOUrfe to his Ideas^ or To put any Know^ I build on them exprefsly, or ( as H' /" f '^/^ I he too often does in other places ) jure of the Thing, I take Fhantafws for Notions • which andlmpUcatory, ^ takes off the force of his Reafons. ' Particularly, he argues fo ftrongly that a Ccgi- |; tati^e Beifi^ can never be made of meer-M^nter^ iithat I do judge it Unanfwerable : And, withall, ^,1 that it nccelfarily concludes that Brutes can have \ roKnowledge,without having fomething in them '' that is Spiritual J which 1 am fure he w'ill not B b 3 fay. ^90 Solid Vh'dofnphy Ajferted, fay. I could wifh Mr. L. had been fteady to this Dildn6i:ion of thofe two Natures, of Spiritual and Corporeal^ which adequately divide Ens: Which, I think he was not, when he faid B, 4. Ch. 3. § o. that he fees 710 ccntradiBion in it that CKob flouU^ if he pleas* d^ giz'e to certain Syfiems of Cre.'.ted Senfclcfs Matter^ put together as he thinks ft^fome degrees of Scnfe^Perception and Thought. For, if the Nature of meer Matter^ by being Com- modiouily put together, can bear the having Th ought fulnefs 3 it is but Compounding it more arti^ fciallj, and it may be as Cogitative as the IVlfell^ Man living 3 and fo farewell to all Spirituality of our Soul, nay, to all Spir'tujl Nature whatever: For, to w^hat end fhould (BotJ create the Diilindt Nature of ^/j/r/Vj, if Mart.. r w fly orderd could perform all their Operation? ? If once we yield that Matter., conveniently c./nirivcd, can be ca- pable of any degree of Knowledge, it is but con- triving it better and better , ( and who can ftint (Bd&j^J Omnipotency in this, more than in other things ? ) and it may be capable of the highefi Degree of Science 3 and, confequently, to create Spiritual Nature at all, would be needlefs, and to no purpofe. Befides, if Men and Brutes differ oneiy in the Degrees of Knowledge, they ought to be of the fame Species ; fince Magis et minus non variant fpeciem : For, otherwife, every fingle Man would make a Dillin6l Species^ which is a plain Contradidlion. . Againft thisPofition of the pof- fibility of Matters being Cogitative, he argues here very Vigorouily § 10. and fhows clearly that hicogitati've Matter y and Motion., whatever changes it might produce of Fissure and Rulk^ could vtver produce Thought, He will fay that, tho' it could Reflexion Twentieth. 391 could not do zh\^ of it felf^ yet (Botl could make it doit. But if (5o& cannot contradict himfelf^ or do Urjvjifeljy tlun, iincc his Creative Wifdom has Efl:ablil"ht each kind of Nature to be it felf'And 710 other ; then, to put in (Boti a Power to confound thofe Natures again, ( which he does if he fhould confound the Primary and proper Operation of Spirits, which is Thought^ Knowledge or Reason bv giving it to Bodies, ) is to put a Power in (BoD to do Contradiclionsy that is, tO do Impojjibili" ties ^ for whatever is againfi the EJJence or Nature of any thing, makes that thing not to be it feif, which is againfl: an Identical and felf evident Pro- pofition, and a Direct ContradiHion. 3. The Clear Diflinftion of Corporeal and Spiritual Natures, is of that vafl: importance • that ( tho' it may ^j"- ^ . ^o"f'J^'^^/ r ^ 1-1 rrii\T Material .'7?.'rfS pi- leem a little unleaionable) I can- ritual N;i/«m. not but take this occaiion to re- fle(S,once more uponMr.L's doctrine in this point, apprehending I may not meet with a fitter oppor- tunity hereafter. I have reafon to think, that he does not exclude Materiality out of the Idea of Sfirity or at leafl: of the 5W, which all Chriftian Philofophers and moft Heathens too, hold to be of a Spiritual Nature. On the other fide he at- tributes Reafcn and Kiiowledge ( in fome degree at leaft ) to Brutes. Now, out of thefe two po- fitions it follows demonftrativcly. i. That the Corporeal and Spiritual Natures are not clearly di- Jl:ngu}jl}t^ which utterly deftroys all poffibility of Truth in Philofophy, and feems to do no fmall prejudice to Truths of a Higher Concern • which are left Inexplicable to Menof Senfe, if thofe in- feriour Truths, which relate to the Clear Di- B b 4. ftindtioii 392^ ^oliJ rhilofophy JJfertCf), flin^lion of thofe two Natures, be violated and rcncler'd Uncertain. For, Corporeal and Spiritual Natures, comprizing, or dividing between them- fdvcs, the Objacls of all the Sciences a Philofopher can treat of, v/hether they be Phyficks, Ethicks or iMetaphy licks, all which mud necelBirily build tb ir Dilcourfes, and draw their Conclufions {': jw. fijC'^ Notions as are taken from, and do of rigV- b'^. .ng ^ i thofe two Didint^t Natures • it fol!:^.w.^ that, ^'^thefe two Natures be confiuvded t^n6 iumbkd ^jgether, and be not clearly Difiin- Itil^ht^ ic is impoiribl. any Clear Conclufion can b." drav/n from either of them, or any Rational t ."'^ concerning them. 2. That Mr. Vs way ox r'uiiofophizing by Ideas^ which leads him iiiio fiich ftrangc Errours, or at leaft affords him no certain Light to Diftingufh thofe Natures, is good for nothing at all. For, if it cannot fur- iiilh him with means, to put a Clear Diflinftion t)erween Natures {0 widely Dlflant^ and Different from qne another; much lefs can it alfift him to fliow clearly what Modes, Accidents or Pro- prti'-S belong to one Nature, what to i\\t other -^ or to DiiLinguiQi thofe Natures, which are hife- r'.'ur to thofe two General ones; and therefore differ for kfs from one another than They did. It remains then to fliow that Mr. L's Do6lrine by way of /r/e'^ J, does not put a Cle.^rDilUnttionhc- tween the aforelaid Natures, but confounds them together. He holds it not to be Certain that Im- materiality, is not included in the Notion of our Spiritual part the Soul ; it may^ therefore, be Md- ferial^ or have' Matter in it, for any thing his Way of /^f/5 J tells him ; and therefore ii nee Mat- ter cannot be crampt into an Indiviiible, ir may be Reflexion Twentieth. 393' be Dh'lfiUe or Extended j and, fo, irtny be Di- ^jt^IedOYShatttrJ, that is ( its Unity being thus lofl, and, confequently, its Entity,) it m^ry ceafe to beey or be Corrupted, Again, \t it bc Dh'i/Ilpley it niuft be to [owe degree^ Or cither were or lefs^ DivifibJe j that is, P.are^ or elfe Denfe. If Rare^ then ( fince FaJJlvcncs is ElTtntial to the Notion of Matter ) it may b)- the operation of other Mate- rial Caufcs, which never wants, be Condenid-^ and confequently, become O^accusor Vijjhhj or, it may by the fame Caufes become Rnrer^ and be rurn'd into Fire. Alfo being Dl'vifible^ii may have ^arts of which one muft: be imthout the other, that is, it mull be Impenetrable as to its own parts, and thence be able to protrude another Material being, and be Solid too (in his Senfe of that Word ) which is the fame with Impenetrable, Moreover, fince it mufi: be Divifibl«, it mull be Quantitative or Extended, and this not Infinitely but Finitely • that is, it muft be Terminated-^ wherefore, Termination of Qiiantity, being the Notion of Figure^ it may have Figure too. In a Word, if it may poilibly be Material, there is no Property of Body^ but may agree to the Soul • and therefore, the Scul^ tho' Spiritual, may be Ccrpo- real • and fo the Nature of Body and Spirit may bc cne and the fame. But w^hat needs more than meerly his afcribing Materiality to it, at leaft, permitting it to belong to it ? Our No- tion of [ Matter^ is taken from Body, and fi-om noching elfe, and therefore can be nothing but Body, confiderM as (not what it aBually is, but) as 'ti5 AIterabIe,ChangeabIe, or apt to be another Thiv.g^ that is, as 'tis Corruptible j which, I am fure, Mr. L, will not fay or think of our Soul, Perhaps he may 594 Solid Philofophy AJferted. may fay, that he only means that it may have Matter annex d to its Sfir'nuality. But then he muft grant, that fince this Materiality did not, as an Accident^ accrue to the Soul afterwards^ fhe had it from her Nature ^ and therefore it muft be Intrin- fecal to her, and help to conflitute her peculiar Na- ture j and, if this be fo, then, when this Material kind of Compart is diffolv'd or corrupted (for if Material^ it may be Alter'd, wrought upon, and Corrupted as other Material Compounds may) the Complex or Compound it felf is dillblv'd, and fo no longer the fame^ but per/jJj'd. Befides, what ihould the Soul do with two Material Comparts ; one, Organical 3 the other, Inorganical ? Efpe- cially, fmce there areas fubtil Parts in thisVifible Body of ours, with which, as the Form of the Bo- dy, fhe is united^ Quiz,, the Spirits) as any, perhaps, Mr. Locke (^n conceive to be annexed to her. 4. To proceed, He does but think it pjjihle^ for any thing he knows, that the hir. Vs Principles Soul may have fome Materiality; cojifound Human ]^^^ ]^^ pofitively judges, that f^y.^^^ Brutes have Reajon-^ nay, that *tis as E'uident to him as that they haue Smfc. Now, if they have Reafcn^ they mufl know how to draw Confequences^ this be- ing Eflential to the Notion of Re afon^ or rather the fame Thing in other Words. Again, If they can Reafon, they can compare what's meant by our Terms ^ and have the Senfe of thofe Sayings we call Tropofitions in their Knowing Power. And, iince that Reafon is not given them for nothing, but for their Prefervation, they can compare h^x^c- able and Difigreeable Objcfts, and purfue^ out of that Reafon^ that which is moft Agreeable 3 that Reflesicn Twentieth. 395* is, they can Will^ Chufe ^ and AEt freely, whicii are naturally confcqucnt to their leathering by their Reaion what is better or worje for them, and r/jfw?e Determining ihemfelves to it accordingly : I fay, the?nfehes ; for, if they ha've. Reafon, then Reafon is part of Themfehes, and not a DifUnti Thing from them. Out of which Two Things follow : One, That the Nature of Man and Brute are Confounded j fmce all thofe Chief Operations Proper to Man, are Communicable to Brutes, Se^ conclly. That Mr. Locke wiil be at a lofs to get an Idea of the Spirituality of his Soul, or of Other Sfi- ritual Beings, by refle^ing On the Operations of his Mind'^ fmce the fame may pofTibly be found in fuch Beings as are meerly Corporeal. Wherefore, to conclude this Difcourfc, all our Natural Noti- ons of ^0 J/ and 5pir/V, and of all then Operations^ mufl: be jumbled together in a kind of Indilferency to either j and therefore thofe two Natures muft be Confounded, if either ih^Scul, which is Spiritual^ may have Materiality Annex'd to her 3 or Brutcsy which are material Entities, may have Thought, Knowledge, and Reafon Annex'd to them. And fince Mr. Locke affirms very rationally, that one of his Ideas ^ not Another, 1 cannot but think he be- comes the more obliged to fhew out of the Na- tures of thofe two Things, liquidly and precifely, how thofe two Natures are diftihguirn'd • or lMc his ^2yo( Ideas will be conceiv'd to be meerly Phantailick and Unphilofophical j being mod: un- like the Ideas in the Divine Underftanding, the Original Ground of all Truth, which do not <:ow/6//w J Natures, but eftabliJJ) them in a mod per- fect Difiinciicn to he what they are, and no ether. I prefs not here how no Difcourfe at all in Philo- fophy 3 9 6 Soli J Philofoj)hy AJferteJ. fophy can be Conclufi've^ unlefs the Nature of Bo- dy and Spirit be perfectly and clearly contradifiin- gi^iJJ}'^':, nor repeat what I have fhewn, Reflex. 9. §. 7. that our Natural Notions teach us to diftin^ guifli perfectly between Body and Spirit^ which his Ideas do not, but confound them, and thence Aefrave our Natural Knowledge of Things. I know he fays^ but pro^ves not^ that the halving Ge- neral Ideas, puts a perfedl Difference between Brutes and us 3 to which I havefpoken formerly. I add, that 'tis a thoufanS times eaiier to have Ge- neral Ideas, they being but ImperfeB Perceptions of the Thing, than to have Reajon • as is eafie to be demon ftrated, and has been manifefted above. 5. As for making fomething out of Nothing, or Creating j after we have prov*d To create is the ^^^^ Exiflence is EjTential tO God, Peculiar Effect of ^ a. • j i i • i • i ^elf-exiftencc. ^^^^^ ^^^ Accidental ro him, which Mr. L. clearly demonftrates , it follows thence, and out of the Commoneft No- tion ofCaufalitj^ that it is not a matter of Won- derment, or hard to believe that he fhould Create, but that if he pleafcs to operate ad extra, this is his Peculiar Adlion ; fince nothing is more Evi^ dent than that E^erj Thing a^s as it is. Whence, if (Botl'S Effence, and his very Nature be Exijtence or ABual Being, *tis demonftrable that it is not onely as peculiar to him to caufe Adual Being or Create, as it is for Fire to heat, or Light to tnlighten 3 but, moreover, that this is the onely Effect that can immediately or without the inter- vention of5fcc?w^/Caufes, proceed from him. 6, \ Heflesion Twentcith. 397 6. I much fear that it may fccm fomcthing to weaken the true Argument for the PolTibilirv of Creatiov, to ^^-' Thought .^;/- , . 1 1 .1 ^c n-n 1^ mt move the Body. bring the hiltance Of our Tboitght and why. moving cur Body^ whence he conclud-s that Gods Vower to do a Thing is not to be denyM hccaufe we cannot comprehend its Ope- ration. For, i. Ah*. Locke thinks he experiences this, 'VIZ.. that the Soul moves the Body 3 where- as we do not experience that (BcD Created any thing. 1. As Mr. Locke has iliown very in- genioufly, that onely the Man is Free : So I affirm *tis the Man that, wrought upon himfelf, moves his Body., and not his Thought onely. And, that, as when we gaind our Firft: Notions, the Man was a6ted upon, both according to his Corporeal and Spiritual Partj fo, every New Adt he had afterwards^ that proceeded from him as he was Man., is perform' d by the Concurrence of both thofe Parts. Whence, in every kSt of his SouI> he muft be re-excited by fome Object that is out of the Soul, either ftriking on his Senfes^ or elfe, by the repeated Strokes of the Material Phantafms^ Jodg'd within., upon the Seat of Knov;lcdge. 77:^^/^? propofe a-frefh the Motives, and continue thofe Impreifions all the while he dehberates, compares, difcourfes, and dctermins ^ and, when the Man^ according to that part calfd the Fancy., is full (as it were ) of thofe Agreeable Phantafms 3 and, con- fequently, the Soul (hie e si nunc ) is full too of thofe Notions or Apprehenfions of their Agree- ablenefs, the l^^hole Man afts for them, and moves to attain them. In which Cafe, what is purely Material in thofe Actions, or belonging meerly to Corporeal Motion, is refunded into the Stu- pendious 3 9 8 Solid Thilofophy Afferted. peiidious Contrivance of the Body^ whofe Motions follow connaturally from the Phantafms, in the fame way as it docs in Brutes , which is equally wonderful, we knowing no more than they^ ( that is, not at all) how it is done : But, the Manner of theAflion, as to its Defign, Direftion, wife Or- dering of it, and its Proceeding from Knowledge, Freedom and Reafon, ( all which we know it does, ) fprings peculiarly from the Soul., or from Man., according to his Spiritual Part. Now, the Fundamental Ground of my Pofition is this, Maft is not Two Things ; nor ( which is the fame) made up of Soul and Body, as t^o ABual Farts • but One Thing, of which, confequently, thofe two are Totentlal Farts onely. Wherefore, neither of thofe Parts is Mluall/y but the IVbole ; and therefore, neither of them alone can AB^ becaufe neither of them exifis alone ; * the Exiftence See ^ Method to ^f ^\^^ ^hing being that in which ^Cle^ce, Book i. - xr' ^ ^r /-v • rn iffT c St il^s Virtue ot Operatmo- confi/ls. But, m truth, his Argument pro- ceeds as well from this Topick, as it does rroni that of meer Thought moving the Body ; for, we can comprehend as little, how Man, tho' a6ling with his Phantafms and Thoughts too, does move the Body, and all its Diftin-Sl Parrs, (o varioufly, as how the Thought alone can do if. Nor, were there fome Flaw in this Particular, does it preju- dice his main Demonftration of a Deity, they being Difl:in6t Q^ieftions. Add. thit if wemiy conjedlure from lome Expreilijn^ of his in other places, he may perhaps be of my Opinion in this Point, and, by the Word [MW,] mean the Af^w; rho* in many places he fpeak^ very Ambiguoully y or rather, fcems too plainly to maintain the con^ rrary Pofition* 7, I Reflesion Twontictli." 399 7. 1 take leave on this Occalion, to recommend it to Speculative Men, to endeavour to draw all their Demonftrations T'.e Notion or m^ r T -KT r I ^; ■ r^i • iure of it:e Deity from tbe Nature of the Thing, (this ^^ -^^ ^„^^ ^■.,,/^^ being the onely iblid way, ) and • to be Self-exift- not from Forei^^n Topicks. After ence, alUthat can we have prov'd a Deity, let us i>^ f^^dof it foU next demonltrate ihatGorfis5f/f- tively, exifient • or, that his Eflence, or Nature, is Exlftence • and then, all that concerns the Deity, or his Immediate Operations, nay, even the Rational Explication of the Trinity it felf^ will ( if Right Logick and Reflexion be not want- ing ) follow more folidly, and more clearly, than the cleared: Mathematical Conclufions • if we rate Clearnefs and Evidence, ( as we ought,) not from the Figures on Paper, which make it eafie to our Fancy 3 but from the greater Simplicity and Clear- nefs of the Notions, and their Terms, and of their equally-evident Connexion j which, coming near- eft to Firft, and Self-evident Principles, do mod firmly eftablifli the Judgment. 8. The I ith Chapter treats Of our Knowledge of the Exigence of other Things y by which words he mf^Zns^otherThings ^e can hov> there than our fehes. He feems tO ^^J ^^'^('; ^^^f^ ground his Difcourfe on this Po- ^//^ JJ^'°' ^^'^'^ iition, that no particular Man can know the Exifience of any other Beings hut only whc?j-i hy ABually operating upon him, it maizes it Jelf fer- cei^\l by him • which he calls the Way of Senfa- tion, or Experience. Now, if, by the Words, l^any othtr Be.'ng,'] he means Bodies, nothing can be more Solid, or worthy a Philofopher. But, why wc may not gather by our Reafin, the Exift- tnce 400 Solid Philofophy AJferteJ. ence of Spiritual Relngrs^ or An;^els, ( tho' they do not operate upon /^ ailually, ) fi" )m fome Opera- tion on other Things in Nature that can onely pro- ceed from them^ I cannot difccrn : Rather, 1 hope I have demopfaatcd we can, in my Method^ Book -i. LelT.6. Thefts :^. Indv;.d, the Notions of Angehcal Natures are not prober on^s, as our Na^ aural Notions, which are imprinted by Scnfation, are j which makes our Conceptions, and confe- quently, the Words which we ufe when we dif- courfe of them Metaphorical. Nor matters it, that our ExprefTions Concerning them are oft- times Negative^ Or figniiie that they ^re not fuch Beings as Bodies are, but JmMracrial^ Unextended^ Indruifihle^ and, confcquently, their Operations UnfiicceJJive 3 in regard we Intend all the while to fignific by thofe Words, a Fofitlve Beings tho' our low Natural Conceptions cannot reach its parti- cular Nature, as in it (df: And, if we Intend this, then this is the meaning- of thofe Words, or our Notion of them j Meaning and hitention being all one. Yet, thefe Predicates, tho* Negative, or Metaphorical, are, notwithllanding, trtdy faid of them; and, therefore, we can Argue and Dif- courfe as confequcntly from than^ as we can from the mofl: Vofithve or Broper Notions we have. In- deed, as Mr. Locke fays well, §. 12. we cannot know they exift, by the Ide.zx we ha^ve of them in cur Minds 3 and the Reafon is, becaufe thofe Ideas^ or Notions^ taking them as di{llnB, are but In- adcefu.ite Conception;; of the Thing ; and, confi- der'd dlflhttrlj^ are formally but a part of that Complexion of Accidents that conditute the Indi- 'vlduum^ which only is capable of Exifting, or the IVhole y becaufe Tarts cannot exift an of the Whole : Bur Reflexion Tvvcntierli ^oi' But he is much miiuikcn if he thinks we can no more know they are dipMe of Exi fling hy the Notions we have of them,- than we can that c/n- taurs are : For, the Idea or Fancy of Centaurs in-* volves Inco-nfifltnt Notions in its very Nature^ ( or. rather, No-N^ture ; j which, the Notion of a Sub^ Jifient Spirit^ Called an Angela does not. Add, that Knowing, Willing, and Operating, VC^hich we attribute to fuch Beings^ are all V(Jit:'ve No- tions j and Cofififlenty or capable to meet in a Spi^ ritual Thing. -f.yru-(> , ' 9. Whereas Mr. Locke fays we can onely know the E:iiftcvce of any Other Thing when it overbites upon us, and ^^^^^ ^"on at ji.fl cuf therefore we know it /r^^^^«^//v by ^rr^^f 2''-''' ^ 1 I n-^ //?^y^w^ maimer 6ew/^?/6;;7,I cannot lee the leau rea- ay we ho^ the fon why we fhould not know our Exijicvu of oxhQc 'C9//W Bei^to; by Senfatlon tOO, as well ^'''f I ^- «• ^^. as that of c:kr Bodies, Without mt byUtmuon. ha\'ing recouife to htm t ion j which, apply'd to that Cafe, 'tis hard! to under- fland • or, to know how it diiFers from the direct JjCnowledge had by Senfation or Experience. We can hear^ fee,: feel and.fmell fome p.irrs of cur pwji Body, as well as we can thofe of Others, In- deed, ncTi;^: when we are ripe for more exprcfs Knowledges, thofe Impredions made by; one of our own Parts upon others, do not caufe in us. the ^Notion of Exjftence, (tho\ perhaps, jl^ey may tacitly re;>/^tff it, ) becaufe we know alreaij^ and before-hand^ that we do exift : But, pur cafe , wc tlid nct^ would not thefe Imprellions make u? know by Senfation our own Ex'iflence^ as well as that of any other Body whatever ? I doubt not bur JVIr. Lojji.^ will grant they wculL Since then the C c Embryo '401 Solid Vhtlofophy Afferted. Embryo in the Womb lies in a Roundifh Pofture, -u^hy may not one fart of it, by touching another, or operating upon it, caufe in us, ^s foon as the Soul ( which has a Capacity of Receiving Notions) 3S in it, a Notion of our o-wn Exigence, by way of Senfation ? Efpecially, fince Operation is nothing but the * Exiftence of the Agent * s^. Method to j^^j prcfs'd or imprinted (as it Science, Book J. v i. i^ •» )- • Lfjr.i. §.7. "were) upon another, by Motion, Certainly, it becomes us who de- ny Innate Ideas^ to fhew how all our Firfi Notions do come into us by ImpreiTions on the Senfes ; and, not to fay rawty, that fome of them come by Intuition y which is the Way of Knowing Proper to Angels^ whofe Knowledges are all In- natey and none of them Acqu'irdy either by Senfe, or Difcourfe, for they have neither. This, I fay, is certainly beft for the Intereft of our Tenet j of which, Intuition gives but a (lender Account. I believe Mr. Locke proceeds upon this, that he finds he not only does^ but muH as firmly affent to the Propofition Ego fum^ as he does to the moft Evi- dent Propofition whatever ; nor can he at all douht of if, nor can it need Proof. Buf, my Judg- ment is, that this Introverfion, and Studying our own Interiour, is a very Fallacious Guide, and will often lead us aftray, it we keep not a (leady Eye, attentively bent to our Principles j which he feems here to neglect. For, many Pofitions need no Proof j and force our A (Tent, and yet their Cenainty may depend on Differ rent Caufes. I o. The Reflexion Twenticcli." 40 j" ro. The Tirli Chapter treats of the Injprovemt72t cfour Kyiovdedge^ wh^ch Ml . Locke fays, does 7tOt devoid 01 Maxims. No Improvcmetit of But, Firft, he miftakes the ITfe Science i^/r^i. .. >^ I , ^ . T-1 <"<^ / '''^^ General ot General Maxims: They arc PrhidpU. not made for the Vulgar, or Be- ginners, to ^^^^^fr Knowledge by them ; tho* it may be obferv*d, that Men of all foits do natu- rally ufe them when they fute their purpofe^ nay, fometimes make Proverbs of them. Nor was this Maxim, [ n Whole ts bigger than a Vart^ ] ever intended for Boys, or to teach them that their Hand is bigger than their Little Finger^ OX fuch like 3 but, being premifed totheenuiing Proofs, they are occaflonally made ufe of by Learned Men, in the Procefs or their Difcourfe, to clinch the Truth of the Point, when it needs it, by their 'Self -Evidence, In the fame manner as my felf have very frequently Ifed recourfe to Metaphyfi- cal Principles, and made ufe of them, in my Pre- liminaries and Reflexions, as Occafion prelentcd, to make my Difcoui'fes Evident j and,, to rivet the Truths I advance, in the Minds of my Rea- ders ; as any Attentive Perufer of them may easi- ly obferve. He fpeaks againft our Receiving Prin- tiples without Examination^ and of Principles that are not Certain 3 that is, againft fuch Sayings, as are no Trlnciples 3 for, if they can cither need^ or admit of Examination, or, if thej he not Certain^ none but meer Fops will let them paj^ for Vrin- pies. Yet, tho* Mr. Locke does thus oppofe Ma- xims and Principles, 'tis, notwithftanding, very evident, that himfelf muft make ufe of fome Ma- xims and Principles all the while he difputes aganft their Ufefulncfs 3 otherwife, he cannot dif- C c z courfc ^04 Solid Philofophy AfferteJ. courre at all , or, his Difcourfe can have no Force : In the fame manner as he that wraftles with an- other, muft either f:x his Foot on fome Firm Ground^ or he will fall himfclf, inftead of over- throwing his Adverfary. Let us then examin his Principles. He alledges, that the Mr. LockeV Prin- K7tGwlec^ge of the Certainty of Vrin^ ciples ixamiii'd. cipies depends only upon the Percept tion of the ylgreement or Difagree- went of cur Ideas. This, then, is one of his Prin- ciples j both becaufe it runs through good pare of his 3d and j.th Books, as alfo becaufe 'tis Equi- valent to this Univerfal, [ All Certainty of Priaci^ pies depends^ dcc] Now, this is fo far from 5f//- e'v:dc7n^ that it needs Examination enough 3 and is ofie of thofe I judge not Certain y and, therefore, can be no Ground or Principle at all: Nor is it poffible it fhould, urilefs the Word [Idea'] be clear- ed to mean Spiritual Notiop in our Mind^ and not meer Refemhlances^ Or Alaterial Repreftntaticns in our Fa?Kj' ; to clear which, ( tho*' the whole Trea- tife needs it, ) no Provilion is made j bur, on the contraiy, thofe two vaftly different things are rather carelefly confounded , as is fhewn in my Firft PreIiminar3^ Another Principle fecms to be this, [Ncne ought^ VJith a Blind and hnp lie it Faithy to Receive and Siv allow Principles.'] This is of Unl- verfal Influence^ QiW^ Self-Evident 'y and, therefore, in all Points well qualify'd for a Principle. For, Principles were not Principles, if they needed ei- ther i-^/Z^/S, or jDer/w7/Wjof Rcafon, to make them go down, flnce they ought to be Evident by their own Light. But, what Good can this do 10 any, but to fuch as have renounced Common Scnle, even to Ridicuioufnefs ? And, perhaps Mr. LocJCe - ^ had Reflexion Twentieth. /\os had fome fuch weak Writers in his Eye, when he advanc'd this caLuious Pofition, as a Warning to Learners. r r .Now,thc General Maxims and Principles, o\\ which the Learned Pa^'t of the World has hitherto proceeded, ^^'"- Locke*/ w.t/« can oncly be overthrown (\t they P'-^'-'PIj ' ^J^'^h n iir\» iT^« ^^ to a certain all muft needs be lo ) oy other Prnv ,.;,,^ Principles, •iples, wore E-vidtnt than them- Inevitlent. fclves are j or elfe it will be but a drawn Match • and fo tliey may hope fliil to Hand ( as the Lawyers phrafe it ) in their full Force^ EJf'ecf^ and Vertue. We are to confider then, what PriJiciple Mr. Locke has fubflituted in their room, when they are difcarded j for, 'tis a very ill Cafe to be left without any Principles at all. * Lis this, [ All KnowLdge of the Certainty of Frinciples^ and COnfequently, the JVay to impro^ve cur Knowledge^ zi*, to get ^ and fix in cur Minds^ Clear ^ Diftivii and Comj)leat Ideas^ as far as they are to be had^ and an^ nex to the?n Proper and Confiant Names, ^ Now, if the Ideas muft be Clear^ the Terms muO: be very Simple^ . and COnfequently ( as was fhewn above ) General onc^ y and this will force us back upon General Maxims^ which it was intended wt fhoukl avoid, as good for little. To be Difi-inH^ if we go ro work like Artifts, we muft diftinguifh thofe Ge- neral and Common Notions • which will bring us back into the old Road of thofe Ten Common Heads, called Predicaments j and, confequently, of Genus^ Species and Differences^ which was larely diflik'd • 1 fuppofe, becaufe it was too much tra- vell'd in, and beaten ; tho', 1 think, fuch a Com- mon Path fhould not be left, becaufe fome may have here and there laid a Block or Briar in the C c 5 way. 40(5 Solid PhJlofophy Jjfertei. way. Laftly, Coyn^kat Ideas ( as he grants) are not to be had of the Species^ much Icfs of the Indi" rulduums. And as for NamtSj *tis nor 7/^^ that are to annex them, bur the Common Ufagc of the Vulgar, or of the Gcneralk}^ of Learned Men, (in cafe they be ArriFc'^nl ones j ) for, thefe are they who gave them their Confiant and Vrofer Signifi- cation, Whence is feen, that f) many Difficulties are involved in this one Thefis^ or Frincifle, (befides what is faid above, of the Word [J^e^/,] ) that we can build no Degree of Certainty^ nor Improrue- ment of Knowledge upon it 3 efpecially, fmce Mr. Locke himfelf (according to his ufjal Candour ondModefy) declares here, he docs but th.nkit true. But, which is the hardeft Cafe of all, to embrace this Principle, we muft be ob'igM to quit all our Self-evident^ Maxims^ as of little Ufe^ upon which our felves, and all the Learned part of the World, have proceeded hitherto. iz. 'Tis a great Truth, that it is a right Method of advancing Knowledge^ to Confi- Wh^tnings hin> 2er our Ahfira^ 1 juakc it pafs for a kind of Maxim, that [ there ts no ferfetl Certainty to he had^ hut only in Lines nnd Numhers : ] Whereas, the Principles of Morality are as Evidtnt^ and the Notions belonging to fucli Subjects as Clear ^ as thofe in Natural Philofophy, perhaps Clearer 3 as this worthy Author has fhcwn mod manifeftly. *Tis alfo True, that Knovdedge Tnay he hetter d hy Experience. But, il" he tneanj Scientifcal Knowledge, which is the ElfecS of De^ tnonflration^ I muft deny it, unlefs Common Prin- ciples of Nature do guide Experience, and give ic Light of the True and Proper Caufcs of what Ex- perience informed our Senles 3 for, without their AlMance, ( as 1 have fhewn in the Preface to my my Method^ ) Experimental Knowledge can never produce any one Scientifical Conclufwn. 1 add, that True Science would be a Thouiand times more advanced, did Learned Men bend their Endea- vours to begin with the Trimary AtFedlions of Bo- dy, and thence proceed gradually to Secondary^ or more Ccrnpounded ones : For, this Method would furnifh Studious Men with good Store of Proper Middle Terms^ to deduce their Demonllrations. Laftly, *Tistrue, that -we must hew are of Hypothec /nnciph s, or ct' ^^^^ Truths need not be por d ifpcn '^ficrd Maxims. at all 5 xior Were they . ever meant for the attaining New Know- ledges by fcrivg on thofe Propoi^rions, Jinglj con- lidtr'd : Yet, thefe Maxims muft be pre-fuppofed to be True, and admitted, or the Arguments would very often want their beft Cement, that gives them an 'evident and neceOiiry Coherence. They are prefixed by Euclid at fii-ft-, both becaufe they may eften comic in play afterwards 3 as alfo, becaule it would throw o*Fthe Tenour of the Difcourfe, ro mention themi dill expreily every time there needs Rccourfe to them : Whence it was judg d fx by him, and others like him, to premife them ^-rr/r//, and then refer to them. Let Men but ob- ferve hoji^'^ and in wh^t Occafions, Euclid makes life of them, and it will then be beft feen what they are good for :' But, if they are good for no- thing at all, lam fure it muft be concluded, that both EncLd himfclf, and fuch Writers and Ufers of Af^?.v/w/,- were, all of them, a Company of vain, idle Fops, to amuf.^ their Headers by propoiing fofckmnly fuch Ridiculous Trifles ; and dubbing thofe Iniignificant' Baubles with the Honourable Titles of Maxims and Vrincipks. To fix which Dif-repute upon him, and his Imitaters, will, I doubt, much Scandalize every True Member of the Commonwealth of Learning. - ' 409 REFLEXION 2ub. O N The Fourteenth^ Fifteenthj and Sixteenth CHJPTERS. I. T" Am forry I muft declare, that in Mr. Locked X 1 4th Chapter, which treats {Of Judgment] there is fcarcc one Line that I can yield to. 1 difcourlethus : yW^- The Point Jlated. went docs mod evidently import the Fixure of our Underflanding in its AfTent to the Truth or Fallliood of any Proportion. For to fay, 7 j^tdge a thing to be Jo ) is the fame as to fay, [I am fully and firmly ferfuaded it is /o.] Kow, this Fixure of the Mind may arifc from two Cau- fes 3 Reason 2iX\^Vaffim. Under the Word {^Rea- fon, ] taken at large, I comprehend all kind of E'vident KnovAedge whatever, that can belong to a Rational Creature- To PaJJion belongs all Frcci- fitancy of Aflent, from what Motive or Caufe fo- ever it fprings. The Former makes us adhere to what we iudge, upon fuch Motives, as by their E'vidcnce do determine the Underftanding to Af- fent, and fix it in that A (Tent • which Motives, therefore, can be only fuch as are purely Int elk- dual j or fuch as, by our Proceeding upon them, we fee clearly the Thing muH hefo^ or not fo^ as we apprehend. The Later fprings from the //'?//, cor- rupted and byaffcd by lome Inttreft or Pica! u re, which inveigles our Underflanding to adhere to at as a Truth, becaufe the Will 7i^culd ha've it Jq, Again. r 41 o Solid Thilofophy AfferteJ. Again, there are two forts of Objeds Man, as ha- ving two Natures in him, may be employed a- bout, "vlZj, Outward AB'ion and In-ward AJJent, The former does (generally) concern the Exter- nal Conveniences or Necellities of our Tempo- ral Life here j the Later, the Interiour and Na- tural PerfeSion of our Soul j which is the Ad- hering to Truths and rejecting of Errour. In the Former of thcfe we can have no Clear Evidence, or very feldom ; both becaufe Outward Actions arc employed about Particulars, of which we can have m Science j as alfo, becaufe thofe Particulars about which we are toAB-y are furrounded with almofl: Innumerable Circumftances which we can- not Comprehend, and way-laid by the Undifco- verable Ambufhes of Fortune j fo that we can fel- dom or never, with abfolute Certainty, know whether they may, or may not prove Succefful, Notwithftanding which Dangers, when there is Neceflity or great Conveniency to k^Outwardlyy we may, without difparaging our Reafon, fall to afling upon a VrohabUlty , the NecelFity obliging us to do fo, and the Impolfibility of ferfeB Af- furance acquitting us ot Imprudence. But, of Affentingy OX of Judging Inwardly^ that a Propofl- tion is True or Falfe, there can be no Neceffuy^ unlefs E'vidence foices us to it j in regard (BoD'sS Goodnefs has furnil'h'd us with a Faculty of 5«- ff ending our Judgment in fuch Cafes, left we run into Errour , which is always prejudicial to our Nature j and, if the Errour does concern matters of high Moment, pernicious to our Souls Eternal Welfare. This 1 take to be flain Reafon^ nor do t doubt but tlut each Branch of this Difcourfe may be reduced to perfect Evidence. We come to exa- min Reflexion Twenty Firft. 411 min now what Mr. Locke delivers in this moft irnportant Point. 2. J/Vi?, He Confounds Outward AHio7i^ of which there is Necefity , and caji he no E'videncc of Succefs : with ^A^-^°"/°""'^.* - . c^ 1 . J ifT ■ c Outward A6ti- IntenOUryz/^^/w^ and Jjjentmg, Ot on, to which ^e which there dm be no NeceJJity^ if may proceed «;- there can be no Evidence : and *'" '^ Probability, of which Evident Knowledge Ten .f'/ w"^^' r . Ill ir lent, ^0 which we 7nay Ortentimes he had ; as alio niay nor. concerning whofe Truth or Falf- hood, till Evidence appear, we may fafcly and honourably fufpend our Judgment^ nay, if, in fuch a cafe, v/e do not^ we hazard to do our fclves an Injury when we need not. That he thus con- founds thofe two vaftly Different^ or rather Con^ trary Conliderations, appears hence 3 that, § i . he /hews the Unreafonablenefs of not eatings and of not going about our Bujinef^ till we baz/e a Demo7t^ firation that the Meat will nourijJ) //^, and the Bifj7- nefwlll fucceed'^ which Inllances evidently relate to Outward A^ion ; but in § 3 . he fpeaks in the fame Tenour of taking the Fropo/ition to be True or Falfe • wj-iich clearly relates to Inward AJJcnt. Se- condly ^ (KoD's Wifdom has indeed given us, ge- nerally, no more but Probability for our Outward A6lions doing r^s good, or fucceedivg j but to think our all-wife Maker has given us no T)etter Grounds to make us JJJent • or rather, that he intended we fhould Afltnt upon Probabiliiies, which are ftill liable to be K7//e 3 and, if they be i'w^ Proba- bilities, may all be Falfe, is to think that God meant to expofe our SojIs to innumerable Er- rours 3 nay, allows and defgns we fho;:.'d em- brace Errours, For, if (as Mr. L. fays) cSoD h^^ jfiven 41 2^ Solid Thilofophy AJfertecf. g'ruen as a Faculty to judge that to be True^ which, the Keafons for their Truth being hut Vrohahk^ may not he True 3 then, fince (BoD has mod cer- tainly intended we fhould make ufe of the Fa- culty he has given us, it mufl follow that Go^has expofed us to Errour^ or de^gndwc fhould err y and that, (this Faculty, as he fays, not being Kno-ivhilge) ^uery frequently. Which is hardly con- fident w^ith the Reverence we do both of us owe to our Creatour, w^ho governs his Creatures ac- cording to the Nature he has given them , which, is to a^^old Err our y and never ( as will fhortly be fecn this does ) to admit a Contradiction. 3. What therefore 1 extremely admire, is, that Mr. Locke fhould fay in exprefs H,^T^'' ?T" Terms, that Judgment js that Fa- irer of onrXuag' J ; 1 1 -, ,. 1 1 ins Faculty. culty^ "wberehy toe Mind takes any Yrofcjition to be True or Falfcy with- cut pcrcei'vJng a Demonjlrati've Evidence in the Troofs j and that this Faculty is giuen Man hy God to en- lighten him. For, Firfty Judgment does not en- I'ghten US at all j as appears evidently, bccaufe Falfe Judgments are Errours , w^hich are fo far from cnl'ghtn'ng the Mind, that they manifeftly darken it. All that Judgment does, is tO Fix the Mind in the Perfwaiion it has, whether that Per- fuafion fprings from Clear Reafcn or Dark Vajjion j and Mr. Locke ' fdbns to make good my Words, while he contradiftinguifhes 7«^/^wfwr to Know- ledge 3 w Inch later, and cnely which, is our Intel^ lcttHal%\%\yt. .SecoW//, The Words [TakingVxo- pofitioi^s 10 be True or Falfe ] mud mean AJfenting ro them as fuch 3 for every Judgment is not on- ly an Aj^enty bac a///// and firm AlTent. Now, that no Vrcbahllty can, with Reafon, caufe JJ]ent., (and Reflexion Twenty Firft." 413* ( and certainly dPoOt vvho gaoje us our Rcafon, has not given us a Faculty to ufc it agaln^l cur Reafon) will be fccn hereafter. Thirdly^ Which is yet worfe, by contradiflinguilTiing Judgment and Clear Knowledge^ he makes thofe Allents which fpring out of Clear Know^ledge to be no Judgmtnts at all ^ whereas Thefe are the onely judgments that we can be fure will do usgood> and are according to our True Nature, Reafon. He tells us indeed, in the Clofe, that when we judge as th'pjgs really are^ they are Right Judg-^ ments. But, how docs this agree with his Con- tradiftinguifhlng formerly \Jttdgmentl] according to its whole Latitude, or in its General Notion, from Knon-ledge • unlefs we fhould fay, that w^e only do right when we judge at Hap-hazard, or judge Right by Chance, Qui cjuod ^ee^uum eff fia^ tuit parte inaudita alter a-^ ^L^auum licet fiatuerlt^ baud iiquus eff tamen : By which Rule, we are ill Men, even tho' we Judge right j becaufe v/e pre- cipitate and hazard to embrace Errour when w'e 7;eed not. Befides, Things are fo really to us as we "know them to he : And, if we do not know them to be fuch, w^e cannot with Reafon fay or judge them to be fuch j and, if we do, we a6l againft our true Nature 3 to do which (I5o0 has given us no Faculty. Fourthly, Amongft the Caules men- tioned here that make us judge, NeceJJJty is reck- on d as one, when Ca'tain Knowledge is not to he had : But, this Can be no Caufe at all to make us Judge, For, there can be no poilible NeceiFity, forcing }JiS 10 ]\xdi^Q, but Clear Evidence. This, in- deed, obliges us to Interiour AlTent, and compels us to judge that the Thing is fo as we/^e it to be. But, if no Evidence can be had, what Neceffity \% there 414 ^^^^^ Philofophy Ajjerted. there at all of Judging one way or other ? Cannot Wcfufpend our Judgment till Evidence appears- or whether it does ever appear, or not ? Why are we in fuch haft to hazard falling 'into Error ? Or who bids us Judge at all till we fee a good (or Condufive ) Reafon why ? 1 am fure, what- ever many Men may do out of Weakyjefi^ neither' (BoD nor Nature ever imposed upon any fuch an abfurd Duty. Lnftlyy What means his n^.aking it then to be Judgment, when we have no Demcn* 'fir at I've Evidence ? May we not judge a Conclufi- on that is Demonfirated to be Trtiey becaufe it i5 Demofifirated? Or that an Identical Propofition IS True, becaufe 'tis Self-evident ? Or, rather, cught we not to judge all fuch Proportions to be True for this very Reafon, becaufe we know evU flently they are fo. So far then is Certain Know- ledge from being cmtradlp-'mgui^i d from Judg- ment, that they are in fome manner the fame, as I have fhewn in my METHOD, B, 2. Leff. i, 5 g. where, I hope, I have fet the Nature of 7/^/^- ment in a Clear Light j as I have that of Ajfent^ Sufpenfe, and Certainty, ^. 3. § 9. 4. I fhould be glad to think my felf miftakeil in Mr. Locke's Meaning , if hii Tfrat God has pro- Exprefs Wotds, the Tenour of 'videddtteMfftirjef }^\^ Difcourfe, and his next Chap- 'I ^J'^'^'ii^ .f"^^ rer [Of Prohability,]\^-\uch runs iH lent ro all Man^ i y-^ n . -^ -" u • kind, if they ke ^bc fame Stram, would give me Trot Tvttnting to leave. Perhaps, he thinks that, thefnjelver. f j^ce nonc Can embrace Chriftia- nity without judging it to V>t True, and few knov^ it to hz fo, we Ihould excludt the Generality from the way to Solvation, if wfc do not allow fuch a Faculty givetrus by (!Poli> is Judging Refles:ion Twenty Firft. 4 i^ fudging without KnovJing, I Anfwer, r.Thofe Gifts that come from Jhave^ from the Father of Lights, are all TerftB, as being the Endowments of his Infinitely-bountiful Hand ; and, that Men a6l: imferfdHy 2nd fooliply, fprings from the IJmi- tednefi of Creatures. Scarce a Faculty they have but has its Weaknefs when we come to a6l, as weU as our Reafon. When then any one is reduc'd to Chriftianity upon lueak Motives, what's Good or Sincere in that Adion is refunded into ^,/,v;^^^/ Truths, each Remove has littLe or no . 1 r r 1 -n r -C PQrce. weakeyis the jcrce of the rrocf, ir it defcendsmieerly ( as he exprefles at ) by the v/ay of the Hearfay of a Hearf.j. The bare Narative mud either be Supported by a Con- fonant, Frequent, Open and Obligatory VraBife^ and be flrcngthen'd by the Acknowledged High Ccnc.rn of Perpetuating the Matter of Fadl attefted, or it m.ay in time dwindle away into a feeble Tittle-tattle. And, I very much efteem his Re- mark, as both very Acute, and very Solid, that no 'Prih..h}lity In H.forJc^l Relation can ar'ife higher than its Fir H Original y unlefs that Fir ft Original "Were afternjards abetted and corroborated by other Motives. His Allowance of the Validity of the Testimony for Miracles, .is Wife, and Pious y and his making Di^uine Rex'elatic n to he the h'gheft Certainty^ is v."c\\ becoming a Chri- ftian Philofopher : For, all our Knowkdge what- ever is taken from Things, made and eftablifh^d by (BoD, as the F'rH Caufe • and, therefore, if it be Certain that (SoD's Revelation or Teflimo- ny (lands engag'd for ^ny Point, the Truth of that Point is prov'd by a Nobler, Stronger and Higher Medium than can be drawn from Phy- - ficks, ReJIexioH Twenty Fir ft '415" (icks, or even Merapbyficks • that is, from rhc S(rueriiign Caufe of all thofe Objeds, whence thofe refpidive Mediums are taken 3 and, by whom oncly they they have any Truth at all in them j no, not fo much as their Mttaphyfual Ve- rity it fd^. II. It would not be imperthient on this Oc- cafion , to prefcnt Mr. Lccke with a fhort Story. A ^ very ^moreFirm^T: Judicious Cantahr}g'ia?t defir'd to fint if due to know of me, whether we ought f "'"'^ certainly not to affent to a Point of Chri- ^Zn '\t ^': tv' X- \ r r ' ' '^eaLci, than ta Itian Faith, luppoimg it was e^vi- Sdentifcai Cm- dtntly ReueaVd^ more firmly than dufms. ro any Scicntifical Conclulion ? I anfwer'd, that ve cught. He ask'd. Why ? Al- Jcdging, that , fince there could not be any greater Certainty that it was reveal'd than De- mcnfiration^ the Aflent to the Conclufion could nor, m true Reafon^ be more Finn than that which a Dtmonftration produces, or than the Conclufion of any Science : For, let the Syllo- gifm be this, [ Whatever God faid, is True : But, God faid there will be a Refurredtion of our Bodies 3 Therefore, there will be fuch a Refurredlion : ] None can pretend ( faid he ) any greater Certainty than that of Science^ for the Certainty of the Authority that gave us the Minor 3 therefore, (ince Conchifw ftc^nitur dtteric- rem partem^ the Afilnt to the Conclulion can be, in true Reafon, no greater than that of Science, I reply 'd, that that Saying of the Logicians was meant of the Varticularity or Negat.'uenefi found in the Premid'es, and not of the Force of the Medium. 1 alkdgd, that the Ma^cr had the greater 41 6 Soli J Thtlofophy AfferteJ, greater Influence upon theConcIufion, (whence that Propolition fo called, had its Appellation, ) than the Minor j which w^as onely an ^pplier of the Force of the A'lajor to fome Particular, "or fome other Notion, in order to coitdude con- cerning it 5 and therefore, the Certainty of the Conclufion was chiefly to be rated from the Force of the Major : Whence, thofe Enthymems^ which have the Major for their Antecedent, are 2Tiore Natural than tliofe w'hich have the Minor. I infifted, that the Divine Authority being al- kdg'd for the onely Medlurn or Motive for all Revealed Points whatever, our Aifent to the Verity of all fuch Points, was onely to be re- funded into It 3 and, that it loft not its Force by its being appl/d by a weaker Medium to fome Particular, provided that Supream Authority's ftanding engag'd for that Particular, w^ere clofe- I) ^pplfd to our Mind j which is done by ab- iblute Certainty and Lvidcnce. To illuftrate which, I brought this Inftance. Let there be two Agents, whereof the one is Calldum ut oHo^ the other Calldum ut duo^ and both of them /t/),- flydto the fame Patient equally • it will not fol- low from this Equal Afpllcatiun^ that they will have an Equal EffcB , but the Heat produced by the cne^ will be more hitenfe than that which was caufcd by the other. So, fuppofing two .Syilogifins, the Minors of w hich are both known by Science j but of tlie Majors^ one is known onely by Science, the other by an infinitely higher F>vidence, 'viz,, by the hllential Veraci- ty of the Divine Authority ; it will not fol- low, from the Equal Application of it, by the refpcdive Minors^ to this or that Particular, Sub^ Reflexion Twenty Firft. '4x7 Subfum'd under them, that the Aflent to the two Condufions, \A/'hich is the Effect they are to produce in our Minds, will be Eciual j but they will operate according to their Several Forces^ provided the Force oF both be but Clofe^ ly apply *d to our Minds, fo to make it work its Full EffeB 5 which is done by feeing both the Minors to be Abfolutely Certain and Evi- dent. I have not Time to dilate on this high Point as it deferves, but leave it to the So- ber Reflexion of all Judicious Lovers of Truth, who ferioufly deiire that Chriftian Principles may approve themfelvcs to be, in all refpedls, perfeftly Rational. And 'tis a Duty we all owe to our felves, and to the World, to fhew that Chriftian Faith does not ferverp or impair^ but perfeSl and exalt our Reafon. RE. '^ 1 8 Solid Thilofophy AJferted. REFLEXION z%th. O N Tl^e 1 7 1/; 5 \%ih ^ i gth ^ and LaU CHAPTERS. i.T^His Learned Author ftates Reafon very X right in all its Parts , but, 1 believe, he miftakes the right End, Intention Hor^SyUoglfmscan^e ^^^ jjf^ ^f SyHo^ifms ' and that, to be invented at i-ii r \ i i f^^^ w^hile he oppoies them, he takes his Measures from the Modern School-w^ay of Syllogiftick Arguing, and the lit- tle Fruit it has yielded. Such Forms of Reafon- ing were, certainly, never intended for the Vul- gar, as by his Difcourfe he feems to apprehend j nor for Men of good IVIother-Wits, to attain Or- dinary Knowledge, by caftlng their Thoughts in thofe Exatl Molds. For, Mankind could ufe their Reafon, and improve in it too • nay, could draw their Confequences ( generally ) very well, be- fore Syllogillick Reafoning came in fafliionj tho* they could not fo -n'eli make it cut to them- ielves or others, -why the Confequence muH fol- low, nor refund it into its Caujh, and fo fet it above Contefl, by reduchjg it to Evldeyjce. Their own Natural Genius taught them to difcourfe right, very oftv n unreflcciingly j as it does aifo the Vulgar inlbings within their Ken. In procefs of rime, Ltjiittcrs upon Nature, finding ( as it were ) by Experience, that fome Difcourfes were evi- Reflexion Twenty Fird. '^^^ evidently Conlcqucnr, fome mt^ they began t(^ caft about and find out by what Virtue fome Dif- courlcs came to be lb evidently Conclufive abcz'e others. And, to this end {Art^ if truly fuch, be- ing nothing but a dee^ InfpeHiov into Nature) they fet thcniillves to anatomize and dilTe^t a Ratiojial Difcourfe^ that fo they might difcover the hidden Nerves and Ligaments that gave Force and Con- nexion to the whole. They found that fuch a Difcourfe did confift of three main Parts, call'd Propofitions ; and each of thefe again, of three lef- fer parts, called by them Suhje^^ Copula^ and P?v- dicate 3 all which had Dillinft Natures and Offices in the Difcourfe. They difcover'd that the Con- nexion of the two Terms in the Conclullon, in which coniifls the Trtfth of it, depended on thei\- Connexion with a Third or Middle Term in the Premiiles j and that, if they be not connethd with it or Immediate^ but Keynote from it, as all Com- mon Aledhims are, which beget Vrobabilities 3 no- thing is concluded^ and fo the Conclulion may, ( for any thing we know ) be Falfe. They ob- ferv'd hence, that there could be but Three Terms in fuch a Difcourfe , and that, were they more, it caufed a Blunder and Inconfequence. Hence they took Care thofe th;ee Terms fliould be fo f laced, as would render the Connexion of the other Two with the Medium mod Clear at Firll: Sight. This done, they treated of each of thofe Greater 2r\di Le^tr VOiXls^ that is, of Propofitions and Notions lingly and apart j adding fuch Rules as they faw convenient for each. From thefe Ob- fervations, laid orderly together, fprung the Art of Logick^ and all the Rudiments bvlonging to if , All which have their Force from Nature , nor ought 43 O Soli J Phtlofophy Afferted. ought any thing be efteemed An^ but what has honeft downright Nature for its Ground : And, I hope, that in every Tittle of my whole MethoJy I have not one Argument in thofe many Trains of Confequences 1 have drawn there throughout it, that is not taken from the Nature of the Thivg in hand. Now, things Handing thus, who can think Logkk^ or Syllogifm ( the main End of it,) are to be flighted as of little or no nfe ? Can any Man think that Art and Reflexion do add no Ad- vantage to U7tt aught Nature ? Or that our Rude, Natural, and Common Reafon may not be Cul- tivated and Improv'd, as well as our Natural Voice, Walking and Handling, may be better d^ by being taught to Sing, Dance, or Play on the Lute Artificially, 2. I am very apt to think, that at firft the In- venters of Logick and SjUogifms the True ufe and did never intend to ufethem^^r- ^bufe of them, ptually themfelves, nor to inftrudl others in any Science by ufing confiantly that Method. Since neither Arlfiotk^ nor any other Author I ever read. Ancient or Modern, ever went about to deliver a Scheme of Doctrine in a Syllogiflkk way : But that, after they had by Study and Reflexion, found out in what their Evidence lay, they made ufe of them as Ex- emplars or Tefls^ by which they mi[i;ht try whe- ther their Loofe and DilTieveird Diicourfes had an Evident and Neceifary Connexion of Terms at the boctom ; or elfe, in fome Signal Occ.ifions, to confute and convince an Acute or Obftinate Ad- verfary ; efpjciafiy, if the Auditory and Judges oftheDifpute were Men of Learning. For which Keafonthat way isftiil continued in Learned Af-. femblies: Reflex/on Twenty Second. ^} 3 1 femblies : Such as the Sciiools often are^ and nl~ ways flwtdd be. Bur, when at Icni^th that way grew t(X) common, and that Sophiileis and Bun- glers would needs conftantly uie /r, and h cnl)\ in their extempore Difputes ; which could be ma- naged right, and asth^y ought, by none but thofe v\ ho were exact Maflers of Logick ; it came at length to degenerate into iniipid Artlefs Wranglo and Talking at random. For, the Multitude of ill- underdood and barbarous School-terms encrea- led, frivolous Diftindions (as I lately inftanced) grew rife ; Principles were either negledlcd, or elfe fupplied by their Mafters «tuV^ e^* • the Natures of Things, and the Ways dictated by Nature, were left olf 3 and hence it came, that no Progrefs was made in Science j nor any Point decifively concluded. 3. In divers parts of this Difcourfe I doubt not but Mr. Locke agrees with me ; What 1 difagree with him in is : ^f^f T l^'J''^ I. I deny that m Learned and in for a Syliogifm that does not conclude is not worth a Straw , and no Mediujii that is meerly Trcha- bk (it being a Remote one) can be connected with the Extremes, nor Confequently can it aw- dude. 'Tis left then, that if they help little in Dewonfiration, they do not help us much in ar.y thing. We need then very flrong Arguments to make us yield to fuch a Paradox. Mr. Locke con- fefles Sylhgifm ts fomctimes good to difcozfer Fallacies : I take leave to fay they are al-ways good for that End : And does this help us little in Demonfira-^ tion? All Argumentations are either CwJ///i/^ or Inconclufi^e j Conclulive ones have a middle Term immediately conneftc^ with the Extremes ^ In- conclufive Ones either are aim'd to deceive us, by bringing a Bad Medium., or by ufing a Bad Form • and thofe are the worfi fort o't Fallacies, or of fuch Syllogifms as lead us into Errour • moft of thofe Fallacies noted in common Logick-books, being but Trifles. If then the Syllogiftick way difccz^crs Fallacies, it cannot be deny'd but it exceedingly helps Conclufi've Argumentation, or Dcm3n[tr.iticn. He grants too, that itfets the ahjhit Prcppfition(;indy fo, the whole Argument) before the View in a Clear Light. I infer 5 therefore without it, we fhjuld E e nor 4 5 4 ^^^^^ Philofophj AJJertecf* nor have bad fo Cle^ir a Knowledge of the Proof, nor confequcntly of the Corxludon j and is this- nothing ? But he thinks this good is over ballan- Ced by this, that it engages the Allvd />; the per- plexity of Olfcure^ Equi'L'ocal and Fallacious Terms. Let US bjame then thofe Logicians, who multiply Terms and needlefs Crotchets, ( which I have endeavoured in my Method^ to lop off as Super- fluous ) and thofe Authors who do not define thofe Terms they ufe • and not Sylkgifm nor Artificial Loglck^ which tells them they ought to do it. I know no more, properly and peculiarly belong- ing to Syllogifm, but a Middle Term rightly placed j as is ufually done in the Firfi Figure^ and according to the Firfi: Four Moods. Nor do 1 fee any thing in thefethatin my ^Ctl)Ot! is not re- duced to Clear Evidence. 'Tis confeft too that it is adapted to the attaini??g Viclcry . in Difiputes. Now^, if this be fo, then the Champion of Truth, by means of Syllogifm^ will make Truth ViBcrious-^ and then, how it can be deny'd (as Mr. Locke ^ does) that it confirms Truth i^ifiair Enquiries^ is to' me Unintelligible- unlefs by Fair Enquiries he means Loofe Difccmfes^ which are not Syllcgifiidil, nor reducible to that Form • w hich I think is an Improper and Lukewarm expreifion^ For, a iPhi- lofopher ought to efteem no Diltourie Fair^ which is not Clear and Conclufive. 5". Indeed Mr. Locke (liys veiy well, that Sjl- logijm is cf no ufe at all i7i Troha- syv.gifms ^rc of /,^./.y;,,. And there is very good, «« r//«? ;w Proba- n r / tr CM -r ■' hUDifiourfes. R^^^uon v-^hy. For Syllpgifm /iiows an Infallibly- Certain way of Concluding 3 whence nothing caii bear that Teft but what dies Ccnclu^icj, Whereas Probabili- ties Reflex} on Twenty .Second. .j ] 5- ^ /\'i being grounded on Coimnon Med'itnm^ do woi conclude ai ally and therefore k would do Probability a Great Dill'ervice to bring it to the Touchftone of all True or Concluiive Rcafoning, a Syllogiftick Form. This would quickly hy open the Incoherence of the Terms, and con- fequently, /how thofe Men to be lefs Ratioval who do Affent^ or fay interiourly, The Ttrms do cohere^ OX the 'Jlo'nig is True^ upon a Trchcble Ar- gument, in which the}- (^o not Cohere. *Tis then by Sagacious Prudence^ and noihy Syllogifws^ that the Degrees of Prohability 'Ai'C tO be Weighed and^. try'd. He grants alfo that Syllogifm fcr-vcs to fence: And lb it does, tho' not in Mi\ Lock^s fenle of that word. For, as an expert Fencei' eafily Wounds, and overthrows an Enemy, who is not Skilful in that Art ' So a Man who is Skil- ful in Syllogifm, which is the Art of Co?JcIudi7;g evident Ij^ will quickly confound and overthrow* an Adverfary of- Truth. But why he iliould think it does not ferve to i?tcre a fe Knovledge, is a ftrange Riddle- the whole Defign of Artihcial, or Syllogiftick, Reafoning being to Deduce Con- clufions not yet knonm, from Premilles which are either perfe6tly Foi-ekmv^it, or at lead: bettir known, 6, Mr. Locke has then good reafon to fay, that Other Help ^wuld he foua^ht : But, i( Syllogifm be difcardJd, where ^f'' ^^^^^^^^ any ether Help can be found to clear'a. make the force and Ckamefs of the Confequence better appear, or upon more evident and more Certain Grounds, not the Wit of Mankind can Imagin : And f dcW •Any Man to bring me any Rcifon, that is'ag.vod one, or E e 2 " Coji- ^j 3 6 Solid Philofophy AJJerted. Conclufivc, but I will fhow him that it is equi- valcntly a Syllogifm ; and 1 will undertake to reduce it to that Form , and manifeft that it has all its Strength and Evidence from the fame Principles which give a Syllogifm to be clearly Ccnclufive. 1 know not what Authors Mr. Locke may have met with, who fay we cannot Reafon flhotit particulars^ or, that No Syllogl flick Reafoning can he right and conclufi've^ hut what has at leafl one General Propojition in it : I am fure 1 have fhown the contrary in my Method. 5.3. L.r. § 21. Indeed I fhow § 12. and § 24. that fuch Syl- logifm.sare notlnftrumental to Science^ as are thofe which have one or more, Uni^crfal Premafles; For, all Science is of Inadequate or Jhfiracled Notions, w^hich are Unl-verfal ones, and not Particulars y for who Can pretend tohave^a^wc^* of the whole Complexion of Accidents, which conftitute any Particulars? And, to let my Rea- der farther fee, that the Knowledge of Particular ConclufiOns cannot reach Science, I defire him to reflect, that if a Phyfician knew onely that this Particular Indi'vidual Herb is good for fuch a Difeafc, and not that all of that Sort or Kind is fo, he could not pretend to have Scie?ice of the Nature of Herbs j or, if a Mathematician knew onely that this Individual Triangle, which he is defcribing in Paper, has three Angles equal to two Right ones, but knew not that any cther^ or /r//, had fo^ none would much praife him for his Science in Ivlathematicks. The fo much neg- lected and abus'd Ariflotle^ wiio had too much, and too well-grounded Senfe to be rightly un- derftood by thofe who did not much regard C Grounds, noiihQ Ilighefi Canfes of Things, told us Reflexion Twenty Second. 437 us that Singularia von pcrfcitrnt IntelkHum ; the Knowledge ofS'mgidars does 7tot perfe^ the Undcr- fiandlng. Since then ScieTice is a Perfc^ioJi ot our Soul, k mud be employ'd about the undcr- flanding Umverfals-. Plain Reafon abeuini^ his faying, as I have iTiown Ibid. § 2?. 7. I cannot let this Chapter pafs, without re- flcding particularly on Ah-. L s fa}'ing, that Inferences cr Ccvfe- ifremesandCon^ • Trr 1 l^qtlCliCeS of fjuences in IFords, are a great part y^ox^s.ah/raa- of Reafon^ tho' the Agreement, t^ig from their- or Difagreement of Ideas be the Senfe,// flrangc Principal. Now , it is evident h^^l^^fp^J^^^^^ by thofe expreifions that he fpeaks >o«j.''" ''^ ^' of JFords jbflratledly or Contra- diftinclly^ from the Ideas iignify'd by them j that is, from their Senfe j taking Words in which fenfe they are no more but meer Sounds. Whence I fee not but Black-fmiths llrildng orderly and re- gularly upon their Anvil, may make us good Confeque7Kesy as thofe he fpeaks of, and purs them ro be a great part of our Reafm. I have obfcrv'd that this Acute Author fancies UninteJligible Myfteries in xhc Annexing Words to his Id^as :^ Nay, ( as appears here ) in Words taken wiuliout Ideas., or the 5(^7;,'^ of them , that is in Scnfclefs Sounds or Characters. Whcrcas my weak Specu- lation, tho' 1 bend my light never fo ftrongly, cannot difcern any Annexion other than this, that Men have agreed that fach Words, ir.all (igniry fuch and fuch Things or Notions j all other An- nexion being Unaccountable. Nor , can I fee how in fuch fayings as this, Mr. Locke does (as Philolbphers ought ) guide himfe If by the Natures of the Things in hand, 'uiz-. Words^ and H e 3 Rciijon 438 Solid Philofofhy AJJerteJ, Reafon. For Uh-^s, abfl:ra6ted from his Idejj^ which he purs to be fignify'd by them, are meer Articulate Sounds^ and out of the Mind -^ whereas Reafcn and all its A6ls are compleatcd in the Mi fid, and Senfe. How then the Cottfcquence of Words ( thus underftood ) fhould h^2i great part of Reafi?} which is Sejtfe • or what Reafcn, which is an Internal and Spiritual Power, has to do with thofe Exter7jal and Material Sounds Or Motions of the Ayr, more than to know their Signification, and ^ to take care they be not Ambiguous, quite fur- " pafles my Underftanding. The Complexion of Ideas^ he fpeaks of, which the Words are to fig- nify, is confeffedly made fir^ by the Underftand- ing 3 and, the Memory can retain our Notions as well, or better than it can Sounds -^ and tho* fuch Sounds, thro' the ufe of the Words are apt to re-excice the Memory, yet all this amounts to no more but their Aptnefs, thro' ufe, to fignify our Notions, let them be what they will : Which is plain Senfe and eafily Underftood • Whereas the Confeo^uence of Sounds, Abftrafted from our Notions, is very Amufing, and utterly Unintel- ligible. 8. The 1 8th Chapter [Of Faith and Re a fo?t, ami their difinB Provinces] is admi- TVhjt is arte to rablyClear,and in great part vcty Reafon, Tp/^^r r. ^^,|-j^ j .^^^^ ^^^ ^^^^^ ^. .^ ilf^jj^ ideas, that are proper ones, can be Conuey dhy Traditional Revelation. The Author of Nature gave us our Natural No- tions, and tlie Author of Grace, (who is the lame Perfon, ) brought no unheard-of Objects of our Senfes to increafe the Stock, already fuf- ficicnt for all our Knowledge ; yet, if the Pointy thu Reflexion Twenty Second. 439 thus conveyed are Spiritual ones, as nioft points of the Re'vealed Faith are, there will be con- ve/d new Mtt a phcr leal KoxAons,, tranllated from our Natural ones which are Proper. I grant too, thar Revelation cannot he admitted againjt clear Evidence of Reafon. 1 wifh, that inflead ot the word [ Revelation ] he had rather faid [ Rre- fence of Rtvelaticn'] for, otherwiii', fome Read- ers may hap to take his words in a Dif-edify- ing fenfe ; as if it were a poilible Cafe, that Re- 'velation it [elf may be fuppofed to be oppolit to Clear Evidence of Reafon j and ( which is woi'fe,) in cafe they hap to contracly muft truckle and fub- mit to it. My Judgment in the Point is this, that fappodng the Revelation is grounded on the Means laid hy God to alTure us he has Re- veafd fuch and fuch Points, ( which therefore cannot but be Certain to us, or Evident^ at leaft to thofe who are Guides to others ) the Cafe imply'd here is impoffible j becaufe it is impof- fible that God, who gave us our Nature, jljould ( as Mr. L. well exprelVes it) v/ill us to admit any thing for true^ in a dlreB Contradiclion to the Cleat Evidence of our Under flan ding. 1 add, not tO ad- mit it as True., if the Motives be but Probable, or ( which is the fame ) if the Thing may be Falfe, What I am here to note, is that, Two Cautions are necefl'ary in this occafion. The one, that iince God does no- ^^'' f''f, ^""1*1''!* \ ' 11 r 1 \ r f to oe oju'f'v a. in thmg needle fsly, therefore the order to thisPoint. Points Reveal' d by God are fuch as Humane Reafon could not other ways attain to ; whence they being fuch as thofe Mr. Locke holds to be above Reafon., hence they mull: oft look very oddly to thofe Low Conceptions which the E e 4 Courfc 440 Solid Pkilofophy AJferted. Courfc of Nature affords us : Whereas the Mo^ tl'ves laid by God for Mankind, to embrace Chriftian Faith, do, for that very regard, lie le^el to our Natural Reafon. Wherefore, in our En- quiry what v:c are to embrace, what not ^ we ciigljt mt to begin our queft, by fcanning the Fowts propos'd to us as Revtafd 3 but, by ex- amining whether the Motives to judge they are Reveafd, be Certain or no. Otherwife, we fhall Neglcd: to employ our Reafon, in fuch Things as are fultahle to her Capacity, and in which fhe can have Evidence j and task it to Confider what's perhaps ahcve her reach., and of which, confe- quentiy, flie can have no Evidtnce 5 which way of Proceeding is clearly IrraticnaL How many are there in the world who are reputed for Learnt- d men, and yet have no Principles which are not taken from Fancy ? Let then fuch fhori Speculaters loofe, to iudge of the Verity of Points ( perhaps ) Incomprehenlible to our Na- tural Reafon, they will be apt to fancy twenty Contradictions in the Trinity^ the Incarnation, a Virgins Conceiving., the RifurrcBicn, and in ma- ny Other main Points of Chriflian Faith : And, were it allowable for any to begin his Search after Truth on this prepofterous manner, the Pcrfons muft be highly Qualify'd to decide what is a Contradiction, w^hat not, ere their Sen- timents can be thought to have any kind of weight. They muft be excellent Logicians to know the force of a Conf(qtunce^ and how ma- ny things go to make a Centra diction. They muft be acute Metaphylicians to know all the many feveral Re^idis belonging to Things, without which it will be hard to detcrmin certainly what Notions Reflexion Twenty Second. 441 Notions are in all rejpefh ConiY7id\Soi'V^ w/jtc/j not: And, if they be not thus Qiinlityd, thdr Skill is Incompetent for fuch a Ferfoiirancc. Again, if the Point do concern the Nature of BoJy^ they muft be able to Ccznprchev^ the Na- ture of that Subject. And, in a word, unlcfs thty can iiewcvfirate their own Oppqfip Tenet, plain Terms give it that they can never iho\v the 0- ther (ide to be a CovtradiBkn : For, iince both fides of a Contradidion cannot be 7r«f,they muft: ilewonjlrate their Tenet to be True, or they can- not demonftrate the other to be Falfe and Cc7i~ tradiBcry j for 'tis one labour to do both. 9. The other neceflary Caution is, that men do not take the Bud Exflicatio7is of fome weak Divines for the The fccovdCaut/oK Point of Faith it lelr. For, luch pp/„r. men, as Mr. L. well notes, being very forward to ft:op the mouths of all Opponents by crying out fuch a Pofition is of Faiths and, withall, having a high Opinion of their own Sentiments, and MijcaWd Autkrity j are apt to fancy that all is of Faith which belongs to their own Explication of it, or feems to them Ccnfe- qtitnt from it, or Connected with it j which is no better, in tffe^l, than to obtrude their o-un Skill in drawing Ccnjt^uences upon Men for Dlvlr.e Re- velation. Now, if the Explicater be not truly Learned and Candid, then in ftcad of lliowing the Point of Faith, Confrmahle to Nature, as a Solid Divine cught -^ he mayhap to rcprefcnt every Point of Faith fo untorardly^ that it may have Twenty Contradictions in it. 'Tis therefore the Duty of every Ingenuous Man, to diflinguifh fuch Explications horn thcFoint it felf j and not to pro- 441' Scii^ Philofophy Afferte^. pronounce too haftily of it, till it appears it cannot potfibly bear any cthzr Rational Explication, and fuch a one as is Agmahle and not ComradiEiory to the true Principles of Keafon and Nature. Which I the rather Note, bccaufe I have obfer- ved that fcatce any one point of Faith that is Controverted has efcapM this Misfortune ; nay more, that Metaphorical txprelTions have ofcn ( I may fay, generally ) been miftaken for Literal ones : In a word, let but the Grounds for GOD's •Revealing Chriftian Faith be held and fhown Ahfolukly Certain ( and the Motives lay*d by GOD to that end, cannot but be fuch ) and the Divine Authority^ thus Evidently Engaged, and clofely Apply* d to our Mind, ought to fubdue bur Underftanding to ajjent^ notwithftanding our feemlng-K2LZion2i\ DiiTatisfadtions. I f:Ay^ Seeming -^ For, to put the Grounds and Motives we have to know God revealed it to be thus Certain^ and yet that there is Clear Evidence againft the Point feveaFd^ is to pur a perfect Contradiction, or ImpolFibility. Which makes me fomething ap- prehenfive that thofe Authors, who put fuch a Cafe ( however their meaning may be good and pious, and they fee not the Confequence of it) do deerh that the Grounds we Chriftians have for GOD's Revealing our Faith, are not iikogether Certain^ but 'Probable onely ; which leaves all our Faith in a Pojfiblllty of being Falfe for any thing any man living knows , that is, of being perhaps not True, 10. Hence I think 'tis but a very (leight de- ference to Divine Revelation to R,aJon IS not to he ^^^.„ j.|^,^^ j^ Matters where Rea^ rely a on in thinzs r • i ; / a ; hfjmditsS^h,rt. fon cannot ptdge, cr but frobably, Reve^ Reflexion Twenty Second. c\^^ Revelation is to he hearken J to : Hut that in ALitters whtre Reafon can ajfoid tertain Kyiowlalgi'^ Reason is to he hearken ci to. For, tho' it vvcrc fo that Rcafon can do this, yet Experience tells us that Reafon does not a'ciually., ( and this very often ) what it can <7j, 01 all that lies witlun the Coni- pafs of that power j but that we may often ^rc~ fume we have Certain Knowledge when we have none. Efpecially (ince of the two it is far more likely our Reafon may difcourfe wrong of the Toints that are Revealed, than of the Moti'ves which God has lay'd for Mankind to know they are fo 3 the later being within its Sphere, the other oft-times not. II. The 19th Chapter treats of JVrong JJJenty or Errour. This Learned Author feems here not to fpeak conftant- The isotion cf [ h ly of the fame Point. To ^J]ent True, J mnn be to any Propolition, is to fay in- ^'/i^^g'^'jh'dfycm • ^ , r J. r-r' 1 \ '^"^ Sot in of teriourly, [It ts True,] or, that f^^y ^ ^^J^ the Thing «-/oas the Proportion or may no^ be exhibits it. Now, thefe Propo- true.j litions may be of two Sorts : The one is exprefs'd thus, [The Thing is fo, or is True .] The other thus, [The Thing jsVrchahle.] Hither- to, and in fome places here, he fpcaks of the For- mer, or of Allenting to the Truth of the Thing j or, of taking the Prohahle Propolition to be True : In other places here, he ftems to Ipeak of the Lat- ter j as, when, ^.6. he complains that ?r oh a bio Doclrines are not always received with an Afcvt prc- fortioyiable to the Reajons which are to be had for their Frch ability : Which clearly makes the Objedl of Aflent to be the Vrohahility of the Thing, or as it {lands under fuch Motives as make it to a highev Dc^rce 444 Solid Philofophy AJ^erteJ. Degree Trohahle , or, ( which is perfeflly Equi- valent, ) that Propo/ttions to fuch a Degree Vrobable^ are to be ajjented tOy as to fuch a Degree Trcbable. Now, this is an E'uident Propofition 3 and the Af- Cent to it, moft Rational, For, fince we call that Frobable that flands under Probable Motives ^ it is as perfeft a Truth, and as firmly to be aflented to, as 'tis to aflent, that what's Probable^ is Probable * or, 'what's PHbable to fuch a Degree^ is Probable to fuch a Degree : Both which Propofitions being evi- dent, nay, the Terms of it asclofely connected as they are in this Propofition, [ What ts^ is,, ] we not onely may,^ but are forced to aflent to them, as be- ing both of them Self-ezfldcnt. But, I much fear this is not Mr. Locke's meaning 3 but, that he means, we muft aflent to a Thing as True,, or that the Thing />, upon a Proof which, of its own pe- culiar Nature, and as it is diftinguifh'd from Ei/l~ ilencc^ is fo far from Concluding it is^ that it per- mits and allows it may not be^ or be Falfe. In which cafe, to aflent, is both againft Cleared Reafon, and even (as was /hewn above) againfl: a Firfl Prin- chk of our Underfl:anding. 12. What confirms me in this Apprehenfion, is, his making way to his enfu- Therefor.% that m ing Difcourfc With thefe Words • 4f,nt ought to h [jfyiin^f /;, grounded on Likeli- ^«//fo>/ Probable , -^ j ■' 1 -r , n r\i • a 1 MedIums,rVDe. ^^^^) ^"^ {/ ^''^ ^I'^P^^ ^^.F^ ^^^ monftrable. Motive of our AJjcnt be Probabili- ty, &c.] Now, both thofe Hy- pothetical Jfs I muft: Categorically declare againft 3 and pofitiveiy affirm and maintain, that Likely Mo- tives can onely, in true Reafon, make us aflent the Thing is Likely j and that Motives but Probable cannot, without highly wronging our Reafon, caufc Refiexion Twenty Second. 4^5* Caufe us to afl'cnt the Thing is more than T^ohable : Laftly, That [may be, or may fiot be^ ] Cannot be a good Argument that the Thing u. I affirm far ther, that this Poiition of mine is clearly Demon- llrable : For, all Motives or Troofs affeding the Conclufion, and our Affent to it, according to their Different Nature and Force j therefore, as £i/i- ilent Motives make the Thing Evident, fo Likely Motives can onely prove the Thing to be Likely ■ and Probable Motives can onely prove the Thing to be Probable 3 and that, the Proof being the Caufe of the Concluiion, and thofe Proofs being Proper, and adjufted to thofe refpe6tive Effeclsy 'tis as perfect a Demonftration, drawn from the Proper Caufe to its Proper Effec^t, that they can make the Conclufion no more than Probable ; and, confequently, our Alfent to it (if Rational) no more than that it is onely Probable 3 as it is that an Agent which is Hot but to fuch a Degree, can onely caufe Heat to luch a Degree j and this is as Evident, as that no Caufe can acl beyond its Power to atl, or can do what it cannot do ; which is an Identical Propofition, and Self-evident. 13. *Tis in vain then to Hart this Queftion, Hovj Men come to give their Affent contrary to Probability, till 'this '^Aifemln^'^rrli Queftion be firft fatisfy'd , Wjy Piobabilfry"^"'^ Alen jJ}ould affent 8t flll upo?i mecr Probability ? But, this being fuppofed without any Proof j and, it being allow'd by me, that Men may aifent contrary to Probability all the Ways he alligns, 1 am not to purfue that Point any far- ther, becaufe it is quite belides my Aim j which is, to concern my felf onely with what promotes ' true Science ; with which, Probability, as being both 44<5 Solid PhUofophy Averted, both IMicertainy and Ine^ldent^ has nothing at all CO do, but to Injure it, ( if it meets with Ra(h Con-: cinders^ ) by Ill-grounded AjJ'ents. But, cafting my Eye on the Title of this Chapter, which is, [ Of Wrojig Ajfent^ or Errour,'] I obferve, that he has not fo much as t<)uch'd upon one main Caufe of Evrour, which has an unhappy Influence even upon fomeWifeand Good Men, and oft proves Prejudicial to their bed Concerns j I mean, the Aflcnting ahfolutely upon veiy high VrohahiUtks • Or, ( as Mr. Locke exprelfes it, ) ^s firmly^ as if they njjere ijfaUihly demon f rated. We are, indeed, more often deceiv'd by AfTenting on fight Probabilities j But, we are far more grofly deceiv'd, when a very Highy and very Likely Probability fails us : Whence, in fuch occafions. Men ufe to fay, [JVho could €-ver haz'e thought or imagind /V ? ] or, \_I was ne-^ ver fo abominably deceiv'd in my Lif."] I will ex- plain my felt by one Signal Inftance, Ihewing how dangerous it is to yield up our Reafon, by Affent- Ing Abfolutely upon very Great Likelihoods^ and even the Higheft Probabilities, Which Difcourfe may, I hope, cdife foine, and thence convince others, that fuch an Allent is Irrational. 14. A Man who is at this Inftant in perfect Health, is apr to alTent abfolutely. The Temt, that we cbat he lliall noc die fuddcniy of oKghi to .ifait u}>' an Apoplexy before Morning- cnprobnbility is f|-j^-^j ,^ Y\\i: fhall not fall from a r-fw PvT V Houfe, and kill him when he to hcji Chriftian walks thc Streets , that his Honle Morality. ihall not fill on his Head, and crufh him 3 that a Drunken or Qaarrelfcm Rufiiin Ihall nar, without Provoca- tion, run him ihorow • that a Bit of Meat, a Crum, Reflexion Twenty Second. ^47 Cruni, or a Bone, fhall not choak him ; or any fuch fudth?} DifalKr bcFall him that Day ; and 'tis i/t?y higblj VrobabU they will not. Now, the greatcft Concern we can have in this World, is, to die well prepared for the other. Pur cafe then, a Man of a Locfe Life^ (lucli Men being mod: apt to prafurpe^'J^nd lull themfdves in a blind Security,) ^IJents Ju-mlj; and ahfclutdy^ iipon fuch a high Pro- bability that he fhall not be taken otf fuddenly, but /hall have Time to die Penitent, haps to be fiir- priz'd by fome fuch unlucky Accident, without having any Leifure to repent 3 the cafe of \\\^ Soul IS very defperate. Now, 'tis evident, that that this Eternal Lofs of Happinefs lights to fuch Men thro' their acting contrary to ibeir Realbn ; and their Allenting; and Relying /?-w// upon the Frail Alfurance of a Probability : For, had they ufcd their Reafon right, it would have naturally fuggeftcd to them thefe Thoughts : I can fee no Bottom nor Fouiidation for Allenting io fully that I fhall. not die 'very flwrtljy or juddcnly. How ma- i ny Men, who thought themfelves as fee u re as I do now, have, notwithftanding, been taken awav in an Inftant ! Every Man. living is liable to thefe, and a Thoufand other UnforeknowableMifchan- ces: Nor have I any kind, of Privilege above others j nor know 1 any reafon vby thofe Si ni iter Chances that happen'd 10 other Men, may nor as well be my Lot. This plain and obvious Difcourfe, join'd with the Iniinite Concern of the Thing, might have conduced to make thole carelelly ie cure. Men redtifie their \Vanderings, and cndea vour to keep agoodConfcience, left theylhould befuddenly iVirefted by Death, with their Debts un(;_ancclf d : Which goqd Thoughts and Motives they 448 Solid Philofophy AJfertecf. they had wanted, had they aflented upon a high Probability that they Jhould not die fuddenly, as firmly as tho the Thing were infallibly demonfirated. This Infallible and Irrational Security, I fay, would, in all likelihood, have made fuch weak Souls run on in Sin, defer the Amendments of their Lives, and put it off with a dangerous prefuming on Death-bed Repentance. Hence I infer two Things 3 one, that our Pofition, that we ought not to ajjent upon a high Probability, but to re- tain fume Degree of Sufpence^ is a Great and very Important 7ruth^ fince it has fo great an Influence (not to fpeak of our many other Concerns ) up- on the befi and moft Important Part of Chriftian Morality. Errour does not ufe to be fo favour- able to Goodnefs and Viety^ no 'more than Igno- rance is the Mother of Devotion j whereas Truth reduced to TraBice^ is ever the Genuin Parent of Virtue, The other, that to Judge or Aflent -ivithout Kno-wledge^ fprings from our Weaknefs, or elfe from Palfion j and that Judgment taken in this Senfe, is not (as Mr. Loc^e affirms) , the Gift of God, 1 5. He proceeds to the Reafons why Af^« take wrong meafures of Probability^ and To apply our fehef fo COme tO ajfent wrong or Err, /or/[;^ Right Me- But, it appears evidently from Hiod to find out that's faid, or rather indeed, .?. 7ut ): iris evident out of the very Terms, cnce ts the onely r tr Antidote againjl that all F.rrour QT Wro7ig AJJent^ Errour. does onely Spring from Aflenting at aU upon Probable Motives. For, did they Affent onely upon E'vidence^ it is Im- polTiblc they fhould ez^er erre ; fmce Evidence for an Errour is in it felf impoflible. Or, did they /«/- j Reflexion Twenty Second. ^jj(9 fend their AlTcnt, or not Aljent when the Thing is but Vrobable^ *tis again itnpotlibic thcv fhoiild Err j for, it is impolliblc they lliould £r;% or Aj^cnt -wrongs when they do not Ai]cnt at all. Whence follows, that ( excepting Invincible Ignorance, which concerns not our Point in hand) all Wrong Ajjent, or Errour., fprings from our AJJl-nting upon Trobability. The Reafons he alligns, why Men take wrong Meafures of ProbabiHtics, ferve bet- ter to fhew why Men do not affent upon E'vidt^nce, viz. Doubtful and Falfe Principles^ Recei'v'd Hypc^ thefesy Predominant PaffJons^znd Authority ; by which laft, I fuppofe, he means, fuch Authority 2Sn7ay deceive m. All thefe are fo many Rem or a s to the Advancement of Science^ and Motes in our Intel- lectual Eye, hindring it from feeing E.^Adent Truth. Xqi., none of them, but has fome kind of Probability, ( as the World goes , ) or, at leafl, will furnifh Men with probable Arguments : For, a very flight Thing ferves to make a Thing Pro- bable, So that the Upfhot is, that the Chief, and ntoH Effectual Way for Men to avoid Wrong Af- fe7jts^ or Errours^ is to inftru(5l them in the Way how to conclude evidently j which is the fole End and Aim of my Method to Science j and,particularly, of that part of it which treats of the Self-evident ' Conclulivenefs of Syllogifms, in which no Man can pollibly be deceived. For, this fhews, that the Inference or Confequence of the Conclufion, when the Medium is Proper ^ is as Certain as Self- Evidence can make it 3 and, that Common Medium s.^ (fuch as all Probable Ones are,) can never Conclude j and, therefore, fuch Conclulions cannot be alTent- edto, or held True., without wronging our Rea~ fon* Whence follows, that the Way to avoid F f Wrong 45 o Sc^ld Fhilofophy AjferteJ, Wrong Ajfent^ is^ to exclude Probability from ha- ving any Title at all to our Ailent , it being high- ly and nianifcftly Irrational for any lo judge ^ a Pro- poiition net at all Demonftrated or fhewn to be True^ Hionld be ajjented to as firmly as if it ivere in- fallibly demonfir at ed : For, this is diredly to judge a ThinG; to he fuch as it ts net : which is a manifeft Err cur ^ or Untruth. Nor, matters it what moft People do out of Weaknefi : Man's true Nature,- \\\\\Qn\^ Rational^ is to be rated according to the Conformity we ought to conceive it had fVom the Idea of it in the Divine Underftanding, its true Ejjince 5 v;here none can doubt but it was Verfetly till if came to be ilubber'd and fully'd by the tam- pering of Second Caufcs, and their Never-uni- form Circumftances. The Natural PerfevSion^ then, of a Rational Creature being to arrive rcr- tahily^ or without miJjiiTg^ at Knovledge and Truthy w^hich cannot be had without E^idtnce ^ hence, \\s his true Nature to be guided in his Wa7ro ac- quire thofe Interiour Perfe^ions of his Mind, onely by E'vidence j without w^hich, he is liiable to fall, every Step he takes, into the Precipice of Err our. Nay, 'tis fo clear a Truth, that Man's true Nature is onely to be guided in his Inte^ ricur JJJents by Evidence ylhzt^ even in om* 0;/r- 71'ard Mlicns, which do not diredtly concern the fcrfet'i;}7jg our Soul, and in which we can have no £vidence of their Succcfi^ or o^ the Good they will certainly do US 3 yn^ ilill we nruft ( unlefs we will incurr the Note of Folly ) have Evidence that it is better to acJ, or better to "venture j, Other wile, we fhall c?.:arly adl: with fome Precipitancy, and a- gainft our true Nature, Reafin, 1 6, Befides, i Reflexion Twenty Second. ^\^ i \6. Bciidcs, it is exrrcani hard to take \\hi\^^ Aleafures of Probability. Every Mcafure is a Certr.ln Standard-^ No popU^ff^a;, or whereas, Probabilities arc not ca- ^^rtam .Sran- 1 , ,» 1 ,., 1 r I Clara, to t^ke thf pable ol- any • but, hkc dcfuito- y,,/? ,,„^,^ ,.^.^. ^f xy Jgnes-fatui^ whiffle noW to this Probabilities. lidc, now to that j doubling, and re-doubling 3 {o that none can take their jufl: Di- mcnfion, or Proportion. They vary c^jery i>ay^ oft-^ rimes QWcryHour-j and, what's ;7?6rc' Probable, th:^ Minute, may, by fome new Circumflancc latLly come to our Knowledge, become iefs Prob.qble; the next , perhaps , Imfrcbabk, Even the Hi^k^ f/? Probabilities are not exempt from this Frail- ty, and Ficklenefs* I may think my Houfe will certainly fiand J nor do I fee any ileafon to make the lead Doubt of it: A prudent Neighbour, , Xvhom I take to be more Judicious than my feif in fuch Things, fpies a Flav/, or Crack, near the : Foundation, which he thinks weakens it ; which I makes it now Imp-obable it will (land, and Vroba- ; ble it will fall. Hereupon, I fend for an expert i Mafter-Builder, who has ten times the Skill of \ the other 3 and he a flu res me, that late Formi- dable Crack is nothing at all to the Firmnef; of the Foundation, and therefore it will certainly ftand : Which faid, the Motive fhifts Faces again, and it becomes ^uery Frobabi^ it will net fall. A- mongft School-men, fome hold, that the Opi- nion of Three Do j,l:ors makes a Point Probable j jfomc think, the Opinion of Two is fuflicient- Jbme fay, One^ who has maturely weigh'd the toinr, will fcrvd3 and, in the mean time, per- haps it is Jcarce 'Probable, at moft but Vrobable^ '^h'At any of th.fe fay True. But then, thefe Later F f X uy 45 2. SoIiJ Piydofophy AJferteJ^ i^iy^ that it is certain that what Se^en Learn- ed Men agree in, is Vrohahle : Let then thefe Se- ven Learned Men agree that what fome One very Learned JMan, whom they nominate, fays, makes ihc Thing Probable , that One Man has the Virtue of all the Seven centered in him • and, therefore, that one iingle Learned Man s Opinion makes it Probable enough in all Confcience. Where then Ihali we fix the Bounds, or whence take any Ctx- l\\\n Meafures O^Greaier and LeJJer Probabilities ? Whoever perufes, and confiders well the feveral Sorts of Probable Motives, enumerated in my Me- tbody.B. 3. L.z. §. 10. and by Ah\ Lccke here, in his .15th and i (5th Chapters, will fee, ( tho' w'e iVavc not rcckon'd up half of them, ) by refle(3:ing o-n their Variety, and their CrOilnefs toone ano- ther, (abating the feveral Degrees of each,) how ihfupcrable a Task it is to fettle any fix^d Limits by which we can he confiantly affur'd, which fort of Probability is Greater^ or Lejjer, 'Tis a Thoufand times eafier to eftablilli abfolutely certain Rules of Dcmc7ifiratic7iy WTre Men but as zealous to purfu^ Tnith^'is^ they love to talk at random j cither becaufe they think that Nob left Qiieft not worth their Pains^ or, perhaps, becaufe Palliated Scepticks inveigle them into a Conceit, that Science is unattainable. To obvi:^re which Calumny, has, thefc Fifty Years, been the Butt of my Endeavours. 17. Ksfo'C Authority^ this One Maxim, purfu*d home, fecures us from being de- Th Certain Rule ccivM by relying On it , "Jiz,, [No ?2ot to he wirUci . i . i r a,v r i /'J' Authority. Authority dejcri>cs AJJint, farther tha?} Reafo7i gives it to deferve.^ So that all the Certainty of Authority is to be re- funded into bftrinjecal Arguments^ taken from the Nature Reflexion Twenty Second. 4-^;; Nature of ALwhind^ the y\ttc(lcr,s; and the Na- ture ( I mean, the Notoreit)' and Co Kern) of the Tilings atteded • and, thence afcertaining the Ar- refters Knowledge, and Veracity : \Mnch, if ihey can be dcmonflrated, or put bevond Probability, ( for, till then, none who are able to raife Doubt.^ and fee the Medium is Incondufive, can be bound in Reafon io ^ J] hit upon any Teftimony, ) even, the IVifeH Men may rationally j4l]cnt to what tliey atteft -J otherwife, 7Jot ^ tho' weaker Arguments (as I hinted above) may fulf.ce for the Vulgar, and for our Outward Adions. 18. Toclofe my Reflexions on this Chapter, I am apt to think that this Learned II Author is here drawn a(ide from j^^-^, Locke fa-m: uiing his Excellent R eafon to his totnkcfomcTJrn-s heft Advantage, by apprehending /<"' ^nely Proba- fome Things to be oneh Vrohahle, ^':/:''X ^fl u- u / L A^ • r 1 t,^e y1 lit homy far which ( or the Certainty of- the thcw ) are I)^ Authority for them ) are fcrfedly monftrable. Demonfirable ; as, in particular, tliat of the Exiftence of Jtdim Cafnr. The fame I judge of thefe, ^^iz,. That .Alexander the Great conquer'd yifia-j that there are fuch Cities as Rome^ or Paris • that the fame Chances cannot light often upon a Hundred Dice j that I )hall not think over again, in order, the fame Thoughts next Year, as 1 did this j and a Thoufand luch like. Which, perhaps, many will take to be but highly Vrobahle • whereas I, Upon good Reafon, cannot but judge they are all of them Dcmcnjira- /'.v. But 1 an; weary, and haflen to an Lnd. Ff3 iS.The 454 •So/i^ rhilofophy Ajferte^, 19. The \2& Chapter bears for irs Title, [0/ i the D'lv'ificn of Sctences?\ The two jh Mw'^ers of pj,-(]. general Branches of this Di- viiion of Scien. ^^^^^^^ ^^'^^ ^'^ ^'^^^ Opinion, O- ces /r-f />«)•;/;' 2?;«V<^??f , as w ill be fecH hereafter. Co-incident , " However, the Learned World is fr.r:iy not belongs ^^^^)^ oblig d to the Author, for '^l '' ^''''''' ^' putting Ethicks to be capable of Demcnftraticny and a true Science, But, as to his Third Branch, which he calls otcum- t", or the DoBrlne of Slgns^ 1 muft confefs, I do not well know what to make of it: For, to inake the BoFlrhie of Words to be a Science^ Or part ni Thilcfophy, is to make Philofophy Wordijli. He dcfin'd Philofophy, in his Preface, to be The Know^ ledge cf Things 3 and here he feems to make the Knozvledge of Wcrds a part of Science^ or Philofo- phy, taken diftinftly from the Knowledge ofThivgSy AA,'hich is his Firft Branch. All Science is Con- neded Sei?fe^ and both Senfe and Science are in our A£nds. The Common Agreement of Men gives "Words ro be Signs 3 Common Uf^ge fhews this A- greeintnt 3 Grammar helps them with Congrui- ry 3 Crltick gathers from Authors, or Derivations, } he Genuine Signification of fuch Words as are not io much worn by Common Ufe, but moftly 1 ifed by the Learned .- For, when they are tb^s Commt:}^ Critick is Ufclefs. Log'ick^ which is to J/rc^/ our Reafon, and defii^.e our Notions, fa to keep our Thoughts or Uifcourfes fteady^ takes rare they be not ^w/';>z/c;?/.f 3 or, if they be, gives UulcS to deted their Double Senfe, Jeft the 111- undcrftood Signs lead us aftray from the Point, But, all begins and ends in this, that we be fure p-ur \^'ords do iignifie our Notions, rightly^ and fmcereljr. Reflexion Twenty Second. 45^ p7tcerely. Sometimes wc have Simple Notiv^r.s ; and then wc ufc fuch Words as liji:nifie them : Sometimes we join many Simpler Notions in a Comj>lex one ; and then wc make iiic of luch a Word as lij^nifi'.s that Complex Idn^^ or Notion: Sometimes wc conned divers Notions ainnnativc- ly^ and frame Judgments, ov Afcntal Frcpr//tJc?is ; and then, Verbal trcpo/itio?Js figniiie tliat VLvhto/t Mentis^ or Interiour Saying. We may f^''^cy that Words do ty together many Simple Jde^-s ni a Com- plex one- (for, there is norhing which Men of Wit, by much bending their Thouglits, cannot fancy ^ ) but 'tis J4^''e who ty our Notions together in om Mind,, nor can nicer Articulate Sounds any more Conneft Simple Jdcas^ than they c^n conmcl or idcvtlfie our Notions which arc the Terms of a Propofition :^ nor can they do this^ any more than they can trame a Judgment, that is, Judge^ or K710W. We mzy fa77cy too, that they recurd our Thoughts, which otherwifc would be loft: Tis true, that after we have agreed {uchlVords (hould fiirnifie fuch Tbinzi in our Mind, thev have an order to one another, and do ordinarily c-wf fo- ^fi^/j^' into our Thoughts^ and fothc Word infers the Thing • but 10 do.s the Ti'htg infer the Word too, to which W'C, by our Agreement of its Sig- nilication, do relate it 3 and, ol the two, the IVord is (boner losl out of the Memory, and more needs a Recorder^ than the Notion does j efpecial- ly, when our Memory is of Connechd Scnjt, Hpw often do we remember very well the 5fw/f of aii Author we have read, and yet cannot at all call ro mind his IVords / Myfelf, when i was^^yw/;^, had JVords^ and great Variety of them, at !ny Tongue's i:nd^ my F:>:prcnion w.^ Cf^u/r^, drA If 4 Florida 456 Solid rhilofophy AJferted. Florid^ and now I am c/^and part my Autunm, mv ftile is dry j and the Flovers and Leagues fzll off, when the Fruit is rlpe-y and tho' I ftill retain and incre^fe my flock of Thcughts^ 1 have loft that Multiplicity and Choice of Words I had formerly. But, I mud complain that it is a great Injury to that Excellent and moft Ufeful Science, [ Logick ] •U'hich treats of the Operations of our Under fland- ing, and of the way how to manage them, to make it nothing but the DcBrine of Signes^ or Words ; and to pretend it has its Name thence. As if KoyQr (^id not f]gnify Ratic^ and Uerhum mentis^ aS properly as it does Vox-^ and >^o-)4m far more often [ Rationalis^ ] than it does Scrmone tttens. But, above all, I am fure, w ^oj'jcm is never found to iignify the Jrt or DcBrine of Words^ but the i^rt ofDifcourJIvg or Reafcn'ing. 20. 1 cannot but think that the Subordination of Sciences^ is as Ufeful and Neceflary The Connatural roay to be known, as th eir Diw/o^ Or u'^hY'vMed Piftinc^ion,in Philofophy ; they be- Ld Subordinat- ^"g ^^'^ ^^^^ Kno'W ledge of Things^ ed. taking this laft word in its largeft knk^ as it Comprehends Rem and Mcdvim ret. Alfo every Notion being the Thing inadequately conceiv'd, and having a kind of Difiincl Nature peculiar 10 it felf in our Minds 3 and all Sciences ( they being Diftindl and nor Confuftd Know^lcdges,) having, confequently, for their Object, the Thing as thus Diilindly or In- adequately confider'd, (by which Objefe they are Specify d and Dtfringuijin 3 ) it follows, that there may be as many Sciences as we have fuch Diftinci Notions of the Thing • and that each of them is got by looking more penetratively into thofe Difiinti , • Na- \ Refles^tcn Twenty Second. ^^5-7 Nntures'm oui" Mind, or DlfllnH- Notiovs: Science being in realiry nothing bur Defcanrs ( as it were ) on thofe NctJons, and grounded entirely on their Metaphylical Verity. Whence follows llkewife that the Subordination of Sciences is grounded on this, that thofe Notions ( their Ohje^h) arc Sukr- Ainate:, or that onc of them is were Ujut-erfal Or General, others more VarticuUr. To inftance^ The HiJi;heft Science in the Line of that General Notion we call Suhfiancc^ is that which treats of the Supre7}je Genus^ Or of Ens as Ens^ and of what belongs to it as fuch ; and this we call Mttaphyficks or Tranf-natural Knowledge. The iniediate Notion under Ens is Corpus , and this is the Object of NaturJ Philofophy, or Thyficks, Next under That isVi'vens'^ which (as its Obie6l) Conditutes the Science or Knowledge o^ Ll^oingThings., and what belongs to them as fach. Under that is Animal^ which is the Object of the Science that treats of Senfiti'ue Things, as they sre Senfiti've^ and of what appertains to them, as they are fuch. The Loweft of our Notions in that Line, which are in any degree Common or General, is that of Homo 3 which treats of Humane Nature., of its Operations proper to M/w, as Man 3 and Chiefly of his Primary Operation Reafo?iing 3 and then, the Science which fhows how to order thofe Ope- rations right that belong to his Underfianding., is Logick 3 as that Science which fliows how to or- der thofe Operations right that belong to his Will, is calfd Ethicks. Loivcr than this, Science pro- ceeds not 3 Individuals., by reafon of the Com- plexion of Innumerable Accidents that Conftitutes them, not being knowable to us, as fuch., fo as to give us Exadl Knowledge of their Singularities. Co;;cllarj(» 45 S Solid Thilofophy Afferted. Corollary I. From what's faid it appears j that Mr. Locke s two Firft Branches soms "jery ufeful fall into onc. For his Firft Corollaries co^r- i^^^^^h being [ T/je Knowledp-e of cermng that Sub'" ,7-, . j ^ ^ . j . ^ J j^fi Ibings as they are m their own pro- per Beings^ their Confiittitions^ Pro- ferries and Operations ] and his fecond, 'uiz,. Ethicksy naving for its Object the Operations of Mans Will j and Logicky tlie Operations of his Under ft andingy which proceed from him as Mait^ ( all Outward Actions that proceed not from his Interiour Knowledge and WiUy being meerly Animal-^ ) it follows that Ethicksy which is his Second Branchy is coincident with his Firft. For Man is a Things and has a Troper Being of his own, and his Under- fiandlng and Will are his Froperties , and their Op- erations are his Operations. Corollary II. Each of the Subordinant Sci- ences deduces Conclufions about its Proper Ob- ject : Which, tho' Concluiions there^ are the Principles to the immediately Inferiour or Sub- ordinate Science : fo that none can know cxadly what Homo is, who is fitch an Animal^ if he be Ig- norant what Animal is j Nor what Animal^ which is fuch a Living Body, is, if he knows not what iJ^ing Body is ; Nor what Living Bodjy which is i'ltch a Body, is, if he knows not what Body is; Nor, what Body^ which is fuch an Ens^ is, if he knows nor what Ens or Thing is. Corollaay \\\: Hence is leen evidently, how Neceflary, and according to Nature it is, that chofe Notions which are moft Unl^erfal^ fliould be moft kmwahle or Clear ^ in regard the Inferi- our ones cannot be known but by them y and thai being moft Clear^ they muft ( as was often /howii above ).bc alfo mofl Sir>iple. CqvoIL Reflexion Twenty. Second. '459 Corollary, IV. Hencc is fccn alfo how all Sci- encis converfant about our Gradual Notions m the Line of Suhflance (and the ilime holds in all the other Lines ) come to be connaturally Subor- illnaie tO thofe which have a Stiferiot4Y Notion for their Ohjecl • and hew Ferfefl Knowledge or Skill in the Inftrkur Sciencc, is Vnattainabk without Knowledge or Skill in tht Simper i our. Corollary V. Hence is demonftratcd, that Me- taphyficks is abfolutely the Higbeft Science ^ and that, without Knowledge or Skill in ity none caa ferfeBly underhand the Inferiour Sciences^ fo as tO reiolve them into their F/rfiy and mofi Eijidtnt Vrincifles, CorolUiry VL And, fince the Gft^tsr Qlcarmfs of that Notion^ which is the Qbje& of zxiy Sci- ence, gives a greater Qearncfs and Evidence to the Science it ielf j and the Greater Charnefs of a- ny Notion arifes from its being ;;; pre Simf^-^ and the TTJore General they are, the were Simfie thc^ are ; and the Notion of Ens is Evidently more General than all the reft : It follows demonftra- tively that the Science of Metapbyjtcksy which treats of Ens as E«/, is the mofi- Clear of any 0- thers j and, in the Highefi Decree, Evident ; and that they who think othervvife do guide them- felves by Fancy, to which fuch very Abftraft No- tions arc Unfuirable. Corollary VIL And, fince Evidence dctcrmins our Underftanding to Ajfent, and therefore Cer- tainty which is the Determination of our Judg- ing Power, follows Evidence as its Proper Caufe - it follows, that, as no Inferiour Science can be EVi- dent without Knowledge in Aietaphyficks, fo nei- ther can our Knowledge of any of them be per- fdUy, "^60 Solid Phzlofophy AJferteJ, 8cc, fe^tly^ (or in the Higbefi Degree J Certaw^ but by virtue of It^ or of fuch Maxims, or Firfi Trinci^les^ as belong to It. Corollary^ VIII. The fame Difcourfe that is made here of Ohje5ls fatind in the Line of Ens^ and their proper Sciences j may be made and have Equal force in the Objects belonging to all the Lines of Accidents^ and the Sciences Proper to them. Corollary laft. Hence the Dodrine of Words is no part of Philofophjy taking them as aparted from our Notions , becaufe it has neither for its Objeft, Rem nor Modum rei -^ nor any thing found zw Nature^ Or Belonging to it j fince Words are meerly Signes^ appointed by our Voluntary De~ fignation^ to aifift US in Communicating our Con- ceptions to others, which can be no part of the Knowledge of Things or true Vhilofophy j Words be- ing neither Simple nor Complex, Adequate or In- adequate Ndtions, nor in any Manner taken from the Things thewfelves. FINIS. THE CONTENTS Preliminary Firfl. J^ $ 1. ThtUfmg the word [Idea] /;; diffaratc Senfes oblirkth the way to Science, 3 . Vhilofcph'ical ITords generally ufed^ not to he laid afide without great Necejfity j much lefs changed for Others lefs p-oper. 4. Mr.h.'s Accept ion of the word\\At2i\very Am- biguous, 5. The Ambiguity of it not clear'd by him, 7. The pitting Brutes to have Knowledge ajjociates them with ^lankind. 8. The First Confideratic?i pre-reqnir d^ ere we ought to think that Brutes know. 9. The Second Co?jfideratio?i pre-recjuird, I o. That our felvcs both ajleep and awake^doy with- out Knowledg, perfrm as jlrange Operations a. Brutes do, 1 1 . The Refemblance of Rcafon in feme Actions 0/ Brutes, no Argument of their Knowledge. 12. Brutes hai;e Phantafnis, hut no Notions or Meanings. §12.. Ideas The CONTENTS. 5 13. Ideas, if net Spiritual Notions, InexpILahle. 14. Experience thar we have Ideas gi-ves no Di- JtinQ Accaunt 7vhat they are. Nor the fay'mg, they are Refemblances. 1^, To have Ideas of our 0^;? Ideas inexplicable. 1 6. No Operation^ External or Interna ly begins front the Soul alone, 1 7. Mr. L. not only, nor diredlly opposed by this Difcourfe. '" 18. To ground all Knowledge on Ideas not difiin- gniflj' d from Phantafms, makes Science Impof- fibkc Preliminary Second, S I . ^ [ ^Hat the Elements or Materials of our KnoM^ JL ledge are properly to be called NOTIONS^ I. The word Notion ^nd Cognition are taken here objeftively. 3. What Notions are, 4. Fancy is to have no hand in difcourjing about Spiritual Conceptions. 5f. The Que/lion about Notions Jlated, 6. A Notion is the Thing it felf in eur Under- fianding. Proof I. Becaufe Knowing is an Immanent Acl. 7. Proof 2. Becaufe the Thing known mujt be in cur Knowing Tower, 5. Proof J. Becaufe aKQitmhhinCtTs not the OO' je61: of our Knowledge, norfuffici-ent focaufe it, 9. Otherwife Ideas only could be faidto be Known, 10. Proof |. Becaufe otherTVife all Philofopli/ would be dtftroyM. I I . Proof $: . Becaufe Similitudes cannot fofftblj give m the Firft Knowledge of Tbif^s, % \i. Ai The CONTENTS. §11. y4s way pro'v'J formerlj. 13. Proof 6. Becatife ire we can know the Idea re- fcmbles the Th'in^ righr, both of them mujt be in the Mind, to be there comfard. 1 4. Proof 7. BeCiUife both the Correlates mujl be in the Underflamimg, Proof ^). Becdufe the Prototype mufi be firft known. i^. Proof 9. Becaufe the Notions are what's meant by IVords. 16. Proof 10. Becaufe^ when fZ^e Thing it felf /x intended to be ?nade known^ the Ho'ing it felt ts the FWH Meanings or what s firfl: meant by tbc words, 1 7. Proof 1 1 . Becaufe the Ideas cannot be fore- known to our Agreement what the IVords are to fignificy /'///■ r/?^ Things only. Hence the Que/Hon^ whether the Things or cur Notions^ areimmcdhtdy fignified by VVords^ js frivolous. ^ 18. Proof II. From the Verification of FropoJI-^ tioMs. 1 9. Proof 1 3. Becaufe what's perfeftly Like js the Same. 10. Proof 14. This lafi Reafon maintain d by the Infiance of the Notion o/Exiftence. 2 I . Proof I ^ . The fame Reajon abetted by the Na- tural Sayings of Mankind. 11, The Difference in r^e Manner of Exifting pre- judices not the Identity of the Notion and the Thing. 13. Ti:t F.m'.mncy of the Spiritual Nature of thz Soul g.vcs her a tower to be all Things Intel- le^ttidlly^ $ 24. Sown The CONTENTS. § 24. Shewn that Things may have tWO Different Manners of Exiting. 25^. A^(? Solid Vhilofophy can he httilt c?» Ideas. z6. What Knowledge js. Preliminary JhirJ. § I . \ ^ OhjeSiion againft the ToJJihility of the j^X Whole Thing being in cur Mind. 2. Some Notes premised to clear thjs OhjeBion, 5. Oifr Knowledge is fuch as our Notions are. 4. We can have fuch a Notion of a Thin^ (or Ef- fence) as diftinguifhcs it fro?n ail other Things. 5. Confufed Notions fuffice for a Remote Ground of Science. 6. Only Di(tin6t or Abftra6led Notions arc rZ^e Im- mediate Ground of DifiinB Knoivledge^or Science, 7. Science thus grounded, ts truly callcdihc Know- ledge of the Thing. 8. AbfiraBed Ideas^ tho* Exclufive of one another, do Include or connotate the Thing. 9. This Point farther explicated and enfcrc d. 10. Arg. i,Trovd.,hecaufe AhftraBed Notiom^ if Eilential, do evidently include the Thing, 11. Arg. 2. Trovdy betaufe all Modes do' the fame. 12. Arg. 3. As having no Being of their own. 13. This makes, or iliews Philofophy to be the Knowledge of Things. i^.. Hence Ariftotle expreffcs the Modes or Acci- dejits by Concrete Vf^crds. This Point elucidated by AbftraB and Concrete Words. 15. Plence Space vithcut Body^ cr VaCUUm, is a Contradiction, Prelim The contents: Preliminary Fourth. 5 I. TJoe State of the Quefiio?t. I, Ariftotlc 7jegktU tojhew f articular Ij how Know* ledge is made. 3. Later Fhilofophers ivcre at a great Puzzle about it, 4. Hov^ the Schools explicated tljis Point. 5. How the Ideifts behaved themfelves of to this Point. 6. How far the Author engages to clear this Diffi" culty. 7. The FirH Caufe carries en the Courfe of Second Caufes by Immediate Diipofitions. 8. And^ therefore^ he affifts Nature^ z/ difpos'd, •when it Cannot reach. 9. Therefore, if the Mattered;; be dKpos'd for a Rational Soul, God will give it. I o. There can be fuch a Difpo/ition in Matter. II. Therefore, fome M2itci'h\ Parr, by which im-^ mediately the Soul has Notions from the ObjeBs. 12. Therefore Effiuviums are ftnt from Bodies to that Part. 13. Therefore Man is truly One Thing, which is Corporec-Spiritual. 14. Therefore /owe Chief Part i?i himvfhich is pri- marily Corporeo-Spiritual, or has both thofe Na-* tures in it. I 5. Which is ajfccled according to both thofe Na^ tures, becaufe o/f/je/r IdcntitiCation in that pari. 1 6. The peculiar Teynper of that Part co7ijifls In In- ditferency. 17. That Part 'Very tender and Senjibkj yet notTe-^ naiioitSi G g 5 i^.Thfit the CONtENTS. § 1 8 . That Tart the moft Noble of all Material Nature, 19. Tirhaps 'tis Reflexive of Lights or Luc'ld. 20. The 'Effi.mmms have z?; thc?n the Nature of the Bodies 71'hence they are fe??t. 2 1 . They offeH that Part^ as Thi7Jgs Diftin(5l from the Man. 2,2. Vl^hy they hn print AhftraB Notions, 23. The peculiar Nature of our Soul renders thofc Notions perfeBly DifiinB^ and Indiviflble. 24. Whence Complex- Notions come, 25. The Soul camiot^ alone, produce any new y^5 in her felf , 16, But by the PhantafmS exciting her a-new. 27. How Reminifccnce is made, 2^. Memory and Reminifccnce Inexplicahlcy unlefs Rhantafms remain in the Brain, The Aianner how Reminifccnce is made in BruteS. 29. Hiw Reflexion is connaturally made. 30. Dirc-6l Notions are Common to all Ma-nkind^ and their /Fcrr/i Proper j Reflex ones, Improper j and their V/ords Metaphorical. 3 1 . Whence we come to have Negative Notions, 32. But thofe Negative Notions do not ahfira^l from the Subjeft. 33. How we come to have a Notion &^rrt'>v/ [Accidents] is hn^rcpn-. G g 1 ^ij.The The CONTENTS. $ 17. The Word [Modes] more Frcfer. 18. The Word [ Qliantity ] is 'very Froper. 1 9. The Word [Extenfion ] 'very Improper. io, Tlje Meaning of D\v\{\h\Y\iY^ Impenetrability, Space, and Meafurability. ri. A Jliort Explication^ what Quantity, Quality, and Relation are. 11. /^r/j^t Tranfcendenrs /rrf. ^3. The five Sorts of Tranfcendents, 24. Great Care to he had^ that Tranfcendent Words he not held Univocal. 15. What great Err ours Jj)ring thence^ fljejvn in the Univocal Accepion of the Tranfcendent Word [ Compounded. ] i6. TIk Cartefians Unadvifed in going ultra Cre- pidam. Reflexion Firjl. § I . ^ I ^ HE Excellent Wit^ and Jjnhyafs d Ingentii- 1 ty of the Author of the Eflay acknowledg J, 2. *Tis prohahle he has taken a Prejudice againff Metaphyficks. 5. The Inccmparahle Excellency of the Science of Metafhyjicks^ fiiewnfrcm the Objects it treats of, 4. A?id from the Manner, hy which it handles them, 5. The knowledge of thefe High OhjeHs Attainahh hy Natural Reafon. 6. Mr. Locke' J Teriet of no Innate Ideas, Solidly Grou7ided^ and Unanjwerahle. Reflexion SecmjJ, § I . TT JV what the Author agrees^ and difagreesy X "^^'i^l^ ^r. Locke. %. We may have Nctions^ withoHt perceiving wa have them, § 3. Ws The CONTENTS. §^. We may think, without being Confcious that we think. 4. '77j Iwpojp.hle to he Confcious, cr know we know, vithout a new Acl 0/ Reflexion. 5. '7// impojflble to he Confciorts of^ or know, cur prefent Reflex AH^ hut by a new Reflex one. Hence^ we can never come to know our Lafl Re- flexion. 6. ^Tis utterly deny d that Coyifcioufnefs caufes Jndi^' ^'iduation. The Unreafonah!e7iefs of the Opipion^ that A'len do always think. Reflexion Third. § I . ']VT O Notion Simple, hut that o/[Exi(lcnce.] J^^ TJ:e Order of our Notions Is to be taken from Nature. 2. 7^f 5/*W [Solidity] arbitrarily and ahufively taken by Mr. Locke. 5. His Solidity not at all Effential to Body. 4. Space without Body, or Vacuum, is a mecr Groundltfs Fancy. 5'. The Contrary to that Tenet demonfirated. 6» Therefore *tls imfojfihle there jJwuld be any True Experiment to prove a Vacuum. Reflexion Fourth, § I. TV /Tl?. Locke'/ First Chapter commendable. JLvX § ^' Privative Notions ccnnotale the Subjeft. 2. Afe^r Motions made upon the Senfcsy Infuffjclcnt to give us Knowledge of the Objech. 4. S^nfi\>kQualfties are the fame in the Objecls, ris- in the M.m(i. ' Og 3 ^<;.V:e The CONTENTS. ! §5. The Vrctence of God's Voluntary Annexing Im^ proper Canfes to EjfeBs^ is Unphilofofhical. 6. Tie Power in the Ohjeci to catife Senfation and KnovAedge^ /j improperly ///Jj. Reflexion Fifth. $ I . T Dcas or Notions are wofAdlual PerCTptionS,^^ ^ the ObiecSl percciv'd,^«^ durably remaining. It dcjlroys the Nature 0^ Memory jfo make it con^ fifi in the Reviving Ideas, The Mind cannot rcvi've Perceptions. 1 . Ideas in the Fancy way fade 5 hut Notions are never blotted cut of the Soul. Reflexion Sixth. § I . ^ F Brutes can kiiOW, they may ha've General 1^ Notions^ andi\h^XX2idiand Com^ZrQtoo, 1. Jhe Diftinguifhing cur Notions guides our Rea^ fen and ^judgment right. 3 . AH Complex Ideas or Notions muH conJiH of Simpler ones^ united in the Thing. 4.. Otherwife^ they are GronndleJ^ Fancies. ^. The Manner how aH Complex Ideas or NotijLns ar,e made^ elaborately explain d. 6. Hcvj the DoBrine (?/ CartefiiV", vWr. Lockc, avd J. S. differ^ as to this Feint. Refled:icn Severuh. §1. X?XrenfiOn, not well Explicated. XL Immcnfity, li^crfc. r, PLlce, well Explicated. 3, Body and Extenjiony not the fame Notion. § 4. Space The CONTENTS. §4. Space cannot bi' oj^itfjout Extcnlion. 5. Exte?ifion ^ml Space differ oncly Formall)', or in fome nice re/pecL 6. Tloe Common Explication of Exte?7fon defcvdeiL 7. Ens adequately d^'vidal into Body and Spirit. 8. Vacuum muH either he Res, or Modus Rci j otherwife^ we can haue no Noticyi of it. ^. The Extra'vagant Arguments for V 'dCUUmre fated, 10. VFe can fct Bounas to Space^ Time^ and to all Durations but (iPoD's. 11. Annihilation implies a Contradiclicn ^ and is not an Aci of Om^ji potency^ but of Impotency. 1 2. The Cartcfians can hardly nevoid Vacuum. 13. The halving an Idea 0/^' Vacuum, difiinci from that (?/ Plenum, no Argument to pro've it. Reflexion Eighth. plain Se?7fe of the \ true Notion of Time. § I . np^ HE plain Se?7fe of the Vulgar gives us the 2. Duration is not SuccefEon, hut rather Oppofite to it. J. '77/ a (Irange Paradox to fay^ the Notion of Suc- - cefTion or Duration is to be taken from the Train of Ideas in our Mind. 4. Our not perceiving Duration when we- Sleeps no Argument for it, 5:. This Tenet is again fl Experience, 6. And^ againsl the Nature of Thing^Sy andofRc- femblances too. 7. 0?ie Motion^ if Known and Regular, may^ and muFi be a Meafure to another. 5. There is no Shtw of Reafcn^ 'that the Equality of the Periods of Duration can pojfibly be taken from the Train of our Ideas. . ;x 9 , Tins oddTenet notpofti%ely ajjertcd by ilfr Locke. Gg^ Re-* \. V The CONTENTS, Reflexion Ninth. § I . "VMaginary Time h(fcre the Wcrldy a meer lU J^ luficn of Fancy. i. They who ad-vance Tenets againft Nature, mufl; alter the Meaning of thcfe VVords that exprefs our Natural Notions. J . (Botl^s Immcnfity not Commenfurate to an Infi- nitely Expanded SpzCC. 4.. Vl^e can have no Notion of a Vacuum, hut a Fancy onely, 5, Scripture-Texts the^oxft. fort of Arguments for Thilofophers^ unlef they he mo ft Plain, and Lite- rally meant, 6, Owf /y Sdf-Exiftence, and what fows from that Notion^ is peculiar to dBoD* 7, Our Natural Notions ajjure usy that ^tis meer Fancy to explicate (BoO's Attributes by rej^e^ ta Corporeal Natures, Reflexion Tenth. § I. T?Ndlefs Addition of Numbers can never give r J us the Notion of Inanity. 1 . How wc cGfne to have that Notion. •5. Arid with what Eafe. 4. The Notion of [Infinite] is mofi perfcBly Pofitive. 5. Duration eafly conceivable without Succeflion. Reflexion Eleventh. § r. r"T^Houghts are not to he <:^ W Senfations. JL §i- Thinking is the AfXiony and not th^ f^ftQXlCQfiftheSouL The CONTENT S. § 3. Mr. Locke's Vojhion^ that m?:gs are Good or Evil ovely in reference to Pjcafurc or Pain, is True and SoLiL Reflexion Twelfth, §1. f I ^ HE due Commendation of Mr. Lockc'j \ DoHrlne^ in this Chapter of Power. z. That Jome Spiritual Agent is the Firfl Mover of Bodies. The Will cannot movt our Bodies. 3 . The Vnderftandi-ng and Will not Diftinft V ewers. 4. Man s Freedom, or Self-Determination^ dcdu^ ced from Principles. ^. The Difference between Men ^?;^BrutCS, In their Determination to Aclion. 6. Man naturally purfues what is accordipg to Reafon, or Virtuous. Therefore his Nature has been perverted fince his Creation. 7, Therefore Supernatural Mofrjes are added^ ta ftrengthcn Mans Weaken' d Nature^ or Reafon. 8, Supernatural Motives hei?jg the Stronger, would always prevail^ were they duely apply'd to a Subject difpofed. 9. Why the Under flanding and Will muB be the fame Tower Subftantiaily. I o. How to Conquer in c«r Spiritual Warfare. 1 1 . 'Tis evident that Man Determins himfelf te ABion : II. Tet., /T^fPre-determin'd ^jCBoD* 13. Determination to Virtuoi/s Aclion does perfe<5^, and not deflroy Freedom. 14. Good, if evidently appearing fuchy does rer^ tainlj Determin the Will. 1 5 . How Wrong Jitdg7m7iti come... The CONTENTS. 5 i(^. Sin generally Jprings from True, btft DiiprO- portionate Judgments. 17. Of Unealinels^ and Mr, Lodce'^ Dlfcoitrfe concerning it, 1 8. Good is the onely Determiner of the Willy and not Uneafinef, i^, Tro'v d from our Natural Defre of Happinefs. 20, 77:>e Appearance of Good is o/Greateft Weight; hut^ in a manner^ difregardcd by Mr. Locke. II. Tutting this Appearance, his Reafcns do not conclude. 22. Frovdy hecaufeE^ih is 7}ot the PQrfcQion of a Soul, 1^. The Truth of this Voint flated^ 24. Mr. Locke omits here the Idea of Power tO be ■ a Thing, tho'Nsituice fuggefis and forces it. Reflexion Thirteenth. % I. f^^^ Mixture of our Notions is Regular ; V^ Mr. Locke* J, Irregular, and Difordcrly. r. Without knowiJig what Subftance or Thing /V, we cannot pretend to Vhilofofhy, 3. All cur Notions^ and^ amcngFi them^ that f?/'Sub- ftance, or Res, is taken fv-Qm the Thing. 4. We cannot he Ignorant of the Notion of Suh- fiancey * or Thing. 5. We know the more Inferiour Notions of Things lefs perfedtly. And^ Individual Eflence, the leafl of all. 6. To gain a Diflinct Notion ofSubfiance,^ or Thifjg,, we muf confider it abftraftedly fom its Modcsy fingly Confider d. 7. The Literal Truths how Subflance and its Accl- dmtsy or the Thing and its Modes, are exaBly known. §8, '7/4^ The CONTENTS. § 8. '7/i imfojjihk not to hmw Extcnfion, ;/ he'in^ in a manner^ Self-evident. 9. The Cohcfion of Extended Varts is above Phy^ ileal Vroofs^ and can cnely he known by Mcta- phyiicks. 10. IVbence^ "'tis in v.iin to feek for Natural V.^-^ cknt Caufes for thofe Ejfetls that depend on For- mal Caitfes. 11. We may have Clear Knowledge of Spiritual Natures by Reflexion. II. The Reafon why, and the Manner how. Reflexion Fourteenth. § I. rnpHE M/wJalone does not collefl Notions^ JL or compare them. 2. Verbal Relations come not from DefiB in our Language, butforwantofaKcalGwimd, 3. /r/(?^r Caufality /V, and what Grounds the Rela- tions of Caufe and Eff ed", 4. The Kncjiung the Principle of Individuation 7mifi antecede the Knowledge of Identity and Di^ verfity. 5:. What gives the Ground to fpecifie all Notions. 6. What gives the Ground to ottr Notions of the In- dividuum. 7. How Individual Men are confiituted. 8. Exiftence cannot foffibly he the Principle of Indi- viduation. 9. The Outward Circumflances of Time and Place ca?jnct conduce to COnftitUte the Individual Ef fence. JO, An Individual Man ;x formally an Individual Thing of that Kind., and an Individual Perfon too^ -t $11. Tl^i The CONTENTS. fi r lo TJje EiTence of Things not to he taken from the Judgment cf the Vulgar , nor from Extravagant Suppofitions, II. Confcioufnefi cafinot conftitute Pcrfonal Iden- ' tity: 1 3 . That ConfcioufneJIis Infeparable from e^verj In- dividual Man, 14. Tet Angels^ who are pure ASs, are Conflittited in party by the JSlofKiK^mng themfelves. 15. JSfo Soul 7 J Indifferent to any Matter. The Notion of the Individuum is Eflential. The Suhfiance is the fame^ tho fome Quantity of the Matter Joes come and o-o. i> Reflexio^i Fifteenth. Si. ' I "^Hat is cwf/y True Virtue, oi^hich is ajcor- X ^^^g ^^ Right Reafon. 2. How we come to have Confus'd Ideas, (?r Na- tions. 3. The Whole Thi-ng^ as it neecjs not^ fo it CannOj: he known ckSivly, 4. The Metaphyfical Reafon why this Complexion of Accidents^ which confiitutes Individuums, J/;o«/^ be almofi infinitely Various. 5. We can Sufficiently know Things without Com- frehending fillly this Complsxion, 6. No Forjual Truth or Faljhood in Ideas or No-^ '" tions. Reflexion Sixteenth. $ '• 1[7^T Hence Proper is Clearer than thofe cf Particular Tropofitions, 6* Such General Maxims are never ufed to deduCe Conclufions from them^ hut to reduce Infer tour Truths to them, 7. The Abfolute NeceJJity o/Firfl: Principles AJJerted. 5. How other General Maxims do govern all cur Adlions and Sayings. 9. The Difcarding General Maxljps deftroys all Science, The CONTENTS. T^jis Errour Jf)rino^s from Mt:n s taking Wrong Mcafures, in ju^ghig what Notions are Clear, and what Con fa fed. §10. That not General Aiaxiins^ hut their Auufe^ breeds Danger to Science. 11. His hijrance^ th.it General Maxims are fit to prove Con traditions, ^lews he quite mifhikes the Notion of Body. 12. Ideifm is the GenuinTarent of ^mhwd^idw in Vhilnfovhy. 13. Identical Prcpc/itions not to be ridicufd. 14. The Right Way how to life them -^ and that Air. Locke hlmjelf does.^ end mufi rely upon them. 15. Neither Ideas w^r Names fj« /'^ Predicate, cr Subjefl: , but the Thing it Jtlf as cCfKeizi'd by tfs^ in whole, or in parr. 16. Mr.Lockts 7jew lnftra6live Way is utterly Infignificant. 17. That the Signification of Words is the Mean- ing of them • their Meaning ts our Notion 3 /zw^ 6///r Notion ts the Thing. Reflexion Twoisieth. §1. 1 "^Nverfals musi relate to the Exifiertce they \Ji, ha^e in the Mind. %. To put any Knowledge in Brutes^ is againfl the Nature of Things^ and Implicatory. 3. Mr. Locke confounds Material and Spiritual. • Natures. 4. Mr. Locke'j Principles confound Humane and Brutal Natures. S' To Create, is the Peculiar Ejfecl of Seif-Exi- ftence. |i 6, The Thought cannot m^ue the Body j a7td why. \ Hh ^I'TIh The CONTENTS. f 7, The Not'icn cr Nature of the Deity being once fet- lid to he Self-Exiftence, all that can he [aid of it follows Di'moijftrati'vcly. 8, Ji'c ca7i know there are Angels^ iho they do not operate c;; ///. 9. We know at frft our own Exijlence^ in the fame wajmer as we knew the Exijhnce c/^other Things j \. c. hy Senfation, and not by Intuition. I o. No Improvement of Science^ without fome Ge- neral Principles. Mr. Locke'-f Vrinciplcs examind. J I. j\lr. Loc\€s Main Principle; which is to afccrtain all other Frinciplcs, Inevidcnt. II. JVhat Things hinder the Adz'pncement of Science, i;. Euclid, and fuch others., 7iot hlaweahle for lay- iv^g Principles, or Gt:neral Maxims. Reflexion Twenty Firji, '§r. npH£ Point fiated. X §^- A/r. Locke confounds Outward A-^ c^ion, to which we may proceed upon a Proha- bility ; with Inward Affcnt/^ which we may not. ^. A itrano,'" Character of our Judging Faculty. 4. That (j^c> has provided due Motives of En- join d j-i, cat to all AIanki?idy if they he not want^ ivg to tLcmfcl'ues. ^ ^. To AiTent upon a Probability, is againfi the Cor^^ moneji Light of Reafon. 6.. There canned he, in Proper Speech^ any Degrees ' of AfJent. J. Prob 'what to Divine Revela- tion. The Firfi Caution to he obfervd^ in order to this To int. 9. The Second Caution to be ufed in this Toint. 10. Riafon not to be rely'd on in Things beyond its Sphere. ir. The Not i en of [is True,] mujf be difiinguijlj'd from the Notion 6/ [may be True, or may not be True.] 11. Therefore^ that 710 Ajfent ought. to he built upon Probable Mediums, is Demonfrrahk. 1 3 . All Err our crmes by Afj'/nting upcn Probabilities. 14. 71)e Tenet that we ought to Ajjcnt u^on Proba- bility, js highly Prejudicial ta Piety, and to befi phriilian Morality, The CONTENTS. ^15--. To ^f ply our fehes to the Right Method ta fnd cut Truth and Science, is the cnely Antidote again ft ElTOUr. j6, NoToJJlbleWay^ /.p.439* inntrajl, p.45 1. 1. 1 2,1 3. Probable the next j perhaps im^robabU, -[ 1 ^-ii.<''—n-~<^^ ^T=^ I ^4 V. _, 0" i ,- •■ ■« .i^v '--#