S.V,-- 
 
 'm,/- c^/^^^l 
 
 6^z^-c^- 
 
 
 2^ 
 
 
 
 »ir\^ 
 
 ^r^ 
 
 
 r^ 
 
 
 et»«?--5>03'^—::>3©' 
 
 ji PRINCETON. N. J. \ 
 
 1) Case, Division... . J 
 
 ^•^''^'V,,, I 
 
 . sod 
 /a 44 X 
 
 w 
 

li .' j^\\' -^ 
 
 > 
 
LOGIC K: 
 
 O R, 
 
 The Right Ufe of REASON 
 
 I N T H E 
 
 Encluiry after TRUTH. 
 
 WITH 
 
 A Variety of Rules to guard againft Err or ^ 
 
 in the Affairs of Religion and 
 
 Human Life, as well as 
 
 in the Sciences. 
 
 By ISAAC WATTS, D. D. 
 
 The Eighth Edition, Corrcded. 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 Printed for T. Longman, and T. Shewell, 
 in Pater-noJler-roWy and J. Brackstone, in 
 CornhilL 
 
 M,DGC,XLV, 
 
TO 
 
 Sir John Hartopp, Bar'* 
 
 Sir, 
 
 IT is fit the Publick fliould receive 
 thro' your Hands what was writ- 
 ten originally for the Afiiftance of 
 your younger Studies, and was then 
 prefented to you. 
 
 It v/as by the repeated Importuni- 
 ties of our Learned Friend Mr. John 
 Eames^ that I was perfuaded to revile 
 thefe Rudbnents of Logick ; and when 
 ' had once fuffered myfelf to begin 
 .he Work, I was drawn ftill onward 
 ar beyond my firft Defign, even to 
 i :he Negleft, or too long Delay of other 
 ( prefTmg and important Demands that 
 were upon me. 
 
 It has been my Endeavour to forn> 
 
 every Part of this Treatife both for the 
 
 A 2 Inftru^c- 
 
D E D ICAtI N. 
 
 Inftru6tion of Students to open their 
 Way into the Sciences, and for the 
 more extenfive and general Service of 
 Mankind, that the Ge72tleman and the 
 Chrijlian might find their Account in 
 the Perufal as well as the Scholar. I 
 have therefore collected and propofed 
 the chief Principles and Rules of right 
 Judgment in Matters of common and 
 facred Importance, and pointed out 
 our moft frequent Miftakes and Preju- 
 dices in the Concerns of Life and Re- 
 ligion, that we might better guard 
 againft the Springs of Error, Guilt and 
 Sorrow, which furround us in every 
 State of Mortality. 
 
 You know, Sir^ the great Defign of 
 this noble Science is to refcue our rea- 
 foning Powers from their unhappy Sla- 
 very and Darknefs ; and thus v/ith all 
 due Submiflion and Deference it offers 
 a humble Affiftance to divine Reve- 
 lation. Its chief Bufinefs is to relieve 
 the natviral Weakneffes of the Mind by 
 feme better Efforts of Nature j it is to 
 
 diffufe 
 
DED ICAriO N. 
 
 diffufe a Light over the Underftanding 
 in our Enquiries after Truth, and not 
 to furnifli the Tongue with Debate and 
 Controverfy. T^rue Logick is not that 
 noify Thing that deals all in Difpute 
 and Wrangling, to which former Ages 
 had debafed and confined it ; yet its 
 Difciples muft acknowledge alfo, that 
 they are taught to vindicate and defend 
 the Truth, as well as to fearch it out. 
 True Logick doth not require a long 
 Detail of hard Words to amufe Man- 
 kind, and to puff up the Mind with 
 empty Sounds, and a Pride of falfe 
 Learning ; yet fome Diftindions and 
 Terms of Art are neceffary to range 
 every Idea in its proper Clafs, and to 
 keep our Thoughts from Confufion. 
 The World is now grown fo wife as 
 not to fuffer this valuable Art to be 
 engrofled by the Schools. In fo polite 
 and knowing an Age, every Man of 
 Reafon will covet fome Acquaintance 
 with Logick^ fmce it renders its daily 
 Service to TVifdom and Virttie^ and to 
 A 3 the 
 
DEDICATION. 
 
 the Affairs of common Life as well as 
 to the Sciences. 
 
 I will not prefume, Sir^ that this 
 ^little Book is improved fince its firft 
 Compofure, in Proportion to the Im- 
 provements of your manly Age. But 
 when you Ihall pleafe to review it in 
 your retired Hours, perhaps you may 
 refreih your own Memory in fome of 
 the early Parts of Learning : And if 
 you find all the additional Remarks 
 and Rules made fo familiar to you al- 
 ready by your own Obfervation, that 
 there is nothing new among them, it 
 will be no unpleafing Refledion that 
 you have fo far anticipated the prefent 
 Zeal and Labour of, 
 
 SIR, 
 
 Tour mafl faithful and 
 
 obedient Servant, 
 
 London^ Aug. 24. 
 1724. 
 
 I. WATTS. 
 
( 1 ) 
 
 L OGICK: 
 
 O R, 
 
 The Right Ufe of Reason. 
 
 The Introduction a?2d general Scheme. 
 
 LO G I G K is the Art of ufing Reafon * well 
 in our Enquiries after Truths and the Commu- 
 nication of it to others, 
 
 Reafon * is the Glory of human Nature, and one 
 of the chief Eminencies whereby we are raifed above 
 our Fellow-creatures the Brutes in this lower World. 
 
 Reafon^ as to the Power and Principle of it, is 
 the common Gift of God to all Men •, tho' all arc 
 not favoured with it by Nature in an equal Degree : 
 But the acquired Improvement of it in different 
 Men, make a much greater Diflindlion between 
 them than Nature had made. I could even venture 
 to fay, that the Improvement of Reafon hath raifed 
 the Learned and the Prudent m the European World, 
 almoft as much above the Hottentots^ and other Sa- 
 vages of Africa^ as thofe Savages are by Nature fu- 
 perior to the Birds, the Beads, and the Fifties. 
 
 Now the Defign of Logick is to teach us the 
 right Ufe of our Reafon^ or Intelle5iual Powers^ 
 and the Improvement of them in our felves and 
 others ; this is not only neceflary in order to at- 
 
 * The Word Reafcn in this Place is not confined to the mere Faculty of 
 reafoning or inferring one thing from another, but inchides all the inteJledual 
 Powers of Man. 
 
 A 4 tain 
 
2 L O G I C K : Or, 
 
 tain any competent Knowledge in the Sciences, or 
 the Aflairs of Learning, but to govern both the 
 greater and the meaner Aolions of Life. It is the 
 Cultivation of our Reafon by which we are better 
 enabled to diftinguifli Good from Evil, as well as 
 Truth from FalJIoood : And both thefe are Matters 
 of the higheft Importance, whether we regard this 
 Life, or the Life to come. 
 
 The Purfuit and Acquifition of Truth is of infi- 
 nite Concernment to Mankind./ Hereby we be- 
 come acquainted with the Nature of Things both 
 in Heaven and Earth, and their various Relations 
 to each other. It is by this Means we difcover 
 our Duty to God and our Fellow Creatures : By 
 this we arrive at the Knowledge of natural Reli- 
 gion, and learn to confirm our Faith in divine Re- 
 velation, as well as to underftand what is revealed. 
 Our Wifdom, Prudence and Piety, our prefenc 
 Condu6l and our future Hope, are all influenced 
 by the Ufe of our rational Powers in the Search 
 after Truth. 
 
 There are feveral Things that make it very ne- 
 ceflary that our Reafon fhould have fome AfTiftance 
 in the Exercife or Ufe of it. 
 
 The firft is, the Depth and Difficulty of many 
 Truths, and the Weaknefs of our Reafon to fee far 
 into Things at once, and penetrate to the Bottom of 
 them.] It was a Saying among the Ancients, Ve- 
 ritas in Puteo, Truth lies in a Well ; and to carry 
 on this iVIetaphor we may very juftly fay, that 
 Logick does, as it were, fupply us with Steps 
 whereby we may go down to reach the Water ; 
 or it frames the Links of a Chain, whereby we 
 may draw the Water up from the Bottom. Thus, 
 by the Means of many Reafonings well connedl- 
 ed together, Philofophers in our Age have drawn 
 a thoufand Truths out of the Depchs of Dark- 
 
 nefs, 
 
The right Ufe ^Rcafon, j 
 
 nefs, which our Fathers were utterly unacquainted 
 with. 
 
 Another Thing that makes it neceflliry for our 
 Reafon to have fome Ailiftance given it, is the 
 Difguife and falfe Colours in which many 'Things ap- 
 pear to us in this prefent impsrfeol State .-/There are 
 a Thoufand Things which are not in reaHty what 
 they appear to be, and that both in the natural 
 and the moral World : So the Sun appears to be 
 flat as a Plate of Silver, and to be lefs than twelve 
 Inches in Diameter : the Moon appears to be as 
 big as the Sun^ and the Rainbow appears to be a 
 large fubllantial Arch in the Sky ; all which are 
 in reality grofs FaKhoods. So Knavery puts on the 
 Face of Juftice^ Hypocrify and Superftition wear the 
 Vizard of Piety ^ Deceit and Evil are often cloathed 
 in the Shapes and Appearances of Truth and Good- 
 nefs. Now Logick helps us to flirip off the outward 
 Difguife of Things, and to behold them and judge 
 of them in their own Nature. 
 
 There is yet a farther Proof of our intelleclual 
 or rational Powers need fome AfiTiftance, and that 
 is, becaufe they are fo frail and fallible in the pre- 
 fent State ; we are impofed upon at home as well as 
 abroad -j/ws are deceived by our Senfes^ by our Ima- 
 ginations^ by our Paffions and Appetites % by the Aii» 
 thority of Men, by Education and Cufiom^ ^c. and 
 we are led into frequent Errors, by judging accord- 
 ing to thefe falfe and flattering Principles, rather 
 than according to the Nature ot Things. Some- 
 thing of this Frailty is owing to our very Confti- 
 tution, Man being compounded of Flefli and Spi- 
 rit : Something of it anfcs from our Infant State^ 
 and our growing up by fmall Dc'grees to Manhood, 
 fo that we form a thoufand Judgments before our 
 Reafon is mature. But there is ftill more of it 
 owing to our original Defection from God, and 
 
 the 
 
4 L O G I C K: Or, 
 
 the foolifli and evil Difpofitions that are found in 
 fallen Man : So that one great Part of the Bef^gn 
 of Logickisio ^mrd us againft the delufive Influ- 
 ences of our meaner Powers, to cure the Miftakes 
 of immature Judgment, and to raife us in fome 
 Meafure from the Ruins of our Fall. 
 
 It is evident enough from all thefe Things, that 
 our Reafon needs the AfTiftance of Art in our En • 
 quiries after Truth or Duty ; and without fome 
 Skill and Diligence in forming our Judgments a- 
 right, we fhall be led into frequent Miftakes, both 
 in Matters o^ Science, and in Matters of Pra^ice, 
 and fome of thefe Miftakes may prove fatal too. 
 
 The Art of Logick, even a^ ic aflifts us to gain 
 the Knowledge of the Sciences, leads us on towards 
 Virtue and Happinefs ; for all our Jpeculative 
 Acq^uaintance with Things fhould be made fubfervi- 
 ent to our better Condu5i in the civil and the religious 
 Life. This is infinitely more valuable than all 
 Speculations, and a wife Man will ufe them chiefly 
 for this better Purpofc. 
 
 All the good Judgment and Prudence that any 
 Man exerts in his common Concerns of Life, 
 without the Advantage of Learning, is called 
 natural Logick : And it is but a higher Advance- 
 ment, and a farther AfTiftance of our rational 
 Powers that is defigned by and expeded from this 
 artificial Logick, 
 
 In order to attain this, we muft enquire what are 
 the principal Operations of the Mind, which are put 
 forth in the Exercife of our Reafon : And we fhall 
 find them to be thefe four, (viz.) Perception, J^^g" 
 ment^ Argumentation, and Bifpofition. 
 
 Now the Art of Logick is compofed of thofe Ob- 
 fervations and Rules, which Men have made about 
 thefe four Operations of the Mind, Perception, Judg-- 
 r?ient, Reafoning, and Bifpofition, in order to affift 
 and improve them. I. Per- 
 
The right life (pfReafon. 5 
 
 I. Perception^ Conception, or Apprehenfton, is the 
 mere fimple Contemplation of Things offered to our 
 Minds, without affirming or denying any Thing 
 concerning them. So we conceive or think of a 
 Hmfe^ a Tree, High, Swift, Slow, Animal, Time^ 
 Motion, Matter, Mind, Life, Death, ^c. The 
 Form under which thefe Things appear to the Mind, 
 or the Refult of our Conception or Apprehenfion, 
 is called an Idea, 
 
 II. Judgment is that Operation of the Mind, 
 whereby we join two or more Ideas together by- 
 one Affirmation or Negation, that is, we either 
 affirm or deny this to be that. So This Tree is 
 high ; That Horfe is not fwift -, The Mind of Man 
 is a thinking Being ; Mere Matter has no Thought 
 belonging to it ; God is jufi ; Good Men are often 
 miferable in this World ; A righteous Governor will 
 make a Difference hetwixt the Evil and the Good^ 
 which Sentences are the Effedb of Judgment, and 
 are called Propofttioos, 
 
 III. Argumentation or Reafoning is that Opera* 
 tion of the Mind, whereby we infer one Thing, 
 i. e. one Propofition, from two or more Propo(i« 
 lions premifed. Or it is the drawing a Conclulion, 
 which before was either unknown, or dark, or 
 doubtful^ from fome Propoficions which are more 
 known and evident. So when we have judged that 
 Matter cannot think, and that the Mind of Man 
 doth thinks we then infer and conclude, that there- 
 fore the Mind of Man is not Matter, 
 
 So we judge that A jujl Governor will make a 
 Difference between the Evil and the Good -, we judge 
 alfo that God is a juft Governor ; and from thence 
 we conclude, chat God will make a Difference he- 
 twixt the Evil and the Good, 
 
 This 
 
6 L O G I C K: Or, 
 
 This Argumentation may be carried on f^nhtr^ 
 thus, God will one Time or another make a Diffe* 
 rence between the Good and the Evil : But there is 
 little or no Dijference inade in this IVorld •, Therefore 
 there muft be another World wherein this Difference 
 Jhall be made, 
 
 Thefe Inferences or Conclufions are the Effcdls of 
 Reafoning, and the three Propofitions taken all to- 
 gether are called a Syllogifm^ or Argument, 
 
 IV. Bifpofition is that Operation of the Mindj 
 whereby we put the Ideas, Propofitions and Ar- 
 guments, which we have formed concerning one 
 Subjed:, into fuch an Order as is fittefl to gain 
 the cleared Knowledge of it, to retain it longed^ 
 and to explain it to others in the bed Manner: 
 Or, in fhort, it is the Ranging of our Thoughts 
 in fuch Order, as is bed for our own and others 
 Conception and Memory. The Ede(ft of this 
 Operation is called Method. This very Befcrip- 
 tion of the four Operations of the Mind and their Ef- 
 feEls in this Order^ is an Indance or Example of 
 Method. 
 
 Now as the Art of Logick aflids our Concept 
 iioHy fo it gives us a large and comprehenfive View 
 of the Subjecls we enquire into, as well as a clear 
 and didind: Knowledge of them. As it regulates 
 our Judgment and our Reafoning^ fo it fecures us 
 from Midakes, and gives us a" true and certain 
 Knowledge of Things; and as it furnidies us with 
 Method^ fo it makes our Knowledge of Things 
 both eafy and regular, and guards our Thoughts 
 from Confufion. 
 
 Logick is divided into four Parts, according to 
 thefe four Operations of the Mind, which it di- 
 reds, and therefore we diall treat of it in this 
 Order. 
 
 THE 
 
"fhe right UJe of Reafon. 
 
 THE 
 
 FIRST PART 
 
 O F 
 
 L O G I C K. 
 
 Of Perceptiom dnd Ideas, 
 
 THE firft Part of Logick contains Ob- 
 fervations and Precepts about the firft 
 Operation of the Mind, Perception or 
 Conception : And fince all our Knowledge, how 
 wide and large foever it grow, is founded up- 
 on our Conceptions and Ideas^ here we fhall con- 
 fider, 
 
 1 . ^he general Nature of them, ^ 
 
 2. The Obje^s of our Conception^ or the Archetypes 
 or Patterns of thefe Ideas, 
 
 3 . The fever al Divifions of them, 
 
 4. The Words and Terms whereby our Ideas are 
 exprefjed, 
 
 5. General Dire^ions about our Ideas, 
 
 6. Special Rules to direct our Conceptions. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
$ L O G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Nature of Ideas. 
 
 FIRST, the Nature of Conception or Percep- 
 tion f (hall juft be mentioned, tho' this may 
 feem to belong to another Science rather than Lo- 
 gicL 
 
 Perception is that A51 of the Mind (or as fome 
 Philofophers call it, rather a Pajfion or Impreffion) 
 whereby the Mind becomes confcious of any Things 
 as when I feel Hunger^ Thirjl^ or Cold, or Heat ; 
 when I fee a Horfe, a. Treey or a Man ; when I 
 hear'^ biwian Foice, or Thunder, I am confcious of 
 thefe Things, and this is called Perception, It I 
 fiudy, meditate, ivijh, or fear, I am conftious of 
 thefe inwards Adls alfo, ,and my. Mind perceives its 
 own Thoughts^ Wifljes, F^ars, &c. 
 
 An Idea is generally defined a Reprefentation af 
 a Thing in the Mind -, it is a Reprefentation of 
 fomething that we have feen, Jcit, heard, ^c. or 
 been confcious oft That Notion or Form of a 
 Horfe, a Tree, or a Man, which is in the Mind, 
 is called the Idea of a Horfe, a Tree, or 'a Man. 
 
 That Notion of Hunger, Cold, Sound, Colour, 
 Thought, or Wifh, or Fear, which is in the 
 Mind, is called the Idea of Hunger, Cold, Sounds 
 Wijh, ^c. 
 
 It is not the outward Objedl, or Thing which is 
 perceived, (viz,) the Horfe, the Man, &c. nor 
 
 -f* A''(/^(?, The Words Conception and Perception are often iifed promlfcuoufly, 
 as I have dons here, becaufe I would not embarrafs a Learner with too many 
 Diftiiiclioiis J but if I were to diftinguiih them, I would fay Perception is the 
 Conicioufncfs of an Object when prefent : Conception is the forming an Idea, 
 of the Qbjcft whether prefent or abfent. 
 
C. I. The right life of Rcafon. g 
 
 is it the very Perception or Senfe^ and Feelings viz. 
 of Hunger, or Cold, &c. which is called the 
 Idea -, but it is the Thing as it exijls in the Mind by 
 Way of Conception or Reprefentation that is proper- 
 ly called the Idea^ whether the Objed be prefent 
 or abfent. 
 
 As a Horfe, a Man, a Tree, are the outward 
 Objedls of our Perception, and the outward Arche- 
 types or Patterns of our Ideas ; fo our own Senfa- 
 tions of Hunger, Cold, i^c. are alfo inward Ar^ 
 chetypes^ or Patterns of our Ideas : But the Notions 
 or Pi5fures of thefe Things, as they are confidered, 
 or conceived in the Mind, are precifely the Ideas 
 that we have to do with in Logick, To fee aHorfe^ 
 or to feel Cold, is one Thing ; to think of, and con- 
 verfe about a Man, a Horfe, Hunger^ or Cold, is 
 another. 
 
 Among all thefe Ideas, fuch as reprefent Bodies, 
 are generally called Images, efpecialiy if the Idea 
 of the Shape be included. (|^Thofe inward Repre- 
 fentations which we have or Spirit, Thought, LovCy 
 Hatred, Caufe, Effecl, ^c, are more pure and men- 
 tal Ideas, belonging more efpecialiy to the Mind, 
 and carry nothing of Shape or Senfe in them. But 
 I fhall have Occafion to fpeak more particularly 
 of the Original and the Diftindion of Ideas in the 
 third Chapter. I proceed therefore now to confider 
 the Objeds of our Ideas, 
 
 C H A P, 
 
JO L O G I C K: Or, Part L 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 Of the ObjeBs of Perception, 
 
 S E C T. I. 
 
 Of Being in general, 
 
 TH E Object of Perception is that which is re- 
 preferited in the Idea, that which is the Ar- 
 chetype or Pattern, according to which the Idea 
 is formed ; and thus Judgments^fPropofttionSy Rea- 
 fons^ and long Difcourfes^ may all become the Ob- 
 jeds of Perception ; but in this Place we fpeak 
 chiefly of iht firft and more fmple Objeds of it, be- 
 fore they arejoined and formed into Propofitions or 
 Difcourfes. 
 
 Every Objedl of our Idea is called a 5"/^^;«^,| whe- 
 ther it be a Being or Not Being \\ for Not Being 
 may be propofed to our Thoughts, as well as 
 that which has a real Being. But let us firft treat 
 of BeingSy and that in the largeft Extent of the 
 Word. 
 
 A Being is confider'd as poffible^ or as a5fual, ( 
 
 When it is confider'd as poffible^ it is faid to 
 have an EJfence or Nature *, fuch were all Things 
 before their Creation .-/When it is confidered as ac^ 
 tual^ then it is faid to have Exigence alfo ; fuch are 
 all Things which are created, and God himfelf the 
 Creator, f 
 
 EJfence therefore is but the very Nature of any 
 Beings whether it be adually exifting or no. A 
 Rofe in Winter has an Efiencej in Summer it has 
 Exitlence aUb. f 
 
 Note, 
 
C Ih S. 2. The right Ufe of Reafon, j j 
 
 TVo/d', There is but one Being which includes 
 Exiftence in the very EfTence of it, and chat is God/ 
 who therefore adluaily exifts by natural and eternal 
 NecefTity : But the a5lual Exijlence of every Crea- 
 ture is very diltindl from its EJfence^ for it may he 
 or may not be, as God pleafe. 
 
 Again, Every Being is confukr^i either as fub- 
 fifting in and by its felf, and then it is called a 
 Suhftance ; or it fubfids in and by another, and then 
 ic is called a Mode or Manner of Being./ Tho' few 
 Writers allow Mode to be calTd a Being in the fame 
 perfedl Senfe as a Suhftance is ; and fome Abodes 
 have evidently more of real Entity or Being than 
 others, as will appear when we come to treat of 
 them. Thefe Things will furnifh us with Matter 
 for larger Difcourfe in the following Sediohs. 
 
 SECT. li. 
 
 Of Subftances and their various Kinds, 
 
 ^ A Suhftance is a Being which can fubfifl by it- 
 jL\, felf, without Dependance upon any other 
 created Being. The Notion of fuhfifting by itfelf 
 gives occafion to Logicians to call it a Suhftance, So 
 a Horfe, a Houfe, Wood, Stone, Water, Fire, a Sfait, 
 a Body, an Angel, are called Subftances, becaufe they 
 depend on nothing but God for their Exiftence. 
 
 It has been ufual alfo in the Defcription of Suh- 
 ftance to add, it is that which is the Subjedl of 
 Modes or Accidents ; a Bedy is the Subftance or , 
 Subject, its Sha-pe is the Mode, 
 
 But left we be led into Miftakes, let us here take 
 IQotice, that when a SubfFance is faid lofuhfift with- 
 mt Dependance upon another created Being, all that 
 we mean is, that it cannot be annihilated, or utter- \ 
 Jy deftroy'd and reduced to nothing, by any Power 
 inferior to that of our Creator •, tho' its prefenc 
 B particular 
 
12 LOG IC K: Or, Part t 
 
 particular Form, Nature and Properties may be 
 alter'd and deftroy'd by many inferior Caufes ; a 
 Horfe may die and turn to I)u§1; ; JVood may be 
 turned into Fire^ Smoke and J/hes ; a Houfe into 
 Ruhhijh^ and Water into /<rf or Vapour •, but the 
 Subftance or Matter of which they are made ftill 
 remains, tho' the Forms and Shapes of it are al- 
 tered. A Body may ceafe to be a Houfe or a Horfe, 
 but it is a Body ftill ; and in thisSenfe it depends 
 only upon God for its Exiftence. 
 
 Among Suhjlances fome are thinking or confcious 
 Beings, or have a Power of Thought, fuch as the 
 Mind of Man^ God^ Angels, Some are extended 
 and folid or impenetrable^ that is, they have Di- 
 menfions of Length, Breadth, and Depth, and 
 have alfo a Power of Refiftance, or exclude every 
 Thing of the fame Kind from being in the fame 
 Place. This is the proper Charader of Matter or 
 Body. 
 
 As for the Idea of Space^ whether it be void or 
 full^ i. e. a Vacuum or a Plenum, whether it be in- 
 terfpers'd among all Bodies, or may be fuppofed 
 to reach beyond the Bounds of the Creation, it is 
 an Argument too long and too hard to be difpU' 
 ted in this Place what the Nature of it is : It has 
 been much debated whether it be a real Subftance, 
 or a mere Conception of the Mind, whether it be 
 the Immenfity of the Divine Nature, or the mere 
 Order of co-exiftent Beings, whether it be the man- 
 ner of our Conception of the Diftances of Bodies,, 
 or a mere Nothing. Therefore I drop the Men- 
 tion of it here, and refer the Reader to the firfl: 
 Eflay among the Philofophical Effays by /. W* 
 publiQied 1733. 
 
 Now if we feclude Space out of our Confidera* 
 tion, there will remain but two Sorts of Subftances 
 in the World, i. e. Master and Mind, or as v^e 
 
 other- 
 
C. 11. S. 2, n-e right U/e efReafon. i j 
 
 Otherwife call them. Body and Spirit ; at lead, wc 
 have no Ideas of any other Subftance but thefe *. 
 
 Among Subftances, fome are called Simple^ 
 fome are Compound^ whether the Words be taken 
 in a philofophical or a vulgar Senfe. 
 
 Simple Suhftdnces in a philofophical S^n^^^ are either 
 Spirits^ which have no Manner of Compofition ia 
 them, and in this Senfe God is called zfwiple Being 5 
 Or they are the firft Principles of Bodies, which 
 are ufually called Elements^ of which all other 
 
 Bodies 
 
 * Becaafe Men have different Ideas and Notions of Suljlame^ I thought it 
 not proper entirely to omit sill Accounts of them, and therfore have thrown 
 them into the Margin, 
 
 Some Philofophef s fuppofe that our Acquaintance with Matter or Mind 
 reaches no farther than the mere Properties of them, and that there is a 
 ibrt of unknown Being, which is the Subjiance or the ^tie^ by which thefe 
 Properties of Jolid Extenjion and of Cogitation are fuOT^Wt^y and in which 
 thefe Properties inhere or exift. But perhaps this Notionafifes only from! 
 bur turning the mere abllrafted or logical Notion of Svhjlar.ci' oi-^Self-JuhfiJi" 
 ing into the Notion of a ^i^m£k phyjical or natural Being, without-siny Ne- 
 ceflity. Solid Extsnfion feems to me to be the very Subftance of Mattefy^ or 
 of all Bodies 5 and a P civet of thinking, ivkich is aiivays in AEl, feems to"l)C^ 
 the very Subftance of all Spirits ; for God himfelf is an intelligent, almighty ^ 
 Pciver J nor is there any Need to feek for any other fecret and unknown Beo 
 Jng, or abflraBed Subftance entirely diftinft from thefe, in order to fupport 
 ihe feveral Modes or Properties of Matter or Mind, for thefe two Ideas are 
 fufficient for that Purpofe j therefore I rather think thefe are Subftances. 
 
 It muft: be confefl:, when we fay. Spirit is a thinking Subftance, and Mat- 
 ier is an extended Jolid Subftance, we are fometimes ready to imagine that 
 Extenfion and Solidity are but mere Modes and Properties of a certain un- 
 known Subftance or Subjeft which fupports them, and which we call Body ; 
 and that a P<nver of thinking is biac a mere Mode and Property of fome un- 
 known Subftance or Subjetl which fupports it, and which we call Spirit i 
 But I rather take this to be a mere Miftake, which we are led into by the 
 grammatical form and Ufe of Words j and perhaps our logical Way of 
 thinking by Subftances and Modes, as well aS our grammatical Way of talking 
 by Subftanii'ves and Adje&i'ves, help to delude us into the Suppofitiort. 
 
 However, that I may not be wanting to any of my Readers, I would let 
 them know Mf. Locke's Opinion, whith has obtained much in the prefent 
 Age, and it is this : *^ That our Idea of zny particular Subftance is only 
 *' fuch a Combination of fimple Ideas as reprefents that Thing as fubfifting by 
 ** itfelf, in which the fuppofedor confufed Idea of Subftance (fuch as it is) is 
 *' always ready t5 offer itfelf. It is a Conjun£tion of Ideas co-exifting iii 
 " fuch a Caufe of their Union, and fnakes the whole Subjetl fubfift by itfelf 
 ** though the Caufe of their tJnion be unknown j and our general Idea of 
 ** 5?/^/«;<fe arifesfrom the Self-fubfiftence of this Colledion of Ideas.'* 
 
 Now if this Notion of Subftance reft: here, and be confidered merely as an 
 unknown Caufe of the Union of Properties, it is much more eafy to be ad,* 
 jnitted : But if We proceed to fupport a fort of real, fubfiantiai^ diftintft Beiftg, 
 
 S 2 cli^i:«iK 
 
14 L O G I C K: Or, Part 1. 
 
 Bodies are compounded : Elements are fuch Sub- 
 fiances as cannot be refolved, or reduced, into two 
 or more Subftances of different Kinds. 
 
 The various Se^ls of Philofophers have attri- 
 buted the Honour of this Name to various Things. 
 The Peripateticks^ or Followers of Ariftotle^ made 
 Fire^ Air^ Earth and V/ater^ to be the four Ele- 
 ments, of which all earthly Things were com- 
 pounded ; and they fuppofed the Heavens to be a 
 Suintejfence^ or fifth fort of Body diflindl from 
 all thele : But fmce Experimental Philofophy and 
 Mathematicks have been better underftood, this 
 Dodlrine has been abundantly refuted. The Che- 
 mifts make Spirit^ Salt^ Sulphur^ Water and Earthy 
 to be their five Elements, becaufe they can re- 
 duce all terreftrial Things to thefe five : This 
 ftcms to come nearer the Truth \ though they are 
 not all agreed in this Enumeration of Elements, 
 In fhort, our modern Philofophers generally fup- 
 pole Matter or Body to be one fimple Principle, 
 or folid Extent'ion^ which being diverfified by its 
 various Shapes, Quantities, Motions and Situations, 
 makes all the Varieties that are found in the Uni- 
 vcrfe, and therefore they make little Ufe of the 
 Word Element, 
 
 different from folid ^antity or Extenjion in Bodies, and different from a 
 Power of thinking in Spirits, in my Opinion it is the Introduftion of a need- 
 iefs fcholaftical Notion into the real Nature of Things, and then fancying it 
 to have a real Exiftence. 
 
 Mr. Lode, in his EJfay of Hum. Ui:d. Book II. Ch. 22. §. 2. feems to ridi- 
 cule this common Idea of Suhfiance, which Men have generally fuppofed to 
 be a fort of Sulfratum diftindl from all Properties whatfoever, and to be 
 the Support of all Properties. Yet in Book IV. Ch. 3. §.6. he feems to 
 fuppofe there may be fome fuch unknown Subfirati<m, which may be capaple 
 of receiving the Properties both of Matter znd oi' Mind, (viz.) Extenfion, So-. 
 lidity, and Cogitatiof? ; for he fuppofcs it poflible for God to add Cogitaficn to 
 that Suhfiance which is corporeal, and thus to cavfe Matter to think. If this 
 be true, then Spirits (for ought we know) may be corporeal Beings or think' 
 ifig Bodies, which is a Doftrine too favourable to the Mortality of th: Soul, 
 But I leave thefe Debates to the Philofophers of the Age, and will not be 
 tx)0 pofitive in my Opinion of this abftrufe Subjedi. 
 
 See more of this Argument in Pbihfophical EJJ'ays, before cited, Eflay 2d. 
 
 Compound 
 
C. II. S. 2. The right Vfe of Reafon. \^ 
 
 Compound Suhjlances are made up of two or more 
 fimple Subftances ; fo every Thing in this whole 
 material Creation, that can be reduced by the Art 
 of Man into two or more different Principles or 
 Subftances, is a compound Body in the philofophical 
 Senfe. 
 
 But if we take the Words Sifnpk and Compound 
 in a vulgar Senfe, then all thofe are fimple Sub- 
 ftances which are generally efteemed uniform in 
 their Natures. So every Herb is called a Simple •, 
 and every Metal and Mineral^ though the Chemift 
 perhaps may find all his feveral Elements in each 
 of them. So a Needle is a ftmple Body, being 
 only made of Steel *, but a Sword or a Knife is a 
 Compound^ becaufe its Haft or Handle is made of 
 Materials different from the Blade. So the Bark 
 of PerUy or the Juice of Sorrel is a fmple Medicine : 
 But when the Apothecaries Art has mingled feveral 
 Simples together, it becomes a Compound^ as Diaf- 
 cordium or Mithridate, 
 
 The Terms of pure and tntxt^ when applied to 
 Bodies, are much a-kin x.o fimple and co7?ipoiind. So 
 a Guinea is pure Gold, it it has nothing but Gold 
 in it, without any Alloy or bafer Metal : But if 
 any other Mineral or Metal be mingled with it, it 
 is called a mixt Subftance or Body. 
 
 Subftances are alfo divided into animate and in- 
 animate. Animated Subftances are either animal 
 or vegetable *, 
 
 Some of the animated Subftances have various 
 organicai or inftrumental Parts, fitted for a Va- 
 riety of Motions from Place to Place, and a Spring 
 of Life within themfelves, as Be aft s^ Birds ^ Fifhes^ 
 and Infe5fs ; thefe are called Animals, Other ani^ 
 mated Subftances are called Vegetables^ which have 
 
 * Note, Vegetables as well as Animah, have gotten the Name of animated 
 Subftances, becaufe fome of the Ancients fuppofed Herbs and Plants j Beajis 
 ^nd Birds, (^c, to have a fort of Souh diftindl from Matter or Body. 
 
 B 3 within 
 
i6 LOG I C K: Or^ Part L 
 
 within themfelves the Principles of another fort of 
 Lite and Growth, and of various Produdions of 
 Leaves^ Flower: and Fruity fuch as we fee in 
 plants^ Herbs and Trees, 
 
 And there are other SuhftanceSy which are called 
 inanimate^ becaufe they have no Sort of Life ia 
 them, as, Earthy Stone ^ Air^ Water ^ ^c. 
 
 There is alfo one fort of Subftance, or Being, 
 which is compounded of Body and Mind^ or a ra- 
 tional Spirit united to an Animal ; fuch is Man- 
 kind, Angels^ or any other Beings of the fpiritual 
 and invifible World, who have aflurned vifible 
 Shapes for a Seafon, can hardly be reckoned among 
 this Order of compounded Beings ; becaufe they 
 drop their Bodies, and diveft themfelves of thofe 
 vifible Shapes, v;hen their particular MefTage is 
 performed, anc} thereby Ihew that thefe Bodies dp 
 pot belong to their Natures. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Qf Modes and their various Kmds, and firft of ejjen* 
 tial and accidental Modes, 
 
 r~T-^ H E next fort of Objeds which are repre- 
 X_ fented in our Ideas, are called Modes ^ 0|? 
 
 Manners of Being *. 
 
 A Mode is that which cannot fubfift in and of 
 itfelf, but is always efteem'd as belonging to, and 
 fubfifting by, the Help of fome Suhftance^ which 
 for that Reafon, is call'd its Suhjeof, A Mode 
 muft depend on that Subftance for its very Exift- 
 cnce and Being ; and that not as a Being depends 
 pn its Cau/Cy (for fo Suhflances themfelves depend 
 
 * Note, The Term Mode is by fome Authors applied chiefly to the Kf- 
 latiom or relative Manneir. of Being. But in logical Treatifes it is often ufed 
 in a larger Senfc, and extends to all Attributes whatfoever, and includes the 
 jnoft eflfehtial and inward Properties as well as outward Refpefts and Rela«» 
 t'ons, and icachcs to AtTicn: themfelves as well as Manners of Adion, 
 
C. II. S. 3 T!he right life of Reafon. ly 
 
 on God thfilr Creator ;) but the very Being cf a 
 Mode depends on fome Subftance for its SuhjeSf^ 
 in which it is, or to which it belongs ; fo Motion^ 
 Shape ^ ^antity^ JVeigbt^ are Modes of Body ; 
 Knowledge^ Wit^ Folly^ Love^ Doubting^ Judging^ 
 are Modes of the Mind ; for the one cannot fubfift 
 without Body^ and the other cannot fubfift without 
 Mind, 
 
 Modes have their feveral Divifions, as well as 
 Subftances. 
 
 I. Modes are either ejfential, or accidental. 
 An ejjential Mode or Attribute^ is that which 
 belongs to the very Nature or ElTence of the Sub- 
 jedl wherein it is ; and the Subjedl can never have 
 the fame Nature without it ; fuch is Roundnefs in 
 a Bowly Hardnefs in a Stone^ Softnefs in Water ^ vital 
 Motion in an Animal^ Solidity in Matter^ Thinking 
 in a Spirit ; for tho' that piece of Wood which 
 is now a Bowl may be made Jquare^ yet if Round- 
 nefs be taken away, it is no longer a Bowl : So that 
 very Flefh and Bones, which is now an Animal, 
 may be without Life or inward Motion ; but if 
 all Motion be entirely gone, it is no longer an Ani- 
 mal, but a Carcafs : So if a Body or Matter be 
 divefted of Solidity^ it is a mere void Space or No- 
 thing ; and if Spirit be entirely without Thinkings 
 I have no Idea of any Thing that is left in it ; 
 therefore fo far as I am able to judge, Conjcioufnefs 
 muft be its eflential Attribute * : Thus all the Per^ 
 feUions of God are called his Attributes^ for he can- 
 not be without them. 
 
 * Notey When I €all ^olid Extentlon an eflential Mode or Attribute of 
 Mattery and a Power of Thinking an eflential Mode or Attribute of a Spirit, 
 I do it in Compliance with common Forms of Speech j but perhaps in reality 
 thefe are the very EflTences or Subflances themfelves, and the mofl: fubftan* 
 tial Ideas that we can frame of Body and Spirit, and have no need of any 
 (we know not what) Subjiratum or uninteltgible Subftance to fupport them 
 KJ tljeir Exiftence or Being, 
 
 B4 • Aa 
 
i8 LOGIC K: Or, Part I, 
 
 An ejfentlal Mode is either primary or fecondary, 
 
 A frimary ejfenlial Mode is the firft, or chief 
 Thing, that conflicutes any Being in its particular 
 Eflence or Nature, and makes it to be that which it 
 is, and difiinguifhes it from all other Beings : This 
 is called the Difference in the JDefinition of Things, 
 of which hereafter : So Roundnefs is the primary ef- 
 fential Mode, or Difference of a Bowl j the meeting 
 of two Lines h the primary elTential Mode, or the 
 Difference of an yin^Ie ; the Perpendicularity of 
 thefe Lines to each other is the Difference of a right 
 Angle: Solid Extenfion is the Primary Attribute^ or 
 Difference of Matter : Confcioufnefs^ or at leafl a 
 Power of Thinkings is the Difference, or primary 
 Attribute of a Spirit* *, and to fear and love God is 
 the primary Attribute of a pious Man. 
 
 A fecondary effential Mode is any other Attribute 
 of a Thing, which is not of primary Confidera- 
 tion : This is called a Property : Sometimes indeed 
 it goes toward making up the Effence, efpecially 
 of a complex Beings fo far as we are acquainted 
 with it j fometimes it depends upon, and follows 
 from the E{Tence of it ; fo Volubility^ or Aptnefs 
 to roll, is the Property of a Bowl^ and is derived 
 from its Roundnefs. Mqhility and Figure or Shape 
 are Properties of Matter ; and it is the Property of 
 a potis Man to love his Neighbour. 
 
 An accidental Mode, or an Accident^ is fuch a 
 jMode as is not neceffary to the Being of a Thing, 
 for the Subje£l may be v/ithout it, and yet re- 
 rnain of the fame Nature chat it was before ; or 
 it is that Mode which maybe feparated or abo- 
 lifh'd from its Subjecfl; ; fo Smoothnefs or R^oughnefs, 
 Blacknefs or Whitenefs, Motion or Refi^ are the Ac- 
 cidents of a Bowl j for thefe may be all changed, 
 and yet the Body remain a Bowl ftill : Learning, 
 
 f See the Note i|i tjie foregoing Page, 
 
 Juftke^ 
 
C. II. S. 3 . The right Ufe of Reafon,' 1 9 
 
 Jiiftice^ Folly^ Sicknefs, Healthy are the Accidents 
 of a Man : Motion^ Sq^narenefs^ or any particular 
 Shape or Sixe^ are the Accidents of Body : Yet 
 Shape and Size in general are elTential Modes of it ; 
 for a Body muft have fome Size and Shape, nor 
 can it be without them : So Hope, Fear, Wilhing^ 
 Affenting, and Doubting, are Accidents of the 
 Mind^ tho' Thinking in general feems to be eflential 
 to it. 
 
 Here obferve, that the Name of Accident has 
 been oftentimes given by the old Peripatetick Philo- 
 fophers to all Modes, whether eflential or acciden- 
 tal ; but the Moderns confine this Word Accident 
 to the Senfe in which I have defcribed it. 
 
 Here it flioukl be noted alfo, that tho' the 
 Word Property be limited fometimes in logical 
 Treatifes to the fecondary ejjential Mode, yet it is 
 ufed in common Language to fignify thefe four 
 Sorts 0^ Modes ; of which fome are ejjential, and 
 fome accidental, 
 
 (i.) Such as belong to every Subjedt of that 
 Kind, but not only to thofe Subjeds. So yellow Co- 
 lour and Du^lility are Properties of Gold ; they be- 
 long to <3//Gold, but not only to Gold ; for Saffron 
 is alfo yellow, and Lead is duolile, 
 
 (2.) Such as belong only to one kind of Subjecft 
 but not to every Subjed of that Kind. So Learn- 
 ing, Reading, and Writing, are Properties of hu- 
 man Nature ', they belong only to Man, but not to 
 all Men. 
 
 (3.) Such as belong to every Subje6l of one Kind, 
 and only to them, but not akvays. So Speech or 
 Language is a Property of Man, for it belongs to 
 ell Men, and to Men only -, but Men are not aU 
 IV ays fpeaking. 
 
 (4.) Such as belong to every Subjed: of one 
 Kind, and to them only and always. So Shape and 
 
 Divifihility 
 
20 LOGIC K: Or, Part L 
 
 Bivifihllity are Properties of Body ; fo Omnifcience 
 and Oftinipotence are Properties of the Divine l<la- 
 ture^ for in this Senfe Properties and Attributes are 
 the fame, and except in logical Treatifes there is 
 fcarce any Diftind:ion made between them. Thefc 
 called Propria quarto Modo in the Schools, or Pro- 
 perties of the fourth Sort, 
 
 Note, Where there is any one Property or ej/en- 
 iial Attribute fo fuperior to the reft, that it ap- 
 pears plainly that all the reft are derived from it, 
 and fuch as is fufficient to give a full Dlftindlion 
 of that Subjed: from all other Subjeds, this At- 
 tribute or Property is call'd the ejfential Difference^ 
 as is before declared ; and we commonly fay, the 
 Effence of the Thing confifts in it ; fo the Effence 
 cf Matter in general feems to confift in Solidity, or 
 folid Extention, But for the moft Part, we are fo 
 much at a Lofs in finding out the intimate Effence 
 of particular natural Bodies, that we are forced 
 10 diftinguifti the effential Difference of moft Things 
 by a Combination of Properties. So a Sparrow is 
 a Bird which has fuch coloured Feathers, and 
 fuch a particular Size, Shape and Motion. So 
 Wormwood is an Herb which has fuch a Leaf of 
 fuch a Colour, and Shape, and Tafte, and fuch 
 a Root and Stalk. So Beafts and Fifhes, Mine- 
 rals, Metals and Works of Art fometimes, as well 
 as of Nature, are diftinguiftied by fuch a Colle^ion 
 cf Properties, 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 The farther Divifions of Mode. 
 
 II. nr H E feccnd Divifion of Modes is into at" 
 
 \ folute and relative. An abfolute Mode is 
 
 that which belongs to its Subjed, without Re- 
 
 fpeft 
 
C. II. S. 4, The right Ufe of Reafon. 21 
 
 fped to any other Beings whatfoever : But a re- 
 lative Mode is derived from the Regard that one 
 Being has to others. So Roundnefs and Sinooth- 
 nefs are the ahjolute Modes of a Bowl ; for if there 
 were nothing elfe exifting in the whole Creation, 
 a Bowl might be round and fmooth : But Greatnefs 
 and Smallnefs are relative Modes ; for the very 
 Ideas of them are derived merely from the Com- 
 parifon of one Being with others ; a Bowl of four 
 Inches Diameter is very greats compared with one 
 of an Inch and a half ; but it is very fmall in 
 Comparifon of another Bowl, whofe Diameter is 
 eighteen or twenty Inches. Motion is the abfolute 
 Mode of a Body, but Szmftnefs or Slownefs are 
 relative Ideas ; for the Motion of a Bowl on a 
 Bowling Green is fwift, when compared with a 
 Snail ; and it is Jlow^ when compared with a Can- 
 non-Bullet. 
 
 Thefe relative Modes are largely treated of by 
 fome logical and metaphyfical Writers under the 
 Name of Relation : And thefe Relations themfelves 
 are farther fubdivided into fuch as arife fro?n the 
 Nature of Things,^ and fuch as arife merely from 
 the Operation of our Minds •, one Sort are called 
 real Relatio7is^ the other mental ; fo the Likenefs of 
 one Egg to another is a real Relation^ becaufe it 
 arifes from the real Nature of Things ; for whe- 
 ther there was any Man or Mind to conceive it or 
 no, one Egg would be like another : But when 
 we confider an Egg as a Noun Suhftantive in 
 Grammar, or as fignified by the Letters, e^ g^ gj 
 thefe arc mere mental Relations^ and derive their 
 very Nature from the Mind of Man. Thefe Sort 
 of Relations are called by the Schools Entia Ratio- 
 nis^ or fecond Notions^ which have no real Being, 
 |)ut by the Operation of the Mind, 
 
 III. The 
 
22 L G I C L : Or, Part I. 
 
 III. The third Divifion of Modes fhews us, 
 they are either intrinftcal or extrinfical, Intrinfi- 
 cat Modes are conceived to be in the Subjed: or 
 Subftance, as when we fay a Globe is rounds or 
 
 fw'ift^ rollings or at refl : Or when we fay, a Man 
 is iall^ or learned, thefe are intrinfick Modes : But 
 extrinfick Modes are fuch as arife from fomething 
 that is not in the Subjedl or Subftance itfelf j 
 but it is a Manner of Being which fome Sub- 
 Itances attain by Reafon of fomething that is ex- 
 ternal or foreign to the Subjedt ; as, This Globe 
 lies within two Tards of the Wall ; or, this Man 
 is beloved or bated. Note, Such fort of Modes, as 
 this laft Example, are called external Denomina- 
 tions, 
 
 IV. There is a fourth Divifion much a-kin to 
 this, whereby Modes are faid to be Inherent or 
 Adherent, that is Proper or Improper. Adherent 
 or improper Modes arife from the joining of fome 
 accidental Subftance to the chief Subje6t, which 
 yet may be feparated from it ; fo when a Bowl is 
 wet, or a Boy is clothed, thefe are adherent Modes \ 
 for the Water and the Clothes are diftind: Sub- 
 llances which adhere to the Bowl, or to the Boy :■ 
 But when we fay, the Bowl is fwift or round ; 
 when we fay, the Boy is flrong or witty, thefe are 
 proper or inherent Modes, for they have a fort of 
 In-being in the Subftance it felf, and do not a- 
 rife from the Addition of any other Subftance 
 to it, 
 
 V. A5lion and Pajfwn are Modes or Manners 
 which belong to Subftances, and fhould not en- 
 tirely be omitted here. When a Smith with a 
 Hammer ftrikes a Piece of Iron, the Hammer and 
 the Smith are both Agents, or Subjeds of Ac- 
 tion j 
 
C. 11. S. 4. The right life of Reafon. 2% 
 
 tion ; the one is the Prime or Supreme^ the other 
 the Subordinate : The Iron is the Patient^ or the 
 Subjed: of Paflion, in a philofophical Senfe, be- 
 caufe it receives the Operation of the Agent : 
 Though this Senfe of the Words Pajjion and Pa^ 
 tient differs much from the vulgar Meaning of 
 them *. 
 
 VI. Th^ftxth Divifion of Modes may be into 
 Phyfical^ i. e. Natural^ Civile Morale and Super- 
 natural. So when we confider the Apoftle Pauly 
 who was a little Man, a Roman by the Privilege 
 of his Birth, a Man of Virtue or Honefty, and an 
 infpired Apoftle ; his low Stature is a pbyfical 
 Mode, his being a Roman is a civil Privilege, his 
 Honefty is a moral Confideration, and his being in- 
 fpired is fupernaturaL 
 
 VII. Modes belong either to Body or to Spi- 
 rit^ or to hth. Modes of Body belong only to 
 Matter or to corporeal Beings ; and thefe are 
 Shape ^ Size^ Situation^ or Place ^ i^c. Modes ef 
 Spirit belong only to Minds ; fuch are Knowledge^ 
 Affent^ Dijfent^ Doubting^ Reafoning^ ^c. Modes 
 which belong to both have been fometimes called 
 mipct ModeSy or human Modes, for thefe are only 
 found in human Nature, which is compounded 
 both of Body and Spirit *, fuch are Senfation, Ima- 
 gmation, Pajfwn, ^c, in all which there is a Con- 
 currence of the Operations both of Mind and Bo- 
 dy, i. e, of animal and intellectual Nature. 
 
 But the Modes of Body may be yet farther dif- 
 tinguifhed. Some of them are primary Modes or 
 
 * Note, Agetit fignliies the Doer^ Patient the Sufferer, AEi'ion is Doings 
 PaJJiori is Suffering : Agent and AEiion have retained their original and philo- 
 fophical Senfe, tho' Patient and Paffion have acquired a very different Mean- 
 ing in common Language, 
 
 ^alitiesy 
 
24 L O G I C K: Or, Part 1/ 
 
 ^alities^ for they belong to Bodies confidered in 
 themfelves, whether there were any Man to take 
 Notice of them or no , fuch are thofe before-men- 
 tioned (viz,) Shape ^ Size, Situation, i^c. Secon- 
 dary Qualities, or Modes, are fuch Ideas as we 
 afcribe to Bodies on account of the various Im- 
 preflions which are made on the Senfes of Men 
 by them ; and thefe are called fenfihle ^alities^ 
 which are very numerous ; fuch are all Colours, as 
 Red, Green, Blue, &c, fuch are all Sounds, as 
 Sharp, Shrill, Loud, Hoarfe ; all Taftes, as Sweet, 
 Bitter, Sour ; all Smells, whether Pleafant, Of- 
 fenfive, or Indifferent -, and all Ta^ile ^Malities^ 
 or fuch as affedt the Touch or Feeling, {viz.) Heat, 
 Cold^ ^c, Thefe are properly called fecondary 
 ^alities, for though we are ready to conceive them 
 as exifting in the very Bodies themfelves which 
 afFedl our Senfes, yet true Philofophy has moft un- 
 deniably proved, that all thefe are really various 
 Ideas or Perceptions excited in humane Nature^ 
 by the different ImprelTions that Bodies make up- 
 on our Senfes by their primary Modes, i. e. by 
 Means of the different Shape, Size, Motion and 
 Pofition of thofe little inviffble Parts that com- 
 pofe them. Thence it follows, that a fecondary 
 ^ality, confidered as in the Bodies themfelves, h 
 Nothing elfe but a Power or Aptitude to produce 
 fuch Senfations in us : SeeZodv's EfTay of the Un- 
 derftanding. Book 2. Gh, 8. 
 
 VIII. I might add, in the laft Place, that as 
 Modes belong to Suhftances, fo there are fome alfo 
 that are but Modes of other Modes : For tho' they 
 fubfift in and by the Subjlance, as the original 
 Subjed: of them, yet they are properly and di- 
 redtly attributed to fome Mode of that Subftance. 
 Motion is the Mode of a Body 5 but the Swift- 
 
 nefs^ 
 
C. II. S. 5. The right Ufe of Reafoii. 2^ 
 
 72efs, or Slownefs^ of it, or its Dire^ion to the North 
 cr South, are but Modes of Motion. PFalking is 
 the Mode or Manner of Man, or of a Beafl: ; buC 
 Walking gracefully implies a Manner or Mode fu- 
 peradded to that Adion. Ail comparative and 
 fuperlative Degrees of any Quality, are the Modes 
 of a Modey as Swifter implies a greater Meafure of 
 Swiftnefs. 
 
 It would be too tedious here to run through all 
 the Modes^ Accidents, and Relations at large that 
 belong to various Beings, and are coploufly treat- 
 ed of in general^ in the Science called Metafhy- 
 ftcks, or more properly Ontology : They are alfa 
 treated of in particular in thofe Sciences which 
 have afiumed them feverally as their proper Sub-, 
 jeds. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 Of the ten Categories, Of Suhjlance modlffd. 
 
 WE have thus given an Account of the two 
 chief 0^/^^i of our Ideas, (viz,) Subftances 
 and Modes, and their various Kinds : And in 
 thefe laft Scdlions we have briefly comprized the 
 greateft Part of what is neceflary in the famous 
 ten Ranks of Being, called the ten Predicaments 
 or Categories of Ariftotle, on which there are end- 
 lefs Volumes of Difcourfes formed by feveral of 
 his Followers. But that the Reader may not 
 utterly be ignorant of them, let him know the 
 Names are thefe : Suhjlance, ^.antity, ^ality. 
 Relation, A5fion, Pajfwn, Where, When, Situa- 
 tion and Clothing, \x. would be mere Lofs of 
 Time to fhew how loofe, how injudicious, and 
 even ridiculous, is this ten- fold Divifion of Things : 
 And whatfoever farther relates to them^ and which 
 
 may 
 
26 LOGIC K: Or, Part t 
 
 may tend to improve ufeful Knowledge, fhould be 
 fought in Ontology, and in other Scie^ues. 
 
 Bcfides Suhjiance and Mode, fome of the Mo- 
 derns would have us confider the Suhftance modified, 
 as a diftindt Objedl of our Ideas ; but I think there 
 is nothing more that need be laid on this Subject, 
 than this, {viz,) There is fome Difference between 
 a Subftance when it is confidered with all its Modes 
 about it, or clothed in all its Manners of Exiftence, 
 and when it is diftinguifhed from them, and con- 
 fider 'd naked without them. 
 
 S E C T. VI. 
 
 Of I^gt' Being. 
 
 AS Being is divided into Suhftance and Mode^ 
 fo we may confider Not-Being with Regard 
 to both thefe. 
 
 I. Not' Being is confider'd as excluding all Suh- 
 ftance, and then all Modes are alfo neceiiaHly ex- 
 cluded, and this we call fure Nihility, or mere No- 
 thing, 
 
 This Nothing is taken either in a vulgar or a phi- 
 Ioft)phical Senfe ; fo we fay there is nothing in the 
 Cup, in a vulgar Senfe, when we mean there is 7to 
 Liquor in it ; but we cannot fay there is nothing in 
 the Cup, in a ftridl philofophical Senfe, while there 
 IS Air in it, and perhaps a Million of Rays of Light 
 are there. 
 
 II. Not-Being, as it has relation to Modes or 
 Manners of Being, may be confidered either as a 
 mere Negation, or as a Privation. 
 
 A Negation is the Abfence of that which does 
 not naturally belong to the Thing we are fpeak- 
 ing of, or which has no Right, Obligation, or 
 Neceffity to be prefent with it ; as when we fay 
 
 a Stone 
 
e. II. S. 5. T:he right Vfe 2/"Reafdn: if 
 
 a Stone is Inanimate, or Blinds or Deaf, i. e. ic 
 has no Life, nor Sight, nor Hearing ; or when we 
 fay a Carpenter or a Fijherman is unlearned, thefe 
 are mere Negations. 
 
 Buc a Privation is the Abfence of what does 
 naturally belong to the Thing we are fpeaking of, 
 or which ought to be prefent with it, as when a 
 Man or a //t^r/d- is deaf, or Z?AW, or dead, or if a 
 Phyfician or a Divine be unlearned, thefe are called 
 Privations : So the Stnfulnefs of any human A5iion 
 is faid CO be a Privation ; for 6'/« is that Want of 
 Conformity to the Law of God, which ought to 
 be found in eve^y Adion of Man. 
 
 Note, There are fome Writers who make all 
 fort of relative Modes or Relations, as well as all 
 external Denominations, to be mere Creatures of the 
 Mind, and Entia Rationis, , and then they rank 
 them alfo under the general Head of Not- Beings ; 
 but it is my Opinion, that whatfoever may be 
 determined concerning mere mental Relations and 
 external Denominations, which feem to have fome- 
 thing lefs of Entity or Being in them, yet there 
 are many real Relations, which ought not to be 
 reduced to fo low a Clafs ; fuch are the Situation 
 of Bodies, their mutual Difiances^ their particu- 
 lar Proportions and Meafures, the Notions of Fa- 
 therhood, Brotherhood, Sonfhip, i^c. all which are 
 relative Ideas, The very EfTence of Virtue ot 
 Holinefs confifts in the Conformity of our Ac- 
 tions to the Rule of Right Reafon, or the Law of 
 God : The Nature and Effence of Sincerity is the 
 Conformity of our Words and Adions to our 
 Thoughts, all which are but 7nere Relations ; and 
 I think we muft not reduce fuch pofitive Beings as 
 Piety, and Virtue, and Truth, to the Rank of 
 Non- Entities, which have nothing real in them, 
 though Sin (or rather the Sinfulnefs of an Adion) 
 
 C ' may 
 
28 LOG IC K: Or, Parti. 
 
 may be properly called a Not-Being^ for it is a 
 Want of Piety and Fir///^. This is the moll ufual, 
 and perhaps the jufteft Way of reprefenting thefe 
 Matters. 
 
 CHAP. 111. 
 
 Of the feveral Sorts of Perceptions or Ideas. 
 
 IDEAS may be divided with Regard to their 
 Original, their Nature, their Obje^fs, and their 
 Qualities. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of fenfihle, fpiritual, and ahftraSfed Ideas, 
 
 THERE has been a great Controverfy a- 
 bout the Origin of Ideas, (viz,) whether any 
 of our Ideas are innate or no, i. e, born with us, and 
 naturally belonging to our Minds. Mr. Locke ut- 
 terly denies it ; others as pofitively affirm it. Now, 
 though this Controverfy may be compromifed, by 
 allowing that there is a Senfe, wherein our firft 
 Ideas of fome Things may be faid to be innate^ 
 (as I have fhewn in fome Remarks on Mr. Locke*% 
 Eflay, which have lain long by me) yet it does 
 not belong to this Place and Bufinefs to have that 
 Point debated at large, nor will it hinder our Pur- 
 fuitof the prefent Work to pafs it over in Silence. 
 
 There is fufficient Ground to fay, that all our 
 Ideas, with Regard to their Original, may be di- 
 vided into three forts, (viz.) fenfihle, fpritual, and 
 ahJlraEled Ideas. 
 
 I. Senfihle or corporeal Ideas, are derived originally 
 from our Senfes, and from the Communication 
 
 which 
 
C III. S. I. The right Ufe /Reafon. 29 
 
 which the Soul has with the animal Body in this 
 prefenc State; fuch are the Notions we frame of 
 all Colours^ Sounds^ Taftes^ Figures^ or Shapes and 
 Motions ; for our Senfss being converfant abouc 
 particular fenfible Objed:s beconie the Occafions 
 of feveral diftindl Perceptions in the Mind ; and 
 thus we come by the Ideas of Tellovj^ IVhite^ Heat^ 
 Cold, Soft, Hardy Bitter , Sweety and all thofe 
 which we call fenfible ^mliiies. All the Ideas which 
 we have of Body, and the feveral Modes and Pro- 
 perties that belong to it, feem to be derived from 
 Senfation, 
 
 And howfoever thefe may be treafured up ia 
 the Memory, and by the Work of Fancy may be 
 increafed, diminifhed, compounded, divided, and 
 diverfified, (which we are ready to call our In- 
 vention) yet they all derive their firft Nature and 
 Being from fomething that has been let into our 
 Minds by one or other of our Senfes. If I think 
 of a golden Mountain^ or a Sea of liquid Fire, yen ■ 
 the fingle Ideas of Sea, Fire, Mountain and Gold 
 Came into my Thoughts at firft by Senfation ; the 
 Mind has only compounded them. 
 
 II, "* Spiritual ov Intelkofual Ideas are thofe which 
 we gain by refle(fl:ing on the Nature and Adions 
 of our own Souls, and turning our Thoughts with- 
 in our felves, and obferving what is tranfadled in 
 our own Minds. Such are the Ideas we have of 
 Thought, Affent, DiJJent, Judging, Reafon, Knowledge, 
 Under II anding. Will, Love, Fear, Hope, 
 
 By Senfation the Soul contemplates Things (as it 
 were) out of itfelf, and gains corporeal Reprefen- 
 tations or fenfible Ideas : By Reflexion the Soul 
 contemplates itfelf, and Things within itfelf and 
 
 * Here the Word Spiritual is ufed in a mere natural, and cot in a 
 religious Senfe, 
 
 C 2 by 
 
30 L G I C K: Or, Part L 
 
 by this Means it gains ypfn'/z^^/ Ideas, or Reprefen* 
 tations of Things i7itelle5iuaU 
 
 Here it may be noted, tho' the firft Original of 
 thefe two Sorts of Ideas, {viz,) Senfihle and Spiri- 
 tiial^ may be entirely owing to thefe two Principles, 
 Senfalion and Refte5fion, yet the Recolle5fion and 
 frefh Excitation of them may be owing to a thou- 
 fand other Occafions and Occurrences of Life, 
 We could never inform a Man who was born 
 Blind or Deaf what we mean by the Words Tel- 
 low^ Blue^ Redy or by the Words Loud or Shrilly 
 nor convey any juft Ideas of thefe Things to his 
 Mind, by all the Powers of Language, unlefs he 
 has experienced thofe Senfations of Sound and Go- 
 lour i nor could we ever gain the Ideas of Thoiigbty 
 Judginenty Reafon^ Doubting^ Hoping^ &c. by all 
 the Words that Man could invent, without turn- 
 ing our Thoughts inward upon the Adlions (3f our 
 own Souls. Yet when once v^e have attained thefe 
 Ideas by Senfatlon and RejleLlion^ they may be ex- 
 cited afrefli by the Ufe of Names, Words, Signs, 
 or by any Thing elfe that has been connected with 
 them in our Thoughts ; for when two or more 
 Ideas have been aflbciated together, whether it be 
 by Cuftom, or Accident, or Defign, the one pre- 
 fently brings the other to Mind. 
 
 III. Befidt-s thefe two which we have named, 
 there is a third Sort of Ideas, which are commonly 
 called ahftra5fed Jdeas^ becaufe tho' the original 
 Ground or Occafion of them may be Senfations or 
 Refle^lion^ or hoth^ yet thefe Ideas are framed by 
 another A61 of the Mind which we ufually call 
 Jhftra^ion. Now the Word Ahftra5fion fignifies 
 a withdrawing fome Parts of an Idea from other 
 Tarts of ity i3y which Means fuch abflra5led Ideas 
 are formed, as neither reprefenc any Thing corpo- 
 
 real 
 
cm. S. I. TherightUfeofRt2ikn: 31 
 
 real or fpiritual^ i. e. any thing peculiar or proper 
 to Mind or Body. Now thefe are of two Kinds. 
 
 Some of tliefe ahflra£fed Ideas are the moft ah- 
 folute^ general and univerfal Conceptions of Things 
 confidered in themfelves, without Refpedt to others, 
 fuch as Etitity or Beings and Not-hebig^ EJfence^ 
 Exiftence^ A5f^ Power^ Suhflance^ Mode^ Accident^ 
 
 The other Sort of ahjira5led Ideas is relative^ as 
 when we compare feveral Things together, and 
 confider merely the Relations of one Thing to 
 another, entirely dropping the Subjeds of thofe 
 Relations, whether they be corporeal or fpi ritual ; 
 fuch are our Ideas of Caufe^ Effe£i^ Likenefs^ Un- 
 likenefsy Suhje^^ OhjeSf^ Identity^ or Samenefs^ and 
 Contrariety^ Order^ and other Things which are 
 treated of in Ontology, 
 
 Moft of the Terms of Art in feveral Sciences 
 may be ranked under this Head of ahftraBed Ideas y 
 as Noiin^ Pronoun ^ Verb, in Grammar, and the 
 feveral Particles of Speech, as wherefore^ therefore^ 
 when^ hoWy althd* howfoever^ &c. So Connexions, 
 Tranfitions, Similitudes^ Tropes^ and their various 
 Forms in Rhetorick. 
 
 Thefe ahflra^ed Ideas, whether abfolute or re- 
 lative, cannot fo properly be faid to derive their 
 immediate, complete and diftindl Original, either 
 from Senfation or Reflexion, (i.) Becaufe the Na- 
 ture and the Adlions both of Body and Spirit give 
 us Occafion to frame exadly the fame Ideas of EI- 
 fence. Mode, Caufe^ Effe5f, IJkenefs^ Contrariety^ 
 i£c. Therefore thefe cannot be called either y^^;?//- 
 lle or fpiritual Ideas, for they are not exadt Re- 
 prefeniaticns either cf the peculiar ^mliiies or ABions 
 of Spirit or Body, but feem to be a diilindl Kind 
 of Idea fram'd in the Mind, to reprefcnt our mod 
 general Conceptions of Things or their Relations to 
 C 3" on^ 
 
32 L O G I C K: Or, Part I, 
 
 one another, without any Regard to their Natures, 
 whether they be corporeal or fpiritual. And, (2.) 
 the fame general Ideas, of Caufe and Effe^, Like- 
 pefs^ &c\ may be transferr'd to a Thoufand other 
 JCinds of Being, whether bodily or fpiritual, befides 
 thofe from whence we firf!: derived them : Even 
 thofe ahlira5ied Ideas, which might be firft occa- 
 fion'd by Bodies^ may be as properly afterward at- 
 tributed to Spirits. 
 
 Now, though Mr. Locke fuppofes Senfation and 
 P.efle£fion to be the two only Springs of all Ideas, 
 ^nd that thefe two are fufficient to furnifh our 
 Minds with all that rich Variety of Ideas which 
 we have •, yet Ah[ira^ion is certainly a different 
 Adl of the Mind, whence thefe ahftra5led Ideas 
 have their Original ; though perhaps Senfation or 
 |leflf^6lion may furnifli us with all the firft Objcdts 
 and Occafions whence thefe ahJiraBed Ideas are ex- 
 cited and deriv'd. Nor in this Senfe and View of 
 Things can I think Mr. Locke himfelf would deny 
 my Reprefentation of the Original of ahftra5led 
 Jdeas, nor forbid them to ftand for a diftindt Species. 
 Note, Though we have divided Ideas in this 
 Chapter into three Sorts (viz.) fenfible, fpiritual, 
 and ahftra5fed, yet it may not be amifs juft to take 
 notice here, that as Man may be called a compound 
 Suhftance, being made up of Body and Mind, 
 and the Modes which arife from this Compofition 
 are called mixed Modes, fuch as Senfation, Pajfon, 
 Difcourfe^ &c. So the Ideas of this Subftance or 
 Being called Man, and of thefe mixed Modes may 
 be called ?mxt Ideas, for they are not properly and 
 ftridlly fpiritual, fenfible or ahflraBed. See a much 
 jarger Account of every Part of this Chapter in the 
 philofopbical Effays, by /. IF, EfT. 3, 4, ^c. 
 
 SECT, 
 
C. IIL S. 2. "The right XJfe of Reafon. 33 
 
 SECT II. 
 
 Of fimple and compUic^ compound and colle5iive Ideas, 
 
 IDEAS confidered in their Nature are either 
 fimple or complex, 
 
 A fimple Idea is one uniform Idea which cannot 
 be divided or diftinguifhed by the Mind of Man 
 into two or more Ideas ; fuch are a Multitude of 
 our Senfacions, as the Idea of Sweet, Bitter^ Cold^ 
 Heaty Wbite^ Red, Blue, Hard, Soft, Motion, Refi^ 
 and perhaps Extenfwn and Duration : Such are alfo 
 many of our fpiritual Ideas , /uch as Thought, Will^ 
 Wifh, Knowledge, ^c, 
 
 A complex Idea is made by joining two or more 
 fimple Ideas together ; as a Sqiiare, a Triangle, a 
 Cube, a Pen, a Table, Reading, Writing, Truths 
 Falfhood, a Body, a IVlan, a Horfe, an Angel, a 
 heavy Body, 2ifwift Horfe, &c. Every Thing that 
 can be divided by the Mind into two or more Ideas 
 is called complex. 
 
 Co?7ip!ex Ideas are often confidered z^fingle and 
 diflin^ Beings, tho' they may be made up of fe- 
 veral fimple Ideas -, fo a Body, a Spirit, a Houfe, 
 a Tree, a Flower. But when feveral of thefe 
 Ideas of a different Kind are join'd together, which 
 are wont to be confider'd as diftindl fingle Beings, 
 this is called a compounded Idea, whether thefe 
 united Ideas be fimple or complex. So a Man is 
 compounded of Body and Spirit, fo Mithridate is 
 a compound Medicine, becaufe ic is made of many 
 different Ingredients : This I have fhewn under 
 the Dodrine of Suhftances, And Modes alfo may 
 be compounded ; Harmony is a compound Idea 
 made up of different Sounds united ; fo feveral dif-- 
 ferent Virtues muft be united to make up the com- 
 C 4. pounded 
 
34 L G IC K: Or, Part I 
 
 pounded Idea or Gharader, either of a Hero, or a 
 
 Saint. 
 
 But when many Ideas of the fa?}ie Kind are 
 joined together and united in one Name, or under 
 one View, it is called a colle^ive Idea •, fo an Ar- 
 my^ or a Parliament^ is a Colledion of Men ; 
 a Di5iionary or Nomenclatura is a ColJedlion of 
 Words 5 a Flock is a Colledion of Sheep ; a Fo- 
 reft^ or Grove ^ a Colled ion of Trees ; a Heap is 
 a Colledion of Sand, or Corn, or Dufl, l^c. a 
 City is a Colledlion of Houfes ; a Nofegay is a 
 Colledion of Flowers j a Months or a l^/^r, is a 
 Colle<5i:ion of Days j and a noufand is a Colledion 
 of Units. 
 
 The precife Difference between a cojnpound and 
 colle5live Idea is this, that a compound Idea unites 
 Things of a different Kind, but a colle5iive Idea 
 Things of the fame Kind : Tho' this Diftin6tion in 
 fome Cafes is not accurately obferv'd, and Cuftom 
 oftentimes ufes the Word compound for colk^ive, 
 
 SECT. Ill 
 
 Of univerfal and particular Ideas, real and ima^ 
 
 ginary, 
 
 IDEAS, according to their 0^;>^j, may firft 
 be divided into particular or univerfal, 
 A particular Idea is that which reprefents one 
 Thing only. 
 
 Sometimes the one Thing is reprefented in a 
 loofe and indeterminate Manner, as when we fay 
 fome Man^ any Man, one Man, another Man ; 
 fome Horfe, any Horfe ; one City, or another, which 
 is called by the Schools Individuum Vagum. 
 
 Sometimes the particular Idea reprefents one 
 TThing in a determinate^ Manner, and then it is 
 
 callec} 
 
C. Ill, S. 3. The right life c/Reafon, 35 
 
 called z/ingular Idea ; fuch is Bucephalus or ^lex- 
 finder^ Horfe, Cicero the Orator, Peter the Apoftle, 
 the Palace of Verfailles^ this Book^ that River ^ the 
 new For eft, or the City of Lofidon : That Idea 
 which reprefents one particular determinate Thing 
 to me is called a fingular Idea^ whether it be fmiple, 
 or complex, or compound. 
 
 The OhjcEl of any particular Idea, as well as 
 the Idea itfelf, is fometimes called an Individual : 
 So Peter is an individual Man, London is an indi- 
 vidual City. So this Book^ one Horfe, another Horfe^ 
 are all Individuals ; though the Word Individual is 
 more ufually limited to one fingular^ certain^ and 
 determined Objeft. 
 
 An univerfal Idea is that which reprefents a com- 
 mon Nature agreeing to feveral particular Things ; 
 fo a Horfe^ a Man, or a Book, are called univerfal 
 Ideas^ becaufe they agree to all Horfes^ Men^ or 
 Books. 
 
 And I think it not amifs to intimate, in this 
 Place, that thefe univerfal Ideas are formed by 
 that A61 of the Mind which is called Abftra^lioUj 
 i. e. a Withdrawing fome Part of an Idea from, other 
 Parts of it : For when fingular Ideas are firft let 
 into the Mind by Senfation or Refledlion, then, in 
 order to make them univerfal, we leave out, or 
 drop, all thofe peculiar and determinate Characters, 
 Qualities, Modes, or Circumftances, which belong 
 merely to any particular individual Being, and by 
 which it differs from other Beings ; and we only 
 contemplate thofe Properties of it, wherein it agrees 
 with other Beings. 
 
 Though it muft be confefled, that the Name of 
 abftra5ied Ideas is lometimes attributed to univer- 
 fal Ideas, both fenfible or fpiritual, yet this Jb- 
 ftra5fion is not fo great, as when we drop out of 
 pur Ide^ every fsnfihle or fpiritual Reprefentation, 
 
 and 
 
36 L O G IC K: Or, Part I, 
 
 and retain nothing but the mo^ general and ahfolute 
 Conceptions of Things, or their mere Relations to 
 one another, without any Regard to their particular 
 Natures, whether they htfenfiUe or fpirilual. And 
 it is to this Kind of Conceptions we more properly 
 give the Name of ahjlra5ied Ideas^ as in the firit 
 Sedlion of this Chapter. 
 
 An univerfal Idea is either general or /fecial. 
 
 A general Idea is called by the Schools a Genus ; 
 and it is one common Nature agreeing to feveral 
 other common Natures. So Animal is a Genusy 
 becaufe it agrees to Horje^ Lion^ Whale^ Butterfly^ 
 which are alfo common Ideas *, fo Fijh is a Genus y 
 becaufe it agrees to Trouty Herrings Crah^ which 
 are common Natures alfo. 
 
 Afpecial Idea is called by the Schools a Species ; 
 it is one common Nature that agrees to feveral lin- 
 gular individual Beings; fo Horfe is afpecial Idea^ 
 or a Species^ becaufe it agrees to Bucephalus, Trotly 
 and Snow- ball. City is 3.fpecial Idea^ for it agrees 
 to London^ Paris, Brijlol. 
 
 Note, I ft. Some of thefe Univerfals are Genus^Sy 
 if compared with lefs common Natures ; and they 
 are Species's^ if compared with Natures more com- 
 mon. So Bird is a Genus, if compared with Ea- 
 gle, Sparrow, Raven, which are alfo common Na- 
 tures : But it is a Species, if compared with the more 
 general Nature, Animal, The lame may be faid of 
 Fijlj, Beaft, ^c. 
 
 This fort of univerfal Ideas, which may either 
 be confidered as a Genus, or a Species, is called 
 Subaltern : But the higheft Genus, which is never 4 
 Species, is called the 7no(i general ; and the loweft 
 Species, which is never a Genus, is called the mofi 
 fpecial. 
 
 It may be obferved here alfo, that that general 
 Nature or Property wherein one Thing agrees with 
 
 moft 
 
C. III. S. 3 ne right Ufe of Reafon. 37 
 
 moil other Things is called its more remote Genus : 
 So Suhftance is the remote Genus of Bird^ or Beaft^ 
 becaufe it agrees not only to all Kinds of Animals, 
 but alfo to things inanimate, as Sun, Stars, Clouds, 
 Metals, Stones, Air, Water, i^c. But Animal is 
 the frommate or near eft Genus of Bird, becaufe ic 
 agrees to feweft other Things. Thofe general Na- 
 tures which Hand between the nearefi and mod re^ 
 mote are called Intermediate, 
 
 Note^ IP^y, In univerfal Ideas it is proper to 
 confider their Comprehenfwn and their Extention *. 
 
 The Comprehenfwn of an Idea regards all the ef- 
 fential Modes and Properties of it : So Body in its 
 Comprehenjion takes in Solidity.^ Figure, ^aniity^ 
 Mobility, &c. So a Bowl in its Comprehenfwn in- 
 cludes Roundnefs, Volubility, ^c. 
 
 The Extenfion of an univerfal Idea regards all the 
 particular Kinds and fingle Beings that are con- 
 tained under it. So a Body in its Extenfon includes 
 Sun, Moon, Star, TFood, Iron, Plant, Animal, &c, 
 which are feveral Species, or Individuals, under the 
 general Name of Body, So a Bowl, in its Extejt^ 
 fon, includes a wooden Bowl, a hrafs Bowl, a white 
 and black Bowl, a heavy Bowl, iSc, and all Kinds 
 of Bowls, together with all the particular indivi- 
 dual Bowls in the World. 
 
 Note, The Comprehenfwn of an Idea is fometimes 
 taken in fo large a Senfe, as not only to include the 
 elTential Attributes, but all the Properties, Modes, 
 and Relations whatfoever, that belong to any Being, 
 as will appear Chap. VI. 
 
 This Account of Genus and Species is part of 
 that famous Dodrine of Univerfals^ which is taught 
 in the Schools, with divers other Formalities be- 
 longing to it ; for it is in this Place that they in- 
 
 "* Notey The Word Extenfion here is taken in a mere logical S&nk, and 
 jg©t in a fhyfical and mathematical Senfe* 
 
 troduce 
 
38 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 troduce Difference, which is the primary effential 
 Mode, and Property, or the fecondary effential 
 Mode, and Accident or the accidental Mode ; and 
 thefe they call the five Predicahles, becaufe every 
 Thing that is alHrm'd concerning any Being muft 
 be either the Genus, the Species, the Difference, 
 fome Property, or fome Accident : But what farther 
 is neceffary to be faid concerning thefe Things will 
 be mentioned when we treat oi Definition. 
 
 Having finilhed the Dodrine of univerfal and 
 particular Ideas, I fhould take notice of another 
 Divifion of them, which alfo hath Refpedk to their 
 Objects 9 and that is, they are either real or imagi- 
 nary. 
 
 Real Ideas are fuch as have a juft Foundation in 
 Nature, and have real Objedls, or Exemplars, which 
 did, or do, or may actually exift, according to the 
 prefent State and Nature of Things ; fuch are all 
 our Ideas of Long, Broad, Swift, Slow, Wood, Iron, 
 Men, Horfes, Noughts, Spirits, a cruel Mafier, a 
 proud Beggar, a Man feven Feet high. 
 
 Imaginary Ideas, which slvq slKo ca.\kd fantaftical, 
 or chimerical, are fuch as are made by enlarging, 
 diminifhing, uniting, dividing real Ideas in the 
 Mind, in fuch a Manner, as no Objeds, or Ex- 
 emplars, did or will ever exift, according to the 
 prefent Courfe of Nature, tho' the feveral Parts of 
 thefe Ideas are borrowed from real Objeds ; fuch 
 are the Conceptions we have of a Centaur, a Satyr, 
 a golden Mountain, a flying Horfe, a Dog without a 
 Head, a Bull lefs than a Moufe, or a Moufe as big as 
 a Bull, and a Man twenty Feet high. 
 
 Some of thefe fantaftick Ideas are poffible, that 
 is, they are not utterly inconfiftent in the Nature 
 of Things ; and therefore it is within the Reach 
 of Divine Power to make fuch Objeds ; fuch are 
 moft of the Inftances already given : But ImpoJJibles 
 
 carry 
 
C III. S. 4 ne right Ufe of Reafon. 39 
 
 carry an utter Inconfiftence in the Ideas which are 
 join'd ; fuch are felf-aSiive Matter^ and infinite or 
 eternal Men, a pious Man without Honefly^ or Hea-^ 
 ven without Holmefs, 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 ^he Bivifion of Ideas, with Regard to their ^alities. 
 
 IDEAS, with Regard to their ^alities, afford 
 us thefe feveral Divifions of them. i. They 
 are either clear and diftin5i, or oh/cure and confufed. 
 2. They are vulgar or learned, 3. They are per^ 
 fe5i or imperfe5f, 4. They are true ov falfe, 
 
 I. Our Ideas are either clear and diflin^y or oJ- 
 fcure and confufed. 
 
 Several Writers have diftinguiflied the clear 
 Ideas from thofe that are diftin5i ; and the confufed 
 Ideas from thofe that are ohfcure ; and it mull be 
 acknowledged, there may be fome Difference be- 
 tween them ; for it is the Clearnefs of Ideas for 
 the moft Part makes them di§iinif ; and the Oh* 
 fcurity of Ideas is one Thing that will always bring 
 a Sort of Confufton into them. Yet when thefe 
 Writers come to talk largely upon this Subjed:, and 
 to explain and adjuft their Meaning with great 
 Nicety, I have generally found that they did not 
 keep up the Diftindtion they firft dcfign'd, but 
 they confound the one with the other. I fhall 
 therefore treat of clear or diftin^ Ideas, as one and 
 the fame Sort, and ohfcure or confufed Ideas, as 
 another. 
 
 A clear and diftin5i Idea is that which reprefents 
 the Objed of the Mind with full Evidence and 
 Strength, and plainly diftinguilhes it from all other 
 Objcds whatfoever. 
 
 An 
 
40 LOGIC K: Or, t>a^t L 
 
 An oh/cure and csnfufed Idea reprefents the Ob- 
 jedl either fo faintly, fo imperfedly, or fo mingled 
 with other Ideas, that the Objecl of it doth not 
 appear plain to the Mind, nor purely in its own 
 Nature, nor fufficiently diftinguillied from other 
 Things. 
 
 When we fee the Sea and Shy nearer at Hand^ 
 we have a clear and di§iiii5l Idea of each ; but when 
 we look far toward the Horizon, efpecially in a 
 mifty Day^ our Ideas of both are but obfcure and 
 confufed ; for wc know not which is Sea and which 
 is Sky, So when we look at the Colours of the Rain^ 
 how^ we have a clear Idea of the red^ the blue, the 
 green in the Middle of their feveral Arches, and a 
 diftin^ Idea too, while the Eye fixes there ; but 
 when we confider the Border of thofe Colours, they 
 fo run into one another that it renders their Ideas 
 confufed and obfcure. So the Idea which we have of 
 our Brother^ or our Friend^ whom we fee daily, is 
 clear and diffin5f ; but when the Abfence of many 
 Years has injured the Idea, it becomes obfcure and 
 confufed. 
 
 Note here^ that fome of our Ideas may be very 
 clear and diflinct in one Refpedl, and very obfcure 
 and confufed in another. So when we fpeak of a . 
 Chiliagonum^ or a Figure of a thoufand Angles^ we 
 may have a clear and diflinct rational Idea of the 
 Number one thoufand Angles ; for we can demon- 
 ftrate various Properties concerning it by Reafon : 
 But the hnage^ or fenfible Idea^ which we have of 
 the Figure, is but confufed and obfcure 5 for we 
 cannot precifely diflinguifh it by Fancy from the 
 Image of a Figure that has nine hundred Angles^ or 
 nine hundred and ninety. So when we fpeak of the 
 infinite DivifibiUty of Matter^ we always keep in 
 our Minds a very clear and diflindl; Idea of Divi- 
 /ton and DivifibiUty , But after v/e have made a 
 
 little 
 
C. ill. S. 4. The right life c/'Reafon: 41 
 
 Jktle Progrefs in dividing, and come to Parts 
 that are far too fmall for the Reach of our Senfes> 
 then our Ideas ^ or fenfihle Images of thefe little 
 Bodies, become oh/cure^ and indijlin5fy and the 
 Idea of Infinite is very ohfcure^ imperje5f^ and con- 
 fufed. ^i 
 
 II. Ideas are either vulgar or learned. A vuU 
 gar Idea reprefents to us the moft obvious and 
 fenfible Appearances that are contained in the Ob- 
 jed: of them : But a learned Idea penetrates farther 
 into the Nature, Properties, Reafons, Caufes and 
 Effedls of Things. This is beft illuftrated by fome 
 Examples. 
 
 It is a vulgar Idea^ that we have of a Rainbow, 
 when we conceive a large Arch in the Clouds, 
 made up of various Colours parallel to each other ^ 
 But it IS a learned Idea which a Philofopher has 
 when he confiders it as the various Reflexions and 
 Refractions of Sun- beams, in Drops of falling 
 Rain. So it is a vulgar Idea which we have of 
 the Colours of folid Bodies, when we perceive them 
 to be, as it were, a red, or blue, or green Tindture 
 of the Surface of thofe Bodies : But it is a philo- 
 fopbical Idea when we confider the various Colours 
 to be nothing elfe but different Senfations exci- 
 ted in us by the varioufly rafradled Rays of 
 Light, refiedled on our Eyes in a different Man- 
 ner, according to the different Size, or Shape, 
 or Situation of the Particles of which the Sur- 
 faces of thofe Bodies are compofed. It is a vul- 
 gar Idea which we have of a Watch or Clocks 
 when we conceive of it as a pretty Inflrument, 
 made to fliew us the Hour of the Day : But it is 
 a learned Idea which the Watch?naker has of it, 
 who knows all the feveral Parts of it, the Spring, 
 the Balance, the Chain, the Wheels, their Axles^ 
 Cs?r. together with the various Connexions and 
 
 Adjuftments 
 
42 L G 1 C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 Adjuftments of each Parr, Whence the exa6l and 
 uniform Motion of the Index is derived, which 
 points to the Minute or the Hour. So when a 
 common Underftanding reads Virgil's jEneid, he 
 has but a vulgar Idea of that Poem, yec his Mind 
 is naturally entertained with the Story, and his 
 Ears with the Verfe : But wheh a Critick, or a 
 Man who has Skill in Poefy, reads it^ he has a 
 learned Idea of its peculiar Beauties, he taftes and 
 relifhes a fuperior Pleafure ; he admires the Ko- 
 man Poet, and wiflies he had known the Chrijiian 
 neology^ which would have furniflied him with 
 nobler Materials and Machines than all the Heathen 
 Idols. 
 
 It is with a vulgar Idea that the World beholds 
 the Cartoons of Raphael at Ham-pton- Court, and 
 every one feels his Share of Pleafure and Entertain- 
 ment : But a Fainter contemplates the Wonders of 
 that Italian Pencil, and fees a thoufand Beauties in 
 them which the vulgar Eye negleded : His learned 
 Ideas give him a tranfcendent Delight, and yet, at 
 the fame time, difcover the Blemifhes which the 
 common Gazer never obferved. 
 
 III. Ideas are either perfe^f or imperfe5f^ which 
 are otherwife called adequate or inadequate, 
 
 Thofe are adequate Ideas which perfedly repre- 
 fent their Archetypes or Objedts. Inadequate 
 Ideas are but a partial, or incomplete Reprefen-* 
 tation of thofe Archetypes to which they are re- 
 ferred. 
 
 All our fmple Ideas are in fome Senfe adequate 
 or perfe^, becaufe fmple Ideas, confidered merely 
 as our firll Perceptions, have no Parts in them : 
 So we may be faid to have a perfed Idea of 
 White^ Black, Sweet, Sour, Length, Light, Mo- 
 tion, Reft, &c. We have alfo a perfedl Idea of 
 various Figures, as a Triangle, a Square, a Cylin-' 
 
 der. 
 
G. III. S. 4. The right Ufe of Reafon. 43 
 
 der^ a Cuhe, a Sphere^ which are complex Ideas : 
 But our Idea or Image of a Figure of a thoufand 
 Sides ^ our Idea of the City of London^ or the Pow- 
 ers of a Loadftone^ are very imperfect, as well as 
 all our Ideas of infinite Length or Breadth^ infinite 
 Power^ TVtfdom or Duration \ for the Idea of in- 
 finite is endlefs and ever growing, and can never be 
 completed. 
 
 Note^ I. When we have a per fed Idea of any- 
 thing in all its Parts, it is called a complete Idea ; 
 when in all its Properties^, it is called comprehenfive. 
 But when we have but an inadequate and imperfeof 
 Idea, we are only faid to apprehertd it; therefore 
 ufe the Term Apprehenfion, when we fpeak of our 
 Knowledge of God, who can never be comprehend- 
 ed by his Creatures. 
 
 Note, 2. Tho' there are a Multitude of Ideas 
 which may be called psrfe^, or adequate in a vulgar 
 Senfe, yet there arc fcarce any Ideas which are ade- 
 quate, comprehenfive and complete in a philofophical 
 Senfe ; for there is fcarce any thing in the World 
 that we know^ as to all the Parts, and Powers, and 
 Properties of it in Perfedion. Even fo plain an 
 Idea as that of a Triangle has, perhaps^ infinite 
 Properties belonging to it, of which we know but 
 a few. Who can tell what are the Shapes and Po- 
 rtions of thofe Particles, which caufe all' the Va- 
 riety of Colours that appear on the Surface of 
 Things ? Who knows what are the Figures of the 
 little Corpufcles that compofe and diftinguilli dif- 
 ferent Bodies? The Ideas of Brafs, Iron, Gold^ 
 Wood, Stone, Hyfjop^ and Rofemary have an infi- 
 nite Variety of hidden Myfteries contained in the 
 Shape, Size, Motion and Pofition of the little Par- 
 ticles, of which they are compofed ; and, perhaps, 
 alfo infinite unknown Properties and Powers, that 
 may be derived from them. And if we arife ro 
 
 D the 
 
44 L G I C K: Or, Part I, 
 
 the Animal World, or the World of Spirits^ our 
 Knowledge of them mull be amazingly imperfedl, 
 when there is not the lead Graijt of Sand^ or empty 
 Space, but has too many Queftions and Difficul- 
 ties belonging to it for the wifeft Philofopher upon 
 Earth to anfwer and refolve. 
 
 IV. Our Ideas are either true or falfe -, for an Idea 
 being the Reprefentation of a Thing in the Mind, 
 it mud be either a true or o. falfe Reprefentation of 
 it. If the Idea be conformable to the Obje<fl or 
 Archetype of it, it is a true Idea *, if not, it is a 
 fai/e one. Sometimes our Ideas are referr'd to things 
 really exiiling without us as their Archetypes. If I 
 fee Bodies in their proper Colours I have a true Idea: 
 But when a Man under the Jaundice fees all Bodies 
 yellow, he has a falfe Idea of them. So if we fee 
 the Sun or Moon, rifing or fetting, our Idea repre- 
 fents them higger than when they are on the Meri- 
 dian : And in this Senfe it is a falfe Idea, becaufe 
 thofe heavenly Bodies are all Day and all Night 
 of the fame Bignefs. Or when I fee a Jirait Staff 
 appear crooked while it is half under the IVater, I 
 fay, the Water giv^es me a falfe Idea of it. Some- 
 times our Ideas refer to the Ideas of other Men de- 
 noted by fuch a particular Word, as their Archetypes r 
 So when I hear a Proteflant ufe the Words Church 
 and Sacraments, if I underfland by thefe Words, a 
 Congregation of faithful Men who profefs Chriftianityy 
 and the two Ordinances, Baptifm and the Lora's 
 Supper, I have a true Idea of thofe Words in the 
 common Senfe of Prote^ants : But if the Man who 
 fpeaks of them be a Papijl, he means the Church of 
 ■Rome and the feven Sacraments, and then I have a 
 miflaken Idea of thofe Words, as fpoken by him, for- 
 he has a diiferent Str\(t and Meaning: And in ge- 
 neral whenfoev'cr I miftake the Senfe of any Speaker 
 or Writer, I may be faid to have a falfe Idea of ito 
 
 Some 
 
C. iV. S. I . rhe right life of Reafcn, 45 
 
 Some think that Truth or Faljhood properly be- 
 longs only to Propofitions^ which fhall be the Sub- 
 jedl of Difcourfe in the fecond Part of Logkk ; for 
 if we confider Ideas as mere Impreflions upon the 
 Mind^ made by outward Objeds, thofe Impref- 
 lions will ever be conformable to the Laws of Na- 
 ture in fuch a Cafe : The fVater v/ill make a Stick 
 appear crooked, and the horizontal Air will make 
 the Sun and Moon appear hgger. And generally 
 where there is Faljhood in Ideas^ there feems to be 
 iomtfecret or latent Propqfition, whereby we judge 
 falfly of Things i This is more obvious where we 
 take up the Words of a Writer or Speaker in a 
 miftaken Senfe, for we join his Words to our owa 
 Ideas, which are different from his. Butafter all^ 
 fince Ideas are Pictures of Things, it can never be 
 very improper to pronounce them to be true or 
 falfe, according to their Conformity or Nonconformity 
 to their Exemplars. 
 
 C H A P, IV, 
 
 Of tVords and their fever al DivifiG?2s, together ^ 
 with the Advantage and- Danger of thefn, 
 
 SECT I. 
 
 Of JVords in general^ and their life, 
 
 TH O' our Ideas are firft acquired by the Per- 
 ception of Obje(n:s, or by various Senfations 
 and RefleBions^ yet we convey them to each other 
 by the Means of certain Sounds, or written Marks, 
 which we call iVords j and a great Part of our 
 Knowledge is both obtained and communicated by 
 theft Means, which are cali'd Speech or LanguagCo 
 D 2 But 
 
46 L G I C K: Or, Part \ 
 
 But as we are led into the Knowledge of Things 
 by fVords, fo we are oftentimes led into Error, or 
 Miftake, by theUfe or Abufe o^tVords alfo. And 
 in order to guard againft fuch Miftakes as well as 
 to promote our Improvement in Knowledge, it is 
 necefifary to acquaint ourfelves a little with IVords 
 and TerfHs, We fhall begin with thefe Obferva- 
 tions. 
 
 Ohferv. i. Words (whether they are fpoken or 
 written ) have no natural Connexion with the 
 Ideas they are defigned to fignify, nor with the 
 Things which are reprefented in thofe Ideas. There 
 is no Manner of Affinity between the Sounds 
 white in Engltjh, or blanc in French^ and that Co- 
 lour which we call by that Name ; nor have the 
 Letters, of which thefe Words are compofed^ 
 any natural Aptnefs to fignify that Colour rather 
 than red or green. Words and Names therefore 
 are mere arbitrary Signs invented by Men to 
 communicate their Thoughts or Ideas to one ano- 
 ther. 
 
 Ohferv. 2. If one fingle Word were appointed 
 
 to exprefs but one fimple Idea, and nothing elfe, 
 
 as White. Blacky Sweet, Sour^ Sharp, Bitter, Exten- 
 
 fion, 'Duration, there would be fcarce any Miftake 
 
 about them. 
 
 But alas ! It is a common Unhappinefs in Lan- 
 guage, that differentyF;;2/}/d' Ideas are fometimes ex- 
 prefs'd by \\\^ fame Word \ fo the W ord.s> fweet and 
 fljarp are applied both to the Objects of hearing 
 and tailing, as we fhall fee hereafter ; and this, per- 
 haps, may be one Caufe or Foundation of Obfcurity 
 and Error arifing from Words. 
 
 Ohferv, 3. In communicating our Complex 
 Ideas to one another, if we could join as many 
 peculiar and appropriated Words together in one 
 Sound, as we join fimple Ideas to make one com- 
 plex 
 
C. IV. S. I . The right life of Reafon. 47 
 
 plex one, we (hould feldom be in Danger of mif- 
 taking : When I exprefs the Tafte ot an Apple, 
 which we call the Bitter Sweety none can miftake 
 what I mean. 
 
 Yet this fort of Compfition would make all Lan- 
 guage a moft tedious and unweildy Thing, fince 
 moft of our Ideas are complex, and many of 
 them have eight or ten fimple Ideas in them ; 
 fo that the Remedy would be worfe than the 
 Difeafe ; for what is now exprefled in one fliort 
 Word, as Months or Tear^ would require two 
 Lines to exprefs it. It is necelTary, therefore, 
 that ftngle Words be invented to exprefs complex 
 Ideas y in order to make Language fhort and ufe- 
 ful. 
 
 But here is our great Infelicity, that when 
 /p2gle Words fignify complex Ideas^ one Word can 
 never diftindly manifeft all the Parts of a com- 
 plex Idea ; and thereby it will often happen, that 
 one Man includes more or Jefs in his Idea, than 
 another does, while he affixes the fame Word to 
 it. In this Cafe there will be Danger of Mif- 
 take between them, for they do not mean the 
 fame Object^ tho' they ufe the fame Name» So if 
 one Perfon or Nation, by the Word l^ear mean 
 twelve Months of thirty Days each, i. e. three 
 hundred and fixcy Days, another intend a Solar 
 Tear of three hundred fixcy five Days, and a third 
 mean a Lunar Tear^ or twelve Lunar Monthsy 
 i. e. three hundred fifty four Days, there will be 
 a great Variation and Error in their Account of 
 Things, unlefs they are well apprized of each 
 other's Meaning beforehand. This is fuppofed to 
 be the Reafon, why fome ancient Hiftories^ and 
 Prophecies^ and Accounts of Chronology ^ are fo 
 hard to be adjufted. And this is the true Reafon 
 of fo furious and endlefs Debates on many Points 
 
 D 3 ia 
 
48 L G IC K: Or, Parti, 
 
 in Divinity ; the Words Church, Worjhip, Idola- 
 try^ Repentance^ Faith^ Ele5iion, Merits Grace^ and 
 many others which fignify very complex Ideas, arc 
 not applied to include juft the fame fimple Ideas, 
 and the fame Number of them, by the various 
 contending Parties j thence arife Confufion and 
 Conteft. 
 
 Obferv. 4. Tho' a Jngle Name does not cer- 
 tainly manlfeft to us all the Parts of a C07nfle^ 
 Idea, yet it muft be acknowledged, that in many 
 of our complex Ideas, the fingle Name may point 
 out to us fome chief Property which belongs to 
 the Thing that the Word fignifies \ efpecially 
 when the Word or Name is traced up to its 
 Original, thro' feveral Languages from whence ic 
 is borrowed. So an Apoftle fignifies one who is fent 
 forth. 
 
 But this tracing of a Word to its Original, 
 (which is called Etymology) is fometimes a very 
 precarious and uncertain Thing : And after all, 
 we have made but little Progrefs towards the 
 Attainment of the full Meaning of a complex 
 Idea, by knowing fome one chief Property of it. 
 We know but a fmall Part of the Notion of 
 an Apoftle, by knowing barely that he is fent 
 forth, 
 
 Obferv. 5. Many (if not mod) of our Words 
 which are applied to fnoral and intellectual Ideas^ 
 when traced up to their Original in the learned 
 Languages, will be found to fignify fenfible and 
 corporeal Things : Thus the Words Apprehenjion^ 
 Underftanding, Abflraction, Invention, Idea, In- 
 ference, Prudence, Religion, Church, Adoration^ 
 &c, have ail a corporeal Signification in their 
 Original. The Name Spirit itfelf fignifies Breath 
 pr Air, in Latin, Greek, and Hebrew : Such is 
 fhe Poverty of all Languages, they are forced to 
 
 ufe 
 
C. IV. S. i: ^he right Ufe ^/Reafon. 49 
 
 ufe thefe Names for incorporeal Ideas, which Thing 
 has a Tendency to Error and Confufion. 
 
 Obferv, 6. The lad Thing I Ihall mention that 
 leads us into many a Miftake is, the Multitude of 
 Objedls that one Name fometimes fignifies : There 
 is almolt an infinite Variety of Things and Ideas 
 both fimple and complex, beyond all the Words 
 that are invented in any Language ; thence it be- 
 comes almoft necefTary that one Name fhould fig- 
 nify feveral TKings. Let us but confider the two 
 Colours oi Tellow and Blue, if they are mingled to- 
 gether in any conliderable Proportion they make 
 a Green : Now there may be infinite Differences 
 of the Proportions in the Mixture of Tellow and 
 and Blue ; and yet we have only thefe three Words, 
 Tellow, Blue, and Green, to fignify all of them, at 
 leaft by one fingle Term. 
 
 When I ufe the Word Shore, I may intend there- 
 by a Coaji of Land near the Sea, or a Drain to 
 carry off Water, or a Vrop to fupport a Building ; 
 and by the Sound of the Word Porter, who can 
 tell whether I mean a Man who hears Burthens, or 
 a Servant who waits at a Nobleman's Gate ? The 
 World is fruitful in the Invention of Utenfds of 
 Life, and new Characters and Offices of Men, yet 
 Names entirely new are feldom invented -, there- 
 fore old Names are almoil necefifarily ufed to figni- 
 fy new Things, which may occafion much Confu- 
 fion and Error in the receiving and communicating 
 of Knowledge. 
 
 Give me leave to propofe one fingle Inflance, 
 wherein all thefe Notes ihall be remarkably ex- 
 emplified. It is the Word BiJIoop, which in 
 French is called Eveque ; upon which I would make 
 thefe feveral Obfervations. (i.) That there is 
 no natural Connexion between the facred Of- 
 fice hereby fignified, and the Letters or Sound 
 D 4 which 
 
Ijo LOG I C K: Or, Part L 
 
 which fignify this Office ; for both thefe Words 
 Eveque and Bijhop fignify the fame Office, tho* 
 there is not one Letter alike in them •, nor have 
 the Letters which compofe the Englijh or the 
 French Word any thing facred belonging to them, 
 more than the Letters that compofe the Words 
 King or Scldier. (2.) If the Meaning of a Word 
 could be learn'd by its Derivation or Etymology, 
 yet the original Derivation of Words is often- 
 times very dark and unfearchable ; for who would 
 imagine that each of thefe Words are derived 
 from the Latin Epifcopus^ or the Greek 'Em<7iLO'moi ? 
 Yet in this Inftance we happen to know certainly 
 the true Derivation ; the French being anciently 
 writ Evefque^ is borrowed from the firfl: Part of 
 the Latin Word ; and the old Englijh Bifcop from 
 the Middle of it. ^3.) The original Greek Word 
 fignifies an Overlooker^ or one who ilands higher 
 than his Fellows and overlooks them : It is a 
 compound Word, that primarily fignifies (enfihle 
 
 ■Ideas, tranflated to fignify or include feveral fnoral 
 or intelle^ual Ideas \ therefore all will grant that 
 the Nature of the Office can never be known by the 
 mere Sound or Senfe of the Word Overlooker, (4.) 
 I add farther, the Word Bijhop or Eptfcopus, even 
 when it is thus tranflated from a fenfible Idea, to 
 include feveral intellecftual Ideas, may yet equally 
 fignify an Overfeer of the Poor ; an Infpe^or of 
 the Cuftoms ; a Surveyor of the Highways , a 
 Supervifor o^ the Excife, ^c. But by the Confent 
 of Men, and the Language of Scripture, it is 
 appropriated to fignify a Jacred Office in the Church. 
 
 '(5.) This very Idea and Name, thus tranflated 
 from Things ferifiblc, to fignify a fpiritual and fa- 
 cred Tiling, contains but one Property of it, 
 {vix.) one that has an Overfight^ or Care over others : 
 But it does not tell us, whether it includes .a 
 
 Car^ 
 
C. IV. S. 2- ^he right life i^/Reafon. 51 
 
 Care over one Churchy or many ; over the Laity^ 
 or the Clergy, (6.) Thence it follows, that thofe 
 who in the complex Idea of the Word Bijhop in- 
 clude an Overfight over the Clergy, or over a whole 
 Diocefe of People, a Superiority to Presbyters, a 
 diftin6t Power of Ordination, ^c, muft necefla- 
 rily difagree with thofe who include in it only the 
 Care of a (ingle Congregation. Thus according 
 to the various Opinions of Men, this Word fig- 
 nifies a Pope^ a Galilean Bijhop^ a Lutheran Super- 
 intendant^ an Englijh Prelate^ a Paftor of a Jingle Af- 
 femblyy or a Presbyter or Elder, Thus they quarrel 
 with each other perpetually ; and it is well if any 
 of them all have hit'precifely the Senfe of the facred 
 Writers, and included juft the fame Ideas in it, and 
 no others. 
 
 I might make all the fame Remarks on the Word 
 Church or Kirk^ which is derived from Kt/e/8 oW, 
 or the Hoiife of the Lord, contracted into Kyriotky 
 which fome fuppofe to fignify an AJfemhly of Chri" 
 Jlians, fome take it for all the World that profejfes 
 Chriftianity, and fome make it to mean only the 
 Clergy^ and on thefe Accounts it has been the Occa- 
 fion of as many and as furious Controverfies as the 
 Word Bi/hop which was mentioned before. 
 
 SECT. II, 
 
 Of negative and pofttive "Terms, 
 
 FROM thefe and other Confiderations it will 
 follow, that if we would avoid Error in our 
 Purfuit of Knowledge, we muft take good heed 
 to the Ufe of Words and Terms, and be acquainted 
 with the various Kinds of them. 
 
 . J. Terms are either pofttive or 7tegative. 
 
 Negative 
 
52 L O G IC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 Negative Terms are fuch as have a little Word 
 or Syllable of denying join*d to them, according 
 to the various Idioms of every Language, as Ufi" 
 fkafant^ Imprudent^ Immortal^ Irregular^ Ignorant^ 
 Infinite^ EndlefSy Lifelefs^ Beatblefs^ Nonfenfe^ A- 
 hyfs^ Anonymous^ where the Prepofitions Un^\Im^ In^ 
 NoHy Ay An^ and the Termination lefs^ fignify a 
 Negation, either in Englijhy Latin or Greek, 
 
 Pofuive Terms are thofe which have no fuch ne- 
 gative Appendices belonging to them, as Life^ 
 Deaths End, Senfe, Mortal. 
 
 But fo unhappily are our Words and Ideas link*d 
 together, that we can never know which are poft- 
 tive Ideas, and which are negative, by the Word 
 that is ufed to exprefs them, and that for thefe 
 Reafons : 
 
 I ft. There are fome pofttive ^erms which are 
 made to fignify a negative Idea ; as Dead is pro- 
 perly a Thing that is deprived oi Life \ Blind im- 
 plies a Negation or Privation of Sight ; Deaf a 
 Want of Hearing •, Dumb a Denial of Speech, 
 
 2dly, There are alfo fome fjegative Terms which 
 imply pcfitive Ideas, fuch as immortal and death- 
 lefs, which fignify ever-living, or a Continuance in 
 Life : Infolent fignifies rude and haughty : Indem- 
 7iify to keep fafe ; and Infinite perhaps has a pofi^ 
 tive Idea too, for it is an Idea ever growing -, and 
 when it is applied to God, it fignifies his cojnplete 
 Perfcclion, 
 
 3dly, There are both pofitive and negative Terms, 
 invented ro fignify the fame and contrary Ideas ; 
 as Unhappy and MiferaUe, Sinlefs and Holy, Pure 
 and Undefded, Impure and Filthy, Unkind and Cruel, 
 Irreligious and Profane, Unforgiving and Revenge- 
 ful, (^c, and there is a great deal of Beauty and 
 Convenience derived to any Language from this 
 Variety of ExprefTion x tho' fometimes it a little 
 
 con- 
 
C. IV. S. 2. "He right Ufe of Reafon. 53 
 
 confounds our Conceptions of Being and Not-being^ 
 Dur 'pqfitive and negative Ideas. 
 
 4thly, I may add alfo, that there are fome Words 
 which are negative in their original Language, buc 
 feem pofttive to an Englijhman^ becaufe the Nega- 
 tion is unknown \ as Ahyfs^ a Place without a Bot- 
 tom ; Anodyne^ an eafing Medicine ; Amnefiy^ an 
 Unremembrance or general Pardon ; Anarchy^ a 
 State without Government *, Anonymous^ i, e. name- 
 lefs ; Inept ^ i, e, not fit ; Iniquity^ i. e. Unrighteouf- 
 nefs ; Infant^ one that can't fpeak, {viz,) a Child ; 
 Injurious,, not doing Juftice or Right. 
 
 The Way therefore to know whether any Idea 
 be negative or not is, to confider whether it pri- 
 marily imply the Abfence of any pofitive Being, 
 or Mode of Being ; if it doth, then it is a Nega^ 
 tion or negative Idea , otherwife it is a pofitive one, 
 whether the Word that exprefies it be pofitive or 
 negative, l^et after all, in many Cafes this is 
 very hard to determine, as in Amnefty,, Infinite^ 
 Ahyfs, which are originally relative Terms, but 
 ehey fignify Pardon^ &c. which feem to be Pofi- 
 tives. So Darknefsy Madnefs, Clown^ are politive 
 Terms, but they imply the Want of Light,^ the 
 Want of Reafon^ and the Want of Manners ; and 
 perhaps theie may be ranked among the negative 
 ideas. 
 
 Here note, that in the Engli/h Tongue tivo ne- 
 gative Terms are equal to one pofitive ,, and figni- 
 fy the fame Thing, as not unhappy^ fignifies hap- 
 py ; not immortal^ fignifies mortal ; he is no im- 
 prudent Man^ i. e. he is a Man of Prudence : But 
 the Senfe and Force of the Word in fuch a negative 
 Way of ExprefTion fcems to be a little dimi- 
 nifh'd. 
 
 SECT. 
 
54 LOGIC K: Or, Part L 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of fmple and complex Terms, 
 
 11/ I ^ E R MS are divided into fmple or com- 
 JL plex. Afimple Term is one Word, a r6?/«- 
 ^/^a; Term is when more Words are ufed to fignify 
 one Thing. 
 
 Some Terms are complex in Wordsy hut not in 
 Senfe^ fuch is the fecond Emperor of Rome ; for ic 
 excites in our Mind only the Idea of one Man {viz,) 
 Augujiiis, 
 
 Some Terms are complex in Senfe^ hut not in 
 Words ; fo when I fay an Army^ a Forefi^ I mean 
 a Multitude of Men^ or Trees \ and almoft all our 
 moral Ideas, as well as many of our natural ones, 
 are exprefled in this Manner ; Religion^ Piety^ Loy- 
 alty^ Knavery y Theft^ include a Variety of Ideas in 
 each Term. 
 
 There are other Terms which are complex hoth 
 In Words and Senfe ; fo when I fay, a fierce Bog, 
 or a pious Man, it excites an Idea, not only of 
 thofe two Creatures, but of their peculiar Charadters 
 alfo. 
 
 Among the Terms that are com.plex in Senfe, hut 
 mt in Words, we may reckon thofe fimple Terms 
 which contain a primary and a fecondary Idea in 
 them ; as when I hear my Neighbour fpeak that 
 which is not true, and I fay to him this is not 
 true, or this is falfe, I only convey to him the 
 naked Idea of his Error ; this is the primary Idea : 
 But if I fay it is a Lie, the Word Lie carries alfo 
 Si fecondary Idea in ic, for it implies both the Falf- 
 hood of the Speech, and my Reproach and Cen- 
 iure of the Speaker. On the other Hand, if I fay it 
 is a Miftake, this carries alfo a fecondary Idea with 
 
 it^ 
 
C. IV. S. 3 . The right Ufe of Reafon. s5 
 
 it ; for it not only refers to the Falfhood of his 
 Speech, but includes my Tendernefs and Civility 
 to him at the fame Time. Another Inftance may 
 be this ; when I ufe the Word Inceff^ Adultery^ 
 and Murder^ 1 convey to another not only \.\\t pri- 
 mary Idea of thofe Adlions, but I include alfo the 
 fecondary Idea of their Unlawfulnefs, and my Ab- 
 horrence of them. 
 
 NotCy I ft. Hence it comes to pafs, that among 
 Words which fignify the fame principal Ideas, 
 fome are clean and decent ^ others unclean *, fome 
 cbajlcy others ohfcene ; fome are kind, others are 
 affronting and reproachful^ becaufe of the fecondary 
 Idea which Cuftom has affixed to them. And it 
 is the Part of a wife Man, when there is a Ne* 
 ceffity of expreffing any evil A5fion5^ to do it ei- 
 ther by a Word that has a fecondary Idea of Kind- 
 nefsy or Softnefs ; or a Word that carries in it an 
 Idea of Rebuke and Severity^ according as the Cafe 
 requires. So when there is a Neceffity of expreff- 
 ing Things unclean or ohfcene^ 2l wife Man will do 
 it in the moft decent Language, to excite as few 
 uncleanly Ideas as poffible in the Minds of the 
 Hearers, 
 
 NotCy 2dly, In Length of Time, and by the 
 Power of Cuftom, Words fometimes "change their 
 primary Ideas ^ as ftiall be declared, and fometimes 
 they have changed their fecondary Ideas^ tho' the 
 primary Ideas may remain : So Words that were 
 once chafe by frequent Ufe grow ohfcene and un- 
 cleanly ; and Words that were once honourable 
 may in the next Generation grow mean and con^ 
 iemptible. So the Word Da??ie originally fignifi- 
 ed a Miftrefs of a Family, who was a Lady, and 
 it is ufed ftill in the Englifh Law to fignify a 
 Lady ; but in common Ufe now-a-days it repre- 
 fencs a Fanner^ s Wfe^ or a Miftrefs of a Family 
 
 cf 
 
^6 LOGIC K: Or, Part L 
 
 of the lower Rank in the Country, So thofe Words 
 oi Rahfloakeh^ Ifa. xxxvi. 12. in our Tranfladon^ 
 (Eat their own Dung^ &c.) were doubdefs decenc 
 and clean Language, when our Tranflators wrote 
 them above a hundred Years ago. The Word 
 Dung has maintain'd its old fecondary Idea and in- 
 offenfive Senfe to this Day ; but the other Word in 
 that Sentence has by Cultom acquired a more un- 
 cleanly Ideaj and fhould now rather be changed 
 into a more decent Termj and fo it fhould be read 
 in publick, unlefs it fhould be thought more pro- 
 per to omit the Sentence ** 
 
 For this Reafon it is, that the Jew'ijh Rabbins 
 have fupplied other chafte Words in the Margin 
 of the Hebrew Bible, where the Words of the 
 Texr^ thro* Time and Cuflom^ are degenerated^ 
 fo as to carry any bafe and unclean Jecondary Ided 
 in them ; and they read the Word which is in the 
 Margin, which they call Keri^ and not that 
 which was written in the Text, which they call 
 Chetib, 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Of Words common and proper. 
 
 llhXliJORDS and 'Names are either commofi 
 V V or proper. Common Names are fuch as 
 fland for univerfal Ideas, or a whole Rank of Be- 
 ings, whether general or fpecial. Thefe are calPd 
 Appellatives *, fo Fi[h^ Bird^ Alrni^ City, River^ are' 
 common Names ; and fo are Trout, Eel^ Lobfleri 
 for they all agree to many Individuals^ and feme of 
 them CO many Species : But Cicero, Virgil, Buce^ 
 
 * So in fome Places of the facred Hiftorlans, where it is written, Every 
 tne that pijjis agaivfi the Wully we fhould xead E'vcry Male, 
 
 phaluSf 
 
C. IV. S. 4 "The right Ufe of Reafon. ^7 
 
 pbalus, London^ Rome^ jEtna^ the Thames^ are pro- 
 per Names, for each of them agrees only to one 
 fingle Being. 
 
 Note here firft^ that a proper Name may become 
 in fome Senfe common^ when it hath been given to 
 feveral Beings of the fame Kind ; fo Ccefar^ which 
 was the proper Name of the firft Emperor Julius^ 
 became alfo a common Name to all the following 
 Emperors. And ^ea^ which was the proper Name 
 of one Sort of Indian Leaf, is now-a-days become 
 a common Name for many Infufions of Herbs, or 
 Plants, in Water ; as Sage-Tea^ Alehoof-Tea^ Li' 
 mon-Tea^ &c. So Peter ^ Thomas y John^ JVilliam^ 
 may be reckoned common Names alfo, becaufe 
 they are given to many Perfons, unlefs they are 
 determined to fignify a fingle Perfon at any parti- 
 cular Time or Place. 
 
 Note in the fecond Place, that a common Name 
 may become proper by Cuflom, or by the Time^ 
 or Place, or Perfons that ufe it ; as in Great Bri- 
 tain, when we fay the Kingy we mean our prefenE 
 rightful Sovereign King George, who now reigns ^ 
 when we fpeak of the Prince, we intend his Roy- 
 al Highnefs Frederick Prince cf Wales : If we men- 
 tion the City when we are near London, we ge- 
 nerally mean the City of London ; when in a 
 Country Town, we fay the Parfon or the Efquire^ 
 all the Parifh knows who are the fingle Perfons 
 intended by it ; fo when we are fpeaking of the 
 H.ftory of the New Teftament, and ufe the 
 Words Peter, Paul, John^ we mean thofe three 
 Apoftles. 
 
 Note in the third Place, that any common Name 
 whatfoever is made proper, by Terms of Particu- 
 larity added to it, as the com.mon Words Pope^ 
 King, Horfe, Garden, Book, Knife, &c, are de- 
 figned to fignify a fmgular Idea^ when we fay 
 
 the 
 
^8 L O G 1 C K: 0/-, Part h 
 
 the pefent Pope ; the King of Great Britain % the 
 Horfe that won the laft Plate at New-Market -, 
 the Royal Garden at Kenftngton 5 this Book ; that 
 Knifey &c. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 Of concrete and ahjira5l Terms. 
 
 IV. TX70RDS or Terms are divided into ah- 
 V V ftra^ and concrete. 
 
 Abftra5i Terms fignify the Mode or Quality of a 
 Being, without any Regard to the Subjec^t in which 
 it is ^ as JVhitenefs, Roundnefs^ Lengthy Breadth ^ 
 Wifdom^ Mortality^ Life^ Beath. 
 
 Concrete Terms, while they exprefs the Quali- 
 ty, do alfo either exprefs, or imply, or refer to 
 fome Subjed co which it belongs -, as white^ 
 rounds long, broad, wife, mortal, living, dead. 
 But thefe are not always Noun Adje^lives in a 
 grammatical Senfe ; for a Fool, a Knave, a Philo- 
 fopher, and many other Concretes are Suhftan- 
 tives, as well as Knavery, Folly, and Philofophyi, 
 which are the abftrad Terms that belong to 
 them. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Of univocal and equivocal Words, 
 
 V.\J^ ORBS and Terms are either univocal or 
 V V equivocal. Univocal Words are fuch as 
 fignify but one Idea, or at leaft but one Sort of 
 Thing ; equivocal Words are fuch as fignify two 
 or more different Ideas, or different Sorts of Ob- 
 je6ls. The Words Book, Bible, Fiflj, Houfe, Ele- 
 phant y may be called univocal Words ; for I 
 
 know 
 
C. IV. S. 6. The right Vfe /Reafon: 59 
 
 know not that they fignify any thing elfe but 
 thofe Ideas to which they are generally affixed 5 
 but Head is an equivocal Word, for it fignifies 
 the Head of a Nail^ or of a Pin^ as well as of an 
 Animal : Nail is an equivocal Word, it is ufed for 
 the Nail of the Hand or Foot., and for an iron 
 Nail to faften any thing. Poft is equivocal^ it 
 is a Piece of Timber^ or a fwift Meffenger, A 
 Church is a religious AjfemUy^ or the large fair 
 Building where they meet ; and fometimes the 
 fame Word means a Synod of Bifhops or of Pref- 
 hyters^ and in fome Places it is the Pope and a gene- 
 ral Council, 
 
 Here let it be noted, that when two or more 
 Words fignify the fame Thing, as Wave and Bil- 
 low^ Mead and Meadow^ they are ufually called 
 Jynmymous Words : But it feems very flrange, 
 that Words-, which are dire(flly contrary to each 
 other, fhould fometimes reprefent almoft the fame 
 Ideas \ yet thus it is in fome few Inftances ; a va^ 
 luable^ or an invaluable Blejftng ; a fhameful^ or a 
 Jhamekfs Villain ; a thick Skull^ or a thin JkuWd 
 Fellow, a mere Paper Skull ; a Man of a large 
 Conference^ little Confcience^ or no Confcience ; a fa- 
 mous Rafcal^ or an infamous one : So uncertain a 
 Thing is human Language, whofe Foundation and 
 Support is Cuftom, 
 
 ' As Words fignify ing the fame Thing are called 
 fynonynwus ; fo equivocal Words, or thofe Which 
 fignify feveral Things, are called homonymous^ or 
 a'rtihiguous *, and when Perfons ufe fuch ambiguous 
 Words, with a Defign to deceive, it is called Eiiii- 
 vocation. 
 
 Out* fimpk Ideas^ and efpecially i\it fenftble ^a- 
 lities^ furnifh us with a great Variety of equivo-^ 
 cal or ambiguous JVords \ for thefe being the firft^ 
 and moft natural Ideas we have, we borrow fome 
 
 E of 
 
6c^ L O G I C Kt Or, Part I. 
 
 of their Names, to fignify many other Ideas, 
 both fimple and complex. The Word Sweel ex- 
 prefTes the pleafant Perceptions of almofl every 
 Senfe •, Si^gar is fweet, but it hath not the fame 
 Sweetnefs as Mufick \ nor hath Mufick the Sweet- 
 nefs of a Rofe ; and a fweet Profpe^ differs from 
 them all : Nor yet have any of thefe the fame 
 Sweetnefs as Difcourfe^ Counfel^ or Meditation hath ; 
 yet the royal Ffahiiift faith of a Man, We took 
 fweet Couneel together ; and of God, My Medita- 
 tion of him /hall he fweet. Bitter is alfo fuch an 
 equivocal Word ; there is bitter Wormwood^ there 
 are bitter Words ^ there are bitter Enemies^ and 2l 
 bitter cold Morning, So there is a Sharpnefs in 
 Vinegar^ and there is a Sharpnefs in Pain^ in 6*^?;^- 
 row, and in Reproach ; there is a fharp Eye^ a 
 fharp Wit^ and a fharp Sword ; But there is not 
 one of thefe feven Sharpneffes^ the fame as another 
 of them, and a Iharp Eaft Wind is different from 
 them all. 
 
 There are alfo Verhs^ or Words of Adlion^ 
 which are equivocal as well as Nouns or Names,, 
 The Words to hear^ to take, to come, to get, are 
 fufficient Inftances of it s as when we fay, to bear 
 a Burden, to bear Sorrow or Reproach, to bear a 
 Name, to bear a Grudge, to bear Fruit, or to bear 
 Children ; the Word hear is ufed in very different 
 Senfes : And {o is the Word get, when we fay,: to 
 get Money, to get in, to get off, to get ready^ to 
 get a Stomach, and to get a Cold, &c. 
 
 There is alfo a great deal of Ambiguity in many 
 of the Englifj Particles, as, hut, hefore, hefide, withy 
 without, that, then, there, for, forth, above, ahout^ 
 &c. of which Grammars and Dictionaries will fuf- 
 ficiently inform iis». 
 
 SEC T, 
 
C IV. S. 7. The right Ufe of Reafon; gf 
 
 SECT VII. 
 
 f^arious Kinds of equivocal Words, 
 
 IT v/ould be endlefs to run through all the Va- 
 rieties of Words and Terms, -which have dif- 
 ferent Senfes applied to them ; I fhall only mention 
 therefore a few of the moft remarkable and moft 
 ufeful Biftin^'wns among them. 
 
 I ft, The firft Divifion of equivocal Words 
 lets us know that fome are equivocal only in their 
 Sound or Pronunciation ; others are equivocal only 
 in Writing j and others, both in Writing and in 
 Sound, 
 
 Words equivocal in Sound only^ are fuch as- 
 thefe ; the Rein of a Bridle, which hath the fame 
 Sound with the Reign of a King, or a Shower of 
 Rain^ but all three have different Letters, and 
 diftin6l Spelling; So Mights, or Strength, is equi- 
 vocal in Sound, but differs in Writing from Mite^ 
 a little Animal, or a fmall Piece of Money. And 
 the Verb to write, has the fame Sound with 
 Wright a Workman, Right or Equity, and Rite 
 or Ceremony, but it is fpelled very differently from 
 them all. 
 
 Words equivocal in Writing only, are fuch as 
 thefe 5 to tear to Pieces has the fame Spelling 
 with a Tear : To lead^ or guide j has the fame 
 Letters as L^^ J the Metal : And a Bowl for Re- 
 creation, is written the fame Way as a Bowl for 
 drinking 5 but the Pronunciation of all thefe is 
 different. 
 
 But thofe Words, which are moft commonly 
 and juftly called eqiivvocal, are fuch as are both 
 written and pronounced the fame Way, and yee 
 have different Senfes or Ideas belonging to them \ 
 
 E 2 fuch 
 
fe2 L G 1 C K : Or, Pait: t 
 
 fuch are all the Inilances which were given in the 
 preceding Sedion. 
 
 Among the Words which are equivocal m 
 Sound only, and not in U^riting, there is a large 
 Field for Perfons who delight in Jejls, and Piins^ 
 in Riddles and ^Mles, to [port themfelves. This 
 fort of Words is alfo ufed by wanton Perfons to 
 conrey lewd Ideas, under the Covert of ExpreJJions' 
 capablg of a chafbe Meaning, which are called 
 double Entendres \ or when Perfons fpeak FaJf- 
 hood v/ith- a Defign to deceive, under the Covert 
 of ^ruth. Tho' it muft be confefTed, that all forts- 
 of equivocal Words yield fuHcient Matter for fucb 
 Purpofes. 
 
 There are many Cafes alfo, wherein an equivo- 
 cal Word is ufed for the Sake of Decency to cover 
 a foul Idea : For the moil chafte and modeft, and- 
 well-bred Perfons, having fometimes a Neceffity 
 to fpeak of the Things of Nature, convey their 
 Ideas in the moft inofFenfive Language by this 
 Means. And indeed, the mere Poverty of all' 
 Languages makes it necefTary to ufe equivocal Ji^ords- 
 upon many Occafions, as the common Writings of 
 Men, Snd even the Holy Book of God fufficiently 
 mani fell. 
 
 2dly, Equivocal Words are ufually diftinguifli- 
 ed, according to their Original, into fuch, whofe 
 various Senfes arife from mere Chance or AccidenP^ 
 and fpxh as are made equivocal by Defign ; as the 
 Word Bear fignifies a Jhaggy Btaft, and it figni- 
 fies alfo to hear or carry a' Burden \ this feems to 
 be the n'.ere Ettecfc of Chance : But if I- call my 
 Dog, Bear^ becaufe he is fhaggy, or call one of 
 the Northern ConfttUaiim by that Name, from a 
 fancied Situation of the Stars in the Shape of that 
 Animal, then it is by Defign that the Word ismada 
 yet farther equivocal* 
 
 But 
 
C. IV, S. 7. He right Ufe of Reafon; 65 
 
 But becaufe I think this common Account of 
 the Spring or Origin of equivocal Words is too 
 flight and imperfed, I fliall referve this Subject 
 to be treated of by icfeif, and proceed to the third 
 Divifwn. 
 
 3dly, Ambiguous, or equivocal Words, are 
 fuch as are fometimes taken in a large and ge- 
 ral Senfe, and fometimes in a Senfe more ftr'icl and 
 limited^ and have different Ideas affixed to them 
 accordingly. Religion ^ or Virtue^ taken in a large 
 Senfe, includes both our Duty to God and our 
 Neighbour ; but in a more ftric^, limited^ and pro'- 
 per Senfe, Virtue fignifies our Duty towards Men, 
 and Religion our Duty to God. Virtue may yet be 
 taken in the ftridleft Senfe, and then it fignifies 
 Power or Courage^ which is the Senfe of ic in feme 
 Places of the New Teftament. So Grace, taken 
 in a large Senfe means the Favour of God, and all 
 the fpiritual Bleffings that proceed from it, (which 
 is a frequent Senfe of it in the Bible) but in a 
 limited Senfe it fignifies the Habit of Holinefs 
 wrought in us by Divine Favour, or a complex 
 Idea of the Chriflian Virtues, It may be alfo ta- 
 ken in the ftridleft Senfe ; and thus it fignifies any 
 fingle Chriftian Virtue, as in 2 Cor, viii. 6, 7. where 
 it is ufed for Liberality. So a City, in a ftridt 
 and proper Senfe, means the Houfes inclofed within 
 the Myalls j in a larger Senfe it reaches to all the 
 Suburbs. 
 
 This larger and flri5fcr Senfe of a Word is ufed 
 In almoft all the Sciences, as well as in Theolo- 
 gy, and in common Life, The Word Geography, 
 taken in d.ftri5l Senfe, fignifies the Knowledge of 
 the Circles of the earthly Globe, and the Situa- 
 tion of the various Parts of the Earth ; when it is 
 taken in a little larger Senfe, it includes the Know- 
 ledge of the Seas alio ; and in the largeft Senfe of 
 E 3 aU 
 
64 . L G IC K: Or, Parti, 
 
 all, it extends to the various Cuftoms, Habits, and 
 Governments of Nations. When an Aftronomer 
 ufes the Word Star in its proper and flrid Senfe, 
 it is applied only to i\\t fixed Stars, but in a large 
 Senfe it includes the Planets alfo. 
 
 This equivocal Senfe of Words belongs alfo to 
 many proper Names : So Jfta taken in the largeft 
 Senfe, is one Quarter of the World % in a more 
 limited Senfe it fignifies Natolia, or the lefier Jfia ; 
 but in the flridteft Senfe it means no more than 
 one little Province of Natolia, where flood the 
 Cities of EphefuSy Smyrna, Sardis, &c. And this 
 is the moil frequent Senfe of it in the New Tefla- 
 ment, Flanders and Holland, in a fir id Senfe, are 
 but two fiugle Provinces among the feventeen, but 
 in a large Senfe Holland includes feven of them, 
 and Flanders ten. 
 
 There are alfo fome very common and little 
 Words in all Languages, that are ufed in a more 
 exterifive or more limited Senfe ; fuch as all, every^ 
 whatfoever, ^c. When the Apoille fays, all Meti 
 have finned, and all Men muft die, all is taken in 
 its mofl univerfal and extenfive Senle, including all 
 Mankind^ Rom. v. 12. When he appoints Pr^jy<?r 
 to he made for all Men, it appears by the §)1 lowing 
 Verfes, that he reflrains the Word all to fignify 
 chiefly all Ranks and Degrees of Men, i Tim. 2. 
 I. But when St. Paul fays, / pieafe all Men in 
 (ill Things, I Cor. x. 33. the Word all is exceed- 
 ingly limited, for it reaches no farther than that he 
 pleafed all thofe Men whom he conv^rfed with, in all 
 Things that were lawful, 
 
 4thly, Equivocal Words are in the fourth Place 
 diflinguifhed by their literal or figurative Senfe. 
 Words are ufed in a proper or literal Senfe, when 
 they are defigned to fignify thofe Ideas for which 
 they were originally made^, or to which they are 
 
 primarily 
 
C 'IV. S. 7. The right Ufe of Reafon: 6^ 
 
 primarily and generally annexed ; but they are 
 ufed in a figurative or tropical Senfe, when they 
 are made to fignify fome Things, which only 
 bear either a Reference or a Refemh lance to the pri- 
 ^mary Ideas of them. So when two Princes con- 
 tend by their Armies, we fay they are at IVar in 
 a proper Senfe ; but when we fay there is a War 
 betwixt the Winds and the Waves in a Storm, 
 this is called figurative^ and the peculiar Figure 
 is a Metaphor, So when the Scriptures fay. Riches 
 7nake them [elves Wings, and fly away as an Eagle 
 toward Heaven, the Wings and the Flight of the 
 Eagle are proper Expreffions ; but when Flight 
 and Wings are applied to Riches, it is only by 
 Way of Figure and Metaphor, So when Man is 
 faid to repent, or laugh or grieve, it is literally 
 taken ; but when God is faid to he grieved, to re- 
 pent, or laugh, &c. thefe are all figurative Ex- 
 preffions, borrowed from a Refemblance to Man- 
 kind. And when the Words Job or Efiher are 
 ufed to fignify thofe very Perfons, it is the literal 
 Senfe of them ; but when they fignify thofe two 
 Books of Scripture, this is a figurative Senfe. 
 The Names of Horace, Juvenal, and Milton, are 
 ufed in the fame Manner, either for Books or 
 Men, 
 
 When a Word, which originally fignifies any 
 particular Idea or Objedt, is attributed to feveral 
 other Objedls, not fo much by Way of Refem- 
 hlance, but rather on the Account of fome evi- 
 dent Reference or Relation to the original Idea, 
 this is fometimes peculiarly called an analogical 
 Word ; fo a found or healthy Pulfe ; a found Di- 
 geftion ; found Sleep, are all fo called, with Reference 
 to a found and healthy Conftitution ; but if you 
 fpeak of found Do^rine, or found Speech, this 
 is by Way of Refemblance to Health, and the 
 E 4 Words 
 
U LOGIC K: Or, Part I, 
 
 Words are metaphorical : Yet many Times jina- 
 logy and Metaphor are ufed promifcuoufly in the 
 fame Senfe, and not diflinguifhed. 
 
 Here note^ That the Defign of metaphorical 
 Language and Figures of Speech is not merely to 
 reprefent our Ideas, but to reprefent them with 
 Vivacity, Spirit, Affedtion, and Power -, and tho* 
 |:hey otten make a deeper ImprefTion on the Mind 
 of the Hearer, yet they do as often lead him 
 into a Miftake, if they are ufed at improper 
 Times and Places. Therefore, where the Defign 
 of the Speaker or Writer is merely to explain^ to 
 in(lru^^ and to lead into the Knowledge of naked 
 Truth, he ought, for the molt Part, to ufc plain 
 and proper Words, if the Language affords them, 
 and not to deal mych in figurative Speech. But 
 this Sort of Terms is ufed very profitably by Poets 
 and Orator s, whole Bufmefs is to move, and per- 
 fuade, and work on the PalTions, as well as on the 
 Underllanding. Figures are alio happily employ- 
 ed in proverbial moral Sayings by the uifefl and 
 the belt of Men, to imprefs them deeper on the 
 Memory by jenfiUe Images \ and they are often 
 ufed for other valuable Purpofes jn the facred 
 Writings, 
 
 5thly, I might adjoin another fort of equivocal 
 Words ; as there are fome which have a different 
 Meaning in comjnon Language^ from what they 
 have in the Sciences-^ the Word ToJJion fignifies 
 the receiving any A^ion in a large philofophical 
 Senfe ; in a more limited philofophical Senfe, it 
 fignifies any of the Affections of human tlature^ as 
 Lcve^ Fear^ joy^ Sorrow^ ifjc. But the commm 
 People confine it only to Anger. So the Word Sim- 
 ple philofophically fignilies Single^ but vulgarly it 
 is ufed for Foolijh. 
 
 ^thly^ 
 
C. IV. S. 8 . The right life of Reafon: 67 
 
 6i;hly, Other equivocal Words are ufed fome- 
 times in an ahfcliite Senfe, as when God is called 
 ferfe^y which allows of no Defe6t ; and fome^ 
 times in a comparative Senfe, as good Men are 
 oftentimes cali'd perfeEl in Scripture, in Conipa- 
 rifon of thofe who are much inferior to them in 
 Knowledge orHolinefs: But I have dwelt rather 
 too long upon this Subjed already, therefore I 
 ^dd no more. 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 
 ^he Origin or Caufes of equivocal H^ords. 
 
 NOW, that we may become more fkilful in 
 guarding ourfelves and others againft the 
 Dangers of Miftake which may arife from equivo- 
 cal Words, it may not be amifs to conclude this 
 Chapter with a fhort Account of the various Ways 
 or Means whereby a Word changes its Signi- 
 fication, or acquires any new Senfe, and thus be- 
 comes equivocal^ efpecially if it keeps its old Senfe 
 alfo. 
 
 I. I^ere Chance fometimes gives the fame Word 
 different Senfes •, as the Word Light fignifies a Body 
 Jhat is not heavy ; and it alfo fignifies the Effeh 
 of Sun- beams, or the Medium whereby we fee Ob- 
 jeBs : This is merely accidental, for there feems to 
 be no Connexion between thefe two Senfes, nor any 
 Reafon for them. 
 
 2. Error and Miftake is another Occafion of 
 giving various Senfes to the fame Word ; as when 
 different Perfons read the Names of Priefty Bi- 
 fhop. Church, Rafter, ike, in the New Teftament, 
 rhey affix different Ideas to them, for want of 
 Acquaintance with the true Meaning of the facred 
 Writer ; thqugh it mull bs confeifed, thefe ya- 
 
 riou$ 
 
68 L 0<i I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 rious Senfes, which might arife at firfl from honeft 
 Miftake may be culpably fupporced and propagated 
 by Intereft, Amhitiony Prejudice, and a Party-Spirit 
 on any Side. 
 
 3. Time andCuftom alters the Meaning of Words, 
 Knave heretofore fignified a diligent Servant {Gnavus ;) 
 and a Villain was a nearer Tenant to the Lord of the 
 Manor {Villieus ;) but now both thefe Words carry 
 an Idea of Wickednefs and Reproach to them. 
 A Ballad once fignified a folemn and facred Song, 
 as well as one that is trivial, when Solomon's Song 
 was called the Ballad 0} Ballads ; but now it is 
 applied to nothing but trifling Verfe, or comical 
 Subjedls. 
 
 4. Words change their Senfe by Figures and 
 M^taphors^ which are derived from fome real Ana- 
 logy or Refemhlance between feveral Things ; as 
 when Wings and Flight are applied to Riches, it 
 'fignifies only, that the Owner may as eafily lofe 
 them, as he would lofe a Bird who flew away with 
 Wings. 
 
 And I think, under this Head, we may rank 
 thofe Words, which fignify different Ideas, by a 
 Sort of an unaccountable far-fetcht Analogy, or di- 
 ftant Refemhlance, that Fancy has introduced be- 
 tween one Thing and another ; as when we fay, 
 the Meat is green when it is half-roafted : We fpeak 
 of airing Linnen by the Fire, when we mean drying 
 or warming it : We call for round Coals for the 
 Chimney, when we mean large fquare ones : And 
 we talk of the JVing of a Rabbit, when we mean 
 the Fore 'leg : The true Reafon of thefe Appellati- 
 ons we leav€ to the Cri ticks. 
 
 5. Words alfo change their Senfe by the fpecial 
 Occafton of ufing them, the peculiar Manner of 
 Pronunciation, the Sound of the Voice, the Motion 
 of the Face, or Gefiures of th^ Body j fo when an 
 
 angry 
 
C. IV. S. 8. The right Ufe ^/Reafon. 69 
 
 angry Mailer fays to his Servant, it is bravely done^ 
 or you are a fine Gentleman ^ he means juft the 
 contrary ; namely, it is very ill done •, you are a 
 firry Fellow : It is one Way of giving a fevere 
 Reproach, for the Words are fpoken by Way of 
 Sarcafim or Irony, 
 
 6. Words are applied to various Senfes, by new 
 Ideas appearing or arifing fafter than new fVords 
 are framed. So when Giin-pcwder was found out, 
 the Word Powder^ which before fignified only 
 Duft^ was made then to fignify that Mixture or 
 Compofition ofi Nitre, Charcoal, &c. And the Name 
 Canon, which before fignified a Law or a Rule, 
 is now alfo given to a great Gun^ which gives 
 l.aws to Nations. So Foocboys, who had fre- 
 quently the common Name of Jack given them, 
 were kept to tarn the Spit, or to pull off their 
 Mailer's Boots -, but when Inftruments were in- 
 vented for both thofe Services, they were both 
 called Jacks^ tho' one was of Iron, the other of 
 Wood, and very different in their Form. 
 
 7. Words alter their Significations according to 
 the Ideas of the various Perfions, Se5ls, or Parties 
 who ufe them, as we have hinted before •, fo when 
 a Papift ufes the Word Hereticks he generally means 
 the P rot eft ants •, when a P rot eft ant ufes the Word, 
 be means any Perfions who were wilfully Cand per- 
 haps contentioufly) ohftinate in fundamental Errors. 
 When a Jew fpeaks of the true Religion, he means 
 the Inftitutions of Mofes -, when a 'J'urk mentions 
 it, he intends the Do^rine of Mahomet ; but when 
 a Chriftian makes Ufe of it, he defigns to fignify 
 Chriftianity, or the Trmhs and Precepts of the 
 Gofpel, 
 
 8. Words have different Significations accord- 
 ing to the Book, JVriting, or Difcourfe in which 
 |hey Hand. So in a Treatife of Anatomy^ a Foot 
 
 fignifies 
 
-TO LO G IC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 fignlfies that Member in the Body of Man : But in a 
 Book of Geometry or Menfuration, it fignifies twelve 
 Inches. 
 
 If I had Room to exemplify moft of thefe Par- 
 ticulars in one fingle Word, I know not where 
 to chufe a fitter than the Word Sounds which 
 feems (as it were) by Chance, to fignify three 
 diftind Ideas, {viz.) Healthy, (from Sanus) as a 
 found Body ; Noife, (from Sonus) as zjhrill Sound -, 
 and to found the Sea (perhaps from the French 
 Sonde, a Probe, or an Initrument to find the Depth 
 of Water.) From thefe three, which I may call 
 original Senfes, various derivative Senfes arife ; as 
 found Sleep, found Lungs, found Wind and Limb, 
 a found Heart, a found Mind, found Do5irine, a 
 found Divine, found Reafon, a. found Cask, found 
 Timber, a found Reproof, to beat one foundly, to 
 found one's Meaning or Inclination, and a Sound or 
 narrow Sea -, turn thefe all into Latin, and the Va- 
 riety will appear plain. 
 
 I confefs, fome few of thefe which I have men- 
 tion'd as the different Springs of equivocal Words, 
 may be reduced in fome Cafes to the fame Origi- 
 nal : But it muft alfo be granted, that there may be 
 other Ways befides thefe whereby a Word comes 
 to extend its Signification, to include various Ideas, 
 and become equivocal, And though it is the Bufi- 
 nefs of a Grammarian to purfue thefe Remarks 
 with more Variety apd Particularity, yet it is alfo 
 the Work of a Logician to give Notice of thefe 
 Things, left Darknefs, Confufion and Perplexity 
 be brought into our Conceptions by the Means of 
 Words, and thence our Judgments and Reafonings 
 become erroneous. 
 
 CHAP, 
 
C. V. TfJe rtgk Ufe of Rc3.{on, jx 
 
 CHAP. y. 
 
 General DireBiom relating to our Ideas, 
 
 Direofion I. Y7UrmJh yourfelves with a rich Variety 
 X/ of our Ideas ; acquaint yourfelves 
 with Things ancient and modern ; Things natural, 
 civil and religious ; Things domeftick and national 5 
 Things of your native Land, and of foreign Coun- 
 tries : Things prefent, paft and future ; and above 
 all, be well acquainted with God and yourfelves 5 
 learn animal Nature, and the Workings of your 
 own Spirits. 
 
 Such a general Acquaintance with Things will 
 be of very great Advantage. 
 
 The firft Benefit of it is this ; it will alTifl: the 
 Vk of Reafon in all its following Operations; it 
 will teach you to judge of Things aright^ to argue 
 juftlyy and to methodife your Thoughts with Accu* 
 racy. When you fliall find feveral Things a- kin 
 to each other, and feveral different from each other, 
 agreeing in fome Part of their Idea, and difagree- 
 ing in other Parts, you will range your Ideas in 
 better Order, you will be more eafily led into a 
 diftind Knowledge of Things, and will obtain a 
 rich Store of proper Thoughts and Arguments up- 
 on all Occafions. 
 
 You will tell me perhaps, that you defign the 
 Study of the Law or Divinity % and v/hat Good 
 can natural Philofi)phy or Mathematicks- do you, or 
 any other Science, not dire(fl:ly fubordinate ta 
 your chief Defign ? But let it be confider'd, that 
 all Sciences have a fort of mutual Connexion ; and 
 Knowledge of all Kinds fits the Mind to reafon 
 and judge better concerning any particular Sub- 
 ject. 
 
7^ L O G I C K: Or, Part I, 
 
 je6t. I have known a Judge upon the Bench be- 
 tray his Ignorance, and appear a little confufcd in 
 his Sentiments about a Cafe of fufpeded Murder 
 brought before him, for want of fome Acquaintance 
 with animal Nature and Philofophy, 
 
 Another Benefit of it is this ; fuch a large and 
 general Acquaintance with Things will fecure yoa 
 from perpetual Admirations and Surprizes^ and guard 
 you againft that Weaknefs of ignorant Perfons^/ 
 who have never feen any Thing beyond the Con- 
 fines of their own Dwelling, and therefore they 
 wonder aC almoft every Thing they fee ; every 
 Thing beyond the Smoke of their own Chimney^ . 
 and the Reach of their own Windows, is new and^ 
 flrange to them. 
 
 A third Benefit of fuch an univerfal Acquaintance 
 with Things, is this ; it will keep you from being, 
 too pofitive and dogmatical^ from an Excels of Cre^ 
 dulity ^nd Unbelief, i.e. 3, Readinefs to believe, or' 
 to deny every Thing at firft Hearing *, when you- 
 fhall have often feen, that flrange and uncommon 
 Things, which often feemed incredible, are found 
 to be true ; and Things very commonly received^ 
 have been found falfe. 
 
 The IVay of attaining fuch an extcnfive Treafure' 
 of Ideas, is, with Diligence to apply yourfelf to 
 read the befl Books *, converfe with the mofl 
 knowing and the wifefl of Men, and endeavour- 
 to improve by every Perfon in whofe Gompany 
 you are *, fufter no Hour to pafs away in a lazy 
 Idlenefs, an impertinent Chattering or ufelefs 
 Trifles : Vifit other Cities and Countries whert' 
 you have feen your own, under the Care of one 
 who can teach you to profit by Travelling, and 
 to make wife Obfer vat ions 5 indulge a juft Curio* 
 fity in feeing the Wonders of Art and Nature 5 
 fearch into Things yourfelves, as well as learn 
 
 them 
 
C. V. 'The right life of Reafon. 73. 
 
 tjhem from others •, be acquainljed with. Men as 
 well as Books •, learn all Things as much as yon 
 can at firft Hand ; and let as many of your Ideas 
 as pofTible be the Reprefentations of Things, and 
 not merely the Reprefentations of other Mens Ideas-: 
 Thus your Soul, like fome noble Building, fliall 
 be richly furnifh'd with original Paintings, and not 
 with mere Copies. 
 
 Direfl. II. Ufe the moft proper Methods to re4am 
 that Treafure of Ideas which you have acquired ; foe 
 the Mind is ready to let many of them flip, unlefs 
 fome Pains and Labour be taken to fix them upon 
 the Memory, 
 
 And more efpecialiy let thofe Ideas be laid up 
 and preferv'd with the greateft Care, which are 
 moft diredlly fuited, either to your eternal WeU 
 fare as a Chriftian^ or to your particular Station 
 and Profefjion in this Life ; for though the former 
 Rule recommends an univerfal Acquaintance with 
 Things, yet it is but a more general and fuperfi- 
 cial Knowledge that is required or expeded of 
 any Man, in Things which are utterly foreign ta 
 his own Bufinefs ; but it is necefTary you (hould 
 have a more particular and accurate Acquaintance 
 with thofe Things that refer to your peculiar Pro- 
 vince and Duty in this Life, or your Happinefs in 
 another. 
 
 There are fome Perfons who never arrive at any 
 deep, folid, or valuable Knowledge in any Sci- 
 ence or any Bufinefs of Life, beeaufe they are 
 perpetually fluttering over the Surface of Things 
 in a curious and wandering Search of infinite Va- 
 riety ; ever hearing, reading, or afking after 
 fomething new, but impatient of any Labour to 
 jay up and preferve the Ideas they have gained : 
 Their Souls may be compared to a LookingrGlafsy 
 
 that 
 
^4 LOGIC K: Or, Parf I. 
 
 that wherefoever you turn it, it receives the Images 
 of all Objeds, but retains none. 
 
 In order to preferve your Treafure of Ideas and 
 the Knowledge you have gain'd, purfue thefe Ad- 
 vices, efpecially in your younger Years. 
 
 1 . Recolkul evny Day thi Things you have feen^ 
 sr heard, or read, which may have made any Ad- 
 dition to your Underftanding : Read the Writings 
 of God and Men with Diligence and perpetual 
 Reviews : Be not fond of haftning to a new Bodk, 
 or a new Chapter, till you have well fix'd and 
 eftablifh'd in your Minds what was ufeful in the 
 Jail : Make ufe of your Memory in this Manner^ 
 and you will fenfibly experience a gradual Improve- 
 ment of it, while you take Care not to load it to 
 Excefs. 
 
 2. Ta/k over the Things which you have feert^ 
 heard or learnt with fome proper Acquaintance ; this 
 will make a frefh Impreflion upon your Memory ; 
 and if you have no Fellow-Srudent at hand, none 
 of equal Rank with yourfelves, tell it over to any 
 of your Acquaintance, where you can do it with 
 Propriety and Decency ; and whether they learn 
 any Thing by it or no, your own Repetition of it 
 will be an Improvement to yourfelf : And this 
 Practice alfo will furnifh you with a Variety ofWordi 
 and copious Language, to exprefs your Thoughts 
 upon all Occafions. 
 
 3. Commit to Writing fome of the moft con- 
 fiderable Improvements which you daily make, at 
 lead fuch Hints as may recall therri again to your 
 Mind, when perhaps they are vanifh'd and loft; 
 And here I think Mr. Locke'^ Method of Adver- 
 faria or common Places, which he defcribes in the' 
 End of the firft Volume of his pofthumous IVorks^ 
 is the bed: •, ufing no learned Method at all, fet- 
 ting down Things as cliey occur^ leaving a dif- 
 
 tinft 
 
C. V, ^he right Ufe of Reafon. j^ 
 
 tindl Page for each Subjed, and making an Index 
 to the Pages. 
 
 At the End of every Week, or Monti), or 
 Year, you may review your Remarks tor thefe 
 Reafons : Firfty to judge of your own Improve- 
 menty when you fhall find that many of your 
 younger Colledlions are either weak and trifling 5 
 or if they are jufl and proper, yet they are 
 grown now fo familiar to you, that you will 
 thereby fee your own Advancement in Know- 
 ledge. And in the next Place, what Remarks 
 you find there worthy of your riper Obfervation^ 
 you may note them with a marginal Star, inftcad 
 of tranfcribing them, as being worthy of your 
 fecond Year's Review, when the others are neg- 
 leded. 
 
 To (horten fomething of this Labour, if the 
 Books which you read are your own, mark with 
 a Pen, or Pencil, the mofl confiderable Things 
 in them which you defire to remember. Thus 
 you may read that Book the fecond Time over 
 with half the Trouble, by your Eye running 
 over the Paragraphs which your Pencil has 
 noted. It is but a very weak Objcrdion againfl 
 this Practice to fay, / Jhall fpoil my Bock •, tor I 
 perfuade my fclf, that you did not buy it as a 
 Bockfeller, to fell it again for Gain, but as a 
 Scholar, to improve your Mind by it *, and if the 
 Mind be improved, your Advantage is abundant^ 
 though your Book yields lefs Money to your Exe- 
 cutors, 
 
 Note, This Advice of Writhg, Marking, and Re-v ie^i ng yoiir Marks, re- 
 fer chiefly to thofe occafional Notions you meet with either in Reading or in 
 Converfation ; But when you are direftly and profeJJ'eciiy purfuing any Sub- 
 jeft of Knowledge in a good Syftem in your younger Years, the Syjlcm itfelf 
 is your Common-Place- Book, and muft be entirely reviewed. The fame may 
 be laid concerning any Treatife which clofely, fuccindtly, and accurately 
 liandles any particular Theme, 
 
 F Direa:. 
 
76 L G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 Direcft. III. Js you proceed hoth in I^earning and 
 in Ltfe^ make a wife Obfervation what are the Ideas^ 
 what the Difcourfes and the Parts of KnoiJi;Icdge thai 
 have he en more or lefs ufeful to y our f elf or others. 
 In your younger Years, while we are furnifhing 
 our Minds with a Treafure of Ideas^ our Experi- 
 ence is but fmall, and our Judgment weak ; it i^ 
 therefore impofTible at that Age to determine aright 
 concerning the real Advantage and Ufefulnefs of 
 many Things we learn. But when Age and Expe- 
 rience have matured your Judgment, then you will 
 gradually drop the more tifelefs Part of your 
 younger Furniture^ and be more folicitous to re- 
 tain that which is moft necefTary for your Wel- 
 fare in this Life, or a better. Hereby you will 
 come to make the fame Complaint that almofi 
 every learned Man has done after long Experi- 
 ence in Study, and in the Affairs of human Life 
 and Religion : Alas ! how many Hours^ and Day^y 
 and Months^ have I lo§i in purfuing fome Parts of 
 Learnings and in reading fome Authors ^ which have 
 turned to no other Account ^ but to inform me^ that 
 they were not worth my Labour and Purfuit ! Hap- 
 py the Man who has a wife Tutor to conduct him 
 through all the Sciences in the firft Years of hi^ 
 Study ; and who has a prudent Friend always at 
 Hand to point out to him, from Experience, how 
 much of every Science is worth his Purfuit ! And 
 happy the Student that is fo wife as to follow fuch 
 Advice 1 
 
 Dire(51:. IV. Learn to acquire a Government over 
 your Ideas and your noughts^ that they may come 
 when they are called^ and depart when they are hid- 
 den. There are fome Thoughts that rife and id- 
 trude upon us while we fhun them j there are 
 
 others 
 
C. V. The fight life of Reafori, y^ 
 
 others chat fly from us, when we would hold and 
 fix them. 
 
 If the Ideas which you would willingly make 
 the Matter of your prefent Meditation are ready 
 to fly fromyou^ you mufl be obftinate in the Pur- 
 fuit of them by an Habit of fixed Meditation % 
 you mufl keep your Soul to the Work, when it 
 is ready to ftart afide every Moment, unJefs you 
 will abandon yourfelf to be a Slave to everf 
 wild Imagination. It is a common, but it is art 
 unhappy and a fhameful Thing, that every Trifle 
 that comes acrofs the Senfes or Fancy fliould divert 
 us, that a buzzing Fly fliouId teaze our Spirits^ 
 and fcatter our befl: Ideas : But we mufl: learn to be 
 deaf and regardlefs of other Things, befides that 
 which we make the prefent Subject of our Me- 
 ditation : And in order to help a wandering and 
 fickle Humour, it is ufeful to have a Book or Pa- 
 per in our Hands, which has fome proper Hints 
 of the Subjeft that we defign to purfue. We 
 muft be refolute and laborious, and fometimes 
 conflid. with ourfelves if we would be wife and 
 learned. 
 
 Yet I would not be too fevere in this Rule : It 
 mufl: be confeflTed there are Seafons when the Mind^ 
 or rather the Brain is overtired or jaded with Study 
 or Thinking ; or upon fome other Accounts ani- 
 mal Nature may be languid or cloudy^ and unfit to 
 aflift the Spirit in Meditation ; at fuch Seafons 
 ( provided that they return not too often ) it is 
 better fometimes- to yield to the prefent Indifpo- 
 fition *, for if Nature entirely refift, nothing can be 
 done to the Purpofe, at leaft in that Subjed or Sci- 
 ence. Then you may think it proper to give 
 yourfelf up to fome Hours of Leifure and Recrea- 
 tion^ or ufeful Idknefs \ or if not, then turn your 
 Thoughts to fome other alluring Subje^, and pore 
 F 2 no 
 
78 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 no longer upon the firfi^ till fome brighter or more 
 favourable Moments arife. A Student fliall do 
 more in one Hour, when all Things concur to in- 
 vite him to any fpecial Study, than in four HourS) 
 at a dull and improper Seafon. 
 
 I would alfo give the fame Advice, if fome vain, 
 or worthlefs^ or foolifh Idea will crowd itfelf into 
 your Thoughts •, and if you find that all your La- 
 bour and Wreltling cannot defend yourfelf from 
 it, then divert the Importunity of that which of- 
 fends you by turning your Thoughts to fome en- 
 tertaining Subject, that may amufe a little and 
 draw you off from the troublefom and impofing 
 Gueft •, and many a Time alfo in fuch a Cafe, when 
 the impertinent and intruding Ideas would divert 
 from prefent Duty, Devotion and Prayer have been 
 very fuccefsful to overcome fuch obflinate Trou- 
 biers of the Peace and Profit of the Soul. 
 
 If the natural Genius and Temper be too vola- 
 tiky fickle and wanderings fuch Perfons ought in a 
 more efpecial Manner to apply themfelves to ma- 
 themalical Learnings and to begin their Studies with 
 Arithmetick and Geometry ; wherein new Truths^ 
 continually arifing to the Mind out of the plaineft 
 and eafieft Principles, will allure the Thoughts 
 with incredible Pleafure in the Purfuit : This will 
 give the Student fuch a delightful Tafte of Reafon- 
 ing, as will fix his Attention to the fingle Subjed 
 which he purfues, and by Degrees will cure the ha- 
 bitual Levity of his Spirit : But let him not indulge 
 and purfue thefe fo far, as to negledt the prime 
 Studies of his defign'd Profeirion. 
 
 CHAP* 
 
C. VI. The right Vfe of Reafon. 79 
 
 CHAP. VI. 
 
 Special Rules to diredt our Conceptions of Things^ 
 
 A Great Part of what has been already writ- 
 ten is defign'd to lay a Foundation for thofe 
 Rules^ which may guide and regulate our Concep- 
 tions of Things ; this is our main Bufinefs and De- 
 lign in the firft Fart of Logick. Now if we can 
 but direft our Thoughts to a juft and happy Man- 
 ner in forming our Ideas of Things, the other Ope- 
 rations of the Mind will not fo eafily be perverted ; 
 becaufe moft of our Errors in Judgment^ and the 
 Weaknefs, Fallacy and Miftake of our Argumen- 
 tation^ proceed from the Darknefs, Confufion, De- 
 feft, or fome other Irregularity in our Conceptions. 
 
 The Rules to affift and dired our Conceptions 
 ^re thefe, 
 
 1. Conceive of things clearly and diftin5fly in 
 
 their own Natures, 
 
 2. Conceive of things completely in all their 
 
 Parts. 
 
 3. Conceive of things comprehenfively in all their 
 
 Properties and Relations. 
 
 4. Conceive of things e^tenjively in all their 
 
 Kinds. 
 
 5. Conceive of things orderly^ or in a proper 
 
 Method, 
 
 F 3 SECT. 
 
8o 4: G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 S E C T. L 
 
 Of gaining clear and diJlinSf Ideas. 
 
 TH E firft Rule is this. Seek after a char and 
 difiinul Conception of Things as they are in their 
 oivn Nature, and ^0 not content yourfehes with oh- 
 fcure and corfufed Ideas, where clearer are to he atr 
 tain^d. 
 
 There are fome Things indeed whereof diflindt 
 Ideas are fcarce attainable, they feem to furpaf§ 
 the Capacity of the Underftanding in our prc- 
 lent State ♦, fuch are the Notions of Eternal, Im- 
 menfe. Infinite, whether this Infinity be applied to ^A 
 Number, as an infinite Multitude *, to ^mntity, as fN 
 infinite Length, Breadth ; to Powers and Perfec- ^ 
 pons, as Strength, Wifdom, or Goodnefs infi- "V 
 nite, i^c. Tho' Mathematicians in their Way J 
 demonftrate feveral Things in the Do6lrine of N 
 Infinites, yet there are ftill fome infolvable Diffi- jf 
 culties that attend the Ideas of Infinity, when it ^ 
 is applied to Mind or Body ; and while it is invk 
 Reality but an Idea ever growing, we cannot have 
 fo clear and diftindl a Conception of it as to fer 
 cure us from Miftakes in fome of our Reafonings 
 about it. 
 
 T^'here are many other Things that belong to 
 the material World, wherein the fharpeft Philo- 
 fophers have never yet arrived at clear and diftind: 
 Ideas, fuch as the particular Shape, Situation, Con- 
 texture, Motion of the fmall Particles of Minerals^ 
 Mttals^ Plants, i^c. whereby their very Natures 
 and Eflences are diflinguiflied from each other. 
 Nor have we either Senfes or Inftruments fuf- 
 gciently nice and accurate to find them out. 
 Jhere are other Things lr\ the World of Spirits 
 
 whereir; 
 
C VI. S. I. The right TJfe of Reafon. 8i 
 
 wherein our Ideas are very dark and con fu fed, 
 fuch as their Union with animal Nature^ the Way 
 cf their aEling on material Beings ^ and their CoU" 
 verfe with each other. And tho' it is a laudable 
 Ambition to fearch what may be known of thefe 
 Matters, yet it is a vaft Hindrance to the Enrich- 
 ment of our Underitandings, if we fpend too 
 much of our Time and Pains among Infinites and 
 Unfe arch able s^ and thofe Things for the Invefli- 
 gation whereof we are not furniflied with proper 
 Faculties in the prefent State. It is therefore of 
 great Service to the true Improvement of the 
 Mind, to diftinguifh well between KnowaUes and 
 Unknowahles, 
 
 As far as Things are knowahle by us, it is of 
 excellent Ufe to accuftom ourfelves to clear and di*- 
 Jlin5i Ideas, Now among many other Occafions 
 of the Darknefs and Miftakes of our Minds, there 
 
 "- arc thefe two Things which moft remarkably bring 
 A Confufion into our Ideas, 
 
 ^ I. That from our Infancy we have had the Ideas 
 
 M of Things fo far conne6led with the Ideas of Words^ 
 i^that we often miitake Words for Things, we min- 
 
 ^"^ gle and confound one with the other. 
 
 2. From our youngeft Years we have been ever 
 ready to confider Things not fo much in their own 
 Natures, as in their various Refpe5ls to ourfelves^ 
 and chiefly to our Senfes ; and we have alfo joined 
 and mingled the Ideas of foine 'Things^ with many 
 other Ideasy to which they are not a- kin in their 
 own Natures. 
 
 In order therefore to a clear and diflin^ Know- 
 ledge of Things, we mud unclothe them of all 
 thefe Relations and Mixtures^ that we may con- 
 template them naked, and in their own Natures : 
 and diftinguifh the Subje6b that we have in View 
 from all other Subjedls whatfoever : Now to per- 
 F 4 form 
 
 
82 L O G I C K: Or, Part T, 
 
 form this well, we muft here confider the Defini" 
 tion of PVords^ and the Definition of things, 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Of the Definiiion of JVords or Names. 
 
 IF we could conceive of Things as Angels and 
 unbodied Spirits do, wirhouc involving them 
 in thofe Clouds which Words and Language throw 
 upon them, we {hould feldom be in Danger of 
 fuch Mirlakes as are perpetually committed by us 
 in the prefent State ; and indeed it would be of 
 unknown Advantage to us to accuftom ourfelves 
 to form Ideas cf Things without Words ^ that we might 
 know them in their own proper Natures. But fince 
 we mud ufe IPords, both to learn and to comr 
 municate mod of our Notions, we fhould do it 
 with juft Rules of Caution. 1 have already de- 
 clared in part, how often and by what Means our 
 Words become the Occafions of Errors in our 
 Conceptions of Things. To remedy fuch Incon- 
 veniencies, we muft get an exafl Definition of the 
 Words we make uft^ of, i. e. we muft determine 
 precifely the Senfti of our Words, which is called 
 the Definition of the Name, 
 
 Now a Definition of the Name being only a 
 Declaration in what Senfe the Word is ufed^ or 
 what Idea or Objcd we mean by it, this may be 
 exprefted by any one or more of the Properties, 
 Effects or Circumftances of that Objeft which 
 do fufliciently diftinguifh it from other Objeffs : 
 As if I wtre to tell what I mean by the Word 
 Air., I may fay it is that thin Matter which we 
 hreathe in and breathe out continually ; or it is that 
 fluid Body in which the Birds fiy a little above the 
 'Earth \ cr ic is tha,t invifible Matter which fills all 
 
 Places 
 
C. VL S. z. "The right life of Reafon. 83 
 
 Places near the Earth, or which immediately encom- 
 pajfes the Globe of Earth and Water, So if I would 
 tell what I mean by Jjight, I would fay, it is that 
 Medium whereby we fee the Colours and Shapes of 
 Things-, or it is that which dijlinguijhes the Day from 
 the Night. If I were ask'd what 1 mean by Reli- 
 gion, I would anfwer, ic is a Colle5fion of all our 
 Duties to God, if taken in a ftridl: and limited Senfe ; 
 but if taken in a large Senfe, it is a Colle^ion of all 
 pur Duties both to God and Man, Thefe are called 
 the Definitions of the Name, 
 
 Note, In defining the Name there is no Neceflity 
 that we fhould be acquainted with the intimate Ef- 
 fence or Nature of the Thing ; for any Manner of 
 Defcription that will but fufficiently acquaint an- 
 other Perfon what we mean by fuch a Word, is a 
 fufficient Definition for the Name, And on this Ac- 
 count, ?L fynonymousY^ord, or a mere Negation of 
 the contrary, a Tranflation of the Word into another 
 Tongue, or a Grammatical Explication of it, is 
 fometimes fufficient for this Purpofe ; as if one 
 would know what I mean by a Sphere, I tell him 
 it is a Globe ; if he ask v/hat is a Triangle, it is 
 that which has three Angles \ or an Oval is that which 
 has the Shape of an Egg, Dark is that which has 
 no Light : Afihma is a Difficulty of Breathing -, a 
 Diaphoretick Medicine, or a Sudorifick, is fome- 
 thing that will provoke Sweating •, and an Infolvent 
 is a Man that cannot pay his Debts. 
 
 Since it is the Defign of Logick, not only to af- 
 fift us in Learning but in Teaching alfo, it is necef- 
 fary that we fhould be furnifh'd with fome parti- 
 cular Diredlions relating to the Dejinitions of Names ^ 
 both in Teaching and Learning, 
 
 SECT. 
 
84 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 SECT. Ill 
 
 Dire5fions concerning the Definition of Names, 
 
 Dired. I. T T A V E a Care of making Ufe of mere 
 XX ^^ords^ inftead of Ideas, i. e. fuch 
 Words as have no Meaning, no Definition be- 
 longing to them : Do not always imagine that there 
 are Ideas wherefoever there are Names : For tho* 
 Mankind hath fo many Millions of Ideas more 
 than they have Names, yet fo foolifh and lavifh 
 are we, that too often we ufe fome Words in mere 
 Waile, and have no Ideas for them ; or at Jeaft, 
 our Ideas are fo exceedingly fliattered and confu- 
 fed, broken and blended, various and unfettled, 
 that they can fignify Nothing toward the Improve- 
 ment of the Underftanding. You will find a great 
 deal of Reafon for this Remark, if you read the 
 Popifh School-men, or the myftick Divines, 
 
 Never reft fatisfied therefore with mere IVords 
 'which have not Ideas belonging to the?n^ or at leaft 
 m fettled and deter?ninate Ideas, Deal not in fuch 
 empty Ware, whether you are a Learner or a 
 Teacher ; for hereby fome Perfons have made 
 themfelves rich in Words, and learned in their 
 own Efteem ; whereas in reality their Under- 
 ftandings have been poor, and they knew No^ 
 thing. 
 
 Let me give, for Inftance, fome of thofe Wri» 
 ters or Talkers who deal much in the Words Na- 
 ture, Fate, Luck, Chance, Perfe5iion, Power, Life^ 
 Fortune, Injlinol, i^c, and that even in the moft 
 calm and inftrudlive Parts of their Difcourfe ; 
 though neither they themfelves nor their Hearers 
 have any fettled Meaning under thofe Words % 
 
 and 
 
C. VI. S. 3 . rhe right Ufe of Reafon. 85 
 
 and thus they build up their Reafonings, and in- 
 fer what they pleafe, with an Ambition of the 
 Name of Learning or of fublime Elevations in 
 Religion ; whereas in truth, they do but amufe 
 themfelves and their Admirers ^^iih fwelUng Words 
 of Vanity^ underftanding neither what they fay^ nor 
 whereof they affirm. But this Sort of Talk was 
 reproved of old by the two chief Apoftles St. 
 Peter and Su Paul^ i Tim. i. 7. and 2 Pet. ii. i8. 
 
 When Pretenders to Philofophy or good Senfe 
 grow fond of this Sort of Learning, they dazle 
 and confound their weaker Hearers, but fall under 
 the Negledt of the Wife. The Epicureans are 
 guilty of this Fault, when they afcribe the For- 
 mation of this World to Chance : The Arifio- 
 telians, when they fay, Nature abhors a Vacuum : 
 The Stoics when they talk of Fate^ which is fu- 
 perior to the Gods : And the Gamefters when 
 they curfe their Ill-luck^ or hope for the Favours 
 of Fortune, Whereas, if they would tell us, that 
 by the Word Nature they mean the Proterties of 
 any Beings or the Order of Things eftaUifhed at the 
 Creation ; that by the Word Fate., they intend the 
 Decrees of God., or the neceffary Connexion and In- 
 fluence of fecond Caufes and EffeEls \ if by the Word 
 Luck or Chance they fignity the abfohte Negation 
 of any determinate Caufe., or only their Ignorance of 
 any fuch Caufe^ we (hould know how to converfe 
 with them, and to afTent to, or difTent from their 
 Opinions. But while they flutter in the dark, 
 and make a Noife with Words which have no fixe 
 Ideas, they talk to the Wind, and can never 
 profit. 
 
 I would make this Matter a little plainer ftill 
 by Inftances borrowed from the Peripatetick Phi- 
 lofophy, which was taught once in all the 
 
 Schools. 
 
86 L O G IC K: Or, Part L 
 
 Schools. The ProfefTor fancies he has affign'd the 
 true Reafon, why all heavy Bodies tend downward, 
 why Amber will draw Feathers or Straws, and the 
 Loadftone draw Iron^ when he tells you, that this 
 is done by certain gravitating and attractive ^a- 
 litiesy which proceed from the fubflantial Forms of 
 thofe various Bodies. He imagines that he has 
 explain'd why the Loadftone'' s * JSorth Pole, Jhall 
 repel the North End of a magnetick Needle, and at- 
 traU the South, when he affirms, that this is done 
 by its Sympathy, with one End of it, and its An- 
 tipathy againft the other End. Whereas in Truth, 
 all thefe Names of Sympathy, Antipathy, fuhftan- 
 iial Forms and ^alities, when they are put for the 
 Caufes of thefe EfFefls in Bodies, are but hard 
 Words, which only exprefs a learned and pom- 
 pous Ignorance of the true Caufe of natural Ap- 
 pearances ; and in this Senfe they are mere Words 
 without Ideas, 
 
 This will evidently appear if one afk me, why 
 a concave Mirror or convex Glafs will burn Wood 
 in the Sun-Beams, or why a Wedge will cleave 
 it? and I fhould tell him, it is by an uftorious 
 ^ality in the Mirror or Glafs, and by a cleaving 
 Power in the Wedge, arifing from a certaia un- 
 known fubftantial Form in them, whence they 
 derive thefe ^alities ; or if he fhould ask me 
 why a Clock ftrikes, and points to the Hour ? and I 
 fhould fay, it is by an indicating Form znd fonorijick 
 Quality ; whereas I ought to tell him how the 
 Sun-Beams are collecfled and united by a burning 
 Glafs ; whence the mechanical Force of a Wedge 
 is deriv'd ; and what are the Wheels and Springs, 
 
 * Note, Some Writers call that the South-Pole of a Loadftone which at- 
 tracts the South-End of the Needle j but 1 chufe to follow thofe who call 
 Jt the Nortb'Pok, 
 
 the 
 
C. VI. S. 3. The right Ufe of Reafon: 87 
 
 the Pointer and Hamfner, and Belly whereby a 
 Clock gives notice of the Time, both to the Eye 
 and the Ear. But thefe uftorious and cleaving 
 Powers^ fonorous and indicating Forms and ^alitieSy 
 do either teach the Enquirer nothing at all but 
 what he knew before, or they are mere Words 
 without Ideas *. 
 
 And there is many a Man in the vulgar and 
 in the learned World, who imagines himfelf 
 deeply (killed in the Controverfies of Divinity^ 
 whereas he has only furnifhed himfelf with a 
 Parcel o^ fcholaftick or myftick Words, under fome 
 of which the Authors themfeives had no juft Ideas ; 
 and the Learner when he hears, or pronounces 
 them, hath fcarce any Ideas at all. Such fort of 
 Words fometimes have become Matters of im- 
 mortal Contention, as though the Gofpel could 
 not (land without them ; and yet the Zealot per- 
 haps knows little more of them than he does of 
 Shippoletby or Higgaion, Selah, Judges xii. 6. PfaL 
 ix. 16. 
 
 Yet here I would lay down this Caution, that 
 there are feveral Objedls of which we have not a 
 clear and diftincl Idea, much lefs an adequate or 
 comprehenfive one, and yet we cannot call the 
 Names of thefe Things Words without Ideas j 
 
 * It may be objeBed here, *' And what does the nnodern Philofopher, 
 •* with all his detail of mathematical Numbers, and Diagrams, do more 
 " than this toward the Solution of thefe Difficulties ? Does he not defcribe 
 ** Gravity by a certain unknoivn Force, ivhereby Bodies tend doivntvard to the 
 " Center f Hath he found the certain and mechanical Reafons o£ j4ttraSiiort, 
 <« Magnetifm, &c. ?" I anjkver. That the Moderns have found a thoufand 
 Things by applying Mathematicks to natural Philofophy, which the Anci- 
 ents were ignorant of j and when they ufe any Names of this Kind, 'vix. 
 Gravitation, AttraEiion, Sec. they ufe them only to fignlfy, that there are 
 fuch Eflfefts and fuch Caufes, with a frequent Confellion of their Ignorance 
 of tha true Springs of them : They do not pretend to make thefe JVords 
 iland for the real Caufes of Things, as tho' they thereby aflign'd the true 
 philofophical Solution of thefe Difficulties 5 for in this Senfe they will ftill 
 be TFords ivitbsut Ideas, whether in tke Mouth of an eld Philofopher or a 
 /?#w one. 
 
 fuch 
 
88 L O G I C K: Or, Part t 
 
 fuch are the Infinity and Eternity of God himfelf, 
 the Union of our own Soul and Body^ the Union of 
 the divine and Ijutnan Natures in Jefus Chrift^ the 
 Operation of the Holy Spirit on the Mind of Man^ 
 i^c. Thefe ought not to be called IVords with- 
 out Ideasy for there is fufficient Evidence for the 
 Reality and Certainty of the fixiftence of their 
 Objcdts ; tho' there is fome Confufion in our clear- 
 eft Conceptions of them ♦, and our Ideas of them, 
 tho' imperfedb, are yet fufficient to converfe about 
 them, fo far as we have Need, and to determine 
 fo much as is necefTary for our own Faith and 
 Pradlice. 
 
 Dire6l. II. Do not fuppofe that the 'Matures of 
 Effences of 'Things always differ from one another^ 
 as much as their Names do. There are various 
 Purpofes in human Life, for which we put very 
 different Names on the fame Thing, or on Things 
 whofe Natures are near a- kin ; and thereby often- 
 times, by making a new nominal Species ^ we are 
 ready to deceive ourfelves with the Idea of another 
 real Species cf Beings : And thofe, whofe Under* 
 ftandings are led away by the mere Sound of 
 Words, fancy the Nature of thofe Things to be very 
 different whofe Names are fo, and judge of them 
 accordingly. 
 
 I may borrow a remarkable Inftance for my 
 Purpofe almoft out of every Garden, which con- 
 tains a Variety of Plants in it. Moft or all Plants 
 agree in this, that they have a Root^ a Stalky 
 Leaves y Buds, Bloffoms and Seeds : But the Gar- 
 dener ranges them under very different Names, as 
 tho' they were really different Kinds of Beings, 
 merely becaufe of the different Ufe and Service to 
 which they are applied by Men : As for Inftance, 
 
 thofe 
 
C. VI. S. 3. ^he right Ufe (9/Reafon. 89 
 
 thofe Plants whofe Roots are eaten fhall appro- 
 priate the Name of Roots to themfelves ; fuch are 
 Carrots^ Turnips, Radi/hes, &c. If the Leaves are 
 of chief Ufe to us, then we call them Herbs ; as 
 Sage, Mint, Thyme : If the Leaves are eaten raw, 
 they are termed Sallad ; as Lettuce, PurJIain : If 
 boiled, they become Pot-herbs ; as Spinage, Cole" 
 worts ; and fome of thofe fame Plants, -which are 
 Pot-herbs in one Family, are Sallad in another. 
 If the Buds are made our Food, they are called 
 Heads^ or Tops ; fo C^^^^^<?- Heads, Heads of Af- 
 paragus and Artichoaks, If the Blojfom be of mofl: 
 Importance, we call it a Flower -, fuch are Dai' 
 fies. Tulips, and Carnations, which are the mere 
 Bloflbms of thofe Plants. If the Husk or Seeds 
 are eaten, they are called the Fruits of the Ground^ 
 as Peafe, Beans, Strawberries, ^c. If any Part 
 of the Plant be of known and common Ufe to us, 
 in Medicine, we call it a phyfical Herb, as CarduuSy 
 Scurvy-grafs ; but if we count no Part ufeful, we 
 call it a JVeed, and throw it out of the Garden ; 
 and yet perhaps our next Neighbour knows fome 
 valuable Property and Ufe of it ; he plants it in 
 his Garden, and gives it the Title of an Herb, or 
 a Flower, You fee here how fmall is the real Di- 
 llindlion of thefe feveral Plants, confidered in 
 their general Nature as the lejfer f^egetables : Yet 
 what very different Ideas we vulgarly form con- 
 cerning them, and make different Species of them, 
 chiefly becaufe of the different Names given 
 them. 
 
 Now when Things are fet in this clear Light, 
 it appears how ridiculous it would be for two 
 Perfons to contend, whether Dandelion be an Herb, 
 or a fP'eed ; whether it be a Pot-herb or Sallad-, 
 when by the Cuftom or Fancy of different Fami- 
 lies, this one Plant obtains all thefe Names ac- 
 cording 
 
90 L O G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 cording to the feveral Ufes of it, and the Value 
 that is put upon it. 
 
 Nole here, that I find no Manner of Fault with 
 the Variety of Names which are given to feveral 
 Plants, according to the various Ufes we make of 
 them. But I would not have our Judgments im- 
 pofed upon hereby, to think that thefe mere no- 
 jninal Species, viz. Herbs, Sallad, and JVeeds, be- 
 come three really different Species of Beings, on 
 this Account, that they have different Names and 
 Ufes. But I proceed to other Inllances. 
 
 It has been the Cuftom of Mankind, when 
 they have been angry with any thing, to add a 
 new ill Name to it, that they may convey there- 
 by a hateful Idea of it, tho* the Nature of the 
 thing ftill abides the fame. So the Papifts call the 
 Proteftants Her clicks : A prophane Perfon calls a 
 Man of Piety a Precifian : And in the Times 
 of the Civil War in the laft Century, the Royalijls 
 called the Parliamentarians, Fandticks, Roundheads, 
 and Se^aries, And they in Requital called the 
 Royalijls, Malignants : But the Partizans on each 
 Side were really neither better nor worfe for thefe 
 Names. 
 
 It has alfo been a frequent Pradice on the 
 other Hand, to put new favourable Names upon ill 
 Jdeas, on purpofe to take off the Odium of them. 
 But notwithftanding all thefe flattering Names 
 and Titles, a Man of profufe Generofity is but a 
 Spendthrift ; a natural Son is a Baftard dill ; a 
 Gallant is an Adulterer, and a Lady of Pleafure is a 
 Whore. 
 
 ¥ 
 
 Dire(5l. III. Take heed of believing the Nature 
 and Effence of two or more Things to be certainly the 
 Jame, becaufe they may have the fame Name given 
 them. This has been an unhappy and fatal Occa- 
 
 fion 
 
C. VI.'S. 3. fhe right Ufe ^/Reafon. 91 
 
 fion of a thoufand Miftakes in the natural, in the 
 civil, and in the religious Affairs of Life, both a- 
 mongft the Vulgar and the Learned. I fhall give 
 two or three Inftances, chiefly in the Matters of 
 Natural Philofophy^ having hinted feveral Dangers 
 of this Kind relating to Geology in the foregoing 
 Difcourfe concerning Equivocal JVords, 
 
 Our elder Philofophers have generally made ufe 
 of the Word Soul to fignify that Principle where- 
 by a Plant grows, and they called it the vegetative 
 Soul : The Principle of the animal Motion of a 
 Brute has been likewife called a Soul, and We have 
 been taught to name it the fenfitive Soul : They 
 have alfo given the Name Soul to that fuperior 
 Principle in Man, whereby he thinks, judges, rea- 
 fons, ^c. and tho' they diftinguifhed this by the 
 honourable Title of the rational Soul, yet in com- 
 mon Difcourfe and Writing we leave out the Words 
 vegetative^ fenfitive^ and rational ; and make the 
 Word Soul ferve for all thefe Principles : Thence 
 we are led early into this Imagination, that there is 
 a Sort of fpiritual Being in Plants and in Brutes^ 
 like that in Men, Whereas if we did but abflradl 
 and feparate thefe Things from Words, and com- 
 pare the Caufe of Growth in a Plant, with the 
 Caufe of Reafoning in Man (without the Word 
 Soul) we fhall never think that thefe two Princi- 
 ples were at all like one another \ nor fliould we 
 perhaps fo eafily and peremptorily conclude, that 
 Brutes need an intelligent Mind to perform their 
 animal Adions. 
 
 Another Inilance may be the Word Life, 
 which being attributed to Plants^ to Brutes^ and 
 to Men^ and in each of them afcribed to the Soul^ 
 has very eafily betrayed us from our Infancy into 
 this Miftake, that the Spirit or A4ind^ or think* 
 ing Principle^ in. Man^ is the Spring of i^egetative 
 
 G and 
 
92 LOGIC K: Or, Part t 
 
 and animal Life to bis Body : Whereas it is evident, 
 that if the Spirit or thinking Principle of Man 
 gave Life to his animal Nature, the Way to 
 fave Men from dying would not be to ufe Medi- 
 cines, but to perfuade the Spirit to abide in the 
 Body. 
 
 I might derive a third Inftance from the Word 
 Heat; which is ufed to fignify the Senfation 
 we have when we are near the Fire, as well as the 
 Caufe of that Senfation which is in the Fire itfeif 5. 
 and thence we conclude from our Infancy, that 
 there is a Sort of Heat in the Fire refemlling our own 
 Senfationy or the Heat which we feel : Whereas in 
 the Fire there is nothing but little Particles of 
 Matter, of fuch particular Shapes, Sizes, Situa- 
 tions and Motions as are fitted to imprefs fuch 
 Motions on our Flefh or Nerves as excite the 
 Senfe of Heat, Now if this Caufe of our Senfa- 
 tion in the Fire had been always called by a di- 
 flindl Name, perhaps we had not been fo rooted 
 in this Miftake, that the Fire is hot with the fame 
 Sort of Heat that we feel. This will appear with 
 more Evidence, when we confider that we are 
 fecure from the fame Miilake where there have 
 been two different Names allotted to our Senfation^ 
 and to the Caufe of it ; as, we do not fay. Pain is 
 in the Fire that burns us, or in the Knife that cuts 
 and wounds us ; for we call it burning in the Fire^ 
 cutting in the Knife ^ and Fain only when it is in 
 ourfelves. 
 
 Numerous Inflances^of this Kind might be de- 
 rived from the Words fweet, four^ loud, JJmlly and 
 almoft all theffi^fi^k ^ialities, whofe real Natures 
 we miftake from our very Infancy, and v/e are 
 ready -to fuppofe them to be the fame in us, and la 
 the Bodies that caufe them ; partly, becauf* the 
 Words which fignify our own Senfations are a[>- 
 
C. VI. S. 3. He right Ufe of V^tafon. 93 
 
 plied alfo to fignify thofe unknown Shapes and 
 Motions of the little Corpufcles, whieh excite and 
 caufe thofe Senfations. 
 
 DIredV. IV. In Converfatton or Reading he diligent 
 to find out the true Senfe^ or diftin^ Idea, which the 
 Speaker or Writer affixes to his fVords ; and efpecially 
 to thofe TFords which are the chief Suhje^f of his Dif- 
 courfe. As far as pofTible take heed, left you put 
 more or fewer Ideas into one Word^ than the Per- 
 fon did when he wrote or fpokc 5 and endeavour 
 that your Ideas of every Word may be the fame 
 as his were : Then you will judge better of whal 
 he fpeaks or writes. 
 
 It is for want of this that Men quarrel in the 
 Dark ; and that there are fo many Contentions in 
 the feveral Sciences, and efpecially in Divinity 
 Multitudes of them arife from a Millake of the 
 true Senfe or complete Meaning, in which Words 
 are ufed by the Writer or Speaker ; and hereby 
 fometimes they feem to agree , when they really differ 
 in their Sentiments ; and fometimes they feem to dif^ 
 fer when they really agree. Let me give an Inftance 
 of boLh, 
 
 When one Man by the Word Church fhall 
 underftand all that believe in Chrift \ and another 
 by the Word Church means only the Church of 
 Rome -, they may both affent to this Propofjti- 
 on, nere is 720 Salvation out of the Churchy and 
 yet their inward Sentiments may be widely diffe- 
 rent. 
 
 Again, if one Writer fhall affirm that Virtue 
 added to Faith is fuff.cient to make a Chriftian, and 
 another fnall as zealoufly deny this Propofition, 
 they feem to differ widely in Words, and yet 
 perhaps they may both really agree in Sentiment : 
 G 2 if 
 
94 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 If by the Word Virtue^ the Affirmer intends our 
 whole Duty to God and Man ; and the Denier by 
 the Word Virtue means only Courage^ or at moil 
 our Duty toward our JSJeigbhour^ without inclu- 
 ding in the Idea of it the Duty which we oive to 
 God. 
 
 Many fuch Sort of Contentions as thefe are, if 
 traced to their Original, will be found to be mere 
 Logomachies^ or Strifes and Quarrels about Names 
 and fVordsy and vain Janglings^ as the Apoille 
 calls them in his tirft Letter of Advice to Ti^ 
 mothy. 
 
 In order therefore to attain clear and diftin^ 
 Ideas of what we read or hear, we muft fearch 
 the Senfe of Words ; we muft confider what is 
 their Original and Derivation in our own or fo- 
 reign Languages ; what is their common Senfe 
 amongft Mankind, or in other Authors, efpecial- 
 Jy fuch as wrote in the fame Country, in the fame 
 Age, about the fame Time, and upon the fame 
 Subjedls : W^e muft confider in what Senfe the 
 fame Author ufes any particular Word or Phrafe^ 
 and that when he is difcourfing on the fame Mat- 
 ter, and efpecially about the lame Parts or Para- 
 graphs of his Writing : We muft confider whe- 
 ther the Word be ufed in a ftrict and limited, or 
 in a large and general Senfe ; whether in a literal, 
 in a figurative, or in a prophetick Senfe ; whe- 
 ther It has any fccondary Idea annexed to it befideg 
 the primary or chief Senfe. We muft enquire 
 farther, what is the Scope and Defign of the 
 Writer ; and what is the Connexion of that Sen- 
 tence with thofe that go before it, and thofe which 
 follow it. Cy thefe and other Methods we are to 
 fearch out the Defmiticn cf Names^ i. e. the true 
 Senfe and Meaning in which any Author or Speaker 
 ufes any Word, which may be the chief Subjed 
 
 of 
 
C. VI. S .3. 7'he right Ufe <9f Realbn. 95 
 
 of Difcourfe, or may carry any confiderable Im- 
 portance in it. 
 
 Dired". V. When we commtmicate our Notions to 
 others^ merely with a Defign to inform and improve 
 their Knowledge^ let us in the Beginning -of our Dif- 
 courfe take care to adjuft the Definition of Names 
 vjherefoever there is need of it ; that is, to determine 
 -plainly what we mean by the chief Words which 
 are the SuhjeSl of our Difcourfe *, and be fur e always 
 to keep the fame Ideas^ whenfoever we ufe the fame 
 Words^ unlefs we give due Notice of the Change, 
 This will have a very large and happy Influence, in 
 fecuring not only others but our lelves too from 
 Confufion and Miftake ; for even Writers and 
 Speakers themfelves, for want of due Watchful- 
 nefs, are ready to affix different Ideas to their own 
 Words^ in different Parts of their Difcourfcs, and 
 hereby bring Perplexity into their own Reafonings, 
 and confound their Hearers. 
 
 It is by an Obfervation of this Rule that Ma- 
 thematicians have fo happily fccured themfelves, 
 and the Sciences which they have profefTed, from 
 Wrangling and Controverfy ; becaufe whenfoever 
 in the Progrefs of their Treatifes they have Oc- 
 cafion to ufe a new and unknov/n Word, they al- 
 ways define it, and tell in what Senfe they fliall 
 take it ; and in many of their Writings you find 
 a heap of Definitions at the very Bt^ginning. Now 
 if the Writers of Natural Ph'ilofophy and Morality 
 had ufcd the fame Accuracy and Care, they had 
 effedually fecluded a Multitude of noify and fruit- 
 lefs Debates out of their feveral Provinces : Nor 
 had that facred Theme of Divinity been perplex- 
 ed with fo many intricate Difputes, nor the Church 
 of Chrifl been torn to pieces by fo many Se(fts 
 and Fadions, if the Words Grace^ Faith^ Righte- 
 G 3 oufnefsy 
 
96 LOGIC K: Or, Part I, 
 
 oufnefs. Repentance, Juftificatlon, Worjhip^ Churchy 
 Bi/bop, Presbyter, ^c. had been welJ defined, and 
 their Significations adjuded, as near as polTible, by 
 the Ufe of thofe Words in the New Teflament 5 or 
 ^t leaft, if every Writer had told us at firit in whac 
 Senfe he would ufe thofe Words, 
 
 Direft. VI. In your own Studies, as well as in 
 the Cojninuni cation of your Noughts to others, viere^ 
 ly for their Information, avoid ambiguous and equi- 
 vocal Terms as much as poffible. Do not ufe fuch 
 Words as have two or three Definitions of the 
 Name belonging to them, t, e. fuch Words as 
 have two or three Senfes, where there is any 
 Danger of Miftake. Where your chief Bufinefs 
 is to inform the Judgment, and to ej^plain a Mat- 
 ter, rather than to perfuade or afrc(fl, be not fond 
 of expreffing your felves in figurative Language, 
 when there are any proper Words that fignify the 
 fame Idea in their literal Senfe. It is the Jmhi- 
 guity of Names, as we have often faid, that brings 
 almoQ: infinite Confufion into our Conceptions of 
 Things, 
 
 But where there is aNecefTity of ufing an ajnbigu- 
 pus F/ordy there let double Care be ufed in defining 
 that Word, and declaring in what Senfe you take 
 it. And be fure to fuffer no ambiguous Word ever 
 to come into your Definitions, 
 
 Pire(5l. VII. In communicating your Notions, ufe 
 every IFord as near as pcjfihle in the fa?ne Senfe in 
 *ivhich Mankind commonly ufes it ; or which Writers 
 that have gone before you have ufually affixed to it^ 
 upon Ccndilion that it is free from Ainbiguity, Tho^ 
 Names are in their Original merely arbitrary, yet 
 we fhould alv/ays keep to the eflablifhed Meaning 
 of themij unlefs great NccelTity require the Al- 
 teration J 
 
C. VI. S. 3. T:he right life (?/Reafoii: 97 
 
 teration ; for when any Word has been ufed to 
 fignify an Idea, that old Idea will recur in the 
 Mind when the Word is heard or read, rather 
 than any new Idea which we may fallen to it. 
 And this is one Reafon why the received Defini- 
 tion of Names fhould be changed as little as pof- 
 fible. 
 
 But I add farther, that tho* a Word entirely 
 new, introduced into a Language, may be affixed 
 to what Idea you pleafe, yet an old Word ought 
 never to be fix'd to an unaccuftomed Idea, without 
 jufl and evident Neceflity, or without prefent or 
 previous Notice, left we introduce thereby a Li« 
 cenfe for all Manner of pernicious Equivocations 
 and Fal [hoods \ as for Inftance, when an idle Boy 
 who has not feen his Book all the Morning fhall tell 
 his Mafter that he has learn' d his Lejfon^ he can ne- 
 ver excufe himfelf by faying, that by the Word 
 Leffon he meant his Breakfajl^ and by the Word 
 learn he meant eating ; furely this would be con- 
 llrued a downright Lie, and his fancied Wit would 
 hardly procure his Pardon. 
 
 In ufmg an ambiguous Word, which has been 
 ufed in different Senfcs, we may choofe what we 
 think the mod proper Senfe, as I have done, p, 86. 
 in naming the Poles of the Loadjloncy North or 
 South. 
 
 And when a Word has been ufed in two or three 
 Senfes, and has made a great Inroad for Error up- 
 on that Account, it is of good Service to drop one 
 or two of thofe Senfes, and leave it only one re- 
 maining, and affix the other Senfes or Jdeas to o- 
 ther Words. So the modern Philofophers, when 
 they treat of the human Soul, they call it the Mnd 
 or Mens humana, and leave the Word Anima or 
 Soul to fignify the P rinciple of Life and Motion in 
 mere animal Beings, 
 
 G 4 The 
 
98 L G 1 C K: Or, Part. I. 
 
 The Poet Juvenal has long ago given us a Hint 
 of this Accuracy and Diftindtion, when he lays of 
 Brutei and Men^ 
 
 Indulfit mundi comirmnis Conditor illis 
 Tantum Animas , nobis Animum quoque. 
 
 Sat. xvi. V, 134. 
 
 Exception. There is one Cafe, wherein feme of 
 thefe Jaft Rules concerning ibe Definition of IVords, 
 may be in fome Meafure difpenfed with ; and that 
 is, when ftrong and rooted Prejudice hath efta- 
 bliihed fome favourite Word or Phrafe, and long 
 ufed it to exprefs fome miftaken Notion, or to 
 unite fome inconfiftent Ideas ; for then it is fome- 
 times much eafier to lead the World into Truth by 
 indulging their Fondnefs for a Phrafe, and by af- 
 figning and applying new Ideas and Notions to their 
 Favourite Word ; and this is much fafer alfo than 
 to awaken all their PafTions by rtjeding both their 
 old Words, and Phrafes, and Notions, and intro- 
 ducing all new at once : Therefore we continue to 
 lay. There is Heat in the Fire^ there is Coldnejs in 
 Ice^ rather than invent new Words to exprefs the 
 Powers which are in Fire or Ice^ to excite the Sen- 
 fations of HecU or Cold in us. For the fame Reafon 
 fome Words and Phrafes which are lefs proper, 
 may be continued in Theology^ while People are led 
 into clearer Ideas with much more Eafe and Succefs, 
 than if an Attempt were made to change all their 
 beloved Forms of Speech. 
 
 In other Cafes, thefe logical DireElions fhould ge- 
 nerally be obferved, and different Names affixed to 
 different Ideas. 
 
 Here I cannot but take Occafion to remark, 
 that it is a confiderable Advantage to any Lan- 
 guage to have a Variety of new Words introduced 
 
 into 
 
C. VI. S. 3. The right Ufe of Reafon. 99 
 
 into it, that when in Gourfe of Time new Ohje^s 
 and new Ideas arife, there may be new Words and 
 Names afTign'd to them : And alfo where one fm- 
 gle Name has fuftain'd two or three Ideas in Time 
 pad, thefe new Words may remove the Ambigu- 
 ity by being affix'd to fome of thofe Ideas. This 
 Practice would by Degrees take away Part of the 
 Uncertainty of Language. And for this Reafon I 
 cannot but congratulate our Englijh Tongue^ that it 
 has been abundantly enrich'd with the Tranflation 
 of Words from all our Neighbour Nations, as well 
 as from ancient Languages, and thefe Words have 
 been as it were enfranchifed amongft us j for French^ 
 Latin, Greek and German Names will fignify Eng- 
 lifl) Ideas, as well as Words that are anciently and 
 intirely Englijh. 
 
 It may not be amifs to mention in this Place, 
 that as the Determination of the particular Senfe 
 in which any Word is ufed, is called the 'Definition 
 of the Name, fo the Enumeration of the various 
 Senfes of an equivocal Word, is fometimes called 
 the Divifion or DiJlin5lion of the Name \ and for 
 this Purpofe good Didionaries are of excellent 
 Ufe. 
 
 This D'lflinBion of the Name or Word is greatly 
 neceffary in Argumentation or Difpute ; when a 
 fallacious Argument is ufed, he that anfwers it di- 
 flinguifhes the feveral Senfes of fome Word or 
 Phrafe in it, and fhews in what Senfe it is true, and 
 in what Senfe it is as evidently/:?^. 
 
 SECT. 
 
^oo L O G I C K: Or, fan h 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Of the Definition of Things, 
 
 ^ A ^ ^^^^^ ^^ much Confafion introduced into 
 jfX our Ideas, by the Means of thofe fFords 
 to which they are affixed, fo the fningUng our I- 
 deas with each other without Caution, is a farther 
 Occafion whereby they become confufed. A Court 
 Lady^ born and bred up amongft Pomp and Eq^ui- 
 fage^ and the vain Notions of Birth and ^ality^ 
 conflantly joins and mixes all thefe with the Idea 
 of her feJf, and flie imagines thefe to be ejfential 
 io her Nature^ and as it were necejjary to her Bei?ig ; 
 thence fhe is tempted to look upon menial Servants^ 
 and the loweil Rank of Mankind, as another 
 Species of Beings quite diftind from her felf. A 
 Plough-hoy^ that has never travelled beyond his 
 own Village, and has feen nothing but thatch'^d 
 Houfes and his Parifi Churchy is naturally led to 
 imagine that 'thatch belongs to the very Nature 
 of a Houfe, and that that muft be a Church which 
 is built of Stone^ and efpecially if it has a Spire up- 
 on it. A Child whofe Uncle has been excefTive 
 fond, and his SchocUmafier very fevere, eafily be- 
 lieves that Fondnefs alv/ays belongs to Uncles^ and 
 that Severity is eflential to Mafters or Inftru5lors. 
 He has feen alfo Soldiers with red Coats^ or Mi- 
 niifers with long black Gowns^ and therefore he 
 perfuades himfelf that thefe Garbs are effential to 
 the Charadlers, and that he is not a Minijler who 
 has not a long black Gown^ nor can he be a Soldier 
 who is not dreffed in red. It would be well i^' all 
 fuch Miftakes ended with Childhood. 
 
 It 
 
C. VI. S. 4. The right Ufe of Rcafbn. 1 o i 
 
 It might be alfo fubjoined, that our complex 
 Ideas become confufed, not only by uniting or blend- 
 ing together tnore fimple or ftngle Ideas than real- 
 ly belong to them, as in the Inftances juft men- 
 tion'd ; but Obfcurity and Confufion fomecimes 
 come upon our Ideas alfo, for want of uniting a, 
 fuficient Number of fingle Ideas to make the com- 
 plex one : So if I conceive of a Leopard only as a 
 (potted Beaji, this does not diilinguifh it from a 
 Tyger or a Lynx, nor from many Dogs or Horfrs^ 
 which are fpocted too ; and therefore a Leopard 
 mud have fome more Ideas added to complete and 
 diftinguifh it. 
 
 I grant that it is a large and free Acquaintance 
 with the World, a watchful Obfervation and dili- 
 gent Search into the Nature of Things that mud 
 fully corre(fl this kind of Errors: The Rules of Lo- 
 gick are not fufficient to do it ; But yet the Rules of 
 Logick may inftrudl us by what means to diftinguifli 
 one thing from another, and how to fearch and 
 mark out as far as may be the Contents and Limits 
 of the Nature of diftindl Beings, and thus may give 
 us great AfTiftance towards the Remedy of thefe 
 Miftakes. 
 
 As the definition of Names frees us from that 
 Confufion which Words introduce, fo the Defini- 
 tion of Things will in fome Meafure guard us a- 
 gainfl that Confufion which mingled Ideas have 
 introduced : For as a Definition of the Name ex- 
 plains what any Word means, fo a Definition of 
 the Thing explains what is the Nature of that 
 Thing. 
 
 In order to form a Definition of any Thing 
 we muft put forth thefe three Adls of the 
 Mind. 
 
 Firll, Compare the Thing to be defined with 
 pther Things that are moft like to itfelf, and fee 
 
 wherein 
 
102 LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 wherein its EfTence or Nature agrees with them ; 
 and this is call'd the general Nature or Geims in a 
 Definition: So if you would define what PFwe is, 
 firft compare it with other Things like itielf, as 
 Cy^er, Perry, ^c, and you will find it agrees 
 eirentialiy with them in this, that it is a Sort of 
 Juice, 
 
 Secondly, Confider the mod remarkable and 
 primary Attribute, Property, or Idea wherein this 
 Thing differs from thofe other Things that are 
 mod like iti and that is its ejjential or fpecifick Dif- 
 ference : So PFine differs from Cyder and Perry^ and 
 all other Juices, in that it is prejfed from a Grape, 
 This may be called its f pedal Nature, which di- 
 ftinguifhes it from other Juices, 
 
 Thirdly, Join the general and fpecial Nature 
 together, or (which is all one) the Genus and the 
 Difference, and thefe make up a Definition. So the 
 Juice of a Grape, or Juice preffed from Grapes, is 
 tiie Definition of JVine. 
 
 So if I would define what Winter is, I confider 
 firfl wherein it agrees with other Things which are 
 moft like it {viz,) Summer, Spring, Autumn, and 
 I find they are all Seafons of the Tear ♦, therefore a 
 Seafon of the Tear is the Genus, Then I obferve 
 v/herein it differs from thefe, and that is in the 
 Shortnefs of the Days \ for it is this which does pri- 
 marily diilinguifii it from other Seafons -, therefore 
 this may be called its fpecial Nature or its Diffe- 
 rence, Then by joining thefe together I make a 
 Definition, Winter is that Seafon of the Tear where- 
 in the Days are fhorteft, I confefs indeed this is 
 but a ruder Definition of it, for to define it as an 
 accurate Aflronomer I muft limit the Days, Hours 
 and Minutes. 
 
 After the fame Manner if we would explain or 
 define what the Pi^ure of a Man is, we confider 
 
 firfl 
 
C. VI. S. 4. ^he right Ufe of Reafon. 1 03 
 
 firfl- the Genus or general Nature of it, which is a 
 Reprefentation ; and herein ic agrees with many- 
 other Things, as a Statue^ a Shadow^ a Prints a 
 verbal Defcription of a Man, &c. Then we con- 
 fider wherein it differs from thefe, and we find it 
 differs from a verbal Defcription in that it is a Re- 
 prefentation to the Eye and not to the Ear : It dif- 
 fers from a Statue in that it is a Reprefentation up- 
 on a flat Surface, and not in a folid Figure : It dif- 
 fers from a Shadow in that it is an abiding Repre- 
 fentation and not a fleeting one : It differs from a 
 Print or Draughty becaufe it reprefents the Colours 
 by Paint as well as the Shape of the Objecft by De- 
 lineation. Now fo many or rather fo few of thefe 
 Ideas put together, as are juft fufHcient to diftin- 
 guifh a Pi5ture from all other Reprefentations^ 
 make up its effential Difference or its fpecial Na- 
 ture ', and all thefe are included in its being painted 
 on a plain Surface. Then join this to the Genus^ 
 which is a Reprefentation \ and thus you have the 
 complete Definition of the Pi^ure of a Man, viz. 
 it is the Reprefentation of a Man in Paint upon a 
 Surface (or a Plane,) 
 
 Here it muft be ohferved^ that when we fpeak 
 of the Genus and Difference as compofing a De- 
 finition^ it muft always be underftood that the 
 neareft Genus and the fpecifick Difference are re- 
 quired. 
 
 The next general Nature or the neareft Genus 
 muft be ufed in a Definition, becaufe it includes 
 all the reft •, as if I would define JVine^ I muft 
 fay Wine is a Juice ^ which is the neareft Genus ; 
 and not fay. Wine is a Liquid^ which is a remote 
 general Nature •, or Wine is a Subfiance, which is 
 yet more remote, for Juice includes both Subftance 
 and Liquid, Befides, neither of thefe two remote 
 general Natures would make any Diftinction be- 
 tween 
 
104 LOGIC K: Or, fart t 
 
 tween Wwe and a thoufand other Suhjiances, or 
 other Liquidsy a remote Gems leaves the Thing too 
 much undiftinguilh'd. 
 
 The fpecifick Difference is that primary Attribute 
 which diftinguifhes each Species from one another^ 
 while they ftand ranked under the fame general Na- 
 ture or Genus. Tho* IVine differs from other Li- 
 quids in that it is the Juke of a certain Fruit, yet 
 this is but a general or generick Difference, for it does 
 not diftinguifh PVine from Cyder or Perry ; the Spe- 
 cifick Difference of Wine therefore is its Preffurefrom 
 the Grape ; as Cyper is prefled from Apples^ and 
 Perry from Fears, 
 
 In Definitions alfo we muft ufe the primary At- 
 tribute that diftinguifhes the Species or fpecial Na- 
 ture, and not attempt to define fFine by its parti- 
 cular Taftes, or EfFeds, or other Properties, which 
 are but fecondary or confequential, when its Preffur^ 
 from the Grape is the moil obvious and primary 
 Diftindlion of it from all other Juices. I confefs in 
 feme Cafes it is not fo eafily known which is the 
 primary Idea that diftinguifhes one Thing from 
 another j and therefore fome would as foon define 
 Winter by the Coldnefs of the Seafon, as by the 6"^^?;"/- 
 nefs of the Days ; though the Shorttiefs of the Days 
 is doubtlefs the moft juft, primary and philofophi- 
 cal Difference betwixt that and the other Seafons 
 of the Year, fince Winter Days are always y??^r/<f/?j 
 but not always the coldeft ; I add alfo, that the 
 Shortnefs of the Days is one Caufe of the Coldnefsi 
 but the Cold is no Caufe of their Shrtnefs, 
 
 SEC T. 
 
C. VI. S. 5. The right Ufe of Rcafon. 205 
 
 SEC T. V. 
 
 Rules of Definition of the Thing. 
 
 TH E f^ecial Rules of a gdod Definition^ are 
 thefe : 
 
 Rule I. A Definition intifi he univerfal, or as fome 
 call it, adequate ; that is, it muft agree to all the 
 particular Species or Individuals that are included 
 under the fame Idea ; fo the Juice of a Grape agrees 
 to all proper IVines^ whether Red^ IVhite^ French^ 
 Spanifhy Florence^ i^c. 
 
 Rule II. // muft he proper and peculiar to the Thing 
 defined, and agree to that alone •, for it is the very 
 Defign of a Definition effedlually to diftinguifh one 
 Thing from all others : So the Juice of a Grape a- 
 grees to no other Subftance, to no other Liquid, to 
 no other Being but JVine, 
 
 Thefe two Rules being obferved, will always ren- 
 der a Definition reciprocal with the Thing defined 5 
 which is a fcholaftick Way of fpeaking, to fignify 
 that the Definition may be ufed in any Sentence in the 
 Place of the Thing defined, or they may be mutually 
 afHrmed concerning each other, or fubflituted in the 
 room of each other. The Juice of the Grape is IFtne^ 
 or Wine is the Juice of the Grape, And wherefoever 
 the Word IVine is ufed, you may put the Juice of 
 the Grape inftead of it, except when you confider 
 fVine rather as a Word than a Thing, or when ic 
 is mentioned in fuch logical Rules. 
 
 Rule 
 
io6 L G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 Rule III. A Definition ought to he clear and plain ; 
 for the Defign of it is to lead us into the Knowledge 
 of the Thing defined. 
 
 Hence it will follow, that the Words ufed in a 
 Definition ought not to be doubtful^ and equivocal^ 
 and ohfciire^ but as plain and eafy as the Language 
 will afford : And indeed it is a general Rule con- 
 cerning the Definition both of Names and Things^ 
 that no Word fhould be ufed in either of them, 
 which has any Darknefs or Difficulty in it, unlefs 
 it has been before explained or defined. 
 
 Hence it will follow alfo, that there are many 
 Things which cannot well be defined either as to 
 the Name or i\\t Things unlefs it be by fynonymous 
 Words, or by a Negation of the contrary Idea, ^c. 
 for learned Men know not how to make them 
 nore evident or more intelligible than the Ideas 
 which every Man has gained by the vulgar Me- 
 thods of teaching. Such are the Ideas of ExtentioHy 
 Duration^ Thought^ Confcioufnefi^ and moft of our 
 fimple Ideas, and particularly fenfible Qualities, 
 as White^ Blue^ Red^ Coldy Heat^ Shrilly Bitter^ 
 Sour^ ^c. 
 
 We can fay of Duration, that it is a Continuance 
 in Being, or a not ceafing to he ; we can fay of 
 Confcioujnefsy that it is as it were a Feeling within 
 cur felves -, we may fay Heat is that which is not 
 Cold ; or Sour is that which is like Vinegar -, or 
 wc may point to the clear Sky, and fay that is 
 Blue, Thefe are the vulgar Methods of teaching 
 the Definitions of Names, or Meaning of Words. 
 But there are fome Philofophers, whofe Attempts 
 10 define thefe Things learnedly, have wrapt up 
 their Ideas in greater Darknefs, and expofed them- 
 felves to Ridicule and Contempt ; as when they 
 define Heat, they fay, it is ^alitas congregans ho-* 
 
 mogenea 
 
t. VI. S. 5. The right XJfe of Reafon. 167 
 
 mogenca ^ jegregam heterogenea^ i.e. a Quality ga- 
 thering together Things of the fame Kind, and 
 feparating Things of a different Kind. So they de- 
 fine IVbite^ a Colour ariftng from the Prevalence of 
 Brightnefs : But every Child knows Hot and PFhite 
 better without thefe Definitions. 
 
 There are many other Definitions given by the 
 feripatetick Philofophers, which are very faulty 
 by Reafon of their Ohfcurity ; as Motion is defined 
 by them the Aut of a Being in Power fo far forth 
 as it is in Power. Time is the Meafure or Number 
 of Motion according to paft, prefent and future. The 
 Soul is the J^ of an organical natural Body^ hav- 
 ing Life in Power 'y and feveral others of the fame 
 Stamp* 
 
 Rule IV. It is alfo commonly prefcribed a- 
 mongfl the Rules of Definition, that it fjjould he 
 fhort^ fo that it muji have no Tautology in ity nor any 
 Words fuperfluous. i confefs Definitions ought to 
 be eXprcffed in as few Words as is confiftent with 
 a clear and juft Explication of the Nature of the 
 Thing defined, and a Diflindlion of it from all 
 other Things befide : But it is of much more 
 Importance, and far better, that a Definition 
 fhould explain clearly the Subjecfl we treat of, 
 though the Words be many, than to leave Obfcu- 
 rities in the Sentence, by confining it within too 
 narrow Limits. So in the Definition which we 
 have given of Logick^ that it is the Art of ufing 
 Reafon well in the Search after Truth and the Com- 
 munication of it to others.^ it haS indeed many Words 
 in it, but it could not well be fhorter. Art is the 
 Genus wherein it agrees with Rhetorick^ Poef}\ 
 Arithmetick, Wreftling^ Sailing, Building, &c. for 
 all thefe are Arts alfo : But the Difference or fpe- 
 cial Nature of it is drawn from its Objed, Rea- 
 • H (on% 
 
io8 L G I C K: Or, Part t 
 
 fon ; from the Act ufmg it well^ and from its two 
 
 great Ends or Drfigns, viz. the Search of 'Truth ^ 
 and the Cojnmmiication of it^ nor can it be juftl/ 
 defcribed and explained in fewer Ideas. 
 
 V. If we add a fifth Rule, it mud be, that nel-- 
 ther the Thing defined^ nor a mere fynonymous Name, 
 Jhould niake any Part of the Definition, tor this 
 would be no Explication of the Nature of the Thing ^ 
 and a fynonymous Word at beft could only be a 
 Defijiition of the Name, 
 
 S E C T #. 
 
 Ohfervations concerning the Definition of Things, 
 
 BEfore I part with this Subjedl, I muft propofe 
 feveral Ohfervations which relate to the Defini- 
 tion of Things. 
 
 I. Ohferv. There is no Need that m Definitions 
 we fliould be confined to one fingle Attribute or 
 Property, in order to exprefs the Difference of the 
 Thing defined, or fometimes the effential Diffe- 
 rence confifts in two or three Ideas or Attributes. 
 So a Grocer is a Man who buys and fells Sugar and 
 Plu?nhs and Spices for Gain. K Clock is an Engine 
 with PFeights and Wheels, that Jhews the Hour of 
 the Day both by pointing andftriking : And if I were 
 to define a Repeating Clock, I muH add another Pro- 
 perty, VIZ. that it alfo repeats the Hour. So that 
 the true and primary effential Difference of fome 
 complex Ideas confifting in feveral diftind Proper- 
 ties, cannot be well exprefTed without conjundive 
 Particles of Speech. 
 
 2^ Obferv. There is no Need that Definitions 
 fhould always be pofitive, for fome Things differ 
 
 from 
 
t. VI. S. 6. Tbe right tlfe ^Reafon. 109 
 
 from others merely by a Defedl: of what others 
 have ; as if a Chair be defined a Seat for a Jingle 
 Perfon with a Back belonging to it^ then a Stool is a 
 Seat for a fingle Perfon without a Back % and a Form 
 is a Seat for feveral Perfons without a Back : Thefe 
 are negative Differences. So Sin is a want of Con- 
 formity to the Law of God\ Blindnefs is a Want of 
 Sight ; a Vagabond is a Perfon without a Home. 
 Some Ideas are negative, and their Definitions ought 
 to be fo too. 
 
 3*^ Obferv, Some Things may have two or more 
 Definitions^ and each of them equally juft and good ; 
 as a Mile is the Length of eight Furlongs^ or it is 
 the third Part of a League;. Eternal is that which 
 ever was and ever fhall be \ or it is that which had 
 no Beginning and floall have no End, * Man is ufual- 
 ly defined a ratio?ml Animal : But it may be much 
 better to define him a Spirit united to an Animal 
 of fuch a Shape ^ or an Animal of fuch a peculiar 
 Shape united to a Spirit^ or a Being compofed of fuch 
 an Animal or a Mind, 
 
 4^^ Obferv. Where the Effences of Things are 
 evident, and clearly diftind from each other, there 
 We may be more exacl and accurate in the Defi- 
 nitions of them : But where their Effences approach 
 near -to each other, the Definition is more difii- 
 Cult. A Bird may be defined a feathered Animal 
 mth Wings If a Ship may be defined a large hollow 
 Building made to pafs over the Sea with Sails : But 
 if you afk me to define a Batt^ which is between 
 a Bird and a Beaft, or to define a Barge and Hoyy 
 
 * The common I)efinition of Man, v.'^. a rational Animal^ is very 
 faulty, I. Becaufe the Animal \^ not rational -^ the Rationality of Man ariies 
 from the Mind to which the Animal is united. 2. Becaufe if a Spirit fhould 
 be united to a Horfe and make it a rational Being, furely this would not be a 
 Man : It is evident therefore that the peculiar Shape muft enter into the 
 Definition of a Man to render it juft and perfeft j and for want of a fui( 
 Pefcription thereof all our Definitions are d;f;<^ive, 
 
 H 2 which 
 
no LOGIC K: Or, Part I. 
 
 which are between a Boat and a Ship^ it is much 
 harder to define them, or to adjuft the Bounds of 
 their EPence. This is very evident in all mon- 
 ftrous Births and irregular Preclusions cf Nature^ as 
 well as in many IForks of Art^ which partake fo 
 much of one Species and fo much of another^ that 
 we cannot tell under which Species to rank them, 
 or how to determine their fpecifick Difference. 
 
 The feveral Species of Beings are feldom pre- 
 clfely limited in the Nature of Things by any 
 certain and unalterable Bounds : The Eflences of 
 many Things do not confift in indivijibili^ or in 
 one evident indivifible Point, as fome have ima- 
 gined ; but by various Degrees they approach 
 nearer to, or ditfcr more from others that are of a 
 Kindred Nature. So (as I have hinted before) in 
 the very Middle of each of the Arches of a Rain- 
 bow the Colours of green^ yellow^ and red are fuf- 
 ficiently diftinguilhed ; but near the Borders of 
 the feveral Arches they run into one another, fo 
 that you hardly know how to limit the Colours, 
 nor whether to call it red or yellow^ green or 
 Hue. 
 
 5^h Ohferv. As the higheft or chief Genus's^ viz. 
 Being and Not-being can never be defined, becaufc 
 there is no Genus fuperior to them ; fo neither can 
 fingular Ideas or Individuals be well defined, be- 
 caufe either they have no effential Differences from 
 other Individuals, or their Differences are not 
 known ; and therefore Individuals are only to be 
 defcribed by their particular Circumftances : So 
 King George is diflinguifhed from all other Men 
 and other Kings, by defcribing him as the firft 
 King cf Great Britain of the Houfe of Brunfwick 5 
 and Weflininfter-hall is defcribed by its Situation 
 and its Ufe, ^c, ^ 
 
 That 
 
C VL S. 6. The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 1 1 
 
 That individual Bodies can hardly have any 
 eflential Difference, at leaft within the Reach of 
 our Knowledge, may be made thus to appear ; 
 Methufelah^ when he was nine hundred and fixty 
 Years old^ and perhaps worn out with Age and 
 Weaknefs, was the fame Perfon as when he was 
 in his full Vigour of Manhood, or when he was 
 an Infant, newly born ; but how far was his Body 
 the fame ? who can tell whether there was any 
 Fibre of his Flefli or his Bones that continued the 
 fame throughout his whole Life ? or who can de- 
 termine which were thofe Fibres ? The Ship in 
 which Sir Francis Drake failed round the World 
 might be new built and refitted fo often, that few 
 of the fame Timbers remained ; and who can fay 
 whether it mud be called the fame Ship or no ? 
 and what is its eflential Difference ? How fhall we 
 define Sir Francis Drake^s Ship, or make a Defini- 
 tion for Methufelah ? 
 
 To this Head belongs that moft difficult Que- 
 ftion. What is the Principle of Individuation ? or 
 what is it that makes any one Thing the fame as it 
 was fometime before ? This is too large and labo- 
 rious an Enquiry to dwell upon it in this Place : 
 Yet I cannot forbear to mention this Hint, viz. 
 Since our own Bodies muft rife at the laft Day for 
 us to receive Rewards or Punifhments in them, 
 there may be perhaps fome original Fibres of each 
 human Body, fome Stamina VitcEy or primeval 
 Seed of Life, which may remain unchanged thro' 
 all the Stages of Life, Death and the Grave ; thefe 
 may become the Springs and Principles of a Re- 
 furredtion, and fufficient to denominate it the fame 
 Body. But if there be any fuch conftant and vital 
 Atoms which diftinguifh every human Body, they 
 are unknown to God only. 
 
 H 3 6th Ohferv, 
 
jr2 L O G I C K: Or, Parti. 
 
 6^^ Oh/erv. Where we cannot find out the E/- 
 fence or ejferdial Difference of any Species or Ktn^ 
 of Bc^ings that vvc would define, we mufb contenc 
 ourfrlvcs with a Colled ion of fuch chief Parts 
 or Properties of it as may bed explain it fo far 
 as it is known, and btft diftinguifh it from other 
 Thinos : So a Marigold is a Flower which hath 
 vidny long yellow heaves round a little Knot of 
 S^'eds in the inidfi with fuch a peculiar Stalky &c. 
 So if we woald define Siiver, we fay it is a white 
 and hard MetaU next in Weight to Gold: If we 
 v/ould define an Elder -Tree ^ we might fay it is 
 ciie among the leffer Trees^ whofe younger Branches 
 are fft and full of Pith, whofe Leaves are jagged 
 ct indented^ and cf fuch a -particular Shape ^ and it 
 hears large Clufters of fmall black Berries : So we 
 muft define Water^ Earth, Stone, a Lion, an Ea- 
 gk, a Serpent, and the greatefl Part of natural 
 Beings, by a Colledion of thofe Properties, which 
 according to our Obfervation diftinguifh them 
 from all other Things. This is what Mr. Locke 
 C2i\h nominal Effences, and nominal Defnitions, And 
 indeed fince the effentia! Differences of the various 
 natural B:ings or Bodies roundabout us arife from 
 a peculiir Shape, Size, Motion and Situation of the 
 fmall Particles of which they are compofed, and 
 fmce we have no fufficient Method to inform us 
 what thefe are, we mull be contented with fuch a 
 fort cf Definition of the Bodies they compofe. 
 
 Here note, that this Sort of Definition, which 
 is made up of a mere Colledlion of the mod re- 
 markable Parts or Properties, is called an imperfe^ 
 Definition or a Defcription ; whereas the Defini- 
 tion is calkd perfcB when it is compofed of the ef- 
 fenrial Difference added to the general Nature or 
 Genus, 
 
 7^^ Ohferv. 
 
C VI. S. 6. The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 1 3 
 
 7th Qhjerv. The perfeof Definition of any Being 
 always includes the Definition of the IS! ante where- 
 by it is called, for ic informs us of the Senfe or 
 Meaning of that Word, and (hews us what Idea 
 that Word is affixed to : But the Definition of the 
 Names does by no Means include a ferfeEl Defini- 
 tion of the Thing ; for as we have faid before, a 
 mere fynonymous Word, a Negation of the con- 
 trary, or the Mention of any one or two diftin- 
 guiriiing Properties of the Thing may be a fuffi- 
 cient Definition of the Name, Yet in thofe Cafes 
 where the efTential Difference or EfTence of a Thing 
 is unknown, there a Definition of the Name by the 
 chief Properties, and a Defcri-ption of the Thing are 
 much the fame. 
 
 And here I think it neceflary to take Notice of 
 one general Sentiment that feems to run through 
 that excellent Performance, Mr. Lockers EJjay of 
 human Underftanding^ and that is, " That the 
 *' EfTences of Things are utterly unknown to 
 *' us, and therefore all our Pretences to diftin- 
 " guifh the EfTences of Things can reach no far- 
 *' ther than mere nominal EJfences ; or a Collec- 
 *' tion of fuch Properties as we know -, to fome of 
 " which we affix particular Names, and others 
 *' we bundle up, feveral together, under one 
 " Name : And that all our Attemps to rank Be- 
 " ings into different Kinds of Species can reach 
 " no farther than to make mere nominal Species ; 
 " and therefore our Definitions of Things are but 
 " mere nominal Defcriptions or Definitions of the 
 " Name." 
 
 Now that we may do Juflice to i\\\s great Author^ 
 we ought to confider that he confines this Sort 
 of Difcourfe only to the Effence of fim-ple Ideas ^ 
 and to the Effence of Subjiances^ as appears 
 evident in the fourth and fixth Chapters of his 
 H 4 Thirtl 
 
114 L O G I C K: Or, Part J, 
 
 Third Book •, for he allows the Naiiies of mixed 
 Modes always to fignify the real EJtfences of their 
 Species^ Chap. V. and he acknowledges artifcii^l 
 Things to have real diftin5t Species ; and that in the 
 Diftindion of their Eflenccs there is generally lefs 
 Confufion and Uncertainty than in natural^ Chap. VI. 
 Se(ft.40, 41. though it mull be confelTf'ct that he 
 fcarce makes any Diftindlion between the 'Definition 
 of the Name and the Definition of the Things as 
 Ch. IV. and fometimes the Current of his Dif- 
 courfe decries the Knowledge of Effences in fuch ge- 
 neral Terms as may juflly give Occafion to mif- 
 take. 
 
 It muft be granted, that the EfTence of moft of 
 our fimple Ideas and the greateft Part of particular 
 natural Suhftances are much unknown to us ; and 
 therefore the efTcntial Difference of fenfible Quali- 
 ties and of the various Kinds of Bodies, (as 1 have 
 faid before J lie beyond the Reach of our Under- 
 ftandings: W^e know not what rnakes the primary 
 real inward Diftindions between Red^ Green, 
 Sweet, Sour, &c. between Wood, Iron, Oil, Stone, 
 Fire, Water, Flefh, Clay, in their general Natures, 
 nor do we know what are the inward and prime 
 Diftin^lions between all the particular Kinds or 
 Species in the Vegetable, Animal^ Mineral, Metal- 
 lick, or Liquid World of Things. Sec Philofoph, 
 Effays. Eff. xi. Sec. i. 
 
 But dill there is a very large Field for the Know- 
 ledge of the Effences of Things, and for the Ufe 
 of perfeol Definitions amongft pur complex Ideas, 
 the modal Appearances and Changes of Nature, the 
 Works of Art, the Matters of Science, and all the 
 Affairs of the civil, the moral and the religious 
 Life : And indeed it is of much more Importance 
 to ?X\ Mankind to have a better Acquaintance with 
 the Works of Art for their own Livelihood and 
 
 "daily 
 
C. VI. S. 6. "the right Ufe of Reafon. 115 
 
 daily Ufe, with the Affairs of Morality for their 
 Behaviour in this World, and with the Matters of 
 Religion^ that they may be prepared for the World 
 to come, than to be able to give a perfedl Definition 
 of the Works of Nature. 
 
 If the particular EfTences of Natural Bodies are 
 unknown to us, we may yet be good Philofophers, 
 good Artifts, good Neighbours, good Subjects and 
 good Chriftians without that Knowledge, and we 
 have j aft Reafon to be content. 
 
 Now that the Effences of fome of the modal Ap- 
 pearances and Changes in Nature^ as well as Things 
 of Art^ Science and Morality are fufficiently known 
 to us to make perfe5l Definitions of them, will ap- 
 pear by the Specimen of a few Definitions of thefe 
 Things. 
 
 Motion is a Change of Place. Swiftnefs is the 
 pafTing over a long Space in a iliort Time. A 
 natural Day is the Time of one alternate Revoluti- 
 on of Light and Darknefs, or it is the Duration of 
 twenty four Hours. An Eclipfeofthe Sun is a De- 
 fed in the Sun's Tranfmifiion of Light to us by the 
 Moon interpofing. * Snow is congealed Vapour, 
 ^ Hail is congealed Rain. An * IJland is a Piece of 
 Land rifing above the furrounding Water. An * Hill 
 is an elevated Part of the Earth, and a * Grove is a 
 Piece of Ground thick fet with Trees. An Houfe 
 is a Building made to dwell in. A Cottage is a 
 mean Houfe in the Country. A Supper is that 
 Meal which we make in the Evening. A Tri- 
 angle is a Figure compofed of three Sides. A 
 Gallon is a Meafure containing eight Pints, A 
 Porter is a Man who carries Burdens for Hire. A 
 
 * Note, Ijland, Hill, Gro've, are not defigned here in their more remote and 
 Jubftantial Natures^ (if I may fo exprefs it ) or as the Matter of them is 
 Earth J for in this Senfe we know not their EfTence, but only as confidered 
 mtht\r modal Appearances, whereby one part of Earth is diftinguilhed from 
 aoother, The fame may be faid of Snozu^ Ha'iL &c. 
 
 King 
 
ii6 L G I C K: Or, Part I. 
 
 King is the chief Ruler in a Kingdom. Veracity 
 is the Conformity of our Words to our Thoughts. 
 Covetoufnefs is an excelTive Love of Money, or 
 other Poffefrions. Killing is the taking away the 
 Life of an Animal. Murder is the unlawful kil- 
 ling of a Man. Rhetorick is the Art of fpeaking 
 in a Manner fit to perfuadc. Natural Philofophy 
 is the Knowledge of the Properties of Bodies and 
 the various Eticds of them, or it is the Knowledge 
 of the various Appearances in Nature, and their 
 Caufes ; and Logick is the Art of ufing our Reafon 
 well, ^c. 
 
 Thus you fee the eflfential Differences of various 
 Beings may be known, and are borrowed from their 
 ^alities and Properties^ their Caufes^ Effe5iSy Oh- 
 je5fs^ y^i'jun5l^ Ends, ^c. and indeed as infinitely 
 various as the Effences of Things are, their Defi- 
 nitions muft needs have very various Forms. 
 
 After all it mufl be confefTed, that many Logi- 
 cians and Philofophers in the former Ages, have 
 made too great a fiuftle about the Exadlnefs of their 
 Dtfiniiions of Things, and enter'd into long fruitlefs 
 Controverfics and very ridiculous Debates in the fe- 
 veral Sciences about adjufting the Logical Formali- 
 ties of every Definition ; whereas that fort of wrang- 
 ling is now grown very juflly contemptible, iince 
 it is agreed that true Learning and the Knowledge 
 of Things depends much more upon a large Ac- 
 quaintance wirh their various Properties, Caufes, 
 Eifeds, Sabjed, Obje6l, Ends and Defigns, than 
 it does upon the formal and fcholaflick Niceties of 
 Genus and Difference. 
 
 SECT. 
 
p, VL S. 7» The right TJfe of Reafon, 117 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 Of a complete Conception of Things, 
 
 HAV I N G dwelt fo long upon the firft Rule 
 to direct our Conceptions, and given an Ac- 
 count of the Definition both of Names and Things 
 in order to gain clear and diflin5l Ideas, we make 
 hafte now to the fecond Rule to guide our Concep- 
 tions, and that is, Conceive of Things completely in 
 all their Parts, 
 
 All Parts have a Reference to fome Whole : 
 Now there is an old Diftindion which logical Wri- 
 ters make of a Whole and its Parts into four feve- 
 ral Kinds, and it may be proper juft to mention 
 them here. 
 
 1. There is 2l met aphyftcal Whole ^ when the Ef- 
 fence of a Thing is faid to confift of two Parts, the 
 Genus and the Difference, i. e. the general and the 
 fpecial Nature, which being joined together make 
 up a Definition. This has been the Subjedt of the 
 foregoing Sedions. 
 
 2. There is a mathematical Whole which is better 
 called integral, when the feveral Parts, which go 
 to make up the Whole are really diftind from one 
 another, and each of them may fubfifl apart. So the 
 Head, the Limhs and the Trunk are the integral 
 Parts of an animal Body ; fo Units are the integral 
 Parts of any large Number-, fo thefe Difcourfes 
 which I have written concerning Perception, Judg- 
 ment, Reafoning and Dlfpofition are the four integral 
 Parts of Logick, This Sort of Parts goes to make 
 up the Completenefs of any Subject, and this is the 
 chief and moil dired Matter of our Difcourfe in 
 this Sedion* 
 
 3. The 
 
ii8 L O G I C K: Or, Part L 
 
 3 . There is a phyfical or effential Whole, which is 
 ufually made to fignify and include only the two 
 ejfential Pans of Man, Body and Soul: But I think 
 the Senfe of it may better be alter'd, or at leaft en- 
 larged, and fo include all the effential Modes, At- 
 tributes or Properties which are contained in the 
 Comprehenfion of any Idea. This fhall be the Sub- 
 je6t of Difcourfe under the third Rule to dire5i our 
 Conceptions, 
 
 4. There is a logical Whole, which is alfo called 
 an Univerfal'y and the Parts of it are all the parti- 
 cular Ideas to which this univerfal Nature extends. 
 So a Genus is a Whole in refped: of the feveral Spe- 
 cies which are its Parts. So the Species is a Whole, 
 and all the Individuals are the Parts of it. This 
 fhall be treated of in ih^ fourth Rule to guide our 
 Conceptions. 
 
 At prefent we confider an Idea as an integral 
 Whole, and our fecond Rule directs us to contemplate 
 it in all its Parts : But this can only refer to complex 
 Ideas, for fimple Ideas have no Parts, 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 
 Of Bivifwn, and the Rules of it. 
 
 Since our Minds are narrow in their Capacity, 
 and cannot furvey the feveral Parts of any 
 complex Being with one Tingle View, as God fees 
 all Things at once ; therefore we muft as it were 
 take it to Pieces, and confider of the Parts fepa- 
 rately that we may have a more complete Concep- 
 tion of the Whole. So if I would learn the Na- 
 ture of a Watch, the Workman takes it to pieces 
 and fhews me the Spring, the Wheels, the Axles, 
 the Pinions, the Balance, the Dial Plate, the Poin- 
 ier, the Cafe, ^c, and defcribes each of thefe Things 
 
 to 
 
C. VL S. 8. The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 1 9 
 
 to me apart, together with their Figures and their 
 Ufes. If I would know what an Animal is, the 
 Anatomift confiders the Head^ the Trunks the 
 Limbs^ the Bowels apart from each other, and 
 gives me diflind Ledures upon each of them. 
 So z Kingdom is divided into its feveral Provinces ; 
 a Book into its feveral Chapters ; and any Science 
 is divided according to the feveral Suhje^fs of which 
 it treats. 
 
 This is what we properly call the Divifwn of an 
 Idea, which is an Explication of the Whole hy its 
 feveral Parts, or an Enumeration of the feveral PartSy 
 that go to compofe any Whole Idea, and to render 
 it complete. And I think when Man is divided into 
 Body and Soul, it properly comes under this part 
 of the Dodrine of integral Divifwn, as well as when 
 the mere Body is divided into Head, Trunk and 
 Limbs : This Divifion is fometimes calPd Par- 
 tition, 
 
 When any of the Parts of any Idea are yet far- 
 ther divided in order to a clear Explication of 
 the Whole, this is called a Subdivifion ; as when a 
 Tear is divided into Months, each Month into DaySy 
 and each Day into Hours, which may alfo be hv- 
 ihQv fubdivided into Minutes and Seconds. 
 
 It is neceflary in order to the full Explication 
 of any Being to confider each Part, and the Pro- 
 perties of it, diftindl ^jy it felf, as well as in its Re- 
 lation to the Whole : For there are many Properties 
 that belong to the feveral Parts of a Being which 
 cannot properly be afcribed to the Whole, tho' 
 thefe Properties may fit each Part for its proper 
 Station, and as it ftands in that Relation to the 
 whole complex Being : As in a Houfe^ the Doors 
 are moveable, the Rooms fquare, the Cielings white, 
 the Windows tranfparenc, yet the Houfe is neither 
 moveable, nor fquare, nor white, nor tranfparent. 
 
 The 
 
i^o LOGIC K: Or, Part h 
 
 The fpecial Rules of a good Divifton are thefe, 
 
 1. Rule. Each Part fingly taken mujl contain lefi 
 than the Whole^ hut all the Parts taken colle5lvvely 
 {or together) muft contain neither more nor lefs thari 
 the Whole. Therefore if in difcourfmg of a *Tree 
 you divide it into the Trunk and Leaves it is an 
 imperfcc5t Divifion, becaufe the Root and the 
 Branches are needful to make up the Whole. So 
 Logick would be ill divided into Apprehenfion^ 
 Judgment and Reafoning ; for Method is a confider- 
 able Part of the Art which teaches us to tife our 
 Reafon right, and lliould by no Means be omit- 
 ted. 
 
 Upon this Account, in every Divifion whereinf 
 we defign a perfedl Exadnefs, it is neceffary to 
 examine the whole Idea with Diligence, left we 
 omit any Part of it thro' want of Care ; tho* inf 
 fome Cafes it is not poffible, and in others it is not 
 tiecefiary that we fhould defcend to the minuteft 
 Parts. 
 
 2. Rule. In all Viviftons we fhould firft confder 
 the larger and more immediate Parts of the Suhje5f^ 
 and not divide it at once into the more minute and re- 
 mote Parts. It would by no means be proper to 
 divide a Kwgdojn firft into Streets^ and Lanes and 
 Fields, but it muft be firft divided into Provinces 
 or Counties, then thofe Counties may be divided into 
 Towns, FillagcSy Fields^ &c, and Towns into Streets 
 and Lanes. 
 
 3. Rule. The fever al Parts of a Bivifon ought 
 to he oppoftte, i. e. one Part ought not to contain another; 
 It would be a ridiculous Divifion of an Animal into 
 Head, Limhs, Body and Brain^ fur the Brains are 
 contained in the Head, 
 
 Yet 
 
C VI. S. 8. The right Ufe o/Reafon. 12s 
 
 Yet here it muft be noted, that fometimes the 
 Subjects of any Treatife, or the Objects of any par- 
 ticular Science may be properly and necelTarily fo 
 divided, that the fecond may include the firft, and 
 the third may include the firft and fecond, with- 
 out offending againft this Rule, becaufe in the fe- 
 cond or following Parts of the Science or Dif- 
 courfe, thefe Objeds are not confidered in the fame 
 Manner as in the firft ; as for Inftance, Geometry 
 divides its Objeds into Lines, Surfaces and Solids : 
 Now though a Line De contained in a Surface, or 
 a Solid, yet it is not confidered in a Surface fepa- 
 rate and alone, or as a mere Line, as it is in the 
 firft Part of Geometry, which treats of Lines. So 
 Logick is rightly divided into Conception, Judg-" 
 ment, Reafoning, and Method. For though Ideas ot 
 Conceptions are contained in the following Parts of 
 Logick, yet they are not there treated of as fepa^ 
 rate Ideas, which are the proper Subjed: of the 
 firft Part. 
 
 4. Rule. Let not Suhdivljions he too numerous 
 without Neceffity : For it is better many Times ta 
 diftinguilh more Parts at once if the Subject will 
 bear it, than to mince the Difcourfe by excelTive 
 dividing and fubdividing. It is preferable therefore 
 in a Treatife of Geography to fay, that in a City we 
 will confider its Walls, its Gates, its Buildings, its 
 Streets, and Lanes, than to divide it formally firft 
 into the encompajfing and the encompajjed Parts ; the 
 encompaffing Parts are the Walls and Gates ; the 
 cncompaffed Part includes the Ways and the Build- 
 ings ', the Ways are the Streets and the Lanes y 
 Buildings confift of the Faundations and the Super- 
 firu^ure, ^c. 
 
 Toa 
 
1^2 LOGIC K: Or, Part 1 
 
 Too great a Number of Subdivifions has been 
 afFedled by feme Perfons in Sermons, Treatifes, In- 
 ftrudlions, ^c, under pretence of greater Accuracy : 
 But this Sort of Subtleties hath often given great 
 Confufion to the Underftanding, and fometimes 
 more Difficulty to the Memory. In thefe Cafes it 
 is only a good Judgment can determine what Sub- 
 divifions are needful. 
 
 5. Rule, Divide every Suhje5i according to the 
 fpecial Defign you have in View. One and the fairie 
 Idea or Subjecft may be divided in very different 
 Manners according to the different Purpofes we 
 have in difcourfing of it. So if a Printer were to 
 confider the fcveral Parts of a Book^ he muft di- 
 vide it into Sheets^ the Sheets into PageSy the Pages 
 into LineSy and the Lines into Letters, But a 
 Grammarian divides a Book into Periods^ Sentences 
 and Words, or Parts of Speech, as Noun^ Pronoun, 
 Verb, ^c, A Logician confidcrs a Book as divid- 
 ed into Chapters, Sections, Arguments, Propofi- 
 tionsy Ideas-, and with the Help of 0«/o/^^jV, he di- 
 vides the Propofitions into Subject, Object, Pro- 
 ferty. Relation, A5iion, Pajfion, Caufe, Effect, ^c. 
 But it would be very ridiculous for a Logician to 
 divide a Book into Sheets, Pages and Lines ; or 
 for a Printer to divide it into Nouns and Pro- 
 nouns, or into Propojitions, Ideas, Properties or 
 Caufes, 
 
 6. Rule. In all your Divifions obferve with great- 
 eft: Exa5inefs the Nature of Things, And here I am 
 conftrained to make a Subdivifion of this Rule into 
 two very neceffary Particulars. 
 
 (i.) Let the Parts of your Divifion be fuch as 
 are properly diftinguifhed in Nature, Do not di- 
 vide afunder thofe Parts of the Idea which are in- 
 timately 
 
tC. VI. S. 8. "the right Ufe ofVit^hn. iaj 
 
 timately united in Nature, nor unite thofe Things 
 into one Part which Nature has evidently disjoin- 
 ed : Thus it would be very improper in treating of 
 an animal Body to divide it into the fuperior and 
 inferiW Halves \ for it woiild be hard to fay how' 
 much belongs by Nature to the inferior Half^ and 
 how much to the fuperior. Much more improper 
 "Would it be flill to divide the Aniinal into the 
 Right-hand Parts 2ind Left-hand Parts; which would 
 bring greater Confufion. This would be as unna- 
 tural as a Man who fhould cleave a Hdfl Nut in 
 Halves thro' the Husk^ the Shell and the Kernel^ at 
 once, and fay a Nut is divided into thefe two Parts ; 
 whereas Nature leads plainly to the threefold Di* 
 ftindlion of Husky Shelly drid Kernel: 
 
 (2.) Bo not affeU Duplicities nor Triplicities^ nor 
 any certain Number of Parts in your Di'Vifion of 
 ^Things i for we know of no fuch certain Number 
 bf Parts which God the Creator has obferved in 
 forming all the Varieties 6f his Creatures, nor is 
 thefe any Uniform determined Number of Parts 
 in the various Subjeds of hum'Sn Art or Science 5 
 yet fome Perfons have difturbed the Order of Na- 
 ture, and abufed their Readers by an AfFcrdlation of 
 Dichotomies^ Trichotomies ^ Sevens^ 'Twelves^ &c. 
 Let the Nature of the Subject, confidered togethef 
 with the Deftgn which you have in view, always 
 determine the Number of Parts into which yoa 
 divide it. 
 
 After all, it ttiitfl be confefTcd that an intimate 
 Knowledge of Things and a judicious Obfferva- 
 tion will aflift in the Bufinefs of Divifion, as well 
 as of Definition^ better tha'n too nice and curious 
 an Attention to the m^re Formalities of logical 
 Writers, without a real Acquaintance withThingi, 
 
 I SECT, 
 
124 
 
 L G I C K: Or, Part I> 
 
 SECT. IX. 
 
 Of a coviprehenfive Conception cf Things, and of 
 Abfiraction, 
 
 TH E third Rule to direct our Conception re- 
 quires us to conceive of 'Things comprehenfively. 
 As we muft furvey an Object in all its Parts to 
 obtain a complete Idea of it, fo we mud confider 
 it in all its Modes^ Attributes^ Properties^ and Re- 
 lations^ in order to obtain a comprehenfive Con- 
 ception of it. 
 
 The Comprehenfwn of an Idea, as it was ex- 
 plain'd under the Dodrine of Univerfals, includes 
 only the efjential Modes or Attributes of that Z^^^^ 
 but in this Place the Word is taken in a larger 
 Stwk, and implies alfo the various occafional Pra- 
 perties^ accidental Modes and Relations, 
 
 The Neceflity of this Rule is founded upon the 
 fame Reafon as the former, viz. That our Minds 
 are narrow and fcanty in their Capacities, and as 
 they are not able to confider all the Parts of a 
 complex Idea at once^ fo neither can they at once 
 contemplate all the different Attributes and C/>- 
 cumfiances of it : We muft therefore confider Things 
 fucceffively and gradually in their various Appear- 
 ances and Circumflances : As our natural Eye 
 cannot at once behold the fix Sides of a Dye or 
 Cube^ nor take Cognizance of all the Points that 
 •are marked on them, and therefore we turn up the 
 Sides fucceffively, and thus furvey and number the 
 Points that are marked on each Sidey that we may 
 know the whole. 
 
 In 
 
C. Vi. S. 9. The right Vfe of Reafon: in^ 
 
 In order to a comprehenfive View of any Idea 
 we muft firft confider, whether the Objcd of it 
 has an Exigence as well as an EJfence \ whether ic 
 be a fiinple or complex Idea ; whether it be a Sub- 
 fiance or a Mode \ if ic be a Subftance^ then we 
 mull enquire what are the ejfential Modes of it, 
 which are neceffary to its Nature, and what are 
 thofe Properties or Accidents of it, which belong 
 to it occafionally, or as it is placed in fome par- 
 ticular Gircumftances : We muft view it in its 
 internal and abfolute Modes, and obferve it in thofe 
 various external Relations in which it (lands to other 
 Beings : We mull confider ic in its Powers and 
 Capacities either to do or fuffer : We muft trace 
 ic up to its various Caufes^ whether fupreme or 
 fubordinate. We muft defcend to the Variety 
 of its Effe5is^ and take notice of its feveral Ends 
 and Defigns which are to be attained by it. We 
 muft conceive of it as it is either an Ohje^ or a 
 8ubje5f j what are the Things that are a-kin to it, 
 and what are the Oppojites or Contraries of ic ;• for 
 many Things are to be known both by their con^^ 
 irary and th-eir kindred Ideas. 
 
 If the Thing we difcourfe of be a mereM?^^, 
 we muft enquire whether ic belong to Spirits or 
 Bodies ; whether ic be a -phyjical or moral Mode : 
 if morale then we muft confider its Relation to 
 Gody to our felves^ to our Neighbours ; its Reference 
 to this Life, or the Life to come. If ic be a Virtue^ 
 We muft feek what are the Principles of it, what 
 are the Rules of ic, what are the 'Tendencies of ic^ 
 and whac are the falfe Virtues that counterfeit ic, 
 and whac are the real Vices that oppofe ir, whaC 
 are the Evils which attend the Negkoi of ic, what 
 are the Rewards of iht Praclice of ic both here 
 and hereafter, 
 
 1 2 If 
 
126 L G I C R: Or, Fart t 
 
 If the Subjed be hiftorical or a Matter of FaB^ 
 we may then enquire whether the Aclion^ was 
 done at all\ whether it was done in fuch a Manner^. 
 or by fuch Perfons as is reported *, at what Time 
 it was done ; m what Place ; by what Motive j and 
 for what Defign ; what is the Evidence of the 
 FaB ; who are the Witneffes ; what is their Cha^ 
 raBer and Credibility v what Sigm there are of 
 fuch a Fadl •, what cmcurrent Circumjlances which 
 may either fupport the Truth of it, or render ic 
 doubtful. 
 
 In order to make due Enquiries into all thefe 
 and many other Particulars which go towards the 
 complete and comyrehenfive Idea of any Being,, the 
 Science of Ontology is exceeding necellary. This 
 is what was wont to be called x.\\t firft Part of Me^ 
 taphyficks in the Peripatetick Schools. It treats of 
 Being in its moft general Nature^ and of all its 
 Affe^ions and Relations. I confefs the old Popifh 
 Schoolmen hav^e mingled a Number of ufelefs Sub- 
 tleties with this Science; they have exhaufled their 
 own Spirits, and. the Spirits of their Readers in 
 many laborious and intricate Trifles, and fome 
 of their Writings have been fruitful of Names 
 without Ideas, which hath done much Injury to 
 the facred Study of Divinity. Upon this Account 
 many of the Moderns have mod unjuftly aban- 
 doned the whole Science at once, and thrown 
 Abundance of Contempt and Raillery upon the 
 very Name of Metaphyficks ; but this Contempt 
 and Cenfure is very unreafonable, for this Science 
 fcparated from fome Ariftotelian Fooleries and fcho^ 
 lajlick Subtleties, is fo neceflary to a dillind: Con- 
 cfption, folid Judgment, and jufl Reafoning on 
 many Subje<5ts, that fometimes it is 'introduced as 
 a Part of Logick^ and not without Reafon. And 
 thofe, who utterly defpife and ridicule it, either 
 
 betray- 
 
C. VI. S. 9. The right life of Reafon. 1 27 
 
 betray their own Ignorance, or will be fuppofed 
 to malce their Wit and Banter a Refuge and Ex- 
 cufe for their own Lazinefs. Yec thus much I 
 would add, that the later Writers of Ontology are 
 generally the bed on this Account, becaufc they 
 have left out much of the ancient Jargon, See the 
 Brief Scheme of Ontology in the Pbilofo^hick EJfays 
 by Lm 
 
 Here let it be noted that it is neither ufsful, 
 neceflary, or polTible to run thro' all the Modes, 
 Circu?n(ianceSy and Relations of every Subjedl we 
 take in hand *, but in Ontology we enumerate a great 
 Variety of them, that fo a judicious Mind may 
 choofe what are thofe Circumflances^ Relations and 
 Properties of any Subjedl, which are moft nccef- 
 fary to the prefent Defign of him that fpeaks or 
 writes, either to explain, to illuftrate, or to prove 
 the Point. 
 
 As we arrive at the complete Knowledge of an 
 Idea in all its Parts, by that A&: of the Mind 
 which is called Divifwn, fo we come to a ccmpre^ 
 henfive Conception of a Thing in its feveral Pro- 
 perties and Relations , by that Ad: of the Mind which 
 is called AhfiraElion, i. e. we confider each Tingle 
 Relation or Property of the Subjedl alone, and thus 
 we do as it were withdraw and feparate it in our 
 Minds both from the Subjed itfelf, as well as from 
 other Properties and Relations in order to make a 
 fuller Obfervation of it. 
 
 This A61 of AhfiraBion is fald to be twofold, 
 either Prectfive or Negative, 
 
 Precifive Abjlra5ficn is when we confider thofe 
 Things apart which cannot really exift apart -, as 
 when we confider a Mode without confidering its 
 Suhftance and Suhje^, or one efjential Mode with- 
 out another. Negative Ahftra5fion is when we con- 
 fider one Thing feparate from another, which 
 I 3 may 
 
iaS LOGIC K: Or, Part I, 
 
 may alfo exift without it ; as when we conceive 
 of a Subjeo^ without conceiving of its accidental 
 Modes or Relations -, or when we conceive of one 
 Accident without thinking of another. If I think 
 of readying or writing without the exprefs Idea of 
 feme Man^ this is precifive AhJlra5lion ; or if I 
 think of the Attra5iion of Iron^ without the exprefs 
 Idea of fome particular magnetick Body, But when 
 I think of a Needle without an Idea of its Sharp- 
 vefs^ this is negative Jbftra5iion ; and it is the fame 
 when I think of its Sharpnefs without confidering 
 its Length, 
 
 SECT. X. 
 
 Of the extenfive Conception of Things^, and o^ 
 Difiribution. 
 
 AS the Completenefs of an Idea refers to the fe» 
 vera! Parts that compofe it, and the Cofn- 
 prehenfion of an Idea includes its various Pr/?p^r- 
 iies^ fo the Extention of an Idea denotes the vari- 
 ous Sorts or Kinds of Beings to which the fame Idea 
 belongs : And if we would be fully acquainted 
 with a Subjedl we muft obferve. 
 
 This fourth Rule to dired our Conceptions, viz. 
 Conceive 9f Things in all their Extenjion^ i. e. wc 
 muft fearch out the various Species or Special Na- 
 tures which are contained under it as a Genus or 
 general Nature. If we would know the Nature of 
 an Animal perfectly, we muft take Cognizance of 
 Beajlsy Birds, FifLes and Infers, as well as M?«, 
 all which are contained under the general Nature 
 iind ^fame of A^jimaL 
 
C. VI. S. 10. i:he right Ufe of Reafon. 129 
 
 As an integral Whole is diflinguifhed into its fe- 
 veral Parts by Divifion^ lb the Word Diftribu-. 
 iion is moft properly ufed when we diflinguifli an 
 univerfal Whole into its feveral Kinds of Species : 
 And perhaps it had been better if this Word had 
 been always confined to this Signification, tho' ic 
 mud be confefs'd, that we frequently fpeak of the 
 Divifion of an Idea into its feveral Kinds, as well 
 as into feveral Parts. 
 
 The Rules of a good Dilirihution are much the 
 fame with thofe which we have before applied 
 to Divifion^ which may be jufl repeated again in 
 the briefeft Manner in order to give Examples 
 to them. 
 
 I. Rule, Each Part fingly taken mufl contain 
 lefs than the Whole, but all the Parts taken col- 
 k5fively^ or together^ mud contain neither more nor 
 lefs than the Whole ; or as Logicians fometimes ex - 
 prefs it, the Parts of the Divifion ought to exhaufl 
 the whole 'Thing which is divided. So Medicine is 
 juftly diftributed into Prophyla5iick^ or the Art of 
 preferving Health ; and Therapeutick^ or the Art 
 of reftoring Health ; for there is no other fort of 
 Medicine befides thefe two. Bnt Men are not well 
 diftributed into /^// or 7^i?r/, for there are fome of 
 H jniddle Stature, 
 
 II. Rule, In all Vlftrihutions v/e fhould firil 
 confider the larger and more immediate Kinds or 
 Species, or Ranks of Being, and not divide a 
 Thing at once into the more minute and remote. 
 A Genus fliould not at once be divided into hdU 
 viduals^ or even into the lowefl Species^ if there 
 be a Species fuperior. Thus it would be very, im- 
 proper to divide Animal into Trout ^ Lchfter, Eel, 
 JDog^ Bear^ Eagle^ Dove, Worm and Butterfly^ for 
 
 I 4 thefe 
 
r«o LOGTCK: Or, Parti, 
 
 
 
 thcfe arc inferior Kinds ; whereas Animal ought 
 firfl: to be dlftributed into Man^ Beaft, Bird, Ftjb^ 
 Jnfict ; and then Bead fhould be diftributed into 
 Bog, Bear, &c. Bird into Eagle, Dove^ ^c. Filb 
 into Trout^ Eel, Lohfier, &c. 
 
 It is irregular alfo to join any inferior Species in 
 the fame Rank or Order with the fuperior ; as 
 if we would diftinguifh Animals into Birds, Bears ^ 
 and Oifiers, &:c. It would be a ridiculous Diftrir 
 bution. 
 
 lil. Rule, The feveral Parts of a Diftributior^ 
 ought to be oppofite ; that is, one Species or Clafs 
 of Beings in the fame Rank of Divifion ought not 
 to contain or include another ; fo Men ought not 
 to be divided into the Rich, the Roor, the Learned, 
 and the Tall ; for foor Men rnay be both learned 
 and tall, and fo may the rich. 
 
 But it will be objected, are not animated Bodies 
 rif'htly diftributed into Vegetativ.e and Animal, op 
 (as they are ufually called) Senfitive 2 Now thtfen- 
 fttive contains the vegetative Nature in it, for Ani- 
 mals grow as well as Plants. I anfwer, that in this 
 and all fuch Diftributions, the Word Vegetative. 
 fianifies merely vegetative j and in this Senfe Vege- 
 tative will be fufFiciently oppofite to Animal, for it 
 cannot be faid of an Animal that it contains m^ra 
 Vegetation in the Idea of it. 
 
 IV. Rule. Let not Subdivifions he too nume- 
 rous without NecefTity ; therefore I think Stuantity, 
 is better diftinguidied at once into a Line, a Sur-^ 
 face, and a Solid, than to fay as Ramus does, that 
 Quantity is either a Line, or a Thing lined -, and ^ 
 'fbing lined is either a Surface or a Solid. 
 
 V, Rulu 
 
Q, y I. S. I o. Tfo nght Ufe of Reafon* 1 3 1 
 
 V. Rule. Diftribute every Subjedl according to 
 |the rpecial Defign you have in View, fo far as is 
 neceflary or ufeful to your prefent Enquiry. Thus 
 a Politician diftributes Mankind according to their 
 civil Charadlers into the Rulers and the Ruled ; 
 and a Phyftcian divides them into the Sick or the 
 Healthy \ but a Dm;;^ diftributes them into Turks, 
 Heathens i Jews^ or Chrijtians. 
 
 Here note^ That it is a very ufelefs Thing to 
 diftribute any Idea into fuch Kinds or Members 
 as have no different Properties to befpokenof; 
 as it is mere trifling to divide right Angles into fuch 
 whofe Legs are equals and whofe Legs are unequal^ 
 for as to the mere right Angle they have no diffe- 
 rent Properties, 
 
 VI. Rule, la all your Diftrlburions obferve the 
 Nature of Things with great Exadnefs ; and do 
 not affedl any particular Form of Diftribution, as 
 f^me Perfons have done, by dividing every Genus 
 into two Species^ or into three Species *, whereas 
 Nature is infinitely various, and human Affairs and 
 human Sciences have as great a Variety, nor is there 
 any one Form of Diftribution that will exadly fuit 
 with all Subjeds. 
 
 Note^ It is to this Doclrine of Diftribution of 
 ^? Genus into its fever al Species^ we muft alfo refer 
 the Diftribution of a Cat(fe according to its feve- 
 ral Effects, as fome Medicines are beating, fome are 
 cooling ; or an Effect, when it is diftinguidied by 
 its Caufes, as Eaith is either built upon divine Tefli- 
 tnony or human. It is to this Head we refer par- 
 ticular artificial Bodies, when they are diftinguifh- 
 cd according to the Matter they are made of, as 
 a Statue is either of Brafs, of Marble, or f Foody 
 ^c, and any oih^v Beings, when they are diftin- 
 
 guiftied 
 
132 L G I C K : Or, Parti. 
 
 guifhed according to their End and Befign^ as the 
 furniture of Body or Mind is either for Ornament 
 or Uje. To this Head alfo we refer Subje^fs when 
 they are divided according to their Modes or Ac-- 
 cidents ; as Men are either merry or grave, or fad ; 
 and Modes, when they are divided by their SuhjeSis^ 
 as Dijlempers belong to the Fluids, or to the [olid Parts 
 cf the Animal, 
 
 It is alfo to this Place we reduce the Propofals 
 cf a Difficulty under its various Cafes, whether ic 
 be in Speculation or Pradlice : As to fhew the Rea- 
 fon of Sun-beams burning Wood, whether it be done 
 hy a convene Gl/ifs or a concave -, or to fhew the Con- 
 flru5fion and Menfuration of "Triangles^ whether you 
 have two Angles and a Side given, or two Sides 
 and an Angle, or only three Sides. . Here it is ne- 
 ceflary to di (tribute or divide a Difficulty into all its 
 Cafes, in order to gain a perfed Knowledge of the 
 Subj',^61 you contemplate. 
 
 Ic might be obferved here, that Logicians have 
 fometimes given a Mark or Sign to diftinguifli 
 when it is an integral Whole, that is divided into 
 iis Parts or Members, or v/hen it is a Genus, an 
 univcrfal Whole, that is diftirbuted into its Species 
 and Individuals, The Rule they give is this : 
 Whenfoever the whole Idea can be diredly and 
 properly affirmed of each Part, as a Bird is an 
 Animal, a FifJj is an AnimaL Bucephalus is a Horfe, 
 Peter is a Alan, then it is a Dillriburion of a Ge- 
 nus into its Species, or a Species into its Individuals : 
 But when the whole cannot be thus diredly af- 
 lirmed concerning every Part, then ic is a Divi- 
 Tion of an Integral into its feveral Species or Mem* 
 hers ; as we cannot f:iy the Head, the Breafi, the 
 Hand, or the Foot is an Animal, but we lay, the 
 Head is a Part of tlJe Animal, and the Foot is ano- 
 ther Part, 
 
 This 
 
C. VL Si 1 1 . The right XJfe of Reafon. 1 3 3 
 
 This Rule may hold true generally in corporeal 
 Beings, or perhaps in all Subftances : But when 
 we fay the Fear of God is Wifdo?n^ and fo is human 
 Civility : Crilici/m is true Learnings and fo is Phi- 
 lofophy : 'To execute a Murderer is Juftice^ and to 
 fave and defend the Innocent is Juflice too : In thefc 
 Cafes it is not fo eafily determined, whether an 
 integral Whole be divided into its Parts, or an uni- 
 verfal into its Species: For iht Fear of God may 
 be called either one Part^ or one Kind of JVifdoin : 
 Criticifm is one Part^ or one Kind of Learning : 
 And the Execution' of a Murderer may be called a 
 Species of Jufiice as well as a Part of it. Nor in- 
 deed is it a Matter of great Importance to deter- 
 ipine this Controverfy. 
 
 SECT. XL 
 
 Of an orderly Conception of Things. 
 
 TH E lafl Rule to diredl our Conceptions is, 
 that we fhoiild rank and place them in a pro- 
 fer Method and juft Order, This is of neceflary 
 Ufe to prevent Confufion \ for as a Trader who 
 never places his Goods in his Shop or Warehoufe 
 in a regular Order, nor keeps the Accounts of his 
 buying and felling, paying and receiving in a juft 
 Method, is in utmoft Danger of plunging all his 
 Affairs into Confufion and Ruin \ fo a Student who 
 is in the Search of Truth, or an Author or Teacher 
 who communicates Knowledge to others, will very 
 much obftru6t his Defign, and confound his own 
 Mind or the Mind of his Hearers, unlefs he range 
 his Ideas in juft Order. 
 
 If we would therefore become fuccefsful Learn- 
 ers or Teachers, we muft not conceive of Things 
 in a confufed Heap^ but difpofe our Ideas in feme 
 pertain Method^ which may be moft eafy and ufe- 
 
 ful 
 
134 LOGICK:Or, Part L 
 
 ful both for the Undcrftanding and Memory ; 
 and be fure as much as may be To follow the Na^ 
 tiire of Things^ for which many Rules might be 
 given, viz. 
 
 1. Conceive as much as you can of xht EJfen^ 
 tiah of any Subjed, before you confider its Acci^. 
 dentals, 
 
 2 . Survey firfl the general Parts and Properties 
 of any Subjed, before you extend your Thoughts 
 to difcourfe of the particular Kind or Species 
 of it. 
 
 3. Contemplate Things firfl in their own /;«/?/(? 
 Natures, and afterwards view them in Compofition 
 with other Things ; unlefs it be your prefent Pur- 
 pofe to take a compound Being to pieces, in order 
 to find out or to fhew the Nature of it by fearch- 
 ing and difcovering of what Simples it is com- 
 pofed. 
 
 4. Confider the dbfolute Modes or AfFe^lions 
 of any Being as it is in itfelf, before you proceed 
 to confider it relatively, or to furvey the vari- 
 ous Relations in which it Hands to other Beings, 
 
 Note, Thefe Rules chiefly belong to the Me- 
 thod of Inftrudion which the Learned call Syn- 
 ihetick. 
 
 But in the Regulation of our Ideas there is 
 feldom an abfolute NecefTity that we fhould place 
 them in this or the other particular Method : Ic 
 is pofTible in fome Cafes that many Methods may 
 be equally good, that is, may equally affid the 
 Underflanding and the Memory : To frame a 
 Method exquifitely accurate, according to the 
 flrid Nature of Things, and to maintain this Ac- 
 curacy from the Beginning to the End of a Trea- 
 tife, is a moft rare and difficult Thing, if not im- 
 pofTible. But a larger Account oi Method would 
 
 bg 
 
C.VI. S. 12. The right Ufe of Rc^{on. 135 
 
 be very improper in this Place, left we aBtlcipate 
 what belongs to the fourth Pari of Logick, 
 
 SECT. XII. 
 
 nefe five Rules of Conception exemplified. 
 
 IT may be ufeful here to give a Specimen of the 
 five fpcial Rules to direct our Conceptions^ which 
 have been the chief Subjed of this long Chapter, 
 and reprefent them pradically in one View. 
 
 Suppofe the Theme of our Difcourfe were the 
 Pajfwns of the Mind, ' 
 
 I ft. To gain a clear and dijlin5f Idea of Paffion^ 
 we muft define both the Name and the ning. 
 
 To begin with the Definition of the Name ; we 
 are not here to underftand the V^ord FaJJion in its 
 vulgar and moft limited Sen fe, as it fignifies merely 
 Anger or Fury ; nor do we take it in its moft exten- 
 five philofophical Senfe, for the fuftaining the A5lion 
 of an Agent -, but in the more limited philofophical 
 Senfe, PaJJions fignify the various Affections of the 
 JMind^ fuch as Admiration^ Love^ or Hatred j this 
 is the Definition of the Name. 
 
 We proceed to the Definition of the ^hing, Paf- 
 
 fion is defined a Senfation of fome fpecial Commotion 
 
 in animal Nature^ occafioned hy the Mind^s Perception 
 
 of fome Obje5l fuited to excite that Commotion. * Here 
 
 the Genus or general Nature of Faffion is a Sen^ 
 
 * Since this was written I have publi/hed a Aort Treatife of the PaJJions, 
 wherein I have fo far varied from this Definition as to call them Senjlble 
 Commotions of our whole Ntture, both Soul and Body y occafioned hy the Mind's 
 Perception of fome ObjeBsy &c. I made this Alteration in the Defcription of 
 the Paflions in that Book chiefly to include in a more explifit Manner the 
 Palfions of Defre and Averfion which are Aft-s of Volition rather than Sen- 
 j'atiom. Yet fince lome Commotions of animal Nature attend ail the Paf- 
 fions, and fince there is always a Senfation of thefe Commotions, I fhaJl 
 rot change the Definition 1 have written here : For this will agree to all the 
 Paflions whether they include any A&. of Volition or not : Nor indeed is th« 
 Matter cf any ^reat Importance, Nov, 17,, 1728.. 
 
 fat ion 
 
136 L O G I C K: Or, Part t 
 
 fation of fome fpecial Commotion in animal Nature ; 
 and herein it agrees with Hunger, Thirfl, Pain^ 
 i^c. The ejfential Difference of it is, that this Com- 
 motion arifes from a nought or Perception of the 
 Mindy and hereby it is diftinguifhed from Hunger^ 
 Third, or Pain. 
 
 2dly, We mufl: conceive of it completely^ or fuN 
 vey the feveral Parts that compofe it^ Thefe are 
 (i.)'Tbe Mind's Perception of fome Obje^, (2.) The 
 confequent Ruffle or fpecial Commotion of the Nerves^ 
 aud Bloody and animal Spirits. And (3.) The Sen^' 
 fation cf ibis inward Commotion, 
 
 3d]y, We mud confider iC comprehenfively in its 
 various Properties. The moll eftential Attributes 
 that make up its Nature have been already mention- 
 ed under the foregoing Heads. Some of the mod 
 confiderable Properties that remain are thefe, viz. 
 That Paffwn belongs to all Mankind in greater or 
 Jeffer Degrees : It is not confiantly prefent with us^ 
 hut upon fome certain Occafions : It is appointed by 
 our Creator for various ufeful Ends and Purpofes, viz, 
 to give us Vigour in the Purfuit of what is good and 
 agreeable to us, or in the Avoidance of what is 
 hurtful : // is very proper for our State of Trial in this 
 World : It is not utterly to be rooted out of our Na- 
 ture, but to be moderated and governed according to 
 Rules of Virtue and Religion, &c. 
 
 4.thly, We muft take Cognizance of the various 
 Kinds of it, which is called an extenfive Conception 
 of it. If the Objed: which the Mind perceives 
 be very uncommon, it excites the PafTion of Ad- 
 miration: If the Obje(5l appear agreeable it raifes 
 Love: If the agreeable Objed be ahfent and at- 
 tainable it is Bcfire : If likely to be obtained, it 
 excites Hope : \^ unattainable, Defpair : If it be 
 prefent and pcffeffed, it is the Paflion of Jcj : If /^/, 
 it excites Sorrow : If the Objedl be difagreeable, 
 
 k 
 
C. VL S. 13. The right Ufe (jfReafon. 137 
 
 ic caufes in general Hatred or Averfion : If it be 
 ahfent and yet we are in Danger of it, it raifts 
 our Fear : If it be frefent^ it is Sorrow and Sad'- 
 nefs^ &c. ■ 
 
 5thly, All thefe Things and many more which 
 go to compofe a Treatife on this Subje6l muft be 
 placed in their 'proper Order : A flight Specimen of 
 which is exhibited in this fhort Account o^ Paffion^ 
 and which that admirable Author Defcarles has 
 treated of at large ; though, for want of fufficienc 
 Experiments and Obfervations in natural Philofo- 
 phy, there are fome few Miftakes in his Accoun: 
 of animal Nature. 
 
 SECT. XIII. 
 
 An Illuftration of thefe five Rules hy Similitudes, ' 
 
 THUS we have brought the firfl Part of Logick 
 to a Conclufion : And it may not be impro- 
 per here to reprefent its Excellencies (fo far as we 
 have gone) by general Hints of its chief Deftgit and 
 Ufe, as well as by a various Comparifon of it to thofe 
 Inftruments which Mankind have invented for their 
 feveral Conveniencies and Improvements. 
 . The Defign of Logick is not to furnifh us with* 
 the perceiving Faculty, but only to dire5i and af- 
 fift us in the Ufe of it : It doth not give us the 
 Objedls of our Ideas, but only calls fucb a Light 
 on thofe Objedls which Nature furnifnes us v/ith, 
 that they may be the more clearly and diftincftly 
 known : It doth not add new Parts or Properties 
 to Things, but it difcovers the various Parts, Pro- 
 perties, Relations and Dependencies of one Thing 
 upon another, and by ranking all Things under ^^- 
 neral ^Lndi fpedal ¥{td,ds^ it renders the Nature, or 
 any of the Properties, Powers, andUfes of a Thing 
 
 more 
 
138 L O G IC K: On Part h 
 
 morQ eafy to be found our, when we feek in what 
 Rank of Brings it Jycs, and wherein it agrees withj' 
 and wherein it differs from others. 
 
 If any Comparifons would iJluftrate thisy it may 
 be thus reprelented. 
 
 I. When Logick afllfts us to attain a clear and 
 dtftin5f Conception of the Nature of Things by 
 Definition^ it is like thofe Glajfe^ whereby we be- 
 hold fuch Objeds diftindly, as by Reafon of their 
 Smallnefs or tiieir great Diftance appear in Con- 
 fufion to the naked Eye : So the 'Telefcope difcoveri 
 to us diftant Wonders in the Heavens, and fhews 
 the milky JVay^ and the hrtght cloudy Spots in a very 
 dark 5ky to be a CoUedion of little Stars, which 
 the Eye unaflifted beholds in mingled Confufion, 
 So when Bodies are two fmall for our Sight to' fur- 
 vey them diftindily, then the Micro/cope is at Hand 
 for our Adiftance, to fliew us all the Limbs and 
 Features of the moft minute Animals^ with great 
 Clearnefs and Diftindlion. 
 
 II. When we are taught by Logick to view s 
 Thing completely in all ics Parts by the Help of £)/- 
 i)ifiony it has the Ufe of an anatomical Knife^ which 
 difleds an animal Body^ and feparates the Veins ^ 
 Arteries^ Nerves^ Mufcles^ Membranes^ &c. and 
 fhews us the leveral Parts which go to the Compo- 
 fition of a complete Animal. 
 
 III. When Logick inftrufls us to furvey an' 
 Objed comprehenfivcly in all the Modes^ Properties^ 
 Relations^ Faces^ and Appearances of it, it is of 
 the fame Ufc as a terrejlrial Globe, which turning 
 round oh its Axis reprefents to us all the Variety 
 of Lands and Seas, Kingdoms and Nations on tht 
 Surface of the Earth in a very fhort S^jceeffron ci 
 
 Time, 
 
C. VL S, i^^, The right XJfe of Rcafon. 139 
 
 Time fhews the Situation and various Relation of 
 them to each other, and gives a comprehenfive 
 •View of them in Miniature. 
 
 IV. When this Art teaches us to dijlrihute any 
 extenfive Idea into its different Kinds or Species^ it 
 may be compared to the pri/fnatick Glafs^ that re- 
 ceives the Sun-Beams or Rays of Light, which 
 feem to be uniform when falling upon it, but it 
 feparates and deftributes them into their different 
 Kinds and Colours, and ranks them in their proper 
 Succeflion. 
 
 Or if we defcend to Suhdivifwns and fubordinate 
 Ranks of Being, then Diftribution may alfo be 
 faid to form the Refemblance of a natural Tree^ 
 wherein the Genus or general Idea (lands for the 
 Root or Stocky and the feveral Kinds or Species^ and 
 Individuals^ are diitrtbuted abroad, and reprefented 
 in their Dependance and Connexion, like the fe- 
 veral Boughs^ Branches^ and lejfer Shoots. For In- 
 ftance, let Animal be the Root of a logical Tree, 
 the Refemblance is feen by meer Infpedtion, tho* 
 the Root be not placed at the Bottom 'of the 
 Page. 
 
 Animal 
 
146 Z G 1 C K: Or, Part, T, 
 
 Man 
 
 Philip 
 I James 
 I Feter 
 
 Thomas^ Sec, 
 
 Beaft< 
 
 Animal < 
 
 Bird 
 
 Fifh 
 
 Horfe 
 
 Squirrel. 
 
 Lion 
 
 Dog 
 
 Bear, (f?c. 
 
 Eagle 
 I Lark 
 
 I Duck 
 
 Goofe, ^c. 
 
 Trout 
 [Whale 
 'Oifter, (^c. 
 
 C Tron. 
 
 I Bayard^ &C. 
 
 MaftifF, 
 Spaniel. 
 GreyhouncL 
 .Beagle, ^c. 
 
 'Englijh, 
 \Mufcovy, 
 ^Hook-Bill, Be, 
 
 \ 
 
 ,F^y^"S — {B^ef^r. 
 Infea-^ (Worm. 
 
 Creeping — -^Anc. 
 
 (^Caterpillar, £sJ*c 
 
 The fame Similitude will ferve alfo to illuftrate 
 the DivifwJi and Subdivifton of an integral Whole ^ 
 into its feveral Parts. 
 
 When Logick direds us to place all our Ideas 
 in a proper Method^ mod convenient both for In- 
 ftrudlion and Memory, it doth the fame Service 
 
 as 
 
C. VI. S. i3i '^he'ri^kt life ojKt^Gn. 141 
 
 as the Cafes of well contrived Shelves in a large Li^ 
 brary wherein Folio* s^ ^artd's^ 03avo*Sy and lejfer 
 Volunies^ are difpofed in fuch exadt Order under 
 the particular Heads of Divinity^ Hifiory, Mathe- 
 maticks^ ancient and inifcellaneous Learning, tfff. 
 that the Student knows where to find every Book, 
 and has them all as it were within his Command 
 at once, becailfe of tha exac^ Order wherein they 
 are placed. 
 
 Tlie Man who has fuch ATiitances as thefe at 
 Hand) \w order to manage his Conceptions and re- 
 gulate his Ideas^ is well prepared td improve Kis 
 Knowledge, and to join thefe Ideas together in a. re- 
 gular Manner by Judg7nent^ which is the fecond 
 Operation of the Mind, and will be the Subjedt of 
 
 she fecond Part of Logkk 
 
 K 2 THE 
 
142 L G IC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 THE 
 
 SECOND PART 
 
 O F 
 
 L O G I C K. 
 
 Of Judgment and Propofition, 
 
 WHEN the Mind has got Acquain- 
 tance with Things by training Ideas 
 of them, it proceeds to the next Ope- 
 ration, and that is, to compare thefe 
 Ideas together, and to join them by Affirmation^ or 
 disjoin them by Negation^ according as we find 
 them to agree or difagree. This Ad of the Mhid 
 is called Judgment ; as when we have by Perception 
 obtained the Ideas of Plato^ a Philofopher^ Man^ 
 Innocent^ we form thefe Judgments ; Flato was a 
 Philofopher ; no Man is innocent. 
 
 Some Writers have alTerted, that Judgment con- 
 fifts in a 7nere Perception of the Agreement or Difa- 
 greement of Ideas, But I rather think there is an A6t 
 of the Will (at k aft in inoft Cafes) neceffary to form 
 2i Judgment -, for tho' . e do perceive or think we 
 perceive Ideas to agr^:^- or difagree, yet we may 
 fometimes refrain jrchi judging or alTenting to the 
 Perception, for fear xtH the Perception lliould 
 
 not 
 
T'he right Ufe ^Reafon.- 14 j 
 
 not be fufficiently clear, and we fhould be miftaken : 
 And I am well affured at other Times, that there 
 are Multitudes of Judg?nents formed, and a firm 
 Allen t given to Ideas joined or disjoined, before 
 there is any clear Perception whether they agree or 
 difagree -, and this is the Reafon of fo tna.ny falfe 
 Judg7nent5 or Miftakes among Men. Both thefe 
 Pradices are a Proof that Judgment has foinething of 
 the Will in it, and does not merely confift in Per- 
 ception, fince we fometimes judge (tho* unhappily^ 
 without perceiving, and fometimes we perceive 
 without immediate judging. 
 
 As an Idea is theRefult of our Conception or Jp- 
 prehenfion, fo a Propofition is the EfFed: of Judg- 
 ment. The foregoing Sentences which are Exam- 
 ples of the Ad: of Judgment are properly called 
 Propofitions. Plato is a Philofopher, &c. 
 
 Here let us confider, 
 
 1. ne general Nature of a Propofition, and the 
 Parts of which it is compofed, 
 
 2. The various Dlvifions or Kinds of Propofitions, 
 
 3. The Springs of falfe Judgment, or the BoElrine 
 of Prejudices. 
 
 4. General Direolions to ajfift us in judging aright, 
 
 5. Special Rules to dire5i us in judging particular 
 Ohje5is. 
 
 K3 CHAP. 
 
t4+ L G I C K: Or, Part If, 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Nature of a Tropofitloiiy and if$ 
 feveral Parts. 
 
 A Proportion is a Sentence wherein two or 
 more Ideas or Terms are joined or disjoined 
 by one Affirmation or Negation, as Plato was a 
 Philofopher : Every A^igle is formed by two Lines 
 meeting : No Man living on Earth can he completely 
 happy. Wiien there are ever fo jnany Ideas or 
 Terms in the Sentence, yet if they are joined or 
 disjoined merely by one fingle Affirmation or Ne- 
 gation, they are properly called but one Propofiti- 
 on^ tho' they may be reiblved into feveral Propo- 
 fitions which are implied therein, as will appear 
 hereafter. 
 
 In defcribing a Propojition I ufe the Word T'erms 
 as well as Ideas^ becaufe when mere Ideas are joined 
 in the Mind without Words, it is rather called a 
 Judgment ; but when clothed with Words, it is 
 called a Prepcfuion^ even tho' it be in the Mind 
 only, as well as when it is expreiTed by fpeaking or 
 Writing. 
 
 There are three Things which go to the Nature 
 and Conftitution of a Propofition, {viz.) i\it Suhjeof^ 
 the Predicate and the Copula. 
 
 The Suhjecl of a Propofition is that concerning 
 which any thing is affirmed or denied : So Plato^ 
 Jngle, Man livi/.g on Earthy are the Subjects of the 
 foregoing Propofitions. 
 
 The Predicate is that which is affirmed or deni- 
 ed of the Subj' d ; fo Pbilofopher is the Predicate 
 0^ the firil: Proportion ; formed by two Lines meet- 
 ifig^ is the Predicate of t|ie fecond -, capahk of h- 
 
 ivg 
 
C\ I. 7he right life ^Reafon, 145 
 
 ing completely happy ^ is the proper Predicate of the 
 third. 
 
 The Suhje5l and Predicate of a Propofition taken 
 together are called the Matter of it ; for thefe are 
 the Materials of which it is made. 
 
 The Copula is the Formo^ z Propofition ; it repre- 
 fents the A(ft of the Mind affirming or denying, and 
 it is exprefled by the Words, am^ art^ isy arcy ^c. 
 or, am not, art not^ is not^ are not^ l^c. 
 
 It is not a Thing of Importance enough to 
 create a Difpute, whether the Words no^ none^ 
 noty never^ &c. which disjoin the Idea or Terms 
 in a negative Propofition, fhall be called a Part of 
 the Subjed: of the Copula^ or of the Predicate^ 
 Sometimes perhaps they may feem mofl naturally 
 to be included in one, and fometimes in another 
 of thefe, though a Propofition is ufually denomi- 
 nated affirmative or negative by its Copula^ as here- 
 
 after. 
 
 iVo/f I . W^here each of thefe Parts of a Propo- 
 fition is not exprefs'd diflindly in fo many Words, 
 yet they are all underflood, and implicitly contained 
 therein ; as, Socrates difputed^ is a complete Propofi- 
 tion, for it fignifies Socrates was difput'ing. So Idie^ 
 f:gnifies I am dying, I can zvrite, i. e. I am able to 
 write. In Latin and Greek one fingle Word is many 
 Times a com pleat Propofition. 
 
 Note 2 . Thefe Words, am^ art^ is^ Sec, when 
 they are ufed alone without any other Predicate 
 fignify both the ^ct of the Mind judging^ which 
 includes the Copula^ and fignify alfo actual Exifl- 
 ence, which is the Predicate of that Propofition. 
 So Rome is^ fignifies Rome is exiftent : There are 
 fo7ne Jlrange Monfters^ that is, fomefirange Monjlers 
 are exiffent : Carthage is no morCy i, e, Carthage 
 bas no Being, 
 
 K 4 Not^ 
 
146 L G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Note 3. The Subject and Predicate of a Propo* 
 ficion are not always to be known and diftinguifli'd 
 by the placing of the Words in the Sentence, but 
 by refleding duly on the Senfe of the Words, and 
 on the Mind and Defign of the Speaker or Wri- 
 ter : As if 1 fay, 171 Africa there are many Licns^ 
 I mean many Lions are ex i (lent in Africa ; Many 
 Lions is the Subjedl, and exiftent in Africa, is the 
 Predicate. It is proper /(?r a Philofopher to under - 
 ftand Geometry ; here the Word -proper is the Pre- 
 dicate, and all the reft is the Subject, except Is 
 the Copula. 
 
 Note 4. The Subjed and Predicate of a Propofi- 
 tion ought always to be two different Ideas^ or two 
 different Terms ; for where both the Terjns and 
 Ideas are the fame, it is called an identical Propojt- 
 tion^ which is mere trifling, and cannot tend to pro^ 
 mote Knowledge ; fuch as, a Rule is a Rule^ or a 
 good Man is a good Man. 
 
 But there are fome Propofitions, wherein the 
 Terms of the Subjed and Predicate feem to be the 
 fame ; yet the Ideas are not the fame ; nor can 
 thefe be called purely identical or trifling Propor- 
 tions ; fuch as Home is Home •, that is. Home is a 
 convenient or delightful Place ; Socrates is Socrates 
 llill ; that is, the Man Socrates is ftill a Philofo - 
 pher : The Hero was not a Hero •, that is, the Hero 
 did not /hew his Courage : TVhat I have written^ I 
 have written \ that is, what I wrote I [iill approve ^ 
 and will not alter it : What is done^ is done ; that 
 is, it cannot le undone. It may be cafily obferved 
 in thefe Propofitions the Term is equivocal^ for in 
 the Predicate it has a different Idea from what it 
 has in the Suhje5f, 
 
 There are alfo fome Propofitions wherein the 
 Terms of the Subjed and Predicate differ, but the 
 Lkas are the fame j and thefe are not merely iden- 
 tical 
 
C. II. S. I. The right Vfe tj/'Reafon. 147 
 
 iical or trifling Propofitions ; as impudent is Jhame- 
 lefs ; a Billow is a PVave ; or Flu5ius (in L^/fwJ is a 
 /i^i7i? ; a Globe is a r<?M«i ^j^iy. In thefe Propofi- 
 tions either the Words are explained by a Defini- 
 tion of the Name, or the Ideas by a Definition of 
 the Things, and therefore they are by no Means 
 ufelefs when formed for this Purpofe. 
 
 C H A P. II. 
 
 Of the various Kinds of Propojttions. 
 
 PRopofitions may be diftributed into various 
 Kinds, according to their Subject^ their Copula^ 
 their Predicate^ their Nature or Compofition^ their 
 Senfey and their Evidence^ which Diftributions will 
 be explained in the following Sections. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of univerfaly -particular ^ indefinite ^ and fingular 
 Propofitions. 
 
 PRopofitions may be divided according to their 
 Subject into univerfal and particular •, this is 
 ufually called a Divifion arifing from the Quantity, 
 An univerfal Propofition is when the Sabjedl is 
 taken according to the whole of its Extenfion ; 
 fo if the Subjed be a Genus, or general Nature, 
 it includes all its Species or Kinds: If the Subjed 
 be a Species, it includes all its Individuals. This 
 Univerfality is ufually fignified by thefe Words, 
 ally every^ no^ none^ or the like s as, all Men muft 
 
 die : 
 
148 L O G I C K: Or, Part II, 
 
 ^ie : No Man is Almighty : Every Creature had a 
 Beginning, 
 
 A -particular Propofition is when the Subje6l is 
 not taken according to its whole Extenfion ; thac 
 is, when the Term is limited and reftrained to 
 fome one or more oF thofe Species or Individuals^ 
 whofe general Nature it exprefles, but reaches 
 rot to all *, and this is ufually denoted by the 
 Words, fojne^ many, a few^ there are which, &c, 
 as, Some Birds can fing well : Few Men are truly 
 wife : There are Parrots which will talk a Hundred 
 Things. 
 
 Under the general Name of univerfal Propofi- 
 tions, we may juftly include thofe that are fingu- 
 Jar, and for the mod part thofe that are indejiititc 
 alfo. 
 
 A fingular Propofition is when the Subject is a 
 (angular or individual Term or Idea 5 as Defcartes 
 w^s an ingenious Philojopher : Sir Ifaac Newton 
 has far exceeded all his Predeceffors : The Palace at 
 Hampton Court is a pleafant Dwelling : This Bay 
 is very cold. The Subjed here mufl be taken ac- 
 cording to the whole of its Extenfion, becaufe be- 
 ing an Individual it can extend only to one, and 
 it muft therefore be' regulated by the Laws of uni- 
 verfal Propofitions. 
 
 An indefinite Propofition is when no Note, ei^ 
 ther of Univerfality or Particularity is prefixed to 
 a Subjedl, which is in its own Nature general ; 
 as a Planet is ever changing its Place : Angels are 
 7iohle Creatures. Now this Sort of Propofition, 
 cfpecially when it defcribes the Nature of Things, 
 is ufually counted univerfal alfo, and it fuppofcs 
 the Subjecfl to be taken in its whole Extenfion: 
 for if there were any Planet which did not change 
 its Placey or any Angel that were not a noble 
 
 Creature^ 
 
C. II. S. I . The right Ufe of Realbn. 1 49 
 
 'Creature, thefe Propofuions would not be {Iricftly 
 true. 
 
 Yet in order to fecure us againft Miftakes ia 
 judging of univerfaU 'particular and indefinite Pro- 
 pofuions, it is neceilary to nuke theie following 
 Jlcmarks. 
 
 I. Concerning tiniverfal Propqfitions. 
 
 Note I. Univerfal Terms may either denote a 
 pietapbyfical, a phyfical, or a moral Univerfality. 
 
 A inetaphyfical or mathematical Univerfality is 
 when all the Particulars contained under any ge- 
 neral Jdea have the fame Predicate belonging to 
 them without any Exception whatfoever ; or when 
 the Predicate is fo eflential to the univerfal Sub- 
 ject, that it deftroys the very Nature of the Sub- 
 jedt to be without it ; as, all Circles have a Center 
 and Circumference : All Spirits in their own JSIature 
 are itmnortaL 
 
 A phyfical or natural Univerfality is when ac- 
 cording to the Order and common Courfe of Na- 
 ture a Predicate agrees to all the Subjedls of that 
 Kind, tho' there may be fome accidental and pre- 
 ternatural Exceptions ; as, all Men ufe Words to 
 exprefs their Thoughts^ yet dumb Perfons are except- 
 ed, for they cannot fpeak. All Beafts have four 
 Feet, yet there may be fome Monflers with five j 
 or maim''d, who have but three. 
 
 A tnoral Univerfality is when the Predicate a- 
 grees to the greateil Part of the Particulars which 
 are contained under the univerfal Subjedl ; as all 
 Negroes are ftupid Creatures : All Men are governed 
 iy Affe5lion rather than ly Reafon : All the old Ro- 
 mans loved their Country : And the Scripture ufes 
 this Language, when Sc. Paul tells us. The Cretcs 
 0re always Liars, 
 
 Now 
 
I50 L O G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Now it is evident, that a fpecial or lingular Con- 
 clufion cannot be inferr'd from a moral Unvverfality^ 
 nor always and infallibly from a -phyfical one, tho* 
 it may be always inferred from a Univerfality 
 which is metaphyficaly without any Danger or Pof- 
 fibility of a Miftake. 
 
 Let it be obferved alfo, that ufually we make 
 little or no Diflindion in common Language, be- 
 tween a Subject that is fhyfically or metapbyjically 
 univerfal. 
 
 Note 2. An univerfal Term is fometimes taken 
 colle5fively for all its particular Ideas united toge- 
 ther, and fometimes dijlrihutiveJyy meaning each 
 of them fingle and alone. 
 
 In (lances of a colle5live Univerfal are fuch as 
 thefe : All thefe Apples will fill a Bujhel : All the. 
 Hours of the Night are fnfficient for Sleep : All the 
 Rules of Grammar overload the Memory. In thefe 
 Propofitions it is evident, that the Predicate be- 
 longs not to the Individuals feparately^ but to the 
 whole colle^ivt Idea ; for we cannot affirm the 
 fame Predicate if we change the Word all into 07ie 
 or into every ^ we cannot fay one Apple or every Ap- 
 ple will fill a Bufijel^ &c. Now fuch a colle^ive 
 Ideay when it becomes the Subjedl of a Propofition, 
 ought to be efteemed as one fingle Thing, and 
 this renders the Propofition fingular or indefinite, as 
 we fhall fhew immediately. 
 
 A dijiributive Univerfal will allow the Word all 
 to be changed into every, or into one, and by this 
 Means is diitinguidi'd from a colIeBive. 
 
 Inftances of a diftrihutive Univerfal are the moll 
 common on every Occafion ; as, all Men are mor- 
 tal : Every Man is a Sinner, &c. But in this fort 
 of Univerfal there is a Diftindtion to be made, 
 which follows in the next Remark, 
 
 Note 3. 
 
C. II. S. I. T'he right Ufe (j/'Reafon. 151 
 
 Note 3. When an univerfal Term is taken dif- 
 tributively, fomecimes it includes all the Individu- 
 als contained in its inferior Species: As when I 
 fay every Sicknefs has a Tendency to Death \ I mean 
 every Individual Sicknefs, as well as every Kind, 
 But fometimes it includes no more than merely 
 each Species or Kind ; as when the Evangelift fays 
 Chrift healed every Difeafe^ or every Difeafe was 
 healed by Chrift ; that is, every Kind of Difeafe. 
 The firft of thefe Logicians call the Diilribution 
 of an Univerfal in fingula generum ; the laft is a 
 Dlftribution in genera fingulorufn. But either of 
 them joined to the Subjed: render a Propofition 
 univerfaL 
 
 Note 4. The Univerfality of a Subjedl is often 
 reflrained by a Part of the Predicate ; as when we 
 fay all Men learn Wifdom by Experience : The uni- 
 verfal Subjedt, all Men^ is limited to fignify only, 
 all thofe Men who learn Wifdom, The Scripture 
 alfo ufes this fort of Language, when it fpeaks of 
 all Men being juftified by the Right eoufnefs of one^ 
 Rom. V. 18. that is all Men who are juftified ob- 
 tain it this way. 
 
 Obferve here, that not only a metaphyfical or na- 
 tural^ but a moral Univerfality alfo is oftentimes 
 to be reflrained by a Part of the Predicate ; as when 
 we fay, all the Dutch are good Seamen : All the I- 
 talians are fubtle Politicians •, that is, thofe among 
 the Dutch that are Seamen are good Seamen ; and 
 thofe among the Italians who are Politicians are 
 fubtle Politicians, i, e, they are generally fo. 
 
 Note e^. The Univerfality of a Term is many 
 times reflrained by the particular Timey Place^ Cir^ 
 cumftance^ &c. or the Defign of the Speaker ; as 
 if we are in the City of London^ and fay, all the 
 Weavers went to prefent their Petition •, we mean 
 
 only 
 
t52 LOGIC K: Or, Part It 
 
 only all the Weavers who dwell in the City, Sd 
 when ic is laid in the Gofpel, all Men did marvel^ 
 Mark v. 20. it reaches only to all thofe Men who 
 beard of the Miracles of our Saviour, 
 
 Here alfo it fliould be obferved^ that a inordl 
 Univerfality is reftrain'd by Tifne^ Place^ and other 
 Circujnftances as well as a natural % fo that by thefe 
 Means the Word all fometimes does not extend lb 
 a tenth Part of thole who at firft might feem' to be 
 included in that Word. 
 
 One Occafion of thefe Difficulties and Ambigui- 
 ties, that belong to mnverfal Propofttions^ is the 
 common Humour and Temper of Mankind, who 
 generally have an Inclination to magnify their I- 
 deaa, and to talk roundly and univerfally concern- 
 ing any thing they fpeak of-, which has introdu- 
 ced univerfal Terms of Speech into Cuflom and 
 Habit, in all Nations and all Languages, more 
 than Nature cr Reafon would didate ; yet when 
 this Cuflom is introduced, it is not at all improper 
 to ufe this fort of Language in folemn and facred 
 Writings, as well as in familiar Difcourfe* 
 
 n. Remarks concerning indefinite Propofttions, 
 
 Note I. Propofitions carrying in them univerfnl 
 Forms of Expreffion may fometimes drop the 
 Note of Ufdverfility^ and become indefinite^ and 
 yet retain the fame univerHil Stnk^ whether metd^ 
 phyfical^ natural or moral^ whether colkutive or du 
 ftrihutive. 
 
 We may give Inftances of each of thefe. 
 
 Metaphyseal ; as, a Circle has a Center and Cir- 
 cumference. Natural ; as, Bea^s have four Feet, 
 Moral ; as, Negroes are ftiipid Creatures, Collec- 
 tive; as, the Apples will fill a Bufijel, Diftribu- 
 tivc ; as, A^cn are mortal. 
 
 Note 
 
C. II. S. I. The right life of Reafon," 15^3 
 
 Note 2. There are many Cafes wherein a col- 
 Ie5five Idea is exprefied in a Propofirion by an in- 
 definite Tenn, and thai where it defcribes the Nature 
 or ^tality of the Subjed:, as well as when it declares 
 fome paft Matters of Faoi ; as Fir-trees fet in good 
 Order will give a charming Profpe5i -, this mull 
 fignify a CoUe5iion of Fir-trees^ for one makes no 
 Profped. In Matters of Fadt this is more evident 
 and frequent ; as the Romans overcame the Gauls : 
 The Robbers fiirrounded the Coach : The wild Geefe 
 flew over the Thames in the Form of a Wedge, All 
 thefe are colledtive Subjefts. 
 
 Note 3. In indefinite Propojitions the Subject is 
 often reftrained by the Predicate, or by the fpe- 
 cial Time, Place, or Circumftances, as well as in 
 PropoHtions which are exprefly univerfal ; as, the 
 Chinefes are ingenious Silk-JVeavers^ i. e. thofe Chi- 
 nefes^ which are Silk-Weavers are ingenious at their 
 Work. The Stars appear to us when the Twilight is 
 gone. This can fignify no more than the Stars 
 which are above our Horizon. 
 
 Note 4. All thefe Reftriclions tend to reduce 
 fome indefinite Propofitions almoft into particular^ 
 as will appear under the next Remarks. 
 
 III. Remarks concerning particular Propofitions, 
 Note I. A particular Propofition may fometimes 
 be expreffed indefinitely^ without any Note of Parti- 
 cularity prefixed to the Subjedt ; as, in Times of 
 Confufion Laws are not executed : Men of Virtue are 
 difgraced^ and Murtherers efcape^ i. e. fome Laws^ 
 fome Men of Virtue^ fome Murtherers : Unlefs we 
 fhould call this Language a moral Univerfality^ tho* 
 I think it can hardly extend fo far. 
 
 Note 2. The Words fome^ afew^ &c. tho' they 
 generally denote a proper Particularity^ yet fome- 
 times they exprefs a colle^ive Idea ; as, fome of the 
 
 Enemies 
 
154 L O G I C K: Or, Part It 
 
 Enemies lefet the General around, A few Greeks 
 would heat a thoufand Indians. 
 
 I conclude this Se5lion with a kvf general Remarks 
 on this Subjedl, {viz,) 
 
 Gen, Rem, I. Since univerfal, indefinite and par- 
 ticular Terms in the plural Number may either be 
 taken in a colle5live or difirihutive Senfe, there is one 
 Ihort and eafy Way to find when they are collec- 
 tive and when difirihutive, (viz.) If the Plural 
 Number may be changed into the fmgular, i, e, if 
 the Predicate will agree to one fingle Subjecb, it is 
 a difirihutive Idea ; if not, it is colle5iive. 
 
 Gen, Rem, II. Umverfal and particular Terms in 
 the plural Number, fuch as, alh fome^ few^ many^ 
 &CC. when they are taken in their difirihutive Senfe, 
 reprefent fever al Jingle Ideas ; and when they are 
 thus affixed to the Subjed of a Propofition, render 
 that Propofition univerfal or particular^ according to 
 the univerfality or particularity of the Terms affix'd. 
 
 Gen, Rem, III. Univerfal and particular Terms 
 in the plural Number, taken in their collective Senfe, 
 reprefent generally one colle^ive Idea. 
 
 If this one colle5fiv€ Idea be thus reprefented 
 (whether by univerfal or particular Terms) as the 
 Subjed of a Propofition which defcrihes the Na- 
 ture of a Things it properly makes either a Jingu- 
 lar or an indefinite Propofition ; for the Words, ally 
 fome^ a jew., &c. do not then denote the ^lan^ 
 tily of the Propofition, but are efleemed merely as 
 Terms which connect the Individuals together in 
 order to compofe one colle5live Idea, Obferve 
 thefe Inftances, all the Sycamores in the Garden 
 would make a large Grove \ i. e. this one Col- 
 ledion of Sycamores, which is a ftngular Idea, 
 
 Some 
 
C. 11. S. I. The right life ^Reafon. i^j 
 
 Some of the Sycamores in the Garden would make a 
 fine Grove, Sycamores would make a noble Grove : 
 In thefe laft the Subject is rather indefinite than fin- 
 gular. But it is very evident, that in each of thefe 
 Propofitions the Predicate can only belong to a col- 
 le5iive Idea, and therefore the Subjcd muft be ef- 
 teemed a colle5live. . 
 
 If this collective Idea (whether reprefented by uni- 
 verfal or particular Terms) be ufed in defcribing faft 
 Matters of Fa5l, then it is generally tobeefteemed. 
 zfingular Idea, and renders the Propofition fingu- 
 lar *, as, all the Soldiers of Alexander made but a 
 little Army : A few Macedonians vanquifhed the 
 large Army of Darius : Some Grenadiers in the Camp 
 plundered all the neighbouring Towns, 
 
 Now we have fhewn before, that if a Propofition 
 defcribing the Nature of Things, has an indefinite 
 Subje(ft, it is generally to be efteemed univerfal 
 in its propofitional Senfe : And if it has a fingular 
 Subje£f, in its propofitional Senfe it is always rank- 
 ed with Univerfals, 
 
 After all we mufh be forced to confefs, that the 
 Language of Mankind, and the Idioms of Speech 
 are fo exceeding various, that it is hard to reduce 
 them to a few Rules ; and if we would gain a juit 
 and precife Idea of every univerfal, particular 
 and indefinite Expreffion, we muft not only con- 
 fider the peculiar Idiom of the Language, but the 
 Time, the Place, the Occafion, the Circum- 
 flances of the Matter fpoken of, and thus pene- 
 trate as far aspolTible into the Defignof the Speak- 
 er or Writer. 
 
 SECT, 
 
156 L O G I C K: Or, Part IL 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Of affirmative and negative PropofUions. 
 
 Wl ^^ E. N a Propofition is confidered with Re- 
 V V gard to its Copula^ it may be divided into* 
 ajfinnative and negative \ for it is the Copula joins- 
 or disjoins the two Ideas. Others call this a Divi- 
 fion of Propofitions according to their Quality. 
 
 An affirmative Propofuion is when the Idea of 
 the Predicate is fuppofed to agree to the Idea of 
 the Subjed, and is joined to it by the Word fj, or 
 are^ which is the Copula •, as all Men are Sinners, 
 But when the Predicate is not fuppofed to agree 
 with the Subjtd:, and is disjoined from it by the 
 Particles is not, are not^ &c. the Propofition is 
 negative ; as, Man is not innocent •, or, no Man is 
 innocent. In an affirmative Propofition we afTert one 
 Thing to belong to another,, and, as it were, unite 
 them in Thought and Word : In negative Propofi- 
 tions we feparate one Thing from another, and de- 
 ny their Agreement. 
 
 It may feem fomething odd, that tv/o Ideas or 
 Terms are faid to be disjoined as well 2,^ joined by a 
 Copula : But if we can but fuppofe the negative 
 Panicles do really belong to the Copula of negative 
 Propofitions, it takes away the Harfhnefs of the 
 Exprelfion •, and to make it yet fofter, we may 
 confidcr that the Predicate and Subjeft may be 
 properly faid to be joined in a Form of Words as ^ 
 Propofition^ by connexive Particles in Grammar or 
 Logick^ though they are disjoined in their Senfe and 
 Signification. Every Youth, who has learned his- 
 Grammar, knows there are fuch Words as disjunc- 
 tive ConjunSiions. 
 
 Several 
 
C. li. S. 2. the right tjfe ^Reafon. i^y 
 
 Several Things arc worthy our Notice on this 
 Subje<5]:. 
 
 1^ Note. As there are fome Terms ^ or Words^ 
 and Ideas ( as I have fhewn before ) concerning 
 which it is hard to determine whether they are 
 negative or pq/itive, fo there are fome Propofjtions 
 concerning which it may be difficult to fay, whe- 
 ther they affirm or deny : as, when we fay, Plato 
 was no Fool : Cicero was no uvjkilful Orator : Cae- 
 far made no Expedition to Mufcovy : j^n Oijler has 
 no Part like an Eel ; It is not necejfary for a Phyft- 
 dan to fpeak French, and for a Phyfician to fpeak 
 French is needle fs. The Senfe of thefe Propor- 
 tions is very plain and eafy, though Logicians 
 might fquabble perhaps a Whole Day, whether they 
 fhould rank them under the Names of Negative or 
 jiffirmative, 
 
 2^ Note, In Latin and Englijh two Negatives 
 joined in one Sentence make an Affirmative j as 
 when we declare no Man is not mortal^ it is the 
 fame as though we faid, Man is mortal. But in 
 Greeks and oftentimes in French, two Negatives 
 make but a ftronger Denial. 
 
 3^ Note. If the mere negative Term, Not, be 
 added to the Copula of an ziniverfal affirmative Pro- 
 pofition, it reduces it to a particular Negative •, as, 
 all Men are not wife, fignifies the fame ^s,fome Men 
 are not wife. 
 
 4^^ Note, In all affirmative PrOpofitions, the 
 Predicate is taken in its whole Comprehenfion ; 
 that is, every eflential Part and Attribute of it is 
 affirmed concerning the Subjedl ; as when I fay, a 
 true Chrijltan is an honefi Man, every Thing that 
 belongs to Honefly is affirmed concerning a trm 
 Chriftian. 
 
 L 2 ^th jvW, 
 
,58 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 5th Note, In all negative Propofitions the Predi- 
 cate is taken in its whole Extention ; that is, every 
 Species and Individual that is contained in the ge- 
 neral Idea of the Predicate, is utterly denied con- 
 cerning the Subjeft : So in this Propofition, a Spi- 
 rit is not an Am?naly we exclude all Sorts and Kinds, 
 and particular Animals whatfoever from the Idea of 
 a Spirit, 
 
 From thefe two lad Remarks we may derive this 
 Inference, that we ought to attend to the eiitire 
 Comprehenjion of our Ideas, and to the univerfal 
 E^tenfion of them, as far as we have proper Capa- 
 city for it, before we grow too confident in our 
 affirming or denying any Thing, which may have 
 the leaft Darknefs, Doubt or Difficulty attending 
 it : It is the Want of this Attention that betrays us 
 into many Miftakes. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of the Oppofttion and Converfion of Propofitions, 
 
 AN Y two Ideas being joined or disjoined in 
 various Forms will afford us feveral Propo- 
 fitions : All thefe may be diftinguifhed according to 
 their ^antity and their ^ality * into four, which 
 are marked or denoted by the Letters A, E, I, O, 
 thus: 
 
 r Univerfal Affirmati'/e. 
 denotes a J Univerfal Negative. 
 
 y Particular Affirmative. 
 ^Particular Negative, 
 according to thefe old Latin Rhymes 
 
 * The Reader fhould remember here, that a Propofition according to 
 its Sliiantity is called uriwrfal or J>arti(ular, and according to its ^aL'fy, 
 it h either a£i>-mati've or negawve^ 
 
 JJJerit 
 
C. II. S. 3 . The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 59 
 
 jifferit A, T^egat E, verum generaliter Amice ^ 
 Ajjerit I, 'Negat O, fed particular iter Amho. 
 
 This may be exemplified by thefe two Ideas, % 
 Vine and a Tree. 
 
 A Every Vine is a Tree, 
 E No Vine is a Tree, 
 I Some Vine is a Tree, 
 O Some Vine is not a Tree. 
 The Logicians of the Schools have written 
 many large Trifles concerning the Opposition and 
 Converfion of Propoficions. It will be fufficienc 
 here to give a few brief Hints of thefe Things, 
 that the Learner may not be utterly ignorant of 
 them. 
 
 Propofitions which are made of the fame Subjedl: 
 and Predicate are faid to be cppofite^ when that 
 which is denied in one is affirmed in the other, ei- 
 ther in whole or in part, without any Confidera- 
 tion whether the Propofitions be true or no. 
 
 If they difier both in Quantity and Quality they 
 are called Contradiolory^ as, 
 
 A Every Vine is a^r^^ r ' u u .u 
 
 a- -^ /Thefe can never be both true, 
 
 O Some Vine is notT %. ^°'^ ^^'^^ ""^ "-^^ ""^"^^ 
 rr- \ Time. 
 
 a Tree. j 
 
 If two Univerfals differ in Quality they are 
 
 Contraries^ as, 
 
 A Every Vine is ^")t-i r u u .u . 
 
 cr -^ /Ihefe can never be both true 
 
 J. ree i 
 
 T? A7 Tr ' r together, but they may be 
 
 E iV^ Vine ^i «V u urir ^ 
 
 rr- \ both falfe. 
 
 Tree, j 
 
 If two particular Propofitions differ in Quality 
 they are Subconiraries^ as, 
 
 L ^ I Sojne 
 
i6o L G I C K: Or, Part II, 
 
 1 Sm, Viue is a^^^^^^ ^^^ ^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^ 
 
 ^ J^^' rr • }^ ^l^er, but they can never be 
 O Son^ Vm » not^ ^^^^ f^,^^^_ 
 
 a Tree. j 
 
 Both particular and univerfal Propofitions which 
 :^gree in Quality but not in Quantity, are called 
 Subaltern^ though thefe are not properly c^pofite^ as, 
 A E^'ery Vine is a ^ree, 
 I Some Vine is a "Tree. 
 Or thus, 
 
 E No Vine is a "Tree, 
 O Some Vine is not a Tree, 
 The Canons o^ Juhalternate Profofitions are ufi;- 
 ally reckoned thefe three (viz.) (i.) If an univer- 
 fal Propofition be true, the particular will be true 
 alfo, but not on the contrary. And (2.) If a par- 
 titular Propofiiion be falfe, the univerfal rnuft be 
 falfe too, but not on the contrary. (3.) Subaltern 
 PyopofilioHs^ whether univerfal or particular, may 
 fomeiimes be both true and fometimes both falfe. 
 
 The Convej-fion of Propofitions is when the Sub- 
 ]tdi and Predicate change their Places with Pre- 
 lervation of the Truth. This may be done with 
 conftant Certainty in all univerfal Negatives and 
 particular /Iffir ma lives *, as no Spirit is an Animal^ 
 may be converted, no Animal is a Spirit j and fome 
 Tree is a Vine, may be converted, fome Vine is a 
 Tree. But there is more formal Trifling in this fore 
 of Difcourfe than there is of folid Improvement, 
 becaufe this fort of Converfion arifes merely frorn 
 the Form of IVords, as connected in a Proportion, 
 rather than from the Matter. 
 
 Yet it may be ufeful to obferve, that there are 
 fome Propofitions, which by Reafon of the Ideas 
 or Matter of which they arc compofed may be 
 ;;onyerted with cpnflant Truth : Such are thofe 
 
 Propofition^ 
 
C II. S. 4. The right life ^/'Reafon. 161 
 
 Propofitions whofe Predicate is a nominal or real 
 Definition of the Subjed, or the Difference of it, 
 or a Property of the fourth Kind, or a fuperlative 
 Degree of any Property or Quality whatfoever, or 
 in fhort, wherefoever the Predicate and the Sub- 
 jedl have exaflly the fame Extenfion or the fame 
 Comprehenfion j as, every Vine is a Tree hearing 
 Grapes \ and every ^ree hearing Grapes is a Vine : 
 Religion is the trueft IVifdom and the trueft Wif- 
 dom is Religion : Julius Caefar was the fir (i Emperor 
 of Rome : and the firft Emperor of Rome was 
 Julius Csefar. Thefe are the Propoficions which 
 are properly convertible, and they are called red- 
 J^rocal Propofitions, 
 
 SECT IV. 
 
 Of pure and modal Propofitions, 
 
 •" A Nother Divifion of Propofitions among the 
 Jf\^ fcholafbick Writers is into pure and modal. 
 This may be called (for Diftindion fake) a Divi- 
 fion according to the Predicate. 
 
 When a Proportion merely exprefles that the 
 predicate is connected with the Subject, it is called 
 a pure Propofttion •, as, every true Chriftian is an 
 honejl Man. But when k includes alfo the Way and 
 Manner wherein the Predicate is connected with the 
 Subject, it is called a modal Propofttion^ as, when I 
 fay, it is neceffary that a true Chrijiian fhould he an 
 hone ft Man, 
 
 Logical Writers generally make the Modality 
 of this Propofition to belong to the Copula^ be- 
 caufe k Ihews the Manner of the Connexion be- 
 tween Subjed and Predicate. But if the Form 
 of the Sentence as a logical Propofition be duly 
 ponfidered, the Mode itfelf is the very Predicate 
 L 4 of 
 
1 62 L G I C K: Or, Part 11. 
 
 of the Propofition, and it mufl: run thus : Thai a 
 true Chridian Jhould be an honeft Man is a ncceffary 
 TbwF^ and then the whole primary Propofition is 
 included in the Sabjedl: of the modal Propofition. 
 
 There 2iXtfour Modes of connecting the Predi- 
 cate with the Subjcd", which are ufualjy reckoned 
 up on this Occafion, {viz) Necejftty and Contin- 
 gency which are two Oppofites, Poffibility and Im- 
 pofflbiuiy \Yh\ch SLve alfo Oppofues ^ as, ii is necef- 
 firy that a Globe JJmild be round : ^hat a Globe be^ 
 made of fF'ood or Glafs is an unneceffary or con- 
 tingent Thing : It is impoj/ible that a Globe Jhould be 
 jquare : It is fojfibk that a Globe may be made of 
 Water, 
 
 With Regard to the modal Propofitions which the 
 Schools have introduced, I would make thefe two 
 Remarks. 
 
 Remark i. Thefe Propofitions in Engli/h are 
 formed by the Refolution of the V/ords, muft he^ 
 might not be^ can be, and cannot be, into thofe more 
 explicate Forms of a logical Copula and Predi- 
 cate, is neceffary^ is contingent, is poffible, is impojfi- 
 hle : For it is neceffary that a Globe fhould be rounds 
 fignifies no more than that a Globe mufi be 
 round. 
 
 Remark 2. Let it be noted that this quadru- 
 ple Modality is only an Enumeration of the na- 
 tural Modes or Manners wherein the Predicate is 
 connedled with the Subjed : We might aifo de- 
 fer ibe feveral moral 2ind. civil Modes of conned ing 
 two Ideas together (viz.) Lawfulncfs and Unlaw- 
 fulnefs, Conveniency and Inconveniency, &c. whence 
 we may form fuch modal Propofitions as thefe. It 
 is unlawful for any Perfon to kill an innocent Man : 
 It is lawful for Chriftians to eat FlefJo in Lent: To 
 
 ' ■ ■■ ^ till 
 
C. 11. S. 5. The right Ufe ^Reafon. 16 j 
 
 tell ail that we think is inexpedient : For a Man to he 
 affable to his Neighbour is very convenient^ &c. 
 
 There are feveral other Modes of fpeaking where- 
 by a Predicate is connected with a Subjeft : Such 
 as, it is certain^ it is doubtful^ it is probable ^ it is 
 improbable^ it is agreedy it is granted, it is /aid by 
 the Ancients, it is written, &c. all which will form 
 ocher Kinds of modal Propofitions, 
 
 But whether the Modality be natural, moral, &c. 
 yet in all thefe Propofitions it is the Mode is the 
 proper Predicate, and all the reft of the Propofition, 
 except the Copula (ox Word is) belongs to the Suh^ 
 jeol 'y and thus they become pure Propofitions of a 
 cornplex Nature, of which we (hall treat in the 
 next Se5lion, fo that there is no great Need of mak- 
 ing Modals a diftindt Sort. 
 
 There are many little Subtleties which the Schools 
 acquaint us with concerning the Converfion and Op- 
 pofttion and Equipollence of thefe modal Propofitions, 
 1x1 i ted to the Latin or Greek Tongues, rather than 
 the Englijh, and fit to pafs away the Idle Time of 
 a Student, rather than to enrich his Under- 
 ftanding. 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 Of fingle Propofitions^ whether fimple or complex. 
 
 WHEN \ye confider the Nature cf Propofiti- 
 ons, together with the Formation of them, 
 and the Materials whereof they are made, we di- 
 vide them \nio fingle and compound, 
 
 A fingle Propofition is that which has but one 
 Subjed: and one Predicate; but if it has moreSub- 
 jcds or more Predicates, it is called a compound Pro- 
 poftion, and indeed ic contains two or more Propo- 
 fuions in' it. 
 
 A fingle 
 
j64 L O G I C K: Or, Part IL 
 
 Afmgle Propofition (which is ajfo called cate- 
 gorical) may be divided again mio fmple and com- 
 plex *. 
 
 A purely ftmple Propofition is that whofe Subject 
 and Predicate are made up of fmgle Terms ; as 
 Virtue is dejr cable : Every Penitent is pardoned: 
 No Man is innocent. 
 
 When the Subject or Predicate, or both, are 
 made up of complex Terms, it is called a complex 
 Propofition ; as, every ftncere Penitent is pardoned ; 
 Virtue is deftreable for its own Sake -, No Man alive 
 is perfe^ly innocent. 
 
 If the Term which is added to the Subjcd of a 
 complex Propofition be either elTential or any Way 
 necelTary to it, then it is called explicative^ for it 
 only explains the Subjed: •, as, every mortal Man 
 is a Son of Adam. But if the Term added to make 
 up the complex Subjedt docs not neceflarily or 
 conflantly belong to it, then it is determinative^ 
 and limits the Subjefl to a particular Part of its 
 Exteniion -, as, every pious Man fhall he happy. 
 In the firfl Propofition the Word 7?iortal is merely 
 explicative : In the fecond Propofition the Word 
 pious is determinative. 
 
 Here note, that whatfoever may be affirmed or 
 denied concerning any Subjed, with an explicative 
 Addition, may be alio affirmed or denied of that 
 Subje<fl without it ; as we may boldly fay, every 
 Alan is a Son of Adam, as well as every mortal 
 Man : But it is notfo, v/here the Addition is deter- 
 minativCy for we cannot fay, every Man fhall he 
 happy, tho* every pious Man Ihall be fo. 
 
 * k% fiMple Ideas arc oppofcd to compIcXy znA Jingle Ideas to compound ^ {o 
 Propofitions lire diftinguiflied in the fame Manner: The Englijh Tongue in 
 this Refpecl hnving ibme Advai\tage above the learned Languages^ which 
 have no ufual Woid to diftin2uith_/7»;o^/? itom fimple. 
 
 In 
 
C. II. S. 6. The right Ufe of Reafon. j 6| 
 
 In a complex Propofition the Predicate or Sub- 
 jedl is fometimes made complex by the Pronouns., 
 whoy which, whofe, to whom, &c. which make 
 another Propofition ; as e'very Man, who is pious, 
 Jhall he faved : Julius, whole Sirname was CcBfar^ 
 overcame Pompey : Bodies, which are tranfparent, 
 have many Pores, Here the whole Propofition is 
 called the primary or chief, and the additional Pro- 
 pofition is called an incident Propofition, But it is 
 itill to be efteemed in this Cafe merely as a Part of 
 the complex Term ; and the Truth or Faifliood 
 of the whole complex Propofition is not to be judged 
 by the Truth or Falfliood of the incident Propofi- 
 fion, but by the Connexion of the whole Subjed: 
 with the Predicate. For the incident Propofi- 
 tion may be falfe, and abfurd, or impofTible, and 
 yet the whole complex Propofition may be true, 
 as, a Horfe^ which has Wings, might fly over the 
 names, 
 
 Befide this Complexion which belongs to the Sub- 
 ject or Predicate, logical Writers ufe to fay, there 
 is a Complexion which may fall upon the Copula 
 alfo : But this I have accounted for in the Se5fion 
 concerning modal Propofitions •, and indeed it is not 
 of much Importance whether it were placed there 
 pr here. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Of co?npoiind Propofitions, 
 
 A Compound Propofition is made up of two or 
 more Subjects or Predicates, or both ; and 
 it contains in it two or more Propofitions, which 
 ^re cither plainly exprefs^d, or mtceal'd and imply' d. 
 
 The 
 
i66 LOGIC K: Or, Part 11. 
 
 The firft fort of compound propofitions are thofe 
 wherein the Compofition is exprefi'd and evident ^^ 
 and they are diflinguifli'd into thcie fix Kinds [viz.) 
 Copulative, Disjun^live, Conditional , Caufal, Rela- 
 tive and Difcretive. 
 
 I. Copulative Propofitions are thofe which have 
 more Subjeds or Predicates connected by affirma- 
 tive or negative Conjundions ; as Riches and Ho- 
 Tiours are Temptations to Pride : Caefar conquered the 
 Gauls and the Britons : Neither Gold nor Jewels 
 "jvill purchaje hnmortality, Thefe Propofitions are 
 evidently compounded^ for each of them may be re- 
 folved into two Propofitions, ( viz. ) Riches are 
 Temptations to Pride \ and Honour is a Temptation 
 to Pride ; and fo the reft. 
 
 The Truth of copulative Propofitions depends 
 npon the Truth of all the Parts of them ; for if 
 Ccrfar had conquered the Gauls^ and not the Bri- 
 ionsy or the Britons . and not the Gauls, the fecond 
 copulative Propofition had not been true. 
 
 Here note, thofe Propofitions, which cannot be 
 refolved into two or more fimple Propofitions, are 
 not properly copidative, tho' two or rnore Ideas be 
 connedted and coupled by fuch Conjun(n;ions, either 
 in the Subject or Predicate ; as, two and three make 
 five : Majefty and Meekncfs don't often meet : The 
 Sun, Moon, and Stars are not all to he feen at once. 
 Such Propofitions are to be efi:eemed merely cofn- 
 ■plo:, becaufe the Predicate cannot be affirmed of 
 each fingle Subjecl, but only of all of them toge- 
 tiier as a colleUive Subjedl. 
 
 II. Disjun^ive Propofitions are when the Parts 
 nrif disjoined or oppofed to one another by dif- 
 jundive Particles-, as, it is either D^jy or Night : 
 
 ■ The 
 
G. IL S. 6. The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 6y 
 
 The U^eather is either Jhining or rainy : ^antity is 
 either Lengthy Breadth^ or Depth. 
 
 The Truth of Di.jun^ives depends on the ne- 
 ceflary and immediate Oppofition of the Parts 5 
 therefore only the laft of thefe Examples is true ; 
 but the two firft are not ftridlly true, becaufe Twi- 
 light is a Medium between Day and Nigbt -, and 
 dry, cloudy Weather is a Medium between Jhining 
 and raining, 
 
 III. Conditional or hypothetical Propofitlons are 
 thofe whofe Parts are united by the conditional Par- 
 ticle if\ as, l^ the Sun he fix^d^ the Earth muji move : 
 If there he no Fire, there will he no Smoke. 
 
 Note., The lirfl Part of thefe Proportions, or 
 that wherein the Condition is contained, is called 
 the Antecedent^ the other is called the Conjequent. 
 
 The Truth of thefe Propofitions depends not at 
 all on the Truth and Fallhood of their two Parts, 
 but on the Truth of the Connexion of them ; for 
 each Part of them may be falfe, and yet the whole 
 Proportion true ; as, // there he no Providence, 
 there will he no future Punijhment, 
 
 IV. Caufal Propofitions are where two Propofi- 
 tions are joined by caufal Particles ; as, Houfes were 
 not huilt that they might he deflrofd: Rehoboam 
 was unhappy becaufe he followed evilCounfel. 
 
 The Truth of a caufal Propofition arifes not 
 from the Truth of the Parts, but from the caufal 
 Influence that the one Part of it has upon the 
 other ; for both Parts may be true, yet the Pro- 
 pofition falfe, if one Part be not the Caufe of^the 
 other. 
 
 Some Logicians refer reduplicative Prcpofiticns to 
 this Place, as Men, confidered as Men, are rational 
 Creatitres^ i. e. hccaufe thev are Men. 
 
 V. Re^ 
 
i68 L G I C K: Or^ Part II; 
 
 V. Rehitive Propojitions have their Parts joined 
 by fuch Particles, as exprtfs a Relation or Compa- 
 rifon of one Thing to another -, as, when you are 
 
 filent 1 will fpeak : As much as you are worthy fo 
 7nuch you Jljall he eftcemed : As is the Father^ fo is 
 the Son : Wbers thvre is no Tale-Bearer^ Contention 
 t^'ill ceafe, 
 
 Thefe are very much a-kin to conditional Propo- 
 fitions, and the Truth of them depends upon the 
 Judnefs of their Comexion, 
 
 VI. Bifcretive Proportions are fuch wherein vari- 
 ous and fcemingly oppofire Judgments are made 
 whofe Variety or Diftindion is noted by the Parti- 
 cles, hut^ tho\ yet^ &'c. as Travellers may change 
 their Climate but not their Temper : job was patient^ 
 thd' his Grief was great. 
 
 The Truth and Goodnefs of a difcretive Prcpo- 
 fiiion depends on the Truth of both Parts^ and 
 their Contradiftindlion to one another ; for tho* 
 both Parts fiiould be true, yet if there be nd 
 feeming Oppofition between them, it is an ufe- 
 lefs Afiertion, tho' we cannot call it a falfe one 5 
 as, Dcfcartcs was a Fhilofopher^ yet he was a 
 Frenchman : The Romans were valiant^ hut they 
 fpoke Latin •, both which Propofitions are ridicu- 
 lous, for want of a feeming Oppofition between the 
 Parts. 
 
 Since we have declared wherein the Truth and 
 Fal/hood of thefe compou7id Propofuions confift, it is 
 proper alfo to give fome Intimations how any of 
 thefe Propofitions when they are falfe may be op- 
 pofed or contradi^ed. 
 
 All compound Propofitions, except Copulatives 
 and DifcretiveSy are properly denied or contradidl- 
 ed when the Negation aflecls their conjundive 
 Particles 5 as, if the disjunclive Propofition af- 
 
 ferts. 
 
C. II. S. 6. The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 69 
 
 ferts, f/ /i W/^^r Day or Night. The Opponent fays, 
 // is not either Day or Nighty or it is not necejfary 
 that it flmdd he either Day or Nighty fo the hypothe- 
 tical Propofition is denied by faying, it does not fol- 
 low that the Earth muft move if the Sun he fixt. 
 
 A disjun^live Propoftlion may be con trad idled 
 alfo by denying all the Parts ; as, it is neither Day 
 nor Night, 
 
 And a caufal Propofition may be denied or op- 
 pofed indirectly and improperly^ when either part of 
 the Propofition is denied ; and it muft be falfe if 
 either part be falfe ; But the Defign of the Propo- 
 fition being to fhew the eaufal Connexion of the 
 two Parts, each Part is fuppofed to be true, and 
 k is not properly contradided as a caufal Propofition, 
 unlefs one Part of it be denied to be the Caufe of the 
 other. 
 
 As for Copulatives and Difa-etives^ becaufe their' 
 Truth depends more on the Truth of their parts* 
 therefore thefe may be oppofed or denied as many- 
 Ways, as the Parts of which they are compofed 
 may be denied ; fo this copulative Propofition, 
 Riches and Honour are Te?nptations to Pride^ may 
 be denied by faying. Riches are not Te?nptations^ 
 tho* Honour may he : or. Honour is not a 'temptations 
 tho* Riches may he j or neither Riches nor Honour are 
 Temptations, &c. 
 
 So this difcretive Proportion, Job was patient^ 
 ihd* his Grief was greats is denied by faying, Job 
 •^I'as not patient iho^ his Grief was great : or. Job 
 was patient^ hut his Grief was not great : or. Job 
 was not patient^ nor was his Grief great. 
 
 We proceed now to the fecond fort of compound 
 Propofitions, viz, fuch whofe Compcfttion is not 
 exprefjedy hut latent or concealed^ yet a fmall Atten- 
 tion will find two Propofitions included in them. 
 Such are thefe that follow j 
 
 J , Exclufives ; 
 
170 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 1. Exclufives ; as, 'The pious Man alone is hap- 
 py. It is only Sir Ifaac Newton could find out true 
 Philofophy, 
 
 2. Except! ves \ as, None of the Ancients hut Pla- 
 to ivell defended the Soul's Immortality. The Prote- 
 ftants worfhip none hut God. 
 
 3. Comparatives i as Pain is the greatefi Afflic- 
 tion. No Turk was fiercer than the Spaniards at 
 Mexico. 
 
 Here note, that the comparative Degree does 
 not always imply the pofitive •, as if I fay, A Fool 
 is hetter than a Knave, this does not affirm that 
 Folly is good, but that it is a lefs Evil than Kna- 
 very. 
 
 4. Inceptives and Defitives, which relate to the 
 beginning or ending of any thing : as, the Latin 
 Tongue is not yet forgotten^ No Man hefore Orpheus 
 *uorote Greek Verfe, Peter Czar of Mufcovy hegari 
 to civilize his Nation, 
 
 To thefe may be added Continuatives j as Rome 
 remains to this Day, which includes at leafl two Pro- 
 pofitions, viz, Rome was, and Rome is. 
 
 Here let other Authors fpend Time and Pains 
 in giving the precife Definitions of all thefe forts 
 of Propofitions, which may be as well underftood 
 by their Names and Examples: Here let them tell 
 what their Truth depends upon, and how they 
 are to be oppofed or contradicfled ; but a mode- 
 rate Share of common Senfe, with a Review of 
 what is faid on the former Compounds, will fuffice 
 for all thefe Purpofes without the Formality of 
 Rules. 
 
 SECT. 
 
Ci II. S. 7. "the right life of Reafon, 171 
 
 SECT. YII. 
 
 Of true and falfe Propofitionsi 
 
 PRopofitions are next to be confidered according 
 to their Senfe or Signification^ and thus they 
 are diftributed into trut^nd falfe. K true Propo- 
 fition reprefents Things as they are in themfelves 5 
 but if Things are reprefented otherwife than they 
 are in themfelves, the Propofition is falfe. 
 
 Or we may defcribe them more particularly 
 thus ; a true Propofition joins thofe Ideas and Terms 
 together whofe Objeds are joined and agree, or ic 
 disjoins thofe Ideas and Terms, whofe Objedls dif- 
 agree or arc disjoined ; as every Bird has fVirigs^ a 
 Brute is not immortal, 
 
 A falfe Propofition joins thofe Ideas or Terms 
 whofe Objeds difagree, or it disjoins thofe whofe 
 Objeds agree ; as Birds have no JVings^ Brutes are 
 immortal, 
 
 Note^ It is impofTible that the fame Propofition 
 fhould be both true and falfe at the fame Time, in 
 the fame Senfe and in the fame Refped ; becaufe a 
 Propofition is but the Reprefentation of the Agree- 
 ment or Difagreement of Things: Now it is impof 
 fihle that the fame Thing fhould be and not he^ or that 
 the fame Things fhoiild agree and not agree at the 
 fame Time and in the fame Refpe5f, This is a firft 
 Principle of human Knowledge. 
 
 Yet fome Propofitions may feem to contradidt 
 one another, though they may be both true, but in 
 different Senfes or Refpeds or Times: as, Man 
 was immortal in Paradife^ and Man was mortal in 
 Paradife. But thefe two Propofuions mud be re- 
 ferr'd to different Times ; as, Man before his Fail 
 was immorial, but at the Fall he becam.e mortal, 
 
 M So 
 
172 LOGIC K: Or, Part II, 
 
 So we rray fay now, Man is mortal^ or Man is 
 immortal^ if we take thefe Propofitions in different 
 Rtlpcds ; as Man is an immortal Creature as to his 
 Sou/, but mortal as to his Body. A great Variety 
 of Difficulties and fceming Contradic^tions, both in 
 holy Scripture and other Writings, may be folved 
 and explained in this Manner. 
 
 The mod important Queftion on this Subjedl is 
 this, PFhdt is the Criterion, or diftinguifhing Mark of 
 Truth F How fliallwe know when a Proportion is 
 really true or falfe ? There are fo many Difguifes of 
 Truth in the World, fo many falfe Appearances of 
 Truth, that fome Sects have declared there is no 
 Podibility of diftinguifhing Truth from Faljhood ^ 
 and therefore they have abandoned all Pretences to 
 Knowledge, and maintained ftrenuoufly ih^t nothing 
 is to he known. 
 
 The firft Men of this Humour made themfelves 
 famous in Greece by the Name of Scepticks^ that 
 is, Seekers : They were alfo called Academicks, 
 borrowing their Name from Academia, their 
 School or Place of Sfudy. They taught that all 
 Things are uncertain^ tho* they allowed that fome 
 are more probable than others. After thefe arofe 
 the Se6l of Pyrrhonicks^ named from Pyrrho their 
 Mafter, who would not allow one Propofition to 
 be more probable than another *, but profefTed that 
 alt Things were equally uncertain. Now all thefe 
 Men (as an ingenious Author exprefTes it) were 
 rather to be called a Sedl of Liars than Philofo' 
 phers^ and that Cenfure is jufl for two Reafons : 
 (i.) Becaufe they determined concerning every 
 Propofition that it was uncertain, and believect 
 that as a certain Truth, v/hile they profefTed there 
 was nothing certain, and that nothing could he 
 determined concerning Truth or FaKhood ; and 
 thus their very Dodrine gave itfdf the Lie. (2.) 
 
 Becaufe 
 
C. II. S. 7, ne right Vfe of Reafon, 173 
 
 6ecaufe they judged and aded as other Men did in 
 the common Aftairs of Life 5 they would neither 
 run into Fire nor Water, though they profelTed Ig- 
 norance and Uncertainty, whether the one would 
 burn, or the other drown them. 
 
 There have been fome in all Ages who have too 
 much affeded this Humour, who difpute againft 
 every Things under Pretence that Truth has no cer- 
 tain Mark to diftinguijh it. Let us therefore en- 
 quire^ what is the general Criterion of THith ? And 
 in order to this, it is proper to confider what is the 
 Reafon v/hy we aflent to thofe Propofitions, which 
 contain the moft certain and indubitable Truths, 
 fuch as thefe, the tVhole is greater than a Part \ 
 two and three make five. 
 
 The only Reafon why We believe thefe Propofi- 
 tions to be true, is becaufe the Ideas of the Sub- 
 jed:s and Predicates appear with fo much Clearnefs 
 and Strength of Evidence to agree to each other, 
 that the Mind cannot help difcerning the Agree- 
 ment, and cannot doubt of the Truth of them, 
 but is conftrained to judge them true. So when 
 we compare the Ideas of a Circle and a Triangle^ or 
 the Ideas of an Oifter and a Butterfly^ we fee fuch 
 dn evident Difagreement between them, that we are 
 fure that a Butterfly is not an Oifter 5 nor is a Tri- 
 dngle a Circle, There is nothing but the Evidence 
 of the Agreement or Difagreement between two 
 Ideas, that makes us affirm or deny the one or the 
 other. 
 
 Now it will follow from hence that a dear and 
 diftin5l Perception er full Evidence of the Agreement 
 and Difagreement of our Ideas to one another^ or to 
 Things^ is a certain Criterion of Truth : For fince 
 our Minds are of fuch a Make, that where the 
 Evidence is exceeding plain and firong, we cannot 
 withhold our AfTent ; we fhould then be necefia- 
 M 2 rily 
 
174 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 rily cxpoftrd to believe Falfhood, if complete Evi- 
 dence ibould be found in any Propofitions that are 
 not true. But furely the God of perfe6l Wifdom, 
 Truth and Goodnefs would never oblige his Crea- 
 tures to be thus deceived , and therefore he would 
 never have conftituted us of fuch a Frame as would 
 render it naturally impoflible to guard againft 
 Error. 
 
 Another Confequence is naturally derived from 
 the former ; and that is, that the only Reafon 
 why we fall into a Miftake is becaufe we are im- 
 patient to form a Judgment of Things before we 
 have a clear and evident Perception of their Agree- 
 ment or Dilagreement ; and if we will make Hafte 
 to j idge while our Ideas are obfcure and confufed,, 
 or before we fee whether they agree or difagree, 
 we fhall plunge ourfelves into perpetual Errors. 
 See more on this Subjefl in an Ejfay on the Free- 
 dom of Will in God and Man: Publifhed 1732. 
 Se<ft. I. p. 13. Sold by J. Roberts in Warwick- 
 Lane^ and R. Hett^ in the Poultry, 
 
 Ncte^ What is here allerted concerning the Ne- 
 cefTity of clear and diftin6t Tdeas refers chiefly to 
 Propofitions, which we form ourfelves by our own 
 Powers : As for Propofitions which we derive from 
 the 'Teftimony of others^ they will be accounted for 
 in Chap, IV. 
 
 SECT. vm. 
 
 Of certain and dubious Propofitions^ of Knowledge- 
 and Opinion. 
 
 Since we have found that Evidence is the great Cri- 
 terion and the fure Mark of Truth j this leads us 
 diredly to confider Propofitions according to their E- 
 vidence ; and here we muft take Notice both of the 
 different Degrees of Evidence, and the different Kinds 
 of it. Pro- 
 
C. II. S. 8. ne right Ufe of Reafon. 175 
 
 Propofitions according to their different Degrees 
 cf Evidence are difiinguilhed into certain and du- 
 hiom^. 
 
 Where the Evidence of the Agreement or Dif- 
 agreement of the Ideas is fo flrong and plain, that 
 we cannot forbid nor delay our Afient ; the Pro- 
 pofition is called certain^ as, every Circle hath a 
 Centre ; the World did not create ilfdf. An Ajjent 
 to fuch Propofitions is honoured with the Name of 
 Knowledge. 
 
 But when there is any Obfcurity upon the 
 Agreement or Difigreement of the Ideas, fo that 
 the Mind does not clearly perceive it, and is not 
 compelled to afient or dilTent, then the Propofition, 
 in a proper and Philofophical Senfe, is called 
 doubtful or uncertain -; as, the Planets are inhabited ; 
 the Souls of Brutes are meer Matter ; the World will 
 not fland a thoufand Tears longer ; Dido built the 
 City 6f Carthage, ^c. Such uncertain Propofitions 
 are called Opinions. 
 
 When we confider ourfelves as Philofophers or 
 Searchers cf Trulh^ it would be well if we always 
 fufpended a full Judgment or Determination about 
 any Thing, and made farther Inquiries^ where this 
 plain and perfect Evidence is wanting ; but we 
 are fo prone of ourfelves to judge without full 
 Evidence, and in fome Cafes the Neceffity of 
 Adion in the Affiiirs of Life, conftrains us to judge 
 and determine upon a tolerable Degree of Evi- 
 dence, that we vulgarly call thofe Propofitions 
 
 * It may be objefted, that this Certainty znA Uncertainty being only in the 
 Mind, the Divifion belongs to Propofitions rather according to the Degrees 
 of our Ajfenty than the Degrees of E'vidence. But it may well he anfwered, 
 that the E'vidence here intended is that which appears fo to the Mind, and 
 not the mere Evidence in the Nature of Things : Befides (as we fiiall ihew 
 immediately) the Degree of AJj'ent ought to be exaftly proportionable to the 
 Degree of E'vidence : and therefore the Difference is not great, whether Pro- 
 portions be called certain or uncertain ^ according to the Meafure of E'vidcme, 
 or of Affent, 
 
 M 3 certain 
 
J 76 L O G I C K: Or, Part 11, 
 
 ccrlaifiy where we have but very little Room or 
 Reafon to doubt of them, though the Evidence be 
 not complete and refiftlefs. 
 
 Certainty^ according to the Schools, is diflin- 
 guifhed into Ohjeolive and Suhje5iiv^. Qhje^ive 
 Certainty is when the Propofition is certainly true 
 in itfelf •, and Suhjeofive, when we are certain of the 
 Truth of it. The one is in Things, the other is \ri 
 our Minds. 
 
 But let it be obferved here, that every Propofi- 
 tion in itfelf is certainly true or certainly falfe. For 
 though Bouhtfulnefs or Uncertainty feems to be a Mcr 
 dlum between certain Truth and certain Falfhood 
 in our Minds, yet there is no fuch Medium in 
 Things themlelves, no, not even in future Events ; 
 for now at this Time it is certain in itfelf, that 
 Midfuminer-Day /even Tears hence will he ferene, or 
 it is certain h will be cloudy^ tho' we are uncertain 
 and utterly ignorant what Sort of Day it will be : 
 This Certainly of diftant Futurities is known to 
 God only. 
 
 Uncertain or dubious Propofitions, i. e. Opinions^ 
 are diftinguiHied into probable, or improbable. 
 
 When the Evidence of any Propofition is greater 
 than the Evidence of the contrary, then it is a 
 probable Opinion : Where the Evidence and Argu- 
 ments are flronger on the contrary Side, we call it 
 improbable. But v;hile the Arguments on either 
 Side feem to be equally flrong, and the Evidence 
 for and againjl any Propofition appears equal to 
 the Mind, then in common Language we call it j^ 
 doubtful Matter. We alfo call it a dubious or 
 doubtful Propoftion when there are no Argu- 
 ments on either Side, as next Chriflmas Day 
 will be a very floarp Frcfl, And in general all thele 
 Propufuions are doubtful, wherein we can per- 
 ceive no fufficitnt Marks or Evidences of "truth 
 
 Of 
 
C IL S. 9, rbe right Ufe f?/Reafon. 177 
 
 or Fal/hood. In fuch a Cafe, the Mind which is 
 fearching for Truth ought to remain in a State of 
 Doubt or Sufpence^ until fuperior Evidence on one 
 Side or the other incline the Balance of the Judg- 
 ment, and determine the Probability or Certain^:y 
 CO the one fide. 
 
 A great many Propoficions which we generally 
 believe or disbelieve in human Affairs, or in the 
 Sciences, have very various Degrees of Evidence, 
 which yet arife not to complete Certainty ^ either of 
 Truth or Falfhood. Thus it comes to pafs thac 
 there are fuch various and almoft infinite Degrees 
 of Probability and Improhabiliiy. To a weak Pro- 
 bability we fhould give a weak AfTentvand ^./irong-^ 
 er Aflent is due where the Evidence is greater, and 
 the Matter more probable. If we proportion our 
 Ajffent in all Things to the Degrees of Evidence, we do 
 the utmoft that human Nature is capable of in 4 
 rational Way to fecure itfclf from Error, 
 
 SECT. IX. 
 
 Of Senfey Confcioufnefsy Intelligence ^ Reafon^ Faith ^ 
 and Infpiratton, 
 
 AFTER we have confidered the Evidence of 
 Propofitions in the various Degrees of it, 
 we come to furvey the fever al Kinds of Evidence ^ 
 or the different Ways whereby Truth is let into 
 the Mind, and which produce accordingly feverai 
 Kinds of Knowledge. We fhali diftribute them 
 into thefe fix, {viz,) Senfe^ Confcioufnefs, Ihtelli- 
 gencCy ReafoUy Faith, and Infpiration, and then 
 diflinguifh the Propofitions which are derived from 
 them, 
 
 M 4 I. The 
 
'I7S 
 
 L O G I C K: Or, Part II, 
 
 I. The Evidence of Senfe is when we frame a 
 Propofuion according to the Didlate of any of 
 our Senfcs ; fo we judge that Grafs x^ green-, thaC 
 a Trumpet gives a pleafant Sound ; the Fire hums 
 Wood ; Water is foft^ and Iron is hard ; for we 
 have fcen, heard or felt all thefe. It is upon this 
 Evidence of Senfe that we know and believe the 
 daily Occurrences in human Life ; and almoft all 
 the Hiftories of Mankind that are written by 
 Eye or Ear-WitnefTes are built upon this Prin- 
 ciple. 
 
 Under the Evidence of Senfe we do not only in- 
 clude that Knowledge which is derived to us by 
 our outward Senfes of Hearings Seeing^ Feelingy 
 Tjf ing a-nd S. vie I ling, but that alfo which is de- 
 rived from the invyard Senfations and Appetites 
 of Hunger, Thirfl, Enfe, Pleafure, Pain^ We art- 
 fiefs. Reft, &c. and all thofe Things which belong 
 to the B^dy -, as. Hunger is a painful Appetite -, Light 
 is pleajant -, Refl is fweet to the weary Limbs, 
 
 Propofitions which are built on this Evidence, 
 niay be named fenfihle Propofitions, or the Dilates 
 of Senfe, 
 
 II. As we learn what belongs to the Body by 
 the Evidence of Senfe, fo we learn what belongs to 
 the Soul by an inward Confcioufnefs, which may be 
 called a fort of internal Feeling, or fpiritual Senfa- 
 tion of whit p.iflcrs in the Mind ; as, I think before 
 Ifpeak', Idef re large Knowledge ; I fufpe5f my own 
 Prauiice -, I ftudied hard to Bay -, my Confcience hears 
 IFitfief of my Sincerity % my Soul hates vain Thoughts ; 
 Fear is an uneafy Paffwn -, long Meditation on one 
 Thing is tirefome, 
 
 ^ Thus 
 
e. II. S. 9. The right life of Reafon. 179 
 
 Thus it appears that we obtain the Knowledge 
 of a Multitude of Propofitions^ as well as oi fingle 
 Ideas, by thofe two Principles which Mr. Loc^^ calls 
 Senfation and Reflexion : One of them is a Sort of 
 Confcioufnefs of what afFeds the Body, and the other 
 is a Confcioufnefs of what paflfes in the Mind. 
 
 Propofitions which are built on this internal Con- 
 fcioufnefs^ have yet no particular or diftinguilhing 
 Name afllgned to them. 
 
 III. Intelligence relates chiefly to thofe abflradled 
 Propofitions which carry their own Evidence with 
 them, and admit no Doubt about them. Our 
 Perception of this Self- Evidence in any Propofition 
 is called Intelligence, It is our Knowledge of 
 thofe firft Principles of Truth which are (as it were) 
 wrought into the very Nature and Make of our 
 Minds : They are fo evident in themfelves to 
 every Man who attends to them, that they need 
 no Proof. It is the Prerogative and peculiar Ex- 
 cellence of thefe Propofitions, that they can fcarce 
 ever be proved or denied : They cannot eafily be pro- 
 ved^ becaufe there is nothing fuppofed to be more 
 clear or certain, from which an Argument may be 
 drawn to prove them. They cannot well be denied, 
 becaufe their own Evidence is fo bright and convin- 
 cing, that as foon as the Terms are underftood the 
 Mind neceflarily affents ; fuch are thefe, IVhatfoever 
 aBeth hath a Beings nothing has no properties \ a 
 Part is lefs than the whole ; nothing can he the Caufe 
 of itfelf 
 
 Thefe Propofitions are called Moms, or Maxims, 
 or firft Principles \ thefe are the very Foundations of 
 all improved Knowledge and Reafonings, and on 
 this Account thefe have been thought to be innate 
 Propofitions, or Truths born with us. 
 
 Some 
 
,8o LOGICK: Or, Part II. 
 
 Some fuppofe that a great part of the Know- 
 ledge of Angels and human Souls in the feparate 
 State is obtained in this Manner, (viz.) by fuch an 
 immediate View of Things in their own Nature, 
 which is called Intuition, 
 
 IV. Reafoning is the next Sort of Evidence, and 
 that is when one Truth is inferr'd or drawn from 
 others by natural andjuft Methods of Argument; 
 as, if there be much Light at Midnight, I infer, 
 it -proceeds from the Moon, becaufe the Sun is under 
 the Earth*- If 1 fee a Cottage in a Foreft, I 
 conclude, fome Man has been there and built it. 
 Or when I furvey the Heavens and Earth, this 
 gives Evidence to my Reafon, that there is a God 
 who made them. 
 
 The Propofitions which I believe upon this 
 kind of Evidence, are called Conclufions^ or rational 
 Truths^ and the Knowledge that we gain this Way 
 is properly called Science. 
 
 Yet Jet it be noted, that the Word Science is 
 ufually applied to a whole Body of regular or me- 
 thodical Obfervations or Propofitions which learn- 
 ed Men have formed concerning any Subjedl of 
 Speculation^ deriving one Truth from another by 
 a Train of Arguments. If this Knowledge chief- 
 ly diredls our Pra^ice^ it is ufually called an Art. 
 And this is the moft remarkable Diilindion be- 
 tween an Art and a Science^ {viz,) the one refers 
 chiefly to PaaoIicCy the other to Speculation. Na- 
 tural Philofophy, or Phyftch^ and Ontology^ are Sci- 
 ences ; Logick and Rhetorick are called Arts ; but 
 Mathematicks include both Art and Science ; for 
 they have much of Speculation, and much of Prac- 
 tice in them. 
 
 * Nctt, Since this Boq}^ was written, we have (o many Appearances ©f 
 the Aurora Bcrtahi as reduces this Inference only to a Probability. 
 
 Obferve 
 
C, II. S. 9. T:he right Ufe of Reafon. 181 
 
 Ohferve here, that when the Evidence of a 
 Propofition derived from Se?ife^ Confcioufnefs^ In- 
 telligence^ or Reafon^^is firm and indi|bitable, it pro- 
 duces fuch AfTent as we call a natural Cer- 
 tainty, 
 
 V. When we derive the Evidence of any Pro- 
 pofition from the ^eftimony of others, it is called 
 the Evidence of Faith \ and this is a large Part of 
 our Knowledge. Tenthoufand Things there are 
 which we believe merely upon the Authority or 
 Credit of thofe who have fpoken or written of them. 
 It is by this Evidence that we know there is fuch 
 a Country as China, and there was fuch a Man as 
 Cicero who dwelt in Rome. It is by this that moft 
 of the Tranfadions in human Life are managed : 
 We know our Parents and our Kindred by this 
 Means, we know the Perfons and Laws of our 
 prefent Governors, as well as Thingsthat are at a 
 vaft Diftance from us in foreign Nations, or in 
 ancient Ages. 
 
 According as the Perfons that inform us of any 
 Thing are many or few, or more or iefs wife, and 
 faithful, and credible, fo our Faith is more or Iefs 
 firm or wavering, and the Propfition believed is 
 either certain or doubtful •, but in Matters of Faith^ 
 an exceeding great Probability is called a moral 
 Certainty, 
 
 Faith is generally diftinguifhed into Divine and 
 Human^ not with Regard to the Propofitions that 
 are believed, but with Regard to the Teflimony 
 ppon which we believe them. When God reveals 
 any Thing to us, this gives us the Evidence of 
 divine Faith *, but what Man only acquaints us 
 with, produces a human Faith in us ; the one, be* 
 ing bulk upon the Word of Man, arifes but to 
 tnoral Certainty \ but the other being founded on 
 
 the 
 
i82 L O G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 the Word of God^ arifes to an abfolute and inJalUble 
 Ajjurance^ fo fir as we underfland the Meaning of 
 this Word. This is Q?i\\td fupernatural Certainty. 
 
 Propofitions which we believe upon the Evi- 
 dence of human Teftimony, are called Narratives ^ 
 Relations^ Reports^ Hiftorical Obfervations, &c. 
 but fuch as are built on Divine Tedimony, are 
 termed Matters of Revelation ; and if they are of 
 great Importance in Religion, they are called Ar- 
 ticles of Faith. 
 
 There are fome Propofitions or Parts of Know- 
 ledge, which are faid to be derived from Obferva- 
 tion and Experience y that is. Experience in our- 
 felves, and the Obfervations we have made on 
 other Perfons or Things ; but thefe are made up 
 of fome of the former Springs of Knowledge join- 
 cd together, (viz.) Senfe^ Confcioufnefsy Reafon^ 
 Faithy &'c. and therefore are not reckoned a dillindt 
 Kind of Evidence. 
 
 VI. Infpiration is a fort of Evidence diflind 
 from all the former, and that is, when fuch an 
 overpowering Impreffion of any Proportion is made 
 upon the Mind by God himfelf, that gives a con- 
 vincing and indubitable Evidence of the Truth 
 and Divinity of it : So were the Prophets and the 
 Apoliles infpired*. 
 
 Sometimes God may have been pleafed to make 
 ufe of the outward Senfes, or the inward Work- 
 ings of the Imagination, of Dreams, Apparitions, 
 Vifions and Voices, or Reafoning, or perhaps hu- 
 man Narration, to convey divine Truths to the 
 Mind of the Prophet ; but none of thefe would 
 be fufficient to deferve the Name of Infpiration, 
 
 * Note here, I fpeak chiefly of the higheft Kind of rnfpiratlon, 
 
 without 
 
C. 11. S. 9. The right Ufe o/Reafon. 18-3, 
 
 without a i^aperior or divine Light and Power at- 
 tending them. 
 
 This fort of Evidence is alfo very diftindl from 
 what we ufually call divine Faith •, for every com- 
 mon- Chriftian exercifes divine Faith when he be- 
 lieves any Propofition which God has revealed in 
 the Bible upon this Account, becaufe God has /aid 
 it^ though it was by a Train of Reafonings that he 
 was led to believe that this is the Word of God: 
 Whereas in the Cafe of Infpiration^ the Prophet 
 not only exercifes Divine Faith, in believing what 
 God reveals, but he is under a fuperior heavenly 
 Impreflion, Light and Evidence, whereby he is 
 aiTured that God reveals it. This is the moft emi- 
 nent kind of fupernatural Certainty, 
 
 Tho' Perfons might be afiured of their own 
 Infpiration by fome peculiar and inexpreffihle Con- 
 fcioufnefs, of this divine Infpiration and Evidence 
 in their own Spirits, yet it is hard to make out this 
 Infpiration to others, and to convince them ot 
 it, except by fome antecedent or confequent Pro- 
 phecies or Miracles, or fome public Appearances 
 more than human. 
 
 The Propofitions which are attained by this fort 
 of Evidence are called infpired Truths, This is 
 divine Revelation at firft Hand, and the Didlates 
 of God in an immediate Manner, of which Theo- 
 logical Writers difcourfe at large, but fince it be- 
 longs only to a few Favourites of Heaven to be 
 infpired, and not the Bulk of Mankind, it is not 
 neceflary to fpeak more of it in a Treat ife of Lo- 
 gick, which is defigned for the general Improve- 
 ment of human Reafon. 
 
 The various Kinds of Evidence, upon which we 
 believe any Propofition, afford us thefe three Re- 
 marks, 
 
 L Re?nark. 
 
184 L O G I C K: Or, Part IL 
 
 I. Remark. The fame Propofuion may be known 
 to us by different Kinds of Evidence : That the 
 Whole is bigger than a Part is known by ouvSenfes, 
 and it is known by the Self Evidence of the Thing 
 to our Mind. That God created the Heavens and 
 the Earth is known to us by Reafon^ and is known 
 alfo by Divine Teftimony or Faith. 
 
 II. Remark Among thofe various Kinds of 
 Evidence, fome are generally (Ironger than others 
 in their own Nature, and give a better Ground fof 
 Certainty. Inward Confcioufnefs and Intelligence^ 
 as well as Divine Faith and Infpiration, ufually 
 carry much more Force with them than Senfe of 
 buman Faith, which are often fallible ; tho* there 
 are Inftances wherein human Faith, Senfe, and Red- 
 fining lay a Foundation alfo for complete Aflu- 
 rance, and leave no room for Doubt. 
 
 Reafon in its own Nature would always lead us 
 into the Truth in Matters within its Compafs, if 
 it were ufed aright^ or it would require us to fuf- 
 pend our Judgment where there is want of Evi- 
 dence. But it is our Sloth, Precipitancy, Senfe^ 
 Fafion, and many other Things that lead our 
 Reafon aftray in this degenerate and imperfect 
 Eftate : Hence it comes to pafs that we are guilty 
 of fo many Errors in Reafonifig, efpecially about 
 Divine Things, becaufe our Reafon either is bufy 
 to enquire, and refolved to determine about Mat- 
 ters that are above our prefent Reach ; or becaufe 
 "we mingle many Prejudices and fecret Influences 
 of Senfe, Fancy, Paffion, Inclination, &c. with our 
 Exercifes of Reafon, and judge and determine ac* 
 cording to thefe irregular Influences. 
 
 Divine 
 
C. IL S. 9. The right Ufe ^/Reafon. 18^ 
 
 Divine Faith would never admit of any Contro- 
 veriies or Doubtings, if we were but allured that 
 God had fpoken, and that we rightly under flood 
 his Meaning. 
 
 III. Remark. The greateft Evidence and Cer- 
 tainty of any Propofition does not depend upon 
 the Variety of the Ways or Kinds of Evidence^ 
 whereby it is known, but rather upon the Strength 
 and Degree of Evidence, and the Clearnefs of 
 that Light in or by which it appears to the Mind. 
 For a Propofition that is known only one Way 
 may be much more certain, and have ftronger 
 Evidence than another that is fuppofed to be 
 known many Ways. Therefore thefe Propofi- 
 tions, Nothing has no P roper ties^ Nothing can make 
 itfelf^ which are known only by Intelligence^ are 
 much furer and truer than this Propofition, *The 
 Rainbow has real and inherent Colours in it, or 
 than this, the Sun rolls round the Earth ; tho* we 
 feem to know both thefe laft by our Senfes, and 
 by the common Teftimony of our Neighbours, So 
 any Propofition that is clearly evident to our own 
 Confcioufnefs or Divine Faith, is m.uch more cer- 
 tain to us than a thoufand others that have only 
 the Evidence of feeble and obfcure Senfations, of 
 mere probable Reafonings and doubtful Arguments^ 
 or the Witnefs of fallible Men^ or even tho* all 
 ^hefe ihould join together. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
l86 L O G I C K: Or, Part 11. 
 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 ^he Springs offalfe Judg}?ient^ or the Dodirine 
 of Prejudices. 
 
 Introduction. 
 
 IN the End of the foregoing Chapter we have 
 furveyed the feveral Sorts of Evide72ce, on which 
 we build our Aflent to Propofitions. Thefe are 
 indeed the general Grounds upon which we form 
 our Judgments concerning Things. What remains 
 in this fecond Part of Logick is to point out the fe- 
 veral Springs and Caufes of our Miftakes in judging, 
 and to lay down fome Rules by which we fliould 
 condudl ourfelves in paffing a Judgment of every 
 Thing that is propofed to us. 
 
 I confefs many Things which will be mentioned 
 in thefe followings Chapters might be as well re- 
 fcr'd to the third Part of Logick^ where we fhall 
 treat of Reafoning and Argument \ for mod of our 
 falfe Judgments feem to include a fecret had Reafon- 
 ing in them -, and while we fhew the Springs of Er- 
 ror^ and the Rules of true Judgment^ we do at the 
 fame time difcover which Arguments are fallacious, 
 which Reafonings are weak, and which are juft and 
 Ilrong. Yet fince this is ufually called a judging 
 ill, or judging well, I think we may without any 
 Impropriety treat of it here ; and this will lay a 
 furcr Foundation for all Sorts of Ratiocination and 
 Argument. 
 
 Rafli Judgments are called Prejudices, and io 
 are the .Springs of them. This Word in com- 
 mon Life fignifies an ill Opinion which we have 
 
 conceived 
 
C. III. Tk right life of Reafon. 1 87 
 
 conceive of fome other Per/on^ or fome Injury done to 
 him. But when we ufe the Word in Matters of 
 Science, it fignifies a Judgment that is formed con- 
 cerfjing anyPerfon or Thing before fufficient Exami- 
 nation ; and generally we fuppofe it to mean ^falfe 
 Judgment or Miflake : At lead, it is an Opinionr 
 taken up without folid Reafon for it, or an Afient 
 given to a Propofition before we have juft Evidence 
 of the Truth of it, though the Thing itfclf may 
 happen to be true. 
 
 Sometimes thefe rafh Judgments are called Pre* 
 foffejfio'ns^ whereby is meant, that fome particular 
 Opinion has pofTefled the Mind, and engaged the 
 Aflent without fufficient Search or Evidence of the 
 Truth of it. 
 
 There is a* vaft Variety of thefe Prejudices and 
 Prepo£eJfwns which attend Mankind in every Age 
 and Condition of Life ; they lay the Foundations 
 of many an Error, and many an unhappy Pra6tice, 
 both in the Affairs of Religion, and in our civil 
 Concernments ; as v/eli as in Matters of Learning. 
 It is neceffary for a Man who purfues Truth to 
 enquire into thefe Springs of Error^ that as far as 
 poflible he may rid himfelf of old Prejudices and 
 watch hourly againft new ones. 
 
 The Number of them is fo great, and they are 
 fo interwoven with each other^ as well as with the 
 Powers of human Nature, that it is fometimes hard 
 to diftinguifh them apart •, yet for Method's Sake 
 we fhall reduce them to thefe four general Heads^ 
 (viz.) Prejudices arifing from nings., or from 
 Words., from ourfelves^ or from other Perfons ; and 
 after the Defcription of each Prejudice^ we fhall 
 propofe one or more Ways of curing it. 
 
 N SECT. 
 
i88 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 SECT I. 
 
 Prejudices arifing from Things, 
 
 TH E firfl fort cf Prejudices are chofe which 
 arifc from the Things thewfelves about which 
 'uce judge. But here Jet it be obferved that there is 
 nothing in the Nature of Things that will neceiTarily 
 lead us into Error, if we do but ufc our Reafon 
 aright, and with- hold our Judgment till there ap- 
 pear fufficient Evidence of Truth. But fmce we 
 are fo unhappily prone to take Advantage of every 
 doubtful Appearance and Circumfiance of Things 
 to form a wrong Judgment, and plunge ourfelves 
 incoMiftake, therefore it is proper to confider what 
 there is in the Things themfelves that may occafion 
 our Errors. 
 
 I. The Ohfcurity of fome Truths^ and the Diffi- 
 culty of f arching them out^ is one Occafion of rafli 
 and miilaken Judgment. 
 
 Some Truths are difficult becaufe they lye re- 
 mote from the firfl: Principles of Knowledge, and 
 want a long Chain of Argument to come at them : 
 Such are many of the deep Things o^ Algebra and 
 Geometry^ and fome of the Theorems and Pro- 
 blems of- mofl: Parts of the Mathematicks. Many 
 Things alfo in natural Philofophy are dark and in- 
 tricate upon this Account, becaufe we cannot come 
 at any certain Knowledge of them without the La- 
 bour- of many and difficult, as well as chargeable 
 Experiments. 
 
 There are other Truths which have great Dark- 
 nefs upon them, becaufe we have no proper Means 
 or Mediums to come at the Knowledge" of them. 
 Tho' in our Age we have found out many of the 
 
 deep 
 
C. III. S. I. The right Ufe of Reafon. 189 
 
 deep Things of Nature by che AlTiftance of Glaf- 
 fes and other Inftruments ; yet we are not huher- 
 to arrived at any fufficient Methods to difcover 
 the Shape of thofe little Particles of Matter which 
 diftinguifh the various 6'^/?6'^rj, OJ{?^/n, and Colours 
 of Bodies ; nor to find what Sort of Atoms com- 
 pofe Liquids or Solids^ and diftinguifh W^ood, Mi- 
 nerals, Metals, Glafs, Stone, &c. ' There is a 
 Darknefs alfo lies upon the Actions of the intellec- 
 tual or angelical World ; their Manners of Subfift- 
 ence and Agency, the Power of Spirits to move 
 Bodies, and the Union of our Souls with this ani- 
 mal Body of ours, are much unknown to us on this 
 Account. 
 
 Now in many of thefe Cafes, a great part of 
 Mankind is not content to be entirely ignorant ; 
 but they rather chufe to form rafh and hafty 
 Judgments, to guefs at Things without juft Evi- 
 dence, to believe fomething concerning them before 
 they can know them, and thereby they fall into 
 Error. 
 
 This fort of Prejudice, as well as mofi: others, 
 is cured by Patience and Diligence in Enquiry and 
 Reafoning, and a Sufpenfion of Judgment, till we 
 have attained fome proper Mediums of Know- 
 ledge, and till we fee fufficient Evidence or the 
 Truth. 
 
 II. The Appearance of Things in a Dijguife, is 
 another Spring of Prejudice or rafh Judgment. 
 The Outfide of Things which firft ilrikes us, is 
 oftentimes different from their inward Nature, 
 and we are tempted to judge fuddenly according 
 to outward Appearances. If a Pi3iure is daubed 
 with many bright and glaring Colours, the vul- 
 gar Eye admires it as an excellent Piece \ whereas 
 the fame Perfon judges very contempmoully of 
 N 2 foir.e 
 
190 L G 1 C K: Or, Part. IL 
 
 fome admirable Dcfign iketched out only with a 
 black Pencil on a coarfe Paper, tho' by the Hand 
 of Raphael. So the Scholar fpies the Name of a 
 new Book in a publick News-Paper^ he is charm- 
 ed with the Title, he purchafes, he reads with huge 
 Expedations, and finds ir all Trafh and Im- 
 pertinence : This is a Prejudice derived from the 
 Appearaiice ; we are too ready to judge that 
 Volume valuable which had lb good a Frontifpiece. 
 The large Heap of Encomiums and fwelling Words 
 of AlTurance that are beflowed on S^ack-Medi- 
 cines in publick Advcrtifements tempt many a 
 Reader to judge them infallible, and to ufe the Pills 
 or the Plaifter with vail Hope and frequent Difap- 
 pointment. 
 
 We are tempted to form our Judgment of Per- 
 fons as well as Things by thefe outward Appearances, 
 Where there is PFealth^ Equipage and Splendor we 
 are ready to call that Man happy, but we fee not 
 the vexing Difquietudes of his Soul : And when we 
 fpy a Perfon in ragged Garments^ we form a de- 
 fpicable Opinion of him too fuddenly ; we can 
 hardly think him either happy or wife^ our Judg- 
 ment is fo ftrangely biafled by outward and fenfible 
 Things. It was thro' the Power of this Prejudice 
 that the Jews rejeded our blefTcd Saviour ; they 
 could not fuffer themfelves to believe that the Man 
 who appeareci as the Son of a Carpenter was alfo the 
 Son of isBi' And becaufe St, Paul was of a little 
 Stature, a mean Prefence, and his Voice contemp- 
 tible, fome of the Corinthians were tempted to 
 doubt whether he were infpired or no. 
 
 This Prejudice is cured by a longer Acquain- 
 tance with the World y^ and ^ 'fujl Ohfervation that 
 Tilings are fofnetimes better andfo7netimes worfe than 
 thiy appear to he, Wc ought therefore to re- 
 drain our cxcefTive Forwardncfs to form our Opi- 
 nion 
 
cm. S.I. The right Ufe of Ktzton. 191 
 
 nion of Perfons or Things before we have Oppor- 
 tunity to fearch into them more perfedlly. Re- 
 member that a grey Beard does not make a Philofo- 
 pher ; all is not Gold that gUJlers ; and a rough Dia- 
 mond may he worth an immenfe Sum, 
 
 III. A Mixture of different Qualities in the fame 
 Things is another Temptation to judge amifs. We 
 are ready to be carried away by that Quality which 
 ftrikes the firfi or the ftrongeji Impreffwns upon us, 
 and we judge of the whole Objedl according to 
 that Quality, regardlefs of all the reft ; or fome- 
 times we colour over all the other Qualities with 
 that one Tindture, whether it be bad or good. 
 
 When we have juft Reafon to admire a Man for 
 his Virtues, we are fometimes inclined not only to 
 negledl his PFeakneffes, but even to put a good 
 Colour upon them, and to think them amiable. 
 When we read a Book that has many excellent 
 Truths in it and divine Sentiments, we are 
 tempted to approve not only that whole Book, 
 but even all the Writings of that Author. When 
 a Poet^ an Orator, or a Painter, has performed ad- 
 mirably in feveral illuftrious Places, we fometimes 
 alfo admire his very Errors, we miftake his Blun- 
 ders for Beauties, and are fo ignorantly fond as to 
 copy after them. 
 
 It is this Prejudice that has rendered fo many 
 great Scholars perfe6t Bigots, and inclined them to 
 defend Homer or Horace, Livy or Cicero, in all 
 their Miftakes, and vindicate all the Follies of their 
 favourite Author. It is this that tempts fome 
 great Writers to fupport the Sayings of almoft all 
 the ancient Fathers of the Church, and admire them 
 even in their very Reveries. 
 
 N 3 On 
 
192 L G I C K: Or, Part. II. 
 
 On the other Hand, if an Author has profefTed 
 heretical Sentiments in Religion, we throw our 
 Scorn upon every Thing he writes, we dcfpife even 
 his critical or jnathematical Learning, and will hard- 
 ly allow him common Senfe. It a Poem has Tome 
 Blemilhes in ir, there is a Sett o\ falfe Criticks 
 who decry it univerfilly, and will allow no Beau- 
 ties there. 
 
 This fort of Prejudice is relieved by learning to 
 diftinguilh Things well, and not to judge in the 
 Lump, There is fcarce any Thing in the World 
 of Nature or Art, in the World of Morality or 
 Religion, that is perfectly uniform. There is a 
 Mixture of Wifdom and Folly, Vice and V^irtue, 
 Good and Evil, both in Men and Things. We 
 fhould remember that fome Perfons have great Wit 
 'Andlit tie Judgment ', others are judicious, but not 
 witty. Some are good humour'* d without Compli- 
 merit ; others have all the Formalities of Complai- 
 fance, but no good Humour. We ought to know 
 that one Man may be vicious and learned^ while 
 another has Virtue without Learning. That many 
 a Man thiiiks admirably well who has a poor Ut- 
 terance ; while others have a charming Manner of 
 Speech, but their Thoughts are trifling and imper- 
 tinent. Some are good Neighbours^ and courteous 
 and charitable toward Men who have no Piety to- 
 ward God ; others are truly religious, but ot mo- 
 rofe natural Tempers. Some excellent Sayings are 
 found in w try filly Books ^ and fome filly Thoughts 
 appear in Books of Value. We fhould neither 
 praife nor difpraife hy Whole fale^ but feparate the 
 Good from the Evil, and judge of them apart : 
 The Accuracy of a good Judgment confifts much 
 
 In making fuch Diilindions. 
 
 Yet 
 
C. III. S. I . The right life of Reafon. 1 93 
 
 Yet let it be noted too, that in common Dif- 
 courfe we ufually denominate Perfons and Things 
 according to the major Part of their Character. 
 He is to be called a wife Man who has but few 
 Follies : He is a good Philofopher who knows much 
 of Nature, and for the mod Part reafons well in 
 Matters of human Science : And that Book fhould 
 be e deemed well written^ which has much more of 
 good Senfe in it than it has of Impertinence. 
 
 IV. Tho' a Thing be uniform In its own Na- 
 ture, yet the different Lights in which it may he 
 placed^ and the different Views in which it appears 
 to us, will be ready to excite in us millaken Judg- 
 ments concerning it. Let an eredl Cone be placed 
 in a horizontal Plane, at a great Diftance from 
 the Eye, and it appears a plain Triangle -, but we 
 fhall judge that very Cone to be nothing but a flat 
 Circle, if its Bafe be obverted towards us. Set a 
 common round Plate a little obliquely before our 
 Eyes afar off, and we fhall think it an oval Figure ; 
 but if the very Edge of it be turned towards us, 
 we fliall take it for a flrait Line, So when we 
 view the feveral Folds of a changeable Silk, we pro- 
 nounce this Part red, and that yellow, becauie of 
 its different Pofition to the Light, tho' the Silk 
 laid fmooth in one Light appears all of one Co- 
 lour. 
 
 When we furvey the Miferies of Mankind, and 
 think of the Sorrows of Millions, both on Earth 
 and in Hell, the Divine Government has a terrible 
 Afpe5i, and we may be tempted to think hardly 
 even of God himfelf : But if we view the Profu- 
 fion of his Bounty and Grace amongft his Crea- 
 tures on Earth, or the happy Spirits in Heaven, 
 we Qiall have fo exalted an Idea of his Goodnefs as 
 to forget his Vengeance. Some Men dwell en- 
 N 4 tirely 
 
194 LOGIC K: Or, Part IL 
 
 tirely upon the Promifes of his Gofpel, and think 
 him all Mercy : Others under a melancholy Frame, 
 dwell upon his Terrors and his Threatnnigs, and 
 are overwhelmed with the Thought of his Severity 
 and Vengeance, as tho' there were no Mercy in 
 him. 
 
 The true Method of delivering ourfelves from 
 this Prejudice is to view a Thing on all Sides, to 
 compare all the various Appearances of the fame 
 Thing with one another, and lee each of them have 
 its full Weight in the Balance of our Judgmenr, 
 before we fully determine our Opinion. It was by 
 this Means that the modern Aftronomers came to 
 find out that the Planet Saturn hath a flat broad 
 Circle round its Globe, which is called its Ring^ by 
 obferving the different Appearances as a narrow 
 or a broader Oval, or as it fometimes feems to be a 
 ftrait Line, in the different Parts of its twenty -nine 
 Years Revolution thro' the Ecliptic, And if v/e rake 
 the fame juli and religious Survey of i\\t great and 
 bleffed God in all the Difcoveries of his Vengeance 
 and his Mercy, we ihal) at laft conclude him to be 
 hoihjuft and good, 
 
 • V. The cafiial AJfociation of many of our Ideas 
 becomes the Spring of another Prejudice or rafh 
 Judgment, to which we are fonietimes expofed. 
 If in our younger Years we have taken Medicines 
 that have been naufeous, when any Medicine what- 
 foever is afcervard propofed to us under Sicknefs, 
 we immediately judge \i naufeous : Our Fancy has 
 fo clofcly joined thefe Ideas together that we 
 know not how to feperate them : Then the Sto- 
 mach feels the Difgufl, and perhaps refufes the 
 only Drug that can preferve Life. So a Child 
 who has been let Blood joins the Ideas of Pain 
 and the Surgeon together, and he hates the Sight 
 
 01 
 
C. III. S. 2 The right Ufe of Reafon. 1 95 
 
 of the Surgeon^ bpcaufe he thinks of his Pain : Or 
 if he has drank a hitter Potion^ he conceives a bit- 
 ter Idea of the Cup which held it, and will drink 
 nothing out of that Cup, 
 
 It is for the fame Reafon that the Bulk of the 
 common People are fo fuperflitioufly fond of the 
 Pfalms tranflated by Hopkins and Sternbold^ and 
 think them facred and divine, becaufe they have 
 been now for more than an hundrd Years bound 
 up in the fame Covers with our Bibles, 
 
 The bed Relief againft this Prejudice of AJfo- 
 elation is to confider, whether there be any natu- 
 ral and neceflary Connexion between thofe Ideas 
 which Fancy^ Cuftom^ or Chance hath thus joined 
 together : And if Nature has not joined them, let 
 our Judgment corredl the Folly of our Imagina- 
 tion^ and feparate thefe Ideas again. 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Prejudices arifing from Words, 
 
 OU R Ideas and Words are fo link'd together, 
 that while we judge of Things according to 
 Words ^ we are led into feveral Miftakes. Thefe 
 may be diftribured under two general Heads, {viz.) 
 Such as arlfe from fingle Words or Phrafes^ or fuch 
 as arife from Words joined in Speech^ and compofmg 
 a Difcourfe, 
 
 I. The mod eminent and remarkable Errors of 
 the firft Kind, are thefe three, (i.) When our 
 Words are infignificant^ and have no Ideas •, as 
 when the myftical Divines talk of the Prayer of 
 Silence^ the fupernatural and pajfive Night of the 
 Scul^ the Vacuity of Powers^ the Sufpenfion cf all 
 noughts: Or (2.) When our Words are equivo- 
 
 caly 
 
196 L O G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 cal^ and fignify two or more Ideas, as the Words 
 Law, Light, ¥kjh^ Spirit, Right eoufnefs, and many 
 ocher Terms in Scripture: Or (3.) When two 
 or three Words are fynonymous, and fignify one 
 Idea, as Regeneration and new Creation in the New 
 Teftament ; both which mean only a Change of 
 the Heart from Sin to Holinefs •, or as the EleEtor of 
 Cologn and the Bifhop of Cologn are two Tiiles of 
 the fame Man. 
 
 Thefe kinds of Phrafes are the Occafions of 
 various Miftakes ^ but none fo unhappy as thofe 
 in Theology : For both J^^oreis without Ideas, as 
 well as fyno/nymous and equivocal IVords, have been 
 ufed and abufed by the Humours, PafTions, Inte- 
 rells, or by the real Ignorance and Weaknefs of 
 Men, to beget terrible Contefts among Chriflians. 
 
 But to rthcve us under all thofe Dangers, and 
 to remove thefe ^r/j of Prejudices which arife from 
 fingle IVords or Phrafes, I muft remit the Reader 
 to Part I. Chap. 4. where I have treated about 
 IVords, and to thofe Dire^ions which I have given 
 concerning the Definition of Names, Part I. Chap. 6. 
 
 II. There is another fort of falfe Judgments or 
 Miftakes which we are expofed to hy Words-, and 
 that is, when they are joined in Speech^ and com- 
 pofe a Difcourfe •, and here we are in Danger two 
 Ways. 
 
 The one is, when a Man writes good Senfe, or 
 fpeaks much to the Purpofe, but he has not a 
 happy and engaging manner of Exprrffion. Per- 
 haps he ufes coarfe and vulgar Words, or old, 
 obfelete, and untafhionable Language, or Terms 
 and Phrafes that are foreign, latinized, fcholaftick, 
 very uncommon, and hard to be underftood : And 
 
 this 
 
C. III. S. 2. "The right Ufe c/'Reafon. 197 
 
 this is {till worfe, if his Sentences are long and 
 intricate, or the Sound of them harfh and grating 
 to the Ear. All theie indeed are Befecls in Style, 
 and lead fome nice and unthinking Hearers or 
 Readers into an ill Opinion of all that fuch a Per- 
 fon fpeaks or writes. Many an excellent Difcourfe 
 of our Forefathers has had abundaace of Contempt 
 caft upon it by our modern Pretenders to Senfe, 
 for Want of their difringuiQiing between the Lan- 
 guage and the Ideas. 
 
 On the other Hand, when a Man of Eloquence 
 fpeaks or writes upon any Subject, we are too 
 ready to run into his Sentiments, being fweetly 
 and infenfibly drawn by the Smoothnefs of his 
 Harangue, and the pathetick Power of his Lan- 
 guage. Rhetorick will varnifli every Error fo that 
 it fliail appear in the Drefs of Truths and put fuch 
 Ornaments upon Vice^ as to make it look like 
 Virtue : It is an Art of wondrous and extenfive In- 
 fluence ; it often conceals, obfcures or overwhelms 
 the Truth, and places fometimes a grofs Falfhood 
 in a moil alluring Light. The Decency of Adlion, 
 the Mufick of the Voice, the Harmony of the 
 Periods, the Beauty of the Style, and all the en- 
 gaging Airs of the Speaker, have often charm'd 
 the Plearers into Error, and perfuaded them to 
 approve whatfoever is propofeci in fo agreeable a 
 Manner. A large AiTembly (lands expofed at once 
 to the Power of thefe Prejudices, and imbibes 
 them all. So Cicero and Dernofthenes made the 
 Romans and the Athenians believe almofl whatfoever 
 they pleafed. 
 
 The bell Defence againft both thefe Dangers, 
 is to learn the Skill (as much as poflable) of fepa- 
 rating our Thoughts and Ideas from Words and Phra- 
 fes^ to judge of the Things in their own Natures, 
 and in their natural or juft Relation to one ano- 
 ther. 
 
198 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 iher, abflraded from the Uf* of Language, and 
 to maintain a fteady and obftinate Relblution to 
 hearken to nothing but Truth, in whatfoever Style 
 or Drels it appears. 
 
 Then we fhall hear a Sermon of pious and juft 
 Sentiments with Efteem and Reverence, though the 
 Preacher has but an unpolifh'd Style, and many 
 Defers in the Manner of his Delivery. Then we 
 Ihall negledf and difregard all the flattering Infinua- 
 tions whereby the Orator would make Way for his 
 own Sentiments to take Poflefllon of our Souls, if he 
 has not folid and inltrudive Senfe equal to his Lan- 
 guage. Oratory is a happy Talent when it is right- 
 ly employ'd to excite the PafTions to the Pradice 
 of Virtue and Piety *, but to fpeak properly, this 
 Art has Nothing to do in the Search after Truth. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Prejudices arifing from ourfelves. 
 
 N Either IVords nor Things would fo often lead 
 us allray from Truth, if we had not with- 
 in our fclves fuch Springs of Error as thefe chat 
 follow. 
 
 I. Many Errors are derived from our PFeaknefs 
 cf Rcafon, and Incapacity to judge of Things in our 
 Infant State. Thefe are called the Prejudices of 
 Infancy. We frame early Miftakes about the 
 common Objeds which furround us, and the com- 
 mon Afiairsof Life : We fancy the Niirfe is our 
 hefl- Friend^ becaufe Children receive from their 
 Nurfes their Food and other Conveniencies of 
 Life. We judge that Books are very unpleafant 
 Toirgf, becaufe perhaps we have been driven to 
 
 them 
 
C. III. S. 3 . ^he right life of Reafon. 1 99 
 
 them by the Scourge. We judge alfo that the 
 Sky toitches the diflant Hills^ becaufe we cannot in- 
 form ourfelvcs better in Childhood. We be- 
 lieve the Stars are not rifen till the Sun isfet, be- 
 caufe we never fee them by Day. But fome of 
 thefe Errors may feem to be derived from the next 
 Spring. 
 
 The Way to cure the Prejudices of Infancy is 
 to diftinguifh, as far as we can, which are thofe 
 Opinions which we framed in perfedt Childhood, 
 to remember that at that Time our Reafon was 
 incapable of forming a right Judgment, and to 
 bring thefe Propofitions again to be examined at 
 the Bar of mature Reafon. 
 
 II. Our Senfes give us many a falfe Informa- 
 tion of Things, and tempt us to judge amifs. 
 This is called the Prejudice of Senfe^ as when we 
 fuppofe the Sun and Moon to he flat Bodies^ and 
 to be but a few Inches hroad^ becaufe they appear 
 fo to the Eye. Senfe inclines us to judge that Air 
 has no Weighty becaufe we do not feel it prefs heavy 
 upon us ; and we judge alfo by our Senfes that 
 Cold and Heat^ Sweet and Sour^ Red and Blue^ i^c, 
 are fuch real Properties in the Objedls themfelves, 
 and exactly like thofe Senfations which they excite 
 in us. 
 
 Note^ Thofe Miftakes of this Sort which al} 
 Mankind drop and lofe in their advancing Age are 
 called mere Prejudices of Infancy^ but thofe which 
 abide with the vulgar Part of the World, and ge- 
 nerally with all Men, till Learning and Philo- 
 fophy cure them, more properly attain the Name 
 of Prejudices of Senfe. 
 
 Thefe Prejudices are to be removed feveral Ways, 
 (i.) By the Affiftance of one Senfe we cure the 
 Miftakes of another, as when a Sticfi thrujl into 
 
 the 
 
200 L O G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 the Water feems crooked, we are prevented from 
 judging it to be really fo in itfelf, for when we 
 take it out of the Water, both our Sight and our 
 Feeling agree and determine ic to be ftrait. (2.) 
 The Exercife of our Reafon, and an Application 
 to mathematical and philofophlcal Studies, cures 
 many other Prejudices of Senfe, both with relation 
 to the heavenly and earthly Bodies. (3.) We 
 fhould remember that our Senfes have often de- 
 ceived us in various Infbances, that they give but 
 a confus'd and imperfed Reprefentation of Things 
 in many Cafes, that they often reprefent falily 
 thofe very Obje6ls to which they feem to be fuit- 
 ed, fuch as the Shajje^ Motion, Size and Situation 
 of grofs Bodies, if they arc but placed at a Di- 
 ftance from us ; and as for the minute Particles of 
 which Bodies are compofed, our Senfes cannot 
 diftinguifh them. (4.) We fhould remember alio, 
 that one prime and original Defign of our Senfes, is 
 to inform us what various Relations the Bodies 
 that are round about us bear to our own animal 
 Body, and to give us Notice what is pleafant and 
 ufeful, or what is painful and injurious to us 5 but 
 they are not fufficient of themfclves to lead us in- 
 to a philofophical Acquaintance with the inward 
 Nature of Things. It muft be confefs'd it is by 
 the AiTiftance of the £)•<? and the Ear efpecially 
 (which are called the Setifes of Bifci-pline) that our 
 Minds are furnifh'd with various Parts of Know- 
 ledge, by reading, hearing, and obferving Things 
 divine and human ; yet Reafon ought always to 
 accompany the Exercife of our Senfes whenever 
 we would form ajuft Judgment of Things propo- 
 fed to our Enquiry. 
 
 Here it is proper to obferve alfo, that as the 
 JVeaknefs of Reafon m our Infancy, and the Dic- 
 tates of our SenfeSy fomeiimes in advancing Tears, 
 
 lead 
 
C. III. S. 3. The right TJJe ofReafon. 201 
 
 lead the wifer Pare of Mankind aftray from Truth ; 
 fo the meaner Parts of our Species, Perfons whofe 
 Genius is very low, whofe Judgment is always 
 weak, who are ever indulging iht Dilates of Senfe 
 and Humour^ are but Children of a larger Size, they 
 {land expofed to everlafting Miftakes in Life, and 
 live and die in the midft of Prejudices, 
 
 III. Imagination is another fruitful Spring of 
 falfe Judgments. Our Imagination is nothing elfe 
 but the various Appearances of our fenfible Ideas 
 in the Brain, where the Soul frequently works in 
 uniting, disjoining, multiplying, magnifying, di- 
 minifhing and altering the feveral Shapes, Colours, 
 Sounds, Motions, Words and Things that have 
 been communicated to us by the outward Organs 
 of Senfe. It is no wonder therefore if Fancy leads 
 us into many Miftakes, for it is but Senfe at Se- 
 cond-hand, Whatever is ftrongly imprelTed upon 
 the Imagination fome Perfons believe to be true. 
 Some will choofe a particular iV^?;2^(fr in a Lottery ^ 
 or lay a large Wager on a fingle Chance of a Dye^ 
 and doubt not of Succefs, becaufe their Fancy feels 
 fo powerful an ImprelTion, and allures them ic 
 will be profperous. A thoufand pretended Pro- 
 phecies and JnfpirationSy and all the Freaks of En- 
 thufiafm\iV7t been derived from this Spring. Dreams 
 are nothing tl^n but the Deceptions of Fancy : A 
 Delirium is but a fhort Wildnefs of the Imagina- 
 tion ; and a fettled Irregularity of Fancy is Z)/- 
 flraolion and Madnefs, 
 
 One Way to gain a Vidlory over this unruly 
 Faculty, is to fet a Watch upon it perpetually, 
 and to bridle it in all its Extravagances ; never to 
 believe any thing merely becaufe Fancy didfates it, 
 any more than I would believe a Midnight-Dream^ 
 nor to truft Fancy any farther than it is attended 
 
202 L O G I C K : Or, Part IL 
 
 y/ithfevere Reafon, It is a very ufeful and enter- 
 taining Power of human Nature in Matters of 11- 
 Jujlration^ Perfuafion^ Oratory , Poefy^ iVif, Con- 
 verfat'iGn^ ^c. but in the cahn Enquiry after Truth 
 and final Judgment of Things Fancy fhould re- 
 tire, and Hand afide, unlefs it be called in to ex- 
 plain or illuftrate a difficult Point by a Simi- 
 litude. 
 
 Another Method of Deliverance from thefe Pre- 
 judices of Fancy y is to compare the Ideas that arife 
 in our Imaginations with the real Feature of Things^ 
 as often as we have Occafion to judge concerning 
 them ; and let calm and fedate Reafon govern and 
 determine our Opinions, though Fancy fliould fhew 
 never fo great a Reluctance. Fancy is the inferior 
 Faculty, and it ought to obey. 
 
 IV. The various Pajfons or Affe^ions of the 
 Mind are numerous and endlefs Springs of Pre- 
 judice, They difguife every Objed they converfe 
 with, and put their own Colours upon it, and 
 thus lead the Judgment ailray from Truth. It is 
 hove that makes the Mother think her own Child 
 the faireft, and will fometimes perfuade us that a 
 Blemiflj is a Beauty, Flop and Defire make an 
 Hour of Delay feem as long as two or three 
 Hours; Hop inclines us to think there is nothing 
 too difRcult to be attempted ; Defpair tells us that 
 a brave Attempt is mere Rafhnefs, and that every 
 Difficulty is unfurmountable. Fear makes us 
 imagine that a Bufh Ihaken with the Wind has 
 fome favage Beafl in it, and m,ultiplies the Dan- 
 gers that attend our Path : But flill there is a 
 more unhappy Effed of Fear when it keeps Mil- 
 lions of Souls in Slavery to the Errors of an efta- 
 blifhed Religion : What could perfuade the wife 
 Men and Philofophers of a Poptflj Country to be- 
 lieve 
 
C. in. S. 3. The right life ^'^Reafon. 203 
 
 iieve the grofs Abfurdities of the Roman Church, 
 but the Fear of 'Torture or Beath^ the Galleys or 
 the Inquijition ? Sorrow and Melancholy tempt us to 
 think our Gircumftances much more difmal than 
 they are, that we may have fome Excufe for 
 Mourning : And Envy reprefents the Condition of 
 our Neighbour better than it is, that there might 
 be fome Pretence for her own Vexation and Uneafi- 
 nefs; Anger and Wrath and Revenge^ and all thofe 
 hateful PalTions excite in us far worfe Ideas of Men 
 than they deferve, and perluade us to believe ail that 
 is ill of them. A detail of the evil Influence of 
 the Affe^ions of the Mind upon our Judgment would 
 make a large Volume. 
 
 The Cure of thefe Prejudices is attained by a 
 tonftant jealoufy of ourfelves, and Watchfulnefs 
 over our PaffionSy that they may never interpofe 
 when we are called to pals a Judgment of any 
 Thing : And when our Affedions are warmly en- 
 gaged, let us abftain from judging; It would be 
 alfo of great Ufe to us to form our deliberate Judg- 
 ments of Perfons and Things in the calmeft and 
 fercneft Hours of Life, when the Paffions of Na- 
 ture are all filent^ and the Mind enjoys its mod 
 perfed Compofure : And thefe Judgments fo form- 
 ied fhould be treafured up in the Mind, that we 
 might have Recourfe to them in Hours of Need. 
 See many more Sentiments and Diredions relating 
 to this Subjed in my DoUrine of the Paffons, z^ 
 Edition enlargedi 
 
 V. The Fondnefs we have for Self, and th^ 
 Relation which other Perfons and Things have to 
 ourfelves^ furniih us with another long Rank 
 of Prejudices. This indeed might be reduced 
 to the Paffion of Self Love, but it is fo copious 
 an Head that I chofe to name ic as a diftinA 
 Q Spring 
 
204 LOGIC K: Or, PaFt It 
 
 Spring of falle Judgments. We are generally 
 ready to fancy every Thing of our own has fomc- 
 thing peculiarly valuable in it, when indeed there- 
 is no other Reafon, but becaufe it is our own^ 
 Were we born among the Gardens of Italy ^ the 
 Rocks of Switzerlajid^ or the Ice and Snows of 
 Riiffia and Sweden, fliU we fhould imagine pecu- 
 liar Excellencies in our native Land. We con- 
 ceive a good Idea of the Town and Village where 
 we firft breathed, and think the better of a Man 
 for being born near us. We entertain the btfl Opi- 
 nion of the Perfons of our own Party^ and eafily 
 believe evil Reports of Perfons of a different Seif 
 or Fa^ion. Our own Sex, our Kindred^ mr Houfes, 
 and oi{r v£ry Names, feem to have fomething good 
 and dtfireable in them. We are ready to mingle 
 all thefe with oiirfehes, and cannot bear to have 
 others think meanly of them. 
 
 So good ail Opinion have wt of our own Senti- 
 ments and PraMices, that it is very difficult to be- 
 lieve what a Reprover fays of our Condud ; and 
 we are as ready to aflent to all the Language of 
 Flattery. We fet up our own Opinions in Religion 
 and Philofophy as the Tefts of Orlhodo^y and Truth 5 
 and we are prone to judge every Pradice of other 
 Men either a Duty or a Crims, which we think 
 woukl be a Crime or a Duty in us, though their 
 Circumitances are vaftly different from our own. 
 This Humour prevails fometimes to fuch a Degree, 
 that we would make our own Tafte and Inclination 
 the Standard by which to judge of every Difh of 
 
 . Meat that is fet upon the Table, every Book in a 
 Library, every Employment, Study and Bufinefs 
 of Life, as well as every Recreation. 
 
 It is from this evil Principle o[ fet ting up Self 
 
 for a Model what other Men ought to he, that the 
 Antichrifiian Spirit of Impofdion and Perfecution 
 
 had 
 
C. -III. S. I. ne right TJfe of Rcafon, 20^ 
 
 had its Original : cho' there is no more Reafon for 
 it than there was for the Pradice of that Tyrant, 
 who having a Bed fit for his own Size was reported 
 to ftretch Men of low Stature upon the Rack, till 
 they were drawn out to the Length of his Bed ; 
 and fome add alfo, that he cut of} the Legs of any 
 whom he found two long for it. 
 
 It is alfo from a Principle near akin to this that 
 we pervert and fl:rain the Writings of any venerable 
 Authors, and efpccially the facred Books of Scrip- 
 ture to make them fpeak our own Senfe, Through 
 the Influence which our own Scheniss or Hypotkejes 
 have upon the Mind, we fometimes become fo 
 fharp-fighted as to find thefe Schemes in thofe 
 Places of Scripture where the holy Writers never 
 thought of them, nor the holy Spirit intended them. 
 At other Times this Prejudice brings fuch a Dim- 
 nefs upon the Sight that we cannot read any 
 Thing that oppofes our own Scheme, though it be 
 written as with Sun-beams, and in the plainefl Lan- 
 guage 5 and perhaps we are in Danger in fuch a 
 Cafe of winking a little againft the Light. 
 
 We ought to bring our Minds free, unbiafTed 
 and teachable to learn our Religion from the Word 
 of God ; but we have generally formed ail the 
 lefTer as well as the greater Points of our Religion 
 beforehand, and then we read the Prophets and 
 Apoitles only to pervert them to confirm our own 
 Opinions. Were it not for this Influence of Self^ 
 and a Bigotry to cur own Tenets, we could hardly 
 imagine that fo many flrange, abfurd, inconfiftent, 
 wicked^ mifchievous, and bloody Principles fhould 
 pretend to fupport and defend thenifelves by the 
 Gofpel of Cbri/i. 
 
 Every learned Crltick has his own Hypothefis \ 
 
 and if the common 1'ey:t be not favourable to his 
 
 Opinion, a various Legion fhall be made authen- 
 
 O 2 tick. 
 
2^5 L G I C K: Or, Part II 
 
 tick. The Text mud be fuppofed to be defeElive 
 or redundant^ and the Senfe of it fliall be liter al^ 
 or metaphorical^ according as it beft fupports his 
 own Scheme. Whole Chapters or Books fhall 
 be added or left out of the facred Canon, or be 
 turned into Parables by this Influence. Luther 
 knew not well how to reconcile the Epiftle of St. 
 "James to the Doflrine of Juftification hy Faith 
 aloncy and To he could not allow it to be Divine. 
 The Fapifts bring alt the Jpocrypha into their 
 Bible, and ftamp Divinity upon it i for they can 
 fancy Purgatory is there, and they find Prayers for 
 the Dead. But they leave out the fecond Com' 
 mandment hecaufe it forbids the IVorJhip of Images, 
 Others fippofe the Mofaick Hiftory of the Creation 
 and the Fall rf Man to be oriental Ornaments, or 
 a mere Allegory^ becaufe the literal Senfe of thofe 
 three Clijprrrs of Genefis do not agree with their 
 Tn.^oncs. Even an honeft plain-hearted and un- 
 ]carnL-d Chriftian is ready to find fomething in 
 every Chapter of the Bible to countenance his own 
 pi p'atc Sentiments *, but he loves thofe Chapters befl 
 wh'ch fpeak his own Opinions plainefl : This is a 
 prtjudice that (licks very clofe to our Natures ; the 
 Scholar is infelted with it daily, and the Mechajiick 
 ib not free. 
 
 Self has yet a farther and a pernicious Influence 
 upon our Underftandings, and is an unhappy 
 Guide in the Search after Truth. When our own 
 Inclination or our Eafe^ our Honour or our Profit 
 tempts us to the Pradice of any Thing of fufpedl- 
 ed Lawfulnefs, how do we ftrain our Thoughts 
 to find Arguments for it, and perfuade ourfelves 
 it is lawful ? We colour over Iniquity and finful 
 (compliance with the Names of Virtue and Inno- 
 cence^ or at leaft of Conftraint and Neceffity. All 
 the different and oppofite Sentiments and Prac- 
 tices 
 
C III. S. 3 . The right life of Reafon. 207 
 
 tices of Mankind are too much influenced by this 
 mean Bribery, and give too juft Occafion for faty- 
 rical Writers to fay that Self- Inter eft governs all 
 Mankind, 
 
 When the Ji^dge had awarded due Damages to 
 a Perfon into whofe Field a Neighbour's Oxen had 
 broke, it is reported that he reverfed his own Sen- 
 tence, when he heard that the Oxen which had 
 done this Mifchief were his own. Whether this be 
 a Hiftory or a Parable^ it is ft ill a juft Reprefenta- 
 tion of the wretched Influence of Self to corrupt the 
 Judgment. 
 
 One Way to amend this Prejudice is to thruft 
 Self fo far out of the Queftion that it may have 
 no Manner of Influence whenfoever we are called 
 to judge and confider the naked Nature, Truth 
 and Juftice of Things. In Matters of Equity be- 
 tween Man and Man, our Saviour has taught us 
 an effedual Means of guarding againft this Prejudice, 
 and that is to put my Neighbour in the Place of f7jy 
 felf, and myfelf in the Place of my Neighbour^ ra- 
 ther than be bribed by this corrupt Principle of 
 Self Love to do Injury to our Neighbours. Thence 
 arifes that Golden Rule of dealing with vlbers as we 
 would have others deal with us. 
 
 In the Judgment of Truth and Falfhood^ Right 
 and Wrongs Good and Evil^ we ought to confider 
 that every Man has a Self as well aswej and 
 that the Taftes, Pafllons, Inclinations and Interefts 
 of different Men are very different, and often con- 
 trary, and that they didate contrary Things : Un- 
 lefs therefore all Manner of different and contrary 
 Propofitions could be true at once. Self can never 
 be a juft Teft or Standard of Truth and Faljhood^ 
 Good and Evil. 
 
 O 3 VI. The 
 
^c8 L G I C K: Or, Part II, 
 
 VI. The Tempers, Humours^ and peculiar Terms 
 of the Mwd, whether they be natural or acquired, ' 
 have a great Influence upon our Judgment, and be- 
 come the Occafion of many Mijlakes, Let us fur- 
 vey a few of them. 
 
 (i.) Some Perfons are of an eafy and credulous 
 Temper, while others are perpetually difcovering a 
 Spirit of Contradiuiion, 
 
 The creduiGiL^ Man Is ready to receive every 
 Thing for Truth, that has but a Shadow of Evi- 
 dence ; every nev/ Book that he reads, and every 
 ingenious Man vi^ith whom he converfes, has Power 
 enough to draw him into the Sentiments of the 
 Speaker or Writer, He has fo much Complaifancc 
 in him, or Weaknefs of Soul, that he is ready to 
 refign his own Opinion to the firft Objedion which 
 he hears, and to receive any Sentiments of another 
 that are aflerted with a pofit.ive Air and much Afr 
 furance. Thus he is under a kind of NecefTity 
 through the Indulgence of this credulous Humour, 
 either to be often changing his Opinions, or to 
 believe Inconfiftencies. 
 
 The Man of Conlradi5iiGn is of a contrary Hu- 
 mour, for he ftands ready to oppofe every Thing 
 that is faid : he gives a flight Attention to the 
 Reafons of other Men, for an inward fcornful 
 Prefumption that they have no Strength in them, 
 When he reads or hears a Difcourfe different from 
 his own Sentiments, he does not give himfelf Leave 
 CO confider whether that Dilcourfe may be true ; 
 but employs all his Powers immediately to con- 
 fute it. Your great Difputers and your Men of 
 Controverfy are in continual Panger of this Sort of 
 Prejudice : they contend often for Vi6lory, and 
 will maintain v/hatfoever they have afTerted, while 
 Truth rs loft in the Noife and Tumult of reci- 
 procal 
 
C. Ill S. 3 . The right Ufe oj Reafon. 209 
 
 procal Contradidlions ; and ic frequently happens, 
 that a Delate about Opinions is turned into a mutual 
 Reproach of Perjons. 
 
 The Prejudice of Credulity may in fome Mea- 
 fure be cured, by learning to fee a high Value on 
 Truth, and by taking more Pains to attain it -, re- 
 membring that Truth oftentimes lies dark and 
 deep, and requires us to dig for it as hid Trea-, 
 fure •, and that Falfhood often puts on a fair Dif- 
 guife, and therefore we lliouJd not yield up our 
 Judgment to every plaufible Appearance: It is 
 no Part of Civility or good Breeding to part with 
 Truth, but to ma^intain ic with Decency and 
 Candour, 
 
 A Spirit of ContradiSiion is fo pedantick and 
 hateful, that a Man fhould take much Pains with 
 himfelf to watch againfl every Inftance of it : He 
 fhould learn fo much good Humour, at leafl, as 
 never to oppofe any Thing withaut juft and folid 
 Reafonforit: He fliould abate fome Degrees of 
 Pride and Morofenefs^ which are never-failing In- 
 gredients in this fort of Temper,, and fhould feek 
 after fo much HoneJly2iX\d Confcience as never to con- 
 tend for Conquefl or Triumph •, but. to review his 
 own Reafons, and to read the Arguments of his 
 Opponents (if poffible) with an equal Indifi^crency, 
 and be glad to fpy Truth, and to fubmittQ ic.> tho* 
 it appear on the oppofite Side. 
 
 (2,) There is anotlxr Pair o^ Prejudices derivecj 
 from two Tempers of Mmd, near a-lvin to thofe-J[ 
 have juft mentioned -, and thefe are the dogmatical 
 and the fceptical Humour^ i, e, always pofitive^ or 
 always douhting. 
 
 By what Means foever the Dogmatijl came by 
 
 his Opinions, whether by his Senfes, or by his 
 
 Fancy, his. Education,, or his own Readings yec 
 
 he believes them all with the fame Affarance that 
 
 O 4 he 
 
2IO LOGIC K: Or, Partll, 
 
 he does a mathe?natical 'Truth ; he has fcarce any 
 mere Probabilities that belong to him ; every thing 
 with him is certain and infallible ; every Pundilio 
 in Religion is an Arcicle of his Faith, and he an- 
 fwers all Manner of Objedions by a Sovereign Con- 
 tempt. 
 
 {*erfons of this Temper are feldom to be con- 
 vinced of any Miftake : A full Aflurance of their 
 own Notions makes all the Difficulties of their 
 own Side vanifh fo entirely, that they think every 
 Point of their Belief is written as with Sun beams, 
 and wonder any one fhould find a Difficulty in it. 
 They are amazed that learned Men fhould make a 
 Controverfy of what is to them fo perfpicuous and 
 indubitable. The lowed Rank of People both in 
 learned and in vulgar Life, is very fubjedl to this 
 Obftinacy. 
 
 Scepticifm is a contrary Prejudice. The Dogma- 
 tiff is fure of every Thing, and the Sceptick believe$ 
 Nothing. Perhaps he has found himfejf often mif- 
 taken in Matters of which he thought himfelf well 
 alTured in his younger Days, and therefore he is 
 afraid to give AfTent to any Thing again. He fees 
 fo much Shew of Reafon for every Opinion, and 
 fo many Qbjeflions alfo arifing againft every 
 Dodlrine, that he is ready to throw off the Belief 
 of every Thing : He renounces at once the Purfuit 
 of Truth, and contents himfelf to fay. There is 
 nothing certain. It is well, if through the Influence 
 of fuch a Temper he does not caft away his Reli- 
 gion as well as his Philofophy, and abandon him- 
 felf to a profane Courfe of Life, regard lefs of Hell 
 and Heaven. 
 
 Both thefe Prejudices laft mentioned, tho' they 
 are fo oppofite to each other, yet they arife from 
 the fame Spring, and that is. Impatience of Study ^ 
 ffjd IVant of diligent Attention in the Search of 
 
 Truths 
 
C. III. S. 3. The right Ufe of Reafon. 211 
 
 ^ruth. The Dogmatifi is in hafte to believe fome- 
 thing ; he can't keep himfelf long enough in Suf- 
 pence, till fome bright and convincing Evidence 
 appear on one Side, but throws himfelf cafually 
 into the Sentiments of one Party or another, and 
 then he will hear no Argument to the contrary. 
 I'he Sceptick will not take Pains to fearch Things 
 to the Bottom, but when he fees DifEculties on 
 both Sides, refolves to believe neither of them. 
 Humility of Soul, Patience in Study^ Diligence in 
 Enquiry^ with an honeft Zeal for i'mth^ would go 
 a great Way towards the Cure of both thefe Fol- 
 lies. 
 
 (3.) Another fort of Temper that is very injuri- 
 ous to a right Judgment of Things, is an inconliant^ 
 fickle^ changeable Spirit^ and a very uneven Temper 
 of Mind, When luch Perfons are in one Hu- 
 mour, they pafs a Judgment of Things agreeable 
 to it ; when their Humour changes, they reverfe 
 their firft Judgment, and embrace a new Opinion. 
 They have no Steadinefs of Soul ; they want Firm^ 
 vefs of Mind fufficient to eftablifh themfelves in 
 any Truth, and are ready to change it for the 
 next alluring Falfliood that is agreeable to their 
 Change of Humour. This Ficklenefs is fometimes 
 fo mingled with their very Conftitution by Na- 
 ture, or by Diftemper of Body, that a cloudy Day 
 and a lowring Sky fhall ftrongly incline them to 
 form an Opinion both of themfelves, and of Per- 
 fons and Things round about them, quite different 
 from what they believe when tht Sun fhines, and 
 the Heavens are ferene. 
 
 This Sort of People ought to judge of Things 
 and Perfons in their moft fedate, peaceful, and 
 rompofed Hours of Life, and refer ve thefe Judg- 
 fnenrs for their Condud at more unhappy Seafons. 
 
 (4.) Some 
 
212 L G I C K: Or, Part 11. 
 
 (4.) Some Perfons have a violent and turgid Man- 
 gier both of talking and Thinking ; whatlbever they 
 judge o\\ it is always with a Tindture of this Vani- 
 cy. They are always in Extremes, and pronounce 
 concerning every thing in the fuperlative. If they 
 think a Man to be learned, he is- the chief Scholar 
 of th^ Ag& : If another has low Parts, he is the 
 greatefl Blockhead in Nature : If they approve any 
 Book on divine Subjeds, it is the hefi Book in the 
 IVorld next to the Bible : If they fpeak af a, Storm 
 of Rain or Hail, it is the moft terrible Storm that 
 fell fuice the Creation : And a cold Winter Day is 
 the coldefi that ever was known. 
 
 But the Men of this fwelling Language ought 
 to remember, that Nature has ten thoufand moderate 
 Things in it, and does not always deal in Extremes 
 as they do. 
 
 (5.) I think it may be called another fort of 
 Prejudices derived from Humour^ when fome Men 
 believe a Doctrine merely becaufe it is ancient^ and 
 has been long believ'd ; others are fo fond of No^ 
 iielty, that Nothing prevails upon their AlTent fa 
 much as new Thoughts and new Notions, Again 
 there are fome who fet a high Efteem upon every 
 Thing that is foreign and far-fetch'' d \ therefore 
 C^i;w Pi^;^;TJ are admired, how aukward foever : 
 Others value Things the more for being of our 
 own native Growth., Invention., or ManufaQure^^ 
 and thefe as much defpife foreign Things, 
 
 Some Alc7; of Letters and Theology wiU not be- 
 lieve a Propofition even concerning a fublimeSub- 
 jc^ft, till every thing myfterious, deep and diffi- 
 cult is cut off from it, though the Scripture afTerts 
 it ntvtx fo plainly \ others are fo fond of a My^ 
 fiery and Things ittco7nfyehenfible, that they would 
 fcarce believe the Dodrine of the Trinity., if it 
 could be cxplaiiicd j they incline to that foolifli 
 
 Rant 
 
C. III. S. 3 . The right Ufe of Reafon. 2 1 3 
 
 Rant of one of the Ancients, Credo quia impoffihile 
 eft ; 1 believe it becaufe it is impofTible. 
 
 To cure thefe Miftakes remember that neither 
 antique nor novels foreign, nor native^ myfterious nor 
 flain^ are certain Charadlers either of Truth or 
 Falfhood. 
 
 I might mention various other Humours of Men 
 that excite in them various Prejudices, and lead 
 them into ralli and miftaken Judgments ; but thefe 
 are fufficient for a Specimen. 
 
 VII. There are feveral other TVeakneJfes which 
 belong to human Nature, whereby we are led into 
 Miftakes, and indeed are rendered almoft unca- 
 pable of paffing a folid Judgment in Matters of 
 great Depth and Difficulty. Some have a native 
 Obfcurity of Perception, (or fhall I call it a want of 
 natural Sagacity ?) whereby they are hindered from 
 attaining clear and diftindl Ideas. Their Thoughts 
 always feem to have fomething confufed and 
 cloudy in them, and therefore they judge in 
 the dark. Some have a T)efe5l in Memory, and 
 then they are not capable of comparing their pre- 
 fent Ideas with a great Variety of other, in order 
 to fecure themfelves from Inconfiftency in Judg- 
 ment. Others may have a Memory large enough, 
 yet they are fubjedt to the fame Errors from a 
 Narrownefs of Soul, and fuch a Fixation and Con- 
 finefnent of 'Thought to a few Ohje5fs, that they fcarce 
 ever take a Survey of Things wide enough to judge 
 wifely and well, and to fecure themfelves from 
 all Inconfiftencies. 
 
 Though thefe are natural Defe5fs and Weaknejjes^ 
 yet they may in fome Meafure be relieved by La- 
 bour, Diligence, and a due Attention to proper 
 Rules. 
 
 But 
 
214 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 But among all the Canfes of falfe Judgment which 
 are within ourfelvcs^ I ought by no Means to 
 leave out that univerfal cwid original Spring of Er- 
 ror^ which we are informed o\ by the Word of 
 God, and that is the Sin and Defe5iion of our firft 
 Parents, whereby all our befl natural Powers both 
 of Mind and Body are impaired, and rendered 
 very much inferior to what they were in a State 
 of Innocence. Our Underftanding is darkened, 
 our Memory contradbed, our corrupt Humours 
 and PafTions are grown predominant, our Rea- 
 fon enfeebled, and various Diforders attend our 
 Conflitution and animaj Nature, whereby the Mind 
 is ftrangely impofed upon in its Judgment of 
 Things. Nor is there any perfecft Relief to be 
 expected on Earth. There is no hope of ever re- 
 covering from thefe Maladies, but by a fincere 
 Return to God in the Ways of his own Appoint- 
 ment, whereby we fhall be kept fafe from all dan- 
 gerous and pernicious JErrors in the Matters of 
 Religion ^ and tho' hnperfe^ions and Miftakes will 
 hang about us in the prefent Life as the Effeds of 
 our original Jpofiafy from God, yet we hope for a 
 full Deliverance from them when we arrive at 
 Heaven- 
 
 SECT. iV. 
 
 Prejudices arffwgfrom other Ferfons. 
 
 WERE It not for the Springs of Prejudice 
 that are lurking in ourfelves, we fhould not 
 be fubjed to fo many Miftakes from the Influence 
 of others : But fincc our Nature is fo fufceptive 
 of Errors on all Sides, it is fit we fhould have 
 Hints and Notices given us, how far other Per ' 
 fons may have Power over us, and become the 
 
 Caufes 
 
C. III. S. 4. Ti'he right Ufe of Reafon. 21^ 
 
 Caufes of our falfe Judgments. This might all 
 be caft into one Heap, for they are all near a-kin, 
 and mingle with each other ; but for Diftindion fake 
 let them be called the Prejudices of Education^ of 
 Cuftom, ot Authority^ and fuch as arife from the 
 Manner of PropofaL 
 
 I. Thofe with whom our Education is entruft- 
 ed may lay the firft Foundation of many Miflakes 
 in our younger Years. How many Fooleries and 
 Errors are inftilled into us by our Nurfes, our 
 Fellow-Children, by Servants or unfkilful Teach- 
 ers, which are not only maintained through the 
 following Parts of Life, but fometimes have a very 
 unhappy Influence upon us ! We are taught that 
 There are Gohlings and Bugbears in the Dark \ our 
 young Minds are crowded with the terrible Ideas 
 of Gbofts appearing upon every Occafwn, or with the 
 pleafanter Tales of Fairies dancing at Midnight. 
 We learn to prophecy betimes^ to foretel Futurities 
 by good or evil Omens, and to prefage approaching 
 Death in a Family by Ravens and little JVorms, 
 which we therefore call a Death-Watch. We are 
 taught to know beforehand, for a Twelvemonth 
 together, which Days of the Week will be fair or 
 fouly which will be lucky or unlucky ; nor is there 
 any thing fo filly, but may be impofed upon our 
 Underftandings in that early part of Life •, and 
 thefe ridiculous Stories abide with us too long, 
 and too far influence the weaker Part of Man- 
 kind. 
 
 We choofe our particular Sc£f and Party in ihs 
 civil, the religious and the learned Life, by the In- 
 fluence of Education, In the Colleges of Learn- 
 ing, fome are for the Nominals, and fome for the 
 Realijls in the Science of Metaphyficks, becaufe 
 their Tutors were devoted to thefe Parties. The 
 
 Qld 
 
2i6 LOG I C K: Or, Part It 
 
 eld Philofophy and the new have gained thoufands 
 of Partizans the fame way : And every Religion 
 has its Infant Votaries^ who are born, live and die 
 in the fame Faith without Examination of any 
 Article. The "Turks are taught early to believe in 
 Mahomet -, the Jews in Mofes \ the Heathens wor- 
 fliip a Multitude of Gods under the Force of their 
 Education. And it would be well if there were 
 not Millions of Chriftians^ who have little more to 
 fay for their Religion, than that they were born 
 and bred up in it. The greateft Part of the 
 Chriftian World can hardly give any Reafon why 
 they believe the Bihle to he the Word of God, but 
 becaufe they have always believed it, and they 
 were taught fo from their Infancy. As Jews and 
 Turks^ and Atnerican Heathens believe the mod 
 monllrous and incredible Stories, becaufe they 
 have been trained up amongft them, as Articles of 
 Faith •, fo the Papifis believe their Tranfub/lanti^ 
 ation, and make no Difficulty of afTenting to Im- 
 poffibiliues, fmce it is the current Doctrine of their 
 Catechifms. By the fame Means the feveral Sedls 
 and Parties in Chrifiianity believe all the Jlrained 
 Interpretations cf Scripture by which they have been 
 taught to fupport their own Tenets : They find 
 nothing difficult in all the abfurd Glojfes and 
 far-fetched Senfes that are fometimes put upon 
 the Words of the facred Writers, becaufe their 
 Ears have been always accudomed to thefe GlofTcs ; 
 and therefore they fet fo fmooth and eafy upon 
 their Underftandings, that they know not how to 
 admit the moll natural and eafy Interpretation in 
 Oppofirion to them. 
 
 in the fime Manner we are nurfed up in many 
 filly and grofs Miftakes about domeflick Affairs as 
 well as in Matters of political Concernment. It 
 is upon the fame Ground that Children are train'd 
 
 up 
 
C III. S. 4. 'The right life o/Reafon. 217 
 
 up to be JVbigs and Tories betimes ; and every one 
 learns the diftinguifhing Terms of his own Party, 
 as the Papifts learn to fay their Prayers in Latin^ 
 without any Meaning, Realbn, or Devotion. 
 
 This Sort of Prejudice muft be cured by calling 
 all the Principles of our young Years to the Bar 
 cf more mature Reafon, that we may judge of 
 the Things of Nature and political Affairs by juft- 
 er Rules of Philofophy and Obfervation : And 
 even the Matters of Religion muft be firfb inquired 
 into by Reafon and Confcience^ and when thefe have 
 led us to believe Scripture to he the Word of God^ 
 then that becomes our fovereign Guide, and Rea- 
 fon and Confcience muft fubmit to receive its 
 Didates. 
 
 II. The next Prejudice which I fhall mention 
 is, that which arifes from the Culiom or Fafhion of 
 thofe among ft whom we live. Suppofe we have freed 
 'ourfclves from the younger Prejudices of our Edu- 
 cation^ yet we are in Danger of having our Mind 
 turned afide from Truth by the Influence o^ general 
 Cuftom. 
 
 Our Opinion of Meats and Drinks^ of Gar- 
 menls and Forms of Salutation are influenced much 
 more by Cuflom, than by the Eye, the Ear, or the 
 Tafte. Cuftom prevails even over Senfe itfelf, and 
 therefore no Wonder if it prevail over Reafon too. 
 What is it but Cuftoin that renders many of the 
 Mixtures cf Feed and Sauces elegant in Britain^ 
 which would be aukward and naufeous to the In- 
 habitants oi China ^ and indeed were naufeous to 
 us when we firft tafted them ? What but Cuftom 
 could make thofe Salutations polite in Mufcovy^ 
 which are ridiculous in France or England? We 
 call curfelves indeed the politer Nations^ but it is 
 we who judge thus of ourfelves ; and that fan- 
 cied 
 
2i8 L G I C K : Or, Part IL 
 
 cied Politenefs is oftentimes more owing to Cuftoni 
 than Reafon, Why are the Forms ot our prefent 
 Gannents counted beautiful, and thofe Fafhions of 
 our Anceftors the Matter of Scoff and Contempt, 
 which in their Day were all decent and genteel ? 
 It is Cuftom that forms our Opinion of Brejs^ and 
 reconciles us by Degrees to thofe Habits which 
 at firft leemed very odd and monftrous. It muft 
 be granted there are fome Garments and Habits 
 which have a ;7^///r^/ Congruity or Incongruity, Mo- 
 defty or Immodefty, Decency or Indecency, Gau- 
 dery or Gravity •, tho' for the moft part there 
 is but litde of Reafon in thefe Affliirs : But what 
 little there is of Reafon or natural Decency^ Cuftom 
 triumphs over it all. It is almoft impoflible to per- 
 fuade a gay Lady that any thing can be decent 
 which is out ot Fafhion : And it were well if Fa- 
 f}jion ftretched its Powers no farther than the Bufinefs 
 of Drapery and the fair Sex. 
 
 The Methods of our Education are govern'd by 
 Cuflofn. It is Cu/lom and not Reafon that fends 
 every Boy to learn the Roman Poets, and begin a 
 little Acquaintance with Greeks before he is bound 
 an Apprentice to a Soapboiler or Leatherfeller. 
 It is Cuftom alone that teaches us Latin by the 
 Rules of a Latin Grammer \ 3. tedious and abfurd 
 Method ! And what is it but Cuftom that has for 
 paft Centuries confined the brighteft Genius's evert 
 of the high Rank in the Female World to the only 
 Bufinefs of the Needle, and fecluded them moft 
 unmercifully from the Pieafures of Knowledge^ 
 and the divine Improvements of Reafon ? But ws 
 begin to break all thefe Chains, and Reafon begins 
 to did:ate the Education of Youth. May ths grow- 
 ing Age be learned and wife ! 
 
 it 
 
C. III. S. 4. rhe right Ufe of Reafon. 2 1 g 
 
 Ic is by the Prejudice arlfing from our own Cuf- 
 tomSj that we judge of all other civil and religious 
 Forms and Pra5fices, The Rites and Ceremonies 
 of IVar and Peace in other Nations, the Forms of 
 Weddings and Funerals y the feveral Ranks of Ada- 
 gislracy^ the Trades and Employments of both Sexes, 
 the piihlick and the domejlick Affairs of Life^ and al- 
 moft every xhinoo^ foreign Cufiornsy is judged irre- 
 gular. Ic is all imagined to be unreafonahle or un- 
 natural^ by thofe who have no other Rule to judge 
 of Nature and Reafon, but the Cuftoms of their 
 own Country, or the little Town where they dwell* 
 Cuflom is called a fecond Nature, but we often mif- 
 take ic for Nature itfelf. 
 
 Befidcs all this, there is a Fafhion in Opinions^ 
 there is a Fafhion in Writing and Printing, in Style 
 and Language. In our Day ic is the Vogue of the 
 Nation, that Parliaments may fettle the Succeffion of 
 the Crown, and that a People can make a King ; in 
 the lad Age this was a Dodirine a-kin to Treafon. 
 Citations from the Latin Poets were an Embellifh- 
 ment of Style in the laft Century, and whole Pages 
 in that Day were covered with them ; it is no'w 
 forbidden by Cuftom, and expofed by the Name 
 Pedantry ; whereas in Truth both thefe are Ex- 
 tremes. Sometimes our printed Books (hall abound 
 in Capitals, and fometimes fejed them all. Now 
 we deal much in Effays, and molt unreafonably 
 defpifs fyftematick Learnings whereas our Fathers 
 had a juft Value for Regularity and Syflems 5 
 then Folio's and ^larto's were the fafhionable 
 Sizes, as Volumes in Oulavo are now. VVe are 
 ever ready to run into Extremes, and yet Cuftom 
 flill perfuades us that Reafon and Nature are on 
 our Side. 
 
 F This 
 
220 L G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 This Bufinefs of the Fafhion has a moft power- 
 ful Influence on our Judgments ; for it employs 
 thofe two flrong Engines of Fear and Shame to 
 operate upon our Underftandings with unhappy 
 Succefs. We are afliamed to believe or profefs an 
 unfafhionable Opinion in Philofophy, and a cow- 
 ardly Soul dares not fo much as indulge a Thought 
 contrary to the eftahlijhed ov fajhionahle Faith^ nor 
 a6l in Oppofuion to Cuflomy tho' it be according 
 to the Diflates of Reafon. 
 
 I confels, there is a Refpe6b due to Mankind 
 which fhould incline even the wifefl of Men to 
 follow the innocent Cujioms of their Country in 
 outward Pradiccs of the Civil Life, and in fome 
 Meafure to fubmit to Fafhion in all indifferent Af- 
 fairs^ where Reafon and Scripture make no Re- 
 monltranccs againfl: it. But the Judgments of the 
 Mind ought to be for ever free, and not biafled 
 by the CuJloms and Fajhions of any Age or Nation 
 whatfoever. 
 
 To deliver our Underftandings from this Dan- 
 ger and Slavery, we fhould confider thefe three 
 Things. 
 
 1. That the greateft Part of the civil Cujioms 
 of any particular Nation or Age fpring from Hu- 
 mour rather than Reafon. Sometimes the Humour 
 of the Prince prevails, and fometimes the Humour 
 of the People. It is either the Great or the Many 
 who didate the Fafhion, and thefe have not always 
 the highcft Reafon on their Side. 
 
 2. Confider alfo, that the Cujioms of the fame 
 Nation in different Ages, the Cu^oms of different 
 Nations in the fame Age, and the Cujioms of dif- 
 ferent Towns and Villages in the fame Nation, are 
 very various and contrary to each other. The 
 fajhionahle Learning, Language, Sentiments, and 
 Rules of Policenefs differ greatly in different Coun- 
 tries 
 
C. III. S. 4. The right Ufe of Reafon. 2 2 1 
 
 tries and Ages of Mankind ; but Truth and Reafon 
 are of a more uniform and fteady Nature, and 
 don't change with the Fafhion. Upon this Ac- 
 count, to cure the Prepojfeffwns which arife from 
 Cuftom^ it is of excellent Ufe to travel, and fee the 
 Cuftoms of various Countries, and to read the 
 Travels of other Men, and the Hiftory of paft 
 Ages, that every thing may not feem ftrange and 
 uncouth which is not prad:ifed within the Limits 
 of our own Parifh, or in the narrow Space of our 
 own Life- time. 
 
 3. Confider yet again, how often we ourfelves 
 have changed our own Opinions concerning the 
 Decency, Propriety, or Congruity of feveral 
 Modes or Pra5iices in the World, efpecially if we 
 have lived to the Age of thirty or forty. Cuftom 
 or Fa/hion, even in all its Changes, has been ready 
 to have fome Degree of Afcendency over our 
 Underftanding, and what at one time feemed de- 
 cent appears obfolete and difagreeahle afterward, 
 when the Fafhion changes. Let us learn there- 
 fore to abflraft as much as pofTible from Cuftom 
 and Fajhioriy when we would pafs a Judgment 
 concerning the real Value and intrinfic Nature of 
 Things. 
 
 in. The Authority cf Men is the Spring of another 
 Rank of Prejudices. 
 
 Among thefe the Anthority of our Forefathers 
 and ancient Authors is moft remarkable. We pay 
 Deference to the Opinions of others, merely be- 
 caufe they lived a thoufand Years before us ; and 
 even the Trifles and Impertinencies that have a 
 Mark of Antiquity upon them are reverenced for 
 this Reafon, becaufe they came from the Anci- 
 ents, It is granted, that the Ancients had many 
 wife and great Men among them, and fome of 
 P 2 their 
 
222 L G I C k : Or, Part II. 
 
 their Writings, which Time hath delivered down 
 to us, as truly valuable: But thofe Writers lived 
 rather in the Infant- State of the World -, and the 
 Pbilofipkers^ as well us the polite Authors of our 
 Age, are properly the Elders ^ who have feen the 
 Midnkes ot ihtt younger Ages of Mankind, and cor- 
 r^^td them by Obfcrvation and Experience. 
 
 Some borrow all their Religion from the Fathers 
 of the Cbrhlian Churchy or trom their Synods or 
 Councils \ but he that will read Monfieur Bailie 
 on the life of the Fathers will find many Reafons 
 why they are by no means fit to di(5late our Faith, 
 fince w^e have the Gofpel of Chrift^ and the Writ- 
 ings of the Apoftles and Prophets in our own 
 Hands. 
 
 Some Perfons believe every Thing that their 
 Kindred, their Parents, and their Tutors believe. 
 The Veneration and the Love which they have 
 for their Jnceftors incline them to fwallow down 
 all their Opinions at once, without examining 
 what Truth or Falfhood there is in them. Men 
 take up their Principles by Inheritance, and de- 
 fend them as they would their Eftates, becaufe 
 they are born Heirs to them. I freely grant, that 
 Parents are appointed by God and Nature to teach 
 us all the Sentiments and Pra6lices of our younger 
 Years •, and happy are thofe whofe Parents lead 
 them into the Paths of Wifdom and Truth! I 
 grant farther, that when Perfons come to Years 
 of Difcretion, and judge for themfelves, they 
 ought to examine the Opinions of their Parents 
 with the grearcd Modefty, and with an humble 
 Deference to ther luperior Chara6ler 5 they ought 
 in Matters perfedlly dubious to give the Prefer- 
 «:nce to their Parents Advice, and always to pay 
 them the firft Refpe(ff, nor ever depart from, thejr 
 Opinions and Practice, till Reafon and Confcience 
 
 n;ake 
 
C, in. S. 4. The right life of Reafon. 223 
 
 make it necefTary. Bat after all, it is poflible that 
 Parents may be miftaken, and therefore Reafon and 
 Scripture ought to be our final Rules of Determina- 
 tion in Matters that relate to this World, and that 
 which is to come. 
 
 Sometimes a favourite Author^ or a Writer of 
 great Name^ drags a thoufand Followers after him 
 into his own Miltakes, merely by the Authority of 
 his Name and Charader. The Sentiments of A- 
 rijhtle were imbibed and maintained by all the 
 Schools in Europe for feveral Clcnturies ; and a 
 Citation from his Writings was thought a fuffi- 
 cient Proof of any Propofuion. The great Def 
 cartes had alfo too many implicit Believers in the 
 lafl: Age, tho* he himfelf, in his Philofophy, dif- 
 claims all fuch Influence over the Minds of his 
 Readers. Calvin and Luther^ in the Days of Re^ 
 formation from Popery^ were learned and pious 
 Men, and there have been a SuccefTion of their 
 Difciples even to this Day, who pay too OTuch 
 Reverence to the Words of their Mailers. There 
 are others who renounce their Authority, but give 
 themlelves up in too fervile a Manner to the Opinion 
 and Authority of other Mailers, and follow as bad 
 or worfe Guides in Religion. 
 
 If only learned y and wife^ and good Men had 
 Influence on the Sentiments of others, it would 
 be at leaft a more excufeable fort of Prejudice, and 
 there would be fome Colour and Shadow of Rea- 
 fon for it : But that Riches^ Honours^ and outward 
 Splendour ihould fct up Perfons for Didators to all 
 the red of Mankind i this is a mod (hameful In- 
 vafion of the Right of our Underftandings on the 
 one Hind, and as fhameful a Slavery of the Soul 
 on the other. T\\^ poor Man, or the Labourer, too 
 often bt^lieves fuch a Principle in Politicks, or in 
 Morality y and judges concerning the Rights cf tkr 
 
 P 3 Kin^ 
 
224 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 King and the People^ juft as his wealthy JSIcighhour 
 dots. Half the Parifh follows the Opinion of the 
 Efquire, and the Tenants of a Manor fall into the 
 Sentiments of their Lord^ efpecially if he lives a- 
 mongft them. How unreafonable and yet how 
 common is this ! 
 
 As for Principles of Religicn^ we frequently 
 find how they are taken up and forfaken, changed 
 and refumed by the Influence of Princes. In all 
 Nations the Priejis have much Power alfo in dic- 
 tating the Religion of the People, but the Princes 
 didate to them : And where there is a great Pomp 
 and Grandeur attending the Priefthood in any 
 Religion whatfoever, with fo much the more Re- 
 verence and flronger Faith do the People believe 
 whatever they teach them : Yet it is too often evi- 
 dent that Riches, and Dominions, and high Titles 
 in Church or State have no Manner of Pretence to 
 Truth and Certainty, Wifdom and Goodnefs, above 
 the reft of Mortals, becaufe thefe Superiorities in 
 this World are not always conferred according to 
 Merit. 
 
 I confefs, where a Man of Wifdom and 7'ears, 
 of Ohfervation and Experience, gives us his Opi- 
 nion and Advice in Matters of the civil or the 
 fnoral Life, Reafon tells us we fhould pay a great 
 Attention to him, it is probable he may be in the 
 Right. Where a Man of long Exercife in Piety 
 fpcaks of pra5fical Religion, there is a due Defe- 
 rence to be paid to his Sentiments: And the fame 
 we m:iy fay concerning an ingenious Man longverf 
 ed in any Art or Science, he may juftly expedl due 
 Regard when he fpeaks of his own Affairs and 
 proper Bufinefs. But in other Things each of thefe 
 may be ignorant enough, notv/ithftanding all their 
 Piery and Years, and particular Skill : Nor even 
 in their own proper Province are they to be believed 
 
 in 
 
C. III. S. 4. The right life of Reafon. 225 
 
 in every thing without Referve, and without Exa- 
 mination. 
 
 To free ourfelves from thefe Prejudices^ it is fuf- 
 ficient to remember, that there is no Rank nor Cha- 
 rader among Mankind, which has any juft Pre- 
 tence to fway the Judgments of other Men by their 
 Authority : For there have been Perfons of the 
 fame Rank and Gharadler who have maintained 
 different and contrary Sentiments ; but all thefc 
 can never be true, and therefore the mere Namp or 
 Reputation that any of them poficfTes, is not a fut- 
 ficient Evidence of Truth. 
 
 Shall we believe the Ancients in Philofophy ? But 
 fome of the Ancients were Stoicksy fome Peripa- 
 teticksy fome Plaionicks, and fome Epicureans^ fome 
 Cynics^ and fome Sceptics, Shall we judge of Mat- 
 ters of the Chrijlian Faith by the Fathers or Pri- 
 mitive Writers for three or four hundred Years 
 after Chrijf ? But they often contradided one an- 
 other, and themfelves too ; and what is worfe, 
 they fometimes contradided the Scripture itfelf. 
 Now among all thefe different and contrary Sen- 
 timents in Philofophy and Religion^ which of the 
 Ancients mull we believe, for we cannot believe 
 them all ? 
 
 Again, To believe in all Things as our Prede- 
 ceflbrs did, is the ready Way to keep Mankind in 
 an everlalling State of Infancy, and to lay an 
 eternal Bar againft all the Improvements of our 
 Reafon and our Happinefs. Had the prefent Age 
 of Philofophers fatisfied themfelves with the ful?- 
 ftantial Forms, and occult ^.alities of Ariftotle, 
 with the folid Spheres, Eccentrtcks, and Epicycles of 
 Ptolomy^ and the ancient Aftronomers ; then the 
 great Lord 5^^^;/, Copernicus,, ^^nd De/cartes, with 
 the greater Sir Ifaac Newton, Mr. Locke, and Mr. 
 Boyle, had rifen in our World in vain. We muft 
 
 P 4 have 
 
226 L G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 have blundered on flill in fucceffive Generations 
 amongll Ablurdities and thick Darknefs, and a 
 hundred ufeful Inventions tor the Happincfs ot" 
 human Life had never been known. 
 
 Thus it is in Matters o( Philofophy and Science, 
 Buty yoLi will fay, Shall not our own Anceftors de- 
 ter mine our Judgment in Matters of civil or reltgi- 
 cus Concermnent ? If they muft, then the Child ot" 
 a Heathen mud believe that Heathenism is Truth •, 
 the Son of a Fafifi muft aflent to all the Ablurdi- 
 ties of Popery \ the Pofterity of the Jews and Soci- 
 rdans mult for ever be Socinians and Jews j and a 
 Man whofe Father was o^ Republican Principles, 
 muft make a SuccefTion of Republicans in his Family 
 to the End of the World. If we ought always 
 to believe whatfoever our Parents, or our Priefts^ 
 or our Princes believe, the Inhabitants of China 
 ought to worfhip their own Idols, and the Sa- 
 vages of Africa ought to believe all the Nonfenfe, 
 and pradice the Idolatry of their Negro Fathers 
 and Kings. The Britifh Nation, when it was 
 Heathen^ could never have become Chrijlian ; and 
 when it was a Slave to Ro?nCy it could never have 
 been reformed, 
 
 Befides, let us confider that the great God, our 
 common Maker, has never given one Man's Un- 
 derilanding a legal and rightful Sovereignty to de« 
 termine Truihs [brothers, at ieafl after they are paft 
 the State of Childhood or Minority. No fmglc 
 Perfon, how learned and wife, and great foever, or 
 whatfoever natural, or civil, or ecclefiaftical Rela- 
 tion he- may have to us, can claim this Doniinion 
 ■over our Faiih. St. P^/// the Apoftle, in His pri- 
 vate Op.icicy would not doit; nor hath an in- 
 spired Man any fuch Authority, until he makes his 
 divine Commiffion appear. Our Saviour himfeif 
 rtlls the Jezvs, that if he had not done fuch won- 
 
 d^vo'^yx 
 
C. III. S. 4. "The right XJJe o/'Reafon. 227 
 
 drous JVorks among them^ they had not finned in 
 difbelieving his Dodrines, and refufmg him for 
 the Meffiah. No Billiop or Prefbyrer, no Synod 
 or Council, no Church or AffembJy of Men, (fincc 
 the Days of Infpiration) hath Power derived to 
 them from God to make Creeds or Articles of 
 Faith for us, and impofe them upon our Under- 
 ftandings. We muft all ad according to the belt 
 of our own Light, and the Judgment of our own 
 Conlciences, ufing the belt Advantages which 
 Providence hath given us, with an honed and im- 
 partial Diligence to enquire and fearch out the 
 Truth : For every one of us viufi give an Account of 
 bimfelf to God, To believe as the Churchy or the 
 Court believes^ is but a forty and a dangerous 
 Faith : This Principle would make mo.re Heathens 
 than Chrifiajjs^ and more Papijls than Protejlants ; 
 and perhaps lead more Souls to Hell than to Hea- 
 ven \ for our Saviour himfelf has plainly told us, 
 that if the Blind will be led by the Blind ^ they mufi 
 both fall in the Ditch, 
 
 Though there be fo much Danger of Error ari- 
 fing from the three Prejudices lall mentioned, yet 
 before I difmifs this Head, i think it proper to take 
 J>Jotice, that as Education^ Cufiom and Authority^ 
 are no fure Evidences of Truths fo neither are they 
 certain Marks of Faljhood \ for Reafon and Scrip- 
 ture may join to didate the fame Things which 
 our Parents, our Nurfcs, our Tutors, our Friends, 
 and our Country believe and profefs. Yet there 
 appears fometimes in our Age a Pride and Petu- 
 hncy in Youth, zealous to cad off the Sentiments . 
 of their Fathers and Teachers^ on Purpofe to fhew 
 that they carry none of the Prejudices of Educa- 
 tion and Authority about them. They indulge all 
 Manner of licentious Opinions and Pradices, from 
 ^ vain Pretence of afTertjng their Liberty. But 
 
 alas I 
 
238 L G I C K: Or, Part 11. 
 
 alas ! This is but changing one Prejudice for an- 
 other ; and fometimes it happens by this Means, 
 that they make a Sacrifice both of Truth and 
 Virtue to the vile Prejudges of their Pride and 
 Senfuality, 
 
 IV. There is another Tribe of Prejudices which 
 are near a-kin to thofe of Authority^ and that is, 
 when we receive a Dodlrine becaufe of the Man- 
 ner in which it is propofdd to us by others, I have 
 already mentioned the powerful Influence that Ora^ 
 tory and fine Words have to infinuate a falfe Opi- 
 nion, and fometimes Truth is refufed, and fuffers 
 Contempt in the Lips of a wife Man, for Want of 
 the Charms of Language : But there are feveral 
 other Manners of Propofals whereby miftaken Senti- 
 ments are powerfully conveyed into the Mind. 
 
 Some Perfons are eafily perfuaded to believe 
 what another didlates with a pofitive Air, and a 
 great Degree of Affurance : They feel the over- 
 bearing Force of a confident Dictator, efpecially 
 if he be of fuperior Rank or Charader to them- 
 lelves. 
 
 Some are quickly convinced of the Truth of 
 any Do(5lrine, when he that propofes it puts on 
 all the Airs of Piety, and makes jfble?nn Appeals to 
 Heaven^ and Protejlations of the ^ruth of it : The 
 pious Mind of a weaker Chriftian is ready to re^ 
 ceive any thing that is pronounced with fuch an 
 awful Solemnicy. 
 
 It is a Prejudice near a-kin to this, when a humble 
 Soul is frighted into any particular Sentiments of 
 Religion, becaufe a Man of great Name or Charac- 
 ter pronounces Herefy upon the contrary Senti- 
 ments, caffs the Disbeliever out of the Church, and 
 forbids him the Gates of Heaven. 
 
 Others 
 
C. III. S. 4. The right life of Rcafon. 229 
 
 Ochers are allured into particular Opinions by 
 gentler Pra5iices on the Underftanding : Not only 
 the foft Tempers of Mankind, but even hardy and 
 rugged Souls are fometimes led away Captives to 
 Error by \\itfoft Airs of Addrefs^ and ihtfweet and 
 engaging Methods of Perfuafion and Kindnejs, - 
 
 I grant, where natural or revealed Religion 
 plainly didlate to us the infinite and everlafting 
 Importance of any facred Dodrine, it cannot be 
 improper to ufe any of thefe Methods to perfuade 
 Men to receive and obey the Truth, after we have 
 given fufficient Reafon and Argument to convince 
 their Underftandings. Yet all thefe Methods, con- 
 fidered in themfelves, have been often ufed to con- 
 vey Falfhood into the Soul as well as Truth ; and 
 if we build our Faith merely upon thefe Founda- 
 tions, without Regard to the Evidence of Truth 
 and the Strength of Argument, our Belief is but the 
 Effe^ of Prejudice : For neither the pofttive^ the 
 awful or folemn^ the terrible or the gentle Methods 
 of Addrefs carry any certain Evidence with them 
 that Truth lyes on that Side. 
 
 There is another Manner of propofing our own 
 Opinion, or rather oppoftng the Opinions of others, 
 which demands a mention here, and that is when 
 Perfons make a Jeft ferve inftead of an Argument ; 
 when they refute what they call Error by a Turn 
 of Wit^ and anfwer every Objection againft their 
 own Sentiments, by cafling a Sneer upon the Ob- 
 je6tor. Thefe Scoffers pradlife with Succefs upon 
 weak and cowardly Spirits : Such as have not been 
 well eftablifhed in Religion or Morality have been 
 laughed out of the befl Principles by a confident 
 Buffoon \ they have yielded up their Opinions to a 
 witty Banter^ and fold their Faith an^ Religion for 
 a 7^/?. 
 
 There 
 
230 L O G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 There is no Way to cure thefe Evils in fiich a 
 degenerate World as we Jive in, but by learning 
 ro diflinguifh well between the Subjiance of any 
 Douiriue^ and the Manner of Addrefs either in pro- 
 pofing, attacking, or defending it *, and then by 
 fctting a jull and levere Guard of Realbn and 
 Conlcience over all the Exercifes of our Judg- 
 ment, refolving to yield to nothing but the con- 
 vincing Evidence ot Truth, religioufly obeying the 
 Light of Reafon in Matters of pure Reafon^ and 
 the Didlates of Revelation in Things that relate to 
 our Faitb, 
 
 Thus we have taken a brief Survey of feme of 
 the infinite Varieties of Prejudice that attend Man- 
 kind on every Side in the prcfent Srate, and the 
 Dangers of Error or of rajh Judgfnent^ we are 
 pc^rpetu.illy expofed co in this Life : This Chapter 
 fliail conclude wiih one Remark^ and one Piece of 
 jidvice. 
 
 The Remark is this. This fame Opinion, whe- 
 ther /^//c' or true^ may be didated by miny Preju- 
 dices at the fame Time -, for as I hinted before. 
 Prejudice may happen to didlate Truth fometimes 
 as well as Error. Butv/here two or more Prejudices 
 oppofe one another, as it often happens, the (Irongtr 
 prevails and gains the AfTent : Yet how fddom does 
 Rcafm interpofe with fufHcient Power to get the 
 Afcendant of them all as it ought to do! 
 
 The Advice follows, {viz.) Since we find fuch 
 a fwarm of Prejudices attending us both within and 
 without ; fince we feel the Weaknefs of our Rea- 
 fon, the Frailty of our Natures, and our Infuffi- 
 cieiKV to guard ourfclves from Error upon this 
 Account, it is not at all unbecoming the Characfter 
 of a Logician or a Pbilofopbsr (together with the 
 Advice already given; to dire6l every Perfon in his 
 S<ijr b :ifior Truth to make his daily AddrcfTcs to 
 
 Heaven, 
 
C. IV. 7h^ right life of Reafon . 231 
 
 Heaven, and implore the God of 'Truth to lead hinrv 
 into all Truth, and to ajk IVifdom of him who giveth 
 liberally to them that afk it, and upbraideth us not 
 with our own Follies. 
 
 Such a devout Pradice will be an excellent Pre- 
 parative for the bed Improvement of all the Di- 
 regions and Rules propofed in the two following 
 Chapters. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 General Bire5ims to affijl us in judging 
 aright. 
 
 TH E chief Defign of the Art of Logick is to 
 affift us in forming a true Judgment of 
 Things •, a few proper Ohfervations for this End 
 have been dropt occafionally in fome of the fore- 
 going Chapters : Yet it is necelTary to mention 
 them again in this Place, that we may have a 
 more complete and fimultaneous View of the^^w<f- 
 ral Direolionsy which are neceflary in order to 
 judge aright. A Multitude of Advices may be 
 framed for this Purpofe ; the chief of them may, 
 for Order fake, be reduced to the following 
 Heads. 
 
 I. Dire^. When we confider ourfelves as Phi- 
 lofophers^ or Searchers after Truths we fhould exa- 
 mine all our old Opinions afrefJj^ and enquire what 
 was the Ground of them^ and '■jchether our Affent were 
 built onjufl Evidence •, and then we fhould caft off 
 all thofe Judgments which were formed hereto- 
 fore without due Examination, A Man in purfuit 
 of Knowledge Qiould throw of ail thofe Preju- 
 dices 
 
232 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 dices which he had imbibed in Times pad, and 
 guard againft all the Springs of Error mentioned in 
 the preceding Chapler, with utmoft Watchfulnefs 
 for Time to come. 
 
 Obferve here, that this Rule of cafiing away all 
 cur former prejudicate Opinions and Sentiments^ is 
 not propofed to any of us to be pra6tifed at once, 
 confidered as Men of Bufmefs, or Religion, as Friends 
 or Neighbours^ as Fathers or Sons, as Magiftrates, 
 SubjeBs or Chriftians •, but merely as Philofophers 
 and Searchers after 'Truth : And though it may be 
 well prefumed that many of our Judgments, both 
 true and falfe, together with the Pradices built 
 thereon in the natural, the civil and the religious 
 Life, were formed without fufEcient Evidence ; 
 yet an univerfal RejeBion of all thefe might deflroy 
 at once our prefent Senfe and Pra6tice of Duty 
 with Regard to God, our Selves, and our Fellow^ 
 Creatures, Mankind would be hereby thrown 
 into fuch a Stale of Doubting and Indifference, 
 that it would be too long e'er they recovered any 
 Principles of Virtue or Religion by a Train of 
 Reafonings. 
 
 Befides, the common Affairs of human Life of- 
 ten demand a much fpeedier Determination, and we 
 muft many Times adl upon prefent Probabilities : 
 The Bulk of Mankind have not Time and Lei- 
 fure, and Advantages fufficient to begin all their 
 Knowledge anew, and to build up every fingle O- 
 pinion and Pradlice afrelh upon the jufteft Grounds 
 of Evidence. 
 
 Yet let it be obferved alfo, that fo far as any 
 Perfon is capable of forming and correding his 
 Notions and his Rules of Condudt in the natural, 
 civil and religious Life, by the ftrid Rules of Lo- 
 gick i and fo far as he hath Time and Capacity to 
 review his old Opinions, to re-examine all thofe 
 
 which 
 
C. IV. The right Ufe of Rcafon. '233 
 
 which are any Way doubtful, and to determine no- 
 thing without juft Evidence, he is likely to become 
 fo much the wifer, and the happier Man, and (if 
 Divine Grace aflift him) fo much the better Chri- 
 (lian. And tho* this cannot be done all at once, 
 yet it may be done by prudent Steps and Degrees, 
 till our whole Set of Opinions and Principles be in 
 time corredted and reformed, or at leaft eftablifhed 
 upon jufter Foundations. 
 
 11. Diredt. Endeavour that all your Ideas of thofi 
 Obje^s, concerning which you fafs any Judgment^ be 
 clear and dijiin5iy complete^ C07nprehenjtve^ extenfive 
 and orderly^ as far as you have Occajion to judge 
 concerning them. This is the Subftance of the lafi 
 Chapter of the fir ft Part of Logick, The I^ules 
 which dire5l our Conceptions muft be reviewed, if 
 we would form our Judgments aright. But if 
 we will make hade to judge at all Adventures, 
 while our Ideas are dark and confufed and very im- 
 perfe^, we Ihall be in Danger oi running into many 
 Miftakes. This is like a Perfon who would pre- 
 tend to give the Sum total of a large Account in 
 Arithmetick^ without furveying all the Particulars; 
 or as a Painter^ who profefTes to draw a fair and 
 diftind: Landskip in the Twilight, when he can 
 hardly diftinguifh a Houfe from a Tree. 
 
 Obferve here, that this Bire^ion does not re- 
 quire us to gain clear, diftind compleat Ideas of 
 Things in all their Parts, Powers, and Qualities 
 in an abfolute Senfcy for this belongs to God alone, 
 and is impoflible for us to attain : But it isexprefs'd 
 in a relative or limited Senfe -, that is, our Ideas 
 fhould be clear, diftindl, and comprehenfive, ^c. 
 at leaft fo far as we have Occafion at that Time to 
 judge concerning them. We may form many true 
 and certain Judgments concerning God, Angels^ 
 
 /Inimals^ 
 
234 L 6 G 1 C K: Or, Part. II. 
 
 Ammals, Men^ Heaijen^ Hell^ &c, by thofe partial 
 and very imperfed; Conceptions of them to which 
 we have attained, if we judge no farther concern- 
 ing them than our Conceptions reach. 
 
 We may have a clear and diflindl Idea of the 
 Exijlence of many Things in Nature, and affirm 
 that they do exift^ tho' our Ideas of their Intimate 
 EJfences and Caufes^ their Relations and Manners of 
 A5lion are very con fu fed and obfcure. We may 
 judge well concerning fever al Properties of any 
 Being, tho' other Properties are unknown, for per- 
 haps we know not all the Properties of any Being 
 whatfoever. 
 
 Sometimes we have clear Ideas of the ahfolute 
 Properties of an Objedl *, and we may judge of 
 them wiih Certainty, while the relative Proper- 
 ties are very obfcure and unknown to us. So we 
 may have a clear and juft Idea of the Area of a 
 Parallelogram, without knowing what Relation it 
 bears to the Area of a Triangle or a Polygon, 1 
 may know the Length of the Diameter of a Circle^ 
 without knowing what Proportion it has to the Cir- 
 ,cumference. 
 
 There are other Things, whofc external relative 
 Properties, with refpe<5l to each other, or whofe 
 Relation to us we know better than their own 
 inward and ahfolute Properties, or their eflential 
 didinguifliing Attributes. We perceive clearly, 
 that Fire will warm or hum us, and will evaporate 
 f^ater ; and that H-^'atcr will allay our Tbirjl, or 
 quench the Fire, though we know not the inward 
 di'ftnguifijing Particles or prime effential Properties 
 of Fire or H'^ater. We may know the King, and 
 Lord Chancellor, and affirm many Things of them 
 in their legal Charailers, though we can have but a 
 confus'd Idea of their Perfons or natural Features, 
 if we have never feen their Faces. .So the Scrip- 
 ture 
 
C; IV. TKie right life of R^afbn. 23 5 
 
 ture has revealed God himfelf to us, and our Crea- 
 tory Preferver^ Redeemer^ and San5iifier^ and as the 
 Oh]e5l of our V/orfhip in clearer Ideas than it has re- 
 vealed many other abftrufe Queftions which may be 
 railed about his own Divine EJfence or Suhftancei his 
 Immen/ity or Qmviprefence, 
 
 This therefore is iht general Ohfer'VaUon in order 
 to guide our Judgments, that we (hould not allow 
 ourfelves to form a Judgment concerning Things farther 
 than our clear and diflin^i Ideas reacb^ and then wf. 
 are not in Danger of Error. 
 
 But there is one confiderable Ohjeciion againfl this 
 Rule which is neceflary to be anfwered 5 and there 
 is one juft and reafonable Exception^ which is as 
 needful to be mentioned. 
 
 The Objection is this : May we n6t judge fafely 
 eoncerning fome total or complete IdeaSy when we 
 have a clear Perception only of fome Parts or Pro^ 
 perties of them ? May we not affirm^ that All that is 
 in God is eternal^ or that all his unknown Attrihules 
 cire infinite y though we have fo very imperfcrd an 
 ideaofG/?(i, Eternityy and Infinity? Again, May 
 we not fafely judge of particular Objeds vv^hofe Idea 
 is obfcure by a clear Idea of th^ General ? May I 
 not affirm, that every unknown Species of Animals 
 has inward Springs of Motion y becaufe I have a clear 
 Idea that thefe inward Springs belong to an Animal 
 in general ? 
 
 Anfwer, All thofe fuppofed unknown Parts^ 
 Properties or Speciesy are clearly and diftindlly per- 
 ceived to be connected with, or contained in the 
 known PartSy PropertieSy or general Ideas^ which 
 we fuppofe to be clear and diflind as far as we 
 judge of them : And as we have no particular 
 Idea of thofe unknown divine AttributeSy or unknown 
 Species of Animals % fo th^re is nothing particular 
 affirmed conceiving them beyond what belongs to 
 
 Q th$ 
 
236 L O G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 the general Idea of Divine Jttnhutes or Animalsy 
 wich which I clearly and diftindlly perceive them to 
 be conneded. 
 
 Ic may be illuftrated in this Manner. Suppofe 
 a long Chain lies before me, whofe neareft Links I 
 fee are Iron Rings, and I fee them faften'd to a Poll 
 near me, but the mod diftant Links lie beyond the 
 Reach of my Sight, fo that I know not whether 
 they are oval or round, Brafs or Iron : Now I 
 may boldly affirm the whole LeTigtb of this Chain 
 is fajlened to the Poft^ for I have a clear Idea that 
 the neareft Links are thus fattened, and a clear 
 Idea that the diftant Links are connecfled with the 
 neareft, if I can draw the whole Chain by one 
 Link. 
 
 Or thus : If two known Ideas, A and B are 
 evidently joined, or agree, and if C unknown be 
 included In A, and a!fo D unknown be included 
 in B, then I may affirm that C and D are joined 
 and agree : for I have a clear Perception of the 
 Union of the two known Ideas A and B ; and 
 alfo a clear Perception of the Connexion of the 
 unknown Ideas with the known. So that clear 
 and diftin^ Ideas muft ftill abide as a general necef- 
 fary Qualification in order to form right Judg- 
 rnents : And indeed it is upon this Foot, that all 
 Ratiocination is built, and the Conclufions are thus 
 formed, which deduce Things unknown from Things 
 known. 
 
 Yet it feems to me, that there is one juft Limi- 
 tation or Exception to this general Rule of Jiidg- 
 ment^ as built on clear and diftincfl Ideas, and it 
 is this ; 
 
 Exception. /;; Matters o^nere Teflimony^ whether 
 human or divine^ there is'Juways a Uecejfity of clear 
 and diflwcl Ideas of the Things which are believed. 
 Though the Evidence of Propoficions, which are 
 
 entirely 
 
C. IV. "^he right tJfi of Reafoii. 237 
 
 tntirely fermed by our/elves^ depends on the Clear- 
 nefs and Diflinctnefs of thofe Ideas of which they 
 are compofed, and on our own clear Perception 
 of their Agreement or Difagreement, yet we may 
 juftly aflent to Propoficions formed ly others^ when 
 we have neither a very clear Conception in ourfelves 
 of the two Ideas contained in the Words, nor how 
 they agree or difagree ; provided always that we have 
 a clear and fufHcient Evidence of the Credibility of 
 the Perfons who inform us. 
 
 Thus when we read in Scripture the great Doc- 
 trines of the Deity of Chrift^ of the Union of the 
 divine and human Natures in him^ of the divine 
 Agency of the hleffed Spirit^ that the Son is the Bright- 
 fiefs of his Father^ s Glory ^ that all mngs were created 
 by him, and for him, that the Son fhall give up his 
 Kingdom to the Father, and that God fhall be all in 
 nil, we may fafely believe them : For though our 
 ideas of thefe Objedls themfelves are not fufficiently 
 clear, diftindi, and perfedl, for our own Minds to 
 form thefe Judgments or Proportions concerning 
 them, yet we have a clear and diftind: Perception of 
 God's revealing them, or that they are contained in 
 Scripture ; and this is fufficient Evidence to deter- 
 mine our AfTent. 
 
 The fame Thing holds true in fome Meafure^ 
 tvhere credible human Teflimony aflures us of fome 
 Propofitions, while we have no fufHcient Ideas of 
 the Subjeft and Predicate of them to determine 
 our Afient. So when an honed and learned Ma- 
 thematician afTures a Ploughman that the three An- 
 gles of a triangle are equal to two right Angles, or 
 that the Square of the Uypotenufe of a right-angled 
 triangle is equal to the Sum of the Squares of the 
 two Sides ; the Ploughman, who has but confufed 
 Ideas of thefe Things, may firmly and fafely be- 
 lieve thefe Propofitions upon the fame Ground, 
 0^2 becaufe 
 
-33 LOGIC K: Or, Part IT. 
 
 becaufc he has Evidence of the Skill and Fakhfuli- 
 nefs of his Informer*. 
 
 III. Dire^fion, When you have obtained as 
 clear and comprehenfive Ideas as is needful, both 
 of the Subjedl and Predicate of a' Propofition, 
 then compare thofe Ideas of the Suhje^ and Predi- 
 
 cate 
 
 * Perhaps fonae may obje£l agalnft this Reprefentation of Things, and 
 lay, that " We cannot properly be faid to believe a Fropofition any farther 
 *' than \?c ourfelves have Ideas under the Terms: Therefore if we have no 
 *' Llcas under the Terms, we believe nothing but the Connexion of Words 
 *' or Sounds; and if we have but obfcure and inadequate Ideas under the 
 ** Terms, then we partly believe a Connexion of Things, and partly a 
 *' Connexion of Sounds: but that we cannot properly be faid to belie've the 
 ** Picpojition, for our Faith can never go beyond our Ideas." 
 
 Now to fet this Mattsr in a clear Light, 'l fuppofe that every Propofition 
 which is propofed to my AiTcni, is a Sentence made up of Terms which 
 have Ibme Ideas under them, known or unknown to me. ' I confefs, if I 
 believe th»re arc no Ideas at all under the Terms, and there is nothing meant 
 by them, then indeed (with Regard to me) it is the mere joining of Sounds T 
 But if (for Inftance) a Ploughman has credible Information from an honeft 
 and skilful Mathematician, that an Elltpjis is tnade by. the SeSiionof a Cone, 
 he believes the Propoficion, or he believes the Sentence is true, as it is 
 made up of Terms which his Informant under ftands, tho' the Ideas be un- 
 known to him ; that is, he believes- there are fome Ideas which his In- 
 formant has under thefe V/ords which are really connected. And, I think 
 this mzy jwttly be cdlled belieTjing the PropJitioM, for it is a Belief of fome- 
 thing more than the mere joining of Sou7ids ; it is a Belief of the real Con- 
 nexion of fome unknown Ideas belonging to thofe Sounds, and in this Senfe a 
 Man may be faid to believe the Truth of a Propofition, which he doth not 
 undcrltand at all. 
 
 With more Reafon ftill may we be faid to belie-vc a Propofition upon cre- 
 dible Teftimony, if we ha\cjcme Sort of Ideas under the Terms, tho' they 
 are but partial or inadequate, and obfcure j fuch as divine Anjivers ivexe 
 given by Ifrim and Thummim : For fmce it is purely upon Teftimony we be- 
 Jifeve the knoivn Parts of the Ideas fignified by thofe Words to be connefted, 
 upon the fame Tcfiimony we may alfo believe all the unknown Parts of the 
 Ideas fignified by thofe Words to be connected, (-w/a.) becaufe our Informant 
 is knowing ar>d faithful. And in this Senfe we may juftly be faid to believe a 
 Propofition of Scripture entirely, which we underftand but very imperfecllyy 
 bccdufc God who reveals it is knowing and faithful in PerfeftTon. 
 
 And indeed, unlcfs this Reprefentation of the Matter be allowed, there are 
 but very few Propofitions in the World, even in human Things, to which 
 we can give an entire Afient, or which wc may be faid either to know, or 
 to believe, becaufe there is fcarce any Thing on Earth of which we have an 
 adequate, and moft pcrfedl Idea. And it is evident that in Divine Things 
 there is icarcc any Thing which we could either know or believe without 
 this Allowance : For though Reafon and Revelation joia to inform me, that 
 Cud is h'll-i, how exceeding inadequate are "my Ideas of God, and of his llo- 
 Unef? Yet I may boldly and entirely aflcnt to this whole Propofition, fince 
 I am fare that every known and unknown Wea fignified by the Term God 
 
a IV. The right Ufe of Reafon. 239 
 
 €ate together with utmofl Attention^ and obferve how 
 far they agree, and wherein they differ : Whether the 
 Propofition may be affirmed Ahfoluiely or Rela- 
 tively, whether in Whole or in Part, whether 
 Univerfally or Particularly, and then under what 
 particular Limitations, Turn thefe Ideas about in 
 your Mind, and take a View of them on all Sides, 
 juil as a Mafon would do to fee whether two hewn 
 Stones exadlly fuit each other in every Part, and 
 
 Ss connefted with the Ideas of the Term Holinefs, becaufe Reafon partly in- 
 forms me, but efpecially because the Divine Teftimony which has conne£led 
 them, is certainly credible. 
 
 I might argue upon this Head perhaps more forcibly from the Doftrine of 
 God^s Incomprehenfiblenefs. If we could believe nothing but what we have 
 Ideas of, it would be impoflible for us to believe that God is incomprehsnfibU : 
 For this implies in it a Belief, that there are fome unknown Ideas belonging 
 to the Nature of God. Therefore we do both believe and profefs that fome- 
 thing concerning unknown Ideas, when we believe and profefs that God is 
 Incomprehenftble. 
 
 I perfuade myfelf that mofl: of thofe very Per&ns who obje£l againft my 
 Reprefentatlon of Things, will yet readily confefs, they hel'ie-ve all the Propo- 
 fitions in Scripture, rather than declare T^hey do not believe feveral of them ; 
 tho' they mult acknowledge that feveral of them are far above their Under- 
 ftanding, or that they have fcarce any Ideas of the true Senfe of them. And 
 therefore where Propofitions derived from credible Tellimony are made up 
 of dark or inadequate Ideas, I think it is much more proper to fay, We be- 
 lieve them, than that We do not beVnje them, left we cut off a Multitude of 
 the Propofitions of the Bible from our Affent of Faith. 
 
 Yet let it be obferved here, that when we believe a Propofition on mere 
 Teftimony, of which we have no Ideas at all, we can only be faid to give a 
 general implicit Affent to the Truth of that Propofition, without any particular 
 TCnowledge of, or explicit Afj'ent to thefpecial Truth contained in that Propofi- 
 tion : And this our implicit Af}'ent is of very little Ufe, unlefs it be to teftify 
 our Belief of the Knowledge and Veracity of him that informs us. 
 
 As our Ideas of a Propofition are more or lefs clear and adequate, as well 
 as juft and proper, fo we do explicitly affent more or lefs to the particular 
 Truth contained in that Propofition. And our Affent hereby becomes more 
 or lefs ufeful for the Enereafe of our Knowledge or the Diredlion of our 
 Praftice. 
 
 When Divine Teftimony plainly propofes to our Faith fuch a Propofition 
 •whereof we have but obfcure, doubtful and inadequate Ideas, we are bound 
 implicitly to believe the Truth of it, as expreffed in thofe Terms, in order to 
 ihew our Submiffion to God who revealed it, as a God of perfedl Know- 
 ledge and Veracity : Bat it is our Duty to ufe all proper Methods to obtain 
 a farther and explicit Knowledge of the pa>-ticular Truth contained in the Pro- 
 pofition, if we would improve it by either in Knowledge or Virtue. All ne- 
 ceffary Rules of Grammar and Criticifm ihould be employed to find out the 
 very Ideas that belong to thofe Words, and which were defigned by the Divine 
 Speaker or Writer. Tho' we may believe the Truth of a Propofition which 
 yre do not underftand, yet we fhould endeavour to unierftand every Propofi- 
 tion which we believe to be true. 
 
 QL3 i^e 
 
240 L G I C K: Or, Part II, 
 
 are fit to be joined in erecting a carved or fluted 
 Pillar. 
 
 Compare the iz-hole Suhje^ with the who/e Predi- 
 cate in their feveral Parts : Take heed in this Mat- 
 ter that you neither add to, nor diminifh the Ideas; 
 contained in the Subje(!t or in the Predicate ; for 
 fuch an Inadvertence or Miftake will expofe you CQ 
 great Error in Judgment. 
 
 IV. Dire5f. Search for Evidence of Truth with 
 J) dig en ce and Honefty^ and he heartily ready to re- 
 ceive Evidence^ whether for the Agreement or Dif- 
 agreement of Ideas. 
 
 Search with Diligence ; fpare no Labour in fearch? 
 ing for the Truth in due Proportion to the Im-? 
 portance of the Propofltion. Read the bed Au- 
 thors who have writ on that Subjed ; confult your 
 wife and learned Friends in Converfation ; and 
 be not unwilling to borrow Hints toward your 
 Improvement, from the meaneft Perfon, nor to 
 receive any Glimpfe of Light from the moft 
 unlearned. Diligence and Humility is the Way 
 to thrive in the Riches of the Underftanding, as 
 well as in Gold or Silver. Search carefully for the 
 Evidence of Truth, and dig for TFifdom as for hidi 
 Treafure, 
 
 Search with a fieady Honefty of Soul, and a fin- 
 cere Impartiality to find the Truth. Watch 
 againft every Temptation that might bribe your 
 Judgment, or warp it afide from Truth. Do not 
 indulge yourfelf to wifh any uneicamined Propofttion 
 were true or falfe, A Wifh often perverts the 
 Judgment, and tempts the Mind ftrangely to be- 
 Jieve upon flight Evidence whatfoever we wifla to 
 be falle. 
 
 V. Dire^,^ 
 
C IV. S. I. The right Ufe ofRczfon, 241 
 
 V, Dire^, Since the Evidence of the Agree- 
 ment or Difagreement of two Ideas is the Ground 
 of our Affent to any Propofition, or the great Cri- 
 terion of Truth ; therefore we Jhould fufpend our 
 Judgment^ and neither affirm mr deny till this Evi- 
 dence appear. 
 
 This DireBton is different from the fecond ; for 
 tho* the Evidence of the Agreement or Difagreement 
 of two Ideas moa timts depends on the Clearnefs 
 and Di(\\nd:aeCs of the Ideas themfelvesy yet it does 
 not always arife thence. Teftifnony may be a fuf- 
 ficient Evidence of the Agreement or Difagree- 
 ment of two obfcure Ideas, as we have feen juil 
 before in the Exception under the fecond Dire^ion. 
 Therefore, tho' we are not univerfally and in all 
 Cafes bound to fufpend our Judgment till our Ideas 
 of the Ohje^s themfelves are clear and diffin^^ yeC 
 we muft always fufpend our Judgment, and with- 
 hold our Affent to, or Denial of any Propofition, 
 till {ome juji Evidence appear of its Truth or Falfhoodp 
 It is an Impatience of Doubt and Sufpence, a Ra(h- 
 nefs and Precipitance of Judgment, and Haftinefs 
 CO believe fomething on one fide or the other, that 
 plunges us into many Errors, 
 
 This Bire5lion to delay and fufpend our Affent 
 is more particularly neceffary to be obferved whea 
 fuch Propofitions offer themfelves to us as are 
 fupported by Education^ Authority^ Cuflom, Incli- 
 nation^ Inter eft ^ or other powerful Prejudices ; for 
 our Judgment is led away infenfibly to believe all 
 that they dicftate 5 and where Prejudices and Dan- 
 gers of Error are multiplied, we fliould fet the 
 llrider Guard upon our AffenL 
 
 Yet remember the Caution or Limitation here 
 which I gave under the firfi Dire^ion^ (viz.) that 
 this is not to be tooftridlly applied to Matters of 
 daily PraSice^ either in human Life or Religion ; 
 
 qL4 buc 
 
242 LOGIC K: Or, Part 11, 
 
 but when we confider ourfelves as Philofophers^ or 
 Searchers ajier ^ruth^ we fhould always with-hold 
 our A0ent where there is not juft Evidence ; 
 And as far and as faft as we can in a due Con- 
 lillence with our daily necefTary Duties, we fhould 
 alio reform and adjuft all our Principles and Prac- 
 tices both in Religion and the civil Life by thefc 
 Rules. 
 
 VI. Dire5f, We muft judge of every Propofition 
 hy tkofe proper and peculiar Mediums or Means^ 
 whereby the Evidence of it is to he obtained^ whe- 
 ther it be Soife^ Confcioufnefs^ Intelligence^ Rea- 
 fon, or 1'eftimony. All our Faculties and Powers 
 are to be employed in judging of their proper 
 Objeds. 
 
 If we judge of Sounds^ Colours^ Odours^ Sapors^ 
 the Smootbnefs^ Roughnefs^ Softnefs^ or Hardnefs of 
 Bodies^ it muft be done by the Ufe of our Senfes : 
 But then we muft take heed that our Senfes are 
 well difpofed, as fhall be fhewn afterward. 
 
 And fince our Senfes in their various Exercifes 
 are in fome Cafes liable to be deceived, and more 
 efpecially when by our Eyes or Ears we judge of 
 the Figure, ^.antUy^ Diftance^ and Pofition of Ob- 
 jedls that are afar off, we ought to call our Reafon 
 in to the AiTiftance of our Senfes, and correct the 
 Errors of one Senfe by the Help of another. 
 
 It is by the Powers of Senfe and Reafcn joined 
 together, that we muft judge philofophically of 
 the inward Nature, the fecret Properties and Pow- 
 ers, the Caufes and Effe5fs, the Relations and Pro- 
 portions of a thoufand corporeal Objeds which 
 furround us on Earth, or are placed at a Diftance 
 in the Heavens. If a Man on the one Hand con- 
 fines himfelf only to fenfible Experiments, and does 
 not cxercife Reafon upon them, he may furprife 
 
 hin.fdf 
 
C. IV. The right Vfe of Reafon. 243 
 
 himfelf and others wich flrange Appearances, and 
 learn to entertain the World with Sights and 
 Shews, but will never become a Philofopher : And 
 on the other Hand, if a Man innprifon himfelf in 
 his Clofet, and employ the mod exquifite Powers 
 of Reafon to find out the Nature of Things in 
 the corporeal World, without the Ufe of- his 
 Senfes, and the Pradice of Experiments^ he will 
 frame to himfelf a Scheme of Cbiineras inftead of 
 true Philofophy. Hence came the Invention of 
 fuhjlantial Forms and ^lalhies^ of Materia pri?na 
 and Privation, with all the infignificant Names 
 ufed by the peripatetick Writers ; and it was for 
 Want of more Experiments that the Great Def- 
 cartes failed in feveral Parts of his philofophicai 
 Writings. 
 
 In the ahftra5fed and [peculative Parts of the 
 Mathematicks, which treat of ^antity and Num^ 
 her^ the Faculty of Reafon mud be chiefly em- 
 ployed to perceive the Relation of various ^anti- 
 tie s^ and draw certain and ufeful Conclufions ; but 
 it wants the AfTiftance of Senfe alfo to be acquainted 
 with Lines, Angles and Figures, And in practical 
 Mathemaiicks our Senfes have ftill greater Employ- 
 ment. 
 
 If we would judge of the pure Properties^ and 
 Alliens of the Mind, of the Nature of Spirits, their 
 various Perceptions and Powers, we muft not en- 
 quire of our Eyes and our Ears, nor the Images or 
 Shapes laid up in the Brain, but we muft have Re- 
 courfe to our own Confcioufnefs of what palTes within 
 our own Mind. 
 
 If we are to pafs a Judgment upon any thing that 
 relates to Spirits in a State of Union with animal Na- 
 ture, and the mixt Vvo^tviits o^ Senfation, Fancy, Ap- 
 petite, Pajfton, Pleafure and Pain, which arife thence, 
 we muft confulc our own Senfation^y and the other 
 
 Powers 
 
244 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Powers which we find in ourfelvesconfider'dasM?;! 
 or Creatures made up of a Mind and an Animal \ and 
 by juft Reafonings deduce proper Con fequences, and 
 improve our Knowledge in thefe Subjedls. 
 
 If we have Occafion to judge concerning Matters 
 done in pafl Ages, or in diftant Countries^ and where 
 we ourfclves cannot be prefent, the Powers of Senfs 
 and Reafon (for the rrwft part) are not fufficient to 
 inform us, and we muft therefore have Recourfe to 
 the Teftimony of others : And this is either divine 
 or hujnan. 
 
 In Matters of fnere human Prudence^ we fliall 
 find the greateft Advantage by making wife Obfer- 
 vations on our own Condud, and the Condudb of 
 others, and a Survey of the Events attending fuch 
 Conduct. Experience in this Cafe is equal to a na^ 
 tural Sagacity^ or rather fuperior. A Treafure of 
 Ohfervations and Experiences colJecfled by wife Men, 
 is of admirable Service here. And perhaps there is 
 nothing in the World of this kind equal to the facred 
 Book of Proverbs^ even if we look on it as a mere 
 human Writing. 
 
 In Queftions of Natural Religion^ we muft exer- 
 cife the Faculty of Reafon which God has given 
 us ; and fince he has been pleafed to afford us his 
 fVbrdy we fhould confirm and improve, or correft 
 our Reafonings on this Subjedt by the Divine Af- 
 fiftance of the Bible. 
 
 In Matters of revealed Religion ^ that is, Chri^ 
 flianity^ Judaifm^ &c. which we could never have 
 known by the Light of Nature, the Tf^ord of God is 
 our only Foundation and chief Light ; tho' here our 
 Reafon muft be ufed both to find out the true Mean- 
 ing of God in his Word, and to derive juft Infer- 
 ences from what God has written, as well as to judge 
 of the Credentials whereby divine Tejlimony is diftin- 
 guifti'd from 7nere human Tejlimony^ or from Impcflure^ 
 
 As 
 
C, IV. The right Ufe of Reafon. 245 
 
 As Divine Revelation can never contraditfl righi 
 Reafon, (for they are two great Lights given us 
 by our Creator for oqr Conduct) fo Reafon ought by 
 no Means to aiTume to itfeif a Power to contradid: 
 pivine Revelation, 
 
 Though Revelation be not contrary to Reafon^ yet 
 there are four Claffes wherein Matters of Revela- 
 tion may be faid to rife above, or go beyond our 
 Reafon, 
 
 1. tVhen Revelation afferts two Things of which 
 we have clear IdeaSy to be joined, whofe Connecfion 
 or Agreement is not difcoverable by Reafon ; as when 
 Scripture informs us that I'he Bead fhall rife, that 
 ne Earth fhall be burnt up, and the Man Chrijl 
 
 ?efus fhall return from Heaven, none of thefe 
 'hings could ever be found out or proved by 
 Reafon. 
 
 2. When Revelation affirms any Propofttion, 
 while Reafon has no clear and difiin5i Ideas of 
 the Subje5l, or of the Predicate ; as God created 
 all Things by}t(\is Chrift : By the Urim and Thum- 
 mim God gave forth Divine Oracles, The Predi- 
 cate of each of thefe Propofitions is to us an ob- 
 fcure Idea, for we know not what was the peculiar 
 Agency of Jefus Chrifi when God the Father created 
 the World by him ; qor have we any clear and 
 certain Conception what the Urim and Thummim 
 were, nor how God g^ve Anfwers to his People by 
 them. 
 
 3. When Revelation, in plain and exprefs Lan- 
 guage, declares fome DoElrine which our Reafon at 
 prefent knows not with Evidence and Certainty how or 
 in what Senfe to reconcile to fome of its own Princi- 
 ples 5 as, that the Child Jefus is the mighty God, Efa. 
 ix. 6. which Propoficion carries a feeming Oppofi- 
 tion to the Unity and Spirituality of the Godhead, 
 ^hich are Principles of Reafon. 
 
 4. When 
 
246 LOG IC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 4. men tivo Propofitions or Do5lrine5 are plainly 
 ajferted by divine Revelation, which our Reafon at 
 frefent knows net how or in what Senfe with Evidence 
 and Certainty to reconcile with one another ; as. The 
 Father is the only true Gcd, John xvii. 3. and yet 
 Chrijl is over all, God blejfed for ever^ Rom. ix. 5. 
 
 Now divine Revelation having declared all thefe 
 Propofitions, Reafon is bound to receive them, be- 
 caufe it cannot prove them to be utterly inconfiftenc 
 or impoflible, the' the Ideas of them may be ob- 
 Icure, tho' we ourfelves fee not the rational Connexi- 
 on of them, and tho' we know not certainly how 
 to reconr#e them. In thefe Cafes Reafon mufh fub- 
 mit to Faith ; that is, we are hound to believe what 
 God afferts, and wait till hefhall clear up that which 
 feems dark and difFicult, and till the Myfferies of 
 Faith fliall be farther explained to us either in this 
 World or in the World to come*, and Reafon it^ 
 felf didlates this Submiflion. 
 
 VII^J^ Bire5lion. It is very ufeful to have fome ge- 
 mral Principles of Truth fettled in the Mind^ whofe 
 Evidence is great and obvious, that they may he al- 
 ways ready at hand to affift us in judging of the great 
 Variety of Things which occur, Thefe may be call'd 
 frft Notions, or fundamental Principles -, for though 
 many of them are deduced from each other, yet 
 rnoft or all of them may be called Principles when 
 compared with a thoufand other Judgments which 
 we form under the Regulation and Influence of 
 thefe primary Propofitions. 
 
 Every Art and Science, as well as the Affairs of 
 civil Life and Religion, have peculiar Principles 
 of this Kind belonging to them. There are Me- 
 taphyfical, Phyfual, Mathematical, Political, Oem~ 
 mmical. Medicinal, Theological, Moral and Pni- 
 
 ♦ See fonjcUiJng more on thi£ Sabjcdl;, Dlr:a. 11. p-eccd. and Chap. V. Sc3. 6, 
 
 dcntial 
 
C. IV. The right Ufe ^Reafon. 2:47 
 
 dential Principles of Judgment. It would be too 
 tedious to give a Specimen of them all in this 
 Place. Thofe, which are of the moil univerfal Ufe 
 to us both as Men and as ChnjJian.f^ may be found 
 in the following Chapter among the Rules of Judg- 
 ment about 'particular Ohjtols, 
 
 Vlllth T)ire5lion. L.et the Degrees of your AJfent 
 to every Propofition hear an exatl Proportion to the 
 different Degrees of Evidence. Remember this is 
 one of the greatell Principles of Wifdom that Man 
 can arrive at in this World, and the beft human 
 Security againll dangerous Miftakes in Speculation 
 or Pradice. 
 
 In the Nature of Things of which our Know- 
 ledge is made up there is infinite Variety in their 
 Degrees of Evidence. And as God hath given our 
 Minds a Power to fufpend their AlTent till the 
 Evidence be plain, fo we have a Power to re- 
 ceive Things which are propofed to us with a 
 ftronger or weaker Belief in infinite Variety of 
 Degrees proportionable to their Evidence. I be- 
 lieve that the Planets are inhabited^ and I believe 
 that the Earth rolls among them yearly round the 
 Sun ; but I don't believe both thefe Propofitions 
 with an equal Firmnefs of AfTent, becaufe the Ar- 
 guments for the latter are drawn from mathematical 
 Ohfervations \ but the Arguments for the former are 
 bat probable Conje^iures and moral Reafomngs. Yet 
 neither do I believe either of thefe Propofitions fo 
 firmly, as I do that the Earth is about twenty four 
 thoufand Miles rounds becaufe the mathematical 
 Proof of this is much eafier, plainer and ftronger. 
 Anti yet farther, when I fay that the Earth was 
 created by the Power of God^ I have ftill a more in- 
 fallible AfTurance of this than of all the reft, becaufe 
 Reafon and Scripture ioin to afiure me of it. 
 
24S LOG I C K: Or, Part it 
 
 IX^^ DireSfm, Keep your Mind always open to 
 receive Truth, and never Jet Limits to your own Im- 
 frcvements. Be ready always to hear what may be 
 obje(5led even againfl your favourite Opinions, and 
 thofe which have had longeft PofTeflion of your 
 Aflent. And if there (hould be any new and un- 
 controulable Evidence brought againfl: thefe old or 
 beloved Sentiments, don't wink your Eyes fall 
 againfl: the Light, but part with any Thing for the 
 Sake of Truth : Remember when you overcome 
 an Error you gain Truth •, the Vidlory is on your 
 Side, and the Advantage is all your own. 
 
 1 confcfs thofe grand Principles of Belief and 
 Fra3ice which univerfally influence our Conducl 
 both with Regard to this Life and the Life to 
 come, fhould be fappofed to be well fettled in the 
 firfl: Years of our Studies, fuch as, the Exigence 
 and Providence of God, the Truth of Chri(lianity, th^ 
 Authority of Scripture, the great Bjdes of Mora^ 
 lity, ^c. We fliould avoid a light fluttering Ge- 
 nius, ever ready to change our Foundations, and 
 to be carried about with every Wind of Do5frine, 
 To guard againfl which Inconvenience, we fliould 
 labour with earneft Diligence and fervent Prayer, 
 that our mofl: fundamental and important Points of 
 Belief and Practice may be eftabiiflied upon jufl: 
 Grounds of Renfon and Scripture when we come to 
 Years of Dlfcretion, and fit to judge for ourfrlves 
 in fuch important Points. Yet flnce it is poflible 
 that the Folly or Prejudices of younger Years may 
 have eftabiiflied Perfons in fome miftaken Senti- 
 ments, even in very important Matters^ we fliould 
 always hold ourfelves ready to receive any new Ad- 
 vantage toward the Corredion or Improvement 
 even of our eftahli/hcd Principles, as well as Opinions 
 of leflTcr Moment. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
C. V. The right Ufe of Reafon. 249 
 
 CHAP V. 
 
 Special ^ Rules to direct us in judging ofparti^ 
 cular ObjeBs. 
 
 IT would be endlefs to run thro* all thofe par- 
 ticular Objeds concerning which we have Oc- 
 cafion to pafs a Judgment at one Time or an- 
 other. Things of the moft frequent Occurrence, 
 of the wideft Extent, and of the greateft Im- 
 portance, are the Objedls and Exercifes o^Senfe^ 
 of Reafon and Speculation^ the Matters of Mora- 
 lity y Religion^ and Prudence, of human' and divine 
 Tejlimonyy together with the Effays of Reafoning 
 upon Things paft and future. Special Rules relating 
 fo all thefe will be the Subjed of the following Sec- 
 tions. 
 
 SECT I. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment concerning the 
 OhjeBs of Senje, 
 
 f "TT^ H O' our Senfes are fometimes liable to be 
 JL deceived, yet when they are rightly difpo- 
 fed, and fitly exercifed about their proper Ohje^fs, 
 with the juft AfTiftance of Reafon^ they give us 
 fufHcient Evidence of Truth. 
 
 This may be proved by an Argument drawn 
 from the fVifdom, Goodnefs^ and Faithfulnefs of 
 God our Creator, It was He gave us our Senfes^ 
 and he would not make us of fuch a Conftitution 
 as to be liable to perpetual Deception and una- 
 voidable Error in ufing thefe Faculties of »S^«/^ in 
 the beft Manner we are capable of, about thefe 
 
 very 
 
250 LOGIC K: Or, t^art It 
 
 very Things which are the proper Objedls of 
 them. 
 
 This may be proved alfo by the ill Coiifequences 
 that would follow from the Suppofition of the con- 
 trary. If we could have no Certainty or che Dic- 
 tates of our Senfes, we could never be fureofany of 
 the common Affairs and Occurrences of Life. Men 
 could not tranfaifl any of their civil or moral Con- 
 cerns with any Certainty or Juftice ; nor indeed 
 could we eat or drink, walk or move with Safety, 
 Our Senfes direct us in all thefe. 
 
 Again, the Matters of Religion depend in fome 
 Meafure upon the Certainty of the Dictates of 
 Se7ife •, for Faith comes by Hearing •, and it is to 
 our Senfes that God appeals in working Miracles 
 to prove his own Revelation. Now if when our 
 Eyes and Ears, and other Organs of Senfe are 
 rightly difpofed and exercifed about their proper 
 Objedls, they were always liable to be deceived^ 
 there could be no Knowledge of the Gofpel, no 
 Proof of divine Revelation by Vifions, Voices, or 
 Miracles. 
 
 Our Senfes will difcover Things near lis arid 
 round about us, which are necelTary for our pre- 
 fent State with fufficient Exadlnefs, and Things 
 diflant alfo, fo far as they relate to our necelTary 
 Ufe of them. 
 
 Nor is there Need of any more accurate Rules 
 for the Ufe of our Senfes in the Judgment of all 
 the common Affairs of Life^ or even of miraculous 
 and divine Operations, than the vulgar Part of 
 Mankind are fufficiently acquainted with by Na- 
 ture, and by their own daily Obfervations. 
 
 But if we would exprefs thefe Rules in a more 
 exadl Manner, hozv to judge by the Diofates of our 
 Senfes, they (hould be reprefented thus : 
 
 I. We 
 
C. V. S. I. The right Ufe of Reafon. zsx 
 
 1. We muft take Care that the Organs of our 
 Senfe he rightly difpofed^ and not under the Power 
 of any Djftemper or confiderable Decay ; as for 
 Inftance, that our Eyes are not tindlured with the 
 Jaundice^ when we would judge of Colours^ left 
 we pronounce them all yellow : That our Hands 
 are not burning in a Fever^ nor benumb'd with 
 Froft or the Palfy^ when we would judge of the 
 Heat or Coldnefs of any Objed : That our Palate 
 be not vitiated by any Difeafe^ or by fome other 
 improper Tajle^ when we would judge of the true 
 Tajle of any Solid or Liquid. This Diredion re- 
 lates to all our Senfes^ but the following Rules 
 chiefly refer to our Sight, 
 
 2. We mud obferve whether the Ohje^f he at a 
 proper Dtftance^ for if it be too near or too far off, 
 our Eyes will not fufficiently diftinguifh many 
 Things which are properly the Objeds of Sight ; 
 and therefore fif poffible) we muft make nearer 
 Approaches to the ObjecSt, or remove iarrher from 
 it, till we have obtained that due Diftance which 
 gives us the cleareft Perception. 
 
 3. We mufr noc employ our Sight to take a 
 full Survey at once of OhjeHs that are too large for 
 it, but we muft view them by Parts, and then 
 judge of the Whole: Nor muft our Scnfes judge 
 of Ohje^s too fmally for fome Things which ap- 
 pear thro' Glafles to be really and diftindly exif- 
 tent are either utterly invifible, or greatly con- 
 fufed when we would judge of them by the naked 
 Eye. 
 
 4. We muft place ourfelves m fuch a Pofition 
 toward the Ohjc^f, or place the Ohje^l in fuch a 
 Pofition toward our Eye^ as may give us the clear- 
 eft Reprefentation of it j for a different Pofition 
 greatly alters the Appearance of the Shape of Bo- 
 dies. And for this Reafon we fhould change the 
 
 R PoftiGn 
 
252 L G I C K: Or, Part It 
 
 Pofition both of the Eye and the Olje^ in lome 
 Cafes, that by viewing the Ohje^ in fc-veral Appear- 
 ances we may pafs a naore complete and certain 
 Judgment concerning it. 
 
 5. We muft confider what the Medium is by 
 which Ohjebls are reprefented to our Senfes ; whe- 
 ther it be thinner or thicker *, whether it be Air, 
 or Vapour, or Water, or Glafs, &c, whether ic 
 be duly enlightened or dufl<:y ; whether it reflect 
 or refra(ft, or only tranfmit the Appearance of the 
 Objedl •, and whether it be tindured with any 
 particular Colour ; whether it be moving or at 
 Reft. 
 
 6. We muft: fometimes ufe other Helps to afllft: 
 our Senfes •, and if we make ufe or GlaJJes^ we 
 muft make all juft Allowances for the Thicknefs 
 or Thinnefs of them, for the Clearnefs or Dulnefs, 
 for the Smoothnefs or Roughnefs, for the Plain- 
 nefs, the Convexity or Concavity of them, and for 
 the Diftance at which thefe Glafles are placed from 
 the Eye, or from the Obje6l, (or from one ano- 
 ther, if there be two or more Glafles ufed) and 
 all this according to the Rules of Art. The fame 
 fort of Caution ftiould be ufed alfo in Mediums 
 which aftift the Hearing, fuch as Speaking-Trumpets^ 
 Hearing- 'Trumpets^ &c. 
 
 7. If the Object may be propofed to more Senfes 
 than one^ let us call in the Affiftance of fome 
 other Senfes to examine it, and this will encreafe 
 the Evidence of what one Senfe didates. Ex. gr. 
 Our Ear may affift our Eye in judging of the Di- 
 ftance of Bodies, which are both vifible and fo- 
 iiorous, as an exploded Cannon, or a Cloud charged 
 with Thunder. Our Feeling may afTift our Sight in 
 judging of the Kind, the Shape, Situation, or Di- 
 ftance of Bodies that are near at Hand, as whe- 
 ther a Garment be Silk or Stuff, ^c. So if I both 
 
C. V. S. 2; "The right Ufe of Reafon. 253 
 
 fee^ hear, and embrace my Friend, I am fure he is 
 prefenc. 
 
 8. We iliould alfo make fever al Tryals^ at fome 
 diilant Times, and in different Circumftances, com- 
 paring former Experiments with later, and our 
 own Obfervations with thofe of other Perfons. 
 
 It is by fuch Methods as thefe that modern Phi- 
 lofophy has been fo greatly improved by the ufe of 
 fenjihle Experiments, 
 
 SECT. IL 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 Reafon and Speculation. 
 
 IT is by Reafon we judge both in Matters of 
 Speculation and Pra^ice ; there are peculiar 
 Rules which relate to Things pra5licaly whether 
 they be Matters of Religion^ Morality^ or Prudence^ 
 yet many Things in this Sedion may be applied to 
 pra5iical Enquiries and Matters of Faith^ though 
 it chiefly relates to Knowledge or Speculations of 
 Reafon. 
 
 1. Whatfoever clear Ideas we can join together 
 without Inconfiftency, are to be counted Poffihle^ 
 becaufe Almighty Power can make whatfoever we 
 can conceive. 
 
 2. From the mere Foffihiltty of a Thing we can- 
 not infer its a5lual Exiftence-, nor from the Non^ 
 Exiftence of it can we infer its impoffihility , 
 
 Note, The Idea of God feems to claim an Ex- 
 emption from this general Rule ; for if he be pof- 
 fible, he certainly exifts, becaufe the very Idea 
 includes Eternity^ and he cannot begin to be : If 
 he exift not, he is impoiTible, for the very fame 
 Reafon, 
 
 R 2 ^. What- 
 
254 L G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 3. Whatfoever is evidently contained in the Idea 
 of any Thing, may be affirmed of that Thing with 
 Certainty. Reafon is contained in the Idea of a 
 Man \ and Exijtence is contained in the Idea of 
 God •, and therefore we may affirm God exiftsy and 
 Alan is reafonahle. 
 
 4. Ic is impoITible that the fame Thing fliould 
 be, and not be at the fame Time, and in the fame 
 Refpedl. Thence it follows, that two contradictory 
 Ideas cannot be joined in the fame Part of the fame 
 Subject, at the fame Time, and in the fame Reflects : 
 Or, that two contradictory Propofitions can never he 
 both true. 
 
 5. The more we converfe with any Subjed in 
 its various Properties^ the better Knowledge of it 
 we are likely to attain •, and by frequent and re- 
 peated Enquiries and Experiments, Reafonings 
 and Converfations about it, we confirm our true 
 Judgments of that Thing, and corredl our former 
 Miftakes. 
 
 6. Yet after our utmoft Enquiries, we can never 
 be afTured by Reafon, that we know all the Powers 
 and Properties of ^ny finite Being, 
 
 7. U finite Beings are not adequately known by 
 us, much lefs the Things infinite : For it is of the 
 Nature of -^finite Mind not to be able to compre- 
 prehend what is i?ifinite, 
 
 8. We may judge and argue very juflly and 
 certainly concerning Infinites, in fome Parts of 
 them, or fo far as our Ideas reach, tho' the Infi- 
 nity of them hath fomething incomprehenfible in 
 it. And this is built on the general Rule follow- 
 ing, viz. 
 
 9. Whatfoever is fufficiently clear and evident 
 ought not to be denied, tho' there are other Things 
 htlongirig to the fame Subjecl, whcih cannot be 
 comprehended. I may affirm many Things with 
 
 Certainty 
 
C. V. S. 2. "The right Ufe of Reafon. 255 
 
 Certain ry concerning hwnan Souh^ their Union with 
 Bodies^ concerning the Divifibilty of Matter^ and 
 the Attributes of God, tho' many other Things re- 
 lating to them are all Darknefs to us. 
 
 10. If any Opinion propoled has either no Argu- 
 7nents, or e(inal Arguments for and againft it, we 
 mutl remain in perfecfl Sufpence about it, till con- 
 vincing Evidence appear on one fide. 
 
 11. Where prefent NecefTity of Adlion does 
 not conilrain us to determine, we fliould not im- 
 mediately yield up our Afient to mere probable 
 Arguments, without a due Referve, if we have any 
 realbnable Hope of obtaining greater Light and 
 Evidence on one fide or the other : For when the 
 Balance of the Judgment once refigns its Equili- 
 hriiim or Neutrality to a mere probable Argument, 
 it is too ready to fettle itfelf on that fide, fo that 
 the Mind will not eafily change that Judgment, 
 tho' bright add ftrong Evidence appear afterwards 
 on the other fide. 
 
 12. Of two Opinions, if one has unanfwerable 
 Difficulties attending it, we muft not rejeifl it im- 
 mediately, till we examine whether the contrary 
 Opinion has not Difficulties as unanfwerable. 
 
 13. If each Opinion has Objehions againft it 
 which we cannot anfwer, or reconcile, we fhould 
 rather embrace that which has the leaft Difficul- 
 ties in it, and which has the beft Arguments to fup- 
 port it : And let our Affenc bear Proportion to the 
 iuperior Evidence. 
 
 14. If any Dodlrine hath very ftrong and fuf- 
 ficient Light and Evidence to command our A (Tent, 
 v/e fhould not reje6t it becaufe there is an Objec- 
 tion or two againft it which we are not able to 
 anfwer ; for upon this Foot a common Chriftian 
 vi^ould be baffled out of every Article of bis Faitby 
 and muft renounce even the Dictates of his Rea- 
 
 R 3 fin 
 
256 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 fon and his Senfes ; and the mod learned Man per- 
 haps would hold but very few of them faft : for 
 fome Objeclions which attend the facred Doc- 
 trine of the Eternity and the Oniftipre fence of God^ 
 and the philofophicai Doctrines of Lights Atomsy 
 Space^ Motiony ^c, are hardjy folvable to this 
 Day. 
 
 15. Where two Extremes are propofed, either 
 in Matters of Speculation or Practice, and neither 
 of them has certain and convincing Evidence ^ it is 
 generally fafeft to take the middle Way. Modera- 
 tion is more likely to come near the Truth than 
 dcuhlful Extremes, This is an excellent Rule to 
 judge of the Characters and Value of the greateft 
 Fart of Perfons and Things ; for Nature feldom 
 deals in Superlatives, It is a good Rule alfo by 
 which to form our Judgment in many fpeciilative 
 Controverfies •, a reconciling Medium in iuch Cafes 
 does ofcen bed fecure Truth as well as Peace. 
 
 1 6. When two different Propofitions have each 
 a very ftrong and cogent Evidence, and do not plain- 
 ly appear inconfiftent, we may believe both of 
 them, though we cannot at prefent fee the Way to 
 reconcile them, Reafon^ as well as our own Con- 
 fcioufnefsy afilires us, ih^t the fFi II of Man is Jree, 
 and that Multitudes of human Anions are in that 
 Refpe5 contingent ; and yet Reafon and Scripture 
 afllire us, that God foreknows them alU and this im- 
 plies a certain Fatality, Now though learned Men 
 have nor to this Day hit on any fo clear and hap- 
 py Method as is defired to reconcile thefe Propo- 
 fitions, yet fince we do not fee a plain Inconfiftency 
 in them, wc juflly believe them boih, becaufe their 
 Evidence is great. 
 
 17. Let us not therefore too fuddenly determine 
 in difficult Matters, that two Things arc utterly in- 
 confifient : For there are many Proportions which 
 
 may 
 
C. V. S. 2. The right life ^Reafon. 257 
 
 may appear hiconp.Jlent at firll, and yet afterwards 
 we tind their Coujijlency^ and the Way of recon- 
 ciling them may be made plain and eafy : As alfo, 
 there are other Propofitions which may appear 
 confijient at firfl, but after due Examination we find 
 their Inconfidency. 
 
 18. For the fame Reafon we fliould not call 
 thofe Difficulties utterly infolvahle^ or thofe Ob- 
 jections unanfwerable. which we are not prefently 
 able to anfvver : Time and Diligence may give far- 
 ther Light. 
 
 19. In fliort, if we will fecure ourfelves from 
 Error, we fhould not be two frequent or hafly in 
 affcrting the certain Confiftency or Inconftftency^ the 
 abfoiute Univerfality^ Neceffity^ or Impqffibility of 
 Things, where there is not the brighteft Evidence. 
 He is but a young and raw Philofopher, who, 
 when he fees two particular Ideas evidently agree y 
 immediatly afferts them to. agree univerfally, to 
 agree Jiecejfarily^ and that it is impqffihle it fhould be 
 otherwife : Or when he fees evidently that two par- 
 ticular Ideas happen to difagree^ he prefently alTerts 
 their conftant and natural Inconjiftency, their utter 
 ImpoJ/ibility of Agreement, and calls every thing 
 contrary to his Opinion Ahfurdity and Nonfenfe, A 
 true Philofopher will afHrm or deny with much 
 Caution or Modefty, unlefs he has thoroughly ex- 
 amined and found the Evidence of every Part of 
 his AfTertion exceeding plain. 
 
 20. Let us have a Care of building our AlTu- 
 rance of any important Point of Do6trine upon one 
 fingle Argument^ if there are more 1:0 be obtained. 
 
 We fhould not flight and rejedl all other Argu- 
 ments which fupport the fame Dodlrine, left if 
 om favourite Argument fhould be refuted, and fail 
 us, wc: fhould be tempted to abandon that /;;2/3or- 
 tam Principle of Truth. I think this was a very 
 
 R 4 ' culpable 
 
25S L G I C K: Or, Part IL 
 
 culpable Pradice in Defcartes^ and fome of his Fol- 
 lowers, who when he had found out the Argu- 
 ment for the Exiflence of God^ derived from the 
 Idea of a moft -per feci andjelf-exiftent Being, he feemed 
 to defpife and abandon all other Arguments againft 
 Atheifin. 
 
 21. If we happen to have our chief Arguments 
 for any Opinion refuted, we fliould not immedi- 
 ately give up the O[)inion itlelf; for perhaps it 
 may be a Truth ftill, and we may find it to be 
 juftly lupported by other Arguments, which we 
 might once think weaker, or perhaps by new Ar- 
 guments which we knew not before. 
 
 22. We ought to elleem that to be fuficient E- 
 evidence of a Propofition, where both the Kind and 
 the Force of the Arguments or Proofs are as great 
 as the Nature of the Thing admits, and as the 
 NecefTity or Exigence of the Cafe requires. So if 
 we have ^ credible and certain Teftimony that Chrift 
 rofe from the Dead, it is enough ; we are not to 
 exped mathematical or ocular Demonfl ration for it, 
 at leafl in our Day. 
 
 23. Tho' we fliould feek what Proofs may be 
 attained of any Propofition, and we Ihould receive 
 any Number of Arguments which are jull and 
 evident for the Confirmation of the fame Truth, 
 yet we mud not judge of the Truth of any Pro- 
 pofition by the Number of Arguments which are 
 brought to fupport it, but by the Strength and 
 Weight of the?n : A Building will (land firmer and 
 longer on four large Pillars of Marble, than on 
 ten of Sand, or Earth, or Timber. 
 
 24. Yet where certain Evidence is not to be 
 found or expedcd, a confiderable Nu?nber of pro- 
 bable Arguments carry great Weight with them 
 even in Matters of Speculation. That is a proba- 
 ble Ilypothefis in Philofphy or in Geology, which 
 
 goes 
 
C. V. S. 3. The right Ufe of Reafon. 259 
 
 goes fartheft toward the Solution of many difficult 
 Queflions arifing on any Subjedt. 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 Morality and Religion, 
 
 HERE it may be proper in the firft Place 
 to mention a few Definitions of Words or 
 Terms. 
 
 By Matters of Morality and Religion I mean 
 thofe Things which relate to our Duty to God, our 
 Selves, or our Fellow-Creatures. 
 
 Moral Good^ or Virtue^ or Holinefs^ is an Ac- 
 tion or Temper conformable to the Rule of our Du- 
 ty. Moral Evily or Fice^ or Sin, is an Adion or 
 Temper unconformable to the Rule of our Duty, 
 or a Negledl to fulfil it. 
 
 Note, The Words Fice or Firtue chiefly imply 
 the Relation of our Adions to Men and this World : 
 Sin and Holinefs rather imply their Relation to God 
 and the other World. 
 
 Natural Good is that which gives us Pleafure or 
 Satisfadtion. Natural Evil is that which gives us 
 Pain or Grief. 
 
 Happinefs confifts In the Attainment of the higheft 
 and moft lafting natural Good. Mifery confills in 
 faffering the higheft and moft lafting natural Evil ; 
 that is, in Ihort, Heaven or Hell, 
 
 Tho' this be a juft Account of perfect Happinefs 
 and perfe5i Mifery, yet wherefoever Pain overba- 
 lances Pleafure, there is a Degree of Mifery ; ' and 
 wherefoever Pleafure overbalances Pain^ there is a 
 Degree of Happinefs, 
 
 I proceed 
 
26o L G I C K : Or, Part II. 
 
 I proceed now to lay down fome Principles and 
 Rules of Judgvient in Matters of Morality and Re- 
 ligion. 
 
 1. The Will of our Maker, whether difcovered 
 by Reafon or Revelation, carries the higheft Au- 
 thority with it, and is therefore the higheft Rule ef 
 Duty to intelligent Creatures ; a Conformity or 
 Non-conformity to it determines their Adions to be 
 morally good or evil. 
 
 2. Whatfjever is really an immediate Duty to- 
 ward ourfelves, or toward our Fellow-Creatures, 
 is more remotely a Duty to God ; and therefore in 
 the Pradice of it we fhould have an Eye to the 
 Will of God as our Rule., and to his Glory as our 
 End. 
 
 2. Our wife and gracious Creator has clofely 
 uni:cd our Duty and our Happinefs together ; and 
 has conne61:ed Sin., or Vice^ and Puni/Jjment ; that 
 is, he has ordained that the higheft natural Good 
 and Evil fhould have a dole Connexion with mo" 
 ral Good and Evil., and that both in the Nature 
 of Things, and by his own pofitive Appoint- 
 ment. 
 
 4. Confcience fhould feek all due Information 
 in order to determine what is Duty^ and what 
 is Sin^ becaufe Happinefs and Mifery depend upon 
 it, 
 
 5. On this Account our Inclination to prefent 
 temporal Good., and our Averfion to prefent tempo- 
 ■ral Evil, muft be wilely overbalanced by the Con- 
 fideration of future and eternal Good or Evil, that is, 
 Happinefs or Mifery, And for this Reafon we 
 iliould not omit a Duty or commit a Sin, to 
 gain any temporal Good, or to avoid any temporal 
 Evil. 
 
 6. Tho* 
 
C. V. S. 3. I'he right life df Reafon. 261 
 
 6. Tho' our natural Reafon in a State of Innocence 
 might be fufficient to find out thofe Duties which 
 were necefiary for an innocent Creature, in order 
 to abide m the Favour of his Maker, yet in 2l fallen 
 State our natural Reafon is by no means fufficient to 
 find out all that is necefTary to reflore a fmful Crea- 
 ture to the divine Favour. 
 
 7. Therefore God hath condefcended in vari- 
 ous Ages of Mankind to reveal to fmful Men what 
 he requires of them in order to their Reftoration^ 
 and has appointed in his Word fome peculiar Mat- 
 ters of Faich and Pradice, in order to their Sal- 
 vacion. This is called revealed Religion^ as the 
 Things knowable concerning God, and our Duty 
 by the Light of Nature are called natural Reli- 
 gion. 
 
 There are alfo many Parts of Morality^ and 
 natural Religion^ or many natural Duties relating 
 to God, to ourfelves, and to our Neighbours, 
 which would be exceeding difficult and tedious 
 for the Bulk of Mankind to find out and deter- 
 mine by natural Reafon ; therefore ic has pleafed 
 God in this facred Book of Divine Revelation to 
 exprefs the mod necefTary Duties of this kind in 
 a very plain and eafy Manner, and made them in- 
 telligible to Souls of the lowefl Capacity ; or they 
 may be very eafily derived thence by the Ufe of 
 Reafon. 
 
 9. As there are fome Duties much more fiecef- 
 Jary^ and more important than others are, fo every 
 
 Duly requires our Application to underftand and 
 pradife it in Proportion to its Neceffity and Impor^ 
 tance, 
 
 10. Where two Duties feem to fland in Op- 
 pofition to each other, and we cannot pra6life 
 both, the lefs mufh give Way to the greater^ and 
 the Omiffion of the lefs is not fmful. So ceremo- 
 nial 
 
262 LOGIC K: Or, Part IL 
 
 nial Laws give Way to moral : God will have Mer- 
 cy and not Sacrifice, 
 
 11. Ill Du'uic^s of natural Religion^ we may 
 judge of the different Degrees of their NecelTity 
 and Importance by Reafony according to their 
 greater or more apparent Tendency to the Ho- 
 nour of God and the Good of Men : But in Mat- 
 ters of r^'y^^/^^ Religion, it i$ only divine Revela- 
 tion can certainly inform us what is moft ne- 
 ceflary and moft important ; yet we may be 
 aflifted alfo in that Search by the Exercifes of 
 Reafon. 
 
 12. In Adions wherein there may htfome Scru- 
 ple about the Duty or Lawfulnefs of them, we 
 Ihould chufe always the fafeft Side, and abftain as 
 far as we can from the Pradice of Things whofe 
 Lawfulnefs we fufpedl. 
 
 13. Points of the great eft Importance in human 
 Life, or in Religion, are generally the moft evi- 
 dent, both in the Nature of Things, and in the 
 Word of God ; and where Points of Faith or 
 Pradice are exceeding difficult to find out, they 
 cannot be exceeding important. This Proportion 
 may be proved by the Goodnefs and Faithfulnefs 
 of God, as well as by Experience and Obferva- 
 tion. 
 
 14. In fome of the outward Pradlices and 
 Forms of Religion, as well as human Affairs, 
 there is frequently a prefent Neceffity of fpeedy Ac- 
 tion one Way or another : In fuch a Cafe, hav- 
 ing furveyed Arguments on both Sides, as far as 
 our Time and Gircumftances admit, we muft 
 guide our Pradice by thofe Reafons which appear 
 moft probable^ and feem at that Time to overbalance 
 the reft -, yet always referving room to admit far- 
 ther Light and Evidence, when fuch Occurrences 
 return again. It is a Prepnderation of circumftantial 
 
 Arguments 
 
C. V. S. 4. "The right XJJe (j/Reafon. 265 
 
 Argufnents that muft determine our Actions in a 
 thoufand Occurrences. 
 
 15. We may alfo determine upon probable Ar^ 
 guments where the Matter is o^ fmall Confequence 
 and would not anfwer the Trouble of feeking af- 
 ter Certainty, Life and Time are more precious 
 than to have a large Share of them laid out in 
 fcrupulous Enquires, whether fmoaking TobaccOy or 
 wearing a Periwig be lawful or no. 
 
 1 6. In Affairs of greater Importance^ and which 
 may have a long, lading, and extenfive Influ- 
 ence on our future Condu6t or Happinefs, we 
 fhould not take up with Probabilities^ if Certain- 
 ty may be attained. Where there is any Doubt 
 on the Mind, in fuch Cafes we fhould call in the 
 AfTiflance of all Manner of Circumftances, Rea- 
 fons, Motives, Confequences on all Sides : We 
 mufl wait longer and with earnefl Requeft feek 
 human and divine Advice before we fully deter- 
 mine our Judgment and our Pradlice, according 
 to the old Roman Sentence, ^od ftatuendum eft 
 
 femeU deliberandum eft diu. We Ihould be long 
 in confidering what we muit determine once for 
 all. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of hu* 
 man Prudence. 
 
 TH E great Defign of Prudence^ as diflinft 
 from Morality and Religion^ is to determine 
 and manage every Affair with Decency, and to 
 the befl Advantage. 
 
 This is decent^ which is agreeable to our State, 
 Condition, or Circumflances, whether it be in 
 Behaviour, Difcourfe, or Aclion, 
 
 That 
 
^64 LOG I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 That is advantageous which attains the moft and 
 beft Purpofes, and avoids the moft and greateft In- 
 conveniencies. 
 
 As there is infinite Variety in the Circumftances 
 of Perfons^ Things^ A5iions^ Times and Places fo 
 we muft be furnifhed with fuch general Rules as 
 are accommodable to all this Variety by a wife 
 Judgment and Difcretion ; For whai is an A6t of 
 confiimmate Prudence in fome Times ^ Places and 
 Circumftances^ would be confiimmate Folly in others. 
 Now thefe Rules may be ranged in the following 
 Manner. 
 
 1. Our Regard to Perfons or Things fhould be 
 governed by the Degrees of Concermnent we have 
 with them, the Relation we have to them, or the 
 Expeulation we have from them. Thefe fhould be 
 the Meafures by which we (hould proportion 
 our Diligence and Application in any thing that re- 
 lates to them. 
 
 2. We fhould always confider whether the 
 Thing we purfue by attainable •, whether it be 
 worthy our Purfiiit ; whether it be worthy the 
 Degree of Purfuit ; whether it be worthy of the 
 Means ufed in order to attain it. This Rule is ne- 
 cefTary both in Matters of Knowledge^ and Matters 
 of Practice, 
 
 3. When the Advantages and Difadvantages^ 
 Conveniencies and Inconveniencies of any Adion are 
 balanced together, we mufl finally determine on 
 that Side which has the fuperi^r Weight; and the 
 fooner in Things which are necelTurily and fpeedily 
 to be done or determined. 
 
 4. If Advantages and Difadvantages in their 
 own Nature are equal, then thofe which are moft 
 certain or likely as to the Event fhould turn the 
 Scale of our Judgment, and determine our Prac- 
 tice, 
 
 5, Where 
 
C. V. S. 4. ne right Ufe of Reafon. 265 
 
 5. Where the ImprohaViUties of Succefs or Ad- 
 vantage are greater than the Probabilities^ it is 
 not Prudence to acft or venture. It is proper to 
 enquire whether this be not the Cafe in almoft all 
 Lotteries ; for they that hold Stakes will certainly 
 fecure Part to therrjfelves; and only the Remainder 
 being divided into Prizes muft render the Improba- 
 lity of Gain to each Adventurer greater than the 
 Probability, 
 
 6. We Ihould not defpife or negledl any real 
 Mvantage^ and abandon the Purfuit of it, though 
 we cannot attain • all the Advantages that we defire. 
 This would be to a6l like Children^ who are fond 
 of fomething which ftrikes their Fancy mofl, and 
 fullen and regardlefs of every thing elfe, if they are 
 not humoured in that Fancy. 
 
 7. Tho' 2l general Knowledge of Things be ufeful 
 in Science and in human Life, yet we fhould con- 
 tent ourfelves with a more fuperficial Knowledge 
 of thofe Things which have the leaft Relation to 
 our chief End and Defign. 
 
 8. This Rule holds good alfo in Matters of Bu- 
 finefs and Pra5iice^ as well as in Matters of Know- 
 ledge ; and therefore we fijotdd not grafp at every 
 'Things left in the End we attain nothing, Perfons 
 that either by an Inconftancy of Temper, or by a 
 vain Ambition, will purfue every Sort of Art and 
 Science, Study and Bufmefs, feldom grow excellent 
 in any one of them : And Proje5iors who form 
 tv/enty Schemes feldom ufe fufHcient Application 
 to finifh one of them, or make it turn to good 
 Account. 
 
 9. Take heed of delaying and trifling amongO: 
 the Means inftead of reaching at the End. Take 
 heed of wafting a Life in fncre fpeculative Studies, 
 which is called to Aclion and Employment : Dwell 
 not too long in pMofphical^ inathematicaU or 
 
 gravima - 
 
z66 LOGIC K: Or, Part II. 
 
 grammatical Parts of Learning, when your chief 
 Defign is Law^ Phyfick^ or Divinity, Do not 
 fpend the Day in gathering Flowers by the Way 
 Side, left Night come upon you before you arrive 
 at your Journey's End, and then yo will not 
 reach it. 
 
 10. Where the Cafe and Circumftances of wife and 
 good Men refemble our own Cafe and Circumftances ^ 
 we may borrow a great deal of Inftrudlion toward 
 our prudent Condudt from their Example^ as well 
 as in all Cafes we may learn much from their Con- 
 verfation and Advice, 
 
 11. After all o\}i\tx Rules remember this, that 
 mere Speculation in Matters of human Prudence can 
 never be a perfedl Diredor without Experience and 
 Obfervation, We may be content therefore in 
 our younger Years to commit fome unavoidable 
 Miftakes in Point of Prudence, and we fhall fee 
 Miftakes enough in the Condud of others, both 
 which ought to be rreafured up amongft our ufe- 
 ful Ohfervations^ in order to teach us better Judg- 
 ment for Time to come. Sometimes the Mif- 
 takes^ Imprudences and Follies^ which ourfelves or 
 others have been guilty of, give us brighter and 
 more effedtual Leflbns of Prudence^ than the wifeft 
 Councils, and the faireft Examples could ever have 
 done, 
 
 S E C T. V. 
 
 Principles and Rules, of Judgment in Matters of 
 human Teftimony, 
 
 TH E Evidence of hu?nan Tefiimony is not fo 
 proper to lead us into the Knowledge of 
 the Efjence and inward Nature of Things, as to 
 acquaint us with the Exiftence of Things, and to 
 
 inform 
 
C. V.S.J. The right life of Kc^^on. 26 f 
 inform us of Matters of Fa£l both paft and pre- 
 fent. And though there be a great deal of Fallibi- 
 lity in the Teftimony of Men, yet there are fome 
 Things we may be almoft as certain of, as that the 
 Sun (hines^ or that five Twenties make an Hundred. 
 Who is there at London that knows any Thing of 
 the World, but believes there is fuc'h a City as 
 Faru in France •, that the Pope dwells at Rome ; 
 that Julius Caefar was an Emperor^ or that Luther 
 had a great Hand in the Reformation ? 
 
 If we obferve the following Rules, we may ar- 
 rive at fuch a Certainty in many Things of human 
 Teftimony, as that it is morally impofTible we 
 Ihould be deceived, f. e. we may obtain a tnoral 
 Certainty, 
 
 1. Let us confider whether the Thing reported 
 be in itfelf pfjihle \ if not, it can never be credible^ 
 whofoever relates it. 
 
 2. Confider farther whether it be prohahle^ whe- 
 ther there are any concurring Circumftances to prove 
 it, befide the mere Teftimony of the Perfon that 
 relates it. I confefs if thefe laft Conditions are 
 wanting the Thing may be true, but then ic 
 ought to have the ftronger Teftimony to fup- 
 port it. 
 
 3. Confider whether the Perfon who relates ic 
 be capable of knowing the Truth : Whether he be a 
 Jkilful Judge in fuch Matters, if it be a Bufinefs of 
 
 Art, or a nice Appearance in Nature, or fome 
 curious Experiment in Philofophy. But if it be 
 a mere Occurrence in Life, a plain, fenfible Mat- 
 ter of Fa6t, it is enough to enquire whether he 
 who relates ic were an Eye or Ear-fViln^fs^ or 
 whether he himfelf had it only by Hearfay^ or can 
 trace it up to the Original. 
 
 S 4. Con- 
 
268 L O G I C K: Or, Part. IL 
 
 4. ConfiJcr whetluT the Narrator be honejl and 
 faubful^ as well as Ikillui : Whether he hath no 
 
 Eiafsw^on his Mind, no peculiar Gain or Profit 
 by believing or reporting it, no Inter eft or Prin- 
 ciple which might warp his own Belief afide from 
 Irtuh, or which might tempt him to prevaricate, 
 10 Tpeak talfly, or to give a Repreientation a little 
 (different From the naked Truth of Things. In 
 Ihort, whether there be no Occafton of Sufpicion 
 concerning his Report. 
 
 5. Corud<:r wliether fever al Perfons agree toge- 
 ther in the Report of this Matter ; and if fo, then 
 whether thefc Perfons w^ho joined together in their 
 Teftimony might not be iuppofed to combine to- 
 gether in a Falfjood, Whether they are Perfons 
 of Efficient Skilly' Probity and Credit, It might- 
 be alfo enquired, whether they are of different Na- 
 tions, Setts, Parties, Opinions, or Intercds. For 
 the more divided they are in all thefe^ the more 
 likely is their Report to be true, if they agree 
 together in their Account of the fame Thing ; 
 and cfpcciaily if they perfiil in it without waver- 
 
 ing 
 
 6. Comlder farther, whether the Report were 
 capable of being eafily refuted at fir ft if it had not been 
 true; il lb, this confirms the Teftimony. 
 
 7. Enquire yet again, whether there has been a 
 conftant^ m/ifonn Tradition and Belief of f.hi^' Matter 
 from the very firfb Age or Time when the Thing 
 was tran faded, without any realbnable Doubts or 
 Con traditions Or^ 
 
 8. If any Part of it hath been doubted by any 
 confiderable Perfons, whether it has been fearched 
 out and afterwards confirmed^ by having all the 
 Scruples and Doubts removed. In either of thefe 
 Cafes the Teftimony becomes more firm and cre- 
 dible, 
 
 9. En- 
 
G. V: S. 5. The right Ufe of Reafon. 26^ 
 
 9. Enquire on the other Hand, whether there 
 are any confiderable OhjeEliom remaining againft 
 the Belief of that Propofition fo attefted. Whe- 
 ther there be any Thing very improhahle in the 
 Thing itfelf. Whether any concurrent Circumftances 
 feem to oppofe it. Whether any Pcrfon or Perfons 
 give a pnfuive and plain Teftimony againji it. Whe- 
 ther they are equally skilful^ and equally faithful as 
 thofe who alTcrt it. Whether they be as many or 
 more in Number, and whether they might have 
 any fecret Biafs or Influence on them to contradidt 
 it. 
 
 10. Sometimes the entire Silence of a Thing may 
 have fomething of Weight toward the Decifion of 
 a doubtful Point of Hiftory, or a Matter of hu- 
 man Faith, {viz.) where the Fac5l is pretended to 
 be publick, if the Perfons who are filent about 
 it were fkilful to obferve, and could not but know 
 fuch an Occurrence \ if they were engaged by 
 Principle or by Intereft to have declared it : if 
 they had fair Opportunity to fpeak of it : And 
 thefe Things may tend to make a Matter fufpi- 
 cious, if ic be not very well attefted by pofuive 
 Proof. 
 
 11. Remember that in fome Reports there are 
 more Marks of Faljhood than of Truth, and in 
 others there are more Marks of Truth than of Falfe^ 
 hood. By a Gomparifon of all thefe Things toge- 
 ther, and putting every Argument on one Side 
 and the other into the Balance, we mud form as 
 good a Judgment as we can which Side prepon- 
 derates ; and give a ftrong or a feeble Aflent or 
 Difient, or withhold our Judgment entirely, ac- 
 cording to greater or leffer Evidence, according to 
 more plain or dubious Marh of Truth or Falfe* 
 hood, 
 
 S i 12. Ob- 
 
270 L G I C K: Ory Part 11. 
 
 12. Obferve that in Matters of human Tefti- 
 mony there is oftentimes a great Mixture of Truth 
 and Falfiocd \n the Report itfelf: Some Parts of 
 the Story may be perfedly true, and fome utterly 
 falfe ; and fome may have fuch a blended Confu- 
 fion of Circumftances which are a little warpt afide 
 from the Truth, and mifreprefented, that there is 
 Need of good Skill and Accuracy to form a Judg- 
 ment concerning them, and determine which Part 
 is true, and which is falfe. The whole Report is 
 not to be believed, becaufe fome Parts are induhi- 
 tahly true^ nor the whole to be rejeded, becaufe 
 fome Parts are as evident Faljhoods, 
 
 We may draw two remarkable Ohfervations from 
 this Se^ion, 
 
 Ohfirv. I. How certain is the Truth of the 
 Chrijlian Religion^ and particularly of the Re fur * 
 region of Chrift^ which is a Matter of Fadt on 
 which Chriftianity is built ! We have almoft all 
 the concurrent Evidences that can be derived from 
 human Teftimony joining to confirm this glorious 
 Truth. The Fadt is not impoffible ; concurrent 
 Circumftances caft a favourable Afped: on it ; it 
 was foretold by one who wrought Miracles, and 
 therefore not unlikely, nor unexpected : The A- 
 poftles and firfl Difciples were Eye and Ear-Wit- 
 neflcs, for they converfed with their rifen Lord ; 
 they were the moft plain, honeft Men in them- 
 felves ; the Temptations of worldly Interefls did 
 rather difcourage their Belief and Report of it : 
 They all agree in this Matter, though they were 
 Men of different Charaders ; Pharifees and Fi/her- 
 men^ and Publicans^ Men of Judcea and Galilee^ 
 and perhaps fome Heathens^ who were early con- 
 verted : The Thing might eafily have been dif- 
 proved if it were falfe ; it hath been conveyed by 
 
 conftanc 
 
C. V. S. 6. The right life of Reafon. 271 
 
 conftant Tradition and Writing down to our Times ; 
 thofe who at firft doubted were afterwards convinced 
 by certain Proofs •, nor have any pretended to give 
 any Proof of the contrary, but merely denied the 
 Fad with Impudence in Oppofition to all thefe 
 Evidences. 
 
 Olferv, II. How weak is the Faith which is due 
 to a Multitude of Things in ancient human Hifto- 
 ry ! For though many of thefe Criteria^ or Marks 
 of Credibility are found plainly in the more general 
 andpuhlick Fa^s, yet as to a MultkudQ of pariicular 
 FaEis and Circumstance Sy how deficient are they in 
 fuch Evidence as fhould demand our AfTent ! Per- 
 haps there is nothing that ever was done in all paft 
 Ages, and which was not a publick Fad:, lb well 
 attefted as the Refurredion of Chrift. 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Principles 'and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 divine Teftimony. 
 
 AS human Teftimony acquaints us with Matters of 
 Fa5iy both paft SLud prefenty which lye beyond 
 the Reach of our own perfonal Notice*, fo divine 
 Teftimony is fuited to inform us both of the Nature 
 of ThingSy as well as Matters of Fa£iy and of 
 Things /i^/«r^, as well 2ls pre/ent or paft. 
 
 Whatfocver is didated to us by God himfelf, 
 or by Men who are divinely infpired, muft be be- 
 lieved with full AfTurance. Reafon demands us to 
 believe whatfoever divine Revelation didates : For 
 God is perfedly wife^ and cannot be deceived ; he 
 is faithful and good^ and will not deceive his Crea- 
 tures : And when Reafon has found out the cer- 
 tain Marks or Credentials of divine Teftimony to 
 S 3 belong 
 
272 L G I C K: Or, Part IL 
 
 belong to any Propoficion, there remains then no 
 farther Enquiry to be made, but only to find out 
 the true Senfe and Meaning of that which God 
 has revealed, for Reafon iilelt demands the Belief 
 of it. 
 
 Now divine Tejfimony or Revelation requires thefe 
 following Credentials. 
 
 I. That the Propofitions or Dodrines reveal- 
 ed be not inconfi^ent with Reafon ; for jntelligenc 
 Creatures can never be bound to believe real In- 
 con fiftencies. Therefore we are fure the popifh 
 Dodrine of Tranfubftantiation is not a Matter of 
 divine Revelation^ becaufe it is contrary to all our 
 Senfcs and our Reafon, even in their proper Exer- 
 tifes. 
 
 God can dictate nothing but what is worthy of 
 himfcU, and agreeable to his own Nature and di- 
 vine Perfedlions. Now many of thefe Perfedions 
 are difcoverable by the Light of Reafon, and what- 
 focver is inconfifttnt with thefe Perfections, cannot 
 be a divine Revelation, 
 
 Ba: let it be noted, that in Matters of Practice 
 towards our Fellow Creatures^ God may command 
 us to acl: in a Manner contrary to what Reafon 
 ^vould dired; antecedent to that Command. So 
 Abraham was commanded to offer up his Son a 
 Sacrifice : The Ifraeiites were ordered to borrow 
 of ihe Egyptians without, paying them, and to 
 plunder and flay the Inhabitants of Canaan : Be- 
 caufe God has a fovereign Right to all Things, 
 and can with Equity difpofTcfs his Creatures of 
 L-ife, and every Thing which he has given them, 
 «nd cfpccially fuch finful Creatures as Mankind ; 
 and he can appoint whom he pleafes to be the In- 
 (Irumencs of this juft DifpofTefTion or Depriva- 
 tion. So than thefe divine Commands are not 
 Rally incoufiftcnt with ri^ht Reafon i for whatfoever 
 
 is 
 
C. V. S. 6. The right life of Reafon. 273 
 
 is fo cannot be believed where that Inccnfiftency 
 appears. 
 
 2. Upon the fame Account the iz^hole Doclrine 
 of Revelaticn muft be coyifijlent with itfelf ; every 
 Part of it mud be conliflent with each other : 
 And though in Points of" Pra^ice latter Revelation 
 may repeal or cancel former divine Laws, yet in 
 Matters of Belief no latter Revelation can be in- 
 confitlent with what has been heretofore reveal- 
 ed. 
 
 3. Divine Revelation muft be confirmed by 
 fome divine av.d fupernatural Appearances^ fome 
 extraordinary Signs or 'Tokens^ Vifions^ Voices^ or 
 Miracles wrought, or Prophecies fulfilled. There 
 mufl be fome Demonflrations of the Prefence and 
 Power of God, fuperior to all the Powers of Na- 
 ture, or the fettled Connexion which God as Creator 
 has eftablifhed among his Creatures in this vifible 
 World. 
 
 4. If there are any fuch extraordinary and won- 
 derful Appearances and Operations brought to con- 
 teft with, or to oppofe divine Revelation^ there muft 
 and always will be fuch a Superiority on the Side of 
 that Revelation which is truly divine^ as to manifefl: 
 that God is there. This was the Cafe when the 
 Egyptian Sorcerers contended with Mofes. But the 
 Wonders which Mofes wrought did fo far tranf:end 
 the Power of iht Magicians^ as made them confcfs, 
 // was the Finger of God. 
 
 5. Thefe divine Appearances or Atteffations to 
 Revelation muft be either known to ourfehes^ by 
 our own perfonal Obfervation of them, or they 
 muft be fufficiently attefted hy others^ according to 
 the Principles and Rules by which Matters of 
 human Faith are to be judged in the foregoing 
 Se^lion, 
 
 S 4 Some 
 
274 L O G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 Some of thofe, who lived in the Nations and 
 Ages were Miracles were wrought, were Eye and 
 Har-Witnelles of the Truth and Divinity of the 
 Revelation •, but we, who live in thefe diftant Ages, 
 mud have them derived down to us by juft and in- 
 conteftable Hiftory and Tradition. We alfoeven 
 in thefe diftant Times may fee the Accomplifh- 
 ments of feme ancient Predi^ionsy and thereby ob- 
 tain that Advantage toward the Confirmation of 
 our Faith in dhnne Revelation beyond what thofe 
 Perfons enjoyed who lived when the Predi^lions 
 were pronounced. 
 
 6. There is another very confidcrable Confir- 
 mation of divine 'Tejlimony \ and that is, when the 
 Do(ftrines themfclves either on the Publication or 
 the Btrlief of them produce fupernatural Effects. 
 Such w(^re the 7niracuLou5 Powers which were com- 
 municated to Believers in the firft Ages of Chri- 
 ftianity, the Converfion of Jews or Gentiles^ the 
 nmazing Siiccefs of the Go/pel of Chrift without 
 human Aid, and in Oppofuion to a thoufand Im- 
 pediments, its Power in changing the Hearts and 
 Lives of ignorant and vicious Heathens, and wicked 
 and profane Creatures in all Nations, and filling 
 them with a Spirit of Virtue, Piety and Goodnefs. 
 Wherefoever Perfons have found this Effed: in their 
 own Hearts, wrought by a Belief of the Gofpel 
 of Chrift, they have a Witnefs in themfelves of 
 the Truth of it, and abundant Reafon to believe 
 it divine. 
 
 Of the Difference between Reafon and Revela- 
 tion^ and in what Senfe the latter is fuperior, fee 
 more in Chap. II. 6Vt7. 9. and Chap. IV. Dire^. 6. 
 
 SECT. 
 
C. V. S. 7. ne right Ufe of Rcafon. '275 
 
 SECT VII. 
 
 Principles and Rules of judging^ concerning Things 
 faft^ frefent^ and to come^ by the mere Ufe of 
 Reafon, 
 
 r"T^ Hough we attain the greateft Afllirance of 
 X Things fall and future by divine Faith^ and 
 learn many Matters of Fa6t, both paft and prefent, 
 by human Faith, yet Reafon alfo may in a good 
 Degree aflift us to judge of Matters of Fadl both 
 pafl, prefent, and to come^ by the following Prin- 
 ciples. 
 
 1. There is a Syfiem of Beings round about us 
 of which we ourfelv€S are a Part, which we call 
 the JVorld ; and in this World there is a Courfe of 
 Nature, or a fettled Order of Caufes^ Effe5ls^ Ante- 
 cedents, Concomitants, Confequences, ^c, from which 
 the Author of Nature doth not vary but upon very 
 important Occafions. 
 
 2. Where Antecedents, Concomitants, and Confe- 
 quents, Caufes and Effe^s, Signs and Things figni- 
 fed, Suhje5ls and Adjun5is are neceffarily connected 
 with each other, we may infer the Caufes from 
 the Effeds, and Effeds from Caufes, the Antece- 
 dents from the Confequents, as well as Confequents 
 from Antecedents, ^c. and thereby be pretty cer- 
 tain of many Things both pafl, prefent and to 
 come. It is by this Principle that Aflronomers can 
 tell what Bay and Hour the Sun and Moon were 
 eclipfed five hundred Tears ago^ and predict all fu- 
 ture Eclipfes as long as the World fhail (land. They 
 can tell precifely at what Minute the Sun rifes or 
 fets this Day at Pequin in China, or what Alti- 
 tude the Dog-fiar had at Midnight or Midncon in 
 Rome, on the Day when Julius Caeliir was fain. 
 
 Gardiners 
 
476 L G I C K: Or, Part IJ. 
 
 Gardiners upon the fame Principle can foretel the 
 Alontbs when every Plant will be in Bloom^ and the 
 Ploughman knows the Weeks of Harvejt : We are 
 fure, if there be a Chicken, there was an Egg : If 
 there be a Rainbow, we are certain // rains not far 
 off : If we behold a Tree growing on the Earth, we 
 know it has naturally a Root under Ground, 
 
 3. Where there is a neceffary Connexion be- 
 tween Caufes and Effects, Antecedents and Confequents, 
 Sigjts and 57?i«^i fignified, we know alfo that /i^d' 
 Caufes will have like EfFe6ls, and proportionable 
 Caufes will have proportionable EfTeds, contrary 
 Caufes will have contrary Effeds ; and obferving 
 Men may form many Judgments by the Rules of 
 Similitude and Proportion, where the Caufes, Effects, 
 i^c. are not entirely the fame. 
 
 4. Where there is but a probable and uncertain 
 Connexion between Antecedents, Concomitants and 
 Confequents, we can give but a Conjedure, or a pro- 
 hable Determination. If the Clouds gather, or the 
 Weather-glafs fmks, we fuppofe it will rain : If a 
 'Ma.nfpit Blood frequently with Coughing, we fuppofe 
 liis Lungs are hurt : If very dangerous Symptoms 
 appear, we exped his Death, 
 
 5. Where caufes operate freely, with a Liberty of 
 Indifftrence to this or the contrary, there we cannot 
 certainly know what the Effects will be : For it feems 
 to be contingent, and the certain Knowledge of it 
 belongs only to God. This is the Cafe in the 
 greatell Part of human Actions. 
 
 6. Yet wife Men by a juft Obfervation of hu- 
 man Nature, will give very probable Conjectures 
 in this Matter, alio concerning Things paft, or 
 T\\\x\g9, future, becaufe human Nature in all Ages 
 and Nations has fuch a Conformity to itfelf. By 
 a Knowledge of the Tempers of Men and their 
 prefent Circumflances, we may be able to give a 
 
 happy 
 
C. V. S. 7. The right life of Reafon. 277 
 
 happy Guefs what their Conduct will be, and whac 
 will be the Event, by an Obfervation of the like 
 Cafes in former Times. This made the Emperor 
 Marcus Antoninus to fay, " By looking back into 
 *' Hiftory^ and confidering the Fate and Revolutions 
 " ofGovernnientSy you will he able to form a Guefs^ 
 *' and almofi ^rophefy upon the future. For Things 
 *' paft^ prcfent, and to come^ are ftrangely uniform^ 
 " and of a Colour \ and are common^ caft in the 
 " fame Mould. So that upon the Matter, forty 
 *' Tears of human Life may ferve for a Sample of 
 " ten thoufand.'' Collier'j Antoninus, Book VIL 
 Sed:. 50. 
 
 7. There are alfo fome other Principles of judg- 
 ing concerning the pad Adions of Men in former 
 Ages, befides Books, Hiflories and Traditions, which 
 are the Mediums of conveying human Teftimony ; 
 as we may infer the Skill and Magnificence of the 
 Ancients by fome Fragments of their Statues, and 
 Ruins of their Buildings. We know what Roman 
 Legions came into Great Britain by Numbers of 
 Bricks dug out of the Earth in fome Parts of the 
 Ifland, with the Marks of fome particular Legion 
 upon them, which mud have been employed there 
 in Brick- making. We reftify fome Miftakes in 
 Hiftory by Statues, Coins, old Altars, Utenfils of 
 War, &c. We confirm or difprove fome pretend- 
 ed Traditions and hiftorical Writings, by Medals, 
 Images, Pictures, Urns, ^c. 
 
 Thus I have gone through all thofe particular Ob- 
 jects of our Judgment which I firft propofed, and 
 have laid down Principles and Rules by which we 
 may fafely condud: ourfelves therein. There is a 
 Variety of other Objeds concerning which we 
 are occafionally called to pafs a Judgment, {viz.) 
 The Characters of Perfons, the Value and Worth 
 
 - of 
 
278 L O G I C K: Or, Part II. 
 
 of TbwgSy the Sefife aud Meaning of particnlar Wri- 
 tersy Matters of Wit, Oratery^ Poefy^ Matter? of 
 Equity in judicial Courts ^ Matters of ^raffick and 
 Commerce between Man and Man, which would be 
 cndlefs to enumerate. But if the general zndfpecial 
 Rules of Judgment which have been mentioned in 
 thefe two laft Chapters are treafured up in the Mind, 
 and wrought into the very Temper of our Souls in 
 our younger Years, they will lay a Foundation for 
 juft and regular Judgment concerning a thoufand 
 fpecial Occurrences in the religious, civil and learned 
 Life. 
 
 THE 
 
1 279 ] 
 
 THE 
 
 THIRD PART 
 
 OF 
 
 L O G I C K. 
 
 A^ 
 
 Of Reafon and Syllogtfm. 
 
 c's 
 S the firfl Work of the Mind k Perception^ 
 whereby our Ideas are framed, and the fe- 
 X J^ cond is Judgment^ which joins or disjoins 
 our Ideas, and forms a Propofition, fo the third 
 Operation of the Mind is Reafomng^ which joins 
 feveral Propofuions together, and makes a Syllogifm^ 
 that is, an Argument whereby we are wont to infer 
 fomething that is lefs known^ from Truths which are 
 more evident. 
 
 In treating of this Subject, let us confider more 
 particularly, 
 
 1. The Nature of a Syllogifm, and the Parts of 
 which it is cofnpofed. 
 
 2. The feveral Kinds of Syllogifms, with parti- 
 cular Rules relating to them. 
 
 2. The 
 
28o L G I C K : Or, Part Ilii 
 
 3. The' Dooirifie of Sophifms, or falfe Reafoning, 
 together with the Means of avoiding them^ and the 
 Manner of folving or anfwering them . 
 * 4. Some general Rules to direfi our Reafoning. 
 
 CHAP. I. 
 
 Of the Nature of a Syllogifm, and the Farts of 
 which it is compofed, 
 
 IF the mere Perception and Comparifon of two 
 Ideas would always fhew us whether they agree 
 or difagree \ then all rational Propofitions would 
 be Matters of Intelligence^ or firjt Principles^ and 
 there would be no Uie of Reafoning^ or drawing 
 any Confcquences. It Is the Narrownefs of the 
 human Mind which introduces the Neceflity of 
 Reafoning. When we are unable to judge of the 
 Tru'-h or Falfliood of a Propofition in an imme- 
 diate Manner, by the mere Contemplation of its 
 Subjecl and Predicate, we are then conftrained to 
 ufe a Medium^ and to compare each of them with 
 fome third Idea^ that by feeing how far they agree 
 or difagree with it, we may be able to judge how 
 far they agree or difagree among themfelves : As, 
 if there are two Lines A and 5, and I know not 
 whether they are equal or no, 1 take a third Line 
 C, or an Inch^ and apply it to each of them ; if it 
 agree with them both, then I infer that A and B 
 are equal % but if it agree with one and not with 
 the other, then I conclude A and B are unequal : 
 If it agree with neither of them, there can be no 
 Comparifon. 
 
 So 
 
C. I. The right XJfe of Reafon. 28 1 
 
 So If the Qaeftion be whether God miift he wor- 
 Jhippedy we feck a third Idea^ fuppofe the Idea of a 
 Creator, and fay. 
 
 Our Creator muft he worjhipped, 
 
 God is our Creator^ 
 
 therefore God mujl he worjhipped. 
 
 The Comparifon of this third Idea^ with the two 
 diftind Parts of the Quefton, ufually requires two 
 Propofitions which are called the Premijfes : The 
 third Propofition which is drawn from them is the 
 ConclufioHy wherein the ^eftion itfelf is anfwered, 
 and the Subjedt and Predicate joined either in the 
 ISIegative or the Affirmative, 
 
 The Foundation of all Affirmative Conclufions is 
 laid in this general Truth, that fo far as two pro- 
 pofed Ideas agree to any third Idea, they agree alfo 
 among themfdves. The Charadler of Creator a- 
 grees to God^ and Worfhip agrees to a Creator y 
 therefore Worfhip agrees to God, 
 
 The Foundations of all negative Conclufions is this, 
 that where one of the two propofed Ideas agrees 
 with the third Idea, and the other difagrees with it, 
 they muft needs difagree fo far alfo with one ano- 
 ther ; as, if no Sinners are happy^ and if Angels are 
 happy\ then Angels are not Sinners. 
 
 Thus it appears what is the ftrid and juft No- 
 tion of a Syllogifm : It is a Sentence or Argument 
 made up of three Propofitions fo difpofed, as that 
 the laft is neceflarily inferred from thofe which go 
 before, as in the Inftances which have been juft men- 
 tioned. 
 
 In the Conftitution of a Syllogifm two Things 
 may be confidered, {viz.) the Matter and ihtForm 
 of it. 
 
 The Matter of which a Syllogifm is made up, 
 is three Propofitions ; and thefe three Propofitions are 
 m^dit up of three Ideas or Terms varioufly joined. 
 
 The 
 
282 L G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 The three Terms are called the remote Matter of a 
 Syilogifm ; and the three Propofttions the proxime or 
 immediate Matter of it. 
 
 The three Terms are named the Major^ the Mi- 
 nor, and the Middle. 
 
 The Predicate of the Conclufion is called the ma- 
 jor Term, becaufe it is generally of a larger Exten- 
 (ion than the minor Term, or the Subje5i, The major 
 and 7ninor Terms are called the Extremes. 
 
 The middle Term is the third Idea invented and 
 difpofed in two Propofitions in fuch a Manner as 
 to fhew the Conntxion between the major and 
 minor Term in the Conclufion ; for which Reafon 
 the middle Term itfelf is fometimes called the Ar- 
 gument. 
 
 That Propofition which contains the Predicate 
 of the Conclufion, conneded with the middle Term, 
 is ufually called the fnajor Propofttion, whereas the 
 minor Propofition conneds the middle Term with 
 the Subjed: of the Conclufion, and is fometimes 
 called the Ajjumption. 
 
 Note, This exad Dillindlion of the feveral Parts 
 of a Syilogifm, and of the major and minor Terms 
 conne6ted with the middle Term, in the major and 
 minor Proportions, does chiefly belong to fimple 
 or categorical Syllogifms, of which we fliall fpeak in 
 the next Chapter, though all Syllogifms whatfoever 
 have fomething analogical to it. 
 
 Note farther, that the major Propofition is gene- 
 rally placed firft, and the minor fecond, and the 
 Conclufion in the laft Place, where the Syilogifm is 
 regularly compofed and reprefented. 
 
 The Form of a Syllogiftn is the framing and dif- 
 pofing of the PremiiTes according to Art, or jull 
 Principles of Reafoning, and the regular Inference 
 of the Conclufion from them. 
 
 The 
 
C. II. S. I . The right Vfe of Reafon. 283 
 
 The A^ of Reafoning^ or inferring one Thing 
 from another, is generally exprefled and known by 
 the Particle Therefore^ when the Argument is form- 
 ed according to the Rules of Art ; though in com- 
 mon Difcourfe or Writing, fuch cattfal Particles 
 as For^ Becaufe^ manifeft the A6t of Reafoning as 
 well as the illative Particles TheJt and Therefore : 
 And wherefoever any of thefe Words are ufed, 
 there is a perfeft Syllogifm exprefled or implied^ 
 tho* perhaps the three Propofitions do not appear^ 
 or are not placed in regular Form. 
 
 C H A P II. 
 
 Of the various Kinds of Syllogifms^ with par^ 
 ticular Rules relating to them. 
 
 SYllogifms are divided into various Kinds, either 
 according to the ^eftion which is proved by 
 themj according to the Nature and Compoftion of 
 them, or according to the middle 'Term^ which ia 
 ufed to prove the Queftion. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Of umverfal and particular Syllogifns^ both negative 
 and affirmative. 
 
 According to the ^eflion which is to be 
 proved, fo Syllogifms are divided into uni- 
 verfal Affirmative^ umverfal Negative^ particular 
 Affirmative^ and particular Negative. This is often 
 called a Divifion of Syllogifms drawn from the 
 
 T Con- 
 
284 L G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 Conclufion *, for fo many Sorts of Conclufions there 
 may be which are marked with the Letter A^ E, 
 
 /, O. 
 
 In an univerfal affirmative Syllogifm^ one Idea is 
 proved univerfally to agree with another, and may- 
 be univerfally affirmed of it, as every Sin deferves 
 Death, every unlawful JViJlj is a Sin ; therefore every 
 unlawful Wifh deferves Death, 
 
 In an univerfal negative Syllogifm, one Idea is 
 proved 10 difagree with another Idea univerfally, 
 and may be thus denied of it, as, no Injuftice can 
 he pleafing to God •, all Perfecution for the fake of 
 Confcience is Injuftice ; therefore no Perfecution for 
 Confcience Sake can he fleafing to God, 
 
 Particular affirmative, and 'particular negative 
 Syllogifms may be eafily underftood by what is faid 
 of tfniverfals. and there will be fufficient Examples 
 given of all thefe in the next Seftion. 
 
 Tht general Principle upon which thefe univer- 
 fal and particular Syllogifms are founded is this, 
 Whatfoever is affirmed or denied univerfally of any 
 Idea, may be ..ffii.ned or denied of all the parti- 
 cular Kinds or Beings, which are contained in the 
 Extenfion of that univerfal Idea. So the Defert 
 of Death is affirmed univerfally of Sin, and an un- 
 lawful Wifh is one particular Kind of Sin, which 
 is contained in the univerfal Idea of Sin, therefore 
 the Defert of Death may be affirmed concerning 
 an unlawful IViflo, And fo of the reft. 
 
 Note, In the Do(5trine of Syllogifms, a finguiar 
 and an indefinite Proportion are ranked among 
 IJniverfals, as was before obferved in the Dodrine 
 of Propofuions. 
 
 SECT. 
 
C. II. S. i: The right Vfe of Reafon. 285 
 
 « 
 
 SECT, 11. 
 
 Of plain^ fimpk Syllogifms^ and their Rules, 
 
 THE next Divifion of Syllogifms is into fm- 
 gk and compound. This is drawn from the 
 Nature and Compqfition of them. 
 
 Single Syllogifms are made up of three Propofi- 
 tions : Compound Syllogifms contain more than 
 three Propofitions, and may be formed into two 
 or more Syllogifms. 
 
 Single Syllogifms^ for Diftindion's Sake, may 
 be divided into * Simple ^ Complex y and Conjunc- 
 tive. 
 
 Thofe are properly called fimple or categorical 
 Syllogifms^ which are made up of three plain^ fm- 
 gkj or categorical Propofitions^ wherein the middle 
 Term is evidently and regularly joined with one 
 Part of the Queflion in the major Propofition, 
 and with the other in the minor, whence there 
 follows a plain (ingle Conclufion ; as, every hu^ 
 man Virtue is to he fought with Diligence •, Prudence 
 is a human Virtue 5 therefore Prudence is to he fought 
 diligently, 
 
 Note^ Tho* the Terms of Propofitions may be 
 complex 5 yet where the Compofition of the whole 
 Argument is thus plain^ fimple^ and regular^ it is 
 properly called a fimple Syllogifm^ fince the Cinn* 
 pleBion does not belong to the fyllogiftic Form of 
 it. 
 
 * As Ideas and Propofitions are divided \nto fingle and corr.pound^ ^n^ Jingle 
 are fubdivided into fimpk and complex j lb there are the fair-e Divifions and 
 Subdivifions applied to Syllogifms. 
 
 T 2 Simple 
 
286 L O G I C K: Or, Part lit 
 
 Simple Syllogifms have feveral Rules belonging 
 to them, which being oblerved, will generally fc- 
 cure us from talfe Inferences : B'at thefe Rules be- 
 ing founded on four general Axioms^ it is neceflary 
 to mention thefe Axioms beforehand, for the Ufe 
 of thofe who will enter into the fpeculative Reafon 
 of all thefe Rules. 
 
 Axiom I. Particular Propofitions are contained 
 in Univerfals, and may be inferred from them *, but 
 Univerfals are not contained in Particulars, nor 
 can be inferred from them. 
 
 Axiom 2. In all univerfal Propofitions, the Sul> 
 je6t is univerfal : In all particular Propofitions, the 
 Subjefl is particular. 
 
 Axiom 3. In all afnrmative Propofitions, thft 
 Predicate has no greater Extcnfion than the Sub- 
 jedl; for its Extenfion is reflrained by the Sub- 
 ject, and therefore it is always to be efteemed as 
 a particular Idea. It is by mere Accident, if it 
 ever be taken univerfally, and cannot happen but 
 in fuch univerfal or fingular Propofitions as are 
 reciprocal. 
 
 Axiom 4. The Predicate of a negative Propofi- 
 tion is always taken univerfally, for in its whole 
 Extenfion it is denied of the Subjed. If we fay 
 no Stone is vegetable, we deny all Sorts of Vegeta* 
 tion concerning Stones, 
 
 The Rules oi fimple, regular Syllogifms arc 
 thefe. 
 
 Rule I. ^he middle Term mufi not he taken twice 
 particularly, hut once at leaft univerfally. For if 
 the middle Term be taken for two different Parts 
 or Kinds of the fame univerfal Idea, then the Sub- 
 je(fc of the Conclufion is compared with one of 
 
 thefe 
 
C. 11. S. 2. "Hht right life of Reafon.' 287 
 
 thefe Parts, and the Predicate with another Pare, 
 and this will never fhew whether that Subjedt and 
 Predicate agree or difagree : There will then be 
 four dijlin^ Terms in the Syllogifm, and the two 
 Parts of the Queftion will not be compared with 
 t\it Jhne third Idea ; as if I fay, fome Men are piousy 
 and fo?ne Men are Robbers^ I can never infer that 
 fome Robbers are pious y for the middle Term Men 
 being taken twice particularly, it is not the fame 
 Men who are fpoken of in the major and minor 
 Proportions. 
 
 Rule II. The Terms In the Conclujton muft never 
 he taken more univerfally than they are in the Pre- 
 miffes. The Reafon is derived from the firfl Axi- 
 om, that Generals can never he inferred from Par- 
 ticulars. 
 
 Rule III. A negative Conchfion cannot he proved 
 hy two affirmative Premiffes. For when the two 
 Terms of the Conclufion are united or agree to 
 the middle Term, it does not follow by any Means 
 that they difagree with one another. 
 
 Rule IV. If one of the Premtffes he negative^ the 
 Conclufion muft he negative. For if the middle 
 Term be denied of either Part of the Conclu- 
 Iion, it may Ihew that the Terms of the Conclu- 
 fion difagree, but ic can never fhew that they 
 agree. 
 
 Rule V. If either of the Premiffes he particular y 
 the Conclufion muft he particular. This may be 
 proved for the moft part from the firfl Axiom. 
 
 Thefe two lafl Rules are fometimes united in 
 
 this fmgle Sentence, The Conclufion always follows 
 
 the weaker Part of the Premifjes. Now Negatives 
 
 T 3 and 
 
>>88 L O G IC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 and Particulars are counted inferior to Affirmatives 
 and Univerfals. 
 
 Rule VI. From two negative Premijfes nothing 
 can he concluded. For they feparate the middle 
 Term both from the Subject and Predicate of the 
 Conclufion, and when two Ideas dilagree to a 
 third, we cannot infer that they either agree or dif- 
 agree with each other. 
 
 Yet where the Negation is a Part of the middle 
 Term, the two Premifles may look like Negatives 
 according to the Words, but one of them is af- 
 firmative in Senfe ; as, TVhat has no Thought can- 
 not reafon -, but a Worm has no Thought ; therefore 
 a Worm cannot reafon. The minor Propofition does 
 really affirm the middle Term concerning the Sub- 
 ject, {yiz.^ a Worm is what has no Thought, and 
 thus it is properly in this Syllogifm an affirmative 
 Propofition. 
 
 Rule VII. From two particular Prefniffes nothing 
 tan he concluded. This Rule depends chiefly on the 
 firft Axiom. 
 
 A more laborious and accurate Proof of thefe 
 Rules, and the Derivation of every Part of them 
 in all pofTible Cafes, from the foregoing Axioms, 
 require fo much Time, and are of fo little Impor- 
 tance to afTifl the right Ufe of Reafon, that it is 
 needlefs to infifl: longer upon them here. See all 
 this done ingenuoufly in the Logick called, the Art 
 of Thinking, Part III. Chap. III.&c. 
 
 S E C T, 
 
C II. S. 3. The right life ?/'Reafon. 289 
 
 SECT. III. 
 
 Of the Moods and Figures of fimple Syllogtfms. 
 
 Simple Syllogifms are adorned and furrounded in 
 the common Books of Logick with a Va- 
 riety ot Inventions about Moods and Figures^ where- 
 in by the artificial Contexture of the Letters A^ 
 Ey /, and 0, Men have endeavoured to transform 
 Logick^ or the Art of Reafoning^ into a fort of 
 Mechanifm^ and to teach Boys to fyllogize, or 
 frame Arguments and refute them, without any 
 real inward Knowledge of the Queftion. This is 
 almofl in the fame Manner as School-boys have 
 been taught perhaps in their trifling Years to com - 
 pofe Latin Verfes\ i. e, by certain Tables and 
 Squares, with a Variety of Letters in them, where- 
 in by counting every fixth, feventh, or eighth Let- 
 ter, certain Latin Words fhould be framed in the 
 Form of Hexameters or Pentameters ; and this may 
 be done by thofe who know nothing of Lalin or 
 of Ferfes. 
 
 I confefs fome of thefe logical Subtilties have 
 much more Ufe than thofe verfifying Tables, and 
 there isfnuch Ingenuity difcovered in determining 
 the precife Number of Syllogifms that may be 
 formed fn every Figure^ and giving the Reafons of 
 them ; yet the Light of Nature, a good Judg- 
 ment, and due Confideration of Things tend more 
 to true Reafoning than all the Trappings of Moods 
 and Figures. 
 
 But left this Bo<^k be charged with too great 
 De(eds and Imperfections, it may be proper to 
 give fhort Hints of that which fome Logicians have 
 fpent fo much Time and Paper upon. 
 
 T4 A» 
 
^90 L G I C K: Or, Part III, 
 
 All the pofTible Combinations of three of the 
 Letters, y^, £, /, 0, to make three Propofitions 
 amount lofixty four \ but fifty four of them are ex- 
 cluded froij forming true Syllogifms by the ftven 
 Rules in me foregoing Sedion : The remaining 
 Ten are varioufly diverfified by Figures and Moods 
 into fourteen Syllogifms. 
 
 The Figure of a Syllogifm is the proper Difpo- 
 firion of the middle Term with the Parts of the 
 Queftion. 
 
 A Mood is the regular Determination of Pro- 
 pofitions according to their Quantity and Quality, 
 i. e. their univerfal or particular Affirmation or 
 Negation ; which are fignified by certain artifi- 
 cial Words wherein the Confonants are negle(5led, 
 and thefe four Vowels yf, £, /, O, are only re* 
 garded. 
 
 There are generally counted three Figures, 
 
 In the jirft of them the middle Term is the 
 Subjed of the major Propofition, and the Predi- 
 cate of the minor. This contains four Moods (viz,) 
 Barbara, Celarent, Darii, Ferio. And it is the 
 Excellency of this Figure that all Sorts, of Quef- 
 tions or Conclufions may be proved by it, whether 
 ^, E, /, or 0, i. e, univerfal or particular, affir^ 
 mative or negative, as, * 
 
 Bar- Every wicked Man is truly miferable. 
 ba- All Tyrants are wicked Men ; 
 ra^ Therefore all Tyrants are truly miferable, 
 
 Ce- He that's always in Fear is not happy ; 
 ia- Covetous Men are always in Fear ; 
 rem. Therefore Covetous Men are not happy. 
 
 Da. 
 
C. II. S. 3. The right Ufe of Reafon; 291' 
 
 Da- Whatfoever furthers our Salvation is good 
 
 for us ; 
 ri' Some Afflldlions further our Salvation ; 
 /, Therefore fome Afflidtions are good for us. 
 
 Fe- Nothing that mud be repented of is truly 
 
 defirable; 
 ri' Some Pleafures mud be repented of; 
 0, Therefore there are fome Pleafures which are 
 
 not truly defirable. 
 
 In the fdcorid Figure the middle Term is the 
 Predicate of both the PremifTes ; this contains 
 four Moods, (viz.) Cefare, Camejires, Feftino^ Ba^ 
 roco, and it admits only of negative Conclufions; 
 as, 
 
 Ce- No Liar is fit to be believed ; 
 fa- Every good Chriftian is fit to be believed 5 
 re. Therefore no good Chriftian is a Liar. 
 
 The Reader may eafily form Examples of the 
 reft. 
 
 The third Figure requires that the middle Term 
 be the Subjed of both the PremifTes. It has fix 
 Moods, (viz,) Darepii^ Felapton, Bifamisy Datift^ 
 Bocardo^ Ferijon : And it admits only of particular 
 Conclufions j as. 
 
 Da- Whofoever loves God fhall be faved ; 
 rap' All the Lovers of God have their Imper- 
 
 fecftions 5 
 ti. Therefore fome who have Imperfedlions fhall 
 
 be faved. 
 
 I leave the Reader to form Examples of the 
 
 reft. 
 
 The 
 
292 L O G I C K: Or, Part III, 
 
 The Moods of thefe three Figures are comprized 
 in four Latin Verfes. 
 
 Barbara^ Celarent^ Darii, Ferio quoque primse, 
 Cefare^ Cameflres, Feftino^ Baroco, fecundas. 
 Tercia Darepti fibi vindicat, atque Felapton^ 
 Adjungens Difajnisy Datifi^ Bocardo, Ferifon. 
 
 Thefpecial Rules of the three Figures are thefe. 
 
 In xhtfirli Figure the major Propofition mud al- 
 ways be univerfal, and the minor affirmative. 
 
 In the fecond Figure alfo the major muft be uni- 
 verfal, and one of the Premifles, together with the 
 Conclufion, muft be negative. 
 
 In the third Figure the minor muft be affirmative, 
 and the Conclufion always particular. 
 
 There is alfo a fourth Figure^ wherein the middle 
 Term is predicated in the major Propofition, and 
 fubjefted in the minor : But this is a very indirecft 
 and oblique Manner of concluding, and is never 
 ufed in the Sciences, nor in human Life, and 
 
 therefore 1 call it ufelefs. Some Logicians will 
 
 allow it to be nothing elfe but a mere Inverfion 
 of the firft Figure ; the Moods of it, {viz.) Ba- 
 r dipt on ^ or Barhari, Caientes, Dihaiis^ Fefpamo^ 
 Freftfom^ are not worthy to be explained by one 
 Example. 
 
 SECT. IV. 
 
 Of Complex Syllogifms, 
 
 IT is not the mere Ufe of complex Terms in a 
 Syllogifm that gives it this Name, tho' one 
 of the Terms is ufually complex *, but thofe are 
 properly called complex Syllogifms, in which the 
 middle Term is not conneded with the whole 
 
 Subjed, 
 
C. II. S. 4: rhe right Ufe of Reafon: 293 
 
 Subje6t, or the whole Predicate in two di(lin6l Pro- 
 pofitions, but is intermingled and compared with 
 them by Parts, or in a more confufed Manner, in 
 different Forms of Speech ; as, 
 
 The Sun is a fenfelefs Being ; 
 
 The Perfians worjhipped the Sun ; 
 
 Therefore the Perfians wor/hip'ped a fenfelefs Be- 
 ing. 
 
 Here the Predicate of the Conclufion is worfJoip- 
 ed a fenfelefs Beings part of which is joined with the 
 middle Term Sun in the major Propofition, and the 
 other part in the minor. 
 
 Tho' this fort of Argument is confelTed to be 
 entangled^ or confufed^ and irregular^ if examined 
 by the Rules of funple Syllogifms ; yet there is a 
 great Variety of Arguments ufed in Books of Learn- 
 ing, and in common Life, whofe Confequence is 
 ftrong and evident, and which muft be ranked un- 
 der this Head ; as, 
 
 I. Exclufive Proportions will form a complex 
 Argument ; as, pious Men are the only Favourites 
 of Heaven ; true Chriflians are Favourites of Hea- 
 ven ; therefore true Chriftians are pious Men, Or 
 thus, Hypocrites are not pious Men ; therefore Hy- 
 pocrites are no Favourites of Heaven, 
 
 II. Exceptive Propofnions will make fuch com- 
 plex Syllogifms ; as No7je hut Phyjicians came to 
 the Conjultation ; the Nurfe is no Phyfician -, there- 
 fore the Nurfe came not to the Confultation. 
 
 III. Or, Comparative Propofitions ; as. Know- 
 
 ledge is better than Riches ; Virtue is better than 
 Knowledge-, therefore Virtue is better than Eiches, 
 Or thus, a Dove will fly a Mile in a Minute : a 
 
 Szvallo'U) 
 
294 LO G IC K: Or, Part HI. 
 
 Swallow flies fuuifter than a Dove : therefore a Swal' 
 low will fly more than a Mile in a Minute, 
 
 IV. Or Inceptive and Defltive Propofition ; as, 
 
 the Fogs vanifh as the Sun rifes ; hut the Fogs have 
 not yet begun to vanijh •, therefore the Sun is not yet 
 rifen. 
 
 V. Or Modal Propofitions \ as, // is necejfary 
 that a General underftand the Art of War \ but 
 Caius does not underliood the Art of War ; there- 
 fore it is necejfary Caius fhould not he a General, 
 Or thus, A total Eclipfe of the Sun would caufe 
 Darknefe at Noon; it is poffihle that the Moon at 
 that 'time may totally eclipfe the Sun \ therefore it 
 is pojfible that the Moon may caufe Darknefs at 
 Noon. 
 
 Befide all thefe, there is a great Number of com- 
 plex Syllogifms which can hardly be reduced under 
 any particular Titles, becaufe the Forms of human 
 Language are fo exceeding various ; as, 
 
 Chriftianity requires us to helieve what the Apoftles 
 wrote i St. Paul is an Apoftle ; therefore Chriftianity 
 require us to helieve what St. Paul wrote. 
 
 No human ArtiH can make an Animal \ a Fly or 
 a Worm is an Animal ; therefore no human Artift 
 can make a Fly or a Worm. 
 
 The Father always lived in London ; the Son aU 
 ways lived with the Father \ therefore the Son always 
 lived in London. 
 
 The Bloffom foon follows the full Bud; this Pear- 
 Tree hath many full Buds ; therefore // will Jhortly 
 have many Bloffom s. 
 
 One Hailftone never falls alone ; but a Hailftone 
 felljufi now •, therefore others fell with it. 
 
 Thunder 
 
C. 11. S. 4. The right Vfe of Reafon. 295 
 
 Thunder feldom comes without Lightnings but :/ 
 thundered Tejlerday ; therefore pobably it lightened 
 alfo. 
 
 Mofes wrote before the Trojan P^ari the firft 
 Greek Hijtorians wrote after the Trojen War ; 
 therefore the firft Greek Hiftorians wrote after 
 Mofes*. 
 
 Now the Force of all thefe Arguments is fo 
 evident and conclufive, that tho' the Form of the 
 Syllogifm be never fo irregular, yet we are fure the 
 Inferences are juft and true ; for the Premiffes^ ac- 
 cording to the Reafon of Things, do really con- 
 tain the Conclufion that is deduced from them^ which 
 is a never failing Teft of true Syllogifm, as fhall be 
 fhcwn hereafter. 
 
 The truth of moft of thefe complete Syllogifms 
 may alfo be made to appear (if needful) by reduc- 
 ing them either to regular, fimple Syllogifms, or 
 to fome of the conjun5iive Syllogifms, which arc 
 defcribed in the next Sed:ion. I will give an In- 
 fiance only in the firft, and leave the reft to cxer- 
 cife the Ingenuity of the Reader. 
 
 The firft Argument may be reduced to a Syllo- 
 gifm in Barbara thus, 
 
 The Sun is a fenfelefs Being ; 
 
 What the Perfians worjhipped is the Sun ; 
 
 Therefore what the Perfians worjhipped is a Senfe- 
 lefs Being. Tho' the conclufive Force of this Argu- 
 ment is evident without this Redudlion. 
 
 * Perhaps fome of thefe Syllogifms may be reduced to thofe which I 
 call Connexi've afterward j but it is of little Moment to what Species they 
 belong J For it is not any formal Set of Rules (o much as the Evidence 
 and Force of Reafon that rauft determin* the Truth or Falfhood of allfuch 
 Syllogifms. 
 
 SECT. 
 
296 LOGIC K: Or, Vkxt III, 
 
 SECT. V. 
 
 Of ConjunBive Syllogifms, 
 
 THofe are called conjun5iive Syllogifms^ wherein 
 one of the PremifTes, namely the major, has 
 diltindl Parts, which are joined by a Conjandion, 
 or fome fuch Particle of Speech. Moll Times 
 the major or minor, or both, are explicitely com- 
 found Propofitiom : And generally the major Pro- 
 pofition is made up of two diftind: Parts or Pro- 
 pofuions, in fuch a Manner, as that by the Afler- 
 tion of one in the minor^ the other is either aflerted 
 or denied in the Condujion : Or by the Denial of 
 one in the minor^ the other is either aflerted or de- 
 nied in the Conclufton, It is hardly poflible indeed 
 to fit any ihort Definition to include all the Kinds 
 of them ; bur the chief amongft them are the condi^ 
 tional Syllogifm, the disjunctive y the relative , and 
 the connexive, 
 
 I. The conditional or hypothetical Syllogifm is 
 whofe major or minor, or both, are conditional Pro- 
 pofitions ; as, Jf there he a God, the World is go- 
 verned by Providence \ but there is a God ; there- 
 fore the World is governed hy Providence. 
 
 Thefe Syllogifms admit two Sorts of true Argu- 
 mentation, where the major is conditional. 
 
 1. When the Antecedent is aflerted in the minor, 
 that the Confequent may be aflerted in the Gonclu- 
 fion ; fuch is the preceeding Example. This is called 
 arguing from the Pofition of the Antecedent to the Po- 
 
 fition of the Confequent. 
 
 2. When the Confequent is contradided in 
 the minor Propofuion, that the Antecedent may 
 be ccntradicled in the Conclufion • as, If Atheifts 
 
 are 
 
C. II. S. 5. The right Ufe ofRQahnl ^97 
 
 are in the rights then the World exifts without a 
 Caufe ; but the World does not exijl without a Caufe i 
 therefore Atheijls are not in the right. This is called 
 arguing /rd?w/ the removing of the Confequent to the r^- 
 moving of the Antecedent. 
 
 To remove the Antecedent or Confequent here 
 does not merely fignify the Denial of it, but the 
 Contradi5lion of it ; for the mere Denial of it by 
 a contrary Propofition will not make a true Syllo- 
 gifm, as appears thus : If every Creature he rea- 
 fonable^ every Brute is reafonahle : But no Brute is 
 reafonaUe ; therefore no Creature is reafonahle. 
 Whereas if you fay in the minor, but every Brute 
 is not reafonahle, then it would follow truly in the 
 Gonclufion, therefore every Creature is not reafon- 
 ahle. 
 
 When the Antecedent or Confequent are nega-^ 
 tive Propofitions, they are removed by an Affir- 
 mative y as. If there he no God, then the World 
 does not difcover creating Wifdom ; but the World 
 does difcover creating Wifdom ; therefore there is a 
 God. In this Inftance the Confequent is removed 
 or contradidled in the minor, that the Antecedent 
 may be contradidled in the Gonclufion. So in this 
 Argument of St. Paul, i Cor. xv. If the Dead rife 
 not, Chrift died in vain ; but Chriffc did not die in 
 vain ; therefore the Dead fhall rife. 
 
 There are alfo two forts of falfe Arguing, {viz.) 
 (i.) Fro7n the removing of the Antecedent to the re- 
 7noving of the Confequent j or (2.) Frojn the Poftion 
 of the Confequent to the Pofttion of the Antecedent. 
 Examples of thefe are eafily framed ; as, 
 
 (i.) If a Minifler were a Prince he viufl he ho* 
 mured ; But a Minifler is not a Prince j 
 
 Therefore he mufi not he honoured, 
 
 (2.) // 
 
2>98 L O G I C K: Or, Part lit 
 
 (2.) If a Mini/is r were a Prince^ he mujl be ho" 
 floured ; but a Minijier mujl be honoured ; 
 
 Therefore he ts a Prince, 
 
 Who fees not the ridiculous Falihood of both 
 thefe Syllogifms ? 
 
 Obferv. I. If the Subjcd of the Antecedent and 
 the Confcquent be the fame, then the hypothetical 
 Syllogifm may be turned into a categorical One ; aSj 
 If Csefar be a King he nmfl be honoured \ but Csefar 
 is a King \ therefore, i^c. T\\\s may be changed 
 thus, Every King mufl be honoured \ but Casfar is a 
 King', therefore, ^c. 
 
 Obferv. II. If the major Propofition only be 
 conditional^ the Conclufion is categorical : But if the 
 minor or both be conditional^ the Conclufion is alfo 
 conditional ; as, The IVorfhippers of Images are Ido' 
 later s ; If the Pap ids worfhip a Crucifix^ they are 
 Worfhippers of an Image ; therefore If the Papijls 
 worjhip a Crucifiy:^ they are Idolaters, But this fort 
 of Syllogifms fhould be avoided as much as pofli- 
 ble in Difputation, becaufe they greatly embarrafs 
 a Caufe : The Syllogifms, whofe Major only is 
 hypothetical^ are very frequent, and ufed with great 
 Advantage. 
 
 II. A disjunElive Syllogifm Is when the major Pro- 
 pofition is disjundive *, as. The Earth moves in a 
 Circle or an EUipfis \ but it does not move in a Circle i 
 therefore it moves in an EUipfis, 
 
 A disjunBive Syllogifm may have many Members 
 or Parts thus •, it is either Springs Summer^ Autumn^ 
 or Winter \ but it is 7iot Springs Autumn^ or Win- 
 ter ; therefore it is Summer, 
 
 The true Method of arguing here is from the 
 AJfertion of one^ to the Denial of the reji^ or fro7n 
 
 the 
 
C. II. S. 5. The right life of Reafon. 299 
 
 the Denial of one or more^ to the Ajjertm of what 
 remains ; but the Major fhould be fo framed, that 
 the feveral Parts of it can't be true together, tho* 
 one of them is evidently true. 
 
 III. A relative Syllogifin requires the major Pro- 
 pofition to be relative -, as, IVhere Chrijl is, there 
 Jhall his Servants he : but Chrifl is in Heaven ; 
 
 therefore his Serva^its Jhall he there alfo. Or, As is 
 the Captain, fo are his Soldiers *, hut the Captain is a 
 Coward ', therefore his Soldiers are fo too, 
 
 Arguments that relate to the Dodrine of Pro- 
 portion, muil be referred to this Head 5 as, As 
 two are to four, fo are three to fix •, but two make 
 the half of four \ therefore three make the half of 
 fix, 
 
 Befides thefe, there is another fort of Syllogifm 
 which is very natural and common, and yet Au- 
 thors take very little Notice of it, call it by an 
 improper Name, and defcribe it very defedlively, 
 and that is, 
 
 IV. A connexive Syllogifm, This feme have 
 called copulative -, but it does by no Means require 
 the major to be a copulative nor a compound Pro- 
 pofition (according to the Definition given of it. 
 Part 11. Chap. II. Se5f, 6.) but it requires that 
 two or more Ideas be fo connedted either in the 
 complex Subjed or Predicate of the major, that 
 if one of them be affirmed or denied in the minor, 
 common Senfe will naturally fhew us what will 
 be the Confequence. It would be very tedious 
 and ufelefs to frame particular Rules about them, 
 as will appear by the following Examples, which 
 are very various, and yet may be farther multi- 
 plied. 
 
 U (lO M^ek^ 
 
300 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 (i.) Meeknefs and Humility always go together^ 
 Mofes was a Man of Meeknefs, therefore Mofes 
 was alfo bumble. Or we may form this Minor, 
 Pharaoh was no humble Man s therefore he was not 
 7n£ek, 
 
 (2.) No Man can ferve God and Mammon ; the 
 covetous Man ferves Mammon ; therefore he can- 
 not ferve God. Or the Minor may run thus, the 
 true Q\in^\2Ln ferves God 'y therefore he does noty^ri;^ 
 Mammon. 
 
 (3.) Genius mufl join with Study to make a great 
 Man \ Florino /:?<^j Genius to he cannot flu dy -, there- 
 fore Florino will never be a great Man, Or thus, 
 Quintus fludies hard but has no Genius *, therefore 
 Quintus will never be a great Man. 
 
 (4.) G\Ao catiU make a Dinner without Flefh and 
 Fifh ', there was no Fijh to be gotten to Day ; there- 
 fore Gulo this Day cannot make a Dinner, 
 
 (5.) London ^« J Paris are in different Latitudes ; 
 the Latitude of London is 5 1 1- Deg, therefore this 
 cannot be the Latitude of Paris. 
 
 (6.) Jofeph and Benjamin had one Mother \ Ra- 
 chel was the Mother of Jofeph ; therefore fhe was 
 Benjamin' J Mother too, 
 
 (7.) The Father and the Son are of equal Stature ; 
 The Father is fix foot high \ therefore the Son is fix 
 foot high alfo, 
 
 18.) Pride ij inconfiftent with Innoctnct \ Angels 
 have Innocence *, therefore they have no Pride. Or 
 thus ; Devils have Pride 5 therefore they have not 
 Innocence. 
 
 I might multiply other Inftances of thefe con- 
 tiexive Syllogifms, by bringing in all forts of eH" 
 ceptivcy exclu/ive^ comparative, and modal Propo- 
 fitions into the Compofition of them ; for all 
 thefe may be wrought into conjunctive, as well as 
 inio fmple Syllogifms, and thereby we may render 
 
 them 
 
C II. S. 6. T'he right Ufe ^/Reafon. 301 
 
 them complex. But ic would wafte Time and Paper 
 without equal Profit. 
 
 Concerning thefe various Kinds of conjunctive 
 Syllogifms, take thefe two Obfervations. 
 
 Obferv. I. Mod of them may be transformed 
 into categorical Syllogifms by thofe wlio have a 
 mind to prove the Truth of them that Way ; or 
 they may be eafily converted into each other by 
 changing the Forms of Speech. 
 
 Obferv. II. Thefe covjun^ive Syllogifms are fel^ 
 dom deficient or faulty in the Form of them 5 for 
 fuch a Deficience would be . difcovered at firft 
 Glance generally by common Reafon, without 
 any artificial Rules of Logick : The chief Care 
 therefore is to fee that the major Propofition be true, 
 upon which the whole Force of the Argument 
 ufually depends* 
 
 SECT. VI. 
 
 Of Compound Syllogif??is. 
 
 W£ properly call thofe compound Syllogifms 
 which are made of two or more fingle 
 Syllogifms^ and may be refolved into them. The 
 chief Kinds are thefe, Epichirema^ Bilem?nay Prd- 
 fyllogifmuSy and Sorites. 
 
 I. Epichirema is a Syllogifm which Contains the 
 Proof of the major or minor, ot* both, before it 
 draws the Conclufion. This is often ufed in Writ- 
 ing, in publick Speeches, and in common Con- 
 verfation, that fo each Part of the Difcourfe may 
 be Goafirmed and put out of Doubt, as it moves 
 U a on 
 
302 L G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 on toward the Conclnfion, which was chiefly de- 
 figned. Take ihis Inltance •, 
 
 Sicknefs may he good for us ; for it weans us from 
 the Pie a fares of Ltfe^ and makes us think of dy- 
 ing ; 
 
 But we are uneafy under Sicknefs^ which ap- 
 pears by our Impatience^ Complaints^ Groaning s, 
 dec. 
 
 Therefore we are uneafy fometimes under that 
 which is good for us. 
 
 Another Initance you may fee in Cicero* s Oration 
 in Dc^fence of Milo^ who had flain Clodius, His 
 major Propofuion is, that it is lawful for one Man 
 to kill another who lies in wait to kill him ; which 
 he proves from the Cuflom of Nations^ from natural 
 Equity^ Examples^ &c. his minor is, that Clodius 
 laid wait for Milo ; which he proves by his Armsy 
 Guards^ Sec. and then infers the ConclufiOD) that 
 it was lawful for Milo to kill Clodius. 
 
 II. A Dilemma is an Argument which divides 
 the whole into all its Parts or Members by a difa 
 jun5iive Proportion, and then infers fomething 
 concerning each Part which is finally inferred con- 
 cerning the whole. Inftances of this are frequent ; 
 as, In this Life we muff either obey our vicious In^ 
 f Una lions or rejifl them : To obey them will bring Sin 
 and Sorrow^ to refift them is laborious and pairful ; 
 therefore we cannot be perfe^ly free from Sorrow or 
 Pain in this Life, 
 
 A Dilemma becomes faulty or ineffeElual three 
 Ways : Fz>/?, When the Members of the Divifion 
 are not well oppofed, or not fully enumerated ; for 
 then the major is falfe. Secondly^ When what is 
 afTcrted concerning each part is not jufl ; for then 
 the minor is not true. Thirdly^ when it may be 
 
 retorted 
 
C. 11. S. 6. The right Ufe of Reafon. 303 
 
 retorted with equal Force upon him who utters 
 it. 
 
 There was a famous ancient Inftance of this 
 Cafe wherein a Dilemna was retorted. Euathlus 
 promlfcd Protagoras a Reward when he had taught 
 him the Art of Pleadings and it was to be paid the 
 firil Day that he gained any Caufe in the Court. 
 After a conliderable time Protagoras goes to Law 
 with Euathlus for the Reward, and ufes this Di- 
 lemma ; Either the Caufe zvill go on my Side or on 
 yours ; If the Caufe goes on my Side^ you muff pay me 
 according to the Sentence of the Judge : If the Caufe 
 goes on your Side^ you mu§f pay me according to your 
 Bargain: Therefore whether the Caufe goes for me 
 or again^i me you mud pay me the Reward, But 
 Euathlus retorted this Dilemma thus : Either Ifhall 
 gain the Caufe or lofe it : If I gain the Caufe^ then 
 nothing will be due to you according to the Sentence of 
 the Judge : But if I lofe the Caufe ^ nothing will he 
 due to you according to tny Bargain : Therefore whe- 
 ther I lofe or gain the Caufe 1 will not pay you^ 
 for nothing will he due to you. 
 
 Noie^ I, A Dilemma is ufually defcribed as tho* 
 it always proved the Abfurdity, Inconvenience, or 
 Unreafonablenefs of fome Opinion or Pradlice ; 
 and this is the mod common Defign of it •, but it 
 is plain, that it may alfo be ufed to prove the Truth 
 or Advantage of any thing propofed ; as, /;; Hea- 
 ven we fhall either have Deftres or not : If we have 
 no Dejires^ then we have full Satisfa5iion ; if we 
 have Deferes^ they fhall he fatisfied as fa ft as they 
 arife ; therefore in Heaven we fhall he completely 
 fatisfied. 
 
 Note 2. This Sort of Argument may be com- 
 pofed of three or more Members, and may be 
 called a Tri lemma, 
 
 u 3 in. A 
 
3^4 
 
 LOG IC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 III. A Profyllogifm is when two or more Syllo- 
 gifnis are fo conneded together, that the Conclu- 
 iion of the former is the major or the minor of the 
 following ; as, Blood can't think ; hut the Soul of 
 Man thinks •, therefore the Soul of Man is not Blood ; 
 but the Soul of a Brute is his Blood according to the 
 Scripture ; therefore the Soul of Man is different 
 
 from the Soul of a Brute. See another Inflance in 
 the Introdu5lion to this Treatife, p. 5. 
 
 IV. A Sorites is when fcveral middle Terms are 
 chofen to conned one another fucceflively in fevc- 
 ral Propofitions, till the laft Proportion conneds 
 its Predicate with the firft Subjedl. Thus, All 
 Men of Revenge have their SouJs often uneafy ; un* 
 eafy Souls are a Plague to themfelves *, now to be one's 
 own Plague is Folly in the Extreme j therefore all 
 Men of Revenge are extreme Fools, 
 
 The Apoftle, Rom. viii. 29. gives us an Inflance 
 of this fort of Argument if it were reduced to ex- 
 adl Form : Whom he foreknew thofe he predejiinated ; 
 whom he predeftinated he called ; whom he called he 
 juftified \ whom he jufiified he glorified ; therefore 
 whom he foreknew he glorified. . 
 
 To thefe Syllogifms it may not be improper to 
 add Induofion, which is, when from feveral parti- 
 cular Propofitions we infer one general ; as, The 
 Doctrine of the Socinians cannot he proved from the 
 Gofpels^ it cannot he proved fro7n the A^s of the 
 Apoftle s^ it cannot he proved from the EpilileSy nor 
 the Book of Revelations \ therefore it cannot he pro- 
 ved from the New Tefta7?ient. 
 
 Note, This Sort of Argument is often defedlive, 
 becaufe there is not due Care taken to enumerate 
 all the Particulars on which the Conclufion fhould 
 depcr^d. 
 
 All 
 
C. II. S. 7. "the right UJe of Reafon . 305 
 
 All thefe four Kinds of Syllogifms in this Se6lion 
 may be called redundant^ becaufe they have more 
 than three Propofitions. But there is one fort of 
 Syllogifm which is defedive, and is called an En- 
 ihymem^ becaufe only the Conclufion with one of 
 the PremilTes is exprefs'd, while the other is fuppofed 
 and referved in the Mind : Thus, There is no true 
 Religion without good Morals \ therefore a Knave 
 cannot be truly religious : Or thus, // is our Duty to 
 love our Neighbours as our/elves ; therefore there are 
 but few who perform their Duty. 
 
 Note, This is the moft common fort of Argu- 
 ment amongft Mankind both in Writing and in 
 fpeaking ; for it would take up too much Time 
 and too much retard the Difcourfe to draw out all 
 our Arguments in Mood and Figure. Befides, Man- 
 kind loves to have fo much Compliment paid to 
 their Under (landings, as to fuppofe that they know 
 the Major or Minor, which is fupprelTcd and im- 
 plied, when you pronounce the other Premifs and 
 the Conclufion. 
 
 If there be any Debate about this Argument, 
 the Syllogifm muft be compleated in order to try 
 its Force and Goodnefs, by adding the abfent Pro- 
 pofitions. 
 
 SECT. VII. 
 
 Of the middle Terms, of common Places or Topics, 
 and Invention of Arguments, 
 
 THE next Divifion of Syllogifms is according 
 to the middle Term, which is made ufe of in 
 the Proof of any Propofition. Now the middle 
 Term (as we have hinted before) is often called 
 Argument, becaufe the Force of the Syllogifm de- 
 pends upon it : We muft make a little Delay here 
 
 U A to 
 
3o6 L G 1 C K: Or, Part. III. 
 
 to treat briefly of the Dod:rin3 of Topics^ or Places 
 whence middle 'Terms or Arguments are drawn. 
 
 All Arts and Sciences have feme general Sub- 
 jects which belong to them, which are called To- 
 pes or common Places ; bccaufe middle Terms are 
 borrowed, and Arguments derived from them for 
 the Proof of their various Propofitions which we 
 have Occafion to difcourfe of. The Topics of 
 Grammar^ are Etymology^ Noun^ Verb, Conftruc- 
 tion. Signification^ &c. The Topics of Logick are 
 Geni/s, Species, Difference^ Property, Definition, 
 Divifion, &c. The Topics o'i Ontology or Meta- 
 phyfick, are Caufe, Effe5l, Action, Paffion, Identi- 
 ty, Oppofiticn, Subject, Adjunct, Sign, &c. The 
 Topic of Morality or Elhicks, are. Law, Sin, Du^ 
 iy. Authority, Freedom of Will, Coinmand, threat- 
 7jing, Reward, Punijhment, &:c. The Topics of 
 Theology, are, God, Chrift^ Faith, Hope, fVorfiip, 
 Salvation, dzc. 
 
 To thefe feveral Topics there belong particular 
 Obfervations, Axioms, Canons, or Rules *, which 
 are laid down in their proper Sciences *, as, 
 
 Grammar hath fuch Canons, (viz.) Words in a 
 different Conftruction obtain a different Senfe, Words 
 derived from the fame Primitive may probably have 
 fome Affjiify in their original Meaning, &c. 
 
 Canons in Logic, are fuch as thefe. Every Part 
 of a Divifwn fingly taken muft contain lefs than 
 the Whole. A Definition mufl be peculiar and pro- 
 per to the Thing defined. Whatever is aff>,rmed or 
 denied of the Genus, -may be affirmed or denied of the 
 Species, &:c. 
 
 Metaphyfical Canons are fuch as thefe ; final 
 Caufes belong only to intelligent Agents. If a natural 
 and necejjary Caufe operate, the Effect zvill follow, 
 
 * A Canon I'c a Prop 'Htion d.-claring fome Property of the Subicft, which 
 ii r.ot txp::ilRd in the Dcri.itiori or Di'viji'^n of it. 
 
C. IL S. 7, The right life of Reafon.' 307 
 
 ^c, and there are large Catalogues of many more 
 in each diftindl Science. 
 
 Now it has been the Cuftom of thofe who teach 
 Logick or Rhetorkky to dircdl their Difciples, when 
 they want an Argument, to confult the federal 
 Topics which are fuited to their Subjed of Difcourfe, 
 and to rummage over the Definitions, Divifions and 
 Canons that belong to each Topic. This is called 
 the Invention of an Argument ; and it is taught 
 with much Solemnity in fome Schools. 
 
 I grant there may be good Ufe of this Pradice 
 for Perfons of a lower Genius, when they are to 
 compofe any Difcourfe for the Publick ; or for 
 thofe of fuperior Parts to refrefli their Memory, 
 and revive their Acquaintance with a Subje6l which 
 has been long abfent from their Thoughts, or 
 when their natural Spirits labour under Indifpofi- 
 tion and Languor ; but when a Man of moderate 
 Sagacity has made himfelf Mailer of his Theme 
 byjuft Diligence and Enquiry, he has feldom need 
 to run knocking at the Doors of all the Topics that 
 he may furnifh himfelf with Argument or Matter 
 of fpeaking : And indeed it is only a Man of Senfe 
 and Judgment that can ufe common Places or To- 
 pics well ', for amongft this Variety he only knows 
 what is fit to be left out, as well as what is fit to 
 be fpoken. 
 
 By fome logical Writers this Bufinefs of Topics 
 and Invention^ is treated of in fuch a Manner with 
 Mathematical Figures and Diagrams, filled with 
 the barbarous technical Words, Napcas, Mpcis^ 
 Ropcos, Nofropj IBc, as tho' an ignorant Lad were 
 to be led mechanically in certain artificial Harnef- 
 fes and Trammels to find out Arguments to prove 
 or refute any Propofition whatfoever, without any 
 rational Knowledge of the Ideas. Now there is 
 no Need to throw Words of Contempt on fuch 
 
 a Pradice •, 
 
3o8 L O G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 a Pradice ; the very Defcription of it carries Re- 
 proof and Ridicule in Abundance. 
 
 SECT. VIII. 
 
 Of fever al Kinds of Arguments and De?nonf rations. 
 
 WE proceed now to the Divifion of Syllo- 
 gifms according to the middle Term ; and 
 in this Part of our Treatife the Syllogifms them- 
 felves are properly called Arguments , and are thus 
 diftributed. 
 
 !• Arguments are called Grammatical Logical^ 
 Metaphyfical^ Phyftcal^ Moral, Mechanical, Theo- 
 logical, &c. according to the Art, Science, or Sub- 
 ject whence the middle Term or Topic is bor- 
 rowed. Thus if we prove that no Manfhould fteal 
 from his Neighbour, becaufe the Scripture forbids it, 
 this is a theological Argument : If we prove it from 
 the Laws of the Land, it is political -, but if we 
 prove it from the Principles of Reafon and Equity, 
 the Argument is moral. 
 
 II. Arguments are either certain and evident, or 
 doubtful and merely probable. 
 
 Probable Arguments are thofe whofe Conclu- 
 fions are proved by fome probable Medium ; as, 
 This Hill was once a Church-Tard, or a Field of 
 Battle, becaufe there are many human Bones found 
 here. This is not a certain Argument, for human 
 Bones might have been conveyed there fome other 
 Way. 
 
 Evident and certain Arguments are called Be- 
 monftrations ; for they prove their Conclufions by 
 clear Mediums and undoubted Principles ; and they 
 are generally divided into thefe two Sorts. 
 
 I. De- 
 
C. II. S. 8. The right Ufe of Reafon. 309 
 
 1. Demonftrations a Priori^ which prove the 
 Effed by its neceflary Caufc -, as, I prove the 
 Scripture is infallibly true, becaufe it is the Word of 
 God, who cannot lye, 
 
 2. Demonftrations ^ Pq/?^non, which infer the 
 Caufe from its neceflary EfFed: •, as, I infer there 
 hath been the Hand of fame Artificer here, becaufe 
 I find a curious Engine, Or, I infer, there is a Gody 
 from the Works of his Wifdoin in the vifible World, 
 
 The laft of thefe is called De?nonflratio t» oti, 
 becaufe it proves only the Exiftence of a Thing -, 
 the firft is named Bemonflratio rk S^iotj, becaufe ic 
 ihev7s alfo the Caufe of Exiftence. 
 
 But Note, That tho' thefe two Sorts of Argu- 
 ments are moft peculiarly called Bemonjlrations, 
 yet generally any ftrong and convincing Argument 
 obtains that Name ; and it is the Cuftom of Ma- 
 thematicians to call all their Arguments Denion- 
 jflrations, from what Medium foever they derive 
 them. 
 
 III. Arguments are divided into artificial and 
 inartificial. 
 
 An artificial Argument is taken from the Na- 
 ture and Circumftances of the Things *, and if the 
 Argument be ftrong it produces a natural Certain- 
 ty ; as The World was firfl created by God, becaufe 
 nothing can create itfelf. 
 
 An inartificial Argument is the Teftimony of an- 
 other, and this is called original, when our Infor- 
 mation proceeds immediately from the Perfons con- 
 cerned, or from Eye or Ear-Witnefles of a Fact: 
 it is called Tradition when it is delivered by the 
 Report of others. 
 
 We have taken Notice before, that Teftimony 
 is either divine or human. If the human Tefti- 
 mony be ftrong, it produces a moral Certainty ; 
 
 but 
 
3IO L G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 but divine Teftimony produces a fupernatural Cer- 
 tawty^ which is far fuperior. 
 
 Note, Arguments taken from human Teftimony 
 as well as from Laws and Rules of Equity, arecal- 
 Jed moral ; and indeed the fame Name is alfo ap- 
 plied to every Sort of Argument which is drawn 
 from the free A5lions of God, or the contingent Ac- 
 tions of Men, wherein we cannot arife to a natural 
 Certainty, but content ourfeives with an high De- 
 gree of Probability, which in many Cafes is fcarce 
 inferior to natural Certainty, 
 
 IV. Arguments are either ^ireEl or indireEi, It 
 is a direot Argument where the middle Term is 
 fuch as proves the Queftion itfelf, and infers that 
 very Propofition which was the Matter of En- 
 quiry, yln indireoi or oblique Argument proves or 
 refutes fome other Propofition, and thereby makes 
 the Thing enquired appear to be true by plain 
 Confequence. 
 
 Several Arguments are called indire^l-, as, (i.) 
 When fome contradictory Propofition is proved 
 to be falfe, improbable or impofTible : Or when 
 upon Suppofition of the FalOiood, or Denial of 
 the original Propofition, fome Abfurdity is infer- 
 red. This is called a Proof per impoj/ibile, or a 
 Redu5lio ad abfurdum, (2.) When fome other 
 Propofition is proved to be true which is lefs pro- 
 bable, and thence it follows that the original Pro- 
 pofition is true, becaufe it is more probable. This 
 is an Argument ex magis probabili ad minus. (3.) 
 When any other Propofition is proved upon which 
 it v/as before agreed to yield the original Queftion, 
 This is an Argument ex Concejfo, 
 
 V. There is yet another Rank of Arguments 
 which have Latin Names j their true Diftin(flion 
 
 is 
 
C. II. S . 8. The right life oj Reafon. 3 1 1 
 
 is derived from the Topics or middle Terms which 
 are ufed in them, tho' they are called an Addrefs 
 to our Judgment^ our Faiih^ our Ignorance ^ our 
 Profeffion^ our A^ode^y, and our Paffions, 
 
 1. If an Argument be taken from the Nature 
 or Exiflence of Things, and addrefled to the 
 Reafon of Mankind^ it is called Argimentiim ad Ju- 
 diciiim, 
 
 2. When it is borrowed from fome convincing 
 Teflimony, it is Argufuentiim ad Fidem^ an Addrels 
 to our Faitb» 
 
 3 . When it is drawn from any infufficient Me~ 
 dium whaufoever, and yet the Oppofer has not Skill 
 to refute or anfwer it, this is Argumentum ad Igno^ 
 rant tarn, an Addrefs to our Ignorance. 
 
 4. When it is built upon the profefTed Principles 
 or Opinions of the Perfon with whom we argue, 
 whether the Opinions be true or falfe, it is named 
 Argumentum ad hominem^ an Addrefs to our frO" 
 fefd Principles, St. Paul ohtn ufes this Argument 
 
 when he reafons with the Jews, and when he fays, 
 Ifpeak as a Man. 
 
 5. When the Argument is fetched from the 
 Sentiments of fome wife, great, or good Men, 
 whofe Authority we reverence and hardly dare 
 oppofe, it is called Argumentum ad Verecundiam^ an 
 Addrefs to our Mode§fy. 
 
 8. 1 add finally, when an Argument is borrow- 
 ed from any Topics which are fuited to engage 
 the Inclinations and Pafllons of the Hearers on 
 the Side of the Speaker, rather than to convince 
 the Judgment, this is Argumentum ad Paffiones^ 
 an Addrefs to the Paffions ; or if it be made pub- 
 lickly, it is called ad Populu?n, or an Appeal to the 
 People. 
 
 Afcer 
 
312 L O G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 After all thefc Divifions of Syl/ogifm or ^rgu- 
 vient arifing from the 7mddle Term^ there is one 
 Diftindion proper to be mentioned which arifes 
 from the Premiffes, An iVrgument is called uni- 
 form when both the Premiffes are derived from the 
 fame Springs of Knowledge, whether it be Se^ife^ 
 Reafon^ Confcioufnefs, human Faith, or divine Faith : 
 But when the two Premiffes are derived from dif- 
 ferent Springs of Knowledge, it is called a ?nixt 
 Argiment, 
 
 Whether the Conclufion muft be called Human 
 or Divine, when one or both Premiffes are Mat- 
 ters of Diviiie Faith, but the Conclufion is drawn by 
 human Reafon, 1 leave to be difputed and determi- 
 ned in the Schools of Theology, 
 
 Thus they^-fow^ C^^p/^r is finifhed, and a parti- 
 cular Account given of all the chief Kinds or SyU 
 logifms or Arguments which are made ufe of among 
 Men, or treated of in Logick, together mthfpecial 
 Rules for the Formation of them, as far as is ne- 
 ceffary. 
 
 If a Syllogifm agree with the Rules which are 
 given for the Conftrudion and Regulation of it, 
 it is called a true Argument : If it difagree with 
 thefe Rules, it is a Faralogifm, or falfe Argument : 
 But when a falfe Argum.ent puts on the Face and 
 Appearance of a true one, then it is properly cal- 
 ' led a Sophifm or Fallacy which fhall be the Subject 
 of the next Chapter. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
C. III. S. I . "The right life of Reafon. 3 1 3 
 CHAP. III. 
 
 The DoBrine of Sophifms, 
 
 FROM Truth nothing can really follow but 
 what is true : Whenfoever therefore we find 
 zfalfe Conclufton drawn from PremilTes which feem 
 to be true, there muft be feme Fault in the De- 
 duction or Inference ; or elfe one of the Premifles 
 is not true in the Senfe in which it is ufed in that 
 Argument. 
 
 When an Argument carries the Face of Truth 
 with it, and yet leads us into Miftake, it is a 
 Sophifm ; and there is fome Need of a particular 
 Defcription of thefe fallacious Arguments, that we 
 may with more Eafe and Readinefs deted and 
 folve them. 
 
 SECT. I. 
 
 Offeveral Kinds of SopbifmSy and their Solution. 
 
 AS the Rules of right Judgment and o^ good 
 Ratiocination often coincide with each o- 
 ther, fo the DoClrine of Prejudices, which was 
 treated of in the Second Part of Logicky has anti- 
 cipated a great deal of what might be faid on the 
 Subjed of Sophifms ; yet I fliall mention the mofl 
 remarkable Springs of falfe Argumentationj which 
 are reduced by Logicians to fome of the following 
 Heads. 
 
 I, The 
 
314 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 I, The firft fort of Sophifm is called Ignoratio 
 Elenchiy or a Miflake of the ^efiion ; that is, 
 when fomething elfe is proved which has neither 
 any neceflary Connexion nor Inconfiftency with 
 the Thing enquired, and confequently gives no 
 Determination to the Enquiry, tho' it may feem 
 at firft Sight to determine the Queftion ; as, if 
 any fhould conclude that St. Paul was not a na- 
 tive JeWy by proving that he was born a Roman ; 
 or if they fhould pretend to determine that he was 
 neither Roman nor Jew^ by proving that he was 
 lorn at Tarfus in Cilicia : Thefe Sophifms are re- 
 futed by fhewing that thefe three may be true ; 
 for he was born of Jewlfh Parents in the City of 
 ^arfusy and by fome peculiar Privilege granted to 
 his Parents, or his native City, he was born a 
 T)tn\ztno^ Rome. Thus there is neither of thefe 
 three Characters of the Apoftle inconfiftent with 
 each other, and therefore the proving one of them 
 true does not refute the others. 
 
 Or if the Queftion be propofed, Whether Excefs 
 of Wine can he hurtful to him that drinks it, and the 
 Sophifter fhould prove that it revives his Spirits^ 
 it exhilerates his Soul, it gives a Man Courage, and 
 makes him ftrong and aoiive, and then he takes it 
 for granted that he has proved his Point. 
 
 But the Refpondent may eafily fliew, that tho' 
 Wine may do all this, yet it may ht finally hurtful 
 both to the Soul and Body of him that drinks it to 
 Excefs, 
 
 Difputers when they grow warm, are ready to 
 run into this Fallacy : They drefs up the Opinion 
 of their Adverfary as they pleafe, and afcribe Sen- 
 timents to him which he doth not acknowledge, 
 and when they have with a great deal of Pomp 
 attacked and confounded thefe Images of Straw 
 
 of 
 
C. III. S. I . The right Vfe of Reafon. 3 1 5 
 
 of their own making, they triumph over their Ad- 
 verfary as though they had utterly confuted his 
 Opinion. 
 
 It is a Fallacy of the fame Kind which a Bif- 
 futant is guilty of when he finds that his Adverfary 
 is too hard for him, and that he cannot fairly prove 
 the Queftion firft propofed ; he then with Slinefs 
 and Subtlety turns the Difcourfe afide to fome other 
 kindred Point which he can prove^ and exults in 
 that new Argument wherein his Opponent never 
 contradicfled him. 
 
 The Way to prevent this Fallacy is by keeping 
 the Eye fixed on the precife Point of Difpute, and 
 neither wandering from it ourfelves, nor fuffering 
 our Antagonifl to wander from it, or fubflitute any 
 Thing elfe in its Room, 
 
 II. The next Sophifm is called Petitio Prlncipit^ 
 or a Suppofition of what is not granted ; that is, when 
 any Propofition is proved by the fame Propofition 
 in other Words, or by fomething that is equally 
 uncertain anddifputed: As if any one undertake 
 to prove that the human Soul is extended through all 
 the Parts of the Body^ becaufe it reftdes in every 
 Member, which is but the fame Thing in other 
 Words. Or, if a Papifl fhould pretend to prove 
 that his Religion is the only Catholick Religion^ and 
 is derived from Chrift and his Apoflles^ becaufe it 
 agrees with the Do5irine of all the Fathers of the 
 Churchy all the holy Martyrs, and all the Chriflian 
 PVorld throughout all Ages : Whereas this is a great" 
 Point in Conteft, whether their Religion does agree 
 with that of all the Ancients and the primitive 
 Chriftians, or no. 
 
 III. That Sort of Fallacy which is called z 
 Circle is very near a-kin to the Petitio Principii ; as 
 
 X wheo 
 
3i6 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 when one of the PremifTes in a Sylloglfm is quef- 
 tioned and oppofcd, and we intend to prove it 
 by the Conclufion : Or, when in a Train of Syl- 
 logifins we prove the lad by recurring to what 
 was the Conclufion of the firft. The Papifis are 
 famous at this Sort of Fallacy, when they prove 
 the Scripture to he the Word of God by the Authority 
 or infallible Te^imony of their Churchy and when 
 they are called to Ihew the infallible Authority cf 
 their Church, they pretend to prove it by the 
 Scripture, 
 
 IV. The next kind of Sophifm is called non 
 Caufa pro Caufd^ or the Affignation of a falfe Caufe, 
 This the Peripatetic Philofophers were guilty of 
 continually, when they told us that certain Beings, 
 which i\\ty CdWtd fubftantial Forms, were the Springs 
 of Colour, Motion, Vegetation, and the various 
 Operations of natural Beings in the animate and 
 inanimate World ; when they informed us that 
 Nature was terribly afraid of Vacman, and that 
 this was the Caufe why the Water would not fall 
 out of a long Tube if it was turned upfide down : 
 The Moderns as well as the Antients fall often into 
 this Fallacy when they pofitively aflign the Reafons 
 of natural Appearances, without fufficient Experi- 
 ments to prove them. 
 
 Asfrologers are over- run with this Sort of Falla- 
 cies, and they cheat the People grofly by pretend- 
 ing to tell Fortujies, and to deduce the Caufe of 
 the various Occurrences in the Lives of Men from 
 the various Pofitions of the Stars and Planets, which 
 they cal; Afpeols. 
 
 When Comets and Eclipfes of the Sun and Moon 
 are conftrued to fignify the Fate of Princes, the 
 Hevolution of States, Famine, Wars and Calami- 
 
 ties 
 
C. III. S. I. The right Vfe of Reafon. 317 
 
 ties of all Kinds, it is a Fallacy that belongs to 
 this Rank of Sophifms, 
 
 There is fcarce any Thing more common in 
 human Life than this Sore of deceitful Argument. 
 If any two accidental Events happen to concur, 
 one is prefently made the Caufe of the other. If 
 Titius wronged his Neighbour of a Guinea and in 
 fiic Months after he fell down and hroke his Leg, 
 weak Men will impute it to the divine Vengeance 
 on Titius for his former Injuftice. This Sophifm 
 was found alfo in the early Days of the World : 
 For when holy Job was furrounded with uncommon 
 Miferies^ his own Friends inferred, that he was ci 
 tnoft heinous Criminal, and charged him with aggra- 
 vated Guilt as the Caufe of his Calamities ; though 
 God himfelf by a Voice from Heaven folved this 
 uncharitable Sophifm, and cleared his Servant Job 
 of that Charge. 
 
 How frequent is it among Men to impute 
 Crimes to wrong Perfons? We too often charge 
 that upon the wicked Contrivance and premedi- 
 tated Malice of a Neighbour, which arofe merely 
 from Ignorance, or from unguarded Temper. 
 And on the other Hand, when we have a Mind to 
 excufe ourfelves, we pradife the fame Sophifm., 
 and charge that upon our Inadvertence or our Ig- 
 norance, which perhaps was defigned Wickednels. 
 What is really done by a Neceflity of Circumftan- 
 ces, we fometimes impute to Choice. And again, 
 we charge that upon Neceflity, which was really 
 defired and chofen. 
 
 Sometimes a Perfon ads out of Judgment in 
 Oppofition to his Inclination *, another Perfon 
 perhaps adcs the fame Thing out of Inclination, 
 and againft his Judgment. It is hard lor us to 
 determine with AlTurance what are the inward 
 
 X 2 Springs 
 
3i8 L O G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 Springs and fecrec Caufes of every Man's Con- 
 dudl ; and therefore we fhould be cautious and 
 flow in pafling a Judgment, where the Cafe is 
 not exceeding evident : And if we ifhould miftake, 
 let it rather be on the charitable than on the cenfo- 
 rious Side. 
 
 It is the fame Sophifm that charges inathemati* 
 cal Learning with leading the Minds of Men to 
 Scepticifm and Infidelity^ and as unjuftly accufes 
 the new Philofophy of paving the Way to Herefy 
 and Schifm. Thus the Reformation from Popery 
 has been charged with the Murder a?jd Blood of 
 Millio72S^ which in Truth is to be imputed to the 
 Tyranny of the Princes and the Priefts^ who would 
 not fuffcr the People to reform their Sentiments 
 and their Pradices according to the Word of 
 God. Thus Chrinianity in the primitive Ages 
 was charged by the Heathens with all the Cala- 
 mities which bqfel the Roman Empire^ becaufe 
 the Chriflians renounced the Heathen Gods and 
 Idols. 
 
 The Way to relieve ourfelvcs from thofe So- 
 phifms, and to fecure ourfelves from the Danger 
 of falling into them, is an honeft and diligent En- 
 quiry inro the real Nature and Caufes of Things, 
 with a conftant Watchfulnefs againfl all thofc Pre- 
 judices that might warp the Judgment afide from 
 Truth in that Enquiry, 
 
 V. The next is called Fallacia Accidentis^ or a 
 Sophifm wherein we pronounce concerning the 
 Nature and ejjential Properties of any Subje(n: ac- 
 cording to fomething which is merely accidental 
 to it. This Is a-kin to the former, and is alfo very 
 frequent in human Life. So if Opium or the 
 Peruvian Bark has been ufed imprudently or un- 
 
 fuccefsfullys 
 
C. Ill S. I. T:he right Ufe of Rtdon. 319 
 
 fuccefsfully, whereby the Patient has received In- 
 jury, fome weaker People abfolutely pronounce 
 againft the Ufe of the Bark or Opiiun upon all 
 Occafions whatfoever, and are ready to call them 
 Foifon, So tVine has been the accidental Occa- 
 fion of Drunkennefs and parrels ; Learning and 
 Printing may have been the accidental Caufe of 
 Sedition in a State ; the Reading of the Bible by 
 Accident has been abufed to promote Herejies or 
 de^ru5iive Errors j and for thefe Reafons they have 
 been all pronounced evil Things, Mahomet forbad 
 his Followers the Ufe of Wine *, the Turks dif- 
 courage Learning in their Dominions ; and the 
 FapiHs forbid the Scripture to be read by the Laity. 
 But how very unreafonable are thefe Inferen- 
 ces, and thefe Prohibitions which are built upon 
 them I 
 
 VI. The next Sophifm borders upon the former; 
 and that is, when we argue from that which is true 
 in particular Circumjlances to prove the fame 
 thing true abfolutely^ fimply^ and obftraEled from 
 all Circumfiances ; this is called in the Schools a 
 Sophifm a di5io fecundum quid ad di5fum fimpliciter \ 
 as. That which is bought in the Shambles is eaten for 
 Dinner ; raw Meat is bought in the Shambles ; there- 
 fore raw Meat is eaten for Dinner. Or thus, Livy 
 writes Fables and Improbabilities when he defcribes 
 Frodigies and Omens ; therefore Livy*s Roman Hif- 
 tory is never to be believed in any thing. Or thus. 
 There may be fome Miifake of Tranfcribers in fome 
 Fart of Scripture ; therefore Scripture alone is not a 
 fafe Guide for our Faith, 
 
 This Sort of Sophifm has its Reverfe alfo ; as 
 
 when we argue from that which is true fimply and 
 
 abfolutely to prove the fame Thing true in all parti- 
 
 X 3 cular 
 
320 L O G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 cular Circumftances whatfoever * •, as if a Traytor 
 Ihould argue from the fixth Commandment, Thou 
 Jhalt not kill a Man^ to prove that he himfelf ought 
 not to be hanged : Or if a Madman fhould tell me, 
 I ought 7iot to withhold his Sword from him^ be- 
 cauje no Man ought to withhold the Property of an- 
 other. 
 
 Thefe two lafl Species of Sophtfms are eafily folv- 
 ed by Ihewing the Difference betwixt Things in 
 their abfolute Nature, and the fame Things fur- 
 rounded with peculiar Circmnjlances, and confidered 
 in Regard to fpecial Times, Places, Perfons and 
 Occafions ; or by fhewing the Difference between 
 a moral and a metaphyfical Univerfality, and that the 
 Propofition will hold good in one Cafe, but not 
 in the other. 
 
 VII. The Sophifms of Compojition and Bivifion 
 come next to be mentioned. 
 
 The Sophifm of Compojition is when we infer 
 any thing concerning Ideas in a compounded Senfe, 
 which is only true in a divided Senfe. And when it 
 is faid in the Gofpel that Chrifl made the Blind to 
 fee, and the Deaf to hear, and the Laine to walk, 
 we ought not to infer hence that Chrifl performed 
 Contradi5licns , but thofe who were blind before 
 were made to fee, and thofe who were deaf before 
 were made to hear, &c. So when the Scripture 
 affares us the worfl of Sinners 7nay be faved, it fig- 
 nifies only that they who have heen the worfl of 
 Sinners may repent and be faved, not that they 
 ihall be faved in their Sins. Or if any one fliould 
 argue thus, Two and three are even and odd ; five 
 
 * This Is arguing from a moral Ur»verfality, which admits of fome Ex- 
 fppti»>n«, in the fiAme Manner as may be argued from metaphyfical or z na- 
 tural Uni-frjality, which admics of no Exceptions, 
 
 are 
 
C. III. S. I. The right life ^Reafon. 321 
 
 are two and three ; therefore five are even and odd. 
 Here that is very falfely inferred concerning two 
 or three in Unions which is only true of them divi- 
 ded. 
 
 The Sophlfm of Divi/wn is when we infer the 
 fame Thing concerning Ideas in a divided Senfe^ 
 which is only true in a compounded Senfe -, as, if 
 we fhould pretend to prove that every Soldier in the 
 Grecian Army put an hundred thoufand Perfjans to 
 Flighty becaufe the Grecian Soldiers did fo. Or if 
 a Man fhould argue thus •, five is one Number ; two 
 and three are five \ therefore two and three are one 
 Number, 
 
 This fort of Sophifms is committed when the 
 Word All is taken in a collective and a dejiributive 
 Senfe, without a due Diftindion ; as, if any one 
 fhould reafon thus ; All the muftcal Inftruments of the 
 Jewifli Temple made a noble Concert^ The Harp was 
 a mufical Inftrument of the ]i^m(h Temple •, therefore 
 the Harp made a noble Concert. Here the Word All 
 in the Major is colledlive, whereas fuch a Conclu- 
 fion requires that the Word All fhould be diftri- 
 butive. 
 
 It is the fame Fallacy when the univerfil Word 
 All or No refers to Species in one Propofition, and 
 to Individuals in another •, as. All Animals were in 
 Noah'j Ark ; therefore no Animals perifhed in the 
 Flood : Whereas in the Premife all Ani?nals figmfies 
 every kind of Animals ^ which does not exclude or 
 deny the drowning of a thoufand Individuals. 
 
 VIII. The laft fort of Sophifms arifes from our 
 Abufe of the Ambiguity of tFords^ which is the larg- 
 eft and moil extenfive kind of Fallacy ; and in- 
 deed feveral of the former Fallacies might be re- 
 duced to this Head. 
 
 X 4 Whea 
 
322 L G I C K: Or, Part III, 
 
 When the Words or Phrafes ^re plainly equivocal, 
 they are called Sopbifms of Equivocation \ as, if we 
 Ihould argue thus, He that fends forth a Book into the 
 Lights defires it to he read ; He that throws a Book 
 into the Fire, fends it into the Light •, therefore he 
 that throws a Book into the Fire defires it to he read. 
 
 This Sophifm, as well as the foregoing, and all 
 of the like Nature are folved by fhewing the 
 different Senfes of the Words, Terms or Phrafes. 
 Here Light in the major Propoficion fignifies the 
 pihlick View of the World \ in the minor it figni- 
 fies the Brightnefs of Flame and Fire, and therefore 
 the Syllogifm has four Terms, or rather it has no 
 middle Term, and proves nothing. 
 
 But where fuch grofs Equivocations and Amli* 
 guitles appear in Arguments, there is little Danger 
 of impofing upon ourfelves or others. The great- 
 eft Danger, and which we are perpetually expofed 
 to in Reafoning, is, where the two Senfes or Sig- 
 nifications of one Term are near a-kin, and not 
 plainly diftinguifhed, and yet they are really fuffi- 
 ciently different in their Senfe to lead us into great 
 Miftakes, if we are not watchful. And indeed the 
 greateft Part of Gontroverfies in the facred or ci- 
 vil Life arife from the different Senfes that are pun 
 upon Words, and the different Ideas which are in- 
 cluded in them ; as have been fhewn at large in 
 the firft Part of Logick, Chap, IV. which treats of 
 Words and Terms, 
 
 There is after all thefe, another Sort of So- 
 phifm which is wont to be called an imperfe5l Enu- 
 meration, or a falfe InduElion, when from a few Ex- 
 periments or Obfervations Men infer general Theo- 
 rems and univerfal Propofitions. But this is fufH- 
 ciencly noticed in the foregoing Chapter, where we 
 treated of that fort of Syllogifm which is called 
 JnduSfion, 
 
 SECT. 
 
C. III. S. 2. The right Ufe ^ Reafon. 323 
 
 SECT. II. 
 
 Two general Tefts of true Syllogifms^ and Methods of 
 folvlng all Sopbifns. 
 
 BEfides the fpecial Defcription of true Syllogifms 
 and Sophifnis already given, and the Rules by 
 which the one are framed, and the other refuted, 
 jthere are thefe two general Methods of reducing all 
 3yllogifnis whatsoever to a Te§f of their Truth or 
 Falfliood* 
 
 1. The Hrft is, that the Preinijfes mu[i fat leafl: 
 implicitly) contain the Conclujion ; or thus, One 
 of the Premifjes muji contain the Conclufion^ and the 
 other muft Jhew that the Conclufion is contained in 
 it. The Reafon of this Rule is this ; When any 
 Propofition is offered to be proved, it is necef- 
 fary to find another Propofition which con- 
 firms it, which may be called the containing Pro- 
 'pofition \ but becaufe the fecond mufl not contain 
 the firft in an exprefs Manner, and in the fame 
 Words,* therefore it is necefTary that a third or 
 cflenfive Propofition be found out to fhew that 
 the fecond Propofition contains the firft which 
 was to be proved. Let us make an Experiment 
 of this Sy llogifm. Whofoever is a Slave to his na- 
 tural Inclinations is miferahle ; the wicked Man 
 is a Slave to his natural Inclinations \ therefore the 
 wicked Man is miferahle. Here it is evident that 
 the major Propofition contains the Conclufion; 
 
 * It is confefTed that conditicnal and difjun&i've major Propofitions do 
 exprefly contain all that is in the Conclufion ; but then it is not in a certain 
 zni corxlujirue Manner , but only in a dubious Form of Speech, and mingled 
 with other Terms, and therefore it is not the fame exprefs Picpofitioih 
 
 for 
 
324 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 for under the general Chara6ter of a Slave to na- 
 tural Inclinations^ a wicked Man is contained or 
 included ; and the minor Propofition declares it \ 
 whence the Conclufion is evidently deduced that the 
 kicked Man is viiferable. 
 
 In many affirmative Syllogifms we may fuppofe 
 cither the major or the minor to contain the 
 Conclufion, and the other to fhew it ; for there 
 is no great Difference. But in negative Syllo- 
 gifms it is the negative Propofition that contains 
 the Conclufion, and the affirmative Propofition 
 ihews it ; as, every wife Man majiers his Pajfwns j 
 no angry Man majiers his PaJJions ; therefore no 
 angry Man is wife. Here k is more natural to 
 fuppofe the minor to be the containing Propofi- 
 tion j it is the minor implicitly denies Wifdom 
 conceding an angry Man^ hecaufe niafterifig the 
 Fafftons is included in Wifdom, a^d the major 
 fliews it. 
 
 Note, This Rule may be applied to complex and 
 CGnjunuiive, as well as fimple Syllogifms, and is 
 adapted to fhew the Truth or Faifhood of any of 
 them. 
 
 II. The fccond is this ; As the 1'erms in every. 
 Syllogifm are ufually repeated tzvice, fo they muji he 
 taken prectfely in the fame Senfe in both Places : 
 For the greateft Part of Miftakes, that arife in 
 forming Syllogifms, is derived from fome little Dif- 
 ference in the Senfe of one of the Terms in the twa 
 Parts of the Syllogifm wherein it is ufed. Let us 
 confider the following Sophifms. 
 
 I . It is a Sin to kill a Man ; a Murderer is a 
 Man \ therefore it is a Sin to kill a Murderer, 
 Here the Word Kill in the firft Propofition fig- 
 nifies to kill unjustly, or without a Law -, in the 
 Conclufion it is taken abfolutely for putting a, 
 
 Man 
 
C. III. S. 2 . "The right life of Reafon. 325 
 
 Man to Death in general^ and therefore the Inference 
 is not good. 
 
 2. What I am^ you are not ; but I am a Man ; 
 therefore you are not a Man, This is a relative 
 Syllogifm : But if it: be reduced to a regular categori- 
 cal Form, it will appear there is Ambiguity in the 
 Terms, thus •, fVhat 1 ajn, is a Man \ you are not 
 what I am \ therefore you are not a Man, Here 
 what I am in the major Propofition, is taken fpe- 
 dally for my Nature \ but in the minor Propofi- 
 tion the fame Words are taken individually for my 
 Perfon ; therefore the Inference muft be falfe, for 
 the Syllogifm does not take the Term what I am 
 both times in the fame Senfe. 
 
 3. He that fays you are an Animal^ fays true ;but 
 i)e that fays you are a Goofe, fays you are an Animal y 
 therefore he that fays you are a Goofe^ fays true. In 
 the major Propofition the Word Animal is the Pre- 
 dicate of an incidental Propofition -, which incidental 
 Propofition being affirmative, renders the Predicate 
 of it particular, according to Chap, II. Se5f, 2, Axi- 
 om 3. and confequently the Word Animal there 
 fignifies only hufnan Animality, In the minor Pro- 
 pofition, the Word Animal^ for the fame Reafon, 
 fignifies the Animality of a Goofe -, thereby it be- 
 comes an ambiguous Term, and unfit so build the 
 Conclufion upon. Or if you fay, the Word Ani- 
 mal in the minor, is taken for hujnan Animality^ 
 then the minor is evidently falfe. 
 
 It is from this lafl: general Tejl of Syllogifms that 
 we derive the Guftom of the Refpondent in anfwer- 
 ing the Arguments of the Opponent^ which is to di- 
 ftinguifh upon the major or minor Propofition, and 
 declare which Term is ufed in two Senfes, and in 
 what Senfe the Propofition may be true, and in 
 what Senfe it is falfe. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
326 L G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 CHAP. IV. 
 
 Some general Rules to direSi our Reafoning, 
 
 MOST of the general and fpecial Direflions 
 given to form our Judgments aright in the 
 preceeding Part of Logick might be rehearfed here ; 
 for the Judgments which we pafs upon Things are 
 generally built on fome fecret Reafoning or Argu- 
 ment by which the Propofuion is fuppofed to be 
 proved. But there may be yet fome farther Af- 
 fiftances given to our reafoning Powers in their 
 Search after Truth, and an Obfervation of the fol- 
 lowing Rules will be of great Importance for that 
 End. 
 
 I. Rule. Accuftcm yourfelves to clear and diftin^ 
 JdeaSy to evident Propofitions^ to jlrong and convinc- 
 ing Arguments. Converfe much with thofe Friends, 
 and thofe Books, and thofe Parts of Learning 
 where you meet with the greateft Clearnefs of 
 Thought and Force of Reafoning. The mathe- 
 viatica I Sciences, and particularly Arithmetick^ 
 Geometry^ and Mechanicks^ abound with thefe Ad- 
 vantages : And if there were nothing valuable in 
 them for the Ufes of human Life, yet the very 
 fpeculative Parts of this fort of Learning are well 
 v/orth our Study ; for by perpetual Examples 
 they teach us to conceive with Clearnefs, to con- 
 ned our Ideas and Proportions in a Train of De- 
 pendance, to reafon with Strength and Demon- 
 Itration, and to diftinguifh between Truth and 
 Falfhood. Something of thefe Sciences fhould be 
 fludied by every Man who pretends to Learning, 
 and that (as \Av. Locke cxprefles it) not fo much to 
 
 make 
 
C. IV. The right Vfe of Reafoii. 3 27 
 
 make us Mathematicians y as to make us reafonabk 
 Creatures, 
 
 We ihould gain fuch a Familiarity with Evi- 
 dence of Perception and Force of Reafoning, and 
 gee fuch a Habit of difcerning clear Truths, than 
 the Mind may be foon offended with Obfcurity 
 and Confufion : Then we fhall (as ic were) natu- 
 rally and with Eafe reflrain our Minds from rafli 
 Judgment, before we attain jufl Evidence of the 
 Propofition which is offered to us ; and we fhall 
 with the fame Eafe, and (as it were) naturally feize 
 and embrace every Truth that is propofed with 
 jufl Evidence. 
 
 This Habit of conceiving clearly^ of judging 
 jufily^ and of reafoning well, is not to be attained 
 merely by the Happinefs of Conftitution, the 
 Brightnefs of Genius, the beft natural Parts, or 
 the beft Colledion of logical Precepts. It is 
 Cuftom and Practice that ?nuff for?n and eftablifh 
 this Habit. We muft apply ourfelves to it till 
 we perform all this readily, and without refledl- 
 ing on Rules. A coherent Thinker^ and a ftri^ 
 Reafoner is not to be made at once by a Set of 
 Rules, any more than a good Painter or Mufician 
 may be formed extcfnpore by an excellent Lecfture 
 on Mufick or Painting. It is of infinite Impor- 
 tance therefore in our younger Years to be taught 
 both the Value and the PraElice of conceiving 
 clearly and reafoning right : For when we are 
 grown up to the middle of Life, or paft it, it is 
 no Wonder that we fhould not learn good Rea- 
 foning, any more than that an ignorant Clown fhould 
 not be able to learn fine Language, Dancing, or a 
 courtly Behaviour, when his ruftic Airs have grown 
 up with him till the Age of Forty. 
 
 For 
 
328 LOGIC K: Or, tart HI. 
 
 For wane of this Care fome Perfons of Rank and 
 Education dwell all their Days among obfcure 
 Ideas ; they conceive and judge always in Confufi- 
 on, they take weak Arguments for Demonftration, 
 they are led away with the Difguifes and Shadows 
 of Truth. Now if fuch Perfons happen to have 
 a bright Imagination, a Volubility of Speech, and 
 a Copioufnefs of Language, they not only impofe 
 many Errors upon their own Underftandings, but 
 they {tamp the Image of their own Miftakes upon 
 their Neighbours alfo, and fpread their Errors 
 abroad. 
 
 It is a Matter of juft Lamentation and Pity to 
 confider the Weaknefs of the common Multitude 
 of Mankind in this Refped:, how they receive any 
 thing into their AfTent upon the mod trifling 
 Grounds. True Reafoning hath very little Share 
 in forming their Opinions. They refift the moft 
 convincing Arguments by an obftinate Adherence 
 to their Prejudices, and believe the moft impro- 
 bable Things with the greateft AfTurance. They 
 talk of the abftrufeft Myfteries, and determine 
 upon them with the utmoft Confidence, and with- 
 out juft Evidence either from Reafon or Revela- 
 tion. A confufed Heap of dark and inconfiftent 
 Ideas make up a good Part of their Knowledge in 
 Matters of Philofopby as well as Religion^ having 
 never been taught the Ufe and Value of clear and 
 juft Reafoning. 
 
 Yet it muft be ftill confeiTed that there are fome 
 Myfteries in Religion ^ both natural and revealed^ as 
 well as fome ahftrufe Points in Philofophy^ where- 
 in the Wife as well as the Unwife muft be con- 
 tent with obfcure Ideas. There are feveral Things, 
 efpecially relating to the invifible World, which 
 are unfearchable in our prefent State, and there- 
 fore we muft believe what Revelation plainly dic- 
 tates. 
 
C. IV. The right Ufe of Reafon. 3 2 9 
 
 tates, tho' the Ideas may be obfcure. Reafon itfelf 
 demands this of us ; but we fhould feek for the 
 brighiefl Evidence both of Ideas, and of the Con- 
 nexion of them, wherefoever it is attainable. 
 
 II. Rule. Enlarge your general Acquaintance 
 with Things daily ^ in order to attain a rich Furniture 
 of Topics, or middle Terms ^ whereby thofe Propofi- 
 tions which occur may he either proved or difproved ; 
 but efpecially meditate and enquire with great Dili- 
 gence and Exa5lnefs into the Nature^ Properties^ Cir- 
 cumftances and Relations of the particular Suhje^ about 
 which you judge or argue, Confider its Caufes, Ef- 
 fedls, Confequences, Adjundls, Oppofites, Signs, 
 ^c, fo far as is needful to your prefent Purpofe. 
 You fhould furvey a Queftion round about, and on 
 all Sides, and extend your Views as far as polTible, 
 to every Thing that has a Connexion with it. This 
 Pradicc has many Advantages in it ; as, 
 
 1. It will be a Means to fuggeft to your Mind 
 proper Topics for Argument about any Propor- 
 tion that relates to the fame Subjedl. 
 
 2. It will enable you with greater Readinefs and 
 Juftnefs of Thought to give an Anfwer to any 
 fudden Queftion upon that Subjedt, whether it 
 arifes in your own Mind, or to be propofed by 
 others. 
 
 3. This will inftru6t you to give a plainer and 
 fpeedler Solution of any Difficulties that may at- 
 tend the Theme of your Difcourfe, and to refute 
 the Objediions of thofe who have efpoufed a con- 
 trary Opinion. 
 
 4. By fuch a large Survey of the whole Sab- 
 jed in all its Properties and Relations, you will be 
 better fecured from Inconfiftencies, i. e, from af- 
 ferting or denying any thing in one Place, which 
 contradidls what you have afTcrted or denied in an- 
 other : 
 
330 LOGIC Ki Or, Part IlL 
 
 other: And to attain thefe Ends, an Extenfivenefs 
 of" Underftanding and a large Memory are of un- 
 fpeakable Service. 
 
 One would be ready to wonder fometimes how 
 eafily great and wife and learned Men are led in- 
 to Aflertions in fome Parts of thd fame Treatife, 
 which are found to be fcarce confiflent with whaE 
 they have afferted in other Places : But the true 
 Reafon is the Narrownefi of the Mind of Man, 
 that it cannot take in all the innumerable Proper- 
 ties and Relations of one Subje6l with a fingle 
 View •, and therefore whilft they are intent on one 
 particular Part of their Theme, they bend all their 
 Force of Thought to prove or difprove fome Pro-^ 
 pofition that relates to that Part, without a fufH^ 
 cient Attention to the Confequences which may 
 flow from it, and which may unhappily affedt an- 
 other Part of the fame Subject, and by this Means 
 they are fometimes led to fay things which are in- 
 coiififlent. In fuch a Cafe the great Dealers in Dif- 
 pute and Controverfy take Pleafure to caft Nen'- 
 fenfe and Self Contraction on their Antagonift 
 with huge and hateful Reproaches. For my part, 
 I rather choofe to pity human Nature, whofe nc- 
 ceiTary Narrownefs of Underftanding expofes us 
 all to fome Degrees of this Frailty. But the moft 
 extenfive Survey pofTible of our whole Subjed is 
 the bcft Remedy againft it. It is our judging 
 and arguing upon a partial View of Things, 
 that expofes us to Miftakes, and pufhes us into 
 Abfurdities, or at leaft to the very Borders of 
 them. 
 
 III. Rule. In fearcbing the Knowledge of Things^ 
 always keep the precife Point of the prefent ^ef- 
 tion in your Eye. Take heed that you add nothing to 
 U while you are arguing^ nor ortiit any part of it. 
 
 Watch 
 
C. IV. S. I. The right Vfe ^Rcafon. 351 
 
 Watch .carefully Jeft: any new Ideas flide in to 
 mingle themfelves either with the Subjed or the 
 Predicate. See that the Queftion be not altered 
 by the Ambiguity of any Word taken in different 
 Senfes ; nor let any fecret Prejudices of your own, 
 or the fophiftical Arts of others, cheat your Under- 
 itanding by changing the Queftion, or fliuffling in 
 any thing elfe in its room. 
 
 And for this End it is ufeful to keep the preciie 
 Matter of Enquiry 2L^fimple as may be, and difen- 
 gaged from a Complication of Ideas ^ which do not 
 necefiarily belong to it. By admitting a Complica- 
 tion of Ideas, and taking too many Things at once 
 into one Queftion, the Mind is fometimes dazzled 
 and bewildered ; and the Truth is loft in fuch a- 
 Variety and Confufion oi Ideas ; whereas by limit- 
 ting and narrowing the Queftion, you take a fuller 
 Survey of the whole of it. 
 
 By keeping the ftngle Point of Enquiry in our 
 conflant View, we ftiall be fecured from fudden, 
 rafh, and impertinent Refponfes and Determina- 
 tions, which fome have obtruded inftead of Solu- 
 tions and folid Anfwers, before they perfedly know 
 the Queftions. 
 
 IV. Rule. When you have exactly confide red 
 the precife Point of Enquiry^ or what is unknown in 
 the ^ejiion^ then confider what^ and how much you 
 know already of this ^fefiion, or of the Ideas and 
 Terms of which it is compofed. It is by a Compari-' 
 fon of the known and unknown Parts of the Quef- 
 tion together, that you find what Reference the 
 Part known hath unto, or what Connexion it hath 
 with the Thing that is fought : Thofe Ideas, where- 
 by the known and unknown Parts of the Queftion 
 are conneded, will furnifh you with middle Terms 
 y or 
 
332 L O G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 or Arguments whereby the Thing propofed may 
 be proved or difproved. 
 
 In this Part of your Work, (viz.) Cofnparifjg 
 Ideas together^ take due Time, and be not too hafty 
 to come to a Determination, efpecially in Points 
 of Importance. Some Men when they lee a little 
 Agreement or Difigrecment between Ideas, they 
 prefume a great deal, and lb jump into the Con- 
 clufion : This is a fliort Way to Fancy, Opinion, 
 and Conceit, but a mod uniafe and uncertain Way 
 to true Knowledge and Wifdom. 
 
 V. Rule. /// chtiftng your middle Terms or Ar- 
 guments to prove any ^'.efiicjt^ always take fuch To- 
 pics as arefurefi^ and leafl fallible, and which carry 
 the greate/l Evidence and Strength with them. Be 
 not fo folicitous about the Number, as the Weight 
 of your Arguments, efpecially in proving any Pro- 
 poficion which admits of natural Certainty, or of 
 coinplete Demon fir atioji. Many Times we do In- 
 jury to a Caufe by dwelling upon trifling Argu- 
 ments. We amufe our Hearers with Uncertain- 
 ties, by multiplying the Number of feeble Reafon« 
 ings, before we mention thofe which are more 
 ilibllantial, conclufive and convincing. And too 
 often we yield up our own Ailent to mere pro- 
 bable Arguments, where certain Proofs may be ob- 
 tained. 
 
 Yet it mufl be confefTed there are many Cafes, 
 wherein the growing Number of probable Arguments 
 increafes the Degree of Probability, and gives a 
 great and fufficicnt Confirmation to the Truth 
 v/hich is fought ; as, 
 
 ( I .) When we are enquiring the true Senfe of 
 any Word or Phrafe, we are more confirmed in 
 the Signification of it, by finding the fame Ex- 
 
 prefTion 
 
C. IV. The right Ufe of Reafon. 3 3 3 
 
 preflion fo ufed in feveral Authors, or In fevera! 
 Places of the fame Author. 
 
 2. When we are fearching out the true Mean- 
 ing or Opinion of any Wricer, or enquiring into 
 any facred Doctrine of Scripture, we come to a 
 furer Determination of the Truth by feveral di- 
 flindl: Places wherein the fame Thing is exprefTed 
 or plainly implied ; becaufe it is not fo probable 
 that an honell skilful Reader Ihould miftake the 
 Meaning of the Writer in many Places, as he may 
 in one or two. 
 
 (3 .J When we; wolild prove the Importance of 
 any fcriptural Doclrine or Duty, the Multitude 
 of Texts, wherein it is repeated and inculcated upon 
 the Reader, feems naturally to inftru6l us that it is 
 a Matter of greater Importance, than other Things 
 which are but flighdy or Imgly mentioned in the 
 Bible. 
 
 ("4.) In fearching out Mattei-s of Fad in Times 
 pad or in diftanc Places (in which Cafe 7noral Evi- 
 dence is fufficient, and moi^al Certainty is the ut- 
 mofl which can be attained) here we derive a 
 greater Aflfurance of the Truth of it by a Num- 
 ber of Perfons, or a Multitude of Circumftances 
 concurring to bear Witnefs to it. 
 
 (^.) From many Experiments in natural Philo- 
 fophy we more fafely infer a general Theorem, 
 than we can from one or two. 
 
 (6.) In Matters which require prefent Praiflice, 
 fcoth facred and civil, we muft content ourfelves 
 oftentimes with a mere Preponderation of probable 
 Reafons or Arguments. Where there are fcjveral 
 Reafons on each Side, for and againff a Thing 
 that is to be done or omirted, a fmall Argumenc 
 added to the Heap may juftly turn tlie Balance on 
 one Side, and determine the Judg'ncnr, ;^s I havr: 
 noted in the Second P^rt of Logick, 
 
 Y 2 to 
 
334 L G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 To conclude j a growing Acquaintance with 
 Matters of Learning, and a daily Improvement of 
 our Underftandings in Affairs human and divine, 
 will bed teach us to judge and diflinguifli in what 
 Cafcrs the Number of Arguments adds to their 
 Wejc^ht and Force : It is only Experience can fully 
 inform us when we m.uft be dc^termined by probable 
 Topics, and when we mull feek and expecSl De- 
 vwnfiralivns, 
 
 VI. RtJLE. Prove your Conch fion {as far as 
 pcffible) by fome Propofttions that are in themfelves 
 fnore plain, evident, ami certain than the Conclufion ; 
 or at leajl Juch as are more known, and more intelli- 
 gible to the Per fin whom you would convince. If we 
 negled this Rule, we (hall endeavour to enlighten 
 that which is obfcure by fomething equally or 
 more obfcure, and to confirm that which is doubt- 
 ful by fomething equally or more uncertain. Com- 
 mon Scnfe dictates to all Men, that it is impofTible 
 to eftablifh any Truth, and to convince others of 
 it, but by fomething that is better known to them 
 than that Truth is. 
 
 VII. Rule. Labour in all your Arguings to en^ 
 lighten the Underftanding, as well as to conquer and 
 captivate the Judgment. Argue in fuch a manner 
 as may give a natural, diftind, and folid Know- 
 ledge of Things to your Hearers, as well as to 
 force their AfTent by a mere Proof of the Que- 
 flion. Now to attain this End, the chief Topic 
 or Medium of your Demonftration fhould be fetch'd 
 as much as porfible, from the Nature of the Thing 
 to be proved, or from thofe Things which are mofl 
 naturally connedted v^rith ic. 
 
 Geome- 
 
C. IV. S. I . The right Ufe of Reafon. 335 
 
 Geometriciam fomecimes break this Rule without 
 Neceffity, two Ways, {y\z.) 
 
 1. When they prove one Propoficion only by 
 fhewing what Ablurdities will follow if the' con- 
 tradictory Propoficion be fuppofed or admitted ; 
 This is called Rediittio ad ahfurdtnii*^ or Demon- 
 
 Jlratio fer tjupcffibile ', as for Inllance, When they 
 prove all the Radii of 'a Cirle to he equals by fup- 
 pofing one Radius to be longer or fliorter than 
 another, and then fliewing what abfurd Confe- 
 quences will follow. This, I confcfs, forces the 
 Aflcnt, but it does not enlighten the Mind by 
 fliewing the true Reafon and Caufe why all Radii 
 are equals which is derived from the very Conftruc- 
 tion of a Circle : For fince a Circle is formed by 
 fixing one End of a llraic Line in the Centre, and 
 moving the other End round (or, which is all one, 
 by CompaiTes kept open to a certain Extent) ic 
 follows evidently that every Part of the Circum- 
 ference being thus defcribed mult be equally diflant 
 from the Centre, and therefore the Radii^ which 
 are Lines from the Centre to the Circumference, 
 7mift he all equal. 
 
 2. Geometricians forget this Rule when they 
 heap up many far-fetched. Lines, Figures and Pro- 
 portions to prove fome plain, fimple, and obvious 
 Propofition. This is called a Demonfiration per 
 aliena et remota., or an Argument from unnatural 
 and remote Mediums : As if in order to prove the 
 Radii of a Circle are all equals I fhould make fe- 
 veral Triangles and Squares about the Circle, and 
 
 * Note, This Rule chiefly refers to the Efiablijhtncr.t ot fome Truth, ra- 
 ther than to the Refutation of Error. It is a very common and ufeful Way 
 of arguing to refute a faife PropofitioTJ, by fhewing what evident Falfliood 
 cr Abfurdity will follow from it : For what Propofition focver is really ab- 
 furd and falfe, does eftedually prove that Principle to be falfe from which 
 it is derived ; fo that this Way of refuting an Error is not fo ufually called 
 ReduSfio ad abjurdunu 
 
 y 3 then 
 
336 LOGIC K: Or, Part III. 
 
 then from fome Properties and Propofuions of 
 Squares and Triangles prove tlut the Radii of a 
 Circle are equal. 
 
 Yet it mull be confefied, that fometimes fuch 
 Queflions happen, that it is hardly pofllble to 
 prove them by direcl ylrguments drawn from the 
 Nature of Things, ^c. and then it may not only 
 be lawful, but necelTary to ufe indirect Proofs^ and 
 Arguments drawn from re mete Mediums, or from 
 the Abfurdity of the contradi^iory Suppcfitions. 
 
 Such indire^ and remote Arguments may alfo be 
 fometimes ufed to confirm a Propofition which has 
 been before proved by Arguments more dire^ and 
 immediate. 
 
 YIII. Rule. Tho'jgh Arguments lliould give 
 Light to the Subjedt, as well as conflrain the Af- 
 fent, yet you mull learn to diflinguijh well between 
 an Explication and an Argument \ and neither im- 
 pofe upon your felves, 7ior fuffer yourfelves to he i?n- 
 fofed upon by others, by miftaking a ?nere Illuliratitn 
 for a convincing Reafon, 
 
 Axioms themfL^lves, or Self-evident Propofuions 
 may want an Explication or llluf ration, though thty 
 are not to be proved by Reafoning, 
 
 Similitudes and AUufions have oftentimes a very 
 happy Influence to explain fome difficult Truth, 
 and to render the Idea of it familiar and eafy. 
 Where the Rtftmblance is juft and accurate, the 
 Influence of a Simile may proceed fo far as to 
 fliew the PofTibility of the Thing in Queflion : 
 But Similitudes muft not be taken as a folid Proof 
 of the Truth or Exi Hence of thofe Things to 
 which they have a Refemblance. A too great 
 Deference paid to Similitudes, or an utter Rejec- 
 tion of them feem to be two Extremes, and ought 
 to be avoided. The late ingenious Mr. Locke, 
 
 even 
 
C IV. The right Vfe of Reafon. 337 
 
 even in his Enquiries after Truth, makes great 
 Uie of Similes ioY frequent Illuftration, and is very 
 happy in the Invention of them, though he warns us 
 alfo left we mi [lake them tor conckifive Argu- 
 ments. 
 
 Yet let it be noted here, that a Parable or a Si- 
 miUtude ufed by any Author, may give a fufficienc 
 Proof of the true Senfe and Meaning of that Au- 
 thor, provided that we draw not this SimiHtude 
 beyond the Scope and Defign for which it was 
 brought •, as when our Saviour affirms. Rev, iii. 3. 
 / will come on thee as a Thief', this will plainly 
 prove that he defcribes the Unexpe5lednefs of his Ap^ 
 pearance, tho* it will by no means be drawn to fig- 
 nify any Injuflic^ in his Defign, 
 
 IX. Rule. /;/ your whole Courfe of Reafoning 
 keep your Mind fincerely intent in the Purfuit of 
 Truth ; and follozv folid Argument wherefoever it 
 leads you. Let not a Party Spirit , nor any Paffion 
 or Prejudice whatfoever, ftop or avert the Cur- 
 rent of your Reafoning in Quell of true Know- 
 ledge. 
 
 When you are enquiring therefore into any Sub- 
 jedl, maintain a due Regard to the Arguments and 
 Ohje5fions on both Sides of a Queflion : Confi- 
 der, compare, and balance them well before you 
 determine for one Side. It is a frequent, but a 
 very faulty Pradlce to hunt after Arguments only 
 to make good one Side of a Q^ieftion, and en- 
 tirely to negled and refufe thofe which favour the 
 other Side. If we have not given a due Weight 
 to Arguments on both Sides, we do but wilfully 
 mifguide our Judgment, and abufe our Reafon, 
 by forbidding its Search after Truth. When we 
 efpoufe Opinions by a fecret Biafs on the Mind 
 thro' the Influences of Fear^ Hope^ Honour, Credit, 
 y ^ Intcrrf^ 
 
338 L O G I C K: Or, Part III. 
 
 Interejl^ or any other Prejudice^ and then feck Ar- 
 guments only to fupport thoie Opinions, v/e have 
 neither done our Duty to Gud nor to ourfelves •, 
 and it is a Matter of mere Chance if we Humble 
 upon Truth in our Ways to Eaie and Pretcrmenr. 
 The Power of Reafomig was given us by our 
 Maker for this very End, to purfue Truth ; and we 
 abufe one of his richefl Gifts, it we bafely yieki 
 it up to be led ailray by any of the meaner Powers 
 of Nature, or the perifliing Intercfts of this Life. 
 Reafon itfelf, if honeftly obeyed, will lead us to 
 receive the divine Revelatign of the Gofpel, where 
 it is duly propoled, and this will Hievv us the Path 
 of Life everlalUng, 
 
 THE 
 
I'he right UJe of Reafon. 339 
 
 THE 
 
 FOURTH PART 
 
 O F 
 
 L O G I C K. 
 
 Of Difpofttion and Method. 
 
 IT is not merely a clear and dijlin5i Idea, a well" 
 formed Propofition^ or a juri; Argutnent^ thac is 
 jufficient to fearch out and communicate the Know- 
 ledge of a Subjedl. There mull be a Variety and 
 Series of them difpofed in a due Manner in order 
 to attain this End : And therefore it is the Defign 
 of the laft Part of Logick to teach us the Art of 
 Method, It is that muft fecure our Thoughts from 
 that Confufion, Darknefs, and Miftake which un- 
 avoidably attend the Meditations and Difcourfes 
 even of the brightefl Genius who defpifes the Rules 
 of it. 
 
 1. We fliall here confider the Nature of Method^ 
 and the fever al Kinds of it, 
 
 2. Lay down the general Rules of Method^ with 
 a few Particulars under them. 
 
 CHAP. 
 
;40 L O G I C K: Or, Part IV, 
 
 CHAP I. 
 
 Of the Nature of Method^ and the feveral 
 Kinds of it, (viz.) Natural and Arbitrary^ 
 Synthetic and Analytic, 
 
 MEthod^ taken in the largeft Senfe, implies the 
 placing of feveral Things^ or 'performing fe- 
 veral Operations in fuch an Order as is 77ioft convement 
 to attain fome End propofed : And in this Senfe ic ia 
 applied to all the Works of Nature and Art, to all 
 the divine Affairs of Creation and Providence ; and 
 to the Artifices, Schemes, Contrivances and 
 Practices ot Mankind, whether in natural, civil, or 
 ficred Affairs. 
 
 Now this orderly Difpofition of Things includes 
 the Ideas of Prior ^ Pofterior^ and Simultaneous-, of 
 Superior^ Inferior^ and Equal ; of Beginnings End^ 
 and Middle^ &c. which are defcribed more par- 
 ticularly among the general AffeBions of Being in 
 Ontology. 
 
 But in Logick Method is ufually taken in a more 
 limited Senfe, and the Nature of it is thus de- 
 fcribed : Method is the Bifpofition of a Variety of 
 Thoughts on any Suhje^ in fuch Order as may heft 
 ferve to find out unknown 'Truths^ to explain and 
 confirm, Truths that are known ^ or to fix them in the 
 Memory, 
 
 It is diftributed into t\yo general Kinds, (viz,) 
 Natural and Arbitrary. 
 
 Natural Method is that which obferves the Or- 
 der of Nature, and proceeds in fuch a Manner as 
 that the Knowledge of the Things, which follow 
 depends in a great Meafure on the Things which 
 go before, and this is twofold, {viz.) Synthetic 
 
 and 
 
C. I. T'he right life of Reafon. 341 
 
 and Analytic^ which are fometimes called Synthefts 
 and Anaiyfv,^ 
 
 Synthetic Method is that which begins with the 
 Pares f, and leads onward to the Knowledge of 
 the Whole ; it bf-gins with the mod fimple Princi- 
 ples, and general Truths, and proceeds by Dc^grees 
 CO that which is drawn from them or compounded 
 of them : And therefore it is called the Method of 
 Compojttion, 
 
 Analytic Method takes the whole Compound as ic 
 finds it, whether it be a Species or an Individual^ 
 and leads us into the Knowledge of it by refolving 
 it into its firft Principles or Parts, its generic Na- 
 ture, and its fpecial Properties •, and therefore it is 
 called the Method of Refolution. 
 
 As Jynthetic Method is gentr^iWy ufed in teach- 
 ing the Sciences after they are invented, fo 
 
 * The Word Analyfn has three or four Senfes, which it may not be im- 
 proper to take Notice of here. 
 
 J. It fignifies the general and particular Heads of a Difcourfe, with their 
 mutual Connexions, both co-ordinate and fubordinate, drawn out by way of 
 Abllraft into one or more Tnbles, which are frequently placed like an Indi:^ 
 at the Beginning or End of a Book. 
 
 2- It fignifics the refilving of a Difcourfe into its various Subjeifls and 
 Arguments, as when any Writing of the ancient Prophets is refolved into the 
 ■prophetical, hijlorical, doctrinal, and/z't/c^/t-jj/ Parts of it 5 it is faid to be <a«d- 
 lyfed in general. Vv'hen a Sentence is diltinguifhed into the Nour.s, the Vcrhsj 
 Frciwiitis, Ad'verbs, and other Particles of Speech which compofe it, then it is 
 faid to be analyfed grammatically. When the fame Sentence is diftinguifhed 
 into Siibjeci and Predicate, Propofition, Argument, AEi, OhjeEi, Caufe, EffcEi, 
 AdjunH, Oppofite, Sec. then it is analyfed logically and metaphyftcally. This 
 lafl: is what is chiefly meant in the theological Schools, when they fpcak of 
 analyfing a Text of Scripture, 
 
 3. Analyfts fignifies particularly the Science of Algebra, wherein a Que- 
 flion being propoied, one or more Letters, as, x,y, %, or Vowels, as, a,e, 7, 
 ^c. are made ufe of to fignify the unknown Number, which being intermin- 
 gled with feveral known Numbers in the Quertion, is at lalt by the Rules of 
 Art feparated or releafed from that Entanglement, and its particular Value is 
 found out by fhewing its Eqnatim, or Equality to fome known Number. 
 
 4. It fignifies analytical Method, as here explained in Logick. 
 
 \ Note, It is confefled that Syntbtfis often begins with the Genus, and pro- 
 ceeds to the Species and Indi'viduals. But the Genus or generic Nature is then 
 confidered only as a phyfical or ejj'ential Part of the Species, tho' it be fome- 
 Hmes called an uni-verjal or logical Whole. Thus fymhetic Method maintains 
 its own Defcription ftill, for it begins with the PartSj and proceeds to the 
 JVhck 'which Is compofed of them. 
 
 anabtic 
 
342 L O G I C K: Or, Part IV, 
 
 analytic is moft pradifed in finding out Things un- 
 known. Though it muft be confefled that both 
 Methods are fometimes employed to find out Truth 
 and to communicate it. 
 
 If we know the Parts of any Subjtrdl eafier and 
 better than the Whole, we confider the Parrs 
 djftindly, and by putting them together we come 
 to the Knowledge of the Whole. So in Grammar 
 we learn firft to know Letters^ we join them to 
 make Syllables^ out of Syllables we compofe fVonhy 
 and out of Words we make Senknces and Bifccuffes, 
 So the Phyfician or Apothecary knows the Nature 
 and Powers of his SmipleSy (viz.) his Brugs^ his 
 Herhs^ his Minerals, 6cC. and putting them toge- 
 ther, and confidering their feveral Virtues, he finds 
 what will be the Natuie and Powers of the BoIuSy 
 or any coinpound Medicine : This is the fynthettc 
 Method. 
 
 But if we are better acquainted with the Whole 
 than we are with particular Parts, then we divide 
 or refove the Whole into its Parts, and thereby 
 gain a diflindt Knowledge of them. So in vulgar 
 J_.ife we learn in the Grofs what Plants or Minerals 
 are ; and then by Chemiflry we gain the Know- 
 ledge of Salt., Sulphur., Spirit., M^ater., Earth., which 
 are the Principles of them. So we are firfl ac- 
 quainted with the whole Body of an Animal., and 
 then by Anatomy or Dijfeolion we come to learn all 
 the inward and outward Parts of it. This is ana- 
 lytic Method, 
 
 According to this moft general and obvious 
 \dt2L o^ fynthetic and analytic Method, they differ 
 from each other as the Way which leads up from 
 a Valley to a Mountain differs from itfelf, confi- 
 dered as it leads down from the Mountain to the 
 Valley ; or as St. Matthew and St. Luke prove 
 Chrijl to he the Son of Abraham ; Luke finds out 
 
 by 
 
C. I. ^he right life of Reafon. 343 
 
 by Anahfis^ rifing from Chrift to his Ancefion \ 
 Matthew teaches it in fynthetic Method, begin- 
 ning from Abraham^ and fhcwing that Cbrijt is 
 found among his Pofterily, Therefore it* is a 
 ufual Thing in the Sciences, when we have by 
 Analyjls found out a Truth, we ufe fynthetic Me- 
 thod to explain and deliver it, and prove it to be 
 true. 
 
 In this eafy View of Things, thefe two kinds of 
 Method may be preferved confpicuoufly, and en- 
 tirely diftinct : But the Subjeds of Knowledge be- 
 ing infinite, and the Ways whereby we arrive at 
 this Knowledge being almoft infinitely various, it 
 is very difficult, and almofl impoffible, always 
 to maintain the precife Diftindlion between thefe 
 two Methods. 
 
 This will evidently appear in the following Oh- 
 fervations, 
 
 Ohf. I. Analytic Method being ufed chiefly to 
 find out Things unknown, it is not limited or con- 
 fined merely to begin with fome whole SubjedV, and 
 proceed to the Knowledge of its Parts^ but it takes 
 Its Rife fometimes from any fingle Part or Proper- 
 ty, or from any thing whatfoever that belongs to 
 a Subjedl which happens to be firft and mofl eafily 
 known, and thereby enquires into the more abftrule 
 and unknown Parts, Properties, Caufes, Efi'eds, 
 and Modes of it, whether abfolute or relative: as 
 for Inftance, 
 
 (1.) Analyfis finds out Caufes by their EfFeds. 
 So in the fpeculative Part of natural Philofophy^ 
 when we obferve Lights Colours^ Motions^ Hard- 
 7iefs^ Softnefs^ and other Properties and Powers of 
 Bodies, or any of the common or uncommon 
 appearances of things either on Earth, or in Hea- 
 ven, we fearch out the Caufes of them. So by 
 
 the 
 
344 L O G 1 C K: Or, Part. IV. 
 
 the various Creatures we find out the Creator^ and 
 learn his Wifdom^ Power and Goodnefs. 
 
 2. It finds out EfFedls by their Caufes. So 
 the practical and mechanical Part of natural Philo- 
 fophy confiders fuch Powers of Motion, as the Wind, 
 the Fire^ and the Water, &c. and then contrives 
 what Ufcs they may be applied to, and what will 
 be their Effects in order to make Mills and Engines 
 of various Kinds. 
 
 (3.) It finds out the general and fpecial Nature 
 of a Thing by confidering the various Attributes of 
 the Individuals, and obferving what is common, 
 and what is proper, what is accidental, and what is 
 efiential. So by furveying the Colour^ the Shape, 
 Motion, Reft^ Place, Solidity, Extenfwn of Bodies, 
 we come to find that the Nature of Body in general 
 h folid Extenfwn; becauic all other Qualities of 
 Bodies are changeable, but this belongs to all Bo- 
 dies, and it endures through all Changes; and be- 
 caufe this is proper to Body aloite^ and agrees not 
 to any thing elfe ; and it is the Foundation of all 
 other Properties. 
 
 (4.) It finds out the remaining Properties of 
 Parts of a Thing, by having fome Parts or Pro- 
 perties given. So the Jrea of a Triangle is found 
 oy knowing the Height and the Bafe. So by hav- 
 ing two Sides, and an Angle of a Triangle given, 
 we find the remaining Side and Angles. So when 
 we know Cogitation is the prime Attribute of a 
 Spirit, we infer its Immateriality, and thence its 
 Immortality. 
 
 (5.) Analyfis finds the Means necefTary to at- 
 tain a propofed End by having the End firft af- 
 figned. So in moral, "political, ccconomical Afl^airs, 
 having propofed the Government of Self, a Family, 
 a Society, or a Nation, in order to their beft Inte- 
 reft, we confider and fearch out what are the pro- 
 
 pir 
 
C L ^he right UJe ofRt^fonl 345 
 
 per Laws^ Rules and Means to effeft it. So in 
 the Pra6licgs of Artificers, and the Manufadures 
 of various Kinds, the End being propofed, as, 
 making Cloth ^ Houfes^ Ships ^ ^c. we find out 
 Ways of compofing thefe Things for the feveral 
 Ufes of human Life. By the putting any of thefe 
 Means in Execution to attain the End, is fynthetic 
 Method. 
 
 Many other Particulars might be reprefented, to 
 fhew the various Forms of analytic Alethod, where- 
 by Truth is found out, and fome of them come 
 very near to fynthetic^ fo as hardly to be diftin- 
 guiflied. 
 
 Ohf. II. Not only the Inveftigation of Truth, 
 but the Comimunication of it alfo is often praftifed 
 in fuch a Method, as neither agrees precifely to 
 fynthetic or analytic. Some Sciences, if you con- 
 fider the '3£;M<? of them in general, are treated in 
 fynthetic Order ; fo PhyftcSy or natural Philofophy^ 
 begins ufually with an Account of the general 
 Nature and Properties of Matter or Bodies, and 
 by Degrees defcends to confider the particular 
 Species of Bodies, with their Powers and Proper- 
 ties ', yet it is very evident,^ that when Philofophers 
 come to particular Plants and Animals, then by. 
 Chemiftry and Anatomy they analyfe or refolve thofe 
 Bodies into their feveral conftituent Parts. On the 
 other hand. Logic is begun in analytic Method ; the 
 whole is divided into its integral Parts, according to 
 the four Operations of the Mind •, yec here and 
 there fynthetic Method is ufed in the particular 
 Branches of ir, for it treats of Ideas in general firft, 
 and then defcends to the feveral Species of them -, 
 it teaches us how Propofitions are made up of Ideas^ 
 and Syllogifms of Propofitiom^ which Is che Order of 
 Compofuions. 
 
 The 
 
^46 L O G I C K: Or, Part IV, 
 
 The ancient fcholaflic Writers have taken a great 
 deal of Pains, and engaged in ulelefs Difputes 
 about thefe two Methods, and after all have not 
 been able to give fuch an Account of them as to 
 keep them entirely diftindl from each other, nei- 
 ther in the Theory nor in the Pradice. Some of 
 the Moderns have avoided this Confufion in fome 
 Meafure, by confining themfelves to defcribe almoft 
 nothing elfe but the fynthetic and analytic Methods 
 of Geometricians and Algehraifts^ whereby they have 
 too much narrowed the Nature and Rules of Me- 
 thod, as tho' every thing were to be treated in ma- 
 thematical Forms. 
 
 Upon the whole I conclude, that neither of 
 thefe two Methods lliould be too fcrupuloully 
 and fuperftitioufly purfued, either in the Inven- 
 tion or in the Communication of Knowledge. Ic 
 is enough if the Order of Nature ht but obferved 
 in making the Knowledge of Things following 
 depend on the Knowledge of the Things which 
 go before. Oftentimes a mixed Method will be 
 found moil effeiftual for thefe Purpofes ; and in- 
 deed a wife and judicious Profped of our main 
 End and Defign muft regulate all Method whatfo- 
 ever. 
 
 Here the Rules of natural Method ought to be 
 propofed, (whether it be analytic^ or jynthetic or, 
 mixt :) but it is proper firft to give fome Account 
 of arbitrary Method, left it be thruft at too great 
 a Diflance from the firft Mention of it. 
 
 Arbitrary Method leaves the Order of Nature, 
 and accommodates itfelf to many Purpofes j fuch 
 as, to treafure up Things, and retain them in 
 Memory ; to harangue and perfuade Mankind to 
 any Practice in the religious or the civil Life; or 
 to delight, amufe, or entertain the Mind. 
 
 As 
 
C. I. The right Ufe of Reafon. 347 
 
 As for the AJfiftance of the Memory^ in moll 
 Things, a natural Order has an happy Iniluence -, 
 for Reafon itfelf deducing one Thing from another, 
 greatly aflills the Mewiory, by the natural Con- 
 nexion and mutual Dependance of Things. But 
 there are various other Methods which Mankind 
 have made ufe of for this Purpofe, and indeed 
 there are fome Subjeds that can hardly be reduced 
 to Analyfis or Synthejis, 
 
 In reading or writing Hiftory^ fome follow the 
 Order of the Governors of a Nation, and difpofe 
 every Tranfadlion under their particular Reigns : 
 So the facred Books of Kings and Chronicles are 
 written. Some write in Annals or Journals^ and 
 make a new Chapter of every Year. Some put 
 all thofe Tranfadions together which relate to one 
 Subje^ ; that is, all the Affairs of one War^ one 
 he ague ^ one Confederacy^ one CounciU ^c, tho' ic 
 lafted many Years, and under many Rulers. 
 
 So in writing the Lives of Men^ which is called 
 Biography^ fome Authors follow the Track of their 
 Tears^ and place every Thing in the preclfe Order 
 of Time when it occur'd : Others throw the T^cm- 
 per and Chara^ier of the Perfons, their 'private 
 Life^ their puhlick Statiofts, their perfnal Occur- 
 rences, their domeflick Condu^, their Speeches, their 
 Books or Writings, their Sicknefs and Death, into lb 
 many diftindl Chapters. 
 
 In Chronology, fome Writers make their Epochas 
 to begin all with one Letter : So in the Book 
 CdWtd Ducior Hiftorictis, the Periods all begin with 
 C% as, Creation, Cataclyfm, or Deluge, Chaldean 
 E?npire, Cyrus, Chrijl^ Confiantine, ^c. Some 
 divide their Accounts of Time according to the 
 four great Monarchies, Affyrian, Perfian, Ore 
 cian and Roman. Others think it fervcs the Me- 
 mory beft to divided all their Sr.H-as into the re - 
 
 Z m:irkablc 
 
348 LOGICK: Or, Part IV. 
 
 markable Number of Sevens ; fo Prideaux has 
 written an Introdu^ion to Hiftory, And there is a 
 Book of Divinity called Fajciculus Controverftarum^ 
 by an Author of the fame Name, written in the 
 fame Method, wherein every Controverfy has feven 
 Qiieflions belonging to it •, tho' the Order of Na- 
 ture feems to be too much negiedled by a Confine- 
 ment to \.\{\s feptenary Number, 
 
 Thofe Writers and Speakers, whofe chief Bufi- 
 nefs is to amufe or delight, to allure, terrify, or 
 perfuade Mankind, do not confine themfelves to 
 any natural Order^ but in a cryptical or bidden Me- 
 thod adapt every Thing to their defigned Ends. 
 Sometimes they omit thofe Things which might 
 injure their Defign, or grow tedious to their 
 Hearers, tho' they feem to have a neceflary Rela- 
 tion to the Point in Hand : Sometimes they add 
 thofe Things which have no great Reference to 
 the Subjed, but are fuitcd to allure or refrefii the 
 Mind and the Ear. They dilate fometimes, and 
 flourifh long upon little Incidents, and they skip 
 over, and but lightly touch the drier Part of their 
 Theme. They place the fir (l Things laft^ and the 
 laft Things fir ft ^ with wondrous Art, and yet fo 
 manage it as to conceal their Artifice, and lead the 
 Senfes and PafTions of their Hearers into a pkafing 
 and powerful Captivity, 
 
 It is chiefly Poefy and Oratory that require the 
 Pradice of this Kind of arbitrary Method : They 
 omit Things eflential which are not beautiful, 
 they infert little needlefs Circumftances, and beau- 
 tiful DigreiTions, they invert Times and Actions, 
 in order to place every Thing in the mod affect- 
 ing Light, and for this End in their Pradtice they 
 ntr gle(5l all logical Forms •, yet a good Acquaintance 
 widi the Forms of Logick and natural Methody is of 
 admirable Ufe to thofe who would attain thefe 
 
 Arts 
 
C. 11. The right Ufe of Rcafon. 349 
 
 Arts in Perfecaion. Hereby they will ' Me to 
 range their own Thoughts in fuch a Mll: o/- and 
 Scheme, as to make a more large and comprehen- 
 five Survey of their Subjeift and Defign in all the 
 Parts of it ; and by this Means they will better 
 judge what to choofe and what to refufe ; and how 
 to drefs and manage the whole Scene before them, 
 fo as to attain their own Ends with greater Glory 
 and Succefs. 
 
 CHAP. II. 
 
 The Rules of Method^ general and fpecial. 
 
 TH E General Requifites of true Method in 
 the Purfuit or Communication of Know- 
 ledge, may be all comprifed under the following 
 Heads. It muft be (i.) Safe, (2.) Plain and 
 Eafy. (3.; Difttn5i. (4.) Full or without De- 
 fe5f, (^,) Short or mthout Superfluilyy (6.) Pro- 
 per to the Suhje^ and the Defign. (7.) Coti* 
 ne5ied, 
 
 I. Rule. Among all the Qualifications of 
 a good Method, there is none more necefiary 
 and important than that it fhould be fafe and 
 fecure from Error -, and to this End thele four 
 particular or fpecial Dire^ions fhould be ob- 
 ferved. 
 
 I . Ufe great Care and Circufnfpe5iion in laying the 
 Foundations of your Difcourfe, or your Scheme of 
 Thoughts upon any SuhjeB, Thefe Propofuions 
 which are to (land as ftrft Principles, and on 
 which the whole Argument depends, muft be 
 viewed on all Sides with utmoit Accuracy, left an 
 Z 2 Error 
 
350 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV, 
 
 Error being admitted there, fhould difFufe itfejf 
 thro' the whole Subjedt. See therefore that your 
 general Definitions or Befcriptions are as accurate 
 as the Nature of the Thing will bear : See that 
 youv general Divifions z.nd Diftrihu lions be juft and 
 exad:, according to the Rules given in the firft 
 Part of Logick : See that your Jxioms be fuffici* 
 ently evident, fo as to demand the Aflent of thafe 
 that examine them with due Attention. See that 
 your firfi: and more i^nmediate Confequences from 
 thefe Principles be well drawn ; and take the fame 
 Care of all other Propofitions that have a powerful 
 and fpreading Influence thro' the feveral Farts ot 
 your Dilcourfe. 
 
 For want of this Care fometimes a large Trea- 
 tife has been written by a long Dedudion of Con- 
 feqaences from one or two doubtful Principles, 
 which Principles have been effedually refuted in 
 a few Lines, and thus the whole Treatife has been 
 deflroyed at once : fo the largeft and faireft Build- 
 ings finks and tumbles to the Ground, if the Foun- 
 dations and Corner- Stones of it are feeble and in- 
 fufiicient. 
 
 2. It is a very advifeable Thing that your pn- 
 mary and fundamental Propofitions be not only evi^ 
 dent and iriie^ hut they fhould he made a little fami- 
 liar to the Mind by dwelling upon them before you 
 proceed farther. By this Means you will gain fo 
 Kill an Acquaintance with them, that you may draw 
 Confequences from them with much more Free- 
 dom, with greater Variety, brighter Evidence, and 
 with a firmer Certainty, than if you have but a 
 flight and fudden View of them. 
 
 3. As you proceed in the Connexion of your 
 Arguments, fee that your Ground he made firm in 
 every Step. See that every Link of your Chain 
 ot Reafoning be ftrong and good : For if but 
 
 one 
 
C. II. The right Ufe of Reafon. 3 5 j 
 
 one Link be feeble and doubtful, the whole Chain 
 of Arguments feels the Weaknefs of it, and lye 
 expofed to every Objedor, and the original Qucf- 
 tion remains undetermined. 
 
 4. Draw tip all your Propofitions and Arguments 
 vAth fo much Caution^ and exprfs your Ideas with 
 fuch a ju^ Li?nitation as may preclude or anticipate 
 any Ohje5fions. Yet remember this is only to be 
 done as far as it is pofTibJe, without too much en- 
 tangling the Quefiion, or introducing complicat- 
 ed Ideas, and obfcuring the Senfe. But if fuch a 
 cautious and limited Drefs of the Queftion fhould 
 render the Ideas too much complicated, or the 
 Senfe obfcure, then it is better to keep the Argu- 
 ment more fmiple, clear and eafy to be under- 
 ftood, and afterwards mention the Ohjeofims di- 
 ftincflly in their full Strength, and give a diflindl 
 Anfwer to them. 
 
 IF Rule. Let your Method he plain and eafy^ 
 fo that your Hearers or Readers, as well as your- 
 felf may run thro' it without Embarraffment, and 
 may take a clear and comprehenfive View of the 
 whole Scheme. To this End the following parti- 
 cular Direuiions will be ufeful. 
 
 I . Begin always with thofe Things which are heft 
 known^ and moft ohvious^ wherehy the Mtnd may 
 have no Difficulty or Fatigue^ and proceed hy regu- 
 lar and eafy Steps to Things that are more difficult. 
 And as far as pofTible let not the Underflanding, 
 or the Proof of any of our Pofitions, depend on 
 the Pofitions that follow, but always on thofe 
 which go before. It is a Matter of Wonder that 
 in fo knowing an Age as this, there fhould be fo 
 many Perfons offering Violence daily to this Rule 
 by teaching the Latin Language hy a Gravwiar writ- 
 ten in Latiny which Method feems to require a 
 Z 2 perfecft 
 
352 L O G I C K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 perfe(5t Knowledge of an unknown Tongue, in 
 order to learn the firft Rudiments of it. 
 
 2. Do not affe^ exceffive Hafte in learning or 
 teaching any Science^ nor hurry at once into the midft 
 of ity left you be too foon involved in feveral new 
 and ftrange Ideas and Propofitions, which cannot 
 be well underftood without a longer and clofer 
 Attention to thofe which go before. Such fort of 
 Speed is but a wafte of Time, and will conftrain 
 you to take may Steps backward again, if you 
 would arrive at a regular and complete Knowledge 
 of the Subjed:. 
 
 3. Be not fond of crowding two many Thoughts and 
 Reafonings into one Sentence or Paragraph^ beyond 
 the Apprehenfion or Capacity of your Readers or 
 Hearers. There are fome Perfons of a good Ge- 
 nius, and a capacious Mind, who write and fpeak 
 very obfcurely upon this Account -, they affed a 
 long Train of Dependences, before they come to 
 a Period ; th-ey imagine that they can never fill 
 their Page with two much Senfe ; but they little 
 think how they bury their own beft Ideas in the 
 Crowd, and render them in a manner invifible and 
 ufelefs to the greateft Part of Mankind. Such 
 Men may be great Scholars, yet they are but poor 
 Teachers. 
 
 4. For the fame Reafon avoid too many Subdi- 
 vifions. Contrive your Scheme of Thoughts in 
 fuch a Manner as may finifti your whole Argu- 
 ment with as few inferior Branchings as Reafon 
 will admit ; and let them be fuch as arc obvious 
 and open to the Underftanding, that they may 
 come within one fingle View of the Mind. This 
 will not only aflift the Underftanding to receive, 
 but it will aid the Memory alfo to retain Truth : 
 whereas a Difcourfe cut out into a vaft Multitude 
 of gradual Subordinations has many Inconveni- 
 
 cncics 
 
C. II. The right Ufe of Reafon. 353 
 
 encies in it ; it gives Pain to the Mind and Me- 
 mory, in furveying and retaining the Scheme of 
 Difcourfe, and expofes the unskilful Hearers to 
 mingle the luperior and inferior Particulars toge- 
 ther, it leads them into a thick Wood inftead of 
 open Day- light, and places them in a Labyrinth 
 inftead of a plain Path. 
 
 5. Give all Diligence in your younger Tears to ob- 
 tain a clear and eafy Way of exprejfing your Con- 
 ceptionSy that your Words, as faft as you ucter 
 them, may ftamp your own Ideas exa(flly on the 
 Mind of the Hearer. This is a moft happy Ta- 
 lent for the Conveyance of Truth, and an excel- 
 lent Security againft Miftakes and needlefs Contro- 
 verfies. 
 
 IIl^ Rule. Let your Method be difiinof, and 
 without the perplexing Mixture of Things that 
 ought to be kept feparate, and this will be eafily 
 pradlifed by four Bireolions. 
 
 1 . Don't bring unnecejfary heterogeneous * Mat- 
 fer in your Difcourfe on any Suhje5l -, that is, don't 
 mingle an Argument on one Subjedl with Matters 
 that relate entirely to another, but juft fo far as is 
 neceffary to give a clearer Knowledge of the Sub- 
 icdl in hand. Examples in Logick may be bor- 
 rowed from any of the Sciences to illuftrate the 
 Rules : But long Interpofitions of natural Phllo- 
 fophy^ of the Imagination and Fajfiom^ of Agency of 
 Spirits united to Bodies^ &c. break the Thread of 
 Difcourfe, and perplex the Subjeci. 
 
 2. Let every complicated T^heme or Idea be divided 
 into its diftin5l fingle Parts, as far as the Nature of 
 the Suhje5f and your prefent Defign requires it, Tho' 
 
 * Things of one Kind are called kmcgencaus, Things of ditferent Kinds 
 are called bfterogeneous, 
 
 z 4 yo^ 
 
354 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 you muft not abound in needlefs 'Subdivifions, yet 
 fomething of this Work is very neceflliry ^ and it 
 is a good Judgment alone can didlate how far to 
 proceed in it, and when to ftop. 
 
 Compound Ideas mufh be reduced to a fimple 
 Form in order to underlland them well. You 
 may eafily mafter that Subje6l in all the Parts of 
 it by a regular Succcffion, which would confound 
 the Underilanding to furvey them at once. So we 
 come to the Knowledge of a very perplexed Dia- 
 gram in Geo7netry\ or a complicated Machine in Me- 
 chanics^ by having it parcelled out to us into its 
 feveral Parts and Principles, according to this, and 
 the foregoing Rule of Method. 
 
 3. Call every Idea, Propofition and Argument to 
 its proper Clafs, and keep each Part of the Suhje^f 
 in its oijcn Place. Put thofe Things all together 
 that belong to one Part or Property, one Confi- 
 deration or View of your Subjedl. This will 
 prevent needlefs Repetitions, and keep you from 
 intermixing Things which are difierent. We 
 muft maintain this Diftindion of Things and 
 Places if we would be fafe from Error, k isCon- 
 fufion that leads us into endlefs Miltakes, which 
 naturally arife from a Variety of Ideas ill-joined, 
 fortcd, or ill-difpofed. It is one great Ufe of Me- 
 thod, that a Multitude of Thoughts and Propo- 
 fitions may be fo diftindly ranged in their pro- 
 per Situations, that the Mind may not be over- 
 whelmed with a confufed Attention to them all ac 
 once, nor be diftracled with their Variety, nor 
 be tempted to unite Things which ought to be 
 feparated, nor to disjoin Things which Ihould be 
 united. 
 
 4. In the Partition cf your Difcourfe into dillin5i 
 Heads, take heed that your Particulars do not inter- 
 fere ivith the General, nor with each other. Think 
 
 it 
 
C. II. The right XJfe of Reafon. '3 ^ j 
 
 it is not enough that you make ufe of diftindl Ex- 
 preflions in each Particular, but take Care that the 
 Ideas be diftinct alfo. It is mere Foolery to mul- 
 tiply diftindl Particulars in treating of Tbwgs, where 
 the Difference of your Particulars lies only in Names 
 and JVords, 
 
 IV'^ Rule. The Method of treating a Subjed: 
 fhould be plenary or fuU^ fo that nothing may he 
 wanting \ nothing which is neceffary or proper 
 ihould be omitted. 
 
 When you are called to explain 3. Subject, don't 
 pafs by, nor fkip over any Thing in it which is 
 very difficult or obfcure. 
 
 When you enumerate the Parts or the Properties 
 of any Subjecft, do it in a complete and comprehen- 
 five Manner. 
 
 When you are averting or proving any Truth, 
 fee that every doubtful or difputable Part of the Ar- 
 gument be well fupported and confirmed. 
 
 If you are to illuftrate or argue a Point of Diffi- 
 culty^ be not too fcanty of Words, but rather 
 become a little copious and diffufive in your Lan- 
 guage : Se: the Truth before the Reader in fcveral 
 Lights, turn the various Sides of it to view, in 
 order to give a full Idea and firm Evidence of the 
 Propofition. 
 
 When you are drawing up a "Narrative of any 
 Matter of Fadl, fee that no important Circumftance 
 be omitted. 
 
 When you propofe the Solution of any Difficulty^ 
 confider all the various Cafes wherein it can happen, 
 and ffiew how they may be folved. 
 
 In fhort, let your Enumerations^ your DivifwnSy 
 and Difirihutions of Things be fo accurate, that no 
 
 needful Part or Idea may be left out. 
 
 • 
 
 This 
 
356 L G I C K: Or,- Part IV. 
 
 This Fulnefs of Method does not require that every 
 thing fhould be fa id which can be faid upon any 
 Subjed ; for this would make each fingle Science 
 endlefs : But you fhould fay every thing which is 
 necelTary to the Defign in View, and which has a 
 proper and dired Tendency to this End -, always 
 proportioning the Amplitude of your Matter, and 
 the Fulnefs of your Difcourfe to your great Defign, 
 to the Length of your Time, to the Convenience, 
 Delight and Profit of your Hearers, 
 
 V*. Rule. As your Method muft htfull with- 
 out Deficiency^ fo it muft be Jhort^ or without Su- 
 perfluity, The Fulnefs of a Difcourfe enlarges our 
 Knowledge, and the well -concerted Brevity faves 
 our Time. In order to obferve this Rule, it will 
 be enough to point out the chief of thofe Super- 
 fluities or Redundancies, which fome Perfons are 
 guilty of in their Difcourfes, with a due Caution 
 againft them. 
 
 1. Avoid all needlefs Repetitions of the fame Thing 
 in different Parts of your Dfcourfe, Ic muft be 
 confefled there are feveral Cafes wherein a Review 
 of the fame foregoing Propofition is needful to ex- 
 plain or prove feveral of the following Pofitions •, 
 but let your Method be fo contrived, as far as pofH- 
 bie, that it may occafion the feweft Rehearfals of 
 the fame Thing ; for it is not grateful to the Hear- 
 ers without evident NecelTity. 
 
 2. Have a care of tedious Prolixity y or draw- 
 ing out any Part of your Difcourfe to an unnecefjary 
 and tirefome Length, It is much more honourable 
 for an Inftrudor, an Orator, a Pleader, or a Preach- 
 er, that his Hearers Ihould fay, / was afraid he 
 would have done^ than that they fhould be tempted 
 to fhew Signs of Uneafinefs, and long for the Con- 
 clufwn, 
 
 Befides, 
 
C. II. "The right Ufe of Reafon. 3 57 
 
 Bcfides, there is another Inconvenience in it ; 
 when you atFed to amplify on the former Branches 
 of a Difcourfe, you will often lay a Neceflity upon 
 yourfelf of contrading the latter and molt ufcful 
 Parts of it, and perhaps prevent yourfelf in the 
 moil important Part of your Defign. Many a 
 Preacher has been guilty of this Fault in former 
 Days, nor is the preient Age without fome Inftances 
 of this Weaknefs. 
 
 3. Do not multiply Explications where there is n9 
 Difficulty^ or Darknefs^ or Danger of Miftake, Be 
 not fond of tracing every Word of your Theme 
 thro' all iht grammatical, the logical and metaphy- 
 fical Charadters and Relations of it, nor Ihew your 
 critical Learning in fpreading abroad the various 
 Senfes of a Word, and the various Origin of thofe 
 Senfes, the Etymology of Terms, the fynonimous 
 and the paronimous or kindred Names, (^c. where 
 the chief Point of Difcourfe does not at all re- 
 quire it. You would laugh at a Pedant^ who 
 profefTmg to explain the Athanafian Creed, Ihould 
 acquaint you, that Athanafius is derived from a 
 Greek Word, which fignifies Immortality, and that 
 the fame Word K^ava^ia fignifies alio the Herb 
 Tanfie. 
 
 There are fome Perfons fo fond of their learned 
 Diftindtions, that they will (hew their Subtlety 
 by dillingmjhing where there is no Difference : And 
 the fame filly AfFeftation will introduce DiftinoH^ 
 ons upon every Occurrence, and bring three or 
 four Negatives upon every Subjecft of Difcourfe ; 
 firft to declare what it is not, and then what it is : 
 Whereas fuch Negatives ought never to be men- 
 tioned where there is no apparent Danger of Mif- 
 take. How ridiculous would that Writer be, 
 who, if he were fpeaking of the Nicene Creedy 
 ftiould declare negatively, i. That he did not 
 
 mean 
 
358 L O G I C K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 mean the BoLlrine which the Inhabitants- of Nice 
 believed^ nor (2.) A Creed written by them, but 
 (3.) Pofitively a Creed compo/ed by feveral Chndian 
 Bijhops met together in the City of Nice ? The Poji- 
 live is fufficient here, and the two Negatives are 
 impertinent. 
 
 4. Be not fond of proving thofe 'Things which need 
 no Proofs fuch as felf-evideat Proporitions and 
 Truths univerfally confefied, or fuch as are entirely- 
 agreed to and granted by our Opponents. It is this 
 vain AfFedation of proving every Thing that has led 
 Geometricians to form ufelefs and intricate Demon- 
 ftrations to fupport fome Theorems, which are fuf- 
 ficiently evident to the Eye by Infpedion, or to 
 the Mind by the firft Mention of them •, and it is 
 the fame Humour that reigns fometimes in the Pul- 
 pit, and fpends half the Sermon in proving fome 
 general Truth which is never difputed or doubted, 
 and thereby robs the Auditory of more ufcful En- 
 tertainment. 
 
 5. As there are fome Things fo evidently true, 
 that they want no Proof, fo there are others fo 
 evidently falfe that they want no Refutation. It is 
 mere trifling, and a Wade of our precious Mo- 
 ments, to invent and raife fuch Objedions as no 
 Man would ever make in earned, and that merely 
 for the Sake of anfwering and folving them : This 
 breaks in notorioufly upon the due Brevity of Me- 
 thod. 
 
 6. Avoid in general all learned Forms^ all Trap- 
 pings of Art^ and Ceremonies of the Schools, where 
 there is no need of them. It is reported concern- 
 ing the late Czar of Mufcovy, that when he 
 lirii acquainted himfelf with mathematical Learn- 
 ing he pradlifed all the Rules of Circujnvallation 
 and Contravullation, at the Siege of a Town in 
 
 Livonia j 
 
C. II. "The right Ufe of Reafon. 3 59 
 
 Livonia-, and by the Length of thofe Formalities 
 he loft the Opportuuity of taking the I'own. 
 
 7. Don't Juffer every qccafional and incidental 
 Thought to carry you away into a long Farenihejis^ 
 and thus to ft retch out your Bifcourfe^ and divert 
 you from the Point in Hand. In the Purfuit of your 
 Subjedt, if any ufeful Thought occur which belongs 
 to Ibme other Theme, note it down for the Sake of 
 your Memory on fome other Paper, and Liy ic 
 by in Referve for its proper Place and Seafon : but 
 let it not incorporate icfelf with your prcfent Theme, 
 nor draw otf your Mind from your main Bufi- 
 nefs, though it fhould be ever fo inviting. A 
 Man, who walks diredlly but flowly towards his 
 Journey's End, will arrive thither much fooner than 
 his Neighbour, who runs into every crooked Turn- 
 ing which he meets, and wanders afide to gaze at 
 every Thing that ftrikes his Eyes by the Way, 
 or to gather every gaudy Flower that grows by 
 the Side of the Road. 
 
 To fum up all ; There is an happy Medium to he 
 ohferved in our Method, fo that the Brevity may 7Wt 
 render the, Senfe ohfcure^ nor the Argument feeble^ 
 nor our Knowledge merely fuperficial : And on the 
 other Hand., that the Fulnefs and Copioufnefs of our 
 Method fnay not wafte the Time, tire the Learner, or 
 fill the Mind with Trifles and hnpertinencies. 
 
 The copious and the contracted Way of writing 
 have each their peculiar Advantages. There is a 
 proper Ufe to be made of large Paraphrafes, and 
 full, particular, and diffuftve Explications and Argu- 
 ments-, thefe are fitteft for thofe who defign to 
 be acquainted thoroughly with every Part ol the 
 Subjed. There is alfo a Ufe o^ fiorter Hints, 
 Abjtra£fs and Compendiu?ns to inftrudl thofe who 
 fcek only a flight and general Knowledge*, as wel! 
 as to refrefh the Memory of thofe who have learnM 
 
 the 
 
360 LOGIC K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 the Science already, and gone thro* a larger Scheme. 
 But it is a grofs Abufe of thefe various Methods 
 of Inftruftion, when a Perfon has read a mere Com- 
 fend or Epitome of any Science, and he vainly ima- 
 gines that he underftands the whole Science. So 
 one Boy may become a Philofopher by reading 
 over the mere dry Definitions and Divifions of 
 Scbeihler^s Compendiu?n of P eripatetkifm : So an- 
 other may boaft that he underftands Anatomy^ be- 
 caufe he has feen a Skeleton *, and a third profefs 
 himfelf a learned Divine, when he can repeat the 
 Apoftles Creed, 
 
 Vr^ Rule. Take Care that your Method he pro- 
 per to the Subject in Hand^ proper to your prefent De- 
 fign^ as well as proper to the Age and Place wherein 
 they dwell. 
 
 I. Let your Method he proper to the Suhje5f, All 
 Sciences muft not be learned or taught in one Me- 
 thod. Morality and neology^ Metaphyftcs and Lo' 
 gicky will not be eafily and happily reduced to a 
 (tri(5t mathematical Method : Thofe who have tried 
 have found much Inconvencience therein. 
 
 Some things have more need to be explained 
 than to be proved ; as Axioms or felf- evident Propo- 
 fitiom ; and indeed all the firft great Principles, 
 the chief and moft important Dodlrines both of 
 natural and revealed Religion ; for when the Senfe 
 of them is clearly explained, they appear fo evi- 
 dent in the Light of Nature or Scripture^ that 
 they want no other Proof. There are other Things 
 that ftand in Need of Proof, as well as Explication, 
 as many mathematical Theorems, and feveral deep 
 Contr over fie s in Morality and Divinity, There are 
 yet other Sorts of Subjedls which want rather to 
 be warmly imprefled upon the Mind hy fervent Ex- 
 bertaticns^ and ftand in more Need of this than 
 
 they 
 
C. II. The right Ufe of Reafon. 361 
 
 they do either of Proof or Explication ; fuch are the 
 moft general, plain and obvious Duties of Piety to- 
 wards God, and Love towards Men, with a Govern- 
 ment of all our Inclinations and Paffwns. Now thefe 
 feveral Subjects ought to be treated in a different 
 Manner and Method. 
 
 Again, There are fome Subjeefls in the fame 
 Treatife which are more ufeful and necejfary than 
 others, and fome Parts ot a Subject which are 
 eminently and chiefly defigned by a Writer or Speak- 
 er : True Method will teach us to dwell longer 
 upon thefe Themes, and to Jay out more Thought 
 and Language upon them ; whereas the fame Art 
 of Method will teach us to cut fhort thofe Things 
 which are ufed only to introduce our main Subjedt, 
 and to ftand as a Scaffolding merely to aid the 
 Structure of our Difcourfe. It will teach us alfo 
 to content ourfelves with brief Hints of thofe 
 Matters which are merely occafwnal and inci- 
 dental, 
 
 2. Tour Method muft he adjufted by your Bejign ; 
 for if you treat of the fame Subjedt with two dif- 
 ferent Views and Defigns, you will find it necef- 
 fary to ufe different Methods. Suppofe the DeC' 
 trine of the facred Trinity were your Theme, and 
 you were to read a Ledlure to young Students on 
 that Subjed, or if you defigned a Treatife for the 
 Convidiion of learned Men, you would purfue a 
 very different Method from that which would be 
 proper to regulate a praftical Difcourfe, or a Ser- 
 mon to inftrudl vulgar Chriflians merely in the pi- 
 ous Improvement of this Dodlrine, and awaken 
 them to their Duties which are derived thence. 
 
 In fhort, we muft not firft lay down certain 
 and precife Rules of Method, and refolve to con- 
 fine the Matter we difcourfe of to that particular 
 Form and Order of Topics ; but we mun; wt-ll 
 
 con filler 
 
362 L O G I C K: Or, Part IV, 
 
 confkkr and ftudy the Suhje^ of our Difcourfe 
 throughly, and take a jult Survey of our prefent 
 T>eftgn^ and thcfe will give fufficienc Hints of the 
 particular Form and Order in which we fhould handle 
 it, provided that we are moderately skilled in the 
 general Laws of Method and Ordef^JX Vakl 
 
 Yet let it be noted here, that neither the Siib- 
 je^^ nor Matter of a Difcourfe, nor the particular 
 Defign of it, can fo precifely determine the Me- 
 thod, as to leave no Room for Liberty and Va- 
 riety. The very fiime Theme may be handled, and 
 that alfo with the farrie Defign, in feveral different 
 Methods, among which it is hard to fay which is 
 the beft. In writing a Syftem of Divinity^ fome 
 begin with the* Scriptures, and thence deduce all 
 other Do(fl:rines and Duties. Some begin with 
 the Being of God and his Attributes^ fo far as he 
 is known by the Light of Nature, 2ind then pro- 
 ceed to the Dodrines of Revelation, Some di- 
 flinguifli the whole Subject into the Credenda and 
 Agenda, that is, Things to he believed, and Things 
 to he done. Some think it bell to explain the 
 whole Chriftian Religion by an hiflorical Detail 
 of all the Difcoveries which God has made of him- 
 felf to this lower JVorld, beginning at the Creation 
 in the firft Chapter of Genefis, and fo proceeding 
 onward according to the Narrative of the Old and 
 New Teftament. And there are others that en- 
 endeavour to include the whole of Religion under 
 thefe four Heads, {viz.) The Apoftles Creed, the 
 Lord's Prayer, the Ten Co7nmandments, and the two 
 Sacraments \ tho' I cannot buf think this is the 
 lead accurate of any. The fame Variety may be 
 allowed in treating other Subjects *, this very Trea- 
 tife of Logick is an Inflance of it, whofe Method 
 differs very confiderably from any others which I 
 have fcen, as they differ alfo greatly from one an- 
 other 
 
C* 11. The right Ufe ^Reafon. 363 
 
 other, tho' feveral of them are confefled to be well 
 written. 
 
 3. Tho* a juft View of our Suhje^l and our Be- 
 fign may didlate proper Rules of natural Method, 
 yet there muft he fome little Deference at leaft paid 
 to the Cufiom of the Age wherein we dwells and to 
 the Humour and Genius of our Readers or Hearers^ 
 which if we utterly rejed and difdain, our Per- 
 formances will fail of defired Succefs, even though 
 we may have followed the juft Rules of Method. 
 I will mention but this one Inftance : In the for- 
 mer Century it was frequent with learned Men to 
 divide their Theme or Subject into a great Multi- 
 tude o^ co-ordinate Members or PartSy they abound- 
 ed alfo in the For?ns of Logic k and Diftin^ion^ 
 and indulged numerous Ranks of Subordination. 
 Now though we ought not to abandon the Rules of 
 juff Method and Divifwn, in order to comport with 
 the modifh Writers in our Age who have renoun- 
 ced them, yet it is prudent to pay fo much Refped: 
 to the Cuftom of the Age, as to ufe thefc Forms 
 of Divifon with due Moderation, and not affedt 
 to multiply them in fuch a Manner as to give an 
 early and needlefs Difguft to the Generality of our 
 prefent Readers. The fame may be faid concern- 
 ing various other Methods ofCondu(ft in the Af- 
 fairs of Learning as well as the Affairs of Life, 
 wherein we mud indulge a little to Cuftom : And 
 yet we muft by no means fufter ourfelves fo far to 
 be impofed upon and governed by it, as to negledt 
 thofe Rules of Method which are neceflary for the 
 fafe, eafy and compleat Enquiry into Truth, or 
 the ready and effectual Communication of it to 
 others. 
 
 VIL'^RuLE. The laft Requifice of Method is, 
 
 that th^ Parts of a Difcourfe (Ijould he -ivell connc^ed \ 
 A a and 
 
364 L O I C K: Or, Part IV. 
 
 and thefe three lliort Diredions will fuffice for this 
 Purpofe, 
 
 1 . Keep your main End and Defign ever in View, 
 and let all the Farts of your Difcourfe have a Tenden- 
 cy toivard it, and as far as fojfihle make that "Tenden* 
 cy vifible all the Way : Otherwife the Readers or 
 Hearers will have Reafon to wonder for what End 
 this or that Particular was introduced. 
 
 2. Let the inutual Relation and Dependance of 
 the feveral Braiiches of your Difcourfe he fo jufl and 
 evident, that every Part may naturally lead onward 
 to the next, without any huge Chafms or Breaks 
 which interrupt and deform the Scheme. The Con- 
 nexion of Truths fhould arife and appear in their 
 fuccefTive Ranks and Order, as the feveral Parts 
 of a fine Profped: afcend juft behind each other, 
 in their natural and regular Elevations and Diftan- 
 ct^, and invite the Eye to climb onward with con- 
 flant Pleafure till it reach the Sky. Whatfoever 
 horrid Beauty a Precipice or a Catarad may add 
 to the Profpedl of a Country, yet fuch fort of hi- 
 deous and abrupt Appearances in a Scene of Rea- 
 foning are real Blemifhes and not Beauties. When 
 the Reader is pafTing over fuch a Treacife, he often 
 finds a wide Vacancy, and makes an uneafy Stop, 
 and knows not how to tranfport his Thoughts over 
 to the next Particular, for Want of fome Clue or 
 conneding Idea to lay hold of. 
 
 3. Acquaint your f elf with all the proper and decent 
 Forms of T^ranfiiion from one Tart of a Difcourfe to 
 another^ andpractfe them as Occafion offers. Where 
 the Ideas, Propofitions and Arguments, are hap- 
 pily difpofed, and well conneded, the Truth in- 
 deed is kcure •, but it renders the Difcourfe much 
 more agreeable, when proper and graceful Expref- 
 fion joins the Parts of it together in fo entertain- 
 
 ing 
 
C. II. The right life of Reafon. 365 
 
 ing a niannner, that the Reader knows not how 
 to Jeave off till he hath arrived at the End. 
 
 Thele are the general and mod important Rules 
 of true Method -y and though thc7 belong chiefly to 
 the Coinmunication of Knowledge, yet an early and 
 thorough Acquaintance with them will be of 
 confiderable Ufe toward the Furfuit and Aitamnent 
 of it. 
 
 Thofe Perfons who have never any Occafion to 
 communicate Knowledge by Writing or by pub- 
 lick Difcourfes, may alfo with great Advantage 
 perufe thefe Rules of Method^ that they may learn 
 to judge with Jufticc and Accuracy concerning 
 the Performance of others. And befides, a good 
 Acquaintance with Method^ will greatly afllll every 
 one in ranging, difpofmg and managing all hu- 
 man Affairs. 
 
 The particular Means or Methods for a farther 
 Improvement of the Underfl:anding are very va- 
 rious, fuch as, Meditation^ Reading, Converjing^ 
 Difputing by Speech or by Writing, ^leftion and 
 Anfwer^ 8cc. And in each of thefe Praflices 
 fome fpecial Forms may be obferved, and fpecial 
 Rules may be given to facilitate and fecure our 
 Enquiries aker Truth : But this would require 
 a little Volume by itfelf, and a Treatife of Logich 
 has always beer) efteemed fufHciently complete with- 
 out it. 
 
 FINIS. 
 
The TABLE of the 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 CT^HE Introdu5fion or general Scheme ^ Page i» 
 
 The Firfl Part (viz,) Of Perception and 
 Ideas. 
 
 Chap. I. Of the Nature of IdeaSy p. 8. 
 
 Chap. II. Of the Obje^s of Perception. Sed. i. 
 Of Being in general ^ p. lo. Sed. 2. Of Sub- 
 fiances and their various Kinds ^ p. 11. Se(^. ^. 
 Of Modes and their various Kinds ; and firft of 
 ejfential and accidental Modes, p. 16. Sed:. 4, 
 The farther Divifwns of Mode, p. 20. Se<5l. 5. 
 Of the ten Categories. Of Sub/lance inodified, 
 p. 25. Sect. 6. Of Not-Being, p. 26. 
 
 Chap. III. Of the feveral Sorts of Perceptions or 
 Ideas. Sect. i. Of fenfible, fpiritual, and ab- 
 flra^ed Ideas, p. 28. Se6t. 2. Of fmple and 
 complex, compound and colleElive Ideas, p. 33. 
 Se(^. 3. 0/ univerfal and particular Ideas, real 
 and imaginary, p. 34. Sedt. 4. 57?^ Divifion of 
 Ideas, with regard to their ^alities, Ip- 39* 
 
 Chap. IV. Of TVords and their feveral Divifions^ 
 together with the Advantage and Banger of than. 
 Sed. I. Of Words in general and their Ufe, p. 45. 
 Sc6l. 2. Of negative and pofitive Terms, p. 51. 
 Sd6t. 3. Of Jimple and complex Terms^ p. 54. 
 
 Sedt. 4. Of Words common and proper, p. 56. 
 Sed. 5. 0/ concrete and abflraEl Terms ^ p- 58. 
 
 Se6t. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Se(5l. 6. Of univocal and equivocal PFords^ P- 58. 
 Seel. 7. Various Kinds of equivocal Words ^ p. 61! 
 Seft. 8. The Origin or Caufes of equivocal fVords, 
 
 P-^7. 
 
 Chap. V. General Dire^ions relating to our Ideas, 
 (viz.) I. Of acquiring a Treafure of Ideas. 2. Of 
 retaining Ideas in Memory 3. Of fele5ling ufe- 
 ful Ideas, 4. Of the Government of our thoughts, 
 
 p. 71. 
 
 Chap. VI. Special Rules to dire5l our Conception of 
 Things^ p. 79. Se(ft. i. Of gaining clear and 
 dijlin^ Ideas, p. 80. Sed. 2, Of the Definition 
 of IFords or Names, p. 82. Sed. 3. Dtre^ions 
 concerning the Definition of Names p. 84. Scd. 
 4. O/' /^^ Definition of Things, p. 100. Sedl. 5. 
 JR^ules of Definition of the Thing, p. 105. Sedl. 6. 
 Ohfervations concerning the Definition of Things, 
 p. 108. Scdt. 7. Of a complete Conception of 
 Things, p. 117. Sed. 8. O/" Divifion, and the 
 Rules of it, p. 118. Sed. ^, Of a comprehen- 
 five Conception of Things and of Ahfira5lion, p. 
 124. Sedt. 10. Of the extenfive Conception of 
 Things, and of Difiribution, p. 128. Sedl. 11. 
 Of an orderly Conception of Things, p. 133. Sedt. 
 12. Thefe five Rides of Conception exemplified. 
 p. 135. St:(5l. 13. An Illufiration of the five 
 Rules by Similitudes, p. 137. 
 
 The Second Part, (viz.) Of Judgment and 
 Propofition. 
 
 HAP. I. Of the Nature of a Propofition and 
 itsfeveral Parts, p. Ml* 
 
 Chap. 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 Chap. II. Of the various Kinds of Propofitions. 
 Sedl. I. Of univerfal^ particular^ indefinite^ and 
 fingular Proportions, p. 147. Sed:. 2. Of af- 
 firmative^ and negative Propo/ttions^ p. 156. Sedt. 
 3. Of the Oppofition and Converfwn of Propo- 
 Jitions^ p. 158. S^di. 4. Of pure and modal Pro- 
 pofitions, p. 161. Sedl. 5. Of fingular Propofi- 
 tions , whether fimple or complex^ p. 163. Se6l. 6. 
 Of compound Propofitions, p. 165 Sed:. 7. O/" 
 /rw^ and falfe Propofitions, p. 171. Sed. 8. Of 
 certain and doubtful Propofitions of Knowledge 
 and Opinion, p. 174. Sed. 9. O/" Senfes Con- 
 fcioufnefs. Intelligence, Reafon, Faith, and Infpi- 
 ration lp'^77 
 
 Chap. III. The Springs of falfe Judgment, or the 
 ' Do^rine of Prejudices, p. 186. Secfl. i. Preju- 
 dices arijing jrom 'Things, p. 188. Sedl. 2. Pre- 
 judices arifing from Words, ^. i()^, Secfl. 3. Pr^- 
 judices arifing from ourfelves, p. 198. Sed. 4. 
 Prejudices arifing from other Per fons, p. 214. 
 
 Chap. IV. General BireBions to affifl us in judging 
 aright, p. 231. 
 
 Chap V. Special Rules to direB us in judging of 
 particular Ohje5ls. Sedl. i. Principles and Rules 
 of Judgment concerning the Ohje5fs of Senfe, p. 249. 
 Sc6l. 2 . Principles and Rules of Judgment in Mat- 
 ters of Reafon and Speculation, p. 253. Sedt. 3. 
 Principles and Rules of Judgment in Matters of 
 Morality and Religion, p. 259. Se6t. 4. Principles 
 and Rules of Judgment in Matters of human Pru- 
 dence, p. 263. Sedt. 5. Principles and Rules of 
 Judgment in Matters of human Tellimony, p. 266. 
 Seft, 6. Principles and Rules of Judgment in Mat- 
 ters of divine Te/limony, p. 271. Se6t. 7. Principles 
 
 and 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 and Rules of judging concerning Things pafly prefint 
 and to comcy by the mere Ufe of Reafon^ p. 275 
 
 The Third Part (viz.) of Reafoning and 
 Syllogifm. 
 
 CHAP. I, Of the Nature of a Syllogifm, and 
 if the Parts of which it is compofed, p. 280 
 
 Chap. II. Of the various Kinds of Syllogifmsy i£:ith 
 ^particular Rules relating to thern. Sedl. i. Of 
 miverfal and particular Syllogifms^ both negative 
 and affirmative^ p, 283. Sedl. 2. Of plain Jiviple 
 SyIlogtf?ns, and their Rules, p, 285. Sedl. 3. 0/ 
 the Moods and Figures of fwiple Syllogifms, p. 289. 
 St6k, 4. Of complex Syllogifms, p. 292, Sedl. 5. 
 Of conjun5iive Syllogifms^ p. 296. Sedl. 6. Of 
 compound Syllogifms, p. 301. Sedl. 7. Of the 
 middle Ter?ns^ of comfnon Places or Topics, and 
 Invention of JrguineittSy p. 305. Sedl. 8. Of fe- 
 veral Kinds of Arguments atid Demonftrationsy 
 
 p. 308. 
 
 Chap. III. The BoBrine of Sophifms. Sed. i. Of 
 fever al Kinds of Sophifms, and their Sohiticn 
 p. 313. Sedl. 2. Two general 'J efts of true Syl- 
 logiffus^ and Methods of Jolving all Sophifms, 
 
 Chap. IV. Some general Rules to dire5i our Rca- 
 fining, p. 326- 
 
 The Fourth Part, (viz.) Of Method. 
 
 HAP. I. 57?^ Nature and Kinds of Method^ 
 
 p. 340 
 
 Ch AP. II. General and fpccial Rules of Meihd, 
 
 \ 
 
B O O K ^ Printed for T. Longman and 
 T. S H E w E L L in Pater- nofter-Row ; and 
 J. Brackstone f« Cornhili. 
 
 I. r 'TUmility reprefented in the CharaBer of St. Paul : The 
 J_ J|[ chief Springs of it opened and its various Advantages 
 diiplay'd. Together with fome occafional Views of the con- 
 trary Vice. 8vo, 
 
 II. 7he Holinefs of Times, Places and People y under the y^w- 
 ijh and Chrijiian Difpenfations : Confidered and compared in fe- 
 veml Difcourfes, On the Sabbath^ the TempUy Churches, Meet- 
 ing-hmfeSy &c. i zmo. 
 
 III. The World to come : Or Difcourfes on the Joys or Sorrows 
 of departed Souls at Death ; and the Glory or Terror of the 
 Refurreftion : Whereto is prefixed a Proof of the Separate State. 
 8vo. 
 
 IV. Hor/e Lyrico' : Poems chiefly of the Lyrick Kind. In 
 three Books. Sacred, i . To Devotion and Piety. 2. To Vir- 
 tue, Honour and Friendlhip. 3. To the Memory of the Dead. 
 The Seventh Edition, correded, with the Author's Effigy, izmo. 
 
 V . The Knoivledge of the Hea<vens a7id the Earth made Eajy : 
 Or, The fir a Principles of Afronomy and Geography explain' d by 
 the Ufe of Glebes and Maps. Written for the Ufe of Learn- 
 ers. The Third Edition. 8vo. 
 
 VI. The VoSlrine of the Pajftons explained and impronS'd : Or, 
 a brief and comprehenfive Scheme ot the natural AfFedions of 
 Mankind : And an Account of their Names, Nature, Appear- 
 ances, EfFeds, and different Ufes in human Life. To which are 
 fubjoin'd Moral and Divine Rules for the Regulation or Ge- 
 vernment of them. The Third Edition. i2mo. 
 
 VI I. The Art of Reading and Writing Englijh : Or, the chief 
 Principles and Rules of pronouncing our Mother Tongue both in 
 Profe and Verfe. With a Variety of Iijilrudtions for true Spel- 
 ling. The Fifth Edition. i2mo. 
 
 VIII. Philofophical EJjfays on various Subjects, n)iz. Space, 
 Subflance, Body, Spirit, the Operations of the Soul in Union 
 with the Body, innate Ideas, perpetual Confcioufnefs, Place and 
 Motion of Spirits, the departing Soul, the Refurredtion of the 
 Body, the Produdion and Operation of Plants and Animals ; with 
 fome Remarks on Mr. Locke's EJfay on the Human Underjiand- 
 ing. To which is fubjoin'd, A brief Scheme of Ontology ; or. 
 The Science of Being, in general, with its AfFedUons, Thp 
 Second Edition. 8vo. 
 

 1 
 
I 
 
 I 
 
 r^ 
 
 ^' '^^