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trUbnefts oriental series. 
 
 Messrs. TRUBNER & CO. beg to call attention to their 
 ORIENTAL SERIES, in which will he collected, as far as 
 possible, all extant information and research upon the History, 
 Religions, Languages, Literature, dec., of Ancient India, China, and 
 the East in general. 
 
 The Oriental Series will be on a comprehensive design, and 
 no labour or expense will be spared to render the undertaking 
 worthy of its subject. Messrs. Trubner & Co. have already 
 secured the services of eminent Eastern students and writers ; 
 and while the labour proposed must necessarily prove vast, they 
 intend to accomplish it by working with many able hands over 
 the whole held, under careful and well-organised Editorship. 
 
 THE FOLLOWING WORKS ARE NOW READY:— 
 
 Second Edition, post 8vo, cloth, pp. xvi. — 427, price 16s. 
 
 ESSAYS ON THE SACRED LANGUAGE, WRITINGS, 
 AND RELIGION OF THE PARSIS. 
 
 By MARTIN HAUG, Ph.D., 
 
 Late of the Universities of Tubingen, Gottingen, and Bonn ; Superintendent 
 of Sanskrit Studies, and Professor of Sanskrit in the Poona College ; 
 Honorary Member of the Bombay Branch Royal Asiatic Society, &c. 
 
 Edited by Dr. E. W. WEST. 
 
 I. History of the Researches into the Sacred Writings and Religion of the 
 Parsis, from the Earliest Times down to the Present. 
 
 II. Languages of the Parsi Scriptures. 
 
 III. The Zend-Avesta, or the Scripture of the Parsis. 
 
 IV. The Zoroastrian Religion, as to its Origin and Development. 
 
 The Author of these Essays intended, after his return from India, to 
 expand them into a comprehensive work on the Zoroastrian religion ; but 
 this design, postponed from time to time, was finally frustrated by his 
 untimely death. That he was not spared to publish all his varied know- 
 ledge on this subject must remain for ever a matter of regret to the student 
 of Iranian antiquities. In other hands, the changes that could be introduced 
 into this Second Edition were obviously limited to such additions and 
 alterations as the lapse of time and the progress of Zoroastrian studies have 
 rendered necessary. 
 
 In the First Essay, the history of the European researches has been extended 
 to the present time ; but for the sake of brevity several writings have been 
 passed over unnoticed, among the more valuable of which those of Professor 
 
TRUBNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES. 
 
 Hubschmann may be specially mentioned. Some account has also been given 
 of the progress of Zoroastrian studies among the Parsis themselves. 
 
 In the Second Essay, additional information has been given about the 
 Pahlavi language and literature ; but the technical portion of the Avesta 
 Grammar has been reserved for separate publication, being better adapted 
 for students than for the general reader. 
 
 Some additions have been made to the Third Essay, with the view of 
 bringing together, from other sources, all the Author’s translations from the 
 Avesta, except those portions of the Gathas which he did not include in the 
 First Edition, and which it would be hazardous for an Editor to revise. 
 Further details have also been given regarding the contents of the Nasks. 
 
 Several additional translations having been found among the Author’s 
 papers, too late for insertion in the Third Essay, have been added in an 
 Appendix, after careful revision, together with his notes descriptive of the 
 mode of performing a few of the Zoroastrian ceremonies. 
 
 The Author’s principal object in publishing these Essays originally, was 
 to present in a readable form all the materials for judging impartially of the 
 scriptures and religion of the Parsis. The same object has been kept in view 
 while preparing this Second Edition, giving a large quantity of such materials, 
 collected from a variety of sources, which may now be left to the reader’s 
 impartial judgment. 
 
 The value of this Second Edition is greatly enhanced by the addition of many 
 posthumous papers, discovered by the Editor, Dr. E. West, at Munich. They 
 consist of further translations from the Zend and Pahlavi of the Zend-Avesta, 
 and also of numerous detailed notes descriptive of some of the Parsi ceremonies. 
 
 “We have, in a concise and readable form, a history of the researches into the 
 sacred writings and religion of the Parsis from the earliest times down to the 
 present. ” — Times. 
 
 Post 8vo, cloth, pp. viii.— 176, price 7s. 6d. 
 
 TEXTS FROM THE BUDDHIST CANON 
 
 COMMONLY KNOWN AS “ DHAMMAPADA.” 
 
 With Accompanying Narratives. 
 
 Translated from the Chinese by S. BEAL, B.A., Professor of Chinese, 
 University College, London. 
 
 Among the great body of books comprising the Chinese Buddhist Canon, 
 presented by the Japanese Government to the Library of the India Office, 
 Mr. Beal discovered a work bearing the title of “ Law Verses, or Scriptural 
 Texts,” which on examination was seen to resemble the Pali version of 
 Dhammapada in many particulars. It was further discovered that the 
 original recension of the Pali Text found its way into China in the Third 
 Century (a.D. ), where the work of translation was finished, and afterwards 
 thirteen additional sections added. The Dhammapada, as hitherto known 
 by the Pali Text Edition, as edited by Fausboll, by Max Muller’s English, 
 and Albrecht Weber’s German translations, consists only of twenty-six 
 chapters or sections, whilst the Chinese version, or rather recension, as now 
 translated by Mr. Beal, consists of thirty-nine sections. The students of 
 Pali who possess Fausboll’s text, or either of the above-named translations, 
 will therefore needs want Mr. Beal’s English rendering of the Chinese 
 version ; the thirteen above-named additional sections not being accessible to 
 them in any other form ; for, even if they understand Chinese, the Chinese 
 original would be unobtainable by them. 
 
 “ Mr. Beal’s rendering of the Chinese translation is a most valuable aid to the 
 critical study of the work." — Times. 
 
 ► “Mr. Beal, by making it accessible in an English dress, has added to the great 
 services he has already rendered to the comparative study of religious history.” — 
 Academy. 
 
TR UBNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES. 
 
 “ Valuable as exhibiting the doctrine of the Buddhists in its purest, least adul- 
 terated form, it brings the modern reader face to face with that simple creed and rule 
 of conduct which won its way over the minds of myriads, and which is now nominally 
 professed by 145 millions, who have overlaid its austere simplicity with innumerable 
 ceremonies, forgotten its maxims, perverted its teaching, and so inverted its leading 
 principle that a religion whose founder denied a God, now worships that founder as 
 a gud himself." — Scotsman. 
 
 Post 8 vo, cloth, pp. xxiii. — 360, price 18s. 
 
 THE HISTORY OF INDIAN LITERATURE. 
 
 By ALBRECHT WEBER. 
 
 Translated from the Second German Edition by John Mann, M.A., and 
 Theodor Zachariae, Ph.D., with the sanction of the Author. 
 
 Dr. Buhler, Inspector of Schools in India, writes: — “I am extremely 
 glad to learn that you are about to publish an English translation of Pro- 
 fessor A. Weber’s ‘ History of Indian Literature.’ When I was Professor of 
 Oriental Languages in Elphinstone College, I frequently felt the want of 
 such a work to which I could refer the students. I trust that the work 
 which you are now publishing will become a class-book in all the Indian 
 colleges, as it is the first and only scientific one which deals with the whole 
 field of Vedic, Sanskrit, and Prakrit literature.” 
 
 Professor Cowell, of Cambridge, writes : — “The English translation of 
 Professor A. Weber’s ‘ History of Indian Literature ’ will be of the greatest 
 use to those who wish to take a comprehensive survey of all that the Hindu 
 mind has achieved. It will be especially useful to the students in our 
 Indian colleges and universities. I used to long for such a book when I was 
 teaching in Calcutta. Hindu students are intensely interested in the history 
 of Sanskrit literature, and this volume will supply them with all they want 
 on the .subject. I hope it will be made a text-book wherever Sanskrit and 
 English are taught.” 
 
 Professor AVhitney, Yale College, Newhaven, Conn., U.S.A., writes 
 “ I am the more interested in your enterprise of the publication of Weber’s 
 Sanskrit Literature in an English version, as I was one of the class to whom 
 the work was originally given in the form of academic lectures. At their 
 first appearance they were by far the most learned and able treatment of 
 their subject ; and with their recent additions they still maintain decidedly 
 the same rank. Wherever the language, and institutions, and history of 
 India are studied, they must be used and referred to as authority.” 
 
 “ Is perhaps the most comprehensive and lucid survey of Sanskrit literature 
 extant. The essays contained in the volume were originally delivered as academic 
 lectures, and at the time of their first publication were acknowledged to be by far 
 the most learned and able treatment of the subject.’’ — Times. 
 
 Post 8vo, cloth, pp. xii. — 198, accompanied by Two Language 
 Maps, price 12s. 
 
 A SKETCH OF 
 
 THE MODERN LANGUAGES OF THE EAST INDIES. 
 
 By ROBERT N. CUST. 
 
 The Author has attempted to fill up a vacuum, the inconvenience of 
 which pressed itself on his notice. Much had been written about the 
 languages of the East Indies, but the extent of our present knowledge had 
 not even been brought to a focus. Information on particular subjects was 
 only to be obtained or looked for by consulting a specialist, and then hunting 
 down the numbers of a serial or the chapters of a volume not always to be 
 
TR UBNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES. 
 
 found. It occurred to him that it might be of use to others to publish in an 
 arranged form the notes which he had collected for his own edification. 
 Thus the work has grown upon him. 
 
 “ Supplies a deficiency which has long been felt.” — Times. 
 
 “ The book before us is then a valuable contribution to philological science. It 
 passes under review a vast number of languages, and it gives, or professes to give, in 
 every case the sum and substance of the opinions and judgments of the best-informed 
 writers." — Saturday Review. 
 
 Second Corrected Edition, post 8vo, pp. xii. — 116, cloth, price 5s. 
 
 THE BIRTH OF THE WAR-GOD. 
 
 A Poem. By KALIDASA. 
 
 Translated from the Sanskrit into English Verse by 
 Ralph T. H. Griffith, M.A. 
 
 “ A very spirited rendering of the Kumdrasambhava, which was first published 
 twenty -six years ago, and which we are glad to see made once more accessible.” — 
 Times. 
 
 “ Mr. Griffith’s very spirited rendering of the Kumdrasambhava, first published 
 twenty-six years ago, is well known to most who are at all interested in Indian 
 literature, or enjoy the tenderness of feeling and rich creative imagination of its 
 author." — Indian Antiquary. 
 
 “ We are very glad to welcome a second edition of Professor Griffith’s admirable 
 translation of the well-known Sanskrit poem, the Kumdrasambhava. Few transla- 
 tions deserve a second edition better." — Athenaeum. 
 
 Post 8vo, cloth, pp. 432, price 16s. 
 
 A CLASSICAL DICTIONARY OF HINDU MYTHOLOGY 
 AND RELIGION, GEOGRAPHY, HISTORY, AND 
 LITERATURE. 
 
 By JOHN DOWSON, M.R.A.S., 
 
 Late Professor of Hindustani, Staff College. 
 
 In this work an endeavour has been made to supply the long-felt want of 
 a Hindu Classical Dictionary. The late Professor Wilson projected such 
 a work, and forty years ago announced his intention of preparing it for the 
 Oriental Translation Fund, but he never accomplished his design. The main 
 portion of this work consists of mythology, but religion is bound up with 
 mythology, and in many points the two are quite inseparable. Of history, 
 iu the true sense, Sanskrit possesses nothing, or next to nothing, but what 
 little has been discovered here finds its place. The chief geographical names 
 of the old writers also have received notice, and their localities and identi- 
 fications are described so far as present knowledge extends. Lastly, short 
 descriptions have been given of the most frequently mentioned Sanskrit 
 books, but only of such books as are likely to be found named in the works 
 of English writers. 
 
 This work will be a book of reference for all concerned in the government 
 of the Hindus, but it will be more especially useful to young Civil Servants 
 and to masters and students in the universities, colleges, and schools iu India. 
 
 “This not only forms an indispensable book of reference to students of Indian 
 literature, but is also of great general interest, as it gives in a concise and easily 
 accessible form all that need be known about the personages of Hindu mythology 
 whose names are so familiar, but of whom so little is known outside the limited 
 circle of savants.” — Times. 
 
 “ It is no slight gain when such subjects are treated fairly and fully in a moderate 
 space ; and we need only add that the few wants which we may hope to see supplied 
 in new editions detract but little from the general excellence of Mr. Dowson's work.” 
 — Saturday Review. 
 
TRUBNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES. 
 
 Post 8vo, with View of Mecca, pp. cxii.— 172, cloth, price 9s. 
 
 SELECTIONS FROM THE KORAN. 
 
 By EDWARD WILLIAM LANE, 
 
 Hon. Doctor of Literature, Leyden ; Correspondent of the Institute of France ; non. 
 Member of the German Oriental Society, the Royal Asiatic Society, Ac. ; 
 Translator of “ The Thousand and One Nights ; " Author of an “ Arabic-Englisli 
 Lexicon,” Ac. 
 
 A New Edition, Revised and Enlarged, with an Introduction by 
 Stanley Lane Poole. 
 
 Extract from Preface. 
 
 There has always been a wish to know something about the sacred book 
 of the Mohammedans, and it was with the design of satisfying this wish, 
 whilst avoiding the weariness and the disgust which a complete perusal of 
 the Koran must produce, that Mr. Lane arranged the “ Selections ” which 
 were published in 1843. ... It has proved of considerable service to students 
 of Arabic, who have found it the most accurate rendering in existence of a 
 large part of the Koran ; and even native Muslims of India, ignorant of 
 Arabic, have used Lane’s “Selections ” as their Bible. 
 
 “. . . Has been long esteemed in this country, as the compilation of one of the 
 greatest Arabic scholars of the time, the late Mr. Lane, the well-known translator of 
 the ‘Arabian Nights.’ . . . The present editor has enhanced the value of his 
 relative’s work by divesting the text of a great deal of extraneous matter introduced 
 by way of comment, and prefixing an introduction.” — Times. 
 
 “ Mr. Poole is both a generous and a learned biographer. . . . Mr. Poole tells us 
 the facts ... so far as it is possible for industry and criticism to ascertain them, 
 and for literary skill to present them in a condensed and readable form.” — English- 
 man , Calcutta. 
 
 Post 8vo, pp. xliv. — 376, cloth, price 14s. 
 
 METRICAL TRANSLATIONS FROM SANSKRIT 
 WRITERS. 
 
 With an Introduction, many Prose Versions, and Parallel Passages from 
 Classical Authors. 
 
 By J. MUIR, C.I.E., D.C.L., LL.D., Pli.D. 
 
 The present embraces the contents of the little work entitled “ Religious 
 and Moral Sentiments, metrically rendered from Sanskrit Writers,” &.C., 
 published by Messrs. Williams & Norgate in 1875, together with Three 
 collections of Versified Translations subsequently printed, but not published, 
 and a reprint of the metrical pieces contained in Volumes II. and V. of the 
 author’s “Original Sanskrit Texts,” &c. 
 
 . . An agreeable introduction to Hindu poetry.” — Times. 
 
 “ . . . A volume which may be taken as a fair illustration alike of the religious 
 and moral sentiments and of the legendary lore of the best Sanskrit writers.” — 
 Edinburgh Daily Review. 
 
 Post 8vo, pp. vi. — 368, cloth, price 14s. 
 
 MODERN INDIA AND THE INDIANS, 
 
 BEING A SERIES OF IMPRESSIONS, NOTES, AND ESSAYS. 
 
 By MONIER WILLIAMS, D.C.L., 
 
 Hon. LL.D. of the University of Calcutta, Hon. Member of the Bombay Asiatic 
 Society, Boden Professor of Sanskrit in the University of Oxford. 
 
 Third Edition, revised and augmented by considerable Additions, 
 with Illustrations and a Map. 
 
 This edition will be found a great improvement on those that preceded it. 
 The author has takeu care to avail himself of all such criticisms on particular 
 
 A 2 
 
TRUBNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES. 
 
 passages in the previous editions as appeared to him to be just, and he has 
 enlarged the work bv more than a hundred pages of additional matter. The 
 chapter on the “ Villages and Rural Population of India,” and several other 
 sections of the work, are quite new. 
 
 “In this volume we have the thoughtful impressions of a thoughtful man on some 
 of the most important questions connected with our Indian Empire. ... An en- 
 lightened observant man. travelling among an enlightened observant people, Professor 
 Monier Williams has brought before the public in a pleasant form more of the manners 
 and customs of the Queen’s Indian subjects than we ever remember to have seen in 
 any one work. He not only deserves the thanks of every Englishman for this able 
 contribution to the study of Modern India— a subject with which we should be 
 specially familiar — but he deserves the thanks of every Indian, Parsee or Hindu, 
 Buddhist and Moslem, for his clear exposition of their maimers, their creeds, and 
 their necessities.” — Times. 
 
 In Two Volumes, post 8vo, pp. viii. — 408 and viii. — 348, cloth, price 28s. 
 
 MISCELLANEOUS ESSAYS RELATING TO INDIAN 
 SUBJECTS. 
 
 By BRIAN HOUGHTON HODGSON, Esq., F.R.S., 
 
 Late of the Bengal Civil Service ; Corresponding Member of the Institute ; Chevalier 
 of the Legion of Honour ; Honorary Member of the German Oriental Society and 
 the Sociht6 Asiatique ; Member of the Asiatic Societies of Calcutta and London ; 
 of the Ethnological and Zoological Societies of London ; and late British Minister 
 at the Court of Nepal. 
 
 CONTENTS OF VOL. I. 
 
 Section 1. — On the Kocch, Bddd, and D'nunal Tribes. — Part I. Vocabulary. — 
 Part II. Grammar. — Part III. Their Origin, Location, Numbers, Creed, Customs, 
 Character, and Condition, with a General Description of the Climate they dwell in. 
 — Appendix. 
 
 Section II. — On Himalayan Ethnology — I. Comparative Vocabulary of the Lan- 
 guages of the Broken Tribes of Ndpal. — II. Vocabulary of the Dialects of the Iviranti 
 Language. — III. Grammatical Analysis of the Vayu Language. The Vayu Grammar. 
 — IV. Analysis of the Billing Dialect of the Kiranti language. The Billing Gram- 
 mar. — V. On the Vavu or Hayu Tribe of the Central Himalaya. — VI. On tie Kiranti 
 Tribe of the Central Himalaya. 
 
 CONTENTS OF VOL. II. 
 
 Section III. — On the Aborigines of North-Eastern India. Comparative Vocabulary 
 of the Tibetan, Bddd, and Gar 6 Tongues. 
 
 Section IV. — Aborigines of the North-Eastern Frontier. 
 
 Section V. — Aborigines of the Eastern Frontier. 
 
 Section VI —The Indo-Chinese Borderers, and their connection with the Hima- 
 layans and Tibetans. Comparative Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Arakan. 
 Comparative Vocabulary of Indo-Chinese Borderers in Tenasserim. 
 
 Section VII. — The Mongolian Affinities of the Caucasians. — Comparison and Ana- 
 lysis of Caucasian and Mongolian Words. 
 
 Section VIII.— Physical Type of Tibetans. 
 
 Section IX. — The 'Aborigines of Central India — Comparative Vocabulary of the 
 Aboriginal Languages of Central India. — Aborigines of the Eastern Ghats. — Vocabu- 
 lary of some of the Dialects of the Hill and Wandering Tribes in the Northern Sircars. 
 
 Aborigines of the Nilgiris, with Remarks on their Affinities. — Supplement to the 
 
 Nilgiriaii Vocabularies. — The Aborigines of Southern India and Ceylon. 
 
 Section X — Route of Nepalese Mission to Pekin, with Remarks on the Water- 
 shed and Plateau of Tibet. 
 
 Section XI.— Route from Kithmdndii, the Capital of Nepal, to Darjeeling in 
 Sikim— Memorandum relative to the Seven Cosis of Nepal. 
 
 Section XII. — Some Accounts of the Systems of Law and Police as recognised in 
 the State of Nepal. 
 
 Section XIII.— The Native Method of making the Paper denominated Hindustan, 
 N epale.-e. 
 
 Section XIV. — Pre-eminence of the Vernaculars ; or, the Anglicists Answered : 
 Being Letters on the Education of the People of India. 
 
 “ For the study of the less-known races of India Mr. Brian Hodgson’s “ Miscellane- 
 ous Essays” will be found very valuable both to trie philologist and the ethnologist.” 
 — Times. 
 
TRUBNER'S ORIENTAL SERIES. 
 
 Third Edition, Two Vols., post 8vo, pp. viii. — 268 and viii. — 326, cloth, 
 price 21s. 
 
 THE LIFE OR LEGEND OF GAUDAMA, 
 
 THE BUDDHA OF THE BURMESE. With Annotations. 
 
 The Ways to Neibban, and Notice on the Phongyies or Burmese Monks. 
 
 By the Right Rev. P. BIGANDET, 
 
 Bishop of Ramatha, Vicar- Apostolic of Ava and Pegu. 
 
 “The work is furnished with copious notes, which not only illustrate the subject- 
 matter, but form a perfect encyclopaedia of Buddhist lore.” — Times. 
 
 “From long residence in Burmah, and high scholarship, Bishop Bigandet has 
 been enabled to produce a work which will furnish European students of Buddhism 
 with a most valuable help in the prosecution of their investigations.” — Edinburgh 
 Daily Review. 
 
 “ Bishop Bigandet's invaluable work on Buddha and Burmese Buddhism first 
 appeared in a single volume published at Rangoon in 1858, . . . and no work founded 
 — rather translated — from original sources presents to the Western student a more 
 faithful picture than that of Bishop Bigandet.” — Indian Antiquary. 
 
 “Viewed in this light, its importance is sufficient to place students of the subject 
 under a deep obligation to its author.” — Calcutta Review. 
 
 “This work is one of the greatest authorities upon Buddhism.” — Dublin Review. 
 
 “ . . . A performance the great value of which is well known to all students of 
 Buddhism."— Tablet. 
 
 Post 8vo, pp. xxiv. — 420, cloth, price 18s. 
 
 CHINESE BUDDHISM. 
 
 A VOLUME OF SKETCHES, HISTORICAL AND CRITICAL. 
 
 By J. EDKINS, D.D., 
 
 Author of “ China’s Place in Philology,” “ Religion in China,” &c., &c. 
 
 “ It contains a vast deal of important information on the subject of Chinese 
 Buddhism, such as is only to be gained by long-continued study on the spot.” — 
 Athenaeum. 
 
 ■ “ It is impossible within our limits even to mention the various subjects connected 
 with Buddhism with which Dr. Edkins deals. The title of the work inadequately 
 represents the range of its contents.” — Saturday Review. 
 
 “ Upon the whole, we know of no work comparable to it for the extent of its 
 original research, and the simplicity with which this complicated system of philo- 
 sophy, religion, literature, and ritual is set forth. It is clearly the fruit of a lifetime 
 of observation and study in one of the most recondite subjects, through the medium 
 of a language of incomparable difficulty "—British Quarterly Review. 
 
 “ The whole volume is replete with learning. ... It deserves most careful study 
 from all interested in the history of the religions of the world, and expressly of those 
 who are concerned in the propagation of Christianity. Dr. Edkins notices in terms 
 of just condemnation the exaggerated praise bestowed upon Buddhism by recent 
 English writers.” — Record. 
 
 Post 8vo, pp. 496, cloth, price 18s. 
 
 LINGUISTIC AND ORIENTAL ESSAYS. 
 
 Written from the Year 1846 to 1878. 
 
 By ROBERT NEEDHAM OUST, 
 
 Late Member of Her Majesty’s Indian Civil Service ; Hon. Secretary to 
 the Royal Asiatic Society ; 
 
 and Author of “ The Modern Languages of the East Indies.” 
 
 “ We know none who has described Indian life, especially the life of the natives, 
 with so much learning, sympathy, and literary talent." — Academy. 
 
TRUBNER’S ORIENTAL SERIES. 
 
 “ It is impossible to do justice to any of these essays in the space at our command. 
 
 . . . But they seem to us to be full of suggestive and original remarks. Praise is the 
 sum of what we have to offer him on the present occasion.” — St. James's Gazette. 
 
 “ His book contains a vast amount of information, which will not only be of the 
 greatest service to those especially connected with India, but also of much interest to 
 every intelligent reader. It is, he tells us, the result of thirty-five years of inquiry, 
 reflection, and speculation, and that on subjects as full of fascination as of food for 
 thought.” — Tablet. 
 
 “ The essays contained in this interesting volume have been written by the 
 talented author at various periods during the last quarter of a century, and exhibit 
 such a thorough acquaintance with the history and antiquities of India as to entitle 
 him to speak as one having authority.” — Edinburgh Daily Review. 
 
 “ The author speaks with the authority of personal experience It is this 
 
 constant association with the country and the people which gives such a vividness 
 
 to many of the pages He always writes with a kindly heart, and he has 
 
 the unspeakable advantage of knowing his subject from a continued experience of 
 years.” —Athenceum. 
 
 Second Edition, post 8vo, pp. xxvi. — 244, cloth, price 10s. 6d. 
 
 THE GULISTAN; 
 
 Or, ROSE GARDEN OF SHEKH MUSHLIU’D-DIN SADI OF SHIRAZ. 
 Translated for the First Time into Prose and Verse, with an Introductory 
 Preface, and a Life of the Author, from the Atisti Kadah, 
 
 By EDWARD B. EASTWICK, C.B., M.A., F.R.S., M.R.A.S., 
 
 Of Merton College, Oxford, &c. 
 
 “ It is a very fair rendering of the original.” — Timex. 
 
 “ The new edition has long been desired, and will be welcomed by all who take 
 any interest in Oriental poetry. The Gulistan is a typical Persian verse-book of the 
 highest order. Mr. Eastwick’s rhymed translation . . . has long established itself in 
 a secure position as the best version of Sadi’s finest work.” — Academy. 
 
 “ It is both faithfully and gracefully executed.”— Tablet. 
 
 Post 8vo, pp. civ. — 348, cloth, price 18s. 
 
 BUDDHIST BIRTH STORIES; or, Jataka Tales. 
 
 The Oldest Collection of Folk-lore Extant : 
 
 BEING THE J ATAKATTHA VANNANA, 
 
 For the first time Edited in the original Pali. 
 
 By V. FAUSBOLL. 
 
 And Translated by T. W. Rhys Davids. 
 
 Translation. Volume I. 
 
 “ It is now some years since Mr. Rhys Davids asserted his right to be heard on 
 this subject by his able article on Buddhism in the new edition of the ‘ Encyclopaedia 
 Britannica.’ . . . Apart altogether from the light which these stories throw upon 
 the earliest Buddhist teaching, they have an interest from the fact that they are the 
 oldest collection of folk-lore in the world.” — Leeds Mercui-y. 
 
 “ All who are interested in Buddhist literature ought to feel deeply indebted to 
 Mr. Rhys Davids. His well-established reputation as a Pali scholar is a sufficient 
 guarantee for the fidelity of his version, and the style of his translations is deserving 
 of high praise.” — Academy. 
 
 “ It is certain that no more competent expositor of Buddhism could be found than 
 Mr. Rhys Davids, and that these Birth Stories will be of the greatest interest and 
 importance to students. In the Jataka book we have, then, a priceless record of the 
 earliest imaginative literature of our race; and Mr. Rhys Davids is well warranted 
 in claiming that it presents to us a nearly complete picture of the social life and 
 customs and popular beliefs of the common people of Aryan tribes, closely related to 
 ourselves, just as they were passing through the first stages of civilisation. These 
 stories, to which at the present day the Singhalese peasant listens through the long 
 summer night, when the Buddhist clergy hold their annual missions at the sacred 
 season of Was, and which in other vestures are the delight of children throughout 
 the Western world, carry us back to what M. Laboulaye happily calls ‘ the infancy of 
 humanity which we misname antiquity.’ 1 C’est alors que l’esprit humain a cree ces 
 reeits qui edifiaient les plus sages, et qui aujourd'hui, que l’humuuitd est vieille, 
 n'amusent plus que les enfants — grands et petits.’ "—St. James's Gazette. 
 
TR UBNER’S ORIENTAL SERIES. 
 
 Post 8 vo, pp. xxviii. — 362, cloth, price 14s. 
 
 A TALMUDIC MISCELLANY; 
 
 Or, A THOUSAND AND ONE EXTRACTS FROM THE TALMUD, 
 THE MIDRASHIM, AND THE KABBALAH. 
 
 Compiled and Translated by PAUL ISAAC HERSHON, 
 
 Author of “ Genesis According to the Talmud,” &c. 
 
 With Notes and Copious Indexes. 
 
 “ To obtain in so concise and handy a form as this volume a general idea of the 
 Talmud is a boon to Christians at least.” — Times. 
 
 “ This is a new volume of the ‘ Oriental Series,’ and its peculiar and popular 
 character will make it attractive to general readers. Mr. Hershon is a very com- 
 petent scholar. He thinks, however, that if the translation of the whole were made 
 into English, not one in a thousand would have patience to read consecutively the 
 first twelve pages. The present selection contains samples of the good, bad, and 
 indifferent, and especially extracts that throw light upon the Scriptures. The 
 extracts have been all derived, word for word, and made at first hand, and references 
 are carefully given. The extracts are curious and interesting, and will speak for 
 themselves.” — British Quarterly Review. 
 
 “ Mr. Hershon's book, at all events, will convey to English readers a more complete 
 and truthful notion of the Talmud than any other work that has yet appeared.” — 
 Daily News. 
 
 “ Without overlooking in the slightest the several attractions of the previous 
 volumes of the ‘ Oriental Series,’ we have no hesitation in saying that this surpasses 
 them all in interest. The Talmud is the great repository of Jewish learning ; and, if 
 we except the Sacred Scriptures, which are of a unique character, was for centuries 
 almost the sole literature of that wonderful people, ‘ of whom as concerning the flesh 
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HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 THE SANKHYA KARIKA OF 
 
 v4 
 
 ISWARA KRISHNA. 
 
 Bn Exposition of tbe System of IRapila, 
 
 WITH 
 
 AN APPENDIX ON THE NYAYA AND VAISESHIKA SYSTEMS. 
 
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 JOHN DAVIES, M.A. (Cantab.), 
 
 MEMBER OF THE ROYAL ASIATIC SOCIETY. 
 
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 [All rights reserved.] 
 

 
 
 
 
 
PREFACE. 
 
 I wish to present to my readers the philosophy of Kapila 
 as it has been set forth by his Indian exponent, Hwara 
 Krishna. The system of Kapila, called the Sankhya or 
 nationalistic, in its original form, and in its theistic 
 development by Patanjali, contains nearly all that India 
 has produced in the department of pure philosophy. 
 Other systems, though classed as philosophic, are mainly 
 devoted to logic and physical science, or to an exposition 
 of the Yedas. 
 
 The system of Kapila may be said to have only an 
 historical value, but on this account alone it is interesting 
 as a chapter in the history of the human mind. It is the 
 earliest attempt on record to give an answer, from reason 
 alone, to the mysterious questions which arise in every 
 thoughtful mind about the origin of the world, the nature 
 and relations of man, and his future destiny. It is 
 interesting, also, and instructive to note how often the 
 human mind moves in a circle. The latest German 
 philosophy, the system of Schopenhauer and Von Hart- 
 mann, is mainly a reproduction of the philosophic system 
 of Kapila in its materialistic part, presented in a more 
 elaborate form, but on the same fundamental lines. In 
 
VI 
 
 PREFACE. 
 
 this respect the human intellect has gone over the same 
 ground that it occupied more than two thousand years 
 ago, hut on a more important question it has taken a 
 step in retreat. Kapila recognised fully the existence of 
 a soul in man, forming indeed his proper nature — the 
 absolute Ego of Fichte — distinct from matter and im- 
 mortal ; but our latest philosophy, both here and in Ger- 
 many, can see in man only a highly developed physical 
 organisation. “ All external things,” says Kapila, “ were 
 formed that the soul might know itself and be free.” 
 “The study of psychology is vain,” says Schopenhauer, 
 “ for there is no Psyche.” 
 
CONTENTS. 
 
 PAGE 
 
 OF KAPILA, THE AUTHOR OF THE SANKHYA SYSTEM . 5 
 
 THE SANKHYA KARIKA, BY ISWARA KRISHNA. . . 1 3 
 
 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTICE OF THE NYAYA AND VAISESHIKA 
 
 SYSTEMS I 1 9 
 
 NOTES. 
 
 Note A. 
 
 ON THE ORGANS OF THE SOUL IN THE SYSTEM OF KAPILA 1 33 
 
 Note B. 
 
 ON THE MEANING OF “ SAT ” AND “ ASAT ” . . . I 35 
 
 Note C. 
 
 ON THE CONNECTION OF THE SANKHYA SYSTEM WITH THE 
 
 PHILOSOPHY OF SPINOZA . . . . . 1 39 
 
 Note D. 
 
 ON THE CONNECTION OF THE SYSTEM OF KAPILA WITH 
 
 THAT OF SCHOPENHAUER AND VON HARTMANN . 1 43 
 

HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 PART I. 
 
 The Hindu schools of philosophy are usually classed in 
 the following order : — 
 
 1. The Nyaya, founded hy Gautama. 
 
 2. The Vaiseshika, hy Ivanada. 
 
 3. The Sankhya, hy Ivapila. 
 
 4. The Yoga, hy Patanjali. 
 
 5. The Mimansa, hy Jaimini. 
 
 6. The Vedanta, by Badarayana, sometimes called 
 Vyasa, or Veda Vyasa. 
 
 They are caUed the six Sastras, or writings of autho- 
 rity, and sometimes the six Darsanas, views or exposi- 
 tions of doctrine. 
 
 The term “ philosophy ” cannot be strictly applied to 
 all these systems. 
 
 The Nyaya is properly a system of logic, offering 
 many points of resemblance to the methods of Aris- 
 totle. 
 
 The Vaiseshika treats of physics, of the categories 
 or general attributes of things, and of the formation of 
 
2 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the kosmos, which it attributes to the qualities and move- 
 ments of primitive atoms. 
 
 The Mlmansa and Vedanta systems are nearly related 
 to each other. 
 
 The Mlmansa, or Purva (Prior) Mlmansa, arose from 
 a desire to maintain and illustrate the Vedas. Its object 
 was to support the supreme authority of these books, 
 to maintain their ritual, and to determine the true mean- 
 ing of such passages as had been misunderstood, or wrested 
 in support of error. 
 
 The Vedanta, or Uttara (Posterior) Mlmansa, as it is 
 sometimes called, was formed at a later date on the 
 base of the Upanishads, or treatises relating generally 
 to the Vedas. It differs from the Purva Mlmansa chiefly 
 in this, that its main object is to explain and enforce 
 the religious doctrines of the Vedas. It teaches that there 
 is in reality only one existence. It maintains the doctrine 
 of a-dvaita, or non-dualism, as decidedly as Schelling 
 or Hegel. All things, visible and invisible, are only 
 forms of the one eternal Essence (to ev). The basis 
 of the system is therefore a pure Pantheism. In its 
 later development, this system denied the existence of 
 matter or material forms as objective realities. Visible 
 things are only appearances, a kind of mirage, called 
 mayci (illusion ). 1 
 
 These systems may be conveniently arranged in three 
 divisions : — 
 
 1. The Sankhya, including the modification of it by 
 Patanjali. 
 
 2. The Nyaya, connecting with it the system of 
 Kanada. 
 
 1 Colebrooke’s Essays, ii. 400, and note by Professor Cowell. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 3 
 
 3. The Mlmansa, both divisions of it being devoted to 
 the support and illustration of the Yedas. 
 
 I purpose to treat only of the first of these divisions, 
 adding, as an appendix, an outline of the methods and 
 physical theories of the second. 
 
 The Sankhya Karika of Iswara Krishna is an exposi- 
 tion of the pure Sankhya doctrine of Ivapila. 
 

OF KAPIL A, THE AUTHOR OF THE 
 SANKHYA SYSTEM. 
 
 The imagination of the Hindus has thrown a veil 
 of mystery and fable around Kapila, the traditional 
 author of the Sankhya philosophy. So much reverence 
 gradually attached to his name, that he was sometimes 
 called “ the divine Kapila,” and was said to have been 
 a son of Brahma, the creative form of Brahma , 1 an 
 incarnation of Vishnu , 2 or a form of Agni, though 
 born as a son of Vitatha and Devahuti ; 3 one of the 
 great rishis or ancient sages ; a descendant of the 
 great lawgiver Manu ; and to have been endowed with 
 knowledge, virtue, freedom from passion, and super- 
 natural power at the time of his birth. We can only 
 say that he was probably a Brahman, who, being dis- 
 gusted with the prevailing beliefs and practices of his 
 time, wrought out for himself a system by which he 
 hoped to solve the mysteries connected with spirit and 
 
 1 See Gaudapada’s Commentary which had been lost through the 
 
 on the S. Karika, Wilson’s ed., p. lapse of time” (Bhag. Purana, i. 3, 
 1. ; Colebrooke, ii. 242. 10 ; Muir, iii. 192 ; Vishnu Purana, 
 
 2 “In his (Vishnu’s) fifth mani- iii. 2, 18; Bhag. Gita, x. 26). 
 festation, he (in the form of) Kapila 3 In the Bhag. Purana, however, 
 and Lord of Saints, declared to Kapila is said to have had nine 
 Asuri the Sankhya (doctrine), which sisters, all born to Kardama by his 
 defines the series of principles, and wife Devahuti (ii. 7, 3 ; iii. 33, 1). 
 
6 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 matter by reason alone. His memory survives only in 
 bis system ; for of the details of his life or of the time 
 when he lived we have no certain account. It is pro- 
 bable that he lived in the seventh or eighth century 
 before Christ. He is said to have been born at Pushkara, 
 a sacred bathing-place near Ajmeer, and to have dwelt 
 at Ganga Sagar ; 1 but there is no reliable evidence in 
 support of either statement. It seems to be certain that 
 he was born in Northern India, and at some time before 
 the birth of the great reformer Gautama Buddha, the 
 date of whose death has been generally assigned to 
 544 B.c. ; for in the Pali Dathavamsa, Buddha is said 
 to have been born in the city of Kapila, and that this 
 city, called Kapila-vastu, had been built by the sons 
 of Ikshvaku, by the permission of the sage Kapila, and 
 that it was near the Himalaya mountains (i. 20). An 
 indefinite antiquity was sometimes assigned to the 
 system. In the first book of the Mahabharata, Narada 
 is said to have taught the thousand sons of Daksha 
 the doctrine of final deliverance (from matter), the sur- 
 passing knowledge of the Sankhya, 2 and he is reckoned 
 as one of the Prajapatis, or first progenitors of mankind. 
 
 Tradition affirms that Kapila lived as a recluse — he 
 is called a Muni in Bhag. G., x. 1 . 5 2 — and that he pos- 
 sessed a supernatural power, not always used with 
 philosophic calmness. In the Bamayana (i. 36-44) we 
 are told, with true Oriental exaggeration, that the sixty 
 thousand sons of Sagara, a king of Ayodhya (Oude), 
 were directed by their father to go in search of a horse 
 
 1 In the Padma Purana he is said to have dwelt in the village of 
 Indraprastha (F. Hall, Introduction to S. Sara, p. 20). 
 
 2 Adi-parvan, 3131 ; Sans. Texts, i. 125. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 7 
 
 that had been stolen by a Eakshasa (demon) at an aswa- 
 medha (horse-sacrifice). Meeting with Kapila in their 
 search, they accused him of the theft, and the charge so 
 enraged him that he reduced them immediately to ashes . 1 
 
 It does not appear that Kapila separated himself en- 
 tirely from the Brahmanic system. It has been said 
 that he “ proclaimed the authority of revelation as para- 
 mount to reasoning and experience .” 2 This, however, 
 is contrary to the main principle of his system, which 
 upholds a knowledge of philosophy as the only way 
 of obtaining the deliverance of the soul from matter. 
 He denies that such a result can be obtained from the 
 Yedas; for they are impure, as ordaining sacrifice, and 
 insufficient for the attainment of this great purpose. He 
 allows “ valid testimony ” to be one method of proof ; 
 and his Vedantist expounders have interpreted this to 
 be an acknowledgment of the divine origin and authority 
 of the Yedas, hut there is no ground for such a state- 
 ment. The common designation of his system as Kiris - 
 wara (godless or atheistical) is a sufficient indication 
 that it did not acknowledge a Supreme Lord or a divine 
 revelation. The eminent Yedantist commentator, San- 
 kara, rightly estimated the position of the Sankliya 
 system with regard to the Yedas. In his commentary 
 on the Brahma Sutras he discusses this subject, and 
 concludes : “ Hence it is proved that Kapila’s system 
 is at variance with the Yeda, and with the words of 
 Manu, who follows the Yeda, not only in supposing an 
 independent Prakriti (Nature), but also in supposing a 
 
 1 Sankara says, however, that it mentary on the Brahma Sutras, ii. 
 was another Kapila, named also I, I ; Sans. T., iii. 190). 
 
 Vasudeva [a name of Krishna], who 2 Sanskrit Literature, p. 83. 
 destroyed the sons of Sagara (Com- 
 
8 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 diversity of souls ” (Sans. T., iii. 190). The system of 
 Kapila, if it had been generally adopted, would have 
 been as fatal to the Vedantist ritual and doctrine as 
 that of Gautama Buddha, which was the natural 
 result or logical issue of the earlier system. In each, 
 knowledge and meditation took the place of religious 
 rites; but Kapila established no society and no hier- 
 archy ; he knew nothing of sympathy with mankind in 
 general ; he addressed himself 'to thinkers like himself, 
 and to these alone. Hence his system remained only 
 as a philosophical theory, affecting the whole course of 
 Hindu thought in some respects, chiefly in its physical 
 speculations, but never attaining to a practical supremacy 
 over large masses of men. It was never embodied and 
 crystallised in a concrete form, and as a complete system 
 it has been preserved only as an intellectual product, 
 or as an esoteric doctrine, understood and accepted by 
 a small inner circle of free-thinking men. 
 
 It has often been misunderstood. Professor Cousin 
 asserted that it was a pure materialism, though the soul 
 is represented in it as holding a kind of royal supremacy, 
 and all material things are subservient to it. Another 
 writer states, on the contrary, that in this system “ souls 
 alone are regarded as substances, whatever affects the 
 soul being ranged under the head of a quality: 1. pleas- 
 ing ; 2. displeasing ; or 3. indifferent.” The Gunas, how- 
 ever, are not qualities, but constituent elements, of 
 Prakriti, as real in their nature as the soul, and having 
 like it an eternal existence. 1 
 
 1 The Sankhya philosophy, what- Schliiter in describing it says, “ Das 
 ever may be its merits or demerits, Selbstbewusstsein (Ahankara) ist 
 is rarely presented in a correct erzeugt und nicht zeugend” (Aris- 
 form by Western writers. Professor totle’s Metaph. eine Toch. de San- 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 9 
 
 The term sankhya is from the noun sankliyd, number, 
 and also calculation, reasoning. In the Mahabharata it 
 is said : “ They (the Sankhyans) exercise reason ( sankliyd ) 
 and discuss Nature and the twenty-four principles, and 
 are therefore called Sankhya.” Vijnana Bhikshu, in his 
 commentary, explains the noun sankliyd as meaning 
 “ discrimination,” “ the setting forth of spirit as distinct 
 from matter ( Prakriti ).” Sankara Acharya gives a similar 
 interpretation (Comm, on the Vishnu-sahasra-naman ; In- 
 trod. to Sankhya Sara, by F. Hall). The course of ideas 
 seems to be from number to discrimination, and then to a 
 discriminating judgment, a result of reasoning. 
 
 The doctrines of the Sankhya system have been set 
 forth in many well-known treatises, and on these many 
 commentaries have been written. 
 
 1. The Sankhya-Pravachana (Exposition of the Sankhya), 
 or Sankhya Sutras, a work which has been attributed, 
 but erroneously, to Kapila. It appears to be compara- 
 tively modern, for it is not mentioned by Sankara 
 Acharya, who lived probably in the seventh or eighth 
 century a.d. ; by Vachaspati Mi£ra ; or even by the author 
 of the Sarva-darsana-sangraha, who is supposed to have 
 lived in the fourteenth century . 1 The most important 
 commentary on this work is the Sdnkliya-pravacliana- 
 hhdshya, by Vijnana Bhikshu, probably written in the 
 sixteenth century. 
 
 2. The Tattwa-Samasa, or Compendium of Principles, 
 a smaller work, also assigned by some, but incorrectly, 
 to Kapila. 
 
 khya-Lehre, p. n). It is, on the proceed, and from these the gross, 
 contrary, from consciousness, or visible, manifold forms of sensuous 
 conscious mind-matter, that the existence. 
 
 subtle essences of material forms 1 Introd. to Sank. Sara, p. 9. 
 
IO HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 3. The Sankhya-Sdra, written by Vijnana Bhikshu. It 
 has been lately edited by Dr. Fitz-Edward Hall, who has 
 prefixed to it a valuable introduction. 
 
 4. The Sdnkhya-Kdr ikd (Exposition of the Sankhya), 
 by Iswara Krishna. This is a work of high authority on 
 the subject, and appears to be the oldest exposition of 
 Kapila’s philosophy that has come down to the present 
 time. An edition of this work was published at Bonn 
 in 1832 by Professor Lassen, with a Latin translation 
 and notes. It was also translated by the late Sir H. T. 
 Colebrooke, and this translation was adopted by Pro- 
 fessor Wilson in an edition published by the Oriental 
 Society, to which the commentary of Gaudapada, with 
 explanations, was added. It has also been translated 
 into German by Drs. Windischmann and Lorinser, and 
 into French by Messrs. Pautier and St. Hilaire. The 
 latter has added a very extensive commentary. 
 
 It consists of seventy-two distichs or slokas, each 
 expressing in general a distinct principle or dogma. The 
 last three, however, are not connected with the exposition 
 of the Sankhya system, and are probably a late addition. 
 It is written in the Arya or Gatha metre. 1 
 
 It is this work which is now presented to my readers 
 in a new translation with notes, and also occasionally 
 with references to other systems where they coincide 
 with parts of the system of Kapila. It may seem 
 hazardous to attempt the translation of a work which 
 is confessedly obscure and difficult, after the labours of 
 such eminent Sanskrit scholars as Professor Lassen and 
 Sir H. T. Colebrooke ; but neither of them has, I think, 
 interpreted the Hindu system, or this exposition of it, 
 
 1 Williams, Sans. Gram., p. 354, 2d ed. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 ii 
 
 with perfect accuracy. I have had, however, the benefit 
 of their labours, of the occasional remarks of Professor 
 Wilson on Colebrooke’s translation, and of the criticism 
 of Dr. Pitz-Edward Hall on Professor Wilson’s share of 
 the work. Dr. Hall has criticised some parts of Professor 
 Wilson’s work with unnecessary harshness, forgetting 
 that those who follow the footsteps of pioneers in a 
 difficult country may be able to make the path somewhat 
 more distinct than it was before, without possessing as 
 much skill and energy as those who led the way. I 
 have adopted Professor Wilson’s translation of Gauda- 
 pada’s commentary, except in a few instances, where I 
 think he has failed to apprehend its right meaning, or 
 the real nature of Kapila’s system, which he admits, in 
 his preface, he had not previously studied. 
 

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE SANKHYA KARIKA. 
 
 By IS WAR A KRISHNA. 
 
 i. “From the injurious effects of the threefold 
 kinds of pain (arises) a desire to know the means 
 of removing it (pain). If, from the visible (means 
 of removing it), this (desire) should seem to be 
 superfluous, it is not so, for these are neither abso- 
 lutely complete nor abiding.” 1 
 
 1 The first distich is obscure. I 
 subjoin a transliteration of the text 
 (adopting Lassen’s reading in the 
 first line, apagliatake, which is found 
 in the S. Tatwa Kaumudi and S. 
 Chandrika), with the translations of 
 Colebrooke and others : — 
 
 du’khatrayabhighatajjijnasa tadapa- 
 ghatake hetau 
 
 drishtesaparthachennaikantatyanta- 
 to’ bhavat. 
 
 Colebrooke: — “ The inquiry is into 
 the means of precluding the three 
 sorts of pain, for pain is embarrass- 
 ment. Nor is the inquiry super- 
 fluous because obvious means of 
 alleviation exist, for absolute and 
 final relief is not thereby accom- 
 plished.” 
 
 Lassen: — “E tergeminorum dolo- 
 rum impetu (oritur) desiderium cog- 
 noseendce rationis qua ii depellantur. 
 Quod '(cognoscendi desiderium) licet 
 in visibilibus rebus infructuose ver- 
 setur, non est (infructuosum) propter 
 absentiam absoluti et omni sevo 
 superstitis (remedii).” 
 
 St. Hilaire: — “ La philosophic con- 
 siste h gudrir les trois especes de 
 douleurs. Si l’on pretend qu’il ex- 
 iste des moyens materiels de les 
 guerir, et que, par consequent, la 
 philosopbie est inutile, on se trompe, 
 car il n’est pas un seul de ces moyens 
 qui soit absolu ni definitiv.” 
 
 Eitz-Edward Hall: — “Because of 
 the discomposure that comes from 
 threefold pain there arises a desire 
 to learn the means of doing away 
 
14 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The first distich gives the chief, if not the sole, purpose 
 of Kapila’s philosophy. It is to relieve mankind from 
 the suffering of pain. It is founded on the gloomy view 
 of human life which is generally accepted by Hindu 
 writers. They assert an absolute pessimism. Our pre- 
 sent life is not a blessing ; it is only a wearisome burden, 
 which is finally cast off when the soul has become free 
 from all contact with matter. The soul then gains, 
 according to Kapila, an absolute independence, a self- 
 existence, which is not affected by any subsequent 
 changes in the outer material world ; or it is absorbed, 
 according to the theistic system of Patahjali, into the 
 essence of the One Supreme Being (Brahma). 
 
 The three kinds of pain are explained by the commen- 
 tators to be — 
 
 1. The natural and intrinsic, both bodily and mental 
 ( adhyatmika ). 
 
 2. The natural and extrinsic ( adhibhautiha ). 
 
 3. The divine or supernatural ( adhidaivika ). 
 
 The first includes bodily disease and mental infirmity 
 or suffering. The second includes all pain derived 
 from external causes of every kind. The third, as 
 Gaudapada interprets it, may be either divine or at- 
 mospheric ; “ in the latter case, it means pain which 
 
 therewith effectually. If it be ob- supports this rendering, and censures 
 jected, that visible means to this end Lassen for translating it by the Latin 
 being available, such desire is need- impetus. It is composed of ablii = 
 less, I demur ; for that these means Gr. apipi, and han, for ghan, to strike, 
 do not entirely and for ever worlc to slay. In the Peters. Diet, it is 
 immunity from discomposure ” (In- explained as schlag, angriff, beschddi- 
 trod, to S. Sara, p. 26). gung. Lassen was confessedly mis- 
 
 Colebrooke’s version of the first taken in his version of the second 
 part of the distich is not very accu- part. Dr. Hall’s is the truest ver- 
 rate, and abhighata is not “ embar- sion, but abliighata is much more 
 rassment,” though Professor Wilson than “discomposure.” 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 15 
 
 proceeds from cold, heat, wind, rain, thunderbolts, 
 and the like.” This, however, belongs to the second 
 division. According to Vachaspati Misra, the third kind 
 is “ from the influence of the planetary bodies, or by being 
 possessed by impure spirits, such as Yakshas, Eakshasas, 
 &c.” But, in old time, the gods of a higher class, and 
 not demons merely, were supposed to afflict men with 
 disease and pain. In the Rig- Veda (ii. 33, 7), Gritsa- 
 mada prays to Rudra that he may be freed from his 
 bodily pains, which he affirms to have been sent by the 
 Devas or gods ( daivya ). 1 
 
 The visible remedies for pain, such as medicine or 
 earthly enjoyments, are not absolute or wholly complete, 
 nor are they eternal ; for they do not procure that entire 
 separation of the soul from matter which is an absolute 
 condition of its perfect deliverance from pain. 
 
 2. “The revealed (means) are like the visible 
 (i.e., inefficient), for they are connected with im- 
 purity, destruction, and excess. A contrary method 
 is better, and this consists in a discriminative 
 knowledge of the Manifested (forms of matter), the 
 Unmanifested (Prakriti or primeval matter), and 
 the knowing (Soul).” 
 
 i 
 
 By “revelation” the Vedas are meant, which were sup- 
 posed to have been heard by wise men ( [rishis ) as a 
 divine communication, and hence were called Sruti 
 
 1 “ 0 Rudra, who bearest away One ! to me.” So Apollo sent the 
 the disease (rapas) sent by the plague into the camp of the Greeks 
 (other) gods, be gracious, 0 mighty (Iliad, i. 42). 
 
i6 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (hearing.) 1 In the judgment of Kapila the Yedic system 
 was not perfectly efficient; for (i.) it was impure. It 
 required sacrifice, and thus the blood of animals was 
 shed, often to a great extent. In the Aswamedha (horse- 
 sacrifice) more than a hundred horses might be sacrificed 
 at one time. According to the Brahmans, this would 
 avail “to expiate all sin, even the murder of a Brahman,” 2 
 and would confer supernatural power ; but to Kapila all 
 such rites were impure. (2.) It was connected with 
 destruction. The Yedic system could not give that final 
 exemption from all material conditions without which 
 there must still be a destruction and renewal of bodily 
 life. (3.) It was excessive or unequal, for all men are 
 not wealthy enough to offer costly sacrifices to the gods, 
 and thus the rich man may have more and the poor man 
 less than is due to his individual merit. The Yedas say 
 indeed that there is “no return (to bodily life) for one 
 who has attained to the state of Brahma;” but in the 
 school of Kapila this blessedness is reserved for those 
 who may attain in the heaven of Brahma to a discrimi- 
 nating knowledge of soul and matter. 3 * 
 
 This is the leading principle of Kapila’s system. The 
 complete and final blessedness of the soul, which consists 
 of an absolute self-existence, cannot be gained by any 
 religious rites. It is obtained by knowledge, and yet not 
 by every kind of knowledge : it can only be gained by a 
 knowledge of philosophy (which Kapila expounds), and 
 
 1 “ By sruti is meant the Veda, exposition), for from them all law 
 
 and by smriti (tradition, lit. remem- or duty ( dltarma ) has proceeded ” 
 
 brance), the institutes of law (dharma- (Manu, ii. 10). 
 
 sdstra). These are not to be op- 5 Gaudapada’s Commentary on 
 pugned by heterodox arguments (con- this distich. 
 
 trary to the Mlmansa or Vedantist 3 Sank. Prav., i. 83, 84 ; vi. 58. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 1 7 
 
 this treats of existence in three forms — (i.) Manifested 
 or developed matter ( Vyalcta ) ; (2.) the Unmanifested 
 or primal matter, called Prakriti or Pradhana ( Avyakta ) ; 1 
 and (3.) the knowing Soul (Jna). 
 
 This theory of being is unfolded in the following distich 
 and the 22d, which may be brought together for a full 
 exhibition of the system : — 
 
 3. “ Nature [Prakriti), the root (of material 
 forms), is not produced. The Great One ( Mahat= 
 Budclhi or Intellect) and the rest (which spring 
 from it) are seven (substances), producing and 
 produced. Sixteen are productions 2 (only). Soul 
 is neither producing nor produced.” 
 
 Matter in its primal form ( Prakriti ) is eternal and 
 self-existing. From it all things emanate, except Soul, 
 which has an independent existence, and is eternal, both 
 a parte ante and a parte post. 
 
 From Prakriti proceed : (i.) Intellect (Mahat or Buddlii), 
 the substance or essence by which the soul obtains 
 a knowledge of external things. It is material, 3 but 
 
 1 In the Institutes of Manu this 
 is an appellation of the Supreme 
 Being. “Then the self - existent 
 Lord, unmanifested ( avyakta ) caused 
 all this universe, with the great 
 principles of being, and the rest, to 
 appear ” (i. 6). 
 
 Prakriti-. resembles the one uni- 
 versal invisible substance or being 
 of the Platonists, from which all 
 material forms have sprung. 
 
 “ Aid Si] ri]V rou yeyovdros oparoG 
 kou 7 ravTios aia8r]Tod prjrepa kcl<- 
 virodoxv 1 ' pyre y rjp pyre atpa pyre 
 irGp, pyre iiSus \tywpev, p.7]Te 6Va ex 
 
 tovtwv ppre e£ Civ ravra ytyovev, 
 aXX’ avoparov elSos tl ko.1 tLp.op<pov 
 TravSex^ ” (Timseus, 24). 
 
 2 Properly “ modifications ” ( vile - 
 ara). They are only developments 
 from a primary form, and have no 
 developing power. 
 
 3 Modern science, like the system 
 of Kapila, makes intellect a mere 
 form of matter. “ Mind, used in the 
 sense of substance or essence, and 
 brain, used in the sense of organ of 
 mental function, are at bottom names 
 for the same substance ” (Maudsley’s 
 Physiology of Mind, 3d ed., p. 38). 
 
 B 
 
i8 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 of the subtlest form of matter. In the system of Ka- 
 pila, everything connected in function with sensuous 
 objects is as material as the objects themselves, being 
 equally an emanation from Prakriti. The soul exists as 
 a pure inward light , 1 without any instrumentation by 
 which it can become cognisant of the external world. This 
 instrumentation has been supplied, hut it is as foreign 
 to the soul, and as objective to it, as any other form of 
 matter. 
 
 From Intellect ( Buddhi ) proceeds Consciousness 2 or 
 Egoism ( Ahankara ) ; a consequence resembling that of 
 Descartes : “ Cogito, ergo sum.” Self-consciousness is not, 
 however, in the system of Kapila, a corollary of thought, 
 but inherent in it ; or, as Sir W. Hamilton has expressed 
 the same idea, “ Consciousness and knowledge each 
 involves the other .” 3 It. is the same thing in another 
 form, for cause and effect are identical according to 
 Kapila, as water issuing from its source is still the same 
 in reality though not in form. By Ahankara Kapila 
 means a substance or ens connected with thought 
 (Buddhi), in which consciousness inheres. It is nearly 
 equivalent to the “ mind-stuff” which the late Professor 
 Clifford assumed as the original ground of all being, i.e., 
 of all formal being; a synthesis of mind and grosser 
 matter in which consciousness was produced, by which 
 
 1 Comp. Hegel on Thought (Das one another, but one world of nature, 
 
 Denken), in connection with the Ab- whereof human consciousness is an 
 solute: “Es ist das Licht, welches evolution” (Maudsley, p. 57). A 
 leuchtet ; aber eben keinen andem dogmatic assertion, but only of a 
 Inhalt hat, alseben das Licht” (Phil, theory, as yet unproved, though 
 der Rel., i. 1 17). offered at first more than 2000 years 
 
 2 “There are not two worlds, a ago. 
 
 world of nature and a world of human 3 Metaphysics, i. 193. 
 consciousness, standing over against 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 19 
 
 the existence of conscious and unconscious beings was 
 made possible, and was finally developed. 
 
 From Ahankara or Consciousness proceed the five 
 subtle elements {tanmatra) which are the primary forms or 
 essences of gross material things, i.e., of all formal life. 
 This might seem to he as pure an idealism as that of 
 Berkeley or Fichte; hut there is no idealism in the system 
 of Kapila. Both Consciousness and all existing external 
 forms have a real objective being independent of the 
 soul. In one respect he coincides with the views of 
 Kant, for both agree that we have no knowledge of an 
 external world, except as by the action of our faculties 
 it is represented to the soul , 2 and take as granted the 
 objective reality of our sense-perceptions . 3 In one re- 
 
 1 “ There is room for the supposi- 
 tion that even the ultimate particles 
 of matter may be permeable to the 
 causes of attractions of various kinds, 
 especially if those causes are im- 
 material ; nor is there anything in 
 the unprejudiced study of physical 
 philosophy that can induce us to 
 doubt the existence of immaterial 
 substances ; on the contrary, we see 
 analogies which lead us almost di- 
 rectly to such an opinion. The elec- 
 trical fluid is supposed to be essen- 
 tially different from common matter ; 
 the general medium of light and 
 heat, according to some, or the prin- 
 ciple of caloric, according to others, 
 is equally distinct from it ” (Dr. 
 Thomas Young, Unseen Universe, 
 p. 160). The authors of this work 
 would substitute “ not grossly mate- 
 rial ” for l: immaterial,” and “ gross 
 matter” for “matter” in the pas- 
 sage quoted. They correspond to 
 the tanmatra and mahabhiita of 
 Kapila. 
 
 2 “ Bedenkt man dass diese Natur 
 an sich nichts als ein Inbegriff von 
 Erscheinungen, mithin kein Ding an 
 sich, sondem bios eine Menge von 
 Vorstellungen des Gemtith’s sei, so 
 wird man sich nicht wundern sie 
 bios in dem Radicalvermogen aller 
 unser Erkenntniss, nlimlich der der 
 transcendentalen Apperception in 
 derjenigen Einheit zu sehen, um 
 deren Willen allein sie Object aller 
 moglichen Erfahrung, d. i. Natur 
 heissen kann ” (Kant, Deduction of 
 the Categories, p. 576). 
 
 “After all, what do we know of 
 this terrible ‘matter,’ except as a 
 name for the unknown and hypo- 
 thetical cause of states of our own 
 consciousness ” (Huxley, Lay Ser- 
 mons, p. 142). 
 
 3 Cf. the Sankhya Sara (i. 41,42). 
 Tlie Vedantist objects that “ since 
 nothingexistsexcept thought, neither 
 does bondage, for it has no cause.” 
 The reply is, “Not thought alone 
 exists, because there is the intuition 
 
20 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 spect there seems to be in the Hindu theory a germ of 
 the system of Hegel, in which subject and object are 
 made one by an absolute synthesis; for the substratum 
 of thought and consciousness and of the external world is 
 the same in kind, since elementary substances issue from 
 consciousness, and consciousness proceeds from intellect 
 (. Buddhi ). There would be some resemblance if the 
 
 system of Kapila ended with Nature ( Prakriti ). But 
 there is still a dualism. The soul is different in kind 
 from all material things, and will finally be severed from 
 them by an eternal separation. When finally separated 
 from matter, including intellect and all the forms or 
 emanations of Prakriti, it will have no object, and no 
 function, of thought. It will remain self-existent and 
 isolated in a state of passive and eternal repose. 
 
 To the five subtle principles are given the technical 
 names of sound, tangiblcness or touch, odour, visibility or 
 form, and taste. 
 
 From these primary essences proceed the five gross 
 elements ( mahabhuta ). These are : (i.) ether ( aJcasa ), from 
 the subtle element called sound ; this fills all space and 
 envelops all things ; (2.) air ( vdyu ), from the element 
 tangiblcness ; (3.) earth, from the element odour ; (4.) light 
 or fire, from the element visibility ; and (5.) water, from 
 the element called taste. 
 
 of the external.” The objector 
 replies, “From the example of in- 
 tuitive perception in dreams, we find 
 this (your supposed evidence of ob- 
 jective reality) to exist even in the 
 absence of objects.” The rejoinder 
 is, “ Then if one does not exist, the 
 other does not exist, and there is 
 only a void ; ” “ for,” the commen- 
 
 tator, Vijnana Bhikshu, adds, “ if 
 the external does not exist, then 
 thought does not exist. It is intui- 
 tion that proves the objective, and 
 if the intuition of the external does 
 not establish the objective, then the 
 intuition of thought cannot establish 
 it (thought).” 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 21 
 
 From Consciousness proceed also (6.) the five organs 
 of sense (indriya), 1 which are the eye, the ear, the nose, 
 the tongue, and the skin ; and (7.) the five organs of 
 action ; the voice, the hands, the feet, the anus, and the 
 organs of generation. Lastly, it produces the manas, 2 
 which is the receptive and discriminating faculty. It 
 receives and individualises the impressions made by out- 
 ward objects on the senses. These it submits to Con- 
 sciousness, by which an attribute of personality is given 
 to them, and through which they pass on to the Intel- 
 lect (. Buddhi ). By this last faculty the sense-perceptions 
 are defined and represented in a full, distinct form. The 
 soul beholds these presentations as objects are seen in 
 a mirror, and thus has a knowledge of the external 
 world. 
 
 (ii.) The next object of inquiry (the first in point of ex- 
 istence) is the primal source of these material existences, 
 or the Unmanifested (. Avyakta ). 3 This is the primordial 
 matter, from which all material things have emanated or 
 
 1 Kapila saw that consciousness 
 
 was the base of the reality of all our 
 sense - perceptions. “ Soil Etwas 
 uberhaupt etwas Reelles im Gegen- 
 satz gegen das - bios Eingebildete 
 bezeichnen, so mus das Ich wohl 
 etwas Reelles sein, da es Princip 
 aller Realitiit ist” (Schelling, System 
 des Transcen. Idealismus, p. 60). 
 
 “ Both sensation and reflection are 
 thus original states of consciousness, 
 and exist only in so far as we are 
 conscious of them. For example, I 
 see and I am conscious that I see. 
 These two assertions, logically dis- 
 tinct, are really one and inseparable. 
 Sight is a state of consciousness, and 
 I see only in so far as I am conscious 
 
 of seeing” (Dean Mansel’s Letters, 
 Lectures, &c., p. 162). 
 
 2 “ There exists, latent or poten- 
 tial, in the sensory centres, some- 
 thing that may be called a faculty, 
 which on the occasion of the appro- 
 priate impression, renders the sen- 
 sation clear and definite ; in other 
 words, gives the interpretation ” 
 (Maudsley, p. 237). This is the 
 manas of Kapila. 
 
 3 “ Here let us remind our 
 readers of the argument by which 
 we were led to conclude that the 
 visible system (the Vyalcta of Ka- 
 pila) is not the whole universe, . . . 
 and that there must be an invisible 
 order of things (.4 vyalcta), which will 
 
22 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 have been evolved. It is eternal, universal, single, i.e., 
 without parts, invisible, and is inferred only by reasoning 
 from present, actual existences, which must have a cause. 
 It is not produced, but is productive, having within itself 
 the potentiality of all being, except soul. The Yedan- 
 tists incorporated it in their system, making it the Brahml, 
 or productive energy, of Brahma. 
 
 (iii.) The soul, which is uncompounded and eternal, 
 neither a product nor producing. The system of Kapila 
 only recognises each individual soul, but the theistic 
 Sankhya asserts the existence of a supreme soul, the Lord 
 ( Iswcira ) of all, the intelligent cause of the emanations 
 from Pralcriti (Nature). 
 
 These form the twenty-five principles, or categories of 
 being, laid down in the Sankhya system. They are the 
 base of nearly all the philosophy of India. 
 
 In the following distichs the methods by which all true 
 knowledge is obtained are determined, according to the 
 judgment of Kapila. 
 
 4. “ Perception, inference, and fit testimony are 
 the threefold (kinds of) accepted proof, because 
 in them every mode of proof is fully contained. 
 The complete determination or perfect knowledge 
 ( siddhi ) of what is to be determined is by proof.” 1 
 
 remain and possess energy when the 
 present system has passed away. . . . 
 It is, moreover, very closely connected 
 with the present system, inasmuch 
 as this may be looked upon as having 
 come into being through its means ” 
 (The Unseen Universe, p. 157; see 
 also p. 158). 
 
 1 Colebrooke’s translation is, “ It 
 
 is from proof that belief of that 
 which is to be proven results,” and 
 this version is supported by Pro- 
 fessor Wilson, on the ground that 
 the Hindu commentators explain the 
 word siddhi (accomplishment, per- 
 fect knowledge) by pratiti, “ trust,” 
 “ belief ; ” but in the Peters- 
 burg Dictionary this is explained as 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 23 
 
 5. “ Perception is the application 1 (of the senses) 
 to special objects of sense. Three kinds of infer- 
 ence are declared : it (an inference or logical con- 
 clusion) is preceded by a linga (mark or sign = 
 major premiss) and a lingl (the subject in which 
 it inheres = minor premiss). Fit testimony is fit 
 revelation ( sruti ).” 
 
 6. “ The knowledge of formal or generic exist- 
 ence is by perception ; of things beyond the senses 
 by inference ; that which cannot be determined by 
 this (method) and cannot be perceived must be 
 determined by fitting means.” 2 
 
 Perception results from the action of any of the 
 organs of sense on its proper objects. 
 
 Inference ( anumana ) is the process of reasoning. The 
 conclusion that is drawn from it is cinumiti (Tarka 
 Sangraha, p. 30). 
 
 The Nyaya or Logical school admits four kinds of 
 
 meaning : (i.) a drawing near (hin- 
 zutreten, nahen) ; (2.) a clear insight 
 into a matter, a full knowledge, 
 conviction (klare Einsicht in Etwas, 
 volkommenes Verstandniss, Ueber- 
 zeugung). Lassen’s translation is, 
 “ Nimirum demonstrandse rei con- 
 summate (oritur) e demonstra- 
 tione,” adding in his commentary, 
 “ mtimam sententiam ita accipio 
 ut dicatur id quod demonstrandum 
 sit, magis minusve absoluta evi- 
 dentia posse evinci secundum ge- 
 nus demonstrationis qua probetur.” 
 Proof, however, is here spoken of 
 absolutely. There is no question of 
 degree. 
 
 1 Adhyavasdya, a word difficult 
 of explanation. Colebrooke trans- 
 lates it by “ascertainment,” Lassen 
 by “intentio (sensuum),” St. Hilaire 
 by “application.” In the Amera 
 Kosha it is glossed by utsalia (force, 
 effort, application). The authors 
 of the Petersburg Dictionary only 
 quote from Hindu commentators 
 some untranslated glosses, adding 
 that some explain it as meaning 
 “ a strong will or effort.” 
 
 2 Aptagamat, from “ revelation ” 
 (Colebrooke); “ revelatione ” (Las- 
 sen) ; “par une information legitime ” 
 (St. Hilaire). 
 
24 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 proof: (i.) pratyaksha (perception); (2.) anumana (in- 
 ference) ; (3.) upamdna (comparison or analogy) ; and 
 (4.) 6 abda (verbal testimony). To these the Vedantie 
 school adds arthdpatti (presumption), an informal kind 
 of inference ; as, “ Devadatta does not eat hy day and yet 
 is fat, it is presumed therefore that he eats hy night ; ” 
 and abhava (non-existence), a method of proof from 
 an impossibility, or a reductio ad absurdum, as, “ There 
 can be no flowers in the sky.” 
 
 By the latter part of Distich 4, Kapila limits all 
 possible knowledge to his three methods of proof. He 
 rejects all innate ideas, and all knowledge derived from 
 pure consciousness. He does not admit any moral sense 
 as inherent in the soul. This only knows or sees what 
 Buddhi (intellect) presents to it. He adopts the axiom, 
 “ Nihil est in intellectu quod non prius in sensu ; ” and as 
 neither sensation nor intellect can present the form of an 
 eternal self-existent Author of all things, the doctrine of 
 a Supreme Deity was not admitted into his philosophy. 
 Kant has contended that the idea of God cannot be 
 derived from reason, but only from the facts of our moral 
 consciousness, which have no place in Kapila’s system. 
 Goodness or virtue is an attribute of Buddhi, which is 
 only a form of matter. The soul has no concern with it. 
 The only real evil is pain, and this can only be destroyed 
 by an eternal separation of the soul from matter, which 
 is obtained by knowledge, not by moral or religious virtue. 
 
 There is the same obscurity in the language of Distich 5 
 as in our use of the word “ perception ; ” for drishtam (thing 
 seen) properly denotes not the application of the eye to 
 objects of sense, but the result of that process. The use 
 of the term “ application ” is, however, strictly in accord- 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 25 
 
 ance with the Hindu theory of the method of perception. 
 The knowledge gained by the eye is not from rays of 
 light proceeding from an object, hut by a ray of light 
 proceeding from the eye. 
 
 An inference, according to the Nyaya school, is “ know- 
 ledge produced from a logical antecedent . 1 This consists 
 in the knowledge of a general principle combined with 
 the knowledge that the case in question is one to which 
 it is applicable.” In the Nyaya Sutra Yritti inference 
 is said to he threefold : (1.) “Prior, that is, cause, charac- 
 terised by or having that (cause); as inference of rain 
 from the gathering of clouds ; (2.) posterior, effect charac- 
 terised by it ; as inference of rain from the swelling of a 
 river ; analogous or generic, characterised as distinct from 
 both effect and cause ; as the inference of anything being 
 a substance from its being earthy.” This is reasoning a 
 priori, from cause to effect ; a posteriori, from effect to 
 cause ; and by analogy, or community of properties. 
 
 The terms linga (character or mark) and lihgl (the 
 subject of the lihga) answer nearly to the major and minor 
 premisses of Western logicians. In the syllogism, com- 
 monly given as an esample — 
 
 “ Whatever smokes has fire ; 
 
 This hill smokes ; 
 
 Ergo, This hill has fire,” 2 
 
 1 Tarka Sangraha, p. 29. The is always attended by fire, is a pard- 
 word paramarsa, translated “ logi- marsa.” 
 
 cal antecedent” by Ballantyne, is 2 In the Tarka Sangraha (p. 32), 
 translated by Wilson “ observa- the knowledge that this “ moun- 
 tion,” “ experience ; ” prim, taking tain is characterised by smoke (the 
 hold and then apprehension by the linga), which is invariably attended 
 mind. In logic it means a fact or by fire,” is called a linga paramarsa, 
 truth apprehended by observation, which means “ such recognition of a 
 “For example, the knowledge that sign as leads to inference.” 
 this hill is marked by smoke, which 
 
26 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tlie first proposition contains the lihga, which here is 
 smoke, and the second the lihgl, or that in which the 
 lihga inheres. By “ revelation ” is meant either the teach- 
 ing of the Yedas or of other works supposed to have a 
 similar or equal authority. Kapila, who was doubtless 
 a Brahman, did not wholly reject the Yedas, but he 
 treats them with little respect, and makes their authority 
 subordinate to that of reason. His Yedantist commen- 
 tators draw conclusions from this passage which are incon- 
 sistent with the first and second distichs, which express 
 Kapila’s fundamental principle. 
 
 By “ formal or generic existence ” in Distich 6 ( sam - 
 dnya 1 ) is meant all the related forms or genera of the 
 material world. In the Tarka Sangraha (p. 56) it is thus 
 explained : “ Community ( samanya ) is eternal, one, belong- 
 ing to more than one, residing in substance, quality, 
 and action. It is of two kinds, the highest and what is 
 lower. The highest is existence ( sattwa , primal matter ?) ; 
 the lower is genus (jati, family or race), such as have the 
 nature of substance (elementary substance), and the rest.” 2 
 It is used in the latter sense in the passage which we 
 are now considering. 
 
 1 In the Sankhya Bhashya it is 
 maintained that samanya here means 
 “ analogy,” and that drishtat is put 
 in apposition with anumanat. The 
 passage must then be translated, 
 
 “ The knowledge of things beyond 
 the senses is obtained by inference, 
 i.e., by the perception of analogy.” 
 Wilson and St. Hilaire adopt this 
 view, but it is opposed by the 
 following considerations : — (i.) The 
 word samanya is not used by Hindu 
 logicians to denote analogy, but a 
 generic form of being ; (2.) reasoning 
 
 by analogy, or a perception of it, is 
 not equivalent to the whole of the 
 inferential process, but only a part 
 of it. I adopt, therefore, the conclu- 
 sions of Colebrooke and Lassen; but 
 Colebrooke’s translation of samanya 
 by “sensible things,” and Lassen’s by 
 “ aequalitas,” do not represent with 
 sufficient exactness its meaning. 
 
 2 Dravyatwa, having the nature 
 of substance, from dravya, sub- 
 stance, which sometimes means ele- 
 mentary substance, as lire, earth, 
 &c. See Burnouf, s. v. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 27 
 
 Things beyond the senses are not only those which 
 are too subtle for the organs of sense, but those which 
 are imperceptible by accident, as the fire in a mountain 
 that smokes. 
 
 Whatever lies beyond perceived or inferred existence 
 can only be known by testimony. 
 
 7. “ (This want of perception may be) from ex- 
 cessive distance, too great nearness, destruction of 
 organs, inattention of the mind ( manas ), minute- 
 ness, concealment (by other objects), predominance 
 (of other things), and by intermixture with like 
 objects.” 
 
 8. “From the subtlety (of Nature), not from 
 its non-existence, it is not apprehended (by the 
 senses) ; it is apprehended (or perceived) by its 
 effects. Intellect ( Buddhi ) and the rest (of the 
 derived principles) are its effects, which have an 
 unlike and a like 1 form to Prakriti (Nature).” 
 
 9. “ Existing things (sat) are (proved to be) 
 effects from the non-existence of (formal) being by 
 the non-existence of cause ; by the taking (by men) 
 of a material cause (to produce anything) ; from 
 the non-existence of universal production (by every 
 cause) ; from the possible causality of an efficient 
 agent (only) ; and from the nature of cause.” 
 
 1 Lassen has in the text swarupam the MSS. but one have sarupam 
 (having its own form), from the (like), which the sense requires. In 
 Sankhya Kaumudi, which must be his translation he has “ dissimile et 
 referred to intellect (Mahat). All simile.” 
 
28 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Kapila, or his expounder, contends in Distich 6, as the 
 philosophers of the Eleatic school, against the assumption 
 that the senses are the only sources of knowledge. Our 
 senses are limited in their own nature, and their action 
 is imperfect from many opposing circumstances. Hence 
 many things exist which they cannot reveal, and they 
 give imperfect information of things which lie within 
 their range. The intellect ( Buddhi ) must arrange and 
 present our sense-conceptions, that there may be a true 
 cognition. In this way we rise from the knowledge of 
 the manifold to the conception of the one, in which all 
 things were contained and from which they have issued. 
 Kapila, however, confines this oneness to primordial 
 matter, Pralcriti. He does not refer the existence of souls 
 to one supreme spiritual Being, as the theistic school of 
 Patanjali. 1 Herein he differs, too, from the Vedantists, 
 who maintain that all things are the one supreme Spirit ; 
 that the visible things of the outer world are only mciya 
 (illusion), the deceptive form with which the Invisible is 
 veiled ; and that, therefore, there is neither cause nor 
 effect : all things inhere in, and indeed are, the One sole 
 Existence. 
 
 But the world, as it exists, was to Kapila an effect. 
 
 1 Dr. Fitz-Edward Hall says that 
 “ alike in both the Sankhyas there is 
 acknowledgment of a being superior 
 to the gods. He is made up of an 
 immaterial part, purusha, or ‘ per- 
 son,’ and of an anta’karana or 
 ‘ internal organ,’ which is Prakriti 
 (Nature) ” (Introd. Sank. Sara, p. 
 2). This statement is not supported 
 by anything in the Sank. Karika, 
 and in the Sank. Pravacliana it is ex- 
 pressly stated that “ they (the Vedas) 
 
 are not the work of Purusha, from 
 the non-existence of a Purusha (pu- 
 rushasyabhavat). Vijnana Bhikshu 
 adds, “ Supply, because we deny that 
 there is a Lord ” (v. 46). Some of 
 the followers of this school asserted 
 the existence of a personified sum 
 of existence, called Hiranya-Garbha 
 (Professor Cowell, Note in Elph. 
 India, p. 126) ; but Kapila did not 
 recognise such a being. His Pra- 
 kriti is impersonal matter. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 29 
 
 He proceeds in Distich 9 to prove this proposition by 
 arguments which have received very different interpreta- 
 tions. Colebrooke translates the first part of the distich 
 thus : “ Effect subsists (antecedently to the operation of 
 cause), for what exists not can by no operation of cause 
 be brought into existence.” The doctrine of Kapila is 
 indeed that cause and effect are so far identical that an 
 effect is only a developed cause, but this part of his argu- 
 ment is contained in the sixth clause of the distich, where 
 he argues from the nature of cause. The general argu- 
 ment or the main proposition to be proved is, that formal 
 existence is an effect, implying a cause, not that effect 
 exists antecedently in its cause. Professor Wilson adopts 
 Colebrooke’s translation, and explains the passage as if in 
 accordance with this view, but in reality he confounds 
 two distinct ideas. “It is laid down,” he says, “as a 
 general principle that cause and effect are in all cases co- 
 existent, or that effect exists anteriorly to its manifestation : 
 sut-karycim , in the text, meaning existent effect prior to 
 the exercise of the (efficient) cause ; or, as the phrase also 
 of the text, asadakaranat, is explained, ‘ If effect prior to 
 the exercise of (efficient) cause does not exist, its exist- 
 ence cannot by any means be effected.’ The expression 
 sat-karyam, therefore, is to be understood throughout as 
 meaning ‘ existent effect,’ not the effect of that which 
 exists, and the object of the stanza is to establish the 
 existence of cause from its effects, and not of effects from 
 the existence of cause, as Professor Lassen has explained 
 it: ‘ Qusenam sint rationes docetur quibus evincatur men- 
 tem ceteraque principia effecta esse a tm ovti.’ ” Here 
 the two propositions, that effect exists in its cause, and 
 that formal existence is an “existent effect,” are con- 
 
30 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY . 
 
 founded, and the last part of the sentence is not in 
 harmony with the statement of the proposition as laid 
 down in the beginning. The words sat-karyam express 
 the proposition to be proved, which is that sat, manifest 
 or formal existence, must be considered as wrought; or, 
 in other words, is an effect implying an efficient cause. 
 The phrase does not mean “ an existent effect,” but that 
 what is formally existent is necessarily an effect. Caus- 
 ality is implied as an absolute condition of all formal 
 being. Asadakarandt (literally from non-existence, non- 
 cause) implies that there is an identity in the terms non- 
 existence and non-cause, and that we cannot conceive 
 of formal existence as uncaused : only the unformed 
 Prakriti (Nature) is without a cause, having existed 
 eternally. (See p. 17.) 
 
 Lassen translates the first argument thus : “ E nulla 
 non eutis efficacitate . . . colligitur ilium effectum esse 
 effectum rod ovros.” Professor Wilson remarks, “ It is 
 here to be objected that the ens (sat) is the result, not 
 the agent ; ” but Lassen here means by the to ov, not any 
 simple or formal existence, but the unformed Prakriti, 
 which is the true material cause of the whole series of 
 existent things. The argument implies that the idea of 
 cause is involved in the idea of formal existence, and that 
 we can only conceive of any limited conditioned life as 
 produced by something that preceded it, which is as truly 
 existent as the effect, until we come to what is formless 
 and unconditioned, i.e., Prakriti (Nature). 
 
 M. Cousin has entirely mistaken the meaning of Ka- 
 pila’s argument. He understands it as really denying the 
 existence of cause, because cause and effect are, in the 
 system of Kapila, of the same nature. “ Selon Kapila 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 3i 
 
 il n’y a pas de notion propre de cause, et ce que nous 
 appelons une cause n’est qu’une cause apparente relative- 
 ment h l’effet qui la suit, ruais c’est aussi un effet par la 
 meme raison, et toujours de meme, de mani&re que tout 
 est un enchainement necessaire d’effets sans cause veri- 
 table et independente.” It is difficult to imagine bow 
 such a theory could be attributed to Kapila after reading 
 any of the well-known expositions of his philosophy. 
 Any link in the series of existent things may be a cause 
 of that which follows and an effect of that which has 
 preceded it ; and hence, as Kapila argues, we must admit 
 a primal material cause, itself uncaused, from which all 
 existent things have ultimately proceeded. He did not 
 admit a supreme spiritual Being, an Iswara or Lord, 
 either as the Author or Euler of the visible world, but he 
 argued for the existence of a primal material cause ( Pra - 
 Jcriti ) as the necessary antecedent of every other existence. 
 
 M. St. Hilaire translates the clause as follows : “ Ce qui 
 prouve bien que l’effet provient de l’etre, c’est que le non- 
 etre ne peut etre cause de quoi que ce soit but this makes 
 Kapila assume that the existing world is an effect spring- 
 ing from a cause, but his proposition is to prove that it 
 is an effect, and that therefore there must have been a 
 primary cause. His standpoint is existence in the mani- 
 fold conditioned forms of things as they are, and that such 
 forms must have had a primary cause, i.e., that they are 
 effects. The nature of cause forms the last clause of the 
 distich. He rises finally at the end of the series, traced 
 in an ascending line, at a true cause, which is, however, 
 identified in kind with the effects which have issued 
 from it. 
 
 Mr. Mill’s definition of cause is more clearly expressed, 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 but is insufficient : “ It is an universal truth,” he says, 
 “ that every fact which has a beginning has a cause,” and 
 “ an invariability of succession is found by observation to 
 obtain between every fact in nature, [which Kapila calls 
 sat ] and some other fact which preceded it.” 1 So cause 
 is defined, but more precisely, in the Tarka Sangraha : 
 “ That which invariably precedes an effect that cannot 
 else he is a cause.” It is this law of succession which 
 Kapila declares to be invariable and necessary as to all 
 the facts or formal existences in Nature. 
 
 In the second clause he appeals to the common ob- 
 servation of mankind that cause and effect mutually 
 imply each other. If you wish to produce anything, you 
 must use means for the accomplishment of your end. 
 This cause must also bear a relation to the effect ; it must 
 be of the same nature, as stated in the third clause. If 
 
 1 Mill’s theory of causation (which 
 is that of Dr. Thomas Brown), that 
 it means only the idea of an invari- 
 able sequence, is insufficient, for we 
 cannot think of cause without con- 
 ceiving a necessary and invariable 
 power inherent in it by which the 
 effect is produced. The definition in 
 the Tarka Sangraha is more precise. 
 It declares the necessity of a cause 
 in relation to an effect. But the idea 
 of power is not distinctly enunciated 
 by either. It is well expressed by 
 the late Professor Wilson : “We do 
 not fear to say that when we speak 
 of a power in one substance to pro- 
 duce a change in another, and of a 
 susceptibility of such change in that 
 other, we express more than our be- 
 lief that the change has taken and 
 w'ill take place. . . . There is, besides 
 this, the conception included of a 
 
 fixed constitution of their nature 
 which determines the event — a con- 
 stitution which, while it lasts, makes 
 the event a necessary consequence” 
 (Quot. in Hamilton’s Metaph., ii. 383, 
 384). “ It is a self-evident maxim 
 
 that every event must have a cause. 
 After contemplating an event in life 
 or nature, I find myself going in 
 thought beyond it to consider how 
 it came to pass ; by some instinctive 
 law, some constitutional motion in- 
 herent in my mind, I go in the 
 direction of a cause for that event ; 
 something not merely antecedent 
 to it, but which stands in such a 
 relation to it as that, in conse- 
 quence of it, that event or thing 
 exists ” (Professor Mozley’s Essays, 
 The Principle of Causation, i. 416). 
 See Sir W. Hamilton’s Discussions 
 in Philosophy, App. 1. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 33 
 
 3 T ou would have cheese, you must use milk and not water ; 
 for one cause is not equal to the production of every 
 effect. An efficient cause is also necessary for the pro- 
 duction of an effect as well as a material cause. A potter 
 is necessary for the making of ajar; he is not competent 
 to produce cloth. 
 
 The last argument of Kapila is “from the nature, of 
 cause,” or, as Vachaspati explains it, “the identity of 
 cause and effect.” 1 This would have been more properly 
 placed at the beginning of the distich, for it shows what 
 he meant by cause , which he explains as a material source 
 from which an effect issues. As oil is extracted from 
 sesamum seeds, we have in the latter the material cause 
 or source of the oil which was in the seeds before it was 
 extracted by pressure. His idea of cause and effect is of 
 an antecedent form or substance, of which the effect is an 
 emanation . 2 Effect is a developed cause and cause is an 
 undeveloped effect ; both are the same in substance, and 
 
 1 Sir W. Hamilton also declares 
 the identity of cause and effect, so 
 far as that an effect must have 
 previously existed in the cause. 
 “ What is the law of causality ? 
 Simply this : . . . That all that we at 
 present come to know as an effect 
 must have previously existed in its 
 causes ” (Metaph., ii. 400). Not ab- 
 solutely so, for the effect may differ, 
 and, in truth, must always differ, in 
 some respect from the cause. 
 
 2 So, according to Aristotle, the 
 
 ancient Greek philosophers taught : 
 “ Tolituiv 5 £ rb pbv eK /XT) bvrwv yiveadcLL 
 abwarov irepl yap ravrijs bpoyvwpbv- 
 ov<ri rrjs diravres oi irepl rpvrrews ” 
 
 (Phys., i. 4). Mr. G. H. Lewes goes 
 further than Kapila, for he practi- 
 
 cally denies that there is any differ- 
 ence between cause and effect. “ I 
 have endeavoured to show that the 
 supposed axiom of causes not being 
 knowable when their effects are 
 known is a fallacy and a misappre- 
 hension of the principle of causation ; 
 it is plausible only through the meta- 
 physical postulate that the cause is 
 something different from its effects ” 
 (Fort. Rev., April 1S76). Kapila 
 taught that the effect must be of 
 the same hind as the cause, but he 
 also taught that one may differ from 
 the other in many ways. The potter 
 (instrumental cause) and the clay 
 (material cause) are not the same as 
 the jar produced. 
 
 C 
 
3 + 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 hence, from the nature of cause, it involves the effect in 
 itself, as that 'which is evolved implies the cause or 
 material source from which it has been evolved. Now 
 all formal life is a development, and implies that from 
 which it has been developed. It seems, however, to be 
 forgotten that the efficient cause, as the potter in making 
 ajar, is something altogether different from the clay with 
 which he works and the jar which he produces. 
 
 The nature of visible or developed things is then dis- 
 cussed, in contrast with the invisible or undeveloped 
 source (. Avyakta ), which is Prakriti. 
 
 io. “That which is visible or developed has a 
 cause ; it is not eternal or universal ; it is mobile 
 (modifiable), multiform, dependent, attributive, con- 
 junct, and subordinate. The undeveloped principle 
 is the reverse.” 
 
 The visible or developed universe contains the twenty- 
 three principles ( tattioa , existence, reality), which are 
 emanations from Prakriti (Nature). 
 
 It is caused, for it proceeds from Prakriti ; it is there- 
 fore not eternal as manifestation or form, but is eternal 
 as being one with its source ; for “ destruction,” says 
 Kapila, “ is a return to the producing cause.” 
 
 It is not universal or pervading (vyapi ) : each of these 
 principles ( tattwa ) is not found in every form. 
 
 It is mobile, admitting changes of position in different 
 bodies. 
 
 It is multiform, existing in various forms of aggrega- 
 tion. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 35 
 
 It is dependent or conditioned ; 1 eacli of the grosser 
 elements is dependent upon the more subtle, and these 
 are dependent on consciousness, &c., up to Prakriti. 
 
 It is attributive or predicative ( 'ling am , 2 ), i.c., each sub- 
 stance has a characteristic sign or quality which may be 
 predicated of it. 
 
 It is conjunct or conjunctible, for the elements combine 
 with one another. 
 
 It is subordinate or governed, each being subordi- 
 nate to the other in an ascending series, up to Buddlii 
 (intellect). 
 
 Prakriti, however, is uncaused, eternal, universal, self- 
 existing, and supreme. 
 
 11. “The manifested ( Vydkta ) has the three 
 modes ( guna ). It is indiseriminating, objective, 
 generic , 3 irrational , 4 and productive. So also is 
 Pradhana (Nature). Soul in these respects, as 
 in those (previously mentioned), is the reverse.” 
 
 12. “ The modes have a joyous, grievous, and 
 stupefying nature. They serve for manifestation, 
 activity, and restraint : they mutually subdue and 
 
 1 Asritam. Lassen translates it by 
 “ innixum ; ” Colebrooke by “ sup- 
 porting ; ” St. Hilaire by “ acci- 
 dentel.” The Petersburg Diet, has 
 “ Halt und Schutz bei Jmd suchend,” 
 lit. “ going to one ” (for protection 
 or support). 
 
 2 Lingam. Colebrooke translates it 
 
 “ mergent,” i.e., subject to dissolu- 
 
 tion, after Gaudapada ; but Professor 
 Wilson remarks that “ predicative ” 
 
 or “ characteristic ” would be a pre- 
 ferable translation. Lassen has “ re- 
 ciprocans,” but he adds “ dubise 
 mihi est signifieationis.” See the 
 Tarka Sangraha, p. 38 (Ballan- 
 tyne). 
 
 3 Samanyam, translated by Lassen 
 and Colebrooke “common.” See 
 p. 26. 
 
 4 Achetcmam, from a, neg. part, and 
 chit, to perceive, to know. 
 
36 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 support eacli other, produce each other, consort 
 together, and take each other’s condition.” 1 
 
 13. “ ‘Goodness’ ( sattwa ) is considered as light 
 (or subtle), and enlightening (or manifesting) ; 
 ‘ passion ’ or ‘ foulness ’ as exciting and mobile ; 
 ‘ darkness ’ as heavy and enveloping (or obstruc- 
 tive, varanaJca). Their action, for the gaining of 
 an end, is like that of a lamp.” 2 
 
 These disticlis introduce an element in the Sankhya 
 philosophy which plays an important part in its physical 
 and moral teaching. It is that of the three gunas, or 
 qualities, as the word is generally translated. They are 
 not qualities, however, but the constituent elements of 
 Nature ( Prakriti ). “ These three qualities,” says Cole- 
 
 brooke, “ are not mere accidents of Nature, but are of 
 its essence and enter into its composition.” Nature, or 
 primordial matter, is described in the system of Kapila 
 as formed by the gunas, which were primarily in equili- 
 
 1 Vrittayas. Vachaspati interprets 
 the word by lcrriya, (act, operation), 
 and connects it with each of the 
 foregoing terms (Wilson, p. 51). 
 The Sank. Bhashya interprets this 
 part by “ parasparam varttante ” (are 
 reciprocally present). St. Hilaire 
 has “ se suppleent reciproquement.” 
 Vritti means state, condition, or 
 manner of being, and the meaning 
 is that each guna may, in some cir- 
 cumstances, assume the nature of 
 the others, or be the same in effect. 
 See p. 26. 
 
 2 Sattwa (goodness or reality), 
 
 rajas (passion), and tamas (darkness) 
 are the usual names of the three 
 gunas. In the preceding distich they 
 are named from “ priti" (joy or love), 
 aprlti (aversion), and vishada (stu- 
 pefaction or dulness). The first is 
 said to include rectitude, gentleness, 
 modesty, faith, patience, clemency, 
 and wisdom ; the second produces 
 hatred, violence, envy, abuse, and 
 wickedness ; and the last causes 
 tardiness, fear, infidelity, dishonesty, 
 avarice, and ignorance (S. Chandrika, 
 Wilson, p. 52). 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 37 
 
 brium, and so long as this state existed there was no 
 emanation into separate forms of matter. This state of 
 rest was destroyed when Nature began to act, though 
 unconsciously, for the welfare of soul , 1 and this move- 
 ment, as motion or activity in general, is due to the 
 influence of that guna, or constituent of Nature, which 
 is called “ passion ” {rajas). This theory seems to be 
 contrary to a previous statement that Nature is one; 
 but it is conceived as we apprehend light to be a simple 
 colourless substance, though formed by a perfect union of 
 the coloured rays, whose individuality is lost or unde- 
 veloped in that which we call light. 
 
 The G-unas are a mere hypothesis, invented to account 
 for the manifest differences in the conditions of formal 
 existences. There is evidently a subtle or spiritual ele- 
 ment, one of passion or force, and something which is 
 contrary to both, an element of dulness or insensibility, 
 in at least all human beings ; 2 and these are assumed by 
 Kapila to indicate a primary difference in the constituent 
 elements of Nature ( Prakriti ). The same idea seems to 
 have presented itself to some of the earlier Greek philo- 
 sophers, as Aristotle has described their doctrine . 3 
 
 1 “ The governorship thereof (of 
 soul over Nature) is from its proxi- 
 
 mity, as in the caBe of the gem” 
 
 (Sank. Sara, i. 96). The interpreta- 
 tion is, “ that as the gem (the load- 
 stone) is attracted by iron merely by 
 proximity, without resolving (either 
 to act or to be acted upon), so by 
 the mere juxtaposition of the soul, 
 Nature (Prakriti) is changed into 
 the principle called the Great One 
 (Buddhi, intellect).” We are not told 
 how this proximity was caused, by 
 which soul acted upon Nature, and 
 
 Nature brought soul into bondage 
 by connecting it with matter. 
 
 2 In the system of Valentinus the 
 Gnostic, all men and all substances 
 are divided into three classes : (1.) 
 the spiritual, (2.) the vital, and (3.) 
 the material (Hylic). This corre- 
 sponds to the gunas of Kapila, and is 
 probably an importation from India. 
 
 3 Cf. Aristotle : “ Ti)s ovaLas 
 inro/xevovays rots Se irddecrL y.eral3a\- 
 \bvor]S tovto aroxctov Kal ravryv 
 tCjv ovtiov T7 ) v apxyv <t>o.aiv tlvai' 
 (Metaph., i. 3 ; Wilson, p. 53). 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 33 
 
 These gunas are called by Kapila: (1.) sattwa, truth or 
 goodness ; (2.) rajas, properly passion, hut sometimes in- 
 terpreted as foulness; and (3.) tamas, darkness. Professor 
 Lassen translates them as (1.) essentia, (2.) impetus, (3.) 
 caligo. The first, however, is not more an essence than 
 the second or third. The second, “ passion,” is rather the 
 cause of an impetus than the impetus itself, the moving 
 force rather than the motion. The terms have, however, 
 only a relative meaning. The gunas 1 are the constituents 
 of Nature, which is only matter, and this is incapable of 
 truth or goodness, according to our ideas of them. Sattwa 
 means primarily existence or reality, the real essence of 
 anything, and hence truth and also goodness or virtue ; 
 but as by the essence of a being we imply something 
 more subtle than the gross form, the word is used to 
 denote that constituent or formative element of Nature 
 which is lighter and more subtle than the other two. 
 The second constituent is termed “ passion ” or “ foulness,” 
 because it is the exciting element, and all action is, to the 
 Hindu mind, an evil, or at least a defect. The perfect 
 state is an inactive repose. The third, “ darkness,” is the 
 grossest of the elements. 
 
 The gunas or modes are sometimes termed (1.) Prakasa, 
 
 1 In the notes to the Sankhya 
 Karika which Lassen has given he 
 explains the word guna thus : “ Di- 
 versus sane est usus vocabuli, quum, 
 veluti per Manum, de peculiari 
 cujusvis elementi virtute dicatur. 
 Atque est sane guna apud Sank- 
 yicos materise innata ivtpyeLa, per 
 tres gradus ascendens atque consi- 
 dens. Sunt tres materiae cum arcu 
 vel lyra coinparatae tensiones, et 
 reddi possit guna haud inepte per 
 potentiam ” (p. 30). This is not 
 
 strictly correct. Guna means pri- 
 marily a thread or cord, and Pra- 
 kriti, or Nature, is as a string com- 
 posed of three varying strands ; not 
 properly energies, but constituent 
 elements of different virtue. Ka- 
 pila did not resolve matter into 
 mere force, as some of our modern 
 physicists. Force was only to him 
 a condition of matter, or rather of 
 one of its primary elements, i.e., of 
 the guna called “ passion.” 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 39 
 
 luminousness ; this is prevalent in fire. (2.) Pravritti, 
 activity ; this predominates in air. (3.) Holm, delusion ; 
 this resides in earth, which, being heavy, is supposed to 
 be formed by, and to represent, the gross, stupefying 
 element. 
 
 Every kind of existence except soul is formed by the 
 gunas, but in an infinite variety of conditions, as the dif- 
 ferent kinds of these elements are blended together in 
 varying degrees. 1 
 
 Kapila, or his disciple, Iswara Krishna, proceeds to 
 define more fully the qualities which belong to every 
 one of the twenty-three principles or forms of material 
 existence. 
 
 Each is indiscriminative, i.e., it has not the power of 
 discerning the differences of things and deciding upon 
 them. The manas (“ mind ”) receives the sensations 
 which are caused by the action of external things on the 
 organs of sense; these it transmits to the consciousness 
 ( ahankara ), which presents them to the intellect ( buddhi ). 
 There the soul beholds them as in a mirror. The soul 
 alone discriminates and uses them. Thus only is a true 
 cognition formed. 
 
 It is objective. The only proper subject is the soul. 
 All other things, from intellect to the grossest form of 
 matter, lie without the soul and are its objects. 
 
 It is generic ( samanya ), i.e., it produces generic or 
 
 1 Even the gods are represented equality in the gunas arises, then 
 in the Vayu Purana as springing they (the gods) who preside over 
 from the three gunas. “ From Prad- them are generated. . . . The rajas 
 hana (Nature), when agitated, the quality was born as Brahma ; the 
 quality of passion (rajas) arose, which tamas (darkness) as Agni ; the sattioa 
 was there a stimulating cause, as (goodness) as Vishnu ” (Muir, Sans, 
 water is to seeds. When an in- Texts, i. 75). 
 
40 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 specific forms. Colebrooke translates the word “ common,” 
 and Gaudapada says that it is so called “ from being the 
 common possession of all, as a harlot.” This is not true, 
 as an exposition of Kapila’s system, for buddhi is not 
 common to all things. The meaning is, that each may 
 form, with others, things that have common properties. 
 
 It is irrational ( achetana , unthinking). Even “ intellect ” 
 cannot think, for it is material. It is only a passive re- 
 ceptacle for arranged and individualised ideas. Cognition 
 is a property of the soul alone. 
 
 It is productive. Intellect produces Consciousness, and 
 this produces the five subtle elements, from which the 
 grosser elements proceed. 
 
 Nature {Prakriti) is the same in these respects as 
 each of its developments. Soul, however, is the opposite 
 of Nature. It discriminates; it exists by and for itself 
 alone ; it knows, and is not productive. 
 
 In Distich 12 the gunas are classed as pleasant, un- 
 pleasant, and stupefying. “ Goodness ” serves for mani- 
 festation, for it is light and elastic ; “ passion ” leads to 
 activity, and “ darkness ” to restraint or inertness. 
 
 Each may subdue or support the other; they are capable 
 of producing each other, and have a mutual existence, i.e., 
 they pass into one another, or produce the effects of each 
 in different conditions ; as a good king rewards a good 
 and punishes a bad subject, and clouds which may be 
 heavy and inert may cause fertility and gladness. In 
 their mutual co-operation they are compared to a lamp, 
 whose light is produced by the application of flame to the 
 wick and the oil. 
 
 14. “The absence of discrimination and the rest 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 4i 
 
 (the other conditions of material forms) are a con- 
 clusion from the three modes, and by the absence 
 of the reverse of this (the modal existence). The 
 Unmanifested (Nature) is also to be determined by 
 the cause having the same qualities as the effect.” 
 
 In Distich 8 it is affirmed that the productions (emana- 
 tions) of Nature are in some respects like, and in others 
 unlike, their original source. In Distich 10 the points of 
 disagreement are mentioned, and the points of agreement 
 in Distich 1 1. The first-named of the common properties 
 is the presence of the three modes, and in Distichs 12 and 
 13 the nature of these modes is defined. As they affect 
 the constitution of all Nature’s productions, the faculty 
 of discrimination cannot belong to any, for this does not 
 belong to the modes. In like manner they are all, from 
 intellect downward, objective, and have other properties 
 of the modes. Also, as they are objective, i.e., external to 
 soul, they must be material. 
 
 The latter part of the first line of the distich — tad- 
 viparyayabhavat — is obscure. Colebrooke translates it, 
 “ and by the absence thereof in the reverse ; ” that is, as 
 Vachaspati and others interpret it, in the soul; soul and 
 matter being opposite in their nature. Gaudapada con- 
 fines the passage to the undeveloped Nature (avyakta) 
 and the developed principles (- vyakta ), and explains it 
 to mean that the absence of the reverse of these quali- 
 ties in the developed establishes its absence in the un- 
 developed, for they are not contrary to each other. 
 Vachaspati says, also, that “it may be understood as 
 taking for its own two subjects, vyakta and avyakta, and 
 asserting by the inverted proposition (negatively) that 
 
42 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 there is no reason (to the contrary) from one being 
 exempt from the three modes.” 1 Lassen connects “ this ” 
 with “ the three modes,” and after examining other trans- 
 lations, interprets the passage thus : “ Quseritur, quomodo 
 interpreter hsec verba ; vertenda sunt Latine, quia non est 
 contrarium hujus ( i.e ., trium qualitatum). Eefero autem 
 ad Evolutum et Involutum, de quibus hie potissimum est 
 sermo. Sensus ijitur ex mea opinione est : quia in eis 
 (Involuto et Evoluto) non sunt proprietates tribus quali- 
 tatibus contrapositoe. Hoe enim si essent, falsa esset 
 enunciatio dist. 1 1 proposita.” I adopt Lassen’s explana- 
 tion, as best suited to the grammar of the language and to 
 the sequence of ideas, the 14th distich being thus linked 
 to the preceding. 
 
 After arguing that the undeveloped (Prakriti or Nature), 
 assuming it to exist, must be essentially the same as the 
 developed (forms), five arguments are offered to prove the 
 existence of Prakriti. 
 
 15. “From the finite nature of specific objects; 
 from the homogeneous nature (of genera and 
 species) ; from the active energy of evolution 
 (the constant progressive development of finite 
 forms) ; 2 from the separateness of cause and effect ; 
 and from the undividedness (or real unity) of the 
 whole universe.” 3 
 
 1 Wilson, p. 59. of production or development ( pra - 
 
 2 “ Propter manifestationem per vritti). 
 
 potestateni” (Lassen); “since effects 3 “Since there is a reunion of the 
 exist through energy ” (Colebrooke); universe” (Coleb.) ; “propter insepa- 
 “de 1’ activity de tout ce qui a rabilitatem omnes formas induentis 
 puissance d’agir” (St. Hiliare.), lit. (Involuti) ” (Lassen). Vaiswarupa 
 from the energetic action (sakti) is the entirety of formal existence. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 43 
 
 1 6 . “(It is proved that) there is a primary 
 cause, the Unmanifested ( Avyakta ), which acts (or 
 develops itself) by the three modes ; by blending 
 and modification, like water, from the difference 
 of the receptacle or seat of the modes as they 
 are variously distributed.” 1 
 
 1. From the finite nature ( parimana , measure) of specific 
 objects. On this account they must have a cause, for 
 otherwise they would have no limit in space or time. 
 That which is conditioned must be dependent on some- 
 thing external to itself, and be limited by it. 
 
 2. From the common properties (samanvaya) in diffe- 
 rent things. Hence species and genera exist, from which 
 we rise to the conception of one primary genus. 
 
 3. From the active or living energy (SaJcti) shown in 
 production (emanation) of things. All things are in a 
 state of progression, but their active, progressive life is 
 not due, according to Kapila, to any “ potentiality ” which 
 they possess in their separate nature. 2 Development 
 implies a developing principle or energy, and this must 
 be from an external source. The arrangement of parts 
 can no more create a living energy than a machine can 
 supply its own motive power. 
 
 4. From the separate existence of cause and effect. 
 
 1 “Per diversitatem cujusvis, quam is certainly correct. This is Gauda- 
 amplectitur qualitatis ” (Lassen), pada’s explanation. 
 
 “ Por different objects are diversified 2 As Lassen explains it: “Evol- 
 
 by the influence of the several quali- vuntur evoluta non per suam ip- 
 ties respectively ” (Coleb.). Wilson’s sorum facultatem, sed per potentiam 
 suggested correction, “ by modifica- quandam, quae est causa potestate 
 tion, like water, according to the ea evolvendi instructa ” (p. 33). 
 receptacle or subject of the qualities,” 
 
44 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 This is closely connected with the former argument. A 
 living energy is at work in production. This is the 
 producing cause, and we can only conceive of cause and 
 effect as different things, though each is enfolded in the 
 other. The existing world of finite forms is an effect, 
 and must therefore have a cause beyond itself. 
 
 5. From the inseparable unity of all (material) forms 
 ( vaisvarupa ), or of the whole universe in its manifold 
 forms. No part of Nature can exist independently 
 of the rest. There is an unbroken chain or abso- 
 lute continuity from the lowest to the highest. At 
 the end of the existing Jcalpa (period of creation) 
 they will all become one again. Gaudapada assumes 
 this fact as a proof or illustration of the argument. 
 Kapila, however, more logically, refers only to the 
 actual connection of all the several parts of Nature 
 as a proof that they have sprung from a common 
 origin. 
 
 Some important questions are suggested by this theory 
 of a primordial matter, from which all things, except 
 soul, have emanated. How does this universal Nature, 
 being one, produce different effects ? How does it act 
 at all, since it is not acted upon by anything external 
 to itself ? The answer of Kapila is, that it acts by 
 virtue of its internal formation. It is composed of the 
 three gunas or modes, and is inert when these are in 
 equilibrium. It acts through a disturbance of this state. 
 The modes are endowed witli a power of motion, 1 like 
 the atoms of Lucretius, and from their restless action 
 combination may be effected in different proportions, as 
 
 1 Motion, however, is primarily due to the mode or constituent element 
 of Nature (Prakriti), called “passion” or “foulness.” 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 45 
 
 one or another may be predominant. This is the mix- 
 ture or blending mentioned in Distich 1 6. It is also 
 modified, as water or moisture, by different conditions, 
 caused by the nature of its receptacle or seat. “ As 
 simple water coming from the clouds is modified 
 as sweet, sour, hitter, pungent, in the nature of the 
 juice of the cocoa-nut, palm, bel-karanja, 1 and wood- 
 apple.” 
 
 “ Modified condition,” says Vachaspati, “ is the cha- 
 racter of the three modes, which are never for a moment 
 stationary.” This constant motion produces different 
 effects by the ever-varying proportion of their action. 
 In the gods, the quality of “ goodness ” predominates, 
 and they are happy ; in mankind, that of “ passion ” or 
 “ foulness,” and they are miserable ; in animals and 
 lower substances, “ darkness ” prevails, and they are in- 
 sensible or indifferent. 
 
 Kapila having endeavoured to prove the existence of 
 Nature ( Pralcriti ), now attempts to prove the existence 
 of soul. 
 
 1 7. “ Because an assemblage (of things) is for 
 the sake of another ; 2 because the opposite of the 
 three modes and the rest (their modifications) must 
 exist ; because there must be a superintending 
 power ; because there must be a nature that en- 
 joys; and because of (the existence of) active 
 
 1 The bel-haranja is a leguminous 2 This is stated a little more fully 
 plant, whose seed produces an oil in the SankhyaPravachana: “Every 
 used for the cure of scabies (Asiat. assemblage, every combination, has 
 Res., iv. 310). A Sanskrit name of always for its object another being ” 
 the plant is chiravilwa. (i. 133). 
 
4 6 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 exertion for the sake of abstraction or isolation 
 (from material contact ); 1 therefore soul exists.” 
 
 1. The first argument is from design; not of a de- 
 signing mind from evidences of design, hut objectively 
 of another nature for which the arrangement ( sam - 
 glicita, collocation) of material things is made. “ In 
 like manner,” says Gaudapada, “as a bed, which is an 
 assemblage of bedding, props, cotton, coverlet, and pil- 
 lows, is for another’s use, not for its own, and its several 
 component parts render no mutual service; thence it is 
 concluded that there is a man who sleeps upon the bed, 
 and for whose sake it was made : so this world, which 
 is an assemblage of the five elements, is for another’s 
 use; or there is a soul, for whose enjoyment this enjoy- 
 able body, consisting of intellect and the rest, has been 
 produced .” 2 
 
 2. Because there must be something different from 
 Prakriti (Nature) formed of the three modes; for this 
 is the material source of pleasure or pain, and the 
 sentient nature, which feels the pleasure or the pain, 
 must be diverse from it . 3 This argument is based upon 
 
 1 Colebrooke translates the last 
 clause, “since there is a tendency 
 to abstraction ; ” St. Hilaire by 
 “ parcequ’enfin il y a une activity 
 qui tend h la liberation absolue des 
 trois especes de douleurs ; ” Lassen 
 has “ ex actione propter abstraction^ 
 causam.” 
 
 2 Wilson, p. 66. 
 
 3 Wilson, p. 67. The soul, how- 
 ever, in the Sankhya system, is not 
 properly sentient, and the difficulty 
 is thus explained in the S. Prava- 
 
 chana (vi. n): “Though it (pain) 
 is the property or function of some- 
 thing else, yet it is effected (in the 
 soul) by non-distinction (of soul 
 and matter),” or, as the passage 
 is explained by Vijnana B hik shu, 
 “ though the qualities pleasure, 
 pain, &c., belong only to the mind 
 [which is material], they exist in 
 the shape of a reflection in it (the 
 soul), through ‘ non -distinction ’ as 
 the cause.” 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 47 
 
 our consciousness. We are conscious of a nature witliin 
 us, which feels joy or woe ; and this we infer is some- 
 thing different from matter, for we cannot conceive of 
 mere matter as feeling or thinking. 
 
 3. There must he a superintending or directing force. 
 “ As a charioteer guides a chariot drawn by horses,” says 
 Gaudapada, “ so the soul guides the body.” The idea of 
 Kapila seems to be that the power of self-control cannot 
 be predicated of matter, which must be directed and con- 
 trolled for the accomplishment of any purpose, and this 
 controlling power must be something external to matter 
 and diverse from it. The soul, however, never acts. It 
 only seems to act ; and it is difficult to reconcile this part 
 of the system with that which gives to the soul a con- 
 trolling force. If the soul is a charioteer, it must be an 
 active agent. 
 
 4. “ Because there must be a nature that enjoys.” 
 This is substantially the same as the first proposition. 1 
 Gaudapada has practically joined them together by a 
 common interpretation. The difference seems to be 
 merely this : That the first refers to an arrangement 
 of utility, and implies that it has been made for some 
 one’s use. The fourth indicates ownership or possession, 
 and therefore a possessor, as an estate implies an owner. 
 The idea that underlies both is expressed in the S. 
 Tattwa Kaumudl : “ Intellect and the rest are things to 
 
 1 The first or teleological argu- in their nature, an appanage; they 
 ment appears to be of an universal have no raison d'etre except as the 
 kind. Every arrangement of ma- adjuncts of another nature, whose 
 terial things is for a purpose, and ministers they are. They are inter - 
 therefore for one in whom that pur- mediaries, implying the existence of 
 pose is fulfilled ; or, in other words, the two extremes, the objective world 
 the use implies an user. Some things, and soul, 
 however, as intellect, are evidently, 
 
4 S 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 be enjoyed (jbhogya, what is eaten, enjoyed possessed) 
 or perceived (drisya), and therefore these imply one that 
 perceives.” 1 Each has a separate function, which can 
 only be brought into action by the influence of soul. 
 
 5. It is assumed here that the yearning which all 
 sometimes feel for a higher life than we can have in our 
 present bodily state points to the possibility of gaining 
 it. This pure isolation or abstraction ( kaivalya ) from 
 matter cannot be obtained by any material means. These 
 can only work by some kind of material contact, and this 
 is the very condition that makes such a life impossible. 
 The agent, therefore, which must set us free from matter 
 must be something that is not of a material nature. It 
 is knowledge, which the soul gains by its own powers, 
 when brought into proximity to matter. 
 
 Kapila, or his expositor Iswara Krishna, proceeds to 
 establish the plurality or separate existence of souls. 
 
 18. “From the separate allotment of birth, 
 death, and the organs ; from the diversity of oc- 
 cupations at the same time, and also from the 
 different conditions (or modifications) of the three 
 modes, it is proved that there is a plurality of 
 souls.” 2 
 
 1 S. Tattwa KaumudI, Wilson, 
 p. 67. 
 
 2 Neither Hindu nor European 
 commentators explain clearly the 
 meaning of this distich ; they merely 
 repeat it. There is, however, the 
 difficulty that the soul is not af- 
 fected by the three modes. How, 
 then, can their various modifications 
 prove the individuality of souls, in 
 
 opposition to the Vedantist doctrine 
 that all souls are only portions of the 
 one, an infinitely extended monad ? 
 Kapila’s argument seems to be that 
 every soul is accompanied by its 
 lihga, a subtle body formed of the 
 finer principles of matter, in which 
 lie the dispositions ( bhavas ) of the 
 individual. Now the liiiga is vari- 
 ously affected by the three modes, 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 49 
 
 As birth is only the entrance of the soul into another 
 body, and death the departure of the soul from it, then, 
 it is argued, if soul were absolutely one (as the Yedantists 
 teach), it would enter into bodies or leave them at the 
 same time. It is not very clear why the organs of sense 
 or of action must be alike in all if soul were absolutely 
 one. The course of thought in the mind of Kapila was 
 possibly this : As defects in the organs, such as blindness 
 or deafness, are due to the actions of a previous life, and 
 oneness of soul must produce an uniformity of conditions, 
 such an effect happening to one must happen to all. But 
 all actions are not alike, nor are they the same at the 
 same time, as they would be if all souls (and there is 
 a directing force in the soul) were absolutely one. Men 
 are differently affected, too, by the modes or constituent 
 elements of Nature : one has more affinity to, or is more 
 easily affected by, the mode called “ goodness ; ” another 
 by the mode called “ passion ; ” and another by the 
 “ darkness ” mode. But if all souls were absolutely 
 one, each person would be the same in his mental and 
 moral state. Each soul has, therefore, a distinct per- 
 sonality, for men are not the same in these respects. 
 This line of argument makes the soul less passive than 
 it is represented to be in other parts of the system, for 
 a certain responsibility is given to it which is inconsistent 
 with the idea of a perfect abstinence from all action. 
 
 In the Sankhya Sutras (i. 154), Kapila is repre- 
 sented as arguing that his doctrine is not different from 
 that of the "Vedas, because the latter are said to teach 
 
 and hence arise the different mental ever, is very like saying that men 
 and moral conditions of persons, and are differentiated from each other, 
 by this difference each soul is sepa- not by their self-consciousness, but 
 rated from other souls. This, how- by the clothes which they wear 
 
 D 
 
5 ° 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 only a generic oneness of soul. The sutra is probably 
 a late interpolation, due to some one who wished to 
 reconcile the system of Kapila with that of the Vedantist 
 school . 1 Kapila himself seems to have been too honest 
 and too bold a thinker to make such an attempt. The 
 teaching of the Vedanta system is that all souls are 
 one, not because they belong to the same genus or class 
 of being, but because they are portions of the One Spirit, 
 who is indeed the All. Kapila thought that each soul is 
 a separate ens or existence , 2 limited by its union with 
 a body, though soul, in the abstract idea of it, seems 
 to be unlimited. But this abstract soul is not the 
 Supreme Spirit, the I^wara or Lord of the Pantajali 
 system. If an absolute Supreme Spirit exists, he main- 
 tained (it seems) that such a nature lies outside the 
 domain of philosophy ; humanity being with him, as with 
 Fichte and the Comtists, the highest point of philosophic 
 research. 
 
 19. “And from that contrariety (of soul) it 
 is concluded that the witnessing soul is isolated, 
 neutral, perceptive, and inactive by nature.” 
 
 1 The Vedantist leaning of the 
 Sank. Pravachana shows not only 
 that Kapila was not the author of 
 the work, but that it is later in time 
 than the Sank. Karika. 
 
 2 Cf. Sank. Pravachana (vi. 63), 
 where it is said that the separate 
 life of a soul (jnatwa, the property 
 of living) is from a distinction as of 
 race, i.e., by attendant qualities; or, 
 as Vijnana Bhiksliu interprets the 
 passage, “ to be a living soul means 
 the being possessed of the vital airs 
 (see p. 66), and this is the character 
 
 of the soul distinguished by per- 
 sonality, not of pure soul (which is 
 unconditioned).” There is some 
 confusion here. In the system of 
 Kapila the vital airs belong to the 
 body and do not affect the soul. In 
 the next Sutra all action is separated 
 from the soul and from any super- 
 intending influence. “The accom- 
 plishment of works depends on the 
 agent, self-consciousness (see p. 18), 
 not on a Lord (T.swara), from the 
 absence of proof (that such a Lord 
 exists).” 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 51 
 
 20. “ It is thus, from this union, that the unin- 
 telligent body (the lingo ) 1 appears to be intelligent, 
 and from the activity of the modes the stranger 
 (the soul) appears to be an agent.” 
 
 21. “It is that the soul may be able to con- 
 template Nature, and to become entirely separated 
 from it, that the union of both is made, as of the 
 halt and the blind, and through that (union) the 
 universe is formed.” 
 
 The soul beholds as an eye-witness ( sakshin ), for in- 
 sight or cognition does not belong to matter. “ That 
 which is irrational cannot observe, and that to which 
 an object is apparent is a witness.” It is solitary or 
 perfectly distinct from matter, and therefore from the 
 modifications which the modes produce. It is neutral 
 (madhyastha, lit. standing between), “ as a wandering 
 ascetic is lonely and unconcerned while the villagers 
 are busily engaged in agriculture .” 2 It is perceptive. 
 This appears to differ from the first quality in this, 
 that as a witness the soul only observes, and then by 
 seeing that which is presented to it by the buddhi 
 (intellect), it perceives and understands the phenomena 
 of the material world. It is still, however, passive or 
 inert. All action, in the judgment of a Hindu, is in- 
 ferior to a contemplative state, and the soul in its regal 
 
 1 Prof. Wilson says : “ The term subtle vehicle of the soul is formed 
 linga in the first line is explained from the substance of the three in- 
 to denote maliat [intellect] and the ternal organs and the finer elements 
 subtle products of pradhdna [Na- of matter ( tanmatra ). 
 ture].” This is a mistake. The 2 Gaudapada’s Commentary. 
 
 linga does not denote them. This 
 
52 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 grandeur has no part in the inferior life of action. It 
 directs as a sovereign, but it does not work. In the 
 system of Ivapila, all action, even mental effort or appli- 
 cation, is due to the influence of the three modes, of 
 which Nature ( PraJcriti ) is formed, and the soul is not 
 subject to their influence. It is, therefore, completely 
 passive . 1 
 
 In every form of earthly life the soul is united to its 
 own peculiar vehicle or body, but is not blended with 
 it ; it is only in a state of juxtaposition, or rather it 
 is enveloped by the body. By this is meant, not the 
 gross material body, which perishes at each migration 
 of the soul, but the lihga, which is formed out of the 
 subtler elements of Nature. This attends the soul until 
 finally a complete separation from matter is obtained. 
 
 It is from the proximity of “ intellect ” ( buddhi ) to the 
 soul that the former seems to think and the latter to act. 
 “ Thence,” says the S. Chandrika, “ that which is an effect 
 of pradhana (Nature), the category, buddhi, though it is 
 unintelligent, is as if it were intelligent : says, ‘ I know,’ 
 and is endowed with knowledge.” But there is no true 
 cognition until the soul has seen the individualised and 
 complete sensations, now elaborated into form, in the 
 buddhi. It is from this effect that the soul seems to act, 
 the motive power of the “ intellect ” being in close ap- 
 proximation to it. It has, indeed, a kind of action in 
 itself, so far as observation and the formation of thought 
 are action, but it is not an agent upon anything external 
 to itself. Kapila insists upon this distinction, which is 
 
 1 “ To fools the spirit seems to be are passing ” (Atma Bodha Praka- 
 active, when the senses alone are sika, by Sankara-acharya, i. 19, 
 really active; just as the moon ap- quoted in Ind. Ant., May 1876). 
 pears to move when the clouds only 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 53 
 
 essential to his system, from a strong conviction of the 
 absolute and essential distinction of soul and matter. 
 They are in their very nature subject and object, and can 
 never coalesce. As “ idea ” and “ thing ” they are eter- 
 nally separate, and their properties or functions can never 
 be interchanged. The doctrine of Fichte — that material 
 things exist, at least to us, only as a result of the laws of 
 the inward subjective nature — is wholly contrary to that 
 of Kapila. Both are absolute entities, having distinct 
 functions, but it is only by the juxtaposition of the two 
 that knowledge can he gained. This is a result of the 
 synthesis of the discerning faculty and the thing to be 
 discerned. Hence there are no innate ideas, and the soul, 
 when freed from the contact of matter, has neither know- 
 ledge nor self-consciousness. The soul can only see what 
 buddhi (intellect) presents to its view, and it is of the 
 essence of his system that “ nihil est in intellectu, quod 
 non prius in sensu.” In making the soul absolutely 
 dependent on the senses for its ideas ; in refusing to admit 
 that there is anything higher than the individual soul 
 which may enlighten or act upon it, he laid the foundation 
 for a philosophical atheism, or what is now called agnos- 
 ticism. Like Fichte, in making the individual self, i.e., 
 the soul, the highest form of knowable being, he rejected 
 the idea of a supreme, personal Deity, as a truth de- 
 termined by logical inference, though it is not certain 
 that he absolutely denied it. We cannot know God, 
 because he cannot be presented as an object to be seen in 
 the buddhi, and the soul has no virtue or moral conscious- 
 ness, for this is a property of our material nature. He 
 seems to magnify philosophy, as an outcome of human 
 reason, as some of our modern teachers, but in reality 
 
5 + 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 degrades it, both in its mental and moral aspects, by 
 making the thinking faculty completely dependent on the 
 sensations that come from material things for the whole of 
 its knowledge, and even its self-consciousness. 
 
 Kapila teaches (Dist. 21) that the material universe was 
 formed, or, in Hindu phrase, the various forms of matter 
 were evolved, by the unconscious Prakriti (Nature), for 
 the use of the soul, i.e., that the soul may gain a know- 
 ledge of material things, and thus by contrast know itself 
 as the means of a final liberation from matter. This is 
 illustrated by the well-known tale of a blind man meeting 
 in a forest with one that was lame, when, agreeing to help 
 each other, the blind man bore the lame on his shoulders, 
 and by the union of their powers they were able to escape 
 from the jungle. Nature ( Prakriti ) is the blind man, for 
 it cannot see, and the soul is the lame one, for it cannot 
 act. 
 
 The order in which the various emanations from Nature 
 were produced is then set forth — 
 
 22. “ From Nature ( Prakriti ) issues tlie great 
 principle ( maliat , intellect), and from this the Ego 
 or Consciousness ; from this (consciousness) the 
 whole assemblage of the sixteen (principles or 
 entities), and from five of the sixteen the five gross 
 elements.” 
 
 The categories, or separate entities, of the Sankhya 
 system have been assumed in the previous distichs, and 
 their mutual relations determined. Here the order of 
 their production is given. This has been stated in p. 17 
 ff., but it may be useful to present it in a tabular form. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 55 
 
 1. Prakriti or primordial matter, tlie vkr) of the 
 Greek philosophy. 
 
 2. Mahat or Buddhi (intellect). 
 
 3. Ahankara, the Ego or Consciousness. 
 
 4. The five subtle elements (Tanmatra). 
 
 5. The five grosser elements, ether, air, earth, light 
 or fire, and water. 
 
 6. The five senses. 
 
 7. The five organs of action. 
 
 8. The Manas (mind), which is the first of the internal 
 organs, receiving the impressions made upon the senses. 
 It ought to be numbered with buddhi and ahankara, mak- 
 ing with them the three internal organs. 
 
 9. The soul [Atman, Purusha), which is totally dis- 
 tinct from Prakriti (Nature), forms, with Nature and 
 its emanations, the twenty-five tattwas (categories) in 
 the Sankhya philosophy. He who understands them 
 thoroughly has attained to the highest state of man in the 
 present life, and in laying aside the body in death shall 
 know birth no more : he is for ever freed from any contact 
 with matter, and therefore from pain. “ He who knows 
 the twenty-five principles, whatever order of life he 
 may enter, and whether he wear braided hair, or a top- 
 knot only, or he shaven, he is free; of this there is no 
 doubt.” 1 
 
 23. “Intellect is the distinguishing principle 
 ( adhyavasaya ). Virtue, knowledge, freedom from 
 passion, and power denote it when affected by (the 
 
 1 Quoted in Gaudapada’s Comm, matted hair worn by Siva and 
 (Wilson, p. 79). The meaning is, ascetics, or be a Brahman, or has the 
 whether he has the braided or shaven head (munda) of a Buddhist. 
 
56 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mode) ‘goodness;’ when affected by ‘darkness’ 
 it is the reverse of these.” 
 
 The word by which buddhi (intellect) is defined or 
 explained is unfortunately of doubtful meaning. In the 
 Amara Ivosha it is a synonym of utsdlia, strenuous effort . 1 
 The Peters. Diet, interprets it by “ fester wille,” “ fester 
 bestreben.” Professor Lassen translates it by “ intentio,” 
 and Colebrooke by “ ascertainment.” St. Hilaire writes, 
 “ L’intelligence, e’est la determination distincte des choses,” 
 and with this interpretation the comment of Gaudapada 
 agrees . 2 “ This is a jar, this is cloth ; that which marks or 
 designates thus is buddhi.” The word is, however, more 
 commonly used in the sense of “ determination,” “ re- 
 solve ; ” but this appears to be a secondary meaning, the 
 primary being a defining or distinguishing act. “ In- 
 tellect ” ( buddhi ) is then, in the system of Ivapila, the 
 faculty or organ by which outward objects are presented 
 to the view of the soul in their proper and definite form. 
 Some of the commentators suppose that here is the seat of 
 will, or that by buddhi we say, “This must be done.” 
 But this assignment is probably due to the modern sense 
 of the word ; for it does not appear that Kapila attributed 
 volition to any form of matter, though as subtle as that of 
 buddhi. 
 
 He assigns to it, however, other properties which are 
 equally strange as attributes of matter. Having defined 
 the soul as that which contemplates but never acts, he is 
 
 1 It has this meaning in the is interpreted by Dr. Ballantyne as 
 Hitopadesa, “effort,” “determined “judgment.” “Intellect is judg- 
 application ” (see Voc. by Johnson), ment, and judgment, called also 
 
 2 The same word is used to denote ascertainment, is its peculiar modi- 
 luddhi in the S. Parv. Bhashna, and fication ” (ii. 13). 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 57 
 
 obliged to assign every quality or state that is connected 
 with our active life to buddhi, the first emanation of 
 Prakriti (Nature), as its primary seat. When it is under 
 the influence of that mode or constituent of Nature called 
 “goodness,” it is (i.) virtue ( [dharma ), (2.) knowledge 
 ( jndna ), (3.) absence of passion or passivity (virago), and 
 (4.) supernatural power ( aiswarya ). When affected by 
 the mode called “ darkness,” it is then vice, ignorance, 
 passion, and weakness. The commentators, who are gene- 
 rally under a Vedantist influence, explain virtue (dharma) 
 as including humanity, benevolence, acts of restraint 
 (yama) and of obligation (niyama). Gaudapada explains 
 acts of restraint as restraint of cruelty, falsehood, dis- 
 honesty, incontinence, and avarice ; acts of obligation 
 are purification, contentment, religious austerities, sacred 
 study and divine worship ; but he expressly refers this 
 interpretation to the Patanjala, or theistic branch of the 
 Sankhya school. Knowledge, according to the same 
 commentator, is of two kinds, external and internal. The 
 former includes knowledge of the Yedas and the six 
 branches of study connected with them — recitation, ritual, 
 grammar, interpretation of words, prosody, and astronomy; 
 also of the Puranas, and of logic, theology, and law. 
 Internal knowledge is the knowledge of Nature (Prakriti) 
 and soul, or the discrimination that “This is Nature,” the 
 equipoised condition of the modes; and “This is Soul,” 
 devoid of modes, pervading, 1 and intelligent. By external 
 knowledge worldly distinction or admiration is obtained ; 
 
 1 Gaudapada gives this attribute supernatural power to the soul in 
 to the soul, the power of pervading certain states, but he does not assign 
 (vyapl) ; but this is properly a Ved- the power of pervading matter as its 
 antist idea. Kapila attributes much constant attribute. 
 
53 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 by internal knowledge, liberation, i.e., from tbe bondage 
 of matter. 
 
 Kapila, however, placed a knowledge of tbe Yedas at 
 a very low point, if he did not discard it altogether. 
 Beligious austerities and divine worship found no place 
 in his system. The soul of man is the highest exist- 
 ence which his philosophy contemplates, recognising, as 
 Comtism, only the supremacy of humanity, but rising 
 above M. Comte in admitting the soul to be its only 
 true representative. 
 
 Dispassion is also of two kinds — one which is indif- 
 ference to all external things, either on account of their 
 defects, or the trouble of acquiring them, or their in- 
 juriousness and wrong; and another which seeks only 
 to be delivered from matter, accounted as “ illusion,” 1 
 that the soul may be free. 
 
 By “ power ” or “ mastery ” is meant (we are told) super- 
 natural or magical power. A devotee who shall attain, 
 by knowledge, to a complete abstraction from anything 
 external to himself, can accomplish what he pleases : 
 he may traverse all things by subtlety of Nature; may 
 rise to colossal dimensions ; may stand on the tops of the 
 filaments of a flower ; may rise to the solar sphere on a 
 sunbeam, and may command the three worlds. What- 
 ever the person having this faculty intends or proposes 
 must be complied with by that which is the subject of 
 his purpose ; the elements themselves must conform to 
 bis designs. “ The ordinary laws that govern material 
 
 1 This is Gaudapada’s interpreta- ing from the rays of the sun (Indra). 
 tion. “ Illusion ” (indrajala, Iudra’s Here, as elsewhere, there is a Ved- 
 net) means a kind of magic, pro- antist colouring. Wilson renders it 
 bably at first a kind of mirage aris- “ witchcraft.” 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 59 
 
 things,” says Hemachandra, “ cannot impede the move- 
 ments of one who has attained to this etherealised state.” 
 
 24. “ Egoism is self-consciousness. From this 
 proceeds a double creation ( sarga , emanation), the 
 series of the eleven (principles) and the five (subtle) 
 elements.” 
 
 25. “From consciousness modified (by ‘good- 
 ness’) proceed the eleven good principles; 1 from 
 this origin 2 of being as ‘ darkness ’ come the subtle 
 
 C> O 
 
 elements. Both emanations are caused by the 
 ‘ foul ’ or ‘ active ’ mode.” 3 
 
 The term used in Distich 24 as the definition of the ego 
 ( ahankdra ) is abliimdna. The ordinary meaning of this 
 word is “pride.” 4 As Vachaspati interprets it, “The 
 pride or conceit of individuality, self-sufficiency, the notion 
 that ‘ I do, I feel, I think, I am, I alone preside, and have 
 
 1 In the Comm, on the S. Prava- 
 chana byVi jnana Bhikshu, elcadasaka 
 is explained as “ eleventh,” i.e., the 
 eleventh organ, manas, which pro- 
 ceeds from consciousness when modi- 
 fied by goodness. 
 
 2 Bhutadi, rightly translated by 
 Lassen “elementorum generator,” 
 the elements being what we call 
 “ matter ” in its subtler forms. St. 
 Hilaire has, incorrectly, “element 
 primitif.” 
 
 3 Taijasa, having the nature of the 
 tejas, or active mode. 
 
 4 The ordinary sense of both words 
 (ahankdra and abhimana) is pride. 
 The principle is therefore something 
 more in Hindu metaphysics than 
 mere consciousness. “ It might be 
 
 better expressed perhaps by le moi, 
 as it adds to the simple conception 
 of individuality the notion of self- 
 property, the concentration of all 
 objects and interests and feelings in 
 the individual ” (Wilson, p. 91). The 
 meaning of pride is a secondary 
 one. It is not contained in the 
 philosophical use of the word, which 
 expresses only the perception, not 
 the exaltation, of self ; though very 
 naturally this perception led to a 
 sense of superiority over outward 
 things. Lassen gives an explanation 
 of abhimana from a native scholiast: 
 “ Abhimana est persuasio hominis in 
 omnibus rebus semetipsum respici, 
 omniaque ad se spectare ” (p. 36). 
 
6o 
 
 HIXDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 power over all that is perceived or known, and all these 
 objects of sense for my use : there is no other Supreme, 
 except this ego, I am.’ This pride, from its exclusive 
 application, is egotism.” We cannot suppose that Kapila 
 meant to imply all this by the term abhimana, but pro- 
 bably he did mean by it that egoism is not merely a 
 consciousness of our individual life, but that which forms 
 the relation we bear to the outer world. 
 
 The eleven principles are the organs or faculties of 
 sense and action, together with the manas (see p. 21). 
 For the five subtle elements see p. 19. 
 
 The physical substratum of consciousness is affected 
 by the modes, as every other emanation of Prakriti. 
 From the influence of “ goodness,” it produces the ten 
 organs and the manas which are called “ good ” because 
 of their utility; but it is only when affected by that 
 mode or constituent of Nature called “ darkness ” 1 
 that it produces inanimate matter. The element called 
 “ passion,” which is here described as ardent or glowing 
 ( taijasa ), must co-operate in the production of all, because 
 it is the exciting mode. 
 
 The Egoism of Kapila has a threefold name, according 
 to the various actions of the modes. When the mode 
 called “ goodness ” affects it, and it produces the eleven 
 good principles — the ten organs and the manas — it is 
 
 1 A real darkness is assumed in a splendid hymn of the Rig- Veda 
 (x. 129)— 
 
 “ Nor aught nor naught existed ; yon bright sky 
 Was not, nor heaven’s broad woof outstretched above. 
 
 The only One breathed breathless in itself ; 
 
 Other than it there nothing since has been. 
 
 Darkness there was, and all at first was veiled 
 In gloom profound, an ocean without light.” 
 
 — M. MiiUer's Translation. 
 
 In the old Greek cosmogonies, Erebus or Night was the primordial state 
 from which all things arose. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 61 
 
 then called modified (vaiJcrita) Consciousness. When it 
 is under the influence of the mode “ darkness ” and 
 produces inanimate matter, it is then called bhutadi, 
 source of elemental being. The influence of the mode 
 called “ passion ” excites the others to action, for the 
 giving of activity or impetus is its especial office. The 
 three modes therefore act upon, or rather within, egoism 
 or consciousness (for this, as a part of Prakriti, or an 
 emanation of it, is itself formed of the modes), and 
 their various action has the effect of producing different 
 results ; the first and second modes in union causing 
 the first issue, and the second and third in their joint 
 action the inferior class of existences. 
 
 26. “The eye, the ear, the nose, the tongue, 
 and the skin 1 are termed the organs of intellect 
 (i buddhi ) ; the voice, the hands, the feet, (the 
 organs of) excretion and generation are called 
 the organs of action.” 
 
 27. “The manas (mind) in this respect has 
 the nature of both (classes). It is formative (or 
 determinative), and a sense-organ from having 
 cognate functions (with the other organs). It is 
 multifarious from the specific modifications of the 
 modes and the diversity of external things.” 2 
 
 28. “ The function of the five (senses), with 
 
 1 Gaudapada, whom Wilson fol- 2 Colebrooke adopts the reading 
 lows, has sparsanaka, that which bahyabhedascha and translates the 
 touches or has contact ; the skin, passage : “ They (the organs) are 
 as a sensitive organ. The MSS., numerous by specific modification 
 however, have twach, the skin, and of qualities, and so are external 
 
 this is Lassen’s reading. diversities.” Following the explana- 
 
62 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 regard to sound and other (sense-objects), is that 
 of observation only. Speech, handling, walking, 
 excretion, and generation are the functions of 
 the five (organs).” 
 
 The eye, the ear, &c., are organs of the intellect 
 ( buddhi ), because they receive sensations which are 
 transmitted through the manas to the intellect. In 
 this division the tongue is considered only as the seat 
 of the sensation of taste. The other organs are those 
 of action. The organisation by which speech is produced 
 is classed under this head, and the power or faculty 
 of speech is evidently referred to mere sensation, as 
 handling and walking. Probably Kapila meant to im- 
 ply that language, at least in its primary form, only 
 expresses what Locke calls “ sensible ” ideas ; i.e., ideas of 
 material things formed by the senses. The action of mind 
 upon language he does not allude to, and as the soul, 
 in the system of Kapila, can only contemplate, it 
 does not appear how language has passed from the ex- 
 pression of material objects to an abstract or spiritual 
 meaning. 
 
 The manas belongs to both classes. It is both an 
 organ of the intellect and an instrument of action. The 
 word by which its proper function is defined (sankal- 
 jpalca) is explained in an uncertain manner by the 
 
 tion of Vachaspati and Gaudapada, as to the reading. As the distich is 
 Lassen has lahyabhedachcha (bhedat) devoted to an explanation of the 
 and translates the line thus : “ Mul- manas, I prefer, of the two, Lassen’s 
 tifidum est (the manas ) propter interpretation and the reading on 
 diversam per qualitates mutationem which it is founded, but have given 
 et propter divisionem per res exter- a slightly different version, 
 nas.” The MSS. are equally divided 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 63 
 
 Hindu commentators. It is compounded of sam (Lat.= 
 cum) and kalpa, “ form,” from klip, to dispose, to prepare. 
 It may be translated as “ formative ” or “ plastic ; ” the 
 faculty of the manas being to collect together and 
 arrange in an idealised form the manifold impressions 
 of the senses . 1 It is the sensorium commune in the 
 system of Kapila. The Latin mens and our mind corre- 
 spond to it in origin hut not in meaning. In our 
 Western philosophy, mind is usually considered as an 
 expression for the rational faculties of the soul, and 
 as opposed to matter; but in the view of Kapila, it is 
 not a part of the soul, hut is itself a form of matter 
 from a material source ( 'Prakriti ). Its functions are 
 
 thus explained by Vachaspati: “It gives form in a 
 collective manner to that which is perceived by an 
 organ of sense, and says ‘ This is a thing ; ’ ‘ This is com- 
 pounded and that is not so,’ and it discriminates or 
 defines (a thing) by its specific or unspecific nature.” 
 The manas then is the first agent between the outer 
 world and the soul, collecting and shaping the scattered, 
 indefinite sensations of the different organs of sense. 
 
 1 Colebrooke renders the passage 
 thus : “ It (the manas) ponders, and 
 it is an organ as being cognate with 
 the rest ; ” but the manas never 
 ponders ; it is an unconscious agent, 
 whose office is merely to transmit 
 our sense-impressions, when col- 
 lected and united, through con- 
 sciousness to the intellect ( buddhi ). 
 It is an organ, not from being cog- 
 nate merely with the other organs 
 in its origin, but from having cog- 
 nate duties or functions ( sadharma ) 
 to fulfil. Lassen translates thus : 
 “ Geminag indolis inter hosce sensus 
 
 est animus (manas), et imaginans 
 est.” St. Hilaire: “Le cceur 
 
 (manas) est h la fois . . . et un 
 organe d’action et an organ d’in- 
 telligence : sa fonction est de re- 
 unir.” The Hindu commentators 
 seem to have been perplexed by the 
 secondary meaning of sanlcalpa, “ de- 
 sign,” in its twofold sense of a 
 “formed plan” or “project” and 
 “resolve.” Hence, too, they have 
 assigned the faculty of will to the 
 manas, which in Kapila’ s system is 
 unconscious and subordinate. 
 
6+ 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 It belongs, however, to that mode or constituent element 
 of Nature ( Prakriti ) which is called “ goodness.” It is, 
 therefore, not dull, inanimate matter, for this proceeds 
 from the mode called “ darkness,” but matter of a subtle, 
 elastic, animate nature. 
 
 The multifariousness mentioned in Distich 27, is often 
 understood to refer to the diversified natures of the ten 
 organs. It is so applied by Colebrooke and Professor 
 Wilson after Gaudapada. But the distich is evidently 
 devoted to a description of the manas, and the multiform 
 action is assigned in the Sankhya Pravachana Bhashya 
 more correctly to this organ alone, on "which it is im- 
 posed by the varying actions of the modes and the 
 variety of external things : “ as the same individual 
 assumes different characters according to the influence 
 of his associations, becoming a lover with his beloved, 
 a sage with sages, and a different person with others ; 
 so mind (manas) becomes various from its connection 
 with the eye or any other organ, being identified with it, 
 and being diversified by the modification of the function 
 of sight and the rest of the organs.” If, then, the manas 
 is not in action, the sensation received from an object 
 is lost, or, in the language of Locke, “perception is 
 only when the mind receives the impression.” It is 
 thus that the manas is both an organ of perception and 
 action; for it receives an impression from the senses 
 and then actively forms this impression, which before 
 “ was only as the knowledge of a child or a dumb 
 man,” into a definite form according to its properties 
 or its species. 
 
 The function of the five organs of the intellect is that 
 of observation only (alochana, seeing, observing). This 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 65 
 
 cannot be applied literally to all the senses. The meaning 
 appears to be that each organ acts passively in receiving- 
 only the sensations which affect it, as the eye receives 
 impressions of form and colour. In the Sankhya Pra- 
 vachana it is said that the senses are the instruments of 
 the soul. It is through the action of the manas and 
 buddhi that the impressions made on the senses become 
 real perceptions, if such a term can be applied to the 
 action of unconscious matter. 
 
 29. “The function (or action) of the three (in- 
 ternal organs) is the distinguishing mark (specific 
 nature J ) of each, and it is not common (to the 
 three). The common (combined) function of these 
 organs is (the production of) the five vital airs, 
 breathing and the rest.” 
 
 30. “ The function (or action) of the four (the 
 internal organs and an organ of sense) is declared 
 to be either instantaneous or consecutive with re- 
 gard to visible objects; the function of the three 
 (internal organs) with regard to an invisible object 
 is preceded by that of the fourth.” 1 2 
 
 In Distich 29 the distinct individuality of the three 
 internal organs is affirmed, i.e., their functions in the 
 formation of ideas are never interchanged ; but they 
 have a common physiological function assigned to them, 
 
 1 Swdlakshanyam, “specifische un- prior function,” but the function of 
 terschiedenheit ” (Petersburg Diet.), the three (internal organs) is pre- 
 
 2 Tatpurvika vrittih, not, as Pro- ceded by that (the action of a sense- 
 fessor Wilson translates it, “their organ). 
 
 E 
 
66 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and that is the maintenance of the five vital “ airs.” 1 The 
 word employed here ( vdyu , air or wind) does not mean 
 the elemental air, but a subtle inward force or action, 
 necessary to vitality and independent of sensation. Ac- 
 cording to Gaudapada they are — 
 
 1. Prana, breath, the ordinary inspiration and expiration. 
 
 2. Apdna, downward breath, the air or vital force acting 
 in the lower parts of the body. 
 
 3. Samdna, collective breath ; “ so named from conduct- 
 ing equally the food, &c., through the body.” 
 
 4. Udcina, ascending breath, the vital force that causes 
 the pulsations of the arteries in the upper portions of the 
 body from the navel to the head. 
 
 5. Vydna, separate breath, “ by which internal division 
 and diffusion through the body are effected.” 2 This is not 
 very intelligible, but as vydna is connected in the S. 
 Tattwa Kaumudl with the skin, the subtle nerve-force 
 by which sensibility is given to the skin or outer surface 
 of the body is probably meant. It is also connected with 
 the circulation of the blood along the surface, the great 
 arteries being under the action of udana , 3 
 
 In the absence of a precise definition of these “ airs,” a 
 variety of fanciful explanations is furnished by native 
 
 1 The maintenance of the five vital 
 airs is attributed by Gaudapada to 
 all the organs, but by the Hindu 
 commentators generally to the three 
 internal organs exclusively. Vij- 
 nana Bhikhsu, in his commentary 
 on the Sankhya Pravachana, ex- 
 pressly limits the production and 
 continuance of the vital airs to the 
 three internal organs (ii. 31). 
 
 2 Gaudapada, Wilson, p. 105. 
 
 3 In the Atma-bodha (knowledge 
 
 of the soul), a Vedantic poem as- 
 signed to the great commentator 
 Sankaracharya, the soul is said to 
 be enwrapped “ in five investing 
 sheaths or coverings ” (kosha, cf. Fr. 
 cosse ; Ir. Gael, coch-al, a pod or 
 husk). The third of these is called 
 prana-mciya, i.c., “ the sheath com- 
 posed of breath, and the other vital 
 airs associated with the organs of 
 action” (Indian Wisdom, p. 123). 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 6 7 
 
 commentators. It is evident that they denote some subtle 
 forces which cause respiration, excretion, digestion, the 
 circulation of the blood, and the sensibility of the skin 
 — an unsatisfactory kind of physiology ; but here is the 
 first germ of the science, and the “airs” of Kapila are 
 as scientific as the “ vapours ” which in the opinion of our 
 forefathers caused melancholy and other diseases. They 
 indicate a dim perception of what we call “ nerve-force,” 
 something more subtle than the elements of inanimate 
 matter; for it is caused by the action of the internal 
 organs, which are due to the agency of the mode called 
 “goodness,” i.e., matter of an etherealised and animate 
 kind. 
 
 The action of the internal organs and sensation may be 
 either instantaneous, like a flash of lightning, or gradual ; 
 “ as,” says Gaudapada, “ a person going along a road sees 
 an object at a distance, and is in doubt whether it he 
 a post or a man; he then observes some characteristic 
 marks upon it, or a bird perched there, and doubt being 
 thus dissipated by the reflection of the mind, the under- 
 standing (buddhi) discriminates that it is a post ; 1 and 
 then egotism interposes for the sake of certainty, as 
 “ Yerily (or I am certain) it is a post.” In this way the 
 functions of intellect, egotism, mind ( 'manas ), and the 
 eye are (successively) fulfilled. The doctrine of the 
 Vaiseshikas was that, in all cases, the formation of ideas 
 is a gradual process. 
 
 This observation will apply to objects that are within 
 
 1 This is Professor Wilson’s trans- comes discriminative.” The manas 
 lation of the passage. I venture to does not reflect ; it only forms a 
 translate it : “A doubt (or doubtful satikalpa, or collected form of an 
 impression) having been formed by object from the sensory impres- 
 the manas, the intellect ( buddhi ) be- sions. 
 
68 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the range of the senses at a given time. If the object he 
 not present, then the reproduction of an idea is dependent 
 on memory, for which a previous sensation is necessary. 
 Memory is therefore a revived sensation ; it is assumed 
 that this has been, by some means, unconsciously retained. 
 
 Ivapila seems to teach herein that “ nihil est in intellectu 
 quod non prius in sensu ; ” but not wholly so. He also 
 would add, “ Nisi intellectus ipse.” The soul has a distinct 
 faculty, which belongs to its own nature and is indepen- 
 dent of the inner or outer organs. It sees and understands 
 the forms of external things presented by its ministers, the 
 internal organs. The soul alone is the seat of all real 
 cognition ; it alone knows and decides ; it is therefore 
 something more than a name for a generalisation of the 
 nerve-processes of the brain, as some of our modern 
 physiologists affirm “ mind ” to be. 
 
 31. “They (the internal organs) perform each 
 his own separate function, which is caused to act 
 by a mutual impulse. The advantage of the soul 
 is their cause of action. An organ is not caused 
 to act by any one.” 
 
 The organs are defined and separate in their functions, 
 but act upon each other by a mutual impulse ( cLkuta 1 ). 
 
 1 Akuta is glossed in the Petersb. autres ” (St. Hilaire). It is composed 
 Lexicon by absicht, antrieb. Cole- of a, to, towards, and ku, to cry. 
 brooke’s translation is “ incited by Gaudapada says that it means adara- 
 mutual invitation.” Lassen has sambhrama (respectful eagerness in 
 “ ad quam cietur unum ratione al- action). 
 
 terius.” The meaning of “ incite- Colebrooke and Wilson suppose 
 ment to activity,” mentioned by that in this distich all the organs are 
 Wilson, expresses more nearly the referred to, but Gaudapada, more 
 sense of akuta. “ L’influence spon- correctly, I think, connects it with 
 tande qu’ils exercent les uns sur les the three internal organs only. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 69 
 
 This word generally implies a conscious purpose or resolve ; 
 hut as the organs are not intelligent, the term is explained 
 to mean an unconscious activity which is produced by the 
 action of one organ upon another for the fulfilment of a 
 design which is common to them all, and this is the final 
 liberation of the soul from matter. Tor this purpose they 
 act spontaneously but unconsciously, as the milk of a 
 cow is formed unconsciously in the udder and yet serves 
 to nourish the calf. They act, however, by an impulse 
 derived from their own nature, and cannot be directed by 
 any external agent. 
 
 32. “ Instrument (or organ) is of thirteen kinds, 
 and lias the property of seizing, retaining, and 
 manifesting : the effect to he produced is of ten 
 kinds, and is that which is to be seized, retained, 
 or manifested.” 
 
 33. “ The internal organs are three; the exter- 
 nal ten, 1 and these are to make known external 
 objects to the three (internal organs). The exter- 
 nal organs act only at the time present ; the 
 internal (or intermediate) at the three divisions of 
 time.” 
 
 Gaudapada refers the property of manifestation to the 
 organs of the intellect only, and those of seizing and 
 holding to the organs of action. Professor Wilson adopts 
 this view ; but the author of the “ Karika ” appears to 
 
 1 St. Hilaire translates this part The text is dasadhd vahyam , “the 
 “ 1’exterieur [organe] est simple,” external (set of organs) is in ten 
 but for what reasons he does not say. divisions. ” 
 
70 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 attribute these properties to all the organs alike. The 
 organ of sight seizes and holds the impression conveyed 
 by an external object and manifests it to the manas; 
 this organ does the same to consciousness, and the latter 
 to the intellect ( buddhi ), which, as a mirror, receives, 
 retains, and reflects the impression, which has now 
 become a definite ideal form, that the soul may see it. 
 The ten external organs are the means of making external 
 objects known to the internal, but they are limited in 
 their action to the present time, the eye receiving an 
 impression only from an object then present ; but the 
 internal organs have relation to time past, present, and 
 future. This would seem to imply that they possess 
 within themselves a power of volition, and that they are 
 the seat of memory. The manas and the other internal 
 organs appear to have impressions stamped, or (so to 
 speak) photographed upon them ; and these may be re- 
 produced without reference to time. But Kapila has not 
 attempted to determine where the power of willing resides, 
 nor has he treated of memory or imagination as a dis- 
 tinct faculty. If the soul really directs, “ as a charioteer 
 directs a chariot,” then it acts, though not as a mechanical 
 force, and the faculty of volition must belong to it. But 
 the action of the internal organs in reproducing a pre- 
 vious impression is not expressly referred to the soul, but 
 rather to the organs themselves, which, though material, 
 are thus endowed with a kind of volition . 1 
 
 i In the Sankhya Pravachana the manas. Gaudapada, however, 
 (ii. 39-41) the manas is called the attributes to each of the three inter- 
 chief of the organs, and the pos- nal organs the power of acting ac- 
 session of memory is assigned as a cording to its own nature without 
 reason for the distinction. Memory reference to time, and to buddhi 
 is therefore a quality or function of (intellect) is attributed the power 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 7i 
 
 The results of the action of the organs are tenfold, 
 according to the nature of the five organs of sensation 
 and the five of action. 
 
 34. “Of these, the five intellectual organs (or 
 organs of sensation) are the domain 1 of specific and 
 non-specific objects. 2 Speech is connected with 
 sound. The rest are connected with the five objects 
 of sense.” 
 
 35. “ Since the intellect (buddhi), with the other 
 internal organs, allies itself 3 with all objects of sense, 
 these three organs are the gatekeepers and the rest 
 are gates.” 
 
 36. “ These having different characteristic (speci- 
 fic) differences from each other, and being variously 
 affected by the modes, present the whole (of being 4 ) 
 in the ‘ intellect ’ (buddhi) for the sake of the soul, 
 enlightening it, having a likeness to a lamp.” 
 
 37. “As it is ‘intellect’ which accomplishes all 
 
 of forming an idea not only of a 
 present object, but of one past or 
 future ; so also consciousness and 
 the manas can act, and memory, or 
 imagination, in its complete form, 
 must be a product of the three. 
 
 1 Vishaya, gebiet, wirkungskreis 
 (Peters. Diet.). The meaning is, the 
 five intellectual organs have specific 
 and non-specific objects as their pro- 
 vince or domain. “ Sensuum perfi- 
 ciendi inter hos quinumprovincise sunt 
 distincta atque indistincta”(Lassen). 
 
 2 See Note A. 
 
 3 Avagahate, “adverts to (C.); 
 
 “ perlustrat ” (L.); “ embrasse ” (St. 
 H.); lit. “dives down to,” and thence, 
 “ has business with, apprehends.” 
 
 4 “ Present to the intellect the 
 soul’s whole purpose ” (Colebrooke 
 and Gaudapada). “ Universitatem 
 genii causa menti tradunt ” (Las- 
 sen). St. Hilaire has, after Cole- 
 brooke, “presentent a l’intelli- 
 gence l’objet entier de lame.” I 
 prefer Lassen’s version. The organs 
 bring all things in a definite form 
 before the soul, as a lamp reveals 
 objects, that the soul may know 
 both them and itself. 
 
72 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the fruition of the soul, so also it is that which dis- 
 criminates the subtle difference between the chief 
 principle ( Pradhana — Prakriti ) and the soul.” 
 
 There is much uncertainty about the meaning of the 
 “ specific ” and “ non-specific ” objects mentioned in Distich 
 34. G-audapada, whose explanation is quoted by Professor 
 Wilson, affirms that specific objects are those which are 
 perceived by men, and those which are non-specific are 
 seen only by the gods. This is nothing more than a 
 guess, which proves that the original meaning of the 
 words had been lost. In the 38th distich those 
 
 objects which have no specific marks are the subtle 
 elements of matter, and Kapila’s meaning appears to be 
 (as M. St. Hilaire has suggested), that the organs of 
 sensation (or of “ intellect ”) have a relation to these as 
 well as to the gross elements. For example, the gross 
 element ether is produced from a subtle element called 
 “ sound.” The doctrine of Kapila seems to be, that in 
 hearing, the ear has a relation not only to the ether, but 
 to the subtler principle that underlies it; a dim appre- 
 hension of the truth that hearing depends not only on 
 some channel of communication between the ear and the 
 source of sound, but on some modification of the material 
 element through which the sound is conducted. This 
 explanation is supported by the S. Tattwa Kaumudl, 
 which identifies specific with corporeal objects, and non- 
 specific with subtle, rudimental objects, the latter being 
 seen only by holy men and gods. This clause Kapila 
 would reject, for he set knowledge and philosophers above 
 virtue and holy men, and is silent about the gods. He 
 appears to have supposed that a high power of physical 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 73 
 
 discernment is possible to those who are sufficiently en- 
 lightened by knowledge. 
 
 Speech has reference only to sound, i.e., we can only 
 hear it ; but the remaining four organs of action may be 
 connected with all the five kinds of sensation; “as in 
 the combination of sound, touch, colour, smell, taste in 
 objects like a water-jar and others, which may be taken 
 hold of by the hand.” 1 
 
 All the organs are affected by the modes or constituents 
 of Nature; they are only modifications of these three 
 kinds of matter. They may, therefore, cause pleasure, 
 pain, and insensibility. 
 
 The succession of the agencies by which the soul is 
 reached is thus stated by Vachaspati: “As the headmen 
 of the village collect the taxes from the villagers and 
 pay them to the governor of the district; as the local 
 governor pays the amount to the minister, and the 
 minister receives it for the use of the king; so the 
 manas having received ideas from the external organs 
 transfers them to consciousness, and consciousness de- 
 livers them to intellect ( buddhi ), the general superin- 
 tendent, who takes charge of them for the use of the 
 sovereign, soul .” 2 The intellect is, therefore, the soul’s 
 chief officer, its direct agent, and presents all that it 
 receives, as in a mirror, to the gaze of the soul ; not 
 for the purpose, however, of adding to its treasures, 
 but simply to free it by knowledge from contact with 
 matter . 3 It has thus the means of discriminating be- 
 
 1 S. Tattwa Kaumudl, Wilson, ( buddhi ) merely represents sensa- 
 
 p. 1 15. tional ideas in a complete form to 
 
 2 Wilson, p. 1 1 7. the gaze of the soul, and the soul 
 
 3 The mental physiology of Ka- never acts. It does not appear, 
 pila is imperfect. The “ intellect ” therefore, how abstract ideas are 
 
74 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 tween matter and itself in order to discern its own 
 higher nature. This knowledge does not lead to virtue 
 or piety. Gaudapada says that it is gained only by 
 those who practise religious austerities; but here, as 
 in other places, he misinterprets Kapila, to whom re- 
 ligion was neither a means nor an end. It has an 
 inferior place in his system. Virtue and religion may 
 do something, by causing the attainment of a happier 
 birth, but by knowledge only can the soul attain to 
 its final liberation. 
 
 38. “ From these five subtle elements, which 
 are non-specific, proceed the five gross elements 
 ( bhutdni ), which are called ‘specific.’ They are 
 (in their nature) tranquil, violent, and stupefying.” 
 
 The five gross elements and the five subtle elements 
 which underlie them have been explained in page 20. 
 The subtle elements are said to be non-specific. This 
 is explained to mean that “ they have only one quality 
 or mode, which is not affected by change, and by which 
 no feeling of pleasure, pain, or stupidity can be pro- 
 duced.” But it belongs to the nature of any mode or 
 constituent of Nature to produce some effect of this kind. 
 Vijnana Bhikshu explains the term “non-specific” by 
 saying that “ the subtle elements are not affected by 
 the modes ; that they have an unchanging nature ; but 
 the gross elements change in their nature and effects 
 according to circumstances. Thus the wind is agree- 
 
 o o 
 
 formed, or by what means a course called chitta, the thinking or rea- 
 of reasoning can be carried on. The soning faculty, 
 
 Vedantists add a fourth faculty 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 75 
 
 able to a person oppressed by heat, disagreeable to 
 one that is cold, and when tempestuous or loaded with 
 clouds of sand or dust, it is stupefying.” As the subtle 
 elements never come into contact with the bodily organs, 
 they cannot cause any sensations, of whatever kind, though 
 the gods, and sometimes even sages, may perceive them 
 and receive pleasure from them . 1 They must also be 
 affected by the modes, for these form every development 
 of Nature, as they are from Nature itself. We may 
 best translate these terms by “diversified” and “non- 
 diversified.” The subtle elements have each only one 
 nature and one effect. The gross elements may have 
 various effects, and become changed in kind by com- 
 mingling in various degrees. 
 
 39. “ Subtle (bodies), those which are born of 
 father and mother, with the gross forms of exist- 
 ence, 2 are the threefold species (of bodies). Of 
 these, the subtle are permanent ; those which are 
 born of father and mother perish.” 
 
 40. “ The subtle (body) linga, formed prime vally, 
 unconfined, permanent, composed of ‘ intellect ’ and 
 the rest, down to the subtle elements, migrates, 
 
 1 Lassen supposes that three kinds 
 of gross elemental bodies are here 
 defined, the subtle being only subtle 
 relatively, or in comparison with 
 
 uterine and other bodies or sub- 
 stances ; but the linga is not formed 
 of the gross elements; it is a com- 
 pound of the substance of the three 
 internal organs and of the finer ele- 
 ments called tanmatrani. All are 
 bodies or developed forms, but not 
 of the same materials. 
 
 2 Saha prabhiitais. Prahhuta, that 
 which is brought into being, often 
 used with an idea of multitude con- 
 nected with it; “in grossem Maase 
 vorhanden ” (St. Peters. Lex. ). Cole- 
 brooke has “ together with the great 
 elements;” Lassen, “crassa” simply. 
 The reference is not to the gross ele- 
 ments, but to the substances formed 
 from them. 
 
76 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 never enjoys, and is endowed with dispositions” 
 (blidvas). 
 
 After dividing the elements into two classes — those 
 which have no specific marks and those which have 
 such marks — the Sankhya philosophy divides the latter 
 into three divisions: (i.) Subtle bodies; (2.) those which 
 are horn of father and mother ; and (3.) gross substances 
 or inorganic matter. By the first is meant the subtle 
 or rudimental body called lihga, which forms a curious 
 element in the Sankhya philosophy. It is a kind of 
 “ spiritual ” body formed from “ intellect ” (buddhi), 
 egoism, the manas, and the subtle elements. It always 
 accompanies the soul as an outward covering or form 
 in migrating to another body. It becomes “ specific ” 
 by the aggregation of the subtle elements, which in 
 themselves are “ non-specific ” or undiversified. Each 
 lingo is inseparably connected with its appropriate soul, 
 whose minister it is, until it is no longer required. It 
 has a separate existence from the body which is pro- 
 duced in the womb of the mother. The latter dies and 
 has no more distinct existence, but the lingo, never dies ; 
 it migrates with the soul. It is endowed with a separate 
 vitality of a subtle kind, but still material, for it is formed 
 from elements which proceed from Prakriti, but not of the 
 later or grosser development. 1 It is capable, therefore, of 
 
 1 “ Let us begin by supposing that some way stored up in that organ 
 we possess a frame, or the rudiments so as to produce what may be termed 
 of a frame, connecting us with the our material or physical memory, 
 invisible universal, which we may Other parts of these motions are, 
 call the spiritual body.” “ Now, however, communicated to the spi- 
 each thought that we think is accom- ritual or invisible body, and are 
 panied by certain molecular motions there stored up, forming a memory 
 and displacements in the brain, and which may be made use of when 
 part of these, let us allow, are in that body is free to exercise its 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 77 
 
 rising to the heaven of Indra or to other celestial abodes, 
 though it may descend to the vilest human forms, or even 
 to the bodies of beasts and reptiles. Kapila does not 
 appear to recognise the possibility of the soul existing 
 independent of material conditions until it has been pre- 
 pared for its solitary but perfect state by a knowledge of 
 the nature of the outer world and its own higher nature. 
 
 The linga was created primevally, or with the first 
 emanations of Nature ( Prakriti ). Its period is there- 
 fore indefinite. 
 
 It is unconfined, i.e., it is not confined to one body ; 
 it is capable of passing into any number of bodies or 
 to any region. 
 
 It is permanent, continuing to be the attendant of 
 the soul until the latter has attained by knowledge to 
 a perfect liberation from all matter. The linga is then 
 resolved into Nature again. 
 
 It does not enjoy or possess, for it is only the hand- 
 maid or minister of the true sovereign, the soul. 
 
 It is of a subtle nature, being formed from the primary 
 emanations of Nature, “ intellect muddhi) and the rest.” 
 Hence it has dispositions or forms of being ( 'bhavas ), 
 as virtue and other faculties or powers. As the S. 
 Tattwa Kaumudl explains its nature, it is “ through 
 the influence of intellect (buddhi) that the whole of 
 the subtle body is affected by dispositions or conditions, 
 in the same manner as a garment is perfumed by con- 
 tact with a fragrant cliampa flower.” 1 
 
 functions ” (The Unseen Universe, 1 The Bauliinia variegata of Lin- 
 p. 159.) This “spiritual body” naeus. It is called Tcovidara in the 
 answers to the linga, which carries Asiat. lies. (iv. 285) ; a leguminous 
 into another state of being the feel- plant ; “ flowers chiefly purplish and 
 ings and habits of a previous state. rose-coloured, fragrant.” 
 
78 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 41. “As a painting does not stand without a 
 support or receptacle, 1 nor a shadow without a 
 stake, &c., so the linga does not exist unsupported, 
 without specific elements.” 
 
 42. “Formed for the sake of the soul, the 
 linga , by the connection of means and their re- 
 sults, and by union with the predominant power 
 of Nature, plays its part like a dramatic actor.” 
 
 It is affirmed in Distich 41 that the linga cannot 
 exist alone. It needs a support or receptacle, but what 
 kind of support is not clearly defined. Gaudapada reads 
 aviseshairvina, “without unspecific elements,” i.e., the 
 subtle elements of material things ( tanmatra ). The 
 
 usual reading is “ without specific elements,” i.e., “ with- 
 out the grosser elements,” as the word is usually trans- 
 lated, but here it means, I think, as in Distich 38, 
 specific forms, which are usually of the gross elements. 
 The linga alone cannot perform any functions ; it 
 must be joined to or enveloped in the linga-sarlra 
 (linga-body, 2 ) by which it acts. And this body, when 
 
 1 Nirairayam, without a receptacle, 
 i.e., the linga-iarira. The support 
 or receptacle for a picture seems to 
 mean a frame in which it may be 
 fixed ; but Colebrooke translates the 
 word by “ ground,” and the authors 
 of the Peters. Diet, interpret the 
 passage by “ wie ein Bild ohne L T n- 
 terlage ” (s. v. asraya). Vijnana 
 Bihkshu (Com. Sank. Pravachana 
 
 iii. 9) makes the linga to be formed 
 of seventeen principles or factors, 
 the “ eleven organs, the five subtle 
 elements and buddhi (intellect). 
 
 Self-consciousness or egoism is in- 
 cluded in the latter.” He explains 
 the support which the linga requires 
 to be that of the gross body. 
 
 2 The linga and the linga-sarlra 
 (linga - body) are sometimes con- 
 founded ; but the liiiga is a rudi- 
 mental substance, sometimes com- 
 pared to light, and the linga-sarira 
 is its vehicle. “ When a dead body 
 is burnt by one who knows and can 
 repeat these verses (Smarta-sutra, 
 x. 18, II, and x. 14, 7-1 1) properly, 
 then it is certain the soul (invested 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 79 
 
 deposited in the maternal womb, is connected with 
 another body produced in the womb of the mother from 
 cross elements. 
 
 O 
 
 This distinction between gross and subtle bodies runs 
 through the whole of Hindu philosophy. It is trans- 
 ferred to other worlds. According to the Institutes of 
 Manu, a subtle body envelops the souls of the wicked, 
 that they may suffer the torments of hell . 1 
 
 This subtle body plays many parts as an actor, in 
 order that the destinies of the soul may be fulfilled, 
 either in successive forms of an united existence, or in 
 a final deliverance from matter. Sometimes it dwells 
 in noble, and at other times ignoble forms, according 
 to the virtues or vices of a former life. These vicissi- 
 tudes are undergone by the agency of a peculiar energy 
 or attribute (vibhuti) of Nature, to whom here a pre- 
 siding power is given. The linga is the receptacle of 
 the soul, giving it a kind of attributive or conditioned 
 nature by contact, and it bears the soul, which never 
 
 with a kind of subtle body) rises 
 along with the smoke to heaven ” 
 (Indian Wisdom, p. 206). Professor 
 Williams adds, “ The eighth Sutra 
 of chap. iv. states that a hole ought 
 to be dug north-eastward of the 
 Ahavaniya fire and strewn with the 
 plants Avaka and Slpala ; and the 
 commentator adds that the soul of 
 the dead man, invested with its 
 vehicular subtle body (called ativa- 
 hika and sometimes adhishthana, and 
 distinct from the linga or sukshma, 
 being anguslitha-matra, ‘ of the size 
 of a thumb ’), waits in this hole until 
 the gross body is burnt, and then 
 emerging, is carried with the smoke 
 to heaven.” 
 
 The Hindu commentators are 
 much perplexed by the word “ spe- 
 cific ” being applied to the subtle 
 body of the linga. There is, how- 
 ever, no real inconsistency in the 
 language of Iswara Krishna. The 
 subtle body which is the envelope of 
 the linga is specific or diversified 
 by being formed of diverse elements, 
 though each element is unspecific. 
 On this is based the personality of 
 each individual, for these elements 
 may be combined in various degrees. 
 
 1 Manu, xii. 16. This body is 
 said to be formed of the five gross 
 elements ( matrani ), not “ (nerves 
 of) five sensations,” as SirC. Haugh- 
 ton translates the word. 
 
8o 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 acts, from one body to another. It forms the personaht)'- 
 of each individual. 
 
 43. “ Conditions or states of being are trans- 
 cendental, natural, and modified. These (last) 
 are virtue and the rest. They must be considered 
 as including cause (lit. cause-receptacle), and 
 those which belong to the uterine germ and the 
 rest of the gross body as including (or belonging 
 to) effect.” 1 
 
 44. “ By virtue an ascent to a higher region is 
 obtained ; by vice a descent into a lower. Deli- 
 verance is gained by knowledge, and bondage by 
 the contrary.” 
 
 45. “ By the absence (or destruction) of passion 
 there is a dissolution of Nature ( Prakriti 2 ) or 
 (the power of Nature is destroyed). Transmi- 
 
 1 Colebrooke’s translation is, “ Es- 
 sential dispositions are innate. In- 
 cidental, as virtue and the rest, 
 are considered appurtenant to the 
 instrument.” The meaning of the 
 distich is that there are conditions 
 or states of being in every specific 
 existence, but that they differ in 
 their nature and their source. 
 
 2 Lassen’s translation is, “ placi- 
 ditatedeletur potentia naturae.” The 
 original is vairdgyat pralritilayah 
 (from the absence of passion is 
 nature - dissolution). The Hindu 
 commentators interpret the words 
 to mean that by dispassion an ab- 
 sorption into Nature is gained, i.e., 
 of the subtle body as well as the 
 gross, but that final deliverance is 
 
 not hereby gained. So says Vijnana 
 Bhikshu : “ In the absence of know- 
 ledge of the distinction (between 
 Soul and Nature), when indifference 
 towards Mind, &c., has resulted 
 from devotion to Nature, then ab- 
 sorption into Nature takes place ; 
 for it is declared, ‘ Through dispas- 
 sion there is absorption into Nature.’ 
 Even through this, i.e., absorption 
 into the cause, the end is not gained, 
 because there is a rising again as in 
 the case of one who has dived ” 
 (Comm, on Sank. Prav., Ballantyne, 
 p. 92). This statement is made 
 because it is a cardinal doctrine of 
 the Sankhya philosophy that tho 
 final liberation of the soul from 
 matter can only be gained by know- 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 81 
 
 gration is from disorderly passion. By power we 
 o-ain destruction of obstacles, and the reverse by 
 the contrary.” 
 
 These conditions or states of being are either innate 
 or constructive (modified). To the former class belong : 
 (i.) The transcendental state ( sansiddhika ), obtained only 
 by sages, or, as Gaudapada supposes, by the great sage 
 Kapila ; (2.) that which is natural ( prdkritika ), or the 
 state at birth caused by virtue or vice in a previous 
 existence. The constructive or modified condition (vaih- 
 ritiJca ) is gained by other means, as by knowledge ob- 
 tained from a tutor. 
 
 The modified conditions are : (1.) Intellectual, as virtue 
 and the rest, i.c., virtue, knowledge, absence of passion, 
 power and their contraries. These conditions have the 
 nature of cause or instrument, for they produce a higher 
 or lower state in a subsequent life, or even final deliver- 
 ance from matter. (2.) Other superadded conditions 
 belong to the generated body and the progress from 
 infancy to old age. These have only the nature of effect. 
 They are due to external circumstances, and do not 
 produce anything. 
 
 By virtue (dharma), as a cause, the soul and its subtle 
 body, the linga-sarira, may rise to a higher state, either 
 upon earth, or in one of the eight heavens, or supra- 
 mundane abodes. These are : — 
 
 ledge. It does not, however, recog- the meaning is, “ By the destruction 
 nise any absorption of the subtle of passion the influence of the ma- 
 body into Nature until the soul is terial world ( Prakriti ) is destroyed, 
 entirely free ; and hence, notwith- and the soul is independent, though 
 standing the general consensus of not yet finally liberated.” See Dis- 
 Hindu commentators, I think Las- tich 67. 
 sen's translation is correct, and that 
 
 F 
 
82 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 i. The region of the Pisachas, who are genii of the 
 lowest class. 
 
 2 and 3. The regions of the Pbikshasas and the Yak- 
 shas, of a higher class. 
 
 4. That of the Gandharvas, a kind of demigods, the 
 musicians of the higher class of deities. 
 
 5. The heaven of Indra (the Sun). 
 
 6. That of Soma (the moon). 
 
 7. That of the Prajapatis, the abode of the Pitris, or 
 early fathers of mankind, and of the Rishis (holy sages). 
 
 8. That of Brahma, the highest heaven. 
 
 If, however, the soul is degraded by vice, it may descend 
 to the form of an animal, or it may dwell for a time in the 
 lower regions. Virtue and vice, though not clearly defined, 
 have therefore an influence on the soul’s future state, but 
 the final deliverance from matter, when the soul attains to 
 an eternal state of isolated self-existence, can only be 
 obtained by a knowledge of Soul as distinct from Matter. 
 Bondage 1 is the union of the soul with matter, though the 
 matter may be only the subtle body of the lihga, and the 
 place of abode may be the heaven of Brahma. 
 
 By attaining to a complete suppression of passion, it is 
 possible to gain a perfect freedom from the dominion of 
 Nature or the external world, an absolute loosening of 
 the bonds by which the soul is bound to material con- 
 
 1 The bondage that comes from by an union with a bodily form for 
 ignorance, according to Vachaspati, various periods. The state of the 
 has three degrees : (i.) The bondage first is almost hopeless, but the 
 of the Materialists, who assume that period of bondage for the second 
 matter is the whole of being ; (2.) of class is said to be ten manwantaras 
 those who consider the soul to be one or 3,084,480,000 years (Wilson, p. 
 of the products of Nature ( Prakriti ); 145 ; St. Hilaire, p. 180). The time 
 
 (3.) of those who, not knowing the of this penance is not, however, quite 
 nature of the soul, practise moral and so long. The manwantara is a period 
 religious observances from the hope of 4,320,000 years, 
 of gain. These errors confine the soul 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 83 
 
 ditions. The common Hindu interpretation of the pas- 
 sage is, that for a time all the elements which form any 
 envelopment of the soul are absorbed into Nature (Pra- 
 kriti), but they are re-formed again until the soul has gained 
 the knowledge by which alone it can be finally liberated 
 from matter. 
 
 Supernatural power may also be gained, and then 
 matter, in all its varied forms, can offer no impediment 
 to the movements of the spiritualised body, which is no 
 longer subject to the laws of the material world; but, 
 on the other hand, there may be a contrary state, in 
 which every obstacle may bar its course. 
 
 46. “ This is an intellectual production (or 
 evolved state) which is distinguished by the names 
 of obstruction, incapacity, acquiescence (or content- 
 ment), and perfection. By the hostile influence 
 (■ vimarda , destruction, ravage, hostile attack) of 
 modal inequalities (or specific differences) the 
 different kinds are fifty.” 
 
 47. “There are five kinds of obstruction, and, 
 from the imperfection of instruments or organs, 
 twenty-eight of incapacity ; acquiescence has nine 
 divisions, and perfection eight.” 
 
 48. “ There are eight divisions of obscurity, and 
 also of illusion ; those of extreme illusion are ten ; 
 those of gloom and utter darkness are eighteen in 
 each case.” 
 
 49. “ The destructive injuries of the eleven 
 senses, with those of the intellect ( buddhi ), are 
 
8 4 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 accounted as ‘incapacity.’ The seventeen (in- 
 juries) of the intellect are from the opposites of 
 acquiescence and perfection.” 
 
 50. “ Nine varieties of acquiescence are set 
 forth ; four internal, named from Nature, means, 
 time, and fortune ; five external, relating to absti- 
 nence from objects of sense.” 
 
 The 46th and following distichs form the outline of a 
 Hindu system for “ the conduct of the human understand- 
 ing; ’’but as they stand, they are too indefinite to have 
 any practical value, and the commentators are not agreed 
 in all points as to the right meaning. 
 
 In the phrase “ intellectual production ” (jpratyaya sarga). 
 the first part represents luddlii, the faculty by which modi- 
 fied sensations are presented as ideas to the gaze of the 
 soul. “ By intellectual production,” says Professor Wilson, 
 “ are to be understood the various accidents of human life 
 occasioned by the operations of the intellect or the exer- 
 cise of its faculties, virtue, knowledge, impassiveness, and 
 power, or their contraries.” It denotes rather new condi- 
 tions or modifications of the intellect itself, which by the 
 varied action of the modes may be differently formed or 
 modified. 1 
 
 “Obstruction” is explained by Vachaspati as “igno- 
 rance ; ” by Gaudapada as “ doubt.” It is whatever is 
 opposed to the soul’s purpose of final liberation from 
 contact with matter. 
 
 Incapacity ( asalcti ) arises from the imperfection of the 
 senses. Acquiescence or contentment ( tushti ) is a passive 
 
 1 Lassen calls the results “mentis conditiones speciales,’’ p. 46. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 85 
 
 state of the intellect. Perfection (siddhi) means perfect 
 knowledge, not completeness in moral virtue. 
 
 The fifty different varieties of these states are defined 
 in the following distichs. 
 
 The five kinds of obstruction, according to Gaudapada, 
 are obscurity, illusion, extreme illusion, gloom, and utter 
 darkness, which are explained below. The school of 
 Patanjali defines them as ignorance, self-love, love, hatred, 
 and fear. The eight varieties of obscurity correspond, it is 
 said, to the first eight forms of matter. A person may 
 think, for instance, that the soul merges into ISTature, 
 intellect, consciousness, or the five rudimental elements, 
 and each of these obscurities or errors obstructs the soul 
 in its efforts for final liberation. 
 
 Illusion is defined to be the error which induces men 
 to seek for the eight degrees of supernatural power (see 
 p. 58). The soul is thus drawn aside from its proper aim. 
 
 Extreme illusion is the error of seeking happiness in 
 sensual objects, and is interpreted as being tenfold, be- 
 cause gods and men may seek happiness in the pleasures 
 of the senses, and thus there may be a double series of 
 errors arising from the five senses. Thus say all the com- 
 mentators ; but more probably, as M. St. Hilaire has 
 suggested, reference is here made to the five organs of 
 sense and the five organs of action. 
 
 Gloom ( [tamisra ) is interpreted “ hate,” and the explana- 
 tion is, that a man may hate the ten senses or organs, and 
 the eight degrees of supernatural power. He may thus be 
 as much disturbed and drawn away from his proper aim 
 as by the influence of love. The highest state to which 
 he can attain next to Nirvana is one of pure contempla- 
 tion, in which nothing is hated or loved. 
 
86 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Utter darkness ( andhatdmisra , lit. tlie darkness of the 
 blind) is terror. It may be the fear of death in men, and 
 in gods the fear of being expelled from heaven by the 
 Asuras ; in each case it is the loss of pleasure or power 
 which is feared ; and as their sources are eighteen in num- 
 ber , 1 there are so many varieties of “ utter darkness.” 
 
 The destructive injuries of the eleven organs, i.e., of the 
 organs of sense and action with the manas, are deafness, 
 blindness, paralysis, loss of taste and smell, dumbness, 
 mutilation, lameness, constipation, impotence, and in- 
 sanity. The injuries of the intellect are the inversed or 
 evil forms of acquiescence, of which there are nine 
 varieties, and of perfection, of which there are eight. 
 These states of acquiescence are both internal and ex- 
 ternal. The internal kind is fourfold. A man may 
 believe, for instance, that Nature does everything and 
 will in time procure the liberation of the soul; he 
 remains, therefore, passive. Or he may rest satisfied with 
 the efficacy of some religious or ascetic observances, or 
 in the idea that liberation will necessarily come in time, 
 or by an accident of fortune. 
 
 The five external inversions of acquiescence are abstin- 
 ence from the five kinds of sensuous pleasure, not from a 
 right idea of their obstructive nature, but merely from a 
 desire to avoid the trouble and anxiety which they may 
 cause by the indulgence of them. 
 
 51. “ The eight perfections (or means of acquir- 
 
 1 They are, according to Gauda- He explains “utter darkness” as 
 pada, the eight sources of super- profound grief, such as might be 
 natural power and the ten objects of felt by one who dies in the midst of 
 perception, or the five objects of all sensual delights, 
 sense, twice told, to gods and men. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 8 7 
 
 ing perfection) are reasoning ( uha ), word or oral 
 instruction ( sabda ), study or reading (adhyayana), 
 the suppression of the three kinds of pain, ac- 
 quisition of friends and liberality ( dana ). The 
 three fore-mentioned (conditions) are checks to 
 perfection.” 
 
 The fore-mentioned conditions are the several varieties 
 of obstruction, incapacity, and acquiescence. They are 
 all checks or hindrances in the pursuit of perfect know- 
 ledge. Kapila now defines the eight methods or means 
 of attaining it. 
 
 Vachaspati interprets the first source of perfect know- 
 ledge, “reasoning,” to be “investigation of scriptural 
 authority by dialectics which are not contrary to the 
 scriptures ; ” 1 but this gloss is evidently due to the 
 Vedantist views of the commentator. In placing reason 
 as the first source of perfection, Kapila meant to ignore 
 the Vedas, or to place them on a lower scale. Human 
 reason is the highest power which his system acknow- 
 ledges. It is sufficient to determine what is truth, 
 or at least it is the supreme judge of truth and error, 
 in all that can be known. But its capacity has no 
 defined limits. Such questions as “ What am I ? ” 
 “ Whence have I come ? ” “ What is the true purpose of 
 my existence and of all existence ? ” might be answered, 
 he supposed, by the reason, if not alone, yet as para- 
 mount over all other means. But the knowledge gained 
 by reason, though far above virtue, is not man’s highest 
 state : it is only a means to the final deliverance of 
 
 1 Wilson, p. 158. 
 
83 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 the soul, which will then exist in a state wholly 
 independent, without motion, or consciousness, or know- 
 ledge ; a state of eternal calmness and repose. 
 
 Word ( sabda ) is receiving instruction from a teacher. 
 The suppression of the three kinds of pain (see Distich 
 i), forms one of the means of acquiring perfection by 
 taking away an obstacle to thought or meditation. 
 
 Intercourse with friends is sometimes limited to philo- 
 sophical discussions with a teacher or fellow-student. 
 
 Liberality ( dcina ) is explained as giving money or other 
 offerings to a teacher or to religious devotees ; a Brah- 
 manic gloss. Vachaspati and Narayana, however, explain 
 the word as meaning purity ( suddhi ), deriving it from the 
 root daip, 1 to purify, and not from da, to give. M. St. 
 Hilaire approves of this interpretation. Professor Wilson 
 does not reject it. It is, however, contrary both to sound 
 philology and to all we know of Kapila’s views of morality. 
 It is due to Pataiijali, the author or expounder of the 
 theistic branch of the Sankhya school. He, however, 
 defines purity to be “undisturbedness of discriminative 
 knowledge through long - continued and uninterrupted 
 practice of veneration.” Kapila would have admitted the 
 ultimate point in this definition, but he nowhere speaks 
 of veneration as a means of gaining it, nor did he admit a 
 Supreme Spirit as the object of veneration. 
 
 52. “Without dispositions or states of being 
 there would be no linga, and without the linga no 
 development or manifestation of conditions (dis- 
 positions) ; whence comes a double creation — one 
 
 1 This root seems to be coined for the occasion. I have not been able to 
 find it in any dictionary, Indian or European. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 89 
 
 called personal (of the Hit get), and the other condi- 
 tional (of the dispositions, bhavds) ” 
 
 In Distichs 40 and 43 it is stated that the lingo, migrates, 
 invested with dispositions, according to the conditions of 
 the intellect ( "buddhi ), but the effect of these conditions or 
 states of a former being cannot be made manifest except 
 in or by a bodily form, and hence the necessity of the 
 lingo. 
 
 The second clause is translated by Colebrooke and 
 Wilson, “ Without person there would be no pause 
 (nirvritti) of dispositions.” Wilson explains the passage 
 in his comment on Gaudapada’s exposition thus : This 
 creation of the lingo is not “ indispensable for the exist- 
 ence or exercise of the intellectual conditions or senti- 
 ments alone, but is equally necessary for their occasional 
 cessation ; thus virtue and vice and the rest necessarily 
 imply and occasion bodily condition ; bodily condition is 
 productive of acts of vice and virtue.” 1 But here there 
 is no cessation, but production of intellectual conditions. 
 Lassen’s translation of the passage is, “ ISTec sine corpusculo 
 conditionum manifestatio ; ” and in his notes he remarks 
 
 1 Professor Wilson, having failed 
 to perceive the meaning of the pas- 
 sage, has translated incorrectly, I 
 think, the comment of Gaudapada: 
 “ Without person, without rudi- 
 mental creation, there would be no 
 pause of dispositions, from the in- 
 dispensability of virtue and vice for 
 the attainment of either subtle or 
 gross body.” I translate the pas- 
 sage thus: “Without the linga , which 
 is formed of the finer elements 
 ( tanmatrani ), there is no develop- 
 ment of dispositions ( bhavds ), and 
 
 there would be no beginning of 
 virtue and the rest without a com- 
 plete formation of subtle and gross 
 body ” (na sthulasukshmadehasad- 
 byatwaddharmaderanaditwachcha). 
 The soul per se knows nothing of 
 virtue or vice. Each is possible only 
 by its union with the subtle body 
 the linga, and the grosser uterine 
 body. On the other hand, but for 
 the necessity of these conditions 
 there would be no occasion for the 
 linga. 
 
go 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 “ Nirvritti est manifestatio, evolutio, originario vocabuli 
 sensu,” referring to Manu i. 31. The translation of the 
 word in the Petersburg Lex. is “ fertigwerden,” “ ausbil- 
 dung.” The meaning of the distich then becomes evident. 
 There is a continual action and reaction of intellectual 
 and personal states, the first causing the latter, and the 
 latter giving manifestation to the former. There is there- 
 fore a constant double creation, the bhavdkhya (or disposi- 
 tional) and the lihgakya (of the subtle body, linga). 
 
 Some commentators make the linga itself to be buddhi 
 (intellect) and bhavas to be its conditions. The former 
 interpretation is preferable, for the linga, though formed 
 of the intellect and other internal organs, is yet something 
 different from them. It is, moreover, conditioned by the 
 state of a former life, whicli is due to “ intellect.” 
 
 53. “The divine class has eight varieties; the 
 animal, 1 five. Mankind is single in its class. This 
 is, in summary, the world ( sarga , emanation) of 
 living things.” 
 
 54. “ In the higher world, the quality (or mode) 
 called ‘ goodness ’ prevails ; below, the creation 
 abounds in ‘ darkness in the midst, ‘foulness’ or 
 ‘ passion ’ abounds. Brahma and the rest (of the 
 gods) and a stock form the limits.” 2 
 
 1 Tairyagyonas, “grovelling” (Cole- in Beziehung stehend), from tiryaga 
 brooke); “inhumana” (Lassen); “nds (beast) and yoni (womb), 
 de la matrice” (St. Hilaire). The 2 Colebrooke’s translation is, “In the 
 last is certainly wrong, for it would midst is the predominance of foul- 
 include mankind. The Petersburg ness, from Brahma to a stock;” and 
 
 Diet, translates it, “standing in Professor Wilson translates Gauda- 
 relation to beasts ” (zu den Thieren pada’s commentary thus: “In the 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 The gods are only a created order ( sargct , emanation). 
 The genii or superhuman beings, such as the Yakshas and 
 Bakshasas, are included in this class. For the eight 
 grades up to Brahma, see p. 53. 
 
 The low or grovelling class has five genera or divisions : 
 (1.) domestic animals (pasu) ; (2.) wild animals, such as 
 deer (mriga) and the rest; (3.) birds; (4.) reptiles, includ- 
 ing fishes (. samsripa ); and (5.) fixed things ( sthdvara ), 
 vegetables and minerals. 
 
 Man stands alone between these two classes, forming 
 an order by himself. The mode or quality of “ good- 
 ness ” is only, it must be remembered, a light, elastic, 
 etherealised kind of matter, favourable to virtue, but not 
 of a moral nature in itself. Some of the supposed 
 superhuman beings are neither virtuous nor beneficent ; 
 on the contrary, they are often evil and malignant. 
 Man is under the influence of the active mode, “ passion,” 
 and therefore he is miserable. Animals and inanimate 
 things are formed from the mode “ darkness ; ” they are 
 therefore stupid or insensate. 
 
 55. “There (in the world of men) the sentient 
 (or intelligent) sonl experiences pain arising from 
 old age and death until the linga has ceased to he ; 
 wherefore pain is from the nature of the (linga).” 
 
 midst, in man, foulness predominates, 
 although goodness and darkness exist, 
 and hence men for the most part 
 suffer pain. Such is the world, 
 from Brahma to a stocJc, from Brahma 
 to immovable things.” “In the midst” 
 certainly means in the earth, which 
 is between heaven and the lower 
 regions, and Brahma does not belong 
 
 to it, but to the region “above.” 
 Gaudapada’s comment is, “This, i.e., 
 from Brahma to a stock, is equivalent 
 to from Brahma to immovable (in- 
 animate) things.” In the S. Prava- 
 chana (iii. 50) it is said, “ In the 
 midst ” passion “ abounds,” i.e., as 
 Vijnana Bhikshu interprets the pas- 
 sage, “ in the world of mortals.” 
 
92 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Here is the climax of the Sankhya philosophy, the 
 liberation of the soul from every kind or form of matter 
 even that of its subtle vehicle the linga. It is from 
 contact with matter that pain arises. The soul knows 
 nothing of decay or pain in itself, hut the linga is so 
 closely connected with it that it becomes sensible of 
 the imperfections and pains that belong to bodily condi- 
 tions by this union . 1 But when at length, by full know- 
 ledge, the soul escapes from “ the body of this death,” it 
 knows pain no more; the linga is then absorbed again 
 in Nature ( Prakriti ). Kapila, however, does not say where 
 the soul exists after its final severance from matter. 
 
 56. “ Thus this (development of being), formed 
 from Nature (Prakriti), from the great principle 
 (Buddhi, intellect) down to specific beings, is for 
 the deliverance of each individual soul. This 
 action ( drambha , effort) is for another, as if for 
 itself (Nature).” 
 
 57. “As the production of milk, which is un- 
 intelligent (unknowing), causes the growth of the 
 calf, so the development 2 of Nature causes the 
 liberation of the soul.” 
 
 58. “ As people engage in acts that they make 
 desires to cease, so does the undeveloped principle 
 (Prakriti) for the liberation of the soul.” 
 
 1 “ So long as we are entangled the diseases which fall upon it are 
 and oppressed by the body, we shall constant interruptions. It fills us 
 never arrive at the point which we with desires, cravings, fears, delu- 
 aim at, namely, at truth. The body is sions, follies ” (Plato, Phaedo, c. 28). 
 a constant enemy to us. The neces- 2 Pravritti (flowing forth, emana- 
 sity of providing for its wants and tion) is used in each line. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 93 
 
 Ivapila here maintains that a purpose or design may 
 he formed and completed unconsciously, without a de- 
 signing mind. He feels, however, the difficulty of con- 
 necting design with unintelligent matter, and adduces 
 as an argument in his favour the fact that in the udder 
 of a cow the milk by which the calf is nourished is 
 secreted without the action of intelligence. This is a 
 favourite illustration among his disciples, and is generally 
 put forward as conclusive on the subject. But the 
 question still remains, is this adaptation the work of an 
 intelligent designer, or the result of blind chance, a 
 fortuitous concourse of atoms only ? Ivapila does not 
 enter upon an examination of this question. He is 
 content to assume the non-existence of a designer, because 
 the milk is produced, and there is no evidence of a 
 designing mind in the course of its production. He 
 does not ask if the arrangement of the several parts 
 or functions for the attainment of this end were for- 
 tuitous or not. In India, however, as in other parts of 
 the world, the idea of a design without an intelligent de- 
 signer is held to be an impossible assumption. “ Whether 
 this (evolution),” says Yachaspati, “ be for its own pur- 
 pose or that of another, it is a rational principle that 
 acts. Nature cannot act thus without rationality, and 
 therefore there must be a reason which directs Nature. 
 Embodied souls, though rational, cannot direct Nature, 
 as they are ignorant of its character; therefore there is an 
 omniscient Being, the director of Nature, who is Iswara 
 (Lord 1 ).” This is sound reasoning, but it was not 
 adopted by Ivapila. He saw that there was an adapta- 
 tion of means to an end in the supply of a suitable 
 
 1 Wilson, p. 1 68 . 
 
94 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nourishment for the calf ; but as the cow supplies it 
 without bringing an intelligent agency to bear upon the 
 production, so Nature works in providing what is for the 
 benefit of the soul. She is not acted upon by any ex- 
 ternal force or necessity, nor is she directed by a superior 
 power, nor does she produce by the necessary action of 
 some internal mechanism, but by a blind instinct, as 
 men act to gratify some desire that rises within them 
 without volition. 
 
 59. “ As a dancer, having exhibited herself on 
 the stage ceases to dance, so does Nature ( Prakriti ) 
 cease (to produce) when she has made herself 
 manifest to soul.” 
 
 60. “ Generous Nature, endowed with modes, 
 causes by manifold means, without benefit to her- 
 self, the benefit of Soul, which is devoid of modes, 
 and makes no return.” 
 
 61. “ Nothing is more modest than Nature ; that 
 is my judgment. Saying ‘ I have been seen/ she 
 does not expose herself again to the view of Soul.” 1 
 
 62. “ Wherefore not any Soul is bound, or is 
 . liberated, or migrates. It is Nature, which has 
 
 many receptacles (or bodily forms of being), which 
 is bound, or is liberated, or migrates.” 
 
 1 Lassen’s translation of Distich 61 sen assumes, but pralcritih. Cole- 
 is this : “ Procreatrix, pudibundae brooke’s translation is : “ Nothing, 
 iustar puellaa, non iterum invisit in my opinion, is more gentle than 
 presentiam Genii, dicens ne hilum Nature.” It is not, however, gentle- 
 quidem est ; haec mihi nascitur per- ness, but modesty, that is attributed 
 suasio, postquam sum conspecta.” to Nature, by which she withdraws 
 It is certainly wrong. The true from the gaze of the soul, 
 reading is not pralritih, which Las- 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 95 
 
 Beautiful as poetry, but not very philosophic, nor in 
 strict harmony with other parts of the Sankhya philo- 
 sophy. Kapila, or Iswara Krishna, forgets that Nature 
 (. Prakriti ) has no personality, no power of volition, and no 
 consciousness. But the instincts of the soul (if I may use 
 the term) are often too strong for mere reason. Kapila, 
 like others, discards the idea of unconscious matter when 
 he breaks away from the meshes of his false logic, and 
 Nature is endowed with all the qualities that belong to a 
 thinking and self-conscious mind. 
 
 Nature is called generous, or not seeking return, be- 
 cause she acts for the benefit of Soul, which, having no 
 modes, cannot act, and therefore can give nothing in 
 return. She exhibits herself to Soul in the forms of gods, 
 men, and animals, and by the properties of sensuous 
 objects, and by showing thus to Soul its own separate 
 nature, provides for its liberation from Matter. When 
 this has been gained, the result is eternal. Soul is never 
 again joined to Matter; and Nature, having shown herself 
 once, retires from the scene, “ as a modest matron who may 
 be surprised in dishabille by a strange man, but takes good 
 heed that another shall not behold her off her guard.” 1 
 
 It is not the soul, therefore, which is liberated or bound, 
 or which migrates, i.e., it is not liberated or bound in and 
 by itself, nor does it migrate by any act of its own. It 
 is the lihga which migrates, &c. ; the soul is merely 
 passive. “These circumstances,” says Vachaspati, “are 
 ascribed to and affect Soul, as the superior, in the same 
 manner that victory and defeat are attributed to and 
 relate to a king, though actually occurring to his generals ; 
 for they are his servants, and the gain or loss is his, not 
 
 1 S. Tattwa KaumudI, Wilson, p. 173. 
 
96 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 theirs.” The distinction is more than this. Ivapila 
 has a lofty idea of the soul. It is incomparably sup- 
 erior to matter. All outward things minister to it, as 
 the servants of a king minister to his desires. But 
 the servants and the king are both of a Hindu type. 
 The servants are mere slaves, without reflection or power 
 of self-action ; and the king dwells in solitary grandeur, 
 shutting himself up in his palace, and refusing to share 
 in the ordinary pursuits of mankind, from whom he is 
 separate, living in aimless and unchanging inaction. 
 
 63. “Nature by lierself binds herself by seven 
 forms ; she causes deliverance for the benefit of 
 soul by one form.” 
 
 The seven forms are virtue, passiveness, power, vice, 
 ignorance, passion, and weakness. The one source of 
 deliverance is knowledge, which when Nature has given, 
 she has accomplished her object and retires. 
 
 64. “It is thus that by the study of principles 
 (; tattwa ) the knowledge is obtained which is com- 
 plete, 1 incontrovertible, and absolute; 2 by which it 
 is said, ‘ I am not,’ ‘ Nothing is mine,’ and ‘ There 
 is no ego.’ ” 
 
 The meaning of this distich has been variously under- 
 stood. To M. Cousin it seems to teach “an absolute 
 nihilism, the last fruit of scepticism ; ” hut this idea is 
 contrary to the fundamental principles of the Sankhya 
 
 1 Apariiesha, which leaves nothing 2 Kevala, abstract, the only one 
 
 remaining, including everything in science, 
 itself. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 97 
 
 philosophy. To Kapila tlie soul was the most real of 
 all things — self-existent, never born, and never dying. It 
 becomes, by knowledge of the doctrines of Kapila, wholly 
 separate from matter, and this separation is the soul’s 
 highest achievement. This is distinctly expressed in the 
 S. Pravackana : “ By renunciation through study of prin- 
 ciples (it is said), ‘ It is not thus ; it is not thus,’ ” i.e., the 
 soul is different from all the emanations of Prakriti. The 
 Sankhya Pravachana Bhashya gives this interpretation : 
 “ ‘ Neither I am ’ denies the agency of soul ; ‘ nor is aught 
 mine ’ denies attachment (to any objects) ; ‘ nor do I exist ’ 
 denies its appropriation (of faculties) ; ” 1 or, as the Chand- 
 rika explains the last clause, “ By this, difference from 
 egotism is expressed.” We learn, then, by these testi- 
 monies, confirmed by other parts of the Sankhya system, 
 that the phrase “ I am not ” (nasmi) denies only life in 
 its ordinary form, existence of a moving, acting kind ; 
 “ naught is mine ” implies that the soul has now no 
 adjuncts to itself, it is wholly self-contained; “nor is 
 there an ego” affirms that the soul exists without con- 
 sciousness or sense of personality. The final and supreme 
 state of the soul is then an abstract, passionless, uncon- 
 scious state, which is the nearest possible approach to the 
 Buddhist idea of Nirvana , 2 which, in its full completeness, 
 is simple annihilation. The last stage of the wise man, 
 according to Buddhism, before absolute extinction of 
 being is gained, is very nearly the final state of the soul 
 in the system of Kapila. But the Sankhya doctrine main- 
 tains the continued existence of soul, though in a perfectly 
 unconditioned and passive state, as an eternal entity. 
 
 1 Wilson, p. I So. 
 
 2 See Professor Childers’ Pali Diet., s. v. Nirvana. 
 
98 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 65. ££ By this (knowledge), Soul, as a spectator, 
 unmoved and at ease, beholds Nature, which has 
 now reverted from the seven forms (to its primitive 
 state), because the capacity (or desire) of producing 
 has now ceased.” 
 
 66. “ £ It has been seen by me,’ says the one, 
 ceasing to regard ; £ I have been seen,’ says the 
 other, and ceases to act. In the (mere) conjunction 
 of the two there is no motive for production.” 1 
 
 The soul having gained the supreme knowledge, beholds 
 Nature as a spectator looks upon an actress. The seven 
 forms are described at page 96. There is no longer any 
 occasion for virtue, or for any condition of ordinary life, 
 because the soul has now become entirely independent of 
 Nature. The latter has now also no capacity (vasa) of 
 producing. In the language of Vachespati, “The two 
 objects of soul, fruition and discrimination, are the excite- 
 ments to the activity of Nature: if they do not exist, 
 Nature is not stimulated (to production). In the text, 
 the term ‘motive’ implies that by 'which Nature is ex- 
 cited to creation (to evolve the existing world), which 
 cannot be in the non-existence of the objects of Soul.” 
 Creation, or the development of Nature, does not arise 
 from the union of Soul and Matter, as some other philo- 
 sophers have taught, but solely from Nature acting to 
 satisfy the needs or the desires of Soul. 
 
 All things, however, return to unconsciousness. Con- 
 
 1 St. Hilaire’s translation is “ Et be reunited, according to Kapila, 
 bien que Turnon de tous deux puisse when the soul has been liberated 
 subsister encore,” &c. This is in- from it. An assertion or theory of 
 correct. Soul and matter can never others is here denied. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 99 
 
 sciousness, or the ego, is a development from buddhi 
 (intellect), which proceeds directly from Nature (. Prakrit , ; 
 but in the consummation of all things this element retires 
 within buddlii, and the latter is absorbed again into 
 Prakriti. Soul and Matter continue to exist, but each in 
 an isolated, independent state. 
 
 But if the liberation of the soul is gained by know- 
 ledge, how then does the soul remain connected with 
 matter when the requisite knowledge has been obtained ? 
 This inquiry is answered in the following distich : — 
 
 67. “ By the attainment of complete knowledge, 
 virtue and the rest have become no longer a real 
 
 O 
 
 cause ; 1 yet a body continues to he held, as a 
 potter’s wheel continues to revolve from the force 
 of the previous impulse.” 
 
 68. “ This separation from body being obtained, 
 when Nature ceases to act because her purpose has 
 been accomplished, then the soul obtains an 
 abstraction from matter 2 which is both complete 
 and eternal.” 
 
 By perfect knowledge the soul is freed from the influ- 
 ence of virtue and the rest, which are the cause of bodily 
 
 1 Dist. 67. Lassen translates the 
 
 first line thus : “ Postquam consum- 
 matae seientiae acquisitione invenit 
 genius nullum esse pietatis ceter- 
 arumque conditionum usurn.” The 
 lit. translation is, “ By the attain- 
 ment of complete knowledge, virtue 
 and the rest have become a name- 
 cause (ndmaJcaraiui),” i.e., a cause 
 only in name. Cf. ndmai/ajna (name- 
 
 sacrifice), a false or hypocritical sacri- 
 fice. Colebrooke has “ Virtue and 
 the rest become causeless,” which is 
 ambiguous. St. Hilaire, “La vertu 
 et les autres facultds cessent aussitot 
 d'etre des causes.” 
 
 - Kaivalya, the state of complete 
 abstraction or isolation from mat- 
 ter. 
 
IOO 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 existence in a higher or lower form. But for a time their 
 influence may he felt, as a wheel will continue to revolve 
 after the impulse which caused it to move has ceased. 
 There is no longer any need of the activities of Nature 
 when knowledge has freed the soul from all material 
 conditions, and all things connected with this activity, 
 such as virtue or love, will be known no more. The 
 soul’s perfect and final deliverance from the bondage of 
 matter has been gained. No new character can be 
 assumed ; no birth into any kind of bodily state, even 
 that of the gods, can follow. The drama of life is ended, 
 and the actors retire from the stage for ever. 
 
 69. “ This abstruse knowledge, which is for the 
 benefit of the soul, wherein the origin, 1 production 
 (or development) 2 and dissolution of beings are 
 described, has been thoroughly expounded by the 
 great rishi (Kapila).” 
 
 70. “ This supreme purifying doctrine the sage 
 compassionately imparted to Asuri ; Asuri taught 
 it to Panchasikha, by whom it was extensively 
 made known.” 
 
 71. “Handed down by disciples in succession, it 
 has been compendiously written in Arya metre by 
 the noble-minded Iswara Krishna, having fully 
 learned the demonstrated truth.” 
 
 72. “The subjects treated in seventy distichs 
 are those of the complete science, containing sixty 
 
 1 Sthiti is here, I think, the German dascin, coining into formal being 
 (see Peters. Diet, s.v.) ; prim, fixity, place. 
 
 - Utpatti, going forth. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. ioi 
 
 topics, excluding illustrative tales, and omitting 
 also controversial questions .” 1 
 
 “ Thus is completed the book of the Sankhya 
 (philosophy), uttered by the venerable, great- 
 minded, and divine Kapil a.” 
 
 “ May prosperity attend it'd 
 
 We have in the preceding distichs an outline, and 
 it is no more than an outline, of the philosophic system 
 taught by Kapila. In what manner or to what extent 
 it was explained by its author we do not know. The 
 comments upon it by Gaudapada and others are com- 
 paratively modern. It is not certain that they offer 
 an accurate tradition of the manner in which it was 
 expounded by Kapila himself, for some of them are 
 evidently influenced by a desire to make its doctrines 
 accord with the dogmas of the prevalent Vedantist system. 
 But even as an outline, it is interesting as the first 
 recorded system of philosophy, the first attempt to 
 answer, from human perception and reason alone, the 
 mysterious questions, “ What am I ? ” “ From what 
 source have I sprung?” and “Bor what purpose do I 
 exist ? ” 
 
 The system of Kapila is essentially a philosophy. 
 Practically, as some of our modern philosophers, he 
 had no theology. He admitted, indeed, the existence 
 of gods, but they were only emanations from Prakriti 
 
 1 The reference is here to such Sankhya system, the fourth con- 
 works as the Sankhya Pravachana, tains some short illustrative tales 
 which consists of six chapters or ( dkhydyikas ), and the fifth offers 
 readings, of which the first three are some arguments against the objec- 
 devoted to an exposition of the tions of opposite schools of thought. 
 
102 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 (Nature), and are to be absorbed hereafter into this 
 all-comprehending source, as all other forms of material 
 life. He rejects, with evident scorn, the rites which the 
 Vedas assumed or commanded. In his view they were 
 both impure and inefficient. They enjoined sacrifice, 
 which he rejected because it required the shedding of 
 blood, and it could not procure the final liberation of the 
 soul from the bondage of a material connection. Neither 
 religion nor morality could avail to procure this supreme 
 state. It could only be gained by knowledge, nor yet 
 by every kind of knowledge ; but only by the Sankhya 
 philosophy, whereby the soul gains a knowledge of the 
 external world and of its own higher nature. 
 
 This was the sole purpose of Kapila’s philosophy. 
 He had no desire to raise mankind to a higher degree 
 of moral excellence or a more perfect civilisation, either 
 as a means to provide more amply for the uses or 
 the pleasures of his kind, or to gratify a love of know- 
 ledge for its own sake. To him, the world of matter, 
 enfolding and producing so much pain, is to be regarded 
 only as an enemy. Our present physical life is a mere 
 bondage ; it is full of pain ; it can never be the source 
 of anything but sorrow and degradation . 1 The aim of 
 philosophy is simply to free the soul from this and 
 
 1 Compare the language of Jeremy have no meaning ” (Introduction to 
 Bentham : “Nature has placed man- Principles of Morals, i. I, and 
 kind under the governance of two x. 9). 
 
 sovereign masters, pleasure and pain. Kapila, like Schopenhauer, goes, 
 . . . On the one hand, the standard however, farther than Bentham ; for 
 of right and wrong, on the other, his is a system of Pessimism, though 
 the chain of causes and effects, are older than the German by more than 
 fastened to their throne.” two thousand years. Life, i.e., con- 
 
 “Pain is in itself an evil, and in- scious life, not merely containsevil : 
 deed, without exception, the only it is an unmixed evil. The better 
 evil, or the words good and evil state, nay, the best of all, is the un- 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 103 
 
 every other connection witli matter for ever. We must 
 seek to cast it away, as men cast off a vile and loath- 
 some garment; and this emancipation must be gained 
 by the soul itself, without the aid — if such aid can be 
 obtained — of any external power or influence. 
 
 Kapila saw the necessity, in any system of philosophy, 
 of an examination into the sources of our knowledge. 
 If these cannot be defined accurately, or if their 
 information cannot be relied upon, it is evident that 
 there cannot be any philosophy, for there can be no 
 certain knowledge. He admitted three such sources : 
 (1.) The perceptions of outward things gained from the 
 senses ; (2.) the logical faculty or reason of man, by 
 which inferences may be drawn from that which is 
 directly known to other truths which are enfolded in 
 this knowledge, but are not perceptible in themselves ; 
 (3.) valid testimony. The senses can only inform us of 
 specific objects, but he accepted our sense-perceptions 
 as representing a real external world, which exists in 
 itself, and not merely as a projection of our sensations 
 or thoughts. The Vedantist doctrine, that the material 
 world is only may a, or illusion, was not held by him ; 
 it was, in fact, a speculation of a much later date. 
 Kapila admitted the truth of the perceptions which 
 we receive from the senses, but he saw that their 
 extent is limited by various causes, and that many things 
 do and must exist of which they cannot give us any 
 direct information. Here then the logical faculty begins 
 to work. We may reason either a priori from cause 
 
 conscious impassive life, in which all sacrifice, but self -suppression, the 
 things were before the evil birth of annihilation of the conscious self, 
 reason and consciousness. The high- which is the cardinal principle of 
 est aim of both systems is not self- Buddhism. 
 
104 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to effect, or a posteriori from effect to cause, or by 
 analogy. The relation of cause and effect is real and 
 necessary ; but causation is not properly a creation of 
 anything — it is only an emanating force: the effect existed 
 fully beforehand in the cause, 1 of which it is only a 
 development or issue, as a stream emanates from, and 
 is thus created by, the fountain from which it springs. 
 In the system of Kapila, a pure creation is impossible. 
 Each individual soul and every particle of matter has 
 existed from all eternity. Nor can either perish. They 
 must exist for ever; the soul in an unconditioned, un- 
 changing, isolated state ; and matter, including therein 
 intellect and consciousness, will be absorbed for ever 
 in Nature (. Prakriti ). 
 
 We may also reason by analogy, or, as Sir. AY. Hamilton 
 terms it, “philosophical presumption,” 2 which Kapila per- 
 ceived to be “ a natural or ultimate principle of intelli- 
 gence.” How Kapila explained and defended this method 
 of proof we do not know. The opinions of his commen- 
 tators have been already explained (see page 22). 
 
 Beyond this range some things are known by “valid 
 testimony.” Under what conditions or for what purposes 
 testimony is “ valid ” we are not informed. Nor do we 
 know whether Kapila admitted what is called Sruti, or 
 revelation, as coming within this definition. His followers 
 
 1 “ When we are aware of some- 
 
 thing that begins to be, we are, by 
 the necessity of our intelligence, 
 constrained to believe that it has a 
 cause. But what does the expres- 
 sion that it has a cause signify ? If 
 we analyse our thought, we shall 
 find that it simply means, that as we 
 cannot conceive any new existence 
 to commence, therefore all that now 
 
 is seen to arise under a new appear- 
 ance had previously an existence 
 under a prior form. . . . We think 
 the causes to contain all that is con- 
 tained in the effect ; the effect to 
 contain nothing which was not con- 
 tained in the causes ” (Hamilton! 
 Lect. on Metaph., ii. 377). 
 
 2 Lectures on Logic, ii. 1 66. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 105 
 
 gave a modified assent to the Yedas ( sruti ), and also to 
 the teaching of tradition ( smriti ), that is, of the ancient 
 sages as handed down to posterity orally or by writings ; 
 but the highest position, the sole emancipating power, 
 was given to Kapila’s system of philosophy, which could 
 work out deliverance for the soul without the aid of the 
 Vedas , 1 either in their dogmatic or ritual teaching. 
 
 It is by the logical faculty we attain to the knowledge 
 of Nature ( Prakriti ) ; the oneness from which all material 
 forms have been developed . 2 It is itself the Undeveloped 
 (. avyakta ) ; eternal, and, in its essence, unalterable. All 
 material existences are only developed modes of the One. 
 In like manner, some of the Greek philosophers inferred, 
 as a necessity of thought, that the many forms of sensible 
 objects must be referred to one primeval substance as 
 their source. They affirmed, as Kapila, that this was not 
 one of the gross elements, as fire or water, but an invisible, 
 universal, and formless substance {avoparov el&o? ti kcu 
 apopifiov wai'Se^e?.) 3 But they maintained either that 
 
 1 “ The Vedanta maintained that 
 the acquisition of truth is indepen- 
 dent of caste or any other distinction, 
 and that the highest knowledge, 
 which is the chief end of man, can- 
 not be imparted by the Vedas (vide 
 Katha, ii. 23) ; yet it insisted that a 
 knowledge of the Vedas was neces- 
 sary to prepare the mind for the 
 highest knowledge. This the Sankhya 
 denied altogether, and though it 
 referred to the Vedas, and especially 
 to the Upanishads, still it did so only 
 when they accorded with its own 
 doctrines, and it rejected their autho- 
 rity in a case of discrepancy ” (Dr. 
 Roer, Introd. to Svetasvatara Upani- 
 shad, p. 36). 
 
 2 The Pralcriti of Kapila answers 
 
 to the Wills of Schopenhauer. It is 
 a blind unconscious force, or rather 
 a primal substance, with a potenti- 
 ality of force through the constituent 
 called passion or foulness, out of 
 which conscious life was an unhappy 
 development. 
 
 3 Plato, Timaeus : “This mother and 
 receptacle of all visible and sensible 
 things we do not call earth, nor air, 
 nor fire, nor water, nor anything 
 produced from them, or from which 
 these are produced. It is an invisible 
 and formless thing, the recipient of 
 everything (all-embracing), partici- 
 pating in a certain way of the intelli- 
 gible, but in a way very difficult to 
 seize.” 
 
106 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 this first principle was God, as the Eleatics, or that it 
 was fashioned by an Intelligence superior to this primeval 
 substance, and independent of it. In the system of 
 Kapila no place is found for the plastic hand of an 
 intellectual Power in the formation of the world. The 
 one primeval source was simply Matter, and in all its 
 developments was wholly unconnected with the working 
 of Mind. It wrought, and for a distinct purpose, but 
 unconsciously, and by a “potentiality” which dwelt en- 
 tirely within itself. 
 
 How then did Nature ( Prakriti ) begin to work ? Be- 
 cause, says Kapila, though formless, it has modes or 
 constituents of its being. When these are in a state of 
 equipose, Nature is at rest. When the equipose is dis- 
 turbed, then Nature begins to work. The impelling 
 influence was an unconscious purpose to free the souls 
 of men from all contact with matter, which is the source 
 of pain. For this purpose it first sent forth intellect 
 ( buddhi ), the first-born of all created things. But the 
 nature and functions of this first product are not clearly 
 defined. It has a faculty of ascertainment ; and by this 
 Kapila means a determinant power by which the percep- 
 tions of sense-objects are defined in an ultimate form, that 
 the soul, may look upon them and gain a knowledge of 
 their nature. From intellect ( 'buddhi ) consciousness or 
 egoism is evolved. It is from this product of thought 
 that a knowledge of the difference between subject and 
 object is gained. But consciousness, in emanating from 
 intellect, becomes a separate entity, and the intellect 
 works without any consciousness of its working or of its 
 effects. From egoism or consciousness, i.e., conscious 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 107 
 
 mind-matter, 1 spring the manas (mind), the ten organs 
 of sense and action, and the five subtle elements (see page 
 18). The manas is an internal faculty, the doorkeeper 
 of the senses, which are the doors through which the soul 
 gains a knowledge of Nature. It receives the sensations 
 which the senses give from outward things, and has a 
 formative power. Our sensations hereby become percep- 
 tions, and these, passed on to consciousness, become 
 individualised as “ mine ; ” then by the intellect these 
 individualised perceptions become, in the language of Sir 
 W. Hamilton, “ concepts or judgments,” and are fit to be 
 presented to the soul. 2 This is as near an approximation 
 to the ideology of Kapila as we can offer in terms derived 
 from another system. It is not an exact representation, 
 
 1 “Mind is the one ultimate reality; 
 not mind, as we know it, in the com- 
 plex forms of conscious feeling and 
 thought, but the simpler elements 
 out of which thought and feeling are 
 built up. The hypothetical ultimate 
 element of mind, or atom of mind- 
 stuff, precisely corresponds to the 
 hypothetical atom of matter, being 
 the ultimate fact of which the 
 material atom is the phenomenon. 
 Matter and the sensible universe 
 are the relations between particular 
 organisms, that is, mind organised 
 into consciousness and the rest of 
 the world. This leads to results 
 which would, in a loose and popular 
 sense, be called Materialist. But 
 the theory must, as a metaphysical 
 theory, be reckoned on the Idealist 
 side. To speak technically, it is an 
 Idealist monism ” (Art. on Prof. 
 Clifford, Fort. Rev., May 1879). This 
 mind - stuff of Professor Clifford’s 
 theory corresponds to the ahankara 
 of Kapila, from which the visible 
 
 universe has been developed. But 
 Kapila supposed ahankara to be 
 developed from Prakriti (primal 
 matter), and taught the existence of 
 Soul as the true cognitive power. 
 
 2 The process in the formation of 
 ideas and of the resulting action, as 
 taught by Kapila, is not very different 
 from the conclusions of our modern 
 savants. Wundt thus defines the 
 several steps of the process: — “ 1. The 
 transition from the organ of sense to 
 the brain (the manas of Kapila) ; 2. 
 The entrance into the field of view of 
 consciousness or perception ( egotism ) ; 
 3. The entrance into the point of 
 view of attention or apperception 
 (buddhi or intellect) ; 4. The action 
 of the will in giving the necessary 
 impetus to the motor nerves ; 5. The 
 transmission of this motor excita- 
 tion to the muscles ” (the action of 
 the soul in directing by volition). 
 (Grundziige, der physiol. Psychologie, 
 Leipsic, 1873-74.) 
 
10S HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 nor have we a phraseology which will suffice for this 
 purpose; for, in Kapila’s system, the “mind” (memos), 
 consciousness, and “ intellect ” ( luddhi ) are all only forms 
 of developed matter. The “ intellect ” has no proper cogni- 
 tion, though from its proximity to soul this is sometimes 
 ascribed to it. Hence the common Hindu saying, 
 “ Agency from affection, intelligence from proximity,” 
 i.e., the apparent agency of the soul, which never acts, 
 is from the affection or influence of buddhi, and the 
 apparent intelligence of buddhi is from its proximity to 
 soul. 
 
 The mcinas is classed with the ten organs of sense and 
 action from its immediate connection with them. These 
 organs and the monos, together with the five subtle 
 elements out of which the five gross elements are formed, 
 sprang directly from consciousness. Here we seem to 
 have a glimpse of the Hegelian theory that Thought and 
 Being are one absolutely ; subject and object , 1 which 
 appear to be contradictory to each other, being really 
 one, and existence the relation of the two. Perhaps we 
 may say that it is nearer the doctrine of Schelling, that 
 subject and object are really distinct from each other, but 
 yet only the manifestation of the absolute essence in dif- 
 ferent stages of development. This absolute essence may 
 be supposed to be thought or matter, and thus we have the 
 system of the Idealists and that of the Materialistic school. 
 “ If the subject be taken as the original and genetic, and 
 the object evolved from it as its product, the theory of 
 Idealism is established. On the other hand, if the object 
 be assumed as the original and genetic, and the subject 
 evolved from it as its product, the theory of Materialism 
 1 Morell, Hist, of Mod. Phil., ii. 16S. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 109 
 
 is established.” 1 The system of Kapila does not, how- 
 ever, quite accord with this definition. Here the sub- 
 jective element is genetic, but it is not ideal or spiritual. 
 It is itself only a development of a material nature. As 
 far, then, as the outward world and the inner life of con- 
 sciousness are concerned, Kapila is a Materialist ; but 
 not wholly so. The soul exists apart from both, but it 
 never creates, nay, it never acts. It exists simply as light, 
 self-contained and eternally distinct. 
 
 In the evolution of the five gross elements from the 
 five subtle forms or elements of matter, and in the general 
 process by which all existing forms have been produced, 
 we have, in a crude form, the doctrine of development ; 
 but it is a development, not from a lower to a higher 
 state of being, but from a higher or more subtle state to 
 one more gross, and, therefore, more adapted to the senses. 
 Ivapila seems to have had a dim apprehension of the fact 
 that the gross elements or forms of matter are not ulti- 
 
 1 Hamilton, Metaphysics, i. 297. 
 There are some points of contact 
 between the system of Fichte and 
 that of Kapila which deserve notice. 
 Fichte contends that the absolute 
 Ego, the I by myself I, must be 
 something different from conscious- 
 ness, for this is only a certain state 
 of the real Ego. It is the Ego 
 “ affirming itself.” With this abso- 
 lute Ego, distinct from consciousness, 
 the Purusha (person) or soul of Ka- 
 pila agrees. But the Ego, in affirm- 
 ing itself, is also conscious of the 
 non-Ego, or is determined by the 
 necessary law of its nature, and 
 “ distinguishes between itself as a 
 definite representation and every- 
 thing else which is not that repre- 
 sentation; it only comes to know 
 
 itself perfectly by that contrast.” So 
 Kapila taught that soul only knows 
 itself by knowing Prakriti (Nature). 
 Further, Fichte maintained that we 
 have no knowledge — and his work is 
 the “ Doctrine of Science ” — of the 
 non-Ego except by concepts or re- 
 presentations which are due, in part, 
 to the mind, and, so far, are created 
 by it. The mind or Absolute Ego, 
 which is an intuitive principle, as 
 with Kapila, thus sees only what in 
 part it has formed. Kapila expressed 
 a similar thought by teaching that 
 from consciousness all the subtle 
 and gross forms of matter emanate, 
 but this consciousness is clumsily 
 represented as distinct from soul, 
 because the latter cannot act. 
 
I IO 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mate forms, as the Greek philosophers generally supposed 
 them to be ; but as a scientific analysis had not yet 
 showed how to resolve any of these forms into more 
 primitive elements, no more can be claimed for Ivapila 
 than the invention of a fanciful hypothesis which modern 
 science has shown to have a limited substratum of truth. 
 
 All these productions are only mode-developments of 
 Nature ( Prakriti ). They vary in their kind, as these 
 several modes or constituent elements of Nature are 
 compounded in them, or as one or the other may be the 
 predominant quality. But all these effects are one in 
 their source, in which they were virtually contained, for 
 an effect is only the cause in a state of development. 
 “ Ex nihilo nihil fit ” was an axiom in Hindu philosophy 
 long before it was expressed in the schools of Europe. 
 Hence Nature, the all-embracing, never had an origin. 
 It is, like the soul, eternal and self-subsisting . 1 
 
 The psychology of Kapila is entirely Oriental in the 
 base of its conception. The soul is a monarch superior 
 to Nature, which ministers to it, but a monarch of an 
 Eastern kind. It dwells apart in a lofty but barren 
 isolation. The soul alone sees, i.e., has a true cognition 
 
 1 It is curious that the latest philo- 
 sophy — Von Hartmann’s Philosophy 
 of the Unconscious — should accord 
 in many points with its earliest de- 
 velopment in the system of Kapila. 
 I. In each system the source of all 
 existing forms is an unconscious 
 Monism, which is self-existent. 2. 
 The unconscious first principle de- 
 velops consciousness. 3. In this 
 conscious life only misery can pre- 
 vail. 4. Pain is a necessary conse- 
 quence of the normal development 
 
 of the first principle, and must re- 
 main as long as the present system 
 continues. 5. The ideal state, for 
 which we are to labour and wait, is 
 an unconditioned, unconscious state, 
 the nirvana of the Buddhist school. 
 6. Virtue and vice are only acci- 
 dents of material conditions. The 
 great aim of life is not to attain to 
 goodness or even a high intellectual 
 state, but only deliverance from 
 pain, which is the chief, if not the 
 only evil. (See Note D.) 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 in 
 
 of tilings. It can behold and understand Nature. By 
 this knowledge the soul knows itself, and in knowing 
 itself it gains an eternal liberation from Nature, and 
 therefore from pain. The soul then gains its supreme 
 state of unmoving, unconscious self-existence, which it 
 never afterwards loses. Until this state has been gained, 
 it is enveloped in a body formed from the subtle elements 
 of Nature, the ling a or lihga sarira, which is affected by 
 the modes of Nature, and is fated to migrate into bodies 
 of a higher or lower state until the soul becomes entirely 
 free. The lihga enters into the womb, and forms the 
 inner frame over which the bodily form derived from 
 the mother is gradually wrought. This latter body 
 perishes entirely in death, but the lihga survives until 
 the soul, by knowledge, becomes prepared for a separate 
 life, and then it is absorbed into the universal Nature 
 from which it sprung. 
 
 This theory of the lihga deserves more consideration 
 than it has received from either ancient or modern ex- 
 pounders of the Sankhya philosophy. It plays an im- 
 portant part in what we must call, though improperly, 
 the moral element of the system. It is the seat of those 
 dispositions, whether moral- or physical, which in the 
 Western systems are generally referred, so far as they 
 are moral, to the soul. But Kapila attributes to the soul 
 only a passive state, and to the lihga , which is formed 
 from the substance of the internal organs and the subtle 
 forms of matter, is assigned the congeries of states or 
 affections which form the individuality of each separate 
 being. “ The commentators agree,” says Professor Wilson 
 (page 130), “that subtle body (the lihga) is subject to 
 enjoyment or suffering only through its connection with 
 
1 1 2 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 generated body, understanding apparently thereby, not 
 its abstract capability of either, but the actual condition in 
 which it partakes of them ; for it is repeatedly declared 
 that the seat of enjoyment or suffering is luddhi or 1 intel- 
 lect,’ through the presence of which, as an ingredient in 
 subtle body, it is immediately added, the latter is invested 
 with dispositions ( bhavas ), that is, with the properties 
 of intellect enumerated in v. 43, virtue, vice, knowledge, 
 ignorance, &c.” This is not strictly correct. The “intel- 
 lect” ( luddhi ) cannot properly be said to enjoy or suffer. 
 The lihga may be called the “ acting soul ; ” it is the 
 “ annexe ” of the soul, in the language of M. St. Hilaire, 
 and the seat of those qualities by which an individual 
 is formed, and thinks and feels according to his nature. 
 In being compounded of huddhi and other substances, it 
 shows what Professor Jowett has called “ the interpenetra- 
 tion of the intellectual and moral faculties” (Plato, i. 
 464). 
 
 The grandeur of the soul, in Kapila’s system, is unreal 
 and useless. It has no moral elevation. It knows 
 nothing of virtue and vice as connected with itself. It 
 has no purpose beyond itself. It directs 'in some unde- 
 fined degree, but it never condescends to work, either for 
 itself or for others. It has no sympathy. Its highest 
 state is one of perfect abstraction from matter and from 
 other souls ; a self-contained life, wherein no breath of 
 emotion ever breaks in on the placid surface. The 
 system of Kapila tends then to destroy morality as an 
 active agency against evil ; nay, more, it levels so nearly 
 the barrier between virtue and vice, that the difference 
 becomes unimportant except as a matter of sensation. 
 They are, in fact, pleasure and pain, which are both to be 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 1 13 
 
 avoided ; for both imply action, and all action, if not an 
 evil, is at least an imperfection. The true philosopher 
 rises above virtue or vice by his knowledge. He has 
 reached a higher region in which all voluntary action has 
 ceased, and only contemplation remains. But the soul 
 not only rises above all moral influences ; it is never in 
 itself either virtuous or wicked. Virtue and vice are 
 conditions of the lihga or spiritual body, as it may be 
 affected by the three modes of Nature. They do not 
 belong to the soul, but are only the results of material 
 conditions. The modes of Nature, which are called 
 “ goodness,” “ foulness,” and “ darkness,” are only the 
 formative elements of Nature, differing indeed in kind, 
 but not good or bad in our European estimate of goodness 
 and badness. They do not affect the soul. The mode or 
 constituent element called “ goodness ” is the most subtle 
 of all. It is elastic, and has an enlightening or alleviating 
 influence. It is prevalent, therefore, in fire. The mode 
 called “ foulness ” or “ passion ” is the emotional element, 
 causing work, and is the source of all pain. The mode 
 called “ darkness ” is heavy and destructive. It is the 
 cause of stupidity and illusion. Such theories are only 
 the subjective devices of a man who, having observed the 
 manifold differences in the things around him, endeavours 
 to account for them by the assumption of a difference in 
 the constituent elements of the Nature from which, in his 
 opinion, all had primarily issued. 
 
 There is no place for duty, or a sense of sin in failing to 
 fulfil it, in the system of Ivapila. These are impossible 
 except in connection with a law which proceeds from a 
 source higher than man, and which he is bound to obey. 
 It is singular that Ivapila stands so far apart from the 
 
 H 
 
1*4 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 rest of his countrymen in ignoring that sense of moral 
 evil which has so deep a root in the Hindu mind. But 
 lie is not alone in this. Our modern philosophers decry 
 or ignore those deep, irrepressible instincts of the human 
 heart which in all ages have led to many austere rites for 
 the putting away this sense of moral guilt which presses 
 so heavily on the conscience. They ignore what they do 
 not understand, and for which their systems afford no 
 remedy. But logically Kapila was consistent in rejecting 
 both the idea of duty and of guilt from his system. He 
 did not admit that any Power existed that was of right 
 the ruler of the world , 1 or of any superintending Provi- 
 dence. The soul is sufficient for itself. There is no 
 real, absolute duty, except perhaps that of acquiring 
 knowledge and of gaining thus deliverance from all con- 
 tact with matter. But this is rather a privilege of the 
 few than a duty incumbent on all. By not obtaining it 
 the soul is doomed to reappear in some new bodily form, 
 but there is no guilt incurred. All actions are not 
 indeed alike ; they differ in their power of affecting the 
 conditions of the new life, and may, in this sense, be 
 called good or bad ; 2 but the highest degree of virtue is 
 
 1 As Fichte maintained that since merely a name for a collective sense 
 thesoulcanknownothinghigherthan, during many generations of what is 
 or beyond, its own concepts, and useful to mankind. A virtuous ac- 
 therefore the being of a God cannot tion and a fountain of water do not 
 be proved as a part of science, so differ in kind. But the latest theory 
 Kapila taught that the soul can only makes it to denote only a healthy 
 know what is presented to it by and vigorous organisation. “ If I 
 buddhi (intellect), and therefore can- have evolved myself out of some- 
 not know absolutely that there is an thing like an amphioxus, it is clear 
 Iswara or Supreme Lord of all that I have become better by the 
 things, for this idea cannot be thus change. I have risen in the organic 
 presented. scale ; I have become more organic. 
 
 2 Our modern philosophers go Of all the changes which I have 
 further. Some make virtue to be undergone, the greater part must 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 US 
 
 in itself unable to procure full deliverance for the soul. 
 Virtue and vice are only conditions of the material 
 envelope of the soul, which knows nothing of either in 
 itself, for it never acts. Knowledge is the only ark by 
 which it can attain to its final position of pure abstraction ; 
 but by this ark even the worst might pass over the ocean 
 of this restless world to the haven of perfect and eternal 
 rest. 
 
 As the system of Kapila ignored a Supreme Being, it 
 sought only to guide and strengthen man by his own 
 unaided power. It did not, however, address itself to all 
 classes of men alike, though it did not leave the lowest 
 wholly without hope. Even Sudras and women might 
 possibly hear some one explain this philosophic system, 
 and might receive some benefit from the knowledge thus 
 gained, but it was not addressed primarily to them. It 
 was essentially an esoteric system, designed chiefly for 
 those more instructed or more intelligent classes who 
 could rise to so great a height of philosophic knowledge 
 as the system of Ivapila, when perfectly understood, would 
 enable them to reach. It was practically opposed to 
 religious observances, and prayer became a superfluous 
 
 have been changes in the organic that definition of them which must, 
 direction ; some in the opposite on the whole, cause those people 
 direction, some perhaps neutral, who act upon it to be selected for 
 But if I could only find out which, survival. The good action, then, is 
 I should say that those changes a mode of action which distinguishes 
 which have tended in the direction organic from inorganic things, and 
 of greater organisation were good, which makes an organic thing more 
 and those which tended in the op- organic ” (Prof. Clifford, Nineteenth 
 posite direction bad. Here there Century, October 1877). So Kapila 
 is no room for proof ; the words taught that goodness was only a 
 ‘ good ’ and ‘ bad ’ belong to the material condition, and led only to a 
 practical reason, and if they are happier bodily life, 
 defined, it is by pure choice. I choose 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 1 16 
 
 act, because knowledge could alone accomplish more for 
 the soul than these religious rites ; but on this account it 
 did not commend itself to the people of India. It was 
 therefore supplemented and made more popular by Patan- 
 jali, of whom, however, little is known. He probably 
 lived about 200 years B.c. ; but almost all that we know 
 of him is that he is reputed to be the author of a book 
 called the “ Yoga Sutra,” in which the theistic form or 
 modification of Ivapila’s system is expounded. 
 
 The modifications which Patanjali made in this system 
 are not many in number, but they are important both in 
 themselves and in their bearing upon the inner and outer 
 life of mankind. They were mainly (1.) the doctrine 
 of a Supreme Spirit, who directed and presided over the 
 workings of Nature ( Prakriti ); and (2.) the enjoining of 
 yoga, i.e., the concentration of the soul on the Supreme 
 Being by abstract meditation as the means of obtaining 
 finally Nirvana, or absorption into the Divine Essence. 1 
 Hence this system is called the Seswara or Theistical 
 Sankhya, and Kapila’s the Niriswara or Atheistical ; a 
 term which may also be applied to Buddhism, which 
 apparently owed its origin to the system of Kapila. 
 
 “ God ” (Iswara, the supreme Euler), according to Patan- 
 jali, “is a soul or spirit distinct from other souls, unaffected 
 by the ills with which all men are beset, unconnected 
 with good or bad deeds and their consequences. In him 
 is an absolute omniscience. He is the instructor of 
 the earliest beings that have a beginning (the deities of 
 the Hindu mythology), himself infinite, unlimited by 
 
 1 In the full attainment of yoga , are either wholly overcome and 
 or a mystic union with the Deity, destroyed, or they act only as far 
 all the affections and the senses as necessity requires. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 u 7 
 
 time.” 1 Here is an essential difference between the master 
 and his pupil ; for Kapila taught that the existence of 
 thought or instruction is dependent on Consciousness, not 
 upon Iswara, and Consciousness is from the great principle, 
 Buddhi (Intellect). 
 
 The means of attaining to Yoga are (i.) Yama, self- 
 restraint; (2.) Niyama, necessary religious duties; (3.) 
 Asana, postures; 2 (4.) Prana-yama, restraint of breath; 
 (5.) Pratyahara, subjugation of the senses; (6.) Dharana, 
 fixed control ; (7.) Dhyana, contemplation ; (8.) Samadhi, 
 pious meditation. The aim of the Yogi or devotee under 
 this system is to destroy all movement and all thought, 
 that the soul may be absorbed in passive meditation. 
 But as all cannot rise to this elevation, various means of 
 subduing the senses by severe ascetic rites are set forth 
 and commended, and a frequent repetition of the mystic 
 syllable OM is enjoined. By these means the Yogi 
 might attain to a state called videha (incorporeal) or 
 kevala (abstracted or purely spiritual). In such condi- 
 tions he is endowed with supernatural wisdom and power. 
 He can enter into the body of another, and even into his 
 mind, and thus may read his thoughts. The attracting 
 power of the earth cannot bind him. He can soar in the 
 air as if carried up by a balloon. He can understand all 
 mysteries of this world and of other worlds. Both the 
 past and the future may lie distinctly before his view. 
 In short, there is no marvel of modern spiritualism that 
 was not equalled, and even surpassed, in India, according 
 to the Yoga system and the popular belief, two thousand 
 years ago. 
 
 1 Yoga-Sastra, i. 23, 24, 26-29 ; Colebrooke, i. 264. 
 
 2 Bhagavad Gita, vi. 13. 
 
1 1 8 HIND U PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 Practically the system of Patanjali, though setting 
 forth a very sublime aim, has resulted in the practice of 
 cruel and degrading rites, of almost incredible devices for 
 self-torture, which have no high or purifying purpose, 
 but, on the contrary, often conceal a base and even 
 sensual life. The Yogi is frequently regarded as a mere 
 sorcerer, and in this character he appears in many an 
 Indian drama and popular tale. 
 
SUPPLEMENTARY NOTICE 
 
 OF THE 
 
 NY AY A AND VAISESHIKA SYSTEMS. 
 
 These systems are generally classed together, for they 
 agree upon the subjects of which they treat in common, 
 hut are distinct in their chief purpose. The Hyaya is not 
 properly a system of philosophy, hut an introduction to 
 all such systems, for it treats mainly of the objects and 
 the laws of thought. The Vaiseshika system is a system 
 of physical science as taught by Kanada, the reputed 
 author of the Vaiseshika-Sutra, in which this system is 
 explained. From the singular absence or deficiency of 
 historical data in India, little is known of Gotama or 
 Gautama, the author of the Nyaya, or of Kanada. The 
 former has become the subject of fanciful legend almost 
 to the same degree as Kapila, the author of the Sankhya 
 system. He is said to have been horn in northern India 
 at the beginning of the Treta Yuga, or second age of the 
 world, and to have married Ahalya, the daughter of Brahma. 
 We can only infer from these statements that he was pro- 
 bably a Brahman, and may have been of noble descent. 
 He is the Aristotle of India, and his Sutras have always 
 been a popular study among the Hindus, whose acuteness 
 finds a suitable field in the discussion of dialectic subtleties. 
 A large number of commentators have explained and com- 
 
120 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 mented on the system of Gotama, in order to adapt it to 
 popular use. 
 
 It is set forth in a treatise called the Nyaya Sutra, 
 which comprises five divisions or readings, each containing 
 two lessons. These are divided into sections or praka- 
 ranas, relating to distinct topics. In practice, this system 
 is commonly combined with that of Kanada, as in the 
 Bhasha-parichchheda, the popular text-book in India. It 
 is not always easy to distinguish, in the modern schools, 
 what belongs to each system. Both Gotama and Kanada 
 observe the following order in discussion : (i.) enunciation 
 (uddcsa) ; (2.) definition ( lakshana ) ; and (3.) investigation 
 (parlksha). Enunciation declares by name the subject to 
 be discussed. Definition is the defining of the subject by 
 its peculiar properties or differentia. Investigation is an 
 examination of the subject with regard to its peculiar 
 properties. 
 
 The first reading or division of the Nyaya Sutra con- 
 sists of sixty aphorisms, and the first Sutra gives a list of 
 the subjects to be discussed. These are sixteen in number: 
 (1.) Pramana, or the means by which a right knowledge 
 may be gained; (2.) Prameya, or the objects of thought; 
 (3.) Doubt; (4.) Motive; (5.) Instance, or example; (6.) 
 Dogma, or determinate truth ; (7.) Argument, or syllogism ; 
 (8.) Confutation ; (9.) Ascertainment; (10.) Controversy ; 
 (11.) Jangling ; (12.) Objection, or cavilling; (13.) Fallacy ; 
 (14.) Perversion; (15.) Futility; and (16.) Conclusion, or 
 the confounding of an adversary. Of these, the first two 
 are the chief ; the others being only subsidiary, as indicating 
 the course which a discussion may take, from the setting 
 forth of a doubt to the final confutation of the doubter. 
 
 Proof or evidence ( pramdna ) is of four kinds: (1.) 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 121 
 
 Pratyaksha, or perception by the senses ; (2.) Anumana, 
 inference, which is of three kinds — from cause to effect, 
 from effect to cause, and by analogy; (3.) Upamana, or 
 comparison ; and (4.) Sabda, word or verbal authority, 
 including revelation and tradition. 
 
 Cause ( Karana ) is defined as that which necessarily 
 precedes an effect, which without the cause could not be ; 
 for the relation of cause and effect, connection ( sam - 
 bandha), must be considered. This is twofold, implying 
 either simple conjunction ( samyoga ), or intimate and con- 
 stant relation ( samavdya ), x wherein two things must always 
 be joined, as cloth and the threads of yarn which form it. 
 Hence cause is considered as (1.) intimate or direct, as 
 clay is the material cause of pottery, and yarn of cloth ; 
 (2.) mediate or indirect, proximate to the intimate cause, 
 as the weaving of yarn in forming cloth ; and (3.) instru- 
 mental or concomitant, as the loom. In desire, the soul 
 is the direct or intimate cause ; the mediate is the conjunc- 
 tion of the soul and its internal organ, the manas ; the 
 instrumental is knowledge. We may rather call them the 
 aggregate of conditions necessary for the forming either of 
 a material product or a psychical state. 
 
 The objects of which a right knowledge may be gained 
 are (1.) soul; (2.) body; (3.) the senses; (4.) the objects 
 of sense; (5.) intellect (buddhi ) ; (6.) mind (manas) ; (7.) 
 production, oral, mental, or corporeal ; (8.) fault or wrong 
 (dosha); (9.) transmigration; (10.) fruit or retribution; 
 (11.) pain; (12.) deliverance, or emancipation. 
 
 The soul is different, or individual, in each person, 
 separate from the body and the senses, the seat of know- 
 ledge and feeling. It is eternal in duration. Knowledge, 
 
 1 Tarka Sangraha, p. 22 ; Colebrooke, i. 287. 
 
122 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 desire, aversion, volition, pain, and pleasure, imply tlie 
 existence of soul, which is called a substance, as being the 
 substratum or entity in which these several qualities 
 reside. The soul experiences the fruit or retribution of 
 deeds, good or had. 
 
 The Supreme Soul (. Paramatman ) is One, the seat of 
 eternal knowledge, the maker or former of all things. 
 
 Body is the seat of effort and of the organs of sensation. 
 By association with it the soul has fruition, or the feeling 
 of pleasure and pain. It is earthly, for the properties of 
 earth are perceived in it, as solidity, smell, &c. Some 
 supposed the body to be formed of three elements — earth, 
 water, and light or heat ; others that it was formed of four, 
 adding air to the former elements. But Gotama rejects 
 these suppositions, mainly on the ground that there is no 
 intimate, absolute union of heterogeneous substances ; 
 an argument which Ivapila had employed. The distinct 
 kinds, as classified by Vaisesliika writers are (i.) un- 
 generated, as those of gods and demigods; (2.) uterine 
 or viviparous ; (3.) oviparous ; (4.) engendered in filth ; 
 and (5.) vegetative or germinating. 
 
 The five external organs are not modifications of con- 
 sciousness, as the Sankhya philosophy teaches, but are 
 formed of gross matter, earth, water, light, air, and ether, 
 corresponding to the senses of smell, taste, sight, touch, 
 and hearing. There is a sixth sense, an internal organ, 
 manas or “ mind,” which is the organ of the bodily senses. 
 By union with the external senses it produces knowledge 
 of exterior objects. Its office is to separate the sensations, 
 and to present them singly to the soul ; and hence it is 
 that the soul does not receive more than one sensation, or 
 rather perception, at the same instant. The manas is 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 123 
 
 minutely small, as an atom ; for otherwise it might come 
 into connection with many things or many sensations at 
 one time. It is eternal, and distinct from both soul and 
 body. 
 
 The objects of sense are odour, taste, colour, feeling, and 
 sound. Under this head are placed the six categories 
 ( padartha ) of Kanada, which are substance, quality, action, 
 generality or community of properties, particularity or 
 specific quality, and co-inherence or perpetual and intimate 
 relation. Later writers added a seventh, privation or 
 negation. 
 
 Intellect is twofold, including notion and remembrance. 
 It is defined as that which manifests or makes known. 
 Its relation to the manas is not clearly explained. A 
 notion or concept is either right or wrong. A right 
 notion is that which is derived from a clear proof, and is 
 fourfold: (1.) From perception, as a jar perceived by the 
 bodily organs ; (2.) from inference, as fire is inferred from 
 smoke ; (3.) from comparison, by which we have a know- 
 ledge of genera ; and (4.) from revelation, as the notion of 
 celestial happiness, which we have from the Vedas. 
 
 A wrong notion is one which is not derived from proof, 
 and is threefold in origin: (1.) From doubt; (2.) false 
 premisses ; and (3.) error, as the mistaking of mother-of- 
 pearl for silver. 
 
 Bemembrance is also either right or wrong. A waking 
 remembrance may be either, but in sleep it is wrong. 
 
 Production is the cause of virtue and vice, of merit and 
 demerit. It is oral, mental, or corporeal ; speech being 
 considered to be of a compound nature, but does not 
 include unconscious vital functions. It is the result of 
 the three faults — rnssion or extreme desire, aversion or 
 
124 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 loathing, and error or delusion. The wise man, according 
 to Gotama, is one that avoids these faults, and is pro- 
 foundly indifferent to all action. 
 
 The only motive to action is the desire of attaining 
 pleasure or of avoiding pain . 1 
 
 Transmigration is the passing of the soul to successive 
 bodies. 
 
 Blessedness is deliverance from pain. Pain is the 
 primary evil, but there are twenty-one varieties of evil 
 which are the causes of pain, and these are in the organs 
 of sense, the objects of sense, the mental apprehensions, 
 and even in pleasure, for this may be evil and a source of 
 pain, as honey drugged with poison is fatal. The soul 
 attains to this deliverance by knowledge, by meditating 
 on itself, by not earning fresh merit or demerit through 
 actions sprung from desire, and by becoming free from 
 passion through knowledge of the evil inherent in objects. 
 It is knowledge, as in the Sankhya system, and not vir- 
 tue, which obtains final deliverance from the body . 2 The 
 latter can only procure a better state of bodily connection ; 
 it cannot destroy it. 
 
 1 “ A motive is substantially no- 
 thing more than pleasure or pain 
 operating in a certain manner. 
 
 “Now, pleasure is in itself a good 
 — nay, even setting aside immunity 
 from pain, the only good. Pain is 
 in itself an evil ; and indeed, with- 
 out exception, the only evil, or else 
 the words good and evil have no 
 meaning. And this is alike true of 
 every sort of pain and every sort of 
 pleasure. It follows, therefore, im- 
 mediately and incontestably, there 
 is no such thing as any sort of 
 motive that is in itself a bad one.” 
 “Nature has placed mankind 
 
 under the governance of two sove- 
 reign masters, pain a.n& pleasure. It 
 is for them alone to point out what 
 we ought to do, as well as to deter- 
 mine what we shall do” (Jeremy 
 Bentham, Introd. to Prim of Morals, 
 &c., c. x. ss. 9, io, c. i. s. i). 
 
 2 In the system of Bentham 
 there is no more room for vir- 
 tue, goodness, justice, or unselfish 
 liberality than in the system of 
 Gotama. The base of what is called 
 in these systems morality (a real 
 morality in such systems is impos- 
 sible) is only the gratifying of 
 desire. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 125 
 
 The other subjects mentioned are only the possible suc- 
 cessive stages of a discussion. 
 
 The development of inference as a method of proof, by 
 the construction of a true syllogism, is the most interest- 
 ing part of these systems. The right methods of reasoning 
 have been discussed with as much subtlety as by any of 
 the Western logicians. A complete syllogism, in the 
 Hindu system, consists of five members or parts ( ava - 
 yava ) : (1.) The proposition ( pratijna ), (2.) the reason (lietu 
 or apadesa), (3.) the instance or example (udaliarana or 
 nidarsana), (4.) the application of the reason (upanaya), 
 and (5.) the conclusion ( 'nigamana ). 
 
 Ex. (1.) This hill is fiery, 
 
 (2.) For it smokes. 
 
 (3.) Whatever smokes is fiery, as a kitchen-hearth, &c. 
 (4.) This hill is smoking, 
 
 (5.) Therefore it is fiery. 
 
 Or, 
 
 (1.) Sound is non-eternal, 
 
 (2.) Because it is produced. 
 
 (3.) Whatever is produced is non-eternal, as pots, &c. 
 (4.) Sound is produced, 
 
 (5.) Therefore it is not eternal. 
 
 Some confine the syllogism to three members, either the 
 first three or the last : in the latter form it is the same as 
 the syllogism of Aristotle. 
 
 The term vycipti (pervasion or invariable concomitance) 
 is used to express the connection in the major premiss of the 
 Aristotelian syllogism. Inference is defined as the know- 
 ledge which is caused by the knowledge of vydpti 1 or a 
 knowledge “generable by a mediate judgment” ( para - 
 
 1 Vyaptijnana-karanakam jnanam. 
 
126 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 marsa). 1 “This mediate judgment is a recognition that 
 there is in the subject of the question ( paksha ) an attribute 
 characterised by a pervasion (or universal concomitance, 
 vyapti). In other words, the subject of the question lias a 
 property universally accompanied by something else, viz., 
 by that which is to be proved or disproved of it by the sad - 
 hya or predicate of the conclusion.” 2 The meaning of this 
 term, vyapti, is fully explained by Sankara Jfisra. “ It may 
 be asked, What is this invariable concomitance ? It is not 
 merely a relation of co-extension. Nor is it the relation 
 of totality. For if you say that invariable concomitance 
 is the connection of the middle term with the whole of 
 the major term, such connection does not exist in the case 
 of smoke [for smoke does not always exist where there is 
 fire]. Nor is it natural conjunction, for the nature of a 
 thing is the thing’s proper mode of being. ... Nor is it 
 the possession of a form determined by the same connec- 
 tion as something else ; as, for instance, the being fiery is 
 not determined by connection with smoke, for the being 
 fiery is more extensive. We proceed, then, to state that 
 invariable concomitance is a connection requiring no 
 qualifying term or limitation. It is an extensiveness co- 
 extensive with the predicate. In other words, invariable 
 concomitance is invariable co-inherence of the predicate.” 3 
 The qualifying term or limitation is called upadlii. 
 Fire always underlies smoke, but smoke does not always 
 accompany fire ; and the proposition that smoke accom- 
 panies fire requires a qualifying condition (upadlii) — that 
 there must be moist fuel — which may not be present. 
 An universal proposition is not therefore simply conver- 
 
 1 Paramarsa-janyam jnanam. 
 
 2 Professor Gough, Calcutta Review, January 1876. 
 
 3 Mr. Gough’s translation (Indian Wisdom), p. 73. 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 127 
 
 tible, but only convertible by limitation per accidens. The 
 upadhi is the limitation or qualifying condition which is 
 necessary for the conversion of the proposition. 
 
 The process by which the vyapti is determined is called 
 vyaptigraha, and is a generalisation by experience or 
 induction. Induction is defined as “ the determination of 
 unconditional and of conditional concomitances.” The 
 Hindu logicians are quite aware of the necessity of a 
 sound induction for the establishment of an universal 
 proposition. From a passage in “ Mukt avail ” (p. 122) 
 we learn that such a proposition must be proved by 
 affirmative and negative induction, which correspond to 
 the methods of Agreement and Difference in Mill’s 
 “Logic” (i. 454), the object being to discover a certain 
 relation of cause and effect in the two phenomena. “ The 
 two suggestors of the relation of cause and effect are (1.) 
 this concomitancy of affirmatives — that whenever the 
 product exists the material cause thereof exists ; and (2.) 
 this concomitancy of negatives — that when the material 
 cause no longer exists the product no longer exists.” 1 
 
 The system of Kanada (the Vaiseshika ) is supplementary 
 to that of Gotama, coinciding with it in the main, but 
 differing from it in allowing only two methods of proof, 
 perception and inference, and in its arrangement of the 
 objects of knowledge. It is expounded in the “ Vaise- 
 shika Sutra, which contains about 550 aphorisms. 
 
 There are in this system six categories or predicaments 
 (padartlia): (1.) things or substance ; (2.) quality; (3.) ac- 
 tion; (4.) community or genus ; (5.) particularity; (6.) the 
 co-inherence or intimate connection of constituent parts, 
 
 1 Comm, on the Sankhya Sutras, Professor Cowell’s note to Colebrooke, 
 i. 314. 
 
128 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 to which later writers added a seventh, non-existence or 
 negation ( abhava ). 
 
 The first category, substance ( dravya ) is subdivided 
 into nine divisions: (i.) earth (prithivi) ; (2.) water 
 (dpas) ; (3.) light ( 'tejas ); (4.) air ( vayu ); (5.) ether 
 (1 dkasa ) ; (6.) time (Jcala) ; (7.) space (<£is) ; (8.) soul 
 {pitman) ; and (9.) the internal organ, mind ( manas ). Of 
 these, the first four and the ninth are affirmed to he 
 formed of atoms. These atoms are round, extremely 
 minute, invisible, incapable of division, eternal in them- 
 selves but not in their aggregate forms. They have 
 individually a specific difference ( visesha ). Light, for 
 example, is formed by the aggregation of luminous atoms. 
 Other substances are formed in a similar manner. These 
 atoms combine by twos in an aggregate called dwy-anuka, 
 or by threes, forming an aggregate called trasa-renu, which 
 comes within the range of our sight, as a mote in a sun- 
 beam. They also combine by fours, &c. They are in- 
 numerable in extent, and are perpetually united, disinte- 
 grated, and redintegrated by an unseen peculiar virtue or 
 force ( adrishta ). 
 
 What idea Ivanada intended to convey by the term 
 adrishta, the Unseen, it is not possible to say. The term 
 Iswara = God, as ruler, is not found in the Sutras ascribed 
 to him. He may mean a force or “ potentiality ” inherent 
 in the atoms themselves. His disciples, however, who 
 were affected by the teaching of Gotama, or the popular 
 Vedanta system, explain this unseen force to be the 
 Supreme Spirit, who is declared to be the framer of all 
 things. They argue for the existence of a controlling 
 Mind from the existence of effects ; from the combinations 
 of the atoms ; from the support of the earth in the sky ; 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 129 
 
 from traditional arts, and from the Yedas. As Kanada dif- 
 fered from Gotama in not admitting speech or tradition as a 
 source of knowledge, it may he doubted whether he would 
 have admitted an argument founded on the Yedas. They 
 appeal, however, chiefly to the evidence of design. “ The 
 earth must have had a Maker,” says Haridasa, “ because 
 it is an effect, like a jar.” 1 This is the argument which 
 Paley has so largely developed, now often rejected, hut 
 yet gaining assent from the common sense of mankind. 
 
 The traditional arts are those which have been handed 
 down from father to son, which, it is argued, must have 
 been first taught or inspired by a superintending Mind. 
 It is implied that the inventive, creative mind of man 
 must have been created by a power possessing like 
 qualities, hut of an infinitely higher kind. Kanada 
 certainly taught that the soul is distinct from matter. 
 He appeals, in proof, to our feelings of desire and 
 aversion, which are excited by a perception of the 
 good or evil connected with certain things ; affirming 
 that this perception of good and had results is an attri- 
 bute of spirit. He combats the assertion of an objector 
 that the soul might be diffused in matter, and not be 
 separate from it, by asserting that the nature of the 
 cause is always seen in the effect, and that if soul 
 were diffused through matter, all matter would be 
 animate. 
 
 In the second category, “ quality,” Kanada recognised 
 seventeen varieties in the nine substances, of which 
 soul is one. These qualities are colour, savour, odour, 
 tangibility, number, extension, individuality, conjunction, 
 disjunction, priority, posteriority, intellections (buddhayas ) , 
 
 1 Indian Wisdom, p. 88. 
 
 I 
 
130 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, and volition. To these 
 liis followers added the seven following : gravity, fluidity, 
 viscidity, self-reproduction (including motion, elasticity, 
 and memory), sound, with merit and demerit. 
 
 Light and heat are considered as only different forms of 
 the same substance. 
 
 The direct instrument of vision is a ray of light pro- 
 ceeding from the pupil of the eye to the object seen. 
 This ray of light is not ordinarily visible, as the brightness 
 of a torch is not seen in the meridian light, hut may he 
 seen at night in the eye of a cat or other animal watch- 
 ing for its prey. 
 
 Ether (akasa) is uncompounded, infinite, and eternal. 
 It is not atomic. It is known only by inference. It 
 has the quality of sound, and hearing is formed hv 
 means of a portion of ether confined in the hollow of 
 the ear and endowed with an occult virtue. 
 
 The mind ( manas ) is considered to he, as in the 
 system of Gotama, extremely small, as an atom, and 
 thus only one sensation is conveyed to the soul at one 
 time. It is eternal, distinct from both soul and body, 
 with 'which it is only conjoined. 
 
 Gravity is the peculiar cause of a body falling to the 
 ground. It affects earth and water. Lightness is not a 
 distinct quality, hut only the negation of gravity. 
 
 Time is inferred from the relation of priority and sub- 
 sequence, other than that of place. It is marked by 
 associations of objects with the sun’s revolutions. 
 
 Space is inferred from the relation of priority and sub- 
 sequence other than that of time. It is deduced from 
 the notion of here and there. 
 
 The third category, action ( '/carman ), is divided into five 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 )3i 
 
 kinds, upward and downward movement, contraction, 
 dilatation, and going, or motion in general. 
 
 Tbe fourth category, community (samcinya), is the source 
 of our notion of genus. In its highest degree it expresses 
 only existence, a property common to all, hut it usually 
 denotes qualities common to many objects. It denotes 
 species also, as indicating a class. These genera and 
 species have a real, objective existence. The Baud- 
 dhas deny this, affirming that individuals only have 
 existence, and that abstractions are false conceptions. 
 It is the quarrel revived in the .Realist and Nominalist 
 theories of the mediaeval schoolmen. 
 
 The fifth category, particularity ( yisesha ), denotes simple 
 objects, devoid of community. These are soul, mind, 
 time, place, the ethereal element, and also atoms in their 
 ultimate form. 
 
 The sixth category, co-inherence or inseparable connec- 
 tion ( samavdya ), denotes the connection of things that in 
 their nature must be connected so long as they exist, as 
 yarn and the cloth of which it is formed ; for so long as 
 the yarn subsists the cloth remains. 
 
 The seventh category, subsequently added, negation or 
 privation ( abhdva ), is of two kinds, universal and mutual. 
 Universal negation includes three species : (i.) antecedent, 
 a present negation of what will be at some future time, as 
 in yarn before the production of cloth ; (2.) emergent, which 
 is destruction or cessation of an effect, as in a broken jar ; 
 (3.) absolute, implying that which never existed, as fire in 
 a lake. 
 
 Mutual privation is essential difference, a reciprocal 
 negation of identity, as in cloth and a jar. 
 
 The system of Kanada, in its modern form at least, is 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 132 
 
 essentially a dualism ; eternal atoms existing together 
 with eternal soul, whether the latter term be confined 
 to individual souls or includes the Supreme Soul ( Para - 
 matmari). In every Hindu system of philosophy, Matter 
 is supposed to be eternal, generally as a real and distinct 
 entity in itself, except in the school of the Vedantists, by 
 whom it is regarded as maya, the illusive manifestation of 
 the One Supreme Brahma, who is himself the All. 
 
 Gotama and Kanada, like Kapila, could see no higher 
 aim or blessing for mankind than a complete deliverance 
 from pain. They agree with him in maintaining that this 
 deliverance must be wrought out by knowledge, mean- 
 ing thereby a knowledge of philosophy, and that the 
 state to which the soul may rise by knowledge, its best 
 and final state, is that of a tranquil unconscious passivity, 
 in which all thought and emotion and the sense of per- 
 sonality have passed away for ever. 
 
NOTES. 
 
 NOTE A. 
 
 On the Organs of the Soul in the System of Kapila. 
 
 Distichs 22, 24, 26, 34. 
 
 The Intellect ( buddhi ), the first emanation of Nature ( Prakrit! ), 
 is an organ or instrument of the Soul, for by it all material 
 things are brought within the view of the Soul, which is imma- 
 terial. From it Consciousness orMind-stuff emanates, and from 
 Consciousness, affected by the mode of Nature called “ good- 
 ness,” issue the eleven organs ( indriyani ), which are the Mind 
 ( manas ), the five organs of sensation and the organs of action. 
 From it also emanate the five subtle elements of matter when 
 it is affected by the mode called “ darkness,” and from the 
 subtle elements the grosser elements are evolved. The five 
 organs of sensation are called “ intellect-organs ” ( buddhi - 
 indriyani), and in Distich 34 they are said to be the domain 
 of specific and non-specific elements (as Lassen translates the 
 passage), or to concern objects specific and unspecific (as 
 Colebrooke translates it). The meaning is obscure, and, as 
 usual, the Hindu commentators throw no light on the dark- 
 ness. Gaudapada assumes that by non-specific objects are 
 meant such as are apprehended by the gods. If so, they 
 would have no place in the system of Kapila. His meaning 
 
HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 1 34 
 
 may probably be ascertained by noting that he regards these 
 organs as a direct emanation from Consciousness, affected by 
 “goodness,” and therefore as being more subtle productions 
 than even the subtle elements of what are usually called 
 material things or gross existences. But the eye, for instance, 
 as an organ of sight belongs to this last class. It is formed 
 entirely of gross matter. It seems then that Kapila meant 
 by “ intellect-organs ” something of a very different nature. 
 The organ of sight is, in his theory, twofold: (1.) a 
 subtle organisation in which the faculty of seeing dwells ; 
 and (2.) an instrument, the eye, which is formed of grosser 
 elements. The faculty by which we see was connected by 
 Kapila directly with Consciousness, and by it a sense-percep- 
 tion, which is defined by the manas, is gained. Without it 
 the eye could no more see than in the case of a dead body. 
 Sometimes the faculty and its instrument are united in one 
 expression. Hence, I think, we may explain Distich 34 as 
 meaning that the “intellect-organs” are composed of non- 
 specific substances, i.e., of the more subtle or ethereal forms of 
 matter in the faculty of seeing, and of specific or the grosser 
 elements in the instrument, i.e., the eye. This distinction 
 seems to have partly suggested itself to the author of the 
 “ S. Tattwa Kaumudi,” for he supposes that by “ non-specific ” 
 are meant such objects as are too subtle in their nature to be 
 seen by ordinary men. Whether Kapila meant farther to 
 say that this finer element or organisation could be known 
 through the buddhi to Soul, is an inquiry that we may lay 
 aside as having no practical importance. 
 
 If this interpretation is correct, the theory of Kapila has 
 some resemblance to the conclusions of modern science. 
 “ Sensation proper is not purely a passive state, but implies 
 a certain amount of mental activity. It may be described, on 
 the psychological side, as resulting directly from the attention 
 which the mind gives to the affections of its own organism.” 
 
NOTES. 
 
 135 
 
 “ Numerous facts prove demonstrably that a certain applica- 
 tion and exercise of mind on one side is as necessary to the 
 existence of sensation as the occurrence of a physical impulse 
 on the other” (Morell, Elements of Psychology, pp. 107, 108). 
 
 NOTE B. 
 
 On the Meaning of Sat and A sat. 
 
 There is a general misunderstanding of these terms as used 
 in the philosophy of the Hindus, especially in the system of 
 Kapila. Sat is supposed to mean existence per se, and asat is 
 therefore represented as its logical opposite, or rather contra- 
 dictory ; the negation of being, or non-existence. Thus Dr. 
 Muir writes : “ These ideas of entity and nonentity seem to 
 have been familiar to the Yedic poets, and we find it thus 
 declared (R-Y. x. 72, 2, 3), that in the beginning nonentity 
 was the source of entity. ‘ In the earliest age of the gods 
 entity sprang from nonentity ; in the first age of the gods 
 entity sprang from nonentity [ asat ].’ In the Atharva-Veda 
 (x. 7, 10) it is said that ‘ both nonentity and entity exist 
 within the god Skambha;’ and in v. 25 of the same hymn, 
 ‘ Powerful indeed are those gods who sprang from nonentity. 
 Men say that that nonentity is one, the highest member of 
 Skambha.’ The Taittiriya Upanishad also (p. 99) quotes a 
 verse to the effect: ‘This was at first nonentity. From that 
 sprang entity \sat\.’ ” And in a note he adds : “ This phrase 
 is also applied to Agni in R-V. x. 5, 7, where it is said that 
 that god, being 1 a thing both asat, non-existent (i.e., unmani- 
 fested), and sdt, existent ( i.e ., in a latent state or in essence), 
 in the highest heaven, in the creation of Daksha, and in the 
 womb of Aditi, became in a former age the first-born of our 
 ceremonial, and is both a bull and a cow ’ ” (Progress of the 
 Yedic Peligion, Journal A. S., 1865, p. 347). So also Pro- 
 
136 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 fessor Max Muller writes : “ Some of the ancient sages, after 
 having arrived at the idea of Avyakrita, Undeveloped, went 
 even beyond, and instead of the sat or rb bv, they postulated 
 an asat, ro /j.ri ov, as the beginning of all things. Thus we 
 read in the Chandogya Upanishad, ‘And some say in the 
 beginning there was asat (not being) alone, without a second ; 
 and from this asat might the sat be born ’ ” (Sans. Literature, 
 p. 324). There is occasionally some confusion in the minds 
 of Hindu writers, especially the later ones, about the meaning 
 of sat and asat; but, with Kapila and his exponents, sat 
 denotes the existence of things in the manifold forms of the 
 external world, the JDaseyn of Hegel, the Natura naturata of 
 Spinoza, and asat is the opposite of this, or the formless 
 Prakriti, the Mind-matter from which all formal existence 
 has sprung. Sat corresponds in each separate form to the 
 “being-this” of Hegel, and Kapila argues, as the German 
 philosopher, that “ by virtue of its predicate of merely being- 
 this, every something is a finite,” and therefore it is an effect, 
 because otherwise we could only conceive it as absolute being, 
 and therefore unlimited. Soul was something different from 
 both. So in the S'atapatha Brahmana (x. 5, 3, 1) it is said, 
 “ In the beginning this universe was, as it were, and was 
 not, as it were. Then it was only that mind. Wherefore it 
 has been declared by the rishi, ‘ There was then neither 
 nonentity (asat) nor entity (sat) - for mind was, as it were, 
 neither entity nor nonentity.’ ” The meaning is that 
 mind is neither the primal matter (Prakriti) (which Kapila 
 assumed to be the source of all formal existence), nor the sum 
 of existing things. The Vedantists taught that this primal 
 matter was the sakti, or productive energy of Brahma. So 
 says Sankara Acharya, “ We (Vedantists) consider that this 
 primordial state of the world is dependent upon the Supreme 
 Deity (Parameswara), and not self-dependent. And this state 
 to which we refer must of necessity be assumed, as it is essen- 
 
NOTES. 
 
 1 37 
 
 tial • for without it the creative action of the Supreme Deity 
 could not be accomplished, since if he were destitute of his 
 sakti, any activity on his part would be inconceivable ” (Comm, 
 on the Brahma Sutras, Muir’s Sans. Texts, iii. 164). The 
 full development of the Vedantist doctrine made the external 
 world to be only maya, illusion. There is really neither sat 
 nor asat, but the Supreme Spirit is absolutely the All. Nature 
 is only the projection of the One, or, as Hegel thought (for he 
 was essentially a Vedantist), “the idea in its externality, in 
 having fallen from itself into a without in time and space ; ” 
 but this is only a manifestation of the Absolute. “ The 
 Absolute, the being-thinking [the ultimate synthesis of exis- 
 tence and thought, of object and subject] passes through the 
 three periods, and manifests itself as idea in and for itself 
 [thinking] ; secondly, in its being otherwise, or in objective- 
 ness and externality [nature] ; thirdly, as the idea which from 
 its externality has returned into itself [mind] ” (Chalybaus, 
 Hist, of Spec. Phil., Eng. ed., p. 362). As Mr. Morrell has 
 expounded his views, and correctly, I may add, “With him 
 God is not a person, but personality itself, i.e., the universal 
 personality which realises itself in every human consciousness 
 as so many separate thoughts of one eternal mind. . . . God 
 is with him the whole process of thought, combining in itself 
 the objective movement as seen in Nature, with the subjective 
 as seen in logic, and fully realising itself only in the universal 
 spirit of humanity” (Mod. Phil., ii. 189). Pure Vedantism ! 
 though Hegel, if he -were alive, would protest against such a 
 statement. But Kapila was not a Vedantist. With him the 
 aggregate of existing things and each separate existence (sat), 
 and the formless Prakriti from which they issued (asat), were 
 objectively real and eternally distinct from Soul, though both 
 Soul and Prakriti are eternal and uncaused. 
 
 Dr. Muir, however, refers to the commentators on the Eig- 
 Veda who explain asat as meaning “ an undeveloped state,” 
 
138 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 and adds that if we accept this statement there will be no con- 
 tradiction. Asat does not mean simply an undeveloped state, 
 but the state of pure or formless existence of the primal sub- 
 stance from which all forms have sprung. It is clear, however, 
 that if asat means an undeveloped state, then sat must mean, not 
 the essence of anything, but a developed state, the develop- 
 ment of the existing world, as Kapila uses it. The writer of 
 the Yedic hymn (R.-V. x. 57) meant to say that Agni was 
 asat, but became sat in the birth ( janrnan ) of Daksha and in 
 the womb of Aditi. It is clear, also, that Kapila, in this part 
 of his system, incorporated an older theory, in which asat 
 denoted at least the undeveloped state from which existing 
 things have been developed. Sat was the whole of existent 
 things. In Rig-Veda, i. 96, 7, Agni is called satas gopa, the 
 guardian of that which has a present being. There is also the 
 germ of another part of his system in a hymn of this Yeda 
 (x. 129) : “ There was then neither asat nor sat.” There was 
 only the one Supreme Spirit dwelling in self-existence. 
 “ Desire, then, in the beginning ( agre ) arose in It, which was 
 the earliest germ of mind, and wise men have beheld in their 
 heart, not being ignorant, that this is the bond between asat 
 and sat.” In the system of Kapila it is an unconscious 
 impulse on the part of Prakriti, or instinctive desire to set 
 the soul free from matter which causes the emanation of 
 Prakriti into the manifold forms of developed life (sat). This 
 latter was, in Kapila’s view, an effect, because developed, and 
 implying therefore a developing cause. 
 
NOTES. 
 
 139 
 
 NOTE C. 
 
 On the Connection of the Sankhya System with 
 the Philosophy of Spinoza. 
 
 The teaching of Spinoza has been unjustly described as a 
 pure Atheism or as a system based on Materialism. This 
 error has apparently arisen from his use of the word “ sub- 
 stantia,” which he is supposed to use to denote mere matter 
 or gross body, in opposition to mind or spirit. He uses it, 
 however, to denote absolute or infinite Being with infinite 
 attributes, manifesting itself by modes or accidents (affec- 
 tiones) in the manifold forms of the universe, and to this 
 absolute substance or Being he gives the name of God. To 
 God he sometimes gives the name of Nature, as Kapila called 
 his primal substance Prakriti. “ Infinitum ens, quod Deum 
 sive naturam, appellamus, eadem, qua existit, necessitate agit ” 
 (Eth. iv.). But he made a distinction between God as the 
 source of formal existence and these existences themselves, 
 calling the one Natura naturans and the other Natura naturata. 
 God is the cause of all things, not of their existence merely, 
 but of their essence, and this not transiently but immanently. 
 God is the only substance, whether as Natura naturans or 
 Natura naturata. Whatever is, is in God, and without God 
 nothing can be conceived, for as the Infinite Substance he is 
 the source of all things, and they are contained in Him. 
 Thus, as others who have attempted to solve the mysterious 
 problem of the relation of the Infinite to the Finite, he forms 
 only a kind of Pantheism. It has been said that “ Spinoza 
 does not confound God with the material universe,” but this 
 is, in his system, a part of God : “ Natura naturans et natura 
 naturata in identitate Deus est.” God has, indeed, two attri- 
 butes, thought and expansion. “ Cogitatio attributum Dei 
 est, sive Deus est res cogitans. Extensio attributum Dei est, 
 
140 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 sive Deus est res extensa ” (Eth. 2). But here are not two 
 distinct entities. God is the All. Extension is visible 
 thought and thought is invisible extension, but He is the 
 living whole. “ Bes particulars nihil sunt nisi Dei attri- 
 butorum affectiones, sive modi, quibus Dei attributa certo et 
 de terminate modo exprimuntur ” (Eth. i.). God, however, 
 is not corporeal. The universe is only a manifestation of his 
 being. Body is only a mode of his attribute of extension, a 
 passing form of his existence. All formal existence changes 
 and dies ; it is but a visible aspect of him who is unchange- 
 able and eternal. He, the Infinite, exists in himself, and that 
 which is finite exists in another, and cannot therefore be a 
 representation of his nature. As Cousin has interpreted the 
 idea : the universe is “ the Deity passing into activity, but not 
 exhausted by the act ” (Cours de Phil. Intro.). 
 
 In his psychology Spinoza taught that the mind does not 
 know itself, except so far as it receives ideas of sensation by 
 the bodily organs; but these perceptions, which are primarily 
 confused, become clear by the action of the mind in internal 
 reflection. It is not, however, free in its action. It is 
 determined by a cause, which is itself determined ad infinitum 
 by some other cause. All things issue and are carried on by 
 an eternal necessity. Even God does not act for some volun- 
 tary purpose, for this would indicate desire. He acts only 
 from the necessity of his nature. As there is no free will and 
 no really free action, for man is but a part of the general 
 order whose laws cannot be disturbed, there is no absolute 
 goodness or its opposite, and men have invented the names 
 of goodness or virtue to denote such actions as tend to their 
 benefit. God is really the cause of all things, even of our 
 thoughts ; of the latter by his attribute of thought, and of 
 outward actions by his attribute of extension. Men attribute 
 their actions to the determination of the mind, not knowing, 
 in their ignorance, that the mind cannot think till it is 
 
NOTES. 
 
 141 
 
 impelled by the bodily organs, and our volitions are only our 
 appetites which are connected with the body. 
 
 Spinoza taught that truth, i.e., the just correlation of idea 
 and fact, might be obtained. Ideas are obtained (1.) by the 
 action of the bodily senses; (2.) in their generic form by 
 imagination, i.e., the remembrance of sensational ideas, which 
 are classified by words ; (3.) by the logical faculty or reason ; 
 and (4.) by intuition, as Sclielling afterwards taught. Error 
 arises from the confused and imperfect results of the first 
 source of knowledge. There is no faculty of thought or of 
 desire, as distinguished from the act, and both mind and body 
 “ are but one thing considered under different attributes.” 
 There is ultimately an identity, as in the system of Hegel, of 
 subject and object, and this oneness is in God. It is not 
 made evident how Spinoza reconciled the apparently opposite 
 ideas of the spirituality of the Divine nature and the real 
 existence of material forms. If the latter are only his visible 
 aspect, a realisation of himself in the material world, and 
 particular things are only modes of his attribute of extension, 
 we have a near approach to the Vedantist doctrine of mayo, 
 (illusion), which represents the whole of formal, material 
 existence to be only an illusive manifestation of the One 
 Supreme Spirit, who is himself the All. 
 
 It will be unnecessary to say to those who have read the 
 “ Sankhya Karika” that the system of Ivapila is not the 
 same as that of Spinoza ; but the latter, as an exposition of 
 God and Nature, has a close resemblance to the tlieistic form 
 of the Sankhya as set forth by Patanjali, and especially to 
 this form of it as represented in the “ Bhagavad Gita.” In 
 that work the One Supreme Being has a dual nature, a higher 
 which is spiritual, and a lower which answers to the Prakriti 
 of Kapila, and corresponds to the attributes of God — thought 
 and expansion — in the system of Spinoza. The world of 
 existing things is a manifestation of the Supreme Spirit in 
 
142 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 this lower attribute, coming forth at the will of the spiritual 
 nature and again at the end of an age called a lcalpa, dissolving 
 into his all-containing self. All individual or formal existence 
 is but the modal form in which the one spiritual essence makes 
 itself manifest. All things issue from this source and are con- 
 tained in it. As the ether pervades and encompasses all things, 
 so the One pervades and encompasses all. Spinoza might 
 have employed the language of the “ Bhagavad Gita,” and the 
 author of this work might have taught, in the words of Spinoza, 
 “ Deum esse non tantum causam, ut res incipiant existere, sed 
 etiam, ut in existendo perseverent ; sive (ut termino scliolas- 
 tico utar), Deum esse causam essendi rerum ” (Eth. i.). Both 
 taught that the universe was an evolution, but not such an 
 evolution as Darwin has endeavoured to prove — from the 
 lowest point of being to its highest state — but from the one 
 highest or sole being to its lowest depths, there being a 
 gradation from buddhi (intellect) down to inanimate matter. 
 The one, in this gradation, ends where the other begins. 
 The Hindu and the German philosopher moved, in other 
 respects, in precisely the same lines of thought. Both taught 
 that the mind or the soul knows itself only by the action of 
 the ideas of sensation or sense-perceptions that originate in 
 the bodily organs. There is no absolute self-consciousness. 
 
 In another conclusion the two systems agree. The fatalism 
 which Spinoza asserted, though supported by a more im- 
 posing array of argument and more absolute in its kind, is 
 maintained by his Hindu predecessor. According to the 
 latter, the universe is only a vast machine, which is caused 
 to revolve by the action of the One Being, in whom all 
 existence is contained. All things are but the agents of 
 his power; and though virtue and vice have an essential 
 difference from each other, yet a fatal necessity destroys, in 
 fact, the barriers that, in the conscience of mankind, are 
 placed between good and evil. Conscience has no part in 
 
NOTES. 
 
 143 
 
 either system. Man seeks only his own advantage, though 
 in the system of Patahjali the highest good is obtained by 
 an absorption into the divine essence by yoga (lit. union), 
 the blending of the human with the divine, even in this 
 life, by the force of constant meditation. The Deity has 
 no concern with human actions, whether good or bad. The 
 perfect man has no sympathy with his fellows. He lives in 
 a state of complete isolation, in which all necessity for action 
 and all sense of duty are entirely lost. The system of Spinoza 
 leads to the same selfish exclusiveness ; for if men ought to 
 seek only what is profitable or agreeable to them, or rather, 
 must do so from the very necessity of their nature, there is 
 no possibility of self-sacrifice or the abandonment of a per- 
 sonal gain for the benefit of others, either in their personal 
 or national capacity. There is virtually no law, or no law 
 but that of an unchangeable necessity, and all rightfulness 
 and the sense of right or wrong are absolutely destroyed. 
 
 NOTE D. 
 
 On the Connection of the System of Kapila with that 
 of Schopenhauer and Yon Hartmann. 
 
 The philosophical system of Spinoza has many points in 
 common with the theory of Patanjali, but the teaching of 
 Kapila is more closely allied with the latest philosophy of 
 Germany, as set forth by Schopenhauer and Yon Hartmann, 
 in “ Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung” (“The World as 
 Will and Idea”) of the first, and the “ Philosophie des Unbe- 
 wussten” (“Philosophy of the Unconscious ”) of the latter. 
 If we leave out of view Hartmann’s poetical illustrations of 
 his subject, by which he gives an unnatural brightness to a 
 gloomy system, we shall find only a “ philosophy of despair,” 
 an inarticulate cry, a wail of lamentation in which there is 
 
144 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 no hope. There is absolutely none for man in his present 
 conscious life. Its pleasures are chiefly a mere absence of 
 pain, and pain meets us at every step. Riches bring with 
 them many cares, together with much toil ; and labour — a 
 thoroughly Hindu sentiment — is itself an evil. Love brings 
 upon us embarrassments and disappointment ; it requires 
 immense sacrifices ; it causes more pain than pleasure ; it 
 is an “ evil,” or at best an “ illusion.” Nor can sympathy, 
 as some falsely suppose, bring pleasure to the man who 
 offers it : it is only another form of pain. Ambition is a 
 mere delusion, a vain striving — which is itself an evil — 
 for that which will only mock us if attained, and cause 
 bitter sorrow if, as the course of affairs usually runs, we 
 are left to pine in solitude for the unattained object of our 
 dreams. 
 
 The pleasures of science and art are rarely obtained, and 
 if they are won, they are only gained by much toil and 
 continual sacrifice. The end, if gained, is not a compensation 
 for the substantial evils of the method of our success ; and 
 our intellectual elevation makes us only more sensitive of 
 pain. A dog or an ox is happier, or rather less miserable, 
 than man, for it has a lower sensibility in proportion as it 
 has a duller intellect. Hope, indeed, remains, and might 
 give a real enjoyment, but we have learned by experience 
 that our hopes are deceptive : they only make our miserable 
 state more sad and despairing from the false light which 
 they throw around us for a while, leaving us, in their 
 departure, immersed in a deeper darkness and at a lower 
 depth. “ Human life,” says Schopenhauer, “ oscillates be- 
 tween pain and ennui, which two states are indeed the 
 ultimate elements of life.” Hartmann says of love that “the 
 sorrow of disappointment and the bitterness of betrayal 
 continue infinitely longer than the happiness of the illusion.” 
 Kapila taught, also, that our present life is occupied aud 
 
NOTES. 
 
 145 
 
 made miserable by pain, which comes upon mankind from 
 three different sources. In the Sutras attributed to him it 
 is declared that “the complete destruction of pain is the 
 highest object of man” (i. 1 ). Pain is, therefore, the chief 
 evil, if not, as Jeremy Bentham maintained, the only evil 
 in the world, and the sole purpose of the wise is to learn 
 how it may be put away for ever. Virtue and vice are 
 determined only by the tendency of actions to produce 
 pleasure or pain. There is no absolute or moral difference ; 
 in fact, morality may be discarded from our thoughts : the 
 soul, in the system of Kapila — for he believed in the existence 
 of souls — having no direct connection with virtue or vice, 
 which are only material conditions. To strive for inward 
 purity, or to contend for a noble purpose in our own lives 
 or for the benefit of others, was not indeed to him, as to 
 some modern philosophers, a work of folly or delusion, but 
 it was not held to be man’s highest or most necessary pur- 
 pose. This is found only in the attainment of the knowledge 
 by which the soul may be freed from all contact with matter, 
 that by such means pain may be destroyed. There is no 
 greatness in the suffering of pain, no moral elevation in 
 sharing the pains or the sorrows of others. Philosophy 
 began, as it ends, by seeking only to obtain a painless, un- 
 troubled life. 
 
 If now the question be put, How was this state of misery 
 produced ? the answer in the two systems is substantially the 
 same. The nature of the kosmos is explained in different 
 terms, but in each the sum of existent things has been 
 developed from a primary unconscious substance or force, 
 which Schopenhauer describes as Will, of which the world is 
 an objective manifestation, and which Hartmann calls “ the 
 Unconscious.” This is the all-containing principal or primal 
 source of all formal existence, the 1 )>. y of the Greeks. “ The 
 Unconscious is the ultimate principle of all existence ; it enters 
 
 K 
 
146 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 into all organic forces, into all our bodily movements and our 
 mental processes ; it guides man through all the stages of his 
 life, and without man’s knowledge it directs his steps so as 
 to realise its plans ; it lies at the root and forms the essence 
 of both matter and spirit ; they are therefore identical, and 
 only different aspects of the self-same substance .” 1 If we 
 substitute mind as the formative power or faculty of ideas for 
 spirit, this would serve for a description of the Prakriti of 
 Kapila. This is the universal primordial monad, from which 
 have emanated all the different states of mind and matter. 
 It enfolds and animates all things, and all things will be finally 
 absorbed and lost in it. In its primary state it was in a con- 
 dition of equilibrium, and there was no development of formal 
 existence while it continued in that state. How then was this 
 passive state brought to an end and the beginning of the 
 existing kosmos produced ? The answer of Kapila is that the 
 proximity of Prakriti (Nature) to Soul gave rise to an un- 
 conscious movement of Nature’s constituted elements, that 
 by their consequent unfolding into the forms of material life 
 the Soul might know the existence of matter and be sub- 
 sequently free from all contact with it. The Soul thus knows 
 itself and gains its natural state of isolation. All existing 
 things have been formed for this purpose. So says Hegel : 
 “ Everything in heaven and earth aims only at this — that 
 the soul may know itself, may make itself its object, and close 
 together with itself.” The doctrine of Schopenhauer is that 
 everything, physical or mental, is an emanation of that 
 mysterious force called Will, which has thus changed itself 
 from subject to object, and that this includes all things and 
 all beings, so that the idea of self or individuality is an illusion. 
 Hartmann represents the Unconscious as the unity of Will and 
 Idea, the latter being the object which the Will unconsciously 
 
 1 See an able article on the “ Philosophy _of Pessimism ” in the “ West- 
 minster Review,” January 1876. 
 
NOTES. 
 
 147 
 
 seeks to realise. The Idea has no separate existence per se, 
 and here we come very near the Vedantist doctrine of maya 
 (illusion). Schopenhauer, however, says that “absence of end 
 belongs to the nature of Will per se, which is an endless striv- 
 ing ” (Die Welt als Wille, &c.). From neither do we learn 
 how the world of existent things came to be developed from 
 this unknown power called Will, but the German philosophers 
 agree with Kapila in maintaining that the primary essence or 
 substance was unconscious, and that the conscious life has been 
 developed from it. Hartmann speaks of the Unconscious as 
 being properly that which is above consciousness ( das Ueberbe- 
 misste ), and that an individual consciousness is a limitation 
 and defect. Its birth is explained in language which is pro- 
 bably as strange as any that the science of mental physiology 
 has ever known : “ Before the rise of consciousness, mind can, 
 in its own nature, have no other presentations and ideas than 
 those which are called into being through Will and form its 
 content. Suddenly organised matter breaks in upon this 
 peace of the Unconscious with itself” — as in the system of 
 Kapila the external world is presented to the soul by Buddhi 
 (Intellect ) — “ and impresses on the astonished individual mind, 
 in the necessary reaction of the sensation, a conception which 
 falls upon it as it were from heaven, because it finds within 
 itself no Will for this idea ; for the first time the content of 
 intuition is given it from outside ” (Phil. d. Unb., p. 394). 
 Consciousness is, therefore, the surprise of the unconscious 
 Will in an individual mind at the presence of an idea which 
 the senses present. 
 
 Kapila has not ventured upon such flights of fancy, but he 
 preceded Schopenhauer and Hartmann in asserting that the 
 misery of our present state is due to the fact of our conscious 
 life, for this has arisen from material developments which 
 cause pain, and this can be put away only when consciousness 
 has ceased to exist. When the soul has gained a complete 
 
I4§ 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 isolation, then all conscious life is absorbed into the un- 
 conscious Prakriti. Freedom from pain can only be obtained 
 by the destruction of this conscious life, and the aim of 
 the wise is to obtain by knowledge the primitive state of 
 unconsciousness. Schopenhauer and Hartmann teach the 
 same doctrine. There is no remedy for the misery of the 
 world in anything that belongs to our present life. It has its 
 root in consciousness, which is found in every kind of formal 
 existence, even the lowest, but has its highest development in 
 man, and hence he is supremely wretched. But the remedy 
 for the evil is not suicide : this affects only the individual ; it 
 cannot benefit the race. “ The basis of all man’s being is 
 want, defect, and pain. Since he is the most complete ob- 
 jective form of will, he is by that same fact the most defective 
 of all beings. His life is only a continual struggle for exist- 
 ence, with the certainty of being beaten” (Die Welt als Wille). 
 How, then, is the world to be delivered from this state of 
 wretchedness? The answer is : (i.) By a knowledge of the 
 fact that the world in its present form is wholly and un- 
 alterably bad. This answers to Kapila’s statement that our 
 deliverance from pain can only be gained by knowledge. (2.) 
 By the abandonment of desire, the renunciation of will, the 
 absolute surrender of personal existence, that all things may 
 be absorbed into the unconscious. Thus the whole of present 
 formal existence will pass away for ever. The world, as it 
 now is, was an irrational development of will. “As man 
 becomes penetrated with the idea of the misery of existence, 
 and the feeling gains strength through heredity ; as people 
 become more capable of co-operation, the greater portion of 
 the active spirit in the world will adopt the resolution to 
 destroy the act of will, and the world will have vanished into 
 nothingness. The unconscious will return to that passive 
 state of pure self-satisfied intelligence from which it never 
 should have passed ; and the possibility of another world, 
 
NOTES. 
 
 149 
 
 with all the miseries of this, will be for ever exhausted and 
 exterminated” (West. Kev., p. 159). In the system of 
 Kapila this state of unconsciousness, of calm and eternal repose, 
 is gained by the soul when absolutely freed from contact 
 with matter, and the whole of formal or developed existence 
 will be absorbed into the formless, unconscious Prakriti. 
 Hartmann, too, asserts a true Nirvana , the extinction of all 
 conscious personal life as the final goal which the wise will 
 seek to obtain. The Hindu and the German philosopher 
 alike maintain that there is no hope for the world by any 
 process of amendment. The labours of statesmen and philan- 
 thropists are in vain. The only sufficient and abiding cure of 
 its woes is the annihilation of all individual life. The last act 
 of the great drama, which we are to expect eagerly, ends in 
 the universal destruction of the present order, and the world, 
 with all its miseries, will pass away for ever. The German 
 philosopher has a more Vedantist leaning than Kapila. The 
 unconscious that will reabsorb all existence in itself bears a 
 close resemblance to the supreme Brahma, who is the efficient 
 and material cause of all created things, or rather they are, as 
 the Vedantists say, himself in certain deceptive forms, which 
 shall finally disappear, and all life, as at the beginning, shall 
 be absorbed and contained in him. M. Renan anticipates a 
 similar result as the conclusion of the existing world. “We 
 imagine a state of the world in which everything would end 
 alike in a single conscious centre in which the universe would 
 be reduced to a single existence, in which the idea of a per- 
 sonal monotheism would be a truth. A Being omniscient and 
 omnipotent might be the last term of the deific evolution, 
 whether we conceive him as rejoicing in all (all also rejoicing 
 in him), according to the dream of the Christian mysticism, 
 or as an individuality attaining to a supreme force, or as 
 the resultant of tens of thousands of beings, as the harmony, 
 the total voice of the universe. The universe would be thus 
 
150 
 
 HINDU PHILOSOPHY. 
 
 consummated in a single organised being, in whose infinitude 
 would be resumed millions of millions of lives, past and pre- 
 sent, at the same time.” This sole Being is further described in 
 language which, from its united grandeur and grotesqueness, 
 might have been written in the East, and will remind the 
 Sanskrit scholar of the description of the Supreme Being 
 in the eleventh chapter of the Bhagavad Gita : “ Only a 
 small part of matter is now organised, and that which is 
 organised is organised feebly ; but we may admit an age in 
 which all matter may be organised, in which thousands of 
 suns joined together would serve to form a single being, sen- 
 tient, rejoicing, absorbing by his burning throat a river of 
 pleasure which would flow from him in a torrent of life. This 
 living universe would present the two poles which every ner- 
 vous mass presents, the pole which feels and the pole which 
 enjoys. Now, the universe thinks and rejoices by millions of 
 individuals. One day a colossal mouth would give a sense of 
 the infinite ( savourerait I'infini), an ocean of intoxicating delight 
 ( un ocean d’ivresse ) would flow into it ; an inexhaustible 
 emission of life, knowing neither repose nor fatigue, would 
 spring up throughout eternity. To coagulate this divine 
 mass the earth will probably have been taken and spoiled as 
 a clod that one crushes without care of the ant or the worm 
 which conceals itself there.” 1 Is this philosophy or a dream 1 
 Ivapila and Hartmann had substantially the same theory, but 
 the exercise of their imagination was less bold and vivid than 
 that of the Frenchman. But, however expressed, whether in 
 the obscure brevity of Iswara Krishna, or in the subtle but 
 flowing arguments and illustrations of Hartmann, or the im- 
 aginative flights of Renan, the theory is substantially the 
 same. All existent things have issued from the One ; this 
 emanation into separate and conscious forms of being has been 
 the cause of unnumbered woes ; and this state of misery can 
 1 Dialogues Philosophiques, trois. dial. (Reves), pp. 125-128. 
 
NOTES. 
 
 I5i 
 
 only be put away by the absorption of all personal, conscious 
 life in its primal source. The oldest and the latest system of 
 philosophy, though severed in time by more than two thou- 
 sand years, speak with the same voice ; but they give no hope 
 to man, for his highest ambition or his only refuge from 
 misery lies in his personality being destroyed for ever. 
 
 THE END. 
 
 PRINTED BY BALLANTYNE. HANSON AND CO. 
 EDINBURGH AND LONDON.