FAIRFIELD—In Bciuity.
July Term, 1867,
LUCY A. MOBLEY, 1
vs. V Bill for Dower, etc.
EDWARD D. MOBLEY, et al J
BRIEF OF FACTS.
The Bill is filed by Lucy A. Mobley, widow of David Mobley,
deceased, late of Chester District, against Edward D. and Sam'l
W. Mobley, executors of David Mobley, and against others, the
children of David Mobley,—all of the defendants, except two
infants, being his children by a former marriage.
The testator died on the 10th of February, A. D., 1866, pos-
sessed of a large real estate of near 4,500 acres of land, andleav-
ing of force a Will which had been executed by him on the 28th
July, A. D., 1860 ; which Will, inter alia, contained the follow-
ing clauses:
"First.—I bequeath to my wife, Lucy A., the following
slaves, to wit, Emeline, Dilcey, Sally, (Lipford,) Ellen, (Lipford,)
and Eliza, (Lipford,) together with such increase as they may have
between this date and my death. Also a note on Gen. John
Buchanan for $3,881.54, and all the furniture she brought with
her on our marriage. The above bequest to be in lieu of dower.
" Second.—To my sons, Edward D., Samuel W., and David
M., I devise the tract of land situated in Fairfield District, on
Wateree Creek, bought of Thos. R. McClintock, together with
the several tracts which I have added thereto, (except the tract
bought of Thos. Brown, which I have sold to my son Edward,)
the said lands containing a body of about 2,747 acres. The
lines of division I purpose to have run, and when done to execute
titles to each of my said sons for his separate portion ; but in the
event of my death, without having done so, I direct that the same
be divided, allotting to Edward 915 acres, to Samuel 917 acres,
and to David 915 acres."
In the fall of the year 1860, after the will had been executed,
the testator called in a surveyor and himself made the division
of these lands among his three sons, allotting to David Mobley,
908 acres; to Samuel W., 913 acres; and to Edwrard D., 912
2
acres. Plats of each portion were prepared by the Surveyor
and were certified in the following form:
" Soutii Carolina.—The above plats represent two tracts of
land laid off from David Mobley to his son D. M. Mohley, con-
taining nine hundred and eight acres, situated in Fairfield Dis-
trict, on the waters of Rocky Creek and Wateree Creek, and
hath such shape, form, marks, and boundaries as represented by
the above plat. (Signed) J. Y. MILLS, D. S.
Laid, Sept. 27 and Nov. 3, 1860.
Each son was by the testator put in possession of his respec-
tive portion, but no deeds of conveyance were executed.
In the lands thus allotted to these sons in severalty, the com-
plainant, on the 11th day of October, A. D., 1862, executed to
each son respectively her relinquishment of dower, in this form:
" THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, \
" Chester District. j
" I, J. Y. Mills, a Notary Public for said District, do hereby
certify unto all whom it may concern that Lucy A. Mobley, the
wife of David Mobley, of said State and District, did this day
appear before me, and upon being privately and separately ex-
amined by me, did declare that she does freely, voluntarily, and
without any compulsion, dread or fear of any person or persons
whomsoever, renounce, release, and forever relinquish unto
David M. Mobley, son of David Mobley, all her interest and
estate in a tract of land lying and being in Fairfield District and
State aforesaid, on the waters of Wateree and Rocky Creeks,
containing nine hundred and eight acres, and bounded by lands
of Joseph Stewart, E. D. Mobley, Samuel Stewart, estate of
John Ratteree, Dr. William Thorn, Samuel W. Mobley, and
others, as will more fully appear by reference to a plat made out
by J. Y. Mills, D. S., and dated September 27th and November
3d, 1860 ; and also all her right and claim of Dower of, in or to
all and singular the premises above desci^bed.
" Given under my hand and seal, this eleventh day of October,
Anno Domini, 1862. (Signed) LUCY A. MOBLEY.
"J. Y. Mills, Notary Public and Magst. ex. off." [L. S.]
Relinquishments in like form were at the same date executed to
Edward D. and Samuel W.; and were all recorded July 9,1866.
The sons were in possession, each of his several lands, when
the testator died in 1866; and had paid taxes thereon in their
own names before his death.
3
On the day of his death (Feb. 10,1866,) the testator attempted
to execute another Will, but died in the act of affixing his signa-
ture. This unexecuted paper contained the following provision :
"I bequeath to my wife, Lucy A. Mobley, and our two chil-
dren, Cicely A. and David Woodward Mobley (1305) thirteen
hundred and five acres of land in Fairfield District, on the waters
of Wateree Creek, and adjoining lands of Dr. Thorn, Mr. DuBose,
and E. P. Mobley. I also give them the following mules, viz.,
Beck, Peter, Jake, and Bash. Also, all my cattle, hogs, and
sheep, to be equally divided between them and my two daughters
Catherine Amelia and Mary, and my son William D. Mobley.
I do hereby declare as to the land and other property given to
my wife and her two children, to be in lieu of all dowry or dower, to
my estate or any part thereof, and shall be held subject to the
following limitations, that is to say, at her death or marriage the
above land and other property to pass over to my two children,
Cicely A. and David Woodward equally, and should either of
them die leaving no issue, to pass over to the surviving child,
and should both of them die, leaving no child or children, the
land to pass over to my other children equally."
Two days after his death the following agreement was entered
into in reference to the unexecuted Will, and signed by the widow
and all of the children of the first wife:
"STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA—Chester District.—
We, the undersigned, heirs-at-law of the late David Mobley, of
Chester District, and legatees under his last Will and Testament,
bearing date the 28th day of July, A. D., 1860, in consideration
that the said David Mobley had prepared another Will which he
was unable to sign, but which we believe to contain his wishes in
reference to the final disposition of his estate—said last mentioned
paper being in the handwriting of Col. Samuel W. Mobley, and
bearing date the tenth day of February instant—do hereby agree
to carry out the provisions of the last mentioned paper, and to
execute to each other such deeds of conveyance, release, and re-
linquishment, as we shall be advised are necessary to effect said
agreement. Given under our hands and seals this twelfth day of
February, 1866. LUCY A. MOBLEY,
EDWARD D. MOBLEY,
SAML. W. MOBLEY,
DAVID M. MOBLEY,
WILLIAM D. MOBLEY,
Witness: Wm. J. Henry, \ CATHARINE A. MOBLEY.
John Sweat. / MARY E. MOBLEY,
l. S.
l. s;
l. s;
u. s;
l. s.:
"l. s.:
l. s."
4
The Bill was filed by the complainant in May, 1866, for dower
in all of the lands of testator, for an account of certain funds
received by David Mobley of her separate estate, and to set
aside, as to the complainant, the agreement entered into on the
12 th February, 1866, if it should be pleaded in bar of her dower.
The defendants waive the agreement, but in bar of her dower
in the lands devised to David M., Edward D., and Samuel W.
Mobley, they plead the Releases executed by her to each of them
respectively. Her dower in other lands conceded.
Several questions were discussed at the hearing. The first
relates to the validity and effect of the releases of dower executed
by the plaintiff to the defendants, Edward D., Samuel W., and
David M. Mobley, respectively, on the 11th October, 1862. By
his will, bearing date 28th July, 1860, David Mobley, their
father, had devised to these defendants the lands mentioned in
those releases, and they were respectively in possession of the
same in October, 1862. They are not understood, however, to
claim otherwise than as devisees under his will. Indeed, two of
them, Edward D. and Samuel W. Mobley, having proved his
will and assumed the office of his executors, are precluded from
setting up any opposing title; and as to the origin of David M.„
Mobley's possession of the land in his occupancy, we are only and
vaguely informed by the testimony that it began in 1860.
The renunciations or releases of dower referred to pursue the
general form prescribed by the Act of Assembly of 1795 (5 Stat.,
256). The wife's relinquishment of dower in such mode was
obviously designed to operate in conjunction with the husband's
conveyance of the land. It was meant to be adjunct and ancil-
lary merely to the conveyance of the husband, but not to have
effect as a separate and independent alienation by the wife. With
the advance of civilization, population, and wealth, the necessity
became more and more manifest of providing for the conveyance
Chancellor's Decree.
LUCY A. MOBLEY,
vs. V Bill for
EDWARD D. MOBLEY, et al. j
5
of the entir£ and absolute ownership of land divested of all lien
or charge whatever. To meet this very necessity were framed
the various devices of fine, recovery, the joint deed of husband
and wife, with her acknowledgment of the same duly certified
and recorded, and lastly, the modes of renunciation indicated
by the acts of 1795 and 1785 (7 Stat., 233.) In all of them the
the wife is regarded as acting concurrently with the husband, and
not solely and apart from him. Under the act of 1785 her
"relinquishment of her right of dower and acknowledgment of
the same in Court or before a Commissioner, and such acknowl-
edgment recorded, are declared effectual in law to convey and
pass away her right." But to whom is it transferred? Not to
the husband undoubtedly, but to the person to whom he shall
have previously conveyed the land. Nothing could be more
explicit in that regard than the terms of the act of 1795. The
married woman is there designated as the wife of " any grantor
conveying real estate" by the form of deed prescribed, and she
is empowered, in the mode indicated to " renounce and release
her dower to the grantee and his heirs and assigns in the premi-
ses mentioned in such deed." Such mode of relinquishing the
right of dower assumes, therefore, the execution of a prior con-
veyance by the husband, and without it is wholly inoperative as
a statutory renunciation, transfer, or release.
The plaintiff's releases of dower to the three sons of the testa-
tor occurred in his lifetime. He survived for more than three
years afterwards, and died as late as the 10th February, 1866.
As devisees under his will, the sons, of course, took no interest
whatever in the lands devised until the death of their father.
In no just sense can they be regarded as being his grantees, or
alienees on the 11th October, 1862, and unless they were so, they
can derive no benefit whatever from the plaintiff's renunciations,
or releases in their favor.
It is contended that we have here the concurrence of aliena-
tion of the land by the husband, and releases of dower by the
wife, and that the mere order in which they occurred ought not
to affect the rights of the parties under them. The general le-
gal disability of the wife to dispose of her estate is not removed,
6
even in her regard to her right of dower, by the statutes referred
to. She is regarded as being invested by them with a special
power of disposition, which can only be effectually exercised in
the mode and subject to the conditions which they prescribe.
It has been adjudged to be the settled law of this State, that
even where property is secured to the separate use of a married
woman, she cannot charge, encumber, or dispose of it, except by
strictly pursuing the power to do so conferred by the instrument
creating her estate. "She can in no manner of respect," re-
marks Chancellor Harper, as the organ of the court, "be con-
sidered a feme sole. A. feme sole disposes of or charges her pro-
perty by her own act and according to her own will by her inhe-
rent power as owner. A feme covert exercises a delegated power
and cannot exceed it. She is enabled to execute a power, as in
some instances any third person, even though having no interest
in the property, might be enabled to execute it and bind her by
their act."—Reid vs. Lamar, 5 Rich. Eq., 42.
The doctrine of this court seems to be in conformity to the
opinion expressed by Sir Thomas Plumer, that a married woman
with a special power of appointment, cannot bind herself by
contract to sell the property. Her disability as a married avo-
man is taken away if she pursue her power. But Avhen the in-
strument is not executed according to the power, it is nothing
but an agreement signed by a married woman, and as an agree-
ment it is invalid.—Martin vs. Mitchell, 2 Jac. and Walk., 413.
It is, therefore, considered that the instruments purporting to
be renunciations or releases by the plaintiff to the defendants
Edward D., Sam'l. W., and David M. Mobley respectively, are in-
effectual to exclude her from dower in the lands referred to.
Another question in the cause remains to be considered. By
the will of Osmond Woodward a portion of his residuary estate
was devised to his daughter, the plaintiff, during her natural life
"for her sole and separate use, benefit and behoof," with certain
ulterior limitations not necessary to be set forth. At the divis-
ion of their testator's estate, the executors of Woodward propos-
ed to assign to the plaintiff, as her portion, tAVO tracts of land in
Fairfield District, and a house and lot in the toAvn of Winnsboro'.
7
The plaintiff's husband, David Mobley, assuming to represent
her on that occasion, declined to accept the house and lot in
Winnsboro' and one of the tracts of land referred to as parcel
of her portion, but received their assessed value in the treasury
notes of the late Confederate States of America. Of course the
husband, David Mobley, was wholly unauthorised to receive, in
lieu of the real estate referred to, the money thus paid to him.
Nevertheless, being discovert, the plaintiff is now competent, so
far as her interests are concerned, to affirm the acts of her hus-
band in that regard. She does so in effect when by her bill she
calls upon his executors to account for the moneys so received
by him, in her right, from the executors of her father. If she
had elected to repudiate his action in the premises altogether,
and to treat him simply as an intruder, her remedy would have
been exclusively against the executors of Woodward.
It is urged for the plaintiff that the sum in Confederate Treas-
ury Notes, which her husband, David Mobley, received from her
father's executors, was greatly less than the value of the real es-
tate for which it was substituted, and that the executors of Da-
vid Mobley should be held to account for the actual value of such
realty. The substance of the complaint here made is, that Da-
vid Mobley received too small a sum in satisfaction of the plain-
tiff's claim under her father's will. It is not easy to perceive
how David Mobley was in default for not exacting a larger sum
from the executors of Woodward, when he had no authority in
her right to exact from them any sum at all. As he was not
possessed of any of the powers or authority of a trustee, so
neither was he subject to any of a trustee's obligations in that
regard. His liability, it is apprehended, must be restricted to
the value of what was actually received by him.
On the other hand, it is considered that the executors of Da-
vid Mobley can claim no abatement from the amount of their tes-
tator's liability, upon the ground, that the fund which he received
on his wife's account was subsequently, in part or in whole, lost
by its unfortunate investment or otherwise, despite due care apd
diligence on his part. His receipt of the fund from Woodward's
executors was wrongful, as was his retaining it in his hands up to
8
the time of his decease; and he is not regarded as being at any
time charged with the duties or entitled to the immunities of a
rightful trustee.
Dower, by metes and bounds, has been assigned to the plaintiff
under the writ for that purpose ordered by Chancellor Lesesne,
in all the lands in Fairfield District, of which the testator Mobley
died seized. If she is not precluded by her releases to certain
of the defendants, as has been here adjudged, then none of the
parties are understood as objecting to the assignment of dower
proposed by the commissioners in their return to that writ.
It is ordered and adjudged that the return of the Commission-
ers appointed for that purpose, assigning to the plaintiff her dower
by metes and bounds in the lands in Fairfield District, of which
her late husband, David Mobley, died seized, be confirmed and
be made the decree of the Court.
It is further ordered and decreed that an account be taken of
the rents and profits of the said lands accrued since the death of
the testator, David Mobley, which have been received by the de-
fendants or any of them; that the one-third part thereof is due
and payable to the plaintiff in respect of her dower out of said
lands ; and that the Commissioner inquire and report which of the
defendants should contribute, and in what proportion, towards
paying the plaintiff her third part of said rents and profits.
And it is further ordered that the Commissioner inquire and
report what sums are due and payable to the plaintiff, conform-
ably to the principles of this decree, in respect of any moneys,
effects, or estate, being her separate property under the will of
her father, Osmond Woodward, which were received by the testa-
tor Mobley, or came to his hands during his lifetime.
(Signed,) J. P. CARROLL.
p-round. of Appeal.
Because his Honor has erred in decreeing that the Releases
executed by the complainants to the defendants, Edward D.,
Samuel W., and David M. Mobley, are ineffectual to exclude
her from dower in the lands referred to.
MELTON & MELTON, Solicitors for Defendants.
9
Acts in Relation to Dower.
A. A. 1731, 3 Stat. 303.—This act, in section xxix., recites
as follows:
"XXIX. And whereas, no office or offices have hitherto been
established, whereby any fine might be passed for barring any
feme covert of her right and inheritance, or of her dower or
thirds, in any lands or tenements, but such feme coverts have
only joined with their husbands in such conveyances, and by the
practice of late years, being privately examined before the Chief
Justice of the Province, have acknowledged that they did freely
and voluntarily join with their husbands in such conveyances,
without any compulsion, dread, or fear of their said husbands,
which being certified by the Chief Justice, the same hath been
entered of record in the office of pleas, yet no law hath hitherto
passed for establishing and confirming such practice, so that such
titles may be still deemed defective:"
And thereupon enacts, that all such deeds and conveyances
heretofore made, where the wife hath joined with her husband,
etc., and hath been privately examined, etc., shall be deemed
good and effectual in the law, to all intents and purposes, to bar
such feme covert and her heirs of such estate as therein is ex-
pressed, etc., and for the barring of her dower and thirds, etc.
"And that the usual method and practice now observed for
the barring of any feme covert of her estate or inheritance, or of
her dower and thirds, by joining freely and voluntarily with her
husband in any conveyance for the purposes aforesaid, and ac-
knowledging the same before the Chief Justice for the time being,
or before any persons by him thereunto authorised and certified
by the said Chief Justice, and recorded in the office of pleas,
shall be deemed as effectual and valid in the law, to all intents
and purposes whatsoever, as any fine passed in due form of law
in his Majesty's Court of Pleas at Westminster for conveying of
lands in Great Britain."
A. A., 1785,7 Stat., 233.—This act having in §xlv. prescribed
9
10
the general requisites of a deed of conveyance and the manner of
proving and recording, enacts as to releases of inheritance and
dower as follows:
"XLVI. That all deeds or other conveyances hereafter made
in writing, under the hand and seal of husband and wife, and by
them personally acknowledged in the County Court, (the wife
being first examined separately and apart from her husband, by
some Justice of the Court, and giving her free consent to the
same,) shall be, and are hereby declared to be, good and effectual
in law to pass and convey all the estate, title and interest of such
wife and her heirs; and where any feme covert shall relinquish her
right of dower in any real estate, and acknowledge the same in
Court, or before a commission or commissioners, and such acknowl-
edgment shall be recorded, the same shall be effectual in law to
convey and pass away the right of such feme covert, although
she has not executed or acknowledged any deed of conveyance for
that purpose."
A. A., 1795, 5 Stat., 255.—This act "To facilitate the con-
veyance of Real Estate," in section I. prescribes a form of con-
veyance which shall be valid and effectual to convey from one to
another the fee simple of real estate, with this proviso:
"Provided, That this act shall be so construed as not to oblige
any person to insert the clause of warranty, or to restrain him
from inserting any other clause or clauses, in conveyances here-
after to be made, as may be deemed proper and advisable by the
purchaser and seller; or to invalidate the forms heretofore in use
within this State."
Section II. provides as follows:
" II. That the wife of any grantor conveying real estate in the
manner above prescribed, may, if she be of lawful age, release,
renounce, and bar herself of her dower in all the premises so
conveyed, by going before any Judge of the Court of Common
Pleas, or Justice of the Quorum, or any Judge of the Court of
the County wherein she may reside or the land may be, and ac-
knowledge before him, upon a private and separate examination,
that she did freely and voluntarily, without any compulsion, dread
or fear of any person whomsoever, renounce and release her
dower to the grantee and his heirs and assigns in the premises
mentioned in such deed. Provided, that a certificate under the
hand of the woman and the hand and seal of the Judge or Justice
11
aforesaid, shall be endorsed upon such release or a separate in-
strument of writing to the same effect, in the form or to the
purport hereafter following, and be recorded in the office of mesne
conveyances, or office of the Clerk of the County Courts in the
district or county where the land lies."
12
Points and Authorities.
1. Error: That dower can be barred only in the mode pre-
scribed by statutes.
This error arises, 1. from assuming that the statutes prescribe a mode
of release, preclusive of all others; 2. from adhering too closely to
supposed analogy between Eight of Dower and wife's Inheritance.
Statutes do not prescribe a general mode of release. Do not confer on
wife right or power to release : that she had at common law. They
do hut legalize certain new modes of conveyance in fee, to which are
superadded the common law release. Other modes of conveyance
not invalidated.—See act of '95.
Analogy of Dower to Inheritance not close. Inheritance an absolute
estate; as such cannot pass hut by deed; wife cannot during
coverture execute deed; ergo, enabling statute necessary. Dower
not an estate, but a mere contingent, inchoate right; not being an
estate, needs not to pass by deed; ergo, no enabling statute neces-
sary.
At common law coverture imposed no legal disability on wife as to
release of dower. It was a contract which she was always held
competent to make. Coverture only raised presumption of restraint
of action; rebutted by evidence of voluntary action. Doubts as to
power to release had no reference to coverture, but to her want of
estate.—Parke, *192. She joined in husband's conveyance, not as a
party thereto, but as a mode of expressing freedom of release.—-
2 Scribner, 294, §49; Biekard vs. Talbird, Bice, Ch. 158.
Releases existed at common law. Sprang from necessity; attached,
independently of statutes, to every known mode of conveyance—to
leases, to terms, to conveyances conditional as well as absolute.—
1 Boper, H. & W., *539; ParJce, *195; 2 Crabbe, B. P., §1193;
2 Scrib. 287, §§37, 38. Usual method of release by deed, derived
from custom of London.—2 Scrib. 268, §8. Wife's deed not required
as a deed. Her joining with the husband dispensed with by acts of
'85 and '95.
The gist of a valid release at common law was tli e privy examination.
Evidence of wife's free volition satisfied all requirements of the com-
mon law. In this, and not in conformity to statute, was the distin-
guishing feature of a valid release.—3 Bac. Ab. Title Power, F.
For obvious reasons release could not be by parol. This common
law release subsequently attached by statute to new modes of con-
veyance.
Eight of Dower, a common law incident of marriage : the right to re-
lease as old as the right to enjoy; equally a common law incident of
marriage.
13
2. Error: That the Releases pleaded are inoperative because
not predicated on a prior conveyance from husband.
This error arises from supposing that statutes preclude all other modes
of release. Grant that they do presuppose a prior conveyance—
what kind ? An absolute conveyance in fee and of immediate effect.
Are we to assume that no release is valid unless supported by such
a conveyance ? The argument must go to this extent. If statutes are
preclusive, they are only so as to absolute- voluntary conveyances in
fee, and having present effect as such. Alone to those do statutes
relate.
But other releases do prevail, and are recognized as valid. For ex-
ample : Release to attend Sheriff's title; such title not the voluntary
conveyance of husband, but a conveyance by operation of law. Re-
lease to attend mortgage; such not an absolute conveyance; fee
remains in husband, and may remain in him until his death.—Keith
vs. Trapier, Bail., Ch. 63; Kechley vs. Kechley, 2 Hill, Ch. 250;
Richard vs. Talbird, Rice, Ch. 158. Release to attend escroio; fee
remains in husband until delivery; his death may intervene.—2
Bouv. Inst. 393.
Idea that & prior conveyance is necessary to support a release not found
in statute or at common law. That a conveyance is at all necessary
is a common law not a statutory idea. To the common law must
we look for its import. At no time held necessary that there should
be an absolute conveyance in fee to support a release; never held
that there should be an actual subsisting conveyance at date of
release. Only necessary that release be made with view to aliena-
tion by husband, and that it should attend particular alienation in
view when made. Quantity of estate immaterial, or its time of vest-
ing. Intent of release could not go beyond extent of estate which it
was made to attend.
Doctrine of relation applicable to dower.—1 Scrib. 250, §23; 556, §2.
Title to dower may be defeated by relation, even in cases of parol
contracts of sale made before marriage but executed after.—1 Scrib.
564, §15; 556, §21. E converso, a release may bar, although the
alienation which it was made to attend may not take effect until after
death of husband. In ordinary conveyancing the date of release often
precedes delivery of conveyance; the latter takes effect only on
delivery.
3. Error: That at date of Releases, defendants were not the
alienees of testator, and the subsequent acquisition of title can-
not give them validity.
Devise a conveyance having inception at date of will, and perfected by
death of testator.—Lovelass on Wills, *245; 4 Kent, *510; Ibid,
*512.
Releases were revocable at any time during life of husband.—2 Scrib.
256, §36. Not having been revoked, they became absolute bar
when the devise vested.
After acquired title operated to estop her denial of her releases.—2
Scrib. 290, §42,
14
4. The Releases pleaded conform to all the essential require-
ments of the law, and are effectual to exclude complainant of her
dower in the lands referred to.
They are not pleaded as statutory renunciations; do not purport to be
such. They conform to all requisites of the common law release.
May he sustained under Act of '85.
They are not in parol; were the voluntary acts of complainant; ac.-
knowledged on private examination; before a competent officer;
certified and recorded; made to attend a proposed alienation by hus-
band; do attend the particular alienation "with reference to which
they were made.
Defendants were not strangers; were in possession when releases were
executed ; were placed in possession with view to devise then writ-
ten. They had at the time an inchoate title, as well under proposed
devise as under the delivery of seizin ; the former imperfect by reason
of life of testator, the latter imperfect for want of deed. In either
view sufficient to support a release.
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS.
April Term, 1868.
fepitjL
JUI3F-Terixi, 1867.
EDWARD D. MOBLEY, et al.
ads.
LUCY A. MOBLEY. <
I
MELTON & MELTON,
For Appellants.
RION,
For Appellee.
Power Press Southern Presbyterian, Columbia, g. C.