3*morg Idniuersitg Xibrarg
LECTURES
on
HUMAN NATURE,
BY
rev. 8amuejl ak, ©, ©.
ADAPTED TO THE USE O? STUDENTS A V COLLEG ES, ACADE¬
MIES, OR IN OTHER SCHOOLS, OP IN PRIVATE.
TO which is added
AN ESSAY ON LIFE,
BY
rev. john w. doak, d. d. & m. d.
Attention, aided by consciousness and common sense, at last,
must teacb us wbat our own nature is,
f. GIFFORD A CO., FKINTER3, JOHESBOROTJGII, TENN.
1845.
COPY RIGHT SECURED, ACCORDING TO LAW,
PREFACE.
This Epitome written by Rev. Samuel Doak, D. D.,
was used by him as a classic through the whole of his
long course of instruction on the Philosophy of Human
Nature. He recommended to his students the reading
of Watts, Locke, Reed, Steward, Brown &-c. as collater¬
al books. With him it was a primary object to bring
up his students to the investigation of all parts of the
subject for themselves, by applying the testimony of
consciousness and common sense regardless of what
they had read.
The origin of this Epitome is this. Rev. William
Graham, the founder of Washington College at Lex¬
ington, Virginia, delivered a course of extempore lec¬
tures on the Philosophy of Human Nature, while'said
Doak was one of his students. He took short notes on
Mr, Graham's Lectures. While a student afterwards
at Princeton, he heard Dr. Witberspoon lecture on the
same and kindred subjects. When he had graduated at
Princeton, he spent some time as an assistant of Dr.
Smith at Hampden Sidney college where he read, as he
had done at Princeton, much on the subject, written by
many authors. But finding no regular coherent system
furnished by any one, and that each aimed more at de¬
molishing the systems of others than at establishing one
of his own, he felt there was a want. When h,e came
to Tennessee, organized Salem and some other church¬
es and opened a classical school, he delivered several
courses of extemporaneous lectures on the subject. In
these lectures he was regardfessofwhathad been said and
written by others; he aimed at establishing a regular
coherent system of his own, under the guidance ofcon-_
sciousnes? and common sense. Many of -the features,'
and outlines of this system, no doubt, were suggested by
the recollection of Mr. Graham's lectures. He wrote a
4
summary of his first course which he required his stu¬
dents to transcribeand study, and which, he from time
10 time, amended and improved. Ilis lectures were
never written; if they had been, they would have been
too voluminous for general use. In this little book we
have the sum and substance of the whole, expressed in
ihe simple, concise and lucid style of the lecturer.
While this Epitome exhibits the subject in such a man¬
ner as may call forth all the energies of the college stu¬
dent, it makes 1 lie subject at the same time so plain that
it can hardly fail to be read and studied with much in¬
terest and profit by children in academies and common
schools, and by individuals who would study it without
an instructor.
The 22d lecture was written and is added by the pub¬
lisher, because he thought ^jiat something more ex¬
plicit on the subject of conscience than what was in the
proceeding lectures ought to be in a work of this kind.
He has added a full set of questions to each lecture and
to the Essay, (not because he approves the plan,) but
because fashion requires them. They will be conveni¬
ent for the teacher who is not master of the subject, and
for children who cannot undergo the labor of investi¬
gating the subject for themselves.
No branch of science contributes more to the strength¬
ening of all the faculties and the useful training of the
mind than the philosophy of the mind itself, when the
student can be prevailed on to think, and tjunk for him¬
self, and not depend on others to think for him: vet no
real improvement of the'facultics nor maturing of the
mind will be attained when the memory alone is exer¬
cised in treasuring up answers to the questions in the
language cf the book.
TIIE PUBLISHER.
c&rvzisrsm
Lecture I Oa Education.
tc II On-first principles.
4i III On first principles.
IV Oa perception and its concomitants.
" T On Emotion.
" VI On Passion.
" VII Orr Appetite.
VIII On Original desires of the mind. ;
" IX Observations on the two preceding subjects.
" X Observations coniinned.
'*' ' XI On Inclination, disposition and habit, includ¬
ing propensity.
" XII On common sense,' reason, memory ami
recollection.'
" XI11 On P'owe".
" 'XIV On the* will.
" XV On motives.
" XVI On guilt.
a. XVII On taste.
" XVIII On grandeur and sublimity^
"■ XIX On Beauty.
w XX On instinct, conception and imagination.
" XXI On the relative state of man.
XXII iMan's relative state, continued, and duties
-rising out of iu
w XXIII On conscience, by S. W. Doak.
Essay on Life.
LECTURE I—ON EDUCATION.
What is the end of an Education? It is tp train the
mind to exercise its facul.ies properly. It is also to
furnish the mind with truth and useful knowledge which
will enable the student to pursue w hatever business he
may think proper in after life. Another end of an edu¬
cation is the knowledge of language, which enables1 a
person- to convey his ideas to others with ease, and to
express his Sentiments so as to be easily understood.
But this last is not the most important end of an educa¬
tion, as it is only to answer a secondary purpose.
It may be asked here-, what are the best means to ac¬
quire an education? To which I would answer dili¬
gence and application. Here I would observe thru the
student ought to be vei'y careful to avoid the running
into two extremes;—grasping at too much at once ~md
being neglectful of his business. We are so constituted
that wc can nehher take in much at once, nor acquire
an education without diligence or application. We
ought therefore, in pursuit of an education to ubscive g
{ roper medium.
In our enquiries after truth, we should observe ccrtaip,
maxims, or general rules which may preserve us from
error. We ought-to enquire to what branch of science
the subject belongs, and what evidence would afibnlthe
most suitable illustration or proof;—Whether the illus¬
tration or proof will depend on the testimony cfpur
senses, or of consciousness, or of mathematical axioms,
or philosophical principles. Truth, for want of apply-
ing the proper evidence, may be left in the dark. If I
put my hand into the fire I immediately feel pain, but
this feeling will .not prove to me the fifth proposition ill
Euclid, nor that gold is yellow. If a philosopher tell
me that a man on the moon is seven feet high, I would
ask how he knows that—what evidence he can
7
produce to prove his assertion? If he would reply, T
have seen him/ I would laugh at die whole as a fiction
of his own brain, knowing that he had never gone to the
moon to measure the fancied-man, and that nothing short
of actual measurement would be proper evidence in the
case*
Questions on Lecture I.
What are the ends of an education? ,What ase means
for acquiring it? What extremes should be avoided?
fnoup enquiries after truth, what should be observed?
For want of what is truth often left in obscurity?
LECTURE II-ON FIRST PRINCIPLES.
Such is the constitution of our nature that we cannot
take in many things at once, nor see far into nature at
the first glance. We ought, therefore, to begin with
those things which are most plain, and then proceed to
those which appear at first view more intricate.
Before we proceed in any science we must take some
things as granted, which are called -first principles or
axioms.
First principles cannot be proved: they are seen by
immediate perception which surpasses all other proof
whatever. Who does not pereeive that two and two
make four, or that a whole is greater than a part. If
you prove first principles, you must prove them by some¬
thing more plain, and you must prove that also by some¬
thing still plainer than itself, and so on ad infinitum. But
as these first principles cannot admit a doubt, their
demonstration would not only be impossible but alto¬
gether needless. These first principles are the founda¬
tion of all reasoning, and without them there can be no
reasoning. To become acquainted with human nature
we must ourselves examine it, not depending on the hy¬
potheses of Metaphysicians on the subject, but,, directed
by certain axioms or self evident truths established by
8
consciousness and common sense. We should enquire
what is the nature, what is the constitution, and what
the Capacity which £»od has given to man?
1. I lay it down as a first principle, that I exist.
All men in ages have believed their own existence
except a few cracked brain Metaphysicians. Were I
asked how I know that I exist, I would not answer in the
language of Descartes "cogito ergo sum/' I think there¬
fore I am, but that I know i exist, because I am conscious
that J do exist. If any one would attempt to convince
me that I do not exist, whilst I am conscious that I do,
his attempt would be vain, because my belief is prior to
and independent of all argumentation on the subject.
The argument Vcogito ergo sum" is manifestly defective,
for we may with equal, if not greater propriety, invert
the order and say—sum, ergo cogito, I am, therefore I
think. This axiom then is founded ott consciousness,
which is the strongest possible testimony. It is therefore,
unnecessary as well as useless to seek arguments for its
establishment. I take, it, therefore, as a dictate of con¬
sciousness and of common sense that I exist.
2dly. I lay down as a dictate of common sense that I
think.
This also depends on the testimony of consciousness.
3dly. I lay it down as a dictate of common sense that /
am the same person lo-day that I was yesterday, or at any
other period of my life.
It is true the body of man is subject to changes: It
may be much wasted by sickness, and on the return of
health, it may acquire a. new recruit of matter, yet the
person is the same. Some attempt to establish the iden¬
tity of person by telling us that there are certain stamina
vitae or threads of life, which are born with us, which
remain the same through childhood, manhood, old age,
and from death to the resurrection, and are, therefore,
say they, sufficient to establish identity. But we have no
evidence, from our senses, nor from consciousness, nor
from any other source, of the existence of these stamina
9
vitas; nor can any one tell us where they reside. We
have no reason for believing any such thing. All con¬
jectures on this subject are equally Vain and unsatisfactory.
I am conscious that I am what I am to day, and I
am conscious that I remember that I was ten years ago,
pr at any other period of my life, the same person that I
am now, and this is sufficient for ail the purposes of gov¬
ernment human or divine. If a man has committed a
Crime twenty years ago, however his body may have
changed* he is conscious that he is still the same man and
Sensible of bis guilt, and that he is the one who deserves
punishment for that crime. Hence we have an easy so¬
lution ofthe infidel question. How are the dead raised
and with what bodies do they come forth? If God can
make me conscious that I am the same in the morning
wheiyl rise, that I was when I lay down at night, he can
make md conscious in the morning of the resurrection,
that I am the same person that I was, while I lived on
earth; and this is sufficient for all the purposes of moral
government. Identity, then, is established by the most
convincing of all testimony i. e. consciousness.
Questions on Lecture IL
What is the subject of this- lecture? How should wo
proceed in our searrffi after truth? How arc first prin¬
ciples perceived? What is the foundation officii reason¬
ing? Can they be proved? To be acquainted with human
nature whet is necessary? What is laid down as a first
principle? flow do you know thatyou exist? Vv hat is. se¬
condly, laid down as a first principle? What thirdly? By
what is identity of person established? By what is it not?
LECTURE III—ON FIRST PRINCIPLES.
4thlv. I take it for granted that my senses are true, and
that the information they give me is to be depended on.
The senses are five, Seeing, Hearing, Smelling, Tasting
and Feeling. I see a man. From the constitution of my
to
nature I must believe that a man is there, and all thfi
argument that can be invented cannot convince me that
a man is not there, when I am conscious that I see him.
I'f I be asked why I believe my senses? I answer, I
am so constituted by my creator that-1 cannot do other¬
wise. Some Metaphysicians have endeavored to prove
that our senses are not to be depended on, and that they
sometimes deceive us. For, say they, the sun appears
to be not more than one foot in diameter to the eye,
w hen to the philosopher it is known to be many thous¬
and miles: therefore, they say, our senses are not true,
and are not to be depended on at all times unless regu¬
lated by reason. To this I reply, that reason alone Would
never have discovered to me that there is a sun, nor
coulcfl have known it without sight or hearing; then the
knowledge of it is derived from the evidence of sense.
It appears then their mistake lies in this—they apply ond
of the senses to that which principally belongs to the
office of another. My eyes were given me to discover
the shapes and colors of bodies, but if I wish to kiiow
the length, breadth, or distance of any object T must ap¬
ply actual measurement. Ileason may and does assist
in forming instruments for that purpose. I find that all
men in all ages have been disposed to credit their senses
independently of reason. If there were a cririiinal at
the bar accused of murder, and two men of good charac¬
ter would testify that they saw him kill a man and
hectrd him say previously that he would do it; the Jfdge
would not hesitate to pronounce him guilty and worthy
< if death, because the evidence of sight would be suf¬
ficient proof that he did the. deed, and the evidence of
hearing sufficient for the discovery of his intention. I
feel pajn from the puncture of a pin. I am conscious
that I feci pain, but I cannot prove it any other way
than by saying that I feel it; though the circumstances
may correspond with what I say, viz: the blood flowing
and the distortion of my countenance.
It may be said that the senses may be disordered; true
n
enough, but this cannot be remedied by reason. To a
jaundiced eye (it is said) all things appear yellow? but in
this case we must refer to former experience, and recol¬
lect whether these things always appeared so: or we
must enquire if they appear sb to men in general; if not,
we may conclude that our sight is disordered.
5thly. 1 take it for granted that I remember. If I be
asked how I know that I remember? I answer I am
conscious of it, therefore I cannot doubt it.—Mankind
in general are disposed to credit their memory prior to,
and altogether independent of reason.-—Although mem¬
ory is not dependent on reason, reason is dependent on
memory. It is impossible to reason vvi.hout first prin¬
ciples, and it is impossible to use them without remem¬
bering them.
Gttdy. I take it for granted ihaf there is a material
w-orld—'Sun, Moon, tind Stars, and other objects which I
see, feel and smell. All men have believed tins, a few
Metaphysicians excepted; who have denied every thing
they could not prove; and as they could not prove the
existence of matter, have therefore denied its existence.
For, say they, a body cannot net where it is not: the
moon is not an inhabitant of our minds, therefore, she
cannot act there except in idea only. But this may
easily fye refuted by an example. Although France is
not in America yet she may transmit business here by
an agent. So although the moon is not in cur minds, nor
can our minds leave our bodies to go to the moon, yet the
evident;© conveyed to our minds is so strong and con-
yineingtbat wc must believe that such a body exists in
reality. We can conceive of objects being in certain
places when they are not there. lean conceive of my
Jiorse being in the cornfield, when he is not-, and I know
that he is in the stable.. I believe a stone is hard and
th.it snow is white as I believe I exist.— I must believe
then, that there is something existent more than mere
jdeas. I believe that the sun, moon and planets are
more thasr-merc sensations, or images impressed on tho
12
brain, as some "Metaphysicians tell y. Tins doctrine of
ideas has given rise to ail that system of metaphysical
non-sense taught by George Berkley of Trinity College,
.Dublin, who reasoned away the material world and
left nothing but spirits,and David Hume, a Scotchman,
completed tho work of annihilation,, and left nothing but
a bundle of ideas floating in vacim. This affords us a
lively example of man's liability to err.when lie forsakes
the piaiq path of common, sense. But if we adhere to
the principles lajd down in the beginning we carl have
rjo reason for believing any such things.
?thly. I take it for granted that there are-certain rela¬
tions established between things in nature. I mdrt beiiev e
there i3 a relation between cause and effect before 1 c*nn
believe the cause will produce the effect, and that ihcyi
is a relation between tl.6 ruler and the ruled, before the
ruled can be under obligation to olcy, and that there
must be a relation between 9 and 2, before they can
make 4.
Questions on Lecture III.
Wltjit is, fourthly, laid down as a first principle? What
ore the 5 senses 1 Why do we believe our senses? Ilmv
■does it appear that all men 'rust their senses? Can the
testimony of the senses when disordered bo corrected?
JIow? What is, fifthly, laid down as a first principle?
What establishes this? Have all men trusted jnenirry I
Whe'her is memory-dependent on reason or rcas'ii on
memory? Why? What is, sixthly, laid down as a fimt
principle? Have any denied this? Why? How is it.
established? What is the seventh first pririciple? Is
tins essential in all reasoning?
LECTURE IV—ON PERCEPTION AND ITS
CONCOMITANTS.
Perception is simply the seeing of an object present¬
ed to the mind. In perception there are three things to
13
be considered; the agent, the energy and the object. I
perceive a tree, as it is mere commonly expressed, I see
a tree. The pronoun I, represents the agent, the verb
s-eet expresses the energy and the noun, tree, the object.
Wc are so constituted by our Creator that whenever
\ye see, hoar, feel, taste or smell, we immediately per¬
ceive. Ilencc Me use the operation of the senses for
perception itself Thus, I see a man, I hear a sound, I
feel a surface, I taste an apple, I smelt a rose. The
senses are the only-means of perception, they are dis-
tmcL from iti yet "the senses and perception are often
blended together. A question on which there has been
much, metaphysical reasoning is "Whether the mind" is
Active or passive in the perception of an object?" For
an answer to this question, I appeal to the common
sense of mankind, and I hud men in all languages use
■active transitive verbs to express their perceptions—
verbs expressing the action of an agent passing to the
object winch is expressed in an objective case required
by the verb or energy which governs it. From this
manner of expression, which is common to all languages,
it must be inferred as a universal sentiment of mankind,
that the mind is active in perception in all cases what¬
ever.
Belief inevitably accompanies perception. I see a
hbuse, I instantly believe a house is there* I hear my
friends' Voice, I immediately believe that it is my friend's
voice. If I be asked why I believe so? I can give no
other reason than this, that I am so constituted that I
must family believe whatever I clearly "perceive. If I
should be required to define my belief, I would reply,
I cannot, because it is too simple to admif*of a defini¬
tion. I believe there is such a city as Philadelphia be¬
cause I have seen it,-or have heard of it. But were I
requested to define ray belief I would laugh at the re¬
quest. If you ask a plain Christian whether he believes
the scriptures, he will say yes. If you ask him if he
believes the Gcsrel of Christ? he will promptly assenb
14
But ask him to define his belief, and he vrilb eitkc* taught'
at your request, or he will be much puzzled to say any
thing satisfactory on tire subject. But if you recur to
his former experience, he will not only understand yau
perfectly, but also give you satisfactory answers.
Whatever we perceive, we immediately believe prior
to all reasoning. Yet there are some things which we
believe, though we may have forgotten the evidence on
which we first believed them; but if we now remember
that the evidence on which our belief then rested, was
sufficient to induce belief, we still believe them.
Emotion is also a concomitant of perception and is
closely connected with it.
A pleasant or painful emotion always attends the per¬
ception of objects that arrest the attention. I see a
house well arrayed and situated on a beautiful emi¬
nence, I feel a pleasant emotion. But if I see a house
badly formed, illy proportioned and situated in a dark-
vallev, I feel a painful emotion.
Belief as well as perception is attended by conscious¬
ness. I see a house; I immediately believe there is a
house there. Here I am conscious not only of the per¬
ception, but also of the belief which follows it. A ques¬
tion here arises more fit to be solved by the refined
Metaphysician than by him who enquires, after plain
truth, viz; Does consciousness g§_ before belief or belief
before consciousness? To this I answer; I do pot know
winch goes before, because I am not conscious of any
difference, and it would be difficult if not impossiblo to,
point out any difference. Consciousness is perhaps more
simple than belief and always accompanies it. We say
we are conscious of our existence, but never say we be¬
lieve we are conscious of it. The emotions that ac¬
company perceptions are sometimes called impressions,
and are either strong or weak. If 1 meet my friend
who has been long absent without any previous notice
of his coming, I feel strong emotions. But-if I meet a
friend with whom I am daily conversant; although I may.
15
have as great a regard for him as for my long absent
friend; yet the emotion or impression is much weaker.
Questions on Lecture IV.
What is the subject of this lecture? What is perception?
What three things must be considered on this subject ?
Example. What expresses the agent? What the energy?
What the object? What are the means of perception? Is
fhe mind active or passive in perception? How do you
prove that it is active? What accompanies perception?
Examples, Why do we believe? Can belief be defined?
Does the belief of what we perceive depend on reason¬
ing? Do we sometimes believe things when the evi¬
dence is forgotten? What besides belief accompanies
perception? Emotions are of what two kinds? Accord¬
ing to what? Examples. What accompanies percep¬
tion besides belief and emotion? Which is first in the
miacl, consciousness or belief? May emotions be in
different- degrees of strength? Example.
LECTURE Y—ON EMOTIONS.
In order to understand this subject fully it will be nc-»
cessarydo attend to the following question, viz; whether
the object or the attributes be the immediate cause of the
emotion? Experience teaches us that we cannot con¬
ceive of an object distinct from its attributes, nor ean we
have dny idea of the qualities without conceiving of
some object in which they exist. I cannot conceive of
material substance without some form; neither can I
conceive of form entirely abstracted from all matter. I
see a broad spreading tree adorned with beautiful flow¬
ers and green leaves. This object excites a pleasant
emotion. Now it is not the tree of itself, abstracted
from its ^ualitios, tliat excites the amotion; nor is it the
verdure or the- blossoms, abstracted nmm-the-trfifiibutjt
is the tree with all its agreeable qualities.—We, there-
fare, answer the question by saving, thaf it is an object
16
so qualified, perceived by the mind, thai is the immedi¬
ate cause of emotion, feueh is the constitution of our
nature that on the perception of any object an cmpuc^n
either pleasant or painful, in proportion asthe object ap¬
pears agreeable or disagreeable is excited. Thus a
gentle, flowing river, or a wide extended plain excites a
pleasant emotion. But a muddy stagnant lake,, or a
tract of barren hills excites a painful emotion. Emo¬
tions either painful or pleasant, may be heightened by
external relations. If I see a smoky hut, the emotion
arising from the perception is painful; but if it be situated
between rugged mountains in a dark valley the' emo¬
tion is still more painful. On the other hand, an elegant
building will excite a pleasant emotion however it .may
be situated; but if it be placed on a beautiful eminence
in the midst of an extensive plain the emotion is height¬
ened; but if there are around it beautiful meadows and
vast herds of thrifty cattle grazing in them, and a broad
river gently flowing through the plain, the emotion is
still increased. A man possessed of amiable qualities
such as benevolence, cheerfulness &c., excites a pleas¬
ant emotion. On the contrary a man possessed of hate¬
ful qualities—malevolence, envy, moroseness, dullness,
&c. excites a painful emotion.
. The action of others is the cause of emotion in us; But
the intention is the most material circumstance by
which the emotion is excited in us whether painful or
"pleasant. For example. I see one man give another
a piece of money, it excites little or no emotion either
pleasant or painful until I learn the intention or, at least
have some conjecture about the design, because here
the quality of the action is out of view. But if I learn
thatjie gave it in payment of a just debt, I have an idea
of his honesty, which excites a pleasant emotion; or if I
find that he gave it for favor received, the emotion is
heightened by the expression of gratitude, or if I discov¬
er that he gave^it for the relief of some poor distressed
family, the emotion is stiil greater. But if I find he gave
1.7
it as a reward for the assassination of an honest citizen,
the emotion is exceedingly painful; but if I find that citi¬
zen was my father or my greatest earthly friend, the
emotion is still much higher and rises to indignation.
Here X would observe that the intention is always sup¬
posed to arise from some antecedent disposition. A
man may do an action that is productive of good ef¬
fects, and yet he can claim no merit if he does it from a
malevolent disposition.—An action that proceeds from
a good intention, though productive of bad effects, can¬
not be accounted a crime: it may be thought imprudent
but not wicked. But as the merit and demerit of action
are to be considered more appropriately in another lec¬
ture, the subject we pass over for the present. Motion
is another cause of emotion. To see a man walk with
ease and unaffectedness excites a pleasant emotion; but
to see a man walk stiffly and affectedly excites a painful
emotion. The feelings of others excite in us emotions
pleasant or painful. I hear a noise in a solitary place,
I pause and listen: I perceive it to be the cry of some
one in distress; I approach the place; the cry becomes
more bitter; I am compelled to hasten to the relief of the
distressed. I conclude this lecture with the observation,
That emotions are excited in us by all the interesting
objects with which we are conversant; and if the ob¬
ject be agreeable the emotion is pleasant; but if the ob¬
ject be disagreeable the emotion is painful.
Questions on Lecture V
What is the subject of this lecture ? To understand
the subject what is necessary ? What does experience
teach ? Examples. What does not excifCj. y-^otion ?
What does excite it ? Emotions will be ar y^'ng to
what? What will highten emotion ? Exatatjge{j ^re
the actions of others the cause of emotions-,,^ Aefly
what 1 Examplf s; The intention is always \^posed
to arise from whit J* What will render a good action
bad ? What will be some excuse for a bad action ? Is
motion a cause of emotion ? Will the feelings of others
B
18
excite it ? Examples. Do all interesting objects ex¬
cite it 1
"LECTURE VI—ON PASSIONS.
Helving in the last lecture treated on Emotion wc?;
now proceed to consider some of its concomitants/ We
have already shown that on the perception of an inter¬
esting object, an emotion either pleasant or painful is
excited in -us.
Some emotions are followed by desire, others are
not.
A beautiful garden well laid off, filled with useful veg¬
etables and adorned with a rich variety of well scented
flowers, will excite a pleasant emotion and a desire of
possessing so beautiful an object. A well formed horse,
well trained for the saddle or for the draught will excite
emotion, and if he be for sale, a desire of possession
will probably ensue. A cloud is a beautiful object and
excites a pleasant emotion; but no one of common sense
desires to possess it, or to walk upon it. I see a beauti¬
ful young lady of correct taste, amiable dispositions and
good habits, a pleasant emotion is excited. And if I
find she is attainable as my companion, a strong desire
may be excited in me to have so lovely an object: but
when I find she is not to be obtained my desire subsides,
but the pleasant emotion remains. We may observe
that objects out of our power are not generally objects
of our desire,.'
Ther^- some cases in which emotion and desire
subsided»<; same time; in others-they do not. l am
"passjnT l'1' the highway,I hear an uncommon sound
I amf£avei6ns of an emotion, and-ftjsoof a desire to
• know caused the sound. I approach the place and
find it wag paused only by some childrprf at play. Here
my desire Subsides with the emotion. Desire arises af¬
ter emotion, and accompanies it, and generally remains
after it has subsided.
19
We notfr proceed to show in what respects emotion
differs from passion. Emotion, accompanied and fol¬
lowed by desire, is passion. For what is the- passion of
love besides a pleasant emotion accompanied by a de¬
sire of possessing the beloved object?' or what is hatred'
but a painful emotion accompanied by a desire of evil
to the hated object? Here then we may easily discover
the difference between passion and emotion,-in as much-
as emotion, accompanied and followed by desire, consti¬
tutes passion. We may have an emotion without pas¬
sion, but passion is always preceded by emotion and in¬
cludes it.1. Another distinction between passion-> and
emotion is^ that emotion has a law but no object, where¬
as passion has both. We always suppose emotion to
have a cause which excites it in the mind. We never
speak of the object of emotion; but we often hear peo¬
ple talk of the object of passion. Here I would observe,
that the same thing that is the cause of emotion, is the
cause and also the object of passion. - A beautiful wo¬
man will cause a pleasant emotion, and if the emotion
be followed by desire, it becomes-passion^ of which the
woman is both the cause and the object.
Having explained the difference between passion and
emotion we now are to consider passion as selfish or
benevolent. Every passion has some gratification as its
object; when this is: obtained the. passion ceases.
When a person has nothing but his own interest in view3,'-
his passion is selfish; but when the happiriess of others
is its object, .then it is benevolent. If a man gives a.
piece of money for his own benefit, his passion is selfish;
but if he gives it for the benefit of another, it is benevo¬
lent.
These passions often unite, and are gratified in the^
same object. A man may entertain his friend for his
own improvement and thereby gratify a selfish passion.
He may do it also to make his friend happy and sot
gratify a benevolent passion.,.
What is impulse? I answer, Passion so inflamed that
20
it drives its subject to act without deliberating on his
action or its consequences* A man in a crowd receives
a blow. He forthwith strikes the person nearest to him
prompted by impulse. This is called impulse, because
the man was impelled by his passion to strike without
considering what he was doing. Hence we have these
phrases in our languagei—mpulse of passion, impulse of
appetite, &c. A person, who kills another by impulse,
is not considered guilty of murder, but of manslaughter
only. But if he had time to reflect, and went to some
other place, procured a weapon, returned, searched for
his adversary and killed him, he was actuated by a ma¬
licious passion: he is guilty of murder. In the former
case, the man is considered as acting, as brutes act*
from instinct without reflection; but in the latter case
the action was intended to use a law phrase, with mal¬
ice afore-thought.
We shall conclude this lecture by showing the differ¬
ence between passion and affection. They are nearly
allied to one another, but the following example will
show a difference. I see a lovely woman pessessed of
all the perfections belonging to her sex. This object
excites a pleasant emotion, and if followed by desire, it
is passion: but when the object is possessed, passion is
changed into affection. In other words it may be said,
a man has a passion for his sweetheart, but a man has
affection for his wife. We say a man has the passion
of anger, of envy, of revenge, of malice &c; but we
never say we have the affection of anger, the affection
of envy, of revenge, or of malice. Passion, is a state of
mind more turbulent and boisterous, affection more
calm and uniform. Passion agitates with some degree
of violence. Affection being calm gives the mind real
pleasure in the enjoyment of the object.
Questions on JLecture VI.
What is the subject of this lecture! Some emotions
are followed," by what? Examples. Are objects
known to be out of our power desired ? Will emotioE
21
and desire ever subside at the same time ? Examples.
Does desire rise before or after emotion ? Which gen¬
erally remains longest ? What is passion ? Can we
have emotion without passion ?—passion without emo¬
tion ? Has passion both, a cause and an object? Has
emotion both? Is the same object both the cause and
object of passion ? Is passion always either selfish or
benevolent ? Examples. May both be gratified in the
same object sometimes ? E xample. What is impulse ?
Example. Why called impulse ? How will you show
the difference between impulse and passion by an ex¬
ample ? How do you distinguish between passion and
affection ?
LECTURE VII—ON APPETITE.
What is the difference between passion and appetite?
To answer this question satisfactorily, it will be neces¬
sary to observe what appetite is, and to what part of
our constitution it belongs.
1., Appetite is an uneasy sensation accompanied by a
desire for a gratifying object.
. 2. When the desire is gratified the appetite subsides
for a time and again returns.
Hunger, thirst and animal love have these properties
and are, therefore, properly called appetites.—Hunger is
an uneasy sensation accompanied by a desire to eat.
Thirst is an uneasy sensation accompanied by a desire
to drink. When the desire of eating or drinking is sat¬
isfied those appetites subside for a time, but afterwards
return. The returns of thirst are not so periodical as
those of hunger. The same may be said of animal love.
It is probable that hunger and thirst, in infants, are
nothing more than painful sensations. We cannot sup¬
pose them to be followed by desire, when the infants
cannot know that eating and drinking are necessary to
remove the sensations.
22
We have these appetites in common with brutes
There is in them the painful sensation accompanied by a
desire of gratification. The brutes desire the object of
gratification by instinct, but habit or custom has con¬
siderable influence on them. A horse long accustomed
to eat oats and hay, will not, at first, readily eat corn
and fodder. The ends for which these appetites are
given are too obvious to require remarks, viz: the pre¬
servation of animal life and health and propagation of
the species.
The cravings of the appetites are often so dangerous
that they withdraw the attention from every other ob¬
ject and fix it on the objects of their gratification.
Hence we have an easy solution of the question, -what is
the difference between passion and appetite ? Appetite
craves a general object; -as hunger craves food in gen¬
eral Yet custom has considerable influence in direct¬
ing the desire to particular articles of food. Thus I may
eat oysters or tomatoes or beets from fancy ; or J may
eat beef, mutton, pork, or potatoes for the sake of
health. Thirst craves drink in general, but the influ¬
ence of habit may cause it to select", for its object, a
pa r tic ular sort of drink.
But passion has its particular object. A man when
hungry may desire; a particular sort of food, but if he
cannot obtain that, another sort will satisfy his appe¬
tite. But if be hates one man it will not satisfy his
passion to be revenged on another, or on any one be¬
sides the man he hates.
Another distinction is: Appetite is prior to object;
but passion is posterior. A man does not desire food
because it is first presented to his view, but no one has
pity without having first a pitiable object in contem¬
plation.—Appetite goes before and suggests its object
to the mind, but passion follows after, as an effect follows
its cause.
The appetites above mentioned have their seat in
the body.
23
These lappitites in inferior animals have nothing in
them morally good or evil. Nothing has changed them
from their original state. In man they may be vitiated
by indulgence, yet indulgence of them is not criminal
unless it goes beyond the limits prescribed by laws hu-
manor divine. These appetites are called in the scrip¬
tures "the desires of the flesh, the lusts of the flesh"
from the influence they have over us in determining our
choices.
There are other appetites belonging to our constitu¬
tion such as the desire of rest after fatigue, and a desire
of motion after long continued rest. When these have
become very strong, we are said to be weary or rest¬
less. These appetites are in different degrees in dif¬
ferent persons. Some men can plan their business well,
who are too indolent to put their plans into execution :
some are too restless to lay their plans well, or to stick
to any business Until it is completed. These appetites
as well as all others, by indulgence, may be increased in
all men and especially in the young. Hence it is that
so many youth go astray by giving loose play to all
their appetites. Hence I would observe, that the young
man who keeps his appetites under due subordination,
and whose genius, education and industry all conspire
to promote his respectability and usefulness, can scarce¬
ly fail to become a useful and respectable member of so¬
ciety.
Questions on Lecture VII.
What is the subject of this lecture ? To see the dif¬
ference between appetite and passion what is necessary ?
What is appetite 1 When the object is obtained what
takes place ? The appetites are what ? Are the re¬
turns of appetite periodical? Hunger and thirst in
children are merely what ? Why? Are the appetites
common to men and brutes ? Has custom an influ¬
ence on the appetites? Example. Do appetites and
passions differ with regard to their objects? How?
jExamples. Is appetite prior or posterior to its object?
24
Is passion? Examples. Appetites have their seat?
where? Passions where ? May they be increased by-
indulgence ? When is indulgence of the appetites crim¬
inal ? What other appetites belong to our constitution ?
Are they equally strong in all men ? Example. How
may they be increased ?
LECTURE VIII—ON ORIGINAL DESIRES OF
THE MIND.
There are other original principles in the human con¬
stitution, besides those mentioned in the last lecture,
which agree with the appetites before mentioned in some
respects, but differ from them in others; such as the de¬
sire of esteem, of knowledge, of wealth and of power.
They agree with the appetites in being prior to their
objects,—in having their objects general,—in being
strengthened by indulgence and weakened by restraint.
Hunger craves food in general, yet a person may pre¬
fer one sort before another. So the desire of wealth
craves a general object; yet, as there are many kinds of
wealth, a person may prefer one kind before another.
The general desire is common to all men. Hunger,
when gratified to excess, terminates in gluttony. So the
desire of wealth may grow to avarice.
They differ in this respect; Hunger and thirst are pe¬
riodical; and when gratified subside for a time: but the
desire of wealth, power, esteem and knowledge, do not
subside when they are gratified. The appetites have
their seat in the body, but these desires have their seat
in the mind. Lord Cames called these desires appetites;—
Professor Reed calls them general desires, to distin¬
guish them from particular ones. But I think they may
be called, with more propriety, original desires of the
mind: yet it is of little importance by what name they
are called.
Let us examine and see whether there be any such
23>
desires in our constitution. It is evident that we weredc
signed by our Creator for social, and not solitary beings.
It was necessary that there be in our nature some stimu¬
lus—exciting us to society. Without this we would not
be social. The desire of esteem answers this purpose-
This desire is easily discovered in children at an early
period. We observe them endeavoring to engratiate
themselves in the favor of their nurses and playmates-
They desire to be esteemed more than others. The
desire is no less discovered in advanced age. The at¬
tention paid to dress and to deportment in company, on
examination, is found, for the most part, to grow out of
this desire. When men attempt to gain esteem by pur¬
suing a course of conduct truly polite and moral towards
men, and pious towards God, they are justly esteemed
and commended for it; but when men endeavor to gain
esteem by immorality, impiety, selfishness, pride or ar¬
rogance, they are truly detestable. The gratification of
this desire affords great pleasure to the mind, while
the want of it leaves the mind, in some degree, misera¬
ble. Suppose a man to know that he is disesteemed
and considered perfectly detestable by all human beings,
must he not be a most miserable object ? There is in
brutes something like this principle: We observe horses,
that are much fed and wrought together, discover mu¬
tual attachment for one another. The same may be said
of almost all domestic animals.
The desire of knowledge is also a principle common
to all mankind. This principle is discovered very early
in children. We see them examining things very min¬
utely and sometimes breaking them open to see what
is in the inside. Prompted by this principle, the savage
leaves his hut and travels over distant mountains and
valleys in pursuit of discoveries. It is this principle per¬
verted that excites people to enquire into the scandals
of their neighbors.
When this desire has become strong and, is directed
to many objects it is called curiosity.
26
Somebrutes'show this desire. •-■A ■ dog coming into ft
strange room will examine every corner. A fox going
into a hollow tree examines all its turns and windings.
The desire of wealth is not less common or universal
among all ranks of men. The child, the slave and the
savage, eaGh desires something that he may call his own.
The child is fond of his toys and desires new ones. The
slave values-his dog and his patch of vegetables. The
savage values his beads, his belt and instruments for
hunting and warfare.
We are so constituted by our Creator that every in¬
dividual has his wants, and in many easeshe alone is the
best judge of his wants: and the infinitely wise Creator
has given to every man a desire for some objects to
relieve his wants. The pursuit of wealth, with a view
to supply our real wants, or the real wants of others, or
to accomplish some laudable purpose, is commendable:
but when the object is merely to supply some .imaginary
want, or to gratify some vicious lust, it is blameworthy.
The desire of power over others is also a universal
principle among mankind. In uncivilized and rude
nations, superiority in bodily strength generally decides;
but, in more civilized nations wisdom, fortune or birth,
generally determines the superiority in. power. Brutes
show this desire. Among them superiority is always
decided by superior strength. A strange beast comes
into a herd; he must fight each one before he knows his
proper place; those that beat him take their station above
him, and those that are beaten by him take their station
below him.
Questions on ;Lecture VIII.
What is the subject of this lecture ? Whatare named
as original desires? In what do they agree with the
appetites ? Hunger gratified to excesd, terminates in
what ? The desire of wealth in whqt? They have
their seats where? What prompts man to society?
How do children show the desire of esteem ? How do
all men show it ? How do horses ? How does the de-
27
sire of knowledge appear to be universal ?- -How do
"children show it?—Savages? A perversion of it is
shown how? 'Mow do inferior animals show it? Ex¬
amples. Is a desire of wealth a universal principle in
man ? How does this appear? Children show it how7
Savages? When is it comrriendable ? When not?
Is the desire of power universal in mankind ? How is
superiority determined among the uncivilized? How
among the more civilized ? How among brutes ? Ex¬
ample. How among brutish men1?
LECTURE IX—OBSERVATIONS ON APPE¬
TITE.
GENERAL OBSERVATIONS DEDUCED FROM
THE TWO PRECEEDING LECTURES.
We deduce from thelwo.preceeding lectures the fol¬
lowing observations:
1st. That these appetites and desires, eight in num¬
ber, including the desire of motion and rest, areoriginal
parts of our constitution; and'have for their objects all
things in nature. When but little attention is paid to
these appetites and desires, and to things in nature, it
clearly appears-evident that there are objects suited
to each of them. There are many objects for the grati¬
fication of hunger, &c. The desire of esteem extends
.to all those actions and gratifications for which we es¬
teem others, or for which we expect to be esteemed our¬
selves. Many are the objects suited to gratify the de¬
sire of power. The objects suited for the gratification
of the desire of wealth are many and various. There is
scarcely an object that will not, in some degree, gratify
the desire of knowledge. These principles of action
prompt us to pursue those objects which we suppose
suited to the gratification of either of these appetites or
desires. And when the pursuit becomes too ardent,
fatigue and a desire for rest serveto moderate thepursuit.
ss
2nd. I observe, that though these appetites and desires
are evidently distinct from one another, yet they are of¬
ten joined together in the same individual, at the same
time and in the same pursuit; and the appropriate ob¬
jects of one are frequently sought to gratify another.
Thus a man in pursuit of wealth may be hungry, thirsty
and fatigued. And wealth may be sought as the means
of gaining power over others, or of gaining esteem from
fellow men. These appetites being so blended together
is, no doubt, one reason why the science of human na¬
ture is so difficult to understand. Man, stimulated to
action by strong desires, without attending to the prin¬
ciple by which he is actuated, is, of all the objects of
knowledge, most ignoran* of himself.
3d. I observe, that these appetites and desires, be*
ing prior to their objects, give particular objects a great
advantage in raising particular desires in us. The
constitution of man is formed for the part of the world
in which he acts, and he is formed susceptible of influ¬
ence from the various objects with which he is conver¬
sant. He having ihese general principles antecedent to,
and independent of reason, the particular objects, when
presented, immediately excite in him emotion and draw
the desires after them. We shall illustrate this by ex¬
amples. A man has been accustomed to acquire
wealth by some mechanical trade ; a method offers it¬
self, that appears more advantageous, viz: trading in
lands. Now his general and prior desire for wealth
prompts him to use the most effectual means for acquir¬
ing it. He immediately leaves his shop and turns, his
attention to lands, This change gives a new turn to
his conversation and company. Before he associated
with mechanics and talked about mechanical business:
now he chooses to associate with speculators in land, and
his conversation is turned to land speculations. When
an unexperienced youth sees a man of high character
have on a beautiful and uncommon coat, his general de¬
sire of esteem prompts him to wish for one like it. And
29
he even tries to imitate the admired man in his gestures,
Jboks and articulation of words. Hence, we see that
general principles give particular objects a great advan¬
tage over us in raising particular desires in us. And we
may add that if there were no general desires, there
would be no particular ones excited.
4th. Most or perhaps all particular passions and
affections are founded on these general principles and
arise out of them. It is obvious that a desire for any
particular kind of food rises out of the general appetite,
hunger, and love for wine, or for a particular companion
out of their correspondent appetites. But whether the
malevolent passions, such as envy, hatred or mal¬
ice, are founded on these general principles of our na¬
ture or not, is more difficult to see- Envy is emulation
carried to excess. When we wish to suppress a com¬
petitor, this is envy, and arises from a supposition that
he has injured us, or prevented us from obtaining that
esteem, that wealth, that power, or some other object of
desire, to which we thought ourselves entitled, or which
we would otherwise have obtained. Hatred rises from
the supposition that the hated object has injured us or
is likely to injure us, by directly inflicting pain, or by
depriving us of the means necessary for the gratifica¬
tion of some of our appetites or desires. Malice is
habitual hatred, and arises from the supposition that its
object is continually opposing our happiness. Hence
we clearly see why the carnal mind is enmity against
the law of God, i. e. because that law continually op¬
poses either the mode, or the degree of gratification, in
which the degenerate mind supposes its chief happiness
consists.
Questions en Lecture IX.
What is the first observation ? Are the appetites and
desires original ? How many are there in all ? Are
there objects suited to each ? What will gratify hun¬
ger? What the desire of esteem?—of power?—of
wealth? What prompts to pursuit? What is the
30
second observation ? Examples. Why is the science;
of human nature so difficult ? What is the third obser¬
vation ? Are the desires dependent on reason ? If there
were no general desires would there be any particular
ones ? All particular passions and affections arise out
of what ? What is difficult to see ? What is envy ?
It arises from what ? Hatred arises from what ? What
is malice? It arises from what ? Why do men hate
God's law ?1
LECTURE X—OBSERVATIONS CONTINUED.
5th. I would observe, that the distinction between
the appetites of the body and the desires of the mind ap¬
pears to have been known to Paul and John. Says Paul,
Ephs. ii, 3, "Among whom also we all had our conver¬
sation in times past in the lusts of our flesh, fulfilling the
desires of the flesh and of the mind." John in his first
epistle, Chap, ii, 16, says: "For all that is in the world,
the lust of the flesh, and the lust .of the eyes, and the
pride of life, is not of the Father but is of the world." By
this he means the objects of lust, or the various objects
that are suited to the appetites and desires. The flesh¬
ly mind (as it is sometimes called) is the mind contin¬
ually employed in meditating on these objects and devis¬
ing ways and means for obtaining • them.. The law in
our members is that commanding influence which the
appetites of the body have over the mind. In connec¬
tion with this we may obserye:
6th. The great influence the body has over the mind.
In all ages men have observed the, influence the body
has in exciting particular desires in the mind: yet few
have attended to it with that care, or explained it with
that accuracy, .which the subject requires. Some have
observed t'that the state of the mind depends, in a great
measure, on the health of the body, .and that the body
may. have a tendency to reduce the mind to a state of
31
ignorance and stupidity by enslaving it to the appetites,"
but have, not traced out such a connection as merited a
place in moral disquisition. The omission of which has
left their systems extremely dark and confused.1 A lit¬
tle attention to some of the most obvious parts of our
nature, will make the connection and influence very
evident. The appetites hunger, thirst and animal love,
being original, and prior to their objects, suggest their
objects to the mind and solicit gratification; from them.
That solicitation is also enforced by the fancy of pleas¬
ure, and the pain of wanting.it; which are strengthened
and made still more urgent by delay. . As these appe¬
tites do nofdepend on choice, but are antecedent to it,.
when their cravings become so clamorous, they are
more than a balance for, any mere theory or speculative.
opinion. The objects suggested by opinion or theory
are too remote to raise feelings strong enough to coun¬
terbalance the strong cravings of appetite. Hence
we have an easy solution of the question: Why are
men of good understanding, and extensive knowledge,.
often guilty of great debauchery, gluttony and sottish-
ness 1 Though their knowledge be great,. and at times
their resolution strong, yet these are not equal to their
fancy of pleasure, arising from the gratification of their.
appetites, and to the pain of wanting, that pleasure.
Thus the saying of Media is daily verified, "Video
meliora proboque, et deteriora sequor." I'.see and ap¬
prove the better and pursue the worse.
7th. We may observe the influence the mind has
over the body in certain circumstances. When objects
are presented to the mind which excite in it terror, grief
or joy, to a high degree, this effect on the mind is com¬
municated to the body and often produces violent con¬
vulsions and sometimes even death itself. Agreeable
objects, by exciting agreeable emotions, brighten the
countenance, whilst painful objects, by exciting painful
emotions, cover it with a gloom, or cause tears to flow
from the eyes. Objects suited to the appetites when
32
presented to the mind elicit desire, excite emotion and
the craving of the appetites.
8th. We may observe, that these appetites and
passions, being original and prior to their objects give
evil tempters a great advantage in tempting us to trans¬
gression. The objects, being presented to these appetites
and desires, tend to inflame them, and they prompt
us to indulge in the gratification of them beyond the
limits prescribed by the law of God. There are two
remarkable instances found in scripture which will suf¬
ficiently illustrate this observation. The temptation of¬
fered to Eve was addressed to the appetite of hunger,
and to the desire of knowledge. "And when she saw
the tree that it was good for food, and a tree to be de¬
sired to make one wise, she took of the fruit thereof and
did eat." The beauty of the fruit is a circumstance
naturally added, because the beauty of the object in all
cases tends to influence the desire for it. The other
is the temptation of Christ, which was addressed to him
in the wilderness, on a mountain, and on a pinnacle of
the temple. The temptation was addressed first to
the appetite, hunger, and the desire of esteem; secondly,
to the desire of wealth, of power and of esteem; and
thirdly to the desire of esteem, and a disposition, dis¬
covered in him, to obey and trust God and his word.
Questions on Lecture X.
What is the fifth observation? What is the sixth?
Are appetites prior to their objects ? What do
they do ? What enforces solicitation ? What strength¬
ens the cravings of appetite ? Are the appetites de¬
pendent on choice ? Why are men of good understand¬
ing sometimes subjects of debauchery, gluttony and
drunkenness ? What is the saying of Media ? What is
the seventh observation ? What effect have agreeable
objects on the body ?—Painful what ?—Objects suited to
the appetites what ? What is the eighth observation ?
How do they give tempters the advantage ? Examples,
The temptation of Eve was addressed to what ?
LECTURE XI—INCLINATION.
INCLINATION, DISPOSITION AND HABIT, IN-
CLUDING PROPENSITY.
Inclination is the leaning or bending of our nature to¬
ward an object. The term is used to express any mode¬
rate desire. It is sometimes used in expressing a strong
desire, but not without some word to qualify it, as,
strong, violent, invincible inclination.
Inclination prompts and leads the mind to choose.
An example will make this sufficiently plain. Iam
asked if I will go to see the show to-day? I answer, I am
not certain. Every one who hears me, must believe
that I have some desire to go, and that this desire is
counterbalanced by some other desire, or that it is not
sufficiently strong to determine my choice. There is
something in every man's nature that distinguishes him
from every other man; this we call disposition. Some
are said to be of an amiable disposition, others of a
hateful disposition, some of a cheerful, others of a moral
disposition.
Disposition differs from principle in this-—principle is
a law of our nature, and is common to all our species,
but disposition is that which makes a difference between
men, and produces a^diversity in their characters. If
I were asked what disposition is 1 I would reply, it is
very difficult, if not impossible, to define it. If we ap¬
peal to common sense and the experience of mankind,
we find that men are as distinguishable by their dispo¬
sitions as they are by their features.
There are two other states of the mind nearly allied
to disposition, viz: Good humor, and its opposite, bad
humor. These are not so periodical as appetite, nor so
habitual as disposition, though there may be such states
as habitual good and bad humor. Good humor often
arises from uninterrupted success in our pursuits, and
its effects are of the most agreeable nature. It renders
us happy in ourselves and agreeable to others, and is ac¬
companied by benevolence and every social affection.
W<? may, therefore, say, that our happiness 1 will be
either perpetual or temporary, as our good humor may be.
34
On the other hand, habitual bad humor is a source
of habitual misery, and temporary bad humor of tempo-
rary misery. It casts a gloom over every object, and
sours every enjoyment. It renders us unhappy in our¬
selves and disagreeable to others. And it stirs up in the
mind malevolent passions.
There are two other states of the mind similar to
these, viz: Elevation and dejection.
Elevation is joy excessive, which arises from the
mind's approbation of itself for having done some good
actions. This, some have called the pride of virtue, or
it arises from some unexpected and desirable turn of
fortune, or a sudden transition from a very miserable,
into a very comfortable state.
There is an elevation of mind which arises from a
mistaken and vain opinion we entertain of ourselves, as
persons endowed with very good or extraordinary abil¬
ities, and mental accomplishments, or some distinguish¬
ing excellence of body. This elevation discovers pride,
the parent of many atrocious evils, such as arrogance,
selfishness, haughtiness, disdain, contempt of others, &q.
Dejection may arise from various causes, such as
disappointment in our anxious pursuits, privation of
something we accounted very valuable to us, or to our
friends. Dejection is of different degrees, and may be
increased by indulgence, or by repeated losses or dis¬
appointments, until it becomes what is called melan-.
choly. To define clearly what melancholy is, would be
a difficult task: All that is necessary to be said is, that it
seems lo be a bodily complaint, of the nervous kind,
which effects the mind in an unusual manner—casts a
gloom on every object, and excites strange and absurd
notions on religious subjects, as well as on other subjects
of contemplation.
Habits have been distributed into two classes,. natural
and moral. But this distribution seems to be neither
accurate nor complete: because we have no habits by
nature, they are founded upon custom, and they are all
3 5
acquired. We are constituted by our Maker, suscepti¬
ble of habits: but this will not justify the application of
the term natural, merely because they are acquired by
means of the pliancy of our nature. A better distribu¬
tion of habits would be into three classes, mechanical,
animal and moral.
Mechanical habit is an acquired facility in doing a
thing, arising from our having frequently done it.
An apprentice learning his tradp, at first, finds his
work very difficult, requiring his whole attention, but by
frequent performance of the same thing, it becomes easy,
and he acquires such facility in the performance, that
he can both work and talk, or meditate on soffie othe'r
subject at the same time. In this way we acquire all
our skill and dexterity in, all the arts. Thus we learn
to speak, to read, to write, &c. Children, though they
cannot at first pronounce words distinctly, yet after fre¬
quent trials and long continued practice, acquire
facility in pronouncing them. What the physical cause,,
of this habit is, we do not undertake to say, but the
important ends, for wffiich we were made susceptible of
these habits, are obviotisto all. Without this suscepti¬
bility of habit, we never could have been able to acquire
much more knowledge than the inferior animals, and
a man at sixty, would be as ignorant as he was at five
years old. If a young man has spent ten or fifteen
years, diligently endeavoring to acquire some mechani¬
cal art, and can perform no better than he could at first,
his acquirement of it is hopeless, or if one has spent as
long a time in the attempt to acquire the knowledge of a
language, and now can perform no better than he could
at first, all must agree that it would be useless for him
to spend more time in it.
Animal habits are habits of doing and indulging, that
are acquired by doing or indulging.
A man, by accustoming himself to holding-his hand
in his bosom or his pocket, acquires a propensity to do
so. This we call animal habit. By frequently sitting
36
cross-legged, or playing with a watch key, or playing
with the ends of the fingers on a table or chair back, or
cutting sticks with a knife, a man may acquire the habit
of doing these and like things, so that he can do them
without design, and sometimes* even contrary to his
general intention. We may here observe, that, general¬
ly speaking, there is nothing either morally good or evil
in these habits except what arises from circumstances,
or the customs of the place.
Moral habits are such as regard moral actions.
If a man, by drinking spirits, acquire a habit, and con¬
sequently a desire to drink, this is a moral habit; be¬
cause, when excessi ve, it is contrary to the law of God,
which is the standard of moral rectitude. Any habit
which prompts to the breaking of any law, that we are
bound to obey, whether human or divine, is a bad moral
habit, such as the habit of lying, swearing, gambling,
&c. It is called moral, to distinguish it from animal
habit,and always regards actions or omissions which are
conformable or not conformable to some rule, which
requires or forbids them. That inclination which we
acquire by doing or indulging frequently, we call pro¬
pensity, whether it respect moral or animal actions.—
We speak of a propensity to get drunk, a propensity to
chew tobacco, &c. We shall conclude this lecture
with an observation on the error of some who admonish
others of the duty of engaging in religion, saying, "al¬
though it may be difficult at first, to love the divine char¬
acter and laws of God, yet habit will make it easy."
If by religion they mean what always should be meant,
love to God, faith in Christ, &c., it is a great mistake;
for the christian finds it no easier to love God after hav¬
ing loved him twenty years, than he did when he first
beheld his beauty exhibited in equal light.
Questions on Lecture XI.
What is the subject of this lecture ? What is inclina¬
tion? Doeis it lead to choice ? Example. What does
this show? In what do men greatly differ? Is dispo-
37
sition a principle of our nature ? Why not ? What is
disposition? What other two states of mind are men¬
tioned ? Good humor rises from what ? Bad humor
iromwhat? Good humor is accompanied by what?
What effect has it on us ? What effect has bad humor ?
What two other states are named ? What is elevation?
It arises from what ? Does it ever arise from mistake?
What is pride ? Pride leads to what ? What is de¬
jection ? It arises from what ? What is melancholy ?
How have some classed the habits? What objection to
this classification ? How should they be classed ?
What is mechanical habit ? Example. Dexterity in
the arts depends on what ? Examples. Why is the
susceptibility of habit important to us ? Animal habits
are what? Examples. What are moral habits ? Ex¬
amples. What are bad moral habits? Examples.
What do we call propensities ? Examples. Will habit
make moral exercises of mind easy ? Why not ?
LECTURE XII—COMMON SENSE.
COMMON SENSE, REASON, MEMORY AND
RECOLLECTION.
What is common sense ? It is the energy of the
mind, by which we perceive the most plain and obvious
truths without the assistance of intermediate relations.
Although this definition be incontrovertably true, yet,
without further explanation it will never satisfy a minute
philosopher, or an enquiring mind. In order, therefore,
to ascertain the true meaning of the terms accurately, it
will be necessary to analize them as used in the ques¬
tion; and also to attend diligently to the operation of our
own minds.
The above question may, with propriety, be divided in¬
to two. 1st. Why is it called common ? 2nd. Why is
it called sense ? I answer these questions by giving an
example for the illustration of the subject. I lay down
38
thi$ axiom, "the whole is greater than a part." I under¬
stand the terms, I percieve the thing asserted, I believe
confidently the truth of the axiom. Here there are
three things to be considered: 1st The agent, I, who
perceive. 2nd, The energy or apt of perception. 3rd.
The object perceived. I invincibly believe the reality
of what J perceive, and lam conscious of my belief.
As perception always precedes belief, when I say that
I believe any thing, all will understand that J first per¬
ceived it
Farther,find a certain vivid force accompanying
every perception, wliich is called emotion or sensO, and
this is stronger or weaker according to the objects that
excite it, When I say that I believe this axiom, every
man supposes that J perceive it, but when I say I am
sensible of its truth, every one who hears me sup¬
poses tfiat | fee] a consciousness of tire force of the evi¬
dence of its truth. jNfqw all men in all ages and: nations,
who understand the terms, immediately perceive the
truth of this axiom. Theie are many ether self-evident
Ir'uths equally plain, which are believed by all men, and
are,therefore, called common truths, and are perceived
by the sense, by which every man discriminates between
truth and i's opposite. For this reason it is called
common sense, or the common sense of mankind.
2nd. Why is it called domnion sense*? We have al¬
ready observed that there is tn emotion, feeling &r sense,
accompanying the perception of any object, jf opn as¬
sign lio other cause for our susceptibility of emotion,
than that we are so constituted by our theater, that we
are moved by all the objects which we pcrOeive, This
-sense is often put for its concomitants as in the instance
now before us. When we say that we are sensible of
any truth, we mead that wTe perceive it, and conse¬
quently believe it. Hence it is called sense1—common
sense.
Common sense, therefore, means nothing more than
common perception and belief, which all men have of
30
certain truths. When we appeal to common sense, we
mean that common perception and universal sentiment
which all men have in regard to the point in question,
and suppose the thing to be so obvious and plain that,
all men may perceive its truth.
It is very common to say that such a man has a good
share of common sense: by which is meant that he not
only perceives plain truths, but ,also the connection of
things, and the fitness of means to an end.
What is reason ? It is that series of connected ener¬
gies of the mind, by which we discover truth not before
known, or by which we bring to view truth through
the medium of known truths, or find out the connection
of known truths: this we call reason. Though this defi¬
nition of reason be just, yet it is not sufficiently satisfac¬
tory, therefore we shall attempt to illustrate it by ex¬
amples stated in a svlogistecal manner.
My Creator should be honored.
God is rny Creator.
Therefore God should be honored.
Here I perceive the two first propositions distinctly,
and by retaining them in memory I perceive the connec¬
tion between them and draw the conclusion, "Cod
should be honored." Bat had I forgotten the first pro¬
position "My Creator should be'honored," or the second,
that "God is my Creator," or had I not perceived the
connection between them, I could not have -drawn
the conclusion. Again. Every. virtuous man is
happy. A. B. is virtuous. Therefore A. B.. is happy.
Here I remember that virtue'always makes its possessor
happy, and I also remember, that A. B. is virtuous,
therefore I immediately perceive the connection between
them, and draw , the conclusion accordingly. But had
I forgotten the two , former propositions, commonly
called the premises, or not perceived their connection,
I could not have drawn the conclusion. Thus we see
if one step be missed the conclusion cannot be drawn.
In this manner, Mathematicians, by laying down cer-
40'
tain first principles, or self-evident axioms and proceed¬
ing on them, demonstrate truths more obscure and in¬
tricate. Now the result df this investigation is, that
reason is nothing more than perception and memory.
Reason is of different degrees both in the practice and
in the capacities of men.
A propensity to seek happiness is a principle ©f our
nature. Whatever, therefore, we suppose would pro¬
duce most happiness, we think it reasonable to pursue,
some choose to be employed in sailing, some in mer¬
chandizing, some in agriculture, and others, in various
other ways. There is a kind of instinctive delight
\vhich every man feels, in the pursuit of some particular
object: and'that object he will pursue, if not diverted
from the pursuit by necessity, education or authority.
And that pursuit which affords a man no happiness hd
will abandon as soon as he can. -Some men have a
capacity for acquiring mathematical knowledge, others
for learning languages, others for history, others take
delight in poetry. This difference seems to depend on
the difference of memory in different persons. Those,
whose memories are accurate and strong, and who can
retain truths and connect them together with accuracy
and promptness, will find it easy to study mathematics,
whilst those whose memory is weaker, or of a different
cast, will retain facts with equal, if not greater facility.
There are some people who can remember the ages of
almost all the young people in their neighborhood, and
all the scandals that have occurred in it for many years,
yet could not be taught urtderstandingly and clearly to.
demonstrate one proposition in Euclid, in a month.
What particular cast of the muscles or of the nerves,
may effect this difference, we know not. We can only
say that it is the will of the Creator, that men should be
endowedwith different capacities and talents for rea¬
soning, and this difference is as obvious as the differ¬
ence in their faces.
We come now to speak of memory and recollection,
41
and the difference between them; When any thing
past recurs to mind without an effort, we call this mem¬
ory: but in recollection the mind is conscious of an ef¬
fort. Things whiOh we remember are held in view, of
the mind involuntarily, but to recollect requires an exer¬
cise of will, and an effort of the mind. A familiar ex'am-
ple'will make this plain. I ask any friend if he remem¬
bers a certain past event; if it occur to his mind imme¬
diately, he answers, "I do." If not, then lie tries to
recollect it, and to ascertain with certainty whether or
not he ever knew it. He thinks of the time and place,
the occasion and the Consequences of the supposed
event, and a variety of circumstances that might tend
to suggest assistance to his recollection, at' length his
past knowledge of the event is recalled with the evi¬
dence by which he once knew it. Memory is indepen¬
dent of the will but recollection in some measure, is
dependent on it. <
Questions on Lecture XII.
What is the subject of this lecture? What is com¬
mon sense? What three things are included? What
accompanies these ? Why is it called common?. Are
there many self-evident truths ? Why is it called sense?
Whence arisesthe-motion? What is meant then, by
cpmmOn sense ? What do. we mean, when ; we say a
man has a good-share of common sense ? What is trea¬
son? Example. Is memory necessary to reason ?
Is perception of relation necessary ? Is the capacity
for reasoning the same in all men ? Is a propensity, to
seek happiness a principle in our > onstitution ? How
does this appear? Why do men pii, -sue particular ob¬
jects? What is said about the difference in capacities?
The difference arises from what? What is memory?
What is recollection? Is memory/O'mendent on the
will? Is recollection ? Example 'rcumstances
suggest assistance to recollection
LECTURE^lIl—t)JTTOWER.
Power is one of the most ambiguous terms in, its sig-4
nificatiqn, in the English language, and: sagtc
time the most genera) in its use. It is applied to all the
principles of our nature, to all habits and improvements,
to all the influence we have over others, to all mechan¬
ics, and In sbprt, to all things that move or are moved.
In this lecture we shall confine ourselves more particu¬
larly- to the meaning which it has in the philosophy of
the human mind.
I observe that the words Can and cannot, able and
■unable, possible and Impossible ?tre synonymous with the
term power and the want of it. Thus we say we can,
do a thing; that is we have pomr to do it, W e are un¬
able to do a thing, 3. e, wre have not four r to do it, &x\
iPowpr, when applied tothebndy or the mind, means
nothing more than a capacity to perform certain opera-
tiohs. Thus we speak of the powers of the mfod, the
faculties of the mind, find we mean only that the mind:
is capable of certain operations which We know jJ^does
perform, and not that the mind i* made up of scvpral
parts, orcGmasts in several operations as some have
vainly imagined. This doctrine,that the mind is a com¬
position, ligS rendered this part of the science of human
nature obscure and unintelligible. The mind is to be
considered a.1? void of parts, or not composed. It is one,
simple, living, active principle or being, which is capa¬
ble of understanding apd choosing. When I understand
rimy th{pg» it is my mind that understands it. When
I am affected, It is mv mind that is all beted- When I
choose, it is my mit|i that chooses. Hence lire- powers
and capacilies-of lb* mind or soul arc only its capacity
of performing drffeT ent operations. We eay we hare
power to think of an obicgt when we do not think of it,
to choose when v^do not choose, to love when wC do
not love. Tb^'ee of the whole is this, the mindin
\fdpabie aj thinking, loving anil
~d\
flei!foe body, means that firmness
^ pnuscles- and tendons by
4$
Which we put other bodies in motion. I have power t©
Jift fifty pounds, to move mV body from this place to
another, although I choose to do neither. Having ex*
plained the term power as we intend to use it, we cow
proceed to a farther investigation of this jmpprtant sub¬
ject, We may lay it down as a universal sentiment,
that there are some things that wCean doandothers that
we cannot do; some things that we can know and other
ihing&that we cannot know. I can remote a weight of
fifty pounds but 1 c^nilot remove Clinch Mountain. I
can know the length and breadth of this roorel, but I
cannot know \Vhat General Jackson is thinking about at
this moment. So we see that our power is limited
within certain bohnds, beyond which we Cannot go.
It is also a universal sentiment that any thing is in our
power, the performance of which depends upon the
wilj. "The body is so far subject to the mind, that in
all caseS whenlt is possible, it instantaneously obeys the
Choice. We may here observe that the degrees of our
power are known by experience. The body, being
nothing more than organized matter, fitted to produce
motion in other bodies, and capable, within certain lim¬
its, of obeying 4he choice of the mind, will do what the
mind Wills till by new choices and greater bxerlinns, we
find tfat we can go no farther. A child knows by ex¬
perience when he can walk or Tup,/and a man knows
when he can walk twenty miles in a day, or lift One
huhdred pounds. A man tells' me he can lift a hundred
pounds. I ask,can you lift no morel hp answers, no.
flow do you know yon cannot? He answers, I have
made repeated triqlkand have not succeeded in the ef¬
fort to lift moire. So limited is ramp that netwithstand1-
ing his desires may'be unbounded, yet he cannot move
any body whatever, without first mowing his owb J
henqe he may easily know to what extent he can pro¬
duce motion in other bodies, and here is the limit or his
po\ver over matter. We now spe that the determination
of the mind .gives motioft. to the hody, but whether
44
choice is the immediate cause of the motion or not, we1
cannot know. We are not conscious of any agency
operating between the choice and the1 motion, yet how
the choice can produce the motion is to us wholly in¬
conceivable. We can only extricate ourselves from
this, difficulty by resolving it into the will of our Creator,
who, in our constitution has established the connection
between the cause and the effect, whilst the modus op¬
erandi is concealed from us. The motion of the body
and the choice of the mind are so uniformly and instan¬
taneously connected from infancy to old age and death,
that their distinction has, been overlooked, not only by
the vulgar, but also by the most oflearned writers on
this subject: ye!, they are evidently distinct, and should
be so considered. We now see the dominion that the
mind has over the body in influencing us to certain ac¬
tions. /
That capacity of the body, by which it performs the
determinations of the mind, is called our bodily strength.
This we have at all times, but it lies dormant until by
the choice it is put into exercise.
There are some motions of the body which do not
depend upon the choice of the mind, such as instinctive
motions; To these we do not apply the term power.
We come, now to consider the dominion the mind has
over itself. , We find from experience that in many
cases, we can, by our choice give our thoughts a cer¬
tain direction, • This may be made plain by an example.
This hour I determine to think on the extent of human
power, and to think themext hour on Mathematics. In
consequence of my determination a number of thoughts
occur relative to the subject. Though many other
thoughts may interfere, yet particular attention to the
subject will follow the choice, and when 1 choose a new
subject, attention follows the choice and is directed to
the new subject. My neighbor proposes a bargain to
me. I reply, I am not determined yet, but I will think
about it. Ifi find it inconvenient or disadvantageous, I
45
tell him it does not suit me, or I do not like it. He in¬
sists on me to think of it. I reply I cannot. . He urges
that I can if I will. Hence it appears that the mind has
power over itself.
Although thinking does not originally depend on
choice, yet the particular train or current of our thoughts
may be dependent on it. The subject must have been
the object of our thoughts before we could choose £>
yet when the choice is fixed, a new train of thoughts and
choices will ensue. The power of thinking, therefore '
only means the soul's capacity for turning and fixing its
attention on a subject. The result of the whole is that
bodily motion and the direction of thoughts to particular
subjects follow the choice of the mind. But the physi¬
cal cause and the manner of its operation lie beyond our
conception. What choice is, and how determined, will
be the subject of the two following lectures.
Questions on Lecture XIII.
What is the subject of this lecture ? The term pow¬
er in general, is applied to what ? In mental philsophy
what does it mean ? When applied to body or mind, it
means what ? What is the mind ? Power of body
means what? What is a universal sentiment with re-
fard to power ? When is a performance in our power ?
Yom what do we learn the degree of our power ? The
body is what? Obeys what? Can the mind move
any other body by volition without first moving its own ?
What is bodily strength ? Are all motions of the body
dependent on the will. Has the mind any power over
itself? What? Example. Does thinking originally
depend on choice? What then depends on it? What
follows choice ?
LECTURE XIV—ON THE WILL.
What is the will and what is moral agency? The
"Will is the soul choosing or determining. It is not a dis-
43
tinct being, as some- have supposed, but is only the act
or operation of a being- This is the pommon sense of
mankind as appears from the structure of all languages.
I am willing, or I will, is a mode of expression common
Ao all languages. I, a living, thinking agent, perform the
act or operation, or will, floral agenpy is the action
of a being under a law.
"Man is under obligation to obey the revealed will of
his Creator, and reason; is given to him to assist him in
discovering his duty. He is therefore to be copsidcred
as a moral ageht. This naturally implies that he is ac¬
countable and will be rewarded or punished according
to his works. But brutes,acting frbm instipCt only, are
nut moral agerits, and therefore not accountable. A
man's morals are denominated good Or had, according
as his actions are conformed or not Conformed to the
standard of his duty.
What is free will? I answer I do not knovt what it
is. I can have ho conception of its opposite—bound
will or choice. If it has no opposite it is as improper to
Say jree -will as it would be tp say wise wisdom or
foolish folly- I am sensible that phrase has been sanc¬
tioned by long Usage- and that it may appear in me ar¬
rogant to reject it: but in philosophical disquisitions we
should not admit the use of any term unless we can
fix a distinct meaning to it, and as no such meaning can
be fixed here, I shall reject it* I can conceive of a free
man and its opposite a bpund man, but if there Were'
no such thing as pondage it would be as great folly to
talk of freedom, as tpsay a man with a face, when all
men have faces. Choosing is as much the law of our
nature as it is the law of a rock to gravitate, whether we
choose conformably fa the standard ofourdutyor not,
that fs whether our choice be good or bad.
AH men, are conscious of cpoosing and refusing, and
tpey can generally give a reason for their choice or
refusal This is a simple representation of the subject
and if men would follow the plain road of coramo
41
sense, there wbuld be no difficulty m understanding it.
One man chooses a religious course of life because he
conceives it to be his duty and to be productive of the
greatest happiness. Another chooses merchandising,
because it is a means of accumulating wealth. But
when you, with parade, bring forward your logical
definitions and metaphysical hypotheses the subject i? in¬
volved in obscurity, so that -the refined as well as the
plain man can scarcely understand what you inean.
Let us now enquire what moral liberty is.
Some have defined it to be the power of acting as we
please. To this definition I have the following objec¬
tions: T. It cannot be proved that any such liberty exists
amonfmenin civilized nations, where the law prevents
them from doing as they please, and in savage nations
where o-oVerncnent and custom operate as law, there is
still less power of acting at pleasure. We are prevent¬
ed, in innumerable instances, by the limited state of our
nature from doing as we please, Besides, if this defini¬
tion be true and just, every restraint takes away moral
liberty and accountability. The greatest moral liberty
is supreme love, which is equally as practicable to Paul
and Silas in a dungeon as to Herod on his throne, to the
enslaved and ignorant African as to the free and en¬
lightened American.
2nd. I object to this definition of moral liberty be¬
cause the word acting, on which the propensity of the
definition depends, is very ambiguous. It may mean
either the choice of the mind, or the motion' of the body,
or both. This occasions great confusion. The choice
of the mind which is the cause, and the motions of tfie
body, which are the effect, are improperly blended to¬
gether, when they are distinct, both in perception and
name, 'l cannot conceive that thebhoice of my mind and
the motion of my body are the same,any morethanthat
my choice, and the motion of a pulley or a pendulum are
the same. In the former case, I know nothing of any in¬
termediate agency between my choice and the motion
48
of my body; but in the latter case there is necessity for
the motion of my body to produce the motion in the
pulley, because the pulley is not immediately under the
direction of my mind as my body is. If my maker had
put a pulley under the immediate direction of my mind
as he has my body, then I could have moved the pulley
by my choice without the intervention of bodily motion
as easy as I now can move my body.
3d. I object because the operations of the mind are
too simple to admit of a logical definition. In order to
gain an accurate knowledge of human nature, we should
attend immediately to the operations of our own minds:
the want of this attention has been one great cause of
the knowledge of moral science being involved in so much
obscurity. The substitution of logical definitions and
metaphysical reasoning in the place of this attention will
always perplex and involve in obscurity the plainest
subject. Some have included all the appetites, desires,
propensities, inclinations, passions and affections, under
the will, and call them modifications of the will. That
this is a great mistake in morals will appear from the
following example: I am hungry; consequently I deter¬
mine to eat. Here it is evident that hunger and my de¬
termination to eat are distinct, or if I be too much em
gaged otherwise, I determine not to eat, then if my ap¬
petite arid will be the same, they will cease together,
but experience teaches us that they do not. Therefore,
it is plain that hunger is entirely independent of the will
This is true with regard to all the appetites. A man
who has acquired a propensity to drink spirits will feel
the cravings of that appetite, though he should have a
fixed determination of will not to indulge it. Appetite
is, therefore prior to choice and independent of it;
choice is posterior and dependent. Appetite is the
cause, choice the effect. The same may be said of all
other propensities, inclinations, passions and affections.
It has been asserted by some that we choose our own
actions only, but this manner of expression seems am-
4a
biguous. If it mean any thing, it must mean barely the
motions pf ourbbdi.es. I think it is an universal senti¬
ment that we choose any action that we wish to be done,
which depends upon our choice. If this be true, a mas¬
ter may choose the actions of. his servant, who is
bound; to obey his will. It is true, he must ypnake his
will known before it can be executed. But, if I am not
mistaken, the thing to be done and the means for doing
it, are always included in the same choice. I choose to
raise a weight of five ounces: to effect this a little exer¬
tion of body is necessary, as means. Here I: am con¬
scious of one choice only, which appears to me to in¬
clude both the thing to be done, and the means for do¬
ing it. Again. I choose to lift a hundred pounds: here a
greater exertion of bodily strength is necessary, yet, as
before said/it is included in the same choice. That one
man may choose the actions of another, appears evident
from the notion of government, where the ruled are
bound to perform the will of the ruler.
Some have said^that things out of our power are not
objects of our choice. But this assertion appears inac
curate, from the following example. I am taken sick at
a distance from home; I have a strong desire to be at
home; I choose to pursue my journey, but I find it im
possible to get home, yet my desire continues the same,
though I have determined not to pursue its object. I
would rather say, that things known not to be in our
/mcer are not objects of our choice. I would only
observe farther on this subject-, that the will is the soul
choosing or determining, and the thing chosen is called
the otyect of choice. There is always some, perception
of the object, and some reason or motive which leads
the mind to choose. What these motives are, and how
they operate, shall be the subject of the next lecture.
" ' Questions on Lecture XIV,
What is the subject of this lecture X WJiat is the
will 1} Ts the will h distinct being? What iajnoral
D '
50
agency ? What is a moral agent ? Why are brutes not
moral agents ? When are mans'morals good or bad?
What is free will? Why is the term absurd ? Is
choosing a law of our nature ? Is choice a simple op-
oration of the mind ? How have some defined moral
liberty? Is this a correct definition? What objec¬
tions to.it? First? Second? Third? Some have
included what in the will ? How is the error shown by
an example ? Whether is appetite dependent on choice,
or choice on appetite ? Examples. Do we choose our
actions of body '!—the actions of others ? Does volition
include as its object, both the means and end Do w e
choose things known not to be in our power? What is
the Will ? It always implies what ?
LECTURE XV—ON MOTIVES.
Any thing which leads us to choose or refuse, is called
a motive. Motives may he considered in two lights;
first, as they are in themselves, and secondly, as they
affect us.
1st. Motives, considered in themselves, are either
stronger or weaker: Thus the improvement of the mind
is of more importance than the ornaments of the body.
The concerns of eternity are of greater importance than
the concerns of this life, and ought to have the prefer¬
ence whenever they come in competition.
This appears to me as plain as any proposition in
mathematics. In things relating to this life, th6 common
'sense of mankind determines the difference in the
strength of motives; no man will hesitate to choose a
thousand wounds rather than a hundred, when either of
themmayiseobtained on terms equally honorable and
easy, and when one only can be obtained. No man
can be undetermined whether to educate his own son,
or a stranger—when the prospect of their happiness
and usefulness in after life, is now the same. These and
51
many others arc easy pases. It is the common sense
of mankind that we should choose, that which we judge
to be most advantageous to us. If, then, it be the com¬
mon sense of mankind, it is the law of our nature, and
if we choose otherwise, we violate a law of our nature,
and contradict common sense.
2nd. Motives may be considered as they affect us.
Experience teaches that we are, in many cases, less af¬
fected by-the motive that is in itself stronger, than we
are by the weaker. The cravings of hunger and thirst
are, in many cases, stronger motives to action than
higher principles. Even the concerns of eternity do
not always affect us more than the low pleasures of
this world. We often pursue the gratification of our
appetites to the neglect of our more important concerns.
Hence it appears that the motive which seems to us to
be the strongest, and not that which shoidd appear so,
always determines the choice.
We proceed to another important division of motives,
viz: into external and internal'.
. External motives are all the objects in nature, argu¬
ments, commands, threatenings, and advice. The in¬
ternal are all the appetites, desires, passions and propen¬
sities. These appetites, &c., have formerly been ex¬
plained. There is, however, one property that is com¬
mon to all .motives, namely, a desire to attain some ob¬
ject. '
■ Here a question arises; whether the external or in¬
ternal motives determine the choice■?
It seems to be the general sentiment of mankind, that;
the 'Internal motives determine the choice. I ask
whether, it is food or the desire of food, that determines
in me the choice to eat 1 Whether drink or my desire
■ off drink, determines me to choose it'1 1 immediately
perceive that it is my desire that is the motive, which
moves me to choose. It is the common sense and ex¬
perience of mankind that men do not choose thkt which
they' do not desire. Hence we often hear it asked,
«2
Why should I choose that for which I have no desire X
Thus it appears to be the common, sense of mankind,
that desire must precede choice.
Again it may be asked, D,o we choose without a mo¬
tive ? I think not. A hian at rest rises up to take ex¬
ercise, but has no particular kind of exercise in view.
Here it would seem as though he acts without motive, if
wre did not know that his general desire of action is a
sufficient motive to general action. Although he had
no particular motive to any particular action. A man
can never be without motives so long as he is capable
of acting.
Does the strongest motive always prevail ? I ap¬
peal to experience, and I find universal experience de¬
cides in the affirmative. We shall conclude with a few
observations.
1st. Many desires may unite in craving the same ob¬
ject and lead to choice. A rich, virtuous and beautiful
woman, of a good family, is an object that excites sev¬
eral particular desires, which ^11 unite and influence the
mind to choose.
2nd. The circumstance that gives to motives, in
many instances, a deciding influence is very' trifling. A
man has occasion to spend one guinea out of a hundred.
Which of them shall he take? and what determines him
to take one more than another? He takes one, because
it is nigher to bis hand, or because it either first or last
met his eye.
3d. We sometimes choose contrary to our inclination,
but not contrary to the strongest desire. A man, com¬
ing to a river that is swelled by rain, desires to go
across, but is afraid ofloseing his life in the attempt,
therefore, he determines not to go over.
4th. It has been supposed that the will has a self de¬
termining power; but this is an absurd supposition, be¬
cause it implies that one choice must precede and dr-
termine another, and another precede and determi .e
thad, and so on back, ad infinitum, which is impossible.
It also implies that a volition can be pfiotf to, itself, and
both the cause and effect of its own existence
5th. Some have supposed that God has power to do
evil: this also is absurd and unphilosophical, because
power to do evil implies a will to do evil; therefore, it
he has a will to do evil, he must love to do evil, which
is totally inconsistent with every idea we can have of a
being who is infinitely perfect, holy and righteous.
Questions on Lecture XV.
What is the subject of this lecture? What do ypil
mean by motives ? Motives are of what two classes ?
Are motives in themselves different in strength ? Do
the strongest motives always effect us most ? Exam¬
ples. What always determines us ? External moiives
are what ? Internal are what ? What is common to
all motives? Do external or internal motives determine
the choice ? Examples. Do men choose without de¬
sire ? What always precedes choice ? Do we ever
choose without a motive ? Does the strongest motive
always prevail ? What is the first observation ?—the
second ?-—the third ?—the fourth ? What reasons are
assigned ? What is the fifth observation ? What rea¬
son is assigned ?
LECTURE XVI-ON GUILT.
By guilt we mean obligation to suffer punishment.
Here punishment may be taken in its most extensive
signification, including any painful emotion, arising from
a consciousness of having done bad actions, or of hav¬
ing entertained evil passions or affections. I would
observe, it makes no difference whether the body be
the instrument in the suffering or not. The emotion of
shame is painful, arising from having done shameful
actions, as well as stripes inflicted on the body. It is
painful to fall under the censure of our fellow men.
Guilt, as accounted by mankind, is of different degrees,
&4
from the lowest to the highest. This may be illustrated
by an example. If a hunter, in pursuit of his game,
should chance to kill his neighbor, when concealed so
that he could not be perceived, and should it be made
appear that reasonable precaution had been taken by
the hunter to guard against injuring any person, lie
would be acquitted as not guilty. But if he fired his
gun without reasonable precaution, and killed his neigh¬
bor, he falls under the censure of men, but he is not thought
worthy ofpunishment. But should it appear that he hated
his neighbor, apd shot and killed him, under the pretext
of shooting at his game, the judge will pronounce him
guilty of nturder and worthy of death. Thus it appears
there are different degrees in human guilt. Here a
question naturally arises, which we will briefly answer.
What constitutes human guilt ? I answer:
1st, The aqtion must be voluntary. 2nd. The actiort
must be intended, 3d. The action must proceed from a
bad motive. A few examples will make this sufficient¬
ly plain. Ofte man takes hold of the hand of another
knd with it striked a third person. Here the second
person, who is the instrument in doing the action, is al¬
together free from blame, because he had no intention:
but if he had intentionally been the instrument in doing
the mischief he then would be equally guilty with him
who did the deed.
An actioh may be voluntary, and; yet not worthy of
blame^ I dim to shoot a highway man who is attempt¬
ing To kill and rob me. 1 miss him and shoot my brother,
wnb'is irihocent., I am not accounted guilty, because I
did hpt iptehd to kill thy brother, n6r was the action,
thbbghyoluhtary, done with a bad design.
Hdre iy may be.prbper t6 observe the distinction be-
tWcep Volition tfficl intention. Volition respects the ac-
tibh of-the bbdy only: Intention regards the effec ts of
that action: yet fbr the most tphrt they are viewed as
inseparable, beedbse they are so 'nearly*connected. Bu,t
IWetitfbh yolitibh.
55
As volition without intention does n>t constitute guilt,
so neither does intention constitute it Without an evil mo¬
tive. 1 meet a man on the highway;- he says he will
take my lite. I expostulate with him, but to no purpose;
he persists, and actually attempts to execute his purpose,
but having missed his first aim, I throw a stone and kill
him. I am brought to justice. The first question asked
by the court is, Was the action alleged performed by
me? The second, from what intention was it done—
from the intention of making necessary self-defence, or
from accident, or from a malicious design against the
life of the man who is killed ? If I prove that I did kill
him only from the design of making self defence, and
that seemed the only possible means of making it, I am
acquitted of guilt, because my motive was not bad.
But should it appear that I had entertained a premedi¬
tated and malicious design against his life, then I would
be found guilty and worthy of death. We should never
judge of actions before we are acquainted with the mo¬
tives. Though actions at first view may appear very
bad, whilst the motives are concealed, yet, upon a- full
investigation they may appear praiseworthy. In my way
home I meet my neighbor, conveying away rny proper¬
ty, at first I think him guilty of theft. But on exami¬
nation I find that my house by accident was burnt, and
that he has, by running great risk, got it out of the
burning house, and is preserving it for my benefit. In¬
stead of prosecuting him as a thief, I thank and com¬
mend him as a kind neighbor.
As the merit or demerit of our actions arises from
their motives, so also does their denomination. Actions
which arise from love, benevolence, &c., are denomi¬
nated good actions, but those which flew from avarice,
malevolence, &c., are called bad. We shall new
conclude With a few observations.
1st. When we see any person acting under a law We
suppose that he kriOWs that law, ©f has it in his pOWer
5G
to know it. If he violates that law we account him
guilty and worthy of punishment. But if he knows not
the law, and has no possible means for knowing it, he is
altogether guiltless. Now, our relations to law, ami
consequently our duty, ar,ise out of our relationship to
God and man, as has been befere observed. Some of
these relations are more plain than others. Every man
knows that it is wrong to destroy his neighbors life, or
fraudulently to take away his property: yet but few of
us are acquainted with those things that relate to the
m aki ng of peace or war, to commerce, &c. Hence we
see the necessity of laws, both human and divine.
Here we may observe the difference between the
divine law and human laws. The divine law regards
not only the actions and motives, but also our most se¬
cret thoughts. But human law regards only the overt
act and the motives, as far as they can be learned from
the action; for the action discovers the motive, though
the discovery may be made more definite and clear by
attested circumstances. We never heard of a man
being punished according to law, for his wish to com¬
mit theft or murder, without doing the act itself. If
mankind had no knowledge whatever of God, and had
no possible means of knowing anything about him, they
would not be guilty for not fearing, loving and serving
him. But if we know him, or have opportunity for
knowing him, and do not love, fear and obey him, we are
then, in a high degree, guilty.
2nd. We always suppose a capacity to deliberate, to
be necessary in order to constitute human guilt. Hence
we see how idiots and infants are not accountable for
their actions. Yet, a person may have a capacity to
deliberate, and the want of time may excuse him. A
roan in a crowd receives a blow; he, in the heat of past
sion, and without deliberation, strikes and kills a person;
This man is not thought guilty of murder. But, if he
enters his room, arms himself, and some time after
goes in pursuit of his adversary, finds and kills him, he
57
is guilty of murder, because he had time to deliberate.
Questions: on Lecture XVI.
What is the subject of this lecture ? What is meant
by guilt ? Are there different degrees* of guilt? Exam¬
ple. What constitutes human guilt?-—first?—second?
Third constituent? Examples. May an action be vol¬
untary and yet blameworthy? Example. What is the
distinction between volition arid intention ? Which pre¬
cedes ? Does volition constitute guilt without intention?
Does intention without a motive ? Example. What
characterize actions as being good or bad ? Explain.
What is observation first ? How does the divine law
regard the conduct, of men? How do human laws ?
Is opportunity to know law necessary to constitute ob¬
ligation? What is observation second? Why are
Idiots and infants not accountable for their actions ?
LECTURE XVII—ON TASTE.
In-treating on this subject we-shall notice three tilings;
1st. The nature of taste. 2nd. Enquire whether
there be-any standard'of the seeming difference among
men in regard to taste. ' 3d. Consider some of its char-
acters, and sources o f impro vement.
The term taste, when applied to discourse or writing,
is used metaphorically; it. is, therefore, necessary to at¬
tend to its literal meaning. When sugar or honey is
applied to a sound palate, it makes an impression which
we call a, sweet taste.- ' When vinegar or wormwood
is applied,to the palate, it makes an impression which
we call a sour or bitter taste. Here'we have but one
word to express the different qualities of the objects
sugar, vinegar and wormwood, and the different sensa¬
tions they excite in us; yet, no person is at a loss to
understand our meaning,, nor to discover the different
tendencies, of those objects to produce those different
sensations. We can easily discover the difference be-
S8
tweerc things that tire simple or unepmpounded, $uoh k*
sugar, vinegar and wormwood? bpt wheh several in¬
gredients are compounded, it is more difficult to discov¬
er the composition or the nature of the compound, apd
it requires not only a, sound palate, but also much ex¬
perience. By experience we learn td distinguish tb<?
^ingredients in some Compounds with a degred of exact¬
ness Taste is either .simple or compound. Uporath©'
application of any thing to the palate, it expitos in us the
sensation of either swept, sour or Jbittet, Or a, compound
sensation, and all that Is necessary to dlstinguishbb'-
tween Compound and simple taste, is experience.
mucfo about the literal meaning of the term taste* we
have said.
We how proceed to consider the tehn taste tas meta¬
phorically used. Qqp .man is said to have- a taste for
music, another for oratory, a third for architecture, &c„
Now as the term is too simple to admit of a definition,
it will be necessary to illustrate tas,te by an example. I
hear a harmonious sound. I am instantaneously de.
lighted* and not only feel pleasure, but I l;now also the
reason wfy I feel it: viz, harmony. Bat when J fedr a
discprd in music, I am immediately disgusted? I arfcr not
only disgusted,,, but I also lrnow discord to be the cause,
if 1 be delighted with good and harmonious sou ads, I
ami said tohave a good taste. Bj,rt if I cannot distin¬
guish between hapr»ony and discord, my taste for music,
if I have any, is bad. If I see a beautiful house, well
arranged on- U beautiful eminence, thi^ gives pie apical
ant emotion. "Taste hot only implies a pleasant or pain¬
ful eruption, bulfdso a discernment of fhp cpuseBy which
the pmotfon is excited in hs. The emotion and ity
cause are closely Connected, because at the very mo¬
ment I feel an emotion, whether pleasant or painful, f
am sensible of its cause.
The seeming difference of taste among men is very
obviops. Some have a taste for one thing, and some for
another. Some are more pleased with the low fancies
59
of Bunyan, than the high conceptions of Homer or Mih
ton.
'2nd. Enquire if there be any common standard of
taste.
There are certain properties belonging to every part
of creation, which distinguish it from every other part.
There are certain properties belonging to man, which
distinguish him from every other creature. A deviation
from these properties, in ihe description of man, would
be thought monstrous: As a man with two heads, four
eyes, or six feet. If a limner would draw the picture of
a horse with the horns of a buffalo, the head of a cat.
and the tail of a cow, it would be disgusting to every
person of good taste, because it would not be a true
representation of the species. But if the picture of a
man be rightly drawn, and exhibit his properties justly,
it would not iail to please. Although lively colors, in
an unnatural picture, may please for a time, yet, the pic¬
ture of an ox, with the head of a hog, the tail of a
sheep and the claws of a cat, would cause' a disagree¬
able emotion in the mind of every person of taste: there
may be monsters in pictures as well as in nature, and
the effect upon the mind in both cases is the same.
Thus the particular properties, w hich every species of
being has, peculiar to itself, lay a sufficient ground for
ihe establishment of a standard of taste. When a pic-
lure or a poem is made naturally, it will never be dis¬
gusting. However time may alter, and description be
tilled to the peculiarities of taste in different ages and
among different people, still an unnatural picture or
poem cannot please long. But the poems of Homer and
Virgil have been universally admired, because, in writ¬
ings they were guided by nature and wrote with sim¬
plicity. Though in taste, as in morals, habit may pre¬
vail for a time, yet the general principle, to which taste
should be reduced, remains the same.
3rd. The characters of taste, and its sources of ibJ-
proveimM,
®.Q
The leading characters of taste are two, sensibility and
correctness'. Sensibility of taste regards the sensation
which the objects excite in us, whether pleasant or pain¬
ful. Correctness of taste regards the judgment we form
concerning those objects. Sensibility was originally-
implanted in us by nature, and is capable ot being
greatly improved, but cannot be acquired. A man
can never acquire a taste for music if he has none nat¬
urally. We are formed by our Creator susceptible of
emotion. All the beauties of nature are calculated to
excite pleasant emotions in all men; yet, some men are
more pleased than others with the same objects. This
is wisely so ordered by the author of nature: consequent¬
ly every bind of business is pursued, and machines of
every description are invented and used. This differ¬
ence in taste decs not arise from the diffeience in the
objects enly, but also from custom, education and the
natural sensibility of men. Some are pleased with
merchandize, others with farming; some with music,
others w'ith poetry. Though these tastes are different,
yet, they are good, because all those objects possess
real beauty.
The second characteristic of taste is correctness.
Correctness arises from improvement in the. knowledge
of the imitative and descriptive arts, such as poetry,
oratory, painting, statuary and music. To acquire ac¬
curacy of taste, we must be well acquainted with the
nature and qualities of things in general, and especially
those concerning which we are about to form a judg¬
ment. If we treat of morals, it is necessary that we be
acquainted wi.h the relation that subsists between Cod
and man, and the relations between man and man. If
we treat of physics we should be well acquainted with
the nature of man, and how he is operated on. A poli¬
tician should be well acquainted with the rights of man
and the laws of nature and nations in general. A dj-
vine should be welj acquainted with theperfections ot
God, and with the sacred scriptures. It tYa common sear
titnent of mankind, that he who judges -or decides on
any matter, should be well acquainted with it.
To have a correct taste, requires much experience.
In short to beechne a good critic, a person ought to have
experience, not only* in particular things but also in
tbirigs in general, and must also have a sound under¬
standing. We shall conclude this lecture with a few
directions and an observation.
1st. If we, judge of any composition we should under¬
stand the subject.
2nd. We should have a regard to fitness and design.
T:tis necessary in architecture, that all the pahs tend to
ah end, .and form one regular whole. Thus we may
judge of any composition.
I observe that taste and the moral sense are nearly
allied. Both have regard to the propriety and impro¬
priety of things. For he who gives himself up to revel¬
ing and drunkenness, will become so habituated to vice,
that he will scarcely discern the difference between
right and wrong. So he who'does Hot desire improve¬
ment, and makes no proficiency in useful knowledge,
cannot have a refined taste.
Questions on Lecture XVII.
What is the subject of this lecture ? The term taste
when applied to discourse, is used how? It is used to
express what, when literally used ?1 When is taste uses,
metaphorically ? When is taste for music good, or
when bad? Taste implies what besides emotion ?
What, in every species of being, lays the foundation for
a standard of taste ? How must a picture or poem, be
formed so as to please ? What are the characters of
taste ? Sensibility regards what ? Correctness what ?
Is sensibility in us by nature? Cart it be improved?
Can it be acquired ? The difference of taste in, men
arises from what? What consequences follow this
difference.of taste in men? Correctness of taste arises
from what? To acquire accuracy of taste requires
what? What is necessary besides knowledge?
6:2
judging any composition what Is first necessary ? We
should have regard to what? What is said about taste
and the moral sense ?
LECTURE XVIII.—GRANDEUR AND
SUBLIMITY.
The most of writers on this subject, have considered
the terms, grandeur and sublimity, as syiionvmous, but
they are really terms of different import. Grandeur
regards the greatness or vastness of an Object, sublimity
its height, "ih'e, emotions " excited in us by grand, and
those excited by sublime objects* are/very different, as
is evident from the manner of expression amongst the
most illiterate of mankind. When they attempt to de¬
scribe a sublime object, they stretch themselves as much
as possible: and when they attempt tq describe a grand
abject, swell themselves. As has been observed before,
man is formed for that-part'of the world in which he
acts; and his nature is made pliant, so as to be suscepti¬
ble of emotions,excited by the various objects with which
he is conversant, in a greater or less degree, according
to the quality of,the object?. This is the'reason some
critics, in treating on jublimity, say <;i,t is that w hich as¬
tonishes, ravishes and capiivaes." This definition is
exceedingly vague, as vv.ill appear from an example. I
contemplate the starry heavens. If I be not captivated,
ravished and astonished, t cannot 'tell whether the hea¬
vens are grand and sublime, or not. We are so ac¬
customed to view those vast shining luminaries, that
they do not excite in us any of the above emotions;
therefore we might conclude, according to that defini¬
tion, that they are neither grand nor sublime, notwith¬
standing their vast extent and immeasurable height,
which render them both grand and sublime. The most
intelligible way of treating this subject, is to state the
qualities belonging to the objects> and then attend to
63
their meaning. Now,'as has been befoiv observed, gran¬
deur respects the greatness of objects, and sublimity
their height. A widely extended plain is a grand ob¬
ject, but not sublime. A Maypole is'sublime, but not
grand. Grandeur and sublimity often unite'in the same
object; the starry heavens are both grand and sublime,
the shining orbs dispersed there, add greatly to their
grandeur. High mountains with broad bases are both
grand and sublime, as the'Andes or Alleghany, on ac¬
count of height anil vast extent. The ocean, because
vast in extent, and sublime, because it seems to rise and
obscure the heavens at thp horizon. Large, rivers are
grand objects, such as the Ohio, Mississippi,-Danube and
Amazon. Large hills with extensive bases, smooth
surfaces and gradual-ascent, are, grand.
Wonder is nearly allied to sublimity. Anything that
is unaccountable br incomprehensible, excites in the
mind wonder. Thus when we contemplate God, who
is the most grand -and sublime object that human nature
is capable of,contemplating, the immensity of his na¬
ture, hjs inflexible justice, his jnviolable faithfulness and
truth, his omnipotence, infinite wisdom and unbounded
goodness, fill the* mind with- wonder.—'Immensity of
space comes into the estimate of grand and. sublime' ob¬
jects. Hence, all men speak of heaven far above, and
hell as far beneath.' Robes of-state are made large,
thrones high. In savage nations the chiefs: are dis¬
tinguished by their wearing of higher capd than others
wear. Two armies arranged for battle, are grand, and
more so'if allarein uniform, and attended bybandsof mu¬
sicians, yet, the associated thought of the havoc 'of hu¬
man life, made in battle, renders the emotion" unpleas¬
ant.
As there is sublimity, in objects, so there is in senti¬
ments. The reply- of King Porus to Alexander, is tyuly
sublime. When taken prisoner and asked how he ex¬
pected to be treated, answered, "like a King." This
showed such firmness, and undaunted valor, that "we
u
wonder at the seafimenf, becSusd it is so unconjm^ti
for risen to speak', thus in such• circumsiances.,, Thedee¬
ply of Governor Ileid, to' a lady -who' w,as employed by
the King of England, to brtbe him to sell his country,
who offered ten thousand ^pounds for that purpose.
"Madam" said he "I am not worth purchasing, and if I
were, the King of England is too poor to "do it." Sublim¬
ity does not consist in a multiplicity of high flowing
words, but in a subject that i§ sublime, described in the
most plain and simple manner. In Moses' descriptipn
of creation; there is a most subjime phrase, and at the
same time the most simple. "And God said let there
be light and there was light." Here we have the great¬
est exertion of power, expressed in the most familiar
terms. Also Psalm 18, 0—10. "In my distress I called
upon the. Lord, and c,ried unto my God, he heard my
voice out of his temple, and my cry came before him
even into my ears. Then the earth shook and trembled;
the foundations also of the hills moved, and were shaken
because he was wroth. There went up a smoke out of
his nostrils, and fire out of his mouth devoured: coals
were kindled by it; he bowed the heavens also and
came down, and darkness was under his feet. And he
rode upon a cherub, and did fly; yea he did fly upon
the wings of the wind." Here the language is exceed¬
ingly Simple and very expressive. In describing a
great man, the-leading circumstances of his life, and his
most celehi ated actions, should be described in the most
plain and simple manner. In the description of objects
we should avoid two extremes. J. Coldness or languor,
which is called frigidity. 2d. Bombast, which arises
from vanity. Bombast is an attempt to raise an object
by a description higher than its nature will admit. This
is also called rant or fustian.
; Questions oyi Lecture XVIII.
What if :the subject of this lecture? Grandeur re¬
gards whatV Sublimity regards what? A wide ex¬
tended plam is what ? A May pole is what ? The
65
Marry heavens what? Why? Wonder is nearly al¬
lied to what ? The most wonderful, grand and sublime
bisect is what ? Is there sublimity in sentiments as well
as objects? Examples. Sublime sentiments, should
bo expressed hovr ?
LECTURE XIX—ON BEAUTY.
The beauties of nature and art have pleased all men*
m a!i ages, but not to an equal degree: for some are
more pleased with the same objects than others are.
That some things are beautiful., and others the opposite,
has always been an universal sentiment. Beauty is
a very comprehensive term., and may be applied to a
variety of objects, both external and internal. Thus,
we say a beautiful horse, a beautiful tree; a beautiful
poem. Colour and form are constituents of beauty.
Whatever object has its qualities in high perfection, is
accounted beautiful. A child will choose a pebble from
a large heap, which appears to him to have the most
beautiful colour, and neatest form. This choice of the
child would also be the choice of a man, provided utility
have no influence on him. Colour is the most simple
of all the qualities belonging to the beautiful in nature.
The most refined colours of art- can never equal in sim¬
plicity and beauty, the colors in the rainbow. Some
particular colors please some people more than others
according to their association with ideas in different
minds. All men have acknowledged the rainbow to be a
most beautiful object, and its different colors to be in the
highest perfection. In figures, uniformity, and varie¬
ty, contribute greatly to beauty, if the variety be not
carried to too great an extent. A circle is more beauti¬
ful than a square, and a square than a polygon; because
the variety in the polygon destroys the uniformity in too
great a degree. To render an object beautiful, in
works of art. itis necessarv to Mention to colour,
66
proportion, regularity, simplicity, and fitness to an end.
These are obvious in a well formed house. Colour re¬
gards the materials: proportion requires the materials to
be of proper size, and to be neatly put together; regulari¬
ty regards the arrangement of the whole according to
rule—that the doors and windows, as to size and distance,
correspond with one another, and with the other parts of
the building: simplicity respects the omission of all su¬
perfluity and fantastical show of ornament: fitness to
amend requires that there be nothing wanting, that is
necessary to fit it for answering the end for which it
was intended. Now the beauty of a house, a tree or a
garden is different from a poem. We should, therefore,
attend to its original meaning. Beauty seems to have
been originally applied to objects of sight. Objects well
formed and of agreeable colour, were always found to
excite pleasant emotions: and the term beauty, by an
easy transition, has been applied to any objects that ex¬
cite such emotions. Here, for the better illustration
of the subject, I would make two remarks.
1st. That the mind is conscious of a pleasant emotion
which is excited by the perception of a beautiful object.
Here we should observe, that the emotion excited by
perception of a beautiful object is pleasant and gay,
whilst that which is excited by a grand object, is pleasant
and serious.
Bnd. That the mind has a belief that the qualities
which constitute beauty, do really exist in the object. I
have been induced to make these remarks, and especial¬
ly the latter, in order to guard you against some errors,
into which some Philosophers some times fall, who say
that 'heat, cold, colour, &c., do not really exist in the
mind that perceives them.' Yet, they acknowledge that
we are convinced by our senses, that these qualities do
really exist in the objects: but say also that "nature, for
wise purposes, deceives us, and that philosophy sets us
right." But it must be a very ridiculous sort of philoso¬
phy that contradicts the common sense and universal
67
experience of mankind. It would be ridiculous to at¬
tempt to convince a man that greenness does not be¬
long to the forest in summer, whiteness to snow, or heat
to a hot body. And he would be justly met with con¬
tempt Who would attempt to convince a lover that beauty
does not exist in his sweet heart, but exists only in his
own mind. But, however ridiculous and unphilosophi-
calit.may be, they attempt to prove it by saying that
4by rubbing our fingers over a soft velvet surface, we
refer the pleasure we feel to the ends of our fingers, and
not to our minds-' But we do the same in all other cas¬
es, that is, ouEtsenses are the only medium by which ex
ternal things convey sensation to the mind. I bruise my
heel. I refer the pain I feel to my heel. But if my mind
were separated from my body, I could not feel this pain.
We now proceed to the better illustration of this sub¬
ject, by dividing beauty into two kinds, original and
derived.
Original beauty is that which an object of itself pos¬
sesses, without any assistance from art, or any relation
to any other object. Derived beauty is that which the
object receives from art, or from its relation to some
other object. The beauty of the sun is original. The
beauty of the moon is derived. You will recollect while
treating on taste, it was observed that every species of
being has peculiar properties oelonging to itself, which
distinguish it from all others. Thus man has peculiar
properties belonging to him which distinguish him from
every other creature. In whatever object we see the
peculiar properties of its species, in high perfection, we
say that it is a beautiful object. Thus we say & beauti¬
ful man, a beautiful woman, a beautiful horse, &c.
In objects, whose beauty is derived, the chief thing
to be considered, is their fitness for answering a desira¬
ble end. Thus a plough is a beautiful object when it is
well adapted to the end for which ploughs are intended.
A ship is beautiful when it is well adapted to the use of
commerce and navigation. Any machine ia beautiful
e8
when well calculated to answer the purpose for which it
was designed.
Original and derived beauties frequently are found ip
the s^me objects! A horse may possess all the proper'
ties belonging to his species in great perfection, and at
the same time he may have the training that renders
him well fitted for the use of riding, or the draught. A
beautiful man inay have his features made spore beauti¬
ful by increase of knowledge, and the cultivation of a
sweet temper and amiable dispositions. Simplicity and
fullness as well as fitness, contribute to the boauty pf
works of art. Objects that are beautiful are without
any thing superfluous, and without deficiency. SuperJ
fluity Or a defect will always lessen the beauty of any
object. This may be considered a good criterion by
which to judge of beauty: a just description of a
beautiful object yill Cause a pleasant emotion, yetj pot
so strong as the object itself, if placed before the senses.
Beauty in composition, consists in the proper choice of
words, and their'arrangement so as to express the sense
clearly and plainly- The style should always be simple
and plain, free from bombast, and also frigidness, for the
more simple and plain the language is, it is the more
.beautiful.
The display of ingenuity, design and contrivance adds
greatly to beauty in the works of art: but in the works
of nature, the most beauty appears in the display there
made, of Gods power and wisdom in the adaptation of
the means to their respective ends, and these ends tp the
promotion of one, the ultimate, greatest and best end.
When we take into view the Globe on which we live,
and find it furnished with all things necessary for man's
temporal happiness, and ornamented With the various
beauties, which every where present themselves to our
view: When we consider the order in which she moves
round the sun in her orbit, to produce the succession of
seasons, and also her revolution around her axis, .every
twenty four hours, to produce alternately day and night;
69
that she is surrounded by a vast atmosphere for the ben¬
efit of man, and all living creatures: I say, vvbeir we
take into view all these things, we may justly; conclude
that they indicate infinite wisdom, power and goodness
in Him who. formed, preserves and governs the whole.
We shall conclude this lecture'with a few observa¬
tions, relative to the beauty of the human frame, as to
colour, form, expression and grace. If we examine from
the equator to the poles, we will find a variety of col
ourin the human species, and probably every nation thinks
its own colour the most beautiful. We may observe, that
any colour that indicates health and vigor is beautiful,
but the color that shows languor and decay is disagree-
abfe. The form of the human body is. certainly more
beautiful than the form of any other creature with
which we are acquainted. The great variety of parts,
all formed with exquisite skill, exactly filled to answer
their several ends, and adorned with an agreeable mix¬
ture of colours, contribute to make man an object most
beautiful. To the beauty of form is added an indescrib¬
able beauty of countenance called expression. The
creator has constituted the face of man so pliant and
flexible that it expresses almost all the qualities of the
mind. That countenance which expresses courage,
good sense, compassion and benevolence is beautiful; but
on the contrary, that which expresses cowardice, ignor¬
ance, selfishness- and cruelty is truly disgusting. A
beautiful countenance in females is that which expresses
modesty, sensibility and. humanity; but that which
presses wantonness, ignorance and pride is uncomely,!.
Gracefulness is a quality of motion, and contributes,
to the beauty of man. Graceful motion is that which i s
easy, smooth, unaffected and indicates composure, se¬
renity and cheerfulness of mind, prevalence or soma
amiable disposition: but an affected, awkward .jerking*
violent motion that indicates pain, vanity, pride, laziness;
or any odious temper, habit or disposition, is ungraceful
and displeasing.
70
Questions on Lecture XtX.
What is the subject of this lecture? Does beauty
please all men equally ? Do colour and form contri¬
bute to beauty 1 To render an object in art beautiful,
we must attend to what? What two remarks are
made? How i? beauty divided? What is original
beauty? Derived beauty is what? Examples. When does
an object appear to have original beauty? In objects,
whose beauty is derived, what is chiefly to be consider¬
ed? Do original and derived beauties ever meet in th#
same object ? Examples. What would be a good crite¬
rion by wliich to judge of the beauty of objects? The
beauty of composition consists in what? The display of
what adds beauty to works of art? What is said about
colour in the human species?—about the form of tjie hu¬
man body?—hhccountenance? - what expression is beau¬
tiful ?—What is disgusting? What is gracefulness 1
LECTURE XX—INSTINCT, CONCEPTION AND
IMAGINATION.
. Instinct is a blind impulse impelling to action without
a view to consequences, without deliberation, and often
without knowing what we do. Thus an infant cries by
instinct without knowing it will excite pity in its parent,
or be the: means of obtaining sustenance. The instinct
of pain causes every other creature to cry. It is by in-
blinct that any being, when pained, cries out without
consideration. Prompted by a similar impulse, infants,
and the young of all animals, suck nutriment from tlieir
mothers^ without knowing it to be necessary for the^re-
serv&tioa of life, or for the gratification of hunger. The
action of sucking is done with great facilhy. The
muscles necessary for the performance of all instinctive
actions are so constituted that they work without thought
or deliberation. An infant breathes without knowing
the vivifying quality of the air, or determining to use it
for the preservation of life.
n
In'the progress of human life, experience and obser¬
vation, teach us that there,are many actions for the per¬
formance of wftich;' volition and intention are necessary,
and, that,there are many that are to be performed so
often, and in so "quick ' succession, 'that we could not
deliberate and determine to act every time that action is
necfessarv.; In many cases we act without thought or
desire, and sometimes even contrary to volition. Thus
we continue constantly to breajhe, whether awake or
asleep, without thought, desire or attention. If we were
obliged to think every time we breathe, or to determine
to breathe every lime breath is necessary, it would be
impossible to attend to the business of life., To provide
against this inconveniency the all-wise author of our
nature, has so ordered that, in this case, as in many
others, we should act by* instinct,* and independently of
design and Volition. \ see the point of a sword, direct¬
ed to my breast; upon its approach I am immediately
impelled to start backward, though I am assured that
I am in no danger. The frequent winking of our eyes
is'necessary to preserve them in a state of soundness
and lustre. This we perform with' the greatest ease
and without any predetermination to- do it; nor can we
easily prevent ourselves from winking. If my friend
make a motion at my face with his hand, although I am
determined at first not to shut my eyes, yet at the ap¬
pearance of approaching danger instinct overcomes my
determination, and 1 am impelled to shut them instinc¬
tively.' There are many other cases in which we are
actuated exclusively by instinct. When we slip, we
lose that balance which is necessary to keep the body
upright and firm, we are immediately prompted to re¬
cover ourselves, by throwing out our hands or some
other motion ofuhe body which is necessary to restore
the equilibrium; and tf we find this impossible, we throw
out our arms to break'the fall. The actions of the in¬
ferior aginials are performed by instinct generally, but
those of men by reason. That animals come to perfec-
n
tion so soon is very remarkable. We have no reason
to believe that bees now build their' cells in a mariner
different from that in which they built them in Virgil's
time, or that they have made any great improvement in
their manner. But every work of art has had an in¬
ventor, who discovered and designed it, and constant
improvements are made in works pf art, from age to age.
That this is not the case in the works of inferior animals
is evident from experience and, observation—rfrom the
wonderful construction of the nests of many birds, the
productions of the silkworm, the webs of -spiders, and'
the unexampled skill exhibited in the combs of bees; all
these' exceed the works of any artist. It is well known
that bees construct their cells on opposite sides, fit for
holding the honey and rearing their young. There are
only three possible figures that will make cells all equal
and similar, without any variation: viz, the equilateral
triangle, the square, and the regular hexagon. Of these
three the hexagon is the most proper for convenience
and strength. The bees, as if they knew this, make their
cells regular hexagons. As the combs have cells on
both sides, the cells may be exactly opposite, with par-
tition against partition, or the bottom of the cell may
rest upon the partion between the cells on the other
side which will serve as a buttress to strengthen it. The
latter way is the best for strength. Accordingly the
bottom of each cell rests against the the point where
three partitions on the other side meet,# and give it aJi
possible strength. The bottom of the cell may be
either one plane, perpendicular to the side partitions, of
it may be composed of several planes, meeting* in a point
in the middle. It is only in one of these two ways that
all the cells can be made similar without loseing any
room. Now it has been demonstrated that by making
the-bottoms of the cells to consist of three planes meet¬
ing in a point, there is a saving of materials and labor.
The bee, as if acquainted with the principles of solid ge¬
ometry, follows this manner of construction mqst ac-
T3
eurately: the bottom consists of three planes, which
make obtuse angle's with the side partitions and with
one another, and meet in a point in the middle of the
bottom; the three angles or planes being supported by
the three partitions on the other side of the comb, and
the point by the common intersection of the partitions*
It has been a curious question, "At what precise angle
the three planes, which compose the bottom of the cell,
should meet to make the greatest saving of materials and
labor!" The solution of this question clearly shows that
the bee, in making its comb, works most geometrically
without knowing any thing of Geometry. But the
truth is, the geometry or wisdom displayed in making
its comb, is not in the bee; it works by instinct.
It is by instinct that the young of animals are prompt¬
ed to suck the dugs of their mothers, without knowing
that this is necessary for the support of life. By instinct
the infant is soothed by the smiling countenance of its
mother, and affrightneed by her angry countenance.
In man there is a kind of instinctive imitation.
Thus, if a man come into a neighborhood of people,
whose customs and dialect are different from his own,
and at first even disagreeable to him, yet, by frequent in¬
tercourse, he will adopt their dialect and many of their
customs. It is, therefore, highly important that young
people should be very careful in choosing the company
they are to keep, while their passions are strong and
they are more prone to imitation than they will be when
they shall arrive at riper age; for by keeping bad com¬
pany, they are likely to contract bad habits, that will
prove injurious both to their present and future welfare.
It is very difficult to restrain evil habits when they
have been formed, even when their injuriousness is dis¬
covered.
We come now to explain conception and imagination.
Conception is the image, notion or representation,
which the mind forms of an absent object. When m \
• F
74
friend is present, I pdrcaive him and am conscious that
I perceive him a-s being present; but when he is absent I
remember hiifi, and when I form an image • of his struc¬
ture, complexion, &c., I\ have a 'conception of him.
Memory respects what is past, , but conception is not
limited to any point of tirhe. I can remember that I
have seen Philadelphia, but I can only have a concep¬
tion of ancient Troy. Memory does not always im¬
ply; conception: for I can remember that I saw a person
twenty years-ago; but can have ho conception of his
size, shape or complexion. Nor-does conception al¬
ways impty belief of the, real existence of its object. If
any person would describe to me the structure of a
Centaur, I could conceive of such a being, yet, I firmly
believe that no such thing ever existed. Some philoso¬
phers have asserted that belief is never implied in con¬
ception; but I am led by experience to think otherwise^
When I conceive of my absent friend, I as firmly' be¬
lieve that my conception of him , is true, as that he is my
friend.
. Imagination is a complex operation, and not easy to
be understood. I shall, therefore, analyze it. I can
form an image in my mind, of a horse seven feet high,
and having wings and claws. -Here it is easy to per¬
ceive that memory, invention and conception are es¬
sentially necessary in forming- this image in my mind. I
remember that I have s'een a horse and wings and claws.
Invention joins them together and extends the image to
the 'height of seven feet. By conception I form a rep¬
resentation of the image thus composed. Imagination
)i4era% signifies the discovery of some thing before un¬
known; 1 think in imagination we are' always con¬
scious of an effort, Thus, I form in my mind the image
of the horse above mentioned. I have to call to mind
the idfea of a horse, extend him by imagination to seven
feet in height, and tlien ■ conceive of the image thug
form d It is<easy to see that imagination does not al¬
ways impiy belief; for though I can imagine such a
7$
monster as a horse with wings and claws3 yetr J do not
behevs that such an animal ever existed.
Imagination and conception have generally been used
ns synonymous terms, and it is sometimes difficult to
mark the difference between them. I think, strictly
speaking, the operation of imagination in the mind is
prior to that of conception in those, things that have no
real existence: for the image must first he formed in the
mind before we can ponceive of it. Conception has for
its objects things that do exist, either in reality, or as the
creatures of the imagination, and is a simple operation
of the mind: but imagination is a complex term that is
not applied to objects, which have real existence, but
the mind, by compounding and extending such things as
are known, forms a notion of something that has 110 real
existence-
From what has been said pn imagination,It is easy to
acount for that fearfulncss of apparitions which sy gen¬
erally prevails amongst mankind. They being accus¬
tomed in childhood, to hear frightful stories concerning
apparitions, told them with the confidence of ttuth, are
so strangely impressed that they are afraid to walk
alone in the night, though they are convinced of the
folly of such fear. Yet, by imagination, the ideas of
darkness and of danger are so associated together as to
cause us to fear.
Questions on Lecture XY.
What is the subject of this lecture? What is instinct?
Examples. What,is said of the muscles for instinctive
action ? What does experience teach ? Is instinct de¬
pendent on design and will? Examples, inferior ani¬
mals act from what? Man from what? What in
animals is remarkable? Do they improve in their
manner of working?
What is remarkable in the construction of the combs
.of bees ? Are men's wo-rks of art improved ? How do
bees, construct their eells$ Are bees acquainted with
geometry ? By what are they guided \ Could any
76
Geometrician plan the cells better ? By what are .in ¬
fants and animals guided in sucking sustenance? Does
instinctive imitation belong to -man ? How does this
appear ? Why should young people avoid bad com¬
pany?
What is conception? Examples.- Memory has re¬
spect to what? Is conception limited to any point of
time? Does memory imply conception? Example.
Does conception always imply a belief of the reality of
its object? Example. Is belief ever implied in con¬
ception? Example. What is imagination? Wh„at
operations does it include ? Examples. What are re¬
membered? Invention does what? Conception does
what? Imagination literally signifies what? Does
imagination always imply an effort?—belief ? Exam¬
ple. Whether is imagination «r conception prior in the
mind ? Why ? What is the difference between
imagination and conception? How do you account
for the common fear of apparitions ?
LECTURE XXI-r-ON THE RELATIVE STATE
OF MAN.
In the preceeding lectures we have briefly explained
the leading principles of human nature. Our researches
might have been much extended, but in a course of
Academical study, a very extended knowledge of this
or any one subject, is.not to be expected yet, it is ex¬
pected that the principles be well understood, and when
understood, the application of them is easy in the ac¬
quisition of more extensive knowledge in future re¬
searches. We now proceed to consider man in his
relative state, and point out some of the principle du¬
ties whi'qh arise put of his relations. Man in his relative
state, may be considered in three points of view: 1st.
As he is related IP God. -2nd. As related to his fellow
men, and, 3rd. Asrelated tq himself. But before ws
7f
tuny «ntcr upon tins subject, it will be necessary to an-
cw ur two important- questions. 1st. What reason have
we for believing that there is such a being as God? and,
2nd. It there bat a God what properties does he possess?
L'efote v/c answer these questions it will be necessary to
take, asgrantei, some plain truthvas first principles, viz:
1st. I take it ns granted that-I exish 2nd. That there is
a material woiId. 3rd. That there are-certain relations
between things. 4th. That no one thing can be the cause
of its own existence. 5th. That whatever begins to be,
must have a. cause. 6th. When we discover marks of
Intqlligcncc in the effect, we infer intelligence in the
cause that has produced it. The first three having been
stated before, we would not have introduced them now,
had it not been necessary in reasoning upon any subject,
to fiave in view the principles on vfhich our arguments
are founded. The fourth is, that no thing can be the
cause of itself. Now if this be not true, then a thing
may exist and not exist at the same time, and a thing
may act before it has existence, which would be an ab¬
surd supposition. The fifth is, that whatever begins to
be, must have a cause. This truth is a universal senti¬
ment of mankind. The sixth is, that whenever we dis¬
cover marks of intelligence in the effect, we infer there
must have been intelligence in its cause. Thus, if we
find, in a wilderness, a neatly constructed edifice, we
immediately conclude that some intelligent builder was
its cause, and that the'structure is not the production of
Nature, of irrational beasts, or of undesigning chance, but
of a being that had intellect and a rule to work by.
Taking the above principles as granted, which are as
plain as any propositions in Euclid, we infer that some¬
thing must have existed from eternity, or nothing could
have existed. This same thing we call the eternal and
self existelnt God. It is very difficult, if not impossible;
to conceive clearly of an eternal and self-existpnt being..
Yet, this difficulty is no argurnent against the^ belief of
mich a being: for there are many things which we do
78
believe, and cannot avoid believing, that \vc caunnt clear
]y conceive of. Every man believes tliere is a union
between soul apd body, but no one can conceive of that
union. I believe there is a self-existent being, not be¬
cause 1 can clearly conceive of him, but because I am
constrained to believe, by evidence that will not admit
a doubt, concerning the object. The Psalmjst has,
therefore, wisely said, "The fool hath said in his heart
there is no God."
We may observe that as there are some things trne, Ot
which we cannot have a clear conception; so also, wc
can have conception of some things that are not true,
or have no real existence. T can conceive of Dor
Quixotte and his Squire iSancoPansa, yet i do not be¬
lieve there were any such beings. As before observed,
there are many things wlricli we believe to be true, ot
which we can have no ejear conception, sol believe
there is one Self existent being, though I cannot com¬
prehend this being clearly. There have been man}
arguments advanced to prove the existence qf God, but
we shall mention only a few. In every Species of
beings, and in every form of matter, we have strong
proof of the being of some great first cause. When wre
contemplate the heavens above, decorated with vast
numbers of shining orbs, dispersed through unbounded
space, the sun scattering his rays in every direction, and
the earth beneath with its surface diversified with oceans,
seas, lakes, rivers, mountains, valleys, continents and is¬
lands, all composed of a few simple constituents, combin¬
ed so variously as to exhibit almost an infmiie variety of
kinds, species and individuals; all fitted for answering
innumerable subordinate ends, and alsp one great ulti¬
mate end of the whole. All exhibit works of superior
power and design in their first cause. When we take
a view of the planets revolving round the sun in order,
we see the effects of unsearchable wisdom in some be¬
ing who must have arranged, and who governs them.
This wisdom we call infinite, because we cannot set to
73
ii in} bounds When we contemplate the structure of
our own bodies and see how beautifully the several parts
aic formed, how nicely they are adjusted, and exactly
fitted for performing the several functions assigned
thorn, we are a wonder to ourselves, and we cannot
find out the depth of that wisdom-and power, that
formed us. When we contemplate the earth and wa¬
ter, filled with innumerable living creatures, all (for
Ought we know) capable of enjoying happiness, we
plainly see that nothing is made in vain; we, therefore,
conclude there must have been an intelligent great first
cause, that existed before all creatures, self-existent
from eternity, who is unbounded in goodness as well as
in wisdom and power, who gave existence to these be¬
ings. This first cause We cat! God.
We also have a book, called the Bible, which leads
us to the satne conclusion. This book contains such in¬
ternal evidence, and is accompanied with such external
also, as clearly prove thp-t its origin is not human, and
can be no other than that infinite first cause himself
whom it reveals ani teaches us to call God.
Having briefly stated a few of the reasons for believ¬
ing that there is a God, wo come now to consider what
properties he possesses. The attributes of God have
generally'been divided into two classes, Natural and
Mqral; not because either of these are separate from the
divine character, but because they are found in different
degrees in inferior beings. Thus we often find in men
great intellectual powers, joined with bad moral dispo¬
sitions, and sometimes weak intellectual powers, joined
with good moral disposition. Another reason for this
division of the divine perfection is, that the manner of
ascertaining them is different. The natural perfections
of God are inferred chiefly from the material world, but
his moral perfections mainly from the nature of man.
The natural perfections of God are,, spirituality, immen¬
sity, wisdom and power. To these might be added eter¬
nity and immutability. Wherever we find marks of in-
60
telligence in an efTecb we iufor its Cause mUst • have
been intelligent. That Dod is a sp irit is evident, because
wisdom belongs to him; and wisdom is not a property of
matter but of spirit only* It is difficult to cmlceive of a
spirit, abstract from its; operations, and no less difficult
to concede of opofatiorss. without an operator: so al¬
so it is difficult to concetvp'of matter abstract from its
properties, and of the prppertics* of hiatter as the pro¬
perties of uothjhg. Tim truth* is, wh cannot confcCrve of
any object wholly abstract finm all its properties; but
we may conceive Of objects as qualified" by their proper¬
ties. '' '
Question$ on JLcHure XXl.
What is the subject of0this lecture? Xo whom is
man eonsidordd as related ? What previous questions
must first be answered ? What must first b? taken' 'as
granted ? What is the first ?—the second?—the third?—
-the fourth?—the fifth?—4,he sixth? Wfiy .are the first
three introduced here ? What mfist .follotv if the fourffi
be not true % How does it appear that the fifth is truC ?
What example illyistrates the sixth'? Prom these prin¬
ciples what is inferred ? Is it easy to conceive of an
eternal.self-existent being? Does this difficulty 4is-
ptroveit? What else do we believe that.we canrtot
conceive clearly 1 • What constrains us to believe there
is such a being ?1 Are some thing!? true that we cannot
conceive of? Can we conceive of some things that are
not true ? Expmples. * We find .proof of a first cause in
what ? What exhibit marks of power in the first cause?
—wisdom %— intelligence and goodness, in the first
cause ? What besides the creatjon and government of
the universe, proves the being of God ? How does it
appear that the Bible is a credible witness on the sub¬
ject ? The attributes of God are divided how ? What
■reasons for this division? His natural perfections
are inferred from what? His moral from what?
What are his4natural perfections?—moral What?
What evidence have we that God is a spirit? Is it easy
81
to conceive of a spirit abstract from its operations 1—>
or of operations without an operator 1
LECTURE XXII—THE RELATIVE STATE OF
MAN CONTINUED.
Immensity is that property of the divine being by
which he is, at all times, every where present, Here a
question arises, whether space can be, with propriety,
applied to spirit ? A spirit cannot operate where it is
not. God^s operations can be circumscribed within no
smaller bounds than the utmost extent of creation,
which can only be known to himself. His presence,
therefore, must be in ail space, included within the limits
of creation- If God be an infinite spirit he may not only
fill the limits of creation with his presence, but immensi¬
ty of space unlimited. We know that created spirits
are limited in their operations. With, regard to our¬
selves, we know that our spirits are confined to our bod¬
ies while connected with them, that we are here and no
where else. Wisdom, as a property of God, is infinite
knowledge, and implies his aim at good ends, and the
knowledge of the best means for accomplishing good
efids. In all the works of creation, at least as far as
we know, the best means have been used for the accom¬
plishment of the best ends. Power is that perfection by
which God is able to fio all things that are objects of
power. Two opposites cannot both at the same time
be proper objects of power. It is no limitation of God's
power to say, that he cannot make a thing exist and ht
tile same time not exist. Power is a term of very gen*
eral signification, and is applied to every fining that
moves oris moved. When it is applied to ourselves wo
have some idea of mechanical force, because we are so
limited in our nature that we cannot move any other
body without first moving our own, and being so accus¬
tomed to use the term whqn such force is applied, wo
ss
generally affix the idea df power to the idea of mechani¬
cal force, but when the term is applied to the supreme
being, no mechanical force should be conceived to be in¬
cluded, because he is purely a spirit; and the term pow¬
er, when applied to him means nothing more than his
will, as evidently appears from, the description Moses
gives of creation's work: "And God said let there be
light and there was light." He wills the effect a,nd im¬
mediately it Comes to pass. We have something simi¬
lar to this in our constitution. We find from experience
that the choice of our minds determines the motions of
Our bodies, and as long as the volition continues, so
long the motions continue, fcdo it is with the supreme
being. lie Isas move power over all the material uni-
icrse, than we have over Our own bodies. He can
move all bodies with greater ease than we can move
our fingers.
The holiness of God is the aggregate of all his moral
perfection, and includes his justice, goodness and truth.
♦Sin, its opposite, is a general term also, which is used to,
express all moral evil.
Justice is1 a fixed and unalterable disposition in Hod
to render to all, that which is due to them, whether re¬
wards or punishments. Goodness is a disposition, to
promote happiness and show kindness.. Mercy express¬
es a modification of goodness, and is a placable dispo¬
sition in God. Goodness has foi" its object the happi¬
ness of beings that are not illdcserving and capable of
enjoying happiness. But mercy has lor its object the
happiness of beings capable of enjoying il, that are both
miserable and illdeservinm or guilty.
Truth is that perfection of the divine nature that
makes it impossible for God to lie. Falsehood amongst
creatures always arises from weakness, or from wicked¬
ness in them, but in God thorc is no weakness nor wicjt-
eduusM, consequently there can be in him no want of
veracity or integrity. Faithfulness docs not essentially
differ from truth, and is nothing moie thuu a tuiform
t3
and persevering conformity with his truth and other
attributes pledged for the accomplishment of certain
ends.
With this infinitely perfect* being man is connected
in important relation?, out of which arise certain rights,
and, obligations.
1st. Man is related to God as his Creator. Hence
God has a right to require man to submit to his will, and
man is under obligation to render to him this submission,,
for right and obligation always imply each other. Man
ha? the right to use or dispose of, at pleasure, the pro*
duct of his own industry and skill.
2nd. Man is related to God as to a benefactor. . God
has not only made man capable of enjoying happiness,
hut also has furnished him with innumerable and inesU-
timable objects of enjoyment. Whenever favors are
received, the receiver is laid under the obligation of
gratitnde to his benefactor and is bound to use tjiepi as
the will of the giver prescribes.
3d. Man is related to God as to his law-giver. It is
God's undoubted right to give la\ts for the government
■of his intelligent creatures and beneficiaries. . Hence
arises obligation resting on us to yield obedience to his
laws. It is a universal sentiment that the right to make
laws implies a correspondent obligation to obey those
laws.
4th. Man is related to God as to his Judge. Man is
so constituted by bis maker that he has a sens6 of re¬
sponsibility when he learns his duty, and feels his obli¬
gation to perform. This lays us under obligation to
study to have all our moral conduct, such as will
meet his approbation. As these relations make our
general obligation.to God sufficiently plain, we shall now
consider the duties we owe to him as they may be
summed up under two classes, first, internal, and second¬
ly, external duties.
1 st* The internal duties maybe comprehended un¬
der two heads, 1. A moral state, bias, disposition or in-
84
clination of soul, such as Adam had before the fall,
predisposing us to give the preference to right moral
conduct when discovered. 2. Right mental exercis¬
es; which may be arranged under three heads, /ovc,
fear and trust. Under love are comprehended esteem*
gratitude and every benevolent passion, which have
lor their object God as a being possessing lovely pro¬
perties. A question has been oiten raised whether "Love
to God be disinterested or selfish!" When we love in¬
ferior objects, our love may be selfish or disinterested,
or it may be mixed. When I love an object merely
for its own excellence, without any view to my own
happiness, this is disinterested love; but when I love an
object only because I see it is calculated to promote my
happiness, then my love is selfish; so when 1 esteem an
object for its amiable qualities which I perceive, and also
for its adaptedness as a means to promote my happiness,
I call this mixed love. I doubt not but the mind may be
so wholly occupied in the contemplation of God, as to
have no regard to self, but is not the mind happy in this
contemplation? If so, will it not desire the continuation
and increase of this happiness? And when it has sub¬
sided will it not seek the renewal of it, by resorting to
the contemplation of the same lovely object? It is im¬
possible for the soul of man, constituted as it is, to de¬
sire misery, or be indifferent as to misery or happiness.
Where there is no desire, there can be no gratification,
and where there is no desire, a stimulus, prompting to
action, will be wanting. God is a proper object of de¬
sire as well as of esteem; loving God, therefore, is a
gratification of that desire, and desire a motive exciting
us to pursue gratification. Fear includes those exer¬
cises that are expressed by the terms awe, reverence,
&e., which have for their object a being of infinite great¬
ness, majesty, wisdom and power, as well as purity.
That servile dread that arises out of a sense of guilt,
distrust and hatred of God, being not dutiful, is not in¬
cluded in this class. The perfect exercise of love to
85
God, casts this slavish fear out of the heart.
Trust is a continual reliance on God for all we need,
and submission to be at his disposal and ordering, with
all our interests, and implies a confidence that all things
are to be well under his management. This class has
for its object God, as a being of infinite veracity,
faithfulness, goodness, power, wisdom and immutability.
This class of exercises spring up in the mind from a
perception of its object, of God's promises, and of
I hose promises as being made to us.
2nd. Having very briefly brought to view the internal
duties we owe to God, we proceed to the consideration
of the external.
The external duties may be all summed up in few
words. They are all proper expressions of the internal
exercises, love, fear and trust. If the internal exercises
be really due to God, and if he has so constituted us
that we are capable of making the external expression
of them, this external expression also must be due to
him; and if due to him, he who is infinitely just and
faithful, cannot fail to require it of us. The external ex¬
pression of the internal sentiments, is made by prayer,
thanksgiving and praise, by keeping all God's ordinan¬
ces and obeying all his commandments.
Though we cannot render God more happy or glori¬
ous in himself, who is already infinitely happy and glo¬
rious, by our loving, fearing, trusting, and worshipping
him, yet these are duties, which ought to be performed,
because the performance is justly due to him. The
performance of them is profitable to ourselves, as the
means by which right mental exercises are cultivated,
cherished and strengthened—as the means by which
our minds may be chastened, elevated, assimilated to
the moral likeness of God, and prepared for communing
with him, and for fellowship with holy beings.
Questions on Lecture XXII.
What is God's immensity?—his wisdom? Wisdom
G
86
always implies what ? Can two opposites be both pro¬
per objects of power at the same time? When power
is applied to ourselves, what idea is always included
in the term? When applied to God should the idea of
mechanical force be included ? Why ? What does
the term mean when applied to God ? Examples. What
in our constitution resembles this? Has God more
power over the universe, than we over our bodies '
What is the holiness of God?—his goodness?—mercy ?
What has goodness for its object?—mercy for its?
Truth is what? Falsehood always arises from what ?
What is faithfulness? Eights and obligations arise out
of what? In what relations is man connected with
God ? What rights of God arise out of these relations?
What obligations on men rise out of them? The duties
we owe God are of what two classes ? The internal
comprehend what? What do you mean by aright
moral state? How may right mental exercises "be
classed? Love comprehends what ? What its proper
object? What properties may love for inferior objects
have? When is it disinterested? When selfish?
When mixed? Examples. When is our love to God
disinterested ? Are we interested in loving God ? Is a
desire of happiness constitutional in man ? Can there
be gratification when there is no desire? What prompts
men to the contemplation of lovely objects? Fear in¬
cludes what ? What are their proper objects i What
is excluded from this class? Why? Trust is what?
Trust implies what ? They have for their proper ob¬
jects what? They rise in the mind from what ? The
external duties we owe to God may be summed how?
How does it appear that this external expression is due
to God from us? How is the expression to be made ?
Is the expression to benefit God ? Why should it be
practised ? How may it be beneficial to ourselves ?
LECTURE XXIII—ON CONSCIENCE.
The soul, mind or spirit of man is a living, thinking,
active, immaterial being, endued by its creator with sus¬
ceptibilities and capacities, which render it a fit subject
of moral government. The soul is so constituted that it
is susceptible ot knowledge, and also of emotions or im¬
pressions corresponding with its knowledge. The soul
is endued with a capacity for comparing known objects
and for discovering a difference between virtue and
vice, right and wrong, good and evil, when presented
to its view—a capacity for feeling obligation, to obey a
moral ruler, when he and his rightto rule, and his will are
known—a capacity for knowing by immediate percep¬
tion of its own exercises and acts when its attention is di¬
rected to them—a capacity for feeling pleasure when its
own acts are perceived to accord with the laws-'"pre¬
viously known, and remorse and horror, when they are
seen, to be contrary it. The soul is also endued with a
capacity for choosing and refusing"objects, and for ex¬
ercising agency according to its own determinations.
These susceptibilities, capacities and faculties, are con¬
stitutional principles, with which the human soul is in¬
dued by its creator. They belong to its nature and are
innate, and not acquired. Having these constitutional
principles, man is a moral being and a fit subject for
moral government. As soon as the knowledge of his
obligation to obey his ruler, and of the will of his ruler,
as a rule of conduct, is acquired, he has a sense or
feeling of obligation to obey, res'ing on him. Idiots and
inferior animals, not being indued with these constitution¬
al principles, are not moral beings and are not respon¬
sible to God as a moral governor; but we, who have
thern are responsible, and conscious of a sense of our
responsibility to God for our exercise of moral agency.
What is conscience? various are the senses in which
the term has been used, and different lexicographers
have given various definitions of it. From this circum¬
stance, the most, if not all the disputes on this subject
have no doubt arisen, whilst the disputants have not dif¬
fered so much in their views of the comprehension of the
88
term. The term "conscience is a Latin participle trans¬
ferred to the English language and is used by us as a
noun, being changed only in its last syllable. Consciens,
in latin, is composed of two words, con, which signifies
together, or in connection with, and sciens, which means
exactly what we express by the word knowing. Some
have used the term as the name of a distinct innate fa¬
culty of mind; some as the name of some emenation
from God, infused into the mind to guide man to the
knowledge of his duty; and others, as a name given only
to that sense of guilt, remorse and horror which the
guilty feel, or that pleasure which follows virtuous ac¬
tion. Regardless of these and other senses in which in
dividuals have used, the term. I would define it agree¬
ably to its original meaning and the sense in which it is
used in the Bible. '
Conscience is the mind viewing its own acts in rela¬
tion to a moral rule previously known and felt to be
binding, and deciding or judging those acts to be agree¬
able to that rule.
The mind becomes acquainted with its own acts only
by consciousness or immediate perception.—Its capacity
for being conscious or immediately perceiving its'own
acts, its capacity for comparing them with the law, and
deciding on their moral character, and its capacity for
knowing the law and for feeling obligation to obey it,
are all natural or innate capacities in man. These ca¬
pacities may be improved but are never acquired. But
the knowledge of our actions,-of what the law requires
and forbids, and of our obligation to obey, and also the
judgment we pass on our- own acts in the exercise of
those innate capacities, are not innate but acquired.
We obtain certain knowledge of our own acts by
consciousness whenever the attention is turned to them.
But the knowledge of God's law, we can acquire only by
the instrumentality of our bodily senses, exercised in
learning it as revealed by the Bible, and by his works of
creation and providence, and by our reasonable facul-
89
ties exercised in view of this revelation- Conscience,
then, is the exercise of the human mind, and a result in¬
separable, both from innate capacities and from acquired
knowledge and feeling of obligation. All we know of
Cod, or of his law, or of our obligation we have acquired
from the manifestation which he has made of himself,
his law and our obligation, and from our perception of
what lie has manifested. Conscience is therefore, not
one simple operation of the mind only, but a combina¬
tion of many operations. An example will make this
plain.
I swear profanely. Conscience condemns me as
cniUv, as a consequence of mv swearing profanely.
This judgment of my mind that I am guilty, implies a
knowledge that the deed is done and a consciousness
that I myself have done it; it implies that I know a law
which forbids profane swearing as a crime. I must
know also that that law was binding on me and required
me not to do that deed.—It also implies a comparison of
what I have done with my obligation to do otherwise,
and a consequent perception of my act as contrary to
my obligation.—Ilence follows the decision or judgment
that I am guilty of violating my obligation to''obey the
law, and that I now deserve punishment. All. these
operations of mind are included in what we call con¬
science and each one is essential, to it. They are all the
consequence.of the mind's attention being directed to
the act, the law, &c., and the effects of truth brought to
bear upon the mind, and are the mind operating accord-
in^ to those constitutional capacities with which it is
endued by its Creator.
The infant of a day having not the knowledge of law
eft-of obligation to law, and having no opportunity for
receiving the knowledge of law or a sense of obligation,
for wanf of the developement and exercise of its innate
capacities, cannot either approve or disapprove of its
ov/n actions. Here there is no law and can be no
transgression. The heathen whose capacities are de-
i>0
veloped and exercised, are a law, unto themselves, ha\-
in.g the law written on their minds. Their conscience
accusing or excusing is proof of this. Their mental
operations being more or less under the law of their
own rational and moral nature, they cannot but perceive
evidence of the existence of a Supreme Being exhibited
by the light of nature. The heavens declare the glory
of God and the firmament showeth his handy work.
From this light of nature they learn that there is a dif¬
ference between pleasure and pain, between right and
wrong, truth and falsehood, obligation and independence,
relative to some moral rule. Hence they have their
idols and their forms of idolatrous worship. They have
their national laws, by which they encourage the prac¬
tice of many virtues, such as truth, fidelity, justice, &c.,
amongst themselves, and punish and suppress many
vices such as crimes, frauds, impiety towards their
gods, &c. Having the light of nature thus to teach
them correctly corcerning God and the relations they, as
his creatures and beneficiaries, sustain to him, and con¬
sequently their obligation to him, and having their un¬
derstanding more or less exercised in learning these in¬
structions, and their agency exercised in conformity or
opposition to these instructions, they are prepared for
the exercise of conscience and for feeling pleasure or
pain from a view of their actions as being right or
wrong.
The possession of constitutional capacities for obeying
God's law alone, does not constitute a ground of obli¬
gation to obeV, without the opportunity for knowing the
law and obligation to it, more than the publication of the
law and its obligation 011 men alone, would bind men to
qbedience if they were destitute of the constitutional ca¬
pacities. Both the capacities and the publication are
r.necessar.y to lay a ground of obligation. Tho heathen
have both, and having both, this constitutes a ground of
obligation to obey the law as far as it is revealed. Con¬
scious of having the capacity and of the perception of
01
the law as revealed by the light of, Nature, they have.a
sense, of obligation to obey. Hence they are. a law unto
themselves, and their minds approve or condemn their
conduct accordingly^ These constitutional capacities,
the knowledge of duty and a turn,of mind, inclination or
dispositionito obey, constitute ability or power.
• Though these,capacities and this knowledge lay the
grO.und of obligation, yet they do not constitute power to
obey it without the disposition, more than the disposi¬
tion would constitute power without the capacities or
knowledge. They are all three essential constituents of
power. . ■ . ,
A man may have a general disposition to obey God.
This may give rise to a particular disposition for the
performance of a particular part of his duty, but fail to
excite a disposition essential to the performance, of an¬
other part of duty. This failure must be a consequence
of a'misconception of the duty, or the counter influence
of some vicious appetite, desire, habit or particular dis¬
inclination. The constitutional capacity, and opportuni¬
ty to know duty, then, and not power to perform it, lay
the ground of man's obligation. ' . ■
His having power, which includes a disposition to do
duty, would excuse, a failure to perform it, whilst the
want of a disposition leaves him without excuse at the
bar of God or of his own mind. When civil law is en¬
acted and published, every man .is considered as under
obligation to obey it, because he has the constitutional
capacity for knowing and obeying it, and also oppor¬
tunity to know his duly; his disposition to obey or dis¬
obey does not affect his obligation. The man who is
disposed to pay his debts is neither more nor less bound
to do so, than the man who is not disposed, God's law
requires menfo love him,Who is infinite lovely, with
supreme affection. The law is published, supreme ex¬
cellence is exhibited, the man who loves him supremely
is no more bound to love him than he who hates him.
Inclination or moral state ©f mind in man oanndt alter
his obligation nor the operations of concience. If it could,
then the deliberate murderer ough: not to be punished,
and the more he is inclined to cothmit murder he would
be the less guilty; but the opposite of this is trhe. The
more a man is inclined to hate God and practice nil
manner of wickedness, when he reflects upon his incli¬
nations and obligation and seek the contrast between
them, he is the more sensible of guilt, Ilence a man in
the world of ruin, when he can never forget the obliga¬
tion he has been under to obey God, nor forget that an
evil inclination led him to disobey, will ever reproach
and condemn himself as guilty and deserving of pun¬
ishment. The feeling of remorse, terror and Jiorrnr
cannot be prevented nor suppressed by the present evil
disposition nor the will. As loner as the unfailing mem¬
ory will retain the knowledge of guilt, as the attention
which can never cease, will be directed to it, so long
will the operations of conscience inevitably continue and
the consequent torment be perpetual
Conscience has been called the voice cf God, a mon¬
itor for God, and God's vicegerent, iri the human breast!
It is such when the mind is sufficiently enlightened and
its decisions .accord with his revealed laws.
The question "Whether conscience is natural and in¬
nate, or acquired and the effect of education?" has been
often controverted with zeal and devotion.—We con¬
sider this question as both very improper and absurd,
because opposite answers may be given to it, which are
both true. If we say conscience is natural and innate,
because the constitutional capacities, essential to con¬
science, are natural and innate; this is undoubtedly true,
If we say that conscience is acquired and the effect of
education, because the knowledge of law, the feeling of
obligation, and the decision of the mind, which are es¬
sential to conscience, are acquired and the effect# of
education; this is equally true. Again, if we say that
conscience is not natural, or innate, because the knowl¬
edge of law, obligation, &c., essential to conscience, are
93
not natural or innate, but acqu'red; this is. true. If we
say conscience is not acquired nor the effect of education,
because the constitutional capacities, essential to con¬
science, though they may he improved, are not acquired
nor the effects of education; this also is true,
t Those who consider the term, conscience, as compre¬
hending the constitutional capacities only, which are es¬
sential to conscience, would consistently with this view,
contend for the proposition, that conscience is natural
and innate. Those who consider it as embracing only
the exercise of these capacities and the knowledge,
which are essential to conscience, would with equal con¬
sistency, advocate the proposition'that conscience is ac¬
quired. Each has correct views of that part of the sub¬
ject embraced by his definition of the term; but both are
wrong in excluding from the meaning of the term, an
essential part of its meaning. Conscience is the mind
exercising its natural or innate capacities in viewing its
own actions as they are related to a moral rule previous¬
ly known and felt to be binding, and deciding or. judging
that those actions are agreeable or disagreeable to that
rule.
AN ESSAY OUT LIFE.
Life is not a being, but a state of being, in something
which exists. Its opposite is death. Both life and deal];
are alike predicated on the same being, which at one
time is alive, and at another time is dead. Mind can
exist only, in the living state, but, matter, organised or
unorganised, may exist as matter in either state. There
are different kinds of life belonging to different orders
of living beings. Thegreat "I am," the only living God,
possesses life which is underived, necessary, indepen¬
dent, immutable and eternal. Created minds possess
another kind oflife, which is essential to their existence
as minds. Man, who.is the connecting link between the
material and immaterial worlds, has, superadded to the
life last mentioned, a life which he enjoys.in common
witli other animals. This is denominated animal life.
When we descend still lower to the vegetable kingdom,
we perceive the phenomena of another, and inferior
kind of life, which is denominated vegetable life.
In those different states of living beings, we discern
a regular gradation, so that each inferior state evidently
approximates to that which is next in order above it;
which all agree in exhibiting, but in different ways, the
phenomena of life.
Our ideas of life are' originally derived from con¬
sciousness. I am conscious of the operations of my
own mind, of the reality of my existence as a person—
that I have a body, and that this body is alive. These
propositions need no proof, because they are sell-evi¬
dent, nor do they admit of proof because there are no
principles more evident, from which their truth could
be deduced in a process of reasoning. My belief, there¬
fore, of my existence as a living and animated beipg,
simply rests on the testimony of consciousness.- But I
am not conscious of the mental operations or animated
■existence of other beings; consequently, my belief of
their existence as minds, or as animals, or as living sub¬
stances depends on another kind of evidence, either the
testimony of other persons, or my own perception of
certain phenomena of life, which they exhibit. This
kind ol evidence, however, could not produce in
our minds a belief that such beings do exist in the living
state, had not we, previously derived some ideas ofiife
from our own consciousness. If, then, our ideas ofiife
are primarily derived from consciousness, the best mode
of correcting any false ideas we may acquire on this
subject will be, to analyze the operations of our own
minds in relation to life, arid view them accurately in
detail. .
As different kinds of life, exhibiting different phenom¬
ena, exist in man, he is evidently formed for having
intercourse with other grades of living beings, both su¬
perior and inferior to himself. No general definition of
life can be given,that will apply to any two different
kinds of life, because each kind, in some respects es¬
sentially differs from every other kind.
I know not that we ever have a direct and intuitive
knowledge of life itself, aside from the phenomena it
exhibits. We know that inert matter, whether in a
moving or quiescent state, is always in a state of mo¬
bility; but this knowledge is derived not from an intui¬
tive perception of this state of matter, but from the phe¬
nomena exhibited by it in the state of motion. So our
consciousness ofiife results from our attention to some
of the phenomena of the mind and of the body in a liv¬
ing state. We are apt to err on the subject of life, from
considering it as a being having real existence, or as the
quality of an existing subject. It is not a being, and
therefore does not possess any one of all the properties of
mind or matter. It is not a quality, because when ab¬
stracted, the subject to which it belonged remains es¬
sentially the same. The soul and body of man dis¬
united undergo a change of state, yet retain their pri¬
mary qualities.
96
Another source of error is the confoundingof life
itself, with the phenomena and evidence of life from
which it ought to be distinguished. Life is that state in
which the living being, under favorable circumstances,
will exhibit the various phenomena of life, which cor¬
respond with such a state; and the phenomena, when
perceived, are to us so many evidences that the being,
in which they are exhibited, is in a living state. But the
same being in the opposite state, or when dead, ceases
to exhibit, when under the same circumstances, every
one of these phenomena.
There are various different states in which living
matter may exist. If we trace an animal from its ex¬
istence in embryo to its state of maturity, and from ma¬
turity to the verge of declining life, at every step we are
met by a succession of changes. We see it motionless,
and again in active excitement—asleep and presently
awake—conjealed with chilling frosts, and afterwards
resisting cold with all the energies of vitality—in a
death-like torpor, with every sense completely locked
and every power dormant, then, after weeks and months
have past them in this state of insensibility, again re¬
newing every animal and vital function, and exhibiting
all the phenomena of perfect life.
Life may be truly predicated of a being though, some
of its members be destroyed, and some of its functions
ceased to be performed. We know not how far the
work of destruction may possibly extend, and yet vi¬
tality be still preserved. This, however, is certain.
An animal may still be alive after many of its limbs
have been amputated, and after the the process of putri-
faction has widely spread its ravages. Perhaps the
general decomposition of the body is the only infalible
indication of extinguished life.
Life is prior to all the phenomena peculiar to the living
state. It is vitality co-operating, with the appropriate
stimuli by wnich all these phenomena are produced.
When a change of state, from life to death, has occur-
97
«d, the same stimuli, operating on the same organized
substance, prove inadequate to the production of any
one of all the phenomena of life, but, a series of af¬
finities which denote the absence of life is the only re¬
sult.
It appears to be a dictate of common sense, that all
the phenomena peculiar to the living state, depend as
well on the preexistence of life itself, as on the influence
of stimuli. For this reason most of the phenomena ap¬
parent in animated beings, are commonly expressed by
verbs indifferently used, either in the active or passive
voice. Such language is so common and-familiar, that
we often use it in a vague or figurative manner, to ex¬
press the motions of dead matter, especially those which
bear some resemblance to the phenomena of life.
From the view I have taken of this subject, I am lead
to reject all the theories of life, which are founded on
the suppositions that life is a substance, either material
or spiritual—that it is a primary quality of a substance
—or that it is the same with irritability, excitability or
a susceptibility of impressions from stimuli; and to adopt
the conclusion, that life is simply a state of being,
which state is coeval with the existence ofits living sub¬
ject, and in which the living being, under the influence of
appropriate exciting powers, will exhibit those phenome¬
na, which are objects of its original destination. In
consistency with this conclusion, I consider the terms
health and disease, watchfulness and sleep, excitement
and torpor as expressing so many modifications or
changes of the living state, which are attended with
different phenomena, but are not inconsistent with vi¬
tality; and the term death, as expressing that final
change of the vital state, which is incompatible with
life and all its functions.
The second inquiry is: What are the distinguishing
phenomena of mental, animal and vegetable life 1
To find a satisfactory solution of this question, it will
H
08
be necessary to take a- general view, at least of the
most prominent phenomena of the three kinds of life
mentioned. Examples of the two first we find in man,
and of the last in the vegetable kingdom.
Man is a compound being, composed of substances
whose natures and qualities are essentially different.
That mind and matter are combined in the constitution-
of man, has been the common sentiment of mankind in
all ages and all nations. It would be strange indeed, if
not wholly incredible, that a belief so common and uni¬
versal, should have no foundation in truth. But this
belief, while it accords with reason, is yet independent
of it, and rests on the testimony of consciousness. Man,
in the present state of his existence, is conscious that he
possesses a body. He betrays this consciousness, when
he resists or evades the operation of such physical caus¬
es as threaten to make an unfavorable impression upon
it. He is equally conscious of the existence of a think¬
ing principle. This thinking principle possesses proper¬
ties inconsistent with, and dissimilar to all the known
properties of the body. It can travel, if I may use the
figurative expression, from world to world without mo¬
tion and without change of position. Can this be truly-
predicated of any material substance?
The distinguishing phenomena of mental life, are the
various exercises of the understanding, the affections'
and the will. Where one of these faculties exists, and
wherever one of these phenomena is exhibited, there, the
presence of a living and immaterial substance is infalk-
bJy indicated.
The following statement will give a concise and gen¬
eral view of the phenomena of animal life. An animal,
that it may continue to live, "must have the free use of
air, as applied by the organs of respiration. In order
to grow, it must have likewise food, which is a sub¬
stance somehow adapted to its constitution; and which,.
on being received into the system, is prepared by di¬
gestion—taken up by absorption—distributed by ciixula-
99
tion-—assimilated by nutrition. And the whole carried
dn by means of secretion.
We again may perceive that" the functions are all
dependent on a general principle—irritability. By
which the system is rendered by stimulants susceptible
of motion—accommodates itself to different circum¬
stances by means of habit—alters its shape by succes¬
sive transformation—produces the species by generation,
and when the business of life is finished, is after many a
languid affection, sleep. It is at last subjected to the
fate of all living bodies, death."—Dobsons Encyclopedia.
To the above statement we may add, that animated
bodies have the property of preserving a temperature,
■either above or below, as necessity may require, the
surrounding medium in which they may happen to be
placed, and of resisting the operation of other physical
causes, which, if operating on the same bodies when
devoid of life, would infallibly produce decomposition
and putrifaction.
These phenomena, however, when collectively viewed,
^an constitute a very obscure line of distinction between
the animal and . vegetable kingdoms. Most of them
exist in greater perfection in animals; yet, something
very nearly allied to each is perceptible in plants. Were
we hereto terminate our views of the animal economy,
we would be strongly tempted to consider animals and
vegetables, as only different species of one common
genus.
But extending our views a little farther, we discern
the phenomena of sensation and voluntary motion, which
are true characteristics of animals. Now if the vis
entrtice, or inactivity of matter, which universally is ac¬
counted one of its essential properties, be no philosophi¬
cal illusion, it then follows that something more than
matter enters into the composition of every animal,
which makes it capable of feeling pleasure or pain, and
of voluntary, action under the influence of its perceptions,
emotions and propensities.
100
Let us now inquire for the distinguishing phenomena
of vegetable life. Vegetables devoid of sensation and
voluntary motion, by these phenomena are distinguished
from animals. By theiporganization, their growth from
secretion and assimilation, their powerful resistanceof
the operation of physical causes, while they continue in
the living state, and by the various and peculiar phe¬
nomena, which are common to animals and vegetables,
a conspicuous line of discrimination, is drawn between
the vegetable and animal kingdoms.
O ©
One question more still remains to be considered.
What is the efficient cause of life?
The living state of mind or body is universally viewed
as being.an effect, and must, therefore, be attributed to
some cause either real or imaginary. It will tend to
facilitate and render more conspicuous our views of
this subject, to mark well the distinction that has been
made and which evidently exists in nature, between life
itself and all its variegated phenomena. Without keep¬
ing in view this distinction, our ideas must necessarily
be indistinct and confused. This being premised, I am
ready to state and to defend the following proposition.
That the life of an> created being is an effect produced
by the omnipotent will of the Creator.
In the production of this and similar effects, he is
pleased to employ his almighty energy agreeably to
certain prescribed laws; and with a view to the free
agency and general happiness of rational creatures, to
bring into operation a variety of secondary causes.
These laws are not agents, yet their existence is neces¬
sary to render the free agency of finite intelligences a
real blessing, instead of the greatest misfortune; and
these secondary causes, although they have an agency,
yet their efficiency is dependent on the operation of the
first and only efficient cause. It is, therefore, truly said,
that in God "We live, move and have our being." At no
period since the formation of the material world has one
particle of matter been endued with animations or put in
101
motion without the positive agency of mind. If we as¬
sert that inactivity is an essential property of matter,
and that any body has an inherent property of moving
itself or communicating motion to other bodies, inde°
pendent of the agency of mind, the assertion will con¬
tain an irreconcilable contradiction. If, then, we admit
what never can be disproved, that inactivity is essential,
it will then follow that neither organization nor chymi-
cal combinations, can impart life and motion to a dead
body. It is in vain to object that material substances,
devoid of organization and life, obedient to the laws of
attraction and affinity, undoubtedly present the most ac¬
tive phenomena. These phenomena are certainly pro¬
duced agreeably to prescribed laws, the knowledge of
which will enable us to predict with certainty future
results; but these laws are not active properties of mat¬
ter, nor arc they agents by which the visible effects are
produced. These effects depend on the operation of a
cause exterior to matter. Were that cause withdrawn,
second causes would cease to operate and subsequent
action be suspended.
Is life, then, "a forced state?"
If, by this ambiguous expression, we mean only that
life is an effect produced by an adequate cause, we an¬
swer in the affirmative. But if the intention is to assert
that life is an effect produced by stimulants, and not a
premordial state, we deny the truth of the assertion.
What are these mighty stimulants, that a power not
inferior to omnipotence should be ascribed to them?
At the head of the long list of these life-giving substan¬
ces, stands the atmospheric air. This is denominated
"the air of lives" and therefore "must needs" be the
author of life. But in vain had the lungs of Adam,
when newly formed, been inflated with this air, had not
life been superadded by his Creator, to carry on the
process of respiration. This and other stimulants co¬
operate with life and are essential to the' production of
the various phenomena apparent in animated beings.-
102
but to believe that, a dead substance operating on a dead
substance, can generate life itself, requires more cre¬
dulity than I am able to exercise.
In a case of asphixia, or suspended animation, the
judicious application of air, and other stimulants concur-
ing in their operation with the remaining life, may pro¬
duce the phenomena, and evidences of life, which could
not be produced by all their united energies of life it¬
self were extinguished. The phenomena of life are,
therefore, produced by the united energies of pre-existing
life and appropriate exciting powers: but life itself is
the effect of a different cause.
With a view to establish an opposite doctrine, a few
passages from the Old and New Testaments, have been
quoted by one who confessedly shines in the medical
firmament, like a star of the first magnitude. " And the
Lord God for med man of the dust of the ground, and
breathed into his nostrils the breath of life (as the air of
lives) and man became a living soul." From this it is
inferred "that the air, by exciting respiration, gave the
first impulse of the life to the mind, and body of Adam."
But the language of the text is evidently figurative, and
it is not necessary that figurative language should be
literally true, or true if misunderstood in a literal sense.
Air being essential to the phenomena of animal life, it is
proper, therefore, to employ the terms, air and breath,
figuratively to express that divine agency on which the
existence and preservation of life depended.
The same author remarks on another passage, that
"the dry bones seen by Ezekiel, in a vision, when brought
together, were devoid of life until the winds were in¬
voked to inflate their lungs with air. Immediately af¬
terwards they became living and intelligent beings."
But in vain had the phophet expected the reanimation of
the dry bones if only the breath of the four winds had
been the real object of his invocation. Is it necessary
that figurative.language, taken literally be true ?. It is
spoken in figurative, "Thus saith the Lord God unto
1.03
these, bodies, behold I will cause breath to enter into you
and ye shall live." But when the figure is dropped and
the meaning1 expressed literally it is said, "And shall put
my Spirit in you, and ye shall live." Believing it to be
unnecessary, I forbear to offer any remarks on the sin¬
gular interpretation which has been given to other pas¬
sages. ■
The strange hypothesis is "That mind itself and its
various operations are the production of material stimu¬
li, subversive of the regular order ofvNature, equally re¬
pugnant to divine revelation and common sense, and
resting, only on the reasoning basis of bold conjectures:,
it cannot merit a serious refutation.
Questions on'the-Essay.
What is Life? What is its opposite? Is life essen¬
tial to the existence of.spirit? How many kinds of life
are there? What are they? How manyyki'nds has
man? Do all exhibit the same phenomena of life?
From what are our ideas of life originally derived?
How? What is a source of error on this subject? Why
is life not.a being-nor a quality of a being? What is
another source of error? How will you define life?
What are the evidences of life? May living matter be
in different states? Examples. Is life prior to its phe¬
nomena? What will produce the phenomena of fife?
Will stimulants produce them if life be wanting? What
is a dictate of common sense on this subject? How
does this appear? What is the second inquiry? What
is necessary to a solution of this question? Examples of
the two first are found where? Man is composed of
what? Are mind and matter combined in man? What
evidence of this? Are the properties of mind and of
body essentially different ? What are properties of
each? The distinguishing phenomena of mental life are
what?—of animal life are what? What distinguish animal
and vegetable life from one another? What other phe¬
nomena distinguish vegetables? v.
What other question is to be considered? I,s the liv^
lOi
Ing state an effect of an adequate cau.se? It. there a
real distinction between life and its phenomena? What
proposition is stated? Agreeably to what does the
Creator exert his energy? Are "these laws agents, or
what are they? Has matter ever been endued with an¬
imation, or put in motion without the energy of the
mind? Will organization give life? Will chvmieal
combinations impart life to dead bodies? Are chymi-
cal affinities prime agents or only secondary causes of
their effects?
What is another inquiry? Is life a forced state? Is
it ihe effect of an adequate cause? Are stimulants an
adequate Cause? Will atfnospherio air give life to a
dead body? Will stimulants, co-onerating with vitality,
produce the phenomena of fife? What is a strange hy¬
pothesis of sbme materialists? This hypothesis is sub¬
versive of \vt*at?-—repugnant^ to what? It rests on what?
ERRATA,
On page 22 Kne II, read impereouf for dangerous.
" 69 " 34, " andtfie be&re prevalence, and of
for on.
On page 88 line 20, read after agreeable or disagreeable
to that rule.
On page 9*1 line 34, read infinitely for in^nite-
RECOMMENDATIONS.
I have examined "Lectures on Human Nature," by
Rev. Samuel Doak, D. D., with th'e Es,say on Life at¬
tached, and believe it to be a'"$vork well suited to the
different schools oflearning, and convenient for the pur¬
poses of instruction: indeed, in the course of my studies
while at Washington College, those Lectures (in manu¬
script) Were put into my han4s by the Rev. Samuel
DoaL, and I then entertained the opinion that they were
well adapted to the proper training of the mind, and a
useful-Jbranch of science. I still entertain the same opin¬
ion.
JOHN BLAIR,
I fully confeur in the above statement of the Hon,
John Blair,
DANIELKENNEY.